{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_54137/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_54137","id":"gutenberg_54137","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/54137","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Logic"],"text":"LOGIC AS THE SCIENCE OF THE PURE CONCEPT\n\nTRANSLATED FROM THE ITALIAN OF\n\nBENEDETTO CROCE\n\nBY\n\nDOUGLAS AINSLIE\n\nB.A. (OXON.), M.R.A.S.\n\nMACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED\n\n\nST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON\n\n1917\n\n\n\n\n [Benedetto Croce's Philosophy of the Spirit, in the English translation\n by Douglas Ainslie, consists of 4 volumes (which can be read separately):\n 1. Aesthetic as science of expression and general linguistic. (A first\n ed. is available at Project Gutenberg. A second augmented ed. follows.)\n 2. Philosophy of the practical: economic and ethic. (In preparation)\n 3. Logic as the science of the pure concept.\n 4. Theory and history of historiography. (In preparation)\n                                                     Transcriber's note.]\n\n\n\n\nTRANSLATOR'S PREFACE\n\n\nThe publication of this third volume of the _Philosophy of the\nSpirit_ offers a complete view of the Crocean philosophy to the\nEnglish-speaking world.\n\nI have striven in every way to render the Logic the equal of its\npredecessors in accuracy and elegance of translation, and have taken\nthe opinion of critical friends on many occasions, though more\nfrequently I have preferred to retain my own. The vocabulary will be\nfound to resemble those of the _\u00c6sthetic_ and the _Philosophy of the\nPractical,_ thereby enabling readers to follow the thought of the\nauthor more easily than if I had made alterations in it. Thus the word\n\"fancy\" will be found here as elsewhere, the equivalent of the Italian\n\"fantasia\" and \"imagination\" of \"immaginazione\"; this rendering makes\nthe meaning far more clear than the use of the words in the opposite\nsense that they occasionally bear in English; this is particularly so\nin respect of the important distinction of the activities in the early\npart of the _\u00c6sthetic._ I have also retained the word \"gnoseology\" and\nits derivatives, as saving the circumlocutions entailed by the use of\nany paraphrase, especially when adjectival forms are employed.\n\nI think that this Logic will come to be recognized as a masterpiece, in\nthe sense that it supplants and supersedes all Logics that have gone\nbefore, especially those known as formal Logics, of which the average\nlayman has so profound and justifiable mistrust, for the very good\nreason that, as Croce says, they are not Logic at all, but illogic--his\nhealthy love of life leads him to fight shy of what he feels would\nlead to disaster if applied to the problems that he has to face in the\nconduct of life. It is shown in the following pages that the prestige\nof Aristotle is not wholly to blame for the survival of formal Logic\nand for the class of mind that denying thought dwells ever in the _ipse\ndixit._ Indeed, one of the chief boons conferred by this book will be\nthe freeing of the student from that confusion of thought and word that\nis the essence of the old formal Logic--of thought that rises upon the\nwings of words, like an aviator upon his falcon of wood and metal to\nspy out the entrenchments of the enemy.\n\nOne of the most stimulating portions of the book will, I think, be\nfound in Croce's theory of error and proof of its necessity in the\nprogress of truth. This may certainly be credited to Croce as a\ndiscovery. That this theory of the uses of error has a great future,\nI have no doubt, from its appearance at certain debates on Logic that\nhave taken place at the Aristotelian Society within the last year or\ntwo, though strangely enough the name of the philosopher to whom it\nwas due was not mentioned. A like mysterious aposiopesis characterized\nProfessor J. A. Smith's communication to the same Society as to the\ndevelopment of the ethical from the economic activity (degrees of the\nSpirit) some years after the publication of the _Philosophy of the\nPractical._\n\nIt is my hope that this original work, appearing as it does in the\nmidst of the great struggle with the Teutonic powers, may serve to\npoint out to the Anglo-Saxon world where the future of the world's\ncivilization lies, namely in the ancient line of Latin culture,\nwhich includes in itself the loftiest Hellenic thought. It is sad to\nthink that the Germans have relapsed to barbarism from the veneer of\ncultivation that they once possessed, particularly sad when one comes\nupon the German names that must always abound in any treatise on the\ndevelopment of thought. Their creative moment, however, was very brief,\nand the really important names can be numbered on the fingers of one\nhand, that of Emmanuel Kant being corrupted from the Scots Cant. Of\nrecent years the German contribution has been singularly small and\nunimportant, such writers as Eucken being mere compilers of the work of\nearlier philosophers, and without originality. The foul-souled Teuton\nwill need a long period of re-education before he can be readmitted\nto the comity of nations upon equal terms--his bestiality will ask a\npotent purge.\n\nIn conclusion, I can only hope that the fact of this work having been\nput into the hands of readers a decade earlier than would in all\nprobability have been the case, had I not been fortunate enough to\nmake a certain journey to Naples, will be duly taken advantage of by\nstudents, and that it will serve for many as a solid foundation for\ntheir thought about thought, and so of their thought about the whole of\nlife and reality in the new world that will succeed the War.\n\nDOUGLAS AINSLIE.\n\nTHE ATHENAEUM, PALL MALL,\n\n_March_ 1917.\n\n\n\n\nADVERTISEMENT\n\n\nThis volume is, and is not, the memoir entitled _Outlines of Logic as\nthe Science of the Pure Concept,_ which I presented to the Accademia\nPontiana at the sessions of April 10 and May 1, 1904, and April 2,\n1905, and which was inserted in volume xxxv. of the _Transactions_\n(printed as an extract from them by Giannini, Naples, 1905, in quarto,\npp. 140).\n\nI might have republished that memoir, and made in it certain\ncorrections, great and small, and especially I might have enriched it\nwith very numerous developments. But partial corrections and copious\nadditions, while they would have injured the arrangement of the\nfirst work, would not have allowed me to attain to that more secure\nand fuller exposition of logical doctrine which, after four years'\nstudy and reflection, it now seems to be in my power to offer. I\nhave therefore resolved to rewrite the work from the beginning on a\nlarger scale, with a new arrangement and new diction regarding its\npredecessor as a sketch, which in a literary sense stands by itself,\nand only making use of a page, or group of pages, here and there, as\nsuited the natural order of exposition.\n\nOwing to this connection between the present volume with the\nabove-mentioned academic memoir, it will be seen in what sense it may\nbe called, and is called, a \"second edition.\" It is a second edition of\nmy thought rather than of my book.\n\nB. C.\n\nNAPLES,\n\n_November_ 1908.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE TO THIRD ITALIAN EDITION OF THE _LOGIC_\n\n\nOn reprinting the present volume, after an interval of seven years, I\nhave reread it with attention to its literary form, but have made no\nsubstantial changes or additions to it; because the further development\nof that part which deals with the logic of Historiography has been\ncollected in a special volume, forming as it were an appendix. This is\nnow the fourth volume of the _Philosophy of the Spirit._\n\nIt seemed to many, upon the first publication of this volume, that it\nchiefly consisted of a very keen attack upon Science. Few, above all,\ndiscovered what it was: _a vindication of the seriousness of logical\nthought,_ not only in respect to empiricism and abstract thought, but\nalso to intuitionist, mystical and pragmatistic doctrines, and to\nall the others then very vigorous, which, including justly combated\npositivism, distorted every form of logicity.\n\nNor, in truth, did its criticism of Science favour what is known as a\nphilosophy \"detesting facts\": indeed, the chief preoccupation of that\ncriticism was meticulous respect of facts, which was neither observed\nnor observable in empirical and abstract constructions and in the\nanalogous mythologies of naturalism. The character of this _Logic_\nmight equally be described as affirmation of the concrete universal and\naffirmation of the concrete individual, as proof of the Aristotelian\n_Scientia est de universalibus_ and proof of Campanula's _Scientia\nest de singularibus._ In this manner those empty generalizations and\nfictitious riches which are removed from philosophy in the course\nof treatment, there appear more than amply, infinitely compensated\nfor by the restitution to it of its own riches, _of the whole of\nhistory,_ both that known as human and that known as history of nature.\nHenceforward it can live there as in its own dominion, or rather its\nown body, which is co-extensive with and indivisible from it. The\nseparation there effected by philosophy from science is not separation\nfrom what is _true knowledge in science,_ that is from the historical\nand real elements of science. It is only separation from the schematic\nform in which those elements are compressed, mutilated and altered.\nThus it may also be described as a reconnection of it with what of\nliving, concrete and progressive exists in those sciences. If the\ndestruction of anything be aimed at in it, that can clearly be nothing\nbut abstract and anti-historical philosophy. This _Logic_ must thus be\nlooked upon as a liquidation of philosophy rather than of science, if\nabstract science be posited as true philosophy.\n\nThat point is dwelt upon in the polemic against the idea of a general\nphilosophy which should stand above _particular philosophies,_ or\nthe methodological problems of historical thought. The distinction\nof general philosophy from particular philosophies (which are true\ngenerality in their particularity) seems to me to be the gnoseological\nresidue of the old dualism and of the old transcendency; a not\ninnocuous residue, for it always tends to the view that the thoughts\nof men upon particular things are of an inferior, common and vulgar\nnature, and that the thought of totality or unity is alone superior\nand alone completely satisfying. The idea of a general philosophy\nprepares in this way consciously or otherwise for the restoration of\nMetaphysic, with its pretension of rethinking the already thought\nby means of a particular thought of its own. This, when it is not\naltogether religious revelation, becomes the caprice of the individual\nphilosopher. The many examples offered by post-Kantian philosophy\nare proof of this. Here Metaphysic raged so furiously and to such\ndeleterious effect as to involve guiltless philosophy in its guilt. The\nlatent danger always remains, even if this restoration of Metaphysic\ndoes not take place, for if it never becomes effective because it is\ncarefully watched and restrained, the other draw-back persists, namely,\nthat that general philosophy, or super-philosophy or super-intelligence\ndesired, while it does not succeed in making clear particular problems,\nwhich alone have relation to concrete life, nevertheless in a measure\ndiscredits them, by judging them to be of slight importance and by\nsurrounding them with a sort of mystical irony.\n\nTo annul the idea of a \"general\" philosophy is at the same time to\nannul the \"static\" concept of the philosophic system, replacing it with\nthe dynamic concept of simple historical \"systemizations\" of groups of\nproblems, of which particular problems and their solutions are what\nremain, not their aggregate and external arrangement. This latter\nsatisfies the needs of the times and of authors and passes away with\nthem, or is preserved and admired solely for \u00e6sthetic reasons when\nit possesses them. But those who retain some superstitious reverence\nfor \"General Philosophy\" or \"Metaphysic\" have still a superstitious\nreverence for what are known as static systems. In so doing they behave\nin a rational manner, for they cannot altogether free themselves from\nthe claims of a definitive philosophy which is to solve once and for\nall the so-called \"enigma of the world\" (imaginary because there are\ninfinite enigmas which appear and are solved in turn, but there is\nnot the Enigma), and is to provide the \"true system\" or \"basis\" of\nthe true system. Nevertheless I hope that good fortune will attend\nthe doctrine of the concept here set out, not only because it seems\nto me to afford the satisfaction proper to every statement of truth,\nnamely, to accord with the reality of things, but also (if I may so\nexpress myself) because it carries with it certain immediate and\ntangible advantages. Above all, it relieves the student of philosophy\nof the terrible responsibility--which I should never wish to assume--of\nsupplying the Truth, the unique eternal Truth, and of supplying it in\ncompetition with all the greatest philosophers who have appeared in\nthe course of centuries. Further, it removes from him together both\nthe hope of the definitive system and the anxious fear of the mortal\ndoom which will one day strike the very system that he has so lovingly\nconstructed, as it has struck those of his predecessors. At the same\ntime it sets him out of reach of the smiling non-philosophers who\nforesee with accuracy and are almost able to calculate the date of that\nnot distant death. Finally, it frees him from the annoyance of the\n\"school\" and of the \"scholars\"; \"school\" and \"scholars\" in the sense of\nthe old metaphysicians are no longer even conceivable, when the idea\nof \"systems\" having-their \"own principles\" has been abolished. All\ndynamic systems or provisory systemizations of ever new problems have\nthe same principle, namely, Thought, _perennis philosophia._ There has\nnot been and never will be anything to add to this. And although the\nmany propositions and solutions of problems strive among themselves\nto attain harmony, yet to each, if it be truly thought, is promised\neternal life, which gives and receives vigour from the life of each of\nthe others. This is just the opposite of what takes place with static\nsystems which collapse, one upon the other, only certain portions of\ngood work surviving them in the shape of happy treatment of special\nproblems which are to be found mingled with the metaphysic of every\ntrue philosopher. And although there is no longer a field left over to\nthese scholars who merely faithfully echo the master, like adepts of a\nreligion, there is yet a wide field always open to the other type of\nscholar, men who pay serious attention and assimilate what is of use to\nthem in the thought of others, but then proceed to state and to solve\nnew problems of their own. Finally, the life of philosophy as conceived\nand portrayed in this _Logic,_ resembles the life of poetry in this:\nthat it does not become effective save in passing from _different_ to\n_different,_ from one original thinker to another, as poetry passes\nfrom poet to poet, and imitators and schools of poetry, although they\ncertainly belong to the world, yet do not belong to the world of poetry.\n\nB. C.\n\n_September_ 1916.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\nFIRST PART\n\nTHE PURE CONCEPT, THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT AND THE _A PRIORI_ LOGICAL\nSYNTHESIS\n\nFIRST SECTION\n\nTHE PURE CONCEPT AND THE PSEUDOCONCEPTS\n\nI\n\nAFFIRMATION OF THE CONCEPT\n\nThought and sensation--Thought and language--Intuition and\nlanguage as presuppositions--Scepsis as to the concept--Its three\nforms--\u00c6stheticism--Mysticism--Empiricism--_Redactio ad absurdum_ of\nthe three forms--Affirmation of the concept.\n\nII\n\nTHE CONCEPT AND THE PSEUDOCONCEPTS\n\nConcept and conceptual fictions--The pure concept as ultra- and\nomnirepresentative--Conceptual fictions as representative without\nuniversality, or universals void of representations--Criticism of the\ndoctrine which considers them to be erroneous concepts, or imperfect\nconcepts preparatory to perfect concepts--Posteriority of fictional\nconcepts to true and proper concepts--Proper character of conceptual\nfictions--The practical end and mnemonic utility--Persistence of\nconceptual fictions side by side with concepts--Pure concepts and\npseudoconcepts.\n\nIII\n\nTHE CHARACTERISTICS AND THE CHARACTER OF THE CONCEPT\n\nExpressivity--Universality--Concreteness--The concrete-universal\nand the formation of the pseudoconcepts--Empirical and abstract\npseudoconcepts--The other characteristics of the pure concept--The\norigin of multiplicity and the unity of the characteristics of the\nconcept--Objection relating to the unreality of the pure concept and\nthe impossibility of demonstrating it--Prejudice concerning the nature\nof the demonstration--Prejudice relating to the representability of\nthe concept--Protests of philosophers against this prejudice--Reason of\ntheir perpetual reappearance.\n\nIV\n\nDISPUTES CONCERNING THE NATURE OF THE CONCEPT\n\nDisputes of materialistic origin--The concept as value--Realism\nand nominalism--Critique of both--True realism--Resolution of\nother difficulties as to the genesis of concepts--Disputes arising\nfrom the neglected distinction between empirical and abstract\nconcepts--Intersection of the various disputes--Other logical\ndisputes--Representative accompaniment of the concept--Concept\nof the thing and concept of the individual--Reasons, laws and\ncauses--Intellect and Reason--The abstract reason and its practical\nnature--The synthesis of theoretical and practical and intellectual\nintuition--Uniqueness of thought.\n\nV\n\nCRITIQUE OF THE DIVISIONS OF THE CONCEPTS AND\n\nTHEORY OF DISTINCTION AND DEFINITION\n\nThe pseudoconcepts, not a subdivision of the concept--Obscurity,\nclearness and distinction, not subdivisions of the concept--Inexistence\nof subdivisions of the concept as logical form--Distinctions of\nthe concepts not logical, but real--Multiplicity of the concepts;\nand logical difficulty arising therefrom. Necessity of overcoming\nit--Impossibility of eliminating it--Unity as distinction--Inadequacy\nof the numerical concept of the multiple--Relation of distincts\nas ideal history--Distinction between ideal history and real\nhistory--Ideal distinction and abstract distinction--Other usual\ndistinctions of the concept, and their significance--Identical,\nunequal, primitive and derived concepts, etc.--Universal,\nparticular and singular. Comprehension and extension--Logical\ndefinition--Unity-distinction as a circle--Distinction in the\npseudoconcepts--Subordination and co-ordination of empirical\nconcepts--Definition in empirical concepts, and forms of the\nconcept--The series in abstract concepts.\n\nVI\n\nOPPOSITION AND LOGICAL PRINCIPLES\n\nOpposite or contradictory concepts--Their diversity from distincts\n--Confirmation of this afforded by empirical Logic--Difficulty arising\nfrom the double type of concepts, opposite and distinct--Nature of\nopposites; and their identity, when they are distinguished, with\ndistincts--Impossibility of distinguishing one opposite from another,\nas concept from concept--The dialectic--Opposites are not concepts,\nbut the unique concept itself--Affirmation and negation--The principle\nof identity and contradiction; true meaning, and false interpretation\nof it--Another false interpretation: contrast with the principle of\nopposition. False application of this principle also--Errors of the\ndialectic applied to the relation of distincts--Its reduction to the\nabsurd--The improper form of logical principles or laws--The principle\nof sufficient reason.\n\n\nSECOND SECTION\n\nINDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT\n\nI\n\nTHE CONCEPT AND THE VERBAL FORM. THE DEFINITIVE JUDGMENT\n\nRelation of the logical with the \u00e6sthetic form--The concept as\nexpression--\u00c6sthetic and \u00e6sthetic-logical expressions or expressions of\nthe concept: propositions and judgments--Overcoming of the dualism of\nthought and language--The logical judgment as definition--Indistinction\nof subject and predicate in the definition--Unity of essence and\nexistence--Pretended vacuity of the definition--Critique of the\ndefinition as fixed verbal formula.\n\nII\n\nTHE CONCEPT AND THE VERBAL FORM. THE SYLLOGISM\n\nIdentity of definition and syllogism--Connection of concepts and\nthinking of concepts--Identity of judgment and syllogism--The middle\nterm and the nature of the concept--Pretended non-definitive logical\njudgments--The syllogism as fixed verbal formula--Use and abuse\nof it--Erroneous separation of truth and reason of truth in pure\nconcepts--Separation of truth and reason of truth in the pseudoconcepts.\n\nIII\n\nCRITIQUE OF FORMAL LOGIC\n\nIntrinsic impossibility of formal Logic--Its nature--Its partial\njustification--Its error--Its traditional constitution--The three\nlogical forms--Theories of the concept and of the judgment--Theory\nof the syllogism--Spontaneous reductions to the absurd of formal\nLogic--Mathematical Logic or Logistic--Its non-mathematical\ncharacter--Example of its mode of treatment--Identity of nature of\nLogistic and formal Logic--Practical aspect of Logistic.\n\nIV\n\nINDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT AND PERCEPTION\n\nReaction of the concept upon the representation--Logicization of the\nrepresentations--The individual judgment; and its difference from\nthe judgment of definition--Distinction of subject and predicate in\nthe individual judgment--Reasons for the variety of definitions of\nthe judgment and of some of its divisions--Individual judgment and\nintellectual intuition--Identity of individual judgment with perception\nor perceptive judgment, and with commemorative or historical\njudgment--Erroneous distinction of individual judgments as of fact\nand of value--The individual judgment as ultimate and perfect form of\nknowledge--Error of treating it as the first fact of knowledge--Motive\nof this error--Individual syllogisms.\n\nV\n\nTHE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT AND THE PREDICATE OF EXISTENCE\n\nThe copula: its verbal and logical significance--Questions relating to\npropositions without a subject. Verbalism--Confusion between different\nforms of judgments in the question of existentiality--Determination\nand subdivision of the question concerning the existentiality of\nindividual judgments--Necessity of the existential character in these\njudgments---The absolutely and the relatively inexistent--The character\nof existence as predicate--Critique of existentiality as position\nand faith--Absurd consequences of those doctrines--The predicate of\nexistence as not sufficient to constitute a judgment--The predicate of\njudgment as the totality of the concept.\n\nVI\n\nINDIVIDUAL PSEUDOJUDGMENTS. CLASSIFICATION AND ENUMERATION\n\nIndividual pseudojudgments--Their practical character--Genesis of the\ndistinction between judgments of fact and judgments of value; and\ncritique of it--Importance of individual pseudojudgments--Empirical\nindividual and individual abstract judgments--Formative process\nof empirical judgments--Their existential basis--Dependence of\nempirical judgments upon pure concepts--Empirical judgments as\nclassification--Classification and understanding--Substitution of\nthe one for the other, and genesis of perceptive and judicative\nillusions--Abstract concepts and individual judgments--Impossibility\nof direct application of the first to the second--Intervention of\nempirical judgments as intermediate--Reduction of the heterogeneous\nto the homogeneous--Empirical abstract judgments and enumeration\n(mensuration, etc.)--Enumeration and intelligence--The so-called\nconversion of quantity into quality--Mathematical space and time and\ntheir abstractness.\n\n\nTHIRD SECTION\n\nIDENTITY OF THE PURE CONCEPT AND THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT THE LOGICAL _A\nPRIORI_ SYNTHESIS\n\nI\n\nIDENTITY OF THE JUDGMENT OF DEFINITION (PURE CONCEPT) AND OF THE\nINDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT\n\nResult of preceding enquiry: the judgment of definition and the\nindividual judgment--Distinction between the two: truth of reason\nand truth of fact, necessary and contingent, etc.; formal and\nmaterial--Absurdities arising from these distinctions: the individual\njudgment as ultra-logical; or, duality of logical forms--Difficulty of\nabandoning the distinction--The hypothesis of reciprocal implication,\nand so of the identity of the two forms--Objection; the lack of\nrepresentative and historical element in the definitive--The historical\nelement in the definitions taken in their concreteness--The definition\nas answer to a question and solution of a problem--Individual and\nhistorical conditionally of every question and problem--Definition\nas also historical judgment--Unity of truth of reason and truth of\nfact--Considerations in confirmation of this--Critique of the false\ndistinction between formal and material truths--Platonic men and\nAristotelian men--Theory of application of the concepts, true for\nabstract concepts and false for true concepts.\n\nII\n\nTHE _A PRIORI_ LOGICAL SYNTHESIS\n\nThe identity of the judgment of definition and of the individual\njudgment, as synthesis _a priori_--Objections to the synthesis\n_a priori,_ deriving from abstractionists and empiricists--False\ninterpretation of the synthesis _a priori_--Synthesis _a priori in_\ngeneral and logical synthesis _a priori_--Non-logical synthesis _a\npriori--_The synthesis _a priori,_ as synthesis, not of opposites,\nbut of distincts--The category in the judgment. Difference between\ncategory and innate idea--The synthesis _a priori,_ the destruction of\ntranscendency, and the objectivity of knowing--Power of the synthesis\n_a priori_ remained unknown to its discoverer.\n\nIII\n\nLOGIC AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE CATEGORIES\n\nThe demand for a complete table of the categories--This demand\nextraneous to Logic--Logical categories and real categories--Uniqueness\nof the logical category: the concept. The other categories, no longer\nlogical, but real. Systems of categories--The Hegelian system of\nthe categories, and other posterior systems--The logical order of\nthe predicates or categories--Illusion as to the logical reality of\nthis order--The necessity of an order of the predicates not founded\nupon Logic in particular, but upon the whole of Philosophy--False\ndistinction of Philosophy into two spheres--Metaphysic and Philosophy,\nrational Philosophy and real Philosophy, etc., derived from the\nconfusion between Logic and Doctrine of the categories--Philosophy and\npure Logic, etc.; overcoming of the dualism.\n\n\nSECOND PART\n\nPHILOSOPHY, HISTORY AND THE NATURAL AND MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES\n\nI\n\nTHE FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE DIVISIONS OF KNOWLEDGE\n\nSummary of the results relating to the forms of\nknowledge--Non-existence of technical forms, and of composed\nforms--Identity of forms of knowledge and of knowing. Objections\nto them--Empirical distinctions and their limits--Enumeration and\ndetermination of the forms of knowing reality, corresponding to the\nforms of knowledge--Critique of the idea of a special Logic as doctrine\nof the forms of knowing the external world and of a special Logic\nas doctrine of the methods--Nature of our treatment of the forms of\nknowledge.\n\nII\n\nPHILOSOPHY\n\nPhilosophy as pure concept; and the various definitions of\nphilosophy--Those which negate philosophy--Those which define it as\nscience of supreme principle, of final causes, etc.; contemplation\nof death, etc.; as elaboration of the concepts, as criticism, as\nscience of norms; as doctrine of the categories--Exclusion of material\ndefinitions from philosophy--Idealism of every philosophy--Systematic\ncharacter of philosophy--Philosophic significance and literary\nsignificance of the system--Advantages and disadvantages of the\nliterary form of the system--Genesis of the systematic prejudice,\nand rebellion against it--Sacred and philosophic numbers; meaning of\ntheir demand--Impossibility of dividing philosophy into general and\nparticular--Disadvantages of the conception of a general philosophy,\ndistinct from particular philosophies.\n\nIII\n\nHISTORY\n\nHistory as individual judgment--The individual element and historical\nsources: relics and narrative--The intuitive faculty in historical\nresearch--The intuitive faculty in historical exposition. Resemblance\nof history and art. Difference between history and art--The predicate\nor logical element in history--Vain attempts to eliminate it--Extension\nof historical predicates beyond the limits of mere existence--Asserted\nunsurmountable variance in judging and presenting historical facts\nand consequent demand for a history without judgment--Restriction of\nvariance, and exclusion of apparent variances--Overcoming of variances\nby means of deep study of the concepts--Subjectivity and objectivity\nin history: their meaning--Historical judgments of value, and normal\nor neutral values. Critique--Various legitimate meanings of protests\nagainst historical subjectivity--The demand for a theory of historical\nfactors--Impossibility of dividing history according to its intuitive\nand reflective elements--Empiricity of the division of the historical\nprocess into four stages--Divisions founded upon the historical\nobject--Logical division according to the forms of the spirit--The\nempirical division of the representative material--Empirical concepts\nin history; and the false theory as to the function they fulfil\nthere--Hence also the claim to reduce history to a natural science;\nand the thesis of the practical character of history--Distinction\nbetween historical facts and non-historical facts; and its empirical\nvalue--The professional prejudice and theory of the practical character\nof history.\n\nIV\n\nIDENTITY OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY\n\nNecessity of the historical element in philosophy--Historical\nquality of the culture required of the philosopher--Apparent\nobjections--Communication of philosophy as changing of\nphilosophy--Perpetuity of this changing--The overcoming and continuous\nprogress of philosophy--Meaning of the eternity of philosophy--The\nconcept of spontaneous, ingenuous, innate philosophy, etc.; and its\nmeaning--Philosophy as criticism and polemic--Identity of philosophy\nand history--Didactic divisions, and other reasons for the apparent\nduality--Note.\n\nV\n\nTHE NATURAL SCIENCES\n\nThe natural sciences as empirical concepts, and their practical\nnature--Elimination of an equivocation concerning this practical\ncharacter--Impossibility of unifying them in one concept--Impossibility\nof introducing into them rigorous divisions--Laws in the natural\nsciences, and so-called prevision--Empirical character of\nnaturalistic laws--The postulate of the uniformity of nature, and its\nmeaning--Pretended impossibility of exceptions to natural laws--Nature\nand its various meanings. Nature as passivity and negativity--Nature\nas practical activity--Nature in its gnoseological significance,\nas naturalistic or empirical method--The illusions of materialists\nand dualists--Nature as empirical distinction of an inferior reality\nin respect to a superior reality--The naturalistic method, and the\nnatural sciences as extending to superior not less than to inferior\nreality--Claim for such extension, and effective existence of what is\nclaimed--Historical foundation of the natural sciences--The question\nwhether history be foundation or crown of thought--Naturalists\nas historical investigators--Prejudices as to non-historicity of\nnature--Philosophic foundation of the natural sciences, and effect\nof philosophy upon them--Effect of natural sciences upon philosophy,\nand errors in conceiving such relation--Reason of these errors.\nNaturalistic philosophy--Philosophy as the destroyer of naturalistic\nphilosophy, but not of the natural sciences. Autonomy of these.\n\nVI\n\nMATHEMATICS AND THE MATHEMATICAL SCIENCE OF NATURE\n\nIdea of a mathematical science of nature--Various definitions of\nmathematics--Mathematical procedure--Apriority of mathematical\nprinciples--Contradictoriness of the _a priori_ principles. They\nare not thinkable, and not intuitive--Identification of mathematics\nwith abstract pseudoconcepts--The ultimate end of mathematics: to\nenumerate, and, therefore, to aid the determination of the single.\nIts place--Particular questions concerning mathematics--Rigour of\nmathematics and rigour of philosophy--Loves and hates between the\ntwo forms--Impossibility of reducing the empirical sciences to the\nmathematical; and the empirical limits of the mathematical science of\nnature--Decreasing utility of mathematics in the loftiest spheres of\nthe real.\n\nVII\n\nTHE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES\n\nTheory of the forms of knowledge and doctrine of the\ncategories--Problem of classification of the sciences; its empirical\nnature--Falsely philosophic character that it assumes--Coincidence\nof that problem with the search for the categories, when understood\nwith philosophic rigour--Forms of knowledge and literary-didactic\nforms--Prejudices derived from the latter--Methodical prologues to\nscholastic manuals, their impotence--Capricious multiplication of the\nsciences--The sciences and professional prejudices.\n\n\nTHIRD PART\n\nTHE FORMS OF ERROR AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH\n\nI\n\nERROR AND ITS NECESSARY FORMS\n\nError as negativity; impossibility of a special treatment of\nerrors--Positive and existing errors--Positive errors as practical\nacts--Practical acts and not practical errors--Economically practical\nacts, not morally practical acts--Doctrine of error, and doctrine\nof necessary forms of error--Logical nature of all theoretical\nerrors--History of errors and phenomenology of error--Deduction of\nthe forms of logical errors. Forms deduced from the concept of the\nconcept, and forms deduced from the other concepts--Errors derived from\nerrors--Professionally and nationality of errors.\n\nII\n\n\u00c6STHETICISM, EMPIRICISM AND MATHEMATICISM\n\nDefinition of these forms--\u00c6stheticism--Empiricism--Positivism, the\nphilosophy founded upon the sciences, inductive metaphysic--Empiricism\nand facts--Bankruptcy of Empiricism: dualism, agnosticism, spiritualism\nand superstition--Evolutionistic positivism and rationalistic\npositivism--Mathematicism--Symbolical mathematics--Mathematics\nas a form of demonstration of philosophy--Errors of mathematical\nphilosophy--Dualism, agnosticism and superstition of mathematicism.\n\nIII\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHISM\n\nRupture of the unity of the _a priori_ synthesis--Philosophism,\nlogicism or panlogicism--Philosophy of history--Contradictions in its\nassumptions--Philosophy of history and false analogies--Distinction\nbetween Philosophy of history and books so entitled--Merits of these,\nphilosophic and historical--Philosophy of nature--Its substantial\nidentity with Philosophy of history--Contradictions of Philosophy of\nnature--Books entitled Philosophy of nature--Contemporary seekings for\na Philosophy of nature and their various meanings.\n\nIV\n\nTHE MYTHOLOGISM\n\nRupture of the unity of the _a priori_ synthesis. The mythologism\n--Essence of myth--Problems relating to theory of myth--Myth\nand religion--Identity of the two spiritual forms--Religion and\nphilosophy--Conversion of errors, the one into the other--Conversion of\nthe mythologism into philosophism (theology) and of the philosophism\ninto the mythologism (mythology of nature, historical apocalypses,\netc.)--Scepsis.\n\nDUALISM, SCEPTICISM AND MYSTICISM\n\nDualism--Scepsis and scepticism--Mystery--Critique of affirmations\nof mystery in philosophy--Agnosticism as a particular form of\nscepticism--Mysticism--Errors in other parts of philosophy--Conversion\nof these errors into one another and into logical errors.\n\nVI\n\nTHE ORDER OF ERRORS AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH\n\nNecessary character of the forms of errors. Their definite number\n--Their logical order--Examples of this order in various parts of\nphilosophy--Erring spirit and spirit of search--Immanence of error\nin truth--Erroneous distinction between possession of and search\nfor truth--Search for truth in the practical sense of preparation\nfor thought; the series of errors--Transfiguration of error into\ntentative or hypothesis in the search so understood--Distinction\nbetween error as error and error as hypothesis--Immanence of the\ntentative in error itself as error--Individuals and error--Duplicate\naspect of errors--Ultimate form of error: the methodological error or\nhypotheticism.\n\nVII\n\nTHE PHENOMENOLOGY OF ERROR AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY\n\nInseparability of phenomenology of error from the philosophical\nsystem--The eternal course and recurrence of errors--Returns to\nanterior philosophies; and their meaning--False idea of a history of\nphilosophy as history of the successive appearance of the categories\nand of errors in time--Philosophism case in point of this false\nview, as is the formula concerning the identity of philosophy and\nhistory of philosophy--Distinction between this false idea of a\nhistory of philosophy, and the books which take it as their title or\nprogramme--Exact formula: identity of philosophy and history--History\nof philosophy and philosophic progress--The truth of all philosophies;\nand criticism of eclecticism--Researches for authors and precursors of\ntruths; reason for the antinomies which they exhibit.\n\nVIII\n\n\"DE CONSOLATIONE PHILOSOPHIAE\"\n\nLogic and defence of Philosophy--Utility of Philosophy and the\nPhilosophy of the practical--Consolation of philosophy, as joy\nof thought and in the true. Impossibility of a pleasure arising\nfrom falsity and illusion--Critique of the concept of a sad truth\n--Examples: Philosophical criticism and the concepts of God and\nImmortality--Consolatory virtue, pertaining to all spiritual\nactivities--Sorrow and elevation of sorrow.\n\n\nFOURTH PART\n\nHISTORICAL RETROSPECT\n\nI\n\nHISTORY OF LOGIC AND HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY\n\nReality, Thought and Logic--Relation of these three terms--Inexistence\nof a general philosophy outside particular philosophic sciences;\nand, in consequence, of a general History of philosophy outside the\nhistories of particular philosophic sciences--Histories of particular\nphilosophies and literary value of such division--History of Logic in\nits particular sense--Works dealing with history of Logic.\n\nII\n\nTHEORY OF THE CONCEPT\n\nQuestion as to the \"father of Logic\"--Socrates, Plato, Aristotle\n--Enquiries as to the nature of the concept in Greece. Question of\ntranscendency and immanence--Controversies in Plato concerning the\nvarious forms of the concept--Philosophic, empirical and abstract\nconcepts in Aristotle. Philosophy, physics, mathematics--Universals of\nthe \"always\" and those of \"for the most part\"--Logical controversies\nin the Middle Ages--Nominalism and realism--Nominalism, mysticism and\ncoincidence of opposites--Renaissance and mysticism--Bacon--Ideal of\nexact science and Cartesian philosophy--Adversaries of Cartesianism\n--Vico--Empiristic logic and its dissolution. Locke, Berkeley and\nHume--Exact science and Kant. Concept of the category--Limits of\nscience, and Jacobi--Positive elements in Kantian scepticism--The\nsynthesis _a priori_--Inward contradiction in Kant. Romantic principle\nand classic execution--Progress since Kant: Fichte, Schelling,\nHegel--Logic of Hegel. The concrete concept or Idea--Identity of\nHegelian Idea and Kantian synthesis _a priori_--The Idea and the\nantinomies. The dialectic--Lacun\u00e6 and errors in Hegelian Logic. Their\nconsequences--Contemporaries of Hegel: Herbart, Schleiermacher and\nothers--Posterior positivism and psychologicism--Eclectics. Lotze--New\ngnoseology of the sciences. Economic theory of scientific concept.\nAvenarius, Mach--Rickert--Bergson and the new French philosophy--Le\nRoy, and others--Reattachment to romantic ideas, and progress upon\nthem--Philosophy of pure experience, of intuition, of action, etc.: and\nits insufficiency--The theory of values.\n\nIII\n\nTHEORY OF THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT\n\nSecular neglect of theory relating to history--Ideas upon history\nin Gr\u00e6co-Roman world--Theory of history in medi\u00e6val and modern\nphilosophy--Writers on historical art in the sixteenth century--Writers\non method--Theory of history and G. B. Vico--Anti-historicism of\neighteenth century, and Kant--Hidden historical value of synthesis\n_a priori_--Theory of history in Hegel--W. von Humboldt--F.\nBrentano--Controversies as to the nature of history--Rickert; X\u00e9nopol.\nHistory as science of individual--History as art--Other controversies\nrelating to history.\n\nIV\n\nTHEORY OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THOUGHT AND WORD AND FORMALIST LOGIC\n\nRelation between history of Logic and history of Philosophy of\nlanguage--Logical formalism. Indian logic free of it--Aristotelian\nLogic and formalism--Later formalism--Rebellions against Aristotelian\nLogic--Opposition by humanists and its motives--Opposition of\nnaturalism--Simplicatory elaboration in eighteenth century.\nKant--Refutation of formal Logic. Hegel; Schleiermacher--Its partial\npersistence, owing to insufficient ideas as to language--Formal\nLogic in Herbart, in Schopenhauer, in Hamilton--More recent\ntheories--Mathematical Logic--Inexact idea of language among\nmathematicians and intuitionists.\n\nV\n\nCONCERNING THIS LOGIC\n\nTraditional character of this Logic and its connection with Logic of\nphilosophic concept--Its innovations--I. Exclusion of empirical and\nabstract concepts--II. Atheoretic character of second, and autonomy\nof empirical and mathematical sciences--III. Concept as unity of\ndistinctions--IV. Identity of concept with individual judgment and of\nphilosophy with history--V. Impossibility of defining thought by means\nof verbal forms, and refutation of formal Logic--Conclusion.\n\n\n\n\nFIRST PART\n\nTHE PURE CONCEPT, THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT, AND THE _A PRIORI_ LOGICAL\nSYNTHESIS\n\n\n\n\nFIRST SECTION\n\n\n\nTHE PURE CONCEPT AND THE PSEUDOCONCEPTS\n\nI\n\nAFFIRMATION OF THE CONCEPT\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Thought and sensation._]\n\nPresupposed in the logical activity, which is the subject of\nthis treatise, are representations or intuitions. If man had no\nrepresentations, he would not think; were he not an imaginative spirit,\nhe would not be a logical spirit. It is generally admitted that thought\nrefers back to sensation, as its antecedent; and this doctrine we have\nno difficulty in making our own, provided it be given a double meaning.\nThat is to say, in the first place, sensation must be conceived as\nsomething active and cognitive, or as a cognitive act; and not as\nsomething formless and passive, or active only with the activity of\nlife, and not with that of contemplation. And, in the second place,\nsensation must be taken in its purity, without any logical reflection\nand elaboration; as simple sensation, that is to say, and not as\nperception, which (as will be seen in the proper place), so far from\nbeing implied, in itself implies logical activity. With this double\nexplanation, sensation, active, cognitive and unreflective, becomes\nsynonymous with representation and intuition; and certainly this is\nnot the place to discuss the use of these synonyms, though there are\nexcellent reasons of practical convenience pointing to the preference\nof the terms which we have adopted.\n\nAt all events, the important thing is to bear clearly in mind, that the\nlogical activity, or thought, arises upon the many-coloured pageant of\nrepresentations, intuitions, or sensations, whichever we may call them;\nand by means of these, at every moment the cognitive spirit absorbs\nwithin itself the course of reality, bestowing upon it theoretic form.\n\n[Sidenote: _Thought and language._]\n\nAnother presupposition is often introduced by logicians: that of\nlanguage; since it seems clear that, if man does not speak, he does\nnot think. This presupposition also we accept, adding to it, however,\na corollary, together with certain elucidations. The elucidations are:\nin the first place, that language must be taken in its genuine and\ncomplete reality; that is to say, it must not be arbitrarily restricted\nto certain of its manifestations, such as the vocal and articulate;\nnor be changed and falsified into a body of abstractions, such as\nthe classes of Grammar or the words of the Vocabulary, conceived as\nthese are in the fashion of a machine, which man sets in motion when\nhe speaks. And, in the second place, by language is to be understood,\nnot the whole body of discourses, taken all together and in confusion,\ninto which (as will be seen in its place) logical elements enter;\nbut only that determinate aspect of these discourses, in virtue of\nwhich they are properly called language. A deep-rooted error, which\nsprings directly from the failure to make this distinction, is that\nof believing language to be constituted of logical elements; adducing\nas a proof of this that even in the smallest discourse are to be\nfound the words _this, that, to be, to do,_ and the like, that is,\nlogical concepts. But these concepts are by no means really to be\nfound in every expression; and, even where they are to be found,\nthe possibility of extracting them is no proof that they exhaust\nlanguage. So true is this that those who cherish this conviction are\nafterwards obliged to leave over as a residue of their analysis,\nelements which they consider to be illogical and which they call\n_emphatic, complementary, colorative,_ or _musical_: a residue in which\nis concealed true language, which escapes that abstract analysis.\nFinally, the corollary is that if the concept of language is thus\nrectified, the presupposition made for Logic regarding language is not\na _new_ presupposition, but is identical with that already made, when\nrepresentations or intuitions were discussed. In truth, language in the\nstrict sense, as we understand it, is equivalent to expression; and\nexpression is identical with representation, since it is inconceivable\nthat there should be a representation, which should not be expressed\nin some way, or an expression which should represent nothing, or be\nmeaningless. The one would fail to be representation, and the other\nwould not even be expression; that is to say, both must be and are, one\nand the same.\n\n[Sidenote: _Intuition and language as presuppositions._]\n\nWhat is a real presupposition of the logical activity, is, for that\nvery reason, not a presupposition in Philosophy, which cannot admit\npresuppositions and must think and demonstrate all the concepts that\nit posits. But it may conveniently be allowed as a presupposition\nfor that part of Philosophy, which we are now undertaking to treat,\nnamely Logic; and the existence of the representative or intuitive\nform of knowledge be taken for granted. After all, scepticism could\nnot formulate more than two objections to this position: either the\nnegation of knowing in general; or the negation of that form of knowing\nwhich we presuppose. Now, the first would be an instance of absolute\nscepticism; and we may be allowed to dispense with exhibiting yet again\nthe old, but ever effective argument against absolute scepticism which\nmay be found in the mouths of all students at the university, even\nof the boys in the higher elementary classes (and this dispensation\nmay more readily be granted, seeing that we shall unfortunately be\nobliged to record many obvious truths of Philosophy in the course of\nour exposition). But we do not mean by this declaration that we shall\nevade our obligation to show the genesis and the profound reasons for\nthis same scepticism, when we are led to do so by the order of our\nexposition. The second objection implies the negation of the intuitive\nactivity as original and autonomous, and its resolution into empirical,\nhedonistic, intellectualist, or other doctrines. But we have already,\nin the preceding volume,[1] directed our efforts towards making the\nintuitive activity immune against such doctrines, that is to say,\ntowards demonstrating the autonomy of fancy and establishing an\n\u00c6sthetic. So that, in this way, the presupposition which we now allow\nto stand has here its pedagogic justification, since it resolves itself\ninto a reference to things said elsewhere.\n\n[Sidenote: _Scepticism as to the concept._]\n\nFacing, therefore, without more ado, the problem of Logic, the first\nobstacle to be removed will not be absolute scepticism nor scepticism\nconcerning the intuitive form; but a new and more circumscribed\nscepticism, which does not question the two first theses, indeed\nrelies upon them, and negates neither knowledge nor intuition, but\n_logical_ knowledge itself. Logical knowledge is something beyond\nsimple representation. The latter is individuality and multiplicity;\nthe former the _universality_ of individuality, the _unity_ of\nmultiplicity; the one is intuition, the other _concept._ To know\nlogically is to know the universal or concept. The negation of logic is\nthe affirmation that there is no other knowledge than representative\n(or sense knowledge, as it is called), and that universal or conceptual\nknowledge does not exist. Beyond simple representation, there is\nnothing knowable.\n\nWere this so, the treatise which we are preparing to develop would\nhave no subject-matter whatever, and would here cease, since it is\nimpossible to seek out the nature of what does not exist, that is, of\nthe concept, or how it operates in relation to the other forms of the\nSpirit. But that this is not so, and that the concept really exists\nand operates and gives rise to problems, undoubtedly results from the\nnegation itself, pronounced by that form of scepticism which we will\ncall _logical,_ and which is, indeed, the only negation conceivable\nupon this point. Thus, we can speedily reassure ourselves as to the\nfate of our undertaking; or, if it be preferred, we must at once\nabandon the hope which we conjured up before ourselves, and resign\nourselves to the labour of constructing a Logic; a labour which logical\nscepticism, by restricting us to the sole form of representation, had,\nas it seems, the good intention of sparing us.\n\n[Sidenote: _Its three forms._]\n\nLogical scepticism, in fact, can assume three forms. It may affirm\nsimply that representative knowledge is the whole and that unity or\nuniversality, whose existence we have postulated, are words without\nmeaning. Or it may affirm that the demand for unity is justified, but\nthat it is satisfied only by the non-cognitive forms of the Spirit.\nOr, finally, it may affirm that the demand is certainly satisfied by\nthese non-cognitive forms, but only in so far as they react upon\nthe cognitive, that is to say, upon the one admitted form of the\ncognitive, namely, the representative. It is clear that there is no\nother possibility beyond these three, either that of being satisfied\nwith representative knowledge; or of being satisfied with something\nnon-cognitive; or of combining these two forms. In the first case,\nwe have the theory of _\u00e6stheticism_ (which could also be correctly\ncalled sensationalism, if this did not happen to be an inconvenient\nterm, by reason of the misunderstanding which might easily spring from\nit); in the second, the theory of _mysticism;_ in the third, that of\n_empiricism_ or _arbitrarism._\n\n[Sidenote: _\u00c6stheticism._]\n\nAccording to \u00e6stheticism, in order to understand the real, it is not\nnecessary to think by means of concepts, to universalize, to reason, or\nto be logical. It suffices to pass from one spectacle to another; and\nthe sum of these, increased to infinity, is the truth which we seek,\nand which we must refrain from transcending, lest we fall into the\nvoid. The _sub specie aeterni_ would be just like that mirror of water\nwhich deceived the avidity of the dog of Ph\u00e6drus, and made it leave the\nreal for the illusory food. For the cold and fruitless quest of the\nlogician there is substituted the rich and moving contemplation of the\nartist. Truth lies in works of speech, of colour, of line, and not at\nall in the vain babblings of philosophy. Let us sing, let us paint, and\nnot compel our minds to spasmodic and sterile efforts.\n\n[Sidenote: _Mysticism._]\n\nThe \u00e6stheticist's attitude may be considered as that of the spirit,\nwhich comes out of itself and disperses itself among things, while\nkeeping itself above and aloof from them, contemplating, but not\nimmersing itself in them. Mysticism is not satisfied with this, feeling\nthat no repose is ever accorded to the spirit which abandons itself to\nthis orgy, this breathless adventure of infinitely various spectacles,\nand that the intimate meaning of them all escapes the \u00e6stheticist.\nIt is true that there is no logical knowledge, that the concept is\nsterile, but the claim for unity is legitimate, and demands to be, and\nis, satisfied. But in what way is it satisfied? Art speaks, and its\nspeech, however beautiful, does not content us; it paints, and its\ncolours, however attractive, deceive us. In order to find the inmost\nmeaning of life, we must seek, not the light, but the shade, not\nspeech, but silence. In silence, reality raises its head and shows its\ncountenance; or, better, it shows us nothing, but fills us with itself,\nand gives us the sense of its very being. The unity and universality\nthat we desire are found in action, in the practical form of the\nSpirit: in the heart, which palpitates, loves, and wills. Knowledge is\nknowledge of the single, it is representation; the eternal is not a\nmatter of knowledge, but of _intimate and ineffable experience._\n\n[Sidenote: _Empiricism._]\n\nIf the sceptics of logico-\u00e6sthetic type are chiefly artistic souls, the\nlogico-mystical sceptics are sentimental and perturbed souls. These,\nalthough they do not usually take an entirely active part in life, yet\ndo to some extent take part in it, vibrating in sympathetic unison\nwith it, and, according to circumstances, suffering, sometimes through\ntaking part, and sometimes through failing so to do. Empiricists\nor arbitrarists are to be found, on the other hand, among those\nwho, engaged in practical affairs, do not indulge in emotions and\nsentiments, but aim at producing definite results. Thus, while they are\nin complete agreement with the \u00e6stheticists and the mystics in denying\nall value to logical knowledge as an autonomous form of knowledge,\nthey are not satisfied, like the former, with spectacles and with\nworks of art; nor are they caught, like the latter, in the madness and\nsorcery of the One and Eternal. The combination which they effect,\nof the \u00e6stheticist's thesis concerning the value of representation,\nwith the mystical concerning the value of action, strengthens neither,\nbut weakens both; and in exchange for the poetry of the first and for\nthe ecstasy of the second, it offers an eminently prosaic product\ncountersigned with a most prosaic name, that of _fiction._ There is\nsomething (they say) beyond the mere representation, and this something\nis an act of will; which also satisfies the demand for the universal,\nnot by shutting itself up in itself, but by means of a manipulation\nof single representations, so concentrated and simplified as to give\nrise to classes or symbols, which are without reality but convenient,\nfictitious but useful. Ingenuous philosophers and logicians have\nallowed themselves to be deceived by these puppets and have taken them\nseriously, as Don Quixote took the Moorish puppets of Master Peter.\nForgetful of the nature and character of the complete operation,\nthey have proceeded to concentrate and to simplify where there is no\nmaterial for such an undertaking, claiming to group afresh, not only\nthis or that series of representations, but all representations, hoping\nthus to obtain the universal concept, that is to say, the concept which\nenfolds in its bosom the infinite possibilities of the real. Thus they\nhave attained the pretended new and autonomous form of knowledge which\ngoes beyond representations; a refined, but slightly ridiculous process\nof thought, like that of a man who would like to make not only knives\nof various sizes and shapes, but a knife of knives, beyond all knives\nwhich have a definite shape and are made of iron and steel.\n\n[Sidenote: _Reduction to the absurd of the three forms._]\n\nWe shall proceed to examine in their places both the errors resulting\nfrom these modes of solving, or of cutting, the problem of knowledge,\nand also the partial truths mingled with them which it is necessary to\nexhibit in their full efficacy. But, at the point which now occupies\nus, _i.e.,_ the affirmation or negation of the conceptual form of\nknowledge, let it suffice to observe how all the ranks of those who\ndeny the concept move to the assault armed with the _concept._ We\nneed simply observe, not strive to confute, because it is a question\nof something which leaps to the eye at once and does not demand many\nwords; although many would be necessary to illustrate psychologically\nthe conditions of spirit and of culture, the natural and acquired\ntendencies, the habits and the prejudices, which render such marvellous\nblindness possible. The \u00e6stheticists affirm that truth resides in\n\u00e6sthetic contemplation and not in the concept. But, pray, is this\naffirmation of theirs perchance song, or painting, or music, or\narchitecture? It certainly concerns intuition, but it is not intuition;\nit has art for subject-matter, but it is not art; it does not\ncommunicate a state of the soul, but communicates a thought, that is to\nsay, an affirmation of universal character; therefore, it is a concept.\nAnd by this concept it is sought to deny the concept. It is as if one\nsought to leap over one's own shadow, when the leap itself throws\nthe shadow, or, by clinging to one's own pigtail, to pull oneself\ninto safety out of the river. The same may be said of the mystics.\nThey proclaim the necessity of silence and of seeking the One, the\nUniversal, the I, concentrating upon themselves and letting themselves\nlive; during which mystical experience it may, perhaps, befall them (as\nin the _Titan_ of J. P. Richter) to rediscover the I, in a somewhat\nmaterialized form, in their own person. Nevertheless in the case of\nthose who recommend silence, _non silent silentum,_ they do not pass\nit by in silence; rather, it has been said, they _proclaim_ it, and go\nabout explaining and demonstrating how efficacious their prescription\nis for satisfying the desire for the universal. Were they silent about\nit, we should not be faced with that doctrine, as a precise formula\nto combat. The doctrine of silence and of silent action and inner\nexperience is nothing but an affirmation of absolute character and\nuniversal content, by means of which are refuted, and it is believed\nconfuted, other affirmations of the same nature. This too, then,\nis a concept; as contradictory as you will, and therefore, needing\nelaboration, but always conceptual elaboration and not practical;\nwhich last would altogether prevent the adepts in the doctrine from\ntalking. And who, in our day, talks as much as the mystics? Indeed,\nwhat could they do, in our day, if they did not talk? And is it not\nsignificant that mystics are now found, not in solitudes, but crowded\nround little tables in the caf\u00e9s, where it is customary, not so much to\nachieve inner experiences, as, on the contrary, to chatter? Finally,\nthe theorists of fictions and of toys, in their amiable satire of\nlogic and of philosophy, forget to explain one small particular, which\nis not without importance; that is to say, whether their theory of\nthe concepts as fiction, is in its turn _fiction._ Because, were it\nfiction, it would be useless to discuss it, since by its own admission\nit is without truth; and if it were not (as it is not), it would have\na character of true and not fictitious universality; or, it would\nbe, not at all a simplification and symbol of representations, but\na concept, and would establish the true concept at the very moment\nthat it unmasks those that are fictitious. Fiction and the theory\nof fiction are (and it should appear evident) different things; as\nthe delinquent and the judge who condemns him are different, or the\nmadman and the doctor who studies madness. A fiction, which pretends\nto be fiction, opens, at the most, an infinite series which it is not\npossible to close, unless there eventually intervene an act which is\nnot fiction, and which explains all the others, as in the unravelling\nof a comedy of cross-purposes. And this is the way that the empiricists\nor arbitrarists also come to profess the faith that they would deny.\n_Salus ex inimicis_ is a great truth for philosophy not less than for\nthe whole of life; a truth, which on this occasion finds beautiful\ncontinuation in the hostility towards the concept, perhaps never so\nfierce as it is to-day, and in the efforts to choke it, never so great\nand never so courageously and cleverly employed. But those enemies\nfind themselves in the unhappy condition of being unable to choke it,\nwithout in the very act suppressing the principle of their own life.\n\n[Sidenote: _Affirmation of the concept._]\n\nThe concept, then, is not representation, nor is it a mixture and\nrefinement of representation. It springs from representations, as\nsomething implicit in them that must become explicit; a necessity\nwhose premisses they provide, but which they are not in a position to\nsatisfy, not even to affirm. The satisfaction is afforded by the form\nof knowledge which is no longer representative but logical, and which\noccurs continually and at every instant in the life of the Spirit.\n\nTo deny the existence of this form, or to prove it illusory by\nsubstituting other spiritual formations in its place, is an attempt\nwhich has been and is made, but which has not succeeded and does not\nsucceed, and which, therefore, may be considered desperate. This series\nof manifestations, this aspect of reality, this form of spiritual\nactivity, which is the Concept, constitutes the object of Logic.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: See the first volume of this _Philosophy as Science of the\nSpirit; \u00c6sthetic as Science of Expression._]\n\n\n\n\nII\n\n\nTHE CONCEPT AND THE PSEUDOCONCEPTS\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Concepts and conceptual fictions._]\n\nBy distinguishing the concept from representations, we have recognized\nthe legitimate sphere of representation, and have assigned to it in the\nsystem of spirit the place of an antecedent and more elementary form\nof knowledge. By distinguishing the concept from states of the soul,\nfrom efforts of the will, from action, it is intended also to recognize\nthe legitimacy of the practical form, although we are not here able\nto enlarge upon its relations with the cognitive form.[1] But by\ndistinguishing the concept from _fictions,_ it would almost seem that\nin their case we have not explicitly admitted any legitimate province,\nthat, indeed, we have implicitly denied it, since we have adopted for\nthem a designation which in itself sounds almost like a condemnation.\nThis point must be made clear; because it would be impossible to go\nfurther with the treatment of Logic, if we left doubtful and insecure,\nthat is, not sufficiently distinguished, one of the terms, from which\nthe concept must be distinguished. What are conceptual fictions? Are\nthey false and arbitrary concepts, morally reprehensible? Or are they\nspiritual products, which aid and contribute to the life of the spirit?\nAre they avoidable evils, or necessary functions?\n\n[Sidenote: _The pure concept as ultra- and omnirepresentative._]\n\nA true and proper concept, precisely because it is not representation,\ncannot have for content any single representative element, or\nhave reference to any particular representation, or group of\nrepresentations; but on the other hand, precisely because it is\nuniversal in relation to the individuality of the representations, it\nmust refer at the same time to all and to each. Take as an example any\nconcept of universal character, be it of _quality,_ of _development,_\nof _beauty,_ or of _final cause._ Can we conceive that a piece of\nreality, given us in representation, however ample it may be (let it\neven be granted that it embraces ages and ages of history, in all\nthe complexity of the latter, and millenniums and millenniums of\ncosmic life), exhausts in itself quality or development, beauty or\nfinal cause, in such a way that we can affirm an equivalence between\nthose concepts and that representative content? On the other hand,\nif we examine the smallest fragment of representable life, can we\never conceive that, however small and atomic it be, there is lacking\nto it quality and development, beauty and final cause? Certainly,\nit may be and has been affirmed, that things are not quality, but\npure quantity; that they do not develop, but remain changeless and\nmotionless; that the criterion of beauty is the arbitrary extension\nwhich we make to cosmic reality of some of our narrow individual and\nhistorical experiences and sentiments; and that final cause is an\nanthropomorphic conception, since not \"end\" but \"cause\" is the law\nof the real, not teleology but mechanism and determinism. Philosophy\nhas been and is still engrossed in such disputes; and we do not here\npresent them as definitely solved, nor do we intend to base ourselves\nupon determinate conceptions in the choice of our examples. The point\nis, that if the theses which we have just mentioned as opposed to the\nfirst, were true, they would furnish, in every case, true and proper\nconcepts, superior to every representative determination, and embracing\nin themselves all representations, that is to say, every possible\nexperience; and our conception of the concept would not thereby be\nchanged, but indeed confirmed. Final cause or mechanism, development\nor motionless being, beauty or individual pleasure, would always, in\nso far as they are concepts, be posited as ultrarepresentative and\nat the same time omnirepresentative. Even if, as often happens, both\nthe opposed concepts were accepted for the same problem, for example,\nfinal cause and mechanism, or development and unmoved substance, it\nis never intended simply to apply either of them to single groups of\nrepresentations, but to make them elements and component parts of all\nreality. Thus, every reality would be, on one side, end, and on the\nother, cause; on one side, motionless, on the other, changeable; man\nwould have in himself something of the mechanical and something of the\nteleological; nature would be matter, but urged forward by a first\ncause which was non-material, that is, spiritual and final, or at least\nunknown--and so on. When it is demonstrated of a concept that it has\nbeen suggested by contingent facts, by this very fact we eliminate\nit from the series of true concepts, and substitute for it another\nconcept, which is given as truly universal. Or again, we suppress it\nwithout substituting another for it, that is to say, we reduce the\nnumber of true and proper concepts. Such a reduction is a progress\nof thought, but it is a progress which can never be extended to the\nabolition of all concepts, because one, at least, will always remain\nineliminable; that of thought, which thinks the abolition; and this\nconcept will be ultra- and omnirepresentative.\n\n[Sidenote: _Conceptual fictions as representative without\nuniversality,_]\n\nFictional concepts or conceptual fictions are something altogether\ndifferent. In these, either the content is furnished by a group of\nrepresentations, even by a single representation, so that they are\nnot ultrarepresentative; or there is no representable content, so\nthat they are not omnirepresentative. Examples of the first type are\nafforded by the concepts of _house, cat, rose_; of the second, those\nof _triangle,_ or of _free motion._ If we think of the house, we refer\nto an artificial structure of stone or masonry or wood, or iron or\nstraw, where beings, whom we call men, are wont to abide for some\nhours, or for entire days and entire years. Now, however great may be\nthe number of objects denoted by that concept, it is always a finite\nnumber; there was a time when man did not exist, when, therefore,\nneither did his house; and there was another time when man existed\nwithout his house, living in caverns and under the open sky. Of course,\nundoubtedly, we shall be able to extend the concept of house, so as\nto include also the places inhabited by animals; but it will never\nbe possible to follow with absolute clearness the distinction between\nartificial and natural (the act of inhabiting itself makes the place\nmore or less artificial, by changing, for instance, the temperature);\nor between the animals which are inhabitants and the non-animals,\nwhich nevertheless are inhabitants, such as plants, which, as well as\nanimals, often seek a roof; admitting that certain plants and animals\nhave other plants and animals as their houses. Hence, in view of the\nimpossibility of a clear and universal distinctive character, it is\nadvisable to have recourse at once to enumeration and to give the name\nhouse to certain particular objects, which, however numerous they are,\nare also finite in number, and which, with the enumeration complete, or\ncapable of completion, exclude other objects from themselves. If it is\ndesired to prevent this exclusion, no other course remains than that of\nunderstanding by _house_ any mode of life between different beings; but\nin that case, the conceptual fiction becomes changed into a universal,\nlacking particular representations, applicable alike to a house and to\nany other manifestation of the real. The same may be said of the cat\nand of the rose, since it is evident that cats and roses have appeared\non the earth at a definite time and will disappear at another, and\nthat while they endure, they can be looked upon as something fixed and\nprecise, only when we have regard to some particular group of cats and\nof roses, indeed to one particular cat or rose at a definite moment of\nits existence (a gray cat or a black cat, a cat or a kitten; a white\nrose or a red rose, flowering or withered, etc.), elevated into a\nsymbol and representative of the others. There is not, and there cannot\nbe, a rigorous characteristic, which should avail to distinguish the\ncat from other animals, or the rose from other flowers, or indeed a cat\nfrom other cats and a rose from another rose. These and other fictional\nconcepts are, therefore, representative, but not ultrarepresentative;\nthey contain some objects or fragments of reality, they do not contain\nit all.\n\n[Sidenote: _or universals void of representations_]\n\nThe conceptual fictions of the triangle and of free motion have an\nanalogous but opposite defect. With them, it appears, we emerge from\nthe difficulties of representations. The triangle and free motion are\nnot something which begins and ends in time and of which we are not\nable to state exactly the character and limits. So long as thought,\nthat is to say, thinkable reality, exists, the concept of the triangle\nand of free motion will have validity. The triangle is formed by the\nintersection of three straight lines enclosing a space and forming\nthree angles, the sum of which, though they 'vary from triangle to\ntriangle, is equal to that of two right angles. It is impossible to\nconfuse the triangle with the quadrilateral or the circle. Free motion\nis a motion, which we think of as taking place without obstacles of\nany sort. It is impossible to confuse it with a motion to which there\nis any particular obstacle. So far so good. But if those conceptual\nfictions let fall the ballast of representations, they ascend to a zone\nwithout air, where life is impossible; or, to speak without metaphor,\nthey gain universality by losing reality. There is no geometric\ntriangle in reality because in reality there are no straight lines, nor\nright angles nor sums of right angles, nor sums of angles equal to that\nof two right angles. There is no free motion in reality, because every\nreal motion takes place in definite conditions and therefore among\nobstacles. A thought, which has as its object nothing real, is not\nthought; and those concepts are not concepts but conceptual fictions.\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique of the doctrine which considers them to be\nerroneous concepts,_]\n\nHaving made clear, by means of these examples, the character of\nconcepts and of fictional concepts, we are prepared to solve the\nquestion as to whether the second are legitimate or illegitimate\nproducts, and if they merit the reproach which seems to attach to\ntheir name. And certainly, a view which has had and still has force\ndoes not hesitate to consider those fictions as nothing but _erroneous\nconcepts,_ and declares a war of extermination against them, in the\nname of rigorous thought and of truth. If it follows from what we have\nsaid, that the cat or the house or the rose are not concepts, and\nthat the geometrical triangle or free motion are not so either, the\nconclusion seems inevitable that we must free ourselves from these\nerrors or misconceptions, and affirm that there is neither the cat\nnor the rose nor the house, but a reality all compact (although it is\ncontinuously changing) which develops and is new at every instant; nor\nis there either the triangle or free motion, but the eternal forms of\nthis reality, which cannot be abstracted and fixed by themselves, and\ndeprived of the conditions which are an integral part of them. But a\nsingle fact suffices to invalidate this conclusion and to confute the\npremiss upon which it rests, that conceptual fictions are erroneous\nconcepts. An error once discovered cannot reappear, at least until the\ndiscovery is forgotten, and there is a falling back into the conditions\nof mental obscurity similar to those antecedent to the discovery.\nWhen, for example, the position has been attained that morality is not\na phenomenon of egoism and that it has value in itself, or one has\nbecome certain that Hannibal was ignorant of the disaster that befell\nhis brother Hasdrubal on the Metaurus, it is impossible to continue\nbelieving that morality is egoism, or that Hannibal has been informed\nof the arrival of Hasdrubal and had voluntarily allowed him to be\nsurprised by the two Consuls. But with conceptual fictions similar to\nthose in the example the case is otherwise. Even when we are persuaded\nthat the triangle and free motion correspond to nothing real, and that\nthe rose, the cat, and the house have nothing precise and universal in\nthem, we must yet continue to make use of the fictions of triangles, of\nfree motion; of houses, cats, and roses. We can criticise them, and we\ncannot renounce them; therefore, it is not true that they are, at least\naltogether and in every sense, errors.\n\n[Sidenote: _or imperfect concepts preparatory to perfect concepts._]\n\nThis indispensability of conceptual fictions to the life of the spirit,\nfinds acknowledgment in a more temperate form of the doctrine which\nconsiders them as erroneous concepts; that is, in the thesis that\nthey are erroneous, but at the same time preparatory to, and almost a\nfirst step towards, the formation of true and proper concepts. The\nspirit does not issue all at once from representations and attain to\nthe universal; it issues from them little by little, and prior to\nthe rigorous universal, it constructs others less rigorous, which\nhave the advantage of replacing the infinite representations with\ntheir infinite shades, through which reality presents itself in\n\u00e6sthetic contemplation. Conceptual fictions, then, would be sketches\nof concepts, and therefore, like all sketches, capable of revision\nand annulment, but useful. Thus it would be explained how they are\nerrors, and errors made for a good reason. But this moderate theory\nalso clashes noisily with the most evident facts. Above all, it is not\ntrue that the spirit issues little by little from the representations,\npassing through a series of grades; the procedure of the spirit, in\nthis regard, is altogether different, and when philosophers have wanted\nto find a comparison for it, they have been obliged to come back to\nthat very 'leap' which they wanted to avoid: \"Spirit (said Schelling,\nfor example,) is an _eternal island,_ which is not to be reached from\nmatter, without a leap, whatever turns and twists be made.\" And, for\nthis very reason, conceptual fictions are not good passages to rigorous\nconcepts: to think rigorously, we must plunge ourselves again into the\nflood of representations and think immediate reality, clearing away the\nobstacles that proceed from conceptual fictions. And always for the\nsame reason, rigorous concepts, when they find themselves confronted\nwith conceptual fictions as rivals in the same problem, do not claim\ntheir assistance, nor correct, nor refine upon them, in order partially\nto preserve them, but combat and destroy them. What the rigorous\nconcepts are unable to do, is to prevent the others from reappearing;\nbecause the spirit, as has been seen, preserves, without correcting\nthem, although it has recognized their falsity: it preserves them, that\nis to say, not fused and rendered true in the rigorous concepts, but\n_outside and after these._\n\n[Sidenote: _Posteriority of conceptual fictions to true and proper\nconcepts._]\n\nIn short, we have to abandon entirely the idea that conceptual fictions\nare errors, or sketches and aids, and that they precede rigorous\nconcepts. Quite the opposite is true: conceptual fictions do not\nprecede rigorous concepts, but follow them, and presuppose them as\ntheir own foundation. Were this not so, of what could they ever be\nfictions? To counterfeit or imitate something implies first knowledge\nof the thing which it is desired to counterfeit or to imitate. To\nfalsify means to have knowledge of the genuine model: false money\nimplies good money, not vice versa. It is possible to think that man,\nfrom being the ingenuous poet that he first was, raised himself,\nimmediately, to the thought of the eternal; but it is not possible to\nthink that he constructed the smallest conceptual fiction, without\nhaving previously imagined and thought. The house, the rose, the cat,\nthe triangle, free motion presuppose quantity, quality, existence,\nand we know not how many other rigorous concepts: they are made with\niron instruments great and small, which logical thought has created,\nand which come to be used with such rapidity and naturalness that we\nusually end by believing that we have proceeded without them. Whoever\nmakes conceptual fictions, has already taken his logical bearings in\nthe world: he knows what he is doing and reasons about it; progress\nwith his conceptual fictions depending upon progress with his rigorous\nconcepts, and being continuously remade, according to the new needs and\nthe new conditions which are formed. Now that the concept of miracle\nor witchcraft has been destroyed, the conceptual fictions relating\nto the various classes and modes of miraculous facts and acts of\nwitchcraft are no longer constructed; and since the destruction of\nthe belief in the direct influence of the stars upon human destinies,\nthe astrological and mathematical fictions, which arose upon those\nconceptual presuppositions, have also disappeared.\n\nThose who have seen errors or sketches of truth in conceptual\nfictions have certainly seen something: because (without incidentally\nanticipating at this point the theory of errors, or that of sketches\nor aids to the search for truth) it may at once be admitted, that\nconceptual fictions also sometimes become both errors and obstacles,\nand suggestions and aids to truth. But because a given spiritual\nproduct is adopted for an end different from that which rightly belongs\nto it (thereby becoming itself different and giving rise to a new\nspiritual product), we must not omit to search for the intrinsic end,\nwhich constitutes the genuine nature of this product. The portrait\nof a fair lady, white as milk and red as blood, which the prince of\nthe story finds beneath a cushion by the help of the fairy, may serve\nas an incentive to make him undertake the journey round the world\nin search of the woman in flesh and blood, who is like the portrait\nand whom he will make his wife; but that portrait, before it is an\ninstrument in the hands of the fairy, is a picture, that is to say, a\nwork of art, which has come from the hands, or rather from the fancy,\nof the painter; and must be appreciated as such. Thus conceptual\nfictions, before they are transmuted into errors or into expedients,\ninto obstacles or into aids to the search for truth, have, before\nthem, a truth already constructed, toward the construction of which,\ntherefore, they cannot serve; whereas that truth has served them, for\nthey would not otherwise have been able to arise. They are, therefore,\nintrinsically neither obstacles nor aids to truth, but something else,\nthat is, themselves; and what they are in themselves it is still\nnecessary to determine.\n\n[Sidenote: _Practical character of conceptual fictions._]\n\nFor this purpose it is needful to direct our attention to the moment of\ntheir formation, which, as has been said, is not at all theoretical,\nbut practical; and to ask ourselves in what way and with what end\nthe practical spirit can intervene in representations and concepts\npreviously produced, manipulate them and make of them conceptual\nfictions. The view that the work of the practical spirit can give\nrise to new knowledge, not previously attained, must be resolutely\nexcluded: the practical spirit is such, precisely because it is\nnon-cognitive; as regards knowledge it is altogether sterile. If,\nthen, it accomplishes those manipulations, and says to a cat: \"You\nwill represent for me all cats\"; or to a rose: \"See, I draw you in\nmy treatise on botany, and you will represent all roses\"; and to\nthe triangle: \"It is true I cannot think you, nor represent you;\nbut I suppose that you are the same as what I draw with rule and\ncompass, and I make use of you to measure the approximate triangles\nof reality\";--in so doing, it recognizes that it does not accomplish\nany act of _knowledge._ But does it, in that case, accomplish an act\nof _anti-knowledge_--that is, does it make these manipulations and\nfictions in order to place obstacles in the way of knowledge and to\nsimulate its products, so that it leads astray the seeker for truth?\nIf this were so, the \"practical spirit\" would be synonymous with\nthe spirit of confusion; and the contriver of conceptual fictions\nwould deserve the reprobation that attaches to forgers of documents,\nsophists, rhetoricians, and charlatans; whereas, on the contrary,\nhe receives the applause and gratitude of every one. Each one of\nus, at every instant, would be guilty of a plot against the truth,\nbecause at every instant each of us forms and employs those fictions;\nwhereas the moral consciousness, delicate and intolerant though it\nbe, makes no reproof, but indeed offers encouragement. Therefore, the\nact of forming intellectual fictions is an act neither of knowledge\nnor of anti-knowledge; it is not logically rational, but neither is\nit logically irrational; it is rational, indeed, but _practically_\nrational.\n\n[Sidenote: _The practical end and mnemonic utility._]\n\nIn this case the practical end in view can be but one. We know in order\nto act; and he who acts is interested only in that knowledge, which is\nthe necessary precedent of his doing. But since our knowledge is all\ndestined to be recalled as occasion serves for action, or to aid us in\nthe search for new knowledge (which in this case is a form of acting),\nthe practical spirit is impelled to provide for the preservation of the\npatrimony of acquired knowledge. Without doubt, speaking absolutely,\neverything is preserved in reality, and nothing that has once been\ndone or thought, disappears from the bosom of the cosmos. But the\npreservation of which we speak, is properly the making easily available\nto memory, knowledge that has once been possessed, and providing for\nits ready recall from the bosom of the cosmos or from the apparently\nunconscious and forgotten. For this purpose there are constructed\nthose instruments, which are conceptual fictions, by means of which\narmies of representations are evoked with a single word, or by which\na single word approximately indicates what form of operation must be\nresorted to, in order that certain representations may be recovered.\nThe cat of the appropriate conceptual fiction does not enable us to\nknow any single cat, as a painter or a historian of cats makes us\nknow it; but by means of it, many images of animals, which would have\nremained separate before the memory, or each one dispersed and fused in\nthe complete picture in which it had been imagined and perceived, are\narranged in a series and recorded as a whole. This matters little or\nnothing to one who dreams as a poet or who seeks absolute truth; but it\nmatters a great deal to one whose house is infested by rats, and who\nmust employ some one to obtain a cat; and it matters not less to the\nseeker for the cat, in that he has to study a new animal, and that he\nmust proceed in that study with some order, though it be artificial,\nand though he reject the artifice in the final synthesis. Again, the\ngeometrical triangle is of no service either to imagination or to\nthought, which are developed without it; but it is indispensable to\nany one measuring a field, in the same way as it may possibly be of\nservice to a painter in his preparatory studies for a picture, or to\na historian, who wishes to know well the configuration of a piece of\nground where a battle was fought.\n\n[Sidenote: _Persistence of conceptual fictions side by side with\nconcepts._]\n\nThis is the real reason why, however perfect rigorous concepts become,\nconceptual fictions remain ineliminable, and indeed obtain from these\nfresh nourishment. They cannot be criticized and resolved by means of\nrigorous concepts, because they are of a different order from them:\nthey cannot act as inferior degrees of the rigorous concept, because\nthey presuppose it. The reason, which we were pledged to give, is\ngiven; and henceforward there can no longer arise any misunderstanding\nas to the relation of the concept to conceptual fictions. It is a\nrelation not of identity, nor of contrariety, but simply of diversity.\n\n[Sidenote: _Pure concepts and pseudoconcepts._]\n\nThe terminological question remains, and this, as always, has but\nslight importance. \"Conceptual fictions\" is a manner of speech; and no\none would wish to combat manners of speech. For brevity's sake we shall\ncall them _pseudoconcepts,_ and for the sake of clearness we shall\ncall the true and proper concepts _pure concepts._ This term seems to\nus more suitable than that of _ideas_ (pure concepts), as opposed to\n_logical concepts_ (pseudoconcepts), as they were at one time called\nin the schools. It must further be noted, that the pseudoconcepts,\nalthough the word \"concept\" forms part of their name, are not concepts,\nthey do not form a species of, nor do they compete with, concepts (save\nwhen forcibly made to do so); and that the pure concepts have not got\nthe impure concepts at their side, for these are not truly concepts.\nEvery word offers, in some degree, a hold for misunderstanding, because\nit circulates in this base world, which is full of snares; the search\nfor words which should absolutely prevent misunderstandings is vain,\nfor it would be necessary first of all to clip the wings of the human\nspirit. We may prefer one word to another, according to historical\ncontingencies; and for our part we prefer the words _pseudoconcept_\nand _pure concept,_ if for no other reason than to remind the makers\nof fictional concepts to be modest, and to flash above their heads the\nlight of the only true form of concept, which is logical nature itself\nin its universality and in its severity. How can we fail to think\nthat the choice has been well made if this title of _pure concept_\nplease the few, but terrify the many and irritate the most, more than\nthe red cloth shaken before the eyes of the bull; and if, like every\nefficacious medicine, it provoke a reaction in the organism of the\npatient?\n\n\n[Footnote 1: These relations are examined in the _Philosophy of the\nPractical,_ first part.]\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\n\nTHE CHARACTERISTICS AND THE CHARACTER OF THE CONCEPT\n\n\nThe characteristics of the pure concept, or simply, concept, may be\ngathered from what has previously been said.\n\n[Sidenote: _Expressivity._]\n\nThe concept has the character of _expressivity;_ that is to say, it is\na cognitive product, and, therefore, expressed or spoken, not a mute\nact of the spirit, as is a practical act. If we wish to submit the\neffective possession of a concept to a first test, we can employ the\nexperiment which was advised on a previous occasion:--whoever asserts\nthat he possesses a concept, should be invited to expound it in words,\nand with other means of expression (graphic symbols and the like). If\nhe refuse to do so, and say that his concept is so profound that words\ncannot avail to render it, we can be sure, either that he is under the\nillusion of possessing a concept, when he possesses only turbid fancies\nand morsels of ideas; or that he has a presentiment of the profound\nconcept, that it is in process of formation, and will be, but is not\nyet, possessed. Each of us knows that when he finds himself in the\nmeditative depth of the internal battle, of that true _agony_ (because\nit is the death of one life and the birth of another), which is the\ndiscovery of a concept, he can certainly talk of the state of his soul,\nof his hopes and fears, of the rays that enlighten and of the shadows\nthat invade him; but he cannot yet communicate his concept, which is\nnot as yet, because it is not yet expressible.\n\n[Sidenote: _Universality._]\n\nIf this character of expressivity be common to the concept and to the\nrepresentation, its _universality_ is peculiar to the concept; that is\nto say, its transcendence in relation to the single representations, so\nthat no single representation and no number of them can be equivalent\nto the concept. There is no middle term between the individual and\nthe universal: either there is the single or there is the whole, into\nwhich that single enters with all the singles. A concept which has been\nproved not universal, is, by that very fact, confuted as a concept.\nOur philosophical confutations do not proceed otherwise. Sociology,\nfor instance, asserts the concept of _Society,_ as a rigorous concept\nand principle of science; and the criticism of Sociology proves that\nthe concept of society is not universal, but individual, and is\nrelated to the groupings of certain beings which representation has\nplaced before the sociologist, and which he has arbitrarily isolated\nfrom other complexes of beings that representation also placed or\ncould place before him. The theory of tragedy postulates the concept\nof the _tragic,_ and from it deduces certain necessary essentials\nof tragedy; and the criticism of literary classes demonstrates that\nthe tragic is not a concept, but a roughly defined group of artistic\nrepresentations, which have certain external likenesses in common; and,\ntherefore, that it cannot serve as foundation for any theory. On the\nother hand, to establish a universality, which at first was wanting,\nis the glory of truly scientific thought; hence we give the name of\ndiscoverers to those who bring to light connections of representations\nor of representative groups, or of concepts, which had previously been\nseparate; that is to say, who universalize them. Thus, it was thought\nat one time that will and action were distinct concepts; and it was\na step in progress to identify them by the creation of the truly\nuniversal concept of the will, which is also action. Thus, too, it was\nheld that expression in language was a different thing from expression\nin art; and it was an advance to universalize the expression of art by\nextending it to language; or that of language by extending it to art.\n\n[Sidenote: _Concreteness._]\n\nNot less proper to the concept is the other character of\n_concreteness,_ which means that if the concept be universal and\ntranscendent in relation to the single representation, it is yet\nimmanent in the single, and therefore in all representations. The\nconcept is the universal in relation to the representations, and is\nnot exhausted in any one of them; but since the world of knowledge\nis the world of representations, the concept, if it were not in the\nrepresentations, would not be anywhere: it would be in _another_ world,\nwhich cannot be thought, and therefore is not. Its transcendence,\ntherefore, is also immanence; like that truly literary language that\nDante desired, which, in relation to the speech of the different parts\nof Italy, _in qualibet redolet civitate nec cubat in ulla._ If it is\nproved of a concept that it is inapplicable to reality, and therefore\nis not concrete, it is thereby confuted as a true and proper concept.\nIt is said to be an _abstraction,_ it is not reality; it does not\npossess _concreteness._ In this way, for example, has been confuted the\nconcept of spirit as different from nature (abstract spiritualism); or\nof the good, as a model placed above the real world; or of atoms, as\nthe components of reality; or of the dimensions of space, or of various\nquantities of pleasure and pain, and the like. All these are things not\nfound in any part of the real, since there is neither a reality that is\nmerely natural and external to spirit, nor an ideal world outside the\nreal world; nor a space of one or of two dimensions; nor a pleasure or\npain that is homogeneous with another, and therefore greater or less\nthan another; and for this reason all these things do not result from\nconcrete thinking and are not concepts.\n\n[Sidenote: _The concrete universal, and the formation of the\npseudoconcepts._]\n\nExpressivity, universality, concreteness, are then the three\ncharacteristics of the concept derived from the foregoing discussion.\nExpressivity affirms that the concept is a cognitive act, and denies\nthat it is merely practical, as is maintained in various senses by\nmystics, and by arbitrarists or fictionists. Universality affirms that\nit is a cognitive act _sui generis,_ the logical act, and denies that\nit is an intuition, as is maintained by the \u00e6stheticists, or a group\nof intuitions, as is asserted in the doctrine of the arbitrarists\nor fictionists. Concreteness affirms that the universal logical act\nis also a thinking of reality, and denies that it can be universal\nand void, universal and inexistent, as is maintained in a special\npart of the doctrine of the arbitrarists. But this last point needs\nexplanation, which leads us to enunciate explicitly an important\ndivision of the pseudoconcepts, which has hitherto been mentioned as\napparently incidental.\n\n[Sidenote: _Empirical pseudoconcepts and abstract pseudoconcepts._]\n\nThe pseudoconcepts, falsifying the concept, cannot imitate it\nscrupulously, because, if they did, they would not be pseudoconcepts,\nbut concepts; not imitations, but the very reality which they imitate.\nAn actor who, pretending on the stage to kill his rival in love,\nreally did so, would no longer be an actor, but a practical man and an\nassassin. If, therefore, with regard to the representations, and when\npreparing to form pseudoconcepts, we should think representations with\nthat universality which is also the concreteness proper to the true\nconcept, and with that transcendence which is also immanence (and is\ntherefore called _transcendentalism),_ we should form true concepts.\nThis, indeed, often happens, as we can see in certain treatises which\nmean to be empirical and arbitrary, and from which, _currente rota,\nnon urceus, sed amphora exit._ Their authors, led by a profound and\nirrepressible philosophic sense, gradually and almost unconsciously\nabandon their initial purpose, and give true and proper concepts in\nplace of the promised pseudoconcepts: they are philosophers, disguised\nas empiricists. In order to create pseudoconcepts, we must therefore\nbegin by arbitrarily dividing into two the one supreme necessity of\nlogic, immanent transcendence, or concrete universality, and form\npseudoconcepts, which are _concrete_ without being _universal,_\nor _universal_ without being _concrete._ There is no other way of\nfalsifying the concept; whoever wishes to falsify it so completely as\nto render the imitation unrecognizable, does not falsify, but produces\nit; he does not remain outside, but permits himself to be caught in its\ncoils; he does not invent a practical attitude, but thinks. That one\nmode is therefore specified in two particular modes, of which examples\nhave already been given in our analysis of the pseudoconcepts of the\nhouse, the cat, the rose, which are concrete without being universal;\nand of the triangle and of free motion, which are universal without\nbeing concrete. There is nothing left to do, therefore, but to baptize\nthem; selecting some of the many names that are applied, and often\napplied, sometimes to the one, sometimes to the other of the two forms,\nor indifferently to both, and giving to each of them a particular name,\nwhich will be constant in this treatise. We shall then call the first,\nthat is to say, those which are concrete and not universal, _empirical_\npseudoconcepts; and the second, or those which are universal and not\nconcrete, _abstract_ pseudoconcepts; or, taking as understood for\nbrevity's sake, the general denomination (pseudo), _empirical concepts_\nand _abstract concepts._\n\n[Sidenote: _The other characteristics of the pure concept._]\n\nThus, of the three characteristics of the concept which we have\nexhibited, the second and the third constitute, as we can now see, one\nonly, which is stated in a double form, solely in order to deny and\nto combat these two one-sided forms which we have called empirical\nand abstract concepts. But, on the other hand, it is easy to see that\nthe characteristics of the concept are not exhausted in the two that\nremain, namely, in expressivity or cognizability, and in transcendence\nor concrete universality. Others can reasonably be added, such as\n_spirituality, utility, morality,_ but we shall not dwell upon these,\nbecause either they belong to the general assumption of Logic, that\nis, to the fundamental concept of Philosophy as the science of spirit,\nor they are more conveniently made clear in the other parts of this\nPhilosophy. The concept has the character of spirituality and not of\nmechanism, because reality is spiritual, not mechanical; and for this\nreason we have to reject every mechanical or associationist theory\nof Logic, just as we have to reject similar doctrines in \u00c6sthetic,\nin Economic and in Ethic. A special discussion of these views seems\nsuperfluous, because they are discussed and negated, that is to say,\nsurpassed, in every line of our treatise. The concept has the character\nof utility, because, if the theoretic form of the spirit be distinct\nfrom the practical, it is not less true, by the law of the unity of\nthe spirit, that to think is also an act of the will, and therefore,\nlike every act of the will, it is teleological, not antiteleological;\nuseful, not useless. And, finally, it has the character of morality,\nbecause its utility is not merely individual, but, on the contrary,\nis subordinated to and absorbed in the moral activity of the spirit;\nso that to think, that is, to seek and find the true, is also to\ncollaborate in progress, in the elevation of Humanity and Reality, it\nis the denial and overcoming of oneself as a single individual, and\nthe service of God.\n\n[Sidenote: _The origin of the multiplicity and unity of character of\nthe concept._]\n\nCertainly, the form in which the order of our discourse has led us to\nestablish the characters of the concept--that of enumeration, the one\ncharacter being connected with the other by means of an \"also\"--is,\nlogically, a very crude form, and must be refined and corrected. Above\nall, if we have spoken of _characters_ of the concept, we have done so\nin order to adhere to the usual mode of expression. The concept cannot\nhave characters, in the plural, but _character,_ that one character\nwhich is proper to it. What this is has been seen; the concept is\nconcrete-universal two words which designate one thing only, and can\nalso grammatically become one: \"transcendental,\" or whatever other word\nbe chosen from those already coined, or that may be coined for the\noccasion. The other determinations are not _characters_ of the concept,\nbut affirm its _relations_ with the spiritual activity in general,\nof which it is a special form, and with the other special forms of\nthis activity. In the first relation, the concept is spiritual; in\nrelation with the \u00e6sthetic activity, it is cognitive or expressive,\nand enters into the general theoretic-expressive form; in relation\nwith the practical activity, it is not, as concept, either useful or\nmoral, but as a concrete act of the spirit it must be called useful\nand moral. The exposition of the characters of the concept, correctly\nthought, resolves itself into the compendious exposition of the whole\nPhilosophy of spirit, in which the concept takes its place in its\nunique character, that is to say, in itself.\n\n[Sidenote: _Objections relating to the unreality of the pure concept\nand to the impossibility of demonstrating it._]\n\nThis declaration may save us from the accusation of having given an\nempirical exposition of the non-empirical _Concept of the concept,_ and\nso committing an error for which logicians are justly reproved (for\nthey have often believed themselves to possess the right of treating\nof Logic without logic; perhaps for the same reason that custodians of\nsacred places are wont, through over-familiarity, to fail in respect\ntowards them). But it lays us open to censure very much more severe;\nwhich, if it ultimately prove to be inoffensive, is certainly very\nnoisy and loquacious. The pretended characters of the concepts (it\nis said) are, by your own confession, nothing but its relations with\nthe other forms of the spirit; and the one character proper to it is\nthat of universality-concreteness, that is, of being itself, since the\n\"concrete-universal\" is synonymous with the concept, and _vice versa._\nSo it turns out that in spite of all your efforts, your concept of the\nconcept becomes dissipated in a tautology. Give us a demonstration\nof what you affirm, or a definition which is not tautologous; then\nwe shall be able to form some sort of an idea of your pure concept.\nOtherwise you may talk about it for ever, but for us it will always be\nlike \"Ph\u0153nician Araby\" of Metastasian memory: \"you say _that it is;\nwhere it is,_ no one knows.\"\n\n[Sidenote: _Prejudice relating to the nature of demonstration._]\n\nBeneath such dissatisfaction and the claim it implies, we find first\nof all a prejudice of scholastic origin concerning what is called\n_demonstration._ That is to say, it is imagined that demonstration\nis like an irresistible contrivance, which grasps the learner by the\nneck and drags him willy-nilly, whither he does not and the teacher\ndoes will to go, leaving him open-mouthed before the truth, which\nstands external to him, and before which he must, _obtorto collo,_ bow\nhimself. But such coercive demonstrations do not exist for any form\nof knowledge--indeed, for any form of spiritual life--nor is there a\ntruth outside our spirit. Not that truth presupposes _faith,_ as is\noften said, so that rationality is subordinated to some unknown form of\nirrationality; but _truth is faith,_ trust in oneself, certainty of\noneself, free development of one's inner powers. The light is in us;\nthose sequences of sounds, which are the so-called demonstration, serve\nonly as aids in discarding the veils and directing the gaze; but in\nthemselves they have no power to open the eyes of those who obstinately\nwish to keep them closed. Faced with this sort of reluctance and\nrebellion, the pedagogues of the good old days had recourse, as we\nknow, not to demonstrations, but to the stool of penitence and to the\nstick; so fully were they persuaded that the demonstration of truth\nrequires good dispositions, _i.e._ requires those who are disposed to\nfall back upon themselves and to look into themselves. How can the\nbeauty of the song of Farinata be demonstrated to one who denies it,\nand will neither appreciate the soul contained in that sublime poem,\nnor accomplish the work necessary to attain to the possibility of such\nan appreciation, nor will, on the other hand, humbly confess his own\nincapacity and lack of preparation,--how can we forcibly demonstrate\nto him that that song is beautiful? The critical wisdom of Francesco\nde Sanctis would be disarmed and impotent before such a situation.\nHow can we demonstrate to one who deliberately refuses to believe\nin any authority or document, and breaks the tradition by which\nwe are bound to the past, that Miltiades conquered at Marathon, or\nthat Demosthenes strove all his life against the power of Macedonia?\nHe will capriciously throw doubt on the pages of Herodotus and the\norations of Demosthenes; and no reasoning will be able to repress\nthat caprice. What more can be said? Even in arithmetic, for which\ncalculating machines exist, compulsory demonstration is impossible.\nIn vain you will lift two fingers of the hand, and then the third\nand the fourth, in order to demonstrate to one who does not wish for\ndemonstration that two and two are four; he will reply that he is not\nconvinced. And indeed he cannot be convinced, if he do not accomplish\nthat inner spiritual synthesis by which twice two and four reveal\nthemselves as two names of one and the same thing. Therefore, he\nwho awaits a compelling demonstration of the existence of the pure\nconcept, awaits in vain. For our part, we cannot give him anything\nbut that which we are giving: a discourse, directed towards making\nclear the difficulties, and towards demonstrating how, by means of\nthe pure concept, all problems concerning the life of the spirit are\nilluminated, and how, without it, we cannot understand anything.\n\n[Sidenote: _Prejudice concerning the representability of the concept._]\n\nBut another prejudice, perhaps yet more tenacious than the first,\naccompanies this extravagant idea about demonstration. Accustomed as\nmen are to move among things, to see, to hear, to touch them, while\nhardly or only fugitively reflecting upon the spiritual processes which\nproduce that vision, hearing and touching; when they come to treat of a\nphilosophic question, and to conceive a concept (and especially when it\nis necessary to conceive precisely the concept of the concept), they do\nnot know how to refrain from demanding just that which they have been\nobliged to renounce in their new search, and which they have already\nrenounced, owing to the very fact of their having entered into it: the\nrepresentative element, something that they can see, hear and touch. It\nis almost as though a novice, on entering a monastery, and having just\npronounced the solemn vow of chastity, should ask, as his first request\nupon taking possession of his cell, for the woman who is to be his\ncompanion in that life. He will be answered that in such a place his\nspouse cannot be anything but an ideal spouse, holy Religion or holy\nMother Church.\n\n[Sidenote: _Protests of the philosophers against this prejudice._]\n\nAll philosophers have been compelled to protest against the request,\nwhich they have had addressed to them, for an impossible external\ndemonstration and for something representative in a field where\nrepresentation has been surpassed. \"In our system (said Fichte) we\nmust _ourselves_ lay the _foundation_ of our own philosophy, and\nconsequently that system must seem to be without foundation to one\nwho is incapable of accomplishing that act. But he may be assured\nbeforehand that he will never find a foundation elsewhere, if he do\nnot lay such an one for himself, or remain not satisfied with it.\nIt is fitting that our philosophy should proclaim this in a loud\nvoice, in order that it may be spared the pretence of demonstrating\nto mankind from _without_ what they must create in themselves.\"[1]\nSchelling appropriately compared philosophic obtuseness with \u00e6sthetic\nobtuseness: \"There are two only ways out of common reality. Poetry,\nwhich transports you into an ideal world, and Philosophy, which makes\n_the real world disappear altogether from our sight._ One does not see\nwhy the sense for Philosophy should be more generally diffused than\nthat for Poetry.\"[2] And Hegel, giving explanations which precisely\nmeet the present case, says: \"What is called the _incomprehensibility_\nof Philosophy, arises, in part, from an incapacity (in itself only\na lack of habit) to think abstractly, that is to say, to hold pure\nthoughts firmly before the spirit and to move in them. In our ordinary\nconsciousness, thoughts are clothed in and united with ordinary\nsensible and spiritual matter; and in our rethinking, reflecting and\nreasoning we mingle sentiments, intuitions and representations with\nthoughts: in every proposition whose content is entirely sensible (for\nexample: this leaf is green) there are already mingled categories,\nsuch as being and individuality. But it is quite another thing to\ntake as our object thoughts by themselves, without any admixture.\nThe other reason for its incomprehensibility is the impatience which\ndemands to have before it as representation that which in consciousness\nappears only as thought and concept. And we hear people say that they\ndo not know what there is _to think_ in a concept, which is already\napprehended; whereas _in a concept there is nothing to be thought\nbut the concept itself._ But the meaning of this saying is just that\nthey want a familiar and ordinary _representation._ It seems to\nconsciousness as if, with the removal from it of the representation,\nthe ground had been removed which was its firm and habitual support.\nWhen transported into the pure region of the concepts, it no longer\nknows _what world it is in._ For this reason, those writers, preachers\nand orators are esteemed marvels of _comprehensibility_ who offer their\nreaders or hearers things which they already know thoroughly, things\nwhich are familiar to them and which are self-evident.\"[3]\n\n[Sidenote: _Reason for their perpetual recurrence._]\n\nThus have all philosophers protested, and thus will all protest still,\nfrom age to age, because that intolerance, that immobility, that\nrecalcitrance before the very painful effort of having to abandon\nthe world of sense (though but for a single instant, and in order\nto reconquer and to possess it more completely) will perpetually be\nrenewed. They are the birth-pangs of the Concept, to escape which no\nplans for virginity and no man\u0153uvres to procure abortion are of any\navail. They must be endured, because that law of the Concept (\"thou\nshalt bring forth in suffering\") is also a law of life.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: _System de Sittenlehre_ (in _S\u00e4mmtl. Werke_), iv. p. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Idealismo transcendentale,_ trad. Losacco, p. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Encyclop\u00e6dia,_ Croce's translation, \u00a7 3, Observations.]\n\n\n\n\nIV\n\n\nDISPUTES AS TO THE NATURE OF THE CONCEPT\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Disputes of materialistic origin._]\n\nDisputes as to the nature of the concept have sometimes had their\norigin (notably in the recent period of philosophic barbarism,\nwhich \"renews the fear of thought,\" whence we have with difficulty\nemerged) in materialistic, mechanical and naturalistic prejudices.\nTherefore, as already mentioned, discussion has arisen as to whether\nthe concept should be considered logical or psychological, as the\nproduct of synthesis or of association, or of individual or hereditary\nassociation. But these are controversies which, for the reasons we gave\nbefore, we shall not spend time in illustrating.\n\n[Sidenote: _The concept as value._]\n\nNor shall we pay attention to the other controversy, as to whether\nconcepts are _values or facts,_ whether they operate only as _norms_ or\nalso as _effective forces_ of the real; because the division between\nvalues and facts, between norms and effective existence (between\n_Gelten_ and _Sein,_ as it is expressed in German terminology), is\nitself surpassed and unified, implicitly and explicitly, in all our\nphilosophy. If the concept or thought has value, it can have value\nonly because it _is;_ if the norm of thought operate as a norm, that\nimplies that it is thought itself, its own norm, a constitutive element\nof reality. There is not to be found in any form of spiritual life any\nvalue which is not also reality--not in art, where there is no other\nbeauty than art itself; nor in morality, where no other goodness is\nknown than action itself directed to the universal; nor in the life of\nthought. The concept has value, because it is; and is, because it has\nvalue.\n\n[Sidenote: _Realism and nominalism._]\n\nBut the greater part of these dissensions, which have existed for\ncenturies and are yet living, rests on the confusion between concepts\nand pseudoconcepts, and the consequent pretension to define the concept\nby denying one or other of these two forms. This is the origin of\nthe two opposite schools of _realists_ and _nominalists,_ which are\nalso called in our times rationalists and empiricists (arbitrarists,\nconventionalists, hedonists). The realists maintain that concepts\nare real: that they correspond to reality; the nominalists, that\nthey are simple names to designate representations and groups of\nrepresentations, or, as is now said, tickets and labels placed upon\nthings in order to recognize and find them again. In the former case,\nno elaboration of representations higher than the universalizing act\nof the concept is possible; in the latter, the only possible operation\nis that which has already been described--mutilation, reduction and\nfiction, directed to practical ends.\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique of both._]\n\nThe consequence of these one-sided affirmations has been that the\nrealists have defined as concepts, and therefore as having a universal\ncharacter, all sorts of rough pseudoconcepts; not only the horse, the\nartichoke and the mountain, but also, logically, the table, the bed,\nthe seat, the glass, and so on; and they have exposed themselves from\nthe earliest beginnings of philosophy to the sarcastic and irresistible\nobjection that the horse exists, but not horsiness, the table, but not\ntabularity. This conceptualization of pseudoconcepts is the error of\nwhich they have really been guilty, not that of conferring empirical\nreality on the concepts by placing them as single things alongside\nof other things, an extravagance which it is doubtful if any man of\nmoderate sense has ever seriously committed. The realists who rendered\nthe concepts real in this sense at the same time rendered them unreal,\nthat is to say, single and contingent, and in need of being surpassed\nby true concepts. The nominalists, on the other hand, considered as\narbitrary and mere names all the presuppositions of their mental\nlife--being and becoming, quality and final cause, goodness and beauty,\nthe true and the false, the Spirit and God. Without being aware of it,\nthey have fallen into inextricable contradictions and into logical\nscepticism.\n\n[Sidenote: _True realism._]\n\nIt is henceforth clear that this secular dispute cannot be decided in\nfavour of one or other of the contending parties, for both are right in\nwhat they affirm and wrong in what they deny, that is, both are right\nand wrong. The two forms of spiritual products, of which each of those\nschools in its affirmations emphasizes only one, both actually exist;\nthe one is not in antithesis to the other, as the rational is to the\nirrational. The true doctrine of the concept is realism, which does\nnot deny nominalism, but puts it in its place, and establishes with it\nloyal and unequivocal relations.\n\n[Sidenote: _Solution of other difficulties concerning the genesis of\nconcepts._]\n\nBy establishing such relations we emerge from the vicious circle,\nwhich has given such trouble to certain logicians, who have striven\nto explain the genesis of the concepts in terms of nominalism, but\nwere afterwards, when probing their doctrine to the bottom, compelled\nto admit the _necessity of the concepts_ as a _foundation_ for the\n_genesis of the concepts._ They believed that they had got out of\nthe difficulty by distinguishing two orders of concepts, primary and\nsecondary, formative models and formations according to models; and\nthey thus reproduced, in the semblance of a solution, the problem still\nunsolved. In different words, others admitted the same embarrassment.\nThey attempted to obtain the concepts from _experience,_ but\nrecognized at the same time that all experience presupposes an _ideal\nanticipation._ Or they declared that the concept fixes the _essential_\ncharacters of things, and, at the same time, that the essential\ncharacters of things are indispensable for fixing the _concept._ Or,\nfinally, they based the formation of concepts upon _categories,_ which,\nenumerated and understood as they understood them, were by no means\ncategories and functions, but _concepts._ Primary concepts, formative\nmodels, ideal anticipations, essential concepts, concept-categories,\nand the like, are nothing but verbal variants of the pure concepts;\nthe necessary presupposition, as we know, for the impure concepts or\npseudoconcepts.\n\n[Sidenote: _Disputes arising from neglect of the distinction between\nempirical and abstract concepts._]\n\nOther disputes, far enough apart in significance and nature, concerning\nthe nature of the concept, acquire a more precise meaning when\nreferred to our subdivision of pseudoconcepts into _empirical_ or\n_representative,_ and _abstract._ Thereby we can understand why it\nhas been asked if the concepts are _concrete_ or _abstract, general_\nor _universal, contingent_ or _necessary, approximate_ or _rigorous;_\nif they are obtained _a posteriori_ or _a priori,_ by _induction_ or\n_deduction,_ by _synthesis_ or _analysis,_ and so on. This series\nof disputes likewise cannot be settled, save by admitting that both\ncontending parties are right and wrong, and demonstrating that\npseudoconcepts (which are alone here in discussion) are constructed\nby analysis, and by deduction are _a priori,_ and have the characters\nof abstractness, rigorousness, universality and necessity, if it be\na question of _abstract_ pseudoconcepts, that is to say, of empty\nfictions, outside experience; while, on the other hand, they are\nconstructed by synthesis, and by induction are _a posteriori,_ and have\nthe characters of concreteness, approximation, mere generality and\ncontingency, if they be empirical or _representative_ pseudoconcepts,\nthat is to say, groups of representations, which do not go beyond\nrepresentation and experience. Indeed, from this last point of view, no\nerror was made in denying any difference between the (representative)\n_concept_ and the _general representation._ It is false that this\nlatter is the result of psychical mechanism or association, and the\nformer of psychical purpose, because there is nothing mechanical in\nthe spirit; and the general representation, if it is a product of the\nspirit, is as teleological as the other, indeed is absolutely one with\nthe other. It obeys, like it, the law of _economy,_ or, as we have\nshown, the practical ends of convenience and utility.\n\n[Sidenote: _Crossing of the various disputes._]\n\nBut these last disputes have crossed with that which we first examined\nbetween realism and nominalism, and have sometimes taken on the same\nmeaning. This must be kept in mind, to serve as a guide in the dense\nforest. Is the concept _a priori_ or _a posteriori,_ universal or\ngeneral, necessary or contingent? These questions and others like them\nwere sometimes understood as equivalent to the question: is it real or\nnominal, truth or fiction?\n\n[Sidenote: _Other logical disputes._]\n\nCertain problems of Logic, not yet solved in a satisfactory manner,\narise from the failure to make clear the confusion between concepts\nand pseudoconcepts, and between empirical and abstract concepts.\nIs it or is it not true that every concept must have an individual\nrepresentation, taken from its own sphere, as a necessary _support_?\nAre concepts of _things_ possible, or is there a special concept\ncorresponding to every thing? Is a concept of the _individual_\npossible? These three questions may be answered in the affirmative, in\nthe negative, and in the affirmative-negative, according as they are\nreferred to the empirical concept, the abstract concept, or the pure\nconcept.\n\n[Sidenote: _The representative accompaniment of the concept._]\n\nFor, if we consider the first question, we must resolutely deny that\nthe abstract concept has any need of a particular representation as its\nnecessary support. The geometric triangle, as such, is neither white\nnor black, nor of any given size; if the representation of a particular\ntriangle unites itself to it, geometry discards it. But we must just\nas resolutely affirm than an empirical or representative concept has\nalways an image to support it; the concept of a cat needs the image of\na cat, and every book on zoology is accompanied with illustrations.\nThe image may be varied, but never suppressed; and it may be varied\nonly within certain limits, because, if these be exceeded, the concept\nitself loses its form and is dissipated. Thus, for the concept of the\ncat, we could frame a representation of a white or black or red cat, or\na small or big one; but if scarlet colour or the size of an elephant\nbe attributed to the cat, which serves as symbol of the fiction, the\nconcept must be changed. That concept has at its command the images\nof cats, upon which it has been formed, which, as we know, are always\nfinite in number. Finally, with reference to the pure concept, it must\nbe said that every image and no image is in turn a symbol of it; as\nevery blade of grass (as Vanini said) represents God, and a number of\nimages, however great it be, does not suffice to represent Him.\n\n[Sidenote: _The concept of the thing and the concept of the\nindividual._]\n\nIn like manner, as regards the second question, it must be answered\nthat the empirical concept is nothing but a concept of things, or a\ngrouping of a certain number of things beneath one or other of them,\nwhich functions as a type; that the abstract concept is by definition,\nthe not-thing, incapable of representation; and that the pure concept\nis a concept of every thing and of no thing. And as regards the third,\nwe must answer that the abstract concept is altogether repugnant to\nindividuality; the pure concept alights upon every individual, only\nto leave it again, and in so far as it thinks all individual things,\nit renders them all, in a certain way, concepts, and in so far as it\nsurpasses them, it denies them as such; while the empirical concept\ncan be the _concept of the individual._ Because if in reality, the\nindividual be the situation of the universal spirit at a determinate\ninstant, empirically considered the individual becomes something\nisolated, cut off from the rest and shut up in itself, so that it is\npossible to attribute to it a certain constancy in relation to the\noccurrences of the life it lives; so that that life assumes almost the\nposition of the individual determinations of a concept. Socrates is the\nlife of Socrates, inseparable from all the life of the time in which he\ndeveloped; but empirically and usefully we can construct the concept of\na Socrates a controversialist, an educator, endowed with imperturbable\ncalm, of which the Socrates who ate and drank and wore clothes, and\nlived during such and such occurrences, is the incarnation. Thus we can\nform pseudoconcepts of individuals as well as of things, or, to express\nit in terms that are the fashion, we can form _Platonic ideas_ of them.\n\n[Sidenote: _Reasons, laws, and causes._]\n\nIt is also well to note that to adduce the _reasons,_ the _laws,_\nthe _causes_ of things and of reality, is equivalent to establishing\nconcepts, and since the word \"concepts\" has been applied in turn to\npure and to empirical and abstract concepts, laws and causes have been\nalternately described as truths and as fictions. It belongs to the\ndiscussion of terminology to remark that in general the word \"reason\"\nhas been used only for researches into pure and abstract concepts,\n\"cause\" for empirical concepts, and \"laws\" almost equally for all\nthree, but perhaps a little more for empirical and abstract than for\npure concepts. But to the confusion of these three forms of spiritual\nproducts is to be attributed the fact that there have been discussions,\nas, for instance, whether there be _concepts of laws_ in addition to\nconcepts of things, the issue of which was at bottom the desire to\nascertain whether there exist abstract and pure concepts, in addition\nto empirical concepts.\n\n[Sidenote: _Intellect and Reason._]\n\nThe profound diversity of the concepts and of the pseudoconcepts\nsuggested (at the time when it was customary to represent the forms\nor grades of the spirit as faculties) the distinction between two\nlogical faculties, which were called _Intellect_ (or, also, _abstract_\nIntellect), and _Reason._ The first of these formed what we now call\npseudoconcepts; the second, pure concepts.\n\n[Sidenote: _The abstract intellect and its practical nature._]\n\nBut the proper character of neither of the two faculties was realized\nby those who postulated them; they fell into the error, which we have\nalready had occasion to criticize, of conceiving the Intellect as a\nform of knowledge, which either lives in the false, or is limited to\npreparing the material for the superior faculty, to which it supplies\na first imperfect sketch of the concept. But the faculty required\nfor this should be, not of a theoretical nature, but of a practical.\nIt is a terminological question of slight interest, whether the name\n\"Intellect\" should be retained for the production of pseudoconcepts,\nor whether the purely theoretic meaning, which it first had, should be\nrestored to it, and it should thus be made synonymous with \"Reason.\"\nIt can only be observed that it will be very difficult to remove\nhenceforth from \"Intellect,\" from \"intellectual formations,\" and from\n\"intellectualism,\" the suspicion and discredit cast upon them by the\ngreat philosophic history of the first half of the nineteenth century;\nso much so, that only where a rather popular style is employed, can\nIntellect and Reason be used promiscuously.\n\nWith greater truth, Reason was considered as unifying what the\nIntellect had divided, and therefore as unifying abstraction and\nconcreteness, deduction and induction, analysis and synthesis. With\ngreater truth, although complete exactness would have demanded here,\nnot so much that to Reason should be given the power of unifying\nwhat has been unduly divided, as that to the Intellect, that is to\nsay, to the practical faculty, should be given the power of dividing\nextrinsically what for Reason is never divided: a power which the\nIntellect, as a practical faculty, possesses and exercises, not in a\npathological, but in a physiological way.\n\n[Sidenote: _The synthesis of theoretic and practical, and the\nintellectual intuition._]\n\nThe incomplete survey of the so-called Intellect, the theoretic\ncharacter of which was preserved, though in a depreciatory sense,\nissued in the result that finally to Reason itself was attributed a\ncharacter, no longer theoretic, or rather, _more than theoretic._\nKnowledge, presenting itself in the form of Intellect, seemed\ninadequate to truth; to attain to which there intervened Reason, or\nspeculative procedure, the _synthesis of theory and practice,_ a\nknowledge which is action, and an action which is knowledge. Sometimes,\nReason itself, thus transfigured, seemed insufficient, owing to\nthe presence of ratiocinative processes, which came to it from the\nIntellect, and were absorbed by it; and the supreme faculty of truth\nwas conceived, not as logical reasoning, but as intuition; an intuition\ndiffering from the purely artistic and revealing the genuine truth,\nan organ of the absolute, _intellectual Intuition._ It was urged\nagainst intellectual intuition that it created irresponsibility in\nthe field of truth, and made lawful every individual caprice. But a\nsimilar objection could be brought against Reason, which is superior to\nknowledge, and is the synthesis of theory and practice: while, on the\nother hand, it cannot be denied, both of intellectual Intuition and of\nReason, that on the whole they affirmed or tended to affirm _the rights\nof the pure Concept,_ as opposed to empirical and abstract concepts.\n\n[Sidenote: _Uniqueness of thought._]\n\nFor our part, we have no need to lower the cognitive activity beneath\nthe level of truth, by attributing to it an intellectualiste and\narbitrary function; nor, on the other hand (in order to supplement\nknowledge and intellect thus pauperized), to exalt Reason above\nitself. Thought (call it Intellect, or Reason, or what you will) is\nalways thought; and it always thinks with pure concepts, never with\npseudoconcepts. And since there is not another thought beneath thought,\nso there is not another thought superior to it. The difficulties\nwhich led to these conclusions have been completely explained, when\nwe have distinguished concepts from pseudoconcepts, and demonstrated\nthe heterogeneity which exists between these two forms of spiritual\nproducts.\n\n\n\n\nV\n\nCRITIQUE OF THE DIVISIONS OF THE CONCEPTS AND THEORY OF DISTINCTION AND\nDEFINITION\n\n\n[Sidenote: _The pseudoconcepts, not a subdivision of the concept._]\n\n\nPrecisely because they are heterogeneous formations, pure concepts and\npseudoconcepts do not constitute divisions of the generic concept of\nthe concept. To assume that they did, would be a horrible confusion of\nterms, not far different (to use Spinoza's example) from that of the\ndivision of the dog into _animal_ dog and _constellation_ dog; though\npoets used at one time to talk of the celestial dog also, as \"barking\nand biting,\" when the sun implacably burned the fields.\n\n[Sidenote: _Obscurity, clearness and distinction, not subdivisions of\nthe concept._]\n\nAnd seeing that our point of view is philosophic, we can take no\naccount of another division of the concept, which had great fame\nand authority in the past: that into _obscure, confused, clear_ and\n_distinct_ concepts and the like, or of the degrees of _perfection_ to\nwhich the concept attains. Such a division can retain at the most but\nan empirical and approximate value, and under this aspect it will be\ndifficult altogether to renounce it in ordinary discourse; but it has\nno logical and philosophic value whatever. The concept is what is truly\nconcept, the perfect concept, not at all the encumbered or wandering\ntendency toward it. Yet that division had great historical importance.\nBy means of it, indeed, the attempt was made to differentiate the\nconcept, under the name of _clear_ and _distinct_ thought, from the\nintuition, which was _clear_ but _confused_ thought, and both of these\nfrom sensation, impression, or emotion, which was called _obscure._\nThis was attempted, but without success; the problem was set but not\nsolved; for the solution was only attained when it was seen that,\nin this case, it was not a question of three degrees of thought, as\nabsolute logic claimed, but of three forms of the spirit: of thought\nor _distinction,_ of intuition _ox clearness_; and of the practical\nactivity, _obscurity_ or _naturality._\n\n[Sidenote: _Non-existence of subdivisions of the concept as a logic at\nform._]\n\nLogically, the concept does not give rise to distinctions, for there\nare not several forms of concept, but one only. This is a perfectly\nanalogous result in Logic to that which we reached in \u00c6sthetic, when\nwe established the uniqueness of intuition or expression, and the\nnon-existence of special modes or classes of expressions (except\nin the empirical sense, in which we can always establish as many\nclasses as we wish). In distinguishing the forms of the spirit, the\ntwo principal forms, theoretic and practical, having been divided,\nand the theoretic having been subdivided into intuition and concept,\nthere is no place for a further subdivision of the theoretic forms,\nsince intuition and concept are each of them indivisible forms. The\nreason for this indivisibility cannot be clearly understood, save by\nthe complete development of the Philosophy of the spirit; and it is\nonly to be remarked here in passing, that the division of intuition\nand concept has as its foundation the distinction between individual\nand universal. And since in this distinction there is no _medium quid_\nnor an _ulterius,_ a third or fourth intermediate form, so there is no\nsubdivision; since we pass from the concept of individuality to single\nindividuality, which is not a concept, and from the concept of the\nconcept to the single act of thought, which is no longer the simple\ndefinition of logical thinking, but effective logical thinking itself.\n\n[Sidenote: _The distinctions of the concept not logical, but real._]\n\nSince all subdivision of the logical form of the concept has been\nexcluded, the multiplicity of concepts can be referred only to the\nvariety of the objects, which are thought in the logical form of the\nconcept. The concept of _goodness_ is not that of _beauty_; or rather,\nboth are logically the same thing, since both are logical form; but the\naspect of reality designated by the first is not the same aspect of\nreality as is designated by the second.\n\n[Sidenote: _Multiplicity of the concepts, and the logical difficulty\narising therefrom. Necessity of overcoming it._]\n\nBut here arises the difficulty. How can it be that since in the concept\nwe deal with reality, in its universal aspect, we yet obtain so many\nvarious forms of reality, that is, so many distinct concepts (for\nexample, passion, will, morality, imagination, thought, and so on), so\nmany _universals,_ whereas the concept should give us _the universal._\nIf this variety were not overcome or capable of being overcome by the\nconcept, we should have to conclude that the true universal is not\nattainable by thought, and to return to scepticism, or at least to\nthat peculiar form of logical scepticism which makes the consciousness\nof unity an act of the inner life, which cannot be stated in terms of\nlogic; that is, mysticism. The distinction of the concepts, one from\nanother, in the absence of unity, is separation and atomism; and it\nwould certainly not be worth while getting out of the multiplicity of\nrepresentations if we were then to fall into that of the concepts.\nFor this, no less than the other, would issue in a _progressus ad\ninfinitum,_ for who would ever be able to affirm that the concepts\nwhich were discovered and enumerated were all the concepts? If they be\nten, why should they not be, if better observed, twenty, a hundred, or\nfifty thousand? Why, indeed, should they not be just as numerous as\nthe representations, that is to say, infinite? Spinoza, who counted,\nwithout mediating between them, two attributes of substance, thought\nand extension, admitted, with perfect coherence, that two are known to\nus, but that the attributes of Substance must in reality be considered\ninfinite in number.\n\n[Sidenote: _Impossibility of eliminating it._]\n\nThe concept, then, demands that this multiplicity be denied; and we\ncan affirm that the real is one, because the concept, by means of\nwhich alone we know it, is one; the content is one, because the form\nof thought is one. But in accepting this claim, we run into another\ndifficulty. If we jettison distinction, the unity that we attain is\nan empty unity, deprived of organic character, a whole without parts,\na simple _beyond_ the representations, and therefore inexpressible\nso that we should return to mysticism by another route. A whole is a\nwhole, only because and in so far as it has parts, indeed _is_ parts;\nan organism is such, because it has and is organs and functions; a\nunity is thinkable only in so far as it has distinctions in itself,\nand is the unity of the distinctions. Unity without distinction is as\nrepugnant to thought as distinction without unity.\n\n[Sidenote: _Unify as distinction._]\n\nIt follows, therefore, that both terms are reciprocally indispensable,\nand that the distinctions of the concept are not the negation of the\nconcept, nor something outside the concept, but the concept itself,\nunderstood in its truth; the _one-distinct;_ one, only because\ndistinct, and distinct only because one. Unity and distinction are\ncorrelative and therefore inseparable.\n\n[Sidenote: _Inadequateness of the numerical concept of multiplicity._]\n\nThe distinct concepts, constituting in their distinction unity, cannot,\nabove all, be infinite in number, for in that case they would be\nequivalent to the representations. Not indeed that they are finite in\nnumber, as if they were all alike equally arranged upon one and the\nsame plane, and capable of being placed in any other sort of order,\nwithout alteration in their being. The _Beautiful,_ the _True,_ the\n_Useful,_ the _Good,_ are not the first steps in a numerical series,\nnor do they permit themselves to be arranged at pleasure, so that we\nmay place the beautiful after the true, or the good before the useful,\nor the useful before the true, and so on. They have a necessary order,\nand mutually imply one another; and from this we learn that they are\nnot to be described as finite in number, since number is altogether\nincapable of expressing such a relation. To count implies having\nobjects separate from one another before us; and here, on the contrary,\nwe have terms that are distinct, but inseparable, of which the second\nis not only second, but, in a certain sense, also first, and the first\nnot only first, but, in a certain way, also second. We cannot dispense\nwith numbers, when treating of these concepts of the spirit, owing to\ntheir convenience for handling the subject; hence we talk, for example,\nof the _ten_ categories, or of the _three_ terms of the concept, or of\nthe _four_ forms of the spirit. But in this case the numbers are mere\n_symbols_; and we must beware of understanding the objects which they\nenumerate, as though they were ten sheep, three oxen, and four cows.\n\n[Sidenote: _Relation of the distinct concepts as ideal history._]\n\nThis relation of the distinct concepts in the unity which they\nconstitute, can be compared to the spectacle of life, in which every\nfact is in relation with all other facts, and the fact which comes\nafter is certainly different from that which precedes, but is also the\nsame; since the consequent fact contains in itself the preceding, as,\nin a certain sense, the preceding virtually contained the consequent,\nand was what it was, just because it possessed the power of producing\nthe consequent. This is called _history_; and therefore (continuing\nto develop the comparison) the relation of the concepts, which are\ndistinct in the unity of the concept, can be called and has been called\n_ideal history_; and the logical theory of such ideal history has been\nregarded as the theory of the _degrees of the concept,_ just as real\nhistory is conceived as a series of _degrees of civilization._ And\nsince the theory of the degrees of the concept is the theory of its\ndistinction, and its distinction is not different from its unity, it\nis clear that this theory can be separated from the general doctrine\nof the concept with which it is substantially one, only with a view to\ngreater facility of exposition.\n\n[Sidenote: _Distinction between ideal and real history._]\n\nMetaphors and comparisons are metaphors and comparisons and (like all\nforms of language) their effectiveness for the purposes of dissertation\nis accompanied, as we know, by the danger of misunderstanding. In order\nto avoid this, without at the same time renouncing the convenience of\nsuch modes of expression, it will be well to insist that the historical\nseries, where the distinct concepts appear connected, is _ideal,_ and\ntherefore outside space and time, and eternal; so that it would be\nerroneous to conceive that in any smallest fragment of reality, or in\nany most fugitive instant of it, one degree is found without the other,\nthe first without the second, or the first and the second without\nthe third. Here too, we must allow for the exigencies of exposition,\nwhereby, sometimes, when we intend to emphasize the distinction, we\nare led to speak of the relation of one degree to another, as if they\nwere distinct existences; as if the practical man really existed side\nby side with the theoretic man, or the poet side by side with the\nphilosopher, or as if the work of Art stood separate from the labour\nof reflection, and so on. But if a particular historical fact can in\na certain sense be considered as essentially distinct in time and\nspace, the grades of the concept are not existentially, temporally, and\nspatially distinct.\n\n[Sidenote: _Ideal and abstract distinction._]\n\nAn opposite, but not less serious error, would be to conceive the\ngrades of the concept as distinct only _abstractly,_ thus making\nabstract concepts of distinct concepts. The abstract distinction\nis unreal; and that of the concept is real; and the reality of the\ndistinction (since here we are dealing with the concept) is precisely\n_ideality,_ not _abstraction._ The universal, and therefore also all\nthe forms of the universal, are found in every minutest fragment of\nlife, in the so-called physical atom of the physicists, or in the\npsychical atom of the psychologists; the concept is therefore all\ndistinct concepts. But _each one of them is, as it were, distinct\nin that union_; and in the same way as man is man, in so far as he\naffirms all his activities and his entire humanity, and yet cannot\ndo this, save by specializing as a scientific man, a politician, a\npoet, and so on. In the same way the thinker, when thinking reality,\ncan think it only in its distinct aspects, and in this way only he\nthinks it in its unity. A work of Art and a philosophical work, an\nact of thought or of will, cannot be taken up in the hand or pointed\nout with the finger; and it can be affirmed only in a practical and\napproximate sense that this book is poetry, and that philosophy,\nthat this movement is a theoretic or practical, a utilitarian or a\nmoral act. It is well understood that this book is also philosophy;\nand that it is also a practical act; just as that useful act is also\nmoral, and also theoretic; and _vice versa._ But to think a certain\nintuitive datum and to recognize it as an affirmation of the whole\nspirit, is not possible save by thinking its different aspects\ndistinctly. This renders possible, for example, a criticism of Art,\nconducted exclusively from the point of view of Art; or a philosophical\ncriticism, from the exclusive point of view of philosophy; or a moral\njudgment, which considers exclusively the moral initiative of the\nindividual, and so on. And therefore, here as in the preceding case,\nit is needful to guard against forcing the comparison with history\ntoo far, and conceiving, in history, the possibility of divisions as\nrigorous as in the concept. If distinct concepts be not _existences,_\nexistences are not _distinct_ concepts; a fact cannot be placed in the\nsame relation to another fact, as one grade of the concept to another,\nprecisely because in every fact there are all the determinations of the\nconcept, and a fact in relation to another fact is not a conceptual\ndetermination.\n\nCertainly _distinct_ concepts can become _simple abstractions_; but\nthis only happens when they are taken in an abstract way, and so\nseparated from one another, co-ordinated and made parallel, by means of\nan arbitrary operation, which can be applied even to the pure concepts.\nThe distinct concepts then become changed into _pseudoconcepts,_ and\nthe character of abstraction belongs to these last, not to the distinct\nconcepts as such, which are always at once distinct and united.\n\n[Sidenote: _Other usual distinctions of the concept, and their meaning,\nidenticals, disparates, primitives, and derivatives, etc._]\n\nThis is not the place to dwell upon the other forms of concepts met\nwith in Logic, known as _identical_ concepts, which cannot be anything\nbut synonyms, or words;--or upon _disparate_ concepts, which are simply\ndistinct concepts, in so far as they are taken in a relation, which\nis not that given in the distinction, and is therefore arbitrary, so\nthat the concepts, thus presented without the necessary intermediaries,\nappear disparate;--or _primitive and derived concepts, or simple and\ncompound concepts_; a distinction which does not exist for the pure\nconcepts, since they are always simple and primitive, never compound or\nderived.\n\n[Sidenote: _Universals, particulars, and singulars. Intension and\nextension._]\n\nBut the distinction of concepts into _universal, particular,_ and\n_singular_ deserves elucidation, for the reason that we are now\ngiving. Concepts, which are only universal, or only particular, or\nonly singular, or to which any one of these determinations is wanting,\nare not conceivable. Indeed, universality only means that the distinct\nconcept is also the unique concept, of which it is a distinction and\nwhich is composed of such distinctions; particularity means that the\ndistinct concept is in a determinate! relation with another distinct\nconcept; and singularity that in this particularity and in that\nuniversality it is also itself. Thus the distinct concept is always\nsingular, and therefore universal and particular; and the universal\nconcept would be abstract were it not also particular and singular. In\nevery concept there is the whole concept, and all other concepts; but\nthere is also one determinate concept. For example, beauty is spirit\n(universality), theoretic spirit (particularity), and intuitive spirit\n(singularity); that is to say, the whole spirit, in so far as it is\nintuition. Owing to this distinction into universal, particular, and\nsingular, it is self-evident that intension and extension are, as the\nphrase is, in inverse ratio, since this amounts to repeating that the\nuniversal is universal, the particular particular, and the singular\nsingular.\n\n[Sidenote: _Logical definition._]\n\nThe interest of this distinction of universality, particularity, and\nsingularity lies in this, that upon it is founded the doctrine of\n_definition,_ since it is not possible to define, that is, to think\na concept, save by thinking its _singularity_ (peculiarity), nor to\nthink this, save by determining it as _particularity_ (relation with\nthe other distinct concepts) and _universality_ (relation with the\nwhole). Conversely, it is not possible to think universality without\ndetermining its particularity and singularity; otherwise that universal\nwould be empty. The distinct concepts are defined by means of the one,\nand the one by means of the distinct. This doctrine, thus made clear,\nis also in harmony with that of the nature of the concepts.\n\n[Sidenote: _Unity, distinction as circle._]\n\nBut the theory of the distinct concepts and that of their unity still\npresent something irrational and give rise to a new difficulty.\nBecause, if it be true that the distinct concepts constitute an ideal\nhistory or series of grades, it is also true that in such a history\nand series there is a _first_ and _last,_ the concept _a,_ which opens\nthe series, and, let us say, the concept _d,_ which concludes it.\nCommencement and end thus remain both without motive. But in order\nthat the concept be unity in distinction and that it may be compared\nto an organism, it is necessary that it have no other commencement\nsave itself, and that none of its single distinct terms be an absolute\ncommencement. For, in fact, in the organism no member has priority over\nthe others; but each is reciprocally first and last. Now this means\nthat the symbol of _linear series_ is inadequate to the concept; and\nthat its true symbol is the _circle,_ in which _a_ and _d_ function, in\nturn, as first and last. And indeed the distinct concepts, as eternal\nideal history, are an eternal going and returning, in which _a, b, c,\nd_ arise from _d,_ without possibility of pause or stay, and in which\neach one, whether _a_ or _b_ or _c_ or _d,_ being unable to change its\nplace, is to be designated, in turn, as first or as last. For example,\nin the Philosophy of Spirit it can be said with equal truth or error\nthat the end or final goal of the spirit is to know or to act, art or\nphilosophy; in truth, neither in particular, but only their totality\nis the end; or only the Spirit is the end of the Spirit. Thus is\neliminated the rational difficulty, which might be urged in relation to\nthis part.\n\n[Sidenote: _Distinction in the pseudoconcepts._]\n\nIt is still better eliminated, and the whole doctrine of the pure\nconcepts which we have been expounding is thereby illumined and thrown\ninto clearer outline when we observe the transformation (which we will\nnot call either inversion or perversion), to which it is submitted in\nthe doctrine of the pseudoconcepts. It is therefore expedient to refer\nrapidly to this for the sake of contrast and emphasis.\n\nAbove all, certain distinctions, which in the doctrine of the pure\nconcepts have been seen to be without significance or importance,\nfind their significance in the doctrine of the pseudoconcepts. We\nunderstand, for instance, how and why _identical_ concepts can be\ndiscussed; since, in the field of caprice, one and the same thing,\nor one and the same not-thing, can be defined in different ways\nand give rise to two or more concepts which, owing to the identity\nof their matter, are thus identical. The concept of a figure having\nthree angles, or that of a figure having three sides, are identical\nconcepts, alike applicable to the triangle; the concept of 3 x 4 and\nthat of 6 x 2 are identical, since both are definitions of the number\n12; the concept of a feline domestic animal and that of a domestic\nanimal that eats mice are identical, both being definitions of the cat.\nIt is likewise clear how and why _primary_ and _derived, simple_ and\n_compound_ concepts are discussed; for our arbitrary choice, by forming\ncertain concepts and making use of these to form others, comes to posit\nthe first as simple and primitive in relation to the second, which are,\nin their turn, to be considered as compound or secondary.\n\n[Sidenote: _The subordination and co-ordination of the empirical\nconcepts._]\n\nWe have already seen that the arbitrary concept differs from the pure\nconcept in that, of necessity, it produces two forms by the two acts of\nempiricism and emptiness and thereby gives rise to two different types\nof formations, empirical and abstract concepts. Empirical concepts\nhave this property, that in them unity is outside distinction and\ndistinction outside unity. And it is natural: for if it were the case\nthat these two determinations penetrated one another, the concepts\nwould be, as we have already noted, not arbitrary, but necessary and\ntrue. If the distinction is placed outside the unity, every division\nthat is given of it is, like the concepts themselves, arbitrary;\nand every enumeration is also arbitrary, because those concepts can\nbe infinitely multiplied. In exchange for the rationally determined\nand completely unified distinctions of the pure concepts, the\npseudoconcepts offer multiple groups, arbitrarily formed, and sometimes\nalso unified in a single group, which embraces the entire field of the\nknowable, but in such a way as not to exclude an infinite number of\nother ways of apprehending it.\n\nIn these groups the empirical concepts simulate the arrangement of\nthe pure concepts, reducing the particular to the universal, that is\nto say, a certain number of concepts beneath another concept. But\nit is impossible in any way to think these subordinate concepts, as\nactualizations of the fundamental concept, which are developed from\none another and return into themselves; hence we are compelled to\nleave them external to one another, simply co-ordinated. The scheme\nof _subordination_ and _co-ordination,_ and its relative spatial\nsymbol (the symbol of _classification_), which is a right line, on\nthe upper side of which falls perpendicularly another right line,\nand from whose lower side descend other perpendicular and therefore\nparallel right lines, is opposed to the circle and is the most evident\nocular demonstration of the profound diversity of the two procedures.\nIt will always be impossible to dispose a nexus of pure concepts in\nthat classificatory scheme without falsifying them; it will always be\nimpossible to transform empirical concepts into a series of grades\nwithout destroying them.\n\n[Sidenote: _The definition in the empirical concepts, and the notes of\nthe concept._]\n\nIn consequence of the scheme of classification, the definition which,\nin the case of pure concepts, has the three moments of universality,\nparticularity, and singularity, in the case of empirical concepts\nhas only two, which are called _genus_ and _species_; and is applied\naccording to the rule, by means of the _proximate genus_ and the\n_specific difference._ Its object indeed is simply to record, not to\nunderstand and to think, a given empirical formation; and this is fully\nattained when its position is determined by means of the indication of\nwhat is above and what is beside it. In order to determine it yet more\naccurately, the doctrine of the definition has been gradually enriched\nwith other _marks_ or _predicables,_ which, in traditional Logic,\nare five: _genus, species, differentia, property, accident._ But it\nis a question of caprice upon caprice, of which it is not advisable\nto take too much account. And as it would be barbaric to apply the\nclassificatory scheme to the pure concepts, so it would be equally\nbarbaric to define the pure concepts by means of _marks,_ that is, by\nmeans of characteristics mechanically arranged.\n\n[Sidenote: _Series in the abstract concepts._]\n\nWhere the thinker forgets the true function of the empirical concepts\nand is seized with the desire to develop them rationally, and thus\nto overcome the atomism of the scheme of classification and of\nextrinsic definition, he is led to refine them into abstract concepts,\nin which that scheme and that method of definition are overcome:\nthe classification becomes a _series_ (numerical series, series of\ngeometrical forms, etc.), and the definition becomes _genetic._ But\nthis improvement not only makes the empirical concepts disappear,\nand is therefore not improvement but death (like the death which the\nempirical concepts find in true knowledge when they return or mount up\nagain to pure thought); but such improvement substitutes for empiricism\nemptiness. Series and genetic definitions answer without doubt to\ndemands of the practical spirit; but, as we know, they do not yield\ntruth, not even the truth which lies at the bottom of an empirical\nconcept or of a falsified and mutilated representation. Hence, here as\nelsewhere, empirical concepts and abstract concepts reveal their double\none-sidedness, and exhibit more significantly the value of the unity\nwhich they break up; the distinction, which is not classification,\nbut circle and unity; the definition, which is not an aggregate of\nintuitive data; the series, which is a complete series; the genesis,\nwhich is not abstract but ideal.\n\n\n\n\nVI\n\nOPPOSITION AND LOGICAL PRINCIPLES\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Opposite or contrary concepts._]\n\nBy what has been said, we have made sufficiently clear the nature of\ndistinct concepts, that is to say, unity in distinction and distinction\nin unity, and we have left no doubt as to the kind of unity which\nthe concept affirms, that it is not _in spite of_ but _by means of_\ndistinction. But another difficulty seems to arise, due to another\norder of concepts, which are called _opposites_ or _contraries._\n\n[Sidenote: _Their difference from distincts._]\n\nIt is indubitable that opposite concepts neither are nor can be reduced\nto distincts; and this becomes evident so soon as instances of both\nare recalled to mind. In the system of the spirit, for instance, the\npractical activity will be distinct from the theoretic, and within\nthe practical activity the utilitarian and ethical activities will\nbe distinct. But the contrary of the practical activity is practical\ninactivity, the contrary of utility, harmfulness, the contrary of\nmorality, immorality. Beauty, truth, utility, moral good are distinct\nconcepts; but it is easy to see that ugliness, falsehood, uselessness,\nevil cannot be added to or inserted among them. Nor is this all: upon\ncloser inspection we perceive that the second series cannot be added\nto or mingled with the first, because each of the contrary terms\nis already inherent in its contrary, or accompanies it, as shadow\naccompanies light. Beauty is such, because it denies ugliness; good,\nbecause it denies evil, and so on. The opposite is not positive, but\nnegative, and as such is accompanied by the positive.\n\n[Sidenote: _Confirmation of this given by the Logic of empiria._]\n\nThis difference of nature between opposite concepts and distinct\nconcepts is also reflected in empirical Logic, that is, in the theory\nof pseudoconcepts; because this Logic, while it reduces the distinct\nconcepts to _species,_ refuses to treat the opposites in like manner.\nHence one does not say that the genus _dog_ is divided into the species\n_live_ dogs and _dead_ dogs; or that the genus _moral man_ is divided\ninto the species _moral_ and _immoral_ man; and if such has sometimes\nbeen affirmed, an impropriety--even for this kind of Logic--has been\ncommitted, since the _species_ can never be the _negation_ of the\n_genus._ So this empirical Logic confirms in its own way that opposite\nconcepts are different from distinct.\n\n[Sidenote: _Difficulty arising from the double type of concepts,\nopposites, and distincts._]\n\nIt is, however, equally evident that we cannot content ourselves with\nenumerating the opposite, side by side with the distinct concepts;\nbecause we should thus be adopting non-philosophical methods in place\nof philosophical, and in the philosophical theory of Logic should be\nlapsing into illogicality or empiricism. If the unity of the concept\nbe at the same time its _self-distinction,_ how can that same unity\nhave another parallel sort of division or self-distinction, which is\n_self-opposition!_ If it is inconceivable to resolve the one into\nthe other, and to make of the opposites distinct concepts, or of the\ndistincts opposite concepts, then it is not less inconceivable to leave\nboth distincts and opposites within the unity of the concept unmediated\nand unexplained.\n\n[Sidenote: _Nature of the opposites; and their identity with the\ndistincts when distinguished from them._]\n\nIt will possibly serve towards a solution of this\ndifficulty--undoubtedly a very grave one--to go deeply into the\nnature of the difference between opposite and distinct concepts.\nThese latter are distinguishable in unity; reality is their unity and\nalso their distinction. Man is thought and action; indivisible but\ndistinguishable forms; so much so that in so far as we think we deny\naction, and in so far as we act we deny thought. But the opposites are\nnot distinguishable in this way: the man who commits an evil action,\n_if he really does something,_ does not commit an evil action, but an\naction which is useful to him; the man who thinks a false thought, _if\nhe does something real,_ does not think the false thought, indeed does\nnot think at all, but, on the contrary, lives and provides for his own\nconvenience and in general for a good which at that instant he desires.\nHence we see that the opposites, when taken as distinct moments, are no\nlonger opposites, but distincts; and in that case they retain negative\ndenominations only metaphorically, whereas, strictly speaking, they\nwould merit positive. In order, therefore, that the consideration of\nopposition be not changed when superficially regarded into that of\ndistinction, it is desirable not to make of it a distinction in the\nbosom of the concept, that is to say, to combat every distinction by\nopposition, by declaring it to be _merely abstract._\n\n[Sidenote: _Impossibility of distinguishing one opposite from another,\nas concept from concept._]\n\nSo true is this, that no sooner are opposite terms taken as distincts\nthan the one becomes the other, that is to say, both evaporate into\nemptiness. The disputes caused by the opposition of _being_ to\n_not-being_ and the unity of both in _becoming_ are celebrated in this\nconnection. And we know that being, thought as pure being, is the same\nas not-being or nothing; and nothing, thought as pure nothingness,\nis the same as pure being. Thus, the truth is neither the one nor\nthe other, but is becoming, in which both are, but as opposites, and,\ntherefore, indistinguishable: becoming is being itself, which has in\nit not-being, and so is also not-being. We cannot think the relation\nof being to not-being as the relation of one form of the spirit, or\nof reality, to another form. In the latter case we have unity in\ndistinction: in the former, rectified or _restored_ unity, that is to\nsay, reaffirmed against _emptiness;_ against the empty unity of mere\nbeing, or of mere not-being; or against the mere sum of being and of\nnot-being.\n\n[Sidenote: _The dialectic._]\n\nThe two moments should certainly be synthesized, when we attack the\nabstract thought, which divides them: taken in themselves, they\nare, not two moments united in a third, but one only, the third\n(in this case also the number is a symbol), that is to say, the\nindistinguishability of the moments. It thus happens (be it said in\npassing) that Hegel, to whom we owe the polemic against empty being,\nwas content for this purpose neither with the words _unity_ and\n_identity,_ nor with _synthesis,_ nor with _triad,_ and preferred\nto call this indistinguishable opposition in unity the objective\n_dialectic_ of the real. But whatever be the words that we chose to\nemploy, the thing is what has been said. The opposite is not the\ndistinct of its opposite, but the abstraction of the true reality.\n\n[Sidenote: _The opposites are not concepts, but the unique concept\nitself._]\n\nIf this be the fact, the duality and parallelism of distinct and\nopposite concepts no longer exist. The opposites are the concept\nitself, and therefore the concepts themselves, each one in itself,\nin so far as it is determination of the concept, and in so far as it\nis conceived in its true reality. Reality, of which logical thought\nelaborates the concept, means, not motionless being or pure being,\nbut opposition: the forms of reality, which the concept thinks in\norder to think reality in its fullness, are opposed in themselves;\notherwise, they would not be forms of reality, or would not be at\nall. _Fair is foul and foul is fair_: beauty is such, because it has\nwithin it ugliness, the true is such because it has in it the false,\nthe good is such because it has within it evil. If the negative term\nbe removed, as is usually done in abstract thought, the positive also\ndisappears; but precisely because, with the negative, the positive\nitself has been removed. When we talk of negative terms, or of\nnon-values and so of not-beings as existing, existence really means\nthat to the _establishment_ of the fact we add the _expression of the\ndesire_ that another existence should arise upon that existence. \"You\nare dishonest\" means \"You are a man that seeks your own pleasure\" (a\ntheoretic judgment); \"but you _ought to be_\" (no longer a judgment, but\nthe expression of a desire) \"something else, and so serve the universal\nends of Reality.\" \"You have written an ugly verse\" will mean, for\nexample, \"You have provided for your own convenience and repose, and\nso have accomplished an economic act\" (a theoretic judgment); \"but you\n_ought to_ accomplish an \u00e6sthetic act\" (no longer judgment, but the\nexpression of a wish). Examples can be multiplied. But every one has in\nhim evil, because he has good: Satan is not a creature extraneous to\nGod, nor the Minister of God, called Satan, but God himself. If God had\nnot Satan in himself, he would be like food without salt, an abstract\nideal, a simple _ought to be_ which is not, and therefore impotent\nand useless. The Italian poet who had sung of Satan, as \"rebellion\"\nand \"the avenging force of reason,\" had a profound meaning when he\nconcluded by exalting God: as \"the most lofty vision to which peoples\nattain in the force of their youth,\" \"the Sun of sublime minds and of\nardent hearts.\" He corrected and integrated the one abstraction with\nthe other, and thus unconsciously attained to the fullness of truth.\n\n[Sidenote: _Affirmation and negation._]\n\nThought, in so far as it is itself life (that is to say, the life\nwhich is thought, and therefore life of life), and in so far as it is\nreality (that is to say, the reality which is thought, and therefore\nreality of reality) has in itself opposition; and for this reason it\nis also _affirmation and negation_; it does not affirm save by denying,\nand does not deny save by affirming. But it does not affirm and deny\nsave by distinguishing, because thought is distinction, and we cannot\ndistinguish (truly distinguish _i.e.,_ which is a different thing from\nthe rough and ready separations made by the pseudoconcepts) save by\nunifying. He who meditates upon the connections of affirmation-negation\nand unity-distinction has before him the problem of the nature of\nthought, and so of the nature of reality; and he ends by seeing that\nthose two connections are not parallel nor disparate, but are in their\nturn unified in unity-distinction understood as effective reality, and\nnot as simple abstract possibility, or desire, or mere ought to be.\n\n[Sidenote: _The principle of identity and contradiction; its true\nmeaning and false interpretation._]\n\nIf we now wish to state the nature of thought as reality in the form of\n_law_ (a form which we know to be one with that of the concept, though\nthe first term be adopted by preference for the pseudoconcepts), we can\nonly say that the law of thought is the law of unity and distinction,\nand therefore that it is expressed in the two formul\u00e6 A is A (unity)\nand A is not B (distinction), which are precisely what is called\nthe law or _principle of identity and contradiction._ It is a very\nimproper, or, rather, a very equivocal formula, chiefly because it\nallows it to be supposed that the law or principle is outside or above\nthought, like a bridle and guide, whereas it is thought itself; and it\nhas the further inconvenience of not placing in clear relief the unity\nof identity and distinction. But these are not too great evils, because\nmisunderstandings can be made clear, and because--what we will not tire\nof repeating--all, all words indeed, are exposed to misunderstandings.\n\n[Sidenote: _Another false interpretation; struggle with the principle\nof opposition. False application of this principle._]\n\nWe have a much greater evil, when the principle of identity and\ncontradiction is formulated and understood, not in the sense that A is\nnot B, but in that of A is A only and not also not A, or its opposite;\nbecause, understood in this way, it leads directly to placing the\nnegative moment outside the positive, not-being outside or opposite\nto being, and so, to the absurd conception of reality as motionless\nand empty being. In opposition to this degeneration of the principle\nof identity and contradiction, another law or principle has been\nconceived and made prominent, whose formula is: \"A is also not A,\" or\n\"everything is self-contradicting.\" This is a necessary and provident\nreaction against the one-sided way in which the preceding principle was\ninterpreted. But it too brings in its turn the inconvenience of all\nreactions, because it seems to rise up against the first law, like an\nirreconcilable rival destined to supplant it. In the first formula we\nhave a duality of principles, which, as has been said, cannot logically\nbe maintained; in the second, a degeneration in the opposite sense, the\ntotal loss of the criterion of distinction. To the false application\nof the principle of identity and contradiction succeeds _the false\napplication of the dialectic principle._\n\nThis false application has also been manifested in a form which could\nbe called doubly arbitrary; that is to say, when it has attempted to\ntreat dialectically neither more nor less than empirical and abstract\nconcepts, whereas in any case it could not be applied to anything\nbut the pure concepts. The dialectic belongs to opposed categories\n(or, rather, it is the thinking of the one category of opposition),\nnot at all to representative and abstract fictions, which are based\neither upon mere representation or upon nothing. As the result of that\narbitrary form, we have seen vegetable opposed to mineral, society\nopposed to the family, or even Rome opposed to Greece, and Napoleon\nto Rome; or the superficies actually opposed to the line, time to\nspace, and the number two to the number one. But this error belongs to\nanother more general error, which we shall deal with in its place, when\ndiscussing philosophism.\n\n[Sidenote: _Errors of the dialectic applied to the relation of the\ndistincts._]\n\nHere it is important to indicate only that false application of the\ndialectic which tends to resolve in itself and so to destroy distinct\nconcepts, by treating them as opposites. The distinct concepts are\ndistinct and not opposite; and they cannot be opposite, precisely\nbecause they already have opposition in themselves. Fancy has its\nopposite in itself, fanciful passivity, or \u00e6sthetic ugliness, and\ntherefore it is not the opposite of thought, which in its turn has\nits opposite in itself, logical passivity, antithought, or the false.\nCertainly (as has been said), he who does not make the beautiful\n(in so far as he does anything, and he cannot but do something)\neffectively produces another value, for example the useful, and he\nwho does not think, if he does anything, produces another value, the\nfanciful for instance, and creates a work of art. But in this way we\nissue from those determinations considered in themselves, from the\nopposition which is in them and _which constitutes them_; and from the\nconsideration of effectual opposition we pass to the consideration of\ndistinction. Considered as real, the opposite cannot be anything but\nthe distinct; but the opposite is precisely the unreal in the real,\nand not a form or grade of reality. It will be said that unless one\ndistinct concept is opposed to another, it is not clear how there can\nbe a transition from one to the other. But this is a confusion between\nconcept and fact, between _ideal_ and therefore eternal moments of the\nreal and their _existential_ manifestations. Existentially, a poet\ndoes not become a philosopher, save when in his spirit there arises\na contradiction to his poetry, that is to say, when he is no longer\nsatisfied with the individual and with the individual intuition: in\nthat moment, he does not pass into but is a philosopher, because\nto pass, to be effectual, and to become are synonyms. In the same\nway, a poet does not pass from one intuition to another, or from one\nwork of art to another, save through the formation of an internal\ncontradiction, owing to which his previous work no longer satisfies\nhim; and he passes into, that is to say he becomes and truly is,\n_another_ poet. Transition is the law of the whole of life; and\ntherefore it is in all the existential and contingent determinations\nof each of these forms. We pass from one verse of a poem to another\nbecause the first verse satisfies, and also does not satisfy. The ideal\nmoments, on the contrary, do not pass into one another, because they\nare eternally in each other, distinct, and one with each other.\n\n[Sidenote: _Its reductio ad absurdum._]\n\nMoreover, the violent application of the dialectic to the distincts,\nand their illegitimate distortion into opposites, due to an elevated\nbut ill-directed tendency to unity, is punished where it sins; that\nis to say, in not attaining to that unity to which it aspired. The\nconnection of distinct is circular, and therefore true unity; the\napplication of opposites to the forms of the spirit and of reality\nwould produce, on the contrary, not the circle, which is true infinity,\nbut the _progressif ad infinitum,_ which is false or bad infinity.\nIndeed, if opposition determine the transition from one ideal grade\nto the other, from one form to the other, and is the sole character\nand supreme law of the real, by what right can a final form be\nestablished, in which that transition should no longer take place?\nBy what right, for instance, should the spirit, which moves from the\nimpression or emotion and passes dialectically to the intuition, and\nby a new dialectic transition to logical thought, remain calm and\nsatisfied there? Why (as is the contention of such philosophies)\nshould the thought of the Absolute or of the Idea be the end of Life?\nIn obedience to the law of opposition, it would be necessary that\nthought, which denies intuition, should be in its turn denied; and the\ndenial again denied; and so on, to infinity. This negation to infinity\nexists, certainly, and it is life itself, seen in representation; but\nprecisely for this reason we do not escape from this evil infinite\nof representation save through the true infinite, which places the\ninfinite in every moment, the first in the last and the last in\nthe first, that is to say, places in every moment unity, which is\ndistinction.\n\nWe must, however, recognize that the false application of the dialectic\nhas had, _per accidens,_ the excellent result of demonstrating the\ninstability of a crowd of ill-distinguished concepts; as we must take\nadvantage of the devastation and overturning of secular prejudices\nwhich it has brought about. But that erroneous dialectic has also\npromoted the habit of lack of precision in the concepts, and sometimes\nencouraged the charlatanism of superficial thinkers; though this too,\n_per accidens,_ so far as concerns the initial motive of dialectical\npolemic is rich with profound truth.\n\n[Sidenote: _The Improper form of logical principles or laws. The\nprinciple of sufficient reason._]\n\nThe form of _law_ given to the concept of the concept has led to this\nconfusion; for it is an improper form, all saturated with empirical\nusage. Given the law of identity and contradiction, and given side by\nside with it that of opposition or dialectic, there inevitably arises a\nseeming duality; whereas the two laws are nothing but two inopportune\nforms of expressing the unique nature of the concept, or, rather, of\nreality itself. The peculiar nature of the concept may rather be said\nto be expressed in another law or principle, namely that of _sufficient\nreason._ This principle is ordinarily used as referring to the concept\nof cause, or to the pseudoconcepts, but (both in its peculiar tendency\nand in its historical origin) it truly belonged to the concept of end\nor reason. That is to say, it was desired to establish that things\ncannot be said to be known, when any sort of cause for them is adduced,\nbut on the contrary, that cause must be adduced, which is also the end,\nand which is, therefore, the _sufficient_ reason. But what else does\nseeking the sufficient reason of things mean but thinking them in\ntheir truth, conceiving them in their universality, and stating their\nconcept? This is logical thought, as distinct from representation or\nintuition, which offers things but not reasons, individuality but not\nuniversality.\n\nIt is not worth while talking about the other so-called logical\nprinciples; because, either they have been already implicitly dealt\nwith, or they are ineptitudes without any sort of interest.\n\n\n\n\nSECOND SECTION\n\nTHE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT\n\n\nI\n\nTHE CONCEPT AND VERBAL FORM. THE DEFINITIVE JUDGMENT\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Relation of the logical with the \u00c6sthetic form._]\n\nWith the ascent from the intuition-expression to the concept, and with\nthe concentration upon it of our attention, we have risen from the\npurely imaginative to the purely logical form of the spirit. We must\nnow, so to speak, begin the descent; or rather consider in greater\ndetail the position that has been reached, in order to understand it in\nall its conditions and circumstances. Were we not to do this, we should\nhave given a concept of the concept, which would err by abstraction.\n\n[Sidenote: _The concept as expression._]\n\nThe concept, to which we have risen from intuition, does not live in\nempty space. It does not exist as a mere concept, or as something\nabstract. The air it breathes is the intuition itself, from which it\ndetaches itself, but in whose ambient it continues. If these images\nseem unsuitable, or somewhat drawn from the sphere of representations,\nwe may choose others, such as that, which we used on another occasion,\nof the second grade, which, to be second, must rest upon the first,\nand, in a certain sense, be the first. The concept does not exist, and\ncannot exist, save in the intuitive and expressive forms, or in what is\ncalled language. To think is also to speak; he who does not express, or\ndoes not know how to express his concept, does not possess it: at the\nmost, he presumes or hopes to possess it. Not only is there never in\nreality an unexpressed representation, a pictorial vision unpainted,\nor a song unsung; but there is never even a concept which is simply\nthought and not also translated into words.\n\nWe have previously defended this thesis against the objections which\nare wont to be made to it.[1] But in order to recapitulate and thus to\navoid the misunderstandings which might arise from the abbreviating\nformul\u00e6 which we use, it will be well to repeat that the concept is\nnot expressed only in the so-called vocal or verbal forms; and if we\nmention these more than others, it will be by synecdoche, that is to\nsay, when we refer to them, we desire to take them as representative\nof all the others. Undoubtedly, the affirmation that the concept can\nalso be expressed in non-verbal form may cause surprise. It will be\nsaid that geometry itself, in so far as it describes geometrical\nfigures, at the same time employs or implies speech; and we shall be\nironically challenged to attempt to set the _Critique of Pure Reason_\nto music or to make a building of Newton's _Natural Philosophy._ But\nwe must carefully beware of breaking up the unity of the intuitive\nspirit, because errors arise and become incorrigible, precisely through\nsuch breaking up. Words, tones, colours, and lines are physical\nabstractions, and only by abstraction can they be successfully\nseparated. In reality, he who looks at a picture with his eyes also\nspeaks it in words to himself; he who sings an air also has its words\nin his spirit; he who builds a palace or a church speaks, sings, and\nmakes music; he who reads a poem sings, paints, sculptures, constructs.\n_The Critique of Pure Reason_ cannot be set to music, because it\nalready has its music; the _Natural Philosophy_ cannot be built in\nstone, because it is already architectonic; in exactly the same way\nthat the _Transfiguration_ cannot be turned into a symphony in four\nmovements, or the _Promessi Sposi_ into a series of pictures. Thus the\nchallenge, if made, would testify to the lack of reflection on the part\nof the challengers, for they would confuse physical distinctions with\nthe real and concrete act of the intuitive spirit.\n\n[Sidenote: _\u00c6sthetic and \u00c6sthetic-logical expressions or expressions of\nthe concept; propositions and judgments._]\n\nOwing to the incarnation of the concept or logic in expression and\nlanguage, language is quite full of logical elements; hence people\nare often led astray into affirming (we have already made clear the\nerroneousness[2] of this) that language is a logical function. Water\nmight as well be called wine, because wine has been poured into the\nwater. But language as language or as simple \u00e6sthetic fact is one\nthing, and language as expression of logical thought is another, for\nin this case, certainly, language remains always language and subject\nto the law of language, but is also more than language. If the first\nbe termed simple expression, _logos seimantikos,_ as Aristotle said,\nor _judicium \u00e6stheticum sive sensitivum,_ according to the school of\nBaumgarten, the second must on the contrary be called affirmation,\n_logos apophantikos, judicium logicum_ or _\u00e6sthetico-logicum._ To\nthis same issue we can reduce, if we understand it properly, the\ndistinction between _proposition_ and _judgment,_ for they are only\ndistinguishable in so far as it is assumed that the second form is\ndominated by the concept, whereas the first is given as free of such\ndomination.\n\nBut we should seek in vain for facts in proof of expressions belonging\nto either form, because we cannot furnish them without making the\nproviso that we understand them in the meaning of one or other of\nthe two forms. Taken by themselves, any verbal expressions which we\nadduce or can adduce as proofs are indeterminate and therefore of many\nmeanings. \"Love is life\" can be the saying of a poet who notes an\nimpression with which his soul is agitated and marks it with fervour\nand solemnity; or it can be, equally, the logical affirmation of\nsome one philosophizing on the essence of life. \"Clear, fresh, and\nsweet waters,\" when uttered by Petrarch, is an \u00e6sthetic proposition;\nbut the same words become a logical judgment when, for example, they\nanswer the question as to which is the most celebrated love song\nof Petrarch, or pseudological when applied by a naturalist to the\nsubstance water. A word no longer has meaning, or--what amounts to the\nsame thing--has no definite meaning, when it is abstracted from the\ncircumstances, the implications, the emphasis, and the gesture with\nwhich it has been thought, animated, and pronounced. Nevertheless,\nforgetfulness of this elementary hermeneutic canon, by which a word is\na word only on the soil that has produced it and to which it must be\nrestored, has been in Logic the cause of interminable disputes as to\nthe logical nature of this or that verbal phrase, separated from the\nwhole to which it belonged and rendered abstract. It would be much less\nequivocal to adduce such poems as _I Sepolcri,_ or the song _A Silvia,_\nas documents of \u00e6sthetic propositions, and philosophical treatises\n(for examples, the _Metaphysics_ or the _Analytics_) as documents of\n\u00e6sthetic-logical judgments or propositions. But here, too, we should\nneed to add: \"poetry considered as poetry,\" and \"philosophy considered\nas philosophy,\" since it is clear that a poem is prose in the soul of\nhim who reflects upon it, and prose is poetry in the soul of a writer\nvibrating with enthusiasm and emotion in the act of composition. Facts\ndo not constitute proofs in philosophy, save when they are interpreted\nthrough the medium of philosophy; and then, too, they become mere\n_examples,_ which aid in fixing the attention upon what is being\ndemonstrated.\n\n[Sidenote: _Surpassing of the dualism of thought and language._]\n\nThe relation between language and thought, conceived as we have\nconceived it, does not admit the criticism that it creates an\ninsuperable dualism, though that criticism was justly aimed at those\nwho set the two concepts side by side and parallel with one another.\nIn that case the sole means that remained of obtaining unity was\nto present language as an acoustic fact and declare thought to be\nthe unique psychic reality, and language the physical side of the\npsychophysical nexus. But no one will henceforth wish to repeat the\nblasphemy that language (the synonym of fancy and poetry) is nothing\nbut a physical-acoustic fact and merely adherent to thought. We have in\nthe two forms, notwithstanding their clear distinction, not parallelism\nand dualism, but an organic relation of connection in distinction,--the\nfirst form being implied in the second, the second crystallized into\nthe first,--precisely in conformity with that rhythmical movement of\nthe concepts which we have already discussed. And thus, too, when asked\nif the _prius_ of Logic be the concept or the judgment, we must reply\nthat the judgment, understood as an \u00e6sthetic proposition, is certainly\na _prius;_ but understood as a logical judgment, it is neither a\n_prius_ nor a _posterius_ in relation to the concept, since it is the\nconcept itself in its effectuality.\n\n[Sidenote: _The logical judgment as definition._]\n\nThis pure expression of the concept, which is the logical judgment,\nconstitutes what is called _definitive judgment_ or _definition._\nThis, considered on its verbal side, or as the synthesis of thought\nand word, does not give rise to any special logical theory in addition\nto that which we have already stated, when definition showed itself to\nbe one with distinction or conceptual thought; nor does it give rise\nto any special \u00e6sthetic doctrine, since the general doctrine expounded\nelsewhere includes this also. The dispute, as to whether the definition\nbe verbal or real, finds its solution in the relation we have just\nestablished between thought and words; hence definition is verbal\nbecause it is real, and _vice versa._ And as to the other meaning\nof the question, whether, that is to say, definition be _nominal_\nor _real,_ conventional or corresponding with the truth, that finds\nits solution in the distinction between pseudoconcepts and concepts,\nthe first of which, it is clear, are _defined_ only in a nominalist\nor conventional way, because they _are,_ in fact, nominalist and\nconventional.\n\n[Sidenote: _The indistinguishability of subject and predicate in the\ndefinition. Unity of essence and existence._]\n\nGreater importance attaches to the other dispute, as to whether the\ndefinitive judgment be analysable into subject, predicate, and copula,\nwhether, for example, the definition: \"the will is the practical\nform of the spirit,\" can be resolved in the terms: \"will\" (subject),\n\"practical form of the spirit\" (predicate), and \"is\" (copula). Now,\nthe difference between subject and predicate is here illusory, since\npredicate means the universal which is predicated of an individual, and\nhere both the so-called subject and the so-called predicate are two\nuniversals, and the second, far from being more ample than the first,\nis the first itself. As to the \"is,\" since the two distinct terms which\nshould be copulated are wanting, it is not a copula; nor has it even\nthe value of a predicate, as in the case in which it is asserted of an\nindividual fact that it is, that is to say, that it has really happened\nand is _existing._ The \"is,\" in the case of the definition, expresses\nnothing except simply the act of thought which thinks; and what is\nthought is, in so far as it is thought; if it were not, it would not be\nthought; and if it were not thought, it would not be. The concept gives\nthe essence of things, and in the concept _essence involves existence._\nThat this proposition has sometimes been contested is due solely to\nthe confusion between the essence, which is existence and therefore\nconcept, and the existence which is not essence and therefore\nis representation. It is due therefore to the problem to which\nrepresentations gave rise in this respect, and with which we shall\ndeal further on. Freed from this confusion, the proposition is not\ncontestable, and is the very basis of all logical thought, of which we\nhave to examine the conceivability, or essence, that is, its internal\nnecessity and coherence; and when this has been established, existence\nhas also been established. If the concept of _virtue_ be conceivable,\nvirtue is; if the concept of _God_ be conceivable, God is. To the most\nperfect concept the perfection of existence cannot be wanting without\nbeing _itself_ non-existent.\n\n[Sidenote: _Alleged emptiness of the definition._]\n\nYet it would seem that though the definition affirms both essence\nand existence, and therefore the reality of the concept, it is,\nnevertheless, an empty form; for we have recognized that in every\ndefinition subject and predicate are the same, and it is therefore a\ntautological judgment. Certainly, the definition is tautological, but\nit is a sublime tautology, altogether different from the emptiness\nwhich is usually condemned in that expression. The tautology of the\ndefinition means that the concept is equal only to itself and cannot be\nresolved into another or explained by another. In the definition truth\n_praesentia patet,_ and if the Goddess does not reveal herself by her\nsimple presence, it is in vain that the priest will strive to discover\nher to the multitude by comparing her with what is inferior to her:\nwith sensible things, which are particular manifestations of her.\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique of the definition as fixed verbal form._]\n\nAs in relation to the concept the definition is not to be held\ndistinguishable, so in its expressive or verbal aspect it must not be\nunderstood as a formula separate from the basis of the discourse, as\nthough it were the official garb of truth, the only worthy setting\nfor that gem. Such a conception of its nature has caused _pedantry of\ndefinition, hatred_ of and consequent rebellion _against definitions._\nThat pedantry, however, like all pedantries, had some good in it; that\nis to say, it energetically affirmed the need for exactitude; and too\nfrequently the rebellion, denying, like all rebellions, not only the\nevil but also whatever good there might be in the thing opposed, has,\nthrough its hatred of formul\u00e6, made exactitude of thought a negligible\nmatter. But definition, taken verbally, is not a formula, a period\nor part of a book or discourse; it is the whole book or the whole\ndiscourse, from the first word to the last, including all that in it\nmay seem accidental or superficial, including even the accent, the\nwarmth, the emphasis, and the gesture of the living word, the notes,\nthe parentheses, the full stops, and commas of the writing. Nor can we\nindicate a special literary form of definition, such as _the treatise\nor system or manual,_ because the definition or concept is given alike\nin opuscules and in dialogues, in prose and in verse, in satire and\nin lyric, in comedy and in tragedy. To define, from the verbal point\nof view, means to express the concept; and all the expressions of the\nconcept are definitions. This might trouble rhetoricians desirous of\ndevoting a special chapter to the form of scientific treatment; but it\ndoes not trouble good sense, which quickly recognizes that the thing\nis just so, and that an epigram may give that precise and efficacious\ndefinition in which the ample scholastic volume of a professor\nsometimes fails, although full of pretence in this respect.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: See _\u00c6sthetic,_ part i. chap. iii.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See Sect. I. Chap. III.]\n\n\n\n\nII\n\n\nTHE CONCEPT AND THE VERBAL FORM, THE SYLLOGISM\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Identity of definition and syllogism._]\n\nThe definition not only is not a formula separable or distinguishable\nfrom the thread of the discourse, but it cannot even be separated or\ndistinguished from the ratiocinative forms or forms of demonstration,\nas is implied in the custom of logicians, who make the doctrine of the\ndefinition or of the _systematic_ forms, as they usually call them,\nfollow that of the forms of demonstration. They ingenuously imagine\nthat thought, after having had a rough-and-tumble with its adversaries,\nand after having proclaimed, shouted, and finally vindicated its own\nright, mounts the rostrum and henceforth calm and sure of itself begins\nto define. But, in reality, to think is to combat continuously without\nany repose; and at every moment of that battle there is always peace\nand security; and definition is indistinguishable from demonstration,\nbecause it is found at every instant of the demonstration and\ncoincides with it. _Definition and Syllogism_ are the same thing.\n\n[Sidenote: _Connection of concepts and thought of the concept._]\n\nThe syllogism, indeed, is nothing but a connection of concepts; and\nalthough it has been disputed as to whether it must be considered so,\nor rather as a connection of logical propositions or judgments, the\ndispute is at once solved, so far as we are concerned, by observing\n:hat precisely because the syllogism is a connection of concepts, and\nconcepts only exist in verbal forms, that is to say, in propositions\nor judgments, the syllogism is also a connection of judgments. This\nserves to reinforce the truth that if the effective presence of the\nverbal form must always be recognized in the logical fact, it must, on\nthe other hand, be forgotten when Logic is being constructed and the\nnature of Logic and of the concept is being sought. Now, the connection\nof the concepts represents nothing new in relation to the thinking of\nthe concept. As has already been seen, to think the concept signifies\nto think it in its distinctions, to place it in relation with the other\nconcepts and to unify it with them in the unique concept. A concept\nthought outside its relations is indistinct, that is to say, not\nthought at all.\n\nTherefore, the connection of the concepts, or syllogizing, cannot be\nconceived as a new and more complex logical act. To syllogize and\nto think are synonymous; although, in the ordinary use of language,\nthe term \"to syllogize\" throws into special relief the verbal aspect\nof thinking, and, more exactly, the _dynamic_ character of verbal\nexposition, which is indeed the very character of this exposition,\nfor it is with difficulty, or only empirically, that it can be\ndistinguished into static and dynamic, definition and demonstration.\n\n[Sidenote: _Identity of judgment and of syllogism._]\n\nBut if the syllogism be thus identified with the concept itself, it may\nnevertheless seem that it must be distinguished from the judgment of\ndefinition seeing that the syllogism is a form of logical thought, and\nconsequently of verbal expression, quite distinct from and incapable\nof being confounded with any other: a connection of _three_ judgments,\ntwo of which are called _premisses_ and the third _conclusion,_ closely\ncemented by the syllogistic force, which is placed in the _middle_\nterm. This character of triplicity seems ineradicable and peculiar to\nthe syllogism in contrast with the judgment.\n\nSome question, however, must be raised concerning this characteristic\nbecause of another characteristic universally recognized in the\nsyllogism; namely, that the premisses are conclusions of other\nsyllogisms, just as the conclusion becomes, in its turn, a premiss.\nThis being so, it might be said with greater truth that the syllogism\nis to syllogize or to think; and since this is infinite, so the\npropositions of which it consists are also infinite. On the other hand,\nthere is no judgment which is not a syllogism, since it is clear that\nhe who affirms a judgment affirms it by some reasoning or syllogism,\npresent and active in his spirit, though more or less understood in\nthe words. And are not other propositions understood in the syllogisms\nwhich are properly so-called, not only in the forms, which are called\nabbreviated (immediate inferences, enthymemes, etc.), but also in all\nthe other forms; since it is admitted that every syllogism, as has\njust been observed, presupposes other preceding syllogisms, indeed an\ninfinity of others? It will be replied that at the end of the chain\nthere must yet be found the difference between judgment and syllogism,\nor two first judgments, which are not produced by syllogism, and form\nthe columns, upon which the structure of the first conclusion rests.\nBut such an answer (if it do not imply simply the strange fancy that\nthought has a beginning and therefore also an end in time) will mean\nthat judgment and syllogism are distinct in intrinsic character, which\nmakes the one the necessary condition of the other. Now, this intrinsic\ndistinctive character is precisely what cannot be found, because it\ndoes not exist; and if it be not in every link, it is vain to seek it\nat the beginning of the chain.\n\n[Sidenote: _The middle term and the nature of the concept._]\n\nCertainly, that _venatio medii,_ that _ergo,_ that unification\nof triplicity, are things of much importance. But whence comes\ntheir importance if not from being the expression of the synthetic\nforce of thought, of thought which unifies and distinguishes, and\ndistinguishes because it unifies and unifies because it distinguishes?\nAnd is triplicity truly triplicity, one, two, three, arithmetically\nenumerable? But if this be so, how is it that we never succeed in\ncounting those three, resolving each one of them into a series of\nsimilar terms, or of other propositions and concepts? Upon attentive\nconsideration we perceive that here, too, the number three is\nsymbolical, and that it does no more than designate the distinction,\nwhich unifies or thinks the _singular_ concept in the _universal_\nthrough the _particular,_ or determines the _universal_ through the\n_particular,_ by making it a _singular_ concept, whence it remains\nperfectly certain that the relation of these three determinations is\nnot numerical. Such a logical operation, not being anything special,\nbut simply logical reasoning itself, is of necessity found also in the\njudgment.\n\n[Sidenote: _Pretended non-definitive logical judgments._]\n\nA possible objection at this point is that even if the unity of\njudgment and syllogism can be held to be demonstrated as regards\ndefinitions and syllogisms which are the basis of definitions, yet\nit has not been demonstrated for the other forms of syllogisms and\nlogical judgments, which are not definitive. But if these judgments\nand syllogisms be logical, they cannot fail to be definitive, or to\nhave for their content affirmations of concepts. \"All men are mortal\"\nis a definition of the concept of man, whose mortality is verbally\nemphasized or his immortality denied. It is without doubt an incomplete\ndefinition, because it is torn from the web of thoughts and of speech\nof which it formed part; and this web will also always be incomplete\nor capable of infinite completion by means of new affirmations and\nnew negations. But in its incompleteness it is at the same time also\ncomplete, because it affirms a concept of reality, of life and death,\nof finite and infinite, of spirituality and of its forms, and so on;\nthese are all presupposed determinations, and therefore existing and\noperating in the concepts of _man_ and _mortality._ \"Caius is a man\"\n(which is the second premiss of the syllogism traditionally adduced as\nan example) is certainly not a definition (though it presupposes and\ncontains many definitions) precisely for the reason that it is not a\npure logical judgment. Hence it happens that the conclusion itself:\n\"therefore Caius is mortal,\" is more than a pure logical conclusion,\nsince it also contains a historical element, the person of Caius. But\nwe shall speak further on of these individual or historical judgments;\nand then we shall also see in what relation they stand to the universal\nor pure logical judgments, and if it be truly possible to distinguish\nbetween them, otherwise than for the sake of convenience. The\ndistinction is in any case convenient and does no harm at this point;\nand therefore for didactic reasons we allow it to stand; indeed we make\nuse of it.\n\n[Sidenote: _The syllogism as fixed verbal form. Its use and abuse._]\n\nJust as in the case of definitions, so also in the case of the\nsyllogism, it is to be noted that the verbal expression does not\nconsist of an obligatory formula, but assumes the most varied forms,\napparently very remote from syllogizing as commonly understood. The\nabuse of the syllogism as a formula continued for centuries, notably\nin medi\u00e6val Scholasticism, and notwithstanding the rebellion of the\nRenaissance, it has persisted among many philosophical schools,\nits last conspicuous manifestation being the didactic elaboration\nof the Leibnitzian philosophy, or Wolffianism. Certain of Wolff's\ndemonstrations have remained famous, such as that concerning the\nconstruction of windows, contained in his _Manual of Architecture._ \"A\nwindow must be large enough for two persons to lean against it, side by\nside,\" he developed it in this way: \"_Demonstration._ It is customary\nto lean against a window with another person in order to look out. But\nthe architect must serve the interests of his employer in everything.\nTherefore he must make the window large enough for two persons to be\nable to be there side by side.[1] _Q.E.D._\"\n\nNo more such syllogistic pedantries have been seen in our times, but\n(as has been already remarked in reference to pedantry of definition)\ncontempt for the formula has too often resulted in contempt even for\nthe correctness of the reasoning. So that it has sometimes been\nnecessary to advise a bracing bath of scholasticism, and it has been\nobserved and lamented of certain new civilizations (for example, of\nRussian culture, or of the Japanese people, who are so little addicted\nto mathematics), that they have not had a scholastic period, like that\nof the West, so general with them is the habit of incorrect, loose, and\npassionately impulsive and fantastic reasoning. Certainly the formula,\nthe exercise of disputation in _forma,_ the _logica scholastica\nutens_ has its merits; and we must know how to have recourse to it\nwhen it is advantageous to do so, and to express thought in the brief\nand perspicuous formul\u00e6 of the syllogism, of the sorites, or of the\ndilemma. From this point of view the new methods of mathematical Logic\nor Logistic, upon which some are now working, and even the logical\nmachines which have been constructed, would help; they would help--if\nthey helped. For the point is just this: when formul\u00e6, methods of\ndemonstration, machines and the like, are recommended, expedients\nand instruments of practical or economic use are thereby proposed;\nand these cannot make good their existence otherwise than by getting\nthemselves accepted for the utility--the saving of time and space, and\nso of fatigue, which they effect. Like all technical inventions, those\nproducts must be brought to the market; and the market alone decides\nupon their value and assigns to them their price. At the present time,\nit seems that logistic methods have no value and price, save for\ncertain narrow circles of people, who amuse themselves with them in\ntheir own way and so pass the time.\n\n[Sidenote: _Erroneous separation of truth and reason of truth in the\npure concepts._]\n\nCertain erroneous doctrines take their origin from the undue separation\nof demonstration and definition, conspicuously that particular error\nwhich places a difference of degree between _truth_ and _reason_ of\ntruth, and consequently admits that a truth can be known without its\nreason being known. But a truth, of which the reason is not known, is\nnot even truth; or it is truth only in preparation and in hypothesis.\nWe hear much about the _intuition_ with which men of genius are\nequipped, and which enables them to go straight to the truth, even when\nthey are not capable of demonstrating it. But this intuition, when it\nis not that truth in preparation, or that orientation towards a truth\nstill quite hypothetical, must of necessity be thought and thus also\nbe demonstration of truth; it must be truth and also reason of truth;\nthought and reasoning performed no doubt with lightning rapidity,\nwhich is expressed in brief propositions and needs going over again\nand rethinking, in order that it may afford a more ample and, from the\ndidactic point of view, a more persuasive, exposition; but it is always\nthought and reasoning.\n\nThings are still worse, when not only is a diversity of degree\nadmitted, but the complete _indifference_ of demonstration to truth is\nproclaimed, so that many or infinite possible demonstrations of one\nidentical truth would be possible. If by this it were meant merely that\none identical truth, or one identical concept, can assume infinite\nverbal or expressive forms, and if demonstration were understood as\n\"exposition\" or \"expression,\" there would be nothing to object. But\nif by demonstration be meant something truly logical, that which is\nproperly called by that name in Logic, this thesis leads directly to\nthe negation of truth, making the demonstration of truth, or truth\nitself, an illusion, a sophistical appearance created simply to\npersuade. Those acquainted with courts of law know that very often when\na magistrate has made his decision and pronounced sentence he deputes\nto a younger colleague the task of \"reasoning\" it, or of providing an\nappearance of reasoning to what is indeed not a logical product, but\nsimply the _voluntas_ of a certain provision. But though this procedure\nbe intelligible and useful when it occurs in the field of practice and\nof law, it cannot be admitted in the theoretical field, where it would\nbe the ruin of thought and indirectly of the will itself.\n\n[Sidenote: _Difference between truth and reason of truth in the\npseudoconcepts._]\n\nNaturally, all that has been said as to the definition and the\nsyllogism has reference to the true and proper concept, or the pure\nconcept. In the case of pseudoconcepts, where practical motives enter,\ndefinition is a simple _command_ (a nominalist definition), and\ndemonstration has no place, save for those of its elements that are\nderived from the pure concept: _given_ the definitions, the reasoning\nmust logically proceed in a determinate manner. In pseudoconcepts,\nthen, definitions are separate from demonstrations: the first do not\nspring from the second and are not all one with them; the second\npresuppose the first and do not produce them. Of these definitions\ninfinite demonstrations are possible, precisely because in reality\nnone is possible, for the definitions themselves are infinite; and\nwhen a demonstration is given, this is done only _pro forma_; it is\na deception, to conceal a practical convenience, or rather a logical\nreasoning employed to make it clear. It is for this reason also that\nthe definitions employed in those demonstrations seem to be obtained\nby means of an act of _faith_ in the irrational; and here faith\nsignifies, not the confidence of thought in itself, but the making a\nvirtue of necessity, accepting as true what is not known as such.--For\nthe rest, pseudoconcepts and concepts have the same relation with the\nverbal form; that is to say, all are expressed in the most various\nways, and there is no obligatory form of language, which can be called\nthe literary form of logical character. The style of the _Civil Code,_\nwhich aroused the admiration of Stendhal, is not the eternal style\nof laws, for laws were once even put into verse; as in like barbaric\ntimes the sciences used to be put into verse. In the life of the word,\nconcepts and pseudoconcepts rush forward in such a way that it is vain\nto seek there for distinction among them.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: Mentioned in Hegel, _Wiss. d. Logik 2,_ iii. 370 _n._]\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\n\nCRITIQUE OF FORMALIST LOGIC\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Intrinsic impossibility of formal Logic._]\n\nFrom the fact that in the verbal form all distinctions (pure\nconcepts, and empirical and abstract concepts, distinct concepts and\nopposite concepts) are indistinguishable, and on the other hand all\nidentities, such as that of concept, definition and demonstration,\nappear differentiated or capable of differentiation, we can deduce the\nimpossibility of constructing logical Science by means of an analysis\nof the verbal form. The condemnation of all _formal_ Logic is thus\npronounced.\n\n[Sidenote: _Its nature._]\n\nThis Logic has been variously called _Aristotelian, peripatetic,\nscholastic,_ after its authors and historical representatives;\n_syllogistic,_ from the doctrine that forms its principal content;\n_formal,_ from its pretensions to philosophic purity; _empirical,_ by\nthose who tried to drive it back to its place; and although this last\nname is correct, it would be better to call it _formal,_ and still\nbetter, _verbal,_ to indicate of what the empiricism to which it is\ndesired to allude, chiefly consists. Indeed, if empiricism be marked\nby its limiting itself to single representations, regrouping them in\ntypes and arranging them in classes, there is no doubt that that method\nof treatment is empirical, which takes the logical function, not in\nthe eternal peculiarity of its character as thought of the universal,\nbut only in its various particular translations or manifestations, in\nwhich it acquires contingent characteristics. Since these contingent\ncharacteristics come to it, in the first place, from the verbal form,\nit can well be called verbalism. Owing to its verbalism, too, it has\nhappened, that over and above the grammars of individual languages,\nthere has been conceived as existing a _general, rational_ and\n_logical_ Grammar; and this hybrid science, which is no longer grammar\nand arose from logical assumptions, has developed in such a way as to\nbe indistinguishable from empirical or verbal Logic.\n\n[Sidenote: _Its partial justification._]\n\nCertainly, as mere empiricism, this so-called Logic could not be\ncondemned. And Hegel was not wrong in remarking that if people are\ninterested in establishing that there are sixty species of parrots\nand one hundred and thirty-seven of veronica, it is not clear why\nit should be of less interest to establish the various forms of the\njudgment and of the syllogism. That discipline has its utility as mere\nempiricism, and it may be useful to any one to employ in certain cases\nthe terminology in which an affirmation is characterized as positive\nor as merely negative, as particular or as universal, as a judgment\nthat awaits reasoning and demonstration, as an immediate inference,\nenthymeme or sorites, as a conclusive or an inconclusive, or as a\ncorrect or an incorrect syllogism, and so on. It is also comprehensible\nhow, as mere empiricism, it assumed a _normative_ character, and was\ntranslated into _rules_; rules, which are valid within their own\nsphere, neither more nor less than are all empirical rules.\n\n[Sidenote: _Its error._]\n\nBut it does not limit itself to acting simply as an empirical\ndescription, nor even as a simple technique; it usurps a much more\nlofty office. Just as Rhetoric and Grammar, innocent and useful so\nlong as they limit themselves to the functions of convenient grouping\nand convenient terminology, become false and harmful when they assume\nthe attitude of sciences of absolute values, and must then be resolved\ninto, and replaced by \u00c6sthetic; so empirical or verbal Logic becomes\ntransformed into error when it claims to give the laws of thought, or\nthe thought of thought, which cannot be other than the concept of the\nconcept. It is not, then, _formal,_ as it boasts itself to be, because\nthe only logical form is the universal, and this alone is the object of\nlogical investigation; but it is falsely formal, since it relies upon\ncontingencies, and must, therefore, be called _formalist._ We reject it\nhere exclusively in its formalist aspect; that is to say, in so far as\nit is a complex of empirical distinctions that wish to pass as rational\nand usurp the place of true rationality.\n\n[Sidenote: _Its traditional constitution._]\n\nSeveral of such empirical distinctions, such as the distinction between\nthought and principle of thought, truth and reason of truth, judgments\nand syllogisms, and such-like, have been recorded and criticized; we\nshall proceed to mention others, when suitable opportunities occur.\nHere it will be well to refer to the general physiognomy and structure\nof that Logic, as it was embodied for centuries in the schools and\nstill persists in treatises.\n\n[Sidenote: _The three logical forms._]\n\nIts point of departure is the external distinction between words and\nconnections of words, which belongs properly to Grammar. But words\nare then treated by it as concepts, and connections of words, as\njudgments. Thus it obtains the identification of the concept with the\nabstract and mutilated grammatical word and arrives at the monstrous\ndetermination of the concepts as things which are not in themselves\neither true or false. Thus, again, by constantly calling upon the\nconnections of the concepts for succour, it succeeds in distinguishing\nthe judgment from the mere proposition. A double criterion is\nconstantly adopted in establishing these and other fundamental forms:\nthe verbal and the logical; and formalist Logic oscillates equivocally\nbetween the two different determinations; whence the alternating\nappearance of truth and of falsehood, with which its distinctions\npresent themselves. The syllogism, which should be the third\nfundamental form, is conceived as the connection of three distinct\njudgments; but if it yet retains its importance and preponderance\nover two-membered forms or over serial forms of more than three\npropositions and judgments, this is really because to the distinction\nand enumeration of the three propositions there is added the criterion\nof the concept as a nexus, or as a triunity of universal, particular\nand singular.\n\n[Sidenote: _The theories of the concept and of the judgment._]\n\nThe three fundamental forms have been reduced by some logicians to\ntwo, by others; amplified to four or to five, by adding to them\nthe perceptive form or the definitive and systematic form. These\nrestrictions and amplifications have always encountered resistance,\nbecause it was justly felt that in this way one form of empiricism was\nbeing mingled with another: the verbal form with empirical distinctions\ndrawn from other presuppositions. But in determining in particular the\nthree fundamental forms, formalist Logic has not been able to restrict\nitself to the mere distinction of words and propositions, artificially\nplaced in relation with the pure concept; but has been obliged to draw\nfrom other sources. The concepts are variously classified, sometimes\nfrom the verbal point of view, as _identical, equivalent, equivocal,\nanonymous_ and _synonymous_; sometimes from the logical point of view,\nas _distinct, disparate, contrary_ or _contradictory_; sometimes\nfrom the psychological point of view, as _incomplete_ and _complete,\nobscure_ and _clear,_ the concepts further always being understood\nas names, so that, for example, distinct concepts are indifferently\nphilosophically distinct concepts, and empirically distinct concepts;\nand the contraries are both the philosophical contraries and those\nempirically so-called. The same has occurred in the classification\nof judgments where sometimes the determinations of the concept are\ntaken as foundation and the judgments distinguished as _universal\nparticular_ and _individual;_ sometimes the intrinsic dialectic nature\nof the concept, and they are distinguished as _affirmative, negative_\nand _indeterminate_ or _infinite_; sometimes the stages passed through\nin the search for truth, and they are distinguished into _categorical,\nhypothetical_ and _disjunctive,_ or _apodeictic, assertory_ and\n_problematic._ And these forms have further always been understood\nverbally. \"Universality\" is the \"totality\" empirically designated\nby the word, and not true universality; and \"individuality,\" on the\ncontrary, is not only the individuality of the representation, but\nalso the single particularity of the distinct concept; \"affirmative\"\nis differentiated from \"negative\" by accidental grammatical form, and\nnot because that unique act which is thought, at once affirmation and\nnegation (as the will is both love and hatred) can be truly divided.\n\n[Sidenote: _The theory of the syllogism._]\n\nThe classification of syllogisms, founded exactly upon the empirical\nconception of the judgment as the copulation of a _subject_ and a\n_predicate_ affords a suitable parallel to this method of treatment of\nthe judgment; subject and predicate being understood in an empirical\nand grammatical manner, whence they are also discovered in those\nverbal affirmations, in which they are not distinct, because they are\nidentical, as in the case of the judgment of definition. For empirical\nLogic, in the judgment: \"The will is the practical form of the spirit,\"\n\"will\" is subject and \"practical form\" predicate in the same way as in\n\"Peter is a man,\" \"Peter\" is subject, and \"man\" predicate. From the\ndistinction between subject and predicate, arise the four _figures_\nof the syllogism; the criterion being the position of the middle term\nin the two premisses of the three propositions of which the syllogism\nis formed. If the middle term be subject in the first premiss and\npredicate in the second, we have the first figure; if it be predicate\nin both, the second; if it be subject in both, the third; if it be\npredicate in the first and subject in the second, the fourth figure\n(\"_sub-prae,_ turn _prae-prae,_ turn _sub-sub,_ turn _prae-sub\")._\nBut in order to deduce the moods of each figure recourse is then had\nto another criterion, indeed to two other criteria; that is, to the\nempirical distinctions of judgments into universal and particular, and\ninto affirmative and negative, with the four consequent determinations\ninto universal-affirmative judgments (A), universal-negative (E),\nparticular-affirmative (I), and particular-negative (O). Thus, in the\nfirst figure, two universal affirmative premisses constitute the first\nmood, and the conclusion is universal affirmative _(Barbara)_; two\npremisses, both universal, but one affirmative and the other negative,\nconstitute the second, and the conclusion is universal negative\n_(celarent)_; two premisses, one universal affirmative and the other\nparticular affirmative, constitute the third mood, and the conclusion\nis particular affirmative _(darii);_ two premisses, one universal\nnegative and one particular affirmative, constitute the fourth mood,\nand the conclusion is particular negative _(ferio)._ And so on.\n\n[Sidenote: _Spontaneous reductions to the absurd of formal Logic._]\n\nThis is not the occasion to go on expounding in its other particulars\nthis construction, of which we have given an example, for it is\nvery well known: nor to attach importance to criticizing it, since'\nits foundations themselves have already been shown to be false and\nits hybrid genesis explained. Verbal Logic, which vaunts itself as\nrational, carries its own caricature in itself, namely the creation of\n_Sophisms_; because, since it seeks the force of thought in words, it\ncannot prevent sophistical ability from making use, in its turn, of\nwords, in order capriciously to create thoughts and forms of thought.\nThus verbal Logic, in order to combat sophisms, is constrained hastily\nand eagerly to abandon simple verbal connections, and to take refuge in\nconcepts and connections of concepts thought in words; that is to say,\nneither more nor less than to negate the formalist point of view. And\nwith analogous self-irony it renounces that point of view and dissolves\nitself, when it tries to refute the fourth figure of the syllogism, or\nto reduce the second, third and fourth to the first, as the only real\nfigure, and then the first to a connection of three concepts; not to\nmention the permanent self-irony and patent demonstration of falsity\ninvolved in the logical deduction of the figures of the syllogism which\nit makes from a series of moods, recognized as _not conclusive._\n\n[Sidenote: _Mathematical Logic or Logistic._]\n\nFormalist Logic has been the object of many violent attacks from the\nRenaissance onwards; but it cannot be said that it has been struck in\nits essential part, because up to the present, the principle itself, or\nthe incoherence from which it springs, has not been attacked. Several\nattempts at reform have followed and still follow; they have all of\nthem the same defect, which is the wish to reform formal Logic without\nissuing from its circle, and without refuting its tacit presumption--\nthe pretension of obtaining thought in words, concepts in\npropositions. The most considerable attempt of the kind that has been\nmade, which has many zealous followers in our day, is _mathematical\nLogic,_ also called _calculatory, algebraical, algorhythmic, symbolic,\na new analytic,_ or a _Logical calculus or Logistic._\n\n[Sidenote: _Its non-mathematical character._]\n\nIt is admitted by those who profess it and is for the rest evident\nfrom the definitions of Logistic that have been given, that it has\nnothing in common with mathematics, for although the majority of its\ncultivators are mathematicians and use is made of the phraseology usual\nin Mathematics, and it is directed toward Mathematics, in certain of\nits practical intentions, there is nothing intrinsically mathematical\nin it. Logistic is a science which deals, not with quantity alone, but\nwith _quantity and quality together_; it is a science of _things in\ngeneral_; it is _universal mathematics,_ containing also, subordinated\nto itself, the mathematical sciences properly so-called, but not\ncoinciding with these. It means to be, not mathematics, but _a general\nscience of thought._\n\n[Sidenote: _Example of its mode of treatment._]\n\nBut the \"thought\" of Logistic is nothing but the \"verbal proposition,\"\nwhich, in fact, supplies its starting-point. What the proposition is;\nwhether it be possible truly to distinguish the proposition we call\n\"verbal\" from all the others, poetical, musical, pictorial; whether\nthe verbal proposition does not bear indistinctly in itself, a series\nof very diverse spiritual formations, from poetry to mathematics, from\nhistory and philosophy to the natural sciences; what language is and\nwhat the concept is--these and all other questions concerning the forms\nof the spirit and the nature of thought, remain altogether extraneous\nto Logistic and do not disturb it in its work. The propositions (the\nconcept of the proposition remaining an unexplained presupposition)\ncan be indicated by _p, q,_ etc.; the relation of implication of one\nproposition in another can be indicated by the sign _\u2283,_ hence an\nisolated proposition is \"that which implies itself\" _(p.\u2283.q.)._ By\nfollowing a method such as this, many distinctions of the traditional\nformalist Logic are eliminated, and in compensation for this, new ones\nare added and old and new are dressed in a new phraseology. The logical\n_sum a + b_ is the smallest concept, which contains the other two _a_\nand _b_ and is what was previously called the \"sphere of the concept\";\nthe logical _product a x b_ indicates the greater concept contained\nin _a_ and in _b,_ and answers to that which was previously called\n\"comprehension.\" There are also new or renovated laws, like the law\nof _identity,_ by force of which, in Logic (differently from Algebra),\n_a + a + a ... = a;_ by which it is desired to signify this profound\ntruth, that the repetition of one and the same concept as many times as\none wishes, always gives the same concept;--the law of _commutation,_\nby which _ab = ba_;--or that of absorption, by which _a(a + b) = a;_\nor--(the convention being that the negation of a concept is indicated\nby placing against it a vertical line) the other beautiful laws and\nformul\u00e6: _a + a | = a| (a | )a = a; aa | = o._ This is a charming\namusement for those who have a taste for it.\n\n[Sidenote: _Identity of nature of Logistic with formalist Logic._]\n\nThus it is seen that if the words and the formul\u00e6 be somewhat\ndifferent, the nature of mathematical Logic in no respect differs from\nthat of formalist Logic. Where the new Logic contradicts the old, it is\nnot possible to say which of the two is right; as of two people walking\nside by side over insecure ground, it is impossible to say which of\nthe two walks securely. The very doctrine of the _quantification\nof the predicate_ (which has been the leaven of the reform) in no\nwise alters the traditional manner of conceiving the judgment, with\nthe corresponding arbitrary manner of distinguishing subject and\npredicate. It simply establishes a convention with the object of being\nable to symbolize, with the sign of equality, the subject and the\npredicate:--the subject being included in the predicate, is part of it:\n\"men are mortal\" equals: \"men are some mortals\"; and so, \"men\" being\nindicated with _a_ and \"some mortals\" with _b,_ the judgment can be\nsymbolized: _a = b._ For us, it is indifferent whether the modes of\nthe syllogism be the 64 and the 19 recognized as valid by traditional\nLogic, or the 12 affirmative and the 24 negative of Hamilton's Logic,\nwhich distinguishes four classes of affirmative and four of negative\npropositions. It is indifferent whether the methods of conversion\nbe three or two or one. It is indifferent whether logical laws or\nprinciples be enumerated as two, three, five or ten. Since we do not\naccept the point of departure, it is impossible for us, far from\nadmitting the development, even to discuss it; save to demonstrate\nthat from capricious choice comes capricious choice, as we have made\nsufficiently clear in our treatment of formalist Logic. Mathematical\nLogic is a new manifestation of this formalist Logic, involving a great\nchange in traditional formul\u00e6, but none in the intimate substance of\nthat pretended science of thought.\n\n[Sidenote: _Practical aspect of Logistic._]\n\nAs the _science of thought,_ Logistic is a laughable thing; worthy, for\nthat matter, of the brains that conceive and advocate it, which are the\nsame that are promulgating a new Philosophy of language, indeed a new\n\u00c6sthetic, with their insipid theories of the _universal Language._ As a\nformula of _practical utility_ it is not incumbent upon us to examine\nit here; all the more since we have already had occasion to give our\nopinion upon this subject. In the time of Leibnitz, fifty years later\nin the last days of Wolffianism; a century ago in Hamilton's time;\nforty years ago in the time of Jevons and of others; and finally now,\nwhen Peano, Boole, and Couturat are flourishing, these new arrangements\nare offered on the market. But every one has always found them too\ncostly and complicated, so that they have not hitherto been generally\nused. Will they be so in the future? The practical work of persuasion,\nproper to the commercial traveller seeking purchasers of a new product,\nand the foresight of the merchant or manufacturer as to the fortune\nthat may await that product, are not pertinent to Philosophy; which,\nbeing disinterested, could here, at the most, reply with words of\nbenevolent patience: \"If they be roses, they will bloom.\"\n\n\n\n\nIV\n\n\nTHE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT AND PERCEPTION\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Reaction of the concept upon the representation._]\n\nProblems of a widely different nature from these formalist playthings\nawait exploration in the depths of the Science of Logic. And resuming\nwhat we have called the descent of the universal into the individual,\nit is of importance, after having established the relation between\nconcept and form of expression, to examine in what way the concept\nreacts upon the representation, from which it appears to be at a stroke\nand altogether separated.\n\nIn more precise terms: Beyond doubt the concept is thought only in\nso far as it becomes concrete in an expressive form and itself also\nbecomes, from this point of view, representative. Thus, a logical\naffirmation, or one that presents itself as logical, can be viewed\nunder a twofold aspect, as logical and as \u00e6sthetic. It can be regarded\nas well thought-out, and so also very well expressed, perfectly\n\u00e6sthetic because perfectly logical; or as very well expressed but ill\nthought, or not truly thought, and so not logical, and yet sentimental,\npassionate and imaginative. But this expression-representation,\nin which the concept lives (and which is, for example, the tone,\nthe accent, the personal form, the style, which I am employing in\nthis book to expound Logic), is a _new_ representation, conditioned\nby the concept. We now ask, not indeed the character of this\nrepresentation (which is sufficiently clear), but of what kind are\nthose representations, about and upon which, the thought of the concept\nhas been kindled. Do they remain apart, excluded from the light of\nthe concept, obscure as before, that is, logically obscure? Does the\nconcept illuminate only itself in a sort of egoistic satisfaction,\nwithout irradiating with its light the representations upon which it\nhas arisen?\n\n[Sidenote: _Logicization of the representations._]\n\nThat would be inconceivable and contrary to the unity of the spirit;\nand indeed, such separation and indifference do not exist. The\nappearance of the concept transfigures the representations upon which\nit arises, making them _other_ than they formerly were; from being\nindiscriminate it makes them discriminate; from fantastic, logical;\nfrom clear but indistinct (as used to be said), clear and distinct.\nI am, for example, in such a condition of soul as prompts me to sing\nor to versify, and thus to make myself objective and known to myself;\nbut I am objective and known only to fancy, so much so, that at the\nmoment of poetical or musical expression I should not be able to say\nwhat was really happening in me: whether I wake or dream, whether I\nsee clearly, or catch glimpses, or see wrongly. When from the variety\nof the multitude of representations, which have preceded and which\nfollow it, I pass on to enquire as to the truth of them all (that is\nto say, the reality, which does not pass), and rise to the concept,\nthose representations themselves must be revised in the light of the\nconcept that has been attained, but no longer with the same eyes as\nformerly,--they must not be _looked at,_ but henceforth, _thought._\nMy state of soul then becomes determinate; and I shall say, for\nexample: \"What I have experienced (and sung and made poetry of), was\nan absurd desire; it was a clash of different tendencies that needed\nto be overcome and arranged; it was a remorse, a pious desire,\" and\nso on. Thus by means of the concept is formed a _judgment_ of that\nrepresentation.\n\n[Sidenote: _The individual judgment and its difference from the\ndefinitive judgment._]\n\nWe have already studied the judgment, which is proper to the concept,\nand called it definitive judgment or judgment of definition. We have\nshown how in it there is no distinction of subject and predicate,\nso much so that it may be said, with regard to it, that there is\nneither subject nor predicate, but the complete identity of the two:\na predicate or universal, which is subject to itself. However, the\njudgment which is now being discussed is not a simple definition and\ndoes not coincide with the first. It certainly has as its base a\nconcept and therefore a definition; but it contains something more,\na representative or individual element, which is transformed into\nlogical fact, but does not lose individuality on that account; indeed\nit reaffirms its individuality with more precise distinction. This\njudgment is connected with the first, but it represents a further stage\nof thought. If the first form be a conceptual or _definitive_ judgment,\nthe second may be called an _individual_ judgment.\n\n[Sidenote: _Distinction of subject and predicate in the individual\njudgment_]\n\nOwing to this new element, which the individual judgment contains,\nand the judgment of definition does not contain, we eventually find\nfully justified in the former that distinction between subject and\npredicate which verbal Logic in vain claims to discover in all\njudgments, including those of universal character (and even in simple\npropositions); so that it ends by attributing to that distinction, of\nwhich later we shall perceive the capital philosophical importance, a\npurely grammatical or verbal significance. Subject and predicate can\nbe distinguished only in so far as the one is not and the other is\nuniversal, in so far as the one is not and the other is concept, that\nis to say, only in so far as the one is representation and the other\nconcept. A particular or singular concept (for example, the will) is\nalways also a universal concept; and therefore not adapted to function\nas a subject to which a predicate is applied; because that predicate,\nthat universal, is already explicitly in the pretended subject itself\nwhich is net thinkable, save by means of that predicate. Only the\n_representation_ can be truly _subject;_ and only the _concept_ can\nbe _predicate._ This takes place plainly in the individual judgment,\nwhere the two elements are connected. \"Peter is good,\" an individual\njudgment, implies the subject \"Peter\" and the predicate \"good,\" the one\nnot to be confounded with the other; whereas, in the definition \"the\nwill is the practical form of the spirit,\" \"practical form\" and \"will\"\nare identical.\n\n[Sidenote: _Reasons for the variety of definitions of the judgment and\nof certain of its divisions._]\n\nWhen the attempt was made to define the judgment as differing both\nfrom the concept and from the definition, what was aimed at was\nthe individual judgment. But, if this be so, then the definitions\nwhich conceive the judgment either as relation of representations\nor as relation of concepts (the subsumption of one concept under\nanother, etc.), must be termed false, since it is henceforth clear\nthat, as individual judgment, it must be conceived as a _relation\nof representation and concept._ On the other hand, some celebrated\ndivisions of the judgment find their origin in the distinction made\nby us (which, we again repeat, is given at this point provisionally\nwith the intention of seeking the definite formula further on),\nbetween the judgment of the concept and the judgment of the\nrepresentation, between definition and individual judgment. In this\nway the _analytic_ judgment, defined as that in which the concept of\npredicate was obtained from the subject, reveals itself as nothing\nbut the definition, the identity of subject and predicate; the\n_synthetic_ judgment, which adds to the subject something which was\nnot there previously, is the individual judgment, logical thinking\nof the intuition, at first only intuited and not thought. We shall\nexamine further on the true meaning and the definite formula of this\ndistinction also.\n\n[Sidenote: _The individual judgment and intellectual intuition._]\n\nTo ignore the form of the individual judgment, and to recognize only\nthat of the concept and of the definition, is an impossible position,\nthough occasionally there appears a tendency in that direction.\nWe perceive it, for instance, in those who seek for definitions\nof everything, and limit themselves to syllogizing, when there is\ncertainly a case for thinking, but also one for looking, or for\nthinking while we look, and for looking while we think. This may be\nsaid truly to represent knowledge, that complete knowledge in which\nall anterior forms unite, and which is the result of all of them. To\nknow is to know reality; and knowledge of reality is translated into\nrepresentations, penetrated with thought. That famous _intellectual\nintuition,_ which has sometimes been described as the faculty to which\nman aspires, but does not possess, and sometimes as a prodigious\nfaculty, superior to knowledge itself, should be declared, with the\nfull rigour of letter and concept, to be nothing but the individual\njudgment; which is, in truth, intellectual intuition or intuited\nintellection.\n\n[Sidenote: _Identity of the individual judgment with perception or\nperceptive judgment._]\n\nBut the individual judgment can take another name, much better known\nand more familiar: _perception_; and perception, in its turn, should\nbe called, synonymously, individual judgment, or at least _perceptive\njudgment._ Perception does not consist of opening the eyes, of offering\nthe ear, and of unlocking any of the other senses, which are wont to be\nenumerated, nor, in general, of abandoning oneself to sensation. The\nworld does not enter our spirit by these wide gates; but has itself\nannounced, in order to be received with due honours. That good folk\n(and among the best of folk are to be counted many philosophers) think\notherwise is in truth to be explained by their wonted neglect or lack\nof analysis and reflection.\n\nAnd further, perception is not intuition, _i.e.,_ an impression\ntheoretically fashioned, or that stage or moment of the spirit which\nis represented in an eminent degree by the poet, who intuites and does\nnot know what he intuites, indeed does not know that he does not know\n(because the pertinent question has not arisen, and cannot arise, in\nhim, as poet). To perceive means to apprehend a given fact as having\nthis or that nature; and so means to think and to judge it. Not even\nthe lightest impression, the smallest fact, the most insignificant\nobject, is perceived by us, save in so far as it is thought.\n\nHence the supreme importance of the individual judgment, which is that\nwhich embraces all knowledge produced by us at every moment, by means\nof which we _possess the world,_ by means of which a _world exists._\n\n[Sidenote: _and with the commemorative or historical judgment._]\n\nIn perceptive judgments also, are comprised those judgments which\nare called by some _commemorative_ or _historical,_ that is to say,\nthose by which it is recognized that a given fact has occurred in the\npast. This recognition can never be founded upon anything other than\npresent intuitions, intuitions, that is to say, of our present life,\nwhich contains the past in it, and persuades us of the veracity of a\ngiven piece of evidence, as now apprehended by us. And conversely, all\nperceptive judgments are, in some way, commemorative and historical,\nbecause the present, in the very act by which we hold it before our\nspirit, becomes a past, that is to say an object of memory and of\nhistory.\n\n[Sidenote: _Erroneous distinction of individual judgments as of fact\nand of value._]\n\nOn the other hand, it would be erroneous to divide individual\njudgments, as has often been attempted, into judgments of _fact_ and\njudgments of _value,_ claiming that the judgment, \"Peter is a man,\" is\nof a different nature from: \"Peter is good.\" Every judgment of fact, in\nso far as it attributes a predicate to a subject, gives to it a value,\ndeclaring it to participate in the universal or in a determination of\nthe universal. And conversely, every judgment of value, in so far as\nit attributes a value, cannot attribute other than the universal or\na determination of the universal, since outside the universal there\nis no value. Even judgments of negative form, such as: \"Peter is\nnot good,\" or \"is not-good,\" or: \"Peter is bad,\" are attributes of\nuniversality and of value; because, as we know, theoretically they do\nnot affirm anything other than that Peter has a spiritual determination\ndifferent from goodness (for example, that he is utilitarian, not yet\nmoral). Certainly, in judgments such as these which we have selected\nas examples, there is mingled (this too has been noted; and at this\npoint it suffices to recall it) the expression of an _ought to be,_\nwhich, in this case, is revealed in the negative formula adopted; but\nthe expression of an ought to be or of a desire is not a judgment\neither of fact or of value; indeed, it is not a judgment at all; it is\na mere proposition, a logos semanticos, not apophanticos, an optative\nor desiderative formula, a _lyricism_ of the spirit directed to the\nfuture.[1]\n\n[Sidenote: _The individual judgment as ultimate and perfect form of\nknowledge._]\n\nThere is no other cognitive fact to know, beyond perception or\nindividual judgment. In this, the ultimate and the most perfect\nof cognitive facts, the circle of knowledge is completed. Obscure\nsensibility, having become clear intuition, and then having made itself\nthought of the universal, in the individual judgment is logically\nthought, and is, henceforward, knowledge of fact or of event, that is,\nof effectual reality. The individual judgment, or perception, is fully\nadequate to reality.\n\n[Sidenote: _Error of treating it as the first fact of knowledge._]\n\nBut precisely because perception is the completion of knowledge, it\nmust be placed not at the beginning, but at the end of cognitive life.\nTo place it at the beginning, as mere sensibility, and to derive from\nit the concepts, either as the effect of psychological mechanism,\nor by an arbitrary act of will, is the error of sensationalists and\nempiricists. To conceive it as judgment, and nevertheless to place\nit at the beginning, and to deduce from it the concepts by further\nelaboration, is the error of rationalists and intellectualists. Against\nthese, it must be firmly maintained that the first moment of knowledge\nis _intuitive_ and not perceptive; and that the concepts do _not\noriginate_ from the intellectual act of perception, but enter the act\nitself as _constituents._ To begin with perception, understood as\nperceptive judgment, is to begin at the end, that is to say, with the\nmost highly complex. Perception is thus the sole problem of gnoseology;\nbut only because it is the whole problem, which contains in itself\nall the others. And it also is, if you like, the _first_ form of the\ncognitive spirit, but not because it is the most simple, but precisely\nbecause it is the _last_; and the last, being also the whole, can also\nin an absolute sense be called first.\n\n[Sidenote: _Origin of this error._]\n\nCertainly, the misunderstanding of the sensationalists and the\nopposing error of the rationalists contain an element of truth, since\nboth are really concepts, which are developed from perception and\npresuppose it. But, on the other hand, they are not true and proper\nconcepts, but pseudoconcepts, as we have already defined them, and\nthese, being developed from perception, give rise, in their turn,\nto pseudojudgments. We shall treat of this further on; and thereby\nexplain the genesis of the misunderstanding, that is to say, the\nerroneous theory will be overcome as misunderstanding and determined as\ntruth. In this difference between individual judgments and individual\npseudojudgments, between perceptions and pseudoperceptions, will\nalso clearly be found another of the motives (and perhaps the most\nprofound), which have divided judgments into judgments of fact and\njudgments of value.\n\n[Sidenote: _Individual syllogisms._]\n\nIt is also easy to understand that, as there are individual judgments,\nso there are also individual syllogisms; or rather, that since it\nis not possible to distinguish between judgments and syllogisms in\nphilosophical Logic, for they constitute one indivisible whole, so it\nis not possible to distinguish individual syllogisms from individual\njudgments, or it is only possible to do so verbally. \"Caius is dead,\"\nis indeed the conclusion of a syllogism; since it is not possible to\naffirm that he is mortal without some reason: for example, because he\nis a man, an animal, or a finite being. Thus, the syllogism: \"Men are\nmortal, Caius is a man; therefore, Caius is mortal,\" is only verbally\ndifferent from \"Caius is mortal.\" We do not say that the difference of\nwords is nothing; there is always a spiritual difference, even when,\ninstead of saying, \"Caius is mortal,\" we say, \"He, whom I call Caius,\nis mortal,\" or when the same thought is expressed in Latin or German.\nBut being here occupied with Logic, we declare that there is none,\nbecause, indeed, there is none, _in point of difference of logical\nact,_ both forms being the realization of logical reasoning alone.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: See above, Section I. Chap. VI.]\n\n\n\n\nV\n\n\nTHE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT AND THE PREDICATE OF EXISTENCE\n\n\n[Sidenote: _The copula: its verbal and logical significance._]\n\nSubject and predicate are indistinguishable in the judgment of\ndefinition, and distinguishable and distinct in the individual\njudgment; but the act of distinction (which is also union) between\nsubject and predicate, representation and concept, is again, in the\nindividual judgment, the same as the act of distinction and union, by\nmeans of which, in the judgment of definition, the concept is defined.\nIn both cases thought makes essential what it thinks. In this respect\nthere is no difference between the two forms of judgment, which we have\nanalysed and have hitherto kept distinct for reasons of analysis. One\nidentical act of thought distinguishes both from mere representation,\nin which there is wanting the \"is\" (logical and not verbal)--that \"is,\"\nwhich belongs to the judgment of definition and to the individual\njudgment, and which in the second of these more properly assumes the\nname of _coptila,_ because it unites two distinct elements, the one\nrepresentative, the other logical. Here, too, of course, we must not\nallow ourselves to be deceived by verbalism. The essentialization, the\ncopula, thought, cannot be made to consist of a word, which, abstracted\nfrom the whole, becomes a simple sound, and as sound can assume any\nother signification. In mere representation there can also be found the\n\"is,\" or what, verbally and grammatically, is called copula, but there\nit has no value whatever as act of thought.\n\n    _Nunc est bibendum, nunc pede libero_\n               _Pulsanda tellus_\n\nis a proposition which possesses the \"is,\" but in this case it has\nmerely the value of a sign, not of an act of thought, for that phrase\nof old Horace is nothing but the expression of a hortatory motion.\nThe word, too, can be suppressed, but we do not thereby suppress the\nact of thought. The exclamation \"beautiful!\" uttered before a picture\nmay be an individual judgment, having as subject the representation\nof the picture, and as predicate the \u00e6sthetic universal, which is\ncalled beautiful, in which the copula (and here, also, the subject) is\nverbally understood, but logically existent, and therefore always also\ncapable of verbal reintegration. On the other hand, this reintegration\ncannot be effected when it is a case of a mere representation or an\nexpression of a state of the soul; because, in that case, there would\nbe, not a reintegration, but an integration, that is to say, it would\ncarry out that act of thought, and produce that individual judgment\nwhich was not present before.\n\n[Sidenote: _Questions concerning propositions without subject.\nVerbalism._]\n\nThus, in asking a last question concerning the individual judgment,\nthat is to say, whether it be always _existential,_ we must, as always,\ntransfer the enquiry from verbal to logical analysis, and not waste\ntime with speculations as to words or fragments of propositions,\narbitrarily torn from their context, and therefore insignificant and\nequivocal. The dispute has been most keen in relation to what are\ncalled propositions without a subject, such as \"It rains\" and the\nlike. But, although we do not intend to negate the results, obtained\nor obtainable from these disputes, we cannot accept the position which\nthey imply and which renders it possible to agitate and to discuss the\nproblem to infinity and therefore makes it insoluble. \"It is raining\"\nsaid with a smile of satisfaction means: \"Thank heaven, it is raining\";\nwith a feeling of disappointment: \"Bother the rain for preventing my\ntaking a walk\"; in reply to some one asking what is the noise audible\non the window-panes: \"The audible sound is the sound of rain\"; to\ncontradict some one who says the weather is fine: \"You are stating a\nfalsehood and have not given yourself the trouble of observing; it is\nraining\"; or it is the correction of an historical error. And so on.\nIt is therefore waste of breath to dispute as to the logical nature of\nthat proposition if its precise signification be not determined; and\nwhen it is truly determined (for the propositions we have substituted,\ntaken abstractly, can also appear to have many senses and give rise\nto misunderstandings), we have quite abandoned the materiality of\nverbalism and passed to the thinking of spiritual acts, taken in\nthemselves.\n\n[Sidenote: _Confusion between different forms of judgments with\nrelation to existentiality._]\n\nThe question of existentiality in the act of judgment has been\nstrangely confused, owing both to this verbalism and to the failure\nto keep distinct the judgment of definition and the individual\njudgment, and even the concept and the pseudoconcept. The question\nas to existence has been asked, as if it were the same in the case\nof a judgment of definition, like: \"The Idea is,\" and in the case of\nan individual judgment like \"Peter is.\" But in the first case, as we\nalready know, existence coincides with essence, and that judgment\nonly says that the Idea is thought, and therefore is; whereas the\nsecond not only says that Peter is representable, and therefore is,\nbut that he exists; Peter might be representable and not exist; the\ngriffin is representable and does not exist. Pseudoconcepts have\nalso been incorrectly adduced as examples of judgment of definition\nin such statements as: \"The triangle is thinkable, but does not\npossess existence,\" or: \"The genus mammifer is thinkable, but does\nnot exist as single animals\"; for in this case it should have been\nsaid that \"triangle\" and \"mammifer\" are not thought at all, but are\nconstructed, and therefore have neither essence nor existence. For\nus, then, the question of existentiality cannot arise, either for the\npure judgment of definition, which is a concept and has existence as\na concept, that is to say, essence; nor for the definitive judgment\nof the pseudoconcepts, which is not even thought; but arises only for\nthe individual judgment, into which there enters as a constituent\na representative element, that is to say, something individual and\nfinite. Essence does not coincide with existence in the individual and\nfinite; indeed its definition is just this: the inadequacy of existence\nto essence. Therefore the individual changes at every instant, and\nalthough being at every instant the universal, yet it is adequate to it\nonly at infinity.\n\n[Sidenote: _Determination and subdivision of the question of existence\nin individual judgments._]\n\nHaving limited the question to the individual judgment, for which alone\nit has meaning, we can opportunely divide it into three particular\nquestions: (i.) Does the individual judgment always imply that the\nsubject of the judgment is existent? (ii.) What is the character of\nexistentiality? (iii.) Does this character suffice to construct that\njudgment?\n\n[Sidenote: _Necessity of the existential character in these judgments._]\n\nBeginning with the first, we believe that without doubt the answer\nis affirmative and that adherence should be given to those who have\ndiscovered and persistently defended the necessity of the existential\ncharacter, thus contributing in no small degree to the progress of\nlogical science. Whether what is represented exist or not, is doubtless\nindifferent to the intuitive man, to the poet or artist, simply\nbecause he does not leave the circle of representation. But it is not\nindifferent to the logical man, since he forms an individual judgment.\nHe cannot _judge of what does not exist._\n\nIt has been incorrectly objected that the logical judgment always\nremains the same, whether I have a hundred dollars in my pocket or\nonly in my imagination; that a mountain of gold is a subject of\njudgment, although hitherto at least no one has found one in any part\nof the earth; that Pamela is a virtuous woman (whatever Barretti may\nhave written to the contrary), although she has never lived elsewhere\nthan in the imagination of Richardson and of Goldoni. No predicate\nwhatsoever can be attributed to a hundred dollars, to a mountain of\ngold, and to a Pamela which do not exist; and if it be said that\nthose hundred dollars are exactly divisible by two or by five; or\nthat that mountain of gold, imagined as of a certain base and height,\nis measurable in terms of cubic metres, and has a value of so many\nmillions or milliards on the market; or that Pamela is worthy of esteem\nand of reward; it must be noted that neither the hundred imagined\ndollars, nor the imagined mountain, nor the imagined Pamela are\njudged with these judgments, but that the judgments define simply the\narithmetical concepts of number, prime number and divisibility, or the\ngeometrical concepts of the cube, and the economic concepts of gold\nas merchandise, or the moral concepts of virtue, esteem and reward.\nNo judgment whatever has been given as to those non-existent facts,\nbecause where there is nothing the king (in this case, thought) loses\nhis rights.\n\n[Sidenote: _The absolute and the relative non-existent._]\n\nIt will be replied that we talk at every moment about these\nnon-existent things, and consequently judge them. But here care must\nbe taken not to confuse absolute with relative non-existence, which\nlatter is non-existent only in name. The absolutely non-existent is\nwhat is excluded from the judgment, implicitly in the affirmative\nformula, explicitly in the negative formula. To him who speaks of the\nmountain of gold, of the possession of a hundred dollars, and of Pamela\nas existing realities, we reply by denying these existences, that is\nto say, by denying them in an absolute manner; and of those negated\nexistences it is not possible to judge, or even to talk, precisely\nbecause they are altogether negated. Here, in fact, we are speaking of\nthe individual judgment, which excludes its contradictory from itself,\nas, for that matter, is also the case with the judgment of definition.\nBut in that absolute affirmation and negation there is also made,\nexplicitly or implicitly, a relative affirmation or negation; as when\nwe say, in the examples given: \"The mountain of gold, the hundred\ndollars, Pamela, do not exist,\" we say at the same time: \"There do\nexist phantasms, products of the fancy or of the imagination, of a\nmountain of gold, of a hundred dollars, and of a virtuous Pamela.\" Now\nthe mountain, the dollars, and Pamela are, as such, not the absolutely\nnon-existent, but certain facts, _subjects_ of judgment, of which the\npredicate is expressed by the word \"non-existent,\" which in this case\nis equivalent to \"existing as phantasms.\" The absolutely non-existent\nis the contradictory, true and proper nothingness; the relatively\nnon-existent (which is precisely that of the individual judgment) is\nan existence, _different_ from that which the same individual judgment\naffirms.\n\nCertainly relative non-existence, and the whole content of the\nconcept of existence in general, would require more minute analysis;\nfrom which it would perhaps be seen that the so-called non-existent\nresolves itself into certain categories of practical facts; and thus\ndesignates sometimes _arbitrary constructions,_ made by combining\nimages for amusement or with some other intention; sometimes, on the\ncontrary, the _desires,_ which accompany every volitional act and are\nthe infinite _possibilities_ of the real. And it would also be seen\nthat non-existence in the second sense, or the desires, which have been\nrepresented by art, are not in its circle in any way distinguished\nfrom effective volitions and actions; since, in order to distinguish\nthem, it would be necessary that art should possess a philosophy of\nthe will, however summary, whereas art is without any philosophy. This\nexamination would lead us, however, not only outside the problem now\nbefore us, but also outside Logic, to another part of Philosophy,[1]\nwhich, although closely related to Logic (as Logic to it), must be\nthe object of special treatment if we do not wish to produce mental\nconfusion by offering everything at once. This was the defect, for\nexample, of G. B. Vico, who put all books into one book, the whole book\ninto a chapter, and frequently his whole philosophy and history into a\npage or a period. The present writer, though proud to call himself a\nVichian, does not propose to imitate the didactic obtuseness of that\nman of genius.\n\nSuffice it to have made clear, as concerns the problem which now\noccupies us, that every individual judgment implies the existence of\nwhat is spoken of, or of the fact given in the representation, even\nwhen this fact consists of an act of imagination, that this act may be\nrecognized as such and as such existentialized. It assumes a concept of\nreality, which divides into effective reality and possible reality,\ninto existence and non-existence, or mere representability. Some modern\ninvestigators of what is called the _theory of values_ (students who\nfluctuate between psychology and philosophy, and between an antiquated\nphilosophy and one that has the future before it) have maintained that\na judgment of value cannot be pronounced when we are not dealing with\nan existing thing. Since for us a judgment of value is equivalent to\nany individual judgment, we must accept their thesis; freeing it from\nthe embarrassment in which it finds itself in regard to _unreal images_\n(which yet give rise, as they themselves confess, to such judgments\nof value as the \u00e6sthetic) by observing that in that case there is the\n_effectuality,_ the _reality,_ or, in short, the _existence_ of images,\nwhich have the _ineffectual_ or _non-existent_ as their content.\n\n[Sidenote: _The character of existence as predicate._]\n\nWe have in this way opened a path for the solution of the second\nquestion enunciated, which concerns the character to be assigned to\nthe existentializing act of the judgment. Does this consist of an act\nof thought, that is to say, of the application of a predicate to a\nsubject; or is it an original act of an altogether peculiar nature,\nwhich does not find its parallel in the other acts of thought? In\nshort, is existence a predicate, or is it not? The answer, already\nimplicitly contained in the foregoing explanations, affirms that\n_existence_ in the individual judgment is a _predicate._ And we say \"in\nthe individual judgment\" because in the judgment of definition it is\nnot predicate, for the reason already expounded, that in that judgment\nthere is no distinction between subject and predicate, and that in it\nexistence coincides with essence.\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique of existentiality as position and faith._]\n\nThe traditional reply is, on the other hand, that existence, in the\njudgment of existence, is not a predicate, but a knowledge _sui\ngeneris,_ sometimes called a knowledge of _position,_ sometimes an act\nof belief, or _faith;_ two determinations, which are reducible to a\nsingle one. Because, if being is conceived as external to the human\nspirit, and knowledge as separable from its object, so much so that the\nobject could be without being known, it is evident that the existence\nof the object becomes a position, or something placed before the\nspirit, given to the spirit, extraneous to it, which the spirit would\nnever appropriate to itself unless it were courageously to swallow the\nbitter mouthful with an irrational act of faith. But all the philosophy\nwhich we are now developing demonstrates that there is nothing external\nto the spirit, and therefore there are no positions opposed to it.\nThese very conceptions of something external, mechanical, natural, have\nshown themselves to be conceptions, not of external positions, but of\npositions of the spirit itself, which creates the so-called external,\nbecause it suits it to do so, as it suits it to annul this creation,\nwhen it is no longer of use. On the other hand, it has never been\npossible to discover in the circle of the spirit that mysterious and\nunqualifiable faculty called _faith,_ which is said to be an intuition\nthat intuites the universal, or a thinking of the universal, without\nthe logical process of thought. All that has been called faith has\nrevealed itself step by step as an act of knowledge or of will, as a\ntheoretic or as a practical form of the spirit.\n\nThere is therefore no doubt that existence, if it be something that\nis affirmed or denied, cannot be anything but a predicate; it can\nonly be asked what sort of predicate it is, that is to say, what is\nthe precise content or concept of existence, and this has already\nbeen indicated or at least sketched in the preceding explications.\nObjections have been made to the conceptual and predicative character\nof existence, such as that which maintains that if it were a predicate\nit would be necessary in the judgment \"A is\" to be able to think the\ntwo terms--A and existence--separately, whereas in the thought of A, A\nis already existentialized. But these objections show themselves to be\nsophistical; because outside the judgment A is not thinkable, but only\nrepresentable, and therefore without existentiality, which predicate it\nonly acquires in the act of judgment.\n\n[Sidenote: _Absurd consequences of those doctrines._]\n\nFor the rest, the difficulties that befall those who conceive\nexistentiality in the individual judgment as something _sui generis,_\nare illustrated by the theory to which they find themselves led, of a\ndouble kind of judgment, the existential and the categorical, without\ntheir being able to justify this duality. This is at bottom the most\napparent manifestation of their more or less unconscious _metaphysical\ndualism,_ which assumes an object external to the spirit, and makes\nthe spirit apprehend it with an _act of faith_ and afterwards reason\nabout it with an act of _thought._ Why not always continue with an act\nof faith? Or why not also extend the act of thought to the initial\njudgment? We have either to continue upon the same path, or to change\nit altogether--this is the dilemma which imposes itself here.\n\n[Sidenote: _The predicate of existence as not sufficing to constitute a\njudgment._]\n\nBut in rejecting the double form of the individual judgment, the one\nexistential, the other categorical, and in resolving both into the\nsingle form, which is the categorical by making existence a predicate\namong predicates, we must also explain for what reason (in reply to\nthe third of the questions into which we have divided the treatment\nof existentiality) we now say that the predicate of existence does\nnot suffice to constitute the judgment. How can it fail to suffice?\nIf I say that \"Peter is,\" or that \"The \u00c6gean is,\" have I not before\nme a perfect judgment? and is it not simply a judgment of existence?\nBut here, too, we must repeat: _cave_; beware of the deceptions of\nverbalism; think of things, not of words. The judgments adduced as an\nexample are so little judgments of existence that in them we speak of\nthe \"\u00c6gean\" and of \"Peter,\" and since we speak of them, it is clear\nthat we know that the \u00c6gean, for example, is a sea, and what a sea\nis, and so on; that Peter is a man, and a man made in this or that\nway, an Italian and not a Bushman, thirty years old and not a month,\nand so on. The merely representative element cannot be found in the\njudgment by fixing it in a word, which, in so far as it forms part of\nthe judgment, is, like all the rest, penetrated with logical character;\nand when we say that \"Peter\" is the subject and is representation,\nand \"existing\" is the predicate, we speak in a general sort of way and\nalmost symbolically. If we are looking for the formula of the merely\nexistential judgment in relation to a representation, that is, of a\njudgment which leaves the representation free from all other predicate\nsave that of existence, such a formula could only be _\"Something\nis.\"_ But upon mature consideration this formula would no longer be\nan individual judgment, since every logical transfiguration of the\nindividual and every individual determination of the universal would\nnot have been excluded: it would correspond neither more nor less than\nto a judgment of definition which asserts that \"something\" (something\nin general, indeterminate) \"is\" or that \"reality is.\"\n\n[Sidenote: _The predicate of judgment as the totality of the concept._]\n\nBut our theory concerning the indispensability of other predicates in\nconstituting the judgment is not to be understood as an affirmation\nof the necessity that any _other_ predicate of any sort should be\n_added_ to the predicate of existence, nor even that _all the others\npossible_ should be added to it. In the first case, we shall always\nhave an unjustifiable duality of predicates: that of existence and\nthat necessary for essentializing and completing the judgment; in\nthe second, duality would certainly be avoided, since to constitute\nthe judgment all the predicates would be necessary, without their\ndistinction into a double order, and all would be qualitative\npredicates; but there would remain the idea of a successive addition\nof predicates. Granted this idea, it is impossible ever to understand\nwhat those acts would be, by which the first, or also the second, or\nalso the third predicate, and so on, should be attributed, without\nyet attaining in such attributions the full totality of truth. They\nare representations no longer; and not yet judgments: they are then\nsomething insufficient and one-sided, whose existence could not be\nadmitted save arbitrarily (as in Psychology), and which, therefore,\nwould be inadmissible in Philosophy. It therefore only remains to\nconclude that in the judgment, all possible predicates are _given in\none act_ alone; that is, that the subject is predicated as existence,\nand for this very reason determined in a particular way; determined in\na particular way, and for this very reason, as existence.\n\nIn other words, the concept which is predicated in the individual\njudgment is not and cannot be a f\u0153tus or a sketch of a concept; but is\nthe whole concept, in its indivisible unity, as universal, particular\nand singular. And if existence seem to be a first predicate, the reason\nlies perhaps in this, that the concept of existence as actuality and\naction, and in its distinction from mere possibility, is perhaps the\nfundamental concept of the real, although on the other hand it is not\ntruly thinkable save as determined in the particular forms of reality;\nhence that first predicate is first only in so far as it contains the\nlast, that is to say, is neither last nor first, but the whole. To\nexplain these statements is in any case, as has been said, the task of\nthe whole of Philosophy, not of Logic alone, which here, as elsewhere,\nmust rest satisfied with demonstrating the point that most closely\nconcerns it; that is to say, the impossibility of separating from one\nanother in the judgment, the predicates necessary for the determination\nof the reality of the fact, the absence of any one of which renders the\njudgment itself impossible.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: See the _Philosophy of the Practical,_ pt. i. sect. ii.\nch. 6.]\n\n\n\n\nVI\n\n\nTHE INDIVIDUAL PSEUDOCONCEPTS. CLASSIFICATION AND ENUMERATION\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Individual pseudojudgments._]\n\nAs pseudoconcepts imitate pure concepts and the corresponding judgments\nof definition, so by means of them are imitated pure individual\njudgments, and spiritual formations are obtained, which can be\nconveniently called _individual pseudojudgments._\n\n[Sidenote: _Their practical character._]\n\nThe character of these pseudojudgments, like that of the\npseudoconcepts, is not cognitive, but practical and more properly\nmnemonic. Fixing our attention upon certain examples of such judgments,\nif we say of an animal: \"It is a squirrel,\" or \"It is a platyrrhine\nmonkey\"; if we say of a house: \"This house is thirty metres high\nand forty wide\"; if of a painting we say: \"The _Transfiguration_ is\na sacred picture,\" or \"The _Dana\u00eb_ is a mythological picture\"; or\nif of a literary work we say, \"The _Promessi Sposi_ is a historical\nromance\";--what have we learned as to the true nature of the _Promessi\nSposi,_ of the _Transfiguration,_ of the _Dana\u00eb,_ of that house and of\nthose animals? Upon close consideration, nothing at all. The animals\nhave been put into one or another compartment or glass case, decorated\nwith a name which might also be different from what it is, as the\ncompartment and the glass case might also be different; the house\nhas been compared in respect of its dimensions to other houses or to\nan object arbitrarily assumed as the unit of measurement, which is\nthe metre, but which might be the foot, the palm, and so on; the two\npictures and the literary work have been looked at from the visual\nangle of an arbitrary character, such as the mythological, religious\nor historical subject. As to what they truly are, as to how all these\nthings came to be and to live, and as to their relation with other\nthings and with the Whole, we have been silent. Their _value,_ as it is\ncalled, remains unknown.\n\n[Sidenote: _Genesis of the distinction between judgments of fact and\njudgments of value; and criticism of them._]\n\nThis lack of all determination as to value, which is characteristic of\nindividual pseudoconcepts, gives support to the distinction between\njudgments of _fact_ (as individual pseudojudgments are sometimes\ncalled) and judgments of _value;_ a distinction which makes evident the\nfurther need of supplying the spirit with what the first judgments\ndo not give, that is to say, with the meaning or value of things. But\nsince the individual pseudojudgments are not for us what they boast\nthemselves to be, judgments of fact, we have no need to complete them\nwith judgments of value; which would thus be themselves arbitrary (that\nis to say, conceived extrinsically to the determination of fact). True\nindividual judgments are pure, and in them the universal penetrates the\nindividual and the determination of value coincides with that of fact.\nIn pseudojudgments there takes place no such penetration, but only the\nmechanical _application_ of a predicate to a subject; so much so, that\nhere is a true occasion for employing words which signify an extrinsic\nplacing side by side, a reunion, combination or aggregation of subject\nwith predicate.\n\n[Sidenote: _Importance of the individual pseudojudgments._]\n\nHaving made this clear, it is superfluous to repeat that we do\nnot intend to remove, or even to attenuate, the due importance of\nindividual pseudojudgments, as we did not remove or attenuate that of\npseudoconcepts, when we defined them for what they are. And how can\nwe deny their importance, if each one of us create and employ them at\nevery instant, if each one of us strive to keep in order as best he\ncan the patrimony of his own knowledge? It is easier for a student to\nwork without notes and memoranda than for any one not to make use of\nindividual pseudojudgments. If I pass mentally in review the material\nthat must go to form the history of Italian painting or literature, I\nmust of necessity arrange it in works of greater or less importance,\nin plays and novels, in sacred pictures and landscapes, and so on;\nsave when I wish to understand those facts historically, and then I\nmust abandon those divisions. I must abandon them during that act\nof comprehension; but I must immediately resume them, if I wish to\ngive the result of my historical research; and in this exposition it\nwill be impossible for me to avoid saying that Manzoni, after having\ncomposed _five sacred hymns_ and _two tragedies,_ set to work upon a\nhistorical _romance_; or that _landscape painting_ was developed in the\nseventeenth century. These words are necessary instruments for swift\nunderstanding, and only a philosophical pedant could propose to expel\nthem. In like manner, if I wish to buy a house, I shall visit several\nhouses and arrange them in memory, according to the situation, their\narrangement, their size and other characteristics, all formulated in\npseudojudgments. I shall have to abandon all of these in the act of\nchoice, for then the house that I shall choose will possess one only\ncharacteristic: that of being the one that suits my wants, that is\nto say, the one _that pleases me._ But I shall again have to employ\nthose abstract characteristics, in my conversation with the person who\nsells it to me and in the contract that I make; there I shall speak,\nnot only of my will and pleasure, but also of a house thirty metres\nhigh and forty wide, and so on. The same must be said of the squirrels\nand platyrrhine monkeys, which I cannot contrive to see in a museum\nor zoological garden, unless I describe them in that way; and I shall\ncontinue so to describe them, although those abstract characteristics\nhave no definite value, either in permitting me to describe those\nanimals with accuracy, or in making me understand their meaning in the\nuniverse, or in the history of the cosmos.\n\n[Sidenote: _Empirical individual judgments and abstract individual\njudgments._]\n\nBut in proceeding further to determine the differential characteristics\npresented by pseudojudgments in contrast with individual judgments, it\nis necessary to consider them according to the double form, empirical\nand abstract, assumed by pseudoconcepts, thus distinguishing them as\nempirical individual judgments and abstract individual judgments.\n\n[Sidenote: _Process of formation of empirical judgments._]\n\nIn comparing empirical individual judgments with pure individual\njudgments--for example, \"The _Transfiguration_ is a sacred picture,\" an\nempirical judgment, and \"The _Transfiguration_ is an \u00e6sthetic work,\" a\npure judgment--the first thing to note is that the empirical individual\njudgment presupposes the pure individual judgment. We already know\nthat pseudoconcepts, empirical or abstract, presuppose the idea of\nthe pure concept; but that idea does not suffice for the formation of\ndeterminate empirical concepts, which can be employed as predicates of\nempirical judgments. We must not only think effectively these or those\npure concepts, but they must be translated into individual judgments.\nWere this not so, where would empirical concepts obtain their material?\nBefore the judgment: \"The _Transfiguration_ is a sacred picture,\" can\nbe pronounced, we must first have the empirical concept of \"sacred\npicture.\" Now this empirical concept (setting aside the fact that it\npresupposes other empirical concepts which we do not here take into\naccount, because they would complicate the problem without aiding\nthe solution that we wish to give) presupposes in its turn the pure\nconcept of \"\u00e6sthetic work\"; and it is only when a certain number, more\nor less large, of artistic works have been recognized as such, that\nis, when pure individual judgments concerning them have been formed,\nthat we can abstract the characteristics and pass to the formation\nof the pseudoconcepts: sacred, historical, mythological pictures,\nlandscapes, and so on. Having obtained these, then, and only then when\nwe stand before an \u00e6sthetic work, for example, the _Transfiguration,_\nand formulate again the pure individual judgment which recognizes it\nas such (\"The _Transfiguration_ is an \u00e6sthetic work\"), are we enabled\nfinally to apply the pseudoconcept and to pronounce the empirical\njudgment: \"The _Transfiguration_ is a sacred picture.\"\n\n[Sidenote: _Its foundation in existence._]\n\nThe consequence of the process here recognized as to the manner in\nwhich individual empirical judgments are formed, and in virtue of which\nthey have pure judgments as their base, is that empirical judgments\nalso in the last analysis are based upon the concept of existentiality.\nPseudoconcepts of possibility are not formed, because possibilities are\ninfinite, and it would be vain, or of no mnemonic use, to fix types of\nthem. When, as sometimes occurs, such types seem to be formed outside\nof all existence, their appearance serves, not a mnemonic purpose,\nbut a purpose of research. This is the case with hypotheses and with\nother provisional methods of thought. But the empirical judgment is\nrelated to the individual or existential judgment, and it also employs\npseudoconcepts of existential origin. For this reason, when giving\nexamples of judgments of existence in the preceding chapter, we availed\nourselves without scruple of empirical judgments also; for these obey\nthe same law in relation to existentiality. \"This animal is a monkey\"\nimplies, not only the existence of the animal taken as subject of the\njudgment; but also of that class of animals, of which the character has\nbeen abstracted, and the complex of characteristics which under the\nname of a monkey fulfil the function of predicate. An animal that does\nnot exist and a class of animals that does not exist are not reducible\nto subject and predicate, and do not give rise to judgment of any sort.\n\n[Sidenote: _Dependence of empirical judgments upon pure judgments._]\n\nAnother consequence is that empirical concepts and judgments are\ncontinually originated and modified by pure individual judgments.\nThe object of empirical concepts and judgments is to maintain the\npossession and the easy use of our knowledge; and this with no other\nend than that of serving as base for our actions, and thus also as\na means of attaining new knowledge. New knowledge is expressed in\nnew pure individual judgments, which in their turn supply material\nfor the elaboration of new empirical concepts and judgments. In this\nway empirical concepts and judgments must be and continually are\nrenewed, by being dipped in the waters of pure individual judgments,\ntrue judgments of reality. From these waters they issue forth with\nyouth renewed. If they do not do this, the worse for them: they fall\nill, waste away and die. Given a rapid and profound revolution of\nthought, or, as it is also called, a transvaluation of all the values\nof life and reality, we should also have at once a no less rapid and\nprofound transformation of all the empirical concepts and judgments\npreviously possessed and employed. But this is continually occurring\nin the life of the spirit, if not in cataclysmic form, then in a more\nmodest way. For example, who now employs the empirical concept of\nphlogiston, or forms judgments based upon it, now that we no longer\nadmit the existence of that element, which was at one time believed to\nbe separated from combustible bodies in the act of combustion? Who now\nsays (save in jest) that such and such a syllogism is in _bramantip_ or\nin _fresison,_ or that a certain part of a speech is an _ornatum_ or\na _hypotyposis,_ now that we no longer believe the facts upon which\nsuch concepts of the old Logic and Rhetoric were based? Who still\ndistinguishes human destinies according to the _conjunctions_ of the\nstars that presided at birth, as was done when astrology was believed?\n\n[Sidenote: _Empirical judgments as classification._]\n\nThe empirical judgment, in so far as it applies a predicate to a\nsubject supplied by the pure individual judgment, makes that subject\n_enter_ that predicate, which is a _type_ or _class_; and therefore it\n_classifies_ the subjects of individual judgments. Thus we may also\ncall empirical judgments, judgments of _classification._ This explains\nwhy the judgment has sometimes been considered to be nothing but a\nrelation of subordination: for the empirical judgment does indeed\nsubordinate a representation (which has first been logically determined\nby the individual judgment) to an empirical concept; that is, it places\nit in a class.\n\n[Sidenote: _Classification and intelligence._]\n\n_Classification_ is an essential function, for the reasons already\ngiven, which it would be useless to repeat; but to classify is not\nto _realize intellectually,_ to understand, to grasp, to comprehend.\nIf therefore, in life, we disapprove of those unmethodical people\nwho detest classification, we do not disapprove any the less of the\nperpetual classifiers, who content themselves with arranging things in\nclasses, when on the contrary the needful thing is to penetrate their\nnature and peculiar value. It is a very common error to believe that\nsomething has been thoroughly understood and every problem relating to\nit completely solved, when it has simply been put into a drawer, that\nis, into a class. Thus in the not distant past, instead of establishing\nwhether the _Promessi Sposi_ were or were not an \u00e6sthetic work, and\nwhat movement of the spirit it represents, it was considered to be the\nduty of criticism to enquire whether that book were a romance or a\nnovel, a historical or didactic romance, a historical representation\nof persons or of environment, and so on. The zoologist too, instead of\nstudying the history and transformations of animals, their life and\nhabits, limited himself to adding a rare specimen to a variety, or a\nvariety to a subspecies, or a subspecies to a species, and believed\nthat by so doing he had completely fulfilled the function of science.\n\n[Sidenote: _Interchange of the two, and genesis of perceptive and\njudicial illusions._]\n\nThe abuse of empirical or classificatory judgments is not less in\nrelation to perception, which, as we know, is nothing but the series of\nindividual judgments. It frequently happens that when entering upon\nthe discussion of real facts, and having in mind groups and series of\npseudoconcepts, we hastily form empirical judgments, which take the\nplace of pure individual judgments and are taken in exchange for them.\nFrom these exchanges have arisen certain famous controversies about\nthe truth of perception, such as that indicated by the instance of the\nstick immersed in water, which seems to the eye to be broken, whereas\nit is whole and straight. The usual answer to such a view is that the\nerror lies in the judgment, since perception as perception is never\nwrong. This answer is not altogether correct, since the perception\nis a judgment, and if the judgment is wrong, the perception also is\nwrong. On the contrary, the error is not in the judgment, but in the\nprejudice that the stick in question is in reality straight, and that\nwhen immersed in water the genuine reality is disturbed by a new\nelement; as though the stick outside the water possessed greater or\nless reality than when immersed in the water. This error arises from\nthe construction of the empirical concept of \"stick,\" taken as a true\nand proper concept, so that when the stick is immersed in water and\nseems to be broken it seems not to answer to its true concept. Strictly\nspeaking, the perception of the stick as broken or otherwise altered\nis not less true than that of the straight stick; the absurdity,\noccasioned by the empirical concept, arises from seeking the true\nperception among various perceptions, in order to make of it the basis\nand foundation of the others declared illusory. This error would seem\nto be of slight importance, so long at least as it is a matter of a\nstick; but it entails most serious consequences, since it is owing to\nsimilar errors that outside the Spirit there has come to be posited\n_the Thing in itself._\n\n[Sidenote: _Abstract concepts and individual judgments._]\n\nPassing from the empirical to the abstract concepts, if these latter\npresuppose the pure concept, they do not on the other hand presuppose\nindividual judgments. For example, in order to form the concepts of\nnumerical series, or of geometrical figures, it is not necessary to\nknow individual things. Those concepts are abstract, just because they\nare without any representative content, and therefore no representative\nelement is required for their formation.\n\n[Sidenote: _Impossibility of direct application of the first to the\nsecond._]\n\nBut if this be so, it is clear that they cannot alone be translated\ninto individual pseudojudgments. They will certainly give rise to\njudgments of definition (though always arbitrary and abstract), but\nnot to individual judgments. And in truth numerical and geometrical\nseries is not applicable to individual facts, as affirmed in\nindividual judgments. These are at the same time different and yet\ninter-connected, in such a way that the one is somehow in the other.\nThe application of numerical series or geometrical figures implies\nthat we have before us _homogeneous_ objects (or objects which have\nbeen made homogeneous, which amounts to the same thing). Things\nqualitatively different elude such procedure: we cannot add up a cow,\nan oak, and a poem. It may be urged that all things have this at least\nin common, that they are _things_ and can therefore be enumerated as\nsuch. But things, as such, or things in general are innumerable, being\ninfinite; which amounts to saying that the series of things in general\nis the same as numerical series. Doubtless numerical series can be\nconstituted; but our enquiry concerns the possibility of making direct\napplications of numbers to the individual; that is to say, whether or\nnot they give rise to _abstract_ individual judgments. We must reply\nto this question in the negative. The formula \"abstract individual\njudgments\" is itself a contradiction in terms; for the individual taken\nin itself can never be abstract, nor the abstract ever individual, even\nthrough a practical fiction.\n\n[Sidenote: _Intervention of empirical judgments as intermediaries.\nReduction of the heterogeneous to the homogeneous._]\n\nThe consequence of this demonstration is then that if abstract\nconcepts can be applied to individual judgments (and they are as\na fact applied), there must be an intermediary which makes the\napplication possible. The Individual empirical judgments are just such\nan intermediary. They reduce the heterogeneous to the homogeneous\nand prepare the ground for the application of the abstract concepts\nand for the formation of their corresponding pseudojudgments. These\nare therefore more correctly termed empirico-abstract judgments\nthan individual-abstract judgments. Empirical and empirico-abstract\njudgments cannot then be presented as two co-ordinate classes of the\nindividual pseudojudgment. They are two forms, of which the second is\nevolved from the first.\n\nThe reduction of the _heterogeneous_ to the _homogeneous_ is effected\nby means of the procedure already discussed, by the formation of\nclasses and classification with them as basis. Individual varieties,\nwhich escape all numerical application, are thus subdued, and we obtain\nin exchange things belonging to the same class, as for example oaks,\ncows, men, ploughs, plays, pictures, and so on. These things are finite\nin number (as we already know from our analysis of the representative\nelements contained in a determinate empirical concept) and can\ntherefore be numbered. Thus we can finally arrive at pronouncing the\nempirico-abstract judgments: \"These cows number one hundred,\" \"these\noaks are three hundred in number,\" \"there are four hundred houses in\nthis village,\" \"it contains two thousand inhabitants,\" \"there are two\nploughs in this field,\" and so on. Or we can say elliptically: \"100\ncows,\" \"300 oaks,\" \"400 houses,\" \"2000 inhabitants,\" \"2 ploughs,\" and\nso on, as is done in statistics and inventories.\n\n[Sidenote: _Empirico-abstract judgments and enumeration (measurement,\netc.)._]\n\nIf the procedure proper to individual judgments has been described\nas _classification,_ that of empirico-abstract judgments is rightly\ncalled _enumeration._ Enumeration also makes possible another\nprocedure, known as _measurement,_ and what has been said by way of\nexample about abstract concepts of number must be repeated _mutatis\nmutandis_ of geometrical figures, which are employed as instruments\nof measurement. The procedure of measurement is somewhat more\ncomplicated; enumeration and measurement are related to one another as\nare arithmetical and geometrical concepts, but substantially they come\nto the same thing. The definition sometimes given of measurement can\nbe extended to enumeration in general, namely, that it is _qualitative\nquantity_ applied to quality, strictly speaking, to quality rendered\nhomogeneous by the process of classification. The empirico-abstract\njudgments are in fact qualitative-quantitative.\n\n[Sidenote: _Enumeration and intelligence._]\n\nIf classification does not imply understanding things and assigning\nto them their value, neither does enumeration imply intelligence\nand comprehension, because it consists of a manipulation, which is\naltogether extrinsic and indifferent to the quality of the things\nenumerated. That given objects are capable of enumeration or measurable\nas ioo, or iooo, or 10,000 reveals nothing as to their character. It is\nonly as the result of gross illusion that value is sometimes believed\nto be a function of number, and that value increases or diminishes with\nthe increase or diminution of number. The common saying that number is\nnot quality is a good answer to that illusion.\n\n[Sidenote: _So-called conversion of quantity into quality._]\n\nA mental fact, afterwards called the transition from _quantity_ to\n_quality,_ or the conversion of quantity into quality, has certainly\nbeen known since ancient times. This transition finds a parallel in\nthose logical diversions, in which, granted the admission, apparently\nas legitimate as it is slight, that by the removal of a single hair\nfrom the head of a luxuriantly haired individual, that individual does\nnot become bald, or that by the removal of a single grain from a heap,\nthe heap does not disappear, one hair or one grain after another is\nremoved, and he of the luxuriant locks becomes bald and for the heap\nis substituted the bare ground. But the error is in reality contained\nentirely in the first admission. A man with a head of hair or a heap\nof grain are what they are, so long as nothing in them is changed. The\nchange of quantity is translated into change of quality, not because\nthe first concept is constitutive of the second, but, on the contrary,\nbecause the second is constitutive of the first. Quantity has been\nobtained, measurement has been effected, by starting from quality,\ndetermined in the pure individual judgment and made homogeneous in the\nempirical judgment, which is the basis of the judgment of enumeration\nand of measurement. Thus quality constitutes the only real content\nof the abstract quantitative concept. By the taking away of the hair\nor the grain, _quality_ itself is changed through the _quantitative\nformula._ That is to say, quantity does not pass into quality, but one\nquality passes into another quality. Quantity, taken by itself, as an\nabstract determination, is impotent in presence of the real.\n\n[Sidenote: _Mathematical space and time and their abstraction._]\n\nA final observation, suggested by the difference between pure\nindividual judgments (or judgments of reality and value, if it please\nyou so to call them), and quantitative or empirico-abstract judgments,\nis that the entire conception of things as occupying various portions\nof _space_ and following one another in a _discontinuous_ manner,\n_separated_ from one another in _time,_ is derived from the last type\nof pseudojudgments, namely the quantitative. It is an _alteration_\neffected for practical ends from the ingenuous view offered by pure\nperception. To show, as we have shown, the genesis of quantitative\njudgments and so of mathematical space and time, amounts to describing\ntheir nature and giving their definition. It amounts to revealing them\nas thoughts of _abstractions,_ which are not to be confounded with real\nthought, or with genuine thought of reality. The Kantian concept of the\n_ideality_ of _time_ and _space_ gives the same result. This doctrine\nis among the greatest discoveries of history, and should be accepted\nby every philosophy worthy of the name. In accepting it ourselves, we\nmake but one reservation (justified by the proofs given above), namely,\nthat the character of mathematical space and time should be called not\nideality (because ideality is true reality), but rather _unreality_ or\n_abstract ideality,_ or, as we prefer to call it, _abstractness._\n\n\n\n\nTHIRD SECTION\n\n\nIDENTITY OF THE PURE CONCEPT AND THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT THE LOGICAL _A\nPRIORI_ SYNTHESIS\n\n\nI\n\n\n\n\nIDENTITY OF THE JUDGMENT OF DEFINITION (PURE CONCEPT) AND OF THE\nINDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Result of preceding enquiry: the judgment of definition and\nthe individual judgment._]\n\nThe descent, as we have called it, from the pure concept to the\nintuition, or the examination of the relations which are established\nbetween the concept and the intuitions, when we have attained the\nfirst, and of the ensuing transformations, to which the second are\nsubject, might at first sight seem complete. The concept, which was\nfirst contemplated in abstraction, has been demonstrated in a more\nconcrete manner, in so far as it takes the form of language and exists\nas the judgment of definition. Further, we have shown how, when thus\nconcretely possessed, it reacts upon the intuitions from which it was\nformed, or how it is applied to them, as it is called, giving rise\nto the individual or perceptive judgment. The transition from the\nintuitions to the concept, and so to the expression of the concept or\nthe judgment of definition, and from this to the individual judgment,\nhas been followed and demonstrated in its logical necessity. Thus the\ntwo distinct forms are also united, the first being the presupposition\nand base of the second, so that the connection seems at first sight to\nbe perfect. The judgment of definition is not an individual judgment;\nbut the individual judgment implies a previous judgment of definition.\nTo think the concept of man does not mean that the man Peter exists.\nBut if we affirm that the man Peter exists, we must first have affirmed\nthat the concept of man exists, or is thought.\n\n[Sidenote: _Distinction between the two: truth of reason and truth of\nfact, necessary and contingent, etc., formal and material._]\n\nThe distinction between the two forms, the judgment of definition and\nthe individual judgment, is universally recognized. Not only can it be\nfound, as has already been noted, in at least one of the significations\nwhich have been attached to the two classes of judgments, analytic and\nsynthetic, but it is even more clearly expressed in the well-known\ndistinction between _truth of reason_ and _truth of fact,_ between\n_necessary truths_ and _contingent_ truths, between truths _a priori_\nand truths _a posteriori,_ between what is _logically_ and what is\n_historically_ affirmed. Indeed, it is only on the basis of this\ndistinction that it seems possible to give any content to the logical\ndoctrine, which recognizes the possibility of propositions true _in\nform_ and false _in fact._ This doctrine, as usually stated, is\naltogether untenable. It is impossible, above all, to maintain that\nformal truth can be distinguished from effective truth, always assuming\nthat \"form\" is understood in its philosophical sense and not in that of\nformalist Logic, where it indicates an arbitrarily fixed externality,\nwhich, as such, is neither true nor false. It is therefore impossible\nto maintain that one and the same proposition can be true in one\nrespect and false in another; for a proposition can be judged only\nfrom one point of view, which is that of its unique signification and\nvalue. But it is clear that once we admit the distinction between truth\nof reason and truth of fact, affirmations of both kinds might be found\nincorporated in the same verbal proposition, one of them false and the\nother true. For example, that the saying of Cambronne, \"The Guard dies\nand never surrenders,\" is a \"sublime saying\" is formally (rationally)\ntrue, but it is materially (as fact) false, because Cambronne did not\nutter those words. On the other hand, that the _Assedio di Fiorenze_ of\nGuerrazzi is \"a very beautiful book, because it inflamed many youthful\nbosoms with love of country,\" is materially (as fact) true, but it is\nformally (rationally) false, because the fact of its having produced\nsuch an effect is not proof of the beauty of a book, since beauty does\nnot consist of practical efficacy.\n\n[Sidenote: _Absurdities arising from these distinctions; the individual\njudgment as ultralogical._]\n\nYet, notwithstanding the apparently glaring distinction between the\njudgment of definition and the individual judgment, between truth\nof reason and truth of fact; notwithstanding its secular celebrity\nand its confirmation by universal agreement and common usage, this\ndistinction meets with a very grave difficulty. In order to understand\nit, we must, above all, establish clearly what we have just stated\nin positing that distinction and in making the individual judgment\nor truth of fact _follow_ the judgment of definition or truth of\nreason. We have already posited a distinction of this kind between\nintuition and concept, and have noted that we have thus distinguished\ntwo fundamental forms of the Spirit: the representative or fantastic\nform, and the logical. Now, in positing as distinct the judgment of\ndefinition and the individual judgment, do we mean to do something\nanalogous? Do we mean to distinguish the logical form (concept or\ndefinition) from another form, no longer logical, although containing\nthe logical form in itself as overcome and subordinate, in the same way\nthat the concept contains in itself the intuition? In other words, is\nthe individual judgment something _ultralogical_? It can certainly be\nasserted that it is not mere definition; but can it be asserted that\nit is not logical? The words used should not lead to misconception. If\nin the individual judgment the subject be a representation, it is also\ntrue that this representation is not found there as it would be found\nin \u00e6sthetic contemplation, but as subject of a judgment, and therefore\nnot as a representation pure and simple, but as a representation\nthought, or made logical. Hegel has several times remarked that whoever\ndoubts the unity of individual and universal can never have paid\nattention to the judgments which he utters at every instant. In these,\nby means of the copula, he resolutely affirms that Peter _is_ a man,\nor that the individual (the subject) _is_ the universal (predicate);\nnot something different, not a piece or fragment, but just that, the\nuniversal. Further, are not truths of fact also truths of reason? Would\nit not be irrational to think that a fact was not the fact it had\nbeen? The existence of C\u00e6sar and of Napoleon is not less _rational_\nthan that of quality and of becoming. And are not both kinds of facts\nequally necessary--those called contingent not less than those called\nnecessary? We are right to laugh at those who like to think that things\ncould have happened otherwise than they have happened. C\u00e6sar and\nNapoleon are as necessary as quality and becoming.\n\n[Sidenote: _or duality of logical forms._]\n\nIt follows from these considerations (which could be easily multiplied)\nthat the individual judgment is not less logical than that of\ndefinition. Truths of fact, contingent and _a posteriori,_ are not\nless logical than those of reason, necessary and _a priori._ But if\nthis be so, the distinction between the two forms would not be a\ndistinction between forms of the spirit, but a subdistinction within\nthe logical form of the spirit: a subdistinction of which we have\nalready denied the possibility. For it is not clear how a logical\nthought, or thought of the universal, can be _two_ thinkings, one in\none way, one in another: one universal of the universal, the other\nuniversal of the individual. Either the first is void, or the second is\nimproper. Intuition and concept are distinguished as individual from\nuniversal; but that universal should be distinguished from universal\nby the introduction of individuality as element of differentiation is\ninconceivable.\n\n[Sidenote: _Difficulty of abandoning the distinction._]\n\nThe difficulty becomes greater from the equal inconceivability and\nimpossibility of abandoning the result reached above, by which the\nindividual judgment was shown to be possible only by means of a concept\nor judgment of definition. Every attempt that may be made to cancel\nthat presupposition and to reconceive the individual or perceptive\njudgment as preceding the concept and being altogether without logical\ncharacter, a mere assertion of fact, unenlightened by universality,\nmust be considered, for the reasons we have given, to be entirely\nvain. If we cannot admit a duality of logical forms, still less can we\nadmit that an alogical character, below the level of logic altogether,\nattaches to the individual judgment.\n\n[Sidenote: _The hypothesis of reciprocal implication and so of the\nidentity of the two forms._]\n\nThere seems to be but one way out of such a difficulty: namely,\nto preserve the result attained, that is to say, the necessity of\nthe judgment of definition as the presupposition of the individual\njudgment, but to affirm at the same time the necessity of the\nindividual judgment as the presupposition of the judgment of\ndefinition. Admitting this supposition by way of hypothesis, let us\nsee what it would mean and what effect it would have in the discussion.\nSince the one judgment presupposes the other, and this presupposition\nis reciprocal, we could no longer talk of distinction between the two,\nbut of unity pure and simple, of _identity,_ in which distinction\ncould arise only by abstraction and the arbitrary act of dividing\nwhat cannot exist save as indivisible. But, on the other hand, the\ndistinction, although abstract, would always retain its value as a\ndidactic means of making clear the true nature of the logical act. Thus\nwe should justify our first proceeding to develop the concept and the\njudgment of definition and then the individual judgment, and also the\nreservation that we have always made as to the provisional nature of\nsuch distinction, and thus also the new question as to the unity of the\nact, put and answered in the way proposed. All the difficulties arising\nfrom the appearance of a duality of logical forms would disappear.\nDefinitions and individual judgments, truth of reason and truth of\nfact, necessity and contingency, _a priori_ and _a posteriori,_ would\nbe revealed as one act and one truth. And we should also be justified\nin talking of them as distinct acts, for in expressing that single\ntruth and single judgment verbally or in literature, we can attach\ngreater importance now to the definition, and now to the statement of\nfact; now to the subject, and now to the predicate.\n\n[Sidenote: _Objection: the lack of an historical and representative\nelement in definitions._]\n\nThis path, which would offer such advantages and would constitute a\ntrue way out of the difficulty, seems, however, to be closed to us by\nthe fact that in definitions there is no trace whatever of individual\njudgments which, on this hypothesis, would have to be contained within\nand be one with them. If we say \"the will is the practical form of the\nspirit,\" or \"virtue is the habit of moral actions,\" where is to be\nfound in such statements the individual judgment and the representative\nelement? We find in them without doubt the verbal form, expressive and\nrepresentative, which is necessary to the concept for its concrete\nexistence; but we do not find the statement of fact of which we are\nin search. Thus the proposed hypothesis will prove very ingenious and\nrich with all the advantages that we have stated; but since it does not\nappear to be confirmed by facts, we must, it seems, reject it, even at\nthe risk of having to think out a better one, or, if we fail in this,\nof renouncing as desperate the attempt at a solution.\n\n[Sidenote: _The historical element in definitions, taken in their\nconcreteness._]\n\nWe must not, however, be in a hurry, but rather carefully recall the\nobservation just made incidentally: that the verbal or literary form\ncan throw into _relief_ a moment of the judgment, while casting a\nshadow over the other and causing it to be forgotten, without thereby\never being able to suppress it. There seemed, we remember, to be no\ntrace of concepts in perceptive judgments or judgments of fact, and\nespecially in those forms of them which are called merely existential\nand in those called impersonal. Yet there can be no doubt that none\nof those judgments is ever possible without the concept as basis. An\nanalysis which does not allow itself to be arrested by appearances\nand examines verbal forms as regards both what they express and what\nthey leave to be understood (though this too is expressed in its own\nway) has discovered it. Similarly a definition does not exist in the\nair, as might appear from the examples given in treatises, in which\nthe _where_ and the _when_ and the _individual_ and the _actual\ncircumstances_ in which the definition has been given are omitted. In a\ndefinition thus presented, it would certainly be impossible to discover\na representative element and an individual judgment. But the reason for\nthis is that it has been mutilated and made abstract and indeterminate,\nto such an extent that it can be made determinate only by the meaning\nwhich he to whom it is communicated likes to attach to it. If, on the\ncontrary, we look at the definition in its concrete reality, we shall\n_always_ find in it when we examine it with care the _representative\nelement_ and the _individual judgment._\n\n[Sidenote: _The definition as answer to a question and solution of a\nproblem._]\n\nFor every definition is the answer to a question, the solution of a\nproblem. Did we not ask questions and set problems, there would be\nno occasion for giving any definition. Why should we give them? What\nneed could there be? The definition is an act of the spirit and every\nact of the spirit is conditioned. Without contradiction, there can\nbe no agreement; without the shock of multiplicity there can be no\nunity; without the travail of doubt that calls for peace, there can be\nno affirmation of the true. Not only does the answer presuppose the\nquestion; but every answer implies a certain question. The answer must\nbe in harmony with the question; otherwise, it would not be an answer,\nbut the avoiding of an answer. In reply to a question of a certain\nkind, we should turn our deaf ear, as the saying is, or reply with a\nblow. This means that the nature of the question colours the answer\nand that a definition taken in its concreteness is determined by the\nproblem which gives it rise. The definition varies with the problem.\n\n[Sidenote: _Individual and historical conditionedness of every question\nand problem._]\n\nBut the question, the problem, the doubt is always individually\nconditioned. The doubt of the child is not that of the adult, the\ndoubt of the uncultured man is not that of the man of culture, or\nthe doubt of the novice that of the learned. Further, the doubt of\nan Italian is not that of a German, and the doubt of a German of the\nyear 1800 is not that of a German of the year 1900. Indeed, the doubt\nformulated by an individual in a given moment, is not that formulated\nby the same individual a moment after. It is sometimes said by way\nof simplification, that the same question has been put by very many\nmen, in various countries and at various times. But in the very act of\nsaying this, we simplify. In reality, every question differs from every\nother question. Every definition, though it may seem to be the same and\nbounded with certain definite words, which seem to remain unchanged\nand constant, differs in reality from every other, because the words,\neven when they seem to be materially the same, are in effect different,\naccording to the spiritual differences of those who pronounce them.\nEach of these is an individual, and on that account each finds himself\nin circumstances that are individually determined. \"Virtue is the habit\nof moral actions,\" is a formula which can be pronounced a hundred\ntimes. But if it be seriously pronounced as a definition of virtue\neach of those hundred times, it answers to a hundred psychological\nsituations, more or less different, and is in reality not _one,_ but _a\nhundred_ definitions.\n\nIt will be replied that the concept remains the same through all these\ndefinitions, like a man who changes his clothes a hundred times. But\n(setting aside the fact that even the man who changes his clothes a\nhundred times does not remain the same) the truth is that the relation\nbetween concept and definition is not the same as that between a man\nand his clothes. No concept exists save in so far as it is thought and\nenclosed in words, or in so far as it is defined. If the definitions\nvary, the concept itself varies. There are, certainly, variations\nof the concept, of that which is, _par excellence,_ self-identical.\nThese are the life of the concept, not of the representation. But the\nconcept does not exist outside its life, and every thinking of it is a\nphase of this life, never its overcoming, since however far we go, it\nis never possible to swim outside water, or however high we climb, to\nfly outside air.\n\n[Sidenote: _The definition as also historical judgment. Unity of truths\nof reason and of fact._]\n\nIf we posit individual or historical conditions for every thinking of\nthe concept, or of every definition (conditions which constitute the\ndoubt, the problem, the question, to which the definition replies),\nwe must admit that the definition, which contains the answer and\naffirms the concept, at the same time illumines by so doing those\nindividual and historical conditions, that group of facts, from which\nit comes. It illumines, that is to say, qualifies it as what it is,\ngrasps it as subject by giving it a predicate, and judges it. And\nsince the fact is always individual, it forms an individual judgment.\nThis means just that every definition is also an individual judgment.\nAnd this agrees with the hypothesis we framed: it is the assumption\nthat seemed doubtful and now is proved. Truth of reason and truth of\nfact, analytic and synthetic judgments, judgments of definition and\nindividual judgments, do not exist as distinct from one another: they\nare abstractions. The logical act is unique: it is the identity of\ndefinition and of individual judgment, the thinking of the pure concept.\n\n[Sidenote: _Considerations confirming this._]\n\nSuch a theory as this, although it goes against the ordinary way\nof thinking (though this, in its turn, suffers from its own\ncontradictions), can be made convincing even to ordinary thought,\nwhen it is led to reflect upon what is implicitly understood in any\njudgments of definition that are pronounced. For example, definitions\nhave always in view some particular adversary; they change according to\ntime and circumstances, and those definitions that we felt constrained\nto give, at one stage of our mental development, we abandon at another,\nnot because we judge them to be erroneous, but because they seem to\nus to be inopportune or commonplace. These and other facts, easy to\nobserve, would not be possible, unless judgment of definite situations\nintervened to produce the change. And this judgment, though we may try\nto think of it as preceding or as following each one of those acts of\ndefinition, in reality neither precedes nor follows them, but on the\ncontrary presents itself to the mind as contemporaneous, or rather\ncoincident and identical with the act of definition. Every one who\nattains to a conceptual truth, every one, for instance, who achieves\na definite doctrine of art or of morality, is immediately aware in\nhimself that henceforth he knows more adequately not only the kingdom\nof ideas but also the kingdom of things. He realizes that as soon as\nan idea becomes more clear _ipso facto_ it makes clearer the things out\nof whose vortex and tumult it comes. The star-gazer who forgets the\nearth, will be an astronomer, but certainly not a philosopher. In the\nact of thought, in the world of ideas, earth and sky are fused in one.\nWhoever looks well at the sky sees in it (miraculously!) the earth.\n\nFor the rest, the identity of definition and individual judgment, which\nwe have demonstrated by various processes that are usually called\nnegative, hypothetical, or inductive and based upon observation, is\nalso confirmed by the process called deductive. For if the thinking\nof the concept be a degree superior to pure representation, and if in\nthe degrees of the spirit the superior contain in itself the inferior,\nit is evident that representation as well as conceptual elements must\nalways be found in the concept. But it is also evident that we can\nnever find them distinct or distinguishable, but mingled in such a\nway that every distinction in them must be introduced solely by a\ndeliberate act. The logical act is certainly spoken, represented,\nindividualized. But when it is split up into concept and individual\njudgment, one of two things must happen: either we make an empirical\nand external distinction, of more or less; or two monstrosities are\nasserted: a non-individualized concept, which therefore does not exist,\nand a judgment not thought, and therefore non-existent as judgment, and\nexisting, at the most, as pure intuition.\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique of the false distinction between formal and\nmaterial truths._]\n\nAs our distinction between definitions and individual judgments was\nprovisional, so also we must regard the consequence that we showed\nto issue from it--the partial justification of the doctrine of\naffirmations formally (logically) true and materially (individually)\nfalse. In reality, an error of fact implies a more or less inaccurate\nand erroneous definition, and an error of definition implies an error\nof fact. Thus this distinction also retains only an empirical meaning\nuseful for the rough distinction of certain classes of errors from\ncertain others. And resuming another previous observation, we must\nalso say that, strictly speaking, it must be held impossible to err as\nto facts through the use of pure concepts, since the penetration of\nconcepts, however great one may think it, is also always penetration\nof facts. This formula, too, cannot have anything but an empirical\nmeaning, to indicate a certain type of errors of concept and of fact,\nwhich is popularly called the use of concepts and the use of facts,\nwhereas it is the abuse of both.\n\n[Sidenote: _Platonic and Aristotelian men._]\n\n\nIn ordinary life it is customary to distinguish between those who\ncultivate ideas and those who cultivate facts, between _Platonic_ and\n_Aristotelian_ men. But if the Platonists seriously cultivate ideas,\nthey cultivate facts and are also Aristotelians, and the Aristotelians\ncultivate ideas and are Platonists. Here, too, the difference is\npractical and extrinsic, not substantial; so much so that we are often\nastonished both at the singular clear-sightedness and penetration of\nthe actual situation manifested by cultivators of ideas, and at the\nprofound philosophy which we discover in the pretended cultivators of\nfacts.\n\n[Sidenote: _Theory of the application of the concepts, true for\nabstract concepts and false for pure concepts._]\n\n\nHence the further consequence, that we must avoid the formula which\nspeaks of the _application_ of concepts, as, for instance, that in\nthe individual judgment the concept is applied to the intuition. To\nsay this, is, as a saying, innocuous, since like many others, it is\nmetaphorical; but the doctrine implied in it, or that may be suggested\nby it (and that is indeed rarely separated from it), is altogether\nerroneous. The concept is not applied to the intuition, because it\ndoes not exist, even for a moment, outside of the intuition, and the\njudgment is a _primitive act_ of the spirit, it is the logical spirit\nitself. If that formula has been successful, the reason for its success\nmust usually be sought in the theory of the pseudoconcepts. Even\nthese, in relation to the question which engages us now, and in so far\nas they are empirical concepts, are indistinguishable from individual\npseudojudgments. To construct an empirical concept is equivalent to\npronouncing that the objects _a, b, c, d,_ etc., belong to a definite\nclass. The two acts of the construction of the class and of effectual\nclassification are only to be distinguished in an abstract manner. In\nconformity with this, we must now correct the theory that we have given\nabove. But on the other hand, in so far as they are abstract concepts,\nthey are void of all representative content, and therefore constituted\noutside of every individual judgment. They cannot of themselves give\nrise to such judgments. Before they can be united to them, we must\n_apply them_ to individual judgments, elaborated into pseudojudgments,\nor made homogeneous by the process of classification. And in truth,\n'not only the doctrine of application, but also the distinctions\nbetween analytic and synthetic judgments, between definitions and\nperceptions, between truths of reason and of fact, between necessity\nand contingency, find their confirmation in being referred to abstract\nconcepts, as distinct from empirical. The same may be also said of\nthe other doctrine, which distinguishes between affirmations that are\nformally true and materially false. Two griffins plus three griffins\nmake five griffins. This is formally true, since it is true that two\nplus three equals five; but it is materially false, because griffins\ndo not exist. Numbers and their laws would, for example, be truths\nof reason, necessary, _a priori,_ in analytical judgments and pure\ndefinitions; truths derived from experience would be truths of fact,\ncontingent, _a posteriori,_ in synthetic and individual judgments. But\nthough this conception may have currency in a field where, properly\nspeaking, there is neither thought nor truth, in the field of truth\nand of thought the terms of both series are found in the corresponding\nterms of the other. Analysis apart from synthesis is as unthinkable\nas synthesis apart from analysis. In the same way we can empirically\ndistinguish intention and action in the practical spirit. But in\nreality pure intention outside effectual action, is not even intention,\nbecause it is nothing. And an action beyond and without intention is\nnothing, for practical reality is the identity of intention and action.\nHere, too, theoretical spirit and practical spirit correspond at every\npoint.\n\n\n\n\nII\n\nTHE LOGICAL, _A PRIORI_ SYNTHESIS\n\n\n[Sidenote: _The identity of the judgment of definition and of the\nindividual judgment, as synthesis a priori._]\n\nIf analysis apart from synthesis, the _a priori_ apart from the _a\nposteriori,_ be inconceivable, and if synthesis apart from analysis,\nthe _a posteriori_ apart from the _a priori,_ be equally inconceivable,\nthen the true act of thought will be a synthetic analysis, an analytic\nsynthesis, an _a posteriori-a priori,_ or, if it be preferred, an _a\npriori synthesis._\n\nIn this manner, the identity that we have established between the\njudgment of definition and the individual judgment comes to assume a\nname celebrated in the annals of modern philosophy. And by assuming\nit at this point, it is also able to affirm, since it has already\ndemonstrated, the truth of the _a priori_ synthesis, and to determine\nits exact content.\n\n[Sidenote: _Objections raised by abstractionists and empiricists\nagainst the a priori synthesis._]\n\nThis is not the place to enter again into the objections which the\nKantian concept elicited (indeed could not fail to elicit): objections\nwhich in Italy too gave rise to very acute attempts at confutation,\nand which ended in the partial absorption of that concept into the\nmental organism of its opponents. Suffice it to say that all the\nobjections to the _a priori_ synthesis, when thoroughly examined, seem\nto be derived, as was to be expected, from the upholders of the two\none-sided doctrines which were surpassed by the synthesis. Thus the\ndogmatists or abstractionists believed the concept to be thinkable\napart from or above the facts (simple analysis); the empiricists\nperceived only the representative element and claimed to obtain the\nconcept from mere facts (simple synthesis). Both failed to explain\nperception, or the individual judgment. The former found it to arise\nfrom the external and almost accidental contact between pure concepts\nand given facts; the latter sometimes assumed it without explanation,\nsometimes confused it with pure intuition, if not altogether with\nsensibility and emotion. It can be said that whoever does not accept\nthe _a priori_ synthesis is outside the path of modern philosophy,\nindeed of all philosophy. Strive to find or to rediscover that path,\nunless you wish to incur the punishment of trifling with empiricism,\nof lying to yourself with mysticism, or of wandering in the void with\nscholasticism.\n\n[Sidenote: _False interpretation of the a priori synthesis._]\n\nInstead of noting and of examining all the objections made to the _a\npriori_ synthesis (which we have already substantially discussed in\nthe development of our treatise), it will be of assistance to add some\nexplanations, which will prevent false interpretations of that concept.\nThese false interpretations sometimes (as often happens) mingle with\nthe true even in the philosopher who discovered it, and confer force\nand authority upon several of the objections to the very reality of the\n_a priori_ synthesis.\n\n[Sidenote: _A priori synthesis in general and logical a priori\nsynthesis._]\n\nIn the first place, in accordance with the formula given in Logic we\nmust not speak of the _a priori_ synthesis in general, but of the\n_logical a priori synthesis._ The _a priori_ synthesis belongs to all\nthe forms of the Spirit; indeed, the Spirit, considered universally,\nis nothing but _a priori_ synthesis. The synthesis is operative in the\n\u00e6sthetic activity, not less than in the logical. For how could a poet\ncreate a pure intuition, if he did not proceed from a given fact, from\nsome passionate moment of his own, conditioned and constituted in a\nparticular way? Without something to intuite and to express could there\never be a poet? And would he be a poet, if he were to repeat that\nsomething mechanically, without transforming it into pure intuition?\nIn his pure intuition, there is and there is not matter: not as brute\nmatter, but as formed matter, or form. Thus it is said with reason\nthat art is pure form, or that matter and form, content and form, in\nart are wholly one (_a priori_ \u00e6sthetic synthesis). The _a priori_\nsynthesis is not less operative in the practical activity than in\nthe \u00e6sthetic and logical (that is, in the theoretic activity). It is\nimpossible to will without material to will, or to will outside the\ngiven material. The practical man accepts actual conditions, and at the\nsame time transforms them with his volitional act, creating something\nnew, in which those conditions are and are not. They are, because\nthe action achieved is in relation to them; they are not, because\nbeing new, it has transformed them. _A priori_ synthesis, in general,\nthen, means spiritual activity; not abstract but concrete spiritual\nactivity, that is to say, the spirit itself, which is _condition_ to\nitself and _conditioned_ by itself. Thus the _a priori_ synthesis,\nwhich is constituted by the coincidence or identity of the judgment of\ndefinition with the individual judgment, is not _a priori_ synthesis in\ngeneral, but logical _a priori_ synthesis.\n\n[Sidenote: _Non-logical a priori syntheses._]\n\nHaving clearly established this point we are enabled to eliminate the\nconfusion caused by the citation of certain spiritual formations,\nwhich do not correspond with that logical act, as examples of _a\npriori_ synthetic judgments. Such for instance is the case of the\nfamous example: \"5 + 7 = 12,\" concerning which it was long disputed\nwhether it were an _a priori_ synthetic judgment or simply analytical;\nthe synthetic element being found or not found in it, according to\nthe point of view. The same thing has occurred in the case of other\nexamples of a different nature, as in the judgment: \"Snow is white.\"\nHere the dispute has been as to whether it be _a priori_ synthetic,\nor simply synthetic. The truth is, on the contrary, that in neither\nof these two cases is there _logical a priori_ synthesis, because\nthe judgment \"5 + 7= 12\" is the expression of abstract or numerical\nconcepts, and \"snow is white\" is the expression of empirical or\nclassificatory concepts. This amounts to saying that both are products,\nnot of a logical nature, nor of a theoretic nature, but, as we know,\nof an arbitrary or practical nature. For this reason, we have denied\nthe very possibility of simply analytic or simply synthetic judgments\nin pure logic. On the other hand, both these kinds of spiritual\nformations are _a priori_ syntheses, precisely because, being spiritual\nformations (though of a practical nature), they cannot fail to be\nproduced by a creative (synthetic) act of the spirit. This explains why\nthey sometimes appear as _a priori_ syntheses, sometimes as something\naltogether different from the _a priori_ synthesis. It suffices to\nadd to the affirmative solution the adjective \"practical\" and to the\nnegative the adjective \"logical\" to obtain agreement and truth.\n\n[Sidenote: _The a priori synthesis, as synthesis, not of opposites but\nof distincts._]\n\nA question of no less importance is whether the logical _a priori_\nsynthesis (we might say, the _a priori_ synthesis in general) is to be\nconceived as a synthesis of opposites; if, in other words, intuition\nand concept, matter and form, exist in the _a priori_ synthesis in the\nsame way as Being and not Being exist in true Being, which is Becoming;\nor as good and evil, true and false, and so on, exist in the special\nforms of the Spirit. The affirmative reply to this question finds,\nas is well known, its chief representative in the doctrine of Hegel.\nWe do not wish to deny the great truth contained in this doctrine,\nin so far as by considering the _a priori_ synthesis as a synthesis\nof opposites, it insists upon this essential point: that intuition\nand concept matter and form, do not exist in the logical act as two\nseparable elements, merely externally connected. Outside the synthesis\nthe subject does not exist as subject, and the predicate does not\nexist in any way. We must banish altogether the idea of the _a priori_\nsynthesis, conceived as the reuniting of two facts existing separately.\nBut having recognized the true side of the doctrine, we must correct\nthe inexactness it contains. This arises from the confusion already\ncriticized, by which the relation of opposition is unduly extended to\ndistinct concepts, and the unity of effectual distinction is confused\nwith the dialectic unity, which declares itself synthetic, only in so\nfar as it makes war against an abstract distinction.[1] The _a priori_\nsynthesis is a unity of distinct concepts and not of opposites. That\nwhich is the material of the logical synthesis and which outside it\nhas no logical character (is not subject), yet in another and inferior\ngrade of the spirit is form and not matter, and is called intuition.\nHence, there is distinction and unity together; form is not without\nmatter; but the new matter was already form and, therefore, had its\nown matter. The logical _a priori_ synthesis presupposes an \u00e6sthetic\n_a priori_ synthesis. When considered in the logical sphere, this is\ncertainly no longer a synthesis, but an indispensable element of the\nnew synthesis. But outside the logical sphere, it possesses its own\nproper and peculiar autonomy. In the logical act intuition is _blind_\nwithout the concept, as the concept is _void_ without the intuition.\nBut pure intuition is not blind, because it has its own proper\nintuitive light. The concept contains the intuition, but the intuition\ntransfigured. It is a synthesis, not of itself and its opposite, but\nof itself and its distinct concept which is indistinguishable from\nitself, save by an act of abstraction. In this way we satisfy the\ndemand expressed in the formula of the synthesis as unity of opposites,\nand at the same time repress its tendency to usurpation. This tendency\nleads to the rejection of the concept of \u00e6sthetic synthesis, in favour\nof the concept of logical synthesis; it means the negation of art by\nphilosophy, not only in the philosophical field (which would be just),\nbut in the whole spiritual field. Extending itself from this to other\nusurpations and led on by the mirage of an ill-understood unity, it\nclaims all the other syntheses for logical synthesis, and produces a\ngreat spiritual desert, in which logical thought itself at length dies\nof starvation.\n\n[Sidenote: _The category in the judgment. Difference between category\nand innate idea._]\n\nThe logical element, the pure concept or judgment of definition\nconsidered in itself, is given the name of _category_ in the logical\n_a priori_ synthesis. This term is nothing but the Greek equivalent\nfor the word \"predicate,\" which we have hitherto employed. It has been\nasked if the category is what used to be called an _inniate idea._\nThe answer must be that it is both that and also something profoundly\ndifferent. The innate idea was indeed the category, but the category\ntaken as possessed and thought _prior_ to experience, according to\nthe view that we have described as abstract or dogmatic. First the\nmusic, then the words; first definitions, then individual judgments or\nperceptions. The category, on the contrary, is neither the mother nor\nthe first-born. It is born at one birth with the individual judgment,\nnot as its twin, but as that judgment itself. From this aspect the\ncategory or the _a priori_ is not the innate, but the perpetually\nnew-born. From this we see the vanity of the question, whether the\njudgment or the concept be logically _prior,_ not only in the relation,\nwhich we have already examined, of concept with verbal form (judgment\nof definition), but also in the relation of concept with individual\njudgment. We can say indifferently that to _think_ is to _conceive,_\nor that to _think_ is to _judge,_ because the two formul\u00e6 are reduced\nto one. Equally vain is the question as to whether the categories\nprecede the judgment or are obtained from it. They not only do not\nprecede the judgment, but are not even obtained from it. We never issue\nforth from the judgment, as we never issue forth from reality and\nhistory.\n\n[Sidenote: _The a priori synthesis, the destruction of transcendency,\nand the objectivity of knowledge._]\n\nA final explanation, not less important than those already given,\nconcerns the _importance_ of the logical _a priori_ synthesis. This too\nhas been diminished by the very man who discovered and defined that\nmental act, and even more by those who have repeated him, without being\ncapable of reviving again the moment of discovery, and of understanding\nthe intimate reasons that brought it about. When the concept was placed\noutside and prior to the representative element, and thought prior to\nand outside the world, so that the former was applied to the latter,\nthe world was bound to appear to be something inferior to the concept,\na degradation or an impure contact, which thought had to undergo.\nWhen, on the other hand, the representative element was placed outside\nand prior to the concept, the latter seemed to be inferior to it,\nalmost as though it were an expedient for taking hold of the world,\nwithout truly being able to do so, and thus in its turn a degradation\nor defilement of it. Hence the sigh that we hear already in antiquity\nand more strongly in modern times: oh, if _words_ (that is to say\n_concepts,_ because concepts were called words) were not, how directly\nshould we apprehend things! Oh, if _thought_ were not, how vigorously\nshould we embrace genuine reality!\n\nIn the first instance, reality is inferior to the concept, in the\nsecond the concept to reality; but in both alike, the two elements\nare always thought--as mutually external and truth as undiscoverable.\nThus both these one-sided tendencies end in mystery. According to the\nformer, the world is created by a God external to it, and will be\ndisintegrated when it shall seem good to him, while the latter holds\nthat the truth of things is plunged in impenetrable darkness. But\ngranted the idea of the _a priori_ synthesis, reality is not inferior\nto thought nor thought to reality, nor is the one external to the\nother. Representations are docile to thought, and thought conceals\nrepresentations even less than the tenuous and scanty veil concealed\nthe beauty of Alcina. The interpenetration of the two elements is\nperfect, and they constitute unity. The false belief in the externality\nand heterogeneity of reality and thought can only arise when for the\npure concept and the _a priori_ synthesis there are substitutes, either\nabstract concepts with their related analytic judgments, which are\nvoid of all representative content, or empirical concepts with their\nrelated and merely synthetic judgments, which are without logical\nform. The value of the _a priori_ synthesis lies in its efficacy in\nputting an end to doubts as to the _objectivity_ of thought and the\n_cognizability_ of reality, and in making triumphant the power of\nthought over the real, which is the power of the real to know itself.\n\n[Sidenote: _Power of the a priori synthesis never known to its\ndiscoverer._]\n\nBut this efficacy of the _a priori_ synthesis remained obscure to its\ndiscoverer (and most obscure to his orthodox followers). To such an\nextent was this the case, that even to Kant the category did not seem\nto be immanent in the real and to be the thinking of its reality,\nbut an extrinsic, though necessary adjunct, an inevitable alteration\nintroduced into reality to make it thinkable, an anticipatory\nrenunciation of the knowledge of genuine reality. Reality itself lay\noutside every category and judgment, a _thing in itself._ Even in Kant,\nthe _a priori_ synthesis was confused with simple analysis and with\nsimple synthesis. These being manipulations of the real, extrinsic and\nnot intrinsic, practical and not logical, useful, but without truth, so\nthe _a priori_ synthesis appeared to him to be an expedient to which\nman has recourse and cannot but have recourse, but which constitutes,\nnot his power, but his weakness. Kant, too, dreamed of an ideal of\nknowledge, which was not _a priori_ synthesis, but the _intellectual\nintuition,_ the perfect adequacy of thought to reality, unattainable\nby the human spirit. He did not perceive that the intellectual\nintuition, which he longed for as an impossible ideal, was precisely\nthe continuous operation of the _a priori_ synthesis, nor did he think\nthat what is necessary and insuperable cannot be defective. He never\nknew that the _a priori_ synthesis, which he had discovered, is alone\nthe true concept and the true judgment, and, therefore, operates in an\naltogether different way from simple analysis and simple synthesis,\nwhich are neither concept nor judgment; nor finally that if these\nlast postulate a _thing in itself,_ the _a priori_ synthesis cannot\npostulate it, because it has _it in itself._\n\nTo understand all the richness of the _a priori_ synthesis is to pay\nhonour to the genius of Emmanuel Kant; but it is also to recognize\nthat the systematic construction of Kant showed itself altogether\nunequal to the great principle he laid down, but whose value he\ninsufficiently estimated.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: See above, Sect. I. Chap. VI.]\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\n\nLOGIC AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE CATEGORIES\n\n\n[Sidenote: _The demand for a complete table of the categories._]\n\nWhen the definition of the _a priori_ synthesis and of the category has\nbeen attained, it is usual to demand of logical Science (and this will\nbe demanded also of our exposition) that it should say how many and of\nwhat sort are the categories, how they are connected among themselves,\n_i.e._ that it should draw up a _table_ of them.\n\n[Sidenote: _A request extraneous to Logic. Logical and real\ncategories._]\n\nLogic, in our opinion, should reject this demand, the origin of\nwhich lies in the confusion between thought in general and thought\nas the science of thought. The categories are certainly affirmed in\nthe individual judgment, but Logic, as the science of thought, does\nnot undertake to formulate judgments which will say what are the\npredicable terms, the ultimate or pure concepts, the categories, with\nwhich reality is thought. Logic cannot claim to substitute itself for\nthe other philosophic sciences and itself to solve all the problems\nwhich offer themselves to thought as to the nature of reality. Its\nscope is to define categories and to formulate judgments _only on that\naspect of Reality, which is logical thought._ It is, therefore, under\nthe obligation to face the question as to whether there be logical\ncategories, supreme concepts or supreme predicables from the point of\nview of logic, and if there be, to indicate and to deduce them. It is\nnot obliged to indicate and to deduce all the supreme predicables and\ncategories.\n\n[Sidenote: _The uniqueness of the logical category: the concept._]\n\nNow we have already treated of the question as to the categories\nof Logic and have solved it, partly affirmatively, partly in the\nnegative. That is to say, we have denied to Logic a multiplicity\nof categories, since the three fundamental categories, usually\ngiven as concept, judgment, and syllogism, have been revealed to be\nidentical. The others, derived from formalist Logic and relating to\nclasses of concepts, to forms of judgments and to figures of the\nsyllogism (and even these three preceding, if they are taken as\nseparable or distinguishable), have been shown to be empirical and\narbitrary. Finally, those that were based upon the gnoseology of the\npseudoconcepts have shown themselves to be extraneous to pure Logic.\nOn the other hand, we have affirmed the category proper to Logic,--the\nunique category to which it gives rise. It has been defined as the\npure concept, at once judgment of definition and individual judgment,\nthe logical _a priori_ synthesis. Thus the enquiry can be looked upon\nas exhaustive as regards this part of the subject.\n\n[Sidenote: _The other categories. No longer logical, but real. Systems\nof categories._]\n\nA glance at the tables of categories that have appeared in the course\nof the history of philosophy, from that of Aristotle, which is the\nfirst, at least among the conspicuous, to that of Stuart Mill, or if\nit be preferred, to the Kategorienlehre of E. von Hartmann, which is\nthe last, or among the last, shows at once that the other categories,\nwhich have been described as logical categories, can be reduced to\nverbal variants of this unique one of the pure concept, or belong to\nother aspects of the spirit and of reality, as distinct from that of\nlogical thought. For if in the Aristotelian table the _ousia_ and the\n_poion,_ substance and quality, to some extent denote the subject and\nthe predicate of the judgment, that is to say, the abstract elements\nof the _a priori_ synthesis: the _poson,_ on the other hand, appeals\nto the processes of enumeration and of measurement, the _pou_ and\nthe _pot\u00e9_ to the determination of space and time, the _poiein_ and\nthe _paschein_ to the principles of practical activity, and so on.\nThe Kantian table seems to refer, or to mean to refer, to logical\nthought; but that does not prevent the appearance in it of traces of\nthe principles of mathematical, naturalistic, heuristic, and other\nprocesses. Furthermore, in the Kantian philosophy, the whole system\nof the categories is to be deduced, not from the transcendental Logic\nalone, but also from the transcendental \u00c6sthetic (space and time), and\nfrom the Critique of Practical Reason and Judgment, which all lead to\nfunctions or forms, operating as spiritual syntheses and reappearing\nas categories in judgments. Finally, we must not neglect the Kantian\nmetaphysical categories of Physics.\n\n[Sidenote: _The Hegelian system of the categories and other later\nsystems._]\n\nAll this becomes clearer in the doctrine of Hegel, where the categories\nare not only those of logical thought or subjective thought, concept,\njudgment, syllogism; but also those of quality, quantity and measure,\nessence, phenomenon and reality, with their subforms and transitions,\nand those of the objective concept, mechanism, chemism, and teleology,\nand those of the Idea, life, knowing, and the absolute Idea. The\nHegelian, Kuno Fischer, makes certain declarations in his _Logic_\nto which it is expedient to give heed. Following the example of the\nmaster, he was induced to include knowing and willing among the\ncategories; \"It may at first sight seem strange (he says), that\nknowing and willing should appear here as logico-metaphysical concepts,\nas categories. Knowledge has need of categories; but is knowledge\nitself a category? Willing belongs to Psychology and Morality, not\nto Logic and Metaphysic. It seems, then, that the categories lose\nthemselves now in Physics or Physiology, by means of concepts such\nas those of mechanism and organism, now in Psychology and Ethics,\nwith the concepts of knowing and of willing. Objections of this sort\nhave often been made. We have shown that the concept must be thought\nas object, and that the concept of object demands that of mechanism:\nthe justification of the thing resides in this proof. Willing and\nknowing are indeed categories. If the test, by which we recognize the\ncategories, consists in that they are valid, not only for certain\nobjects, but for all, and in that they should express the universal\nnature of things, it is not difficult to see in what a profoundly\nsignificant way knowing and willing emerge triumphantly from such a\ntest. They belong not only to what are called the faculties of the\nhuman spirit, but in truth to the _very conditions of the world._ If\nthe world must be understood as end it must also be understood as\nwilling; for the end without the willing is nothing. ... If knowing\nand willing were only a small human province of the world, they\nwould certainly not be categories. Their concept would belong not to\nmetaphysic, but to the anthropological sciences. Since they are, on the\ncontrary, both of them cosmic principles, universal concepts, without\nwhich the concept of objects and of the world cannot be thoroughly\nthought and known, for that reason they necessarily have the value of\ncategories. And since, in truth, they compose the concept of the world,\nthey are the supreme categories.\"[1] This argument amounts to saying,\nthat whenever a concept is truly universal (not restricted to this\nor that class of manifestations of reality and therefore empirical),\nwhenever a concept is a pure concept, it is always a category. This\nthesis is most exact, but it amounts to excluding such a search from\npure Logic, which does not give the concepts or concept of reality,\nbut only the _concept of the concept._ The attempt of Hegel to embrace\nthe totality of the categories was not understood and was abandoned\nat a later date, and a return was made in some sort to the categories\nof the theoretic and practical--theoretic spirit alone--(von Hartmann\ngives them in his fundamental tripartition of the categories into\nsensibility, reflective thought and speculative thought). But the\ntendency to totality reappeared, in an elementary form, in Stuart\nMill, who opposed to the Aristotelian table his own, divided into\nthe three classes of _sentiments_ (sensations, thoughts, emotions,\nvolitions), of _substances_ (bodies and spirits), and of _attributes_\n(quality, relation, quantity): a vertiginous regression to an infantile\nconception, which yet sought to embrace in its own way the whole of\nreality.\n\n[Sidenote: _The logical order of the predicates or categories._]\n\nThe doctrine of the categories has been introduced and retained in\nLogic, not only because of the confusion between the thought of thought\nand thought in general, which has just been explained, but also because\nof another confusion, which must now be explained, as it has far\ndeeper roots and far greater importance. It has been and may be argued\nin this way. It is true that the categories are nothing but simply\nthe concepts of reality; but these concepts, acting as predicates,\nare presented in logic in a necessary order, which it is the task of\nlogical Science to deduce. In determining reality by means of thought,\nwe begin with a first predicate, for instance _being,_ judging that\nreality is. This judgment immediately shows itself insufficient,\nwhence it becomes necessary to determine it with a second predicate\nand to judge that reality both is and is not, or is _becoming._ This\npredicate of becoming appears in its turn vague and abstract, and it\nbecomes necessary to determine reality as _quality,_ then as _quantity,\nmeasure, essence, existence, mechanism, teleology, life, reflexion,\nwill, idea,_ in short with all the predicates that exhaust the concept\nof reality.\n\n[Sidenote: _Illusion as to the logical reality of this order._]\n\nBut we know that this order, this supposed succession, is illusory and\nis simply the product of abstract analysis. In the predicate to which\nverbal prominence is given, there is concentrated or understood every\npredicate, because in every judgment complete reality[2] is predicated\nof the subject. Moreover this is shown just by the observation, which\nreveals the insufficiency of an isolated and abstract predicate,\nand requires for sufficiency nothing less than the totality of the\npredicates, the full concept of the Real, of the Spirit or of the Idea.\nThe concept of Reality, of Spirit or the Idea, can without doubt be\ndeveloped, in its unity and in its distinctions; but (let us yet again\nrepeat) logical Science has for its object, not the effective unity and\ndistinction of the Real, but the _concept_ of unity and distinction..\n\n[Sidenote: _The necessity of the order of the predicates, not founded\nin Logic in particular, but in the whole of Philosophy._]\n\nThe ordering of the variety of the predicates, their gradation\naccording to their greater or less adequacy to reality, arises from\nthe fact that disputes as to reality show themselves as one-sided\naffirmations of this or that predicate or group of predicates,\ncoupled with the neglect or negation of others, which are not less\nindispensable. When, therefore, we attack such one-sidedness and\naffirm the complete indivisibility of the predicates, the single\npredicates, the objects of the one-sided affirmations, are scrutinized\none after the other, in order to demonstrate their insufficiency, and\nfor this very reason a certain order is given to them. This order is,\nwithout doubt, necessary, because the possibility of errors, or of\none-sided thoughts, is a consequence of the distinctions, in which\nthe unity of the Real lives, and which are necessary to it. But for\nthis very reason the order must be sought, not in logical Science,\nbut in the total conception of Reality. For instance, in researches\nconcerning the ethical concept, only he who thinks, not the concept\nof the concept (logical science), but the concept of ethical activity\n(ethical science), will be able to determine what one-sided concepts\nare there possible and what is their order. Only he who thinks a\nwhole philosophy will be able to determine how many and what and how\nconnected are the one-sided and erroneous modes of philosophy. This\ncannot be found in the concept of the concept; or rather only those\nerroneous modes are there found which derive from a one-sided thinking\nof the concept of the concept. This we shall see in its place. The\norder of the categories in the sense indicated is certainly not\nsubjective and arbitrary, as a didactic ordering of them would be, a\n_\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd pr\u1f78s \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2_; it is a _\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9._ But since this first by\nnature is identical with the whole concept of Reality, it is not wholly\ncontained in the concept of Logic.\n\n[Sidenote: _False distinction of philosophy into two spheres,\nMetaphysic and Philosophy, rational philosophy and real philosophy,\netc., due to the confusion between Logic and doctrine of the\ncategories._]\n\nIf the confusion between Logic and the Doctrine of the Categories, or\nbetween the thinking of the logical category and the thinking of the\nother categories, had produced no other effect than that of introducing\ninto books of Logic a method of treatment that exceeds their bounds,\nthe evil would not be great. It would chiefly affect literary harmony\nand clarity of didactic exposition. But from that confusion there has\nsometimes as _rational Philosophy and real Philosophy,_ sometimes as\n_Gnoseology and Anthropology (or Cosmology,)_ sometimes as _Logic and\nSystem of Philosophy,_ and so on. The conception of Reality is thus\ntwice described: once as part of Logic (the Doctrine of the Categories,\nOntology, etc.); and again as effective or applied Philosophy.\nPhilosophy is divided into a Prologue to Philosophy and Philosophy,\nor into Philosophy and a Conclusion to Philosophy. But Philosophy,\nalthough it is distinguishable into philosophies (for example,\n\u00c6sthetic, Logic, Economic and Ethic), _is this distinction itself,_\nor the unity immanent in it. It never gives rise to a duality of\ngrades. It is never prologue, development and conclusion, being, at its\nevery point, prologue, development and conclusion. As from empirical\nand formalist Logic arose the idea of a Logic which should not be\nphilosophy, but an organ or instrument or rule or law for the rest of\nphilosophy; so from the confusion of Logic with the Doctrine of the\nCategories has arisen the idea of a Logic, or Metaphysic, or general\nPhilosophy, or whatever else it may be called, which should be _opposed\nto or above_ the rest of philosophy. But the Science of thought, Logic,\nis at once thought and effective philosophy; it is thought itself\nwhich in thinking the Real, thinks itself and places itself, as logical\nScience, in the place which belongs to it in the system of the Real.\n\n[Sidenote: _Philosophy and pure logic: overcoming of the duality._]\n\nIt may seem that in this way thought and reality are again divided and\na metaphysical dualism created. But the exact opposite is the truth.\nWhen Philosophy is distinguished into general and particular, into\nrational and real, into pure and applied, into Logic-metaphysic and\ninto Philosophy of nature and of man, an irreparable breach is made,\nwhich can only be concealed or attenuated in a more or less ingenious\nmanner. But when that doubleness of degree is destroyed (and thought\nthinking the real thereby thinks itself), and in the construction of\nPhilosophy, the Philosophy of philosophy, namely Logic, is constructed,\nthe dualism is for ever overcome. This thought is the thinking of the\ndistinctions, which the real presents; but to think distinctions and to\nthink unity is, as has been already demonstrated, the same thing.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: _Logik,_ pp. 532-3.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See above Sect. II. Chap. V.]\n\n\n\n\nSECOND PART\n\nPHILOSOPHY, HISTORY AND THE NATURAL AND MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES\n\n\n\n\nI\n\nTHE FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE DIVISIONS OF KNOWLEDGE\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Summary of results as to the forms of acquaintance._]\n\n\nThe result of the preceding enquiries into the constitution of the\ncognitive spirit can be resumed, for mnemonic purposes, by saying\nthat there are _two pure theoretic_ forms, _the intuition_ and\n_the concept,_ the second of which is subdivided into _judgment\nof definition and individual judgment,_ and that there are two\nmodes of _practical_ elaboration of knowledge, or of formation of\npseudoconcepts, the _empirical concept and the abstract concept,_ from\nwhich are derived the two subforms of judgment of _classification_ and\nof judgment of _enumeration._ If the methods in use in the medi\u00e6val\nschools or in those of Port-Royal (which were not without their\nutility) were still in vogue, we should be able to embody these results\nin a few _mnemonic verses,_ which would render the distinctions we have\nmade easy to impart.\n\nEasy to impart, but not understood, or worse, ill understood; because,\nas we know, both the scheme of classification here adopted and the\narithmetical determination of two or more forms are not truly logical\nthoughts adequate to the representation of the process of the real\nand of thought. Our grouping constructed to help the memory must\ntherefore be interpreted with the aid of the developments offered\nabove, and not only corrected, but altogether resolved in them. In\nthese developments, the intuition and the concept have appeared as two\nforms, not capable of co-ordination, but both distinct and united. The\njudgment of definition and the individual judgment have appeared as\nlogically identical, divisible only from an external or literary point\nof view, that is to say, by the greater or less importance attached\neither to the predicate or to the subject. Further, the formation of\nthe pseudoconcepts is outside theory, although founded upon theoretic\nelements; it belongs essentially, not to the cognitive spirit, but\nto the practical spirit. And if their subdivision into empirical and\nabstract concepts is necessary, the necessity is founded upon the fact,\nthat only in these two modes can the concept be practically developed,\nwhen its synthetic unity is arbitrarily split up into two one-sided\nforms. Finally, the two fundamental forms of the spirit themselves, the\ntheoretic and the practical, are not co-ordinate with one another, nor\ncapable of arithmetical enumeration. The one is in the other, the one\nis correlative to the other, because the one presupposes the other.\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Non-existence of technical forms, and of composite forms._]\n\nNo other cognitive or practical-cognitive forms, or other subforms,\nbeyond those which we have defined, are conceivable. The _technical\nknowledge,_ which is discussed in some treatises on Logic, is nothing\nbut knowledge itself, which is always and entirely technical, preceding\nand conditioning the action and practice of life. The same may be\nsaid of _normative_ knowledge, by which, as with technical, it is\nespecially meant in ordinary language to designate the whole of the\npseudoconcepts. But this is erroneous, when we consider that such\nknowledge constitutes the true immediate precedent condition of action.\nThe pseudoconcepts must be retranslated into individual judgments, in\norder that they may be able to form the basis of action, for which,\nas is justly remarked, we require direct and concrete perceptions of\nactual situations. Formul\u00e6 and abstractions aid perception only in an\nindirect and subsidiary manner.\n\nThe so-called combined or _composite_ forms in which two or more\noriginal forms are brought together, must also be rejected, for the\nreason already given, that composite concepts do not exist in pure\nLogical thought, and consequently cannot exist in the Science of\nLogic, which is the science of that thought. The composite form, then,\nis an empirical and arbitrary determination, as may be observed, for\ninstance, in the case in which we speak of an empirico-philosophic\nconcept, that is, of the union (which is a successive enunciation) of\nan empirical concept and a philosophic concept.\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Identity of cognitive forms and forms of knowledge.\nObjections to it._]\n\nThe cognitive forms having thus been established, we pass on to\nthe question, what and how many and of what kind are the _forms of\nknowledge._ The reply must be that the forms of knowledge (for example,\nHistory and the natural Sciences) cannot be anything but identical with\nthe cognitive forms, and of the same kind and same number as they. The\nfirst of these statements finds itself at once at issue with common\nthought, in which a profound distinction is drawn between the ordinary\nand the scientific man, the profane and the philosopher, the poet and\nthe non-poet, the ignorant and the learned, layman and clergy; and\nagain, between conversation and science, effusion of the soul and\nart, collection of facts and history, good sense and philosophy. It\nis thought that acquaintance belongs to all: every one communicates\nhis sentiments, narrates his experiences and those of others, reasons,\nclassifies and calculates. But art, philosophy, history and science are\nbelieved to belong to the few. That alone deserves those solemn names,\nwhich is the result of exceptional moments, when man is more than man,\nor at least when he is no longer one of the crowd, but belongs to an\naristocracy.\n\n[Sidenote: _Empirical distinctions and their limits. _]\n\nAnd, certainly, these distinctions are useful, and therefore necessary\nin practice. We all feel the need of creating an aristocracy of men and\nthings; of distinguishing the word that a sergeant whispers in the ear\nof a maid-servant from a sonnet or a symphony; the proverbs of Sancho\nPanza from a treatise on Ethics; and the report of a police-agent from\nthe history of Rome or of England. We distinguish the classification\nof the glasses and bowls in use at home from that of Mineralogy or\nof Zoology; the reckoning of our daily expenses from the calculation\nof the astronomer; and, finally, Tom, Dick and Harry from Aeschylus,\nPlato, Thucydides, Hippocrates and Euclid. The _odi profanum vulgus_ is\na motto that should be appropriated by whosoever labours to promote\nthe life of thought and of art, yet not without adding to it Ariosto's\npost-script: \"Nor do I wish to absolve any from the name of vulgar,\nsave the prudent.\"\n\nBut, admitting all this, we must recognize not less energetically\nthat these distinctions, imposed by the necessities of life, have in\nphilosophy no value at all, and that their introduction there, if it\nhas some excuse in professional custom, is nevertheless the way to shut\noff from us for ever all understanding both of the forms of knowledge\nand of those of acquaintance. Man is complete man at every instant\nand in every man; the spirit is always whole in every individuation\nof itself. The philosopher in the highest sense (in the philosopher\nworthy of the name) could be defined as one who raises doubts, collects\ndifficulties, and formulates problems, intent upon clearing up doubts,\nupon levelling difficulties, and upon solving problems; the artist as\na man who limits himself to looking and to recording the significance\nof what he has seen. In this case, the ordinary man would be he who\nencounters no theoretic difficulties and is unaware of spectacles\nworthy of contemplation. But in reality the ordinary man also sets\nhimself problems and solves them, contemplates and expresses the\nspectacle of the real. The distinction has value, therefore, only in\ndescriptive Psychology, which passes in review types of reality and\nthe perfected organs, so to speak, which reality creates for itself in\ngreat philosophers and great poets. But what empiricism always divides,\nphilosophy must always unite. To be scandalized when some one speaks of\nthe poetry, philosophy, science, mathematics, which are in every one's\nmouth; to mock those who unify and identify; to appeal to good sense\nand to threaten the madhouse, are things that reveal much pedantry\nbut no humanity, or, at most, very little. It is foolish to fear that\nsuch an identification as we propose will lessen the importance of the\nforms of knowledge and render trivial divine Poetry, lofty Philosophy,\nsevere History, serious Science and ingenious Mathematics. As the hero\nis not outside humanity, but is he in whom the soul of the people is\nconcentrated and made powerful, so poetry, philosophy, science and\nhistory, aristocratically circumscribed, are the most conspicuous\nmanifestations attained by the elementary forms of acquaintance\nthemselves. Such they could not be, were they not all one with them,\njust as the mountains could not be, were it not for the earth upon\nwhich they are raised and of which they are constituted.\n\nIt might be said that the forms of knowledge are rich and complex\nmanifestations of the human spirit, if this statement did not open\nthe way to another common prejudice, to the belief that to each of\nthose forms (for instance, to Art, History and Philosophy) several\nspiritual activities contribute. Were this so, we should have before\nus a mixture, not a product of an unique and original character, such\nas we find, as a matter of fact, in a work of Art, a philosophic\ntheory, a narrative, and a theorem. By the law of the unity of the\nspirit all the forms of the spirit are implicit in one another; and the\nresults, previously obtained from the various forms, condition each\none of them. But each one of them is, explicitly, itself and not the\nothers; it absorbs and transforms the results of the others; it does\nnot leave them within itself as extraneous elements, and it therefore\nmakes of them its own results. The strength of each one of those\nforms of knowledge lies precisely in this _purity,_ which persists\nin the greatest complexity. A great poem is as homogeneous as the\nshortest lyric or as a verse; a philosophic system as homogeneous as a\ndefinition; the most complicated calculations as the addition of \"two\nand two make four.\"\n\n[Sidenote: _Enumeration and determination of the forms of knowing,\ncorresponding to the forms of acquaintance._]\n\nIf the forms of acquaintance and the forms of knowledge be identical,\nit is proved thereby that the second are as many and of the same\nsort as the first; and the existence of combined or composite forms\nis also excluded from the forms of knowledge. Thus we are henceforth\nfreed from the obligation of enquiring into the particular nature of\nthe various forms of knowledge, a task that we have already fulfilled\nwhen enquiring into the forms of acquaintance. It is sufficient to\nname them (in correspondence) with the names already given to the\nforms of acquaintance, for thus they will be clearly distinguished and\ncompletely enumerated. The method of denomination itself will not be\nnew and surprising, because it has been, as it were, anticipated, and\nforeseen from the examples of which we have availed ourselves above,\nand also from some terminological references. We have now only to make\nit manifest, to declare it, so to speak, in clear tones.\n\nPure intuition is the theoretic form of Art (or of _Poetry,_ if we wish\nto extend to the whole of \u00e6sthetic production the name given to a group\nof works of art); and art cannot be otherwise defined than as pure\nintuition. The thinking of the pure concept, of the concept as itself,\nof the universal that is truly universal and not mere generality or\nabstraction, is _Philosophy,_ and Philosophy cannot be otherwise\ndefined than as the thinking, or the conceiving of the pure concept.\nAnd since the pure concept can be expressed either in the form of\ndefinition or in that of individual judgment, there corresponds to this\nduplication the distinction of the two forms of knowing, _Philosophy\nin the strict sense, and History._ The method of treatment called\n_empirical Science or natural Science,_ or most commonly in our time,\n_Science,_ is composed of those pseudoconcepts known as representative\nor empirical or classificatory. The mathematical Sciences are\ncomposed of abstract, enumerative and mensurative pseudoconcepts,\nand the application of the second of these, by means of the first,\nto individual judgments, is nothing else than what is called the\n_mathematical Science of nature._\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique of the idea of a special Logic as doctrine of the\nforms of knowledge,_]\n\nIt is usual for the treatment of the forms of knowledge to be presented\nin the majority of treatises as a _special_ or _applied Logic_;\nfollowing _general_ or _pure Logic,_ which has for its object the\nspecific forms of acquaintance alone, or as it is significantly\nexpressed, the _elementary_ forms of acquaintance. But we cannot admit\nthe existence of such a Logic, for the reasons already given. The\nelementary or fundamental forms are the only forms philosophically\nconceivable and really existing, and the whole of logical Science is\nexhausted in them. There is no duality of grades for logical Science\nany more than for Philosophy in general. And as no special \u00c6sthetic\nexists independent of general \u00c6sthetic, no special Ethic and Economic\nindependent of general Economic, so there is not a _general_ Logic\nalongside of a _special_ Logic.\n\n[Sidenote: _and as doctrine of methods._]\n\nSpecial Logic is also inadmissible, when it is presented as doctrine\nof _methods,_ and especially of demonstrative or intrinsic methods.\nThe method of a form of knowledge and in general of a form of the\nspirit, is not something different or even distinguishable from this\nform itself. The method of poetry is poetry, the method of philosophy\nis philosophy, the method of mathematics is mathematics, and so on.\nOnly by means of empirical abstraction is the method separated from the\nactivity itself; and when this duality has been created, we are led\nto add to it a third term, which is called the _object_ of that form.\nBut since the method is the form itself, so form and method are the\nobject itself. Certainly, all the forms of the spirit have a common\nobject, which is Reality; but this is not because reality is separated\nfrom them, but because they are reality: they therefore _have_ not, but\n_are_ this object. Thus the forms of knowledge have not a theoretic\nobject, but create it: they themselves are that object. Philosophy has\nthe pure concept for method and object; art has intuition; science\nthe empirical concept, and so on. If we wished to treat of methods in\na special Logic, we could not do otherwise than repeat what we have\nalready said in respect to the character of each form.\n\n[Sidenote: _Nature of our treatise in respect to the forms of\nknowledge._]\n\nAll this amounts to saying that the things we shall discuss concerning\nthe various forms of knowledge are not to be understood as a special\nLogic, although they are grouped in a second part for literary reasons.\nThere we shall examine one by one the various forms of knowledge,\nin order to confirm their identity with the forms of awareness and\nto demonstrate how the characters adopted by them are reducible to\nthose already explained for the others, and how the difficulties\nfound in them are overcome by means of the same principles that we\nemployed to overcome the difficulties presented by the others. In\nso doing, we shall also gain the advantage of making more clear the\ndoctrines already laid down as to the elementary forms, by fixing\nour attention upon those manifestations of them which are presented\non a larger scale. To those who forget or deny the existence of the\npure concept or of the abstract concept, it will be of assistance,\nin giving the speculative deduction of those forms, to point out the\nmasterpieces of Art, of Philosophy, or of Mathematics, and to invite an\nexamination of their structure. It is true that in our day preference\nis given to another method, which is not only antiphilosophical but\nalso antip\u00e6dagogic. This method consists in altogether neglecting\nphilosophic demonstration in the attempt to divert the attention from\nnotable and luminous manifestations of the spirit, in order to devote\nit to rude and uncertain manifestations. Inscriptions of savages are\npreferred to the art of Michael Angelo, the philosophy that is still\ncrudely enveloped in religion and custom to that of civilized times,\nsomething whose nature none can tell precisely, owing to lack of\ndocuments and the elements of research, to what is evidently art and\nphilosophy. Such enquirers adopt precisely an opposite course to that\nfollowed by the sciences of observation, which have made telescopes\nand microscopes to enlarge the little and bring the distant near.\nThey seek for instruments which shall diminish the great and make the\nnear remote. Theirs is a strange empirical caricature of philosophy,\nwhich substitutes the chronologically remote for the fundamentally\nconceptual, and for the logically simple, the materially small, which\nis not, on that account, simple and is far less transparent. For our\npart (and we say it in passing), we believe that to furnish examples\nof where to fix the attention in logical enquiry, the minds of an\nAristotle or of a Kant afford all we require, without there being any\nnecessity to have recourse to the psychology of sucklings and idiots.\nBut to study Aristotle and Kant does not suffice for knowledge of the\ntruth of the concept. We must find in all beings of whatever grade and\nimportance, the universal Spirit and its eternal forms.\n\nAnd since we have studied the first and most ingenuous form of\nknowledge, Art, in a special volume, we shall here begin our\nexamination of the second of its forms, Philosophy; and first of all,\nof Philosophy _in the strict sense._\n\n\n\n\nII\n\n\nPHILOSOPHY\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Philosophy as pure concept and the various definitions of\nphilosophy. Those which deny philosophy._]\n\nAll the definitions that have ever been given of philosophy will be\nfound to contain the thought that philosophy is the pure concept\n(or to say the same thing with more words and less precision), that\nit has the pure concept as its directive criterion. All, be it well\nunderstood, save those which, in negating the pure concept, negate also\nthe peculiar nature of philosophy. But such are not, properly speaking,\ndefinitions of philosophy, although even these, by contradicting\nthemselves, imply and assume the definition of philosophy as an\noriginal form, and so as the pure concept. Such is the case with the\ntheories already examined, of \u00e6stheticism, mysticism, and empiricism\n(and also of mathematicism), to which we shall return. For them,\nphilosophy is art, sentiment, the empirical (or abstract) concept.\nBut it is an art in some way differentiated from the rest of art, a\nsentiment that acquires a peculiar value, an empirical or abstract\nconcept, which raises itself up and looks over the heads of the others.\nThus it is something peculiar, a mode of reflecting _sui generis,_\nand so precisely the pure concept. Empiricism especially reveals this\nintimate contradiction, when it advocates a philosophy consisting of a\nsystematization or synthesis of the results of the empirical sciences.\nThat is to say, it advocates something not given by the empirical\nsciences, because, were they to give it, they would already be\nsystematized and synthesized of themselves, and the further elaboration\nasked for would be altogether superfluous.\n\n[Sidenote: _Those that define it as the science of supreme principles,\nultimate causes, etc.; contemplation of death, etc.;_]\n\nAll the other definitions which presuppose the peculiarity of\nphilosophy are reducible, as is easily seen, to the single character of\nthe pure concept. Philosophy (they say) is the science of the _supreme\nprinciples of the real,_ the science of _ultimate causes,_ of the\n_origin of things,_ and the like. In these propositions, the supreme\nprinciples are evidently not real things, or groups of real things, or\nempty formul\u00e6, but the ideal generators of the real. Ultimate causes\nare not causes (for the cause is never ultimate, being always the\neffect of an antecedent cause), but ideal principles. The origin in\nquestion is not the historical origin of this or that single fact, but\nthe ideal deduction of the fact from facts or from omnipresent reality.\nThe same idea is expressed in the imaginative saying that philosophy is\nthe _contemplation of death._ For what but the individual dies? And is\nnot the contemplation of the death of the individual also that of the\nimmortality of the universal? Is it not contemplation of the eternal?\nThis remark supplies the motive for that other formula which defines\nphilosophy as \"the vision of things _sub specie aeterni._\"\n\n[Sidenote: _as elaboration of the concepts, criticism, science of\nnorms;_]\n\nThe character of the pure concept is also indicated in the definition\nof philosophy as the _elaboration of the concepts,_ which the other\nsciences leave imperfect and self-contradictory. Indeed, since no human\nactivity has the imperfect and contradictory as its aim, if the other\nsciences are involved in imperfect and contradictory concepts, this\nmeans that they do not aim at constructing concepts and that philosophy\nalone elaborates true and proper concepts. For this reason, philosophy\nhas sometimes been conceived, not as science, but as criticism, and\ncriticism means placing oneself above the object criticized, in virtue\nof a concept superior to those criticized. For this reason, finally,\nphilosophy has been conceived as the science of _norms and values_:\nnorms and values, which, if they are to surpass singular things, cannot\nbe extraneous to them. Hence it is the same thing to speak of _norms\nand values,_ or of universal concepts, surpassing and containing in\nthemselves each single thing.\n\n[Sidenote: _as doctrine of the categories._]\n\nIf philosophy is the pure concept, it is also the distinctions of\nthe pure concept; it is all the pure concepts capable of serving as\npredicates to individual judgments and so of acting as categories. Here\nthere is another definition of philosophy: philosophy is the _doctrine\nof the categories._ For this reason we have already refused to assign\nto Logic the search for the categories: first because the doctrine of\nthe categories is the whole of Philosophy, whereas Logic is only one\nof its links, and consequently seeks only one of the categories, that\nof logicity. It could also be said that Philosophy is the doctrine of\nthe categories, and that Logic, as a part of Philosophy, is a Category\nof categories, or a Philosophy of Philosophy. Hence its singular\nposition among philosophical sciences, so that it appears at the same\ntime within and without Philosophy, because it completes by surpassing\nand surpasses by completing it. In reality, Logic, like every other\nphilosophic science, is within and not without Philosophy; like the\nglassy water which reflects the landscape and is itself part of the\nlandscape.\n\n[Sidenote: _Exclusion of mathematical definitions of philosophy._]\n\nThese definitions which we have selected to record and to interpret\n(and others which we leave to the reader to record and to interpret)\nare all _formal,_ in the legitimate sense of the word. They define\nthe eternal nature of philosophy, they do not determine actually any\nspecial solution of other philosophical problems, although naturally\nthey do potentially determine one solution, in that they can agree\nonly with one solution. Obedient to this formal character, we have\nnot taken and shall not take account of definitions that imply the\neffective solution of all philosophical problems, or of Philosophy in\nits totality. Such is, for instance, the definition that Philosophy is\nknowledge of oneself, as was said at the dawn of Hellenic thought; or\nthat it is the return to the inward man where dwells the truth, as St.\nAugustine said; or that it is the science of Spirit, as we say. This\ndefinition offers something more than the simply logical aspect of\nPhilosophy. Looked at from the purely logical standpoint, Philosophy\nwill be the science of God or of the Devil, of Spirit or Matter, of\nfinal cause or mechanism, or of anything else that may be suggested\nas a hypothesis for enquiry, provided that this, whatever it be, is\nthinkable as a _pure concept or Idea._ Whoever should negate this\ncondition, would not negate this or that philosophy, but as we have\nseen, philosophy itself, in favour of art, of action, or of something\nelse.\n\n[Sidenote: _Idealism of every philosophy._]\n\nBut if Philosophy is by its logical nature pure concept or idea, every\nphilosophy, to whatever results it may attain, and whatever may be its\nerrors, is in its essential character and deepest tendency, _idealism._\nThis has been recognized by philosophers of the most different and\nantagonistic views (for example, by Hegel and by Herbart). It should\nbe taught as truth to those who are ignorant of it and those who have\nforgotten should be reminded of it. Determinism negates the end and\naffirms the cause; but the cause which it posits as its principle, is\nnot this or that cause, but the _idea_ of cause. Materialism negates\nthought and affirms matter; but not this or that matter, which composes\nthis or that body, but the _idea_ of matter. Naturalism denies spirit\nand affirms nature; not this or that manifestation of nature, but\nnature as _idea._ Finally, when a single natural fact seems to be\nposited as the principle of explanation of reality, this fact is\nidealized and stands as the idea of itself, generating itself and\neverything else. Thus (it has been repeatedly remarked) the water\nof Thales, by the very fact that it is taken as a principle, is no\nlonger any given empirical water, but metaphysical and ideal water.\nIn like manner, the _numbers_ of Pythagoras are not those of the\nPythagorean table, but cosmic principles and ideas. Theism does not\nbelieve it possible to obtain the sufficient reason of reality, without\npositing a personal God, above and beyond the world. But this God is\nalways something non-representative, however much he may be involved\nin sensible representation, and placed upon Sinai or Olympus. He is\nthe idea of personal divinity, the idea of Jehovah or of Jove. The\nphilosophy which is called idealist in the strict sense of the word (it\nwould be better called activist or finalist or absolute spiritualism),\nstrives to prove that, for instance, cause, matter, nature, number,\nwater, Jehovah, Jove and the like, are not thinkable as pure concepts\nand as such imply contradictions, and that therefore such philosophies\nare insufficient. This means that it holds the _idealism_ of those\nphilosophies _insufficient,_ that they are not equal to themselves and\nare inadequate to the assumption on which they rest; but it does not\nimply that this assumption is not idealistic.\n\nWere it not idealistic, it would not be philosophical, and so it would\nnot be possible to submit it to criticism from the philosophical point\nof view.\n\n[Sidenote: _Systematic character of philosophy._]\n\nFrom the identity of philosophy with the pure concept can be also\ndeduced its necessarily _systematic_ character.\n\nTo think any pure concept means to think it in its relation of unity\nand distinction with all the others. Thus, in reality, what is thought\nis never _a_ concept, but _the_ concept, the _system_ of concepts. On\nthe other hand, to think the concept in general is only possible by\narbitrary abstraction. To think it truly in general, means to think\nit also as particular and singular, and so to think the whole system\nof distinct concepts. Those who wish to think an isolated concept\nphilosophically without paying attention to the others, are like\ndoctors who wish to cure an organ without paying attention to the\norganism. Such a mode of treatment may cure the organ, but the organism\ndies and with it dies the healed organ a moment after. The true\nphilosopher, when he makes even the smallest modification in a concept,\nhas his eye on the whole system, for he knows that this modification,\nhowever small it may seem, modifies to some extent the whole.\n\n[Sidenote: _Philosophic and literary significance of system._]\n\nThe systematic character of philosophy, understood logically,\nbelongs to every single philosophical proposition which is always a\nphilosophical cosmos, as every drop of water is the ocean, indeed, the\nwhole world, contracted into that drop of water. It is hardly necessary\nto distinguish from this the _literary sense_ of system, which is the\nname given to certain forms of exposition, which embrace definite\ngroups of problems, traditionally held to be those in which philosophy\nis contained. When some or many of those groups do not receive explicit\nliterary treatment, it is said that system is wanting. It is true\nthat there is wanting the fulfilment of a literary task (or what here\namounts to the same thing, of a pedagogic task); but the system is\nthere, even in the case when a very specialized problem is treated,\nprovided it be approached with philosophic and so with systematic\nenergy. That the same thinker, when he passes to another problem,\nshould give a wrong solution contradictory to that previously given,\ndoes not prove that he had not at first a system, but that he has lost\nit when faced with the new difficulty. He was at first a philosopher\nand so systematic; afterwards, not philosopher enough, and so not\nsufficiently systematic.\n\n[Sidenote: _Advantages and disadvantages of the literary form of\nsystem._]\n\nThe traditional groupings of problems, and the construction of system\nin the literary and pedagogic sense, certainly have their utility\n(all that exists has its proper function and value). They preserve\nand promote culture already acquired, by obliging it to examine\ndifficulties, which, were they neglected, might unexpectedly become\na great hindrance and loss. Hence the love for system, or for the\nliterary form of system, a love which the author of these pages\nalso nourishes in his soul and of which he has sought to give some\nproof, by writing a _system,_ although it is long since systems have\nbeen written, in Italy at least (unless scholastic manuals be thus\ncalled), and it is no slight merit to have braved the ridicule of the\nenterprise. But systems have also the disadvantage of sometimes leading\nto a tiresome re-exposition of problems that are out of date and\nwhose solutions have passed into the common patrimony of culture. The\ntreatment of these problems is better left to be understood, that time\nand space may be gained for the treatment of others more urgent. Hence\nthe rebellion against system, or against the pedantry which can adhere\nto that form of exposition. This rebellion is similar at all points\nwith that against the pedantry of definition, which is a legitimate\nrebellion, yet cannot eliminate the logical form of definition. Instead\nof systems, we write monographs, essays, and aphorisms, but these, if\nphilosophic, will always be inwardly systematic.\n\n[Sidenote: _Genesis of the systematic prejudice and rebellion against\nit._]\n\nBut the rebellion against systems has another more serious cause, less\nliterary and more philosophical. Sometimes the demand for a system\nbecomes a _systematic prejudice._ This fact merits explanation, because\nthus stated it may reasonably appear to be paradoxical. However could\nthe demand inherent in a function be changed into a prejudice, or into\nan obstacle to that function? Stated in these terms, it certainly\nseems inconceivable. But it becomes clear and admissible, when we\nremember that philosophical enquiry is both induction and deduction,\nthe thinking of distinction and the thinking of unity in distinction.\nNeither of the two processes, which are one single thing, should be\nsubstituted for or dominate the other. If we think the concept of\nmorality, it should be placed in relation to and deduced from the\nother forms of the spirit and thus from unity; but it must also be\nthought in itself. The thinking of the peculiar nature of the moral\nact cannot remain isolated and atomic, but unity in its turn cannot\ngive the character of the moral act, unless this act be present to\nthe spirit and make itself known for what it is. In the process of\nresearch, it is possible to deduce the moral act from the consideration\nof the other activities of the spirit, without thinking it in itself.\nBut here a _heuristic_ process is adopted, a _hypothesis_ is made,\nand this hypothesis must afterwards be verified, in order to become\neffective thought and concept. Now the systematic prejudice consists\nprecisely in thinking the unity without thinking the distinctions, in\ndeduction without induction, in changing the hypothesis into a concept\nwithout having seriously verified it. Hence analogical constructions\n(or falsely analogical, and so metaphysical and fantastic), which take\nthe place of philosophical distinctions, and hence the systematic\nprejudice, which is a _false idea of system._ Against this rebellion\nis justified. But the mistake is usually made of discarding the true\ndemand for system through horror of the false, or of denying the\nutility of the analogical process, which is blameable in the system,\nbut useful in enquiry.\n\n[Sidenote: _Sacred and philosophical numbers; meaning of the demand\nwhich they express._]\n\nAnother aspect of this same rebellion which has become universal\nin most recent times, is the distrust of or open hostility towards\nthe search for _symmetry,_ the arrangement of philosophic concepts\nin _dyads, triads, quatriads,_ or in other suchlike numbers, which\nprecisely express symmetry in the ordering of those concepts. And\nsuch distrust will be judged reasonable by any one who recalls the\nexcesses caused by this love of symmetry and the puerilities to which\nsome even of the loftiest philosophers abandoned themselves, owing to\ntheir excessive attachment to certain numbers. The pedantry of the\nKantian quatriads and triads is truly insupportable, nor are Hegel's\ntriads less artificial. These were very often reduced by his disciples\nto conjuring tricks and almost to buffoonery. It was natural that\nthere should be a reaction towards the search for the asymmetrical and\ntowards the doctrine that the concepts attained cannot be arranged\nin a beautiful order, for they change their order from one sphere to\nanother, but that nevertheless they and no others are the concepts of\nreality--inelegant but honest; asymmetrical but true. The reaction\nis comprehensible, the distrust justifiable; but the hostility is\ncertainly unjustifiable. If distinct concepts constitute a unity, they\nmust of necessity constitute an order or symmetry, of which certain\nnumbers, that can be called regular, are the expression or symbol. The\nconcepts of an empirical science may be thirty-seven, eighty-three,\na hundred and thirteen, or as many as you like according as they\nare arranged. But the concepts of philosophy will always be dyads,\ntriads, quatriads and the like, that is to say, an organic unity of\ndistinctions and a correspondence of parts. For this reason, the human\nrace has always had _sacred numbers_ in religion and _philosophic\nnumbers_ in philosophy. Let him laugh who wills; but we do not say\nthat he laughs well. The criterion of symmetry must not become a\n_prejudice._ It must, however, act as a control upon the enquiry that\nhas been accomplished, since it greatly aids, as a heuristic process,\nthe enquiry that is yet to be made. Astronomers are praised, when,\nthanks to their calculations, supported by the criterion of proportion\nand symmetry, they form a hypothesis that a star, unseen at the time,\nbut which the telescope eventually discovers, must be at a certain\nplace in the sky. Why should not a philosopher be equally praised, who\ndeduces that for reasons of symmetry, there must be in the spirit a\nform, as yet unobserved, or that for the same reasons, there should\nbe eliminated a form which does not seem to be eliminable, but which\nspoils the symmetry? Why should the spirit be less rhythmical and less\nsymmetrical than the starry sky?\n\n[Sidenote: _Impossibility of dividing philosophy into general and\nparticular._]\n\nWhen the systematic character of philosophy is conceived in this\nway, it is seen that the system is not something superadded, like a\nthread used for binding together the various parts of philosophy and\nquite external to the objects that it unites, so that we can consider\nseparately the objects and the thread, the parts and the system. In\nphilosophy, none of the parts are without the whole, and the whole does\nnot exist without the parts. Translated into other terms, this means\nchat there are not _particular_ philosophic sciences, just as there\nis not a _general_ philosophy. We have made use of this proposition,\nin order to confute the usual conception of Logic as a prologue to\nphilosophy, and to show how this error (which in the case of Logic\nis supported by special reasons) is the principal source of other\nlike errors. Thus Metaphysic or Ontology, or some other science,\nwhich is supposed to give the unity of the real, of which the special\nphilosophic sciences give only the distinctions, is placed before or\nafter the special philosophic sciences like a prologue or an epilogue.\nThe truth is that general philosophy is nothing but the special\nphilosophic sciences, and _vice versa._ The plural and the singular\ncannot be separated in the pure concept, where the plural is plural of\nthe singular, and the singular is singular of the plural.\n\n[Sidenote: _Evils of the conception of a general philosophy, separated\nfrom particular philosophies._]\n\nThe destruction of this erroneous idea of a general philosophy has\ndirect practical, importance. For, once the so-called science has been\nconstituted, by means of a group of arbitrarily isolated problems,\nwhich really belong to the various sciences called particular, we\nare led to believe that true philosophy consists of a medley, in\nconstant agitation and shock, and that, thanks to this agitation and\nthese shocks, it becomes ever more worthy of itself, that is, of\nbeing a medley. But the problems of God and of the world, of spirit\nand of matter, of thought and of nature, of subject and of object,\nof the individual and of the universal, of life and death, torn from\nLogic, from \u00c6sthetic, from the Philosophy of the practical, become\ninsoluble or are solved only in appearance (that is to say, verbally\nand imaginatively). Many young men, ignorant of all particular\nphilosophical knowledge, attack them as if they were the first step\nin philosophy, and many old professors find themselves at the end of\ntheir lives in the same state of mental confusion as at the beginning,\nindeed with their confusion increased and henceforth inextricable,\nowing to the false path that they have followed for so many years.\nThey have not respected philosophy, in their first relations with it;\nthey resemble those men who will never really love a woman, because\nthey failed of respect to women in their youth. On the other hand,\nthe so-called particular philosophical sciences, deprived of some of\ntheir organs and become blind or deaf or otherwise maimed, fall into\nthe power of psychologism and empiricism. Hence the empirical and\npsychological treatment of Morality, of \u00c6sthetic, and of Logic itself.\nIn regard to this evil, now more than ever rampant in philosophic\nstudies, it is necessary to remember, that the history of philosophy\nteaches that no philosophic progress has ever been achieved by\nso-called general philosophy, but always by discoveries made in one or\nother of the so-called special philosophies. The concept of Socrates\nand the dialectic of Hegel are discoveries in Logic. Kant's concept\nof freedom is a discovery in Ethics. The concept of intuition is a\ndiscovery in \u00c6sthetic. The critique of formalist logic is a discovery\nin the Philosophy of language. The old idea of God has been dissolved\nby those most modest, yet greatest of men, who contented themselves\nwith formulating a new proposition on the syllogism or on the will, on\nart or history, or with defining the abstract intellect or with fixing\nthe limits of the fancy. Had we been obliged to await these solutions\nfrom the cultivators of that an\u00e6mic general philosophy, the old idea of\nGod would now be more rife than before. And in truth it is still rife\namong those philosophers of whom we have spoken, for it reappears from\nthe midst of the medley which they stir, either with the name of the\nUnknowable, or with the old name that still is reverenced.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\n\nHISTORY\n\n\n[Sidenote: _History as individual judgment._]\n\nSince all the characteristics assigned to Philosophy are verbal\nvariants of its unique character, which is the pure concept, so all\nthe characteristics of History can be reduced to the definition and\nidentification of History with the individual judgment.\n\nHistory, being the individual judgment, is the synthesis of subject and\npredicate, of representation and concept. The intuitive and the logical\nelements are both indispensable to it and both are bound together with\nan unseverable link.\n\n[Sidenote: _The individual element and historical sources; relics and\nnarratives._]\n\nOwing to the necessity for the subject or intuitive element, history\ncannot be constructed by pure reason. The vision of the thing done\nis necessary and is the sole _source_ of history. In treatises upon\nhistorical method the sources are usually divided into _remains_ and\n_narratives,_ meaning by remains (_Ueberreste_) the things which\nremain as traces of an event (for example, a contract, a letter, a\ntriumphal arch), and by narratives the accounts of the event as they\nhave been communicated by those who were more or less eye-witnesses, or\nby those who have consulted the notes of eye-witnesses. But, in truth,\nnarratives are valuable just in so far as it is presumed that they\nplace us in direct contact with the thing that happened and make us\nlive it again, drawing it forth from the obscure depth of the memories\nthat the human race bears with it. Had they not this virtue, they would\nbe altogether useless, as are the narratives to which for one reason\nor another credence is refused. A hundred or a thousand narratives\nlacking authenticity are not equal to the poorest authentic document.\nAn authentic narrative is both a document and remains; it is the\nreality of the fact as it was _lived_ and as it vibrates in the spirit\nof him who took part in it. The search for veracity and the criticism\nof the value of sources are reducible in the ultimate analysis, to the\nisolation of this genuine resonance of fact, by its liberation from\nperturbing elements, such as the illusions, the false judgments, the\npreoccupations and passions of the witness. Only in so far as this can\nbe successfully done, and in the measure in which it is successful,\ndo we have the first condition of history as act of cognition--that\nsomething can be _intuited_ and thereby transformable into the\n_subject_ of the individual judgment, that is to say, into historical\nnarrative.\n\n[Sidenote: _The intuitive faculty in historical research._\u00b7]\n\nOn this necessity is based the importance which in the examination of\nhistorians is attached to intuition, or touch, or scent, or whatever\nelse it may be called, that is to say, to the capacity (derived in\npart from natural disposition and in part from practical exercise) of\ndirectly intuiting what has occurred, of passing beyond the obstacles\nof time and space and the alterations produced by chance or human\npassion. An historian without intuitive faculty, or more exactly (since\nno one is altogether without it), with but slender intuitive faculty,\nis condemned to barrenness, however learned and ingenious he may be in\nargument. He finds himself inferior to others, less learned and less\nlogical than he, inferior even to the uncultured and to the illogical,\nwhen it is a question of feeling what lies beneath words and signs, or\nof reproducing in himself what actually happened. For the same reason,\nit sometimes happens that an expert in a given trade is astonished to\nhear the learned arm-chair historian describe certain orders of facts,\nof which he has no experience and of which he talks as a blind man\ntalks of colours. A sergeant can intuite a march better than a Thiers,\nand laugh at the millions of men that Xerxes had led into Greece by\nsimply enquiring how they were fed. A political schemer understands\na court or ministerial intrigue far better than an honest man like\nMuratori. A craftsman can reconstruct the successive brush-strokes and\nthe traces of change of mind in a picture better than the erudite and\n\u00e6sthetic historian of art. Historical works perhaps defective or even\nfailures from other points of view, sometimes fascinate by the proof\nthey give of freshness of impression: and this quality may serve to\nincrease our knowledge of facts and to rectify the errors into which\ntheir authors have fallen in other respects. To a historian of the\nFrench Revolution we can pardon even the mistaking of one personage\nfor another, of a river for a mountain, or the confusion of months and\nyears, when on the whole he has lived again better than others the soul\nof the Jacobins, the spiritual conditions of the mob of Paris, the\nattitude of the peasants of Burgundy or of La Vend\u00e9e. What is called an\nhistorical novel sometimes has in certain respects greater value than\na history, if the novel is inspired by the spirit of the time and the\nhistory contains merely an inventory.\n\n[Sidenote: _The intuitive faculty in historical exposition. Similarity\nof history and art._]\n\nThe intuitive faculty, indispensable in research, is not less\nindispensable in historical exposition; since it is necessary to\nintuite the actual fact, not in a fugitive and sketchy manner, but so\nfirmly as to be able to express it and to fix it in words, in such a\nway as to transmit its genuine life to others. Hence the specially\nartistic character that must be possessed by true historians. Here\nthey resemble pure artists, painting pictures, as they do, composing\npoems and writing tragic dialogues. Certainly, every thought, even that\nof the most abstruse philosopher and mathematician, becomes concrete\nin artistic form. But the historian (in the somewhat empirical sense\nof the word) approximates much more nearly to those who express pure\nintuitions, since he gives literary preference to the subject over\nthe predicate. This has been generally recognized both by historians,\nwho have freely presented themselves as bards of their race invoking\nthe Muse who represents History upon Parnassus, while there is there\nno representative of Philosophy, Mathematics, or Science; and by\ntheorists, who have constantly debated the question as to _whether\nhistory is art._ It seems indeed to be art, when the predicate or\nlogical element is so well concealed that hardly any attention is paid\nto it.\n\n[Sidenote: _Difference between history and art. The predicate or\nlogical element in history._]\n\nI say _hardly_; because if no attention whatever be paid to it, if\nliterary emphasis become logical mutilation, art will remain, but\nhistory will have gone. A book of history will no longer merely\n_resemble_ a poem or romance, but will _be_ a poem or a romance. What\nis it that, from the point of view of intuition, distinguishes an\nimaginative vision and an historical narrative? If we open the _Divine\nComedy_ or the _Rime_ of Petrarch and read: \"In the middle pathway\nof our life, I found myself in a dark forest ...,\" or, \"I raised my\nthought to where she whom I seek was and find not upon earth ...\"; and\nif we open Livy's _History,_ at the place where he recounts the battle\nof Cannae, and read: \"_Consules satis exploratis itineribus sequentes\nPoenum, ut ventum ad Cannas est, ubi in conspecta Poenum habebant,\nbina, castra communiunt,\"_ nothing at first seems changed; both are\nnarratives. Yet everything is changed. If we read Livy as we read\nDante or Petrarch, the battle of Cannae in the same way as the voyage\nof Dante to the Inferno, or the passage of the spirit of Petrarch to\nthe third heaven, Livy is no longer Livy, but a story book. In like\nmanner, if we read a book of stories, as, for example, the _Kings of\nFrance_ or the _Guerin Meschino,_ in the same way as they are read by\nthe uneducated man of the people, who seeks history in them, the story\nbook becomes transformed into a historical book, although of a kind\nthat must be criticized and refuted when a higher degree of culture has\nbeen attained. This suffices to show the importance of that predicate,\nwhich is sometimes left to be understood in the words, but whose\neffective presence transforms the pure intuition into the individual\njudgment and makes _history_ of a _poem._\n\n[Sidenote: _Vain attempts to eliminate it._]\n\nThe necessity of the logical element has been several times denied,\nand it has been affirmed that the historian must let things speak for\nthemselves and put into them nothing of his own. This fine phrase may\nhave some reference to a-certain truth, as we shall see. But if it is\nunderstood as the exclusion of the logical element in favour of pure\nintuition (and worse still, if it intends to exclude also the category\nof intuition, for in that case we have simple _muteness),_ it proclaims\nthe death of history. Without the logical element it is not possible to\nsay that even the smallest, the most ordinary fact, belonging to our\nindividual and everyday life, has _occurred;_ as, for instance, that I\nrose this morning at eight o'clock and took luncheon at twelve. For (to\ngive no other reasons) these historical propositions imply the concept\nof existence or actuality and the correlative concept of non-existence\nor possibility, since in affirming them I also deny that I only dreamed\nof rising at eight or of taking luncheon at twelve. All will agree that\nwe cannot speak of a historical fact if we do not know that it is a\nfact, that is to say, something that has happened; even stories become\nthe object of history, in so far as their existence as stories is\nattributed to them. A story, told without knowing or deciding whether\nit be or be not a story, is poetry; perceived and told as a story, it\nis mythography, that is to say, history; the author of the _Iliad_ or\nthe author of the _Niebelungen_ is not Adalbert Kuhn, Jacob Grimm or\nMax M\u00fcller.\n\n[Sidenote: _Extension of historical predicates beyond that of mere\nexistence._]\n\nBut the criterion of existentiality does not itself suffice, as some\nbelieve, for the effectual constitution of historical narrative. For\nwhat sort of narrative should we have, if we merely said that something\nhad happened, without saying _what_ had happened? That something has\nhappened and does happen at every instant, is not, as we know, the\ncontent of historical narrative, because it is the affirmation that\nbeing is, or that becoming is. What has been said of the individual\njudgment, namely, that it is constituted by all the predicates\ntogether, that is, of the whole concept, and not by the predicate of\nexistence alone, torn from the others, must also be said of historical\nnarrative. It is truly complete and therefore realized, when the\nintuition, which supplied it with the rough material, is completely\npenetrated by the concept, in its universality, particularity and\nsingularity. That the consuls, after having sufficiently explored\nthe routes, followed the Carthaginian, entered Cannae, and seeing\nthemselves face to face with the army of Hannibal, pitched and\nfortified their camp (as runs Livy's narrative), implies a crowd of\nconcepts, equal in number to the historical affirmations collected in\nthat sentence. No one ignorant as to what is man, war, army, pursuit,\nroute, camp, fortification, dream, reality, love, hatred, fatherland,\nand so on, is capable of _thinking_ such a sentence as this. And the\nobscurity of one of those concepts is sufficient to make it impossible\nto form the narrative as a whole, just as any one who does not\nunderstand the meaning of the word _castra_ is not in a position to\nunderstand what forms the argument of Livy's narrative. If the sources\nare changed, the historical narrative changes; but this latter changes\nno less, if our convictions as to the concepts are changed. The same\nmatter is differently arranged and gives rise to different histories,\nif it is narrated by a savage or a cultured European, by an anarchist\nor a conservative, by a protestant or a catholic, by the me of this\nmoment or the same me of ten years hence. Given that all have the same\ndocuments before them, each one reads in them a different happening.\n\n[Sidenote: _Alleged insuperable variation in judging and presenting\nhistorical facts, and consequent claim for a history without\njudgments._]\n\nBut the fact here stated seems to lead straight to despair as to the\nfate of history, or at least as to its fate, so long as it is bound\nto the logical element, to convictions about the concepts. When it is\nobserved that the same facts are narrated in the most different way;\nthat what for some is the work of God is for others the work of the\nDevil; that what for some is the manifestation of spiritual forces is\nfor others the product of material movements of the brain, according\nas it is well or ill-nourished; that to some the good of life lies in\nevery explosion and revolt, while to others it lies only in regular\nwork under the tutelage of laws rigorously observed and made to be\nobserved,--we arrive at the conclusion of historical scepticism,\nnamely, that history as usually narrated is nothing but a story woven\nfrom such a state of degeneration seems to be a return to the pure and\nsimple reproduction of the document, or at least to the pure intuition,\nwhich introduces no element of _judgment,_ or of what is called\n_subjective._ But this salvation is only a figure of speech, for pure\nintuition is poetry and not history, and to return to it is equivalent\nto abolishing history. This, however, is clearly impossible, for the\nhuman race has always narrated its doings, and none of us can dispense\nwith establishing at every instant how things have happened, what has\nreally happened, and in what actual or historical conditions he finds\nhimself.\n\n[Sidenote: _Restriction of variations and exclusion of apparent\nvariations._]\n\nHistorical scepticism is, however, as inexact and one-sided in the\nobservation of fact as it is puerile in the suggestion of a remedy.\nCertainly, there are divergences between the various accounts of\nthe same fact; but (setting aside _apparent_ divergences, derived\nfrom the different interest taken in a given fact, owing to which\nverbal prominence is given to one or to another aspect of it, and\nlimiting ourselves here to _real_ differences) we must, for the sake\nof exactitude, take account of all the no less real agreements, to\nbe found side by side with these divergences. In virtue of them, for\ninstance, Protestant and Catholic are unanimous in recognizing that\nLuther and Leo X. existed, that the one produced a definite movement\nin Germany and that the other had recourse to certain definite\nprohibitions; and, finally, both Protestant and Catholic recognize (now\nat least) the corruption of the ecclesiastical orders at the beginning\nof the sixteenth century, and the mundane and political interests of\nthe German princes in the wars of religion. In like manner no one,\nhowever revolutionary or conservative he is, will question the bad\ncondition of French finances at the eve of the Revolution; or that\nLouis XVI. convoked the States General; or that he attempted flight\nand was stopped at Varennes; or that he was guillotined on the 21st\nof January 1793; or that the French Revolution was an event which\nprofoundly changed the social and moral life of the whole of Europe.\nOwing to this substantial agreement between two historians in very many\npoints, and indeed in the greater part of the narrative, it happens\nthat we can often read and advise others to read histories that are\ntainted with the passions of the partisan, while merely recommending\nthe reader to make a mental allowance for these passions. In like\nmanner, we can usefully employ a defective instrument of measurement,\nprovided we include in the calculation the coefficient of aberration.\n\n[Sidenote: _The overcoming of variations by means of deepening the\nconcepts._]\n\n\nAs to the remedy, it is clear that if the divergences as to the\nconcepts arise from ignorance, prejudice, negligence, illegitimate\nprivate or national interests, and from other disturbing passions,\nthat is to say, from _insufficient conceiving of the concepts,_ or\nfrom inexact thought, the remedy is certainly not to be sought in the\nabandonment of concepts and of thought, but in correcting the former\nand making perfect the latter. Abandonment would not only be cowardly,\nbut impossible. Having left the Eden of pure intuition and entered\nthe field of history, it is not given us to retrace our steps. There\nis no returning to blessed and ingenuous ignorance; innocence is lost\nfor ever, and we must no longer aspire to it, but to virtue, which\nis neither innocent nor ingenuous. Why does what seems good to the\nProtestant seem bad to the Catholic? Evidently, owing to the different\nconception that each forms as to this world and the world above us,\ndeath and life, reason and revelation, criticism and authority, and so\non. It is necessary, then, to open the discussion with the enquiry as\nto whether the truth is with the Protestants or with the Catholics,\nor whether it be not found rather in a third view, which goes beyond\nboth. Once a definite result has been obtained, perplexity will be at\nan end (at least for him who has attained it), and the narrative can be\nconstructed with as much security as the available historical sources\npermit. The way indicated will seem hard; but it is the only way.\nWhoever decides to retain his own opinions, received without criticism,\nwill perhaps provide for his own convenience, but he will renounce\nhistory and truth. For the rest, we do not here draw up a programme for\nthe future, but simply establish what history is in its true nature,\nand consequently how it is manifested and has _always_ been manifested.\nMen in every age have discussed the concepts with which historical\nreality has been interpreted and have agreed upon very many points,\nas to which there is no longer any discussion. Both Catholics and\nProtestants, Revolutionaries and conservatives are, as has been already\nremarked, more in agreement than they were formerly; because something\nhas passed and penetrated from each to each, or rather the _humanity,_\nwhich is in both, has become elevated. Scepticism accomplishes an easy\ntask, but uses an illusory argument, in history as in philosophy,\nwhen it catalogues the points of disagreement. These are before the\neyes of all, just because they represent the problems which it is\nimportant to solve. Would it not be worth while to keep in view as of\nequal importance the points already solved, and to say, for example,\nthat historians are henceforth agreed that Anchises did not sleep with\nAphrodite, that the wolf did not suckle Romulus and Remus, and that\nWilliam Tell did not establish the liberty of the Swiss Cantons? In\nshort, it would not be easy to find either those who support or those\nwho deny Mary's immaculate conception. The Catholic writers who insist\nupon such disputes are rare, and those who deny are found only in\nlittle democratic journals of the inferior sort or of degraded taste.\n\n[Sidenote: _Subjectivity and objectivity in history: their meaning._]\n\nTo drive _subjectivity_ out of history, in order to obtain\n_objectivity,_ cannot therefore mean to drive away thought to obtain\nintuition, or worse still, to obtain brute matter, which is altogether\ninexpressible; but to drive away false thought, or passion that\nusurps the place of truth, and to mount to true thought, rigorous\nand complete. If we attain to intuition, instead of saving ourselves\nfrom passion we shall burn in its flames. For intuition says nothing\nbut what we as individuals experience, suffer, and desire. It is\njust intuition which, when unduly introduced into history, becomes\nsubjectivity _sensu deteriori;_ whereas thought is _true subjectivity,_\nthat of the universal, which is at the same time _true objectivity._\n\n[Sidenote: _Historical judgments of value, and normal or neutral\nvalues. Critique._]\n\nWe have thus also solved the question (so much discussed in our day)\nas to the _criterion of value_ in history, and whether judgments of\nvalues, as well as judgments of fact belong to the province of the\nhistorian. It is solved, because true judgments of fact, individual\njudgments, are precisely judgments of value, or determinations of the\nproper quality, and therefore of the meaning and value of the fact.\nWe admit no other criterion of value than the concept itself. For\nthis reason, we must also reject the distinction of the _history_ of\nfact and the _criticism_ (or valuation) of it. Every history is also\ncriticism, and every criticism is also history; to say that a thing is\nthe fact which we call the _Divine Comedy_ is to say what its value\nis, and so to criticize it. To think _normal_ or _neutral_ values,\nas to which (according to the most modern historical theories) men\nof different points of view should agree, seems at the most a mere\n_symbol_ of that agreement which men are constantly seeking and\nrealizing in the subjectivity objectivity of thought. This will never\nbe a _fact_ completely agreed upon, because it is a perpetual _fieri._\nIt cannot be expected of the future, because it will belong to the\nfuture, as it belongs and has belonged to the present and to the past.\n\n[Sidenote: _Various legitimate meanings of the protests against\nhistorical subjectivity._]\n\n\nIf the protest against the intrusion of subjectivity into history\ncannot logically be said to have any legitimate meaning save that of a\npolemic against false subjectivity in favour of true subjectivity, it\nmay also imply, on the literary side, a question of expediency, namely,\nthat in the historical work of art greater importance should be given\nto the representation of facts than to the theoretical discussion of\nconcepts. A historical should not be transformed into a philosophical\nwork. But this is a question that must be studied case by case; for\nwhat harm could it do, if a historian, beginning by writing a history,\nwere to end by writing a philosophic treatise? Certainly, it would not\nbe a greater evil than if a philosopher, becoming passionate about the\nfacts he gives as instances, were gradually to abandon his first plan\nand produce a history in place of a system. At bottom it would do no\nharm, or very little, provided that such philosophy or such historical\nrepresentation were good; and this is precisely what must be examined\ncase by case. A more appropriate meaning of the polemic against the\nsubjectivity of history is the recommendation that in narrating\nhistory, _emphatic, negative,_ and _desiderative_ forms should\naccompany logical judgments which, as such, are judgments of value,\nas little as possible. These forms, it is argued, are justifiable in\nrelation to the present or immediate past, because they indicate the\ndirection of the future, but in relation to the remote past they are\nusually empty and superfluous. Indeed, to rage against Marius or Sulla,\nC\u00e6sar or Pompey, Frederick Barbarossa or the burgesses of Lombardy, is\nsomewhat vain, because those historical personages have, in general,\nno near or practical interest. But, on the other hand, it is also true\nthat these characters always have some near and practical interest,\nand in that measure we cannot prevent history, even of the remote\npast, being here and there revived with the accents of our present\nand of our future. Still more legitimate is the significance of that\npolemic when the intention is to blame the habit of those who assume\nthe functions of praise or blame, in relation not only to men, but to\nhistorical events. They applaud paganism, abuse Christianity, weep\nover the fall of the Roman Empire, deplore the formation of Islamism,\nregret that Buddhism should not have been disseminated in Europe,\nsympathize with the Reformation, or disapprove of Catholicism after\nthe Council of Trent. To them was addressed the saying that history\nis not to be judged but to be narrated. But it would be more accurate\nto say that history is not to be judged by the categories by which we\njudge the actions of individuals, which are subject to the dialectic\nof good and evil, because the action of an individual differs from the\nhistorical event, which transcends individual wills. But the definition\nof individuality and of event goes outside the gnoseology of history,\nand more properly belongs to the Philosophy of the Practical.[1]\n\n[Sidenote: _The demand for a theory of historical facts._]\n\nThe conviction that has been gained as to the necessity of the logical\nelement, of concepts, criteria, or values, for the formation of\nnarrative, has induced some to demand, not only that the historian\nshould continually have clearly and firmly in mind the concepts that\nhe employs and his intention in employing them, but that a _theory\nof historical factors_ or, as others call it, a _table of values,_\nshould be constructed, which should serve as foundation for historical\nnarrative in general. The demand is exactly similar to that of the man\nwho, observing that electricians or metal-founders employ physical\nforces, demands the construction of a physical theory to serve as the\nbasis of industry; as if Physics did not exist and supply the basis\nfor industry; or as if the sciences changed their nature, according\nto the men who employ them. The theory of historical factors, or the\ntable of values, exists, and is called _Philosophy,_ whose precise\nbusiness it is to define _universals,_ which are _factors_ and not\nfacts, and to give the table of _values,_ which are _categories._ At\nthe most this demand might be taken to suggest the recommendation of a\npopular philosophy, for the use of professional historians; but this\ntoo exists and is natural _good sense. A_ historian who entertains\ndoubts as to the deliverances of good sense begins to philosophize\n(in the restricted and professional sense of the word), and once he\nhas done this, what is called popular philosophy no longer suffices\nhim, or serves only to make his mental condition worse, with its\ninsufficient nourishment. Books on the teaching of history which abound\nin our literature of to-day are proof of this. Disquisitions as to\nthe _predominance_ or the _fundamental_ character of this or that\nhistorical factor belong to this popular and more or less dilettante\nliterature. In strict philosophy, such problems do not arise, or are\npromptly dissolved, because it is known that, since every fact of\nreality depends upon another fact, so also every factor, or every\nconstitutive element of the spirit and of reality, is such only in\nunion with other factors and elements. None of them predominates,\nbecause measures of greater or less are not used in philosophy, and\nnone is fundamental, because all are fundamental.\n\n[Sidenote: _Impossibility of dividing history according to its\nintuitive and reflective elements._]\n\n\nThe representative and conceptual elements in historical judgment\nare not separable or even, strictly, distinguishable unless it is\nintended to dissolve the historical narrative in order to return to\npure intuition. This too is a corollary of what has been said on the\nindividual judgment. For this reason, every division of history, based\nupon the presence or absence of one or other of these elements, must\nbe held to be without truth. Of this kind is the once popular division\ninto _picturesque_ and _reflective_ or _thinking_ history. But this\ndivision designates not two kinds of history, but rather, on the one\nhand, the return to indiscriminate intuition, and on the other, true\nhistory, which is intuition thought or reflected. The same false\ndivision is sometimes expressed in the terms _chronicle_ and _history,_\nor _narrative_ and _philosophic_ history.\n\n[Sidenote: _Empirical nature of the division of the historical process\ninto four stages._]\n\nOutside the individual judgment, there is neither subject nor\npredicate. Outside the narrative, which synthesizes representation and\nconcept, and by representing gives existence and judgment, there is no\nhistory. Technical manuals usually divide the process of historical\ncomposition into four stages. The first is _heuristic,_ consisting\nof the collection of historical material; the second _criticism_ or\n_separation_ of it; the third is _interpretation_ or _comprehension,_\nthe fourth _exposition_ or _narrative._ These distinctions portray the\nprofessional historian's method of work. _First,_ he examines archives\nand libraries, _then_ he verifies the authenticity of the documents\nfound, _then_ he seeks to understand them, and _finally_ he puts his\nthoughts on paper and pays attention to the beauty of form of the\nexposition. These are doubtless useful didactic distinctions. But it\nmust be observed that so long as we do not have a historical source\nbefore us (the first stage) the very condition of the birth of history\nis wanting. Hence the first stage does not belong to historical work,\nbut to the practical stage of him who goes in search of a material\nobject. The second stage is already a complete historical work in\nitself, since it consists in establishing, whether a given fact, called\nsincere evidence, has really taken place. The third coincides logically\nwith the second, since it is the same thing to ascertain the value of\na piece of evidence and to pronounce on the reality and quality of the\nfacts to which it witnesses. The fourth coincides with the second and\nthird, because it is impossible to think a narrative without speaking\nit, that is, without giving to it expressive or verbal form.\n\n[Sidenote: _Divisions founded upon the historical object._]\n\nIf history be not divisible on the basis of the presence or absence\nof the reflective or representative element, it may well be divided\nby taking as basis, either the concept that determines the particular\nhistorical composition, or the representative material that enters into\nit.\n\n[Sidenote: _Logical division according to the forms of the spirit._]\n\nThe first mode of distinction is rigorous, because founded upon the\ncharacter of unity-in-distinction, proper to the pure concept. Thus,\nthe human mind cannot think history as a whole, save by distinguishing\nit at the same time into the history of doing and the history of\nknowing, into the history of the practical activity and the history\nof \u00e6sthetic production, of philosophic thought, and so on. In like\nmanner, it cannot think any one of these distinctions, save by placing\nit in relation with the others, or with the whole, and thinking it\nin complete history. Naturally, this intimate, logical unity and\ndistinction has nothing to do with the _books_ which are called\nhistories of the practical, philosophic, artistic activities, and the\nlike. There the correspondence with the division of which we speak is\nonly approximate, owing to the operation of what we called practical\nor economic motives. But every historical proposition, like every\nindividual judgment, qualifies the real according to one aspect of the\nconcept, and excludes another, or it qualifies it indeed according to\nall its aspects, but distinguishes them, and therefore prevents the\none from intruding upon the other. The literary division of books into\nbooks of practical, philosophic, and artistic history, and so on, gets\nits importance from this fundamental distinction, according to which\nare also divided the different points of view of historians and the\nvarious interests of their readers.\n\n[Sidenote: _Empirical division of representative material._]\n\nThe second mode is, of necessity, empirical, and cannot be carried\nout without the introduction of empirical concepts. For otherwise it\nwould not be possible to keep the representations of reality separate,\nsince they constitute a continuous and compact series. By means of\nempirical concepts, history is divided into the history of the State,\nof the Church, of society, of the family, of religion (as distinct\nfrom philosophy), or of philosophy (as distinct from religion). Or,\nas the history of philosophy, it is divided into the history of\nidealism, of materialism, of scepticism; or as the history of art,\ninto the history of painting, of poetry, of the drama, of fiction. Or\nagain, as the history of civilization, it is divided into oriental\nhistory--history of Greece, of Rome, of the Middle Ages, of the\nRenaissance, of the Reformation, and so on. Even these last mentioned\ncriteria (Greece, Rome, the Middle Ages, etc.) are empirical concepts\nand not representations, because, as we know,[2] the representation\nis individual, and when it is made constant and general it is changed\ninto a concept of the individual, the summary and symbol of several\nrepresentations, in fact, the empirical concept. Each one of these\ndivisions is valid in so far as it is useful; and equally valid, under\na like condition, are all the divisions that have been conceived, and\nthe infinite number that are conceivable.\n\n[Sidenote: _Empirical concepts in history and the false theory as to\nthe function that they have there._]\n\nBut the failure to understand that the true function of the\nintroduction of empirical concepts is to divide the mass of historical\nfacts and to regroup them conveniently for mnemonic purposes, has\ngreatly interfered with the ideas of logicians as to the writing\nof history. Just as the individual judgment presupposes neither\nthe empirical concept, nor the judgment of classification, nor the\nabstract concept, nor the judgment of enumeration, whereas all these\nforms presuppose just the individual judgment; so history does not\npresuppose classifications conducted from the practical point of\nview, or enumerations and statistics, whereas on the other hand all\nof these do presuppose history, and without it could not appear. We\nshould not be deceived by finding them fused in historical works (which\ncontinually have recourse to such aids to memory), nor allow ourselves\nto forget that their function is _subservient,_ not _constitutive._\nThere can be no abstract idea of the Greek, unless we have first known\nthe individual life of the men called Pericles and Alcibiades. Nor can\nthere be any enumeration of the Three Hundred of Thermopyl\u00e6 or of the\nThree Hundred of Cremera, except in so far as each was known in his\nindividual features, and then classified as a citizen of Sparta or a\nRoman of the Fabian _gens._ To avail oneself of these simplifications\nis not to narrate history, which is already present to the spirit,\nbut to fix it in the memory and to communicate it to others in an\neasier way. Those others, if they have not the capacity to recover\nthe individual fact beneath those concepts of class and of number,\nwill understand nothing of history, thus simplified and reduced to a\nskeleton for the purposes of communication.\n\n[Sidenote: _Hence comes also the claim to reduce history to a natural\nscience;_]\n\nThe positivist fiction that _history can be reduced to a science_\n(natural science is of course meant) arises from the false\ninterpretation of the subsidiary character of the pseudoconcepts in\nhistory and from making them a constitutive part of it. History, on\nthis view, would be rendered a perfect example of what it has hitherto\nbeen only in imperfect outline, a classification and statistical table\nof reality. The many practical attempts at such a reduction have\ndamaged contemporary historical writing not a little, by substituting\ncolourless formul\u00e6 and empty abstractions which are applicable to\nseveral epochs at once or to all times, for the narration of individual\nreality. The same tendency appears in what is called _sociologism,_ and\nin its polemic against what it calls _psychological_ or _individual_\nhistory, and in favour of _institutional_ or _social_ history. Against\nthese materialistic reductions of history, the doctrines of _accident_\nor of _little causes_ which upset the effects of _great_ causes, are\nefficacious and valuable, for these and suchlike absurdities have the\nmerit of reducing that false reduction to absurdity.\n\n[Sidenote: _and the thesis of the practical character of history._]\n\nBy reason of the same erroneous interpretation there has come from\nphilosophers who are not positivists, the theory that history is\nrendered possible only by the intervention of _the practical_ spirit.\nOn this view, the practical spirit, after establishing practical\nvalues, arranges beneath them the formless material and shapes it into\nhistorical narrative. But the practical spirit is impotent to produce\nanything in the field of knowledge; it can act only as the custodian\nand administrator of what has already been produced. For this reason,\nthe theory here referred to, by appealing to the practical spirit,\nresolves itself into a complete negation of the value of history as\nknowledge. And this negation, though it was certainly not foreseen or\ndesired by those who maintain the theory, yet is unavoidable.\n\n[Sidenote: _Distinction between historical facts and facts that are not\nhistorical, and its empirical value._]\n\nIn this connection, there has also been maintained the importance of\nthe distinction between historical events and events not worthy of\nhistory, between historical and non-historical, or between teleological\nand ateleological personages. Such a distinction, it has been affirmed,\nis afforded by the practical spirit. This is true, but for the reason\nalready given, it amounts to removing all theoretical importance from\nthe distinction, by emptying it of all cognitive content. In reality,\nfor the practical economy of social work, for selecting subjects\nfor books, or for being easily understood in our own speech, it is\nnecessary to speak of a definite event or of a definite individual as\na thing and person altogether common and unworthy of history. But it\nasks the brain of a pedant to imagine that the individual or the event\nhas thereby been suppressed, we do not say from the field of reality\n(which would be too manifestly absurd), but from that of the _narrative\nof reality,_ or from history. What is understood forms part of what\nis said; and if we did not always imply a mental reference to the men\nwe call commonplace, and to insignificant facts, which are more or\nless excluded from our words, great men and significant events would\nalso lose all meaning. Such implications are so little eliminated\nor eliminable, that they break out and are even verbally expressed,\naccording to the various interests that determine books on history at\nvarious times. Thus we have seen domestic and social life, neglected\nby the old historians, not only gradually assume importance, but throw\nwars and diplomatic negotiations into the shade. We have seen the\nso-called masses, neglected in favour of the individual genius, in\ntheir turn conquer, and almost eclipse, the heroes (which does not mean\nthat these latter will not have their revenge). We have seen names,\nonce hardly mentioned, become attractive and popular, and others, at\none time celebrated, lose their colour and disappear from view. Even\nItalian histories of the most recent events afford instances of such\nfluctuations. For instance, in the period of the Risorgimento, the\nprevailing interest regarded as supremely important and historical,\nthe formation of Italian nationality, the constitution of the middle\nclass and of the commune, and popular rebellions against foreigners\nor against tyrants. Now it is the social problem and the socialist\nmovement that dominate, and preference is given to histories of\neconomic facts, of class struggles and of movements of the proletariat.\n\n[Sidenote: _Professional prejudice and the theory of the practical\ncharacter of history._]\n\nPractical preoccupations are so strong with any one engaged in a given\ntrade, even though it is that of a maker of books of history, as to\nsuggest almost inevitably the strange doctrine of the _practical_\ncharacter of history, or the non-theoretic character of that form,\nwhich is the crowning result of the theoretic spirit, and which alone\ngives full truth--if truth is the Knowledge of Reality, and if Reality\nis history.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: See on this point my _Philosophy of the Practical,_ part\ni. sect. ii. chaps, v.-vi.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See above, Part I. Sect. I. Chap. IV.]\n\n\n\n\nIV\n\n\nIDENTITY OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Necessity of the historical element in philosophy._]\n\n\nThe necessity of philosophy as a condition of history has been made\nevident from the preceding considerations. It is now necessary\nto affirm with no less clearness the necessity of history for\nphilosophy. If history is impossible without the logical, that is,\nthe philosophical, element, philosophy is not possible without the\nintuitive, or historical element.\n\nFor a philosophic proposition, or definition, or system (as we have\ncalled it), appears in the soul of a definite individual at a definite\npoint of time and space and in definite conditions. It is therefore\nhistorically conditioned. Without the historical conditions that\ndemand it, the system would not be what it is. The Kantian philosophy\nwas impossible at the time of Pericles, because it presupposes, for\ninstance, exact natural science, which developed from the Renaissance\nonward. And this presupposes geographical discoveries, industry,\ncapitalist or civil society, and so on. It presupposes the scepticism\nof David Hume, which in its turn presupposes the deism of the beginning\nof the eighteenth century, which in its turn is connected with the\nreligious struggles in England and in all Europe in the sixteenth and\nseventeenth centuries, and so on. On the other hand, if Kant were\nto live again in our time, he could not write the _Critique of Pure\nReason_ without modifications so profound as to make of it, not only a\nnew book, but an altogether new philosophy, though containing within\nitself his old philosophy. Stiff with old age, he was even capable\nof ignoring the interpretations and developments of Fichte, and of\nignoring Schelling. But to-day he could not ignore either of these,\nnor Hegel, nor Herbart, nor Schopenhauer. He could not even ignore\nthe representatives of the medi\u00e6val philosophy, which followed the\nclassical period of modern philosophy; the authors of positivist myths,\nKantian and Hegelian scholastics, the new combinations of Platonism and\nAristotelianism, that is, of pre-Kantian with post-Kantian philosophy,\nthe new sophists and sceptics, the new Plotinians and Mystics, nor\nthe states of soul and the facts, which condition all these things.\nFor the rest, Kant truly lives again in our days, with a different\nname (and what is individuality, countersigned with the name, save a\njuxtaposition of syllables?) He is the philosopher of our times, in\nwhom is continued that philosophic thought, which once took, among\nothers, the Scoto-German name of Kant. And the philosopher of our day,\nwhether he will it or no, cannot abandon the historical conditions in\nwhich he lives, or so act as to make that not to have happened which\nhappened before his time. Those events are in his bones, in his flesh\nand blood, and it is impossible to drive them out. He must therefore\ntake account of them, that is, know them historically. The breadth\nof his philosophy will depend upon the breadth of his historical\nknowledge. If he did not know them, but merely carried them in him as\nfacts of life, his condition would not differ from that of any animal\n(or of ourselves in so far as we are animals or beings that are, or\nrather seem to be, completely immersed in will and practice). For the\nanimal is precisely conditioned by the whole of nature and the whole of\nhistory, but does not know it. The meaning of the demand must therefore\nbe understood that a truthful answer may be obtained. _History_ must\nbe known in order to obtain the truth of _philosophy._\n\n[Sidenote: _Historical quality of the culture required in the\nphilosopher._]\n\nThis demand is usually expressed in the formula that the philosopher\nmust be cultured, though it is not clear what is the quality of this\nculture that is said to be requisite. Some, especially in our own\ndays, would wish the philosopher to be a physiologist, a physicist, a\nmathematician, that is, that his brain should be full of abstractions,\nwhich are certainly not useless (everything is worth knowing, even the\ntriviality of girls, for even that is a part of life and of reality),\nbut which are in no direct relation to that form of knowledge which\nmust be the condition of philosophy. This form of knowledge is, on the\ncontrary, history; or, as it is said (with an _a potiori_ intention),\nthe history of philosophy, which of necessity as the history of a\nmoment of the spirit, includes all history in itself, as we have shown\nabove, when criticizing the divisions of history. That is to say, it is\nnecessary to know the meaning of the problems of our own time, and this\nimplies knowing also those of the past, in order not to take the former\nfor the latter and so cause inextricable confusion. And to the extent\nthat they can be of use according to the requirements of the problem,\nwe must know also the natural, physical, and mathematical sciences. But\nwe must _not_ know them _as stick_ and develop them as such, but rather\n_as historical knowledge_ concerning the state of the natural sciences,\nof physics, and of mathematics, in order to understand the problems\nthat they help to raise for philosophy.\n\n[Sidenote: _Apparent objections._]\n\nIt is vain to set against this the example of great philosophers\nwithout historical culture, as it is vain in the case of the necessity\nof historical knowledge for \u00e6sthetic criticism to bring forward\ninstances of those who, although without any historical knowledge,\nhave yet given far more true and more profound judgments upon art\nthan the historically learned. If those judgments are true, then the\ncritic supposed to be ignorant of history is not ignorant of it. He has\nsomehow absorbed, scented in the air, divined with rapid perception\nthose actual facts that were applicable to the given case. And, on the\nother hand, the so-called learned man will not be cultured, because his\nerudition is not lively and synthetic. The same happens in the case\nof those acute philosophers, who are said to be ignorant of the world\nand of history and of the thoughts of other philosophers. It cannot\nbe denied that much or little history may be learned outside the\nusual course of teaching by manuals and by orderly mnemonic methods.\nBut here, too, the exceptional mode of learning confirms the rule and\ndoes not obviate the usefulness for the majority of the customary\nmodes of learning. On the other hand, if he who is said empirically to\nbe without historical knowledge, but is not so in a given instance,\nshould nevertheless prove really ignorant in other instances, where\nhis unusual way of learning is not open to him, his philosophy also\nsuffers. For this reason, those philosophers who are ignorant of\nhistory exhibit deficiencies that have often been deplored. They burst\nopen doors already opened, they do not avail themselves of important\nresults, they ignore grave difficulties and objections, they fail\nto probe certain problems sufficiently deeply, and show themselves\ntoo insecure and too superficial in others, and so on. Thus is the\ncustomary learning of history avenged upon them: and Herbert Spencer,\nwho would never read Plato or Kant, is rejected, while Schelling and\nHegel are again in the hands of students.\n\n[Sidenote: _Communication of history as changing of history._]\n\nPhilosophy also changes with the change of history, and since history\nchanges at every moment, philosophy at every moment is new. This can\nbe observed even in the fact of the communication of philosophy from\none individual to another by means of speech or writing. Change at once\ntakes place in that transmission. When we have simply created again in\nourselves the thought of a philosopher, we are in the same condition\nas he who has enjoyed a sonnet or a melody, by suiting his spirit to\nthat of the poet or composer. But this does not suffice in philosophy.\nWe may attain to ecstasy by the recitation of a poem or the execution\nof a piece of music, just as it is, without altering it anywhere. But\nit does not seem possible to possess a philosophic proposition, save\nwhen we have _translated_ it, as we say, _into our own language,_ when\nin reality, relying upon its results, we formulate new philosophic\npropositions and solve new problems that have presented themselves in\nour souls. For this reason no book ever completely satisfies us. Every\nbook quenches one thirst, only to give us a new one. So true is this,\nthat when we have finished reading or are in course of reading, we\noften regret that it is impossible to speak with the author. We are led\nto say, like Socrates in the _Ph\u00e6drus,_[1] that written discourses are\nlike pictures and do not answer questions, but always repeat what has\nalready been said. Or we lose patience, like that Paduan professor of the\nfifteenth century, who, commenting on the jurist Paolo, and annoyed\nat the difficulties, exclaimed at a certain point: _\"Iste maledictus\nPaulus tam obscure loquitur ut, si haberem eum in manibus, eum per\ncapillos interrogarem!\"_ But if instead of the dumb book, we had\nbefore us a living man, a Paolo obliged to be clear, the process would\nstill be the same: his speech would be translated into our speech, his\nproblem would arouse in our spirit our own problem.\n\n[Sidenote: _The perpetuity of change._]\n\nThe author of a philosophic work is, however, always dissatisfied, for\nhe feels that his book or treatise hardly suffices for an instant,\nbut immediately reveals itself as more or less insufficient. For this\nreason, to any philosopher, as to any poet, the only works of his\nown that bring true satisfaction are those that he has still to do.\nThus every philosopher and every true artist dies unsatisfied, like\nKarl Marx, who, when asked in the last year of his life to prepare\na complete edition of his works, replied that he had yet to write\nthem. He alone is satisfied who at a certain moment ceases to think\nand takes to admiring himself, that is to say, the corpse of himself\nas a thinker, and is careful, not of art or philosophy, but of his\nown person. Yet to no one can even this give the satisfaction he\nimagines, for life is no less voracious and insatiable than thought.\nIn any case, to be satisfied, the author must become philosophically\nimmobile in a _formula,_ and the reader must content himself with this\nformula. Thoughts must become \"obtuse and deaf,\" as Leibnitz called\nthem, who defined such a spiritual condition as _psittacism._ The\nonly consolation left to one who does not become immobile is that of\nreflecting, like Socrates, that his discourses will not be sterile, but\nfruitful. Other discourses will spring from them in his own soul and in\nthe soul of others, in whom he has sown the _seeds_[2] He will console\nhimself with the thought that philosophy, like life, is infinite.\n\n[Sidenote: _Surpassing and continuous progress of philosophy._]\n\nThe infinity of philosophy, its continuous changing, is not a doing\nand an undoing, but a continuous _surpassing of itself._ The new\nphilosophic proposition is made possible only by the old; the old\nlives eternally in the new that follows it and in the new that will\nfollow that again and make old that other which is new. This suffices\nto reassure those minds which are easily led astray and inclined to\nlament the vanity of things. Where everything is vain, nothing is\nvain; fullness consists precisely in that perpetual becoming vain,\nwhich is the perpetual birth of reality, the eternal becoming. Nobody\nrenounces love because love is transitory, nor abandons thinking\nbecause his thought will give place to other thoughts. Love passes, but\ngenerates other beings, who will love. Thought passes, but generates\nother thoughts, which, in their turn, will excite other thoughts. In\nthe world of thought also, we survive in our own children: in our\nchildren who contradict us, substitute themselves for us and bury us,\nnot always with due piety.\n\n[Sidenote: _Meaning of the eternity of philosophy._]\n\nNo other meaning but this is to be found in the vaunted eternity\nof philosophy in regard to time and space. The eternity of every\nphilosophic proposition must be affirmed against those who\nmaterialistically consider all propositions as valueless existences,\nand fugitives which leave no trace, as phenomena of brute matter,\nwhich alone persists. Philosophic propositions, though historically\nconditioned, are not effects produced and determined by these\nconditions, but creations of thought, which is continued in and through\nthem. When they appear to be produced determinately, they must be\nheld to be, not philosophy, but false philosophy, vital interests\nmasquerading as thoughts. That alone can be eternal as philosophy,\nwhich is knowledge and truth. But when eternity is misunderstood as\nisolation from those conditions, it must then be denied, and in place\nof it the thesis of relativity must be admitted, provided we are\ncareful that it does not assume the erroneous vesture of historical\nmaterialism and economic determinism. The thesis that the history of\nphilosophy should be treated _psychologically,_ by the attribution\nof ideas to the temporal conditions and the personal experiences of\nphilosophers, to social history and biography, is reducible (and it\nis worth while noticing this) to materialism and determinism in its\nleast evident form, namely psychologism. Such a thesis is the failure\nto recognize spiritual value, or at least (as is the case with some\nunconscious \u00e6stheticists), the logical value of philosophy, whose\nhistory, when changed into that of the expressions of states of the\nsoul, comes to coincide altogether with the history of poetry and\nliterature.\n\n[Sidenote: _The concept of spontaneous, ingenuous, innate philosophy,\netc., and its meaning._]\n\nThe eternity of philosophy is its truth, and the conception which is\nsometimes brought forward of a _spontaneous_ or _ingenuous_ or _innate_\nor _cryptic_ (_abdita_) philosophy, which alone should be permanent\namid the variations of philosophic opinions, or to which the spirit\nshould return after many wanderings, is nothing but a symbol of this\ntruth. The Platonic theory of _reminiscence (anamneisis)_ is reducible\nto this conception. In this theory true knowledge is explained as the\nrecollection of an original state; and it is this reminiscence, as the\nrestitution of the childish soul, that is described by our Leopardi in\nthe following verses:\n\nI believe that to know is very often, if we examine it, nothing but to\nperceive the folly of beliefs due to habit, and the careful reconquest\nof the knowledge of childhood, taken from us by age; for the child\nneither knows nor sees more than we, but he does not believe that he\nsees and knows.\n\nBut such philosophy and such reminiscence are really found only in\npropositions historically conditioned. Ingenuous philosophy and\nprimitive knowledge are nothing but the concept itself of philosophy,\nfully realized in all and none. \"Platonic reminiscence (explained\nSchelling) is the memory of that state, in which we are all one with\nnature.\" But since we are one with nature in every one of our acts,\neach one of them demands a special reminiscence and so a new thought.\nIn like manner, _the state of nature,_ celebrated in moral and\npolitical doctrines (the doctrines of morality and rights), was a state\nof perfection which can never be found anywhere in the world or at any\nmoment of time, because it expressed the very concept of the good, of\nvirtue and of justice. Socrates, in another Platonic dialogue, spoke\nof those true beliefs (doxai aleiteis) as elusive like the statues of\nDaedalus, that disappear from the soul, unless one binds them with\nrational arguments, and only when thus bound do they from beliefs\nbecome knowledge.[3] Such is ingenuous philosophy, which in reality\nexists only when bound and never when loose and ingenuous, as the name\nwould suggest; philosophy _abdita_ exists only as philosophy _addita._\nCertainly, to the consciousness of doctrinaires, obscured with too much\nlabour, we can sometimes oppose ingenuous consciousness, and to the\npedantry of scholastic treatises we can oppose the truth of proverbs,\nof good sense, of children, of the people, or of primitive races. But\nwe must not forget that in all these cases ingenuous is a metaphor\nwhich designates truth in contradistinction to what is not truth.\n\n[Sidenote: _Philosophy as criticism and polemic._]\n\nThe division of philosophy into ingenuous and learned is due to its\nconvenience and to its didactic value, and in like manner philosophy\nproperly so-called, or _system,_ is distinguished from philosophy as\n_criticism._ The former is looked upon as the solid and permanent\npart, the latter as variable and adaptable to times and places,\nhaving as its object the defence of the eternal truths conquered by\nthe human spirit, against the wiles and assaults of error. In reality\nthe distinction is empirical: philosophy and philosophical criticism\nare the same thing; every affirmation is a negation, every negation\nis an affirmation. The critical or negative side is inseparable from\nphilosophy, which is always substantially a _polemic,_ as can be seen\nfrom the examination of any philosophic writing. Peace-loving people\nare fond of recommending abstention from polemics and the expression of\none's own ideas in a _positive_ manner. But only the artist is capable\nof expressing his soul without polemic, since it does not consist of\nideas. Ideas are always armed with helmet and lance, and those who wish\nto introduce them among men must let them make war. A philosopher, when\nhe truly abstains from polemics and expresses himself as though he\nwere pouring out his own soul, has not even begun to philosophize. Or,\nhaving philosophized upon certain problems, he makes, as Plato does,\nthe act of renunciation when he is confronted with others, feeling that\nhe has attained to the extreme limit of his powers, and from philosophy\nhe passes to poetry and prophecy.\n\n[Sidenote: _Identity of philosophy and history._]\n\nPhilosophy, then, is neither beyond, nor at the beginning, nor at\nthe end of history, nor is it achieved in a moment or in any single\nmoments of history. It is achieved _at every moment_ and is always\ncompletely united to facts and conditioned by historical knowledge. But\nthis result which we have obtained and which completely coincides with\nthat of the conditioning of history by philosophy is still somewhat\nprovisional. Were we to consider it definite, philosophy and history\nwould appear to be two forms of the spirit, mutually conditioning one\nanother, or (as has sometimes been trivially remarked) in reciprocal\naction. But philosophy and history are not two forms, they are one sole\nform: they are not mutually conditioned, but identical. The _a priori_\nsynthesis, which is the reality of the individual judgment and of the\ndefinition, is also the reality of philosophy and of history. It is the\nformula of thought which by constituting itself qualifies intuition\nand constitutes history. History does not precede philosophy, nor\nphilosophy history: both are born at one birth. If it is desired to\ngive precedence to philosophy, this can only be done in the sense that\nthe unique form of philosophy-history must take the name and character,\nnot of intuition, but of what transforms intuition, that is to say, of\nthought and of philosophy.\n\n[Sidenote: _Didactic divisions and other reasons for the apparent\nduality._]\n\nPhilosophy and history are distinguished, as we know, for didactic\npurposes, philosophy being that form of exposition in which special\nemphasis is accorded to the concept or system, and history as that form\nin which the individual judgment or narrative is specially prominent.\nBut from the very fact that the narrative includes the concept, every\nnarrative clarifies and solves philosophic problems. On the other\nhand, every system of concepts throws light upon the facts which are\nbefore the spirit. The confirmation of the value of a system resides\nin the power of interpreting and narrating history, which it displays.\nIt is history which is the touchstone of philosophy. It is true that\nthe two may appear to be different, owing to the external differences\nof books, in which only one of the two seems to be treated: and it\nis also true that the didactic division is based upon a diversity\nof aptitudes, which practice contributes to develop. But, provided\nalways that the meaning both of a philosophic proposition and of a\nhistorical proposition is fathomed to the bottom, their intrinsic\nunity is indubitable. The fact that is so often cited of conflicts\nbetween philosophy and history is in reality a conflict between two\nphilosophies, the one true and the other false, or both partly true and\npartly false. Some thinkers, for instance, are idealist in recounting\nhistory and materialist in their philosophic systems. This means\nthat two philosophies are at strife within them without either being\nsufficiently aware of it. And does it not also happen that we find in\na philosophic exposition propositions that contradict one another and\ndivergent systems capriciously associated in one system?\n\nFrom intuition, which is indiscriminate individualization, we rise to\nthe universal, which is discriminate individualization, from art to\nphilosophy, which is history. The second stage, precisely because it is\nsecond, is more complex than the first, but this does not imply that\nit is, as it were, split into two lesser degrees, philosophy _and_\nhistory. The concept, with one stroke of the wing, affirms itself and\ntakes possession of the whole of reality, which is not different from\nit, but is itself.\n\n_Note._--May I be permitted an explanation concerning the history of\nmy thought (and also of its criticism owing to their unity already\ndemonstrated)? Sixteen years ago I began my studies in philosophy with\na memoir entitled _History beneath the general concept of Art_ (1893).\nThere I maintained, not that history is art (as others have summarized\nmy thought) but (as indeed the title clearly showed) that history\ncan be placed beneath the _general_ concept of art. I now maintain,\nsixteen years after, that, on the contrary, history is philosophy\nand that history and philosophy are indeed the same thing. The two\ntheories are certainly different; but they are far less different\nthan appears, and the second theory is in any case a development and\nperfecting of the first. _Elle a bien chang\u00e9 sur la route,_ without\ndoubt; but without discontinuity and without gaps. Indeed, the objects\nof my memoir were chiefly: (1) to combat the _absorption_ of history,\nwhich the natural sciences were then attempting more than they are\nnow; (2) the affirmation of the _theoretic_ character of art and of\nits _seriousness,_ art being then regarded as a hedonistic fact by the\nprevailing positivism; (3) the negation of history as a _third form_\nof the theoretic spirit different from the \u00e6sthetic form and from that\nof thought. I still maintain these three theses intact and they form\npart of my _\u00c6sthetic_ and of my _Logic._ But the proper character of\nphilosophy, so profoundly different from the empirical and abstract\nsciences, was not clear to me at the time, and therefore neither was\nthe difference between philosophic Logic and Logic of classification.\nFor this reason I was unable completely to solve the problem that I had\nproposed to myself. Owing to this confusion of the true universality\nof philosophy and of the false universality of the sciences (which is\neither mere generality or abstractness) in a single group, it seemed\nto me that the concreteness of history could enter only the group of\nart, understood in its greater extension (hence the general concept of\nart). In this group, by means of the fallacious method of subordination\nand co-ordination, I distinguished history as the _representation of\nthe real,_ placing it without mediation alongside the representation of\nthe _possible_ (art in the strict sense of the word). When I understood\nthe true relation between Philosophy and the sciences (a slow progress,\nbecause to reattain to consciousness of what philosophy truly is has\nbeen slow and difficult for the men of my generation), the nature of\nhistory also became somewhat clearer to me as I gradually freed myself\nfrom the remnants of the intellectualistic and naturalistic method.\nIn the _\u00c6sthetic_ I looked upon that spiritual product as due to the\nintersection of philosophy and of art. In the _Outlines of Logic_ I\nmade another step in advance, history there appearing to me as the\nultimate result of the theoretic spirit, the sea into which flowed the\nriver of art, swelled with that of philosophy. The complete identity of\nhistory and of philosophy was, however, always half-hidden from me,\nbecause in me the prejudice still persisted that philosophy might have\na form in a certain way free from the bonds of history, and constitute\nin relation to it a prior and independent moment of the spirit. That is\nto say, something abstract persisted in my idea of philosophy. But this\nprejudice and this abstractness have been vanquished little by little.\nAnd not only have my studies in the Philosophy of the practical greatly\nhelped me to vanquish them, but also and above all, the studies of my\ndearest friend Giovanni Gentile (to whom my mental life owes many other\naids and stimulations), concerning the relation between philosophy\nand history of philosophy (cf. now especially _Critica,_ vii. pp.\n142-9). In short, I have gradually passed from the accentuation of the\ncharacter of concreteness, which history possesses in relation to the\nempirical and abstract sciences, to the accentuation of the concrete\ncharacter of philosophy. And having completed the elimination of the\ndouble abstractness, the two concretenesses (that which I had first of\nall claimed for history, and that which I have afterwards claimed for\nphilosophy) have finally revealed themselves to me as one. Thus I can\nnow no longer accept without demur my old theory, which is not the new\none, but is linked to it by such close bonds.\n\nSuch is the road I have travelled, and I wished especially to describe\nit, in order to leave no misunderstandings which, through my neglect,\nmight lead others into error.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: _Ph\u00e6drus,_ 275.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Ph\u00e6drus,_ 276-7.]\u00b5\n\n[Footnote 3: _Meno,_ 97-8.]\n\n\n\n\nV\n\n\nTHE NATURAL SCIENCES\n\n\n[Sidenote: _The natural sciences as empirical concepts, and their\npractical nature._]\n\nThe natural sciences are nothing but edifices of pseudoconcepts, and\nprecisely of that sort of pseudoconcept that we have distinguished from\nthe others as _empirical_ or _representative._\n\nThis is evident also from the definitions that they assume as _sciences\nof phenomena,_ in opposition to philosophy, the science of _noumena_;\nand as _sciences of facts,_ again in opposition to philosophy, which\nis taken to be the science of _values._ But the pure phenomenon is not\nknown to science; it is represented by art: and the noumena, in so far\nas they are known, are also phenomena, since it would be arbitrary to\nbreak up unity and synthesis. In like manner, true values are facts,\nand, on the other hand, facts without the determination of value and of\nuniversality dissolve again into pure phenomena. Hence it is possible\nto conclude that those sciences offer neither pure phenomena nor mere\nfacts, but, on the contrary, develop representative concepts, which\nare not intuitions, but spiritual formations of a practical nature.\n\n[Sidenote: _Elimination of a misunderstanding concerning this practical\ncharacter._]\n\nThe word \"practical\" having been pronounced, it behoves us to eliminate\na misapprehension which leads to the natural sciences (or simply\n_sciences,_ as they are also called) being said to be practical, in the\nsame sense as those whose aim is action. Bacon was a fervent apostle\nof the naturalistic movement of modern times and full of this latter\nidea or preconception. He proclaimed to satiety that _meta scientiarum\nnon aha est quam ut dotetur vita humana novis inventis et copiis_;\nthat they propose to themselves _potentiae et amplitudinis humanae\nfines in latim proferre_; and that, by means of them, reality _ad\nusus vitae humanae subigitur_[1] But in our day also, many theorists\ndo not tire of repeating that the sciences are _ordonn\u00e9es \u00e0 faction._\nNow, this does not suffice to describe the natural sciences, because\nall knowledge is directed to action, art, philosophy, and history\nalike, which last, by providing knowledge of the actual situation, is\nthe true and complete precedent and fact, preparatory to action.[2]\nThe misapprehension in favour of the natural sciences arises from\nthe vulgar idea that the only practical things in life are eating,\ndrinking, clothes, and shelter. It is forgotten that man does not\nlive by bread alone, and that bread itself is a spiritual food if\nit increase the force of spiritual life. But further: the natural\nsciences, just because they are composed of empirical concepts (which\nare not true knowledge), do not _directly_ subserve action, since\nin order to act it is necessary to return from them to the precise\nknowledge of the individual actual situation. That is to say, in\nordinary parlance, _abstractions_ must be set aside and it must\nbe seen _how things_ truly and properly _stand._ The patient, the\nindividual patient, is treated, not the malady; Socrates or Callias\n(as Aristotle said), not man in general: \u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03c0\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8' \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd:\nknowledge of _materia medica_ does not suffice; the _clinical eye_ is\nneeded. The natural sciences are not directed to action, but _are,_\nthemselves, actions: their practical character is not extrinsic, but\n_constitutive._ They are actions, and are therefore not directed to\naction, but to aid the cognitive spirit. Thus they subserve action\n(that is, other actions) only in an indirect way. If an action does not\nbecome knowledge, it cannot give rise: to a new action.\n\n[Sidenote: _Impossibility of unifying them in a concept._]\n\nThe empirical character (and the practical character in the sense\nalready established) of the natural sciences is commonly admitted in\nthe case of such of them as consist in classifications of facts: for\nexample, of zoology, botany, mineralogy, and also of chemistry, in so\nfar as it enumerates chemical species, and of physics, in so far as\nit enumerates classes of phenomena or physical forces. The universals\nof all these sciences are quite arbitrary, for it is impossible to\nfind an exact boundary between the concept of animal (the universal\nof zoology) and that of vegetable (the universal of botany). Indeed\nit is impossible to find one between the living and the not living,\nthe organic and the material. Finally, the cellule, which is, for the\npresent at any rate, the highest concept of the biological sciences,\nis differentiated from chemical facts only in an external way. It will\nbe objected that there is in any case no lack of attempts to determine\nstrictly the supreme concepts of the sciences, such, for instance, as\nthose that place the _atom_ at the beginning of all things and attempt\nto show each individual fact as nothing but a different aggregate of\natoms. There are also those who mount to the concept of _ether_ or of\n_energy_ and declare all individual facts to be nothing but different\nforms of energy. Or finally, the vitalists recognize as irreducible\nthe two concepts of the teleological and the mechanical, of organic\nand inorganic, of life and matter. But in all these cases _the natural\nsciences are deserted,_ phenomena are abandoned for noumena, and\nphilosophic explanations are offered. These may or may not have value,\nbut they are of no use from the point of view of the natural sciences,\nor at most ensure to some professor the insipid pleasure of calling an\nanimal \"a complex of atoms,\" heat \"a form of energy,\" and the cellule\n\"vital force.\"\n\n[Sidenote: _Impossibility of introducing into them strict divisions._]\n\nSince the natural sciences cannot be unified in a concept (hence their\nineradicable _plurality_), and therefore remain unsystematic, a mass of\nsciences without close relation among themselves, logical distinctions\nare not possible in any science. No one will ever be able to prove that\ngenera and species must be so many and no more, or describe the truly\noriginal character by which one genus may be distinguished from another\ngenus and one species from another species. The animal species hitherto\ndescribed have been calculated it over four hundred thousand, and those\nthat may yet be described as fifteen millions. These numbers simply\nexpress the impotence of the empirical sciences to exhaust the infinite\nand individual forms of the real and the necessity in which they are\nplaced of stopping at some sort 1 of number, of some hundreds, of some\nthousands, or of some millions. Those species, however few or many they\nmay be, flow one into the other owing to the undeniable conceivability\nof graduated, indeed of continuous intermediate forms, which made\nevident the arbitrariness of the clean cut made into fact by separating\nthe wolf from the dog or the panther from the leopard.\n\n[Sidenote: _Laws in the natural sciences, and so called prevision._]\n\nBut some doubt is manifested where we pass from classification and\ndescription or from _system_ (as the lack of system of naturalistic\nclassifications is called, by a curious verbal paradox) to the\nconsideration of the laws that are posited in those sciences. It is\nthen perceived that the classification is certainly a simple labour\nof preparation, arbitrary, convenient, and nominalistic, but that the\ntrue end of the natural sciences is not the class but the _law._ In the\ncompass of the law strict accuracy of its truth is indubitable; so much\nso that by means of laws it is actually possible to make _previsions_\nas to what will happen. This is indeed a miraculous power, which places\nthe natural sciences above every form of knowledge, and endows them\nwith an almost magical force, by means of which man, not contented\nwith knowing what has happened (which is yet so difficult to know), is\ncapable of knowing even what has not yet happened, what will happen,\nor the future! _Prevision_(there must be a clear understanding of the\nconcepts) is equivalent to _seeing beforehand or prophesying,_ and the\nnaturalist is thus neither more nor less than a clairvoyant.\n\n[Sidenote: _Empirical character of naturalistic laws._]\n\nThe miraculous nature of this boasted power should suffice to make us\ndoubt whether the law is truly what it is said to be, a strict truth,\nquite different from the empirical concept, from the class, and from\nthe description. In reality, the law is nothing but the empirical\nconcept itself, the description, class or type, of which we have\njust spoken. In philosophy law is a synonym for the pure concept; in\nthe empirical or natural sciences it is a synonym for the empirical\nconcept; hence laws are sometimes called _empirical_ laws, or laws of\nexperience. If they were not empirical, they would not be naturalistic,\nbut philosophic universals, which, as we have seen, are unfruitful in\nthe field of the natural sciences. The law of the wolf is the empirical\nconcept of the wolf: granted that in reality there is found one part\nof the representation corresponding to that concept, it is possible to\nconclude that the rest is also found. Thus Cuvier (to choose a very\ntrite example), arranging the types of animals and hence the laws of\nthe correlations of organs, was able to reconstruct from one surviving\nbone the complete fossil animal. In like manner, granted the chemical\nconcept of water, H2O, and given so much of oxygen and double that\nquantity of hydrogen, O and H2, and submitting the two bodies to the\nother conditions established by chemistry, it is possible to conclude\nthat water will be seen to appear. All naturalistic laws are of this\ntype. Certain naturalists and theorists have reasonably protested\nagainst the division of the natural sciences into descriptive and\nexplicative, sciences of classification and sciences of laws, and have\nmaintained that all have one common character, namely, law. But this\nis not because the law is superior to the class or to the empirical\nconcept, but because the two things are identical: the law is the\nempirical concept and the empirical concept is the law.\n\n[Sidenote: _The postulate of the uniformity of nature, and its\nmeaning._]\n\nThe postulate of the _constancy or uniformity of nature_ is the\nbase of _empirical laws or concepts._ This, too, is something\nmysterious, before which many are ready to bow, seized with reverence\nand sacred terror. But that postulate is not even an hypothesis,\nsomehow conceivable, though not yet explained and demonstrated.\nOrdinary thought, like philosophical thought, knows that reality is\nneither constant nor uniform, and indeed that it is perpetually being\ntransformed, evolving and becoming. That constancy and uniformity,\nwhich is postulated and falsely believed to be objective reality,\nis the same _practical necessity_ which leads to the neglect of\ndifferences and to the looking upon the different as uniform, the\nchangeable as constant. The postulate of the uniformity of nature is\nthe demand for a treatment of reality made uniform for reasons of\nconvenience. _Natura non facit saltus_ means: _mens non facit saltus in\nnaturae cogitatione,_ or, better still, _memoriae usus saltus naturae\ncohibet._\n\n[Sidenote: _Pretended inevitability of natural laws._]\n\nAnother consequence of this is the inversion of the assertion (to be\nfound everywhere in the rhetoric of the natural sciences) as to the\n_inexorability and inevitability_ of the laws of nature. Those laws,\nprecisely because they are arbitrary constructions of our own and give\nthe movable as fixed, are not only not inevitable and do sometimes\nafford exceptions; but there _is_ absolutely _no real fact,_ which is\nnot an _exception_ to its naturalistic law. By coupling a wolf and a\nshe-wolf we obtain a wolf cub, which will in time become a new wolf,\nwith the appearance, the strength, and the habits of its parents. But\nthis wolf will not be identical with its parents. Otherwise how could\nwolves ever evolve with the evolution of the whole of reality, of which\nthey are an indivisible part? By chemical analysis of a litre of water\nwe obtain H2O; but if we again combine H2O, the water that we obtain\nis only in a way of speaking the same as before. For that combining\nand recombining must have produced some modification (even though not\nperceived by us), and in any case changes have occurred in reality\nin the subsequent moment, from which the water is not separable, and\ntherefore in the water itself taken in its concreteness. We could\nconsequently give the following definition: the _inexorable_ laws of\nnature are those that _are violated at every moment,_ while philosophic\nlaws are by definition those that are _at every moment observed._\nBut in what way they are observed cannot be known, save by means of\nhistory, and therefore true knowledge knows nothing of previsions;\nit knows only facts that have really happened; of the future there\ncan be no knowledge. The natural sciences, which do not furnish real\nknowledge, have, if possible, even less right (if one may speak thus)\nto talk of previsions.\n\nYet, it will be objected, it is a fact that we all form previsions,\nand that without them we should neither be able to cook an egg nor\nto take one step out of doors. That is quite true, but those alleged\nprevisions are merely the summary of what we know by experience to\nhave happened, and according to which we resolve upon our action. We\nknow what has happened. We do not know, nor do we need to know, what\nwill happen. Were any one truly to wish to know it, he would no longer\nbe able to move and would be seized with such perplexity before life,\nthat he would kill himself in desperation or die of fear. The egg,\nwhich usually takes five minutes to cook in the way that suits my\ntaste, sometimes surprises me by presenting itself to my palate after\nthose five minutes, either as too much or too little cooked; the step\ntaken out of doors is sometimes a fall on the threshold. Nevertheless,\nthe knowledge of this does not prevent me from leaving the house and\ncooking the egg, for I must walk and take nourishment. The laws of my\nindividual being, of my temperament, of my aptitudes, of my forces,\nthat is, the knowledge of my past, make me resolve to undertake a\njourney, as I did twenty years ago, to begin work upon a statue, as I\ndid ten years ago. Alas! I had not considered that in the meantime my\nlegs have lost their strength and my arm has begun to tremble. By all\nmeans call the previsions made use of in these cases true or false;\nbut do not forget that they are nothing but empirical concepts, that\nis to say, mnemonic devices, founded upon historical judgments. There\ncan be no doubt that they are useful; indeed, what we maintain is that\njust because they are useful, they are not true. If they possess any\ntruth, it resides in the establishment of the fact. That is to say, it\ndoes not reside in the prevision and in the law, but in the historical\njudgment which forms its basis.\n\n[Sidenote: _Nature and its various meanings. Nature as passivity and\nnegativity._]\n\nHaving thus made clear the coincidence of empirical concepts and the\nnatural sciences, we must determine exactly the meaning of the word\n\"natural,\" which is used as qualifying these sciences. It has not\nseemed advisable to change it, since its use is so deeply rooted,\nalthough we have, on the other hand, already given its synonym in\nqualifying these sciences as \"empirical.\" What is _nature_? The first\nmeaning of \"nature\" is the \"opposite\" of \"spirit,\" and designates\nthe natural or material moment in relation to the spiritual, the\nmechanical in relation to the teleological moment, the negative moment\nin relation to the positive. Thus, in the transition from one form of\nthe spirit to another, the inferior form is like matter, ballast, or\nobstacle, and so is the negation of the superior form. Hence reality is\nimagined as the strife of two forces, the one spiritual and the other\nmaterial or natural. It is superfluous to repeat that the two forces\nare not two, but one, and that if the negative moment were not, the\npositive moment could not be. The pigeon (says Kant), which rises to\ntake flight, may believe that had it not to vanquish the resistance of\nthe air, it would fly still better. But the fact is that without that\nresistance, it would fall to earth. In this sense, there is no science\nof Nature (of matter, passivity, negation, etc.) distinguishable from\nthat of Spirit, which is the science of itself and of its opposite, and\nthe science of itself only in so far as it is also the science of its\nopposite.\n\n[Sidenote: _Nature as practical activity._]\n\nBut in another sense, _nature_ is, not indeed the opposite of spirit,\nbut something distinct _in_ the spirit, and especially distinct from\nthe cognitive spirit, as that form of spirituality and activity\nwhich is not cognitive. A non-theoretical activity, a spirituality\nwhich should not be in itself knowledge, cannot be anything but the\n_practical_ form of the spirit, the will. _Man makes himself nature_\nat every moment, because at every moment he passes from knowing to\nwilling and doing and from willing and doing returns to knowing, which\nis the basis for new will and action. In this sense, the science of\nnature, or the philosophy of nature, could not be anything but the\nphilosophic science of the will, the Philosophy of the practical.\n\n[Sidenote: _Nature in the gnoseological sense, as naturalistic or\nempirical method._]\n\nThe natural sciences have nothing to do with a philosophic knowledge\nof nature as will, with a Philosophy of the practical. They are, as\nhas already been said, not knowledge of will, but will; not truth, but\nutility. In consequence of this, they extend to the whole of reality,\ntheoretic and practical, to the products of the theoretic spirit, not\nless than to those of the practical spirit; and without knowing any\nof them, universally or individually, they manipulate and classify\nthem all in the way we have seen. They have not therefore a _special\nobject,_ but _a special mode of treatment,_ their object or matter\nbeing the presupposed philosophic-historical knowledge of the real.\nThey do not treat of the material and mechanical aspect of the real,\nnor even of its non-theoretical, practical, volitional aspect (or what\nis incorrectly called the irrational aspect of it). They turn the\ntheoretical into the practical, and by killing its theoretic life,\nmake it dead, material, and mechanical. Nature, matter, passivity,\nmotion _ab extra,_ the inert atom and so on, are not reality and\nconcepts, but natural science itself in action. Mechanism, logically\nconsidered, is neither a fact nor a mode of knowing the fact. It is a\nnon-fact, a mode of not-knowing: a practical creation, which is real\nonly in so far as it becomes itself an object of knowledge. This is the\n_gnoseological_ or _gnoseopractical_ meaning of the word \"nature,\" a\nmeaning which must be kept carefully distinct from the two preceding\nmeanings. When we speak, for instance, of _matter_ or of _nature_\nas not existing, we mean to refer to the puppet of the naturalists,\nwhich the naturalists themselves and the philosophers of naturalism,\nforgetting its genesis, take for a real if not a living being. That\nmatter (said Berkeley) is an abstraction; it is (say we) an empirical\nconcept, and whoever knows what empirical concepts are will not pretend\nthat matter or nature exists, simply because it is spoken about.\n\n[Sidenote: _The illusions of materialists and dualists._]\n\nWe do not claim to have supplied the full solution of the problem\nconcerning the dualism or materialism of the real with this discussion\non the theme of Logic. This solution cannot (we repeat) be expected,\nsave from all the philosophic sciences together, that is to say, from\nthe complete system. But we can already see, from the logical point\nof view, that the dualists and materialists cannot avoid the task of\nshowing that the nature or matter, which they elevate to a principle of\nthe real or to one of the two principles of the real, is not: firstly,\nthe mere negation of the spirit, nor secondly, a form of the spirit,\nnor thirdly, the abstraction of the natural sciences. They must also\nshow that it answers to something conceivable and existing, outside\nor above the spirit. Logic can pass onward at this point, saying of\nmaterialists and dualists what Dante said of the devils and the damned\nstruggling in the lake of burning pitch: \"And we leave them thus\nencompassed.\"\n\n[Sidenote: _Nature as empirical distinction of an inferior in relation\nto a superior reality._]\n\nThe word \"nature\" has yet a fourth meaning (but this time altogether\nempirical), which is clear in those propositions which distinguish\nnatural life from social life, natural men _(Naturmenschen)_ or savages\nfrom civilized men, and again natural from human beings, animals\nfrom men, and so on. Nature, in this sense, is distinguished from\ncivilization or humanity, and thus the sole reality is divided into two\nclasses of beings: natural beings and human beings (which are sometimes\nalso called spiritual as compared with the former, which are called\nmaterial). The vague and empirical nature of this distinction is at\nonce perceived from the impossibility that we meet with of assigning\nboundaries between civilization and the state of nature, between\nhumanity and animality. Man can be only empirically distinguished\nfrom the animal, the animal from the vegetable, and vegetables from\ninorganic beings, which are organic in their own way. Certainly,\nwhat are called _things_ are not organic, for example a mountain or\na plough-share; but they are not organic, because they are not real,\nbut aggregates, that is to say, empirical concepts. In the same way,\na forest is not organic, though it is composed of things vegetating,\nnor a crowd, though composed of men. When we treat of things in the\nabove sense, we can say with some mathematicians that _things_ do not\nexist, but only their _relations._ Hence if the dualists feel able to\naffirm that the two classes of beings, natural and human, are based\nupon the existence of two different substances and upon the different\nproportions of these in each of the two classes, the task of proving\nthe thinkability of the two substances and the different proportions of\nthe compound falls upon them.\n\n[Sidenote: _The naturalistic method and the natural sciences as\nextended to superior not less than to inferior reality._]\n\nThe distinction between nature and spirit being therefore, in this last\nsense, altogether empirical, it is clear that the natural sciences\n(in the gnoseological or gnoseopractical sense in which we give chem\nthis name) are not restricted to the development of knowledge relating\nto what is called inferior reality, from the animal downwards, leaving\nto the sciences of the spirit the knowledge that relates to superior\nreality from the animal upwards, that is to say, to man. Sciences\nof nature and sciences of the spirit, _orbis naturalis_ and _orbis\nintellectuals,_ are also, in this case, partitions and convenient\ngroupings. All do substantially the same thing, that is to say, they\nprovide one single homogeneous practical treatment of knowledge.\n\n[Sidenote: _Demand for such an extension, and effective existence of\nwhat is demanded._]\n\nOn this unity and homogeneity is based the demand so often made\n(especially in the second half of the nineteenth century) for the\nextension of _the method of the natural sciences_ to the sciences\nof the spirit or moral sciences, the _orbis intellectualis,_ for a\nnaturalistic treatment of the productions of language and of art, or\nof political, social, and religious life. Thus were originated or\nprophesied a Psychology, an \u00c6sthetic, an Ethic, a Sociology, _methodo\nnaturali demonstratae._ It was necessary to draw the attention of those\nmakers of programmes and advisers (apart from the evil philosophic\nintentions, positivist or materialistic, which they nourished in their\nbosoms) to the superfluity of their demand, and gently to reprove them\nwith the old phrase: _Quod petis in manu habes._ Since man was man and\nconstructed pseudoconcepts and empirical sciences, these naturalistic\nclassifications have never been limited to animals, plants, and\nminerals, nor to physical, chemical, and biological phenomena, but\nhave been extended to all the manifestations of reality. Naturalistic\nLogic, Psychology, Linguistic Sociology and Ethics have not awaited the\nnineteenth century ere they should open to the sun. And (without going\ntoo far back in time, or leaving Europe) they already bore flower and\nfruit in the Sociology (Politics) of Aristotle, in the Grammatics of\nthe Alexandrians, in the Poetics and Rhetoric of Aristotle himself, or\nof Hermagoras, of Cicero, or of Quintilian, and so on. The novelty of\nthe nineteenth century has principally consisted in giving the names\n_social Physics,_ or the _physico-acoustic science of language_ to what\nwas once more simply, and perhaps in better taste, called otherwise.\nBut in saying this we do not wish to deny that certain naturalistic\nwork has been far more copious in the nineteenth century than in\nGreece, and that naturalistic methods have not been applied with\nsingular acumen and exactitude in those fields of study. Linguistic\naffords a case in point, with _its phonetic laws,_ by reason of which\nit moves so proudly among its companions.\n\n[Sidenote: _Historical basis of the natural sciences._]\n\nThe natural sciences and the empirical concepts which compose them\nappear therefore like a tachygraphic transcription upon living and\nmutable reality, capable of complete transcription only in terms of\nindividual representations. But upon what reality? Upon the reality of\nthe poet, or upon the clarified and existentialized reality of--the\nhistorian? The constructions of the natural sciences take history\nfor their presupposition, just as judgments of classification take\nindividual judgments. Were this not so, their economic function would\nhave no way of expressing itself, from lack of matter whereon to work.\nTo employ the easy example already given, it would be of no use to the\nzoologist to construct types and classes of animals that were certainly\nconceivable, but non-existent. For while those types and classes would\ndistract the attention from the useful and urgent task of summarizing\nreality historically given and known, they would not exhaust the\npossibilities, which are infinite And if it appear that imaginary\nanimals are sometimes classified, as for example griffins centaurs,\nPegasi, and sirens, it is easy to see that this is not done in Zoology,\nbut in another naturalistic science,--comparative Mythology, in which\nnot animals but the imaginings of men are really classified. These\ntoo are historical facts, because they are imaginings or fancies\nhistorically given. They are not combinations of images which no people\nhas ever dreamed of, nor any poet represented, for such, as has already\nbeen said, would be infinite in number and food for mere diversion.\n\n[Sidenote: _The question as to whether history is the foundation or the\ncrown of thought._]\n\nHistory, which has philosophy for its foundation, becomes in its\nturn foundation in the natural sciences. This explains why, with the\ncontroversy as to whether history be a science or an art, there has\nalways been inextricably connected the other question as to whether\nhistory be the foundation of science or science the foundation of\nhistory. The question finds a solution in the solution of the ambiguity\nof the term \"science,\" which is used indifferently, sometimes in the\nsense of philosophy, sometimes in that of the natural sciences. If\nscience is understood as philosophy, history is not its foundation,\nindeed philosophy is the foundation of history. Both mingle and are\nidentified in the sense already explained. If science is understood\nas naturalistic science, then history is its necessary foundation or\nprecedent. Certainly, naturalistic classifications are also reflected\nin historical narrative; but, as we have seen, they do not perform a\nconstitutive function in it; they are of merely subsidiary assistance.\n\n[Sidenote: _Naturalists and historical research._]\n\nBut since history is the foundation of the natural sciences, and the\nspecial treatment of perceptive material or historical data by these\nsciences does not possess theoretic value, but is valuable merely as\na convenient classification, it is clear that the whole content of\ntruth of the natural sciences (the measure of truth and reality that at\nbottom they contribute) is history. Therefore it is not without reason\nthat the natural sciences or some of them have been called in the\npast _natural history._ History is the hot and fluid mass, which the\nnaturalist cools and solidifies by pouring it into formal classes and\ntypes. Previous to this manipulation, the naturalist must have thought\nas a historian. The matter thus cooled and solidified for preservation\nand for transport has no theoretic value, save in so far as it can\nagain be rendered hot and fluid. Similarly, on the other hand, it is\nnecessary to revise continually the classifications adopted, returning\nto the observation of facts, to simple intuitions and perceptions, to\nthe historical consideration of reality. The _naturalist_ who makes a\ndiscovery, in so far as he is a discoverer of truth, is a _historical_\ndiscoverer; and revolutions in the natural sciences represent progress\nin historical knowledge. Lamarckianism and Darwinism may serve as an\nexample of this. Naturalists (and we use the word in its ordinary\nmeaning, applying it to those who explore this \"fair family of plants\nand animals,\" and what is called in general the physical world)\nfeel themselves somewhat humiliated when described as classifiers\ncareless of truth. But if such classification is exactly what the\nnatural sciences accomplish from the gnoseological point of view, yet\nnaturalists as individuals and as corporations of students exercise a\nfar more substantial and fruitful function. The historical foundation\nof the life of the natural sciences is also found in the fact that\na change of historical conditions sometimes renders, if not wholly\nuseless, at least less useful, certain classifications made with the\nobject of controlling conditions of life remote from us, or perceptions\nconcerning life that have now been abandoned. This has occurred\nwith regard to the classifications of alchemy and of astrology, and\nalso (passing on to examples from other empirical sciences) to the\ndescriptive and casuistic portions of feudal law. When the book is no\nlonger read, the _index_ also falls into disuse.\n\n[Sidenote: _The prejudice as to the non-historicity of nature._]\n\nThe strangest of statements, that _nature has no history,_ comes from\nforgetting the historical foundation of the natural sciences, from\nignorance that it constitutes their sole truth, and from attributing\ntheoretic importance to classifications which have merely practical\nimportance. In this case, nature signifies that reality, from man\ndownwards, which is empirically called inferior reality. But how, if\nit is reality, is it without history? How, if it is reality, is it\nnot becoming? And further, the thesis is confuted by all the most\nattentive studies of so-called inferior reality. To limit ourselves\nto the animal kingdom, a century before Darwin the acute intellect\nof the Abb\u00e9 Galiani shook itself free of this prejudice as to the\nimmobility of animals. He remarks in certain places about cats:\n\"_A-t-on des naturalistes bien exacts qui nous disent que les chats, il\ny a trois mille ans, prenaient les souris, pr\u00e9servaient leurs petits,\nconnaissaient la vertu m\u00e9dicinale de quelques herbes, ou, pour mieux\ndire, de l'herbe, comme ils font \u00e0 pr\u00e9sent? ... Mes recherches sur\nles m\u0153urs des chattes m'ont donn\u00e9 des soup\u00e7ons tr\u00e8s forts qu'elles\nsont perfectibles; mais au bout d'une longue tra\u00een\u00e9e de si\u00e8cles,\nje crois que tous que les cliats savent est l'ouvrage de quarante \u00e0\ncinquante mille ans. Nous n'avons que quelques si\u00e8cles d'histoire\nnaturelle: ainsi le changement qu'ils auront subi dans ce temps,\nest imperceptible.\"_[3] This slight perceptibility of the relative\nchanges of what is called nature or inferior reality has contributed\nto that prejudice (not to mention the confusion between the fixity\nthat belongs to naturalistic classifications and reality, which is\nalways in motion). Nature appears to be motionless, just because of\nthe slight interest that we take in the shadings of its phenomena and\nin their continuous variation. But not only is nature not motionless,\nbut it is not even true that it proceeds (as the poet says) \"with\nsteps so slow that it seems to stand still.\" The movement of nature or\ninferior reality is fast or slow, neither in less nor greater degree\nthan human reality, according to the various arbitrary constructions of\nempirical concepts which are adopted, and according to the variable and\narbitrary standards of measurement which are applied to them. We watch\nwith vigilant eye every social movement that can cause a variation in\nthe price of grain or the value of Stock Exchange securities; but we\ndo not surprise with equally vigilant eye the revolutions that are\nprepared in the bosom of the earth or among the green-clad herbs of the\nfield.\n\n[Sidenote: _The philosophic foundation of the natural sciences, and the\nefficacy of the philosophy that they contain._]\n\nBut if history is the foundation of the natural sciences, it follows\nfrom this that those sciences are always based upon a philosophy. This\nis indubitable, for the naturalist, however much he be a naturalist, is\nabove all things a man, and a man without a philosophy (or what comes\nto the same thing, without a religion) has not yet been found. This\ndoes not mean that the natural sciences are philosophy. Their special\ntask is classification, and here they are just as independent and\nautonomous as philosophy is incompetent. But philosophy is competent\nin philosophy, and so we see that those naturalists who possess\nphilosophic culture avoid the prejudices, errors, and absurdities\nthat spring from bad philosophies, and to which other naturalists are\nprone. For instance, if the chemist Professor Ostwald had possessed a\nbetter philosophy, he would not have abandoned his good chemistry for\nthat doubtful mixture of things--his _Philosophy of Nature._ And had\nErnest Haeckel made an elementary study of philosophy, he would never\nhave given up his researches upon micro-organisms, in order to solve\nthe riddles of the universe and to falsify the natural sciences. Let\nus limit ourselves to these instances, for our life of to-day supplies\ninnumerable examples of philosophizing men of science, who are as\npernicious to science as they are to philosophy and to culture. The\nantithesis between science and philosophy, of which so many speak, is\na dream. The antithesis is between philosophy and philosophy, between\ntrue philosophy and that which is very imperfect and yet very arrogant,\nand manifestly active in the brains of many scientists, though it\nhas nothing to do with the discoveries made in laboratories and\nobservatories.\n\n[Sidenote: _Action of the natural sciences upon philosophy, and errors\nin conceiving such relation._]\n\nThe action of philosophy upon the natural sciences is not constitutive\nof them, but preparatory. The action of the natural sciences upon\nphilosophy is not even preparatory, but merely incidental and\nsubsidiary, having for its end simplicity of exposition and of\nmemorizing, just as in history. A very common error, derived from a too\nhasty analysis of the forms of spiritual life, is that of looking upon\nthe empirical and natural sciences as a _preparation_ for philosophy.\nBut in the achievement of the natural sciences, philosophy has been\ncold-shouldered, and to recover it we must seek pure intuition, which\nis the necessary and only precedent of logical thought.\n\nStill worse is it, when the natural sciences are considered, not\nonly as preparation, but just as a first sketch, or a chiselling of\nthe marble block, from which philosophy will carve the statue. For\nthis view denies without being aware of it, either the autonomy of\nthe natural sciences, or that of philosophy, according as either the\nphilosophic method or the naturalistic method is held to be the method\nof truth.\n\nIndeed, in the first case, if the natural sciences be of a philosophic\nnature and represent a first approximation to philosophy, they must\ndisappear when philosophy is evolved, as the provisional disappears\nbefore the definite, as the proof before the printed book. This would\nmean that natural sciences as such do not exist and that what really\nexists is philosophy. In the second case, if philosophy have the same\nnature as the natural sciences, the further development of the first\nsketch will always be the work of the naturalistic method, however\nrefined and however increased in power we may please to imagine it.\nThus, what would really exist would never be philosophy, but always the\nnatural sciences. This erroneous conception therefore reduces itself\nto a denial, either of the natural sciences or of philosophy; either\nof the pseudoconcepts or of the pure concepts; a negation that need\nnot be confuted, because the whole of our exposition of Logic is its\nexplicit confutation.\n\n[Sidenote: _Motive of these errors: naturalistic philosophy._]\n\nThe genesis of such a psychological illusion resides in the fact that\nthe natural sciences seem to be tormented with the thirst for full and\nreal truth, and philosophy, on the other hand, to be intent solely\nupon correcting the perversions and inexactitudes of the empirical and\nnatural sciences. But it is a question of likeness or appearance only,\nbecause the thirst for truth belongs not to the natural sciences, but\nto philosophy, which lives in all men, and also in the naturalist.\nAnd the philosophic perversions and inexactitudes which have to be\ncorrected do not form part of the natural sciences (which as such\naffirm neither the true nor the false), but to that philosophy which\nthe naturalist forms and into which he introduces the prejudices\nderived from his special business.\n\n[Sidenote: _Philosophy as destroyer of naturalistic philosophy, but not\nof the natural sciences. Autonomy of these._]\n\nThe proof of the theory here maintained is that even when philosophy\nengages in strife with naturalistic prejudices, it dissolves those\nprejudices, but does not and could not dissolve the sciences which had\nsuggested them. Indeed, a philosopher becoming again a naturalist,\ncultivates those sciences successfully, just as his philosophizing\ndoes not forbid his going into the garden and there scenting and\npruning the plants. The naturalistic sciences of language and of art,\nof morality, of rights and of economics (to take instances from the\nintellectual world, which seem to have closer contact with philosophy),\nare not only what is called the _empirical stage_ of the corresponding\nphilosophic disciplines, but persist and will persist side by side with\nthem, because they render services which cannot be replaced. Thus there\nis no philosophy of language and of art which can expel from their\nproper spheres, even if it does expel them from its own, empirical\nLinguistic, Grammar, Phonetics, Morphology, Syntax, and Metric, with\ntheir empirical categories, which are useful to memory. Nor can they\neliminate the classifications of artistic and literary kinds, and\nthose of the arts according to what are called means of expression,\nby means of which it is possible to arrange books on shelves, statues\nand pictures in museums, and our knowledge of artistic-literary\nhistory in our memories. Psychology, an empirical and natural science,\ncertainly does not make us understand the activity of the spirit;\nbut it permits us to summarize and to remember very many effective\nmanifestations of the spirit, by classifying as well as may be the\nspecies or classes of facts of representation (sensations, intuitions,\nperceptions, imaginings, illusions, concepts, judgments, arguments,\npoems, histories, systems, etc.), facts of sentiment, and volitional\nfacts (pleasure, pain, attraction, repulsion, mixed feelings, desires,\ninclinations, nostalgias, will, morality, duties, virtue, family,\njudicial, economic, political, religious life, etc.), or by classifying\nthese same facts according to groups of individuals (the Psychology\nof animals, of children, of savages, of criminals, and of man, both\nin his normal and abnormal conditions). This wholly extrinsic mode of\nconsideration, which is now prevalent in Psychology, is the source of\nthe remark that it has risen (or has sunk?) _to the level_ of a natural\nscience, and that its method is mechanical, determinist, positive,\nantiteleological. Sociology, understood not as a philosophic science\n(--there is no such thing--), but as an empirical science, classifies\nas well as may be the forms of family and the forms of production, the\nforms of religion, of science and of art, political and social forms,\nand constructs series of classifications to summarize the principal\nforms which human history has assumed in the course of its development.\nThe philosopher expels these classifications from philosophy, as\nextraneous elements causing pathological processes; but that same\nphilosopher, in so far as he is a complete man, and in so far as\nhe provides for the economy of his internal life and for more easy\ncommunication with his fellows, must fashion and avail himself of the\nempirical. Having ideally destroyed the adjective and the adverb, the\nepic and the tragic kinds, the virtues of courage and of prudence, the\nmonogamous and the polygamous family, the dog and the wolf, he must yet\nspeak when necessary of adjectives and adverbs, of epics and tragedies,\nof courage and of prudence, of families formed in this or that way, of\nthe species \"dog,\" as though it were clearly distinguished from the\nspecies \"wolf.\"\n\nThus is confirmed the autonomy and the peculiar nature of the empirical\nor natural sciences, indestructible by philosophy as philosophy is\nindestructible by them.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: _Nov. Org._ I. \u00a7\u00a7 81, 116; and II. in fine.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See _The Philosophy of the Practical,_ pt. i. sect. i.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Letter to d'Epinay, October 12, 1776.]\n\n\n\n\nVI\n\n\nMATHEMATICS AND THE MATHEMATICAL SCIENCE OF NATURE\n\n\n[Sidenote: _The idea of a mathematical science of nature._]\n\nThe conception of a _mathematical science of nature_ is at variance\nwith the thesis that recognizes the ineliminable historical foundation\nof the natural sciences and the consequences which follow from it. It\nis claimed that this mathematical science, in expressing the ideal and\nend of the natural sciences, would express also their true nature,\nwhich is not empirical but abstract, not synthetic but analytic, not\ninductive but deductive. The mathematical conception of the natural\nsciences would imply perfect mechanism, the reduction of all phenomena\nto quantity without quality, the representation of each phenomenon\nby means of a mathematical formula, which should be its adequate\ndefinition.\n\n[Sidenote: _Various definitions of mathematics._]\n\nBut the nature of mathematics cannot be considered a mystery in our\ntime. Mathematics (as has lately been said with a subtlety equal to\nits truth) is a science \"in which it can never be known _what_ we\nare talking about, nor whether what we are talking about be _true_\"\nThese affirmations are made one after the other by all mathematicians\nwho are conscious of their own methods. In what sense can a process\nthat merits such a description be called a science? A science that\nstates no sort of truth does not belong to the theoretic spirit,\nsince it is not even poetry; and a science which is not related to\nanything is not even an empirical science, which is always related\nto a definite group of representations. For this reason, others\nincline to consider mathematics sometimes as _language,_ sometimes as\n_logic._ But mathematics is neither language in general nor any special\nlanguage; it is not language in the universal sense, co-extensive with\nexpression and with art; nor is it a historically given language,\nwhich would be a contingent fact; nor a class of languages (phonetic,\npictorial, or musical language, etc.), which would be an approximate\nand empirical definition, inapplicable in a function like mathematics,\nwhich expresses its own original nature. It is not logic, because\nthere is only one logic, and thought thinks always as thought. If it\nis maintained, on the other hand, that the human spirit has also a\nspecial logic, which is that of mathematicizing, a return is made to\nthe problem to be solved, namely, what is mathematicizing? that is to\nsay, this logic, which is not the logic of thought, because it does not\ngive truth, and is not the logic of the empirical sciences, because it\ndoes not depend upon representations.\n\n[Sidenote: _Mathematical process._]\n\nAny sort of arithmetical operation can serve as an example of\nmathematical process. Let us take the multiplication: 4\u00d74 = 16. The\nsign = (equals) indicates identity: 4\u00d74 is identical with 16, as it\nis identical with an infinite number of such formul\u00e6, since there\ncan be infinite definitions of every number. What do we learn from\nsuch an equivalence concerning the reality, phenomenal or absolute,\nto which the human mind aspires? Nothing at all. But we learn how to\nsubstitute 16 for 8\u00d72, for 9+7, for 21-5, for 32\u00f72, for 4\u00b2, for \u221a256,\nand so on. One or the other substitution is of service, according to\ncircumstances. When, for instance, some one promises to pay us 4 lire\ndaily, and we wish to know the total amount of lire, that is to say,\nthe object that we shall have at our disposal after four days, we shall\ncarry out the operation 4\u00d74=16. Again, when we have 32 lire to divide\ninto equal parts between ourselves and another, we shall have recourse\nto the formula: 32\u00f72 = 16. Mathematics as Mathematics does not know,\nbut establishes formul\u00e6 of equality; it does not subserve knowing, but\ncounting and calculating what is already known.\n\n[Sidenote: _Apriority of mathematical principles._]\n\nFor counting and calculating Mathematics requires formul\u00e6, and to\nestablish these it requires certain fundamental principles. These are\ncalled in turn definitions, axioms, and postulates. Thus arithmetic\nrequires the number series, which beginning from unity, is obtained by\nalways adding one unit to the preceding number. Geometry requires the\nconception of three dimensional spaces, with the postulates connected\nwith it. Mechanics requires certain fundamental laws, such as the\nlaw of inertia, by which a body in motion, which is not submitted\nto the action of other forces, covers in equal times equal spaces.\nThere has been much dispute as to whether these principles are _a\npriori_ or _a posteriori,_ pure or experimental; but the dispute must\nhenceforth be considered settled in favour of the former alternative.\nEven empiricists distinguish mathematical principles from natural or\nempirical principles, as at least (to use their expression) _elementary\nexperiences,_ as experiences which man completes in his own spirit,\nin isolation from external nature. This means, whether they like it\nor no, that they too distinguish them profoundly from _a posteriori_\nor experimental knowledge. The _a priori_ character of mathematical\nprinciples is made manifest by every attack upon it.\n\n[Sidenote: _Contradictory nature of these a priori principles. Their\nunthinkability,_]\n\nBut when they are recognized as being not _a posteriori_ and empirical,\nbut _a priori,_ difficulties are not thereby at an end. The apriority\nof those principles possesses other most singular characteristics,\nwhich render them unlike the _a priori_ knowledge of philosophy,\nthe consciousness of universals and of values, for instance, of\nlogical or of moral value. For if it is impossible to think that\nthe concepts of the true and of the good are not true, on the other\nhand it is _impossible to think that the principles of mathematics\nare trice._ Indeed, when closely considered, they prove to be all of\nthem altogether false. The number series is obtained by starting from\nunity and adding always one unit; but in reality, there is no fact\nwhich can act as the beginning of a series, nor is any fact detachable\nfrom another fact, in such a way as to generate a discrete series. If\nmathematics abandons the discrete for the continuous, it comes out of\nitself, because it abandons quantity for quality, the irrational,\nwhich is its kingdom, for the rational. If it remains in the discrete,\nit posits something unreal and unthinkable. Space is characterized\nas constituted of three or more dimensions; but reality gives, not\nthis space, thus constituted, made up of dimensions, but spatiality,\nthat is to say, thinkability, intuitibility in general, living and\norganic extension, not mechanical and aggregated. Its character is\nnot to have three dimensions, one, two, three, but to be spatiality,\nin which all the other dimensions are in the one, and so there are\nnot distinguishable and enumerable dimensions. And if the three or\nmore dimensions as attributes of space prove to be unthinkable, and\nalso the point without extension, the line without superficies, and\nthe superficies without solidity--so too in consequence are all the\nconcepts derived from them, such as those of geometrical figures, none\nof which has, or can have, reality. No triangle has, or can have,\nthe sum of its angles equal to two right angles, because no triangle\nhas existence. Hence those geometrical concepts are not completely\nexpressed in any real fact, since they are in none, thereby differing\nfrom the philosophic concepts, which are all in every instant and are\nnot completely expressed in any instant. Similar results follow in the\ncase of the principles of Mechanics. No body can be withdrawn from the\naction of external forces, because every body is connected with all the\nothers in the universe; hence the law of inertia is unthinkable.\n\n[Sidenote: _and not intuitible._]\n\nAs they are unthinkable, so are the principles of mathematics\nunimaginable; they have therefore been ill defined as imaginary\nentities, for they would in that case lose such _a priori_ validity\nas they have. They are _a priori,_ but without the character of\ntruth--they are organized contradictions. Had mathematics (said\nHerbart) to die because of the contradictions of which it is composed,\nit would have died long ago.[1] But it does not die of them, because it\ndoes not set itself to think them, as a venomous animal does not die\nof its own poison, because it does not inoculate itself. Were it to\npretend to think them and to give them as true, those contradictions\nwould all become falsities.\n\n[Sidenote: _Identification of mathematics with abstract\npseudoconcepts._]\n\nNow, a function which organizes theoretic contradictions without\nthinking them, and so without falling into contradictions, is not a\ntheoretic, but a practical function, and is perfectly well known to\nus as that particular productive form of the practical spirit which\ncreates pseudoconcepts. But since those contradictions are _a priori_\nand not _a posteriori,_ pure and not representative, mathematics cannot\nconsist of those pseudoconcepts which are representative or empirical\nconcepts. It remains, therefore, that it consists of the other form of\npseudoconcepts, which are _abstract_ concepts, which we have already\ndefined as altogether void of truth and also void of representation,\nas analytic _a priori_ and not synthetic _a priori._ And we have\ndemonstrated how, in the falsification or practical reduction of the\npure concept, concreteness without universality, that is to say, mere\ngenerality, belongs to empirical concepts, and universality without\nconcreteness, that is to say, abstraction, to abstract concepts.\n\nSuch indeed are the fictions of mathematics;--they have universality\nwithout concreteness, and therefore feigned universality. Inversely\nto the natural sciences, which give the value of the concept to\nrepresentations of the singular, although they succeed in doing so\nonly by convention, mathematics gives the value of the single to\nconcepts, also succeeding in this only by convention. Thus it divides\nspatiality into dimensions, individuality into numbers, movement into\nmotion and rest, and so on. It also creates fictitious beings, which\nare neither representations nor concepts, but rather concepts treated\nas representations. It is a devastation, a mutilation, a scourge,\npenetrating into the theoretical world, in which it has no part, being\naltogether innocuous, because it affirms nothing of reality and acts\nas a simple practical artifice. The general purpose of that artifice\nis known; it is to aid memory. And the particular mnemonic purpose of\nthis is at once evident; it is to aid the recall to memory of series of\nrepresentations, previously collected in empirical concepts and thus\nrendered homogeneous. That is to say, they serve to supply the abstract\nconcepts, which make possible the judgment of enumeration; to construct\ninstruments for counting and calculating and for composing that sort of\nfalse _a priori_ synthesis, which is the enumeration of single objects.\n\n[Sidenote: _The ultimate end of mathematics: to enumerate and\nconsequently to aid the determination of the single. Its place._]\n\nApplying thus to mathematics what has been said of the judgment of\nenumeration, it is now clear that it facilitates the manipulation of\nknowledge as to individual reality. Calculation indeed presupposes:\n(i) perceptions (individual judgments); (2) classifications (judgments\nof classification); and only by means of these latter does it attain\nto the first. But it must attain to the first, because were there\nno single things to recall to the mind, calculation would be vain.\nQuantification would be sterile fencing, if it did not eventually\narrive at qualification.\n\nMathematics is sometimes conceived as the special instrument of the\nnatural sciences, _appendix magna_ to the natural sciences, as Bacon\ncalled it; but from what has been said, we must not forget that both\ntaken together, because co-operating, constitute an _appendix magna_\nor an _index locupletissimus_ to history, which is full knowledge of\nthe real. It is further altogether erroneous to present mathematics\nas a prologue to all knowledge of the real, to philosophy and to the\nsciences, for this confuses head with tail, _appendix_ and _index,_\nwith text and preface.\n\n[Sidenote: _Particular questions concerning mathematics._]\n\nIt does not form part of the task that we have undertaken further to\ninvestigate the constitution of mathematics and to determine whether\nthere be one or several mathematical sciences; if one be fundamental\nand the others derived from it; if the Calculus include in itself\nGeometry and Mechanics, or if all three can be co-ordinated and unified\nin general mathematics; if Geometry and Mechanics be pure mathematics,\nor if they do not introduce representative and contingent elements\n(as seems to be without doubt the case in mathematical Physics); and\nso on. Suffice it that we have established the nature of mathematical\nscience and furnished the criterion according to which it can be\ndiscerned if a given formation be mathematics or natural science, if\nit be pure or applied mathematics (concept or judgment of enumeration,\nscheme of calculation, or calculation in the act). And for this reason\nwe shall not enter into the solution of particular questions, like\nthose concerning the number of possible fundamental operations of\narithmetic, or concerning the nature of the calculus of infinitesimals,\nand whether, in this, there be any place for non-mathematical concepts,\nthat is, the philosophic, not the quantitative infinite, or, again,\nconcerning the number of the dimensions of space. As to the use of\nmathematics, it concerns the mathematician who knows his business to\nsee what arbitrary distinctions it suits him to introduce, and what\narbitrary unifications to produce, in order to attain certain ends.\nFor the philosopher, these unifications and those distinctions, if\ntransported into philosophy, are all alike false, and all can be\nlegitimate, if employed in mathematics. If three dimensions of space\nare arbitrary but convenient, four, five and _n_ dimensions will be\narbitrary, and the only question that can be discussed will be whether\nthey are convenient. Of this the philosopher knows nothing, as indeed\nhe is sure _a priori_ is the case.\n\n[Sidenote: _Rigour of mathematics and rigour of philosophy. Loves and\nhates of the two forms._]\n\nPractical convenience suggests the postulates to mathematics; but the\npurity of the elements that it manipulates gives to them the rigour\nof demonstrations, the force of truth. It is a curious force, that\nhas a weakness for point of support,--the non-truth of the postulate,\nand reduces itself to a perpetual tautology, by which it is recorded\nthat what has been granted has been granted. But the rigour of the\ndemonstrations and the arbitrariness of the foundations explain how\nphilosophers have been in turn attracted and repelled by mathematics.\nMathematics operating with pure concepts is a true _simia philosophiae_\n(as it was said of the devil that he was _simia Dei_), and philosophers\nhave sometimes seen in it the absoluteness of thought and have saluted\nit as sister or as the first-born of philosophy. Other philosophers\nhave recognized the devil in that divine form, and have addressed to it\nthe far from pleasant words that saints and ascetics used to employ on\nsimilar occasions. Hence mathematics has been accused of not being able\nto justify its own principles, notwithstanding its rigorous procedure;\nand of constructing empty formul\u00e6 and of leaving the mind vacant. It\nhas been accused of promoting superstition, since the whole of concrete\nreality lies outside its conventions, an unattainable mystery; and of\nbeing too difficult for lofty spirits, just because it is too easy.[2]\nGianbattista Vico confessed that having applied himself to the study of\nGeometry, he did not go beyond the fifth proposition of Euclid, since\n\"that study, proper to minute intellects, is not suitable to minds\nalready made universal by metaphysic.\"[3] But these accusations are not\naccusations, and simply confirm the peculiar nature of those spiritual\nformations, eternal as the nature of the spirit is eternal.\n\n[Sidenote: _Impossibility of reducing the empirical sciences to\nmathematics, and empirical limits of the mathematical science of\nnature._]\n\nThe nature of mathematics being explained, we can now resume the thread\nof the narrative, left hanging loose, and discover how inadmissible is\nthe claim for a mathematical science of nature, which should be the\ntrue end and the inner soul of the empirical and natural sciences. It\nis said that this mathematical science presides, as an ideal, over\nall the particular natural sciences, but it should be added, as an\nunrealized and unrealizable ideal, and therefore rather an illusion\nand a mirage than an ideal. It is urged that this ideal has been\npartially realized, and that therefore nothing prevents its being\naltogether realized. But, indeed, whoever looks closely will see that\nit has not been even partially realized, because mathematical formul\u00e6\nof natural facts are always affected by the empirical and approximate\ncharacter of the naturalistic concepts which they use, and by the\nintuitive element upon which these are based. When it is sought to\nestablish in all its rigour the ideal of the mathematical science of\nnature, it becomes necessary to assume as a point of departure elements\nthat are distinct, but perfectly identical and therefore unthinkable;\nquantity without quality, which are nothing but those mathematical\nfictions of which we have spoken. The idea of a mathematical science is\nthus resolved into the idea simply of mathematics, and the much-vaunted\nuniversality of that science is the universal _applicability_ of\nmathematics, wherever there are things and facts to number, to\ncalculate and to measure. The natural sciences will never lose their\ninevitable intuitive and historical foundation, whatever progress may\nbe made in the calculus and in the application of the calculus. They\nwill remain, as has been said, _descriptive_ sciences (and this time\nit has been well said, as it prevents the failure to recognize the\nintuitive elements, of which they are composed).\n\n[Sidenote: _Decreasing utility of mathematics in the most lofty spheres\nof the real._]\n\nWe have already illustrated the slight perceptibility of differences\n(or the slight interest that we take in individual differences),\nas we gradually descend into what is called nature or inferior\nreality. On this is founded the illusion that nature is invariable\nand without history. And it also explains why mathematics has seemed\nmore applicable to the _globus naturalis_ than to the _globus\nintellectualis,_ and in the _globus naturalis,_ to mineralogy more\nthan to zoology, to physics more than to biology. Still, mathematics\nis equally applicable to the _globus intellectualis,_ as, for\ninstance, in Economics and Statistics. And, on the other hand, it\nis inapplicable to both spheres, when they are considered in their\neffective truth and unity as the _history of nature_ or the _history\nof reality,_ in which nothing is repeated and therefore nothing is\nequal and identical. Beneath that difference of applicability there\nis nothing but a consideration of utility. If the grains of sand on\nwhich we tread can be considered (although they are not) equal to one\nanother, it happens less frequently that we regard those with whom we\nassociate and act in the same light. Hence the _decreasing utility_ of\nnaturalistic constructions (and of mathematical calculation), as we\ngradually approach human life and the historical situation in which\nwe find ourselves. Decreasing but never non-existent, for otherwise,\nneither empirical sciences (grammars, books on moral conduct,\npsychological types, etc.) nor calculations (statistics, economic\ncalculations, etc.,) would continue in use. A constructor of machines\nneeds little intuition, but much physics and mechanics. A leader of\nmen needs very little mathematics, little empirical science, but much\nintuitive and perceptive faculty for the vices and value of the human\nindividuals with whom he has to do. But both little and much are\nempirical determinations; the Spirit, which is the whole spirit in\nevery particular man and at every particular instant of life, is never\ncomposed of measurable elements.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: _Introduction to Philosophy,_ Italian tr., Vidossich, p.\n272.]\n\n[Footnote 2: There is a curious collection of judgments adverse to\nmathematics in Hamilton, _Fragments philosophiques,_ tr. Plisse, Paris,\n1840, pp. 283-370.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Autobiography in _Works,_ Ferrari, 2nd edition, iv. p.\n336.]\n\n\n\n\nVII\n\n\nTHE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES\n\n\n[Sidenote: _The theory of the forms of knowledge and the doctrine of\nthe categories._]\n\nThe explanations given as to the various forms of knowledge are\nalso explanations concerning the categories of the theoretic and\ntheoretic-practical spirit: the intuition, the concept, historicity,\ntype, number; and also quality and quantity and qualitative quantity,\nspace, time, movement, and so on. They form part of that doctrine of\nthe categories, in which the account of philosophy in the strict sense\nis completed. To ask what mathematics or history is, means to search\nfor the corresponding categories; to ask what is the relation between\nhistory and mathematics, and in general how the various forms of\nknowledge are related to one another, means to develop genetically all\nthese forms, which is precisely what we have attempted.\n\n[Sidenote: _The problem of the classification of the sciences and its\npractical nature._]\n\nBut the difficult enquiry as to the forms of knowledge as categories\nhas not been much in favour in recent times. Another problem has, on\nthe other hand, acquired vogue. It has seemed more easy, but that is\nnot so, because though artfully disguised, it is at bottom identical\nwith the preceding problem. Instead of putting the question in the\nmanner indicated above, which implies seeking out the constitution\nof the theoretic spirit, a modest request has been made for a\nclassification of the various forms of knowledge, a _classification of\nthe sciences._\n\nScant confidence in philosophic thought, and excessive confidence in\nnaturalistic methods, have so operated that, unable to renounce the\nnecessity of dominating the chaos of the various competing sciences and\nnot wishing to have recourse to philosophic systematization, an attempt\nhas been made to classify the sciences like minerals, vegetables, and\nanimals. Even now there exist writers occupying professorships who\nclaim to be specialists in classifying sciences. Volumes on this theme\nappear with an unprofitable frequency and abundance.\n\n[Sidenote: _False philosophic character that it assumes._]\n\nCertainly, if such writers and professors were to proceed in an\naltogether empirical manner, corresponding with their declarations,\nnothing could be said against their labours, beyond advising them not\nto discuss them philosophically in order that they may not waste time\nin misunderstandings, and to recognize their slight utility. But, as\na fact, none of them contains himself within empirical limits, but\neach gives some philosophic and rational basis to the classification\nwhich he proposes. Thus there appear bipartitions of the sciences into\n_concrete_ and _abstract,_ into _historical_ and _theoromatic_(or\nnomotechnical), into sciences of the _successive_ and sciences of the\n_coexistent,_ or into _real_ and _formal;_ or _tripartitions,_ into\nsciences of _fact,_ of _law_ and of _value_; into _phenomenalist,\ngenetic_ and _systematic_ sciences; and into similar partitions and\ngroups, of which some are old acquaintances and correspond to functions\nof the spirit that we have already distinguished, while others, on the\ncontrary, must be held to be false, because they confuse under the\nsame name functions that are different and divide functions that are\nunique. But all of them, true or false, leave the empirical and direct\nthemselves to the problem of Logic and of theoretic Philosophy. This is\nnot the place to criticize them, because substantially it has already\nbeen done in the course of the exposition of our theories; and what is\nleft would reduce itself to a criticism of minute errors, which finds a\nmore suitable place in reviews dealing with books of the day than in\nphilosophic treatises. So true is it that those classificatory systems\npass with the day that witnessed their birth.\n\n[Sidenote: _Coincidence of that problem with the search for the\ncategories, when understood in a strictly philosophic sense._]\n\nWe are concerned only to demonstrate more clearly that the demand\ninherent in such attempts is identical with that which leads to the\nestablishing of a doctrine of the categories or a philosophic system.\nIt is indeed possible to discover now and then in the demands for a\nclassification of the sciences, two demands, the one limited, the other\nwider. The first takes the form of a demand for a classification of the\nforms of knowledge, as in the Baconian system, and in the others which\nrepeat the type. Here the sciences are divided according to the three\nfaculties, memory (natural and civil history), imagination (narrative,\ndramatic and parabolical poetry), and reason (theology, philosophy of\nnature and philosophy of man). The other tends to a classification\nnot according to gnoseological forms alone, but according to objects,\naccording to all the real principles of being, as in the system of\nComte and in those derived from it. Now a classification of the first\nkind coincides with researches relating to the forms of the theoretic\nspirit, and the problems that it exposes cannot be solved save by\npenetrating into the problems of these forms. Otherwise it is not\npossible to say if, for example, the Baconian classification be exact\nor no, and if not, where it should be corrected. But in passing to\nthe other form of classification, according to objects or to the real\nprinciples of being, we pass from the sea to the ocean, because that\ncoincides with the entire philosophic system. The classification of\nComte, for example, is his positivism itself, and it is not possible to\naccept or refute or evaluate the one, without accepting or refuting or\nsubmitting to examination the other. There are people who ingenuously\nbelieve that they can understand things by representing them on a\nsheet of paper, in the form of a genealogical tree or of a table rich\nin graphic signs of inclusion and exclusion. But when we seriously\nengage upon the work, we perceive that in order to draw up the tree and\nconstruct the table, it is above all things needful to have understood\nthem. The pen falls from the hand and the head is obliged to bend\nitself in meditation, when it does not prefer to abandon the dangerous\ngame and amuse itself in other ways.\n\n[Sidenote: _Forms of knowledge and literary-didactic forms._]\n\nAnd this is just the occasion to make clear the distinction that\nwe have on several occasions employed, between forms of knowledge\nand literary or didactic forms of knowledge, between the orders of\nknowledge and books. The arrangement of books is not always determined\nsolely by the demand for the strict treatment of a determinate problem;\nvery frequently, its motive is supplied by the practical need of having\ncertain different pieces of knowledge collected together, in order not\nto be obliged to go and search for them in several places, that is to\nsay, in their true places. Thus, side by side with scientific treatises\nproperly so-called, are to be found scholastic compilations and\nmanuals. Such are Geographies, Pedagogies, juridical or philological\nEncyclop\u00e6dias, Natural Histories, and so on. Authors, even outside\nstrictly scholastic limits, used formerly to consider it convenient\nsometimes to isolate, sometimes to unite certain orders of knowledge,\nand to baptize the mutilation or mixture with a particular name. It is\nevident that when dealing with these hybrid compilations and formations\nthe philosopher and the historian of the sciences, who seek not books,\nbut ideas, must carry out a series of analyses and syntheses, of\ndisassociations and associations, without allowing themselves to be\nseduced by the authority of the writers or by the solidity of these\nmixtures, which have become traditional.\n\n[Sidenote: _Prejudices arising from these last._]\n\nBut it is not an easy matter. Those mixtures are no longer ingenuous,\nnor are the practical motives that have determined them apparent.\nAround them has grown up a dense forest of philosophemes, of capricious\ndistinctions, of false definitions, of imaginary sciences, of\nprejudices of every sort. Any one who has succeeded in discerning the\ngenuine connections and attempts to separate the interlaced boughs,\nto isolate the trees and to show the different roots, any one who\nsets an axe to those wild tree-trunks, is horrified by cries and\ncomplaints, not less resonant than those that drove Tancred from the\nenchanted wood. And there is the traditionalist who admonishes us\nseverely not to divide _natural_ groupings and not to introduce among\nthem our own _caprice._ Thus he calls the capricious natural and the\nnatural capricious. \"What?\" (has recently written the shocked Professor\nWundt) \"for the excellent reason that the search for the individual\nis historical search, must Geology be considered history and research\nrelating to the glacial epoch be abandoned to the amiable interest of\nthe historian?\" And others lament that the ancient _richness_ of the\nsciences is destroyed by these simplifications, and call the confusion\nrichness.\n\n[Sidenote: _Methodical prologues to Scholastic Manuals and their\npowerlessness._]\n\nIt is true that in order to obviate the evil of confusion and the\ndefective consciousness of the various kinds of research which have\nbeen mingled together, many authors are in the habit of prefixing to\ntheir books theoretic introductions, about the _method,_ as they call\nit, of their science. The special logic of the individual disciplines\nis to be sought (they say) in the books that treat of these. Manuals\nin the German language are especially notable for this arrangement,\npreceded, as they are, by the heaviest introductions, which occupy a\ngreat part of the volume or of the volumes of the book. They present a\ncontrast to French and English books, which usually enter at once _in\nmedias res._ This arrangement seems preferable: the German type has\nagainst it the sensible observation of Manzoni, that one book at a time\nis enough, when it is not more than enough. He who opens a historical\nbook in order there to learn the particulars of an event, or a book on\neconomics in order to learn how an economic institution works, should\nnot be obliged to read the theory of historica events and disquisitions\non the place of Economics in the system of the sciences. _\"Il s'agit\nd'un chapon et non point d'Aristote,\"_ as the judge in the _Plaideurs_\nsaid to the advocate who went back in his speech to the _Politics_ of\nAristotle. But, besides the literary contamination, there is also here\nthe other inconvenience, that science and the theory of the sciences\nbeing different operations and demanding different aptitudes and\npreparations, the specialist who is competent in the first is usually\nnot at all competent in the second; though he may be believed to be so,\nowing to a confusion of names. Why, indeed, should an expert on banking\nand Stock Exchange business be versed in the gnoseology of economic\nscience? The affirmation of competence in the one on the strength of\ncompetence in the other constitutes a true and proper sophism _a dicto\nsimpliciter ad dictum secundum quid._\n\n[Sidenote: _The capricious multiplication of the sciences._]\n\nFurther, the specialist has his pride, which leads him to exaggerate\nwhat he practises and fail to recognize its true nature and limits. The\nmultiplication of the _Sciences_ in our days has no other origin than\nthis; the philosopher contemplates it with astonishment; it is a truly\nmiraculous multiplication of the seven loaves of bread and five small\nfishes. A _new science_ is announced, whenever a crude idea passes\nthrough the brain of a professor. We are made glad with _Sociologies,\nsocial Psychologies, Ethnopsychologies, Anthropogeographies,\nCriminologies, comparative Literatures,_ and so on. Some years ago,\nan eminent German historian, having observed that some use might be\nmade of genealogical and heraldic studies, generally abandoned to the\ncultivators and purveyors of the mania for birth and titles, instead\nof limiting himself to publishing his little collection of minute\nobservations at once proclaimed Genealogy as a science, _Genealogie\nals Wissenschaft,_ and provided the appropriate manual. This begins\nby determining the _concept_ of Genealogy, and proceeds to study its\nrelations with history, with the natural sciences, with zoology, with\nphysiology, with psychology and psychiatry, and with the knowable\nuniverse.\n\n[Sidenote: _The sciences and academic prejudices._]\n\nFinally, the specialist is generally a teacher, and therefore\naccustomed to identify eternal ideal science with his real and\ncontingent chair, and the organism of knowledge with that of the\nuniversity faculties. Hence arises a fashion of conceiving the nature\nand scope of the sciences that has become habitual in the academic\nworld. It consists of _personifying_ science, and telling this\nimaginary person what he has to do, without regard to whether the\nassignment of the task accords or no with the quality of the function.\n\"Logic will be occupied with this, but yet will not neglect this other\nthing; it will benefit by casting a look on this third thing also,\nwhich is extraneous to its task, but not to its interest; nor will\nit fail to aid, with due regard, the student of an analogous matter,\nby giving to him suggestions, if not even rules.\" Whoever reads the\nscientific books of our times will recognize in this example, not\na caricature, but a plan constantly repeated and applied. It was\nsaid of the poet Aleardo Aleardi that he treated the Muse like his\nmaid-servant, since he was at every instant addressing himself to her\nand asking her something. The professor ends by treating Science like\nhis steward, or at least his respectable consort, with whom he naively\ncomes to an agreement regarding the portions that are to form the meals\nof the day, and other matters concerning the management of the family.\n\n\n\n\nTHIRD PART\n\n\nTHE FORMS OF ERRORS AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH\n\n\n\n\nI\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Error as negativity, and impossibility of treating\nspecially of errors._]\n\nError has sometimes been called privation or _negativity._ It is\ncommonly defined as a thinking of the false, as the non-conformity\nof thought with its object, and in other similar ways. These are all\nreducible to the first, since, for example, thought which is of a\ndifferent form from its object is false thought, which does not attain\nto its intrinsic end; and false thought is not thought, but privation\nof thought, negativity.\n\nAs negativity error gives rise to a negative concept, responding\nto the positive concept, which is truth. True and false, truth and\nerror, are related to one another as opposite concepts. Now we know\nfrom the logical doctrines just stated that opposite concepts, far\nfrom being separable, are not even distinguishable, and when they are\ndistinguished, they represent nothing but the abstract division of\nthe pure concept, of the unique concept, which is the synthesis or\ndialectic of opposites. And we know from the whole of Philosophy that\nReality, thought in the pure concept and of which the pure concept\nis also an integral element, genuine and truly real Reality, is a\nperpetual development and progress, which is rendered possible by the\nnegative term intrinsic to the positive and constituting the mainspring\nof its development.\n\nIf then, error is negativity, it is vain to treat it as something\npositive. No other positivity or reality belongs to it than just\nnegativity, which is a moment of the dialectic synthesis and outside\nthe synthesis is nothing. A treatment of error in this sense already\nexists quite complete in the treatment of logical truth; and there is\nnothing special to add here to that argument. As a fact, a form of the\nspirit distinguishable from the positive and real forms, error does not\nexist, and philosophy cannot philosophize upon what is not.\n\n[Sidenote: _Positive and existing errors._]\n\nNevertheless, we all know errors, distinguishable from truth and\nexisting for themselves. The evolutionist affirms the biological\nformation of the _a priori_; the utilitarian resolves duty into\nindividual interest; the Christian says that God the Father sent\nhis son Jesus to redeem men from the perdition into which they had\nfallen through the sin of Adam; the Buddhist preaches the annulment of\nthe Will. Are not these true and proper errors? Have they perchance\nno existence? Have they not been expressed, repeated, listened to,\nbelieved? Whoever does not admit the validity of the examples adduced\ncan himself find others; there will certainly be no lack of examples in\nsuch a field. Do we wish to maintain that these errors do not exist, in\nhomage to the definition of error as negativity and unreality? They may\nnot exist as truth, but they may perfectly well exist as errors.\n\n[Sidenote: _Positive errors as practical acts._]\n\nThere is no way of escaping from this antithesis between the\ninconceivability of the existence of error and the impossibility of\ndenying the existence of errors which the mind recognizes and the\nfact proves, save by the solution to which we have several times had\noccasion to refer. That error, which has existence, is not error and\nnegativity, but something positive, a product of the spirit. And since\nthat product of the spirit is without truth, it cannot be the work\nof the theoretic spirit. And since beyond the theoretic spirit there\nis nothing but the practical spirit, error, which we meet with as\nsomething existing, must of necessity be a product of the practical\nspirit. If every way of issue is closed, this one is open; it goes to\nthe very bottom and leads to the place of rest.\n\nIndeed, he who produces an error has no power to twist or to\ndenaturalize or stain the truth, which is his thought itself, the\nthought which acts in him and in all men; indeed, no sooner has he\ntouched thought than he is touched by it: he thinks and does not err.\nHe possesses only the practical power of passing from thought to\n_deed_; and his doing, in fact his thinking, is to open his mouth and\nemit sounds to which there corresponds no thought, or, what is the same\nthing, no thought which has value, precision, coherence and truth.\nIt is to smear a canvas to which no intuition corresponds; to rhyme\na sonnet, combining the phrases of others, which simulate the genius\nthat is absent. Theoretical error, when it is truly so, is inseparable\nfrom the life of thought, which to the extent to which it perpetually\novercomes that negative moment, is always born anew. When it is\npossible to separate and consider it in itself, what is before us is\nnot theoretical error, but practical act.\n\n[Sidenote: _Practical acts not practical errors._]\n\nPractical act and not practical error, or Evil; for that practical act\nis altogether rational. Let him who doubts this cast a glance at those\nwho produce errors. He will be at once convinced that they act with\nperfect rationality. The dauber produces an object which is asked for\nin the market by people who wish to have at home pictures of any sort,\nto cover the walls and to attest to their own easy circumstances or\nriches, and who are altogether indifferent to the \u00e6sthetic significance\nof those objects. The rhymer wishes to secure an easy success for\nhimself among people who look upon a sonnet as a social amusement. The\nbabbler who emits sounds instead of thoughts, often obtains in virtue\nof those sounds applause and honour denied to the serious thinker: _un\nsot trouve toujours un plus sot pour l'admirer._ If, by means of those\nso-called errors, provision is made for house, firing, food, children's\nclothes, or for the satisfaction of self-esteem, ambitions and\ncaprices, who will say that they are irrational acts? Man does not live\nby bread alone, but he does live by bread; and if, by means of those\nacts, bread is provided, that is to say, if the wants of each one's\nindividuality are met, they are well-directed, far-sighted, fruitful,\nand therefore most rational.\n\n[Sidenote: _Economically practical, not morally practical._]\n\nThis does not, on the other hand, mean that they are moral; they are\nrational, economically rational but not moral. Morality demands that\nman should think the true. Producers of errors evade, or rather, do\nnot elevate themselves to that duty. Still intent upon the demands\nof practical life _qua talis,_ they do not actualize in themselves\nthe universal life, nor do they create in obedience to this last the\nethical will and the will for truth. Therefore there arises in their\nsouls, and in the souls of those who see them at work, the desire for\nanother superior activity, which should supervene upon the preceding\nand complete it. They demand, not only to live, but to live well, to\nseek not only bread, but that \"bread of the angels\" with which, as the\ndivine poet says, we are never sated. The expression of this desire\nmanifests itself in a cry of discontent, of reprobation, of anguish,\nof longing; and therefore, with negative emphasis, it accuses of\nirrationality that inferior rationality which has to be surpassed, and\ngives the name theoretical error to that which considered in itself\nmust be called a simple economic act.\n\n[Sidenote: _Doctrine of error, and doctrine of the necessary forms of\nerror._]\n\nThe doctrine here expounded is developed from what has been said above,\nor from developments given elsewhere in the Philosophy of the Spirit.\nWe shall not therefore enlarge further upon the immanence of values\nin facts, upon evil as the stimulus and concreteness of the good,\non the non-existence of evil in itself, on the practical character\nof theoretical error, on moral responsibility for such error, on\nthe content of desire exhibited by negative statements accompanying\njudgments of value, and so on. In an exposition of Logic the genesis of\nthe theoretical error could be set aside as presupposed, for in this\ndidactic sphere any one among the common definitions which present\nerror as a thinking of the false is sufficient.\n\nA task in closer connection with Logic is that of enquiring as to the\nnecessary forms of error, the task, that is to say, not of confuting\nall errors (which is performed by Philosophy as a whole), but of\nestablishing in how many ways the products of the various forms\nof knowing and of knowledge can be practically combined, and what\ntherefore are the gnoseological possibilities of error. If error is\nnothing but an _improper combination_ of ideas (as Vico said), we\nmust see the number to which the fundamental forms of these improper\ncombinations can be reduced. In traditional Logic, the theory of error\nappears as the doctrine of _Sophisms_ or of sophistical refutations:\nit has the formalist, verbalist, empirical character common to all\nthat Logic. In our Logic, it must have a philosophic character, that\nis to say, it must depend upon the already distinguished forms of the\ntheoretic spirit, and deduce from them the arbitrary combinations of\nthe errors which are formally possible. The ideas or concepts of the\ntheoretic and theoretic-practical spirit are so many and no more, and\nso many and no more must be the possible improper combinations of them\nand the forms of theoretic error.\n\n[Sidenote: _Logical nature of all theoretic errors._]\n\nThat theoretical error is always at bottom logical error. This is an\nimportant proposition, which merits explicit statement, because it\nis customary to speak of \u00e6sthetic, naturalistic, mathematical and\nhistorical errors side by side with those that are properly logical\nor philosophical. We too have spoken and will speak thus, when more\nsubtle distinctions and more precise determinations are not necessary.\nBut in truth, a fact like _humano capiti cervicem equinam jungere,_\nor _simulare cupressum_ in the sea where the shipwrecked struggles in\nthe waves, does not constitute in itself that practical act, called\n\u00e6sthetic error, unless there be added to it the false affirmation that\nthe object produced is an \u00e6sthetic object, that is to say, unless there\nbe added a logical affirmation, so that the practical act becomes,\nby means of it, logical error. Taken in itself, the union of a human\nhead with a horse's neck, or of a cypress with the sea is a sort of\nplay of the imagination, such as occurs in fancy, in idleness and in\ndream. The extrinsic combination of a fancy and a concept is also\naltogether innocent, as in the case of allegory, which, in itself, is\nnot unsuccessful art, but becomes so only when it is affirmed that\nthe two heterogeneous elements form only one; or rather, it then\nbecomes, not unsuccessful art, but bad philosophy. In the same way, a\nmathematical error (for example, the formula 4 x 4 = 20) is nothing\nbut a _flatus vocis,_ such as is made in jest or to loosen the tongue.\nOnly when we add the logical affirmation that in this _flatus vocis_ an\neffectual multiplication has been expressed, do we have a mathematical\nerror, which is therefore a logical error. It is not possible to\nconsider and to condemn as a theoretical error a combination which\ndoes not intend to deceive any one as to its proper nature; neither\nthose to whom it is shown, nor him who has made it. Thus, among\n\u00e6sthetic, naturalistic, mathematical, historical, logical and practical\nproductions, combinations without cognitive content are quite possible\nand constantly to be found; but they do not become theoretical errors\nunless they are crowned with an improper logical affirmation, or rather\nwith an arbitrary judgment formed upon a logical affirmation. Indeed,\neven illogical combinations of philosophic concepts are not, as such,\nlogical or theoretical errors, since they can be made tentatively,\nin order to see whether the two concepts combine or no. To make them\nerrors, the arbitrariness of a special act of judgment is necessary.\nThat arbitrariness consists in a lying to others or to ourselves, in\norder to satisfy an interest of our merely individual life, and it is\nimpossible to lie without employing an affirmation, which is always a\nlogical product.\n\n[Sidenote: _History of errors and phenomenology of error._]\n\nIn this way the problem of determining the various forms of theoretical\nerrors, according to the already distinguished forms of knowledge,\nbecomes transformed and circumscribed in the other problem of\ndetermining the various forms of _logical errors,_ in relation to\nthe various forms of knowledge, that is to say, of determining the\nnecessary forms of philosophic errors. Certainly, every individual\nerrs in his own way, according to the conditions in which he finds\nhimself; just as every individual according to those conditions\ndiscovers truth in his own way. But Philosophy in the strict sense (in\nthe form of a philosophical treatise) cannot complete the examination\nof all individual errors. This is the task of all philosophies as they\nare developed in the ages and of the thought of all thinking beings,\nwho have been, are, and will be. _Its_ task is to illuminate the\neternal ideal history of errors, which is the eternal ideal history\nof truth, in its relations with the eternal forms of the practical\nspirit. The Philosophy of the spirit, as a treatise of philosophy,\ncannot give the history of errors; but must limit itself to giving\ntheir _phenomenology._ In this sense is to be understood the enquiry\nconcerning the fundamental forms of philosophical errors. These forms\nmay be briefly deduced as follows.\n\n[Sidenote: _Deduction of the forms of logical errors. Forms deduced\nfrom the concept of the concept, and forms deduced from the other\nconcepts._]\n\nThe pure concept, which is philosophy, can be incorrectly combined and\nmistaken either for the form that precedes it, pure representation\n(art), or for that which follows it, the empirical and abstract\nconcept (natural and mathematical sciences); or it can be wrongly\ndivided in its unity of concept and representation _(a priori_\nsynthesis), and wrongly again combined--either the concept may be\ntaken as representation, or the representation as concept. Hence\narise the fundamental forms of errors which it will be useful to\ndenominate as _\u00e6stheticism, empiricism, mathematicism, philosophism,_\nand _historicism_ (or _mythologism_). On the other hand, the other\ndistinctions of the concept, or distinct concepts, can be incorrectly\ncombined among themselves in a series of false combinations,\ncorresponding to the series of the other particular philosophic\nsciences, and hence arise the forms of the other philosophic errors.\nBut in Logic it is sufficient to show the possibility of these last\nforms of errors, and to adduce certain cases as examples, because a\ncomplete determination of them would demand that complete exposition of\nthe whole philosophic system, which cannot be furnished in a treatise\non Logic.\n\n[Sidenote: _Errors arising front errors._]\n\nFinally, since it is impossible that any form whatever of these errors,\nwhether specifically logical or generically philosophic, should\nsatisfy the mind, which asks for the true and does not lend itself to\ndeception or mockery, each one of these forms tends to convert itself\ninto the other, owing to its arbitrariety and untenability, and all\nmutually destroy one another. When the attempt is made to preserve\nboth the true form and the insufficient form, or all the insufficient\nforms, we have gnoseological dualism; but with the decline to complete\ndestruction, we have the error of _scepticism_ and of _agnosticism._\nFinally, if, having been by these led back to life and being deprived\nof every concept that should illuminate it back to life as a mystery,\nwe affirm that truth lies in that theoretic mystery, in living life\nwithout thought, we have the error of _mysticism._ Dualism, scepticism\n(or agnosticism) and mysticism thus extend both to strictly logical\nproblems (that is to say, to the possibility, in general, of knowing\nreality), and to all other philosophic problems. Hence we can speak of\na practical dualism, of an \u00e6sthetic or ethical scepticism, and of an\n\u00e6sthetic or ethical mysticism.\n\n[Sidenote: _Professionalism and nationality of errors._]\n\nSuch, stated in a summary manner, is the deduction of philosophic\nerrors, which we shall now proceed to examine in detail. Upon their\nforms, which represent so many tendencies of the human spirit, is based\nthis other fact, which is constantly striking us, and which may be\ncalled the _professionalism_ of errors. Every one is disposed to use\nin other fields of activity those instruments that are familiar to him\nin the field which he knows best. The poet by vocation and profession\ndreams and imagines, even when he should reason; the philosopher\nreasons even when he should be poetical; the historian seeks authority,\neven when he should seek the necessity of the human mind; the practical\nman asks himself of what use a thing is, even when he should ask\nhimself what a thing is; the naturalist constructs classes, even when\nhe should break through them, in order to think real things; the\nmathematician persists in writing formulae, even when there is nothing\nto calculate. If the narrowness of the _Esprits math\u00e9matiques_ has been\ndenounced, it must not be believed that the other professions have\nnot also got their narrownesses. The philosopher's profession is no\nexception to this, for he should surpass all one-sided views, but does\nnot always succeed. It is one thing to say and another to do, and if\na man forewarned is half saved, he is not therefore altogether saved.\nThat professionalism of error, which we observe in individuals, is also\nto be observed on a large scale among peoples. Thus we speak of peoples\nas antiartistic, antiphilosophical, or antimathematical: of speculative\nGermany, of intellectualist and abstract France, of empiricist\nEngland, of Italy as artistic in the centre and the north, and as\nphilosophic in the south. But peoples, like individuals, are changeable\nand can be educated: so much so that in our days, the traditional\nAnglo-Saxon empiricism begins little by little to lose ground before\nthe speculative education of the English people, due to classical\nGerman thought; France that was abstractionist becomes intuitionist and\nmystic. Germany leaves the vast dominion of the skies assigned to her\nby Heine for that of industry and commerce, and philosophizes somewhat\nunworthily; Italy, which in greater part was a country of artists,\npoets and politicians, is traversed in every direction by religious and\nphilosophic currents. Were it not for this capacity for education of\nindividuals and peoples, History would not be a free development, but\ndeterminism and mechanism, and each of us would possess less of that\ncourage for social activity which each one exhibits with great ardour\naccording to his own convictions.\n\n\n\n\nII\n\n\n\u00c6STHETICISM, EMPIRICISM AND MATHEMATICISM\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Definition of these forms._]\n\n\u00c6stheticism is the philosophic error which consists in substituting\nthe form of intuition for the form of the concept, and of attributing\nto the former the office and value of the latter. Empiricism is the\nanalogous substitution of the empirical concept, by means of which\nphilosophic function and value is attributed to the empirical and\nnatural sciences. Finally, mathematicism is the presentation of the\nabstract concept as concrete concept and of mathematics as philosophy.\n\n[Sidenote: _\u00c6stheticism._]\n\nWe have met with \u00e6stheticism and with empiricism at the beginning of\nour exposition, and again here and there throughout its course; and we\nhave sufficiently determined the nature of both and demonstrated the\ncontradictions in which they become involved. In every one of their\nmovements they presuppose the pure concept and the philosophy of which\nthey mean to take the place. At the same time, they do not develop the\nphilosophy which they have presupposed, because they suffocate it in\nthe vapour of the intuitions and in the chilly waters of naturalistic\nconcepts. They are not therefore effective thought, but an adulteration\nof thought with heterogeneous elements, which by a misuse of words are\nsaid to be furnished with theoretic and logical value.\n\n\u00c6stheticism has few representatives, because complete abstention\nfrom reflection and reason is too obviously contradictory. Even when\nart was considered to be a true _instrument_ of philosophy, in the\nRomantic period, this affirmation was put forward in a confused manner,\nintuition being finally distinguished from intuition, art from art.\nThis amounted at bottom to a radical change and an abandonment of\nthe original thesis. We have seen \u00e6stheticism reappear in our times\nunder the name of _intuitionism,_ or again as _pure experience:_ an\nexperience which is taken to be not posterior, but anterior to every\nintellectual category, and should therefore be called nothing but pure\nintuition.\n\n[Sidenote: _Empiricism_]\n\nThe representatives of empiricism are on the other hand most numerous,\nnow as in the past; so much so that empiricism sometimes seems to\nbe the sole adversary of philosophy, and the true origin of all\nphilosophic errors. This opinion is without doubt inexact, but it finds\nsupport in the fact that philosophy is obliged to defend itself from\nthe incessant assaults of empiricism, more than from any other enemy.\nThe confusion between pure and empirical concepts is, indeed, easy,\nsince both have the form of universality (though the universality of\nthe second is falsely assumed) and both refer to the concept (though\nin the second the concept is something arbitrarily limited). The\nempiricist is like the philosopher, in so far as he immerses himself in\nfacts and constructs concepts.\n\n[Sidenote: _Positivism, philosophy founded upon the sciences, inductive\nmetaphysic._]\n\nThe last great historical manifestation of empiricism is that which,\nfrom the system of Auguste Comte, took the name of _positivism_ and\nby its very name expressed the intention of basing itself upon facts\n(that is, upon facts historically certified), in order to classify\nthem, thus reducing philosophy to a classification. This, like all\nclassifications, proceeded from the poorest to the richest, from the\nabstract gradually to the less abstract, though never to the concrete.\nPositivism did not seem to be aware that the facts from which it\nproposed to proceed and which it believed to be the rough material of\nexperience, were already _philosophic determinations,_ and could only\nin this way be admitted as _historically ascertained. Psychologist_ is\nalso positivism; positivism, that is to say, more properly applied to\nthe group of the so-called mental and moral sciences. _Neocriticism_\ncan be almost altogether identified with positivism, although its\nupholders generally possess some knowledge of philosophical history\n(which is altogether lacking to the pure positivists), and this\nconfers a more specious polish on their doctrine. Neocriticism,\nindeed, tends to eliminate every speculative element from the Kantian\ncriticism, and by so doing approaches positivism--so as almost to\nbecome confounded with it. It is no wonder, therefore, that from\nthe camp of the neocritics should have originated the proclamation\nand programme of _a philosophy founded upon the sciences,_ or of\nan _inductive metaphysic._ This is simply and solely the reduction\nof philosophy to the sciences, because a scientific philosophy, an\ninductive metaphysic, is not speculation, but classification, or\nas those who advocate it ingenuously declare, a systematization of\nthe results obtained by the sciences. Here too are kindled the most\ncomical quarrels between scientists and philosophers. For when it is\nonly a question of classifying and systematizing those results, the\nscientist rightly feels that he can dispense with the labours of the\nphilosopher, indeed, he feels that he alone, who has obtained the\nresults, knows what these exactly are and how they should be treated\nin order to avoid deformation. And the philosopher, who by making\nhimself an empiricist, a positivist, a psychologist and a neocritic,\nhas renounced his autonomy, approaches the scientists and offers with\nlittle dignity services that they refuse. He elaborates scientific\nexpositions, which they call compilations and mistakes, he proposes\nadditions or corrections at which they mock as superfluous or foolish.\nNevertheless, the philosopher does not grow weary nor become offended\nat these repulses and jests; he returns to the charge and indeed it is\nonly when someone wishes to redeem him from this voluntary servitude\nand abjection that he turns upon him with fury, saying that philosophy\nshould live on _familiar terms_ with the sciences. As if the relations\nthat we have faithfully described were relations of reciprocal respect\nand harmony! The truth is that the majority of empirical philosophers\nare failures in science and unsuccessful in philosophy, who out of\ntheir double incompetence compound a logical theory, thus furnishing\nanother proof (if further proof were needed) in confirmation of the\npractical origin of errors. For our part, we recognise the justice of\nthe accusation of parasitism, which is brought against a philosophy of\nthis character, and we will willingly afford our aid to the scientists\nin driving out these intruders, who dishonour philosophy in our eyes\nnot less than in theirs they dishonour the sciences.\n\n[Sidenote: _Empiricism and facts._]\n\nEmpiricism owes the greater part of its influence upon the minds of\nmany to its continual appeal to reality and facts. This leads to the\nbelief that speculative philosophy wishes to neglect reality and facts\nand to build, as the saying is, upon clouds. But we have here an\nambiguity and a sophism with which we must not allow ourselves to be\ndeceived. Not only does speculative philosophy also base itself upon\nfacts and have the phenomenal world as its point of departure; but\nspeculative philosophy truly founds itself upon facts and empiricism\ndoes not. The first considers facts in their infinite variety and\nin their continuous development; the second, a certain number of\nfacts, collected at certain epochs and among certain peoples, or\nat all epochs and among all peoples empirically known; chat is to\nsay, it considers a limited number of facts. Speculative philosophy,\npresupposing the pure phenomenon, transforms it into (historical) fact\nand is a true _philosophy of fact_; empiricism, without being aware of\nit, presupposes the facts that it accepts, which are already, though\nwith little criticism, historically ascertained and interpreted. This\nunconsciousness of what it is doing makes its condition worse, so that\nit can give nothing but _a philosophy of classifications,_ which are\ntaken for facts only through habitual lack of reflection. Speculative\nphilosophy, therefore, can answer the claim and the boast of empiricism\nthat it is based upon facts, by accepting the claim but denying the\nboast, as one to which empiricism has and can have no right, and by\nappropriating this achievement to itself.\n\n[Sidenote: _Bankruptcy of empiricism: dualism, agnosticism,\nspiritualism and superstition._]\n\nBut the bankruptcy of empiricism in all its forms and under all its\nsynonyms is clear in the dualism to which it leads, of appearance and\nessence, phenomenon and noumenon. For while it professes that there is\nnothing knowable but the phenomenon, it also postulates an essence, a\nnoumenon, something that is beyond the phenomenon and unknowable. It\nis all very well to say that this unknowable is not, for it, a proper\nobject for science and philosophy, but it is not to be driven from the\nfield of reality merely by removing it from science and philosophy.\nEvery empiricism, then, recognises side by side with the rights of\nthought, the rights of _feeling,_ and thus the circle of reality comes\nto be broken at one or more points. When it is wished to continue\nworking empirically upon the unknowable residue, we have those various\nattempts, which can all of them be summarized beneath the name of\n_spiritualism._ Here the hidden truth is sought by means of experiments\nof a naturalistic type and spirit is reduced to matter more or less\nlight and subtle. Empiricism ends in superstition. This has always\nhappened; in the decadence of ancient civilization, when philosophers\ntook to converting themselves into thaumaturges; at the eve of the\nFrench Revolution, after a century of empiricism and sensationalism,\nwhen all sorts of fanatics and schemers appeared and were the\nfavourites of a society of most credulous materialists; in our times,\nwhen they have been favoured by a less credulous public of positivists,\nor of ex-positivists.\n\n[Sidenote: _Evolutionist positivism and rationalist positivism._]\n\n\nEmpiricism has certainly sought to cure its own insufficiencies, of\nwhich it was more or less conscious, and _evolutionist positivism_\nmust be numbered among these attempts. This form proposed to correct\nthe anti-historical character of positivism by providing a _history_\nof reality. But this history was always based upon empirical\npresuppositions, and was therefore a history of classifications, not\nof concrete reality; an extravagant caricature of the philosophy of\nbecoming, from whose breast comes History rightly and truly so-called.\nAnother attempt was that of _rationalist positivism,_ which sought to\ncheck the degeneration of positivism toward dualism, sentimentalism\nand superstition, by appealing to the absolute rights of reason.\nBut this reason is nevertheless always empirical reason, limited to\ncertain series of facts, extrinsic, classificatory, unintelligent.\nAbsolute authority can well be attributed to it in words, but such an\nattribution does not confer the power of exercising it. This kind of\npositivism, therefore, meets in our day with favour in freemasonry\n(at least of the Franco-Italian sort). This is a sect, which is\nannoying, chiefly because, heedless of facts, it preserves and defends\nthe habit of making use of empty formulas and phrases, and because\nwhen it has insulted some priestly vestment, it believes that it\nhas successfully destroyed superstition and obscurantism in man, or\nwhen it has declaimed about liberty, it imagines that by this slight\neffort, liberty has been won and established. True _reason_ abhors\n_rationalism,_ if it be rationalism of that sort.\n\n[Sidenote: _Mathematicism_]\n\n_Mathematicism_ is much rarer than empiricism, because the confusion\nbetween thinking and calculating is less easy than that between\nthinking and classifying. Owing to its rarity and paradoxical\ncharacter, mathematicism has something aristocratic about it,\nresembling in this the other extreme error, of \u00e6stheticism; whereas\nthe intermediate error, empiricism, just because of its mediocrity, is\npopular and indeed vulgar.\n\n[Sidenote: _Symbolical mathematics._]\n\nWe cannot properly consider as mathematicism that form of philosophy\nwhich appeared in antiquity as _Pythagoreanism_ and _Neopythagoreanism_\nand has reappeared in our days as a doctrine of the mathematical\nrelations of the universe and the harmony of the world. In this\nconception, numbers are not numbers, but symbols; the numerical\nrelations are not arithmetical, but \u00e6sthetic. The pretended\nmathematical philosophers of this type are neither philosophers nor\nmathematicians, nor are they arbitrary combiners of these two methods.\nThey would be better described as poets or semi-poets.\n\n[Sidenote: _Mathematics as demonstrative form of philosophy._]\n\nNor again can we consider to be mathematicism the attempt made by some\nphilosophers to expound their own ideas by a mathematical, algebraical\nor geometrical method. If their ideas were ideas and not numbers, the\nmethod to which they had recourse necessarily remained extrinsic, and\npossessed no mathematical character beyond the verbal complacency with\nwhich they adopted certain formulae of definitions, axioms, theorems,\nlemmas, corollaries and certain numerical symbols, These formulas and\nsymbols could always be replaced by others, without any inconvenience\nwhatever. It is possible to discuss, it has indeed been discussed,\nwhether such modes of exposition are in good or bad literary taste,\nor of greater or less didactic convenience. They can be condemned,\nas they have been condemned, and caused to fall into disuse, as they\nhave fallen; but the quality of the philosophic truth thus expressed,\nremains unaltered and is never changed into mathematics. Neither the\nsystem of Spinoza, who employed the geometrical method, nor that of\nLeibnitz, who desired the universal calculus, are mathematical systems.\nIf they were so, modern philosophy would not owe some of its most\nimportant idealist concepts to those two systems.\n\n[Sidenote: _Errors of mathematicist philosophy._]\n\nBetter examples of mathematicism than the treatises and systems\ndeveloped according to its rules are found in the unfulfilled\nprogrammes of such treatises and systems, or in the mathematicist\ntreatment of certain philosophie problems. Such, for instance, is that\nconcerning the infinity of the world in space and time, a problem\nwhich, treated mathematistically, becomes insoluble and makes many\npeople's heads turn. It is impossible to comprehend the world in one's\nown mind with the mathematical infinite; and either to give or to\nrefuse to it a beginning and an end. Hence the exclamations of terror\nbefore that infinite, and the sense of sublimity which seems to arise\nin the struggle joined between it, which is indomitable, and the\nhuman mind which wishes to dominate it. It has, however, already been\nobserved with reason, that such sublimity is not only very near to the\nridiculous, but falls into it with all its weight; and that such terror\ncould not in truth be anything but terror of the _ennui_ of having\nto count and recount in the void and to infinity. The mathematical\ninfinite is nothing real; its appearance of reality is the shadow\nprojected by the mathematical power which the human spirit possesses,\nof always adding a unit to any number. The true infinite is all before\nus, in every real fact, and it is only when the continuous unity of\nreality is divided into separate facts, and space and time are rendered\nabstract and mathematical, only then, if the complete operation be\nforgotten, that the desperate problem arises and the anguish of never\nbeing able to solve it. Another and more actual example of this\nmathematicist mode of treatment is that of the dimensions of space.\nHere, forgetting that space of three dimensions is nothing real that\ncan be experienced, but is a mathematical construction, and on the\nother hand finding it convenient for mathematical reasons to construct\nspaces of less or more than three dimensions, or of _n_ dimensions,\nthey end by treating these constructions as conceivable realities, and\nseriously discuss bi-dimensional beings or four-dimensional worlds.\n\n[Sidenote: _Dualism, agnosticism and superstition of mathematicism._]\n\nWith affirmations such as those of infinites incomprehensible to\nthought, and of real but not experienceable spaces, mathematicism also\ncreates a dualism of thought and of reality superior to thought, or\n(what amounts to the same thing) of thought which meets its equivalent\nin experience and thought without a corresponding experience. The\nunknowable here too lies in wait and falls upon the imprudent\nmathematicist philosopher, who feels himself lost before a second,\nthird, fourth and infinite worlds, excogitated by himself, superior\nor inferior worlds to those of man, underworlds and overworlds and\nover-over worlds. He then becomes even spiritualist and asks with\nZollner, why spiritualist facts should not possess reality and be\nproduced in the fourth dimension of space, shut off from us. The\ncontradiction of the mathematicist attempt, like that of the \u00e6sthetic\nand empiricist, is clearly revealed in the dualistic, agnostic and\nmystical consequences to which, as we shall see more clearly further\non, all of them necessarily lead.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\n\nPHILOSOPHISM\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Rupture of the unity of the a priori synthesis._]\n\nThe three modes of error examined exhaust the possible combinations of\nthe pure concept with the forms of the theoretic or theoretic-practical\nspirit, anterior or posterior to it. Other modes of error arise from\nthe breaking up of the unity of the concept, from the separation of its\nconstitutive elements. Each one of these elements, abstracted from the\nother, and finding that other before it, annuls, instead of recognizing\nthe other as an organic part of itself; that is to say, substitutes for\nit its own abstract existence.\n\nThe concept, as we know, is the logical _a priori_ synthesis, and\nso the unity of subject and predicate, unity in distinction and\ndistinction in unity, affirmation of the concept and judgment of the\nfact, at once philosophy and history. In pure and effective thought,\nthe two elements constitute an indissoluble organism. A fact cannot be\naffirmed without thinking; it is impossible to think without affirming\na fact. In logical thought, the representation without the concept is\nblind, it is pure representation deprived of logical right, it is not\nthe subject of a judgment; the concept without representation is void.\n\n[Sidenote:_Philosophism, logicism or panlogism._]\n\nThis unity can be severed, practically, in the act which is called\nerror, where propositions expressing the truth are combined, not\naccording to their theoretical connection, but according to what is\ndeemed useful by him who makes the combination. It then happens that\nin the first place we have an empty concept, which, being without\nany internal rule (owing to this very vacuity), fills itself with a\ncontent which does not belong to it--for this it could have only from\ncontact with the representation--and gives itself a _false_ subject.\nThe opposite also occurs, that is to say, a false predicate or concept\nis posited, a case which will be considered further on. Limiting\nourselves, meanwhile, to the first and observing that it consists in\nthe abuse of the logical element, we shall be able to call that mode\nof error _logicism_ or _panlogism,_ or also _philosophism_ (since\nthe abuse of the logical element is identical with the abuse of the\nphilosophic element).\n\n[Sidenote: _Philosophy of history._]\n\nLogicism, panlogism or philosophism, is the usurpation that philosophy\nin the narrow sense wreaks upon history, by pretending to deduce\nhistory a _priori,_ as the process is called. This usurpation is\nlogically impossible owing to the identity of philosophy and history\nalready demonstrated, whence bad history is bad philosophy, and\ninversely. It may happen that the same individual who at a given moment\ncreates excellent philosophy (and excellent history at the same time)\nmay create bad history (and so bad philosophy) the moment after. But\nthis amounts to saying that he who at one moment has philosophized\nwell, may philosophize badly and err the moment after, and not by any\nmeans that the two things are possible in the same act. However, the\nusurpation, logically impossible, is practically effected, in which\ncase, it is not strictly speaking usurpation, although it comes to\nbe so considered from the logical point of view. On the other hand,\nthe claim for the _a priori_ in history is perfectly just; for to\naffirm a fact means to think it, and it is not possible to think\nwithout transforming the representation by means of the concept, and\nso deducing it from the concept. But this deduction is an _a priori_\nsynthesis and therefore also induction, whereas the claim to deduce\nhistory _a priori_ would amount to a deduction without induction,\nnot _History_ (which is, for that very reason, _Philosophy),_ but a\n_Philosophy of History._\n\n\n[Sidenote: _The contradictions in this undertaking._]\n\nThe absurdity of this programme must be clearly set forth, because\nthose who formulate it are wont to concede equivocally that a\nPhilosophy of history must be founded upon actual data, and have\ninduction as its basis. In reality, were those actual data documents\nto be interpreted, we should not have the Philosophy of history that\nthey desire, but simply History. The actual data, the so-called\nformless material, in the programme of the Philosophy of history,\nare at the most already constructed histories, which do not content\nthe philosophers of history. They do not content them, not because\nthey judge them to be false interpretations of the documents (in\nwhich case nothing else would be needed but to correct history with\nhistory, carrying out the work that all historians do); but because\nthe _very method of history_ does not content them, and they demand\nsomething else. History is despised as mere narration, and considered\nnot as a form of thought, but as its material, a chaotic mass of\nrepresentations. The true form of thought is for them the Philosophy\nof history, which appears in history and not in documents. And how\ndoes it appear? If the documents are removed, the _a priori_ synthesis\nis no longer possible. It arises, then, by the parthenogenesis of the\nabstract concept, which history finds in itself, without the spark\nbeing struck by confrontation with documents. History is deduced\n_a priori,_ not in the concrete but in the void. Whatever be the\ndeclarations which philosophers of history add to their programme, its\nessence cannot be changed. Were these declarations made seriously and\nall their logical consequences accepted, there would be no reason for\nmaintaining a Philosophy of history beside and beyond history. The\ntwo things would become identical, and the programme itself would be\nannulled, both for those who propose it, and for us who judge it to\nbe contradictory. This is the dilemma, from which there is no escape:\neither the Philosophy of history is an interpretation of documents,\nand in this case it is synonymous with History and makes no new\nclaim;--or it does make a new claim and in that case, being no longer\ninterpretation of documents and intending all the same to think facts,\nit thinks them without documents and draws them from the empty concept,\nand we have the Philosophy of history, philosophism, panlogism.\n\n[Sidenote: _Philosophy of history and false analogies._]\n\nIn order to give itself body, the Philosophy of history has recourse to\nanalogy. This is a legitimate process of thought, which, in its search\nfor truth, seeks analogies and harmonies. But it is legitimate, as\nwe know, only on condition that the analogy does not remain a merely\nheuristic hypothesis, but is effectively thinkable and thought. Now the\nconcepts that the Philosophy of history deduces cannot be effectively\nthought, because they are void; they are neither pure concepts nor\npure representations, but an arbitrary mixture of the two forms, and\ntherefore contradiction and vacuity. Thus the analogies of which the\nPhilosophy of history avails itself, are _false analogies,_ that is\nto say, _metaphors_ and _comparisons,_ transformed into analogies and\nconcepts. It will declare, for instance, that the Middle Ages are the\nnegation of ancient civilization, and that the modern epoch is the\nsynthesis of these two opposites. But ancient civilization is nothing\nbut an unending series of facts, of which each is a synthesis of\nopposites, real only in so far as it is a synthesis of opposites. And\nbetween ancient civilization and the Middle Ages, there is absolute\ncontinuity, not less than between the Middle Ages and the modern epoch.\nFacts cannot stand to one another as opposite concepts, because they\ncannot be opposed to one another as positive and negative. The fact\nthat is called positive is positive-negative and so, in like manner,\nis that which is called negative. It will further declare (always by\nway of example) that Greece was thought and Rome action, and the modern\nworld is the unity of thought and action. But in reality, Greek life\nwas thought and action, like that of Rome, and like modern life. Every\nepoch, every people, every individual, every instant of life is thought\nand action, in virtue of the unity of the spirit, whose distinctions\nare never broken up into separate existences. The affirmations that\nbelong to the Philosophy of history are all of this kind, and when they\nare not of this kind, it means that they do not belong to the essence\nof the Philosophy of history.\n\n[Sidenote: _Distinction between the Philosophy of history, and the\nbooks thus entitled. Philosophical and historical merits of these._]\n\nThe last-mentioned case occurs frequently in books that bear the title\nof Philosophy of history. These certainly cannot be considered to have\nbeen refuted when the concept of that science has been refuted. Science\nis one thing and the book another. The error of a false attempt at\nscience is one thing and the value of books, which usually (especially\nwith great thinkers and writers) have deeper motives and more valuable\nparts, is another. Among books upon the philosophy of history are\nnumbered some masterpieces of human genius,--fountains of truth, at\nwhich many generations have quenched their thirst and to which men\nreturn perpetually. They have often indeed been marvellous books on\nhistory, true history, produced by reaction against superficial,\npartisan or trifling histories. They have for the first time revealed\nthe true character of certain epochs, of certain events, of certain\nindividuals.[1] The sterile form of duality and opposition between\nPhilosophy of history and simple History, concealed the fruitful\npolemic of a better history against a worse history. Even the formulae,\nwhich were falsely regarded as deductions of concepts (for example,\nthat the Middle Ages are the negation of antiquity and the Renaissance\nthe negation of the Middle Ages, or that the Germanic spirit, from the\nReformation to the Romantic movement, is the affirmation of inward\nliberty, or that Italy of the fifteenth century represents Art,\nFrance the State, and so on), were at bottom vivacious expressions of\npredominant characteristics, by means of which the various epochs and\nevents were portrayed. These expressions and truths could be accepted\nwithout there being any necessity for presupposing clear and fixed\noppositions and distinctions, or for denying the extra-temporality of\nspiritual forms. Besides these historical characteristics, discoveries\nmore strictly philosophical appeared for the first time in those books;\nhence not only do we find in them the first outlines of a Logic of\nhistorical science (a Logic of the individual judgment), but also,\nsometimes in imaginative forms, determinations of eternal aspects of\nthe Spirit, which had previously been unknown or ill-known. Such is\nthe case with the concept of _progress_ and _providence,_ and of that\nother concept concerning the spiritual autonomy of _language_ and of\n_art,_ which presented itself for the first time as the discovery of\nthe historical epoch, in which man, wholly sense and imagination,\nwithout intelligible genera and concepts, is supposed to have spoken\nand poetized without reasoning. In an equally imaginary fashion the\nconstancy of the spirit, which eternally repeats itself, also found\nin those philosophies the formula of the perpetual _passing_ away and\nreturning of the various epochs of civilization. These philosophical\ntruths, like the historical characteristics, must be purged, the first\nfrom the representations improperly united with them, the second from\nthe logical character which they wrongly assumed. But they cannot be\ndiscarded, unless we are willing to throw away the gold, through our\nunwillingness to have the trouble of separating it from the dross.\nAnd this necessity for purification further confirms the error of the\nphilosophism, since it is the purification of Philosophy and of History\nfrom the Philosophy of History.\n\n[Sidenote: _Philosophy of nature._]\n\nAnother manifestation of the philosophism, somewhat different from\nthe preceding, is the science which assumes the name of _Philosophy_\nof _nature._ Here it is claimed to deduce, not the historical facts\nthemselves, but the general concepts, which constitute the natural\nsciences. The philosophy of nature can be considered as the converse\nerror to the empiricist error, which claims to induce philosophic\ncategories _a posteriori,_ whereas this claims to deduce empirical\nconcepts _a priori._\n\n[Sidenote: _Its substantial identity with the Philosophy of history._]\n\nBut the theoretic content of empirical concepts and of the natural\nsciences is, as we know, nothing but perception and history. So that,\nin the final analysis, the Philosophy of nature can be reduced to the\nPhilosophy of history (extended to so-called inferior or subhuman\nreality), making, like the other, the vain attempt to produce in the\nvoid what thought can produce only in the concrete, that is to say,\nby synthesizing. And that it tends to become a Philosophy of history\nis also to be seen from its not infrequent hesitances before abstract\nconcepts, or mathematical science, sometimes declaring that the pure\nabstractions of the intellect must remain such and are not otherwise\ndeducible and capable of being philosophized about. The Philosophy\nof nature has usually been extended to the field of the physical and\nnatural sciences, including also some parts of mechanics. But it has\nrefused to undertake the deduction of the theorems of geometry and\nstill more the operations of the Calculus.\n\n[Sidenote: _The contradictions of the Philosophy of nature._]\n\nThe Philosophy of nature, like the Philosophy of history, has abounded\nin declarations of the necessity of the historical and empirical\nmethod. It has recognized that the physical and natural sciences are\nits antecedent and presupposition and that it continues and completes\ntheir work. But it is not permitted to complete this work because\nthis work extends to infinity. And it would not be able to continue\nit, save by turning itself into physics and natural sciences, working\nas these do in laboratories, observing, classifying, and making laws\n(legislating). Now the Philosophy of nature does not wish to adopt such\na procedure, but to introduce a new method into the study of nature.\nAnd since a new method and a new science are the same thing, it does\nnot wish to be a continuation of physics and of the natural sciences,\nbut a new science. And since a new science implies a new object, it\nwishes to give a new object, which is precisely the _philosophic\nidea of nature._ This philosophic idea of nature would therefore be\nconstructed by a method which would not and could not have anything\nin common with that of the empirical sciences. Yet the Philosophy of\nnature is not able to dispense with the empirical concepts, which it\nstrives to deduce _a priori._ And here lies the contradictoriness of\nits undertaking. The dilemma which confronted the Philosophy of history\nmust be repeated in this case also:--either it has to continue the work\nof the physical and natural sciences, and in this case there will be\nprogress in the physical and natural sciences and not in the Philosophy\nof nature; or it has to construct the Philosophy of nature (the\nphysical and natural sciences); and this cannot be done, save by an _a\npriori_ deduction of the empirical and thus falling into the error of\npanlogism or philosophism.\n\n[Sidenote: _False analogies in the Philosophy of nature._]\n\nThe Philosophy of nature, like that of history, expresses itself in\nfalse analogies. It will say, for instance, that the poles of the\nmagnet are the opposed moments of the concept, made extrinsic and\nappearing in space; or that light is the ideality of nature; or that\nmagnetism corresponds to length, electricity to breadth and gravity to\nvolume; or again (like more ancient philosophers), that water, or fire,\nor sulphur, or mercury, is the essence of all natural facts. But these\nphenomena which are given as essences, those classes of natural facts\nwhich are given as moments of the concept and of the spirit, are no\nlonger either scientific phenomena, or the concepts and spiritual forms\nof philosophy. The first are intuitions and not categories; the second\ncategories and not intuitions; and just because they are so clearly\ndistinguished from one another they mutually mingle in the _a priori_\nsynthesis. On the other hand, the concepts of the Philosophy of nature\nare categories, which as such present themselves in their emptiness\nas intuitions, and intuitions, which in their blindness present\nthemselves as categories. These thoughts are contradictory. They can\nbe _spoken,_ or rather _tittered,_ because it is possible to combine\nphonetically contradictory propositions, but it is impossible to think\nthem. Such combinations by their ingenuity often give rise to surprise\nor astonishment. But mental satisfaction is never obtained from them\nmerely because the mind is excited and deluded. On the other hand, the\nPhilosophy of nature, in this labour of ingenuity, runs against limits,\nwhich even ingenuity cannot overcome. Then are heard affirmations,\nwhich amount to open confessions of the impossibility of the task. Of\nthis sort is the assertion that nature contains the contingent and the\nirrational and therefore is incapable of complete rationalization;\nor that nature in its self-externality is impotent to achieve the\nconcept and the spirit. In like manner. Philosophies of history end by\nconfessing that there are facts which are told and are not deduced,\nbecause they are small, contingent and fortuitous matter for chronicle.\nThus, after having announced in the programme the rationality of nature\nand of history, they recognize in the execution of the programme that\nthe contrary is true. They simply deny the rationality of the world,\nbecause they cannot bring themselves to deny the rationality of the\npseudo-sciences of philosophism.\n\n[Sidenote: _Works entitled Philosophy of nature._]\n\nFinally, the reservations made in the case of works dealing with the\nPhilosophy of history are to be repeated for those dealing with the\nPhilosophy of nature. In them, too, there is something more than, and\nsomething different from, the sterile analogical exercises that we have\nmentioned. Some of the philosophers of nature, in the pursuit of their\nillusions, have made occasional scientific discoveries, in the same way\nthat the alchemists seeking the philosopher's stone made discoveries\nin Chemistry. Those discoveries in physical and natural science cannot\nserve to increase the value of the theory of the Philosophy of nature\nany more than those made in chemistry increased the value of alchemy.\nBut they confer value on the books entitled Philosophy of nature, and\ndo honour to their authors as physicists, not as metaphysicians. From\nthe philosophical point of view, those works have had the merit of\naffirming, though but in imaginative and symbolical ways, the unity\nand spirituality of nature, opening the path to its unification with\nthe history of man. They have the yet greater merit of contributing\neffectively in the battle engaged by them against the sciences of\nmaking clear the empirical character of the naturalistic concepts and\nthe abstract character of the mathematical. Nevertheless, they drew\nillegitimate conclusions from such gnoseological truth and carried on\na war of conquest, which must be held to be unjust. In virtue of the\npositive elements that they contain, works on the Philosophy of nature\nhave aided the advance both of the sciences and of philosophy, which in\ntheir properly philosophico-naturalistic parts they have violated and\ndebased and forced into hybrid unions.\n\n[Sidenote: _Contemporary demands for a Philosophy of nature and their\nvarious meanings._]\n\nIn our day demands for a Philosophy of history are rare and received\nwith scant favour; but it seems that those for a Philosophy of nature\nare again acquiring vigour. On seeking the inward meaning of this fact,\nit is seen that on the one hand many of those who demand a Philosophy\nof nature are empiricists, desirous of a natural science elaborated\ninto a philosophy, and therefore not properly of a Philosophy of\nnature, but of a view of the natural sciences that may supplant\nphilosophy. Other upholders of a Philosophy of nature echo the only\nprogramme of such a philosophy, as it was formulated especially by\nSchelling and by Hegel, but declare themselves altogether dissatisfied\nwith the attempts to carry it out made by Schelling, by Hegel and by\nthe followers of both. They are dissatisfied, but incapable of setting\ntheir dissatisfaction at rest by a new attempt at carrying out the\nprogramme. They are also without the intellectual courage necessary\nto question and to re--examine the solidity of the programme itself,\nwhich is in their judgment plausible and guaranteed by such great\nnames. For what indeed is more plausible upon first inspection than\nthe affirmation that the empirical sciences must be elevated to the\nrank of philosophy? It seems that too much mental liberty is needed\nto understand and to distinguish from the preceding, the somewhat\ndifferent proposition that empiricism (empirical philosophy) must\ncertainly be elevated to the rank of non-empirical philosophy, but that\nthe _empirical sciences_ must be left in peace to their own methods,\nwithout any attempt to render perfect by means of extrinsic additions\nthat which has in itself all the perfection of which it is capable.\nIt seems that more intelligence than is usually met with is necessary\nin order to recognize that this last proposition does not establish a\n_dualism_ of spirit and nature, of philosophy and the natural sciences,\nbut for ever destroys every dualism by making of the natural sciences\na merely practical formation of the spirit, which has no voice in\nthe assembly of the philosophical sciences, as the object which it\nhas created has no reality. An ultimate tendency can be discerned in\nthe complex movement of the day toward a Philosophy of nature. This\nis the attainment of the consciousness that reality is on this side\nof the classifications of the natural sciences, and that the natural\nsciences must be retranslated into _history,_ by means of a historical\nconsideration (concrete and not abstract) of the facts that are called\nnatural. But this tendency is not something that will attain its end\nin a near or in a distant future. It has always shown its value and\nshows it also to-day; it can be recommended and promoted, but neither\nmore nor less than every other legitimate form of spiritual activity\ncan be recommended and promoted. Classifications are classifications;\nand what man really seeks out, what continually enriches the empirical\nsciences, is always the history of nature,--the series of facts, which,\nas we know, can be distinguished only in an empirical manner from the\nhistory of man, and which along with this constitutes _History_ without\ngenitive or adjective; history, which cannot even be strictly called\nhistory of the spirit, for the Spirit is, itself, History.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: See my _Essay on Hegel,_ chap. ix. (_What is living, etc.,\nof Hegel,_ tr. D. Ainslie).]\n\n\n\n\nIV\n\n\nMYTHOLOGISM\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Rupture of the unity of the synthesis a priori.\nMythologism._]\n\nWhen by the severance of subject from predicate, of history from\nphilosophy, the mutilated subject is given as predicate, mutilated\nhistory as philosophy, and consequently a false predicate is\nposited, which predicate is an abstract subject and therefore mere\nrepresentation; when this happens, there occurs the opposite error\nto that which we have just particularly examined. That was called\nphilosophism; this might be called historicism; but since this last\nterm has usually been employed to indicate a form of positivism, it\nwill be more convenient to call it _mythologism._\n\nThe process of this error (somewhat abstruse in the way that we have\nstated it) becomes clear at once in virtue of the name that has been\nassigned to it. Every one has examples of myths present in his memory.\nLet us take the myths of Uranus and G\u00e6a, of the seven days of creation,\nof the earthly Paradise, and of Prometheus, of Dana\u00eb, or of Niobe.\nEvery one is ready to say of a scientific theory which introduces\ncauses not demonstrable either in the experience or in thought, that it\nis not theory, but mythology, not concept, but myth.\n\n[Sidenote: _Essence of the myth._]\n\nWhat then is it that is called myth? It is certainly not a simple\npoetic and artistic fancy. The myth contains an affirmation or logical\njudgment, and precisely for this reason may be considered a hybrid\naffirmation, half fanciful and erroneous. If it has been confused with\nart, it is not so much a false doctrine of the myth that should be\nblamed, as a false \u00e6sthetic doctrine, which we have already refuted,\nand which fails to recognize the original and ingenuous character of\nart. On the other hand, the logical affirmation does not stand to the\nmyth as something extrinsic, as in the case of a fable or image put\nforward to express a given concept, where the difference of the two\nterms and the arbitrariness of the relation between them declares\nitself more or less openly. In this case there is not myth, but\n_allegory._ In myth, on the contrary, the concept is not separated\nfrom the representation, indeed it is throughout penetrated by it.\nYet the compenetration is not effected in a logical manner, as in the\nsingular judgment and in the _a priori_ synthesis. The compenetration\nis obtained capriciously, yet it gives itself out as necessary and\nlogical. For instance, it is desired to explain how sky and earth were\nformed, how sea and rivers, plants and animals, men and language arose;\nand behold, we are given as explanations, the stories of the marriage\nof Uranus and G\u00e6a, and the birth of Chronos and of the other Titans;\nor the story of a God Creator, who successively drew all things out of\nchaos in seven days, and made man of clay and taught him the names of\nthings. It is desired to explain the origin of human civilization, and\nthe tale is told of Prometheus, who steals fire and instructs men in\nthe arts; or of Adam and Eve, who eat the forbidden fruit, and driven\nfrom the earthly Paradise are forced to till the ground and bathe it\nwith their sweat. It is desired to explain the astronomical phenomena\nof dawn or of winter, and the story is told of Ph\u0153bus, who pursues\nDaphne, or of the same god who slays one after the other the sons of\nNiobe. These naturalistic interpretations may pass as examples, however\ncontested and antiquated they may be. In place of the concepts which\nshould illuminate single facts, we are given representations. Hence\nare derived what we have called false predicates. Philosophy becomes a\nlittle anecdote, a novelette, a story; history too becomes a story and\nceases to be history, because it lacks the logical element necessary\nfor its constitution. The true philosophic doctrine in the preceding\ncases, for example, will be that of an immanent spirit, of which stars\nand sky, earth and sea, plants and animals, constitute the contingent\nmanifestations; the doctrine which looks upon the consciousness of\ngood and evil and the necessity for work, not as the result of a theft\nmade from the gods or of a violation of one of their commands, but\nas eternal categories of reality; and which regards language, not as\nthe teaching of men by a god, but as an essential determination of\nhumanity, or indeed of spirituality, which is not truly, if it does\nnot express itself. They will also, if we like, be the philosophic\ndoctrines of materialism and of evolutionism; but these, in order\nto be accepted as philosophic, must prove, like the preceding, that\nthey do not substitute representations for concepts and are strictly\nfounded upon thought and employ its method, that is to say, that they\nare philosophy and not mythology. For this reason, in philosophical\ncriticism, adverse philosophies often accuse one another of being\nmore or less mythological, and we hear of the mythology of _atoms,_\nthe mythology of _chance,_ the mythology of _ether,_ of the _two\nsubstances,_ of _monads,_ of the _blind will,_ of the _Unconscious,_\nor, if you like, of the mythology of the _immanent Spirit._\n\n[Sidenote: _Problems concerning the theory of myth._]\n\nThe particular treatment of all the problems that concern the myth does\nnot belong to this place, where it was important solely to determine\nthe proper nature of that spiritual formation. It is customary, for\ninstance, to distinguish between _myth_ and _legend,_ attributing\nthe first name to stories of universal content, and the second to\nstories with an individual and historical content. This partition is\nanalogous to that between philosophy in the strict sense and history,\nand as such, though it possesses no little practical importance, it is\nwithout philosophic value, because, as has been remarked, in myth the\nuniversal becomes history and history becomes legend. Nor is it only\nlegend of the past, but it extends even to the future, and thus appear\n_apocalypses,_ the legend of the _Millennium,_ and _eschatology._\nAgain, myths are usually distinguished as _physical_ and _ethical,_\nand this division is in turn analogous to that between the philosophy\nof the external world and the philosophy of the internal world, the\nphilosophy of nature and the philosophy of the spirit, and stands or\nfalls with it. So that by this criticism we can solve the disputes as\nto whether physical myths precede ethical or inversely, whether the\norigin of myth is or is not anthropomorphic, and the like.\n\n[Sidenote: _Myth and religion. Identity of the two spiritual\nformations._]\n\nBut the myth can assume another name, which makes yet clearer the\nknowledge of the logical error of which the analysis has been given:\nthe name of _religion._ Mythologism is the _religious error._ Against\nthis thesis various objections have been brought, such as that religion\nis not theoretical but practical, and has therefore nothing to do\nwith myth; or that it is something _sui generis,_ or that it is not\nexhausted in the myth, since it consists of the complex of all the\nactivities of the human spirit. But against these objections it must\nabove all be maintained that religion is a theoretic fact, since\nthere is no religion _without affirmation._ The practical activity,\nhowever noble it may be held, is always an operating, a doing, a\nproducing, and to that extent is mute and alogical. It will be said\nthat that affirmation is _sui generis_ and goes beyond the limits\nof human science. This is most true, if by science we understand\nthe empirical sciences; but it is not true, if by human science we\nunderstand philosophy, since philosophy also goes beyond or is outside\nthe limits of the empirical sciences. It will be said that every\nreligion is founded upon a _revelation,_ whereas philosophy does not\nadmit of other revelation than that which the spirit makes to itself\nas thought. That too is most true; but the revelation of religion, in\nso far as it is not that of the spirit as thought, expresses precisely\nthe logical contradiction of mythologism: the affirmation of the\nuniversal as mere representation, and this asserted as a universal\ntruth on the strength of a contingent fact, a communication which\nought to be proved and thought, whereas on the contrary it is taken\ncapriciously, as a principle of proof and as equivalent or superior to\nan act of thought. The theory of religion as a mixture hardly merits\nrefutation, since that complex of the activities of the spirit is a\nmetaphor of the spirit in its totality; that is to say, it gives not a\ntheory of religion, but a new name of the spirit itself,--the object of\nphilosophic speculation.\n\n[Sidenote: _Religion and philosophy._]\n\nSince then, religion is identical with myth, and since myth is not\ndistinguishable from philosophy by any positive character, but only\nas false philosophy from true philosophy and as error from the truth\nwhich rectifies and contains it, we must affirm that religion, in\nso far as it is truth, is identical with philosophy, or as can also\nbe said, _that philosophy_ is the _true religion._ All ancient and\nmodern thought about religions, which have always been dissolved in\nphilosophies, leads to this result. And since philosophy coincides\nwith history, and religion and the history of religion are the same,\nand myth and religion are strictly speaking indistinguishable, we can\nsee very well the vanity of the attempt that is being made beneath our\neyes to preserve a religion or mythological truth side by side with a\nhistory of religions, which on the contrary is supposed to be practised\nwith complete mental freedom and with an entirely critical method.\nThis, which is one of the tendencies of so-called _modernism,_ is\ncondemned as contradictory and illogical, by philosophy not less than\nby the Catholic Church.[1] The history of religions is an integral part\nof the history of philosophy, and as inseparable from it as error from\nthe history of truth.\n\n[Sidenote: _Conversion of errors into one another. Conversion of\nmythologism into philosophism (theology) and of philosophism into\nmythologism (mythology of nature, historical apocalypses, etc.)._]\n\nWhen religion does not dissolve into philosophy and wishes to persist\ntogether with it, or to substitute itself for philosophy, it reveals\nitself as effective error; that is to say, as an arbitrary attempt\nagainst truth, due to habit, feelings and individual passions. But\nthe destiny of every form of error is to be unable to persist before\nthe light of truth. Hence the constant change of tactics and the\npassage of every error into the error from which it had at first\nwished to disassociate itself, or into which it did not mean to fall.\nThus \u00e6stheticism, dislodged from its positions, takes refuge in\nthose of empiricism; and empiricism either descends again into pure\nsensationalism and \u00e6stheticism, or becomes volatilized in mysticism.\nThus (to stop at the case we have before us) mythologism, which intends\nto be the opposite of philosophism and to work with blind fancy instead\nof with empty concepts, is obliged in order to save itself from the\nattacks of criticism to have recourse to philosophism; and religion is\nthen called _theology._ Theology is philosophism, because it works with\nconcepts which are empty of all historical and empirical content. Myth\nbecomes _dogma_; the myth of the expulsion from Paradise becomes the\ndogma of original sin; the myth of the son of God becomes the dogma of\nthe incarnation and of the Trinity. Nor must it be thought that for its\npart philosophism does not accomplish the opposite transition. Every\nphilosophy of nature ends by appearing as a _mythology of nature,_\nevery philosophy of history as an _apocalypse._ Sometimes even a sort\nof revelation occurs in them, and we often find that the unthinkable\nconnections of concepts constituting those pseudo-philosophies are\nobtained and comprehended in virtue of second sight, as the result of a\nmental illumination, which is the prerogative of but a few privileged\npersons. Finally, philosophism and mythologism embrace one another\nand fall embracing into empiricism and into the other forms of error\npreviously described.\n\n[Sidenote: _Scepsis._]\n\nThis perpetual transition from one form of error to another gives rise\nto a _scepsis,_ which promotes the reciprocal dissolution of errors,\nand scorning illusions and confusions, throws their _mental vacuity_\ninto clear light. Such a scepsis fulfils an important function. The\nlies of \u00e6stheticism, mathematicism, philosophism, mythologism, cannot\nresist it. Their little wordy strongholds are broken into; the shadows\nare dispersed. Especially against mythologism, which in a certain sense\nmay be called the most complete negation of thought, a scepsis is\nhelpful; and owing to the resistance offered here more than elsewhere,\nby passions and interests, it often takes the form of violent satire.\nThe last great epoch of this strife is what is called the _Aufkl\u00e4rung,_\nEncyclopedism or Voltaireism, and was directed against Christianity,\nespecially in its Catholic form. We must make so many reservations in\nwhat follows concerning the enlightened Encyclopedist and Voltairean\nattitude, that here we feel obliged to indicate explicitly its serious\nand fruitful side.\n\n\n\n[Footnote 1: See with reference to this G. Gentile, _Il modernismo e\nl'enciclica, Critica,_ vi. pp. 208-229.]\n\n\n\n\nV\n\nDUALISM, SCEPTICISM AND MYSTICISM\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Dualism._]\n\nTotal scepticism can be reached only through _dualism,_ which, in\naddition to being a particular error in a given philosophic problem,\nis a logical error, consisting in the attempt to affirm two methods of\ntruth at the same time--the philosophic method and the non-philosophic\nmethod, however the second of these be afterwards determined. Such an\nerror would not be error but supreme truth, if the various methods\nwere given each its due post (which is what has been attempted in\nthis Logic); but it becomes error when the various methods are made\nphilosophical and placed _alongside_ the philosophical. This is the\nerror of those conciliatory people, who, unwilling to seek out where\nreason stands, admit that reason is operative in all of them, and\ndivide the kingdom of truth amongst all in equal parts. Thus arise\nthose logical doctrines which demand for the solution of philosophic\nproblems, the successive or contemporaneous application of the\nnaturalistic method, of mathematics, of historical research, and so\non. At the least they demand the combination of the naturalistic\nmethod (empiricism) with the speculative and the use of what they call\nthe double criterion of _teleology_ and _causality,_ or of _double_\ncausality. To the question, what is reality, they reply with two\nmethods and consequently offer two concurrent and parallel realities.\nBeneath the appearance of treatment and solution, they abandon the\nphilosophic problem. Instead of conceiving, they describe, and\ndescription is given as concept, and concept as description: hence the\njustifiable intervention of the scepsis.\n\n[Sidenote: _Scepsis and scepticism._]\n\nBut the scepsis, which clears the ground of all forms of erroneous\nlogical affirmation, is the negation of error and consequently the\nnegativity of negativity. The negativity of negativity is affirmation,\nand for this reason, the true scepsis, like every true negation, always\ncontains a positive content in the negative verbal form, which can be\nalso verbally developed as such. If this positive content, instead of\nbeing developed, is choked in the bud, if instead of negation, which\nis also affirmation, a mere negation is given,--an abstract negation,\nwhich destroys without constructing, and if this negation claims to\npass as truth, the final form of error is obtained, which is no longer\ncalled scepsis, but _scepticism._\n\n[Sidenote: _Mystery._]\n\nScepticism is the proclamation of mystery made in the name of\nthought;--a definition the contradictoriness of which leaps to the\neye. It is mortally wounded both by the ancient dilemma against\nscepticism and by the _cogito_ of Descartes. Nevertheless, since a\nsingular tenderness for the idea of mystery seems to have invaded the\ncontemporary world, it is desirable to leave open no loophole whatever\nfor misunderstanding. The _mystery_ is _life itself,_ which is an\neternal _problem_ for thought; but this problem would not even be a\nproblem, if thought did not eternally solve it. For this reason, both\nthose who consider mystery to be definitely penetrated by thought and\nthose who consider it impenetrable are equally wrong. The first we\nalready know: they are the philosophists who reduce reality to pure\nterms of abstract thought, by breaking up the _a priori_ synthesis\nand by neglecting the historical element, which is ever new and ever\nassuming forms not determinable _a priori._ Thus, they claim to shut\nup the world for ever in one single act (maybe in some particular\nphilosophic system). Through their excessive love of the infinite\nthey make it finite; the sun and the earth and all the stars, the\nhistorical forms of life, and what is called human life, which has\nbeen known for some thousands of years, are transformed by them into\ncategories of thought, solidified and made eternal. This conception,\nwhich appears (at least as a tendency) in certain parts of the Hegelian\nphilosophy, is narrow and suffocating. The spirit is superior to all\nits manifestations hitherto known, and its power is infinite. It\nwill never be able to surpass itself, that is to say, its eternal\ncategories, just as God (according to the best theological doctrines)\ncould destroy heaven and earth, but not the true and the good, which\nare his very essence; yet the spirit is able to surpass, and actually\ndoes surpass, its every contingent incarnation. The world, which is\nabstractly assumed to be more or less constant, is all in movement and\nbecoming. Those who will be raised up to think it will know what worlds\nwill issue from this world of ours. That we cannot know, for we must\nthink this world which exists at our moment, and must act on the basis\nof it.\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique of the affirmations of mystery in philosophy._]\n\nBut if the philosophers incur the guilt of arrogance, the sceptics,\nwho affirm a mystery, that is to say, that reality is impenetrable to\nthought, fall under the accusation of cowardice. These, when faced with\nthe problems of the real (soluble, we repeat, by the very fact that\nthey are problems), avoid the hard work of dominating and penetrating\nthem, and think it convenient to wrap themselves in abstract negation\nand to affirm that _mystery is._ There is mystery, without doubt; and\nthis means that there is a problem, something that invokes the light of\nthought. And it is a beautiful solution which these mysterious ones and\nsceptics offer, for it consists in stating the problem and leaving it\nuntouched. In the same way, when a man asks for help, we might claim to\nhave given it to him when we had noticed his request. Charity consists\nin hastening to render effective aid, not in noting that aid has been\nasked for and then turning the back. To think is to break up the\nmystery and to solve the problem, not simply to recognize that there is\na problem and a mystery, and to renounce seeking the solution as though\nit had already been given and the matter settled by that recognition.\n\nIt seems strange that it should be necessary to explain these\nelementary concepts; yet in our time it is necessary, so much have\nthose concepts been darkened for historical reasons, which it would\ntake long to expound here, and which can all of them be summarized\nas due to a certain moral weakening. And it may be opportune here to\ngive a warning (since we are dealing with a theme that belongs to\nthe elementary school of philosophy) that to inculcate the courage\nto confront and to solve the problem and to conquer the mystery, is\nnot to counsel the neglect of difficulties, or superficiality and\narrogance. Mysteries are covered and must continually be covered\nby their own shadows; problems torment and must torment, yet it is\nonly through these shadows and by means of those torments that we\nattain to momentary repose in the true; and only thus does repose not\nbecome sloth, but the restoration of our forces to resume the eternal\njourney. Superficiality, arrogance, neglect of difficulties, belong\nto the sceptics who deafen themselves with words and contrive to live\nat their ease in their abstract negation. True thinkers suffer, but\ndo not flee from pain. \"_Et iterum ecce turbatio_ (groans St. Anselm\namid the anxious vicissitudes of his meditations), _ecce iterum obviat\nmaeror et luctus quaerenti gaudium et laetitiam. Sperabat jam anima\nmea satietatem, et ecce iterum obruitur egestate. Conabar assurgere\nad lucem Dei, et recidi in tenebras meas: immo non modo cecidi in\neas, sed sentio me involutum in eis....\"_[1] Such words as these are\nthe pessimistic lyric of the thinker. Sceptics create no such lyric,\nbecause they have cut the desire at the root. They are as a rule\nblissfully calm and smiling.\n\n[Sidenote: _Agnosticism as a particular form of scepticism._]\n\nThere is a form of scepticism which would like to appear critical and\nrefined and which takes the name of _agnosticism._ It is a scepticism\nlimited to ultimate things, to profound reality, to the essence of\nthe world, which amounts to saying that it is limited to the supreme\nprinciples of philosophy. Now, since the principles of philosophy are\nall equally supreme, such agnostic scepticism extends its affirmation\nof mystery over neither more nor less than the whole of philosophy and\nconsequently over the whole of human knowledge. Its limits would be\nnothing less than the boundaries of knowledge. Indeed, agnosticism is\nthe spiritual fulfilment sought by all those who negate philosophy,\nsuch as \u00e6stheticists, mathematicians, and especially empiricists; and\nagnostics and empiricists are ordinarily so closely connected that the\none name is almost synonymous with the other.\n\n[Sidenote: _Mysticism._]\n\nThe sceptical error, which consists in stating the problem as solution\nand mystery as truth, can give way to another mode of error, in which\nthe very affirmation of scepticism is denied and it is recognized\nthat thought cannot explicitly state mystery. But this recognition,\nwhich would imply that of the authority of thought, is strangely\ncombined with the most precise negation of such authority. Thought\nbeing excluded, either affirmatively or negatively, as in the\nself-contradiction of scepticism, what remains is life, no longer\na problem, or a solution of a problem, but just life, life lived.\nTo affirm that truth is life lived, reality directly felt in us as\npart of us and we part of it, is the pretension of _mysticism._\nThis is the last general form of error that can be thought; and its\nself-contradiction is evident from the genetic process which we have\nalready expounded. Mysticism affirms, when no affirmation is permitted\nto it; and it is yet more gravely contradictory than scepticism, which,\nthough forbidding to itself logical affirmation, does not forbid\nitself speech, that is to say, \u00e6sthetic expression. To mysticism not\neven words can be permissible, because mysticism, being life and not\ncontemplation, practice and not theory, is by definition _dumbness._\nBut we shall say no more of mysticism, having had occasion to refer to\nit, as also to \u00e6stheticism and empiricism, at the beginning of this\ntreatise on Logic.\n\n[Sidenote: _Errors in the other parts of philosophy._]\n\nWhen we consider these errors more closely, it is easy to see that\ndualism, scepticism, and mysticism manifest themselves not only in the\nforms of thought, in philosophy as Logic, but also in all the other\nparticular philosophic problems, distinct from those that are peculiar\nto Logic, and in the errors due to them. The complete enumeration of\nthese and their concrete determination would (as has already been said)\nrequire the development of the whole philosophic system, and therefore\ncannot all be contained in the present treatise. Indeed, they take\ntheir name, not from the forms of the spirit, with which the logical\nform is confused, or from the internal mutilation of the logical form,\nbut from the confusion and mutilation of the remaining spiritual forms.\nThey are no longer called \u00e6stheticism, mathematicism, or philosophism,\nbut ethical utilitarianism, moral abstractionism, \u00e6sthetic logicism,\nsensationalism and hedonism, practical intellectualism, metaphysical\ndualism or pluralism, optimism and pessimism, and so on. It is not\nthose who, as in the previous instances, deny philosophy itself, that\nfall into such errors, but those who admit it and carry it out more\nor less badly in its other parts. Without the admission of the method\nof philosophic thought, and without the assertion of a concept, it is\nimpossible to conceive logical usurpations in the domain of another\nconcept, which is not less necessary than the first to the fulness and\nunity of the real.\n\n_Ethical utilitarianism,_ for instance, thinks the concept of\nutilitarian practical activity; but its fallacy consists in arbitrarily\nmaintaining that the concept of utility altogether exhausts that of\nthe practical activity, thus negating the other concept distinct from\nit, the practical moral activity. _Moral abstractionism_ commits\nthe opposite error, affirming the moral activity, but negating the\nutilitarian. _\u00c6sthetic logicism_ rightly affirms the reality of the\nlogical mental form, but is wrong in not recognizing the intuitive\nmental form and in considering it to be resolved in the logical\nform. \u00c6sthetic _sensationalism,_ directing its attention to crude\nand unexpressed sensation, emphasises the necessary precedent of the\n\u00e6sthetic activity, but then makes of the condition the conditioned,\ndefining art as sensation. \u00c6sthetic _hedonism, utilitarianism or\npracticism,_ is true in so far as it notes the practical and hedonistic\nenvelope of the \u00e6sthetic activity; but it becomes false in so far as\nit takes the envelope for the content, and treats art as a mere fact\nof pleasure and pain. _Practical intellectualism_ perceives that the\nwill is not possible without a cognitive basis, but by exaggerating\nthis, it ends by destroying the originality of the practical spiritual\nform, and reduces it to a complex of concepts and reasonings. In like\nmanner, _metaphysical dualism_ avails itself of the difference between\nthe concept of reality as spirit and that of reality as nature, the\none arising from logical thought, the other from an empirical and\nnaturalistic method of treatment, in order to transmute them into\nconcepts of two distinct forms of reality itself, as spirit and matter,\ninternal and external world, and so on. _Pluralism_ or monadism,\nconfounding the individuality of acts with the substantiality which\nbelongs to the universal subject, makes entities of single acts and\nturns them into a multiplicity of simple substances. _Pessimism_ and\n_optimism,_ each one availing itself of an abstract element of reality,\nwhich is the unity of opposites, maintain that reality is all evil and\nsuffering, or all goodness and joy. This process of exemplification\ncould be carried much further, and would become, as we see, a deduction\nof all philosophical concepts and errors.\n\n[Sidenote: _Conversion of these errors with one another and with\nlogical errors._]\n\nNow, each one of those false solutions, obeying the law of errors,\nis obliged, in order to maintain itself, to pass into that from\nwhich it was distinguished, and then to pass back again from that\nto this. Thus utilitarianism becomes abstract morality and abstract\nmorality utilitarianism. Hence the work of scepsis and the consequent\nappearance of a _particular scepticism of this or that concept._ Ethics\nhaving vainly struggled with the alternate negations, of utility and\nof morality, ends in _ethical scepticism;_ \u00c6sthetic torn between\nsensationalism and utilitarianism and logicism, and other errors, and\ndestroying them all with its scepsis, ends in _\u00c6sthetic scepticism_;\nMetaphysics, torn between materialism, abstract spiritualism,\ndualism, pluralism, pessimism, optimism, and other erroneous views,\nends in _metaphysical scepticism._ And to these errors of particular\nscepticism, errors of _particular mysticism_ soon succeed. Thus we hear\nit said that there is no concept of the beautiful, as there is of the\ntrue or the good, but that it is only felt and lived; or, again, that\nthere is no possible definition of what is good, since it concerns a\nthing that must be left to sentiment and to life; or, finally, that\nthought has value within the limits that abstraction has value, but\nthat it is impotent before complete reality, because life alone is\ncapable of comprehending reality, by receiving it into its very bosom.\n\nOn the other hand, it is not possible that any \u00e6stheticism, empiricism,\nmathematicism, philosophism, mythologism, or logicism whatever, should\nremain limited to a determinate philosophic concept without coming\nin contact with others, because those forms of error strike at the\nlogical form of thought itself, and therefore equally at all other\nphilosophic concepts. The ethical or \u00e6sthetic empiricist, for instance,\nmust logically affirm a general philosophic empiricism if he does not\nwish to correct himself by contradicting himself (an hypothesis which\nmust be neglected and left to be understood in this consideration of\nthe simple, elementary, fundamental, or _necessary_ forms of error).\nHe who in a particular philosophic problem has committed a confusion\nof concepts, and has thence arrived at a particular scepticism and\nmysticism, is led by the systematic and unitary character of philosophy\nto widen that mysticism and scepticism from particular to general. From\nthis general mysticism and scepticism, he is led to return gradually to\nmythologism, philosophism, empiricism, and to the other negations of\nthe logical form of philosophy. Everything is connected in philosophy\nand everything is connected in error, which is the negation of\nphilosophy.\n\n\n\n[Footnote 1: _Proslog.,_ c. 18.]\n\n\n\n\nVI\n\n\nTHE ORDER OF ERRORS AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Necessary character of the forms of errors. Their definite\nnumber._]\n\nEverything is connected in errors; error has its necessary forms.\nThis implies, in the first place, that the possible forms of errors,\nthe logical forms of the illogical, are _so many_ and _no more._\nIndeed, the forms of the spirit or concepts of reality, which can\nbe arbitrarily combined, can be stated as a finite number (where\nthe process of numbering can be applied to them). Consequently,\nthe arbitrary combinations or errors which arise from them can\nalso be similarly numbered. Only the individual forms of error are\ninfinite, and that for the same reason which we have already given,\nas the individual forms of truth are infinite. Problems are always\nhistorically conditioned, and the solutions are conditioned in the same\nway; even false solutions, which are determined by feelings, passions,\nand interests, also vary according to historical conditions.\n\n[Sidenote: Their logical order.]\n\nIn the second place, and as corollary to the preceding thesis, the\npossible forms of errors present a necessary order; and this, because\nthe forms of the spirit or the concepts of reality stand in a necessary\norder to one another. They cannot be placed after or before one another\nnor changed at will. This necessary order is, as we know, a genetic\norder of degrees, and consequently the possible forms of errors\nconstitute a series of degrees. It is commonly said that _error has\nits logic,_ and we must say more correctly, that it cannot constitute\nitself as error, save by borrowing logical character from truth.\n\n[Sidenote: _Examples of this order in the various parts of philosophy._]\n\nThis is already clearly seen in the exposition given of the forms of\nlogical error, and more clearly still when, resuming, we consider\nthat the spirit, when it rebels against the concept, must by this\nvery act affirm the term which is distinct from the concept, whether\nit be called representation, intuition, or pure sensation. Hence the\nnecessity of the form of error (in a certain sense the first), which is\n_\u00e6stheticism,_--the affirmation of truth as pure sensation. Below this\nstage, the spirit can descend to annul the problem in _dualism;_ or,\ngoing further and abandoning affirmation, it may fall into scepticism;\nor, finally, abandoning even expression, it may fall into _dumbness,_\nor _mysticism,_ which is the lowest degree. Above \u00e6stheticism it\ncan raise itself to try to take refuge in _empiricism,_ in which\nis posited a universal, but one that is merely representative and,\ntherefore, a false universal. It is the second step, nor can any other\nbe conceived as second:--we must give a false value either to the pure\nrepresentation (\u00e6stheticism);--or (taking the second step), to the\nrepresentation and the concept together, as is the case in the form of\nthe empirical concept (empiricism). The third step is the desperate\nescape from the insufficiency of the empirical concept, by means of the\nabstract concept, which guarantees the universality which the other\nlacks, but gives an empty universality (mathematicism). Finding no\nrefuge in this emptiness from the objections of its adversaries, it is\nobliged finally to enter philosophy. But the erring spirit continues\nits work in philosophy itself and, once it has taken possession, abuses\nit. Now it is not possible to abuse philosophy, save by reducing it\neither to a concept without intuition, which is nevertheless taken as a\nsynthesis of concept and intuition (_philosophism_); or to an intuition\nwithout concept, which, in its turn, is taken as the requisite\nsynthesis _(mythologism)._ The result of all this process is always the\nrenunciation of the philosophic problem, disguised by the admission of\nthe double method (dualism), and hence the descent below the logical\nform, either with the affirmation which denies itself (scepticism),\nor, again, with that which denies even the possibility of expression\n(mysticism) and returns to life, which is not a problem at all, being\nlife lived.\n\nThe same thing occurs with the other errors, when we refer to the other\nconcepts of the spirit or of reality, although we shall not be able to\ngive the complete series without summarizing the whole of philosophy,\nwhich is not necessary here, and by its excessive concentration and\nextreme brevity would be obscure. Suffice it to say, by way of example,\nthat the ethical problem, besides being negated by means of erroneous\nsensationalist, empiricist, and mycologist solutions, and so on (to\nwhich, in common with all philosophic problems, it is subject), can\nbe negated by practical intellectualism, which does not recognize a\npractical problem side by side with that of the theoretic spirit,\nand reduces virtue to knowledge. Hence _ethical intellectualism._\nSince ethical intellectualism cannot resist objections, it is obliged\nto introduce at least the slightest practical element that can be\nadmitted, which is that of individual utility, and resolving morality\ninto this, it then presents itself as _ethical utilitarianism._\nThis in its turn, finding itself in contradiction with the peculiar\ncharacter of morality, which goes beyond individual utility, arranges\nto recognize and to substitute for the first a super-individual\nutility, which is the universal practical value or morality. And thus,\nby negating the first on account of the second concept, it presents\nitself as _moralism_ or _ethical abstractionism._ The impossibility of\nnegating both the first and the second, and the necessity of affirming\nboth, urge the acceptance of the final form of _practical dualism,_\nin which utility and morality appear as co-ordinated or juxtaposed.\nEach one of these arbitrary doctrines is critical of the others,\nand, by its internal contradictions, of itself. Hence the fall into\nscepticism and mysticism. The circle of error can be traversed again,\nbut it is impossible to alter the place that each of those forms has\nin the circle, by placing, for instance, practical dualism before\nutilitarianism or intellectualism after moralism.\n\n[Sidenote: _Spirit of error and spirit of search._]\n\nThere is no gradual issuing from the infernal circle of error, and\nsalvation from it is not possible, save by entering at one stroke into\nthe celestial circle of truth, in which alone the mind rests satisfied\nas in its kingdom. The spirit that _errs_ or flees from the light must\nbe converted into the spirit of _search,_ that longs for the light;\npride must yield to humility; narrow love for one's own abstract\nindividuality become wider and elevate itself to an austere love, to\nan unlimited devotion toward that which surpasses the individual, thus\nbecoming an \"heroic fury,\" the \"_amor Dei intellectualis._\"\n\n[Sidenote: _Immanence of error in truth._]\n\nIn this act of love and fervour the spirit becomes pure thought and\nattains to the true, is indeed transmuted into the true. But as spirit\nof truth it possesses truth and also its contrary transfigured in\nthat. The possessing of a concept is the possession of it in all its\nrelations, and so are possessed all the modes in which that concept can\nbe wrongly altered by error. For instance, the true concept of moral\nactivity is also the concept of utilitarianism, of abstractionism,\nof practical dualism, and so on. The two series of knowledge, that\nof the true and that of its contrary, are, in truth, inseparable,\nbecause they really constitute one single series. The concept is\naffirmation-negation.\n\n[Sidenote: _Erroneous distinction between possession of and search for\ntruth._]\n\nIt will be said that this is perhaps exact in the case of the\n_possession_ of truth, but not in that of the _search_ for it, where\nthe two series may well appear disunited. Truth, to one who searches,\nis at the top of the staircase of errors, and as it is possible to\nclimb a great part of the staircase without reaching what is at the\ntop of it, so when once the desired place has been reached, it is\npossible not to see or not to remember the staircase that is below. But\nthe possession of truth is never static, as in general no real fact\nis static. The possession of and the search for truth are the same.\nWhen it seems that a truth is possessed in a static way and almost\nsolidified, if we observe closely we shall see that the word expressing\nit, the sound of it, has remained, but the spirit has flown away. That\ntruth was, but is no longer thought, and so is not truth. It will be\ntruth only when it is thought anew, and thinking and thinking anew are\nthe same, since each rethinking is a new act of thought. In thinking\nthe truth is search for truth; it is a most rapid ideal motion which,\nstarting from the centre, runs through all the possibilities of error,\nand only in so far as it runs through and rejects them all does it find\nitself at its centre, which is the centre of motion.\n\n[Sidenote: _The search for truth in the practical sense of preparation\nfor thought; and the series of errors._]\n\nIn order to separate truth from the search for truth this latter must\nbe understood, not as the will for thought and so as thought in action,\nbut as the _will which lays down the conditions for thought,_ the will\nwhich prepares itself for thought, but does not yet think effectually.\nThis indeed is the usual meaning of the word \"search.\" To search\nis to stimulate oneself for thinking, by employing opportune means\nfor that purpose. And there is no more opportune means than that of\nconfronting one with another the various forms of the spirit and the\nvarious concepts; because in the course of that confrontation there is\nproduced the true combination; that is to say, thought, which is truth,\nis aroused. To search means therefore to _run through the series of\nerrors._\n\n[Sidenote: _Transfiguration, in the search thus understood, of error\ninto suggestion or hypothesis._]\n\nBut the seeker sets to work in quite a different spirit from that of\nthe assertor of errors. The spirit of research is not the rebel erring\nspirit, and therefore the path that both follow is only the same in\nappearance; the first was the path of errors, but the second can only\nbe so called by metaphor. Errors are errors when there is the will for\nerror. Where, on the other hand, there is the will to unify material\nand to prepare the conditions of thought, the improper combination\nof ideas is not indeed error, but _suggestion_ or _hypothesis._ The\nhypothesis is not an act of truth, because either it is not verified\nand so reveals itself as without truth, or it is verified and becomes\ntruth only at the moment in which it is verified. But neither is it\nan act of error, because it is affirmed, not as truth, but as simple\nmeans or aid toward the conquest of truth. In the doctrine of search,\nthe series of errors is all redeemed, baptized, or blessed anew; the\ndiabolic spirit abandons it precipitately, leaving it void of truth,\nbut innocent.\n\n[Sidenote: _Distinction between error as error and error as\nhypothesis._]\n\nThe distinction between error as _error_ and error as _suggestion,_\nbetween _error_ and _hypothesis_ or heuristic expedients, is of\ncapital importance. It is found as basis of some common distinctions,\nsuch as those between _mistake_ and _error,_ between error committed\nin _good faith_ and error committed in _bad faith,_ and the like.\nThese and others like them show themselves to be certainly untenable,\nbecause error as error is always in bad faith, and there is no\ndifference between error and mistake, save an empirical difference,\nor a difference of verbal emphasis, for it can be said according to\nempirical accidents that an affirmation is either simply erroneous or\naltogether a mistake. But although they cannot be maintained as they\nare formulated, they nevertheless suggest the desirability and the\nanticipation of this true and profound distinction.\n\n[Sidenote: _Immanence of the suggestion in error itself as error._]\n\nOn the other hand, error and suggestion, error and heuristic procedure,\nsince they have in common the practical, extrinsic, and improper\ncombination of ideas, stand in this relation to one another, that\nthe suggestion is not error, but _error always contains in itself\nwillingly or unwillingly a suggestion._ The erring spirit, though\nwithout intending it, prepares the material for the search for truth.\nIt means to evade that search or to bring it to an arbitrary end; but\nin doing so it breaks up the clods of earth, throws them about, ploughs\nand fertilizes the field where the truth will sprout. Thus it happens\nthat many combinations of ideas, proposed and maintained through\ncaprice and vanity with the lawyer's object of scoring his point, or\nof shining and astonishing with paradox, or for pastime and for other\nutilitarian reasons, have been adopted by more serious spirits as steps\nin the progress of research. The enemies of the truth not only testify\nto the truth but come to serve it themselves, through the unforeseen\nconsequences of their work. A sort of gratitude comes over us at times\nand makes us tender toward these adversaries of the truth, because we\nfeel that from them has come the stimulus to obtain it, as from them\ncome the strengthening of our hold upon it and the inspiration, the\nclear-sightedness, and the warmth of the defence of it that we make\nagainst them.\n\n[Sidenote: _Individuals and error._]\n\nBut it is not necessary in yielding to the generous feeling for human\nfraternity to exaggerate in this last direction. The gratitude that we\nfeel is not deserved by them; at the most, it is God or the universal\nspirit or Providence who deserves it. They did not wish to serve the\ntruth and did not serve it, save through consequences which are not\ntheir work. One-sided and abstract optimism has intruded here also;\nand perceiving in error the element of suggestion, it has altogether\ncancelled the category of error in favour of that of suggestion and\nhas pronounced that man always seeks the true, as he always wills the\ngood. Certainly; but there is the man who stops at his individual\ngood, _fruges consumere natus_; and there is the man who progresses\nto the universal good. There is the man who combines words to give\nhimself and others the illusion of knowing what he does not know and\nof being able to attend to his own pleasures without further trouble;\nand there is the man who combines words with anxious soul and spirit\nintent, _venator medii,_ a hunter of the concept. Here, too, the truth\nis neither in the optimism nor in the pessimism, but in the doctrine,\nwhich conciliates and surpasses them both. Nor does it matter that\nowing to the defect of abstract optimism that very philosopher, who did\nmore than any other to reveal the hidden richness of the dialectical\nprinciple, was not able to look deeply into the problem of error.\n\nThe conscience of humanity well understood knows how to do justice to\nall men, without, on that account, confounding him who seeks with him\nwho errs, the man of good will with the utilitarian. It does justice\nto them, because in every man, indeed at every instant in the life\nof every man, it discovers all those various spiritual moments, both\ninferior and superior. Error and the search for truth are continually\nintertwined. Sometimes a beginning is made with research, and it ends\nwith an obstinate persistence in the suggestion that has been made,\nwhich is converted into a result and an erroneous affirmation. At\nothers a beginning is made, with the deliberate intention of escaping\ndifficulties by means of some sort of a combination of ideas; and that\ncombination arouses the mind and becomes a suggestion for research,\nwhich is followed until peace is found in the truth. Each one of us is\nat every moment in danger of yielding to laziness and to the seduction\nof error and has hope of shaking off that laziness and following the\nattraction of truth. We fall and rise up again at every instant; we are\nweak and strong, cowardly and courageous. When we call another weak and\ncowardly, we are condemning ourselves; when we admire another as strong\nand courageous, we idolize the strength and courage which is active\nwithin us. When we are in the presence of a complex product, as, for\nexample, a faith, a doctrine, a book, it would be na\u00efve and fallacious\nto look upon it as only error or as only suggestion. For it is both\nthe one and the other; that is to say, it contains equally the moments\nof error properly so-called, and the other moments of suggestion and\nsearch; the voluntary interposition of obstacles to the truth and\nthe voluntary removal of such obstacles; the disfigured image of the\ntruth and the outline of the truth. Sometimes we are unable to say of\nourselves whether we are erring or are seeking, whether we believe\nthat we have found the whole truth or only discovered a ray of it. The\nlogical criticism which implacably condemns us seems to be unjust,\nalthough we cannot contest its arguments which impose the truth upon\nour thought. We feel that that truth was in a way sought, seen for a\nmoment, and almost possessed in that spiritual state of ours, which has\nbeen summarily and abruptly condemned by others as altogether erroneous.\n\n[Sidenote: _The double aspect of errors._]\n\nFor this reason even that which has been rejected and blamed as false\nfrom one point of view must be accepted and honoured from another as\nan approach to truth. Empiricism is perverse in so far as it is a\nconstruction opposed to the philosophic universal, but it is innocuous\nand indeed beneficial in so far as it is an attempt to rise from\npure sensation and representation to the thinking of the universal.\nScepticism as error annuls the theoretic life; but as suggestion it\nis necessary to the demonstration of the impossibility of dwelling in\nthat desert when all false doctrines have been annulled. Mythologism\npresents this double aspect in a yet clearer manner; religion is the\nnegation of thought, but it is also in another aspect a preparation\nfor thought; the myth is both a travesty and a sketch of the concept;\nhence every philosophy feels itself adverse to myth and born from\nmyth, an _enemy_ and a _daughter_ of religions. In what is empirically\ndefined as religion or as a body of religious doctrines, for example,\nin Christianity, in its myths and in its theology, there is so much of\ntruth and suggestion of truth that it is possible to affirm (always\nfrom the empirical point of view) the superiority of that religion\nover a well-reasoned but poor, a correct but sterile philosophy.\nNevertheless, a period of reverence, of attentive harkening, of\nphilosophic study and criticism, which is not pure scepticism,\nsucceeds to a period of encyclop\u00e6dism, of irreligious scepticism, of\nenlightenment, and of Voltaireism. Those who in the nineteenth or in\nthis twentieth century have repeated the Voltairean scepticism and have\njibed at religion have with good reason been considered superficial of\nintellect and soul, vulgar and trivial people. The philosophy of the\neighteenth century has filled and filled well the office of enemy of\nreligion; that of the nineteenth century has disdained to give blows\nto the dead and has adopted towards religion the attitude of a pious\ndaughter and diligent heir. For our part we are persuaded that the\ninheritance of religion has not been well and thoroughly utilized.\nThis inheritance is at bottom indistinguishable from the philosophic\ninheritance, for is there not religion, in, for instance, the Cartesian\nidea of God, which unifies the two substances and guarantees with its\ntruth the certainty of our knowledge? And is it not also philosophy,\nthat is to say, the concept (in however gross a form), of the immanent\nSpirit which is a self-distinguishing unity and certainty of itself?\n\n[Sidenote: _Last form of the methodological error; Hypothesism._]\n\nWe have now attained to the theory of research, yet we cannot abandon\nthe survey of the necessary forms of error without mentioning a new\nform which arises precisely from the confusion between truth and the\nsearch for the conditions preparatory to truth, between truth and\nhypothesis. This error, which converts Heuristic into Logic, may be\ncalled _hypothesism._ It asserts that in regard to truth man can do\nnothing more than propose hypotheses, which are said to be more or\nless probable, so that his fate is not dissimilar to the punishments\nwhich were assigned to Tantalus, Sisyphus, and the Danaids. But in the\nkingdom of the True, differently from that of Erebus:\n\n    The birds do not feed,\n    The wheels do not turn,\n    The stone is not rolled up the high mountain,\n    Nor water drawn with the sieve from the fountain.\n\nThe hypothesis is made, because it serves toward the attainment of the\ntruth; did it not serve this end it would not be made. The spirit does\nnot admit waste of time; for it time is always money. Hypothesism is\nsometimes restricted to the supreme principles of the real, or to what\nis called metaphysics, which would thus be always hypothetical; but for\nthe reasons given in our discussion of agnosticism, if the principles\nof the real were hypothetical, the whole truth would be so, that is to\nsay, there would not be any truth. For the rest, hypothesism, besides\nbeing internally contradictory, openly reveals that it is so, in\nits reference to the greater or lesser _probability_ of hypotheses.\nIt would be impossible to determine the degree of approximation to\nthe true without presupposing a criterion of truth, a truth and\nconsequently the truth. We should hardly have made mention of this\nerror did it not constitute the fulcrum of some of the most celebrated\nand revered philosophies of our times.\n\n\n\n\nVII\n\n\nTHE PHENOMENOLOGY OF ERROR AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Inseparability of the phenomenology of error from the\nphilosophic system. _]\n\nThe phenomenology of error, in its double sense of error and of\nsuggestion, coincides therefore with the philosophic system. Both\nerror and suggestion are improper combinations of philosophic ideas or\nconcepts. To determine these improper combinations is equivalent to\nshowing the _obverse_ of that of which the philosophic system is the\n_face._ But face and obverse are not separable, for they constitute a\nsingle thought (and single reality), which is positivity-negativity,\naffirmation-negation. There is, therefore, no phenomenology of error\noutside the philosophic system, nor a philosophic system outside\nthe phenomenology of error; the one is conceived at the moment when\nthe other is conceived. And since the philosophic system and the\ndoctrine of the categories are the same, the phenomenology of error is\ninseparable and indistinguishable from the doctrine of the categories.\n\n[Sidenote: _The eternal going and coming of errors._]\n\nAs such the phenomenology of error is an ideal and eternal circle, like\nthe eternal circle of the truth. Its stages are eternally traversed and\nretraversed by the spirit, being the stages of the spirit itself. At\nevery instant of the life of history and of our individual life there\nare represented the stages that have been surpassed and must again be\nsurpassed: the lower stages return and announce beforehand the higher.\n\n[Sidenote: _Returns to anterior philosophies, and their meaning._]\n\nIn this lies the origin of a fact which cannot fail to attract\nattention in the history of philosophy: the tendency which is found\nthere, to _return_ to one or other of the philosophies of the past, or,\nmore correctly, to one or other of the philosophic points of view of\nthe past. The thirteenth century returned to Aristotle, the Renaissance\nto Plato; Bruno revived the philosophy of Cusanus, Gassendi that of\nEpicurus; Hegel wished to renew Heraclitus; Herbart, Parmenides;\nin recent times a return has been made to Kant, and in times yet\nmore recent to Hegel. These are spiritual movements, which must be\nunderstood in all their seriousness. This consists wholly in the need\nof the philosophic spirit of a certain moment, which, struggling with\nan error, discovers the true concept with which it should be corrected,\nor at least, the superior and more ample suggestion, to which we\nmust pass in order to progress. And since that concept or suggestion\nhad already been represented in an eminent degree in the past by one\nparticular philosopher, or by one particular school, they speak of the\nnecessity of again asserting the superiority of that philosopher and\nhis school against other philosophers and other schools. In reality\nneither Aristotle nor Plato returns, nor Cusanus nor Epicurus, nor\nHeraclitus nor Parmenides, nor Kant nor Hegel; but only the mental\npositions of which these names are, in those cases, the symbols. The\neternal Platonism, Aristotelianism, Heracliteanism, Eleaticism are in\nus, as they were formerly in Plato and in Aristotle, in Heraclitus and\nin Parmenides. Divested of those historical names, they are called\ntranscendentalism and immanentism, evolutionism and anti-evolutionism,\nand so on. To the philosophers of the past, as men of the past, no\nreturn is made, because _no return is possible._ The past lives in the\npresent and the pretence of returning to it is equivalent to that of\ndestroying the present, in which alone it lives. Those who understand\n_ideal_ returns in this _empirical_ sense, do not in truth know what\nthey are saying.\n\n[Sidenote: _The false idea of a history of philosophy as the history of\nthe successive appearances in time of the categories and of errors._]\n\nBut just because the phenomenology of error and the system of the\ncategories are outside time, we must also recognize the fallacy of a\nhistory of philosophy which expounds the development of philosophic\nthought as a successive appearance in time of the various philosophic\ncategories and of the various forms of error. On this view the human\nrace seems to begin to think truly philosophically at a definite moment\nof time and at a definite point of space; for example at a definite\nyear of the seventh or sixth century before Christ, at a definite\npoint of Asia Minor, with Thales, who surpassing mere fancy posits as\na philosophic concept the empirical concept of water; or in another\nyear and place, with Parmenides, who posits the first pure concept,\nthat of being. And it seems further to progress in philosophic thinking\nwith other thinkers, each of whom either discovers a concept or offers\na suggestion of one. Thus each takes the other's hand and they form\na chain which is prolonged to one who, more audacious and fortunate\nthan the others, gives his hand to the first, and unites them all in\na circle. After this, there would remain nothing else to do but to\ndance eternally, as the stars dance in the imaginations of the poets,\nwithout any further necessity to devise suggestions and to risk falling\ninto error. All this is brilliant but arbitrary. The categories are\noutside time, because they are all and singly in every instant of\ntime, and therefore they cannot be divided and impersonated within\nempirical and individual limits. It is not true that each philosophic\nsystem has for its beginning a particular category or a particular\nsuggestion. A philosophic system, in the empirical signification of\nthe word, is a series of thoughts whose unity is the empirical bond of\nthe life of a definite individual. It is therefore without beginning,\nsince it does not constitute a true unity and refers on the one hand\nto its predecessors, on the other to those who continue it, and on all\nsides to its contemporaries. In the strict sense, in that system, in\nso far as it is philosophic, there is always the whole of philosophy;\nand therefore, as we have previously seen, all philosophic systems\n(including materialism and scepticism) have, whether they admit it\nor not, displayed or implied the same principle, which is the pure\nconcept, and every philosophy is idealism. Nor is it true that there\nis progress in the history of philosophy, in the sense of the passage\nfrom one category to another superior category, or from one suggestion\nto another superior suggestion. Speaking empirically, we should have in\nthis case to admit regress also, because it is a fact that a return is\nmade to inferior categories and suggestions. Philosophically, we can\nspeak in this case, neither of progress nor of regress, seeing that\nthose categories and suggestions are eternal and outside time.\n\nFinally, this conception of philosophic history itself declares its\nuntenability, since in its last term it is logically obliged to posit a\ndefinitive philosophy (which is that represented by him who constructs\nsuch a history of philosophy), whereas there is nothing definitive\nin reality, which is perpetual development. Those very historians of\nphilosophy themselves, who have desired and in part attempted to give\nactuality to that conception, have been perplexed at the assumption of\nso great a responsibility as to proclaim a _definitive philosophy,_\nthat is to say, to decree the retirement of Thought and so of Reality.\n\n[Sidenote: _Philosophism both of this false view and of the formula\nconcerning the identity of philosophy and history of philosophy._]\n\nThe error which appears in this conception of philosophic history, is\nthe same that we have already studied under the name of philosophism,\nand which appears here in one of its special applications. The formula\nof the error is the _identity of Philosophy with the History of\nphilosophy._ The sense in which this is meant is at once shown by the\ntendency which exists in this identity of the two terms, to be enlarged\ninto a third term, that is to say, into the recognition of the identity\nof philosophy and of the history of philosophy with the _Philosophy\nof history._ And this Philosophy of philosophic history, like every\nphilosophy of history, converts representations and empirical concepts\ninto pure concepts assigning to each one the function which properly\nbelongs to the categories, corrupting philosophy and history and\nbecoming shipwrecked in a sort of mythologism and propheticism.\n\n[Sidenote: _Distinction between this false idea of a history of\nphilosophy and the books that are so entitled or profess a like\nprogramme._]\n\nBut, as in the case of the philosophy of history in general, so also in\nthis application of it to the history of philosophy, it is necessary\nto recognize the elements of truth. These lie in the works of genius\nin _historical characterization,_ which under this guise have been\nachieved by various thinkers and in various epochs of philosophy.\nCertainly Plato is not only transcendental, nor is Aristotle only\nimmanentist; nor Kant only agnostic, nor Hegel only logical, nor\nEpicurus only materialist, nor Descartes only dualist; nor is Greek\nthought concerned only with objectivity, nor modern thought with\nsubjectivity alone. But history takes shape as historical narrative,\nby noting the prominent traits of the various individuals and of the\nvarious epochs. Without this process it would be impossible to divide,\nto summarize, or to record it; without the introduction of empirical\nconcepts, history could not be fixed in the memory.[1] By means of\nthose characterizations, it also happens that historical names can be\ntaken as symbols of truths and errors: all the crudity of dualism is\nexpressed in Descartes, the paradox of determinism in Spinoza, that of\nabstract pluralism in Leibnitz. We owe (as is admitted by all those\ncompetent to judge) the elevation of the history of philosophy from a\nchronicle or an erudite collection to history properly so-called, to\nhistorians of philosophy who were tainted with philosophism. And since\nHegel was the first and greatest of those historians, we must impute to\nHegel the arbitrary act that he committed, but also the merit of having\nbeen the first to give a history of philosophy worthy of the name\nand accord to him all the more merit, in so far as he almost always\ncorrected in execution the errors of his original plan.[2]\n\n[Sidenote: _Exact formula: identity of philosophy and of history._]\n\nThis original plan (and in general the position taken up by the system\nof Hegel) may perhaps be considered as a deviation and aberration\nfrom a just impulse, which still awaits its legitimate satisfaction.\nThis satisfaction we have attempted to give, by going deeply into the\nmeaning of the Kantian _a priori_ synthesis and by establishing the\nidentity of philosophy and history. Thus, as regards the question at\nissue, the formula that we oppose to Hegel's formula of the identity\nof _philosophy and history of philosophy,_ is that of the identity\nof _philosophy and history._ This difference may at first sight seem\nnon-existent or very slight, but yet it is substantial. Philosophy is\nindeed identical with history, because by solving historical problems\nit affirms itself, and is in this way identical with the history of\nphilosophy, not because this is separable from other histories, or has\nprecedence over them, but for precisely the contrary reason, that it\nis altogether inseparable from and completely fused in the totality\nof history, according to the unity in distinction already explained.\nHence it is seen that philosophy does not originate in time, that\nthere are not philosophic men and non-philosophic men, that there are\nnot concepts belonging to one individual which another individual\nis without, nor mental efforts which one makes and another does not\nmake, and that philosophy, or all the categories, operates at every\ninstant of the spiritual life, and at every instant of the spiritual\nlife operates upon material altogether new, given to it by history,\nwhich for its part it helps to create. This amounts to saying that\nfrom that concept we obtain the criticism of philosophism and of the\nformula expressing the identity of Philosophy, History of Philosophy\nand Philosophy of history; and a more exact idea of the history of\nphilosophy, free from the chains of an arbitrary classification.\n\n[Sidenote: _The history of philosophy and philosophic progress._]\n\nIt may seem that in this way we destroy all idea of philosophic\nprogress; and certainly philosophy, taken in itself, that is to say\nas an abstract category, does not progress any more than the category\nof art or of morality progresses. But philosophy in its concreteness\nprogresses, like art and the whole of life; it progresses, because\nreality is development, and development, including antecedents in\nconsequences, is progress. Every affirmation of truth is conditioned\nby reality and conditions a new reality, which, in turn, is in its\nprogress, the condition of a new thought and of a new philosophy. In\nthis respect it is true that a philosophy which comes later in time,\ncontains the preceding philosophies in itself, and not only when it\nis truly a philosophy, adequate to the new times, which comprehend\nancient times in themselves, but even when it is a simple suggestion,\nof the kind we have called erroneous and in need of correction. As\nerroneous suggestion it will be, ideally, inferior to the truths\nalready discovered. The scepticism of David Hume, for instance, is\ninferior from this point of view, not only to Cartesianism, but even\nto Scholasticism, to Platonism and to Socraticism. But historically it\nis superior even to the most perfect of those philosophies, because it\nis occupied with a problem which they did not propose to themselves\nand initiates its solution, by forming a first attempt at solution,\nhowever erroneous. Those perfect philosophies belong to the past, this,\nthough imperfect, has the future in itself. Thus it is explained how we\nsometimes find far more to learn in philosophers who have maintained\nerrors than from others who have maintained truths; the errors of\nthe former are gold in the quartz, which when it has been purified\nwill add weight and value to the mass of gold, which is already in\nour possession and has been preserved by the latter. Fanatics content\nthemselves with truths, however poor they are, and therefore seek those\nwho repeat them, even though they be poor of spirit. True thinkers seek\nfor adversaries, bristling with errors and rich with truth; they learn\nfrom them, and while opposing, love and esteem them; indeed, their\nopposing them is at the same time an act of esteem and of love.\n\n[Sidenote: _The truth of all philosophies, and critique of\neclecticism._]\n\nThe philosophy which each one of us professes at a determinate moment,\nin so far as it is adequate to the knowledge of facts and in the\nproportion in which it is adequate, is the result of all preceding\nhistory, and in it are organically brought together all systems,\nall errors and all suggestions. If some error should appear to be\ninexplicable, some suggestion without fruit, some concept incapable of\nadoption, the new philosophy is to that extent more or less defective.\nBut the organic reconciliation, which preceding philosophies must find\nin those that follow, cannot be the bare bringing them together in\ntime, and _eclecticism,_ as in those superficial spirits, who associate\nfragments of all philosophies without mediation. Eclecticism (from\nthe historical point of view also, as for instance in the relation\nof Victor Cousin to Hegel, whom he admired, imitated and failed to\nunderstand) is the falsification or the caricature of the vastness of\nthought, which embraces in itself all thoughts, though apparently the\nmost diverse and irreconcilable. The peace of the lazy, who do not\ncollide with one another, because they do not act, must not be made\nsublime and confounded with the lofty peace that belongs to those who\nhave striven and have fraternized after strife, or, indeed, during the\nactual combat.\n\n[Sidenote: _Researches concerning the authors and precursors of truths:\nand the reason for the antinomies which they exhibit._]\n\nA proof of this _constancy_ of philosophy, which is immanent in all\nphilosophies and in all the thoughts of men, and also of its perpetual\nvariation and novelty of historical form, is to be found in the\nquestions that have been and are raised, concerning the _origin_ or\n_discovery_ of truth. Hardly has the truth been discovered, when the\ncritics easily succeed in proving that it was already known, and begin\nthe search for _precursors._ And there can be no doubt that they are\nright and their researches deserve to be followed up. Every assertion\nof discovery, in so far as it seems to make a clear cut into the web\nof history, has something arbitrary about it. Strictly speaking,\nSocrates did not discover the concept, or Vico \u00e6sthetic fancy, or Kant\nthe _a priori_ synthesis, or Hegel the synthesis of opposites; nor\neven perhaps, did Pythagoras discover the theorem of the square on the\nhypotenuse, or Archimedes the law of the displacement of liquids. If\na discovery is represented as an explosion, this happens for reasons\nof practical and mnemonic convenience in narrating and summarising\nhistory; and, for that matter, the explosion, the eruption and the\nearthquake are continuous processes. But the rational side of the\nsearch for precursors must not cause the acceptance of the irrational\nside, which is the denial of the _originality_ of discoveries, as\nthough they were to be found point for point in the precursors, or\nas though they consisted only in the aggregation of elements which\npre-existed, or in like insignificant changes of form. To attach\noneself to precursors, does not mean to repeat them, but to continue\ntheir work. This continuation is always new, original, and creative\nand always gives rise to discoveries, be they small or great. To think\nis to discover. The reduction to absurdity of the wrong meaning of\nthe search for precursors is to be found in the fact that every one\nof the most important thoughts can be discovered in a certain sense\nin common beliefs, in proverbs, in ways of speech, and among savages\nand children. This is so much the case that by this path we can return\nto the Utopia of an _ingenuous_ philosophy, outside history; whereas\nphilosophy is truly ingenuous or genuine only when it _is,_ and it is\nnot, save in History.\n\n\n\n[Footnote 1: See above, Part II. Chap. III.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See ch. ix. _What is Living and What is Dead of the\nPhilosophy of Hegel,_ by the Author, English translation by Douglas\nAinslie.]\n\n\n\n\nVIII\n\n\n\"DE CONSOLATIONE PHILOSOPHIAE\"\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Logic and the defence of philosophy._]\n\nAttacks upon Philosophy and defences of it have been made as more\nor less academic exercises. But the true defence of it can only be\nPhilosophy itself, and above all, Logic, which, by determining the\nconcept of Philosophy, recognizes its necessity and function. And since\nLogic itself teaches that a concept is not truly known, save in the\nsystem where it is shown in all its relations, the complete defence is\nobtained in our opinion only, when this treatise dedicated to _Logic_\nis placed in relation to the preceding, which treats of _\u00c6sthetic,_ and\nwith that which follows and has for its object the _Philosophy of the\npractical._\n\n[Sidenote: _The utility of Philosophy and the philosophy of the\npractical._]\n\nTo this last must be relegated the complete elucidation of the problem\nconcerning the utility or non-utility of philosophy. It is a problem\nabout which We can here raise no fundamental question, if the equation\nposited by us be true: philosophy = thought = history = perception\nof reality. Thus the doubt concerning the utility of philosophy\nwould be of equal value with the extravagant doubt as to the utility\nof knowledge. The philosophy of the practical also demonstrates\nthat no action is possible, save when preceded by knowledge, and\nthat presupposed in action there is always historical or perceptive\nknowledge, that is, the knowledge which contains in itself all other\nknowledge. And it also demonstrates that reality, being always will\nand action, is always thought, and that therefore thought is not an\nextrinsic adjunct, but an intrinsic category constitutive of the Real.\nReality is action, because it is thought, and it is thought because it\nis action.\n\n[Sidenote: _Consolation of philosophy, as joy in thought and in the\ntruth. Impossibility of a pleasure arising from falsity or illusion._]\n\nIf thought is so useful that without it the Real would not be, the\ncommon concept of an unconsolatory philosophy cannot be accepted.\nConsolation, pleasure, joy, is activity itself, which rejoices in\nitself. So far as is known, no other mode of pleasure, joy and\nconsolation has yet been discovered. Now, knowledge of the true,\nwhatever it is, is activity and promotes activity, and therefore brings\nwith it its own consolation. \"The truth, known, though it be sad, _has\nits delights.\" _Not a few would wish to attribute these delights, not\nto truth, but to _illusion._ But illusion is either not recognized as\nillusion, or it is so recognized. When it is not recognized as such\nand yet truly satisfies the mind, it cannot be called illusion, but\ntruth, which has its own good reasons, since nothing can be held to be\ntrue without good reasons; it is that much of truth which can be noted\nin the given circumstances and which from the point of view of a more\ncomplete truth can only arbitrarily be called illusion: the consolation\ngiven by the pretended illusion resides, therefore, in its truth--or\nit is recognized as illusion, because the actual circumstances have\nchanged; and then it is anguish and desire to attain to the truth. If\nthere is no desire to attain to this truth, and if in order to avoid\nit, affirmations are brought forward, which are not adequate to the\nnew conditions in which we find ourselves, there is error, which,\nas such, is always more or less voluntary; and from error, which is\nself-critical, arise evil conscience, and remorse, and so again anguish\nand desire for the truth, which dissipates illusion and produces\nconsolation, because ... \"the truth though it be sad, yet has its\ndelights.\"\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique of the concept of a sad truth._]\n\nYet (it will be said), the true can be _sad;_ true, but sad. This\nprejudice also should be eliminated. Truth is reality, and reality is\nnever either glad or sad, since it comprehends both these categories in\nitself, and therefore surpasses them both. To judge reality to be sad,\nit would have to be admitted that we possessed besides the idea of it,\nthe idea of _another_ reality, which should be better than the reality\nknown to us. But this is contradictory. The second reality would be not\nreal and therefore not thinkable, and so no idea at all of it could be\nformed. And if we did attempt to form an idea of it, thought, entering\ninto contradiction with itself and striving in a vain effort, would be\nseized with terror, and would produce, not that ideal reality, but at\nthe most an \u00e6sthetic expression of terror, like that of a man who looks\nupon a bottomless abyss.\n\n[Sidenote: _Examples: philosophical criticism and the concepts of God\nand of Immortality._]\n\nOnce upon a time and even to-day many found and find consolation in\nthe idea of a personal God, who has created and governs the universe,\nand of an immortal life, above this life of ours, which vanishes\nat every instant. And this consolation seems to have diminished in\nour times, or to many of us, owing to Philosophies. But he who does\nnot limit himself to the surface and analyses the state of soul of\nsincere and noble believers, realizes that the God who comforted\nthem is the same who comforts us and whom our Philosophies call the\nuniversal Spirit, immanent in all of us--the continuity and rationality\nof the universe--just as the Immortality in which they reposed was\nthe immortality which transcends our individual actions, and in\ntranscending them, makes them eternal. All that is born is worthy to\nperish; but in perishing, it is also preserved as an ideal moment of\nwhat is born from it; and the universe preserves in itself all that\nhas ever been thought and done, because it is nothing but the organism\nof these thoughts and actions. Philosophy has rendered those concepts\nof God and of Immortality more exact, and has liberated them from\nimpurities and errors and thus at the same time from perplexities and\nanguish; it has rendered them more, not less, consolatory. On the\nother hand, the absurdity which mingled with those concepts, has never\nconsoled any one who seriously thought them--and serious thinking\nof them is an indispensable condition of obtaining consolation from\nconcepts. If they are not thought, but mechanically repeated, the\nconsolation is obtained from something else, from distraction and\noccupation with life lived, not from the concepts. In the effort\nto think a God outside the world, a Despot of the world, we are\nseized with a sense of fear for that God, who is a solitary being,\nsuffering from his omnipotence, which makes activity impossible for\nhim and dangerous for his creatures, who are his playthings. That God\nbecomes an object of maledictions. Equally, in seriously thinking our\nimmortality as empirical individuals, immobilized in our works and in\nour affections (which are beautiful only because they are in motion and\nfugitive), we are assailed by the terror, not of death, but of this\nimmortality, which is unthinkable because desolating and desolating\nbecause unthinkable. Ideal immortality has generated the poetic\nrepresentations of Paradise, which are representations of infinite\npeace; the false concepts of an empirical immortality can generate no\nother representation than Swift's profoundly satirical picture of the\n_Struldbrugs_ or immortals, plunged in all the miseries of life, unable\nto die, and weeping with envy at the sight of a funeral.\n\n[Sidenote: _Consolatory virtue belonging to all spiritual activities._]\n\nBut we do not wish to close these new considerations upon the old\ntheme _de consolatione Philosophiae,_ without noting that philosophy\nis not the sole or supreme consoler, as the philosophers of antiquity\nbelieved, and some among the moderns, who assumed the same attitude.\nIt is neither the sole nor the supreme consoler, because thought does\nnot exist alone, nor does it exist above life: thought is outside and\ninside life; and if on one side it surpasses life, on the other it is a\nmode of life itself. Philosophy brings consolation in its own kingdom,\nputting error to flight and preparing the conditions for practical\nlife; but man is not thought alone, and if he has joys and sorrows\nfrom thought, other sorrows and joys come to him from the exercise of\nlife itself. And in this exercise action heals the evils of action and\nlife brings consolation for life. The error of Stoicism and of similar\ndoctrines consists in attributing to philosophy a direct action upon\nthe ills of life and of making it in consequence the whole totality\nof the real. But philosophy has no pocket-handkerchiefs to dry all\nthe tears that man sheds, nor is it able to console unhappy lovers\nand unfortunate husbands (as sentimental people pretend): it can only\ncontribute to their comfort by healing that part of their pain which\nis due to theoretic obscurity. Such part is certainly not small: all\nour sorrows are irritated and made more pungent by mental darkness\nwhich paralyses or fetters the purification of action. But it is a\npart and not the whole. Every form of the activity of the Spirit, art\nlike philosophy, practical life like theoretic life, is a fount of\nconsolation and none suffices alone.\n\n[Sidenote: _Sorrow and the elevation of sorrow._]\n\n\"He that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow\" is a false saying,\nbecause the increase of knowledge is the overcoming of sorrow. But it\nis true, in so far as it means that the increase of knowledge does not\neliminate the sorrows of practical life. It does not eliminate, but\n_elevates_ them; and to adopt the fine expression of a contemporary\nItalian writer, superiority is \"nothing but the right to suffer on\na higher plane.\" On a higher plane, but neither more nor less than\nothers, who are at a lower level of knowledge,--to suffer on a higher\nplane, in order to act upon a higher plane.\n\n\n\n\nFOURTH PART\n\nHISTORICAL RETROSPECT\n\n\n\n\nI\n\n\nTHE HISTORY OF LOGIC AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Reality, Thought and Logic._]\n\nThe three terms, _Reality, Thought_ and _Logic_, and their relations,\ncould be represented by a system of three circles, the one included in\nthe other, and by marking at will as the first term that which includes\nall, or that which is included in all: R T L or L T R. Limiting\nourselves to the first method, the first circle would be Reality,\nwhich Thought (the second circle) would think, in the same way that\nit would in its turn be thought in the third circle, formed by Logic,\nthe Thought of thought, or the Philosophy of philosophy. This graphic\nsymbol is probably destined to some fortune; but the reader must not\nseek it in our pages, because knowing how much inadequacy, clumsiness\nand danger it contains, we share the repugnance, almost instinctively\nfelt at such materializations, which seem to be and are of slight value.\n\n[Sidenote: _Relation of these three terms._]\n\nThe vice of that spatial figuration is that it divides into three\ncircles what is three, but three in one, and should consequently be\nexpressed as a triple circle which should also be a single circle, in\nwhich all the three coincide; which is geometrically unrepresentable.\nThe relation of Reality, Thought of Reality and Thought of Thought,\ndivided into three circles, legitimately gives rise to the question:\nWhy should there not be a fourth, a fifth, a sixth circle (and so on\nto infinity) which should include respectively the third, the fourth,\nthe fifth (and so on to infinity)? Why should not a Logic of Logic,\nor a thought of the thought of thought, and so on, follow the thought\nof thought, which is Logic? For us, this question raises no objection\nthat need bring us to a halt for a single instant, just because we have\nnever divided the one reality into two or more different realities\n(matter and spirit, nature and idea, and so on), nor into a series of\ndifferent realities, the one following the other; but we have conceived\nit as a system of relations and of correlations, constituting a unity,\nindeed the only unity concretely thinkable. There is no progress to\ninfinity, when the terms are coincident and correlative; hence to\nthink the thought of thought would not be a new act, but equivalent\nto thinking thought. The mental act will be new (and any mental act\nis new) for the individual who accomplishes it in conditions that are\nalways new; but its spiritual form will always be that of Logic, which\nthinks thought and contains within itself, on its side, the process\nof reality. Further, the indifference exhibited by the symbol of the\ntriple circle as to the determination of the first as last and the\nlast as first, confirms for us the non-existence of a first that is\nonly first and of a last that is only last; confirms, that is to say,\nthe coincidence of unity in relation that is first and last. Reality\nis not only thought by thought, but is also thought; and thought\nis not only thought by Logic, but is also Logic. Those who wish to\nexpound philosophy and history, proceeding from the centre of the logos\nor Logic, and those who wish to expound them, proceeding from the\nperiphery of facts, are both right and wrong, because the centre is\nperiphery and the periphery centre.\n\n[Sidenote: _Non-existence of a general philosophy outside the\nparticular philosophic sciences:_]\n\nBy adopting this view, which affirms the most complete immanence, it\nhas never happened that in any part of the Real we have discovered a\ndivision between idea and fact, between general and particular, between\nprimary and secondary reality and the like, but we have found, in every\npart, relation and correlation, unity and distinction in unity. There\nis no general philosophy opposed to, or consequent on, or alongside\nparticular philosophies; particular philosophy is general, and the\ngeneral is the particular; nor is there a general history, which is\nnot also particular history, and _vice versa._ History is always the\nhistory of man as artist, thinker, economic producer, and moral agent,\nand in distinguishing these various aspects, it gives their unity,\nwhich does not transcend these various aspects, but _is_ these various\naspects themselves.\n\n[Sidenote: _and consequently of a History of general philosophy outside\nthe histories of particular philosophic sciences._]\n\nIn like manner, the History of thought, or the History of Philosophy,\nwhich is one of these determinate aspects, is distinguished in the\nhistories of particular philosophic concepts, as the history of\n\u00c6sthetic, of Logic, of Economics and of Ethics; but it is also unified\nin them and _consists in nothing but them,_ completely resolving itself\ninto them. There is no _general History of Philosophy,_ in the sense\nof a history of _general Philosophy,_ or of _Metaphysics,_ or whatever\nelse it may be called, outside particular histories (which are unity in\nparticularity).\n\nOne of the errors which in our opinion vitiates the writing of the\nhistory of philosophy, appears to be just the prejudice in favour of a\ntreatment of the general part of this history, in which, for instance,\nspeculations concerning practice enter only incidentally, a great\npart of logical doctrine is excluded as not belonging to it, and the\ndoctrines of \u00c6sthetic are hardly referred to at all. The prejudice is\nderived, in the last analysis, from the old idea of an Ontology or\nMetaphysic, as the science of an ideal world, of which nature and man\nare the more or less imperfect actualizations; hence the relegation of\na great part of true and proper philosophy to what is called the human\nand natural world, and the looking upon this as a special philosophy,\ndistinguished from general philosophy and consequently lying outside\nthe true and proper history of philosophy. That prejudice, amounting\nalmost to a survival, persists even in those who have more or less\nsurpassed such a conception, and determines the curious configuration\nof a general history of philosophy, outside the special histories.\nSuch a scheme, when closely examined, shows itself to be a complex of\nhistorical elucidations of some problems of Logic, and of some of the\nphilosophy of the practical (individuality, liberty, the supreme good,\netc.), and of some arising from their relations (knowing and being,\nspirit and nature, infinite and finite, etc.). These are all without\ndoubt arguments of philosophical history; but they must be united with\nthe others, from which they have been wrenched, and without which they\nprove but little intelligible. Philosophy is present in the Poetics\nand the Rhetoric of Aristotle as much as in the Metaphysics; not less\nin the _Critique of Pure Judgment_ of Kant, than in the _Critique of\nPure Reason._ It is never outside those treatises concerning what are\ncalled the special parts of philosophy. The present-day historians\nof philosophy who have overcome so many forms of transcendence\nand re-established immanence, must also overcome the residue of\ntranscendence, which, so to speak, they still retain in their own house.\n\n[Sidenote: _Histories of particular philosophies and literary value of\nsuch division._]\n\nCertainly, the reality of the distinctions between the various aspects\nof the real and between the various particular philosophies renders\npossible literary divisions, through which there are composed special\ntreatises upon Ethics and so upon the history of Ethic; upon Logic and\nso upon the history of Logic; upon \u00c6sthetic and so upon the history\nof \u00c6sthetic; but it is not possible by a like method of division to\nconstruct a treatise upon general Philosophy and a corresponding\nHistory of general philosophy. It is not possible, because this\nliterary division presupposes a distinction of concepts; and a general\nphilosophy is not conceptually distinguishable. When the attempt to\ndistinguish it is made, we have, as we saw, a mass of historical\nfragments taken from the various philosophic sciences; that is to\nsay, not the coherent historical treatment of problems relating to a\ndefinite aspect of the real, but a more or less arbitrary aggregate.\n\n[Sidenote: _History of Logic in a particular sense._]\n\nWith these considerations, we have answered the question concerning the\nrelation between the History of Logic and the History of Philosophy.\nThis relation is the same as that between Logic and Philosophy,--terms\nwhich are capable neither of distinction nor of opposition. The history\nof Logic is not outside the history of Philosophy, but is an integral\npart of this history itself. To make it the object of special treatment\nalways means to compose a complete history of philosophy, in which,\nfrom the literary point of view, prominence and priority are given\nto the problems of Logic, the others being thrown, not outside the\npicture, but into the background. The same may be said of the History\nof \u00c6sthetic or of Ethic or of any other particular discipline, which is\nnever held to be distinguishable.\n\n[Sidenote: _Works relating to the history of Logic._]\n\nLogic being more or less profoundly renovated (as we have sought\nto do in this book), it is natural that the histories of Logic\nhitherto available can no longer be completely satisfactory. For they\nare written from points of view that have been surpassed, such as\nAristotelian formalism or Hegelian panlogism, and therefore either\ndo not interpret facts with exactitude, or they give prominence and\nexaggerated importance to certain orders of facts, neglecting others\nfar more worthy of mention and of examination.\n\nOf the special books bearing the title of the History of Logic, there\nis really only one--that of Charles Prantl--which, based upon wide\nresearches, is truly remarkable for its doctrine and for lucid and\nanimated exposition. Unfortunately this does not go further than the\nfifteenth century and omits the whole movement of modern philosophy.[1]\nBut even the period exhaustively treated by him (Antiquity and the\nMiddle Ages) is looked at from the narrow angle of an Aristotelian and\nformal temperament. Other works bearing the same title are not worthy\nof attention.[2] On the other hand, the better histories of Logic must\nnot be sought under this title, but especially in the better Histories\nof Philosophy, beginning with that of Hegel, which, for the most part,\nis precisely a history of Logic.\n\nIn inaugurating a new treatment, governed by the principles which we\nhave defended, we shall confine ourselves, in the following pages,\nto a sketch of the history of some of the principal parts of logical\ndoctrine, without any claim to even approximate completeness, and with\na view to giving simple illustrations of the things that were said\nin the theoretical part. In this theoretical part, in virtue of the\nidentity of philosophy and history which we have explained, history may\nbe said to be already contained and projected, even though names and\ndates are mostly omitted and left to be understood.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: _Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande,_ Leipzig, 1855-1870,\n4 vols. Scattered memoirs of certain writers belonging to later times\nare being published by Prantl in academic journals, and it would be\nopportune to collect these in a volume.]\n\n[Footnote 2: A rapid sketch, compiled in part from the work of Prantl,\nwith a polemical addition directed against the adversaries of the\nHegelian Logic, precedes the _Logic_\u00b2 of Kuno Fischer. The historical\npart of the _System der Logik_ of Ueberweg (fifth edition, 1882, edited\nby J. B. Meyer) has an almost exclusively bibliographical character\nwith excerpts, and that contained in L. Rabus, _Logik ii. System der\nWissenschaften,_ Erlangen-Leipzig, 1895, is yet more arid. The _Gesch.\nd. Logik_ of F. Harms (Berlin, 1881) is meagre in facts, verbose and\nvague. In recent monographs on special points, one feels the effect\nof what is called Logistic or new formalism, which makes the authors\npursue ineptitudes and curiosities of slight value.]\n\n\n\n\nII\n\n\nTHE THEORY OF THE CONCEPT\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Question as to who was the \"father of Logic.\"_]\n\nJust as whenever in \u00c6sthetic any one sought the \"father\" of the science\nPlato was usually named, so whenever a like enquiry has been proposed\nfor Logic that honourable title has been almost unanimously bestowed\nupon Aristotle. But even if we admit (as we must) in a somewhat\nempirical and expedient sense, the propriety of these searches for\n\"discoverers\" and \"fathers,\" Aristotle could not in our eyes occupy\nthat position. For if Logic is the science of the concept, such a\nscience was evidently begun before him. Further, Aristotle himself\nclaimed the distinction only of having reduced and treated the theory\nof reasoning[1] and recognized elsewhere that to Socrates belonged the\nmerit of having directed attention to the examination and definition of\nthe concept (\u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c2 \u03c4' \u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03cc\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9), that is to\nsay, to the very principle of logical Science,[2] the rigorous form of\ntruth.\n\n[Sidenote: _Socrates, Plato, Aristotle._]\n\nIn this affirmation of the consistency and absoluteness of knowledge\nand of truth (sustained in him by a vivid religious and moral\nconsciousness) lies the significance of Socrates as opposed to the\nSophists; as indeed in the same thing lies the importance of Hellenic\nLogic of the truly classical period. This Logic elaborated the idea\nof conceptual knowledge, of science or of philosophy, and transmitted\nit to the modern world with a terminology, which is in great part\nthat which we ourselves employ. We too reject in almost the same\nwords as the Greek philosophers the renascent sophism, the perennial\nProtagoreanism, and the sensationalism which denies truth, and (like\nthe ancient Gorgias), by declaring it incommunicable by the individual,\nindividualizes and reduces it to practical utility. In Plato, the\naffirmation and glorification of conceptual knowledge was accompanied\nby contempt for the knowledge of the individual, and in comparison\nwith the immortal world of ideas, the world of sensations was for him\nso dark and obscure as to disappear in his eyes like phantoms before\nthe sun. But Aristotle, although he held firmly that there is no\nscience of the accidental and individual, and of sensation, which is\nbound to space and time, to the _where_ and the _when,_ and that the\nobject of science is the universal, the essence, _which is being,_\nwas less exclusive than he; and as he saved the world of poetry from\nthe condemnation of Plato, so, in all his philosophy and in all his\nwork as physicist, politician and historian, he affirmed the world of\nexperience and of history.[3]\n\n[Sidenote: _Enquiries concerning the nature of the concept in Greece.\nThe question of transcendence and immanence._]\n\nOn the other hand, there was in Socrates only the consciousness of\nthe universal still indefinite and vague; in Plato there appeared\nfor the first time the consciousness of the true character of the\nuniversal, and so of its distinction from empirical universals; and\nin Aristotle this enquiry gave important results. The problem of the\nnature of the concept became, then and afterwards, interwoven with\nthat other problem of the transcendence or immanence of the concepts;\nbut since, notwithstanding many points of contact, the two problems\ncannot be completely identified, they must not be confounded. Indeed,\nthe problem of the transcendence or immanence of the universals is\nreducible to the more general problem of the relation between values\nand facts, the ideal and the real, what ought to be and what is;\nwhereas the other, concerning the nature of the universals, centres\nupon the distinction between universals that are truly logical, and\npseudological universals, and upon the greater or less admissibility\nof one or the other or of both, and so upon their mode of relation.\nThe point of contact between the two problems lies in this, that where\npure and real universals are denied and only arbitrary and nominal\nuniversals allowed to subsist, the question of the immanence or\ntranscendence of the universals also disappears. And as to the first\nproblem and the polemic of Aristotle against Plato concerning the\nideas, it has appeared to some critics (to Zeller and others) that\nAristotle misunderstood his master and invented an error that Plato\nhad never maintained, or attacked merely certain gross expositions of\ndoctrine which were current in some Platonic school. To others again\n(to Lotze, for instance), it has seemed that Aristotle thought this\nproblem, at bottom, in the same way as Plato, who by placing the ideas\nin a hyper-Uranian space, in a super-world or a super-heaven, thus\ncame to refuse to them that reality which Aristotle himself refused\nto them and to consider them as _values,_ not as _beings;_ although\nGreek linguistic usage prevented Plato from expressing the difference,\njust as it prevented Aristotle from expressing the same thing, when it\nled him to describe genera as \"second substances\" (\u03b4\u03b5\u03cd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f7a\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03b9).\nHowever, as regards the first interpretation, it certainly seems to\nus that it is impossible to raise doubts about such a document as\nthe testimony of Aristotle[4] by means of such frequently uncertain\ndocuments as the Platonic dialogues. And as regards the second\ninterpretation, it seems to us that it does not so much purge Plato\nof the vice of transcendence as convict his adversary also of sharing\nthat vice. On this point the opposition of Aristotle to his predecessor\ndoes not coincide with that of modern nominalism and empiricism to\nphilosophic idealism, for the former sets in question the truth of the\nconcept itself. Aristotle denied this truth as little as Plato; indeed\nhe expressly asserted that his predecessor was right, and approved his\ndefinite accusation of the sophists that they were occupied not with\nthe universal but with the accidental, that is to say, with not-being.\n\n[Sidenote: _Controversies as to the various forms of concept in Plato._]\n\nThe beginning of the enquiry as to the nature of universals or of ideas\nis to be seen, on the other hand, in Plato's embarrassments before the\nquestions as to whether there are ideas of everything, of artificial\nas well as of natural things, of noble things and vile things alike,\nof things only or also of properties and relations; of good things\nor also of bad things (\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd, \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd)[5] He\ndoes not escape from the embarrassments, save occasionally, by making\nstrange admissions, by accepting ideas of all the preceding, only\nto fall immediately afterwards into contradictions, through which\nhowever we see the outlines of the problems of to-day. Are the ideas\nrepresentative concepts (of things) or are they not rather categories\n(ideas of relation)? Arc opposites particular kinds of ideas (if there\nexist ideas of base and ugly things, as well as of beautiful and good\nthings)? Is it possible to distinguish, from the point of view of the\nIdeas, between the natural world and the human world (between natural\nthings and artificial)? Plato himself refers to mathematical knowledge\nas distinct from philosophic knowledge.\n\n[Sidenote: _The philosophic concepts and the empirical and abstract\nconcepts in Aristotle. Philosophy, physics and mathematics._]\n\nIn Aristotle, the determination of the rigorous philosophic concept\nand its distinction from empirical and abstract concepts make great\nprogress, although this does not amount to a solution of those Platonic\nembarrassments. Aristotle accurately traces the limits between\nPhilosophy (and so the philosophic concept) and the physical and\nmathematical sciences. Philosophy, the science of God or _theology_\n(as he also calls it), treats of being in its absoluteness, and so\nnot of particular beings or of the matter that forms part of their\ncomposition. The non-philosophical sciences, on the other hand, always\ntreat of particular beings (\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f44\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9). They take their\nobjects from sense or assume them by hypotheses, giving now more, now\nless accurate demonstrations of them. All the physical sciences have\nneed of some definite material (\u1f55\u03bb\u03b7) because they are always concerned\nwith noses, eyes, flesh, bones, animals, plants, roots, bark, in short\nwith material things, subject to movement. There even arises a physical\nscience that is concerned with the soul, or rather, with a sort of\nsoul (\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03c2), in so far as this is not without matter.\nMathematics, like philosophy, studies, not things subject to movement,\nbut motionless being; but it differs from philosophy in not excluding\nthe matter in which their objects are as it were incorporated (\u1f61\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\n\u1f54\u03bb\u1fc3i): the suppression of matter is obtained in them by aphairesis or\nabstraction.[6]\n\n[Sidenote: _The universals of the \"always\" and those of the \"for the\nmost part.\"_]\n\nThis divergence between philosophic and physical or mathematical\nprocedure is the point upon which empiricism and mathematicism rely;\nbut these, inferior here to Aristotle, deny the science of absolute\nbeing (\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f45\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ac\u03c0\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2) and leave in existence only the second\norder of sciences, which deal with the particular and abstract.\nThere is another important distinction in Aristotle, but to tell\nthe truth it is impossible to say how far he connected it with the\npreceding distinction between philosophy and physics, with which it is\nsubstantially one. Aristotle knew two forms of universal: the universal\nof the _always_ (\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe1 \u1f00\u03b5\u03af) and that of the _for the most part_ (\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe1\n\u1f61\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03cd).[7] He was well aware of the difference between the\nfirst, which is truly universal, and the second, which is so only in\nan approximate and improper manner; and he even asked himself if the\n_for the most part_ alone existed and not also the _always_; but his\ninterest was directed not so much to the comparative differences of\nthe two series, as to the common character of universality which both\nof them asserted as against the individual and accidental. Science (he\nsaid) is occupied, not with the accidental, but with the universal,\nwhether it be eternal and necessary (\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd) or only approximately\nuniversal (\u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03cd).[8] Philosophy, physics and mathematics felt at\nthis period that they had a common enemy in sensationalism and sophism,\nand they formed an alliance against this common enemy, rather than as\nhappened later, dissipate their energies in intestinal welfare.\n\n[Sidenote: _Controversies concerning Logic in the Middle Ages._]\n\nWithout dwelling upon the later scepticism, mysticism and mythologism,\nwhich represented the dissolution of ancient philosophy and the germ\nof a new life (especially in Christian mythologism, which had absorbed\nelements of ancient philosophy and was accompanied by a very developed\ntheology), we must pass on to note the progress which the logical\nproblem made in the schools of the Middle Ages. To look upon medi\u00e6val\nphilosophy (as many do) as a negligible episode, a mere detritus of\nancient culture quite unconnected with the later spiritual activity, is\nnow no longer possible. Certainly in the disputes of the nominalists\nand realists, the problem of transcendence and of immanence was\nneglected. It could not be solved on the presumptions of a philosophy\nwhich had at its side a theology, of which it constituted itself the\nhandmaiden. The Platonic transcendence was incurable in Christianity,\nand those who even to-day seek to purify Christianity from survivals\nof Greek thought, do not perceive that, in this purification effected\nby their philosophies of action and of immanence, they are destroying\nChristianity itself.[9]\n\n[Sidenote: _Nominalism and realism._]\n\nBut in those disputes, besides the question of the place that belongs\nto science in relation to religious faith, or to mundane science in\nrelation to revealed and divine science, the question of the nature\nof the concept was also raised; that is to say, they continued the\nPlatonic-Aristotelian enquiry into the doctrine of the concept in\nthe second of the meanings that we have distinguished. But no true\nconclusion was reached in this enquiry. The conciliatory formula of\nthe Arabic interpreters of Aristotle, accepted by Albertus Magnus and\nThomas Aquinas, in which the universals were affirmed as existing\n_ante, in_ and _post rem,_ in so far as it is possible to confer\nupon it an exact meaning, was understood in a superficial manner,\nand therefore it has not unreasonably seemed too easy and too\nexpeditious.[10] A dispute of this sort cannot be solved by summarizing\ndiscordant opinions, as in the formula we have mentioned, or by fixing\na mean, as in conceptualism. But the realists, bravely maintaining\nthe truth of the philosophic universal, maintained the rights of\nrational thought and of philosophy; and the nominalists, on their part,\nasserting in contradiction to the former, the nominalist universal,\nprepared the modern theories of natural science. Realism produced\nphilosophic thought of high importance, as in the so-called ontological\nargument of Anselm of Aosta, which (though through the myth of a\npersonal God) asserts the unity of Essence and Existence, the reality\nof what is truly conceivable and conceived. Gaunilo, who confuted and\nsatirized that concept, by employing the example of a \"most perfect\nisland,\" thinkable yet non-existent, seems an anticipation of Kant;\nat least of the Kant who employed the example of the hundred dollars\nto illustrate the same case--if it is not more accurate to say that\nKant was, in that case, a late Gaunilo. Anselm replied (as Hegel did to\nKant) that it was not a question of an island (or of a hundred dollars\nof something imaginable that is not at all a concept), but of the being\nthan which it is impossible to think a greater and a more perfect (the\ntrue and proper concept). On the other hand, the nominalists, who\nlike Roscellinus maintained that the _universelles substantiae_ were\n_nonnisi flatus vocis,_ performed the useful office of preventing the\nsciences of experience from being absorbed and lost in philosophy.\nIn Roger Bacon we see clearly the connection of nominalism with\nnaturalism. He considered individual facts, so-called external\nexperience, in its immediacy, as the true and proper object of science.\nConcepts were for him a simple expedient, directed towards the mastery\nof the immense richness of the individual. \"_Intellectus est debilis_\n(he said); _propter eam debilitatem magis conformatur rei debili, quae\nest universale, qitam rei quae habet multum de esse, ut singulare._\"\n\n[Sidenote: _Nominalism, mysticism and coincidence of opposites._]\n\nBut the nominalists, _dialecticae haeretici_ (as Anselm called them),\nwere heretics only in the circle of the dialectic. The truth remained\nfor them something beyond; the concept, the _secunda intentio,_ was\ncertainly something arbitrary and _ad placitum instituta_; it was\n\"_forma artificialis tantum, quae per violentiam habet esse,_\" but\nbeyond it were always faith and revelation. God is the truth, and in\nGod the ideas are real; hence Roger Bacon gave to inner light (as\nthe positivists or neocritics of to-day give to feeling) a place\nbeside sensible experience. Mysticism, being developed from medi\u00e6val\nphilosophy, both from one-sided realism and from one-sided nominalism,\nextends its hand at the dawn of the new Era to the philosophy of\nCusanus, to scepticism, to _docta ignorantia._ This was not a mere\nnegation; so much so that in it (though in a negative form and\nmixed with religion) there appears in outline nothing less than the\ntheory of the _coincidence of opposites,_ that is to say, the cradle\nof that modern logical movement, which was destined definitely to\nconquer transcendence. The coincidence of opposites is the germ of\nthe dialectic, which unifies value and fact, ideal and real, what\nought to be and what is. This important thought reappears in German\nmysticism; and (significantly for its future destinies) rings out upon\nthe lips of Martin Luther, who declared that virtue coexists with its\ncontrary, vice, hope with anxiety, faith with vacillation, indeed with\ntemptation, gentleness with disdain, chastity with desire, pardon with\nsin; as in nature, heat coexists with cold, white with black, riches\nwith poverty, health with disease; and that _peccatum manet et non\nmanet, tollitur et non tollitur,_ and that at the moment a man ceases\nto make himself better, he ceases to be good.[11] And before it became\ndominant in Jacob B\u00f6hme it was stripped of its religious form and\neloquently defended in Italy by Giordano Bruno.[12]\n\n\n[Sidenote: _The Renaissance and naturalism. Bacon._]\n\nThis realist, mystical and dialectical current of thought was destined\nto yield its best fruits some centuries later. For the time being, in\nthe seventeenth century, and yet more in the century that followed,\nthe victory seemed to rest with nominalism, that is to say, with\nnaturalism. In Italy, Leonardo da Vinci laughed at theological and\nspeculative disputes and celebrated, not the mind, but the _eye_ of\nman, that is, the science of observation. The same tendency appeared\nin the anti-Aristotelians and naturalists, who placed the natural\nsciences above scholasticism. In England, the other Bacon, however\nslight his importance both as philosopher and naturalist, yet has\nmuch importance as the symptom and spokesman of the self-assertion\nof naturalism. In the _Novum Organum,_ the universal of the _for the\nmost part_ claims its rights as against the universal of the necessary\nand eternal. He does not wish, however, to do away with the latter,\nbut rather to complete it; the syllogism is insufficient, induction\nalso is needed. Philosophy and theology are well where they are, but a\nscience of physics is also needed; philosophic induction, which goes\nat a leap to first causes, must be accompanied by a gradual induction\n(the only one that interests the naturalist), which connects particular\nfacts by means of laws more and more general; final causes must be\nbanished from the study of nature, and only efficient causes admitted.\n_Anticipationes naturae,_ that is to say, the invasions of philosophism\ninto the natural sciences, are to be prohibited. These utterances are\nfar more discreet than those that have so often since been heard.\n\n[Sidenote: _The ideal of exact science and the Cartesian philosophy._]\n\nBy another school of this period, on the other hand, the pure concept\nwas wrongly identified with the abstract concept. Thus speculative\nrationalism took the form of mathematical rationalism and the ideal\nof philosophy was confused with the ideal of _exact science._ This\ntendency is also to be found in Leonardo, who exalted \"reason\"\nalone, that is calculation, as outside of and sometimes superior to\nexperience. Galileo expressed similar thoughts later. The Cartesian\nphilosophy is animated with it, that is to say, the philosophy of\nDescartes and of his great followers, especially Spinoza and Leibnitz.\nThus this is especially an intellectualist philosophy, full of empty\nexcogitations and rigid divisions, developed by a mechanical or by\na teleological method, which always operated by means of mechanism.\nIt is true that even under these improper forms, philosophic thought\nprogressed. The consciousness of the inner unity of philosophy\nprogressed with Descartes, that of the unity of the real by means of\nSpinoza's concept of substance, and that of spiritual activity by means\nof the dynamism of Leibnitz; but Logic remained as a whole the old\nscholastic logic. The purity of the concept was asserted at the expense\nof concreteness; thus the concept, in the Logic of those writers, is\nalways something abstract, although its reality is so far recognized\nthat it is thought possible to think with it the most real (the God\nof Descartes, the substance of Spinoza, the Monad of Leibnitz). The\neighteenth century, mathematical, abstractionist, intellectualist\nratiocinative, anti-historical, illuminist, reformist, and finally\nJacobin, is the legitimate issue of this Cartesian philosophy, which\nconfuses the Logic of philosophy with the Logic of mathematics. France,\nwhich was the country of its birth and where it became most firmly\nrooted and most widely disseminated, owes to it, perhaps even more than\nto Scholasticism, the mental imprint which it still bears and which\nthe strong Germanic influence that has made itself felt there also in\nthe last century has not sufficed to eradicate. It is only in our day\nthat the country which is the type of the abstract intellect strives\nto become philosophically more concrete. It is now occupied with\n\u00e6stheticism or intuitionism, and, unless the movement is suffocated or\ndissipated, it may effect a true revolution in the traditional French\nspirit.\n\n[Sidenote: _Adversaries of Cartesianism. Vico._]\n\nThe opposition to abstractionism had no representatives in the\nseventeenth century and for a great part of the eighteenth, except\namong thinkers of but slight systematic powers, with whom it did\nnot progress beyond the logical form of the presentiment and the\nliterary form of the aphorism. In France, Blaise Pascal was one of\nthese, with his anti-Cartesianism, his restriction of the value of\nmathematics, and his celebration of the reasons of the heart which\nreason does not know. In Germany there was Hamann, who possessed such\na strong sense of tradition, of history, of language, of poetry and\nof myth, and finally of the truth contained in the principle of the\n_coincidence of opposites_ which he had met with somewhere in Bruno.\nThe Italian Giambattista Vico was the only great systematic thinker\nto express opposition to abstractionism and Cartesianism. Prior to\nand more clearly than Hamann, he perceived the unity of philosophy\nand history, or as he called it, of _philosophy and philology._ He\nconceived thought as an _ideal history_ of reality, immanent in the\nreal history which occurs in time; he abolished the distinctions of the\nconcept as separate species and substituted the notion of degrees or\nmoments, which (as Schelling did after him) he called _ideal epochs_;\nhe considered the abstractionist and mathematical century which he saw\nrising before him, as a period of philosophic decadence, and foretold\nthe evil effects of Cartesian anti-historicism. (His presage was\nfulfilled.) In this way, he sketched a new Logic, very different from\nthat of Aristotle or of Arnaud which was the most recent, a Logic in\nwhich he attempted to satisfy Plato and Bacon, Tacitus and Grotius, the\nidea and the fact. But if the other opponents of abstractionism had\nvery little effect, because of their immaturity and want of system,\nVico also was ineffectual, because he was born in Italy precisely at\nthe time when Italy as a productive country was definitely issuing from\nthe circle of European thought and was beginning passively to accept\nthe more popular forms of foreign thought. Finally, Naples, the little\ncountry of Vico, was then becoming encyclop\u00e6dist and sensationalist,\nand did not really begin to know until a century later the remedy for\nsuch evils composed in anticipation by Vico.\n\n[Sidenote: _Empiricist Logic and its dissolution--Locke, Berkeley and\nHume._]\n\nThe surpassing of the Logic of the abstract concept and the achievement\nof that of the concrete concept or pure concept or idea, was realized\nin other ways, primarily by a sort of reduction to the absurd of\nempiricist and mathematical Logic, in the scepticism which was its\nresult. This reduction to the absurd, this final scepticism, is to\nbe observed in the movement of English philosophy, beginning with\nLocke or even with Hobbes, to Hume. Locke, starting from perception\nas his presupposition, derived all ideas from experience, with the\nsole instrument of reflection; and rejecting innate ideas and looking\nupon others as more or less arbitrary, he preserved some objectivity\nto mathematical ideas alone, which relate to what are called primary\nqualities. Berkeley denies objectivity even to the primary qualities.\nAll concepts, naturalist and mathematical alike, are for him abstract\nconcepts and to that extent without truth. The only truth is the\n\"idea,\" which means here nothing but sensation or the representation\nof the individual. His Logic is not empiricist, because it is in no\nrespect Logic. At the most it is an \u00c6sthetic substituted for and\ngiven as Logic. It is true, notwithstanding his complete denial of\nuniversals--of empirical and abstract, no less than of philosophic,\nwhich he never even mentions--that he deludes himself into thinking\nthat he has overcome scepticism; and it is true also that he laid the\nfoundations of a spiritualist and voluntarist conception of reality,\nwhich in our opinion should be preserved and adopted by modern thought.\nBut this proves only that his philosophy does not wholly agree with\nhis Logic, and not that his Logic is not the complete denial of the\nconcept and of thought. The logical consequence of Berkeley could not,\nthen, be anything but the scepticism of David Hume, who shakes the very\nfoundation upon which the whole of the science of nature rests, namely,\nthe principle of causality.\n\n[Sidenote: _Exact science and Kant. The concept of the category._]\n\nAs the effect of this extreme scepticism, the surpassing of empiricist\nand abstractionist Logic had to be begun with the restoration of that\nLogic itself (because that which does not exist cannot be surpassed),\nthat is to say, with the demonstration, against Hume, that the exact\nscience of nature is possible. Such is the principal task of the\n_Critique of Pure Reason_, which contains the Logic of the natural\nand mathematical sciences, thought no longer by an empiricist, but by\na philosopher who has surpassed empiricism and recognized that the\nconcepts of experience presuppose the human intellect, which originally\nconstructed them. Leibnitz had already travelled this road, when in\na polemic against Locke he maintained that reflection to which Locke\nappealed, referred back to the innate ideas: for if reflection (he\nsaid) is nothing but \"_une attention \u00e0 ce qui est en nous et les sens\nne nous donnent point ce que nous portons d\u00e9j\u00e0 avec nous,_\" how can\nit ever be denied \"_qu'il y est beaucoup d'inn\u00e9 en nous, puisque nous\nsommes, pour ainsi dire, inn\u00e9s \u00e0 nous m\u00eames? Peut-on nier qu'il y ait\neu nous \u00eatre, unit\u00e9, substance, dur\u00e9e, changement, action, perception,\nplaisir et mille autres objets de nos id\u00e9es intellectuelles?_\"[13] The\n_New Essays,_ in which theses and other similar themes were developed,\nremained for a time unedited, but appeared opportunely in 1765 to\nfecundate German thought, and acted upon Kant, together with English\nempiricism and scepticism, the latter giving the problem and the former\nalmost an attempt at a solution. But the innate ideas of Leibnitz\nare profoundly transformed in the Kantian concept of the _category,_\nwhich is the formal element and really exists only in the very act\nof judgment, which it effects. Mathematics are thus secured in their\npossession, no longer by means of the primary qualities of Locke, but\nbecause they arise from the _a priori_ forms of intuition, space and\ntime. The natural sciences are also secured, because the concepts of\nthem are constituted by means of the categories of the intellect,\non the data of experience. In other words, mathematical and natural\nscience have value, in so far as they are a necessary product of the\nspirit.\n\n[Sidenote: _The limits of science and Kantian scepticism._]\n\nBut a limitation of value due also to Kant, accompanies this theoretic\nreinforcement of exact science. That science is necessary, because\nproduced by the categories; but the categories cannot develop their\nactivity except upon the data of experience; so that exact science is\nlimited to experience, and whenever it makes the attempt to surpass it,\nit becomes involved in antinomies and paralogisms and gesticulates in\nthe void. Science moves among phenomena and can never penetrate beyond\nthem and attain to the \"Thing in itself.\"\n\n[Sidenote: _The limits cf science and Jacobi._]\n\nIt would seem from this that Kant was bound to end in a renovated\nnominalism and mysticism, and indeed such is partly the case.\nContemporaneously with him, Jacobi also observed the limit in which\nis enclosed the mechanical and determinist science of nature (the\nhighest philosophic expression of which was then found in the _Ethic_\nof Spinoza), since it works with the principle of causation and is\nimpotent, unless it wishes to commit suicide, to leave the finite\nwhich it describes in a causal series, and Jacobi concluded in favour\nof mysticism and of _feeling,_ the organ of the Knowledge of God.\nKant, like Jacobi, in his turn has recourse to the non-theoretic\nform of the spirit, to the practical reason and its postulates, to\nprovide that certitude of God, of immortality, and of human freedom,\nwhich is not evident to the theoretic reason. But in Kant there are\nother positive elements which are not in Jacobi, and these elements,\nalthough not sufficiently elaborated by him and not harmonized with\none another, confer upon his philosophy the value of a new Logic,\nmore or less sketched. For he recognizes not only a theoretic but\nalso a practical reason, which cannot be called simply practical, if\nit in any way produce (although only under the title of postulates),\nknowledge (and knowledge of supreme importance). He recognises also an\n\u00e6sthetic judgment, which, although developed without concepts, does\nnot belong to the sphere of practical interests; and a teleological\njudgment, which is regulative and not constitutive, but not on this\naccount arbitrary or without meaning. Finally, the very contradictions,\nin which the intellect becomes involved, when it wishes to apply the\ncategories beyond experience, could not reasonably be considered by\nhim to be mere errors, because they constitute serious problems, if\nthe intellect becomes involved in them, not capriciously, but of\n_necessity._ All this presages the coming of a new Logic, which shall\nset in their places these scattered elements of truth and solve the\ncontradictions.\n\n[Sidenote: _The a priori synthesis._]\n\nBut the Kantian philosophy also contains, in addition to these elements\nand these stimulations, the concept of the new Logic in the _a priori_\nsynthesis. This synthesis is the unity of the necessary and the\ncontingent, of concept and intuition, of thought and representation,\nand consequently is the pure concept, the _concrete_ universal.\n\n[Sidenote: _The intimate contradiction of Kant. Romantic principle and\nclassical execution._]\n\nKant was not aware of this; and instead of developing with a mind free\nfrom prejudice the thought of his genius, he also allowed himself\nto be vanquished by the abstractionism of his time and out of the\nlogical and philosophical _a priori_ synthesis he made the more or\nless arbitrary _a priori_ synthesis of the sciences. In this way, the\napriority of the intuition led him, not to art, but to mathematics\n(transcendental \u00c6sthetic)[14] the apriority of the intellect led\nhim, not to Philosophy, but to Physics (abstract intellect): hence\nthe impotence which afflicted that synthesis, when confronted with\nphilosophic problems. When he discovered the _a priori_ synthesis,\nKant had laid his hand upon a profoundly _romantic_ concept; but his\ntreatment of it became afterwards _classicist_ and _intellectualist._\nThe synthesis is the palpitating reality which makes itself and knows\nitself in the making: the Kantian philosophy makes it rigid again in\nthe concepts of the sciences; and it is a philosophy in which the sense\nof life, of imagination, of individuality, of history, is almost as\ncompletely absent as in the great systems of the Cartesian period.\nWhoever is not aware of this intimate drama and fails to understand\nthis contradiction; whoever, when confronted with the work of Kant, is\nnot seized with the need, either of going forward or of going backward,\nhas not reached the heart of that soul, the centre of that mind. The\nold philosophers who condemned Kant as sceptical and as a corrupter of\nphilosophy, and who confined themselves strictly to Wolfianism and to\nscholasticism, and the new who greeted him as a precursor and made of\nhim a stepping-stone on which to mount higher,--these alone came truly\ninto contact with Kant's philosophy. For in his case there are but two\nalternatives: abhorrence or attraction, loathing or love. In the midst\nof a battle one must flee or fight: to sit still and take one's ease is\nthe attitude of the unconscious and the mad. Certainly it is better to\nfight than to flee, but it is better to flee than to sit inactive. He\nwho flees, saves at least his own skin, or, to abandon metaphor, saves\nthe old philosophy, which is still something; but the inactive man\nloses both life and glory, the old philosophy and the new.\n\n[Sidenote: _Advance upon Kant: Fichte, Schelling, Hegel._]\n\nThe new philosophy was that of the three great post-Kantians, Fichte,\nSchelling and Hegel. With Fichte, all trace of the thing in itself has\ndisappeared and the dominating concept is that of the Ego, that is,\nof the Spirit, which creates the world by means of the transcendental\nimagination and recreates it in thought. In Schelling is found the\nconcept of the Absolute, the unity of subject and object, which has, as\nits instrument, intellectual intuition. In Hegel, there is this same\nconcept, but it has itself as instrument, that is to say, it is truly\nlogical. All three are Kantians, but all three (and especially the last\ntwo) are not simply Kantian. They employed elements which Kant ignored\nor employed timidly, and in particular the mystical tradition and the\nnew tendencies of \u00e6sthetic and historical thought. Thus they pass\nbeyond the abstractionism and intellectualism of the Kantian period,\nand inaugurate the nineteenth century. They are connected ideally with\nVico (Hamann was the little German Vico), and they enrich him with the\nthoughts of Kant.\n\n[Sidenote: _The Logic of Hegel. The concrete concept or Idea._]\n\nNeglecting the particular differences between these thinkers and the\ngenetic process by which we pass from one to the other, and taking the\nresult of that speculative movement in its most mature form, which is\nthe philosophy of Hegel, we see in it (like a new, securely established\nsociety after the frequent changes of a revolution) the establishment\nof the new doctrine of the concept. Kant's unconsciousness of the\nconsequences of the _a priori_ synthesis had been such that he had\nnot hesitated to affirm that Logic, since the time of Aristotle,\nhad possessed so just and secure a form as not to need to take one\nsingle step backward, and to be unable to take one forward.[15] But\nHegel insisted that this was rather a sign that that science demanded\ncomplete re-elaboration, since an application of two thousand years\nshould have endowed the spirit with a more lofty consciousness of\nits own thought and of its own essential nature.[16] What was the\nconcept for Hegel? It was not that of the empirical sciences, which\nconsists in a simple general representation and therefore always\nin something finite; it is barbaric to give the name concepts to\nintellectual formations, like \"blue,\" \"house,\" or \"animal.\" Nor was\nit the mathematical concept, which is an arbitrary construction. All\nthe logical rationality that there is in mathematics is what is called\nirrational. These so-called concepts are the products of the abstract\nintellect; the true concept is the product of the concrete intellect,\nor reason. It has therefore nothing to do with the immediate knowledge\nof the sentimentalists and of the mystics, and with the intuition of\nthe \u00e6stheticists; such formulae as these express the necessity for the\nconcept, but give only a negative determination of it. They assert what\nit is not in relation to the empirical sciences and then misstate what\nit is in philosophy. For the rest, the shortcomings of the abstract\nintellect, generating the pure void or _thing in itself_(which far\nfrom being, as Kant believed, unknowable, is indeed the best known\nthing of all, the abstraction from everything and from thought itself)\nprepare the environment for the phantasms and caprices of mysticism\nand intuitionism. The true concept is the _idea,_ and the idea is the\nabsolute unity of the concept and of its objectivity.\n\n[Sidenote: _Identity of the Hegelian Idea with the Kantian a priori\nsynthesis._]\n\n\nThis definition has sometimes seemed whimsical, sometimes most obscure;\nyet it presents nothing but the elaboration in a more rigorous form\nof the Kantian _a priori_ synthesis, so that these two terms could\nwithout further difficulty be regarded as equivalent; the _a priori_\nlogical synthesis is the Idea and the Idea is the _a priori_ logical\nsynthesis. If Hegel has not been understood, that is due to the fact\nthat Kant himself has not been understood. Those who assert that they\nunderstand what Kant meant to say, but not what Hegel meant to say,\ndeceive themselves. For Kant and Hegel say the same thing, though the\nlatter says it with greater consciousness and clearness, that is to\nsay, better.[17]\n\n[Sidenote: _The Idea and the Antinomies. The Dialectic._]\n\nThe idea, the concrete universal, the pure concept, rebels against\nthe mechanical divisions employed for the empirical concepts. For it\nhas its own division, its own proper and intimate rhythm, by means\nof which it divides and unifies, and unifies itself when dividing\nand divides itself when unifying. The concept thinks reality, which\nis not immobile but in motion, not abstract being, but becoming;\nand therefore in it distinctions are generated one from another and\noppositions reconciled. Hegel not only gives the true meaning of\nthe Kantian _a priori_ synthesis, recognizing it as the concrete\nconcept, but replaces the antinomies in its bosom. The contradiction\nis not due to the limitation of thought before a non-contradictory\nreality, which thought is unable to attain; it is the character of\nreality itself, which contradicts itself in itself, and is opposition,\n_coincidentia oppositorum,_ the synthesis of opposites, or dialectic.\nA new doctrine of opposites and the outlines of a new doctrine of\ndistinction accompanies the new doctrine of the pure concept. In this\nphilosophy is truly summarized all the previous history of thought. The\nconcept of Socrates has acquired the reality of the idea of Plato, the\nconcreteness of the substance of Aristotle, the unity-in-opposition\nof Cusanus and Bruno, the Vichian reconciliation of philosophy and\nphilology, the unity-in-distinction of the Kantian synthesis and the\n\u00e6sthetic suppleness of Schelling's intellectual intuition.\n\n[Sidenote: _The lacun\u00e6 and errors of the Hegelian Logic. Their\nconsequences._]\n\nNevertheless, the history of thought does not stop at Hegel. In Hegel\nhimself are found the points to which later history must attach\nitself; the lacun\u00e6 which he left and the errors into which he fell.\nThe fundamental error was the abuse of the dialectic method, which\noriginated for the philosophic solution of the problem of opposites,\nbut was extended by Hegel to the distinct concepts, so that he\ninterpreted even the Kantian synthesis itself as nothing but the unity\nof opposites. Hence arises his incapacity to attribute their true\nvalue and function to the alogical forms of the spirit, such as art,\nand to the atheoretic, such as the natural sciences and mathematics;\nand even to logical thought itself, which, violating the laws of the\nsynthesis, ended by imposing itself upon history and the natural\nsciences, attempting to resolve them into itself by dialectizing them,\nas the philosophy of history and the philosophy of nature. To this,\ntherefore, is due the philosophism or panlogism which is characteristic\nof the system. This error was assisted by Hegel's want of clearness as\nto the nature of the empirical sciences. For him as for Kant, these\nremained _sciences,_ that is to say, knowledge of truth, although\nimperfect knowledge of it. They therefore constituted even for him\nthe material or the first step in philosophy. It is true that he also\nhad other more acute and profound thoughts upon this subject. Amid a\nnumber of incidental observations, he emphasized the arbitrariness\n(_Willkurlichkeit_), with which those forms are affected; and this is\ntantamount to declaring their practical and atheoretic character. But\ninstead of respecting this character, he decided upon surpassing it by\nmeans of a philosophic transformation of those sciences, which was not\nso much their death as pretended philosophies (a most true conclusion),\nas their elevation to the rank of particular philosophies by means of a\nmixture of empirical concepts and pure concepts, of abstract intellect\nand of reason. The erroneous tendency found nourishment and took\nconcrete form in the idea of a Philosophy of nature, which Schelling\nhad obtained, partly from Kant himself and partly had found in his\nown at first latent and then manifest theosophism. In this way, the\nsystem of Hegel became divided into three parts, a Logic-metaphysic,\na Philosophy of nature and a Philosophy of Spirit, whereas it should\non the contrary have unified Logic and the Philosophy of Spirit, and\nexpelled the Philosophy of nature. By its internal dialectic, panlogism\nor philosophism was converted, even in Hegel himself, and still more\namong his disciples, into mythologism, and from the system of the Idea\nand of absolute immanence, because of the imperfections which they\ncontained, there reappeared theism and transcendence (the Hegelian\nright wing).[18]\n\n[Sidenote: _Contemporaries of Hegel: Herbart, Schleiermacher, and\nothers._]\n\nIt would be vain to seek the correction of Hegel among those thinkers\nthat were his contemporaries, for they were all, though in various\ndegrees, inferior to him. None of them had attained, through Kant, to\nthe height attained by Hegel. Dwelling on a lower level, they could\ncertainly refuse to recognize him and vituperate him, but they could\nnever collaborate with and beyond him, in the progress of truth.\nHerbart held those concepts to which the particular sciences give rise\nto be contradictory, but he claimed to surpass the contradiction by\nmeans of an elaboration of the concepts (_Bearbeitung der Begriffe_),\nconducted in the very method of the old Logic, that is, of the Logic\nof the empirical sciences. Schleiermacher renounced the attempt to\nreach the unity of the speculative and the empirical, of Ethic and\nPhysics, that is, the realization of the pure idea of knowledge;\nand he substituted for that ideal, which for him was unattainable,\n_criticism,_ a form of worldly wisdom; that is to say, of philosophy\n(_Weltweisheit_) which gave access to theology and to religious\nfeeling.[19] Schopenhauer accepted the distinction between concept\nand idea, the first abstract and artificial, the second concrete and\nreal; but so slight was his understanding of the idea (which he called\nthe Platonic idea) that he confused it with the concept of natural\nspecies,[20] that is to say, precisely with one of the most artificial\nand arbitrary of empirical concepts. Finally, Schelling, who had been\na precursor of Hegel in his youth and had collaborated with him,\nnot only failed to improve his logic of the intuition in his second\nphilosophical period, but he abandoned even this embryonic form of the\nconcrete concept, and gave himself over as a prey to the will and to\nirrationality. In his positive philosophy the old adversary of Jacobi\nmade a bad combination of the alogism of Jacobi with the Hegelian\nidea of development and with mythologism, as in metaphysic he had\nanticipated the blind will of Schopenhauer.[21]\n\n[Sidenote: _Later positivism and psychologism._]\n\nThe ensuing period, both in Germany and in the whole of Europe, had\nlittle philosophical interest. It was marked by the reappearance of\na form of naturalism and of Empiricism, in part justified by the\nabuse of the dialectic, which had sometimes, in the hands of Hegel's\ndisciples, seemed altogether mad. But this recrudescence was in every\nway very poor in thought and inadequate to previous history. With this\nEmpiricism is associated the deplorable _Logic_ of John Stuart Mill,\none of those books which do least honour to the human spirit. That\nless than mediocre reasoner did not even succeed in producing a Logic\nof the natural sciences. He became involved in contradictions and\ntautologies, talking, for instance, of experience, which criticises\nitself and imposes its own limits upon itself, and of the principle\nof causality, as a law which affirms the existence of a law that\nthere shall be a law. Still less had he any notion of what it is\nto philosophize, maintaining that in order to make progress in the\nmoral and philosophical sciences it is necessary to apply to them\nthe method of the physical sciences. Nothing is more puerile than\nhis nominalism, which gives language a logical character, and then\npretends that language must be logically reformed. Logical science was\naltogether lost in the evolutionism or physiologism of Spencer, and in\nthe psychologism which had and still has many followers in Germany, in\nFrance, and in England, not less than in Italy. The state in which the\nLogic of philosophy is found in such an environment can be inferred\nfrom the fact that even mathematical Logic fared ill there, since there\nhave not been wanting those who have dared to conceive a _psychology\nof arithmetic._ Finally, as a healthy corrective of psychologism, the\ndanger of which to the old Logic had already been noted by Kant,[22]\nthere came the revival of the Aristotelian, and even of the scholastic\nLogic, in which there yet lived, though in erroneous forms, the idea of\nthe universal which had been discovered by the Greek philosophers.\n\n[Sidenote: _Eclectics. Lotze._]\n\nOther thinkers have not abandoned all contact with classical German\nphilosophy; but, in comparison with the thoughts of Kant and of Kant's\ngreat pupils, they seem like children. They try to lift the weapons\nof the Titans, and either they do not move them at all or they let\nthem fall from their hands, wounding themselves with them, but failing\nto grip them. The thoughts of Schelling and of Hegel indeed were\ndiscredited, but not touched; and those of Kant were touched, but\nill-treated. In the most esteemed Logics of this description, such\nas those of Sigwart and of Wundt, the capital distinction between\npure concepts and representative concepts, between _universalia_ and\n_generalia,_ has no prominence at all. Sigwart is obliged to complete\nthe knowledge obtained from naturalistic and mathematical procedure\nby faith and by a gradual elevation to the idea of God. Wundt, who\ndoes not attribute to philosophy a method which is proper to it and\ndifferent from that of the other forms of knowledge, conceives the\nfinal result of metaphysical thought as the position of a perpetual\nhypothesis. In the Logic of Lotze, who combated Hegelianism and revived\ntranscendentalism and theism, there is just a luminous streak, a\nfaint trace, of the idealist philosophy. Lotze understands that it\nis impossible to form (empirical) concepts by simply cancelling the\nvarying parts of representations and preserving the constant parts, and\nrecognizes that the formation of concepts presupposes the concept: the\nuniversal is made with the universal. He strives to issue from this\ncircle by positing a _primary_ universal, not formed by the method of\nthe others, but such that thought finds it in itself. This primary\nuniversal has nothing particular and representative; and only by means\nof it is it possible to combine heterogeneous and to differentiate\nhomogeneous elements, and to form the ideas of size, of more or less,\nof one and of many and such like, with which the _second_ universals of\nthe synthesis are afterwards constructed.[23]\n\n[Sidenote: _New gnoseology of Science. The Economic theory of the\nscientific concept._]\n\nWhile students of philosophy, although manifesting some doubt and\ndissatisfaction, allowed themselves to be intimidated by naturalism\n(dazzled, like the public, with technical applications, or confounded\nby the applause of the public), a tendency has become more and more\naccentuated during the last decades, which seems to us to offer great\nassistance to Logic and philosophy in general, if it is understood\nhow to adapt it to its true end. It has not had any single centre\nof diffusion, but has arisen, almost contemporaneously, in several\nplaces, becoming at once diffused everywhere, like something that has\nhappened at the right time. Several of its founders and promoters\nare mathematicians, physicists, and naturalists. From the very fact\nof their having begun to reflect upon their activity, these men\nhave certainly ceased to be mere specialists, notwithstanding their\nprotests to the contrary. Yet they obtain considerable strength from\ntheir specialism, finding in it a guide and a curb to prevent their\nlosing sight in their gnoseological enquiry of the actual procedure of\nnaturalistic constructions, which are its origin. The formula of this\ntendency is the recognition of the _practical or economic_ character of\nthe mathematical, physical, and natural sciences.\n\n[Sidenote: _Avenarius, Mach._]\n\nThe empirocriticism of Avenarius considers science to be a simple\ndescription of the forms of experience, and conceptual procedure to\nbe the instrument that alters pure and primitive experience (pure\nintuition or pure perception) for the purpose of simplifying it. Ernest\nMach has developed and popularized these views, for as a student of\nmechanics he had reached the same conclusions by his own path and in\nhis own way. The physical sciences (he says), not less than zoology and\nbotany, have as their sole foundation the description of natural facts\nin which there are never identical cases. Identical cases are created\nby means of the schematic imitation that we make of reality; and here\ntoe lies the origin of the mutual dependence that appears in the\ncharacter of facts. To this therefore he restricts the significance of\nthe principle of causality, for which (in order to avoid fancifulness\nand mythologicism) it would be opportune to substitute the concept of\n_function._ Bodies or things are abbreviated intellectual _symbols_ of\ngroups of sensations; symbols, that is to say, which have no existence\noutside our intellect. They are cards, like those which dealers attach\nto boxes and which have no value except in so far as there are goods of\nvalue inside the box. In this economic schematicism lies the strength,\nbut also the weakness, of science; for in the presentation of facts\nscience always sacrifices something of their individuality and real\nappearance, and does not seek exactness in another way save when\nobliged to do so, by the requirements of a definite moment. Hence the\nincongruity between experience and science. Since they are developed\nupon parallel lines, they can reduce to some extent the interval that\nseparates them, but they can never annul it by becoming coincident with\none another.[24]\n\n_Rickert,_ in his book on the _Limits of the Naturalistic Concepts,_\nmaintains similar ideas, though with different cultural assumptions.\nThe concept, which is the result of the labour of the sciences, is\nnothing but a means to a scientific end. The world of bodies and of\nsouls is infinite in space and time. It is not possible to represent\nit in every individual part, by reason of its variety, which is not\nonly extensive but also intensive: intuition is inexhaustible. The\nnaturalistic concept is directed to surpassing this infinity of\nintuitions. It effects this by determining its own extension and\ncomprehension, and by formulating its being in a series of judgments.\nThus, in order to conquer intuition altogether, the natural sciences\ntend to substitute for concepts of _tilings_ concepts of _relations_\nfree from all intuitive elements. But the ultimate concept must always\nof necessity be a concept of things (though of things _sui generis,_\nimmutable, indivisible, perfectly equal among themselves, expressible\nin negative judgments); and besides, they find everywhere insuperable\nbarriers in the historical or descriptive element, which surrounds them\nall and is ineliminable. This naturalistic procedure can be applied\nand is indeed applied, not only to the science of bodies, but also to\nthat of souls, to psychology and sociology; and Rickert opportunely\ninsists (as did Hegel in his time) upon the possibility of empirical\nsciences of what is called the spiritual world; or (as he says) the\nword \"nature,\" as used in this connection, means not a reality, but a\nparticular point of view from which reality is observed, in order to\nreach the end of conceptual simplification.[25]\n\n[Sidenote: _Bergson and the new French philosophy._]\n\nIn France, the same ideas or very similar are represented by a group\nof thinkers, who are called variously philosophers of contingency, of\nliberty, of intuition, or of action. Bergson, who is the chief of them,\nlooks upon the concepts of the natural sciences in the same way as\nMach, as _symboles_ and _\u00e9tiquettes._ Besides the extremely apposite\napplications that he has made of this principle to the analysis of\ntime, of duration, of space, of movement, of liberty, of evolution, he\nhas also the great merit of having broken his country's traditions of\nintellectualism and abstractionism, of giving to France for the first\ntime that lively consciousness of the intuition, which she has always\nlacked, and of shaking her excessive reliance upon clear distinctions,\nupon well-turned concepts, upon classes, formul\u00e6, and reasonings that\nproceed in a straight line, but run upon the surface of reality.[26]\n\n[Sidenote: _Le Roy and others._]\n\nLe Roy, one of the followers of Bergson, has set himself to\ndemonstrate, with many examples, that scientific laws only become\nrigorous when they are changed into conventions and depend upon vicious\ncircles. The course of events is habitual and regular (if you like\nto say so), but it is not at all necessary. The great security of\nastronomical previsions is commonly praised; but that security is not\nalways such in actual fact (\"_il y a des com\u00e8tes qui ne reviennent\npas_\"), and in any case it is always approximate. The rigorous\nnecessity of which the natural sciences boast, is not known, but is\nrather postulated, and this postulation has merely the practical object\nof dominating single facts and of communicating with our neighbours\n(\"_parler le monde_\"). The law of gravity holds, but only when external\nforces do not disturb it. In this way it is well understood that it\nalways holds. The conservation of energy avails only in closed systems;\nbut closed systems are just those in which energy is conserved. A body\nleft to itself persists in the state of repose; but this law is nothing\nbut the definition of a body left to itself, and so on.[27] Poincar\u00e9\nboldly affirms the conventional character of the mathematical and\nphysical sciences, as do Milhaud and several others. They have deduced\nit as a consequence of the impression aroused by the theories of higher\ngeometry, which has contributed more or less successfully towards\nrevealing the practical character of mathematics, which was formerly\nheld to be the foundation or model of truth and certainty.\n\n[Sidenote: _Reattachment to romantic ideas and advance made upon them._]\n\nAll those criticisms directed against the sciences do not sound new\nto the ears of those Schelling, of Novalis, and of other romantics,\nand particularly with Hegel's marvellous criticism of the abstract\n(that is, empirical and mathematical) intellect. This runs through\nall his books, from the _Phenomenology of the Spirit_ to the _Science\nof Logic,_ and is enriched with examples in the observations to the\nparagraphs of the _Philosophy of Nature._ But if compared with that of\nHegel, they are at the disadvantage of not being based upon powerful\nphilosophical thought; they have, on the other hand, this superiority:\nthat they do not present the characteristics observed in the sciences\nas errors which must be corrected, but define them as physiological,\nnecessary, uncensurable characteristics, derived from the very function\nof the sciences, which is not theoretic, but practical and economic. In\nthis way there is posited one of the premisses that are necessary for\npreventing the mixture of the economic method with the method of truth,\nof empirical and abstract concepts with pure theoretic forms, and thus\nfor making impossible that speculative hybridism, which is expressed in\nphilosophies of history and of nature, and which fashions an abstract\nreason to work out a dialectic of the naturalistic concepts, and even\nof the representations of history. And with the prevention of this\nerror there is also prepared a more exact idea of the relation between\npseudoconcepts and concepts and a better constitution of philosophic\nLogic.\n\n[Sidenote: _Philosophy of pure experience, of intuition, of action,\netc.; and its insufficiency._]\n\nBut in order that this result should be obtained, the idea of the\nphilosophic universal must be reawakened and strengthened, in\nconformity with its most perfect elaboration in the history of thought,\nat the hands of Hegel. The critics of the sciences are at present\nfar from this mark. The term that is distinct from the empirical and\nabstract concepts, the knowledge of reality which is not falsified by\npractical ends and discovered beneath labels and formulae, is supplied,\nnot by the pure concept, by reality thought in its concreteness, by\nphilosophy which is history, but by pure sensation or intuition. Both\nAvenarius and Mach appeal to pure and primitive experience, that is,\nto experience free of thought and anterior to it. Bergson, with an\nartistic talent that is wanting to the two Germans, but following\nthe same path, has proclaimed a new metaphysic, which proceeds in an\nopposite sense to that of symbolical knowledge and of generalizing and\nabstracting experience. He has defined the metaphysic which he desires,\nas a science _qui pr\u00e9tend se passer des symboles,_ and therefore as\n\"_Science de l'exp\u00e9rience int\u00e9grale._\" This metaphysic would be the\nopposite of the Kantian ideal, of the mathematical universal, of the\nPlatonism of the concepts, and would be founded upon intuition, the\nsole organ of the Absolute: \"_est relative la connaissance symbolique\npar concepts pr\u00e9-existants qui va du fixe au mouvant, mais non pas la\nconnaissance intuitive, qui s'installe dans le mouvement et adopte\nla vie m\u00eame des choses. Cette intuition atteint l'absolu._\"[28] The\nconclusion is \u00e6stheticism, and sometimes something even less than\n\u00e6stheticism, namely mysticism, or _action_ substituted for the concept.\nThe criticism of the sciences thereby comes to mean the negation of\nknowledge and of truth. Hence the protest of Poincar\u00e9[29] against Le\nRoy, justified in its motive, but ineffective, because based upon the\npresuppositions of mathematics and physics. In others again, it becomes\nintermingled with the turbid waters of pragmatism, which is a little of\neverything, but, above all, chatter and emptiness.\n\n[Sidenote: _The theory of values._]\n\nFinally, another of the thinkers that we have mentioned, Rickert\n(following Windelband), wishes to integrate naturalistic and abstract\nknowledge with the historical knowledge of individual reality. Being\nreasonably diffident as to the possibility of a metaphysic as an\n\"experimental science\" (such as Zeller was among the first to desire),\nhe moves towards a general theory of values. This indeed is the form\n(imperfect because stained with transcendence) by means of which many\nin our day are approaching a philosophy as the science of the spirit\n(or of immanent value). But in the hands of Windelband and Rickert it\nis understood as a primacy of the practical reason, which is taken to\ngovern the double series of the world of the sciences and the world\nof history. This doubtless represents progress, as compared with\nempiricism and positivism; but not as compared with the Hegelian Logic\nof the pure concept, which included in itself what is and what ought to\nbe.\n\nSuch, briefly stated, is the present state of logical doctrines\nconcerning the Concept.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: _De sophist. elench._ ch. 34.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Metaphys._ M 4, p. 1078 b 28-30; cf. A 6, p. 987 b 2-3.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Cf. _\u00c6sthetic,_ part ii. chap. i.]\n\n[Footnote 4: See in this connection the observations of Lasson, in the\npreface to his recent German translation of the _Metaphysic,_ Jena,\nDiederichs, 1907.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Cf. especially the _Parmenides,_ the _The\u00e6tetus,_ and\n_Book of the Republic._]\n\n[Footnote 6: _Metaphys._ E I, p. 1025 b, 1026 a.]\n\n[Footnote 7: _Metaphys._ vi. 1027 a.]\n\n[Footnote 8: _Anal. post._ i. ch. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 9: See the writings of Gentile concerning De Wulf and La\nBerthonni\u00e8re in the _Critica,_ iii. pp. 203-21, iv. pp. 431-445.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Prantl, _Gesch. d. Logik,_ iii. pp. 182-3.]\n\n[Footnote 11: For these references to writings of Luther, see F. J.\nSchmidt, _Zur Wiedergeburt des Idealismus,_ Leipzig, 1908, pp. 44-6.]\n\n\n[Footnote 12: See my Essay upon Hegel, ch. ii.]\n\n\n[Footnote 13: Preface to _Nouveaux Essais._]\n\n[Footnote 14: See what is said on this point in my\n_\u00c6sthetic,_\u00b2 Part II. Chap. VIII.]\n\n[Footnote 15: _Krit. d. rein. Vern._ ed. Kirchmann, pp. 22-3.]\n\n[Footnote 16: _Wiss. d. Logik,_ i. p. 35; cfr. p. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Kuno Fischer in his _Logic,_ when expounding the thought\nof Hegel, clearly distinguishes the empirical concepts from the pure\nconcepts, and notes that those which are pure or philosophical, are,\nin the spirit, the basis and presupposition of the others. \"These\nothers, the empirical, are formed from single representations or\nintuitions, by uniting homogeneous characteristics and separating\nthem from the heterogeneous; and thus arise general representations,\nconcepts of classes\": empirical, because of their empirical origin,\nand representative, because they represent entire classes of single\nobjects, that is, are generalized representations. But at the base\nof each of these are found judgments or syntheses, which contain\nnon-empirical and non-representable elements, elements which are _a\npriori_ and only thinkable. These are the true concepts, the first\nthoughts in the ideal order, without which nothing can be thought\n(_Logik\u00b2,_ i. sect. i. \u00a7 3). The difference between these pure concepts\nor categories and empirical concepts or categories is not quantitative,\nbut qualitative: the pure concepts are not the most general, the\nbroadest classes; they do not represent phenomena, but connections and\nrelations; they can be compared to the signs (+,-, x, \u00f7, \u221a, etc.) of\narithmetical operations; they are not obtainable by abstraction, indeed\nit is by means of them that all abstractions are affected (_loc. cit._\n\u00a7\u00a7 5-6).]\n\n[Footnote 18: See my essay, _What is Living and what is Dead of the\nPhilosophy of Hegel,_ for the criticism here briefly summarized.]\n\n[Footnote 19: _Dialektik,_ ed. Halpern, pp. 203-245.]\n\n[Footnote 20: _Werke,_ ed. Grisebach, ii. chap. 39.]\n\n[Footnote 21: The movement of Italian thought in the first decades of\nthe nineteenth century was rather a progress of national philosophic\nculture than a factor in the general history of philosophy. In this\nlast respect, the r\u00f4le of Italy was for the time being ended; though\nit did not end in the seventeenth century with Campanella and Galileo\n(as foreign historians and the Italians who copy them believe). It\nended magnificently in the first half of the eighteenth century with\nVico, the last representative of the Renaissance and the first of\nRomanticism. The influence of German philosophy continued to manifest\nitself in Italy in the nineteenth century, at first almost entirely\nthrough French literature, then directly. It can be studied in the\nthree principal thinkers of the first half of the century, Galuppi,\nRosmini, and Gioberti. The first began from the Scottish school, and\nwhile attacking Kant, he absorbed not a few of his principles. The\nsecond, also in a polemical sense and in a Catholic wrapping, can be\ncalled the Italian Kant. The third, who had always only the slightest\nconsciousness of history, assumed the same position as Schelling and\nHegel. To have attained (between 1850 and 1860) to such historical\nconsciousness is the merit of Bertrando Spaventa (see especially his\nbook, _La filosofia italiana nelle sue relazioni con la filosofia\neuropea,_ new edition, by G. Gentile, Bari, Laterza, 1908), who\nrepresented Hegelianism in Italy in a very cautious and critical form.\nBut there was no true surpassing of Hegelianism either by his disciples\nor by his adversaries, and some original thought is to be found only\namong non-professional philosophers, particularly in \u00c6sthetic, with\nFrancesco de Sanctis (cf. _Estetica,_ part ii. chap. 15).]\n\n[Footnote 22: _Krit. d. rein. Vernunft, loc. cit._]\n\n[Footnote 23: _Logik,_ p. 42 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 24: See, among other books, _L'Analisi delle sensazioni,_\nItalian translation Turin, Bocca; 1903.]\n\n[Footnote 25: _Grenzen d. naturwissensch. Begriffsbildung,_ Freiburg i.\nB, 1896-1902, chaps. 1-3.]\n\n[Footnote 26: See above, p. 528.]\n\n[Footnote 27: See his articles in the _Revue de m\u00e9taphys. et de\nmorale,_ vols. vii. viii. xi.]\n\n[Footnote 28: \"Introduction \u00e0 la M\u00e9taphysique,\" in the _Revue de\nm\u00e9taphys. et de mor._ xi. pp. 1-36.]\n\n[Footnote 29: _La Valeur de la science,_ Paris, 1904.]\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\n\nTHE THEORY OF THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Secular neglect of the theory of history._]\n\nThe theory of the individual judgment and therefore of historical\nthought, has been the least elaborated of all logical theories in\nthe course of philosophic history. It is a very true and profound\nremark that the historical sense is a modern thing, and that the\nnineteenth century is the first great century of historical thinking.\nOf course, since history has always been made and individual judgments\npronounced, theoretic observations upon historical judgments have not\nbeen altogether wanting in the past. The spirit is, as we know, the\nwhole spirit at every instant, and in this respect nothing is ever\nnew under the sun, indeed, nothing is new, either before or after the\nsun.[1] But history, and in particular, the theory of history, did not\nformerly arouse interest nor attract attention, nor was its importance\nfelt, nor was it the object of anxious and wide investigations to the\ndegree witnessed in the nineteenth century and in our times, when the\nconsciousness of immanence triumphs more and more--and immanence means\nhistory.\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Gr\u00e6co-Roman world's ideas of history._]\n\nTranscendence, then, which has for centuries been more or less\ndominant, supplies the reason why the study of the individual and the\ntheory of history were neglected. In Greek philosophy, individual\njudgments were either despised, as in Platonism, or superseded by and\nconfused with logical judgments of the universal, as in Aristotle. In\nthe _Poetics_[2] the character of history did not escape him. Differing\nfrom science (which was directed to the universal) and from poetry\n(which was directed to the possible), it expresses things that have\nhappened in their individuality, _ta genomena_ (what Alcibiades did and\nexperienced). But in the _Organon,_ although he distinguished between\nthe universal (ta katholou) and the individual (ta kath' ekastou),\nbetween man and Callias,[3] he made no use of the distinction, and\ndivided judgments into universal, particular and indefinite. The\ntheory of history was not raised to the rank of philosophic treatment\nin antiquity, like the other forms of knowledge, and especially\nphilosophy, mathematics and poetry. What mark the ancients have\nleft upon the argument is limited to incidental observations, and\nsome altogether empirical remarks here and there upon the method of\nwriting history. They were wont to assign extrinsic ends to it, such\nas utility and advice upon the conduct of life. Such utterances of\ngood common sense as that of Quintilian, to the effect that history\nis written _ad narrandum, non ad demonstrandum,_ do not possess great\nphilosophic weight. Nor had the rules of the rhetoricians philosophic\nvalue, such as that of Dionysus of Halicarnassus, that historical\nnarrative, without becoming quite poetical, should be somewhat more\nelevated in tone than ordinary discourse; or that of Cicero, who\ndemanded for historical style _verba ferme po\u00ebtarum,_ \"perhaps\" (wrote\nVico, making the rhetorical rule profound) \"in order that historians\nmight be maintained in their most ancient possession, since, as has\nbeen demonstrated in the _Scienza nuova,_ the first historians of\nthe nations were the first poets.\"[4] More important, on the other\nhand, are the demands (as expressed especially by Polybius) of what\nis indispensable to history. Besides the element of fact, there is\nneedful (Polybius observed) knowledge of the nature of the things\nof which the happenings are portrayed, of military art for military\nthings, of politics for things political. History is written, not\nfrom books, as is the way with compilers and men of letters, but from\noriginal documents, by visiting the places where it has occurred and by\npenetrating it with experience and with thought.[5]\n\n[Sidenote: _The theory of history in medi\u00e6val and modern philosophy_]\n\nThe abstractionist and anti-historical character of the Aristotelian\nLogic had an injurious effect in the schools, though, on the other\nhand, it allied itself well with the persistent transcendentalism.\nCertainly, just as in the Middle Ages appeared reflections upon\nhistory, so there could be no avoiding the distinction between what\nwas known _logice_ and what was known _historice,_ or, as Leibnitz\nafterwards formulated the distinction, between _propositions de raison_\nand _propositions de fait._ But these latter were always regarded\nwith a compassionate eye, as a sort of uncertain and inferior truth.\nThe ideal of exact science would have been to absorb truths of fact\nin truths of reason, and to resolve them all into a philosophy, or\nrather into a universal mathematics. Nor did the empiricists succeed\nin increasing their credit. These certainly paid particular attention\nto facts (hence the polemic of the Anti-Aristotelians and the origin\nof the new instrument of observation and induction). But by weakening\nthe consciousness of the concrete universal they also weakened that\nof the concrete individual, and therefore presented the latter in the\nmutilated form of species and genera, of types and classes. Bacon, had\nhe done nothing else, at any rate assigned a place to history in his\nclassification of knowledge, which was divided, as we know, according\nto the three faculties (memory, imagination and reason), into History,\nPoetry and Philosophy. He passed in review the two great classes of\nhistory, natural and civil (the first of which was either narrative\nor inductive, the second more variously subdivided); thus he even\npointed out the kinds of history that were desirable, but of which no\nconspicuous examples were yet extant, such as literary history.[6]\nHobbes, on the other hand, having distinguished the two species of\ncognition, one of reason and the other of fact, \"altera facti, et est\ncognitio propria testium, cujus conscriptio est historia,\" and having\nsubdivided this into natural and civil, \"_neutra_\" (he added, that is\nto say neither the natural nor the civil) \"_pertinet ad institutum\nnostrum_\" which was concerned only with the _cognitio consequentiarum,_\nthat is to say, science and philosophy.[7] Locke is not less\nanti-historical than Descartes and Spinoza, and even Leibnitz, who was\nvery learned, did not recognize the autonomy of historical work, and\ncontinued to consider it as directed towards utilitarian and moral ends.\n\n[Sidenote: _Treatises on historical art in the Renaissance._]\n\nReflections upon history, suggested rather by the professional needs\nof historians than by a need for systematization and a profound\nphilosophy, continued on their way, almost apart from the philosophy\nof the time. From the Renaissance onwards, treatises on historical\nart were multiplied at the hands of Robortelli, Atanagi, Riccoboni,\nFoglietta, Beni, Mascardi, and of many others, even of non-Italians;\nbut their discussions usually centred upon elocution, upon the use of\nornament and of digressions, upon arguments worthy of history, and\nthe like. Among these writers of treatises we must note (here as well\nas in the history of Poetics and of Rhetoric) Francesco Patrizio or\nPatrizzi (1560), for his ideas, sometimes acute, sometimes incoherent\nand extravagant. Overcoming one of the prejudices of empiricism, he\njustly wished that the concept of history should not be limited to\nmilitary enterprises and political negotiations alone, and that it\nshould be extended to all the doings of men. With a like superiority\nto empirical views, he found historical representation not only in\nwords, but also in painting and sculpture--(our times, so fruitful\nof histories graphically illustrated, should admit that he was to\nsome extent right), and he did not accept chronological limits. He\nalso insisted upon the mode of testing historical truth and upon the\ndegree of credibility of witnesses. But he became extravagant, when he\nadmitted a history of the future, calling the prophets as witnesses,\nand incoherent, when he both denied and affirmed the moral end of\nhistory.[8]\n\n[Sidenote: _Treatises upon method._]\n\nAnother form of empiricism, certainly more important, the\nmethodological, which dealt with the canons and criteria to be borne in\nmind in making historical researches, accompanied the often rhetorical\nempiricism of writers of treatises. The reference to the duties of\nthe historian in one place in Cicero was repeated and commented upon\nby all. But this treatment became gradually more wide, as we see\nespecially in the work of Vossius, _Ars historica sive de historia\net historiae natura, historiaeque scribendae praeceptis commentatio_\n(1623). The term \"Historic\" dates from this book and is formed on the\nanalogy of Logic, Poetic, Rhetoric, etc., and applied to the theory or\nLogic of history. Gervinus (1837) and Droysen (1858) tried to bring\nthis term again into vogue. The methodological treatment of historical\nresearch was more widely developed in the scholastic manuals of Logic\nof the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, such as the _Logica seu ars\nratiocinandi_ of Leclerc (1692).[9] With these canons arising in the\nfield of research and historical criticism, we may opportunely compare\nthose concerning the mode of valuing and weighing evidence, which were\ngradually unified in juridical literature. Methodological treatment\nhas also progressed in our times, in manuals such as those of Droysen,\nof Bernheim, of Langlois-Seignobos; but the general tendency of these\nworks (as is also evident from their apparatus in heuristic, in\ncriticism, in comprehension and in exposition) remains and must remain\naltogether empirical.\n\n[Sidenote: _The theory of history and G. B. Vico._]\n\nThe first philosopher who gave to History an importance equal to\nPhilosophy was Vico, with his already-mentioned union of philosophy\nand philology, of _truth_ and _certainty,_ and with the example that\nhe offered of a philosophic _system,_ which is also a _history_ of the\nhuman race: an \"_eternal ideal_ history, upon which the histories of\nnations run in _time._\" For this reason (not less than from his strong\nconsciousness of the difference in character between the metaphysical\nconcept and mathematical abstraction) Vico was an Anti-Cartesian. He\nstands between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as the opposer\nof the past and of the future, or of the nearest past and the nearest\nfuture. Indeed, there is even in Vico a trace of that vice which\narises from a too indiscriminate identification of philosophy and\nhistory, which certainly constitute an identity, but an identity which\nis a synthesis and therefore a distinction. Hence, when no account\nis taken of this, the substantial truth affirmed loses its balance\nin philosophism and mythologism. The real epochs of Vico are too\nphilosophic and have in them something forced; the ideal epochs are too\nhistorical and have in them something of exuberance and of contingency.\nThe real epochs are not exempt from philosophistic caprices; the ideal\nsometimes become converted into a mythology (though full of profound\nmeanings). For this reason, it has been possible now to praise, now to\nblame him for having invented the _Philosophy of history._ There is\nindeed in him, here and there, some hint of a philosophy of history\n_sensu deteriori,_ but above all he is the great philosopher and the\ngreat historian.\n\n[Sidenote: _The anti-historicism of the eighteenth century and Kant._]\n\nAs the eighteenth century did not really know the concept of\nphilosophy, so was it ignorant of that of history: its anti-historicism\nhas become proverbial. There appeared at this time some celebrated\ntheoretic manifestations of historical scepticism, of the negation\nof history, which seemed, as before to Sextus Empiricus, a thing\nwithout art and without method (\u1f05\u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd ... \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1f25\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03cc\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03c5\u03b3\u03c7\u03c1\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd). The book of Melchior Delfico, _Pensieri sull' Istoria\ne sull' incertezza ed inutilit\u00e0 della medesima_ (1808), is one of\nthe last manifestations of this sort. But all the thinkers of that\ntime were of this opinion; even Kant, in whose wide culture were\ncertainly two lacun\u00e6--artistic and historical. And if in the course\nof elaborating his system he was led by logical necessity to meditate\nupon art, or rather upon beauty, he never paid serious attention to the\nproblem of history.\n\n[Sidenote: _Concealed historical value of the a priori synthesis._]\n\nYet Kant is the true, though unconscious creator of the new Logic\nof history. To him belongs the merit, not only of having shown the\nimportance of the historical judgment, but also of having given the\nformula of the identity of philosophy and history in the _a priori_\nsynthesis. The logical revolution effected by Kant consists in this:\nthat he perceives and proclaims that to know is not to think the\nconcept abstractly, but to think the concept in the intuition, and\nthat consequently to think is to _judge._ The theory of the judgment\ntakes the place of that of the concept and is truly the theory of\nthe concept, in so far as it becomes concrete. What does it matter\nthat he is not aware of all this and that instead of referring\nthe logical _a priori_ synthesis to history, he refers it to the\nsciences, constituting it an instrument not of history, but of the\nsciences; and that instead of exhausting knowledge in the _a priori_\nsynthesis, he leaves outside of it true knowledge as an unattainable,\nor theoretically unattainable ideal? What does it matter that when\nconfronted with the problem of the judgment of existence, he solves it\nlike Gaunilo and withdraws existence from thought, removing from it\nthe character of predicate and of concept and making of it a position\nor an imposition _ab extra?_ What does it matter that his history is\nwithout historical developments and wanting even in knowledge of the\nhistory of philosophy, and that in the parts of the so-called system\nthat he has developed (for example, in the doctrine of virtue and of\nrights) there reigns the most squalid crowd of abstractions and of\nanti-historical determinations? What does it matter that we find the\nman of the eighteenth century on every page of his book, and that he\nwas absolutely without sympathy for the tendencies of thought of the\nHamanns and of they Herders? There always remains the fact that the\n_a priori_ synthesis carried in itself even that which its discoverer\nignored or denied.\n\n[Sidenote: _The theory of history in Hegel._]\n\nIt would be preferable to say that all Kant's failures in recognition\nand all his lacun\u00e6 are certainly of importance, just because they\nprovided his followers with a new problem, and generated by way of\ncontrariety the philosophy of Schelling and the historical philosophy\nof Hegel. Not even in Hegel is there to be found the elaboration of\nthe doctrine of the individual judgment, nor is its identity with that\nof the concept explicitly recognized. But in Hegel not only do we find\nourselves in the full historical atmosphere (suffice it to recall\nhis histories of art, of religion, of philosophy and of the general\ndevelopment of the human race, which are still the most profound and\nthe most stimulating writings upon history that exist); but these\nhistorical elucidations are all connected with the fundamental thought\nof his Logic: the concept is immanent and is divided in itself in the\njudgment, of which the general formula is that the individual _is_ the\nuniversal, the subject _is_ the predicate, every judgment is a judgment\nof the universal, and the universal is the dialectic of opposites. For\nthis reason also, we find in the works of Hegel a historical method\nfar in advance of all his predecessors and also (save in a few points)\nof his successors. He maintained, with much vigour, the necessity of\nthe interpretative and rational element in history; and to those who\ndemanded that a historian should be disinterested, in the same way as\na magistrate who judges a case, he replied that since the magistrate\nhas nevertheless his interest, that for the right, so has the historian\nalso his interest, namely that for truth.[10]\n\n[Sidenote: _W. von Humboldt._]\n\nHegel's defect in relation to history (as was Vico's before him but on\na larger scale) was the philosophist error, which led him to the design\nof a philosophy of history, rising above history properly so-called.\nThe psychological explanations of this strange duplication, together\nwith its philosophic motives, have already been adduced.[11] Wilhelm\nvon Humboldt certainly alluded to Hegel and intended to oppose him in\nthis respect in his discourse concerning the office of the historian\n(1820). Here the method of the writer of history was likened to that\nof the artist. Fancy is as necessary to the historian as to the poet,\nHumboldt said, not in the sense of free fancy, but as the gift of\nreconstruction and of association. History, like art, seeks the true\nform of events, the pure and concrete form of real facts. But whereas\nart hardly touches the fugitive manifestations of the real, in order to\nrise above all reality, history attaches itself to those manifestations\nand becomes totally immersed in them. The ideas which the historian\nelaborates are not introduced by him into history, but discovered in\nreality itself, of which they constitute the essence. They are the\noutcome of the fulness of events, not of an extrinsic addition, as\nin what is called philosophic or theological history (Philosophy of\nhistory). Certainly, universal history is not intelligible without\na world-order (eine Weltregierung). But the historian possesses no\ninstrument which enables him directly to examine this design, and every\neffort in which he attempts to reach it, makes him fall into empty and\narbitrary teleologism. He must, on the contrary, proceed by deducing\nit from facts examined in their individuality; for the end of history\ncan only be the realization of the idea, which humanity must represent\nfrom all sides and in all the different modes in which finite form\ncan ever be united with the idea. The course of events can only be\ninterrupted when idea and form are no longer able to interpenetrate\none another.[12] The protest was justified, not indeed against the\nfundamental doctrine of Hegel, but rather against one of its particular\naberrations. But the protest was inferior in the determinateness of\nits concepts to the philosophy which it opposed. Even in the healthy\ntendency of the Hegelian doctrine, ideas should not be introduced but\ndiscovered in history. And if it sometimes seemed that the Philosophy\nof history introduced them from without, this happened because in that\ncase true ideas were not employed and the concreteness of the fact was\nnot respected.\n\n[Sidenote: _F. Brentano._]\n\nThe theory of the individual judgment has made no progress in the\nLogics of the nineteenth century, save for certain timely explanations\nconcerning the existential character of the judgment given by Brentano\nand his school. Brentano, who is an Anti-Kantian, considers the period\ninaugurated by Kant to be that of a new philosophical decadence. Yet\nnotwithstanding his sympathy for medi\u00e6val scholasticism and for modern\npsychologism, he has too much philosophic acumen to remain fixed in the\none or to lose himself in the other. Thus the tripartition of the forms\nof the spirit, maintained by him,[13] beneath the external appearance\nof a renovated Cartesianism, bears traces of the abhorred criticism,\nromanticism and idealism. The first form, the pure representation,\nanswers to the \u00e6sthetic moment; the second, the judgment, is the\nprimitive logical form answering to the Kantian _a priori_ synthesis;\nand love and hatred, the third form, which contains will and feeling,\nis not without precedent among the Post-Kantians themselves. He\nreasonably criticizes the various more or less mechanical theories,\nwhich treat the judgment as a connection of representations or a\nsubsumption of concepts, and defends the _idiogenetic_ against\nallogenetic theories. But when he tries to prove that the judgment\n\"A is\" cannot be resolved into \"A\" and \"is\" (that is, into A and\nexistence), because the concept of existence is found in the judgment\nand does not precede it, he goes beyond the mark. For the concept of\nexistence certainly does not precede, but neither does it _follow_\nthe judgment: it is contemporaneous; that is to say, it exists only\nin the judgment, like the category in the _a priori_ synthesis.\nAnd he goes beyond the mark again, when he makes existentiality\nthe character of the judgment, whereas existentiality is only one\nof the categories and consequently, if it be indispensable for the\nconstitution of the judgment, it is not sufficient for any judgment,\nsince for every judgment there is necessary the inner determination\nof the judgment as essence and as existence. For the rest, this is\neasily seen in the theories of his school, which end by establishing\na double degree or form of judgment, thus creating a duality that\ncannot be maintained.[14] In any case, in the researches of Brentano\nand his followers, there is affirmed the need for a complete doctrine\nof the judgment and of its relation (which in our opinion is one of\nidentity) with the doctrine of the concept. The theories of values and\nof judgments of values already mentioned, in their investigation of\nthe universal or valuative element, express the same need from another\npoint of view; although none of them discovers, by recalling the\nKantian-Hegelian tradition, that values are immanent in single facts,\nand that consequently judgments of value, as judgments, are the same as\nindividual judgments.\n\n[Sidenote: _Controversies concerning the nature of history._]\n\nEnquiries concerning the character of history may assist the\nconstitution of a theory of individual judgments. These enquiries have\nnever enjoyed so much favour as in the last decade of the nineteenth\ncentury. Naturalism or positivism has provided the incentive to such\nenquiries, for it brought into being the problem: \"whether history is\nor is not a (natural) science,\" by its attempt to violate and pervert\nhistory by raising it (as they said, and it must have sounded ironical)\nto the rank of a science, that is to say, of a naturalistic science.\nThere were two answers to the problem: (1) that history is a science\n_sui generis_ (not natural); (2) that it is, not a science, but an art,\na particular form of art, the representation of the real.\n\n[Sidenote: _Rickert; X\u00e9nopol. History as science of the individual._]\n\nThe first of these answers is to be found in the work of Rickert\n(1896-1902), cited above, and in the almost contemporary work\nof X\u00e9nopol (1899).[15] Rickert's work is that of a professional\nphilosopher, and a follower of Windelband; the other, of an\nintelligent historian, who is somewhat lacking in equipment as a\nphilosopher. Rickert, after having examined the naturalistic process\nand demonstrated how it finds a limit in individuality, next examines\nhistorical process, which takes possession of the field that naturalism\nis obliged to relinquish. X\u00e9nopol upholds the same distinction, of a\ndouble series of sciences, historical and theoretical, of _ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes\nsuccessifs_ and of _ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes de r\u00e9p\u00e9tition._ To both these writers\n(besides the merit of having revived, in opposition to naturalism, the\nconsciousness of individuality) belongs that of having understood that\nthe field of history extends far beyond that ordinarily assigned to it,\nand embraces every manifestation of the real. But merely successive\nphenomena or phenomena of mere repetition do not exist and are not\nconceivable; nor is it true that the sciences dealing with the former\nstop at differences of fact and neglect identities. For how could a\nhistory of political facts be written, if no attention were paid to\nthe constant political nature of those facts? or of poetry, without\npaying attention to the constant poetical nature of all its historical\nmanifestations? or of zoological species, without paying attention\nto the constant nature of the organism and of life? The distinction,\ntherefore, as formulated by X\u00e9nopol, is little enough elaborated, not\nto say crude. Rickert, for his part, falls into a like error, owing\nto his failure to respect that intuitive and individual element,\nwhich he had previously admitted. Hence the serious contradictions,\nin which he becomes involved in the second part of his book. After\nhaving defined the concept as peculiar to the naturalistic method, he\neventually claims to find also a species of concept in the procedure\nof history, which he had distinguished from and opposed to the former:\na _historical_ concept, which is obtained by cutting out, in the\nextensive and intensive infinity of facts, certain groups, which are\nplaced in relation by means of practical criteria of importance and\nof value. It is true (he writes) that the concept has been defined by\nus as something of universal content; but now we _wish_ precisely to\nsurpass this one-sidedness, and therefore in the interest of logic it\nis justifiable to give the name concepts also to the thoughts which\nexpress the _historical essence_ of reality.[16] It is worse still\nwhen he attempts to explain the ineradicable intuitive and \u00e6sthetic\nelement of historical narration; for holding art to be without truth\nand of use only in producing some sort of artistic (hedonistic?)\neffect, he recognizes that element as a means of endowing narration\nwith liveliness and of exciting the fancy.[17] A consequence of this\nlack of understanding of the \u00e6sthetic function has been the laborious\nand vain attempt which Rickert is obliged to make, to determine to what\npersonages and facts we are to attribute objective historical value.\n\n[Sidenote: _History as art._]\n\nThe second answer, that history is an art (that is to say, a special\nform of art, which is distinguished from the rest, in that it\nrepresents, not the possible but the real), avoids the above-mentioned\ndifficulties. It distinguishes clearly between the natural sciences\nand history; it explains the ineliminability and the function of\nthe intuitive element in history, and does not lose itself in the\nvain search for the distinctive criterion between historical facts\nand non-historical facts, because it declares that all facts are\nhistorical.[18] But it must in any case be corrected and completed with\nthe conclusion that the representation of the real is no longer simple\nrepresentation or simple art, but the interpenetration of thought and\nrepresentation, that is to say, philosophy-history.[19]\n\n[Sidenote: _Other controversies concerning history._]\n\nAll the other controversies recently engaged upon, relate to the\ncriteria of interpretation, or the system of ideas, which serves as\nthe basis of any sort of historical narration. Thus there have been\ndisputes as to the precise meaning and the greater or less importance\nin history of climate, of race, of economic factors, of individuality,\nof collectivity, of culture, of morality, and of intelligence; and\nalso as to how teleology, immanence, providence, and so on, are to be\nunderstood in history. In these disputes there recur constantly the\nnames of Buckle, of Taine, of Spencer, of Ranke, of Marx, of Lamprecht\nand of others. It is evident that those controversies concern, not\nonly the gnoseological nature of historical writing, but the system of\nthe spirit and of the real, the conception of the world itself. The\nmaterialist and the spiritualist, the theist and the pantheist, will\nsolve them differently. To write their history here would be to go\nbeyond the boundaries of Logic and of the particular history of Logic,\nthat we have set ourselves.\n\n\n\n[Footnote 1: See my observations concerning the perpetuity of\nhistorical criticism in _Critica,_ vi. pp. 383-84.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Poetics,_ chap. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Anal. pr._ i. chap. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 5: See (in particular for Polybius) E. Pais, _Della\nstoriografia della filosofia della storia presso i Greci,_ Livorno,\n1889.]\n\n[Footnote 6: _De dign. et augm._ i. ii. chaps. 1-2.]\n\n[Footnote 7: _De homine,_ chap. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 8: E. Maffei, _I trattati dell' arte storica del Rinascimento\nfino al secolo XVII,_ Napoli, 1897.]\n\n[Footnote 9: G. Gentile, \"Contribution \u00e0 l'histoire de la m\u00e9thode\nhistorique,\" in the _Revue de synth\u00e8se historique,_ v. pp. 129-152.]\n\n[Footnote 10: _Encycl._ \u00a7 549; and all the introduction to the _Phil.\nd. Gesch._]\n\n[Footnote 11: See above, Part III. Chap. III.]\n\n[Footnote 12: \"Ueber die Aufgabe des Geschichtsschreibers,\" in the\n_Transactions_ of the Academy of Berlin, 1882, and reprinted in _W. W._]\n\n[Footnote 13: F. Brentano, _Psychologie,_ Leipzig, 1874.]\n\n[Footnote 14: F. Hildebrand, _Die neuen Theorien der kategorischer.\nSchlussen,_ Vienna, 1891.]\n\n\n[Footnote 15: _Les Principes fondamentaux de l'histoire,_ Paris, 1899;\n2nd ed., entitled _La Th\u00e9orie de l'histoire,_ Paris, 1908.]\n\n[Footnote 16: _Grenzen d. naturwiss. Begriffsbildung,_ pp. 328-29.]\n\n[Footnote 17: _Op. cit._ pp. 382-89.]\n\n[Footnote 18: This is the thesis maintained in 1893 by the author of\nthis book, cf. also B. Croce, \"Les \u00c9tudes relatives \u00e0 la th\u00e9orie de\nl'histoire en Italie,\" in the _Revue de synth\u00e8se historique,_ v. pp.\n257-259.]\n\n[Footnote 19: See above, Part II. Chap. IV., and the note concerning\nit.]\n\n\n\n\nIV\n\n\nTHEORIES OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THOUGHT AND WORD AND FORMALIST LOGIC\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Relation between the history of Logic and that of the\nPhilosophy of language._]\n\nThe history of Logic depends very closely upon the history of the\nPhilosophy of language, or of \u00c6sthetic, understood as the philosophy\nof language and of expression in general. Every discovery concerning\nlanguage throws new light upon the function of thought, which,\nsurpassing language, employs it as an instrument, and therefore unites\nitself with language both negatively and positively. It belongs to the\nprogress of the Philosophy of language, not less than to that of Logic,\nto have determined in a more exact manner the relations between thought\nand expression, as also to have dissipated or begun the dissipation of\nempirical and formalist Logic. This Logic, deluding itself with the\nbelief that it was analysing thought, presents a series of mutilated\nand empty linguistic forms.\n\n[Sidenote: _Logical formalism. Indian Logic free of it._]\n\nThis error, which appeared very early in our western world, has spread\nduring the centuries and yet dominates many minds; so true is this that\n\"Logic\" is usually understood to mean just illogic or formalist Logic.\nWe say our western world, because if Greece created and passed on the\ndoctrine of logical forms, which was a mixture of thoughts materialized\nin words and of words become rigid in thoughts, another Logic is known,\nwhich, as it seems, developed outside the influence of Greek thought,\nand remained immune from the formalist error. This is Indian Logic,\nwhich is notably antiverbalist, though very inferior to that of Greece\nand of Europe in wealth and depth of concepts, and limited almost\nexclusively to the examination of the empirical concept or reasoning,\nof naturalistic induction or _expectatio casuum similium._ Indian\nLogic studies the naturalistic syllogism in _itself,_ as internal\nthought, distinguishing it from the syllogism _for others,_ that is to\nsay, from the more or less usual, but always extrinsic and accidental\nforms of communication and dispute. It has not even a suspicion of the\nextravagant idea (which still vitiates our treatises) of a truth which\nis merely syllogistic and formalist, and which may be false in fact. It\ntakes no account of the judgment, or rather it considers what is called\njudgment, and what is really the proposition, as a verbal clothing\nof knowledge; it does not make the verbal distinctions of subject,\ncopula and predicate; it does not admit classes of categorical and\nhypothetical, of affirmative and of negative judgments. All these are\nextraneous to Logic, whose object is the constant: knowledge considered\nin itself.[1]\n\n[Sidenote: _Aristotelian Logic and formalism._]\n\nIt was a subject of enquiry and of disagreement, especially during\nthe second half of last century, whether formalist Logic, the Logic\nof the schools, could legitimately be called _Aristotelian._ Some,\namong whom were Trendelenburg and Prantl, absolutely denied this,\nand wished to restore the genuine thought of Aristotle, opposing it\nto post-Aristotelian and medi\u00e6val Logic. But they themselves were\nso enmeshed in logical formalism, that they were not capable of\ndetermining its peculiar character. The contrast between those two\nLogics, so far as it struck them, concerned secondary points. If\nthe proper character of formalism consists in the confusion between\nthought and word, how are we to deny that Aristotle fell into this\nerror, or that at any rate he set his foot upon the perilous way?\nCertainly he did not proceed to the exaggerations and ineptitudes\nof later logicians. He was ingenuous, not pedantic. And his books\n(and in particular the _Analytics)_ are rich in acute and original\nobservations. He was a philosopher, and his successors were very\noften manual labourers. But Aristotle (probably influenced by\nthe mathematical disciplines) conceived the idea of a theory of\n_apodeictic,_ which, from simple judgments, through syllogisms and\ndemonstrations, reached completeness in the definition as its last\nterm. The concept was the first term, as the loose concept or name,\nthe last term was the concept defined. He was not ignorant that not\neverything can thus be demonstrated, that in the case of the supreme\nprinciples such a demonstration cannot be given, and it is vain to\nlook for it, and that there is alongside the apodeictic a science of\n_anapodeictic._ But that did not induce him to abandon the study of\nverbal forms for a close study of the concepts or of the category,\nwhich is the demonstration of itself. In his divisions of judgments\nhe was very discreet; but yet he distinguished them verbally, as\nuniversal, particular and indefinite, negative and affirmative. In the\nsyllogism he distinguished only three figures, and affirmed that of\nthose the first is the truly scientific (\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u1f40\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd), because it\ndetermines _what is,_ whereas the second does not give a categorical\njudgment and affirmative knowledge, and the third does not give\nuniversal knowledge; but these restrictions did not suffice to correct\nthe false step made in positing the idea of _figures_ and _moods_ of\nthe syllogism. When we examine the various doctrines of Aristotle\nand compare them with the forms and developments which they assumed\nlater, it can be maintained that no logician was less Aristotelian than\nAristotle. But even he was Aristotelian, and the impulse to seek logic\nin words had been begun in so masterly a manner that for centuries it\nweighed upon the mind like a fate.\n\n[Sidenote: _Later formalism._]\n\nWhy, then, should we rage, like many modern critics, against the later\nmanipulations and amplifications to which Aristotelian Logic was\nsubmitted by Peripatetics and Stoics, by commentators and rhetoricians,\nby doctors of the Church and masters of the University, by Neolatins\nand Byzantines, by Arabs and Germans? We certainly harbour no\ntenderness for the _hypothetical_ and _disjunctive_ syllogism, or for\nthe _fourth figure_ of the syllogism, as elaborated from Theophrastus\nto Galen, or for the _five predicables_ of Porphyry, or for subtleties\nupon the _conversions_ of judgments, or for the _mnemonic verses_ of\nMichael Psellus and of Peter Hispanus, or for the geometric symbols\nof the concepts and syllogisms invented by Christian Weiss in the\nseventeenth century (\"to direct blockheads aright,\"[2] as Prantl\npermits himself to say), or for the calculations upon the moods of the\nsyllogism made by John Hispanianus, which he found to be no less than\nfive hundred and sixty in number, thirty-six of which are conclusive.\nWe also willingly admit that errors have been made in the traditional\ninterpretation of certain doctrines of Aristotle (for example, in the\ndoctrine of the enthymeme).[3] But setting aside these errors, we can\nsay that for those excogitations and distinctions support was already\nfound in the Organon of Aristotle, and that they were derived from\nprinciples there laid down. Certainly, with their crude roughness and\ntheir evident absurdity, they shock good sense in a way in which the\ndistinctions of Aristotle did not, for these were in some sort of\nrelation with the empirical description of the usual mode of scientific\ndiscussions. But the error nestled in themselves; and it was well that\nit should be intensified, so that it might leap to the eyes of all,\njust as it is sometimes well that there should be scandals in practical\nlife.\n\n[Sidenote: _Rebellions against Aristotelian Logic. The opposition of\nthe humanists and their motives._]\n\nThe rebellions which the school (in the wide sense of the word,\nfrom the Peripatetic to the modern) continued to arouse in regard\nto these doctrines might seem to be of greater interest than this\nlabour of embroidering and carving. But since there has been a time\nduring which every protest, and indeed, every insult levelled against\nthe philosopher of Stagira seemed a sign of original thought, of\nspiritual freedom and of secure progress, it is well to repeat that an\nindispensable condition for surpassing the Aristotelian Logic was a new\nPhilosophy of language. Such a condition was altogether wanting in the\npast and is partly wanting now. It is therefore not surprising that\nwhen those rebellions are closely examined, we discover in the midst\nof secondary and superficial disagreement something quite different\nfrom what was expected; not the radical negation, but the substantial\nacceptance, explicit or understood, of the principles of formalist\nLogic.\n\nSuch is the case with the rebellions of the humanists, Ciceronians\nand rhetoricians, which took place in the fourteenth and fifteenth\ncenturies, of Lorenzo Valla, of Rudolph Agricola, of Luigi Vives,\nof Mario Nizolio, of Peter Ramus. The motive power with all of them\nwas abhorrence for the heavy scholastic armour. Culture, leaving\nthe cloisters, spread itself abroad in life; philosophy began to be\nwritten in the common tongue, and for this reason men sought forms of\nexposition that were rapid, easy and clear or eloquent and oratorical.\nBut under these new forms the direction of logical thought remained\nunchanged. Ramus, for example, who applied to Aristotle the elegant\nterms of _fatuus impostor, cham\u00e6leon somnians et stertens,_ and so\nforth, ended by claiming that he alone had understood his true thought,\nand showed by the reforms of it that he proposed (among which was the\nsuggestion that the third figure of the syllogism should pass to the\nfirst place) that he, too, was still revolving in the narrow circle of\nformalism.[4]\n\n[Sidenote: _The opposition of naturalism._]\n\nEven the opposition of naturalism to the Aristotelian Logic did\nnot strike it to the heart, but wished to replace and more often\nto accompany one form of empiricism with another: the rules of the\nsyllogism with the precepts of induction, the sophistical refutations\nwith the determination of the four idols that preoccupy men's minds.\nBacon never dreamed of denying to syllogistic the value of true\ndoctrine. He believed, however, that it had already been sufficiently\nstudied and developed, that it lacked nothing, and even possessed\nsomething superfluous, whereas there was still wanting a criterion of\ninvention and of induction, which was of fundamental importance for\nsyllogistic itself. In making the inventory of knowledge (he writes) it\nis to be observed that we find ourselves almost in the conditions of a\nman who inherits an estate, in the inventory of which there is noted:\n\"ready money, none\" (\"numeratae pecuniae, nihil\").[5] Hence he raised\nhis voice against the abuse of disputations and of reasoning as to\nmatters of fact; the subtlety of the syllogism is always conquered by\nthat of nature.[6] The syllogism consists of propositions, propositions\nof words, and words are the counters of concepts; but if the concepts\nare confused or wrongly abstracted, the syllogistic consequences\ndeduced from them are without any sort of security. Hence the necessity\nof beginning with induction: \"_spes est una in inciuctione vera._\"[7]\nBacon's position (which was therefore not anti-formalist, but only\nan addition or complement to formalism) has been renewed, word for\nword, in all inductive Logics, up to that of the English school of the\nnineteenth century, and to ours of to-day. Stuart Mill's book expresses\nthe combination of the two empiricisms, syllogistic and inductive, in\nits very title: \"A system of Logic, _ratiocinative_ and _inductive,_\nbeing a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of\nScientific _investigation._\"\n\n[Sidenote: _Labour of simplification in the eighteenth century. Kant._]\n\nIn the eighteenth century, while Leibnitz sought an amplification\nand perfecting of syllogistic in the logical calculus, and some\nfollowed him who did not, however, attain to true effectiveness in the\nhistory of culture,[8] formalist Logic fell always more and more into\ndiscredit, not only as Logica _utens,_ but also as _docens,_ that is to\nsay, as theory.\n\nHence the moderate tendency, to which Kant adhered, which consists of\npreserving that Logic, while seeking to correct, and, in particular,\nto simplify it. For example, Kant undertook to demonstrate the \"false\nsubtlety of the four figures of the syllogism,\" and at the same time\nrendered traditional Logic yet more formalist by withdrawing from it\nall examination of the synthesis and the categories, which he referred\nto his new transcendental Logic. Traditional Logic, which he respected\nand held to be substantially perfect, constituted (he said) a canon\nof the intellect and of reason, but only in the _formal_ aspect of\ntheir employment, whatever be the content to which it is applied. Its\nonly criterion is the agreement or non-agreement of any knowledge\nwith the general and formal laws of the intellect and of reason; a\n_conditio sine qua non_ of every truth, but a _conditio_ which is only\nnegative.[9]\n\n[Sidenote: _Refutation of formalist Logic. Hegel; Schleiermacher._]\n\nHegel, on the contrary, opposed tradition. He understood the\ncharacter of formalist Logic marvellously well: this \"_empirical_\nLogic, a bizarre science, which is an _irrational_ knowledge of\nthe _rational,_ and sets the bad example of not following its own\ndoctrines. Indeed it assumes the licence of doing the opposite of\nwhat its rules prescribe, when it neglects to deduce the concepts and\nto demonstrate its affirmations.\"[10] In so far as it was empirical\nit was intellectualist, and presented the determinations of reason\nin an abstract and atomic manner in combining them mechanically. The\nnew concept of the concept, originated by Hegel, creates from itself\nits own theories and allows the old formalist theories to disappear\nas dead and dry remains. The forms of thought are henceforth the very\nforms of the real; the Idea is the unity of concept and representation,\nbecause it is the universal itself, big with the individual. Things\nare realized judgments, and the syllogism is the Idea which identifies\nitself with its own reality. This at bottom amounts to saying that\nthought fully dominates reality, because it is not an extrinsic\naddition or an interposed means, but Reality itself, which makes itself\nthought, because it is thought. Other philosophers, too, contemporaries\nand adversaries of Hegel, rejected formalist Logic, and among these\nwas Schleiermacher.[11] He made the logical forms of the _concept_ and\nof the _judgment_ correspond to the two forms of reality, _being_ and\n_doing,_ finding corresponding analogies in _space,_ a dividing of\nbeing, and in _time,_ a dividing of doing. The concept and the judgment\nmutually presuppose one another, and give rise to a circle, which is so\nonly when considered temporally; since at the point of indifference, of\nfusion, of indistinction the two make one.[12] Schleiermacher differed\nfrom Hegel (who attains in thought the unity of the real) in being\nobliged to withdraw the syllogism from the number of the essential\nforms of thought, because (he says), \"if the syllogism were a true\nform, a being of its own should correspond to it, and this is not found\nto be the case.\"[13]\n\n[Sidenote: _Its partial persistence owing to insufficient ideas as to\nlanguage._]\n\nBut if with the Hegelian criticism formalist Logic was surpassed by a\ntruly philosophical Logic, and thereupon lost all its importance, it\ncannot be said that it was definitely dissolved. In Hegel himself there\nremain traces of it in certain divisions of the forms of judgment and\nof syllogism, which he either accepts and corrects or creates anew.\nDefinitive criticism demanded that in any case the error peculiar to\nthis empiricism should be recognized. This error consists in confusing\nlanguage and thought, taking thought as language, and therefore also\nlanguage as thought. Hegel could not effect this criticism, for he\nwas logistic as regards the theory of language, conceiving it to be a\ncomplex of logical and universal elements.[14] Hence the coincidence\nbetween the forms of language and those of thought did not seem to him\nirrational, provided that both were taken in their true connection. The\nrevival of the Philosophy of language, begun by Vico and carried on\nby Hamann and by Herder, and then again by Humboldt, remained unknown\nto him or had no influence upon him. Nor, to tell the truth, has it\ninfluenced even later Logic, for had it acquired this knowledge, it\nwould have been freed for ever from formalism or verbalism and have\npossessed a method and a power of application to the nature of the\nproblems that belong to it. Just a trace of serious discussion (but\nmade rather in the interest of the Philosophy of language than in\nthat of Logic) appears in the polemic between Steinthal and Becker\nconcerning the relations between Logic and Grammar.[15]\n\n[Sidenote: _Formalist Logic in Herbart, in Schopenhauer, in Hamilton._]\n\nFor this reason, formalist Logic has continued to exist (with\ndifficulty if you will, but yet to exist) in the nineteenth century.\nFrom Kant it had received with the name _formal_ a new baptism and\na new legitimization. Among post-Kantians Herbart clung closely\nto it, though he somewhat simplified it, and hostile as he was to\nall transcendental Logic, he continued to conceive it as the sole\ninstrument of thought. Schopenhauer held logical forms to be a good\nparallel to rhetorical forms, and limited himself to proposing some\nslight remodelling of the former: for example, to consider judgments\nas always universal (both those called by that name and particular\nand singular judgments as well), and to explain hypothetical and\ndisjunctive judgments as pronounced upon the comparison of two or\nmore categorical judgments. From the syllogism, which he defined as\n\"a judgment drawn from two other judgments, without the intervention\nof new conditions,\" he dropped the fourth figure, but he proclaimed\nthe first three to be \"ectypes\" of three real and essentially\ndifferent operations of thought.[16] Kant's teaching was followed in\nEngland by Hamilton. Hamilton insisted upon the purely hypothetical\ncharacter of logical reasonings; he excluded from Logic discussions\nof possibility and impossibility and of the modalities, and declared\nthat the intrusion into that science of the concepts of perfect or\nimperfect induction, which refer to material differences and are\ntherefore extralogical,[17] was a fundamental error. In this way he\nreacted against inductive Logic, which, in his country especially, had\nprevailed against formalist Logic or had strangely accompanied it. He\npersuaded himself that he could perfect the latter, by simplifying\nthe doctrine of the judgment, by means of what is called the\n_quantification of the predicate._[18]\n\n[Sidenote: _More recent theories._]\n\nLater logicians continued to employ these partial and superficial\nmodifications. Trendelenburg, as has been mentioned, believed that\nhe could make progress by referring the thing to its beginning,\nthat is, by turning from Aristotelianism to Aristotle, and owing to\nthe curious influence of a thought of Hegel, he assigned to logic\nand reality a common foundation which, for him, was not the Idea,\nbut Movement. Lotze reduced the forms of judgments to three only,\naccording to the variations of the copula: categorical, hypothetical\nand disjunctive judgments; and he made impersonal judgments precede\ncategorical. By this last class he vainly sought to satisfy the\ndesire for a theoretic form which is presupposed in properly\nlogical thought, and it is yet to seek. Lotze always had at bottom\nan intellectualistic concept of language: poetry and art seemed to\nhim to be directed, not to contemplation and expression, but to\nemotion and to feelings of pleasure and pain. He could not therefore\nrecognize the primitive theoretic form in art, in intuition, in pure\nexpressiveness. Drobisch, the Herbartian, revealed formalism in all\nits crudity, beginning with the affirmation that \"there are certainly\nnecessary judgments and syllogisms, but no necessary concepts.\"\nSigwart reformed the classification of judgments (of denomination, of\nproperty and activity, impersonal, of relation, abstract, narrative and\nexplicative), and retouched that of syllogisms. Wundt, accepting the\nold tripartition of logical forms, also attempts new sub-divisions,\ndistinguishing judgments for example, according to their subject, into\nindeterminate, singular and plural; according to their predicate,\ninto narrative, descriptive and explicative; according to their\nrelation, into judgments of identity, superordination, subordination,\nco-ordination and dependence; and into negative predications and\nnegative oppositions. Brentano's reform does not in general abandon the\nformalist circle; hence, having assigned the quantity of judgments to\ntheir matter, he limits himself to dividing them into affirmative and\nnegative; among immediate inferences he accepts only the inference _ad\ncontradictoriam_; among the laws of the syllogism he denies the law\n_ex mere negativis,_ maintaining indeed that _ex mere affirmativis nil\nsequitur;_ he defends, as the law of all syllogisms, that of _quaternio\nterminorum,_ which used to pass for the sign of the sophism; and he\nfurther abolishes the vain distinctions of figures and moods.\n\n[Sidenote: _Mathematical Logic._]\n\nOpposed as radical innovators to these logicians, who work more or less\nwith traditional formulas, are the mathematical logicians, who follow,\nnot philosophy, but certain fictions of the Leibnitzian philosophy.\nGeorge Bentham, De Morgan, Boole, Jevons, Grassman and now several in\nEngland, in France, in Germany and in Italy (Peano), have been and are\nrepresentative of this tendency. They are innovators only in a manner\nof speaking, for they are ultra-reactionaries, far more formalist than\nthe formalist Aristotle. They are dissatisfied with the divisions made\nby him, not because they are toe numerous and arbitrary, but because\nthey are toe few and still bear some traces of rationality They strive\nto the uttermost to provide a theory of thought, from which all thought\nis absent This kind of Logic has been well defined by Windelband as\n\"Logic of the green cloth.\"[19]\n\n[Sidenote: _Inexact idea of language among mathematical logicians and\nintuitionists._]\n\nThese logicians have naturally inherited the other fiction of\nLeibnitz, namely that of the possibility of a constant and universal\nlanguage,[20] thus revealing another reason for their aberration,\nand the usual support of the whole formalist error--ignorance of the\nalogical nature of language. The nature of language remains obscure\nfrom another point of view, even to the modern intuitionists (Bergson).\nThey continue to regard as language, not language in its simplicity,\nbut the intellectualist procedure (classificatory and abstractive)\nwhich falsifies the continuous in the discontinuous, breaks up\nduration, and builds a fictitious world upon the real world. They are\ntherefore ultimately led to attribute the value of a pure expression\nof reality to music, as though music were not language, and true\nlanguage (not the intellectualist discourse which they accept in place\nof it) were not essentially music, that is to say, poetry. For the\nintellectualists also, a Logic (were they to resolve upon constructing\none) would be nothing but formalist.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: See the recent exposition of the secular Indian Logic, in\nits most complete form, as found in a treatise of the twelfth century,\nin II. Jacobi, \"Die indische Logik,\" in the _Nachrichten v. d. K\u00f6nigl.\nGesellsch. d. Wissenschaft zu G\u00f6ttingen,_ Philol.-hist. Klasse, 1901,\nfasc. iv. pp. 460-484.]\n\n\n[Footnote 2: _Gesch. d. Logik,_ i. p. 362.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Hamilton, _Fragments philosophiques,_ French tr. pp.\n238-242.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Frantl, \"\u00dcber Petrus Ramus,\" in the _Sitzungsberichte d.\nk. bayer. Akad. d. Wissensch.,_ Philol.-hist. Klasse, 1878, ii. pp.\n157-169.]\n\n[Footnote 5: _De dign. et augm._ iv. ch. 2-5.]\n\n[Footnote 6: _Ib._ ch. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 7: _Nov. Org._ i., aphorism 14.]\n\n[Footnote 8: It is pertinent to translate here a passage of Hegel, in\nrelation to this Leibnitzian tendency, which is now again becoming\nfashionable. \"The extreme form of this (syllogistic) disconceptualized\nmanner of dealing with the conceptual determinations of the syllogism,\nis found in Leibnitz, who (_Opp._ t. ii. p. i) places the syllogism\nunder the calculus of combination. By this means he has calculated\nhow many positions of the syllogism are possible, and thus, by taking\ncount of the differences of positive and negative judgments, then of\nuniversal, particular, indeterminate and singular judgments, he has\narrived at the result that the possible combinations are 2048, of\nwhich, after excluding the invalid, there remain 24 valid. Leibnitz\nboasts much of the utility possessed by the analysis of combination in\nfinding, not only the forms of the syllogism, but also the connections\nof other concepts. This operation is the same as that of calculating\nthe number of possible combinations of letters that can be made from\nan alphabet, or of moves in a game of draughts, or of different hands\nin a game of _hombre,_ and so on. From which it is clear that the\ndeterminations of a syllogism are placed on a level with moves in\ndraughts, or hands in _hombre._ The rational is taken as something\ndead, altogether deprived of the concept, and the peculiar character\nof the concept and its determinations is left out; that is to say,\nthe character that in so far as they are spiritual facts, they are\n_relation,_ and that, in virtue of this relation, they suppress their\n_immediate_ determination. This Leibnitzian application of the calculus\nof combination to the syllogism and to the connection of other concepts\nis not to be distinguished in any way from the discredited _art of\nLully,_ save for the greater methodicalness in calculation of which\nit gives proof; it resembles that absurdity in every other respect.\nAnother thought, dear to Leibnitz, was included in the calculus\nof combination. He had nourished this thought in his youth, and\nnotwithstanding its immaturity and superficiality, he never afterwards\nabandoned it. This was the thought of a _universal characteristic_ of\nconcepts, of a writing, in which every concept should be represented as\nproceeding from others or as referring to another; almost as though, in\na rational connection, which is essentially dialectic, a content should\npreserve the same determinations that it has when standing alone.\n\n\"The calculus of Ploucquet is doubtless supported by the most cogent\nmode of submitting the relation of the syllogism to calculation. He\nabstracts in the judgment from the difference of relation; that is to\nsay, from its singularity, particularity and universality, and fixes\nthe _abstract identity_ of subject and predicate, placing them in a\n_mathematical relation._ This relation reduces reason to an empty,\ntautological formation of propositions. In the proposition, 'the rose\nis red,' the predicate must signify, not red in general, but only the\ndeterminate 'red of the rose.' In the proposition, 'all Christians are\nmen,' the predicate must signify only 'those men who are Christians.'\nFrom this and from the other proposition, 'Hebrews are not Christians,'\nfollows the conclusion (which did not constitute a good recommendation\nfor this calculus with Mendelssohn): 'hence, Hebrews are not men' (that\nis to say, they are not those men, who are Christians).\n\n\"Ploucquet gives as a consequence of his invention _posse etiant rudes\nmechanice tot am logicam doceri, uti pueri arithmeticam docentur. ita\nquidem, ut nulla formidine in ratiociniis suis errandi lorqueri, vel\nfallaciis circumveniri possint, si in calculo non errant._ This eulogy\nof the calculus, to the effect that by its means it is possible to\nsupply uneducated people with the whole of Logic, is certainly the\nworst that can be said of an invention which concerns logical Science'\"\n(_Wiss. d. Logik,_ iii. pp. 142-43).]\n\n[Footnote 9: _Kr. d. rein. Vern.,_ ed. quoted, pp. 101-2.]\n\n[Footnote 10: _Wiss. d. Logik,_ iii. p. 51.]\n\n[Footnote 11: _Dialektik,_ ed. quoted, pp. 74-5.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Work cited, pp. 145, 147-9.]\n\n[Footnote 13: Work cited, pp. 146, 291-2.]\n\n[Footnote 14: _Wiss. d. Logik,_ i. pp. 10-11 and _passim; Encykl._ \u00a7\n205 and elsewhere.]\n\n[Footnote 15: _Estetica_\u00b2, p. II, ch. xii.]\n\n[Footnote 16: _Werke,_ ed. cited, ii. pp. 120-135.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Work cited, pp. 159, 165.]\n\n[Footnote 18: See above, pp. 297, dealing with Ploucquet.]\n\n[Footnote 19: In his remarks upon the present state of Logic, contained\nin his work _Die Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts_\n(Heidelberg 1904), i. pp. 163-186.]\n\n[Footnote 20: See my remarks in the _Critica,_ iii. pp. 428-433\n(concerning the work of Messrs. Couturat and L\u00e9au); and cf. same, iv.\npp. 379-381.]\n\n\n\n\nV\n\n\nCONCERNING THIS LOGIC\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Traditional character of this Logic and its connection with\nthe Logic of the philosophic concept._]\n\nThe Logic which we have expounded in this treatise is also in a certain\nsense traditional Logic. But it should be connected, not with the\ntradition of formalism, but rather with that of the Hegelian Logic,\nof Kantian transcendental Logic, and so of the loftiest Hellenic\nspeculative thought. In other words, its affinity should be sought in\nthe logical sections of the _Critique of Pure Reason_ of Kant, or in\nthe _Metaphysic_ of Aristotle, and not in the _Lessons in Logic_ or in\nthe _Analytics_ of the same authors. This traditional character endows\nit with confidence, because man has always thought the true, and it\nis to be doubted if he who fails to discover the truth in the past,\npossesses the truth of the present and of the future, of which in his\nproud isolation he thinks himself secure.\n\n[Sidenote: _Its innovations._]\n\nBut to be truly attached to tradition means to carry it on and to\ncollaborate with it. Contact with thought is always dynamic and\npropulsive and urges us to go forward, since it is impossible to stop\nor to turn back. For this reason, this Logic presents some novelties,\nof which the fundamental and principal can be thus enumerated:\n\n[Sidenote: _I. Exclusion of empirical and abstract concepts._]\n\nI. Accepting the doctrine, which culminates in the last great modern\nphilosophy of the _pure Concept,_ as the only doctrine of logical\ntruth, this Logic excludes empirical and abstract concepts, declaring\nthem to be irreducible to the pure concept.\n\n[Sidenote: _II. Non-theoretic character of the second and autonomy of\nthe empirical and mathematical sciences._]\n\nII. Accepting for these last the _economic theory_ of the empirical and\nabstract sciences and considering them as having a practical character\nand therefore as non-concepts (pseudoconcepts), this Logic denies that\nthey exhaust logical thought, indeed it altogether denies that they\nbelong to it and demonstrates that their very existence presupposes\nthe reality of the pure concept. Hence, it connects the two doctrines\nwith one another and asserts the _autonomy_ of philosophy, at the same\ntime respecting the relative autonomy of the empirical and mathematical\nsciences thus rendered atheoretical.\n\n[Sidenote: _III. The concept as unity of distinctions._]\n\nIII. In the doctrine concerning the organism of the pure concept, it\naccepts the _dialectic_ view or the unity of opposites, but denies\nits immediate validity for the distinctions of the concept; the unity\nof which is organized as a unity of distinctions in the theory of\n_degrees_ of reality. In this way, the autonomy of the forms of reality\nor of the spirit is also respected and the _practical_ nature of error\nestablished.\n\n[Sidenote: _IV. Identity of the concept with the individual judgment\nand of philosophy with history._]\n\nIV. The richness of reality, of facts, of experience, which seemed\nto be withdrawn from the pure concept and so from philosophy by the\nseparation of it from the empirical sciences, is on the contrary\nrestored to and recognized in philosophy, not in the diminished and\nimproper form which is that of empirical science, but in a total and\nintegral manner. This is effected by means of the connection, which\nis a _unity,_ between _Philosophy_ and _History_--a unity obtained by\nmaking clear and profoundly studying the nature of the concept and the\nlogical _a priori_ synthesis.\n\n[Sidenote: _V. Impossibility of defining thought by means of verbal\nforms, and refutation of formalists Logic._]\n\nV. Finally, the doctrines and the presuppositions of formalist Logic\nare refuted in a precise manner. The autonomy of the _logical form_ is\nasserted and consequently the effort to contain its determinations in\nwords or expressive forms is declared to be vain. These are certainly\nnecessary, but obey, not the law of logic, but that of the \u00e6sthetic\nspirit.\n\n[Sidenote: _Conclusion._]\n\nSuch, summarily indicated, is the progress upon previous thought, which\nthis Logic would wish to represent. To gain this end, it has availed\nitself, not only of the help afforded by ancient and modern Logic,\nconcentrated in the Hegelian Logic, but also of those others that have\ncome into being since Hegel, and especially of \u00e6sthetic, of the theory\nof historical writing and of the gnoseology of the sciences. It has\nstriven to avail itself of all scattered truths, but of none in an\neclectic manner, that is to say, by making arbitrary collections or\nmerely aggregations, for it has been conscious that scattered truths\nbecome truly truths when they are no longer scattered but fused, not\nmany, but one.\n\nTHE END","title":"Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":131712}