{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_54269/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_54269","id":"gutenberg_54269","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/54269","summary":null,"tags":["Baptism -- Church of England","Category: Essays, Letters & Speeches","Category: History - British","Category: History - Modern (1750+)","Category: Law & Criminology","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Church and state -- Church of England","Church and state -- Great Britain","Ecclesiastical law -- England -- History -- 19th century","Gorham, George Cornelius","Great Britain. Privy Council. Judicial Committee"],"text":"Transcribed from the 1850 William Pickering edition by David Price, email\nccx074@pglaf.org\n\n                        [Picture: Pamphlet cover]\n\n\n\n\n\n                                 A LETTER\n                                  TO THE\n                        REV. WILLIAM MASKELL, A.M.\n\n\n                                    BY\n\n                    THE REV. MAYOW WYNELL MAYOW, A.M.\n                    VICAR OF MARKET LAVINGTON, WILTS,\n                AND LATE STUDENT OF CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\n           HOW FAR THE JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL\n              COMMITS THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND BY ITS DECISION,\n                         EVEN ALLOWING IT TO HAVE\n                          JURISDICTION IN POINTS\n                               OF DOCTRINE.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\n                             Second Edition.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\n                                 LONDON:\n                            WILLIAM PICKERING.\n                                  1850.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\nMY DEAR MASKELL,\n\nIN these \u201clast days,\u201d in which \u201cperilous times\u201d have \u201ccome,\u201d it seems a\nduty, to be somewhat less nice and scrupulous as to any charge of\npresumption or lack of modesty to which a man may lay himself open by\nmaking known his thoughts upon the great matters which now agitate us,\nthan would be the case at another time.  One whose name will add no\nweight to any thing he may say, might well shrink under ordinary\ncircumstances from commenting upon your recent letter, and appear, even\nto himself, over-bold in supposing he can add any thing to the views\ntherein expounded.  But the very pain with which we approach these topics\nis some warrant to express our thoughts; inasmuch as it is, I think,\nsomething of a guarantee that whatever is said, will be, at any rate, not\nsaid lightly.  Most heartily do I desire to adopt and echo your words\n\u201cthat the enquiry on which we are all engaged is far too great to admit\nof any personal consideration; and our aim is not to win a victory, or to\nprove that we ourselves are in the right, but to discover the truth, and\npoint it out to others.\u201d\n\nIf then I imagine a line of argument tending to elucidate this truth, has\nbeen partially overlooked in the expression of your views, I trust I\nshall stand excused, both by yourself and any others who may read this\nletter, from the charge of a too great boldness in writing it.  The\ncrisis and exigence of the time is, as it appears to me, too great to\nallow us to stand upon niceties, or permit any thing to be kept back\nwhich may even by possibility be found of service in indicating the line\nof duty.\n\nLet me, however, here say in the very outset, I am not by any means about\nto attempt an answer to your letter; a task for which I am, in the first\nplace, not qualified, and in the second place, not disposed.  I feel the\ndifficulties you bring forward too much myself to be prepared to ignore\nthem, though I will not say I go with you in the whole of the positions\nyou are concerned to establish.  But it is _became_ I feel the pressure\nof many of them so strongly; _because_, much as the names of Mr. Keble\nand of many who take the same line of argument with him, are to be\nrevered, nevertheless, I am at a loss to make up my mind that they have\nestablished an unassailable position in denying the competency and\nauthority of the court of the Committee of Privy Council, that I am the\nmore anxious to say a few words upon one point which appears to me to\nhave escaped your notice.\n\nLet me come at once to this point: and to do so I cannot, perhaps,\nproceed more conveniently than by making a quotation from your letter.\nAt page 54, you say:\u2014\u201cNo doubt this court,\u201d (The Judicial Committee of\nPrivy Council,) \u201cnor any other court cannot make canons: but, as has been\nbefore said, this is a question, not of new canons and formularies, but\nof the right construction of old ones.  Now, in such a cause, either the\ncourt of the Judicial Committee has authority or it has not: . . .  If\nthen the decision of the court is to be listened to at all, it is not\neasy to discover how one will be able to draw distinctions, and place\nlimitations upon the extent to which it reaches.  _There seems to be no\nmiddle way between accepting and acting upon it_, _and repudiating it\naltogether as if it had never existed_.  I mean, repudiating it in every\nother respect than in the one point, comparatively unimportant and\ntrivial, of the institution of a certain person to a certain benefice.\u201d\n\nYou say, it is not easy to discover a middle way.  I would hope, though\nnot _easy_, it may be _not impossible_.\n\nLet me however here, and in the first place, clear myself from any\nsuspicion, if you should be inclined to attach it to me, that I am about\nto seek a middle course by softening the amount of error contained in a\ndenial of the exclusive doctrine of regeneration in baptism.  Let me not\nbe deemed guilty, even in thought, of doubting that such denial is a\ndenial of the \u201cone baptism for the remission of sins,\u201d and is absolute\nunmitigated heresy; being such as would have shut out any Church\npermitting its profession, from the communion of Christendom in the\nprimitive ages; such as no Church can maintain, and remain a living\nbranch of the one Body of Christ.  I cast to the winds and repudiate with\nall my soul, that spurious charity of our day, which would seek to\n\u201cplease men\u201d at the expense of God\u2019s truth; which would recommend the\nGospel by denying the Faith; which would render it more popular or\npalatable, by explaining away the Creeds; and all, to be able to include\n_the more_ within the Church\u2019s pale, under the plea of an extended\nusefulness.  Such liberality (with what is not our own to give,) is, in\nmy estimation, a giving away God\u2019s honour, and so, mere and absolute\ntreason against HIM: therefore is a giving away our place in His Church,\nand a blotting out it\u2019s name from the book of life.\n\nLet me explain further: that in what I am about to write, I am going to\nadmit, at any rate for the sake of argument, the authority and\njurisdiction of the Committee of Council as a tribunal in this case.  I\nmay, and indeed do think, that in your letter, you have allowed too\nlittle for the difficulty in which the Church has been placed as to\nmaking her voice heard: too little therefore to the circumstances which\nhave hitherto trammelled her, as accounting for and excusing her silence,\nespecially in later times: as for example in the changes made in 1832,\nand perhaps in other instances.  Still I am not concerned in what I am\nabout to write to controvert your positions on this matter, because for\nthe present purpose of my argument I am going to admit the competency,\ni.e. the authority as distinct of course from the fitness, of this\ntribunal to try the issue, between Mr. Gorham and the Bishop of Exeter.\n\nStill, as it seems to me, both these points may be conceded: first that\nthe court is sufficient: and secondly, that to deny unconditional\nregeneration in the case of infants, is heresy; and yet, it may be\nreasonably maintained, that whatever the decision in this trial shall be,\nThe Church of England may not stand committed to heresy thereby.\n\nNo doubt, at first sight this will appear a paradox; and the interpreter\nthe harder to be understood of the two, in thus imagining it not\nimpossible to find a middle way between \u201caccepting and acting upon this\ncourt\u2019s decision, and repudiating it altogether as if it had never\nexisted.\u201d  But I mean, not impossible to find a point of view, regarding\nthe tribunal from which, we may be able justly and reasonably to allow\nit\u2019s competency for the present judgment on doctrine, and yet to\nrepudiate, not exactly the decision itself, but the effect of it as\ncommitting the Church at large: repudiate it, in your own words, \u201cin\nevery other respect, but the one point comparatively unimportant and\ntrivial of the institution of a certain person to a certain benefice.\u201d\n\nNow the only postulate I ask for this conclusion, is, that the Church\nshall not, and cannot, stand committed to heresy without proof that her\ncrime is something not accidental, but wilful and deliberate; something\nmore than a mistake, which she is ready and willing to clear up the\nmoment opportunity is given her to do so.  In short that as a man is not\na liar, without the intention to deceive; so a Church is not heretical,\nunless the animus of heresy be proved against her.\n\nIf you will concede me thus much, I think I may be able to shew that\nthere is a middle course between denying the jurisdiction of the Court,\nand admitting the _weight_ even if I allow the justness, of the sentence:\nthat is to say, the sentence may be such as under the circumstances, the\njudges were bound to give, (I am not conceding but supposing this:) and\nit may therefore carry the conclusion that the Church\u2019s formularies on\nthe subject in question are indistinct; still without proving also that\nthe Church ever intended them to be so; and therefore without affording\nground to say that, though her words are ambiguous, her heart and mind\nhave ever been heretical.  Of course upon the strength of the sentence,\nif thus given, Mr. Gorham would gain his institution; but I say again, I\ndo not think the Church would be committed to his heresy.\n\nLet us consider again, what it is precisely which the judicial Committee\nof Council are about to do. {8}  It cannot be stated more entirely\naccording to my sense, than in your own words.  You say (page 7) \u201cThe\nquestion is one simply of _interpretation of the Law of the Church of\nEngland_ . . .  It is not a question of what is in itself true or untrue,\nagreeable or not agreeable to the Holy Scriptures, but solely whether a\ncertain doctrine has or has not been clearly defined to the exclusion of\nsome other statement about the same doctrine, which would seem to deny it\nor explain it away.\u201d  Again in the passage already quoted (p. 54) \u201cThis\nis a question not of new canons and formularies, but of the right\nconstruction of old ones.\u201d\n\nThen if this be so: though the Decision should affirm what shall be in\nits form, heresy, may there not still be a limitation as to its effect:\nrather perhaps I should say, a suspension of the actual heresy altogether\nuntil some further condition shall be fulfilled to give it life: that is\nto say, though the decision may affirm that the formularies of the Church\nof England do not so clearly define the faith on this point, as to\npreclude the words admitting an uncatholic, nay an heretical\ninterpretation, does it follow that the animus of the Church is therefore\neven in the least degree shown to desire or intend to teach such error,\nnay even to allow it to be taught; and if there be no heretical animus,\ncan She be pronounced herself to have incurred the guilt of heresy?  I\nanswer, (and I hope safely) to both questions; No! because all that will\nbe brought out, even in the event of the decision of the court of appeal\nbeing to reverse the judgment of the court below, will be merely that\nthere is _an ambiguity of language_, in the documents on which that court\nhad to found its judgment; and this, an ambiguity, it may be,\nunintentional on the part of the Church, though really inherent in the\nwording of her formularies, acting therefore imperatively on the judges\nin the case (if so,) and _obliging_ them to give a decision such as shall\nleave the point at issue, an open question.  Let me be well understood.\nIf such ambiguity of language be intentional on the part of the Church;\nif she can be proved to have _desired_ in drawing up her articles and\nservices to admit two interpretations on baptismal regeneration: if it be\nher view and plan to include two such opposite parties within her as\nthose represented by Mr. Gorham and the Bishop of Exeter, by such\nambiguous, and therefore comprehensive language, I most fully admit she\nstands convicted of unpalliated heresy both in form and matter.  But if\nit be lawful without violence to reason or conscience to believe she had\nno such view, but meant to assert the undoubted ancient catholic faith on\nbaptism, I do not think we are bound to make her answerable, as if she\nhad knowingly and wilfully assented to uncatholic doctrine, though as it\nturns out (if so it be) the wording of her formularies is inadvertently\ninsufficient to protect the one truth.  I cannot but think that though\nthe misfortune of such inadvertence is not to be denied, its guiltiness\nis not lightly to be admitted; and that we are bound in all reason, (and\nI am sure if so, in conscience and loyalty) not to consider her chained\nby such ambiguous language to the denial of God\u2019s truth, and the catholic\nfaith.\n\nWith regard then to the animus in question.  Surely in the first place we\nmay say this; that it is not settled adversely to sound doctrine, because\nnot involved in, this decision itself, whatever it may be.  The Judges in\nthe present trial would I imagine, even though using to guide them in\ntheir judgment contemporary documents, and even contemporary opinions to\nelucidate the language of the formularies, yet themselves admit, that to\n_decide the animus_ with which those formularies were originally drawn\nup, is _beside_ the point they have had to try: that it suffices for them\nto declare the ambiguity if they find it in the words; but that it is\nforeign to the matter in hand to settle whether such ambiguity be\naccidental or intentional.  Of course I am not saying they would _deny_\nthe intention of comprehensiveness.  On the contrary they would probably\nappear as a matter of course to infer it; and may even make mention of\nwhat they suppose the intention of the Church to have been: but still\nthey will not _rule_ the animus, as a part of their judgment.  As to mere\nlegal consequences indeed, I presume they will necessarily so far imply\nthe intention to have been according to the judgment they deliver, as\nfully to give the benefit of their construction to the appellant in the\ncause: but yet this intention is to be distinguished, as a different\npoint from any which they have had to try, which has surely been merely\n_what is_ in the words of the formularies, _not how_ it came to be there.\n\nBut even should the court proceed so far as to say it gives its judgment\non the latitudinarian side, expressly on the ground that it believes the\nChurch in drawing up her formularies intended such comprehension, even\nthat declaration would have no judicial authority to impose itself on any\nman as the truth.  The _grounds_ of a judge\u2019s sentence are a different\nthing from the _sentence itself_; and, I think all those \u201clearned in the\nlaw\u201d will bear me out in saying, form no part of it.  It is not an\nimpossible nor an unheard of case for a judge to give a right judgment,\nyet upon wrong grounds.  The _grounds_ are merely _his opinion_ which\nchallenge no authority beyond their intrinsic weight, and which any man\nmay canvas; the _judgement_ is _authoritative_, and of course in a court\nfrom which there is no appeal, is assumed ex necessitate rei, to be\nsound.\n\nLet us then next proceed with one or two considerations which may be of\nservice in determining for ourselves what animus we shall attribute to\nthe Church in drawing up those of her formularies which bear upon the\ndoctrine of baptism.\n\nA point of great weight surely is this:\u2014that they are (even if really\nambiguous when subjected to the searching eyes and acute minds of the\nmost subtle lawyers: I use the word in no ill sense; yet) to all ordinary\nmen, and ordinary unbiassed minds, so clearly on the catholic side, and\nso plainly to such minds convey nothing but the ancient doctrine of\nregeneration in baptism, that it is much more easy and natural to believe\nthe Church never contemplated the ambiguity than that she did.  Let it be\nremembered too that if now on the present appeal, the six eminent law\nofficers who have heard the case do decide for the ambiguity, yet, so\nindistinctly is this ambiguity itself discernible, that not merely\nordinary men, but one of the ablest and perhaps _the_ most practised\necclesiastical lawyer of our day, had no doubt or hesitation on his mind\nwhen the case was argued before him as the Archbishop\u2019s judge of doctrine\nin the court of Arches, that it did not exist; that there was no such\n_approach_ even to ambiguous language as to make him have recourse to\nextraneous comment to guide him, or cause him to give in the very\nslightest degree a doubtful judgment; but on the contrary, thought there\nwas no sense to be put upon the Church\u2019s statements on this subject but\nthe one catholic doctrine, which, a priori, we should suppose she would\nenunciate.\n\nTake with these general considerations the particular circumstance that\nif we assert the ambiguous animus, we must suppose the Church, not only\nin fact to have inadvertently qualified words naturally carrying the\ncatholic meaning; but so to have intended to qualify them, that when she\nsays \u201cseeing this child is regenerate,\u201d she meant \u201cseeing he is not\nregenerate,\u201d or, at the least, \u201cseeing I have no reason to believe he is\nregenerate,\u201d and shall we not have a sufficient case to prevent our\nfeeling compelled to \u201cthink\u201d that \u201cevil,\u201d that the Church had a double\nmind.  To me, at least these thoughts bring home a satisfactory\nconviction that it is much more likely the Church herself has been\nignorant of ambiguity, and did not mean to be indefinite, than that she\npurposely drew up her articles and services, with merely such a subtle\nand almost imperceptible residuum of doubtful words that it appears a\nmere chance, under a peculiar combination of circumstances that it ever\ncomes to the light at all: that she so speciously concealed her own\ndesire to include a second meaning, that taken \u201cin her own craftiness\u201d\nshe deceived Sir Herbert Jenner Fust, so that even when her words were\nmost elaborately sifted by him, this hidden sense escaped his\nobservation; and is only now at last made manifest upon the most laboured\nand minute investigation in another court, where it is not too much to\nsay there has been every inducement to the learned judges composing it to\nsplit hairs, and find an ambiguity if by possibility they could.  I say\nthis not as impeaching the impartiality of the tribunal, but yet as\nworthy of note by any, who knowing what human nature is, would rightly\nweigh the circumstances of this decision before drawing further\ninferences from it.  If I am at all correct in the argument I have\nattempted to draw out, that decision, if in Mr. Gorham\u2019s favour, will\ndecide the ambiguous language of the formularies, and nothing more.\nAbstract then your mind from the present judgment, and what will you say\nis the animus of the Church?  Will it not be the same as heretofore; and\nthat our estimation of our Church\u2019s soundness in the faith is as yet\nunshaken?  For should we, I boldly ask, judge that any friend of ours\nintended an indirectness or double dealing by us upon no better evidence?\nShould _you_ so judge _me_, or _I you_, in any circumstances bearing even\na distant analogy to these? and if not, how thus judge our mother, who\nhas borne us unto Christ?\n\nAn illustration from secular affairs may perhaps make my meaning in all\nthis clearer, and, as it happens, there is one made ready to our hand.\n\nWe all remember the act of Lord Ashley and the late Mr. Fielden, to\nprohibit the labour of young persons in factories, for more than ten\nhours a day.  It was drawn up, no doubt, to the best of their ability to\nattain this object: to give persons under a specified age, rest and\ncessation from labour after ten hours at the mill.  But as we well know\nlikewise, an interpretation of the act grew into use among the\nmill-owners, by which they worked their factories twelve or fifteen hours\na day, using the labours of the younger persons employed by relays; so\nthat though no one of them was actually at work more than the ten hours,\nthe object of the bill was frustrated, if it were to secure their being\ndismissed to their homes after so many hours at the mill.  The resting\nthem an hour, or two hours, in the middle of the day, whilst others took\ntheir place, to be also rested for the same time, at another period, did\nnot secure to those young persons what was at any rate supposed to be the\nhumane object of the framers of the bill, and the legislature which\npassed it; a return to their homes at such a reasonably early hour as\nmight afford some time for relaxation, and some opportunity for mental\ncultivation.  This usage however of the mill-owners did not pass\nunquestioned, and a case involving the principle of it, was first heard\nbefore an inferior tribunal, and, the decision being given there I think,\nagainst the legality of the system of relays, was brought afterwards by\nappeal before the Barons of the Exchequer.  The jurisdiction, observe, of\nthis court was beyond all question, and it applied itself to the decision\nof the case.  Of course, (exactly as in the Gorham cause before the Privy\nCouncil,) the matter in hand was simply a question of the interpretation\nof the act of parliament.  The judges had nothing to do with _which_\narrangement might be most humane, nor even with which they imagined to be\nmost accordant with the mind of parliament in passing the act, if the act\nitself were clear to their understanding.  They most properly confined\nthemselves to the terms of the act, and to the determination of this\npoint, whether it excluded the working by relays or not.  It might be,\n(as has been strongly asserted,) perfectly true, that to permit that\nsystem, frustrated in great measure, if not wholly, the attempt to better\nthe condition of those young persons; but however true, it was nothing to\nthe purpose.  And those judges, as the event shewed did come to the\nconclusion that the terms in which the act was couched were not\nsufficient to make the system which had been used, illegal: and therefore\njudgment went in favour of the mill-owners.\n\nNow let it be granted that this, in its effect, destroys the bill as a\nmeasure of humanity: that so to legislate is in fact _cruelty_, whatever\nthe intention of the act may have been.\n\nBut shall we on this account blame the judges in the case?  Assuredly\nnot; they have but done their necessary duty in interpretation.  Shall we\nsay the court was not competent, or the decision not binding, or in any\nway attempt to resist its legal effect?  Assuredly not; or we overthrow\nall principles of law and order.  Nevertheless shall we say that this\njudgment convicts of cruelty or double dealing the framers of the\nmeasure, or the parliament which passed it?  Assuredly not; because it is\nmuch easier; much more accordant with common sense and experience; much\nmore agreeable to charity and reason, to believe that the subtleties of\nlanguage introduced an unintentional ambiguity, which the judge\u2019s eye was\nobliged to search out and judicially recognize, than to believe that Mr.\nFielden, or Lord Ashley, or even parliament at large, when they professed\nto relieve young persons working in factories, intended to \u201cpalter with\nthem in a double sense and keep the word of promise to the ear but break\nit to the hope.\u201d\n\nDoes any one then, I ask again, now feel justified in charging those\nparties with cruelty, whose bill is nevertheless found capable of a cruel\nworking.  Do we charge them with the intention of such ambiguity, and\nsuch consequences, though they are found both to exist in the act of\nparliament?  Do we infer the animus from the wording, and say that such\nas the bill is practically, such _must_ have been the intention of its\nframers?\n\nThe application is so obvious, I fear to be tedious in drawing it out\never so briefly.  But, for _Parliament_ read, _Church_; for _The Ten Hour\nFactory Bill_, read _The Formularies bearing upon Baptism_; for\n_Doubledealing and Cruelty_ read _False Doctrine and Heresy_: and if in\nboth cases, there be an ambiguity, and yet we charge no such\ndouble-dealing or cruelty on the one, as believing no such animus\nexisted, or need be suspected in the parties who framed the one document,\nmay we not equally acquit of false doctrine or heresy those who drew up\nthe others because, though these may perchance be latent in the wording\nof them, no such animus is shown, or need be suspected in their authors:\n_i.e._ the Church which has sanctioned and used them.\n\nThere is another point in this analogy which will carry us a step\nfurther, and in a most practical direction.\n\nIf the legislature now, knowing all these circumstances, and having the\npower to correct the error, if so it regard that to which the ambiguous\nor careless wording of the Act of Parliament has led, yet take no measure\nfor correcting it, and for re-asserting the humane principle which we are\ntold it was intended to embody, this conduct will surely commit\nparliament now to the adoption of the bill as last interpreted.  It would\nbe too much to say even so, that it would convict the framers of the\nmeasure some four or five years ago, or the then parliament of either\nfraud or cruelty: but it might well fasten those charges upon the present\nparliament if they believe the act was intended to work otherwise but\nwill not restore it to its efficiency.  And so now, in our parallel case.\nIf the Church of this our day, knowing all the circumstances of such an\ninterpretation as we have been supposing in the matter of baptismal\nregeneration, do not use the powers she may have to correct the ambiguity\nwhich permits heresy to be lodged within her, she will acquiesce in and\nadopt that heresy as her own.  It would indeed here again be too much to\nsay that such conduct now would prove there had been a double-mind; an\nintended ambiguity for an heretical purpose in those who drew up our\nformularies; for _they_ might still have no more intended heresy, than\nLord Ashley and the late Mr. Fielden cruelty to the factory children.\nBut this, however it might clear the respective characters of men of\nanother day, would be nothing at all as to establishing a claim to\nsoundness now, or preserving the Church of England as a living branch of\nthe Church of Christ.  If we now adopt the heretical interpretation: if\nwe now knowingly and wilfully continue the ambiguity; if we do not strive\nto remove the blot on the face of the Spouse of Christ; we shall be\nanswerable as a body for the heresy, and must take the consequences both\nhere and hereafter.\n\nWhat then is the practical thing to be done in this exigence, supposing\nthe decision now about to be given to be one admitting heresy?\n\nNo doubt there is much difference between our case here, and that in the\nanalogy we have been using.  The State _can_, beyond all question, take\nup its doubtful matter, and re-word it, in another meaning, too plain to\nbe denied.  The Church (among us) alas! has no freedom of speech: no\ndirect power of action; no immediate method by which to correct the\nambiguity.\n\nBut nevertheless she must do all she can, according to the means she has,\nor she will not be clear in this matter; and the most evident of all the\nsteps for her to take is at once, and in earnest, and with her whole\nheart, to petition the throne to be permitted to meet in convocation to\ntake these points into practical consideration.  If she do all she _can_,\nshe will not be to be judged, that she can do no more; but at any rate, I\nthink any one of us may, nay every one of us should, suspend our judgment\nas to her being committed to heresy until we see what it is she _will_\ndo.\n\nHaving gone thus far in considering our position and duties, I will\nventure a little further, (I trust without presumption offering it merely\nas a suggestion,) to state what appears to me, the first actual step to\nbe taken.\n\nThough as a Church we cannot meet in synod until called together by the\nCrown, yet as Englishmen, as mere subjects of the empire we may meet and\npetition the throne that convocation may be licensed to deliberate upon\nthe momentous questions which now affect the Church.  As soon then as\nconveniently may be after the decision of the Privy Council shall be\ngiven, (and I may as well say here, that it appears to me to make very\nlittle practical difference as to the necessity of such a step, whatever\nthat decision may be:) as soon then as conveniently may be after, a\nmeeting should be called in London of all persons clerical and lay alike,\nwho desire to see a freer action of the Church, for this one specific\npurpose to address the throne praying her Majesty graciously to concede\nto the troubled hearts and perplexed consciences of so many of her\nsubjects, that convocation may be summoned for dispatch of business.  The\nday should be carefully chosen: that it be not too soon nor too late: not\ntoo soon for it to be thoroughly and widely known, and for all who may be\nanxious to be present to make their arrangements accordingly; not too\nlate, so as to beget any suspicion of lukewarmness.  The Archbishop of\nCanterbury or the Bishop of London, should unquestionably with all duty\nand reverence be asked to preside; and all our Right Reverend Fathers in\nGod, be requested to give us their help and blessing in this endeavour.\nAll Churchmen who feel in these dangerous days it would be a great\ncomfort and advantage to hear the Church\u2019s voice distinctly indicating\nthe course to be pursued, within any reasonable reach of that gathering,\nay, and beyond it, would, it is to be hoped, attend.  No extraneous\nmatter should be gone into, and if possible the speaking, (at least so it\nappears to me,) should be but brief, allowing, if it may be, several\nhours afterwards for the sole purpose of those actually present to sign\nthe address before leaving the room.  I cannot doubt myself that the\nlargest room in London would be insufficient for the numbers who would\nmake a point of coming, and each man as he went away might say, with a\nheart of thankfulness, \u201cLiberavi animam meam,\u201d and \u201cGod defend the\nRight.\u201d\n\nDo not think in saying these things I am vain enough to suppose this must\nneeds be the best plan to follow.  I do but mention my own thought as a\nsuggestion for others to consider, and I speak in some detail, because at\nany rate, by this means a practical character is given to what I say.\nWhat is best will be determined by others much more competent to decide,\nand I shall I trust be found ready to follow, wherever the path of duty\nshall be found to lead.\n\nHe would be a bold man who should venture to say what the events of a few\nyears, nay even of one, may bring: but I think those certainly are not\nmistaken who deem that we are in a great crisis of our Church\u2019s lot, and\nthat very much depends upon our faithfulness, our wisdom, and our courage\nnow.  I have therefore been anxious to lay before you and any others\nwhose hearts are burdened with our present troubles some of the thoughts\nwhich have occurred to my mind.  I have been more particularly anxious to\nask whether I am wholly beside the mark of reason and sound sense, in\nthinking it possible to see a middle way \u201cbetween accepting and acting\nupon the decision\u201d of the Privy Council, \u201cand repudiating it altogether\nas if it had never existed.\u201d  In a persuasion that such a middle course\nthere is, I have endeavoured to show how far the Judicial Committee\ncommits the Church of England by its decision, even allowing it to have\njurisdiction in points of doctrine, and my conclusion has been that we\nmay admit both the authority of the tribunal, and also the formal heresy\ninvolved in the judgment it may feel bound to deliver in its duty of\ninterpretation, and yet allow no stigma of actual heresy to lie upon the\nChurch, unless she acquiesce in, and adopt that judgment as her own: that\nis, no further stigma, no further evil than, (to use again your words)\n\u201cin the one point comparatively unimportant and trivial of the\ninstitution of a certain person to a certain benefice.\u201d  I am glad to\nthink I recognize in this sentence an admission, that if the Church can\nbe freed from any further participation in the doctrine involved, and if\nshe do her best to repudiate any implication with heresy which that\njudgment may seem to throw upon her, she may well wait the time (I do not\nsay for ever, but at any rate for the present,) till she may be enabled\nto clear up all ambiguity by restoring the full catholic sense to her\nformularies, through the legitimate channel of her own assembly and\nconvocation.\n\nIn conclusion, I will but express how much consolation it affords my mind\nto think that the \u201cburden and heat\u201d of this trial, fall upon one so\neminently fitted, as I believe, to bear them.  In spite of all the sorrow\nwhich one cannot but feel that at his time of life when there should be\nthe rest and repose which in less trying times, and to less true soldiers\n\u201cshould accompany old age,\u201d _he_ should be called upon still to stand in\nthe battle\u2019s front, and bear its fiercest shock; in spite I say of this\nsorrow, there yet comes over me a lightening of heart and soul when I\nthink this trial has not fallen upon one less equal to the emergency;\nless clear-sighted to see the line of duty; less bold to do it.  If the\nburden indeed be heavy to any one of us; Oh! how much more, to him!  And\nyet it is not merely a pleasure and a comfort, but a source of the most\nheartfelt thankfulness that the present Bishop of Exeter _is_ what he\n_is_.  If _we_ are in doubt, yet _he_ may have no cloud upon his mind.\nIf _we_ almost fail and faint, yet _he_ is one to rally us.  If _we_ know\nnot how to take or interpret the signs of the times, and question what is\nthe path of duty, yet is _he_ one most able to enlighten and to guide us:\nmost fitted (_who_ in our time so much?) to \u201crender a reason\u201d for what he\ndoes, or advises should be done, and _so_ render it, as to attach the\nfaithful; confirm the wavering; and confound the gainsayers.  I could\nalmost weep for grief to think of the harassings and care of heart which\nhe must undergo all these days; but for joy also that I believe they fall\nin God\u2019s providence, upon a prelate, than whom the English Church has had\nnone, since Laud, of a greater heart, to do or suffer all that may be\nneedful in her cause.  Whilst then in these days of rebuke and blasphemy\nwe pray for all, let it be doubly for him, that he may see his way\nclearly in order to guide us also; that a double portion of that great\nArchbishop\u2019s Spirit may rest upon him, both for his own comfort, and the\nbenefit of God\u2019s people; and that even if his very mantle should descend\nupon him, (there are other martyrdoms than those of the scaffold or the\nstake;) _he_ may \u201cbe strengthened continually with might in the inner\nman,\u201d and _we_ may have grace, to _endure_ to see him wear it.\n\n                                              Believe me, my dear Maskell,\n                                              Always affectionately yours,\n                                                       MAYOW WYNELL MAYOW.\n\n_Market Lavington_, _Wilts._\n      _March_ 5_th_, 1850.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\n                                * * * * *\n\n                        C. WHITTINGHAM, CHISWICK.\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES.\n\n\n{8}  I say here and in the whole of this letter, \u201cabout to do;\u201d and\n\u201cexpected Decision,\u201d because even if the judgement be now given, at the\nTime I am writing, I have not seen it or heard what it is.","title":"A Letter to the Rev. William Maskell, A.M.: How far the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council commits the Church of England by its decision, even allowing it to have jurisdiction in points of doctrine","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":6261}