{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_53679/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_53679","id":"gutenberg_53679","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/53679","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Essays, Letters & Speeches","Category: History - Early Modern (c. 1450-1750)","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Newcastle, William Cavendish, Duke of, 1592-1676","Philosophy","Women in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics"],"text":"Philosophical Letters:\n\nOR,\n\nMODEST REFLECTIONS\nUpon some Opinions in\n_NATURAL PHILOSOPHY_,\nMAINTAINED\nBy several Famous and Learned Authors of this Age,\nExpressed by way of LETTERS:\n\nBy the Thrice Noble, Illustrious, and Excellent Princess,\nThe Lady MARCHIONESS of _NEWCASTLE_.\n\n_LONDON_, Printed in the Year, 1664.\n\n\n\n\nTO HER EXCELLENCY\nThe Lady Marchioness of NEWCASTLE\nOn her Book of Philosophical Letters.\n\n\n  _'Tis Supernatural, nay 'tis Divine,\n  To write whole Volumes ere I can a line.\n  I 'mplor'd the Lady Muses, those fine things,\n  But they have broken all their Fidle-strings\n  And cannot help me; Nay, then I did try\n  Their_ Helicon, _but that is grown all dry:_\n  _Then on_ Parnassus _I did make a sallie,\n  But that's laid level, like a Bowling-alley;\n  Invok'd my Muse, found it a Pond, a Dream,\n  To your eternal Spring, and running Stream;\n  So clear and fresh, with Wit and Phansie store,\n  As then despair did bid me write no more._\n\n                              W. Newcastle.\n\n\n\n\nTO HIS EXCELLENCY\nThe Lord Marquis of NEWCASTLE.\n\n\nMy Noble Lord,\n\nAlthough you have, always encouraged me in my harmless pastime of\nWriting, yet was I afraid that your Lordship would be angry with\nme for Writing and Publishing this Book, by reason it is a Book\nof Controversies, of which I have heard your Lordship say, That\nControversies and Disputations make Enemies of Friends, and that such\nDisputations and Controversies as these, are a pedantical kind of\nquarrelling, not becoming Noble Persons. But your Lordship will be\npleased to consider in my behalf, that it is impossible for one Person\nto be of every one's Opinion, if their opinions be different, and that\nmy Opinions in Philosophy, being new, and never thought of, at least\nnot divulged by any, but my self, are quite different from others: For\nthe Ground of my Opinions is, that there is not onely a Sensitive, but\nalso a Rational Life and Knowledge, and so a double Perception in all\nCreatures: And thus my opinions being new, are not so easily understood\nas those, that take up several pieces of old opinions, of which\nthey patch up a new Philosophy, (if new may be made of old things,)\nlike a Suit made up of old Stuff bought at the Brokers: Wherefore to\nfind out a Truth, at least a Probability in Natural Philosophy by a\nnew and different way from other Writers, and to make this way more\nknown, easie and intelligible, I was in a manner forced to write this\nBook; for I have not contradicted those Authors in any thing, but\nwhat concerns and is opposite to my opinions; neither do I anything,\nbut what they have done themselves, as being common amongst them to\ncontradict each other: which may as well be allowable, as for Lawyers\nto plead at the Barr in opposite Causes. For as Lawyers are not Enemies\nto each other, but great Friends, all agreeing from the Barr, although\nnot at the Barr: so it is with Philosophers, who make their Opinions\nas their Clients, not for Wealth, but for Fame, and therefore have no\nreason to become Enemies to each other, by being Industrious in their\nProfession. All which considered, was the cause of Publishing this\nBook; wherein although I dissent from their opinions, yet doth not this\ntake off the least of the respect and esteem I have of their Merits\nand Works. But if your Lordship do but pardon me, I care not if I be\ncondemned by others; for your Favour is more then the World to me, for\nwhich all the actions of my Life shall be devoted and ready to serve\nyou, as becomes,\n\nMy Lord,\n\n_Your Lordships_\n\n_honest Wife, and humble Servant_,\n\nM. N.\n\n\n\n\nTO THE MOST FAMOUS UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE.\n\n\nMost Noble, Ingenious, Learned, and Industrious Students.\n\n_Be not offended, that I dedicate to you this weak and infirm work of\nmine; for though it be not an offering worthy your acceptance, yet it\nis as much as I can present for this time; and I wish from my Soul, I\nmight be so happy as to have some means or ways to express my Gratitude\nfor your Magnificent favours to me, having done me more honour then\never I could expect, or give sufficient thanks for: But your Generosity\nis above all Gratitude, and your Favours above all Merit, like as your\nLearning is above Contradiction: And I pray God your University may\nflourish to the end of the World, for the Service of the Church, the\nTruth of Religion, the Salvation of Souls, the instruction of Youth,\nthe preservation of Health, and prolonging of Life, and for the\nincrease of profitable Arts and Sciences: so as your several studies\nmay be, like several Magistrates, united for the good and benefit of\nthe whole Common-wealth, nay, the whole World. May Heaven prosper you,\nthe World magnifie you, and Eternity record your same; Which are the\nhearty wishes and prayers of,_\n\nYour most obliged Servant\n\n_M. NEWCASTLE._\n\n\n\n\nA PREFACE TO THE READER.\n\n\n_Worthy Readers_,\n\nI did not write this Book out of delight, love or humour to\ncontradiction; for I would rather praise, then contradict any Person\nor Persons that are ingenious; but by reason Opinion is free, and may\npass without a pass-port, I took the liberty to declare my own opinions\nas other Philosophers do, and to that purpose I have here set down\nseveral famous and learned Authors opinions, and my answers to them in\nthe form of Letters, which was the easiest way for me to write; and by\nso doing, I have done that, which I would have done unto me; for I am\nas willing to have my opinions contradicted, as I do contradict others:\nfor I love Reason so well, that whosoever can bring most rational\nand probable arguments, shall have my vote, although against my own\nopinion. But you may say, If contradictions were frequent, there would\nbe no agreement amongst Mankind. I answer; it is very true: Wherefore\nContradictions are better in general Books, then in particular\nFamilies, and in Schools better then in Publick States, and better in\nPhilosophy then in Divinity. All which considered, I shun, as much as I\ncan, not to discourse or write of either Church or State. But I desire\nso much favour, or rather Justice of you, _Worthy Readers_, as not to\ninterpret my objections or answers any other ways then against several\nopinions in Philosophy; for I am confident there is not any body, that\ndoth esteem, respect and honour learned and ingenious Persons more then\nI do: Wherefore judg me neither to be of a contradicting humor, nor of\na vain-glorious mind for differing from other mens opinions, but rather\nthat it is done out of love to Truth, and to make my own opinions the\nmore intelligible, which cannot better be done then by arguing and\ncomparing other mens opinions with them. The Authors whose opinions I\nmention, I have read, as I found them printed, in my native Language,\nexcept _Des Cartes_, who being in Latine, I had some few places\ntranslated to me out of his works; and I must confess, that since\nI have read the works of these learned men, I understand the names\nand terms of Art a little better then I did before; but it is not so\nmuch as to make me a Scholar, nor yet so little, but that, had I read\nmore before I did begin to write my other Book called _Philosophical\nOpinions_, they would have been more intelligible; for my error was,\nI began to write so early, that I had not liv'd so long as to be\nable to read many Authors; I cannot say, I divulged my opinions as\nsoon as I had conceiv'd them, but yet I divulged them too soon to\nhave them artificial and methodical. But since what is past, cannot\nbe recalled, I must desire you to excuse those faults, which were\ncommitted for want of experience and learning. As for School-learning,\nhad I applied my self to it, yet I am confident I should never have\narrived to any; for I am so uncapable of Learning, that I could never\nattain to the knowledge of any other Language but my native, especially\nby the Rules of Art: wherefore I do not repent that I spent not my\ntime in Learning, for I consider, it is better to write wittily then\nlearnedly; nevertheless, I love and esteem Learning, although I am\nnot capable of it. But you may say, I have expressed neither Wit nor\nLearning in my Writings: Truly, if not, I am the more sorry for it; but\nself-conceit, which is natural to mankind, especially to our Sex, did\nflatter and secretly perswade me that my Writings had Sense and Reason,\nWit and Variety; but Judgment being not called to Counsel, I yielded\nto Self-conceits flattery, and so put out my Writings to be Printed as\nfast as I could, without being reviewed or Corrected: Neither did I\nfear any censure, for Self-conceit had perswaded me, I should be highly\napplauded; wherefore I made such haste, that I had three or four Books\nprinted presently after each other.\n\nBut to return to this present Work, I must desire you, _worthy\nReaders_, to read first my Book called _Philosophical and Physical\nOpinions_, before you censure this, for this Book is but an explanation\nof the former, wherein is contained the Ground of my Opinions, and\nthose that will judge well of a Building, must first consider\nthe Foundation; to which purpose I will repeat some few Heads and\nPrinciples of my Opinions, which are these following: First, That\nNature is Infinite, and the Eternal Servant of God: Next, That she is\nCorporeal, and partly self-moving, dividable and composable; that all\nand every particular Creature, as also all perception and variety in\nNature, is made by corporeal self-motion, which I name sensitive and\nrational matter, which is life and knowledg, sense and reason. Again,\nThat these sensitive and rational parts of matter are the purest\nand subtilest parts of Nature, as the active parts, the knowing,\nunderstanding and prudent parts, the designing, architectonical and\nworking parts, nay, the Life and Soul of Nature, and that there is\nnot any Creature or part of nature without this Life and Soul; and\nthat not onely Animals, but also Vegetables, Minerals and Elements,\nand what more is in Nature, are endued with this Life and Soul, Sense\nand Reason: and because this Life and Soul is a corporeal Substance,\nit is both dividable and composable; for it divides and removes parts\nfrom parts, as also composes and joyns parts to parts, and works in a\nperpetual motion without rest; by which actions not any Creature can\nchallenge a particular Life and Soul to it self, but every Creature may\nhave by the dividing and composing nature of this self-moving matter\nmore or fewer natural souls and lives.\n\nThese and the like actions of corporeal Nature or natural Matter\nyou may find more at large described in my afore-mentioned Book of\n_Philosophical Opinions_, and more clearly repeated and explained in\nthis present. 'Tis true, the way of arguing I use, is common, but the\nPrinciples, Heads and Grounds of my Opinions are my own, not borrowed\nor stolen in the least from any; and the first time I divulged them,\nwas in the year 1653: since which time I have reviewed, reformed and\nreprinted them twice; for at first, as my Conceptions were new and my\nown, so my Judgment was young, and my Experience little, so that I had\nnot so much knowledge as to declare them artificially and methodically;\nfor as I mentioned before, I was always unapt to learn by the Rules of\nArt. But although they may be defective for want of Terms of Art, and\nartificial expressions, yet I am sure they are not defective for want\nof Sense and Reason: And if any one can bring more Sense and Reason to\ndisprove these my opinions, I shall not repine or grieve, but either\nacknowledge my error, if I find my self in any, or defend them as\nrationally as I can, if it be but done justly and honestly, without\ndeceit, spight, or malice; for I cannot chuse but acquaint you, _Noble\nReaders_, I have been informed, that if I should be answered in my\nWritings, it would be done rather under the name and cover of a Woman,\nthen of a Man, the reason is, because no man dare or will set his name\nto the contradiction of a Lady; and to confirm you the better herein,\nthere has one Chapter of my Book called _The Worlds Olio_, treating of\na Monastical Life, been answer'd already in a little Pamphlet, under\nthe name of a woman, although she did little towards it; wherefore it\nbeing a Hermaphroditical Book, I judged it not worthy taking notice of.\nThe like shall I do to any other that will answer this present work of\nmine, or contradict my opinions indirectly with fraud and deceit. But\nI cannot conceive why it should be a disgrace to any man to maintain\nhis own or others opinions against a woman, so it be done with respect\nand civility; but to become a cheat by dissembling, and quit the\nBreeches for a Petticoat, meerly out of spight and malice, is base, and\nnot fit for the honour of a man, or the masculine sex. Besides, it will\neasily be known; for a Philosopher or Philosopheress is not produced on\na sudden. Wherefore, although I do not care, nor fear contradiction,\nyet I desire it may be done without fraud or deceit, spight and malice;\nand then I shall be ready to defend my opinions the best I can, whilest\nI live, and after I am dead, I hope those that are just and honorable\nwill also defend me from all sophistry, malice, spight and envy, for\nwhich Heaven will bless them. In the mean time, _Worthy Readers_, I\nshould rejoyce to see that my Works are acceptable to you, for if you\nbe not partial, you will easily pardon those faults you find, when you\ndo consider both my sex and breeding; for which favour and justice, I\nshall always remain,\n\n_Your most obliged Servant,_\n\nM. N.\n\n\n\n\nPhilosophical Letters.\n\nSect. I.\n\nI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYou have been pleased to send me the Works of four Famous and Learned\nAuthors, to wit, of two most Famous Philosophers of our Age, _Des\nCartes_, and _Hobbs_, and of that Learned Philosopher and Divine Dr.\n_More_, as also of that Famous Physician and Chymist _Van Helmont_.\nWhich Works you have sent me not onely to peruse, but also to give\nmy judgment of them, and to send you word by the usual way of our\nCorrespondence, which is by Letters, how far, and wherein I do dissent\nfrom these Famous Authors, their Opinions in _Natural Philosophy_. To\ntell you truly, _Madam_, your Commands did at first much affright me,\nfor it did appear, as if you had commanded me to get upon a high Rock,\nand fling my self into the Sea, where neither a Ship, nor a Plank, nor\nany kind of help was near to rescue me, and save my life; but that I\nwas forced to sink, by reason I cannot swim: So I having no Learning\nnor Art to assist me in this dangerous undertaking, thought, I must\nof necessity perish under the rough censures of my Readers, and be\nnot onely accounted a fool for my labour, but a vain and presumptuous\nperson, to undertake things surpassing the ability of my performance;\nbut on the other side I considered first, that those Worthy Authors,\nwere they my censurers, would not deny me the same liberty they take\nthemselves; which is, that I may dissent from their Opinions, as well\nas they dissent from others, and from amongst themselves: And if I\nshould express more Vanity then Wit, more Ignorance then Knowledg, more\nFolly then Discretion, it being according to the Nature of our Sex, I\nhoped that my Masculine Readers would civilly excuse me, and my Female\nReaders could not justly condemn me. Next I considered with my self,\nthat it would be a great advantage for my Book called _Philosophical\nOpinions_, as to make it more perspicuous and intelligible by the\nopposition of other Opinions, since two opposite things placed near\neach other, are the better discerned; for I must confess, that when\nI did put forth my Philosophical Work at first, I was not so well\nskilled in the Terms or Expressions usual in _Natural Philosophy_; and\ntherefore for want of their knowledg, I could not declare my meaning so\nplainly and clearly as I ought to have done, which may be a sufficient\nargument to my Readers, that I have not read heretofore any _Natural\nPhilosophers_, and taken some Light from them; but that my Opinions\ndid meerly issue from the Fountain of my own Brain, without any other\nhelp or assistance. Wherefore since for want of proper Expressions,\nmy named Book of _Philosophy_ was accused of obscurity and intricacy,\nI thought your Commands would be a means to explain and clear it the\nbetter, although not by an Artificial way, as by Logical Arguments or\nMathematical Demonstrations, yet by expressing my Sense and Meaning\nmore properly and clearly then I have done heretofore: But the chief\nreason of all was, the Authority of your Command, which did work so\npowerfully with me, that I could not resist, although it were to the\ndisgrace of my own judgment and wit; and therefore I am fully resolved\nnow to go on as far, and as well as the Natural strength of my Reason\nwill reach: But since neither the strength of my Body, nor of my\nunderstanding, or wit, is able to mark every line, or every word of\ntheir works, and to argue upon them, I shall onely pick out the ground\nOpinions of the aforementioned Authors, and those which do directly\ndissent from mine, upon which I intend to make some few Reflections,\naccording to the ability of my Reason; and I shall meerly go upon the\nbare Ground of _Natural Philosophy_, and not mix Divinity with it,\nas many Philosophers use to do, except it be in those places, where\nI am forced by the Authors Arguments to reflect upon it, which yet\nshall be rather with an expression of my ignorance, then a positive\ndeclaration of my opinion or judgment thereof; for I think it not onely\nan absurdity, but an injury to the holy Profession of Divinity to draw\nher to the Proofs in _Natural Philosophy_; wherefore I shall strictly\nfollow the Guidance of _Natural Reason_, and keep to my own ground and\nPrinciples as much as I can; which that I may perform the better, I\nhumbly desire the help and assistance of your Favour, that according to\nthat real and intire Affection you bear to me, you would be pleased to\ntell me unfeignedly, if I should chance to err or contradict but the\nleast probability of truth in any thing; for I honor Truth so much, as\nI bow down to its shadow with the greatest respect and reverence; and I\nesteem those persons most, that love and honor Truth with the same zeal\nand fervor, whether they be Ancient or Modern Writers.\n\nThus, _Madam_, although I am destitute of the help of Arts, yet being\nsupported by your Favour and wise Directions, I shall not fear any\nsmiles of scorn, or words of reproach; for I am confident you will\ndefend me against all the mischievous and poisonous Teeth of malicious\ndetractors. I shall besides, implore the assistance of the Sacred\nChurch, and the Learned Schools, to take me into their Protection, and\nshelter my weak endeavours: For though I am but an ignorant and simple\nWoman, yet I am their devoted and honest Servant, who shall never quit\nthe respect and honor due to them, but live and die theirs, as also,\n\nMADAM,\n\n_Your Ladiships_\n\n_humble and faithful Servant._\n\nM. N.\n\n\n\n\nII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nBefore I begin my Reflections upon the Opinions of those Authors you\nsent me, I will answer first your Objection concerning the Ground of my\nPhilosophy, which is Infinite Matter: For you were pleased to mention,\nThat you could not well apprehend, how it was possible, that many\nInfinites could be contained in one Infinite, since one Infinite takes\nup all Place Imaginary, leaving no room for any other; Also, if one\nInfinite should be contained in an other Infinite, that which contains,\nmust of necessity be bigger then that which is contained, whereby the\nNater of Infinite would be lost; as having no bigger nor less, but\nbeing of an Infinite quantity.\n\nFirst of all, _Madam_, there is no such thing as All in Infinite, nor\nany such thing as All the Place, for Infinite is not circumscribed\nnor limited: Next, as for that one Infinite cannot be in an other\nInfinite, I answer, as well as one Finite can be in another Finite;\nfor one Creature is not onely composed of Parts, but one Part lies\nwithin another, and one Figure within another, and one Motion within\nanother. As for example, Animal Kind, have they not Internal and\nExternal Parts, and so Internal and External Motions? And are not\nAnimals, Vegetables and Minerals inclosed in the Elements? But as for\nInfinites, you must know, _Madam_, that there are several kindes of\nInfinites. For there is first Infinite in quantity or bulk, that is\nsuch a big and great Corporeal substance, which exceeds all bounds\nand limits of measure, and may be called Infinite in Magnitude. Next\nthere is Infinite in Number, which exceeds all numeration and account,\nand may be termed Infinite in Multitude; Again there is Infinite in\nQuality; as for example, Infinite degrees of softness, hardness,\nthickness, thinness, heat and cold, &c. also Infinite degrees of\nMotion, and so Infinite Creations, Infinite Compositions, Dissolutions,\nContractions, Dilations, Digestions, Expulsions; also Infinite degrees\nof Strength, Knowledg, Power, &c. Besides there is Infinite in Time,\nwhich is properly named Eternal. Now, when I say, that there is but\none Infinite, and that Infinite is the Onely Matter, I mean infinite\nin bulk and quantity. And this Onely matter, because it is Infinite\nin bulk, must of necessity be divisible into infinite Parts, that is,\ninfinite in number, not in bulk or quantity; for though Infinite Parts\nin number make up one infinite in quantity, yet they considered in\nthemselves, cannot be said Infinite, because every Part is of a certain\nlinked and circumscribed Figure, Quantity and Proportion, whereas\nInfinite hath no limits nor bounds: besides it is against the nature\nof a single Part to be Infinite, or else there would be no difference\nbetween the Part and the whole, the nature of a Part requiring that it\nmust be less then its whole, but all what is less hath a determined\nquantity, and so becomes finite. Therefore it is no absurdity to say,\nthat an Infinite may have both Finite and Infinite Parts, Finite in\nQuantity, Infinite in Number. But those that say, if there were an\nInfinite Body, that each of its Parts must of necessity be Infinite\ntoo, are much mistaken; for it is a contradiction in the same Terms\nto say One Infinite Part, for the very Name of a Part includes a\nFiniteness, but take all parts of an Infinite Body together, then you\nmay rightly say they are infinite. Nay Reason will inform you plainly,\nfor example: Imagine an Infinite number of grains of Corn in one heap,\nsurely if the number of Grains be Infinite, you must grant of necessity\nthe bulk or body, which contains this infinite number of grains, to\nbe Infinite too; to wit, Infinite in quantity, and yet you will find\neach Grain in it self to be Finite. But you will say, an Infinite\nBody cannot have parts, for if it be Infinite, it must be Infinite in\nQuantity, and therefore of one bulk, and one continued quantity, but\nInfinite parts in number make a discrete quantity. I answer it is all\none; for a Body of a continued quantity may be divided and severed\ninto so many Parts either actually, or mentally in our Conceptions or\nthoughts; besides nature is one continued Body, for there is no such\n_Vacuum_ in Nature, as if her Parts did hang together like a linked\nChain; nor can any of her Parts subsist single and by it self, but all\nthe Parts of Infinite Nature, although they are in one continued Piece,\nyet are they several and discerned from each other by their several\nFigures. And by this, I hope, you will understand my meaning, when I\nsay, that several Infinites may be included or comprehended in one\nInfinite; for by the one Infinite, I understand Infinite in Quantity,\nwhich includes Infinite in Number, that is Infinite Parts; then\nInfinite in Quality, as Infinite degrees of Rarity, Density, Swiftness,\nSlowness, Hardness, Softness, &c. Infinite degrees of Motions, Infinite\nCreations, Dissolutions, Contractions, Dilations, Alterations, &c.\nInfinite degrees of Wisdom, Strength, Power, &c., and lastly Infinite\nin Time or Duration, which is Eternity, for Infinite and Eternal are\ninseparable; All which Infinites are contained in the Onely Matter\nas many Letters are contained in one Word, many Words in one Line,\nmany Lines in one Book. But you will say perhaps, if I attribute an\nInfinite Wisdom, Strength, Power, Knowledg, &c. to Nature; then Nature\nis in all coequal with God, for God has the same Attributes: I answer,\nNot at all; for I desire you to understand me rightly, when I speak\nof Infinite Nature, and when I speak of the Infinite Deity, for there\nis great difference between them, for it is one thing a Deitical or\nDivine Infinite, and another a Natural Infinite; You know, that God\nis a Spirit, and not a bodily substance, again that Nature is a Body,\nand not a Spirit, and therefore none of these Infinites can obstruct\nor hinder each other, as being different in their kinds, for a Spirit\nbeing no Body, requires no place, Place being an attribute which onely\nbelongs to a Body, and therefore when I call Nature Infinite, I mean\nan Infinite extension of Body, containing an Infinite number of Parts;\nbut what doth an Infinite extension of Body hinder the Infiniteness of\nGod, as an Immaterial Spiritual being? Next, when I do attribute an\nInfinite Power, Wisdom, Knowledg, &c. to Nature, I do not understand\na Divine, but a Natural Infinite Wisdom and Power, that is, such as\nproperly belongs to Nature, and not a supernatural, as is in God;\nFor Nature having Infinite parts of Infinite degrees, must also have\nan Infinite natural wisdom to order her natural Infinite parts and\nactions, and consequently an Infinite natural power to put her wisdom\ninto act; and so of the rest of her attributes, which are all natural:\nBut Gods Attributes being supernatural, transcend much these natural\ninfinite attributes; for God, being the God of Nature, has not onely\nNatures Infinite Wisdom and Power, but besides, a Supernatural and\nIncomprehensible Infinite Wisdom and Power; which in no wayes do hinder\neach other, but may very well subsist together. Neither doth Gods\nInfinite Justice and his Infinite Mercy hinder each other; for Gods\nAttributes, though they be all several Infinites, yet they make but one\nInfinite.\n\nBut you will say, If Nature's Wisdom and Power extends no further then\nto natural things, it is not Infinite, but limited and restrained.\nI answer, That doth not take away the Infiniteness of Nature; for\nthere may be several kinds of Infinites, as I related before, and one\nmay be as perfect an Infinite as the other in its kind. For example:\nSuppose a Line to be extended infinitely in length, you will call\nthis Line Infinite, although it have not an Infinite breadth; Also,\nif an infinite length and breadth joyn together, you will call it, an\ninfinite Superficies, although it wants an infinite depth; and yet\nevery Infinite, in its kinde, is a Perfect Infinite, if I may call it\nso: Why then shall not Nature also be said to have an Infinite Natural\nWisdom and Power, although she has not a Divine Wisdom and Power? Can\nwe say, Man hath not a free Will, because he hath not an absolute free\nWill, as God hath? Wherefore, a Natural Infinite, and the Infinite\nGod, may well stand together, without any opposition or hinderance, or\nwithout any detracting or derogating from the Omnipotency and Glory\nof God; for God remains still the God of Nature, and is an Infinite\nImmaterial Purity, when as Nature is an Infinite Corporeal Substance;\nand Immaterial and Material cannot obstruct each other. And though an\nInfinite Corporeal cannot make an Infinite Immaterial, yet an Infinite\nImmaterial can make an Infinite Corporeal, by reason there is as much\ndifference in the Power as in the Purity: And the disparity between the\nNatural and Divine Infinite is such, as they cannot joyn, mix, and work\ntogether, unless you do believe that Divine Actions can have allay.\n\nBut you may say, Purity belongs onely to natural things, and none but\nnatural bodies can be said purified, but God exceeds all Purity. 'Tis\ntrue: But if there were infinite degrees of Purity in Matter, Matter\nmight at last become Immaterial, and so from an Infinite Material turn\nto an Infinite Immaterial, and from Nature to be God: A great, but an\nimpossible Change. For I do verily believe, that there can be but one\nOmnipotent God, and he cannot admit of addition, or diminution; and\nthat which is Material cannot be Immaterial, and what is Immaterial\ncannot become Material, I mean, so, as to change their natures; for\nNature is what God was pleased she should be; and will be what she\nwas, until God be pleased to make her otherwise. Wherefore there can\nbe no new Creation of matter, motion, or figure; nor any annihilation\nof any matter, motion, or figure in Nature, unless God do create\na new Nature: For the changing of Matter into several particular\nFigures, doth not prove an annihilation of particular Figures; nor\nthe cessation of particular Motions an annihilation of them: Neither\ndoth the variation of the Onely Matter produce an annihilation of any\npart of Matter, nor the variation of figures and motions of Matter\ncause an alteration in the nature of Onely Matter: Wherefore there\ncannot be new Lives, Souls or Bodies in Nature; for, could there be\nany thing new in Nature, or any thing annihilated, there would not\nbe any stability in Nature, as a continuance of every kind and sort\nof Creatures, but there would be a confusion between the new and\nold matter, motions, and figures, as between old and new Nature; In\ntruth, it would be like new Wine in old Vessels, by which all would\nbreak into disorder. Neither can supernatural and natural effects be\nmixt together, no more then material and immaterial things or beings:\nTherefore it is probable, God has ordained Nature to work in her self\nby his Leave, Will, and Free Gift. But there have been, and are still\nstrange and erroneous Opinions, and great differences amongst Natural\nPhilosophers, concerning the Principles of Natural things; some will\nhave them _Atoms_, others will have the first Principles to be _Salt,\nSulphur_ and _Mercury_; some will have them to be the four Elements,\nas _Fire, Air, Water,_ and _Earth_; and others will have but one of\nthese Elements also some will have _Gas_ and _Blas, Ferments, Ideas_\nand the like; but what they believe to be Principles and Causes of\nnatural things, are onely Effects; for in all Probability it appears to\nhumane sense and reason, that the cause of every particular material\nCreature is the onely and Infinite Matter, which has Motions and\nFigures inseparably united; for Matter, Motion and Figure, are but\none thing, individable in its Nature. And as for Immaterial Spirits,\nthere is surely no such thing in Infinite Nature, to wit, so as to be\nParts of Nature; for Nature is altogether Material, but this opinion\nproceeds from the separation or abstraction of Motion from Matter,\n_viz._ that man thinks matter and motion to be dividable from each\nother, and believes motion to be a thing by its self, naming it an\nImmaterial thing, which has a being, but not a bodily substance: But\nvarious and different effects do not prove a different Matter or Cause,\nneither do they prove an unsetled Cause, onely the variety of Effects\nhath obscured the Cause from the several parts, which makes Particular\nCreatures partly Ignorant, and partly knowing. But in my opinion,\nNature is material, and not any thing in Nature, what belongs to her,\nis immaterial; but whatsoever is Immaterial, is Supernatural, Therefore\nMotions, Forms, Thoughts, Ideas, Conceptions, Sympathies, Antipathies,\nAccidents, Qualities, as also Natural Life, and Soul, are all Material:\nAnd as for Colours, Sents, Light, Sound, Heat, Cold, and the like,\nthose that believe them not to be substances or material things, surely\ntheir brain or heart (take what place you will for the forming of\nConceptions) moves very Irregularly, and they might as well say, Our\nsensitive Organs are not material; for what Objects soever, that are\nsubject to our senses, cannot in sense be denied to be Corporeal, when\nas those things that are not subject to our senses, can be conceived\nin reason to be Immaterial? But some Philosophers striving to express\ntheir wit, obstruct reason; and drawing Divinity to prove Sense and\nReason, weaken Faith so, as their mixed Divine Philosophy becomes meer\nPoetical Fictions, and Romancical expressions, making material Bodies\nimmaterial Spirits, and immaterial Spirits material Bodies; and some\nhave conceived some things neither to be Material nor Immaterial but\nbetween both. Truly, _Madam_, I wish their Wits had been less, and\ntheir Judgments more, as not to jumble Natural and Supernatural things\ntogether, but to distinguish either clearly, for such Mixtures are\nneither Natural nor Divine; But as I said, the Confusion comes from\ntheir too nice abstractions, and from the separation of Figure and\nMotion from Matter, as not conceiving them individable; but if God, and\nhis servant Nature were as Intricate and Confuse in their Works, as Men\nin their Understandings and Words, the Universe and Production of all\nCreatures would soon be without Order and Government, so as there would\nbe a horrid and Eternal War both in Heaven, and in the World, and so\npittying their troubled Brains, and wishing them the Light of Reason,\nthat they may clearly perceive the Truth, I rest\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your real Friend_\n\n_and faithful Servant._\n\n\n\n\nIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nIt seems you are offended at my Opinion, that _Nature_ is Eternal\nwithout beginning, which, you say, is to make her God, or at least\ncoequal with God; But, if you apprehend my meaning rightly, you will\nsay, I do not: For first, God is an Immaterial and Spiritual Infinite\nBeing, which Propriety God cannot give away to any Creature, nor\nmake another God in Essence like to him, for Gods Attributes are not\ncommunicable to any Creature; Yet this doth not hinder, that God\nshould not make Infinite and Eternal Matter, for that is as easie to\nhim, as to make a Finite Creature, Infinite Matter being quite of\nanother Nature then God is, to wit, Corporeal, when God is Incorporeal,\nthe difference whereof I have declared in my former Letter. But as for\n_Nature_, that it cannot be Eternal without beginning, because God is\nthe Creator and Cause of it, and that the Creator must be before the\nCreature, as the Cause before the Effect, so, that it is impossible\nfor _Nature_ to be without a beginning; if you will speak naturally,\nas human reason guides you, and bring an Argument concluding from the\nPriority of the _Cause_ before the _Effect_, give me leave to tell you,\nthat God is not tied to Natural Rules, but that he can do beyond our\nUnderstanding, and therefore he is neither bound up to time, as to be\nbefore, for if we will do this, we must not allow, that the Eternal Son\nof God is Coeternal with the Father, because nature requires a Father\nto exist before the Son, but in God is no time, but all Eternity;\nand if you allow, that God hath made some Creatures, as Supernatural\nSpirits, to live Eternally, why should he not as well have made a\nCreature from all Eternity? for Gods making is not our making, he needs\nno Priority of Time. But you may say, the Comparison of the Eternal\nGeneration of the Son of God is Mystical and Divine, and not to be\napplied to natural things: I answer, The action by which God created\nthe World or made Nature, was it natural or supernatural? surely you\nwill say it was a Supernatural and God-like action, why then will\nyou apply Natural Rules to a God-like and Supernatural Action? for\nwhat Man knows, how and when God created Nature? You will say, the\nScripture doth teach us that, for it is not Six thousand years, when\nGod created this World, I answer, the holy Scripture informs us onely\nof the Creation of this Visible World, but not of Nature and natural\nMatter; for I firmly believe according to the Word of God, that this\nWorld has been Created, as is described by _Moses_, but what is that\nto natural Matter? There may have been worlds before, as many are of\nthe opinion that there have been men before _Adam_, and many amongst\nDivines do believe, that after the destruction of this World God will\nCreate a new World again, as a new Heaven, and a new Earth; and if\nthis be probable, or at least may be believed without any prejudice\nto the holy Scripture, why may it not be probably believed that\nthere have been other worlds before this visible World? for nothing\nis impossible with God; and all this doth derogate nothing from the\nHonour and Glory of God, but rather increases his Divine Power. But\nas for the Creation of this present World, it is related, that there\nwas first a rude and indigested Heap, or Chaos, without form, void\nand dark; and God said, _Let it be light; Let there be a Firmament\nin the midst of the Waters, and let the Waters under the Heaven be\ngathered together, and let the dry Land appear; Let the Earth bring\nforth Grass, the Herb yielding seed, and the Fruit-tree yielding Fruit\nafter its own kind; and let there be Lights in the Firmament, the one\nto rule the Day, and the other the Night; and let the Waters bring\nforth abundantly the moving Creature that hath life; and let the Earth\nbring forth living Creatures after its kinde; and at last God said,\nLet us make Man, and all what was made, God saw it was good._ Thus\nall was made by Gods Command, and who executed his Command but the\nMaterial servant of God, Nature? which ordered her self-moving matter\ninto such several Figures as God commanded, and God approved of them.\nAnd thus, _Madam_, I verily believe the Creation of the World, and that\nGod is the Sole and omnipotent Creator of Heaven and Earth, and of all\nCreatures therein; nay, although I believe Nature to have been from\nEternity, yet I believe also that God is the God and Author of Nature,\nand has made Nature and natural Matter in a way and manner proper to\nhis Omnipotency and Incomprehensible by us: I will pass by natural\nArguments and Proofs, as not belonging to such an Omnipotent Action; as\nfor example, how the nature of relative terms requires, that they must\nboth exist at one point of Time, _viz._ a Master and his Servant, and\na King and his Subjects; for one bearing relation to the other, can in\nno ways be considered as different from one another in formiliness or\nlaterness of Time; but as I said, these being meerly natural things, I\nwill nor cannot apply them to Supernatural and Divine Actions; But if\nyou ask me, how it is possible that _Nature_, the Effect and Creature\nof God, can be Eternal without beginning? I will desire you to answer\nme first, how a Creature can be Eternal without end, as, for example.\nSupernatural Spirits are, and then I will answer you, how a Creature\ncan be Eternal without beginning; For Eternity consists herein, that\nit has neither beginning nor end; and if it be easie for God to make a\nBeing without end, it is not difficult for Him to make a Being without\nbeginning. One thing more I will add, which is, That if _Nature_ has\nnot been made by God from all Eternity, then the Title of God, as\nbeing a Creator, which is a Title and action, upon which our Faith is\ngrounded, (for it is the first Article in our Creed) has been accessory\nto God, as I said, not full Six thousand years ago; but there is not\nany thing accessory to God; he being the Perfection himself. But,\n_Madam_, all what I speak, is under the liberty of Natural Philosophy,\nand by the Light of Reason onely, not of Revelation; and my Reason\nbeing not infallible; I will not declare my Opinions for an infallible\nTruth: Neither do I think, that they are offensive either to Church or\nState, for I submit to the Laws of One, and believe the Doctrine of the\nOther, so much, that if it were for the advantage of either, I should\nbe willing to sacrifice my Life, especially for the Church; yea, had I\nmillions of Lives, and every Life was either to suffer torment or to\nlive in ease, I would prefer torment for the benefit of the Church;\nand therefore, if I knew that my Opinions should give any offence to\nthe Church, I should be ready every minute to alter them: And as much\nas I am bound in all duty to the obedience of the Church, as much am I\nparticularly bound to your Ladiship, for your entire love and sincere\naffection towards me, for which I shall live and die,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your most faithful Friend,_\n\n_and humble Servant._\n\n\n\n\nIV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI have chosen, in the first place, the Work of that famous Philosopher\n_Hobbs_ called _Leviathan_, wherein I find he sayes,[1] _That the\ncause of sense or sensitive perception is the external body or Object,\nwhich presses the Organ proper to each Sense_. To which I answer,\naccording to the ground of my own _Philosophical Opinions_, That all\nthings, and therefore outward objects as well as sensitive organs, have\nboth Sense and Reason, yet neither the objects nor the organs are the\ncause of them; for Perception is but the effect of the Sensitive and\nrational Motions, and not the Motions of the Perception; neither doth\nthe pressure of parts upon parts make Perception; for although Matter\nby the power of self-motion is as much composeable as divideable,\nand parts do joyn to parts, yet that doth not make perception; nay,\nthe several parts, betwixt which the Perception is made, may be at\nsuch a distance, as not capable to press: As for example, Two men\nmay see or hear each other at a distance, and yet there may be other\nbodies between them, that do not move to those perceptions, so that\nno pressure can be made, for all pressures are by some constraint\nand force; wherefore, according to my Opinion, the Sensitive and\nRational free Motions, do pattern out each others object, as Figure\nand Voice in each others Eye and Ear; for Life and Knowledge, which\nI name Rational and Sensitive Matter, are in every Creature, and in\nall parts of every Creature, and make all perceptions in Nature,\nbecause they are the self-moving parts of Nature, and according as\nthose Corporeal, Rational, and Sensitive Motions move, such or such\nperceptions are made: But these self-moving parts being of different\ndegrees (for the Rational matter is purer then the Sensitive) it\ncauses a double perception in all Creatures, whereof one is made by\nthe Rational corporeal motions, and the other by the Sensitive; and\nthough both perceptions are in all the body, and in every part of\nthe body of a Creature, yet the sensitive corporeal motions having\ntheir proper organs, as Work-houses, in which they work some sorts\nof perceptions, those perceptions are most commonly made in those\norgans, and are double again; for the sensitive motions work either\non the inside or on the out-side of those organs, on the inside in\nDreams, on the out-side awake; and although both the Rational and the\nSensitive matter are inseparably joyned and mixed together, yet do they\nnot always work together, for oftentimes the Rational works without\nany sensitive paterns, and the sensitive again without any rational\npaterns. But mistake me not, _Madam_, for I do not absolutely confine\nthe sensitive perception to the Organs, nor the rational to the Brain,\nbut as they are both in the whole body, so they may work in the whole\nbody according to their own motions. Neither do I say, that there is\nno other perception in the Eye but sight, in the Ear but hearing, and\nso forth, but the sensitive organs have other perceptions besides\nthese; and if the sensitive and rational motions be irregular in those\nparts, between which the perception is made, as for example, in the\ntwo fore-mentioned men, that see and hear each other, then they both\nneither see nor hear each other perfectly; and if one's motions be\nperfect, but the other's irregular and erroneous, then one sees and\nhears better then the other; or if the Sensitive and Rational motions\nmove more regularly and make perfecter paterns in the Eye then in the\nEar, then they see better then they hear; and if more regularly and\nperfectly in the Ear then in the Eye, they hear better then they see:\nAnd so it may be said of each man singly, for one man may see the\nother better and more perfectly, then the other may see him; and this\nman may hear the other better and more perfectly, then the other may\nhear him; whereas, if perception were made by pressure, there would\nnot be any such mistakes; besides the hard pressure of objects, in my\nopinion, would rather annoy and obscure, then inform. But as soon as\nthe object is removed, the Perception of it, made by the sensitive\nmotions in the Organs, ceaseth, by reason the sensitive Motions cease\nfrom paterning, but yet the Rational Motions do not always cease\nso suddenly, because the sensitive corporeal Motions work with the\nInanimate Matter, and therefore cannot retain particular figures long,\nwhereas the Rational Matter doth onely move in its own substance and\nparts of matter, and upon none other, as my Book of Philosophical\nOpinions will inform you better. And thus Perception, in my opinion, is\nnot made by Pressure, nor by Species, nor by matter going either from\nthe Organ to the Object, or from the Object into the Organ. By this it\nis also manifest, that Understanding comes not from Exterior Objects,\nor from the Exterior sensitive Organs; for as Exterior Objects do not\nmake Perception, so they do neither make Understanding, but it is the\nrational matter that doth it, for Understanding may be without exterior\nobjects and sensitive organs; And this in short is the opinion of\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Part._ 1. _ch._ 1.\n\n\n\n\nV.\n\n\n_Madam_,\n\nYour Authours opinion is,[1] that _when a thing lies still, unless\nsomewhat else stir it, it will lie still for ever; but when a thing is\nin motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat else stay\nit; the reason is,_ saith he, _because nothing can change it self_;\nTo tell you truly, _Madam_, I am not of his opinion, for if Matter\nmoveth it self, as certainly it doth, then the least part of Matter,\nwere it so small as to seem Individable, will move it self; 'Tis true,\nit could not desist from motion, as being its nature to move, and no\nthing can change its Nature; for God himself, who hath more power then\nself-moving Matter, cannot change himself from being God; but that\nMotion should proceed from another exterior Body, joyning with, or\ntouching that body which it moves, is in my opinion not probable; for\nthough Nature is all Corporeal, and her actions are Corporeal Motions,\nyet that doth not prove, that the Motion of particular Creatures or\nParts is caused by the joining, touching or pressing of parts upon\nparts; for it is not the several parts that make motion, but motion\nmakes them; and yet Motion is not the cause of Matter, but Matter is\nthe cause of Motion, for Matter might subsist without Motion, but not\nMotion without Matter, onely there could be no perception without\nMotion, nor no Variety, if Matter were not self-moving; but Matter, if\nit were all Inanimate and void of Motion, would lie as a dull, dead\nand senseless heap; But that all Motion comes by joining or pressing\nof other parts, I deny, for if sensitive and rational perceptions,\nwhich are sensitive and rational motions, in the body, and in the mind,\nwere made by the pressure of outward objects, pressing the sensitive\norgans, and so the brain or interior parts of the Body, they would\ncause such dents and holes therein, as to make them sore and patched\nin a short time; Besides, what was represented in this manner, would\nalways remain, or at least not so soon be dissolved, and then those\npressures would make a strange and horrid confusion of Figures, for\nnot any figure would be distinct; Wherefore my opinion is, that the\nsensitive and rational Matter doth make or pattern out the figures\nof several Objects, and doth dissolve them in a moment of time; as\nfor example, when the eye seeth the object first of a Man, then of a\nHorse, then of another Creature, the sensitive motions in the eye move\nfirst into the figure of the Man, then straight into the figure of\nthe Horse, so that the Mans figure is dissolved and altered into the\nfigure of the Horse, and so forth; but if the eye sees many figures at\nonce, then so many several figures are made by the sensitive Corporeal\nMotions, and as many by the Rational Motions, which are Sight and\nMemory, at once: But in sleep both the sensitive and rational Motions\nmake the figures without patterns, that is, exterior objects, which\nis the cause that they are often erroneous, whereas, if it were the\nformer Impression of the Objects, there could not possibly be imperfect\nDreams or Remembrances, for fading of Figures requires as much motion,\nas impression, and impression and fading are very different and\nopposite motions; nay, if Perception was made by Impression, there\ncould not possibly be a fading or decay of the figures printed either\nin the Mind or Body, whereas yet, as there is alteration of Motions in\nself-moving Matter, so there is also an alteration of figures made by\nthese motions. But you will say, it doth not follow, if Perception be\nmade by Impression, that it must needs continue and not decay; for if\nyou touch and move a string, the motion doth not continue for ever, but\nceaseth by degrees; I answer, There is great difference between Prime\nself-motion, and forced or Artificial Motions; for Artificial Motions\nare onely an Imitation of Natural Motions, and not the same, but caused\nby Natural Motions; for although there is no Art that is not made by\nNature, yet Nature is not made by Art; Wherefore we cannot rationally\njudg of Perception by comparing it to the motion of a string, and its\nalteration to the ceasing of that motion, for Nature moveth not by\nforce, but freely. 'Tis true, 'tis the freedom in Nature for one man\nto give another a box on the Ear, or to trip up his heels, or for one\nor more men to fight with each other; yet these actions are not like\nthe actions of loving Imbraces and Kissing each other; neither are\nthe actions one and the same, when a man strikes himself, and when\nhe strikes another; and so is likewise the action of impression, and\nthe action of self-figuring not one and the same, but different; for\nthe action of impression is forced, and the action of self-figuring\nis free; Wherefore the comparison of the forced motions of a string,\nrope, watch, or the like, can have no place here; for though the rope,\nmade of flax or hemp, may have the perception of a Vegetable, yet not\nof the hand, or the like, that touched or struck it; and although the\nhand doth occasion the rope to move in such a manner, yet it is not\nthe motion of the hand, by which it moveth, and when it ceases, its\nnatural and inherent power to move is not lessened; like as a man,\nthat hath left off carving or painting, hath no less skill then he\nhad before, neither is that skill lost when he plays upon the Lute or\nVirginals, or plows, plants, and the like, but he hath onely altered\nhis action, as from carving to painting, or from painting to playing,\nand so to plowing and planting, which is not through disability but\nchoice. But you will say, it is nevertheless a cessation of such a\nmotion. I grant it: but the ceasing of such a motion is not the ceasing\nof self-moving matter from all motions, neither is cessation as much as\nannihilation, for the motion lies in the power of the matter to repeat\nit, as oft it will, if it be not overpowred, for more parts, or more\nstrength, or more motions may over-power the less; Wherefore forced,\nor artificial and free Natural motions are different in their effects,\nalthough they have but one Cause, which is the self-moving matter, and\nthough Matter is but active and passive, yet there is great Variety,\nand so great difference in force and liberty, objects and perceptions,\nsense and reason, and the like. But to conclude, perception is not\nmade by the pressure of objects, no more then hemp is made by the\nRope-maker, or metal by the Bell-founder or Ringer, and yet neither\nthe rope nor the metal is without sense and reason, but the natural\nmotions of the metal, and the artificial motions of the Ringer are\ndifferent; wherefore a natural effect in truth cannot be produced from\nan artificial cause, neither can the ceasing of particular forced or\nartificial motions be a proof for the ceasing of general, natural, free\nmotions, as that matter it self should cease to move; for there is no\nsuch thing as rest in Nature, but there is an alteration of motions and\nfigures in self-moving matter, which alteration causeth variety as well\nin opinions, as in every thing else; Wherefore in my opinion, though\nsense alters, yet it doth not decay, for the rational and sensitive\npart of matter is as lasting as matter it self, but that which is\nnamed decay of sense, is onely the alteration of motions, and not an\nobscurity of motions, like, as the motions of memory and forgetfulness,\nand the repetition of the same motions is called remembrance. And thus\nmuch of this subject for the present, to which I add no more but rest\n\nMadam,\n\n_your faithful Friend,_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Leviathan, Part._ 1. _c._ 2.\n\n\n\n\nVI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour Authour discoursing of Imagination, saith,[1] _That as soon as any\nobject is removed from our Eyes, though the Impression that is made\nin us remain, yet other objects more present succeeding and working\non us, the Imagination of the past is obscured and made weak_. To\nwhich I answer, first, that he conceives Sense and Imagination to be\nall one, for he says, _Imagination is nothing else, but a fading or\ndecaying sense_; whereas in my opinion they are different, not onely\ntheir matter, but their motions also being distinct and different; for\nImagination is a rational perception, and Sense a sensitive perception;\nwherefore as much as the rational matter differs from the sensitive, as\nmuch doth Imagination differ from Sense. Next I say, that Impressions\ndo not remain in the body of sensitive matter, but it is in its power\nto make or repeat the like figures; Neither is Imagination less, when\nthe object is absent, then when present, but the figure patterned out\nin the sensitive organs, being altered, and remaining onely in the\nRational part of matter, is not so perspicuous and clear, as when it\nwas both in the Sense and in the Mind: And to prove that Imagination of\nthings past doth not grow weaker by distance of time, as your Authour\nsays, many a man in his old age, will have as perfect an Imagination\nof what is past in his younger years, as if he saw it present. And as\nfor your Authours opinion, that _Imagination and Memory are one and the\nsame_, I grant, that they are made of one kind of Matter; but although\nthe Matter is one and the same, yet several motions in the several\nparts make Imagination and Memory several things: As for Example, a\nMan may Imagine that which never came into his Senses, wherefore\nImagination is not one and the same thing with Memory. But your Authour\nseems to make all Sense, as it were, one Motion, but not all Motion\nSense, whereas surely there is no Motion, but is either Sensitive or\nRational; for Reason is but a pure and refined Sense, and Sense a\ngrosser Reason. Yet all sensitive and rational Motions are not one and\nthe same; for forced or Artificial Motions, though they proceed from\nsensitive matter, yet are they so different from the free and Prime\nNatural Motions, that they seem, as it were, quite of another nature:\nAnd this distinction neglected is the Cause, that many make Appetites\nand Passions, Perceptions and Objects, and the like, as one, without\nany or but little difference. But having discoursed of the difference\nof these Motions in my former Letter, I will not be tedious to you with\nrepeating it again, but remain,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Leviathan, part._ 1. _c._ 2.\n\n\n\n\nVII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour Authours opinion, concerning Dreams,[1] seemeth to me in some part\nvery rational and probable, in some part not; For when he sayes, that\n_Dreams are onely Imaginations of them that sleep, which imaginations\nhave been before either totally or by parcels in the Sense; and that\nthe organs of Sense, as the Brain and the Nerves, being benumb'd\nin sleep, as not easily to be moved by external objects, those\nImaginations proceed onely from the agitation of the inward parts of\nmans body, which for the connexion they have with the Brain, and other\norgans, when they be distemper'd, do keep the same in motion, whereby\nthe Imaginations there formerly made, appear as if a man were waking_;\nThis seems to my Reason not very probable: For, first, Dreams are not\nabsolutely Imaginations, except we do call all Motions and Actions\nof the Sensitive and Rational Matter, Imaginations. Neither is it\nnecessary, that all Imaginations must have been before either totally\nor by parcels in the Sense; neither is there any benumbing of the\norgans of Sense in sleep. But Dreams, according to my opinion, are made\nby the Sensitive and Rational Corporeal Motions, by figuring several\nobjects, as awake; onely the difference is, that the Sensitive motions\nin Dreams work by rote and on the inside of the Sensitive organs, when\nas awake they work according to the patterns of outward objects, and\nexteriously or on the outside of the sensitive Organs, so that sleep\nor dreams are nothing else but an alteration of motions, from moving\nexteriously to move interiously, and from working after a Pattern to\nwork by rote: I do not say that the body is without all exterior\nmotions, when asleep, as breathing and beating of the Pulse (although\nthese motions are rather interior then exterior,) but that onely the\nsensitive organs are outwardly shut, so as not to receive the patterns\nof outward Objects, nevertheless the sensitive Motions do not cease\nfrom moving inwardly; or on the inside of the sensitive Organs; But the\nrational matter doth often, as awake, so asleep or in dreams, make such\nfigures, as the sensitive did never make either from outward objects,\nor of its own accord; for the sensitive hath sometimes liberty to work\nwithout Objects, but the Rational much more, which is not bound either\nto the patterns of Exterior objects, or of the sensitive voluntary\nFigures. Wherefore it is not divers distempers, as your Authour sayes,\nthat cause different Dreams, or Gold, or Heat; neither are Dreams the\nreverse of our waking Imaginations, nor all the Figures in Dreams are\nnot made with their heels up, and their heads downwards, though some\nare; but this error or irregularity proceeds from want of exterior\nObjects or Patterns, and by reason the sensitive Motions work by rote;\nneither are the Motions reverse, because they work inwardly asleep, and\noutwardly awake, for Mad-men awake see several Figures without Objects.\nIn short, sleeping and waking, is somewhat after that manner, when men\nare called either out of their doors, or stay within their houses; or\nlike a Ship, where the Mariners work all under hatches, whereof you\nwill find more in my Philosophical Opinions; and so taking my leave, I\nrest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Leviathan, Part._ 1. _c._ 2.\n\n\n\n\nVIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour Authour going on in his discourse of Imagination, says,[1] _That,\nas we have no Imagination, whereof we have not formerly had sense, in\nwhole or in parts; so we have not Transition from one Imagination to\nanother, whereof we never had the like before in our senses_. To which\nmy answer is in short, that the Rational part of Matter in One composed\nfigure, as in Man, or the like Creature, may make such figures, as\nthe senses did never make in that composed Figure or Creature; And\nthough your Authour reproves those that say,[2] _Imaginations rise\nof themselves_; yet, if the self-moving part of Matter, which I call\nRational, makes Imaginations, they must needs rise of themselves; for\nthe Rational part of matter being free and self-moving, depends upon\nnothing, neither Sense nor Object, I mean, so, as not to be able to\nwork without them. Next, when your Author, defining _Understanding_,\nsays that it is nothing else, but[3] _an Imagination raised by words or\nother voluntary signs_, My Answer is, that Understanding, and so Words\nand Signs are made by self-moving Matter, that is, Sense and Reason,\nand not Sense and Reason by Words and Signs; wherefore Thoughts are\nnot like[4] _Water upon a plain Table, which is drawn and guided by\nthe finger this or that way_, for every Part of self-moving matter is\nnot alwayes forced, perswaded or directed, for if all the Parts of\nSense and Reason were ruled by force or perswasion, not any wounded\nCreature would fail to be healed, or any disease to be cured by outward\nApplications, for outward Applications to Wounds and Diseases might\nhave more force, then any Object to the Eye: But though there is great\naffinity and sympathy between parts, yet there is also great difference\nand antipathy betwixt them, which is the cause that many objects\ncannot with all their endeavours work such effects upon the Interiour\nparts, although they are closely press'd, for Impressions of objects\ndo not always affect those parts they press. Wherefore, I am not of\nyour Author's opinion, that all Parts of Matter press one another; It\nis true, _Madam_, there cannot be any part single, but yet this doth\nnot prove, that parts must needs press each other: And as for his\n_Train of Thoughts_, I must confess, that Thoughts for the most part\nare made orderly, but yet they do not follow each other like Geese,\nfor surely, man has sometimes very different thoughts; as for Example,\na man sometime is very sad for the death of his Friend, and thinks\nof his own death, and immediately thinks of a wanton Mistress, which\nlater thought, surely, the thought of Death did not draw in; wherefore,\nthough some thought may be the Ring-leader of others, yet many are made\nwithout leaders. Again, your Author in his description of the Mind\nsayes, that _the discourse of the mind, when it is govern'd by design,\nis nothing but seeking, or the Faculty of Invention; a hunting out of\nthe Causes of some Effects, present or past; or of the Effects of some\npresent or past Cause. Sometimes a man seeks what he has lost, and from\nthat Place and Time wherein he misses it, his mind runs back from place\nto place, and time to time, to find where and when he had it, that is\nto say, to find some certain and limited Time and Place, in which to\nbegin a method of Seeking. And from thence his thoughts run over the\nsame places and times to find what action or other occasion might make\nhim lose it. This we call Remembrance or calling to mind. Sometimes\na man knows a place determinate, within the compass whereof he is to\nseek, and then his thoughts run over all the Parts thereof in the same\nmanner as one would sweep a room to find a Jewel, or as a Spaniel\nranges the field till he find a sent; or as a Man should run over the\nAlphabet to start a Rime._ Thus far your Author: In which discourse I\ndo not perceive that he defineth what the Mind is, but I say, that if,\naccording to his opinion, nothing moves it self, but one thing moves\nanother, then the Mind must do nothing, but move backward and forward,\nnay, onely forward, and if all actions were thrusting or pressing of\nparts, it would be like a crowd of People, and there would be but\nlittle or no motion, for the crowd would make a stoppage, like water in\na glass, the mouth of the Glass being turned downwards, no water can\npass out, by reason the numerous drops are so closely press'd, as they\ncannot move exteriously. Next, I cannot conceive how the Mind can run\nback either to Time or Place, for as for Place, the mind is inclosed\nin the body, and the running about in the parts of the body or brain\nwill not inform it of an Exterior place or object; besides, objects\nbeing the cause of the minds motion, it must return to its Cause, and\nso move until it come to the object, that moved it first, so that the\nmind must run out of the body to that object, which moved it to such\na Thought, although that object were removed out of the World (as the\nphrase is:) But for the mind to move backward, to Time past, is more\nthen it can do; Wherefore in my opinion, Remembrance, or the like, is\nonely a repetition of such Figures as were like to the Objects; and for\nThoughts in Particular, they are several figures, made by the mind,\nwhich is the Rational Part of matter, in its own substance, either\nvoluntarily, or by imitation, whereof you may see more in my Book of\nPhilosophical Opinions. Hence I conclude, that Prudence is nothing\nelse, but a comparing of Figures to Figures, and of the several actions\nof those Figures; as repeating former Figures, and comparing them to\nothers of the like nature, qualities, proprieties, as also chances,\nfortunes, &c. Which figuring and repeating is done actually, in and\nby the Rational Matter, so that all the observation of the mind on\noutward Objects is onely an actual repetition of the mind, as moving\nin such or such figures and actions; and when the mind makes voluntary\nFigures with those repeated Figures, and compares them together, this\ncomparing is Examination; and when several Figures agree and joyn,\nit is Conclusion or Judgment: likewise doth Experience proceed from\nrepeating and comparing of several Figures in the Mind, and the more\nseveral Figures are repeated and compared, the greater the experience\nis. One thing more there is in the same Chapter, which I cannot let\npass without examination; Your Authour says, That _things Present\nonely have a being in Nature, things Past onely a being in the Memory,\nbut things to come have no being at all_; Which how it possibly can\nbe, I am not able to conceive; for certainly, if nothing in nature is\nlost or annihilated, what is past, and what is to come, hath as well\na being, as what is present; and, if that which is now, had its being\nbefore, why may it not also have its being hereafter? It might as well\nbe said, that what is once forgot, cannot be remembred; for whatsoever\nis in Nature, has as much a being as the Mind, and there is not any\naction, or motion, or figure, in Nature, but may be repeated, that is,\nmay return to its former Figure, When it is altered and dissolved;\nBut by reason Nature delights in variety, repetitions are not so\nfrequently made, especially of those things or creatures, which are\ncomposed by the sensitive corporeal motions in the inanimate part of\nMatter, because they are not so easily wrought, as the Rational matter\ncan work upon its own parts, being more pliant in its self, then the\nInanimate matter is; And this is the reason, that there are so many\nrepetitions of one and the same Figure in the Rational matter, which\nis the Mind, but seldom any in the Gross and inanimate part of Matter,\nfor Nature loves ease and freedom: But to conclude, _Madam_, I perceive\nyour Author confines Sense onely to Animal-kind, and Reason onely to\nMan-kind: Truly, it is out of self-love, when one Creature prefers his\nown Excellency before another, for nature being endued with self-love,\nall Creatures have self-love too, because they are all Parts of Nature;\nand when Parts agree or disagree, it is out of Interest and Self-love;\nbut Man herein exceeds all the rest, as having a supernatural Soul,\nwhose actions also are supernatural; To which I leave him, and rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend,_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Leviathan, part._ 1. _c._ 3.\n\n[2] _part._ 1. _c._ 2.\n\n[3] _ibid. c._ 3.\n\n[4] _ibid._\n\n\n\n\nIX.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nWhen your Author discourseth of the use of _Speech or Words and Names_,\nhe is pleas'd to say,[1] _That their use is to serve for marks and\nnotes of Remembrance_; Whereof to give you my opinion, I say, That\nSpeech is natural to the shape of Man; and though sometimes it serves\nfor marks or notes of remembrance, yet it doth not always, for all\nother Animals have Memory without the help of Speech, and so have deaf\nand dumb men, nay more then those that hear and speak: Wherefore,\nthough Words are useful to the mind, and so to the memory, yet both\ncan be without them, whereas Words cannot be without Memory; for take\na Bird, and teach him to speak, if he had not Memory, before he heard\nthe words, he could never learn them. You will ask me, _Madam_, What\nthen, is Memory the Cause of Speech? I answer, Life and Knowledg, which\nis Sense and Reason, as it creates and makes all sorts of Creatures,\nso also amongst the rest it makes Words: And as I said before, that\nMemory may be without the help of Speech or Words, so I say also, that\nthere is a possibility of reckoning of numbers, as also of magnitudes,\nof swiftness, of force, and other things without words, although your\nAuthor denies it: But some men are so much for Art, as they endeavour\nto make Art, which is onely a Drudgery-maid of Nature, the chief\nMistress, and Nature her Servant, which is as much as to prefer Effects\nbefore the Cause, Nature before God, Discord before Unity and Concord.\n\nAgain, your _Author_, in his Chapter of Reason,[2] defines _Reason_ to\nbe nothing else but _Reckoning_: I answer, That in my opinion Reckoning\nis not Reason it self, but onely an effect or action of Reason; for\nReason, as it is the chiefest and purest degree of animate matter,\nworks variously and in divers motions, by which it produces various\nand divers effects, which are several Perceptions, as Conception,\nImagination, Fancy, Memory, Remembrance, Understanding, Judgment,\nKnowledg, and all the Passions, with many more: Wherefore this Reason\nis not in one undivided part, nor bound to one motion, for it is in\nevery Creature more or less, and moves in its own parts variously; and\nin some Creatures, as for example, in some men, it moves more variously\nthen in others, which is the cause that some men are more dull and\nstupid, then others; neither doth Reason always move in one Creature\nregularly, which is the cause, that some men are mad or foolish: And\nthough all men are made by the direction of Reason, and endued with\nReason, from the first time of their birth, yet all have not the like\nCapacities, Understandings, Imaginations, Wits, Fancies, Passions,\n&c. but some more, some less, and some regular, some irregular,\naccording to the motions of Reason or Rational part of animate matter;\nand though some rational parts may make use of other rational Parts,\nas one man of another mans Conceptions, yet all these parts cannot\nassociate together; as for example, all the Material parts of several\nobjects, no not their species, cannot enter or touch the eye without\ndanger of hurting or loosing it, nevertheless the eye makes use of the\nobjects by patterning them out, and so doth the rational matter, by\ntaking patterns from the sensitive; And thus knowledg or perception of\nobjects, both sensitive and rational, is taken without the pressure of\nany other parts; for though parts joyn to parts, (for no part can be\nsingle) yet this joining doth not necessarily infer the pressure of\nobjects upon the sensitive organs; Whereof I have already discoursed\nsufficiently heretofore, to which I refer you, and rest\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Leviathan, part._ 1. _c._ 4.\n\n[2] _Ch._ 5.\n\n\n\n\nX.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\n_Understanding_ says your Author,[1] _is nothing else but Conception\ncaused by speech, and therefore, if speech be peculiar to man, (as, for\nought I know, it is) then is understanding peculiar to him also._ Where\nhe confineth Understanding onely to speech and to Mankind; But, by his\nleave, _Madam_, I surely believe, that there is more understanding in\nNature, then that, which is in speech, for if there were not, I cannot\nconceive, how all the exact forms in Generations could be produced,\nor how there could be such distinct degrees of several sorts and\nkinds of Creatures, or distinctions of times and seasons, and so many\nexact motions and figures in Nature: Considering all this, my reason\nperswadeth me, that all Understanding, which is a part of Knowledg, is\nnot caused by speech, for all the motions of the Celestial Orbs are not\nmade by speech, neither is the knowledg or understanding which a man\nhath, when sick, as to know or understand he is sick, made by speech,\nnor by outward objects, especially in a disease he never heard, nor\nsaw, nor smelt, nor tasted, nor touched; Wherefore all Perception,\nSensation, Memory, Imagination, Appetite, Understanding, and the like,\nare not made nor caused by outward objects, nor by speech. And as for\nnames of things, they are but different postures of the figures in\nour mind or thoughts, made by the Rational matter; But Reasoning is\na comparing of the several figures with their several postures and\nactions in the Mind, which joyned with the several words, made by the\nsensitive motions, inform another distinct and separate part, as an\nother man, of their minds conceptions, understanding, opinions, and the\nlike.\n\nConcerning Addition and Subtraction, wherein your _Author_ sayes\nReasoning consists, I grant, that it is an act of Reasoning, yet it\ndoth not make Sense or Reason, which is Life and Knowledge, but Sense\nand Reason which is self-motion, makes addition and subtraction of\nseveral Parts of matter; for had matter not self-motion, it could not\ndivide nor compose, nor make such varieties, without great and lingring\nretardments, if not confusion. Wherefore all, what is made in Nature,\nis made by self-moving matter, which self-moving matter doth not at all\ntimes move regularly, but often irregularly, which causes false Logick,\nfalse Arithmetick, and the like; and if there be not a certainty in\nthese self-motions or actions of Nature, much less in Art, which is\nbut a secundary action; and therefore, neither speech, words, nor\nexterior objects cause Understanding or Reason. And although many parts\nof the Rational and Sensitive Matter joyned into one, may be stronger\nby their association, and over-power other parts that are not so well\nknit and united, yet these are not the less pure; onely these Parts and\nMotions being not equal in several Creatures, make their Knowledge and\nReason more or less: For, when a man hath more Rational Matter well\nregulated, and so more Wisdom then an other, that same man may chance\nto over-power the other, whose Rational Matter is more irregular, but\nyet not so much by strength of the united Parts, as by their subtilty;\nfor the Rational Matter moving regularly, is more strong with subtilty,\nthen the sensitive with force; so that Wisdom is stronger then\nLife, being more pure, and so more active; for in my opinion, there\nis a degree of difference between Life and Knowledge, as my Book of\n_Philosophical Opinions_ will inform you.\n\nAgain, your _Author_ sayes, _That Man doth excel all other Animals in\nthis faculty, that when he conceives any thing whatsoever, he is apt\nto enquire the Consequences of it, and what effects he can do with\nit: Besides this_ (sayes he) _Man hath an other degree of Excellence,\nthat he can by Words reduce the Consequences he finds to General Rules\ncalled Theoremes or Aphorisms, that is, he can reason or reckon not\nonely in Number, but in all other things, whereof one may be added\nunto, or substracted from an other._ To which I answer, That according\nto my Reason I cannot perceive, but that all Creatures may do as much;\nbut by reason they do it not after the same manner or way as Man, Man\ndenies, they can do it at all; which is very hard; for what man knows,\nwhether Fish do not Know more of the nature of Water, and ebbing and\nflowing, and the saltness of the Sea? or whether Birds do not know\nmore of the nature and degrees of Air, or the cause of Tempests? or\nwhether Worms do not know more of the nature of Earth, and how Plants\nare produced? or Bees of the several sorts of juices of Flowers, then\nMen? And whether they do not make there Aphorismes and Theoremes by\ntheir manner of Intelligence? For, though they have not the speech of\nMan, yet thence doth not follow, that they have no Intelligence at\nall. But the Ignorance of Men concerning other Creatures is the cause\nof despising other Creatures, imagining themselves as petty Gods in\nNature, when as _Nature_ is not capable to make one God, much less so\nmany as Mankind; and were it not for Mans supernatural Soul, Man would\nnot be more Supreme, then other Creatures in Nature, _But_ (says your\n_Author_) _this Priviledge in Man is allay'd by another, which is, No\nliving Creature is subject to absurdity, but onely Man._ Certainly,\n_Madam_, I believe the contrary, to wit, that all other Creatures do\nas often commit mistakes and absurdities as Man, and if it were not to\navoid tediousness, I could present sufficient proofs to you: Wherefore\nI think, not onely Man but also other Creatures may be Philosophers and\nsubject to absurdities as aptly as Men; for Man doth, nor cannot truly\nknow the Faculties, and Abilities or Actions of all other Creatures,\nno not of his own Kind as Man-Kind, for if he do measure all men by\nhimself he will be very much mistaken, for what he conceives to be\ntrue or wise, an other may conceive to be false and foolish. But Man\nmay have one way of Knowledge in Philosophy and other Arts, and other\nCreatures another way, and yet other Creatures manner or way may be\nas Intelligible and Instructive to each other as Man's, I mean, in\nthose things which are Natural. Wherefore I cannot consent to what\nyour _Author_ says, _That Children are not endued with Reason at all,\ntill they have attained to the use of Speech_; for Reason is in those\nCreatures which have not Speech, witness Horses, especially those which\nare taught in the manage, and many other Animals. And as for the weak\nunderstanding in Children, I have discoursed thereof in my Book of\nPhilosophy; The rest of this discourse, lest I tire you too much at\nonce, I shall reserve for the next, resting in the mean time,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend,_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Leviathan, part._ 1. _c._ 4.\n\n\n\n\nXI.\n\n\n_Madam,_\n\nI sent you word in my last, that your _Author's_ opinion is, _That\nChildren are not endued with Reason at all, until they have attained\nto the use of Speech,_ in the same Chapter[1] he speaks to the same\npurpose thus: _Reason is not as Sense and Memory born with us, nor\ngotten by experience onely, as Prudence is, but attained by industry._\nTo which I reply onely this, That it might as well be said, a\nChild when new born hath not flesh and blood, because by taking in\nnourishment or food, the Child grows to have more flesh and blood; or,\nthat a Child is not born with two legs, because he cannot go, or with\ntwo arms and hands, because he cannot help himself; or that he is not\nborn with a tongue, because he cannot speak: For although Reason doth\nnot move in a Child as in a Man, in Infancy as in Youth, in Youth as in\nAge, yet that doth not prove that Children are without Reason, because\nthey cannot run and prate: I grant, some other Creatures appear to\nhave more Knowledg when new born then others; as for example, a young\nFoal has more knowledg than a young Child, because a Child cannot run\nand play; besides a Foal knows his own Dam, and can tell where to\ntake his food, as to run and suck his Dam, when as an Infant cannot\ndo so, nor all beasts, though most of them can, but yet this doth not\nprove, that a Child hath no reason at all; Neither can I perceive\nthat man is a Monopoler of all Reason, or Animals of all Sense, but\nthat Sense and Reason are in other Creatures as well as in Man and\nAnimals; for example, Drugs, as Vegetables and Minerals, although they\ncannot slice, pound or infuse, as man can, yet they can work upon man\nmore subtilly, wisely, and as sensibly either by purging, vomiting,\nspitting, or any other way, as man by mincing, pounding and infusing\nthem, and Vegetables will as wisely nourish Men, as Men can nourish\nVegetables; Also some Vegetables are as malicious and mischievous to\nMan, as Man is to one another, witness Hemlock, Nightshade, and many\nmore; and a little Poppy will as soon, nay sooner cause a Man to sleep,\nthough silently, then a Nurse a Child with singing and rocking; But\nbecause they do not act in such manner or way as Man, Man judgeth them\nto be without sense and reason; and because they do not prate and\ntalk as Man, Man believes they have not so much wit as he hath; and\nbecause they cannot run and go, Man thinks they are not industrious;\nthe like for Infants concerning Reason. But certainly, it is not local\nmotion or speech that makes sense and reason, but sense and reason\nmakes them; neither is sense and reason bound onely to the actions of\nMan, but it is free to the actions, forms, figures and proprieties of\nall Creatures; for if none but Man had reason, and none but Animals\nsense, the World could not be so exact, and so well in order as it\nis: but Nature is wiser then Man with all his Arts, for these are\nonely produced through the variety of Natures actions, and disputes\nthrough the superfluous varieties of Mans follies or ignorances, not\nknowing Natures powerful life and knowledg: But I wonder, _Madam_, your\n_Author_ says in this place, _That Reason is not born with Man_, when\nas in another place,[2] he says, _That every man brought Philosophy,\nthat is Natural reason with him into the World_; Which how it agree, I\nwill leave to others to judg, and to him to reconcile it, remaining in\nthe meantime,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Constant Friend_\n\n_and Faithful Servant._\n\n[1] _Ch._ 4.\n\n[2] In his _Elements of Philosophy, part._ 1. _c._ 1. _art._ 1.\n\n\n\n\nXII.\n\n\n_Madam,_\n\nTwo sorts of motions, I find your _Author_[1] doth attribute to\nAnimals, _viz. Vital and Animal, the Vital motions_, says he, _are\nbegun in Generation, and continued without Interruption through their\nwhole life, and those are the Course of the Blood, the Pulse, the\nBreathing, Conviction, Nutrition, Excretion, &c. to which motions\nthere needs no help of Imaginations; But the animal Motions, otherwise\ncalled voluntary Motions, are to go, to speak, to move any of our\nlimbs, in such manner as is first fancied in our minds: And because\ngoing, speaking, and the like voluntary motions, depend always upon\na precedent thought of whither, which way, and what, it is evident,\nthat the Imagination is the first Internal beginning of all voluntary\nMotion_. Thus far your _Author_. Whereof in short I give you my\nopinion, first concerning Vital Motions, that it appears improbable if\nnot impossible to me, that Generation should be the cause and beginning\nof Life, because Life must of necessity be the cause of Generation,\nlife being the Generator of all things, for without life motion could\nnot be, and without motion not any thing could be begun, increased,\nperfected, or dissolved. Next, that Imagination is not necessary to\nVital Motions, it is probable it may not, but yet there is required\nKnowledg, which I name Reason; for if there were not Knowledg in all\nGenerations or Productions, there could not any distinct Creature be\nmade or produced, for then all Generations would be confusedly mixt,\nneither would there be any distinct kinds or sorts of Creatures, nor\nno different Faculties, Proprieties, and the like. Thirdly, concerning\n_Animal Motions_, which your _Author_ names _Voluntary Motions, as to\ngo, to speak, to move any of our limbs, in such manner as is first\nfancied in our minds, and that they depend upon a precedent thought\nof whither, which way, and what, and that Imagination is the first\nInternal beginning of them_; I think, by your _Authors_ leave, it doth\nimply a contradiction, to call them Voluntary Motions, and yet to say\nthey are caused and depend upon our Imagination; for if the Imagination\ndraws them this way, or that way, how can they be voluntary motions,\nbeing in a manner forced and necessitated to move according to Fancy\nor Imagination? But when he goes on in the same place and treats of\nEndeavour, Appetite, Desire, Hunger, Thirst, Aversion, Love, Hate, and\nthe like, he derives one from the other, and treats well as a Moral\nPhilosopher; but whether it be according to the truth or probability of\nNatural Philosophy, I will leave to others to judge, for in my opinion\nPassions and Appetites are very different, Appetites being made by\nthe motions of the sensitive Life, and Passions, as also Imagination,\nMemory, &c. by the motions of the rational Life, which is the cause\nthat Appetites belong more to the actions of the Body then the Mind:\n'Tis true, the Sensitive and Rational self-moving matter doth so much\nresemble each other in their actions, as it is difficult to distinguish\nthem. But having treated hereof at large in my other Philosophical\nWork, to cut off repetitions, I will refer you to that, and desire\nyou to compare our opinions together: But certainly there is so much\nvariety in one and the same sort of Passions, and so of Appetites, as\nit cannot be easily express'd. To conclude, I do not perceive that your\n_Author_ tells or expresses what the cause is of such or such actions,\nonely he mentions their dependance, which is, as if a man should\nconverse with a Nobleman's Friend or Servant, and not know the Lord\nhimself. But leaving him for this time, it is sufficient to me, that I\nknow your Ladyship, and your Ladyship knows me, that I am,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend, and humble Servant._\n\n[1] _Leviathan, part._ 1. _c._ 6.\n\n\n\n\nXIII.\n\n\n_Madam,_\n\nHaving obey'd your Commands in giving you my opinion of the First Part\nof the Book of that famous and learned _Author_ you sent me, I would\ngo on; but seeing he treats in his following Parts of the Politicks, I\nwas forced to stay my Pen, because of these following Reasons. First,\nThat a Woman is not imployed in State Affairs, unless an absolute\nQueen. Next, That to study the Politicks, is but loss of Time, unless\na man were sure to be a Favourite to an absolute Prince. Thirdly, That\nit is but a deceiving Profession, and requires more Craft then Wisdom.\nAll which considered, I did not read that part of your _Author_: But\nas for his _Natural Philosophy_, I will send you my opinion so far as\nI understand it: For what belongs to Art, as to Geometry, being no\nScholar, I shall not trouble my self withal. And so I'l take my leave\nof you, when I have in two or three words answered the Question you\nsent me last, which was, Whether Nature be the Art of God, Man the Art\nof Nature, and a Politick Government the Art of Man? To which I answer,\n'Tis probable it may be so; onely I add this, That Nature doth not\nrule God, nor Man Nature, nor Politick Government Man; for the Effect\ncannot rule the Cause, but the Cause doth rule the Effect: Wherefore\nif men do not naturally agree, Art cannot make unity amongst them, or\nassociate them into one Politick Body and so rule them; But man thinks\nhe governs, when as it is Nature that doth it, for as nature doth unite\nor divide parts regularly or irregularly, and moves the several minds\nof men and the several parts of mens bodies, so war is made or peace\nkept: Thus it is not the artificial form that governs men in a Politick\nGovernment, but a natural power, for though natural motion can make\nartificial things, yet artificial things cannot make natural power;\nand we might as well say, nature is governed by the art of nature, as\nto say man is ruled by the art and invention of men. The truth is, Man\nrules an artificial Government, and not the Government Man, just like\nas a Watch-maker rules his Watch, and not the Watch the Watch-maker.\nAnd thus I conclude and rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXIV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nConcerning the other Book of that learned Author _Hobbs_ you sent me,\ncalled _Elements of Philosophy_, I shall likewise according to your\ndesire, give you my judgment and opinion of it as I have done of the\nformer, not that I intend to prejudice him any ways thereby, but onely\nto mark those places wherein I seem to dissent from his opinions,\nwhich liberty, I hope, he will not deny me; And in order to this,\nI have read over the first Chapter of the mentioned Book, treating\nof Philosophy in General, wherein amongst the rest, discoursing of\nthe Utility of Natural Philosophy, and relating the commodities and\nbenefits which proceed from so many arts and sciences, he is pleased to\nsay,[1] that they are _injoyed almost by all people of_ Europe, Asia,\n_and some of_ Africa, _onely the Americans, and those that live neer\nthe Poles do want them: But why_, says he, _have they sharper wits\nthen these? Have not all men one kind of soul, and the same faculties\nof mind?_ To which, give me leave, _Madam_, to add, That my opinion\nis, that there is a difference between the Divine and the Natural\nsoul of man, and though the natural mind or soul is of one kind, yet\nbeing made of rational matter, it is divideable and composeable, by\nwhich division and composition, men may have more or less wit, or\nquicker and slower wit; the like for Judgments, Imaginations, Fancies,\nOpinions, &c. For were the natural rational mind individeable, all\nmen would have the like degree of wit or understanding, all men would\nbe Philosophers or fools, which by reason they are not, it proves the\nnatural rational mind is divideable and composeable, making variations\nof its own several parts by self-motion; for it is not the several\noutward objects, or forreign instructions, that make the variety of\nthe mind; neither is wit or ingenuity alike in all men; for some are\nnatural Poets, Philosophers, and the like, without learning, and some\nare far more ingenious then others, although their breeding is obscure\nand mean, Neither will learning make all men Scholars, for some will\ncontinue Dunces all their life time; Neither doth much experience\nmake all men wise, for some are not any ways advanced in their wisdom\nby much and long experiences; And as for Poetry, it is according to\nthe common Proverb; a _Poet is born, not made_; Indeed learning doth\nrather hurt Fancy, for great Scholars are not always good Poets, nor\nall States-men Natural Philosophers, nor all Experienced Men Wise\nMen, nor all Judges Just, nor all Divines Pious, nor all Pleaders\nor Preachers Eloquent, nor all Moral Philosophers Vertuous; But all\nthis is occasioned by the various Motions of the rational self-moving\nmatter, which is the Natural Mind. And thus much for the present of the\ndifference of wits and faculties of the mind; I add no more, but rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend,_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Art._ 7.\n\n\n\n\nXV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nMy Discourse for the present shall be of _Infinite_, and the question\nshall be first _Whether several Finite parts, how many soever there be,\ncan make an Infinite._ Your Author says,[1] _that several Finite parts\nwhen they are all put together make a whole Finite_; which, if his\nmeaning be of a certain determinate number, how big soever, of finite\nparts, I do willingly grant, for all what is determinate and limited,\nis not Infinite but Finite; neither is there any such thing, as Whole\nor All in Infinite; but if his meaning be, that no Infinite can be made\nof finite parts, though infinite in number, I deny it; Next he says\n_there can be no such thing as One in Infinite, because No thing can\nbe said One, except there be another to compare it withal_; which in\nmy opinion doth not follow, for there is but One God, who is Infinite,\nand hath none other to be compared withal, and so there may be but one\nOnely Infinite in Nature, which is Matter. But when he says, _there\ncannot be an Infinite and Eternal Division_, is very true, _viz._, in\nthis sense, that one single part cannot be actually infinitely divided,\nfor the Compositions hinder the Divisions in Nature, and the Divisions\nthe Compositions, so that Nature, being Matter, cannot be composed\nso, as not to have parts, nor divided so, as that her parts should\nnot be composed, but there are nevertheless infinite divided parts\nin Nature, and in this sense there may also be infinite divisions,\nas I have declared in my Book of Philosophy[2]. And thus there are\nInfinite divisions of Infinite parts in Nature, but not Infinite actual\ndivisions of one single part; But though Infinite is without end, yet\nmy discourse of it shall be but short and end here, though not my\naffection, which shall last and continue with the life of\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_and Humble Servant._\n\n[1] _Elem. of Philos. c._ 7. _a._ 1 2.\n\n[2] _P._ 1. _c._ 8.\n\n\n\n\nXVI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nAn _Accident_, says your _Author_,[1] _is nothing else, but the manner\nof our Conception of body, or that Faculty of any body, by which it\nworks in us a Conception of it self_; To which I willingly consent;\nbut yet I say, that these qualities cannot be separated from the body,\nfor as impossible it is that the essence of Nature should be separable\nfrom Nature, as impossible is it that the various modes or alterations,\neither of Figures or Motions, should be separable from matter or body;\nWherefore when he goes on, and says,[2] _An accident is not a body,\nbut in a body, yet not so, as if any thing were contained therein, as\nif for example, redness were in blood in the same manner as blood is\nin a bloody cloth; but as magnitude is in that which is great, rest in\nthat which resteth, motion in that which is moved_; I answer, that in\nmy opinion, not any thing in Nature can be without a body, and that\nredness is as well in blood, as blood is in a bloody cloth, or any\nother colour in any thing else; for there is no colour without a body,\nbut every colour hath as well a body as any thing else, and if Colour\nbe a separable accident, I would fain know, how it can be separated\nfrom a subject, being bodiless, for that which is no body is nothing,\nand nothing cannot be taken away from any thing; Wherefore as for\nnatural Colour it cannot be taken away from any creature, without the\nparts of its substance or body; and as for artificial Colours, when\nthey are taken away, it is a separation of two bodies, which joyned\ntogether; and if Colour, or Hardness, or Softness do change, it is\nnothing else but an alteration of motions and not an annihilation, for\nall changes and alterations remain in the power of Corporeal motions,\nas I have said in other places; for we might as well say, life doth\nnot remain in nature, when a body turns from an animal to some other\nfigure, as believe that those, they name accidents, do not remain in\nCorporeal Motions; Wherefore I am not of your _Authors_ mind, when\nhe says,[3] that _when a White thing is made black, the whiteness\nperishes_; for it cannot perish, although it is altered from white to\nblack, being in the power of the same matter, to turn it again from\nblack to white, so as it may make infinite Repetitions of the same\nthing; but by reason nature takes delight in variety, she seldom uses\nsuch repetitions; nevertheless that doth not take away the Power of\nself-moving matter, for it doth not, and it cannot, are two several\nthings, and the latter doth not necessarily follow upon the former;\nWherefore not any, the least thing, can perish in Nature, for if this\nwere possible, the whole body of nature might perish also, for if so\nmany Figures and Creatures should be annihilated and perish without\nany supply or new Creation, Nature would grow less, and at last become\nnothing; besides it is as difficult for Nature to turn something into\nnothing, as to Create something out of nothing; Wherefore as there is\nno annihilation or perishing in Nature, so there is neither any new\nCreation in Nature. But your _Author_ makes a difference between bodies\nand accidents, saying, _that bodies are things and not generated,\nbut accidents are Generated and not things._ Truly, _Madam_, these\naccidents seem to me to be like _Van Helmont's_ Lights, Gases, Blazes\nand Ideas; and Dr _More's_ Immaterial Substances or D\u00e6mons, onely in\nthis Dr _More_ hath the better, that his Immaterial Substances, are\nbeings, which subsist of themselves, whereas accidents do not, but\ntheir existence is in other bodies; But what they call Accidents,\nare in my opinion nothing else but Corporeal Motions, and if these\naccidents be generated, they must needs be bodies, for how nothing\ncan be Generated in nature, is not conceivable, and yet your _Author_\ndenies,[4] that _Accidents are something, namely some part of a natural\nthing_; But as for Generations, they are onely various actions of\nself-moving matter, or a variety of Corporeal Motions, and so are all\nAccidents whatsoever, so that there is not any thing in nature, that\ncan be made new, or destroyed, for whatsoever was and shall be, is\nin nature, though not always in act, yet in power, as in the nature\nand power of Corporeal motions, which is self-moving matter, And as\nthere is no new Generation of Accidents, so there is neither a new\nGeneration of Motions; wherefore when your _Author_ says,[5] _That,\nwhen the hand, being moved, moveth the pen, the motion doth not go out\nof the hand into the pen, for so the writing might be continued, though\nthe hand stood still, but a new motion is generated in the pen, and\nis the pens motion_: I am of his opinion, that the motion doth not\ngo out of the hand into the pen, and that the motion of the pen, is\nthe pens own motion; but I deny, that after holding the hand a little\nwhile still, and beginning to write again, a new motion of the pen is\ngenerated; for it is onely a repetition, and not a new generation,\nfor the Hand, Pen and Ink, repeat but the same motion or action of\nwriting: Besides, Generation is made by Connexion or Conjunction of\nparts, moving by consent to such or such Figures, but the motion of\nthe Hand or the Pen is always one and the same; wherefore it is but\nthe variation and repetition in and of the same motion of the Hand,\nor Pen, which may be continued in that manner infinitely, just as the\nsame Corporeal Motions can make infinite variations and repetitions\nof one and the same Figure, repeating it as oft as they please, as\nalso making Copy of Copy; And although I do not deny, but there are\nGenerations in Nature, yet not annihilations or perishings, for if any\none motion or figure should perish, the matter must perish also; and if\nany one part of matter can perish, all the matter in nature may perish\nalso; and if there can any new thing be made or created in nature,\nwhich hath not been before, there may also be a new Nature, and so by\nperishings and new Creations, this World would not have continued an\nage; But surely whatsoever is in Nature, hath been existent always.\nWherefore to conclude, it is not the generation and perishing of an\nAccident that makes its subject to be changed, but the production and\nalteration of the Form, makes it said to be generated or destroyed,\nfor matter will change its motions and figures without perishing or\nannihilating; and whether there were words or not, there would be such\ncauses and effects; But having not the art of Logick to dispute with\nartificial words, nor the art of Geometry to demonstrate my opinions\nby Mathematical Figures, I fear they will not be so well received by\nthe Learned; However, I leave them to any mans unprejudiced Reason and\nJudgment, and devote my self to your service, as becomes,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Ladiships_\n\n_humble and faithful Servant._\n\n[1] _Elem. of Philos. c._ 8. _art._ 2.\n\n[2] _Art._ 3.\n\n[3] _Art._ 20.\n\n[4] _Art._ 2.\n\n[5] _Art._ 21.\n\n\n\n\nXVII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour _Author_ concerning Place and Magnitude says,[1], that _Place\nis nothing out of the mind, nor Magnitude any thing within it; for\nPlace is a meer Phantasme of a body of such quantity and figure, and\nMagnitude a peculiar accident of the body_; but this doth not well\nagree with my reason, for I believe that Place, Magnitude and Body are\nbut one thing, and that Place is as true an extension as Magnitude,\nand not a feigned one; Neither am I of his opinion, _that Place is\nImmoveable_, but that place moves, according as the body moveth, for\nnot any body wants place, because place and body is but one thing, and\nwheresoever is body, there is also place, and wheresoever is place,\nthere is body, as being one and the same; Wherefore _Motion cannot be a\nrelinquishing of one place and acquiring another_,[2] for there is no\nsuch thing as place different from body, but what is called change of\nplace, is nothing but change of corporeal motions; for, say an house\nstands in such a place, if the house be gone, the place is gone also,\nas being impossible that the place of the house should remain, when the\nhouse is taken away; like as a man when he is gone out of his chamber,\nhis place is gone too; 'Tis true, if the ground or foundation do yet\nremain, one may say, there stood such an house heretofore, but yet the\nplace of the house is not there really at that present, unless the same\nhouse be built up again as it was before, and then it hath its place\nas before; Nevertheless the house being not there, it cannot be said\nthat either place or house are annihilated, _viz._, when the materials\nare dissolved, no not when transformed into millions of several other\nfigures, for the house remains still in the power of all those several\nparts of matter; and as for _space_, it is onely a distance betwixt\nsome parts or bodies; But an _Empty place_ signifies to my opinion\nNothing, for if place and body are one and the same, and empty is\nas much as nothing; then certainly these two words cannot consist\ntogether, but are destructive to one another. Concerning, that your\n_Author_ says,[3] _Two bodies cannot be together in the same place, nor\none body in two places at the same time_, is very true, for there are\nno more places then bodies, nor more bodies then places, and this is to\nbe understood as well of the grosser, as the purest parts of nature, of\nthe mind as well as of the body, of the rational and sensitive animate\nmatter as well as of the inanimate, for there is no matter, how pure\nand subtil soever, but is imbodied, and all that hath body hath place.\nLikewise I am of his opinion,[4] _That one body hath always one and\nthe same magnitude_; for, in my opinion, magnitude, place and body do\nnot differ, and as place, so magnitude can never be separated from\nbody. But when he speaks of _Rest_, I cannot believe there is any such\nthing truly in Nature, for it is impossible to prove, that any thing\nis without Motion, either consistent, or composing, or dissolving, or\ntransforming motions, or the like, although not altogether perceptible\nby our senses, for all the Matter is either moving or moved, and\nalthough the moved parts are not capable to receive the nature of\nself-motion from the self-moving parts, yet these self-moving parts,\nbeing joyned and mixt with all other parts of the moved matter, do\nalways move the same; for the Moved or Inanimate part of Matter,\nalthough it is a Part of it self, yet it is so intermixt with the\nself-moving Animate Matter, as they make but one Body; and though some\nparts of the Inanimate may be as pure as the Sensitive Animate Matter,\nyet they are never so subtil as to be self-moving; Wherefore the\nSensitive moves in the Inanimate, and the Rational in the Sensitive,\nbut often the Rational moves in it self. And, although there is no rest\nin nature, nevertheless Matter could have been without Motion, when as\nit is impossible that Matter could be without place or magnitude, no\nmore then Variety can be without motion; And thus much at this present:\nI conclude, and rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Part._ 2. _c._ 8. _a._ 5.\n\n[2] _Art._ 10.\n\n[3] _Art._ 8.\n\n[4] _Art._ 5.\n\n\n\n\nXVIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nPassing by those Chapters of your _Authors_, that treat of _Power and\nAct, Identy and Difference, Analogisme, Angle and Figure, Figures\ndeficient, dimension of Circles_, and several others, most of which\nbelong to art, as to Geometry, and the like; I am come to that wherein\nhe discourses of _Sense_ and _Animal Motion_, saying,[1] _That some\nNatural bodies have in themselves the patterns almost of all things,\nand others of none at all_; Whereof my opinion is, that the sensitive\nand rational parts of Matter are the living and knowing parts of\nNature, and no part of nature can challenge them onely to it self, nor\nno creature can be sure, that sense is onely in Animal-kind, and reason\nin Man-kind; for can any one think or believe that Nature is ignorant\nand dead in all her other parts besides Animals? Truly this is a very\nunreasonable opinion; for no man, as wise as he thinks himself, nay\nwere all Man-kind joyned into one body, yet they are not able to know\nit, unless there were no variety of parts in nature, but onely one\nwhole and individeable body, for other Creatures may know and perceive\nas much as Animals, although they have not the same Sensitive Organs,\nnor the same manner or way of Perception. Next your _Author_ says,[2]\n_The cause of Sense or Perception consists herein, that the first organ\nof sense is touched and pressed; For when the uttermost part of the\norgan is pressed, it no sooner yields, but the part next within it is\npressed also, and in this manner the pressure or motion is propagated\nthrough all the parts of the organ to the innermost. And thus also the\npressure of the uttermost part proceeds from the pressure of some more\nremote body, and so continually, till we come to that, from which, as\nfrom its fountain, we derive the Phantasme or Idea, that is made in\nus by our sense: And this, whatsoever it be, is that we commonly call\nthe object; Sense therefore is some Internal motion in the Sentient,\ngenerated by some Internal motion of the Parts of the object, and\npropagated through all the media to the innermost part of the organ.\nMoreover there being a resistance or reaction in the organ, by reason\nof its internal motion against the motion propagated from the object,\nthere is also an endeavour in the organ opposite to the endeavour\nproceeding from the object, and when that endeavour inwards is the last\naction in the act of sense, then from the reaction a Phantasme or Idea\nhas its being._ This is your _Authors_ opinion, which if it were so,\nperception could not be effected so suddenly, nay I think the sentient\nby so many pressures in so many perceptions, would at last be pressed\nto death, besides the organs would take a great deal of hurt, nay\ntotally be removed out of their places, so as the eye would in time be\nprest into the centre of the brain; And if there were any Resistance,\nReaction or Indeavour in the organ, opposite to the Endeavour of the\nobject, there would, in my opinion, be always a war between the animal\nsenses and the objects, the endeavour of the objects pressing one way,\nand the senses pressing the other way, and if equal in their strengths,\nthey would make a stop, and the sensitive organs would be very much\npained. Truly, _Madam_, in my opinion, it would be like that Custom\nwhich formerly hath been used at _Newcastle_, when a man was married,\nthe guests divided themselves, behind and before the Bridegroom, the\none party driving him back, the other forwards, so that one time a\nBridegroom was killed in this fashion; But certainly Nature hath a\nmore quick and easie way of giving intelligence and knowledg to her\nCreatures, and doth not use such constraint and force in her actions;\nNeither is sense or sensitive perception a meer Phantasme or Idea, but\na Corporeal action of the sensitive and rational matter, and according\nto the variation of the objects or patterns, and the sensitive and\nrational motions, the perception also is various, produced not by\nexternal pressure, but by internal self-motion, as I have declared\nheretofore; and to prove, that the sensitive and rational corporeal\nmotions are the onely cause of perception; I say, if those motions\nin an animal move in another way, and not to such perceptions, then\nthat animal can neither hear, see, taste, smell nor touch, although\nall his sensitive organs be perfect, as is evident in a man falling\ninto a swoon, where all the time he is in a swoon, the pressure of the\nobjects is made without any effect; Wherefore, as the sensitive and\nrational corporeal motions make all that is in nature; so likewise\nthey make perception, as being perception it self, for all self-motion\nis perception, but all perception is not animal perception; or after\nan animal way; and therefore sense cannot decay nor die, but what is\ncalled a decay or death, is nothing else but a change or alteration of\nthose Motions. But you will say, _Madam_, it may be, that one body,\nas an object, leaves the print of its figure, in the next adjoyning\nbody, until it comes to the organ of sense, I answer that then soft\nbodies onely must be pressed, and the object must be so hard as to\nmake a print, and as for rare parts of matter, they are not able to\nretain a print without self-motion; Wherefore it is not probable that\nthe parts of air should receive a print, and print the same again\nupon the adjoyning part, until the last part of the air print it\nupon the eye; and that the exterior parts of the organ should print\nupon the interior, till it come to the centre of the Brain, without\nself-motion. Wherefore in my opinion, Perception is not caused either\nby the printing of objects, nor by pressures, for pressures would\nmake a general stop of all natural motions, especially if there were\nany reaction or resistence of sense; but according to my reason, the\nsensitive and rational corporeal motions in one body, pattern out the\nFigure of another body, as of an exterior object, which may be done\neasily without any pressure or reaction; I will not say, that there\nis no pressure or reaction in Nature, but pressure and reaction doth\nnot make perception, for the sensitive and rational parts of matter\nmake all perception and variety of motion, being the most subtil parts\nof Nature, as self-moving, as also divideable, and composeable, and\nalterable in their figurative motions, for this Perceptive matter can\nchange its substance into any figure whatsoever in nature, as being not\nbound to one constant figure. But having treated hereof before, and\nbeing to say more of it hereafter, this shall suffice for the present,\nremaining always,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your constant Friend,_\n\n_and faithful Servant._\n\n[1] _C._ 25. _a._ 1.\n\n[2] _Art._ 2.\n\n\n\n\nXIX.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nTo discourse of the World and Stars, is more then I am able to do,\nwanting the art of Astronomy and Geometry; wherefore passing by that\nChapter of your Author, I am come to that[1] wherein he treats of\nLight, Heat and Colours; and to give you my opinion of Light, I say,\nit is not the light of the Sun, that makes an Animal see, for we can\nsee inwardly in Dreams without the Suns light, but it is the sensitive\nand rational Motions in the Eye and Brain that make such a figure as\nLight; For if Light did press upon the Eye, according to your _Authors_\nopinion, it might put the Eye into as much pain as Fire doth, when\nit sticks its points into our skin or flesh. The same may be said of\nColours, for the sensitive motions make such a figure, which is such\na Colour, and such a Figure, which is such a Colour; Wherefore Light,\nHeat and Colour, are not bare and bodiless qualities, but such figures\nmade by corporeal self-motions, and are as well real and corporeal\nobjects as other figures are; and when these figures change or alter,\nit is onely that their motions alter, which may alter and change heat\ninto cold, and light into darkness, and black colour into white. But\nby reason the motions of the Sun are so constant, as the motions of\nany other kind of Creatures, it is no more subject to be altered then\nall the World, unless Nature did it by the command of God; for though\nthe Parts of self-moving Matter be alterable, yet all are not altered;\nand this is the reason, that the figure of Light in our eye and brain\nis altered, as well as it is alterable, but not the real figure of the\nSun, neither doth the Sun enter our eyes; and as the Light of the Sun\nis made or patterned in the eye, so is the light of Glow-worms-tails,\nand Cats-eyes, that shine in the dark, made not by the Sun's, but their\nown motions in their own parts; The like when we dream of Light, the\nsensitive corporeal motions working inwardly, make the figure of light\non the inside of the eye, as they did pattern out the figure of light\non the outside of the eye when awake, and the objects before them; for\nthe sensitive motions of the eye pattern out the figure of the object\nin the eye, and the rational motions make the same figure in their own\nsubstance. But there is some difference between those figures that\nperceive light, and those that are light themselves; for when we sleep,\nthere is made the figure of light, but not from a copy; but when the\neye seeth light, that figure is made from a copy of the real figure of\nthe Sun; but those lights which are inherent, as in Glow-worms-tails,\nare original lights, in which is as much difference as between a Man\nand his Picture; and as for the swiftness of the Motions of light, and\nthe violence of the Motions of fire, it is very probable they are so,\nbut they are a certain particular kind or sort of swift and violent\nmotions; neither will all sorts of swift and violent motions make fire\nor light, as for example the swift and violent Circular motion of a\nWhirlewind neither makes light nor fire; Neither is all fire light,\nnor all light fire, for there is a sort of dead fire, as in Spices,\nSpirits, Oyles, and the like; and several sorts of lights, which are\nnot hot, as the light which is made in Dreams, as also the inherent\nlights in Glow-worms, Cats-eyes, Fish-bones, and the like; all which\nseveral fires and lights are made by the self-moving matter and motions\ndistinguishable by their figures, for those Motions make such a figure\nfor the Suns light, such a figure for Glow-worms light, such a figure\nfor Cats-eyes light, and so some alteration in every sort of light;\nThe same for Fire, onely Fire-light is a mixt figure, as partly of the\nfigure of Fire, and partly of the figure of Light: Also Colours are\nmade after the like manner, _viz._ so many several Colours, so many\nseveral Figures; and as these Figures are less or more different, so\nare the Colours.\n\nThus, _Madam_, whosoever will study Nature, must consider the Figures\nof every Creature, as well as their Motions, and must not make\nabstractions of Motion and Figure from Matter, nor of Matter from\nMotion and Figure, for they are inseparable, as being but one thing,\n_viz._ Corporeal Figurative Motions; and whosoever conceives any of\nthem as abstract, will, in my opinion, very much erre; but men are apt\nto make more difficulties and enforcements in nature then nature ever\nknew. But to return to Light: There is no better argument to prove\nthat all objects of sight are figured in the Eye, by the sensitive,\nvoluntary or self-motions, without the pressure of objects, but that\nnot onely the pressure of light would hurt the tender Eye, but that\nthe eye doth not see all objects according to their Magnitude, but\nsometimes bigger, sometimes less: as for example, when the eye looks\nthrough a small passage, as a Perspective-glass, by reason of the\ndifficulty of seeing a body through a small hole, and the double\nfigure of the glass being convex and concave, the corporeal motions\nuse more force, by which the object is enlarged, like as a spark of\nfire by force is dilated into a great fire, and a drop of water by\nblowing into a bubble; so the corporeal motions do double and treble\ntheir strength, making the Image of the object exceeding large in the\neye; for though the eye be contracted, yet the Image in the eye is\nenlarged to a great extension; for the sensitive and rational matter is\nextremely subtil, by reason it is extreamly pure, by which it hath more\nmeans and ways of magnifying then the Perspective-glass. But I intend\nto write more of this subject in my next, and so I break off here,\nresting,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Ch._ 27.\n\n\n\n\nXX.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nSome perhaps will question the truth or probability of my saying, that\nLight is a Body, objecting that if light were a body, when the Sun is\nabsent or retires under our Horizon, its light would leave an empty\nplace, or if there were no empty place but all full, the light of the\nSun at its return would not have room to display it self, especially in\nso great a compass as it doth, for two bodies cannot be in one place at\none time. I _answer_, all bodies carry their places along with them,\nfor body and place go together and are inseparable, and when the light\nof the Sun is gone, darkness succeeds, and when darkness is gone, light\nsucceeds, so that it is with light and darkness as with all Creatures\nelse; For you cannot believe, that if the whole World were removed,\nthere would be a place of the world left, for there cannot be an empty\nnothing, no more then there can be an empty something; but if the world\nwere annihilated, the place would be annihilated too, place and body\nbeing one and the same thing; and therefore in my opinion, there be no\nmore places then there are bodies, nor no more bodies then there are\nplaces.\n\nSecondly, They will think it absurd that I say, the eye can see without\nlight; but in my opinion it seems not absurd, but very rational,\nfor we may see in dreams, and some do see in the dark, not in their\nfancy or imagination, but really; and as for dreams, the sensitive\ncorporeal motions make a light on the inside of the organ of sight\nreally, as I have declared in my former Letter. But that we do not see\nordinarily without exterior Light, the reason is, that the sensitive\nMotions cannot find the outward objects to pattern out without exterior\nlight, but all perception doth not proceed from light, for all other\nperception besides animal sight requires not light. Neither in my\nopinion, doth the Perception of sight in all Creatures but Animals, but\nyet Animals do often see in the dark, and in sleep: I will not say but\nthat the animate matter which by self-motion doth make the Perception\nof light with other perceptive Figures, and so animal perceptive light\nmay be the presenter or ground perceptive figure of sight; yet the\nsensitive corporeal motions can make other figures without the help of\nlight, and such as light did never present: But when the eye patterns\nout an exterior object presented by light, it patterns also out the\nobject of light; for the sensitive motions can make many figures\nby one act, not onely in several organs, but in one organ; as for\nexample, there is presented to sight a piece of Imbroydery, wherein\nis silk, silver and gold upon Sattin in several forms or figures, as\nseveral flowers, the sensitive motions streight by one and the same\nact, pattern out all those several figures of flowers, as also the\nfigures of Silk, Silver, Gold and Sattin, without any pressure of these\nobjects, or motions in the medium, for if they all should press, the\neye would no more see the exterior objects, then the nose, being stopt,\ncould smell a presented perfume.\n\n_Thirdly_, They may ask me, if sight be made in the eye, and proceeds\nnot from the outward object, what is the reason that we do not see\ninwardly, but outwardly as from us? I answer, when we see objects\noutwardly, as from us, then the sensitive motions work on the outside\nof the organ, which organ being outwardly convex, causes us to see\noutwardly, as from us, but in dreams we see inwardly; also the\nsensitive motions do pattern out the distance together with the object:\nBut you will say, the body of the distance, as the air, cannot be\nperceived, and yet we can perceive the distance; I answer, you could\nnot perceive the distance, but by such or such an object as is subject\nto your sight; for you do not see the distance more then the air, or\nthe like rare body, that is between grosser objects; for if there were\nno stars, nor planets, nor clouds, nor earth, nor water, but onely air,\nyou would not see any space or distance; but light being a more visible\nbody then air, you might figure the body of air by light, but so, as in\nan extensive or dilating way; for when the mind or the rational matter\nconceives any thing that hath not such an exact figure, or is not\nso perceptible by our senses; then the mind uses art, and makes such\nfigures, which stand like to that; as for example, to express infinite\nto it self, it dilates it parts without alteration, and without\nlimitation or circumference; Likewise, when it will conceive a constant\nsuccession of Time, it draws out its parts into the figure of a line;\nand if eternity, it figures a line without beginning, and end. But as\nfor Immaterial, no mind can conceive that, for it cannot put it self\ninto nothing, although it can dilate and rarifie it self to an higher\ndegree, but must stay within the circle of natural bodies, as I within\nthe circle of your Commands, to express my self\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend,_\n\n_and obedient Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXXI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nHeat and Cold, according to your _Authors_ opinion, are made by\nDilation and Contraction: for says he,[1] _When the Motion of the\nambient \u00e6thereal substance makes the spirits and fluid parts of our\nbodies tend outwards, we acknowledg heat, but by the indeavour inwards\nof the same spirits and humors we feel cold: so that to cool is to\nmake the exterior parts of the body endeavour inwards, by a motion\ncontrary to that of calefaction, by which the internal parts are\ncalled outwards. He therefore that would know the cause of Cold, must\nfind by what motion the exterior parts of any body endeavour to retire\ninwards._ But I desire you to consider, _Madam_, that there be moist\nColds, and dry Heats, as well as dry Colds, and moist Heats; wherefore\nall sorts of Cold are not made by the retyring of parts inwards, which\nis contraction or attraction; neither are all sorts of Heat made by\nparts tending outwards, which is dilation or rarefaction; for a moist\ncold is made by dilation, and a dry heat by contraction, as well as a\nmoist heat is made by dilation, and a dry cold by contraction: But your\n_Author_ makes not this difference, but onely a difference between a\ndilated heat, and a contracted cold; but because a cold wind is made\nby breath blown thorow pinched or contracted lips, and an hot wind by\nbreath through opened and extended lips, should we judg that all heat\nand cold must be made after one manner or way? The contracted mouth\nmakes Wind as well as the dilated, but yet Wind is not made that way,\nas heat and cold; for it may be, that onely the air pressed together\nmakes wind, or it may be that the corporeal motions in the air may\nchange air into wind, as they change water into vapour, and vapour\ninto air; or it may be something else that is invisible and rare, as\nair; and there may be several sorts of wind, air, heat, cold, as of\nall other Creatures, more then man is capable to know. As for your\n_Authors_ opinion concerning the congealing of Water, and how Ice is\nmade, I will not contradict it, onely I think nature hath an easier\nway to effect it, then he describes; Wherefore my opinion is, that it\nis done by altering motions; as for example, the corporeal motions\nmaking the figure of water by dilation in a Circle figure, onely alter\nfrom such a dilating circular figure into a contracted square, which\nis Ice, or into such a contracted triangle, as is snow: And thus water\nand vapour may be changed with ease, without any forcing, pressing,\nraking, or the like. The same may be said of hard and bent bodies; and\nof restitution, as also of air, thunder and lightning, which are all\ndone by an easie change of motion, and changing into such or such a\nfigure is not the motion of Generation, which is to build a new house\nwith old materials, but onely a Transformation; I say a new house with\nold materials; not that I mean there is any new Creation in nature, of\nany thing that was not before in nature; for nature is not God, to make\nnew beings out of nothing, but any thing may be called new, when it is\naltered from one figure into another. I add no more at this time, but\nrest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _C._ 28. _a._ 1.\n\n\n\n\nXXII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nThe Generation of sound, according to your worthy _Authors_ opinion, is\nas follows: _As Vision,_ says he,[1] _so hearing is Generated by the\nmedium, but not in the same manner; for sight is from pressure, that\nis, from an endeavour, in which there is no perceptible progression\nof any of the parts of the medium, but one part urging or thrusting\non another, propagateth that action successively to any distance\nwhatsoever; whereas the motion of the medium, by which sound is made,\nis a stroke; for when we hear, the drum of the Ear, which is the first\norgan of hearing, is strucken, and the drum being stricken, the_ Pia\nMater _is also shaken, and with it the arteries inserted into it, by\nwhich the action propagated to the heart it self, by the reaction of\nthe heart a Phantasme is made which we call Sound._ Thus far your\n_Author_: To which give me leave to reply, that I fear, if the Ear was\nbound to hear any loud Musick, or another sound a good while, it would\nsoundly be beaten, and grow sore and bruised with so many strokes; but\nsince a pleasant sound would be rendred very unpleasant in this manner,\nmy opinion is, that like as in the Eye, so in the Ear the corporeal\nsensitive motions do pattern out as many several figures, as sounds are\npresented to them; but if these motions be irregular, then the figure\nof the sound in the ear is not perfect according to the original; for\nif it be, that the motions are tyred with figuring, or the object of\nsound be too far distant from the sensitive organ, then they move\nslowly and weakly, not that they are tyred or weak in strength, but\nwith working and repeating one and the same object, and so through\nlove to variety, change from working regularly to move irregularly,\nso as not to pattern outward objects as they ought, and then there are\nno such patterns made at all, which we call to be deaf; and sometimes\nthe sensitive motions do not so readily perceive a soft sound near,\nas a stronger farther off. But to prove it is not the outward object\nof sound with its striking or pressing motion, nor the medium, that\ncauses this perception of sense, if there be a great solid body, as\na wall, or any other partition betwixt two rooms, parting the object\nand the sensitive organ, so, as the sound is not able to press it,\nnevertheless the perception will be made; And as for pipes to convey\nsounds, the perception is more fixt and perfecter in united then in\ndilated or extended bodies, and then the sensitive motions can make\nperfecter patterns; for the stronger the objects are, the more perfect\nare the figures and patterns of the objects, and the more perfect is\nthe perception. But when the sound is quite out of the ear, then the\nsensitive motions have altered the patterning of such figures to some\nother action; and when the sound fadeth by degrees, then the figure\nor pattern alters by degrees; but for the most part the sensitive\ncorporeal motions alter according as the objects are presented, or\nthe perception patterns out. Neither do they usually make figures\nof outward objects, if not perceived by the senses, unless through\nIrregularities as in Mad men, which see such and such things, when\nas these things are not neer, and then the sensitive motions work by\nrote, or after their own voluntary invention. As for Reflexion, it is\na double perception, and so a double figure of one object; like as\nmany pictures of one man, where some are more perfect then others, for\na copy of a copy is not so perfect as a copy of an original. But the\nrecoyling of sound is, that the sensitive motions in the ear begin\na new pattern, before they dissolved the former, so as there is no\nperfect alteration or change, from making to dissolving, but pattern\nis made upon pattern, which causes a confusion of figures, the one\nbeing neither perfectly finished, nor the other perfectly made. But\nit is to be observed, that not always the sensitive motions in the\norgans take their pattern from the original, but from copies; as for\nexample, the sensitive motions in the eye, pattern out the figure of\nan eye in a glass, and so do not take a pattern from the original it\nself, but by an other pattern, representing the figure of the eye in\na Looking-glass; The same doth the Ear, by patterning out Ecchoes,\nwhich is but a pattern of a pattern; But when as a man hears himself\nspeak or make a sound, then the corporeal sensitive motions in the Ear,\npattern out the object or figure made by the motions of the tongue\nand the throat, which is voice; By which we may observe, that there\nmay be many figures made by several motions from one original; as\nfor example, the figure of a word is made in a mans mouth, then the\ncopy of that figure is made in the ear, then in the brain, and then\nin the memory, and all this in one Man: Also a word being made in a\nmans mouth, the air takes a copy or many copies thereof; but the Ear\npatterns them both out, first the original coming from the mouth, and\nthen the copy made in the air, which is called an Eccho, and yet not\nany strikes or touches each others parts, onely perceives and patterns\nout each others figure. Neither are their substances the same, although\nthe figures be alike; for the figure of a man may be carved in wood,\nthen cut in brass, then in stone, and so forth, where the figure may\nbe always the same, although the substances which do pattern out the\nfigure are several, _viz._ Wood, Brass, Stone, &c. and so likewise\nmay the figure of a stone be figured in the fleshy substance of the\nEye, or the figure of light or colour, and yet the substance of the\nEye remains full the same; neither doth the substantial figure of a\nstone, or tree, patterned out by the sensitive corporeal motions, in\nthe flesh of an animal eye, change from being a vegetable or mineral,\nto an animal, and if this cannot be done by nature, much less by art;\nfor if the figure of an animal be carved in wood or stone, it doth not\ngive the wood or stone any animal knowledg, nor an animal substance,\nas flesh, bones, blood, &c. no more doth the patterning or figuring\nof a Tree give a vegetable knowledg, or the substance of wood to the\neye, for the figure of an outward object doth not alter the substance\nthat patterns it out or figures it, but the patterning substance doth\npattern out the figure, in it self, or in its own substance, so as the\nfigure which is pattern'd, hath the same life and knowledg with the\nsubstance by and in which it is figured or pattern'd, and the inherent\nmotions of the same substance; and according as the sensitive and\nrational self-moving matter moves, so figures are made; and thus we\nsee, that lives, knowledges, motions and figures are all material, and\nall Creatures are indued with life, knowledg, motion and figure, but\nnot all alike or after the same manner. But to conclude this discourse\nof perception of Sound, the Ear may take the object of sound afar off,\nas well as at a near distance; not onely if many figures of the same\nsound be made from that great distance, but if the interposing parts\nbe not so thick, close, or many as to hinder or obscure the object from\nthe animal Perception in the sensitive organ; for if a man lays his\nEar near to the Ground, the Ear may hear at a far distance, as well\nas the Eye can see, for it may hear the noise of a troop afar off,\nperception being very subtil and active; Also there may several Copies\nbe made from the Original, and from the last Copy nearest to the Ear,\nthe Ear may take a pattern, and so pattern out the noise in the organ,\nwithout any strokes to the Ear, for the subtil matter in all Creatures\ndoth inform and perceive. But this is well to be observed, that the\nfigures of objects are as soon made, as perceived by the sensitive\nmotions in their work of patterning. And this is my Opinion concerning\nthe Perception of Sound, which together with the rest I leave to your\nLadyships and others wiser Judgment, and rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Ch._ 29. _a._ 1.\n\n\n\n\nXXIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI perceive by your last, that you cannot well apprehend my meaning,\nwhen I say that the print or figure of a Body Printed or Carved, is\nnot made by the motions of the body Printing or Carving it, but by the\nmotions of the body or substance Printed or Carved; for say you, Doth\na piece of Wood carve it self, or a black Patch of a Lady cut its own\nfigure by its own motions? Before I answer you, _Madam_, give me leave\nto ask you this question, whether it be the motion of the hand, or the\nInstrument, or both, that print or carve such or such a body? Perchance\nyou will say, that the motion of the hand moves the Instrument, and the\nInstrument moves the Wood which is to be carved: Then I ask, whether\nthe motion that moves the Instrument, be the Instruments, or the Hands?\nPerchance you will say the Hands; but I answer, how can it be the Hands\nmotion, if it be in the Instrument? You will say, perhaps, the motion\nof the hand is transferred out of the hand into the instrument, and so\nfrom the instrument into the carved figure; but give me leave to ask\nyou, was this motion of the hand, that was transferred, Corporeal or\nIncorporeal? If you say, Corporeal, then the hand must become less and\nweak, but if Incorporeal, I ask you, how a bodiless motion can have\nforce and strength to carve and cut? But put an Impossible proposition,\nas that there is an Immaterial motion, and that this Incorporeal motion\ncould be transferred out of one body into another; then I ask you, when\nthe hand and instrument cease to move, what is become of the motion?\nPerhaps you will say, the motion perishes or is annihilated, and when\nthe hand and the instrument do move again, to the carving or cutting of\nthe figure, then a new Incorporeal Motion is created; Truly then there\nwill be a perpetual creation and annihilation of Incorporeal motions,\nthat is, of that which naturally is nothing; for an Incorporeal being\nis as much as a natural No-thing, for Natural reason cannot know nor\nhave naturally any perception or Idea of an Incorporeal being: besides,\nif the motion be Incorporeal, then it must needs be a supernatural\nSpirit, for there is not any thing else Immaterial but they, and then\nit will be either an Angel or a Devil, or the Immortal Soul of man; but\nif you say it is the supernatural Soul, truly I cannot be perswaded\nthat the supernatural Soul should not have any other imployment then\nto carve or cut prints, or figures, or move in the hands, or heels,\nor legs, or arms of a Man; for other animals have the same kind of\nMotions, and then they might have a Supernatural Soul as well as Man,\nwhich moves in them. But if you say, that these transferrable motions\nare material, then every action whereby the hand moves to the making\nor moving of some other body, would lessen the number of the motions\nin the hand, and weaken it, so that in the writing of one letter,\nthe hand would not be able to write a second letter, at least not\na third. But I pray, _Madam_, consider rationally, that though the\nArtificer or Workman be the occasion of the motions of the carved\nbody, yet the motions of the body that is carved, are they which put\nthemselves into such or such a figure, or give themselves such or such\na print as the Artificer intended; for a Watch, although the Artist\nor Watch-maker be the occasional cause that the Watch moves in such\nor such an artificial figure, as the figure of a Watch, yet it is the\nWatches own motion by which it moves; for when you carry the Watch\nabout you, certainly the Watch-makers hand is not then with it as to\nmove it; or if the motion of the Watch-makers hand be transferred into\nthe Watch, then certainly the Watch-maker cannot make another Watch,\nunless there be a new creation of new motions made in his hands; so\nthat God and Nature would be as much troubled and concerned in the\nmaking of Watches, as in the making of a new World; for God created\nthis World in six days, and rested the seventh day, but this would be a\nperpetual Creation; Wherefore I say that some things may be Occasional\ncauses of other things, but not the Prime or Principal causes; and this\ndistinction is very well to be considered, for there are no frequenter\nmistakes then to confound these two different causes, which make so\nmany confusions in natural Philosophy; and this is the Opinion of,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXXIV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nIn answer to your question, What makes Eccho, I say, it is that which\nmakes all the effects of Nature, _viz._ self-moving matter; I know, the\ncommon opinion is, that Eccho is made like as the figure of a Face, or\nthe like, in a Looking-glass, and that the Reverberation of sound is\nlike the Reflection of sight in a Looking-glass; But I am not of that\nopinion, for both Eccho, and that which is called the Reflection in a\nLooking-glass, are made by the self-moving matter, by way of patterning\nand copying out. But then you will ask me, whether the glass takes the\ncopy of the face, or the face prints its copy on the glass, or whether\nit be the _medium_ of light and air that makes it? I answer, although\nmany Learned men say, that as all perception, so also the seeing of\nones face in a Looking-glass, and Eccho, are made by impression and\nreaction; yet I cannot in my simplicity conceive it, how bodies that\ncome not near, or touch each other, can make a figure by impression\nand reaction: They say it proceeds from the motions of the _Medium_ of\nlight, or air, or both, _viz._ that the _Medium_ is like a long stick\nwith two ends, whereof one touches the object, the other the organ of\nsense, and that one end of it moving, the other moves also at the same\npoint of Time, by which motions it may make many several figures; But\nI cannot conceive, how this motion of pressing forward and backward\nshould make so many figures, wherein there is so much variety and\ncuriosity. But, say light and air are as one figure, and like as a\nseal do print another body; I answer, if any thing could print, yet it\nis not probable, that so soft and rare bodies as light and air, could\nprint such solid bodies as glass, nor could air by reverberation make\nsuch a sound as Eccho. But mistake me not, for, _I do not say_, that\nthe Corporeal motions of light or air, cannot, or do not pencil, copie,\nor pattern out any figure, for both light and air are very active in\nsuch sorts of Motions, but I say, they cannot do it on any other bodies\nbut their own. But to cut off tedious and unnecessary disputes, I\nreturn to the expressing of my own opinion, and believe, that the glass\nin its own substance doth figure out the copy of the face, or the like,\nand from that copy the sensitive motions in the eyes take another copy,\nand so the rational from the sensitive; and in this manner is made both\nrational and sensitive perception, sight and knowledg. The same with\nEcchoes; for the air patterns out the copy of the sound, and then the\nsensitive corporeal motions in the ear pattern again this copy from\nthe air, and so do make the perception and sense of hearing. You may\nask me, _Madam_, if it be so, that the glass and the air copy out the\nfigure of the face and of sound, whether the Glass may be said to see\nand the Air to speak? I answer, I cannot tell that; for though I say,\nthat the air repeats the words, and the glass represents the face, yet\nI cannot guess what their perceptions are, onely this I may say, that\nthe air hath an elemental, and the glass a mineral, but not an animal\nperception. But if these figures were made by the pressures of several\nobjects or parts, and by reaction, there could not be such variety as\nthere is, for they could but act by one sort of motion: Likewise is\nit improbable, that sounds, words or voices, should like a company of\nWild-Geese fly in the air, and so enter into the ears of the hearers,\nas they into their nests: Neither can I conceive, how in this manner\na word can enter so many ears, that is, be divided into every ear, and\nyet strike every ear with an undivided vocal sound; You will say, as\na small fire doth heat and warm all those that stand by; for the heat\nissues from the fire, as the light from the Sun. I answer, all what\nissues and hath motion, hath a Body, and yet most learned men deny that\nsound, light and heat have bodies: But if they grant of light that it\nhas a body, they say it moves and presses the air, and the air the eye,\nand so of heat; which if so, then the air must not move to any other\nmotion but light, and onely to one sort of light, as the Suns light;\nfor if it did move in any other motion, it would disturb the light; for\nif a Bird did but fly in the air, it would give all the region of air\nanother motion, and so put out, or alter the light, or at least disturb\nit; and wind would make a great disturbance in it. Besides, if one body\ndid give another body motion, it must needs give it also substance, for\nmotion is either something or nothing, body or no body, substance or no\nsubstance; if nothing, it cannot enter into another body; if something,\nit must lessen the bulk of the body it quits, and increase the bulk\nof the body it enters, and so the Sun and Fire with giving light and\nheat, would become less, for they cannot both give and keep at once,\nfor this is as impossible, as for a man to give to another creature\nhis human Nature, and yet to keep it still. Wherefore my opinion is\nfor heat, that when many men stand round about a fire, and are heated\nand warmed by it, the fire doth not give them any thing, nor do they\nreceive something from the fire, but the sensitive motions in their\nbodies pattern out the object of the fires heat, and so they become\nmore or less hot according as their patterns are numerous or perfect;\nAnd as for air, it patterns out the light of the Sun, and the sensitive\nmotions in the eyes of animals pattern out the light in the air. The\nlike for Ecchoes, or any other sound, and for the figures which are\npresented in a Looking-glass. And thus millions of parts or creatures\nmay make patterns of one or more objects, and the objects neither\ngive nor loose any thing. And this I repeat here, that my meaning of\nPerception may be the better understood, which is the desire of,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend,_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXXV.\n\n\n_MADAM_\n\nI perceive you are not fully satisfied with my former Letter concerning\nEccho, and a figure presented in a Looking-glass; for you say, how is\nit possible, if Eccho consists in the ears patterning out of a voice\nor sound, but that it will make a confusion in all the parts of the\nair? My answer is, that I doe not say that Eccho is onely made by the\npatterning out of the voice or sound, but by repeating the same voice\nor sound, which repetition is named an Eccho, for millions of ears in\nanimals may pattern out a voice or words, and yet never repeat them,\nand so may millions of parts of the air; wherefore Eccho doth not\nconsist in the bare patterning out, but in the repetition of the same\nsound or words, which are pattern'd out; and so some parts of the air\nmay at one and the same time pattern out a sound and not repeat it,\nand some may both pattern out, and repeat it, but some may neither\npattern out, nor repeat it, and therefore the Repetition, not the\nbare Patterning out is called Eccho: Just as when two or more men do\nanswer or mock each other, and repeat each others words, it is not\nnecessary, if there were a thousand standers by, that they should all\ndo the same. And as for the figure presented in a Looking-glass, I\ncannot conceive it to be made by pressure and reaction; for although\nthere is both pressure and reaction in nature, and those very frequent\namongst natures Parts, yet they do neither make perception nor\nproduction, although both pressure and reaction are made by corporeal\nself-motions; Wherefore the figure presented in a Looking-glass, or\nany other smooth glassie body, is, in my opinion, onely made by the\nmotions of the Looking-glass, which do both pattern out, and present\nthe figure of an external object in the Glass: But you will say, why do\nnot the motions of other bodies pattern out, and present the figures\nof external objects, as well as smooth glassie bodies do? I answer,\nthey may pattern out external objects, for any thing I know; but the\nreason that their figures are not presented to our eyes, lies partly\nin the presenting subject it self, partly in our sight; for it is\nobserved, that two things are chiefly required in a subject that will\npresent the figure of an external object; first it must be smooth, even\nand glassie, next it must not be transparent: the first is manifest\nby experience; for the subject being rough and uneven, will never be\nable to present such a figure; as for example, A piece of steel rough\nand unpolished, although it may perhaps pattern out the figure of an\nexternal object, yet it will never present its figure, but as soon as\nit is polished, and made smooth and glassie, the figure is presently\nperceived. But this is to be observed, that smooth and glassie bodies\ndo not always pattern out exterior objects exactly, but some better,\nsome worse; like as Painters have not all the same ingenuity; neither\ndo all eyes pattern out all objects exactly; which proves that the\nperception of sight is not made by pressure and reaction, otherwise\nthere would be no difference, but all eyes would see alike. Next I\nsay, it is observed, that the subject which will present the figure\nof an external object, must not be transparent; the reason is, that\nthe figure of Light being a substance of a piercing and penetrating\nquality, hath more force on transparent, then on other solid dark\nbodies, and so disturbs the figure of an external object pattern'd out\nin a transparent body, and quite over-masters it. But you will say, you\nhave found by experience, that if you hold a burning Candle before a\nTransparent-glass, although it be in an open Sun-light, yet the figure\nof light and flame of the Candle will clearly be seen in the Glass. I\nanswer, that it is an other thing with the figure of Candle-light, then\nof a duskish or dark body; for a Candle-light, though it is not of the\nsame sort as the Suns light, yet it is of the same nature and quality,\nand therefore the Candle-light doth resist and oppose the light of the\nSun, so that it cannot have so much power over it, as over the figures\nof other bodies patterned out and presented in Transparent-glass.\nLastly, I say, that the fault oftentimes lies in the perceptive\nmotions of our sight, which is evident by a plain and Concave-glass;\nfor in a plain Looking-glass, the further you go from it, the more\nyour figure presented in the glass seems to draw backward; and in a\nConcave-glass, the nearer you go to it, the more seems your figure\nto come forth: which effects are like as an house or tree appears to\na Traveller; for, as the man moves from the house or tree, so the\nhouse or tree seems to move from the man; or like one that sails upon\na Ship, who imagines that the Ship stands still, and the Land moves;\nwhen as yet it is the Man and the Ship that moves, and not the House,\nor Tree, or the Land; so when a Man turns round in a quick motion,\nor when his head is dizzie, he imagines the room or place, where he\nis, turns round. Wherefore it is the Inherent Perceptive motions in\nthe Eye, and not the motions in the Looking-glass, which cause these\neffects. And as for several figures that are presented in one glass,\nit is absurd to imagine that so many several figures made by so many\nseveral motions should touch the eye; certainly this would make such\na disturbance, if all figures were to enter or but to touch the eye,\nas the eye would not perceive any of them, at lead not distinctly;\nWherefore it is most probable that the glass patterns out those\nfigures, and the sensitive corporeal motions in the eye take again a\npattern from those figures patterned out by the glass, and so make\ncopies of copies; but the reason why several figures are presented in\none glass in several places, is, that two perfect figures cannot be in\none point, nor made by one motion, but by several corporeal motions.\nConcerning a Looking-glass, made in the form or shape of a Cylinder,\nwhy it represents the figure of an external object in an other shape\nand posture then the object is, the cause is the shape and form of the\nGlass, and not the patterning motions in the Glass. But this discourse\nbelongs properly to the Opticks, wherefore I will leave it to those\nthat are versed in that Art, to enquire and search more after the\nrational truth thereof. In the mean time, my opinion is, that though\nthe object is the occasion of the figure presented in a Looking-glass,\nyet the figure is made by the motions of the glass or body that\npresents it, and that the figure of the glass perhaps may be patterned\nout as much by the motions of the object in its own substance, as the\nfigure of the object is patterned out and presented by the motions of\nthe glass in its own body or substance. And thus I conclude and rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXXVI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nSince I mentioned in my last that Light did disturb the figures of\nExternal objects presented in Transparent bodies; you were pleased\nto ask, Whether light doth penetrate transparent bodies? I answer,\nfor anything I know, it may; for when I consider the subtil, piercing\nand penetrating nature of light, I believe it doth; but again, when I\nconsider that light is presented to our sight by transparent bodies\nonely, and not by duskish and dark bodies, and yet that those duskish\nbodies are more porous then the transparent bodies, so that the light\nhath more passage to pass through them, then through transparent\nbodies; but that on the contrary, those dark bodies, as Wood, and the\nlike, do quite obscure the light, when as transparent bodies, as Glass,\n&c. transmit it, I am half perswaded that the transparent bodies, as\nGlass, rather present the Light by patterning it out, then by giving it\npassage: Also I am of a mind, that the air in a room may pattern out\nthe Light from the Glass, for the Light in a room doth not appear so\nclear as in the Glass; also if the Glass be any way defective, it doth\nnot present the Light so perfectly, whereas, if it were the penetration\nof light through the glass, the light would pass through all sorts of\nglass alike, which it doth not, but is more clearly seen through some,\nand more obscurely through others, according to the goodness or purity\nof the glass. But you may say, that the light divulges the imperfection\nor goodness of the glass; I answer, so it doth of any other objects\nperceived by our sight; for light is the presenter of objects to the\nsense and perception of sight, and for any thing I know, the corporeal\noptick motions make the figure of light, the ground figure of all other\nfigures patterned out by the corporeal optick motions, as in dreams, or\nwhen as some do see in the dark, that is, without the help of exterior\nlight. But you may say, That if the glass and the air in a room did\npattern out the figure of light, those patterns of light would remain\nwhen light is absent: I answer, That is not usual in nature; for when\nthe object removes, the Pattern alters; I will not say but that the\ncorporeal optick motions may work by rote without objects, but that is\nirregular, as in some distempers. And thus, _Madam_, I have given you\nmy opinion also to this your question; if you have any more scruples,\nI pray let me know of them, and assure your self that I shall be ready\nupon all occasions to express my self,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your humble and faithful Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXXVII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour desire is to know, why sound is louder in a Vault, and in a large\nRoom then in a less? I answer, A Vault or arched Figure is the freest\nfrom obstruction, as being without corners and points, so as the\nsensitive and rational corporeal motions of the Ear can have a better\nperception; like as the Eye can see farthest from a hill then being\nupon a level ground, because the prospect is freer from the hill, as\nwithout obstruction, unless it be so cloudy that the clouds do hinder\nthe perception; And as the eye can have a better prospect upon a hill,\nso the ear a stronger perception in a Vault; And as for sound, that it\nis better perceived in a large, then in a little close room or place,\nit is somewhat like the perception of sent, for the more the odorous\nparts are bruised, the stronger is that perception of sent, as being\nrepeated double or treble, which makes the perception stronger, like as\na thick body is stronger then a thin one; So likewise the perception\nof sound in the air; for though not all the parts of the air make\nrepetitions, yet some or many make patterns of the sound; the truth\nis, Air is as industrious to divulge or present a sound, by patterns\nto the Ear, as light doth objects to the Eye. But then you may ask me,\nWhy a long hollow pipe doth convey a voice to the ear more readily,\nthen any large and open place? My answer is, That the Parts of the\nair in a long pipe are more Composed and not at liberty to wander, so\nthat upon necessity they must move onely to the patterning out of the\nsound, having no choice, which makes the sound much stronger, and the\nperception of the Ear perfecter; But as for Pipes, Vaults, Prospects,\nas also figures presented in a room through a little hole, inverted,\nand many the like, belongs more to Artists then to my study, for though\nNatural Philosophy gives or points out the Ground, and shews the\nreason, yet it is the Artist that Works; Besides it is more proper for\nMathematicians to discourse of, which study I am not versed in; and so\nleaving it to them, I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXXVIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nFrom Sound I am come to Sent, in the discourse whereof, your\n_Author_[1] is pleased to set down these following propositions: 1.\n_That smelling is hindred by cold and helped by heat_: 2. _That when\nthe Wind bloweth from the object, the smell is the stronger, and when\nit blows from the sentient towards the object, the weaker, which by\nexperience is found in dogs, that follow the track of beasts by the\nSent_: 3. _That such bodies as are last pervious to the fluid medium,\nyield less smell then such as are more pervious_: 4. _That such bodies\nas are of their own nature odorous, become yet more odorous, when\nthey are bruised_: 5. _That when the breath is stopped (at least in\nman) nothing can be smelt_: 6. _That the Sense of smelling is also\ntaken away by the stopping of the nostrils, though the mouth be left\nopen._ To begin from the last, I say, that the nose is like the other\nsensitive organs, which if they be stopt, the corporeal sensitive\nmotions cannot take copies of the exterior objects, and therefore must\nalter their action of patterning to some other, for when the eye is\nshut and cannot perceive outward objects then it works to the Sense\nof Touch, or on the inside of the organ to some phantasmes; and so do\nthe rest of the Senses. As for the stopping of breath, why it hinders\nthe Sent, the cause is, that the nostrils and the mouth are the chief\norgans, to receive air and to let out breath: but though they be common\npassages for air and breath, yet taste is onely made in the mouth\nand tongue, and sent in the nose; not by the pressure of meat, and\nthe odoriferous object, but by patterning out the several figures or\nobjects of sent and taste, for the nose and the mouth will smell and\ntaste one, nay several things at the same time, like as the eye will\nsee light, colour, and other objects at once, which I think can hardly\nbe done by pressures; and the reason is, that the sensitive motions\nin the sensitive organs make patterns of several objects at one time,\nwhich is the cause, that when flowers, and such like odoriferous bodies\nare bruised, there are as many figures made as there are parts bruised\nor divided, and by reason of so many figures the sensitive knowledg is\nstronger; but that stones, minerals, and the like, seem not so strong\nto our smell, the reason is, that their parts being close and united,\nthe sensitive motions in the organ cannot so readily perceive and\npattern them out, as those bodies which are more porous and divided.\nBut as for the wind blowing the sent either to or from the sentient, it\nis like a window or door that by the motion of opening and shutting,\nhinders or disturbeth the sight; for bodies coming between the object\nand the organ, make a stop of that perception. And as for the Dogs\nsmelling out the track of Beasts, the cause is, that the earth or\nground hath taken a copy of that sent, which copy the sensitive motions\nin the nose of the Dog do pattern out, and so long as that figure or\ncopy lasts, the Dog perceives the sent, but if he doth not follow or\nhunt readily, then there is either no perfect copy made by the ground,\nor otherwise he cannot find it, which causes him to seek and smell\nabout until he hath it; and thus smell is not made by the motion of the\nair, but by the figuring motions in the nose: Where it is also to be\nobserved, that not onely the motions in one, but in millions of noses,\nmay pattern out one little object at one time, and therefore it is not,\nthat the object of sent fills a room by sending out the sent from its\nsubstance, but that so many figures are made of that object of sent\nby so many several sensitive motions, which pattern the same out; and\nso the air, or ground, or any other creature, whose sensitive motions\npattern out the object of sent, may perceive the same, although their\nsensitive organs are not like to those of animal Creatures; for if\nthere be but such sensitive motions and perceptions, it is no matter\nfor such organs. Lastly, it is to be observed, That all Creatures\nhave not the same strength of smelling, but some smell stronger, some\nweaker, according to the disposition of their sensitive motions: Also\nthere be other parts in the body, which pattern out the object of\nsent, besides the nose, but those are interior parts, and take their\npatterns from the nose as the organ properly designed for it; neither\nis their resentment the same, because their motions are not alike, for\nthe stomack may perceive and pattern out a sent with aversion, when the\nnose may pattern it out with pleasure. And thus much also of Sent; I\nconclude and rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend,_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Ch._ 29. _art._ 12.\n\n\n\n\nXXIX.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nConcerning your Learned Authors discourse of Density and Rarity, he\ndefines[1] _Thick to be that, which takes up more parts of a space\ngiven; and thin, which containes fewer parts of the same magnitude: not\nthat there is more matter in one place then in an other equal place,\nbut a greater quantity of some named body; wherefore the multitude and\npaucity of the parts contained within the same space do constitute\ndensity and rarity._ Whereof my opinion is, That there is no more nor\nless space or place then body according to its dilation or contraction,\nand that space and place are dilated and contracted with the body,\naccording to the magnitude of the body, for body, place and magnitude\nare the same thing, only place is in regard of the several parts of the\nbody, and there is as well space betwixt things distant a hairs breadth\nfrom one another, as betwixt things distant a million of miles, but yet\nthis space is nothing from the body; but it makes, that that body has\nnot the same place with this body, that is, that this body is not that\nbody, and that this bodies place is not that bodies place. Next your\n_Author_ sayes,[2] _He hath already clearly enough demonstrated, that\nthere can be no beginning of motion, but from an external and moved\nbody, and that heavy bodies being once cast upwards cannot be cast\ndown again, but by external motion._ Truly, _Madam_, I will not speak\nof your _Authors_ demonstrations, for it is done most by art, which I\nhave no knowledg in, but I think I have probably declared, that all\nthe actions of nature are not forced by one part, driving, pressing,\nor shoving another, as a man doth a wheel-barrow, or a whip a horse;\nnor by reactions, as if men were at foot-ball or cuffs, or as men with\ncarts meeting each other in a narrow lane. But to prove there is no\nself-motion in nature, he goes on and says; _To attribute to created\nbodies the power to move themselves, what is it else, then to say that\nthere be creatures which have no dependance upon the Creator?_ To which\nI answer, That if man (who is but a single part of nature) hath given\nhim by God the power and a free will of moving himself, why should\nnot God give it to Nature? Neither can I see, how it can take off the\ndependance upon God, more then Eternity; for, if there be an Eternal\nCreator, there is also an Eternal Creature, and if an Eternal Master,\nan Eternal Servant, which is Nature; and yet Nature is subject to Gods\nCommand, and depends upon him; and if all Gods Attributes be Infinite,\nthen his Bounty is Infinite also, which cannot be exercised but by an\nInfinite Gift, but a Gift doth not cause a less dependance. I do not\nsay, That man hath an absolute Free-will, or power to move, according\nto his desire; for it is not conceived, that a part can have an\nabsolute power: nevertheless his motion both of body and mind is a free\nand self-motion, and such a self-motion hath every thing in Nature\naccording to its figure or shape; for motion and figure, being inherent\nin matter, matter moves figuratively. Yet do I not say, That there is\nno hindrance, obstruction and opposition in nature; but as there is\nno particular Creature, that hath an absolute power of self-moving;\nso that Creature which hath the advantage of strength, subtilty, or\npolicy, shape, or figure, and the like, may oppose and over-power\nanother which is inferior to it, in all this; yet this hinderance and\nopposition doth not take away self-motion. But I perceive your _Author_\nis much for necessitation, and against free-will, which I leave to\nMoral Philosophers and Divines. And as for the ascending of light,\nand descending of heavy bodies, there may be many causes, but these\nfour are perceiveable by our senses, as bulk, or quantity of body,\ngrossness of substance, density, and shape or figure, which make heavy\nbodies descend: But little quantity, purity of substance, rarity, and\nfigure or shape make light bodies ascend. Wherefore I cannot believe,\nthat there are[3] _certain little bodies as atoms, and by reason of\ntheir smallness, invisible, differing from one another in consistence,\nfigure, motion and magnitude, intermingled with the air_, which should\nbe the cause of the descending of heavy bodies. And concerning air,[4]\n_whether it be subject to our senses or not_, I say, that if air be\nneither hot, nor cold, it is not subject; but if it be, the sensitive\nmotions will soon pattern it out, and declare it. I'le conclude with\nyour _Authors_ question,[5] _What the cause is, that a man doth not\nfeel the weight of Water in Water?_ and answer, it is the dilating\nnature of Water. But of this question and of Water I shall treat more\nfully hereafter, and so I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _C._ 30. _a._ 1.\n\n[2] _Art._ 2.\n\n[3] _Art._ 3.\n\n[4] _Art._ 14.\n\n[5] _Art._ 6.\n\n\n\n\nXXX.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI am reading now the works of that Famous and most Renowned _Author,\nDes Cartes,_ out of which I intend to pick out onely those discourses\nwhich I like best, and not to examine his opinions, as they go along\nfrom the beginning to the end of his books; And in order to this, I\nhave chosen in the first place, his discourse of motion, and do not\nassent to his opinion,[1] when he defines _Motion to be onely a Mode\nof a thing, and not the thing or body it selfe_; for, in my opinion,\nthere can be no abstraction made of motion from body, neither really,\nnor in the manner of our conception, for how can I conceive that\nwhich is not, nor cannot be in nature, that is, to conceive motion\nwithout body? Wherefore Motion is but one thing with body, without\nany separation or abstraction soever. Neither doth it agree with my\nreason, that[2] _one body can give or transferr motion into another\nbody; and as much motion it gives or transfers into that body, as\nmuch loses it: As for example, in two hard bodies thrown against one\nanother, where one, that is thrown with greater force, takes the other\nalong with it, and loses as much motion as it gives it._ For how\ncan motion, being no substance, but onely a mode, quit one body, and\npass into another? One body may either occasion, or imitate anothers\nmotion, but it can neither give nor take away what belongs to its own\nor another bodies substance, no more then matter can quit its nature\nfrom being matter; and therefore my opinion is, that if motion doth\ngo out of one body into another, then substance goes too; for motion,\nand substance or body, as afore-mentioned, are all one thing, and\nthen all bodies that receive motion from other bodies, must needs\nincrease in their substance and quantity, and those bodies which impart\nor transferr motion, must decrease as much as they increase: Truly,\n_Madam_, that neither Motion nor Figure should subsist by themselves,\nand yet be transferable into other bodies, is very strange, and as much\nas to prove them to be nothing, and yet to say they are something. The\nlike may be said of all others, which they call accidents, as skill,\nlearning, knowledge, &c. saying, they are no bodies, because they\nhave no extension, but inherent in bodies or substances as in their\nsubjects; for although the body may subsist without them, yet they\nbeing always with the body, body and they are all one thing: And so is\npower and body, for body cannot quit power, nor power the body, being\nall one thing. But to return to Motion, my opinion is, That all matter\nis partly animate, and partly inanimate, and all matter is moving and\nmoved, and that there is no part of Nature that hath not life and\nknowledg, for there is no Part that has not a comixture of animate and\ninanimate matter; and though the inanimate matter has no motion, nor\nlife and knowledg of it self, as the animate has, nevertheless being\nboth so closely joyned and commixed as in one body, the inanimate\nmoves as well as the animate, although not in the same manner; for the\nanimate moves of it self, and the inanimate moves by the help of the\nanimate, and thus the animate is moving and the inanimate moved; not\nthat the animate matter transfers, infuses, or communicates its own\nmotion to the inanimate; for this is impossible, by reason it cannot\npart with its own nature, nor alter the nature of inanimate matter,\nbut each retains its own nature; for the inanimate matter remains\ninanimate, that is, without self-motion, and the animate loses nothing\nof its self-motion, which otherwise it would, if it should impart or\ntransferr its motion into the inanimate matter; but onely as I said\nheretofore, the inanimate works or moves with the animate, because of\ntheir close union and commixture; for the animate forces or causes\nthe inanimate matter to work with her; and thus one is moving, the\nother moved, and consequently there is life and knowledg in all parts\nof nature, by reason in all parts of nature there is a commixture of\nanimate and inanimate matter: and this Life and Knowledg is sense and\nreason, or sensitive and rational corporeal motions, which are all one\nthing with animate matter without any distinction or abstraction, and\ncan no more quit matter, then matter can quit motion. Wherefore every\ncreature being composed of this commixture of animate and inanimate\nmatter, has also selfe-motion, that is life and knowledg, sense and\nreason, so that no part hath need to give or receive motion to or from\nanother part; although it may be an occasion of such a manner of motion\nto another part, and cause it to move thus or thus: as for example,\nA Watch-maker doth not give the watch its motion, but he is onely the\noccasion, that the watch moves after that manner, for the motion of the\nwatch is the watches own motion, inherent in those parts ever since\nthat matter was, and if the watch ceases to move after such a manner or\nway, that manner or way of motion is never the less in those parts of\nmatter, the watch is made of, and if several other figures should be\nmade of that matter, the power of moving in the said manner or mode,\nwould yet still remain in all those parts of matter as long as they are\nbody, and have motion in them. Wherefore one body may occasion another\nbody to move so or so, but not give it any motion, but every body\n(though occasioned by another, to move in such a way) moves by its own\nnatural motion; for self-motion is the very nature of animate matter,\nand is as much in hard, as in fluid bodies, although your _Author_\ndenies it, saying,[3] _The nature of fluid bodies consists in the\nmotion of those little insensible parts into which they are divided,\nand the nature of hard bodies, when those little particles joyned\nclosely together, do rest_; for there is no rest in nature; wherefore\nif there were a World of Gold, and a World of Air, I do verily believe,\nthat the World of Gold would be as much interiously active, as the\nWorld of Air exteriously; for Natures motions are not all external or\nperceptible by our senses, neither are they all circular, or onely of\none sort, but there is an infinite change and variety of motions; for\nthough I say in my Philosophical opinions,[4] _As there is but one\nonely Matter, so there is but one onely Motion_; yet I do not mean,\nthere is but one particular sort of motions, as either circular, or\nstraight, or the like, but that the nature of motion is one and the\nsame, simple and intire in it self, that is, it is meer motion, or\nnothing else but corporeal motion; and that as there are infinite\ndivisions or parts of matter, so there are infinite changes and\nvarieties of motions, which is the reason that I call motion as well\ninfinite as matter; first that matter and motion are but one thing, and\nif matter be infinite, motion must be so too; and secondly, that motion\nis infinite in its changes and variations, as matter is in its parts.\nAnd thus much of motion for this time; I add no more, but rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend,_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Philos. p._ 2. _Art._ 25.\n\n[2] _Art._ 40.\n\n[3] _Philos. part._ 2. _a._ 54.\n\n[4] _Part._ 1. _c._ 5.\n\n\n\n\nXXXI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI observe your _Author_ in his discourse of Place makes a difference[1]\nbetwixt an _Interior and Exterior place_, and that according to this\ndistinction, _one body may be said to change, and not to change its\nplace at the same time, and that one body may succeed into anothers\nplace_. But I am not of this opinion, for I believe not that there\nis any more place then body; as for example, Water being mix'd with\nEarth, the water doth not take the Earths place, but as their parts\nintermix, so do their places, and as their parts change, so do their\nplaces, so that there is no more place, then there is water and earth;\nthe same may be said of Air and Water, or Air and Earth, or did they\nall mix together; for as their bodies join, so do their places, and\nas they are separated from each other, so are their places. Say a man\ntravels a hundred miles, and so a hundred thousand paces; but yet this\nman has not been in a hundred thousand places, for he never had any\nother place but his own, he hath joined and separated himselfe from\na hundred thousand, nay millions of parts, but he has left no places\nbehind him. You will say, if he travel the same way back again, then\nhe is said to travel thorow the same places. I answer, It may be the\nvulgar way of expression, or the common phrase; but to speak properly,\nafter a Philosophical way, and according to the truth in nature, he\ncannot be said to go back again thorow the same places he went, because\nhe left none behind him, or els all his way would be nothing but place\nafter place, all the hundred miles along; besides if place should be\ntaken so, as to express the joyning to the neerest bodies which compass\nhim about, certainly he would never find his places again; for the\nair being fluid, changes or moves continually, and perchance the same\nparts of the air, which compassed him once, will never come near him\nagain. But you may say, If a man be hurt, or hath some mischance in his\nbody, so as to have a piece of flesh cut out, and new flesh growing\nthere; then we say, because the adjoyning parts do not change, that a\nnew piece of flesh is grown in the same place where the former flesh\nwas, and that the place of the former flesh cut or fallen out, is the\nsame of this new grown flesh. I answer, In my opinion, it is not,\nfor the parts being not the same, the places are not, but every one\nhath its own place. But if the wound be not filled or closed up with\nother new flesh, you will say, that according to my opinion there is\nno place then at all. I say, Yes, for the air or any thing else may be\nthere, as new parts joyning to the other parts; nevertheless, the air,\nor that same body which is there, hath not taken the fleshes place,\nwhich was there before, but hath its own; but, by reason the adjoyning\nparts remain, man thinks the place remains there also which is no\nconsequence. 'Tis true, a man may return to the same adjoining bodies,\nwhere he was before, but then he brings his place with him again, and\nas his body, so his place returnes also, and if a mans arm be cut off,\nyou may say, there was an arm heretofore, but you cannot say properly,\nthis is the place where the arm was. But to return to my first example\nof the mixture of Water, and Earth or Air; Suppose water is not porous,\nbut onely dividable, and hath no other place but what is its own\nbodies, and that other parts of water intermix with it by dividing and\ncomposing; I say, there is no more place required, then what belongs\nto their own parts, for if some contract, others dilate, some divide,\nothers joyn, the places are the same according to the magnitude of each\npart or body. The same may be said of all kinds or sorts of mixtures,\nfor one body hath but one place; and so if many parts of the same\nnature joyn into one body and increase the bulk of the body, the place\nof that same body is accordingly; and if they be bodies of different\nnatures which intermix and joyne, each several keeps its place; And so\neach body and each particular part of a body hath its place, for you\ncannot name body or part of a body, but you must also understand place\nto be with them, and if a point should dilate to a world, or a world\ncontract to a point, the place would always be the same with the body.\nAnd thus I have declared my opinion of this subject, which I submit to\nthe correction of your better judgment, and rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Ladiships_\n\n_faithful Friend and humble Servant._\n\n[1] _Philos. p._ 2. _a._ 10, 11, 12, 13, 14.\n\n\n\n\nXXXII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nIn my last, I hope, I have sufficiently declared my opinion, That to\none body belongs but one place, and that no body can leave a place\nbehind it, but wheresoever is body, there is place also. Now give me\nleave to examine this question: when a bodies figure is printed on\nsnow, or any other fluid or soft matter, as air, water, and the like;\nwhether it be the body, that prints its own figure upon the snow, or\nwhether it be the snow, that patterns the figure of the body? My answer\nis, That it is not the body, which prints its figure upon the snow,\nbut the snow that patterns out the figure of the body; for if a seal\nbe printed upon wax, 'tis true, it is the figure of the seal, which is\nprinted on the wax, but yet the seal doth not give the wax the print\nof its own figure, but it is the wax that takes the print or pattern\nfrom the seal, and patterns or copies it out in its own substance,\njust as the sensitive motions in the eye do pattern out the figure of\nan object, as I have declared heretofore. But you will say, perhaps, A\nbody being printed upon snow, as it leaves its print, so it leaves also\nits place with the print in the snow. I answer, That doth not follow;\nFor the place remains still the bodies place, and when the body removes\nout of the snow, it takes its place along with it: Just like a man,\nwhose picture is drawn by a Painter, when he goes away, he leaves not\nhis place with his picture, but his place goes with his body; and as\nthe place of the picture is the place of the colour or paint, and the\nplace of the copie of an exterior object patterned out by the sensitive\ncorporeal motions is the place of the sensitive organ, so the place\nof the print in snow, is the snows place; or else, if the print were\nthe bodies place that is printed, and not the snow's, it might as well\nbe said, that the motion and shape of a watch were not the motion and\nshape of the watch, but of the hand of him that made it. And as it is\nwith snow, so it is with air, for a mans figure is patterned out by the\nparts and motions of the air, wheresoever he moveth; the difference is\nonely, that air being a fluid body doth not retain the print so long,\nas snow or a harder body doth, but when the body removes, the print\nis presently dissolved. But I wonder much, your _Author_ denies, that\nthere can be two bodies in one place, and yet makes two places for one\nbody, when all is but the motions of one body: Wherefore a man sailing\nin a Ship, cannot be said to keep place, and to change his place; for\nit is not place he changes, but onely the adjoyning parts, as leaving\nsome, and joyning to others; and it is very improper, to attribute\nthat to place which belongs to parts, and to make a change of place\nout of change of parts. I conclude, repeating once again, that figure\nand place are still remaining the same with body; For example; let\na stone be beat to dust, and this dust be severally dispersed, nay,\nchanged into numerous figures; I say, as long as the substance of the\nstone remains in the power of those dispersed and changed parts, and\ntheir corporeal motions, the place of it continues also; and as the\ncorporeal motions change and vary, so doth place, magnitude and figure,\ntogether with their parts or bodies, for they are but one thing. And so\nI conclude, and rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXXXIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI am absolutely of your _Authors_ opinion, when he sayes,[1] _That all\nbodies of this Universe are of one and the same matter, really divided\ninto many parts, and that these parts are diversly moved_: But that\nthese motions should be circular more then of any other sort, I cannot\nbelieve, although he thinks that this is the most probable way, to find\nout the causes of natural effects: for nature is not bound to one sort\nof motions more then to another, and it is but in vain to indeavour to\nknow how, and by what motions God did make the World, since Creation\nis an action of God, and Gods actions are incomprehensible; Wherefore\nhis \u00e6thereal Whirlpools, and little particles of matter, which he\nreduceth to three sorts and calls them the three elements of the\nUniverse, their circular motions, several figures, shavings, and many\nthe like, which you may better read, then I rehearse to you, are to\nmy thinking, rather Fancies, then rational or probable conceptions;\nfor how can we imagine that the Universe was set a moving as a Top by\na Whip, or a Wheele by the hand of a Spinster, and that the vacuities\nwere fill'd up with shavings? for these violent motions would rather\nhave disturbed and disordered Nature; and though Nature uses variety\nin her motions or actions, yet these are not extravagant, nor by force\nor violence, but orderly, temperate, free, and easie, which causes\nme to believe, the Earth turns about rather then the Sun; and though\ncorporeal motions for variety make Whirl-winds, yet Whirl-winds are\nnot constant, Neither can I believe that the swiftness of motion could\nmake the matter more subtil and pure then it was by nature, for it is\nthe purity and subtilty of the matter, that causes motion, and makes it\nswifter or slower, and not motion the subtilty and purity of matter;\nmotion being onely the action of matter; and the self-moving part of\nmatter is the working part of nature, which is wise, and knows how to\nmove and form every creature without instruction; and this self-motion\nis as much her own as the other parts of her body, matter and figure,\nand is one and the same with her self, as a corporeal, living, knowing,\nand inseparable being, and a part of her self. As for the several\nparts of matter, I do believe, that they are not all of one and the\nsame bigness, nor of one and the same figure, neither do I hold their\nfigures to be unalterable; for if all parts in nature be corporeal,\nthey are dividable, composable, and intermixable, and then they cannot\nbe always of one and the same sort of figure; besides nature would not\nhave so much work if there were no change of figures: and since her\nonely action is change of motion, change of motion must needs make\nchange of figures: and thus natural parts of matter may change from\nlines to points, and from points to lines, from squares to circles,\nand so forth, infinite ways, according to the change of motions; but\nthough they change their figures, yet they cannot change their matter;\nfor matter as it has been, so it remaines constantly in each degree, as\nthe Rational, Sensitive and Inanimate, none becomes purer, none grosser\nthen ever it was, notwithstanding the infinite changes of motions,\nwhich their figures undergo; for Motion changes onely the figure, not\nthe matter it self, which continues still the same in its nature, and\ncannot be altered without a confusion or destruction of Nature. And\nthis is the constant opinion of,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and humble Servant._\n\n[1] _Philos. part._ 3. _a._ 40.\n\n\n\n\nXXXIV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nThat _Rarefaction_ is onely a _change of figure_, according to your\n_Authors_ opinion,[1] is in my reason very probable; but when he sayes,\nthat _in rarified bodies are little intervals or pores filled up with\nsome other subtil matter_, if he means that all rarified bodies are\nporous, I dissent from him; for it is not necessary that all rarified\nbodies should be porous, and all hard bodies without pores: but if\nthere were a probability of pores, I am of opinion, it would be more\nin dense and hard, than in rare and soft bodies; as for example,\nrarifying and dilating motions are plaining, smoothing, spreading and\nmaking all parts even, which could not well be, if there were holes\nor pores; Earth is dense and hard, and yet is porous, and flame is\nrare and dilating, and yet is not porous; and certainly Water is not\nso porous as Earth. Wherefore pores, in my opinion, are according to\nthe nature or form of the figure, and not according to the rarity or\nthinness, and density or thickness of the substance. As for his thin\nand subtil matter filling up the pores of porous bodies, I assent to\nyour _Author_ so far, that I meane, thin and thick, or rare and dense\nsubstances are joyned and mixed together. As for plaining, smoothing\nand spreading, I do not mean so much artificial plaining and spreading;\nas for example, when a piece of gold is beaten into a thin plate, and\na board is made plain and smooth by a Joyners tool, or a napkin folded\nup is spread plain and even, although, when you observe these arts, you\nmay judge somewhat of the nature of natural dilations; for a folded\ncloth is fuller of creases then when plain, and the beating of a thin\nplate is like to the motion of dilation, which is to spread out, and\nthe forme of rarifying is thinning and extending. I add onely this,\nthat I am not of your _Authors_ opinion, that Rest is the Cause or\nGlue which keeps the parts of dense or hard bodies together, but it is\nretentive motions. And so I conclude, resting,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Philos. part._ 2. _a._ 6, 7.\n\n\n\n\nXXXV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\n_That the Mind_, according to your _Authors_ opinion, _is a substance\nreally distinct from the body, and may be actually separated from\nit and subsist without it_: If he mean the natural mind and soul of\nMan, not the supernatural or divine, I am far from his opinion; for\nthough the mind moveth onely in its own parts, and not upon, or with\nthe parts of inanimate matter, yet it cannot be separated from these\nparts of matter, and subsist by its self as being a part of one and\nthe same matter the inanimate is of, (for there is but one onely\nmatter, and one kind of matter, although of several degrees,) onely\nit is the self-moving part; but yet this cannot impower it, to quit\nthe same natural body, whose part it is. Neither can I apprehend,\nthat the Mind's or Soul's seat should be in the _Glandula_ or kernel\nof the Brain, and there sit like a Spider in a Cobweb, to whom the\nleast motion of the Cobweb gives intelligence of a Flye, which he is\nready to assault, and that the Brain should get intelligence by the\nanimal spirits as his servants, which run to and fro like Ants to\ninform it; or that the Mind should, according to others opinions, be\na light, and imbroidered all with Ideas, like a Heraulds Coat; and\nthat the sensitive organs should have no knowledg in themselves, but\nserve onely like peeping-holes for the mind, or barn-dores to receive\nbundles of pressures, like sheaves of Corn; For there being a thorow\nmixture of animate, rational and sensitive, and inanimate matter, we\ncannot assign a certain seat or place to the rational, another to the\nsensitive, and another to the inanimate, but they are diffused and\nintermixt throughout all the body; And this is the reason, that sense\nand knowledg cannot be bound onely to the head or brain; But although\nthey are mixt together, nevertheless they do not lose their interior\nnature, by this mixture, nor their purity and subtilty, nor their\nproper motions or actions, but each moves according to its nature and\nsubstance, without confusion; The actions of the rational part in\nMan, which is the Mind or Soul, are called Thoughts, or thoughtful\nperceptions, which are numerous, and so are the sensitive perceptions;\nfor though Man, or any other animal hath but five exterior sensitive\norgans, yet there be numerous perceptions made in these sensitive\norgans, and in all the body; nay, every several Pore of the flesh is\na sensitive organ, as well as the Eye, or the Ear. But both sorts, as\nwell the rational as the sensitive, are different from each other,\nalthough both do resemble another, as being both parts of animate\nmatter, as I have mentioned before: Wherefore I'le add no more, onely\nlet you know, that I constantly remain,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend,_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXXXVI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nThat all other animals, besides man, want reason, your _Author_\nendeavours to prove in his _discourse of method_, where his chief\nargument is, That other animals cannot express their mind, thoughts or\nconceptions, either by speech or any other signs, as man can do: For,\nsayes he, _it is not for want of the organs belonging to the framing\nof words, as we may observe in Parrats and Pies, which are apt enough\nto express words they are taught, but understand nothing of them._ My\nanswer is, That one man expressing his mind by speech or words to an\nother, doth not declare by it his excellency and supremacy above all\nother Creatures, but for the most part more folly, for a talking man\nis not so wise as a contemplating man. But by reason other Creatures\ncannot speak or discourse with each other as men, or make certain\nsigns, whereby to express themselves as dumb and deaf men do, should we\nconclude, they have neither knowledge, sense, reason, or intelligence?\nCertainly, this is a very weak argument; for one part of a mans body,\nas one hand, is not less sensible then the other, nor the heel less\nsensible then the heart, nor the legg less sensible then the head,\nbut each part hath its sense and reason, and so consequently its\nsensitive and rational knowledg; and although they cannot talk or give\nintelligence to each other by speech, nevertheless each hath its own\npeculiar and particular knowledge, just as each particular man has his\nown particular knowledge, for one man's knowledge is not another man's\nknowledge; and if there be such a peculiar and particular knowledg in\nevery several part of one animal creature, as man, well may there be\nsuch in Creatures of different kinds and sorts: But this particular\nknowledg belonging to each creature, doth not prove that there is no\nintelligence at all betwixt them, no more then the want of humane\nKnowledg doth prove the want of Reason; for Reason is the rational\npart of matter, and makes perception, observation, and intelligence\ndifferent in every creature, and every sort of creatures, according\nto their proper natures, but perception, observation and intelligence\ndo not make reason, Reason being the cause, and they the effects.\nWherefore though other Creatures have not the speech, nor Mathematical\nrules and demonstrations, with other Arts and Sciences, as Men; yet may\ntheir perceptions and observations be as wise as Men's, and they may\nhave as much intelligence and commerce betwixt each other, after their\nown manner and way, as men have after theirs: To which I leave them,\nand Man to his conceited prerogative and excellence, resting,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend,_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXXXVII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nConcerning _Sense_ and _Perception_, your _Authors_ opinion is,[1]\nThat it is made by a _motion or impression from the object upon the\nsensitive organ, which impression, by means of the nerves, is brought\nto the brain, and so to the mind or soul, which onely perceives in\nthe brain_: Explaining it by the example[2] of a Man being blind, or\nwalking in dark, who by the help of his stick can perceive when he\ntouches a Stone, a Tree, Water, Sand, and the like; which example he\nbrings to make a comparison with the perception of Light; _For_, says\nhe, _Light in a shining body, is nothing else but a quick and lively\nmotion or action, which through the air and other transparent bodies\ntends towards the eye, in the same manner as the motion or resistance\nof the bodies, the blind man meets withal, tends thorow the stick\ntowards the hand; wherefore it is no wonder that the Sun can display\nits rays so far in an instant, seeing that the same action, whereby\none end of the stick is moved, goes instantly also to the other end,\nand would do the same if the stick were as long as Heaven is distant\nfrom Earth._ To which I answer first, That it is not onely the Mind\nthat perceives in the kernel of the Brain, but that there is a double\nperception, rational and sensitive, and that the mind perceives by\nthe rational, but the body and the sensitive organs by the sensitive\nperception; and as there is a double perception, so there is also a\ndouble knowledg, rational and sensitive, one belonging to the mind, the\nother to the body; for I believe that the Eye, Ear, Nose, Tongue, and\nall the Body, have knowledg as well as the Mind, onely the rational\nmatter, being subtil and pure, is not incumbred with the grosser part\nof matter, to work upon, or with it, but leaves that to the sensitive,\nand works or moves onely in its own substance, which makes a difference\nbetween thoughts, and exterior senses. Next I say, That it is not the\nMotion or Reaction of the bodies, the blind man meets withal, which\nmakes the sensitive perception of these objects, but the sensitive\ncorporeal motions in the hand do pattern out the figure of the Stick,\nStone, Tree, Sand, and the like. And as for comparing the perception\nof the hand, when by the help of the stick it perceives the objects,\nwith the perception of light, I confess that the sensitive perceptions\ndo all resemble each other, because all sensitive parts of matter are\nof one degree, as being sensible parts, onely there is a difference\naccording to the figures of the objects presented to the senses; and\nthere is no better proof for perception being made by the sensitive\nmotions in the body, or sensitive organs, but that all these sensitive\nperceptions are alike, and resemble one another; for if they were not\nmade in the body of the sentient, but by the impression of exterior\nobjects, there would be so much difference betwixt them, by reason of\nthe diversity of objects, as they would have no resemblance at all.\nBut for a further proof of my own opinion, did the perception proceed\nmeerly from the motion, impression and resistance of the objects, the\nhand could not perceive those objects, unless they touched the hand it\nself, as the stick doth; for it is not probable, that the motions of\nthe stone, water, sand, &c. should leave their bodies and enter into\nthe stick, and so into the hand; for motion must be either something\nor nothing; if something, the stick and the hand would grow bigger,\nand the objects touched less, or else the touching and the touched must\nexchange their motions, which cannot be done so suddenly, especially\nbetween solid bodies; But if motion has no body, it is nothing, and\nhow nothing can pass or enter or move some body, I cannot conceive.\n'Tis true there is no part that can subsist singly by it self, without\ndependance upon each other, and so parts do always joyn and touch\neach other, which I am not against; but onely I say perception is not\nmade by the exterior motions of exterior parts of objects, but by\nthe interior motions of the parts of the body sentient. But I have\ndiscoursed hereof before, and so I take my leave, resting,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Philos. part._ 4. _a._ 189.\n\n[2] _Diopt. c._ 1. _a._ 2, 3. & _c._ 4. _a._ 1.\n\n\n\n\nXXXVIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI cannot conceive why your _Author_ is so much for little and\ninsensible parts, out of which the Elements and all other bodies are\nmade; for though Nature is divideable, yet she is also composeable; and\nI think there is no need to dissect every creature into such little\nparts, to know their nature, but we can do it by another way as well;\nfor we may dissect or divide them into never so little parts, and yet\ngain never the more knowledg by it. But according to these principles\nhe describing amongst the rest the nature of Water, says,[1] _That\nthose little parts, out of which Water consists, are in figure somewhat\nlong, light and slippery like little Eeles, which are never so closely\njoyned and entangled, but may easily be separated._ To which I answer,\nThat I observe the nature and figure of water to be flowing, dilating,\ndivideable and circular; for we may see, in Tides, overflowings, and\nbreaking into parts, as in rain, it will always move in a round and\ncircular figure; And I think, if its parts were long and entangled\nlike a knot of Eeles, it could never be so easily contracted and\ndenced into snow or ice. Neither do I think, That _Salt-water hath a\nmixture of somewhat grosser parts, not so apt to bend_;[2] for to my\nobservation and reason, the nature of salt-water consists herein, that\nits circle-lines are pointed, which sharp and pointed figure makes it\nso penetrating; yet may those points be separated from the circle lines\nof water, as it is seen in the making of Salt. But I am not of your\n_Authors_ opinion, That those little points do stick so fast in flesh,\nas little nails, to keep it from putrefaction; for points do not always\nfasten; or else fire, which certainly is composed of sharp-pointed\nparts, would harden, and keep other bodies from dissolving, whereas on\nthe contrary, it separates and divides them, although after several\nmanners. But Putrefaction is onely a dissolving and separating of\nparts, after the manner of dilation; and the motion of salt is\ncontracting as well as penetrating, for we may observe, what flesh\nsoever is dry-salted, doth shrink and contract close together; I will\nnot say, but the pointed parts of salt may fasten like nayls in some\nsorts of bodies, but not in all they work on. And this is the reason\nalso, that Sea-water is of more weight then fresh-water, for being\ncomposed of points, those points stick within each other, and so become\nmore strong; But yet do they not hinder the circular dilating motion\nof water, for the circle-lines are within, and the points without, but\nonely they make it more strong from being divided by other exterior\nbodies that swim upon it. And this is the cause that Salt-water is not\nso easily forced or turned to vapour, as Fresh, for the points piercing\ninto each other, hold it more strongly together; but this is to be\nconsidered, that the points of salt are on the outside of the watery\nCircle, not on the inside, which causes it to be divideable from the\nwatery Circles. I will conclude, when I have given the reason why water\nis so soon suckt up by sand, lime, and the like bodies, and say that it\nis the nature of all spongy, dry and porous bodies, meeting with liquid\nand pliable bodies as water, do draw and suck them up, like as animal\nCreatures being thirsty, do drink: And so I take my leave, and rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Of Meteor. c._ 1. _a._ 3.\n\n[2] _C._ 3. _a._ 1.\n\n\n\n\nXXXIX.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nConcerning Vapour, Clouds, Wind and Rain, I am of your _Authors_\nopinion,[1] That _Water is changed into Vapour, and Vapour into Air,\nand that dilated Vapours make Wind, and condensed Vapours, Clouds and\nMists_; But I am not for his little particles, _whereof_, he says,\n_Vapours are made, by the motion of a rare and subtil matter in the\npores of terrestrial bodies_; which certainly I should conceive to be\nloose atoms, did he not make them of several figures and magnitude:\nfor, in my opinion, there are no such things in nature, which like\nlittle Flyes or Bees do fly up into the air; and although I grant, that\nin Nature are several parts, whereof some are more rare, others more\ndense, according to the several degrees of matter, yet they are not\nsingle, but all mixt together in one body, and the change of motions in\nthose joyned parts, is the cause of all changes of figures whatever,\nwithout the assistance of any forreign parts: And thus Water of it self\nis changed to Snow, Ice, or Hail, by its inherent figurative Motions;\nthat is, the circular dilation of Water by contraction, changes into\nthe figure of Snow, Ice, or Hail or by rarifying motions it turns into\nthe figure of Vapour, and this Vapour again by contracting motions into\nthe figure of hoar frost; and when all these motions change again into\nthe former, then the figure of Ice, Snow, Hail, Vapour and Frost, turns\nagain into the figure of Water: And this in all sense and reason is\nthe most facil and probable way of making Ice, Snow, Hail, &c. As for\nrarefaction and condensation, I will not say that they may be forced by\nforreign parts, but yet they are made by change and alteration of the\ninherent motions of their own parts, for though the motions of forreign\nparts, may be the occasion of them, yet they are not the immediate\ncause or actors thereof. And as for _Thunder_, that clouds of Ice and\nSnow, the uppermost being condensed by heat, and so made heavy, should\nfall upon another and produce the noise of thunder, is very improbable;\nfor the breaking of a little small string, will make a greater noise\nthen a huge shower of snow with falling, and as for Ice being hard, it\nmay make a great noise, one part falling upon another, but then their\nweight would be as much as their noise, so that the clouds or roves of\nIce would be as soon upon our heads, if not sooner, as the noise in our\nEares; like as a bullet shot out of a Canon, we may feel the bullet\nas soon as we hear the noise. But to conclude, all densations are not\nmade by heat, nor all noises by pressures, for sound is oftener made by\ndivision then pressure, and densation by cold then by heat: And this is\nall for the present, from,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend,_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Of Meteor., c._ 2, 4, 5, 6.\n\n\n\n\nXL.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI cannot perceive the Rational Truth of your _Authors_ opinion,\nconcerning _Colours_, made _by the agitation of little spherical bodies\nof an \u00c6thereal matter, transmitting the action of Light_; for if\ncolours were made after this manner, there would, in my opinion, not\nbe any fixed or lasting colour, but one colour would be so various,\nand change faster then every minute; the truth is, there would be\nno certain or perfect colour at all: wherefore it seems altogether\nimprobable, that such liquid, rare and disunited bodies should either\nkeep or make inherent and fixed colours; for liquid and rare bodies,\nwhose several parts are united into one considerable bulk of body,\ntheir colours are more apt to change then the colours of those bodies\nthat are dry, solid and dense; the reason is, that rare and liquid\nbodies are more loose, slack, and agil, then solid and dry bodies, in\nso much, as in every alteration of motion their colours are apt to\nchange: And if united rare and liquid bodies be so apt to alter and\nchange, how is it probable, that those bodies, which are small and\nnot united, should either keep or make inherent fixed colours? I will\nnot say, but that such little bodies may range into such lines and\nfigures, as make colours, but then they cannot last, being not united\ninto a lasting body, that is, into a solid, substantial body, proper\nto make such figures as colours. But I desire you not to mistake me,\n_Madam_, for I do not mean, that the substance of colours is a gross\nthick substance, for the substance may be as thin and rare as flame or\nlight, or in the next degree to it; for certainly the substance of\nlight, and the substance of colours come in their degrees very neer\neach other; But according to the contraction of the figures, colours\nare paler or deeper, or more or less lasting. And as for the reason,\nwhy colours will change and rechange, it is according as the figures\nalter or recover their forms; for colours will be as animal Creatures,\nwhich sometimes are faint, pale, and sick, and yet recover; but when\nas a particular colour is, as I may say, quite dead, then there is no\nrecovering of it. But colours may seem altered sometimes in our eyes,\nand yet not be altered in themselves; for our eyes, if perfect, see\nthings as they are presented; and for proof, if any animal should be\npresented in an unusual posture or shape, we could not judg of it;\nalso if a Picture, which must be viewed side-wards, should be looked\nupon forwards, we could not know what to make of it; so the figures\nof colours, if they be not placed rightly to the sight, but turned\ntopsie-turvie as the Phrase is, or upside-down, or be moved too quick,\nand this quick motion do make a confusion with the lines of Light, we\ncannot possibly see the colour perfectly. Also several lights or shades\nmay make colours appear otherwise then in themselves they are, for\nsome sorts of lights and shades may fall upon the substantial figures\nof colours in solid bodies, in such lines and figures, as they may\nover-power the natural or artificial inherent colours in solid bodies,\nand for a time make other colours, and many times the lines of light\nor of shadows will meet and sympathize so with inherent colours, and\nplace their lines so exactly, as they will make those inherent colours\nmore splendorous then in their own nature they are, so that light and\nshadows will add or diminish or alter colours very much. Likewise some\nsorts of colours will be altered to our sight, not by all, but onely by\nsome sorts of light, as for example, blew will seem green, and green\nblew by candle light, when as other colours will never appear changed,\nbut shew constantly as they are; the reason is, because the lines of\ncandle light fall in such figures upon the inherent colours, and so\nmake them appear according to their own figures; Wherefore it is onely\nthe alteration of the exterior figures of light and shadows, that make\ncolours appear otherwise, and not a change of their own natures; And\nhence we may rationally conclude, that several lights and shadows by\ntheir spreading and dilating lines may alter the face or out-side of\ncolours, but not suddenly change them, unless the power of heat, and\ncontinuance of time, or any other cause, do help and assist them in\nthat work of metamorphosing or transforming of colours; but if the\nlines of light be onely, as the phrase is, Skin-deep; that is, but\nlightly spreading and not deeply penetrating, they may soon wear out or\nbe rubbed off; for though they hurt, yet they do not kill the natural\ncolour, but the colour may recover and reassume its former vigour and\nlustre: but time and other accidental causes will not onely alter, but\ndestroy particular colours as well as other creatures, although not all\nafter the same manner, for some will last longer then others. And thus,\n_Madam_, there are three sorts of Colours, Natural, Artificial, and\nAccidental; but I have discoursed of this subject more at large in my\nPhilosophical Opinions, to which I refer you, and rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXLI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nMy answer to your _Authors_ question, _Why flame ascends in a pointed\nfigure?_[1] is, That the figure of fire consists in points, and being\ndilated into a flame, it ascends in lines of points slope-wayes from\nthe fired fuel; like as if you should make two or more sticks stand\nupright and put the upper ends close together, but let the lower ends\nbe asunder, in which posture they will support each other, which, if\nboth their ends were close together, they could not do. The second\nquestion is, _Why fire doth not alwayes flame?_[2] I answer, Because\nall fuel is not flameable, some being so moist, as it doth oppose\nthe fires dryness, and some so hard and retentive, as fire cannot so\nsoon dissolve it; and in this contest, where one dissipates, and the\nother retains, a third figure is produced, _viz._ smoak, between the\nheat of one, and the moisture of the other; and this smoak is forced\nby the fire out of the fuel, and is nothing else but certain parts of\nfuel, raised to such a degree of rarefaction; and if fire come near,\nit forces the smoak into flame, the smoak changing it self by its\nfigurative motions into flame; but when smoak is above the flame, the\nflame cannot force the smoak to fire or enkindle it self, for the flame\ncannot so well encounter it; which shews, as if smoak had a swifter\nmotion then flame, although flame is more rarified then smoak; and if\nmoisture predominate, there is onely smoak, if fire, then there is\nflame: But there are many figures, that do not flame, until they are\nquite dissolved, as Leather, and many other things. Neither can fire\nwork upon all bodies alike, but according to their several natures,\nlike as men cannot encounter several sorts of creatures after one and\nthe same manner; for not any part in nature hath an absolute power,\nalthough it hath self-motion; and this is the reason, that wax by fire\nis melted, and clay hardened. The third question is, _Why some few\ndrops of water sprinkled upon fire, do encrease its flame?_ I answer,\nby reason of their little quantity, which being over-powred by the\ngreater quantity and force of fire, is by its self-motions converted\ninto fire; for water being of a rare nature, and fire, for the most\npart, of a rarifying quality, it cannot suddenly convert it self into a\nmore solid body then its nature is, but following its nature by force\nit turns into flame. The fourth question is, _Why the flame of spirit\nof Wine doth consume the Wine, and yet cannot burn or hurt a linnen\ncloth?_ I answer, The Wine is the fuel that feeds the flame, and upon\nwhat it feeds, it devoureth, and with the food, the feeder; but by\nreason Wine is a rarer body then Oyle, or Wood, or any other fuel, its\nflame is also weaker. And thus much of these questions, I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _P._ 4. _art._ 97.\n\n[2] _Art._ 107.\n\n\n\n\nXLII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nTo conclude my discourse upon the Opinions of these two famous and\nlearned Authors, which I have hitherto sent you in several Letters,\nI could not chuse but repeat the ground of my own opinions in this\npresent; which I desire you to observe well, lest you mistake any\nthing, whereof I have formerly discoursed. First I am for self-moving\nmatter, which I call the sensitive and rational matter, and the\nperceptive and architectonical part of nature, which is the life and\nknowledg of nature. Next I am of an opinion, That all Perception is\nmade by corporeal, figuring self-motions, and that the perception of\nforreign objects is made by patterning them out: as for example, The\nsensitive perception of forreign objects is by making or taking copies\nfrom these objects, so as the sensitive corporeal motions in the eyes\ncopy out the objects of sight, and the sensitive corporeal motions in\nthe ears copy out the objects of sound; the sensitive corporeal motions\nin the nostrils, copy out the objects of sent; the sensitive corporeal\nmotions in the tongue and mouth, copy out the objects of taste, and\nthe sensitive corporeal motions in the flesh and skin of the body copy\nout the forreign objects of touch; for when you stand by the fire, it\nis not that the fire, or the heat of the fire enters your flesh, but\nthat the sensitive motions copy out the objects of fire and heat. As\nfor my Book of Philosophy, I must tell you, that it treats more of the\nproduction and architecture of Creatures then of their perceptions, and\nmore of the causes then the effects, more in a general then peculiar\nway, which I thought necessary to inform you of, and so I remain,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXLIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI received your questions in your last: the first was, _Whether there\nbe more body compact together in a heavy then in a light thing?_ I\nanswer, That purity, rarity, little quantity, exteriour shape, as also\nmotion cause lightnesse; and grossness of bulk, density, much quantity,\nexterior figure and motion cause heaviness, as it may be confirmed by\nmany examples: but lightness and heaviness are onely conceptions of\nman, as also ascent and descent; and it may be questioned, whether\nthere be such things really in nature; for change of motions of one\nand the same body will make lightness, and heaviness, as also rarity\nand density: besides, the several figures and compositions of bodies\nwill cause them to ascend or descend, for Snow is a light body and yet\ndescends from the clouds, and Water is a heavie body, and yet ascends\nin springs out of the Earth; Dust is a dense body and yet is apt to\nascend, Rain or Dew is a rare body and yet is apt to descend; Also\na Bird ascends by his shape, and a small worm although of less body\nand lighter will fall down; and there can be no other proof of light\nand heavy bodies but by their ascent and descent; But as really there\nis no such thing as heavie or light in nature more then words, and\ncomparisons of different corporeal motions, so there is no such thing,\nas high or low, place or time, but onely words to make comparisons and\nto distinguish different corporeal motions. The second question was;\n_When a Bason with water is wasted into smoak, which fills up a whole\nRoom, Whether the air in the room doth, as the sensitive motions of the\neye, pattern out the figure of the smoak; or whether all the room is\nreally fill'd with the vapour or smoak?_ I answer, If it be onely the\npattern or figure of smoak or vapour, the extension and dilation is not\nso much as man imagines; but why may not the air, which in my opinion\nhath self-motion, pattern out the figure of smoak as well as the eye;\nfor that the eye surely doth it, may be proved; because smoak, if it\nenter the eye, makes it not onely smart and water much, but blinds it\nquite for the present; wherefore smoak doth not enter the eye, when the\neye seeth it, but the eye patterns out the figure of smoak, and this is\nperception; In the same manner may the air pattern out the figure of\nsmoak. The third question was, _Whether all that they name qualities\nof bodies, as thickness, thinness, hardness, softness, gravity,\nlevity, transparentness and the like, be substances?_ I answer, That\nall those, they call qualities, are nothing else but change of motion\nand figure of the same body, and several changes of motions are not\nseveral bodies, but several actions of one body; for change of motion\ndoth not create new matter or multiply its quantity: for though\ncorporeal motions may divide and compose, contract and dilate, yet they\ncannot create new matter, or make matter any otherwise then it is by\nnature, neither can they add or substract any thing from its nature.\nAnd therefore my opinion is, not that they are things subsisting by\nthemselves without matter, but that there can no abstraction be made\nof motion and figure from matter, and that matter and motion being but\none thing and inseparable, make but one substance. Wherefore density\nand rarity, gravity and levity, &c. being nothing else but change of\nmotions, cannot be without matter, but a dense or rare, heavie or\nlight matter is but one substance or body; And thus having obeyed your\ncommands, I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend,_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXLIV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI am very ready to give you my opinion of those two questions you sent\nme, whereof the first was, _Whether that, which is rare and subtil,\nbe not withal pure?_ To which I answer, That all rare bodies are not\nsubtil, nor pure, and that all which is dense is not gross and dull:\nAs for example, Puddle-water, or also clear water, is rarer then\nQuicksilver, and yet not so subtil and pure as Quicksilver; the like of\nGold; for Quicksilver and Gold may be rarified to a transparentness,\nand yet be so dense, as not to be easily dissolved; and Quicksilver is\nvery subtil and searching, so as to be able to force other bodies to\ndivide as well as it can divide and compose its own parts. Wherefore my\nopinion is, that the purest and subtilest degree of matter in nature,\nis that degree of matter which can dilate and contract, compose and\ndivide into any figure by corporeal self-motion. Your second question\nwas, _Why a man's hand cannot break a little hard body, as a little\nnail, whereas yet it is bigger then the nail?_ I answer, It is not\nbecause the hand is softer then the nail, for one hard body will not\nbreak suddenly another hard body, and a man may easily break an iron\nnail with his hand, as I have bin informed; but it is some kind of\nmotion which can easier do it, then another: for I have seen a strong\ncord wound about both a man's hands, who pulled his hands as hard and\nstrongly asunder as he could, and yet was not able to break it; when\nas a Youth taking the same cord, and winding it about his hands as the\nformer did, immediately broke it; the cause was, that he did it with\nanother kind of motion or pulling, then the other did, which though he\nused as much force and strength, as he was able, yet could not break\nit, when the boy did break it with the greatest ease, and turning onely\nhis hands a little, which shews, that many things may be done by a\nslight of motion, which otherwise a great strength and force cannot do.\nThis is my answer and opinion concerning your proposed questions; if\nyou have any more, I shall be ready to obey you, as,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and humble Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXLV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI understand by your last, that you are very desirous to know, _Whether\nthere be not in nature such animal creatures both for purity and size,\nas we are not capable to perceive by our sight._ Truly, _Madam_, in\nmy opinion it is very probable there may be animal creatures of such\nrare bodies as are not subject to our exterior senses, as well, as\nthere are elements which are not subject to all our exterior senses:\nas for example, fire is onely subject to our sight and feeling, and\nnot to any other sense, water is subject to our sight, taste, touch\nand hearing, but not to smelling; and earth is subject to our sight,\ntaste, touch and smelling, but not to our hearing; and vapour is onely\nsubject to our sight, and wind onely to our hearing; but pure air\nis not subject to any of our senses, but onely known by its effects:\nand so there may likewise be animal creatures which are not subject\nto any of our senses both for their purity and life; as for example,\nI have seen pumpt out of a water pump small worms which could hardly\nbe discerned but by a bright Sun-light, for they were smaller then\nthe smallest hair, some of a pure scarlet colour and some white, but\nthough they were the smallest creatures that ever I did see, yet they\nwere more agil and fuller of life, then many a creature of a bigger\nsize, and so small they were, as I am confident, they were neither\nsubject to tast, smell, touch nor hearing, but onely to sight, and\nthat neither without difficulty, requiring both a sharp sight and a\nclear light to perceive them; and I do verily believe that these small\nanimal creatures may be great in comparison to others which may be\nin nature. But if it be probable that there may be such small animal\ncreatures in nature, as are not subject to our exterior senses, by\nreason of their littleness; it is also probable, that there may be\nsuch great and big animal creatures in nature as are beyond the reach\nand knowledg of our exterior senses; for bigness and smallness are not\nto be judged by our exterior senses, onely; but as sense and reason\ninform us, that there are different degrees in Purity and Rarity, so\nalso in shapes, figures and sizes in all natural creatures. Next you\ndesired to know, _Whether there can be an artificial Life, or a Life\nmade by Art?_ My answer is, Not; for although there is Life in all\nnatures parts, yet not all the parts are life, for there is one part of\nnatural matter which in its nature is inanimate or without life, and\nthough natural Life doth produce Art, yet Art cannot produce natural\nLife, for though Art is the action of Life, yet it is not Life it self:\nnot but that there is Life in Art, but not art in life, for Life is\nnatural, and not artificial; and thus the several parts of a watch\nmay have sense and reason according to the nature of their natural\nfigure, which is steel, but not as they have an artificial shape, for\nArt cannot put Life into the watch, Life being onely natural, not\nartificial. Lastly your desire was to know, _Whether a part of matter\nmay be so small, as it cannot be made less?_ I answer, there is no such\nthing in nature as biggest or least, nature being Infinite as well in\nher actions as in her substance; and I have mentioned in my book of\nPhilosophy, and in a letter, I sent you heretofore concerning Infinite,\nthat there are several sorts of Infinites, as Infinite in quantity or\nbulk, Infinite in number, Infinite in quality, as Infinite degrees\nof hardness, softness, thickness, thinness, swiftness, slowness, &c.\nas also Infinite compositions, divisions, creations, dissolutions,\n&c. in nature; and my meaning is, that all these Infinite actions\ndo belong to the Infinite body of nature, which being infinite in\nsubstance must also of necessity be infinite in its actions; but\nalthough these Infinite actions are inherent in the power of the\nInfinite substance of nature, yet they are never put in act in her\nparts, by reason there being contraries in nature, and every one of\nthe aforementioned actions having its opposite, they do hinder and\nobstruct each other so, that none can actually run into infinite; for\nthe Infinite degrees of compositions hinder the infinite degrees of\ndivisions; and the infinite degrees of rarity, softness, swiftness,\n&c. hinder the infinite degrees of density, hardness, slowness, &c.\nall which nature has ordered with great wisdom and Prudence to make an\namiable combination between her parts; for if but one of these actions\nshould run into infinite, it would cause a horrid confusion between\nnatures parts, nay an utter destruction of the whole body of nature, if\nI may call it whole: as for example, if one part should have infinite\ncompositions, without the hinderance or obstruction of division, it\nwould at last mount and become equal to the Infinite body of nature,\nand so from a part change to a whole, from being finite to infinite,\nwhich is impossible; Wherefore, though nature hath an Infinite natural\npower, yet she doth not put this power in act in her particulars;\nand although she has an infinite force or strength, yet she doth not\nuse this force or strength in her parts. Moreover when I speak of\nInfinite divisions and compositions, creations and dissolutions, &c.\nin nature, I do not mean so much the infinite degrees of compositions\nand divisions, as the actions themselves to be infinite in number;\nfor there being infinite parts in nature, and every one having its\ncompositions and divisions, creations and dissolutions, these actions\nmust of necessity be infinite too, to wit, in number, according to the\nInfinite number of parts, for as there is an Infinite number of parts\nin nature, so there is also an infinite number and variety of motions\nwhich are natural actions. However let there be also infinite degrees\nof these natural actions, in the body or substance of infinite nature;\nyet, as I said, they are never put in act, by reason every action\nhath its contrary or opposite, which doth hinder and obstruct it from\nrunning actually into infinite. And thus I hope, you conceive cleerly\nnow, what my opinion is, and that I do not contradict my self in my\nworks, as some have falsly accused me, for they by misapprehending my\nmeaning, judge not according to the truth of my sense, but according\nto their own false interpretation, which shews not onely a weakness in\ntheir understandings and passions, but a great injustice and injury\nto me, which I desire you to vindicate when ever you chance to hear\nsuch accusations and blemishes laid upon my works, by which you will\nInfinitely oblige,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your humble and faithful Servant._\n\n\n\n\nSect. II.\n\nI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nBeing come now to the Perusal of the Works of that learned _Author_ Dr.\n_Moor_, I find that the onely design of his Book called _Antidote_, is\n_to prove the Existence_ of a God, and to refute, or rather convert\nAtheists; which I wonder very much at, considering, he says himself,[1]\nThat _there is no man under the cope of Heaven but believes a God_;\nwhich if so, what needs there to make so many arguments to no purpose?\nunless it be to shew Learning and wit; In my opinion, it were better\nto convert Pagans to be Christians, or to reform irregular Christians\nto a more pious life, then to prove that, which all men believe, which\nis the way to bring it into question. For certainly, according to the\nnatural Light of Reason, there is a God, and no man, I believe, doth\ndoubt it; for though there may be many vain words, yet I think there\nis no such atheistical belief amongst man-kind, nay, not onely amongst\nmen, but also, amongst all other creatures, for if nature believes\na God, all her parts, especially the sensitive and rational, which\nare the living and knowing parts, and are in all natural creatures,\ndo the like, and therefore all parts and creatures in nature do adore\nand worship God, for any thing man can know to the contrary; for no\nquestion, but natures soule adores and worships God as well as man's\nsoule; and why may not God be worshipped by all sorts and kinds of\ncreatures as well, as by one kind or sort? I will not say the same way,\nbut I believe there is a general worship and adoration of God; for as\nGod is an Infinite Deity, so certainly he has an Infinite Worship and\nAdoration, and there is not any part of nature, but adores and worships\nthe only omnipotent God, to whom belongs Praise and Glory from and to\nall eternity: For it is very improbable, that God should be worshipped\nonely in part, and not in whole, and that all creatures were made to\nobey man, and not to worship God, onely for man's sake, and not for\nGod's worship, for man's use, and not God's adoration, for mans spoil\nand not God's blessing. But this Presumption, Pride, Vain-glory and\nAmbition of man, proceeds from the irregularity of nature, who being a\nservant, is apt to commit errors; and cannot be so absolute and exact\nin her devotion, adoration and worship, as she ought, nor so well\nobservant of God as God is observing her: Nevertheless, there is not\nany of her parts or creatures, that God is not acknowledged by, though\nnot so perfectly as he ought, which is caused by the irregularities of\nnature, as I said before. And so God of his mercy have mercy upon all\nCreatures; To whose protection I commend your Ladiship, and rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Antidote, Book_ I. _c._ 10. _a._ 5.\n\n\n\n\nII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nSince I spake in my last of the adoration and worship of God, you\nwould faine know, whether we can have an Idea of God? I answer, That\nnaturally we may, and really have a knowledge of the existence of\nGod, as I proved in my former letter, to wit, that there is a God,\nand, that he is the _Author_ of all things, who rules and governs all\nthings, and is also the God of Nature: but I dare not think, that\nnaturally we can have an Idea of the essence of God, so as to know what\nGod is in his very nature and essence; for how can there be a finite\nIdea of an Infinite God? You may say, As well as of Infinite space. I\nanswer, Space is relative, or has respect to body, but there is not\nany thing that can be compared to God; for the Idea of Infinite nature\nis material, as being a material creature of Infinite material Nature.\nYou will say, How can a finite part have an Idea of infinite nature? I\nanswer, Very well, by reason the Idea is part of Infinite Nature, and\nso of the same kind, as material; but God being an Eternal, Infinite,\nImmaterial, Individable Being, no natural creature can have an Idea of\nhim. You will say, That the Idea of God in the mind is immaterial; I\nanswer, I cannot conceive, that there can be any immaterial Idea in\nnature; but be it granted, yet that Immaterial is not a part of God,\nfor God is individable, and hath no parts; wherefore the Mind cannot\nhave an Idea of God, as it hath of Infinite nature, being a part of\nnature; for the Idea of God cannot be of the essence of God, as the\nIdea of nature is a corporeal part of nature: and though nature may be\nknown in some parts, yet God being Incomprehensible, his Essence can by\nno wayes or means be naturally known; and this is constantly believed,\nby\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend,_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nAlthough I mentioned in my last, that it is impossible to have an Idea\nof God, yet your _Author_ is pleased to say,[1] That _he will not stick\nto affirm, that the Idea or notion of God is as easie, as any notion\nelse whatsoever, and that we may know as much of him as of any thing\nelse in the world_. To which I answer, That in my opinion, God is not\nso easily to be known by any creature, as man may know himself; nor\nhis attributes so well, as man can know his own natural proprieties:\nfor Gods Infinite attributes are not conceivable, and cannot be\ncomprehended by a finite knowledg and understanding, as a finite part\nof nature; for though nature's parts may be Infinite in number, and as\nthey have a relation to the Infinite whole, if I may call it so, which\nis Infinite nature, yet no part is infinite in it self, and therefore\nit cannot know so much as whole nature: and God being an Infinite\nDeity, there is required an Infinite capacity to conceive him; nay,\nNature her self although Infinite, yet cannot possibly have an exact\nnotion of God, by reason of the disparity between God and her self; and\ntherefore it is not probable, if the Infinite servant of God is not\nable to conceive him, that a finite part or creature of nature, of what\nkind or sort soever, whether Spiritual, as your _Author_ is pleased to\nname it, or Corporeal, should comprehend God. Concerning my belief of\nGod, I submit wholly to the Church, and believe as I have bin informed\nout of the _Athanasian_ Creed, that the Father is Incomprehensible,\nthe Sonne Incomprehensible, and the Holy Ghost Incomprehensible; and\nthat there are not three, but one Incomprehensible God; Wherefore if\nany man can prove (as I do verily believe he cannot) that God is not\nIncomprehensible, he must of necessity be more knowing then the whole\nChurch, however he must needs dissent from the Church. But perchance\nyour _Author_ may say, I raise new and prejudicial opinions, in saying\nthat matter is eternal. I answer, The Holy Writ doth not mention Matter\nto be created, but onely Particular Creatures, as this Visible World,\nwith all its Parts, as the history or description of the Creation of\nthe World in _Genesis_ plainly shews; For _God said, Let it be Light,\nand there was Light; Let there be a Firmament in the midst of the\nWaters, and let it divide the Waters from the Waters; and Let the\nWaters under the Heaven be gathered together unto one place, and let\nthe dry Land appear; and let the Earth bring forth Grass, the Herb\nyielding Seed, and the Fruit-tree yielding Fruit after his kind; and\nlet there be Lights in the Firmament of the Heaven, to divide the Day\nfrom the Night,_ &c. Which proves, that all creatures and figures\nwere made and produced out of that rude and desolate heap or chaos\nwhich the Scripture mentions, which is nothing else but matter, by the\npowerful Word and Command of God, executed by his Eternal Servant,\nNature; as I have heretofore declared it in a Letter I sent you in the\nbeginning concerning Infinite Nature. But least I seem to encroach\ntoo much upon Divinity, I submit this Interpretation to the Church;\nHowever, I think it not against the ground of our Faith; for I am so\nfar from maintaining any thing either against Church or State, as I am\nsubmitting to both in all duty, and shall do so as long as I live, and\nrest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Of the Immortality of the Soul, pt._ 1., _c._ 4.\n\n\n\n\nIV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nSince your _Worthy_ and _Learned Author_ is pleased to mention,[1]\nThat an _ample experience both of Men and Things doth enlarge our\nUnderstanding_, I have taken occasion hence to enquire, how a mans\nUnderstanding may be encreased or inlarged. The Understanding must\neither be in Parts, or it must be Individable as one; if in Parts, then\nthere must be so many Understandings as there are things understood;\nbut if Individable, and but one Understanding, then it must dilate it\nself upon so many several objects. I for my part, assent to the first,\nThat Understanding increases by Parts, and not by Dilation, which\nDilation must needs follow, if the Mind or Understanding of man be\nindivisible and without parts; but if the Mind or Soul be Individable,\nthen I would fain know, how Understanding, Imagination, Conception,\nMemory, Remembrance, and the like, can be in the mind? You will say,\nperhaps, they are so many faculties or properties of the Incorporeal\nMind, but, I hope, you do not intend to make the Mind or Soul a Deity,\nwith so many attributes, Wherefore, in my opinion, it is safer to say,\nThat the Mind is composed of several active Parts: but of these Parts\nI have treated in my Philosophy, where you will find, that all the\nseveral Parts of Nature are Living and Knowing, and that there is no\npart that has not Life and Knowledg, being all composed of rational\nand sensitive matter, which is the life and soul of Nature; and that\nNature being Material, is composable and dividable, which is the cause\nof so many several Creatures, where every Creature is a part of\nNature, and these Infinite parts or creatures are Nature her self; for\nthough Nature is a self-moving substance, and by self-motion divides\nand composes her self several manners or ways into several forms and\nfigures, yet being a knowing, as well as a living substance, she knows\nhow to order her parts and actions wisely; for as she hath an Infinite\nbody or substance, so she has an Infinite life and knowledg; and as she\nhath an Infinite life and knowledg, so she hath an infinite wisdom:\nBut mistake me not, _Madam_; I do not mean an Infinite Divine Wisdom,\nbut an Infinite Natural Wisdom, given her by the Infinite bounty of\nthe Omnipotent God; but yet this Infinite Wisdom, Life and Knowledg in\nNature make but one Infinite. And as Nature hath degrees of matter, so\nshe has also degrees and variety of corporeal motions; for some parts\nof matter are self-moving, and some are moved by these self-moving\nparts of matter; and all these parts, both the moving and moved, are\nso intermixed, that none is without the other, no not in any the least\nCreature or part of Nature we can conceive; for there is no Creature or\npart of Nature, but has a comixture of those mentioned parts of animate\nand inanimate matter, and all the motions are so ordered by Natures\nwisdom, as not any thing in Nature can be otherwise, unless by a\nSupernatural Command and Power of God; for no part of corporeal matter\nand motion can either perish, or but rest; one part may cause another\npart to alter its motions, but not to quit motion, no more then one\npart of matter can annihilate or destroy another; and therefore matter\nis not meerly Passive, but always Active, by reason of the thorow\nmixture of animate and inanimate matter; for although the animate\nmatter is onely active in its nature, and the inanimate passive, yet\nbecause they are so closely united and mixed together that they make\nbut one body, the parts of the animate or self-moving matter do bear\nup and cause the inanimate parts to move and work with them; and thus\nthere is an activity in all parts of matter moving and working as one\nbody, without any fixation or rest, for all is moveable, moving and\nmoved. All which, _Madam_, if it were well observed, there would not\nbe so many strange opinions concerning nature and her actions, making\nthe purest and subtillest part of matter immaterial or incorporeal,\nwhich is as much, as to extend her beyond nature, and to rack her\nquite to nothing. But I fear the opinion of Immaterial substances in\nNature will at last bring in again the Heathen Religion, and make us\nbelieve a god _Pan, Bacchus, Ceres, Venus,_ and the like, so as we\nmay become worshippers of Groves and shadows, Beans and Onions, as\nour Forefathers. I say not this, as if I would ascribe any worship to\nNature, or make her a Deity, for she is onely a servant to God, and so\nare all her parts or creatures, which parts or creatures, although they\nare transformed, yet cannot be annihilated, except Nature her self be\nannihilated, which may be, whensoever the Great God pleases; for her\nexistence and resolution, or total destruction, depends upon Gods Will\nand Decree, whom she fears, adores, admires, praises and prayes unto,\nas being her God and Master; and as she adores God, so do all her parts\nand creatures, and amongst the rest Man, so that there is no Atheist in\nInfinite Nature, at least not in the opinion of,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Antid. Book._ 2. _Ch._ 2. _a._ 1.\n\n\n\n\nV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI cannot well conceive what your _Author_ means by the _Common Laws of\nNature_;[1] But if you desire my opinion how many Laws Nature hath,\nand what they are; I say Nature hath but One Law, which is a wise Law,\nto keep Infinite matter in order, and to keep so much Peace, as not to\ndisturb the Foundation of her Government: for though Natures actions\nare various, and so many times opposite, which would seem to make\nwars between several Parts, yet those active Parts, being united into\none Infinite body, cannot break Natures general Peace; for that which\nMan names War, Sickness, Sleep, Death, and the like, are but various\nparticular actions of the onely matter; not, as your _Author_ imagines,\nin a confusion, like Bullets, or such like things juggled together in a\nmans Hat, but very orderly and methodical; And the Playing motions of\nnature are the actions of Art, but her serious actions are the actions\nof Production, Generation and Transformation in several kinds, sorts\nand particulars of her Creatures, as also the action of ruling and\ngoverning these her several active Parts. Concerning the Pre-eminence\nand Prerogative of _Man_, whom your _Author_ calls[2] _The flower and\nchief of all the products of nature upon this Globe of the earth_; I\nanswer, That Man cannot well be judged of himself, because he is a\nParty, and so may be Partial; But if we observe well, we shall find\nthat the Elemental Creatures are as excellent as Man, and as able to\nbe a friend or foe to Man, as Man to them, and so the rest of all\nCreatures; so that I cannot perceive more abilities in Man then in the\nrest of natural Creatures; for though he can build a stately House, yet\nhe cannot make a Honey-comb; and though he can plant a Slip, yet he\ncannot make a Tree; though he can make a Sword, or Knife, yet he cannot\nmake the Mettal. And as Man makes use of other Creatures, so other\nCreatures make use of Man, as far as he is good for any thing: But Man\nis not so useful to his neighbour or fellow-creatures, as his neighbour\nor fellow-creatures to him, being not so profitable for use, as apt to\nmake spoil. And so leaving him, I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Antid. Book._ 2. _c._ 2.\n\n[2] _C._ 3.\n\n\n\n\nVI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour _Author_ demands,[1] _Whether there was ever any man, that was\nnot mortal, and whether there be any mortal that had not a beginning?_\nTruly, if nature be eternal, all the material figures which ever were,\nare, and can be, must be also eternal in nature; for the figures cannot\nbe annihilated, unless nature be destroyed; and although a Creature\nis dissolved and transformed into numerous different figures, yet all\nthese several figures remain still in those parts of matter, whereof\nthat creature was made, for matter never changes, but is always one\nand the same, and figure is nothing else but matter transposed or\ntransformed by motion several modes or ways. But if you conceive\nMatter to be one thing, Figure another, and Motion a third, several,\ndistinct and dividable from each other, it will produce gross errors,\nfor, matter, motion, and figure, are but one thing. And as for that\ncommon question, whether the Egg was before the Chick, or the Chick\nbefore the Egg, it is but a thred-bare argument, which proves nothing,\nfor there is no such thing as First in Eternity, neither doth Time\nmake productions or generations, but Matter; and whatsoever matter can\nproduce or generate, was in matter before it was produced; wherefore\nthe question is, whether Matter, which is Nature, had a beginning, or\nnot? I say not: for put the case, the figures of Earth, Air, Water,\nand Fire, Light and Colours, Heat and Cold, Animals, Vegetables and\nMinerals, &c. were not produced from all Eternity, yet those figures\nhave nevertheless been in Matter, which is Nature, from all eternity,\nfor these mentioned Creatures are onely made by the corporeal motions\nof Matter, transforming Matter into such several figures; Neither can\nthere be any perishing or dying in Nature, for that which Man calls so,\nis onely an alteration of Figure. And as all other productions are but\na change of Matters sensitive motions, so all irregular and extravagant\nopinions are nothing but a change of Matters rational motions; onely\nproductions by rational motions are interior, and those by sensitive\nmotions exterior. For the Natural Mind is not less material then the\nbody, onely the Matter of the Mind is much purer and subtiller then the\nMatter of the Body. And thus there is nothing in Nature but what is\nmaterial; but he that thinks it absurd to say, the World is composed\nof meer self-moving Matter, may consider, that it is more absurd to\nbelieve Immaterial substances or spirits in Nature, as also a spirit of\nNature, which is the Vicarious power of God upon Matter; For why should\nit not be as probable, that God did give Matter a self-moving power to\nher self, as to have made another Creature to govern her? For Nature\nis not a Babe, or Child, to need such a Spiritual Nurse, to teach her\nto go, or to move; neither is she so young a Lady as to have need of a\nGoverness, for surely she can govern her self; she needs not a Guardian\nfor fear she should run away with a younger Brother, or one that cannot\nmake her a Jointure. But leaving those strange opinions to the fancies\nof their Authors, I'le add no more, but that I am,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend,_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Antid. l._ 3. _c._ 15. _a._ 3.\n\n\n\n\nVII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour _Author_ being very earnest in arguing against those that maintain\nthe opinion of Matter being self-moving, amongst the rest of his\narguments brings in this:[1] _Suppose_, says he, _Matter could move it\nself, would meer Matter with self-motion amount to that admirable wise\ncontrivance of things which we see in the World?--All the evasion I can\nimagine, our adversaries may use here, will be this: That Matter is\ncapable of sense, and the finest and most subtil of the most refined\nsense; and consequently of Imagination too, yea happily of Reason and\nUnderstanding._ I answer, it is very probable, that not onely all the\nMatter in the World or Universe hath Sense, but also Reason; and that\nthe sensitive part of matter is the builder, and the rational the\ndesigner; whereof I have spoken of before, and you may find more of it\nin my Book of Philosophy. _But,_ says your Author, _Let us see, if all\ntheir heads laid together can contrive the anatomical Fabrick of any\nCreature that liveth?_ I answer, all parts of Nature are not bound to\nhave heads or tayls; but if they have, surely they are wiser then many\na man's. _I demand_, says he, _Has every one of these Particles, that\nmust have a hand in the framing of the body of an animal, the whole\ndesign of the work by the Impress of some Phantasme upon it? or as\nthey have several offices, so have they several parts of the design?_\nI answer, All the actions of self-moving Matter are not Impresses, nor\nis every part a hand-labourer, but every part unites by degrees into\nsuch or such a Figure. Again, says he, _How is it conceiveable that\nany one Particle of Matter, or many together, (there not existing, yet\nin Nature an animal) can have the Idea Impressed of that Creature they\nare to frame?_ I answer, all figures whatsoever have been, are, or can\nbe in Nature, are existent in nature. _How_, says he, _can they in\nframing several parts confer notes? by what language or speech can they\ncommunicate their Counsels one to another?_ I answer, Knowledg doth\nnot always require speech, for speech is an effect and not a cause,\nbut knowledg is a cause and not an effect; and nature hath infinite\nmore ways to express knowledg then man can imagine, _Wherefore_, he\nconcludes, _that they should mutually serve one another in such a\ndesign, is more impossible, then that so many men, blind and dumb from\ntheir nativity, should joyn their forces and wits together to build a\nCastle, or carve a statue of such a Creature, as none of them knew any\nmore in several, then some one of the smallest parts thereof, but not\nthe relation it bore to the whole._ I answer, Nature is neither blind\nnor dumb, nor any ways defective, but infinitely wise and knowing;\nfor blindness and dumbness are but effects of some of her particular\nactions, but there is no defect in self-moving matter, nor in her\nactions in general; and it is absurd to conceive the Generality of\nwisdom according to an Irregular effect or defect of a particular\nCreature; for the General actions of Nature are both life and knowledg,\nwhich are the architects of all Creatures, and know better how to frame\nall kinds and sorts of Creatures then man can conceive; and the several\nparts of Matter have a more easie way of communication, then Mans head\nhath with his hand, or his hand with pen, ink, and paper, when he is\ngoing to write; which later example will make you understand my opinion\nthe better, if you do but compare the rational part of Matter to the\nhead, the sensitive to the hand, the inanimate to pen, ink and paper,\ntheir action to writing, and their framed figures to those figures or\nletters which are written; in all which is a mutual agreement without\nnoise or trouble. But give me leave, _Madam_, to tell you, That\nself-moving Matter may sometimes erre and move irregularly, and in some\nparts not move so strong, curious, or subtil at sometimes, as in other\nparts, for Nature delights in variety; Nevertheless she is more wise\nthen any Particular Creature or part can conceive, which is the cause\nthat Man thinks Nature's wise, subtil and lively actions, are as his\nown gross actions, conceiving them to be constrained and turbulent, not\nfree and easie, as well as wise and knowing; Whereas Nature's Creating,\nGenerating and Producing actions are by an easie connexion of parts to\nparts, without Counterbuffs, Joggs and Jolts, producing a particular\nfigure by degrees, and in order and method, as humane sense and reason\nmay well perceive: And why may not the sensitive and rational part of\nMatter know better how to make a Bee, then a Bee doth how to make Honey\nand Wax? or have a better communication betwixt them, then Bees that\nfly several ways, meeting and joyning to make their Combes in their\nHives? But pardon, _Madam_, for I think it a Crime to compare the\nCreating, Generating and producing Corporeal Life and Wisdom of Nature\nunto any particular Creature, although every particular Creature hath\ntheir share, being a part of Nature. Wherefore those, in my opinion, do\ngrossly err, that bind up the sensitive matter onely to taste, touch,\nhearing, seeing, and smelling; as if the sensitive parts of Nature had\nnot more variety of actions, then to make five senses; for we may well\nobserve, in every Creature there is difference of sense and reason\naccording to the several modes of self-motion; For the Sun, Stars,\nEarth, Air, Fire, Water, Plants, Animals, Minerals; although they have\nall sense and knowledg, yet they have not all sense and knowledg alike,\nbecause sense and knowledg moves not alike in every kind or sort of\nCreatures, nay many times very different in one and the same Creature;\nbut yet this doth not cause a general Ignorance, as to be altogether\nInsensible or Irrational, neither do the erroneous and irregular\nactions of sense and reason prove an annihilation of sense and reason;\nas for example, a man may become Mad or a Fool through the irregular\nmotions of sense and reason, and yet have still the Perception of sense\nand reason, onely the alteration is caused through the alteration of\nthe sensitive and rational corporeal motions or actions, from regular\nto irregular; nevertheless he has Perceptions, Thoughts, Ideas,\nPassions, and whatsoever is made by sensitive and rational Matter,\nneither can Perception be divided from Motion, nor Motion from Matter;\nfor all sensation is Corporeal, and so is Perception. I can add no\nmore, but take my leave, and rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Of the Immortality of the Soul, l._ 1. _c._ 12.\n\n\n\n\nVIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour _Author_ is pleased to say,[1] that _Matter is a Principle purely\npassive, and no otherwise moved or modified, then as some other thing\nmoves and modifies it, but cannot move it self at all; which is most\ndemonstrable to them that contend for sense and perception in it: For\nif it had any such perception, it would, by vertue of its self-motion\nwithdraw its self from under the knocks of hammers, or fury of the\nfire; or of its own accord approach to such things as are most\nagreeable to it, and pleasing, and that without the help of muscles, it\nbeing thus immediately endowed with a self-moving power._ By his leave,\n_Madam_, I must tell you, that I see no consequence in this argument;\nBecause some parts of matter cannot withdraw themselves from the force\nand power of other parts, therefore they have neither sense, reason,\nnor perception: For put the case, a man should be over-powr'd by some\nother men, truely he would be forced to suffer, and no Immaterial\nSpirits, I think, would assist him. The very same may be said of other\nCreatures or parts of Nature; for some may over-power others, as the\nfire, hammer and hand doth over-power a Horse-shooe, which cannot\nprevail over so much odds of power and strength; And so likewise it is\nwith sickness and health, life and death; for example, some corporeal\nmotions in the body turning Rebels, by moving contrary to the health\nof an animal Creature, it must become sick; for not every particular\ncreature hath an absolute power, the power being in the Infinite whole,\nand not in single divided parts: Indeed, to speak properly, there is\nno such thing as an absolute power in Nature; for though Nature hath\npower to move it self, yet not beyond it self. But mistake me not, for\nI mean by an absolute Power; not a circumscribed and limited, but an\nunlimited power, no ways bound or confined, but absolutely or every way\nInfinite, and there is not anything that has such an absolute power\nbut God alone: neither can Nature be undividable, being Corporeal or\nMaterial; nor rest from motion being naturally self-moving, and in a\nperpetual motion. Wherefore though Matter is self-moving, and very\nwise, (although your _Author_ denies it, calling those Fools that\nmaintain this opinion)[2] yet it cannot go beyond the rules of its\nNature, no more then any Art can go beyond its Rules and Principles:\nAnd as for what your _Author_ says, That every thing would approach to\nthat, which is agreeable and pleasant; I think I need no demonstration\nto prove it; for we may plainly see it in all effects of Nature, that\nthere is Sympathy and Antipathy, and what is this else, but approaching\nto things agreeable and pleasant, and withdrawing it self from things\ndisagreeable, and hurtful or offensive? But of this subject I shall\ndiscourse more hereafter, wherefore I finish here, and rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Of the Immortality of the Soul, l._ 2., _c._ 1. _a._ 3.\n\n[2] _In the Append. to the Antid. c._ 3. _a._ 10.\n\n\n\n\nIX.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour _Authors_ opinion is,[1] That _Matter being once actually divided\nas far as possibly it can, it is a perfect contradiction it should\nbe divided any further._ I answer, Though Nature is Infinite, yet\nher actions are not all dilative nor separative, but some divide and\nsome compose, some dilate and some contract, which causes a mean\nbetwixt Natures actions or motions. Next your _Author_ says, That\n_as Infinite Greatness has no Figure, so Infinite Littleness hath\nnone also._ I answer, Whatsoever hath a body, has a figure; for it\nis impossible that _substance_, or _body_, and _figure_, should be\nseparated from each other, but wheresoever is body or substance,\nthere is also figure, and if there be an infinite substance, there\nmust also be an infinite figure, although not a certain determined\nor circumscribed figure, for such a figure belongs onely to finite\nparticulars; and therefore I am of your _Authors_ mind, That it is a\ncontradiction to say an Infinite Cube or Triangle, for a Cube and a\nTriangle is a perfect circumscribed figure, having its certain compass\nand circumference, be it never so great or little; wherefore to say\nan Infinite Cube, would be as much as to say a Finite Infinite. But\nas for your _Authors_ example of _Infinite matter, space or duration,\ndivided into three equal parts, all which he says must needs be\nInfinite, or else the whole will not be so, and then the middle part\nof them will seem both Finite and Infinite._ I answer, That Matter is\nnot dividable into three equal parts, for three is a finite number\nand so are three equal parts; but I say that Matter being an Infinite\nbody, is dividable into Infinite parts, and it doth not follow, as\nyour _Author_ says, That one of those infinite parts must be infinite\nalso, for else there would be no difference betwixt the whole and its\nparts; I say whole for distinctions and better expressions sake, and\ndo not mean such a whole which hath a certain number of parts, and\nis of a certain and limited figure, although never so great; but an\nInfinite whole, which expression I must needs use, by reason I speak\nof Infinite parts; and that each one of these Infinite parts in number\nmay be finite in substance or figure, is no contradiction, but very\nprobable and rational; nay, I think it rather absurd to say that each\npart is infinite; for then there would be no difference betwixt parts\nand whole, as I said before. Onely this is to be observed, that the\nInfinite whole is Infinite in substance or bulk, but the parts are\nInfinite in number, and not in bulk, for each part is circumscribed,\nand finite in its exterior figure and substance. But mistake me not,\nwhen I speak of circumscribed and finite single parts; for I do not\nmean, that each part doth subsist single and by it self, there being no\nsuch thing as an absolute single part in Nature, but Infinite Matter\nbeing by self-motion divided into an infinite number of parts, all\nthese parts have so near a relation to each other, and to the infinite\nwhole, that one cannot subsist without the other; for the Infinite\nparts in number do make the Infinite whole, and the Infinite whole\nconsists in the Infinite number of parts; wherefore it is onely their\nfigures which make a difference betwixt them; for each part having its\nproper figure different from the other, which is circumscribed and\nlimited, it is called a finite single part; and such a part cannot\nbe said Infinitely dividable, for infinite composition and division\nbelong onely to the Infinite body of Nature, which being infinite in\nsubstance may also be infinitely divided, but not a finite and single\npart: Besides, Infinite composition doth hinder the Infinite division,\nand Infinite division hinders the Infinite composition; so that one\npart cannot be either infinitely composed, or infinitely divided;\nand it is one thing to be dividable, and another to be divided. And\nthus, when your _Author_ mentions in another place,[2] That _if a\nbody be divisible into Infinite Parts, it hath an Infinite number of\nextended parts:_ If by extension he mean corporeal dimension, I am of\nhis opinion; for there is no part, be it never so little in Nature,\nbut is material; and if material, it has a body; and if a body, it\nmust needs have a bodily dimension; and so every part will be an\nextended part: but since there is no part but is finite in its self,\nit cannot be divisible into infinite parts; neither can any part be\ninfinitely dilated or contracted; for as composition and division do\nhinder and obstruct each other from running into Infinite, so doth\ndilation hinder the Infinite contraction, and contraction the Infinite\ndilation, which, as I said before, causes a mean betwixt Nature's\nactions; nevertheless, there are Infinite dilations and contractions in\nNature, because there are Infinite contracted and dilated parts, and so\nare infinite divisions because there are infinite divided parts; but\ncontraction, dilation, extension, composition, division, and the like,\nare onely Nature's several actions; and as there can be no single part\nin Nature that is Infinite, so there can neither be any single Infinite\naction. But as for Matter, Motion and Figure, those are Individable\nand inseparable, and make but one body or substance; for it is as\nimpossible to divide them, as impossible it is to your _Author_ to\nseparate the essential proprieties, which he gives, from an Immortal\nSpirit; And as Matter, Motion and Figure are inseparable; so is\nlikewise Matter, Space, Place and Duration; For Parts, Motion, Figure,\nPlace and Duration, are but one Infinite body; onely the Infinite parts\nare the Infinite divisions of the Infinite body, and the Infinite\nbody is a composition of the Infinite parts; but figure, place and\nbody are all one, and so is time, and duration, except you will call\ntime the division of duration, and duration the composition of time;\nbut infinite time, and infinite duration is all one in Nature: and\nthus Nature's Principal motions and actions are dividing, composing,\nand disposing or ordering, according to her Natural wisdom, by the\nOmnipotent God's leave and permission. Concerning the _Sun_, which your\n_Author_ speaks of in the same place, and denies him to be a _Spectator\nof our particular affairs upon Earth_; saying, there is no such divine\nPrinciple in him, whereby he can do it. I will speak nothing again\nit, nor for it; but I may say, that the Sun hath such a Principle as\nother Creatures have, which is, that he has sensitive and rational\ncorporeal motions, as well as animals or other Creatures, although not\nin the same manner, nor the same organs; and if he have sensitive and\nrational motions, he may also have sensitive and rational knowledg or\nperception, as well as man, or other animals and parts of Nature have,\nfor ought any body knows; for it is plain to humane sense and reason,\nthat all Creatures must needs have rational and sensitive knowledg,\nbecause they have all sensitive and rational matter and motions. But\nleaving the Sun for Astronomers to contemplate upon, I take my leave,\nand rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend,_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _In the Preface before the Imm. of the Soul._\n\n[2] _Antid. Book._ 2. _c._ 4.\n\n\n\n\nX.\n\n_MADAM,_\n\n\nYour _Author_ in his arguments against _Motion_, being a _Principle of\nNature_,[1] endeavours to prove, that Beauty, Colour, Symmetry, and\nthe like, in Plants, as well as in other Creatures, are no result from\nthe meer motion of the matter; and forming this objection, _It may be\nsaid_, says he, _That the regular motion of the matter made the first\nplant of every kind; but we demand, What regulated the motion of it,\nso as to guide it, to form it self into such a state?_ I answer, The\nWisdom of Nature or infinite Matter did order its own actions so, as\nto form those her Parts into such an exact and beautiful figure, as\nsuch a Tree, or such a Flower, or such a Fruit, and the like; and some\nof her Parts are pleased and delighted with other parts, but some of\nher parts are afraid or have an aversion to other parts; and hence is\nlike and dislike, or sympathy and antipathy, hate and love, according\nas nature, which is infinite self-moving matter, pleases to move; for\nthough Natural Wisdom is dividable into parts, yet these parts are\nunited in one infinite Body, and make but one Being in it self, like\nas the several parts of a man make up but one perfect man; for though\na man may be wise in several causes or actions, yet it is but one\nwisdom; and though a Judg may shew Justice in several causes, yet it\nis but one Justice; for Wisdom and Justice, though they be practised\nin several causes, yet it is but one Wisdom, and one Justice; and so,\nall the parts of a mans body, although they move differently, yet are\nthey but one man's bodily actions; Just as a man, if he carve or cut\nout by art several statues, or draw several Pictures, those statues or\npictures are but that one man's work. The like may be said of Natures\nMotions and Figures; all which are but one self-active or self-moving\nMaterial Nature. But Wise Nature's Ground or Fundamental actions\nare very Regular, as you may observe in the several and distinct\nkinds, sorts and particulars of her Creatures, and in their distinct\nProprieties, Qualities, and Faculties, belonging not onely to each kind\nand sort, but to each particular Creature; and since man is not able\nto know perfectly all those proprieties which belong to animals, much\nless will he be able to know and judg of those that are in Vegetables,\nMinerals and Elements; and yet these Creatures, for any thing Man\nknows, may be as knowing, understanding, and wise as he; and each as\nknowing of its kind or sort, as man is of his; But the mixture of\nignorance and knowledg in all Creatures proceeds from thence, that they\nare but Parts; and there is no better proof, that the mind of man is\ndividable, then that it is not perfectly knowing; nor no better proof\nthat it is composeable, then that it knows so much: but all minds are\nnot alike, but some are more composed then others, which is the cause,\nsome know more then others; for if the mind in all men were alike, all\nmen would have the same Imaginations, Fancies, Conceptions, Memories,\nRemembrances, Passions, Affections, Understanding, and so forth: The\nsame may be said of their bodies; for if all mens sensitive parts\nwere as one, and not dividable and composeable, all their Faculties,\nProprieties, Constitutions, Complexions, Appetites, would be the same\nin every man without any difference; but humane sense and reason doth\nwell perceive, that neither the mind, life nor body are as one piece,\nwithout division and composition. Concerning the divine Soul, I do not\ntreat of it; onely this I may say, That all are not devout alike, nor\nthose which are, are not at all times alike devout. But to conclude:\nsome of our modern Philosophers think they do God good service, when\nthey endeavour to prove Nature, as Gods good Servant, to be stupid,\nignorant, foolish and mad, or any thing rather then wise, and yet they\nbelieve themselves wise, as if they were no part of Nature; but I\ncannot imagine any reason why they should rail on her, except Nature\nhad not given them as great a share or portion, as she hath given to\nothers; for children in this case do often rail at their Parents, for\nleaving their Brothers and Sisters more then themselves. However,\nNature can do more then any of her Creatures: and if Man can Paint,\nImbroider, Carve, Ingrave curiously; why may not Nature have more\nIngenuity, Wit and Wisdom then any of her particular Creatures? The\nsame may be said of her Government. And so leaving Wise Nature, I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Append. to the Antid. c._ 11.\n\n\n\n\nXI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nTo your _Authors_ argument,[1] That _if Motion belong naturally to\nMatter, Matter being Uniform, it must be alike moved in every part or\nparticle imaginable of it, by reason this Motion being natural and\nessential to Matter, is alike every way._ I answer, That this is no\nmore necessary, then that the several actions of one body, or of one\npart of a body should be alike; for though Matter is one and the same\nin its Nature, and never changes, yet the motions are various, which\nmotions are the several actions of one and the same Natural Matter; and\nthis is the cause of so many several Creatures; for self-moving matter\nby its self-moving power can act several ways, modes or manners; and\nhad not natural matter a self-acting power, there could not be any\nvariety in Nature; for Nature knows of no rest, there being no such\nthing as rest in Nature; but she is in a perpetual motion, I mean\nself-motion, given her from God: Neither do I think it Atheistical\n(as your _Author_ deems) to maintain this opinion of self-motion, as\nlong as I do not deny the Omnipotency of God; but I should rather\nthink it Irreligious to make so many several Creatures as Immaterial\nSpirits, like so many severall Deities, to rule and govern Nature and\nall material substances in Nature; for what Atheism doth there lie\nin saying, that natural matter is naturally moving, and wise in her\nself? Doth this oppose the omnipotency and Infinite wisdom of God? It\nrather proves and confirms it; for all Natures free power of moving and\nwisdom is a gift of God, and proceeds from him; but I must confess,\nit destroys the power of Immaterial substances, for Nature will not\nbe ruled nor governed by them, and to be against Natural Immaterial\nsubstances, I think, is no Atheisme, except we make them Deities;\nneither is Atheisme to contradict the opinion of those, that believe\nsuch natural incorporeal Spirits, unless man make himself a God. But\nalthough Nature is wise, as I said before, and acts methodically,\nyet the variety of motions is the cause of so many Irregularities in\nNature, as also the cause of Irregular opinions; for all opinions are\nmade by self-moving matters motions, or (which is all one) by corporeal\nself-motion, and some in their opinions do conceive Nature according\nto the measure of themselves, as that Nature can, nor could not do\nmore, then they think, nay, some believe they can do as much as Nature\ndoth; which opinions, whether they be probable or regular, I'le let\nany man judg; adding onely this, that to humane sense and reason it\nappears plainly, that as God has given Nature a power to act freely, so\nhe doth approve of her actions, being wise and methodical in all her\nseveral Productions, Generations, Transformations and Designs: And so I\nconclude for the present, onely subscribe my self, as really I am,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend,_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Antid. l._ 2. _c._ 1.\n\n\n\n\nXII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI am of your _Authors_ opinion, concerning self-activity or\nself-motion,[1] _That what is Active of it self, can no more cease to\nbe active then to be_: And I have been always of this opinion, even\nfrom the first beginning of my conceptions in natural Philosophy, as\nyou may see in my first Treatise of Natural Philosophy, which I put\nforth eleven years since; where I say, That self-moving Matter is in a\nPerpetual motion; But your _Author_ endeavors from thence to conclude,\nThat _Matter is not self active, because it is reducible to rest._ To\nwhich I answer, That there is no such thing as Rest in Nature: Not do\nI say, that all sorts of motions are subject to our senses, for those\nthat are subject to our sensitive Perceptions, are but gross Motions,\nin comparison to those that are not subject to our exterior senses:\nas for example; We see some bodies dilate, others consume, others\ncorrupt; yet we do not see how they dilate, nor how they consume, nor\nhow they corrupt: Also we see some bodies contract, some attract,\nsome condense, some consist, &c. yet we do not see their contracting,\nattracting, condensing, consisting or retenting motions; and yet we\ncannot say, they are not corporeal motions, because not subject to\nour exterior senses; for if there were not contracting, attracting,\nretenting or consistent corporeal self-motions, it had been impossible\nthat any creature could have been composed into one united figure,\nmuch less stayed and continued in the same figure without a general\nalteration. But your _Author_ says, _If Matter, as Matter, had Motion,\nnothing would hold together, but Flints, Adamants, Brass, Iron, yea,\nthis whole Earth, would suddenly melt into a thinner substance then\nthe subtil Air, or rather it never had been condensated together to\nthis consistency we find it._ But I would ask him, what reason he can\ngive, that corporeal self-motion should make all matter rare and fluid,\nunless he believe there is but one kind of motion in Nature, but this,\nhuman sense and reason will contradict; for we may observe there are\nInfinite changes of Motion, and there is more variety and curiosity in\ncorporeal motions, then any one single Creature can imagine, much less\nknow; but I suppose he conceives all corporeal matter to be gross, and\nthat not any corporeal motion can be subtil, penetrating, contracting\nand dilating; and that whatsoever is penetrating, contracting and\ndilating, is Individable: But by his leave, _Madam_, this doth not\nfollow; for though there be gross degrees of Matter, and strong degrees\nof Corporeal Motions, yet there are also pure and subtil degrees\nof Matter and Motions; to wit, that degree of Matter, which I name\nsensitive and rational Matter, which is natural Life and Knowledg, as\nsensitive Life and rational Knowledg. Again, your _Author_ askes, _What\nglue or cement holds the parts of hard matter in Stones and Metals\ntogether?_ I answer, Consistent or retentive corporeal motions, by an\nagreeable union and conjunction in the several parts of Metal or Stone;\nand these retentive or consistent motions, are as strong and active,\nif not more, then some dilative or contractive motions; for I have\nmentioned heretofore, that, as sensitive and rational corporeal motions\nare in all Creatures, so also in Stone, Metal, and any other dense body\nwhatsoever; so that not any one Creature or part of Matter is without\nMotion, and therefore not any thing is at rest. But, _Madam_, I dare\nsay, I could bring more reason and sense to prove, that sensitive and\nrational Matter is fuller of activity, and has more variety of motion,\nand can change its own parts of self-moving Matter more suddenly, and\ninto more exterior figures, then Immaterial Spirits can do upon natural\nMatter. But your _Author_ says, That Immaterial Spirits are endued with\nSense and Reason; I say, My sensitive and rational corporeal Matter\nis Sense and Reason it self, and is the Architect or Creator of all\nfigures of Natural matter, for though all the parts of Matter are not\nself-moving, yet there is not any part that is not moving or moved, by\nand with the mover, which is animate matter. And thus I conclude, and\nrest constantly,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Of the Immortality of the Soul, l._ 1. _c._ 7.\n\n\n\n\nXIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nThat Matter is uncapable of Sense, your _Author_ proves by the example\nof dead Carcasses;[1] _For,_ says he, _Motion and Sense being really\none and the same thing, it must needs follow, that where there is\nmotion, there is also sense and perception; but on the contrary, there\nis Reaction in dead Carcasses, and yet no Sense._ I answer shortly,\nThat it is no consequence, because there is no animal sense nor\nexterior perceptible local motion in a dead Carcass, therefore there\nis no sense at all in it; for though it has not animal sense, yet it\nmay nevertheless have sense according to the nature of that figure,\ninto which it did change from being an animal. Also he says, _If any\nMatter have sense, it will follow, that upon reaction all shall have\nthe like; and that a Bell while it is ringing, and a Bow while it is\nbent, and every Jack-in-a-box, that School-boys play with, shall be\nliving animals._ I answer, It is true, if reaction made sense; but\nreaction doth not make sense, but sense makes reaction; and though the\nBell hath not an animal knowledg, yet it may have a mineral life and\nknowledg, and the Bow, and the Jack-in-a-box a vegetable knowledg; for\nthe shape and form of the Bell, Bow, and Jack-in-a-box, is artificial;\nnevertheless each in its own kind may have as much knowledg as an\nanimal in his kind; onely they are different according to the different\nproprieties of their Figures: And who can prove the contrary that they\nhave not? For certainly Man cannot prove what he cannot know; but Mans\nnature is so, that knowing but little of other Creatures, he presently\njudges there is no more knowledg in Nature, then what Man, at least\nAnimals, have; and confines all sense onely to Animal sense, and all\nknowledg to Animal knowledg. Again says your Author, _That Matter is\nutterly uncapable of such operations as we find in our selves, and\nthat therefore there is something in us Immaterial or Incorporeal;\nfor we find in our selves that one and the same thing, both hears,\nand sees, and tastes, and perceives all the variety of objects that\nNature manifests unto us._ I answer, That is the reason there is but\none matter, and that all natural perception is made by the animate\npart of matter; but although there is but one matter in Nature, yet\nthere are several parts or degrees, and consequently several actions\nof that onely matter, which causes such a variety of perceptions,\nboth sensitive and rational: the sensitive perception is made by the\nsensitive corporeal motions, copying out the figures of forreign\nobjects in the sensitive organs of the sentient; and if those sensitive\nmotions do pattern out forreign objects in each sensitive organ alike\nat one and the same time, then we hear, see, taste, touch and smell,\nat one and the same time: But Thoughts and Passions, as Imagination,\nConception, Fancy, Memory, Love, Hate, Fear, Joy, and the like, are\nmade by the rational corporeal motions in their own degree of matter,\nto wit, the rational. And thus all perception is made by one and the\nsame matter, through the variety of its actions or motions, making\nvarious and several figures, both sensitive and rational. But all this\nvariety in sense and reason, or of sensitive and rational perceptions,\nis not made by parts pressing upon parts, but by changing their own\nparts of matter into several figures by the power of self-motion: For\nexample, I see a Man or Beast; that Man or Beast doth not touch my\neye, in the least, neither in it self, nor by pressing the adjoyning\nparts: but the sensitive corporeal motions streight upon the sight of\nthe Man or Beast make the like figure in the sensitive organ, the Eye,\nand in the eyes own substance or matter, as being in the eye as well\nas the other degrees of matter, to wit, the rational and inanimate,\nfor they are all mixt together. But this is to be observed, That the\nrational matter can and doth move in its own substance, as being the\npurest and subtillest degree of matter; but the sensitive being not so\npure and subtil, moves always with the inanimate Matter, and so the\nperceptive figures which the rational Matter, or rational corporeal\nMotions make, are made in their own degree of Matter; but those figures\nwhich the sensitive patterns out, are made in the organs or parts of\nthe sentient body proper to such or such a sense or perception: as in\nan animal Creature, the perception of sight is made by the sensitive\ncorporeal motions in the Eye; the perception of hearing, in the Ear,\nand so forth. As for what your _Author_ says, _That we cannot conceive\nany portion of Matter, but is either hard or soft_; I answer, That\nthese are but effects of Matters actions, and so is rare, and dense,\nand the like; but there are some Creatures which seem neither perfectly\nrare, nor dense, nor hard, nor soft, but of mixt qualities; as for\nexample, Quicksilver seems rare, and yet is dense; soft, and yet is\nhard; for though liquid Quicksilver is soft to our touch, and rare to\nour sight, yet it is so dense and hard, as not to be readily dissolved\nfrom its nature; and if there be such contraries and mixtures in\none particular creature made of self-moving Matter, what will there\nnot be in Matter it self, according to the old saying: _If the Man\nsuch praise shall have; What the Master that keeps the knave?_ So if\na particular Creature hath such opposite qualities and mixtures of\ncorporeal motions, what will the Creator have which is self-moving\nMatter? Wherefore it is impossible to affirm, that self-moving Matter\nis either all rare, or all dense, or all hard, or all soft; because by\nits self-moving power it can be either, or both, and so by the change\nand variety of motion, there may be soft and rare Points, and hard and\nsharp Points, hard and contracted Globes, and soft and rare Globes;\nalso there may be pressures of Parts without printing, and printing\nwithout pressures. Concerning that part of Matter which is the _Common\nSensorium_, your _Author_ demands, _Whether some point of it receive\nthe whole Image of the object, or whether it be wholly received into\nevery point of it?_ I answer, first, That all sensitive Matter is not\nin Points; Next, That not any single part can subsist of it self; and\nthen that one Part doth not receive all parts or any part into it self;\nbut that Parts by the power of self-motion can and do make several\nfigures of all sizes and sorts, and can Epitomize a great object into\na very little figure; for outward objects do not move the body, but\nthe sensitive and rational matter moves according to the figures of\noutward objects: I do not say always, but most commonly; _But_, says\nyour Author, _How can so smal a Point receive the Images of so vast\nor so various objects at once, without obliteration or confusion._\nFirst, I answer, That, as I said before, sensitive Matter is not bound\nup to a Point, nor to be a single self-subsisting Part. Next, as for\nconfusion, I say, that the sensitive matter makes no more confusion,\nthen an Engraver, when he engraves several figures in a small stone,\nand a Painter draws several figures in a small compass; for a Carver\nwill cut out several figures in a Cherry-stone, and a Lady in a little\nblack Patch; and if gross and rude Art is able to do this, what may\nnot Ingenious and Wise Nature do? And as Nature is ingenious and\nknowing in her self, so in her Parts, and her Parts in her; for neither\nwhole nor Parts are ignorant, but have a knowledg, each according to\nthe motion of its own Parts; for knowledg is in Motion, and Motion\nin Matter; and the diversity and variety of motion is the diversity\nand variety of knowledg, so that every particular figure and motion\nhath its particular knowledg, as well as its proper and peculiar\nparts; and as the parts join or divide, so doth knowledg, which many\ntimes causes Arts to be lost and found, and memory and remembrance in\nParticular Creatures: I do not say, they are utterly lost in nature,\nbut onely in respect to particular Creatures, by the dissolving and\ndividing of their particular figures. For the rational matter, by\nreason it moves onely in its own parts, it can change and rechange\ninto several figures without division of parts, which makes memory\nand remembrance: But men not considering or believing there might\nbe such a degree of onely matter, namely rational, it has made them\nerre in their judgments. Nevertheless there is a difference between\nsensitive and rational parts and motions, and yet they are agreeable\nmost commonly in their actions, though not always. Also the rational\ncan make such figures as the sensitive cannot, by reason the rational\nhas a greater power and subtiler faculty in making variety, then the\nsensitive; for the sensitive is bound to move with the inanimate, but\nthe rational moves onely in its own parts; for though the sensitive\nand rational oftentimes cause each other to move, yet they are not of\none and the same degree of matter, nor have they the same motions.\nAnd this rational Matter is the cause of all Notions, Conceptions,\nImaginations, Deliberation, Determination, Memory, and any thing else\nthat belongs to the Mind; for this matter is the mind of Nature, and\nso being dividable, the mind of all Creatures, as the sensitive is the\nlife; and it can move, as I said, more subtilly, and more variously\nthen the sensitive, and make such figures as the sensitive cannot,\nwithout outward examples and objects. But all diversity comes by\nchange of motion, and motions are as sympathetical and agreeing, as\nantipathetical and disagreeing; And though Nature's artificial motions,\nwhich are her Playing motions, are sometimes extravagant, yet in her\nfundamental actions there is no extravagancy, as we may observe by her\nexact rules in the various generations, the distinct kinds and sorts,\nthe several exact measures, times, proportions and motions of all her\nCreatures, in all which her wisdom is well exprest, and in the variety\nher wise pleasure: To which I leave her, and rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend,_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Of the Immortality of the Soul, l._ 2. _c._ 2.\n\n\n\n\nXIV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\n_If there be any sense and perception in Matter_, says your Author,[1]\n_it must needs be Motion or Reaction of one part of matter against\nanother; and that all diversity of sense and perception doth\nnecessarily arise from the diversity of the Magnitude, Figure,\nPosture, Vigour and Direction of Motion in Parts of the Matter; In\nwhich variety of perceptions, Matter hath none, but such, as are\nimpressed by corporeal motions, that is to say, that are perceptions\nof some actions, or modificated Impressions of parts of matter\nbearing one against another._ I have declared, _Madam_, my opinion\nconcerning Perception in my former Letters, that all Perception is\nnot Impression and Reaction, like as a Seal is printed on Wax: For\nexample, the corporeal rational motions in the mind do not print,\nbut move figuratively; but the sensitive motions do carve, print,\nengrave, and, as it were, pencil out, as also move figuratively in\nproductions, and do often take patterns from the rational figures, as\nthe rational motions make figures according to the sensitive patterns;\nBut the rational can move without patterns, and so the sensitive: For\nsurely, were a man born blind, deaf, dumb, and had a numb palsie in his\nexterior parts, the sensitive and rational motions would nevertheless\nmove both in body and mind according to the nature of his figure; for\nthough no copies were taken from outward objects, yet he would have\nthoughts, passions, appetites, and the like; and though he could not\nsee exterior objects, nor hear exterior sounds, yet no question but\nhe would see and hear interiously after the manner of dreams, onely\nthey might not be any thing like to what is perceiveable by man in the\nWorld; but if he sees not the Sun-light, yet he would see something\nequivalent to it; and if he hears not such a thing as Words, yet he\nwould hear something equivalent to words; for it is impossible, that\nhis sensitive and rational faculties should be lost for want of an Ear,\nor an Eye; so that Perception may be without exterior object, or marks,\nor patterns: for although the sensitive Motions do usually pattern out\nthe figures of exterior objects, yet that doth not prove, but they can\nmake interior figures without such objects. Wherefore Perception is not\nalways Reaction, neither is Perception and Reaction really one thing;\nfor though Perception and Action is one and the same, yet not always\nReaction; but did Perception proceed from the reaction of outward\nobjects, a blind and deaf man would not so much as dream; for he would\nhave no interior motion in the head, having no other exterior sense but\ntouch, which, if the body was troubled with a painful disease, he would\nneither be sensible of, but to feel pain, and interiously feel nothing\nbut hunger and fulness; and his Mind would be as Irrational as some\nimagine Vegetables and Minerals are. To which opinion I leave them,\nand rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Of the Immortality of the Soul, l._ 2. _c._ 1. _a._ 1, 6, 7.\n\n\n\n\nXV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour _Author_ is pleased, in Mirth, and to disgrace the opinion of\nthose which hold, that Perception is made by figuring, to bring in\nthis following example:[1] _Suppose_, says he, _one Particle should\nshape it self into a_ George on Horse-back _with a Lance in his hand,\nand another into an Inchanted Castle; this_ George on Horse-back\n_must run against the Castle, to make the Castle receive his impress\nand similitude: But what then? Truly the Encounter will be very\nUnfortunate, for S._ George _indeed may easily break his Lance, but\nit is impossible that he should by justling against the Particle in\nthe form of a Castle, conveigh the intire shape of himself and his\nHorse thereby, such as we find our selves able to imagine of a man\non Horse-back; which is a Truth as demonstrable as any Theorem in\nMathematicks._ I answer, first, That there is no Particle single and\nalone by it self; Next, I say, It is more easie for the rational\nmatter to put it self into such figures, and to make such encounters,\nthen for an Immaterial mind or substance to imagine it; for no\nimagination can be without figure, and how should an Immaterial created\nsubstance present such Figures, but by making them either in it self\nor upon matter? For S. _George_ and the _Castle_ are figures, and\ntheir encounters are real fighting actions, and how such figures and\nactions can be in the mind or memory, and yet not be, is impossible\nto conceive; for, as I said, those figures and actions must be either\nin the incorporeal mind, or in the corporeal parts of matter; and if\nthe figures and motions may be in an incorporeal substance, much more\nis it probable for them to be in a corporeal; nay if the figures and\ntheir actions can be in gross corporeal matter, why should they not be\nin the purest part of matter, which is the rational matter? And as for\nbeing made known to the whole body, and every part thereof, it is not\nnecessary, no more then it is necessary, that the private actions of\nevery Man or Family should be made known to the whole Kingdom, or Town,\nor Parish: But my opinion of self-corporeal motion and perception, may\nbe as demonstrable as that of Immaterial Natural Spirits, which, in\nmy mind, is not demonstrable at all, by reason it is not corporeal or\nmaterial; For how can that be naturally demonstrable, which naturally\nis nothing? But your _Author_ believes the Mind or rational Soul\nto be individable, and therefore concludes, that the Parts of the\nsame Matter, although at great distance, must of necessity know each\nParticular act of each several Part; but that is not necessary; for\nif there were not ignorance through the division of Parts, every man\nand other creatures would know alike; and there is no better proof,\nthat matter, or any particular creature in nature is not governed by\na created Immaterial Spirit, then that knowledg is in parts; for the\nhand doth not know what pain the head feels, which certainly it would\ndo, if the mind were not dividable into parts, but an individable\nsubstance. But this is well to be observed, that some parts in some\nactions agree generally in one body, and some not; as for example,\ntemperance and appetite do not agree; for the corporeal actions of\nappetite desire to join with the corporeal actions of such or such\nother parts, but the corporeal actions of temperance do hinder and\nforbid it; whereupon there is a faction amongst the several parts: for\nexample, a Man desires to be drunk with Wine; this desire is made by\nsuch corporeal actions as make appetite; the rational corporeal motions\nor actions which make temperance, oppose those that make appetite,\nand that sort of actions which hath the better, carryes it, the hand\nand other parts of the body obeying the strongest side; and if there\nbe no wine to satisfie the appetite, yet many times the appetite\ncontinues; that is, the parts continue in the same motions that make\nsuch an appetite; but if the appetite doth not continue, then those\nparts have changed their motions; or when by drinking, the appetite is\nsatisfied, and ceases, then those parts that made the appetite, have\naltered their former motions. But oftentimes the rational corporeal\nmotions may so agree with the sensitive, as there may be no opposition\nor crossing at all, but a sympathetical mutual agreement betwixt\nthem, at least an approvement; so that the rational may approve what\nthe sensitive covet or desire: Also some motions of the rational, as\nalso of the sensitive matter, may disagree amongst themselves, as we\nsee, that a man will often have a divided mind; for he will love and\nhate the same thing, desire and not desire one and the same thing, as\nto be in Heaven, and yet to be in the World: Moreover, this is to be\nobserved, That all rational perceptions or cogitations, are not so\nperspicuous and clear as if they were Mathematical Demonstrations, but\nthere is some obscurity, more or less in them, at least they are not\nso well perceivable without comparing several figures together, which\nproves, they are not made by an individable, immaterial Spirit, but\nby dividable corporeal parts: As for example, Man writes oftentimes\nfalse, and seldom so exact, but he is forced to mend his hand, and\ncorrect his opinions, and sometimes quite to alter them, according as\nthe figures continue or are dissolved and altered by change of motion,\nand according as the actions are quick or slow in these alterations,\nthe humane mind is setled or wavering; and as figures are made, or\ndissolved and transformed, Opinions, Conceptions, Imaginations,\nUnderstanding, and the like, are more or less; And according as these\nfigures last, so is constancy or inconstancy, memory or forgetfulness,\nand as those figures are repeated, so is remembrance; but sometimes\nthey are so constant and permanent, as they last as long as the figure\nof the body, and sometimes it happens not once in an age, that the\nlike figures are repeated, and sometimes they are repeated every\nmoment: As for example; a man remembers or calls to mind the figure of\nanother man, his friend, with all his qualities, dispositions, actions,\nproprieties, and the like, several times in an hour, and sometimes not\nonce in a year, and so as often as he remembers him, as often is the\nfigure of that man repeated; and as oft as he forgets him, so often is\nhis figure dissolved. But some imagine the rational motions to be so\ngross as the Trotting of a Horse, and that all the motions of Animate\nmatter are as rude and course as renting or tearing asunder, or that\nall impressions must needs make dents or creases. But as Nature hath\ndegrees of corporeal matter, so she hath also degrees of corporeal\nmotions, Matter and Motion being but one substance; and it is absurd to\njudg of the interior motions of self-moving matter, by artificial or\nexterior gross motions, as that all motions must be like the tearing\nof a sheet of Paper, or that the printing and patterning of several\nfigures of rational and sensitive matter must be like the printing of\nBooks; nay, all artificial Printings are not so hard, as to make dents\nand impresses; witness Writing, Painting, and the like; for they do\nnot disturb the ground whereon the letters are written, or the picture\ndrawn, and so the curious actions of the purest rational matter are\nneither rude nor rough; but although this matter is so subtil and pure,\nas not subject to exterior human senses and organs, yet certainly it\nis dividable, not onely in several Creatures, but in the several parts\nof one and the same Creature, as well as the sensitive, which is the\nLife of Nature, as the other is the Soul; not the Divine, but natural\nSoul; neither is this Soul Immaterial, but Corporeal; not composed of\nraggs and shreds, but it is the purest, simplest and subtillest matter\nin Nature. But to conclude, I desire you to remember, _Madam_, that\nthis rational and sensitive Matter in one united and finite Figure or\nparticular Creature, has both common and particular actions, for as\nthere are several kinds and sorts of Creatures, and particulars in\nevery kind and sort: so the like for the actions of the rational and\nsensitive matter in one particular Creature. Also it is to be noted,\nThat the Parts of rational matter, can more suddenly give and take\nIntelligence to and from each other, then the sensitive; nevertheless,\nall Parts in Nature, at least adjoyning parts, have Intelligence\nbetween each other, more or less, because all parts make but one body;\nfor it is not with the parts of Matter, as with several Constables in\nseveral Hundreds, or several Parishes, which are a great way distant\nfrom each other, but they may be as close as the combs of Bees, and yet\nas partable and as active as Bees. But concerning the Intelligence of\nNatures Parts, I have sufficiently spoken in other places; and so I'le\nadd no more, but that I unfeignedly remain;\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _In the second Book of the Immortality of the Soul, ch._ 6.\n\n\n\n\nXVI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\n_Sensation in corporeal motion is first, and Perception follows_, sayes\nyour _Author_:[1] to which opinion I give no assent, but do believe\nthat Perception and Sensation are done both at one and the same time,\nas being one and the same thing without division, either in reason\nor sense, and are performed without any knocks, or jolts, or hitting\nagainst. But let me tell you, _Madam_, there arises a great mistake\nby many, from not distinguishing well, sensitive Motion, and rational\nMotion; for though all motions are in one onely matter, yet that matter\ndoth not move always in the same manner, for then there could be no\nvariety in Nature; and truly, if man, who is but a part of Nature, may\nmove diversly, and put himself into numerous postures; Why may not\nNature? But concerning Motions, and their variety, to avoid tedious\nrepetitions, I must still referr you to my Book of _Philosophical\nOpinions_; I'le add onely this, that it is well to be observed, That\nall Motions are not Impressions, neither do all Impressions make\nsuch dents, as to disturb the adjoyning Parts: Wherefore those, in\nmy opinion, understand _Nature_ best, which say, that Sensation and\nPerception are really one and the same; but they are out, that say,\nthere can be no communication at a distance, unless by pressing and\ncrowding; for the patterning of an outward object, may be done without\nany inforcement or disturbance, jogging or crowding, as I have declared\nheretofore; for the sensitive and rational motions in the sensitive\nand rational parts of matter in one creature, observing the exterior\nmotions in outward objects, move accordingly, either regularly or\nirregularly in patterns; and if they have no exterior objects, as in\ndreams, they work by rote. And so to conclude, I am absolutely of their\nopinion, who believe, that there is nothing existent in Nature, but\nwhat is purely Corporeal, for this seems most probable in sense and\nreason to me,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _In the Pref. of the Imm. of the Soul._\n\n\n\n\nXVII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nOutward Objects, as I have told you before, do not make Sense and\nReason, but Sense and Reason do perceive and judg of outward objects;\nFor the Sun doth not make sight, nor doth sight make light; but sense\nand reason in a Man, or any other creature, do perceive and know there\nare such objects as Sun, and Light, or whatsoever objects are presented\nto them. Neither doth Dumbness, Deafness, Blindness, &c. cause an\nInsensibility, but Sense through irregular actions causes them; I\nsay, through Irregular actions, because those effects do not properly\nbelong to the nature of that kind of Creatures; for every Creature,\nif regularly made, hath particular motions proper to its figure; for\nnatural Matters wisdom makes distinctions by her distinct corporeal\nmotions, giving every particular Creature their due Portion and\nProportion according to the nature of their figures, and to the rules\nof her actions, but not to the rules of Arts, Mathematical Compasses,\nLines, Figures, and the like. And thus the Sun, Stars, Meteors, Air,\nFire, Water, Earth, Minerals, Vegetables and Animals, may all have\nSense and Reason, although it doth not move in one kind or sort of\nCreatures, or in one particular, as in another: For the corporeal\nmotions differ not onely in kinds and sorts, but also in Particulars,\nas is perceivable by human sense and reason; Which is the cause, that\nElements have elemental sense and knowledg, and Animals animal sense\nand knowledg, and so of Vegetables, Minerals, and the like. Wherefore\nthe Sun and Stars may have as much sensitive and rational life and\nknowledg as other Creatures, but such as is according to the nature\nof their figures, and not animal, or vegetable, or mineral sense and\nknowledg. And so leaving them, I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXVIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour _Author_ denying that Fancy, Reason and Animadversion are\nseated in the Brain, and that the Brain is figured into this or that\nConception:[1] _I demand_, says he, _in what knot, loop or interval\nthereof doth this faculty of free Fancy and active Reason reside?_ My\nanswer is, that in my opinion, Fancy and Reason are not made in the\nBrain, as there is a Brain, but as there is sensitive and rational\nmatter, which makes not onely the Brain, but all Thoughts, Conceptions,\nImaginations, Fancy, Understanding, Memory, Remembrance, and whatsoever\nmotions are in the Head, or Brain: neither doth this sensitive and\nrational matter remain or act in one place of the Brain, but in every\npart thereof; and not onely in every part of the Brain, but in every\npart of the Body; nay, not onely in every part of a Mans Body, but in\nevery part of Nature. But, _Madam_, I would ask those, that say the\nBrain has neither sense, reason, nor self-motion, and therefore no\nPerception; but that all proceeds from an Immaterial Principle, as an\nIncorporeal Spirit, distinct from the body, which moveth and actuates\ncorporeal matter; I would fain ask them, I say, where their Immaterial\nIdeas reside, in what part or place of the Body? and whether they be\nlittle or great? Also I would ask them, whether there can be many, or\nbut one Idea of God? If they say many, then there must be several,\ndistinct Deitical Ideas; if but one, Where doth this Idea reside? If\nthey say in the head, then the heart is ignorant of God; if in the\nheart, then the head is ignorant thereof, and so for all parts of the\nbody; but if they say, in every part, then that Idea may be disfigured\nby a lost member; if they say, it may dilate and contract, then I say\nit is not the Idea of God, for God can neither contract nor extend;\nnor can the Idea it self dilate and contract, being immaterial; for\ncontraction and dilation belong onely to bodies, or material beings:\nWherefore the comparisons betwixt Nature and a particular Creature, and\nbetween God and Nature, are improper; much more betwixt God and Natures\nparticular motions and figures, which are various and changeable,\nalthough methodical. The same I may ask of the Mind of Man, as I do of\nthe Idea in the Mind. Also I might ask them, what they conceive the\nnatural mind of man to be, whether material or immaterial? If material,\ntheir opinion is rational, and so the mind is dividable and composable;\nif immaterial, then it is a Spirit; and if a Spirit, it cannot possibly\ndilate nor contract, having no dimension nor divisibility of parts,\n(although your _Author_ proves it by the example of Light; but I have\nexprest my meaning heretofore, that _light_ is divisible) and if it\nhave no dimension, how can it be confined in a material body? Wherefore\nwhen your _Author_ says, the mind is a substance, it is to my reason\nvery probable; but not when he says, it is an immaterial substance,\nwhich will never agree with my sense and reason; for it must be either\nsomething, or nothing, there being no _medium_ between, in Nature. But\npray mistake me not, _Madam_, when I say Immaterial is nothing; for I\nmean nothing Natural, or so as to be a part of Nature; for God forbid,\nI should deny, that God is a Spiritual Immaterial substance, or Being;\nneither do I deny that we can have an Idea, notion, conception, or\nthought of the existence of God; for I am of your _Authors_ opinion,\nThat there is no Man under the cope of Heaven, that doth not by the\nlight of Nature, know, and believe there is a God; but that we should\nhave such a perfect Idea of God, as of any thing else in the World,\nor as of our selves, as your _Author_ says, I cannot in sense and\nreason conceive to be true or possible. Neither am I against those\nSpirits, which the holy Scripture mentions, as Angels and Devils,\nand the divine Soul of Man; but I say onely, that no Immaterial\nSpirit belongs to Nature, so as to be a part thereof; for Nature is\nMaterial, or Corporeal; and whatsoever is not composed of matter or\nbody, belongs not to Nature; nevertheless, Immaterial Spirits may be\nin Nature, although not parts of Nature. But there can neither be an\nImmaterial Nature, nor a Natural Immaterial; Nay, our very thoughts and\nconceptions of Immaterial are Material, as made of self-moving Matter.\nWherefore to conclude, these opinions in Men proceed from a Vain-glory,\nas to have found out something that is not in Nature; to which I leave\nthem, and their natural Immaterial Substances, like so many Hobgoblins\nto fright Children withal, resting in the mean time,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend,_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Antid. lib._ 1. _c._ 11.\n\n\n\n\nXIX.\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nThere are various opinions concerning the seat of Common Sense, as\nyour _Author_ rehearseth them in his Treatise of the Immortality of\nthe Soul;[1] But my opinion is, That common sense hath also a common\nplace; for as there is not any part of the body that hath not sense\nand reason, so sense and reason is in all parts of the body, as it is\nobservable by this, that every part is subject to pain and pleasure,\nand all parts are moveable, moving and moved; also appetites are in\nevery part of the body: As for example, if any part itches, it hath\nan appetite to be scratched, and every part can pattern out several\nobjects, and so several touches; and though the rational part of matter\nis mixt in all parts of the body, yet it hath more liberty to make\nvariety of Motions in the head, heart, liver, spleen, stomack, bowels,\nand the like, then in the other parts of the body; nevertheless, it is\nin every part, together with the sensitive: but they do not move in\nevery part alike, but differ in each part more or less, as it may be\nobserved; and although every part hath some difference of knowledg, yet\nall have life and knowledg, sense and reason, some more, some less, and\nthe whole body moves according to each part, and so do all the bodily\nFaculties and Proprieties, and not according to one single part; the\nrational Soul being in all parts of the body: for if one part of the\nbody should have a dead Palsie, it is not, that the Soul is gone from\nthat part, but that the sensitive and rational matter has altered its\nmotion and figure from animal to some other kind; for certainly, the\nrational Soul, and so life, is in every part, as well in the Pores of\nthe skin, as in the ventricles of the brain, and as well in the heel\nas in the head; and every part of the body knows its own office, what\nit ought to do, from whence follows an agreement of all the parts: And\nsince there is difference of knowledg in every part of one body, well\nmay there be difference between several kinds and sorts, and yet there\nis knowledg in all; for difference of knowledg is no argument to prove\nthey have no knowledg at all. Wherefore I am not of the opinion, that\nthat which moves the whole body, is as a Point, or some such thing in\na little kernel or _Glandula_ of the Brain, as an Ostrich-egge is hung\nup to the roof of a Chamber; or that it is in the stomack like a single\npenny in a great Purse; neither is it in the midst of the heart, like a\nLady in a Lobster; nor in the blood, like as a Menow, or Sprat in the\nSea; nor in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain, as a lousie Souldier\nin a Watch-tower. But you may say, it is like a farthing Candle in a\ngreat Church: I answer, That Light will not enlighten the by Chappels\nof the Church, nor the Quest-house, nor the Belfrey; neither doth the\nLight move the Church, though it enlightens it: Wherefore the Soul\nafter this manner doth not move the corporeal body, no more then the\nCandle moves the Church, or the Lady moves the Lobster, or the Sprat\nthe Sea as to make it ebb and flow. But this I desire you to observe,\n_Madam_, that though all the body of man or any other Creature, hath\nsense and reason, which is life and knowledg, in all parts, yet these\nparts being all corporeal, and having their certain proportions, can\nhave no more then what is belonging or proportionable to each figure:\nAs for example; if a Man should feed, and not evacuate some ways or\nother, he could not live; and if he should evacuate and not feed, he\ncould not subsist: wherefore in all Natures parts there is ingress and\negress, although not always perceived by one creature, as Man; but all\nexterior objects do not enter into Man, or any other Creature, but are\nfigured by the rational, and some by the sensitive parts or motions\nin the body; wherefore it is not rational to believe, that exterior\nobjects take up any more room, then if there were none presented to\nthe sensitive organs: Nor is there any thing which can better prove\nthe mind to be corporeal, then that there may be several Figures in\nseveral parts of the body made at one time, as Sight, Hearing, Tasting,\nSmelling, and Touching, and all these in each several organ, as well at\none, as at several times, either by patterns, or not; which figuring\nwithout Pattern, may be done as well by the sensitive motions in the\norgans, as by the rational in the mind, and is called remembrance. As\nfor example: a Man may hear or see without an object; which is, that\nthe sensitive and rational matter repeat such figurative actions, or\nmake others in the sensitive organs, or in the mind: and Thoughts,\nMemory, Imagination, as also Passion, are no less corporeal actions\nthen the motion of the hand or heel; neither hath the rational matter,\nbeing naturally wise, occasion to jumble and knock her parts together,\nby reason every part knows naturally their office what they ought to\ndo, or what they may do. But I conclude, repeating onely what I have\nsaid oft before, that all Perceptions, Thoughts, and the like, are the\nEffects, and Life and Knowledg, the Nature and Essence of self-moving\nMatter. And so I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Lib._ 2. _c._ 4.\n\n\n\n\nXX.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI am not able to conceive how the Mind of Man can be compared to a\nTable-book, in which nothing is writ;[1] nor how to a Musician, who\nbeing asleep, doth not so much as dream of any Musick, but being\njogg'd and awakend by another, who tells him two or three words of\na Song, and desires him to sing it, presently recovers himself, and\nsings upon so slight an Intimation: For such intimations are nothing\nelse but outward objects, which the interior sense consents to, and\nobeys; for interior sense and reason doth often obey outward objects:\nand in my opinion there is no rest in Nature, and so neither in the\nMind or natural Soul of Man, which is in a perpetual motion, and needs\ntherefore no jogging to put it into any actual motion; for it hath\nactual motion and knowledg in it self, because it is a self-moving\nsubstance, actually knowing, and Material or Corporeal, not Immaterial,\nas your _Author_ thinks: and this material or corporeal Mind is nothing\nelse but what I call the rational matter, and the corporeal life is\nthe sensitive matter. But this is to be observed, that the motions of\nthe corporeal Mind do often imitate the motions of the sensitive Life,\nand these again the motions of the mind: I say oftentimes; for they do\nit not always, but each one can move without taking any pattern from\nthe other. And all this I understand of the Natural Soul of Man; not\nof the Divine Soul, and her powers and faculties, for I leave that to\nDivines to inform us of; onely this I say, that men not conceiving the\ndistinction between this natural and divine Soul, make such a confusion\nbetwixt those two Souls and their actions, which causes so many\ndisputes and opinions. But if Nature hath power from God to produce\nall kinds of Vegetables, Minerals, Elements, Animals, and other sorts\nof Creatures, Why not also Man? Truly if all Creatures are natural\nCreatures, Man must be so too; and if Man is a natural Creature, he\nmust needs have natural sense and reason, as well as other Creatures,\nbeing composed of the same matter they are of. Neither is it requisite,\nthat all Creatures, being of the same matter, must have the same manner\nof sensitive and rational knowledg; which if so, it is not necessary\nfor Corn to have Ears to hear the whistling or chirping of Birds, nor\nfor Stones to have such a touch of feeling as animals have, and to\nsuffer pain, as they do, when Carts go over them; as your _Author_ is\npleased to argue out of _\u00c6sopes_ Tales; or for the Heliotrope to have\neyes to see the Sun: for what necessity is there that they should have\nhumane sense and reason? which is, that the rational and sensitive\nmatter should act and move in them as she doth in man or animals:\nCertainly if there must be any variety in nature, it is requisite she\nshould not; wherefore all Vegetables, Minerals, Elements, and Animals,\nhave their proper motions different from each others, not onely in\ntheir kinds and sorts, but also in their particulars. And though Stones\nhave no progressive motion to withdraw themselves from the Carts going\nover them, which your _Author_ thinks they would do, if they had\nsense, to avoid pain: nevertheless they have motion, and consequently\nsense and reason, according to the nature and propriety of their\nfigure, as well as man has according to his. But this is also to be\nobserved, that not any humane Creature, which is accounted to have the\nperfectest sense and reason, is able always to avoid what is hurtful or\npainful, for it is subject to it by Nature: Nay, the Immaterial Soul\nit self, according to your _Author_,[2] cannot by her self-contracting\nfaculty withdraw her self from pain. Wherefore there is no manner of\nconsequence to conclude from the sense of Animals to the sense of\nMinerals, they being as much different as their Figures are; And saying\nthis, I have said enough to express the opinion and mind of,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Antid. Book_ 1. _c._ 5.\n\n[2] _Append. to the Antid. ch._ 3.\n\n\n\n\nXXI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour _Author_ endeavours very much to prove the existency of a _Natural\nImmaterial Spirit_, whom he defines to be an _Incorporeal substance,\nIndivisible, that can move it self, can penetrate, contract and dilate\nit self, and can also move and alter the matter._ Whereof, if you will\nhave my opinion, I confess freely to you, that in my sense and reason\nI cannot conceive it to be possible, that these is any such thing in\nNature; for all that is a substance in Nature, is a body, and what has\na body, is corporeal; for though there be several degrees of matter,\nas in purity, rarity, subtilty, activity; yet there is no degree so\npure, rare and subtil, that can go beyond its nature, and change from\ncorporeal to incorporeal, except it could change from being something\nto nothing, which is impossible in Nature. Next, there is no substance\nin Nature that is not divisible; for all that is a body, or a bodily\nsubstance, hath extension, and all extension hath parts, and what has\nparts, is divisible. As for self-motion, contraction and dilation,\nthese are actions onely of Natural Matter; for Matter by the Power\nof God is self-moving, and all sorts of motions, as contraction,\ndilation, alteration, penetration, &c. do properly belong to Matter;\nso that natural Matter stands in no need to have some Immaterial or\nIncorporeal substance to move, rule, guide and govern her; but she is\nable enough to do it all her self, by the free Gift of the Omnipotent\nGod; for why should we trouble our selves to invent or frame other\nunconceivable substances, when there is no need for it, but Matter can\nact, and move as well without them and of it self? Is not God able\nto give such power to Matter, as to an other Incorporeal substance?\nBut I suppose this opinion of natural Immaterial Spirits doth proceed\nfrom Chymistry, where the extracts are vulgarly called Spirits; and\nfrom that degree of Matter, which by reason of its purity, subtilty\nand activity, is not subject to our grosser senses; However, these are\nnot Incorporeal, be they never so pure and subtil. And I wonder much\nthat men endeavour to prove Immaterial Spirits by corporeal Arts, when\nas Art is not able to demonstrate Nature and her actions; for Art is\nbut the effect of Nature, and expresses rather the variety, then the\ntruth of natural motions; and if Art cannot do this, much less will it\nbe able to express what is not in Nature, or what is beyond Nature; as\nto _trace the Visible_ (or rather Invisible) _footsteps of the divine\nCouncel and Providence_,[1] or to demonstrate things supernatural, and\nwhich go beyond mans reach and capacity. But to return to Immaterial\nSpirits, that they should rule and govern infinite corporeal matter,\nlike so many demy-Gods, by a dilating nod, and a contracting frown,\nand cause so many kinds and sorts of Corporeal Figures to arise, being\nIncorporeal themselves, is Impossible for me to conceive; for how can\nan Immaterial substance cause a Material corporeal substance, which\nhas no motion in it self, to form so many several and various figures\nand creatures, and make so many alterations, and continue their kinds\nand sorts by perpetual successions of Particulars? But perchance the\nImmaterial substance gives corporeal matter motion. I answer, My sense\nand reason cannot understand, how it can give motion, unless motion\nbe different, distinct and separable from it; nay, if it were, yet\nbeing no substance or body it self, according to your _Authors_ and\nothers opinion, the question is, how it can be transmitted or given\naway to corporeal matter? Your _Author_ may say, That his Immaterial\nand Incorporeal spirit of Nature, having self-motion, doth form Matter\ninto several Figures: I answer, Then that Immaterial substance must be\ntransformed and metamorphosed into as many several figures as there\nare figures in Matter; or there must be as many spirits, as there are\nfigures; but when the figures change, what doth become of the spirits?\nNeither can I imagine, that an Immaterial substance, being without\nbody, can have such a great strength, as to grapple with gross, heavy,\ndull, and dead Matter; Certainly, in my opinion, no Angel, nor Devil,\nexcept God Impower him, would be able to move corporeal Matter, were\nit not self-moving, much less any Natural Spirit. But God is a Spirit,\nand Immovable; and if created natural Immaterial participate of that\nNature, as they do of the Name, then they must be Immovable also.\nYour _Author, Madam_, may make many several degrees of Spirits; but\ncertainly not I, nor I think any natural Creature else, will be able\nnaturally to conceive them. He may say, perchance, There is such a\nclose conjunction betwixt Body and Spirit, as I make betwixt rational,\nsensitive, and inanimate Matter. I answer, That these degrees are\nall but one Matter, and of one and the same Nature as meer Matter,\ndifferent onely in degrees of purity, subtilty, and activity, whereas\nSpirit and Body are things of contrary Natures. In fine, I cannot\nconceive, how a Spirit should fill up a place or space, having no body,\nnor how it can have the effects of a body, being none it self; for the\neffects flow from the cause; and as the cause is, so are its effects:\nAnd so confessing my ignorance, I can say no more, but rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Antid. lib._ 2. _ch._ 2.\n\n\n\n\nXXII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour _Author_ having assigned Indivisibility to the Soul or Spirit that\nmoves and actuates matter, I desire to know, how one Indivisible Spirit\ncan be in so many dividable parts? For there being Infinite parts in\nNature, they must either have one Infinite Spirit to move them, which\nmust be dilated infinitely, or this Spirit must move severally in\nevery part of Nature: If the first, then I cannot conceive, but all\nmotion must be uniform, or after one and the same manner; nay, I cannot\nunderstand, how there can be any dilation and contraction, or rather\nany motion of the same spirit, by reason if it dilate, then, (being\nequally spread out in all the parts of Matter,) it must dilate beyond\nMatter; and if it contract, it must leave some parts of matter void,\nand without motion. But if the Spirit moves every part severally, then\nhe is divisible; neither can I think, that there are so many Spirits\nas there are Parts in Nature; for your _Author_ says, there is but\none Spirit of Nature; I will give an easie and plain example: When a\nWorm is cut into two or three parts, we see there is sensitive life\nand motion in every part, for every part will strive and endeavour\nto meet and joyn again to make up the whole body; now if there were\nbut one indivisible Life, Spirit, and Motion, I would fain know, how\nthese severed parts could move all by one Spirit. Wherefore, Matter,\nin my opinion, has self-motion in it self, which is the onely soul\nand life of Nature, and is dividable as well as composable, and full\nof variety of action; for it is as easie for several parts to act\nin separation, as in composition, and as easie in composition as in\nseparation; Neither is every part bound to one kind or sort of Motions;\nfor we see in exterior local motions, that one man can put his body\ninto several shapes and postures, much more can Nature. But is it not\nstrange, _Madam_, that a man accounts it absurd, ridiculous, and a\nprejudice to Gods Omnipotency, to attribute self-motion to Matter,\nor a material Creature, when it is not absurd, ridiculous, or any\nprejudice to God, to attribute it to an Immaterial Creature? What\nreason of absurdity lies herein? Surely I can conceive none, except\nit be absurd and ridiculous to make that, which no man can know or\nconceive what it is, _viz._ an immaterial natural Spirit, (which is\nas much as to say, a natural No-thing) to have motion, and not onely\nmotion, but self-motion; nay, not onely self-motion, but to move,\nactuate, rule, govern, and guide Matter, or corporeal Nature, and to\nbe the cause of all the most curious varieties and effects in nature:\nWas not God able to give self-motion as well to a Material, as to an\nImmaterial Creature, and endow Matter with a self-moving power? I do\nnot say, _Madam_, that Matter hath motion of it self, so, that it is\nthe prime cause and principle of its own self-motion; for that were\nto make Matter a God, which I am far from believing; but my opinion\nis, That the self-motion of Matter proceeds from God, as well as the\nself-motion of an Immaterial Spirit; and that I am of this opinion, the\nlast Chapter of my Book of Philosophy will enform you, where I treat of\nthe Deitical Centre, as the Fountain from whence all things do flow,\nand which is the supream Cause, Author, Ruler and Governor of all.\nPerhaps you will say, it is, because I make Matter Eternal. 'Tis true,\n_Madam_, I do so: but I think Eternity doth not take off the dependance\nupon God, for God may nevertheless be above Matter, as I have told you\nbefore. You may ask me how that can be? I say, As well as any thing\nelse that God can do beyond our understanding: For I do but tell you my\nopinion, that I think it most probable to be so, but I can give you no\nMathematical Demonstrations for it: Onely this I am sure of, That it is\nnot impossible for the Omnipotent God; and he that questions the truth\nof it, may question Gods Omnipotency. Truly, _Madam_, I wonder how\nman can say, God is Omnipotent, and can do beyond our Understanding,\nand yet deny all that he is not able to comprehend with his reason.\nHowever, as I said, it is my opinion, That Matter is self-moving by the\npower of God; Neither can Animadversion, and Perception, as also the\nvariety of Figures, prove, that there must be another external Agent or\nPower to work all this in Matter; but it proves rather the contrary;\nfor were there no self-motion in Matter, there would be no Perception,\nnor no variety of Creatures in their Figures, Shapes, Natures,\nQualities, Faculties, Proprieties, as also in their Productions,\nCreations or Generations, Transformations, Compositions, Dissolutions,\nand the like, as Growth, Maturity, Decay, &c. and for Animals, were not\nCorporeal Matter self-moving, dividable and composable; there could not\nbe such variety of Passions, Complexions, Humors, Features, Statures,\nAppetites, Diseases, Infirmities, Youth, Age, &c. Neither would they\nhave any nourishing Food, healing Salves, soveraign Medicines, reviving\nCordials, or deadly Poysons. In short, there is so much variety in\nNature, proceeding from the self-motion of Matter, as not possible to\nbe numbred, nor thorowly known by any Creature: Wherefore I should\nlabour in vain, if I endeavoured to express any more thereof; and this\nis the cause that I break off here, and onely subscribe my self,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXXIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nConcerning the comparison, your _Author_ makes between an Immaterial\nSpirit, and Light,[1] That, _as Light is contractive and dilative, and\nyet not divisible, so is also an Immaterial substance._ Give me leave\nto tell you, that in my opinion, all that is contractive and dilative,\nis also dividable, and so is light: As for example; when a Candle is\nsnuff'd, the Snuffers do not onely clip the wick, but also the light:\nThe like when a dark body is interposed, or crosses the rays of the\nSun; it cuts those rays asunder, which by reason they cannot joyn\ntogether again, because of the interposed body, the light cut off,\nsuddenly goeth out; that is, the matter of light is altered from the\nfigure of light, to some other thing, but not annihilated: And since no\nmore light can flow into the room from the Fountain or Spring of Light,\nthe Sun, because the passage is stopt close, the room remaineth dark:\nFor Light is somewhat of the nature of Water; so long as the Spring\nis open, the Water flows, and whatsoever is taken away, the Spring\nsupplies; and if another body onely presses thorow it, it immediately\njoyns and closes its severed parts again, without any difficulty or\nloss; The same doth Light; onely the difference is, that the substance\nof Light is extraordinary rare, and pure; for as Air is so much rarer\nthen Water, so Light is so much rarer and purer then Air, and its\nmatter may be of so dilating a nature, as to dilate from a point into\nnumerous rayes. As for ordinary Fire-light, it doth not last longer,\nthen it hath fuel to feed it, and so likewise it is with the light\nof the Sun; for Light is according to the substance that feeds it;\nand though it is a substance it self, yet it increases and decreases,\naccording as it hath something that succours or nourishes it. But some\nmay object, that if Light were a body, and did contract and dilate, as\nI say, it is impossible that it could display it self in so great and\nvast a compass, and remove so suddenly and instantly as it doth. To\nwhich objection, I answer, first, That although I say, Light is a real\ncorporeal substance, and doth contract and dilate it self from a point\ninto numerous rayes, as also in another Letter I sent you before,[2]\nThat Light and Darkness do succeed each other; nevertheless, as for the\nperception of Light, I am not so eager in maintaining this opinion,\nas if it was an Infallible Truth, and impossible to be otherwise; but\nI say onely, That, to my sense and reason, it seems very probable,\nthat it may be so, that the light of the Sun doth really dilate it\nself into so vast a compass as we see, and that light and darkness do\nreally succeed each other, as all other Creatures do: But yet it seems\nalso probable to mee, that the parts of the Air may onely pattern\nout the figure of light, and that the light we see in the Air may be\nonely patterns taken from the real figure of the light of the Sun: And\ntherefore, if it be according to the former opinion, to wit, That the\nlight of the Sun doth really dilate it self into so vast a compass, My\nanswer is, That contraction and dilation are natural corporeal actions\nor motions, and that there is no alteration of motion in Nature, but\nis done in Time, that is, successively, not instantly; for Time is\nnothing else but the alteration of motion: Besides, I do not perceive\nany so sudden and swift alteration and succession of light, but that\nit is done by degrees: As for example; in the morning, when it begins\nto dawn and grow light, it appears clearly to our sight how light doth\ncome forth, and darkness remove by degrees; and so at night, when it\ngrows dark, how light removes, and darkness succeeds; nay, if there\nbe any such sudden change of the motions of Light, I desire you to\nconsider, _Madam_, that light is a very subtil, rare, piercing and\nactive body, and therefore its motions are much quicker then those of\ngrosser bodies, and cannot so well be perceived by our gross exterior\nsenses. But if it be, that the Air doth pattern out the light of the\nSun, then the framed objection can prove nothing, because there is not\nthen such a real dilation or succession of light, but the corporeal\nfigurative motions of the Air do make patterns of the light of the\nSun, and dissolve those patterns or figures again, more suddenly and\nquickly then man can shut and open his eyes, as being more subtil\nthen his gross exterior senses. But it may be said, that if Air did\npattern out the light of the Sun, the light would increase by these\nnumerous patterns. I answer, that cannot appear to our Eyes; for we\nsee onely the pattern'd figure of light, and that a great compass is\nenlightned; also that the further the air is from the Sun, the darker\nit is; nevertheless, I do verily believe, that the body of the Sun is\nfar brighter then the light we see, and that the substance of light,\nand the patterns taken from light, are not one and the same, but very\ndifferent. And thus much of light. As for Penetration, I conceive it\nto be nothing else but division; as when some parts pierce and enter\nthrough other parts, as Duellers run each other thorow, or as water\nruns through a sieve. And this is the opinion of,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend,_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _In the Append. to the Antid. c._ 3. and _Of the Immortality of the\nSoul, l._ 1. _c._ 5.\n\n[2] _Sect._ 1. _Let._ 20.\n\n\n\n\nXXIV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nHaving given you my opinion, both of the substance and perception\nof Light, in my last Letter, I perceive your desire is to know how\n_Shadows_ are made. Truly, _Madam_, to my sense and reason, it appears\nmost probable, that shadows are made by the way of patterning: As for\nexample; when a Man's, or Trees, or any other the like Creature's\nshadow is made upon the Ground, or Wall, or the like; those bodies, as\nthe Ground, or Wall, do, in my opinion, pattern out the interposing\nbody that is between the light and them: And the reason that the\nshadow is longer or shorter, or bigger or less, is according as the\nlight is nearer or further off; for when the light is perpendicular,\nthe interposing body cannot obscure the light, because the light\nsurrounding the interposing body by its brightness, rather obscures\nthe body, then the body the light; for the numerous and splendorous\npatterns of light taken from the body of the Sun, do quite involve the\ninterposing body. Next, you desire to know, _Whether the light we see\nin the Moon, be the Moons own natural light, or a borrowed light from\nthe Sun_: I answer, that in my opinion, it is a borrowed light; to\nwit, that the Moon doth pattern out the light of the Sun: and the proof\nof it is, that when the Sun is in an Eclipse, we do plainly perceive\nthat so much of the Sun is darkned as the Moon covers; for though those\nparts of the Moon, that are next the Sun, may, for any thing we know,\npattern out the light of the Sun, yet the Moon is dark on that side\nwhich is from the Sun. I will not say, but that part of the Moon which\nis towards the Earth, may pattern out the Earth, or the shadow of the\nEarth, which may make the Moon appear more dark and sullen; But when\nthe Moon is in an Eclipse, then it is plainly perceived that the Moon\npatterns out the Earth, or the shadow of the Earth. Besides, those\nparts of the Moon that are farthest from the Sun, are dark, as we may\nobserve when as the Moon is in the Wane, and enlightened when the Sun\nis nearer. But I will leave this argument to observing Astrologers, and\nrest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXXV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nIf according to your _Authors_ opinion,[1] _In every particular world,\nsuch as Man is especially, his own Soul_ (which is a Spirit) _be the\npeculiar and most perfective architect of the Fabrick of his Body, as\nthe Soul of the world is of it_: Then I cannot conceive in my reason,\nhow the separation is made in death; for I see, that all animals, and\nso man-kind, have a natural desire to live, and that life and soul are\nunwilling to part; And if the power lies in the Soul, why doth she\nnot continue with the Body, and animate, move and actuate it, as she\ndid before, or order the matter so, as not to dissolve? But if the\ndissolution lies in the body, then the body has self-motion: Yet it is\nmost probable, if the soul be the architect of the body, it must also\nbe the dissolver of it; and if there come not another soul into the\nparts of matter, the body must either be annihilated, or lie immoved as\nlong as the world lasts, which is improbable; for surely all the bodies\nof men, or other animals, are imployed by Nature to some use or other:\nHowever, it is requisite, that the soul must stay so long in the body,\nuntil it be turned into dust and ashes; otherwise, the body having no\nself-motion, would remain as it was when the soul left it, that is,\nentire and undissolved: As for example; when a man dies, if there be\nno motion in his body, and the soul, which was the mover, be gone, it\ncannot possibly corrupt; for certainly, that we call corruption, is\nmade by motion, and the body requires as much motion to be dissolved\nor divided, as it doth to be framed or composed; Wherefore a dead\nbody would remain in the same state continually, it had no self-motion\nin it: And if another soul should enter into the body, and work it\nto another figure, then certainly there must be many more souls then\nbodies, because bodies are subject to change into several forms; but\nif the animal spirits, which are left in the body after the soul is\ngone, are able to dissolve it without the help of the soul, then it is\nprobable they could have fram'd it without the help of the soul; and so\nthey being material, it must be granted, that matter is self-moving:\nBut if corporeal matter have corporeal self-motion, a self-moving\nImmaterial Spirit, by reason of their different natures, would make\ngreat obstruction, and so a general confusion; for the corporeal and\nincorporeal motions would hinder and oppose each other, their natures\nbeing quite different; and though they might subsist together without\ndisturbance of each other, yet it is not probable they should act\ntogether, and that in such a conjunction, as if they were one united\nbody; for it is, in my opinion, more probable, that one material should\nact upon another material, or one immaterial upon another immaterial,\nthen that an immaterial should act upon a material or corporeal. Thus\nthe consideration or contemplation of immaterial natural Spirits puts\nme always into doubts, and raises so many contradictions in my sense\nand reason, as I know not, nor am not able to reconcile them: However,\nthough I am doubtful of them, yet I can assure your self that I\ncontinue,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Of the Immortality of the Soul, l._ 2. _c._ 10.\n\n\n\n\nXXVI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nBy reason the _Soul_ is a _Spirit_, and therefore _Contractible_ and\n_Dilatable_, your _Authors_ opinion is,[1] That _it begins within less\ncompass at first in organising the fitly prepared matter, and so bears\nit self on in the same tenour of work, till the body hath attained its\nfull growth; and that the Soul dilates it self in the dilating of the\nBody, and so possesses it through all the members thereof._ Truly,\n_Madam_, as for the contraction and dilation of an immaterial Spirit,\nif I heard never so many arguments, I should hardly be able to conceive\nthe possibility of it; For in my opinion, dilating and contracting\nare motions and actions of Nature, which belong to natural material\nCreatures, and to none else; for dilation and contraction cannot be\nwithout extension, but extension belongs to parts which an immaterial\nSpirit hath not: But suppose it be so, then the Soul must contract\nand dilate, extend and shrink together, and so grow less and bigger,\naccording to the extension of the body; and when the body dies, the\nsoul, in my opinion, must contract to a very point; and if one part\nof the body die before the other, the soul must by degrees withdraw\nout of those parts: also when a part of the body is cut off, the soul\nmust needs contract, and grow less; the like when a man is let blood.\nWhich contracting of the soul, by your _Authors_ leave, doth seem, to\nmy imagination, just like the contracting of Hodmandod into her shell.\nBesides, if the soul be individable, and equally spread all over the\nbody, then, to my opinion, she must necessarily be of a human shape;\nand if the body be deformed, the soul must be deformed also; and if\nthe body be casually extended, as by taking Poyson into the body, the\nsoul must be so too, as being individable and filling every part; and\nif a man be born with six fingers or toes, the soul must be so too; or\nif a dwarf, the soul must be a dwarf also; and if he be born deaf and\ndumb, the soul must be so too. But if two Twins, as it may fall out,\nshould be born united in one body, I would fain know then, whether they\nwould have two souls, or but one? As for example, if they should have\nbut one body, and one stomack, liver, heart, spleen, lungs, bowels, and\nyet have four legs, four hands, and two heads: It seems, to my opinion,\nthat then two Immaterial Souls must be joyned as into one; neither do\nI know yet how this could well be, the monster having but one body,\nnor how that Immaterial Soul can be divided, being inseparably double,\nwhen the body dies. But, _Madam_, all this I speak of the Natural\nSoul of Man, not of the Divine Soul, which is not subject to natural\nimperfections, and corporeal errors, being not made by Nature, but a\nsupernatural and divine gift of the Omnipotent God, who surely will not\ngive any thing that is not perfect. Wherefore it is not probable, this\nDivine Soul, being not subject to Nature, should be an architect of the\nbody, as having an higher and more divine imployment, _viz._ to fix\nher self on her Creator, and being indued with supernatural faculties,\nand residing in the body in a supernatural manner; all which I leave to\nthe Church: for I should be loth to affirm any thing contrary to their\nDoctrine, or the Information of the holy Scripture, as grounding my\nbelief onely upon the sacred Word of God, and its true Interpretation\nmade by the Orthodox Church; but not upon the opinions of particular\npersons: for particular mens opinions are not authentical, being so\ndifferent and various, as a man would be puzled which to adhere to.\nThus, _Madam_, I avoid, as much as ever I can, not to mix Divinity\nwith Natural Philosophy; for I consider, that such a mixture would\nbreed more confusion in the Church, then do any good to either;\nwitness the doctrine of the Soul of Man, whereof are so many different\nopinions: The onely cause, in my opinion, is, that men do not conceive\nthe difference between the Divine, and Natural material Soul of Man,\nmaking them both as one, and mixing or confounding their faculties and\nproprieties, which yet are quite different; thus they make a Hodg-podg,\nBisk or Olio of both; proving Divinity by Nature, and Faith by Reason;\nand bringing Arguments for Articles of Faith, and sacred Mysteries out\nof Natural Arts and Sciences; whereas yet Faith and Reason are two\ncontrary things, and cannot consist together; according to the Proverb,\nWhere Reason ends, Faith begins. Neither is it possible that Divinity\ncan be proved by Mathematical Demonstrations; for if Nature be not\nable to do it, much less is Art: Wherefore it is inconvenient to mix\nsupernatural Spirits with Air, Fire, Light, Heat, Cold, &c. and to\napply corporeal actions and qualities to them; and the Divine Soul,\nwith the Brain, Blood, Flesh, Animal Spirits, Muscles, Nerves, Bones,\n&c. of Man; all which makes a confusion betwixt the Mind or Natural\nSoul of Man, and the Supernatural and Divine Soul inspired into him by\nGod; for both their faculties and proprieties are different, and so are\ntheir effects, as proceeding from so different causes. And therefore,\n_Madam_, as for Divinity, I pray devoutly, and believe without\ndisputing; but as for Natural Philosophy, I reason freely, and argue\nwithout believing, or adhering to any ones particular opinion, which I\nthink is the best and safest way to choose for,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend,_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Of the Immortality of the Soul, l._ 2. _c._ 10.\n\n\n\n\nXXVII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour _Author_ in the continuation of his discourse concerning the\nImmaterial Soul of Man, demonstrating, that her seat is not bound up\nin a certain place of the body, but that she pervades all the body and\nevery part thereof, takes, amongst the rest, an argument from Passions\nand Sympathies: _Moreover_, says he,[1] _Passions and Sympathies, in my\njudgment, are more easily to be resolved into this hypothesis of the\nSoul's pervading the whole Body, then in restraining its essential\npresence to one part thereof.--But it is evident that they arise in us\nagainst both our will and appetite; For who would bear the tortures\nof fears and jelousies, if he could avoid it?_ Concerning Passions,\n_Madam_, I have given my opinion at large in my Book of Philosophy, and\nam of your _Authors_ mind, that Passions are made in the Heart, but not\nby an Immaterial spirit, but by the Rational soul which is material;\nand there is no doubt, but that many Passions, as Fear, Jealousie &c.\narise against our will and appetite; for so may forreign Nations invade\nany Kingdom without the will or desire of the Inhabitants, and yet\nthey are corporeal men: The same may be said of Passions; and several\nparts of matter may invade each other, whereof one may be afraid of\nthe other, yet all this is but according as corporeal matter moves,\neither Generally, or Particularly: Generally, that is, when many parts\nof Matter unite or joyn together, having the like appetites, wills,\ndesigns; as we may observe, that there are general agreements amongst\nseveral parts, in Plagues, as well as Wars, which Plagues are not\nonely amongst Men, but amongst Beasts; and sometimes but in one sort\nof animals, as a general Rot amongst Sheep, a general Mange amongst\nDogs, a general Farcy amongst Horses, a general Plague amongst Men;\nall which could not be without a general Infection, one part infecting\nanother, or rather one part imitating the motions of the other, that\nis next adjoyning to it; for such infections come by the neer adhesion\nof parts, as is observable, which immaterial and individable natural\nSpirits could not effect; that is, to make such a general infection in\nso many several parts of so many several Creatures, to the Creatures\ndissolution: Also there will be several Invasions at one time, as\nPlague, and War, amongst neighbouring and adjoining Creatures or Parts.\nBut this is to be observed, That the sensitive corporeal motions make\nall diseases, and not the Rational, although the Rational are many\ntimes the occasion, that the sensitive do move into such or such a\ndisease; for all those that are sick by conceit, their sicknesses\nare caused by the rational corporeal motions. But being loth to make\ntedious repetitions hereof, having discoursed of diseases, and passions\nin my mentioned Book of _Philosophy_, I will refer you thither, and\nrest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Immort. of the Soul. Book_ 2. _c._ 10\n\n\n\n\nXXVIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nConcerning _Dimness_ of _Sight_, which your _Author_ will have to\n_proceed from the deficiency of the Animal Spirits_,[1] My meaning\nin short is, That when sight is dim, though the sensitive organs\nare perfect, this dimness is caused by the alteration onely of the\nsensitive motions in the organs, not moving to the nature of sight.\nAnd so is made Deafness, Dumbness, Lameness, and the like, as also\nWeariness; for the Relaxation of strength in several parts, is onely\nan alteration of such sorts of motions which make the nerves strong;\nand if a man be more dull at one time, then at another, it is that\nthere are not so many changes of motions, nor so quick motions at\nthat time, as at another; for Nature may use more or less force as\nshe pleases: Also she can and doth often use opposite actions, and\noften sympathetical and agreeable actions, as she pleases; for Nature\nhaving a free power to move, may move as she will; but being wise,\nshe moves as she thinks best, either in her separating or uniting\nmotions, for continuance, as well as for variety. But if, according\nto your _Author_, the Immaterial Soul should determinate matter in\nmotion, it would, in my opinion, make a confusion; for the motions of\nthe Matter would often oppose and cross the motions of the Immaterial\nSoul, and so they would disagree, as a King and his Subjects, (except\nGod had given the Soul an absolute power of command, and restrained\nmatter to an irrisistible and necessitated obedience; which, in my\nopinion, is not probable:) By which disagreement, Nature, and all that\nis in Nature, would have been quite ruined at this time; for no kinds,\nsorts, or particulars, would keep any distinction, if Matter did not\ngovern it self, and if all the parts did not know their own affairs,\nabilities, offices, and functions: Besides, it would, to my thinking,\ntake up a great deal of time, to receive commands in every several\naction, at least so much, that for example, a man could not have so\nmany several thoughts in so short a time, as he hath. But concerning\nthe Animal Spirits, which your _Author_ calls the Instruments, Organs\nand Engines of the Incorporeal Soul; I would fain know, whether they\nhave no motion but what comes from the Soul, or whether they have\ntheir own motion of themselves? If the first, then the Soul must, in\nmy opinion, be like a Deity, and have a divine Power, to give and\nimpart Motion; if the second, then the spirits being material, it\nfollows that Matter hath motion of it self, or is self-moving; But\nif the Immaterial natural Soul can transfer her gifts upon corporeal\nmatter, then it must give numerous sorts of motions, with all their\ndegrees; as also the faculty of figuring, or moving figuratively in\nall corporeal Matter: Which power, in my judgment, is too much for a\nCreature to give. If you say, the Immaterial Soul hath this power from\nGod; I answer, Matter may have the same; and I cannot imagine why God\nshould make an Immaterial Spirit to be the Proxy or Vice-gerent of his\nPower, or the _Quarter-master General of his Divine Providence_, as\nyour _Author_ is pleased to style it,[2] when he is able to effect it\nwithout any Under-Officers, and in a more easie and compendious way, as\nto impart immediately such self-moving power to Natural Matter, which\nman attributes to an Incorporeal Spirit. But to conclude, if the Animal\nSpirits be the Instruments of the Incorporeal Soul, then the Spirits\nof Wine are more powerful then the Animal Spirits, nay, then the\nImmaterial Soul her self; for they can put them and all their actions\nquite out of order: the same may be done by other material things,\nVegetables, Minerals, and the like. And so leaving this discourse to\nyour better consideration, I take my leave for this time, and rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful and affectionate Friend,_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Immort. of the Soul. Book_ 2. _ch._ 8.\n\n[2] _Immort. of the Soul. Book_ 3. _c._ 13.\n\n\n\n\nXXIX.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nTouching the State or Condition of the Supernatural and Divine Soul,\nboth in, and after this life, I must crave your excuse that I can give\nno account of it; for I dare affirm nothing; not onely that I am no\nprofessed Divine, and think it unfit to take any thing upon me that\nbelongs not to me, but also that I am unwilling to mingle Divinity and\nNatural Philosophy together, to the great disadvantage and prejudice of\neither; for if each one did contain himself within the circle of his\nown Profession, and no body did pretend to be a Divine Philosopher,\nmany absurdities, confusions, contentions, and the like, would be\navoided, which now disturb both Church and Schools, and will in time\ncause their utter ruine and destruction; For what is Supernatural,\ncannot naturally be known by any natural Creature; neither can any\nsupernatural Creature, but the Infinite and Eternal God, know thorowly\neverything that is in Nature, she being the Infinite servant of the\nInfinite God, whom no finite Creature, of what degree soever, whether\nnatural or supernatural, can conceive; for if no Angel nor Devil can\nknow our thoughts, much less will they know Infinite Nature; nay, one\nfinite supernatural Creature cannot, in my opinion, know perfectly\nanother supernatural Creature, but God alone, who is all-knowing; And\ntherefore all what is said of supernatural Spirits, I believe, so far\nas the Scripture makes mention of them; further I dare not presume to\ngo; the like of the supernatural or divine Soul: for all that I have\nwrit hitherto to you of the Soul, concerns the natural Soul of Man,\nwhich is material, and not the supernatural or divine Soul; neither\ndo I contradict any thing concerning this divine soul, but I am\nonely against those opinions, which make the natural soul of man an\nimmaterial natural spirit, and confound supernatural Creatures with\nnatural, believing those spirits to be as well natural Creatures and\nparts of Nature, as material and corporeal beings are; when as there\nis great difference betwixt them, and nothing in Nature to be found,\nbut what is corporeal. Upon this account I take all their relations of\nD\u00e6mons, of the Genii, and of the Souls after the departure from humane\nBodies, their Vehicles, Shapes, Habitations, Converses, Conferences,\nEntertainments, Exercises, Pleasures, Pastimes, Governments, Orders,\nLaws, Magistrates, Officers, Executioners, Punishments, and the like,\nrather for Poetical Fictions, then Rational Probabilities; containing\nmore Fancy, then Truth and Reason, whether they concern the divine\nor natural Soul: for as for the divine Soul, the Scripture makes no\nother mention of it, but that immediately after her departure out\nof this natural life, she goeth either to Heaven or Hell, either to\nenjoy Reward, or to suffer Punishment, according to man's actions\nin this life. But as for the Natural Soul, she being material, has\nno need of any Vehicles, neither is natural death any thing else\nbut an alteration of the rational and sensitive motions, which from\nthe dissolution of one figure go to the formation or production of\nanother. Thus the natural soul is not like a Traveller, going out of\none body into another, neither is air her lodging; for certainly, if\nthe natural humane soul should travel through the airy regions, she\nwould at last grow weary, it being so great a journey, except she did\nmeet with the soul of a Horse, and so ease her self with riding on\nHorse-back. Neither can I believe Souls or D\u00e6mons in the Air have any\nCommon-wealth, Magistrates, Officers and Executioners in their airy\nKingdom; for wheresoever are Governments, Magistrates and Executioners,\nthere are also Offences, and where there is power to offend, as well as\nto obey, there may and will be sometimes Rebellions and Civil Wars; for\nthere being different sorts of Spirits, it is impossible they should\nall so well agree, especially the good and evil Genii, which certainly\nwill fight more valiantly then _Hector_ and _Achilles_, nay, the\nSpirits of one sort would have more Civil Wars then ever the _Romans_\nhad; and if the Soul of _C\u00e6sar_ and _Pompey_ should meet, there would\nbe a cruel fight between those two Heroical souls; the like between\n_Augustus's_ and _Antonius's_ Soul. But, _Madam_, all these, as I\nsaid, I take for fancies proceeding from the Religion of the Gentiles,\nnot fit for Christians to embrace for any truth; for if we should, we\nmight at last, by avoiding to be Atheists, become Pagans, and so leap\nout of the Frying-pan into the Fire, as turning from Divine Faith to\nPoetical Fancy; and if _Ovid_ should revive again, he would, perhaps,\nbe the chief head or pillar of the Church. By this you may plainly\nsee, _Madam_, that I am no Platonick; for this opinion is dangerous,\nespecially for married Women, by reason the conversation of the Souls\nmay be a great temptation, and a means to bring Platonick Lovers to a\nneerer acquaintance, not allowable by the Laws of Marriage, although\nby the sympathy of the Souls. But I conclude, and desire you, not to\ninterpret amiss this my discourse, as if I had been too invective\nagainst Poetical Fancies; for that I am a great lover of them, my\nPoetical Works will witness; onely I think it not fit to bring Fancies\ninto Religion: Wherefore what I have writ now to you, is rather to\nexpress my zeal for God and his true Worship, then to prejudice any\nbody; and if you be of that same Opinion, as above mentioned, I wish my\nLetter may convert you, and so I should not account my labour lost, but\njudg my self happy, that any good could proceed to the advancement of\nyour Soul, from,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXXX.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI sent you word in my last, I would not meddle with writing any\nthing of the Divine Soul of Man, by reason it belongs to Faith and\nReligion, and not to Natural Philosophy; but since you desire my\nopinion concerning the Immortality of the Divine Soul, I cannot but\nanswer you plainly, that first I did wonder much you made question\nof that, whose truth, in my opinion, is so clear, as hardly any\nrational man will make a doubt of it; for I think there is almost no\nChristian in the world, but believes the Immortality of the Soul, no\nnot Christians onely, but Mahometans and Jews: But I left to wonder at\nyou, when I saw Wise and Learned Men, and great Divines, take so much\npains as to write whole volumes, and bring so many arguments to prove\nthe Immortality of the Soul; for this was a greater Miracle to me,\nthen if Nature had shewed me some of her secret and hidden effects,\nor if I had seen an Immaterial Spirit. Certainly, _Madam_, it seems\nas strange to me to prove the Immortality of the Soul, as to convert\nAtheists; for it [is] impossible, almost, that any Atheist should be\nfound in the World: For what Man would be so senceless as to deny a\nGod? Wherefore to prove either a God, or the Immortality of the Soul,\nis to make a man doubt of either: for as Physicians and Surgeons\napply strengthening Medicines onely to those parts of the body which\nthey suppose the weakest, so it is with proofs and arguments, those\nbeing for the most part used in such subjects, the truth of which is\nmost questionable. But in things Divine, Disputes do rather weaken\nFaith, then prove Truth, and breed several strange opinions; for\nMan being naturally ambitious, and endeavouring to excel each other,\nwill not content himself with what God has been pleased to reveal in\nhis holy Word; but invents and adds something of his own; and hence\narise so many monstrous expressions and opinions, that a simple man is\npuzzled, not knowing which to adhere to; which is the cause of so many\nschismes, sects, and divisions in Religion: Hence it comes also, that\nsome pretend to know the very nature and essence of God, his divine\nCounsels, all his Actions, Designs, Rules, Decrees, Power, Attributes,\nnay, his Motions, Affections, and Passions, as if the Omnipotent\nInfinite God were of a humane shape; so that there are already more\ndivisions then Religions, which disturb the peace and quiet both of\nmind and body; when as the ground of our belief consists but in some\nfew and short Articles, which clearly explained, and the moral part\nof Divinity well pressed upon the People, would do more good, then\nunnecessary and tedious disputes, which rather confound Religion, then\nadvance it: but if man had a mind to shew Learning, and exercise his\nWit, certainly there are other subjects, wherein he can do it with\nmore profit, and less danger, then by proving Christian Religion by\nNatural Philosophy, which is the way to destroy them both. I could\nwish, _Madam_, that every one would but observe the Command of Christ,\nand give to God what is Gods, and to _C\u00e6sar_ what is _C\u00e6sars_, and\nso distinguish what belongs to the actions of Nature, and what to\nthe actions of Religion; for it appears to my Reason, that God hath\ngiven Nature, his eternal Servant, a peculiar freedom of working and\nacting, as a self-moving Power from Eternity; but when the Omnipotent\nGod acts, he acts supernaturally, as beyond Nature; of which divine\nactions none but the holy Church, as one united body, mind and soul,\nshould discourse, and declare the truth of them, according to the\nRevelation made by God in his holy Word, to her Flock the Laity, not\nsuffering any one single person, of what profession or degree soever,\nindifferently to comment, interpret, explain, and declare the meaning\nor sense of the Scripture after his own fancy. And as for Nature's\nactions, let those whom Nature hath indued with such a proportion of\nReason, as is able to search into the hidden causes of natural effects,\ncontemplate freely, without any restraint or confinement; for Nature\nacts freely, and so may natural Creatures, and amongst the rest Man, in\nthings which are purely natural; but as for things supernatural, man\ncannot act freely, by reason they are beyond his sphere of conception\nand understanding, so as he is forced to set aside Reason, and onely\nto work by Faith. And thus, _Madam_, you see the cause why I cannot\ngive you a full description of the Divine Soul of Man, as I mentioned\nalready in my last, but that I do onely send you my opinion of the\nnatural soul, which I call the rational soul; not that I dare say, the\nsupernatural soul is without natural reason, but natural reason is not\nthe divine soul; neither can natural reason, without Faith, advance\nthe divine soul to Heaven, or beget a pious zeal, without divine and\nsupernatural Grace: Wherefore Reason, or the rational Soul is onely\nthe Soul of Nature, which being material, is dividable, and so becomes\nnumerous in particular natural Creatures; like as the sensitive life\nbeing also material and dividable, becomes numerous, as being in every\nCreature, and in every part of every Creature; for as there is life in\nevery Creature, so there is also a soul in every Creature; nay, not\nonely in every Creature, but in every particle of every Creature, by\nreason every Creature is made of rational and sensitive Matter; and as\nall Creatures or parts of Nature are but one infinite body of Nature,\nso all their particular souls and lives make but one infinite soul\nand life of Nature; and this natural soul hath onely natural actions,\nnot supernatural; nor has the supernatural soul natural actions;\nfor although they subsist both together in one body, yet each works\nwithout disturbance to the other; and both are Immortal; for of the\nsupernatural soul there is no question, and of the natural soul, I have\nsaid before, that nothing is perishable or subject to annihilation in\nnature, and so no death, but what is called by the name of death, is\nonely an alteration of the corporeal natural motions of such a figure\nto another figure; and therefore as it is impossible, that one part of\nMatter should perish in Nature, so is it impossible, that the natural\nor rational soul can perish, being material: The natural humane soul\nmay alter, so as not to move in an animal way, or not to have animal\nmotions, but this doth not prove her destruction or annihilation, but\nonely a change of the animal figure and its motions, all remaining\nstill in Nature. Thus my Faith of the Divine, and my opinion of the\nNatural Soul, is, that they are both Immortal; as for the immediate\nactions of the Divine Soul, I leave you to the Church, which are the\nMinisters of God, and the faithful dispensers of the sacred mysteries\nof the Gospel, the true Expounders of the Word of God, Reformers of\nmens lives, and Tutors of the Ignorant, to whom I submit my self in all\nthat belongs to the salvation of my Soul, and the regulating of the\nactions of my life, to the honour and glory of God. And I hope they\nwill not take any offence at the maintaining and publishing my opinions\nconcerning Nature and Natural effects, for they are as harmless, and\nas little prejudicial to them, as my designs; for my onely and chief\ndesign is, and ever hath been to understand Nature rightly, obey the\nChurch exactly, Believe undoubtedly, Pray zealously, Live vertuously,\nand Wish earnestly, that both Church and Schools may increase and\nflourish in the sacred knowledg of the true Word of God, and that each\none may live peaceable and happily in this world, die quietly, and\nrise blessedly and gloriously to everlasting Life and happiness: Which\nhappiness I pray God also to confer upon your Ladiship; Till then, I\nrest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful and constant_\n\n_Friend, to serve you._\n\n\n\n\nXXXI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI will leave the Controversie of Free-Will and Necessity, which your\n_Author_ is discoursing of,[1] to Divines to decide it, onely I say\nthis, that Nature hath a natural Free-will and power of self-moving,\nand is not necessitated; but yet that this Free-will proceeds from God,\nwho hath given her both will and power to act freely. But as for the\nquestion, whether there be nothing in the Universe, but meer body?[2]\nI answer, My opinion is not, that there is nothing in the world but\nmeer Body; but that Nature is purely material or corporeal, and that\nthere is no part of Nature, or natural Creature, which is not Matter,\nor Body, or made of Matter; also, that there is not any thing else\nmixt with body, as a copartner in natural actions, which is distinct\nfrom Body or Matter; nevertheless, there may be supernatural spiritual\nbeings or substances in Nature, without any hinderance to Matter or\ncorporeal Nature. The same I may say of the natural material, and\nthe divine and supernatural Soul; for though the divine Soul is in\na natural body, and both their powers and actions be different, yet\nthey cause no ruine or disturbance to each other, but do in many cases\nagree with each other, without incroachment upon each others powers or\nactions; for God, as he is the God of all things, so the God of Order.\nWherefore it is not probable, that created Immaterial or Incorporeal\nbeings should order Corporeal Nature, no more then Corporeal Nature\norders Immaterial or Incorporeal Creatures. Neither can, in my opinion,\nIncorporeal Creatures be clearly conceived by Corporeals, although\nthey may really exist and subsist in Nature; onely, as I said before,\nit is well to be considered, that there is difference betwixt being\nin Nature, and being a part of Nature; for bodiless things, and so\nspiritual substances, although they may exist in Nature, yet they\nare not natural, nor parts of Nature, but supernatural, Nature being\nmeerly corporeal, and Matter the ground of Nature; and all that is\nnot built upon this material ground, is nothing in Nature. But you\nwill say, The divine Soul is a part of Man, and Man a part of Nature,\nwherefore the divine Soul must needs be a part of Nature. I answer,\nNot: For the divine Soul is not a part of Nature, but supernatural, as\na supernatural Gift from God onely to Man, and to no other Creature:\nand although in this respect it may be called a part of Man, yet it is\nno natural or material part of Man; neither doth this supernatural Gift\ndisturb Nature or natural Matter, or natural Matter this supernatural\nGift. And so leaving them both, I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Of the Immortality of the Soul. l._ 1. _c._ 3.\n\n[2] _Lib._ 2. _c._ 2.\n\n\n\n\nXXXII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nIf you desire my opinion concerning Witches, whereof your Learned\n_Author_ hath many Discourses and Stories:[1] I will tell you really,\nthat in my sense and reason, I do not believe any, except it be the\nwitch of _Endor_, which the Scripture makes mention of; for though I\nbelieve that there is a Devil, as the Word of God and the Church inform\nme, yet I am not of the opinion, that God should suffer him to have\nsuch a familiar conjunction, and make such contracts with Man, as to\nimpower him to do mischief and hurt to others, or to foretell things\nto come, and the like; for I believe that all things Immaterial, as\nSpirits, Angels, Devils, and the divine Soul of Man, are no parts of\nNature, but Supernatural, Nature knowing of no Creature that belongs to\nher, but what is material; and since incorporeal Creatures are no parts\nof Nature, they neither have natural actions, nor are they concerned\nas co-partners or co-agents in the actions of Nature and natural\nCreatures; but as their substances, so their actions are supernatural,\nand beyond our conceivement. As for Faires, I will not say, but there\nmay be such Creatures in Nature, and have airy bodies, and be of a\nhumane shape, and have humane actions, as I have described in my Book\nof Poems; for there are many things, in Nature, whereof Man hath no\nknowledg at all, and it would be a great folly for any one to deny what\nhe doth not see, or to ascribe all the unusual effects in Nature to\nImmaterial Spirits; for Nature is so full of variety, that she can and\ndoth present sometimes such figures to our exterior senses, as are\nnot familiar to us, so as we need not to take our refuge to Immaterial\nSpirits: nay, even those that are so much for Incorporeal Spirits,\nmust confess, that they cannot be seen in their own natures, as being\nInvisible, and therefore have need to take vehicles of some grosser\nbodies to manifest themselves to men: and if Spirits cannot appear\nwithout bodies, the neerest way is to ascribe such unusual effects or\napparitions, as happen sometimes, rather to matter that is already\ncorporeal, and not to go so far as to draw Immaterial Spirits to\nNatural actions, and to make those Spirits take vehicles fit for their\npurposes: for Nature takes sometimes delight in unusual Varieties.\nConcerning those stories which your _Author_ relates[2] of the strange\neffects of Food received into a mans body, how they did work upon the\nImagination, and change and transform the humors of those that did feed\nupon them, those, I say, seem very probable to me. As for example;\nof a _Wench who being struck into an Epilepsy, upon the seeing of a\nMalefactors Head cut off, was advised to drink Cats-blood; which being\ndone, she not long after degenerated into the nature and property of\nthat Animal, cried and jump'd like a Cat, and hunted Mice with the\nsame silence and watchfulness as they do. Then of a Man, being long\nfed with Swines-blood, which took a special pleasure in wallowing and\ntumbling himself in the mire. Also of a Girle, which being nourished\nup with Goats-milk, would skip like a Goat, and brouze on Trees as\nGoats use to do. And of a Man, who by eating the brains of a Bear,\nbecame of a Bear-like disposition._ All these stories I believe to be\ntrue; for naturally the motions of a Man may sometimes Sympathize so\nmuch with the received food, as to make an alteration in his humour\nor disposition. But although it be natural, yet it is not regular, at\nleast not usual, but proceeds from an irregular and unusual change of\nmotions, like as the conception and generation of a Monster; For if\nit were ordinary, then those which drink much of the blood of beasts,\nwould also degenerate into a beastly nature, the contrary whereof\nis sufficiently known: Likewise those that drink much of Cows-milk,\nwould change into their humors and natures. But certainly, some\nkinds of meats do not onely cause sickness, but madness, and strange\nImaginations; all which unnatural or unusual accidents are caused by\nMatter's irregular motions; Whereof I have declared my opinion in other\nplaces; and so I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n\n_Your faithful and constant_\n\n_Friend, to serve you._\n\n[1] _Antid. lib._ 3.\n\n[2] _In his discourse of Enthusiasm._\n\n\n\n\nXXXIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYou will have my opinion of the Book that treats of _the Pre-existence\nof Souls_, and the _Key that unlocks the Divine Providence_; but I\nhave told you heretofore, that there are so many different opinions\nconcerning the Soul, as I do not know which to embrace, for the\nmultiplicity confounds my choice: and the cause of these various\nopinions, in my simple judgment, is, that most men make no difference\nbetween the Divine, and Natural Soul. As for the Natural Soul, humane\nsense and reason may perceive, that it consists of Matter, as being\nMaterial; but as for the Divine Soul, being not material, no humane\nsense and reason is able naturally to conceive it; for there cannot\npossibly be so much as an Idea of a natural nothing, or an immaterial\nbeing, neither can sense and reason naturally conceive the Creation of\nan Immaterial substance; for as the Creation of material Creatures,\nas of this World, belongs to Faith, and not to Reason, so doth also\nthe Creation of Immaterial substances, as Spirits; nay, it is more\ndifficult to understand a Natural Nothing to be made out of nothing,\nthen a Natural Something out of nothing. And as for the _Progress\nof Immaterial Souls_, which the same _Author_ mentions, I cannot\nconceive how No-thing can make a Progress, and therefore I suppose,\nit is an Improper, or Metaphorical expression. The truth is, what is\nImmaterial, belongs not to a Natural knowledg or understanding, but is\nSupernatural, and goes beyond a natural reach or capacity. Concerning\n_the Key of Divine Providence_, I believe God did never give or lend\nit to any man; for surely, God, who is infinitely Wise, would never\nintrust so frail and foolish a Creature as Man, with it, as to let\nhim know his secret Counsels, Acts, and Decrees. But setting aside\nPride and Presumption, Sense and Reason may easily perceive, that Man,\nthough counted the best of Creatures, is not made with such infinite\nExcellence, as to pierce into the least secrets of God; Wherefore I am\nin a maze when I hear of such men, which pretend to know so much, as\nif they had plundered the Celestial Cabinet of the Omnipotent God; for\ncertainly, had they done it, they could not pretend to more knowledg\nthen they do. But I, _Madam_, confess my Ignorance, as having neither\ndivine Inspirations, nor extraordinary Visions, nor any divine or\nhumane learning, but what Nature has been pleased to bestow upon me;\nYet in all this Ignorance, I know that I am, and ought to be,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your humble and_\n\n_faithful Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXXXIV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nSince in my former Letters I have discoursed of Immaterial Spirits,\nand declared my meaning, that I do not believe them to be natural\nCreatures, or parts of Nature; you are of opinion, as if I did\ncontradict my self, by reason that in the first Edition of my Book\ncalled _Philosophical Opinions_, I name the rational and sensitive\nMatter, rational and sensitive Spirits. To which I answer, first,\nThat when I did write my first Conceptions in Natural Philosophy, I\nwas not so experienced, nor had I those observations which I have had\nsince; Neither did I give those first Conceptions time to digest, and\ncome to a maturity or perfect growth, but forced them forth as soon\nas conceived, and this made the first publishing of them so full of\nImperfections, which I am much sorry for; But since that time, I have\nnot onely reviewed, but corrected and altered them in several places,\nso that the last Impression of my _Philosophical Opinions_, you will\nfind more perfect and exact then the former. Next, I pray you to take\nnotice, _Madam_, that in the mentioned first Edition, by the word\nSpirits, I meant Material, not Immaterial Spirits; for observing, that\nLearned Men do discourse much of Animal Spirits, which are Material,\nand that also high extracts in Chymistry are called Spirits; I used\nthat word purposely, thinking it most proper and convenient to express\nmy sense and meaning of that degree of matter which I call rational and\nsensitive. But considering again, that my opinions, being new, would\nbe subject to misapprehensions and mis-interpretations; to prevent\nthose, I thought it fitter to leave out the word _Spirits_ in the\nsecond, as also in the last Edition of my named Book of _Philosophy_,\nlest my Readers should think I meant Immaterial Spirits; for I confess\nreally, that I never understood, nor cannot as yet apprehend Immaterial\nSpirits; for though I believe the Scripture, and the Church, that\nthere are Spirits, and do not doubt the existency of them, yet I\ncannot conceive the nature of Immaterial Spirits, and what they are;\nWherefore I do onely treat of natural material substances, and not\nof incorporeal; also my discourse is of the Infinite servant of the\nInfinite God, which servant is corporeal or material Nature: God is\nonely to be admired, adored, and worshipped; but not ungloriously\nto be discoursed of; Which Omnipotent God, I pray of his Infinite\nMercy to give me Faith to believe in him, and not to let presumption\nprevail with me so, as to liken vain and idle conceptions to that\nIncomprehensible Deity. These, _Madam_, are my humble Prayers to God;\nand my request to you is, that I may continue the same in your love and\naffection, which I have been hitherto; so shall I live content, and\nrest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nSECT. III.\n\nI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI have discharged my duty thus far, that in obedience to your commands,\nI have given you my answers to the opinions of three of those famous\nand learned _Authors_ you sent me, _viz. Hobbes, Des Cartes_, and\n_More_, and explained my own opinions by examining theirs; My onely\ntask shall be now to proceed in the same manner with that famous\nPhilosopher and Chymist, _Van Helmont_; But him I find more difficult\nto be understood then any of the forementioned, not onely by reason\nof the Art of Chymistry, which I confess myself not versed in, but\nespecially, that he has such strange terms and unusual expressions\nas may puzle any body to apprehend the sense and meaning of them:\nWherefore, if you receive not that full satisfaction you expect\nfrom me, in examining his opinions and arguments, I beg your pardon\nbefore-hand, and desire you to remember, that I sent you word in the\nbeginning, I did undertake this work more out of desire to clear my\nown opinions, then a quarrelsome humor to contradict others; which\nif I do but obtain, I have my aim. And so to the business: When as\nyour _Author_ discourses of the causes and beginnings of Natural\nthings, he is pleased to say,[1] That _Souls and Lives, as they know\nno Degrees, so they know no Parts_; which opinion is very different\nfrom mine: For although I confess, that there is but one kind of Life,\nand one kind of Soul in Nature, which is the sensitive Life, and the\nrational Soul, both consisting not onely of Matter, but of one kind of\nMatter, to wit, Animate; nevertheless they are of different degrees,\nthe matter of the rational Soul being more agil, subtil and active,\nthen the matter of the sensitive Life; which is the reason that the\nrational can act in its own substance or degree of matter, and make\nfigures in it self, and its own parts; when as the sensitive, being\nof somewhat a grosser degree then the rational, and not so subtil\nand active, is confined to work with and upon the Inanimate matter.\nBut mistake me not, _Madam_, for I make onely a difference of the\ndegrees of Subtilty, Activity, Agility, Purity, betwixt rational and\nsensitive Matter; but as for the rational Matter it self, it has no\ndegrees of Purity, Subtilty and Activity in its own Nature or Parts,\nbut is always one and the same in its substance in all Creatures, and\nso is the sensitive. You will ask me, How comes then the difference\nof so many Parts and Creatures in Nature, if there be no degrees of\nPurity, Activity, and Subtilty in the substance of the rational, and in\nthe substance of the sensitive Matter? As for example: if there were\nno such degrees of the Parts of rational Matter amongst themselves,\nas also of the Parts of the sensitive, there would be no difference\nbetwixt Animals, Vegetables, Minerals, and Elements, but all Creatures\nwould be alike without distinction, and have the same manner of sense\nand reason, life and knowledg. I answer, That although each sort or\ndegree of animate Matter, rational as well as sensitive, has in it self\nor its own substance no degrees of purity, rarity, and subtilty, but\nis one and the same in its nature or essence; nevertheless, each has\ndegrees of quantity, or parts, which degrees of quantity do make the\nonely difference betwixt the several creatures or parts of Nature, as\nwell in their general, as particular kinds; for both the rational and\nsensitive matter being corporeal, and so dividable into parts, some\ncreatures do partake more, some less of them, which makes them to have\nmore or less, and so different sense and reason, each according to the\nnature of its kind: Nay this difference of the degrees of quantity or\nparts in the substance of the rational and sensitive Matter, makes\nalso the difference betwixt particulars in every sort of Creatures, as\nfor example, between several particular Men: But as I said, the nature\nor essence of the sensitive and rational Matter is the same in all;\nfor the difference consists not in the Nature of Matter, but onely in\nthe degrees of quantity, and parts of Matter, and in the various and\ndifferent actions or motions of this same Matter. And thus Matter being\ndividable, there are numerous lives and souls in Nature, according to\nthe variousness of her several Parts and Creatures. Next your _Author_,\nmentioning the _Causes and Principles of natural Bodies_, assigns two\nfirst or chief beginnings and corporeal causes of every Creature,\nto wit, the _Element of Water_, and the _Ferment or Leaven_; which\nFerment he calls a formal created being; neither a substance, nor an\naccident, but a neutral thing. Truly, _Madam_, my reason is not able\nto conceive this neutral Being; for it must either be something or\nnothing in Nature: and if he makes it any thing betwixt both, it is a\nstrange Monster; and will produce monstrous effects: and for Water,\nif he doth make it a Principle of Natural things, I see no reason\nwhy he excludes the rest of the Elements: But, in my opinion, Water,\nand the rest of the Elements, are but effects of Nature, as other\nCreatures are, and so cannot be prime causes. The like the Ferment,\nwhich, to my sense and reason, is nothing else, but a natural effect of\nnatural matter. Concerning his opinion, That _Causes and Beginnings_\nare all one, or that there is but little difference betwixt them, I\ndo readily subscribe unto it; but when he speaks of those _things,\nwhich are produced without life_, my reason cannot find out, what, or\nwhere they should be; for certainly, in Nature they are not, Nature\nbeing Life and Soul her self, and all her parts being enlivened and\nsoulified, so that there can be no generation or natural production\nwithout Life. Neither is my sense and reason capable to understand his\nmeaning, when he says, That the _Seeds of things, and the Spirits,\nas the Dispensers thereof, are divided from the Material Cause_: For\nI do see no difference betwixt the Seed, and the material Cause, but\nthey are all one thing, it being undeniable, that the seed is the\nmatter of that which is produced. But your _Author_ was pleased to say\nheretofore, that there are but two beginnings or causes of natural\nthings, and now he makes so many more; for, says he, Of _Efficient\nand Seminal Causes, some are efficiently effecting, and others\neffectively effecting_: which nice distinctions, in my opinion, do\nbut make a confusion in natural knowledg, setting a mans brain on the\nrack; for who is able to conceive all those _Chym\u00e6ras_ and Fancies of\nthe _Archeus, Ferment,_ various _Ideas, Blas, Gas,_ and many more,\nwhich are neither something nor no-thing in Nature, but betwixt both,\nexcept a man have the same Fancies, Visions and Dreams, your _Author_\nhad? Nature is easie to be understood, and without any difficulty,\nso as we stand in no need to frame so many strange names, able to\nfright any body. Neither do natural bodies know many prime causes and\nbeginnings, but there is but one onely chief and prime cause from which\nall effects and varieties proceed, which cause is corporeal Nature,\nor natural self-moving Matter, which forms and produces all natural\nthings; and all the variety and difference of natural Creatures arises\nfrom her various actions, which are the various motions in Nature;\nsome whereof are Regular, some Irregular: I mean Irregular, as to\nparticular Creatures, not as to Nature her self, for Nature cannot\nbe disturbed or discomposed, or else all would run into confusion;\nWherefore Irregularities do onely concern particular Creatures, not\nInfinite Nature; and the Irregularities of some parts may cause the\nIrregularities of other Parts, as the Regularities of some parts do\ncause the Regularities of others: And thus according as Regularities\nand Irregularities have power, they cause either Peace or War, Sickness\nor Health, Delight and Pleasure, or Grief and Pain, Life or Death, to\nparticular Creatures or parts of Nature; but all these various actions\nare but various Effects, and not prime Causes; which is well to be\nobserved, lest we confound Causes with Effects. And so leaving this\ndiscourse for the present, I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] Van Helm, _in his Book intituled_, Physick Refined, _ch._ 4. _of\nthe Causes and beginning of natural things._\n\n\n\n\nII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nIt is no wonder, your _Author_ has so many odd and strange opinions\nin Philosophy, since they do not onely proceed from strange Visions,\nApparitions, and Dreams, but are built upon so strange grounds and\nprinciples as _Ideas, Archeus, Gas, Blas, Ferment,_ and the like,\nthe names of which sound so harsh and terrifying, as they might put\nany body easily into a fright, like so many Hobgoblins or Immaterial\nspirits; but the best is, they can do no great harm, except it be to\ntrouble the brains of them, that love to maintain those opinions; for\nthough they are thought to be powerful beings, yet being not corporeal\nsubstances, I cannot imagine wherein their power should consist; for\nNothing can do nothing. But to mention each apart; first his _Archeus_\nhe calls[1] _the Spirit of Life; a vital gas or Light; the Balsam\npreferring from Corruption; the_ Vulcan _or Smith of Generation; the\nstirrer up, and inward director of generation; an Air; a skiey or\nairy Spirit; cloathing himself presently with a bodily cloathing, in\nthings soulified, walking through all the dens and retiring places of\nthe seed, and transforming the matter according to the perfect act of\nits own Image, remaining the president and overseer or inward ruler of\nhis bounds even till death; the Principle of Life: the Inn of Life,\nthe onely immediate Witness, Executor, and Instrument of Life; the\nPrince and Center of Life; the Ruler of the Stern; the Keeper of Life,\nand promoter of Transmutations; the Porter of the Soul; a Fountainous\nbeing; a Flint._[2] These, and many more names your _Author_ attributes\nto his _Archeus_, but what properly it is, and what its Nature and its\npeculiar office, I am not able to conceive. In the next place, _Gas_\nand _Blas_ are to your _Author_ also true Principles of Natural things;\nfor[3] _Gas is the Vapour into which Water is dissolved by Cold, but\nyet it is a far more fine and subtil thing then Vapour_; which he\ndemonstrates by the Art of Chymistry. This _Gas_ in another place he\ncalls[4] a _Wild Spirit, or Breath, unknown hitherto; which can neither\nbe constrained by Vessels, nor reduced into a visible body; in some\nthings it is nothing but Water, as for example in Salt, in Fruits, and\nthe like._ But[5] _Blas proceeds from the local and alterative motion\nof the Stars, and is the general beginning of motion, producing heat\nand cold, and that especially with the changing of the Winds._ There is\nalso[6] _Blas in all sublunary things_; witness Amulets or preserving\nPomanders, whereby they do constrain objects to obey them; _Which\nIncorporeal Blas of Government acts without a Corporeal Efflux, even\nas the Moon makes the Sea to swell; but the fleshly generation_[7]\n_hath a Blas of its own, and it is twofold, one which existeth by a\nnatural Motion, the other voluntary, which existeth as a mover to it\nself by an Internal Willing._ There is also a _Blas of the Heart_,\nwhich is _the fuel of the Vital Spirit, and consequently of its heat._\nThe _Ferment_[8] he describes to be _A true Principle or Original\nbeginning of things, to wit, a Formal Created beginning, which is\nneither a substance, nor an accident, but a Neutral being, framed from\nthe beginning of the World in the places of its own Monarchy, in the\nmanner of Light, Fire, the magnal or sheath of the Air, Forms, &c. that\nit may prepare, stir up, and go before the Seeds._ Lastly, his _Ideas_\nare _Certain formal seminal Lights,_[9] _mutually piercing each other\nwithout the adultery of Union; For_, says he, _although at first, that,\nwhich is imagined, is nothing, but a meer being of reason, yet it doth\nnot remain such; for truely the Fancy is a sealifying vertue, and in\nthis respect is called Imaginative, because it forms the Images of\nLikenesses, or Ideas of things conceived, and doth characterize them\nin its own Vital Spirit, and therefore that Idea is made a spiritual\nor seminal powerful being, to perform things of great moment._ And\nthose Ideas he makes various and numerous; as _Archeal Ideas, Ideas of\nDiseases, Sealifying Ideas, Piercing Ideas, Forreign and strange Ideas,\nMad Ideas, Irrational and Incorrigible Ideas, Staggering Ideas,_ and a\nhundred others: the like of _Gas, Blas,_ and the rest. Thus, _Madam_, I\nhave made a rehearsal of your _Authors_ strange, and hitherto unknown,\nPrinciples (as his Confession is) of Natural things, which, to my\nsense and reason, are so obscure, intricate and perplex, as is almost\nimpossible exactly to conceive them; when as Principles ought to be\neasie, plain, and without any difficulty to be understood; Wherefore\nwhat with his Spirits, meer-beings, _non_-beings, and neutral-beings,\nhe troubles Nature, and puzles the brains of his Readers so, that, I\nthink, if all men were of his opinion, or did follow the way of his\nPhilosophy, Nature would desire God she might be annihilated: Onely, of\nall other, she doth not fear his Non-beings, for they are the weakest\nof all, and can do her the least hurt, as not being able to obstruct\nreal and corporeal actions of Nature; for Nature is a corporeal\nsubstance, and without a substance Motion cannot be, and without\nMotion opposition cannot be made, nor any action in Nature, whether\nPrints, Seals, Stamps, Productions, Generations, Thoughts, Conceptions,\nImaginations, Passions, Appetites, or the like: and if motions cannot\nbe without substance; then all Creatures, their properties, faculties,\nnatures, &c., being made by corporeal motions, cannot be _Non_-beings,\nno nor anything else that is in Nature; for _non_-beings are not in\nthe number of Natural things, Nature containing nothing within her,\nbut what is substantially, really, and corporeally existent. But your\nAuthors _Ideal Entity_, (whereof he is speaking in another place of\nhis Works,)[10] which performs all the Works of Nature, seems to me,\nas if it were the Jack of all Offices, or like the Jack in a Clock,\nthat makes every Wheel move; for it hath an admirable power to put off\nand on Corporeality and Incorporeality, and to make it self Something\nand Nothing as often as it has occasion; but if this _Proteus_ have\nsuch power, it may well be named the Magick of Nature. Your _Author_\nsaith, it is not the Devil, nor any effect thereof: but certainly, in\nmy opinion, according to its description, and the effects laid to its\nperformance, it must be more then the Devil; wherefore, in my Reason, I\ncannot conceive it, neither am I able to understand his _Phantastick\nActivity, Fancy of Forms, the Souls acting by an insensible way,_\nand many more such like expressions. But I conceive that all these\ncan be nothing else but the several motions of the sensitive and\nrational matter, which is the Active, Ingenious, Distinguishing,\nKnowing, Wise and Understanding part of Infinite corporeal Nature; and\nthough Infinite Matter hath Infinite parts in general, yet there is a\nfiniteness in every part considered by it self: not that I think a Part\ncan really subsist single and by it self, but it is onely considered\nso in the manner of our Conception, by reason of the difference and\nvariousness of natural Creatures: for these being different from each\nother in their figures, and not all alike, so that we can make a\ndistinction betwixt them; this difference and distinction causes us\nto conceive every part of a different figure by it self: but properly\nand according to the Truth of Nature, there is no part by it self\nsubsisting; for all parts are to be considered, not onely as parts\nof the whole, but as parts of other parts, all parts being joyned in\nInfinite Nature, and tied by an inseparable tie one way or other,\nalthough we do not altogether perceive it. But to return to _Ideas_:\nI had almost forgot to tell you, _Madam_, of another kind of _Ideas_,\nby your _Author_ named, _Bewitching_ or _Inchanting Ideas_,[11] which\nare for the most part found in Women, against which I cannot but\ntake exception in the behalf of our Sex: For, says he, _Women stamp\nIdeas on themselves, whereby they, no otherwise then Witches driven\nabout with a malignant spirit of despair, are oftentimes governed or\nsnatched away unto those things, which otherwise they would not, and\ndo bewail unto us their own and unvoluntary Madness: These Ideas are\nhurtful to themselves, and do, as it were, Inchant, Infatuate, and\nweaken themselves; for so (as_ Plutarch _witnesses) a desire of death\nby hanging took hold of all the young Maids in the Island_ Chios. By\nthis it appears, that your _Author_ has never been in Love, or else he\nwould have found, that Men have as well bewitching _Ideas_ as Women,\nand that they are as hurtful to Men, as to Women. Neither can I be\nperswaded to believe, that men should not have as well Mad _Ideas_ as\nWomen; for to mention no other example, some, (I will not speak of\nyour _Author_) their Writings and strange Opinions in Philosophy do\nsufficiently witness it; but whence those Ideas do proceed, whether\nfrom the Bride-bed of the Soul, or the Splene, your _Author_ doth not\ndeclare. As for the young Maids in _Chios_, I must confess, it is a\nvery strange example; but I think there have been as many Men that\nhave killed themselves, as Women, if not more: However, I hope, by the\nGrace of God, the young Maids in this Kingdom are better advised; for\nif they should do the like, it would be a sad fate for all young Men.\nTo conclude, _Madam_, all these rehearsed opinions of your _Author_,\nconcerning the Grounds or Principles of Natural Philosophy, if you\ndesire my Unfeigned Judgment, I can say no more, but that they shew\nmore Fancy, then Reason and Truth, and so do many others; and, perhaps,\nmy opinions may be as far from Truth as his, although their Ground is\nSense and Reason; for there is no single Creature in Nature, that is\nable to know the perfectest Truth: but some opinions, to humane sense\nand reason, may have more probability then others, and every one thinks\nhis to be most probable, according to his own fancy and imagination,\nand so I think of mine; nevertheless, I leave them to the censure of\nthose, that are endued with solid judgment and reason, and know how\nto discern betwixt things of fancy and reason, and amongst the rest,\nI submit them to the censure of your _Ladiship_, whose solid and wise\nJudgment is the rule of all the actions of,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _In his_ ch. _called_ The Fiction of Elementary Complexions and\nMixtures.\n\n[2] _In the_ ch. of the Birth and Original of Forms. _In the_ ch. Of\nthe Ideas of Diseases. _See his_ ch. _called_ The Seat of Diseases\nin the Soul is confirmed. Ch. of Archeal Diseases. Ch. _called_ The\nSubject of inhering of Diseases is in the point of Life, &c.\n\n[3] _In the_ ch. Of the Gas of the Water.\n\n[4] _In the_ ch. of the Fiction of Elementary Complexions and Mixtures.\n\n[5] _In the_ ch. Of the Blas of Meteors.\n\n[6] _In the_ ch. Of the unknown action of Government.\n\n[7] _In the_ ch. Of the Blas of Man.\n\n[8] Of the Causes and beginnings of Natural things.\n\n[9] Of the Ideas of Diseases.\n\n[10] Of the Magnetick cure of Wounds.\n\n[11] Of things Conceived, or Conceptions.\n\n\n\n\nIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour _Author_ relating how he dissents from the _false Doctrine_, as\nhe terms it, _of the Schools_, concerning the Elements, and their\nMixtures, Qualities, Temperaments, Discords, &c. in order to Diseases,\nis pleased to say as follows:[1] _I have sufficiently demonstrated,\nthat there are not four Elements in Nature, and by consequence, if\nthere are onely three, that four cannot go together, or encounter; and\nthat the fruits which Antiquity hath believed to be mixt bodies, and\nthose composed from a concurrence of four elements, are materially of\none onely Element; also that those three Elements are naturally cold;\nnor that native heat is any where in things, except from Light, Life,\nMotion, and an altering Blas: In like manner, that all actual moisture\nis of Water, but all virtual moisture from the property of the seeds:\nLikewise, that dryness is by it self in the Air and Earth, but in\nFruits by reason of the Seeds and Coagulations; and that there are not\nContraries in Nature._ To give you my opinion hereof, first I think it\ntoo great a presumption in any man, to feign himself so much above the\nrest, as to accuse all others of ignorance, and that none but he alone\nhath the true knowledg of all things as infallible and undeniable,\nand that so many Learned, Wise and Ingenious Men in so many ages have\nbeen blinded with errors; for certainly, no particular Creature in\nNature can have any exact or perfect knowledg of Natural things, and\ntherefore opinions cannot be infallible truths, although they may seem\nprobable; for how is it possible that a single finite Creature should\nknow the numberless varieties and hidden actions of Nature? Wherefore\nyour _Author_ cannot say, that he hath demonstrated any thing, which\ncould not be as much contradicted, and perhaps with more reason, then\nhe hath brought proofs and demonstrations: And thus when he speaks of\nElements, that there are not four in Nature, and that they cannot go\ntogether, or encounter, it may be his opinion; but others have brought\nas many reasons to the contrary, and I think with more probability; so\nas it is unnecessary to make a tedious discourse thereof, and therefore\nI'le refer you to those that have treated of it more learnedly and\nsolidly then I can do. But I perceive your _Author_ is much for Art,\nand since he can make solid bodies liquid, and liquid bodies solid, he\nbelieves that all bodies are composed out of the Element of Water, and\nthat Water therefore is the first Principle of all things; when as\nWater, in my opinion, is but an Effect, as all other natural Creatures,\nand therefore cannot be a cause or principle of them. Concerning the\n_Natural coldness of Water, Air, and Earth,_ it may be, or not be so,\nfor any thing your _Author_ can truly know; but to my sense and reason,\nit seems probable that there are things naturally hot and moist, and\nhot and dry, as well as cold and moist, and cold and dry: But all these\nare but several effects produced by the several actions of Natural\nMatter, which Natural Matter is the onely Principle of all Natural\nEffects and Creatures whatever; and this Principle, I am confident\nyour _Author_ can no more prove to be Water, then he can prove that\nHeat, Light, Life, Motion, and _Blas_, are not material. Concerning\nwhat he saith, That _Native Heat is no where in things, except from\nLight, Life, Motion, and an altering Blas_: I believe that motion of\nlife makes not onely heat, but all effects whatsoever; but this native\nheat is not produced onely from the motions of Particular lives in\nparticular Creatures, but it is made by the motions of Natures life;\nwhich life, in all probability, is the self-moving Matter, which no\ndoubt, can and doth make Light and Blas without Heat, and Heat without\nLight or Blas; Wherefore Light and Blas are not principles of native\nHeat, no more then native Heat is the principle of Light and Blas.\nNeither is Water the Principle of Actual moisture, nor the propriety\nof seeds the Principle of all Virtual moisture; but self-moving Matter\nis the Principle of all, and makes both actual and virtual moisture,\nand there is no question but there are many sorts of moistures. As for\n_Dryness_, which he says, _is by it self in the Air and Earth, and\nin Fruits by reason of the Seeds and Coagulations_: I cannot conceive\nhow any thing can be by it self in Nature, by reason there is nothing\nalone and single in Nature, but all are inseparable parts of one body:\nperchance, he means, it is naturally and essentially inherent in Air\nand Earth; but neither can that be in my reason, because all Creatures\nand Effects of Nature are Intermixt, and there is as much dryness in\nother Creatures, as in Air and Earth. Lastly, as for his opinion, That\n_there are no Contraries in Nature_; I believe not in the essence\nor nature of Matter; but sense and reason inform us, that there are\nContraries in Natures actions, which are Corporeal motions, which cause\nmixtures, qualities, degrees, discords, as also harmonious conjunctions\nand concords, compositions, divisions, and the like effects whatsoever.\nBut though your _Author_ seems to be an enemy to the mixtures of\nElements, yet he makes such a mixture of Divinity, and natural\nPhilosophy, that all his Philosophy is nothing but a meer Hotch-potch,\nspoiling one with the other. And so I will leave it to those that\ndelight in it, resting,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _In his Treatise called_, A passive deceiving of the Schools of the\nHumourists.\n\n\n\n\nIV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\n_Water_, according to your _Authors_ opinion,[1] _is frozen into Snow,\nIce, or Hail, not by Cold, but by its own Gas._ But since I am not able\nto conceive what his Gas is, being a term invented by him self, I will\nbriefly declare my own opinion, which is, That Snow, Ice, and Hail, in\nmy judgment, are made in the like manner, as Passions or Colours are\nmade and raised in Man; for a sad discourse, or a cruel object will\nmake a Man pale and cold, and a fearful object, will make him tremble;\nwhereas a wanton and obscene discourse will make some red and hot.\nBut yet these discourses and objects are onely external, occasional,\nand not immediate efficient causes of such alterations. Also when a\nMan eats or drinks any thing that is actually hot or cold, or enters\ninto a cold or hot room, bath, or air, he becomes hot or cold by the\nactions of those external agents that work upon him, or rather whose\nmotions the sensitive motions of his body do pattern out. The like\nfor diseases; for they may be caused either by hearing ill reports,\nor by taking either hurtful or superfluous food into the Body, or by\nInfections inwardly or outwardly, and many other ways. Likewise may\nColours be made different ways; And so may Snow, Ice, and Hail; for\nall loose, rare, and porous Bodies are more apt to alter and change\nthen close, solid, and dense bodies; and not onely to change from\nwhat they are, but to rechange to what they were. But, _Madam_, many\nstudious persons study Nature more in her own substance, then in her\nvarious actions, which is the cause they arrive to no knowledg of\nNatures Works; for the same parts of Matter may act or work several\nways: Like as a Man, or other animal creature, may put one part of his\nbody into various and several postures, and move it many different\nways. Your _Author_ may say, that although several Creatures may be\nchanged to our sight or perception, yet they are not really changed in\nNature. I answer, Their Principle, which is a natural matter, of which\nall Creatures are made, cannot be changed, because it is one, simple,\nand unalterable in its Nature; but the figures of several Creatures\nare changed continually by the various motions of this matter; not\nfrom being matter, but onely from such or such a figure into another;\nand those figures which do change, in their room are others produced\nto keep up the certain kinds of Creatures by a continual successive\nalteration. And as there are changes of parts, so there are also\nmixtures of several parts, figures and motions in one and the same\nMatter; for there are not different kinds in the nature of Matter:\nBut, although Matter is of several degrees, as partly animate and\npartly inanimate, and the animate Matter is partly rational, and partly\nsensitive; Nevertheless, in all those degrees it remains the same onely\nor meer Matter; that is, it is nothing else but Matter, and the onely\nground in which all changes are made. And therefore I cannot perceive\nit to be impossible in Nature, as to your _Author_ it seems, That\n_Water should not be transchangeable into Air_; for, that he says,\n_The Air would have increased into a huge bulk, and all Water would\nhave long since failed_: It is no consequence, because there is a\nMutual transmutation of all figures and parts of Nature, as I declared\nabove; and when one part is transchanged into another, that part is\nsupplied again by the change of another, so that there can be no total\nmutation of kinds or sorts of figures, but onely a mutual change of\nthe particulars. Neither is it of any consequence, when your _Author_\nsays, That _if Water should once be turned into Air, it would always\nremain Air, because a returning agent is wanting, which may turn Air\nagain into Water._ For he might as well say, a Man cannot go or turn\nbackward, being once gone forward. And although he brings a General\nRule, That _every thing, as much as in it lies, doth desire to remain\nin it self_; Yet it is impossible to be done, by reason there is no\nrest in Nature, she being in a perpetual motion, either working to\nthe consistance of a figure, or to the uniting of several parts, or\nto the dissolving or dividing of several parts, or any other ways. By\ndissolving, I do not mean annihilating, but such a dissolving of parts\nas is proper for the altering of such a figure into one or many other\nfigures. But rather then your Author will consent to the transchanging\nof Water into Air, he will feign several grounds, soils or pavements\nin the Air, which he calls _Peroledes_, and so many Flood-gates and\nFolding-dores, and make the Planets their Key-keepers; which are pretty\nFancies, but not able to prove any thing in Natural Philosophy. And so\nleaving them to their Author, I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your humble and_\n\n_faithful Servant._\n\n[1] _Ch._ Of the Gas of Water.\n\n\n\n\nV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI cannot in reason give my consent to your _Authors_ opinion,[1] That\n_Fishes do by the force or vertue of an inbred Seed transchange simple\nwater into fat, bones, and their own flesh, and that materially they\nare nothing but water transchanged, and that they return into water by\nart._ For though my opinion is, that bodies change and alter from one\nfigure into another, yet they do not all change into water, neither\nis water changed into all other figures; and certainly Fishes do not\nlive nor subsist meerly by Water, but by several other meats, as other\nanimals do; either by feeding upon other Fishes, the stronger devouring\nthe weaker, or upon Mud, and Grass, and Weeds, in the bottom of Seas,\nRivers and Ponds, and the like: As for example, put Fish into a Pool or\nSluce, wherein there is not any thing but clear, pure water, and in a\nshort time they will be starved to death for want of Food; and as they\ncannot live onely by water, so neither can they breed by the power of\nwater, but by the power of their food, as a more solid substance: And\nif all Creatures be nourished by those things whereof they consist,\nthen Fishes do not consist of water, being not nourished by water;\nfor it is not the transchanging of water, by which Fishes live, and by\nwhich they produce; but it is the transchange of food, proceeding from\nother Creatures, as I mentioned above. 'Tis true, Water is a proper\nelement for them to live in, but not to live on; and though I have\nneither learning, nor experience in _Chymistry_, yet I believe, that\nyour _Author_, with all the subtilest Art he had, could not turn or\nconvert all Creatures into pure and simple water, but there would have\nbeen dregs and several mixtures left: I will not say, that the Furnace\nmay not rarifie bodies extreamly, but not convert them into such a\nsubstance or form as Nature can. And although he thinks Gold is made of\nWater, yet I do not believe he could convert it into Water by the help\nof Fire; he might make it soluble, fluid and rare, but all things that\nare supple, soluble, flowing and liquid, are not Water; I am confident\nno _Gas_ or _Blas_ will, or can transform it, nor no Art whatsoever;\nwhat Nature may do, I know not. But since your _Authors_ opinion is,\nthat Air is also a Primigenial Element, and in its nature a substance,\nWhy doth he not make it a Principle of natural bodies, as well as\nWater? I think it had not been so improper to liken Juices to Water;\nbut to make the onely Principle of the composition and dissolution of\nall Creatures to be Water, seems to me very improbable. Neither can\nI admit in reason that the Elements should be called, first, pure,\nand simple beings; we might as well call all other creatures, first,\npure, and simple beings: for although the word Element sounds as much\nas Principle, yet they are in my reason no more Principles of Nature,\nthen other Creatures are, there being but one Principle in Nature, out\nof which all things are composed, _viz._ the onely matter, which is a\npure and simple corporeal substance; and what Man names impure dregs\nand filths, these are onely irregular and cross motions of that matter,\nin respect to the nature of such or such a figure; or such motions as\nare not agreeable and sympathetical to our Passions, Humors, Appetites,\nand the like. Concerning the Contrarieties, Differences and Wars in\nNature, which your _Author_ denies, I have spoken thereof already, and\nthough he endeavours in a long discourse to prove, that there is no War\nin nature; yet, in my opinion, it is to little purpose, and it makes\nbut a war in the thoughts of the Reader; I know not what it did in\nhis own. But I observe he appeals often to Divinity to bear him up in\nNatural Philosophy; but how the Church doth approve his Interpretations\nof the Scripture, I know not: Wherefore I will not meddle with them,\nlest I offend the Truth of the Divine Scripture, wherein I desire to\nsubmit to the Judgment of the Church, which is much wiser then I, or\nany single Person can be. However, for all what your _Author_ says,\nI do nevertheless verily believe, there is a war between Natural\nmotions: For example; between the Regular motions of Health, and the\nIrregular motions of Sickness; and that things applied do oftentimes\ngive assistance to one side or other, but many times in the conflict,\nthe applied remedies are destroyed, and sometimes they are forced to\nbe Neutrals: Wherefore though the nature of Infinite Matter is simple,\nand knows of no discord, yet her actions may be cross and opposite: the\ntruth is, Nature could never make such variety, did her actions never\noppose each other, but live in a constant Peace and Unity. And thus\nleaving them to agree, I am confident your _Ladiship_ and I shall never\ndisagree; for as long as my life doth last, I shall always prove,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your constant Friend,_\n\n_and faithful Servant._\n\n[1] _Ch._ The Fiction of Elementary Complexions and Mixtures.\n\n\n\n\nVI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour _Author_ condemns the _Schools_ for saying,[1] That _Air is\nmoist_, or that it may be _converted into Water by pressing it\ntogether_; bringing an example of an _Iron Pipe, wherein Air has been\npressed together, which afterwards in its driving out has, like a\nHand-gun discharged with Gun-powder, sent a bullet thorow a board or\nplank._ Truly, _Madam_, concerning the moisture of Air, I am against\nit, but the transchanging of Air into Water I do verily believe, _viz._\nthat some sorts of Air may be contracted or condensed into Water, and\nthat Water again may be dilated into Air, but not readily, commonly and\neasily by Art, but onely by Nature. Wherefore your _Authors_ Experiment\ncan serve for no proof; for an artificial trial cannot be an infallible\nnatural demonstration, the actions of Art, and the actions of Nature\nbeing for the most part very different, especially in productions and\ntransmutations of natural things: Neither can an alteration of parts,\ncause an utter destruction of the whole, because when some parts change\nfrom their figures, other parts of matter change again into the like\nfigures, by which successive change the continuation of the whole is\nkept up. Next your _Author_ reproves the Schools for maintaining the\nopinion, that _Air is hot_; for says he, _Water, Air, and Earth, are\ncold by Creation, because without Light, Heat, and the partaking of\nLife._ He might, in my opinion, conclude, as well, that Man is cold by\nCreation, because a Chameleon, or a Fish is cold, being all of animal\nkind: But why may not some sorts of Air, Water and Earth be hot, and\nsome be cold, as well as some sorts of Light are hot, and some cold;\nand so several other Creatures? His Reasons prove nothing: for Light\ndoth not make Heat, nor is it the principle of Heat; and it is no\nconsequence to say, all that is without Light is without Heat, there\nbeing many things without Light, which nevertheless are Hot; But to\nsay, Water, Air, and Earth are cold, because they are without heat, is\nno proof, but a meer begging of the principle; for it is but the same\nthing, as if I should say, this is no Stone, because it is no Glass.\nAnd that Water, Air and Earth, do not partake of Life, must be proved\nfirst, for that is not granted as yet, there being, according to my\nopinion, not one Creature that wants Life in all Nature. Again: your\n_Author_ is of opinion, That _Water is the first and chief Principle of\nall Natural things._ But this I can no more believe, then that _Water\nshould never change or degenerate from its essence_: nay, if your\n_Author_ means, there shall always be Water in Nature, it is another\nthing; but if he thinks that not any part of water doth or can change\nor degenerate in its nature, and is the principle and chief producer\nof all other Creatures; then he makes Water rather a Creator then a\nCreature; and it seems, that those Gentiles which did worship Water,\nwere of the same opinion, whereas yet he condemns all Pagan opinions\nand all those that follow them. Moreover, I cannot subscribe to his\nopinion, That _Gas and Blas from the Stars do make heat_: For heat is\nmade several ways, according to its several sorts; for there is a dry\nheat, and a moist heat, a burning, melting, and evaporating heat, and\nmany more. But as for _Meteors_, that _they are made by Gas and Blas_,\nI can say nothing, by reason I am not skilled in Astrology, and the\nscience of the Heavens, Stars, and Planets; wherefore if I did offer\nto meddle with them, I should rather express my Ignorance, then give\nyour _Ladiship_ any solid reasons; and so I am willing to leave this\nspeculation to others, resting content with that knowledg Nature hath\ngiven me without the help of Learning: Which I wholly dedicate and\noffer to your _Ladiship_, as becomes,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] In the _ch._ of _Air._\n\n\n\n\nVII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nHaving made mention in my last of your _Authors_ opinion, _That Air\nis in its nature Cold_, I thought it fit to take a stricter view of\nthe temper of Air, and to send you withal my own opinion thereof.\nFirst of all, I would fain know, what sort of Air your _Author_ means;\nfor if he thinks there is but one sort of Air, he might as well say,\nthat there is but one sort of Animals, or Vegetables; whereas yet\nthere are not onely different sorts of animal and vegetable kind, but\nalso different particulars in one and the same sort: As for example;\nwhat difference is not amongst Horses, as between a Barb, a Turk,\na Ginnet, a Courser of _Naples_, a Flanders-horse, a Galloway, an\nEnglish-horse, and so forth? not onely in their shapes, but also in\ntheir natures, tempers and dispositions? The like for Cows, Oxen,\nSheep, Goats, Dogs, as also for Fowl and Fish, nay, for Men. And as for\nVegetables, What difference is there not between Barly and Wheat, and\nbetween _French_-barly, _Pine_-barly, and ordinary Barly; as also our\n_English_-wheat, _Spanish_-wheat, _Turkish_-wheat, _Indian_-wheat, and\nthe like? What difference is there not amongst Grapes, as the _Malago,\nMuscadel_, and other Grapes, and so of all the rest of Vegetables?\nThe same may be said of the Elements; for there is as much difference\namongst the Elements as amongst other Creatures. And so of Air: for\nAir in some places, as in the _Indies_, especially about _Brasilia_,\nis very much different from our air, or from the air that is in other\nplaces: Indeed, in every different Climate, you shall find a difference\nof air, wherefore 'tis impossible to assign a certain temper of heat\nor cold to air in general. But although my sense and reason inform me,\nthat air in its own nature or essence is neither hot nor cold, yet\nit may become hot or cold, by hot or cold motions; for the sensitive\nperceptive motions of Air may pattern out heat or cold; and hence it\nis, that in Summer, when as heat predominates, the air is hot; and\nin Winter, when as cold predominates, the air is cold. But, perhaps,\nyou will say, air may be cooled by moving it with a Fan, or such like\nthing which can make wind; wherefore it follows, that air must needs be\nnaturally cold. I answer, That doth not prove Air to be in its nature\ncold: for this moving or making of wind may contract or condense the\nair into cold motions, which may cause a cold wind, like as Ventiducts,\nwhere the air running thorow narrow Pipes makes a cold wind. The same\nmay be done with a mans breath; for if he contract his lips close, his\nbreath will be cold, but if he opens his mouth wide, his breath will\nbe warm. Again: you may say, that rain is congealed by the coldness of\nthe air into Snow, Hail and Ice. I answer; Frost, Ice, Snow and Hail,\ndo not proceed from the coldness of the air, but rather the coldness\nof the air proceeds from them; for Ice, Snow, and Hail, proceed from\ncold contraction and condensation of a vaporous or watery substance;\nand, as Frost and Snow cause air to be cold, so Thunder and Lightning\ncause it to be hot, so long as they last. Thus, _Madam_, though Air may\nbe altered either to heat or cold, yet it is neither hot nor Cold in\nit self. And this is all for the present that I can say concerning the\nTemper of Air; I conclude, and rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your constant Friend,_\n\n_and faithful Servant._\n\n\n\n\nVIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nHaving hitherto considered your _Authors_ Elements or Principles of\nNatural things, you will give me leave to present you now with a short\nview of his Opinions concerning Wind, Vacuum, Rainbows, Thunder,\nLightning, Earth-quakes, and the like; which I will do as briefly as I\ncan, lest I betray my Ignorance; for I confess my self not to be well\nversed in the knowledg of Meteors, nor in those things which properly\nbelong to the Mathematicks, as in Astrology, Geography, Opticks, and\nthe like. But your _Author_ says, in the first place,[1] That _Natural\nWind is nothing but a flowing Air, moved by the Blas of the Stars._\nCertainly, _Madam_, if this were so, then, in my judgment, when the\nStars blaze, we should have constant Winds, and the more they blaze,\nthe more violent winds there would be: But I have rather observed\nthe contrary, that when the Stars blaze most apparently, we have the\ncalmest weather either in Summer or Winter. Perchance your _Author_\nwill say, he doth not mean this apparant and visible Blas, but another\ninvisible Blas. I answer; I know not, nor cannot conceive any other\nBlas in the Stars, except I had seen it in a Vision; neither do I\nthink that Nature her self knows of any other, But your _Author_\ndoth refer himself upon the Authority of _Hypocrates_, who says,\nThat _not onely the Wind is a blast, but that all Diseases are from\nblasts; and that there is in us a Spirit stirring up all things by\nits Blas; which Spirit, by a Microcosmical Analogy, or the proportion\nof a little World, he compares to the blasts of the world._ As for\nmy particular, _Madam_, I dare say, I could never perceive, by my\nsense and reason, any such blazing Spirit in me; but I have found by\nexperience, that when my mind and thoughts have been benighted with\nMelancholy, my Imagination hath been more active and subtil, then\nwhen my mind has been clear from dark Melancholy: Also I find that\nmy thoughts and conceptions are as active, if not more, in the night\nthen in the day; and though we may sometimes dream of several Lights,\nyet I cannot perceive a constant light in us; however Light, Blazes,\nand all those effects are no more then other effects of Nature are;\nnor can they have more power on other Creatures, then other Creatures\nhave on them: Neither are they made otherwise then by the corporeal\nmotions of Natural Matter, and are dissolved and transchanged as other\nCreatures, out of one form or figure into another. Next your _Author_\ndiscoursing[2] whether there be any Vacuum in Nature, doth incline to\nthe affirming party, that there is a Vacuum in the Air; to wit, _There\nis in the air something, that is less then a body, which fills up the\nemptinesses or little holes and pores in the air, and which is wholly\nannihilated by fire; It is actually void of all matter, and is a middle\nthing between a body and an Incorporeal Spirit, and almost nothing\nin respect of bodies; for it came from Nothing, and so may easily be\nreduced to nothing._ All this, _Madam_, surpasses my capacity; for\nI can in no ways conceive any thing between something and nothing,\nas to be less then something, and more then nothing; for all that is\ncorporeal in Nature, is to my reason something; that is, some really\nexistent thing; but what is incorporeal in Nature, is nothing; and if\nthere be any absolute vacuum in Nature, as your _Author_ endeavours\nto prove, then certainly this Vacuum cannot be any thing whatsoever;\nfor a Vacuum is a pure Nothing. But many ingenious and learned men\nhave brought as many arguments and reasons against Vacuum, as others\nbring for it, and so it is a thing which I leave to them to exercise\ntheir brains withal. The like is the opinion which many maintain\nconcerning Place, _viz._ that there is a constant succession of Place\nand Parts, so that when one part removes, another doth succeed in its\nplace; the truth and manner whereof I was never able to comprehend:\nfor, in my opinion, there can be no place without body, nor no body\nwithout place, body and place being all but one thing. But as for\nthe perpetual Creation and annihilation of your _Authors_ Vacuities,\ngive me leave to tell you, _Madam_, that it would be a more laborious\nwork, then to make a new World, or then it was to make this present\nWorld; for God made this World in six days, and rested the seventh\nday; but this is a perpetual making of something out of nothing.\nAgain: concerning Rainbows, your _Author_ says,[3] That _a Rainbow\nis not a natural effect of a natural Cause, but a divine Mystery in\nits original; and that it has no matter, but yet is in a place, and\nhas its colours immediately in a place, but in the air mediately, and\nthat it is of the nature of Light._ This is indeed a great mystery to\nmy reason; for I cannot conceive, as I said before, a place without a\nbody, nor how Light and Colours can be bodiless: But as for Rainbows,\nI have observed, when as water hath been blown up into the air into\nbubles, that by the reflexion of light on the watery bubles, they have\nhad the like colours of the Rainbow; and I have heard, that there\nhath been often seen at the rising and setting of the Sun, Clouds of\ndivers colours; Wherefore I cannot be perswaded to believe that a\nRainbow should not have a natural cause, and consequently be a natural\neffect; For that God has made it a sign of the Covenant between him\nand mortal men, is no proof, that it is not a natural effect; Neither\ncan I believe that it has not been before the Flood, and before it was\nmade a sign by God, as your _Author_ imagines; for though it was no\nsign before the Flood, yet it may nevertheless have had its being and\nexistence before the Flood. Moreover, as for Thunder and Lightning,\nyour _Authors_ opinion is; _That although they may have concurring\nnatural Causes, yet the mover of them is an Incorporeal Spirit, which\nis the Devil; who having obtained the Principality of this world, that\nhe may be a certain executer of the judgments of the chief Monarch, and\nso the Umpire and Commissioner of Lightning and Thunder, stirs up a\nmonstrous and sudden Blas in the Air, yet under Covenanted Conditions;\nfor unless his power were bridled by divine Goodness, he would shake\nthe Earth with one stroke so, as to destroy all mortal men: and thus\nthe cracking noise or voice of Thunder is nothing but a spiritual\nBlas of the Evil Spirit._ I will not deny, _Madam_, that Thunder and\nLightning do argue the Power of the most Glorious God, for so do all\nthe rest of the Creatures; but that this is the onely and immediate\ncause, which your _Author_ assigns of Thunder and Lightning, I cannot\nbelieve; for surely, in my opinion, Thunder and Lightning are as much\nnatural effects as other Creatures in Nature; and are not the Devils\nBlas, for I think they may be made without the help of the Devil; nay,\nI believe, he may be as much affraid of Thunder, as those Creatures\nthat live on Earth. But what the causes are, and how Thunder and\nLightning are made, I have elsewhere declared more at large, especially\nin my _Philosophical Opinions._ Again your _Author_ speaking[4] of the\n_Trembling of the Earth, thinks it is nothing else but the Judgment\nof God for the sins of Impenitent men._ For my part, _Madam_, I can\nsay little to it, either concerning the divine, or the natural cause\nof Earthquakes: As for the divine and supernatural Cause, which your\n_Author_ gives, if it was so, then I wonder much, why God should\ncommand Earth-quakes in some parts of the World more frequent then\nin others. As for example; we here in these parts have very seldom\nEarthquakes, and those we have, which is hardly one in many ages, are\nnot so furious, as to do much harm; and so in many other places of\nthe World, are as few and as gentle Earth-quakes as here; when as in\nothers, Earth-quakes are very frequent and dreadful: From whence it\nmust needs follow, if Earth-quakes be onely a Judgment from God for\nthe sins of Impenitent Men, and not a natural effect, that then those\nplaces, where the Earth is not so apt to tremble, are the habitations\nof the blessed, and that they, which inhabit those parts that are\napt to tremble, are the accursed; when as yet, in those places where\nEarthquakes are not usual and frequent, or none at all, People are as\nwicked and impious, if not more, then in those where Earthquakes are\ncommon. But the question is, Whether those parts which suffer frequent\nand terrible Earthquakes, would not be so shaken or have such trembling\nfits, were they uninhabited by Man, or any other animal Creature?\nCertainly, in my opinion, they would. But as for the Natural Cause\nof Earthquakes, you must pardon me, _Madam_, that I cannot knowingly\ndiscourse thereof, by reason I am not so well skilled in Geography,\nas to know the several Soils, Climats, Parts, Regions, or Countries,\nnor what disposed matter may be within those parts that are subject\nto frequent Earthquakes: Onely this I may say, that I have observed,\nthat the light of a small Fire or Candle, will dilate it self round\nabout; or rather that the air round about the Fire or Candle, will\npattern out both its light and its heat. Also I have observed, That a\nMan in a raging fit of Madness will have such an unusual strength, as\nten strong men shall hardly be able to encounter or bind him, when as,\nthis violent fit being past, a single man, nay a youth, may over-master\nhim: Whence I conclude, that the actions, as the motions of Nature, are\nvery powerful when they use their force, and that the ordinary actions\nof Nature are not so forcible as necessary; but the extraordinary are\nmore forcible then necessary. Lastly, your _Author_ takes great pains\nto prove,[5] That _the Sun with his light rules the Day, and the Moon\nwith hers the Night; and that the Moon has her own Native light; and\nthat Bats, Mice, Dormice, Owles, and many others, as also Men, which\nrise at night, and walk in their sleep, see by the light and power\nof the Moon; also that Plants are more plentifully nourished by the\nnight._ But lest it might be concluded, that all this is said without\nany probability of Truth, by reason the Moon doth not every night\nshine upon the Earth, he makes a difference between the Manner of the\nSun's and Moon's enlightning the Earth; to wit, that the Sun strikes\nhis beams in a right line towards the Earth, but the Moon doth not\nrespect the Centre of the World, which is the Earth, in a right line;\nbut her Centre is always excentrical, and she respects the Earth onely\nby accident, when she is concentrical with the World; And therefore he\nthinks there is another light under the Earth even at Midnight, whereby\nmany Eyes do see, which owes also its rise to the Moon. This opinion\nof your _Author_ I leave to be examined by those that have skill in\nAstronomy, and know both the Light and the Course of the Moon: I will\nonely say thus much, that when the Moon is concentrical, as he calls\nit, with the World, as when it is Full and New Moon, she doth not shine\nonely at night, but also in the day, and therefore she may rule the\nday as well as the night, and then there will be two lights for the\nruling of the day, or at least there will be a strife betwixt the Sun\nand the Moon, which shall rule. But as for Men walking asleep by the\nlight of the Moon, my opinion is, That blind men may walk as well by\nthe light of the Sun, as sleeping men by the light of the Moon. Neither\nis it probable, that _the Moon or her Blas doth nourish Plants_; for\nin a cold Moon-shiny night they will often die; but it is rather the\nRegular motions in well tempered matter that cause fruitful productions\nand maturity. And so I repose my Pen, lest it trespass too much upon\nyour Patience, resting,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your humble and_\n\n_faithful Servant._\n\n[1] _Ch._ Of the Blas of Meteors.\n\n[2] _Ch._ Of Vacuum.\n\n[3] _Ch._ Of an Irregular Meteor.\n\n[4] _Ch._ Of the Earthquake.\n\n[5] _Ch._ Of the Birth or Original of Forms.\n\n\n\n\nIX.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nIn my former, when I related your _Authors_ opinion, concerning\nEarthquakes, I forgot to tell you, that he counts the Doctrine of the\nSchools absurd, when they say that Air, or any Exhalation, is the cause\nof them: For, says he, _There is no place in the Pavements or soils of\nthe Earth, wherein any airy body may be entertained, whether that body\nbe a wind, or an airy exhalation._ But since I promised I would not\noffer to appoint or assign any natural causes of Earthquakes, I have\nonly taken occasion hence to enquire, whether it may not be probably\naffirmed, that there is air in the bowels of the Earth: And to my\nreason it seems very probable; I mean not this Exterior air, flowing\nabout the circumference of the Earth we inhabite; but such an airy\nmatter as is pure, refined, and subtil, there being great difference\nin the Elements, as well as in all other sorts of Creatures; for what\ndifference is there not between the natural heat of an animal, and the\nnatural heat of the Sun? and what difference is there not between the\nnatural moisture of an Animal, and the natural moisture of Water? And\nso for the Purity of Air, Dryness of Earth, and the like: Nay, there\nis great difference also in the production of those Effects: As for\nexample; the heat of the Earth is not produced from the Sun, nor the\nnatural heat in Animals, nor the natural heat in Vegetables; for if it\nwere so, then all Creatures in one Region or place of the Earth would\nbe of one temper. As for example: Poppy, Night-shade, Lettuce, Thyme,\nSage, Parsly, &c. would be all of one temper and degree, growing all\nin one Garden, and upon one patch of Ground, whereon the Sun equally\ncasts his beams, when as yet they are all different in their natural\ntempers and degrees. And so certainly there is Air, Fire, and Water,\nin the bowels of the Earth, which were never made by the Sun, the Sea,\nand this Exterior elemental Air. Wherefore those, in my opinion, are\nin gross Errors, who imagine that these Interior Effects in the Earth\nare produced from the mentioned Exterior Elements, or from some other\nforreign and external Causes; for an external cause can onely produce\nan external effect, or be an occasion to the production of such or\nsuch an effect, but not be the immediate efficient or essential cause\nof an interior natural effect in another Creature, unless the Interior\nnatures of different Creatures have such an active power and influence\nupon each other, as to work interiously at a distance, such effects\nas are proper and essential to their Natures, which is improbable;\nfor though their natures and dispositions may mutually agree and\nsympathize, yet their powers cannot work upon their Interior Natures\nso, as to produce internal natural effects and proprieties in them. The\ntruth is, it cannot be; for as the Cause is, so is the Effect; and if\nthe Cause be an exterior Cause, the Effect must prove so too: As for\nexample; the heat of the Sun, and the heat of the Earth, although they\nmay both agree, yet one is not the cause of the other; for the Suns\nheat cannot pierce into the bowels of the Earth, neither can the heat\nof the Earth ascend so far as to the Center of the Sun: As for the heat\nof the Earth, it is certain enough, and needs no proof; but as for the\nheat of the Sun, our senses will sufficiently inform us, that although\nhis beams are shot forth in direct lines upon the face of the Earth,\nyet they have not so much force, as to pierce into a low Celler or\nVault; Wherefore it is not probable, that the Earth hath its natural\nheat from the Sun, and so neither its dryness from the Air, nor its\nmoisture from the Sea, but these interior effects in the Earth proceed\nfrom some other interior causes. And thus there may be great difference\nbetween the heat, cold, moisture, and drought which is in the Elements,\nand between those which are in Vegetables, Minerals, and Animals, not\nonely in their General kinds, but also in their Particulars: And not\nonely a difference in the aforesaid qualities of heat, cold, moisture,\nand drought, but also in all other motions, as Dilations, Contractions,\nRarefactions, Densations, &c. nay, in their Mixtures and Temperaments:\nAs for example; the temper of a Mineral is not the temper of an Animal,\nor of a Vegetable, neither is the temper of these the temper of the\nexterior Elements, no more then the temper of the Elements is the\ntemper of them; for every Creature has a temper natural and peculiar\nto it self, nay, every particular Creature, has not onely different\ntempers, compositions, or mixtures, but also different productions; or\nelse, if there were no difference in their productions, every Creature\nwould be alike, when as yet there are seldom two that do exactly\nresemble each other. But I desire you to understand me well, _Madam_,\nwhen I speak of Particular heats, colds, droughts, and moistures; for\nI do not believe that all Creatures are made out of the four Elements,\nno more, then that the Elements are produced from other Creatures,\nfor the Matter of all Creatures is but one and the same; but although\nthe Matter is the same, nevertheless, the Tempers, compositions,\nProductions, Motions, &c. of particular Creatures, may be different,\nwhich is the cause of their different exterior figures, or shapes, as\nalso of their different Interiour Natures, Qualities, Properties, and\nthe like. And so, to conclude, there is no impossibility or absurdity\nin affirming, that there may be Air, Fire, and Water, in the bowels\nof the Earth proper for those Creatures, which are in her, although\nnot such an Elemental Air, Fire and Water, as is subject here to our\nsenses; but another kind of Air, Fire and Water, different from those.\nBut this being a subject for Learned and Ingenious men to work and\ncontemplate upon, better, perhaps, then I can do, I will leave it to\nthem, and so remain,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your constant Friend,_\n\n_and faithful Servant._\n\n\n\n\nX.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour _Author_ mentioning in his Works, several Seeds of several\nCreatures, makes me express my opinion thus in short concerning this\nSubject: Several Seeds seem to me no otherwise then several Humours, or\nseveral Elements, or several other Creatures made of one and the same\nMatter, that produce one thing out of another, and the barrenness of\nseeds proceeds either from the irregularity of their natural motions,\nor from their unaptness or unactivity of producing. But it is to be\nobserved, _Madam_, that not every thing doth produce always its like,\nbut one and the same thing, or one and the same Creature, hath many\nvarious and different productions; for sometimes Vegetables do produce\nAnimals, Animals produce Minerals, Minerals produce Elements, and\nElements again Minerals, and so forth: for proof I will bring but a\nmean and common example. Do not Animals produce Stones, some in one,\nand some in another part of their bodies, as some in the Heart, some in\nthe Stomack, some in the Head, some in the Gall, some in the Kidnies,\nand some in the Bladder? I do not say, that this Generation of Stone\nis made the same way as the natural generation of Animals, as, for\nexample, Man is born of his Parents; but I speak of the generation or\nproduction of Creatures in general, for otherwise all Creatures would\nbe alike, if all generations were after one and the same manner and\nway. Likewise do not Fruits, Roots, Flowers and Herbs, produce Worms?\nAnd do not Stones produce Fire? witness the Flint. And doth not Earth\nproduce Metal? 'Tis true, some talk of the seed of Metals, but who with\nall his diligent observations could find it out as yet? Wherefore it\nis, in my opinion, not probable, that Minerals are produced by way of\nseeds. Neither can I perceive that any of the Elements is produced by\nseed, unless Fire, which seems, to my sense and reason, to encrease\nnumerously by its seed, but not any other of the Elements. And thus\nproductions are almost as various as Creatures, or rather parts of\nCreatures, are; for we see how many productions there are in one animal\nbody, as the production of flesh, bones, marrow, brains, gristles,\nveines, sinews, blood, and the like, and all this comes from Food,\nand Food from some other Creatures, but all have their original from\nthe onely matter, and the various motions of Nature. And thus, in my\nopinion, all things are made easily, and not by such constrained ways\nas your _Author_ describes, by Gas, Blas, Ideas, and the like; for I\nam confident, Nature has more various ways of producing natural things\nthen any Creature is able to conceive. I'le give another example of\nVegetables, I pray you but to consider, _Madam_, how many several ways\nVegetables are produced, as some by seeds, some by slips, some by\ngrafts, &c. The graft infuses and commixes with the whole stock and\nthe branches, and these do the like with the graft: As for example;\nan Apple grafted in Colewort produces Apples; but those Apples will\nhave a taste and sent of the Colewort, which shews that several parts\nof several Creatures mix, joyn, and act together; and as for seeds,\nthey are transchanged wholly, and every part thereof into the produced\nfruit, and every part of the seed makes a several production by the\nhelp of the co-working parts of the Earth, which is the reason that so\nmany seeds are produced from one single seed; But Producers, that waste\nnot themselves in productions, do not produce so numerously as those\nthat do dissolve; yet all Creatures increase more or less, according\nto their supplies or assistances; for seeds will encrease and multiply\nmore in manured and fertile then in barren grounds; nay, if the ground\nbe very barren, no production at all will be; which shews, that\nproductions come not barely from the seed, but require of necessity\nsome assistance, and therefore neither Archeus, nor seminal Ideas, nor\nGas, nor Blas, would do any good in Vegetables, if the ground did not\nassist them in their generations or productions, no more then a house\nwould be built without the assistance of labourers or workmen; for let\nthe materials lie never so long, surely they will never joyn together\nof themselves to the artificial structure of an house. Wherefore since\nthere is so much variety in the production of one kind of Creatures,\nnay of every particular in every kind, what needs Man to trouble\nhis brain for the manner and way to describe circumstantially every\nparticular production of every Creature by seminal or printing Ideas,\nor any other far-fetched termes, since it is impossible to be done?\nAnd as for those Creatures whose producers are of two different sorts,\nas a Mule bred of an Asse and a Horse, and another Creature bred of a\nCony and a Dormouse; all which your _Author_ thinks[1] do take more\nafter their mother then their father, more after the breeder then the\nbegetter; I will not eagerly affirm the contrary, although it seems\nto me more probable: But this I can say, that I have observed by\nexperience, that Faunes and Foales have taken more after the Male then\nafter the Female; for amongst many several colour'd Deer, I have seen\nbut one milk white Doe; and she never brought forth a white Faun, when\nas I have seen a white Buck beget white and speckled Faunes of black\nand several coloured Does. Also in Foals I have observed, that they\nhave taken more after the Male then after the Female, both in shape and\ncolour. And thus I express no more, but what I have observed my self,\nothers may find out more examples; these are sufficient for me; so I\nleave them, and rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] In the _Ch._ the Position is demonstrated; and in the _ch._ called\nthe Authority of the _Duumvirate_.\n\n\n\n\nXI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYou will cease to wonder, that I am not altogether capable to\nunderstand your _Authors_ opinions in Natural Philosophy, when you do\nbut consider, that his expressions are for the most part so obscure,\nmystical and intricate, as may puzzle any brain that has not the like\nGenius, or the same Conceptions with your _Author_; wherefore I am\nforced oftentimes to express my ignorance rather, then to declare to\nyou the true sense of his opinions. In the number of these is his\ndiscourse of a _Middle Life_,[1] _viz._ That _the qualities of a\nmiddle life do remain in things that are transchanged:_ For I cannot\nunderstand what he means by a middle life; whether it be a life that\nis between the strongest and weakest, or whether he means a life\nbetween the time of production and dissolution, or between the time of\nconception and production; or whether he means a life that is between\ntwo sorts of substances, as more then an Animal, and not so high and\nexcellent as an Angel; or whether he means a middle life for places,\nas neither in Heaven nor in Hell, but in Purgatory, or neither in, nor\nout of the world, or any other kind of life: Wherefore I'le leave this\nHermaphroditical or neutral life to better understandings then mine.\nLikewise I must confess my disability of conceiving the overshadowing\nof his _Archeus_, and _how it brings this middle life into its first\nlife._ For concerning Generation, I know of none that is performed by\novershadowing, except it be the miraculous conception of the blessed\nVirgin, as Holy Writ informs us; and I hope your _Author_ will not\ncompare his _Archeus_ to the Holy Spirit; But how a middle life may\nbe brought again into the first life, is altogether unconceivable to\nme: And so is that, when he says, that the _first life of the Fruit\nis the last of the seed_; for I cannot imagine, that the seed dies\nin the fruit; but, in my opinion, it lives rather in the fruit, and\nis numerously increased, as appears by the production of seed from\nthe fruit. But the most difficult of all to be understood, are his\n_Ideas_,[2] which he makes _certain seminal Images, Formal Lights,\nand operative means, whereby the soul moves and governs the body_;\nwhose number and variety is so great, as it transcends my capacity,\nthere being _Ideas_ of Inclination, of Affection, of Consideration or\nJudgment, of Passion, and these either mild, or violent, besides a\ngreat number of Archeal and forreign Ideas. Truly, _Madam_, I cannot\nadmire enough the powerful effects of these Ideas, they themselves\nbeing no substances or material Creatures; For how that can pierce,\nseal, and print a figure, which hath neither substance nor matter, my\nreason is not able to comprehend, since there can be no figure without\nmatter or substance, they being inseparably united together, so, that\nwhere figure is, there is also substance, and where substance is, there\nis also figure; neither can any figure be made without a substance.\nYou may say, Ideas, though they are not material or corporeal beings\nthemselves, yet they may put on figures, and take bodies when they\nplease: I answer, That then they can do more then Immaterial Spirits;\nfor the Learned say, That Immaterial Spirits are Immaterial substances;\nbut your _Author_ says, that Ideas are no substances; and I think it\nwould be easier for a substance to take a body, then for that which is\nno substance: But your _Author_ might have placed his Ideas as well\namongst the number of Immaterial Spirits, to wit, amongst Angels and\nDevils, and then we should not have need to seek far for the causes of\nthe different natures and dispositions of Mankind, but we might say,\nthat Ill-natured men proceeded from Evil, and Good-natured men from\nGood Spirits or Ideas. However, _Madam_, I do not deny Ideas, Images,\nor Conceptions of things, but I deny them onely to be such powerful\nbeings and Principal efficient Causes of Natural effects; especially\nthey being to your _Author_ neither bodies nor substances themselves.\nAnd as for the _Figure of a Cherry_, which your _Author_ makes so\nfrequent a repetition of, made by a longing Woman on her Child; I dare\nsay that there have been millions of Women, which have longed for some\nor other thing, and have not been satisfied with their desires, and\nyet their Children have never had on their bodies the prints or marks\nof those things they longed for: but because some such figures are\nsometimes made by the irregular motions of animate Matter, would this\nbe a sufficient proof, that all Conceptions, Ideas and Images have\nthe like effects, after the same manner, by piercing or penetrating\neach other, and sealing or printing such or such a figure upon the\nbody of the Child? Lastly, I cannot but smile when I read that your\n_Author_ makes a _Disease proceed from a non-being to a substantial\nbeing_: Which if so, then a disease, according to his opinion, is\nmade as the World was, that is, out of Nothing; but surely luxurious\npersons find it otherwise, who eat and drink more then their natural\ndigestive motions can dispose; for those that have infirm bodies,\ncaused by the irregular motions of animate matter, find that a disease\nproceeds from more then a _non_-being. But, _Madam_, I have neither\nsuch an _Archeus_, which can produce, in my mind, an Idea of Consent\nor approbation of these your _Authors_ opinions, nor such a light that\nis able to produce a beam of Patience to tarry any longer upon the\nexamination of them; Wherefore I beg your leave to cut off my discourse\nhere, and onely to subscribe my self, as really I am,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your humble and_\n\n_faithful Servant._\n\n[1] _Ch._ called _Magnum oporter_.\n\n[2] Of the Ideas of Diseases.\n\n\n\n\nXII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI cannot well apprehend your _Authors_ meaning, when he says,[1] That\n_Nature doth rise from its fall_; for if he understands Nature in\ngeneral, I cannot imagine how she should fall and rise; for though Man\ndid fall, yet Nature never did, nor cannot fall, being Infinite: And\ntherefore in another place,[2] when he saith, that _Nature first being\na beautiful Virgin, was defiled by sin; not by her own, but by Mans\nsin, for whose use she was created_; I think it too great a presumption\nand arrogancy to say that Infinite Nature was not onely defiled by the\nsin of Man, but also to make Man the chief over all Nature, and to\nbelieve Nature was onely made for his sake; when as he is but a small\nfinite part of Infinite Nature, and almost Nothing in comparison to\nit. But I suppose your _Author_ doth not understand Nature in general,\nbut onely the nature of some Particulars, when he speaks of the fall\nand rise of Nature; however, this fall and rise of the nature of\nParticulars, is nothing but a change of their natural motions. And so\nlikewise, I suppose, he understands the nature of Particulars, when\nhe says in another place,[3] That Nature in diseases is standing,\nsitting, and lying; for surely Nature in general has more several\npostures then sitting, standing, or lying: As also when he speaks[4] of\nthe _Vertues and Properties that stick fast in the bosom of Nature_,\nwhich I conceive to be a Metaphorical expression; although I think it\nbest to avoid Metaphorical, similizing, and improper expressions in\nNatural Philosophy, as much as one can; for they do rather obscure\nthen explain the truth of Nature; nay, your _Author_ himself is of\nthis opinion,[5] and yet he doth nothing more frequent then bring in\nMetaphors and similitudes. But to speak properly, there is not any\nthing that sticks fast in the bosom of Nature, for Nature is in a\nperpetual motion: Neither can she be _heightened or diminished by Art_;\nfor Nature will be Nature in despite of her Hand-maid. And as for your\n_Authors_ opinion, That _there are no Contraries in Nature_, I am quite\nof a contrary mind, that there is a Perpetual war and discord amongst\nthe parts of Nature, although not in the nature and substance of\nInfinite Matter, which is of a simple kind, and knows no contraries in\nit self, but lives in Peace, when as the several actions are opposing\nand crossing each other; and truly, I do not believe, that there is any\npart or Creature of Nature, that hath not met with opposers, let it be\nnever so small or great. But as War is made by the division of Natures\nparts, and variety of natural actions, so Peace is caused by the unity\nand simplicity of the nature and essence of onely Matter, which Nature\nis peaceable, being always one and the same, and having nothing in it\nself to be crossed or opposed by; when as the actions of Nature, or\nnatural Matter, are continually driving against each other, as being\nvarious and different. Again your _Author_ says, That _a Specifical\nbeing cannot be altered but by Fire, and that Fire is the Death of\nother Creatures: also that Alchymy, as it brings many things to a\ndegree of greater efficacy, and stirs up a new being, so on the other\nhand again, it by a privy filching doth enfeeble many things._ I, for\nmy part, wonder, that Fire, being as your _Author_ says, no substantial\nbody, but substanceless in its nature, should work such effects; but\nhowever, I believe there are many alterations without Fire, and many\nthings which cannot be altered by Fire. What your _Authors_ meaning\nis of a _new being_, I know not; for, to my reason, there neither is;\nnor can be made any new being in Nature, except we do call the change\nof motions and figures a new Creation; but then an old suit turned or\ndressed up may be called new too. Neither can I conceive his _Filching\nor Stealing_: For Nature has or keeps nothing within her self, but\nwhat is her own; and surely she cannot steal from her self; nor can\nArt steal from Nature; she may trouble Nature, or rather make variety\nin Nature, but not take any thing from her, for Art is the insnarled\nmotions of Nature: But your _Author_, being a Chymist, is much for\nthe Art of Fire, although it is impossible for Art to work as Nature\ndoth; for Art makes of natural Creatures artificial Monsters, and doth\noftner obscure and disturb Natures ordinary actions, then prove any\nTruth in Nature. But Nature loving variety doth rather smile at Arts\nfollies, then that she should be angry with her curiosity: like as\nfor example, a Poet will smile in expressing the part or action of a\nFool. Wherefore Pure natural Philosophers, shall by natural sense and\nreason, trace Natures ways, and observe her actions, more readily then\nChymists can do by Fire and Furnaces; for Fire and Furnaces do often\ndelude the Reason, blind the Understanding, and make the Judgment\nstagger. Nevertheless, your _Author_ is so taken with Fire, that from\nthence he imagines a Formal Light, which he believes to be the Tip-top\nof Life; but certainly, he had, in my opinion, not so much light as to\nobserve, that all sorts of light are but Creatures, and not Creators;\nfor he judges of several Parts of Matter, as if they were several kinds\nof Matter, which causes him often to err, although he conceits himself\nwithout any Error. In which conceit I leave him, and rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and humble Servant._\n\n[1] _Ch._ Nature is ignorant of Contraries.\n\n[2] In the Hist. of _Tartar_.\n\n[3] _Ch._ Disease is an unknown guest.\n\n[4] Nature is ignorant of Contraries.\n\n[5] _Ch._ The Image of the Ferment begets the Mass with Child.\n\n\n\n\nXIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nThe Art of Fire, as I perceive, is in greater esteem and respect\nwith your _Author_, then Nature her self: For he says,[1] That _some\nthings can be done by Art, which Nature cannot do_; nay he calls[2]\n_Art_ The _Mistress of Nature, and subjects whole Nature unto Chymical\nspeculation_; For, _nothing_, says he,[3] _doth more fully bring a Man,\nthat is greedy of knowing, to the knowledg of all things knowable,\nthen the Fire; for the root or radical knowledg of natural things\nconsists in the Fire:_[4] _It pierces the secrets of Nature, and\ncauses a further searching out in Nature, then all other Sciences,\nbeing put together; and pierces even into the utmost depths of real\ntruth:_[5] _It creates things which never were before._ These, and\nmany more the like expressions, he has in the praise of Chymistry. And\ntruly, _Madam_, I cannot blame your _Author_, for commending this Art,\nbecause it was his own profession, and no man will be so unwise as to\ndispraise his own Art which he professes; but whether those praises\nand commendations do not exceed truth, and express more then the Art\nof Fire can perform, I will let those judg, that have more knowledg\ntherein then I: But this I may say, That what Art or Science soever\nis in Nature, let it be the chief of all, yet it can never be call'd\nthe Mistress of Nature, nor be said to perform more then Nature doth,\nexcept it be by a divine and supernatural Power; much less to create\nthings which never were before, for this is an action which onely\nbelongs to God: The truth is, Art is but a Particular effect of Nature,\nand as it were, Nature's Mimick or Fool, in whose playing actions she\nsometimes takes delight; nay, your _Author_ confesses it himself, when\nhe calls[6] the _Art_ of _Chymistry, Nature's emulating Ape_, and _her\nChamber-maid_, and yet he says, _she is now and then the Mistress of\nNature_; which in my opinion doth not agree: for I cannot conceive how\nit is possible to be a Chambermaid, and yet to be the Mistress too;\nI suppose your _Author_ believes, they justle sometimes each other\nout, or take by turns one anothers place. But whatever his opinion\nbe, I am sure, that the Art of Fire cannot create and produce so, as\nNature doth, nor dissolve substances so, as she doth, nor transform and\ntranschange, as she doth, nor do any effect like Nature: And therefore\nI cannot so much admire this Art as others do, for it appears to me,\nrather to be a troubler, then an assistant to Nature, producing more\nMonsters then perfect Creatures; nay, it rather doth shut the Gates\nof Truth, then unlock the Gates of Nature: For how can Art inform us\nof Nature, when as it is but an effect of Nature? You may say, The\ncause cannot be better known then by its effect; for the knowledg of\nthe effect, leads us to the knowledg of the cause. I answer, 'Tis\ntrue: but you will consider, that Nature is an Infinite cause, and has\nInfinite effects; and if you knew all the Infinite effects in nature,\nthen perhaps you might come to some knowledg of the cause; but to know\nnature by one single effect, as art is, is impossible; nay, no man\nknows this particular effect as yet perfectly; For who is he, that has\nstudied the art of fire so, as to produce all that this art may be able\nto afford? witness the Philosophers-stone. Besides, how is it possible\nto find out the onely cause by so numerous variations of the effects?\nWherefore it is more easie, in my opinion, to know the various effects\nin Nature by studying the Prime cause, then by the uncertain study of\nthe inconstant effects to arrive to the true knowledg of the prime\ncause; truly it is much easier to walk in a Labyrinth without a Guide,\nthen to gain a certain knowledg in any one art or natural effect,\nwithout Nature her self be the guide, for Nature is the onely Mistress\nand cause of all, which, as she has made all other effects, so she\nhas also made arts for varieties sake; but most men study Chymistry\nmore for imployment, then for profit; not but that I believe, there\nmay be some excellent Medicines found out and made by that art, but\nthe expence and labour is more then the benefit; neither are all those\nMedicines sure and certain, nor in all diseases safe; neither can\nthis art produce so many medicines as there are several diseases in\nNature, and for the Universal Medicine, and the Philosophers-stone or\nElixir, which Chymists brag of so much; it consists rather in hope\nand expectation, then in assurance; for could Chymists find it out,\nthey would not be so poor, as most commonly they are, but richer then\n_Solomon_ was, or any Prince in the World, and might have done many\nfamous acts with the supply of their vast Golden Treasures, to the\neternal and immortal fame of their Art; nay, Gold being the Idol of\nthis world, they would be worshipped as well for the sake of Gold, as\nfor their splendorous Art; but how many have endeavored and laboured\nin vain and without any effect? _Gold is easier to be made, then to be\ndestroyed_, says your _Author,_[7] but I believe one is as difficult or\nimpossible, nay more, then the other; for there is more probability of\ndissolving or destroying a natural effect by Art, then of generating\nor producing one; for Art cannot go beyond her sphere of activity, she\ncan but produce an artificial effect, and Gold is a natural Creature;\nneither were it Justice, that a particular creature of Nature should\nhave as much power to act or work as Nature her self; but because\nneither Reason, nor Art has found out as yet such a powerful opposite\nto Gold, as can alter its nature; men therefore conclude that it\ncannot be done. Your _Author_ relates[8] to have seen the Gold-making\nstone, which he says, was of colour such, as Saffron is in its powder,\nbut weighty and shining like unto powder'd Glass; one fourth part of\none grain thereof, (a grain he reckons the six hundredth part of one\nounce) being projected upon eight ounces of Quicksilver made hot in a\nCrucible, and straight way there were found eight ounces, and a little\nless then eleven grains of the purest Gold; therefore one onely grain\nof that powder had transchanged 19186 parts of Quicksilver, equal to\nit self, into the best Gold. Truly, _Madam_, I wish with all my heart,\nthe poor Royalists had had some quantity of that powder; and I assure\nyou, that if it were so, I my self would turn a Chymist to gain so much\nas to repair my Noble Husbands losses, that his noble family might\nflourish the better. But leaving Gold, since it is but a vain wish,\nI do verily believe, that some of the Chymical medicines do, in some\ndesperate cases, many times produce more powerful and sudden effects\nthen the medicines of Galenists, and therefore I do not absolutely\ncondemn the art of Fire, as if I were an enemy to it; but I am of an\nopinion, that my Opinions in _Philosophy_, if well understood, will\nrather give a light to that art, then obscure its worth; for if\nChymists did but study well the corporeal motions or actions of Natures\nsubstantial body; they would, by their observations, understand Nature\nbetter, then they do by the observation of the actions of their Art;\nand out of this consideration and respect, I should almost have an\nambition, to become an Artist in Chymistry, were I not too lazie and\ntender for that imployment; but should I quit the one, and venture\nthe other, I am so vain as to perswade my self, I might perform\nthings worthy my labour upon the ground of my own Philosophy, which\nis substantial Life, Sense, and Reason; for I would not study Salt,\nSulphur, and Mercury, but the Natural motions of every Creature, and\nobserve the variety of Natures actions. But, perchance, you will smile\nat my vain conceit, and, it may be, I my self, should repent of my\npains unsuccessfully bestowed, my time vainly spent, my health rashly\nendangered, and my Noble Lords Estate unprofitably wasted, in fruitless\ntryals and experiments; Wherefore you may be sure, that I will consider\nwell before I act; for I would not lose Health, Wealth, and Fame,\nand do no more then others have done, which truly is not much, their\neffects being of less weight then their words. But in the mean time,\nmy study shall be bent to your service, and how to express my self\nworthily,\n\nMADAM,\n\n_Your Ladiships_\n\n_humble and faithful Servant._\n\n[1] Ch. _called_, The Essay of a Meteor.\n\n[2] _Ch._ Heat doth not digest efficiently, but excitingly.\n\n[3] _Ch._ The ignorant natural Philosophy of _Aristotle_ and _Galen_.\n\n[4] _Ch._ A modern Pharmacopoly and dispensatory.\n\n[5] _Ch._ Of the Power of Medicines.\n\n[6] _Ch._ Heat doth not digest efficiently, but excitingly.\n\n[7] _Ch._ The first Principles of the Chymists, not the Essences of the\nsame are of the Army of Diseases.\n\n[8] In the _Ch._ Of Life Eternal, and in the _Ch._ Of the Tree of Life.\n\n\n\n\nXIV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI have read your _Authors_ discourse concerning _Sensation_,[1] but it\nwas as difficult to me to understand it, ash was tedious to read it;\nTruly, all the business, might have been easily declared in a short\nChapter, and with more clearness and perspicuity: For Sensation, is\nnothing else but the action of sense proceeding from the corporeal\nsensitive motions, which are in all Creatures or parts of Nature, and\nso all have sense and sensation, although not alike after one and the\nsame manner, but some more, some less, each according to the nature and\npropriety of its figure. But your _Author_ speaks of _Motion without\nSense, and Sense without Motion_, which is a meer impossibility; for\nthere is not, nor cannot be any Motion in Nature without Sense, nor\nany Sense without Motion; there being no Creature without self-motion,\nalthough not always perceptible by us, or our external senses; for all\nmotion is not exteriously local, and visible. Wherefore, not any part\nof Nature, according to my opinion, wants Sense and Reason, Life and\nKnowledg; but not such a substanceless Life as your _Author_ describes,\nbut a substantial, that is a corporeal Life. Neither is Light the\nprinciple of Motion, but Motion, is the principle of Light: Neither is\nHeat the principle of Motion, but its effect as well as Cold is; for\nI cannot perceive that Heat should be more active then Cold. Neither\nis there any such thing as Unsensibleness in Nature, except it be in\nrespect of some particular Sensation in some particular Figure: As\nfor example, when an Animal dies, or its Figure is dissolved from the\nFigure of an Animal; we may say it hath not animal sense or motion,\nbut we cannot say, it hath no sense or motion at all; for as long as\nMatter is in Nature, Sense and Motion will be; so that it is absurd and\nimpossible to believe, or at least to think, that Matter, as a body,\ncan be totally deprived of Life, Sense, and Motion, or that Life can\nperish and be corrupted, be it the smallest part of Matter conceivable,\nand the same turned or changed into millions of Figures; for the\nLife and Soul of Nature is self-moving Matter, which by Gods Power,\nand leave, is the onely Framer and Maker, as also the Dissolver and\nTransformer of all Creatures in Nature, making as well Light, Heat, and\nCold, Gas, Blas, and Ferments, as all other natural Creatures beside,\nas also Passions, Appetites, Digestions, Nourishments, Inclination,\nAversion, Sickness and Health; nay, all Particular Ideas, Thoughts,\nFancies, Conceptions, Arts, Sciences, &c. In brief, it makes all that\nis to be made in Nature. But many great Philosophers conceive Nature to\nbe fuller of Intricacy, Difficulty, and Obscurity, then she is, puzling\nthemselves about her ordinary actions, which yet are easie and free,\nand making their arguments hard, constrained, and mystical, many of\nthem containing neither sense nor reason; when as, in my opinion, there\nis nothing else to be studied in Nature, but her substance and her\nactions. But I will leave them to their own Fancies and Humors, and say\nno more, but rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your humble and_\n\n_faithful Servant._\n\n[1] Of the Disease of the Stone. _Ch._ 9.\n\n\n\n\nXV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nConcerning Sympathy and Antipathy, and attractive or magnetick\nInclinations, which some do ascribe to the influence of the Stars,\nothers to an unknown Spirit as the Mover, others to the Instinct of\nNature, hidden Proprieties, and certain formal Vertues; but your\n_Author_,[1] doth attribute to _directing Ideas, begotten by their\nMother Charity, or a desire of Good Will_, and calls it[2] a _Gift\nnaturally inherent in the Archeusses of either part_: If you please\nto have my opinion thereof, I think they are nothing else but plain\nordinary Passions and Appetites. As for example: I take Sympathy, as\nalso Magnetisme or attractive Power, to be such agreeable Motions\nin one part or Creature, as do cause a Fancy, love and desire to\nsome other part or Creature; and Antipathy, when these Motions are\ndisagreeable, and produce contrary effects, as dislike, hate and\naversion to some part or Creature. And as there are many sorts of such\nmotions, so there are many sorts of Sympathyes and Antipathyes, or\nAttractions and Aversions, made several manners or ways; For in some\nsubjects, Sympathy requires a certain distance; as for example, in\nIron and the Loadstone; for if the Iron be too far off, the Loadstone\ncannot exercise its power, when as in other subjects, there is no need\nof any such certain distance, as betwixt the Needle and the North-pole,\nas also the Weapon-salve; for the Needle will turn it self towards\nthe North, whether it be near or far off from the North-pole; and\nso, be the Weapon which inflicted the wound, never so far from the\nwounded Person, as they say, yet it will nevertheless do its effect:\nBut yet there must withal be some conjunction with the blood; for as\nyour _Author_ mentions,[3] the Weapon shall be in vain anointed with\nthe Unguent, unless it be made bloody, and the same blood be first\ndried on the same Weapon. Likewise the sounding of two eights when one\nis touched, must be done within a certain distance: the same may be\nsaid of all Infectious and catching Diseases amongst Animals, where\nthe Infection, be it the Infected Air, or a Poysonous Vapour, or any\nthing else, must needs touch the body, and enter either through the\nMouth, or Nostrils, or Ears, or Pores of the body; for though the\nlike Antipathies of Infectious Diseases, as of the Plague, may be in\nseveral places far distant and remote from each other at one and the\nsame time, yet they cannot infect particular Creatures, or Animals,\nwithout coming near, or without the sense of Touch: For example; the\nPlague may be in the _East Indies_, and in this Kingdom, at one and\nthe same time, and yet be strangers to each other; for although all\nMen are of Mankind, yet all have not Sympathy or Antipathy to each\nother; the like of several Plagues, although they be of the same kind\nof disease, yet, being in several places at one time, they may not\nbe a kin to each other, nor one be produced by the other, except\nthe Plague be brought over out of an infected Country, into a sound\nCountry, by some means or other. And thus some Sympathy and Antipathy\nis made by a close conjunction, or corporeal uniting of parts, but not\nall; neither is it required, that all Sympathy and Antipathy must be\nmutual, or equally in both Parties, so that that part or party, which\nhas a Sympathetical affection or inclination to the other, must needs\nreceive the like sympathetical affection from that part again; for one\nman may have a sympathetical affection to another man, when as this\nman hath an antipathetical aversion to him; and the same may be, for\nought we know, betwixt Iron and the Loadstone, as also betwixt the\nNeedle and the North; for the Needle may have a sympathy towards the\nNorth, but not again the North towards the Needle; and so may the Iron\nhave towards the Loadstone, but not again the Loadstone towards the\nIron: Neither is Sympathy or Antipathy made by the issuing out of any\ninvisible rayes, for then the rays betwixt the North and the Needle\nwould have a great way to reach: But a sympathetical inclination in\na Man towards another, is made either by sight, or hearing; either\npresent, or absent: the like of infectious Diseases. I grant, that\nif both Parties do mutually affect each other, and their motions be\nequally agreeable; then the sympathy is the stronger, and will last\nthe longer, and then there is a Union, Likeness, or Conformableness,\nof their Actions, Appetites, and Passions; For this kind of Sympathy\nworks no other effects, but a conforming of the actions of one party,\nto the actions of the other, as by way of Imitation, proceeding from\nan internal sympathetical love and desire to please; for Sympathy\ndoth not produce an effect really different from it self, or else the\nsympathy betwixt Iron and the Loadstone would produce a third Creature\ndifferent from themselves, and so it would do in all other Creatures.\nBut as I mentioned above, there are many sorts of attractions in\nNature, and many several and various attractions onely in one sort of\nCreatures, nay, so many in one particular as not to be numbred; for\nthere are many Desires, Passions, and Appetites, which draw or intice a\nman to something or other, as for example, to Beauty, Novelty, Luxury,\nCovetousness, and all kinds of Vertues and Vices; and there are many\nparticular objects in every one of these, as for example, in Novelty.\nFor there are so many several desires to Novelty, as there are Senses,\nand so many Novelties that satisfie those desires, as a Novelty to the\nEar, a Novelty to the Sight, to Touch, Taste, and Smell; besides in\nevery one of these, there are many several objects; To mention onely\none example, for the novelty of Sight; I have seen an Ape, drest like a\nCavalier, and riding on Horse-back with his sword by his side, draw a\nfar greater multitude of People after him, then a Loadstone of the same\nbigness of the Ape would have drawn Iron; and as the Ape turn'd, so did\nthe People, just like as the Needle turns to the North; and this is\nbut one object in one kind of attraction, _viz._ Novelty: but there be\nMillions of objects besides. In like manner good cheer draws abundance\nof People, as is evident, and needs no Demonstration. Wherefore, as I\nsaid in the beginning, Sympathy is nothing else but natural Passions\nand Appetites, as Love, Desire, Fancy, Hunger, Thirst, &c. and its\neffects are Concord, Unity, Nourishment, and the like: But Antipathy is\nDislike, Hate, Fear, Anger, Revenge, Aversion, Jealousie, &c. and its\neffects are Discord, Division, and the like. And such an Antipathy is\nbetween a Wolf and a Sheep, a Hound and a Hare, a Hawk and a Partridg,\n&c. For this Antipathy is nothing else but fear in the Sheep to run\naway from the Wolf, in the Hare to run from the Hound, and in the\nPartridg to flie from the Hawk; for Life has an Antipathy to that\nwhich is named Death; and the Wolf's stomack hath a sympathy to food,\nwhich causes him to draw neer, or run after those Creatures he has a\nmind to feed on. But you will say, some Creatures will fight, and kill\neach other, not for Food, but onely out of an Antipathetical nature. I\nanswer: When as Creatures fight, and endeavour to destroy each other,\nif it be not out of necessity, as to preserve and defend themselves\nfrom hurt or danger, then it is out of revenge, or anger, or ambition,\nor jealousie, or custom of quarrelling, or breeding. As for example:\nCocks of the Game, that are bred to fight with each other, and many\nother Creatures, as Bucks, Staggs, and the like, as also Birds, will\nfight as well as Men, and seek to destroy each other through jealousie;\nwhen as, had they no Females amongst them, they would perhaps live\nquiet enough, rather as sympathetical Friends, then antipathetical\nFoes; and all such Quarrels proceed from a sympathy to their own\ninterest. But you may ask me, what the reason is, that some Creatures,\nas for example, Mankind, some of them, will not onely like one sort\nof meat better then another of equal goodness and nourishment, but\nwill like and prefer sometimes a worse sort of meat before the best,\nto wit, such as hath neither a good taste nor nourishment? I answer:\nThis is nothing else, but a particular, and most commonly an inconstant\nAppetite; for after much eating of that they like best, especially if\nthey get a surfeit, their appetite is chang'd to aversion; for then all\ntheir feeding motions and parts have as much, if not more antipathy\nto those meats, as before they had a sympathy to them. Again, you may\nask me the reason, why a Man seeing two persons together, which are\nstrangers to him, doth affect one better then the other; nay, if one of\nthese Persons be deformed or ill-favoured, and the other well-shaped\nand handsom; yet it may chance, that the deformed Person shall be more\nacceptable in the affections and eyes of the beholder, then he that\nis handsom? I answer: There is no Creature so deformed, but hath some\nagreeable and attractive parts, unless it be a Monster, which is never\nloved, but for its rarity and novelty, and Nature is many times pleased\nwith changes, taking delight in variety: and the proof that such a\nsympathetical affection proceeds from some agreeableness of Parts,\nis, that if those persons were vail'd, there would not proceed such a\npartial choice or judgment from any to them. You may ask me further,\nwhether Passion and Appetite are also the cause of the sympathy which\nis in the Loadstone towards Iron, and in the Needle towards the North?\nI answer, Yes: for it is either for nourishment, or refreshment, or\nlove and desire of association, or the like, that the Loadstone draws\nIron, and the Needle turns towards the North. The difference onely\nbetwixt the sympathy in the Needle towards the North, and betwixt the\nsympathy in the Loadstone towards the Iron is, that the Needle doth\nalways turn towards the North, but the Loadstone doth not always draw\nIron: The reason is, because the sympathy of the Needle towards the\nNorth requires no certain distance, as I said in the beginning; and the\nNorth-pole continuing constantly in the same place, the Needle knows\nwhither to turn; when as the sympathy between the Loadstone and Iron\nrequires a certain distance, and when the Loadstone is not within this\ncompass or distance, it cannot perform its effect, to wit, to draw the\nIron, but the effect ceases, although the cause remains in vigour. The\nsame may be said of the Flower that turns towards the Sun; for though\nthe Sun be out of sight, yet the Flower watches for the return of the\nSun, from which it receives benefit: Like as faithful Servants watch\nand wait for their Master, or hungry Beggers at a Rich man's door for\nrelief; and so doth the aforesaid Flower; nay, not the Flower onely,\nbut any thing that has freedom and liberty of motion, will turn towards\nthose Places or Creatures whence it expects relief. Concerning ravenous\nBeasts that feed on dead Carcasses, they, having more eager appetites\nthen food, make long flights into far distant Countries to seek food to\nlive on; but surely, I think, if they had food enough at home, although\nnot dead Carcasses, they would not make such great Journies; or if a\nbattel were fought, and many slain, and they upon their journey should\nmeet with sufficient food, they would hardly travel further before they\nhad devoured that food first: But many Birds travel for the temper of\nthe Air, as well as for food, witness Woodcocks, Cranes, Swallows,\nFieldfares, and the like; some for cold, some for hot, and some for\ntemperate Air. And as for such Diseases as are produced by conceit\nand at distance, the cause is, the fearfulness of the Patient, which\nproduces Irregularities in the Mind, and these occasion Irregularities\nin the Body, which produce such a disease, as the Mind did fearfully\napprehend; when as without that Passion and Irregularity, the Patient\nwould, perhaps, not fall sick of that disease, But to draw towards an\nend, I'le answer briefly to your _Authors_ alledged example[4] which\nhe gives of Wine, that it is troubled while the Vine flowreth: The\nreason, in my opinion, may perhaps be, that the Wine being the effect\nof the Vine, and proceeding from its stock as the producer, has not so\nquite alter'd Nature, as not to be sensible at all of the alteration\nof the Vine; For many effects do retain the proprieties of their\ncauses; for example, many Children are generated, which have the same\nproprieties of their Parents, who do often propagate some or other\nvertuous or vicious qualities with their off-spring; And this is rather\na proof that there are sensitive and rational motions, and sensitive\nand rational knowledge in all Creatures, and so in Wine, according to\nthe nature or propriety of its Figure; for without motion, sense and\nreason, no effect could be; nor no sympathy or antipathy. But it is\nto be observed, that many do mistake the true Causes, and ascribe an\neffect to some cause, which is no more the cause of that same effect,\nthen a particular Creature is the cause of Nature; and so they are apt\nto take the Fiddle for the hot Bricks, as if the Fiddle did make the\nAss dance, when as it was the hot Bricks that did it; for several\neffects may proceed from one cause, and one effect from several causes;\nand so in the aforesaid example, the Wine may perhaps be disturbed by\nthe alteration of the weather at the same time of the flowring of the\nVines; and so may Animals, as well as Vegetables, and other Creatures,\nalter alike at one and the same point of time, and yet none be the\ncause of each others alteration. And thus, to shut up my discourse, I\nrepeat again, that sympathy and antipathy are nothing else but ordinary\nPassions and Appetites amongst several Creatures, which Passions\nare made by the rational animate Matter, and the Appetites by the\nsensitive, both giving such or such motions, to such or such Creatures;\nfor cross motions in Appetites and passions make Antipathy, and\nagreeable motions in Appetites and Passions make Sympathy, although the\nCreatures be different, wherein these motions, Passions and Appetites\nare made; and as without an object a Pattern cannot be, so without\ninherent or natural Passions and Appetites there can be no Sympathy or\nAntipathy: And there being also such Sympathy betwixt your Ladiship and\nme, I think my self the happiest Creature for it; and shall make it my\nwhole study to imitate your Ladiship, and conform all my actions to the\nrule and pattern of yours, as becomes,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Ladiships_\n\n_faithful Friend, and humble Servant._\n\n[1] _Ch._ Of Sympathetical Mediums.\n\n[2] In the Plague-Grave.\n\n[3] In the Magnetick care of Wounds.\n\n[4] _Ch._ Of the Magnetick Power.\n\n\n\n\nXVI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nMy opinion of Witches and Witchcraft, (of whose Power and strange\neffects your _Author_ is pleased to relate many stories) in brief,\nis this; My Sense and Reason doth inform me, that there is Natural\nWitchcraft, as I may call it, which is Sympathy, Antipathy, Magnetisme,\nand the like, which are made by the sensitive and rational motions\nbetween several Creatures, as by Imagination, Fancy, Love, Aversion,\nand many the like; but these Motions, being sometimes unusual and\nstrange to us, we not knowing their causes, (For what Creature knows\nall motions in Nature, and their ways?) do stand amazed at their\nworking power; and by reason we cannot assign any Natural cause for\nthem, are apt to ascribe their effects to the Devil; but that there\nshould be any such devillish Witchcraft, which is made by a Covenant\nand Agreement with the Devil, by whose power Men do enchaunt or bewitch\nother Creatures, I cannot readily believe. Certainly, I dare say,\nthat many a good, old honest woman hath been condemned innocently,\nand suffered death wrongfully, by the sentence of some foolish and\ncruel Judges, meerly upon this suspition of Witchcraft, when as really\nthere hath been no such thing; for many things are done by slights\nor juggling Arts, wherein neither the Devil nor Witches are Actors.\nAnd thus an Englishman whose name was _Banks_, was like to be burnt\nbeyond the Seas for a Witch, as I have been inform'd, onely for making\na Horse shew tricks by Art; There have been also several others; as\none that could vomit up several kinds of Liquors and other things:\nand another who did make a Drum beat of it self. But all these were\nnothing but slights and jugling tricks; as also the talking and walking\nBell; and the Brazen-Head which spake these words, _Time was, Time\nis_, and _Time is past_, and so fell down; Which may easily have been\nperformed by speaking through a Pipe conveighed into the said head:\nBut such and the like trifles will amaze many grave and wise men, when\nthey do not know the manner or way how they are done, so as they are\napt to judg them to be effected by Witchcraft or Combination with the\nDevil. But, as I said before, I believe there is Natural Magick; which\nis, that the sensitive and rational Matter oft moves such a way, as\nis unknown to us; and in the number of these is also the bleeding of\na murdered body at the presence of the Murderer, which your _Author,_\nmentions;[1] for the corporeal motions in the murthered body may move\nso, as to work such effects, which are more then ordinary; for the\nanimal Figure, being not so quickly dissolved, the animal motions are\nnot so soon altered, (for the dissolving of the Figure is nothing else\nbut an alteration of its Motions;) and this dissolution is not done in\nan instant of time, but by degrees: But yet I must confess, it is not a\ncommon action in Nature, for Nature hath both common, and singular or\nparticular actions: As for example, Madness, natural Folly, and many\nthe like, are but in some particular persons; for if those actions were\ngeneral, and common, then all, or most men would be either mad, or\nfools, but, though there are too many already, yet all men are not so;\nand so some murthered bodies may bleed or express some alterations at\nthe presence of the Murtherer, but I do not believe, that all do so;\nfor surely in many, not any alteration will be perceived, and others\nwill have the same alterations without the presence of the Murtherer.\nAnd thus you see, _Madam_, that this is done naturally, without the\nhelp of the Devil; nay, your _Author_ doth himself confess it to be\nso; for, says he, _The act of the Witch is plainly Natural; onely the\nstirring up of the vertue or power in the Witch comes from Satan._\nBut I cannot understand what your _Author_ means, by the departing of\nspiritual rays from the Witch into Man, or any other animal, which she\nintends to kill or hurt; nor how Spirits wander about in the Air, and\nhave their mansions there; for men may talk as well of impossibilities,\nas of such things which are not composed of Natural Matter: If man were\nan Incorporeal Spirit himself, he might, perhaps, sooner conceive the\nessence of a Spirit, as being of the same Nature; but as long as he is\nmaterial, and composed of Natural Matter, he might as well pretend to\nknow the Essence of God, as of an Incorporeal Spirit. Truly, I must\nconfess, I have had some fancies oftentimes of such pure and subtil\nsubstances, purer and subtiler then the Sky or \u00c6thereal substance is,\nwhereof I have spoken in my Poetical Works; but these substances, which\nI conceived within my fancy, were material, and had bodies, though\nnever so small and subtil; for I was never able to conceive a substance\nabstracted from all Matter, for even Fancy it self is material, and\nall Thoughts and Conceptions are made by the rational Matter, and\nso are those which Philosophers call Animal Spirits, but a material\nFancy cannot produce immaterial effects, that is, Ideas of Incorporeal\nSpirits: And this was the cause that in the first impression of my\n_Philosophical Opinions_, I named the sensitive and rational Matter,\nsensitive and rational Spirits, because of its subtilty, activity\nand agility; not that I thought them to be immaterial, but material\nSpirits: but since Spirits are commonly taken to be immaterial, and\nSpirit and Body are counted opposite to one another, to prevent\na misapprehension in the thoughts of my Readers, as if I meant\nIncorporeal Spirits, I altered this expression in the last Edition, and\ncall'd it onely sensitive and rational Matter, or, which is all one,\nsensitive and rational corporeal motions. You will say, perhaps, That\nthe divine Soul in Man is a Spirit: but I desire you to call to mind\nwhat I oftentimes have told you, to wit, that when I speak of the Soul\nof Man, I mean onely the Natural, not the Divine Soul; which as she is\nsupernatural, so she acts also supernaturally; but all the effects of\nthe natural Soul, of which I discourse, are natural, and not divine or\nsupernatural. But to return to Magnetisme; I am absolutely of opinion,\nthat it is naturally effected by natural means, without the concurrence\nof Immaterial Spirits either good or bad, meerly by natural corporeal\nsensitive and rational motions; and, for the most part, there must be a\ndue approach between the Agent and the Patient, or otherwise the effect\nwill hardly follow, as you may see by the Loadstone and Iron; Neither\nis the influence of the Stars performed beyond a certain distance,\nthat is, such a distance as is beyond sight or their natural power to\nwork; for if their light comes to our Eyes, I know no reason against\nit, but their effects may come to our bodies. And as for infectious\nDiseases, they come by a corporeal imitation, as by touch, either of\nthe infected air, drawn in by breath, or entring through the pores\nof the Body, or of some things brought from infected places, or else\nby hearing; but diseases, caused by Conceit, have their beginning,\nas all alterations have, from the sensitive and rational Motions,\nwhich do not onely make the fear and conceit, but also the disease;\nfor as a fright will sometimes cure diseases, so it will sometimes\ncause diseases; but as I said, both fright, cure, and the disease, are\nmade by the rational and sensitive corporeal motions within the body,\nand not by Supernatural Magick, as Satanical Witchcraft, entering\nfrom without into the body by spiritual rays. But having discoursed\nhereof in my former Letter, I will not trouble you with an unnecessary\nrepetition thereof; I conclude therefore with what I begun, _viz._ that\nI believe natural Magick to be natural corporeal motions in natural\nbodies: Not that I say, Nature in her self is a Magicianess, but it\nmay be called natural Magick or Witchcraft, meerly in respect to our\nIgnorance; for though Nature is old, yet she is not a Witch, but a\ngrave, wise, methodical Matron, ordering her Infinite family, which are\nher several parts, with ease and facility, without needless troubles\nand difficulties; for these are onely made through the ignorance of\nher several parts or particular Creatures, not understanding their\nMistress, Nature, and her actions and government, for which they cannot\nbe blamed; for how should a part understand the Infinite body, when it\ndoth not understand it self; but Nature understands her parts better\nthen they do her. And so leaving Wise Nature, and the Ignorance of her\nParticulars, I understand my self so far that I am,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your humble and_\n\n_faithful Servant._\n\n[1] _Ch._ Of the Magnetick cure of wounds.\n\n\n\n\nXVII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI am not of your _Authors_[1] opinion, That _Time hath no relation to\nMotion, but that Time and Motion are as unlike and different from each\nother as Finite from Infinite, and that it hath its own essence or\nbeing Immoveable, Unchangeable, Individable, and unmixed with things,\nnay, that Time is plainly the same with Eternity._ For, in my opinion,\nthere can be no such thing as Time in Nature, but what Man calls Time,\nis onely the variation of natural motions; wherefore Time, and the\nalteration of motion, is one and the same thing under two different\nnames; and as Matter, Figure, and Motion, are inseparable, so is Time\ninseparably united, or rather the same thing with them, and not a\nthing subsisting by it self; and as long as Matter, Motion and Figure\nhave been existent, so long hath Time; and as long as they last, so\nlong doth Time. But when I say, Time is the variation of motion, I\ndo not mean the motion of the Sun or Moon, which makes Days, Months,\nYears, but the general motions or actions of Nature, which are the\nground of Time; for were there no Motion, there would be no Time; and\nsince Matter is dividable, and in parts, Time is so too; neither hath\nTime any other Relation to Duration, then what Nature her self hath.\nWherefore your _Author_ is mistaken, when he says, Motion is made in\nTime, for Motion makes Time, or rather is one and the same with Time;\nand Succession is no more a stranger to Motion, then Motion is to\nNature, as being the action of Nature, which is the Eternal servant of\nGod. _But_, says he, _Certain Fluxes of Formerlinesses and Laternesses,\nhave respect unto frail moveable things in their motions, wherewith\nthey hasten unto the appointed ends of their period, and so unto their\nown death or destruction; but what relation hath all that to Time: for\ntherefore also ought Time to run with all and every motion? Verily so\nthere should be as many times and durations as there are motions._ I\nanswer: To my Reason, there are as many times and durations as there\nare motions; for neither time nor duration can be separated from\nmotion, no more then motion can be separated from them, being all one.\nBut Time is not Eternity, for Eternity hath no change, although your\n_Author_ makes Time and Eternity all one, and a being or substance by\nit self: Yet I will rather believe _Solomon_, then him, who says, that\nthere is a time to be merry, and a time to be sad; a time to mourn, and\na time to rejoyce, and so forth: making so many divisions of Time as\nthere are natural actions; whenas your _Author_ makes natural actions\nstrangers to Nature, dividing them from their substances: Which seemeth\nvery improbable in the opinion of,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Ladiships_\n\n_faithful Friend, and humble Servant._\n\n[1] In his Treatise of Time.\n\n\n\n\nXVIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour _Authors_[1] opinion is, That _a bright burning Iron doth not\nburn a dead Carcass after an equal manner as it doth a live one; For\nin live bodies_, saith he, _it primarily hurts the sensitive Soul,\nthe which therefore being impatient, rages after a wonderful manner,\ndoth by degrees resolve and exasperate its own and vital liquors into\na sharp poyson, and then contracts the fibres of the flesh, and turns\nthem into an escharre, yea, into the way of a coal; but a dead Carcass\nis burnt by bright burning Iron, no otherwise, then if Wood, or if any\nother unsensitive thing should be; that is, it burns by a proper action\nof the fire, but not of the life._ To which opinion, I answer: That my\nReason cannot conceive any thing to be without life, and so neither\nwithout sense; for whatsoever hath self-motion, has sense and life; and\nthat self-motion is in every Creature, is sufficiently discoursed of in\nmy former Letters, and in my _Philosophical Opinions_; for self-motion,\nsense, life, and reason, are the grounds and principles of Nature,\nwithout which no Creature could subsist. I do not say, That there is\nno difference between the life of a dead Carcass, and a live one,\nfor there is a difference between the lives of every Creature; but to\ndiffer in the manner of life, and to have neither life nor sense at\nall, are quite different things: But your _Author_ affirms himself,\nthat all things have a certain sense of feeling, when he speaks of\nSympathy and Magnetisme, and yet he denies that they have life: And\nothers again, do grant life to some Creatures, as to Vegetables, and\nnot sense. Thus they vary in their Opinions, and divide sense, life,\nand motion, when all is but one and the same thing; for no life is\nwithout sense and motion, nor no motion without sense and life; nay,\nnot without Reason; for the chief Architect of all Creatures, is\nsensitive and rational Matter. But the mistake is, that most men, do\nnot, or will not conceive, that there is a difference and variety\nof the corporeal sensitive and rational motions in every Creature;\nbut they imagine, that if all Creatures should have life, sense, and\nreason, they must of necessity have all alike the same motions, without\nany difference; and because they do not perceive the animal motions\nin a Stone or Tree, they are apt to deny to them all life, sense, and\nmotion. Truly, _Madam_, I think no man will be so mad, or irrational,\nas to say a Stone is an Animal, or an Animal is a Tree, because a Stone\nand Tree have sense, life, and motion; for every body knows, that their\nNatural figures are different, and if their Natures be different,\nthen they cannot have the same Motions, for the corporeal motions do\nmake the nature of every particular Creature, and their differences;\nand as the corporeal motions act, work, or move, so is the nature of\nevery figure, Wherefore, nobody, I hope, will count me so senseless,\nthat I believe sense and life to be after the like manner in every\nparticular Creature or part of Nature; as for example, that a Stone or\nTree has animal motions, and doth see, touch, taste, smell and hear by\nsuch sensitive organs as an Animal doth; but, my opinion is, that all\nSense is not bound up to the sensitive organs of an Animal, nor Reason\nto the kernel of a man's brain, or the orifice of the stomack, or the\nfourth ventricle of the brain, or onely to a mans body; for though we\ndo not see all Creatures move in that manner as Man or Animals do, as\nto walk, run, leap, ride, &c. and perform exterior acts by various\nlocal motions; nevertheless, we cannot in reason say, they are void and\ndestitute of all motion; For what man knows the variety of motions in\nNature: Do not we see, that Nature is active in every thing, yea, the\nleast of her Creatures. For example; how some things do unanimously\nconspire and agree, others antipathetically flee from each other; and\nhow some do increase, others decrease; some dissolve, some consist,\nand how all things are subject to perpetual changes and alterations;\nand do you think all this is done without motion, life, sense, and\nreason? I pray you consider, _Madam_, that there are internal motions\nas well as external, alterative as well as constitutive; and several\nother sorts of motions not perceptible by our senses, and therefore\nit is impossible that all Creatures should move after one sort of\nmotions. But you will say, Motion may be granted, but not Life, Sense,\nand Reason. I answer, I would fain know the reason why not; for I am\nconfident that no man can in truth affirm the contrary: What is Life,\nbut sensitive Motion? what is Reason, but rational motion? and do you\nthink, _Madam_, that any thing can move it self without life, sense\nand reason? I, for my part, cannot imagine it should; for it would\nneither know why, whither, nor what way, or how to move. But you may\nreply, Motion may be granted, but not self-motion; and life, sense,\nand reason, do consist in self-motion. I answer: this is impossible;\nfor not any thing in Nature can move naturally without natural motion,\nand all natural motion is self-motion. If you say it may be moved by\nanother; My answer is, first, that if a thing has no motion in it self,\nbut is moved by another which has self-motion, then it must give that\nimmovable body motion of its own, or else it could not move, having\nno motion at all; for it must move by the power of motion, which is\ncertain; and then it must move either by its own motion, or by a\ncommunicated or imparted motion; if by a communicated motion, then\nthe self-moveable thing or body must transfer its own motion into the\nimmoveable, and lose so much of its own motion as it gives away, which\nis impossible, as I have declared heretofore at large, unless it do\nalso transfer its moving parts together with it, for motion cannot be\ntransfered without substance. But experience and observation witnesseth\nthe contrary. Next, I say, if it were possible that one body did\nmove another, then most part of natural Creatures, which are counted\nimmoveable of themselves, or inanimate, and destitute of self-motion,\nmust be moved by a forced or violent, and not by a natural motion; for\nall motion that proceeds from an external agent or moving power, is\nnot natural, but forced, onely self-motion is natural; and then one\nthing moving another in this manner, we must at last proceed to such\na thing which is not moved by another, but hath motion in it self,\nand moves all others; and, perhaps, since man, and the rest of animals\nhave self-motion, it might be said, that the motions of all other\ninanimate Creatures, as they call them, doth proceed from them; but man\nbeing so proud, ambitious, and self-conceited, would soon exclude all\nother animals, and adscribe this power onely to himself, especially\nsince he thinks himself onely endued with Reason, and to have this\nprerogative above all the rest, as to be the sole rational Creature\nin the World. Thus you see, _Madam_, what confusion, absurdity, and\nconstrained work will follow from the opinion of denying self-motion,\nand so consequently, life and sense to natural Creatures. But I, having\nmade too long a digression, will return to your _Authors_ discourse:\nAnd as for that he says, _A dead Carcass burns by the proper action of\nthe fire_, I answer, That if the dissolving motions of the fire be too\nstrong for the consistent motions of that body which fire works upon,\nthen fire is the cause of its alteration; but if the consistent motions\nof the body be too strong for the dissolving motions of the fire, then\nthe fire can make no alteration in it. Again: he says, _Calx vive, at\nlong as it remains dry, it gnaws not a dead Carcass; but it presently\ngnaws live flesh, and makes an escharre; and a dead carcass is by lime\nwholly resolved into a liquor, and is combibed, except the bone and\ngristle thereof; but it doth not consume live flesh into a liquor,\nbut translates it into an escharre_. I will say no more to this, but\nthat I have fully enough declared my opinion before, that the actions\nor motions of life alter in that which is named a dead Carcass, from\nwhat they were in that which is called a Living body; but although\nthe actions of Life alter, yet life is not gone or annihilated; for\nlife is life, and remains full the same, but the actions or motions of\nlife change and differ in every figure; and this is the cause that the\nactions of Fire, Time, and _Calx-vive_, have not the same effects in a\ndead Carcass, as in a living Body; for the difference of their figures,\nand their different motions, produce different effects in them; and\nthis is the cause, that one and the same fire doth not burn or act\nupon all bodies alike: for some it dissolves, and some not; and some\nit hardens, and some it consumes; and some later, some sooner: For put\nthings of several natures into the same Fire, and you will see how they\nwill burn, or how fire will act upon them after several manners; so\nthat fire cannot alter the actions of several bodies to its own blas;\nand therefore, since a living and a dead Body (as they call them) are\nnot the same, (for the actions or motions of life, by their change or\nalteration, have altered the nature or figure of the body) the effects\ncannot be the same; for a Carcass has neither the interior nor exterior\nmotions of that figure which it was before it was a Carcass, and so the\nfigure is quite alter'd from what it was, by the change and alteration\nof the motions. But to conclude, the motions of the exterior Agent,\nand the motions of the Patient, do sometimes joyn and unite, as in one\naction, or to one effect, and sometimes the motions of the Agent are\nonely an occasion, but not a co-workman in the production of such or\nsuch an effect, as the motions of the Patient do work; neither can the\nmotions of the Agent work totally and meerly of themselves, such or\nsuch effects, without the assistance or concurrence of the motions\nof the Patient, but the motions of the Patient can; and there is\nnothing that can prove more evidently that Matter moves it self, and\nthat exterior agents or bodies are onely an occasion to such or such\na motion in another body, then to see how several things put into one\nand the same fire, do alter after several modes; which shews, it is not\nthe onely action of fire, but the interior motions of the body thrown\ninto the fire, which do alter its exterior form or figure. And thus, I\nthink I have said enough to make my opinions clear, that they may be\nthe better understood: which is the onely aim and desire of,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your humble and_\n\n_faithful Servant._\n\n[1] Of the disease of the Stone, _Ch._ 9.\n\n\n\n\nXIX.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour _Author_ is not a Natural, but a Divine Philosopher, for in\nmany places he undertakes to interpret the Scripture; wherein, to my\njudgment, he expresseth very strange opinions; you will give me leave\nat this present to note some few. First, in one place,[1] interpreting\nthat passage of Scripture, where it is said,[2] That the _sons of God\ntook to wives the daughters of men_: He understands by the Sons of\nGod, those which came from the Posterity of _Adam_, begotten of a Man\nand a Woman, having the true Image of God: But by the Daughters of\nMen, he understands Monsters; that is, those which through the Devils\nmediation, were conceived in the womb of a Junior Witch or Sorceress:\nFor when Satan could find no other ways to deprive all the race of\nMen of the Image of God, and extinguish the Immortal mind out of the\nflock of _Adams_ Posterity, he stirr'd up detestable copulations,\nfrom whence proceeded savage Monsters, as Faunes, Satyrs, Sylphs,\nGnomes, Nymphs, Driades, Najades, Nereides, &c. which generated their\noff-springs amongst themselves, and their posterities again contracted\ntheir copulations amongst themselves, and at length began Wedlocks with\nMen; and from this copulation of Monsters and Nymphs, they generated\nstrong Gyants. Which Interpretation, how it agrees with the Truth of\nScripture, I will leave to Divines to judg: But, for my part, I cannot\nconceive, how, or by what means or ways, those Monsters and Nymphs were\nproduced or generated. Next, his opinion is, That _Adam_ did ravish\n_Eve_, and defloured her by force, calling him the first infringer of\nmodesty, and deflourer of a Virgin; and that therefore God let hair\ngrow upon his chin, cheeks, and lips, that he might be a Compere,\nCompanion, and like unto many four-footed Beasts, and might bear before\nhim the signature of the same; and that, as he was lecherous after\ntheir manner, he might also shew a rough countenance by his hairs;\nwhich whether it be so, or not, I cannot tell, neither do I think your\n_Author_ can certainly know it himself; for the Scripture makes no\nmention of it: But this I dare say, that _Eves_ Daughters prove rather\nthe contrary, _viz._ that their Grandmother did freely consent to their\nGrandfather. Also he says, That God had purposed to generate Man by\nthe overshadowing of the Holy Spirit, but Man perverted the Intent of\nGod; for had _Adam_ not sinned, there had been no generation by the\ncopulation of a Man and Woman, but all the off-springs had appear'd\nout of _Eve_, a Virgin, from the Holy Spirit, as conceived from God,\nand born of a woman, a virgin, To which, I answer, first, That it is\nimpossible to know the Designs and secret purposes of God: Next, to\nmake the Holy Spirit the common Generator of all Man-kind, is more\nthen the Scripture expresses, and any man ought to say: Lastly, it is\nabsurd, in my opinion, to say, that frail and mortal Men, can pervert\nthe intent and designs of the Great God; or that the Devil is able to\nprevent God's Intent, (as his expression is in the same place.) But\nyour _Author_ shews a great affection to the Female Sex, when he says,\nthat God doth love Women before Men, and that he has given them a\nfree gift of devotion before men; when as others do lay all the fault\nupon the Woman, that she did seduce the Man; however in expressing\nhis affection for Women, your _Author_ expresses a partiality in God.\nAnd, as for his opinion, that God creates more Daughters then Males,\nand that more Males are extinguished by Diseases, Travels, Wars,\nDuels, Shipwracks, and the like: Truly, I am of the same mind, that\nmore Men are kill'd by Travels, Wars, Duels, Shipwracks, &c. then\nWomen; for Women never undergo these dangers, neither do so many kill\nthemselves with intemperate Drinking, as Men do; but yet I believe,\nthat Death is as general, and not more favourable to Women, then he\nis to Men; for though Women be not slain in Wars like Men, (although\nmany are, by the cruelty of Men, who not regarding the weakness of\ntheir sex, do inhumanely kill them,) yet many do die in Child-bed,\nwhich is a Punishment onely concerning the Female sex. But to go on\nin your _Authors_ Interpretations: His knowledg of the Conception of\nthe Blessed Virgin, reaches so far, as he doth not stick to describe\nexactly, not onely how the blessed Virgin conceiv'd in the womb, but\nfirst in the heart, or the sheath of the heart; and then how the\nconception removed from the heart, into the womb, and in what manner\nit was performed. Certainly, _Madam_, I am amazed, when I see men so\nconceited with their own perfections and abilities, (I may rather\nsay, with their imperfections and weaknesses) as to make themselves\nGod's privy Councilors, and his Companions, and partakers of all the\nsacred Mysteries, Designs, and hidden secrets of the Incomprehensible\nand Infinite God. O the vain Presumption, Pride, and Ambition of\nwretched Men! There are many more such expressions in your _Authors_\nworks, which, in my opinion, do rather detract from the Greatness of\nthe Omnipotent God, then manifest his Glory: As for example; That Man\nis the clothing of the Deity, and the sheath of the Kingdom of God,\nand many the like: which do not belong to God; for God is beyond all\nexpression, because he is Infinite; and when we name God, we name an\nUnexpressible, and Incomprehensible Being; and yet we think we honour\nGod, when we express him after the manner of corporeal Creatures.\nSurely, the noblest Creature that ever is in the World, is not able\nto be compared to the most Glorious God, but whatsoever comparison is\nmade, detracts from his Glory: And this, in my opinion, is the reason,\nthat God forbad any likeness to be made of him, either in Heaven, or\nupon Earth, because he exceeds all that we might compare or liken to\nhim. And as men ought to have a care of such similizing expressions, so\nthey ought to be careful in making Interpretations of the Scripture,\nand expressing more then the Scripture informs; for what is beyond the\nScripture, is Man's own fancy; and to regulate the Word of God after\nMan's fancy, at least to make his fancy equal with the Word of God,\nis Irreligious. Wherefore, men ought to submit, and not to pretend to\nthe knowledg of God's Counsels and Designs, above what he himself hath\nbeen pleased to reveal: as for example, to describe of what Figure\nGod is, and to comment and descant upon the Articles of Faith; as\nhow Man was Created; and what he did in the state of Innocence; how\nhe did fall; and what he did after his fall: and so upon the rest of\nthe Articles of our Creed, more then the Scripture expresses, or is\nconformable to it. For if we do this, we shall make a Romance of the\nholy Scripture, with our Paraphrastical descriptions: which alas! is\ntoo common already. The truth is, Natural Philosophers, should onely\ncontain themselves within the sphere of Nature, and not trespass upon\nthe Revelation of the Scripture, but leave this Profession to those to\nwhom it properly belongs. I am confident, a Physician, or any other man\nof a certain Profession, would not take it well, if others, who are not\nprofessed in that Art, should take upon them to practise the same:\nAnd I do wonder, why every body is so forward to encroach upon the\nholy Profession of Divines, which yet is a greater presumption, then\nif they did it upon any other; for it contains not onely a most hidden\nand mystical knowledg, as treating of the Highest Subject, which is\nthe most Glorious, and Incomprehensible God, and the salvation of our\nSouls; but it is also most dangerous, if not interpreted according to\nthe Holy Spirit, but to the byass of man's fancy. Wherefore, _Madam_, I\nam afraid to meddle with Divinity in the least thing, lest I incur the\nhazard of offending the divine Truth, and spoil the excellent Art of\nPhilosophying; for a Philosophical Liberty, and a Supernatural Faith,\nare two different things, and suffer no co-mixture; as I have declared\nsufficiently heretofore. And this you will find as much truth, as that\nI am,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your constant Friend,_\n\n_and faithful Servant._\n\n[1] _Ch._ The Position is demonstrated.\n\n[2] _Gen._ 6. 2.\n\n\n\n\nXX.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nAlthough your _Author_[1] is of the opinion of _Plato_, in making\n_Three sorts of Atheists: One that believes no Gods; Another, which\nindeed admits of Gods, yet such as are uncarefull of us, and despisers\nof small matters, and therefore also ignorant of us: And lastly, a\nthird sort, which although they believe the Gods to be expert in the\nleast matters, yet do suppose that they are flexible and indulgent\ntoward the smallest cold Prayers or Petitions_: Yet I cannot approve\nof this distinction, for I do understand but one sort of Atheists;\nthat is, those which believe no God at all; but those which believe\nthat there is a God, although they do not worship him truly, nor live\npiously and religiously as they ought, cannot, in truth, be called\nAtheists, or else there would be innumerous sorts of Atheists; to\nwit, all those, that are either no Christians, or not of this or that\nopinion in Christian Religion, besides all them that live wickedly,\nimpiously and irreligiously; for to know, and be convinced in his\nreason, that there is a God, and to worship him truly, according to\nhis holy Precepts and Commands, are two several things: And as for the\nfirst, that is, for the Rational knowledg of the Existence of God, I\ncannot be perswaded to believe, there is any man which has sense and\nreason, that doth not acknowledg a God; nay, I am sure, there is no\npart of Nature which is void and destitute of this knowledg of the\nexistence of an Infinite, Eternal, Immortal, and Incomprehensible\nDeity; for every Creature, being indued with sense and reason, and\nwith sensitive and rational knowledg, there can no knowledg be\nmore Universal then the knowledg of a God, as being the root of\nall knowledg: And as all Creatures have a natural knowledg of the\nInfinite God, so, it is probable, they Worship, Adore, and Praise his\nInfinite Power and Bounty, each after its own manner, and according\nto its nature; for I cannot believe, God should make so many kinds of\nCreatures, and not be worshipped and adored but onely by Man: Nature is\nGod's Servant, and she knows God better then any Particular Creature;\nbut Nature is an Infinite Body, consisting of Infinite Parts, and if\nshe adores and worships God, her Infinite Parts, which are Natural\nCreatures, must of necessity do the like, each according to the\nknowledg it hath: but Man in this particular goes beyond others, as\nhaving not onely a natural, but also a revealed knowledg of the most\nHoly God; for he knows Gods Will, not onely by the light of Nature,\nbut also by revelation, and so more then other Creatures do, whose\nknowledg of God is meerly Natural. But this Revealed Knowledg makes\nmost men so presumptuous, that they will not be content with it, but\nsearch more and more into the hidden mysteries of the Incomprehensible\nDeity, and pretend to know God as perfectly, almost, as themselves;\ndescribing his Nature and Essence, his Attributes, his Counsels, his\nActions, according to the revelation of God, (as they pretend) when as\nit is according to their own Fancies. So proud and presumptuous are\nmany: But they shew thereby rather their weaknesses and follies, then\nany truth; and all their strict and narrow pryings into the secrets of\nGod, are rather unprofitable, vain and impious, then that they should\nbenefit either themselves, or their neighbour; for do all we can, God\nwill not be perfectly known by any Creature: The truth is, it is a\nmeer impossibility for a finite Creature, to have a perfect Idea of\nan Infinite Being, as God is; be his Reason never so acute or sharp,\nyet he cannot penetrate what is Impenetrable, nor comprehend what is\nIncomprehensible: Wherefore, in my opinion, the best way is humbly to\nadore what we cannot conceive, and believe as much as God has been\npleased to reveal, without any further search; lest we diving too deep,\nbe swallowed up in the bottomless depth of his Infiniteness: Which I\nwish every one may observe, for the benefit of his own self, and of\nothers, to spend his time in more profitable Studies, then vainly to\nseek for what cannot be found. And with this hearty wish I conclude,\nresting,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Ch._ Of the Image of the Mind.\n\n\n\n\nXXI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour _Author_ is so much for Spirits, that he doth not stick to\naffirm,[1] _That Bodies scarce make up a moity or half part of the\nworld; but Spirits, even by themselves, have or possess their moity,\nand indeed the whole world._ If he mean bodiless and incorporeal\nSpirits, I cannot conceive how Spirits can take up any place, for\nplace belongs onely to body, or a corporeal substance, and millions of\nimmaterial Spirits, nay, were their number infinite, cannot possess so\nmuch place as a small Pins point, for Incorporeal Spirits possess no\nplace at all: which is the reason, that an Immaterial and a Material\nInfinite cannot hinder, oppose, or obstruct each other; and such an\nInfinite, Immaterial Spirit is God alone. But as for Created Immaterial\nSpirits, as they call them, it may be questioned whether they be\nImmaterial, or not; for there may be material Spirits as well as\nimmaterial, that is, such pure, subtil and agil substances as cannot\nbe subject to any humane sense, which may be purer and subtiller then\nthe most refined air, or purest light; I call them material spirits,\nonely for distinctions sake, although it is more proper, to call them\nmaterial substances: But be it, that there are Immaterial Spirits,\nyet they are not natural, but supernatural; that is, not substantial\nparts of Nature; for Nature is material, or corporeal, and so are all\nher Creatures, and whatsoever is not material is no part of Nature,\nneither doth it belong any ways to Nature: Wherefore, all that is\ncalled Immaterial, is a Natural Nothing, and an Immaterial Natural\nsubstance, in my opinion, is _non_-sense: And if you contend with me,\nthat Created Spirits, as good and bad Angels, as also the Immortal Mind\nof Man, are Immaterial, then I say they are Supernatural; but if you\nsay, they are Natural, then I answer they are Material: and thus I do\nnot deny the existence of Immaterial Spirits, but onely that they are\nnot parts of Nature, but supernatural; for there may be many things\nabove Nature, and so above a natural Understanding, and Knowledg,\nwhich may nevertheless have their being and existence, although they\nbe not Natural, that is, parts of Nature: Neither do I deny that those\nsupernatural Creatures may be amongst natural Creatures, that is,\nhave their subsistence amongst them, and in Nature; but they are not\nso commixed with them, as the several parts of Matter are, that is,\nthey do not joyn to the constitution of a material Creature; for no\nImmaterial can make a Material, or contribute any thing to the making\nor production of it; but such a co-mixture would breed a meer confusion\nin Nature: wherefore, it is quite another thing, to be in Nature, or to\nhave its subsistence amongst natural Creatures in a supernatural manner\nor way, and to be a part of Nature. I allow the first to Immaterial\nSpirits, but not the second, _viz._ to be parts of Nature. But what\nImmaterial Spirits are, both in their Essence or Nature, and their\nEssential Properties, it being supernatural, and above natural Reason,\nI cannot determine any thing thereof. Neither dare I say, they are\nSpirits like as God is, that is, of the same Essence or Nature, no\nmore then I dare say or think that God is of a humane shape or figure,\nor that the Nature of God is as easie to be known as any notion else\nwhatsoever, and that we may know as much of him as of any thing else\nin the world. For if this were so, man would know God as well as he\nknows himself, but God and his Attributes are not so easily known as\nman may know himself and his own natural Proprieties; for God and\nhis Attributes are not conceiveable or comprehensible by any humane\nunderstanding, which is not onely material, but also finite; for\nthough the parts of Nature be infinite in number, yet each is finite\nin it self, that is, in its figure, and therefore no natural Creature\nis capable to conceive what God is; for he being infinite, there is\nalso required an infinite capacity to conceive him; Nay, Nature her\nself, although she is Infinite, yet cannot possibly have an exact\nnotion of God, by reason she is Material, and God is Immaterial; and\nif the Infinite servant of God is not able to conceive God, much less\nwill a finite part of Nature do it. Besides, the holy Church doth\nopenly confess and declare the Incomprehensibility of God, when in the\n_Athanasian_ Creed, she expresses, that the Father is Incomprehensible,\nthe Son Incomprehensible, and the Holy Ghost Incomprehensible, and\nthat there are not three, but one Incomprehensible God: Therefore, if\nany one will prove the contrary, to wit, that God is Comprehensible,\nor (which is all one) that God is as easie to be known as any Creature\nwhatsoever, he surely is more then the Church: But I shall never say or\nbelieve so, but rather confess my ignorance, then betray my folly; and\nleave things Divine to the Church; to which I submit, as I ought, in\nall Duty: and as I do not meddle with any Divine Mysteries, but subject\nmy self, concerning my Faith or Belief, and the regulating of my\nactions for the obtaining of Eternal Life, wholly under the government\nand doctrine of the Church, so, I hope, they will also grant me leave\nto have my liberty concerning the contemplation of Nature and natural\nthings, that I may discourse of them, with such freedom, as meer\nnatural Philosophers use, or at least ought, to do; and thus I shall be\nboth a good Christian, and a good Natural Philosopher: Unto which, to\nmake the number perfect, I will add a third, which is, I shall be,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your real and faithful_\n\n_Friend and Servant._\n\n[1] _Ch._ Of the Magnetick cure of wounds.\n\n\n\n\nXXII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nThough I am loth (as I have often told you) to imbarque my self in the\ndiscourse of such a subject, as no body is able naturally to know,\nwhich is the supernatural and divine Soul in Man; yet your _Author_\nhaving, in my judgment, strange opinions, both of the Essence, Figure,\nSeat and Production of the Soul, and discoursing thereof, with such\nliberty and freedom, as of any other natural Creature, I cannot chuse\nbut take some notice of his discourse, and make some reflections upon\nit; which yet, shall rather express my ignorance of the same subject,\nthen in a positive answer, declare my opinion thereof; for, in things\ndivine, I refer my self wholly to the Church, and submit onely to\ntheir instructions, without any further search of natural reason; and\nif I should chance to express more then I ought to do, and commit some\nerror, it being out of ignorance rather then set purpose, I shall be\nready upon better information, to mend it, and willingly subject my\nself under the censure and correction of the holy Church, as counting\nit no disgrace to be ignorant in the mysteries of Faith, since Faith\nis of things unknown, but rather a duty required from every Layman to\nbelieve simply the Word of God, as it is explained and declared by the\nOrthodox Church, without making Interpretations out of his own brain,\nand according to his own fancy, which breeds but Schismes, Heresies,\nSects, and Confusions. But concerning your _Author_, I perceive by him,\nfirst, that he makes no distinction between the Natural or Rational\nSoul or Mind of Man, and between the Divine or Supernatural Soul, but\ntakes them both as one, and distinguishes onely the Immortal Soul\nfrom the sensitive Life of Man, which he calls the Frail, Mortal,\nSensitive Soul. Next, all his knowledg of this Immortal Soul is\ngrounded upon Dreams and Visions, and therefore it is no wonder, if\nhis opinions be somewhat strange and irregular. _I saw, in a Vision,_\nsays he,[1] _my Mind in a humane shape; but there was a light, whose\nwhole homogeneal body was actively seeing, a spiritual substance,\nChrystalline, shining with a proper splendor, or a splendor of its own,\nbut in another cloudy part it was rouled up as it were in the husk of\nit self; which whether it had any splendor of it self, I could not\ndiscern, by reason of the superlative brightness of the Chrystal Spirit\ncontain'd within._ Whereupon he defines _the Soul_ to be _a Spirit,\nbeloved of God, homogeneal, simple, immortal, created into the Image\nof God, one onely Being, whereto death adds nothing, or takes nothing\nfrom it, which may be natural or proper to it in the Essence of its\nsimplicity._ As for this definition of the Soul, it may be true, for\nany thing I know: but when your _Author_ makes the divine Soul to be a\nLight, I cannot conceive how that can agree; for Light is a Natural and\nVisible Creature, and, in my opinion, a corporeal substance; whereas\nthe Soul is immaterial and incorporeal: But be it, that Light is not a\nsubstance, but a neutral Creature, according to your _Author_; then,\nnevertheless the Immortal Soul cannot be said to be a light, because\nshe is a substance. He may say,[2] The Soul is an Incomprehensible\nLight. But if the Soul be Incomprehensible, how then doth he know that\nshe is a light, and not onely a light, but a glorious and splendorous\nlight? You will say, By a Dream, or Vision. Truly, _Madam_, to judg\nany thing by a Dream, is a sign of a weak judgment. Nay, since your\n_Author_ calls the soul constantly a light; if it were so, and that\nit were such a splendorous, bright and shining light, as he says;\nthen when the body dies, and the soul leaves its Mansion, it would\ncertainly be seen, when it issues out of the body. But your _Author_\ncalls the Soul a _Spiritual Substance_, and yet he says, she has _an\nhomogeneal body, actively seeing and shining with a proper splendor\nof her own_; which how it can agree, I leave to you to judg; for I\nthought, an Immaterial spirit and a body were too opposite things, and\nnow I see, your _Author_ makes Material and Immaterial, Spiritual and\nCorporeal, all one. But this is not enough, but he allows it a Figure\ntoo, and that of a humane shape; for says he, I _could never consider\nthe Thingliness of the Immortal Mind with an Individual existence,\ndeprived of all figure, neither but that it at least would answer to\na humane shape_; but the Scripture, as much as is known to me, never\ndoth express any such thing of the Immortal Soul, and I should be loth\nto believe any more thereof then it declares. The Apostles, although\nthey were conversant with Christ, and might have known it better, yet\nwere never so inquisitive into the nature of the Soul, as our Modern\ndivine Philosophers are; for our Saviour, and they, regarded more the\nsalvation of Man's Soul, and gave holy and wise Instructions rather,\nhow to live piously and conformably to God's Will, to gain eternal\nLife, then that they should discourse either of the Essence or Figure,\nor Proprieties of the Soul, and whether it was a light, or any thing\nelse, and such like needless questions, raised in after-times onely\nby the curiosity of divine Philosophers, or Philosophying Divines;\nFor though Light is a glorious Creature, yet Darkness is as well a\nCreature as Light, and ought not therefore to be despised; for if it\nbe not so bright, and shining as Light, yet it is a grave Matron-like\nCreature, and very useful: Neither is the Earth, which is inwardly\ndark, to be despised, because the Sun is bright. The like may be said\nof the soul, and of the body; for the body is very useful to the soul,\nhow dark soever your _Author_ believes it to be; and if he had not\nseen light with his bodily eyes, he could never have conceived the\nSoul to be a Light: Wherefore your _Author_ can have no more knowledg\nof the divine soul then other men have, although he has had more\nDreams and Visions; nay, he himself confesses, that the Soul is an\nIncomprehensible Light; which if so, she cannot, be perfectly known,\nnor confined to any certain figure; for a figure or shape belongs\nonely to a corporeal substance, and not to an incorporeal: and so, God\nbeing an Incomprehensible Being, is excluded from all figure, when as\nyet your _Author_ doth not stick to affirm, that God is of a humane\nfigure too, as well as the humane Soul is; _For_, says he, _Since God\nhath been pleased to adopt the Mind alone into his own Image, it also\nseems to follow, that the vast and unutterable God is of a humane\nFigure, and that from an argument from the effect, if there be any\nforce of arguments in this subject._ Oh! the audacious curiosity of\nMan! Is it not blasphemy to make the Infinite God of a frail and humane\nshape, and to compare the most Holy to a sinful Creature? Nay, is it\nnot an absurdity, to confine and inclose that Incomprehensible Being\nin a finite figure? I dare not insist longer upon this discourse,\nlest I defile my thoughts with the entertaining of such a subject\nthat derogates from the glory of the Omnipotent Creator; Wherefore, I\nwill hasten, as much as I can, to the seat of the Soul, which, after\nrelating several opinions, your _Author_ concludes to be the orifice\nof the stomack, where the Immortal Soul is involved and entertained\nin the radical Inn or Bride-bed of the sensitive Soul or vital Light;\nwhich part of the body is surely more honoured then all the rest: But\nI, for my part, cannot conceive why the Soul should not dwell in the\nparts of conception, as well, as in the parts of digestion, except it\nbe to prove her a good Huswife; however, your _Author_ allows her to\nslide down sometimes: For, _The action of the Mind_, says he, _being\nimprisoned in the Body, doth always tend downwards_; but whether\nthe Soul tend more downwards then upwards, Contemplative Persons,\nespecially Scholars, and grave States-men, do know best; certainly, I\nbelieve, they find the soul more in their heads then in their heels,\nat least her operations. But, to conclude, if the Soul be pure and\nsingle of her self, she cannot mix with the Body, because she needs\nno assistance; nor joyn with the Body, though she lives in the Body,\nfor she needs no support; and if she be individable, she cannot divide\nher self into several Parts of the Body; but if the Soul spread over\nall the Body, then she is bigger, or less, according as the Body is;\nand if she be onely placed in some particular part, then onely that\none part is indued with a Soul, and the rest is Soul-less; and if she\nmove from place to place, then some parts of the Body will be sometimes\nindued with a Soul, sometimes not; and if any one part requires not\nthe subsistence of the Soul within it, then perhaps all the Body might\nhave been able to spare her; neither might the Soul, being able to\nsubsist without the body, have had need of it. Thus useless questions\nwill trouble men's brains, if they give their fancies leave to work.\nI should add something of the Production of the Soul; but being tyred\nwith so tedious a discourse of your _Author_, I am not able to write\nany more, but repose my Pen, and in the mean while rest affectionately,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Ch._ Of the Image of the Mind.\n\n[2] Of the Spirit of Life.\n\n\n\n\nXXIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour _Authors_ comparison[1] of the Sun, with the immaterial or divine\nSoul in Man, makes me almost of opinion, that the Sun is the Soul of\nthis World we inhabit, and that the fixed Stars, which are counted\nSuns by some, may be souls to some other worlds; for every one man has\nbut one immaterial or divine soul, which is said to be individable\nand simple in its essence, and therefore unchangeable; and if the Sun\nbe like this immaterial soul, then the Moon may be like the material\nsoul. But as for the Production of this immaterial and divine Soul in\nMan, whether it come by an immediate Creation from God, or be derived\nby a successive propagation from Parents upon their Children, I cannot\ndetermine any thing, being supernatural, and not belonging to my\nstudy; nevertheless, the Propagation from Parents seems improbable to\nmy reason; for I am not capable to imagine, how an immaterial soul,\nbeing individable, should beget another. Some may say, by imprinting or\nsealing, _viz._ that the soul doth print the Image of its own figure\nupon the spirit of the seed; which if so, then first there will onely\nbe a production of the figure of the soul, but not of the substance,\nand so the Child will have but the Image of the soul, and not a real\nand substantial soul. Secondly, Every Child of the same Parents would\nbe just alike, without any distinguishment; if not in body, yet in the\nFaculties and Proprieties of their Minds or Souls. Thirdly, There must\nbe two prints of the two souls of both Parents upon one Creature, to\nwit, the Child; for both Parents do contribute alike to the Production\nof the Child, and then the Child would either have two souls, or both\nmust be joyned as into one; which how it can be, I am not able to\nconceive. Fourthly, If the Parents print the Image of their souls upon\nthe Child, then the Childs soul bears not the Image of God, but the\nImage of Man, to wit, his Parents. Lastly, I cannot understand, how an\nimmaterial substance should make a print upon a corporeal substance,\nfor Printing is a corporeal action, and belongs onely to bodies. Others\nmay say, that the soul is from the Parents transmitted into the Child,\nlike as a beam of Light; but then the souls of the Parents must part\nwith some of their own substance; for light is a substance dividable,\nin my opinion; and if it were not, yet the soul is a substance, and\ncannot be communicated without losing some of his own substance,\nbut that is impossible; for the immaterial soul being individable,\ncannot be diminished nor increased in its substance or Nature. Others\nagain, will have the soul produced by certain Ideas; but Ideas being\ncorporeal, cannot produce a substance Incorporeal or Spiritual.\nWherefore I cannot conceive how the souls of the Parents, being\nindividable in themselves, and not immoveable out of their bodies until\nthe time of death, should commix so, as to produce a third immaterial\nsoul, like to their own. You will say, As the Sun, which is the\nfountain of heat and light, heats and enlightens, and produces other\nCreatures. But I answer, The Sun doth not produce other Suns, at least\nnot to our knowledg. 'Tis true, there are various and several manners\nand ways of Productions, but they are all natural, that is, material,\nor corporeal; to wit, Productions of some material beings, or corporeal\nsubstances; but the immaterial soul not being in the number of these,\nit is not probable, that she is produced by the way of corporeal\nproductions, but created and infused from God, according to her nature,\nwhich is supernatural and divine: But being the Image of God, how she\ncan be defiled with the impurity of sin, and suffer eternal damnation\nfor her wickedness, without any prejudice to her Creator, I leave to\nthe Church to inform us thereof. Onely one question I will add, Whether\nthe Soul be subject to Sickness and Pain? To which I answer: As for the\nsupernatural and divine Soul, although she be a substance, yet being\nnot corporeal, but spiritual, she can never suffer pain, sickness, nor\ndeath; but as for the natural soul, to speak properly, there is no\nsuch thing in Nature as pain, sickness, or death; unless in respect\nto some Particular Creatures composed of natural Matter; for what Man\ncalls Sickness, Pain, and Death, are nothing else but the Motions of\nNature; for though there is but one onely Matter, that is, nothing but\nmeer Matter in Nature, without any co-mixture of either a spiritual\nsubstance, or any thing else that is not Matter; yet this meer Matter\nis of several degrees and parts, and is the body of Nature; Besides,\nas there is but one onely Matter, so there is also but one onely\nMotion in Nature, as I may call it, that is, meer corporeal Motion,\nwithout any rest or cessation, which is the soul of that Natural body,\nboth being infinite; but yet this onely corporeal Motion is infinitely\nvarious in its degrees or manners, and ways of moving; for it is\nnothing else but the action of natural Matter, which action must needs\nbe infinite, being the action of an infinite body, making infinite\nfigures and parts. These motions and actions of Nature, since they\nare so infinitely various, when men chance to observe some of their\nvariety, they call them by some proper name, to make a distinguishment,\nespecially those motions which belong to the figure of their own\nkind; and therefore when they will express the motions of dissolution\nof their own figure, they call them Death; when they will express\nthe motions of Production of their figure, they call them Conception\nand Generation; when they will express the motions proper for the\nConsistence, Continuance and Perfection of their Figure, they call them\nHealth; but when they will express the motions contrary to these, they\ncall them Sickness, Pain, Death, and the like: and hence comes also the\ndifference between regular and irregular motions; for all those Motions\nthat belong to the particular nature and consistence of any figure,\nthey call regular, and those which are contrary to them, they call\nirregular. And thus you see, _Madam_, that there is no such thing in\nNature, as Death, Sickness, Pain, Health, &c. but onely a variety and\nchange of the corporeal motions, and that those words express nothing\nelse but the variety of motions in Nature; for men are apt to make more\ndistinctions then Nature doth: Nature knows of nothing else but of\ncorporeal figurative Motions, when as men make a thousand distinctions\nof one thing, and confound and entangle themselves so, with Beings,\nNon-beings, and Neutral-beings, Corporeals and Incorporeals, Substances\nand Accidents, or manners and modes of Substances, new Creations,\nand Annihilations, and the like, as neither they themselves, nor any\nbody else, is able to make any sense thereof; for they are like the\ntricks and slights of Juglers, 'tis here, 'tis gone; and amongst those\n_Authors_ which I have read as yet, the most difficult to be understood\nis this _Author_ which I am now perusing, who runs such divisions, and\ncuts Nature into so small Parts, as the sight of my Reason is not sharp\nenough to discern them. Wherefore I will leave them to those that are\nmore quick-sighted then I, and rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your constant Friend,_\n\n_and faithful Servant._\n\n[1] Of the seat of the Soul. _It._ Of the Image of the Mind.\n\n\n\n\nXXIV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour _Author_ relates,[1] how by some the _Immortal Soul is divided\ninto two distinct parts; the Inferior or more outward, which by a\npeculiar name is called the Soul, and the other the Superior, the\nmore inward, the which is called the bottom of the Soul or Spirit, in\nwhich Part the Image of God is specially contained; unto which is no\naccess for the Devil, because there is the Kingdom of God_: and each\npart has distinct Acts, Proprieties, and Faculties. Truly, _Madam_, I\nwonder, how some men dare discourse so boldly of the Soul, without any\nground either of Scripture or Reason, nay, with such contradiction to\nthemselves, or their own opinions; For how can that be severed into\nparts, which in its nature is Individable? and how can the Image of\nGod concern but one Part of the Soul, and not the other? Certainly,\nif the Soul is the Image of God, it is his Image wholly, and not\npartially, or in parts. But your _Author_ has other as strange and\nodd opinions as these, some whereof I have mentioned in my former\nLetters, the Souls being a Light, her Figure, her Residence, and many\nthe like: Amongst the rest, there is one thing which your _Author_\nfrequently makes mention of;[2] I know not what to call it, whether\na thing, or a being, or no-thing; for it is neither of them; not a\nsubstance, nor an accident; neither a body, nor a spirit; and this\nMonster (for I think this is its proper name, since none other will\nfit it) is the Lacquey of the Soul, to run upon all errands; for the\nSoul sitting in her Princely Throne or Residence, which is the orifice\nof the stomack, cannot be every where her self; neither is it fit she\nshould, as being a disgrace to her, to perform all offices her self\nfor want of servants, therefore she sends out this most faithful and\ntrusty officer, (your _Author_ calls him _Ideal Entity_) who being\nprepared for his journey, readily performs all her commands, as being\nnot tied up to no commands of places, times or dimensions, especially\nin Women with Child he operates most powerfully; for sometime he\nprinted a Cherry on a Child, by a strong Idea of the Mother; but this\nIdeal Entity or servant of the Soul, hath troubled my brain more, then\nhis Mistress the Soul her self; for I could not, nor cannot as yet\nconceive, how he might be able to be the Jack of all offices, and do\nJournies and travel from one part of the body to another, being no body\nnor substance himself, nor tyed to any place, time, and dimension,\nand therefore I will leave him. Your _Author_ also speaks much of the\nInward and Outward Man; but since that belongs to Divinity, I will\ndeclare nothing of it; onely this I say, that, in my opinion, the\nInward and Outward man do not make a double Creature, neither properly,\nnor improperly; properly, as to make two different men; improperly, as\nwe use to call that man double, whose heart doth not agree with his\nwords. But by the Outward man I understand the sinful actions of flesh\nand blood, and by the Inward man the reformed actions of the Spirit,\naccording to the Word of God; and therefore the Outward and Inward\nman make but one Man. Concerning the Natural Soul, your _Author_[3]\nspeaks of her more to her disgrace then to her honor; for he scorns to\ncall her a substance, neither doth he call her the Rational Soul, but\nhe calls her the Sensitive Soul, and makes the Divine Soul to be the\nRational Natural Soul, and the cause of all natural actions; for he\nbeing a Divine Philosopher, mixes Divine and Natural things together:\nBut of the Frail, Mortal, Sensitive Soul, as he names her, which is\nonely the sensitive Life, his opinions are, that she is neither a\nsubstance, nor an accident, but a Neutral Creature, and a Vital Light,\nwhich hath not its like in the whole World, but the light of a Candle;\nfor it is extinguished, and goes out like the flame of a Candle; it is\nlocally present, and entertained in a place, and yet not comprehended\nin a place. Nevertheless, although this sensitive soul is no substance,\nyet it has the honor to be the Inn or Lodging-place of the Immortal\nSoul or Mind; and these two souls being both lights, do pierce each\nother; but the Mortal soul blunts the Immortal soul with its cogitation\nof the corruption of _Adam_. These opinions, _Madam_, I confess really,\nI do not know what to make of them; for I cannot imagine, how this\nMortal soul, being no substance, can contain the Immortal soul, which\nis a substance; nor how they can pierce each other, and the Mortal\nsoul being substanceless, get the better over an Immortal substance,\nand vitiate, corrupt, and infect it; neither can I conceive, how that,\nwhich in a manner is nothing already, can be made less and annihilated.\nWherefore, my opinion is, that the Natural Soul, Life, and Body, are\nall substantial parts of Infinite Nature, not subsisting by themselves\neach apart, but inseparably united and co-mixed both in their actions\nand substances; for not any thing can and doth subsist of it self in\nNature, but God alone; and things supernatural may, for ought I know:\n'Tis true, there are several Degrees, several particular Natures,\nseveral Actions or Motions, and several Parts in Nature, but none\nsubsists single, and by it self, without reference to the whole, and to\none another. Your _Author_ says, the Vital Spirit sits in the Throne\nof the Outward man as Vice Roy of the Soul, and acts by Commission of\nthe Soul; but it is impossible, that one single part should be King\nof the whole Creature, since Rational and sensitive Matter is divided\ninto so many parts, which have equal power and force of action in their\nturns and severall imployments; for though Nature is a Monarchess over\nall her Creatures, yet in every particular Creature is a Republick,\nand not a Monarchy; for no part of any Creature has a sole supreme\nPower over the rest. Moreover, your _Author_[4] says, That an _Angel\nis not a Light himself, nor has an Internal Light, natural and proper\nto himself, but is the Glass of an uncreated Light_: Which, to my\napprehension, seems to affirm, That Angels are the Looking-glasses\nof God; a pretty Poetical Fancy, but not grounded on the Scripture:\nfor the Scripture doth not express any such thing of them, but onely\nthat they are[5] _Ministring Spirits sent forth to minister for them\nwho shall be heirs of Salvation_: Which, I think, is enough for us to\nknow here, and leave the rest until we come to enjoy their company in\nHeaven. But it is not to be admired, that those, which pretend to know\nthe Nature and Secrets of God, should not have likewise knowledg of\nSupernatural Creatures; In which conceit I leave them, and rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your real and faithful_\n\n_Friend and Servant._\n\n[1] _Ch._ Of the Image of the Soul.\n\n[2] _Ch._ Of the Magnetick cure of wounds.\n\n[3] Of the seat of the Soul.\n\n[4] _Ch._ Of the Image of the Mind.\n\n[5] _Heb._ 11. 14.\n\n\n\n\nXXV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nReason and Intellect are two different things to your _Author_;[1]\nfor _Intellect_, says he, _doth properly belong to the Immortal Soul,\nas being a Formal Light, and the very substance of the Soul it self,\nwherein the Image of God onely consists; But Reason is an uncertain,\nfrail faculty of the Mortal Soul, and doth in no ways belong, nor has\nany communion with the Intellect of the Mind._ Which seems to me, as\nif your _Author_ did make some difference between the Divine, and\nthe Natural Soul in Man, although he doth not plainly declare it in\nthe same Terms; for that which I name the Divine Soul, is to him the\nImmortal Mind, Intellect, or Understanding, and the Seat of the Image\nof God; but the Natural Soul he calls the Frail, Mortal, and Rational\nSoul; and as Understanding is the Essence of the Immortal, so Reason\nis to him the Essence of the Mortal Soul; which Reason he attributes\nnot only to Man, but also to Brutes: For _Reason and Discourse_, says\nhe, _do not obscurely flourish and grow in brute Beasts, for an aged\nFox is more crafty then a younger one by rational discourse_; and\nagain, _That the Rational Part of the Soul doth belong to brutes, is\nwithout doubt_: Wherein he rightly dissents from those, which onely\ndo attribute a sensitive Soul to brutes; and Reason to none but Man,\nwhom therefore they call a Rational Creature, and by this Rational\nFaculty do distinguish him from the rest of Animals. And thus I\nperceive the difference betwixt your _Authors_ opinion, and theirs,\nis, That other Philosophers commonly do make the Rational soul, to be\npartly that which I call the supernatural and divine Soul, as onely\nbelonging to man, and bearing the Image of God, not acknowledging any\nother Natural, but a Sensitive soul in the rest of Animals, and a\nVegetative soul in Vegetables; and these three souls, or faculties,\noperations, or degrees, (call them what you will, for we shall not\nfall out about names,) concurr and joyn together in Man; but the\nrest of all Creatures, are void and destitute of Life, as well as of\nSoul, and therefore called Unanimate; and thus they make the natural\nrational soul, and the divine soul in man to be all one thing, without\nany distinguishment; but your _Author_ makes a difference between the\nMortal and Immortal soul in Man; the Immortal he calls the Intellect\nor Understanding, and the Mortal soul he calls Reason: but to my\njudgment he also attributes to the immortal soul, actions which are\nboth natural, and supernatural, adscribing that to the divine soul,\nwhich onely belongs to the natural, and taking that from the natural,\nwhich properly belongs to her. Besides, he slights and despises the\nRational soul so, as if she were almost of no value with Man, making\nher no substance, but a mental intricate and obscure Being, and so far\nfrom Truth, as if there were no affinity betwixt Truth and Reason,\nbut that they disagree in their very roots, and that the most refined\nReason may be deceitful. But your _Author_, by his leave, confounds\nReason, and Reasoning, which are two several and distinct things; for\nreasoning and arguing differs as much from Reason, as doubtfulness\nfrom certainty of knowledg, or a wavering mind from a constant mind;\nfor Reasoning is the discoursive, and Reason the understanding part in\nMan, and therefore I can find no great difference between Understanding\nand Reason: Neither can I be perswaded, that Reason should not remain\nwith Man after this life, and enter with him into Heaven, although\nyour _Author_ speaks much against it; for if Man shall be the same\nthen, which he is now, in body, why not in soul also? 'Tis true, the\nScripture says, he shall have a more glorious body; but it doth not\nsay, that some parts of the body shall be cast away, or remain behind;\nand if not of the body, why of the soul? Why shall Reason, which is\nthe chief part of the natural Soul, be wanting? Your _Author_ is much\nfor Intellect or Understanding; but I cannot imagine how Understanding\ncan be without Reason. Certainly, when he saw the Immortal Soul in\na Vision, to be a formal Light, how could he discern what he saw,\nwithout Reason? How could he distinguish between Light and Darkness,\nwithout Reason? How could he know the Image of the Mind to be the Image\nof God, without the distinguishment of Reason? You will say, Truth\ninformed him, and not Reason. I answer, Reason shews the Truth. You\nmay reply, Truth requires no distinguishment or judgment. I grant,\nthat perfect Truth requires not reasoning or arguing, as whether it\nbe so, or not; but yet it requires reason, as to confirm it to be so,\nor not so; for Reason is the confirmation of Truth, and Reasoning is\nbut the Inquisition into Truth: Wherefore, when our Souls shall be in\nthe fulness of blessedness, certainly, they shall not be so dull and\nstupid, but observe distinctions between God, Angels, and sanctified\nSouls; as also, that our glory is above our merit, and that there is\ngreat difference between the Damned, and the Blessed, and that God is\nan Eternal and Infinite Being, and onely to be adored, admired, and\nloved, and that we enjoy as much as can be enjoyed: All which the Soul\ncannot know without the distinguishment of Reason; otherwise we might\nsay, the Souls in Heaven, love, joy, admire and adore, but know not\nwhat, why, or wherefore; For, shall the blessed Souls present continual\nPraises without reason? Have they not reason to praise God for their\nhappiness, and shall they not remember the Mercies of God, and the\nMerits of his Son? For without remembrance of them, they cannot give\na true acknowledgment, although your _Author_ says there is no use of\nMemory or remembrance in Heaven: but surely, I believe there is; for if\nthere were not memory in Heaven, the Penitent Thief upon the Cross his\nPrayers had been in vain; for he desired our Saviour to remember him\nwhen he did come into his Kingdom: Wherefore if there be Understanding\nin Heaven, there is also Reason; and if there be Reason, there is\nMemory also: for all Souls in Heaven, as well as on Earth, have reason\nto adore, love, and praise God. But, _Madam_, my study is in natural\nPhilosophy, not in Theology; and therefore I'le refer you to Divines,\nand leave your _Author_ to his own fancy, who by his singular Visions\ntells us more news of our Souls, then our Saviour did after his Death\nand Resurrection: Resting in the mean time,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Ch._ The hunting or searching out of Sciences. _It._ Of the Image\nof the Mind.\n\n\n\n\nXXVI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nConcerning those parts and chapters of your _Authors_ Works, which\ntreat of Physick; before I begin to examine them, I beg leave of you\nin this present, to make some reflections first upon his Opinions\nconcerning the Nature of Health and Diseases: As for _Health_, he is\npleased to say,[1] That _it consists not in a just Temperature of the\nbody, but in a sound and intire Life; for otherwise, a Temperature of\nbody is as yet in a dead Carcass newly kill'd, where notwithstanding\nthere is now death, but not life, not health_: Also he says,[2] _That\nno disease is in a dead carcass._ To which I answer, That, in my\nopinion, Life is in a dead Carcass, as well as in a living Animal,\nalthough not such a Life as that Creature had before it became a\nCarcass, and the Temperature of that Creature is altered with the\nalteration of its particular life; for the temperature of that\nparticular life, which was before in the Animal, doth not remain in\nthe Carcass, in such a manner as it was when it had the life of such\nor such an Animal; nevertheless, a dead Carcass hath life, and such a\ntemperature of life, as is proper, and belonging to its own figure: for\nthere are as many different lives, as there be different creatures,\nand each creature has its particular life and soul, as partaking of\nsensitive and rational Matter. And if a dead Carcass hath life, and\nsuch a temperature of motions as belong to its own life, then there\nis no question, but these motions may move sometimes irregularly in\na dead Carcass as well, as in any other Creature; and since health\nand diseases are nothing else but the regularity or irregularity of\nsensitive corporeal Motions, a dead Carcass having Irregular motions,\nmay be said as well to have diseases, as a living body, as they name\nit, although it is no proper or usual term for other Creatures, but\nonely for Animals. However, if there were no such thing as a disease\n(or term it what you will, I will call it Irregularity of sensitive\nmotions) in a dead Carcass, How comes it that the infection of a\ndisease proceeds often from dead Carcasses into living Animals? For,\ncertainly, it is not meerly the odour or stink of a dead body, for\nthen all stinking Carcasses would produce an Infection; wherefore this\nInfection must necessarily be inherent in the Carcass, and proceed\nfrom the Irregularity of its motions. Next I'le ask you, Whether a\nConsumption be a disease, or not? If it be, then a dead Carcass might\nbe said to have a disease, as well as a living body; and the \u00c6gyptians\nknew a soveraign remedy against this disease, which would keep a dead\nCarcass intire and undissolved many ages; but as I said above, a dead\nCarcass is not that which it was being a living Animal, wherefore\ntheir effects cannot be the same, having not the same causes. Next,\nyour _Author_ is pleased to call, with _Hippocrates, Nature the onely\nPhysicianess of Diseases._ I affirm it; and say moreover, that as\nshe is the onely Physicianess, so she is also the onely Destroyeress\nand Murtheress of all particular Creatures, and their particular\nlives; for she dissolves and transforms as well as she frames and\ncreates; and acts according to her pleasure, either for the increase\nor decrease, augmentation or destruction, sickness or health, life\nor death of Particular Creatures. But concerning Diseases, your\n_Authors_ opinion is, That _a Disease is as Natural as Health._ I\nanswer; 'tis true, Diseases are natural; but if we could find out the\nart of healing, as well as the art of killing and destroying; and the\nart of uniting and composing, as well as the art of separating and\ndividing, it would be very beneficial to man; but this may easier be\nwished for, then obtained; for Nature being a corporeal substance, has\ninfinite parts, as well as an infinite body; and Art, which is onely\nthe playing action of Nature, and a particular Creature, can easier\ndivide and separate parts, then unite and make parts; for Art cannot\nmatch, unite, and joyn parts so as Nature doth; for Nature is not\nonely dividable and composeable, being a corporeal substance, but she\nis also full of curiosity and variety, being partly self-moving: and\nthere is great difference between forced actions, and natural actions;\nfor the one sort is regular, the other irregular. But you may say,\nIrregularities are as natural as Regularities. I grant it; but Nature\nleaves the irregular part most commonly to her daughter or creature\nArt, that is, she makes irregularities for varieties sake, but she\nher self orders the regular part, that is, she is more careful of her\nregular actions; and thus Nature taking delight in variety suffers\nirregularities; for otherwise, if there were onely regularities, there\ncould not be so much variety. Again your _Author_ says,[3] That _a\ndisease doth not consist but in living bodies._ I answer, there is\nnot any body that has not life; for if life is general, then all\nfigures or parts have life; but though all bodies have life, yet all\nbodies have not diseases; for diseases are but accidental to bodies,\nand are nothing else but irregular motions in particular Creatures,\nwhich may be not onely in Animals, but generally in all Creatures;\nfor there may be Irregularities in all sorts of Creatures, which may\ncause untimely dissolutions; but yet all dissolutions are not made by\nirregular motions, for many creatures dissolve regularly, but onely\nthose which are untimely. In the same place your _Author_ mentions,\nThat _a Disease consists immediately in Life it self, but not in the\ndregs and filthinesses, which are erroneous forreigners and strangers\nto the life._ I grant, that a Disease is made by the motions of Life,\nbut not such a life as your _Author_ describes, which doth go out like\nthe snuff of a Candle, or as one of _Lucian's_ Poetical Lights; but\nby the life of Nature, which cannot go out without the destruction of\nInfinite Nature: and as the Motions of Nature's life make diseases or\nirregularities, so they make that which man names dregs and filths;\nwhich dregs, filths, sickness, and death, are nothing but changes\nof corporeal motions, different from those motions or actions that\nare proper to the health, perfection and consistence of such or such\na figure or creature. But, to conclude, there is no such thing as\ncorruption, sickness, or death, properly in Nature, for they are\nmade by natural actions, and are onely varieties in Nature, but not\nobstructions or destructions of Nature, or annihilations of particular\nCreatures; and so is that we name Superfluities, which bear onely a\nrelation to a particular Creature, which hath more Motion and Matter\nthen is proper for the nature of its figure. And thus much of this\nsubject for the present, from,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and humble Servant._\n\n[1] _Ch._ Call'd the Authors answers.\n\n[2] _Ch._ Of the subject of inhering of diseases.\n\n[3] _Ch._ The subject of inhering of diseases is in the point of life.\n_It. Ch._ Of the knowledg of diseases.\n\n\n\n\nXXVII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nIn my last, I remember, I told you of your _Authors_ opinion concerning\nthe seat of Diseases, _viz._ that Diseases are properly in living\nbodies, and consist in the life it self; but when I consider his\ndefinition of Life, and of a Disease, I cannot conceive how they\nshould consist together; for he describes[1] _a Disease to be a real,\nmaterial and substantial being, truly subsisting in a body; but life\nto be a meer nothing, and_ _yet the immediate mansion of a disease,\nthe inward subject, yea, and workman of the same; and that with the\nlife all diseases depart into nothing._ Surely, _Madam_, it exceedeth\nmy understanding; for, first, I cannot conceive how life, which is a\nmeer Nothing, can be a lodging to something? Next, how Nothing can\ndepart and die? and thirdly how Something can become Nothing? I think\nyour _Author_ might call a dead Carcass as well No-thing, as Life; and\nsince he names Diseases the Thieves of Life, they must needs be but\npoor Thieves, because they steal No-thing. But your _Author_ compares\nLife to Light, and calls it an Extinguishable Light, like the light of\na Candle; which if so, then the old saying is verified, That life goes\nout like the snuff of a Candle. But I wonder, _Madam_, that grave and\nwise men will seriously make use of a similising old Proverb, or of a\nPoetical Fancy, in matter of natural Philosophy; for I have observed,\nthat _Homer, Lucian, Ovid, Virgil, Horace,_ &c. have been very\nserviceable to great Philosophers, who have taken the ground of their\nFictions, and transferred them into Natural Philosophy, as Immaterial\nsubstances, Non-beings, and many the like; but they can neither do any\ngood nor hurt to Nature, but onely spoil Philosophical Knowledg; and as\nNature is ignorant of Immaterials and Non-beings, so Art is ignorant\nof Nature; for Mathematical Rules, Measures, and Demonstrations,\ncannot rule, measure nor demonstrate Nature, no more, then Chymical\nDivisions, Dissolutions and Extractions (or rather distractions, nay,\nI may say destructions) can divide, dissolve, extract, compose, and\nunite, as Nature doth; Wherefore their Instruments, Figures, Furnaces,\nLimbecks, and Engines, cannot instruct them of the truth of Natures\nPrinciples; but the best and readiest way to find out Nature, or rather\nsome truth of Nature, is sense and reason, which are Parts of Natures\nactive substance, and therefore the truest informers of Nature; but\nthe Ignorance of Nature has caused Ignorance amongst Philosophers,\nand the Ignorance of Philosophers hath caused numerous Opinions, and\nnumerous Opinions have caused various Discourses and Disputes; which\nDiscourses and Disputes, are not Sense and Reason, but proceed from\nIrregular Motions; and Truth is not found in Irregularities. But to\nreturn to Life: it seems your _Author_ hath taken his opinion from\n_Lucian's_ Kingdom of Lights, the Lights being the Inhabitants thereof;\nand when any was adjudged to die, his Light was put out, which was his\npunishment: And thus this Heathenish Fiction is become a Christian\nVerity; when as yet your _Author_ rayls much at those, that insist upon\nthe Opinions and Doctrine of Pagan Philosophers. Wherefore I will leave\nthis Poetical Fancy of Life, and turn to Death, and see what opinion\nyour _Author_ hath of that. First, concerning the cause or original of\nDeath; _Neither God_, says he,[2] _nor the Evil Spirit, is the Creator\nof Death, but Man onely, who made Death for himself; Neither did Nature\nmake death, but Man made death natural._ Which if it be so, then Death\nbeing, to my opinion, a natural Creature, as well as Life, Sickness,\nand Health; Man, certainly, had great Power, as to be the Creator of a\nnatural Creature. But, I would fain know the reason, why your _Author_\nis so unwilling to make God the Author of Death, and Sickness, as well\nas of Damnation? Doth it imply any Impiety or Irreligiousness? Doth\nnot God punish, as well as reward? and is not death a punishment for\nour sin? You may say, Death came from sin, but sin did not come from\nGod. Then some might ask from whence came sin? You will say, From the\nTransgression of the Command of God, as the eating of the Forbidden\nFruit. But from whence came this Transgression? It might be answer'd,\nFrom the Perswasion of the Serpent. From whence came this Perswasion?\nFrom his ill and malitious nature to oppose God, and ruine the race of\nMankind. From whence came this ill Nature? From his Fall. Whence came\nhis Fall? From his Pride and Ambition to be equal with God. From whence\ncame this Pride? From his Free-will. From whence came his Free-will?\nFrom God. Thus, _Madam_, if we should be too inquisitive into the\nactions of God, we should commit Blasphemy, and make God Cruel, as to\nbe the Cause of Sin, and consequently of Damnation. But although God\nis not the Author of Sin, yet we may not stick to say, that he is the\nAuthor of the Punishment of Sin, as an Act of his Divine Justice; which\nPunishment, is Sickness, and Death; nay, I see no reason, why not of\nDamnation too, as it is a due punishment for the sins of the wicked;\nfor though Man effectively works his own punishment, yet Gods Justice\ninflicts it: Like as a just Judg may be call'd the cause of a Thief\nbeing hang'd. But these questions are too curious; and some men will\nbe as presumptuous as the Devil, to enquire into Gods secret actions,\nalthough they be sure that they cannot be known by any Creature.\nWherefore let us banish such vain thoughts, and onely admire, adore,\nlove, and praise God, and implore his Mercy, to give us grace to shun\nthe punishments for our sins by the righteousness of our actions, and\nnot endeavour to know his secret designs. Next, I dissent from your\n_Author_,[3] That _Death and all dead things do want roots whereby they\nmay produce_: For death, and dead things, in my opinion, are the most\nactive producers, at least they produce more numerously and variously\nthen those we name living things; for example, a dead Horse will\nproduce more several Animals, besides other Creatures, then a living\nHorse can do; but what _Archeus_ and _Ideas_ a dead Carcass hath, I can\ntell no more, then what _Blas_ or _Gas_ it hath; onely this I say, that\nit has animate Matter, which is the onely _Archeus_ or Master-workman,\nthat produces all things, creates all things, dissolves all things,\nand transforms all things in Nature; but not out of Nothing, or into\nNothing, as to create new Creatures which were not before in Nature, or\nto annihilate Creatures, and to reduce them to nothing; but it creates\nand transforms out of, and in the same Matter which has been from all\nEternity. Lastly, your _Author_ is pleased to say, That _he doth not\nbehold a disease as an abstracted Quality; and that Apoplexy, Leprosie,\nDropsie, and Madness, as they are Qualities in the abstract, are not\ndiseases._ I am of his mind, that a disease is a real and corporeal\nbeing, and do not understand what he and others mean by abstracted\nqualities; for Nature knows of no abstraction of qualities from\nsubstances, and I doubt Man can do no more then Nature doth: Besides,\nthose abstractions are needless, and to no purpose; for no Immaterial\nquality will do any hurt, if it be no substance; wherefore Apoplexy,\nLeprosie, Dropsie, and Madness, are Corporeal beings, as well as the\nrest of Diseases, and not abstracted Qualities; and I am sure, Persons\nthat are affected with those diseases will tell the same. Wherefore\nleaving needless abstractions to fancies abstracted from right sense\nand reason, I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Ch._ Of the knowledg of diseases.\n\n[2] _Ch._ Called the Position.\n\n[3] _Ch._ Of the knowledg of diseases.\n\n\n\n\nXXVIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI am very much troubled to see your _Authors_ Works fill'd with so\nmany spiteful reproaches and bitter taunts against the Schools of\nPhysicians, condemning both their Theory and Practice; nay, that not\nonely the Modern Schools of Physicians, but also the two ancient and\nfamous Physicians, _Galen_, and _Paracelsus_, must sufficiently suffer\nby him; especially _Galen_; for there is hardly a Chapter in all his\nWorks, which has not some accusations of blind errors, sloth, and\nsluggishness, Ignorance, Covetousness, Cruelty, and the like: Which I\nam very sorry for; not onely for the sake of your _Author_ himself, who\nherein doth betray both his rashness, and weakness, in not bridling\nhis passions, and his too great presumption, reliance and confidence\nin his own abilities, and extraordinary Gifts; but also for the sake\nof the Fame and Repute of our Modern Physicians; for without making\nnow any difference betwixt the _Galenists_ and _Paracelsians_, and\nexamining which are the best, (for I think them both excellent in\ntheir kinds, especially when joyned together) I will onely say this\nin general, that the Art of Physick has never flourish'd better then\nnow, neither has any age had more skilful, learned, and experienced\nPhysicians, then this present; because they have not onely the knowledg\nand practise of those in ages Past, but also their own experience\njoyned with it, which cannot but add perfection to their Art; and I,\nfor my part, am so much for the old way of Practice, that if I should\nbe sick, I would desire rather such Physicians which follow the same\nway, then those, that by their new Inventions, perchance, cure one,\nand kill a hundred. But your _Author_[1] will have a Physician to be\nlike a Handycrafts man, who being call'd to a work, promises that work,\nand stands to his promise; and therefore, _It is a shame_, says he,\n_in a Physician, being call'd to a sick man in the beginning of the\ndisease, and when his strength is yet remaining, to suffer the same\nman to die._ This, in my opinion, is a very unreasonable comparison,\nto liken a Handicrafts man to a Physician, and the art of Curing to\nthe art of Building, or any the like, without regard of so many great\ndifferences that are between them, which I am loth to rehearse, for\nbrevities sake, and are apparant enough to every one that will consider\nthem: but this I may say, that it is not always for want of skill and\nindustry in a Physician, that the cure is not effected, but it lies\neither in the Incureableness of the disease, or any other external\naccidents that do hinder the success: Not but that the best Physicians\nmay err in a disease, or mistake the Patients inward distemper by\nhis outward temper, or the interior temper by his outward distemper,\nor any other ways; for they may easily err through the variation of\nthe disease, which may vary so suddenly and oft, as it is impossible\nto apply so fast, and so many Medicines, as the alteration requires,\nwithout certain death; for the body is not able, oftentimes, to dispose\nand digest several Medicines so fast, as the disease may vary, and\ntherefore what was good in this temper, may, perhaps, be bad in the\nvariation; insomuch, that one medicine may in a minute prove a Cordial,\nand Poyson. Nay, it may be that some Physicians do err through their\nown ignorance and mistake, must we therefore condemn all the skill,\nand accuse all the Schools of Negligence, Cruelty, and Ignorance? God\nforbid: for it would be a great Injustice. Let us rather praise them\nfor the good they do, and not rashly condemn them for the evil they\ncould not help: For we may as well condemn those holy and industrious\nDivines, that cannot reform wicked and perverse Sinners, as Physicians,\nbecause they cannot restore every Patient to his former health, the\nProfession of a Physician being very difficult; for they can have but\noutward signs of inward distempers. Besides, all men are not dissected\nafter they are dead, to inform Physicians of the true cause of their\ndeath; nay, if they were, perchance they would not give always a true\ninformation to the Physician, as is evident by many examples; but\noftentimes the blame is laid upon the Physician, when as the fault is\neither in Nature, or any other cause, which Art could not mend. And\nif your _Author_ had had such an extraordinary Gift from God as to\nknow more then all the rest of Physicians, why did he not accordingly,\nand as the Scripture speaks of Faith, shew his skill by his Works and\nCures? certainly, could he have restored those that were born blind,\nlame, deaf and dumb, or cured the spotted Plague, or Apoplexy after\nthe third fit, or the Consumption of Vital parts, or a Fever in the\nArteries, or dissolved a Stone too big to go through the passage,\nand many the like; he would not onely have been cried up for a rare\nPhysician, but for a miracle of the World, and worshipped as a Saint:\nBut if he could not effect more then the Schools can do, why doth he\ninveigh so bitterly against them? Wherefore I cannot commend him in\nso doing; but as I respect the Art of Physick, as a singular Gift\nfrom God to Mankind, so I respect and esteem also learned and skilful\nPhysicians, for their various Knowledg, industrious Studies, careful\nPractice, and great Experiences, and think every one is bound to do\nthe like, they being the onely supporters and restorers of humane life\nand health: For though I must confess, with your _Author_, that God\nis the onely giver of Good, yet God is not pleased to work Miracles\nordinarily, but has ordained means for the restoring of health,\nwhich the Art of Physick doth apply; and therefore those Persons\nthat are sick, do wisely to send for a Physician; for Art, although\nit is but a particular Creature, and the handmaid of Nature, yet she\ndoth Nature oftentimes very good service; and so do Physicians often\nprolong their Patients lives. The like do Chirurgeons; for if those\nPersons that have been wounded, had been left to be cured onely by the\nMagnetick Medicine, I believe, numbers that are alive would have been\ndead, and numbers would die that are alive; insomuch, as none would\nescape, but by miracle, especially if dangerously hurt. Concerning the\nCoveteousness of Physicians, although sickness is chargeable, yet I\nthink it is not Charitable to say or to think, that Physitians regard\nmore their Profit, then their Patients health; for we might as well\ncondemn Divines for taking their Tithes and Stipends, as Physicians\nfor taking their Fees: but the holy Writ tells us, that a Labourer is\nWorthy of his hire or reward; and, for my part, I think those commit a\ngreat sin, which repine at giving Rewards in any kind; for those that\ndeserve well by their endeavours, ought to have their rewards; and such\nMeritorious Persons, I wish with all my Soul, may prosper and thrive.\nNevertheless, as for those persons, which for want of means are not\nable to reward their Physicians, I think Physicians will not deal so\nunconscionably, as to neglect their health and lives for want of their\nFees, but expect the reward from God, and be recompenced the better by\nthose that have Wealth enough to spare. And this good opinion I have of\nthem. So leaving them, I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your constant Friend_\n\n_and faithful Servant._\n\n[1] In his Promises, _Column._ 3.\n\n\n\n\nXXIX.\n\n\n_MADAM_\n\nI am of your _Authors_ mind, That _heat is not the cause of digestion_;\nbut I dissent from him, when he says, That it is _the Ferment of the\nstomach that doth cause it_: For, in my opinion, Digestion is onely\nmade by regular digestive motions, and ill digestion is caused by\nirregular motions, and when those motions are weak, then there is no\ndigestion at all, but what was received, remains unaltered; but when\nthey are strong and quick, then they make a speedy digestion. You may\nask me, what are digestive motions? I answer, They are transchanging,\nor transforming motions: but since there be many sorts of transchanging\nmotions, digestive motions are those, which transchange food into the\nnourishment of the body, and dispose properly, fitly and usefully of\nall the Parts of the food, as well of those which are converted into\nnourishment, as of those which are cast forth. For give me leave to\ntell you, _Madam_, that some parts of natural Matter, do force or cause\nother parts of Matter to move and work according to their will, without\nany change or alteration of their parts; as for example, Fire and\nMetal; for Fire will cause Metal to flow, but it doth not readily alter\nit from its nature of being Metal; neither doth Fire alter its nature\nfrom being Fire. And again, some parts of Matter will cause other parts\nto work and act to their own will, by forcing these over-powred parts\nto alter their own natural motions into the motions of the victorious\nParty, and so transforming them wholly into their own Figure; as for\nexample, Fire will cause Wood to move so as to take its figure, to\nwit, the figure of Fire, that is, to change its own figurative motions\ninto the motions of Fire: and this latter kind of moving or working\nis found in digestion; for the regular digestive motions do turn all\nfood received from its own nature or figure, into the nourishment,\nfigure, or nature of the body, as into flesh, blood, bones, and the\nlike. But when several parts of Matter meet or joyn with equal force\nand power, then their several natural motions are either quite altered,\nor partly mixt: As for example; some received things not agreeing with\nthe natural constitution of the body, the corporeal motions of the\nreceived, and those of the receiver, do dispute or oppose each other:\nfor the motions of the received, not willing to change their nature\nconformable to the desire of the digestive motions, do resist, and\nthen a War begins, whereby the body suffers most; for it causes either\na sickness in the stomack, or a pain in the head, or in the heart, or\nin the bowels, or the like: Nay, if the received food gets an absolute\nvictory, it dissolves and alters oftentimes the whole body, it self\nremaining entire and unaltered, as is evident in those that die of\nsurfeits. But most commonly these strifes and quarrels, if violent, do\nalter and dissolve each others forms or natures. And many times it is\nnot the fault of the Received, but of the Receiver; as for example,\nwhen the digestive and transforming motions are either irregular, or\nweak; for they being too weak, or too few, the meat or food received\nis digested onely by halves; and being irregular, it causes that which\nwe call corruption. But it may be observed, that the Received food is\neither agreeable, or disagreeable, to the Receiver; if agreeable, then\nthere is a united consent of Parts, to act regularly and perfectly in\ndigestion; if disagreeable, then the Received acts to the Ruine, that\nis, to the alteration or dissolution of the Nature of the Receiver; but\nif it be neutral, that is, neither perfectly agreeable, nor perfectly\ndisagreeable, but between both, then the receiver, or rather the\ndigestive Motions of the receiver, use a double strength to alter and\ntransform the received. But you may ask me, _Madam_, what the reason\nis, that many things received, after they are dissolved into small\nparts, those parts will keep their former colour and savour? I answer;\nThe cause is, that either the retentive Motions in the Parts of the\nreceived, are too strong for the digestive and alterative Motions of\nthe receiver, or perchance, this colour and savour is so proper to\nthem, as not to be transchanged: but you must observe, that those\ndigestive, alterative and transchanging motions, do not act or move all\nafter one and the same manner; for some do dissolve the natural figure\nof the received, some disperse its dissolved parts into the parts of\nthe body, some place the dispersed parts fitly and properly for the\nuse, benefit, and consistence of the body; for there is so much variety\nin this one act of digestion, as no man is able to conceive; and if\nthere be such variety in one Particular natural action, what variety\nwill there not be in all Nature? Wherefore, it is not, as I mentioned\nin the beginning, either Ferment, or Heat, or any other thing, that\ncauses digestion; for if all the constitution and nature of our body\nwas grounded or did depend upon Ferment, then Brewers and Bakers,\nand those that deal with Ferments, would be the best Physicians.\nBut I would fain know the cause which makes Ferment? You may say,\nsaltness, and sowreness. But then I ask, From whence comes saltness and\nsowreness? You may say, From the Ferment. But then I shall be as wise\nas before. The best way, perhaps, may be to say, with your _Author_,\nthat Ferment is a Primitive Cause, and a beginning or Principle of\nother things, and it self proceeds from nothing. But then it is beyond\nmy imagination, how that can be a Principle of material things, which\nit self is nothing; that is, neither a substance, nor an accident.\nGood Lord! what a stir do men make about nothing! I am amazed to see\ntheir strange Fancies and Conceptions vented for the Truest Reasons:\nWherefore I will return to my simple opinion; and as I cannot conceive\nany thing that is beyond Matter, or a Body; so I believe, according to\nmy reason, that there is not any part in Nature, be it never so subtil\nor small, but is a self-moving substance, or endued with self-motion;\nand according to the regularity and irregularity of these motions,\nall natural effects are produced, either perfect, or imperfect;\ntimely births, or untimely and monstrous births; death, health, and\ndiseases, good and ill dispositions, natural and extravagant Appetites\nand Passions, (I say natural, that is, according to the nature of\ntheir figures;) Sympathy and Antipathy, Peace and War, Rational and\nPhantastical opinions. Nevertheless, all these motions, whether\nregular or irregular, are natural; for regularity and irregularity\nhath but a respect to particulars, and to our conceptions, because\nthose motions which move not after the ordinary, common or usual way or\nmanner, we call Irregular. But the curiosity and variety in Nature is\nunconceiveable by any particular Creature; and so leaving it, I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXXX.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour _Author_ says,[1] it is an ancient Truth, _That whatsoever things,\nmeats being digested and cast out by vomit, are of a sowre taste and\nsmell, yea, although they were seasoned with much sugar._ But I do\nnot assent to this opinion; for I think that some Vomits have no more\ntaste then pure Water hath. Neither am I of his mind, That _Digestion\nis hastened by sharpness or tartness:_ For do but try it by one\nsimple experiment; take any kind of flesh-meat, boyl or stew it with\nVinegar, or sowre wine, or with much salt; and you will find, that it\ndoth require a longer time, or rather more motions to dissolve, then\nif you boyl it in fair water, without such ingredients as are sowre,\nsharp, or salt; also if you do but observe, you will find the dregs\nmore sandy, stony and hard, being drest with much salt, and sharp\nwine, or vinegar, then when they are not mixt with such contracting\nand fixing Ingredients. Wherefore, if the Ferment of the stomack hath\nsuch a restringent and contracting quality, certainly digestions will\nbe but slow and unprofitable; but Nature requires expulsion as much\nas attraction, and dilation as much as contraction, and digestion is\na kind of dilation. Wherefore, in my judgment; contracting tartness\nand sharpness doth rather hinder digestion then further it. Next I\nperceive, your _Author_ inclines to the opinion, _That Choler is not\nmade by meat_:[2] But I would ask him, whether any humor be made of\nmeat, or whether blood, flesh, &c. are made and nourished by meat? If\nthey be not, then my answer is, That we eat to no purpose; but if they\nbe, then Choler is made so too. But if he says, That some are made, and\nsome not; then I would ask, what that humor is made of, that is not\nmade by meat or food received into the body? But we find that humors,\nblood, flesh, &c. will be sometimes more, sometimes less, according\neither to feeding, or to digestion, which digestion is a contribution\nof food to every several part of the body for its nourishment; and when\nthere is a decay of those parts, then it is caused either by fasting,\nor by irregular digestion, or by extraordinary evacuation, or by\ndistempered matter, &c. all which, causes sickness, paleness, leanness,\nweakness, and the like. Again: your _Author_ is against the opinion of\nthe Schools, _That the Gall is a receptacle of superfluous humors and\ndregs_: for he says, _it has rather the constitution of a necessary\nand vital bowel, and is the balsom of the liver and blood._ Truly, it\nmay be so, for any thing I know, or it may be not; for your _Author_\ncould but guess, not assuredly know, unless he had been in a man as big\nas the Whale in whose belly _Jonas_ was three days, and had observed\nthe interior parts and motions of every part for three years time, and\nyet he might perchance have been as ignorant at the coming forth, as\nif he never had been there; for Natures actions are not onely curious,\nbut very various; and not onely various, but very obscure; in so much,\nas the most ingenious Artists cannot trace her ways, or imitate her\nactions; for Art being but a Creature, can do or know no more then a\nCreature; and although she is an ingenious Creature, which can and hath\nfound out some things profitable and useful for the life of others,\nyet she is but a handmaid to Nature, and not her Mistress; which your\n_Author_, in my opinion, too rashly affirms, when he says,[3] That _the\nArt of Chymistry is not onely the Chambermaid and emulating Ape, but\nnow and then the Mistress of Nature_: For Art is an effect of Nature,\nand to prefer the effect before the cause, is absurd. But concerning\nChymistry, I have spoken in another place; I'le return to my former\nDiscourse: and I wonder much why your _Author_ is so opposite to the\nSchools, concerning the doctrine of the Gall's being a receptacle for\nsuperfluities and dregs; for I think there is not any Creature that\nhas not places or receptacles for superfluous matter, such as we call\ndregs; for even the purest and hardest Mineral, as Gold, has its dross,\nalthough in a less proportion then some other Creatures; nay, I am\nperswaded, that even Light, which your _Author_ doth so much worship,\nmay have some superfluous matter, which may be named dregs; and since\nNature has made parts in all Creatures to receive and discharge\nsuperfluous matter, (which receiving and discharging is nothing else\nbut a joyning and dividing of parts to and from parts,) why may not the\nGall be as well for that use as any other part? But I pray mistake me\nnot, when I say _superfluous matter or dregs_; for I understand by it,\nthat which is not useful to the nourishment or consistence of such or\nsuch a Creature; but to speak properly, there is neither superfluity\nof matter nor dregs in Nature. Moreover, your _Author_ mentions a\n_six-fold digestion_, and makes every digestion to be performed by\ninbreathing or inspiration; For _in the first digestion_, he says,\n_The spleen doth inspire a sowre Ferment into the Meat: In the second,\nThe Gall doth inspire a ferment, or fermental blas into the slender\nentrails: In the third, The Liver doth inspire a bloody ferment into\nthe veins of the Mensentery_, &c. I answer, first, I am confident\nNature has more ways then to work onely by Inspirations, not onely in\nGeneral, but in every Particular. Next, I believe there are not onely\nsix, but many more digestions in an animal Creature; for not onely\nevery sort of food, but every bit that is eaten, may require a several\ndigestion, and every several part of the body works either to expel, or\npreserve, or for both; so that there are numerous several Motions in\nevery Creature, and many changes of motions in each particular part;\nbut Nature is in them all. And so leaving her, I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Ch._ Of a Six-fold digestion.\n\n[2] See _The passive deceiving of the Schools, the humorists,_ c. 1.\n\n[3] _Ch._ Heat doth not digest efficiently.\n\n\n\n\nXXXI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour _Author_, in opposition to the Schools, endeavouring to prove\nthat there are no humors in an animal body, except blood, proves\nmany humors in himself. But I can see no reason, why Nature should\nnot make several humors, as well as several Elements, Vegetables,\nMinerals, Animals, and other Creatures; and that in several parts of\nthe body, and many several ways; for to mention but one sort of other\nCreatures, _viz._ Vegetables, they are, as we see, not onely produced\nmany several ways, but in many several grounds; either by sowing,\nsetting, or grafting, either in clayie, limy, sandy, chalky, dry, or\nwet grounds: And why may not several humors be produced as well of\nother Creatures and parts, as others are produced of them? for all\nparts of Nature are produced one from another, as being all of one\nand the same Matter, onely the variation of corporeal motions makes\nall the difference and variety between them, which variety of motions\nis impossible to be known by any particular Creature; for Nature can\ndo more then any Creature can conceive. Truly, _Madam_, I should not\nbe of such a mind, as to oppose the Schools herein so eagerly as your\n_Author_ doth; but artificial actions make men to have erroneous\nopinions of the actions of Nature, judging them all according to the\nrule and measure of Art, when as Art oft deludes men under the cover\nof truth, and makes them many times believe falshood for truth; for\nNature is pleased with variety, and so doth make numerous absurdities,\ndoubts, opinions, disputations, objections, and the like. Moreover,\nyour _Author_ is as much against the radical moisture, as he is against\nthe four humors; saying, that according to this opinion of the Schools,\na fat belly, through much grease affording more fuel to the radical\nmoisture, must of necessity live longer. But this, in my opinion,\nis onely a wilful mistake; for I am confident, that the Schools do\nnot understand radical moisture to be gross, fat radical oyl, but a\nthin oylie substance. Neither do they believe radical heat to be a\nburning, fiery and consuming heat, but such a degree of natural heat,\nas is comfortable, nourishing, refreshing, and proper for the life\nof the animal Creature: Wherefore radical heat and moisture doth not\nonely consist in the Grease of the body; for a lean body may have as\nmuch, and some of them more Radical moisture, then fat bodies. But\nyour _Author_ instead of this radical moisture, makes a nourishable\nmoisture, onely, as I suppose, out of a mind to contradict the\nSchools; when as I do not perceive, that the Schools mean by Radical\nmoisture, any other then a nourishable moisture, and therefore this\ndistinction is needless. Lastly, he condemns the Schools, for making\nan affinity betwixt the bowels and the brain. But he might as will\ncondemn Politicians, for saying there is an affinity betwixt Governors\nand Subjects, or betwixt command and obedience; but as the actions of\nParticulars, even from the meanest in a Commonwealth, may chance to\nmake a Publick disturbance, so likewise in the Common-wealth of the\nbody, one single action in a particular part may cause a disturbance\nof the whole Body, nay, a total ruine and dissolution of the composed;\nwhich dissolution is called Death; and yet these causes are neither\nLight, nor Blas, nor Gas, no more then men are shining Suns, or flaming\nTorches, or blazing Meteors, or azure Skies. Wherefore leaving your\n_Author_ to his contradicting humor, I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXXXII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI do verily believe, with the Schools, the _Purging of the Brain_,\nagainst your _Author_;[1] For I know no reason, why all the parts of\na man's body should not stand in need of evacuation and Purging, as\nwell as some. 'Tis true, if the substance or nourishment received were\nall useful, and onely enough for the maintenance, subsistance and\ncontinuance of the Creature, and no more, then there would be no need\nof such sort of evacuation; but I believe the corporeal self-motions\nin a body, discharge the superfluous matter out of every part of the\nbody, if the motions of the superfluous matter be not too strong, and\nover-power the motions in the parts of the body; but some parts do\nproduce more superfluities then others, by reason their property is\nmore to dilate, then to contract, and more to attract, then to retain\nor fix; which parts are the brain, stomack, bowels, bladder, gall, and\nthe like: wherefore, as there is nourishment in all parts of the body,\nso there are also excrements in all parts, for there is no nourishment\nwithout excrement. Next your _Author_ says, That _the nourishment of\nthe solid parts is made with the transmutation of the whole venal blood\ninto nourishment, without a separation of the pure from the impure._\nBut I pray give me leave to ask, _Madam_, whether the solid Parts\nare not Instruments for the nourishment of the Venal blood? Truly, I\ncannot conceive, how blood should be nourished, wanting those solid\nparts, and their particular motions and imployments. Again: his opinion\nis, _That the brain is nourished by a few and slender veins; neither\ndoth a passage or channel appear whereby a moist excrement may derive,\nor a vapour enter._ And by reason of the want of such a passage, in\nanother place[2] he is pleased to affirm, _That nothing can fume up\nfrom the stomack into the brain_, and therefore _Wine doth not make\ndrunk with fuming from the stomach into the head, but the Winie spirit\nis immediately snatched into the arteries out of the stomach without\ndigestion, and so into the head, and there breeds a confusion._ First,\nI am not of the opinion, that all nourishment comes from the veins, or\nfrom one particular part of the body, no more do Excrements; neither do\nI believe that every passage in the body is visible to Anatomists, for\nNatures works are too curious and intricate for any particular Creature\nto find them out, which is the cause that Anatomists and Chymists\nare so oft mistaken in natural causes and effects; for certainly,\nthey sometimes believe great Errors for great Truths. Next, as for\nDrunkenness, I believe that many, who drink much Wine, are drunk before\nsuch time as the Wine spirit can get into the Arteries; but if there be\nPores to the Brain, as it is most probable, the spirit of Wine may more\neasily ascend and enter those Pores, then the Pores of the Arteries,\nor the Mouth-veins, and so make a circular journey to the Head. But\nas for Excrements, whereof I spake in the beginning, as they are made\nseveral manners or ways, and in several parts of the body, so they\nare also discharged several ways from several parts, and several ways\nfrom each particular part, indeed so many several ways and manners, as\nwould puzzle the wisest man in the world, nay your _Authors Interior\nkeeper of the Brain_, to find them out. Wherefore, to conclude, he is\nthe best Physician, that can tell how to discharge superfluity, and to\nretain useful nourishments; or to restore by the application of proper\nMedicines, decaying parts, or to put in order Irregular motions; and\nnot those that have Irregular opinions of Immaterial causes: To which,\nI leave them, and rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and humble Servant._\n\n[1] _Ch._ Call'd _The Erring Watchman, or Wandring Keeper_.\n\n[2] _Ch._ call'd _The Spirit of Life_.\n\n\n\n\nXXXIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI do not approve of your _Authors_ Doctrine, forbidding Phlebotomy or\nblood-letting in Fevers, opposite to the received Practice of the\nSchools; his reason is, that he believes there can be no corruption\nin the blood. _Corrupted blood_, says he,[1] _cannot be in the veins,\nneither doth a state of ill juice consist in the veins; for Gangrenes\ndo teach, that nothing of Putrified matter can long persist without a\nfurther contagion of it self._ Also he says, _That the blood of the\nVeins is no otherwise distinguished by its several colours and signs,\nthen as wine is troubled when the vine flourisheth._ To which I answer,\nfirst, That I can see no reason why there should not be as well corrupt\nblood, or an ill state of juice in the veins, as ill humors in the\nbody. Perchance he will say, There is no corruption in the body. But\nUlcers do teach the contrary. He may reply, Ulcers are not parts of the\nbody. I answer, 'Tis true; but yet they are evil Inhabitants in the\nbody, and the like may be in the Veins. But surely some men may have\ncorrupted parts of their bodies, and yet live a great while; witness\nUlcers in the Lungs, and other parts. But your _Author_ may say, When\na part of the body is corrupted, it is no longer an animal Part. I\ngrant it: but yet, as I said, that transformed part may remain in the\nbody some time without destruction of the whole body; and so likewise,\nwhen some of the blood, is transchanged from being blood, so as not\nto be capable to be reduced again, it may nevertheless remain in the\nveins without definition of the veins, or of the whole body: Neither\ndo I conceive any reason, why corrupt blood should Gangrene in the\nveins, and infect the adjoyning parts more then corrupted lungs do.\nNext, as for the comparison of the various colours and signs of the\nblood, with Wine being troubled when the Vine is flourishing; I answer,\nThat it doth not prove any thing; for we speak of such colours, as\nare signs of corrupted, and not such as are signs of troubled blood:\nBesides, it is an unlike comparison; for though Wine may become thick\nby much fermentation, yet it doth not turn into water, as blood in\nsome sick and diseased persons will do. But corrupted blood may be,\nnot onely in the veins of sick, but also of healthy persons; and the\nstory says, that _Seneca_, when his veins were cut, they would not\nbleed, although in a hot Bath, by reason that which was in the veins,\nwas rather like a white jelly, then blood, and yet he was healthy,\nthough old; which proves, that it is not necessary for the blood to\nbe so pure and fluid as your _Author_ will have it. The truth is, the\nmore fluid the blood is, the weaker it is; like balsam, the more gummy\nit is, the stronger it is: but veins, which are the mouth, to receive\nor suck in juices, as also the stomack which digests the meat that\nafter is turned into blood, may be defective either through weakness,\nsuperfluity, obstruction, corruption, or evil and hurtful diet, or\nthrough the disorders of other particular parts, which may disturb\nall the parts in general, as skilful Physicians have observed, and\ntherefore apply remedies accordingly; for if the defect proceeds from\nweakness, they give strengthening remedies; if from superfluities, they\ngive evacuating remedies; if from evil diets, they prescribe such a\ncourse of diet as shall be beneficial, and conducing for the restoring\nof health to the whole body. But your _Author_, as I perceive, believes\nthe blood to be the chief vital part of the body; which surely it is\nnot: for if it were, the least disturbance of the blood would endanger\nthe life of the whole body, and the least diminution would cause a\ntotal dissolution of that animal Creature which has blood: Not but\nthat blood is as necessary as breath for respiration, and food for\nnourishment of the body; but too much blood is as dangerous to the\nlife of the animal body, as too great a piece of food, which cannot\nbe swallowed down, but doth stick in the throat, and stop the breath,\nor so much quantity as cannot be digested, for too great a fulness or\nabounding makes a stoppage of the blood, or which is worse, causes\nthe veins to break, and an evil digestion, makes a corruption, or at\nleast such disorder as to indanger the whole animal Figure. But some\nveins breed more blood, and some less, and some better, and some worse\nblood, some hotter, and some colder, some grosser, and some purer, some\nthicker, and some thinner; and some veins breed rather an evil juice or\ncorrupt matter then pure blood; the truth is, blood is bred somewhat\nafter the manner of Excrements, for the veins are somewhat like the\nguts, wherein the excrements are digested. But you will say, A man may\nlive without excrements, but not without blood. I answer: a man can\nlive no more without excrements and excremental humors, then he can\nwithout blood: but yet I am not of your _Authors_ mind, that bleeding\nand purging are destructive; for superfluities are as dangerous as\nscarcities, nay more; like as an house filled with rubbish is in more\ndanger to sink or fall, then that which is empty; and when a house is\non fire, it is wisdom to take out the Moveables, but a folly to let\nthem increase the flame. But your _Author_ says, Blood-letting takes\nnot onely away the bad, but also the good blood, by which it diminishes\nand impairs much the strength of the body. I will answer by way of\nquestion, Whether in War men would not venture the loss of some few\nfriends, to gain the victory, or save the whole body of the Army: or\nwhether the destroying of the enemies Army be not more advantageous,\nthen the loss of some few friends? For although some good blood may\nissue out with the bad, yet the veins have more time, room, and some\nmore power to get friendly juices from the several parts of the body,\nwhich will be more obedient, trusty, and true to the life and service\nof the whole body. But neither Fevers, nor any other distempers, will\nbe more afraid of your _Authors_ words, Stones, Spirits, as also Rings,\nBeads, Bracelets, and the like toys, fitter for Children to play\nwithal, then for Physicians to use; then an Army of men will be of\ntheir enemies Colours, Ensigns, Feathers, Scarfs, and the like; knowing\nit must be Swords, Pistols, Guns, Powder and Bullets, that must do the\nbusiness to destroy the enemy, and to gain the victory: Wherefore in\nDiseases it must be Bleeding, Purging, Vomiting, using of Clysters,\nand the like, if any good shall be done. 'Tis true, they must well be\nordered, otherwise they will do more hurt then good; for Diseases are\nlike Enemies, which sometimes take away our Armes for their own uses.\nBut your _Author_ says again, _That the Matter of a Fever floats not\nin the veins, nor sits nigh the heart._ I answer: There are several\nsorts of Fevers; for all Fevers are not produced after one and the\nsame manner, or from one and the same cause, as is very well known\nto wise and experienced Physicians; but although some Fevers are not\nin the blood, yet that doth not prove, that the blood is never in a\nFever; for sometimes the blood is in a Fever, and not the solid parts;\nand sometimes the fluid and moveable humors, and not the blood, or\nsolid parts; and sometimes the solid parts, and not the blood, nor the\nliquid and moveable humors; and sometimes they are all in a Fever; and\nsometimes onely the radical parts, and neither the blood, humors, nor\nsolid parts: and this last kind of Fever, which is a hectick Fever, in\nmy opinion, is incureable; but the others may be cureable, if there\nbe not too many varieties of distempers, or irregular motions. And as\nfor a Fever in the solid parts, Letting of blood, and taking away the\nhumor, may cure it; for the veins being empty, suck the heat out of\nthe solid parts, which solid parts cannot draw out a distempered heat\nin the veins, and the opening of the veins gives vent to some of the\ninterior heat to issue forth: Wherefore it is very requisite, that in\nall sorts of Fevers, except Hectick-Fevers, blood-letting should be\nused, not onely once, but often; for 'tis better to live with a little\nblood, and a little strength, which will soon be recovered, then to\ndie with too much, or too hot and distempered blood. Also Purging, but\nespecially Vomiting is very good; for if the humors be in a Feaver,\nthey may infect the vital parts, as also the blood; but if they be not\nin a Fever, yet the solid parts or blood may do the same, and so make\nthe contagion greater; for the humors are as the moveables in a house,\nwhich ought to be cast out if either they or the house should be on\nfire; and if a disorder proceeds from the error of a particular part,\nthen care must be taken to rectifie that part for the health of the\nwhole: Wherefore Physicians use in some cases Blood-letting, in some\nPurging, in some Vomiting, in some Bathing, in some Sweating, in some\nCordials, especially after much evacuation, in some they prescribe a\ngood diet, and in some they mix and prescribe partly one and partly the\nother, and in some cases they are forced to use all these remedies;\nfor though great evacuations may cause weakness, yet they often save\nthe life; and there is no Patient, but had rather lose some strength,\nthen life; for life can gather strength again; but all strong men are\nnot always long lived, nor all long-lived men very strong; for many\nthat are but weak, will live to a very old age. Lastly, concerning what\nyour _Author_ says, that there is but one Choler and Phlegme in Nature;\nI answer, That is more then he knows: for all that is in Nature, is\nnot nor cannot be known by any Particular Creature; and he might say,\nas well, the same of particular Metals, as that there is but one sort\nof Gold or Silver, when as there is great difference in the weight,\npurity, colour, and gloss, of several parts of Gold and Silver; Neither\nis all Gold found in one place; but some is found in Rocks, some in\nSand, some in Mines, some in Stones; and so Silver, some is found in\nthe bowels of the Earth, some in the veins of Stones, and some in other\nMetals, as Lead, and Iron, and some in Coals. And the like may be said\nof Choler and Phlegme; for they may be several in several places or\nparts of the body, and be of different colours, tastes, odours, and\ndegrees of heat or cold, thinness or thickness, or the like; for though\nthere is but one Matter in Nature, yet this onely Matter by its several\nactions or motions changes into several figures, and so makes several\nsorts of Creatures, and different particulars in every sort. And thus,\n_Madam_, I have delivered unto you my opinion concerning the cure of\nFevers by Blood-letting: Which I submit to the correction of your\nbetter judgment, and rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] In his Treatise of Fevers, _c._ 4.\n\n\n\n\nXXXIV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour _Author_ is not onely against Phlebotomy or Blood-letting, but\nagainst all Purging Medicines, which he condemns to _carry a hidden\npoyson in them, and to be a cruel and stupid invention._ But certainly\nhe shall not have my assent; for if they be Poyson, they are a very\nbeneficial Poyson; and Physical Purgations, in my opinion, are very\nnecessary and profitable for the prolonging of life, and taking away\nof diseases, provided they be proper for those diseases in which they\nare used; and so is Phlebotomy, Vomits, and the like: but Medicines are\noften wrong applyed, and many times the disease is so various, that\nit is as hard for a Physician to hit right with several Medicines,\nas for a Gunner or Shooter to kill with Powder and small Shot a Bird\nflying in the Air; not that it is not possible to be done, but it\nis not ordinary, or frequent: neither doth the fault onely lie in\nthe Gun, Powder, or Shot, but in the swiftness of the flight of the\nBird, or in the various motion of the air, or in a hidden wind, or\nmist, or the like; for the same Gunner may perhaps easily kill a\nBird sitting in a bush, or hopping upon the ground. The like may be\nsaid of Diseases, Physicians, and Medicines; for some diseases have\nsuch hidden alterations, by the sudden changes of motions, that a\nwise Physician will not, nor cannot venture to apply so many several\nmedicines so suddenly as the alteration requires; and shall therefore\nPhysicians be condemned? and not onely condemned for what cannot be\nhelped by reason of the variety of irregular motions, but what cannot\nbe helped in Nature? For some diseases are so deadly, as no art can\ncure them, when as otherwise Physicians with good and proper medicines,\nhave, and do as yet rescue more people from death, then the Laws do\nfrom ruine. Nay, I have known many that have been great enemies to\nPhysick, die in the flower of their age, when as others which used\nthemselves to Physick, have lived a very long time. But you may say,\nCountry-people and Labourers, take little or no Physick, and yet grow\nmost commonly old, whereas on the contrary, Great and rich Persons\ntake much Physick, and do not live so long as the common sort of men\ndoth. I answer: It is to be observed, first, that there are more\nCommons, then Nobles, or Great and rich persons; and there is not so\nmuch notice taken of the death of a mean, as of a noble, great, or\nrich person; so that for want of information or knowledg, one may\neasily be deceived in the number of each sort of persons. Next, the\nVulgar sort use laborious exercises, and spare diet; when as noble\nand rich persons are most commonly lazie and luxurious, which breeds\nsuperfluities of humors, and these again breed many distempers: For\nexample, you shall find few poor men troubled with the Gout, Stone,\nPox, and the like diseases, nor their Children with Rickets; for all\nthis cometh by luxury, and no doubt but all other diseases are sooner\nbred with luxury, then temperance; but whatsoever is superfluous,\nmay, if not be taken away, yet mediated with lenitive and laxative\nmedicines. But as for Physicians, surely never age knew any better, in\nmy opinion, then this present, and yet most of them follow the rules\nof the Schools, which are such as have been grounded upon Reason,\nPractice, and Experience, for many ages: Wherefore those that will\nwander from the Schools, and follow new and unknown ways, are, in my\nopinion, not Orthodoxes, but Hereticks in the Art of Physick. But to\nreturn to your _Author_, give me leave, _Madam_, to consider what his\nopinions are concerning the Purging of Choler; _Come on_, says he to\nthe Schools,[1] _Why doth that, your Choler following with so swift\nan efflux, stink so horribly, which but for one quarter of an hour\nbefore did not stink?_ To which it may be answered, That though humors\nmay not stink in themselves, yet the excrements mixt with the humors\nmay stink; also the very passing thorow the excrements will cause a\nstrong savour. But your _Author_ thinks, That _by passing through so\nsuddenly, the humors cannot borrow such a smell of stinking dung from\nthe Intestines._ Truly, 'tis easily said, but hardly proved, and the\ncontrary is manifest by putting clear, pure water into a stinking\nvessel, which straightway is corrupted with an ill smell. He talks\nalso of _Vitriol dissolved in Wine, which if it be taken, presently\nprovokes vomit; but if after drinking it, any one shall drink thereupon\na draught of Ale or Beer, or Water, &c. he indeed shall suffer many\nstools, yet wholly without stink._ I answer: This expresses Vitriol\nto be more poysonous, by taking away the natural savour of the bowels,\nthen Scammony, Coloquintida, Manna, Cassia, Sena, Rhubarb, &c. to\nall which your _Author_ is a great enemy; and it is well known to\nexperienced Physicians, that Medicines prepared by the art of fire are\nmore poysonous and dangerous then natural drugs; nay, I dare say, that\nmany Chymical Medicines, which are thought to be Cordials, and have\nbeen given to Patients for that purpose, have proved more poysonous\nthen any Purging Physick. Again your _Author_ says, _It is worthy of\nLamentation, that Physicians would have loosening things draw out one\nhumor, and not another, by selection or choyce._ My answer is, That\nnatural drugs and simples are as wise in their several operations, as\nChymists in their artificial distillations, extractions, sublimations,\nand the like; but it has long been observed by Physicians, that one\nsimple will work more upon one part of the body, then upon another; the\nlike may be said of humors. But give me leave to tell you, _Madam_,\nthat if your _Author_ believes magnetick or attractive cures (as he\ndoth, and in whose behalf he makes very long discourses) he doth in\nthis opinion contradict himself. He may say, perhaps, There is no such\nthing as what Physicians name humors. But grant there be none, yet he\ncannot deny that there are offensive juices, or moveable substances\nmade by evil, as irregular digestions, which may be troublesom and\nhurtful to the nature of the body. Or perchance he will say, There are\nsuch humors, but they are beneficial and not offensive to the nature\nof the body. I answer: Then he must make an agreement with every part\nof the body, not to make more of these humors then is useful for the\nbody. Also he mentions some few that took Purging Physick, and died.\nTruly so they might have done without taking it: but he doth not tell,\nhow many have died for want of proper and timely Purges. In truth,\n_Madam_, 'tis an easie thing to find fault, but not so easie to mend\nit. And as for what he speaks of the weighing of those humors and\nexcrements, which by purging were brought out of some Princes body, and\nhow much by the Schools rules remained, and of the place which should\nmaintain the remainder; I onely say this, that all the several sorts\nof juices, humors, or moveable substances in a body, do not lie in one\nplace, but are dispersed, and spread all about and in several parts\nand places in the body; so that the several Laxative medicines do but\ndraw them together, or open several parts, that they may have freedom\nto travel with their chief Commanders, which are the Purging medicines.\nBut your _Author_ says, the Loadstone doth not draw rust. And I say, no\nmore do Purging drugs draw out pure Matter: for it may be as natural\nfor such medicines to draw or work onely upon superfluities, that is,\ncorrupted, or evil-affected humors, juices or moveable substances, as\nfor the Loadstone to draw Iron; and so it may be the property of Purges\nto draw onely the rust of the body, and not the pure metal, which are\ngood humors. But few do consider or observe sufficiently the variety of\nNatures actions, and the motions of particular natural Creatures, which\nis the cause they have no better success in their cures. And so leaving\nthem to a more diligent inquisition and search into Nature, and her\nactions, I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and humble Servant._\n\n[1] In his Treatise of Fevers, _c._ 5.\n\n\n\n\nXXXV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI find your _Author_ to be as great an enemy to Issues, Cauteries,\nClysters, and the like, as he is to Blood-letting and Purging;\nespecially to Issues, which he counts to be blasphemous against\nthe Creator, and blames much the Schools for prescribing them. But\nconcerning Blood-letting and Purging, I have declared my opinion in\nmy former Letters; and if you desire my judgment of Clysters and\nIssues, I must needs tell you, that it is well known these many ages,\nthat in such diseases which lie in the guts, and cause pain in the\nhead, and stop the ureteres, Clysters have been very beneficial, but\nwise Physicians do not prescribe them, unless upon necessity: As for\nexample; if the disease in the Guts proceed from cold or wind, they\nprescribe a Sack-Clyster, with oyl of Walnuts; and if the disease in\nthe guts proceed from a sharp or bitter humor, then they prescribe\nMilk, or Posset, sweetned with Sugar: the same if the guts be too\nfull of excrements or slime. But in case of diseases in the head or\nstomack, they prescribe attractive Clysters, to wit, such as draw down\nfrom the upper into the lower parts, wherein the Physical drugs are;\nand if the guts be too dry, or dryer then their nature requires,\nthey prescribe moistening Clysters, such as have not onely wetting,\nbut slimy qualities. And surely Clysters properly and timely applyed,\nare a safe, speedy, easie and profitable medicine, and far more safe\nthen Chymical Salts, Tartars, Spirits, or the like. Next concerning\nIssues and Cauteries, your _Author_, I say, is so much against them,\nas he counts them a blasphemy; for says he,[1] _I have beheld always\nan implicite blasphemy in a Cautery, whereby they openly accuse the\nCreator of insufficiency in framing the emunctories; for I have bidden\nabove a thousand Issues to be filled up with flesh._ Also, _That which\nGod hath made whole and entire, that it might be very good, seems to\nthe Schools, that it should be better if it be kept wounded._ Truly,\n_Madam_, in my opinion, it is no blasphemy at all, neither directly\nnor indirectly, to make Issues, but a meer superstition to believe the\ncontrary, _viz._ that they are blasphemy, and a great folly not to make\nthem when need requires it to the preservation of ones health. _God has\nmade our body whole and intire_, says your _Author_: by which he will\nprove that no holes must be made in the body to let out excrementious\nmatter, and therefore he thinks that body to be whole and intire which\nis without an Issue, when as yet our bodies have numerous issues,\nwhich are the pores of the skin, to let out sweat; and therefore if\nhe counts that body not to be whole and intire that has Issues, then\nno humane body is intire. Certainly, no Artificial Issue will make\nthe body maimed, but it will nevertheless continue whole and intire\nalthough it has Issues. He says it is Blasphemy; But how will he prove\nit? Surely not by the Scripture; and if not by the Scripture, then it\nis a blasphemy according to his own brain and fancy. 'Tis true, God\ngave no express Command to make Issues; but according to your _Author_,\nGod did never create Diseases, and so there was no need either to\nmake such Issues in bodies as to let out distempered Matter, or to\ngive any command for them; but we might as well say, we must not use\nany Physick, because it is not so natural to man as food, and serves\nnot for the nourishment of the body, but onely to keep off, or drive\nout diseases: Also no stone must be cut, but man must rather indure\ntorment and death. But setting aside this superstitious doctrine of\nyour _Author_, it is evident enough, and needs no proof, that Cancers,\nFistulas, Wenns, Eating-evils, Madness, Fevers, Consumptions, Rheumes,\nPleurisies, and numerous other diseases, are not better cured then by\nIssues, or making of wounds, either by Lancets, Pen-knifes, Scissers,\nRasors, Corrosives, Causticks, Leeches, or the like. And although\nyour _Author_ says, That _that Matter which proceeds from, or out of\nan Issue, is made in the lips of the wound, and not in the body; for\nit cannot possibly drain or draw out any moisture, either from within\nor between the skin and the flesh, having no passages_: Yet if this\nwere so, how come Fistulas, Cancers, and the like diseases, to have\npassages from within the body to the exterior parts, so, as to make\na wound, out of which much sharp and salt humor issues? which humor\ncertainly is not made in the lips of the wound, but in the body: Also\nwhence comes the humor that makes the Gout? For though the swelling and\ninflammation will sometimes appear exteriously, yet after some time\nthose tumors and humors retire back into the body from whence they did\nflow; but he might as well say that Pit-falls or Sluces do not drain\nLand from a superfluity of Water, as that Issues do not drain the body\nof superfluous humors. Wherefore I am absolutely of opinion, that the\nPractice of the Schools is the best and wisest Practice, as well in\nmaking Issues, letting blood, Purging by Siege or Vomits, as any other\nmeans used by them; for by Issues I have seen many cured, when no\nother medicines would do any good with them; and letting blood, I am\nconfident, hath rescued more lives, then the Universal Medicine, could\nChymists find it out, perchance would do. So also Clysters and Vomits,\nskilfully applied, have done great benefits to the life of men; for\nevery part and member hath its peculiar way to be purged and cleansed;\nfor example, Clysters principally cleanse the Guts, Purges the Stomack,\nVomits the Chest, Sneezing the Head, Bleeding the Veins, and Issues\ndrain the whole body of naughty humors: All which remedies, properly\nand timely used, keep the body from being choak'd with superfluities.\nThere are several other ways of cures besides for several diseases, but\nI leave those to learned and skilful Physicians, who know best how and\nwhen to use them to the benefit and health of their Patients, although\nyour _Author_ finds much fault with them, and blames them for suffering\nmen to die miserably; but God has given power to Nature to make certain\ndissolutions, although uncertain diseases, and uncertain remedies.\nNeither hath she in her power to give Immortal Life to particular\nCreatures, for this belongs to God alone, and therefore no Universal\nMedicine will keep out death, or prolong life further then its thread\nis spun, which I doubt is but a Chym\u00e6ra, and an impossible thing,\nby reason there are not onely so many different varieties in several\ndiseases, but in one and the same disease, as no Universal remedy\nwould do any good. But your _Author_ is much pleased with Paradoxes,\nand Paradoxes are not certain Truths: Wherefore it is better, in my\njudgment, to follow the old approved and practised way of the Schools,\ngrounded upon Experience and Reason, then his Paradoxical Opinions.\nTo which Schools, as your _Author_ is a great Enemy, so I am a great\nFriend, as well as,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Ladiships_\n\n_humble Servant._\n\n[1] Of Cauteries.\n\n\n\n\nXXXVI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI approve well of your _Authors_ opinion,[1] That _Drink ought not\nto be forbidden in Fevers_; but yet I would not allow so much as to\ndrown and oppress the Patients life, but onely so much as to refresh\nand moisten him; and therefore the best way is to drink little and\noften. But as for Wine, which your _Author_ commends in Fevers, I am\nutterly against it, unless the Fever proceed from a cold or crude\ncause, otherwise cooling Ptisans are most beneficial to those that are\nsick of a continual Fever, which for the most part is a general Fever\nthroughout the whole body, one part infecting the other, until they\nbe all infected, like as in the Plague. And to let you know the proof\nof it; when I was once sick beyond the Seas, I sent for a Doctor of\nPhysick who was an Irish-man: and hearing of some that knew him, and\nhis practice, that he was not successful in his Cures, but that his\nPatients most commonly died, I asked him what he used to prescribe in\nsuch or such diseases? where amongst the rest, as I remember, he told\nme, That he allowed his Patients to drink Wine in a Fever. I thought\nhe was in a great error, and told him my opinion, that though Wine\nmight be profitable, perhaps, to some few, yet for the most part it\nwas very hurtful and destructive, alledging another famous Physician\nin _France_, Dr. _Davison_, who used in continual Fevers, to prescribe\nonely cooling Ptisan, made of a little Barley, and a great quantity\nof Water, so thin as the Barley was hardly perceived, and a spoonfull\nof syrup of Limmon put into a quart of the said Ptisan; but in case\nof a Flux, he ordered some few seeds of Pomegranats to be put into\nit, and this cold Ptisan was to be the Patients onely drink: Besides,\nonce in Twenty four hours he prescribed a couple of potched Eggs, with\na little Verjuice, and to let the Patient blood, if he was dry and\nhot; I mean dry exteriously, as from sweat; and that either often or\nseldom, according as occasion was found: Also he prescribed two grains\nof Laudanum every night, but neither to give the Patient meat nor drink\ntwo hours before and after: Which advice and Practice of the mentioned\nPhysician concerning Fevers, with several others, I declared to this\nIrish Doctor, and he observing this rule, cured many, and so recovered\nhis lost esteem and repute. But your _Author_ being all for Wine, and\nagainst cooling drinks, or Julips, in hot Fevers, says, _That cooling\nmeans are more like to death, to cessation from motion, and to defect;\nbut heat from moderate Wine is a mean like unto life._ To which I\nanswer, first, That cold, or cooling things, are as active as hot or\nheating things; neither is death more cold then hot, nor life more hot\nthen cold; for we see that Frost is as active and strong as burning\nheat; and Water, Air, and Earth, are as full of life, as Fire; and\nVegetables, Minerals, and Elements, have life as well as Animals: But\nwe, feeling a Man's flesh cold when he is dissolving from an Animal,\nthink death is cold; and seeing he was hot before the same alteration,\nsay, Life is hot: Also finding an animal, when it is dissolving, to be\nwithout external local Motion, we say it is dead; and when it hath as\nyet this local motion before its alteration, we call it alive; which\ncertainly is not proper. Next I say, that a wise Man when his house is\nfired, will fling or squirt water upon it, to quench it, and take out\nall moveables lest they should increase the flame; likewise he will\nmake vent for the flame to issue forth. But perchance your _Author_ may\nsay, that Fevers are not hot. Truly, in my opinion, he might say as\nwell that Fire is cold. Again, he may say, That although the effect\nbe hot, yet the cause is cold. I answer: That in some diseases, the\neffects become so firmly rooted, and so powerfull, that they must be\nmore look'd upon then the cause: for such variety there is in Nature,\nthat oftentimes, that which was now an effect, turns to be a cause, and\nagain a cause an effect: For example; A cold cause often produces a hot\neffect, and this hot effect becomes again a cause of a cold effect:\nWhich variation is not onely a trouble, but a great obstruction to wise\nPhysicians; for Nature hath more varieties in diseases, then Physicians\nhave remedies, And as for drink, if Fevers be neither hot, nor dry,\nnor require drink for want of moisture; then I see no reason why drink\nshould be urged, and those Physicians blamed that forbid it; for if\nthirst proceed from an evil digestion, drink will rather weaken the\nstomack; for heat and driness draw soon away the drink in the stomack,\nand putting much into a weak stomack doth rather hurt then good. But\nif necessity require it, then I approve rather of raw and crude Water,\nthen of hot inflaming Wine. And so taking my leave, I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and humble Servant._\n\n[1] Of Fevers, _Ch._ 12.\n\n\n\n\nXXXVII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nIn your _Authors_ Treatise of Fevers, I find one Chapter[1] whose\nInscription is, _A Perfect Curing of all Fevers_, wherein he declares\nthe secrets of the Cures of Fevers, consisting all in Chymical\nMedicines. But considering, that if all Fevers could be cured by such\nMedicines, then all Physicians would strive to obtain them; I can\nhardly believe (by your _Authors_ favour) that any such perfect curing\nof all Fevers can be effected, but that your _Authors_ prescriptions,\nif they should come to the tryal, might fail as well as any other.\nLikewise he mentions a Medicine of _Paracelsus_, Named _Diaceltesson_,\nor the _Coraline Secret_; which, he says, cures radically the Gout no\nless then Fevers: Which if so, I wonder why so many Great, Noble and\nRich Persons, groan so much under the pains of the Gout; certainly\nit is not for want of cost to have them prepared, nor for want of an\ningenious and experienced Chymist; for this age doth not want skilful\nworkmen in that Art, nor worthy and wise Physicians, which if they knew\nsuch soveraign medicines, would soon apply them to their Patients;\nbut I suppose that they finding their effects to be less then the\ncost and labour bestowed upon them, forbear to use them. Moreover, he\nmentions[2] another remedy for most diseases, by him call'd _Driff_,\nprepared also by the Art of Chymistry; but I believe all those remedies\nwill not so often cure, as fail of cure, like as the Sympathetical\nPowder; for if there were such soveraign medicines that did never fail\nof a successful effect, certainly men being curious, inquisitive,\nand searching, would never leave till they had found them out. Also\namongst Vegetables, the herb _Chameleon_ and _Arsmart_ are in great\nrequest with your _Author_; For, says he, _they by their touching\nalone, do presently take away cruel diseases, or at leastwise ease\nthem._ Which if so, I wonder that there is not more use made of them,\nand they held in greater esteem then they are; Also that your _Author_\ndoth not declare the vertue of them, and the manner and way how, and\nin what diseases to use them, for the benefit of his neighbour, to\nwhich end, he says, all his labours and actions are directed? But\nagain, your _Author_ confirms, as an Eye-witness, _That the bone of\nthe arm of a Toad presently has taken away the Tooth-ach at the first\nco-touching._ Which remedy, if it was constant, few, in my opinion,\nwould suffer such cruel pains, and cause their teeth to be drawn out,\nespecially if sound. Likewise of the mineral _Electrum or Amber_ of\n_Paracelsus_, he affirms[3] to have seen, that _hung about the neck, it\nhas freed those that were persecuted by unclean spirits_, and that many\nsimples have done the like effects; but surely, _Madam_, I cannot be\nperswaded that the Devil should be put away so easily; for he being a\nSpirit, will not be chased by corporeal means, but by spiritual, which\nis Faith, and Prayer; and the cure of dispossessing the Devil belongs\nto Divines, and not to Natural Philosophers or Physicians. But though\nexterior remedies, as Amulets, Pomanders, and the like, may perform\nsometimes such effects as to cure or preserve from some diseases, yet\nthey are not ordinary and constant, but meerly by chance. But there are\nmore false remedies then true ones, and if one remedy chance to work\nsuccessfully with one distempered person, it may fail of its success\napplyed to others in the same kind of distemper; nay, it may cure\nperhaps one and the same person of a distemper once, and in the return\nof the same disease effect little or nothing; witness those remedies\nthat are applyed in Agues, Tooth-aches, and the like, especially\nAmulets; for one and the same disease in several persons, or in one and\nthe same person at several times, may vary and change so often, and\nproceed from so different causes, and be of so different tempers, and\nhave such different motions, as one and the same medicine can do no\ngood: And what would the skill of Physicians be, if one remedy should\ncure all diseases? Why should they take so much pains in studying the\nvarious causes, motions, and tempers of diseases, if one medicine had a\ngeneral power over all? Nay, for what use should God have created such\na number of different simples, Vegetables, and Minerals, if one could\ndo all the business? Lastly, your _Author_ rehearses[4] some strange\nexamples of Child-bearing Women, who having seen terrible and cruel\nsights, as Executions of Malefactors, and dismembring of their bodies,\nhave brought forth monstrous births, without heads, hands, arms, leggs,\n&c. according to the objects they had seen. I must confess, _Madam_,\nthat all Creatures are not always formed perfect; for Nature works\nirregularly sometimes, wherefore a Child may be born defective in some\nmember or other, or have double members instead of one, and so may\nother animal Creatures; but this is nevertheless natural, although\nirregular to us: but to have a Child born perfect in the womb, and the\nlost member to be taken off there, and so brought forth defective,\nas your _Author_ mentions, cannot enter my belief; neither can your\n_Author_ himself give any reason, but he makes onely a bare relation\nof it; for certainly, if it was true, that the member was chopt, rent\nor pluckt off from the whole body of the Child, it could not have\nbeen done without a violent shock or motion of the Mother, which I am\nconfident would never have been able to endure it; for such a great\nalteration in her body, would of necessity, besides the death of the\nChild, have caused a total dissolution of her own animal parts, by\naltering the natural animal motions: But, as I said above, those births\nare caused by irregular motions, and are not frequent and ordinary; for\nif upon every strange sight, or cruel object, a Child-bearing-woman\nshould produce such effects, Monsters would be more frequent then they\nare. In short, Nature loves variety, and this is the cause of all\nstrange and unusual natural effects; and so leaving Nature to her will\nand pleasure, my onely delight and pleasure is to be,\n\nMadam,\n\n_[Your] faithful Friend, and humble Servant._\n\n[1] _Ch._ 14.\n\n[2] In the _Ch._ named _Butler_.\n\n[3] Ch. Of the manner of entrance of things darted into the body.\n\n[4] _Ch._ Of things injected into the body.\n\n\n\n\nXXXVIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour _Author_ reproving the Schools, that they forbid Salt to some\ndiseased persons, as pernicious to their health: _Good God_, says\nhe,[1] _how unsavoury are the Schools, and how unsavoury do they bid us\nto be!_ But I suppose the Schools do not absolutely forbid all diseased\npersons to abstein from salt, but onely not to use it excessively, or\ntoo frequently; for experience proves, that salt meats have not onely\nincreased, but caused diseases, as the Stone, the Gout, Sciatica,\nFistula's, Cancers, sore Eyes, sore Throats, and the like: I do not\nsay, that those diseases are always bred with the excess of salt diets;\nfor diseases of one and the same kind, may be bred variously; but this\nhath been observed, that whosoever is affected with such diseases,\nshall after a salt meal find himself in more pain then before;\nwherefore a constant or common salt diet cannot but be hurtful. Neither\nare those persons that feed much on salt meats, or use strong drinks,\ntake number for number, so healthful or long-lived, as those that are\ntemperate and abstaining. Next, your _Author_[2] bewails _The shameful\nsimplicity of those, that give their Patients Leaf-Gold, Pearls, and\nbruised or powder'd pretious Stones, as Cordials, in fainting fits,\nand other distempers: For_, says he, _they may be dissolved, but not\naltered; wherefore they cannot produce any powerful effect to the\nhealth of the Patient._ Truly, _Madam_, I am not of his mind; for were\nit that those remedies or cordials could not be transchanged, yet their\nvertues may nevertheless be very beneficial to the sick: For example;\na man that is assaulted by enemies, or by chance is fallen into a\ndeep Pit, or is ready to be strangled, and in all not able to help\nhimself, yet by the help of another man, may be rescued and freed from\nhis danger, and from death, using such means as are able to release\nhim, which either by drawing his Sword against his enemies, or by\nthrowing a rope down into the Pit, and haling him out, or by cutting\nthe rope by which he hung, may save him, and yet neither the man, nor\nany of his Instruments, as Sword, Rope, Knife, and the like, need to\nbe transchanged. The like may be said of the aforementioned medicines\nor remedies; which if they be not transchangeable, yet they may\nnevertheless do such operations, as by their natural active qualities\nand proprieties to over-power the irregular motions in the natural\nparts of the body of the Patient; for many diseases proceed more from\nirregular motions then irregular parts: and although there is no motion\nwithout matter, yet one and the same matter may have divers and various\nchanges of motions, and moving parts will either oppose or assist\neach other without transchanging. And truly, _Madam_, I wonder that\nyour _Author_ doth condemn such Cordials made of Leaf-gold, Pearls,\npowdered precious Stones, or the like, and yet verily believe, that\nAmber, Saphires, Emeraulds, Beads, Bracelets, &c. outwardly applied or\nworn, can cure more then when inwardly taken; surely, if this be so,\nthey cure more by Faith, then by Reason. But it seems your _Author_\nregulates the actions of Nature to the artificial actions of his\nFurnace, which although sometimes they produce wonderful effects, yet\nnot such as Nature doth; for if they cure one, they commonly kill ten;\nnay, the best of their Medicine is so dangerous, as it ought not to be\napplied but in desperate cases: Wherefore Wise Physicians must needs be\nProvident and Cautious when they use them. And so leaving them, I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and humble Servant._\n\n[1] Of the disease of the Stone, _c._ 3.\n\n[2] _Ch._ Of the reason or consideration of diet.\n\n\n\n\nXXXIX.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI will not dispute your _Authors_ opinion concerning the Plague of Men,\nwhich he says,[1] _doth not infect Beasts, neither doth the plague of\nBeasts infect Men_; but rather believe it to be so: for I have observed\nthat Beasts infect onely each other, to wit, those of their own kind,\nas Men do infect other Men. For example: the Plague amongst Horses\ncontinues in their own kind, and so doth the Plague amongst Sheep;\nand for any thing we know, there may be a plague amongst Vegetables,\nas well as amongst Animals, and they may not onely infect each other\nbut also those Animals that do feed on those infectious Vegetables:\nso that Infections may be caused several ways; either by inbreathing\nand attracting or sucking in the Poyson of the Plague, or by eating\nand converting it into the substance of the body; for some kinds of\npoyson are so powerful, as to work onely by way of inbreathing. Also\nsome sorts of Air may be full of infection, and infect many Men,\nBeasts, Birds, Vegetables, and the like; for Infections are variously\nproduced, Internally as well as Externally, amongst several particular\nCreatures; for as the Plague may be made internally, or within the body\nof a particular Creature, without any exterior infection entring from\nwithout into the body, so an external Infection again may enter many\nseveral ways into the body. And thus there be many contagious diseases\ncaused meerly by the internal motions of the body, as by fright,\nterror, conceit, fancy, imagination, and the like, and many by the\ntaking of poysonous matter from without into the body; but all are made\nby the natural motions or actions of animate matter, by which all is\nmade that is in Nature, and nothing is new, as _Solomon_ says; but what\nis thought or seems to be new, is onely the variation of the Motions\nof this old Matter, which is Nature. And this is the reason that not\nevery Age, Nation, or Creature, has always the like diseases; for as\nall the actions of Nature vary, so also do diseases. But to speak of\nthe Plague, although I am of opinion, that the Plague of Beasts doth\nnot infect Men, unless they be eaten; nor the plague of Men, Beasts;\nyet Magistrates do wisely in some places, that in the beginning of the\nplague of Men, they command Dogs and Cats to be kill'd, by reason, as\nyour _Author_ saith, _The skins and flesh of Brutes may be defiled with\nour Plague, and they may be pestiferous contagions unto us._ I will\nadd one thing more, which doth concern the Poyson of Measels, whereof\nyour _Author_ is saying,[2] That _it is onely proper to humane kind._\nWhat kind of Measles he means, I know not; but certainly Hogs are often\naffected with that disease, as is vulgarly known; but whether they be\ndifferent diseases in their kinds, and proceed from different motions,\nI will let others inquire. And so I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] In the Plague-grave, _ch._ 17.\n\n[2] _Ch._ Call'd, _The Lunar Tribute_.\n\n\n\n\nXL.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nConcerning the disease of the Stone, your _Author_ seems to be of an\nopinion, That the stone in the Bladder, and the stone in the Kidnies,\nare not made after one and the same manner: For, says he,[1] _The\nBladder and the same Urine in number procreates a duelech of another\ncondition, then that which is made in the Kidney._ And truly, _Madam_,\nit may be so; for there are several ways or modes in irregularities,\nas well as regularities, and not every kind is alike, no not every\nParticular, but there is some difference between them: Wherefore, it\nmay very well be, that the corporeal motions that make the stone in\nthe Kidneys, are not just alike to those that make the stone in the\nBladder; and as each sort of stone is different, so their particular\ncauses ought to be different; but this is to be observed, that\ngenerally all diseases which produce hardness, are made by contracting,\ncondensing and retenting motions, and therefore the remedies of them\nmust be dilating, rarifying and dissolving. Next your _Author_ says,\n_The Stone is not bred by heat, but heat is rather an effect of the\nstone; neither is a certain muscilage, or a slimy, snivelly Phlegme\nthe cause or matter of the stone, but the stone is the cause of the\nphlegme._ But, in my judgment, it seems more probable, that a slimy\nmatter is more proper for a stone to be made of, then that a stone\nshould make slime, except it be in its dissolution; that is, when the\nstone, as in its generation or production it did change from a slimy\nor liquid substance to a stone by condensing and contracting motions,\ndoth, by dilating and rarifying motions, dissolve again into such a\nliquid and slimy body. I will not say always, to wit, that the stone\nmust needs be resolved into a slimy matter, but oftentimes it may be\nso. Neither can I absolutely affirm that either heat or cold onely is\nthe cause of a stone; for some may be produced by hot, and some by\ncold contractions and densations, there being as many several sorts of\nstones as there are of other Creatures: But this is to be well noted,\nthat as some sorts of hot contractions do make stones, so some sorts\nof hot dilations do dissolve them: The like of cold contractions and\ndilations. Again: your _Author_ speaking of the womb wherein the stone\nis made; _Every generated thing or being_, says he, _must of necessity\nhave a certain place or womb where it is produced; for there must\nneeds be places wherein things may be made before they are bred._ I\nanswer: As there is not any body without place, nor any place without\nbody, so the womb is not the place of the body generated, neither\nbefore nor after its generation, no more then a man can be said to\nbe in a room when he is not there, but every body carries its place\nalong with it. Moreover, concerning the voiding of bloody Urine, which\nhappens sometimes in the disease of the Stone, my opinion is, That\nit doth not always proceed from the Stone, but many times from the\nbreaking or voluntary opening of some Veins. But as for the cure of the\ndisease of the Stone your _Author,_[2] is pleased to affirm, _That no\ndisease is incurable_, and so neither the disease of the Stone, _For\nhe himself has cured many of the Stone to which they had been obedient\nfor some years._ Indeed, _Madam_, I fear his words are more cheerful\nthen effectual; however it may be possible, if the Kidneys be no ways\nimpaired, or the Bladder hurt; but if there be some such imperfection\nin either or both, then it is as much, in my opinion, as to say, Man\ncan do more then Nature doth: Neither can I believe, that then any of\nyour _Authors_ Chymical preparations, as _Aroph, Ludus, Alkahest_,\nand the like, if they were to be had, would do any good, no nor\n_Daucus_, or wild Carrot-seed, if the disease be as yet curable, will\nprove an effectual remedy for it, although your _Author_ is pleased\nto relate an example of a man, to whom it did much good; for I can\naffirm the contrary by other the like Examples, that it never did any\ngood to those that used it; nor the liquor of the Birch-tree, whose\nvenue and efficacy I do not believe to be so great as your _Author_\ndescribes:[3] But for the stoppage of Urine, Marsh-mallow and oyl of\nAlmonds, which he despises, I approve to be good, and better then any\nof his Unknown, Chymical Secrets; for those Chymical Medicines, as he\nhimself confesses, are hard to be had, especially _Alkahest_, which is\nonely to be obtained by a Particular favour from Heaven, and is rather\na supernatural Gift, then a natural remedy. But your _Author_ doth\nwisely, to commend such remedies as can never, or with great difficulty\nbe obtained, and then to say that no disease is incurable. And so\nleaving him to his unknown secrets, and those to them that will use\nthem, I am resolved to adhere to the Practice of the Schools, which I\nam confident will be more beneficial to the health of,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your real and faithful_\n\n_Friend and Servant._\n\n[1] Of the Stone, _ch._ 6. See the _ch._ called, _A Numero-Critical\nParadox of supplies_.\n\n[2] _Ch._ 7.\n\n[3] _Ch._ 8.\n\n\n\n\nXLI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour _Author_ speaking of the _Gout_, and of that kind of Gout which\nis called _Hereditary_, says, _It consists immediately in the Spirit\nof Life._ First, as for that which is called an Hereditary Disease,\npropagated from Parents upon their Children; my opinion is, That it\nis nothing else but the same actions of the animate matter, producing\nthe same effect in the Child as they did in the Parent: For example;\nthe same motions which made the Gout in the Parent, may make the same\ndisease in the Child; but every Child has not his Parents diseases, and\nmany Children have such diseases as their Parents never had; neither is\nany disease tied to a particular Family by Generation, but they proceed\nfrom irregular motions, and are generally in all Mankind; and therefore\nproperly there is no such thing as an hereditary propagation of\ndiseases; for one and the same kind of disease may be made in different\npersons, never a kin to one another, by the like motions; but because\nChildren have such a neer relation to their Parents by Generation, if\nthey chance to have the same diseases with their Parents, men are apt\nto conclude it comes by inheritance; but we may as well say, that all\ndiseases are hereditary; for there is not any disease in Nature but is\nproduced by the actions of Nature's substance; and if we receive life\nand all our bodily substance by Generation from our Parents, we may be\nsaid to receive diseases too; for diseases are inherent in the matter\nor substance of Nature, which every Creature is a part of, and are real\nbeings made by the corporeal motions of the animate matter, although\nirregular to us; for as this matter moves, so is Life or Death,\nSickness or Health, and all natural effects; and we consisting of the\nsame natural matter, are naturally subject as well to diseases as to\nhealth, according as the Matter moves. Thus all diseases are hereditary\nin Nature; nay, the Scripture it self confirms it, informing us, that\ndiseases, as well as death, are by an hereditary propagation derived\nfrom _Adam_ upon all Posterity. But as for the Gout, your _Authors_\ndoctrine is,[1] _That Life is not a body, nor proper to a body, nor the\noff-spring of corporeal Proprieties_,[2] but a _meer No-thing_; and\nthat _the Spirit of Life is a real being, to wit, the arterial blood\nresolved by the Ferment of the heart into salt air, and enlightned by\nlife_,[3] and that the Gout doth immediately consist in this spirit of\nlife. All which how it doth agree, I cannot conceive; for that a real\nbeing should be enlightned by Nothing, and be a spirit of Nothing, is\nnot imaginable, nor how the Gout should inhabit in the spirit of life;\nfor then it would follow, that a Child, as soon as it is brought forth\ninto the world, would be troubled with the Gout, if it be as natural\nto him as life, or have its habitation in the Spirit of Life. Also\nyour _Author_ is speaking of _an Appoplexy in the head, which takes\naway all sense and motion._ But surely, in my opinion, it is impossible\nthat all sense and motion should be out of the head; onely that sense\nand motion, which is proper to the head, and to the nature of that\nCreature, is altered to some other sensitive and rational motions,\nwhich are proper to some other figure; for there is no part or particle\nof matter that has not motion and sense. I pray consider, _Madam_,\nis there any thing in Nature that is without motion? Perchance you\nwill say, Minerals; but that is proved otherwise; as for example, by\nthe sympathetical motion between the Loadstone and Iron, and between\nthe Needle and the North, as also by the operation of Mercury, and\nseveral others; Wherefore there is no doubt, but all kinds, sorts and\nparticulars of Creatures have their natural motions, although they are\nnot all visible to us, but not such motions as are made by Gas, or\nBlas, or Ideas, &c. but corporeal sensitive and rational motions, which\nare the actions of Natural Matter. You may say, Some are of opinion,\nthat Sympathy and Antipathy are not Corporeal motions. Truly, whosoever\nsays so, speaks no reason; for Sympathy and Antipathy are nothing else\nbut the actions of bodies, and are made in bodies; the Sympathy betwixt\nIron and the Loadstone is in bodies; the Sympathy between the Needle\nand the North is in bodies; the Sympathy of the Magnetic powder is in\nbodies. The truth is, there is no motion without a body, nor no body\nwithout motion. Neither doth Sympathy and Antipathy work at distance\nby the power of Immaterial Spirits, or rays, issuing out of their\nbodies, but by agreeable or disagreeable corporeal motions; for if\nthe motions be agreeable, there is Sympathy; if disagreeable, there\nis Antipathy; and if they be equally found in two bodies, then there\nis a mutual Sympathy or Antipathy; but if in one body onely, and not\nin the other, there is but Sympathy or Antipathy on one side, or in\none Creature. Lastly, concerning _swoonings or fainting fits_, your\n_Authors_ opinion is, that they _proceed from the stomack_: Which I\ncan hardly believe; for many will swoon upon the sight of some object,\nothers at a sound, or report, others at the smell of some disagreeable\nodour, others at the taste of some or other thing that is not agreeable\nto their nature, and so forth: also some will swoon at the apprehension\nor conceit of something, and some by a disorder or irregularity of\nmotions in exterior parts. Wherefore, my opinion is, that swoonings\nmay proceed from any part of the body, and not onely from the stomack.\nBut, _Madam_, I being no Physicianess may perhaps be in an error,\nand therefore I will leave this discourse to those that are thorowly\nlearned and practised in this Art, and rest satisfied that I am,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Ladiships_\n\n_humble Servant._\n\n[1] Of the disease of the Stone, _c._ 9.\n\n[2] Of the subject of inhering of diseases in the point of life.\n\n[3] Of the Spirit of Life.\n\n\n\n\nXLII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour _Author_[1] is inquiring whether some cures of diseases may be\neffected by bare co-touchings; and I am of his opinion, they may;\nfor co-touchings of some exterior objects may cause alterations of\nsome particular motions in some particular parts of matter, without\neither transferring their own motions into those parts, (for that this\nis impossible, I have heretofore declared) or without any corporeal\ndeparting from their own parts of matter into them, and alterations may\nbe produced both in the motions and figures of the affected parts: but\nthese cures are not so frequent as those that are made by the entring\nof medicines into the diseased parts, and either expel the malignant\nmatter, or rectifie the irregular and disordered motions, or strengthen\nthe weak, or reduce the straying, or work any other ways according to\nthe nature and propriety of their own substance, and the disposition of\nthe distempered parts: Nevertheless, those cures which are performed\nexteriously, as to heal inward affects by an outward bare co-touching,\nare all made by natural motions in natural substances, and not by\n_Non_-beings, substancelesse Ideas, or spiritual Rays; for those that\nwill cure diseases by _Non_-beings, will effect little or nothing; for\na disease is corporeal or material, and so must the remedies be, there\nbeing no cure made but by a conflict of the remedy with the disease;\nand certainly, if a _non_-being fight against a being, or a corporeal\ndisease, I doubt it will do no great effect; for the being will be too\nstrong for the _non_-being: Wherefore my constant opinion is, that\nall cures whatsoever, are perfected by the power of corporeal motions,\nworking upon the affected parts either interiously or exteriously,\neither by applying external remedies to external wounds, or by curing\ninternal distempers, either by medicines taken internally, or by bare\nexternal co-touchings. And such a remedy, I suppose, has been that\nwhich your _Author_ speaks of, a stone of a certain Irish-man, which\nby a meer external contact hath cured all kinds of diseases, either\nby touching outwardly the affected parts, or by licking it but with\nthe tip of the Tongue, if the disease was Internal: But if the vertue\nof the Stone was such, as your _Author_ describes, certainly, what\nman soever he was that possessed such a jewel, I say, he was rather\nof the nature of the Devil, then of man, that would not divulge it\nto the general benefit of all mankind; and I wonder much, that your\n_Author_, who otherwise pretends such extraordinary Devotion, Piety,\nand Religiousness, as also Charity, _viz._ that all his works he has\nwritten, are for the benefit of his neighbour, and to detect the errors\nof the Schools meerly for the good of man, doth yet plead his cause,\nsaying, That _secrets, as they are most difficultly prepared, so they\nought to remain in secret forever in the possession of the Privy\nCouncel_, what Privy Counsels he means, I know not; but certainly some\nare more difficult to be spoken to, or any thing to be obtained from,\nthen the preparation of a Physical Arcanum. However, a general good\nor benefit ought not to be concealed or kept in privy Councels, but\nto be divulged and publickly made known, that all sorts of People, of\nwhat condition, degree, or Nation soever, might partake of the general\nblessing and bounty of God. But, _Madam_, you may be sure, that many,\nwho pretend to know Physical secrets, most commonly know the least, as\nbeing for the most part of the rank of them that deceive the simple\nwith strange tales which exceed truth; and to make themselves more\nauthentical, they use to rail at others, and to condemn their skill,\nonely to magnifie their own: I say, many, _Madam_, as I have observed,\nare of that nature, especially those, that have but a superficial\nknowledg in the Art of Physick; for those that are thorowly learned,\nand sufficiently practised in it, scorn to do the like; which I wish\nmay prosper and thrive by their skill. And so I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Ladiships_\n\n_humble Servant._\n\n[1] In the _ch._ call'd _Butler_.\n\n\n\n\nXLIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour _Author_ is pleased to relate a story[1] of one that died\nsuddenly, and being dissected, there was not the least sign of decay\nor disorder found in his body. But I cannot add to those that wonder,\nwhen no sign of distemper is found in a man's body after he is dead;\nbecause I do not believe, that the subtillest, learnedst, and most\npractised Anatomist, can exactly tell all the Interior Government\nor motions, or can find out all obscure and invisible passages in a\nmans body; for concerning the motions, they are all altered in death,\nor rather in the dissolution of the animal figure; and although the\nexterior animal figure or shape doth not alter so soon, yet the animal\nmotions may alter in a moment of time; which sudden alteration may\ncause a sudden death, and so the motions being invisible, the cause\nof death cannot be perceived; for no body can find that which is not\nto be found, to wit, animal motions in a dead man; for Nature hath\naltered these motions from being animal motions to some other kind\nof motions, she being as various in dissolutions, as in productions,\nindeed so various, that her ways cannot be traced or known thorowly\nand perfectly, but onely by piece-meals, as the saying is, that is,\nbut partly: Wherefore man can onely know that which is visible, or\nsubject to his senses; and yet our senses do not always inform us\ntruly, but the alterations of grosser parts are more easily known, then\nthe alterations of subtil corporeal motions, either in general, or in\nparticular; neither are the invisible passages to be known in a dead\nCarcass, much less in a living body. But, I pray, mistake me not, when\nI say, that the animal motions are not subject to our exterior senses;\nfor I do not mean all exterior animal motions, nor all interior animal\nmotions; for though you do see no interior motion in an animal body,\nyet you may feel some, as the motion of the Heart, the motion of the\nPulse, the motion of the Lungs, and the like; but the most part of\nthe interior animal motions are not subject to our exterior senses;\nnay, no man, he may be as observing as he will, can possibly know by\nhis exterior senses all the several and various interior motions in\nhis own body, nor all the exterior motions of his exterior parts: and\nthus it remains still, that neither the subtillest motions and parts\nof matter, nor the obscure passages in several Creatures, can be known\nbut by several parts; for what one part is ignorant of, another part\nis knowing, and what one part is knowing, another part is ignorant\nthereof; so that unless all the Parts of Infinite Matter were joyned\ninto one Creature, there can never be in one particular Creature a\nperfect knowledg of all things in Nature. Wherefore I shall never\naspire to any such knowledg, but be content with that little particular\nknowledg, Nature has been pleased to give me, the chief of which is,\nthat I know my self, and especially that I am,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your constant Friend,_\n\n_and faithful Servant._\n\n[1] _Ch._ 61. called, _The Preface_.\n\n\n\n\nXLIV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI perceive you are desirous to know the cause, _Why a man is more weak\nat the latter end of a disease then at the beginning, and is a longer\ntime recovering health, then loosing health_; as also _the reason of\nrelapses and intermissions?_ First, as for weakness and strength, my\nopinion is, they are caused by the regular and irregular motions in\nseveral parts, each striving to over-power the other in their conflict;\nand when a man recovers from a disease, although the regular motions\nhave conquered the irregular, and subdued them to their obedience, yet\nthey are not so quite obedient as they ought, which causes weakness:\nNeither do the regular motions use so much force in Peace, as in War;\nfor though animate matter cannot lose force, yet it doth not always\nuse force; neither can the parts of Nature act beyond their natural\npower, but they do act within their natural power; neither do they\ncommonly act to the utmost of their power. And as for Health, why it\nis sooner lost then recovered; I answer, That it is easier to make\ndisorders then to rectifie them: as for example, in a Common-wealth,\nthe ruines of War are not so suddenly repaired, as made. But concerning\nRelapses and Intermissions of diseases, Intermissions are like truces\nor cessations from War for a time; and Relapses are like new stirs or\ntumults of Rebellion; for Rebels are not so apt to settle in peace as\nto renew the war upon slight occasions; and if the regular motions\nof the body be stronger, they reduce them again unto obedience. But\ndiseases are occasioned many several ways; for some are made by a home\nRebellion, and others by forreign enemies, and some by natural and\nregular dissolutions, and their cures are as different; but the chief\nMagistrates or Governors of the animal body, which are the regular\nmotions of the parts of the body, want most commonly the assistance\nof forreign Parts, which are Medicines, Diets, and the like; and if\nthere be factions amongst these chief Magistrates, or motions of the\nparts of the body, then the whole body suffers a ruine. But since\nthere would be no variety in Nature, nor no difference between Natures\nseveral parts or Creatures, if her actions were never different, but\nalways agreeing and constant, a war or rebellion in Nature cannot be\navoided: But, mistake me not, for I do not mean a war or rebellion in\nthe nature or substance of Matter, but between the several parts of\nMatter, which are the several Creatures, and their several Motions; for\nMatter being always one and the same in its nature, has nothing to war\nwithal; and surely it will not quarrel with its own Nature. Next you\ndesire to know, that if Nature be in a Perpetual motion, _Whence comes\na duration of some things, and a Tiredness, Weariness, Sluggishness,\nor Faintness?_ I answer, first, That in some bodies, the Retentive\nmotions are stronger then the dissolving motions; as for example, Gold,\nand Quicksilver or Mercury; the separating and dissolving motions of\nFire have onely power to melt and rarifie them for a time, but cannot\nalter their nature: so a Hammer, or such like instrument, when used,\nmay beat Gold, and make it thin as a Cobweb, or as dust, but cannot\nalter its interior nature: But yet this doth not prove it to be either\nwithout motion, or to be altogether unalterable, and not subject to any\ndissolution; but onely that its retentive motions are too strong for\nthe dissolving motions of the Fire, which by force work upon the Gold;\nand we might as well say, that Sand, or an Earthen Vessel, or Glass,\nor Stone, or any thing else, is unalterable, and will last eternally,\nif not disturbed. But some of Natures actions are as industrious to\nkeep their figures, as others are to dissolve, or alter them; and\ntherefore Retentive motions are more strong and active in some figures,\nthen dissolving motions are in others, or producing motions in other\nFigures. Next, as for Tiredness, or Faintness of motions, there is no\nsuch thing as tiredness or faintness in Nature, for Nature cannot be\ntired, nor grow faint, or sick, nor be pained, nor die, nor be any\nways defective; for all this is onely caused through the change and\nvariety of the corporeal motions of Nature, and her several parts;\nneither do irregular motions prove any defect in Nature, but a prudence\nin Natures actions, in making varieties and alterations of Figures;\nfor without such motions or actions, there could not be such varieties\nand alterations in Nature as there are: neither is slackness of some\nmotions a defect, for Nature is too wise to use her utmost force in\nher ordinary works; and though Nature is infinite, yet it is not\nnecessary she should use an infinite force and power in any particular\nact. Lastly, you desire my opinion, _Whether there be motion in a dead\nanimal Creature._ To which, I answer: I have declared heretofore, that\nthere is no such thing as death in Nature, but what is commonly named\ndeath, is but an alteration or change of corporeal motions, and the\ndeath of an animal is nothing else but the dissolving motions of its\nfigure; for when a man is dying, the motions which did formerly work\nto the consistence of his figure do now work to the dissolution of\nhis figure, and to the production of some other figures, changing and\ntransforming every part thereof; but though the figure of that dead\nanimal is dissolved, yet the parts of that dissolved figure remain\nstill in Nature although they be infinitely changed, and will do so\neternally, as long as Nature lasts by the Will of God; for nothing can\nbe lost or annihilated in Nature. And this is all, _Madam_, that I can\nanswer to your questions, wherein, I hope, I have obeyed your commands,\naccording to the duty of,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and humble Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXLV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI have thus far discharged my duty, that according to your commands,\nI have given you my judgment of the works of those four famous\nPhilosophers of our age, which you did send me to peruse, and have\nwithal made reflexions upon some of their opinions in Natural\nPhilosophy, especially those, wherein I did find them dissent from the\nGround and Principles of my own Philosophy. And since by your leave\nI am now publishing all those Letters which I have hitherto written\nto you concerning those aforesaid Authors, and their Works, I am\nconfident I shall not escape the censures of their followers; But, I\nshall desire them, that they will be pleased to do me this Justice, and\nto examine first my opinions well, without any partiality or wilful\nmisinterpretation of my sence, before they pass their censure: Next,\nI desire them to consider, That I have no skill in School-learning,\nand therefore for want of terms of Art may easily chance to slip, or\nat least, not express my opinions so clearly as my readers expected;\nHowever, I have done my endeavour, and to my sense and reason they\nseem clear and plain enough, especially as I have expressed them in\nthose Letters I have sent you; for concerning my other Work, called\n_Philosophical Opinions_, I must confess, that it might have been done\nmore exactly and perspicuously, had I been better skilled in such\nwords and expressions as are usual in the Schools of Philosophers;\nand therefore, if I be but capable to learn names and terms of Art,\n(although I find my self very untoward to learn, and do despair of\nproving a Scholar) I will yet endeavour to rectifie that work, and\nmake it more intelligible; for my greatest ambition is to express my\nconceptions so, that my Readers may understand them: For which I would\nnot spare any labour or pains, but be as industrious as those that gain\ntheir living by their work; and I pray to God, that Nature may give me\na capacity to do it. But as for those that will censure my works out of\nspite and malice, rather then according to justice, let them do their\nworst; for if God do but bless them, I need not to fear the power of\nNature, much less of a part of Nature, as Man. Nay, if I have but your\nLadiships approbation, it will satisfie me; for I know you are so wise\nand just in your judgment, that I may safely rely upon it: For which I\nshall constantly and unfeignedly remain as long as I live,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Ladiships most faithful Friend_\n\n_and humble Servant._\n\n\n\n\nSECT. IV.\n\n\nI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI perceive, you take great delight in the study of Natural Philosophy,\nsince you have not onely sent me some Authors to peruse, and give my\njudgment of their opinions, but are very studious your self in the\nreading of Philosophical Works: and truly, I think you cannot spend\nyour time more honourably, profitably, and delightfully, then in the\nstudy of Nature, as to consider how Variously, Curiously, and Wisely,\nshe acts in her Creatures; for if the particular knowledg of a mans\nself be commendable, much more is the knowledg of the general actions\nof Nature, which doth lead us to the knowledg of our selves. The truth\nis, by the help of Philosophy our minds are raised above our selves,\ninto the knowledg of the Causes of all natural effects. But leaving the\ncommending of this noble study, you are pleased to desire my opinion of\na very difficult and intricate argument in Natural Philosophy, to wit,\nof Generation, or Natural Production. I must beg leave to tell you,\nfirst, that some (though foolishly) believe, it is not fit for Women to\nargue upon so subtil a Mystery: Next, there have been so many learned\nand experienced Philosophers, Physicians, and Anatomists, which have\ntreated of this subject, that it might be thought a great presumption\nfor me, to argue with them, having neither the learning nor experience\nby practice which they had: Lastly, There are so many several ways\nand manners of Productions in Nature, as it is impossible for a single\nCreature to know them all: For there are Infinite variations made\nby self-motion in Infinite Matter, producing several Figures, which\nare several Creatures in that same Matter. But you would fain know,\nhow Nature, which is Infinite Matter, acts by self-motion? Truly,\n_Madam_, you may as well ask any one part of your body, how every\nother part of your body acts, as to ask me, who am but a small part of\nInfinite Matter, how Nature works. But yet, I cannot say, that Nature\nis so obscure, as her Creatures are utterly ignorant; for as there\nare two of the outward sensitive organs in animal bodies, which are\nmore intelligible then the rest, to wit, the Ear, and the Eye; so in\nInfinite Matter, which is the body of Nature, there are two parts,\nwhich are more understanding or knowing then the rest, to wit, the\nRational and Sensitive part of Infinite Matter; for though it be true,\nThat Nature, by self-division, made by self-motion into self-figures,\nwhich are self-parts, causes a self-obscurity to each part, motion,\nand figure; nevertheless, Nature being infinitely wise and knowing,\nits infinite natural wisdom and knowledg is divided amongst those\ninfinite parts of the infinite body: and the two most intelligible\nparts, as I said, are the sensitive and rational parts in Nature,\nwhich are divided, being infinite, into every Figure or Creature; I\ncannot say equally divided, no more, then I can say, all creatures are\nof equal shapes, sizes, properties, strengths, quantities, qualities,\nconstitutions, semblances, appetites, passions, capacities, forms,\nnatures, and the like; for Nature delights in variety, as humane\nsense and reason may well perceive: for seldom any two creatures are\njust alike, although of one kind or sort, but every creature doth vary\nmore or less. Wherefore it is not probable, that the production or\ngeneration of all or most Creatures, should be after one and the same\nmanner or way, for else all Creatures would be just alike without any\ndifference. But this is to be observed, that though Nature delights\nin variety, yet she doth not delight in confusion, but, as it is the\npropriety of Nature to work variously, so she works also wisely; which\nis the reason, that the rational and sensitive parts of Nature, which\nare the designing and architectonical parts, keep the species of every\nkind of Creatures by the way of Translation in Generation, or natural\nProduction; for whatsoever is transferred, works according to the\nnature of that figure or figures from whence it was transferred, But\nmistake me not; for I do not mean always according to their exterior\nFigure, but according to their interior Nature; for different motions\nin one and the same parts of matter, make different figures, wherefore\nmuch more in several parts of matter and changes of motion; But, as I\nsaid, Translation is the chief means to keep or maintain the species\nof every kind of Creatures, which Translation in natural production\nor generation, is of the purest and subtilest substances, to wit, the\nsensitive and rational, which are the designing and architectonical\nparts of Nature. You may ask me, _Madam_, what this wise and ingenious\nMatter is. I answer: It is so pure, subtil, and self-active, as our\nhumane shares of sense and reason cannot readily or perfectly perceive\nit; for by that little part of knowledg that a humane creature hath, it\nmay more readily perceive the strong action then the purer substance;\nfor the strongest action of the purest substance is more perceivable\nthen the matter or substance it self; which is the cause, that most\nmen are apt to believe the motion, and to deny the matter, by reason\nof its subtilty; for surely the sensitive and rational matter is so\npure and subtil, as not to be expressed by humane sense and reason.\nAs for the rational matter, it is so pure, fine, and subtil, that it\nmay be as far beyond lucent matter, as lucent matter is beyond gross\nvapours, or thick clouds; and the sensitive matter seems not much less\npure: also there is very pure inanimate matter, but not subtil and\nactive of it self; for as there are degrees in the animate, so there\nare also degrees in the inanimate matter; so that the purest degree\nof inanimate matter comes next to the animate, not in motion, but in\nthe purity of its own degree; for it cannot change its nature so, as\nto become animate, yet it may be so pure in its own nature, as not to\nbe perceptible by our grosser senses. But concerning the two degrees\nof animate Matter, to wit, the sensitive and rational, I say that the\nsensitive is much more acute then Vitriol, Aqua-fortis, Fire, or the\nlike; and the rational much more subtil and active then Quicksilver,\nor Light, so as I cannot find a comparison fit to express them, onely\nthat this sensitive and rational self-moving Matter is the life and\nsoul of Nature; But by reason this Matter is not subject to our\ngross senses, although our senses are subject to it, as being made,\nsubsisting and acting through the power of its actions, we are not\napt to believe it, no more then a simple Country-wench will believe,\nthat Air is a substance, if she neither hear, see, smell, taste, or\ntouch it, although Air touches and surrounds her: But yet the effects\nof this animate matter prove that there is such a matter; onely, as I\nsaid before, this self-moving matter causing a self-division as well\nas a general action, is the cause of a self-obscurity, which obscurity\ncauses doubts, disputes, and inconstancies in humane opinions, although\nnot so much obscurity, as to make all Creatures blind-fold, for surely\nthere is no Creature but perceives more or less. But to conclude, The\nRational degree of Matter is the most intelligible, and the wisest part\nof Nature, and the Sensitive is the most laborious and provident part\nin Nature, both which are the Creators of all Creatures in Infinite\nMatter; and if you intend to know more of this Rational and Sensitive\nMatter, you may consult my Book of Philosophy, to which I refer you.\nAnd so taking my leave for the present, I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI understand by your last, that you have read the Book of that most\nlearned and famous Physician and Anatomist, Dr. _Harvey_, which treats\nof Generation; and in the reading of it, you have mark'd several\nscruples, which you have framed into several questions concerning that\nsubject, to which you desire my answer. Truly, _Madam_, I am loth to\nimbarque my self in this difficult argument, not onely for the reasons\nI have given you heretofore, but also that I do not find my self\nable enough to give you such a satisfactory answer as perhaps you do\nexpect. But since your Commands are so powerful with me, that I can\nhardly resist them, and your Nature so good that you easily pardon any\nthing that is amiss, I will venture upon it according to the strength\nof my Natural Reason, and endeavour to give you my opinion as well\nand as clearly as I can. Your first question is; _Whether the action\nof one or more producers be the onely cause of Natural Production\nor Generation, without imparting or transferring any of their own\nsubstance or Matter._ I answer: The sole co-action of the Producers may\nmake a change of exterior forms or figures, but not produce another\nCreature; for if there were not substance or matter, as well as action,\nboth transferred together, there would not be new Creatures made out\nof old Matter, but every production would require new Matter, which\nis impossible, if there be but one Matter, and that infinite; and\ncertainly, humane sense and reason may well perceive, that there can be\nbut one Matter, for several kinds of Matter would make a confusion; and\nthus if new Creatures were made onely by substanceless motion, it would\nnot onely be an infinite trouble to Nature, to create something out of\nnothing perpetually, but, as I said, it would make a confusion amongst\nall Nature's works, which are her several Parts or Creatures. But by\nreason there is but one Matter, which is Infinite and Eternal, and this\nMatter has self-motion in it, both Matter and Motion must of necessity\ntransmigrate, or be transferred together without any separation, as\nbeing but one thing, to wit, Corporeal Motion. 'Tis true, one part of\nanimate or self-moving Matter, may without Translation move, or rather\noccasion other parts to move; but one Creature cannot naturally produce\nanother without the transferring of its corporeal motions. But it is\nwell to be observed, that there is great difference between the actions\nof Nature; for all actions are not generating, but some are patterning,\nand some transforming, and the like; and as for the transforming\naction, that may be without translation, as being nothing else but\na change of motions in one and the same part or parts of Matter, to\nwit, when the same parts of Matter do change into several figures,\nand return into the same figures again. Also the action of Patterning\nis without Translation; for to pattern out, is nothing else but to\nimitate, and to make a figure in its own substance or parts of Matter\nlike another figure. But in generation every producer doth transfer\nboth Matter and Motion, that is, Corporeal Motion into the produced;\nand if there be more producers then one, they all do contribute to\nthe produced; and if one Creature produces many Creatures, those many\nCreatures do partake more or less of their producer. But you may say,\nIf the producer transfers its own Matter, or rather its own corporeal\nmotions into the produced, many productions will soon dissolve the\nproducer, and he will become a sacrifice to his off-spring. I answer;\nThat doth not follow: for as one or more Creatures contribute to one\nor more other Creatures, so other Creatures do contribute to them,\nalthough not after one and the same manner or way, but after divers\nmanners or ways; but all manners and ways must be by translation to\nrepair and assist; for no Creature can subsist alone and of it self,\nbut all Creatures traffick and commerce from and to each other, and\nmust of necessity do so, since they are all parts of the same Matter:\nNeither can Motion subsist without Matter, nor quit Matter, nor act\nwithout Matter, no more, then an Artificer can work without materials,\nand without self-motion Matter would be dead and useless; Wherefore\nMatter and Motion must upon necessity not onely be inseparable, but\nbe one body, to wit, corporeal motion; which motion by dividing and\ncomposing its several parts, and acting variously, is the cause of all\nProduction, Generation, Metamorphosing, or any other thing that is done\nin Nature. But if, according to your _Author_, the sole action be the\ncause of Generation without transferring of substance, then Matter is\nuseless, and of none or little effect; which, in my opinion, is not\nprobable.\n\nYour second question is, _Whether the Production or Generation of\nanimals is as the Conceptions of the Brain, which the Learned say are\nImmaterial?_ I answer: The Conceptions of the Brain, in my opinion,\nare not Immaterial, but Corporeal; for though the corporeal motions\nof the brain, or the matter of its conceptions, is invisible to\nhumane Creatures, and that when the brain is dissected, there is no\nsuch matter found, yet that doth not prove, that there is no Matter,\nbecause it is not so gross a substance as to be perceptible by our\nexterior senses: Neither will your _Authors_ example hold, that as a\nbuilder erects a house according to his conception in the brain, the\nsame happens in all other natural productions or generations; for, in\nmy opinion, the house is materially made in the brain, which is the\nconception of the builder, although not of such gross materials, as\nStone, Brick, Wood, and the like, yet of such matter as is the Rational\nMatter, that is, the house when it is conceived in the brain, is made\nby the rational corporeal figurative motions of their own substance\nor degree of Matter; But if all Animals should be produced by meer\nfancies, and a Man and a Woman should beget by fancying themselves\ntogether in copulation, then the produced would be a true Platonick\nChild; But if a Woman being from her Husband should be so got with\nChild, the question is, whether the Husband would own the Child; and\nif amorous Lovers (which are more contagious for appetite and fancy\nthen Married persons) should produce Children by Immaterial contagions,\nthere would be more Children then Parents to own them.\n\nYour third question is, _Whether Animals may not be produced, as many\nDiseases are, by contagion?_ I answer: Although contagions may be made\nat a distance, by perception; yet those diseases are not begotten\nby immaterial motions, but by the rational and sensitive corporeal\nmotions, which work such diseases in the body of a Creature, by the\nassociation of parts, like as the same disease is made in another body:\nNeither are diseases always produced after one and the same manner, but\nafter divers manners; whereas animals are produced as animals, that\nis, after one natural and proper way; for although all the effects in\nparticular be not alike, yet the general way or manner to produce those\neffects is the same: As for example; there is no other way to produce\na fruitful Egg, but by a Cock and a Hen; But a Contagious disease, as\nthe small-Pox, or the like, may be produced by the way of Surfeits or\nby Conceit, which may cause the sensitive corporeal parts, through the\nirregular motions of the rational corporeal parts, to work and produce\nsuch a disease, or any other ways. But neither a disease, nor no\ncreature else can be produced without matter, by substanceless motion;\nfor wheresoever is motion, there is also matter, matter and motion\nbeing but one thing.\n\nYour fourth question is, _Whether an Animal Creature is perfectly\nshaped or formed at the first Conception?_ I answer: If the Creature\nbe composed of many and different parts, my opinion is, it cannot be.\nYou may say, That if it hath not all his parts produced at there will\nbe required many acts of generation to beget or produce every part,\notherwise the producers would not be the Parents of the produced in\nwhole, but in part. I answer: The Producer is the designer, architect,\nand founder of the whole Creature produced; for the sensitive and\nrational corporeal motions, which are transferred from the producer or\nproducers, joyn to build the produced like to the producer in specie,\nbut the transferred parts may be invisible and insensible to humane\nCreatures, both through their purity and little quantity, until the\nproduced is framed to some visible degree; for a stately building may\nproceed from a small beginning, neither can humane sense tell what\nmanner of building is designed at the first foundation. But you may\nsay, That many Eggs may be made by one act of the producers, to wit,\nthe Cock and the Hen, and those many Eggs may be laid at several\ntimes, as also hatched at several times, and become Chickens at several\ntimes. I answer; It may well and easily be so: for the rational and\nsensitive parts or corporeal motions which were transferred in one act,\ndesigned many produced through that one act; for those transferred\ncorporeal motions, although they have not a sufficient quantity of\nthemselves to make all the produced in their perfect shapes at once,\nyet they are the chief designer, architect and founder of all that are\nto be produced; for the corporeal motions which are transferred, joyn\nwith those they are transferred to, and being associates, work to one\ndesign, the sensitive being the architect, the rational the designer,\nwhich together with the inanimate parts of matter, can never want\nmaterials, neither can the materials want labourers; for the degrees of\nmatter are inseparable, and do make but one body or substance. Again\nyou may say, That some parts of Matter may produce another Creature\nnot like to the producer in its species, as for example, Monsters.\nI answer, That is possible to be done, but yet it is not usual; for\nMonsters are not commonly born, but those corporeal motions which dwell\nin one species, work according to the nature of the same species; and\nwhen the parts of Matter are transferred from Creature to Creature,\nthat is, are separated from some parts, and joyned to other parts of\nthe same species, and the same nature; those transferred parts of\nmatter, although invisible in quantity, by reason of their purity and\nsubtilty, begin the work of the produced according to its natural\nspecies, and the labourers in other parts of matter work to the same\nend; just as it is in the artificial building of a house, where the\nhouse is first designed by the Architect, or Master, and then the\nlabourers work not after their own fancy, (else it would not be the\nsame house that was designed, nor any uniformity in it) but according\nto the architects or surveyors design; so those parts of matter or\ncorporeal motions that are transferred from the producer, are like the\narchitect, but the labourers or workmen are the assisting and adjoyning\nparts of matter. But you will say, How comes it, that many creatures\nmay be made by one or two? I answer: As one owner or two partners may\nbe the cause of many buildings, so few or more transferred rational\nand sensitive corporeal motions may make and produce as many creatures\nas they can get materials and labourers; for if they get one, they\nget the other, by reason the degrees of matter, _viz._ animate and\ninanimate, are inseparably mixt, and make but one body or substance;\nand the proof of it is, that all animals are not constant in the number\nof their off-spring, but sometimes produce more, and sometimes fewer,\nand sometimes their off-spring is less, and sometimes larger, according\nto the quantity of matter. Again you may say, That in some Creatures\nthere is no passage to receive the transferred matter into the place\nof the architecture. I answer: That all passages are not visible to\nhumane sense; and some humane Creatures have not a sufficient humane\nreason to conceive, that most of Natures works are not so gross as\nto be subject to their exterior senses; but as for such parts and\npassages, whether exterior or interior, visible or invisible, as also\nfor copulation, conception, formation, nourishment, and the like in\nGeneration, I leave you to Physicians and Anatomists. And to conclude\nthis question, we may observe, that not any animal Creatures shape\ndissolveth in one instant of time, but by degrees; why should we\nbelieve then, that Animals are generated or produced in their perfect\nshape in one instant of time, and by one act of Nature? But sense and\nreason knows by observation, that an animal Creature requires more time\nto be generated, then to be dissolved, like as an house is sooner and\nwith less pains pull'd down, then built up.\n\nYour Fifth question is, _Whether Animals are not generated by the way\nof Metamorphosing?_ To which I answer, That it is not possible that a\nthird Creature can be made without translation of corporeal motions;\nand since Metamorphosing is onely a change of motions in the same parts\nof Matter, without any translation of corporeal motions, no animal\nCreature can be produced or generated by the way of Metamorphosing.\n\nYour Sixth question is, _Whether a whole may be made out of a part?_ I\nanswer: There is no whole in Nature, except you will call Nature her\nself a whole; for all Creatures are but parts of Infinite Matter.\n\nYour Seventh question is, _Whether all Animals, as also Vegetables,\nare made or generated by the way of Eggs?_ I have said heretofore,\nThat it is not probable, that different sorts, nay, different kinds\nof Creatures, should all have but one manner or way of production;\nfor why should not Nature make different ways of productions, as well\nas different Creatures? And as for Vegetables, if all their Seeds be\nlikened unto Eggs, then Eggs may very well be likened to Seeds; which\nif so, then a Peas-cod is the Hen, and the Peas in the Cod is the\ncluster of Eggs: the like of ears of Corn. And those animals that\nproduce but one creature or seed at a time, may be like the kernel\nof a Nut, when the shell is broke, the creature comes forth. But how\nthis will agree with your _Author_, who says, that the creature in the\nshell must make its own passage, I cannot tell; for if the Nut be not\nbroken by some external means or occasion, the kernel is not like to\nget forth. And as for humane Eggs, I know not what to answer; for it is\nsaid, that the first Woman was made of a mans ribb; but whether that\nribb was an egg, I cannot tell. And why may not Minerals and Elements\nbe produced by the way of Eggs as well as Vegetables and Animals? Nay,\nwhy may not the whole World be likened unto an Egg? Which if so, the\ntwo Poles are the two ends the Egg; and for the Elements, the Yolk is\nthe Fire, the White, the Water; the Film, the Air; and the Shell it\nself will very well serve for the Earth: But then it must first be\nbroken, and pounded into one lump or solid mass, and so sink or swim\ninto the midst of the liquid parts, as to the Center; and as for the\nseveral foetuses in this great Egg, they are the several Creatures in\nit. Or it might be said, that the Chaos was an Egg, and the Universe,\nthe Chicken. But leaving this similizing, it is like, that some\nstudious Men may by long study upon one part of the body, conceive and\nbelieve that all other parts are like that one part; like as those that\nhave gazed long upon the Sun, all they see for a time, are Suns to\nthem; or like as those which having heard much of Hobgoblins, all they\nsee are Hobgoblins, their fancies making such things. But, _Madam_, to\nmake a conclusion also of this question, I repeat what I said before,\nthat all Creatures have not one way of production; and as they have\nnot all one way of production, so they have neither one instant of\ntime either for perfection or dissolution, but their perfection and\ndissolution is made by degrees.\n\nYour Eighth question is, _Whether it may not be, that the sensitive and\nrational corporeal motions in an Egg do pattern out the figure of the\nHen and Cock, whilest the Hen sits upon the Egg, and so bring forth\nChickens by the way of patterning?_ I answer: The action of patterning,\nis not the action of Generation; for as I said heretofore, the actions\nof Nature are different, and Generation must needs be performed by the\nway of translation, which translation is not required in the action\nof Patterning; but according as the Producers are, which transfer\ntheir own matter into the produced, so is the produced concerning its\nspecies; which is plainly proved by common examples; for if Pheasants,\nor Turky, or Goose-eggs, be laid under an ordinary Hen, or an ordinary\nHens-egg be laid under a Pheasant, Turky, or Goose, the Chickens of\nthose Eggs will never be of any other species then of those that\nproduced the Egg; for an ordinary Hen, if she sit upon Pheasants,\nTurky, or Goose-eggs, doth not hatch Chickens of her own species, but\nthe Chickens will be of the species either of the Pheasant, or Turky,\nor Goose, which did at first produce the Egg; which proves, that in\nGeneration, or Natural production, there is not onely required the\naction of the Producers, but also a Transferring of some of their own\nparts to form the produced. But you may say, What doth the sitting Hen\ncontribute then to the production of the Chicken? I answer: The sitting\nHen doth onely assist the Egg in the production of the Chicken, as the\nGround doth the Seed.\n\nYour Ninth question is, _Concerning the Soul of a particular Animal\nCreature, as whether it be wholly of it self and subsists wholly in\nand by it self?_ But you must give me leave first to ask you what Soul\nyou mean, whether the Divine, or the Natural Soul, for there is great\ndifference betwixt them, although not the least that ever I heard,\nrightly examined and distinguished; and if you mean the Divine Soul,\nI shall desire you to excuse me, for that belongs to Divines, and not\nto Natural Philosophers; neither am I so presumptuous as to intrench\nupon their sacred order. But as for the Natural Soul, the Learned have\ndivided it into three parts, to wit, the Vegetative, Sensitive, and\nRational Soul; and according to these three Souls, made three kinds\nof lives, as the Vegetative, Sensitive, and Rational Life. But they\nmight as well say, there are infinite bodies, lives, and souls, as\nthree; for in Nature there is but one life, soul, and body, consisting\nall of one Matter, which is corporeal Nature. But yet by reason this\nlife and soul is material, it is divided into numerous parts, which\nmake numerous lives and souls in every particular Creature; for each\nparticular part of the rational self-moving Matter, is each particular\nsoul in each particular Creature, but all those parts considered in\ngeneral, make but one soul of Nature; and as this self-moving Rational\nMatter hath power to unite its parts, so it hath ability or power to\ndivide its united parts. And thus the rational soul of every particular\nCreature is composed of parts, (I mean parts of a material substance;\nfor whatsoever is substanceless and incorporeal, belongs not to\nNature, but is Supernatural;) for by reason the Infinite and Onely\nmatter is by self-motion divided into self-parts, not any Creature can\nhave a soul without parts; neither can the souls of Creatures subsist\nwithout commerce of other rational parts, no more then one body can\nsubsist without the assistance of other bodies; for all parts belong\nto one body, which is Nature: nay, if any thing could subsist of it\nself, it were a God, and not a Creature: Wherefore not any Creature\ncan challenge a soul absolutely to himself, unless Man, who hath a\ndivine soul, which no other Creature hath. But that which makes so many\nconfusions and disputes amongst learned men is, that they conceive,\nfirst, there is no rational soul but onely in man; next, that this\nrational soul in every man is individable. But if the rational soul is\nmaterial, as certainly to all sense and reason it is, then it must not\nonely be in all material Creatures, but be dividable too; for all that\nis material or corporeal hath parts, and is dividable, and therefore\nthere is no such thing in any one Creature as one intire soul; nay, we\nmight as well say, there is but one Creature in Nature, as say, there\nis but one individable natural soul in one Creature.\n\nYour Tenth question is, _Whether Souls are producible, or can be\nproduced?_ I answer: in my opinion, they are producible, by reason all\nparts in Nature are so. But mistake me not; for I do not mean that any\none part is produced out of Nothing, or out of new matter; but one\nCreature is produced by another, by the dividing and uniting, joyning\nand disjoyning of the several parts of Matter, and not by substanceless\nMotion out of new Matter. And because there is not any thing in\nNature, that has an absolute subsistence of it self, each Creature is a\nproducer, as well as a produced, in some kind or other; for no part of\nNature can subsist single, and without reference and assistance of each\nother, or else every single part would not onely be a whole of it self,\nbut be as a God without controle; and though one part is not another\npart, yet one part belongs to another part, and all parts to one whole,\nand that whole to all the parts, which whole is one corporeal Nature.\nAnd thus, as I said before, productions of one or more creatures, by\none or more producers, without matter, meerly by immaterial motions,\nare impossible, to wit, that something should be made or produced\nout of nothing; for if this were so, there would consequently be an\nannihilation or turning into nothing, and those creatures, which\nproduce others by the way of immaterial motions, would rather be as a\nGod, then a part of Nature, or Natural Matter. Besides, it would be an\nendless labour, and more trouble to create particular Creatures out\nof nothing, then a World at once; whereas now it is easie for Nature\nto create by production and transmigration; and therefore it is not\nprobable, that any one Creature hath a particular life, soul, or body\nto it self, as subsisting by it self, and as it were precised from the\nrest, having its own subsistence without the assistance of any other;\nnor is it probable, that any one Creature is new, for all that is, was,\nand shall be, till the Omnipotent God disposes Nature otherwise.\n\nAs for the rest of your questions, as whether the Sun be the cause of\nall motions, and of all natural productions; and whether the life of a\nCreature be onely in the blood, or whether it have its beginning from\nthe blood, or whether the blood be the chief architect of an animal, or\nbe the seat of the soul; sense and reason, in my opinion, doth plainly\ncontradict them; for concerning the blood, if it were the seat of the\nSoul, then in the circulation of the blood, if the Soul hath a brain,\nit would become very dizzie by its turning round; but perchance some\nmay think the Soul to be a Sun, and the Blood the Zodiack, and the body\nthe Globe of the Earth, which the Soul surrounds in such time as the\nBlood is flowing about. And so leaving those similizing Fancies, I'le\nadd no more, but repeat what I said in the beginning, that I rely upon\nthe goodness of your Nature, from which I hope for pardon, if I have\nnot so exactly and solidly answered your desire; for the argument of\nthis discourse being so difficult, may easily lead me into an error,\nwhich your better judgment will soon correct; and in so doing you will\nadd to those favours for which I am already,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Ladiships most obliged Friend_\n\n_and humble Servant._\n\n\n\n\nIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYou thought verily, I had mistaken my self in my last, concerning the\nRational Souls of every particular Creature, because I said, all\nCreatures had numerous Souls; and not onely so, but every particular\nCreature had numerous Souls. Truly, _Madam_, I did not mistake my self,\nfor I am of the same opinion still; for though there is but one Soul\nin infinite Nature, yet that soul being dividable into parts, every\npart is a soul in every single creature, were the parts no bigger\nin quantity then an atome. But you ask whether Nature hath Infinite\nsouls? I answer: That Infinite Nature is but one Infinite body, divided\ninto Infinite parts, which we call Creatures; and therefore it may\nas well be said, That Nature is composed of Infinite Creatures or\nParts, as she is divided into Infinite Creatures or Parts; for Nature\nbeing Material, is dividable, and composable. The same may be said\nof Nature's Soul, which is the Rational part of the onely infinite\nMatter, as also of Nature's Life, which is the sensitive part of the\nonely Infinite self-moving Matter; and of the Inanimate part of the\nonely Infinite Matter, which I call the body for distinction sake,\nas having no self-motion in its own nature, for Infinite Material\nNature hath an Infinite Material Soul, Life, and Body. But, _Madam_,\nI desire you to observe what I said already, _viz._ that the parts\nof Nature are as apt to divide, as to unite; for the chief actions\nof Nature are to divide, and to unite; which division is the cause,\nthat it may well be said, every particular Creature hath numerous\nsouls; for every part of rational Matter is a particular Soul, and\nevery part of the sensitive Matter is a particular Life; all which,\nmixed with the Inanimate Matter, though they be Infinite in parts, yet\nthey make but one Infinite whole, which is Infinite Nature; and thus\nthe Infinite division into Infinite parts is the cause, that every\nparticular Creature hath numerous Souls, and the transmigration of\nparts from, and to parts, is the reason, that not any Creature can\nchallenge a single soul, or souls to it self; the same for life. But\nmost men are unwilling to believe, that Rational Souls are material,\nand that this rational Matter is dividable in Nature; when as humane\nsense and reason may well perceive, that Nature is active, and\nfull of variety; and action, and variety cannot be without motion,\ndivision, and composition: but the reason that variety, division, and\ncomposition, runs not into confusion, is, that first there is but\none kind of Matter; next, that the division and composition of parts\ndoth ballance each other into a union in the whole. But, to conclude,\nthose Creatures which have their rational parts most united, are the\nwisest; and those that have their rational parts most divided, are the\nwittiest; and those that have much of this rational matter, are much\nknowing; and those which have less of this rational matter, are less\nknowing; and there is no Creature that hath not some; for like as all\nthe parts of a humane body are indued with life, and soul; so are all\nthe parts of Infinite Nature; and though some parts of Matter are not\nanimate in themselves, yet there is no part that is not mixt with the\nanimate matter; so that all parts of Nature are moving, and moved.\nAnd thus, hoping I have cleared my self in this point, to your better\nunderstanding, I take my leave, and rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nIV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nIn the Works of that most famous Philosopher and Mathematician of our\nage _Gal._ which you thought worth my reading, I find, he discourses\nmuch of upwards and downwards, backwards and forwards; but to tell\nyou really, I do not understand what he means by those words, for, in\nmy opinion, there is properly no such thing as upwards, downwards,\nbackwards, or forwards in Nature, for all this is nothing else but\nnatural corporeal motions, to which in respect of some particulars we\ndo attribute such or such names; for if we conceive a Circle, I pray\nwhere is upwards and downwards, backwards and forwards? Certainly, it\nis, in my opinion, just like that, they name Rest, Place, Space, Time,\n&c. when as Nature her self knows of no such things, but all these are\nonely the several and various motions of the onely Matter. You will\nsay, How can Rest be a motion? I answer: Rest is a word which expresses\nrather mans ignorance then his knowledg; for when he sees, that a\nparticular Creature has not any external local motion perceptible by\nhis sight, he says it resteth, and this rest he calls a cessation from\nmotion, when as yet there is no such thing as cessation from motion\nin Nature; for motion is the action of natural Matter, and its Nature\nis to move perpetually; so that it is more probable for motion to be\nannihilated, then to cease. But you may say, It is a cessation from\nsome particular motion. I answer: You may rather call it an alteration\nof a particular motion, then a cessation; for though a particular\nmotion doth not move in that same manner as it did before, nevertheless\nit is still there, and not onely there, but still moving; onely it is\nnot moving after the same manner as it did move heretofore, but has\nchanged from such a kind of motion to another kind of motion, and being\nstill moving it cannot be said to cease: Wherefore what is commonly\ncalled cessation from motion, is onely a change of some particular\nmotion, and is a mistake of change for rest. Next, I find in the same\n_Author_ a long discourse of circular and strait motions; to wit, _That\nthey are simple motions, and that all others are composed out of them,\nand are mixt motions; Also, That the Circular Motion is perfect, and\nthe Right imperfect; and that all the parts of the world, if moveable\nof their own nature, it is impossible, that their motions should be\nRight, or any other then Circular: That a Circular motion is never to\nbe gotten naturally, without a preceding right motion: That a Right\nmotion cannot naturally be perpetual: That a Right motion is impossible\nin the World well ordered:_ and the like. First, I cannot conceive why\nnatural Matter should use the Circle-figure more then any other in\nthe motions of her Creatures; for Nature, which is Infinite Matter,\nis not bound to one particular motion, or to move in a Circle more\nthen any other figure, but she moves more variously then any one part\nof hers can conceive; Wherefore it is not requisite that the natural\nmotions of natural bodies should be onely Circular. Next, I do not\nunderstand, why a Circular Motion cannot be gotten naturally without\na precedent right motion; for, in my opinion, corporeal motions may\nbe round or circular, without being or moving straight before; and if\na straight line doth make a circle, then an imperfect figure makes\na perfect; but, in my opinion, a circle may as well make a straight\nline, as a strait line a circle; except it be like a Gordian knot,\nthat it cannot be dissolved, or that Nature may make some corporeal\nmotions as constant as she makes others inconstant, for her motions\nare not alike in continuance and alteration. And as for right motion,\nthat naturally it cannot be perpetual; my opinion is, that it cannot\nbe, if Nature be finite; but if Nature be infinite, it may be: But the\ncircular motion is more proper for a finite, then an infinite, because\na circle-figure is perfect and circumscribed, and a straight line is\ninfinite, or at least producible in infinite; and there may be other\nworlds in infinite Nature, besides these round Globes perceptible by\nour sight, which may have other figures; for though it be proper for\nGlobes or Spherical bodies to move round, yet that doth not prove, that\nInfinite Matter moves round, or that all worlds must be of a Globous\nfigure; for there may be as different Worlds, as other Creatures. He\nsays, That a Right motion is impossible in the World well ordered; But\nI cannot conceive a Right motion to be less orderly then a Circular\nin Nature, except it be in some Particulars; but oftentimes that,\nwhich is well ordered in some cases, seems to some mens understandings\nand perceptions ill ordered in other cases; for man, as a part, most\ncommonly considers but the Particulars, not the Generals, like as every\none in a Commonwealth considers more himself and his Family, then the\nPublick. Lastly, Concerning the simplicity of Motions, as that onely\ncircular and straight motions are simple motions, because they are made\nby simple Lines; I know not what they mean by simple Lines; for the\nsame Lines which make straight and circular figures, may make as well\nother figures as those; but, in my opinion, all motions may be called\nsimple, in regard of their own nature; for they are nothing else but\nthe sensitive and rational part of Matter, which in its own nature is\npure, and simple, and moves according to the Nature of each Figure,\neither swiftly or slowly, or in this or that sort of motion; but the\nmost simple, purest and subtillest part is the rational part of matter,\nwhich though it be mixed with the sensitive and inanimate in one body,\nyet it can and doth move figuratively in its own matter, without the\nhelp or assistance of any other. But I desire you to remember, _Madam_,\nthat in the compositions and divisions of the parts of Nature, there\nis as much unity and agreement as there is discord and disagreement;\nfor in Infinite, there is no such thing, as most, and least; neither is\nthere any such thing as more perfect, or less perfect in Matter. And\nas for Irregularities, properly there is none in Nature, for Nature is\nRegular; but that, which Man (who is but a small part of Nature, and\ntherefore but partly knowing) names Irregularities, or Imperfections,\nis onely a change and alteration of motions; for a part can know the\nvariety of motions in Nature no more, then Finite can know Infinite, or\nthe bare exterior shape and figure of a mans body can know the whole\nbody, or the head can know the mind; for Infinite natural knowledg is\nincorporeal; and being corporeal, it is dividable; and being dividable,\nit cannot be confined to one part onely; for there is no such thing as\nan absolute determination or subsistence in parts without relation or\ndependance upon one another. And since Matter is Infinite, and acts\nwisely, and all for the best, it may be as well for the best of Nature,\nwhen parts are divided antipathetically, as when they are united\nsympathetically: Also Matter being Infinite, it cannot be perfect,\nneither can a part be called perfect, as being a part. But mistake me\nnot, _Madam;_ for when I say, there is no perfection in Nature, as I do\nin my _Philosophical Opinions_,[1] I mean by Perfection, a finiteness,\nabsoluteness, or compleatness of figure; and in this sense I say Nature\nhas no perfection by reason it is Infinite; but yet I do not deny, but\nthat there is a perfection in the nature or essence of Infinite Matter;\nfor Matter is perfect Matter; that is, pure and simple in its own\nsubstance or nature, as meer Matter, without any mixture or addition of\nsome thing that is not Matter, or that is between Matter and no Matter;\nand material motions are perfect motions although Infinite: just as\na line may be called a perfect line, although it be endless, and\nGold, or other Mettal, may be called perfect Gold, or perfect Metal,\nalthough it be but apart, And thus it may be said of Infinite Nature,\nor Infinite Matter, without any contradiction, that it is both perfect,\nand not perfect; perfect in its nature or substance, not perfect in its\nexterior figure. But you may say, If Infinite Matter be not perfect,\nit is imperfect, and what is imperfect, wants something. I answer,\nThat doth not follow: for we cannot say, that what is not perfect, must\nof necessity be imperfect, because there is something else, which it\nmay be, to wit, Infinite; for as imperfection is beneath perfection,\nso perfection is beneath Infinite; and though Infinite Matter be not\nperfect in its figure, yet it is not imperfect, but Infinite; for\nPerfection and Imperfection belongs onely to Particulars, and not to\nInfinite. And thus much for the present. I conclude, and rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Ladiships_\n\n_most obliged Friend_\n\n_and humble Servant._\n\n[1] _Part._ 1. _c._ 14.\n\n\n\n\nV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nThe _Author_, mentioned in my former Letter, says, _That Quietness is\nthe degree of Infinite slowness, and that a moveable body passing\nfrom quietness, passes through all the degrees of slowness without\nstaying in any._ But I cannot conceive that all the Parts of Matter\nshould be necessitated to move by degrees; for though there be degrees\nin Nature, yet Nature doth not in all her actions move by degrees. You\nmay say, for example, from one to twenty, there are eighteen degrees\nbetween One, and Twenty; and all these degrees are included in the\nlast degree, which is twenty. I answer; That may be: but yet there\nis no progress made through all those degrees; for when a body doth\nmove strong at one time, and the next time after moves weak; I cannot\nconceive how any degrees should really be made between. You may say, by\nImagination. But this Imagination of degrees, is like the conception of\nSpace and Place, when as yet there is no such thing as Place or Space\nby it self; for all is but one body, and Motion is the action of this\nsame body, which is corporeal Nature; and because a particular body\ncan and doth move after various manners, according to the change of\nits corporeal motion, this variety of motions man call's Place, Space,\nTime, Degrees, &c. considering them by themselves, and giving them\npeculiar names, as if they could be parted from body, or at least be\nconceived without body; for the Conception or Imagination it self is\ncorporeal, and so are they nothing else but corporeal motions. But it\nseems as if this same _Author_ conceived also motion to be a thing by\nit self, and that motion begets motion, when he says, That a body by\nmoving grows stronger in motion by degrees, when as yet the strength\nwas in the matter of the body eternally; for Nature was always a grave\nMatron, never a sucking Infant: and though parts by dissolving and\ncomposing may lose and get acquaintance of each other, yet no part\ncan be otherwise in its nature, then ever it was; Wherefore change of\ncorporeal motions is not losing nor getting strength or swiftness; for\nNature doth not lose force, although she doth not use force in all\nher various actions; neither can any natural body get more strength\nthan by nature it hath, although it may get the assistance of other\nbodies joyned to it. But swiftness and slowness are according to\nthe several figurative actions of self-moving matter; which several\nactions or motions of Nature, and their alterations, cannot be found\nout by any particular Creature: as for example, the motions of Lead,\nand the motions of Wood, unless Man knew their several causes; for\nWood, in some cases, may move slower then Lead; and Lead, in other\ncases, slower then Wood. Again: the same _Author_ says, _That an heavy\nmoveable body descending, gets force enough to bring it back again to\nas much height._ But I think, it might as well be said, That a Man\nwalking a mile, gets as much strength as to walk back that mile; when\n'tis likely, that having walked ten miles, he may not have so much\nstrength as to walk back again one mile; neither is he necessitated to\nwalk back, except some other more powerful body do force him back: for\nthough Nature is self-moving, yet every part has not an absolute power,\nfor many parts may over-power fewer; also several corporeal motions may\ncross and oppose as well as assist each other; for if there were not\nopposition, as well as agreement and assistance amongst Nature's parts,\nthere would not be such variety in Nature as there is. Moreover, he\nmakes mention of a _Line, with a weight hung to its end, which being\nremoved from the perpendicular, presently falls to the same again._\nTo which, I answer: That it is the appetite and desire of the Line,\nnot to move by constraint, or any forced exterior motion; but that\nwhich forces the Line to move from the Perpendicular, doth not give it\nmotion, but is onely an occasion that it moves in such a way; neither\ndoth the line get that motion from any other exterior body, but it\nis the lines own motion; for if the motion of the hand, or any other\nexterior body, should give the line that motion, I pray, from which\ndoth it receive the motion to tend to its former state? Wherefore, when\nthe Line moves backwards or forwards, it is not, that the Line gets\nwhat it had not before, that is, a new corporeal motion, but it uses\nits own motion; onely, as I said, that exterior body is the occasion\nthat it moves after such a manner or way, and therefore this motion\nof the line, although it is the lines own motion, yet in respect of\nthe exterior body that causes it to move that way, it may be called a\nforced, or rather an occasioned motion. And thus no body can get motion\nfrom another body, except it get matter too; for all that motion that a\nbody has, proceeds from the self-moving part of matter, and motion and\nmatter are but one thing; neither is there any inanimate part of matter\nin Nature, which is not co-mixed with the animate, and consequently,\nthere is no part which is not moving, or moved; the Animate part of\nmatter is the onely self-moving part, and the Inanimate the moved:\nnot that the animate matter doth give away its own motion to the\ninanimate, and that the inanimate becomes self-moving; but the animate,\nby reason of the close conjunction and commixture, works together with\nthe inanimate, or causes the inanimate to work with it; and thus the\ninanimate remains as simple in its own nature, as the animate doth in\nits nature, although they are mixt; for those mixtures do not alter the\nsimplicity of each others Nature. But having discoursed of this subject\nin my former Letters, I take my leave, and rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nVI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nIt seems, my former Letter concerning Motion, has given you occasion to\npropound this following question to me, to wit, _When I throw a bowl,\nor strike a ball with my hand; whether the motion, by which the bowl\nor ball is moved, be the hands, or the balls own motion? or whether\nit be transferred out of my hand into the ball?_ To which I return\nthis short answer: That the motion by which (for example) the bowl is\nmoved, is the bowls own motion, and not the hands that threw it: for\nthe hand cannot transfer its own motion, which hath a material being,\nout of it self into the bowl, or any other thing it handles, touches,\nor moves; or else if it did, the hand would in a short time become weak\nand useless, by losing so much substance, unless new motions were as\nfast created, as expended. You'll say, perhaps, that the hand and the\nbowl may exchange motions, as that the bowls own motion doth enter\ninto the hand, and supply that motion which went out of the hand into\nthe bowl, by a close joyning or touch, for in all things moving and\nmoved, must be a joyning of the mover to the moved, either immediate,\nor by the means of another body. I answer: That this is more probable,\nthen that the hand should give out, or impart motion to the bowl, and\nreceive none from the bowl; but by reason motion cannot be transferred\nwithout matter, as being both inseparably united, and but one thing;\nI cannot think it probable, that any of the animate or self-moving\nmatter in the hand, quits the hand, and enters into the bowl; nor\nthat the animate matter, which is in the bowl, leaves the bowl, and\nenters into the hand, because that self-moving substance is not readily\nprepared for so sudden a Translation or Transmigration. You may say,\nIt may as easily be done as food is received into an animal body and\nexcrement discharged, or as air is taken in, and breath sent out, by\nthe way of respiration; and that all Creatures are not onely produced\nfrom each other, but do subsist by each other, and act by each others\nassistance. I answer: It is very true, that all Creatures have more\npower and strength by a joyned assistance, then if every part were\nsingle, and subsisted of it self. But as some parts do assist each\nother, so on the other side, some parts do resist each other; for\nthough there be a unity in the nature of Infinite Matter, yet there are\ndivisions also in the Infinite parts of Infinite Matter, which causes\nAntipathy as much as Sympathy; but they being equal in assistance as\nwell as in resistance, it causes a conformity in the whole nature of\nInfinite Matter; for if there were not contrary, or rather, I may\nsay, different effects proceeding from the onely cause, which is the\nonely matter, there could not possibly be any, or at least, so much\nvariety in Nature, as humane sense and reason perceives there is.\nBut to return to our first argument: You may say, that motion may be\ntransferred out of one body into another, without transferring any\nof the Matter. I answer: That is impossible, unless motion were that\nwhich some call No-thing, but how No-thing can be transferred, I cannot\nimagine: Indeed no sense and reason in Nature can conceive that which\nis No-thing; for how should it conceive that which is not in Nature\nto be found. You'll say, perhaps, It is a substanceless thing, or an\nincorporeal, immaterial being or form. I answer: In my opinion, it is\na meer contradiction, to say, a substanceless thing, form, or being,\nfor surely in Nature it cannot be. But if it be not possible that\nmotion can be divided from matter, you may say, that body from whence\nthe motion is transferred, would become less in bulk and weight, and\nweaker with every act of motion; and those bodies into which corporeal\nmotion or self-moving matter was received, would grow bigger, heavier,\nand stronger. To which, I answer: That this is the reason, which denies\nthat there can be a translation of motion out of the moving body into\nthe moved; for questionless, the one would grow less, and the other\nbigger, that by loosing so much substance, this by receiving. Nay if it\nwere possible, as it is not, that motion could be transferred without\nmatter, the body out of which it goes, would nevertheless grow weaker;\nfor the strength lies in the motion, unless you believe, this motion\nwhich is transferred to have been useless in the mover, and onely\nuseful to the moved; or else it would be superfluous in the moved,\nexcept you say, it became to be annihilated after it was transferr'd\nand had done its effect; but if so, then there would be a perpetual and\ninfinite creation and annihilation of substanceless motion, and how\nthere could be a creation and annihilation of nothing, my reason cannot\nconceive, neither is it possible, unless Nature had more power then\nGod, to create Nothing, and to annihilate Nothing. The truth is, it is\nmore probable for sense and reason to believe a Creation of Something\nout of Nothing, then a Creation of Nothing out of Nothing. Wherefore\nit cannot in sense and reason be, that the motion of the hand is\ntransferr'd into the bowl. But yet I do not say, that the motion of the\nhand doth not contribute to the motion of the bowl; for though the bowl\nhath its own natural motion in itself, (for Nature and her creatures\nknow of no rest, but are in a perpetual motion, though not always\nexterior and local, yet they have their proper and certain motions,\nwhich are not so easily perceived by our grosser senses) nevertheless\nthe motion of the bowl would not move by such an exterior local motion,\ndid not the motion of the hand, or any other exterior moving body give\nit occasion to move that way; Wherefore the motion of the hand may\nvery well be said to be the cause of that exterior local motion of the\nbowl, but not to be the same motion by which the bowl moves. Neither\nis it requisite, that the hand should quit its own motion, because it\nuses it in stirring up, or putting on the motion of the bowl; for it\nis one thing to use, and another to quit; as for example, it is one\nthing to offer his life for his friends service, another to imploy it,\nand another to quit or lose it. But, _Madam_, there may be infinite\nquestions or exceptions, and infinite answers made upon one truth; but\nthe wisest and most probable way is, to rely upon sense and reason,\nand not to trouble the mind, thoughts, and actions of life, with\nimprobabilities, or rather impossibilities, which sense and reason\nknows not of, nor cannot conceive. You may say, A Man hath sometimes\nimprobable, or impossible Fancies, Imaginations, or Chym\u00e6ra's, in\nhis mind, which are No-things. I answer, That those Fancies and\nImaginations are not No-things, but as perfectly imbodied as any other\nCreatures; but by reason, they are not so grossly imbodied, as those\ncreatures that are composed of more sensitive and inanimate matter, man\nthinks or believes them to be no bodies; but were they substanceless\nfigures, he could not have them in his mind or thoughts: The truth is,\nthe purity of reason is not so perspicuous and plain to sense, as sense\nis to reason, the sensitive matter being a grosser substance then the\nrational. And thus, _Madam_, I have answered your proposed question,\naccording to the ability of my Reason, which I leave to your better\nexamination, and rest in the mean while,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nVII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nHaving made some mention in my former Letter of the Receiving of Food,\nand discharging of Excrements, as also of Respiration, which consists\nin the sucking in of air, and sending out of breath in an animal body;\nyou desire to know, _Whether Respiration be common to all animal\nCreatures?_ Truly, I have not the experience, as to tell you really,\nwhether all animals respire, or not; for my life being, for the most\npart, solitary and contemplative, but not active, I please my self\nmore with the motions of my thoughts, then of my senses; and therefore\nI shall give you an answer according to the conceivement of my reason\nonely, which is, That I believe, all animals require Respiration; not\nonely those, which live in the air, but those also, which live in\nwaters, and within the earth; but they do not respire all after one\nand the same manner; for the matter which they imbreath, is not every\nwhere the same, nor have they all the same organs, or parts, nor the\nsame motions. As for example: Some Creatures require a more thin and\nrarer substance for their imbreathing or inspiring, then others, and\nsome a more thick and grosser substance then others, according to\ntheir several Natures; for as there are several kinds of Creatures,\naccording to their several habitations or places they live in, so they\nhave each a distinct and several sort of matter or substance for their\ninspiration. As for example: Some live in the Air, some upon the face\nof the Earth, some in the bowels Earth, and some in Waters. There is\nsome report of a Salamander, who lives in the Fire; but it being not\ncertainly known, deserves not our speculation. And, as in my opinion,\nall animal Creatures require Respiration, so I do verily believe, that\nalso all other kinds of Creatures, besides animals, have some certain\nmanner of imbreathing and transpiring, _viz._ Vegetables, Minerals,\nand Elements, although not after the same way as Animals, yet in a\nway peculiar and proper to the nature of their own kind. For example:\nTake away the earth from Vegetables, and they will die, as being, in\nmy opinion, stifled or smothered, in the same manner, as when the Air\nis taken away from some Animals. Also, take Minerals out of the bowels\nof the Earth, and though we cannot say, they die, or are dead, because\nwe have not as yet found out the alterative motions of Minerals, as\nwell as of Vegetables, or Animals, yet we know that they are dead from\nproduction and increase, for not any Metal increases being out of the\nEarth. And as for Elements, it is manifest that Fire will die for want\nof vent; but the rest of the Elements, if we could come to know the\nmatter, manner, and ways of their Vital Breathing, we might kill or\nrevive them as we do Fire. And therefore all Creatures, to my Reason,\nrequire a certain matter and manner of inspiration and expiration,\nwhich is nothing else but an adjoyning and disjoyning of parts to and\nfrom parts; for not any natural part or creature can subsist single,\nand by it self, but requires assistance from others, as this, and the\nrest of my opinions in Natural Philosophy, desire the assistance of\nyour favour, or else they will die, to the grief of,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nVIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nTh'other day I met with the Work of that Learned _Author_ Dr. _Ch._\nwhich treats of Natural Philosophy; and amongst the rest, in the\nChapter of Place, I found that he blames _Aristotle_ for saying, there\nare none but corporeal dimensions, Length, Breadth, and Depth in\nNature, making besides these corporeal, other incorporeal dimensions\nwhich he attributes to _Vacuum_. Truly, _Madam_, an incorporeal\ndimension or extension, seems, in my opinion, a meer contradiction; for\nI cannot conceive how nothing can have a dimension or extension, having\nnothing to be extended or measured. His words are these: _Imagine we\ntherefore, that God should please to annihilate the whole stock or\nmass of Elements, and all concretions resulting therefrom, that is,\nall corporeal substances now contained within the ambit or concave\nof the lowest Heaven, or Lunar sphear; and having thus imagined, can\nwe conceive that all the vast space or region circumscribed by the\nconcave superfice of the Lunar sphere, would not remain the same in all\nits dimensions, after as before the reduction of all bodies included\ntherein to nothing?_ To which, I answer: That, in my opinion, he makes\nNature Supernatural; for although God's Power may make Vacuum, yet\nNature cannot; for God's and Nature's Power are not to be compared,\nneither is God's invisible Power perceptible by Natures parts; but\naccording to Natural Perception, it is impossible to conceive a Vacuum,\nfor we cannot imagine a Vacuum, but we must think of a body, as your\n_Author_ of the Circle of the Moon; neither could he think of space\nbut from one side of the Circle to the other, so that in his mind he\nbrings two sides together, and yet will have them distant; but the\nmotions of his thoughts being subtiler and swifter then his senses,\nskip from side to side without touching the middle parts, like as a\nSquirrel from bough to bough, or an Ape from one table to another;\nwithout touching the ground, onely cutting the air. Next, he says,\nThat an absolute Vacuum, is neither an Accident, nor a Body, nor yet\nNothing, but Something, because it has a being; which opinion seems to\nme like that of the divine Soul; but I suppose Vacuum is not the divine\nSoul, nor the divine Soul, Vacuum; or else it could not be sensible\nof the blessed happiness in Heaven, or the Torments in Hell. Again\nhe says, _Let us screw our supposition one pin higher, and farther\nimagine, that God, after the annihilation of this vast machine, the\nUniverse, should create another in all respects equal to this, and\nin the same part of space wherein this now consists: First, we must\nconceive, that as the spaces were immense before God created the world,\nso also must they eternally persist of infinite extent, if he shall\nplease at any time to destroy it; next, that these immense spaces are\nabsolutely immoveable._ By this opinion, it seems, that Gods Power\ncannot so easily make or annihilate Vacuum, as a substance; because he\nbelieves it to be before all Matter, and to remain after all Matter,\nwhich is to be eternal; but I cannot conceive, why Matter, or fulness\nof body, should not as well be Infinite and Eternal, as his Conceived\nVacuum; for if Vacuum can have an eternal and infinite being, why may\nnot fulness of body, or Matter? But he calls Vacuum Immovable, which\nin my opinion is to make it a God; for God is onely Immoveable and\nUnalterable, and this is more Glorious then to be dependant upon God;\nwherefore to believe Matter to be Eternal, but yet dependent upon\nGod, is a more humble opinion, then his opinion of Vacuum; for if\nVacuum be not created, and shall not be annihilated, but is Uncreated,\nImmaterial, Immoveable, Infinite, and Eternal, it is a God; but if it\nbe created, God being not a Creator of Nothing, nor an annihilator of\nNothing, but of Something, he cannot be a Creator of Vacuum; for Vacuum\nis a pure Nothing. But leaving Nothing to those that can make something\nof it, I will add no more, but rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\n\nIX.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nThat Learned _Author_, of whom I made mention in my last, is pleased to\nsay in his Chapter of Time, that Time is the _Twin-brother to Space_;\nbut if Space be as much as Vacuum, then I say, they are Twin-nothings;\nfor there can be no such thing as an empty or immaterial space, but\nthat which man calls space, is onely a distance betwixt several\ncorporeal parts, and time is onely the variation of corporeal motions;\nfor were there no body, there could not be any space, and were there no\ncorporeal motion, there could not be any time. As for Time, considered\nin General, it is nothing else but the corporeal motions in Nature, and\nParticular times are the Particular corporeal motions; but Duration is\nonely a continuance, or continued subsistence of the same parts, caused\nby the consistent motions of those parts; Neither are Time, Duration,\nPlace, Space, Magnitude, &c. dependents upon corporeal motions, but\nthey are all one and the same thing; Neither was Time before, nor can\nbe after corporeal motion, for none can be without the other, being all\none: And as for Eternity, it is one fixed instant, without a flux, or\nmotion. Concerning his argument of Divisibility of Parts, my opinion\nis, That there is no Part in Nature Individable, no not that so small a\npart, which the Epicureans name an Atome; neither is Matter separable\nfrom Matter, nor Parts from Parts in General, but onely in Particulars;\nfor though parts can be separated from parts, by self-motion, yet upon\nnecessity they must joyn to parts, so as there can never be a single\npart by it self. But hereof, as also of Place, Space, Time, Motion,\nFigure, Magnitude, &c. I have sufficiently discoursed in my former\nLetters, as also in my Book of Philosophy; and as for my opinion of\nAtoms, their figures and motions, (if any such things there be) I will\nrefer you to my Book of Poems, out of which give me leave to repeat\nthese following lines, containing the ground of my opinion of Atomes:[1]\n\n\n  _All Creatures, howsoe're they may be nam'd,\n  Are of_ long, square, flat, _or_ sharp _Atoms fram'd._\n\n  _Thus several figures several tempers make,\n  But what is mixt, doth of the four partake._\n\n  _The onely cause, why things do live and die,\n  'S according as the mixed Atomes lie._\n\n    _Thus life, and death, and young, and old,\n    Are as the several Atoms hold:\n    Wit, understanding in the brain\n    Are as the several atomes reign:_\n    _And dispositions, good, or ill,\n    Are as the several atomes still;\n    And every Passion, which doth rise,\n    Is as each several atome lies.\n    Thus sickness, health, and peace, and war,\n    Are as the several atomes are._\n\nIf you desire to know more, you may read my mentioned Book of Poems\nwhose first Edition was printed in the year, 1653. And so taking my\nleave of you, I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n[1] _Pag._ 7. in the second Impression. _Pag._ 9. _Pag._ 22. _Pag._ 24.\n\n\n\n\nX.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI received the Book of your new _Author_ that treats of Natural\nPhilosophy, which I perceive is but lately come forth; but although\nit be new, yet there are no new opinions in it; for the _Author_ doth\nfollow the opinions of some old Philosophers, and argues after the\naccustomed Scholastical way, with hard, intricate, and nonsensical\nwords: Wherefore I shall not take so much pains as to read it quite\nover, but onely pick out here and there some few discourses, which I\nshall think most convenient for the clearing of my own opinion; in\nthe number of which, is, first, that of Matter, whereof the _Author_\nis pleased to proclaim the opinion that holds Matter to be Infinite,\nnot onely absurd, but also impious. Truly, _Madam_, it is easily\nsaid, but hardly proved; and not to trouble you with unnecessary\nrepetitions, I hope you do remember as yet what I have written to you\nin the beginning concerning the infiniteness of Nature, or natural\nMatter, where I have proved that it implies no impiety, absurdity, or\ncontradiction at all, to believe that Matter is Infinite; for your\n_Authors_ argument, concluding from the finiteness of particular\nCreatures to Nature her self, is of no force; for though no part of\nNature is Infinite in bulk, figure, or quantity, nevertheless, all the\nparts of Infinite Nature are Infinite in number, which infinite number\nof parts must needs make up one Infinite body in bulk, or quantity;\nfor as a finite body or substance is dividable into finite parts, so\nan Infinite body, as Nature, or natural Matter, must of necessity be\ndividable into infinite parts in number, and yet each part must also\nbe finite in its exterior figure, as I have proved in the beginning\nby the example of a heap of grains of corn. Certainly, _Madam_, I see\nno reason, but since, according to your _Author_, God, as the prime\nCause, Agent, and Producer of all things, and the action by which he\nproduced all things, is Infinite; the Matter out of which he produced\nall particular Creatures may be Infinite also. Neither doth it, to my\nsense and reason, imply any contradiction or impiety; for it derogates\nnothing from the Glory and Omnipotency of God, but God is still the\nGod of Nature, and Nature is his Servant, although Infinite, depending\nwholly upon the will and pleasure of the All-powerful God: Neither\ndo these two Infinites obstruct each other; for Nature is corporeal,\nand God is a supernatural and spiritual Infinite Being, and although\nNature has an Infinite power, yet she has but an Infinite Natural\npower, whereas Gods Omnipotency is infinitely extended beyond Nature.\nBut your _Author_ is pleased to refute that argument, which concludes\nfrom the effect to the cause, and proves Matter to be infinite, because\nGod as the Cause is Infinite, saying, that this Rule doth onely hold\nin Univocal things, (by which, I suppose, he understands things of\nthe same kind and nature) and not in opposites. Truly, _Madam_, by\nthis he limits God's power, as if God were not able to work beyond\nNature, and Natural Reason or Understanding; and measures Gods actions\naccording to the rules of Logick; which whether it be not more impious,\nyou may judg your self. And as for opposites, God and Nature are not\nopposites, except you will call opposites those which bear a certain\nrelation to one another, as a Cause, and its Effect; a Parent, and a\nChild; a Master, and a Servant; and the like. Nay, I wonder how your\n_Author_ can limit Gods action, when as he confesses himself, that the\nCreation of the World is an Infinite action. God acted finitely, says\nhe, by an Infinite action; which, in my opinion, is meer non-sense, and\nas much as to say, a man can act weakly by a strong action, basely by\nan honest action, cowardly by a stout action. The truth is, God being\nInfinite, cannot work finitely; for, as his Essence, so his Actions\ncannot have any limitation, and therefore it is most probable, that\nGod made Nature Infinite; for though each part of Nature is finite\nin its own figure, yet considered in general, they are Infinite, as\nwell in number, as duration, except God be pleased to destroy them;\nnay, every particular may in a certain sense be said Infinite, to\nwit, Infinite in time or duration; for if Nature be Infinite and\nEternal, and there be no annihilation or perishing in Nature, but a\nperpetual successive change and alteration of natural figures, then\nno part of Nature can perish or be annihilated; and if no part of\nNature perishes, then it lasts infinitely in Nature, that is, in the\nsubstance of natural Matter; for though the corporeal motions, which\nmake the figures, do change, yet the ground of the figure, which is\nnatural matter, never changes. The same may be said of corporeal\nmotions: for though motions change and vary infinite ways, yet none is\nlost in Nature, but some motions are repeated again: As for example;\nthe natural motions in an Animal Creature, although they are altered\nin the dissolution of the figure, yet they may be repeated again by\npiece-meals in other Creatures; like as a Commonwealth, or united body\nin society, if it should be dissolved or dispersed, the particulars\nwhich did constitute this Commonwealth or society, may joyn to the\nmaking of another society; and thus the natural motions of a body do\nnot perish when the figure of the body dissolves, but joyn with other\nmotions to the forming and producing of some other figures. But to\nreturn to your _Author_. I perceive his discourse is grounded upon a\nfalse supposition, which appears by his way of arguing from the course\nof the Starrs and Planets, to prove the finiteness of Nature; for by\nreason the Stars and Planets rowl about, and turn to the same point\nagain, each within a certain compass of time, he concludes Nature or\nNatural Matter to be finite too. And so he takes a part for the whole,\nto wit, this visible World for all Nature, when as this World is\nonely a part of Nature, or Natural Matter, and there may be more, and\nInfinite worlds besides; Wherefore his conclusion must needs be false,\nsince it is built upon a false ground. Moreover, he is as much against\nthe Eternity of Matter, as he is against Infiniteness; concluding\nlikewise from the parts to the whole; For, _says he_, since the parts\nof Nature are subject to a beginning and ending, the whole must be\nso too. But he is much mistaken, when he attributes a beginning and\nending to parts, for there is no such thing as a beginning and ending\nin Nature, neither in the whole, nor in the parts, by reason there is\nno new creation or production of Creatures out of new Matter, nor any\ntotal destruction or annihilation of any part in Nature, but onely a\nchange, alteration and transmigration of one figure into another; which\nchange and alteration proves rather the contrary, to wit, that Matter\nis Eternal and Incorruptible; for if particular figures change, they\nmust of necessity change in the Infinite Matter, which it self, and\nin its nature, is not subject to any change or alteration: besides,\nthough particulars have a finite and limited figure, and do change,\nyet their species do not; for Mankind never changes, nor ceases to be,\nthough _Peter_ and _Paul_ die, or rather their figures dissolve and\ndivide; for to die is nothing else, but that the parts of that figure\ndivide and unite into some other figures by the change of motion in\nthose parts. Concerning the Inanimate Matter, which of it self is a\ndead, dull, and idle matter, your _Author_ denies it to be a co-agent\nor assistant to the animate matter: For, says he, how can dead and idle\nthings act? To which, I answer: That your _Author_ being, or pretending\nto be a Philosopher, should consider that there is difference betwixt a\nPrincipal and Instrumental cause or agent; and although this inanimate,\nor dull matter, doth not act of it self as a principal agent, yet it\ncan and doth act as an Instrument, according as it is imploy'd by the\nanimate matter: for by reason there is so close a conjunction and\ncommixture of animate and inanimate Matter in Nature, as they do make\nbut one body, it is impossible that the animate part of matter should\nmove without the inanimate; not that the inanimate hath motion in her\nself, but the animate bears up the inanimate in the action of her own\nsubstance, and makes the inanimate work, act, and move with her, by\nreason of the aforesaid union and commixture. Lastly, your _Author_\nspeaks much of Minima's, _viz._ That all things may be resolved into\ntheir minima's, and what is beyond them, is nothing, and that there\nis one maximum, or biggest, which is the world, and what is beyond\nthat, is Infinite. Truly, _Madam_, I must ingeniously confess, I am\nnot so high learned, as to penetrate into the true sense of these\nwords; for he says, they are both divisible, and indivisible, and yet\nno atomes, which surpasses my Understanding; for there is no such\nthing, as biggest and smallest in Nature, or in the Infinite matter;\nfor who can know how far this World goes, or what is beyond it? There\nmay be Infinite Worlds, as I said before, for ought we know; for God\nand Nature cannot be comprehended, nor their works measured, if we\ncannot find out the nature of particular things, which are subject\nto our exterior senses, how shall we be able to judg of things not\nsubject to our senses. But your _Author_ doth speak so presumptuously\nof Gods Actions, Designs, Decrees, Laws, Attributes, Power, and secret\nCounsels, and describes the manner, how God created all things, and the\nmixture of the Elements to an hair, as if he had been Gods Counsellor\nand assistant in the work of Creation; which whether it be not more\nimpiety, then to say, Matter is Infinite, I'le let others judg.\nNeither do I think this expression to be against the holy Scripture;\nfor though I speak as a natural Philosopher, and am unwilling to cite\nthe Scripture, which onely treats of things belonging to Faith, and\nnot to Reason; yet I think there is not any passage which plainly\ndenies Matter to be Infinite, and Eternal, unless it be drawn by force\nto that sense: _Solomon_ says, _That there is not any thing new_:\nand in another place it is said, _That God is all fulfilling_; that\nis, that the Will of God is the fulfilling of the actions of Nature:\nalso the Scripture says, _That Gods ways are unsearchable, and past\nfinding out._ Wherefore, it is easier to treat of Nature, then the God\nof Nature; neither should God be treated of by vain Philosophers, but\nby holy Divines, which are to deliver and interpret the Word of God\nwithout sophistry, and to inform us as much of Gods Works, as he hath\nbeen pleased to declare and make known. And this is the safest way, in\nthe opinion of,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour new _Author_ endeavours to prove, that Water in its own proper\nnature is thicker then Earth; which, to my sense and reason, seems not\nprobable; for although water is less porous then earth in its exterior\nfigure, yet 'tis not so thick as earth in its interior nature: Neither\ncan I conceive it to be true, that water in its own nature, and as long\nas it remains water, should be as hard as Crystal, or stone, as his\nopinion is; for though Elements are so pliant (being not composed of\nmany different parts and figures) as they can change and rechange their\nexterior figures, yet they do not alter their interior nature without a\ntotal dissolution; but your _Author_ may as well say, that the interior\nnature of man is dust and ashes, as that water in its interior nature\nis as thick as earth, and as hard as Christal, or stone; whereas yet\na man, when he becomes dust and ashes, is not a man; and therefore,\nwhen water is become so thick as earth, or so hard as stone, it is not\nwater; I mean when it is so in its interior nature, not in its exterior\nfigure; for the exterior figure may be contracted, when yet the\ninterior nature is dilative; and so the exterior may be thick or hard,\nwhen the interior is soft and rare. But you may say, that water is a\nclose, and heavy, as also a smooth and glossy body. I answer: That doth\nnot prove its interior nature to be hard, dense, thick, or contracted;\nfor the interior nature and parts of a body may be different from the\nexterior figure or parts; neither doth the close joyning of parts\nhinder dilatation; for if so, a line or circle could not dilate or\nextend: But this close uniting of the parts of water is caused through\nits wet and glutinous quality, which wet and sticking quality is\ncaused by a watery dilatation; for though water hath not interiously\nso rare a dilatation as Air, Fire, and Light, yet it hath not so close\na contraction as Earth, Stone, or Metal; neither are all bodies that\nare smooth and shining, more solid and dense, then those that are\nrough and dark; for light is more smooth, glossy, and shining, then\nWater, Metal, Earth, or Transparent-stones, and yet is of a dilative\nnature. But because some bodies and figures which are transparent and\nsmooth, are dense, hard, and thick, we cannot in reason, or sense,\nsay, that all bodies and figures are so. As for Transparency, it is\ncaused through a purity of substance, and an evenness of parts: the\nlike is glossiness, onely glossiness requires not so much regularity,\nas transparency. But to return to Water; its exterior Circle-figure\nmay dilate beyond the degree of the propriety or nature of water, or\ncontract beneath the propriety or nature of water. Your _Author_ may\nsay, Water is a globous body, and all globous bodies tend to a Center.\nI answer: That my sense and reason cannot perceive, but that Circles\nand Globes do as easily dilate, as contract: for if all Globes and\nCircles should endeavour to draw or fall from the circumference to the\nCenter, the Center of the whole World, or at least of some parts of the\nWorld, would be as a Chaos: besides, it is against sense and reason,\nthat all Matter should strive to a Center; for humane sense and reason\nmay observe, that all Creatures, and so Matter, desire liberty, and a\nCenter is but a Prison in comparison to the Circumference; wherefore\nif Matter crowds, it is rather by force, then a voluntary action. You\nwill say, All Creatures desire rest, and in a Center there's rest. I\nanswer; Humane sense and reason cannot perceive any rest in Nature: for\nall things, as I have proved heretofore, are in a perpetual motion.\nBut concerning Water, you may ask me, _Madam_, Whether congeal'd\nWater, as Ice, if it never thaw, remains Water? To which, I answer:\nThat the interior nature of Water remains as long as the Ice remains,\nalthough the outward form is changed; but if Ice be contracted into\nthe firmness and density of Crystal, or Diamond, or the like, so as\nto be beyond the nature of Water, and not capable to be that Water\nagain, then it is transformed into another Creature, or thing, which\nis neither Water, nor Ice, but a Stone; for the Icy contraction doth\nno more alter the interior nature of Water, which is dilating, then\nthe binding of a man with Chains alters his nature from being a man;\nand it might be said as well, that the nature of Air is not dilating,\nwhen inclosed in a bladder, as that Water doth not remain Water in\nits interior nature, when it is contracted into Ice. But you may ask,\nWhether one extreme can change into another? I answer: To my sense\nand reason it were possible, if extremes were in Nature; but I do not\nperceive that in Nature there be any, although my sense and reason doth\nperceive alterations in the effects of Nature; for though one and the\nsame part may alter from contraction to dilation, and from dilation\nto contraction; yet this contraction and dilation are not extremes,\nneither are they performed at one and the same time, but at different\ntimes. But having sufficiently declared my opinion hereof in my former\nLetters, I'l add no more, but rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nMy discourse of Water in my last Letter has given you occasion to\nenquire after the reason, _Why the weight of a great body of water doth\nnot press so hard and heavily as to bruise or crush a body, when it is\nsunk down to the bottom?_ As for example: If a man should be drowned,\nand afterwards cast out from the bottom of a great Sea, or River, upon\nthe shore; he would onely be found smother'd or choak'd to death, and\nnot press'd, crush'd, or bruised, by the weight of water. I answer;\nThe reasons are plain: for, first, the nature of a mans respiration\nrequires such a temperature of breath to suck in, as is neither too\nthick, nor too thin for his lungs, and the rest of his interior parts,\nas also for the organs and passages of his exterior senses, but fit,\nproper, and proportionable to those mentioned parts of his body: As for\nexample; in a too thin and rarified air, man will be as apt to die for\nwant of breath, as in a too gross and thick air he is apt to die with\na superfluity of the substance he imbreaths; for thick smoak, or thick\nvapour, as also too gross air, will soon smother a man to death; and as\nfor choaking, if a man takes more into his throat then he can swallow,\nhe will die; and if his stomack be filled with more food then it is\nable to digest, if it cannot discharge it self, he will die with the\nexcess of food; and if there be no food, or too little put into it, he\nwill also die for want of food. So the eye, if it receives too many,\nor too gross, or too bright objects, it will be dazled or blinded,\nand some objects through their purity are not to be seen at all: The\nsame for Hearing, and the rest of the exterior senses: And this is the\nreason, why man, or some animal Creatures are smother'd and choak'd\nwith water; because water is thicker then the grossest air or vapour;\nfor if smoak, which is rarer then water, will smother and choak a man,\nwell may water, being so much thicker. But yet this smothering or\nchoaking doth not prove, that water hath an interior or innate density\n(as your _Authors_ opinion is) no more then smoak, or thick and gross\nair hath; but the density of water is caused more through the wet and\nmoist exterior parts, joyning and uniting closely together; and the\ninterior nature of smoak being more moist or glutinous then thin air,\nand so more apt to unite its exterior parts, it makes it to come in\neffect nearer to water; for though water and smoak are both of rare\nnatures, yet not so rare as clear and pure air; neither is water or\nsmoak so porous as pure air, by reason the exterior parts of water and\nsmoak are more moist or glutinous then pure air. But the thickness\nof water and smoak is the onely cause of the smothering of men, or\nsome animals, as by stopping their breath, for a man can no more live\nwithout air, then he can without food; and a well tempered or middle\ndegree of air is the most proper for animal Respiration; for if the\nair be too thick, it may soon smother or choak him; and if too thin,\nit is not sufficient to give him breath: And this is the reason that\na man being drown'd, is not onely smother'd, but choak'd by water;\nbecause there enters more through the exterior passages into his body\nthen can be digested; for water is apt to flow more forcibly and with\ngreater strength then air; not that it is more dilating then air, but\nby reason it is thicker, and so stronger, or of more force; for the\ndenser a body is, the stronger it is; and a heavy body, when moved, is\nmore forcible then a light body. But I pray by this expression mistake\nnot the nature of water; for the interior nature of water hath not\nthat gravity, which heavy or dense bodies have, its nature being rare\nand light, as air, or fire; but the weight of water, as I said before,\nproceeds onely from the closeness and compactness of its exterior\nparts, not through a contraction in its interior nature; and there is\nno argument, which proves better, that water in its interior nature\nis dilating, then that its weight is not apt to press to a point; for\nthough water is apt to descend, through the union of its parts, yet it\ncannot press hard, by reason of its dilating nature, which hinders that\nheavy pressing quality; for a dilating body cannot have a contracted\nweight, I mean, so as to press to a Center, which is to a point; and\nthis is the reason, that when a grave or heavy body sinks down to the\nbottom of water, it is not opprest, hurt, crusht, or bruised by the\nweight of water; for, as I said, the nature of water being dilating,\nit can no more press hard to a center, then vapour, air, or fire: The\ntruth is, water would be as apt to ascend as descend, if it were not\nfor the wet, glutinous and sticking, cleaving quality of its exterior\nparts; but as the quantity and quality of the exterior parts makes\nwater apt to sink, or descend, so the dilating nature makes it apt to\nflow, if no hinderance stop its course; also the quantity and quality\nof its exterior parts is the cause, that some heavy bodies do swim\nwithout sinking: as for example; a great heavy Ship will not readily\nsink, unless its weight be so contracted as to break asunder the united\nparts of water; for the wet quality of water causing its exterior parts\nto joyn close, gives it such an united strength, as to be able to bear\na heavy burden, if the weight be dilated, or level, and not piercing or\npenetrating; for those bodies that are most compact, will sink sooner,\nalthough of less weight then those that are more dilated although of\ngreater weight: Also the exterior and outward shape or form makes some\nbodies more apt to sink then others; Indeed, the outward form and shape\nof Creatures is one of the chief causes of either sinking or swimming.\nBut to conclude, water in its interior nature is of a mean or middle\ndegree, as neither too rare, nor too grave a body; and for its exterior\nquality, it is in as high a degree for wetness, as fire is for heat;\nand being apt both to divide, and to unite, it can bear a burden, and\ndevour a burden, so that some bodies may swim, and others sink; and\nthe cause, that a sunk body is not opprest, crush'd, or squeesed, is\nthe dilating nature and quality of water, which hinders its parts\nfrom pressing or crowding towards a point or center; for although\nwater is heavy, and apt to descend, yet its weight is not caused by\na contraction of its substance, but by a union of its parts. Thus,\n_Madam_, I have obeyed your commands, in giving you my reasons to your\npropounded question, which if you approve, I have my aim; if not, I\nsubmit to your better judgment: for you know I am in all respects,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_to serve you._\n\n\n\n\nXIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI am glad, you are pleased with my reasons I gave to your propounded\nquestion concerning the weight of Water; and since you have been\npleased to send me some more of that subject, I shall be ready also\nto give my answer to them, according to the capacity of my judgment.\nFirst, you desire to know, _How it comes, that Water will by degrees\nascend through a narrow pipe, when the pipe is placed straight upright;\nor perpendicular?_ The reason, in my opinion is, that Water, having a\ndilative nature, when it finds an obstruction to descend or flow even,\nwill dilate it self ascendingly, according as it hath liberty, or\nfreedom, and strength, or quantity; the truth is, water would be more\napt to ascend then to descend, were it not for the close uniting of\nits liquid Parts, which causes its exterior density, and this density\nmakes it of more weight then its nature is; and the proof that water\nis apt in its nature to ascend, is, that some sorts of vapours are\nmade onely by the dilation and rarefaction of ascending Water. Your\nsecond question is, _Why the surface of water seems to be concave in\nits middle, and higher on every side?_ I answer, The interior figure\nof water is a circular figure, which being a round figure, is both\nconcave, and convex; for where one is, the other must be; and the\nmotions of ebbing and flowing, and ascending or descending, are partly\nof that figure; and so according to the exterior dilating strength\nor weakness, the exterior parts of water become either concave or\nconvex; for in a full strength, as a full stream, the exterior parts\nof water flow in a convex figure, but when they want strength, they\nebb in a concave figure. Your third question is, _What makes frozen\nwater apt to break those Vessels wherein it is contained, in the act\nof freezing or congealing?_ I answer: The same cause that makes water\nclear, as also more swell'd then usually it is: which cause is the\ninherent dilative nature of water; for water being naturally dilative,\nwhen as cold attractions do assault it, the moist dilations of water\nin the conflict use more then their ordinary strength to resist those\ncold contracting motions, by which the body of water dilates it self\ninto a larger compass, according as it hath liberty or freedom, or\nquantity of parts; and the cold parts not being able to drive the\nwater back to its natural compass, bind it as it is extended, like as\nif a beast should be bound when his legs and neck are thrust out at\nthe largest extent, in striving to kick or thrust away his enemies and\nimprisoners: And so the reason why water breaks these vessels wherein\nit is inclosed, in the act of its freezing or congealing is, that when\nthe cold contractions are so strong as they endeavour to extinguish the\ndilating nature of water, the water refilling, forces its parts so, as\nthey break the vessel which incloses them: The same reason makes Ice\nclear and transparent; for it is not the rarefaction of water that doth\nit, but the dilation, which causes the parts of water to be not onely\nmore loose and porous, but also more smooth and even, by resisting the\ncold contractions; for every part endeavours to defend their borders\nwith a well ordered and regular flowing or streaming, and not onely to\ndefend, but to enlarge their compass against their enemies. Your fourth\nquestion is, How it comes _that Snow and Salt mixt together doth make\nIce?_ The reason, in my judgment, is, that Salt being very active, and\npartly of the nature of fire, doth sometimes preserve, and sometimes\ndestroy other bodies, according to its power, or rather according to\nthe nature of those bodies it works on; and salt being mixt with snow,\nendeavours to destroy it; but having not so much force, melts it onely\nby its heat, and reduces it into its first principle, which is water,\naltering the figure of snow; but the cold contractions remaining in\nthe water, and endeavouring to maintain and keep their power, straight\ndraw the water or melted snow into the figure of ice, so as neither\nthe salts heat, nor the waters dilative nature, are able to resist or\ndestroy those cold contractions; for although they destroy'd the first\nfigure, which is snow, yet they cannot hinder the second, which is Ice.\nYour last question is, _How the Clouds can hang so long in the Skie\nwithout falling down?_ Truly, _Madam_, I do not perceive that Clouds,\nbeing come to their full weight and gravity, do keep up in the air,\nbut some of them fall down in showres of rain, others in great and\nnumerous flakes of snow; some are turned into wind, and some fall down\nin thick mists, so that they onely keep up so long, until they are of\na full weight for descent, or till their figure is altered into some\nother body, as into air, wind, rain, lightning, thunder, snow, hail,\nmist, and the like. But many times their dilating motions keep or\nhinder them from descending, to which contracting motions are required.\nIn my opinion, it is more to be admired, that the Sea doth not rise,\nthen that Clouds do not fall; for, as we see, Clouds fall very often,\nas also change from being Clouds, to some other figure: Wherefore it\nis neither the Sun, nor Stars, nor the Vapours, which arise from the\nEarth, and cause the Clouds, nor the porosity of their bodies, nor the\nAir, that can keep or hinder them from falling or changing to some\nother body; but they being come to their full weight, fall or change\naccording as is fittest for them. And these are all the reasons I can\ngive you for the present; if they do not satisfie you, I will study for\nothers, and in all occasions endeavour to express my self,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your constant Friend,_\n\n_and faithful Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXIV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nSince in my last, I made mention of the Congealing of Water into Ice\nand Snow, I cannot choose, but by the way tell you, that I did lately\nmeet with an _Author_, who is of opinion, That Snow is nothing else but\nIce broken or ground into small pieces. To which, I answer: That this\nopinion may serve very well for a Fancy, but not for a Rational Truth,\nor at least for a Probable Reason; For why may not the cold motions\nmake snow without beating or grinding, as well as they make Ice? Surely\nNature is wiser then to trouble her self with unnecessary labour, and\nto make an easie work difficult, as Art her Creature doth, or as some\ndull humane capacities conceive; for it is more easie for Nature to\nmake Snow by some sorts of cold contractions, as she makes Ice by other\nsorts of cold contractions, then to force Air and Wind to beat, grinde,\nor pound Ice into Snow, which would cause a confusion and disturbance\nthrough the Irregularity of several parts, being jumbled in a confused\nmanner together. The truth is, it would rather cause a War in Nature,\nthen a natural production, alteration, or transformation: Neither can\nI conceive, in what region this turbulent and laborious work should be\nacted; certainly not in the caverns of the Earth, for snow descends\nfrom the upper Region. But, perchance, this _Author_ believes, that\nNature imploys Wind as a Hand, and the Cold air as a Spoon, to beat Ice\nlike the white of an Egg into a froth of Snow. But the great quantity\nof Snow, in many places, doth prove, that Snow is not made of the\nfragments of Ice, but that some sorts of cold contractions on a watery\nbody, make the figure of snow in the substance of water, as other sorts\nof cold contractions make the figure of ice; which motions and figures\nI have treated of in my Book of Philosophy, according to that Judgment\nand Reason which Nature has bestowed upon me. The Author of this Fancy,\ngives the same reason for Snow being white: _For Ice_, says he, _is\na transparent body, and all transparent bodies, when beaten into\npowder, appear white; and since Snow is nothing else but Ice powder'd\nsmall, it must of necessity shew white._ Truly, _Madam_, I am not so\nexperienced, as to know that all transparent bodies, being beaten\nsmall, shew white; but grant it be so, yet that doth not prove, that\nthe whiteness of snow proceeds from the broken parts of Ice, unless it\nbe proved that the whiteness of all bodies proceeds from the powdering\nof transparent bodies, which I am sure he cannot do; for Silver, and\nmillions of other things are white, which were never produced from the\npowder of transparent bodies: Neither do I know any reason against\nit, but that which makes a Lilly white, may also be the cause of the\nwhiteness of Snow, that is, such a figure as makes a white colour; for\ndifferent figures, in my opinion, are the cause of different colours,\nas you will find in my Book of Philosophy, where I say, that Nature\nby contraction of lines draws such or such a Figure, which is such or\nsuch a Colour; as such a Figure is red, and such a Figure is green,\nand so of all the rest: But the Palest colours, and so white, are the\nloosest and slackest figures; Indeed, white, which is the nearest\ncolour to light, is the smoothest, evenest and straightest figure, and\ncomposed of the smallest lines: As for example; suppose the figure of\n8. were the colour of Red, and the figure of 1. the colour of White; or\nsuppose the figure of Red to be a _z._ and the figure of an _r._ to be\nthe figure of Green, and a straight _l._ the figure of White; And mixt\nfigures make mixt colours: The like examples may be brought of other\nFigures, as of a Harpsichord and its strings, a Lute and its strings,\na Harp and its strings, &c. By which your Reason shall judg, whether\nit be not easier for Nature, to make Snow and its whiteness by the way\nof contraction, then by the way of dissolution: As for example; Nature\nin making Snow, contracts or congeals the exterior figure of Water into\nthe figure of a Harp, which is a Triangular figure with the figure\nof straight strings within it; for the exterior figure of the Harp\nrepresents the exterior figure of Snow, and the figure of the strings\nextended in straight lines represent the figure of its whiteness. And\nthus it is easier to make Snow and its whiteness at one act, then first\nto contract or congeal water into Ice, and then to cause wind and cold\nair to beat and break that Ice into powder, and lastly to contract\nor congeal that powder into flakes of Snow. Which would be a very\ntroublesom work for Nature, _viz._ to produce one effect by so many\nviolent actions and several labours, when the making of two figures by\none action will serve the turn. But Nature is wiser then any of her\nCreatures can conceive; for she knows how to make, and how to dissolve,\nform; and transform, with facility and ease, without any difficulty;\nfor her actions are all easie and free, yet so subtil, curious and\nvarious, as not any part or creature of Nature can exactly or throughly\ntrace her ways, or know her wisdom. And thus leaving her, I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI have taken several questions out of your new _Author_, which I\nintend to answer in this present Letter according to the conceptions\nof my own sense and reason, and to submit them to your censure; which\nif you vouchsafe to grant me without partiality, I shall acknowledg\nmy self much obliged to you for this favour. The first question is,\n_Why wet Linnen is dried in the Air?_ I answer; That, according to my\nsense and reason, the water which is spred upon the linnen, being not\nunited in a full and close body, dilates beyond the Circle-degree of\nwater and wetness, and so doth easily change from water to vapour,\nand from vapour to air, whereby the linnen becomes as dry, as it\nwas before it became wet. The second question is, _Why Water and\nWine intermix so easily and suddenly together?_ I answer: All wet\nliquors, although their exterior figures do differ, yet their interior\nnatures, figures and forms are much alike, and those things that are\nof the same interior nature, do easily and suddenly joyn as into one:\nWherefore Wine and Water having both wet natures, do soon incorporate\ntogether, whereas, were they of different natures, they would not so\npeaceably joyn together, but by their contrary natures become enemies,\nand strive to destroy each other; but this is to be observed, that\nthe sharp points of the Circle-lines of Wine, by passing through the\nsmooth Circle-lines of Water, help to make a more hasty and sudden\nconjunction. The third question, is, _Why Light, which in its nature is\nwhite, shining through a coloured Glass, doth appear of the same colour\nwhich the Glass is of, either Blew, Green, Red, or the like?_ I answer:\nThe reason is, that though Light in its nature be white, and the Glass\nclear and transparent, yet when as the Glass is stained or painted with\ncolours, both the clearness of the glass, and the whiteness of the\nlight, is obstructed by the figure of that colour the glass is stained\nor painted withal, and the light spreading upon or thorow the glass,\nrepresents it self in the figure of that same colour; indeed, in all\nprobability to sense and reason, it appears, that the lines or beams\nof light, which are straight, small, even, and parallel, do contract\nin their entrance through the glass into the figure of the colour the\nglass is stained or painted with, so that the light passes through the\nglass figuratively, in so much, as it seems to be of the same colour\nthe glass is of, although in it self it is white, lucent, and clear;\nand as the light appears, so the eye receives it, if the sight be not\ndestructive. The fourth question, is, _Whether_ (as your _Authors_\nopinion is) _kisses feel pleasing and delightful by the thinness of\nthe parts, and a gentle stirring and quavering of the tangent spirits,\nthat give a pleasing tact?_ I answer: If this were so, then all kisses\nwould be pleasing, which surely are not; for some are thought very\ndispleasing, especially from thin lips; wherefore, in my opinion, it\nis neither the thinness of the parts of the lips, nor the quavering of\nthe tangent spirits, but the appetites and passions of life, reason,\nand soul, that cause the pleasure; Nevertheless, I grant, the stirring\nup of the spirits may contribute to the increasing, heightening, or\nstrengthning of that tact, but it is not the prime cause of it. The\nfifth question, is, _Whether the greatest man have always the greatest\nstrength?_ I answer, Not: for strength and greatness of bulk doth not\nalways consist together, witness experience: for a little man may be,\nand is oftentimes stronger then a tall man. The like of other animal\nCreatures: As for example, some Horses of a little or middle size,\nhave a great deal more strength then others which are high and big;\nfor it is the quantity of sensitive matter that gives strength, and\nnot the bigness or bulk of the body. The sixth question, is, _Whether\nthis World or Universe be the biggest Creature?_ I answer: It is not\npossible to be known, unless Man could perfectly know its dimension\nor extension, or whether there be more Worlds then one: But, to speak\nproperly, there is no such thing as biggest or least in Nature. The\nseventh question, is, _Whether the Earth be the Center of Matter, or of\nthe World?_ As for Matter, it being Infinite, has no Center, by reason\nit has no Circumference; and, as for this World, its Center cannot be\nknown, unless man knew the utmost parts of its circumference, for no\nCenter can be known without its circumference; and although some do\nimagine this world so little, that in comparison to Infinite Matter, it\nwould not be so big as the least Pins head, yet their knowledg cannot\nextend so far as to know the circumference of this little World; by\nwhich you may perceive the Truth of the old saying, Man talks much, but\nknows little. The eighth question is, _Whether all Centers must needs\nbe full, and close, as a stufft Cushion; and whether the matter in\nthe Center of the Universe or World be dense, compact, and heavy?_ I\nanswer: This can no more be known, then the circumference of the World;\nfor what man is able to know, whether the Center of the world be rare,\nor dense, since he doth not know where its Center is; and as for other\nparticular Centers, some Centers may be rare, some dense, and some may\nhave less matter then their circumferences. The ninth question is,\n_Whether Finite Creatures can be produced out of an Infinite material\ncause?_ I answer: That, to my sense and reason, an Infinite cause must\nneeds produce Infinite effects, though not in each Particular, yet in\nGeneral; that is, Matter, being Infinite in substance, must needs be\ndividable into Infinite parts in number, and thus Infinite Creatures\nmust needs be produced out of Infinite Matter; but Man being but a\nfinite part, thinks all must be finite too, not onely each particular\nCreature, but also the Matter out of which all Creatures are produced,\nwhich is corporeal Nature. Nevertheless, those Infinite effects in\nNature are equalized by her different motions which are her different\nactions; for it is not _non_-sence, but most demonstrable to sense and\nreason that there are equalities or a union in Infinite. The tenth\nquestion is, _Whether the Elements be the onely matter out of which\nall other Creatures are produced?_ I answer: The Elements, as well as\nall other Creatures, as it appears to humane sense and reason, are all\nof one and the same Matter, which is the onely Infinite Matter; and\ntherefore the Elements cannot be the Matter of all other Creatures,\nfor several sorts of Creatures have several ways of productions, and\nI know no reason to the contrary, but that Animals, Vegetables, and\nMinerals, may as well derive their essence from each other, as from\nthe Elements, or the Elements from them; for as all Creatures do\nlive by each other, so they are produced from each other, according\nto the several ways or manners of productions. But mistake me not,\n_Madam_, for I speak of production in General, and not of such natural\nproduction whereby the several species of Creatures are maintained: As\nfor example, Generation in Animals; for an Element cannot generate an\nAnimal in that manner as an Animal can generate or produce its like;\nfor as Nature is wise, so her actions are all wise and orderly, or\nelse it would make a horrid confusion amongst the Infinite parts of\nNature. The eleventh question is, _What is meant by Natural Theology?_\nI answer: Natural Theology, in my opinion, is nothing else but Moral\nPhilosophy; for as for our belief, it is grounded upon the Scripture,\nand not upon Reason.\n\nThese, _Madam_, are the questions which I have pickt out of your new\n_Author_, together with my answers, of which I desire your impartial\nJudgment: But I must add one thing more before I conclude, which is,\nI am much pleased with your _Authors_ opinion, That Sound may be\nperceived by the Eye, Colour by the Ear, and that Sound and Colour may\nbe smell'd and tasted; and I have been of this opinion eleven years\nsince, as you will find in my Book of Poems, whose first Edition was\nprinted in the Year, 1653. And thus I take my leave of you, and remain\nconstantly,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_to serve you._\n\n\n\n\nXVI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nConcerning your question of the ascending nature of fire, I am\nabsolutely of _Aristotle's_ Opinion, that it is as natural for Fire\nto ascend, as it is for Earth to descend; And why should we believe\nthe nature of one, and doubt the nature of the other? For if it be\ngranted, that there are as well ascending, as descending bodies in\nNature, as also low and high places, (according to the situation of\nParticulars) and Circumferences, as well as Centers, (considering the\nshape of bodies) I cannot perceive by humane reason, but that the\nNature of fire is ascending, and that it is very improbable, it should\nhave a descending or contracting nature, as to tend or endeavour to a\nCenter. But, _Madam_, give me leave to ask what sort of Fire you mean,\nwhether a Celestial, or a Terrestrial Fire, _viz._ that which is named\nan Elemental fire, or any other sort of fire? for there may be as many\nseveral sorts of fire, as of other Creatures; or whether you mean onely\nthat sort of fire that belongs to this terrestrial Globe, or all the\nfire in general that is in Infinite Nature? and if you mean onely that\nsort of fire which belongs to this Terrestrial World we live upon; I\nanswer, There are many several sorts of that fire too; for all the\nfire belonging to this Earthly Globe, doth not lie in one place, body,\nor part, no more then all metal, or but one sort of metal, as Gold,\nlies in one mine, or all Mankind in one womb. Neither can I believe,\nthat the Sun is the onely Celestial Fire in Nature, but that there may\nbe as numerous Suns, as there are other sorts of Creatures in Nature.\nBut as for the ascending propriety of this terrestrial Fire, you may\nsay, That the Elements do commix and unite in this worldly Globe, and\nif Fire should have an ascending motion, it would pierce into other\nGlobes, or Worlds, and never leave ascending. I answer: That, first of\nall, the strength of fire is to be considered, consisting not onely\nin its quantity, but also in its quality; as whether it can ascend\nto those bodies and places which are far above it: For example; A\nMan, or any other Creature, hath never so much strength, or ability,\nor length of life, as to travel to the utmost parts of the Universe,\nwere the way never so plain and free, and the number of men never so\ngreat: the like for Elementary fire, which hath life and death, that\nis, generation and dissolution, and successive motion, as well as other\nCreatures. But you would fain know, whether fire, if it were left at\nliberty, would not turn to a Globous figure? I answer; That, to my\nsense and reason, it would not: but some men, seeing the flame of fire\nin an arched Oven, descend round the sides of the Oven in a Globous\nfigure, do perhaps imagine the nature of fire to be descending, and its\nnatural figure round as a Globe, which is ridiculous; for the fire in\nthe Oven, although every where incompassed and bound, yet, according\nto its nature, ascends to the top of the Oven; and finding a stoppage\nand suppression, offers to descend perpendicularly; but by reason of\na continual ascending of the following flame, the first, and so all\nthe following parts of flame are forced to spread about, and descend\nround the sides of the Oven, so that the descension of the flame is\nforced, and not natural, and its Globous figure is caused, as it were,\nby a mould, which is the Oven. But some are of opinion, that all bodies\nhave descending motions towards the Center of this worldly Globe, and\ntherefore they do not believe, that any bodies do ascend naturally:\nBut what reason have they to believe one, and not the other? Besides,\nhow do they know that all bodies would rest in the Center of this\nterrestrial Globe, if they came thither? For if it was possible, that a\nhole could be digged from the superficies of this Earthly Globe thorow\nthe middle or Center of it unto the opposite superficies, and a stone\nbe sent thorow; the question is, whether the stone would rest in the\nCenter, and not go quite thorow? Wherefore this is but an idle Fancy;\nand the proof that Fire tends not to a Center, is, because it cannot\nbe poised or weighed, not onely by reason of its rarity, but of its\ndilative and aspiring Nature; and as fire is ascending, or aspiring,\nso likewise do I, _Madam_, aspire to the top of your favour, and shall\nnever descend from the ambition to serve you, but by the suppression of\ndeath. Till then, I remain,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your constant Friend,_\n\n_and faithful Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXVII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nIn your last, you were pleased to desire my answer to these following\nquestions: First, _What the reason is, that a Vessel, although it be\nof a solid and compact substance, yet will retain the smell or odour\nof a forreign substance poured into it, for a long time?_ I answer:\nThe Vessel, or rather the perceptive corporeal motions of the Vessel,\nhaving patterned out the figure of the sent of the odorous substance,\nretain that same figure of sent, although the odorous substance is\ngone; and as long as that patterned figure is perfect, the sent will\nremain in the Vessel, either more or less, according as the figure\ndoth last or alter. But you must consider, _Madam_, that although it\nbe the natural motions that make those patterns of odours, yet those\npatterned figures are but as it were artificial, like as a man who\ndraws a Copy from an Original; for Nature has divers and several ways\nof such motions as we call Art, for whatsoever is an imitation, is that\nwhich man calls Art. Your second question was, _How it came, that the\nmind and understanding in many did die or dissolve before the body?_\nI answer: The reason is, because the rational corporeal motions alter\nbefore the sensitive; for as in some, as for example, in Natural fools,\nthe rational motions never move to a regular humane understanding,\nso in some dying Persons they do make a general alteration before\nthe sensitive. Your third question was, _Why a man, being bitten by\na mad Dog, is onely distempered in his mind, and not in his body?_\nThe reason, according to my judgment, is, that the rational part of\nMatter is onely disturbed, and not the sensitive. The fourth question\nwas, _Why a Basilisk will kill with his eyes?_ I answer: It is the\nsensitive corporeal motions in the organ of sight in the man, which\nupon the printing of the figure of the eyes of the Basilisk, make a\nsudden alteration. Your fifth question was, _Why an Asp will kill\ninsensibly by biting?_ The reason, in my opinion, is, That the biting\nof the Asp hath the same efficacy as deadly _Opium_ hath, yea, and much\nstronger. Your sixth question was, _Why a Dog that rejoyces, swings his\ntail, and a Lyon when angry, or a Cat when in a fear, do lift up their\ntails?_ I answer: The several motions of the mind may produce either\nbut one, or several sorts of motions in some part or parts of the body;\nand as the sensitive motions of anger will produce tears, so will the\nmotions of joy; but grief made by the rational motions of the mind,\nmay by excess disturb and make a general alteration of the sensitive\nmotions in an animal: the same may excessive joy. But, _Madam_, you may\nperhaps find out better reasons for your own questions then these are;\nfor my endeavour was onely to frame my answer to the ground of my own\nopinions, and so to satisfie your desire, which was, and is still the\nambition of,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\n\nXVIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nIn your last, you were pleased to desire an account, how far, or how\nmuch I did understand the ancient and modern Philosophers in their\nPhilosophical Writings. Truly, _Madam_, I can more readily tell you\nwhat I do not understand, then what I do understand: for, first, I do\nnot understand their sophistical Logick, as to perswade with arguments\nthat black is white, and white is black; and that fire is not hot, nor\nwater wet, and other such things; for the glory in Logick is rather\nto make doubts, then to find truth; indeed, that Art now is like\nthick, dark clouds, which darken the light of truth. Next: I do not\nunderstand in particular, what they mean by second matter; for if they\nname figures and forms second matter, they may as well say, all several\nmotions, which are the several actions of Nature, are several matters,\nand so there would be infinite several matters, which would produce a\nmeer confusion in Nature. Neither do I understand, when they say, a\nbody dissolves into the first matter; for I am not able to conceive\ntheir first matter, nor what they mean by _magna_ and _major materia_;\nfor I believe there is but one matter, and the motion of that matter is\nits action by which it produces several figures and effects; so that\nthe nature of the matter is one and the same, although its motions,\nthat is, its actions, be various, for the various effects alter not\nthe nature or unity of the onely matter. Neither do I understand what\nthey mean by corruption, for surely Nature is not corruptible. Nor do\nI understand their individables in Nature, nor a bodiless form, nor\na privation, nor a being without a body; nor any such thing as they\ncall rest, for there's not any thing without motion in Nature: Some do\ntalk of moving _minima's_, but they do not tell what those _minima's_\nor their motions are, or how they were produced, or how they came to\nmove. Neither do I understand when they say there is but one World,\nand that finite; for if there be no more Matter then that which they\ncall the whole World, and may be measured by a _Jacob's_ staff, then\ncertainly there is but little matter, and that no bigger then an atome\nin comparison to Infinite. Neither can my reason comprehend, when they\nsay, that not any thing hath power from its interior nature to move\nexteriously and locally; for common sense and reason, that is sight\nand observation, doth prove the contrary. Neither do I know what they\nmean by making a difference between matter and form, power and act;\nfor there can be no form without matter, nor no matter without form;\nand as act includes power, so power is nothing without act: Neither\ncan I conceive Reason to be separable from matter; nor what is meant\nwhen they say, that, onely that is real, which moves the understanding\nwithout. Nor do I understand what they mean by intentionals,\naccidentals, incorporeal beings, formal _ratio_, formal _unity_, and\nhundreds the like; enough to puzle truth, when all is but the several\nactions of one cause, to wit, the onely matter. But most men make such\ncross, narrow, and intricate ways in Nature, with their over-nice\ndistinctions, that Nature appears like a Labyrinth, whenas really she\nis as plain as an un-plowed, ditched, or hedged champion: Nay, some\nmake Nature so full, that she can neither move nor stir; and others\nagain will have her so empty, as they leave not any thing within her;\nand some with their penetrations, pressings, squeezings, and the like,\nmake such holes in her, as they do almost wound, press and squeeze\nher to death: And some are so learned, witty, and ingenious, as they\nunderstand and know to discourse of the true compass, just weight,\nexact rules, measures and proportions of the Universe, as also of the\nexact division of the _Chaos_, and the architecture of the world, to\nan atome. Thus, _Madam_, I have made my confession to you of what I\nunderstand not, and have endeavoured to make my ignorance as brief as I\ncould; but the great God knows, that my ignorance is longer then that\nwhich is named life and death; and as for my understanding, I can onely\nsay, that I understand nothing better, but my self to be,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your most faithful Friend_\n\n_and humble Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXIX.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nSince I have given you, in my last, an account how much I did\nunderstand the Philosophical works of both the ancient and modern\nPhilosophers, or rather what I did not understand of them, you would\nfain have my opinion now of the persons themselves. Truly, _Madam_, as\nfor those that are dead, or those that are living, I cannot say any\nthing, but that I believe they all were or are worthy persons, men\nof vast understandings, subtil conceptions, ingenious wits, painful\nstudents, and learned writers. But as for their works, as I told you\nheretofore, I confess ingeniously, I understand them not, by reason\nI am ignorant in their Scholastical Arts, as Logick, Metaphysick,\nMathematicks, and the like: For to my simple apprehension, when as\nLogicians argue of natural causes and effects, they make natural\ncauses to produce natural effects with more difficulty and enforcement\nthen Nature knows of; and as for Mathematicians, they endeavour to\ninchant Nature with Circles, and bind her with lines so hard, as if she\nwere so mad, that she would do some mischief, when left at liberty.\nGeometricians weigh Nature to an Atome, and measure her so exactly, as\nless then a hairs breadth; besides, they do press and squeeze her so\nhard and close, as they almost stifle her. And Natural Philosophers do\nso stuff her with dull, dead, senceless _minima's_, like as a sack with\nmeal, or sand, by which they raise such a Dust as quite blinds Nature\nand natural reason. But Chymists torture Nature worst of all; for they\nextract and distil her beyond substance, nay, into no substance, if\nthey could. As for natural Theologers, I understand them least of any;\nfor they make such a gallamalfry of Philosophy and Divinity, as neither\ncan be distinguished from the other. In short, _Madam_, They all with\ntheir intricate definitions and distinctions set my brain on the rack:\nbut some Philosophers are like some Poets, for they endeavour to write\nstrong lines. You may ask me, what is meant by strong lines? I answer:\nWeak sense. To which leaving them, I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXX.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI am not of your opinion, That nice distinctions and Logistical\narguments discover truth, dissolve doubts, and clear the understanding;\nbut I say, they rather make doubts of truth, and blind-fold the\nunderstanding; Indeed, nice distinctions and sophistical arguments, are\nvery pernicious both in Schools, Church, and State: As for the Church,\nalthough in Divinity there is but one Truth, yet nice distinctions, and\nLogistical sophistry, have made such confusion in it, as has caused\nalmost as many several opinions as there are words in the Scripture;\nand as for natural Theology, which is moral Philosophy, they have\ndivided vertues and vices into so many parts, and minced them so small,\nthat neither can be clearly distinguished. The same in Government; they\nendeavour to cut between command and obedience to a hairs breadth.\nConcerning causes of Law, they have abolish'd the intended benefit, and\nbanish'd equity; and instead of keeping Peace, they make War, causing\nenmity betwixt men: As for Natural Philosophy, they will not suffer\nsense and reason to appear in that study: And as for Physick, they have\nkill'd more men then Wars, Plagues, or Famine. Wherefore from nice\ndistinctions and Logistical sophistry, Good God deliver us, especially,\nfrom those that concern Divinity; for they weaken Faith, trouble\nConscience, and bring in Atheism: In short, they make controversies,\nand endless disputes. But least the opening of my meaning in such plain\nterms should raise a controversie also between you and me, I'le cut off\nhere, and rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXXI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYesterday I received a visit from the Lady _N. M._ who you know hath\na quick wit, rational opinions, and subtil conceptions; all which she\nis ready and free to divulge in her discourse. But when she came to\nmy Chamber, I was casting up some small accounts; which when she did\nsee, What, said she, are you at Numeration? Yes, said I: but I cannot\nnumber well, nor much, for I do not understand Arithmetick. Said she,\nYou can number to three. Yes, said I, I can number to four: Nay, faith,\nsaid she, the number of three is enough, if you could but understand\nthat number well, for it is a mystical number. Said I, There is no\ngreat mystery to count that number; for one, and two, makes three. Said\nshe, That is not the mystery; for the mystery is, That three makes\none: and without this mystery no man can understand Divinity, Nature,\nnor himself. Then I desired her to make me understand that mystery.\nShe said, It required more time to inform me, then a short visit, for\nthis mystery was such, as did puzle all wise men in the world; and\nthe not understanding of this mystery perfectly, had caused endless\ndivisions and disputes. I desired, if she could not make me understand\nthe mystery, she would but inform me, how three made one in Divinity,\nNature, and Man. She said, That was easie to do; for in Divinity there\nare three Persons in one Essence, as God the Father, the Son, and the\nholy Ghost, whose Essence being individable, they make but one God;\nAnd as for Philosophy, there is but Matter, Motion, and Figure, which\nbeing individable, make but one Nature; And as for Man, there is Soul,\nLife, and Body, all three joyned in one Man. But I replied, Man's Life,\nSoul and Body, is dividable. That is true, said she, but then he is no\nmore a Man; for these three are his essential parts, which make him to\nbe a man; and when these parts are dissolved, then his interior nature\nis changed, so that he can no longer be call'd a man: As for example;\nWater being turned into Air, and having lost its interior nature, can\nno more be called Water, but it is perfect Air; the same is with Man:\nBut as long as he is a Man, then these three forementioned parts which\nmake him to be of that figure are individably united as long as man\nlasts. Besides, said she, this is but in the particular, considering\nman single, and by himself; but in general, these three, as life,\nsoul, and body, are individably united, so that they remain as long\nas mankind lasts. Nay, although they do dissolve in the particulars,\nyet it is but for a time; for they shall be united again at the last\nday, which is the time of their resurrection; so that also in this\nrespect we may justly call them individable, for man shall remain\nwith an united soul, life, and body, eternally. And as she was thus\ndiscoursing, in came a Sophisterian, whom when she spied, away she\nwent as fast as she could; but I followed her close, and got hold of\nher, then asked her, why she ran away? She answer'd, if she stayed,\nthe Logician would dissolve her into nothing, for the profession of\nLogicians is to make something nothing, and nothing something. I pray'd\nher to stay and discourse with the Logician: Not for a world, said she,\nfor his discourse will make my brain like a confused _Chaos_, full of\nsenseless _minima's_; and after that, he will so knock, jolt, and jog\nit, and make such whirls and pits, as will so torture my brain, that I\nshall wish I had not any: Wherefore, said she, I will not stay now, but\nvisit you again to morrow. And I wish with all my heart, _Madam_, you\nwere so near as to be here at the same time, that we three might make\na Triumvirate in discourse, as well as we do in friendship. But since\nthat cannot be, I must rest satisfied that I am,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXXII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYou were pleased to desire my opinion of the works of that Learned\nand Ingenious Writer _B._ Truly, _Madam_, I have read but some part\nof his works; but as much as I have read, I have observed, he is a\nvery civil, eloquent, and rational Writer; the truth is, his style is\na Gentleman's style. And in particular, concerning his experiments, I\nmust needs say this, that, in my judgment, he hath expressed himself to\nbe a very industrious and ingenious person; for he doth neither puzle\nNature, nor darken truth with hard words and compounded languages,\nor nice distinctions; besides, his experiments are proved by his own\naction. But give me leave to tell you, that I observe, he studies the\ndifferent parts and alterations, more then the motions, which cause\nthe alterations in those parts; whereas, did he study and observe\nthe several and different motions in those parts, how they change in\none and the same part, and how the different alterations in bodies\nare caused by the different motions of their parts, he might arrive\nto a vast knowledg by the means of his experiments; for certainly\nexperiments are very beneficial to man. In the next place, you desire\nmy opinion of the Book call'd, _The Discourses of the Virtuosi in\nFrance_: I am sorry, _Madam_, this book comes so late to my hands, that\nI cannot read it so slowly and observingly, as to give you a clear\njudgment of their opinions or discourses in particular; however, in\ngeneral, and for what I have read in it, I may say, it expresses the\nFrench to be very learned and eloquent Writers, wherein I thought our\nEnglish had exceeded them, and that they did onely excel in wit and\ningenuity; but I perceive most Nations have of all sorts. The truth\nis, ingenious and subtil wit brings news; but learning and experience\nbrings proofs, at least, argumental discourses; and the French are\nmuch to be commended, that they endeavour to spend their time wisely,\nhonourably, honestly, and profitably, not onely for the good and\nbenefit of their own, but also of other Nations. But before I conclude,\ngive me leave to tell you, that concerning the curious and profitable\nArts mentioned in their discourses, I confess, I do much admire them,\nand partly believe they may arrive to the use of many of them; but\nthere are two arts which I wish with all my heart I could obtain: the\nfirst is, to argue without error in all kinds, modes, and figures, in\na quarter of an hour; and the other is to learn a way to understand\nall languages in six hours. But as for the first, I fear, if I want a\nthorow understanding in every particular argument, cause, or point, a\ngeneral art or mode of words will not help me, especially, if I, being\na woman, should want discretion: And as for the second, my memory is\nso bad, that it is beyond the help of Art, so that Nature has made\nmy understanding harder or closer then Glass, through which the Sun\nof verity cannot pass, although its light doth; and therefore I am\nconfident I shall not be made, or taught to learn this mentioned Art\nin six hours, no not in six months. But I wish all Arts were as easily\npractised, as mentioned; and thus I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXXIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nConcerning your question, _Whether a Point be something, or nothing,\nor between both_; My opinion is, that a natural point is material;\nbut that which the learned name a Mathematical point, is like their\nLogistical Egg, whereof there is nothing in Nature any otherwise,\nbut a word, which word is material, as being natural; for concerning\nimmaterial beings, it is impossible to believe there be any in Nature;\nand though witty Students, and subtil Arguers have both in past, and\nthis present age, endeavoured to prove something, nothing; yet words\nand disputes have not power to annihilate any thing that is in Nature,\nno more then to create something out of nothing; and therefore they can\nneither make something, nothing; nor nothing to be something: for the\nmost witty student, nor the subtilest disputant, cannot alter Nature,\nbut each thing is and must be as Nature made it. As for your other\nquestion, _Whether there be more then five Senses?_ I answer: There\nare as many senses as there are sensitive motions, and all sensation\nor perception is by the way of patterning; and whosoever is of another\nopinion, is, in my judgment, a greater friend to contradiction, then to\ntruth, at least to probability. Lastly, concerning your question, why a\nGun, the longer its barrel is made, the further it will shoot, until it\ncome to a certain degree of length; after which, the longer it is made,\nthe weaker it becomes, so that every degree further, makes it shoot\nshorter and shorter, whereas before it came to such a degree of length,\nit shot further and further: Give me leave to tell you, _Madam_, that\nthis question would be put more properly to a Mathematician, then to\nme, who am ignorant in the Mathematicks: However, since you are pleased\nto desire my opinion thereof, I am willing to give it you. There are,\nin my judgment, but three reasons which do produce this alteration:\nThe one may be the compass of the stock, or barrel, which being too\nwide for the length, may weaken the force, or being too narrow for the\nlength, may retard the force; the one giving liberty before the force\nis united, the other inclosing it so long by a streight passage, as\nit loses its force before it hath liberty; so that the one becomes\nstronger with length, the other weaker with length. The second reason,\nin my opinion, is, That degrees of strength may require degrees of the\n_medium_. Lastly, It may be, that Centers are required for degrees of\nstrength; if so, every _medium_ may be a Center, and the middle length\nto such a compass may be a Center of such a force. But many times the\nforce being weaker or stronger, is caused by the good or ill making of\nthe Powder, or Locks, or the like. But, _Madam_, such questions will\npuzle me as much as those of Mr. _V. Z._ concerning those glasses,\none of which being held close in ones hand, and a little piece being\nbroke of its tail, makes as great a noise as the discharging of a\nGun: Wherefore I beseech you, _Madam_, do not trouble my brain with\nMathematical questions, wherein I have neither skill, learning, nor\nexperience by Practice; for truly I have not the subtilty to find out\ntheir mystery, nor the capacity to understand arts, no more then I am\ncapable to learn several languages. If you command me any thing else I\nam able to do, assure your self, there is none shall more readily and\ncheerfully serve you then my self; who am, and shall ever continue,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXXIV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI have heard that Artists do glory much in their Glasses, Tubes,\nEngines, and Stills, and hope by their Glasses and Tubes to see\ninvisible things, and by their Engines to produce incredible effects,\nand by their Stills, Fire, and Furnaces, to create as Nature doth;\nbut all this is impossible to be done: For Art cannot arrive to that\ndegree, as to know perfectly Natures secret and fundamental actions,\nher purest matter, and subtilest motions; and it is enough if Artists\ncan but produce such things as are for mans conveniencies and use,\nalthough they never can see the smallest or rarest bodies, nor great\nand vast bodies at a great distance, nor make or create a Vegetable,\nAnimal, or the like, as Nature doth; for Nature being Infinite, has\nalso Infinite degrees of figures, sizes, motions, densities, rarities,\nknowledg, &c. as you may see in my Book of Philosophy, as also in my\nbook of Poems, especially that part that treats of little, minute\nCreatures, which I there do name, for want of other expressions,\nFairies; for I have considered much the several sizes of Creatures,\nalthough I gave it out but for a fancy in the mentioned book, lest I\nshould be thought extravagant to declare that conception of mine for a\nrational truth: But if some small bodies cannot be perfectly seen but\nby the help of magnifying glasses, and such as they call Microscopia;\nI pray, Nature being Infinite, What figures and sizes may there not\nbe, which our eyes with all the help of Art are not capable to see?\nfor certainly, Nature hath more curiosities then our exterior senses,\nhelped by Art, can perceive: Wherefore I cannot wonder enough at those\nthat pretend to know the least or greatest parts or creatures in\nNature, since no particular Creature is able to do it. But concerning\nArtists, you would fain know, _Madam_, whether the Artist be beholden\nto the conceptions of the Student? To which I return this short answer:\nThat, in my judgment, without the Students conceptions, the Artist\ncould not tell how to make experiments: The truth is, the conceptions\nof studious men set the Artists on work, although many Artists do\nungratefully attribute all to their own industry. Neither doth it\nalways belong to the studious Concepter to make trials or experiments,\nbut he leaves that work to others, whose time is not so much\nimployed with thoughts or speculations, as with actions; for the the\nContemplator is the Designer, and the Artist the Workman, or Labourer,\nwho ought to acknowledg him his Master, as I do your _Ladiship_, for I\nam in all respects,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Ladiships_\n\n_humble and faithful Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXXV.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour Command in your last was to send you my opinion concerning the\ndivision of Religions, or of the several opinions in Religions, I\nsuppose you mean the division of the Religion, not of Religions; for\ncertainly, there is but one divine Truth, and consequently but one\ntrue Religion: But natural men being composed of many divers parts, as\nof several motions and figures, have divers and several Ideas, which\nthe grosser corporeal motions conceive to be divers and several gods,\nas being not capable to know the Great and Incomprehensible God, who\nis above Nature. For example: Do but consider, _Madam_, what strange\nopinions the Heathens had of God, and how they divided him into so many\nseveral Persons, with so many several bodies, like men; whereas, surely\nGod considered in his Essence, he being a Spirit, as the Scripture\ndescribes him, can neither have Soul nor body, as he is a God, but\nis an Immaterial Being; Onely the Heathens did conceive him to have\nparts, and so divided the Incomprehensible God into several Deities, at\nleast they had several Deitical Ideas, or rather Fancies of him. But,\n_Madam_, I confess my ignorance in this great mystery, and honour, and\npraise the Omnipotent, Great, and Incomprehensible God, with all fear\nand humility as I ought; beseeching his infinite mercy to keep me from\nsuch presumption, whereby I might prophane his holy Name, and to make\nme obedient to the Church, as also to grant me life and health, that I\nmay be able to express how much I am,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXXVI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nSince I spake of Religion in my last, I cannot but acquaint you, that I\nwas the other day in the company of Sir _P. H._ and Sir _R. L._ where\namongst other discourses they talk'd of Predestination and Free-will.\nSir _P. H._ accounted the opinion of Predestination not onely absurd,\nbut blasphemous; for, said he, Predestination makes God appear Cruel,\nas first to create Angels and Man, and then to make them fall from\ntheir Glory, and damn them eternally: For God, said he, knew before\nhe made them, they would fall; Neither could he imagine, from whence\nthat Pride and Presumption did proceed, which was the cause of the\nAngels fall, for it could not proceed from God, God being infinitely\nGood. Sir _R. L._ answer'd, That this Pride and Presumption did not\ncome from God, but from their own Nature. But, replyed Sir _P. H._\nGod gave them that Nature, for they had it not of themselves, but all\nwhat they were, their Essence and Nature, came from God the Creator\nof all things, and to suffer that, which was in his power to hinder,\nwas as much as to act. Sir _R. L._ said, God gave both Angels and Man\na Free-will at their Creation. Sir _P. H._ answered, that a Free-will\nwas a part of a divine attribute, which surely God would not give away\nto any Creature: Next, said he, he could not conceive why God should\nmake Creatures to cross and oppose him; for it were neither an act of\nWisdom to make Rebels, nor an act of Justice to make Devils; so that\nneither in his Wisdom, Justice, nor Mercy, God could give leave, that\nAngels and Man should fall through sin; neither was God ignorant that\nAngels and Man would fall; for surely, said he, God knew all things,\npast, present, and to come; wherefore, said he, Free-will doth weaken\nthe Power of God, and Predestination doth weaken the power of man, and\nboth do hinder each other: Besides, said he, since God did confirm\nthe rest of the Angels in the same state they were before, so as they\ncould not fall afterwards, he might as well have created them all so\nat first. But Sir _R. L._ replied, That God suffered Angels and Man to\nfall for his Glory, to shew his Justice in Devils, and his Mercy in\nMan; and that the Devils express'd God's Omnipotency as much as the\nBlessed. To which Sir _P. H._ answered, That they expressed more God's\nseverity in those horrid torments they suffer through their Natural\nImperfections, then his power in making and suffering them to sin.\nThus they discoursed: And to tell you truly, _Madam_, my mind was more\ntroubled, then delighted with their discourse; for it seemed rather to\ndetract from the honour of the great God, then to increase his Glory;\nand no Creature ought either to think or to speak any thing that is\ndetracting from the Glory of the Creator: Wherefore I am neither for\nPredestination, nor for an absolute Free-will, neither in Angels,\nDevils, nor Man; for an absolute Free-will is not competent to any\nCreature: and though Nature be Infinite, and the Eternal Servant to\nthe Eternal and Infinite God, and can produce Infinite Creatures, yet\nher Power and Will is not absolute, but limited; that is, she has a\nnatural free-will, but not a supernatural, for she cannot work beyond\nthe power God has given her. But those mystical discourses belong to\nDivines, and not to any Lay-person, and I confess my self very ignorant\nin them. Wherefore I will nor dare not dispute God's actions, being all\ninfinitely wise, but leave that to Divines, who are to inform us what\nwe ought to believe, and how we ought to live. And thus taking my leave\nof you for the present, I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXXVII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYou are pleased to honor me so far, that you do not onely spend some\ntime in the perusing of my Book called _Philosophical Opinions_, but\ntake it so much into your consideration, as to examine every opinion\nof mine which dissents from the common way of the Schools, marking\nthose places which seem somewhat obscure, and desiring my explanation\nof them; All which, I do not onely acknowledg as a great favour, but\nas an infallible testimony of your true and unfeigned friendship; and\nI cannot chuse but publish it to all the world; both for the honour\nof your self, as to let every body know the part of so true a friend,\nwho is so much concerned for the honour and benefit of my poor Works;\nas also for the good of my mentioned Book, which by this means will be\nrendred more intelligible; for I must confess that my Philosophical\nOpinions are not so plain and perspicuous as to be perfectly understood\nat the first reading, which I am sorry for. And there be two chief\nreasons why they are so: First, Because they are new, and never vented\nbefore; for the have their original meerly from my own conceptions, and\nare not taken out of other Philosophers. Next, because I being a Woman,\nand not bred up to Scholarship, did want names and terms of Art, and\ntherefore being not versed in the Writings of other Philosophers, but\nwhat I knew by hearing, I could not form my named Book so methodically,\nand express my opinions so artificially and clearly, as I might have\ndone, had I been studious in the reading of Philosophical Books, or\nbred a Scholar; for then I might have dressed them with a fine coloured\nCovering of Logick and Geometry, and set them out in a handsome array;\nby which I might have also cover'd my ignorance, like as Stage-Players\ndo cover their mean persons or degrees with fine Cloathes. But, as I\nsaid, I being void of Learning and Art, did put them forth according to\nmy own conceptions, and as I did understand them myself; but since I\nhave hitherto by the reading of those famous and learned _Authors_ you\nsent me, attained to the knowledg of some artificial Terms, I shall not\nspare any labour and pains to make my opinions so intelligible, that\nevery one, who without partiality, spleen, or malice, doth read them,\nmay also easily understand them: And thus I shall likewise endeavour to\ngive such answers to your scruples, objections, or questions, as may\nexplain those passages which seem obscure, and satisfie your desire. In\nthe first place, and in general, you desire to know, _Whether any truth\nmay be had in Natural Philosophy_: for since all this study is grounded\nupon probability, and he that thinks he has the most probable reasons\nfor his opinion, may be as far off from truth, as he who is thought to\nhave the least; nay, what seems most probable to day, may seem least\nprobable to morrow, especially if an ingenious opposer, bring rational\narguments against it: Therefore you think it is but vain for any one\nto trouble his brain with searching and enquiring after such things\nwherein neither truth nor certainty can be had. To which, I answer:\nThat the undoubted truth in Natural Philosophy, is, in my opinion, like\nthe Philosopher's Stone in Chymistry, which has been sought for by many\nlearned and ingenious Persons, and will be sought as long as the Art\nof Chymistry doth last; but although they cannot find the Philosophers\nStone, yet by the help of this Art they have found out many rare things\nboth for use and knowledg. The like in Natural Philosophy, although\nNatural Philosophers cannot find out the absolute truth of Nature,\nor Natures ground-works, or the hidden causes of natural effects;\nnevertheless they have found out many necessary and profitable Arts and\nSciences, to benefit the life of man; for without Natural Philosophy\nwe should have lived in dark ignorance, not knowing the motions of\nthe Heavens, the cause of the Eclipses, the influences of the Stars,\nthe use of Numbers, Measures, and Weights, the vertues and effects\nof Vegetables and Minerals, the Art of Architecture, Navigation, and\nthe like: Indeed all Arts and Sciences do adscribe their original to\nthe study of Natural Philosophy; and those men are both unwise and\nungrateful, that will refuse rich gifts because they cannot be masters\nof all Wealth; and they are fools, that will not take remedies when\nthey are sick, because Medicines can onely recover them from death for\na time, but not make them live for ever. But to conclude, Probability\nis next to truth, and the search of a hidden cause finds out visible\neffects; and this truth do natural Philosophers find, that there are\nmore fools, then wise men, which fools will never attain to the honour\nof being Natural Philosophers. And thus leaving them, I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Ladiships_\n\n_humble and faithful Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXXVIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nYour desire is to know, since I say Nature is Wise, Whether all her\nparts must be wise also? To which, I answer; That (by your favour) all\nher parts are not fools: but yet it is no necessary consequence, that\nbecause Nature is infinitely wise, all her parts must be so too, no\nmore then if I should say, Nature is Infinite, therefore every part\nmust be Infinite: But it is rather necessary, that because Nature\nis Infinite, therefore not any single part of hers can be Infinite,\nbut must be finite. Next, you desire to know, Whether Nature or the\nself-moving matter is subject to err, and to commit mistakes? I answer:\nAlthough Nature has naturally an Infinite wisdom and knowledg, yet she\nhas not a most pure and intire perfection, no more then she has an\nabsolute power; for a most pure and intire perfection belongs onely\nto God: and though she is infinitely naturally wise in her self, yet\nher parts or particular creatures may commit errors and mistakes; the\ntruth is, it is impossible but that parts or particular Creatures must\nbe subject to errors, because no part can have a perfect or general\nknowledg, as being but a part, and not a whole; for knowledg is in\nparts, as parts are in Matter: Besides several corporeal motions, that\nis, several self-moving parts do delude and oppose each other by their\nopposite motions; and this opposition is very requisite in Nature to\nkeep a mean, and hinder extreams; for were there not opposition of\nparts, Nature would run into extreams, which would confound her, and\nall her parts. And as for delusion, it is part of Natures delight,\ncausing the more variety; but there be some actions in Nature which\nare neither perfect mistakes, nor delusions, but onely want of a clear\nand thorow perception: As for example; when a man is sailing in a\nShip, he thinks the shore moves from the ship, when as it is the ship\nthat moves from the shore: Also when a man is going backward from a\nLooking-glass, he thinks, the figure in the Glass goeth inward, whereas\nit is himself that goes backward, and not his figure in the glass. The\ncause of it is, That the perception in the eye perceives the distanced\nbody, but not the motion of the distance or medium; for though the man\nmay partly see the motion of the visible parts, yet he doth not see the\nparts or motion of the distance or medium, which is invisible, and not\nsubject to the perception of sight; and since a pattern cannot be made\nif the object be not visible, hence I conclude, that the motion of the\nmedium cannot make perception, but that it is the perceptive motions\nof the eye, which pattern out an object as it is visibly presented\nto the corporeal motions in the eye; for according as the object is\npresented, the pattern is made, if the motions be regular: For example;\na fired end of a stick, if you move it in a circular figure, the\nsensitive corporeal motions in the eye pattern out the figure of fire,\ntogether with the exterior or circular motion, and apprehend it as a\nfiery circle; and if the stick be moved any otherwise, they pattern\nout such a figure as the fired end of the stick is moved in; so that\nthe sensitive pattern is made according to the exterior corporeal\nfigurative motion of the object, and not according to its interior\nfigure or motions. And this, _Madam_, is in short my answer to your\npropounded questions, by which, I hope, you understand plainly the\nmeaning of,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXXIX.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nThe scruples or questions you sent me last, are these following. First,\nyou desire to be informed what I mean by _Phantasmes_ and _Ideas_? I\nanswer: They are figures made by the purest and subtilest degree of\nself-moving matter, that is to say, by the rational corporeal motions,\nand are the same with thoughts or conceptions. Next, your question\nis, what I do understand by _Sensitive Life_? I answer: It is that\npart of self-moving matter, which in its own nature is not so pure and\nsubtil as the rational, for it is but the labouring, and the rational\nthe designing part of matter. Your third question is, _Whether this\nsensitive self-moving matter be dense or rare?_ I answer: density and\nrarity are onely effects caused by the several actions, that is, the\ncorporeal motions of Nature; wherefore it cannot properly be said, that\nsensitive matter is either dense, or rare; for it has a self-power to\ncontract and dilate, compose and divide, and move in any kind of motion\nwhatsoever, as is requisite to the framing of any figure; and thus\nI desire you to observe well, that when I say the rational part of\nmatter is purer in its degree then the sensitive, and that this is a\nrare and acute matter, I do not mean that it is thin like a rare egg,\nbut that it is subtil and active, penetrating and dividing, as well as\ndividable. Your fourth question is, _What this sensitive matter works\nupon?_ I answer: It works with and upon another degree of matter,\nwhich is not self-moving, but dull, stupid, and immoveable in its own\nnature, which I call the inanimate part or degree of matter. Your fifth\nquestion is, _Whether this inanimate Matter do never rest?_ I answer;\nIt doth not: for the self-moving matter being restless in its own\nnature, and so closely united and commixed with the inanimate, as they\ndo make but one body, will never suffer it to rest; so that there is no\npart in Nature but is moving; the animate matter in it self, or its own\nnature, the inanimate by the help or means of the animate. Your sixth\nquestion is, _If there be a thorow mixture of the parts of animate and\ninanimate matter, whether those parts do retain each their own nature\nand substance, so that the inanimate part of matter remains dull and\nstupid in its essence or nature, and the animate full of self-motion,\nor all self-motion?_ I answer: Although every part and particle of\neach degree are closely intermixed, nevertheless this mixture doth not\nalter the interior nature of those parts or degrees; As for example;\na man is composed of Soul, and Body, which are several parts, but\njoyned as into one substance, _viz._ Man, and yet they retain each\ntheir own proprieties and natures; for although soul and body are so\nclosely united as they do make but one Man, yet the soul doth not\nchange into the body, nor the body into the soul, but each continues in\nits own nature as it is. And so likewise in Infinite Matter, although\nthe degrees or parts of Matter are so throughly intermixed as they do\nmake but one body or substance, which is corporeal Nature, yet each\nremains in its nature as it is, to wit, the animate part of matter doth\nnot become dull and stupid in its nature, but remains self-moving;\nand the inanimate, although it doth move by the means of the animate,\nyet it doth not become self-moving, but each keeps its own interior\nnature and essence in their commixture. The truth is, there must of\nnecessity be degrees of matter, or else there would be no such various\nand several effects in Nature, as humane sense and reason do perceive\nthere are; and those degrees must also retain each their own nature and\nproprieties, to produce those various and curious effects: Neither must\nthose different degrees vary or alter the nature of Infinite Matter;\nfor Matter must and doth continue one and the same in its Nature,\nthat is, Matter cannot be divided from being Matter: And this is my\nmeaning, when I say in my _Philosophical Opinions, There is but one\nkind of Matter_: Not that Matter is not dividable into several parts\nor degrees, but I say, although Matter has several parts and degrees,\nyet they do not alter the nature of Matter, but Matter remains one and\nthe same in its own kind, that is, it continues still Matter in its\nown nature notwithstanding those degrees; and thus I do exclude from\nMatter all that which is not Matter, and do firmly believe, that there\ncan be no commixture of Matter and no Matter in Nature; for this would\nbreed a meer confusion in Nature. Your seventh question is, _Whether\nthat, which I name the rational part of self-moving Matter makes as\nmuch variety as the sensitive?_ To which I answer: That, to my sense\nand reason, the rational part of animate or self-moving Matter moves\nnot onely more variously, but also more swiftly then the sensitive;\nfor thoughts are sooner made, then words spoke, and a certain proof\nof it are the various and several Imaginations, Fancies, Conceptions,\nMemories, Remembrances, Understandings, Opinions, Judgments, and the\nlike: as also the several sorts of Love, Hate, Fear, Anger, Joy, Doubt;\nand the like Passions. Your eighth question is, _Whether the Sensitive\nMatter can and doth work in it self and its own substance and degree?_\nMy answer is, That there is no inanimate matter without animate, nor\nno animate without inanimate, both being so curiously and subtilly\nintermixt, as they make but one body; Nevertheless the several parts of\nthis one body may move several ways. Neither are the several degrees\nbound to an equal mixture, no more then the several parts of one body\nare bound to one and the same size, bigness, shape, or motion; or the\nSea is bound to be always at the high tide; or the Moon to be always\nat the Full; or all the Veins or Brains in animal bodies are bound to\nbe of equal quantity; or every Tree of the same kind to bear fruit, or\nhave leaves of equal number; or every Apple, Pear, or Plum, to have an\nequal quantity of juice; or every Bee to make as much honey and wax as\nthe other. Your nineth question is, _Whether the Sensitive Matter can\nwork without taking patterns?_ My answer is, That all corporeal motion\nis not patterning, but all patterning is made by corporeal motion;\nand there be more several sorts of corporeal motions then any single\nCreature is able to conceive, much less to express: But the perceptive\ncorporeal motions are the ground-motions in Nature, which make, rule,\nand govern all the parts of Nature, as to move to Production, or\nGeneration, Transformation, and the like. Your tenth question is, _How\nit is possible, that numerous figures can exist in one part of matter?\nfor it is impossible that two things can be in one place, much less\nmany._ My answer in short is, That it were impossible, were a part of\nMatter, and the numerous figures several and distinct things; but all\nis but one thing, that is, a part of Matter moving variously; for there\nis neither Magnitude, Place, Figure, nor Motion, in Nature, but what\nis Matter, or Body; Neither is there any such thing as Time: Wherefore\nit cannot properly be said, _There was_, and _There shall be_; but\nonely, _There is_. Neither can it properly be said, from this to that\nplace; but onely in reference to the several moving parts of the onely\nInfinite Matter. And thus much to your questions; I add no more, but\nrest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your faithful Friend_\n\n_and humble Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXXX.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nIn your last, you were pleased to express, that some men, who think\nthemselves wise, did laugh in a scornful manner at my opinion, when\nI say that every Creature hath life and knowledg, sense and reason;\ncounting it not onely ridiculous, but absurd; and asking, whether you\ndid or could believe, a piece of wood, metal, or stone, had as much\nsense as a beast, or as much reason as a man, having neither brain,\nblood, heart, nor flesh; nor such organs, passages, parts, nor shapes\nas animals? To which, I answer: That it is not any of these mentioned\nthings that makes life and knowledg, but life and knowledg is the\ncause of them, which life and knowledg is animate matter, and is in\nall parts of all Creatures: and to make it more plain and perspicuous,\nhumane sense and reason may perceive, that wood, stone, or metal, acts\nas wisely as an animal: As for example; Rhubarb, or the like drugs,\nwill act very wisely in Purging; and Antimony, or the like, will act\nvery wisely in Vomiting; and Opium will act very wisely in Sleeping;\nalso Quicksilver or Mercury will act very wisely, as those that have\nthe French disease can best witness: likewise the Loadstone acts very\nwisely, as Mariners or Navigators will tell you: Also Wine made of\nFruit, and Ale of Malt, and distilled Aqua-vit\u00e6 will act very subtilly;\nask the Drunkards, and they can inform you; Thus Infinite examples may\nbe given, and yet man says, all Vegetables and Minerals are insensible\nand irrational, as also the Planets and Elements; when as yet the\nPlanets move very orderly and wisely, and the Elements are more active,\nnay, more subtil and searching then any of the animal Creatures;\nwitness Fire, Air, and Water: As for the Earth, she brings forth her\nfruit, if the other Elements do not cause abortives, in due season; and\nyet man believes, Vegetables, Minerals, and Elements, are dead, dull,\nsenseless, and irrational Creatures, because they have not such shapes,\nparts, nor passages as Animals, nor such exterior and local motions\nas Animals have: but Man doth not consider the various, intricate and\nobscure ways of Nature, unknown to any particular Creature; for what\nour senses are not capable to know, our reason is apt to deny. Truly,\nin my opinion, Man is more irrational then any of those Creatures,\nwhen he believes that all knowledg is not onely confined to one sort\nof Creatures, but to one part of one particular Creature, as the head,\nor brain of man; for who can in reason think, that there is no other\nsensitive and rational knowledg in Infinite Matter, but what is onely\nin Man, or animal Creatures? It is a very simple and weak conclusion to\nsay, Other Creatures have no eyes to see, no ears to hear, no tongues\nto taste, no noses to smell, as animals have; wherefore they have no\nsense or sensitive knowledg; or because they have no head, nor brain as\nMan hath, therefore they have no reason, nor rational knowledg at all:\nfor sense and reason, and consequently sensitive and rational knowledg,\nextends further then to be bound to the animal eye, ear, nose, tongue,\nhead, or brain; but as these organs are onely in one kind of Natures\nCreatures, as Animals, in which organs the sensitive corporeal motions\nmake the perception of exterior objects, so there may be infinite other\nkinds of passages or organs in other Creatures unknown to Man, which\nCreatures may have their sense and reason, that is, sensitive and\nrational knowledg, each according to the nature of its figure; for as\nit is absurd to say, that all Creatures in Nature are Animals, so it is\nabsurd to confine sense and reason onely to Animals; or to say, that\nall other Creatures, if they have sense and reason, life and knowledg,\nit must be the same as is in Animals: I confess, it is of the same\ndegree, that is, of the same animate part of matter, but the motions\nof life and knowledg work so differently and variously in every kind\nand sort, nay, in every particular Creature, that no single Creature\ncan find them out: But, in my opinion, not any Creature is without\nlife and knowledg, which life and knowledg is made by the self-moving\npart of matter, that is, by the sensitive and rational corporeal\nmotions; and as it is no consequence, that all Creatures must be alike\nin their exterior shapes, figures, and motions, because they are all\nproduced out of one and the same matter, so neither doth it follow,\nthat all Creatures must have the same interior motions, natures, and\nproprieties, and so consequently the same life and knowledg, because\nall life and knowledg is made by the same degree of matter, to wit, the\nanimate. Wherefore though every kind or sort of Creatures has different\nperceptions, yet they are not less knowing; for Vegetables, Minerals,\nand Elements, may have as numerous, and as various perceptions as\nAnimals, and they may be as different from animal perceptions as their\nkinds are; but a different perception is not therefore no perception:\nNeither is it the animal organs that make perception, nor the animal\nshape that makes life, but the motions of life make them. But some may\nsay, it is Irreligious to believe any Creature has rational knowledg\nbut Man. Surely, _Madam_, the God of Nature, in my opinion, will be\nadored by all Creatures, and adoration cannot be without sense and\nknowledg. Wherefore it is not probable, that onely Man, and no Creature\nelse, is capable to adore and worship the Infinite and Omnipotent\nGod, who is the God of Nature, and of all Creatures: I should rather\nthink it irreligious to confine sense and reason onely to Man, and to\nsay, that no Creature adores and worships God, but Man; which, in my\njudgment, argues a great pride, self-conceit, and presumption. And\nthus, _Madam_, having declared my opinion plainly concerning this\nsubject, I will detain you no longer at this present, but rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your constant Friend_\n\n_and faithful Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXXXI.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nI perceive you do not well apprehend my meaning, when I say in my\n_Philosophical Opinions,_[1] _That the Infinite degrees of Infinite\nMatter are all Infinite:_ For, say you, the degrees of Matter cannot\nbe Infinite, by reason there cannot be two Infinites, but one would\nobstruct the other. My answer is; I do not mean that the degrees of\nMatter are Infinite each in its self, that is, that the animate and\ninanimate are several Infinite matters, but my opinion is, that the\nanimate degree of matter is in a perpetual motion, and the inanimate\ndoth not move of it self, and that those degrees are infinite in their\neffects, as producing and making infinite figures; for since the cause,\nwhich is the onely matter, is infinite, the effects must of necessity\nbe infinite also; the cause is infinite in its substance, the effects\nare Infinite in number. And this is my meaning, when I say,[2] that,\nalthough in Nature there is but one kind of matter, yet there are\nInfinite degrees, Infinite motions, and Infinite parts in that onely\nmatter; and though Infinite and Eternal matter has no perfect or exact\nfigure, by reason it is Infinite, and therefore unlimited, yet there\nbeing infinite parts in number, made by the infinite variations of\nmotions in infinite Matter, these parts have perfect or exact figures,\nconsidered as parts, that is, single, or each in its particular figure:\nAnd therefore if there be Infinite degrees, considering the effects\nof the animate and inanimate matter, infinite motions for changes,\ninfinite parts for number, infinite compositions and divisions for\nvariety and diversity of Creatures; then there may also be infinite\nsizes, each part or figure differing more or less, infinite smallness\nand bigness, lightness and heaviness, rarity and density, strength and\npower, life and knowledg, and the like: But by reason Nature or Natural\nmatter is not all animate or inanimate, nor all composing or dividing,\nthere can be no Infinite in a part, nor can there be something biggest\nor smallest, strongest or weakest, heaviest or lightest, softest\nor hardest in Infinite Nature, or her parts, but all those several\nInfinites are as it were included in one Infinite, which is Corporeal\nNature, or Natural Matter.\n\nNext, you desire my opinion of _Vacuum_, whether there be any, or not?\nfor you say I determine nothing, of it in my Book of _Philosophical\nOpinions_. Truly, _Madam_, my sense and reason cannot believe a\n_Vacuum_, because there cannot be an empty Nothing; but change of\nmotion makes all the alteration of figures, and consequently all that\nwhich is called place, magnitude, space, and the like; for matter,\nmotion, figure, place, magnitude, &c. are but one thing. But some\nmen perceiving the alteration, but not the subtil motions, believe\nthat bodies move into each others place, which is impossible, because\nseveral places are onely several parts, so that, unless one part could\nmake it self another part, no part can be said to succeed into anothers\nplace; but it is impossible that one part should make it self another\npart, for it cannot be another, and it self, no more then Nature can be\nNature, and not Nature; wherefore change of place is onely change of\nmotion, and this change of motion makes alteration of Figures.\n\nThirdly, you say, You cannot understand what I mean by Creation, for\nyou think that Creation is a production or making of Something out of\nNothing. To tell you really, _Madam_, this word is used by me for want\nof a better expression; and I do not take it in so strict a sense as\nto understand by it, a Divine or supernatural Creation, which onely\nbelongs to God; but a natural Creation, that is, a natural production\nor Generation; for Nature cannot create or produce Something out of\nNothing: And this Production may be taken in a double sence; First,\nin General, as for example, when it is said, that all Creatures are\nproduced out of Infinite Matter; and in this respect every particular\nCreature which is finite, that is, of a circumscribed and limited\nfigure, is produced of Infinite Matter, as being a part thereof: Next,\nProduction is taken in a more strict sense, to wit, when one single\nCreature is produced from another; and this is either Generation\nproperly so called, as when in every kind and sort each particular\nproduces its like; or it is such a Generation whereby one creature\nproduces another, each being of a different kind or species, as\nfor example, when an Animal produces a Mineral, as when a Stone is\ngenerated in the Kidneys, or the like; and in this sence one finite\ncreature generates or produces another finite creature, the producer\nas well as the produced being finite; but in the first sence finite\ncreatures are produced out of infinite matter.\n\nFourthly, you confess, You cannot well apprehend my meaning, when I\nsay,[3] that the several kinds are as Infinite as the particulars; for\nyour opinion is, That the number of particulars must needs exceed the\nnumber of kinds. I answer: I mean in general the Infinite effects of\nNature which are Infinite in number, and the several kinds or sorts of\nCreatures are Infinite in duration, for nothing can perish in Nature.\n\nFifthly, When I say,[4] that ascending and descending is often caused\nby the exterior figure or shape of a body; witness a Bird, who although\nhe is of a much bigger size and bulk then a Worm, yet can by his\nshape lift himself up more agilly and nimbly then a Worm; Your opinion\nis, That his exterior shape doth not contribute any thing towards his\nflying, by reason a Bird being dead retains the same shape, but yet\ncannot fly at all. But, truly, _Madam_, I would not have you think that\nI do exclude the proper and interior natural motion of the figure of\na Bird, and the natural and proper motions of every part and particle\nthereof; for that a Bird when dead, keeps his shape, and yet cannot\nfly, the reason is, that the natural and internal motions of the Bird,\nand the Birds wings, are altered towards some other shape or figure,\nif not exteriously, yet interiously; but yet the interior natural\nmotions could not effect any flying or ascending without the help of\nthe exterior shape; for a Man, or any other animal, may have the same\ninterior motions as a Bird hath, but wanting such an exterior shape, he\ncannot fly; whereas had he wings like a Bird, and the interior natural\nmotions of those wings, he might without doubt fly as well as a Bird\ndoth.\n\nSixthly, Concerning the descent of heavy bodies,[5] that it is more\nforcible then the ascent of light bodies, you do question the Truth\nof this my opinion. Certainly, _Madam_, I cannot conceive it to be\notherwise by my sense and reason; for though Fire that is rare, doth\nascend with an extraordinary quick motion, yet this motion is, in my\nopinion, not so strong and piercing as when grosser parts of Creatures\ndo descend; but there is difference in strength and quickness; for had\nnot Water a stronger motion, and another sort of figure then Fire,\nit could not suppress Fire, much less quench it. But Smoak, which is\nheavier then Flame, flies up, or rises before, or rather, above it:\nWherefore I am still of the same opinion, that heavy bodies descend\nmore forcibly then light bodies do ascend, and it seems most rational\nto me.\n\nLastly, I perceive you cannot believe that all bodies have weight;\nby reason, if this were so, the Sun, and the Stars would have long\nsince cover'd the Earth. In answer to this objection, I say, That as\nthere can be no body without figure and magnitude, so consequently not\nwithout weight, were it no bigger then an atome; and as for the Sun's\nand the Stars not falling down, or rising higher, the reason is, not\ntheir being without weight, but their natural and proper motion, which\nkeeps them constantly in their spheres; and it might as well be said, a\nMan lives not, or is not, because he doth not fly like a Bird, or dive\nand catch fish like a Cormorant, or dig and undermine like a Mole, for\nthose are motions not proper to his nature. And these, _Madam_, are my\nanswers to your objections, which if they do satisfie you, it is all\nI desire, if not, I shall endeavour hereafter to make my meaning more\nintelligible and study for other more rational arguments then these\nare, to let you see how much I value both the credit of my named Book,\nand your _Ladiships_ Commands; which assure you self, shall never be\nmore faithfully performed, then by,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Ladiships most obliged Friend_\n\n_and humble Servant._\n\n[1] _Part._ 1. _c._ 4.\n\n[2] _Ch._ 8.\n\n[3] _Part._ 4. _c._ 10.\n\n[4] _Ch._ 20.\n\n[5] _Ch._ 21.\n\n\n\n\nXXXII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nSince my opinion is, that the Animate part of Matter, which is sense\nand reason, life and knowledg, is the designer, architect, and creator\nof all figures in Nature; you desire to know, whence this Animate\nMatter, sense and reason, or life and knowledg (call it what you will,\nfor it is all one and the same thing) is produced? I answer: It is\neternal. But then you say, it is coequal with God. I answer, That\ncannot be: for God is above all Natural sense and reason, which is\nNatural life and knowledg; and therefore it cannot be coequal with\nGod, except it be meant in Eternity, as being without beginning and\nend. But if Gods Power can make Man's Soul, as also the good and evil\nSpirits to last eternally without end, he may, by his Omnipotency\nmake as well things without beginning. You will say, If Nature were\nEternal, it could not be created, for the word Creation is contrary\nto Eternity. I answer, _Madam_, I am no Scholar for words; for if you\nwill not use the word Creation, you may use what other word you will;\nfor I do not stand upon nice words and terms, so I can but express my\nconceptions: Wherefore, if it be (as in Reason it cannot be otherwise)\nthat nothing in Nature can be annihilated, nor any thing created out\nof nothing, but by Gods special and all-powerful Decree and Command,\nthen Nature must be as God has made her, until he destroy her. But if\nNature be not Eternal, then the Gods of the Heathens were made in\ntime, and were no more then any other Creature, which is as subject to\nbe destroyed as created; for they conceived their Gods, as we do men,\nto have Material Bodies, but an Immaterial Spirit, or as some Learned\nmen imagine, to be an Immaterial Spirit, but to take several shapes,\nand so to perform several corporeal actions; which truly is too humble\nand mean a conception of an Immaterial Being, much more of the Great\nand Incomprehensible God; which I do firmly believe is a most pure,\nall-powerful Immaterial Being, which doth all things by his own Decree\nand Omnipotency without any Corporeal actions or shapes, such as some\nfancy of D\u00e6mons and the like Spirits. But to return to the former\nquestion; you might as well enquire how the world, or any part of it\nwas created, or how the variety of creatures came to be, as ask how\nReason and sensitive corporeal Knowledg was produced. Nevertheless,\nI do constantly believe, that both sensitive and rational Knowledg\nin Matter was produced from God; but after what manner or way, is\nimpossible for any creature or part of Nature to know, for Gods wayes\nare incomprehensible and supernatural. And thus much I believe, That\nas God is an Eternal Creator, which no man can deny, so he has also\nan Eternal Creature, which is Nature, or natural Matter. But put the\ncase Nature or natural Matter was made when the World was created,\nmight not God give this Natural Matter self-motion, as well as he gave\nself-motion to Spirits and Souls? and might not God endue this Matter\nwith Sense and Reason, as well as he endued Man? Shall or can we bind\nup Gods actions with our weak opinions and foolish arguments? Truly,\nif God could not act more then Man is able to conceive, he were not a\nGod of an infinite Power; but God is Omnipotent, and his actions are\ninfinite, supernatural, and past finding out; wherefore he is rather to\nbe admired, adored and worshipped, then to be ungloriously discoursed\nof by vain and ambitious men, whose foolish pride and presumption\ndrowns their Natural Judgment and Reason; to which leaving them, I rest,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your Faithful Friend_\n\n_and Servant._\n\n\n\n\nXXXIII.\n\n\n_MADAM,_\n\nIn obedience to your commands, I here send you also an explanation\nand clearing of those places and passages in my Book of Philosophy,\nwhich in your last Letter you were pleased to mark, as containing some\nobscurity and difficulty of being understood.\n\nFirst, When I say,[1] _Nature is an Individable Matter_, I do not mean\nas if Nature were not dividable into parts; for because Nature is\nmaterial, therefore she must also needs be dividable into parts: But my\nmeaning is, that Nature cannot be divided from Matter, nor Matter from\nNature, that is, Nature cannot be Immaterial, nor no part of Nature,\nbut if there be any thing Immaterial, it doth not belong to Nature.\nAlso when I call Nature a _Multiplying Figure_;[2] I mean, that Nature\nmakes infinite changes, and so infinite figures.\n\nNext, when I say,[3] _There are Infinite Divisions in Nature_; my\nmeaning is not, that there are infinite divisions of one single part,\nbut that Infinite Matter has Infinite parts, sizes, figures, and\nmotions, all being but one Infinite Matter, or corporeal Nature. Also\nwhen I say single parts, I mean not parts subsisting by themselves,\nprecised from each other, but single, that is, several or different, by\nreason of their different figures. Likewise, when I name Atomes, I mean\nsmall parts of Matter; and when I speak of Place and Time, I mean onely\nthe variation of corporeal figurative motions.\n\nAgain: when I say,[4] _Nature has not an absolute Power, because she\nhas an Infinite power_; I mean by _absolute_, as much as finite, or\ncircumscribed; and in this sense Nature cannot have an absolute power,\nfor the Infiniteness hinders the absoluteness; but when in my former\nLetters I have attributed an absolute Power onely to God, and said that\nNature has not an absolute power, but that her power, although it be\nInfinite, yet cannot extend beyond Nature, but is an Infinite natural\npower; I understand by an absolute Power, not a finite power, but such\na power which onely belongs to God, that is, a supernatural and divine\npower, which power Nature cannot have, by reason she cannot make any\npart of her body immaterial, nor annihilate any part of her Creatures,\nnor create any part that was not in her from Eternity, nor make her\nself a Deity; for though God can impower her with a supernatural gift,\nand annihilate her when he pleases, yet she is no ways able to do it\nher self.\n\nMoreover, when I say,[5] _That one Infinite is contained within\nanother_; I mean, the several sorts of Infinites, as Infinite in\nnumber, Infinite in duration; as also the Infinite degrees, motions,\nfigures, sizes, compositions, divisions, &c. all which are contained in\nthe Infinite body of Nature, which is the onely Infinite in quantity or\nsubstance, neither can the parts of Nature go beyond Infinite.\n\nAlso when I say,[6] _That Matter would have power over Infinite,\nand Infinite over Matter, and Eternal over both_; I mean, that some\ncorporeal actions endeavour to be more powerful then others, and thus\nthe whole strives to over-power the parts, and the parts the whole:\nAs for example, if one end of a string were tied about the little\nfinger of ones hand, and the other end were in the power of the other\nwhole hand, and both did pull several and opposite ways; certainly,\nthe little finger would endeavour to over-power the hand, and the hand\nagain would strive to over-power the little finger: The same may be\nsaid of two equal figures, as two hands, and other the like examples\nmay be given. And this is also my meaning, when I say, that some\nshapes have power over others, and some degrees and temperaments of\nmatter over others; whereby I understand nothing else, but that some\nparts have power over others. Also when I say,[7] that outward things\ngovern, and a Creature has no power over it self, I mean, that which is\nstronger, by what means soever, is superior in power.\n\nWhen I say,[8] That _the Animate part of Matter is not so gross an\nInfinite as the Inanimate_, I do not attribute an Infiniteness to a\npart, as if animate matter considered as a part were infinite; but my\nmeaning is, that the Animate matter produces infinite effects: For,\nit being the Designer, Architect, and Creator of all Figures, as also\nthe Life and Soul of all Creatures, it must needs be infinite in its\neffects, as also infinite in its duration. But you may object, That a\npart cannot produce infinite effects. I answer, It is true, if animate\nmatter should be considered in it self without the inanimate, it could\nnot produce infinite effects, having nothing to work upon and withal;\nbut because there is such a close and inseparable conjunction of\nthose parts of matter, as they make but one body, and that Infinite,\nnone can be or work without the other, but both degrees of matter,\nwhich make but one infinite Nature, are required in the production of\nthe infinite effects and figures in Nature: Nevertheless, since the\nAnimate part of Matter is the onely architect, creator, or producer\nof all those effects, by reason it is the self-moving part, and the\nInanimate is onely the instrument which the Animate works withal, and\nthe materials it works upon, the Production of the infinite effects\nin Nature is more fitly ascribed to the Animate then the Inanimate\npart of matter; as for example, If an architect should build an\nhouse, certainly he can do nothing without materials, neither can the\nmaterials raise themselves to such a figure as a house without the help\nof the architect and workmen, but both are of necessity required to\nthis artificial production; nevertheless, the building of the house is\nnot laid to the materials, but to the architect: the same may be said\nof animate and inanimate matter in the production of natural effects.\nAgain, you may reply, That the animate and inanimate parts of matter\nare but two parts, and the number of Two is but a finite number,\nwherefore they cannot make one infinite body, such as I call Nature\nor natural Matter. I answer, _Madam_, I confess, that a finite number\nis not nor cannot make an infinite number; but I do not say, that the\nanimate and inanimate parts or degrees of matter are two finite parts\neach subsisting by it self as circumscribed, and having its certain\nbounds, limits and circumference; for if this were so, certainly they\nbeing finite themselves, could not produce but finite effects; but my\nmeaning is, that both the animate and inanimate matter do make but\none Infinite bulk, body, or substance and are not two several and\ndividable bodies in themselves, and thus they may be divided not into\ntwo but into Infinite parts; Neither are they two different Matters,\nbut they are but one Matter; for by the animate Matter I do understand\nself-motion; and that I call this self-motion Matter, the reason is,\nthat no body shall think as if self-motion were immaterial; for my\nopinion is, that Nature is nothing but meer Matter, and that nothing is\nin Nature which is a part of Nature, that is not material; wherefore\nto avoid such a misapprehension (seeing that most learned men are\nso much for abstractions and immaterial beings) I called self-motion\nanimate matter, or the animate part of matter; not as if they were two\nseveral matters, but that all is but one natural Matter, or corporeal\nNature in one bulk, body, or substance, just like as the soul and body\ndo make but one man; and to avoid also this misapprehension, lest they\nmight be taken for several matters, I have upon better consideration,\nin this volume of _Philosophical Letters_, call'd the animate matter\ncorporeal self-motion, which expression, I think, is more proper,\nplain, and intelligible then any other: Neither would I have you to\nscruple at it, when I say, that both parts or degrees of animate and\ninanimate matter do retain their own interior natures and proprieties\nin their commixture, as if those different natures and proprieties,\nwhere one is self-moving, and the other not, did cause them to be two\ndifferent matters; for thus you might say as well, that several figures\nwhich have several and different interior natures and proprieties,\nare so many several matters. The truth is, if you desire to have the\ntruest expression of animate and inanimate matter, you cannot find\nit better then in the definition of Nature, when I say, Nature is an\ninfinite self-moving body; where by the body of Nature I understand the\ninanimate matter, and by self-motion the animate, which is the life\nand soul of Nature, not an immaterial life and soul, but a material,\nfor both life, soul and body are and make but one self-moving body or\nsubstance which is corporeal Nature. And therefore when I call _Animate\nmatter_ an _Extract_,[9] I do it by reason of its purity, subtilty and\nagility, not by reason of its immateriality. Also when I name the word\nMotion by it self, and without any addition, I understand corporeal\nMotion; and when I name Motion, Matter and Figure, I do not mean three\nseveral and distinct things, but onely figurative corporeal motion, or\nfigurative self-moving matter, all being but one thing; the same when I\nspeak of Place, Time, Magnitude, and the like.\n\nConcerning Natural Production or Generation; when I say,[10] _The same\nmatter or figure of the producers doth not always move after one and\nthe same manner in producing, for then the same producers would produce\none and the same creature by repetition_, I do not mean the very same\ncreature in number, unless the same motions and parts of matter did\nreturn into the producers again, which is impossible; but I understand\nthe like creature, to wit, that one and the same sort of particular\nmotions would make all particular figures resemble so, as if they were\none and the same creature without any difference.\n\nWhen I say,[11] _Sensitive and Rational knowledg lives in sensitive\nand rational Matter, and Animate liveth in Inanimate matter_, I mean\nthey are all several parts and actions of the onely infinite matter\ninseparable from each other; for wheresoever is matter, there is also\nself-motion, and wheresoever is self-motion, there is sense and reason,\nand wheresoever is sense and reason, there is sensitive and rational\nknowledge, all being but one body or substance, which is Nature.\n\nWhen I say,[12] _The death of particular Creatures causes an obscurity\nof Knowledge, and that particular Knowledges increase and decrease,\nand may be more or less_, I mean onely that parts divide themselves\nfrom parts, and joyn to other parts; for every several Motion is a\nseveral Knowledge, and as motion varies, so doth knowledge; but there\nis no annihilation of any motion, and consequently not of knowledge\nin Nature. And as for more or less knowledge, I mean more or less\nalteration and variety of corporeal figurative motions, not onely\nrational but sensitive, so that that creature which has most variety\nof those perceptive motions is most knowing, provided they be regular,\nthat is, according to the nature and propriety of the figure, whether\nanimal, vegetable, mineral, or elemental; for though a large figure\nis capable of most knowledge, yet it is not commonly or alwayes so\nwise or witty as a less, by reason it is more subject to disorders and\nirregularities; like as a private Family is more regular and better\nordered then a great State or Common-wealth. Also when I say, _That\nsome particular Knowledge lasts longer then some other_, I mean that\nsome corporeal motions in some parts do continue longer then in others.\n\nWhen I say,[13] _A little head may be full, and a great head may be\nempty of rational matter_, I mean there may be as it were an ebbing\nor flowing, that is more or less of Rational Matter joyned with the\nSensitive and Inanimate: And when I say, _That, if all the heads of\nMankind were put into one, and sufficient quantity of Rational Matter\ntherein, that Creature would not onely have the knowledge of every\nparticular, but that Understanding and Knowledge would increase like\nUse-money_, my meaning is, that if there were much of those parts of\nrational matter joyned, they would make more variety by self-change of\ncorporeal motions.\n\nWhen I name _Humane sense and reason_, I mean such sensitive and\nrational perception and knowledge as is proper to the nature of Man;\nand when I say _Animal sense and reason_, I mean such as is proper\nto the nature of all Animals; for I do not mean that the sensitive\nand rational corporeal motions which do make a man, or any Animal,\nare bound to such figures eternally, but whilest they work and move\nin such or such figures, they make such perceptions as belong to the\nnature of those figures; but when those self-moving parts dissolve the\nfigure of an Animal into a Vegetable or any other Creature, then they\nwork according to the nature of that same figure, both exteriously and\ninteriously.\n\nWhen I say,[14] _That Place, Space, Measure, Number, Weight, Figures,\n&c. are mixed with Substance_, I do not mean they are incorporeal, and\ndo inhere in substance as so many incorporeal modes or accidents; but\nmy meaning is, they are all corporeal parts and actions of Nature,\nthere being no such thing in Nature that may be called incorporeal; for\nPlace, Figure, Weight, Measure, &c. are nothing without Body, but Place\nand Body are but one thing, and so of the rest. Also when I say,[15]\n_That sometimes Place, sometimes Time, and sometimes Number gives\nadvantage_, I mean, that several parts of Matter are getting or losing\nadvantage.\n\nWhen I say,[16] an Animal or any thing else that has exterior local\nmotion, goeth or moveth to such or such a place, I mean, to such or\nsuch a body; and when such a Creature doth not move out of its place, I\nmean, it doth not remove its body from such or such parts adjoyning to\nit.\n\nWhen I say,[17] _The rational animate matter divides it self into\nas many parts, and after as many several manners as their place or\nquantity will give way to_, I mean their own place and quantity: also,\nas other parts will give way to those parts, for some parts will assist\nothers, and some do obstruct others.\n\nWhen I say,[18] _That the Nature of extension or dilation strives or\nendeavours to get space, ground, or compass_, I mean those corporeal\nmotions endeavour to make place and space by their extensions, that\nis, to spread their parts of matter into a larger compass or body. And\nwhen I say, _That Contractions endeavour to cast or thrust out space,\nplace, ground, or compass_, My meaning is, That those corporeal motions\nendeavour to draw their parts of matter into a more close and solid\nbody, for there is no place nor space without body.\n\nAlso when I name[19] several _tempered substances and matters_, I mean\nseveral changes and mixtures of corporeal motions.\n\nAlso when I speak of _Increase_ and _Decrease_, I mean onely an\nalteration of corporeal figurative motions, as uniting parts with\nparts, and dissolving or separating parts from parts.\n\nWhen I say,[20] That the motions of cold, and the motions of moisture,\nwhen they meet, make cold and moist effects, and when the motions of\nheat and moisture meet, make hot and moist effects; and so for the\nmotions of cold and dryness: I mean, that when several parts do joyn\nin such several corporeal motions, they cause such effects; and when\nI say cold and heat presses into every particular Creature, I mean,\nthat every Creatures natural and inherent perceptive motions make such\npatterns as their exterior objects are, _viz._ hot or cold, if they do\nbut move regularly, for if they be irregular, then they do not: as for\nexample; those in an Ague will shake for cold in a hot Summers day, and\nthose that are in a Fever will burn with heat, although they were at\nthe Poles.\n\nWhen I say,[21] that hot motions, and burning motions, and hot figures,\nand burning figures do not associate or joyn together in all Creatures:\nI mean, that the corporeal motions in some figures or creatures, do act\nin a hot, but not in a burning manner; and when I say, some creatures\nhave both hot and burning motions and figures, I mean, the corporeal\nmotions act both in a hot and burning manner; for though heat is in a\ndegree to burning, yet it is not always burning, for burning is the\nhighest degree of heat, as wetness is the highest degree of moisture.\n\nWhen I say,[22] _Warmth feeds other Creatures after a spiritual manner,\nnot a corporeal_, My meaning is, not as if heat were not corporeal, but\nthat those corporeal motions which make heat work invisibly, and not\nvisibly like as fire feeds on fuel, or man on meat.\n\nAlso when I say, _Excercise amongst animals gets strength_, I mean,\nthat by excercise the inherent natural motions of an animal body are\nmore active, as being more industrious.\n\nWhen I say,[23] _That the passage whence cold and sharp winds do\nissue out, is narrow_, I mean, when as such or such parts disjoyn or\nseparate from other parts; as for example, when dilating parts disjoyn\nfrom contracting parts; and oftentimes the disjoyning parts do move\naccording to the nature of those parts they disjoyn from.\n\nConcerning the actions of Nature, my meaning is, that there is not any\naction whatsoever, but was always in Nature, and remains in Nature so\nlong as it pleases God that Nature shall last, and of all her actions\nPerception and self-love are her prime and chief actions; wherefore it\nis impossible but that all her particular creatures or parts must be\nknowing as well as self-moving, there being not one part or particle\nof Nature that has not its share of animate or self-moving matter, and\nconsequently of knowledg and self-love, each according to its own kind\nand nature; but by reason all the parts are of one matter, and belong\nto one body, each is unalterable so far, that although it can change\nits figure, yet it cannot change or alter from being matter, or a part\nof Infinite Nature; and this is the cause there cannot be a confusion\namongst those parts of Nature, but there must be a constant union and\nharmony betwixt them; for cross and opposite actions make no confusion,\nbut onely a variety, and such actions which are different, cross and\nopposite, not moving always after their usual and accustomed way, I\nname Irregular, for want of a better expression; but properly there is\nno such thing as Irregularity in Nature, nor no weariness, rest, sleep,\nsickness, death or destruction, no more then there is place, space,\ntime, modes, accidents, and the like, any thing besides body or matter.\n\nWhen I speak of _unnatural Motions_,[24] I mean such as are not\nproper to the nature of such or such a Creature, as being opposite or\ndestructive to it, that is, moving or acting towards its dissolution.\nAlso when I call Violence supernatural, I mean that Violence is beyond\nthe particular nature of such a particular Creature, that is, beyond\nits natural motions; but not supernatural, that is beyond Infinite\nNature or natural Matter.\n\nWhen I say, _A thing is forced_, I do not mean that the forced body\nreceives strength without Matter; but that some Corporeal Motions joyn\nwith other Corporeal Motions, and so double the strength by joyning\ntheir parts, or are at least an occasion to make other parts more\nindustrious.\n\nBy _Prints_ I understand the figures of the objects which are patterned\nor copied out by the sensitive and rational corporeal figurative\nMotions; as for example, when the sensitive corporeal motions pattern\nout the figure of an exteriour object, and the rational motions again\npattern out a figure made by the sensitive motions, those figures of\nthe objects that are patterned out, I name Prints; as for example, _The\nsense of Seeing is not capable to receive the Print_,[25] that is, the\nfigure or pattern _of the object of the whole Earth_. And again, _The\nrational Motions are not alwayes exactly after the sensitive Prints_,\nthat is, after the figures made by the sensitive motions. Thus by\nPrints I understand Patterns, and by printing patterning; not that the\nexteriour object prints its figure upon the exteriour sensitive organs,\nbut that the sensitive motions in the organs pattern out the figure of\nthe object: but though all printing is done by the way of patterning,\nyet all patterning is not printing. Therefore when I say,[26] that\n_solid bodies print their figures in that which is more porous and\nsoft, and that those solid bodies make new prints perpetually; and as\nthey remove, the prints melt out, like verbal or vocal sounds, which\nprint words and set notes in the Air_; I mean, the soft body by its own\nself-motion patterns out the figure of the solid body, and not that\nthe solid body makes its own print, and so leaves the place of its own\nsubstance with the print in the soft body; for place remains always\nwith its own body, and cannot be separated from it, they being but\none thing: for example; when a Seal is printed in Wax, the Seal gives\nnot any thing to the Wax, but is onely an object patterned out by the\nfigurative motions of the Wax in the action of printing or sealing.\n\nWhen I make mention[27] _of what the Senses bring in_, I mean what the\nsensitive Motions pattern out of forreign objects: And when I say,[28]\n_that the pores being shut, touch cannot enter_, I mean, the sensitive\ncorporeal motions cannot make patterns of outward objects.\n\nAlso when I say, _our Ears may be as knowing as our Eyes_, and so of\nthe rest of the sensitive organs; I mean the sensitive motions in those\nparts or organs.\n\nWhen I say,[29] _The more the Body is at rest, the more active or busie\nis the Mind_, I mean when the sensitive Motions are not taken up with\nthe action of patterning out forreign objects.\n\nWhen I say,[30] the Air is fill'd with sound, and that words are\nreceived into the ears, as figures of exterior objects are received\ninto the eyes, I mean, the sensitive motions of the Air pattern out\nsound, and the sensitive motions of the Ears pattern out words, as the\nsensitive figurative motions of the Eyes pattern out the figures of\nexternal objects.\n\nAlso when I speak of _Thunder_ and _Lightning_, to wit, _That Thunder\nmakes a great noise by the breaking of lines_: My meaning is, That the\nAir patterns out this sound or noise of the lines; and by reason there\nare so many patterns made in the air by its sensitive motions, the Ear\ncannot take so exact a copy thereof, but somewhat confusedly; and this\nis the reason why Thunder is represented, or rather pattern'd out with\nsome terrour; for Thunder is a confused noise, because the patterns are\nmade confusedly.\n\nBut concerning Sound and Light, I am forced to acquaint you, _Madam_,\nthat my meaning thereof is not so well expressed in my Book of\nPhilosophy, by reason I was not of the same opinion at that time when I\ndid write that Book which I am now of; for upon better consideration,\nand a more diligent search into the causes of natural effects, I have\nfound it more probable, that all sensitive perception is made by the\nway of Patterning, and so consequently the perception of Sound and of\nLight; wherefore, I beseech you, when you find in my mentioned Book\nany thing thereof otherwise expressed, do not judg of it as if I did\ncontradict my self, but that I have alter'd my opinion since upon more\nprobable reasons.\n\nThus, _Madam_, you have a true declaration of my sence and meaning\nconcerning those places, which in my _Philosophical Opinions_ you did\nnote, as being obscure; but I am resolved to bestow so much time and\nlabour as to have all other places in that Book rectified and cleared,\nwhich seem not perspicuous, lest its obscurity may be the cause of its\nbeing neglected: And I pray God of his mercy to assist me with his\nGrace, and grant that my Works may find a favourable acceptance. In\nthe mean time, I confess my self infinitely bound to your Ladyship,\nthat you would be pleased to regard so much the Honour of your Friend,\nand be the chief occasion of it; for which I pray Heaven may bless,\nprosper, and preserve you, and lend me some means and ways to express\nmy self,\n\nMadam,\n\n_Your thankfull Friend,_\n\n_and humble Servant._\n\n\n[1] _Part._ 3. _c._ 13.\n\n[2] _Ibid._\n\n[3] _Part._ 1. _c._ 11.\n\n[4] _Part._ 1. _c._ 13, 14.\n\n[5] _P._ 1. _c._ 8.\n\n[6] _P._ 6. _c._ 3.\n\n[7] _P._ 3. _c._ 10.\n\n[8] _P._ 1. _Ch._ 3.\n\n[9] _P._ 4. _c._ 3, 32.\n\n[10] _P._ 1. _c._ 22.\n\n[11] _P._ 3. _c._ 15.\n\n[12] _Ibid._\n\n[13] _P._ 6. _c._ 11.\n\n[14] _P._ 3. _c._ 21.\n\n[15] _c._ 14.\n\n[16] _P._ 5. _c._ 51.\n\n[17] _P._ 6. _c._ 8.\n\n[18] _P._ 4. _c._ 34.\n\n[19] _Ibid._\n\n[20] _P._ 5. _c._ 4.\n\n[21] _P._ 5. _c._ 13.\n\n[22] _P._ 5. _c._ 27.\n\n[23] _P._ 5. _c._ 45.\n\n[24] _P._ 7. _c._ 11.\n\n[25] _P._ 3. _c._ 2.\n\n[26] _P._ 5. _c._ 23.\n\n[27] _P._ 6. _c._ 13.\n\n[28] _P._ 7. _c._ 12.\n\n[29] _P._ 6. _c._ 13.\n\n[30] _P._ 6. _c._ 29.\n\n\n\n\n  _Eternal God, Infinite Deity,\n  Thy Servant_, NATURE, _humbly prays to Thee,\n  That thou wilt please to favour Her, and give\n  Her parts, which are Her Creatures, leave to live,\n  That in their shapes and forms, what e're they be,\n  And all their actions they may worship thee;\n  For 'tis not onely Man that doth implore,\n  But all Her parts, Great God, do thee adore;\n  A finite Worship cannot be to thee,\n  Thou art above all finites in degree:\n  Then let thy Servant Nature mediate\n  Between thy Justice, Mercy, and our state,\n  That thou may'st bless all Parts, and ever be\n  Our Gracious God to all Eternity._\n\n\nFINIS.","title":"Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":152220}