{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_54618/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_54618","id":"gutenberg_54618","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/54618","summary":null,"tags":["Aesthetics","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Language and languages -- Philosophy","Philosophy"],"text":"\u00c6STHETIC\n\n_As science of expression and general linguistic_\n\nBY\n\nBENEDETTO CROCE\n\n_translated, from the Italian by_ DOUGLAS AINSLIE\n\nTHE NOONDAY PRESS\n\n_A division of_\n\nFARRAR, STRAUS, AND COMPANY\n\n1920\n\n\n\n\nTHE\n\n\u00c6STHETIC\n\nIS DEDICATED BY THE AUTHOR TO THE MEMORY OF HIS PARENTS\n\nPASQUALE AND LUISA SIPARI\n\nAND OF HIS SISTER\n\nMARIA\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\nEXTRACT FROM INTRODUCTION xix\n\nNOTE BY THE TRANSLATOR xxv\n\nAUTHOR'S PREFACE xxvii\n\n\nI\n\nTHEORY OF \u00c6STHETIC\n\nI\n\nINTUITION AND EXPRESSION\n\nIntuitive knowledge--Its independence with respect to intellectual\nknowledge--Intuition and perception--Intuition and the concepts\nof space and time--Intuition and sensation--Intuition and\nassociation--Intuition and representation--Intuition and\nexpression--Illusion as to their difference--Identity of intuition and\nexpression\n\nII\n\nINTUITION AND ART\n\nCorollaries and explanations--Identity of art and intuitive\nknowledge--No specific difference--No difference of intensity--The\ndifference is extensive and empirical--Artistic genius--Content and\nform in \u00c6sthetic--Criticism of the imitation of nature and of the\nartistic illusion--Criticism of art conceived as a fact of feeling,\nnot a theoretical fact--\u00c6sthetic appearance, and feeling--Criticism of\nthe theory of \u00e6sthetic senses--Unity and indivisibility of the work of\nart--Art as liberator\n\nIII\n\nART AND PHILOSOPHY\n\nInseparability of intellectual from intuitive knowledge--Criticism\nof the negations of this thesis--Art and science--Content and form:\nanother meaning--Prose and poetry--The relation of first and second\ndegree--Non-existence of other forms of cognition--Historicity--Its\nidentity with and difference from art--Historical criticism--Historical\nscepticism--Philosophy as perfect science. The so-called natural\nsciences, and their limits--The phenomenon and the noumenon\n\nIV\n\nHISTORICISM AND INTELLECTUALISM IN \u00c6STHETIC\n\nCriticism of the probable and of naturalism--Criticism of ideas in\nart, of theses in art, and of the typical--Criticism of the symbol\nand of the allegory--Criticism of the theory of artistic and literary\nkinds--Errors derived from this theory in judgements on art--Empirical\nsense of the divisions of kinds\n\nV\n\nANALOGOUS ERRORS IN THE THEORY OF HISTORY AND IN LOGIC\n\nCriticism of the philosophy of History--\u00c6sthetic intrusions into\nLogic--Logic in its essence--Distinction between logical and\nnon-logical judgements--Syllogistic--Logical falsehood and \u00e6sthetic\ntruth--Reformed logic--Note to the fourth Italian edition\n\nVI\n\nTHE THEORETIC ACTIVITY AND THE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY\n\nThe will--The will as an ulterior stage in respect to\nknowledge--Objections and explanations--Criticism of practical\njudgements or judgements of value--Exclusion of the practical from the\n\u00e6sthetic--Criticism of the theory of the end of art and of the choice\nof content--Practical innocence of art--Independence of art--Criticism\nof the saying: the style is the man--Criticism of the concept of\nsincerity in art\n\nVII\n\nANALOGY BETWEEN THE THEORETIC AND THE PRACTICAL\n\nThe two forms of the practical activity--The economically\nuseful--Distinction between the useful and the technical--Distinction\nof the useful from the egoistic--Economic will and moral will--Pure\neconomicity--The economic side of morality--The merely economical and\nthe error of the morally indifferent--Criticism of utilitarianism and\nthe reform of Ethics and of Economics--Phenomenon and noumenon in\npractical activity\n\nVIII\n\nEXCLUSION OF OTHER SPIRITUAL FORMS\n\nThe system of the spirit--The forms of genius--Non-existence of a\nfifth form of activity--Law; sociability--Religion--Metaphysic--Mental\nimagination and the intuitive intellect--Mystical \u00c6sthetic--Mortality\nand immortality of art\n\nIX\n\nINDIVISIBILITY OF EXPRESSION INTO MODES OR DEGREES AND CRITICISM OF\nRHETORIC\n\nThe characters of art--Non-existence of modes of\nexpression--Impossibility of translations--Criticism of the rhetorical\ncategories--Empirical sense of the rhetorical categories--Their use as\nsynonyms of the \u00e6sthetic fact--Their use to indicate various \u00e6sthetic\nimperfections--Their use in a sense transcending \u00e6sthetic, in the\nservice of science--Rhetoric in the schools--The resemblances of\nexpressions--The relative possibility of translations\n\nX\n\n\u00c6STHETIC FEELINGS AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE UGLY\n\nVarious significations of the word feeling--Feeling as activity\n--Identification of feeling with economic activity--Criticism\nof hedonism--Feeling as a concomitant of every form of activity\n--Meaning of certain ordinary distinctions of feelings--Value\nand disvalue: the contraries and their union--The beautiful as the\nvalue of expression, or expression without qualification--The ugly,\nand the elements of beauty which compose it--Illusion that there exist\nexpressions neither beautiful nor ugly--True \u00e6sthetic feelings and\nconcomitant and accidental feelings--Criticism of apparent feelings\n\nXI\n\nCRITICISM OF \u00c6STHETIC HEDONISM\n\nCriticism of the beautiful as that which pleases the higher\nsenses--Criticism of the theory of play--Criticism of the theory of\nsexuality and of triumph--Criticism of the \u00c6sthetic of the sympathetic:\nmeaning in it of content and form--\u00c6sthetic hedonism and moralism--The\nrigoristic negation, and the pedagogic justification of art--Criticism\nof pure beauty\n\nXII\n\nTHE \u00c6STHETIC OF THE SYMPATHETIC AND PSEUDO-\u00c6STHETIC CONCEPTS\n\nPseudo-\u00e6sthetic concepts, and the \u00c6sthetic of the\nsympathetic--Criticism of the theory of the ugly in art and\nof the overcoming of it--Pseudo-\u00e6sthetic concepts belong to\nPsychology--Impossibility of rigorous definitions of them--Examples:\ndefinitions of the sublime, of the comic, of the humorous--Relation\nbetween these concepts and \u00e6sthetic concepts\n\nXIII\n\nTHE \"PHYSICALLY BEAUTIFUL\" IN NATURE AND IN ART\n\n\u00c6sthetic activity and physical concepts--Expression in the \u00e6sthetic\nsense, and expression in the naturalistic sense--Representations and\nmemory--The production of aids to memory--Physical beauty--Content and\nform: another meaning--Natural beauty and artificial beauty--Mixed\nbeauty--Writings--Free and non-free beauty--Criticism of non-free\nbeauty--Stimulants of production\n\nXIV\n\nERRORS ARISING FROM THE CONFUSION BETWEEN PHYSICS AND \u00c6STHETIC\n\nCriticism of \u00e6sthetic associationism--Criticism of \u00e6sthetic\nPhysics--Criticism of the theory of the beauty of the human\nbody--Criticism of the beauty of geometrical figures--Criticism of\nanother aspect of the imitation of nature--Criticism of the theory of\nthe elementary forms of the beautiful--Criticism of the search for the\nobjective conditions of the beautiful--The astrology of \u00c6sthetic\n\nXV\n\nTHE ACTIVITY OF EXTERNALIZATION. TECHNIQUE AND THE THEORY OF THE ARTS\n\nThe practical activity of externalization--The technique of\nexternalization--Technical theories of the different arts--Criticism of\n\u00e6sthetic theories of particular arts--Criticism of the classification\nof the arts--Criticism of the theory of the union of the arts--Relation\nof the activity of externalization to utility and morality\n\nXVI\n\nTASTE AND THE REPRODUCTION OF ART\n\n\u00c6sthetic judgement: its identity with \u00e6sthetic\nreproduction--Impossibility of divergences--Identity of taste\nand genius--Analogy with other activities--Criticism of \u00e6sthetic\nabsolutism (intellectualism) and relativism--Criticism of relative\nrelativism--Objection founded on the variation of the stimulus and\nof psychic disposition--Criticism of the distinction of signs into\nnatural and conventional--The surmounting of variety--Restorations and\nhistorical interpretation\n\nXVII\n\nTHE HISTORY OF LITERATURE AND OF ART\n\nHistorical criticism in literature and art: its importance--Literary\nand artistic history: its distinction from historical criticism and\nfrom the \u00e6sthetic judgement--The method of artistic and literary\nhistory--Criticism of the problem of the origin of art--The criterion\nof progress and history--Non-existence of a single line of progress\nin artistic and literary history--Errors committed against this law--\nOther meanings of the word \"progress\" in relation to \u00c6sthetic\n\nXVIII\n\nCONCLUSION: IDENTITY OF LINGUISTIC AND \u00c6STHETIC\n\nSummary of the study--Identity of Linguistic with \u00c6sthetic--\u00c6sthetic\nformulation of linguistic problems--Nature of language--Origin\nof language and its development--Relation between Grammar and\nLogic--Grammatical kinds or parts of speech--The individuality of\nspeech and the classification of languages--Impossibility of a\nnormative Grammar--Didactic organisms--Elementary linguistic facts, or\nroots--\u00c6sthetic judgement and the model language--Conclusion\n\n\nII\n\nHISTORY OF \u00c6STHETIC\n\nI\n\n\u00c6STHETIC IDEAS IN GR\u00c6CO-ROMAN ANTIQUITY\n\nPoint of view of this History of \u00c6sthetic--Mistaken tendencies, and\nattempts towards an \u00c6sthetic, in Gr\u00e6co-Roman antiquity--Origin of the\n\u00e6sthetic problem in Greece--Plato's rigoristic negation--\u00c6sthetic\nhedonism and moralism--Mystical \u00e6sthetic in antiquity--Investigations\nas to the Beautiful--Distinction between the theory of Art and the\ntheory of the Beautiful--Fusion of the two by Plotinus--The scientific\ntendency: Aristotle--The concepts of imitation and of imagination after\nAristotle: Philostratus--Speculations on language\n\nII\n\n\u00c6STHETIC IDEAS IN THE MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE\n\nMiddle Ages. Mysticism: Ideas on the Beautiful--The pedagogic theory\nof art in the Middle Ages--Hints of an \u00c6sthetic in scholastic\nphilosophy--Renaissance: Philography and philosophical and empirical\ninquiries concerning the Beautiful--The pedagogic theory of art and\nthe Poetics of Aristotle--The \"Poetics of the Renaissance\"--Dispute\nconcerning the universal and the probable in art--G. Fracastoro--L.\nCastelvetro--Piccolomini and Pinciano--Fr. Patrizzi (Patricius)\n\nIII\n\nFERMENTS OF THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY\n\nNew words and new observations in the seventeenth\ncentury--Wit--Taste--Various meanings of the word taste--Fancy or\nimagination--Feeling--Tendency to unite these terms--Difficulties\nand contradictions in their definition--Wit and intellect--Taste\nand intellectual judgement--The \"_je ne sais quoi_\"--Imagination\nand sensationalism: the corrective of imagination--Feeling and\nsensationalism\n\nIV\n\n\u00c6STHETIC IDEAS OF THE CARTESIAN AND LEIBNITIAN SCHOOLS, AND THE\n\"\u00c6STHETIC\" OF BAUMGARTEN\n\nCartesianism and imagination--Crousaz and Andr\u00e9--The English:\nLocke, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and the Scottish School--Leibniz:\n\"_petites perceptions_\" and confused knowledge--Intellectualism of\nLeibniz--Speculations on language--J. C. Wolff--Demand for an organon\nof inferior knowledge--Alexander Baumgarten: his \"\u00c6sthetic\"--\u00c6sthetic\nas science of sensory consciousness--Criticism of judgements passed on\nBaumgarten--Intellectualism of Baumgarten--New names and old meanings\n\nV\n\nGIAMBATTISTA VICO\n\nVico as inventor of \u00e6sthetic science--Poetry and philosophy:\nimagination and intellect--Poetry and history--Poetry and\nlanguage--Inductive and formalistic logic--Vico opposed to all\nformer theories of poetry--Vico's judgements of the grammarians and\nlinguists who preceded him--Influence of seventeenth-century writers on\nVico--\u00c6sthetic in the _Scienza Nuova_--Vico's mistakes--Progress still\nto be achieved\n\nVI\n\nMINOR \u00c6STHETIC DOCTRINES OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY\n\nThe influence of Vico--Italian writers: A. Conti--Quadrio and\nZanotti--M. Cesarotti--Bettinelli and Pagano--German disciples of\nBaumgarten: G. F. Meier--Confusions of Meier--M. Mendelssohn and other\nfollowers of Baumgarten--Vogue of \u00c6sthetic--Eberhard and Eschenburg--J.\nG. Sulzer--K. H. Heydenreich--J. G. Herder--Philosophy of language\n\nVII\n\nOTHER \u00c6STHETIC DOCTRINES OF THE SAME PERIOD\n\nOther writers of the eighteenth century: Batteux--The English:\nW. Hogarth--E. Burke--H. Home--Eclecticism and sensationalism:\nE. Platner--Fr. Hemsterhuis--Neo-Platonism and mysticism:\nWinckelmann--Beauty and lack of significance--Winckelmann's\ncontradictions and compromises--A. R. Mengs--G. E. Lessing--Theorists\nof ideal Beauty--G. Spalletti and the characteristic--Beauty and the\ncharacteristic: Hirt, Meyer, Goethe\n\nVIII\n\nIMMANUEL KANT\n\nI. Kant--Kant and Vico--Identity of the concept of Art in Kant\nand Baumgarten--Kant's \"Lectures\"--Art in the _Critique of\nJudgment_--Imagination in Kant's system--The forms of intuition and the\nTranscendental \u00c6sthetic--Theory of Beauty distinguished by Kant from\nthat of Art--Mystical features in Kant's theory of Beauty\n\nIX\n\nTHE \u00c6STHETIC OF IDEALISM: SCHILLER, SCHELLING, SOLGER, HEGEL\n\nThe _Critique of Judgment_ and metaphysical idealism--F.\nSchiller--Relations between Schiller and Kant--The \u00e6sthetic sphere as\nthe sphere of Play--\u00c6sthetic education--Vagueness and lack of precision\nin Schiller's \u00c6sthetic--Schiller's caution and the rashness of the\nRomanticists--Ideas on Art: J. P. Richter--Romantic \u00c6sthetic and\nidealistic \u00c6sthetic--J. G. Fichte--Irony: Schlegel, Tieck, Novalis--F.\nSchelling--Beauty and character--Art and Philosophy--Ideas and the\ngods: Art and mythology--K. W. Solger--Fancy and imagination--Art,\npractice and religion--G. W. F. Hegel--Art in the sphere of absolute\nspirit--Beauty as sensible appearance of the Idea--\u00c6sthetic in\nmetaphysical idealism and Baumgartenism--Mortality and decay of art in\nHegel's system\n\nX\n\nSCHOPENHAUER AND HERBART\n\n\u00c6sthetic mysticism in the opponents of idealism--A. Schopenhauer--Ideas\nas the object of art--\u00c6sthetic catharsis--Signs of a better theory in\nSchopenhauer--J. F. Herbart--Pure Beauty and relations of form--Art as\nsum of content and form--Herbart and Kantian thought\n\nXI\n\nFRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER\n\n\u00c6sthetic of content and \u00c6sthetic of form: meaning of the\ncontrast--Friedrich Schleiermacher--Wrong judgements concerning\nhim--Schleiermacher contrasted with his predecessors--Place assigned\nto \u00c6sthetic in his Ethics--\u00c6sthetic activity as immanent and\nindividual--Artistic truth and intellectual truth--Difference of\nartistic consciousness from feeling and religion--Dreams and art:\ninspiration and deliberation--Art and the typical--Independence of\nart--Art and language--Schleiermacher's defects--Schleiermacher's\nservices to \u00c6sthetic\n\nXII\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE: HUMBOLDT AND STEINTHAL\n\nProgress of Linguistic--Linguistic speculation at the beginning\nof the nineteenth century--Wilhelm von Humboldt: relics of\nintellectualism--Language as activity: internal form--Language and\nart in Humboldt--II. Steinthal: the linguistic function independent\nof the logical--Identity of the problems of the origin and the nature\nof language--Steinthal's mistaken ideas on art: his failure to unite\nLinguistic and \u00c6sthetic\n\nXIII\n\nMINOR GERMAN \u00c6STHETICIANS\n\nMinor \u00e6stheticians in the metaphysical school--Krause, Trahndorff,\nWeisse and others--Fried. Theodor Vischer--Other tendencies--Theory\nof the Beautiful in nature, and that of the Modifications of\nBeauty--Development of the first theory: Herder--Schelling, Solger,\nHegel--Schleiermacher--Alexander von Humboldt--Vischer's \"\u00c6sthetic\nPhysics\"--The theory of the Modifications of Beauty: from antiquity\nto the eighteenth century--Kant and the post-Kantians--Culmination\nof the development--Double form of the theory: the overcoming of the\nugly: Solger, Weisse and others--Passage from abstract to concrete:\nVischer--The \"legend of Sir Purebeauty\"\n\nXIV\n\n\u00c6STHETIC IN FRANCE, ENGLAND AND ITALY DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE\nNINETEENTH CENTURY\n\n\u00c6sthetic movement in France: Cousin, Jouffroy--English \u00c6sthetic--\nItalian \u00c6sthetic--Rosmini and Gioberti--Italian Romantics. Dependence\nof art\n\nXV\n\nFRANCESCO DE SANCTIS\n\nF. de Sanctis: development of his thought--Influence of\nHegelism--Unconscious criticism of Hegelism--Criticisms of German\n\u00c6sthetic--Final rebellion against metaphysical \u00c6sthetic--De Sanctis'\nown theory--The concept of form--De Sanctis as art-critic--De Sanctis\nas philosopher\n\nXVI\n\n\u00c6STHETIC OF THE EPIGONI\n\nRevival of Herbartian \u00c6sthetic--Robert Zimmermann--Vischer _versus_\nZimmermann--Hermann Lotze--Efforts to reconcile \u00c6sthetic of\nform and \u00c6sthetic of content--K. K\u00f6stlin--\u00c6sthetic of content.\nM. Schasler--Eduard von Hartmann--Hartmann and the theory of\nmodifications--Metaphysical \u00c6sthetic in France: C. Lev\u00eaque--In\nEngland: J. Ruskin--\u00c6sthetic in Italy--Antonio Tari and his\nlectures--\u00c6sthesigraphy\n\nXVII\n\n\u00c6STHETIC POSITIVISM AND NATURALISM\n\nPositivism and evolutionism--\u00c6sthetic of H. Spencer--Physiologists of\n\u00c6sthetic: Grant Allen, Helmholtz and others--Method of the natural\nsciences in \u00c6sthetic--H. Taine's \u00c6sthetic--Taine's metaphysic and\nmoralism--G. T. Fechner: inductive \u00c6sthetic--Experiments--Trivial\nnature of his ideas on Beauty and Art--Ernst Grosse: speculative\n\u00c6sthetic and the Science of Art--Sociological \u00c6sthetic--Proudhon--J. M.\nGuyau--M. Nordau--Naturalism: C. Lombroso--Decline of linguistic--Signs\nof revival: H. Paul--The linguistic of Wundt\n\nXVIII\n\n\u00c6STHETIC PSYCHOLOGISM AND OTHER RECENT TENDENCIES\n\nNeo-criticism and empiricism--Kirchmann--Metaphysic translated into\nPsychology: Vischer--Siebeck--M. Diez--Psychological tendency.\nTeodor Lipps--K. Groos--The modifications of the Beautiful in Groos and\nLipps--E. V\u00e9ron and the double form of \u00c6sthetic--L. Tolstoy--F. Nietzsche\n--An \u00e6sthetician of Music: E. Hanslick--Hanslick's concept of form\n--\u00c6stheticians of the figurative arts: C. Fiedler--Intuition and\nexpression--Narrow limits of these theories--H. Bergson--Attempts\nto return to Baumgarten: C. Hermann--Eclecticism: B. Bosanquet\n--\u00c6sthetic of expression: present state\n\nXIX\n\nHISTORICAL SKETCHES OF SOME PARTICULAR DOCTRINES\n\nResult of the history of \u00c6sthetic--History of science and history of\nthe scientific criticism of particular errors\n\nI. RHETORIC: OR THE THEORY OF ORNATE FORM.\n\nRhetoric in the ancient sense--Criticism from moral point of\nview--Accumulation without system--Its fortunes in the Middle Ages\nand Renaissance--Criticisms by Vives, Ramus and Patrizzi--Survival\ninto modern times--Modern signification of Rhetoric: theory of\nliterary form--Concept of ornament--Classes of ornament--The\nconcept of the Fitting--The theory of ornament in the Middle\nAges and Renaissance--_Reductio ad absurdum_ in the seventeenth\ncentury--Polemic concerning the theory of ornament--Du Marsais and\nmetaphor--Psychological interpretation--Romanticism and Rhetoric:\npresent day\n\nII. HISTORY OF ARTISTIC AND LITERARY KINDS\n\nThe kinds in antiquity: Aristotle--In the Middle Ages and\nRenaissance--The doctrine of the three unities--Poetics of the kinds\nand rules: Scaliger--Lessing--Compromises and extensions--Rebellion\nagainst rules in general--G. Bruno, Guarini--Spanish critics--G.\nB. Marino--G. V. Gravina--Fr. Montani--Critics of the eighteenth\ncentury--Romanticism and the \"strict kinds\": Berchet, V. Hugo--Their\npersistence in philosophical theories--Fr. Schelling--E. von\nHartmann--The kinds in the schools\n\nIII. THE THEORY OF THE LIMITS OF THE ARTS\n\nThe limits of the arts in Lessing--Arts of space and arts of\ntime--Limits and classifications of the arts in later philosophy:\nHerder and Kant--Schelling, Solger--Schopenhauer, Herbart--Weisse,\nZeising, Vischer--M. Schasler--E. v. Hartmann--The supreme art:\nRichard Wagner--Lotze's attack on classifications--Contradictions in\nLotze--Doubts in Schleiermacher\n\nIV. OTHER PARTICULAR DOCTRINES\n\nThe \u00c6sthetic theory of natural beauty--The theory of \u00e6sthetic\nsenses--The theory of kinds of style--The theory of grammatical forms\nor parts of speech--Theory of \u00e6sthetic criticism--Distinction between\ntaste and genius--Concept of artistic and literary history--Conclusion\n\n\nBIBLIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX\n\nINDEX\n\n\n\n\nEXTRACT FROM INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST ENGLISH EDITION, 1909\n\n\nI can lay no claim to having discovered an America, but I do claim to\nhave discovered a Columbus. His name is Benedetto Croce, and he dwells\non the shores of the Mediterranean, at Naples, city of the antique\nParthenope.\n\nIt was at Naples, in the winter of 1907, that I first saw the\nPhilosopher of \u00c6sthetic. Benedetto Croce, although born in the Abruzzi,\nProvince of Aquila (1866), is essentially a Neapolitan, and rarely\nremains long absent from the city, on the shore of that magical sea\nwhere once Ulysses sailed, and where sometimes yet (near Amalfi) we\nmay hear the Syrens sing their song. But more wonderful than the song\nof any Syren seems to me the Theory of \u00c6sthetic as the Science of\nExpression, and that is why I have overcome the obstacles that stood\nbetween me and the giving of this theory, which in my belief is the\ntruth, to the English-speaking world.\n\n. . . . . . . . . .\n\nThe solution of the problem of \u00c6sthetic is not in the gift of the Muses.\n\nThis Philosophy of the Spirit is symptomatic of the happy reaction of\nthe twentieth century against the crude materialism of the second half\nof the nineteenth. It is the spirit which gives to the work of art its\nvalue, not this or that method of arrangement, this or that tint or\ncadence, which can always be copied by skilful plagiarists: not so\nthe _spirit_ of the creator. In England we hear too much of (natural)\nscience, which has usurped the very name of Philosophy. The natural\nsciences are very well in their place, but discoveries such as aviation\nare of infinitely less importance to the race than the smallest\naddition to the philosophy of the spirit. Empirical science, with the\ncollusion of positivism, has stolen the cloak of philosophy and must be\nmade to give it back.\n\n. . . . . . . . . .\n\nYet though severe, the editor of _La Critica_ is uncompromisingly just,\nand would never allow personal dislike or jealousy, or any extrinsic\nconsideration, to stand in the way of fair treatment to the writer\nconcerned. Many superficial English critics might benefit considerably\nby attention to this quality in one who is in other respects also so\nimmeasurably their superior. A good instance of this impartiality is\nhis critique of Schopenhauer, with whose system he is in complete\ndisagreement, yet affords him full credit for what of truth is\ncontained in his voluminous writings.\n\n. . . . . . . . . .\n\nThis thoroughness it is which gives such importance to the literary\nand philosophical criticisms of _La Critica._ Croce's method is always\nhistorical, and his object in approaching any work of art is to\nclassify the spirit of its author, as expressed in that work. There\nare, he maintains, but two things to be considered in criticizing a\nbook. These are, _firstly,_ what is its _peculiarity,_ in what way is\nit singular, how is it differentiated from other works? _Secondly,_\nwhat is its degree of _purity_?--That is, to what extent has its author\nkept himself free from all considerations alien to the perfection of\nthe work as an expression, as a lyrical intuition? With the answering\nof these questions Croce is satisfied. He does not care to know if the\nauthor keep a motor-car, like M\u00e6terlinck; or prefer to walk on Putney\nHeath, like Swinburne. This amounts to saying that all works of art\nmust be judged by their own standard. How far has the author succeeded\nin doing what he intended?\n\n. . . . . . . . . .\n\nAs regards Croce's general philosophical position, it is important to\nunderstand that he is _not_ a Hegelian, in the sense of being a close\nfollower of that philosopher. One of his last works is that in which\nhe deals in a masterly manner with the philosophy of Hegel. The title\nmay be translated, \"What is living and what is dead of the philosophy\nof Hegel.\" Here he explains to us the Hegelian system more clearly\nthan that wondrous edifice was ever before explained, and we realize\nat the same time that Croce is quite as independent of Hegel as of\nKant, of Vico as of Spinoza. Of course he has made use of the best of\nHegel, just as every thinker makes use of his predecessors and is in\nhis turn made use of by those that follow him. But it is incorrect\nto accuse of Hegelianism the author of an anti-hegelian _\u00c6sthetic,_\nof a _Logic_ where Hegel is only half accepted, and of a _Philosophy\nof the Practical_ which contains hardly a trace of Hegel. I give an\ninstance. If the great conquest of Hegel be the dialectic of opposites,\nhis great mistake lies in the confusion of opposites with things\nwhich are distinct but not opposite. If, says Croce, we take as an\nexample the application of the Hegelian triad that formulates becoming\n(affirmation, negation and synthesis), we find it applicable for those\nopposites which are true and false, good and evil, being and not-being,\nbut _not applicable_ to things which are distinct but not opposite,\nsuch as art and philosophy, beauty and truth, the useful and the moral.\nThese confusions led Hegel to talk of the death of art, to conceive as\npossible a Philosophy of History, and to the application of the natural\nsciences to the absurd task of constructing a Philosophy of Nature.\nCroce has cleared away these difficulties by showing that if from the\nmeeting of opposites must arise a superior synthesis, such a synthesis\ncannot arise from things which are distinct _but not opposite,_ since\nthe former are connected together as superior and inferior, and the\ninferior can exist without the superior, but _not vice versa._ Thus we\nsee how philosophy cannot exist without art, while art, occupying the\nlower place, can and does exist without philosophy. This brief example\nreveals Croce's independence in dealing with Hegelian problems.\n\nI know of no philosopher more generous than Croce in praise and\nelucidation of other workers in the same field, past and present. For\ninstance, and apart from Hegel, _Kant_ has to thank him for drawing\nattention to the marvellous excellence of the _Critique of Judgment,_\ngenerally neglected in favour of the Critiques of _Pure Reason and of\nPractical Judgment_; _Baumgarten_ for drawing the attention of the\nworld to his obscure name and for reprinting his Latin thesis in which\nthe word _\u00c6sthetic_ occurs for the first time; and _Schleiermacher_ for\nthe tributes paid to his neglected genius in the History of \u00c6sthetic.\n_La Critica,_ too, is full of generous appreciation of contemporaries\nby Croce and by that profound thinker, Gentile.\n\n. . . . . . . . . .\n\nThere can be no doubt of the great value of Croce's work as an\n_educative influence,_ and if we are to judge of a philosophical system\nby its action on others, then we must place the _Philosophy of the\nSpirit_ very high. It may be said with perfect truth that since the\ndeath of the poet Carducci there has been no influence in Italy to\ncompare with that of Benedetto Croce.\n\n. . . . . . . . . .\n\nOf the popularity that his system and teaching have already attained\nwe may judge by the fact that the _\u00c6sthetic,_ despite the difficulty of\nthe subject, is already in its third edition in Italy, where, owing to\nits influence, philosophy sells better than fiction; while the French\nand Germans, not to mention the Czechs, have long had translations\nof the earlier editions. His _Logic_ is on the point of appearing\nin its second edition, and I have no doubt that the _Philosophy of\nthe Practical_ will eventually equal these works in popularity. _The\nimportance and value of Italian thought have been too long neglected\nin Great Britain._ Where, as in Benedetto Croce, we get the clarity\nof vision of the Latin, joined to the thoroughness and erudition of\nthe best German tradition, we have a combination of rare power and\neffectiveness, which can by no means be neglected.\n\nThe philosopher feels that he has a great mission, which is nothing\nless than the leading back of thought to belief in the spirit, deserted\nby so many for crude empiricism and positivism. His view of philosophy\nis that it sums up all the higher human activities, including religion,\nand that in proper hands it is able to solve any problem. But there is\nno finality about problems: the solution of one leads to the posing\nof another, and so on. Man is the maker of life, and his spirit ever\nproceeds from a lower to a higher perfection.\n\n. . . . . . . . . .\n\nI believe that Croce will one day be recognized as one of the very\nfew great teachers of humanity. At present he is not appreciated at\nnearly his full value. One rises from a study of his philosophy with\na sense of having been all the time as it were in personal touch with\nthe truth, which is very far from the case after the perusal of certain\nother philosophies.\n\nSecure in his strength, Croce will often introduce a joke or some\namusing illustration from contemporary life, in the midst of a most\nprofound and serious argument. This spirit of mirth is a sign of\nsuperiority. He who is not sure of himself can spare no energy for\nthe making of mirth. Croce loves to laugh at his enemies and with\nhis friends. So the philosopher of Naples sits by the blue gulf\nand explains the universe to those who have ears to hear. \"One can\nphilosophize anywhere,\" he says--but he remains significantly at Naples.\n\nThus I conclude these brief remarks upon the author of the _\u00c6sthetic,_\nconfident that those who give time and attention to its study will be\ngrateful for having placed in their hands this pearl of great price\nfrom the diadem of the antique Parthenope.\n\nDOUGLAS AINSLIE.\n\nTHE ATHEN\u00c6UM, PALL MALL, _May_ 1909.\n\n\n\n\nNOTE BY THE TRANSLATOR\n\n\nTO THE SECOND ENGLISH EDITION\n\nThis second edition of the _\u00c6sthetic_ will be found to contain the\ncomplete translation of the historical portion, which I was obliged to\nsummarize in the first edition. I have made a number of alterations and\nsome additions to the theoretical portion, following closely the fourth\n(definitive) Italian edition, and in so doing have received much advice\nand assistance of value from Mrs. Salusbury, to whom I beg to tender\nmy best thanks. I trust that this new edition will enable all those\ndesirous of studying the work to get into direct touch with the thought\nof the author.\n\nTHE ATHEN\u00c6UM, PALL MALL, S.W.,\n\n_November_ 1920.\n\n\n\n\nAUTHOR'S PREFACE\n\n\nThis volume is composed of a theoretical and of a historical part,\nwhich form two independent but complementary books.\n\nThe nucleus of the theoretical part is a memoir, bearing the title\n_Fundamental Theses of an \u00c6sthetic as Science of Expression and General\nLinguistic,_ which was read at the Accademia Pontaniana of Naples\nduring the sessions of February 18 and May 6, 1900, and printed in vol.\nxxx. of its _Acts._ The author has added few substantial variations,\nbut not a few additions and amplifications in rewriting it, also\nfollowing a somewhat different sequence with a view to rendering the\nexposition more plain and easy. The first five chapters only of the\nhistorical portion were inserted in the Neapolitan review _Flegrea_\n(April 1901), under the title _Giambattista Vico, First Discoverer of\n\u00c6sthetic Science,_ and these also reappear amplified and brought into\nharmony with the rest.\n\nThe author has dwelt, especially in the theoretical part, upon general\nquestions which are side-issues in respect to the theme that he has\ntreated. But this will not seem a digression to those who remember\nthat, strictly speaking, there are no particular philosophical\nsciences, standing by themselves. Philosophy is unity, and when we\ntreat of \u00c6sthetic or of Logic or of Ethics, we treat always of the\nwhole of philosophy, although illustrating for didactic purposes only\none side of that inseparable unity. In like manner, owing to this\nintimate connexion of all the parts of philosophy, the uncertainty and\nmisunderstanding as to the \u00e6sthetic activity, the representative and\nproductive imagination, this firstborn of the spiritual activities,\nmainstay of the others, generates everywhere else misunderstandings,\nuncertainties and errors: in Psychology as in Logic, in History as\nin the Philosophy of Practice. If language is the first spiritual\nmanifestation, and if the \u00e6sthetic form is language itself, taken in\nall its true scientific extension, it is hopeless to try to understand\nclearly the later and more complicated phases of the life of the\nspirit, when their first and simplest moment is ill known, mutilated\nand disfigured. From the explanation of the \u00e6sthetic activity is also\nto be expected the correction of several concepts and the solution\nof certain philosophic problems which generally seem to be almost\ndesperate. Such is precisely the spirit animating the present work. And\nif the present attempt and the historical illustrations which accompany\nit may be of use in winning friends to these studies, by levelling\nobstacles and indicating paths to be followed; if this happen,\nespecially here in Italy, whose \u00e6sthetic traditions (as has been\ndemonstrated in its place) are very noble, the author will consider\nthat he has gained his end, and one of his keenest desires will have\nbeen satisfied.\n\nNAPLES, _December_ 1901.\n\nIn addition to a careful literary revision, (in which, as well as in\nthe revision of the notes, I have received valuable help from my friend\nFausto Nicolini) I have in this third edition made certain alterations\nof theory, especially in Chapters X. and XI. of Part I., suggested by\nfurther reflexion and self-criticism.\n\nBut I have refrained from introducing corrections or additions of such\na kind as to alter the original plan of the book, which was, or was\nmeant to be, a complete but brief \u00e6sthetic theory set in the framework\nof a general sketch of a Philosophy of the Spirit.\n\nThe reader who desires a complete statement of the general or\ncollateral doctrines or a more particular exposition of the other parts\nof philosophy (_e.g._ the lyrical nature of art) is now referred to the\nvolumes on _Logic_ and the _Philosophy of Practice,_ which together\nwith the present work compose the _Philosophy of the Spirit_ which in\nthe author's opinion exhausts the entire field of Philosophy. The three\nvolumes were not conceived and written simultaneously; if they had\nbeen, some details would have been differently arranged. When I wrote\nthe first I had no idea of giving it, as I have now done, two such\ncompanions; and I therefore designed it to be, as I say, complete in\nitself. In the second place, the present state of the study of \u00c6sthetic\nmade it desirable to append to the theoretical exposition a somewhat\nfull history of the science, whereas for the other parts of Philosophy\nI was able to restrict myself to brief historical notes merely designed\nto show how, from my point of view, such a history would best be\ncomposed. Lastly, there are many things which now, after a systematic\nexposition of the various philosophical sciences, I see in closer\nconnexions and in a clearer, or at least a different, light; a certain\nhesitation and even some doctrinal errors visible here and there in the\n_\u00c6sthetic,_ especially where subjects foreign to \u00c6sthetic itself are\nbeing treated, would now no longer be justified. For all these reasons\nthe three volumes, in spite of their substantial unity of spirit and of\naim, have each its own physiognomy, and show marks of the different\nperiods of life at which they were written, so as to group themselves,\nand to demand interpretation, as a progressive series according to\ntheir dates of publication.\n\nWith what may be called the minor problems of \u00c6sthetic, and the\nobjections which have been or might be brought against my theory, I\nhave dealt and am continuing to deal in special essays, of which I\nshall shortly publish a first collection which will form a kind of\nexplanatory and polemical appendix to the present volume.\n\n_November_ 1907.\n\nIn revising this book once more for a fourth edition, I take the\nopportunity of announcing that the supplementary volume of essays\npromised above was published in 1910 under the title _Problems of\n\u00c6sthetic and Contributions to the History of \u00c6sthetic in Italy._\n\nB. C.\n\n_May_ 1911.\n\n\n\n\nTHEORY OF \u00c6STHETIC\n\n\n\n\nI\n\n\nINTUITION AND EXPRESSION\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Intuitive knowledge._]\n\nKnowledge has two forms: it is either _intuitive_ knowledge or\n_logical_ knowledge; knowledge obtained through the _imagination_\nor knowledge obtained through the _intellect_; knowledge of the\n_individual_ or knowledge of the _universal_; of _individual things_ or\nof the _relations_ between them: it is, in fact, productive either of\n_images_ or of _concepts._\n\nIn ordinary life, constant appeal is made to intuitive knowledge. It is\nsaid that we cannot give definitions of certain truths; that they are\nnot demonstrable by syllogisms; that they must be learnt intuitively.\nThe politician finds fault with the abstract reasoner, who possesses no\nlively intuition of actual conditions; the educational theorist insists\nupon the necessity of developing the intuitive faculty in the pupil\nbefore everything else; the critic in judging a work of art makes it\na point of honour to set aside theory and abstractions, and to judge\nit by direct intuition; the practical man professes to live rather by\nintuition than by reason.\n\nBut this ample acknowledgment granted to intuitive knowledge\nin ordinary life, does not correspond to an equal and adequate\nacknowledgment in the field of theory and of philosophy. There exists a\nvery ancient science of intellectual knowledge, admitted by all without\ndiscussion, namely, Logic; but a science of intuitive knowledge is\ntimidly and with difficulty asserted by but a few. Logical knowledge\nhas appropriated the lion's share; and if she does not slay and devour\nher companion outright, yet yields to her but grudgingly the humble\nplace of maid-servant or doorkeeper.--What can intuitive knowledge be\nwithout the light of intellectual knowledge? It is a servant without\na master; and though a master find a servant useful, the master is a\nnecessity to the servant, since he enables him to gain his livelihood.\nIntuition is blind; intellect lends her eyes.\n\n[Sidenote: _Its independence with respect to intellectual knowledge._]\n\nNow, the first point to be firmly fixed in the mind is that intuitive\nknowledge has no need of a master, nor to lean upon any one; she does\nnot need to borrow the eyes of others, for she has excellent eyes\nof her own. Doubtless it is possible to find concepts mingled with\nintuitions. But in many other intuitions there is no trace of such\na mixture, which proves that it is not necessary. The impression of\na moonlight scene by a painter; the outline of a country drawn by a\ncartographer; a musical motive, tender or energetic; the words of\na sighing lyric, or those with which we ask, command and lament in\nordinary life, may well all be intuitive facts without a shadow of\nintellectual relation. But, think what one may of these instances,\nand admitting further the contention that the greater part of the\nintuitions of civilized man are impregnated with concepts, there yet\nremains to be observed something more important and more conclusive.\nThose concepts which are found mingled and fused with the intuitions\nare no longer concepts, in so far as they are really mingled and\nfused, for they have lost all independence and autonomy. They have\nbeen concepts, but have now become simple elements of intuition.\nThe philosophical maxims placed in the mouth of a personage of\ntragedy or of comedy, perform there the function, not of concepts,\nbut of characteristics of such personage; in the same way as the\nred in a painted face does not there represent the red colour of\nthe physicists, but is a characteristic element of the portrait.\nThe whole is that which determines the quality of the parts. A work\nof art may be full of philosophical concepts; it may contain them\nin greater abundance and they may there be even more profound than\nin a philosophical dissertation, which in its turn may be rich to\noverflowing with descriptions and intuitions. But notwithstanding all\nthese concepts the total effect of the work of art is an intuition;\nand notwithstanding all those intuitions, the total effect of the\nphilosophical dissertation is a concept. The _Promessi Sposi_ contains\ncopious ethical observations and distinctions, but does not for that\nreason lose as a whole its character of simple story or intuition. In\nlike manner the anecdotes and satirical effusions to be found in the\nworks of a philosopher like Schopenhauer do not deprive those works\nof their character of intellectual treatises. The difference between\na scientific work and a work of art, that is, between an intellectual\nfact and an intuitive fact, lies in the difference of the total effect\naimed at by their respective authors. This it is that determines and\nrules over the several parts of each not these parts separated and\nconsidered abstractly in themselves.\n\n[Sidenote: _Intuition and perception._]\n\nBut to admit the independence of intuition as regards concept does\nnot suffice to give a true and precise idea of intuition. Another\nerror arises among those who recognize this, or who at any rate do not\nexplicitly make intuition dependent upon the intellect, to obscure\nand confuse the real nature of intuition. By intuition is frequently\nunderstood _perception,_ or the knowledge of actual reality, the\napprehension of something as _real._\n\nCertainly perception is intuition: the perceptions of the room in\nwhich I am writing, of the ink-bottle and paper that are before me,\nof the pen I am using, of the objects that I touch and make use of as\ninstruments of my person, which, if it write, therefore exists;--these\nare all intuitions. But the image that is now passing through my brain\nof a me writing in another room, in another town, with different paper,\npen and ink, is also an intuition. This means that the distinction\nbetween reality and non-reality is extraneous, secondary, to the true\nnature of intuition. If we imagine a human mind having intuitions\nfor the first time, it would seem that it could have intuitions of\nactual reality only, that is to say, that it could have perceptions\nof nothing but the real. But since knowledge of reality is based upon\nthe distinction between real images and unreal images, and since this\ndistinction does not at the first moment exist, these intuitions\nwould in truth not be intuitions either of the real or of the unreal,\nnot perceptions, but pure intuitions. Where all is real, nothing is\nreal. The child, with its difficulty of distinguishing true from\nfalse, history from fable, which are all one to childhood, can furnish\nus with a sort of very vague and only remotely approximate idea of\nthis ingenuous state. Intuition is the undifferentiated unity of the\nperception of the real and of the simple image of the possible. In our\nintuitions we do not oppose ourselves as empirical beings to external\nreality, but we simply objectify our impressions, whatever they be.\n\n[Sidenote: _Intuition and the concepts of space and time._]\n\nThose, therefore, who look upon intuition as sensation formed and\narranged simply according to the categories of space and time, would\nseem to approximate more nearly to the truth. Space and time (they\nsay) are the forms of intuition; to have an intuition is to place\nit in space and in temporal sequence. Intuitive activity would then\nconsist in this double and concurrent function of spatiality and\ntemporality. But for these two categories must be repeated what was\nsaid of intellectual distinctions, when found mingled with intuitions.\nWe have intuitions without space and without time: the colour of a\nsky, the colour of a feeling, a cry of pain and an effort of will,\nobjectified in consciousness: these are intuitions which we possess,\nand with their making space and time have nothing to do. In some\nintuitions, spatiality may be found without temporality, in others,\n_vice versa_; and even where both are found, they are perceived by\nlater reflexion: they can be fused with the intuition in like manner\nwith all its other elements: that is, they are in it _materialiter_\nand not _formaliter,_ as ingredients and not as arrangement. Who,\nwithout an act of reflexion which for a moment breaks in upon his\ncontemplation, can think of space while looking at a drawing or a\nview? Who is conscious of temporal sequence while listening to a story\nor a piece of music without breaking into it with a similar act of\nreflexion? What intuition reveals in a work of art is not space and\ntime, but _character, individual physiognomy._ The view here maintained\nis confirmed in several quarters of modern philosophy. Space and time,\nfar from being simple and primitive functions, are nowadays conceived\nas intellectual constructions of great complexity. And further, even\nin some of those who do not altogether deny to space and time the\nquality of formative principles, categories and functions, one observes\nan effort to unite them and to regard them in a different manner from\nthat in which these categories are generally conceived. Some limit\nintuition to the sole category of spatiality, maintaining that even\ntime can only be intuited in terms of space. Others abandon the three\ndimensions of space as not philosophically necessary, and conceive the\nfunction of spatiality as void of all particular spatial determination.\nBut what could such a spatial function be, a simple arrangement that\nshould arrange even time? It represents, surely, all that criticism\nand refutation have left standing--the bare demand for the affirmation\nof some intuitive activity in general. And is not this activity\ntruly determined, when one single function is attributed to it, not\nspatializing nor temporalizing, but characterizing? Or rather, when it\nis conceived as itself a category or function which gives us knowledge\nof things in their concreteness and individuality?\n\n[Sidenote: _Intuition and sensation._]\n\nHaving thus freed intuitive knowledge from any suggestion of\nintellectualism and from every later and external addition, we must\nnow explain it and determine its limits from another side and defend\nit from a different kind of invasion and confusion. On the hither side\nof the lower limit is sensation, formless matter, which the spirit can\nnever apprehend in itself as simple matter. This it can only possess\nwith form and in form, but postulates the notion of it as a mere limit.\nMatter, in its abstraction, is mechanism, passivity; it is what the\nspirit of man suffers, but does not produce. Without it no human\nknowledge or activity is possible; but mere matter produces animality,\nwhatever is brutal and impulsive in man, not the spiritual dominion,\nwhich is humanity. How often we strive to understand clearly what is\npassing within us! We do catch a glimpse of something, but this does\nnot appear to the mind as objectified and formed. It is in such moments\nas these that we best perceive the profound difference between matter\nand form. These are not two acts of ours, opposed to one another; but\nthe one is outside us and assaults and sweeps us off our feet, while\nthe other inside us tends to absorb and identify itself with that\nwhich is outside. Matter, clothed and conquered by form, produces\nconcrete form. It is the matter, the content, which differentiates one\nof our intuitions from another: the form is constant: it is spiritual\nactivity, while matter is changeable. Without matter spiritual\nactivity would not forsake its abstractness to become concrete and\nreal activity, this or that spiritual content, this or that definite\nintuition.\n\nIt is a curious fact, characteristic of our times, that this very form,\nthis very activity of the spirit, which is essentially ourselves, is\nso often ignored or denied. Some confound the spiritual activity of\nman with the metaphorical and mythological activity of what is called\nnature, which is mechanism and has no resemblance to human activity,\nsave when we imagine, with \u00c6sop, that \"_arbores loquuntur non tantum\nferae._\" Some affirm that they have never observed in themselves this\n\"miraculous\" activity, as though there were no difference, or only\none of quantity, between sweating and thinking, feeling cold and the\nenergy of the will. Others, certainly with greater reason, would\nunify activity and mechanism in a more general concept, though they\nare specifically distinct. Let us, however, refrain for the moment\nfrom examining if such a final unification be possible, and in what\nsense, but admitting that the attempt may be made, it is clear that\nto unify two concepts in a third implies to begin with the admission\nof a difference between the two first. Here it is this difference that\nconcerns us and we set it in relief.\n\n[Sidenote: _Intuition and association._]\n\nIntuition has sometimes been confused with simple sensation. But since\nthis confusion ends by being offensive to common sense, it has more\nfrequently been attenuated or concealed with a phraseology apparently\ndesigned at once to confuse and to distinguish them. Thus, it has\nbeen asserted that intuition is sensation, but not so much simple\nsensation as _association_ of sensations. Here a double meaning is\nconcealed in the word \"association.\" Association is understood, either\nas memory, mnemonic association, conscious recollection, and in that\ncase the claim to unite in memory elements which are not intuited,\ndistinguished, possessed in some way by the spirit and produced by\nconsciousness, seems inconceivable: or it is understood as association\nof unconscious elements, in which case we remain in the world of\nsensation and of nature. But if with certain associationists we speak\nof an association which is neither memory nor flux of sensations, but\na _productive_ association (formative, constructive, distinguishing);\nthen our contention is admitted and only its name is denied to it.\nFor productive association is no longer association in the sense\nof the sensationalists, but _synthesis,_ that is to say, spiritual\nactivity. Synthesis may be called association; but with the concept of\nproductivity is already posited the distinction between passivity and\nactivity, between sensation and intuition.\n\n[Sidenote: _Intuition and representation._]\n\nOther psychologists are disposed to distinguish from sensation\nsomething which is sensation no longer, but is not yet intellectual\nconcept: the _representation_ or _image._ What is the difference\nbetween their representation or image and our intuitive knowledge?\nEverything and nothing: for \"representation\" is a very equivocal word.\nIf by representation be understood something cut off and standing\nout from the psychic basis of the sensations, then representation is\nintuition. If, on the other hand, it be conceived as complex sensation\nwe are back once more in crude sensation, which does not vary in\nquality according to its richness or poverty, or according to whether\nthe organism in which it appears is rudimentary or highly developed\nand full of traces of past sensations. Nor is the ambiguity remedied\nby defining representation as a psychic product of secondary degree\nin relation to sensation, defined as occupying the first place. What\ndoes secondary degree mean here? Does it mean a qualitative, formal\ndifference? If so, representation is an elaboration of sensation\nand therefore intuition. Or does it mean greater complexity and\ncomplication, a quantitative, material difference? In that case\nintuition is once more confused with simple sensation.\n\n[Sidenote: _Intuition and expression._]\n\nAnd yet there is a sure method of distinguishing true intuition, true\nrepresentation, from that which is inferior to it: the spiritual fact\nfrom the mechanical, passive, natural fact. Every true intuition or\nrepresentation is also _expression._ That which does not objectify\nitself in expression is not intuition or representation, but sensation\nand mere natural fact. The spirit only intuites in making, forming,\nexpressing. He who separates intuition from expression never succeeds\nin reuniting them.\n\nIntuitive activity _possesses intuitions to the extent that it\nexpresses them._ Should this proposition sound paradoxical, that is\npartly because, as a general rule, a too restricted meaning is given to\nthe word \"expression.\" It is generally restricted to what are called\nverbal expressions alone. But there exist also non-verbal expressions,\nsuch as those of line, colour and sound, and to all of these must\nbe extended our affirmation, which embraces therefore every sort of\nmanifestation of the man, as orator, musician, painter, or anything\nelse. But be it pictorial, or verbal, or musical, or in whatever other\nform it appear, to no intuition can expression in one of its forms be\nwanting; it is, in fact, an inseparable part of intuition. How can we\nreally possess an intuition of a geometrical figure, unless we possess\nso accurate an image of it as to be able to trace it immediately upon\npaper or on the blackboard?\n\nHow can we really have an intuition of the contour of a region, for\nexample of the island of Sicily, if we are not able to draw it as\nit is in all its meanderings? Every one can experience the internal\nillumination which follows upon his success in formulating to\nhimself his impressions and feelings, but only so far as he is able\nto formulate them. Feelings or impressions, then, pass by means of\nwords from the obscure region of the soul into the clarity of the\ncontemplative spirit. It is impossible to distinguish intuition from\nexpression in this cognitive process. The one appears with the other at\nthe same instant, because they are not two, but one.\n\n[Sidenote: _Illusion as to their difference._]\n\nThe principal reason which makes our view appear paradoxical as we\nmaintain it, is the illusion or prejudice that we possess a more\ncomplete intuition of reality than we really do. One often hears people\nsay that they have many great thoughts in their minds, but that they\nare not able to express them. But if they really had them, they would\nhave coined them into just so many beautiful, sounding words, and thus\nhave expressed them. If these thoughts seem to vanish or to become few\nand meagre in the act of expressing them, the reason is that they did\nnot exist or really were few and meagre. People think that all of us\nordinary men imagine and intuite countries, figures and scenes like\npainters, and bodies like sculptors; save that painters and sculptors\nknow how to paint and carve such images, while we bear them unexpressed\nin our souls. They believe that any one could have imagined a Madonna\nof Raph\u00e6l; but that Raph\u00e6l was Raph\u00e6l owing to his technical ability\nin putting the Madonna upon canvas. Nothing can be more false than\nthis view. The world which as a rule we intuite is a small thing. It\nconsists of little expressions, which gradually become greater and\nwider with the increasing spiritual concentration of certain moments.\nThey are the words we say to ourselves, our silent judgments: \"Here\nis a man, here is a horse, this is heavy, this is sharp, this pleases\nme,\" etc. It is a medley of light and colour, with no greater pictorial\nvalue than would be expressed by a haphazard splash of colours, from\namong which one could barely make out a few special, distinctive\ntraits. This and nothing else is what we possess in our ordinary life;\nthis is the basis of our ordinary action. It is the index of a book.\nThe labels tied to things (it has been said) take the place of the\nthings themselves. This index and these labels (themselves expressions)\nsuffice for small needs and small actions. From time to time we pass\nfrom the index to the book, from the label to the thing, or from the\nslight to the greater intuitions, and from these to the greatest and\nmost lofty. This passage is sometimes far from easy. It has been\nobserved by those who have best studied the psychology of artists that\nwhen, after having given a rapid glance at any one, they attempt to\nobtain a real intuition of him, in order, for example, to paint his\nportrait, then this ordinary vision, that seemed so precise, so lively,\nreveals itself as little better than nothing. What remains is found to\nbe at the most some superficial trait, which would not even suffice for\na caricature. The person to be painted stands before the artist like a\nworld to discover. Mich\u00e6l Angelo said, \"One paints, not with the hands,\nbut with the brain.\" Leonardo shocked the prior of the Convent of the\nGraces by standing for days together gazing at the \"Last Supper,\"\nwithout touching it with the brush. He remarked of this attitude: \"The\nminds of men of lofty genius are most active in invention when they are\ndoing the least external work.\" The painter is a painter, because he\nsees what others only feel or catch a glimpse of, but do not see. We\nthink we see a smile, but in reality we have only a vague impression\nof it, we do not perceive all the characteristic traits of which it\nis the sum, as the painter discovers them after he has worked upon\nthem and is thus able to fix them on the canvas. We do not intuitively\npossess more even of our intimate friend, who is with us every day\nand at all hours, than at most certain traits of physiognomy which\nenable us to distinguish him from others. The illusion is less easy as\nregards musical expression; because it would seem strange to every\none to say that the composer had added or attached notes to a motive\nwhich was already in the mind of him who is not the composer; as if\nBeethoven's Ninth Symphony were not his own intuition and his intuition\nthe Ninth Symphony. Now, just as one who is deluded as to the amount\nof his material wealth is confuted by arithmetic, which states its\nexact amount, so he who nourishes delusions as to the wealth of his\nown thoughts and images is brought back to reality, when he is obliged\nto cross the _Pons Asinorum_ of expression. Let us say to the former,\ncount; to the latter, speak; or, here is a pencil, draw, express\nyourself.\n\nEach of us, as a matter of fact, has in him a little of the poet, of\nthe sculptor, of the musician, of the painter, of the prose writer:\nbut how little, as compared with those who bear those names, just\nbecause they possess the most universal dispositions and energies\nof human nature in so lofty a degree! How little too does a painter\npossess of the intuitions of a poet! And how little does one painter\npossess those of another painter! Nevertheless, that little is all\nour actual patrimony of intuitions or representations. Beyond these\nare only impressions, sensations, feelings, impulses, emotions, or\nwhatever else one may term what still falls short of the spirit and is\nnot assimilated by man; something postulated for the convenience of\nexposition, while actually non-existent, since to exist also is a fact\nof the spirit.\n\n[Sidenote: _Identity of intuition and expression._]\n\nWe may thus add this to the various verbal descriptions of intuition,\nnoted at the beginning: intuitive knowledge is expressive knowledge.\nIndependent and autonomous in respect to intellectual function;\nindifferent to later empirical discriminations, to reality and to\nunreality, to formations and apperceptions of space and time, which are\nalso later: intuition or representation is distinguished as _form_ from\nwhat is felt and suffered, from the flux or wave of sensation, or from\npsychic matter; and this form, this taking possession, is expression.\nTo intuite is to express; and nothing else (nothing more, but nothing\nless) than _to express._\n\n\n\n\nII\n\n\nINTUITION AND ART\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Corollaries and explanations._]\n\nBefore proceeding further, it may be well to draw certain consequences\nfrom what has been established and to add some explanations.\n\n[Sidenote: _Identity of art and intuitive knowledge._]\n\nWe have frankly identified intuitive or expressive knowledge with the\n\u00e6sthetic or artistic fact, taking works of art as examples of intuitive\nknowledge and attributing to them the characteristics of intuition, and\n_vice versa._ But our identification is combated by a view held even by\nmany philosophers, who consider art to be an intuition of an altogether\nspecial sort. \"Let us admit\" (they say) \"that art is intuition; but\nintuition is not always art: artistic intuition is a distinct species\ndiffering from intuition in general by something _more_.\"\n\n[Sidenote: _No specific difference._]\n\nBut no one has ever been able to indicate of what this something more\nconsists. It has sometimes been thought that art is not a simple\nintuition, but an intuition of an intuition, in the same way as the\nconcept of science has been defined, not as the ordinary concept,\nbut as the concept of a concept. Thus man would attain to art by\nobjectifying, not his sensations, as happens with ordinary intuition,\nbut intuition itself. But this process of raising to a second power\ndoes not exist; and the comparison of it with the ordinary and\nscientific concept does not prove what is intended, for the good\nreason that it is not true that the scientific concept is the concept\nof a concept. If this comparison proves anything, it proves just the\nopposite. The ordinary concept, if it be really a concept and not a\nsimple representation, is a perfect concept, however poor and limited.\nScience substitutes concepts for representations; for those concepts\nthat are poor and limited it substitutes others, larger and more\ncomprehensive; it is ever discovering new relations. But its method\ndoes not differ from that by which is formed the smallest universal\nin the brain of the humblest of men. What is generally called _par\nexcellence_ art, collects intuitions that are wider and more complex\nthan those which we generally experience, but these intuitions are\nalways of sensations and impressions.\n\nArt is expression of impressions, not expression of expression.\n\n[Sidenote: _No difference of intensity._]\n\nFor the same reason, it cannot be asserted that the intuition, which is\ngenerally called artistic, differs from ordinary intuition as intensive\nintuition. This would be the case if it were to operate differently on\nthe same matter. But since the artistic function is extended to wider\nfields, yet does not differ in method from ordinary intuition, the\ndifference between them is not intensive but extensive. The intuition\nof the simplest popular love-song, which says the same thing, or very\nnearly, as any declaration of love that issues at every moment from the\nlips of thousands of ordinary men, may be intensively perfect in its\npoor simplicity, although it be extensively so much more limited than\nthe complex intuition of a love-song by Leopardi.\n\n[Sidenote: _The difference is extensive and empirical._]\n\nThe whole difference, then, is quantitative, and as such is indifferent\nto philosophy, _scientia qualitatum._ Certain men have a greater\naptitude, a more frequent inclination fully to express certain\ncomplex states of the soul. These men are known in ordinary language\nas artists. Some very complicated and difficult expressions are not\noften achieved, and these are called works of art. The limits of\nthe expression-intuitions that are called art, as opposed to those\nthat are vulgarly called non-art, are empirical and impossible to\ndefine. If an epigram be art, why not a simple word? If a story, why\nnot the news-jottings of the journalist? If a landscape, why not a\ntopographical sketch? The teacher of philosophy in Moli\u00e8re's comedy was\nright: \"whenever we speak, we create prose.\" But there will always be\nscholars like Monsieur Jourdain, astonished at having spoken prose for\nforty years without knowing it, who will have difficulty in persuading\nthemselves that when they call their servant John to bring their\nslippers, they have spoken nothing less than--prose.\n\nWe must hold firmly to our identification, because among the principal\nreasons which have prevented \u00c6sthetic, the science of art, from\nrevealing the true nature of art, its real roots in human nature,\nhas been its separation from the general spiritual life, the having\nmade of it a sort of special function or aristocratic club. No one\nis astonished when he learns from physiology that every cell is an\norganism and every organism a cell or synthesis of cells. No one is\nastonished at finding in a lofty mountain the same chemical elements\nthat compose a small stone fragment. There is not one physiology of\nsmall animals and one of large animals; nor is there a special chemical\ntheory of stones as distinct from mountains. In the same way, there is\nnot a science of lesser intuition as distinct from a science of greater\nintuition, nor one of ordinary intuition as distinct from artistic\nintuition. There is but one \u00c6sthetic, the science of intuitive or\nexpressive knowledge, which is the \u00e6sthetic or artistic fact. And this\n\u00c6sthetic is the true analogue of Logic, which includes, as facts of the\nsame nature, the formation of the smallest and most ordinary concept\nand the most complicated scientific and philosophical system.\n\n[Sidenote: _Artistic genius._]\n\nNor can we admit that the word _genius_ or artistic genius, as\ndistinct from the non-genius of the ordinary man, possesses more than\na quantitative signification. Great artists are said to reveal us to\nourselves. But how could this be possible, unless there were identity\nof nature between their imagination and ours, and unless the difference\nwere only one of quantity? It were better to change _poeta nascitur_\ninto _homo nascitur poeta_: some men are born great poets, some small.\nThe cult of the genius with all its attendant superstitions has arisen\nfrom this quantitative difference having been taken as a difference of\nquality. It has been forgotten that genius is not something that has\nfallen from heaven, but humanity itself. The man of genius who poses or\nis represented as remote from humanity finds his punishment in becoming\nor appearing somewhat ridiculous. Examples of this are the _genius_ of\nthe romantic period and the _superman_ of our time.\n\nBut it is well to note here, that those who claim unconsciousness as\nthe chief quality of an artistic genius, hurl him from an eminence\nfar above humanity to a position far below it. Intuitive or artistic\ngenius, like every form of human activity, is always conscious;\notherwise it would be blind mechanism. The only thing that can be\nwanting to artistic genius is the _reflective_ consciousness, the\nsuperadded consciousness of the historian or critic, which is not\nessential to it.\n\n[Sidenote: _Content and form in \u00c6sthetic._]\n\nThe relation between matter and form, or between _content_ and\n_form,_ as is generally said, is one of the most disputed questions\nin \u00c6sthetic. Does the \u00e6sthetic fact consist of content alone, or of\nform alone, or of both together? This question has taken on various\nmeanings, which we shall mention, each in its place. But when these\nwords are taken as signifying what we have above defined, and matter is\nunderstood as emotionality not \u00e6sthetically elaborated, or impressions,\nand form as intellectual activity and expression, then our view cannot\nbe in doubt. We must, that is to say, reject both the thesis that makes\nthe \u00e6sthetic fact to consist of the content alone (that is, the simple\nimpressions), and the thesis which makes it to consist of a junction\nbetween form and content, that is, of impressions plus expressions.\nIn the \u00e6sthetic fact, expressive activity is not added to the fact of\nthe impressions, but these latter are formed and elaborated by it. The\nimpressions reappear as it were in expression, like water put into a\nfilter, which reappears the same and yet different on the other side.\nThe \u00e6sthetic fact, therefore, is form, and nothing but form.\n\nFrom this was inferred not that the content is something superfluous\n(it is, on the contrary, the necessary point of departure for the\nexpressive fact); but that _there is no passage_ from the qualities of\nthe content to those of the form. It has sometimes been thought that\nthe content, in order to be \u00e6sthetic, that is to say, transformable\ninto form, should possess some determined or determinable qualities.\nBut were that so, then form and content, expression and impression,\nwould be the same thing. It is true that the content is that which\nis convertible into form, but it has no determinable qualities until\nthis transformation takes place. We know nothing about it. It does not\nbecome \u00e6sthetic content before, but only after it has been actually\ntransformed. The \u00e6sthetic content has also been defined as the\n_interesting._ That is not an untrue statement; it is merely void of\nmeaning. Interesting to what? To the expressive activity? Certainly\nthe expressive activity would not have raised the content to the\ndignity of form, had it not been interested in it. Being interested is\nprecisely the raising of the content to the dignity of form. But the\nword \"interesting\" has also been employed in another and a illegitimate\nsense, which we shall explain further on.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of the imitation of nature and of the artistic\nillusion._]\n\nThe proposition that art is _imitation of nature_ has also several\nmeanings. Sometimes truths have been expressed or at least shadowed\nforth in these words, sometimes errors have been promulgated. More\nfrequently, no definite thought has been expressed at all. One of\nthe scientifically legitimate meanings occurs when \"imitation\" is\nunderstood as representation or intuition of nature, a form of\nknowledge. And when the phrase is used with this intention, and in\norder to emphasize the spiritual character of the process, another\nproposition becomes legitimate also: namely, that art is the\n_idealization_ or _idealizing_ imitation of nature. But if by imitation\nof nature be understood that art gives mechanical reproductions,\nmore or less perfect duplicates of natural objects, in the presence\nof which is renewed the same tumult of impressions as that caused\nby natural objects, then the proposition is evidently false. The\ncoloured waxen effigies that imitate the life, before which we stand\nastonished in the museums where such things are shown, do not give\n\u00e6sthetic intuitions. Illusion and hallucination have nothing to do\nwith the calm domain of artistic intuition. But on the other hand if\nan artist paint the interior of a wax-work museum, or if an actor\ngive a burlesque portrait of a man-statue on the stage, we have work\nof the spirit and artistic intuition. Finally, if photography have in\nit anything artistic, it will be to the extent that it transmits the\nintuition of the photographer, his point of view, the pose and grouping\nwhich he has striven to attain. And if photography be not quite an art,\nthat is precisely because the element of nature in it remains more or\nless unconquered and ineradicable. Do we ever, indeed, feel complete\nsatisfaction before even the best of photographs? Would not an artist\nvary and touch up much or little, remove or add something to all of\nthem?\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of art conceived as a fact of feeling, not a\ntheoretical fact. \u00c6sthetic appearance, and feeling._]\n\nThe statements repeated so often, that art is not knowledge, that\nit does not tell the truth, that it does not belong to the world of\ntheory, but to the world of feeling, and so forth, arise from the\nfailure to realize exactly the theoretic character of simple intuition.\nThis simple intuition is quite distinct from intellectual knowledge,\nas it is distinct from perception of the real; and the statements\nquoted above arise from the belief that only intellectual cognition is\nknowledge. We have seen that intuition is knowledge, free from concepts\nand more simple than the so-called perception of the real. Therefore\nart is knowledge, form; it does not belong to the world of feeling or\nto psychic matter. The reason why so many \u00e6stheticians have so often\ninsisted that art is _appearance_ (_Schein_), is precisely that they\nhave felt the necessity of distinguishing it from the more complex fact\nof perception, by maintaining its pure intuitiveness. And if for the\nsame reason it has been claimed that art is _feeling_ the reason is\nthe same. For if the concept as content of art, and historical reality\nas such, be excluded from the sphere of art, there remains no other\ncontent than reality apprehended in all its ingenuousness and immediacy\nin the vital impulse, in its _feeling,_ that is to say again, pure\nintuition.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of the theory of \u00e6sthetic senses._]\n\nThe theory of the _\u00e6sthetic senses_ has also arisen from the failure to\nestablish, or from having lost to view, the character of expression as\ndistinct from impression, of form as distinct from matter.\n\nThis theory can be reduced to the error just indicated of wishing to\nfind a passage from the qualities of the content to those of the form.\nTo ask, in fact, what the \u00e6sthetic senses are, implies asking what\nsensible impressions are able to enter into \u00e6sthetic expressions, and\nwhich must of necessity do so. To this we must at once reply, that\nall impressions can enter into \u00e6sthetic expressions or formations,\nbut that none are bound to do so of necessity. Dante raised to the\ndignity of form not only the \"sweet colour of the oriental sapphire\"\n(visual impressions), but also tactual or thermic impressions, such as\nthe \"dense air\" and the \"fresh rivulets\" which \"parch the more\" the\nthroat of the thirsty. The belief that a picture yields only visual\nimpressions is a curious illusion. The bloom on a cheek, the warmth of\na youthful body, the sweetness and freshness of a fruit, the edge of a\nsharp knife, are not these, too, impressions obtainable from a picture?\nAre they visual? What would a picture mean to an imaginary man, lacking\nall or many of his senses, who should in an instant acquire the organ\nof sight alone? The picture we are looking at and believe we see only\nwith our eyes would seem to his eyes to be little more than an artist's\npaint-smeared palette.\n\nSome who hold firmly to the \u00e6sthetic character of certain groups of\nimpressions (for example, the visual and auditive), and exclude others,\nare nevertheless ready to admit that if visual and auditive impressions\nenter _directly_ into the \u00e6sthetic fact, those of the other senses\nalso enter into it, but only as _associated._ But this distinction is\naltogether arbitrary. \u00c6sthetic expression is synthesis, in which it\nis impossible to distinguish direct and indirect. All impressions are\nplaced by it on a level, in so far as they are \u00e6stheticized. A man who\nabsorbs the subject of a picture or poem does not have it before him as\na series of impressions, some of which have prerogatives and precedence\nover the others. He knows nothing as to what has happened prior to\nhaving absorbed it, just as, on the other hand, distinctions made after\nreflexion have nothing whatever to do with art as such.\n\nThe theory of the \u00e6sthetic senses has also been presented in another\nway; as an attempt to establish what physiological organs are necessary\nfor the \u00e6sthetic fact. The physiological organ or apparatus is nothing\nbut a group of cells, constituted and disposed in a particular manner;\nthat is to say, it is a merely physical and natural fact or concept.\nBut expression does not know physiological facts. Expression has its\npoint of departure in the impressions, and the physiological path\nby which these have found their way to the mind is to it altogether\nindifferent. One way or another comes to the same thing: it suffices\nthat they should be impressions.\n\nIt is true that the want of given organs, that is, of certain groups of\ncells, prevents the formation of certain impressions (when these are\nnot otherwise obtained through a kind of organic compensation). The\nman born blind cannot intuite and express light. But the impressions\nare not conditioned solely by the organ, but also by the stimuli which\noperate upon the organ. One who has never had the impression of the sea\nwill never be able to express it, in the same way as one who has never\nhad the impression of the life of high society or of the political\narena will never express either. This, however, does not prove the\ndependence of the expressive function on the stimulus or on the\norgan. It merely repeats what we know already: expression presupposes\nimpression, and particular expressions particular impressions. For the\nrest, every impression excludes other impressions during the moment in\nwhich it dominates; and so does every expression.\n\n[Sidenote: _Unity and indivisibility of the work of art._]\n\nAnother corollary of the conception of expression as activity is the\n_indivisibility_ of the work of art. Every expression is a single\nexpression. Activity is a fusion of the impressions in an organic\nwhole. A desire to express this has always prompted the affirmation\nthat the work of art should have _unity,_ or, what amounts to the same\nthing, _unity in variety._ Expression is a synthesis of the various, or\nmultiple, in the one.\n\nThe fact that we divide a work of art into parts, a poem into scenes,\nepisodes, similes, sentences, or a picture into single figures and\nobjects, background, foreground, etc., may seem opposed to this\naffirmation. But such division annihilates the work, as dividing the\norganism into heart, brain, nerves, muscles and so on, turns the living\nbeing into a corpse. It is true that there exist organisms in which\ndivision gives rise to other living beings, but in such a case we must\nconclude, maintaining the analogy between the organism and the work of\nart, that in the latter case too there are numerous germs of life each\nready to grow, in a moment, into a single complete expression.\n\nIt may be said that expression sometimes arises from other expressions.\nThere are simple and there are _compound_ expressions. One must surely\nadmit some difference between the _eureka,_ with which Archimedes\nexpressed all his joy at his discovery, and the expressive act (indeed\nall the five acts) of a regular tragedy.--Not in the least: expression\nalways arises directly from impressions. He who conceives a tragedy\nputs into a crucible a great quantity, so to say, of impressions:\nexpressions themselves, conceived on other occasions, are fused\ntogether with the new in a single mass, in the same way as we can\ncast into a melting furnace formless pieces of bronze and choicest\nstatuettes. Those choicest statuettes must be melted just like the\npieces of bronze, before there can be a new statue. The old expressions\nmust descend again to the level of impressions, in order to be\nsynthesized in a new single expression.\n\n[Sidenote: _Art as liberator._]\n\nBy elaborating his impressions, man _frees_ himself from them. By\nobjectifying them, he removes them from him and makes himself their\nsuperior. The liberating and purifying function of art is another\naspect and another formula of its character as activity. Activity is\nthe deliverer, just because it drives away passivity.\n\nThis also explains why it is usual to attribute to artists both the\nmaximum of sensibility or _passion_, and the maximum of insensibility\nor Olympian _serenity._ The two characters are compatible, for they do\nnot refer to the same object. The sensibility or passion relates to\nthe rich material which the artist absorbs into his psychic organism;\nthe insensibility or serenity to the form with which he subdues and\ndominates the tumult of the sensations and passions.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\n\nART AND PHILOSOPHY\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Inseparability of intellectual from intuitive knowledge._]\n\nThe two forms of knowledge, \u00e6sthetic and intellectual or conceptual,\nare indeed different, but this does not altogether amount to separation\nand disjunction, as of two forces each pulling in its own direction.\nIf we have shown that the \u00e6sthetic form is altogether independent of\nthe intellectual and suffices to itself without external support, we\nhave not said that the intellectual can stand without the \u00e6sthetic. To\ndescribe the independence as _reciprocal_ would not be true.\n\nWhat is knowledge by concepts? It is knowledge of the relations of\nthings, and things are intuitions. Concepts are not possible without\nintuitions, just as intuition is itself impossible without the matter\nof impressions. Intuitions are: this river, this lake, this brook,\nthis rain, this glass of water; the concept is: water, not this or\nthat appearance and particular example of water, but water in general,\nin whatever time or place it be realized; the material of infinite\nintuitions, but of one single constant concept.\n\nBut the concept, the universal, if it be no longer intuition in one\nrespect, is intuition in another respect, and cannot fail of being\nintuition. The man who thinks has impressions and emotions, in so far\nas he thinks. His impression and emotion will be not love or hate,\nnot the passion of the man who is not a philosopher, not hate or love\nfor certain objects and individuals, but _the effort of his thought\nitself,_ with the pain and the joy, the love and the hate joined to it.\nThis effort cannot but assume an intuitive form, in becoming objective\nto the spirit. To speak is not to think logically; but to _think\nlogically_ is also to _speak._\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of the negations of this thesis._]\n\nThat thought cannot exist without speech, is a truth generally\nadmitted. The negations of this thesis are all founded on equivocations\nand errors.\n\nThe first of the equivocations is that of those who observe that one\ncan likewise think with geometrical figures, algebraical numbers,\nideographic signs, without any word, even pronounced silently and\nalmost insensibly within one; that there are languages in which the\nword, the phonetic sign, expresses nothing, unless the written sign\nalso be examined, and so on. But when we said \"speak,\" we intended\nto employ a synecdoche, by which was to be understood \"expression\"\nin general, for we have already remarked that expression is not only\nso-called verbal expression. It may or may not be true that certain\nconcepts may be thought without phonetic manifestations. But the very\nexamples adduced to show this also prove that those concepts never\nexist without expressions.\n\nOthers point out that animals, or certain animals, think and reason\nwithout speaking. Now as to how, whether, and what animals think,\nwhether they be rudimentary men, like savages who refuse to be\ncivilized, rather than physiological machines, as the old spiritualists\nmaintained, are questions that do not concern us here. When the\nphilosopher talks of animal, brutal, impulsive, instinctive nature\nand the like, he does not base himself on such conjectures as to\ndogs or cats, lions or ants; but upon observations of what is called\nanimal and brutal in man: of the animal side or basis of what we feel\nin ourselves. If individual animals, dogs or cats, lions or ants,\npossess something of the activity of man, so much the better, or so\nmuch the worse, for them. This means that in respect to them also we\nmust talk, not of \"nature\" as a whole, but of its animal basis, as\nbeing perhaps larger and stronger in them than the animal basis of\nman. And if we suppose that animals think and form concepts, what kind\nof conjecture would justify the assertion that they do so without\ncorresponding expressions? Analogy with man, knowledge of the spirit,\nhuman psychology, the instrument of all our conjectures as to animal\npsychology, would constrain us on the contrary to suppose that if they\nthink in any way, they also somehow speak.\n\nAnother objection is derived from human psychology, and indeed literary\npsychology, to the effect that the concept can exist without the word,\nfor it is certainly true that we all know books _well thought and\nill written_: that is to say, a thought which remains _beyond_ the\nexpression, or _notwithstanding_ faulty expression. But when we talk of\nbooks well thought and ill written, we cannot mean anything but that in\nsuch books are parts, pages, periods or propositions well thought and\nwell written, and other parts (perhaps the least important) ill thought\nand ill written, not really thought and so not really expressed. Where\nVico's _Scienza nuova_ is really ill written, it is also ill thought.\nIf we pass from the consideration of big books to a short sentence, the\nerror or inaccuracy of such a contention will leap to the eyes. How\ncould a single sentence be clearly thought and confusedly written?\n\nAll that can be admitted is that sometimes we possess thoughts\n(concepts) in an intuitive form, which is an abbreviated or rather\npeculiar expression, sufficient for us, but not sufficient to\ncommunicate it easily to any other given person or persons. Hence it\nis incorrect to say that we have the thought without the expression;\nwhereas we should rather say that we have, indeed, the expression, but\nin such a form that it is not easy to communicate it to others. This,\nhowever, is a very variable, relative fact. There are always those who\ncatch our thought on the wing, prefer it in this abbreviated form,\nand would be wearied by the greater development of it required by\nothers. In other words, the thought considered abstractly and logically\nwill be the same; but \u00e6sthetically we are dealing with two different\nintuition-expressions, into which different psychological elements\nenter. The same argument suffices to destroy, that is, to interpret\ncorrectly, the altogether empirical distinctior between an _internal_\nand an _external_ language.\n\n[Sidenote: _Art and science._]\n\nThe most lofty manifestations, the summits of intellectual and of\nintuitive knowledge shining from afar, are called, as we know, Art and\nScience. Art and Science, then, are different and yet linked together;\nthey meet on one side, which is the \u00e6sthetic side. Every scientific\nwork is also a work of art. The \u00e6sthetic side may remain little noticed\nwhen our mind is altogether taken up with the effort to understand the\nthought of the man of science and to examine its truth. But it is no\nlonger unnoticed when we pass from the activity of understanding to\nthat of contemplation and see that thought either develop itself before\nus, limpid, exact, well-shaped, without superfluous or insufficient\nwords, with appropriate rhythm and intonation; or confused, broken,\nembarrassed, tentative. Great thinkers are sometimes called great\nwriters, while other equally great thinkers remain more or less\nfragmentary writers even if their fragments have the scientific value\nof harmonious, coherent, and perfect works.\n\nWe pardon thinkers and men of science their literary mediocrity. The\nfragments, the flashes, console us for the whole, because it is far\neasier to recover the well-arranged composition from the fragmentary\nwork of genius, to liberate the flame latent in the spark, than to\nachieve the discovery of genius. But how can we pardon mediocre\nexpression in pure artists? \"_Mediocribus esse poetis non di, non\nhomines, non concessere columnae_\" The poet or painter who lacks\nform, lacks everything, because he lacks _himself._ Poetical material\npermeates the souls of all: the expression alone, that is to say,\nthe form, makes the poet. And here appears the truth of the view\nwhich denies all content to art, just the intellectual concept being\nunderstood as content. In this sense, when we take \"content\" as equal\nto \"concept\" it is most true, not only that art does not consist of\ncontent, but also that _it has no content._\n\n[Sidenote: _Content and form: another meaning. Prose and poetry._]\n\nThe distinction between _poetry and prose_ also cannot be justified,\nsave as that between art and science. It was seen in antiquity that\nsuch distinction could not be founded on external elements, such as\nrhythm and metre, or on rhymed or unrhymed form; that it was, on the\ncontrary, altogether internal. Poetry is the language of feeling, prose\nof the intellect; but since the intellect is also feeling, in its\nconcreteness and reality, all prose has its poetical side.\n\n[Sidenote: _The relation of first and second degree._]\n\nThe relation between intuitive knowledge or expression and intellectual\nknowledge or concept, between art and science, poetry and prose, cannot\nbe otherwise defined than by saying that it is one of _double degree._\nThe first degree is the expression, the second the concept: the first\ncan stand without the second, but the second cannot stand without the\nfirst. There is poetry without prose, but not prose without poetry.\nExpression, indeed, is the first affirmation of human activity. Poetry\nis \"the mother tongue of the human race\"; the first men \"were by nature\nsublime poets.\" We assert this in another way, when we observe that\nthe passage from soul to spirit, from animal to human activity, is\neffected by means of language. And this should be said of intuition\nor expression in general. But to us it appears somewhat inaccurate to\ndefine language or expression as an _intermediate_ link between nature\nand humanity, as though it were a mixture of both. Where humanity\nappears, the other has already disappeared; the man who expresses\nhimself, certainly emerges from the state of nature, but he really does\nemerge: he does not stand half within and half without, as the use of\nthe phrase \"intermediate link\" would imply.\n\n[Sidenote: _Non-existence of other forms of knowledge._]\n\nThe cognitive spirit has no form other than these two. Expression and\nconcept exhaust it completely. The whole speculative life of man is\nspent in passing from one to the other and back again.\n\n[Sidenote: _Historicity. Its identity with and difference from art._]\n\n_Historicity_ is incorrectly held to be a third theoretical form.\nHistoricity is not form, but content: as form, it is nothing but\nintuition or \u00e6sthetic fact. History does not seek for laws nor form\nconcepts; it employs neither induction nor deduction; it is directed\n_ad narrandum, non ad demonstrandum_; it does not construct universals\nand abstractions, but posits intuitions. The this and here, the\n_individuum omnimode determinatum,_ is its domain, as it is the domain\nof art. History, therefore, is included in the universal concept of art.\n\nAs against this doctrine, in view of the impossibility of conceiving\na third mode of knowledge, objections have been brought forward which\nwould lead to the affiliation of history to intellectual or scientific\nknowledge. The greater portion of these objections is animated by the\nprejudice that in refusing to history the character of conceptual\nscience something of its value and dignity has been taken from it. This\nreally arises from a false idea of art, conceived not as an essential\ntheoretic function, but as an amusement, a superfluity, a frivolity.\nWithout reopening a long debate, which so far as we are concerned\nis finally closed, we will mention here one sophism which has been\nand still is widely repeated. Its purpose is to show the logical and\nscientific nature of history. The sophism consists in admitting that\nhistorical knowledge has for its object the individual; but not the\nrepresentation, it is added, but rather the concept of the individual.\nFrom this it is argued that history is also a logical or scientific\nform of knowledge. History, in fact, is supposed to work out the\nconcept of a personage such as Charlemagne or Napoleon; of an epoch,\nlike the Renaissance or the Reformation; of an event, such as the\nFrench Revolution and the Unification of Italy. This it is held to do\nin the same way as Geometry works out the concepts of spatial forms, or\n\u00c6sthetic that of expression. But all this is untrue. History cannot do\notherwise than _represent_ Napoleon and Charlemagne, the Renaissance\nand the Reformation, the French Revolution and the Unification of Italy\nas individual facts with their individual physiognomy: that is, in the\nsense in which logicians use the word \"represent\" when they say that\none cannot have a concept of the individual, but only a representation.\nThe so-called concept of the individual is always a universal or\ngeneral concept, full of characteristics, supremely full, if you like,\nbut however full it be, incapable of attaining to that individuality to\nwhich historical knowledge, as \u00e6sthetic knowledge, alone attains.\n\nTo show how the content of history comes to be distinguished from\nthat of art in the narrow sense, we must recall what has already\nbeen observed as to the ideal character of the intuition or first\nperception, in which all is real and therefore nothing is real. Only\nat a later stage does the spirit form the concepts of external and\ninternal, of what has happened and what is desired, of object and\nsubject, and the like: only at this later stage, that is, does it\ndistinguish historical from non-historical intuition, the _real_ from\nthe _unreal,_ real imagination from pure imagination. Even internal\nfacts, what is desired and imagined, castles in the air, and countries\nof Cockaigne, have their reality, and the soul, too, has its history.\nHis illusions form part of the biography of every individual as real\nfacts. But the history of an individual soul is history, because\nthe distinction between the real and the unreal is always active\nin it, even when the illusions themselves are the real. But these\ndistinctive concepts do not appear in history like the concepts of\nscience, but rather like those that we have seen dissolved and melted\nin the \u00e6sthetic intuitions, although in history they stand out in a\nmanner altogether special to themselves. History does not construct\nthe concepts of the real and unreal, but makes use of them. History,\nin fact, is not the theory of history. Mere conceptual analysis is\nof no use in ascertaining whether an event in our lives was real or\nimaginary. We must mentally reproduce the intuitions in the most\ncomplete form, as they were at the moment of production. Historicity\nis distinguished in the concrete from pure imagination as any one\nintuition is distinguished from any other: in memory.\n\n[Sidenote: _Historical criticism._]\n\nWhere this is not possible, where the delicate and fleeting shades\nbetween the real and unreal intuitions are so slight as to mingle\nthe one with the other, we must either renounce for the time being at\nleast the knowledge of what really happened (and this we often do), or\nwe must fall back upon conjecture, verisimilitude, probability. The\nprinciple of verisimilitude and of probability in fact dominates all\nhistorical criticism. Examination of sources and authorities is devoted\nto establishing the most credible evidence. And what is the most\ncredible evidence, save that of the best observers, that is, of those\nwho best remember and (be it understood) have not wished to falsify,\nnor had interest in falsifying the truth of things?\n\n[Sidenote: _Historical scepticism._]\n\nFrom this it follows that intellectualistic scepticism finds it easy\nto deny the certainty of any history, for the certainty of history\ndiffers from that of science. It is the certainty of memory and\nof authority, not that of analysis and demonstration. To speak of\nhistorical induction or demonstration is to make a metaphorical use of\nthese expressions, which bear a quite different meaning in history to\nthat which they bear in science. The conviction of the historian is the\nundemonstrable conviction of the juryman, who has heard the witnesses,\nlistened attentively to the case, and prayed Heaven to inspire him.\nSometimes, without doubt, he is mistaken, but the mistakes are in a\nnegligible minority compared with the occasions when he grasps the\ntruth. That is why good sense is right against the intellectualists in\nbelieving in history, which is not a \"fable agreed upon,\" but what the\nindividual and humanity remember of their past. We strive to enlarge\nand to render as precise as possible this record, which in some places\nis dim, in others very clear. We cannot do without it, such as it is,\nand taken as a whole it is rich in truth. Only in a spirit of paradox\ncan one doubt that there ever was a Greece or a Rome, an Alexander or a\nC\u00e6sar, a feudal Europe overthrown by a series of revolutions, that on\nthe 1st of November 1517 the theses of Luther were fixed to the door of\nthe church at Wittemberg, or that the Bastile was taken by the people\nof Paris on the 14th of July 1789.\n\n\"What proof hast thou of all this?\" asks the sophist, ironically.\nHumanity replies: \"I remember it.\"\n\n[Sidenote: _Philosophy as perfect science. The so-called natural\nsciences, and their limits._]\n\nThe world of what has happened, of the concrete, of historical fact,\nis the world called real, natural, including in this definition both\nthe reality called physical and that called spiritual and human. All\nthis world is intuition; historical intuition, if it be shown as it\nrealistically is; imaginary or artistic intuition in the narrow sense,\nif presented in the aspect of the possible, that is to say, of the\nimaginable.\n\nScience, true science, which is not intuition but concept, not\nindividuality but universality, cannot be anything but science of the\nspirit, that is, of what reality has of universal: Philosophy. If\nnatural _sciences_ be spoken of, apart from philosophy, we must observe\nthat these are not perfect sciences: they are aggregates of cognitions,\narbitrarily abstracted and fixed. The so-called natural sciences\nindeed themselves recognize that they are surrounded by limitations,\nand these limitations are nothing but historical and intuitive data.\nThey calculate, measure, establish equalities and uniformities,\ncreate classes and types, formulate laws, show in their own way how\none fact arises out of other facts; but while doing this they are\nconstantly running into facts known intuitively and historically.\nEven geometry now states that it rests altogether on hypotheses,\nsince threedimensional or Euclidean space is but one of the possible\nspaces, selected for purposes of study because more convenient. What\nis true in the natural sciences is either philosophy or historical\nfact. What of properly naturalistic they contain, is abstraction and\ncaprice. When the natural sciences wish to become perfect sciences,\nthey must leave their circle and enter philosophy. They do this when\nthey posit concepts which are anything but naturalistic, such as those\nof the unextended atom, of ether or vibration, of vital force, of\nnon-intuitional space, and the like. These are true and proper attempts\nat philosophy, when they are not mere words void of meaning. The\nconcepts of natural science are, without doubt, most useful; but one\ncannot obtain from them that _system_ which belongs only to the spirit.\n\nThese historical and intuitive data which cannot be eliminated from the\nnatural sciences furthermore explain not only how, with the advance\nof knowledge, what was once believed to be true sinks gradually to\nthe level of mythological belief and fantastic illusion, but also how\namong natural scientists some are to be found who call everything in\ntheir sciences upon which reasoning is founded _mythical facts, verbal\nexpedients,_ or _conventions._ Natural scientists and mathematicians\nwho approach the study of the energies of the spirit without\npreparation, are apt to carry thither such mental habits and to speak\nin philosophy of such and such conventions as \"decreed by man.\" They\nmake conventions of truth and morality, and a supreme convention of\nthe Spirit itself! But if there are to be conventions, something must\nexist which is no convention, but is itself the author of conventions.\nThis is the spiritual activity of man. The limitation of the natural\nsciences postulates the illimitability of philosophy.\n\n[Sidenote: _The phenomenon and the noumenon._]\n\nThese explications have firmly established that the pure or fundamental\nforms of knowledge are two: the intuition and the concept--Art, and\nScience or Philosophy. With these are to be included History, which\nis, as it were, the product of intuition placed in contact with the\nconcept, that is, of art receiving in itself philosophic distinctions,\nwhile remaining concrete and individual. All other forms (natural\nsciences and mathematics) are impure, being mingled with extraneous\nelements of practical origin. Intuition gives us the world, the\nphenomenon; the concept gives us the noumenon, the Spirit.\n\n\n\n\nIV\n\n\nHISTORICISM AND INTELLECTUALISM IN \u00c6STHETIC\n\n\nThese relations between intuitive or \u00e6sthetic knowledge and the other\nfundamental or derivative forms of knowledge having been definitely\nestablished, we are now in a position to reveal the errors of a series\nof theories which have been, or are, presented as theories of \u00c6sthetic.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of probability and of naturalism._]\n\nFrom the confusion between the demands of art in general and the\nparticular demands of history has resulted the theory (which has lost\nground to-day, but was once dominant) of the _probable_ as the object\nof art. As is generally the case with erroneous propositions, the\nmeaning of those who employed and employ the concept of probability\nhas no doubt often been much more reasonable than their definition\nof the word. By probability used really to be meant the artistic\n_coherence_ of the representation, that is to say, its completeness\nand effectiveness, its actual presence. If \"probable\" be translated\n\"coherent,\" a very just meaning will often be found in the discussions,\nexamples, and judgements of the critics who employ this word. An\nimprobable personage, an improbable ending to a comedy, are really\nbadly-drawn personages, badly-arranged endings, happenings without\nartistic motive. It has been said with reason that even fairies and\nsprites must have probability, that is to say, be really sprites and\nfairies, coherent artistic intuitions. Sometimes the word \"possible\"\nhas been used instead of \"probable.\" As we have already remarked in\npassing, this word possible is synonymous with the imaginable or\nintuitible. Everything truly, that is to say coherently, imagined, is\npossible. But also, by a good many critics and theorists, the probable\nwas taken to mean the historically credible, or that historical truth\nwhich is not demonstrable but conjecturable, not true but probable.\nThis was the character which these theorists sought to impose upon art.\nWho does not remember how great a part was played in literary history\nby criticism based on probability, for example, censure of _Jerusalem\nDelivered,_ based upon the history of the Crusades, or of the Homeric\npoems, upon the probable customs of emperors and kings? Sometimes too\nthe \u00e6sthetic reproduction of historical reality has been imposed upon\nart. This is another of the erroneous forms taken by the theory of the\n_imitation of nature._ Verism and naturalism also have afforded the\nspectacle of a confusion of the \u00e6sthetic fact with the processes of the\nnatural sciences, by aiming at some sort of _experimental_ drama or\nromance.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of ideas in art, of theses in art and of the\ntypical._]\n\nConfusions between the methods of art and those of the philosophic\nsciences have been far more frequent. Thus it has often been held to\nbe the task of art to expound concepts, to unite an intelligible with\na sensible, to represent _ideas_ or _universals_; putting art in the\nplace of science, that is, confusing the artistic function in general\nwith the particular case in which it becomes \u00e6sthetico-logical.\n\nThe theory of art as supporting _theses,_ of art considered as an\nindividual representation exemplifying scientific laws, can be proved\nfalse in like manner. The example, as example, stands for the thing\nexemplified, and is thus an exposition of the universal, that is to\nsay, a form of science, more or less popular or vulgarizing.\n\nThe same may be said of the \u00e6sthetic theory of the _typical,_ when\nby type is understood, as it frequently is, the abstraction or the\nconcept, and it is affirmed that art should make the _species_ shine\nin the _individual._ If individual be here understood by typical, we\nhave here too a merely verbal variation. To typify would signify, in\nthis case, to characterize; that is, to determine and to represent\nthe individual. Don Quixote is a type; but of what is he a type, save\nof all Don Quixotes? A type, so to speak, of himself. Certainly he\nis not a type of abstract concepts, such as the loss of the sense of\nreality, or of the love of glory. An infinite number of personages\ncan be thought of under these concepts, who are not Don Quixotes. In\nother words, we find our own impressions fully determined and realized\nin the expression of a poet (for example in a poetical personage). We\ncall that expression typical, which we might call simply \u00e6sthetic. Thus\npoetical or artistic universals have sometimes been spoken of, only to\nshow that the artistic product is altogether spiritual and ideal.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of the symbol and of the allegory._]\n\nContinuing to correct these errors, or to clear up misunderstandings,\nwe shall also remark that the _symbol_ has sometimes been given as the\nessence of art. Now, if the symbol be conceived as inseparable from the\nartistic intuition, it is a synonym for the intuition itself, which\nalways has an ideal character. There is no double bottom to art, but\none only; in art all is symbolical, because all is ideal. But if the\nsymbol be conceived as separable--if the symbol can be on one side,\nand on the other the thing symbolized, we fall back again into the\nintellectualist error: the so-called symbol is the exposition of an\nabstract concept, an _allegory_; it is science, or art aping science.\nBut we must also be just toward the allegorical. Sometimes it is\naltogether harmless. Given the _Gerusalemme liberata,_ the allegory\nwas imagined afterwards; given the _A done_ of Marino, the poet of\nthe lascivious afterwards insinuated that it was written to show how\n\"immoderate indulgence ends in pain\"; given a statue of a beautiful\nwoman, the sculptor can attach a label to the statue saying that\nit represents _Clemency_ or _Goodness._ This allegory that arrives\nattached to a finished work _post festum_ does not change the work of\nart. What then is it? It is an expression externally _added_ to another\nexpression. A little page of prose is added to the _Gerusalemme,_\nexpressing another thought of the poet; a verse or a strophe is added\nto the _Adone,_ expressing what the poet would like to make a part\nof his public believe; to the statue nothing but the single word:\n_Clemency_ or _Goodness._\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of the theory of artistic and literary kinds._]\n\nBut the greatest triumph of the intellectualist error lies in the\ntheory of artistic and literary kinds, which still has vogue in\nliterary treatises and disturbs the critics and the historians of art.\nLet us observe its genesis.\n\nThe human mind can pass from the \u00e6sthetic to the logical, just because\nthe former is a first step in respect to the latter. It can destroy\nexpression, that is, the thought of the individual, by thinking of the\nuniversal. It can gather up expressive facts into logical relations.\nWe have already shown that this operation becomes in its turn concrete\nin an expression, but this does not mean that the first expressions\nhave not been destroyed. They have yielded their place to the new\n\u00e6sthetico-logical expressions. When we are on the second step, we have\nleft the first.\n\nOne who enters a picture-gallery, or who reads a series of poems,\nhaving looked and read, may go further: he may seek out the nature and\nthe relations of the things there expressed. Thus those pictures and\ncompositions, each of which is an individual inexpressible in logical\nterms, are gradually resolved into universals and abstractions, such\nas _costumes, landscapes, portraits, domestic life, battles, animals,\nflowers, fruit, seascapes, lakes, deserts; tragic, comic, pathetic,\ncruel, lyrical, epic, dramatic, chivalrous, idyllic facts,_ and the\nlike. They are often also resolved into merely quantitative categories,\nsuch as _miniature, picture, statuette, group, madrigal, ballad,\nsonnet, sonnet-sequence, poetry, poem, story, romance,_ and the like.\n\nWhen we think the concept _domestic life,_ or _chivalry,_ or _idyll,_\nor _cruelty,_ or one of the quantitative concepts mentioned above, the\nindividual expressive fact from which we started has been abandoned.\nFrom \u00e6sthetes that we were, we have changed into logicians; from\ncontemplators of expression, into reasoners. Certainly no objection\ncan be made to such a process. In what other way could science arise,\nwhich, if it have \u00e6sthetic expressions presupposed in it, must yet go\nbeyond them in order to fulfil its function? The logical or scientific\nform, as such, excludes the \u00e6sthetic form. He who begins to think\nscientifically has already ceased to contemplate \u00e6sthetically; although\nhis thought assumes of necessity in its turn an \u00e6sthetic form, as has\nalready been said, and as it would be superfluous to repeat.\n\nError begins when we try to deduce the expression from the concept, and\nto find in what takes its place the laws of the thing whose place is\ntaken; when the difference between the second and the first step has\nnot been observed, and when, in consequence, we declare that we are\nstanding on the first step, when we are really standing on the second.\nThis error is known as the _theory of artistic and literary kinds._\n\n\"What is the _\u00e6sthetic_ form of domestic life, of chivalry, of\nthe idyll, of cruelty, and so forth? How should these contents be\n_represented_?\" Such is the absurd problem implied in the theory of\nartistic and literary classes, when it has been shorn of excrescences\nand reduced to a simple formula. It is in this that consists all\nsearch after laws or rules of classes. Domestic life, chivalry, idyll,\ncruelty and the like, are not impressions, but concepts. They are not\ncontents, but logical-\u00e6sthetic forms. You cannot express the form,\nfor it is already itself expression. For what are the words cruelty,\nidyll, chivalry, domestic life, and so on, but the expression of those\nconcepts?\n\nEven the most refined of such distinctions, which possess the most\nphilosophic appearance, do not resist criticism; as when works of art\nare divided into subjective and objective kinds, into lyric and epic,\ninto works of feeling and decorative works. In \u00e6sthetic analysis it is\nimpossible to separate subjective from objective, lyric from epic, the\nimage of feeling from that of things.\n\n[Sidenote: _Errors derived from this theory in judgements on art._]\n\nFrom the theory of artistic and literary kinds derive those erroneous\nmodes of judgement and of criticism, thanks to which, instead of asking\nbefore a work of art if it be expressive and what it expresses, whether\nit speak or stammer or is altogether silent, they ask if it obey the\n_laws_ of epic or of tragedy, of historical painting or of landscape.\nWhile making a verbal pretence of agreeing, or yielding a feigned\nobedience, artists have, however, really always disregarded these _laws\nof the kinds._ Every true work of art has violated some established\nkind and upset the ideas of the critics, who have thus been obliged to\nbroaden the kinds, until finally even the broadened kind has proved too\nnarrow, owing to the appearance of new works of art, naturally followed\nby new scandals, new upsettings and--new broadenings.\n\nTo the same theory are due the prejudices, owing to which at one time\n(is it really passed?) people used to lament that Italy had no tragedy\n(until one arose who bestowed such a wreath, which alone of adornments\nwas wanting to her glorious locks), nor France the epic poem (until the\n_Henriade,_ which slaked the thirsty throats of the critics). Eulogies\naccorded to the inventors of new kinds are connected with these\nprejudices, so much so, that in the seventeenth century the invention\nof the _mock-heroic_ poem seemed an important event, and the honour of\nit was disputed, as though it were the discovery of America. But the\nworks adorned with this name (the _Secchia rapita_ and the _Scherno\ndegli Dei_) were still-born, because their authors (a slight drawback)\nhad nothing new or original to say. Mediocrities racked their brains to\ninvent new kinds artificially. The _piscatorial_ eclogue was added to\nthe _pastoral,_ and finally the _military_ eclogue. The _Aminta_ was\ndipped and became the _Alceo._ Finally, there have been historians of\nart and literature, so much fascinated with these ideas of kinds, that\nthey claimed to write the history, not of individual and real literary\nand artistic works, but of those empty phantoms, their kinds. They have\nclaimed to portray, not the evolution of the _artistic spirit,_ but the\n_evolution of kinds._\n\nThe philosophical condemnation of artistic and literary kinds is found\nin the formulation and demonstration of what artistic activity has\nalways done and good taste always recognized. What are we to do if good\ntaste and the real fact, when reduced to formulas, sometimes assume\nthe air of paradoxes?\n\n[Sidenote: _Empirical sense of the divisions of kinds._]\n\nIt is not scientifically incorrect to talk of tragedies, comedies,\ndramas, romances, pictures of everyday life, battle-pieces, landscapes,\nseascapes, poems, versicles, lyrics, and the like, if it be only with\na view to be understood, and to draw attention to certain groups\nof works, in general and approximately, to which, for one reason\nor another, it is desired to draw attention. To employ _words_ and\n_phrases_ is not to establish _laws_ and _definitions._ The mistake\nonly arises when the weight of a scientific definition is given to a\nword, when we ingenuously let ourselves be caught in the meshes of\nthat phraseology. Pray permit me a comparison. The books in a library\nmust be arranged in one way or another. This used generally to be done\nby a rough classification of subjects (among which the categories of\nmiscellaneous and eccentric were not wanting); they are now generally\narranged by sizes or by publishers. Who can deny the necessity and\nthe utility of such arrangements? But what should we say if some one\nbegan seriously to seek out the literary laws of miscellanies and of\neccentricities, of the Aldines or Bodonis, of shelf A or shelf B,\nthat is to say, of those altogether arbitrary groupings whose sole\nobject was their practical utility. Yet should any one attempt such\nan undertaking, he would be doing neither more nor less than those do\nwho seek out the _\u00e6sthetic laws_ which must in their belief control\nliterary and artistic kinds.\n\n\n\n\nV\n\n\nANALOGOUS ERRORS IN THE THEORY OF HISTORY AND IN LOGIC\n\n\nThe better to confirm these criticisms, it will be useful to cast a\nrapid glance over analogous and opposite errors, due to ignorance as\nto the true nature of art and its relation to history and to science.\nThese errors have injured alike the theory of history and that of\nscience, Historic (or Historiology) and Logic.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of the philosophy of history._]\n\nHistorical intellectualism has opened the way to the many attempts,\nmade especially during the last two centuries and continued to-day, to\ndiscover _a philosophy of history,_ an _ideal history,_ a _sociology,_\na _historical psychology,_ or whatever else a science may be called,\nwhose object is to extract from history concepts and universal laws.\nWhat must these laws, these universals be? Historical laws and\nhistorical concepts? In that case, an elementary acquaintance with\nthe theory of knowledge suffices to make clear the absurdity of the\nattempt. When such expressions as a _historical law,_ a _historical\nconcept_ are not simply metaphors colloquially employed, they are truly\ncontradictory terms: the adjective is as unsuitable to the substantive\nas in the expressions \"qualitative quantity\" or \"pluralistic monism.\"\nHistory implies concreteness and individuality, law and concept\nmean abstractness and universality. But if the attempt to extract\n_historical_ laws and concepts from history be abandoned, and it be\nmerely desired to draw from it laws and concepts, the attempt is\ncertainly not frivolous; but the science thus obtained will be, not\na philosophy of history, but rather, according to circumstances,\neither philosophy in its various forms of Ethics, Logic, etc., or\nempirical science with its infinite divisions and subdivisions. The\nsearch is in fact either for those philosophical concepts which, as\nalready remarked, are the basis of every historical construction and\ndifferentiate perception from intuition, historical intuition from pure\nintuition, history from art; or already formed historical intuitions\nare collected and arranged in types and classes, which is exactly the\nmethod of the natural sciences. Great thinkers have sometimes donned\nthe ill-fitting cloak of the philosophy of history, and notwithstanding\nthe covering, they have attained philosophical truths of the greatest\nmagnitude. The cloak discarded, the truth has remained. Modern\nsociologists are rather to be blamed, not so much for the illusion\nin which they are involved when they talk of an impossible science\nof sociology, as for the infecundity which almost always accompanies\ntheir illusion. It matters little that \u00c6sthetic should be called\n\"sociological \u00c6sthetic,\" or Logic, \"sociological Logic.\" The grave evil\nis that such \u00c6sthetic is an old-fashioned expression of sensationalism,\nsuch Logic verbal and incoherent. The philosophical movement to which\nwe have referred has however borne two good fruits in relation to\nhistory. First of all, a keener desire has arisen for a theory of\nhistory, that is, a theory of the nature and the limits of history, a\ntheory which, in conformity with the analysis made above, cannot obtain\nsatisfaction save in a general science of intuition, in an \u00c6sthetic, in\nwhich the theory of history would form a special chapter, distinguished\nby the insertion of universal functions. Furthermore, concrete truths\nrelating to historical events have often been expressed beneath the\nfalse and presumptuous cloak of a philosophy of history; rules and\nwarnings have been formulated, empirical no doubt, yet by no means\nuseless to students and critics. It does not seem possible to deny this\nutility even to the most recent of philosophies of history, known as\nhistorical materialism, which has thrown a very vivid light upon many\nsides of social life formerly neglected or ill understood.\n\n[Sidenote: _\u00c6sthetic intrusions into Logic._]\n\nThe principle of authority, of the _ipse dixit_, is an intrusion\nby historicity into the domains of science and philosophy which\nhas dominated the schools and substitutes for introspection\nand philosophical analysis this or that evidence, document, or\nauthoritative statement, with which history certainly cannot dispense.\nBut Logic, the science of thought and of intellectual knowledge, has\nsuffered the most grave and destructive of all disturbances and errors\nthrough an imperfect understanding of the \u00e6sthetic fact. How could it\nbe otherwise, if logical activity come after and contain in itself\n\u00e6sthetic activity? An inexact \u00c6sthetic must of necessity drag after it\nan inexact Logic.\n\nWhoever opens a logical treatise, from the _Organon_ of Aristotle\nto the modern works on the subject, must agree that all contain a\nhaphazard mixture of verbal facts and facts of thought, of grammatical\nforms and of conceptual forms, of \u00c6sthetic and of Logic. Not that\nattempts have been wanting to escape from verbal expression and to\nseize thought in its true nature. Aristotelian logic itself did not\nbecome mere syllogistic and verbalism without some hesitation and\nindecision. The problem proper to logic was often touched upon in\ntheir disputes by the nominalists, realists and conceptualists of the\nMiddle Ages. With Galileo and with Bacon, the natural sciences gave an\nhonourable place to induction. Vico combated formalist and mathematical\nlogic in favour of inventive methods. Kant called attention to the _a\npriori_ synthesis. Absolute idealism despised the Aristotelian Logic.\nThe followers of Herbart, though still loyal to Aristotle, emphasized\nthose judgements which they called narrative and which have a character\naltogether differing from that of other logical judgements. Finally,\nthe linguists insisted upon the irrationality of the word, in relation\nto the concept. But a conscious, sure and radical movement of reform\ncan find no basis or point of departure, save in the science of\n\u00c6sthetic.\n\n[Sidenote: _Logic in its essence._]\n\nIn a Logic suitably reformed on this basis, this truth must first and\nforemost be proclaimed, and all its consequences deduced: the logical\nfact, _the only logical fact,_ is _the concept,_ the universal, the\nspirit that forms, and in so far as it forms, the universal. And if\nby induction be understood, as sometimes it has been, the formation\nof universals, and by deduction their verbal development, then it is\nclear that true Logic can be nothing but inductive Logic. But since by\nthe word \"deduction\" has been more frequently understood the special\nprocesses of mathematics, and the word \"induction\" those of the natural\nsciences, it will be best to avoid both words and say that true Logic\nis Logic of the concept. The Logic of the concept, while employing\na method which is both induction and deduction, will employ neither\nexclusively, that is, it will employ the speculative method which is\nintrinsic to it.\n\nThe concept, the universal, considered abstractly in itself, is\n_inexpressible._ No word is proper to it. So true is this, that the\nlogical concept remains always the same, notwithstanding the variation\nof verbal forms. In respect to the concept, expression is a simple\n_sign_ or _indication._ There must be an expression, it cannot be\nabsent; but what it is to be, this or that, is determined by the\nhistorical and psychological conditions of the individual who is\nspeaking. The quality of the expression is not deducible from the\nnature of the concept. There does not exist a true (logical) sense of\nwords. The true sense of words is that which is conferred upon them on\neach occasion by the person forming a concept.\n\n[Sidenote: _Distinction between logical and non-logical judgements._]\n\nThis being so, the only truly logical (that is, \u00e6sthetico-logical)\npropositions, the only rigorously logical judgements, must be those\nwhose proper and sole content is the determination of a concept. These\npropositions or judgements are _definitions._ Science itself is nothing\nbut a collection of definitions, unified in a supreme definition; a\nsystem of concepts, or highest concept.\n\nIt is therefore necessary (at least as a preliminary) to exclude\nfrom Logic all those propositions which do not affirm universals.\nNarrative judgements, not less than those termed non-enunciative by\nAristotle, such as the expression of desires, are not properly logical\njudgements. They are either purely \u00e6sthetic propositions or historical\npropositions. \"Peter is passing; it is raining to-day; I am sleepy; I\nwant to read\": these and an infinity of propositions of the same kind\nare nothing but either a mere enclosing in words the impression of\nthe fact that Peter is passing, of the falling rain, of my organism\ninclining to sleep, and of my will directed to reading, or an\nexistential affirmation concerning those facts. They are expressions of\nthe real or of the unreal, historical-imaginative or pure-imaginative;\nthey are certainly not definitions of universals.\n\n[Sidenote: _Syllogistic._]\n\nThis exclusion cannot meet with great difficulties. It is already\nalmost an accomplished fact, and the only thing required is to render\nit explicit, decisive and coherent. But what is to be done with\nall that part of human thought called _syllogistic,_ consisting of\njudgements and reasonings based upon concepts? What is syllogistic?\nIs it to be looked down upon with contempt, as something useless, as\nhas so often been done by the humanists in their reaction against\nscholasticism, by absolute idealism, by the enthusiastic admiration of\nour times for the methods of observation and experiment of the natural\nsciences?--Syllogistic, reasonings _forma,_ is not the discovery of\ntruth; it is the art of expounding, debating, disputing with oneself\nand others. Proceeding from concepts already formed, from facts already\nobserved, and appealing to the persistence of the true or of thought\n(such is the meaning of the laws of identity and contradiction), it\ninfers consequences from those data, that is, it re-states what has\nalready been discovered. Therefore, if it be an _idem per idem_ from\nthe point of view of invention, it is most efficacious in teaching and\nin exposition. To reduce affirmations to a syllogistic form is a way of\ncontrolling one's own thought and of criticizing the thought of others.\nIt is easy to laugh at syllogizers, but, if syllogistic has been born\nand persists, it must have good reasons of its own. Satire on it can\nconcern only its abuses, such as the attempt to prove syllogistically\nquestions of fact, observation and intuition, or the neglect of\nprofound meditation and unprejudiced investigation of problems, in\nfavour of syllogistic externality. And if so-called _mathematical\nLogic_ can sometimes aid us in our attempt to remember with ease,\nrapidly to control the results of our own thought, let us welcome this\nform of syllogistic also, anticipated by Leibnitz among others and\nagain attempted by some in our own days.\n\nBut precisely because syllogistic is the art of exposition and debate,\nits theory cannot hold the first place in a philosophical Logic, thus\nusurping that belonging to the doctrine of the concept, which is\nthe central and dominating doctrine, to which everything logical in\nsyllogistic is reducible, without leaving a residuum (relations of\nconcepts, subordination, co-ordination, identification and so on). Nor\nmust it ever be forgotten that concept and (logical) judgement and\nsyllogism are not in the same line. The first alone is the logical\nfact, the second and third are the forms in which the first manifests\nitself. These, in so far as they are forms, can only be examined\n\u00e6sthetically (grammatically), and in so far as they possess logical\ncontent, only by ignoring the forms themselves and passing to the\ndoctrine of the concept.\n\n[Sidenote: _Logical falsehood and \u00e6sthetic truth._]\n\nThis confirms the truth of the ordinary remark to the effect that\nhe who reasons ill, also speaks and writes ill, that exact logical\nanalysis is the basis of good expression. This truth is a tautology,\nfor to reason well is in fact to express oneself well, because the\nexpression is the intuitive possession of one's own logical thought.\nThe principle of contradiction itself is at bottom nothing but\nthe \u00e6sthetic principle of coherence. It may be maintained that it\nis possible to write and to speak exceedingly well, as it is also\npossible to reason well though starting from erroneous concepts; that\nsome, though lacking the acuteness that makes a great discoverer,\nare nevertheless exceedingly lucid writers; because to write well\ndepends upon having a clear intuition of one's own thought, even if\nit be erroneous; not of its scientific, but of its \u00e6sthetic truth,\nwhich indeed is the same thing as writing well. A philosopher like\nSchopenhauer can imagine that art is a representation of the Platonic\nideas. This doctrine is scientifically false, yet he may develop this\nfalse knowledge in excellent prose, \u00e6sthetically most true. But we\nhave already replied to these objections, when observing that at that\nprecise point where a speaker or a writer enunciates an ill-thought\nconcept, he is at the same time a bad speaker and a bad writer,\nalthough he may afterwards recover himself in the many other parts\nof his thought which contain true propositions not connected with\nthe preceding error, and therefore lucid expressions following upon\nconfused expressions.\n\n[Sidenote: _Reformed logic._]\n\nAll researches as to the forms of judgements and of syllogisms, their\nconversions and their various relations, which still encumber treatises\non Logic, are therefore destined to diminish, to be transformed, to be\nconverted into something else. The doctrine of the concept and of the\norganism of concepts, of definition, of system, of philosophy and the\nvarious sciences, and the like, will occupy the field and alone will\nconstitute true and proper Logic.\n\nThose who first had some suspicion of the intimate connexion between\n\u00c6sthetic and Logic and conceived \u00c6sthetic as a _Logic of sensible\nknowledge_ were peculiarly addicted to applying logical categories to\nthe new knowledge, talking of _\u00e6sthetic concepts, \u00e6sthetic judgements,\n\u00e6sthetic syllogisms,_ and so on. We who are less superstitious as\nregards the permanence of the traditional Logic of the schools,\nand better informed as to the nature of \u00c6sthetic, do not recommend\nthe application of Logic to \u00c6sthetic, but the liberation of Logic\nfrom \u00e6sthetic forms. These have given rise to non-existent forms or\ncategories of Logic, due to the adoption of altogether arbitrary and\nill-considered distinctions.\n\nLogic thus reformed will still be _formal_ Logic; it will study the\ntrue form or activity of thought, the concept, excluding individual\nand particular concepts. The old Logic is ill called formal; it would\nbe better to call it _verbal_ or _formalistic._ Formal Logic will drive\nout formalistic Logic. To attain this object, it will not be necessary\nto have recourse, as some have done, to a real or material Logic,\nwhich is no longer a science of thought, but thought itself in action;\nnot only a Logic, but the whole of Philosophy, in which Logic is also\nincluded. The science of thought (Logic) is that of the concept, as\nthat of imagination (\u00c6sthetic) is that of expression. The well-being\nof both sciences lies in exactly carrying out in every particular the\ndistinction between the two domains.\n\n_Note to the Fourth Italian Edition._--The observations contained in\nthis chapter on Logic, which are not all of them clear or accurate,\nshould be clarified and corrected by means of the further treatment\nof the theme in the second volume of the _Philosophy of the Spirit,_\ndedicated to Logic, where the distinction between logical and\nhistorical propositions is again examined and their synthetic unity\ndemonstrated.\n\n\n\n\nVI\n\n\nTHE THEORETIC ACTIVITY AND THE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY\n\n\nThe intuitive and intellectual forms contain between them, as we have\nsaid, the whole theoretic domain of the spirit. But it is not possible\nto know them thoroughly, nor to criticize another series of erroneous\n\u00e6sthetic theories, without first establishing clearly the relations of\nthe theoretic spirit with the _practical_ spirit.\n\n[Sidenote: _The will._]\n\nThe practical form or activity is the _will._ We do not here employ\nthis word in the sense of some philosophical systems, where the will\nis the foundation of the universe, the ground of things and the true\nreality. Nor do we employ it in the wide sense of other systems,\nwhich understand by will the energy of the spirit, spirit or activity\nin general, making of every act of the human spirit an act of will.\nNeither such metaphysical nor such metaphorical meaning is ours. For\nus, the will is, as generally understood, that activity of the spirit\nwhich differs from the merely theoretical contemplation of things,\nand is productive, not of knowledge, but of actions. Action is really\naction, in so far as it is voluntary. It is not necessary to remark\nthat in the will to do, we include, in the scientific sense, also what\nis usually called not-doing: the will to resist, to reject, the will of\na Prometheus, which also is action.\n\n[Sidenote: _The will as an ulterior stage in respect to knowledge._]\n\nMan understands things with the theoretical form, with the practical\nform he changes them; with the one he appropriates the universe, with\nthe other he creates it. But the first form is the basis of the second;\nand the relation of _double degree,_ which we have already found\nexisting between \u00e6sthetic and logical activity, is repeated between\nthese two on a larger scale. A knowing independent of the will is\nthinkable, at least in a certain sense; will independent of knowing is\nunthinkable. Blind will is not will; true will has eyes.\n\nHow can we will, without having before us historical intuitions\n(perceptions) of objects, and knowledge of (logical) relations, which\nenlightens us as to the nature of those objects? How can we really\nwill, if we do not know the world which surrounds us or how to change\nthings by acting upon them?\n\n[Sidenote: _Objections and explanations._]\n\nIt has been objected that men of action, practical men _par\nexcellence,_ are the least disposed to contemplate and to theorize:\ntheir energy is not delayed in contemplation, it rushes at once into\nwill. And conversely, that contemplative men, philosophers, are\noften very mediocre in practical matters, weak willed, and therefore\nneglected and thrust aside in the tumult of life. It is easy to\nsee that these distinctions are merely empirical and quantitative.\nCertainly, the practical man has no need of a philosophical system in\norder to act, but in the spheres where he does act, he starts from\nintuitions and concepts which are perfectly clear to him. Otherwise the\nmost ordinary actions could not be willed. It would not be possible\nto will to feed oneself, for instance, without knowledge of the food,\nand of the link of cause and effect between certain movements and\ncertain satisfactions. Rising gradually to the more complex forms\nof action, for example to the political, how could we will anything\npolitically good or bad without knowing the real conditions of society,\nand consequently the means and expedients to be adopted? When the\npractical man feels himself in the dark about one or more of these\npoints, or when he is seized with doubt, action either does not begin\nor stops. It is then that the theoretical moment, which in the rapid\nsuccession of human actions is hardly noticed and rapidly forgotten,\nbecomes important and occupies consciousness for a longer time. And\nif this moment be prolonged, then the practical man may become a\nHamlet, divided between desire for action and his deficient theoretical\nclarity as regards the situation and the means to be employed. And if\nhe develop a taste for contemplation and discovery, and leave willing\nand acting, to a greater or less extent, to others, there is formed in\nhim the calm disposition of the artist, of the man of science, or of\nthe philosopher, who in practice are sometimes incompetent or downright\nimmoral. These observations are all obvious. Their exactitude cannot be\ndenied. Let us, however, repeat that they are founded on quantitative\ndistinctions and do not disprove but confirm the fact that an action,\nhowever slight it be, cannot really be an action, that is, an action\nthat is willed, unless it be preceded by the cognitive activity.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of practical judgements or judgements of value._]\n\nSome psychologists, on the other hand, place before practical action\nan altogether special class of judgements, which they call _practical_\njudgements or _judgements of value._ They say that in order to resolve\non performing an action there must have been a judgement to the\neffect: \"this action is useful, this action is good.\" And at first\nsight this seems to have the testimony of consciousness on its side.\nBut closer observation and analysis of greater subtlety reveal that\nsuch judgements follow instead of preceding the affirmation of the\nwill, and are nothing but the expression of the volition already\nexercised. A good or useful action is an action willed. It will always\nbe impossible to distil a single drop of usefulness or goodness from\nthe objective study of things. We do not desire things because we know\nthem to be good or useful; but we know them to be good and useful,\nbecause we desire them. Here too, the rapidity with which the facts\nof consciousness follow one another has given rise to an illusion.\nPractical action is preceded by knowledge, but not by practical\nknowledge, or rather, knowledge of the practical: to obtain this, we\nmust first have practical action. The third moment, therefore, of\npractical judgements, or judgements of value, is altogether imaginary.\nIt does not come between the two moments or degrees of theory and\npractice. For the rest, normative sciences in general, which regulate\nor command, discover and indicate values to the practical activity,\ndo not exist; indeed none exist for any sort of activity, since every\nscience presupposes that activity to be already realized and developed,\nwhich it afterwards takes as its object.\n\n[Sidenote: _Exclusion of the practical from the \u00e6sthetic._]\n\nThese distinctions established, we must condemn as erroneous every\ntheory which annexes the \u00e6sthetic activity to the practical, or\nintroduces the laws of the second into the first. That science is\ntheory and art practice has been many times affirmed. Those who make\nthis statement, and look upon the \u00e6sthetic fact as a practical fact,\ndo not do so capriciously or because they are groping in the void; but\nbecause they have their eye on something which is really practical. But\nthe practical which they aim is not \u00c6sthetic, nor within \u00c6sthetic; it\nis _outside and beside it_; and although often found united, they are\nnot united necessarily or by the bond of identity of nature.\n\nThe \u00e6sthetic fact is altogether completed in the expressive elaboration\nof impressions. When we have achieved the word within us, conceived\ndefinitely and vividly a figure or a statue, or found a musical motive,\nexpression is born and is complete; there is no need for anything else.\nIf after this we should open our mouths-_will_ to open them to speak,\nor our throats to sing, that is to say, utter by word of mouth and\naudible melody what we have completely said or sung to ourselves; or\nif we should stretch out_--will_ to stretch out our hands to touch the\nnotes of the piano, or to take up the brush and chisel, thus making\non a large scale movements which we have already made in little and\nrapidly, in a material in which we leave more or less durable traces;\nthis is all an addition, a fact which obeys quite different laws from\nthe former, with which we are not concerned for the moment, although\nwe recognize henceforth that this second movement is a production\nof things, a _practical_ fact, or fact of _will_. It is usual to\ndistinguish the internal from the external work of art: the terminology\nseems to us infelicitous, for the work of art (the \u00e6sthetic work) is\nalways _internal_; and what is called _external_ is no longer a work of\nart. Others distinguish between _\u00e6sthetic_ fact and _artistic_ fact,\nmeaning by the second the external or practical stage, which may follow\nand generally does follow the first. But in this case, it is simply a\nquestion of a linguistic usage, doubtless permissible, though perhaps\nnot advisable.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of the theory of the end of art and of the choice\nof content._]\n\nFor the same reasons the search for the _end of art_ is ridiculous,\nwhen it is understood of art as art. And since to fix an end is to\nchoose, the theory that the content of art must be _selected_ is\nanother form of the same error. A selection among impressions and\nsensations implies that these are already expressions, otherwise how\ncould a selection be made among the continuous and indistinct? To\nchoose is to will: to will this and not to will that: and this and that\nmust be before us, expressed. Practice follows, it does not precede\ntheory; expression is free inspiration.\n\nThe true artist, in fact, finds himself big with his theme, he knows\nnot how; he feels the moment of birth drawing near, but he cannot will\nit or not will it. If he were to wish to act in opposition to his\ninspiration, to make an arbitrary choice, if, born Anacreon, he should\nwish to sing of Atreus and of Alcides, his lyre would warn him of\nhis mistake, sounding only of Venus and of Love, notwithstanding his\nefforts to the contrary.\n\n[Sidenote: _Practical innocence of art._]\n\nThe theme or content cannot, therefore, be practically or morally\ncharged with epithets of praise or blame. When critics of art remark\nthat a theme is _badly selected,_ in cases where that observation has\na just foundation, it is a question of blaming, not the selection of\nthe theme (which would be absurd), but the manner in which the artist\nhas treated it, the failure of the expression due to the contradictions\nwhich it contains. And when the same critics object to the theme or\ncontent of works which they proclaim to be artistically perfect as\nbeing unworthy of art and blameworthy; if these expressions really are\nperfect, there is nothing to be done but to advise the critics to\nleave the artists in peace, for they can only derive inspiration from\nwhat has moved their soul. They should rather direct their attention\ntowards effecting changes in surrounding nature and society, that\nsuch impressions and states of soul should not recur. If ugliness\nwere to vanish from the world, if universal virtue and felicity were\nestablished there, perhaps artists would no longer represent perverse\nor pessimistic feelings, but calm, innocent and joyous feelings,\nArcadians of a real Arcady. But so long as ugliness and turpitude\nexist in nature and impose themselves upon the artist, to prevent\nthe expression of these things also is impossible; and when it has\narisen, _factum infectum fieri nequit._ We speak thus entirely from the\n\u00e6sthetic point of view, and of pure criticism of art.\n\nWe are not concerned to estimate the damage which the criticism of\n\"choice\" does to artistic production, with the prejudices which it\nproduces or maintains among the artists themselves, and with the\nconflict to which it gives rise between artistic impulse and critical\ndemands. It is true that sometimes it seems also to do some good, by\naiding artists to discover themselves, that is, their own impressions\nand their own inspiration, and to acquire consciousness of the task\nwhich is, as it were, imposed upon them by the historical moment in\nwhich they live, and by their individual temperament. In these cases,\ncriticism of \"choice,\" while believing that it generates, merely\nrecognizes and aids the expressions which are already being formed.\nIt believes itself to be the mother, where, at most, it is only the\nmidwife.\n\n[Sidenote: _The independence of art._]\n\nThe impossibility of choice of content completes the theorem of the\n_independence of art,_ and is also the only legitimate meaning of the\nexpression: _art for art's sake._ Art is independent both of science\nand of the useful and the moral. There should be no fear lest frivolous\nor cold art should thus be justified, since what is truly frivolous\nor cold is so because it has not been raised to expression; or in\nother words, frivolity and frigidity come always from the form of the\n\u00e6sthetic treatment, from failure to grasp a content, not from the\nmaterial qualities of the content itself.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of the saying: the style is the man_]\n\nThe saying: _the style is the man_, can also not be completely\ncriticized, save by starting from the distinction between the theoretic\nand the practical, and from the theoretic character of the \u00e6sthetic\nactivity. Man is not simply knowledge and contemplation: he is will,\nwhich contains the cognitive moment in itself. Hence the saying is\neither altogether void, as when it is taken to mean that the style is\nthe man _qua_ style--is the man, that is, but only so far as he is\nexpressive activity; or it is erroneous, as when the attempt is made\nto deduce what a man has done and willed from what he has seen and\nexpressed, thereby asserting that there is a logical connexion between\nknowing and willing. Many legends in the biographies of artists have\nsprung from this erroneous identification, since it seemed impossible\nthat a man who gives expression to generous feelings should not be a\nnoble and generous man in practical life; or that the dramatist whose\nplays are full of stabbing, should not himself have done a little\nstabbing in real life. Artists protest vainly: \"_Lasciva est nobis\npagina, vita proba._\" They are merely taxed in addition with lying\nand hypocrisy. How far more prudent you were, poor women of Verona,\nwhen you founded your belief that Dante had really descended to hell\nupon his blackened countenance! Yours was at any rate a historical\nconjecture.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of the concept of sincerity in art._]\n\nFinally, _sincerity_ imposed as a duty upon the artist (a law of ethics\nalso said to be a law of \u00e6sthetic) rests upon another double meaning.\nFor by sincerity may be meant, in the first place, the moral duty not\nto deceive one's neighbour; and in that case it is foreign to the\nartist. For indeed he deceives no one, since he gives form to what\nis already in his soul. He would only deceive if he were to betray\nhis duty as an artist by failing to execute his task in its essential\nnature. If lies and deceit are in his soul, then the form which he\ngives to these things cannot be deceit or lies, precisely because it\nis \u00e6sthetic. If the artist be a charlatan, a liar, or a miscreant,\nhe purifies his other self by reflecting it in art. If by sincerity\nbe meant, in the second place, fulness and truth of expression, it is\nclear that this second sense has no relation to the ethical concept.\nThe law, called both ethical and \u00e6sthetic, reveals itself here as\nnothing but a word used both by Ethics and \u00c6sthetic.\n\n\n\n\nVII\n\n\nANALOGY BETWEEN THE THEORETIC AND THE PRACTICAL\n\n\n[Sidenote: _The two forms of the practical activity._]\n\nThe double degree of the theoretical activity, \u00e6sthetic and logical,\nhas an important parallel in the practical activity, which has not yet\nbeen placed in due relief. The practical activity is also divided into\na first and second degree, the second implying the first. The first\npractical degree is the simply _useful_ or _economical_ activity; the\nsecond the _moral_ activity.\n\nEconomy is, as it were, the \u00c6sthetic of practical life; Morality its\nLogic.\n\n[Sidenote: _The economically useful._]\n\nIf this has not been clearly seen by philosophers; if the correct\nplace in the system of the spirit has not been given to the economic\nactivity, if it has been left to wander about in the prolegomena to\ntreatises on political economy, often vague and but little developed,\nthis is due, among other reasons, to the fact that the useful or\neconomic has been confused, sometimes with the concept of the\n_technical,_ sometimes with that of the _egoistical._\n\n[Sidenote: _Distinction between the useful and the technical._]\n\n_Technique_ is certainly not a special activity of the spirit.\nTechnique is knowledge; or rather, it is knowledge itself in general\nwhich takes this name when it serves as basis, as we have seen it does,\nfor practical action. Knowledge which is not followed, or is supposed\nnot to be easily followed by practical action, is called \"pure\": the\nsame knowledge, if effectively followed by action, is called \"applied\";\nif it is supposed that it can be easily followed by a particular\naction, it is called \"applicable\" or \"technical.\" This word, then,\nindicates a _situation_ in which knowledge is, or may easily be, not a\nspecial form of knowledge. So true is this, that it would be altogether\nimpossible to establish whether a given order of knowledge were,\nintrinsically, pure or applied. All knowledge, however abstract and\nphilosophical it may be believed to be, may be a guide to practical\nacts; a theoretical error in the ultimate principles of morality may be\nreflected and always in some way is reflected in practical life. One\ncan only speak roughly and unscientifically of certain truths as pure\nand of others as applied.\n\nThe same knowledge that is called technical may also be called\n_useful._ But the word \"_useful_\" in conformity with the criticism of\njudgements of value made above, is to be understood as used here in\na verbal or metaphorical sense. When we say that water is useful for\nputting out fire, the word \"useful\" is used in a non-scientific sense.\nWater thrown on the fire is the cause of its going out: this is the\nknowledge that serves for basis to the action, let us say, of firemen.\nThere is a link, not of nature, but of simple succession, between the\nuseful action of the person who extinguishes the conflagration and that\nknowledge. The technique of the effects of the water is the theoretical\nactivity which precedes; the only useful thing is the _action_ of the\nman who extinguishes the fire.\n\n[Sidenote: _Distinction of the useful from the egoistic._]\n\nSome economists identify utility, that is to say, merely economic\naction or will, with the _egoistic,_ that is to say, with what is\nprofitable to the individual, in so far as individual, without regard\nto and indeed in complete opposition to the moral law. The egoistic is\nthe immoral. In this case Economics would be a very strange science,\nstanding not beside but opposite Ethics, like the devil facing God, or\nat least like the _advocatus diaboli_ in the processes of canonization.\nSuch a conception is altogether inadmissible: the science of immorality\nis implied in that of morality, as the science of the false is implied\nin Logic, science of the true, and a science of unsuccessful expression\nin \u00c6sthetic, science of successful expression. If, then, Economics were\nthe scientific treatment of egoism, it would be a chapter of Ethics,\nor Ethics itself; because every moral determination implies, at the\nsame time, a negation of its contrary.\n\nFurther, conscience tells us that to conduct oneself economically\nis not to conduct oneself egoistically; that even the most morally\nscrupulous man must conduct himself usefully (economically), if he\ndoes not wish to act at hazard and consequently in a manner quite the\nreverse of moral. If utility were egoism, how could it be the duty of\nthe altruist to behave like an egoist?\n\n[Sidenote: _Economic will and moral will._]\n\nIf we are not mistaken, the difficulty is solved in a manner perfectly\nanalogous to that in which is solved the problem of the relations\nbetween expression and concept, \u00c6sthetic and Logic.\n\nTo will economically is to _will an end;_ to will morally is to _will\nthe rational end._ But whoever wills and acts morally, cannot but will\nand act usefully (economically). How could he will the _rational_ end,\nunless he also willed it _as his particular end_?\n\n[Sidenote: _Pure economicity._]\n\nThe converse is not true; as it is not true in \u00e6sthetic science that\nthe expressive fact must of necessity be linked with the logical fact.\nIt is possible to will economically without willing morally; and it\nis possible to conduct oneself with perfect economic coherence, while\npursuing an end which is objectively irrational (immoral), or, rather,\nan end which would be held to be so at a higher grade of consciousness.\n\nExamples of the economic, without the moral character, are\nMachiavelli's hero C\u00e6sar Borgia, or the Iago of Shakespeare. Who can\nhelp admiring their strength of will, although their activity is only\neconomic, and is developed in opposition to what we hold moral? Who\ncan help admiring the Ser Ciappelletto of Boccaccio, who pursues and\nrealizes his ideal of the perfect rascal even on his death-bed, making\nthe petty and timid little thieves who are present at his burlesque\nconfession exclaim: \"What manner of man is this, whose perversity\nneither age, nor infirmity, nor the fear of death which he sees at\nhand, nor the fear of God before whose judgement-seat he must stand in\na little while, have been able to remove, nor to make him wish to die\notherwise than as he has lived?\"\n\n[Sidenote: _The economic side of morality._]\n\nThe moral man unites with the pertinacity and fearlessness of a C\u00e6sar\nBorgia, of an Iago, or of a Ser Ciappelletto, the good will of the\nsaint or of the hero. Or, rather, good will would not be will, and\nconsequently not good, if it did not possess, in addition to the side\nwhich makes it _good,_ also that which makes it _will._ So a logical\nthought which does not succeed in expressing itself is not thought, but\nat the most a confused presentiment of a thought beyond yet to come.\n\nIt is not correct, then, to conceive of the amoral man as also\nanti-economical, or to make of morality an element of coherence in\nthe acts of life, and therefore of economicity. Nothing prevents us\nfrom conceiving (an hypothesis which is verified at least during\ncertain periods and moments, if not during whole lifetimes) a man\naltogether without moral conscience. In a man thus organized, what\nfor us is immorality is not so for him, because it is not felt as\nsuch. The consciousness of the contradiction between what is desired\nas a rational end and what is pursued egoistically cannot arise\nin him. This contradiction is anti-economicity. Immoral conduct\nbecomes also anti-economical only in the man who possesses moral\nconscience. The moral remorse which is the indication of this, is\nalso economical remorse; that is to say, sorrow at not having known\nhow to will completely and to attain that moral ideal which was\nwilled at first, instead of allowing himself to be led astray by the\npassions. _Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor._ The _video_\nand the _probo_ are here an initial _volo_ immediately contradicted\nand overthrown. In the man without moral sense, we must admit a\nremorse that is _merely economic_; like that of a thief or of an\nassassin who, when on the point of robbing or of assassinating should\nabstain from doing so, not owing to a conversion of his being, but\nto nervousness and bewilderment, or even to a momentary awakening of\nmoral consciousness. When he has come back to himself, such a thief\nor assassin will regret and be ashamed of his incoherence; his remorse\nwill not be due to having done wrong, but to _not_ having done wrong;\nit is therefore economic, not moral, since the latter is excluded by\nhypothesis. But since a lively moral consciousness is generally found\namong the majority of men and its total absence is a rare and perhaps\nnon-existent monstrosity, it may be admitted that morality, in general,\ncoincides with economicity in the conduct of life.\n\n[Sidenote: _The merely economic and the error of the morally\nindifferent._]\n\nThere need be no fear lest the parallelism that we support should\nintroduce afresh into science the category of the _morally\nindifferent,_ of that which is in truth action and volition, but is\nneither moral nor immoral; the category in short of the _licit_ and\nof the _permissible,_ which has always been the cause or reflexion of\nethical corruption, as was the case with Jesuitical morality, which it\ndominated. It remains quite certain that indifferent moral actions do\nnot exist, because moral activity pervades and must pervade every least\nvolitional movement of man. But far from upsetting the established\nparallelism, this confirms it. Are there by any chance intuitions which\nscience and the intellect do not pervade and analyse, resolving them\ninto universal concepts, or changing them into historical affirmations?\nWe have already seen that true science, philosophy, knows no external\nlimits which bar its way, as happens with the so-called natural\nsciences. Science and morality entirely dominate, the one the \u00e6sthetic\nintuitions, the other the economic volitions of man, although neither\nof them can appear in the concrete, save the one in the intuitive, the\nother in the economic form.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of utilitarianism and the reform of Ethics and of\nEconomics._]\n\nThis combined identity and difference of the useful and the moral, of\nthe economic and the ethical, explains the success at the present time\nand formerly of the utilitarian theory of Ethics. Indeed it is easy to\ndiscover and to illustrate a utilitarian side in every moral action; as\nit is easy to reveal the \u00e6sthetic side in every logical proposition.\nThe criticism of ethical utilitarianism cannot begin by denying this\ntruth and seeking out absurd and non-existent examples of _useless_\nmoral actions. It must admit the utilitarian side and explain it as\nthe concrete form of morality, which consists in this, that it is\n_inside_ this form. Utilitarians do not see this inside. This is not\nthe place for the fuller development that such ideas deserve. Ethics\nand Economics cannot however fail to be gainers (as we have said of\nLogic and \u00c6sthetic) by a more exact determination of the relations that\nexist between them. Economic science is now rising to the activistical\nconcept of the useful, as it attempts to surpass the mathematical\nphase in which it is still entangled; a phase which was in its turn\na progress when it superseded historicism, or the confusion of the\ntheoretical with the historical, and destroyed a number of capricious\ndistinctions and false economic theories. With this conception, it will\nbe easy on the one hand to absorb and to verify the semi-philosophical\ntheories of so-called pure economics, and on the other, by the\nintroduction of successive complications and additions, to effect a\ntransition from the philosophical to the empirical or naturalistic\nmethod and thus to embrace the particular theories expounded in the\nso-called political or national economy of the schools.\n\n[Sidenote: _Phenomenon and noumenon in practical activity._]\n\nAs \u00e6sthetic intuition knows the phenomenon or nature, and the\nphilosophic concept the noumenon or spirit; so the economic activity\nwills the phenomenon or nature, and the moral activity the noumenon or\nspirit. _The spirit which wills itself,_ its true self, the universal\nwhich is in the empirical and finite spirit: that is the formula which\nperhaps defines the essence of morality with the least impropriety.\nThis will for the true self is _absolute freedom._\n\n\n\n\nVIII\n\n\nEXCLUSION OF OTHER SPIRITUAL FORMS\n\n\nIn this summary sketch that we have given of the entire philosophy of\nthe spirit in its fundamental moments, the spirit is thus conceived\nas consisting of four moments or degrees, disposed in such a way that\nthe theoretical activity is to the practical as the first theoretical\ndegree is to the second theoretical, and the first practical degree to\nthe second practical. The four moments imply one another regressively\nby their concreteness. The concept cannot exist without expression, the\nuseful without both and morality without the three preceding degrees.\nIf the \u00e6sthetic fact is in a certain sense alone independent while\nthe others are more or less dependent, then the logical is the least\ndependent and the moral will the most. Moral intention acts on given\ntheoretic bases, with which it cannot dispense, unless we are willing\nto accept that absurd procedure known to the Jesuits as _direction of\nintention,_ in which people pretend to themselves not to know what they\nknow only too well.\n\n[Sidenote: _The forms of genius._]\n\n[Sidenote: _The system of the spirit._]\n\nIf the forms of human activity are four, four also are the forms of\n_genius._ Men endowed with genius in art, in science, and in moral\nwill or heroes, have always been recognized. But the genius of pure\neconomicity has met with repugnance. It is not altogether without\nreason that a category of bad geniuses or of _geniuses of evil_ has\nbeen created. The practical, merely economic genius, which is not\ndirected to a rational end, cannot but excite an admiration mingled\nwith alarm. To dispute as to whether the word \"genius\" should be\napplied only to creators of \u00e6sthetic expression or also to men of\nscientific research and of action would be a mere question of words. To\nobserve, on the other hand, that \"genius,\" of whatever kind it be, is\nalways a quantitative conception and an empirical distinction, would be\nto repeat what has already been explained as regards artistic genius.\n\n[Sidenote: _Non-existence of a fifth form of activity. Law;\nsociability._]\n\nA fifth form of spiritual activity does not exist. It would be easy to\nshow how all the other forms either do not possess the character of\nactivity, or are verbal variants of the activities already examined, or\nare complex and derivative facts, in which the various activities are\nmingled, and are filled with particular and contingent contents.\n\nThe _juridical_ fact, for example, considered as what is called\nobjective law, is derived both from the economic and from the logical\nactivities. Law is a rule, a formula (whether oral or written matters\nlittle here) in which is fixed an economic relation willed by an\nindividual or by a community, and this economic side at once unites it\nwith and distinguishes it from moral activity. Take another example.\nSociology (among the many meanings the word bears in our times) is\nsometimes conceived as the study of an original element, which is\ncalled _sociability._ Now what is it that distinguishes sociability,\nor the relations which are developed in a meeting of men, and not in a\nmeeting of sub-human beings, if it be not just the various spiritual\nactivities which exist among the former and which are supposed not to\nexist, or to exist only in a rudimentary degree, among the latter?\nSociability, then, far from being an original, simple, irreducible\nconception, is very complex and complicated. A proof of this would\nbe the impossibility, generally recognized, of enunciating a single\nlaw which could be described as purely sociological. Those that are\nimproperly so called are shown to be either empirical historical\nobservations, or spiritual laws, that is to say judgements into which\nthe conceptions of the spiritual activities are translated, when\nthey are not simply empty and indeterminate generalities, like the\nso-called law of evolution. Sometimes, too, nothing more is understood\nby \"sociability\" than \"social rule,\" and so law; thus confounding\nsociology with the science or theory of law itself. Law, sociability,\nand similar concepts, are to be dealt with in a mode analogous to that\nemployed by us in the consideration and analysis of historicity and\ntechnique.\n\n[Sidenote: _Religion._]\n\nIt may seem that _religious_ activity should be judged otherwise.\nBut religion is nothing but knowledge, and does not differ from its\nother forms and sub-forms. For it is in turn either the expression of\npractical aspirations and ideals (religious ideals), or historical\nnarrative (legend), or conceptual science (dogma).\n\nIt can therefore be maintained with equal truth either that religion\nis destroyed by the progress of human knowledge, or that it is always\npresent there. Their religion was the whole intellectual patrimony of\nprimitive peoples: our intellectual patrimony is our religion. The\ncontent has been changed, bettered, refined, and it will change and\nbecome better and more refined in the future also; but its form is\nalways the same. We do not know what use could be made of religion by\nthose who wish to preserve it side by side with the theoretic activity\nof man, with his art, with his criticism and with his philosophy. It\nis impossible to preserve an imperfect and inferior kind of knowledge,\nsuch as religion, side by side with what has surpassed and disproved\nit. Catholicism, which is always consistent, will not tolerate a\nScience, a History, an Ethics, in contradiction to its views and\ndoctrines. The rationalists are less coherent: they are disposed to\nallow a little space in their souls for a religion in contradiction\nwith their whole theoretic world.\n\nThe religious affectations and weaknesses prevalent among the\nrationalists of our time have their origin in the superstitious worship\nso recklessly lavished upon the natural sciences. We know ourselves\nand their chief representatives admit that these sciences are all\nsurrounded by _limits._ Science having been wrongly identified with\nthe so-called natural sciences, it could be foreseen that the remainder\nwould be sought in religion; that remainder with which the human\nspirit cannot dispense. We are therefore indebted to materialism, to\npositivism, to naturalism for this unhealthy and often disingenuous\nrecrudescence of religious exaltation, which belongs to the hospital,\nwhen it does not belong to the politician.\n\n[Sidenote: _Metaphysic._]\n\nPhilosophy removes from religion all reason for existing, because it\nsubstitutes itself for religion. As the science of the spirit, it\nlooks upon religion as a phenomenon, a transitory historical fact, a\npsychic condition that can be surpassed. Philosophy shares the domain\nof knowledge with the natural sciences, with history and with art.\nTo the first it leaves enumeration, measurement and classification;\nto the second, the chronicling of what has individually happened; to\nthe third, the individually possible. There is nothing left to allot\nto religion. For the same reason, philosophy, as the science of the\nspirit, cannot be philosophy of the intuitive datum; nor, as has\nbeen seen, _philosophy of history,_ nor _philosophy of nature_; and\ntherefore there cannot be a philosophical science of what is not form\nand universal, but material and particular. This amounts to affirming\nthe impossibility of _Metaphysic._\n\nThe methodology or logic of history has supplanted the philosophy\nof history; an epistemology of the concepts employed in the natural\nsciences succeeded the Philosophy of Nature. What philosophy can\nstudy of history is its mode of construction (intuition, perception,\ndocument, probability, etc.); of the natural sciences the forms of the\nconcepts which constitute them (space, time, motion, number, types,\nclasses, etc.). Philosophy as metaphysic in the sense above described\nwould, on the other hand, claim to compete with history and with the\nnatural sciences, which alone are legitimate and effective in their\nfield. Such a challenge could do nothing but reveal the incompetence\nof those who made it. In this sense we are _anti-metaphysicans,_\nwhile declaring ourselves to be _ultra-metaphysicians,_ when the\nword is used to claim and to affirm the office of philosophy as\nself-consciousness of the spirit, distinguished from the merely\nempirical and classificatory office of the natural sciences.\n\n[Sidenote: _Mental imagination and the intuitive intellect._]\n\nMetaphysic has been obliged to assert the existence of a specific\nspiritual activity producing it, in order to maintain itself side\nby side with the sciences of the spirit. This activity, called in\nantiquity _mental or superior imagination,_ and more often in modern\ntimes _intuitive intellect or intellectual intuition,_ was held to\nunite the characters of imagination and intellect in an altogether\nspecial form. It was supposed to provide the means of passing by\ndeduction or dialectic from the infinite to the finite, from form to\nmatter, from the concept to the intuition, from science to history,\nacting by a method which was held to penetrate both the universal and\nthe particular, the abstract and the concrete, intuition and intellect.\nA faculty marvellous indeed and most valuable to possess; but we, who\ndo not possess it, have no means of establishing its existence.\n\n[Sidenote: _Mystical \u00c6sthetic._]\n\nIntellectual intuition has sometimes been considered to be the true\n\u00e6sthetic activity. At others a no less marvellous \u00e6sthetic activity\nhas been placed beside, below, or above it, a faculty altogether\ndifferent from simple intuition. The glories of this faculty have been\ncelebrated, and the production of art attributed to it, or at least\nof certain groups of artistic production, arbitrarily chosen. Art,\nreligion and philosophy have seemed in turn to be one only, or three\ndistinct faculties of the spirit, sometimes one, sometimes another of\nthem being supreme in the dignity shared by all.\n\nIt is impossible to enumerate all the various attitudes assumed or\ncapable of being assumed by this conception of \u00c6sthetic, which we will\ncall _mystical._ We are here in the kingdom, not of the science of\nimagination, but of imagination itself, which creates its world out\nof varying elements drawn from impressions and feelings. Suffice it\nto mention that this mysterious faculty has been conceived, sometimes\nas practical, sometimes as a mean between the theoretic and the\npractical, at others again as a theoretic form side by side with\nphilosophy and religion.\n\n[Sidenote: _Mortality and immortality of art._]\n\nThe immortality of art has sometimes been deduced from this last\nconception, as belonging with its sisters to the sphere of absolute\nspirit. At other times, on the other hand, when religion has been\nlooked upon as mortal and as dissolved in philosophy, then has been\nproclaimed the mortality, even the death, actual or at least imminent,\nof art. This question has no meaning for us, because, seeing that the\nfunction of art is a necessary degree of the spirit, to ask if art can\nbe eliminated is the same as to ask if sensation or intelligence can be\neliminated. But Metaphysic, in the above sense, transplanting itself\ninto an arbitrary world, is not to be criticized in its particulars,\nany more than we can criticize the botany of the garden of Alcina or\nthe navigation of the voyage of Astolfo. Criticism can only exist when\nwe refuse to join in the game; that is to say, when we reject the very\npossibility of Metaphysic, always in the sense above indicated.\n\nThere is therefore no intellectual intuition in philosophy, as there\nis no surrogate or equivalent of it in art, or any other mode by which\nthis imaginary function may be called and represented. There does not\nexist (if we may repeat ourselves) a fifth degree, a fifth or supreme\nfaculty, theoretic or practical-theoretic, imaginative-intellectual, or\nintellectual-imaginative, or however otherwise it may be attempted to\nconceive such a faculty.\n\n\n\n\nIX\n\nINDIVISIBILITY OF EXPRESSION INTO MODES OR DEGREES AND CRITICISM OF\nRHETORIC\n\n\n[Sidenote: _The characters of art._]\n\nIt is customary to give long catalogues of the _characters_ of art.\nHaving reached this point of the treatise, after having studied\nart as spiritual activity, as theoretic activity, and as special\ntheoretic activity (intuitive), we are able to discover that those\nvaried and numerous determinations of characters, where they refer\nto anything real, do nothing but represent what we have already met\nwith as genera, species and individuality of the \u00e6sthetic form. To the\ngeneric are reducible, as we have already observed, the characters, or\nrather, the verbal variants of _unity,_ and of _unity_ in _variety,_\nof _simplicity,_ or _originality,_ and so on; to the specific,\nthe characters of _truth,_ of _sincerity,_ and the like; to the\nindividual, the characters of _life,_ of _vivacity,_ of _animation,_ of\n_concreteness,_ of _individuality,_ of _characteristicality_. The words\nmay change again, but they will not contribute anything scientifically\nnew. The analysis of expression as such is completely effected in the\nresults expounded above.\n\n[Sidenote: _Non-existence of modes of expression._]\n\nIt might, on the other hand, be asked at this point if there be _modes_\nor _degrees_ of expression; if, having distinguished two degrees of\nactivity of the spirit, each of which is subdivided into two other\ndegrees, one of these, the intuitive-expressive, is not in its turn\nsubdivided into two or more intuitive modes, into a first, second or\nthird degree of expression. But this further division is impossible;\na classification of intuition-expressions is certainly permissible,\nbut is not philosophical: individual expressive facts are so many\nindividuals, not one of which is interchangeable with another, save\nin its common quality of expression. To employ the language of the\nschools: expression is a species which cannot function in its turn\nas a genus. Impressions or contents vary; every content differs from\nevery other content, because nothing repeats itself in life; and\nthe irreducible variety of the forms of expression corresponds to\nthe continual variation of the contents, the \u00e6sthetic synthesis of\nimpressions.\n\n[Sidenote: _Impossibility of translations._]\n\nA corollary of this is the impossibility of _translations,_ in so\nfar as they pretend to effect the re-moulding of one expression into\nanother, like a liquid poured from a vase of a certain shape into a\nvase of another shape. We can elaborate logically what we have already\nelaborated in \u00e6sthetic form only; but we cannot reduce what has already\npossessed its \u00e6sthetic form to another form also \u00e6sthetic. Indeed,\nevery translation either diminishes and spoils, or it creates a new\nexpression, by putting the former back into the crucible and mingling\nit with the personal impressions of the so-called translator. In the\nformer case, the expression always remains one, that of the original,\nthe translation being more or less deficient, that is to say, not\nproperly expression: in the other case, there would certainly be two\nexpressions, but with two different contents. \"Faithful ugliness or\nfaithless beauty\" is a proverb that well expresses the dilemma with\nwhich every translator is faced. Un-\u00e6sthetic translations, such as\nthose that are word for word, or paraphrastic, are to be looked upon as\nsimple commentaries upon the original.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of the rhetorical categories._]\n\nThe illegitimate division of expressions into various grades is known\nin literature by the name of doctrine of _ornament_ or of _rhetorical\ncategories._ But similar attempts at distinctions in other artistic\ngroups are not wanting: suffice it to recall the _realistic_ and\n_symbolic_ forms, so often mentioned in relation to painting and\nsculpture.\n\n_Realistic_ and _symbolic, objective_ and _subjective, classical_\nand _romantic, simple_ and _ornate, proper_ and _metaphorical,_ the\nfourteen forms of metaphor, the figures of _word_ and _sentence,\npleonasm, ellipse, inversion, repetition, synonyms_ and _homonyms,_\nthese and all other determinations of modes or degrees of expression\nreveal their philosophical nullity when the attempt is made to develop\nthem in precise definitions, because they either grasp the void or\nfall into the absurd. A typical example of this is the very common\ndefinition of metaphor as of _another word used in place of the proper\nword._ Now why give oneself this trouble? Why substitute the improper\nfor the proper word? Why take the worse and longer road when you know\nthe shorter and better road? Perhaps, as is commonly said, because the\nproper word is in certain cases not so _expressive_ as the so-called\nimproper word or metaphor? But if this be so the metaphor is exactly\nthe proper word in that case, and the so-called \"proper\" word, if\nit were used, would be _inexpressive_ and therefore most improper.\nSimilar observations of elementary good sense can be made regarding the\nother categories, as, for example, the general one of the _ornate._\nHere for instance it may be asked how an ornament can be joined to\nexpression. Externally? In that case it is always separated from the\nexpression. Internally? In that case, either it does not assist the\nexpression and mars it; or it does form part of it and is not an\nornament, but a constituent element of the expression, indivisible and\nindistinguishable in its unity.\n\nIt is needless to say how much harm has been done by rhetorical\ndistinctions. Rhetoric has often been declaimed against, but although\nthere has been rebellion against its consequences, its principles\nhave, at the same time, been carefully preserved (perhaps in order to\nshow proof of philosophic consistency). In literature the rhetorical\ncategories have contributed, if not to make dominant, at least to\njustify theoretically, that particular kind of _bad writing_ which is\ncalled _fine writing_ or writing according to rhetoric.\n\n[Sidenote: _Use of these categories as synonyms of the \u00e6sthetic fact._]\n\nThe terms above mentioned would never have gone beyond the schools,\nwhere we all of us learned them (only we never found an opportunity\nof using them in strictly \u00e6sthetic discussions, or at most of doing\nso jocosely and with a comic intention), were it not that they can\nsometimes be employed in one of the following significations: as\n_verbal variants_ of the \u00e6sthetic concept; as indications of the\n_anti-\u00e6sthetic,_ or, finally (and this is their most important use), no\nlonger in the service of art and \u00e6sthetic, but of _science_ and _logic._\n\n[Sidenote: _Empirical sense of the rhetorical categories._]\n\n_First._ Expressions considered directly or positively are\nnot divisible into classes, but some are successful, others\nhalf-successful, others failures. There are perfect and imperfect,\nsuccessful and unsuccessful expressions. The words recorded, and others\nof the same sort, may therefore sometimes indicate the successful\nexpression, and the various forms of the failures. But they do this in\nthe most inconstant and capricious manner, so much so that the same\nword serves sometimes to proclaim the perfect, sometimes to condemn the\nimperfect.\n\nFor example, some will say of two pictures--one without inspiration, in\nwhich the author has copied natural objects without intelligence; the\nother inspired, but without close relation to existing objects--that\nthe first is _realistic,_ the second _symbolic._ Others, on the\ncontrary, utter the word _realistic_ before a picture strongly felt\nrepresenting a scene of ordinary life, while they apply that of\n_symbolic_ to another picture that is but a cold allegory. It is\nevident that in the first case symbolic means artistic and realistic\ninartistic, while in the second, realistic is synonymous with artistic\nand symbolic with inartistic. What wonder, then, that some hotly\nmaintain the true art form is the symbolic, and that the realistic is\ninartistic; others, that the realistic is artistic and the symbolic\ninartistic? We cannot but grant that both are right, since each uses\nthe same words in such a different sense.\n\nThe great disputes about _classicism_ and _romanticism_ were frequently\nbased upon such equivocations. Sometimes the former was understood\nas the artistically perfect, and the second as lacking balance and\nimperfect; at others \"classic\" meant cold and artificial, \"romantic\"\npure, warm, powerful, truly expressive. Thus it was always possible\nreasonably to take the side of the classic against the romantic, or of\nthe romantic against the classic.\n\nThe same thing happens as regards the word _style._ Sometimes it is\nsaid that every writer must have style. Here style is synonymous with\nform of expression. At others the form of a code of laws or of a\nmathematical work is said to be without style. Here the error is again\ncommitted of admitting diverse modes of expression, an ornate and a\nnaked form, because, if style is form, the code and the mathematical\ntreatise must also be asserted, strictly speaking, to have each its\nstyle. At other times, one hears the critics blaming some one for\n\"having too much style\" or for \"writing a style.\" Here it is clear\nthat style signifies, not the form, nor a mode of it, but improper and\npretentious expression, a form of the inartistic.\n\n[Sidenote: _Their use to indicate various \u00e6sthetic imperfections._]\n\n_Second._ The second not altogether meaningless use of these words\nand distinctions is to be found when we hear in the examination of a\nliteral composition such remarks as these: here is a pleonasm, here an\nellipse, there a metaphor, here again a synonym or an ambiguity. The\nmeaning is: Here is an error consisting of using a larger number of\nwords than necessary (pleonasm); here, on the other hand, the error\narises from too few having been used (ellipse), here from the use of\nan unsuitable word (metaphor), here of two words which seem to say\ntwo different things, but really say the same thing (synonym); here,\non the contrary, of one word which seems to express the same thing,\nwhereas it says two different things (ambiguity). This depreciatory\nand pathological use of the terms is, however, less common than the\npreceding.\n\n[Sidenote: _Their use in a sense transcending \u00e6sthetic, in the\nservice of science._]\n\n_Thirdly_ and finally, when rhetorical terminology possesses no\n\u00e6sthetic signification similar or analogous to those passed in review,\nand yet one feels that it is not void of meaning and designates\nsomething that deserves to be noted, this means that it is used in\nthe service of logic and of science. Granted that a concept used by\na writer in a scientific sense is designated by a definite term, it\nis natural that other terms found in use by that writer on which he\nincidentally employs himself to signify the same thought, become _in\nrespect to_ the vocabulary fixed upon by him as true, metaphors,\nsynecdoches, synonyms, elliptical forms and the like. We ourselves in\nthe course of this treatise have several times made use of, and intend\nagain to make use of such language, in order to make clear the sense of\nthe words we employ, or may find employed. But this proceeding, which\nis of value in discussions pertaining to the criticism of science and\nphilosophy, has none whatever in literary and artistic criticism. There\nare words and metaphors proper to science: the same concept may be\npsychologically formed in various circumstances and therefore differ in\nits intuitional expression. When the scientific terminology of a given\nwriter has been established and one of these modes fixed as correct,\nthen all other uses of it become improper or tropical. But in the\n\u00e6sthetic fact there are none but proper words: the same intuition can\nbe expressed in one way only, precisely because it is intuition and not\nconcept.\n\n[Sidenote: _Rhetoric in the schools._]\n\nSome, while admitting the \u00e6sthetic non-existence of the rhetorical\ncategories, yet make a reservation as to their utility and the service\nthey are supposed to render, especially in schools of literature. We\nconfess that we fail to understand how error and confusion can educate\nthe mind to logical distinction, or aid the teaching of a science\nwhich they disturb and obscure. Perhaps what is meant is that such\ndistinctions, as empirical classes, can aid memory and learning, as was\nadmitted above for literary and artistic kinds. To this there is no\nobjection. There is certainly another purpose for which the rhetorical\ncategories should continue to appear in schools: to be criticized\nthere. The errors of the past must not be forgotten and no more said,\nand truths cannot be kept alive save by making them combat errors.\nUnless an account of the rhetorical categories be given, accompanied\nby a criticism of them, there is a risk of their springing up again,\nand it may be said that they are already springing up among certain\nphilologists as the latest _psychological_ discoveries.\n\n[Sidenote: _The resemblances of expressions._]\n\nIt might seem that we thus wished to deny all bond of resemblance\nbetween different expressions and works of art. Resemblances\nexist, and by means of them, works of art can be arranged in this\nor that group. But they are likenesses such as are observed among\nindividuals, and can never be rendered with abstract determinations.\nThat is to say, it would be incorrect to apply identification,\nsubordination, co-ordination and the other relations of concepts to\nthese resemblances, which consist wholly of what is called a _family\nlikeness,_ derived from the historical conditions in which the various\nworks have appeared and from relationship of soul among the artists.\n\n[Sidenote: _The relative possibility of translations._]\n\nIt is in these resemblances that lies the _relative_ possibility of\ntranslations; not as reproductions of the same original expressions\n(which it would be vain to attempt), but as productions of _similar_\nexpressions more or less nearly resembling the originals. The\ntranslation called good is an approximation which has original value as\na work of art and can stand by itself.\n\n\n\n\nX\n\n\n\u00c6STHETIC FEELINGS AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE UGLY\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Various significations of the word feeling._]\n\nPassing to the study of more complex concepts, where the \u00e6sthetic\nactivity is to be considered in conjunction with other orders of facts,\nand showing the mode of their union or complication, we find ourselves\nfirst face to face with the concept of _feeling_ and with those\nfeelings that are called _\u00e6sthetic._\n\nThe word \"feeling\" is one of the richest in meanings in philosophic\nterminology. We have already had occasion to meet with it once, among\nthose used to designate the spirit in its passivity, the matter or\ncontent of art, and so as synonym of _impressions._ Once again (and\nthen the meaning was altogether different), we have met with it as\ndesignating the _non-logical_ and _non-historical_ character of the\n\u00e6sthetic fact, that is to say, pure intuition, a form of truth which\ndefines no concept and affirms no fact.\n\n[Sidenote: _Feeling as activity._]\n\nBut here it is not regarded in either of these two meanings, nor in\nthe others which have also been conferred upon it to designate other\n_cognitive_ forms of the spirit, but only in that where feeling is\nunderstood as a special activity, of non-cognitive nature, having its\ntwo poles, positive and negative, in _pleasure_ and _pain._\n\nThis activity has always greatly embarrassed philosophers, who have\ntherefore attempted either to deny it as activity, or to attribute it\nto _nature,_ excluding it from the spirit. But both these solutions\nbristle with difficulties of such a kind as to prove them finally\nunacceptable to any one who examines them with care. For what could\na non-spiritual activity ever be, an _activity of nature,_ when we\nhave no other knowledge of activity save as spirituality, nor of\nspirituality save as activity? Nature is in this case, by definition,\nthe merely passive, inert, mechanical, material. On the other hand,\nthe negation of the character of activity to feeling is energetically\ndisproved by those very poles of pleasure and of pain which appear in\nit and manifest activity in its concreteness, or, so to say, quivering.\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Identification of feeling with economic activity._]\n\nThis critical conclusion should place us especially in the greatest\nembarrassment, for in the sketch of the system of the spirit given\nabove we have left no room for the new activity of which we are now\nobliged to recognize the existence. But the activity of feeling, if\nit is activity, is not new. It has already had its place assigned to\nit in the system that we have sketched, where, however, it has been\ngiven another name, _economic_ activity. What is called the activity of\nfeeling is nothing but that more elementary and fundamental practical\nactivity which we have distinguished from the ethical activity and made\nto consist of the appetition and volition for some individual end,\napart from any moral determination.\n\nIf feeling has been sometimes considered to be an organic or natural\nactivity, this has happened just because it does not coincide either\nwith logical, \u00e6sthetic or ethical activity. Looked at from the\nstandpoint of those three (which were the only ones admitted), it\nhas seemed to lie _outside_ the true and real spirit, spirit in its\naristocracy, and to be almost a determination of nature, or of the\nsoul in so far as it is nature. From this too results the truth of\nanother thesis, often maintained, that the \u00e6sthetic activity, like the\nethical and intellectual activities, is not feeling. This thesis is\ninexpugnable, when feeling has already been understood implicitly and\nunconsciously as economic volition.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of hedonism._]\n\nThe view refuted in this thesis is known as _hedonism._ This consists\nin reducing all the various forms of the spirit to one, which thus also\nloses its own distinctive character and becomes something obscure\nand mysterious, like \"the night in which all cows are black.\" Having\nbrought about this reduction and mutilation, the hedonists naturally do\nnot succeed in seeing anything else in any activity but pleasure and\npain. They find no substantial difference between the pleasure of art\nand that of easy digestion, between the pleasure of a good action and\nthat of breathing the fresh air with wide-expanded lungs.\n\n[Sidenote: _Feeling as a concomitant of every form of activity._]\n\nBut if the activity of feeling in the sense here defined must not be\nsubstituted for all the other forms of spiritual activity, we have not\nsaid that it cannot _accompany_ them. Indeed it accompanies them of\nnecessity, because they are all in close relation both with one another\nand with the elementary volitional form. Therefore each of them has for\nconcomitants individual volitions and volitional pleasures and pains,\nknown as feeling. But we must not confound a concomitant with the\nprincipal fact, and substitute the one for the other. The discovery of\na truth, or the fulfilment of a moral duty, produces in us a joy which\nmakes vibrate our whole being, which, by attaining the aim of those\nforms of spiritual activity, attains at the same time that to which\nit was _practically_ tending, as its end. Nevertheless, _economic_\nor _hedonistic_ satisfaction, _ethical_ satisfaction, _\u00e6sthetic_\nsatisfaction, _intellectual_ satisfaction, though thus united, remain\nalways distinct.\n\nA question often asked is thus answered at the same time, one which\nhas correctly seemed to be a matter of life or death for \u00e6sthetic\nscience, namely, whether feeling and pleasure precede or follow, are\ncause or effect of the \u00e6sthetic fact. We must widen this question to\ninclude the relation between the various spiritual forms, and answer\nit by maintaining that one cannot talk of cause and effect and of a\nchronological before and after in the unity of the spirit.\n\nAnd once the relation above expounded is established, all necessity for\ninquiry as to the nature of \u00e6sthetic, moral, intellectual and even what\nwas sometimes called economic feelings, must disappear. In this last\ncase, it is clear that it is a question, not of two terms, but of one,\nand inquiry as to economic feeling must be the same as that relating to\neconomic activity. But in the other cases also, we must attend, not to\nthe substantive, but to the adjective: the \u00e6sthetic, moral and logical\ncharacter will explain the colouring of the feelings as \u00e6sthetic, moral\nand intellectual, whereas feeling, studied alone, will never explain\nthose refractions and colorations.\n\n[Sidenote: _Meaning of certain ordinary distinctions of feelings._]\n\nA further consequence is, that we no longer need retain the well-known\ndistinctions between values or feelings _of value,_ and feelings\nthat are merely hedonistic and _without value_; _disinterested_\nand _interested_ feelings, _objective_ feelings and feelings not\n_objective_ but simply _subjective_ feelings of _approbation_ and of\n_mere pleasure_ (cf. the distinction of _Gefallen_ and _Vergn\u00fcgen_\nin German). Those distinctions were used to save the three spiritual\nforms, which were recognized as the triad of the _True,_ the _Good_\nand the _Beautiful,_ from confusion with the fourth form, still\nunknown, and therefore insidious in its indeterminateness and mother\nof scandals. For us this triad has completed its task, because we are\ncapable of reaching the distinction far more directly, by receiving\nalso the selfish, subjective, merely pleasurable feelings among the\nrespectable forms of the spirit; and where formerly antitheses were\nconceived (by ourselves and others), between value and feelings, as\nbetween spirituality and naturality, henceforth we see nothing but\ndifferences between value and value.\n\n[Sidenote: _Value and disvalue: the contraries and their union._]\n\nAs has already been said, feeling or the economic activity presents\nitself as divided into two poles, positive and negative, pleasure\nand pain, which we can now translate into useful and disuseful (or\nhurtful). This bipartition has already been noted above, as a mark of\nthe activistic character of feeling, and one which is to be found in\nall forms of activity. If each of these is _value,_ each has opposed\nto it _antivalue_ or _disvalue._ Absence of value is not sufficient to\ncause dis value, but activity and passivity must be struggling between\nthemselves, without the one getting the better of the other; hence\nthe contradiction and disvalue of the activity that is embarrassed,\nimpeded, or interrupted. Value is activity that unfolds itself freely:\ndisvalue is its contrary.\n\nWe will content ourselves with this definition of the two terms,\nwithout entering into the problem of the relation between value and\ndisvalue, that is, the problem of contraries (that is to say, whether\nthey are to be thought of dualistically, as two beings or two orders\nof beings, like Ormuzd and Ahriman, angels and devils, enemies to one\nanother; or as a unity, which is also contrariety). This definition\nof the two terms will be sufficient for our purpose, which is to make\nclear the nature of \u00e6sthetic activity, and at this particular point one\nof the most obscure and disputed concepts of \u00c6sthetic: the concept of\nthe _Beautiful._\n\n[Sidenote: _The Beautiful as the value of expression, or expression\nwithout qualification._]\n\n\u00c6sthetic, intellectual, economic and ethical values and disvalues\nare variously denominated in current speech: _beautiful, true, good,\nuseful, expedient, just, right_ and so on--thus designating the free\ndevelopment of spiritual activity, action, scientific research,\nartistic production, when they are successful; _ugly, false, bad,\nuseless, inexpedient, unjust,_ wrong designating embarrassed activity,\nthe product that is a failure. In linguistic usage, these denominations\nare being continually shifted from one order of facts to another.\n_Beautiful,_ for instance, is said not only of a successful expression,\nbut also of a scientific truth, of an action successfully achieved,\nand of a moral action: thus we talk of an _intellectual beauty,_ of a\n_beautiful action,_ of a _moral beauty._ The attempt to keep up with\nthese infinitely varying usages leads into a trackless labyrinth of\nverbalism in which many philosophers and students of art have lost\ntheir way. For this reason we have thought it best studiously to avoid\nthe use of the word \"beautiful\" to indicate successful expression in\nits positive value. But after all the explanations that we have given,\nall danger of misunderstanding being now dissipated, and since on the\nother hand we cannot fail to recognize that the prevailing tendency,\nboth in current speech and in philosophy, is to limit the meaning of\nthe word \"beautiful\" precisely to the \u00e6sthetic value, it seems now both\npermissible and advisable to define beauty as _successful expression,_\nor rather, as _expression_ and nothing more, because expression when it\nis not successful is not expression.\n\n[Sidenote: _The ugly, and the elements of beauty which compose it._]\n\nConsequently, the ugly is unsuccessful expression. The paradox is true,\nfor works of art that are failures, that the beautiful presents itself\nas _unity,_ the ugly as _multiplicity._ Hence we hear of _merits_ in\nrelation to works of art that are more or less failures, that is to\nsay, of _those parts of them that are beautiful,_ which is not the case\nwith perfect works. It is in fact impossible to enumerate the merits or\nto point out what parts of the latter are beautiful, because being a\ncomplete fusion they have but one value. Life circulates in the whole\norganism: it is not withdrawn into the several parts.\n\n[Sidenote: _Illusion that there exist expressions neither beautiful nor\nugly._]\n\nUnsuccessful works may have merit in various degrees, even the\ngreatest. The beautiful does not possess degrees, for there is no\nconceiving a more beautiful, that is, an expressive that is more\nexpressive, an adequate that is more than adequate. Ugliness, on the\nother hand, does possess degrees, from the rather ugly (or almost\nbeautiful) to the extremely ugly. But if the ugly were _complete,_\nthat is to say, without any element of beauty, it would for that very\nreason cease to be ugly, because it would be without the contradiction\nin which is the reason of its existence. The disvalue would become\nnon-value; activity would give place to passivity, with which it is not\nat war, save when activity is really present to oppose it.\n\nAnd because the distinctive consciousness of the beautiful and of the\nugly is based on the conflicts and contradictions in which \u00e6sthetic\nactivity is developed, it is evident that this consciousness becomes\nattenuated to the point of disappearing altogether, as we descend from\nthe more complicated to the more simple and to the simplest instances\nof expression. Hence the illusion that there are expressions neither\nbeautiful nor ugly, those which are obtained without sensible effort\nand appear easy and natural being considered such.\n\n[Sidenote: _True \u00e6sthetic feelings and concomitant or accidental\nfeelings._]\n\nThe whole mystery of the _beautiful_ and the _ugly_ is reduced to\nthese henceforth most easy definitions. Should any one object that\nthere exist perfect \u00e6sthetic expressions before which no pleasure is\nfelt, and others, perhaps even failures, which give him the greatest\npleasure, we must recommend him to concentrate his attention in the\n\u00e6sthetic fact, upon that which is truly \u00e6sthetic pleasure. \u00c6sthetic\npleasure is sometimes reinforced or rather complicated by pleasures\narising from extraneous facts, which are only accidentally found united\nwith it. The poet or any other artist affords an instance of purely\n\u00e6sthetic pleasure at the moment when he sees (or intuites) his work\nfor the first time; that is to say, when his impressions take form and\nhis countenance is irradiated with the divine joy of the creator. On\nthe other hand, a mixed pleasure is experienced by one who goes to the\ntheatre, after a day's work, to witness a comedy: when the pleasure of\nrest and amusement, or that of laughingly snatching a nail from his\ncoffin, accompanies the moment of true \u00e6sthetic pleasure in the art\nof the dramatist and actors. The same may be said of the artist who\nlooks upon his labour with pleasure when it is finished, experiencing,\nin addition to the \u00e6sthetic pleasure, that very different one which\narises from the thought of self-complacency satisfied, or even of the\neconomic gain which will come to him from his work. Instances could be\nmultiplied.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of apparent feelings._]\n\nA category of _apparent_ \u00e6sthetic feelings has been formed in modern\n\u00c6sthetic, not arising from the form, that is to say, from the works of\nart as such, but from their content. It has been remarked that artistic\nrepresentations arouse pleasure and pain in their infinite shades\nof variety. We tremble with anxiety, we rejoice, we fear, we laugh,\nwe weep, we desire, with the personages of a drama or of a romance,\nwith the figures in a picture and with the melody of music. But these\nfeelings are not such as would be aroused by the real fact outside\nart; or rather, they are the same in quality, but are quantitatively\nan attenuation of real things. \u00c6sthetic and _apparent_ pleasure and\npain show themselves to be light, shallow, mobile. We have no need to\ntreat here of these _apparent feelings,_ for the good reason that we\nhave already amply discussed them; indeed, we have hitherto treated\nof nothing but them. What are these apparent or manifested feelings,\nbut feelings objectified, intuited, expressed? And it is natural that\nthey do not trouble and afflict us as passionately as those of real\nlife, because those were matter, these are form and activity; those\ntrue and proper feelings, these intuitions and expressions. The formula\nof _apparent feelings_ is therefore for us nothing but a tautology,\nthrough which we can run the pen without scruple.\n\n\n\n\nXI\n\n\nCRITICISM OF \u00c6STHETIC HEDONISM\n\n\nAs we are opposed to hedonism in general, that is to say, to the theory\nbased upon the pleasure and pain intrinsic to the economic activity and\naccompanying every other form of activity, which, confounding container\nand content, fails to recognize any process but the hedonistic; so we\nare opposed to \u00e6sthetic hedonism in particular, which looks at any rate\nupon the \u00e6sthetic, if not also upon all other activities, as a simple\nfact of feeling, and confounds the pleasurable expression, which is the\nbeautiful, with the simply pleasurable and all its other species.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of the beautiful as that which pleases the higher\nsenses._]\n\nThe \u00e6sthetic-hedonistic point of view has been presented in several\nforms. One of the most ancient conceives the beautiful as that which\npleases sight and hearing, that is to say, the so-called _higher\nsenses._ When analysis of \u00e6sthetic facts first began, it was, indeed,\ndifficult to avoid the false belief that a picture and a piece of\nmusic are impressions of sight or hearing and correctly to interpret\nthe obvious remark that the blind man does not enjoy the picture, nor\nthe deaf man the music. To show, as we have shown, that the \u00e6sthetic\nfact does not depend upon the nature of the impressions, but that all\nsensible impressions can be raised to \u00e6sthetic expression and that\nnone need of necessity be so raised, is an idea which presents itself\nonly when all other doctrinal constructions of this problem have been\ntried. Any one who holds that the \u00e6sthetic fact is something pleasing\nto the eyes or to the hearing, has no line of defence against him who\nconsistently proceeds to identify the beautiful with the pleasurable in\ngeneral, and includes in \u00c6sthetic cooking, or (as some positivists have\ncalled it) the viscerally beautiful.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of the theory of play._]\n\nThe theory of _play_ is another form of \u00e6sthetic hedonism. The concept\nof play has sometimes helped towards the realization of the activistic\ncharacter of the expressive fact: man (it has been said) is not really\nman, save when he begins to play (that is to say, when he frees himself\nfrom natural and mechanical causality and works spiritually); and his\nfirst game is art. But since the word \"play\" also means that pleasure\nwhich arises from the expenditure of the exuberant energy of the\norganism (which is a practical fact), the consequence of this theory\nhas been that every game has been called an \u00e6sthetic fact, or that the\n\u00e6sthetic function has been called a game, because like science and\neverything else, it may form part of a game. Morality alone cannot\never be caused by the will to play (for it will never consent to such\nan origin), but on the contrary itself dominates and regulates the act\nitself of playing.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of the theories of sexuality and of triumph._]\n\nFinally, some have tried to deduce the pleasure of art from the echo\nof that of the sexual organs. And some of the most recent \u00e6stheticians\nconfidently find the genesis of the \u00e6sthetic fact in the pleasure of\n_conquering_ and in that of _triumphing,_ or, as others add, in the\nwish of the male to conquer the female. This theory is seasoned with\nmuch anecdotal erudition, heaven knows of what degree of credibility,\nas to the customs of savage peoples. But there was really no need for\nsuch assistance, since in ordinary life one often meets poets who adorn\nthemselves with their poetry, like cocks raising their crests, or\nturkeys spreading out their tails. But any one who does this, in so far\nas he does it, is not a poet but a poor fool, in fact, a poor fool of\na cock or turkey, and the desire for the victorious conquest of women\nhas nothing to do with the fact of art. It would be just as correct to\nlook upon poetry as _economic,_ because there once were court poets\nand salaried poets, and there are poets now who find in the sale of\ntheir verses an aid to life if not a complete living. This deduction\nand definition has not failed to attract some zealous neophytes in\nhistorical materialism.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of the \u00c6sthetic of the sympathetic. Meaning in it\nof content and form._]\n\nAnother less vulgar current of thought considers \u00c6sthetic as the\nscience of the _sympathetic,_ as that with which we sympathize,\nwhich attracts, rejoices, arouses pleasure and admiration. But the\nsympathetic is nothing but the image or representation of what pleases.\nAnd as such it is a complex fact, resulting from a constant element,\nthe \u00e6sthetic element of representation, and a variable element, the\npleasing in its infinite forms, arising from all the various classes of\nvalues.\n\nIn ordinary language, there is sometimes a feeling of repugnance at\ncalling an expression \"beautiful,\" unless it is an expression of the\nsympathetic. Hence the continual conflicts between the point of view\nof the \u00e6sthetician or art critic and that of the ordinary person,\nwho cannot succeed in persuading himself that the image of pain and\nbaseness can be beautiful or at least that it has as much right to be\nbeautiful as the pleasing and the good.\n\nThe conflict could be put an end to by distinguishing two different\nsciences, one of expression and the other of the sympathetic, if the\nlatter could be the object of a special science; that is to say, if\nit were not, as has been shown, a complex and equivocal concept. If\npredominance be given to the expressive fact, it enters \u00c6sthetic as\nscience of expression; if to the pleasurable content, we fall back\nto the study of facts essentially hedonistic (utilitarian), however\ncomplicated they may appear. The particular origin of the doctrine\nwhich conceives the relation between form and content as the sum of two\nvalues is also to be sought in the doctrine of the sympathetic.\n\n[Sidenote: _\u00c6sthetic hedonism and moralism._]\n\nIn all the doctrines just now discussed, art is considered as a merely\nhedonistic thing. But \u00e6sthetic hedonism cannot be maintained, save by\nuniting it with a general philosophical hedonism, which does not admit\nany other form of value. Hardly has this hedonistic conception of art\nbeen received by philosophers who admit one or more spiritual values,\ntruth or morality, when the following question must necessarily be\nasked: What must be done with art? To what use should it be put? Should\na free course be allowed to the pleasures it procures? And if so, to\nwhat extent? The question of the _end of art,_ which in the \u00c6sthetic of\nexpression is inconceivable, has a clear significance in the \u00c6sthetic\nof the Sympathetic and demands a solution.\n\n[Sidenote: _The rigoristic negation, and the pedagogic justification of\nart._]\n\nNow it is evident that such solution can have but two forms, one\naltogether negative, the other of a restrictive nature. The first,\nwhich we shall call _rigoristic_ or _ascetic,_ appears several times,\nalthough not frequently, in the history of ideas. It looks upon art\nas an inebriation of the senses and therefore as not only useless but\nharmful. According to this theory, then, we must exert all our strength\nto liberate the human soul from its disturbing influence. The other\nsolution, which we shall call _pedagogic_ or _moralistic-utilitarian,_\nadmits art, but only in so far as it co-operates with the end of\nmorality; in so far as it assists with innocent pleasure the work\nof him who points the way to the true and the good; in so far as it\nanoints the edge of the cup of wisdom and morality with sweet honey.\n\nIt is well to observe that it would be an error to divide this second\nview into intellectualistic and moralistic-utilitarian, according as to\nwhether be assigned to art the end of leading to the true or to what\nis practically good. The educational task which is imposed upon it,\nprecisely because it is an end which is sought after and advised, is no\nlonger merely a theoretical fact, but a theoretical fact already become\nthe ground for practical action; it is not, therefore, intellectualism,\nbut pedagogism and practicism. Nor would it be more exact to subdivide\nthe pedagogic view into pure utilitarian and moralistic-utilitarian;\nbecause those who admit only the satisfaction of the individual\n(the desire of the individual), precisely because they are absolute\nhedonists, have no motive for seeking an ulterior justification for\nart.\n\nBut to enunciate these theories at the point to which we have attained\nis to confute them. We prefer to restrict ourselves to observing that\nin the pedagogic theory of art is to be found another of the reasons\nwhy the claim has erroneously been made that the content of art should\nbe _chosen_ with a view to certain practical effects.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of pure beauty._]\n\nThe thesis that art consists of _pure beauty_ has often been brought\nforward against hedonistic and pedagogic \u00c6sthetic, and eagerly taken\nup by artists: \"Heaven places all our joy in _pure beauty,_ and the\nVerse is everything.\" If by this be understood that art is not to be\nconfounded with sensual pleasure (utilitarian practicism), nor with\nthe exercise of morality, then our \u00c6sthetic also must be permitted to\nadorn itself with the title of _\u00c6sthetic of pure beauty._ But if (as is\noften the case) something mystical and transcendent be meant by this,\nsomething unknown to our poor human world, or something spiritual and\nbeatific, but not expressive, we must reply that while applauding the\nconception of a beauty _free from all that is not the spiritual form of\nexpression,_ we are unable to conceive a beauty superior to this and\nstill less that it should be _purified of expression,_ or severed from\nitself.\n\n\n\n\nXII\n\n\nTHE \u00c6STHETIC OF THE SYMPATHETIC AND PSEUDO-\u00c6STHETIC CONCEPTS\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Pseudo-\u00e6sthetic concepts, and the \u00e6sthetic of the\nsympathetic._]\n\nThe doctrine of the sympathetic (very often animated and seconded in\nthis by the capricious metaphysical and mystical \u00c6sthetic, and by that\nblind traditionalism which assumes an intimate connection between\nthings fortuitously treated together by the same authors in the same\nbooks), has introduced and rendered familiar in systems of \u00c6sthetic a\nseries of concepts a rapid mention of which suffices to justify our\nresolute expulsion of them from our own treatise.\n\nTheir catalogue is long, not to say interminable: _tragic, comic,\nsublime, pathetic, moving, sad, ridiculous, melancholy, tragi-comic,\nhumorous, majestic, dignified, serious, grave, imposing, noble,\ndecorous, graceful, attractive, piquant, coquettish, idyllic, elegiac,\ncheerful, violent, ingenuous, cruel, base, horrible, disgusting,\ndreadful, nauseating;_ the fist can be increased at will.\n\nSince that doctrine took the sympathetic as its special object, it was\nnaturally unable to neglect any of the varieties of the sympathetic,\nany of the mixtures or gradations by means of which, starting from\nthe sympathetic in its loftiest and most intense manifestation, its\ncontrary, the antipathetic and repugnant, is finally reached. And\nsince the sympathetic content was held to be the _beautiful_ and\nthe antipathetic the _ugly,_ the varieties (tragic, comic, sublime,\npathetic, etc.) constituted for that conception of \u00c6sthetic the shades\nand gradations intervening between the beautiful and the ugly.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of the theory of the ugly in art and of the\novercoming of it._]\n\nHaving enumerated and defined as well as it could, the chief of these\nvarieties, the \u00c6sthetic of the sympathetic set itself the problem\nof the place to be assigned to the _ugly in art._ This problem is\nwithout meaning for us, who do not recognize any ugliness save the\nanti-\u00e6sthetic or inexpressive, which can never form _part_ of the\n\u00e6sthetic fact, being, on the contrary, its _antithesis._ But in the\ndoctrine which we are here criticizing the positing and discussion\nof that problem meant neither more nor less than the necessity of\nreconciling in some way the false and defective idea of art from which\nit started--art reduced to the representation of the pleasurable--with\nreal art, which occupies a far wider field. Hence the artificial\nattempt to settle what examples of the _ugly_ (antipathetic) could be\nadmitted in artistic representation, and for what reasons, and in what\nways.\n\nThe answer was: that the ugly is admissible, only when it can be\n_overcome_; an unconquerable ugliness, such as the _disgusting_ or the\n_nauseating,_ being altogether excluded. Further, that the duty of\nthe ugly, when admitted in art, is to contribute towards heightening\nthe effect of the beautiful (sympathetic), by producing a series of\ncontrasts, from which the pleasurable may issue more efficacious and\njoy-giving. It is, indeed, a common observation that pleasure is more\nvividly felt when preceded by abstinence and suffering. Thus the ugly\nin art was looked upon as adapted for the service of the beautiful, a\nstimulant and condiment of \u00e6sthetic pleasure.\n\nThat special refinement of hedonistic theory which used to be pompously\ncalled the doctrine of the _overcoming of the ugly_ falls with the\n\u00c6sthetic of the sympathetic, and with it the enumeration and definition\nof the concepts mentioned above, which show themselves to be completely\nforeign to \u00c6sthetic. For \u00c6sthetic does not recognize the sympathetic or\nthe antipathetic or their varieties, but only the spiritual activity of\nrepresentation.\n\n[Sidenote: _Pseudo-\u00e6sthetic concepts belong to Psychology._]\n\nNevertheless, the important place which, as we have said, those\nconcepts have hitherto occupied in \u00e6sthetic treatises makes it\nadvisable to supply a rather more complete explanation as to their\nnature. What shall be their lot? Excluded from \u00c6sthetic, in what other\npart of Philosophy will they be received?\n\nIn truth, nowhere; for all those concepts are without philosophical\nvalue. They are nothing but a series of classes, which can be fashioned\nin the most various ways and multiplied at pleasure, to which it is\nsought to reduce the infinite complications and shadings of the values\nand disvalues of life. Of these classes, some have an especially\npositive significance, like the beautiful, the sublime, the majestic,\nthe solemn, the serious, the weighty, the noble, the elevated; others\na significance chiefly negative, like the ugly, the painful, the\nhorrible, the dreadful, the tremendous, the monstrous, the insipid, the\nextravagant; finally in others a mixed significance prevails, such as\nthe comic, the tender, the melancholy, the humorous, the tragi-comic.\nThe complications are infinite, because the individuations are\ninfinite; hence it is not possible to construct the concepts, save in\nthe arbitrary and approximate manner proper to the natural sciences,\nsatisfied with making the best classification they can of that reality\nwhich they can neither exhaust by enumeration, nor understand and\nconquer speculatively. And since _Psychology_ is the naturalistic\nscience which undertakes to construct types and schemes of the\nspiritual life of man (a science whose merely empirical and descriptive\ncharacter becomes more evident day by day), these concepts do not\nbelong to \u00c6sthetic, nor to Philosophy in general, but must simply be\nhanded over to Psychology.\n\n[Sidenote: _Impossibility of rigorous definitions of them._]\n\nThe case of those concepts is that of all other psychological\nconstructions: no rigorous definitions of them are possible; and\nconsequently they cannot be deduced from one another nor be connected\nin a system, though this has often been attempted, with great waste\nof time and without obtaining thereby any useful results. Nor can it\nbe claimed as possible to obtain empirical definitions, universally\nacceptable as precise and true in the place of those philosophical\ndefinitions recognized as impossible. For no single definition of a\nsingle fact can be given, but there are innumerable definitions of it,\naccording to the cases and the purposes for which they are made; and\nit is clear that if there were only one which had the value of truth\nit would no longer be an empirical, but a rigorous and philosophical\ndefinition. And as a matter of fact whenever one of the terms to which\nwe have referred has been employed (or indeed any other belonging to\nthe same class), a new definition of it has been given at the same\ntime, expressed or understood. Each one of those definitions differed\nsomehow from the others, in some particular, however minute, and in its\nimplied reference to some individual fact or other, which thus became a\nspecial object of attention and was raised to the position of a general\ntype. Thus it is that not one of such definitions satisfies either the\nhearer or the constructor of it. For a moment later he finds himself\nbefore a new instance to which he recognizes that his definition is\nmore or less insufficient, ill-adapted, and in need of retouching. So\nwe must leave writers and speakers free to define the sublime or the\ncomic, the tragic or the humorous, on every occasion as they please and\nas may suit the end they have in view. And if an empirical definition\nof universal validity be demanded, we can but submit this one:--The\nsublime (or comic, tragic, humorous, etc.) is _everything_ that is or\nshall be so _called_ by those who have employed or shall employ these\n_words._\n\n[Sidenote: _Examples: definitions of the sublime, the comic, the\nhumorous._]\n\nWhat is the sublime? The unexpected affirmation of an overwhelming\nmoral force: that is one definition. But the other definition is\nequally good, which recognizes the sublime also where the force which\naffirms itself is certainly overwhelming, but immoral and destructive.\nBoth remain vague and lack precision, until applied to a concrete\ncase, to an example which makes clear what is meant by \"overwhelming,\"\nand what by unexpected. They are quantitative concepts, but falsely\nquantitative, since there is no way of measuring them; they are at\nbottom metaphors, emphatic phrases, or logical tautologies. The\nhumorous will be laughter amid tears, bitter laughter, the sudden\nspring from the comic to the tragic and from the tragic to the comic,\nthe romantic comic, the opposite of the sublime, war declared against\nevery attempt at insincerity, compassion ashamed to weep, a laugh,\nnot at the fact, but at the ideal itself; and what you will beside,\naccording as it is wished to get a view of the physiognomy of this or\nthat poet, of this or that poem, which, in its uniqueness, is its own\ndefinition, and though momentary and circumscribed, is alone adequate.\nThe comic has been defined as the displeasure arising from the\nperception of a deformity immediately followed by a greater pleasure\narising from the relaxation of our psychical forces, strained in\nexpectation of a perception looked upon as important. While listening\nto a narrative, which might, for example, be a description of the\nmagnificently heroic purpose of some individual, we anticipate in\nimagination the occurrence of a magnificent and heroic action, and we\nprepare for its reception by concentrating our psychic forces. All of\na sudden, however, instead of the magnificent and heroic action, which\nthe preliminaries and the tone of the narrative had led us to expect,\nthere is an unexpected change to a small, mean, foolish action, which\ndoes not satisfy to our expectation. We have been deceived, and the\nrecognition of the deceit brings with it an instant of displeasure. But\nthis instant is as it were conquered by that which immediately follows:\nwe are able to relax our strained attention, to free ourselves from\nthe provision of accumulated psychic energy henceforth superfluous, to\nfeel ourselves light and well. This is the pleasure of the comic, with\nits physiological equivalent of laughter. If the unpleasant fact that\nhas appeared should painfully affect our interests, there would not\nbe pleasure, laughter would be at once suffocated, the psychic energy\nwould be strained and overstrained by other more weighty perceptions.\nIf on the other hand such more weighty perceptions do not appear, if\nthe whole loss be limited to a slight deception of our foresight,\nthen the feeling of our psychic wealth that ensues affords ample\ncompensation for this very slight disappointment. Such, expressed in\na few words, is one of the most accurate modern definitions of the\ncomic. It boasts of containing in itself, justified or corrected and\nverified, the manifold attempts to define the comic, from Hellenic\nantiquity to our own day, from Plato's definition in the _Philebus,_\nand from Aristotle's, which is more explicit, and looks upon the comic\nas an _ugliness without pain,_ to that of Hobbes, who replaced it in\nthe feeling of _individual superiority_; of Kant, who saw in it the\n_relaxation of a tension_; or from the other proposals of those for\nwhom it was _the conflict between great and small, between the finite\nand the infinite_ and so on. But on close observation, the analysis\nand definition above given, although in appearance most elaborate\nand precise, yet enunciates characteristics which are applicable,\nnot only to the comic, but to every spiritual process; such as the\nsuccession of painful and pleasing moments and the satisfaction\narising from the consciousness of strength and of its free expansion.\nThe differentiation is here given by quantitative determinations\nwhose limits cannot be laid down. They therefore remain vague words,\npossessing some degree of meaning from their reference to this or that\nparticular comic fact, and from the psychic disposition of qualities of\nthe speaker. If such definitions be taken too seriously, there happens\nto them what Jean Paul Richter said of all the definitions of the\ncomic: namely, that their sole merit is _to be themselves comic_ and to\nproduce in reality the fact which they vainly try to fix logically. And\nwho will ever logically determine the dividing line between the comic\nand the non-comic, between laughter and smiles, between smiling and\ngravity, or cut the ever varying continuum into which life melts into\nclearly divided parts?\n\n[Sidenote: _Relation between these concepts and \u00e6sthetic concepts._]\n\nThe facts, classified as far as possible in these psychological\nconcepts, bear no relation to the artistic fact, beyond the general\none, that all of them, in so far as they constitute the material of\nlife, can become the object of artistic representation; and the other,\nan accidental relation, that \u00e6sthetic facts also may sometimes enter\nthe processes described, such as the impression of the sublime aroused\nby the work of a Titanic artist, such as Dante or Shakespeare, and of\nthe comic produced by the attempts of a dauber or scribbler.\n\nBut here too the process is external to the \u00e6sthetic fact, to which\nis linked only the feeling of \u00e6sthetic value and disvalue, of the\nbeautiful and of the ugly. Dante's Farinata is \u00e6sthetically beautiful\nand nothing but beautiful: if the force of will of that personage seem\nalso sublime, or the expression that Dante gives him seem, by reason of\nhis great genius, sublime in comparison with that of a less energetic\npoet, these are things altogether outside \u00e6sthetic consideration. We\nrepeat again that this last pays attention always and only to the\nadequateness of the expression, that is to say, to beauty.\n\n\n\n\nXIII\n\n\nTHE \"PHYSICALLY BEAUTIFUL\" IN NATURE AND IN ART\n\n\n[Sidenote: _\u00c6sthetic activity and physical concepts._]\n\n\u00c6sthetic activity, distinct from the practical activity, is always\naccompanied by it in its manifestations. Hence its utilitarian or\nhedonistic side, and the pleasure and pain which are, as it were, the\npractical echo of \u00e6sthetic value and disvalue, of the beautiful and of\nthe ugly. But this practical side of the \u00e6sthetic activity has in its\nturn a _physical_ or _psycho-physical_ accompaniment, which consists of\nsounds, tones, movements, combinations of lines and colours, and so on.\n\nDoes it _really_ possess this side, or does it only seem to possess it,\nthrough the construction which we put on it in physical science, and\nthe useful and arbitrary methods which we have already several times\nset in relief as proper to the empirical and abstract sciences? Our\nreply cannot be doubtful, that is, it must affirm to the second of the\ntwo hypotheses.\n\nHowever, it will be better to leave this point in suspense, since it\nis not at present necessary to press this line of inquiry further. The\nmere mention suffices to secure our speaking (for reasons of simplicity\nand adhesion to ordinary language) of the physical element as something\nobjective and existing, against leading to hasty conclusions as to the\nconcepts of spirit and nature and their relation.\n\n[Sidenote: _Expression in the \u00e6sthetic sense, and expression in the\nnaturalistic sense._]\n\nIt is important, on the other hand, to make clear that as the existence\nof the hedonistic side in every spiritual activity has given rise\nto the confusion between the \u00e6sthetic activity and the useful or\npleasurable, so the existence of, or rather the possibility of\nconstructing, this physical side, has caused the confusion between\n_\u00e6sthetic_ expression and expression _in a naturalistic sense_; that\nis to say, between a spiritual fact and a mechanical and passive fact\n(not to say, between a concrete reality and an abstraction or fiction).\nIn common speech, sometimes it is the words of the poet that are\ncalled _expressions,_ the notes of the musician, or the figures of the\npainter; sometimes the blush which generally accompanies the feeling of\nshame, the pallor often due to fear, the grinding of the teeth proper\nto violent anger, the shining of the eyes and certain movements of the\nmuscles of the mouth, which manifest cheerfulness. We also say that a\ncertain degree of heat is the _expression_ of fever, that the falling\nof the barometer is the _expression_ of rain, and even that the height\nof the exchange _expresses_ the depreciation of the paper currency of a\nState, or social discontent the approach of a revolution. One can well\nimagine what sort of scientific results would be attained by allowing\noneself to be governed by verbal usage and classing together facts so\nwidely different. But there is, in fact, an abyss between a man who\nis the prey of anger with all its natural manifestations and another\nman who expresses it \u00e6sthetically; between the appearance, the cries\nand contortions of some one grieving at the loss of a dear one and the\nwords or song with which the same individual portrays his suffering\nat another time; between the grimace of emotion and the gesture of\nthe actor. Darwin's book on the expression of the emotions in man and\nanimals does not belong to \u00c6sthetic; because there is nothing in common\nbetween the science of spiritual expression and a _Semiotic,_ whether\nit be medical, meteorological, political, physiognomic, or chiromantic.\n\nExpression in the naturalistic sense simply lacks _expression in the\nspiritual sense,_ that is to say, the very character of activity and\nof spirituality, and therefore the bipartition into the poles of\nbeauty and of ugliness. It is nothing but a relation between cause\nand effect, fixed by the abstract intellect. The complete process\nof \u00e6sthetic production can be symbolized in four stages, which are:\n_a,_ impressions; _b,_ expression or spiritual \u00e6sthetic synthesis;\n_c,_ hedonistic accompaniment, or pleasure of the beautiful (\u00e6sthetic\npleasure); _d,_ translation of the \u00e6sthetic fact into physical\nphenomena (sounds, tones, movements, combinations of lines and colours,\netc.). Any one can see that the capital point, the only one that\nis properly speaking \u00e6sthetic and truly real, is in _b,_ which is\nlacking to the merely naturalistic manifestation or construction also\nmetaphorically called expression.\n\nThe expressive process is exhausted when these four stages have been\npassed through. It begins again with new impressions, a new \u00e6sthetic\nsynthesis, and the accompaniments that belong to it.\n\n[Sidenote: _Representations and memory._]\n\nExpressions or representations follow one another, the one drives out\nthe other. Certainly, this passing away, this being driven out, is\nnot a perishing, it is not total elimination: nothing that is born\ndies with that complete death which would be identical with never\nhaving been born. If all things pass away, nothing can die. Even the\nrepresentations that we have forgotten persist somehow in our spirit,\nfor without this we could not explain acquired habits and capacities.\nIndeed the strength of life lies in this apparent forgetting: one\nforgets what has been absorbed and what life has superseded.\n\nBut other representations are also powerful elements in the present\nprocesses of our spirit; and it is incumbent upon us not to forget\nthem, or to be capable of recalling them when they are wanted. The\nwill is always vigilant in this work of preservation, which aims at\npreserving (we may say) the greater, the more fundamental part of all\nour riches. But its vigilance does not always suffice. Memory, as we\nsay, abandons or betrays us in different ways. For this very reason,\nthe human spirit devises expedients which succour the weakness of\nmemory and are its _aids._\n\n[Sidenote: _The production of aids to memory._]\n\nHow these aids are possible we have been informed from what has been\nsaid. Expressions or representations are _also_ practical facts, which\nare also called physical in so far as physics classifies and reduces\nthem to types. Now it is clear that if we can succeed in making those\npractical or physical facts somehow permanent, it will always be\npossible (all other conditions remaining equal) on perceiving them to\nreproduce in ourselves the already produced expression or intuition.\n\nIf that be called the object or physical stimulus in which the\npractical concomitant acts, or (to use physical terms) in which the\nmovements have been isolated and made in some sort permanent, and\nif that object or stimulus be designated by the letter _e_; the\nprocess of reproduction will take place in the following order: _e,_\nthe physical stimulus; _d-b,_ perception of physical facts (sounds,\ntones, mimetic, combinations of lines and colours, etc.), which is\ntogether the \u00e6sthetic synthesis, already produced; _c_, the hedonistic\naccompaniment, which is also reproduced.\n\nAnd what else are those combinations of words called poetry, prose,\npoems, novels, romances, tragedies or comedies, but _physical\nstimulants of reproduction_ (the stage _e_); what else are those\ncombinations of sound called operas, symphonies, sonatas; or\nthose combinations of lines and colours called pictures, statues,\narchitecture? The spiritual energy of memory, with the assistance of\nthe physical facts above mentioned, makes possible the preservation and\nthe reproduction of the intuitions produced by man. The physiological\norganism and with it the memory become weakened; the monuments of art\nare destroyed, and lo, all that \u00e6sthetic wealth, the fruit of the\nlabours of many generations, diminishes and rapidly disappears.\n\n[Sidenote: _Physical beauty._]\n\nMonuments of art, the stimulants of \u00e6sthetic reproduction, are called\n_beautiful things_ or _physical beauty._ This combination of words\nconstitutes a verbal paradox, for the beautiful is not a physical\nfact; it does not belong to things, but to the activity of man, to\nspiritual energy. But it is now clear through what transferences and\nassociations, physical things and facts which are simply aids to the\nreproduction of the beautiful are finally called elliptically beautiful\nthings and physical beauty. And now that we have explained this\nelliptical usage, we shall ourselves employ it without hesitation.\n\n[Sidenote: _Content and form: another meaning._]\n\nThe intervention of \"physical beauty\" serves to explain another meaning\nof the words \"_content_\" and \"_form,_\" as used by \u00e6stheticians. Some\ncall \"content\" the internal fact or expression (for us, on the other\nhand, form), and \"form\" the marble, the colours, the rhythm, the sounds\n(for us the antithesis of form); thus looking upon the physical fact\nas the form, which may or may not be joined to the content. It also\nserves to explain another aspect of what is called \u00e6sthetic \"ugliness.\"\nSomebody who has nothing definite to express may try to conceal his\ninternal emptiness in a flood of words, in sounding verse, in deafening\npolyphony, in painting that dazzles the eye, or by heaping together\ngreat architectural masses which arrest and astonish us without\nconveying anything whatever. Ugliness, then, is the capricious, the\ncharlatanesque; and, in reality, if practical caprice did not intervene\nin the theoretic function, there might be absence of beauty, but never\nthe real presence of something deserving the adjective \"ugly.\"\n\n[Sidenote: _Natural and artificial beauty._]\n\nPhysical beauty is usually divided into _natural_ and _artificial_\nbeauty. Thus we reach one of the facts which have given the greatest\ntrouble to thinkers: _natural beauty._ These words often designate\nfacts of merely practical pleasure. Any one who calls a landscape\nbeautiful where the eye rests upon verdure, where the body moves\nbriskly and the warm sun envelops and caresses the limbs, does not\nspeak of anything \u00e6sthetic. But it is nevertheless indubitable that\non other occasions the adjective \"beautiful,\" applied to objects and\nscenes existing in nature, has a completely \u00e6sthetic signification.\n\nIt has been observed that in order to enjoy natural objects\n\u00e6sthetically, we must abstract from their external and historical\nreality, and separate their simple semblance or appearance from\nexistence; that if we contemplate a landscape with our head between\nour legs, so as to cancel our wonted relations with it, the landscape\nappears to us to be an ideal spectacle; that nature is beautiful\nonly for him who contemplates her _with the eye of the artist_; that\nzoologists and botanists do not recognize _beautiful_ animals and\nflowers; that natural beauty is _discovered_ (and examples of discovery\nare the points of view, pointed out by men of taste and imagination,\nto which more or less \u00e6sthetic travellers and excursionists afterwards\nhave recourse in pilgrimage, whence a kind of collective _suggestion)_;\nthat, without the _aid of the imagination,_ no part of nature is\nbeautiful, and that with such aid the same natural object or fact\nis, according to the disposition of the soul, now expressive, now\ninsignificant, now expressive of one definite thing, now of another,\nsad or glad, sublime or ridiculous, sweet or laughable; finally, that\na _natural beauty_ which an artist would not _to some extent correct,\ndoes not exist._\n\nAll these observations are just, and fully confirm the fact that\nnatural beauty is simply a _stimulus_ to \u00e6sthetic reproduction,\nwhich presupposes previous production. Without the previous \u00e6sthetic\nintuitions of the imagination, nature cannot awaken any at all. As\nregards natural beauty, man is like the mythical Narcissus at the\nfountain. Leopardi said that natural beauty is \"rare, scattered, and\nfugitive\": it is imperfect, equivocal, variable. Each refers the\nnatural fact to the expression in his mind. One artist is thrown into\ntransports by a smiling landscape, another by a rag-shop, another by\nthe pretty face of a young girl, another by the squalid countenance\nof an old rascal. Perhaps the first will say that the rag-shop and\nthe ugly face of the old rascal are _repulsive_; the second, that the\nsmiling landscape and the face of the young girl are _insipid._ They\nmay dispute for ever; but they will never agree, save when they are\nsupplied with a sufficient dose of \u00e6sthetic knowledge to enable them to\nrecognize that both are right. _Artificial_ beauty, created by man,\nsupplies an aid that is far more ductile and efficacious.\n\n[Sidenote: _Mixed beauty._]\n\nIn addition to these two classes, \u00e6stheticians also sometimes talk in\ntheir treatises of a _mixed_ beauty. A mixture of what? Precisely of\nnatural and artificial. Whoever fixes and externalizes, operates with\nnatural data which he does not create but combines and transforms.\nIn this sense, every artificial product is a mixture of nature and\nartifice; and there would be no occasion to speak of a mixed beauty,\nas of a special category. But it sometimes happens that combinations\nalready given in nature can be used a great deal more than in others;\nas, for instance, when we design a beautiful garden and include in our\ndesign groups of trees or ponds already in place. On other occasions\nexternalization is limited by the impossibility of producing certain\neffects artificially. Thus we can mix colouring matters, but we cannot\ncreate a powerful voice or a face and figure appropriate to this or\nthat character in a play. We must therefore seek them among already\nexisting things, and make use of them when found. When, therefore, we\nemploy a great number of combinations already existing in nature, such\nas we should not be able to produce artificially if they did not exist,\nthe resulting fact is called _mixed_ beauty.\n\n[Sidenote: _Writings._]\n\nWe must distinguish from artificial beauty those instruments of\nreproduction called _writings,_ such as alphabets, musical notes,\nhieroglyphics, and all pseudolanguages, from the language of flowers\nand flags to the language of patches (so much in vogue in the society\nof the eighteenth century). Writings are not physical facts which\narouse directly impressions answering to \u00e6sthetic expressions; they\nare simple _indications_ of what must be done in order to produce such\nphysical facts. A series of graphic signs serves to remind us of the\nmovements which we must execute with our vocal apparatus in order to\nemit certain definite sounds. If, through practice, we become able\nto hear the words without opening our mouths and (what is much more\ndifficult) to hear the sounds by running the eye along the stave, all\nthis does not alter in any way the nature of the writings, which are\naltogether different from direct physical beauty. No one calls the\nbook which contains the _Divine Comedy,_ or the score which contains\n_Don Giovanni,_ beautiful in the same sense in which the block of\nmarble which contains Mich\u00e6l Angelo's _Moses,_ or the piece of coloured\nwood which contains the _Transfiguration,_ is metaphorically called\nbeautiful. Both serve the reproduction of the beautiful, but the former\nby a far longer and more indirect route than the latter.\n\n[Sidenote: _Free and non-free beauty._]\n\nAnother division of the beautiful, still found in treatises, is that\ninto _free and not free._ By not-free beauties have been understood\nthose objects which have to serve a double purpose, extra-\u00e6sthetic\nand \u00e6sthetic (stimulants of intuitions); and since it seems that the\nfirst purpose sets limits and barriers in the way of the second, the\nresulting beautiful object has been considered as not-free beauty.\n\nArchitectural works are especially cited; and just for this reason,\narchitecture has often been excluded from the number of what are called\nthe fine arts. A temple must above all things be for the use of a\ncult; a house must contain all the rooms needed for the convenience\nof life, and they must be arranged with a view to this convenience; a\nfortress must be a construction capable of resisting the attacks of\ngiven armies and the blows of given instruments of war. It is therefore\nconcluded that the architect's field is restricted: he may _embellish_\nto some extent the temple, the house, the fortress; but he is bound by\nthe _object_ of those edifices, and he can only manifest that part of\nhis vision of beauty which does not impair their extra-\u00e6sthetic but\nfundamental objects.\n\nOther examples are taken from what is called art applied to industry.\nPlates, glasses, knives, guns and combs can be made beautiful; but it\nis held that their beauty must not be pushed so far as to prevent our\neating from the plate, drinking from the glass, cutting with the knife,\nfiring off the gun, or combing one's hair with the comb. The same is\nsaid of the art of typography: a book should be beautiful, but not to\nthe extent of being difficult or impossible to read.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of non-free beauty._]\n\nIn respect of all this we must observe in the first place that the\nextrinsic purpose is not necessarily, precisely because it is such,\na limit or impediment to the other purpose of being a stimulus to\n\u00e6sthetic reproduction. It is therefore quite false to maintain that\narchitecture, for example, is by its nature imperfect and not free,\nsince it must also obey other practical purposes; in fact, the mere\npresence of fine works of architecture is enough to dispel any such\nillusion.\n\nIn the second place, not only are the two purposes not necessarily\ncontradictory, but we must add that the artist always has the means\nof preventing this contradiction from arising. How? by simply making\nthe _destination_ of the object which serves a practical end enter\nas material into his \u00e6sthetic intuition and externalization. He will\nnot need to add anything to the object, in order to make it the\ninstrument of \u00e6sthetic intuitions: it will be so, if perfectly adapted\nto its practical purpose. Rustic dwellings and palaces, churches and\nbarracks, swords and ploughs, are beautiful, not in so far as they are\nembellished and adorned, but in so far as they express their end. A\ngarment is only beautiful because it is exactly suitable to a given\nperson in given conditions. The sword bound to the side of the warrior\nRinaldo by the amorous Armida was not beautiful: \"so adorned that it\nmay seem a useless ornament, not the free instrument of war,\" or it\nwas beautiful, if you will, but to the eyes and imagination of the\nsorceress, who liked to see her lover equipped in that effeminate way.\nThe \u00e6sthetic activity can always agree with the practical, because\nexpression is truth.\n\nIt cannot however be denied that \u00e6sthetic contemplation sometimes\nhinders practical usage. For instance, it is a quite common experience\nto find certain new objects seem so well adapted to their purpose,\nand therefore so beautiful, that people occasionally feel scruples in\nmaltreating them by passing from their contemplation to their use. It\nwas for this reason that King Frederick William of Prussia showed\nsuch repugnance to sending his magnificent grenadiers, so well adapted\nto war, into the mud and fire of battle, while his less \u00e6sthetic son,\nFrederick the Great, obtained from them excellent service.\n\n[Sidenote: _Stimulants of production._]\n\nIt might be objected to the explanation of the physically beautiful\nas a simple aid to the reproduction of the internally beautiful, or\nexpressions, that the artist creates his expressions by painting or\nby sculpturing, by writing or by composing, and that therefore the\nphysically beautiful, instead of following, sometimes precedes the\n\u00e6sthetically beautiful. This would be a somewhat superficial mode of\nunderstanding the procedure of the artist, who never in reality makes\na stroke with his brush without having previously seen it with his\nimagination; and if he has not yet seen it, he will make the stroke,\nnot in order to externalize his expression (which does not yet exist),\nbut as a kind of experiment and in order to have a point of departure\nfor further meditation and internal concentration. The physical\npoint of departure is not the physically beautiful instrument of\nreproduction, but a means that may be called _pedagogic,_ like retiring\ninto solitude, or the many other expedients frequently very strange,\nadopted by artists and scientists, who vary in these according to their\nvarious idiosyncrasies. The old \u00e6sthetician Baumgarten advised poets\nseeking inspiration to ride on horseback, to drink wine in moderation,\nand (provided they were chaste) to look at beautiful women.\n\n\n\n\nXIV\n\n\nERRORS ARISING FROM THE CONFUSION BETWEEN PHYSICS AND \u00c6STHETIC\n\n\nWe must mention a series of fallacious scientific doctrines which have\narisen from the failure to understand the purely external relation\nbetween the \u00e6sthetic fact or artistic vision and the physical fact\nor instrument which aids in its reproduction, together with brief\ncriticisms of them deduced from what has already been said.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of \u00e6sthetic associationism._]\n\nThat form of associationism which identifies the \u00e6sthetic fact with the\n_association_ of two images finds support in such lack of apprehension.\nBy what path has it been possible to arrive at such an error, so\nrepugnant to our \u00e6sthetic consciousness, which is a consciousness of\nperfect unity, never of duality? Precisely because the physical and\n\u00e6sthetic facts have been considered separately, as two distinct images,\nwhich enter the spirit, the one drawn in by the other, first one and\nthen the other. A picture has been divided into the image of the\n_picture_ and the image of the _meaning_ of the picture; a poem, into\nthe image of the _words_ and the image of the _meaning_ of the words.\nBut this dualism of images is non-existent: the physical fact does not\nenter the spirit as an image, but causes the reproduction of the image\n(the only image, which is the \u00e6sthetic fact), in so far as it blindly\nstimulates the psychic organism and produces the impression which\nanswers to the \u00e6sthetic expression already produced.\n\nThe efforts of the associationists (the usurpers of to-day in the field\nof \u00c6sthetic) to emerge from the difficulty, and to reaffirm in some way\nthe unity which has been destroyed by their principle of association,\nare highly instructive. Some maintain that the image recalled is\nunconscious; others, leaving unconsciousness alone, hold that, on the\ncontrary, it is vague, vaporous, confused, thus reducing the _force_ of\nthe \u00e6sthetic fact to the _weakness_ of bad memory. But the dilemma is\ninexorable: either keep association and give up unity, or keep unity\nand give up association. No third way out of the difficulty exists.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of \u00e6sthetic physics._]\n\nFrom the failure to analyse so-called natural beauty thoroughly and to\nrecognize that it is simply an incident of \u00e6sthetic reproduction, and\nfrom having looked upon it, on the contrary, as given in nature, is\nderived all that portion of treatises upon \u00c6sthetic entitled _Beauty\nof Nature_ or _\u00c6sthetic Physics_; sometimes even subdivided, save\nthe mark, into \u00e6sthetic Mineralogy, Botany and Zoology. We do not\nwish to deny that such treatises contain many just observations, and\nare sometimes themselves works of art, in so far as they represent\nbeautifully the imaginings and fancies or impressions of their authors.\nBut we must affirm it to be scientifically false to ask oneself if\nthe dog be beautiful and the ornithorhynchus ugly, the lily beautiful\nand the artichoke ugly. Indeed, the error is here double. On the one\nhand, \u00e6sthetic Physics falls back into the equivocation of the theory\nof artistic and literary kinds, of attempting to attach \u00e6sthetic\ndeterminations to the abstractions of our intellect; on the other, it\nfails to recognize, as we said, the true formation of so-called natural\nbeauty, a formation which excludes even the possibility of the question\nas to whether some given individual animal, flower or man be beautiful\nor ugly. What is not produced by the \u00e6sthetic spirit, or cannot be\nreferred to it, is neither beautiful nor ugly. The \u00e6sthetic process\narises from the ideal connexions in which natural objects are placed.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of the theory of the beauty of the human body._]\n\nThe double error can be exemplified by the question as to the _Beauty\nof the human body,_ upon which whole volumes have been written. Here\nwe must before everything turn those who discuss this subject from the\nabstract toward the concrete, by asking: \"What do you mean by the\nhuman body, that of the male, the female, or the hermaphrodite?\" Let\nus assume that they reply by dividing the inquiry into two distinct\ninquiries, as to male and female beauty (there really are writers\nwho seriously discuss whether man or woman is the more beautiful);\nand let us continue: \"Masculine or feminine beauty; but of what race\nof men--the white, the yellow or the black, or any others that may\nexist, according to the division you prefer?\" Let us assume that they\nlimit themselves to the white race, and drive home the argument: \"To\nwhat sub-species of the white race?\" And when we have restricted them\ngradually to one corner of the white world, going, let us say, from\nthe Italian to the Tuscan, the Siennese, the Porta Camollia quarter,\nwe will proceed: \"Very good; but at what age of the human body, and in\nwhat condition and stage--that of the newborn babe, of the child, of\nthe boy, of the adolescent, of the man of middle age, and so on? and of\nhim who is at rest or of him who is at work, or of him who is occupied\nlike Paul Potter's bull, or the Ganymede of Rembrandt?\"\n\nHaving thus arrived, by successive reductions, at the individual\n_omnimode determinatum,_ or rather at \"this man here,\" pointed out with\nthe finger, it will be easy to expose the other error, by recalling\nwhat we have said about the natural fact, which is now beautiful, now\nugly, according to the point of view and to what is passing in the soul\nof the artist. If even the Gulf of Naples have its detractors, and if\nthere be artists who declare it inexpressive, preferring the \"gloomy\nfirs,\" the \"clouds and perpetual north winds,\" of northern seas; is it\nreally possible that such relativity does not exist for the human body,\nsource of the most varied suggestions?\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of the beauty of geometrical figures._]\n\nThe question of the _beauty of geometrical figures_ is connected with\n\u00e6sthetic Physics. But if by geometrical figures be understood the\nconcepts of geometry (the concepts of the triangle, the square, the\ncone), these are neither beautiful nor ugly, just because they are\nconcepts. If, on the other hand, by such figures be understood bodies\nwhich possess definite geometrical forms, they will be beautiful\nor ugly, like every natural fact, according to the ideal connexions\nin which they are placed. Some hold that those geometrical figures\nare beautiful which point upwards, since they give the suggestion\nof firmness and of power. We do not deny that this may be so. But\nit must not be denied on the other hand that those also may possess\nbeauty which give the impression of instability and weakness, where\nthey represent just the insecure and the feeble; and that in these\nlast cases the firmness of the straight fine and the lightness of the\ncone or of the equilateral triangle would seem to be on the contrary\nelements of ugliness.\n\nCertainly, such questions as to the beauty of nature and the beauty\nof geometry, like others analogous as to the historically beautiful\nand human beauty, seem less absurd in the \u00c6sthetic of the sympathetic,\nwhich really means by the words \"\u00e6sthetic beauty\" the representation\nof the pleasing. But the claim to determine scientifically what are\nsympathetic contents and what are irremediably antipathetic is none the\nless erroneous, even in the sphere of that doctrine and after laying\ndown those premises. One can only answer such questions by repeating\nwith an infinitely long postscript the _Sunt quos_ of the first ode of\nthe first book of Horace, and the _Havvi chi_ of Leopardi's letter to\nCarlo Pepoli. To each man his beautiful (= sympathetic), as to each man\nhis fair one. Philography is not science.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of another aspect of the imitation of nature._]\n\nThe artist sometimes has naturally existing facts before him, in\nproducing the artificial instrument, or physically beautiful. These are\ncalled his _models_: bodies, stuffs, flowers and so on. Let us run over\nthe sketches, studies and notes of artists: Leonardo noted down in his\npocket-book, when he was working on the Last Supper: \"Giovannina, weird\nface, is at St. Catherine's, at the Hospital; Cristofano di Castiglione\nis at the Piet\u00e0, he has a fine head; Christ, Giovan Conte, of Cardinal\nMortaro's suite.\" And so on. From this comes the illusion that the\nartist _imitates nature,_ when it would perhaps be more exact to say\nthat nature imitates the artist, and obeys him. The illusion that\n_art imitates nature_ has sometimes found ground and support in this\nillusion, as also in its variant, more easily maintained, which makes\nof art the _idealizer of nature._ This last theory presents the process\nout of its true order, which indeed is not merely upset but actually\ninverted; for the artist does not proceed from external reality, in\norder to modify it by approximating it to the ideal; he goes from\nthe impression of external nature to expression, that is to say, his\nideal, and from this passes to the natural fact, which he employs as\ninstrument of reproduction of the ideal fact.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of the theory of the elementary forms of the\nbeautiful._]\n\nAnother consequence of the confusion between the \u00e6sthetic fact and the\nphysical fact is the theory of the _elementary forms of the beautiful._\nIf expression, if the beautiful, be indivisible, the physical fact on\nthe contrary, in which it externalizes itself, can easily be divided\nand subdivided: for example, a painted surface, into lines and colours,\ngroups and curves of lines, kinds of colours, and so on; a poem, into\nstrophes, verses, feet, syllables; a piece of prose, into chapters,\nparagraphs, headings, periods, phrases, words and so on. The parts\nthus obtained are not \u00e6sthetic facts, but smaller physical facts,\narbitrarily divided. If this path were followed and the confusion\npersisted in, we should end by concluding that the true elementary\nforms of the beautiful are _atoms._\n\nThe \u00e6sthetic law, several times promulgated, that beauty must\nhave _bulk,_ could be invoked against the atoms. It cannot be the\nimperceptibility of the too small, or the inapprehensibility of the\ntoo large. But a greatness determined by perceptibility, not by\nmeasurement, implies a concept widely different from the mathematical.\nIndeed, what is called imperceptible and inapprehensible does not\nproduce an impression, because it is not a real fact, but a concept:\nthe demand for bulk in the beautiful is thus reduced to the actual\npresence of the physical fact, which serves for the reproduction of the\nbeautiful.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of the search for the objective conditions of the\nbeautiful._]\n\nContinuing the search for the _physical laws_ or for the _objective\nconditions of the beautiful,_ it has been asked: To what physical facts\ndoes the beautiful correspond? To what the ugly? To what unions of\ntones, colours, sizes, mathematically determinable? Such inquiries are\nas if in Political Economy one were to seek for the laws of exchange\nin the physical nature of the objects exchanged. The persistent\nfruitlessness of the attempt should have given rise before long to some\nsuspicion of its vanity. In our times, especially, necessity for an\n_inductive_ \u00c6sthetic has been often proclaimed, of an \u00c6sthetic starting\n_from below,_ proceeding like natural science and not jumping to its\nconclusions. Inductive? But \u00c6sthetic has always been both inductive and\ndeductive, like every philosophical science; induction and deduction\ncannot be separated, nor can they separately avail to characterize\na true science. But the word \"induction\" was not pronounced here by\nchance. The intention was to imply that the \u00e6sthetic fact is really\nnothing but a physical fact, to be studied by the methods proper to the\nphysical and natural sciences.\n\nWith such a presupposition and in such a faith did inductive \u00c6sthetic\nor \u00c6sthetic _from below_ (what pride in this modesty!) begin its\nlabours. It conscientiously began by making a collection of _beautiful\nthings,_ for example, a great number of envelopes of various shapes and\nsizes, and asked which of these give the impression of beauty and which\nof ugliness. As was to be expected, the inductive \u00e6stheticians speedily\nfound themselves in a difficulty, for the same objects that appeared\nugly in one aspect appeared beautiful in another. A coarse yellow\nenvelope, which would be extremely ugly for the purpose of enclosing\na love-letter, is just what is wanted for a writ served by process on\nstamped paper, which in its turn would look very bad, or seem at any\nrate an irony, enclosed in a square envelope of English paper. Such\nconsiderations of simple common sense should have sufficed to convince\ninductive \u00e6stheticians that the beautiful has no physical existence,\nand cause them to desist from their vain and ridiculous quest. But no:\nthey had recourse to an expedient, as to which we should hardly like to\nsay how far it belongs to the strict method of natural science. They\nsent their envelopes round and opened a _referendum,_ trying to settle\nin what beauty or ugliness consists by the votes of the majority.\n\n[Sidenote: _The Astrology of \u00c6sthetic._]\n\nWe will not waste time over this subject, lest we should seem to be\nturning ourselves into tellers of comic tales rather than expositors of\n\u00e6sthetic science and of its problems. It is a matter of fact that the\ninductive \u00e6stheticians have not yet discovered _one single law._\n\nHe who despairs of doctors is apt to abandon himself to charlatans.\nThis has befallen those who have believed in the naturalistic laws of\nthe beautiful. Artists sometimes adopt empirical canons, such as that\nof the proportions of the human body, or of the golden section, that\nis to say, of a line divided into two parts in such a manner that the\nless is to the greater as is the greater to the whole line (_be : ac\n= ac : ab_). Such canons easily become their superstitions, and they\nattribute to them the success of their works. Thus Mich\u00e6l Angelo left\nas a precept to his disciple Marco del Pino da Siena that \"he should\nalways make a pyramidal serpentine figure multiplied by one two and\nthree,\" a precept which did not enable Marco da Siena to emerge from\nthat mediocrity which we can yet observe in many of his paintings that\nexist here in Naples. Others took Mich\u00e6l Angelo's words as authority\nfor the precept that serpentine undulating lines were the true _lines\nof beauty._ Whole volumes have been composed on these laws of beauty,\non the golden section and on the undulating and serpentine lines. These\nshould in our opinion be looked upon as the _astrology of \u00c6sthetic._\n\n\n\n\nXV\n\n\nTHE ACTIVITY OF EXTERNALIZATION. TECHNIQUE AND THE THEORY OF THE ARTS\n\n\n[Sidenote: _The practical activity of externalization._]\n\nThe fact of the production of physical beauty implies, as has already\nbeen remarked, a vigilant will, which persists in not allowing certain\nvisions, intuitions or representations to be lost. Such a will must be\nable to act with the utmost rapidity and as it were instinctively, and\nmay also need long and laborious deliberations. In any case, thus and\nthus only does the practical activity enter into relations with the\n\u00e6sthetic, that is to say, no longer as its simple accompaniment, but as\na really distinct moment of it. We cannot will or not will our \u00e6sthetic\nvision: we can however will or not will to externalize it, or rather,\nto preserve and communicate to others, or not, the externalization\nproduced.\n\n[Sidenote: _The technique of externalization._]\n\nThis volitional fact of externalization is preceded by a complex of\nvarious kinds of knowledge. These are known as _technique,_ like all\nknowledge which precedes a practical activity. Thus we talk of an\n_artistic technique_ in the same metaphorical and elliptic manner that\nwe talk of the physically beautiful, that is to say (in more precise\nlanguage), _knowledge at the service of the practical activity directed\nto producing stimuli to \u00e6sthetic reproduction._ In place of employing\nso lengthy a phrase, we shall here avail ourselves of ordinary\nterminology, whose meaning we now understand.\n\nThe possibility of this technical knowledge, at the service of artistic\nreproduction, is what has led minds astray to imagine the existence\nof an \u00e6sthetic technique of internal expression, which is tantamount\nto saying, a doctrine of the _means of internal expression,_ a thing\nthat is altogether inconceivable. And we know well the reason of its\ninconceivability; expression, considered in itself, is a primary\ntheoretic activity, and as such precedes practice and intellectual\nknowledge which illumines practice and is independent alike of both.\nIt aids for its part to illumine practice, but is not illuminated by\nit. Expression does not possess _means,_ because it has not an _end_;\nit has intuitions of things, but it does not will and is therefore\nunanalysable into the abstract components of volition, means and end.\nSometimes a certain writer is said to have invented a new technique\nof fiction or of drama, or a painter is said to have discovered a new\ntechnique of distributing light. The word is used here at hazard;\nbecause the so-called _new technique_ is really _that romance itself,\nor that new picture_ itself and nothing else. The distribution of\nlight belongs to the vision of the picture itself; as the technique\nof a dramatist is his dramatic conception itself. On other occasions,\nthe word \"technique\" is used to designate certain merits or defects\nin a work that is a failure; and it is euphemistically said that the\nconception is bad but the technique good, or that the conception is\ngood but the technique bad.\n\nOn the other hand, when we talk of the different ways of painting\nin oils, or of etching, or of sculpturing in alabaster, then the\nword \"technique\" is in its place; but in such a case the adjective\n\"artistic\" is used metaphorically. And if a dramatic technique in the\n\u00e6sthetic sense be impossible, a theatrical technique of processes of\nexternalization of certain particular \u00e6sthetic works is not impossible.\nWhen, for instance, women were introduced on the stage in Italy in the\nsecond half of the sixteenth century, in place of men dressed as women,\nthis was a true and real discovery in theatrical technique; such too\nwas the perfecting in the following century of machines for the rapid\nchanging of scenery by the impresarios of Venice.\n\nThe collection of technical knowledge at the service of artists\ndesirous of externalizing their expressions, can be divided into\ngroups, which may be entitled _theories of the arts._ Thus arises\na theory of Architecture, comprising mechanical laws, information\nrelating to the weight or resistance of the materials of construction\nor of fortification, manuals relating to the method of mixing lime or\nstucco; a theory of Sculpture, containing advice as to the instruments\nto be used for sculpturing the various sorts of stone, for obtaining\na successful mixture of bronze, for working with the chisel, for\nthe accurate casting of the clay or plaster model, for keeping clay\ndamp; a theory of Painting, on the various techniques of tempera,\nof oil-painting, of water-colour, of pastel, on the proportions of\nthe human body, on the laws of perspective; a theory of Oratory,\nwith precepts as to the method of producing, of exercising and of\nstrengthening the voice, of attitude in impersonation and gesture; a\ntheory of Music, on the combinations and fusions of tones and sounds;\nand so on. Such collections of precepts abound in all literatures.\nAnd since it is impossible to say what is useful and what useless to\nknow, books of this sort become very often a sort of encyclop\u00e6dias or\n_catalogues of desiderata._ Vitruvius, in his treatise on Architecture,\nclaims for the architect a knowledge of letters, of drawing, of\ngeometry, of arithmetic, of optic, of history, of natural and moral\nphilosophy, of jurisprudence, of medicine, of astrology, of music, and\nso on. Everything is worth knowing: learn the art and have done with it.\n\n[Sidenote: _Technical theories of the different arts._]\n\nIt should be evident that such empirical collections are not reducible\nto science. They are composed of notions, taken from various sciences\nand disciplines, and their philosophical and scientific principles\nare to be found in the latter. To propose to construct a scientific\ntheory of the different arts would be to wish to reduce to the single\nand homogeneous what is by nature multiple and heterogeneous; to wish\nto destroy the existence as a collection of what was put together\nprecisely to form a collection. Were we to try to give scientific\nform to the manuals of the architect, the painter, or the musician,\nit is clear that nothing would remain in our hands but the general\nprinciples of Mechanics, Optics, or Acoustics. And if we were to\nextract and isolate what may be scattered among them of properly\nartistic observations, to make of them a scientific system, then the\nsphere of the individual art would be abandoned and that of \u00c6sthetic\nentered, for \u00c6sthetic is always general \u00c6sthetic, or rather it cannot\nbe divided into general and special. This last case (that is, the\nattempt to furnish a technique which ends in composing an \u00c6sthetic)\narises when men possessing strong scientific instincts and a natural\ntendency to philosophy set themselves to work to produce such theories\nand technical manuals.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of \u00e6sthetic theories of particular arts_.]\n\nBut the confusion between Physics and \u00c6sthetic has attained to its\nhighest degree, when \u00e6sthetic theories of particular arts are imagined,\nto answer such questions as: What are the _limits_ of each art? What\ncan be represented with colours, and what with sounds? What with simple\nmonochromatic lines and what with touches of various colours? What with\ntones, and what with metres and rhythms? What are the limits between\nthe figurative and the auditive arts, between painting and sculpture,\npoetry and music?\n\nThis, translated into scientific language, is tantamount to asking:\nWhat is the connexion between Acoustics and \u00e6sthetic expression? What\nbetween the latter and Optics?--and the like. Now, if _there is no\npassage_ from the physical fact to the \u00e6sthetic, how could there be\nfrom the \u00e6sthetic to particular groups of physical facts, such as the\nphenomena of Optics or of Acoustics?\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of the classification of the arts._]\n\nThe so-called _arts_ have no \u00e6sthetic limits, because, in order to\nhave them, they would need to have also \u00e6sthetic existence in their\nparticularity; and we have demonstrated the altogether empirical\ngenesis of those partitions. Consequently, any attempt at an \u00e6sthetic\nclassification of the arts is absurd. If they be without limits,\nthey are not exactly determinable, and consequently cannot be\nphilosophically classified. All the books dealing with classifications\nand systems of the arts could be burned without any loss whatever. (We\nsay this with the utmost respect to the writers who have expended\ntheir labours upon them.)\n\nThe impossibility of such systematizations finds something like a proof\nin the strange attempts made to carry it out. The first and most common\npartition is that into arts of _hearing, sight,_ and _imagination_;\nas if eyes, ears, and imagination were on the same level and could be\ndeduced from the same logical variable as _fundamentum divisionis._\nOthers have proposed the division into arts of _space_ and arts of\n_time,_ arts of _rest_; and _movement_; as if the concepts of space,\ntime, rest and motion could determine special \u00e6sthetic forms and\npossess anything in common with art as such. Finally, others have\namused themselves by dividing them into _classic_ and _romantic,_\nor into _oriental, classic,_ and _romantic,_ thereby conferring the\nvalue of scientific concepts upon simple historical denominations, or\nfalling into those rhetorical partitions of expressive forms, already\ncriticized above; or into arts _that can only be seen from one side,_\nlike painting, and arts _that can be seen from all sides,_ like\nsculpture--and similar extravagances, which hold good neither in heaven\nnor on earth.\n\nThe theory of the limits of the arts was perhaps at the time when\nit was put forward a beneficial critical reaction against those who\nbelieved in the possibility of remodelling one expression into another,\nas the _Iliad_ or _Paradise Lost_ into a series of paintings, and\nindeed held a poem to be of greater or lesser value according as it\ncould or could not be translated into pictures by a painter. But if the\nrebellion were reasonable and resulted in victory, this does not mean\nthat the arguments employed and the systems constructed for the purpose\nwere sound.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of the theory of the union of the arts._]\n\nAnother theory which is a corollary to that of the arts and their\nlimits, falls with them; that of the _union of the arts._ Given\nparticular arts, distinct and limited, it was asked: Which is the most\n_powerful_? Do we not obtain _more powerful_ effects by _uniting_\nseveral? We know nothing of this: we know only that in each particular\ncase certain given artistic intuitions have need of definite physical\nmeans for their reproduction and other artistic intuitions of other\nmeans. We can obtain the effect of certain plays by simply reading\nthem; others need declamation and scenic display: there are some\nartistic intuitions which need for their full externalization words,\nsong, musical instruments, colours, statuary, architecture, actors;\nwhile others are quite complete in a slight outline made with the\npen, or a few strokes of the pencil. But it is false to suppose that\ndeclamation and scenic effects and all the other things together that\nwe have mentioned are _more powerful_ than a simple reading or a simple\noutline of pen or pencil; because each of those facts or groups of\nfacts has, so to say, a different purpose, and the power of the means\ncannot be compared when the purposes are different.\n\n[Sidenote: _Relation of the activity of externalization to utility and\nmorality._]\n\nFinally, it is only from the point of view of a clear and rigorous\ndistinction between the true and proper \u00e6sthetic activity and the\npractical activity of externalization that we can solve the complicated\nand confused questions as to the relations between _art and utility_\nand _art and morality._\n\nWe have demonstrated above that art as art is independent both of\nutility and of morality, as also of all practical value. Without this\nindependence, it would not be possible to speak of an intrinsic value\nof art, nor indeed to conceive an \u00e6sthetic science, which demands the\nautonomy of the \u00e6sthetic fact as its necessary condition.\n\nBut it would be erroneous to maintain that this independence of the\nvision or intuition or _internal expression_ of the artist should\nbe simply extended to the practical activity of externalization and\ncommunication which may or may not follow the \u00e6sthetic fact. If by art\nbe understood the externalization of art, then utility and morality\nhave a perfect right to enter into it; that is to say, the right to be\nmaster in one's own house.\n\nIndeed we do not externalize and fix all the many expressions and\nintuitions which we form in our spirit; we do not declare our every\nthought in a loud voice, or write it down, or print, or draw, or\npaint, or expose it to the public. We _select_ from the crowd of\nintuitions which are formed or at least sketched within us; and the\nselection is ruled by the criteria of the economic disposition of life\nand of its moral direction. Therefore, when we have fixed an intuition,\nwe have still to decide whether or no we should communicate it to\nothers, and to whom, and when, and how; all which deliberations come\nequally under the utilitarian and ethical criterion.\n\nThus we find the concepts of _selection,_ of the _interesting,_ of\n_morality,_ of an _educational end,_ of _popularity,_ etc., to some\nextent justified, although these can in no way be justified when\nimposed upon art as art, and we have ourselves rejected them in pure\n\u00c6sthetic. Error always contains an element of truth. He who formulated\nthose erroneous \u00e6sthetic propositions in reality had his eye on\npractical facts, which attach themselves externally to the \u00e6sthetic\nfact and belong to economic and moral fife.\n\nIt is well to advocate yet greater freedom in making known the means\nof \u00e6sthetic reproduction; we are of the same opinion, and leave\nprojects for legislation and for legal action against immoral art,\nto hypocrites, to the ingenuous and to wasters of time. But the\nproclamation of this freedom, and the fixing of its limits, how\nwide soever they be, is always the task of morality. And it would\nin any case be out of place to invoke that highest principle, that\n_fundamentum \u00e6sthetices,_ which is the independence of art, to deduce\nfrom it the guiltlessness of the artist who calculates like an\nimmoral speculator upon the unhealthy tastes of his readers in the\nexternalization of his imaginings, or the freedom of hawkers to sell\nobscene statuettes in the public squares. This last case is the affair\nof the police, as the first must be brought before the tribunal of\nthe moral consciousness. The \u00e6sthetic judgement on the work of art\nhas nothing to do with the morality of the artist as a practical man,\nor with the provisions to be taken that the things of art may not be\ndiverted to evil ends alien to her nature, which is pure theoretic\ncontemplation.\n\n\n\n\nXVI\n\n\nTASTE AND THE REPRODUCTION OF ART\n\n\n[Sidenote: _\u00c6sthetic judgement. Its identity with \u00e6sthetic\nreproduction._]\n\nWhen the entire \u00e6sthetic and externalizing process has been completed,\nwhen a beautiful expression has been produced and it has been fixed\nin a definite physical material, what is meant by _judging ill To\nreproduce it in oneself,_ answer the critics of art, almost with one\nvoice. Very good. Let us try thoroughly to understand this fact, and\nwith that object in view, let us represent it schematically.\n\nThe individual A is seeking the expression of an impression which\nhe feels or anticipates, but has not yet expressed. See him trying\nvarious words and phrases which may give the sought-for expression,\nthat expression which must exist, but which he does not possess. He\ntries the combination _m,_ but rejects it as unsuitable, inexpressive,\nincomplete, ugly: he tries the combination _n,_ with a like result.\n_He does not see at all, or does not see clearly._ The expression\nstill eludes him. After other vain attempts, during which he sometimes\napproaches, sometimes retreats from the mark at which he aims, all of a\nsudden (almost as though formed spontaneously of itself) he forms the\nsought-for expression, and _lux facta est._ He enjoys for an instant\n\u00e6sthetic pleasure or the pleasure of the beautiful. The ugly, with\nits correlative displeasure, was the \u00e6sthetic activity which had not\nsucceeded in conquering the obstacle; the beautiful is the expressive\nactivity which now displays itself triumphant.\n\nWe have taken this example from the domain of speech, as being nearer\nand more accessible, and because we all talk, though we do not all draw\nor paint. Now if another individual, whom we shall call B, is to judge\nthat expression and decide whether it be beautiful or ugly, he _must of\nnecessity place himself at A's point of view,_ and go through the whole\nprocess again, with the help of the physical sign supplied to him by A.\nIf A has seen clearly, then B (who has placed himself at A's point of\nview) will also see clearly and will see this expression as beautiful.\nIf A has not seen clearly, then B also will not see clearly, and will\nfind the expression more or less ugly, _just as A did._\n\n[Sidenote: _Impossibility of divergences._]\n\nIt may be observed that we have not taken into consideration two other\ncases: that of A having a clear and B an obscure vision; and that of A\nhaving an obscure and B a clear vision. Strictly speaking, these two\ncases are _impossible._\n\nExpressive activity, just because it is activity, is not caprice, but\nspiritual necessity; it cannot solve a definite \u00e6sthetic problem save\nin one way, which is the right way. It will be objected to this plain\nstatement that works which seem beautiful to the artists are afterwards\nfound to be ugly by the critics; while other works with which the\nartists were discontented and held to be imperfect or failures are, on\nthe contrary, held to be beautiful and perfect by the critics. But in\nthis case, one of the two is wrong: either the critics or the artists,\nsometimes the artists, at other times the critics. Indeed, the producer\nof an expression does not always fully realize what is happening in\nhis soul. Haste, vanity, want of reflexion, theoretic prejudices,\nmake people say, and others sometimes almost believe, that works of\nours are beautiful, which, if we really looked into ourselves, we\nshould see to be ugly, as they are in reality. Thus poor Don Quixote,\nwhen he had reattached to his helmet as well as he could the vizor of\ncardboard--the vizor that had showed itself to possess but the feeblest\nforce of resistance at the first encounter,--took good care not to test\nit again with a well-delivered sword-thrust, but simply declared and\nmaintained it to be (says the author) _por celada finisima de encaxe._\nAnd in other cases, the same reasons, or opposite but analogous\nones, trouble the consciousness of the artist, and cause him to value\nbadly what he has successfully produced, or to strive to undo! and do\nagain for the worse what he has done well in artistic spontaneity.\nAn instance of this is Tasso and his passage from the _Gerusalemme\nliberata_ to the _Gerusalemme conquistata._ In the same way, haste,\nlaziness, want of reflexion, theoretic prejudices, personal sympathies\nor animosities, and other motives of a similar sort, sometimes cause\nthe critics to proclaim ugly what is beautiful, and beautiful what is\nugly. Were they to eliminate such disturbing elements, they would feel\nthe work of art as it really is, and would not leave it to posterity,\nthat more diligent and more dispassionate judge, to award the palm, or\nto do that justice which they have refused.\n\n[Sidenote: _Identity of taste and genius._]\n\nIt is clear from the preceding theorem that the activity of judgement\nwhich criticizes and recognizes the beautiful is identical with\nwhat produces it. The only difference lies in the diversity of\ncircumstances, since in the one case it is a question of \u00e6sthetic\nproduction, in the other of reproduction. The activity which judges is\ncalled _taste_; the productive activity is called _genius_: genius and\ntaste are therefore substantially _identical._\n\nThe common remark that the critic should possess something of the\ngenius of the artist and that the artist should possess taste, gives\na glimpse of this identity; or the remark that there exists an active\n(productive) and a passive (reproductive) taste. But it is also\nnegated in other equally common remarks, as when people speak of taste\nwithout genius, or of genius without taste. These last observations\nare meaningless, unless they allude to quantitative or psychological\ndifferences, those being called geniuses without taste who produce\nworks of art, inspired in their chief parts and neglected or defective\nin their secondary parts, and men of taste without genius, those\nwho, while they succeed in obtaining certain isolated or secondary\nmerits, do not possess sufficient power for a great artistic\nsynthesis. Analogous explanations can easily be given of other similar\nexpressions. But to posit a substantial difference between genius and\ntaste, between artistic production and reproduction, would render both\ncommunication and judgement alike inconceivable. How could we judge\nwhat remained external to us? How could that which is produced by a\ngiven activity be judged by a _different_ activity? The critic may\nbe a small genius, the artist a great one; the former may have the\nstrength of ten, the latter of a hundred; the former, in order to reach\na certain height, will have need of the assistance of the other; but\nthe nature of both must remain the same. To judge Dante, we must raise\nourselves to his level: let it be well understood that empirically we\nare not Dante, nor Dante we; but in that moment of contemplation and\njudgement, our spirit is one with that of the poet, and in that moment\nwe and he are one thing. In this identity alone resides the possibility\nthat our little souls can echo great souls, and grow great with them in\nthe universality of the spirit.\n\n[Sidenote: _Analogy with other activities._]\n\nLet us remark in passing that what has been said of the \u00e6sthetic\njudgement holds good equally for every other activity and for every\nother judgement; and that scientific, economic, and ethical criticism\nis effected in a like manner. To limit ourselves to this last, only if\nwe place ourselves ideally in the same conditions in which he found\nhimself who took a given resolution, can we form a judgement as to\nwhether his decision were moral or immoral. An action would otherwise\nremain incomprehensible and therefore impossible to judge. A homicide\nmay be a rascal or a hero: if this be, within limits, indifferent\nas regards the defence of society, which condemns both to the same\npunishment, it is not indifferent to one who wishes to distinguish and\njudge from the moral point of view, and we therefore cannot dispense\nwith reconstructing the individual psychology of the homicide, in order\nto determine the true nature of his deed, not merely in its legal,\nbut also in its moral aspect. In Ethics, a moral taste or tact is\nsometimes mentioned, answering to what is generally called the moral\nconsciousness, that is to say, to the activity of the good will itself.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of \u00e6sthetic absolutism (intellectualism) and\nrelativism._]\n\nThe explanation above given of \u00e6sthetic judgement or reproduction both\nagrees with and condemns the absolutists and relativists, those who\naffirm and those who deny the absoluteness of taste.\n\nIn affirming that the beautiful can be judged, the absolutists are\nright; but the theory on which they found their affirmation is not\ntenable, because they conceive of the beautiful, that is, \u00e6sthetic\nvalue, as something placed outside the \u00e6sthetic activity, as a concept\nor a model which an artist realizes in his work, and of which the\ncritic avails himself afterwards in judging the work itself. These\nconcepts and models have no existence in art, for when proclaiming\nthat every art can be judged only in itself and that it has its model\nin itself, they implicitly denied the existence of objective models of\nbeauty, whether these are intellectual concepts, or ideas suspended in\na metaphysical heaven.\n\nIn proclaiming this, their-adversaries, the relativists, are perfectly\nright, and effect an advance upon them. However, the initial\nrationality of their thesis in its turn becomes converted into a false\ntheory. Repeating the ancient adage that there is no accounting for\ntastes, they believe that \u00e6sthetic expression is of the same nature as\nthe pleasant and the unpleasant, which every one feels in his own way,\nand about which there is no dispute. But we know that the pleasant and\nthe unpleasant are utilitarian, practical facts. Thus the relativists\ndeny the specific character of the \u00e6sthetic fact, and again confound\nexpression with impression, the theoretic with the practical.\n\nThe true solution lies in rejecting alike relativism or psychologism\nand false absolutism; and in recognizing that the criterion of taste is\nabsolute, but absolute in a different way from that of the intellect,\nwhich expresses itself in ratiocination. The criterion of taste is\nabsolute, with the intuitive absoluteness of the imagination. Thus any\nact of expressive activity, which is so really, is to be recognized\nas beautiful, and any fact as ugly in which expressive activity and\npassivity are found engaged with one another in an unfinished struggle.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of relative relativism._]\n\nBetween absolutists and relativists is a third class, which may be\ncalled that of the relative relativists. These affirm the existence of\nabsolute values in other fields, such as Logic and Ethic, but deny it\nin the field of \u00c6sthetic. To dispute about science or morals seems to\nthem to be rational and justifiable, because science depends upon the\nuniversal, common to all men, and morality upon duty, which is also\na law of human nature; but how dispute about art, which depends upon\nimagination? Not only, however, is the imaginative activity universal\nand no less inherent in human nature than the logical concept and\npractical duty; but there is a preliminary objection to the thesis in\nquestion. If the absoluteness of the imagination be denied, we must\nalso deny intellectual or conceptual truth and implicitly morality.\nDoes not morality presuppose logical distinctions? How could these be\nknown, otherwise than in expressions and words, that is to say, in\nimaginative form? If the absoluteness of the imagination were removed,\nthe life of the spirit would tremble to its foundations. One individual\nwould no longer understand another, nor indeed his own self of a moment\nbefore, which is already another individual considered a moment after.\n\n[Sidenote: _Objection founded on the variation of the stimulus and of\npsychic disposition._]\n\nNevertheless, variety of judgements is an indubitable fact. Men\ndisagree as to logical, ethical, and economical valuations; and they\ndisagree equally or even more as to the \u00e6sthetic. If certain reasons\nrecorded by us above, such as haste, prejudices, passions, etc., may\nlessen the importance of this disagreement, they do not on that account\nannul it. When speaking of the stimuli of reproduction we have added a\ncaution, for we said that reproduction takes place, _if all the other\nconditions remain equal._ Do they remain equal? Does the hypothesis\ncorrespond to reality?\n\nIt would appear not. In order to reproduce an impression several times\nby means of a suitable physical stimulus it is necessary that this\nstimulus be not changed, and that the organism remain in the same\npsychical conditions as those in which was experienced the impression\nthat it is desired to reproduce. Now it is a fact that the physical\nstimulus is continually changing, and in like manner the psychological\nconditions.\n\nOil-paintings grow dark, frescoes fade, statues lose noses, hands\nand legs, architecture becomes totally or partially a ruin, the\ntradition of the execution of a piece of music is lost, the text of a\npoem is corrupted by bad copyists or bad printing. These are obvious\ninstances of I the changes which daily occur in objects or physical\nstimuli. As regards psychological conditions, we will not dwell upon\nthe cases of deafness or blindness, that is to say, upon the loss of\nentire orders of psychical impressions; these cases are secondary and\nof less importance compared with the fundamental, daily, inevitable\nand perpetual changes of the society around us and of the internal\nconditions of our individual life. The phonetic manifestations or\nwords and verses of Dante's _Commedia_ must produce a very different\nimpression on an Italian citizen engaged in the politics of the\nthird Rome, from that experienced by a well-informed and intimate\ncontemporary of the poet. The Madonna of Cimabue is still in the Church\nof Santa Maria Novella; but does she speak to the visitor of to-day as\nto the Florentines of the thirteenth century? Even though she were not\nalso darkened by time, must we not suppose that the impression which\nshe now produces is altogether different from that of former times? And\neven in the case of the same individual poet, will a poem composed by\nhim in youth make the same impression upon him when he re-reads it in\nhis old age, with psychic conditions altogether changed?\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of the distinction of signs into natural and\nconventional._]\n\nIt is true that certain \u00e6stheticians have attempted a distinction\nbetween stimuli and stimuli, between _natural_ and _conventional_\nsigns. The former are held to have a constant effect upon all; the\nlatter only upon a limited circle. In their belief, signs employed\nin painting are natural, those used in poetry conventional. But the\ndifference between them is at the most only one of degree. It has\noften been said that painting is a language understood by all, while\nwith poetry it is otherwise. Here, for example, Leonardo found one\nof the prerogatives of his art, \"which hath not need of interpreters\nof different tongues as have letters,\" and it pleases man and beast.\nHe relates the anecdote of that portrait of the father of a family\n\"which the little grandchildren were wont to caress while they were\nstill in swaddling-clothes, and the dogs and cats of the house in like\nmanner.\" But other anecdotes, such as those of the savages who took the\nportrait of a soldier for a boat, or considered the portrait of a man\non horseback to be furnished with only one leg, are apt to shake one's\nfaith in the understanding of painting by sucklings, dogs and cats.\nFortunately, no arduous researches are necessary to convince oneself\nthat pictures, poetry and all works of art only produce effects upon\nsouls prepared to receive them. Natural signs do not exist; because\nall are equally conventional, or, to speak with greater exactness,\n_historically conditioned._\n\n[Sidenote: _The surmounting of variety._]\n\nGranting this, how are we to succeed in causing the expression to be\nreproduced by means of the physical object? How obtain the same effect,\nwhen the conditions are no longer the same? Would it not, rather, seem\nnecessary to conclude that expressions cannot be reproduced, despite\nthe physical instruments made for the purpose, and that what is called\nreproduction consists in ever new expressions? Such would indeed be the\nconclusion if the varieties of physical and psychical conditions were\nintrinsically insurmountable. But since the insuperability has none\nof the characteristics of necessity we must on the contrary conclude\nthat reproduction always occurs when we can replace ourselves in the\nconditions in which the stimulus (physical beauty) was produced.\n\nNot only can we replace ourselves in these conditions as an abstract\npossibility, but as a matter of fact we do so continually. Individual\nlife, which is communion with ourselves (with our past), and social\nlife, which is communion with our like, would not otherwise be\npossible.\n\n[Sidenote: _Restorations and historical interpretation._]\n\nAs regards the physical object, pal\u00e6ographers and philologists,\nwho _restore_ to texts their original physiognomy, _restorers_ of\npictures and of statues and other industrious toilers strive precisely\nto preserve or to restore to the physical object all its primitive\nenergy. These efforts are certainly not always successful, or are\nnot completely successful, for it is never or hardly ever possible\nto obtain a restoration complete in its smallest details. But the\ninsurmountable is here only present accidentally and must not lead us\nto overlook the successes which actually are achieved.\n\n_Historical interpretation_ labours for its part to reintegrate in\nus the psychological conditions which have changed in the course of\nhistory. It revives the dead, completes the fragmentary, and enables us\nto see a work of art (a physical object) as its author saw it in the\nmoment of production.\n\nA condition of this historical labour is tradition, with the help of\nwhich it is possible to collect the scattered rays and concentrate them\nin one focus. With the help of memory we surround the physical stimulus\nwith all the facts among which it arose; and thus we enable it to act\nupon us as it acted upon him who produced it.\n\nWhere the tradition is broken, interpretation is arrested; in this\ncase, the products of the past remain silent for us. Thus the\nexpressions contained in the Etruscan or Mexican inscriptions are\nunattainable; thus we still hear discussions among ethnographers as\nto whether certain products of the art of savages are pictures or\nwritings; thus arch\u00e6ologists and prehistorians are not always able\nto establish with certainty whether the figures found on the pottery\nof a certain region, and on other instruments employed, are of a\nreligious or profane nature. But the arrest of interpretation, as that\nof restoration, is never a definitely insurmountable barrier; and the\ndaily discoveries of new historical sources and of new methods of\nbetter exploiting the old, which we may hope to see ever improving,\nlink up again broken traditions.\n\nWe do not wish to deny that erroneous historical interpretation\nsometimes produces what may be called _palimpsests,_ new expressions\nimposed upon the ancient, artistic fancies instead of historical\nreproductions. The so-called \"fascination of the past\" depends in part\nupon these expressions of ours, which we weave upon the historical.\nThus has been discovered in Greek plastic art the calm and serene\nintuition of life of those peoples, who nevertheless felt the universal\nsorrow so poignantly; thus \"the terror of the year 1000\" has recently\nbeen discerned on the faces of the Byzantine saints, a terror which is\na misunderstanding, or an artificial legend invented later by men of\nlearning. But _historical criticism_ tends precisely to circumscribe\nfancies and to establish exactly the point of view from which we must\nlook.\n\nBy means of the above process we live in communication with other men\nof the present and of the past; and we must not conclude because we\nsometimes, and indeed often, meet with an unknown or an ill-known,\nthat therefore, when we believe we are engaged in a dialogue, we are\nalways speaking a monologue; or that we are unable even to repeat the\nmonologue which we formerly held with ourselves.\n\n\n\n\nXVII\n\n\nTHE HISTORY OF LITERATURE AND ART\n\n\nThis brief exposition of the method by which is obtained the\nreintegration of the original conditions in which the work of art\nwas produced, and consequently reproduction and judgement are made\npossible, shows how important is the function fulfilled by historical\nresearch in relation to artistic and literary works which is what is\nusually called _historical criticism_ or method in literature and art.\n\n[Sidenote: _Historical criticism in literature and art. Its\nimportance._]\n\nWithout tradition and historical criticism the enjoyment of all or\nnearly all the works of art produced by humanity would be irrevocably\nlost: we should be little more than animals, immersed in the present\nalone, or in the most recent past. It is fatuous to despise and laugh\nat one who reconstitutes an authentic text, explains the sense of\nforgotten words and customs, investigates the conditions in which an\nartist lived, and accomplishes all those labours which revive the\nqualities and the original colouring of works of art.\n\nSometimes a depreciatory or negative judgement is passed upon\nhistorical research because of the presumed or proved inability of such\nresearches, in many cases, to give us a true understanding of works\nof art. But it must be observed, in the first place, that historical\nresearch does not only fulfil the task of helping to reproduce and\njudge artistic works: the biography of a writer or of an artist, for\nexample, and the study of the customs of a period, have an interest of\ntheir own, that is to say, extraneous to the history of art, but not to\nother forms of historiography. If allusion be made to those researches\nwhich do not appear to have interest of any kind, nor to fulfil any\npurpose, it must be replied that the historical student must often\nreconcile himself to the useful but inglorious function of a collector\nof facts. These facts remain for the time being formless, incoherent\nand meaningless, but they are preserves or mines for the historian of\nthe future and for whosoever may afterwards want them for any purpose.\nIn the same way in a library, books which nobody asks for are placed\non the shelves and catalogued, because they may be asked for at some\ntime or other. Certainly, just as an intelligent librarian gives the\npreference to the acquisition and cataloguing of those books which he\nforesees may be of more or better service, so intelligent students\npossess an instinct as to what is or may more probably be of use among\nthe material of facts which they are examining; while others less\nwell endowed, less intelligent or more hasty in producing, accumulate\nuseless rubbish, refuse and sweepings, and lose themselves in details\nand petty discussions. But this appertains to the economy of research,\nand does not concern us. It concerns at most the master who selects the\nsubjects, the publisher who pays for the printing, and the critic who\nis called upon to praise or to blame the research workers.\n\nOn the other hand, it is clear that historical research directed to\nilluminate a work of art does not alone suffice to bring it to birth\nin our spirit and place us in a position to judge it, but presupposes\ntaste, that is to say, an alert and cultivated imagination. The\ngreatest historical erudition may accompany a gross or otherwise\ndefective taste, a slow imagination, or, as they say, a cold hard heart\nclosed to art. Which is the lesser evil, great erudition with defective\ntaste, or natural taste and much ignorance? The question has often been\nasked, and perhaps it will be best to deny that it has any meaning,\nbecause one cannot tell which of two evils is the less, or what exactly\nthat means. The merely learned man never succeeds in entering into\ndirect communion with great spirits; he keeps wandering for ever about\nthe outer courts, the staircases and antechambers of their palaces; but\nthe gifted ignoramus either passes by masterpieces to him inaccessible,\nor instead of understanding works of art as they really are, invents\nothers with his fancy. Now, the labour of the former may at least serve\nto enlighten others; but the genius of the latter remains altogether\nsterile in relation to knowledge. How then can we in a certain respect\nfail to prefer the conscientious learned man to the inconclusive though\ngifted man, who is not really gifted, if he resign himself and in so\nfar as he resigns himself, to his inconclusiveness?\n\n[Sidenote: _Literary and artistic history. Its distinction from\nhistorical criticism and from the \u00e6sthetic judgement._]\n\nWe must accurately distinguish _the history of art and literature_\nfrom those historical labours where works of art are used, but for\nextraneous purposes (such as biography, civil, religious and political\nhistory, etc.), and also from historical erudition directed to the\npreparation of the \u00e6sthetic synthesis of reproduction.\n\nThe difference of the first two is obvious. The history of art and\nliterature has the works of art themselves as its principal subject;\nthose other labours invoke and interrogate works of art, but only\nas witnesses from whom to discover the truth of facts which are not\n\u00e6sthetic. The second difference to which we have referred may seem less\nprofound. It is, however, very great. Erudition directed to illuminate\nthe understanding of works of art aims simply at calling into existence\na certain internal fact, an \u00e6sthetic reproduction. Artistic and\nliterary history, on the other hand, does not appear until after such\nreproduction has been obtained. It implies, therefore, a further stage\nof labour.\n\nLike all other history, its object is to record precisely such facts\nas have really taken place, in this case artistic and literary facts.\nA man who, after having acquired the requisite historical erudition,\nreproduces in himself and tastes a work of art, may remain simply\na man of taste, or at the most express his own feeling with an\nexclamation of praise or condemnation. This does not suffice for\nthe making of a historian of literature and art. Something else is\nneeded, namely, that a new mental operation succeed in him the simple\nreproduction. This new operation is in its turn an expression: the\nexpression of the reproduction; the historical description, exposition\nor representation. There is this difference, then, between the man of\ntaste and the historian: the first merely reproduces in his spirit the\nwork of art; the second, after having reproduced it, represents it\nhistorically, or applies those categories by which, as we know, history\nis differentiated from pure art. Artistic and literary history is\ntherefore _a historical work of art founded upon one or more works of\nart._\n\nThe name \"artistic\" or \"literary\" critic is used in various senses:\nsometimes it is applied to the scholar who devotes his services to\nliterature; sometimes to the historian who reveals the works of art of\nthe past in their reality; more often to both. By critic is sometimes\nunderstood in a more restricted sense he who judges and describes\ncontemporary literary works, and by historian, he who treats of those\nless recent. These are linguistic uses and empirical distinctions,\nwhich may be neglected; because the true difference lies between\n_the scholar, the man of taste_ and _the historian of art._ These\nwords designate three successive stages of work, each one independent\nrelatively to the one that follows, but not to that which precedes. As\nwe have seen, a man may be a mere scholar, and possess little capacity\nfor understanding works of art; he may even both be learned and possess\ntaste, yet be unable to portray them by writing a page of artistic and\nliterary history. But the true and complete historian, while containing\nin himself both the scholar and the man of taste as necessary\npre-requisites, must add to their qualities the gift of historical\ncomprehension and representation.\n\n[Sidenote: _The method of artistic and literary history._]\n\nThe theory of artistic and literary historical method presents problems\nand difficulties, some common to the theory of historical method in\ngeneral, others peculiar to it, because derived from the concept of art\nitself.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism of the problem of the origin of art._]\n\nHistory is commonly divided into human history, natural history, and\nthe mixture of both. Without! examining here the question of the\nsolidity of this distinction, it is clear that artistic and literary\nhistory belongs in any case to the first, since it concerns a spiritual\nactivity, that is to say, an activity proper to man. And since this\nactivity is its subject, the absurdity of propounding the historical\nproblem of the _origin_ of _art_ becomes at once evident. We should\nnote that by this formula many different things have in turn been\nincluded on many different occasions. _Origin_ has often meant _nature_\nor _character_ of the artistic fact, in which case an attempt was\nmade to deal with a real scientific or philosophic problem, the very\nproblem in fact which our treatise has attempted to solve. At other\ntimes, by origin has been understood the _ideal genesis,_ the search\nfor the reason of art, the deduction of the artistic fact from a first\nprinciple containing in itself both spirit and nature. This is also\na philosophical problem, complementary to the preceding, coinciding\nindeed with it, although it has sometimes been strangely interpreted\nand solved by means of an arbitrary and semi-imaginary metaphysic.\nBut when the object was to discover further exactly in what way the\nartistic function was _historically formed,_ the result has been the\nabsurdity which we have mentioned. If expression be the first form of\nconsciousness, how can we look for the historical origin of what is not\na product of nature and is presupposed by human history? How can we\nassign a historical genesis to a thing which is a category by means of\nwhich all historical processes and facts are understood? The absurdity\nhas arisen from the comparison with human institutions, which have been\nformed in the course of history, and have disappeared or may disappear\nin its course. Between the \u00e6sthetic fact and a human institution\n(such as monogamic marriage or the fief) there exists a difference\ncomparable with that between simple and compound bodies in chemistry.\nIt is impossible to indicate the formation of the former, otherwise\nthey would not be simple, and if this be discovered, they cease to be\nsimple and become compound.\n\nThe problem of the origin of art, historically understood, is only\njustified when it is proposed to investigate, not the formation of\nthe artistic category, but where and when art has appeared for the\nfirst time (appeared, that is to say, in a striking manner), at what\npoint or in what region of the globe and at what point or epoch of its\nhistory; when, that is to say, not the origin of art, but its earliest\nor primitive history is the object of research. This problem forms\none with that of the appearance of human civilization on the earth.\nData for its solution are certainly wanting, but there yet remains\nthe abstract possibility of a solution, and certainly tentative and\nhypothetical solutions abound.\n\n[Sidenote: _The criterion of progress and history._]\n\nEvery representation of human history has the concept of _progress_ as\nfoundation. But by progress must not be understood the imaginary _law\nof progress_ which is supposed to lead the generations of man with\nirresistible force to some unknown destiny, according to a providential\nplan which we can divine and then understand logically. A supposed law\nof this sort is the negation of history itself, of that accidentality,\nthat empiricity, that contingency, which distinguish concrete fact\nfrom abstraction. And for the same reason, progress has nothing to do\nwith the so-called law of _evolution,_ which, if it mean that reality\nevolves (and it is only reality in so far as it evolves or becomes),\ncannot be called a law, and if it be given as a law, becomes identical\nwith the law of progress in the sense just described. The progress\nof which we speak here is nothing but _the very concept of human\nactivity,_ which, working upon the material supplied to it by nature,\nconquers its obstacles and bends it to its own ends.\n\nSuch conception of progress, that is to say, of human activity\napplied to a given material, is the _point of view_ of the historian\nof humanity. No one but a mere collector of unrelated facts, a mere\nantiquary or inconsequent annalist, can put together the smallest\nnarrative of human doings unless he have a determined point of\nview, that is to say, a personal conviction of his own regarding the\nfacts whose history he has undertaken to relate. No one can start\nfrom the confused and discordant mass of crude facts and arrive at\nthe historical work of art save by means of this apperception, which\nmakes it possible to carve a definite representation in that rough and\nformless mass. The historian of a practical action should know what is\neconomy and what is morality; the historian of mathematics, what is\nmathematics; the historian of botany, what is botany; the historian\nof philosophy, what is philosophy. If he does not really know these\nthings, he must at least have the illusion of knowing them; otherwise\nhe will not even be able to delude himself into believing that he is\nwriting history.\n\nWe cannot here expand the demonstration of the necessity and\ninevitability of this subjective criterion in every narrative of human\naffairs (which is compatible with the utmost objectivity, impartiality\nand scrupulousness in dealing with data of fact and indeed forms a\nconstitutive element in these virtues), in every narrative of human\ndoings and happenings. It suffices to read any book of history to\ndiscover at once the point of view of the author, if he be a historian\nworthy of the name and know his own business. There are liberal and\nreactionary, rationalist and catholic historians, who deal with\npolitical or social history; for the history of philosophy there\nare metaphysical, empirical, sceptical, idealist and spiritualist\nhistorians. Purely historical historians do not and cannot exist.\nWere Thucydides and Polybius, Livy and Tacitus, Machiavelli and\nGuicciardini, Giannone and Voltaire, wholly without moral and political\nviews; and, in our time, was Guizot or Thiers, Macaulay or Balbo,\nRanke or Mommsen? And in the history of philosophy, from Hegel, who\nwas the first to raise it to a great height, to Ritter, Zeller,\nCousin, Lewes and our Spaventa, was there one who did not possess his\nconception of progress and his criterion of judgement? Is there one\nsingle work of any value on the history of \u00c6sthetic which has not\nbeen written from this or that point of view, with this or that bias\n(Hegelian or Herbartian), from a sensationalist or from an eclectic\nor some other point of view? If the historian is to escape from the\ninevitable necessity of taking a side, he must become a political or\nscientific eunuch; and history is not an occupation for eunuchs. Such\nwould at most be of use in compiling those great tomes of not useless\nerudition, _elumbis atque fracta,_ which are called, not without\nreason, monkish.\n\nIf, then, a concept of progress, a point of view, a criterion, be\ninevitable, the best to be done is not to try and escape from it,\nbut to obtain the best possible. Every one tends to this end when he\nforms his own convictions, seriously and laboriously. Historians who\nprofess to wish to interrogate the facts without adding anything of\ntheir own to them are not to be trusted. This is at best the result\nof ingenuousness and illusion on their part: they will always add\nsomething of their own, if they be truly historians, even without\nknowing it, or they will only believe that they have avoided doing\nso because they have conveyed it only by hints, which is the most\ninsinuating, penetrative and effective of methods.\n\n[Sidenote: _Non-existence of a single line of progress in artistic and\nliterary history._]\n\nArtistic and literary history cannot dispense with the criterion of\nprogress any more easily than other history. We cannot show what a\ngiven work of art is, save by proceeding from a conception of art, in\norder to fix the artistic problem which the author of such work of art\nhad to solve, and by determining whether or no he has solved it, or by\nhow much and in what way he has failed to do so. But it is important\nto note that the criterion of progress assumes a different form in\nartistic and literary history to that which it assumes (or is believed\nto assume) in the history of science.\n\nIt is customary to represent the whole history of knowledge by one\nsingle line of progress and regress. Science is the universal, and\nits problems are arranged in one single vast system or comprehensive\nproblem. All thinkers labour upon the same problem as to the nature of\nreality and of knowledge: contemplative Indians and Greek philosophers,\nChristians and Mohammedans, bare heads and turbaned heads, wigged heads\nand college-capped heads (as Heine said); and future generations will\nweary themselves with it, as ours has done. It would take too long to\ninquire here if this be true or not of science. But it is certainly\nnot true of art; art is intuition, and intuition is individuality, and\nindividuality does not repeat itself. To conceive of the history of the\nartistic production of the human race as developed along a single line\nof progress and regress would therefore be altogether erroneous.\n\nAt the most, and working to some extent with generalizations and\nabstractions, it may be asserted that the history of \u00e6sthetic\nproductions shows progressive cycles, but each cycle with its own\nproblem and each progressive only in respect to that problem. When many\nare at work in a general way upon the same subject, without succeeding\nin giving to it the suitable form, yet drawing always more near to\nit, there is said to be progress, and when appears the man who gives\nit definite form, the cycle is said to be complete, and progress is\nended. A typical example of this would here be the progress in the\nelaboration of the mode of using the subject-matter of chivalry, during\nthe Italian Renaissance, from Pulci to Ariosto (using this as an\nexample and excusing excessive simplification). Nothing but repetition\nand imitation, diminution or exaggeration, a spoiling of what had\nalready been done, in short decadence could be the result of employing\nthat same material after Ariosto. The epigoni of Ariosto prove this.\nProgress begins with the beginning of a new cycle. Cervantes, with\nhis more open and conscious irony, is an instance of this. In what\ndid the general decadence of Italian literature at the end of the\nsixteenth century consist? Simply in having nothing more to say and in\nrepeating and exaggerating motives already discovered. If the Italians\nof this period had even been able to express their own decadence, they\nwould not have been altogether failures, but would have anticipated\nthe literary movement of the Risorgimento. Where the matter is not\nthe same, a progressive cycle does not exist. Shakespeare does not\nrepresent an advance on Dante, nor Goethe upon Shakespeare. Dante,\nhowever, represents an advance on the visionaries of the Middle Ages,\nShakespeare on the Elizabethan dramatists, Goethe, with _Werther_ and\nthe first part of _Faust,_ on the writers of the _Sturm und Drang_\nperiod. This mode of presenting the history of poetry and art contains,\nhowever, as we have remarked, something of the abstract, of the merely\npractical, and is without strict philosophical value. Not only is the\nart of savages not inferior, as art, to that of civilized peoples,\nif it be correlative to the impressions of the savage; but every\nindividual, indeed every moment of the spiritual life of an individual,\nhas its artistic world; none of these worlds can be compared with any\nother in respect of artistic value.\n\n[Sidenote: _Errors committed against this law._]\n\nMany have sinned and continue to sin against this special form of the\ncriterion of progress in artistic and literary history. Some, for\ninstance, talk of the infancy of Italian art in Giotto, and of its\nmaturity in Raph\u00e6l or in Titian; as though Giotto were not complete\nand absolutely perfect, granted the material of feeling with which his\nmind was furnished. He was certainly incapable of drawing a figure\nlike Raph\u00e6l, or of colouring it like Titian; but was Raph\u00e6l or Titian\ncapable of creating the _Marriage of Saint Francis with Poverty_ or\nthe _Death of Saint Francis_? The spirit of Giotto had not felt the\nattraction of the body beautiful, which the Renaissance studied and\nraised to a place of honour; the spirits of Raph\u00e6l and of Titian were\nno longer interested in certain movements of ardour and of tenderness\nwith which the man of the fourteenth century was in love. How, then,\ncan a comparison be made, where there is no comparative term?\n\nThe celebrated divisions of the history of art into an oriental period,\nrepresenting a lack of equilibrium between idea and form, the latter\ndominating, a classical representing an equilibrium between idea and\nform, a romantic representing a new lack of equilibrium between idea\nand form, the former dominating, suffer from the same defect. The same\nis true of the division into oriental art, representing imperfection\nof form; classical, perfection of form; romantic or modern, perfection\nof content and of form. Thus classic and romantic have also received,\namong their many other meanings, that of progressive or regressive\nperiods, in respect to the realization of some alleged artistic ideal\nof all humanity.\n\n[Sidenote: _Other meanings of the word \"progress\" in respect to\n\u00c6sthetic._]\n\nThere is no such thing, then, as an _\u00e6sthetic_ progress of humanity.\nHowever, by \u00e6sthetic progress is sometimes meant, not what the two\nwords coupled together really signify, but the ever-increasing\naccumulation of our historical knowledge, which makes us able to\nsympathize with all the artistic products of all peoples and of all\ntimes, or, as they say, makes our taste more catholic. The difference\nappears very great if the eighteenth century, so incapable of escaping\nfrom itself, be compared with our own time, which enjoys alike Greek\nand Roman art, now better understood, Byzantine, medi\u00e6val, Arabic and\nRenaissance art, the art of the Cinquecento, baroque art, and the art\nof the eighteenth century. Egyptian, Babylonian, Etruscan, and even\nprehistoric art are more profoundly studied every day. Certainly,\nthe difference between the savage and civilized man does not lie in\nthe human faculties. The savage has speech, intellect, religion and\nmorality in common with civilized man, and is a complete man. The only\ndifference lies in this, that civilized man penetrates and dominates\na larger portion of the universe with his theoretic and practical\nactivity. We cannot claim to be more spiritually alert than, for\nexample, the contemporaries of Pericles; but no one can deny that we\nare richer than they--rich with their riches and with those of how many\nother peoples and generations besides our own?\n\nBy \u00e6sthetic progress is also meant, in another sense, which is also\nimproper, the greater abundance of artistic intuitions and the smaller\nnumber of imperfect or inferior works which one epoch produces in\nrespect to another. Thus it may be said that there was \u00e6sthetic\nprogress, an artistic awakening in Italy, at the end of the thirteenth\nor of the fifteenth century.\n\nFinally, \u00e6sthetic progress is talked of in a third sense, with an eye\nto the refinement and complications of soul-states exhibited in the\nworks of art of the most civilized peoples, as compared with those of\nless civilized peoples, barbarians and savages. But in this case the\nprogress is of the comprehensive psycho-social conditions, not of the\nartistic activity, to which the material is indifferent.\n\nThese are the most important points to note concerning the method of\nartistic and literary history.\n\n\n\n\nXVIII\n\n\nCONCLUSION:\n\n\nIDENTITY OF LINGUISTIC AND \u00c6STHETIC\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Summary of the study._]\n\n\nA glance over the path traversed will show that we have completed\nthe entire programme of our treatise. We have studied the nature of\nintuitive or expressive knowledge, which is the \u00e6sthetic or artistic\nfact (I. and II.), and described the other form of knowledge, the\nintellectual, and the successive complications of these forms (III.);\nit thus became possible for us to criticize all erroneous \u00e6sthetic\ntheories arising from the confusion between the various forms and from\nthe illicit transference of the characteristics of one form to another\n(IV.), noting at the same time the opposite errors to be found in the\ntheory of intellectual knowledge and of historiography (V.). Passing\non to examine the relations between the \u00e6sthetic activity and the\nother activities of the spirit, no longer theoretic but practical, we\nindicated the true character of the practical activity and the place\nwhich it occupies in respect to the theoretic activity: hence the\ncriticism of the intrusion into \u00e6sthetic theory of practical concepts\n(VI.); we have distinguished the two forms of the practical activity,\nas economic and ethical (VII.), reaching the conclusion that there are\nno other forms of the spirit beyond the four which we have analyzed;\nhence (VIII.) the criticism of every mystical or imaginative \u00c6sthetic.\nAnd since there are no other spiritual forms co-ordinate with these,\nso there are no original subdivisions of the four established, and\nin particular of \u00c6sthetic. From this arises the impossibility of\nclasses of expressions and the criticism of Rhetoric, that is, of\nornate expression distinct from simple expression, and of other similar\ndistinctions and subdistinctions (IX.) But by the law of the unity of\nthe spirit, the \u00e6sthetic fact is also a practical fact, and as such,\noccasions pleasure and pain. This led us to study f the feelings of\nvalue in general, and those of \u00e6sthetic value or of the beautiful in\nparticular (X.), to criticize \u00e6sthetic hedonism in all its various\nmanifestations and complications (XI.), and to expel from the system\nof \u00c6sthetic the long series of psychological concepts which had been\nintroduced into it (XII.). Proceeding from \u00e6sthetic production to the\nfacts of reproduction, we began by investigating the external fixing\nof the \u00e6sthetic expression, for the purpose of reproduction. This\nis called the physically beautiful, whether natural or artificial\n(XIII.). We derived from this distinction the criticism of the errors\nwhich arise from confounding the physical with the \u00e6sthetic side of\nfacts (XIV.). We determined the meaning of artistic technique, or that\ntechnique which is at the service of reproduction, thus criticizing\nthe divisions, limits and classifications of the individual arts,\nand establishing the relations of art, economy and morality (XV.).\nSince the existence of physical objects does not suffice to stimulate\n\u00e6sthetic reproduction to the full, and since, in order to obtain it,\nwe must recall the conditions in which the stimulus first operated,\nwe have also studied the function of historical erudition, directed\ntoward re-establishing the communication between the imagination and\nthe works of the past, and to serve as the basis of the \u00e6sthetic\njudgement (XVI.). We have concluded our treatise by showing how the\nreproduction thus obtained is afterwards elaborated by the categories\nof thought, that is to say, by an examination of the method of literary\nand artistic history (XVII.).\n\nThe \u00e6sthetic fact has in short been considered both in itself and in\nits relations with the other spiritual activities, with the feelings\nof pleasure and pain, with what are called physical facts, with\nmemory and with historical treatment. It has passed before us as\n_subject_ until it became _object,_ that is to say, from the moment\nof _its birth_ until it becomes gradually changed for the spirit into\n_subject-matter of history._\n\nOur treatise may appear to be somewhat meagre when externally compared\nwith the great volumes usually dedicated to \u00c6sthetic. But it will not\nseem so when we perceive that those volumes are nine-tenths full of\nmatter that is not pertinent, such as definitions, psychological or\nmetaphysical, of pseudo-\u00e6sthetic concepts (the sublime, the comic,\nthe tragic, the humorous, etc.), or of the exposition of the supposed\nZoology, Botany and Mineralogy of \u00c6sthetic, and of universal history\n\u00e6sthetically judged; that the whole history of concrete art and\nliterature has also been dragged into those \u00c6sthetics and generally\nmangled, and that they contain judgements upon Homer and Dante, Ariosto\nand Shakespeare, Beethoven and Rossini, Mich\u00e6l Angelo and Raph\u00e6l. When\nall this has been deducted from them, we flatter ourselves that our\ntreatise will no longer be held to be too meagre, but, on the contrary,\nfar richer than ordinary treatises, which either omit altogether, or\nhardly touch at all, the greater part of the difficult problems proper\nto \u00c6sthetic which we have felt it to be our duty to study.\n\n[Sidenote: _Identity of linguistic and \u00c6sthetic._]\n\nBut although \u00c6sthetic as science of expression has been studied by us\nin its every aspect, it remains to justify the sub-title which we have\nadded to the title of our book, _General Linguistic,_ to state and make\nclear the thesis that the science of art and that of language, \u00c6sthetic\nand Linguistic, conceived as true sciences, are not two distinct\nthings, but one thing only. Not that there is a special Linguistic;\nbut the much-sought-for science of language, general Linguistic, _in\nso far as what it contains is reducible to philosophy,_ is nothing\nbut \u00c6sthetic. Whoever studies general Linguistic, that is to say,\nphilosophical Linguistic, studies \u00e6sthetic problems, and _vice versa.\nPhilosophy of language and philosophy of art are the same thing._\n\nWere Linguistic really a _different_ science from \u00c6sthetic it would\nnot have for its object expression, which is the essentially \u00e6sthetic\nfact; that is to say, we must deny that language is expression. But an\nemission of sounds which expresses nothing is not language. Language\nis sound articulated, circumscribed and organized for the purposes of\nexpression. If, on the other hand, linguistic were a _special_ science\nin respect to \u00c6sthetic, it would necessarily have for its object a\n_special class_ of expressions. But the non-existence of classes of\nexpression is a point which we have already demonstrated.\n\n[Sidenote: _\u00c6sthetic formulation of linguistic problems. Nature of\nlanguage._]\n\nThe problems which Linguistic tries to solve, and the errors in which\nLinguistic has been and is involved, are the same that respectively\noccupy and complicate \u00c6sthetic. If it be not always easy, it is on\nthe other hand always possible to reduce the philosophic questions of\nLinguistic to their \u00e6sthetic formula.\n\nThe disputes themselves as to the nature of the one find their parallel\nin those as to the nature of the other. Thus it has been disputed\nwhether Linguistic be a historical or a scientific discipline, and,\nthe scientific having been distinguished from the historical, it\nhas been asked whether it belong to the order of the natural or of\nthe psychological sciences, understanding by these latter empirical\nPsychology as well as the Sciences of the spirit. The same has happened\nwith \u00c6sthetic, which some have looked upon as a natural science\n(confusing the \u00e6sthetic and the physical sense of the word expression).\nOthers have looked upon it as a psychological science (confusing\nexpression in its universality with the empirical classification of\nexpressions). Others again, denying the very possibility of a science\nof such a subject, change it into a simple collection of historical\nfacts; not one of these attaining to the consciousness of \u00c6sthetic as a\nscience of activity or of value, a science of the spirit.\n\nLinguistic expression, or speech, has often seemed to be a fact of\n_interjection,_ which belongs to the so-called physical expressions\nof the feelings, common alike to men and animals. But it was soon\nperceived that an abyss yawns between the \"Ah!\" which is a physical\nreflex of pain and a word; as also between that \"Ah!\" of pain and\nthe \"Ah!\" employed as a word. The theory of the interjection being\nabandoned (jocosely termed the \"Ah! Ah!\" theory by German linguists),\nthe theory of _association_ or _convention_ appeared. This is liable to\nthe same objection which destroyed \u00e6sthetic associationism in general:\nspeech is unity, not multiplicity of images, and multiplicity does\nnot explain, but indeed presupposes the expression to be explained. A\nvariant of linguistic associationism is the imitative, that is to say,\nthe theory of _onomatop\u0153ia,_ which the same philologists deride under\nthe name of the \"bow-wow\" theory, from the imitation of the dog's bark,\nwhich, according to the onomatop\u0153ists, must have given its name to\nthe dog.\n\nThe most usual theory of our times as regards language (apart from mere\ncrass naturalism) consists of a sort of eclecticism or mixture of the\nvarious theories to which we have referred. It is assumed that language\nis in part the product of interjections and in part of onomatop\u0153ia and\nconvention. This doctrine is altogether worthy of the philosophical\ndecadence of the second half of the nineteenth century.\n\n[Sidenote: _Origin of language and its development._]\n\nWe must here note an error into which have fallen those very\nphilologists who have best discerned the activistic nature of language,\nwhen they maintain that although language was _originally a spiritual\ncreation,_ yet that it afterwards increased by _association._ But the\ndistinction does not hold, for origin in this case cannot mean anything\nbut nature or character; and if language be spiritual creation, it must\nalways be creation; if it be association, it must have been so from the\nbeginning. The error has arisen from having failed to grasp the general\nprinciple of \u00c6sthetic, known to us: that expressions already produced\nmust descend to the rank of impressions before they can give rise to\nnew impressions. When we utter new words we generally transform the\nold ones, varying or enlarging their meaning; but this process is not\nassociative, it is _creative,_ although the creation has for material\nthe impressions, not of the hypothetical primitive man, but of man who\nhas lived long ages in society, and who has, so to say, stored so many\nthings in his psychic organism, and among them so much language.\n\n[Sidenote: _Relation between Grammar and Logic._]\n\nThe question of the distinction between the \u00e6sthetic and the\nintellectual fact appears in Linguistic as that of the relations\nbetween Grammar and Logic. This problem has been solved in two\npartially true ways: the _inseparability_ and the _separability_ of\nLogic and Grammar. But the complete solution is this: if the logical\nform be inseparable from the grammatical (\u00e6sthetic), the grammatical is\nseparable from the logical.\n\n[Sidenote: _Grammatical kinds or parts of speech._]\n\nIf we look at a picture which for instance portrays a man walking on a\ncountry road we may say: \"This picture represents a fact of _movement,_\nwhich, if conceived as voluntary, is called _action_; and since every\nmovement implies a _material object,_ and every action a _being_ that\nacts, this picture also represents a _material object_ or _being._\nBut this movement takes place in a definite place, which is a piece\nof a definite heavenly body (the Earth), and precisely of a piece of\nit which is called _terra-firma,_ and more precisely of a part of it\nthat is wooded and covered with grass, which is called _country,_\ncut naturally or artificially into a form called _road._ Now, there\nis only one example of that star, which is called Earth: the earth\nis an _individual._ But _terra-firma, country, road_ are genera or\n_universals,_ because there are other terra-firmas, other countries,\nother roads.\" And it would be possible to continue for a while with\nsimilar considerations. By substituting a phrase for the picture that\nwe have imagined, for example one to this effect: \"Peter is walking on\na country road,\" and by making the same remarks, we obtain the concepts\nof _verb_ (motion or action), of _noun_ (material object or agent), of\n_proper noun,_ of _common noun;_ and so on.\n\nWhat have we done in both cases? Neither more nor less than submit to\nlogical elaboration what first presented itself only \u00e6sthetically;\nthat is to say, we have destroyed the \u00e6sthetic for the logical. But\nsince in general \u00c6sthetic error begins when we wish to return from the\nlogical to the \u00e6sthetic and ask what is the _expression_ of motion,\naction, matter, being, of the general, of the individual, etc.; so in\nthe case of language, error begins when motion or action are called\n_verb,_ being or matter, _noun_ or _substantive,_ and when linguistic\ncategories, or _parts of speech,_ are made of all these, noun and verb\nand so on. The theory of the parts of speech is really identical with\nthat of artistic and literary kinds, already criticized in our \u00c6sthetic.\n\nIt is false to say that the verb or noun is expressed in definite\nwords, truly distinguishable from others. Expression is an indivisible\nwhole. Noun and verb do not exist in it, but are abstractions made by\nus, destroying the sole linguistic reality, which is the _sentence._\nThis last is to be understood, not in the way common to grammars, but\nas an organism expressive of a complete meaning, which includes alike\nthe simplest exclamation and a great poem. This sounds paradoxical, but\nis nevertheless the simplest truth.\n\nAnd since in \u00c6sthetic the artistic productions of certain peoples\nhave been looked upon as imperfect, owing to the error above\nmentioned, because the supposed kinds have seemed not yet to have\nbeen discriminated, or to be in part wanting; so in Linguistic, the\ntheory of the parts of speech has caused the analogous error of judging\nlanguages as _formed_ and _unformed,_ according to whether there appear\nin them or no some of those supposed parts of speech; for example, the\nverb.\n\n[Sidenote: _The individuality of speech and the classification of\nlanguages._]\n\nLinguistic also discovered the irreducible individuality of the\n\u00e6sthetic fact, when it affirmed that the word is what is really\nspoken, and that two truly identical words do not exist. Thus were\nsynonyms and homonyms destroyed, and thus was shown the impossibility\nof really translating one word into another, from so-called dialect\ninto so-called language, or from the so-called mother-tongue into the\nso-called foreign tongue.\n\nBut the attempt to classify languages ill agrees with this just view.\nLanguages have no reality beyond the propositions and complexes of\npropositions really written and pronounced by given peoples at definite\nperiods; that is to say, they have no existence outside the works of\nart (whether little or great, oral or written, soon forgotten or long\nremembered, does not matter) in which they exist concretely. And what\nis the art of a given people but the whole of its artistic products?\nWhat is the character of an art (for example of Greek art or Proven\u00e7al\nliterature) but the whole physiognomy of those products? And how can\nsuch a question be answered, save by narrating in its particulars the\nhistory of the literature, that is to say, of the language in its\nactuality?\n\nIt may be thought that this argument, although possessing validity\nas against many of the usual classifications of languages, yet\nis without any as regards that queen of classifications, the\nhistorico-genealogical, that glory of comparative philology. And this\nit certainly is; but why? Precisely because that historico-genealogical\nmethod is not a mere classification. He who writes history does not\nclassify, and the philologists themselves have hastened to say that\nlanguages which can be arranged in historical series (those whose\nseries have hitherto been traced) are not distinct and separate species\nbut a single whole of facts in the various phases of its development.\n\n[Sidenote: _Impossibility of a normative grammar._]\n\nLanguage has sometimes been regarded as a voluntary or arbitrary act.\nBut at others the impossibility of creating language artificially, by\nan act of will, has been clearly seen. \"_Tu, Caesar, civitatem dare\npotes homini, verbo non potes_\" was once said to a Roman Emperor. And\nthe \u00e6sthetic (and therefore theoretic as opposed to practical) nature\nof expression supplies the method of discovering the scientific error\nwhich lies in the conception of a (normative) _Grammar_, establishing\nthe rules of correct speech. Good sense has always rebelled against\nthis error. An example of such rebellion is the \"So much the worse for\ngrammar\" attributed to Monsieur de Voltaire. But the impossibility\nof a normative grammar is also recognized by those who teach it,\nwhen they confess that to write well cannot be learned by rules, that\nthere are no rules without exceptions, and that the study of Grammar\nshould be conducted practically, by reading and examples, which should\nform the literary taste. The scientific reason of this impossibility\nlies in the principle that we have demonstrated: that a technique of\nthe theoretical amounts to a contradiction in terms. And what could\na (normative) grammar be, but precisely a technique of linguistic\nexpression, that is to say of a theoretic fact?\n\n[Sidenote: _Didactic organisms._]\n\nThe case in which Grammar is understood merely as an empirical\ndiscipline, that is to say, as a collection of schemes useful for\nlearning languages, without any claim whatever to philosophic truth, is\nquite different. Even the abstractions of the parts of speech are in\nthis case both admissible and useful. And we must tolerate as merely\ndidascalic many books entitled \"Treatises of Linguistic,\" where we\ngenerally find a little of everything, from the description of the\nvocal apparatus and of the artificial machines (phonographs) which can\nimitate it, to summaries of the most important I results obtained by\nIndo-European, Semitic, Coptic, Chinese, or other philologies; from\nphilosophical generalizations as to the origin or nature of language,\nto advice on format, calligraphy and the arrangement of notes relating\nto philological work. But this mass of notions, here administered in\na fragmentary and incomplete manner about language in its essence,\nabout language as expression, resolves itself into notions of \u00c6sthetic.\nNothing exists outside _\u00c6sthetic,_ which gives knowledge of the\nnature of language, and _empirical Grammar,_ which is a pedagogic\nexpedient, save the _History of languages_ in their living reality,\nthat is to say, the history of concrete literary productions, which is\nsubstantially identical with the _History of literature._\n\n[Sidenote: _Elementary linguistic facts or roots._]\n\nThe same error of taking the physical for the \u00e6sthetic, from which the\nsearch for the _elementary forms_ of the beautiful originates, is made\nby those who go in search of _elementary linguistic facts,_ decorating\nwith that name the divisions of the longer series of physical sounds\ninto shorter series. Syllables, vowels and consonants, and the series\nof syllables called words, all these elements of speech, which give\nno definite sense when taken alone, must be called not _facts of\nlanguage,_ but mere sounds, or rather sounds abstracted and classified\nphysically.\n\nAnother error of the same sort is that of _roots,_ to which the most\ndistinguished philologists now accord but small value. Having confused\nphysical with linguistic or expressive facts, and considering that the\nsimple precedes the complex in the order of ideas, they necessarily\nended by thinking that the smallest physical facts indicated the\nsimplest linguistic facts. Hence the imaginary necessity that the most\nancient primitive languages had a monosyllabic character, and that\nhistorical research must always lead to the discovery of monosyllabic\nroots. But (to follow up the imaginary hypothesis) the first expression\nthat the first man conceived may have had not a phonetic but a mimetic\nphysical reflex; may have been externalized not in a sound but in\na gesture. And assuming that it was externalized in a sound, there\nis no reason to suppose that sound to have been monosyllabic rather\nthan polysyllabic. Philologists readily blame their own ignorance and\nimpotence, when they do not always succeed in reducing polysyllabism to\nmonosyllabism, and rely upon the future to accomplish the reduction.\nBut their faith is without foundation, and their blame of themselves is\nan act of humility arising from an erroneous presumption.\n\nFor the rest, the limits of syllables, as those of words, are\naltogether arbitrary, and distinguished somehow or other by empirical\nuse. Primitive speech, or the speech of uneducated man, is a\n_continuum,_ unaccompanied by any consciousness of divisions of the\ndiscourse into words or syllables, imaginary beings created by schools.\nNo true law of Linguistic can be founded on such divisions. Proof of\nthis is to be found in the confession of linguists, that there are\nno truly phonetic laws of the hiatus, of cacophony, of di\u00e6resis or\nsyn\u00e6resis, but merely laws of taste and convenience; that is to say,\n_\u00e6sthetic_ laws. And what are laws of _words_ which are not at the same\ntime laws of _style_?\n\n[Sidenote: _\u00c6sthetic judgement and the model language._]\n\nFinally, the search for a _model language,_ or for a method of reducing\nlinguistic usage to _unity,_ arises from the superstition of a\nrationalistic measure of the beautiful, from that concept which we have\ncalled false \u00e6sthetic absoluteness. In Italy we call this the question\nof the _unity of the language._\n\nLanguage is perpetual creation. What has been linguistically expressed\nis not repeated, save by reproduction of what has already been\nproduced. The ever-new impressions give rise to continuous changes\nof sound and meaning, that is, to ever-new expressions. To seek the\nmodel language, then, is to seek the immobility of motion. Everyone\nspeaks and should speak according to the echoes which things arouse\nin his soul, that is, according to his impressions. It is not without\nreason that the most convinced supporter of any one of the solutions of\nthe problem of the unity of language (whether by adopting a standard\nItalian approximating to Latin, or to fourteenth-century usage, or\nto the Florentine dialect) feels repugnance in applying his theory,\nwhen he is speaking to communicate his thoughts and to make himself\nunderstood. The reason is that he feels that in substituting the Latin,\nfourteenth-century Italian, or Florentine word for that of different\norigin, but which answers to his natural impressions, he would be\nfalsifying the genuine form of truth. He would become a vain listener\nto himself instead of a speaker, a pedant in place of a serious man, an\nactor instead of a sincere person. To write according to a theory is\nnot really to write: at the most, it is making _literature._\n\nThe question of the unity of language is always reappearing, because,\nstated as it is, it is insoluble, being based upon a false conception\nof what language is. Language is not an arsenal of arms already made,\nand it is not a _vocabulary,_ a collection of abstractions, or a\ncemetery of corpses more or less well embalmed.\n\nOur dismissal of the question of the model language, or of the unity of\nthe language, may seem somewhat abrupt, and yet we would not wish to\nappear otherwise than respectful towards the long line of literary men\nwho have debated this question in Italy for centuries. But those ardent\ndebates were fundamentally concerned with debates of \u00e6stheticity, not\nof \u00e6sthetic science, of literature rather than of literary theory, of\neffective speaking and writing, not of linguistic science. Their error\nconsisted in transforming the manifestation of a need into a scientific\nthesis, the desirability, for example, of easier mutual understanding\namong a people divided by dialects into the philosophic demand for\na single, ideal language. Such a search was as absurd as that other\nsearch for a _universal language,_ a language possessing the immobility\nof the concept and of abstraction. The social need for a better\nunderstanding of one another cannot be satisfied save by the spread of\neducation becoming general, by the increase of communications, and by\nthe interchange of thought among men.\n\n[Sidenote: _Conclusion._]\n\nThese scattered observations must suffice to show that all the\nscientific problems of Linguistic are the same as those of \u00c6sthetic,\nand that the truths and errors of the one are the truths and errors\nof the other. If Linguistic and \u00c6sthetic appear to be two different\nsciences, this arises from the fact that people think of the former\nas grammar, or as a mixture between philosophy and grammar, that\nis, an arbitrary mnemonic schematism or a pedagogic medley, and not\nof a rational science and a pure philosophy of speaking. Grammar,\nor something not unconnected with grammar, also introduces into the\nmind the prejudice that the reality of language lies in isolated and\ncombinable words, not in living discourse, in the expressive organisms,\nrationally indivisible.\n\nThose linguists or philologists, philosophically endowed, who have\npenetrated deepest into the problems of language, find themselves (to\nemploy a trite but effective simile) like workmen piercing a tunnel:\nat a certain point they must hear the voices of their companions, the\nphilosophers of \u00c6sthetic, who have been at work on the other side. At\na certain stage of scientific elaboration, Linguistic, in so far as it\nis philosophy, must merge itself in \u00c6sthetic: and this indeed it does\nwithout leaving a residue.\n\n\n\n\nII\n\nHISTORY OF \u00c6STHETIC\n\n\n\n\nI\n\n\n\u00c6STHETIC IDEAS IN GR\u00c6CO-ROMAN ANTIQUITY\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Point of view of this history of \u00c6sthetic._]\n\nThe question whether \u00c6sthetic is to be considered as an ancient or a\nmodern science has on several occasions been a matter of controversy;\nwhether, that is to say, it arose for the first time in the eighteenth\ncentury, or had previously arisen in the Gr\u00e6co-Roman world. This is\na question, not only of facts, but of criteria, as is easily to be\nunderstood: whether one answers it in this way or that depends upon\none's idea of that science, an idea afterwards adopted as a standard or\ncriterion.[1]\n\nOur view is that \u00c6sthetic is the _science of the expressive_\n(representative or imaginative) _activity._ In our opinion, therefore,\nit does not appear until a precise concept is formulated of\nimagination, representation or expression, or in whatever other manner\nwe prefer to name that attitude of the spirit, which is theoretical but\nnot intellectual, a producer of knowledge, but of the individual, not\nof the universal. Outside this point of view, we for our part are not\nable to discover anything but deviations and errors.\n\nThese deviations can lead in various directions. Following the\ndistinctions and terminology of an eminent Italian philosopher[2] in\nan analogous case, we shall be inclined to say that they arise either\nfrom _excess_ or from _defect._ The deviation from defect would be\nthat which denies the existence of a special \u00e6sthetic and imaginative\nactivity, or, which amounts to the same thing, denies its autonomy,\nand thus mutilates the reality of the spirit. Deviation by excess is\nthat which substitutes for it or imposes upon it another activity,\naltogether undiscoverable in the experience of the interior life, a\nmysterious activity which does not really exist. Both these deviations,\nas can be deduced from the theoretical part of this work, take\nvarious forms. The first, that due to defect, may be: (_a_) _purely\nhedonistic,_ in so far as it considers and accepts art as a simple fact\nof sensuous pleasure; (_b_) _rigoristic-hedonistic,_ in so far as,\nlooking upon it in the same way, it declares it to be irreconcilable\nwith the highest life of man; (_c_) _hedonistic-moralistic_ or\n_pedagogic,_ in so far as it consents to a compromise, and while still\nconsidering art to be a fact of sense, declares that it need not be\nharmful, indeed that it may render some service to morality, provided\nalways that it is submissive and obedient.[3] The forms of the second\ndeviation (which we shall call \"mystical\") are not determinable _a\npriori,_ for they belong to feeling and imagination in their infinite\nvariety and shades of meaning.[4]\n\n[Sidenote: _Mistaken tendencies, and attempts towards an \u00c6sthetic, in\nGr\u00e6co-Roman antiquity._]\n\nThe Gr\u00e6co-Roman world presents all these fundamental forms of\ndeviation: pure hedonism, moralism or pedagogism, mysticism, and\ntogether with them the most solemn and celebrated rigoristic negation\nof art which has ever been made. It also exhibits attempts at the\ntheory of expression or pure imagination; but nothing more than\napproaches and attempts. Hence, since we must now take sides in the\ncontroversy as to whether \u00c6sthetic is an ancient or modern science,\nwe cannot but place ourselves upon the side of those who affirm its\nmodernity.\n\nA rapid glance at the theories of antiquity will suffice to justify\nwhat we have said. We say rapid, because to enter into minute\nparticulars, collecting all the scattered observations of ancient\nwriters upon art, would be to do again what has been done many times\nand sometimes very well. Further, those ideas, propositions and\ntheories have passed into the common patrimony of knowledge, together\nwith what else remains of the classical world. It is therefore more\nadvisable here than in any other part of this history merely to\nindicate the general lines of development.\n\n[Sidenote: Origin of the \u00e6sthetic problem in Greece.]\n\nArt, the artistic faculty, only became a philosophical problem in\nGreece after the sophistical movement and as a consequence of the\nSocratic dialectic. The historians of literature generally point to\nthe origins of Greek \u00c6sthetic in the first appearance of criticism\nand reflection upon poetical works, painting and sculpture; in the\njudgements pronounced on the occasion of poetical competitions, in\nthe observations that were made as to the methods of the different\nartists, in the analogies between painting and poetry as expressed in\nthe sayings attributed to Simonides and Sophocles; or, finally, in the\nappearance of that word which served to group together the various\narts and to indicate in a certain way their relationship--the word\nmimesis or mimetic (\u03bc\u03af\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2)--which oscillates between the meaning of\n\"imitation\" and that of \"representation.\" Others make the origin of\n\u00c6sthetic go back to the polemics which were conducted by the first\nnaturalistic and moralistic philosophers against the tales, fantasies\nand morals of poets, and to the interpretations of the hidden meaning\n(\u03c5\u03c0\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1), or, as the moderns call it, allegory, employed to defend the\ngood name of Homer and of the other poets; finally, to the _ancient\nquarrel_ between philosophy and poetry, as Plato was afterwards to call\nit.[5] But, to tell the truth, none of these reflections, observations\nand arguments implied a true and proper philosophical discussion of\nthe nature of art. Nor was the sophistical movement favourable to its\nappearance. For although attention was at that time certainly given to\ninternal psychical facts, yet these were conceived as mere phenomena\nof opinion and feeling, of pleasure and pain, of illusion, whim or\ncaprice. And where there is no true and no false, no good and no evil,\nthere can be no question of beautiful and ugly, nor of a difference\nbetween the true and the beautiful or between the beautiful and the\ngood. The most one has in that case is the general problem of the\nirrational and the rational, but not that of the nature of art, which\nassumes the difference between rational and irrational, material\nand spiritual, mere fact and value, to have been already stated and\ngrasped. If, then, the sophistical period was the necessary antecedent\nto the discoveries of Socrates, the \u00e6sthetic problem could only arise\nafter Socrates. And it did indeed arise with Plato, author of the\nfirst, or indeed of the only really great negation of art of which\nthere remains documentary proof in the history of ideas.\n\n[Sidenote: _Plato's rigoristic negation._]\n\nIs art, mimesis, a rational or an irrational fact? Does it belong to\nthe noble region of the soul, where philosophy and virtue are found,\nor does it dwell in that base lower sphere, with sensuality and crude\npassionality? This is the question asked by Plato,[6] who thus states\nthe problem of \u00c6sthetic for the first time. The sophist Gorgias was\nable to note, with his sceptical acuteness, that tragic representation\nis a deception, which (strangely enough) turns out to the honour\nboth of him who deceives and of him who is deceived, in which it is\nshameful not to know how to deceive oneself and not to let oneself be\ndeceived.[7] With that remark he could rest content. That was for him\na fact like another. But Plato, the philosopher, was bound to solve\nthe problem: if it were a deception, then down with tragedy and the\nrest of mimetic productions: down with them among the other things to\nbe despised, among the animal qualities of man. But if it were not\ndeception, what was it? What place did art occupy among the lofty\nactivities of philosophy and of good action?\n\nThe answer that he gave is well known. Mimetic does not realize the\nideas, that is to say the truth of things, but reproduces natural or\nartificial things, which are pale shadows of them; it is a diminution\nof a diminution, a third-hand work. Art, then, does not belong to the\nlofty and rational region of the soul (\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03cb \u1f10\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae) but to\nthe sensual; it is not a strengthening but a corruption of the mind\n(\u03bb\u03ce\u03b2\u03b7 \u03c4\u03ae\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03c2); it can serve only sensual pleasure, which troubles\nand obscures. For this reason, mimetic, poetry and poets, must be\nexcluded from the perfect Republic.\n\nPlato is the most consistent example of those who do not succeed in\ndiscovering any other form of knowledge but the intellectual. It was\ncorrectly observed by him that imitation stops at natural things,\nat the image (\u03c4\u03bf \u03c6\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1), and does not reach the concept, logical\ntruth (\u03ac\u03bb\u03ae\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1), of which poets and painters are altogether ignorant.\nBut his error consisted in believing that there is no other form of\ntruth below the intellectual; that there is nothing but sensuality and\npassionality outside or prior to the intellect, that which discovers\nthe ideas. Certainly, the fine \u00e6sthetic sense of Plato did not echo\nthat depreciatory judgement of art; he himself declared that he would\nhave been very glad to have been shown how to justify art and to place\nit among the forms of the spirit. But since none was able to give him\nthis assistance, and since art with its _appearance_ that yet lacks\n_reality_ was repugnant to his ethical consciousness, and reason\ncompelled him (\u03cc \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ae\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9) to banish it and place it with its peers,\nhe resolutely obeyed his conscience and his reason.[8]\n\n[Sidenote: _\u00c6sthetic hedonism and moralism._]\n\nOthers were not troubled with these scruples, and although art was\nalways looked upon as a mere thing of pleasure among the later\nhedonistic schools of various sorts, among rhetoricians and worldly\npeople the duty of combating or of abolishing it was not felt.\nNevertheless, this opposite extreme was also not calculated to meet\nwith the endorsement of public opinion, for the latter, if tender\ntowards art, is no less tender towards rationality and morality. For\nthis reason both rationalists and moralists, compelled to recognize\nthe force of such a condemnation as Plato's, sought for a compromise,\na half measure. Away with the sensual and with art: certainly. But\ncan we expel the sensual and the pleasurable without more ado? Can\nfragile human nature nourish itself exclusively with the strong food of\nphilosophy and morality? Can we obtain observance of the true and of\nthe good from the young and from the people, without allowing them at\nthe same time some amusement? And has not man himself always something\nof the child, has he not always something of the people in him, is\nhe not to be treated with the same precautions? Is there not a risk\nthat the over-bent bow will break?--These considerations prepared the\nway for the justification of art, for they showed that if it were not\nrational in itself, it could on the other hand serve a rational end.\nHence the search for the _external end_ of art, which takes the place\nof the search for the essence or _internal end_. When art had been\nlowered to the level of a simple pleasurable illusion, an inebriation\nof the senses, it was necessary to subordinate the practical action\nof producing such an illusion and inebriation, like any other action,\nto the moral end. Art, being deprived of any dignity of its own,\nwas obliged to assume a reflected or secondhand dignity. Thus the\nmoralistic and pedagogic theory was constructed upon a hedonistic\nbasis. The artist, who, for the pure hedonist, was comparable to\na _hetaira,_ became for the moralist a _pedagogue._ Hetaira and\npedagogue, these are the symbols of the two conceptions of art that\nwere disseminated in antiquity, and the second was grafted upon the\nfirst.\n\nEven before Plato's peremptory negation had directed thought to this\nway of issue, the literary criticism of Aristophanes was already full\nof the pedagogic idea: \"What schoolmasters are to children, poets\nare to young men\" (\u03c4\u03bf\u0390\u03c2 \u03ae\u03b2\u03ce\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03af), he says in a celebrated\nverse[9] But we can find traces of it in Plato himself (in the\ndialogues in which he seems to withdraw from the too rigid conclusions\nof the _Republic)_ and in Aristotle, both in the _Politics,_ where he\ndetermines the use of music in education, and perhaps in the _Poetics,_\nwhere he speaks obscurely of a tragical _catharsis_; although as\nregards this latter, it is not to be altogether denied that he may\nhave had a sort of glimpse of the modern idea of the liberating power\nof art.[10] Later on, the pedagogic theory takes a form that was much\naffected by the Stoics. Strabo develops and defends this at great\nlength, in the introduction to his geographical work, where he combats\nEratosthenes, who has made poetry consist in mere pleasure without any\nnotion of teaching. Strabo, on the contrary, maintained the opinion of\nthe ancients, that it was \"a first philosophy (\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03ae\u03bd),\nwhich educated young men for life, and created customs, affections and\nactions, by means of pleasure.\" Therefore, he said, poetry has always\nbeen a part of education; one cannot be a good poet unless one is a\ngood man (\u03ac\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b1 \u03ac\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd). Legislators and founders of cities were the\nfirst to employ fables to admonish and to terrify: then this duty,\nwhich must be performed for women and children and even for adults,\npassed to the poets. We caress and dominate the multitude with fiction\nand with falsehood.[11] \"The poets tell many lies\" (\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03ac \u03c8\u03b5\u03cd\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03ac\u03bf\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u03af) is a hemistich recorded by Plutarch, who describes minutely in\none of his lesser works how the poets should be read to youths.[12]\nFor him too poetry is a preparation for philosophy; it is a disguised\nphilosophy, and therefore delights us in the same way as do fish and\nmeat at feasts, so prepared as not to seem to be fish and meat; it is\nphilosophy softened with fables, like the vine that grows close to the\nmandragora, and produces a wine that is the giver of sweet slumbers.\nIt is not possible to pass from dense darkness to sunlight; one should\nfirst accustom the eyes to moderate light. Philosophers, in order to\nexhort and instruct, take their examples from true things; poets aim\nat a like result, when they create fictions and fables.[13] Lucretius,\nin Roman literature, gives us the well-known comparison of the boys for\nwhom the doctors \"_prius or as pocula circum Contingunt mellis dulci\nflavoque liquore,_\" in order to administer the bitter wormwood.[14]\nHorace, in certain verses of the Epistle to the Pisones which have\nbecome proverbial (perhaps his source for them was the Greek of\nNeoptolemus of Paros?), offers both views (that of art as courtesan and\nof art as pedagogue) in his \"_Aut prodesse volunt aut deledare poetae\n... omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci._\"[15]\n\nThus looked at, the office of the poet was confounded with that of the\norator, for he too was a practical man aiming at practical effects;\nhence there arose discussions as to whether Virgil was to be considered\nas a poet or as an orator (\"_Virgilius poeta an orator?_\"). To both was\nassigned the triple end of _delectare, movere, docere_; in any case\nthis tripartition was very empirical, for we clearly perceive that\nthe _delectare_ is here a means-and the _docere_ a simple part of the\n_movere_: to move in the direction of the good, and therefore, among\nother goods, towards that of instruction. In like manner, it was said\nof the orator and poet (recording the meretricious basis of their task,\nand with a metaphor significant in its _na\u00efvet\u00e9_) that they were bound\nto avail themselves of the _allurements_ (_lenocinium_) of form.\n\n[Sidenote: _Mystical \u00e6sthetic in antiquity._]\n\nThe mystical view, which considers art as a special mode of\nself-beatification, of entering into relation with the Absolute, with\nthe Summum Bonum, with the ultimate root of things, appeared only\nin late antiquity, almost at the entrance to the Middle Ages. Its\nrepresentative is the founder of the neo-Platonic school, Plotinus.\n\nIt is strange that Plato should be usually selected as the founder\nand head of this \u00e6sthetic tendency, and that for this very reason to\nhim should be attributed the honour of being the father of \u00c6sthetic.\nBut how could he, who had expounded with such great limpidity and\nclearness the reasons for which he was not able to accord to art a\nhigh place among the activities of the spirit, be credited with having\naccorded to it one of the highest places, equal, if not superior, to\nphilosophy itself? This misunderstanding has evidently arisen out of\nthe enthusiastic effusions about the Beautiful that we read in the\n_Gorgias,_ the _Philebus,_ the _Ph\u00e6drus,_ the _Symposium,_ and other\nPlatonic dialogues. It is well to dissipate it by declaring that the\n_Beauty_ of which Plato discourses has nothing to do with art or with\n_artistic beauty._\n\n[Sidenote: _Investigations as to the Beautiful._]\n\nThe search for the meaning and scientific content of the word\n\"beautiful\" could not but early attract the attention of the subtle\nand elegant Greek dialecticians. Indeed, we find Socrates engaged\nin discussing this question in one of the discourses that have been\npreserved for us by Xenophon; and we find him disposed to stop for\nthe moment at the conclusion that the beautiful is _that which is\nconvenient and which answers to the end desired,_ or at the other\nconclusion that it is _that which one loves_[16] Plato too examines\nthis sort of problem and proposes various sorts of solutions or\nattempts at solutions of it. He sometimes speaks of a beauty that\ndwells not only in bodies, but also in laws, in actions, in the\nsciences; sometimes he seems to conjoin and almost to identify it\nwith the true, the good and the divine; now he returns to the view of\nSocrates and confuses it with the useful; now he distinguishes between\na beautiful in itself (\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03ac \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8' \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03ac) and a relatively beautiful (\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03ac); or he makes true beauty consist in pure pleasure (\u03ae\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03b7\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac), free from all shadow of pain; or he places it in measure and\nproportion (\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03af \u03be\u03bd\u03bc\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03b1); or talks of colours and sounds\nas possessing a beauty in themselves.[17] It was impossible to find\nan independent dominion for the beautiful, if the artistic or mimetic\nactivity were deserted. This explains his wandering among so many\ndifferent conceptions, among which it is just possible to say that the\nidentification of the Beautiful with the Good prevails. Nothing better\ndescribes this uncertainty than the dialogue of the _Hippias maior_\n(which, if it be not Plato's, is Platonic). He here wishes to find\nout not what things are beautiful things, but what the beautiful is;\nthat is to say, what it is that makes beautiful, not only a beautiful\nvirgin, but also a beautiful mare, a beautiful lyre, a beautiful pot\nwith two graceful ears of clay. Hippias and Socrates himself propose\nin turn the most various solutions; but the latter ends by confuting\nthem all. \"That which makes things beautiful is the gold that is added\nto them by way of ornament.\" No: gold only embellishes where it is\n_fitting_ (\u03c0\u03c1\u03ad\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd): for instance, a pot should have a wooden rather\nthan a golden handle. \"That is beautiful which cannot seem ugly to any\none.\" But it is not a question of _seeming_: the question is to define\nwhat the beautiful is, whether it seems so or not. It is the _fitting_\nwhich makes things seem to be beautiful. But in that case, the fitting\n(which makes them _appear,_ not _be)_ is one thing, and the beautiful\nanother. \"The beautiful is what leads to the end, that is to say, the\n_useful_ (\u03c7\u03c1\u03ae\u03c3\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd).\" But if that were so, then evil would also be\nbeautiful, because the useful leads also to the evil. \"The beautiful\nis the _helpful,_ that which leads to the good (\u03c9\u03c6\u03ad\u03bb\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd).\" But in\nthis case, the good would not be beautiful nor the beautiful good; for\nthe cause is not the effect, and the effect is not the cause. \"The\nbeautiful is that which delights the sight and hearing.\" But this fails\nto persuade for three reasons: firstly, because beautiful studies and\nlaws are beautiful, which have nothing to do with the eye or with the\near; secondly, because we cannot discover a reason for limiting the\nbeautiful to those senses, while excluding the pleasure of eating and\nsmelling, and the extremely vivid pleasures of sex; thirdly, because,\nif the foundation of the beautiful were _visibility,_ it would not be\n_audibility,_ and if it were audibility it would not be visibility;\nhence that which constitutes the beautiful cannot dwell in either\nof the two qualities. And the question which has been repeated so\ninsistently in the course of the dialogue: _what is the beautiful?_ (\u03c4\u03af\n\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03cc\u03bd;) remains unanswered.[18]\n\nLater writers also conducted inquiries into the beautiful, and we\npossess the titles of several treatises upon the theme, which have\nbeen lost. Aristotle shows himself changeable and uncertain upon the\npoint. In the scanty references which he makes to it, he at one time\nconfounds the beautiful with the good, defining it as that which is\nboth good and pleasing;[19] at another he notes that the good consists\nof action (\u03b5\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03be\u03b5\u03b9) and the beautiful also in things that are\nimmoveable (\u03b5\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u0390\u03c2 \u03ac\u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03ae\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2), drawing from this the argument that\nmathematics should be studied in order to determine its characters,\norder, symmetry and limit;[20] sometimes he places it in bigness and\nin order (\u03b5\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03b5\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03af \u03c4\u03ac\u03be\u03b5\u03b9);[21] at others he was led to look upon\nit as something apparently indefinable.[22] Antiquity also established\ncanons of beautiful things, such as that attributed to Polycletus on\nthe proportions of the human body. And Cicero said of the beauty of\nbodies that they were \"_quaedam apta figura membrorum cum coloris quadam\nsuavitate._\"[23] All these affirmations, even when they are not mere\nempirical observations, or verbal glosses and substitutions, meet with\nunsurmountable obstacles.\n\n[Sidenote: _Distinction between the theory of Art and the theory of the\nBeautiful._]\n\nIn any case, not only is the conception of the beautiful, taken as\na whole, identified with art in none of them; but sometimes art and\nbeauty, mimesis and pleasing or displeasing material of mimesis, are\nclearly distinguished. Aristotle notes in his _Poetics_ that it pleases\nus to see the most faithful images of things that are repugnant to\nus in reality, such, for instance, as the most contemptible forms of\nanimals, or corpses (\u03c4\u03ac\u03c2 \u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03ac\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ae\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03b2\u03c9\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c7\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\n\u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2).[24] Plutarch demonstrates at length that works of art\nplease us not as beautiful but as _resembling_ (\u03bf\u03cd\u03c7 \u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03cc\u03bd, \u03ac\u03bb\u03bb,'\n\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd); he affirms that if the artist beautified things that are\nugly in nature he would be offending against fitness and resemblance\n(\u03c4\u03bf \u03c0\u03c1\u03b5\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf e\u03af\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2); and he proclaims the principle that _the\nbeautiful is one thing and beautiful imitation another_ (o\u03cd ya\u03c1 \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\n\u03c4\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03cc, \u03c4\u03bf \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b9\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9). Paintings of horrible events\nare pleasing, such as _Medea slaying her sons_ by Timomachus, _Orestes\nthe matricide_ by Theon, and the _Pretended madness of Ulysses_ by\nParrhasius; and if the grunting of a pig, the grating of a machine,\nthe noise of the winds and the tumult of the sea are unpleasing, they\npleased on the contrary in the case of Parmenon, who imitated the pig\nperfectly, and in Theodorus, who was not less expert in rendering the\ngrating of machines.[25] If the ancients had really wanted to place\nthe beautiful and art in relation, a secondary and partial connexion\nof the two conceptions was to hand in the shape of the category of the\n_relatively_ as distinguished from the _absolutely_ beautiful. But\nwhere the word _\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03cc\u03bd_ or _pulchrum_ is applied to artistic productions\nin the writings of literary critics, it does not seem to be more than a\nlinguistic usage, as we find, for instance, in the case of Plutarch's\n_beautiful_ imitation, or also in the terminology of the rhetoricians,\nwho sometimes called elegance and adornment of discourse _beauty_ of\nelocution (\u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u03ae\u03c2 \u03c6\u03c1\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2).\n\n[Sidenote: _Fusion of the two by Plotinus._]\n\nIt is only with Plotinus that the two divided territories are united\nand _the beautiful and art are fused into a single concept,_ not by\nmeans of a beneficial absorption of the _equivocal_ Platonic conception\nof beauty into the _unequivocal_ conception of art, but by absorption\nof the clear into the confused, of _imitative art_ in the so-called\n_beautiful._ And thus we reach an altogether new view: the beautiful\nand art are now both alike melted into a mystical passion and elevation\nof the spirit.\n\nBeauty, observes Plotinus, resides chiefly in things visible; but it\nis also to be found in things audible, such as verbal and musical\ncompositions, and it is not lacking in things supersensible, such as\nworks, offices, actions, habits, sciences and virtues. What is it\nthat makes beautiful sensible and supersensible things alike? Not, he\nanswers, the symmetry of their parts among themselves, and with the\nwhole (\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03ce\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03bb\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf \u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd) and their\ncolour (\u03b5\u03bd\u03c7\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1), according to one of the definitions most in vogue,\nwhich we have quoted above in the words of Cicero; because there are\nproportions in things ugly, and there are things that are simply\nbeautiful without any relation of proportion: beauty, then, is one\nthing and symmetry another.[26] The beautiful is what we welcome as\nakin to our own nature; the ugly is what repels us as our opposite,\nand the affinity of beautiful things with our souls that perceive them\nhas its origin in the Idea, which produces both. That is beautiful\nwhich is _formed_; the ugly is what is _unformed,_ that is to say,\nsomething which is capable of receiving form, but does not receive it\nor is not entirely dominated by it. A beautiful body is such, because\nof its communion (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03af\u03b1) with the Divine; beauty is the Divine, the\nIdea, shining through; and matter is beautiful, not in itself, but only\nwhen it is illuminated by the Idea. Light and fire, which are nearest\nto this state, shed beauty upon visible things, as the most spiritual\namong bodies. But the soul must purify itself, in order to perceive the\nbeautiful, and make the power of the Idea that lies in it efficacious.\nModeration, strength, prudence, and every other virtue, what else are\nthey, according to the oracle, but _purification_? Thus there opens\nanother eye in the soul, beside that of sensible beauty, which permits\nit to contemplate divine Beauty coincident with the Good, which is the\nsupreme condition of beatitude.[27] Art enters into such contemplation,\nbecause beauty, in things made by man, comes from the mind. Compare two\nblocks of stone, the one placed beside the other: one rough and crude,\nthe other reduced to the statue of a god or of a man, for example of\na Grace or of a Muse, or of a human being of such a shape, as art has\ncollected from many particular beauties. The beauty of a block of this\nshape does not consist in its being of stone, but in the form that\nart has been able to give to it (\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 o \u03b5\u03bd\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd \u03b7 \u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b7);\nand when the form is fully impressed upon it, the thing of art is more\nbeautiful than any other natural thing. Hence he who despised the arts\n(Plato), because they imitated nature, was wrong; whereas the truth\nis, in the first place, that nature itself imitates the idea, and then\nthat the arts do not simply limit themselves to imitating what the eyes\nsee, but go back to those reasons or ideas from which nature itself is\nderived (\u03ce\u03c2 \u03bf\u03cd\u03c7 \u03b1\u03c0\u03bb\u03ce\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf \u03cc\u03c1\u03ce\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03cd\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb' \u03ac\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u03c0\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c2\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ad\u03be \u03c9\u03bd \u03b7 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2). Art therefore does not belong to nature, but\nadds beauty where it is wanting in nature: Phidias did not represent\nJove because he had seen him, but such as he would appear if he wished\nto reveal himself to mortal eyes.[28] The beauty of natural things\nis the archetype existing in the soul, the sole source of natural\nbeauty.[29]\n\n[Sidenote: _The scientific tendency. Aristotle._]\n\nThis affirmation of Plotinus and of neo-Platonism is the first\ntrue and proper affirmation of mystical \u00c6sthetic, destined to such\nhigh fortunes in modern times, especially in the first half of the\nnineteenth century. But the attempts at a true \u00c6sthetic, excluding\ncertain luminous but incidental observations to be found even in\nPlato: for instance, that the poet should weave fables, not arguments\n(\u03bc\u03cd\u03b8\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ac\u03bb\u03bb' \u03bf\u03cd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2),[30] go back to Aristotle and are altogether\nindependent of his few and feeble speculations as to the beautiful.\nAristotle by no means agreed with the Platonic condemnation; he felt\n(as indeed Plato himself had suspected) that such a result could not\nbe altogether true, and that some aspect of the problem must have been\nneglected. When in his turn he attempted to find a solution, he found\nhimself in more advantageous conditions than his great predecessor,\nsince he had already overcome the obstacle that arose from the Platonic\ndoctrine of ideas, a hypostasis of concepts and abstractions. The ideas\nwere for him simply concepts, and reality presented itself in a far\nmore lively manner, not as a diminution of ideas, but as a synthesis of\nmatter and form, it was thus much more easy for him to recognize the\nrationality of mimesis in his general philosophical doctrine and to\nassign to it its right place; and indeed it seems generally clear to\nAristotle that mimesis, being proper to man by nature, is contemplation\nor theoretic activity; although he sometimes seems to forget this (as\nwhen he confuses imitation with the case of boys, who acquire their\nfirst knowledge by following an example[31]), and although his system,\nwhich admits practical sciences and poietic activities (distinguished\nfrom the practical as leaving a material object behind them), disturbed\nthe firm and constant consideration of artistic mimesis and poetry as\na theoretical activity. But if it is a theoretical activity, by what\ncharacteristic is poetry distinguished both from _scientific_ knowledge\nand from _historical_ knowledge? This is the way Aristotle states the\nproblem concerning the nature of art, and this is the true and only\nway of stating it. Even we moderns ask ourselves in what way art is\ndistinguished from history and from science, and what this artistic\nform can be, which has the ideality of science and the concreteness\nand individuality of history. Poetry, answers Aristotle, differs from\nhistory, because, while the latter draws things that have happened\n(\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1), poetry draws things that may possibly happen (\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1 \u03b1\u03bd\n\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf), and differs from science, because, although it regards the\nuniversal and not the particular (\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8' \u03b5\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd) like history,\nit does not regard it in the same way as science, but in a certain\nmeasure, which the philosopher indicates by the word _rather_ (\u03bc\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5). The point then is to establish the precise meaning of\nthe _possible,_ the _rather_ and the _historical particular._ But no\nsooner does Aristotle attempt to determine the meaning of these words,\nthan he falls into contradictions and fallacies. That _universal_ of\npoetry, which is the _possible,_ seems to identify itself for him with\nthe probable or the necessary (\u03c4\u03b1 _\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac \u03c4\u03bf \u03b5\u03af\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b7 \u03c4\u03bf \u03ac\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u0390\u03bf\u03bd_),\nand the particular of history is not explained at all, except by\ngiving instances: \"that which Alcibiades did and what happened to\nhim.\"[32] Aristotle, in fact, after having made so good a beginning\nin the discovery of the purely imaginative, proper to poetry, remains\nhalf-way, perplexed and uncertain. Thus he sometimes makes the truth\nof imitation consist in a certain learning and syllogizing that takes\nplace when we look at imitations, by which we recognize that \"this is\nthat,\" that a copy answers to the original;[33] or, worse, he loses the\ngrains of truth that he has found and forgets that poetry has for its\ncontent the possible, admitting, not only that it may also depict the\n_impossible_ (\u03c4\u03bf \u03b1\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd), and even the _absurd_ (\u03c4\u03bf \u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd), seeing\nthat both are _credible_ and that they do not injure the end of art,\nbut even that we must prefer impossible probabilities to incredible\npossibilities.[34] Art, since it has to do even with the impossible\nand absurd, will not therefore have in it anything of the rational,\nbut in accordance with the Platonic theory it will be an imitation of\nthe appearance in which empty sense indulges itself; that is to say, a\nthing of pleasure. Aristotle does not attain to this result, because\nhe does not attain to any clear and precise result in this part of the\nsubject, but it is one of the results that can be deduced from what he\nhas said, or that, at any rate he is not able to exclude. This means\nthat he did not fulfil his tacitly assumed task, and that although\nhe re-examined the problem with marvellous acuteness after Plato, he\nfailed truly to rid himself of the Platonic definition, by substituting\na firmly-established one of his own.\n\n[Sidenote: _The concepts of imitation and of imagination after A\nristotle. Philostratus._]\n\nBut the field of investigation toward which Aristotle had turned was\ngenerally neglected in antiquity: the very _Poetics_ of Aristotle does\nnot seem to have been widely known or influential. Ancient psychology\nknew fancy or imagination as a faculty midway between sense and\nintellect, but always as conservative and reproductive of sensuous\nimpressions or conveying conceptions to the senses, never properly\nas a productive autonomous activity. That faculty was rarely and with\nlittle result placed in relation with the problem of art. Several\nhistorians of \u00c6sthetic attach singular importance to certain passages\nin the _Life of Apollonius of Tyana_ by the elder Philostratus, in\nwhich they believe that they discover a correction of the theory of\n_mimesis_ and the first affirmation in history of the conception of\n_imaginative creation._ Phidias and Praxiteles (says the extract in\nquestion) did not need to go to heaven to see the gods, in order to\nbe able to depict them in their works, as would have been necessary\naccording to the theory of imitation. Imagination, without any need\nof models, made them able to do what they did: imagination, which is\na wiser agent than simple imitation (\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 ... \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03c9\u03c4\u03cc\u03c1\u03b1 \u03bc\u03b9\u03bc\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03cc\u03c2), and gives form, like the other, not only to what has been\nseen, but also to what has never been seen, imagining it on the basis\nof existing things and in that way creating Jupiters and Minervas.[35]\nHowever, the imagination of which Philostratus speaks here is not\nsomething different from the Aristotelian mimesis, which, as has been\nnoted, was concerned not only with real things but also and chiefly\nwith possible things. And had not Socrates observed (in the dialogue\nwith the painter Parrhasius, preserved for us by Xenophon) that\npainters work by collecting what they need to form their figures from\nseveral bodies (\u03b5\u03ba \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b1 \u03b5\u03be \u03b5\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1)?[36] And\nwas not the anecdote of Zeuxis, who was supposed to have taken the\nbest of five Crotonian maidens in order to paint his Helen, and other\nanecdotes of a like sort, sufficiently widespread in antiquity? And\nhad not Cicero eloquently explained, some years before Philostratus,\nhow Phidias, when he was carving Jupiter, did not copy anything real,\nbut kept his looks fixed upon \"_species pulcritudinis eximia quaedam,_\"\nwhich he had in his soul and which directed his art and his hand?[37]\nNor can it be said that Philostratus opened the way to Plotinus,\nfor whom the superior or intellectual imagination (\u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03ae), or eye of\nsupersensible beauty, when it is not a new designation for beautiful\nimitation, is mystical intuition.\n\nThe vagueness of the concept of mimesis reached its apex in those\nwriters who gave it as a general title to any sort of work that had\nnature for its object, employing the Aristotelian phrase to affirm\nthat \"_omnis ars naturae imitatio est,_\"[38] or saying, like the\npainter Eupompus when he blamed his servile imitators, that \"_natura\nest imitanda, non artifex._\"[39] And those who wished to escape this\nvagueness did not know how to do so, save by conceiving the activity of\nimitation as the practical producer of duplicates of natural objects, a\nprejudice bora in the bosom of the pictorial and plastic arts, against\nwhich Philostratus perhaps intended to argue, in common with the other\nadvocates of imagination.\n\n[Sidenote: _Speculations on language._]\n\nThe speculations upon language had a close connexion with those upon\nthe nature of art begun by the sophists, for whom it became a matter\nfor wonder that sounds could signify colours or things inaudible; that\nis to say, _speech_ presented itself as a _problem._[40] It was then\ndiscussed whether language was by nature (\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 or by convention \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03c9).\nBy nature was sometimes understood mental necessity, and by convention\nwhat we should call a merely natural fact, psychological mechanism or\nsensationalism. In that sense of the terms, language would have been\nbetter called \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 than \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03c9. But at other times the distinction led\nto the question whether language answers to objective or logical truth\nand to the real relations between things (\u03cc\u03c1\u03b8\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd); and\nin this case, those would seem to be nearer the truth who proclaimed\nit to be conventional or arbitrary in respect to logical truth: \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03c9\nor \u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9, and not \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 Two different questions were consequently\nbeing treated together, and both were confusedly and equivocally\ndiscussed. They find their monument in the obscure _Cratylus_ of\nPlato, which seems to fluctuate between different solutions. Nor did\nthe later affirmation that the word is a sign (\u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03bd) of the thought\nsolve anything, for it still remained to be shown in what way the sign\nwas to be understood, whether \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 or \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03c9. Aristotle, who looked\nupon words as imitations (\u03bc\u03b9\u03bc\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1), in the same way as poetry,[41]\nmade an observation of first-rate importance: in addition to the\n_enunciative_ propositions, which express the (logically) true or\nfalse, there are others which do not express either the (logically)\ntrue or false, as for example the expressions of aspirations and of\ndesires (\u03b5\u03cd\u03c7\u03ae), which therefore belong, not to logical exposition, but\nto poetical and rhetorical exposition.[42] And in another place we\nfind him affirming in opposition to Bryson (who had said that a base\nthing remained such with whatever word it were designated) that base\nthings can be expressed both with words that place them beneath the\neye in all their crudity, and with other words which surround them\nwith a veil.[43] All this might have led to the separation of the\nlinguistic faculty from the properly logical, and to its consideration\nin union with the poetical and artistic faculty; but here too the\nattempt stopped half-way. The Aristotelian logic assumed a verbal and\nformalistic character, which became more and more accentuated as time\nwent on and formed an obstacle to the distinction between the two\ntheoretical forms. Nevertheless, Epicurus asserted that the diversity\nof names designating the same thing with various peoples was due,\nnot to convention and caprice, but to the fact that the impressions\nproduced by things were different in each one of them.[44] And the\nStoics, although they connected language with thought (\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1) and\nnot with imagination, seem to have had a suspicion of the non-logical\nnature of language, for they interposed between thought and sound a\n_certain something_ which was indicated in Greek by the word \u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd,\nand by the words _effatum_ or _dicibile_ in Latin. But we are not sure\nwhat they really meant, and whether that vague concept were intended\nby them to distinguish the linguistic representation from the abstract\nconcept (which would bring them into touch with the modern view), or\nthe meaning of sound in general.[45]\n\nWe cannot collect any other germ of truth from the ancient writers.\nA philosophical Grammar, like a philosophical Poetics, remained\nunattainable in antiquity.\n\n\n[1] See above, pp. 128-131. Quotations which give only the name\nof the author, or are otherwise abbreviated, refer to historical\nor critical works of which the complete title is given in the\nBibliographical Appendix.\n\n[2] Rosmini, _Nuovo saggio sull' origine delle idee,_ sections iii. and\niv., where theories of knowledge are classified.\n\n[3] See above, pp. 83-84.\n\n[4] See above, p. 65.\n\n[5] _Republic_, x. 607.\n\n[6] _Republic_, x. 607.\n\n[7] Plutarch, _De audiendis poetis_, ch. i.\n\n[8] _Republic_ x.\n\n[9] _Frogs,_ 1, 1055.\n\n[10] Plato, _Laws,_ bk. ii.; Aristotle, _Poet._ ch. 14; _Polit,_ bk.\nviii.\n\n[11] Strabo, _Geographica,_ i. ch. 2, \u00a7\u00a7 3-9.\n\n[12] Texts collected in E. M\u00fcller, _Gesch. d. Th. d. K._ i. pp. 57-85.\n\n[13] Plutarch, _De aud. poetis,_ chs. 1-4, 14.\n\n[14] _De rerum natura,_ i. 935-947.\n\n[15] _Ad Pisones,_ 333-334.\n\n[16] _Memorab._ iii. ch. 8; iv. ch. 6.\n\n[18] _Hippias maior, passim._\n\n[19] _Rhet._ i. ch. 9.\n\n[20] _Metaphys._ xii. ch. 3.\n\n[21] _Poet._ ch. 7.\n\n[22] Diog. L\u00e6rt. v. ch. i, \u00a7 20.\n\n[23] _Tuscul. qu\u00e6st._ bk. iv. \u00a7 13.\n\n[24] _Poet._ ch. iv. 3.\n\n[25] _De aud. poetis_, ch. 3.\n\n[26] _Enneads,_ I. bk. vi. ch. i.\n\n[27] _Enneads, loc. cit._ chs. 2-9.\n\n[28] _Enneads,_ V. bk. viii. ch. i.\n\n[29] _Enneads, loc. cit._ chs. 2-3.\n\n[30] _Ph\u00e6drus,_ ch. 4.\n\n[31] Poet. ch. 4, \u00a7 2.\n\n[32] Poet. ch. 9, \u00a7\u00a7 1-4.\n\n[33] Poet. ch. 4, \u00a7\u00a7 4-5.\n\n[34] Poet. chs. 24-25.\n\n[35] _Apoll. vita,_ vi. ch. io.\n\n[36] _Memorab._ iii. ch. io.\n\n[37] _Orator ad Brutum,_ ch. 2.\n\n[38] For example, Seneca, _Epist._ 65.\n\n[39] Pliny, _Nat. Hist._ xxxiv. ch. 19.\n\n[40] Gorgias in _De Xenoph., Zen. et Gorg._ (in Aristot., ed. Didot),\nchs. 5-6.\n\n[41] _Rhet._ bk. iii. ch. 1.\n\n[42] _Rhet._ bk. iii. ch. 2.\n\n[43] _De interp._ ch. 4.\n\n[44] Diog. L\u00e6rt. bk. x. \u00a7 75.\n\n[45] Steinthal, _Gesch. d. Sprachw.,_ 2nd ed., i. pp. 288, 293,\n296-297.\n\n\n\n\nII\n\n\n\u00c6STHETIC IDEAS IN THE MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Middle Ages, Mysticism, Ideas on the beautiful._]\n\n\nAlmost all the developments of ancient \u00c6sthetic were continued by\ntradition or reappeared by spontaneous generation in the course of the\nMiddle Ages. Neo-Platonic mysticism continued, entrusted to the care\nof the pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (_De c\u0153lesti hierarchia,\nDe ecclesiastica hierarchia, De divinis nominibus,_ etc.), to the\ntranslations of these works made by John Scotus Eriugena, and to the\ndivulgations of the Spanish Jews (Avicebron). The Christian God took\nthe place of the Summum Bonum or Idea: God, wisdom, goodness, supreme\nbeauty, source of beautiful things in nature, which are a ladder to\nthe contemplation of the Creator. But these speculations continued to\nrecede further and further from the consideration of art, with which\nPlotinus had connected them; and the empty definitions of the beautiful\nby Cicero and other ancient writers were often repeated. Saint\nAugustine defined beauty in general as unity (_omnis pulchritudinis\nforma unitas est,_) and that of the body as _congruentia partium cum\nquadam colons suavitate,_ and the old distinction between something\nthat is beautiful in itself and relative beauty reappeared in a book\nof his, which has been lost, entitled _De pulchro et apto;_ the very\nname shows that he reasserted the old distinction between the beautiful\nin itself and the relatively beautiful, _quoniam apte accommodaretur\nalicui._ Elsewhere he notes that an image is called beautiful _si\nperfecte implei illud cujus imago est, et coaequatur ei._[1]\n\nThomas Aquinas varied but little from him in positing three requisites\nfor beauty: integrity or perfection, due proportion, and clearness;\nfollowing Aristotle, he distinguished the beautiful from the good,\ndefining the first as that which pleases in the mere contemplation of\nit (_pulcrum ... id cujus ipsa apprehensio placet_); he referred to\nthe beauty that even base things possess if well imitated, and applied\nthe doctrine of imitation to the beauty of the Second Person of the\nTrinity (_in quantum est imago expressa Patris_).[2] If it were wished\nto discover references to the hedonistic conception of art, it would\nbe possible to do this, with a little goodwill, in some of the sayings\nof jongleurs and troubadours. \u00c6sthetic rigorism, the total negation\nof art for religion or for divine and human science, shows itself in\nTertullian and among certain Fathers of the Church, at the entrance to\nthe Middle Ages; at their conclusion, in a certain crude scholastic\nspirit, for example in Cecco d' Ascoli, who proclaimed against Dante:\n\"I leave trifles behind me and return to the _true_; fables are always\nunpleasing to me,\" and later, in the reactionary Savonarola. But the\nnarcotic theory of pedagogic or moralistic art prevailed over every\nother. It had contributed to send to sleep the \u00e6sthetic doubts and\ninquiries of the ancients, and was well suited to a period of relative\ndecadence of culture. This was all the more the case, seeing that it\naccorded well with the moral and religious ideas of the Middle Ages,\nand afforded a justification not only for the new art of Christian\ninspiration, but also for the surviving works of classical and pagan\nart.\n\n[Sidenote: _The pedagogic theory of art in the Middle Ages._]\n\nThe allegorical interpretation was again a means of salvation for these\nlast. The _De continentia Virgiliana_ of Fulgentius (sixth century)\nis a curious monument to this fact. This work made Virgil compatible\nwith the Middle Ages and opened his way to that great reputation which\nhe was destined to attain, as the \"gentle sage who knew all things.\"\nEven John of Salisbury says of the Roman poet, that \"_sub imagine\nfabularum totius philosophiae exprimit veritatem._\"[3] The process of\ninterpretation became fixed in the doctrine of the _four meanings,_\nliteral, allegorical, moral and anagogic, which Dante afterwards\ntransferred to vernacular poetry. It would be easy to accumulate\nquotations from medi\u00e6val writers, repeating in all keys the theory\nthat art inculcates the truths of morality and of faith and constrains\nhearts to Christian piety, beginning with those well-known verses of\nTheodulf: \"_In quorum dictis_ (that is to say, in the utterances of the\npoets) _quamquam sint frivola multa, Plurima sub falso tegmine vera\nlatent,_\" and so on, until we reach the doctrines and opinions of our\nown great men, Dante and Boccaccio. For Dante, poetry \"_nihil aliud est\nquam fictio rhethorica in musicaque posita._\"[4] The poet should have\na \"reasoning\" in his verses \"under a cloak of figure or of rhetorical\ncolour\"; and it would be a shameful thing for him, if, \"when asked,\nhe were not able to divest his words of such a garment, in such a way\nas to show that they possessed a true meaning.\"[5] Readers sometimes\nstop at the external vesture alone, and this indeed suffices for\nthose who, like the vulgar, do not succeed in penetrating the hidden\nmeaning. Poetry will say to the vulgar, which does not understand \"its\nargument,\" what a song of Dante's says at its conclusion, \"At least\nbehold how _beautiful_ I am\": if you are not able to obtain instruction\nfrom me, at least enjoy me as a pleasing thing. Many, indeed, \"their\nbeauty more than their goodness will delight,\" in poems, unless they\nare assisted by commentaries in the nature of the _Convivio,_ \"a light\nwhich will allow every shade of meaning to reach them.\"[6] Poetry was\nthe \"gay science,\" \"_un fingimiento_\" (as the Spanish poet the Marquis\nof Santillana wrote) \"_de cosas utiles, cubiertas \u00f3 veladas con muy\nfermosa cobertura, compuestas, distinguidas \u00e9 scandidas, por cierto\ncuento, pesso\u00e9 medida._\"[7]\n\nIt would not then be correct to say that the Middle Ages simply\nidentified art with theology and with philosophy. Indeed it sharply\ndistinguished the one from the other, defining art and poetry, like\nDante, with the words _fictio rhethorica_, \"figure\" and \"rhetorical\ncolour,\" \"cloak,\" \"beauty,\" or like Santillana with those of\n_fingimiento_ or _fermosa cobertura._ This pleasing falsity was\njustified from the practical point of view, very much in the same way\nas sexual union and love were justified and sanctified in matrimony.\nThis did not exclude, indeed it implied, that the perfect state was\ncertainly celibacy--that is to say, pure science, free from admixture\nof art.\n\n[Sidenote: _Hints of an \u00c6sthetic in scholastic philosophy._]\n\nThe only tendency that had no true and proper representatives was\nthe sound scientific tendency. The _Poetics_ of Aristotle itself was\nhardly known or rather it was ill-known, from the Latin translation\nthat a German of the name of Hermann made, not earlier than 1256, of\nthe paraphrase or commentary of Averroes. Perhaps the best of the\nmedi\u00e6val investigations into language is that supplied by Dante's _De\nvulgari eloquentia,_ where the word is, however, still looked upon as\na sign (\"_rationale signum et sensuale ... natura sensuale quidem,\nin quantum sonus est, rationale vero in quantum aliquid significare\nvidetur ad piacitum_\").[8] The study of the expressive, \u00e6sthetic,\nlinguistic faculty would, however, have found an appropriate occasion\nand a point of departure in the secular debate between nominalism and\nrealism, which could not avoid touching to some extent the relations\nbetween the word and the flesh, thought and language. Duns Scotus wrote\na treatise _De modis significandi seu_ (the addition is due perhaps to\nthe editors) _grammatica speculativa_.[9] Abelard had defined sensation\nas _confusa conceptio,_ and _imaginatio_ as a faculty that preserved\nsensations; the intellect renders discursive what is intuitive in the\npreceding stage, and we have finally the perfection of knowledge in\nthe intuitive knowledge of the discursive. We find the same importance\nattached to intuitive knowledge, perception, of the individual or\n_species specialissima,_ in Duns Scotus, together with the progressive\ndenominations of the different sorts of knowledge as _confus\u00e6,\nindistinct\u00e6_ and _distinct\u00e6._ We shall see this terminology reappear,\nbig with consequences, at the very commencement of modern \u00c6sthetic.[10]\n\n[Sidenote: _Renaissance. Philography and philosophical and empirical\ninquiries concerning the beautiful._]\n\nIt may be said that the literary and artistic doctrines and opinions\nof the Middle Ages have, with few exceptions, a value rather for the\nhistory of culture than for the general history of science. The like\nobservation holds good of the Renaissance, for here, too, the circle of\nthe ideas of antiquity was not overstepped. Culture increases; original\nsources are studied; the ancient writers are translated and commented\nupon; many treatises are written and henceforth printed upon poetry\nand the arts, grammars, rhetorics, dialogues, and dissertations upon\nthe beautiful: the proportions have increased, the world has become\nbigger; but truly original ideas do not yet show themselves in the\ndomain of \u00e6sthetic science. The mystical tradition is refreshed and\nstrengthened by the renewed cult of Plato: Marsilio Ficino, Pico della\nMirandola, Cattani, Leon Battista Alberti, in the fifteenth century,\nand Pietro Bembo, Mario Equicola, Castiglione, Nobili, Betussi, and\nvery many others in the following century, wrote upon the Beautiful\nand upon Love. Among the most noteworthy productions of the sort, a\ncrossing of the medi\u00e6val and classical currents, is the book of the\n_Dialogues of Love_ (1535), composed in Italian by the Spanish Jew\nLeo, and translated into all the cultured languages of the time.[11]\nThe three parts into which it is divided treat of the nature and\nessence, of the universality, and of the origin of love; and it is\ndemonstrated that every beautiful thing is good, but not every good\nthing is beautiful; that beauty is a grace which dilates the soul and\nmoves it to love, and that knowledge of lesser beauties leads to that\nof higher spiritual beauties. The author gave the name of \"Philography\"\nto these and similar affirmations and effusions of which the book is\ncomposed. Equicola's[12] work is also interesting, because it contains\nhistorical accounts of those who wrote upon the subject before he did\nso himself. The same intuition was versified and sighed forth by the\nPetrarchists in their sonnets and ballads, while others, rebellious and\nmocking, derided it in comedies, verses in _terza rima_ and parodies of\nall sorts. Some mathematicians, reincarnations of Pythagoras, set to\nwork to determine beauty by exact relations: for instance Leonardo's\nfriend, Luca Paciolo, in the _De divina proportione_ (1509), in which\nhe laid down the pretended \u00e6sthetic law of the golden section.[13] And\nside by side with these new Pythagoreans were those who revived the\ncanon of Polycletus as to the beauty of the human body, especially\nof the female body, such as Firenzuola, Franco, Luigini, and Dolce.\nMich\u00e6l Angelo fixed an empirical canon for painting in general, when\nhe stated that the means of giving movement and grace to figures[14]\nconsisted in the observance of a certain arithmetical relation. Others,\nsuch as Fulvio Pellegrino Morato, investigated the symbolism or meaning\nof colours. The Platonists generally placed beauty in the soul, the\nAristotelians rather in the physical qualities. The Averroist, Agostino\nNifo, amid much chatter and many inconclusive remarks, demonstrated\nthe existence of the beautiful in nature by describing the supremely\nbeautiful body of Joan of Aragon, Princess of Tagliacozzo, to whom the\nbook is dedicated.[15] Torquato Tasso, in the \"Mintumo,\"[16] imitated\nthe uncertainties of the _Hippias_ of Plato, not without making a free\nuse of the speculations of Plotinus. A chapter of the _Poetica_ of\nCampanella possesses greater importance, where he describes the good as\n_signum boni_ and the ugly as _signum mali,_ understanding by good the\nthree prime forces of Power, Wisdom and Love. Although Campanella was\nstill tied to the Platonic idea of the beautiful, the conception of a\nsign or symbol, here introduced by him, represents progress. By this\nmeans he succeeded in perceiving that material things or external facts\nare neither beautiful nor ugly in themselves. \"Mandricard called the\nwounds in the bodies of his friends the Moors beautiful, for they were\nlarge and gave evidence of the great strength of Roland who dealt them;\nSaint Augustine called the gashes and the dislocations in the body of\nSaint Vincent beautiful, because they were evidence of his endurance,\nbut they were on the other hand ugly in so far as they were signs of\nthe cruelty of the tyrant Dacianus and of his executioners. It is\nbeautiful to die fighting, said Virgil, for it is the sign of a strong\nsoul. The pet dog of his mistress will seem beautiful to the lover, and\ndoctors call even urine and f\u00e6ces beautiful, when they indicate health.\nEverything is both beautiful and ugly\" (_quapropter nihil est quod non\nsit pulcrum simul et turpe_).[17] In such observations as these we have\nnot a mere state of mystical exaltation, but to some extent a movement\nin the direction of analysis.\n\n[Sidenote: _The pedagogic theory of art and the Poetics of Aristotle._]\n\nNothing better serves to demonstrate that the Renaissance did not pass\nbeyond the confines of ancient \u00e6sthetic thought than the fact that\nnotwithstanding the renewed acquaintance with the thought of Aristotle,\nthe pedagogic theory of art not only persisted and triumphed, but was\ntransplanted bodily into the text of Aristotle, where its interpreters\nread it with a certainty that we have to make efforts to achieve.\nCertainly, a Robortelli (1548) or a Castelvetro (1570) stopped short\nat the simple, purely hedonistic solution, giving simple pleasure as\nthe end of art: poetry, says Castelvetro, \"was discovered solely\nfor the purpose of delighting and of recreating ... the souls of the\nrude multitude and of the common people.\"[18] And here and there\nsome were able to free themselves from both the pleasure theory and\nthat of the didactic end; but the majority, such as Segni, Maggi,\nVettori,[19] were for the _docere delectando._ Scaliger (1561) declared\nthat mimesis or imitation was \"_finis medius ad illum ultimum qui est\ndocendi cum delectatione,_\" and believing himself to be altogether in\nagreement with Aristotle as to this, he continued, \"_docet affectus\npoeta per actiones, ut bonos amplectamur atque imitemur ad agendum,\nmalos aspernemur ad abstinendum._\"[20] Piccolomini (1575) observed\nthat \"It must not be thought that so many excellent poets and artists,\nancient and modern, would have devoted such care and diligence to this\nmost noble study, had they not known and believed that in so doing\nthey were aiding human life,\" and if \"they had not thought that we\nwere to be instructed, directed, and well established by it.\"[21] The\n\"truth preserved in soft verses, which attracts and persuades the most\nreluctant\" (Tasso),[22] with the comparison from Lucretius attached,\nis the conception that even Campanella repeats. Poetry is for him\n\"_Rhetorica quaedam figurata, quasi magica, quae exempla ministrat ad\nsuadendum bonum et dissuadendum malum delectabiliter iis qui simplici\nverum et bonum audire nolunt, aut non possunt aut nesciunt._\"[23] Thus\nreturned the comparison of poetry with oratory; according to Segni\nthey only differ because the first occupies a more lofty situation:\n\"for since imitation representing itself in act by means of poetry, in\nmighty, chosen words, in metaphors, images, and indeed the whole of\nfigured speech, which is to be found more in poetry than in the art\nof oratory, the metrical qualities that are also required in verse,\nthe subjects of which it treats, which have something of the great and\ndelightful, make it appear most beautiful and worthy of being held all\nthe greater marvel.\"[24] \"Three most noble arts\" (wrote Tassoni in\n1620, and he repeated common opinion), \"History, Poetics, and Oratory,\ncome under the heading of Politics and depend upon it; the first of\nthese has reference to the instruction of princes and gentlemen, the\nsecond of the people, the third of those who give counsel in public\ntrials or defend private ones that come up for judgment.\"[25]\n\nAccording to these views, the tragical catharsis was regarded as\ndesigned in general to demonstrate the instability of fortune, or to\nterrify by example, or to proclaim the triumph of justice, or to render\nthe spectators insensible to the strokes of fortune, owing to their\nfamiliarity with suffering. The pedagogic theory, thus renewed and\nsustained by the authority of the ancients, was popularized in France,\nSpain, England and Germany, together with all the Italian poetic\ndoctrines of the Renaissance. The French writers of the period of Louis\nXIV. are altogether penetrated with it. \"_Cette science agr\u00e9able qui\nm\u00eale la gravit\u00e9 des pr\u00e9ceptes avec la douceur du langage_,\" is what La\nM\u00e9nardi\u00e8re calls poetry (1640), in the same way as Le Bossu (1675), for\nwhom \"_le premier but du po\u00e8te est d'instruire_,\"[26] as Homer taught,\nwhen he wrote two interesting didactic manuals relating to military and\npolitical events: the _Iliad_ and the _Odyssey._\n\n[Sidenote: _The \"Poetics of the Renaissance.\"_]\n\nThis pedagogic theory has therefore been reasonably described by all\nthe modern critics in concert, as if by antonomasia, as the _Poetics\nof the Renaissance._ It must, however, always be understood that it\ndid not appear for the first time in the fifteenth or sixteenth\ncentury, but that it was prevalent and generally accepted at that\ntime. It may even be remarked, as has already been acutely done,[27]\nthat the Renaissance naturally did not distinguish the didactic kind\nof poetry from the other kinds, since for it every kind of poetry was\ndidactic. But the Renaissance was not a real Renaissance, save when\nand where it continued the interrupted spiritual work of antiquity,\nand in this sense it would perhaps be more just to describe as its\nPoetics, or rather, as the important element in its Poetics, not the\nrepetition of the pedagogic theory of antiquity and of the Middle Ages,\nbut the resumption, which also took place, of the discussions upon\nthe possible, the probable (_verisimile_, \u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2) of Aristotle, on the\nreasons of Plato's condemnation and on the procedure of the artist who\ncreates by imagining.\n\n[Sidenote: _Dispute concerning the universal and the probable in art._]\n\nIt is in such discussions that is to be found the true contribution of\nthat epoch, not to learning, but to the formation of the science of\n\u00c6sthetic. The ground was prepared and enriched through the work of the\ninterpreters and commentators of Aristotle and of the new writers on\nPoetics, especially the Italians, and it was also enriched with some\nseed that was destined to sprout and to become a vigorous plant in\nthe future. The study of Plato also contributed not a little to call\nattention to the function of the idea, or of the universal, in poetry.\nWhat meaning was to be attached to the statement that poetry should aim\nat the universal and history at the particular? What was the meaning of\nthe proposition that poetry should proceed according to _probability_?\nWhat could that _certain idea_ consist of, which Raph\u00e6l said that he\nfollowed in his painting?\n\n[Sidenote: _Fracastoro._]\n\nGirolamo Fracastoro was among the first to ask himself this question\nseriously, in the dialogue _Naugerius, sive De poetica_ (1555). He\ndisdainfully rejected the thesis that the end of poetry is pleasure:\nfar be from us, he exclaimed, so bad an opinion of the poets, who the\nancients said were the inventors of all the good arts. Nor did the\nend of instruction seem to him to be acceptable, which is the task,\nnot of poetry, but of other faculties, such as geography, history,\nagronomy, philosophy. The poet's task is to represent or to imitate,\nand he differs from the historian, not in the matter, but in the manner\nof representation. The others imitate the particular, the poet the\nuniversal: the others are like the painters of portraits, the poet\nproduces things as he contemplates the universal and most beautiful\nidea of them: the others say only what they need to say for their\npurposes, the poet that he may say everything beautifully and fully.\n\nBut the beauty of a poem must always be understood as relative to\nthe class of subject of which it treats; it is the most beautiful\nin this class, not the supremely beautiful: one must be careful to\nguard against the equivocal or double meaning of this word \"beauty\"\n(_\u00e6quivocatio illius verbi_). A poet never utters what is false or\nexpresses what does not exist, for his words inevitably harmonize in\nappearance or signification either with the opinions of men or with the\nuniversal. Nor can we accept the Platonic axiom that the poet has no\nknowledge of the things of which he treats; he does know them, but in\nhis own poet's manner.[28]\n\n[Sidenote: _L. Castelvetro._]\n\nWhile Fracastoro strives to elaborate the important passage in\nAristotle touching the universal of poetry, and though somewhat\nvague in his treatment, keeps fairly close to the mark; Castelvetro,\non the contrary, judges the Aristotelian fragment with the freedom\nand superior knowledge of the true critic. He recognizes that the\n_Poetics_ is merely a notebook recording certain principles and\nmethods of compiling the art, not the art fully compiled. He remarks,\nmoreover, not without logical acumen, that Aristotle having adopted\nthe criterion of probability or of that \"which presents an appearance\nof historic truth,\" should have applied his theory in the first\ncase to history, not to poetry; for history being a \"narrative\naccording to truth of memorable human actions,\" and poetry a narrative\naccording to probability of events which might possibly occur, the\nsecond cannot receive \"all its radiance\" from the first. Nor does it\nescape him that Aristotle describes two different things by the one\nword \"imitation\": (_a_) \"following the example of another,\" which is\n\"acting in exactly the same way as another without knowing the reason\nof such action\": and (_b_) the imitation \"demanded by poetry,\" which\n\"does things in a manner totally different from that in which they\nhave been done hitherto and proposes a new example for imitation.\"\nNevertheless Castelvetro cannot extricate himself from the confusion\nbetween the imaginary and the historical; for he himself says \"the\nrealm of the former is generally that of certainty,\" but \"the field\nof certainty is often crossed with bars of uncertainty just as the\nfield of uncertainty is often crossed with bars of certainty.\" Also\nwhat can be said of this curious interpretation of the Aristotelian\ntheory of pleasure experienced in the imitation of ugly models, that\nsuch pleasure is based on the fact that since an imitation is always\nimperfect, it is incapable of exciting the disgust and fear which would\narise from the contemplation of real ugliness? And what of his remark\nthat the characteristics of painting and poetry are so diverse as to\nbe in opposition one to the other; imitation of objects giving rise\nto great pleasure in the former art and as great displeasure in the\nlatter? And so on in numberless cases of bold but scarcely felicitous\nsubtleties.[29]\n\n[Sidenote: _Piccolomini and Pinciano._]\n\nIn opposition to Robortelli, who asserted the identity of the probable\nand the false, Piccolomini held that the probable (_verisimile_) is\ninherently neither false nor true, only by accident becoming one or\nother.[30] Of the same mind is the Spaniard Alfonso Lopez Pinciano\n(1596), who says the scope of poetry \"_no es la mentira, que seria\ncoincider con la soph\u00edstica, ni la historia que seria tomar la materia\nal hist\u00f3rico; y no siendo historia porque toca fab\u00falas ni mentira\nporque toca historia, tiene por objeto el verisimil, que todo lo\nabraza. De aqui resulta que es un arte superior \u00e1 la metaphysica,\nporqu\u00e9 comprende mucho mas, y se extiende a lo que es y \u00e1 lo que no\nes._\"[31] What may lie behind this notion of probability is still\nindefinite and impenetrable.\n\n[Sidenote: _Fr. Patrizzi_ (_Patricius_).]\n\nMoved by a wish to place poetry on a foundation other than the\nprobable, Francesco Patrizzi, the anti-Aristotelian, composed his\n_Poetica_ between 1555 and 1586 in refutation of all Aristotle's main\ndoctrines. Patrizzi notes that the word \"imitation\" is given many\nmeanings by the Greek philosopher, who uses it now to denote a single\nword, now to describe a tragedy; at times it stands for a figure of\nspeech, at others for a fiction: whence he draws the logical conclusion\n(from which, however, he shrinks alarmed) \"that all philosophic and\nother kinds of writing and speaking are poetry, since they are made\nof words which themselves are imitations.\" He observes further that,\naccording to Aristotle, it is impossible to distinguish between poetry\nand history (since both are imitations), or to prove that verse is not\nessential to poetry, or that history, science and art are unsuitable\nmaterial for it; since Aristotle in several passages says that poetry\nmay comprise \"fable, actual occurrences, belief of others, duty,\nthe best, necessity, the possible, the probable, the credible, the\nincredible, the suitable\" as well as \"all things worldly.\" After these\nobjections, some sound, others sophistical, Patrizzi comes to the\nconclusion that \"there is no truth in the dogma that poetry is wholly\nimitation; and even if it be imitation at all, it belongs not to poets\nalone, nor is it mere imitation of any kind, but something else not\nmentioned by Aristotle nor pointed out by any one else, nor yet borne\ninto the mind of man. The discovery may possibly be made in course of\ntime, or some one may hit upon the truth and bring it to light\"; but\nup to the present \"such discovery has not been made.\"[32]\n\nYet these confessions of ignorance, these endeavours, though vain, to\nescape from the Aristotelian circle of ideas, and the great literary\ncontroversies of the sixteenth century concerning the concept of poetic\ntruth and the probable had their use in that they stimulated interest\nby directing attention to a mystery still unsolved. Thought had once\nmore begun to move upon the \u00e6sthetic problem, and this time it was not\ndestined to be broken off or to lose itself.\n\n\n[1] _Confess,_ iv. x. ch. 13; _De Trinitate,_ vi. ch. 10; _Epist._\n3, 18; _De civitate Dei,_ xxii. ch. 19 (in _Opera,_ ed. dei Maurini,\nParis, 1679-1690, vols. i. ii. vii. viii.).\n\n[2] _Summa theol._ I. 1. xxxix. 8; I. 11. xxvii. I (ed. Migne, i. cols.\n794-795; ii. col. 219).\n\n[3] Comparetti, _Virg. nel medio evo,_ vol. i. _passim._\n\n[4] _De vulg. eloq._ (ed. Rajna), bk. ii. ch. 4.\n\n[5] _Vita nuova,_ ch. 25.\n\n[6] _Convivio,_ i. 1.\n\n[7] _Prohemio al Condestable de Portugal,_ 1445-1449 (in _Obras,_ ed.\nAmador de los Rios, 1852), \u00a7 3.\n\n[8] _De vulg. eloq._ bk. i. ch. 3.\n\n[9] Lately reprinted under the editorship of padre M. Fernandez Garcia,\nAd claras Aquas (Quarracchi), 1902.\n\n[10] Windelband, _Gesch. d. Phil._ ii. pp. 251-270; De Wulf, _Philos,\nm\u00e9di\u00e9v.,_ Louvain, 1900, pp. 317-320.\n\n[11] _Dialogi di amore, composti per Leone, medico ...,_ Rome, 1535.\n\n[12] _Libro di natura e d' amore,_ Venice, 1525 (Ven. 1563).\n\n[13] _De divina proportione,_ Venice, 1509.\n\n[14] G. P. Lomazzo, _Trattato dell' arte della pittura, scultura ed\narchitettura,_ Milan, 1585, i. I, pp. 22-23.\n\n[15] Aug. Niphi, _De pulcro el amore,_ Rome, 1529.\n\n[16] _Il Minturno o vero de la belleza_ (in _Dialoghi,_ ed. Guasti,\nvol. iii.).\n\n[17] _Ration. philos._ part iv.; _Poeticor._ (Paris, 1638), art. vii.\n\n[18] Fr. Robortelli, _In librum Arts, de arte poet, explicationes,_\nFlorence, 1548; Lud. Castelvetro, _Poetica d' Aristotele vulgarizzata\ned esposta,_ 1570 (Basle, 1576), part i. particella iv. pp. 29-30.\n\n[19] Bern. Segni, _Rettor. e poet. trad._ Florence, 1549; Vinc. Madii,\n_In Arist.... explanationes,_ 1550; Petri Victorii, _Commentarii,_\netc., Florence, 1560.\n\n[20] _Poetica,_ 1561 (ed. 3, 1586), i. I; vii. 3.\n\n[21] _Annotationi net libro della Poetica,_ Venice, 1575, preface.\n\n[22] _Gerus. lib._ i. 3.\n\n[23] _Poetic,_ ch. I, art. 1.\n\n[24] _Poetica trad_. preface.\n\n[25] _Pensieri diversi_, bk. x. ch. 18.\n\n[26] La M\u00e9nardi\u00e8re, _Po\u00e9tique_, Paris, 1640; Le Bossu, _Trait\u00e9 du po\u00e8me\n\u00e9pique_, Paris, 1675.\n\n[27] Borinski, _Poet. d. Renaiss._ p. 26.\n\n[28] Hyeron. Frascatorii _Opera,_ Venetian edition, Giunti, 1574, pp.\n112-120.\n\n[29] _Poet., ed. cit._ i. 1; ii. 1; iii. 7; v. I (pp. 64, 66, 71-72,\n208, 580).\n\n[30] _Annotationi,_ preface.\n\n[31] _Philosophia antiqua poetica,_ Madrid, 1596 (reprinted Valladolid\n1894).\n\n[32] Francesco Patrici, _Della poetica, la Deca disputata,_ \"in\nwhich by history, by reason, by authority of the greatest worthies\nof antiquity, is shown the falsity of the most received opinions\nconcerning Poetry down to our own day.\" Ferrara, 1586.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\n\nFERMENTS OF THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY\n\n\n[Sidenote: _New words and new observations in the seventeenth century_]\n\nInterest in \u00e6sthetic investigation increased rapidly in the early years\nof the following century, owing either to the popularity acquired by\ncertain new words or to the novel meanings given to words already\nfamiliar, which emphasized new aspects of artistic production and\ncriticism, complicating the problem and rendering it thereby more\npuzzling and attractive. For example: wit, taste, imagination or fancy,\nfeeling, and several others, which must be examined rather closely.\n\nWit (_ingegno_) differed somewhat from intellect. Free use of the word\narose, if we mistake not, from its convenience in Rhetoric as conceived\nby antiquity; that is to say, a suave and facile mode of knowledge, as\nopposed to the severity of Dialectic; an \"Antistrophe to Dialectic,\"\nwhich substituted for reasons of actual fact those of probability or\nfancy; enthymemes for syllogisms, examples for inductions; so much\nso that Zeno the Stoic figured Dialectic with her fist clenched and\nRhetoric with her hand open. The empty style of the decadent Italian\nauthors in the seventeenth century found its complete justification\nin this theory of rhetoric; their prose and verse, Marinesque and\nAchillinesque, professed to exhibit not the true but the striking,\nsubtly conceited, curious or nice. The word wit, _ingegno,_ was now\nrepeated much more frequently than in the preceding century; wit\nwas hailed as presiding genius of Rhetoric; its \"vivacities\" were\nlauded to the skies; \"_belli ingegni_\" was a phrase seized upon by\nthe French, who rendered it as \"_esprit_\" or \"_beaux esprits_.\"[1]\nOne of the most noteworthy commentators on these matters (although\nopposed to the literary excesses of the times), Matteo Pellegrini\nof Bologna (1650), defines wit as \"that part of the soul which in\na certain way practises, aims, and seeks to find and create the\nbeautiful and the efficacious\";[2] he considers the work of \"wit\" to\nbe the \"conceits\" and \"subtleties\" noted by him in a previous pamphlet\n(1639).[3] Emmanuele Tesauro also descants at considerable length\nin his _Cannochiale Aristotelico_ (1654) upon wit and subtleties,\nnot alone \"verbal\" and \"lapidary\" conceits, but also \"symbolic\" and\n\"figurative\" (statues, stories, devices, satires, hieroglyphs, mosaics,\nemblems, insignia, sceptres), and even \"animated agents\" (pantomimes,\nplay-scenes, masques and dances): all things which may be grouped under\n\"polite quibbling\" or rhetoric as distinct from \"dialectic.\"\n\nAmongst such treatises, product of their age, one written by the\nSpaniard Baltasar Gracian (1642) became celebrated throughout\nEurope.[4] Wit became in his hands the strictly inventive or artistic\nfaculty, \"genius\"; _g\u00e9nie,_ \"genius\" were now used as synonyms of\nwit, _ingegno_ and _esprit._ In the following century Mario Pagano[5]\nwrote: \"Wit may be taken as equivalent to the _g\u00e9nie_ of the French, a\nword now commonly used in Italy.\" To return to the seventeenth century,\nBouhours, a Jesuit writer of dialogues on the _Mani\u00e8re de bien penser\ndans les ouvrages d'esprit_ (1687), says that \"'heart' and 'wit' are\ngreatly in fashion just now, nothing else is spoken of in polite\nconversation, and all discourse is at last brought round to _l'esprit\net le c\u0153ur._\"[6]\n\n[Sidenote: _Taste._]\n\nThe word _taste_ or _good taste_ was equally widespread and\nfashionable, signifying the faculty of judgement brought to bear\non the beautiful, distinct to some extent from intellectual power,\nand sometimes divided into active and passive, so that it was usual\nto speak of one kind of taste as \"productive\" or \"fertile\" (thus\ncoinciding with \"wit\"), and of another as \"sterile.\"\n\n[Sidenote: _Various meanings of the word taste._]\n\nFrom the rough notes which we possess as to the history of the concept\nof taste, several meanings of the word, not all of equal importance\nas indications of the development of ideas, detach themselves in a\nsomewhat confused manner. \"Taste,\" meaning \"pleasure\" or \"delight,\" was\nan old-established word in Italy and Spain, as is shown in such phrases\nas \"to have a taste for, to be to one's taste\"; when Lope di Vega\nand other Spaniards speak continually of the drama of their country\nas seeking to please the popular taste (\"_deleita el gusto_\"; \"_para\ndarle gusto_\") they mean only the \"pleasure\" of the populace. In Italy\nthere was a very ancient use of the word in the metaphorical sense\nof \"judgement,\" either literary, scientific, or artistic; numberless\nexamples of this use occur in writers of the sixteenth century\n(Ariosto, Varchi, Mich\u00e6l Angelo, Tasso). To take but one of these: the\nlines in _Orlando Furioso_ where it is said of the Emperor Augustus,\n\"_L' aver avuto in poesia buon gusto La proscrizione iniqua gli\nperdona,_\" \"For having had good taste in poetry he shall be forgiven\nhis iniquitous proscriptions\"; or the remark of Ludovico Dolce that'\nsome person \"had such exquisite taste, he sang no verses save those of\nCatullus and Calvus.\"[7] The word \"taste,\" in the sense of a special\nfaculty or attitude of mind, appears to have been used for the first\ntime in Spain in the middle of the seventeenth century by Gracian,[8]\nthe moralist and political writer already quoted. It is evidently to\nhim that the Italian author Trevisano alludes in a preface to a book by\nMuratori (1708) when he speaks of \"Spaniards, above all others cunning\nin metaphor,\" who express themselves in \"that eloquent and laconic\nphrase, good taste\"; touching further on taste and genius he quotes,\n\"that ingenious Spaniard,\" Gracian,[9] who gave the word the sense of\n\"practical wit,\" enabling one to perceive the \"true signification\" of\nthings; his \"man of good taste\" becomes in our language \"a man of tact\"\nin the affairs of life.[10]\n\nThe transference of the word to the domain of \u00e6sthetic seems to have\ntaken place in France during the last quarter of the century. \"_Il y\na dans l'art un point de perfection, comme de bont\u00e9 ou de maturit\u00e9\ndans la nature: celui qui le sent et qui l'aime a le go\u00fbt parfait;\ncelui qui ne le sent pas, et qui aime au de\u00e7\u00e0 ou au del\u00e0, a le go\u00fbt\nd\u00e9fectueux. Il y a donc un bon et un mauvais go\u00fbt, et l'on dispute des\ngo\u00fbts avec fondement,_\" writes La Bruy\u00e8re[11] (1688). As attributes\nor variants of taste it was usual to mention _delicacy_ and _variety_\nor _variability._ Bearing its fresh critical--literary content,\nbut not freed from the encumbrance of its earlier practical and\nmoral significance, the word spread from France into other European\ncountries. Thomasius introduced it into Germany in 1687;[12] and in\nEngland it becomes \"good taste.\" In Italy it appears as early as 1696\nas title of a large book written by Camillo Ettori, the Jesuit, _Il\nbuon gusto ne' componimenti rettorici_.[13] The preface notes: \"The\nexpression 'good taste,' proper to those who rightly distinguish good\nfrom bad flavour in foods, is now in general use and claimed by every\none as a title in connexion with literature and the humanities\"; it\nreappears in 1708 at the beginning of Muratori's[14] book already\nquoted: Trevisano treats of it philosophically: Salvini discusses it\nin his note upon the _Perfetta Poesia_ of Muratori above mentioned,\nwhere the subject of good taste occupies several pages,[15] and finally\nit gives its name to the Academy of Good Taste founded at Palermo in\n1718.[16] Scholars of the day who took up the discussion of the theme,\nrecollecting some passages scattered throughout the ancient classics,\nplaced the new concept in relation with the \"_tacitus quidam sensus\nsine ulla ratione et arte_\" of Cicero; and with the \"_indicium_\" which\n\"_nec magis arte traditur quam gustus aut odor_\" of Quintilian.[17]\nMore particularly Montfaucon de Villars (1671)[18] wrote a book on\n\"Delicacy\"; Ettori strove to find some definition more satisfactory\nthan those current at the time (_e.g._ \"it is the finest invention\nof wit, the flower of wit and extract of beauty's self,\" and similar\nconceits);[19] Orsi made it the subject of his _Considerazioni_ written\nin reply to Bouhours' book.\n\n[Sidenote: _Fancy or Imagination._]\n\nIn Italy in the seventeenth century we find imagination or fancy\nplaced on a pinnacle. What do you mean by talking of probability\nand historical truth (asks Cardinal Sforza Pallavicino in 1644), of\nfalse or true in connexion with poetry; which deals not with fiction,\nfact or historical probability but with primary apprehensions which\nassert neither truth nor falsehood? Following this line of argument,\nimagination takes the place of that probable, neither true nor false,\nadvocated by some commentators of Aristotle; a theory strongly\ncriticized by Pallavicino, here agreeing with Piccolomini, whom however\nhe does not name, and in opposition to Castelvetro whom he explicitly\nmentions. He who goes to the play (continues Pallavicino) knows quite\nwell that the scenes acted on the stage are not real; although he has\nno belief in them yet they please him greatly. For \"if poetry desired\nto be mistaken for truth, the end she had in view would be a he, by\nthe laws of nature and of God doomed inevitably to perish: for a lie\nis nothing but an untruth uttered in the hope that it may be mistaken\nfor truth. How then should an art so tainted be allowed to flourish in\nthe best-regulated republics? How should it be commended and used by\nthe very writers of Holy Scripture?\" _Ut pictura po\u00ebsis_: poetry is\nlike painting, which is a \"diligent imitation\" aiming at a close copy\nof the features, colours, acts, nay, even the hidden motives, of the\nobjects it represents: and it \"does not pretend that fiction is truth.\"\nThe sole aim of poetic tales is \"to adorn our understanding with\nimagery, that is to say, with sumptuous, novel, marvellous and splendid\nappearances. And this is known to diffuse so useful an influence on\nmankind that humanity insists on rewarding poets with praise more\nglorious than is bestowed on any other men; their books are protected\nfrom the ravages of time with greater solicitude than is shown to\nscientific treatises or productions of any other art; in the end the\nnames of poets are crowned with adoring veneration. See how the world\nthirsts for beautiful first apprehensions, although these are neither\nladen with science nor are they vehicles of truth.\"[20]\n\nSixty years later these ideas, although expressed by a Cardinal, seemed\nall too daring to Muratori, who could not bring himself to allow poets\nso much latitude, or to enfranchize them from their obligations to the\nprobable. Nevertheless Muratori allows a large space to imagination,\n\"an inferior apprehensive faculty\" which, without caring whether\nthings be false or true, confines itself to apprehending them, and\n\"represents\" the truth merely, leaving the task of \"cognition\" to the\n\"superior apprehensive faculty\" or intellect.[21] Even the stony heart\nof Gravina yields to the charm of imagination: he admits it occupies\na considerable place in the realm of poetry and suffers his own arid\nprose to describe it as \"a sorceress, but beneficent,\" \"a delirium\nwhich cures madness.\"[22]\n\nEarlier than either of these, Ettori commended it to the good\nrhetorician, \"who in order that he may awaken images\" must \"familiarize\nhimself with whatever is subject to bodily feeling\" and \"encounter\nthe genius of imagination, which is a sensuous faculty,\" to these\nends using \"species rather than genera (since the latter, being more\nuniversal than the former, are less sensible), individuals rather than\nspecies, effects than causes, the number of the greater rather than the\nnumber of the less.\"[23]\n\nAs far back as 1578 the Spaniard Huarte had maintained that eloquence\nis the product of imagination rather than of intellect or reason.[24]\nIn England Bacon (1605) ascribed science to intellect, history to\nmemory and poetry to imagination or fancy:[25] Hobbes inquired into\nthe procedure of poetry:[26] Addison (1712) devoted several numbers\nof his _Spectator_ to analysis of the \"pleasures of imagination.\"[27]\nSomewhat later, the importance of imagination was felt in Germany,\nwhere it found advocates in Bodmer, Breitinger and other writers of the\nSwiss school, who owed much to the influence of the Italians (Muratori,\nGravina, Calepio) and the English: acting in their turn as teachers of\nKlopstock and the new German critical school.[28]\n\n[Sidenote: _Feeling._]\n\nIt was at this same period that opposition became clearly marked\nbetween those accustomed \"_\u00e0 juger par le sentiment_\" and those used\nto \"_raisonner par principes_.\"[29] The Frenchman, Du Bos, author of\n_R\u00e9flexions critiques sur la po\u00e9sie et la peinture_ (1719), upholds the\ntheory of feeling; according to him art is simply a self-abandonment\n\"_aux impressions que les objets \u00e9trangers font sur nous,_\" setting\naside all reflective labour. He laughs at those philosophers who\ndeny the force of imagination, and Malebranche's eloquent discourse\nfounded on this denial draws from Du Bos the remark, \"_c'est \u00e0 notre\nimagination qu'il parle contre l'abus de l'imagination._\" He refuses\nto see any intellectual nucleus in the productions of the arts, saying\nthat art consists not in instruction but in style: nor is he too\nrespectful towards the probable: he says he finds himself unable to\nset limits between it and the marvellous, and leaves to \"born poets\"\nthe task of thus miraculously uniting opposites. For Du Bos there is\nno criterion of art save feeling, which he calls a \"_sixi\u00e8me sens,_\"\nagainst which dispute is vain since in such matters popular opinion\ninvariably wins the day over the dogmatic pronouncements of artists\nand men of letters: all the ingenious conceits of the greatest\nmetaphysicians, though unimpeachable in themselves, will not in the\nslightest degree diminish the lustre of poetry or despoil it of one\nsingle attraction. Attempts to discredit Ariosto and Tasso in the eyes\nof Italians were as vain as those made against the _Cid_ in France.\nOther people's arguments can never persuade us of the contrary of\nwhat we feel.[29] These notions were adopted by many French writers:\nfor example Cartaut de la Villate[30] observes, \"_Le grand talent\nd'un \u00e9crivain qui veut plaire, est de tourner ses r\u00e9flexions en\nsentiments_;\" and Trublet, \"_C'est un principe s\u00fbr, que la po\u00e9sie doit\n\u00eatre une expression de sentiment._\"[30] Nor were the English slow in\nemphasizing the concept of \"emotion\" in their theories of literature.\n\n[Sidenote: _Tendency to unite these terms._]\n\nIn the writings of this period _imagination_ was often identified with\n_wit, wit_ with _taste, taste_ with _feeling,_ and _feeling_ with\nfirst apprehensions or _imagination_;[31] we have already noted that\ntaste is sometimes critical and sometimes productive: this fusion,\nidentification and subordination of terms apparently distinct shows how\nthey gravitate round one single concept.\n\n[Sidenote: _Difficulties and contradictions in their definition._]\n\nA German critic, one of the very few who have sought to penetrate\nthe darkness surrounding the origins of modern \u00c6sthetic, considers\nthe concept of taste (which we owe, he thinks, to Gracian) \"the\nmost important \u00e6sthetic doctrine which remained for modern times to\ndiscover.\"[32] But without going so far as to say that taste is the\nchief doctrine of the science, and the foundation of all the rest,\ninstead of only a particular doctrine, and without recapitulating what\nwe have already said of Gracian's relation to the theory of taste,\nit is well to repeat that taste, wit, imagination, feeling, and so\non, instead of new concepts scientifically grasped, were simply new\nwords corresponding to vague impressions: at most they were problems,\nnot concepts: apprehensions of ground still to be conquered, not yet\nannexed and brought into subjection. It must not be forgotten that the\nvery men who made use of these terms could scarcely grope after the\nideas they suggested without falling back into the old traditions, the\nonly ones on which they had an intellectual grasp. To them the new\nwords were shades, not bodies: when they tried to embrace them their\narms returned empty to their own breasts.\n\n[Sidenote: _Wit and intellect._]\n\nCertainly wit differs to a certain extent from intellect. Yet\nPellegrini and Tesauro, with other writers of treatises, never fail to\npoint out that intellectual truth lies at the root of wit. Trevisano\ndefines it as \"an internal virtue of the soul which invents methods\nfor expressing and executing its own concepts: it is recognizable now\nin the arrangement of things we invent, now in the clear expression\nof them: sometimes in cunning reconciliations of matters seemingly\nopposed, sometimes in tracing analogies but faintly discernible.\" To\nsum up, one must not \"allow the actions of wit to go unaccompanied\nby those of intellect,\" or even by those of practical morality.[33]\nMore ingenuously Muratori says, \"Wit is that virtue and active force\nwith which the intellect is able to assemble, unite and discover the\nsimilarities, relations and reasons of things.\"[34] In this manner wit,\nafter having been distinguished from intellect, eventually becomes a\npart or a manifestation of it. By a somewhat different path the same\nconclusion is reached by Alexander Pope when he counsels that wit be\nreined in like a mettlesome horse, and observes:\n\n    For wit and judgement often are at strife,\n    Though meant each other's aid like man and wife.[35]\n\n[Sidenote: _Taste and intellectual judgement._]\n\nSimilar vicissitudes befell the word \"taste,\" outcome of a metaphor\n(as was noted by Kant) whose effect was to stand in opposition\nto intellectualistic principles, as if to say that the judgement\ngoverning the choice of food destined solely for the delectation\nof the palate is of the same nature as that which decides opinions\nin matters of art.[36] Nevertheless, the very definition of this\nanti-intellectualistic concept contained a reference to intellect and\nreason; the implicit comparison with the palate was ultimately taken\nas signifying an anticipation of reflexion: as Voltaire wrote in the\nfollowing century: \"_De m\u00eame que la sensation du palais anticipe\nla r\u00e9flexion._\"[37] Intellect and reason glimmer through all the\ndefinitions of taste belonging to this period. Mme. Dacier wrote in\n1684, \"_Une harmonie, un accord de l'esprit et de la raison._\"[38]\n\"_Une raison \u00e9clair\u00e9e qui, d'intelligence avec le c\u0153ur, fait\ntoujours un juste choix parmi des choses oppos\u00e9es ou semblables,_\"\nwrote the author of _Entretiens galants._[39] According to another\nwriter quoted by Bonhours, \"taste\" is \"a natural feeling implanted in\nthe soul, independent of any science that can possibly be acquired\"; it\nis practically \"an instinct of right reason.\"[40] The same Bouhours,\nwhilst deprecating this interpretation of one metaphor by another,\nsays, \"Taste is more nearly allied to judgement than wit.\"[41] The\nItalian Ettori thinks that it may generally be described as \"judgement\nregulated by art,\"[42] and Baruffaldi (1710) identifies it with\n\"discernment\" reduced from theory to practice.[43] De Crousaz (1715)\nobserves: \"_Le bon go\u00fbt nous fait d'abord estimer par sentiment ce que\nla raison aurait approuv\u00e9, apr\u00e8s qu'elle se serait donn\u00e9 le temps de\nl'examiner assez pour en juger par des justes id\u00e9es._\"[44] And somewhat\nprior to him Trevisano considered it \"a sentiment always willing to\nconform to whatsoever reason accepts,\" and in conjunction with divine\ngrace, a powerful help to man in revealing the true and good, no longer\nable to circulate freely among mankind owing to original sin. For\nK\u00f6nig (1727) in Germany taste was \"a power of the intellect, product\nof a healthy mind and acute judgement which makes one able to feel\nthe true, good and beautiful\"; and for Bodmer in 1736 (after lengthy\ncorrespondence on the subject with his Italian friend Calepio) \"a\npractised reflexion, prompt and penetrating into the smallest details,\nby which intellect is able to distinguish the true from the false, the\nperfect from the imperfect.\" Calepio and Bodmer were opponents of pure\nfeeling, and made a distinction between \"taste\" and \"good taste.\"[45]\nTraversing the same intellectualistic path, Muratori speaks of \"good\ntaste\" in \"erudition\" and others of \"good taste in philosophy.\"\n\n[Sidenote: _The \"je ne sais quoi.\"_]\n\nPerhaps those authors were wise who preferred to remain vague and to\nidentify taste with an indefinable Something, a _je ne sais quoi_; a\n_nescio quid_: a new expression which expressed nothing new, but at\nleast called attention to the problem. Bouhours (1671) discusses it at\nlength: \"_Les Italiens, qui font myst\u00e8re de tout, emploient en toutes\nrencontres leur_ non so che: _on ne voit rien de plus commune dans\nleurs po\u00e8tes,_\" and quotes Tasso and others in confirmation.[45] A\nnote upon it is found in Salvini: \"This 'good taste' has but recently\ncome to the front; it seems a vague term applicable to nothing\nparticular, and is equivalent to the _non so che,_ to a happy or\nsuccessful turn of wit.\"[46] Father Feij\u00f3o, who wrote on the _Raz\u00f3n\ndel gusto_ and on _El no se qu\u00e9_ (1733), says very wisely: \"_En muchas\nproducciones no solo de la naturaleza, sino del arte, y aun mas del\narte que de la naturaleza, encuentran los hombres, fuera di aquellas\nperfecciones sujetes \u00e1 su comprehension racional, otro genero de primor\nmisterioso que, lisonjeando el gusto, atormenta el entendemento. Los\nsentidos le palpan, pero no le puede dissipar la razon, y as\u00ed, al\nquerer explicarle, no se encuentran voces ni conceptos que cuadren\n\u00e1 su idea, y salimos del paso con decir que hay un non se qu\u00e9, que\nagrada, que enamora que hechiza, sin que pueda encontrarse revelacion\nmas clara da este natural misterio._\"[47] And President Montesquieu:\n\"_Il y a quelquefois dans les personnes ou dans les choses un charme\ninvisible, une gr\u00e2ce naturelle, qu'on n'a pu d\u00e9finir, et qu'on a \u00e9t\u00e9\nforc\u00e9 d'appeler le je ne sais quoi. Il me semble que c'est un effet\nprincipalement fond\u00e9 sur la surprise._\"[48] Some writers rebelled\nagainst the subterfuge of the _je ne sais quoi,_ saying, rightly\nenough, that it was a confession of ignorance: but they knew not how to\nescape that ignorance without falling into confusion between taste and\nintellectual judgement.\n\n[Sidenote: _Imagination and sensationalism. The corrective of\nImagination._]\n\nIf the attempt to define \"wit\" and \"taste\" usually resulted in\nintellectualism, it was easy to transform imagination and feeling into\nsensationalistic doctrines. We have seen how earnestly Pallavicino\ninsisted on the non-intellectuality of the fantasies and inventions\nof the imagination. \"Nothing presents itself to the admirer of the\nbeautiful (he writes) to enable him to verify his cognition and satisfy\nhimself that the object recognized is or is not that for which he takes\nit; if either by vision or by strong apprehension he is led to think\nit actually present by an act of judgement, his taste for beauty as\nbeauty does not arise from such act of judgement, but from the vision\nor lively apprehension which might remain in ourselves even when the\ndeception of belief was corrected\"; just as happens when we are drowsy\nand know ourselves to be but half awake, yet are unwilling to tear\nourselves from sweet dreams. For Pallavicino imagination cannot err; he\nassimilates it wholly to the sensations, which are incapable of truth\nor falsity. And if imaginative knowledge pleases, it is not because\nit holds a special truth (imaginative truth), but because it creates\nobjects which \"though false are pleasing\": the painter makes not\nlikenesses but images which, all resemblance apart, are pleasing to the\nsight: the poet awakens apprehensions \"sumptuous, novel, marvellous,\nsplendid.\"[49] His opinion coincides, if we mistake not, with Marino's\nsensationalism: \"The poet should aim only at the marvellous ... he who\ncannot amaze his hearers is not worth a straw\":[50] he applauds the\noft-repeated dictum of \"Gabriel Chiabrera, that Pindar of Savona, that\npoetry should cause the eyebrows to arch themselves.\"[51] But in the\n_Treatise upon Style_ written later (1646) he repents of his youthful\nachievement and appears willing to return to the pedagogic theory:\n\"And forasmuch as I theorized concerning poetry in the basest manner,\ntreating it solely as a minister of that delight which the mind enjoys\nin the less noble operation of imagination or apprehension arising\nfrom imagination; and, therefore, in consequence I somewhat relaxed the\nstrings which bind it to the probable: I now wish to demonstrate that\npoetry has other functions more exalted and fruitful, while remaining\nin strict servitude to the probable: which office is to guide our\nminds in the noble exercise of judgement; thus it becomes the nurse of\nphilosophy which it nourishes with sweet milk.\"[52] The Jesuit Ettori,\nwhile inculcating the use of imagination and recommending orators to go\nto school with the \"actors,\" points out that imagination should fulfil\nthe simple office of \"interpreter\" between intellect and truth, never\nassuming dominion, otherwise the orator would be treating his audience\nor readers \"not as men, to whom intellect is proper, but as beasts whom\nimagination satisfies.\"[53]\n\nThe conception of imagination as purely sensuous shows strongly in\nMuratori, who is so convinced that the faculty, if left to itself,\nwould deteriorate into a riot of dreams and intoxication, that he links\nit to intellect as to \"an authoritative friend\" who shall influence\nthe choice and combination of images.[54] The problem of the nature of\nimagination had strong attraction for Muratori, and, while traducing\nand vilifying, he returns to it again in his _Della forza della\nfantasia umana_;[55] describing it as a material faculty essentially\ndifferent from the mental or spiritual, and denying it the validity of\nknowledge. Although he had observed that the aim of poetry is distinct\nfrom that of science, in that the latter seeks to \"know,\" and the\nformer to \"represent\" truth,[56] he persisted in counting Poetry as an\n\"art of delectation\" subordinate to Moral Philosophy, of whom she was\none of the three servants or ministers.[57] Very similarly Gravina held\nthat along with novelty and delight in the marvellous, poetry should\nendow the mind of the vulgar with \"truth and universal cognitions.\"[58]\n\nOutside Italy the same movement was going on. Bacon, although he\nassigned poetry to imagination, yet considered it as something\nintermediary between history and science, approximating epic to\nhistory and the most lofty style, the parabolic, to science: (\"_po\u0113sis\nparabolica inter reliquas eminet\"._) Elsewhere he calls poetry\n_somnium_ or declares absolutely that \"_scientias fere non parit,_\" and\nthat \"_pro lusu potius ingenii quam pro scientia est habenda_\": music,\npainting and sculpture are voluptuous arts.[59] Addison identified the\npleasures of the imagination with those produced by visible objects or\nthe ideas to which they give rise: such pleasures are not so strong as\nthose of the senses nor so refined as those of the intellect: he groups\ntogether the pleasures experienced respectively in comparing imitations\nwith the objects imitated, and in sharpening by this means the faculty\nof observation.[60]\n\n[Sidenote _Feeling and Sensationalism._]\n\nThe sensationalism of Du Bos and other upholders of feeling appears\nvery clearly. For Du Bos art is a pastime whose pleasantness consists\nin the fact that it occupies the mind without fatigue, and has\naffinities with the pleasure provoked by gladiatorial contests,\nbullfights and tourneys.[61]\n\nFor these reasons, whilst noting the importance, in the prehistory\nof \u00c6sthetic, of these new words and the new views they express; and\nwhile recognizing their value as a ferment in the discussion of the\n\u00e6sthetic problem, taken up by thinkers of the Renaissance at the point\nat which it had been left by the ancients; we yet cannot discern in\ntheir apparition the true origin of our science. By these words and the\ndiscussions they aroused, the \u00e6sthetic fact clamoured even louder and\nmore insistently for its own philosophical justification; but this it\nwas not yet to attain either by this means or by any other.\n\n\n[1] _E.g._ Moli\u00e8re, _Pr\u00e9c. ridic._ sc. i, 10.\n\n[2] _I fonti dell' ingegno ridotti ad arte,_ Bologna, 1650.\n\n[3] _Delle acutezze che altrimenti spiriti, vivezze e concetti\nvolgarmenti si appellano,_ Genova-Bologna, 1639.\n\n[4] _Agudeza y arte de ingenio,_ Madrid, 1642; enlarged, Huesca, 1649.\n\n[5] _Saggio del gusto e delle belle arti,_ 1783, ch. I, _note._\n\n[6] Ital. trans. in Orsi, _Considerazioni,_ etc. (Modena, 1735), vol.\ni. dial. 1.\n\n[7] _Orl. Furioso_, xxxv. 26; L. Dolce, _Dial. del pittura_ (Venice,\n1557); _ad init_.\n\n[8] Borinski, _Poet. d. Renaiss._ p. 308 _seqq._; _B. Gracian_, pp.\n39-54.\n\n[9] _Riflessioni sopra il buon gusto_ (Venice, 1766), introd. pp. 72-84.\n\n[10] Gracian, _Obras_ (Antwerp, 1669); _El h\u00e9roe, El discreto,_ with\nintrod. by A. Farinelli, Madrid, 1900. Cf. Borinski, _Poet. d. Renais,\nl.c._\n\n[11] _Les Caract\u00e8res, ou les m\u0153urs du si\u00e8cle,_ ch. I; _Des ouvrages de\nl'esprit._\n\n[12] In the programme: _Von der Nachahmung der Franzosen,_ Leipzig,\n1687.\n\n[13] _Opera ... nella quale con alcune certe considerazioni si mostra\nin che consista il vero buon gusto ne' suddetti componimenti,_ etc.,\netc., Bologna, 1696.\n\n[14] _Delle riflessioni sopra il buon gusto nelle scienze e nell'\narti,_ 1708 (Venice, 1766).\n\n[15] Muratori, _Della perfetta poesia italiana,_ Modena, 1706, bk. ii.\nch. 5.\n\n[16] Mazzuchelli, _Scrittori d' Italia,_ vol. ii. part iv. p. 2389.\n\n[17] Cicero, _De oratore,_ iii. ch. 50; Quintilian, _Inst. Orator,_ vi.\nch. 5.\n\n[18] _De la d\u00e9licatesse,_ Paris, 1671.\n\n[19] _Il buon gusto,_ ch. 39, p. 367.\n\n[20] _Del bene_ (Naples, 1681), bk. i. part i. chs. 49-53. Cf. the same\nwriter's _Arte della perfezion cristiana,_ Rome, 1665, bk. i. ch. 3.\n\n[21] _Perfetta poesia,_ bk. i. chs. 14, 21.\n\n[22] _Ragion poetica,_ in _Prose italiane,_ ed. De Stefano, Naples,\n1839, i. ch. 7. 2 _Il buon gusto,_ p. 10.\n\n[23] _Esame degl' ingegni degl' huomini per apprender le scienze_\n(Ital. trans. by C. Camilli, Venice, 1586), chs. 9-12.\n\n[24] _De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum,_ bk. ii. ch. 13.\n\n[25] _De homine_ (in _Opera phil.,_ ed. Molesworth, vol. iii.), ch. 2.\n\n[26] _Spectator,_ Nos. 411-421 (_Works,_ London, 1721, pp. 486-519).\n\n[27] _Die Discourse der Mahlern,_ 1721--1723; _Von dem Einfl\u00fcss und\nGebrauche der Einbildungskraft,_ etc., 1727; and other writings of\nBodmer and Breitinger.\n\n[28] Pascal, _Pens\u00e9es sur l'\u00e9loquence et le style,_ \u00a7 15.\n\n[29] _R\u00e9flexions critiques sur la po\u00e9sie et la peinture,_ 1719 (ed. 7,\nParis, 1770) _passim._; see especially sections 1, 23, 26, 28, 33, 34.\n\n[30] Cartaut de la Villate, _Essais historiques et philosophiques sur\nle go\u00fbt,_ Aix, 1737; Trublet, _Essais sur divers sujets de litt\u00e9rature\net de morale,_ Amsterdam, 1755.\n\n[31] Cf. Du Bos, _op. cit._ \u00a7 33.\n\n[32] Borinski, _B. Gracian_, p. 39.\n\n[33] Trevisano, _op. cit._ pp. 82, 84.\n\n[34] _Perfetta poesia,_ bk. ii. ch. I (_ed. cit._ i. p. 299).\n\n[35] A. Pope, _An Essay on Criticism,_ 1709 (in _Poetical Works,_\nLondon, 1827), lines 81, 82.\n\n[36] _Kritik der Urtheilskraft_ (ed. Kirchmann), \u00a7 33.\n\n[37] _Essai sur le go\u00fbt_ (in appendix to A. G\u00e9rard, _Essai sur le\ngo\u00fbt,_ Paris, 1766).\n\n[38] _Ibid._\n\n[39] Quoted in Sulzer, _Allg. Th. d. s. K._ ii. p. 377.\n\n[40] _Mani\u00e8re de bien penser_ (Ital. trans. _cit._), dial. 4. 2 _Ibid._\n\n[41] _Op. cit._ chs. 2-4.\n\n[42] _Osservazioni critiche_ (in vol. ii. of Orsi's _Considerazioni)_,\nch. 8, p. 23.\n\n[43] _Trait\u00e9 du beau_ (Amsterdam ed., 1724), i. p. 170.\n\n[44] J. Ulr. K\u00f6nig, _Untersuchung von dem guten Geschmack in der Dicht-\nund Redekunst,_ Leipzig, 1727, and (Calepio-Bodmer) _Briefwechsel von\nder Natur des poetischen Geschmackes,_ Z\u00fcrich, 1736; cf. for both\nSulzer, ii. p. 380.\n\n[45] _Les Entretiens d'Ariste et d'Eug\u00e8ne,_ 1671 (Paris ed., 1734),\nconversation v.; \"_Le je ne s\u00e7ai quoi_\"; cf. Gracian, _Oraculo manual,_\nNo. 127, and _El h\u00e9roe,_ ch. 13.\n\n[46] In the notes to Muratori's _Perfetta poesia._\n\n[47] Feij\u00f3o, _Theatro critico,_ vol. vi. Nos. 11-12.\n\n[48] _Essai sur le go\u00fbt dans les choses de la nature et de l'art._\nPosthumous fragment (in appendix to A. G\u00e9rard, _op. cit._).\n\n[49] _Del bene, cap. cit._\n\n[50] Marino, in one of the sonnets in the _Murtoleide_ (1608).\n\n[51] _Del bene,_ bk. i. part i. ch. 8.\n\n[52] _Trattato dello stile_ (Rome, 1666), ch. 30.\n\n[53] _Il buon gusto,_ pp. 12-13.\n\n[54] _Perf. poesia,_ i. ch. 18, pp. 232-233.\n\n[55] Venice, 1745.\n\n[56] _Perf. poesia,_ i. ch. 6.\n\n[57] _Op. cit._ i. ch. 4, p. 42.\n\n[58] _Ragion poetica,_ i. ch. 7.\n\n[59] _De dignitate,_ ii. ch. 13; iii. ch. I; iv. ch. 2; v. ch. 1.\n\n[60] _Spectator, loc. cit._ esp. pp. 487, 503.\n\n[61] _Op. cit._ \u00a7 2.\n\n\n\n\nIV\n\n\n\u00c6STHETIC IDEAS IN THE CARTESIAN AND LEIBNITIAN SCHOOLS, AND THE\n\"\u00c6STHETIC\" OF BAUMGARTEN\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Cartesianism and imagination._]\n\nThe obscure world of wit, taste, imagination, feeling and the _je ne\nsais quoi_ was not selected for examination or even, so to speak,\nincluded in the picture of Cartesian philosophy. The French philosopher\nabhorred imagination, the outcome, according to him, of the agitation\nof the animal spirits: and though not utterly condemning poetry, he\nallowed it to exist only in so far as it was guided by intellect, that\nbeing the sole faculty able to save men from the caprices of the _folle\ndu logis._ He tolerated it, but that was all; and went so far as not to\ndeny it anything \"_qu'un philosophe lui puisse permettre sans offenser\nsa conscience._\"[1] It has been observed that the \u00e6sthetic parallel\nwith Cartesian intellectualism is to be found in Boileau,[2] slave to\nrigid _raison_ (\"_Mais nous que la raison \u00e0 ses r\u00e8gles engage ..._\")\nand enthusiastic partisan of allegory. We have already had occasion\nto draw attention to the diatribe of Malebranche against imagination.\nThe mathematical spirit fostered in France by Descartes forbade all\npossibility of a serious consideration of poetry and art. The Italian\nAntonio Conti, living in that country and witness of the literary\ndisputes raging around him, thus describes the French critics (La\nMotte, Fontenelle and their followers): \"_Ils ont introduit dans les\nbelles lettres l'esprit et la m\u00e9thode de M. Descartes; et ils jugent\nde la po\u00e9sie et de l'\u00e9loquence ind\u00e9pendamment des qualit\u00e9s sensibles.\nDe l\u00e0 vient aussi qu'ils confondent le progr\u00e8s de la philosophie avec\ncelui des arts. Les modernes, dit l'Abb\u00e9 Terrasson, sont plus grands\ng\u00e9om\u00e8tres que les anciens: donc ils sont plus grands orateurs et plus\ngrands po\u00e8tes._\"[3] The fight against this mathematical spirit in the\nmatters of art and feeling was still going on in France in the day of\nthe encyclop\u00e6dists; the din of the battle was heard in Italy, as is\nshown by the writings of Bettinelli and others. At the time when Du Bos\npublished his daring book there was a counsellor in the parliament of\nBordeaux, Jean-Jacques Bel by name, who composed a dissertation (1726)\nagainst the doctrine that feeling should be the judge of art.[4]\n\n[Sidenote: _Crousaz and Andr\u00e9._]\n\nCartesianism was incapable of an \u00c6sthetic of imagination. The _Trait\u00e9\ndu beau_ by the eclectic Cartesian J. P. de Crousaz (1715), maintained\nthe dependence of beauty not upon pleasure or feeling, matters about\nwhich there can be no difference of opinion, but upon that which can\nbe _approved_ and therefore reduced to ideas. He enumerates five such\nideas: variety, unity, regularity, order and proportion, observing,\n\"_La vari\u00e9t\u00e9 temp\u00e9r\u00e9e par l'unit\u00e9, la r\u00e9gularit\u00e9, l'ordre et la\nproportion, ne sont pas assur\u00e9ment des chim\u00e8res; elles ne sont pas\ndu ressort de la fantaisie, ce n'est pas le caprice qui en d\u00e9cide_\":\nfor him, that is to say, they were real qualities of the beautiful\nfounded in nature and truth. He discovered similar characteristics of\nthe beautiful in the individual beauties of the sciences (geometry,\nalgebra, astronomy, physics, history), of virtue, eloquence and\nreligion, finding in each the qualities laid down above.[5] Another\nCartesian, the Jesuit Andr\u00e9 (1742),[6] distinguished between an\n_essential_ beauty, independent of every institution, human and even\ndivine; a _natural_ beauty, independent of the opinions of mankind;\nand, lastly, a beauty to a certain extent _arbitrary_ and of human\ninvention: the first composed of regularity, order, proportion and\nsymmetry (here Andr\u00e9 relied upon Plato and also as an afterthought\nbrought in St. Augustine's definition): the second having its principal\nmeasure in the light which generates colours (as a good Cartesian,\nhe took full advantage of Newton's discoveries): the third belonging\nto fashion and convention, but never at liberty to violate essential\nbeauty. Each of these three forms of beauty was subdivided into\n_sensible_ beauty pertaining to bodies, and _intelligible_ beauty of\nsoul.\n\n[Sidenote: _The English: Locke, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and the\nScottish School._]\n\nLike Descartes in France, Locke in England (1690) is an\nintellectualist, and recognizes no form of spiritual elaboration save\nreflexion on the senses. None the less he takes over from contemporary\nliterature the distinction between wit and judgement; according to him\nthe former combines ideas with pleasing variety, discovering their\nsimilarities and relations and thus grouping them into beautiful\npictures which divert and strike the imagination: the latter (judgement\nor intellect) seeks dissimilarities, guided by the criterion of truth.\n\"The mind, without looking any further, rests satisfied with the\nagreeableness of the picture, and the gaiety of the fancy; and it is\na kind of an affront to go about to examine it by the severe rules of\ntruth and good reason; whereby it appears that it consists in something\nthat is not perfectly conformable to them.\"[7] England produced\nphilosophers who developed an abstract and transcendent \u00c6sthetic,\nbut one more tinged with sensationalism than that of the French\nCartesians. Shaftesbury (1709) raises taste to a sense or instinct for\nthe beautiful; a sense of order and proportion identical with moral\nsense and, with its preconceptions or presentations, anticipating the\nrecognition of reason. Bodies, spirits, God are the three degrees of\nbeauty.[8] Lineal descendant of Shaftesbury was Francis Hutcheson\n(1723), who succeeded in popularizing the idea of an inward sense of\nbeauty as something intermediate between sense and reason, and adapted\nto distinguish unity in variety, concord in the manifold, the true,\nthe beautiful and the good in their substantial identity. Hutcheson\nmaintains that from this sense springs the pleasure we take in art,\nin imitation and in the likeness between copy and original: the last\na relative, as distinct from an absolute, beauty.[9] This view on the\nwhole predominated in England during the eighteenth century and was\nadopted by Adam Smith as well as by Reid, head of the Scottish school.\n\n[Sidenote: _Leibniz. Petites perceptions and confused knowledge._]\n\nMuch more thoroughly and with much greater philosophical vigour Leibniz\nopened the door to that crowd of psychic facts from which Cartesianism\nrecoiled in horror. In his conception of the real, governed by the law\nof continuity (_natura non facit saltus_), presenting an uninterrupted\nscale of existence from the lowest beings to God, imagination, taste,\nwit and the like found ample room for shelter. The facts now called\n\u00e6sthetic were identified by Leibniz with Descartes' _confused_\ncognition, which might be _clear_ without being _distinct_: scholastic\nterms borrowed, it would appear, from Duns Scotus, whose works were\nreprinted and widely read in the seventeenth century.[10]\n\nIn his _De cognitione, veritate et ideis_ (1684), after dividing\n_cognitio_ into _obscura vel clara,_ the _clara_ into _confusa vel\ndistincta,_ and the _distincta_ into _adaequata vel inadaequata,_ Leibniz\nremarks that while painters and other artists are able to judge works\nof art very fairly they can give no reason for their decisions, and\nif questioned as to the reason of their condemnation of any work\nof art, they reply it lacks a _je ne sais quoi_: (\"_at iudicii sui\nrationem reddere saepe non posse, et quaerenti dicere, se in re, quae\ndisplicet, desiderare nescio quid_\").[11] They do possess, in fact,\nclear cognition, but confused and not distinct; what we should call\nto-day imaginative, not _ratiocinative,_ consciousness: and indeed the\nlatter does not exist in the case of art. There are things impossible\nto define: \"_on ne les fait conna\u00eetre que par des exemples, et, au\nreste, il faut dire que c'est un je ne sais quoi, jusqu'\u00e0 ce qu'on\nen d\u00e9chiffre la contexture_.\"[12] But these _perceptions confuses\nou sentiments_ have \"_plus grande efficacit\u00e9 que l'on ne pense: ce\nsont elles qui forment ce je ne sais quoi, ces go\u00fbts, ces images\ndes qualit\u00e9s des sens._\"[13] Whence it appears plainly that in his\ndiscussion of these perceptions Leibniz reposes upon the \u00e6sthetic\ntheories we discussed in the preceding chapter; indeed at one point[14]\nhe mentions Bouhours' book.\n\n[Sidenote: _Intellectualism of Leibniz_]\n\nIt might seem that by according _claritas_ and denying _distinctio_\nto \u00e6sthetic facts Leibniz recognized that their peculiar character is\nneither sensuous nor intellectual. He might seem to have distinguished\nthem by their \"_claritas_\" from pleasure or sense-motions, and from\nintellect by their lack of \"_distinctio._\" But the \"_lex continui_\"\nand the Leibnitian intellectualism forbid this interpretation. In this\ncase obscurity and clarity are quantitative degrees of one single\nconsciousness, distinct or intellectual, towards which both converge\nand with which in the extreme case they unite.\n\nTo admit that artists judge with confused perceptions, clear but not\ndistinct, does not involve denying that these perceptions may be\ncapable of being connected and verified by intellectual consciousness.\nThe self-same object that is confusedly though clearly recognized by\nimagination is recognized clearly and distinctly by the intellect;\nwhich amounts to saying that a work of art may be perfected by being\ndetermined by thought. In the very terminology adopted by Leibniz, who\nrepresents sense and imagination as obscure and confused, there is a\ntinge of contempt, as well as the suggestion of a single form of all\ncognition. This will help us to understand Leibniz' definition of music\nas \"_exercitium arithmeticae occultum nescientis se numerare animi._\"\nElsewhere he says: \"_Le but principal de l'histoire, aussi bien que\nde la po\u00e9sie, doit \u00eatre d'enseigner la prudence et la vertu par des\nexemples, et puis de montrer le vice d'une mani\u00e8re qui en donne\nl'aversion et qui porte ou serve \u00e0 l'\u00e9viter._\"[15]\n\nThe \"_claritas_\" attributed to \u00e6sthetic fact is not specifically\ndifferent from, but rather a partial anticipation of, the\n\"_distinctio_\" of intellect. Undoubtedly this distinction of degree\nmarks a great advance: but careful analysis shows that Leibniz does\nnot differ fundamentally from those who, by inventing the new words\nand empirical distinctions examined above, called attention to the\npeculiarities of \u00e6sthetic facts.\n\n[Sidenote: _Speculation on language._]\n\nWe find the same invincible intellectualism in the speculations on\nlanguage greatly in vogue at the time. When critics of the Renaissance\nand sixteenth century tried to rise above merely empirical and\npractical grammar and strove to reduce grammatical science to a\nsystematic form, they fell into logicism and described grammatical\nforms by such terms as pleonastic, improper, metaphorical or elliptic.\nThus Julius C\u00e6sar Scaliger (1540); thus, too, the most learned of\nall, Francisco Sanchez (Sanctius or Sanzio), called Brocense, who, in\nhis _Minerva_ (1587), asserts that names are attached to things by\nreason, exclusive of interjections which are not parts of speech but\nmerely sounds expressive of joy or sorrow; he denies the existence of\nheterogeneous and heteroclitic words, and works out a system of syntax\nby means of four figures of construction, proclaiming the principle\n\"_doctrinam supplendi esse valde necessarium,_\" that is to say, that\ngrammatical diversities must be explained as ellipsis, abbreviation\nor omission with reference to the typical logical form.[16] Gaspare\nScioppio follows him exactly, abusing the old grammar with his\naccustomed violence and crying up the \"Sanctian\" method, at that time\nstill almost unknown, in his _Grammatica philosophica_ (1628).[17]\nAmongst critics of the seventeenth century, Jacopo Perizonio must not\nbe forgotten; he wrote a commentary on Sanchez' book (1687). Amongst\nrecognized philosophers who studied the philosophy of grammar and\nnoted the merits and defects of various tongues, we find Bacon.[18] In\n1660 Claude Lancelot and Arnauld brought out the _Grammaire g\u00e9n\u00e9rale\net raisonn\u00e9e de Port-Royal,_ a work applying the intellectualism\nof Descartes rigorously to grammatical forms, and dominated by the\ndoctrine of the artificial nature of language. Locke and Leibniz both\nspeculated about language,[19] but neither succeeded in creating a\nfresh point of view, although the latter did much to provoke inquiry\ninto the historical origin of languages. All his life Leibniz cherished\nthe notion of a universal language and of an \"_ars characteristica\nuniversalis_\" as a combination likely to result in great scientific\ndiscoveries: prior to him, Wilkins had fostered the same hope, nor\nindeed, in spite of its utter absurdity, is it even yet wholly extinct.\n\n[Sidenote: _C. Wolff._]\n\nIn order to correct the \u00e6sthetic ideas of Leibniz it was necessary\nto alter the very foundations of his system, the Cartesianism upon\nwhich it rested. This could not be undertaken by disciples of\nhis own personal school, in whom we notice rather an increase of\nintellectualism. Giving scholastic form to the brilliant observations\nof the master, Johann Christian Wolff's system began with the theory\nof knowledge conceived as an \"organon\" or instrument, followed by\nsystems of natural law, ethics and politics, together constituting\nthe \"organon\" of practical activity: the remainder was theology\nand metaphysics, or pneumatology and physics (doctrine of the soul\nand doctrine of phenomenal nature). Although Wolff distinguishes a\nproductive imagination, ruled by the principle of sufficient reason,\nfrom the merely associative and chaotic,[20] yet a science of\nimagination considered as a new theoretical value could find no niche\nin his schematism. Knowledge of a lower order, as such, belonged to\nPneumatology and was incapable of possessing its own \"organon\": at most\nit could be brought under the organon already existing, which corrected\nand transcended it by means of logical knowledge in the same way in\nwhich Ethics treats the \"_facilitas appetitiva inferior._\" As in France\nthe poetics of Boileau corresponded with the philosophy of Descartes,\nso in Germany the rationalistic poetics of Gottsched[21] reflect the\nCartesian-Leibnitian theories of Wolff (1729).\n\n[Sidenote: _Demand for an organon of inferior knowledge._]\n\nIt was no doubt dimly seen that even in the inferior faculties some\ndistinction was operative between perfect and imperfect, value and\nnon-value. A passage in a book (1725) by the Leibnitian B\u00fclffinger\nhas often been quoted where he says: \"_Vellem existerent qui circa\nfacultatem sentiendi, imaginandi, attendendi, abstrahendi et memoriam\npraestarent quod bonus ille Aristoteles, adeo hodie omnibus sordens,\npraestitit circa intellectum: hoc est ut in artis formant redigerent\nquicquid ad illas in suo usu dirigendas et iuvandas pertinet et\nconducid, quem ad modum Aristoteles in Organo logicam sive facultatem\ndemonstrandi redegit in ordinem._\"[22] But on reading the extract in\nits context one recognizes at once that the desired organon would have\nbeen merely a series of recipes for strengthening the memory, educating\nthe attention, and so forth: a technique, in a word, not an \u00e6sthetic.\nSimilar ideas had been spread in Italy by Trevisano (1708), who, by\ndeclaring that the senses might be educated through the mind, asserted\nthe possibility of an _art of feeling_ which should \"endow manners\nwith prudence and judgement with good taste.\"[23] We notice, moreover,\nthat in his day B\u00fclffinger was counted a depreciator of poetry, so\nmuch so that a tract against him was written in order to show that\n\"poetry does not diminish the faculty of clear conception.\"[24] Bodmer\nand Breitinger were ready \"to deduce all the parts of eloquence with\nmathematical precision\" (1727), and the latter sketched a Logic of\nthe Imagination (1740) to which he would have assigned the study of\nsimilitudes and metaphors; even had he carried out his project, it\nis difficult to see how it could have differed materially, from a\nphilosophic point of view, from the treatises on the subject written by\nthe Italian rhetoricians of the seventeenth century.\n\n[Sidenote: _Alexander Baumgarten: his \"\u00c6sthetic.\"_]\n\nThese discussions and experiments filled the boyhood and helped to\nform the intellect of young Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten of Berlin,\na follower of the philosophy of Wolff and, at the same time, student\nand teacher of Latin rhetoric and poetry; these studies led him to\nreconsider the problem and search for some method by which the precepts\nof rhetoricians could be reduced to a rigorous philosophical system.\nOn taking his doctor's degree in September 1735, when twenty-one years\nold, he published a thesis _Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad\npo\u0113ma pertinentibus_:[25] in which the word \"\u00c6sthetic\" appears for the\nfirst time as name of a special science.[26] Baumgarten always remained\nmuch attached to his youthful discovery, and in 1742 when called to\nteach at the university of Frankfort-on-the-Oder, and again in 1749,\nhe gave by request a course of lectures on \u00c6sthetic (_quaedam consilia\ndirigendarum facultatum inferiorum novam per acroasin exposuit_).[27]\nIn 1750 he printed a voluminous treatise wherein the word \"\u00c6sthetic\"\nattained the honours of a title-page;[28] in 1758 he published a more\nslender second part: illness and finally death in 1762 prevented him\nfrom completing the work.\n\n[Sidenote: _\u00c6sthetic as science of sensory consciousness._]\n\nWhat was \u00c6sthetic to Baumgarten? Its objects are sensible facts\n(\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03ac), carefully distinguished by the ancients from mental objects\n(\u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03ac);[29] hence it becomes _scientia cognitionis sensitivae, theoria\nliberalium artium, gnoseologia inferior, ars pulcre cogitandi, ars\nanalogi rationis_[30] Rhetoric and Poetry constitute two special\nand interdependent disciplines which are entrusted by \u00c6sthetic with\nthe distinction between the various styles in literature and other\nsmall differences,[31] for the laws she herself investigates are\ndiffused throughout all the arts like guiding-stars for these various\nsubsidiary arts (_quasi cynosura quaedam specialium_)[32] and must be\nextracted not from isolated cases only, or from incomplete induction\nempirically, but from the totality of facts (_falsa regula peior est\nquant nulla._)[33] Nor must \u00c6sthetic be confounded with Psychology,\nwhich furnishes its presuppositions only; an independent science, it\ngives the norm of sensitive cognition (_sensitive quid cognoscendi_)\nand deals with \"_perfectio cognitionis sensitivae, qua talis,_\" which is\nbeauty (_pulcritudo)_, just as the opposite, imperfection, is ugliness\n(_deformitas_)[34] From the beauty of sensitive cognition (_pulcritudo\ncognitionis_) we must exclude the beauty of objects and matter\n(_pulcritudo obiectorum et materiae_) with which it is often confused\nowing to habits of language, since it is easy to show that ugly things\nmay be thought of in a beautiful manner and beautiful things in an\nugly manner (_quacum ob receptam rei significationem saepe sed male\nconfunditur; possunt turpia pulcre cogitare ut talia, et pulcriora\nturpiter_).[35] Poetical representations are confused or imaginative:\ndistinctness, that is intellect, is not poetical. The greater the\ndetermination, the greater the poetry; individuals \"_omnimode\ndeterminata_\" are highly poetical; poetical also are images or\nphantasms as well as all that appertains to the senses.[36] That which\njudges sensible or imaginary presentations is taste, or \"_indicium\nsensuum._\" These, in brief, are the truths displayed by Baumgarten in\nhis _Meditationes_ and, with many distinctions and examples, in his\n_\u00c6sthetic._[37]\n\n[Sidenote: _Cricisism of judgements based on Baumgarten._]\n\nNearly all German critics[38] are of opinion that from his own\nconception of \u00c6sthetic as the science of sensitive cognition Baumgarten\nshould have evolved a species of inductive Logic. But he can be cleared\nof this accusation: a better philosopher, perhaps, than his critics,\nhe held that an inductive Logic must always be intellectual, since\nit leads to abstractions and the formation of concepts. The relation\nexisting between \"_cognitio confusa_\" and the poetical and artistic\nfacts which belong to the realm of taste had been shown before his\nday, by Leibniz: neither he nor Wolff nor any other of their school\never dreamed of transforming a treatment of the \"_cognitio confusa_\"\nor \"_petites perceptions_\" into an inductive Logic. On the other hand,\nas a kind of compensation, these critics attribute to Baumgarten\na merit he cannot claim, at least to the extent implied by their\npraises. According to them, he effected a revolution by converting[39]\nLeibniz' differences of degree or quantitative distinctions into a\nspecific difference, and turning confused knowledge into something no\nlonger negative but positive[40] by attributing a \"_perfectio_\" to\nsensitive cognition _qua talis_; and by thus destroying the unity of\nthe Leibnitian monad and breaking up the law of continuity, founded\nthe science of \u00c6sthetic. Had he really accomplished such a giant\nstride, his claim to the title of \"father of \u00c6sthetic\" would have\nbeen placed beyond question. But, in order to win this appellation,\nBaumgarten ought to have been successful in unravelling all those\ncontradictions in which he was involved no less than Leibniz and all\nintellectualists. It is not enough to posit a \"_perfectio_\"; even\nLeibniz did that when he attributed _claritas_ to confused cognition,\nwhich, when devoid of clearness, remains obscure, that is to say,\nimperfect. It was imperative that this perfection \"_qua talis_\" should\nbe upheld against the \"_lex continui,_\" and kept uncontaminated by any\nintellectualistic admixture. Otherwise he was bound to fall back into\nthe pathless labyrinth of the \"probable\" which is and is not false,\nof the wit which is and is not intellect, of the taste which is and\nis not intellectual judgement, of the imagination and feeling which\nare and are not sensibility and material pleasure. And in that case,\nnotwithstanding the new name: notwithstanding (as we freely admit) the\ngreater insistence than that of Leibniz upon the sensible nature of\npoetry, \u00c6sthetic, as a science, would not have been born.\n\n[Sidenote: _Intellectualism of Baumgarten._]\n\nNow Baumgarten overcame none of the obstacles above mentioned.\nUnprejudiced and continued study of his works forces one to this\nconclusion. Already in his _Meditationes_ he does not seem able to\ndistinguish clearly between imagination and intellect, confused and\ndistinct cognition. The law of continuity leads him to set up a scale\nof more and less: amongst cognitions, the obscure are less poetical\nthan the confused; the distinct are not poetical, but even those\nof the higher kinds (that is the distinct and intellectual) are to\na certain extent poetical in proportion as they are lower in their\nnature; compound concepts are more poetical than simple; those of\nlarger comprehension are \"_extensive clariores._\"[41] In the _\u00c6sthetic_\nBaumgarten expounds his thought more fully and thereby exposes its\ndefects. If the introduction of the book leads one to believe that he\nsees \u00e6sthetic truth to consist in consciousness of the individual,\nthe belief is shattered by the explanations which follow. As a good\nobjectivist he asserts that truth in the metaphysical sense has its\ncounterpart in the soul, namely, subjective truth, logical truth in a\nwide sense, or \u00e6sthetico-logical.[42] And the complete truth lies not\nin the genus or species, but in the individual. The genus is true,\nthe species more true, the individual most true.[43] Formal logical\ntruth is acquired \"_cum iactura,_\" by jettisoning much great material\nperfection: \"_quid enim est abstractio, si iactura non est?_\"[44]\nSo much being granted, logical truth differs from \u00e6sthetic in this:\nmetaphysical or objective truth is presented now to the intellect,\nwhen it is logical truth in a narrow sense; now to the analogy of\nreason and the lower cognitive faculties, when it is \u00e6sthetic;[45]\na lesser truth in exchange for the greater which man is not always\nable to attain, thanks to the \"_malum metaphysicum._\"[46] Thus moral\ntruths are comprehended in one fashion by a comic poet, in another\nby a moral philosopher; an eclipse is described in one way by an\nastronomer and in another by a shepherd speaking to his friends or\nhis sweetheart.[47] Universals even are accessible, in part at least,\nto the inferior faculty.[48] Take the case of two philosophers, a\ndogmatic and a sceptic, arguing, with an \u00e6sthete listening to them. If\nthe arguments of either party are so balanced that the hearer cannot\ndetermine which is true and which false, this appearance is to him\n\u00e6sthetic truth: if one adversary succeed in overbearing the other\nso that one argument is shown clearly to be wrong, the error just\nrevealed is likewise \u00e6sthetic[49] falsity. Truths strictly \u00e6sthetic are\n(and this is the decisive point) those which appear neither entirely\ntrue nor entirely false: probable truths. \"_Talia autem de quibus\nnon complete quidem certi sumus, neque tamen falsitatem aliquam in\niisdem appercipimus, sunt verisimilia. Est ergo veritas \u00e6sthetica,\na potiori dicta verisimilitudo, ille veritatis gradus, qui, etiamsi\nnon evectus sit ad completam certitudinem, tamen nihil contineat\nfalsitatis observabilis._\"[50] And especially the immediate sequel:\n\"_Cujus habent spectator es auditor esve intra animum quum vident\naudiuntve, quasdam anticipationes, quod plerumque fit, quod fieri\nsolet, quod in opinione positum est, quod habet ad haec in se quandam\nsimilitudinem, sive id falsum (logice et latissime), sive verum\nsit (logice et strictissime), quod non sit facile a nostris sensibus\nabhorrens: hoc illud_ est \u03b5\u1f30\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2 _et verisimile quod, Aristotele et\nCicerone assentiente, sectetur \u00e6stheticus._\"[51] The probable embraces\nthat which is true and certain to the intellect and the senses, that\nwhich is certain to the senses but not to the intellect, that which\nis probable logically and \u00e6sthetically, or logically improbable but\n\u00e6sthetically probable, or, finally, \u00e6sthetically improbable but on the\nwhole probable or that whose improbability is not evident.[52] So we\nreach the admission of the impossible and absurd, the _\u03b1\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd_ and\n_\u1f04\u03c4\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd_ of Aristotle.\n\nIf after reading these paragraphs, highly important as revealing the\ntrue thought of Baumgarten, we turn once more to the Introduction to\nhis work, we notice at once his commonplace and erroneous conception of\nthe poetic faculty. To a friend who suggested that there was no need\nfor him to concern himself with confused or inferior consciousness both\nbecause \"_confusio mater erroris_\" and because \"_facilitate inferior\nes, caro, debellandae potius sunt quam excitandae et confirmandae,_\"\nBaumgarten replied that confusion is a condition wherein to find truth:\nthat nature makes no sudden leap from obscurity to clarity: that\nnoonday light is reached from night time through the dawn (_ex node per\nauroram meridies_): that in the case of the inferior faculties a guide,\nnot a tyrant, is needed (_imperium in facilitates inferiores poscitur,\nnon tyrannis_).[53] This is still the attitude of Leibniz, Trevisano\nand B\u00fclffinger. Baumgarten is terrified lest he should be accused of\ntreating subjects unworthy a philosopher. \"_Quousque tandem_\" (says he\nto himself), \"dost thou, professor of theoretic and moral philosophy,\ndare to praise lies and mixtures of true and false as though they were\nnoble works?\"[54] And if there is one thing above all others from\nwhich he is anxious to guard himself it is sensualism, unbridled and\nnon-moralized. The sensitive perfection of Cartesianism and Wolffianism\nwas liable to be confused with simple pleasure, with the feeling of\nthe perfection of our organism:[55] but Baumgarten falls into no such\nconfusion. When in 1745 one Quistorp combated his \u00e6sthetic theory by\nsaying that if poetry consisted in sensuous perfection it was a thing\nhurtful to men, Baumgarten answered disdainfully that he did not expect\nhe should ever find time to reply to a critic of such calibre as to\nmistake his \"_oratio perfecta sensitiva_\" for an \"_oratio perfecte_\n(that is _omnino) sensitiva._\"[56]\n\n[Sidenote: _New names and old meanings._]\n\nSave in its title and its first definitions Baumgarten's _\u00c6sthetic_ is\ncovered with the mould of antiquity and commonplace. We have seen that\nhe refers back to Aristotle and Cicero for the first principles of his\nscience; in another instance he attaches his \u00c6sthetic to the Rhetoric\nof antiquity, quoting the truth enunciated by Zeno the Stoic, \"_esse\nduo cogitandi genera, alterum perpetuum et latius, quod Rhetorices sit,\nalterum concisum et contractius, quod Dialectices,_\" and identifying\nthe former with the \u00e6sthetic horizon, the latter with the logical.[57]\nIn his _Meditationes_ he rests upon Scaliger and Vossius;[58] of\nmodern writers beside the philosophers (Leibniz, Wolff, B\u00fclffinger)\nhe quotes Gottsched, Arnold,[59] Werenfels, Breitinger[60]; by means\nof these latter he is able to make acquaintance with discussions upon\ntaste and imagination, even without direct acquaintance with Addison\nand Du Bos, as well as the Italians, whose writings had immense vogue\nin Germany in his day, and with whom his resemblances leap to the\neye. Baumgarten always feels himself to be in perfect accord with his\npredecessors; never at variance with them. He never felt himself to\nbe a revolutionary; and though some have been revolutionaries without\nknowing it, Baumgarten was not one of them. Baumgarten's works are but\nanother presentation of the problem of \u00c6sthetic still clamouring for\nsolution in a voice so much the stronger as it uttered a commonplace:\nhe proclaims a new science and presents it in conventional scholastic\nform; the babe about to be born receives the name of \u00c6sthetic by\npremature baptism at his hands: and the name remains. But the new name\nis devoid of new matter; the philosophical armour covers no muscular\nbody. Our good Baumgarten, full of ardour and conviction, and often\ncuriously brisk and vivacious in his scholastic Latinism, is a most\nsympathetic and attractive figure in the history of \u00c6sthetic: of the\nscience in formation, that is to say, not of the science brought to\ncompletion: of \u00c6sthetic _condenda_ not _condita._\n\n\n[1] Letters to Balzac and the Princess Elizabeth.\n\n[2] _Art po\u00e9tique_ (1669-1674).\n\n[3] Letters to Marquis Maffei, about 1720, in _Prose e poesie,_ Venice,\n1756, ii. p. cxx.\n\n[4] Sulzer, _op. cit._ i. p. 50.\n\n[5] _Trait\u00e9 du beau_ (2nd ed., Amsterdam, 1724; Paris ed., 1810).\n\n[6] _Essai sur le beau,_ Paris, 1741.\n\n[7] _An Essay concerning Human Understanding_ (French trans. in\n_\u0152uvres,_ Paris, 1854), bk. ii. ch. 11, \u00a7 2.\n\n[8] _Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times,_ 1709-1711.\n\n[9] _Enquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue,_\nLondon, 1723.\n\n[10] See above, p. 179.\n\n[11] _Opera philosophica_ (ed. Erdmann), p. 78.\n\n[12] _Ibid,_ preface.\n\n[13] _Nouveaux Essais,_ ii. ch. 22.\n\n[14] _Op. cit._ ii. ch. 11.\n\n[15] _Essais de Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e,_ part. ii. \u00a7 148.\n\n[16] Francisci Sanctii, _Minerva seu de causis lingu\u00e6 latin\u00e6\ncommentarius,_ 1587 (ed. with add. by Gaspare Scioppio, Padua, 1663);\ncf. bk. i. chs. 2, 9, and bk. iv.\n\n[17] Gasperis Sciopii, _Grammatica philosophica,_ Milan, 1628 (Venice,\n1728).\n\n[18] _De dignitate,_ etc., bk. vi. ch. i.\n\n[19] Locke, _Essay,_ etc., bk. lii.; Leibniz, _Nouveaux Essais,_ bk.\niii.\n\n[20] _Psychol. empirica_ (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1738), \u00a7\u00a7 138-172.\n\n[21] Joh. Chr. Gottsched, _Versuch einer critischen Dichtkunst,_\nLeipzig, 1729.\n\n[22] _Dilucidationes philosophic\u00e6 de Deo, anima humana et mundo,_ 1725\n(T\u00fcbingen, 1768), \u00a7 268.\n\n[23] Preface to _Rifless. sul gusto, ed. cit._ p. 75.\n\n[24] Borinski, _Poetik d. Renaiss._ p. 380 note.\n\n[25] Hal\u00e6 Magdeburgic\u00e6, 1735 (reprinted, ed. B. Croce, Naples, 1900).\n\n[26] _Med._ \u00a7 116.\n\n[27] _\u00c6sthetica,_ i. pref.\n\n[28] _\u00c6sthetica. Scripsit_ Alex. Gottlieb Baumgarten, _Prof.\nPhilosoph., Traiecti eis Viadrum, Impens. Ioannis Christiani Kleyb,_\n1750; 2nd part, 1758.\n\n[29] _Med._ \u00a7 116.\n\n[30] _\u00c6sth._ \u00a7 i.\n\n[31] _Med.%_ 117.\n\n[32] _\u00c6sth._ \u00a7 71.\n\n[33] _Ibid._ \u00a7 53.\n\n[34] _Med._ \u00a7 115.\n\n[35] _\u00c6sth._ \u00a7 14.\n\n[36] _Ibid._ \u00a7 18.\n\n[37] _Med._ \u00a7 92.\n\n[38] Ritter, _Gesch. d. Philos._ (Fr. trans., _Hist, de la phil. mod._\niii. p. 365); Zimmermann, _Gesch. d. \u00c6sth._ p. 168; J. Schmidt, _L. u.\nB._ p. 48.\n\n[39] Danzel, _Gottsched,_ p. 218; Meyer, _L. u. B._ pp. 35-38.\n\n[40] Schmidt, _op. cit._ p. 44.\n\n[41] _Med._ \u00a7\u00a7 19, 20, 23.\n\n[42] _\u00c6sth._ \u00a7 424.\n\n[43] _Op. cit._ \u00a7 441.\n\n[44] _Op. cit._ \u00a7 560.\n\n[45] _\u00c6sth._ \u00a7 424.\n\n[46] _Op. cit._ \u00a7 557.\n\n[47] _Op. cit._ \u00a7\u00a7 425, 429.\n\n[48] _Op. cit._ \u00a7 443.\n\n[49] _Op. cit._ \u00a7 448.\n\n[50] _Op. cit._ \u00a7 483.\n\n[51] _Op. cit._ \u00a7 484.\n\n[52] _\u00c6sth._ \u00a7\u00a7 485, 486.\n\n[53] _Op. cit._ \u00a7\u00a7 7, 12.\n\n[54] _Op. cit._ \u00a7 478.\n\n[55] Cf. Wolff, Psych, empir. \u00a7 511, and the passage there quoted from\nDescartes; also \u00a7\u00a7 542, 550.\n\n[56] Th. Joh. Quistorp, in _Neuen B\u00fccher-Saal,_ 1745, fasc. 5; _Erweis\ndass die Poesie schon f\u00fcr sie selbst ihre Liebhaber leichtlich\nungl\u00fccklich machen k\u00f6nne_; and A. G. Baumgarten, _Metaphysica,_ 2nd\ned., 1748, preface; cf. Danzel, _Gottsched,_ pp. 215, 221.\n\n[57] _\u00c6sth._ \u00a7 122.\n\n[58] _Med._ \u00a7 9.\n\n[59] _Op. cit._ \u00a7\u00a7 111, 113.\n\n[60] _\u00c6sth._ \u00a7 11.\n\n\n\n\nV\n\n\nGIAMBATTISTA VICO\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Vico as inventor of \u00e6sthetic science._]\n\nThe real revolutionary who by putting aside the concept of probability\nand conceiving imagination in a novel manner actually discovered the\ntrue nature of poetry and art and, so to speak, invented the science of\n\u00c6sthetic, was the Italian Giambattista Vico.\n\nTen years prior to the publication in Germany of Baumgarten's first\ntreatise, there had appeared in Naples (1725) the first _Scienza\nnuova,_ which developed ideas on the nature of poetry outlined in\na former work (1721), _De constantia iurisprudentis,_ outcome of\n\"twenty-five years' continuous and harsh meditation.\"[1] In 1730 Vico\nrepublished it with fresh developments which gave rise to two special\nbooks (_Della sapienza poetica_ and _Della discoperta del vero Omero_)\nin the second _Scienza Nuova._ Nor did he ever tire of repeating his\nviews and forcing them upon the attention of his hostile contemporaries\nat every opportunity, seizing such occasion even in prefaces and\nletters, poems on the occasion of weddings or funerals, and in such\npress notices as fell to his duty as public censor of literature.\n\nAnd what were these ideas? Neither more nor less, we may say, than\nthe solution of the problem stated by Plato, attacked but not solved\nby Aristotle, and again vainly attacked during the Renaissance and\nafterwards: is poetry rational or irrational, spiritual or brutal?\nand, if spiritual, what is its special nature and what distinguishes\nit from history and science?\n\nAs we know, Plato confined it within the baser part of the soul, the\nanimal spirits. Vico re-elevates it and makes of it a period in the\nhistory of humanity: and since history for him means an ideal history\nwhose periods consist not of contingent facts but of forms of the\nspirit, he makes it a moment in the ideal history of the spirit, a form\nof consciousness. Poetry precedes intellect, but follows sense; through\nconfusing it with the latter, Plato failed to grasp the position it\nshould really occupy and banished it from his Republic. \"Men at first\nfeel without being aware; next they become aware with a perturbed and\nagitated soul; finally they reflect with an undisturbed mind. This\nAphorism is the Principle of poetical sentences which are formed by the\nsense of passions and affections; differing thereby from philosophical\nsentences which are formed by reflexion through ratiocination; whence\nthe latter approach more nearly to truth the more they rise towards\nthe universal, while the former have more of certainty the more they\napproach the individual.\"[2] An imaginative phase of consciousness, but\none possessed of positive value.\n\n[Sidenote: _Poetry and Philosophy: imagination and intellect._]\n\nThe imaginative phase is altogether independent and autonomous with\nrespect to the intellectual, which is not only incapable of endowing\nit with any fresh perfection but can only destroy it. \"The studies of\nMetaphysics and Poetry are in natural opposition one to the other;\nfor the former purges the mind of childish prejudice and the latter\nimmerses and drowns it in the same: the former offers resistance to\nthe judgement of the senses, while the latter makes this its chief\nrule: the former debilitates, the latter strengthens, imagination: the\nformer prides itself in not turning spirit into body, the latter does\nits utmost to give a body to spirit: hence the thoughts of the former\nmust necessarily be abstract, while the concepts of the latter show\nbest when most clothed with matter: to sum up, the former strives that\nthe learned may know the truth of things stripped of all passion: the\nlatter that the vulgar may act truly by means of intense excitement\nof the senses, without which stimulant they assuredly would not act\nat all. Hence from all time, in all languages known to man, never has\nthere been a strong man equally great as metaphysician and poet: such a\npoet as Homer, father and prince of poetry.\"[3] Poets are the senses,\nphilosophers the intellect, of mankind.[4] Imagination is \"stronger in\nproportion as reason is weaker.\"[5]\n\nNo doubt \"reflexion\" may be put in verse; but it does not become poetry\nthereby. \"Abstract sentences belong to philosophers, since they contain\nuniversals; and reflexions concerning such passions are made by poets\nwho are false and frigid.\"[6] Those poets \"who sing of the beauty and\nvirtue of ladies by reflexion ... are philosophers arguing in verses\nor in love-rhymes.\"[7] One set of ideas belongs to philosophers,\nanother to poets: these latter are identical with those of painters,\nfrom which \"they differ only in colours and words.\"[8] Great poets are\nborn not in epochs of reflexion but in those of imagination, generally\ncalled barbarous: Homer, in the barbarism of antiquity: Dante in that\nof the Middle Ages, the \"second barbarism of Italy.\"[9] Those who have\nchosen to read philosophic reason into the verse of the great father\nof Greek poetry have transferred the character of a later age into\nan earlier, since the era of poets precedes that of philosophers and\ncountries in infancy were sublime poets. Poetic locutions arose before\nprose, \"by the necessity of nature\" not \"by caprice of pleasure\";\nfables or imaginative universals were conceived before reasoned, _i.e._\nphilosophical universals.[10]\n\nWith these observations Vico justified and at the same time corrected\nthe opinion of Plato in the _Republic,_ denying to Homer wisdom, every\nkind of wisdom; the legislative of Lycurgus and Solon, the philosophic\nof Thales, Anacharsis and Pythagoras, the strategic of military\ncommanders.[11] To Homer (he says) belongs wisdom, undoubtedly, but\npoetic wisdom only: the Homeric images and comparisons derived from\nwild beasts and the elements of savage nature are incomparable; but\n\"such success does not spring from talent imbued with domesticity and\ncivilized with any philosophy.\"[12]\n\nWhen anybody takes to writing poetry in an era of reflexion, it is\nbecause he is returning to childhood and \"putting his mind in fetters\";\nno longer reflecting with his intellect, he follows imagination\nand loses himself in the particular. If a true poet dallies with\nphilosophical ideas, it is not \"that he may assimilate them and dismiss\nimagination,\" but merely \"that he may have them in front of him, to\nexamine as though on a stage or public platform.\"[13] The New Comedy\nwhich made its appearance after Socrates is undeniably impregnated with\nphilosophic ideas, with intellectual universals, with \"intelligible\nkinds of human conduct\"; but its authors were poets in so far only as\nthey knew how to transform logic into imagination and their ideas into\nportraits.[14]\n\n[Sidenote: _Poetry and History._]\n\nThe dividing line between art and science, imagination and intellect,\nis here very strongly drawn: the two distinct activities are repeatedly\ncontrasted with a sharpness that leaves no room for confusion. The\nline of demarcation between poetry and history is hardly less firm.\nWhile not quoting Aristotle's passage, Vico implicitly shows why\npoetry seemed to Aristotle more philosophical than history, and at\nthe same time he dispels the erroneous opinion that history concerns\nthe particular and poetry the universal. Poetry joins hands with\nscience not because it consists in the contemplation of concepts but\nbecause, like science, it is ideal. The most beautiful poetic story\nmust be \"wholly ideal\": \"by means of idea, the poet breathes reality\ninto things otherwise unreal; masters of poetry claim that their art\nmust be wholly compact of imagination, like a painter of the ideal,\nnot imitative like a portrait-painter: whence, from their likeness to\nGod the Creator, poets and painters alike are called divine.\"[15] And\nagainst those who blame poets for telling stories which, they say, are\nuntrue, Vico protests: \"The best stories are those approximating most\nnearly to ideal truth, the eternal truth of God: it is immeasurably\nmore certain than the truth of historians who often bring into play\ncaprice, necessity or fortune; but such a Captain as, for instance,\nTasso's Godfrey is the type of a captain of all times, of all nations,\nand so are all personages of poetry, whatever difference there may be\nin sex, age, temperament, custom, nation, republic, grade, condition\nor fortune; they are nothing save the eternal properties of the human\nsoul, rationally discussed by politicians, economists and moral\nphilosophers, and painted as portraits by the poet.\"[16] Referring\nto an observation made by Castelvetro, and approving it in part, to\nthe effect that if poetry is a presentiment of the possible it should\nbe preceded by history, imitation of the real, yet finding himself\nconfronted by the difficulty that, nevertheless, poets invariably\nprecede historians, Vico solves the problem by identifying history\nwith poetry: primitive history was poetry, its plot was narration of\nfact, and Homer was the first historian; or rather \"he was a heroic\ncharacter amongst Greek men, in so far as they poetically narrated\ntheir own history.\"[17] Poetry and history, therefore, are originally\nidentical; or rather, undifferentiated. \"But inasmuch as it is not\npossible to give false ideas, since falsity arises from an embroiled\ncombination of ideas, so is it impossible to give a tradition, however\nfabulous, that has not had, at the beginning, a basis of truth.\"[18]\nHence we gain an entirely new insight into mythology: it is no longer\nan arbitrary calculated invention, but a spontaneous vision of truth\nas it presented itself to the spirit of primitive man. Poetry gives an\nimaginative vision; science or philosophy intelligible truth; history\nthe consciousness of certitude.\n\n[Sidenote: _Poetry and language._]\n\nLanguage and poetry are, in Vico's estimation, substantially the same.\nIn refuting the \"vulgar error of grammarians\" who maintain the priority\nof the birth of prose over that of verse, he finds \"within the origin\nof Poetry, so far as it has been herein discovered,\" the \"origin of\nlanguages and the origin of letters.\"[19] This discovery was made by\nVico after \"toil as disagreeable and overwhelming as we should undergo\nhad we to strip off our own nature and enter into that of the prim\u00e6val\nmen of Hobbes, Grotius, or Puffendorf; creatures possessing no language\nat all, by whom were created the languages of the ancient world.\"[20]\nBut his painful labour was richly repaid by his refutation of the\nerroneous theory that languages sprang from convention or, as he said,\n\"signified at will,\" whereas it is evident that \"from their natural\norigin words must have had natural meanings; this is plainly seen\nin common Latin ... wherein almost all words have arisen by natural\nnecessity, either from natural properties or from their sensible\neffects; and in general, metaphor forms the bulk of language in the\ncase of every people.\"[21] This argument strikes a blow at another\ncommon error of the grammarians, \"that the language of prose writers\nis correct, that of poets incorrect.\"[22] The poetic tropes grouped\nunder the heading of metonymy seem to Vico to be \"born of the nature\nof primitive peoples, not of capricious selection by men skilled in\npoetic art\";[23] stories told \"by means of similitudes, imagery and\ncomparisons,\" result \"from lack of the genera and species required to\ndefine things with propriety,\" and \"are therefore, by reason of natural\nnecessities, common to entire peoples.\"[24] The earliest languages\nmust have consisted of \"dumb gestures and objects which had natural\nconnexions with the ideas to be expressed.\"[25] He observes very\nacutely that to these figurate languages belong not only hieroglyphics\nbut the emblems, knightly bearings, devices and blazons which he calls\n\"medi\u00e6val hieroglyphics.\"[26] In the barbarous Middle Ages \"Italy was\nforced to fall back on the mute language ... of the earliest gentile\nnations in which men, before discovering articulate speech, were\nobliged like mutes to use actions or objects having natural connexions\nwith the ideas, which at that time must have been exceedingly sensuous,\nof the things which they wished to signify; such expressions, clad in\nalmost vocal words, must have had all the lively expressiveness of\npoetic diction.\" [27] Hence arise three kinds or phases of language:\ndumb show, the language of the gods; heraldic language, or that of the\nheroes; and spoken language. Vico also looked forward to a universal\nsystem of etymology, a \"dictionary of mental words common to all\nnations.\"\n\n[Sidenote: _Inductive and formalistic_]\n\nA man with ideas of this sort about imagination, language and poetry\ncould not say he was satisfied with formalistic and verbal Logic,\nwhether Aristotelian or scholastic. The human mind (says Vico) \"makes\nuse of intellect when from things which it feels by sense it gathers\nsomething that does not fall under sense: this is the true meaning\nof the Latin _intelligere_.\"[28] In a rapid outline of the history\nof Logic, Vico wrote: \"Aristotle came and taught the syllogism, a\nmethod more suited to expound universals in their particulars than to\nunite particulars by the discovery of universals: then came Zeno with\nhis sorites, which corresponds with modern philosophic methods and\nrefines, without sharpening, the wits; and no advantage whatever was\nreaped from either by mankind at large. With great reason, therefore,\ndoes Verulam, equally eminent as politician and philosopher, propound,\ncommend and illustrate induction in his Organum: he is followed by the\nEnglish with excellent results to experimental philosophy.\"[29] From\nthis source is derived his criticism of mathematics, which have always,\nbut especially in his day, been considered as the type of perfect\nscience.\n\n[Sidenote: Vico opposed to all formal theories of poetry.]\n\nIn all this, Vico is not only a thorough revolutionary, but is quite\nconscious of being so: he knows himself to be in opposition to all\nprevious theories on the subject. He says that his new principles of\npoetry \"are wholly opposed to, and not merely different from, all which\nhave been imagined from the time of Plato and his disciple Aristotle\nto Patrizzi, Scaliger and Castelvetro among the moderns; poetry is now\ndiscovered to have been the first language used by all nations alike,\neven the Hebrew.\"[30] In another passage he says that by his theories\n\"is overthrown all that has ever been said of the origin of poetry,\nbeginning from Plato and Aristotle, right down to our own Patrizzi,\nScaliger and Castelvetro; and it is found that poetry arising through\ndefect of human ratiocination is as sublime as any which owes its\nbeing to the later rise of philosophy and the arts of composition and\ncriticism; indeed, that these later sources never gave rise to any\npoetry that could equal, far less surpass it.\"[31] In the Autobiography\nhe boasts of having discovered \"other principles of poetry than those\nfound by Greeks and Latins and all others from those times down to the\npresent day; on these are founded other views on mythology.\"[32]\n\nThese ancient principles of poetry \"laid down first by Plato and\nconfirmed by Aristotle\" had been the anticipation or prejudice which\nhad misled all writers on poetic reason (among whom he cites Jacopo\nMazzoni). Statements \"even of most serious philosophers such as\nPatrizzi and others\" upon the origin of song and verse are so inept\nthat he \"blushes even to mention them.\"[33] It is curious to see him\nannotating the _Ars Poetica_ of Horace, with a view to finding some\nplausible sense in it by applying the principles of the _Scienza\nnuova_.[34]\n\nIt is probable that he was familiar with the writings of Muratori\namong contemporaries, for he quotes him by name, and of Gravina, who\nwas a personal acquaintance; but if he read the _Perfetta Poesia_ and\nthe _Forza della fantasia_ he could not have been satisfied by the\ntreatment meted out to the faculty of imagination, so highly valued\nand respected by himself; and if Gravina influenced him at all it must\nhave been by provoking him to contradiction. In this latter (if not\ndirectly in such French writers as Le Bossu) he may have met with the\nfallacy of regarding Homer as a repository of wisdom, a fallacy which\nhe combated with vigour and pertinacity. In his estimation, among the\ngravest faults of the Cartesians was their inability to appreciate the\nworld of imagination and poetry. Of his own times he complained they\nwere \"benumbed by analytical methods and by a philosophy which sought\nto deaden every faculty of soul which reached it through the body,\nespecially that of imagination, now held to be mother of all human\nerror\": times \"of a wisdom which freezes the generous soul of the best\npoetry,\" and prevents all understanding of it.[35]\n\n[Sidenote: _Judgments of grammarians and linguists who preceded him_]\n\nIt is just the same with the theory of language. \"The manner of birth\nand the nature of languages has been the cause of much painful toil\nand meditation: nor, from the _Cratylus_ of Plato, in which in our\nother works we have falsely delighted and believed\" (he alludes to\nthe doctrine followed by him in his own first book, _De antiquissima\nItalorum sapientia_), \"down to Wolfgang Latius, Julius C\u00e6sar Scaliger,\nFrancisco Sanchez and others, can we find anything to satisfy our\nunderstanding; so much that in discussing matters of this kind Signor\nGiovanni Clerico says there is nothing in philology involved in such a\nmaze of doubt and difficulty.\"[36] The chief grammarian-philosophers do\nnot escape criticism. Grammar, says he, lays down rules for speaking\ncorrectly: Logic for speaking truly; \"and since in the order of\nnature we must speak truly before learning to speak correctly, Giulio\nCesare della Scala, followed by the best grammarians, employs all his\nmagnificent energy to reason to the causes of the Latin language from\nthe principles of logic. But his great design ended in failure for this\nreason, that he attached himself to the logical principles of a single\nphilosopher, namely Aristotle, whose principles are too universal to\nexplain the almost infinite particulars which naturally beset him who\nwould reason concerning a language. Whence it happened that Francisco\nSanchez, who followed him with admirable zeal, attempting in his\n_Minerva_ to explain the innumerable particles which are found in\nLatin by his famous principle of ellipsis, and trying thereby, though\nwithout success, to vindicate the logical principles of Aristotle, fell\ninto the most cumbrous clumsinesses among an almost innumerable host\nof Latin phrases whereby he meant to make good the slight and subtle\nomissions employed by Latin in expressing its meaning.\"[37] The origin\nof parts of speech and syntax is wholly different from that assigned\nto them by folk who fancied that \"the people who invented language\nmust first have gone to school to Aristotle.\"[38] The same criticism\nundoubtedly must have extended to the logico-grammarians of Port-Royal,\nfor Vico remarked that the Logic of Arnauld was built \"on the same plan\nas that of Aristotle.\"[39]\n\n[Sidenote: _Influence of seventeenth century writers on Vico._]\n\nIt may well be granted that Vico was more in sympathy with the\nseventeenth-century rhetoricians, in whom we have detected a\npremonition of \u00e6sthetic science. For Vico, as for them, wit (referring\nto imagination and memory) was \"the father of all invention\": judgement\nconcerning poetry was for him a \"judgement of the senses,\" a phrase\nequivalent to \"taste\" or \"good taste,\" expressions never used by him\nin this connexion. There is no doubt he was familiar with the writers\nof treatises on wit and conceits, for, in a dry rhetorical manual\nwritten for the use of his school (in which one looks in vain for a\nshadow of his own personal ideas), he quotes Paolo Beni, Pellegrini,\nPallavicino and the Marquis Orsi.[40] He highly esteems Pallavicini's\ntreatise on _Style_ and has knowledge of the book _Del bene_ by the\nsame author;[41] perhaps too his mind was not unaffected by the flash\nof genius which had enabled the Jesuit for one instant to perceive that\npoetry consists of \"first apprehensions.\" He does not name Tesauro, but\nthere is no doubt he knew him; indeed the _Scienza nuova_ includes a\nsection, besides that on poetry, upon \"blazons,\" \"knightly bearings,\"\n\"military banners,\" \"medals,\" and so forth, precisely similar in\nmethod to that of Tesauro when he treats of\" figurate conceits\" in\nhis _Cannochiale aristotelico_.[42] For Tesauro such conceits are\nmerely metaphorical ingenuities, like any other; for Vico they are\nwholly the work of imagination, for imagination expresses itself not\nin words only, but in the \"mute language\" of lines and colours. He\nknew something also of Leibniz; the great German and Newton were by\nhim described as\" the greatest wits of the time\"[43]; but he seems to\nhave remained in complete ignorance of the \u00e6sthetic attempts of the\nLeibnitian school in Germany. His \"Logic of poetry\" was a discovery\nindependent of, and earlier than, B\u00fclffinger's Organon of the inferior\nfaculties, the _Gnoseologia inferior_ of Baumgarten, and the _Logik\nder Einbildungskraft_ of Breitinger. In truth, Vico belongs on one\nside to the vast Renaissance reaction against formalism and scholastic\nverbalism, which, beginning with the reaffirmation of experience and\nsensation (Telesio, Campanella, Galileo, Bacon), was bound to go on by\nreasserting the function of imagination in individual and social life:\non the other side he is a precursor of Romanticism.\n\n[Sidenote: _\u00c6sthetic in the \"Scienza nuova.\"_]\n\nThe importance of Vico's new poetic theory in his thought as a whole\nas well as in the organism of his _Scienza nuova_ has never been fully\nappreciated, and the Neapolitan philosopher is still commonly regarded\nas the inventor of the Philosophy of History. If by such a science is\nmeant the attempt to deduce concrete history by ratiocination and to\ntreat epochs and events as if they were concepts, the only result of\nVico's efforts to solve the problem could have been failure; and the\nsame is true of his many successors. The fact is that his philosophy of\nhistory, his ideal history, his _Scienza nuova d' intorno alia comune\nnatura delle nazioni,_ does not concern the concrete empirical history\nwhich unfolds itself in time: it is not history, it is a science of the\nideal, a Philosophy of the Spirit. That Vico made many discoveries in\nhistory proper which have been to a great extent confirmed by modern\ncriticism (_e.g._ on the development of the Greek epic and the nature\nand genesis of feudal society in antiquity and in the Middle Ages)\ncertainly deserves all emphasis; but this side of his work must be kept\ndistinctly apart from the other, strictly philosophical, side. And\nif the philosophical part is a doctrine expounding the ideal moments\nof the spirit, or in his own words \"the modifications of our human\nmind,\" of these moments or modifications Vico undertakes especially\nto define and fully describe not the logical, ethical and economic\nmoments (though on these too he throws much fight), but precisely the\nimaginative or poetic. The larger portion of the second _Scienza nuova_\nhinges on the discovery of the creative imagination, including the \"new\nprinciples of Poetry,\" the observations on the nature of language,\nmythology, writing, symbolic figures and so forth. All his \"system\nof civilization, of the Republic, of laws, of poetry, of history, in\na word, of humanity at large\" is founded upon this discovery, which\nconstitutes the novel point of view at which Vico places himself. The\nauthor himself observes that his second book, dedicated to Poetic\nWisdom, \"wherein is made a discovery totally opposed to Verulam's,\"\nforms \"nearly the whole body of the work\"; but the first and third\nbooks also deal almost exclusively with works of the imagination. It\nmight be maintained, therefore, that Vico's \"New Science\" was really\njust \u00c6sthetic; or at least the Philosophy of the Spirit with special\nemphasis upon the Philosophy of the \u00c6sthetic Spirit.\n\n[Sidenote: _Vico's mistakes._]\n\n\nAmong so many luminous points, or rather in such a general blaze of\nlight, there are yet dark nooks in his mind; corners that remain in\nshadow. By not maintaining a rigid distinction between concrete history\nand the philosophy of the spirit, Vico allowed himself to suggest\nhistorical periods which do not correspond with the real periods, but\nare rather allegories, the mythological expression of his philosophy\nof the spirit. From the same source arises the multiplicity of those\nperiods (usually three in number) which Vico finds in the history of\ncivilization in general, in poetry and language and practically every\nsubject. \"The first peoples, who were the children of the human race,\nfounded first the world of the arts: next, after a long interval, the\nphilosophers, who were therefore the aged among nations, founded the\nworld of the sciences: with which humanity attained completion.\"[44]\nHistorically, understood in an approximate sense, this scheme of\nevolution has some truth; but only an approximate truth. In consequence\nof the same confusion of history and philosophy he denied primitive\npeoples any kind of intellectual logic, and conceived not only their\nphysics, cosmology, astronomy and geography as poetic in character, but\ntheir morals, their economy and their politics as well. But not only\nhas there never been a period in concrete human history entirely poetic\nand ignorant of all abstraction or power of reasoning, but such a state\ncannot even be conceived. Morals, politics, physics, all presuppose\nintellectual work, however imperfect they may be. The ideal priority of\npoetry cannot be materialized into a historical period of civilization.\n\nLinked with this error is another into which Vico often falls when\nhe asserts that \"the chief aim of poetry\" is to \"teach the ignorant\nvulgar to act virtuously\" and to \"invent fables adapted with the\npopular understanding capable of producing strong emotion.\"[45]\nHaving regard to the clear explanations he himself gave of the\ninessentiality of abstractions and intellectual artifice in poetry;\nwhen we remember that for him poetry makes her own rules for herself\nwithout consulting anybody, and that he clearly established the\npeculiar theoretical nature of the imagination, such a proposition\ncannot be taken as a return to the pedagogic and heteronomous theory\nof poetry which in substance he had left far behind: therefore,\nwithout doubt, it follows from his historical hypothesis of a wholly\npoetical epoch of civilization, in which education, science and\nmorality were administered by poets. Another consequence is that\n\"imaginative universals\" are apparently sometimes understood by him as\nimperfect universals (empirical or representative concepts as they were\nsubsequently called); although, on the other hand, individualization\nis so marked in them and their unphilosophical nature so accentuated\nthat their interpretation as purely imaginative forms may be taken\nas normal. In conclusion, we remark that fundamental terms are not\nalways used by Vico in the same sense: it is not always clear how\nfar \"sensation,\" \"memory,\" \"imagination,\" \"wit\" are synonymous\nor different. Sometimes \"sensation\" seems outside the spirit, at\nothers one of its chief moments; poets are sometimes the organ of\n\"imagination,\" sometimes the \"sensation\" of humanity; and imagination\nis described as \"dilated memory.\" These are the aberrations of a\nthought so virgin and original that it was not easy to regulate.\n\n[Sidenote: _Progress still to be achieved._]\n\nTo sever the Philosophy of the Spirit from History, the modifications\nof the human mind from the historic vicissitudes of peoples, and\n\u00c6sthetic from Homeric civilization, and by continuing Vico's analyses\nto determine more clearly the truths he uttered, the distinctions he\ndrew and the identities he divined; in short, to purge \u00c6sthetic of the\nremains of ancient Rhetoric and Poetics as well as from some over-hasty\nschematisms imposed upon her by the author of her being: such is the\nfield of labour, such the progress still to be achieved after the\ndiscovery of the autonomy of the \u00e6sthetic world due to the genius of\nGiambattista Vico.\n\n\n[1] _Scienza nuova prima,_ bk. iii. ch. 5 (_Opere di G. B. Vico,_\nedited by G. Ferrari, 2nd ed., Milan, 1852-1854).\n\n[2] _Scienza nuova seconda, Elementi,_ liii.\n\n[3] _Scienza nuova pr._ bk. iii. ch. 26.\n\n[4] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. ii. introd.\n\n[5] _Op. cit. Elem._ xxxvi.\n\n[6] _Op. cit._ bk. ii.; _Sentenze eroiche._\n\n[7] Letter to De Angelis of December 25, 1725.\n\n[8] Letter to De Angelis, _cit._\n\n[9] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. iii.; Letter to De Angelis, _cit._;\n_Giudizio su Dante._\n\n[10] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. ii.; _Logica poetica._\n\n[11] _Republica,_ x.\n\n[12] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. iii. _ad init._\n\n[13] Letter to De Angelis, _cit._\n\n[14] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. iii. _passim._\n\n[15] _Scienza nuova pr._ bk. iii. ch. 4.\n\n[16] Letter to Solla, January 12, 1729; cf. _Scienza nuova sec. Elem._\nxliii.\n\n[17] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. iii.\n\n[18] _Scienza nuova pr._ bk. iii. ch. 6.\n\n[19] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. ii., _Corollari d' intorno all' origine\ndella locuzion poetica,_ etc.\n\n[20] _Scienza nuova pr._ bk. iii. ch. 22.\n\n[21] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. ii., _Corollari d' intorno all' origini\ndelle lingue_, etc.\n\n[22] _Op. cit._ bk. ii., _Corollari d' intorno a' tropi,_ etc., \u00a7 4.\n\n[23] _Scienza nuova pr._ bk. iii. ch. 22.\n\n[24] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. iii., _Pruove filosofiche._\n\n[25] _Scienza nuova pr._ bk. iii.-ch. 22.\n\n[26] _Op. cit._ bk. iii. chs. 27-33.\n\n[27] Letter to De Angelis, _cit._\n\n[28] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. ii. introd.\n\n[29] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. ii., _Ultimi corollari,_ \u00a7 vi.\n\n[30] _Scienza nuova pr._ bk. iii. ch. 2.\n\n[31] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. ii., _Della metafisica poetica,_ etc.\n\n[32] _Vita scritta da s\u00e8 medesimo,_ in _Opere, ed. cit._ iv. p. 365.\n\n[33] _Scienza nuova pr._ bk. iii. ch. 37.\n\n[34] _Note all' Arte poetica di Orazio,_ in _Opere, ed. cit._ vi. pp.\n52-79.\n\n[35] Letter to De Angelis, _cit._\n\n[36] _Scienza nuova pr._ bk. iii. ch. 22; cf. the review of Clerico (Le\nClerc) in _Opere,_ iv. p. 382.\n\n[37] _Giudizio intorno alia gram. d' Antonio d' Aronne,_ in _Opere,_\nvi. pp. 149-150.\n\n[38] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. ii., _Corollari d' intorno all' origini\ndelle lingue,_ etc.\n\n[39] _Vita, cit._ p. 343.\n\n[40] _Instituzioni oratorie e scritti inediti,_ Naples, 1865, pp. 90\n_seqq._: _De senteniiis, vulgo del ben parlare in concetti._\n\n[41] Letter to the Duke of Laurenzana, March 1, 1732; and cf. letter to\nMuzio G\u00e6ta.\n\n[42] Cf. p. 190.\n\n[43] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. i., _Del metodo._\n\n[44] _Scienza nuova sec., Ultimi corollari,_ \u00a7 5.\n\n[45] _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. iii. ch. 3; _Scienza nuova sec._ bk. ii.,\n_Della metafisica poetica_; and bk. iii. _ad init._\n\n\n\n\nVI\n\n\nMINOR \u00c6STHETIC DOCTRINES OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY\n\n\n[Sidenote: _The influence of Vico._]\n\nThis step in advance had no immediate effect. The pages in the _Scienza\nnuova_ devoted to \u00e6sthetic doctrine were actually the least read of any\nin that marvellous book. Not that Vico exercised no influence at all;\nwe shall see that several Italian authors both of his own time and of\nthe generation immediately following show traces of his \u00e6sthetic ideas;\nbut these traces are all external and material and therefore sterile.\nOutside Italy the _Scienza nuova_ (already announced by a compatriot\nin 1726 in the _Acta_ of Leipzig with the graceful comment that _magis\nindulget ingenio quam veritati_ and the pleasing information that _ab\nipsis Italis taedio magis quam applausu excipitur_)[1] was mentioned\ntoward the end of the century, as is well known, by Herder, Goethe,\nand some few others.[2] In connection with poetry, especially with the\nHomeric question, Vico's book was quoted by Friedrich August Wolf, to\nwhom it had been recommended by Cesarotti[3] after the publication of\nthe _Prolegomena ad Homerum_ (1795), but without any suspicion of the\nimportance of its general doctrine of poetry, of which the Homeric\nhypothesis was a mere application. Wolf (1807) imagined himself in the\npresence of a talented forerunner in an isolated problem, instead of\na man of intellectual stature towering above any philologist, however\ngreat.\n\n[Sidenote: _Italian writers: Conti._]\n\nNeither by reliance on the works of Vico, who founded no real school,\nnor, it must be added, by any independent effort along new lines,\ndid thought succeed in maintaining or improving upon the position\nalready attained. A notable attempt to establish a philosophical\ntheory of poetry and the arts was made by the Venetian A. Conti, who\nleft numerous sketches for essays on imagination, the faculties of the\nsoul, poetic imitation and similar subjects, designed for inclusion\nin a large treatise on the Beautiful and Art. Conti had started by\nprofessing ideas very like those of Du Bos, affirming that the poet\nmust \"put everything in images\"; that taste is as indefinable as\nfeeling, and that there are persons without taste just as there are\nblind and deaf persons; he also wrote polemical tracts against the\nCartesians. Later he abandoned his sensationalistic or sentimentalist\ntheories,[4] and, inquiring into the nature of poetry, declared\nhimself ill-satisfied with Castelvetro, Patrizzi, and even Gravina.\n\"Had Castelvetro,\" he observes, \"who writes so subtly of Aristotle's\n_Poetics,_ given two or three chapters to a philosophical explanation\nof the idea of imitation, he would have solved many questions raised\nbut not clearly answered by himself concerning poetic theories. In his\n_Poetica_ and in his controversy against Torquato Tasso, Patrizzi never\nsucceeded in clearly defining the philosophical idea of imitation; he\ncollected much useful information about the history of poetry, but\nwilfully lost the Platonic doctrine by allowing it to mingle with the\nhistorical detail instead of gathering it up without sophistry into a\nsingle point, when it would have appeared in a very different guise.\nThe _Ragion poetica_ of Gravina shadows forth a sort of philosophical\nidea of imitation; but so wholly engrossed is he in deducing therefrom\nrules for lyrical, dramatical and epic poetry, and illustrating each\nwith examples from the most celebrated poets, Greek, Latin and Italian,\nthat he is too busy to question the sufficiency of the fertile idea he\nhas propounded.\"[5] A close follower of contemporary European thought,\nConti was familiar with Hutcheson, whose theories he vigorously\nrepudiated, observing, \"Why this multiplication of faculties?\" The\nsoul is one, and for scholastic convenience only has been divided into\nthree faculties: sense, imagination, intellect; the first \"concerns\nherself with objects present before her; imagination with those afar\ninto which memory gradually merges: but the object of sense and\nimagination is always particular; it is only the mind, the intellect,\nthe spirit, that by comparing particulars apprehends the universal.\"\n\"Before introducing a new sense for the pleasure of beauty\" Hutcheson\nshould have \"assigned limits to these three faculties of cognition and\ndemonstrated that the pleasure occasioned by beauty does not arise from\nthe three pleasures of these three faculties, or from intellectual\npleasure alone, to which they all reduce, if the functions of the\nsoul be carefully analysed.\" Thus it would appear that the mistake\nof the Scotchman[6] arose from his habit of separating pleasure from\nthe cognitive faculties, placing the former apart in a special empty\n\"sense of beauty.\"[7] On the other hand, when rewriting the history of\nthe opinions of various critics upon the Aristotelian doctrine of the\nuniversal in poetry, Conti gave much weight to the dialogue _Naugerius\nseu De po\u00ebtica_ of Fracastoro;[8] for an instant he seems on the\npoint of grasping the essence of the poetic universal and identifying\nit with the characteristic, which makes us call even horrible things\nwholly beautiful. \"In all his journeys Balzac never saw a beautiful\nold woman: in the poetic or picturesque sense an old woman is highly\nbeautiful, if depicted as having suffered all the dilapidations of\nage\": immediately after, however, he identifies the characteristic with\nWolff's concept of perfection: \"It does not differ from being, nor does\nbeing differ from the truth which the schoolmen call transcendental\nand which is the object of all arts and all sciences; we call it the\nobject of poetry when by means of imaginary presentations it ravishes\nthe intellect and moves the wall, transporting both these faculties\ninto the ideal and archetypal world of which, following S. Augustine,\nFather Malebranche discourses at length in his _Recherche de la\nv\u00e9rit\u00e9_.\"[9] In the same way Fracastoro's universal gives place to the\nuniversal of science: \"Owing to the infinity of their determinations\nall we can know of particulars is their common properties, which\nis merely another manner of saying that we have no science save of\nuniversal. Thus it is precisely the same if we say the object of\npoetry is science or the universal; which is the doctrine of Navagero,\nfollowing Aristotle.\"[10] The \"imaginative universals of Signor Vico\"\n(with whom he had interchanged some letters) opened no new views for\nhim: he notes that Signor Vico \"talks a great deal about them\" and\n\"holds that the most uncivilized men, having framed them not from any\nwish to please or serve others, but from the necessity of expressing\ntheir feelings as nature taught them, spoke in poetical language the\nelements of a theology, a physics, and an ethics wholly poetical.\"\nConti excuses himself from immediate examination of \"this critical\nquestion\" and only opines that \"it can be shown in many ways that\nthese imaginative universals are the material or object of poetry,\nin so far as they contain within them sciences or things considered\nin themselves\"[11]--a conclusion diametrically opposed to that which\n\"Signor Vico\" meant to express. Conti is next obliged to ask himself\nhow it is possible that poetry's object should be not the true but the\nprobable, when the universal of poetry is the same as that of science.\nHe answers by coming down to the commonplace level of a Baumgarten:\n\"When sciences receive a particular colouring, we pass from the true to\nthe probable.\" Imitation means giving the impression of truth; that is\ndone by selecting a few of its features only; and this is the procedure\nin which the probable just consists. If you wish to describe the\nrainbow poetically, a great part of the Newtonian optics must be thrown\noverboard; thus \"many circumstances of mathematical demonstration\" will\nbe neglected in poetical descriptions, and the rest, which is utilized,\nwill form the probable or that particular \"which awakens the universal\nidea, slumbering in the minds of the learned.\" The great art of poetry\nconsists \"in selection of the image containing the greatest number of\npoints of universal doctrine which, by being inserted in the example,\nmay so colour the precept that I may find it without seeking it, or\nrecognize it through its connexion with events described.\"[12] Hence\npoetry cannot be content with imitation; allegory too is needed: \"in\nancient poetry one thing is read and another is meant.\" Here follows\nthe inevitable instance of the Homeric poems, in which Conti certainly\nfinds elements which cannot be reduced to instruction and allegory and\ntherefore to some extent deserve the Platonic condemnation.[13] He\nrecognizes a species of imagination differing from passive sensibility,\n\"which Father Malebranche calls active imagination, and Plato the art\nof imagery; it comprises all that is meant by wit, sagacity, judgement\nand good taste, which teach a poet to use or not to use at a given time\nor place the rules and licences of art, and to control the extravagance\nof his imagery.\"[14] On the question of literary taste he follows\nthe opinion of Trevisano and decides that it consists in \"setting in\nmutual harmony, that is to say restraining within limits, the soul's\ncognitive faculties, memory, imagination and intellect, allowing none\nto overwhelm another.\"[15]\n\n[Sidenote: _Quadrio and Zanotti._]\n\nBy assiduous travail of thought and perpetual search for the best,\nConti kept himself at the highest level of \u00e6sthetic speculation in\ncontemporary Europe (Vico always excepted); at the same level as\nBaumgarten in Germany. We pass rapidly over other Italian writers\nsuch as Quadrio (1739), author of the first great encyclop\u00e6dia of\nuniversal literature, in which he defines poetry as \"the science of\nthings human and divine, presented in pictures to the populace, and\nwritten in words connected by measure\";[16] and Francesco Maria Zanotti\n(1768), who describes poetry as \"the art of versification in order to\ngive pleasure\":[17] the first is worthy of a medi\u00e6val anthologist,\nthe second of a no less medi\u00e6val composer of handbooks on rhythm and\nmethods of composition. The only serious student of \u00e6sthetic was\nMelchior Cesarotti.\n\n[Sidenote: _Cesarotti_]\n\nCesarotti called attention to popular and primitive poetry: he\ntranslated Ossian and illustrated the text with dissertations; he\nunearthed antique Spanish poems and even the folk-songs of Mexico and\nLapland; he studied Hebrew poetry; he dedicated the greater part of\nhis life to the Homeric poems, examining all the theories of critics\npast and present, encountering Vico in this connexion and discussing\nhis views. Besides this, he debated the origin of poetry, the pleasure\ngiven by tragedy, taste, the beautiful, eloquence, style, in short\nevery problem belonging to \u00e6sthetics which had been raised up to his\ntime.[18] One seems to catch an echo of Vico as one listens to his\nwords on La Motte: \"He had logic, but knew not that the logic of\npoetry differs somewhat from ordinary logic: he was a man of great\ntalent, but he recognized talent only, and was incapable of feeling the\nimmeasurable distance between judicious prose and poetry: the real\nHomer with his attractive faults will always be more beloved than his\nreformed Homer with his cold, affected virtue.\"[19] Cesarotti purposed\n(1762) bringing out a great theoretico-historical book in whose first\npart \"we shall suppose the non-existence of poetry and poetic art and\ntry to trace by what path a man of illuminated reason can have reached\nthe idea of the possibility of such an art and how he can have attained\nperfection by these means: every one will be able to see poetry growing\nup under his eyes, so to speak, and attest the truth of theory by\nthe testimony of his own personal feelings.\"[20] Although celebrated\nthroughout Italy in his day as one who \"with the most pure torch of\nphilosophy has thrown beams of light into the darkest recesses of\npoetry and eloquence,\"[21] it does not appear that the distinguished\nscholar, the pleasing and desultory philosopher, offered any profound\nor original solutions. In 1797 he defined poetry as \"the art of\nrepresenting and perfecting nature by means of picturesque, animated,\nimaginative and harmonious discourse.\"[22]\n\n[Sidenote: _Bettinelli and Pagano._]\n\nThe fashion of the day in philosophy made men impatient of the ideas\nfound in writers of treatises of former times. Arteaga praises\nCesarotti for \"that fine tact, that impartial criticism, that\nlogical spirit derived not from the trickling streamlets of Sperone,\nCastelvetro, Casa and Bembo, but from the profound and inexhaustible\nsprings of Montesquieu, Hume, Voltaire, d'Alembert, Sulzer, and\nwriters of like temper.\"[23] Writing to Saverio Bettinelli, who was\npreparing a work on _Enthusiasm,_ Paradisi hoped it would prove \"a\nmetaphysical history of enthusiasm which shall outweigh all those\nPoetics which are only fit to be burned,\" and would \"make waste paper\nof Castelvetro, the 'Mintumo,' and that stupid creature, Quadrio.\"[24]\nIn spite of these aspirations Bettinelli's book (1769) contains little\nbeyond vivacious and eloquent empirical observations concerning the\npsychology of poets, \"poetic enthusiasm,\" to which he assigns six\ndegrees, namely, elevation, vision, rapidity, novelty and surprise,\npassion and transfusion. Equally empirical was Mario Pagano in his two\nfragments, _Gusto e le belle arti_ and _Origine e natura della poesia_\n(1783-1785), in which he grotesquely combines some ideas from Vico with\nthe current sensationalism. Theoretico-imaginative form and sensuous\npleasure are presented by him as two historical periods of art. \"In\ntheir cradle the fine arts are directed towards making a true imitation\nof nature rather than towards loveliness. Their first steps are towards\nexpression rather than charm.... In the most ancient poetry, even in\nthe ballads of barbarous ages, there lives a most compelling pathos:\npassions are expressed naturally, even the sound of the words is\nalive with the expression of the things described.\" But \"the period\nof perfection is reached at the moment when exact imitation of nature\nis coupled with complete beauty, accord and harmony,\" when \"the taste\nis refined and society reaches its most complete form of culture.\"\nFine arts \"precede by a short time the dawn of philosophy, that is\nto say, the time of the most intense perfection of society\"; indeed,\ncertain modes of art, such as tragedy, must necessarily come later\nthan philosophy whose aid must be invoked to further \"the purgation of\nmanners.\"[25]\n\n[Sidenote: _German disciples of Baumgarten. G. F. Meier._]\n\nThe compatriots and successors of Baumgarten, like those of Vico,\ndid little by way of understanding or improving upon his work. An\nenthusiastic admirer and disciple of Baumgarten who had attended his\nlectures at Frankfort-on-the-Oder, Georg Friedrich Meier, came forward\nin 1746 to defend the _Meditationes_ against the attacks of Quistorp to\nwhom the master had deigned no reply;[26] already in 1748, prior to\nthe publication of the _\u00c6sthetic,_ he had published the first volume\nof his _Principles of all the Beautiful Sciences_,[27] followed in\n1749 and 1750 by the second and third volumes. This book, which is\na complete exposition of Baumgarten's theory, is divided, according\nto the master's method, into three parts: invention of beautiful\nthoughts (heuristic), \u00e6sthetic method (methodic), and the beautiful\nsignification of thoughts (semiotic); the first of these (occupying\ntwo and a half volumes) is subdivided into three sections: beauty\nof sense-apprehension (\u00e6sthetic richness, grandeur, verisimilitude,\nvivacity, certainty, sensitive life and wit), sensitive faculties\n(attention, abstraction, senses, imagination, subtlety, acumen,\nmemory, poetic power, taste, foresight, conjecture, signification and\nthe minor appetitive faculties), and the diverse kinds of beautiful\nthought (\u00e6sthetic concepts, judgements, and syllogisms). Elsewhere\nthan in this book, which was reprinted many times (in 1757 an epitome\nwas issued[28]), Meier discusses \u00c6sthetic in several of his numerous\nworks, especially in a little tract, _Considerations on the First\nPrinciples of all Fine Arts and Sciences_.[29] Who was more tenderly\ninclined than he towards the science so recently born and baptized? He\nwas ardent in her defence against those who denied both her possibility\nand her utility, and against those who admitted these yet complained,\nnot unreasonably, that she was substantially the same as that which in\nformer days had been treated as Poetics and Rhetoric. He parried this\naccusation, of which he recognized the partial truth, by asserting\nthat it was impossible for one writer to have perfect knowledge of all\nthe arts: another of his excuses was to the effect that \u00c6sthetic was\na science too young to show the perfection reached by other sciences\nafter the cultivation of centuries; in one place he says he has no\nintention of arguing \"with those enemies of \u00c6sthetic who will not or\ncannot see the true nature and aim of this science, but have built for\nthemselves in its place a deformed and miserable image against which,\nwhen they fight, they fight against themselves.\" With philosophic\nresignation he concludes that the same fate is in store for \u00c6sthetic as\nfor every science: \"At first when almost unknown they encounter enemies\nand detractors who ridicule them through ignorance and prejudice;\nbut later they meet persons of intellect who, by working at them\nconjointly, carry them on to their proper perfection.\"[30]\n\n[Sidenote: _Confusions of Meier._]\n\nStudents of the new science flocked to Halle University to hear Meier\nlecture on \u00c6sthetic whose \"chief author\" or \"inventor\" (_Haupturheber,\nErfinder_), as Meier never tired of repeating, was \"Herr Professor\nBaumgarten\"; at the same time warning them that his own _Anfangsgr\u00fcnde_\nwere no mere transcription of Baumgarten's lectures.[31] Still, while\nrecognizing the great gifts of Meier as publicity-agent, the facility,\nclarity and wealth of his eloquence, and his shrewdness in polemic,\none cannot altogether deny the justice of the remark upon \"Professor\nBaumgarten of Frankfort and his ape (_Affe)_ Professor Meier of\nHalle.\"[32] Every defect of Baumgarten's \u00c6sthetic reappears accentuated\nin Meier; the limits of the inferior cognitive faculties, alleged as\nthe domain of poetry and the arts, are laid down by him most strangely.\nIt is curious to note how, for example, he interprets the difference\nbetween the confused (\u00e6sthetical) and the distinct (logical), and the\nproposition that beauty disappears when made the object of distinct\nthought. \"The cheeks of a beautiful girl whereon bloom the roses of\nyouth are lovely so long as they are looked at with the naked eye. But\nlet them be examined with a magnifying glass. Where is their beauty?\nOne can hardly believe that such a disgusting surface, scaly, all\nmounts and hollows, the pores full of dirt, with hairs sprouting here\nand there, can be the seat of that amorous attraction which subdues\nthe heart.\"[33] That is described as \"\u00e6sthetically false\" whose truth\nthe inferior faculty is unable to grasp: for example, the theory that\nbodies are composed of monads.[34] Once they have become intelligible\nto these faculties, general concepts possess great \u00e6sthetic richness,\nsince they include infinite consequences and particular cases.[35]\n\u00c6sthetic also comprehends those things which cannot be thought\ndistinctly or, if so thought, might be capable of upsetting philosophic\ngravity: a kiss may be an excellent subject for a poet; but whatever\nwould be thought of a philosopher who sought to demonstrate its\nnecessity by the mathematical method?[36] Moreover, Meier includes the\nwhole theory of observation and experiment in \u00c6sthetic, to which this\ntheory belongs, he says, by right of its connexion with the senses,[37]\nand also the whole theory of the appetitive faculties, because\n\"\u00e6sthetic requires not only a fine wit but a noble heart as well.\"[38]\nHe comes near truth sometimes, when, for example, he observes that\nthe logical form presupposes the \u00e6sthetic and that our first concepts\nare sensitive, later becoming distinct by the help of logic;[39]\nand when he condemns allegory as \"among the most decadent forms of\nbeautiful thinking.\"[40] But, on the other hand, he thinks that logical\ndistinctions and definitions, although not necessarily sought after\nby genius, are very useful in poetry; they are even indispensable as\nregulators of beautiful thinking and make up, as it were, the skeleton\nof the body poetic: great care, however, must be taken not to judge\n\u00e6sthetical general concepts, _notiones \u00e6sthetic\u00e6 universales,_ with\nthe rigorous exactitude demanded by philosophical. And since such\nconcepts, taken singly, may be likened to unstrung jewels, they must be\nconnected by the string of \u00e6sthetic judgement and syllogism, the theory\nof which is identical with that presented by Logic, setting aside that\npart which is of little or no use to genius, but belongs exclusively\nto the philosopher.[41] In his _Considerations_ of 1757 Meier, having\ncombated the principle of imitation (which appeared to him at once too\nbroad, since science and morals are also imitations of nature, and too\nnarrow, since art does not imitate natural objects solely nor should\nit imitate them all, for the immoral must be excluded), reaffirmed the\nthesis that the \u00e6sthetic principle consists in the \"greatest possible\nbeauty of sense-perception.\"[42] He upheld this by condemning as\nerroneous the belief that this sense-perception is wholly sensuous\nand confused, without any gleam of distinctness or rationality. The\nperception of sweet, bitter, red, etc., is wholly sensuous; but there\nis another perception which is both sensuous and intellectual, confused\nand distinct, in which both faculties, the higher and the lower,\ncollaborate. When intellectuality prevails in this consciousness,\nthen we have science: when sensibility, then we have poetry. \"From\nour explanation it will be gathered that the inferior cognitive\nfaculties must collect all the material of a poem, and all its parts.\nIntellect and judgement, on the other hand, watch and ensure that these\nmaterials are placed side by side in such a way that in their connexion\ndistinction and order may be observed.\"[43] Here a plunge into\nsensationalism, there a fugitive glimpse of truth: most often, and in\nconclusion, an adherence to the old mechanical, ornamental, pedagogic\ntheory of poetry: this is the impression left on us by the \u00e6sthetic\nwritings of Meier.\n\n[Sidenote: _M. Mendelssohn and other followers of Baumgarten. Vogue of\n\u00c6sthetic._]\n\nAnother disciple of Baumgarten, Mendelssohn, conceiving beauty\nas \"indistinct image of a perfection,\" deduced that God can have\nno perception of beauty, as this is merely a phenomenon of human\nimperfection. According to him a primary form of pleasure is that\nof the senses, arising from \"the bettered state of our bodily\nconstitution\"; a secondary form is the \u00e6sthetic fact of sensible\nbeauty, that is to say, unity in variety; a third form is perfection,\nor harmony in variety.[44] He too repudiates Hutcheson's _deus ex\nmachina,_ the sense of beauty. Sensible beauty, perfection such as\ncan be apprehended by the senses, is independent of the fact that\nthe object represented is beautiful or ugly, good or bad by nature;\nit suffices that it leaves us not indifferent: whence Mendelssohn\nagrees with Baumgarten's definition, \"a poem is a discourse sensibly\nperfect.\"[45] Elias Schlegel (1742) conceived art as imitation, not\nso servile as to seem a copy, but having similarity rather than\nidentity with nature: he considered the duty of poetry was first to\nplease and only afterwards to instruct.[46] Treatises on \u00c6sthetic,\nuniversity lectures or slender volumes for use of the public, _Theories\nof the Fine Arts and Letters, Manuals, Sketches, Texts, Principles,\nIntroductions, Lectures, Essays,_ and _Considerations on Taste_ poured\ndown thick and fast on Germany during the second half of the eighteenth\ncentury. There are at least thirty full or complete treatises and many\ndozens of minor tracts or fragments. After the Protestant universities,\nthe Catholic took up the new science, which was taught by Riedel at\nVienna, Herwigh at W\u00fcrzburg, Ladrone at Mainz, Jacobi at Freiburg,\nand by others at Ingolstadt after the expulsion of the Jesuits.[47] A\npretty little volume on the _First Principles of the Fine Arts_[48] was\nwritten (1790) for Catholic schools by the notorious Franciscan friar\nEulogius Schneider, who, after being unfrocked, terrorised Strasburg in\nthe days of the Convention, and met his end under the guillotine. The\nfrenzied output of these German _\u00c6sthetics_ resembles that of _Poetics_\nin Italy in the sixteenth century, after the rise to popularity of\nAristotle's treatise. Between 1771 and 1774 the Swiss Sulzer brought\nout his great \u00e6sthetic encyclop\u00e6dia, _The General Theory of the Fine\nArts,_ in alphabetical order, with historical notes upon each article,\nwhich were greatly enlarged in the second edition of 1792, edited by a\nretired Prussian captain, von Blankenburg.[49] In 1799, one J. Roller\npublished a first _Sketch of the History of \u00c6sthetic,_[50] in which he\nobserves not unjustly, \"Patriotic youth will be pleased to recognize\nthat Germany has produced more literature on this subject than any\nother country.\"[51]\n\n[Sidenote: _Eberhard and Eschenburg._]\n\nConfining ourselves to bare mention of the works of Riedel (1767),\nFaber (1767), Sch\u00fctz (1776-1778), Schubart (1777-1781), Westenrieder\n(1777), Szerdahel (1779), K\u00f6nig (1784), Gang (1785), Meiners (1787),\nSchott (1789), Moritz (1788),[52] we will select from the crowd the\n_Theory of Fine Arts and Letters_ (1783) of Johann August Eberhard,\nsuccessor to Meier in the Chair at Halle,[53] and the _Sketch of a\nTheory and Literature of Letters_ (1783) by Johann Joachim Eschenburg,\none of the most popular books of the day for students.[54] Both\nthese authors are followers of Baumgarten, with inclinations towards\nsensationalism; amongst other things Eberhard considered the beautiful\nas \"that which pleases the most distinct senses,\" that is to say, of\nsight and hearing.\n\n[Sidenote: _J. G. Sulzer._]\n\nA word must be accorded to Sulzer, in whom we find the most curious\nalternation of new and old, the romantic influence of the new Swiss\nschool and the utilitarianism and intellectualism of his day. He\nasserts that beauty exists wherever unity, variety and order are found:\nthe work of an artist is strictly in the form, in lively expression\n(_lebhafte Darstellung_): the material is irrelevant to art, but\nthe duty of every reasonable and sensible man is to make judicious\nselection. The beauty which is used to clothe the good as well as the\nbad is not the ineffable, celestial Beauty, offspring of the alliance\nbetween the beautiful, the good and the perfect, which awakens more\nthan mere pleasure, a veritable joy which ravishes and beatifies our\nsoul. Such is the human face when, by filling the eye of the beholder\nwith the pleasure of form arising from the variety, proportion and\norder of the features, it proceeds to arouse the imagination and\nintellect by its suggestion of interior perfection; of the same\nnature is the statue of a great man carved by Phidias, or a patriotic\noration by Cicero. If truth lie outside art and belong to philosophy,\nthe most noble use to which art may be put is to make us feel the\nimportant truths which lend her strength and energy, not to mention\nthat truth itself enters into art in the shape of truthful imitation\nor representation. Sulzer also repeats (and he is not the last) that\norators, historians and poets are intermediaries between speculative\nphilosophy and the people.[55]\n\n[Sidenote: _K. H. Heydenreich._]\n\nKarl Heinrich Heydenreich returns to a sounder tradition when he\ndefines art (1790) as \"a representation of a determinate state of\nsensibility,\" and observes that man, as a cognitive being, is impelled\nto enlarge the sphere of his cognitions and impart his discoveries to\nhis fellows, while as a sensitive being he is impelled to represent\nand communicate his sensations; whence arise science and art. But\nHeydenreich does not clearly grasp the cognitive character of art; for\nin his opinion sensations become objects of artistic representation\neither because they are pleasing or, when not pleasing, because they\nare useful to further the moral aims of man as a social being; the\nobjects of sensibility which enter into art must be possessed of\nintrinsic excellence and value and bear reference not to a single\nindividual but to the individual as a rational being: hence the\nobjectivity and necessity of taste. Like Baumgarten and Meier, he\ndivides \u00c6sthetic into three parts: a doctrine of _inventio,_ another of\n_methodica,_ a third of the _ars significandi_.[56]\n\n[Sidenote: J. G. Herder.]\n\nAnother disciple of Baumgarten is J. G. Herder, who had an unbounded\nadmiration for the old Berlin master, whom he calls \"the Aristotle\nof his day,\" and defends him warmly against those who think fit to\ndescribe him as a \"stupid and obtuse syllogizer\" (1769). On the\nother hand he had slight esteem for subsequent \u00c6sthetic, for example\nMeier's work, which he stigmatized accurately enough as \"in part a\nre-mastication of Logic, in part a patchwork of metaphorical terms,\ncomparisons and examples.\" \"O \u00c6sthetic!\" he cries with emphasis,\n\"O \u00c6sthetic! the most fertile, the most beautiful and by far the\nmost novel of all abstract sciences, in what cavern of the Muses is\nsleeping the youth of my philosophic nation destined to bring thee\nto perfection?\"[57] He denied Baumgarten's claim to have established\nan _Ars pulchre cogitandi_ instead of limiting himself to a simple\n_Scientia de pulchro et pulchris philosophice cogitans,_ and ridiculed\nthe scruple which held \u00c6sthetic to be unworthy of the dignity of\nPhilosophy.[58] To compensate for this, however, he accepted the\nfundamental definition cf poetry as _oratio sensitiva perfecta_:\ngem of definitions (says he), the best that has ever been invented,\nthat penetrates to the heart of the matter, touches the true poetic\nprinciples and opens the most extended view over the entire philosophy\nof the beautiful, \"coupling poetry with her sisters, the fine\narts.\"[59] Like Cesarotti the Italian, but with much less vivacity and\nbrilliance, Herder the German had studied primitive poetry, Ossian and\nthe songs of ancient peoples, Shakespeare (1773), popular love-songs\n(1778), the spirit of Hebrew poetry (1782), and oriental poetry; these\nstudies powerfully impressed upon his mind the sensitive nature of\npoetry. His friend Hamann (1762) had written these memorable words,\nwhich read like an extract from one of Vico's aphorisms: \"Poetry is\nthe mother-tongue of mankind: in the same way that the garden is older\nthan the ploughed field, painting than writing, song than declamation,\nbarter than trade. The repose of our most ancient progenitors was a\nslumber deeper than ours; their motion a tumultuous dance. They spent\nseven days in the silence of thought or of stupor; and opened their\nmouths to pronounce winged words. Their speech was sensation and\npassion, and they understood nothing but images. Of images is composed\nall the treasure of human knowledge and felicity.\"[60] Although\nHerder, who knew and admired Vico,[61] does not mention him by name\nwhen treating of language and poetry, one might suppose him to be\ninfluenced by the great Neapolitan at least in the final consolidation\nof his theories; but, on the contrary, the authors whom he chiefly\nquotes in this connexion are Du Bos, Goguet and Condillac, and observes\n\"the first beginnings of human speech in tone, gesture, expression of\nsensations and thoughts by means of images and signs, can only have\nbeen a kind of crude poetry, and so it is among every savage nation\nin the world.\" Not a speech with punctuation and a sense of syllable,\nlike ours, learning as we do to read and write, but an unsyllabled\nmelody which gave birth to the primitive epic. \"Natural man depicts\nwhat he sees and as he sees it, alive, powerful, monstrous; in order\nor disorder, as he sees and hears, so he reproduces. Not alone did\nbarbarous tongues thus arrange their images, but Greek and Latin do\nthe same. As the senses offered material, so the poets utilized it;\nespecially in Homer we see how closely nature is followed in images\nwhich glow and fade perpetually and inimitably. He describes things\nand events line by line, scene by scene; and, in the same way, he\npaints men in their very bodies, actually as they speak and move.\"\nLater we distinguish epic from what we call history; because the former\n\"not only describes what has happened but describes the event in its\nentirety, showing how it occurred in the only possible way, having\nregard to surrounding circumstance of body and spirit\": this is the\nreason of the more philosophical character of poetry. As for pleasure,\nno doubt we do find poetry pleasant; but the idea that the poet's\nmotive is merely to excite pleasure cannot be condemned too strongly.\n\"Homer's gods were as essential and indispensable to the poet's world\nas the forces of motion are to the world of matter. Without the\ndeliberations and activities of Olympus, none of the necessary events\nwhich happen on this earth could take place. Homer's magic island in\nthe western sea belongs to the map of his hero's wanderings by the same\nnecessity which placed it on the map of the world: it was necessary\nto the plan of his poem. It is the same with the severe Dante and his\ncircles of Hell and Heaven.\" Art is formative: she disciplines, orders\nand governs the imagination and every faculty of man: not only did she\ngenerate history, \"but, earlier yet, she created gods and heroes and\npurified the uncouth imaginations and fables of peoples with their\nTitans, monsters and Gorgons, reducing to limit and law the riotous\nimagination of ignorant men which knows no bounds or rule.\"[62]\n\nNotwithstanding these intuitions, so like those of Vico early in the\nsame century, Herder as a philosopher is inferior to his Italian\npredecessor, and in point of fact does not rise superior to Baumgarten.\nBy application of Leibniz' law of continuity, he too arrived at the\nopinion that the pleasing, the true, the beautiful and the good are\ndegrees of one single activity. For instance, sensible pleasure\" is\na participation in the true and the good, so far as the senses may\ncomprehend them; the feeling of pleasure and pain is no other than the\nfeeling of the true and the good, that is to say, the consciousness\nthat the aim of our organism, the conservation of our well-being and\nthe avoidance of our hurt, has been attained.\"[63] Fine arts and\nletters are all instructive (_bildend_): hence the terms _humaniora,_\nthe Greek _\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03cc\u03bd,_ the Latin _pulchrum,_ the _gentle_ arts of days\nof chivalry, _les belles lettres et les beaux arts_ of the French. A\ngroup of them (gymnastic, dance, etc.) educates the body; a second\ngroup (painting, plastic, music) educates the nobler senses of man,\nthe eye, the ear, the hand and tongue; a third (poetry) touches the\nintellect, the imagination and the reason: a fourth group governs human\ntendencies and inclinations.[64] Herder disapproved of the facile\ntheorists of art who began straight away with a definition of beauty,\na complex and involved concept. He held that the theory of fine arts\nshould be subdivided into three theories, each to be built up from\nthe foundations, the theory of sight, of hearing and of touch, that\nis to say of painting, music and sculpture, _i.e._ into \u00e6sthetical\nOptics, \u00e6sthetical Acoustics and \u00e6sthetical Physiology. \"Fairly well\nelaborated in the psychological and subjective aspects, \u00c6sthetic\nis sadly undeveloped in all that belongs to the object and to the\nsensation of beauty, without which there can never be a fertile theory\nof the Beautiful capable of influencing all the arts.\"[65] Taste is not\n\"a fundamental faculty of the soul but a habitual application of our\njudgement (intellectual judgement) to objects of beauty\"; an acquired\nfacility of the intellect (of which Herder outlines the genesis).[66]\nThe poet is poet not only in his imagination but in his intellect.\nIn 1782 he writes: \"The barbarous name \u00c6sthetic of recent invention\nindicates nothing beyond a section of Logic: that which we call taste\nis neither more nor less than a quick and rapid judgement which does\nnot exclude truth and profundity, but rather presupposes and promotes\nthem. All didactic poetry is nothing more than philosophy rendered\nsensible: the fable as exposition of a general doctrine is truth in\nact, in activity.... When expounded and applied to human affairs,\nPhilosophy is not only a fine art in herself (_sch\u00f6ne Wissenschaft,_)\nbut the mother of Beauty: it is only through her that Rhetoric and\nPoetry can ever be educational, useful, or in the truest sense\npleasant.\"[67]\n\n[Sidenote: _Philosophy of language._]\n\nHerder and Hamann deserve our gratitude for having brought a current of\nfresh air into the study of the philosophy of language. The lead given\nby the Port-Royal authors had been followed since the beginning of\nthe century by many writers of logical or general grammars. According\nto the French Encyclop\u00e6dia, \"_La grammaire g\u00e9n\u00e9rale est la science\nraisonn\u00e9e des principes immuables et g\u00e9n\u00e9raux de la parole prononc\u00e9e\nou \u00e9crite dans toutes les langues_,\"[68] and d'Alembert spoke of\ngrammarians of invention and grammarians of memory, assigning to the\nformer the duty of studying the metaphysics of grammar.[69] General\ngrammars had been written by Du Marsais, De Beauz\u00e9e, and Condillac\nin France; Harris in England; and many others.[70] But what was the\nrelation between general grammar and particular grammars? If logic be\none, how comes it that languages are many? Is the variety of tongues\nbut a deviation on their part from one single model? And, if there be\nno such deviation or error, what is the explanation of the fact? What\nis language, and how was it born? If language be external to thought,\nhow can thought exist if not in language? \"_Si les hommes_,\" says\nJean-Jacques Rousseau, \"_ont eu besoin de la parole pour apprendre\n\u00e0 penser, ils ont eu bien plus besoin encore de savoir penser pour\ntrouver l'art de la parole_\"; appalled at the difficulty, he declares\nhis conviction \"_de l'impossibilit\u00e9 presque d\u00e9montr\u00e9e que les langues\naient pu na\u00eetre et s'\u00e9tablir par des moyens purement humains._\"[71]\nSuch questions became fashionable; books on the origin and formation\nof language were written by de Brosses (1765) and Court de G\u00e9belin\n(1776) in France, by Monboddo (1774) in England, S\u00fcssmilch (1766) and\nTiedemann in Germany, and Cesarotti (1785) in Italy, and by others\nwho had some slight acquaintance with Vico, but profited little by\nit.[72] None of the above-named writers was able to free himself of\nthe notion that speech was either natural and mechanical, or else a\nsymbol attached to thought: whereas in fact it was impossible to solve\nthe difficulties under which they were labouring except by dropping\nthe notion of a sign or symbol and attaining the conception of the\nactive and expressive imagination, verbal imagination, language as\nthe expression not of intellect but of intuition. An approach towards\nthis explanation was made by Herder in a brilliant and imaginative\nthesis in 1770 upon this subject of the origin of language, chosen\nfor discussion by the Berlin Academy. In it he says that language is\nthe reflexion or consciousness (_Besonnenheit_) of man. \"Man shows\nreflexion when he puts forth freely such force of mind as enables him\nto make selection from amongst the crowd of sensations by which he is\nassailed: from the ocean of the senses, so to speak, to select a single\nwave and consciously to watch it. He shows reflexion when, amidst the\nthronging chaos of images which pass before him as in a dream, he can\nin a waking moment collect himself and fasten his attention upon a\nsingle image, examine it calmly and clearly, and separate it from its\nneighbours. Once again, man shows reflexion when he is able not merely\nto grasp vividly and clearly all the properties of an image, but also\nto recognize one or more of its distinctive properties.\" The language\nof man \"does not depend on the organization of the mouth, for even he\nwho is dumb from birth has, if he reflects, a language; it is not a\ncry of the senses, since it resides in a reflective creature, not in a\nbreathing machine; it is not an affair of imitation, since imitation\nof nature is a means, and we are here trying to explain the end: much\nless is it an arbitrary convention; a savage in the depths of the\nforest would have had to create a language for himself even though he\nnever used it. Language is an understanding of the soul with herself,\nnecessary just in so far as man is man.\"[73] Here language begins to\nshow itself no longer as purely mechanical or as something derived\nfrom arbitrary choice and invention, but as a creative activity and a\nprimary affirmation of the activity of the human mind. Herder's essay\nmay not state such a view unequivocally, but it points forward to such\na conclusion in a striking way for which its author has not received\nthe credit he deserves. Hamann, in reviewing his friend's theories,\nagreed with him in denying the origin of language by invention or\narbitrary choice; while dwelling also on the liberty of man, he\nregarded language as something which man could only have learned by\nmeans of a mystical _communicatio idiomatum_ from God.[74] That, too,\nwas one way of recognizing that the mystery of language is not to be\nsolved except by placing it in the forefront of the problem of the\nspirit.\n\n\n[1] Vico, _Opere, ed. cit._ iv. p. 305.\n\n[2] Herder, _Briefe zur Bef\u00f6rderung der Humanit\u00e4t,_ 1793-1797, Letter\n59; Goethe, _Italien. Reise,_ Mar. 5, 1787.\n\n[3] Letters from Wolf to Cesarotti, June 5, 1802; in Cesarotti,\n_Opere,_ vol. xxxviii. pp. 108-112; cf. _ibid._ pp. 43-44, and vol.\nxxxvii. pp. 281, 284, 324; cf. on the question of the relations between\nWolf and Vico, Croce, _Bibliografia vichiana,_ pp. 51, 56-58, and\n_Supplem._ pp. 12-14.\n\n[4] Letter in French to Mme. Ferrant (1719), and to the Marquis Maffei\nin _Prose e poesie,_ vol. ii. (1756), pp. lxxxv.-civ., cviii.-cix.\n\n[5] _Prose e poesie,_ vol. i., 1739, pref.\n\n[6] Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746) was an Irishman. Croce's mistake is\nprobably due to the fact that he studied and taught at Glasgow, or that\nhis family was ultimately of Scottish origin.--TR.\n\n[7] _Prose e poesie,_ vol. ii. pp. clxxi.-clxxvii.\n\n[8] See above, pp. 184-185.\n\n[9] _Prose e poesie,_ vol. ii. pp. 242-246.\n\n[10] _Op. cit._ ii. p. 249.\n\n[11] _Op. cit._ ii. pp. 252-253.\n\n[12] _Prose e poesie,_ vol. ii. pp. 233-234.\n\n[13] _Op. cit._ i. pref.\n\n[14] _Op. cit._ ii. p. 127.\n\n[15] _Op. cit._ i. p. xliii.\n\n[16] Fr. Sav. Quadrio, _Della storia e della ragione d' ogni poesia,_\nBologna, 1739, vol. i. part i. dist. i. ch. 1.\n\n[17] Fr. M. Zanotti, _Dell' arte poetica, ragionamenti cinque,_\nBologna, 1768.\n\n[18] On Ossian, _Opere,_ vols, ii.-v.; on Homer, vols, vi.-x.; _Saggio\ncopra il diletto della tragedia,_ vol. xxix. pp. 117-167; _Saggio sul\nbello,_ vol. xxx. pp. 13-70; on _Filosofia del gusto,_ vol. i.; on\n_Eloquenza,_ lecture, vol. xxxi.\n\n[19] _Opere,_ vol. xl. p. 49.\n\n[20] _Ibid._ p. 55.\n\n[21] Letter from Corniani to Cesarotti, November 21, 1790, in _Opere,_\nvol. xxxvii. p. 146.\n\n[22] _Saggio sopra le istituzioni scolastiche, private e pubbliche,_ in\n_Opere,_ vol. xxix. pp. 1-116.\n\n[23] Letter of March 30, 1764, in _Opere,_ vol. xxxv. p. 202.\n\n[24] Saverio Bettinelli, _Dell' entusiasmo nelle belle arti, 1769,_ in\n_Opere,_ iii. pp. xi.-xiii.\n\n[25] Fr. M. Pagano, _De' saggi politici,_ Naples, 1783-1785, vol. i.\nAppendix to \u00a7 1, \"Sull' origine e natura della poesia\"; vol. ii. \u00a7 6,\n\"Del gusto e delle belle arti.\"\n\n[26] See above, p. 217.\n\n[27] _Anfangsgr\u00fcnde aller sch\u00f6nen Wissenschaften,_ Halle, 1748-1750.\n\n[28] _Auszug aus den Anfangsgr\u00fcnde,_ etc., _ibid._ 1758.\n\n[29] _Betrachtungen \u00fcber den ersten Grunds\u00e4tzen aller sch\u00f6nen K\u00fcnste u.\nWissenschaften, ibid._ 1757.\n\n[30] Preface to 2nd ed. (1768) of vol. ii. of _Anfangsgr\u00fcnde,_ and\n_Betrachtungen, cit.,_ esp. \u00a7\u00a7 1, 2, 34.\n\n[31] Preface to vol. i., and cf. \u00a7 5.\n\n[32] In a letter to Gottsched, 1747, in Danzel, _Gottsched,_ p. 215.\n\n[33] _Anfangsgr\u00fcnde,_ \u00a7 23.\n\n[34] _Op. cit._ \u00a7 92.\n\n[35] _Op. cit._ \u00a7 49.\n\n[36] _Op. cit._ \u00a7 55.\n\n[37] _Op. cit._ \u00a7\u00a7 355-370.\n\n[38] _Op. cit._ \u00a7\u00a7 529-540.\n\n[39] _Op. cit._ \u00a7 5.\n\n[40] _Op. cit._ \u00a7 413.\n\n[41] Anfangsgr\u00fcnde, \u00a7\u00a7 541-670.\n\n[42] Betrachtungen, \u00a7 20.\n\n[43] Op. cit. \u00a7 21.\n\n[44] _Briefe \u00fcber die Empfindungen,_ 1755 (in _Opere filosofiche,_\nItal. trans., Parma, 1800, vol. ii.). Letters 2, 5, 11.\n\n[45] _Betrachtungen \u00fcb. d. Quellen d. sch. Wiss. u. K.,_ 1757, later\nentitled _\u00dcber die Hauptgrunds\u00e4tze,_ etc., 1761, in _Opere, ed. cit._\nii. pp. 10, 12-15, 21-30.\n\n[46] J. E. Schlegel, _Von der Nachahmung,_ 1742; cf. Braitmaier,\n_Gesch. d. poet. Th._ i. p. 249 _sqq._\n\n[47] Koller, _Entwurf,_ p. 103.\n\n[48] _Die ersten Grunds\u00e4tze der sch\u00f6nen Kunst \u00fcberhaupt, und der\nsch\u00f6nen Schreibart insbesondere,_ Bonn, 1790; cf. Sulzer, i. p. 55, and\nKoller, pp. 55-56.\n\n[49] See Bibliographical Appendix.\n\n[50] _Entwurf zur Geschichte u. Literatur d. \u00c4sthetik,_ etc.,\nRegensburg. 1799; see Bibl. App.\n\n[51] Koller, _op. cit._ p. 7.\n\n[52] Notices and extracts in Sulzer and Koller, _opp. citt._\n\n[53] Joh. Aug. Eberhard, _Theorie der sch\u00f6nen K\u00fcnste u.\nWissenschaften,_ Halle, 1783; reprinted 1789, 1790.\n\n[54] Joh. Joach. Eschenburg, _Entwurf einer Theorie u. Literatur d. s.\nW.,_ Berlin, 1783; reprinted 1789.\n\n[55] Allgem. Th. d. sch. K\u00fcnste, on words Sch\u00f6n, Sch\u00f6nheit, Wahrheit,\nWerke des Geschmacks, etc.\n\n[56] Karl Heinrich Heydenreich, _System der \u00c4sthetik,_ vol. i.,\nLeipzig, 1790, esp. pp. 149-154. 367-385. 385-392.\n\n[57] _Kritische W\u00e4lder oder Betrachtungen \u00fcber die Wissenschaft und\nKunst des Sch\u00f6nen,_ Fourth Forest, 1769, in _S\u00e4mmtliche Werke,_ ed. B.\nSuphan, Berlin, 1878, vol. iv. pp. 19, 21, 27.\n\n[58] _Kritische W\u00e4lder, loc. cit._ pp. 22-27.\n\n[59] Fragment, _Von Baumgarten Denkart_; and cf. _op. cit._ pp. 132-133.\n\n[60] _\u00c6sthetica in mice,_ in _Kreuzz\u00fcge des Philologen,_ K\u00f6nigsberg,\nquoted in Herder, _Werke,_ xii. 145.\n\n[61] See above, p. 235.\n\n[62] _Kaligone,_ 1800, in _Werke, ed. cit.,_ xii. pp. 145-150.\n\n[63] _Kaligone,_ pp. 34-55.\n\n[64] _Ibid._ pp. 308-317.\n\n[65] _Kritische W\u00e4lder, loc. cit._ iv. pp. 47-127.\n\n[66] _Op. cit._ pp. 27-36.\n\n[67] _Sophron,_ 1782, \u00a7 4.\n\n[68] _Encyclop\u00e9die, ad verb._\n\n[69] _\u00c9loge de Du Marsais,_ 1756 (introd. to _\u0152uvres de Du Marsais,_\nParis, 1797, vol. i.).\n\n[70] Du Marsais, _M\u00e9thode raisonn\u00e9e,_ 1722; _Trait\u00e9 des tropes,_\n1730; _Trait\u00e9 de grammaire g\u00e9n\u00e9rale_ (in _Encyclop\u00e9die_); De Beauz\u00e9e,\n_Grammaire g\u00e9n\u00e9rale pour servir de fondement \u00e0 l'\u00e9tude de toutes les\nlangues,_ 1767; Condillac, _Grammaire fran\u00e7aise,_ 1755; J. Harris,\n_Hermes, or a Philosophical Enquiry concerning Language and Universal\nGrammar,_ 1751.\n\n[71] _Discours sur l'origine de l'in\u00e9galit\u00e9 parmi les hommes,_ 1754.\n\n[72] De Brosses, _Trait\u00e9 de la formation m\u00e9canique des langues,_ 1765;\nCourt de G\u00e9belin, _Histoire naturelle de la parole,_ 1776; Monboddo,\n_Origin and Progress of Language,_ 1774; S\u00fcssmilch, _Beweis dass der\nUrsprung der menschlichen Sprache g\u00f6ttlich sei,_ 1766; Tiedemann,\n_Ursprung der Sprache;_ Cesarotti, _Saggio sulla filosofia delle\nlingue,_ 1785 (in _Opere,_ vol. i.); D. Colao Agata, _Piano, ovvero\nricerche filosofiche sulle lingue,_ 1774; Soave, _Ricerche intorno all'\nistituzione naturale d'una societ\u00e0 e d'una lingua,_ 1774.\n\n[73] _Abhandlung \u00fcber den Ursprung der Sprache,_ in a small book _Zwei\nPreisschriften,_ etc. (2nd ed., Berlin, 1789), esp. pp. 60-65.\n\n[74] Steinthal, _Ursprung der Sprache,_ 4th ed., pp. 39-58.\n\n\n\n\nVII\n\n\nOTHER \u00c6STHETIC DOCTRINES OF THE SAME PERIOD\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Other writers of the eighteenth century: Batteux._]\n\nA great medley of heterogeneous ideas is noticeable among other writers\non \u00c6sthetic during the same period. In 1746 appeared a little volume\nby Abb\u00e9 Batteux bearing the attractive title of _The Fine Arts reduced\nto a Single Principle,_ in which the author attempted a unification\nof all the different rules laid down by the writers of treatises. All\nsuch rules (says Batteux) are branches emerging from one trunk; he who\npossesses the simple principle will be able to deduce the rules one by\none without entangling himself in their mass, which can but involve him\nin endless coils. The author had passed in review the _Ars Poetica_ of\nHorace and that of Boileau, and the works of Rollin, Dacier, le Bossu\nand d'Aubignac; but had found real help only in Aristotle's principle\nof imitation, which he thought could be easily and strikingly applied\nto poetry, painting, music and the art of gesture. But suddenly the\nAristotelian principle of imitation yields place to a wholly new\nrendering, namely the \"imitation of natural _beauty._\" The business\nof art is to \"select the most beautiful parts of nature in order to\nframe them into an exquisite whole which shall be more beautiful than\nnature's self, without ceasing to be natural.\" Now, what may this\ngreater perfection, this beautiful nature, be? On one occasion Batteux\nidentifies it with truth: but \"with the truth which may be; with\nbeauty-truth, which is represented as though it really existed with all\nthe perfections it could possibly receive,\" recalling one example from\nthe ancients in the Helen of Zeuxis, and one from the moderns in the\n_Misanthrope_ of Moli\u00e8re. In another place he explains that beautiful\nnature, _\"tum ipsius (obiecti) natur\u00e6, tum nostr\u00e6 convenit,\" i.e._ that\nit has the closest connexion with our own perfection, our advantage\nand our interest, and is, at the same time, perfect in itself. The\naim of imitation is \"to please, to move, to soften, in one word, to\ndelight\"; so beautiful nature must be interesting and furnished with\nunity, variety, symmetry and proportion. Embarrassed by the question\nof artistic imitation of things naturally ugly or objectionable,\nBatteux falls back on saying, as Castelvetro had said before him, that\ndispleasing objects please when imitated, since imitation, being always\nimperfect, in comparison with the reality, cannot excite the horror and\ndisgust aroused by the latter. From pleasure he deduces the other aim\nof utility: if the aim of poetry be to give pleasure, and \"pleasure\nby moving the passions, then in order to give a perfect and enduring\npleasure it ought to rouse such passions only as it is well to excite,\nnot those inimical to goodness.\"[1]\n\n[Sidenote: _The English: W. Hogarth._]\n\nIt is difficult to string together a more insubstantial mass of\ncontradictions. But Batteux is rivalled and outdone by the English\nphilosophers or rather scribblers on \u00c6sthetic or rather on things in\ngeneral which sometimes accidentally include \u00e6sthetic facts. Happening\nto find in Lomazzo some words attributed to Mich\u00e6l Angelo on the beauty\nof shapes, Hogarth the artist took into his head the idea that the\nfigurative arts can be regulated by a special principle which can be\nexpressed in a particular fine.[2] Filled with this discovery, in 1745\nhe designed a frontispiece for a volume of his engravings; it depicted\na painter's palette scored across with an undulating line and the words\n_The Line of Beauty._ Public curiosity was immediately aroused by this\nhieroglyphic, to be satisfied a little later by the publication of\nhis book _The Analysis of Beauty_ (1753).[3] In this he combated the\nmistake of judging pictures either by the subject or the excellence of\nthe imitation instead of by their form, which is the true essential\nof art and is composed \"of symmetry, variety, uniformity, simplicity,\nintricacy and quantity; all things which co-operate in the production\nof beauty, correcting and restraining each other as required.\"[4]\nBut immediately afterwards Hogarth proclaims that there must also be\ncorrespondence and agreement with the thing copied; for \"regularity,\nuniformity and symmetry give pleasure in so far only as they serve\nto give the illusion of faithful correspondence.\"[5] Further on, the\nreader learns that \"amongst the immense variety of undulating lines\nwhich may be conceived, there is but one which truly merits the name of\nthe Line of Beauty, and this is a precisely serpentine line which may\nbe called the Line of Grace.\"[6] Again, we are told that intricacy of\nlines is beautiful because \"the active mind likes to be engaged,\" and\nthe eye delights in being \"guided in a sort of hunt.\"[7] A straight\nline has no beauty, and the pig, the bear, the spider and the toad are\nugly because devoid of undulating lines.[8] The ancients showed much\njudgement in the management and grouping of lines, \"varying from the\nprecise line of grace only on those occasions when the character or\naction demanded.\"[9]\n\n[Sidenote: _E. Burke._]\n\nWith similar indecision Edmund Burke wavers between the principle\nof imitation and other heterogeneous or imaginary principles in his\nbook, _An Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the\nBeautiful_ (1756). He observes, \"Natural properties contained in an\nobject give pleasure or displeasure to the imagination: beyond this,\nhowever, imagination may delight in the likeness of a copy to its\noriginal\"; he asserts that from \"these two reasons\" arises the whole\npleasure of imagination.[10]\n\nWithout dwelling further on the second, he proceeds to a lengthy\ndiscussion of the natural qualities which should be found in an object\nof sensible beauty: \"Firstly, comparative smallness; secondly, smooth\nsurface; thirdly, variety in disposition of the parts; fourthly, that\nit have no angularity, all lines fusing one in another; fifthly, a\nstructure of great delicacy betraying no signs of violence; sixthly,\nvivid colouring without glare or harshness; seventhly, if it have any\nglaring colour, let it be different from the background.\" These are the\nproperties of beauty working in harmony with nature and least liable to\nsuffer from caprice and differences of taste.[11]\n\n[Sidenote: _H. Home._]\n\nThese books of Hogarth and Burke are generally described as classical;\nif so, they belong to the type of classic that fails to convince. To\na somewhat higher type belongs the _Elements of Criticism_ (1761)\nof Henry Home, Lord Kaimes, who seeks \"the true principles of the\nfine arts\" with the object of converting criticism into \"a rational\nscience,\" and to this end chooses \"the upward path of facts and\nexperiments.\" Home confines himself to feelings derived from objects\nof sight and hearing, which, in so far as unaccompanied by desires,\nare more truly described as simple feelings (emotions, not passions).\nThese occupy a middle position between mere sense-impressions and\nintellectual or moral ideas, and are therefore akin to both; and it is\nfrom these that the pleasures of beauty are derived. Beauty is divided\ninto beauty of relation and intrinsic beauty.[12] Of the latter, Home's\nonly account is that regularity, simplicity, uniformity, proportion,\norder and other pleasing qualities have been \"so disposed by the Author\nof nature in order to increase our happiness here on earth which, as\nis clearly shown in numberless instances, is not foreign to his care.\"\nThis notion is confirmed when he reflects that \"our taste for such\ndetails is not accidental, but uniform and universal, being a very\npart of our nature\"; adding that \"regularity, uniformity, order and\nsimplicity help to facilitate perception and make it possible for us\nto form clearer conception of objects than it would be possible to\ngain by the most earnest attention were such qualities not present.\"\nProportions are often combined with a view to utility, \"as we see that\nthe best proportioned amongst animals are also the strongest; but there\nare also many examples in which this conjunction does not hold good\";\nwherefore the wisest plan \"is to rest content with the final cause just\nmentioned: that of the increase of our happiness intended by the Author\nof nature.\"[13] In his _Essay on Taste_ (1758) and on _Genius_ (1774)\nAlexander G\u00e9rard employs by turns, according to the various forms of\nart, the principles of association, of direct pleasure, of expression,\nand even of moral sense: the same kind of explanation reappears in\nanother _Essay on Taste_ by Alison (1792).\n\n[Sidenote: _Eclecticism and sensationalism. E. Platner._]\n\nIt is impossible to classify works of such calibre, almost wholly\nlacking as they are in scientific method; on each page their writers\npass from physiological sensationalism to moralism; from the imitation\nof nature to mysticism and transcendent finalism without the slightest\nsense of incongruity. It would be absurd to take them seriously; in\ncomparison it is almost refreshing to come across a frank hedonist\nin the German, Ernst Plainer, who interpreted Hogarth's inquiry into\nlines after a fashion of his own and was unable to see anything in\n\u00e6sthetic facts except a reverberation of sexual pleasure. Where can we\nfind a beauty, he asks, that is not derived from the female figure,\nthe centre of all beauty? Undulating lines are beautiful because\nfound in a woman's body; beautiful are all movements distinctively\nfeminine; beautiful the tones of music melting one into another;\nbeautiful the poem where one thought embraces another with tenderness\nand facility.[14] Condillac's sensationalism had already shown\nitself wholly incapable of understanding \u00e6sthetic productivity; the\nassociationism especially promoted by the work of Hume fared no better.\n\n[Sidenote: _Fr. Hemsterhuis._]\n\nThe Dutchman Hemsterhuis considered beauty as a phenomenon born of\nthe meeting between sensibility, which gives multiplicity, and the\ninternal sense, which tends to unity; hence the beautiful is \"that\nwhich exhibits the greatest number of ideas in the shortest time.\" Man,\nto whom it is not permitted to attain ultimate unity, finds in beauty\nan approximate unity which gives him a pleasure somewhat analogous\nwith the joy of love. This theory of Hemsterhuis, in which elements of\nmysticism and sensationalism mingle with glimpses of truth, developed\nlater into the sentimentalism of Jacobi, for whom the totality of Truth\nand Goodness and even the Supersensible itself are sensibly present to\nthe soul in the form of beauty.[15]\n\n[Sidenote: _Neo-Platonism and mysticism. Winckelmann._]\n\nPlatonism or, more accurately, neo-Platonism was revived by the creator\nof the history of figurative art, Winckelmann (1764). Contemplation\nof the masterpieces of antique plastic art, and the impression of\nsuperhuman loftiness and divine indifference which they create all\nthe more irresistibly because we cannot reawaken the life they once\npossessed or understand their real significance, led Winckelmann, and\nothers with him, to the conception of a Beauty which, descending from\nthe seventh heaven of the divine Idea, embodied itself in works of this\ndescription. Baumgarten's follower Mendelssohn had denied the enjoyment\nof beauty to God: the neo-Platonist Winckelmann gave it back to him and\nlodged it in his bosom.\n\n[Sidenote: _Beauty and lack of significance._]\n\n\"Wise men who have meditated upon the causes of universal Beauty,\nseeking her amongst created things and trying to gain the contemplation\nof Supreme Beauty, have placed it in the perfect harmony of creatures\nwith their ends and of their parts with one another. But as this is\nequivalent to perfection, which man is incapable of attaining, our\nconcept of universal beauty remains indeterminate, and arises by means\nof particular cognitions which, when accurately collected and fitted\ntogether, give us the highest idea we can attain of human beauty,\nwhich we elevate in proportion as we raise it above matter. But,\nagain, since the Creator deals out perfection to all his creatures\nin the proportion that befits them, and since every concept rests\non some cause which must be sought outside the concept itself, the\ncause of Beauty which is to be found in every created thing cannot\nbe sought in anything outside these created things. For this reason,\nand because our cognitions are comparative concepts, whereas Beauty\ncannot be compared with anything higher, it is difficult to attain a\ndistinct and universal cognition of Beauty.\"[16] The only way out of\nthis difficulty and others like it is the recognition that \"supreme\nbeauty resides in God\": \"the concept of human beauty becomes the more\nperfect in proportion as it can be thought more in conformity and\nagreement with supreme Being, which is distinguished from matter by\nits own unity and indivisibility. This conception of Beauty is as a\nspirit which, freed by fire from the prison of matter, strives to\nconjure up a creature in the likeness of the first reasonable creature\nformed by the divine intelligence. The forms of such an image are\nsimple and continuous and within this unity they are varied and for\nthat very reason harmonious.\"[17] 2 To these characteristics is added\n\"lack of significance\" (_Unbezeichnung_), since supreme beauty cannot\nbe described with points or fines different from those which alone\ncan constitute that beauty; its form \"is not peculiar to this or that\ndeterminate person, neither does it express any state of feeling or\nsensation of passion, things which disturb unity and overcloud beauty.\"\nWinckelmann concludes: \"We look upon Beauty as a purest water drawn\nfrom the centre of the spring; the less taste it has the higher it is\nesteemed because free from all impurities.\"[18]\n\nTo perceive pure beauty, a special faculty is required, which certainly\nis not sense, but may perhaps be intellect or even, as Winckelmann\nsays, \"a fine internal sense\" free from all intentions or passions\nof instinct, inclination or pleasure. Having asserted beauty to be\nsomething supersensible, it is not surprising that Winckelmann should\nwish, if not wholly to exclude colour, at least to reduce it to a\nminimum, and treat it not as a constitutive element in beauty but as\nsecondary and ancillary.[19] True beauty is given in form: by which he\nmeans line and surface, forgetting that these are only apprehended by\nthe senses, and could not be seen without being in some way coloured.\n\n[Sidenote: _Winckelmann's contradictions and compromises._]\n\nWhen error refuses to retire, hermit-like, to the narrow cell of a\nbrief aphorism, it finds itself condemned to self-contradiction in\norder to live at all in the world of concrete facts and problems.\nAlthough composed with a view to stating a theory, the work of\nWinckelmann always led him among concrete historical facts clamouring\nto be brought into relation with his formally stated idea of supreme\nbeauty. In his admission of line-drawing and his further admission, on\na lower plane, of colour, we have two compromises already; to which\na third is added in his principle of Expression. \"Since human nature\nhas no state intermediate between pain and pleasure\" and as living\ncreature without such feelings is inconceivable, \"the human figure must\nbe represented in a condition of action and passion, which artists\ncall expression.\" Hence Winckelmann, after dealing with Beauty, goes\non to treat of Expression.[20] He then found himself obliged to effect\na fourth compromise between the single constant supreme beauty and\nindividual beauties; for while he preferred the male to the female body\nas a completer embodiment of perfect beauty, he could not shut his eyes\nto the obvious fact that we know and admire beautiful women's bodies\nand even beautiful animals' bodies.\n\n[Sidenote: _A. R. Mengs._]\n\nFriend and, in a sense, collaborator of Winckelmann was Raph\u00e6l Mengs\nthe artist, no less eager than his arch\u00e6ological fellow-countryman to\nunderstand the nature of that beauty which the one studied as a critic\nwhile the other produced it as a painter. Remarking, writes Mengs,\nthat of the two chief duties of a painter, the imitation of appearances\nand the selection of the most beautiful objects, much has been written\non the former, while the latter \"has scarcely been touched by the\nmodems, who would have been ignorant of the art of drawing were it\nnot for the statues of ancient Greece\";[21] pondering this, \"I read,\nasked and looked at everything likely to throw light on the subject,\nbut never was I satisfied; either they spoke of beautiful things or\nof qualities which are the attributes of beauty, or they pretended to\nexplain, as the saying is, the obscure by the more obscure, or even\nconfused the beautiful with the pleasing: so that finally I determined\nto search for the nature of beauty on my own account.\"[22] One of his\nworks on this subject was published during his lifetime by the advice\nand assistance of Winckelmann (1761); many others appeared posthumously\n(1780), all were reprinted several times and translated into several\nlanguages. In his _Dreams of Beauty_ he says, \"I have been sailing\na long time on a vast sea seeking the understanding of beauty, and\nstill I am far from any shore and in great doubt how to shape my\ncourse: gazing around, my sight is confounded by the immensity of the\nsubject.\"[23] In truth it seems as though Mengs never arrived at a\nformula satisfactory to himself, although he conformed more or less to\nWinckelmann's doctrine that \"beauty consists in material perfection\naccording to our ideas; and since God alone is perfect, beauty is\ndivine\"; it is the \"visible idea of perfection\" and stands in the same\nrelation to it as does a visible to a mathematical point. Our ideas\nproceed from the purposes which the Creator has willed to fulfil in\nvarious things; hence the multiplicity of beauties. In general, Mengs\nfinds the types of things in natural species: _e.g._ \"a stone, of\nwhich we have the idea that it should be uniform in colour\"; which\"\nis called ugly if it happen to be spotted\"; or a child \"would be\nugly if he were like a man of mature age, just as a man is ugly when\nshaped like a woman, and a woman when she is like a man.\" He adds\nsurprisingly, \"As among stones there is but one perfect species, the\ndiamond; among metals, gold; and among animated creatures, man only; so\nthere is difference and distinction in every order, and very rarely is\nthere perfection.\"[24] In his _Dreams of Beauty_ he considers beauty\nas \"a middle disposition, including perfection on the one hand and\nthe pleasing on the other\"; in reality it is a third thing, differing\nfrom perfection and the pleasing, and deserving a special name for\nitself.[25] The art of painting arises from four sources: beauty,\nsignificant or expressive character, the pleasing united to harmony,\nand colouring. Mengs finds the first amongst the ancients, the second\nin Raph\u00e6l, the third in Correggio and the fourth in Titian.[26] From\nthis empirical studio-gossip he rouses himself to exclaim, \"The force\nof beauty so transports me that I will tell thee, reader, what I\nfeel. All nature is beautiful, and so is virtue; beautiful are forms\nand proportions; beautiful are appearances and beautiful the causes\nthereof; more beautiful is reason, most beautiful of all is the great\nfirst cause.\"[27]\n\n[Sidenote: _G. E. Lessing._]\n\nAn attenuated, that is to say, a less metaphysical, echo of\nWinckelmann's theory is found in Lessing (1766), who infused a new\nspirit into the literature and social life of the Germany of his time.\nAccording to Lessing the aim of art is \"delight\"; and since delight is\na \"superfluous thing\" it seems reasonable that the legislator should\nnot allow to art that liberty which is indispensable to science in\nher search for truth, the soul's necessity. For the Greeks painting\nwas what by its nature it ought to be, \"the imitation of beautiful\nbodies.\" \"Its (Hellenic) cultivator represented nothing but the\nbeautiful: common beauty of a low grade served him as an accidental\nsubject, an exercise, a diversion. The attractiveness of his work\nmust depend simply and solely on the perfection of his subject: he\nwas far too true an artist to wish his audience to content itself\nwith the barren pleasure arising from mere resemblance or from the\ninspection of skilful workmanship: nothing in his art was dearer to\nhim, nothing seemed more noble, than the end at which it aimed.\"[28]\nPictorial representation must exclude everything unpleasing or ugly;\n\"painting as imitation may express ugliness: painting as a fine art\nwill refuse to do so: all visible objects belong to art taken under\nthe former title: the latter may claim only such objects as awaken\npleasing sensations.\" If, on the contrary, ugliness may be represented\nby the poet, the reason is this: poetic description \"conveys a less\ndispleasing sense of bodily malformation which, in the end, almost\nloses its character as such; unable to use it for itself, the poet\nuses it as a means to provoke certain mixed feelings (the ridiculous,\nthe terrible), in which we are content to remain, in the absence of\nany purely pleasant feelings.\"[29] In his _Dramaturgie_ (1767) Lessing\ntakes his stand upon the Aristotelian _Poetics_: it is well known that\nnot only did he approve of rules in general but he believed those\nlaid down by Aristotle to be as incontrovertible as the theorems of\nEuclid. His polemic against French writers and critics is waged in the\nname of probability, not to be confounded with historical accuracy.\nHe understood the universal as a sort of average of what appears in\nindividuals, and catharsis as a conversion of passions into virtuous\ndispositions, asserting it as beyond doubt that the aim of all\npoetry is to inspire a love for virtue.[30] He follows the example\nof Winckelmann in introducing the concept of ideal beauty into the\ndoctrine of figurative art: \"expression of corporeal beauty is the aim\nof painting: therefore supreme beauty of body is the supreme aim of\nart. But this supreme beauty of body is found in man only, and for\nhim it exists only through the ideal. This ideal may be found among\nthe brute creation in inferior degree; but is entirely absent from\nvegetable or inanimate nature.\" Landscape and flower painters are not\nreally artists because \"they imitate beauties possessed of no ideal:\nwhereby they work by eye and hand alone, genius having little or no\npart in their compositions.\" Nevertheless, Lessing prefers a landscape\npainter to \"the painter of historic pieces who, instead of making\nbeauty his aim, merely depicts a crowd in order to show his cunning in\nsimple expression, not in expression subordinate to beauty.\"[31] The\nideal of bodily beauty then consists \"chiefly in the ideal of form,\nbut also in that of texture of the flesh, and in that of permanent\nexpression. Mere colouring and transitory expression have no ideal\nsince nature herself has placed no indelible seal upon them.\"[32] At\nthe bottom of his heart Lessing dislikes colour; and when he finds\nthe pen-sketches of painters showing \"a life, a freedom, a brilliancy\nnever to be found in their painted pictures,\" he asks himself \"whether\nthe most marvellous colouring can compensate so heavy a loss,\" and\nwhether it is not to be wished \"that painting in oils had never been\ninvented\"?[33]\n\n[Sidenote: _Theorists of ideal beauty._]\n\nIdeal beauty, that curious alliance between God and the subtle outline\ntraced with pen or graver, that cold academical mysticism, came into\nfashion. In Italy (the home of Winckelmann and Mengs, who published\nmany of their works in Italian) it was much discussed by artists,\nantiquaries and connoisseurs. The architect Francesco Milizia professed\nhimself a follower of \"the principles of Sulzer and Mengs\";[34]\nthe Spaniard d'Azara, living in Italy, edited and annotated Mengs,\nadding his own definition of beauty: \"The union of the perfect and\nthe pleasing made visible\";[35] another Spaniard, Arteaga, one of\nthe many Jesuit refugees in Italy, wrote a treatise on _Ideal Beauty_\n(1789);[36] the Englishman Daniel Webb on coming to Rome and making\nthe acquaintance of Mengs seized upon the ideas he heard him express\non beauty, collected them and actually published them in a book\nanticipating Mengs' own.[37]\n\n[Sidenote: _G. Spalletti and the characteristic._]\n\nThe first voice of dissent from this doctrine of ideal beauty was\nraised in 1764 by a small circle of Italians who asserted the\ncharacteristic to be the principle of art. As such appears to\nbe the necessary interpretation of the little _Essay on Beauty_\nwritten by Guiseppe Spalletti in the form of a letter to Mengs,\nwith whom Spalletti had discussed the subject \"in the solitudes of\nGrottaferrata,\" and who had urged him to put all his thoughts in\nwriting.[38] Its polemical character, though not openly asserted, is\ndiscernible in every page. \"Truth in general, conscientiously rendered\nby the artist, is the object of Beauty in general. When the soul finds\nthose characteristics which wholly converge upon the matter which the\nwork of art claims to represent, it judges that work beautiful. The\nsame is true of the works of nature: if the soul perceives a man of\nfine proportions having the face of a lovely woman, which causes it to\ndoubt whether the object before it be man or woman, it esteems that man\nugly rather than the reverse, through deficiency of the characteristic\nof truth; if this can be said of natural Beauty, how much more can\nit be said of the Beauty of art.\" The pleasure given by Beauty is\nintellectual, that is to say, it is the pleasure of apprehending\ntruth: when confronted by ugly things represented characteristically,\nman \"delights in having increased his cognitions\": Beauty, \"with its\nproperty of supplying to the soul likeness, order, proportion, harmony\nand variety, provides it with an immense field for the construction\nof innumerable syllogisms, and by reasoning in this manner it will\ntake pleasure in itself, in the object which arouses such pleasure, and\nin the feeling of its own perfection.\" Finally, the beautiful may be\ndefined as \"the inherent modification of the object under observation\nwhich presents it in the inevitably characteristic manner in which it\nis bound to appear.\"[39] In contrast to the fallacious profundity of\nWinckelmann and Mengs we welcome the sound good sense of this obscure\nSpalletti, upholder of the Aristotelian position against the revived\nneo-Platonism of the \u00e6stheticians.\n\n[Sidenote: _Beauty and the characteristic: Hirt, Meyer, Goethe._]\n\nMany years went by before a similar rebellion arose in Germany; at\nlength in 1797 the art-historian Ludwig Hirt, basing his case on\nancient works of art which depicted all things, even things utterly\nvulgar and ugly, ventured to deny the view that ideal beauty is the\nprinciple of art, and that expression has only a secondary place, above\nwhich it must not rise for fear of disturbing ideal beauty. For the\nideal he substituted the characteristic, as a principle to be applied\nequally to gods, heroes or animals. Character is \"that individuality by\nwhich form, movement, signs, physiognomy and expression, local colour,\nfight, shade and chiaroscuro are distinguished and represented in the\nmanner demanded by the object.\"[40] Another historian of art, Heinrich\nMeyer, who started from the position of Winckelmann and went on by\nadopting a series of compromises, finally asserting an ideal of trees\nand landscape side by side with the ideal of man and various other\nanimals, tried to find an intermediate position between this doctrine\nand Hirt's, in the course of controversy with the latter. And Wolfgang\nvon Goethe, forgetful of his youthful days when he chanted the praises\nof Gothic architecture, returning home from an Italian tour impregnated\nwith Greece and Rome in 1798, also sought a middle term between Beauty\nand Expression; dwelling on the thought of certain characteristic\ncontents which should supply the artist with forms of beauty to be by\nhim remodelled and developed into complete beauty. The characteristic\nwas thus the mere point of departure, and beauty was simply the result\nof the artist's elaboration: \"we must start from the characteristic\"\n(says he) \"in order to attain the beautiful.\"[41]\n\n\n[1] _Les Beaux Arts r\u00e9duits \u00e0 un m\u00eame principe,_ Paris, 1746; see esp.\npart i. ch. 3; part ii. chs. 4, 5; part iii. ch. 3.\n\n[2] See above, p. 110.\n\n[3] _Analysis of Beauty,_ London, 1753 (Ital. trans., Leghorn, 1761).\n\n[4] _Op. cit._ p. 47.\n\n[5] _Op. cit._ p. 57.\n\n[6] _Op. cit._ p. 93.\n\n[7] _Op. cit._ pp. 61, 65.\n\n[8] _Analisi della bellezza,_ p. 91.\n\n[9] _Op. cit._ p. 176.\n\n[10] _Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the\nBeautiful,_ 1756 (Ital. trans., Milan, 1804); cf. the preliminary\ndiscourse on \"Taste.\"\n\n[11] _Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the\nBeautiful,_ part iii. \u00a7 18.\n\n[12] _Elements of Criticism,_ 1761, vol. i. introd. and chs. 1-3.\n\n[13] _Elements of Criticism,_ i. ch. 3, pp. 201-202.\n\n[14] _Neue Anthropologie,_ Leipzig, 1790, \u00a7 814, and the lectures on\n\u00c6sthetic published posthumously in 1836; cf. Zimmermann, _op. cit._ p.\n204.\n\n[15] Zimmermann, _op. cit._ pp. 302-309; v. Stein, _Entstehung d. n.\n\u00c4sth._ p. 113.\n\n[16] _Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums,_ 1764 (in _Werke,_ Stuttgart,\n1847, vol. i.), bk. iv. ch. 2, \u00a7 51, p. 131.\n\n[17] _Op. cit._ \u00a7 22, pp. 131-132.\n\n[18] _Op. cit._ \u00a7 23, p. 132.\n\n[19] _Geschichte,_ \u00a7 19, pp. 130-131.\n\n[20] _Op. cit._ bk. iv. ch. ii. \u00a7 24.\n\n[21] _Geschichte,_ bk. v. chs. ii. and vi.\n\n[22] Letter of January 2, 1778, _Opere,_ Rome, 1787 (reprinted Milan,\n1836), ii. pp. 315-316.\n\n[23] _Opere,_ i. p. 206.\n\n[24] _Riflessioni sulla bellezza e sul gusto della pittura,_ in\n_Opere,_ i. pp. 95, 100, 102-103.\n\n[25] _Opere,_ i. p. 197.\n\n[26] _Ibid._ p. 161.\n\n[27] _Ibid._ p. 206.\n\n[28] Laokoon, \u00a7 2.\n\n[29] Op. cit. \u00a7\u00a7 23, 24.\n\n[30] Hamburg. Dramaturgie (ed. G\u00f6ring, vols. xi. and xii.), passim,\nesp. Nos. 11, 18, 24, 78, 89.\n\n[31] _Laokoon,_ appendix, \u00a7 31.\n\n[32] _Op. cit._ \u00a7\u00a7 22, 23.\n\n[33] _Op. cit. ad fin._ p. 268.\n\n[34] _Dell' arte di vedere nelle belle arti del disegno secondo i\nprincipi di Sulzer e di Mengs,_ Venice, 1871.\n\n[35] D'Azara, in Mengs, _Opere,_ i. p. 168.\n\n[36] _Investigaciones filos\u00f3ficas sobre la belleza ideal, considerada\ncomo objeto de todas las artes de imitaci\u00f3n,_ Madrid, 1789.\n\n[37] _Ricerche su le bellezze della pittura_ (Ital. trans., Parma,\n1804); cf. D'Azara, _Vita del Mengs,_ in _Opere,_ i. p. 27.\n\n[38] _Saggio sopra la bellezza,_ dated \"Grottaferrata, July 14, 1764,\"\nand published at Rome, 1765, anonymously.\n\n[39] _Saggio,_ esp. \u00a7\u00a7 3, 12, 15, 17, 19, 34.\n\n[40] _\u00dcber das Kunstsch\u00f6ne,_ in the review _Die Horen,_ 1797; cf.\nHegel, _Vorles. ii. \u00c4sth._ i. p. 24; and Zimmermann, _Gesch. d. \u00c4sth._\npp. 356-357.\n\n[41] Goethe, _Der Sammler und die Seinigen_ (in _Werke,_ ed. Goedecke,\nvol. xxx.)\n\n\n\n\nVIII\n\n\nIMMANUEL KANT\n\n\n[Sidenote: _I. Kant._]\n\nOf all these writers, Winckelmann and Mengs, Home and Hogarth, Lessing\nand Goethe, none was a philosopher in the true sense of the word: not\neven those who like Meier laid claim to the title, nor those who had\nsome gifts for philosophy like Herder or Hamann. After Vico, the next\nEuropean mind of real speculative genius is Immanuel Kant, who now\ncomes before us in his turn.\n\n[Sidenote: _Kant and Vico._]\n\nThat Kant took up the problem of philosophy where Vico laid it down\n(not, of course, in a directly historical, but in an ideal, sense) has\nalready been noted by others.[1] How far he made an advance upon his\npredecessor and how far he failed to reach the same level it is not\nhere our business to inquire; we must confine ourselves strictly to the\nconsideration of \u00c6sthetic questions.\n\nSummarizing the results of such a consideration, we may say at once\nthat though Kant holds an immensely important place in the development\nof German thought; though the book containing his examination of\n\u00e6sthetic facts is among his most influential works; and though in\nhistories of \u00c6sthetic written from the German point of view, which\nignore practically the whole development of European thought from the\nsixteenth to the eighteenth century, Kant can pose as the man who\ndiscovered the problem of \u00c6sthetic or solved it or brought it within\nsight of solution; yet in an unprejudiced and complete history whose\naim is to take broad views and to consider not the popularity of a\nbook or the historical importance of a nation but the intrinsic value\nof ideas, the judgement passed on Kant must be very different. Like\nVico in the serious tenacity with which he reflected upon \u00e6sthetic\nfacts, more fortunate than he in having a much larger stock of material\ngathered from preceding discussion and argument, Kant was at once\nunlike and less successful than Vico in that he was unable to attain a\ndoctrine substantially true, and unable also to give his thoughts the\nnecessary system and unity.\n\n[Sidenote: _Identity of the concept of art in Kant and Baumgarten._]\n\nIn fact, what was Kant's idea of art? Strange as our reply may\nseem to those who recollect the explicit and insistent war waged\nby him against the school of Wolff, and the concept of beauty as a\nperfection confusedly perceived, we must assert that Kant's idea of\nart was fundamentally the same as that of Baumgarten and the Wolffian\nschool.[2] In that school his mind had been trained; he always had a\ngreat respect for Baumgarten whom in the _Critique of Pure Reason_ he\ncalls \"that excellent analyst\"; he chose the text of Baumgarten for\ntwo of his University lectures on Metaphysics, and that of Meier for\nhis lecture on Logic (_Vernunftlehre_). Kant, like them, therefore\nconsidered Logic and \u00c6sthetic (or theory of art) as conjoined sciences.\nThey were thus described by him in his _Scheme of Lectures_ in 1765,\nwhen he proposed, while expounding the critique of reason, to \"throw a\nglance at that of taste, that is to say, at \u00c6sthetic, since the rules\nof one apply to the other and each throws light upon the other.\"\n\n[Sidenote: _Kant's \"Lectures.\"_]\n\nIn his University lectures he distinguished \u00e6sthetic truth from logical\ntruth in the style of Meier; even citing the example of the beautiful\nrosy face of a girl which, when seen distinctly, _i.e._ through a\nmicroscope, ceases to be beautiful.[3] It is \u00e6sthetically true (said\nhe) that a man once dead cannot come to life again, although this\nis in opposition to logic and moral truth: it is \u00e6sthetically true\nthat the sun plunges into the sea, but it is false logically and\nobjectively. To what degree it is necessary to combine logical truth\nwith \u00e6sthetic the learned have never yet been able to decide; not even\nthe greatest \u00e6stheticians. In order to become accessible, logical\nconcepts must assume \u00e6sthetic forms; a garb to be abandoned only in\nthe rational sciences which seek profundity. \u00c6sthetic certainty is\nsubjective: it is content with authority, _i.e._ the citation of the\nopinions of great men. On account of our weakness, for we are strongly\nattached to the sensible, \u00e6sthetic perfection often helps us to render\nour thoughts distinct. In this, examples and images co-operate;\n\u00e6sthetic perfection is the vehicle for logical perfection; taste is\nthe analogue of intellect. There are logical truths which are not\n\u00e6sthetic truths: and on the other hand we must exclude from abstract\nphilosophy exclamations and other sentimental commotions proper to the\nother truth. Poetry is a harmonious play of thoughts and sensations.\nPoetry and eloquence differ in this: in the former, thoughts adapt\nthemselves to sensations; in the latter the contrary is the case.\nIn these lectures Kant sometimes taught that poetry is anterior to\neloquence because sensations come before thoughts; and he observed\n(perhaps under Herder's influence) that the poetry of Eastern peoples,\nlacking concepts, is wanting in unity and taste although rich in\nimaginative detail. Poetry formed out of the pure play of sensibility\nis doubtless a possibility, _e.g._ love-poems: but true poetry disdains\nsuch productions, concerned as they are with sensations which every one\nknows ought to be expelled from our breasts. True poetry must strive\nto present virtue and intellectual truth in sensible form, as has been\ndone by Pope in his _Essay on Man,_ in which he attempts to vivify\npoetry by means of reason. On other occasions Kant definitely says that\nlogical perfection is the basis of every other, \u00e6sthetic perfection\nbeing merely an adornment of the logical; something of the latter may\nbe omitted in order to appeal to the audience, but it must never be\ndisguised or falsified.[4]\n\nThis is Baumgartenism pure and simple; unless we are prepared to look\non these Lectures as representing a pre-critical period of thought,\nor an exoteric doctrine superseded eventually by Kant's own original\nesoteric ideas in his _Critique of the Judgment_ (1790). Not to open\nsuch a controversy, let us put these Lectures on one side (although\nthey often throw no little light on the signification of Kantian\nphrases and formul\u00e6), and refuse to raise the question what pages\nof the _Critique of the Judgment_ are derived from Baumgarten and\nMeier; he who reads the works of these disciples of Wolff and passes\nimmediately to the _Critique of Judgment_ often has the impression that\nthe atmosphere surrounding him is unchanged. But if the _Critique of\nJudgment_ itself be examined without prejudice it will be seen that\nKant always adhered to Baumgarten's conception of art as the sensible\nand imaginative vesture of an intellectual concept.\n\n[Sidenote: _Art in the \"Critique of Judgment.\"_]\n\nAccording to Kant, art is not pure beauty wholly detached from the\nconcept, it is adherent beauty, which presupposes and attaches\nitself to a concept.[5] This is the work of genius, the faculty of\nrepresenting \u00e6sthetic ideas. An \u00e6sthetic idea is \"a representation of\nthe imagination which accompanies a given concept: a representation\nconjoined with such truthful representation of particulars as to be\nunable to find for it any expression that may mark a determinate\nconcept, thereby endowing the given concept with something of the\nineffable; a feeling which stimulates the cognitive faculties and\nreinforcing the tongue, which is simply the letter, with the spirit.\"\nGenius, then, has two constitutive elements, imagination and intellect;\nit consists in \"that happy disposition, which no science can teach or\ndiligence attain, to find ideas for a given concept and, also, to\nselect the expression by which the subjective commotion it excites\nas accompaniment to a concept may be communicated to others.\" No\nconcept is adequate to the \u00e6sthetic idea, as no representation of the\nimagination can ever possibly be adequate to the concept. Examples\nof \u00e6sthetic attributes are found in the eagle of Jupiter with the\nthunderbolt in its claws, and the peacock of the proud Queen of\nHeaven: \"they do not, like logical attributes, represent that which\nis contained in our concepts of the sublimity or majesty of creation,\nbut something else which gives occasion to the imagination to run\nriot over a multitude of kindred representations which make us think\nmore than we can express in a given concept by means of words, and\ngive us an \u00e6sthetic idea, which serves to this rational idea instead\nof a logical representation, precisely with the aim of quickening our\nfeelings by throwing open to them a view over a vast field of kindred\nrepresentations.\" There are a _modus logicos_ and a _modus \u00e6stheticus_\nof expressing our thoughts: the first consists in following determinate\nprinciples: the other in the mere feeling of the unity of the\nrepresentation.[6] To imagination, to intellect and to spirit (_Geist_)\nwe must add taste, the link between imagination and intellect.[7] Art\nmay therefore represent natural ugliness: artistic beauty \"is not a\nbeautiful _thing_ but a beautiful representation of a thing\": although\nthe representation of ugliness has limits varying with the individual\narts (a reminiscence of Lessing and Winckelmann), and an absolute limit\nat the disgusting and nauseating, which kill representation itself.[8]\nIn natural things, too, there is adherent beauty which cannot be judged\nby the \u00e6sthetic judgement alone but demands a concept. Nature thus\nappears as a work of art, though superhuman art: \"the teleological\njudgement is the basis and condition of the \u00e6sthetic.\" When we say\n\"this is a beautiful woman,\" we merely mean that \"nature beautifully\nrepresents in the form of this woman her purpose in the construction\nof the female body\": it is necessary therefore, besides noting simple\nform, to aim at a concept, \"so that the object may be apprehended\nthrough an \u00e6sthetic judgement logically conditioned.\"[9] By this\nmeans is formed the ideal of beauty in the human face, the expression\nof moral life.[10] Kant admits that there may also be artistic\nproductions without a concept, comparable with the free beauties of\nnature, flowers and some birds (parrot, humming-bird, bird of paradise,\netc.): ornamental drawings, cornice-mouldings, musical fantasies\nwithout words, represent nothing, no object reducible to a determined\nconcept, and must be reckoned among free beauties.[11] But does not\nthis necessitate their exclusion from true and proper art, from the\noperation of genius in which fancy and intellect must both, according\nto Kant, have a place?\n\n[Sidenote: _Imagination in Kant's system._]\n\nThis is Baumgartenism transposed into a higher key, more concentrated,\nmore elaborated, more suggestive, until from moment to moment it seems\nabout to burst into a wholly different conception of art. But it is\nstill Baumgartenism, from whose intellectualistic bonds it never\nescapes. Nor was escape possible. A profound concept of imagination was\nentirely lacking to Kant's system and his philosophy of the spirit.\nGlancing over the table of faculties of the spirit which precedes\nhis _Critique of Judgment,_ we see that Kant co-ordinates with it\nthe cognitive faculty, the feeling of pleasure and pain, and the\nappetitive faculty; to the first corresponds intellect, to the second,\njudgement (teleological and \u00e6sthetic), to the third, reason;[12] he\nfinds no place for imagination amongst powers of the spirit but places\nit among the facts of sensation. He knows a reproductive imagination\nand an associative, but he knows nothing of a genuinely productive\nimagination, imagination in the proper sense.[13] We have seen that, in\nhis doctrine, genius is the co-operation of several faculties.\n\n[Sidenote: _The forms of intuition and the Transcendental \u00c6sthetic._]\n\nYet sometimes Kant had an inkling that intellectual activity is\npreceded by something which is not mere sensational material, but\nis an independent non-intellectual theoretical form. He obtained a\nglimpse of this latter form not when he was reflecting on art in the\nstrict sense but when he was examining the process of knowledge: he\ndoes not treat of it in his _Critique of Judgment,_ but in the first\nsection of his _Critique of Pure Reason,_ in the first part of the\n_Transcendental Doctrine of Elements._ He says here that sensations\nonly enter the spirit when the latter itself gives them form; a form\nnot identical with that which intellect gives to sensations, but\nmuch simpler, namely pure intuition, the totality of the _a priori_\nprinciples of sensibility. There must therefore be \"a science which\nforms the first part of the transcendental doctrine of elements,\ndistinct from that which contains the principles of pure thought and is\nnamed transcendental Logic.\" Now, what name does Kant confer upon this\nscience whose existence he has deduced? None other than Transcendental\n\u00c6sthetic (_die transcendentale \u00c4sthetik_). In a note he even insists\nthat this is the right name for the new science of which he treats, and\ncensures the Germans for their habit of applying it to the Critique of\nTaste, which, as he thought at that time, could never become a science.\nThus, he concludes, we approach more closely to the usage of the\nancients, among whom the distinction between _\u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03ac_[14]\nwas well known.\n\nNevertheless, after having so rightly postulated the necessity\nfor a science of the forms of sensation or pure intuition, purely\nintuitive knowledge, Kant went on, simply because he had no exact idea\nof the nature of the \u00e6sthetic faculty and of art, to fall into an\nintellectualistic error by reducing the form of sensibility or pure\nintuition into the two categories or functions of space and time,\nand by asserting that the spirit emerges from the chaos of sensation\nby organizing its sensations in space and time.[15] But space and\ntime as such are very far from being primitive categories; they are\nrelatively late and complex formations.[16] As examples of the matter\nof sensation Kant quoted hardness, impenetrability, colour and so\nforth. But the mind only recognizes colour and hardness in so far as it\nhas already given form to its sensations; considered as brute matter,\nsensations fall outside the cognitive spirit, they are a limit; colour,\nhardness, impenetrability and so on, when recognized, are already\nintuitions, spiritual elaborations, the \u00e6sthetic activity in its\nrudimentary manifestation. The characterizing or qualifying imagination\nwhich is \u00e6sthetic activity ought to have occupied in the _Critique of\nPure Reason_ the pages devoted to the discussion of space and time,\nand would thus have constituted a real Transcendental \u00c6sthetic, a real\nprologue to the transcendental Logic. In this manner Kant would have\nachieved the truth aimed at by Leibniz and Baumgarten and would have\njoined hands with Vico.\n\n[Sidenote: _Theory of Beauty distinguished by Kant from that of Art._]\n\nHis repeatedly announced opposition to the school of Wolff concerns not\nthe concept of art but that of Beauty; two concepts for Kant entirely\ndistinct. First of all, he did not admit that sensation could be\ncalled \"confused knowledge,\" a confused form, that is, of intellectual\ncognition; rightly judging this to be a false account of sensibility,\nsince a concept, however confused, is always a concept or a rough\nsketch of a concept, never an intuition.[17] But he further denied that\npure beauty contained a concept, and therefore denied that it was a\nperfection sensibly apprehended. These reflexions have no doubt some\nconnexion with those concerning the nature of art in the _Critique of\nJudgment;_ but the connexion is far from close, still less are they\nactually fused into a single whole. That Kant was minutely familiar\nwith eighteenth-century writers who had discussed beauty and taste is\nshown by his Lectures, wherein they are all quoted and used.[18] Of\nthese the greater part, especially the English, were sensationalists,\nothers intellectualists; some few, as we have noted, were inclined\ntowards mysticism. Kant began by tending towards sensationalism\nin \u00e6sthetic problems, then became the adversary of sensationalists\nand intellectualists alike. This development can be traced in his\n_Observations on the Beautiful and Sublime,_ as well as in his\nLectures; its final expression is reached in the _Critique of Judgment._\n\nOf the four moments, as he calls them, _i.e._ the four determinations,\nhe accords to Beauty, the two negative are directed, one against the\nsensationalists, the other against the intellectualists. \"That is\nbeautiful which pleases _without interest_\": \"That is beautiful which\npleases _without concepts_.\"[19] Here he asserts the existence of a\nspiritual region, distinct on one side from the pleasurable, the useful\nand the good, and on the other from truth. But this region, as we know\nvery well, is not that of art, which Kant attaches to the concept: it\nis the region of a special activity of feeling which he calls judgement\nor, more exactly, \u00e6sthetic judgement.\n\n[Sidenote: _Mystical features in Kant's theory of Beauty._]\n\nThe other two moments give some kind of a definition of this region:\n\"That is beautiful which has the form of finality without the\nrepresentation of an end\": \"That is beautiful which is the object of\nuniversal pleasure.\"[20] What is this mysterious sphere? What this\ndisinterested pleasure we experience in pure colours and tones, in\nflowers, and even in adherent beauty when we make abstraction from the\nconcept to which it adheres?\n\nOur answer is: there is no such sphere; it does not exist; the\nexamples given are instances either of pleasure in general or of\nfacts of artistic expression. Kant, who so emphatically criticizes\nthe sensationalists and the intellectualists, does not show the same\nseverity towards the neo-Platonic line of thought whose revival we\nremarked in the eighteenth century. Winckelmann in particular exercised\nstrong influence over his mind. In one course of his Lectures we find\nhim making a curious distinction between form and matter: in music\nmelody is matter and harmony form: in a flower the scent is material\nand the shape (_Gestalt)_ is form (_Form_).[21] This reappears\nslightly modified in the _Critique of Judgment._ \"In painting,\nstatuary and all the figurative arts in architecture and gardening,\nso far as they are fine arts, the drawing is the essential; in which\nthe foundation of taste lies not in what gratifies (_vergn\u00fcgt_) in\nsensation, but in that which pleases (_gef\u00e4llt_) by its form. The\ncolours which illuminate the drawing belong to sensuous stimulus\n(_Reiz_) and may bring the object more vividly before the senses, but\ndo not render it worthy of contemplation as a thing of beauty; they\nare, moreover, often limited by the exigencies of the beautiful form,\nand even where their sensuous stimulus is legitimate, they are ennobled\nonly by the beautiful form.\"[22] Continuing in pursuit of this phantasm\nof beauty which is not the beauty of art nor yet the pleasing, and is\nequally detached from expressiveness and pleasure, Kant loses himself\nin insoluble contradictions. Little inclined to submit himself to the\ncharm of imagination, abhorring \"poetic philosophers\" like Herder,[23]\nhe makes statements and refuses to commit himself to them, affirms\nand immediately criticizes his affirmations, and wraps up Beauty in\na mystery which, at bottom, was nothing more than his own individual\nincertitude and inability to see clearly the existence of an activity\nof feeling which, in the spirit of his sane philosophy, represented a\nlogical contradiction. \"Necessary and universal pleasure\" and \"finality\nwithout the idea of an end\" are the organized expression in words of\nthis contradiction.\n\nBy way of clearing up the contradiction he arrives at the following\nthought: \"The judgement of taste is founded on a concept (the concept\nof a general foundation of the subjective teleology of nature through\njudgement); but it is a concept by which it is impossible to know or\ndemonstrate anything of the object, because the object in itself is\nindeterminable and unsuited to cognition; on the other hand, it has\nvalidity for every one (for every one, I say, in so far as it is an\nindividual judgement, immediately accompanying intuition), since its\ndetermining reason reposes, perhaps, in the concept of that which may\nbe regarded as the supersensible substrate of mankind.\" Beauty, then,\nis a symbol of morality. \"The subjective principle alone, that is the\nindeterminate idea of the supersensible in us, can be considered the\nonly key able to unlock this faculty springing from a source we cannot\nfathom: excepting by its aid, no comprehension of it can possibly\nbe reached.\"[24] These cautious words, and all others here used by\nKant to conceal his thoughts, do not hide his tendency to mysticism.\nA mysticism without conviction or enthusiasm, almost in spite of\nhimself, but very evident nevertheless. His inadequate grasp of the\n\u00e6sthetic activity led him to see double, even triple, and caused the\nunnecessary multiplication of his explanatory principles. Although he\nwas always ignorant of the genuine nature of the \u00e6sthetic activity, he\nwas indebted to it for suggesting to him the pure categories of space\nand time as the Transcendental \u00c6sthetic; it caused him to develop the\ntheory of imaginative embellishment of intellectual concepts by the\nwork of genius; finally it forced him to acknowledge a mysterious\nfaculty of feeling, midway between theoretical and practical activity,\ncognitive and yet not cognitive, moral and indifferent to morality,\npleasing yet wholly detached from the pleasure of the senses. Great\nuse of this power was made by Kant's immediate successors in Germany\nwho were delighted to find their daring speculations supported by that\nsevere critic of experience, the philosopher of K\u00f6nigsberg.\n\n\n[1] B. Spaventa, _Prolus. ed introd. alle lezioni di filosofia,_\nNaples, 1862 pp. 83-102; _Scritti filosofici,_ ed. Gentile, pp.\n139-145, 303-307.\n\n[2] _Kritik d. rein. Vernunft_ (ed. Kirchmann), i. 1, \u00a7 1, note.\n\n[3] See above, p. 244.\n\n[4] Extract from Kant's lectures of 1764 and later, in O. Schlapp,\n_Kant's Lehre vom Genie, passim,_ esp. pp. 17, 58, 59, 79, 93, 96,\n131-134, 136-137, 222, 225, 231-232, etc.\n\n[5] _Kritik d. Urtheilskraft_ (ed. Kirchmann), \u00a7 16.\n\n[6] _Kritik d. Urth._ \u00a7 49.\n\n[7] _Op. cit._ \u00a7 50.\n\n[8] _Op. cit._ \u00a7 48.\n\n[9] _Krit. d. Urth._ \u00a7 48.\n\n[10] _Op. cit._ \u00a7 17.\n\n[11] _Op. cit._ \u00a7 16.\n\n[12] For the historical genesis of this tripartition, cf. remarks in\nSchlapp, _op. cit._ pp. 150-153.\n\n[13] See also _Anthropol._ (ed. Kirchmann), \u00a7\u00a7 26-31; cf. Schlapp, _op.\ncit._ p. 296.\n\n[14] _Kritik d. rein. Vernunft,_ i. I, \u00a7 1 and note.\n\n[15] _Op. cit._ \u00a7\u00a7 1-8.\n\n[16] See above, pp. 4-5.\n\n[17] _Krit. d. r. Vern._ \u00a7 8, and introd. to \u00a7 ii.; cf. _Krit. d.\nUrth._ \u00a7 15.\n\n[18] See catalogue in Schlapp, _op. cit._ pp. 403-404, and _passim._\n\n[19] _Krit. d. Urth._ \u00a7\u00a7 1-9.\n\n[20] _Op. cit._ \u00a7\u00a7 10-22.\n\n[21] Schlapp, _op. cit._ p. 78.\n\n[22] _Krit. d. Urth._ \u00a7 14.\n\n[23] For Kant's judgement of Herder, see Schlapp, _op. cit._ pp.\n320-327, note.\n\n[24] _Kritik d. Orth._ \u00a7\u00a7 57-59.\n\n\n\n\nIX\n\n\nTHE \u00c6STHETIC OF IDEALISM: SCHILLER, SCHELLING, SOLGER, HEGEL\n\n\n\n\n[Sidenote: _The \"Critique of Judgment\" and metaphysical idealism._]\n\nIt is well known that Schelling held the _Critique of Judgment_ to be\nthe most important of the three Kantian _Critiques,_ and that Hegel\ntogether with the great majority of the followers of metaphysical\nidealism had a special affection for the book. According to them the\nthird _Critique_ was the attempt to bridge the gulf, to resolve the\nantitheses between liberty and necessity, teleology and mechanism,\nspirit and nature: it was the correction Kant was preparing for\nhimself, the concrete vision which dispelled the last traces of his\nabstract subjectivism.\n\n[Sidenote: _F. Schiller._]\n\nThe same admiration and an opinion even more favourable were extended\nby them to Friedrich Schiller, the first to elaborate that part\nof Kant's philosophy and to study the third sphere which united\nsensibility to reason. \"It was the artistic sense dwelling in his\nalso profoundly philosophical mind,\" says Hegel, \"which, against the\nabstract infinity of Kant's thought, against his living for duty,\nagainst his conception of nature and reality, and of sense and feeling\nas utterly hostile to intellect, asserted the necessity and enunciated\nthe principle of totality and reconciliation, even before it had been\nrecognized by professed philosophers: to Schiller must be allowed the\ngreat merit of having been the first to oppose the subjectivity of\nKant, and of having dared try to go beyond it.\"[1]\n\n[Sidenote: _Relations between Schiller and Kant._]\n\nDiscussion has raged around the true relation between Schiller and\nKant, and it has lately been maintained that his \u00c6sthetic was not, as\nwould seem to be the case, derived from Kant, but from the pandynamism\nwhich, starting from Leibniz, had propagated itself in Germany through\nCreuzens, Ploucket and Reimarus down to Herder, who had conceived\na wholly animated nature.[2] There can be no doubt that Schiller\nshared Herder's conception, as may be seen from the theosophical tone\nof the fragment of correspondence between Julius and Raph\u00e6l and in\nother writings. It cannot be denied, however, that whatever personal\nfeelings Kant may have had towards Herder, or Herder towards his\nformer teacher (against whose _Critique of Judgment_ he published his\n_Kaligone,_ as he had replied to the _Critique of Pure Reason_ with his\n_Metacritica_), when Kant in a somewhat dubious manner made the first\nstep towards a reconciliation, the breach was at all events partially\nhealed. The dispute is therefore of small importance: we shall find it\nmore useful to observe that Schiller introduced an important correction\nof Kant's views when he obliterated every trace of the double theory\nof art and the beautiful, giving no weight to the distinction drawn\nbetween pure and adherent beauty, and finally abandoning the mechanical\nconception of art as consisting in beauty joined to the intellectual\nconcept. It was certainly his own experience of active artistic work\nthat led him to this simplification.\n\n[Sidenote: _The \u00e6sthetic sphere as the sphere of Play._]\n\nSchiller defined the \u00e6sthetic sphere as the sphere of play (_Spiel_);\nthe unfortunate term, suggested to him partly by some phrases of Kant,\npartly, perhaps, by an article on card-games by one Weisshuhn which he\npublished in his review _The Hours_ (_Die Horen_),[3] has given rise\nto the belief that he anticipated certain modern doctrines of artistic\nactivity as the overflow of exuberant spirits, analogous with the play\nof children and animals. Schiller did not fail to warn his readers\nagainst such a mistaken interpretation (to which, however, he lent\nhimself) when he begged them not to think of \"games in real life,\nwhich are usually concerned with wholly material things,\" nor yet of\nthe idle dreaming of the imagination left to itself.[4] The activity\nof the play of which he treated held the mean between the material\nactivity of the senses, of nature, of animal instinct or passion as\nit is called, and the formal activity of intellect and morality. The\nman who plays, _i.e._ contemplates nature \u00e6sthetically and produces\nart, sees all natural objects as animated; in such a phantasmagoria\nmere natural necessity gives place to the free determination of the\nfaculties; spirit appears as spontaneously reconciled with nature,\nform with matter. Beauty is life, the living form (_lebende Gestalt)_;\nnot life in the physiological sense, since beauty does not extend\nthroughout all physiological life, nor is it restricted to that alone:\nmarble when worked by an artist may have a living form; and a man,\nalthough possessed of life and form, need not be a living form.[5]\nWherefore art must conquer nature with form: \"in an artistic work of\ntrue beauty the content ought to be nil, the form everything: by form\nman is influenced in his entirety; by content in his separate faculties\nonly. The true secret of great artists is that they cancel matter\nthrough form (_den Stoff durch die Form vertilgt)_; the more imposing,\noverwhelming or seductive the matter is in itself, the greater its\nobstinacy in striving to emphasize its own particular effect, the more\nthe spectator inclines to lose himself immediately in the matter, so\nmuch the more triumphant is the art which brings it into subjection\nand enforces its own sovereign power. The mind of hearer or spectator\nshould remain perfectly free and calm; from the magic circle of art\nit should issue as pure and perfect as when it left the hands of the\nCreator. The most frivolous object should be treated in such a manner\nas to enable us to pass at once to the most serious matters; and the\nmost serious in such a way that we may pass from them to the lightest\ngame.\" There is a fine art of passion; a passionate fine art would be\na contradiction in terms.[6] \"So long as man in his early physical\nstate passively absorbs the world of senses and simply feels it, he is\none with it; and precisely because he merely is a world there is for\nhim as yet no world at all. Only when in his \u00e6sthetic state he places\nthe world outside himself and contemplates it, does he detach his\npersonality from the rest; then a world appears to him, since he is no\nlonger one with the world.\"[7]\n\n[Sidenote: _\u00c6sthetic education._]\n\nSchiller ascribed high educational value to art thus conceived as at\nonce sensible and rational, material and formal. Not that it teaches\nmoral precepts or excites to good actions; if it acted thus, or when\nit acted thus, it would at once cease, as we have seen, to be art.\nDetermination in whatsoever direction, to the good or the bad, to\npleasure or to duty, destroys the character of the \u00e6sthetic sphere,\nwhich is rather indeterminism. By means of art man frees himself from\nthe yoke of the senses; but before putting himself spontaneously under\nthat of reason and duty, he takes as it were a little breathing-space\nby staying in a region of indifference and serene contemplation. \"While\nhaving no claim to promote exclusively any special human faculty, the\n\u00e6sthetic condition is favourable to each and all without favouritism;\nand the reason why it favours none in particular is that it is the\nfoundation of the possibility of all alike. Every other exercise gives\nsome inclination to the soul, and therefore presupposes a special\nlimit; \u00e6sthetic activity alone is unlimited.\" This indifference, which\nif not yet pure form is not pure matter, confers its educational value\non art; it opens a way to morality, not by preaching and persuading,\nthat is to say, determining, but by making determination possible.\nSuch is the fundamental concept of his celebrated _Letters on the\n\u00c6sthetic Education of Man_ (1795), in which Schiller took his cue from\nthe conditions of his times and from the necessity of finding a middle\nway between supine acquiescence in tyranny and savage rebellion as\nexemplified by the revolution then raging in France.\n\n[Sidenote: _Vagueness and lack of precision in Schiller's \u00c6sthetic._]\n\nThe defects of Schiller's \u00e6sthetic doctrine are its lack of precision\nand its generality. Who has given a better description of certain\naspects of art, the catharsis produced by artistic activity, the\nserenity and calm resulting from the domination over natural\nimpressions? Equally just is his remark that art, although wholly\nindependent of morality, is in some way connected with it. But what\nprecisely this connexion may be, or what the exact nature of \u00e6sthetic\nactivity, Schiller does not succeed in explaining. Conceiving the\nmoral and intellectual as the only formal activities (_Formtrieb)_ and\ndenying as a convinced anti-sensationalist in opposition to Burke and\nphilosophers of his type that art can belong to the passionate and\nsensuous nature (_Stofftrieb_), he cut himself off from the means of\nrecognizing the general category to which artistic activity belongs.\nHis own concept of the formal is too narrow: too narrow, also, his\nconcept of the cognitive activity, in which he is able to see the\nlogical or intellectual form, but not that of the imagination. What\nfor him was this art he describes as an activity neither formal nor\nmaterial, neither cognitive nor moral? Was it for him, as for Kant,\nan activity of feeling, a play of several faculties at once? It would\nseem so, since Schiller distinguishes four points of view or relations\nof man with things: the physical, in which these affect our senses:\nthe logical, in which they excite knowledge: the moral, in which they\nappear to us as an object of rational volition: and the \u00e6sthetic\n\"in which they refer to our powers in entirety without becoming the\ndeterminate object of any one faculty.\" For example, a man is pleased\n\u00e6sthetically when his feeling depends in no way on the pleasure of\nthe senses and when he is not conscious of thinking about any law or\nend.[8] We look in vain for any more conclusive reply.\n\nIt must not be overlooked that Schiller delivered a course of lectures\non \u00c6sthetic in Jena University in 1792, and that his writings on the\nsubject intended for reviews were couched in a popular style: no\nless popular, in his own opinion, was the style of the book quoted\nabove, which grew out of a series of letters actually sent to his\npatron the Duke of Holstein-Augustenburg. But the great work to be\nentitled _Rallias,_ which he intended writing upon \u00c6sthetic, was never\ncompleted; the only fragments which have reached us are contained in\nthe correspondence with K\u00f6rner (1793-1794). From the discussions between\nthe two friends we gather that K\u00f6rner was not satisfied with Schiller's\nformula and desired something objective, something more precise, a\npositive characteristic of the beautiful: and one day Schiller told him\nthat he had definitely discovered such a characteristic. But what it\nwas that he had discovered we do not know; no mention of it occurs in\nany further document, and we are left in doubt as to whether we have\nlost an integral part of his thought or merely the momentary illusion\nof a discovery.\n\n[Sidenote: _Schiller's caution and the rashness of the Romanticists._]\n\nThe uncertainty and vagueness of Schiller's theory seem almost a merit\nin contrast with that which followed. He had constituted himself\nguardian of the teaching of Kant and refused to abandon the realm of\ncriticism; faithful disciple of his master, he conceived the third\nsphere not as real but as an ideal, a concept not constitutive but\nregulative, an imperative. \"From transcendental motives, reason here\ndemands that communion be established between formal and material\nactivity; that is to say, there must be an activity of play, since the\nconcept of humanity can be complete only by the union of reality with\nform, the accidental with the necessary, passivity with liberty. This\ndemand must be made because reason, in conformity with her essence,\naims at perfection and at sweeping away all obstacles; and every\nexclusive operation of one or other activity leaves humanity incomplete\nand confined within limits.\"[9] Schiller's thought, as it appears in\nhis correspondence with K\u00f6rner, has been well represented as follows:\"\nThe union of sensibility with liberty in the Beautiful, which does\nnot actually take place but is supposed to do so, suggests to man\nan intuition of the union of these elements within himself: a union\nwhich does not take place actually but ought to do so.\"[10] The times\nwhich followed had no such nice scruples. Kant had given new vigour\nto the production of works on \u00e6sthetic, and, as in the days following\nBaumgarten, every new year saw a number of new treatises. It was the\nfashion. \"Nothing swarms like \u00e6stheticians\" (wrote Jean Paul Richter\nin 1804 when preparing his own book on the subject for publication):\n\"it is rare for a youth who has paid his fees for a course of lectures\non \u00c6sthetic not to produce a book on some point of the science in the\nhope that the public may refund him his expenses by buying his book:\nsome there are indeed who pay their professor's fees out of their\nauthor's royalties.\"[11] It was hoped, not unreasonably, that the\nexploration of the obscure region of \u00e6sthetic might throw some light\non metaphysics, and the procedure of artists seemed to offer a good\nexample to philosophers seeking to create a world for themselves:\nso philosophy modelled itself upon art and, as though to render the\ntransition easier, the concept of art was brought as close as possible\nto that of philosophy. Romanticism, gaining vogue daily, was a renewal\nor continuation of that \"age of genius\" in which the youth of Goethe\nand Schiller had been passed; and as the period of _Sturm und Drang_\nhad zealously worshipped the genius who breaks all rules and oversteps\nall limitations, so did Romanticism hail the domination of a faculty\ncalled Fancy, or more frequently Imagination, to which were attributed\nthe most diverse characteristics and the most miraculous effects.\n\n[Sidenote: _Ideas on Art: J. P. Richter._]\n\nThe Romantic theorists, artists themselves for the most part, abounded\nin truthful and subtle observations concerning artistic procedure. Jean\nPaul Richter makes many excellent remarks about productive imagination,\nwhich he distinguishes clearly from the reproductive and asserts to be\nshared by all men as soon as they are able to say \"This is beautiful\";\nfor \"how could a genius be acclaimed or even tolerated for a single\nmonth, not to mention thousands of centuries, by the common herd, if\nhe had not a strong connecting-link of relationship with the herd?\" He\nalso describes how imagination is variously divided among individuals:\nas simple talent, as passive or feminine genius, and in the highest\ndegree as the active or masculine genius, formed by reflexion and\ninstinct, in which \"all faculties flourish simultaneously and fancy\nis no isolated flower, but the goddess Flora herself who, in order\nto produce new combinations, crosses with each other those blossoms\nwhose conjunction is fertile, and is, so to speak, a faculty full of\nfaculties.\"[12] This latter sentence betrays a tendency on Richter's\npart to exaggerate the functions of imagination and to construct upon\nit a kind of mythology.\n\n[Sidenote: _Romantic \u00c6sthetic and idealistic \u00c6sthetic._]\n\nContemporary systems of philosophy are partly impregnated with, and\npartly the source of, such mythologies: the Romantic conception of\nart may be said to have found its most complete expression in German\nidealism, where this attained its most coherent and systematic form.\n\n[Sidenote: _J. G. Fichte._]\n\nIt did not attain this form with Fichte, the first great pupil of Kant;\nfor though Fichte regarded imagination as the activity which creates\nthe universe, effects the synthesis of the ego and the non-ego, posits\nthe object and therefore precedes consciousness, he does not connect it\nwith art.[13] In his \u00e6sthetic notions Fichte is influenced by Schiller,\nwith the addition of a moralism imposed upon him by the general\ncharacter of his system; hence the ethical sphere, midway between the\ncognitive and the \u00e6sthetic, becomes from his point of view a mere\nappurtenance of morality, as being the representation of, and hence\nreverence for, the moral ideal.[14] His subjective idealism eventually\nproduced an \u00e6sthetic doctrine through the work of Friedrich Schlegel\nand Ludwig Tieck; the doctrine of Irony as the basis of art.\n\n[Sidenote: _Irony: Schlegel, Tieck, Novalis._]\n\nThe ego which created the universe can also destroy it; the universe is\nan empty appearance at which the only true reality, the ego, can smile,\nholding itself aloof, like an artist or a creative god, from creatures\nof its own which it does not take seriously.[15] Friedrich Schlegel\ndescribed art as a perpetual parody of itself and a \"transcendental\nfarce.\" Tieck defined irony as \"a power which allows the poet to\ndominate the matter which he handles.\" Another Romantic Fichtian,\nNovalis, dreamed of a magical idealism, an art of creation by the\ninstantaneous act of the ego and of realizing our dreams.\n\n[Sidenote: _F. Schelling._]\n\nBut it is only to the _System of Transcendental Idealism_ (1800) of\nSchelling, to his _Bruno_ (1802), to his celebrated course of lectures\non the _Philosophy of Art_ given at Jena in 1802-1803 (repeated at\nW\u00fcrzburg, and distributed subsequently in manuscript notes all over\nGermany), to the no less celebrated lecture on the _Relation between\nthe Figurative Arts and Nature_ (1807), as well as to other works\nof this eloquent and enthusiastic philosopher that we owe the first\ngreat philosophical affirmation of Romanticism, and of a renewed and\nconscious neo-Platonism in \u00c6sthetic.\n\n[Sidenote: _Beauty and character._]\n\nLike all the other idealistic philosophers, Schelling held firmly to\nthe fusion of the theories of art and the beautiful already effected\nby Schiller. From this point of view it is interesting to note his\nexplanation of the condemnation of art by Plato: this condemnation,\nsays Schelling, was directed against the art of his time, the natural\nand realistic art of antiquity in general, with its character of\nfinitude: Plato could not have uttered such a condemnation (as we\nmoderns are unable to utter it) if he had known Christian art, whose\ncharacteristic is infinity.[16] The pure abstract beauty of Winckelmann\nis not enough; no less inadequate, false and negative is that concept\nof the characteristic which would try to make art something dead, hard\nand ugly by imposing upon it the limitations of the individual. Art is\nbeauty and characteristic in one; characteristic beauty, character from\nwhich beauty is evolved, according to Goethe's saying; it is therefore\nnot the individual but the living concept of the individual. When the\nartist's eye recognizes the creative idea of the individual and draws\nit forth, he transforms the individual into a world in itself, into a\nspecies (_Gattung_), an eternal idea (_Urbild_), and fears no more the\nlimitation or hardness which is the condition of life: characteristic\nbeauty is that plenitude of form which kills form; it does not inflame\npassion, it regulates it, like the banks of a river which are filled\nbut not overflowed by the waters.[17] In all of this we feel the\ninfluence of Schiller, with something added which Schiller could never\nhave expressed.\n\n[Sidenote: _Art and Philosophy._]\n\nIndeed, whilst gratefully acknowledging the excellent contributions to\nthe theory of art made by the writers who succeeded Kant, Schelling\nlaments that in none of them can he find exact scientific method\n(_Wissenschaftlichkeit_),[18] The true point of departure in his\ntheory is in the philosophy of nature, _i.e._ in that criticism of\nthe teleological judgement which Kant places directly after that of\nthe \u00e6sthetic judgement in his third _Critique._ Teleology is the\nunion of theoretical and practical philosophy; but the system would\nbe incomplete but for the possibility of demonstrating in the subject\nitself, in the ego, the identity of the two worlds, theoretical and\npractical; an activity which has, and at the same time has not,\nconsciousness; unconscious as nature, conscious as spirit. This\nactivity is precisely the \u00e6sthetic activity: \"the general organ of\nphilosophy, keystone of the whole edifice.\"[19] There are but two ways\nopen to one who is desirous of escaping from common realities: poetry,\nwhich transports into the ideal world; and philosophy which annihilates\nthe real world.[20] Strictly speaking, \"there is but one sole absolute\nwork of art; it may exist in various exemplars, but in itself it is\none, although it may not yet possess existence in its original form.\"\nTrue art is not the impression of one moment, but the representation\nof infinite life;[21] it is transcendental intuition become objective,\nand is therefore not only the organ but the document of philosophy.\nA time will come when philosophy will return to poetry, from which\nshe has detached herself; and from the new philosophy a new mythology\nwill arise.[22] The Absolute is thus the object of art as well as of\nphilosophy (as Schelling insists elsewhere in greater detail): the\nfirst represents it in idea (_Urbild_), the second in its reflexion\n(_Gegenbild)_: \"philosophy portrays ideas, not realities: so is it with\nart: those same ideas of which real things, as philosophy demonstrates,\nare imperfect copies, themselves appear in the objective arts as\nideas, _i.e._ in all their perfection, and represent the intellectual\nworld in the world of reflexion.\"[23] Music is the \"very ideal rhythm\nof Nature and the Universe, which by means of this art makes itself\nfelt in the derivative world\"; perfect creations of statuary are \"the\nvery ideas of organic nature represented objectively\"; the Homeric\nepic, \"the very identity constituting the foundation of history in the\nAbsolute.\"[24] But while philosophy gives an immediate representation\nof the Divine, of absolute Identity, art can but give the immediate\nrepresentation of Indifference; and \"since the degree of perfection\nor reality in a thing becomes higher in proportion as it approaches\nnearer to the absolute Idea and the fulness of infinite affirmation\nand in proportion as it comprehends within itself other powers, it is\nclear that art, above everything else, is in closest relation with\nphilosophy, from which it is distinguished merely by the character\nof its specification: in everything else it may be considered as the\nhighest power in the ideal world.\"[25] To the three powers of the real\nand ideal world correspond in a rising scale the three ideas of Truth,\nGoodness and Beauty. Beauty is neither the mere universal (truth),\nnor mere reality (action), but the perfect interpenetration of both:\n\"beauty exists when the particular (the real) is so adequate to its\nconcept that the latter, as infinite, enters the finite and presents\nitself to our contemplation in concrete form. With the appearance of\nthe concept, the real becomes truly similar and equal to the idea,\nwherein the universal and the particular find their absolute identity.\nWithout ceasing to be rational, the rational becomes at the same time\napparent and sensible.\"[26] But as above the three powers is poised\nGod, their point of union, so Philosophy stands supreme over the three\nideas; concerning itself not with truth or morality or even beauty\nalone, but with that which belongs to all the three in common, deduced\nfrom one common source. If philosophy assumes the character of science\nand truth, while yet remaining superior to truth, this is made possible\nby the fact that science and truth are its formal determination;\n\"philosophy is science in the sense that truth, goodness and beauty,\n_i.e._ science, virtue and art, interpenetrate each other; therefore\nit is also not science but is that which is common to science, virtue\nand art.\" This interpenetration distinguishes philosophy from all other\nsciences; for instance, if mathematics can dispense with morality and\nbeauty, philosophy cannot do so.[27]\n\n[Sidenote: _Ideas and the gods. Art and mythology._]\n\nIn Beauty are contained truth and goodness, necessity and liberty. When\nbeauty appears to be in conflict with truth, the truth in question\nis a finite truth with which beauty ought not to agree, because, as\nwe have seen, the art of naturalism and of the merely characteristic\nis a false art.[28] The individual forms of art, being in themselves\nrepresentatives of the infinite and the universe, are called Ideas.[29]\nConsidered from the point of view of reality, Ideas are gods; their\nessence, their \"in-itself,\" is in fact equivalent to God; every idea\nis an idea so far as it is God in a particular form; every idea,\ntherefore, is equal to God, but to a particular god. Characteristic of\nall the gods is pure limitation and indivisible absoluteness: Minerva\nis the idea of wisdom united with strength, but she is lacking in\nwomanly tenderness; Juno is power without wisdom and without the sweet\nattraction of love, for which she is forced to borrow the cestus of\nVenus; Venus again has not the weighty wisdom of Minerva. What would\nbecome of these ideas if deprived of their limitations? They would\ncease to be objects of Imagination.[30] Imagination is a faculty which\nhas no connexion with pure intellect or with reason (_Vernunft_) and is\ndistinct from fancy (_Einbildungskraft_) which collects and arranges\nthe products of art, whereas imagination intuits them, forms them out\nof itself, represents them. Imagination is to fancy as intellectual\nintuition is to reason: it is therefore the intellectual intuition of\nart.[31] \"Reason\" no longer suffices in a philosophy such as this:\nintellectual intuition, which for Kant was a limiting concept, is now\nasserted as really existing: intellect sinks to a subordinate place:\neven the genuine imagination which operates in art is overshadowed\nby this new-fangled Imagination, twin with intellectual Intuition,\nwho sometimes changes places with this sister of hers. Mythology\nis proclaimed a necessary condition of all art: mythology which is\nnot allegory, for in the latter the particular signifies only the\nuniversal, while the former is already itself the universal; which\nexplains how easy it is to allegorize, and how fascinating are such\npoems as those of Homer which lend themselves to such interpretations.\nChristian, as well as Hellenic, art has its mythology: Christ; the\npersons of the Trinity; the Virgin mother of God.[32] The fine between\nmythology and art is as shadowy as that between art and philosophy.\n\n[Sidenote: _K. W. Solger._]\n\nThe year 1815 saw the publication of Solger's principal work, _Erwin,_\na long philosophical dialogue on the beautiful; subsequently in\n1819 he gave a course of lectures on \u00c6sthetic which were published\nposthumously. He was one of those who found but a glimpse of truth\nin Kant and held the post-Kantians in very slight estimation,\nparticularly Fichte; in Schelling, who begins from the original unity\nof the subjective and the objective, he detects for the first time a\nspeculative principle not adequately developed, since Schelling had\nnever triumphed dialectically over the difficulties of intellectual\nintuition.[33]\n\n[Sidenote: _Fancy and Imagination._]\n\nSolger was one of those who conceived of Imagination as totally\ndistinct from Fancy: fancy (says he) belongs to common cognition\nand is none other than \"the human consciousness, in so far as it\ncontinues, in temporal succession, infinitely reasserting an original\nintuition\"; it presupposes the distinctions between common cognition,\nabstraction and judgement, concept and representation, amongst which\n\"it acts as mediator by giving to the general concept the form of\nindividual representation; and to the latter the form of a general\nconcept; in this manner it has its being among the antitheses of the\nordinary understanding.\" Imagination is totally different; proceeding\n\"from the original unity of the antitheses in the Idea, it acts so\nthat the elements in opposition, separated as they are from the idea,\nfind themselves united in the reality; by its means we are capable\nof apprehending objects higher than those of common cognition and of\nrecognizing in them the idea itself as real: also, in art, it is the\nfaculty of transforming the idea into reality.\" It presents itself\nin three modes or degrees: as Imagination of the Imagination, which\nconceives the whole as idea, and activity as nothing more than the\ndevelopment of the idea in reality; as Sensibility of the Imagination,\nin so far as it expresses the life of the idea in the real and reduces\nthe one to the other; lastly (and here we have the highest grade of\nartistic activity, corresponding with Dialectic in philosophy) as\nIntellect of the Imagination or artistic Dialectic, conceiving idea and\nreality in such a way that one passes over into the other, that is to\nsay, into reality. Other divisions and subdivisions are made on which\nit is not necessary to dwell. Imagination is said to produce the Irony\nessential to true art: this is the Irony of Tieck and Novalis, of whom\nSolger is in a sense a follower.[34]\n\n[Sidenote: _Art, practice and religion._]\n\nSolger joins Schelling in placing beauty in the region of the Idea,\ninaccessible to common consciousness. It is distinct from the idea\nof Truth, because instead of dissolving the appearances of common\nconsciousness after the manner of truth, art accomplishes the\nmiracle of making appearance dissolve itself while still remaining\nappearance; artistic thought, therefore, is practical, not theoretical.\nFurthermore, it is distinct from the idea of Goodness, with which\nat first sight it would seem to be closely related, because in the\ncase of Goodness the union of ideal with real, of the simple with the\nmultiple, of the infinite with the finite, is not real and complete,\nbut remains ideal, a mere ought-to-be. It is related more closely\nto Religion, which thinks the Idea as the abyss of life where our\nindividual conscience must lose itself in order to become \"essential\"\n(_wesentlich_), while in beauty and art the Idea manifests itself by\ngathering into itself the world of distinctions between universal\nand particular and placing itself in their place. Artistic activity\nis more than theoretical, it is of a practical nature, but realized\nand perfected; art, therefore, belongs not to theoretical philosophy\n(as Kant thought, according to Solger), but to practical. Necessarily\nattached on one side to infinity, it cannot have common nature as its\nobject; for example, art is absent from a portrait, and the ancients\nshowed their discrimination in selecting gods and heroes for objects\nin sculpture since every deity--even in limited and particular\nform--always signifies a determinate modification of the Idea.[35]\n\n[Sidenote:_ G. W. F. Hegel_.]\n\nThe same concept of art appears in the philosophy of Hegel, whatever\nmay be the minor differences which he felt to separate himself from his\npredecessors. Little concerned as we are with the shades and varieties\nof mystical \u00c6sthetic exhibited by each of these thinkers, we are\nchiefly concerned to lay bare the substantial underlying identity,\nthe mysticism of arbitrarism which gives them their historic place in\n\u00c6sthetic.\n\n[Sidenote: _Art in the sphere of absolute spirit._]\n\nOpening the _Phenomenology_ and the _Philosophy of Spirit,_ one need\nnot expect to find any discussion of art in the analysis of the forms\nof the theoretical Spirit, among definitions of sensibility and\nintuition, language and symbolism, and various grades of imagination\nand thought. Hegel places Art in the sphere of absolute Spirit,\ntogether with Religion and Philosophy,[36] and in this he regards\nKant, Schiller, Schelling and Solger as his precursors, for like them\nhe strongly denies that art has the function of representing the\nabstract concept, but not that it represents the concrete concept\nor Idea. Hegel's whole philosophy consists in the affirmation of a\nconcrete concept, unknown to ordinary or scientific thought. \"Indeed,\"\nsays he, \"no concept has in our day been more mishandled than the\nconcept in itself and for itself; for by concept is generally meant\nthe abstract determinateness or one-sidedness of representation and\nintellectualistic thought, with which it is naturally impossible to\nthink either the entirety of truth or concrete beauty.\"[37] To the\nrealm of the concrete concept belongs art, as one of the three forms\nwherein the freedom of the spirit is achieved; it is the first form,\nnamely that of immediate, sensible, objective knowledge (the second is\nreligion, a representative consciousness _plus_ worship, an element\nextraneous to mere art: the third is philosophy, free thought of the\nabsolute spirit).[38]\n\n[Sidenote: _Beauty as sensible appearance of the Idea._]\n\nBeauty and truth are at the same time one yet distinct. \"Truth is\nIdea as Idea, according to its being-in-itself and its universal\nprinciple, and so far as it is thought as such. There is no sensible\nor material existence in Truth; thought contemplates therein nothing\nbut universal idea. But the Idea must also realize itself externally\nand attain an actual and determinate existence. Truth also as such\nhas existence; but when in its determinate external existence it is\nimmediately for consciousness, and the concept remains immediately one\nwith the external appearance, the Idea is not only true but beautiful.\nIn this way Beauty may be defined as the sensible appearance of the\nIdea.\"[39] The Idea is the content of art: its sensible and imaginative\nconfiguration; its form: two elements which must interpenetrate and\nform a whole, hence the necessity that a content destined to become\na work of art should show itself capable of such transformation;\notherwise we have but an imperfect union of poetic form with prosaic\nand incongruous content.[40] An ideal content must gleam through the\nsensible form; the form is spiritualized by this ideal light;[41]\nartistic imagination does not work in the same way as the passive\nor receptive fancy, it does not stop at the appearances of sensible\nreality but searches for the internal truth and rationality of the\nreal. \"The rationality of the object selected by him should not be\nalone in awakening the consciousness of the artist: he should have\nwell meditated upon the essential and the true in all their extension\nand profundity, for without reflexion a man cannot become conscious\nof that which is within himself, and all great works of art show\nthat their material has been thought again and again from every\nside. No successful work of art can issue from light and careless\nimagination.\"[42] It is a delusion to fancy that poet and painter need\nnothing beyond intuitions: \"a true poet must reflect and meditate\nbefore and during the execution of his poem.\"[43] But it is always\nunderstood that the thought of the poet does not take the form of\nabstraction.\n\n[Sidenote: _\u00c6sthetic in metaphysical idealism and Baumgartenism._]\n\nSome critics[44] affirm that the \u00e6sthetic movement from Schelling to\nHegel is a revived Baumgartenism on the ground that this movement\nregarded art as a mediator of philosophical concepts; they mention\nthe fact that a follower of Schelling, one Ast, was moved by the trend\nof his system to substitute didactic poetry for drama as the highest\nform of art.[45] Putting aside some isolated and accidental deviations,\nthere is no truth in this affirmation: these philosophers are hostile\nto intellectualistic and moralistic views, frequently entering upon\ndefinite and explicit polemic against them. Schelling wrote: \"\u00c6sthetic\nproduction is in its origin an absolutely free production.... This\nindependence on any extraneous purpose constitutes the sanctity and\npurity of art, enabling it to repel all connexion with mere pleasure, a\nconnexion which is a mark of barbarism, or with utility, which cannot\nbe demanded of art save at times when the loftiest form of the human\nspirit is found in utilitarian discoveries. The same reasons forbid an\nalliance with morality and hold even science at arm's length, although\nnearest by reason of her disinterestedness; having her aim, however,\noutside herself, she must restrict herself definitely to serve as means\nto something higher than herself: the arts.\"[46] Hegel says, \"Art\ncontains no universal as such.\" \"If the aim of instruction is treated\nas an aim, so that the nature of the content represented appears for\nitself directly, as an abstract proposition, prosaic reflexion, or\ngeneral theory, and is not merely contained indirectly and implicitly\nin the concrete artistic form, the result of such a separation is to\nreduce the sensible and imaginative form, the true constituent of a\nwork of art, to an idle ornament, a covering (_H\u00fclle)_ presented simply\nas a covering, an appearance maintained as mere appearance. The very\nnature of the work of art is thus completely altered, for a work of art\nmust not present to intuition a content in its universality, but this\nuniversal individualized and converted into a sensible individual.\"[47]\nIt is a bad sign, he adds, when an artist sets himself about his work\nfrom a motive of abstract ideas instead of that of the fulness of\nlife (_\u00dcberf\u00fclle des Lebens_).[48] The aim of art lies in itself, in\npresentation of truth in a sensible form; any other aim is altogether\nextraneous.[49] It would not be hard to prove, certainly, that by\nseparating art from pure representation and imagination and making it\nin some sense the vehicle of the concept, the universal, the infinite,\nthese philosophers were facing in the direction of the road opened by\nBaumgarten. But to prove this would mean accepting as a presupposition\nthe dilemma that if art be not pure imagination, it must be sensuous\nand subordinate to reason; and it is just this presupposition and\ndilemma that the metaphysical idealists denied. The road they tried to\nfollow was to conceive a faculty which should be neither imagination\nnor intellect but should partake of both; an intellectual intuition or\nintuitive intellect, a mental imagination after the fashion of Plotinus.\n\n[Sidenote: _Mortality and decay of art in Hegel's system._]\n\nIn a greater degree than any of his predecessors Hegel emphasized the\ncognitive character of art. But this very merit brought him into a\ndifficulty more easily avoided by the rest. Art being placed in the\nsphere of absolute Spirit, in company with Religion and Philosophy,\nhow will she be able to hold her own in such powerful and aggressive\ncompany, especially in that of Philosophy, which in the Hegelian\nsystem stands at the summit of all spiritual evolution? If Art and\nReligion fulfilled functions other than the knowledge of the Absolute,\nthey would be inferior levels of the Spirit, but yet necessary and\nindispensable. But if they have in view the same end as Philosophy\nand are allowed to compete with it, what value can they retain? None\nwhatever; or, at the very most, they may have that sort of value which\nattaches to transitory historical phases in the life of humanity. The\nprinciples of Hegel's system are at bottom rationalistic and hostile to\nreligion, and hostile no less to art. A strange and painful consequence\nfor a man like Hegel, endowed with a warmly \u00e6sthetic spirit and a\nfervid lover of the arts; almost a repetition of the hard fate endured\nby Plato. But as the Greek philosopher, in obedience to the presumed\ncommand of religion, did not hesitate to condemn the mimetic art and\nthe Homeric poetry he loved, so the German refused to evade the logical\nexigencies of his system and proclaimed the mortality, nay, the very\ndeath, of art. \"We have assigned,\" he says, \"a very high place to\nart: but it must be recollected that neither in content nor in form\ncan art be considered the most perfect means of bringing before the\nconsciousness of the mind its true interests. Precisely by reason of\nits form, art is limited to a particular content. Only a definite\ncircle or grade of truth can be made visible in a work of art; that\nis to say, such truth as may be transfused into the sensible and\nadequately presented in that form, as were the Greek gods. But there\nis a deeper conception of truth, by which it is not so intimately\nallied to the sensible as to permit of its being received or expressed\nsuitably in material fashion. To this class belongs the Christian\nconception of truth; and, furthermore, the spirit of our modern world,\nmore especially that of our religion and our mental evolution, seems to\nhave passed the point at which art is the best road to the apprehension\nof the Absolute. The peculiar character of artistic production no\nlonger satisfies our highest aspirations.... Thought and reflexion\nhave superseded fine art.\" Many reasons have been adduced in order to\naccount for the moribund condition of modern art; in especial, the\nprevalence of material and political interests; the true reason, says\nHegel, consists of the inferiority in grade of art in comparison with\npure thought. \"Art in its highest form is and for us must remain a\nthing of the past\"; and just because the thing has vanished, one can\nreason about it philosophically.[50] The \u00c6sthetic of Hegel is thus a\nfuneral oration: he passes in review the successive forms of art, shows\nthe progressive steps of internal consumption and lays the whole in\nits grave, leaving Philosophy to write its epitaph.\n\nRomanticism and metaphysical idealism had elevated art to such a\nfantastic height among the clouds that at last they were obliged to\nadmit that it was so far away as to be absolutely useless.\n\n\n[1] _Vorles. \u00fcber die \u00c4sthetik_ (2nd ed., Berlin, 1842), vol. i. p. 78.\n\n[2] Sommer, _Gesch. d. Psych. u. \u00c4sth._ pp. 365-432.\n\n[3] Danzel, _Ges. Aufs._ p. 242.\n\n[4] _Briefe \u00fc. d. \u00c4sth. Erzieh._ (in Werke, ed. Goedecke), Letters 15,\n27.\n\n[5] _Op. cit._ Letter 15.\n\n[6] _Briefe_, Letter 22.\n\n[7] _Op. cit._ Letter 25.\n\n[8] _Briefe_, Letter 20.\n\n[9] _Briefe,_ Letter 15.\n\n[10] Danzel, _Ges. Aufs._ p. 241.\n\n[11] _Vorschule der \u00c4sth.,_ 1804 (French trans., _Po\u00e9tique ou\nintroduction \u00e0 l'Esth.,_ Paris, 1862), preface.\n\n[12] _Vorschule d. \u00c4sth._ chs. 2, 3.\n\n[13] _Grundl. der Wissenschaftslehre,_ in _Werke_ (Berlin, 1845), vol.\ni. pp. 214-217.\n\n[14] Danzel, _Ges. Aufs._ pp. 25-30; Zimmermann, _G. d. A._ pp. 522-572.\n\n[15] Hegel, _Vorles. \u00fcb. d. \u00c4sth._ introd. vol. i. pp. 82-88.\n\n[16] _Vorles. \u00fcb. d. Methode d. akadem. Stud._ (1803), lecture 14; in\n_Werke_ (Stuttgart, 1856-1861), vol. v, pp. 346-347.\n\n[17] _\u00dcb. d. Verh\u00e4ltniss d. bild. K\u00fcnste, z. d. Natur_ in _Werke,_ vol.\nvii. pp. 299-310.\n\n[18] _Philos, d. Kunst,_ posthumous, introd. in _Werke,_ v. p. 362.\n\n[19] _System d. transcend. Idealismus,_ in _Werke,_ \u00a7 i. vol. iii.\nintrod. \u00a7 3, p. 349.\n\n[20] _Op. cit._ \u00a7 4, p. 351.\n\n[21] _System d. transcend. Idealismus,_ in _Werke,_ part vi. \u00a7 3, p.\n627.\n\n[22] _Op. cit._ \u00a7 3, pp. 627-629.\n\n[23] _Phil. d. Kunst,_ pp. 368-369.\n\n[24] _Op. cit._ p. 369.\n\n[25] _Op. cit._ General Part, p. 381.\n\n[26] _Phil. d. Kunst,_ p. 382.\n\n[27] _Op. cit._ p. 383.\n\n[28] _Op. cit._ p. 385.\n\n[29] _Op. cit._ pp. 389-390.\n\n[30] _Phil. d. Kunst,_ pp. 390-393.\n\n[31] _Op. cit._ p. 395.\n\n[32] _Op. cit._ pp. 405-451.\n\n[33] _Vorles. \u00fcb. \u00c4sthetik_, Heyse, Leipzig, 1829, pp. 35-43.\n\n[34] Vorles. \u00fcb. \u00c4sth. pp. 186-200.\n\n[35] Op. cit. pp. 48-85.\n\n[36] _Encykl. d. phil. Wiss._ \u00a7\u00a7 557-563.\n\n[37] _Vorles. \u00fcb. \u00c4sth._ (_ed. cit._) i. p. 118.\n\n[38] _Op. cit._ i. pp. 129-133.\n\n[39] _Vorles. \u00fcb. \u00c4sth._ i. p. 141.\n\n[40] _Op. cit._ i. p. 89.\n\n[41] _Op. cit._ i. pp. 50-51.\n\n[42] _Op. cit._ i. pp. 354-355.\n\n[43] _Encykl._ \u00a7 450.\n\n[44] Danzel, _\u00c4sth. d. hegel. Sch._ p. 62; Zimmermann, _G. d. A._ pp.\n693-697; J. Schmidt, _L. u. B._ pp. 103-105; Spitzer, _Krit. St._ p. 48.\n\n[45] Fr. Ast, _System der Kunstlehre,_ Leipzig, 1805; cf. Spitzer, _op.\ncit._ p. 48.\n\n[46] _System d. transcend. Idealismus_ (1800), part vi. \u00a7 2; in\n_Werke,_ \u00a7 I, vol. iii. pp. 622-623.\n\n[47] _Vorles. \u00fcb. d. \u00c4sth._ i. pp. 66-67.\n\n[48] _Vorles. \u00fcb. d. \u00c4sth._ i. p. 353.\n\n[49] _Op. cit._ i. p. 72.\n\n[50] _Vorles. \u00fcb. d. \u00c4sth._ i. pp. 13-16.\n\n\n\n\nX\n\n\nSCHOPENHAUER AND HERBART\n\n\n[Sidenote: _\u00c6sthetic mysticism in the opponents of Idealism._]\n\nNothing, perhaps, shows more clearly how well this imaginative\nconception of art suited the spirit of the times (not only a particular\nfashion in philosophy, but the psychological conditions expressed\nby the Romantic movement) than the fact that the adversaries of\nthe systems of Schelling, Solger and Hegel either agreed with this\nconception in general or, while believing themselves to be departing\nwidely from it, actually returned to it involuntarily.\n\n[Sidenote: _A. Schopenhauer._]\n\nEverybody knows with what lack, shall we say, of _phlegma\nphilosophicum_ Arthur Schopenhauer fought against Schelling, Hegel\nand all the \"charlatans\" and \"professors\" who had divided amongst\nthemselves the heritage of Kant. But what was the artistic theory\naccepted and developed by Schopenhauer?\n\n[Sidenote: _Ideas as the object of art._]\n\nHis theory, like Hegel's own, turns upon the distinction between\nthe concept which is abstraction and the concept which is concrete,\nor Idea; although Schopenhauer's Ideas are by himself likened to\nPlato's, and in the particular form in which he presents them more\nnearly resemble those of Schelling than the Idea of Hegel. They have\nsomething in common with intellectual concepts, for like them they\nare unities representing a plurality of real things: but \"the concept\nis abstract and discursive, entirely indeterminate in its sphere,\nrigorously precise within its own limits only; the intellect suffices\nto conceive and understand it, speech expresses it without need for\nother intermediary, and its own definition exhausts its whole nature;\nthe idea, on the contrary (which may be defined clearly as the adequate\nrepresentative of the concept) is absolutely intuitive, and although\nit represents an infinite number of individual things, it is not for\nthat any the less determined in all its aspects. The individual, as\nindividual, cannot know it; in order to conceive it he must strip\nhimself of all will, of all individuality, and raise himself to the\nstate of a pure knowing subject. The idea, therefore, is attained\nby genius only, or by one who finds himself in a genial disposition\nattained by that elevation of his cognitive powers inspired usually\nby genius.\" \"The idea is unity become plurality by means of space\nand time, forms of one intuitive apperception; the concept, on the\ncontrary, is unity extracted from plurality by means of abstraction,\nwhich is the procedure of our intellect: the concept may be described\nas _unitas post yewi_ the idea, _unitas ante rem._\"[1] Schopenhauer is\nin the habit of calling ideas the genera of things; but on one occasion\nhe remarks that ideas are of species, not genera; that genera are\nsimply concepts, and that there are natural species, but only logical\ngenera.[2] This psychological illusion as to the existence of ideas for\ntypes originates (as we find elsewhere in Schopenhauer) in the habit\nof converting the empirical classifications of the natural sciences\ninto living realities. \"Do you wish to see ideas?\" he asks; \"look at\nthe clouds which scud across the sky; look at a brooklet leaping over\nrocks; look at the crystallization of hoar-frost on a window-pane\nwith its designs of trees and flowers. The shapes of the clouds, the\nripples of the gushing brook, the configurations of the crystals exist\nfor us individual observers, in themselves they are indifferent. The\nclouds in themselves are elastic vapour; the brook is an incompressible\nfluid, mobile, transparent, amorphous, the ice obeys the laws of\ncrystallization: and in these determinations their ideas consist.\"[3]\nAll these are the immediate objectification of will in its various\ndegrees; and it is these, not their pale copies in real things,\nthat art delineates; whence Plato was right in one sense and wrong\nin another, and is justified and condemned by Schopenhauer exactly\nin the same way as by Plotinus of old, as well as by Schopenhauer's\nworst enemy, the modern Schelling.[4] In consequence, each art has\na special category of ideas for its own dominion. Architecture, and\nin some cases hydraulics, facilitate the clear intuition of those\nideas which constitute the lower degrees of objectification--weight,\ncohesion, resistance, hardness, the general properties of stone and\nsome combinations of light; gardening and (most curious association)\nlandscape painting represent the ideas of vegetable nature; sculpture\nand animal painting those of zoology; historical painting and the\nhigher forms of sculpture that of the human body; poetry the very idea\nof man himself.[5] As for music, that (let him who can justify the\nlogical discontinuity) is outside the hierarchy of the other arts.\nWe have seen how Schelling considered it to be representative of the\nvery rhythm of the universe;[6] differing but slightly from this,\nSchopenhauer affirms that music does not express ideas but, parallel\nwith ideas, Will itself. The analogies between music and the world,\nbetween the fundamental bass and crude matter, between the scale and\nthe series of species, between melody and conscious will, led him to\nthe conclusion that music was not, as Leibniz thought, an arithmetic\nbut a metaphysic: _exercitium metaphysices occultum nescientis se\nphilosophari animi_.[7]\n\n[Sidenote: _\u00c6sthetic catharsis._]\n\nTo Schopenhauer, no less than his idealistic predecessors, art\nbeatifies; it is the flower of life; he who contemplates art is no\nlonger an individual but a pure knowing subject, at liberty, free from\ndesire, from pain, from time.[8]\n\n[Sidenote: _Signs of a better theory in Schopenhauer._]\n\nSchopenhauer's system no doubt contains here and there premonitions\nof a better and more profound treatment of art. Schopenhauer, who was\ncapable on occasion of clear and keen analysis, constantly insists\nthat the forms of space and time must not be applied to the idea\nor to artistic contemplation, which admits of the general form of\nrepresentation only.[9] From this he might have inferred that art, so\nfar from being a superior and extraordinary level of consciousness, is\nactually its most immediate level, namely that which in its primitive\nsimplicity precedes even common perception with its reference of\nobjects to a position in the spatial and temporal series. To free\noneself from common perception and to live in imagination does not mean\nrising to a Platonic contemplation of the ideas, but descending once\nmore into the region of immediate intuition, becoming children again,\nas Vico had seen. On the other hand Schopenhauer had begun to examine\nthe categories of Kant with an unprejudiced eye; he was not satisfied\nwith the two forms of intuition, and wished to add to them a third,\ncausality.[10] In conclusion, we note that, like his predecessors, he\nmakes a comparison between art and history, with this difference and\nadvantage over the idealist authors of the philosophy of history, that\nfor him history was irreducible to concepts; it was contemplation of\nthe individual, and therefore not science. Had he persevered in his\ncomparison between art and history, he would have arrived at a better\nsolution than that at which he stopped; that is to say, that the matter\nof history is the particular in its particularity and contingency,\nwhile that of art is that which is, and is always identical.[11] But\ninstead of pursuing these happy ideas Schopenhauer preferred to play\nvariations on the themes fashionable in his day.\n\n[Sidenote: _J. F. Herbart._]\n\nMost astounding of all is the fact that a dry intellectualist,\nthe avowed enemy of idealism, of dialectic and of speculative\nconstructions, head of the school calling itself realistic or the\nschool of exact philosophy, Johann Friedrich Herbart, when he\nturns his attention to \u00c6sthetic, turns mystic too, though in a\nslightly different way. How weightily he speaks when expounding his\nphilosophical method! \u00c6sthetic must not bear the blame of the faults\ninto which metaphysic has fallen; we must make it an independent study,\nand detach it from all hypothesis about the universe. Nor must it be\nconfounded with psychology or asked to describe the emotions awakened\nby the content of works of art, such as the pathetic or the comic,\nsadness or joy; its duty is to determine the essential character of\nart and beauty. In the analysis of particular cases of beauty and\nin registering what they reveal lies the way of salvation. These\nproposals and promises have misled numbers of people as to the nature\nof Herbart's \u00c6sthetic. But _ce sont l\u00e0 jeux de princes_; by paying\nattention we shall see what Herbart meant by analysis of particular\ncase; and how he held himself aloof from metaphysics.\n\n[Sidenote: _Pure Beauty and relations of form._]\n\nBeauty, for him, consisted in relations: relations of tone, colour,\nline, thought and will; experience must decide which of these relations\nare beautiful, and \u00e6sthetic science consists solely in enumerating the\nfundamental concepts (_Musterbegriffe)_ in which are summarized the\nparticular cases of beauty. But these relations, Herbart thought, were\nnot like physiological facts; they could not be empirically observed,\n_e.g._ in a psycho-physical laboratory. To correct this error it is\nonly necessary to observe that these relations include not only tones,\nlines and colours, but also thoughts and will, and that they extend to\nmoral facts no less than to objects of external intuition. He declares\nexplicitly \"No true beauty is sensible, although it frequently happens\nthat sense-impressions precede and follow the intuition of beauty.\"[12]\nThere is a profound distinction between the beautiful and the pleasant;\nfor the pleasant needs no representation, while the beautiful consists\nin representation of relations, followed immediately in consciousness\nby a judgment, an appendix (_Zusatz)_ which expresses unqualified\napprobation (\"_es gef\u00e4llt!_\"). And while the pleasant and the\nunpleasant \"in the progress of culture gradually become transient and\nunimportant, Beauty stands out more and more as something permanent and\npossessed of undeniable value.\"[13] The judgment of taste is universal,\neternal, immutable: \"the complete representation (_vollendete\nVorstellung_) of the same relations is always followed by the same\njudgment; just as the same cause always produces the same effect.\nThis happens at all times and in all circumstances, conditions and\ncomplications, which gives to the particularity of certain cases the\nappearance of a universal rule. Granted that the elements of a relation\nare universal concepts, it is plain that although in judging we think\nonly of the content of these concepts, the judgment must have a sphere\nas large as that common to the two concepts.\"[14] Herbart considers\n\u00e6sthetic judgements as a general class comprising ethical judgements as\na subdivision: \"amongst other beauties is to be distinguished morality,\nas a thing not only of value in itself but as actually determining the\nunconditioned value of persons\"; within morality in the narrowest sense\nis distinguished in turn justice.[15] The five ethica ideas guiding\nmoral life (internal liberty, perfection, benevolence, equity and\njustice) are five \u00e6sthetic ideas or rather \u00e6sthetic concepts applied to\nrelations of will.\n\n[Sidenote: _Art as sum of content and form._]\n\nHerbart looks on art as a complex fact, the combination of an\nextra-\u00e6sthetic element, content, which may have logical or\npsychological or any other kind of value, and a purely \u00e6sthetic\nelement, form, which is an application of the fundamental \u00e6sthetic\nconcepts. Man looks for that which is diverting, instructive, moving,\nmajestic, ridiculous; and \"all these are mingled with the beautiful\nin order to procure favour and interest for the work. The beautiful\nthus assumes various complexions, and becomes graceful, magnificent,\ntragic, or comic; it can become all these because the \u00e6sthetic\njudgement, in itself calmly serene, tolerates the company of the most\ndiverse excitations of the soul which are no part of itself.\"[16] But\nall these things have nothing to do with beauty. In order to discover\nthe objectively beautiful or ugly, one must make abstraction from\nevery predicate concerning the content. \"In order to recognize the\nobjectively beautiful or ugly in poetry, one must show the difference\nbetween this and that thought, and the discussion will concern itself\nwith thoughts; to recognize it in sculpture, one must show the\ndifference between this and that outline, and the discussion will turn\nupon outlines; to recognize it in music, one should show the difference\nbetween this and that tone, and the discussion will turn upon tones.\nNow, such predicates as 'magnificent, charming, graceful' and so\nforth contain nothing whatever about tones, outlines or thoughts, and\ntherefore tell us nothing about the objectively beautiful in poetry,\nsculpture, or music; indeed they rather lead us to believe in the\nexistence of an objective beauty to which thought, outline, or tone are\nequally accidental, which may be approached by receiving impressions\nfrom poetry, sculpture, music and so forth, obliterating the object\nand giving oneself up to the pure emotion of mind.\"[17] Very different\nis the \u00e6sthetic judgement, the \"cold judgement of the connoisseur\"\nwho considers exclusively form, _i.e._ objectively pleasant formal\nrelations. This abstraction from the content in order to contemplate\npure form is the catharsis produced by art. Content is transitory,\nrelative, subject to moral law and liable to moral judgement: form is\npermanent, absolute, free.[18] Concrete art may be the sum of two or\nmore values; but the \u00e6sthetic fact is form alone.\n\n[Sidenote: _Herbart and Kantian thought._]\n\nThe reader who goes behind appearances and discounts diversities of\nterminology will not fail to observe the close similarity of the\n\u00e6sthetic doctrine of Herbart to that of Kant. In Herbart we again\nfind the distinction between free and adherent beauty, and between\nform and the sensuous stimulus (_Reiz)_ attached to form: we find an\naffirmation of the existence of pure beauty, the object of necessary\nand universal, but not discursive, judgements; lastly, we find a\ncertain connexion between beauty and morality, between \u00c6sthetic and\nEthics. In these matters Herbart is perhaps the most faithful follower\nand propagator of the thought of Kant, whose doctrine contains the germ\nof his own. In one passage he describes himself as \"a Kantian, but of\nthe year 1828\"; and he is quite right, even in pointing out the exact\ndifference in date. Amidst the errors and uncertainties of his \u00e6sthetic\nthought, Kant is rich in suggestion and scatters fertile seed; he\nbelongs to a period when philosophy was still young and impressionable.\nHerbart, coming later, is dry and one-sided; he takes whatever is\nfalse in Kant's doctrine and hardens it into a system. If they had\ndone little else, the Romanticists and idealists had at least united\nthe theory of beauty to that of art, and destroyed the rhetorical\nand mechanical view; and they had brought into relief (frequently\nexaggerating, doubtless) various important characteristics of artistic\nactivity. Herbart re-states the mechanical view, restores the duality,\nand presents a capricious, narrow, barren mysticism, devoid of all\nbreath of artistic feeling.\n\n\n[1] _Welt als Wille u. Vorstellung,_ 1819 (in _S\u00e4mmtl. Werke,_ ed.\nGrisebach, vol. i.). bk. iii. \u00a7 49.\n\n[2] _Erg\u00e4nzungen_ (ed. Grisebach, vol. ii.), ch. 29.\n\n[3] _Welt a. W. u. V._ iii. \u00a7 35.\n\n[4] See above, p. 291.\n\n[5] _Welt a. W. u. V._ iii. \u00a7\u00a7 42-51.\n\n[6] See above, p. 293.\n\n[7] _Welt a. W. u. V._ \u00a7 53.\n\n[8] _Op. cit._ \u00a7 34.\n\n[9] _Welt a. W. u. V._ \u00a7 32.\n\n[10] _Kritik d. kantischen Philosophie,_ in append, to _op. cit._ pp.\n558-576.\n\n[11] _Erg\u00e4nzungen,_ ch. 38.\n\n[12] _Einleitung in die Philosophie,_ 1813, in _Werke,_ ed.\nHartenstein, vol. 1. p. 49.\n\n[13] _Einleitung in die Philosophie,_ pp. 125-128.\n\n[14] _Allgemeine praktische Philosophie,_ in _Werke,_ viii. p. 25.\n\n[15] _Einleitung,_ p. 128.\n\n[16] _Einleitung,_ p. 162.\n\n[17] _Op. cit._ pp. 129-130.\n\n[18] _Op. cit._ p. 163.\n\n\n\n\nXI\n\n\nFRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER\n\n\n[Sidenote: _\u00c6sthetic of content and \u00c6sthetic of form: meaning of the\ncontrast._]\n\nWe have now reached a point when we are able to give ourselves an exact\naccount of the signification and importance of the celebrated war\nwaged for over a century in Germany between the \u00c6sthetic of content\n(_Gehalts\u00e4sthetik)_ and the \u00c6sthetic of form (_Form\u00e4sthetik_); a war\nwhich gave birth to vast works on the history of \u00c6sthetic undertaken\nfrom one or other point of view, and sprang from Herbart's opposition\nto the idealism of Schelling, Hegel, and their contemporaries and\nfollowers. \"Form\" and \"Content\" are among the most equivocal words\nin the whole philosophical vocabulary, particularly in \u00c6sthetic;\nsometimes, indeed, what one calls form, others call content. The\nHerbartians were specially given to quoting in their own defence\nSchiller's dictum, that the secret of art consists in \"cancelling\ncontent by form.\" But what is there in common between Schiller's\nconcept of \"form,\" which placed the \u00e6sthetic activity side by side\nwith the moral and intellectual, and Herbart's \"form,\" which does not\npenetrate or enliven, but clothes and adorns a content? Hegel, on\nthe other hand, often gives the name \"form\" to what Schiller would\ncall \"matter\" (_Stoff_), that is, the sensible matter which it is\nthe business of spiritual energy to dominate. Hegel's \"content\" is\nthe idea, the metaphysical truth, the constituent element of beauty:\nHerbart's \"content\" is the emotional and intellectual element which\nfalls outside beauty. The \u00c6sthetic of \"form\" in Italy is an \u00e6sthetic of\nexpressive activity; the form is neither a clothing nor a metaphysical\nidea nor sensible matter, but a representative or imaginative faculty\nwith the power of framing impressions; yet there have been attempts\nto confute this Italian \u00e6sthetic formalism with the same arguments\nthat are used against German \u00e6sthetic formalism, a totally different\nthing in every respect. And so forth. Having given a plain account of\nthe thoughts of the post-Kantian \u00e6stheticians, we shall be able to\nappreciate their opponents without seeking light from their obscure\nterminology or allowing ourselves to be misled by the banners they\nwave. The antithesis between the \u00c6sthetic of content and that of\nform, the \u00c6sthetic of idealism and that of realism, the \u00c6sthetic of\nSchelling, Solger, Hegel and Schopenhauer and that of Herbart, will\nappear in its true light, as the lamily quarrel between two conceptions\nof art united by a common mysticism, although one is destined almost to\nmeet with truth during its long journey, while the other wanders ever\nfurther away.\n\nThe first half of the nineteenth century was for Germany a period of\nmany fine-sounding philosophical formul\u00e6: subjectivism, objectivism,\nsubjective--objectivism; abstract, concrete, abstract-concrete;\nidealism, realism, idealism--realism; between pantheism and theism\nKrause inserted his pan-en-theism. In the midst of this uproar, in\nwhich the second-rate men shouted down the first-rate and made good\ntheir claim to their only true property, namely words, it is not\nsurprising that a few modest clear thinkers, philosophers who preferred\nto think about realities, should have the worst of it and remain\nunheard and unnoticed, lost among the roaring crowd or labelled with a\nfalse ticket.\n\n[Sidenote: _Friedrich Schleiermacher._]\n\nThis, at least, seems to have been the lot of Friedrich Schleiermacher,\nwhose \u00e6sthetic doctrine is amongst the least known although it is\nperhaps the most noteworthy of the day.\n\n[Sidenote: _Wrong judgements concerning him._]\n\nSchleiermacher delivered his first lectures on \u00c6sthetic at Berlin\nUniversity in 1819, and from that date he began to study the subject\nseriously with a view to writing a book on it. He repeated his\nlectures on two occasions, in 1825 and 1832-1833; but his death,\nwhich occurred in the following year, prevented him from carrying\nout his plan, and all we know of his thoughts on \u00c6sthetic comes from\nhis lectures, as collected by his pupils and published in 1842.[1] A\nHerbartian historian of \u00c6sthetic, Zimmermann, attacks the posthumous\nwork of Schleiermacher with real ferocity; after twenty pages of\ninvective and sarcasm he concludes by asking, how could his pupils\nso dishonour their great master by publishing such a mass of waste\npaper, \"all play upon words, sophistical conceits and dialectical\nsubtleties\"?[2] Nor was the idealistic historian Hartmann much more\nbenevolent when he describes the work as \"a confused mess in which,\namong much that is merely trivial, many half-truths and exaggerations,\none can detect a few acute observations\"; and says that, in order\nto make bearable \"such unctuous afternoon sermons delivered by a\npreacher in his dotage,\" it must be shortened by three-quarters; and\nthat, \"as regards fundamental principles,\" it is simply useless,\noffering no innovations upon concrete idealism as presented by Hegel\nand others; and that, in any case, it seems impossible \"to attach it\nto any line of thought except the Hegelian, to which Schleiermacher's\ncontribution is only of second-rate importance.\" He further observes\nthat Schleiermacher was primarily a theologian, and in philosophy more\nor less an amateur.[3] Now it cannot be denied that Schleiermacher's\ndoctrine has reached us in a hazy form, by no means free from\nuncertainties and contradictions; and, which is more important,\nit is here and there affected for the worse by the influence of\ncontemporary metaphysics. But, side by side with these defects, what\nexcellent method, really scientific and philosophical; what a number of\ncornerstones well and truly laid; what wealth of new truths, and of\ndifficulties and problems not suspected or discussed before his day!\n\n[Sidenote: _Schleiermacher contrasted with his predecessors._]\n\nSchleiermacher considered \u00c6sthetic as an essentially modern line\nof thought, and drew a sharp distinction between the _Poetics_ of\nAristotle, which never shakes itself free from the empirical standpoint\nof the maker of rules, and what Baumgarten tried to do in the\neighteenth century. He praised Kant for having been the first truly\nto include \u00c6sthetic among the philosophical sciences, and recognized\nthat in Hegel artistic activity had attained the highest elevation by\nbeing brought into connexion and almost into equality with religion\nand philosophy. But he was not satisfied either with the followers of\nBaumgarten when they degenerated into the absurd attempt to construct\na science or theory of sensuous pleasure, or with the Kantian point of\nview which made its principal aim the consideration of taste; or with\nthe philosophy of Fichte, in which art became a means of education; or\nwith the more widely received opinion which placed at the centre of\n\u00c6sthetic the vague and equivocal concept of Beauty. Schiller pleased\nhim by having called attention to the moment of artistic spontaneity or\nproductiveness, and he praised Schelling for having laid stress on the\nimportance of the figurative arts, which lend themselves less easily\nthan poetry to facile and illusory moralistic interpretations.[4]\nHaving with the utmost clearness excluded from \u00c6sthetic the study of\npractical rules as empirical, and therefore irreducible to a science,\nhe assigned to \u00c6sthetic the task of determining the proper position of\nartistic activity in the scheme of ethics.[5]\n\n[Sidenote: _Place assigned to \u00c6sthetic in his Ethics._]\n\nTo avoid falling into error over this terminology, we must call to\nmind that the philosophy of Schleiermacher followed the ancient\ntraditions in its tripartite division into Dialectic, Ethics and\nPhysics. Dialectic corresponds with ontology; Physics embraces all\nthe sciences of natural facts; Ethics includes the study of all free\nactivities of mankind (language, thought, art, religion and morality).\nEthics represented to him not only the science of morality but what\nothers name Psychology or, better still, the Science or Philosophy of\nthe Spirit. This explanation once given, Schleiermacher's point of\ndeparture seems to be the only one just and permissible, and we shall\nnot be surprised when he talks of will, of voluntary acts and so on,\nwhere others would have simply spoken of activity or spiritual energy;\nhe even endows such expressions with a broader meaning than that\nconferred upon them by practical philosophy.\n\n[Sidenote: _\u00c6sthetic activity as immanent and individual._]\n\nA double distinction may be made amongst human activities. In the\nfirst place, there are activities which we presume to be constituted\nin the same manner in all men (such as the logical activity) and are\ncalled activities of identity; and others whose diversity is presumed,\nwhich are called activities of difference or individual activities.\nSecondly, there are activities which exhaust themselves in the\ninternal life, and others which actualize themselves in the external\nworld: immanent activities and practical activities. To which of the\ntwo classes in each of the two orders does artistic activity belong?\nThere can be no doubt of its different modes of development, if not\nactually in each individual person, at least in different peoples and\nnations; therefore it belongs properly to activities of difference or\nindividual activities.[6] As for the other distinction, it is true\nthat art does realize itself in the external world, but this fact is\nsomething superadded (\"_ein sp\u00e4ter Hinzukommendes_\") \"which stands to\nthe internal fact as the communication of thought by means of speech\nor writing stands to thought itself\": art's true work is the internal\nimage (\"_das innere Bild ist das eigentliche Kunstwerk_\"). Exceptions\nto this might be adduced, such as mimicry; but they would be apparent\nonly. Between a really angry man and the actor who plays the part of\nan angry man on the stage there is this difference: in the second case\nanger appears as controlled and therefore beautiful; that is, the\ninternal image is in the actor's soul interposed between the fact of\npassion and its physical manifestation.[7] Artistic activity \"belongs\nto those human activities in which we presuppose the individual in its\ndifferentiation; it belongs equally to those activities developing\nessentially within themselves and not completing themselves in any\nexternal world. Art, therefore, is an immanent activity in which we\npresuppose differentiation.\" Internal, not practical: individual, not\nuniversal or logical.\n\n[Sidenote: _Artistic truth and intellectual truth._]\n\nBut if art be one form of thought, there must be one form of thought\nin which identity is presupposed, and another in which difference is\npresupposed. We do not look for truth in poetry; or, rather, we do look\nfor truth, but for one that is totally different from that objective\ntruth to which there must correspond some being, either universal or\nindividual (scientific and historical truth). \"When a character in a\npoem is said to be devoid of truth, a slur is cast on the given poem;\nbut if the character is said to be a pure invention, corresponding with\nno reality, that is quite a different matter.\" The truth of a poetic\ncharacter consists in the coherence with which a single person's divers\nmodes of thinking and acting are represented: even in portraits it is\nnot an exact correspondence with an objective reality that makes the\nthing a work of art. From art and poetry \"springs no iota of knowledge\"\n(_das Geringste vom Wissen_); \"it expresses but the truth of the single\nconsciousness.\" There are then \"productions of thought and of sensible\nintuitions, opposed to the other productions because they do not\npresuppose identity, and they express the singular as such.\"[8]\n\n[Sidenote: _Difference of artistic consciousness from feeling and\nreligion._]\n\nThe domain of art is immediate self-consciousness (_unmittelbare\nSelbstbewusstsein_), which must be carefully distinguished from the\nthought or concept of the ego or of the determinate ego. This latter is\nthe consciousness of identity in the diversity of moments; immediate\nself-consciousness is \"diversity itself, of which one must be aware,\nsince life in its entirety is but the development of consciousness.\" In\nthis domain art has often been confused with two facts which accompany\nit: sensuous consciousness (the feeling of pleasure and pain), and\nreligion. A double confusion, of which the sensationalists fall into\nthe first half and Hegel into the second; Schleiermacher clears it up\nby proving that art is free productivity, whereas sensuous pleasure and\nreligious feeling, however different in other ways, are both determined\nby an objective fact (_\u00e4ussere Sein_).[9]\n\n[Sidenote: _Dreams and art: inspiration and deliberation._]\n\nThe better to understand this free productivity, we must further\ncircumscribe the domain of immediate consciousness. In this we can\nfind nothing more helpful than comparing it with the images produced\nby dreams. The artist has his own dreams: he dreams with open eyes,\nand from among the thick-thronging images of this dream-state those\nhaving sufficient energy alone become works of art, the rest remaining\na mere background from which the others stand out. All the essential\nelements of art are found in the dream-state, which is the production\nof free thoughts and sensuous intuitions consisting of mere images.\nCertainly something is lacking in dreams, and they differ from art not\nonly in their absence of technique, which has already been excluded as\nirrelevant to art, but in another way, viz. that a dream is a chaotic\nfact, without stability, order, connexion or measure. But when some\nsort of order is introduced into the chaos the difference at once\ndisappears, and the likeness to art merges in identity. This internal\nactivity which introduces order and measure, fixes and determines the\nimage, is that which distinguishes art from a dream or transforms a\ndream into art. It often involves struggle, labour, the obligation to\nstem the involuntary flood of internal images; in a word, it means\nreflexion or deliberation. But the dream and the cessation of dreaming\nare equally indispensable elements of art. There must be production of\nthoughts and images and, together with such production, there must\nbe measure, determination and unity, \"otherwise each image would be\nconfused with its neighbour and have no definiteness.\" The instant of\ninspiration (_Begeisterung_) is as essential as that of deliberation\n(_Besonnenheit)_.[10]\n\n[Sidenote: _Art and the typical._]\n\nBut in order to arrive at artistic truth it is also I necessary (here\nSchleiermacher's thought becomes less clear and accurate) that the\nsingular be accompanied by consciousness of the species; consciousness\nof the self as individual man is impossible without consciousness of\nmankind; nor is a single object true unless referred to its universal.\nIn a pictured landscape \"every tree must possess natural truth, that\nis to say, it must be contemplated as a specimen of a given kind;\nsimilarly, the whole complex of natural and individual life must have\neffective truth of nature and constitute a single harmony. Just because\nin art we do not strive after the production of individual figures\nin themselves and for themselves, but their internal truth as well,\nwe commonly assign to them a high place as being a free realization\nof that in which all cognition has its value, that is to say, in the\nprinciple that all forms of being are inherent in the human spirit.\nIf this principle fails, truth is no longer possible; scepticism only\nremains.\" The productions of art are the ideal or typical figures\nwhich real nature would create were it not impeded by external\ninfluences.[11] \"The artist creates a figure on the basis of a general\nscheme, rejecting whatever may hinder or impede the play of the living\nforces of reality; such a production, founded on a general scheme, is\nwhat we call the Ideal.\"[12]\n\nIn spite of all these determinations, Schleiermacher did not apparently\nintend to limit the artist's scope. He remarks, \"When an artist\nrepresents something really given, whether portrait, landscape or\nsingle human figure, he renounces the freedom of productivity and\nadheres to the real.\"[13] There is a twofold tendency at work in the\nartist: towards perfection of type, and towards representation of\nnatural reality. An artist must not fall into the abstractness of\nthe type or into the unmeaningness of empirical reality.[14] If in\nflower-painting it is necessary to bring out the specific type, a much\nmore complete individualisation is demanded when representing man,\nowing to the lofty position which he occupies.[15] Representation\nof the ideal in the real does not exclude \"an infinite variety,\nsuch as is found in actual reality.\" \"For instance, the human face\nwavers between the ideal and caricature, in its moral conformation\nno less than in its physical. Every human face contains elements of\ndisfigurement (_Verbildung,_) but it has also something by which it\nis a determinate modification of human nature; this does not appear\nopenly, but a practised eye can seize it and ideally complete the face\nin question.\"[16] Schleiermacher is keenly aware of the difficulties\nand perplexities of' such problems as the question whether there exists\none or many ideals of the human face.[17] He observes that the two\nviews which strive for mastery in the field of poetry may be extended\nto art as a whole. Some assert that poetry and art should represent the\nperfect, the ideal, that which would have been produced by nature, had\nshe not been prevented by mechanical forces; others reject the ideal as\nincapable of realisation and prefer that the artist should depict man\nas he really is, with those perturbing elements which in reality belong\nto him no less than his ideal qualities. Each view is a half-truth:\nit is the duty of art to represent the ideal as well as the real, the\nsubjective as well as the objective.[18] The comic element, that is the\nunideal and the faulty ideal, is included in the circle of art.[19]\n\n[Sidenote: _Independence of art._]\n\nIn respect to morality, art is free just as philosophical speculation\nis free: its essence excludes practical and moral effects. This leads\nto the proposition that \"there is no difference between various\nworks of art, except in so far as they can be compared in respect\nof artistic perfection\" (_Vollkommenheit in der Kunst._) \"Given an\nartistic object perfect of its kind, it has an absolute value which\ncannot be increased or diminished by anything else. If motions of\nthe will could truly be described as consequences of works of art, a\ndifferent standard of values would apply to works of art: and since\nthe objects which an artist may depict are not all equally adapted to\ninfluence volition, a scale of values would exist which did not depend\non artistic perfection.\" Nor must we confound the judgement passed\nupon the varied and complex personality of the artist himself with the\nstrictly \u00e6sthetic judgement passed upon his work. \"In this respect\nthe biggest, most complicated canvas is on a level with the smallest\narabesque, the longest poem with the shortest: the value of a work of\nart depends on the perfect manner in which the external corresponds to\nthe internal.\"[20]\n\nSchleiermacher rejects the doctrine of Schiller because in his opinion\nit makes art a sort of game or pastime in contrast to the serious\naffairs of life: a view, he says, for business men to whom their\nbusiness is the only serious thing. Artistic activity is universally\nhuman, a man devoid of it is inconceivable; although, of course, there\nare in this respect great differences betwixt man and man, running from\nthe mere desire to enjoy art to real taste, and from this again to\nproductive genius.[21]\n\n[Sidenote: _Art and language._]\n\nThe artist makes use of instruments which, by their nature, are framed\nnot for the individual but for the universal; of this kind is language.\nBut it is the business of poetry to extract the individual from\nlanguage which is universal without giving to its productions the form\nof the antithesis between individual and universal which is proper to\nscience. Of the two elements of language, the musical and the logical,\nthe poet claims the first for his own ends and constrains the other\nto awaken individual images. In comparison with pure science as in\ncomparison with the individual image, there is something irrational\nabout language: but the tendencies of speculation and of poetry are\nalways contrary, even in their use of language; the former tends to\nmake language approximate to mathematical formul\u00e6; the latter to\nimagery (_Bild_)[22]\n\n[Sidenote: _Schleiermacher's defects._]\n\nLeaving out many details which will be touched on in their\nproper places, the foregoing is a fair summary of the heads of\nSchleiermacher's \u00e6sthetic thought. Adding up the accounts of the\nwhole statement of views, on the side of error and oversight we\nfind: first, ideas or types are not wholly excluded, in spite\nof all Schleiermacher's care and anxiety to safeguard artistic\nindividualisation and to make the ideas and types superfluous.\nSecondly, there is still, undefeated and unexpelled, a certain residue\nof abstract formalism, visible at various points of his theories.[23]\nThirdly, the definition of art as an activity of mere difference may be\ndiluted but is not destroyed by making art a difference of complexes\nof individuals, a national difference. A closer reflexion on the\nhistory of art, a recognition of the possibility of appreciating the\nart of various nations and various times, a more patient investigation\ninto the moment of artistic reproduction, even an examination of the\nrelation between science and art, would have led Schleiermacher to\ntreat this difference as empirical and surmountable, still holding\nfirmly to the distinctive character (individual as opposed to\nuniversal) he assigned to art in comparison with science. Fourthly, he\ndid not recognize the identity of \u00e6sthetic activity with linguistic,\nand failed to make it the basis of all other theoretic activity. It\nwould seem, moreover, that Schleiermacher had no clear ideas concerning\nthat artistic element which enters into the constitution of historic\nnarrative and is indispensable as the concrete form of science; or\nconcerning language, taken not as a complex of abstract means of\nexpression but as expressive activity.\n\n[Sidenote: _Schleiermacher's services to \u00c6sthetic._]\n\nThese defects and uncertainties may perhaps be attributable in part\nto the fact that his thoughts on \u00e6sthetic have reached us in an\ninchoate form, very far from a mature development. But if on the other\nhand we wish to cast up the sum of his very striking merits, it will\nsuffice to run over the list of accusations heaped upon him by the two\nhistorians before mentioned, Zimmermann and Hartmann. Schleiermacher\nhas denuded \u00c6sthetic of its imperative character; he recognizes in it a\nform of thought differing from logical thought; he gives this science\na non-metaphysical and merely anthropological character; he denies\nthe concept of beauty, substituting that of artistic perfection, and\nactually affirms the \u00e6sthetic equivalence of small and great works of\nart, so long as each is perfect in its own sphere; he considers the\n\u00e6sthetic fact as pure human productivity: and so on and so forth. All\nthese criticisms are meant for blame and are really praise; for what\nis blame to the mind of a Zimmermann or a Hartmann, is to ours praise.\nIn the metaphysical orgy of his day, in the perpetual building and\npulling down of more or less arbitrary systems, Schleiermacher the\ntheologian, with philosophic acumen, fixed his eye upon what was really\ncharacteristic of the \u00e6sthetic fact and succeeded in defining its\nproperties and connexions; when he failed to see clearly and wandered\nfrom the track, he never abandoned analysis for fantastic caprice.\nBy his discovery that the obscure region of immediate consciousness\nis also that of the \u00e6sthetic fact, he seems to bid his distracted\ncontemporaries listen to the old adage: _Hic Rhodus, hic salta._\n\n\n[1] _Vorlesungen \u00fcb. \u00c4sthetik_ published by Lommatsch, Berlin, 1842\n(_Werke,_ sect. iii. vol. vii.).\n\n[2] Zimmermann, _G. d. A._ pp. 608-634.\n\n[3] E. von Hartmann, _Deutsche \u00c4sth. s. Kant,_ pp. 156-169.\n\n[4] _Vorles. \u00fcb. \u00c4sthetik_ pp. 1-30.\n\n[5] _Op. cit._ pp. 35-51.\n\n[6] _Vorles. \u00fcb. \u00c4sth._ pp. 51-54.\n\n[7] _Vorles. \u00fcb. \u00c4sth._ pp. 55-61.\n\n[8] _Op. cit._ pp. 61-66; cf. _Dialektik,_ ed. Halpern, pp. 54-55, 67.\n\n[9] _Vorles. \u00fcb. \u00c4sth._ pp. 67-77.\n\n[10] _Vorles. \u00fcb. \u00c4sth._ pp. 79-91.\n\n[11] _Op. cit._ pp. 123, 143-150.\n\n[12] _Op. cit._ p. 505; cf. p. 607.\n\n[13] _Op. cit._ p. 505.\n\n[14] _Vorles. \u00fcb. \u00c4sth._ pp. 506-508.\n\n[15] _Op. cit._ pp. 156-157.\n\n[16] _Op. cit._ pp. 550-551.\n\n[17] _Op. cit._ p. 608.\n\n[18] _Op. cit._ pp. 684-686.\n\n[19] _Op. cit._ pp. 191-196; cf. pp. 364-365.\n\n[20] _Vorles. \u00fcb. \u00c4sth._ pp. 209-219; of. pp. 527-528.\n\n[21] _Op. cit._ pp. 98-111.\n\n[22] _Vorles. \u00fcb. \u00c4sth._ pp. 635-648.\n\n[23] Cf. _e.g._ p. 467 _seqq._\n\n\n\n\nXII\n\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE: HUMBOLDT AND STEINTHAL\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Progress of Linguistic._]\n\nAbout the time when Schleiermacher was meditating on the nature of the\n\u00e6sthetic fact, a movement of thought was gaining ground in Germany\nwhich, tending as it did to overthrow the old concept of language,\nmight have proved a powerful aid to \u00e6sthetic science. But not only had\nthe \u00e6sthetic specialists--if we may so call them--no notion of the\nexistence of this movement, the new philosophers of language never\nbrought their ideas into relation with the \u00e6sthetic problem, and\ntheir discoveries languished imprisoned within the narrow scope of\nLinguistic, condemned to sterility.\n\n[Sidenote: _Linguistic speculation at the beginning of the nineteenth\ncentury_.]\n\nResearch into the relations between thought and speech, between the\nunity of logic and the multiplicity of languages, had been promoted,\nlike many other things, by the _Critique of Pure Reason_: the earliest\nKantians often tried to apply the Kantian categories of intuition\n(space and time) and of intellect to language. The first to make the\nattempt was Roth[1] in 1795; the same who wrote an essay twenty years\nlater on _Pure Linguistic._ Many other noteworthy books on this subject\nappeared in quick succession: those of Vater, Bernhardi, Reinbeck and\nKoch were published one after another in the first ten years of the\nnineteenth century. In all these treatises the dominating subject is\nthe difference between language and languages; between the universal\nlanguage, corresponding with Logic, and concrete, historical languages\ndisturbed by feeling and imagination or whatever other name was applied\nto the psychological element of differentiation. Vater distinguishes a\ngeneral Linguistic (_all gemeine Sprachlehre_), constructed _a priori_\nby means of the analysis of the concepts contained in the judgement,\nfrom a comparative Linguistic (_vergleichende Sprachlehre_) which\nattempts by means of induction to reach probable laws through the\nstudy of a number of languages. Bemhardi considers language to be an\n\"allegory of intellect\" and distinguishes it as functioning either\nas the organ of poetry or that of science. Reinbeck speaks of an\n\u00c6sthetic Grammar and a Logical. Koch, more energetic than the others,\nasserts positively that the character of language is \"_non ad Logices\nsed ad Psychologiae rationem revocanda._\"[2] Some few philosophers\nspeculated on language and mythology: for example Schelling considered\nthem to be the products of a pre-human consciousness (_vormenschliche\nBewusstsein,_) presenting them, in a fantastic allegory, as diabolic\nsuggestions which precipitate the ego from the infinite to the\nfinite.[3]\n\n[Sidenote: _Wilhelm von Humboldt. Relics of intellectualism._]\n\nEven the famous philologist, Wilhelm von Humboldt, was unable to detach\nhimself entirely from the prejudice of the substantial identity and\nthe purely historical, accidental diversity between logical thought\nand language. His celebrated dissertation, _On the Diversity of\nStructure of Human Languages_ (1836),[4] is based on the notion of a\nperfect language split up and distributed amongst particular tongues\naccording to the linguistic or intellectual capacity of various\nnations. \"For,\" says he, \"since disposition towards speech is general\nin mankind, and all men must necessarily carry within themselves the\nkey to the comprehension of all languages, it follows that the form\nof all languages must be substantially equal and all must attain the\nsame general end. Diversity can exist solely in the means, and within\nthe bounds permitted by the attainment of the end.\" Yet this same\ndiversity becomes a real divergence not only in sounds, but in the\nuse of sound made by the linguistic sense in respect to the form of\nlanguage, or rather, in respect to its own idea of the form of the\ndeterminate language. \"Languages being merely formal, the operation\nof the linguistic sense by itself should produce mere uniformity;\nthe linguistic sense must exact from every tongue the same right and\nlegitimate construction that is found in one of them. In practice,\nhowever, the facts are quite otherwise, partly owing to the reaction of\nsounds, and partly by reason of the individual aspect assumed by the\nsame internal meaning in phenomenal reality.\" Linguistic force \"cannot\nmaintain its equality everywhere or show the same intensity, vivacity\nor regularity; it cannot be supported by an exactly equal tendency\ntowards the symbolic treatment of thought or by exactly equal pleasure\nin richness and harmony of sound.\" These, then, are the causes which\nproduce in human languages that diversity which manifests itself in\nevery branch of the civilization of nations. But reflexion on languages\n\"ought to reveal to us a form which of all possible forms best fits the\npurpose of language\" and approaches most closely to its ideal; and \"the\nmerits and defects of existing languages must be estimated by their\nnearness or remoteness from this form.\" Humboldt finds the nearest\napproximation to such an ideal in the Sanskrit tongues, which can\ntherefore be used as a standard of comparison. Setting Chinese apart in\na class by itself, he proceeds to the division of the possible forms of\nlanguage into inflective, agglutinative and incorporative; types which\nare found combined in various proportions in every real language.[5] He\nalso inaugurated the division of languages into inferior and superior,\nunformed and formed, according to the way in which verbs are treated.\nHe was never able to rid himself of a second prejudice connected with\nthe first, namely that language exists as something objective outside\nthe talking man, unattached and independent, and waking up when needed\nfor use.\n\n[Sidenote: _Language an activity. Internal form._]\n\nBut Humboldt opposes Humboldt: amongst the old dross we detect the\nbrilliant gleams of a wholly new concept of language. Certainly his\nwork is for this very reason not always free from contradictions\nand from a kind of hesitation and awkwardness which appear\ncharacteristically in his literary style and make it at times laboured\nand obscure. The new man in Humboldt criticizes the old man when he\nsays, \"Languages must be considered not as dead products but as an act\nof production. ... Language in its reality is something continually\nchanging and passing away. Even its preservation in writing is\nincomplete, a kind of mummification: it is always necessary to render\nthe living speech sensible. Language is not a work, _ergon,_ but\nan activity, _energeia._ ... It is an eternally repeated effort of\nthe spirit in order to make articulated tones capable of expressing\nthought.\" Language is the act of speaking. \"True and proper language\nconsists in the very act of producing it by means of connected\nutterance; that is the only thing that must be thought of as the\nstarting-point or the truth in any inquiry which aims at penetrating\ninto the living essence of language. Division into words and rules is a\nlifeless artifice of scientific analysis.\"[6] Language is not a thing\narising out of the need of external communication; on the contrary, it\nsprings from the wholly internal thirst for knowledge and the struggle\nto reach an intuition of things.\" From its earliest commencement it is\nentirely human, and extends without intention to all objects of sensory\nperception or internal elaboration.... Words gush spontaneously from\nthe breast without constraint or intention: there is no nomad tribe in\nany desert without its songs. Taken as a zoological species, man is a\nsinging animal which connects its thoughts with its utterances.\"[7]\nThe new man leads Humboldt to discover a fact hidden from the authors\nof logico-universal grammars: namely the internal form of language\n(_innere Sprachform_), which is neither logical concept nor physical\nsound, but the subjective view of things formed by man, the product\nof imagination and feeling, the individualization of the concept.\nConjunction of the internal form of language with physical sound is\nthe work of an internal synthesis; \"and here, more than anywhere else,\nlanguage by its profound and mysterious operation recalls art. Sculptor\nand painter also unite the idea with matter, and their efforts are\njudged praiseworthy or not according as this union, this intimate\ninterpenetration, is the work of true genius, or as the idea is\nsomething separate, painfully and laboriously imposed upon the matter\nby sheer force of brush or chisel.\"[8]\n\n[Sidenote: _Language and art in Humboldt._]\n\nBut Humboldt was content to regard the procedure of artist and speaker\nas comparable by analogy, without proceeding to identify them. On the\none hand, he was too one-sided in his view of language as a means\nfor the development of thought (logical thought); on the other, his\nown \u00e6sthetic ideas, always vague and not always true, prevented his\nperception of the identity. Of his two principal writings on \u00c6sthetic,\nthat on _Beauty Masculine and Feminine_ (1795) seems to be wholly\nunder the influence of Winckelmann, whose antithesis between beauty\nand expression is revived, and the opinion expressed that specific\nsexual characters diminish the beauty of the human body and that beauty\nasserts itself only by triumphing over differences of sex. His other\nwork, which is inspired by Goethe's _Hermann und Dorothee,_ defines\nart as \"representation of nature by means of fancy; the representation\nbeing beautiful, just because it is the work of fancy,\" a metamorphosis\nof nature carried to a higher sphere. The poet reflects the pictures\nof language, itself a complex of abstractions.[9] In his dissertation\non Linguistic, Humboldt distinguishes poetry and prose, treating\nthe two concepts philosophically, not by the empirical distinction\nbetween free and measured or periodic and metric language. \"Poetry\ngives us reality in its sensible appearance, as it is felt internally\nand externally; but is indifferent to the character which makes it\nreal, and even deliberately ignores that character. It presents the\nsensuous appearance to fancy and, by this means, leads towards the\ncontemplation of an artistically ideal whole. Prose, on the contrary,\nlooks in reality for the roots which attach it to existence, the cords\nwhich bind her to it: hence it fastens fact to fact and concept to\nconcept according to the methods of the intellect, and strives towards\nthe objective union of them all in an idea.\"[10] Poetry precedes\nprose: before producing prose, the spirit necessarily forms itself in\npoetry.[11] But, beside these views, some of which are profoundly true,\nHumboldt looks on poets as perfecters of language, and on poetry as\nbelonging only to certain exceptional moments,[12] and makes us suspect\nthat after all he never recognized clearly or maintained firmly that\nlanguage is always poetry, and that prose (science) is a distinction\nnot of \u00e6sthetic form but of content, that is, of logical form.\n\n[Sidenote: _H. Steinthal. The linguistic function independent of the\nlogical._]\n\nHumboldt's contradictions about the concept of language lost him his\nprincipal follower, Steinthal. With the help of his master, Steinthal\nrestated the position that language belongs not to Logic but to\nPsychology,[13] and in 1855 waged a gallant war against the Hegelian\nBecker, author of _The Organisms of Language,_ one of the last logical\ngrammarians, who pledged himself to deduce the entire body of the\nSanskrit languages from twelve cardinal concepts. Steinthal declares it\nis not true that one cannot think without words: the deaf-mute thinks\nin signs; the mathematician in formul\u00e6. In some languages, as in\nChinese, the visual element is as necessary to thought as the phonetic,\nif not more so.[14] In this he may have overshot the mark, and failed\nto establish the autonomy of expression with regard to logical thought;\nfor his examples only confirm the fact that if we can think without\nwords, we cannot think without expressions.[15] But he successfully\ndemonstrates that concept and word, logical judgement and proposition,\nare incommensurable. The proposition is not the judgement but the\nrepresentation (_Darstellung_) of a judgement; and all propositions do\nnot represent logical judgements. It is possible to express several\njudgements in a single proposition. The logical divisions of judgements\n(the relations of concepts) find no counterpart in the grammatical\ndivisions of propositions. \"A logical form of the proposition is just\nas much a contradiction as the angle of a circle or the circumference\nof a triangle.\" He who talks, in so far as he talks, possesses not\nthoughts but language.[16]\n\n[Sidenote: _Identity of the problems of the origin and the nature of\nlanguage._]\n\nHaving thus freed language from all dependence on Logic, having\nrepeatedly proclaimed the principle that language produces its forms\nindependently of Logic and in the fullest autonomy,[17] and having\npurified Humboldt's theory from the taint of the logical grammar of\nPort Royal, Steinthal seeks the origin of language, recognizing, with\nhis master, that the question of its origin is identical with that of\nnature of language, its psychological genesis or rather the position\nit occupies in evolution of the spirit. \"In the matter of language\nthere is no difference between its original creation (_Ursch\u00f6pfung_)\nand the creation which is daily repeated.\"[18] Language belongs to the\nvast class of reflex movements; but to say that is to look at it from\none side only and to omit its own essential peculiarity. Animals have\nreflex movements and sensations like man; but in animals the senses\n\"are wide gates through which external nature rushes to the assault\nwith such impetus as to overwhelm the mind and deprive it of all\nindependence and freedom of movement.\" In man, however, language can\narise because man is resistance to nature, conqueror of his own body,\nfreedom incarnate: \"language is liberation: even to-day we feel our\nmind lightened and freed from a weight when we speak.\" In the situation\nimmediately preceding the production of speech man must be conceived as\n\"accompanying all his sensations and all the intuitions received by his\nmind with the most lively contortions of body, attitudes of mimicry,\ngestures, and above all tones, articulate tones.\" What element of\nspeech did he lack? One only, but a most important one: the conscious\nconjunction of reflex bodily movements with the excitations of his\nmind. If sensuous consciousness is already consciousness, it lacks the\nconsciousness of being conscious; if it is already intuition, it is\nnot intuition of intuition; what it lacks is in a word the internal\nform of speech. When that arises, there arises too its inseparable\naccompaniment, words. Man does not select sound: it is given him,\nand he takes it of necessity, instinctively, without intention or\nchoice.[19]\n\n[Sidenote: _Steinthal's mistaken ideas on art: his failure to unite\nLinguistic and \u00c6sthetic._]\n\nThis is not the place for detailed examination of the whole of\nSteinthal's theory and the various phases, not always progressive,\nthrough which he travelled, especially after the beginning of\nhis spiritual collaboration with Lazarus, with whom he studied\nethnopsychology (_V\u00f6lkerpsychologie_), of which they both took\nLinguistic to be a part.[20] But, while giving him full credit for\nbringing Humboldt's ideas into coherent order, and for clearly\ndifferentiating, as had never before been done, between linguistic\nactivity and the activity of logical thought, it must be noted\nthat Steintha! never recognized the identity of the internal form\nof language (which he also called the intuition of intuition, or\napperception) with the \u00e6sthetic imagination. The Herbartian psychology\nto which he clung afforded him no clue to such a discovery. Herbart and\nhis followers divorced psychology from logic as a normative science\nand never succeeded in discerning the true connection between feeling\nand spiritual formation, soul and spirit; they never understood that\nlogical thought is one of these spiritual formations: an activity, not\na code of external laws. The domain allotted by them to \u00c6sthetic we\nalready know; for them \u00c6sthetic too was only another code of beautiful\nformal relations. Under the influence of these doctrines Steinthal\nwas led to regard Art as the embellishment of thoughts, Linguistic as\nthe science of speech, and Rhetoric or \u00c6sthetic as a thing differing\nfrom Linguistic since it is science of fine or beautiful speaking.[21]\nIn one of his innumerable tracts he says, \"Poetics and Rhetoric both\ndiffer from Linguistic, since they are obliged to touch on many\nimportant topics before reaching language. These sciences therefore\nhave but one section devoted to Linguistic, which is the concluding\nsection of Syntax. Moreover Syntax has a character entirely different\nfrom Rhetoric and from Poetics; the former is occupied solely with\ncorrectness (_Richtigkeit)_ of language; the latter two sciences\nstudy beauty or grace of expression (_Sch\u00f6nheit oder Angemessenheit\ndes Ausdrucks_): the principles of the first are merely grammatical,\nthe others must consider matters outside language; for example, the\ndisposition of the orator and so forth. To speak plainly, Syntax is\nto Stylistic as is the grammatical measure of the quantity of vowels\nto the theory of metre.\"[22] That speaking invariably means good or\nbeautiful speaking, since speech that is neither good nor beautiful is\nnot really speech,[23] and that the radical renewal of the concept of\nlanguage inaugurated by Humboldt and himself must produce far-reaching\neffects on the cognate sciences of Poetics, Rhetoric and \u00c6sthetic and,\nby transforming, unify them, never entered Steinthal's head. After\nall this labour and all this minute analysis, the identification of\nlanguage and poetry, and of the science of language with the science of\npoetry, the identification of Linguistic with \u00c6sthetic, still found its\nleast faulty expression in the prophetic aphorisms of Giambattista Vico.\n\n\n[1] _Antihermes oder philosophische Untersuchung \u00fcb. d. reine Begriff\nd. menschl. Sprache und die allgemeine Sprachlehre,_ Frankfurt and\nLeipzig, 1795.\n\n[2] For these writers, see accounts and quotations in Loewe, _Hist,\ncrit. gramm. univ., passim,_ and Pott, introd. to Humboldt, pp.\nclxxi.-ccxii.; cf. also Benfey, _Gesch. d. Sprachwiss.,_ introd.\n\n[3] In _Philos, der Mythologie_: cf. Steinthal, _Urspr._ pp. 81-89.\n\n[4] _\u00dcb. d. Verschiedenheit d. menschl. Sprachbaues,_ posthumous work\n(2nd ed. by A. F. Pott, Berlin, 1880).\n\n[5] _Verschiedenheit_, etc. pp. 308-310.\n\n[6] _Verschiedenheit,_ etc., pp. 54-56.\n\n[7] _Verschiedenheit,_ etc., pp. 25, 73-74, 79.\n\n[8] _Op. cit._ pp. 105-118.\n\n[9] Zimmermann, _G. d. A._ pp. 533-544.\n\n[10] _Verschiedenheit,_ etc., pp. 326-328.\n\n[11] _Op. cit._ pp. 239-240.\n\n[12] _Op. cit._ pp. 205-206, 547, etc.\n\n[13] _Grammatik, Logik und Psychologie, ihre Principien u. ihr\nVerh\u00e4ltn. z. einand.,_ Berlin, 1855.\n\n[14] _Gramm., Log. u. Psych._ pp. 153-158.\n\n[15] See above, pp. 28-30.\n\n[16] _Gramm., Log. u. Psych,_ pp. 183, 195.\n\n[17] _Einleitung i. d. Psych, u. Sprachwissenschaft_ (2nd ed., Berlin,\n1881), p. 62.\n\n[18] _Gramm., Log. u. Psych,_ p. 231.\n\n[19] _Op. cit._ pp. 285, 292, 295-306.\n\n[20] Steinthal, _Ursprung d. Sprache_ (4th ed. Berlin, 1888), pp.\n120-124. M. Lazarus, _Das Leben der Seele,_ 1855 (Berlin, 1876-1878),\nvol. ii. _Zeitschrift f. V\u00f6lkerpsych. u. Sprachwiss._ from 1860\nonwards, edited by Steinthal and Lazarus together.\n\n[21] _Gramm., Log. u. Psych,_ pp. 139-140, 146.\n\n[22] _Einleit._ pp. 34-35.\n\n[23] See above, pp. 78-79.\n\n\n\n\nXIII\n\n\nMINOR GERMAN \u00c6STHETICIANS\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Minor \u00e6stheticians in the metaphysical school._]\n\n\nWhen we turn from the pages of methodical and serious thinkers such as\nSchleiermacher, Humboldt and Steinthal, we are filled with distaste\nby the books written in enormous quantities during the first half of\nthe nineteenth century by disciples of Schelling and Hegel. We are\nfatigued and almost disgusted as we pass from this illuminating and\nscientific study to something which oscillates between vapid fancies\nand charlatanism; between the vanity of empty formul\u00e6 and the attempt,\nnot always free from dishonesty, to employ them in order to amaze and\noverwhelm the reader or student.\n\n[Sidenote: _Krause, Trahndorff, Weisse and others._]\n\nWhy should we encumber a general History of \u00c6sthetic (which ought,\ncertainly, to take account of aberrations from the truth, but only in\nso far as they indicate the general trend of contemporary thought) with\nthe theories of such men as Krause, Trahndorff, Weisse, Deutinger,\nOersted, Zeising, Eckardt and the crowd of manipulators of manuals and\nsystems? The only one who obtained a hearing outside his native Germany\nwas Krause, who was imported into Spain; we are justified, therefore,\nin leaving them to the memory or forgetfulness of their compatriots.\nFor Krause,[1] the humanitarian, the freethinker, the theosophist,\neverything is organism, everything is beauty; beauty is organism, and\norganism is beauty: Essence, that is to say God, is one, free and\nentire; one, free and entire is Beauty. There is but one artist, God;\nbut one art, the divine. The beauty of finite things is the Divinity,\nor rather the likeness of Divinity manifested in the finite. Beauty\nbrings into play reason, intellect and imagination in a mode conforming\nto their laws, and awakens disinterested pleasure and inclination in\nthe soul. Trahndorff,[2] describing the various degrees by which the\nindividual seeks to grasp the essence or form of the universe (the\ndegrees of feeling, intuition, reflexion and presentiment), and noting\nthe insufficiency of simple theoretical knowledge till supplemented\nby the Will, the Will which is power (_K\u00f6nnen_), in its three degrees\nof Aspiration, Faith and Love, places the Beautiful in the highest\ngrade, in Love: it would seem, therefore, that Beauty is Love which\ncomprehends itself. Christian Weisse[3] attempted, like Trahndorff, to\nreconcile the God of Christianity with the Hegelian philosophy: in his\nestimation the \u00e6sthetic Idea is superior to the logical, and leads to\nreligion, to God; the idea of beauty, existing outside the sensible\nuniverse, is the reality of the concept of beauty, and, as the idea of\ndivinity is absolute Love, so must that of Beauty be found truly in\nLove. The same reconciliation was attempted by the Catholic theologian\nDeutinger;[4] beauty, for him, is born of power (_K\u00f6nnen_), an activity\nparallel with those of the knowledge of truth and the doing of good\nbut (differing in this from knowledge, which is receptive) realizing\nitself in an outward movement from within, mastering the world of\nmatter and imprinting upon it the seal of personality. An internal\nideal intuition, the Idea: an external shapable matter: the power of\ninterpenetrating internal with external, invisible with visible, ideal\nwith real: such is Beauty. Oersted[5] (the celebrated Danish naturalist\nwhose works were translated into German and gained him a considerable\nreputation in Germany) defines beauty as the objective Idea in the\nmoment of subjective contemplation: the Idea expressed in things in so\nfar as it reveals itself to intuition. Zeising[6] turned his attention\npartly to exploration of the mysteries of the golden section, and\npartly to speculations on Beauty, which he considered as one of the\nthree forms of the Idea; first, the Idea which expresses itself in\nobject and subject; secondly, the Idea as intuition; and thirdly, the\nAbsolute which appears in the world and is conceived intuitively by\nthe spirit. Eckardt,[7] intent on creating a theistic \u00c6sthetic which\nshould avoid the one-sided transcendence of deism on the one hand and\nthe one-sided immanence of pantheism on the other, maintained that its\nprinciples must be sought not in the feelings of the contemplator, not\nin works of art, not in the idea of the beautiful, not in the concept\nof art, but in the creative spirit of the artist, the original fount\nof beauty; and since a creative artist cannot be conceived except as\nderived from the highest creative genius which is God, Eckardt invokes\naid from a psychology of God (_eine Psychologie des Weltk\u00fcnstlers_).\n\n[Sidenote: _Fried. Theodor Vischer._]\n\nIf quantity is as important as quality, we must devote some space to\nFriedrich Theodor Vischer, the bulkiest of all German \u00e6stheticians,\nindeed the German \u00e6sthetician _par excellence_: after publishing a book\non _The Sublime and the Comic, a contribution to the Philosophy of\nthe Beautiful_,[8] in 1837, he produced four huge tomes on _\u00c6sthetic\nas Science of the Beautiful_ between 1846 and 1857,[9] where, in\nhundreds of paragraphs and long observations and sub-observations, is\nmassed a stupendous amount of \u00e6sthetic material, of matter foreign to\n\u00c6sthetic, and of subjects taken haphazard from the whole thinkable\nuniverse. Vischer's work is divided into three parts: a Metaphysic of\nthe Beautiful, which investigates the concept of Beauty in itself, no\nmatter where and how it is realized: a treatise on concrete Beauty,\nwhich inquires into the two one-sided modes of realization, Beauty\nof nature and Beauty of imagination, one lacking subjective, the\nother lacking objective, existence: lastly, a theory of the arts,\nwhich studies the synthesis in art of the two artistic moments, the\nphysical and psychical, the objective and subjective. It is easy to\nsum up Vischer's concept of \u00e6sthetic activity; it is Hegel's concept,\ndebased. For Vischer, Beauty belongs neither to the theoretical nor to\nthe practical activity, but is placed in a serene sphere, superior to\nthese antitheses; that is to say in the sphere of absolute Spirit, in\ncompany with Religion and Philosophy;[10] but, in contradistinction to\nHegel, Vischer assigns the first place in this sphere to Religion, the\nsecond to Art, and the third to Philosophy. Much ingenuity was devoted\nin those days to moving these words about like pieces on a chess-board;\nit has been observed that of the six possible combinations of the\nthree terms Art, Religion and Philosophy, four were actually adopted:\nby Schelling, _P.R.A._; by Hegel, _A.R.P._; by Weisse, _P.A.R._; and\nby Vischer, _R.A.P_.[11] But Vischer himself[12] states that Wirth,\nauthor of a _System of Ethics_,[13] opted for the fifth combination,\n_R.P.A.,_ which leaves us but the sixth, _A.P.R.,_ unclaimed, unless\n(as is not improbable) some unrecognized genius seized upon it and made\nit the text of his system. Beauty, therefore, as the second form of\nthe absolute Spirit, is the realization of the Idea, not as abstract\nconcept but as union of concept and reality; and the Idea determines\nitself as species (_Gattung_), and every idea of a species, even on the\nlowest degree, is beautiful as being an integral part in the totality\nof Ideas; although the higher the degree of the idea the greater is\nits beauty.[14] Highest of all degrees is that of human personality:\n\"in this spiritual world the Idea attains its true significance; the\nname of idea is given to the great moral motive powers to which the\nconcept of species may also be applied in the sense that they stand\nto their restricted spheres in the same relation in which the genus\nstands to its species and individuals.\" At the head of all is the Idea\nof morality: \"the world of moral and autonomous ends is destined to\nfurnish the most important, the most worthy content of the Beautiful\";\nwith the warning, however, that Beauty, in actualizing this world\nthrough intuition, excludes art having a moral tendency.[15] So Vischer\nproceeds now to degrade Hegel's Idea to the simple class-concept,\nnow to couple it with the idea of the Good; now, in accord with the\nteaching of his master, to make it different from, yet superior to,\nintellect and morality.\n\n[Sidenote: _Other tendencies._]\n\nFrom the first, the Herbartian formalism was little studied and less\nfollowed: two writers, Griepenkerl in 1827 and Bobrik in 1834, made\nsome attempt to develop and apply the cursory notes with which Herbart\ncontented himself.[16] Schleiermacher's lectures, even before their\nappearance in book form, had served as basis for a series of elegant\ndissertations by Erich Ritter (1840)[17] (better known as a historian\nof philosophy); his work is of little value, for instead of dwelling\non the important points of the master's doctrine Ritter brings into\nprominence secondary matters relating to sociability and the \u00e6sthetic\nfife. A penetrating critic of German \u00c6sthetic from Baumgarten to the\npost-Kantian school was Wilhelm Theodor Danzel, who lived about this\ntime and very properly rebelled against the claim to find \"thought\" in\nworks of art: \"Artistic thought:\" he writes; \"unhappy phrase, which\nhelped to condemn an entire epoch to the Sisyphean labour of trying to\nreduce art to intellectual and rational thinking! The thought of a\nwork of art is nothing save that which is contemplated in a definite\nway; it is not represented, as is commonly asserted, in a work of art,\nit is the work of art itself. Artistic thought can never be expressed\nby concepts and words.\"[18] By his early death Danzel ended the hopes\nhe raised by his original views on the science and history of \u00c6sthetic.\n\n[Sidenote: _Theory of the Beautiful in nature, and that of the\nModifications of Beauty._]\n\nThe post-Hegelian metaphysical \u00c6sthetic is chiefly noteworthy for\nthe fuller development of two theories or, to speak more accurately,\nof two very curious combinations of arbitrary assertion and fanciful\ncaprice: the so-called theory of Natural Beauty, and the theory of\nModifications of the Beautiful. Neither of the two had any intimate\nor necessary connexion with this philosophical movement, to which\nthey are rather linked by historical or psychological causes; by the\nrelationship between facts of pleasure and pain and the inclination\ntowards mysticism; by the confusion arising from the really \u00e6sthetic\n(imaginative) quality of some representations wrongly described as\nobservation of natural beauties; or by the scholastic and literary\ntradition of discussing these cases of pleasure and pain and\nextra-\u00e6sthetic natural beauties in books devoted to the discussion\nof art.[19] These metaphysicians were sometimes rather grotesque\nand remind one of the story told of Paisiello, that in the fury of\ncomposition he set even the stage directions of his libretto to music;\nbitten with the rage for construction and dialectic, they did not spare\neven the indexes of chaotic old books, but seized on them as suitable\nmaterial for a dialectical exercise.\n\n[Sidenote: _Development of the first theory. Herder._]\n\nBeginning with the theory of Natural Beauty, observations on beautiful\nnatural objects are found among the inquiries of the ancient\nphilosophers on beauty, and especially among the mystical effusions\nof neo-Platonists and their followers in the Middle Ages and the\nRenaissance.[20] Less frequently such questions were introduced into\ntreatises on Poetics: Tesauro (1654) is among the first who, in his\n_Cannochiale aristotelico,_ discusses not only the conceits of men, but\nalso of God, the angels, nature and animals; and somewhat later (1707)\nMuratori speaks of \"the beauty of matter,\" of which examples are \"the\ngods, a flower, the sun, a rivulet.\"[21] Observations on that which\nis outside art and is merely natural, are made by Crousaz, by Andr\u00e9,\nand especially by those authors of the eighteenth century who wrote\non Beauty and Art in an empirical and gallant style.[22] It was the\ninfluence of these persons that led Kant, as we have seen, to sever the\ntheory of beauty from that of art, specially connecting free beauty\nwith objects of nature and those productions of man which reproduce\nnatural beauties.[23] When the adversary of Kant's theory of \u00c6sthetic,\nHerder (1800), in his sketch of an ethical system united spirit and\nnature, pleasure and value, feeling and intellect, he inevitably made\nmuch of natural beauty, and affirmed that everything in nature has its\nown beauty, the expression of its own greatest content, and that this\naccounts for the ascending scale of beautiful objects: beginning with.\noutlines, colours and tones, light and sound, and proceeding by way of\nflowers, water and sea, to birds, terrestrial animals, and man himself.\nFor instance \"a bird is the sum of the properties and perfections of\nits element, a representation of its potency, a creature of light, song\nand air\"; amongst terrestrial animals, the ugliest are those resembling\nman, as the melancholy moping monkey; the most beautiful, those of\nperfect build, well proportioned, noble, free in action; those which\nexpress sweetness; those, in fine, which live in harmony and happiness,\nendowed with a perfection of their own, harmless to man.[24]\n\n[Sidenote: _Schelling, Solger, Hegel._]\n\nSchelling, on the contrary, utterly, denies the concept of beauty\nin nature, and considers that such beauty is purely accidental and\nthat art alone supplies the norm by which it can be discovered and\njudged.[25] Solger also excludes natural beauty;[26] so does Hegel,\nwho distinguishes himself not by denying it but by proceeding with\nthe utmost inconsequence to deal at length with the beautiful in\nnature. It is in fact not clear whether he means that really no beauty\nexists in nature and that man introduces it in his vision of things,\nor whether natural beauty really exists though inferior in degree\nto the beauty of art. \"The beauty of art,\" he says,\" stands higher\nthan that of nature; it is beauty born and reborn by the work of the\nspirit, and spirit alone is truth and reality; hence beauty is truly\nbeauty only when it participates in spirit and is produced therefrom.\nTaken in this sense, the beauty of nature appears as a mere reflexion\nof the beauty appertaining to spirit, as an imperfect and incomplete\nmode, which substantially is contained within the spirit itself.\" In\nconfirmation, he adds that nobody has attempted a systematic exposition\nof natural beauties, whereas there actually is, from the point of view\nof the utility of natural objects, a _materia medica_[27] But the\nsecond chapter of the first part of his \u00c6sthetic is devoted precisely\nto natural Beauty on the ground that, in order to grasp the idea of\nartistic beauty in its entirety, three stages must be traversed: beauty\nin general, natural beauty (whose defects show the necessity for art),\nand, lastly, the Idea; \"the first existence of the Idea is nature,\nand its first beauty is natural beauty.\" This beauty, which is beauty\nfor us and not for itself, has several phases, from that in which the\nconcept is immersed in matter to the point of disappearing, such as\nphysical facts and isolated mechanisms, to that higher phase in which\nphysical facts are united in systems (_e.g._ the solar system); but\nthe Idea first reaches a true and real existence in organic facts, in\nthe living creature. And even the living creature is liable to the\ndistinction between beautiful and ugly; for example, among animals,\nthe sloth, trailing itself laboriously and incapable of animation or\nactivity, displeases us by its apathetic somnolence; nor can beauty be\nfound in amphibians or in many kinds of fish, or in crocodiles, or\ntoads, as well as in many insects and especially in those equivocal\ncreatures which express a transition from one i class to another, such\nas the ornithorhyncus, a mixture of bird and beast.[28] These samples\nmay suffice to show the general trend of Hegel's doctrine of natural\nbeauty; elsewhere he discusses the external beauty of abstract form,\nregularity, symmetry, harmony, etc., which are; precisely the concepts\nwhich the formalism of Herbart placed in the heaven of the Ideas of the\nBeautiful.\n\n[Sidenote: _Schleiermacher._]\n\nSchleiermacher, who praised Hegel for his attempt to exclude natural\nbeauty from his \u00c6sthetic, excluded it from his own not verbally but\nactually, by confining his attention to the artistic perfection of\nthe internal image formed by the energy of the human spirit.[29] But\nthe so-called Feeling for Nature which came in with Romanticism, and\nthe _Cosmos_ and other descriptive works of Humboldt,[30] directed\nattention increasingly to the impressions awakened by natural facts.\n\n[Sidenote: _Alexander Humboldt._]\n\nThis led to the compilation of those systematic lists of natural\nbeauties whose impossibility had been proclaimed by Hegel, though he\nhimself had furnished an example of them; amongst others, Bratranek\npublished an _\u00c6sthetic of the Vegetable World._[31]\n\n[Sidenote: _Vischer's \"\u00c6sthetic Physics.\"_]\n\nThe best-known and most widely circulated treatment of the subject was\ncontained in this very work of Vischer's; who following Hegel's example\ndevoted a section of his _\u00c6sthetic,_ as we have seen, to the objective\nexistence of Beauty, _i.e._ to the Beauty of nature, and entitled it by\nthe perhaps new and certainly characteristic name of \u00c6sthetic Physics\n(_\u00e4sthetische Physik_). This \u00c6sthetic Physics comprised the beauty of\ninorganic nature (light, heat, air, water, earth); organic nature, with\nits four vegetable types and its animals vertebrate and invertebrate;\nand beauty of human beings, divided into generic and historic. The\ngeneric was subdivided into sections on the beauty of general forms\n(age, sex, conditions, love, marriage, family); of special forms\n(races, peoples, culture, political life); and of individual forms\n(temperament and character). Historical beauty included that of\nancient history (Oriental, Greek, Roman), of Medi\u00e6val or Germanic, and\nof modern times; because, according to Vischer, it was the duty of\n\u00c6sthetic to cast a glance over universal history before summing up the\ndifferent degrees of the beautiful according to the varying phases of\nthe struggle for freedom against nature.[32]\n\n[Sidenote: _The Theory of the Modifications of Beauty. From antiquity\nto the eighteenth century._]\n\nAs regards the Modifications of Beauty, it should be remembered that\nthe ancient manuals of Poetics, and more frequently those of Rhetoric,\ncontained more or less scientific definitions of psychological states\nand facts; Aristotle attempted in his _Poetics_ to determine the nature\nof a tragic action or personality, and sketched a definition of the\ncomic; in his Rhetoric he writes at considerable length of wit;[33]\nsections of the _De oratore_ of Cicero and the _Institutions_ of\nQuintilian[34] are devoted to wit and the comic; the lofty style was\nthe subject of a lost treatise of C\u00e6cilius, which anticipated that\nattributed to Longinus, whose title was translated in modern times\nas _De sublimitate_ or _On the Sublime._ Following the example of\nthe ancients, this kind of medley was perpetuated by writers of the\nsixteenth and seventeenth centuries; whole treatises on the comic are\nincorporated in, for instance, the _Argutezza_ of Matteo Pellegrini\n(1639) and the _Cannochiale_ of Tesauro. La Bruy\u00e8re treated of the\nsublime[35] and Boileau by his translation gave a fresh vogue to\nLonginus: the following century saw Burke inquiring into the origin\nof our ideas of the beautiful and the sublime, and deriving the\nformer from the instinct for sociability, the latter from that of\nself-preservation; he also tried to define ugliness, grace, elegance\nand extraordinary beauty; Home, in his celebrated _Elements of\nCriticism,_ discussed grandeur, sublimity, the ridiculous, wit,\ndignity and grace: Mendelssohn discussed sublimity, dignity and\ngrace in fine art, and described some of these facts as due to mixed\nfeelings, in which he was followed by Lessing[36] and others: Sulzer\nwelcomed all these various concepts into his \u00e6sthetic encyclop\u00e6dia\nand collected round them an elaborate bibliography. A new and curious\nmeaning of the word humour reached the continent from England at this\ntime. Its original meaning was simply \"temperament,\" and sometimes\n\"spirit,\" or \"wit\" (\"_belli umori_\" in Italy; in the seventeenth\ncentury there was in Rome an Academy of _Umoristi_). Voltaire\nintroduced it into France and wrote in 1761, \"_Les Anglais ont un terme\npour signifier cette plaisanterie, ce vrai comique, cette gaiet\u00e9, cette\nurbanit\u00e9, ces saillies, qui \u00e9chappent \u00e0 un homme sans qu'il s'en doute;\net ils rendent cette id\u00e9e par le mot_ humour ...\";[37] in 1767 Lessing\ndistinguishes humour from the German _Laune_ (caprice, whim),[38] a\ndistinction maintained by Herder in 1769 in opposition to Riedel who\nhad confused the terms.[39]\n\n[Sidenote: _Kant and the post-Kantians._]\n\nAccustomed to find all these subjects treated in the same book,\nphilosophers at first theorized about them all without attempting to\nlink them up together by introducing an artificial logical connexion.\nKant, who had already in imitation of Burke written in 1764 a\ndissertation on the beautiful and the sublime, ingenuously remarked\nin the course of his lectures on Logic in 1771 that the beautiful and\nthe \u00e6sthetic are not identical, because \"the sublime also belongs to\n\u00c6sthetic\";[40] and in his _Critique of Judgment,_ while treating of\nthe comic in a mere digression (a magnificent piece of psychological\nanalysis)[41] places side by side with and as if on an equality with\nthe \"Analytic of Beauty,\" an \"Analytic of the Sublime.\"[42] We may\nnote in passing that, before the publication of the third Critique,\nHeydenreich arrived at the same doctrine of the sublime which is\ncontained in Kant's book.[43] Did Kant ever think of uniting the\nbeautiful and the sublime and deducing them from a single concept?\nApparently not. By his declaration that the principle of beauty must\nbe sought outside ourselves, and that of the sublime within us, he\ntacitly assumes that the two objects are wholly disparate. In 1805 Ast,\na follower of Schelling, declared the necessity of overcoming what he\ncalled the Kantian dualism of the beautiful and the sublime:[44] others\nreproached Kant with having treated the comic by the psychological, not\nthe metaphysical, method. Schiller wrote a series of dissertations on\nthe tragic, the sentimental, the ingenuous, the sublime, the pathetic,\nthe trivial, the low, the dignified and the graceful, and their\nvarieties, the fascinating, the majestic, the grave, and the solemn.\nAnother artist, Jean Paul Richter, discoursed at great length on wit\nand humour, described by him as the romantic comic, or the sublime\nreversed (_umgekehrte Erhabene)_.[45]\n\nHerbart, in virtue of his formalistic principle, asserts that all\nthese concepts are irrelevant to \u00c6sthetic; he attributes them to the\nwork of art, not to pure beauty;[46] Schleiermacher comes to the same\nconclusion, but for much better reasons, as a result of his sane\nconception of art. Amongst other things he observes: \"It is usual\nto describe the beautiful and the sublime as two kinds of artistic\nperfection; and so accustomed have we grown to the union of these\ntwo concepts that we must make an effort to convince ourselves how\nvery far they are from being co-ordinate or from together exhausting\nthe concept of artistic perfection\"; he regrets that even the best\n\u00e6stheticians should give rhetorical descriptions of them instead of\ndemonstrating them. \"The thing,\" says he, \"is not right and just\" (_hat\nkeine Richtigkeit_), and he proceeds to exclude the whole subject from\nhis \u00c6sthetic,[47] as he had done previously in the case of natural\nbeauty. Other philosophers, however, clung persistently to their search\nfor a connexion between these various concepts, and called in dialectic\nto help them. The habit of applying dialectic to empirical concepts\naffected everybody at that time; even the great enemy of dialectic,\nHerbart, showed the cloven hoof, when in order to explain the union of\ndifferent \u00e6sthetic ideas in the beautiful he appealed to the formula\n\"they lose regularity in order to regain it.\"[48] Schelling asserted\nthat the sublime is the infinite in the finite, and the beautiful the\nfinite in the infinite, adding that the absolutely sublime includes the\nbeautiful, and the beautiful the sublime;[49] and Ast, whom we have\nmentioned already, spoke of a masculine, positive element, which is the\nsublime, and a feminine, negative element which is the graceful and\npleasing: between which there is a contrast and a struggle.\n\n[Sidenote: _Culmination of the development._]\n\nThese exercises in dialectical system-building developed and increased\ntill about the middle of the nineteenth century they assumed two\ndistinct forms whose history must here be shortly outlined.\n\n[Sidenote: _Double form of the theory. The overcoming of the ugly.\nSolger, Weisse and others._]\n\nThe first form may be called the Overcoming of the Ugly. This theory\nconceives the comic, the sublime, the tragic, the humorous, and so\nforth, as so many engagements in the war between the Ugly and the\nBeautiful, wherein the latter was invariably victorious, and arose by\nmeans of this war to more and more lofty and complex manifestations.\nThe second form of the theory may be described as the Passage from\nAbstract to Concrete; it held that Beauty cannot emerge from the\nabstract, cannot become this or that concrete beauty, except by\nparticularizing itself in the comic, tragic, sublime, humorous, or\nsome other modification. The first form was already well developed in\nSolgei, an adherent of the romantic theory of Irony: but historically\nit presupposes the \u00e6sthetic theory of the Ugly, first sketched by\nFriedrich Schlegel in 1797. We have already noted that Schlegel\nconsidered the characteristic or interesting, not the beautiful, to\nbe the principle of modern art; hence the importance attached by him\nto the piquant, the striking (_frappant_), the daring, the cruel, the\nugly.[50] Solger found here the basis for his dialectic; amongst other\nthings he maintains that the finite, earthly element may be dissolved\nand absorbed in the divine, which constitutes the tragic: or else the\ndivine element may be entirely corrupted by the earthly, producing the\ncomic.[51] These methods of Solger were followed by Weisse (1830), and\nby Ruge (1837); for the former, ugliness is \"the immediate existence of\nbeauty\" which is overcome in the sublime and the comic; for the latter,\nthe effort to achieve the Idea, or the Idea searching for itself,\ngenerates the sublime; when the Idea loses instead of discovering\nitself, ugliness is produced; when the Idea rediscovers itself and\nrises out of ugliness to new life, the comic.[52] A whole treatise\nentitled _The \u00c6sthetic of the Ugly_[53] was published by Rosenkranz in\n1853, presenting this concept as intermediate between the beautiful\nand the comic, and tracing it from its first origin to that \"sort\nof perfection\" it attains in the satanic. Passing from the common\n(_Gemeine)_ which is the petty, the weak, the low, and the sub-species\nof the low, viz. the usual, the casual, the arbitrary and the crude,\nRosenkranz goes on to describe the repugnant, trisected into the\nawkward, the dead and empty, and the horrible: thus he proceeds from\ntripartition to tripartition, dividing the horrible into the absurd,\nthe nauseating and the wicked: the wicked into criminal, spectral and\ndiabolical: the diabolical into demoniac, magical and satanic. He\nopposes the childish notion that ugliness acts as a foil to beauty\nin art, and justifies its introduction by the necessity for art to\nrepresent the entire appearance of the Idea; on the other hand he\nadmits that the ugly is not on the same level as the beautiful, for,\nif the beautiful can stand by itself alone, the other cannot do so and\nmust always be reflected by and in the beautiful.[54]\n\n[Sidenote: _Passage from abstract to concrete: Vischer._]\n\nThe second form prevailed with Vischer. The following extract will\nserve as an illustration of his manner: \"The Idea arouses itself from\nthe tranquil unity in which it was fused with the appearance and\npushes onward, affirming, in face of its own finitude, its infinity\";\nthis rebellion and transcendence is the sublime. \"But Beauty demands\nfull satisfaction for this disruption of its harmony: the violated\nright of the image must be reasserted: this can be accomplished only\nby means of a fresh contradiction, that is to say by the negative\nposition now taken up by the image towards the Idea by rejecting all\ninterpenetration with it and by affirming its own separate existence\nas the whole\"; this second moment is the comic, negation of a\nnegation.[55] The same process is further enriched and complicated by\nZeising, who compares the modifications of Beauty to the refraction of\ncolours: the three primary modifications, the sublime, the attractive\nand the humorous, correspond with the primary colours violet, orange\nand green; the three secondary, pure beauty, comic and tragic, to\nthe colours red, yellow and blue. Each of these six modifications\n(exactly like the degrees of the Ugly in Rosenkranz) branches out, like\nfireworks, into three rays: pure beauty into the decorous, noble and\npleasing: the attractive into graceful, interesting and piquant: the\ncomic into buffoonery, the diverting and burlesque: the humorous into\nthe quaint, capricious and melancholy: the tragic into the moving,\npathetic and demoniac: the sublime into the glorious, majestic and\nimposing.[56]\n\n[Sidenote: _The Legend of Sir Purebeauty._]\n\nAll the works of this period on \u00c6sthetic are filled in this way\nwith the _gest, chanson_ or romaunt of the knight Sir Purebeauty\n(_Reinschon)_ and his extraordinary adventures, recounted in two\nconflicting versions. According to one story, Sir Purebeauty is\nconstrained to abandon his beloved leisure by the Mephistophelean\ndevices of the temptress Ugliness, who leads him into countless\ndangers from which he invariably emerges victorious; his victories and\nsuccesses (his Marengo, Austerlitz and Jena) are called the Sublime,\nthe Comic, the Humorous and so forth. The other story tells how the\nknight, bored by his life of loneliness, sallies forth purposely to\nseek adversaries and occasions for fighting; he is always vanquished,\nbut even in his overthrow _ferum victorem capit,_ he transforms\nand irradiates the enemy. Beyond this artificial mythology, this\nlegend composed without the least imagination or literary skill,\nthis miserably dull tale, it is vain to look for anything whatever\nin the much elaborated theory of German \u00e6stheticians known as the\nModifications of Beauty.\n\n\n[1] _Abriss der \u00c4sthetik,_ post. 1837; _Vorlesung \u00fcb. \u00c4sth._\n(1828-1829), post. 1882.\n\n[2] _\u00c4sthetik,_ Berlin, 1827.\n\n[3] _\u00c4sthetik,_ Leipzig, 1830; _System d. \u00c4sth.,_ lectures, post.\nLeipzig, 1872.\n\n[4] _Kunstlehre,_ Ratisbon, 1845-1846 (_Grundlinien einer positiven\nPhilosophie,_ vols. iv. v.).\n\n[5] _Der Geist in der Natur,_ 1850-1851; _Neue Beitrage z. d. Geist i.\nd. Natur,_ post. 1855.\n\n[6] _\u00c4sthetische Forschungen,_ Frankfurt a. M. 1855.\n\n[7] _Die theistische Begr\u00fcndung d. \u00c4sthetik im Gegensatz z. d.\npantheistichen,_ Jena, 1857; same author, _Vorschule d. \u00c4sth.,_\nKarlsruhe, 1864-1865.\n\n[8] _\u00dcb. d. Erhabene u. Komische,_ Stuttgart, 1837.\n\n[9] _\u00c4sthetik oder Wissenschaft d. Sch\u00f6nen,_ Reutlingen, Leipzig and\nStuttgart, 1846-1857, 3 parts in 4 vols.\n\n[10] _\u00c4sth._ introd. \u00a7\u00a7 2-5.\n\n[11] Hartmann, _Dtsch. \u00c4sth. s. Kant,_ p. 217, note.\n\n[12] _\u00c4sth._ introd. \u00a7 5.\n\n[13] _System der spekulativen Ethik,_ Heilbronn, 1841-1842.\n\n[14] _\u00c4sth._ \u00a7\u00a7 15-17.\n\n[15] _Op. cit._ \u00a7\u00a7 19-24.\n\n[16] Griepenkerl, _Lehrb. d. \u00c4sth.,_ Brunswick, 1827. Bobrik, _Freie\nVertr\u00e4ge \u00fcb. \u00c4sth.,_ Z\u00fcrich, 1834.\n\n[17] _\u00dcb. d. Principien d. \u00c4sth.,_ Kiel, 1840.\n\n[18] _Ges. Aufs._ pp. 216-221.\n\n[19] See above, pp. 87-93.\n\n[20] See above, pp. 179-180.\n\n[21] _Cannochiale arist._ ch. 3: _Perfetta poesia,_ bk. I. chs. 6, 8.\n\n[22] See above, pp. 205-206, 258-261.\n\n[23] See above, pp. 275-277.\n\n[24] _Kaligone, op. cit._ pp. 55-90.\n\n[25] _System d. transcend. Ideal,_ part vi. \u00a7 2.\n\n[26] _Vorles. \u00fcb. \u00c4sth._ p. 4.\n\n[27] _Vorles. \u00fcb. \u00c4sth._ I. pp. 4-5.\n\n[28] _Vorles. \u00fcb. \u00c4sth._ I. pp. 148-180.\n\n[29] _Op. cit._ introd.\n\n[30] _Ansichten der Natur,_ 1088; _Kosmos,_ 1845-1858.\n\n[31] _\u00c4sthetik. Pflanzenwelt,_ Leipzig, 1853.\n\n[32] _\u00c4sth._ \u00a7 341.\n\n[33] _Poet._ 5. 13-14; _Rhet._ iii. 10, 18.\n\n[34] _De orat._ ii. 54-71; _Inst. orat._ vi. 3.\n\n[35] _Caract\u00e8res,_ I.\n\n[36] _Hamb. Dramat._ Nos. 74-75.\n\n[37] Letter to abb\u00e9 d'Olivet, August 20, 1761.\n\n[38] _Hamb. Dramat._ No. 93; in _Werke, ed. cit._ xii. pp. 170-171,\nnote.\n\n[39] _Kritische W\u00e4lder,_ in _Werke, ed. cit._ iv. pp. 182-186.\n\n[40] Schlapp, _op. cit._ p. 55.\n\n[41] _Kr. d. Urth., Anmerkung,_ \u00a7 54.\n\n[42] _Op. cit._ bk. ii. \u00a7\u00a7 23-29.\n\n[43] _System d. \u00c4sth._ introd. p. xxxvi _n._\n\n[44] _System der Kunstlehre:_ cf. Hartmann, _op. cit._ p. 387.\n\n[45] _Vorschule d. \u00c4sth._ chs. 6-9.\n\n[46] See above, pp. 309-310.\n\n[47] _Vorles. \u00fcb. \u00c4sth._ p. 240 _seqq._\n\n[48] Cf. Zimmermann, _G. d. \u00c4sth._ p. 788.\n\n[49] _Philos, d. Kunst,_ \u00a7\u00a7 65-66.\n\n[50] Cf. Hartmann, _Deutsch. \u00c4sth. s. Kant,_ pp. 363-364.\n\n[51] _Vorles \u00fcb. \u00c4sth._ p. 85.\n\n[52] _Neue Vorschule d. \u00c4sth._ Halle, 1837.\n\n[53] K. Rosenkranz, _\u00c4sthetik des H\u00e4sslichen,_ K\u0153nigsberg, 1853.\n\n[54] _\u00c4sth. d. H\u00e4ssl._ pp. 36-40.\n\n[55] _\u00c4sth._ \u00a7\u00a7 83-84, 154-155.\n\n[56] _\u00c4sth. Forsch._ p. 413.\n\n\n\n\nXIV\n\n\n\u00c6STHETIC IN FRANCE, ENGLAND AND ITALY DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE\nNINETEENTH CENTURY\n\n\n[Sidenote: _\u00c6sthetic movement in France: Cousin, Jouffroy._]\n\nIn the last quarter of the eighteenth century and the first half of\nthe nineteenth century German thought, notwithstanding the glaring\nerrors which vitiated it, and were soon to bring about a violent and\nindeed exaggerated reaction, must on the whole be awarded the foremost\nplace in the general history of European thought as well as in the\nindividual study of \u00c6sthetic, the contemporary philosophy of other\ncountries standing on an inferior level of the second and third degree.\nFrance still lay under the dominion of the sensationalism of Condillac\nand, at the opening of the century, was quite incapable of grasping\nthe spiritual activity of art. A faint gleam of Winckelmann's abstract\nspiritualism just appears in the theories of Quatrem\u00e8re de Quincy, who,\nin criticism of \u00c9meric-David (in his turn a critic of ideal beauty and\nan adherent of the imitation of nature),[1] maintained that the arts\nof design have pure beauty, devoid of individual character, as their\nobjective; they depict man and not; men.[2] Some sensationalists, such\nas Bonstetten, vainly endeavoured to trace the peculiar processes\nof imagination in life and in art.[3] Followers of the orthodox\nspiritualism of the French universities date the beginning of a new\nera, and the foundation of \u00c6sthetic in France, to 1818, the year when\nVictor Cousin first delivered at the Sorbonne his lectures on the\nTrue, the Beautiful and the Good, which later formed his book with the\nsame name, frequently reprinted.[4] These lectures of Cousin are but\npoor stuff, although some scraps of Kant are to be found in them here\nand there; he denies the identity of the beautiful with the pleasant\nor useful, and substitutes the affirmation of a threefold beauty,\nphysical, intellectual and moral, the last being the true ideal beauty,\nhaving its foundations in God; he says that art expresses ideal Beauty,\nthe infinite, God, that genius is the power of creation, and that taste\nis a mixture of fancy, sentiment and reason.[5] Academic phrases all\nof them; pompous and void and, for that very reason, well received. Of\nmuch greater value were the lectures on \u00c6sthetic delivered by Th\u00e9odore\nJouffroy in 1822, before a small audience, and published posthumously\nin 1843.[6] Jouffroy allowed a beauty of expression, to be found alike\nin art and nature: a beauty of imitation, consisting in the perfect\naccuracy with which a model is reproduced: a beauty of idealisation,\nwhich reproduces the model, accentuating a particular quality in\norder to give it greater significance: and, finally, a beauty of the\ninvisible or of content, reducible to force (physical, sensible,\nintellectual, moral), which, as force, awakens sympathy. Ugliness is\nthe negation of this sympathetic beauty; its species or modifications\nare the sublime and the graceful. One sees that Jouffroy did not\nsucceed in isolating the strictly \u00e6sthetic fact in his analysis and\ngave, instead of a scientific system, little beyond explanations of the\nuse of words. He could not see or understand that expression, imitation\nand idealization are identical with each other and with artistic\nactivity. Moreover he had many curious ideas, chiefly concerning\nexpression. He said that if we were to see a drunkard with all the\nmost disgusting symptoms of intoxication on a road where there was also\nan unhewn rock, we should be pleased by the drunken man, since he had\nexpression, and not by the rock, since it had none. Beside Jouffroy,\nwhose theories, crude and immature though they be, reveal an inquiring\nmind, it is hardly worth while to cite Lamennais,[7] who like Cousin\nregarded art as the manifestation of the infinite through the finite,\nof the absolute through the relative. French Romanticism in de Bonald,\nde Barante and Mme. de Sta\u00ebl had defined literature as \"the expression\nof society,\" had honoured, under German influence, the characteristic\nand the grotesque,[8] and had proclaimed the independence of art by\nmeans of the formula \"art for art's sake\"; but these vague affirmations\nor aphorisms did not supersede, philosophically speaking, the old\ndoctrine of the \"imitation of nature.\"\n\n[Sidenote: _English \u00c6sthetic._]\n\nIn England associationistic psychology still flourished (and has\ncontinued to flourish uninterruptedly), unable to emancipate itself\nwholly from sensationalism or to understand imagination. Dugald\nStewart[9] had recourse to the wretched expedient of establishing\ntwo forms of association: one of accidental associations, the other\nof associations innate in human nature and therefore common to all\nmankind. England did not escape German influence, as appears, for\nexample, in Coleridge, to whom we owe a saner concept of poetry and\nthe difference between it and science[10] (in collaboration with\nthe poet Wordsworth), and in Carlyle, who placed intellect lower\nthan imagination, \"organ of the Divine.\" The most noteworthy English\n\u00e6sthetic essay of this period is the _Defence of Poetry_ by Shelley\n(1821),[11] containing profound, if not very systematic, views on the\ndistinctions between reason and imagination, prose and poetry; on\nprimitive language and the faculty of poetic objectification which\nenshrines and preserves \"the record of the best and happiest moments of\nthe happiest and best minds.\"\n\n[Sidenote: _Italian \u00c6sthetic._]\n\nIn Italy, where neither Parini nor Foscolo[12] had been able to shake\noff the fetters of the old doctrines (although the latter, in his later\nwritings, was in several ways an innovator in literary criticism), many\ntreatises and essays on \u00c6sthetic were published during the earlier\ndecades of the century, the greater part showing the influence of\nCondillac's sensationalism, which had a great vogue in Italy. Such\nauthors as Delfico, Malaspina, Cicognara, Talia, Pasquali, Visconti\nand Bonacci belong more exclusively to the special, or rather, the\nanecdotal, history of Italian philosophy. Now and then, however,\none comes across remarks that are not wholly contemptible, as in\nMelchiorre Delfico (1818) who, after wandering aimlessly hither and\nthither, fixes on the principle of expression, observing, \"If it\nwere possible to establish that expression is always an element in\nthe beautiful, it would be a legitimate inference to regard it as\nthe real characteristic of beauty, _i.e._ a condition without which\nthe beautiful could not exist, and the pleasing modification which\narouses the sentiment of beauty could not take place in us\"; he tries\nto develop this principle by asserting that all other characters\n(order, harmony, proportion, symmetry, simplicity, unity and variety)\nhave significance only by their subordination to the principle of\nexpression.[13] In opposition to Malaspina's definition of beauty\nas \"pleasure born of a representation\"; and in opposition to the\nthen fashionable threefold division of beauty into sensible, moral\nand intellectual, a critic of Malaspina observed that if beauty be\nrepresentation, it is inconceivable that there should be intellectual\nbeauty, which would be intelligible but not presentable.[14] Nor must\nPasquale Balestrieri be forgotten; he was a student of medicine who\nin 1847 tried to construct an \u00c6sthetic of an exact or mathematical\nkind, with neither better nor worse result than many famous authors in\nother countries. He noticed, while turning his algebraical expressions\ninto numerals, that such general formul\u00e6 \"fulfil their object with an\ninfinite number of systems of different ciphers\"; and that in art there\nis an element \"not arbitrary, but unknown.\"[15] Works by German authors\nwere frequently translated at this time, some of them, for example\nthe writings of the two Schlegels, being reprinted several times; the\n_\u00c6sthetic_ of Bouterweck, deriving from Kant and Schiller,[16] was read\nand discussed; Colecchi gave an excellent statement of the \u00e6sthetic\ndoctrines of Kant;[17] and in 1831 a certain Lichtenthal adapted the\n_\u00c6sthetic_ of Franz Ficker[18] to the use of Italian readers; later the\nsame book was fully translated by another hand; some of Schelling's\nwritings were translated, _e.g._ his discourses on the relation between\nfigurative art and nature.\n\n[Sidenote: _Rosmini and Gioberti._]\n\nIt must be admitted that in Italy \u00c6sthetic received but inadequate\ntreatment in the revival of philosophical speculation effected by\nthe work of Galluppi, Rosmini and Gioberti. It is treated in a\nmerely incidental and popular manner by the first named.[19] Rosmini\ndevotes a section of his philosophical system to the deontological\nsciences, which \"treat of the perfection of being, and the method of\nacquiring or producing such perfection or losing it\"; among these\nsciences is that of \"beauty in the universal\" under the name of\nCallology, of which a special part is \u00c6sthetic, the science of \"beauty\nin the sensible,\" establishing the \"archetypes of beings.\"[20] In\nhis longest literary work, considered by him as his \u00c6sthetic,[21]\nhis essay on _The Idyl_,[22] Rosmini declares the aim of art to be\nneither imitation of nature nor direct intuition of the archetypes,\nbut the reduction of natural things to their archetypes, which are\narranged in a hierarchy of three ideals, natural, intellectual and\nmoral. Gioberti[23] is clearly under the influence of German idealism,\nespecially of Schelling's; for him the beautiful is \"the individual\nunion of an intelligible type with an imaginative element called into\nbeing by fancy\"; the phantasm gives material, while the intelligible\ntype (concept) gives form, in the Aristotelian sense,[24] and since the\nideal element predominates over the sensible or fantastic, art is a\nprop\u00e6deutic to the true and the good. Gioberti is of opinion that Hegel\nwas wrong in detaching natural beauty from \u00c6sthetic, for perfect beauty\nof nature is \"the full correspondence of sensible reality with the Idea\nwhich informs and represents it,\" and as such \"makes its appearance\nin the sensible universe during the second period of the primordial\nage described in detail by Moses in the six days of creation\"; it is\nonly through original sin that imperfection and ugliness arose in\nnature.[25] Art is nothing but a supplement to natural beauty, whose\ndecadence it presupposes, and thus art is at once record and prophecy,\nreferring to the first and last ages of the world. The Last Judgement\nwill reintroduce perfect beauty: \"organic restitution, by empowering\nthe faculties to contemplate the intelligible in the sensible, and by\nrefining their capabilities, will greatly intensify and purify \u00e6sthetic\nenjoyment. The contemplation of perfect beauty will be the beatitude of\nimagination, of which Christ gave an ineffable foretaste by appearing\nto his disciples visibly transfigured and shining with celestial\nradiance.\"[26] Gioberti agrees with Schelling's division of art into\npagan and Christian, a \"heterodox beauty\" (Oriental and Gr\u00e6co-Italian\nart), imperfect when compared with \"orthodox beauty\"; and between the\ntwo, a \"semi-orthodox\" beauty,[27] transitional to Christian art; he\nalso attempted a doctrine of modifications of the beautiful, wherein he\nheld the sublime to be creator of the beautiful. Beauty is the relative\nintelligibility of created things apprehended by fancy: the sublime\nis the absolute intelligibility of time, space and infinite power as\npresented to itself by the faculty of imagination: \"The ideal formula:\nthe Being creates the Existing, translated into \u00e6sthetic language,\ngives the following formula: by means of the dynamical sublime Being\ncreates the beautiful; and by means of the mathematical sublime\ncontains it: this shows the ontological and psychological connexions of\n\u00c6sthetic in First Science.\" Ugliness enters into the beautiful either\nas relief and counterpoise, or to open a way to the comic, or to depict\nthe struggle between good and evil. The Christian ideal of artistic\nbeauty is the figure of the God-Man, absolute union of the two forms\nof beauty, the sublime and the beautiful, a transfigured and divinely\nilluminated expression of man.[28] However carefully we sift the\nthoughts of Gioberti from their mythological Judaico-Christian husk, we\nfind nothing of the least value to science.\n\n[Sidenote: _Italian Romantics. Dependence of Art._]\n\nOn the other hand, if Italian literature of the day chose to revive\nand refurbish certain antiquated critical ideas, a much wider field\nwas opened by social and political upheavals which tended to make\nuse of literature as a practical instrument for spreading abroad the\ntruths of history, science, religion and morality. In 1816 Giovanni\nBerchet wrote that \"poetry ... is intended to improve the habits of\nman and satisfy the cravings of his imagination and heart, since the\ntendency towards poetry, like every other desire, awakens in us moral\nneeds\";[29] and Ermes Visconti in his _Conciliatore_ of 1818 says that\n\u00e6sthetic aims must be subordinated \"to the improvement of mankind and\npublic and private weal, the eminent aim of all studies.\" Manzoni,\nwho subsequently took to philosophizing on art on the principles of\nRosmini, declared in his letter on Romanticism (1823) that \"poetry\nor literature in general should have utility as its objective, truth\nas its subject and interest as its means\";[30] and though noticing\nthe vagueness of the concept of truth in poetry, he inclined always\n(as is seen also in his discourse on the historical novel) to its\nidentification with historical and scientific truth.[31] Pietro\nMaroncelli proposed as a substitute for the classic formula of art,\n\"founded on imitation of the real and having pleasure as its object,\"\na formula of art as \"founded on inspiration, having the beautiful as\nmeans and good as end\"; this doctrine he baptized \"cormentalism,\"\ncontrasting it with the doctrine of art for art's sake found in the\nwritings of August Wilhelm Schlegel and Victor Hugo.[32] Tommaseo\ndefined beauty as \"the union of many truths in one concept\" effected\nby the power of feeling.[33] Giuseppe Mazzini, too, always conceived\nliterature as the mediator of the universal idea or intellectual\nconcept.[34] Attempting to restore serious content to a literature\ngrown weak and frivolous, the Italian Romantics found themselves forced\non the theoretical side, by a natural reaction, into constant and\nperpetual opposition to every tendency of thought likely to affirm the\nindependence of art.\n\n\n[1] \u00c9meric-David, _Recherches sur l'art du statuaire chez les anciens,_\nParis, 1805 (Ital. trans., Florence, 1857).\n\n[2] Quatrem\u00e8re de Quincy, _Essai sur l'imitation dans les beaux arts,_\n1823.\n\n[3] _Recherches sur la nature et les lois de l'imagination,_ 1807.\n\n[4] _Du vrai, du beau et du bien,_ 1818, many lines revised (23rd ed.\nParis, 1881).\n\n[5] _Op. cit._ lectures 6-8.\n\n[6] _Cours d' esth\u00e9tique,_ ed. Damiron, Paris, 1843.\n\n[7] _De l'art et du beau,_ 1843-1846.\n\n[8] Victor Hugo, Preface to _Cromwell,_ 1827.\n\n[9] Dugald Stewart, _Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind,_\n1837.\n\n[10] Gayley-Scott, _An Introd._ pp. 305-306.\n\n[11] P. B. Shelley, _A Defence of Poetry_ (in _Works,_ London, 1880,\nvol. vii.)\n\n[12] Parini, _Principi delle belle lettere applicati alle belle arti,_\nfrom 1773 onward; Foscolo, _Dell' origine e dell' uffizio della\nletteratura,_ 1809, and _Saggi di critica,_ composed in England.\n\n[13] M. Delfico, _Nuove ricerche sul bello,_ Naples, 1818, ch. 9.\n\n[14] Malaspina, _Delle leggi del bello,_ Milan, 1828, pp. 26, 233.\n\n[15] P. Balestrieri, _Fondamenti di estetica,_ Naples, 1847.\n\n[16] Friedrich Bouterweck, _\u00c4sthetik,_ 1806, 1815 (3rd ed., G\u00f6ttingen,\n1824-1825).\n\n[17] O. Colecchi, _Questions filosofiche,_ vol. iii., Naples, 1843.\n\n[18] P. Lichtenthal, _Estetica ossia dottrina del bello e delle arti\nbelle,_ Milan, 1831.\n\n[19] _Elementi di filosofia_ (5th ed., Naples, 1846), vol. ii. pp.\n427-476.\n\n[20] _Sistema filosofico,_ by A. Rosmini-Serbati, Turin, 1886, \u00a7 210.\n\n[21] Cf. _Nuovo saggio sopra l' orig. delle idee,_ \u00a7 v. part iv. ch. 5.\n\n[22] _Sull' idillio e sulla nuova letteratura italiana (opuscoli\nfilosofici,_ vol. i.).\n\n[23] V. Gioberti, _Del buono e del bello_ (Florence ed., 1857).\n\n[24] _Del bello,_ ch. 1.\n\n[25] _Op. cit._ ch. 7.\n\n[26] _Op. cit._ ch. 7.\n\n[27] _Del bello,_ chs. 8-10.\n\n[28] _Op. cit._ ch. 4.\n\n[29] G. Berchet, _Opere,_ ed. Cusani, Milan, 1863, p. 227.\n\n[30] Words suppressed in ed. of 1870.\n\n[31] _Epistolario,_ ed. Sforza, i. pp. 285, 306, 308; _Discorso sul\nromanzo storico,_ 1845; _Dell' invenzione,_ dialogue.\n\n[32] _Addizioni alle Miei Prigioni,_ 1831 (in Pellico, _Prose,_\nFlorence, 1858); see pp. about the _Conciliatore._\n\n[33] _Del bello e del sublime_, 1827; _Stud\u00ee filosofici_ (Venice,\n1840), vol. ii. part v.\n\n[34] Cf. De Sanctis, _Lett. Hal. nel s. XIX,_ ed. Croce, Naples 1896,\npp. 427-431.\n\n\n\n\nXV\n\n\nFRANCESCO DE SANCTIS\n\n\n[Sidenote: _F. de Sanctis: development of his thought._]\n\nOn the other hand, the autonomy of art found a strong supporter in\nItaly in the critical work of Francesco de Sanctis, who held private\nclasses in literature at Naples from 1838 to 1848, taught at Turin and\nZ\u00fcrich from 1852 to 1860 and in 1870 became professor in the University\nof Naples. He expressed his doctrines in critical essays, in monographs\non Italian writers and in his classic _History of Italian Literature._\nReceiving his first elements of old Italian culture in Puoti's\nschool, his natural bent! towards speculation led him to investigate\ngrammatical and rhetorical doctrines with the view of reducing them\nto a system; but he soon began to criticize and to grow out of this\nphase. He pronounced Fortunio, Alunno, Accarisio and Corso \"empirics\";\nhe had a slightly better opinion of Bembo, Varchi, Castelvetro and\nSalviati, who introduced \"method\" into grammar, a process completed\nsubsequently by Buonmattei, Corticelli and Bartoli; and he proclaimed\nFrancisco Sanchez, author of the _Minerva,_ \"the Descartes of\ngrammarians.\" From these his admiration spread to the French writers of\nthe eighteenth century and the philosophical grammars of; Du Marsais,\nBeauz\u00e9e, Condillac and G\u00e9rard; following in their wake and pursuing the\nideal of Leibniz, he conceived a \"logical grammar\"; in this effort,\nhowever, he soon began to recognize the impossibility of reducing the\ndifferences of languages to fixed logical principles., If he found\nthe French theorists admirable in their ability to reconstitute the\nsimple and primitive forms; from \"I love\" to \"I am loving,\" something\ndisquieted him; \"Such decomposition of 'I love' into 'I am loving'\"\n(said he) \"deadens the word by depriving it of the movement proceeding\nfrom active will.\"[1] In the same way he read and criticized the\nwriters of treatises on Rhetoric and Poetics from sixteenth-century\nmen such as Castelvetro and Torquato Tasso (whom he dared to describe\nas an \"indifferent critic,\" to the great scandal of Neapolitan men\nof letters) to Muratori and Gravina, \"more acute than accurate\"; and\neighteenth-century Italians, Bettinelli, Algarotti and Cesarotti.\nColdly rational rules found no favour with him: he urged the young to\nconfront literary works boldly and freely absorb impressions, the only\npossible foundation for taste.[2]\n\n[Sidenote: _Influence of Hegelism._]\n\nPhilosophical study had not been abandoned and had not even fallen\ninto entire decadence in Southern Italy; in these days of renewed\ninterest in philosophy the theories on Beauty from over the Alps and\nthe new ideas of Gioberti and other Italians[3] aroused enthusiastic\ndiscussion. Vico was read again, and B\u00e9nard's French translation of\nHegel's _\u00c6sthetic_ appeared and was canvassed in Naples volume by\nvolume (the first in 1840, the second in 1843, and the rest between\n1848 and 1852). In its desire for new intellectual food Italian youth\nset itself to learn German: De Sanctis himself had to translate the\ngreater _Logic_ of Hegel and Rosenkranz's _History of Literature_\nin the dungeon of the Bourbon prison where he was incarcerated on\naccount of his liberal opinions. The new critical tendency was named\n\"philosophism\" to distinguish it from the old grammatical criticism\nand from the vague, incoherent, exaggerated Romanticism. Philosophism\nattracted De Sanctis; to show how deeply he was imbued with the\nHegelian spirit a tale was told that, having devoured the first volumes\nof B\u00e9nard's translation, he guessed the contents of the remaining\nvolumes and, before they could appear, was expounding them publicly in\nhis classroom.[4]\n\nHis first writings show traces of metaphysical idealism and Hegelism;\nand they still linger here and there in the terminology of his later\nworks. In a lecture prior to 1848 he placed the safety of criticism in\nthe philosophic school which, in works of literature, fixed its eyes\nupon \"that absolute part ... that uncertain idea which moves within the\nmind of great writers, till it appears abroad clothed in fine raiment\nonly less beautiful than itself.\"[5] In a preface to Schiller's plays\n(1850) he wrote, \"The Idea is not thought, nor is poetry reason in\nsong, as a poet of our time is pleased to assert; the idea is at once\nnecessity and freedom, reason and passion, and its perfect form in\ndrama is action.\"[6] Elsewhere he calls attention to the death of faith\nand poetry, absorbed by the development of philosophy: a thesis, he\nremarked some years later, \"imposed on our generation by Hegel with his\nomnipotent thought.\"[7] In 1856 he attempted a definition of humour as\n\"an artistic form having for signification the destruction of limit,\nwith consciousness of such destruction.\"[8] Not to dwell too long on\nother particulars, in the distinction to which De Sanctis always held\nfirm throughout his critical work, that between Fancy and Imagination,\nthe latter considered as the true and only faculty of poetry, arises\nundoubtedly from suggestions of Schelling and Hegel (_Einbildungskraft,\nPhantasie)_; from the same philosophers come the phrases \"prosaic\ncontent,\" \"prosaic world,\" sometimes used by him.\n\n[Sidenote: _Unconscious criticism of Hegelism._]\n\nFor De Sanctis the Hegelian \u00c6sthetic was but a lever wherewith to\nlift himself clear of the discussions and views of the old Italian\nschools. A fresh, clear spirit such as his could not escape the\narbitrary shackles of grammarians and rhetoricians only to fall into\nthose of metaphysicians, the torturers of art. He absorbed the vital\npart of Hegel's teaching and re-expressed the Hegelian theories in\ncorrect or somewhat attenuated interpretations; but he only maintained\nwith hesitation, and in the end openly rebelled against, all that was\nartificial, formalistic and pedantic in Hegel.\n\nThe following examples of such reductions and attenuations show how\nsubstantial and radical was the change he effected. \"Faith has vanished\nand poetry is dead\" (he wrote in 1856, echoing Hegel); \"or it were\nbetter to say\" (here is De Sanctis' own correction) \"faith and poetry\nare immortal: what has disappeared is but one particular mode of their\nbeing. To-day faith springs from conviction and poetry is the spark\nstruck from meditation; they are not dead, they are transformed.\"[9]\nCertainly he distinguished between imagination and fancy; but for\nhim imagination was never the mystic faculty of transcendental\napperception, the intellectual intuition of German metaphysicians,\nbut simply the poet's faculty of synthesis and creation, contrasting\nwith fancy as the faculty of collecting particulars and materials in\na somewhat mechanical fashion.[10] When students of Vico and Hegel\nunderstood and expounded their master's theories as emphasizing the\nimportance of concepts in art, De Sanctis replied, \"The concept does\nnot exist in art, nature or history: the poet works unconsciously and\nsees no concept but only form, in which he is involved and well-nigh\nlost. If the philosopher, by means of abstraction, can extract the\nconcept thence and contemplate it in all its purity, he acts in a way\nentirely contrary to that of art, nature and history.\" He warned his\nhearers not to misunderstand Vico, who, when he extracts concepts and\nexemplary types from the Homeric poems, is not writing as an art critic\nbut as a historian of civilization: Achilles is artistically Achilles,\nnot strength or any other abstraction.[11] Thus his polemic is directed\nin the first instance against misunderstanding what he called the true\nHegelian thought, which was in fact usually a correction made upon\nHegel more or less consciously by himself. He was able to boast in\nhis latter years that even at the time when all Naples went wild over\nHegel, \"at the time when Hegel was master of the field,\" he had always\n\"made certain reservations and refused to accept his apriorism, his\ntriad or his formul\u00e6.\"[12]\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticisms of German \u00c6sthetic._]\n\nDe Sanctis also took up an independent attitude towards the other\nGerman \u00e6stheticians. The views of Wilhelm Schlegel, very advanced\nfor the day in which they had been promulgated, seemed to him to\nhave been already superseded. In 1856 he wrote that Schlegel strives\nto \"transcend ordinary criticism, which leads a humdrum existence\namong phraseology, versification and elocution, but loses its way\nand never comes face to face with art: whereas Schlegel throws\nhimself headlong into the probable, the decorous and the moral; into\neverything save art.\"[13] Thrown by the hazards of life into German\nterritory, he found himself at the Z\u00fcrich Polytechnic, and found among\nhis colleagues (only imagine such a thing!) Theodor Vischer. What\nopinion can he have formed of the ponderous Hegelian scholastic who\nemerged dusty and panting from the systematic labours so well known to\nus, and smiled disdainfully at the poetry and music of the decadent\nItalian race? De Sanctis writes, \"I went there with my opinions and\nmy prejudices and ridiculed their ridicule. Richard Wagner seemed to\nme a corrupter of music, and nothing could be more in\u00e6sthetic than\nthe \u00c6sthetic of Vischer.\"[14] His desire to correct the distorted\nviews of Vischer, Adolf Wagner, Valentin Schmidt and other German\ncritics and philosophers led him to undertake in 1858-59 a course of\nlectures before an international audience at Z\u00fcrich upon Ariosto\nand Petrarch, the two Italian poets worst maltreated by these judges\nbecause hardest to reduce to philosophical allegory. He sketched a\ntypical German critic and contrasted him with a French one, each with\nhis own characteristic defects. \"The Frenchman does not indulge in\ntheories; he goes straight to the subject: his argument palpitates with\nwarmth of impression and sagacity of observation: he never leaves the\nconcrete: he estimates the quality of the talent and the work, studying\nthe man in order to understand the writer.\" He makes the mistake of\nsubstituting reflexion on the psychology of the author and history of\nhis time for reflexion upon art. \"Quite otherwise is your German: be a\nthing never so plain, he makes it his business to manipulate, distort\nand embroil: he accumulates a mass of darkness from whose centre rays\nof dazzling light now and again shoot forth: truth is there at bottom,\nin grievous pangs of parturition. Confronted with a work of art, he\nlabours to fasten down and fix the quality which is most evanescent\nand impalpable. While nobody is more given to talk of life and the\nworld of the living, nobody on earth takes more pains to decompose and\ndisembody it in generalities: as consequence of this last process (last\nin appearance, that is to say; in reality preconceived and _a priori_),\nhe is able to fit you the same boot on every foot and the same coat on\nevery back.\" \"The German school is dominated by metaphysic, the French\nby history.\"[15] About this time (1858) a Piedmontese review published\nhis exhaustive critical survey of the philosophy of Schopenhauer,[16]\nwhich was then beginning to attract disciples among his friends\nand companions in exile in Switzerland; the criticism provoked the\nphilosopher himself to confess that \"this Italian\" had \"absorbed him\n_in succum et sanguinem._\"[17] What value did De Sanctis attach to\nall Schopenhauer's subtleties concerning art? Having fully stated his\ndoctrine of ideas, he contents himself with the merest reference to the\nthird book \"wherein is found an exaggerated theory of \u00c6sthetic.\"[18]\n\n[Sidenote: _Final rebellion against metaphysical \u00c6sthetic._]\n\nThis moderate resistance and opposition to the partisans of the\nconcept and to the romantic Italian mystics and moralists (he directed\ncriticisms equally against Manzoni, Mazzini, Tommaseo and Cant\u00f9[19])\nturned to open rebellion in one of his critical writings on Petrarch\n(1868) in which this false tendency is characterized with biting\nsarcasm. \"According to this school\" (he says, meaning the school of\nHegel and Gioberti), \"according to this school the real and living is\nart only in so far as it surpasses its form and reveals its concept or\nthe pure idea. The beautiful is the manifestation of the idea. Art is\nthe ideal, a particular idea. Under the gaze of the artist the body\nbecomes subtilized until it is nothing but the shadow of the soul, a\nbeautiful veil. The world of poetry is peopled with phantasms; and\nthe poet, eternal dreamer, with the eyes of one slightly intoxicated\nsees bodies float unsteadily around him and change their shapes. Nor\ndo bodies merely become attenuated into forms and phantasms; these\nforms and phantasms themselves become free manifestations of every\nidea and every concept. The theory of the ideal has been driven to\nits last victorious limit, to the destruction of the very phantasms\nthemselves, to concept as concept, form becoming a mere accessory.\"\n\"Thus the vague, the undecided, the undulating, the vaporous, the\ncelestial, the \u00e6rial, the veiled, the angelic, have now a high position\namong artistic forms: whilst criticism revels in the beautiful,\nthe ideal, the infinite, genius, the concept, the idea, truth, the\nsuperintelligible, the supersensible, the being and the existent, and\nmany more generalities cast into barbarous formul\u00e6 just like those\nof the scholastics from whose influence we had so much difficulty in\nescaping.\" All these things, instead of determining the character of\nart, do nothing; save illustrate the contrary of art: its feebleness\nand impotence, preventing it from slaying abstractions and laying hold\nof life. If beauty and the ideal have actually the meaning given them\nby these philosophers \"the essence of art is neither the beautiful nor\nthe ideal, but the living, the form; the ugly too belongs to art since\nugliness lives also in nature; outside the domain of art lies nothing\nbut the formless and the deformed. Thais in Malebolge is more living\nand poetical than Beatrice, who is pure allegory representing abstract\ncombinations. The Beautiful? Tell me of anything as beautiful as Iago,\na form uprisen from the profundity of real life; so rich, so concrete;\nin every part, in each finest gradation, one of the most beautiful\ncreations in the world of poetry.\" If in the course of \"wrangling\nabout the idea or the concept or real, moral, or intellectual beauty,\nand confusing philosophical or moral truths with \u00e6sthetic\" you choose\nto call \"a great part of the poetic world ugly, granting it a permit\nmerely that it may act as contrast, antagonist or foil to beauty,\naccepting Mephistopheles as a foil to Faust, or Iago as foil to\nOthello,\" you are imitating \"those good folk who thought, _in illo\ntempore,_ that the stars shone in the firmament in order to give light\nto this earth.\"[20]\n\n[Sidenote: _De Sanctis own theory_]\n\nThe \u00e6sthetic theory of De Sanctis himself arises entirely from the\ncriticism of the highest manifestations of European \u00e6sthetic as known\nto him. Its nature is revealed by the contrast. \"If you desire a statue\nin the vestibule of art,\" says he, \"let it be that of Form; gaze upon\nthis, question this, begin with this. Before form is attained, that\nexists which existed before the creation: chaos. Chaos is no doubt a\nrespectable thing, with a most interesting history: science has not yet\nuttered its last word about this pre-world of fermenting elements. Art\nalso has its pre-world: art also has its geology, born but yesterday\nand as yet scarcely stretched, a science _sui generis,_ which is\nneither Criticism nor \u00c6sthetic. \u00c6sthetic appears when form appears,\nin which this pre-world is sunk, fused, forgotten and lost. Form is\nitself as the individual is himself; and no theory is so destructive\nto art as the continual harping upon the beautiful as manifestation,\nclothing, light, or veil of truth or the idea. The \u00e6sthetic world\nis not appearance, it is substance; to it indeed belongs everything\nsubstantial and living: its criterion, its _raison d'\u00eatre,_ lies\nnowhere save in this motto: I live.\"[21]\n\n[Sidenote: _The concept of form._]\n\nFor De Sanctis, form did not mean form \"in the pedantic sense attached\nto it until the end of the eighteenth century,\" that is to say, that\nwhich first strikes a superficial observer, the words, the period, the\nsense, the individual image;[22] or form in the Herbartian sense, the\nmetaphysical hypostatization of the former. \"Form is not _a Priori,_ it\nis not something existing of itself and distinct from the content as\nthough it were a kind of ornament or vesture or appearance or adjunct\nof the content: it is generated by the content acting in the mind of\nthe artist: such as the content is, such is the form.\"[23] Between\nform and content there is at the same time identity and diversity. In\na work of art the content, which had been lying in a chaotic state in\nthe mind of the artist, appears \"not as it was originally, but as it\nhas become; the whole of it, with its own value, its own importance,\nits own natural beauty enriched, not weakened, by the process.\"\nTherefore content is essential for the production of concrete form;\nbut the abstract quality of the content does not determine that of\nartistic form.\" If the content, though beautiful and important, remain\ninoperative or lifeless or waste within the mind of the artist, if it\nhave not sufficient generative power and reveal itself in the form as\nweak or false or vitiated, why trouble to sing its praises? In such\ncases the content may be important in itself, but as literature or\nart it is worthless. On the other hand the content may be immoral,\nabsurd, false or frivolous: but if at certain times or in certain\ncircumstances it has worked powerfully on in the brain of the artist,\nand taken form, such content is immortal. The gods of Homer are dead;\nthe _Iliad_ remains. Italy may die and, with her, every memory of Guelf\nand Ghibelline; the _Divina Commedia_ will remain. The content is\nsubject to all the hazards of history; it is born and it dies; the form\nis immortal.\"[24] He held firmly to the independence of art, without\nwhich there can be no \u00c6sthetic; but he objected to the exaggeration of\nthe formula of art for art's sake in that it tended to the separation\nof the artist from life, to the mutilation of the content and to the\nconversion of art into a proof of mere cleverness.[25]\n\n[Sidenote: _De Sanctis as art-critic._]\n\nFor De Sanctis, the concept of form was identical with that of\nimagination, the faculty of expression or representation, artistic\nvision. So much must be said by any one anxious to express clearly\nthe direction which his thought was taking. But De Sanctis himself\nnever succeeded in defining his own theory with scientific exactitude;\nand his \u00e6sthetic ideas remained the mere sketch of a system never\nproperly interrelated and deduced. The speculative tendency shared his\nattention with many other lively interests, the desire to understand\nthe concrete, to enjoy art and rewrite its actual history, to plunge\ninto practical and political life; so that by turns he was professor,\nconspirator, journalist and statesman. \"My mind inclines to the\nconcrete,\" he was wont to say. He philosophized just so much as was\nnecessary to the acquisition of a point of view in problems of art,\nhistory and life; and, having procured light for his intellect, found\nhis bearings, derived some satisfaction from the consciousness of his\nown activity, he plunged as quickly as possible into the particular and\nthe determinate. To immense power of seizing the truth in the highest\ngeneral principles was joined a no less intense abhorrence for the\npale region of ideas in which the philosopher takes an almost ascetic\ndelight. As critic and historian of literature he is unrivalled. Those\nwho have compared him with Lessing, Macaulay, Sainte-Beuve or Taine are\nmaking rhetorical comparisons.\n\nGustave Flaubert wrote to George Sand: \"In your last letter you speak\nof criticism, and say you expect it soon to disappear. I think, on the\ncontrary, that it is just appearing over the horizon. Criticism to-day\nis the exact opposite of what it was, but that is all. In the days of\nLaharpe the critic was a grammarian; to-day he is a historian like\nSainte-Beuve and Taine. When will he be an artist, a mere artist, but a\nreal artist? Do you know a critic who interests himself whole-heartedly\nin the work itself? They analyse with the greatest delicacy the\nhistorical surroundings of the work and the causes which produced\nit: but the underlying poetry and its causes? the composition? the\nstyle? the author's own point of view? Never. Such a critic must have\ngreat imagination and a great goodness of heart; I mean an ever-ready\nfaculty of enthusiasm; and then, taste; but this last is so rare, even\namong the best, that it is never mentioned nowadays.\"[26] Flaubert's\nideal has been worthily reached by one critic only (that is to say,\namongst critics who have given themselves to the interpretation of\ngreat writers and entire periods of literature) and that one is De\nSanctis.[27] No literature of any country possesses so perfect a mirror\nas that possessed by Italy in the _History_ and the other critical\nessays of Francesco de Sanctis.\n\n[Sidenote: _De Sanctis as philosopher._]\n\nBut the philosopher of art, the \u00e6sthetician in De Sanctis is less\ngreat than the critic and historian of literature. The critic is\nprimary, the philosopher a mere accessory. The \u00e6sthetic observations\nscattered in aphorisms up and down his essays and monographs take\nvarious colours from various occasions, and are expressed in uncertain\nand often metaphorical language; this has led to his being accused of\ncontradictions and inexactitudes which had no existence in his inmost\nthought and whose very appearance vanishes as soon as one takes into\naccount the particular cases with which he was dealing. But form,\nforms, content, the living, the beautiful, natural beauty, ugliness,\nfancy, feeling, imagination, the real, the ideal, and all the other\nterms which he used with varying signification, demand a science both\non which to rest and from which to derive. Meditation on these words\nstirs up doubts and problems on every side and reveals everywhere gaps\nand discontinuities. Compared with the few philosophical \u00e6stheticians,\nDe Sanctis seems wanting in analysis, in order and in system, and\nvague in his definitions. But these defects are outweighed by the\ncontact he establishes between the reader and real concrete works of\nart, and by the feeling for truth which never leaves him. He has, too,\nthe attraction possessed by those writers who lead one on to suspect\nand to divine new treasures in store beyond what they themselves\nreveal--living thought, which stimulates living men to pursue and\nprolong it.\n\n\n[1] _Frammenti di scuola,_ in _Nuovi saggi critici,_ pp. 321-333; _La\ngiovinezza di Fr. de S._ (autobiography), pp. 62, 101, 163-166 (works\ncited are those of De S. in stereotyped Naples ed. by Morano, 12 vols.).\n\n[2] _La giovinezza di Fr. de S._ pp. 260-261, 315-316.\n\n[3] _Saggi critici,_ p. 534.\n\n[4] De Meis, _Comm, di Fr. de S._ (in vol. _In Memoria,_ Naples, 1884,\np. 116).\n\n[5] _Scritti vori,_ ed. Croce, vol. ii. pp. 153-154.\n\n[6] _Saggi critici,_ p 18.\n\n[7] _Op. cit._ pp. 226-228; _Scritti var\u00ee,_ ii. pp. 185-187; cf. vol.\nii. p. 70.\n\n[8] _Saggi critici,_ ed. Imbriani, p. 91.\n\n[9] _Saggi critici,_ p. 228; cf. _Scritti var\u00ee,_ vol. ii. p. 70.\n\n[10] _Storia della letteratura,_ i. pp. 66-67 _ Saggi critici,_ pp.\n98-99; _Scritti var\u00ee,_ vol. i. pp. 276-278, 384.\n\n[11] _La giovinezza di Fr. de S._ pp. 279, 313-314, 321-324.\n\n[12] _Scritti var\u00ee,_ vol. ii. p. 83; cf. p. 274.\n\n[13] _Op. cit._ vol. i. pp. 228-236.\n\n[14] _Saggio sul Petrarca,_ new ed. by B. Croce, p. 309 _seqq._\n\n[15] _Saggi critici,_ pp. 361-363, 413-414; cf. as touching Klein,\n_Scritti var\u00ee,_ vol. i. pp. 32-34.\n\n[16] _Op. cit., Schopenhauer e Leopardi,_ pp. 246, 299.\n\n[17] Schopenhauer, _Briefe,_ ed. Grisebach, pp. 405-406; cf. pp.\n381-383, 403-404, 438-439.\n\n[18] _Saggi critici,_ p. 269, note.\n\n[19] Cf. _Scritti var\u00ee,_ i. pp. 39-45, and _Letterat. ital. nel sec.\nXIX,_ lectures, ed. Croce, pp. 241-243, 427-432.\n\n[20] _Saggio sut Petrarca,_ introd. pp. 17-29.\n\n[21] _Saggio sul Petrarca,_ p. 29 _seqq._\n\n[22] _Scritti var\u00ee,_ vol. i. pp. 276-277, 317.\n\n[23] _Nuovi saggi critici,_ pp. 239-240, note.\n\n[24] _Nuovi saggi critici, loc. cit._\n\n[25] _Ibid._ and cf. _Saggio sul Petrarca,_ p. 182; also _Scritti\nvar\u00ee,_ i. pp. 209-212, 226.\n\n[26] _Lettres \u00e0 George Sand,_ Paris, 1884 (Letter of Feb. 2, 1869), p.\n81.\n\n[27] See above, p. 363, the judgement of De S. on French criticism.\n\n\n\n\nXVI\n\n\n\u00c6STHETIC OF THE EPIGONI\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Revival of Herbartian \u00c6sthetic._]\n\nWhen the cry \"Away with metaphysic!\" was raised in Germany, and a\nfurious reaction began against the kind of Walpurgis-night to which\nthe later Hegelians had reduced the life of science and history, the\ndisciples of Herbart came to the front and seemed to ask, with an\ninsinuating air: \"What is all this? a rebellion against Idealism and\nMetaphysic? why, it is exactly what Herbart wished and undertook all by\nhimself half a century ago! Here we stand, his legitimate descendants,\nand we offer you our services as allies. We shall not find it hard to\nagree. Our Metaphysic accords with the atomic theory, our Psychology\nwith mechanism, and our Ethics and \u00c6sthetic with hedonism.\" Herbart\nhimself (had he not died in 1841) would most likely have spumed these\ndisciples of his who pandered to popularity, cheapened metaphysics and\ngave naturalistic interpretations to his reals, his representations,\nhis ideas, and all his highest conceptions.\n\nWith the school thus coming into fashion, the Herbartian \u00c6sthetic\ntoo tried to put on flesh and acquire a pleasing plumpness so as not\nto cut too miserable a figure beside the well-nourished _corpora_ of\nscience launched upon the world by idealists. The feeding-up process\nwas accomplished by Robert Zimmermann, professor of philosophy at\nPrague and later at Vienna, who, after years of laborious effort and\nan introductory sample in the shape of an ample history of \u00c6sthetic\n(1858), at length produced his _General \u00c6sthetic as Science of Form_\nin 1865.[1]\n\n[Sidenote: _Robert Zimmermann._]\n\nThis formalistic \u00c6sthetic, born under bad auspices, is a curious example\nof servile fidelity in externals combined with internal infidelity.\nStarting from unity, or rather from subordination of Ethics and\n\u00c6sthetic to a general \u00c6sthetic defined as \"a science which treats of\nthe modes by which any given content may acquire the right to arouse\napproval or disapproval\" (thereby differing from Metaphysic, science\nof the real, and from Logic, science of right thinking), Zimmermann\nplaces such modes in form, that is to say, in the reciprocal relation\nof elements. A simple mathematical point in space, a simple impression\nof hearing or sight, a simple note, is in fact neither pleasing nor\ndispleasing: music shows that the judgement of beauty or ugliness\nalways depends on the relation between two notes at least. Now these\nrelations, _i.e._ forms universally pleasing, cannot be empirically\ncollected by induction; they must be developed by deduction. By\nthe deductive method it can be demonstrated that the elements of\nan image, which in themselves are representations, may enter into\nrelations either according to their force (quantity), or according to\ntheir nature (quality); whence we have two groups--\u00e6sthetic forms of\nquantity, and \u00e6sthetic forms of quality. According to the first, the\nstrong (large) is pleasing in comparison with the weak (small), and\nthese latter are displeasing when set beside the former; according\nto the other form, that pleases which is substantially identical in\nquality (the harmonious), and that displeases which is on the whole\ndiverse (the discordant).\n\nBut the substantial identity must not be pushed to the point of\nabsolute identity, for in that case the harmony itself would cease to\nbe. From harmonious form is deduced the pleasure of the characteristic\nor expression; for what is the characteristic but a relation of\nprevalent identity between the thing itself and its model? But while\nsimilarity prevailing in the distinction produces accord (_Einklang_),\nqualitative disharmony is as such disagreeable, and demands a\nresolution. (It is easy to detect the sleight of hand with which\nZimmermann first slips the characteristic into the relations of pure\nform, thereby entirely altering Herbart's original thought; and how, by\na second trick, he here introduces into pure beauty the variations and\nmodifications of the beautiful, by the help of the despised Hegelian\ndialectic.) If such resolution is effected by the skilful substitution\nof something other than the unpleasant image, we shall certainly have\nremoved the cause of offence and established quietude (not accord:\n_Eintracht, nicht Einklang_), but we shall have gained the mere form\nof correctness: it is better, then, to supersede this by means of the\ntrue image so as to reach the form of compensation (_Ausgleichung_);\nand, when the true image is also pleasing in itself, the final form\nof definitive compensation (_abschliessende Ausgleich,_) with which\nwe exhaust the series of possible forms. And, in conclusion, what is\nBeauty? It is a conjunction of all these forms: a model (_Vorbild_)\nwhich has grandeur, plenitude, order, accord, correctness, definitive\ncompensation; all this appears in a copy (_Nachbild_) in the form of\nthe characteristic.\n\nPutting on one side the artificial connexion Zimmermann makes between\nthe sublime, the comic, the tragic, the ironic, the humorous and\nthe \u00e6sthetic forms, notice must be taken (so that we may recognize\ninto which of the seven heavens he is wafting us) that these general\n\u00e6sthetic forms concern art equally with nature and morality, whose\nindividual spheres are differentiated solely by the application of the\ngeneral \u00e6sthetic forms to particular contents. These forms, applied to\nnature, give us natural beauty, the cosmos; applied to representation,\nbeauty of wit (_Sch\u00f6ngeist_) or imagination; applied to feeling,\nthe beautiful soul (_sch\u00f6ne Seele_) or taste; applied to the will,\ncharacter or virtue. On one side, then, is natural beauty, on the other\nhuman beauty, in which (latter), on one hand, we have the beauty of\nrepresentation, that is to say \u00e6sthetic fact in the strict sense (art);\non the other, we have the beauty of will, or morality; and between the\ntwo, lastly, we have taste, common to Ethics and \u00c6sthetic. \u00c6sthetic in\nthe narrow sense, as the theory of beautiful representation, determines\nthe beauty of representations, divided into the three classes of\nthe beauty of temporal and spatial connexion (figurative arts); the\nbeauty of sensitive representation (music); and the beauty of thoughts\n(poetry). This tripartition of beauty into figurative, musical and\npoetical brings to a conclusion theoretical \u00c6sthetic, the only section\ndeveloped by Zimmermann.\n\n[Sidenote: _Vischer versus Zimmermann._]\n\nZimmermann's work was a polemic against the principal representative\nof Hegelian \u00c6sthetic, Vischer, who had little difficulty in defending\nhis own position and counter-attacking that of his assailant. He\nheld Zimmermann up to ridicule, for example, in connexion with his\nview of symbolism. Zimmermann defined a symbol as the object \"round\nwhich beautiful forms adhere.\" A painter depicts a fox simply for the\nsake of painting a part of animal nature. Nothing of the sort: this\nis a symbol, because the painter \"makes use of fines and colours to\nexpress things other than fines and colours.\" \"You think I'm a fox,\"\nsays the animal in the picture, \"but you make a great mistake: I'm a\nclothes-peg: I'm an appearance created by the painter with gradations\nof grey, white, yellow and red.\" Even easier was it to make game of\nZimmermann's enthusiastic praises of the \u00e6sthetic quality of the sense\nof touch. It was a pity, the latter had written, that the pleasures of\nthis sense were so difficult to attain; since \"to touch the back of the\nResting Hercules and the sinuous limbs of the Venus of Melos or the\nBarberini Faun would give to the hand a delight comparable only with\nthat felt by the ear when listening to the majestic fugues of Bach or\nthe suave melodies of Mozart.\" Vischer does not seem to be far wrong in\ndeclaring formalistic \u00c6sthetic to be \"a grotesque union of mysticism\nand mathematics.\"[2]\n\n[Sidenote: _Hermann Lotze._]\n\nThe works of Zimmermann seem to have given satisfaction to nobody\nsave himself. Even Lotze, by no means an adversary of Herbartianism,\nblames him severely in his _History of \u00c6sthetic in Germany_ (1868) and\nother writings. Still, Lotze was unable to offer any better substitute\nfor \u00e6sthetic formalism than of a variant of the old idealism. \"Can\nany one persuade us,\" he wrote in criticism of the formalists,\n\"that a spiritual discord expressed by a corresponding discord in\nexternal appearances may have a value equal to that of the harmonious\nexpression of a harmonious content solely because, in both cases,\nthe formal relation of accord is respected? Can any one persuade us\nthat the human form is pleasing solely for its formal stereometric\nrelations, irrespective of the spiritual life by which it is animated?\nIn empirical reality the three domains of laws, facts and values\ninvariably appear as divided; and although they are united in the\nHighest Good, in Goodness in itself, in the living Love of a Personal\nGod, in the Ought which is the basis of Being, our reason is unable to\nattain or to know such union. Beauty alone can reveal it to us: it is\nin close connexion with the Good and the Holy and reproduces the rhythm\nof the divine ordinance and the moral government of the universe.\n\u00c6sthetic fact is neither intuition nor concept; it is idea, which\npresents the essential of an object in the form of an end referred to\nthe ultimate end. Art, like beauty, must include the world of values\nin the world of forms.\"[3] The war between the \u00c6sthetic of content and\nthat of form, having Zimmermann, Vischer and Lotze as protagonists,\nreached its culminating point between 1860 and 1870.\n\n[Sidenote: _Efforts to reconcile \u00c6sthetic of form and \u00c6sthetic of\ncontent._]\n\nSeveral people were in favour of a reconciliation. But the\nreconciliations they offered were not the right one, which was at\nleast glimpsed by a certain young Johann Schmidt, who in his thesis\nfor doctorate observed (1875) that, with all respect for Zimmermann\nand Lotze, it seemed to him they were both wrong in confusing the\nvarious meanings of the word \"beauty,\" and discussed such an absurdity\nas a beauty or ugliness of natural objects, that is to say, of things\nexternal to the spirit; that Lotze, following Hegel, added the second\nabsurdity of an intuitive concept or conceptual intuition: lastly,\nthat neither of them grasped the fact that the \u00e6sthetic problem does\nnot turn upon the beauty or ugliness of the abstract content or of\nform understood as a system of mathematical relations, but with the\nbeauty or ugliness of representation. Form undoubtedly must exist, but\n\"concrete form, full of content.\"[4] These utterances of Schmidt met\nwith a hostile reception: it is easy (he was told in reply) to identify\nbeauty with artistic perfection, but the whole crux of the matter lies\nin finding whether, beside this perfection, there exists another beauty\ndependent on a supreme cosmic or metaphysical principle: otherwise one\nis guilty of a na\u00efve _petitio principii_.[5] It was thought better,\ntherefore, to seek other modes of reconciliation, which consisted\nin cooking up an appetizing dish in which a little formalism and a\nlittle contentism were mixed to taste, the latter as a rule giving the\npredominant flavour.\n\nSome Herbartians were found in the ranks of the mediating or\nconciliatory party. Hardly had Zimmermann's rigid formalism appeared,\nwhen Nahlowsky jumped up to protest that it had never entered the\nmaster's head to exclude content from \u00c6sthetic;[6] but even the ablest\nof the school, men such as Volkmann and Lazarus, chose a middle\ncourse.[7] In the opposite camp Carri\u00e8re,[8] and even Vischer himself\n(in a criticism of his own old _\u00c6sthetic_), began to concede a larger\npart to the consideration of form; thus for Vischer beauty became\n\"life appearing harmoniously,\" which when it appears in space is called\nform, and must always possess form, _i.e._ limitation (_Begrenzung_ )\nin space and time, measure, regularity, symmetry, proportion, propriety\n(these characters constituting its quantitative moments) and harmony\n(qualitative moment), which includes variety and contrast and is\ntherefore the most important characteristic.[9]\n\n[Sidenote: _K. K\u00f6stlin._]\n\nA conciliatory \u00c6sthetic in which formalism prevailed was attempted\nby Karl K\u00f6stlin, a professor at T\u00fcbingen and formerly collaborator in\nthe musical section of the works of Vischer. K\u00f6stlin[10] had been\ninfluenced by Schleiermacher, Hegel, Vischer and Herbart, but, truth\nto tell, does not seem to have perfectly understood the teaching\nof any one of his predecessors. According to him, the \u00e6sthetic\nobject presented three requirements: richness and variety of imagery\n(_anregende Gestaltenf\u00fclle_), interesting content and beautiful form.\nUnder the first we recognize, with no little difficulty, a distorted\nreflexion of Schleiermacher's \"inspiration\" (_Begeisterung_).\nInteresting content he defined as that which concerns man; that which\nhe knows or does not know; that which he loves or hates (it is thus\nalways relative to the individual and the conditions in which he\nexists); and he asserted that interest of content is joined to value\nof form, that is, he conceived content as a second value, the same\nof which we have heard Herbart speak. He also agreed with Herbart\nthat form is absolute, and that its general character is determined\nas being easily perceptible by intuition (_anschaulich_), and by its\npower of giving satisfaction, pleasure and delight, in fact, as being\nbeautiful. Its particular characteristics for K\u00f6stlin were, according\nto quantity, circumscription, simplicity (_Einheitlichkeit_), extensive\nand intensive size, and equilibrium (_Gleichmass_); according to\nquality, determination (_Bestimmtheit_), unity (_Einheit_), importance\n(_Bedeutung_) extensive and intensive, and harmony. But when K\u00f6stlin\nsets himself to the empirical verification of his categories, he falls\ninto hopeless confusion. Greatness is pleasing, but so is smallness;\nunity is pleasing, but so is variety; regularity is pleasing, but so,\nconfound it, is irregularity: uncertainties and contradictions at every\nstep; he was aware of them and made no effort to conceal them; but they\nshould have convinced him that the abstraction of \"beautiful form,\"\nwhose qualities and quantities he had so laboriously collected, is a\nghostly shape without body, since that alone gives \u00e6sthetic pleasure\nwhich fulfils an expressive function. But having illustrated the three\ndemands of the \u00e6sthetic object, K\u00f6stlin wasted all his remaining breath\nin constructing a kingdom of intuitive imagination in the manner of\nVischer, _i.e._ beauty of organic and inorganic nature; of civil life;\nof morality; of religion; of science; of games; of conversations; of\nfeasts and banquets; and lastly of history, reviewing and passing\n\u00e6sthetic comment on its three periods, patriarchal, heroic and\nhistorical.\n\n[Sidenote: _\u00c6sthetic of content. M. Schasler._]\n\nSchasler, who had written as vast a history on \u00c6sthetic as Zimmermann's\nown, found a starting-point for a movement toward formalism in absolute\nidealism, or realism-idealism, as he called it. He began by defining\n\u00c6sthetic as \"the science of the beautiful and of art\" (a single\nscience ill defined as having two different objects), and proceeded\nto justify his unmethodical definition by saying that beauty does not\nexist in art alone, nor does art concern itself solely with beauty. The\nsphere of \u00c6sthetic he defines as that of intuition (_Anschauung_) in\nwhich knowledge assumes a practical character and will a theoretical:\nthe sphere of indivisible unity and absolute reconciliation of the\ntheoretical and practical spirit, in which in a certain sense the\nhighest human activities are developed. Beauty is the ideal, but the\nconcrete ideal; this is why there is no ideal of a human body in\nabstraction from sex, no ideal of a mammal in general, but only of such\nand such species, as of horse or dog, and then only of determinate\nkind of horse or dog. Thus by descending from the more to the less\nabstract genus Schasler vainly attempted to reach the concrete, which\ninevitably escaped his grasp. In art we pass from the typical, which\nis natural beauty, to the characteristic, which is the typical of\nhuman feeling; hence we can frame the ideal of an old woman, a beggar\nor a ruffian. The characteristic of art is in closer relationship\nto the ugly than to the beautiful in nature. On this head (passing\nover the remainder, which is on familiar lines) it is well to notice\nthat Schasler has a bias towards that version of the romaunt of Sir\nPurebeauty which ascribes the birth of the \"modifications of Beauty\" to\nthe influence of the Ugly.[11] \"Although,\" he writes, \"the thought may\ndisturb our minds, it must not be forgotten that were there no world\nof ugliness there could be no world of beauty; for it is only when\nthe Ugly stirs up empty abstract Beauty, that it begins to combat the\nenemy and thus to produce concrete Beauty.\"[12] He even succeeded in\nconverting Vischer himself, the chief supporter of the other version:\n\"Formerly I had been accustomed to think in the old-fashioned Hegelian\nstyle,\" Vischer confesses, \"that unrest, fermentation and strife dwelt\nin the essence of Beauty; that the Idea prevails and thrusts the\nimage forth into the infinite; so arises the Sublime; that the image,\noffended in its finitude, makes war on the Idea; whence arises the\nComic; this finished the struggle; Beauty returned to itself from the\nconflict of the two moments, and was created.\" But now, he continues,\n\"I must acknowledge that Schasler is right, and so are his predecessors\nWeisse and Ruge: the Ugly has a hand in the matter; this is the\nprinciple of movement, the ferment of differentiation: without such\nleaven we never reach the special forms of Beauty, for each single one\npresupposes' the Ugly.\"[13]\n\n[Sidenote: _Ed. von Hartmann._]\n\nClosely allied to that of Schasler is the \u00c6sthetic of Eduard von\nHartmann (1890), preceded by a historical treatise on _German \u00c6sthetic\nsince Kant_[14] wherein with meticulous, critical and polemical study\nhe upholds the definition of Beauty as \"the appearance of the Idea\"\n(_das Scheinen der Idee_). Inasmuch as he insisted on appearance\n(_Schein_) as the necessary characteristic of Beauty, Hartmann held\nhimself justified in naming his \u00c6sthetic the \"\u00c6sthetic of Concrete\nIdealism,\" and in ranging himself alongside Hegel, Trahndorff,\nSchleiermacher, Deutinger, Oersted, Vischer, Meising, Carri\u00e8re\nand Schasler, against the abstract idealism of Schelling, Solger,\nSchopenhauer, Krause, Weisse and Lotze, all of whom, by placing\nbeauty in the supersensible idea, overlooked the sensory element and\nreduced it to the rank of a mere accessory.[15] By his insistence on\nthe idea as the other indispensable and determining element, Hartmann\nproclaimed himself as opposed to the Herbartian formalism. Beauty is\ntruth; neither historical, scientific nor reflective, but metaphysical\nor idealistic, the very truth of Philosophy: \"in proportion as Beauty\nis in opposition to every science and to realistic truth, so much\nnearer is it to Philosophy and metaphysical truth\": \"Beauty, with its\nown peculiar efficacy, remains the prophet of idealistic truth in an\nunbelieving age that abhors Metaphysic and recognizes no value in\nanything but realistic truth.\" \u00c6sthetic truth, which leaps immediately\nfrom subjective appearance to ideal essence, is lacking in the control\nand method possessed by philosophical truth; in compensation, however,\nshe possesses the fascinating power of conviction, the sole property of\nsensible intuition, and unattainable by gradual or reflected mediation.\nThe higher Philosophy soars, the less does it need the gradual passage\nthrough the world of the senses and of science, and the slighter\nbecomes the distance separating Philosophy and Art. The latter, for\nits part, will be well advised to start on its journey towards the\nideal world as B\u00e6deker's handbooks counsel the intending traveller,\n\"with as little luggage as possible\"; \"not overloading herself with a\nweight which paralyses the wings and is made up of unnecessary and\nindifferent trifles,\"[16] Logical character, the microcosmic idea,\nthe unconscious are immanent in beauty; by means of the unconscious,\nintellectual intuition operates in it,[17] and, from its being rooted\nin the unconscious, it is a Mystery.[18]\n\n[Sidenote: _Hartmann and the theory of Modifications._]\n\nIn his employment of the exciting or reactionary influence of the\nUgly, Hartmann exceeded Schasler himself. Lowest among the degrees of\nBeauty, indeed forming the lower limit of \u00e6sthetic fact, lies sensuous\npleasure, which is unconscious formal beauty; its first true degree\nis formal beauty of the first order, or the mathematically pleasing\n(unity, variety, symmetry, proportion, the golden section, etc.); its\nsecond degree is formal beauty of the second order, the dynamically\npleasing; its third is formal beauty of the third order, the passive\nteleological, as in the case of utensils or machinery. Indeed it may\nhere be noted that among machines and utensils, on a level with jars,\nplates and cups, Hartmann placed language: it is a dead thing, said\nhe; receiving the appearances of life (_Scheinleben_)[19] only at the\nvery instant of utterance. Language a \"dead thing,\" an \"utensil\" for\nthe philosopher of the Unconscious, in the land of Humboldt, with a\nSteinthal still living! There follow, as formal beauty of the fourth\norder, the active teleological or living, and as formal beauty of the\nfifth order, conformity to species (_das Gattungsm\u00e4ssige)_: lastly\nand above all, since the individual idea is superior to the specific,\nis beauty concrete beauty or the microcosmic individual, which is no\nlonger formal, but beauty of content. As is to be expected, the passage\nfrom lower to Higher degrees is made by means of the Ugly: nobody has\nlaboured like Hartmann to recount in detail the services rendered by\nUgliness to Beauty. From ugliness, in the form of the destruction of\nthe beauty of equality, arises symmetry: from ugliness in the case of\nthe circle arises the ellipse; the beauty of a waterfall tumbling over\nrocks is caused by the mathematically ugly; destruction, that is to\nsay, of a fall in a parabolic curve; beauty of spiritual expression is\nachieved through the introduction of an ugliness relative to fleshly\nperfection. Beauty of a higher degree is founded on ugliness at a\nlower degree. When the highest degree is reached, that of individual\nbeauty beyond which there can be nothing, even then elemental ugliness\ncontinues its work of beneficent irritation. The later phases thus\nproduced are well known to us as the famous Modifications of the\nBeautiful: in this section also, nobody is so copious or detailed as\nHartmann. He certainly does admit, side by side with simple or pure\nbeauty, certain modifications free from conflict, such as the sublime\nor graceful; but the more important modifications can arise only\nthrough conflict. There are four cases, because the resolution must\nbe either immanent, logical, transcendent or combined: immanent in\nthe idyllic, the melancholy, the sad, the cheerful, the moving, the\nelegiac; logical in the comic in all its varieties; transcendent in the\ntragic; combined in the humorous with the tragi-comic and its other\nvarieties. When none of these resolutions is possible, there arises\nugliness; when an ugliness of content is expressed by an ugliness of\nform, we have the maximum of ugliness, the real \u00e6sthetic devil.\n\n[Sidenote: _Metaphysical \u00c6sthetic in France. C. Lev\u00eaque._]\n\nHartmann is the last considerable representative of the old \u00e6sthetic\nschool in Germany; he inspires terror by the mass of his literary\nproduction, like many others of the school, who seem to accept it as\na dogma that art cannot be dealt with except in several volumes a\nthousand pages long. Those who are not afraid of giants and are able\nto attack this sort of \u00c6sthetic, will find it a fat good-humoured\nMagog full of vulgar prejudices, and so constituted that, despite his\napparent strength, a little blow will kill him.\n\nIn other countries metaphysical \u00c6sthetic had few followers. In France\nthe celebrated competition of the Academy of Moral and Political\nSciences in 1857 crowned with their approval and presented to the\nworld the _Science of Beauty_ by Lev\u00eaque;[20] of which nobody now\nthinks or speaks, only remembering the author (who attitudinized\nas a disciple of Plato) by his eight characteristics of Beauty,\nderived by him from examination of a lily. The eight characteristics\nwere as follows:--sufficient size of form, unity, variety, harmony,\nproportion, normal vivacity of colour, grace and propriety; ultimately\nreducible to two, size and order. As supplementary proof of the truth\nof his theory, Lev\u00eaque applied it to three beautiful things: a child\nplaying with its mother, a symphony of Beethoven and the life of a\nphilosopher (Socrates). Really, it is somewhat difficult (says one of\nhis fellow-spiritualists, venturing to comment on this doctrine though\nspeaking with the utmost deference) to imagine what may be the normal\nvivacity of colour in the life of a philosopher.[21] Translations and\nexplanatory articles by Charles B\u00e9nard[22] and books by various writers\nbelonging to French Switzerland (T\u00f6pffer, Pictet, Cherbuliez) were not\nsuccessful in popularizing the German systems of \u00c6sthetic in France.\n\n[Sidenote: _In England. J. Ruskin._]\n\nEngland showed even less disposition to interest herself, although\nJohn Ruskin may have some claim to be considered a metaphysical\n\u00e6sthetician with a distinctive national stamp. But it is difficult\nto treat of Ruskin in a history of science, for his temperament was\nwholly opposed to the scientific. His disposition was that of the\nartist, impressionable, excitable, voluble, rich in feeling; a dogmatic\ntone and the appearance of theoretical form veil, in his exquisite\nand enthusiastic pages, a texture of dreams and fancies. The reader\nwho recalls those pages will regard as irreverent any detailed and\nprosaic review of Ruskin's \u00e6sthetic thought, which must inevitably\nreveal its poverty and incoherence. Suffice it to say that, following\na finalistic, mystical intuition of nature, he considered beauty as a\nrevelation of divine intentions, the seal \"God sets on his works, even\nupon the smallest.\" For him the faculty which perceives the beautiful\nis neither intellect nor sensibility, but a particular feeling which\nhe names the theoretic faculty. Natural beauty, which reveals itself\nto a pure heart when contemplating any object untouched and unspoiled\nby the hand of man, asserts itself for this reason as immeasurably\nsuperior to any work of art. Ruskin was too hasty in analysis to\nunderstand the complicated psychological and \u00e6sthetic process which\nwent on in his mind when he was moved to an artist's ecstasy by\ncontemplating some humble natural object such as a bird's nest or a\nflowing rivulet.[23]\n\n[Sidenote: _\u00c6sthetic in Italy._]\n\nIn Italy the Abate Tornasi wrote a half-Hegelian, half-Catholic\n\u00c6sthetic, wherein the beautiful is identified with the second person of\nthe Trinity, the Word made man;[24] by this means he hoped to raise a\nbank of opposition against the liberal criticism of De Sanctis, whom he\nconsidered, from the sublime height of his own philosophy, as \"a subtle\ngrammarian.\" Combined Giobertian and German, especially Hegelian,\ninfluence produced several works of secondary importance; De Meis\ndeveloped at length the thesis of the death of Art in the historical\nworld.[25] Somewhat later Gallo also treated \u00c6sthetic from the Hegelian\npoint of view,[26] and others repeated, nearly word for word, the\ndoctrines of Schasler and Hartmann on the overcoming of the Ugly.[27]\n\n[Sidenote: _Antonio Tari and his lectures._]\n\nThe only genuine Italian teacher of metaphysical \u00c6sthetic according\nto the Germans was Antonio Tari, who lectured on this very subject\nin Naples University from 1861 to 1884. He had a meticulous and\nsuperstitiously minute knowledge of everything that issued from German\nprinting-presses, and was the author of an _Ideal \u00c6sthetic_ as well\nas essays on style, taste, serious work and play (_Spiel,_) music and\narchitecture, wherein he tried to keep the mean between the idealism\nof Hegel and the formalism of Herbart:[28] his lectures on \u00c6sthetic\nattracted huge throngs and were one of the regular sights in the noisy,\ncrowded Neapolitan university. Tari divided his treatment under three\nheads, \u00c6sthesinomy, \u00c6sthesigraphy and \u00c6sthesipraxis, corresponding to\nthe Metaphysic of the beautiful, to the doctrine of beauty in nature,\nand to that of beauty in art; like the German idealists, he defined the\n\u00e6sthetic sphere as intermediate between the theoretical and practical:\nhe says emphatically that \"in the world of spirit the temperate zone\nis equidistant from the glacial, peopled by the Esquimaux of thought,\nand from the torrid, peopled by the giants of action.\" He pulled Beauty\nfrom her throne, substituting in her stead the \u00c6sthetic, of which\nBeauty is but an initial moment, the simple \"beginning of \u00e6sthetic\nlife, eternal mortality, flower and fruit in one,\" whose successive\nmoments are represented by the Sublime, the Comic, the Humorous, and\nthe Dramatic.\n\n[Sidenote: _\u00c6sthesigraphy._]\n\nBut the most attractive part of Tari's lectures was that devoted\nto \u00c6sthesigraphy, subdivided into Cosmography, Physiography and\nPsychography, in the course of which he frequently quoted Vischer with\ngreat devotion; \"the great Vischer\" as he called him, in imitation of\nwhom he constructed his own \"\u00e6sthetic physics,\" brightening it with\nmuch varied erudition and enlivening it with quaint comparisons. Is\nhe speaking of beauty in inorganic nature--water, for example? He\nsays in his fanciful manner, \"When water ripples in the sunshine, in\nthat act it has its smile; it has its frown in the breaking wave, its\ncaprice in the fountain, its majestic fury in the foam.\" Is he speaking\nof geological configuration? \"The vale, cradle perchance of the\nhuman race, is idyllic; the plain, monotonous but fat, is didactic.\"\nOf metals? \"Gold is born great; iron, the apotheosis of human toil,\nachieves greatness; the former boasts of its cradle when it does not\nbring it to dishonour; the latter causes it to be forgotten.\" He looked\non vegetable life as a dream, repeating Herder's fine saying that the\nplant is \"the new-born babe that hangs sucking upon the breast of\nmother nature.\" He divided vegetables into three types: foliaceous,\nramified and umbelliferous: \"the foliaceous type,\" he says, \"attains\ngigantic proportions in the tropics, where the queen of monocotyledons,\nthe Palm-tree, represents despotism, the human scourge of those desert\nregions. Of that solitary pinnacle, all crown, the negro may well be\nidentified as the reptile that crawls round its base.\" Amongst flowers,\nthe carnation is \"symbol of betrayal, by reason of the variegation of\nits colours and its deeply-dissected petals\"; the celebrated comparison\nby Ariosto of a rose with a young girl is permissible only when the\nflower is still in bud, because \"when it has unfolded its petals,\ndisdaining the protection of thorns, displaying itself in all the pomp\nof its full colour, and boldly asking to be plucked by any hand, then\nit is woman, all woman, to call it by no harsher name, giving pleasure\nwithout feeling it, simulating love by its perfume and modesty by the\ncrimson of its petals.\" He searches for and comments upon analogies\nbetween certain fruits and certain flowers; between the strawberry, for\ninstance, and the violet; between the orange and the rose; he admired\n\"the luxuriant spirals and the delicate architecture of a bunch of\ngrapes\": the mandarin-orange reminded him of the nobleman _qui s'est\ndonn\u00e9 la peine de na\u00eetre_; the fig, on the contrary, was the great\ncountry bumpkin, \"rough, rude, but profitable.\" In the animal kingdom,\nthe spider symbolized primitive isolation; the bee, monasticism; the\nant, republicanism. He noted, with Michelet, that the spider is a\nliving paralogism; it cannot feed itself without its web, and it cannot\nspin its web without feeding. Fish he condemns as un-\u00e6sthetic: \"they\nare of stupid appearance with their wide--open eyes and incessant\ngaping, which makes them look voraciously gluttonous.\" Not so with\namphibians, for which he entertains a sympathy: the frog and the\ncrocodile, \"alpha and omega of the family, start from the comical, or\neven the scurrilous, and attain the sublimity of the horrid.\" Birds\nare especially \u00e6sthetic by nature, \"possessing the three most genial\nattributes of a living being: love, song, and flight\"; moreover, they\npresent contrasts and antitheses: \"opposite to the eagle, queen of the\nskies, stands the swan, the mild king of the marshes; the libertine\nvainglorious cock has its contrast in the humble uxorious turtle-dove;\nthe magnificent peacock is balanced by the rude and rustic turkey.\"\nAmongst mammals, nature compensates for defects of pure beauty by\ndramatic value; if they cannot throw their song into the air, they\nhave the rudiments of speech; if they have no variegated, myriad-hued\nplumage, they have dark, heavily-marked colouring, instinct with life;\nif they cannot fly, they have many other modes of powerful progression;\nand, the higher they go, the more do they attain individuality in\nappearance and life. \"The epic of animal life is comedy in the donkey,\n_iniquae mentis asellus_; idyl in the great wild beasts; downright\ntragedy in the Kaffir bull, that cloven-hoofed Codrus, who gives\nhimself voluntarily to the lion in order to save the herd.\" As amongst\nbirds, so amongst beasts attractive contrasts are to be made:--the lamb\nand the kid seem to typify Jesus and the devil; dog and cat, abnegation\nand egoism; hare and fox, the foolish simpleton and crafty villain.\nMany quaint and subtle observations does Tari let fall on human beauty\nand the relative beauty of the sexes, allowing the female to have\ncharm, not beauty: \"bodily beauty is poise, and woman's body is so\nill-poised that she falls easily when running; made for child-bearing,\nshe has knock-kneed legs, adapted to support the large pelvis; her\nshoulders have a curve compensating the convexity of the chest.\" He\ndescribes the various parts of the body: \"curly hair expresses physical\nforce; straight hair, moral\"; \"blue, napoleonic eyes have sometimes\na depth like the sea; green eyes have a melancholy fascination; grey\neyes are wanting in individuality; black eyes are the most intensely\nindividual\"; \"a lovely mouth has been best described by Heine; two lips\nevenly matched; to lovers the mouth will rather seem a shell whose\npearl is the kiss.\"[29]\n\nHow could we better take a smiling leave of metaphysical \u00c6sthetic in\nthe German manner than by recording this quaint vernacular version\nof it made by Tari, that kindly little old man, \"the last jovial\nhigh-priest of an arbitrary and confused \u00c6sthetic\"?[30]\n\n\n[1] _Allgemeine \u00c4sthetik als Formwissenschaft,_ Vienna, 1865; see\nalso Meyer's _Konversations-Lexikon_ (4th ed.), art. _\u00c4sthetik,_ by\nZimmermann.\n\n[2] _Kritische G\u00e4nge,_ vi., Stuttgart, 1873, pp. 6, 21, 32.\n\n[3] _Geschichte d. \u00c4sth. i. Deutschl., passim,_ esp. pp. 27, 97,\n100, 125, 147, 232. 234, 265, 286, 293, 487; _Grundz\u00fcge der \u00c4sth._\n(posth., Leipzig, 1884), \u00a7\u00a7 8-13; and two juvenile works, _\u00dcb. d.\nBegriff d. Sch\u00f6nheit,_ G\u00f6ttingen, 1845, and _\u00dcb. d. Bedingungen d.\nKunstsch\u00f6nheit,_ G\u00f6ttingen, 1847.\n\n[4] _Leibniz u. Baumgarten,_ Halle, 1875, pp. 76-102.\n\n[5] G. Neudecker, _Studien z. Gesch. d. dtschn. \u00c4sth. s. Kant,_ pp.\n54-55.\n\n[6] Polemic in _Zeitschr. f. exacte Philos._ (Herbartian organ) for\n1862-1863, ii. p. 309 _seqq.,_ ii. p. 384 _seqq,_ iv. pp. 26 _seqq.,_\n199 _seqq.,_ 300 _seqq._\n\n[7] Volkmann, _Lehrbuch der Psychologie,_ 3rd ed., C\u00f6then, 1884-1885.\nLazarus, _Das Leben der Seele,_ 1856-1858.\n\n[8] Moriz Carri\u00e8re, _\u00c4sthetik,_ 1889 (3rd ed., Leipzig, 1885).\n\n[9] _Kritische G\u00e4nge,_ v., Stuttgart, 1866, p. 59.\n\n[10] _\u00c4sthetik,_ T\u00fcbingen, 1869.\n\n[11] See above, pp. 348-349.\n\n[12] _\u00c4sthetik,_ Leipzig, 1886, i. pp. 1-16, 19-24, 70; ii. p. 52:\ncf. _Kritische Gesch. der \u00c4sthetik,_ pp. 795, 963, 1041-1044, 1028,\n1036-1038.\n\n[13] _Kritische G\u00e4nge,_ v. pp. 112-115.\n\n[14] _Die dtsche. \u00c4sth. s. Kant,_ 1886 (Part i. of _\u00c4sth._).\n\n[15] _Philosophie des Sch\u00f6nen_ (Part ii. of _\u00c4sth._), Leipzig, 1890,\npp. 463-464; cf. _Deutsche \u00c4sth. s. K._ pp. 357-362.\n\n[16] _Phil. d. Sch._ pp. 434-437.\n\n[17] _Op. cit._ pp. 115-116.\n\n[18] _Op. cit._ pp. 197-198.\n\n[19] _Op. cit._ pp. 150-152.\n\n[20] Ch. Lev\u00eaque, _La Science du beau,_ Paris, 1862.\n\n[21] E. Saisset, _L'Esth\u00e9tique fran\u00e7aise_ (in app. to vol. _L'\u00c2me et la\nvie,_ Paris, 1864), pp. 118-120.\n\n[22] In _Revue philosophique,_ vols. i. ii. x. xii. xvi.\n\n[23] J. Ruskin, _Modern Painters_ (4th ed., London, 1891); cf. De la\nSizeranne, pp. 112-278.\n\n[24] Vito Fornari, _Arte del dire,_ Naples, 1866--1872; cf. vol. iv.\n\n[25] A. C. De Meis, _Dopo la laurea,_ Bologna, 1868-1869.\n\n[26] Nic. Gallo, _L' idealismo e la letteratura,_ Rome, 1880; _La\nscienza dell' arte,_ Turin, 1887.\n\n[27] _E.g._ F. Masci, _Psicologia del comico,_ Naples, 1888.\n\n[28] _Estetica ideale,_ Naples, 1863; _Saggi di critica_ (collected\nposthumously), Trani, 1886.\n\n[29] A. Tari, _Lezioni di estetica generale,_ collected by C.\nScamaccia-Luvara, Naples, 1884; _Elementi di estetica,_ compiled by G.\nTommasuolo, Naples, 1885.\n\n[30] V. Pica, _L'Arte dell' Estremo Oriente,_ Turin, 1894, p. 13.\n\n\n\n\nXVII\n\n\n\u00c6STHETIC POSITIVISM AND NATURALISM\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Positivism and Evolutionism._]\n\nThe ground lost by idealistic metaphysic was conquered in the latter\nhalf of the nineteenth century by positivistic and evolutionary\nmetaphysic, a confused substitution of natural for philosophical\nsciences, and a hotch-potch of materialistic and idealistic, mechanical\nand theological theories, the whole crowned with scepticism and\nagnosticism. Characteristic of this trend of opinion was its contempt\nof history, especially the history of philosophy; which prevented its\never making that contact with the unbroken and age-long efforts of\nthinkers without which it is idle to hope for fertile work and true\nprogress.\n\n[Sidenote_\u00c6sthetic of H. Spencer._]\n\nSpencer (the greatest positivist of his day), whilst discussing\n\u00c6sthetic, actually did not know that he was dealing with problems for\nall, or almost all, of which solutions had been already proposed and\ndiscussed. At the beginning of his essay on the _Philosophy of Style,_\nhe remarks innocently: \"I believe nobody has ever sketched a general\ntheory of the art of writing\" (in 1852!); and in his _Principles of\nPsychology_ (1855), touching the \u00e6sthetic feelings he remarks that\nhe has some recollection of observations concerning the relation of\nart and play made \"by some German author whose name I cannot recall\"\n(Schiller!). Had his pages on \u00c6sthetic been written in the seventeenth\ncentury, they would have won a low position amongst the early crude\nattempts at \u00e6sthetic speculation; in the nineteenth century, one knows\nnot how to judge them. In his essay on _The Useful and the Beautiful_\n(1852-1854), he shows how the useful becomes beautiful when it ceases\nto be useful, illustrating this by a ruined castle useless for the\npurposes of modern life, but a suitable scene for picnic parties and\na good subject for a picture to hang on a parlour wall; which leads\nhim to identify the principle of evolution from the useful to the\nbeautiful as contrast. In another essay on the _Beauty of the Human\nFace_ (1852) he explains this beauty as a sign and effect of moral\ngoodness; in that on _Grace_ (1852) he considers the sentiment of the\ngraceful as sympathy for power in conjunction with agility. In the\n_Origin of Architectural Styles_ (1852-1854) he discovers the beauty of\narchitecture as consisting in uniformity and symmetry, an idea which\nis aroused in a man looking at the bodily equilibrium of the higher\nanimals or, as in Gothic architecture, by analogy with the vegetable\nkingdom; in his essay on _Style,_ he places the cause of stylistic\nbeauty in economy of effort; in his _Origin and Function of Music_\n(1857) he theorizes on music as the natural language of the passions,\nadapted to increase sympathy between men.[1] In his _Principles of\nPsychology,_ he maintains that the \u00e6sthetic feelings arise from the\noverflow of exuberant energy in the organism, and distinguishes\nvarious degrees of them, from simple sensation to that accompanied\nby representative elements, and so on until perception is reached,\nwith more complex elements of representation, then emotion, and, last\nof all, that state of consciousness which transcends sensation and\nperception. The most perfect form of \u00e6sthetic feeling is attained\nby the coincidence of the three orders of pleasures, a coincidence\nproduced by the full action of their respective faculties with the\nleast possible subtraction due to the painful effect of excessive\nactivity. But it is very rarely that we experience \u00e6sthetic excitement\nof this kind and strength; almost all works of art are imperfect\nbecause they contain a mixture of artistic with anti-artistic effects;\nnow the technique is unsatisfactory, now the emotion is of a low\norder. These works of art which are universally admired, are found\nwhen measured by this criterion to deserve a lower place than that\naccorded them by popular taste. \"Beginning with the Greek epic and\nthe representations of analogous legends given by their sculptors,\ntending to excite egoistic or ego-altruistic sentiments, and passing\nthrough the literature of the Middle Ages, equally impregnated with\ninferior sentiments, then through the works of the old masters, whose\nideas and sentiments seldom compensate for the displeasing effect they\ninflict on our senses overrefined in study of appearances; and coming\nat last to the vaunted works of modern art, excellent for technical\nexecution in many cases but deplorable for the emotions they arouse\nand express, such as G\u00e9r\u00f4me's battle-pieces, alternately sensual and\nsanguinary;--they are all far off indeed from the qualities deemed\ndesirable, from the artistic forms corresponding to the highest forms\nof \u00e6sthetic feeling.\"[2] These last critical denunciations, like the\ntheories noticed above, are mere substitutions of one word for another;\n\"facility\" for \"grace\"; \"economy\" for \"beauty,\" and so on. Indeed,\nwhen one tries to define the exact philosophical position of Spencer,\none can only possibly say that he wavers between sensationalism and\nmoralism, and is never for a moment conscious of art as art.\n\n[Sidenote: _Physiologists of \u00c6sthetic. Grant Allen, Helmholtz, and\nothers._]\n\nThe same oscillation is noticeable in other English writers such as\nSully and Bain, in whom, however, we find more familiarity with works\nof art.[3] In his numerous essays and in _Physiological \u00c6sthetics_\n(1877), Grant Allen collected a great many records of physiological\nexperiments, all of which may be of supreme value to physiology, for\naught we know to the contrary, but most assuredly are worthless from\nthe point of view of \u00c6sthetic. He keeps to the distinction between\nnecessary or vital activity and the superfluous or that of play, and\ndefines \u00e6sthetic pleasure as \"the subjective concomitant of the normal\nsum of activity, not connected directly with the vital functions, in\nthe terminal peripheric organs of the cerebrospinal nervous system.\"[4]\nPhysiological processes considered as causes of pleasure in art are\npresented under other aspects by later investigators, who assert that\nsuch pleasure arises not only \"from the activity of the visual organs\nand the muscular systems associated with them, but also from the\nparticipation of some of the more important functions of the organism,\nas for instance breathing, circulation of the blood, equilibrium and\ninternal muscular accommodation.\" Art, then, indubitably originated\nin \"a prehistoric man who was habitually a deep-breather, having\nno call to rearrange his natural habits when scratching lines on\nbones or in mud and taking pains to draw them regularly spaced.\"[5]\nPhysical-\u00c6sthetic researches were pursued in Germany by Helmholtz,\nBr\u00fccke and Stumpf,[6] who generally confined themselves to the narrower\nfield of optics and acoustics, giving descriptions of the physical\nprocesses of artistic technique and the conditions to which pleasurable\nvisual and auditive impressions must conform, without claiming to merge\n\u00c6sthetic in Physics, but even pointing out the divergences between\nthem. Degenerate Herbartians hastened to disguise in physiological\nterms the metaphysical forms and relations of which their master had\nspoken, and to coquet with the hedonism of the naturalists.\n\n[Sidenote: _Method of the natural sciences in \u00c6sthetic._]\n\nThe superstitious cult of natural sciences was often accompanied (as is\nfrequently the fate of superstition) by a sort of hypocrisy. Chemical,\nphysical and physiological laboratories became Sybilline grottoes,\nresounding with the questions of credulous inquirers concerning the\nprofoundest problems of the human spirit; and many of those who were\nreally conducting their inquiries on inherently philosophic principles\npretended or deluded themselves into believing that they followed the\nMethod of Natural Science. A proof of this illusion or pretence is\nHippolyte Taine's _Philosophy of Art_[7]\n\n[Sidenote: _H. Taine's \u00c6sthetic._]\n\n\"If by studying the art of various peoples and various epochs,\" says\nTaine, \"we could define the nature and establish the conditions of\nthe existence of each art, we should have arrived at a complete\nexplanation of the fine arts and of art in general, _i.e._ at what\nis called an \u00c6sthetic.\" A historical \u00c6sthetic, not a dogmatic, which\nfixes characters and indicates laws \"like Botany, and studies with\nequal attention orange and ivy, pine and birch; indeed it is a sort of\nbotanical science applied to the works of man instead of to plants\";\nan \u00c6sthetic which shall follow \"the general movement which tends\ndaily more and more to join the moral to the natural sciences and by\nextending to the former the principles, the safeguards and the rules of\nthe latter, enables both to attain the same security and maintain the\nsame progress.\"[8] The naturalistic prelude is followed by definitions\nand doctrines indistinguishable from those offered by philosophers\nwhose infallibility is not guaranteed by scientific methods, indeed,\nfrom those of the wildest of such philosophers. For, says Taine, art\nis imitation, an imitation so carried out as to render sensible the\nessential character of objects; the essential character being \"a\nquality from which all other qualities, or many others, are derived and\nfollow unalterably from it.\" The essential character of a lion, for\nexample, is to be \"a great carnivore\"; this determines the formation of\nall its limbs; the essential character of Holland is to be \"a country\nformed by alluvial soil.\" This is why art is not restricted to objects\nexisting in reality, but is able, as in architecture or in music, to\nrepresent essential characters without natural objects to correspond.[9]\n\n[Sidenote: _Taine's metaphysic and moralism._]\n\nNow, in what do these essential characters, this carnivorosity and this\nalluviality differ, save perhaps in extravagance of example, from the\n\"types\" and \"ideas\" which intellectualiste or metaphysical \u00c6sthetic\nhad always considered as the proper content of art? Taine himself\nclears away every doubt in the matter by explicitly stating that \"this\ncharacter is what philosophers call the 'essence of things,' in virtue\nof which they affirm that the aim and end of art is to make manifest\nthe essence of things\"; he adds that, for his part, he \"refuses to\nmake use of the word 'essence' as being a technical term\":[10] of the\nword itself, maybe; not of the concept for which it stands. There are\ntwo ways (says Taine, for all the world as though he were a Schelling)\nleading to the higher life of man, to contemplation: the way of\nscience and the way of art: \"the former investigates the causes and\nfundamental laws of reality, and expresses them in exact formul\u00e6 and\nabstract terms: the latter makes manifest these causes and laws, not in\ndry definitions inaccessible to the vulgar, and intelligible only to\nthe select few, but in a sensible manner, appealing not merely to the\nreason but to the heart and senses of the most commonplace man; it has\nthe power of being both elevated and popular, of manifesting what is\nmost noble and elevated, and of manifesting it to every one.\"[11]\n\nFor Taine, as for the Hegelian \u00e6stheticians, works of art are arranged\nin a scale of values; so that, having begun by condemning as absurd\nevery judgement of taste (every one to his taste[12]), he ends by\nasserting that \"personal taste has no value whatever,\" and that some\ncommon measure should be abstracted and set up as a standard of\nprogress and retrogression, ornamentation and degeneracy; a standard\nby which to approve and disapprove, praise and blame.[13] The scale of\nvalues set up by him is twofold or threefold, in the first instance\nit turns on the degree of importance of the character, _i.e._ the\ngreater or less generality in idea, and the degree of beneficent effect\n(_degr\u00e9 de bienfaisance_), _i.e._ the greater or less moral value of\nthe representation (two grades which are aspects of one single quality,\nviz. power, considered first for its own sake and then in its connexion\nwith others): in the second instance upon the degree of convergence of\neffects, _i.e._ the fulness of expression, the harmony between idea\nand form.[14] This intellectualistic, moralistic, rhetorical doctrine\nis interrupted now and then by the usual naturalistic protests: \"We\nshall, according to our custom, study this question in the manner of\nthe natural scientist; that is to say methodically, by analysis; hoping\nto raise not merely a song of praise, but a code of laws,\" etc.;[15] as\nthough that sufficed to alter the substance of the method adopted and\nthe doctrine expounded. Taine finally gave himself over to dialectical\ntreatments and solutions, and asserted that in the primitive period\nof Italian art, in the pictures of Giotto, we have soul without body\n(thesis); under the Renaissance, in Verrocchio's pictures, body without\nsoul (antithesis); in the sixteenth century, in Raph\u00e6l, there is\nharmony of expression and anatomy, soul and body (synthesis).[16]\n\n[Sidenote: _G. T. Feckner. Inductive \u00c6sthetic._]\n\nThe same protests and similar methods are to be found in the works of\nGustav Theodor Fechner. In his _Introduction to \u00c6sthetic_ (1876),\nFechner claims to \"abandon the attempt at conceptual determination\nof the objective essence of beauty,\" since he desires to compose not\na metaphysical \u00c6sthetic from above (_von oben_), but an inductive\n\u00c6sthetic from below (_von unten)_ and to achieve clearness, not\nsublimity; metaphysical \u00c6sthetic should bear the same relation to\ninductive, as the Philosophy of Nature to Physics.[17] Proceeding\non inductive lines, he discovers a long series of \u00e6sthetic laws or\nprinciples: the \u00e6sthetic threshold; assistance or increment; unity in\nvariety; absence of contradictions; clarity; association; contrast;\nconsequence; conciliation; the correct mean; economic use; persistency;\nchange; measure; and so on without end. This chaos of concepts he\nexpounds with a chapter apiece, pleased and proud to show himself so\nhighly scientific and so wholly inconclusive.\n\n[Sidenote: _Experiments._]\n\nNext he describes the experiments he can recommend to his readers.\nThey are of this type. Take ten rectangular pieces of white cardboard\nof fairly equal area (say ten square inches), but with sides variously\nproportioned from a ratio of 1:1 to one of 2:5, including the ratio\nof the golden section, 21:34; mix all these together on a black table\nand collect persons of every kind and character, but all belonging\nto the educated classes, and applying the method of choice ask these\npeople first to free their minds of all questions as to a particular\nuse and then to pick out the pieces of cardboard which give them the\nhighest sensation of pleasure and those which inspire them with the\nstrongest feelings of disgust; the answers to be most carefully noted,\nkeeping male and female subjects apart, and tabulated. Then see what\nfollows. Fechner admits that the chosen cardboard-pickers often made\nreservations when questioned by himself, not knowing (very naturally)\nhow to tell whether they liked a shape or disliked it without referring\nit to a definite use; sometimes they refused point-blank to make any\nselection at all; and they almost always seemed vague and perplexed in\nmind and generally, when submitted to a second test, answered in a way\ntotally different from the first. Still, we all know that errors cancel\nout; and anyhow the tabulations showed that the highest sensations\nof delight were aroused not by the square, but by rectangular forms\nmost nearly approaching the square, an enthusiastic rush being made\nfor the proportion 21:34.[18] This method of selection received an\nextraordinarily felicitous definition; it was known as \"an average of\narbitrary judgements by an arbitrary number of persons arbitrarily\nselected.\"[19] Fechner also informs us (always in tabular form) of the\nresult of a statistical inquiry of his own, by means of countless heaps\nof catalogues and gallery-guides, as to the dimensions and shapes of\npictures in relation to the subjects they depict.[20]\n\n[Sidenote: _Trivial nature of his ideas on Beauty and Art._]\n\n\nNevertheless, when he tries to tell us what beauty is, he falls back\non using--whether well or ill--the old speculative method, which he\nprefaces with the remark that for him the concept of beauty is \"merely\nan expedient in conformity with linguistic usage for indicating\nbriefly the link which unites the prevailing conditions of immediate\npleasure.\"[21] He distinguishes three meanings of the word \"beauty\":\nfirst, in a broad sense, the pleasing in general: secondly, in a\nnarrow sense, a higher pleasure, but still sensuous: thirdly, in the\nnarrowest sense, true beauty, which \"not only pleases, but has the\nright of pleasing, possesses value in pleasing\"; in it are united the\nconcepts of beauty (the pleasing) and of goodness.[22] Beauty, in fact,\nis that which must please objectively and as such it corresponds with\nthe good of action. \"The Good,\" says Fechner, \"is like a serious man,\nthe capable organiser of his whole domestic life, sagaciously weighing\nthe present and future, setting himself to extract the greatest benefit\nfrom both. Beauty is his florid spouse, careful of the present and\nmindful of her husband's wishes. The Pleasing is the baby, all senses\nand play: the Useful is the servant who puts his hands at his master's\ndisposal and is given bread solely in accordance with his deserts.\nTruth, lastly, is the preacher and teacher to the household; preacher\nin matters of faith, teacher in those of learning: he gives an eye to\nthe Good and a helping hand to the Useful, and holds up a looking-glass\nto Beauty.\"[23] When speaking of art, he sums up all essential laws or\nrules into the following: (1) art chooses a valuable or, at any rate,\nan interesting, idea for representation: (2) it expresses the idea in\nsensible material in the manner most suitable to its contents: (3) from\namongst the various means at its disposal, it selects those which in\nthemselves are more pleasing than the others: (4) the same procedure\nis observed in all particulars: (5) in the event of conflict between\nthese rules, one is made to give way to another in such a way that the\ngreatest possible pleasure and that of highest value is attained (_das\ngr\u00f6sstm\u00f6gliche und werthvollste Gefallen_).[24] But why should Fechner,\nwho had this eudemonistic theory of beauty and art (as he calls it) all\nready made in advance,[25] take the trouble to enumerate principles\nand laws and conduct experiments and tabulate statistics wholly\nincapable of illustrating or proving it? One is tempted to believe\nthat these pseudo-scientific operations were to him, and still are to\nhis followers, a pastime or hobby neither more nor less important than\nplaying Patience or collecting stamps.\n\n[Sidenote: _Ernst Grosse. Speculative \u00c6sthetic and the science of art._]\n\nAnother example of the superstitious cult of the natural sciences is to\nbe found in Professor Ernst Grosse's _Origins of Art._[26] Contemner of\nall philosophical research into art, which he dismisses under the title\nof \"Speculative \u00c6sthetic,\" Grosse invokes a Science of art (_Kunst\nwissenschaft)_ whose mission is to dig out all the laws lying hidden\nin the mass of historical facts collected to date. It is his opinion\nthat all ethnographic and prehistoric material should be united to\nhistorical matter proper, there being no possibility, according to him,\nof framing general laws when study is restricted to the art of cultured\npeoples \"just as a theory of generation must necessarily be imperfect\nif founded exclusively on the form of that function predominant among\nmammals.\"[27] But immediately after his declaration of abhorrence for\nphilosophy, and of faith in scientific methods, Grosse finds himself\nin the same difficulty as Taine and Fechner. Indeed, there is no\nescape; in order to examine the artistic productions of primitive and\nsavage peoples, a start must be made from some sort of concept of\nart. All the scientific metaphors, all the verbal emollients employed\nby Grosse cannot hide the nature of the plan he is forced to adopt,\nor its striking resemblance to the despised speculative \u00c6sthetic.\n\"As a traveller who desires to explore an unknown land must provide\nhimself with a general outline of the country and have some knowledge\nof the direction in which his path should lie, if he does not wish to\nlose his way entirely; so we, before beginning our enquiry, need a\ngeneral preliminary orientation concerning the essence of the phenomena\n(_\u00fcber das Wesen der Erscheinungen_) about to engage our attention.\"\nMost certainly \"we may count upon having an exact and exhaustive\nanswer, at earliest, when our enquiry is finished; and it is not yet\nbegun. That characteristic which we seek to determine at the outset\n... may be most radically modified by the time we reach the end:\"\nthere is no question, fie on the suggestion! of imitating the old\n\u00e6stheticians: the only question is how \"to give a definition which may\nserve as provisional scaffolding, to be broken away on completion of\nthe edifice.\"[28] Words, words, words: the mite of general ideas and\nartistic laws to be found in his book has been quarried by Grosse not\nfrom study of the reports brought back by travellers in savage lands,\nbut from speculation on the forms of the spirit; and (inevitably) his\ninterpretation of the former is reached by the light thrown on it by\nthe latter. In his final definition, Grosse concludes by considering\nart as an activity which in its development or as its result, possesses\nimmediate feeling-value (_Gef\u00fchlswerth_), and is an end to itself;\npractical and \u00e6sthetic activity are in direct mutual opposition between\nwhich as a middle term lies the activity of play, which like the\npractical activity has its end outside itself, but, like the \u00e6sthetic,\nfinds its enjoyment not in its external end, which is more or less\ninsignificant, but in its own activity.[29] At the end of his book he\nremarks that the artistic activity of primitive peoples is hardly ever\nunaccompanied by the practical; and that art began by being social and\nbecame individual only in civilized times.[30]\n\nThe \u00c6sthetics of Taine and Grosse have also been described by the\nepithet sociological.\n\n[Sidenote: _Sociological \u00c6sthetic._]\n\nBut since no one knows what the science of Sociology is, we must deal\nwith the sociological superstition as we dealt with the naturalistic;\nthat is to say, by skipping the preface with its proposals that\ncan never be carried out, and seeing what it is that the objective\nnecessities of the case have forced the author to assert, and which of\nthe possible alternative views he accepts, or between what selection of\nthem his allegiance wavers. During this examination we shall ignore the\nfairly common case of an author who while pretending to construct an\n\u00c6sthetic simply compiles a list of facts connected with the history of\nart or civilization.\n\n[Sidenote: _Proudhon._]\n\n\nSome social reformers of our day, like Proudhon, have revived the\ncondemnations of Plato, or the mitigated moralism of antiquity and\nthe Middle Ages. Proudhon denied the formula Art for Art's sake; he\nlooked on art as a mere purveyor of sensuous pleasure, something which\nmust be subordinated to legal and economical ends; poetry, sculpture,\npainting, music, romance, history, comedy, tragedy had for him no aim\nsave exhortation to virtue and dissuasion from vice.[31]\n\n[Sidenote: _J. M. Guyau._]\n\nDevelopment of social sympathy is the whole duty of art in the\nestimation of J. M. Guyau, who became famous as the founder of Social\n\u00c6sthetic and was, according to certain French critics, inaugurator\nof the third epoch in the history of \u00c6sthetic, the first being the\n\u00e6sthetic of the ideal (Plato), the second that of perception (Kant),\nand the third that of \"Social Sympathy\" (Guyau). In his _Problems\nof Contemporary \u00c6sthetic_ (1884) Guyau combats the theory of play,\nand substitutes that of Life; in a posthumous publication _Art in\nIts Sociological Aspect_ (1889) he explains more clearly that the\nlife of which he speaks is social life.[32] If the beautiful be the\nintellectually pleasing, certainly it cannot be identified with the\nuseful which is only searching for what is pleasing; but the useful\n(says Guyau, in the belief that he is correcting both Kant and\nthe evolutionists) does not always exclude the beautiful, of which\nindeed it often forms the lowest degree. The study of art is embraced\npartly,[33] not wholly, by Sociology: for art fulfils two ends, firstly\nand primarily that of provoking pleasant sensations (of colour, sound,\netc.) and in this sense finds itself in the presence of practically\nincontestable scientific laws which connect \u00c6sthetic with the physics\n(optics, acoustics, etc.), mathematics, physiology and psychophysics.\nSculpture, in fact, rests especially on anatomy and physiology:\npainting on anatomy, physiology and optics: architecture on optics\n(golden section, etc.): music on physiology and acoustics: poetry on\nmetrics, whose most general laws are acoustical and physiological. The\nsecond function of art is to produce the phenomena of \"psychological\ninduction,\" which bring to a head ideas and sentiments of most\ncomplex nature (sympathy with personages represented, interest, pity,\nindignation, etc.), in short all the social feelings, which constitute\nit \"the expression of life.\" Whence are derived the two tendencies\nrecognised in art; one inclining towards harmony, consonance, and\neverything delightful to ear and eye: the other towards the transfusion\nof life into the domain of art. Genius, true genius is destined to\npreserve the balance of the two tendencies: decadents and degenerates\ndeprive art of its social sympathetic aim by setting \u00e6sthetic sympathy\nat war against human sympathy.[34] Translating all this into familiar\nterms, we may say that Guy au asserts one purely hedonistic art, above\nwhich he superimposes another art, also hedonistic, but serviceable to\nthe cause of morality.\n\n[Sidenote: _M. Nordau._]\n\nThe same polemic against decadents, degenerates and individualists\nis carried on by another writer, Max Nordau, who gives art the task\nof re-establishing the wholeness of life amongst the fragmentary\nspecialisation characteristic of industrial society; he asserts that\nart for art's sake, art as the simple expression of internal states or\nthe objectification of the artist's feelings, no doubt exists, but is\nmerely \"the art of Quaternary man, the art of the cave-dweller.\"[35]\n\n[Sidenote: _Naturalism. C. Lombroso._]\n\nNaturalistic is the best term with which to qualify the \u00c6sthetic\nderived from that identification of genius with degeneracy which made\nthe fortune of Lombroso and his school. This identification derives\nits chief strength from the following piece of reasoning. Great mental\nefforts, total absorption in one dominating thought, often bring about\nphysiological disorders in the bodily organism and weakness or atrophy\nof various vital functions. But such derangements come under the\nhead of the pathological concept of illness, degeneration, madness.\nTherefore genius is identical with illness, degeneration and madness.\nA syllogism from particular to general, in which case, according to\ntraditional Logic, _non est consequentia._ But with sociologists such\nas Nordau, Lombroso and company, we almost overstep the line separating\nrespectable error from that grosser form which we call a blunder.\n\nA mere confusion between scientific analysis and historical inquiry\nor description is visible in the works of certain sociologists and\nanthropologists. Thus one of them, Carl B\u00fccher, in studying the life of\nprimitive peoples, asserts that poetry, music and work were originally\nfused in one single act; that poetry and music were used to regulate\nthe rhythms of labour.[36] This may be historically true or false,\nimportant or no: it has nothing whatever to do with \u00e6sthetic science.\nIn the same way Andrew Lang maintains that the doctrine concerning the\norigin of art as disinterested expression of the mimetic faculty finds\nno confirmation from what we know of primitive art, which is decorative\nrather than expressive:[37] as though primitive art, which is a mere\nfact awaiting interpretation, could ever be converted into a criterion\nfor the interpretation of art in general.\n\n[Sidenote: _Decline of Linguistic._]\n\nThe same vague naturalism exercised a baneful influence on Linguistic,\nwhich of late years has been wholly lacking in such profound research\nas that inaugurated by Humboldt and followed up by Steinthal. But\nSteinthal never succeeded in founding a school. Max M\u00fcller, popular\nand inaccurate, maintained the indivisibility of speech and thought,\nconfounding, or at least not distinguishing, \u00e6sthetic and logical\nthought; although at one time he had noted that the formation of\nnames had a closer connexion with wit, in the sense of Locke, than\nwith judgement. He maintained, moreover, that the science of language\nis not a historical but a natural science, because language is not\nthe invention of man: the dilemma of \"historical\" and \"natural\" was\ncanvassed and resolved over and over again with little result.[38]\nAnother philologist, Whitney, attacked the \"miraculous\" theory of\nM\u00fcller and denied that thought is indivisible from speech: \"The\ndeaf-mute does not speak, but he can think,\" he observes; \"thought is\nnot function of the acoustic nerve.\" By this means Whitney relapsed\ninto the ancient doctrine that speech is a symbol or means of\nexpression, of human thought, subject to the will, the result of a\nsynthesis of faculties and of a capacity for intelligent adaptation of\nmeans to end.[39]\n\n[Sidenote: _Signs of revival. H. Paul._]\n\nPhilosophical spirit reappeared in Paul's _Principles of the History\nof Language_ (1880),[40] though the author's efforts to defend himself\nfrom the terrifying accusation of being a philosopher led him to hunt\nout a fresh title to replace the scandalous \"Philosophy of Language.\"\nBut if Paul is vague about the relation of Logic to Grammar, he must\nbe given every credit for identifying, as Humboldt had already done,\nthe question of the origin of language with that of its nature; and\nreasserting that language is created afresh whenever we speak. He\nmust also be given credit for having conclusively criticized the\nEthnopsychology (_V\u00f6lkerpsychologie_) of Steinthal and Lazarus, showing\nthat there is no such thing as collective psyche and that there can be\nno language other than of the individual.\n\n[Sidenote: _The linguistic of Wundt._]\n\nWundt[41] on the other hand attached the study of language, mythology\nand customs to this non-existent science of Ethnopsychology; in his\nlatest work, on this very subject of language,[42] he foolishly echoes\nWhitney's gibes and denounces as a \"miracle theory\" (_Wundertheorie_)\nthat glorious doctrine inaugurated by Herder and Humboldt, whom he\naccuses of \"mystical obscurity\" (_mystiche Dunkel_): he observes that\nthis view may have had some justification before the principle of\nevolution had reached its triumphant application to organic nature in\ngeneral and to man in particular. He has not the faintest notion of\nthe function of imagination, or of the true relation between thought\nand expression; he finds no substantial difference between expression\nin the naturalistic, and expression in the spiritual and linguistic\nsense; he considers language as a special highly developed form of the\nvital psychophysical manifestations and of the expressive movements\nof animals. Out of these facts language is developed by imperceptible\ngradations; so that, beyond the general concept of expressive movement\n(_Ausdrucksbewegung_) \"there is no specific mark by which language can\nbe distinguished in any but an arbitrary manner.\"[43] The philosophy\nof Wundt betrays its own weakness by showing its inability to master\nthe problem of language and art. In his _Ethics_ \u00e6sthetic facts are\npresented as a complex of logical and ethical elements; the existence\nof \u00e6sthetic as a special normative science is denied, not for the good\nand sufficient reason that there are no such things as \"normative\nsciences,\" but because this special science is said by him to be\nabsorbed by the two sciences of Logic and Ethics,[44] which amounts to\ndenying the existence of \u00c6sthetic and the originality of art.\n\n\n[1] _Essays, Scientific, Political, and Speculative, 1858-1862._\n\n[2] _Principles of Psychology,_ 1855; 2nd ed. 1870, part viii. ch. 9,\n\u00a7\u00a7 533-540.\n\n[3] J. Sully, _Outlines of Psychology,_ London, 1884; _Sensation\nand Intuition, Studies in Psychology and \u00c6sthetics,_ London, 1874;\ncf. _Encycl. Britannica,_ ed. 9, art. \"\u00c6sthetics\"; Alex. Bain, _The\nEmotions and the Will,_ London, 1859, ch. 14.\n\n[4] _Physiological \u00c6sthetics,_ London, 1877; various arts, in _Mind,_\nvols. iii. iv. v. (o. s.).\n\n[5] Vernon Lee and C. Anstruther-Thomson, \"Beauty and Ugliness,\" in\n_Contemp. Review,_ October-November, 1897: (abstract in Arr\u00e9at, _Dix\nann\u00e9es de philosophie,_ pp. 80-85); same author's _Le R\u00f4le de l'\u00e9l\u00e9ment\nmoteur dans la perception esth\u00e9tique visuelle, M\u00e9moire et questionnaire\nsoumis au 4<sup>me</sup> Congr\u00e8s de Psychologie,_ reprinted Imola, 1901.\n\n[6] H. Helmholtz, _Die Lehre von der Tonempfindungen als physiologische\nGrundlage f\u00fcr die Th\u00e9orie der Musik,_ 1863, 4th ed., 1877;\nBr\u00fccke-Helmholtz, _Principes scientifiques des beaux arts,_ Fr. ed.,\nParis, 1881; C. Stumpf, _Tonpsychologie,_ Leipzig, 1883.\n\n[7] _Philosophie de l'art,_ 1866-1869 (4th ed. Paris, 1885).\n\n[8] _Op. cit._ i. pp. 13-15.\n\n[9] _Philosophie de l'art,_ i. pp. 17-54.\n\n[10] _Op. cit._ i. p. 37.\n\n[11] _Op. cit._ i. p. 54.\n\n[12] _Op. cit._ i. p. 15.\n\n[13] _Op. cit._ ii. p. 277.\n\n[14] _Philos. de l'art,_ ii. pp. 257-400.\n\n[15] _Op. cit._ ii. pp. 257-258.\n\n[16] _Op. cit._ ii. p. 393.\n\n[17] _Vorschule der \u00c4sthetik,_ 1876 (2nd ed. Leipzig, 1897-1898).\n\n[18] _Vorschule der \u00c4sthetik,_ i. ch. 19.\n\n[19] Schasler, _Krit. Geschichte d. \u00c4sth._ p. 1117.\n\n[20] _Vorschule der \u00c4sth._ ii. pp 273-314.\n\n[21] _Op. cit._ pref. p. iv.\n\n[22] _Op. cit._ i. pp. 15-30.\n\n[23] _Op. cit._ i. p. 32.\n\n[24] _Vorschule der \u00c4sth._ ii. pp. 12-13.\n\n[25] _Op. cit._ i. p. 38.\n\n[26] _Die Anf\u00e4nge der Kunst,_ Freiburg i. B. 1894.\n\n[27] _Op. cit._ p. 19.\n\n[28] _Die Anf\u00e4nge der Kunst,_ pp. 45-46.\n\n[29] _Op. cit._ pp. 46-48.\n\n[30] _Op. cit._ pp. 293-301.\n\n[31] _Du principe de l'art et de sa destination sociale,_ Paris, 1875.\n\n[32] M. Guyau, _L'Art au point de vue sociologique,_ 1889 (3rd ed.\nParis, 1895); _Les Probl\u00e8mes de l'esth\u00e9tique contemporaine,_ Paris,\n1884; cf. Fouill\u00e9e, pref. to the former work, pp. xli-xliii.\n\n[33] _L'Art au point de vue sociologique,_ pref. p. xlvii.\n\n[34] _Op. cit., passim,_ esp. ch. 4; cf. pp. 64, 85, 380.\n\n[35] Max Nordau, _Social Function of Art,_ 2nd ed., Turin, 1897.\n\n[36] Karl B\u00fccher, _Arbeit u. Rhythmus,_ 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1899.\n\n[37] _Custom and Myth,_ p. 276; quoted by Knight, _The Philosophy of\nthe Beautiful,_ vol. i. pp. 9-10.\n\n[38] _Lectures on the Science of Language,_ 1861 and 1864 (Fr. tr.,\nParis, 1867).\n\n[39] William Dwight Whitney, _The Life and Growth of Language,_ London,\n1875 (It. tr., Milan, 1876).\n\n[40] Hermann Paul, _Principien der Sprachgeschichte,_ 1880 (2nd ed.,\nHalle, 1886).\n\n[41] Wilh. Wundt, _\u00dcber Wege u. Ziele d. V\u00f6lkerpsychologie,_ Leipzig,\n1886.\n\n[42] _Die Sprache,_ Leipzig, 1900, 2 vols, (part i. of\n_V\u00f6lkerpsychologie, eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgesetze von\nSprache, Mythus und Sitte_).\n\n[43] _Die Sprache, passim;_ cf. i. p. 31 _seqq.,_ ii. pp. 599, 603-609.\n\n[44] _Ethik,_ ed. 2, Stuttgart, 1892, p. 6.\n\n\n\n\nXVIII\n\n\n\u00c6STHETIC PSYCHOLOGISM AND OTHER RECENT TENDENCIES\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Neo-criticism and empiricism._]\n\nThe neo-critical or neo-Kantian movement was powerless to make headway\nagainst hedonistic, psychological and moralistic views of the \u00e6sthetic\nfact, although it made every effort to save the concept of spirit from\nthe invading rush of naturalism and materialism.[1] Kant bequeathed to\nneo-criticism his own failure to understand creative imagination, and\nthe neo-Kantians do not seem to have had the faintest notion of any\nform of cognition other than the intellectual.\n\n[Sidenote: _Kirchmann._]\n\nAmongst German philosophers of any renown who clung to \u00e6sthetic\nsensationalism and psychologism was Kirchmann, promoter of a so-called\nrealism, and author of _\u00c6sthetic on a Realistic Basis_ (1868).[2]\nIn his doctrine the \u00e6sthetic fact is an image (_Bild_) of a real;\nan animated (_seelenvolles_) image, purified and strengthened, that\nis, idealized, and divided into the image of pleasure, which is the\nbeautiful, and that of pain, which is the ugly. Beauty admits of a\nthreefold series of varieties or modifications, being determined\naccording to the content as sublime, comic, tragic, etc.; according\nto the image, as beauty of nature or of art; and according to the\nidealization as idealistic or naturalistic, formal or spiritual,\nsymbolical or classical. Not having grasped the nature of \u00e6sthetic\nobjectification, Kirchmann takes the trouble to draw up a new\npsychological category of ideal or apparent feelings, arising from\nartistic images and being attenuations of the feelings of real life.[3]\n\n[Sidenote: _Metaphysic translated into Psychology. Vischer._]\n\nTo the evolution or involution of the Herbartians into physiologists\nof \u00e6sthetic pleasure corresponds a similar evolution or involution of\nthe idealists into adherents of psychologism. The first place must be\ngiven to the veteran Theodor Vischer, who in a criticism of his own\nwork pronounced \u00c6sthetic to be \"the union of mimics and harmonics\"\n(_vereinte Mimik und Harmonik_), and Beauty the \"harmony of the\nuniverse,\" never actually realized because realized only at infinity,\nso that when we think to seize it in the Beautiful, we are under an\nillusion: a transcendent illusion, which is the very essence of the\n\u00e6sthetic fact.[4] His son Robert Yischer coined the word _Einf\u00fchlung_\nto express the life with which man endows natural objects by means of\nthe \u00e6sthetic process.[5] Volkelt, when treating of the _Symbol_[6] and\njoining symbolism to pantheism, opposed associationism and favoured a\nnatural teleology immanent in Beauty.\n\n[Sidenote: _Siebeck._]\n\nThe Herbartian Siebeck (1875) abandoned the formalistic theory and\ntried to explain the fact of beauty by the concept of the appearance of\npersonality.[7] He distinguishes between objects which please by their\ncontent alone (sensuous pleasures), those which please by form alone\n(moral facts), and those which please by the connexion of content with\nform (organic and \u00e6sthetic facts). In organic facts the form is not\noutside the content, but is the expression of the reciprocal action and\nconjunction of the constitutive elements: whereas in \u00e6sthetic facts\nthe form is outside the content, and as it were its mere surface; not\na means to the end, but an end in itself. \u00c6sthetic intuition is a\nrelation between the sensible and the spiritual, matter and spirit,\nand is thus form regarded as the appearance of personality. \u00c6sthetic\npleasure arises from the spirit's consciousness of discovering itself\nin the sensible. Siebeck borrows the theory of modifications of the\nbeautiful from the metaphysical idealists, who held that only in such\nmodifications can beauty be found in the concrete, just as humanity can\nonly exist as a man of determinate race and nationality. The sublime is\nthat species of beauty wherein the formal moment of circumscription is\nlost, and is therefore the unlimited, which is a kind of extensive or\nintensive infinity; the tragic arises when the harmony is not given but\nis the result of conflict and development; the comic is a relation of\nthe small to the great; and so on. These traces of idealism, together\nwith his firm hold on the Kantian and Herbartian absoluteness of the\njudgement of taste, make it impossible to regard Siebeck's \u00c6sthetic as\npurely psychological and empirical and wholly devoid of philosophical\nelements.\n\n[Sidenote: _M. Diez._]\n\nIt is the same with Diez, who, in his _Theory of Feeling as Foundation\nof \u00c6sthetic_ (1892),[8] tries to explain the artistic activity as\na return to the ideal of feeling (_Ideal des f\u00fchlenden Geistes_),\nparallel with science (ideal of thought), morality (ideal of will)\nand religion (ideal of personality). But whatever is this so-called\nfeeling? is it the empirical feeling of the psychologists, irreducible\nto an ideal, or the mystic faculty of communication and conjunction\nwith the Infinite and the Absolute? the absurd \"pleasure-value\" of\nFechner, or the \"judgement\" of Kant? One is inclined to say that\nthese writers, and others like them, still under the influence of\nmetaphysical views, lack the courage of their opinions: they feel\nthemselves to be in an atmosphere of hostility and speak under\nreservations or compromises. The psychologist Jodi asserts the\nexistence of elementary \u00e6sthetic feelings, as discovered by Herbart,\nand defines them as \"immediate excitations not resting upon associative\nor reproductive activity or on the fancy,\" although \"in ultimate\nanalysis they must be reduced to the same principles.\"[9]\n\n[Sidenote: _Psychological tendency. Teodor Lipps._]\n\nThe purely psychological and associationistic tendency becomes clearly\ndefined in Professor Teodor Lipps and his school. Lipps criticizes\nand rejects a whole series of \u00e6sthetic theories: (_a_) of play;\n(_b_) of pleasure; (_c_) of art as recognition of real life, even\nif displeasing; (_d_) of emotion and passional excitation; (_e_)\nsyncretism, attributing to art beside the primary purpose of play and\npleasure the further ends of recognition of life, in its reality,\nrevelation of individuality, commotion, freedom from a weight, or free\nplay of the imagination. His theory differs little at bottom from that\nof Jouffroy, for in his thesis he assumes artistic beauty to be the\nsympathetic. \"The object of sympathy is our objectified ego, transposed\ninto others and therefore discovered in them. We feel ourselves in\nothers and we feel others in ourselves. In others, or by means of them,\nwe feel ourselves happy, free, enlarged, elevated, or the contrary\nof all these. The \u00e6sthetic feeling of sympathy is not a mere mode of\n\u00e6sthetic enjoyment, it is that enjoyment itself. All \u00e6sthetic enjoyment\nis founded, in the last analysis, singly and wholly upon sympathy; even\nthat caused by geometrical, architectonic, tectonic, ceramic, etc.,\nlines and forms.\" \"Whenever in a work of art we find a personality (not\na defect of the man, but something positively human) which harmonizes\nwith and awakes an echo in the possibilities and tendencies of our\nown life and vital activities: whenever we find positive, objective\nhumanity, pure and free from all real interests lying outside the work\nof art, as art only can reproduce it and \u00e6sthetic contemplation alone\ncan demand; the harmony, the resonance, fills us with joy. The value\nof personality is ethical value: outside it there is no possibility\nor determination of ethical character. All artistic and in general\n\u00e6sthetic enjoyment is, therefore, the enjoyment of something which has\nethical value (_eines ethische Werthvollen_); not as element of a\ncomplex, but as object of \u00e6sthetic intuition.\"[10]\n\nThe \u00e6sthetic fact is thus deprived of all its own value and allowed\nmerely a reflexion from the value of morality.\n\nWithout lingering over Lipps's pupils (such as Stern and others[11])\nand writers of similar tendency (such as Biese, with his theory\nof anthropomorphism and universal metaphor;[12] or Konrad Lange,\nwho propounds a thesis that art is conscious self-deception),[13]\nwe will call attention to Professor Karl Groos (1892), who comes\nwithin measurable distance of the concept of \u00e6sthetic activity as\na theoretic value.[14] Between the two poles of consciousness,\nsensibility and intellect, are several intermediate grades, amongst\nwhich lies intuition or fancy, whose product, the image or appearance\n(_Schein_), is midway between sensation and concept. The image is\nfull like sensation, but regulated like the concept; it has neither\nthe inexhaustible richness of the former, or the barren nudity of the\nlatter. Of the nature of image or appearance is the \u00e6sthetic fact;\nwhich is distinguished from the simple, ordinary image not by its\nquality, but by its intensity alone: the \u00e6sthetic image is merely a\nsimple image occupying the summit of consciousness. Representations\npass through consciousness like a crowd of people hurrying over a\nbridge, each bent on his own business; but when a passer-by halts on\nthe bridge and looks at the scene, then is it holiday, then arises the\n\u00e6sthetic fact. This is therefore not passivity but activity; according\nto the formula adopted by Groos it is internal imitation (_innere\nNachahnung_).[15] It may be objected against the theory that every\nimage, so far as it is an image at all, must occupy the summit of\nconsciousness if only for an instant; and that the mere image is either\nthe product of an activity just as is the \u00e6sthetic image, or it is not\na real image at all. It may also be objected that the definition of the\nimage as something sharing in the nature of sensation and concept may\nlead back to intellectual intuition and the other mysterious faculties\nof the metaphysical school, for which Groos professes abhorrence. His\ndivision of the \u00e6sthetic fact into form and content is even less happy.\nHe recognizes four classes of content: associative (in the strict\nsense), symbolic, typical, individual:[16] and into his inquiries\nhe introduces, quite unnecessarily, the concepts of infusion of\npersonality and of play. In connexion with the latter he remarks that\n\"internal imitation is the noblest game of man,\"[17] and adds that \"the\nconcept of play applies fully to contemplation, but not to \u00e6sthetic\nproduction, save in the case of primitive peoples.\"[18]\n\n[Sidenote: _The modifications of the Beautiful in Groos and Lipps._]\n\nGroos does however free himself from the \"modifications of Beauty,\"\nbecause, \u00e6sthetic activity having been identified with internal\nimitation, it is clear that whatever is not internal imitation is\nexcluded from that activity as something different. \"All Beauty\n(beauty understood in the sense of 'sympathetic') belongs to the\n\u00e6sthetic activity, but not every \u00e6sthetic fact is beautiful.\" Beauty,\nthen, is the representation of the sensuously pleasant; ugliness, the\nrepresentation of the unpleasant; the sublime, that of a mighty thing\n(_Gewaltiges_) in a simple form; the comic, that of an inferiority\nwhich arouses in us a pleasing sense of our own superiority. And so\nforth.[19] With great good sense Groos holds up to derision the office\nassigned to the ugly by Schasler and Hartmann with their superficial\ndialectic. To say that an ellipse contains an element of ugliness\nin comparison with the circle because it is symmetrical about its\ntwo axes only and not about infinite diameters is like saying \"wine\nhas a relatively unpleasant taste because in it is lacking (_ist\naufgehoben_) the pleasant taste of beer.\"[20] Lipps too, in his\nwritings upon \u00c6sthetic, recognizes that the comic (of which he gives an\naccurate psychological analysis)[21] has in itself no \u00e6sthetic value;\nbut his moralistic views lead him to outline a theory of it not unlike\nthat of the overcoming of the ugly; he explains it as a process leading\nto a higher \u00e6sthetic value (_i.e._ sympathy).[22]\n\n[Sidenote: _E. Viron and the double form of \u00c6sthetic._]\n\nWork such as that of Groos and, occasionally, of Lipps is of some\nvalue towards the elimination of errors, as well as confining \u00e6sthetic\nresearch to the field of internal analysis. Merit of the same kind\nbelongs to the work of a Frenchman, V\u00e9ron,[23] who controverts the\nAbsolute Beauty of academical \u00c6sthetic and, after accusing Taine of\nconfounding Art with Science and \u00c6sthetic with Logic, remarks that if\nit be the duty of art to make manifest the essence of things, their\none dominating quality, then \"the greatest artists would be those who\nhave best succeeded in exhibiting this essence ... and the greatest\nworks would resemble each other more closely than any others and would\nclearly demonstrate their common identity, whereas the exact opposite\nhappens.\"[24] But one looks in vain for scientific method in V\u00e9ron; a\nprecursor of Guyau,[25] he asserts that art is at bottom two different\nthings; there are two arts: one decorative, whose end is beauty, that\nis to say the pleasure of eye and ear resulting from determinate\ndispositions of fines, forms, colours, sounds, rhythms, movements,\nfight and shade, without necessary interventions of ideas and feelings,\nand capable of being studied by Optics and Acoustics: the other,\nexpressive, which gives \"the agitated expression of human personality.\"\nHe considers that decorative art prevails in the ancient world, and\nexpressive art in the modern.[26]\n\nWe cannot here examine in detail the \u00e6sthetic theories of artists\nand men of letters; the scientific and historicist prejudices, the\ntheory of experiment and human document, which underlie the realism of\nZola, or the moralism which underlies the problem-art of Ibsen and the\nScandinavian school. Gustave Flaubert wrote of art profoundly, better\nperhaps than any other Frenchman has ever written, not in special\ntreatises but throughout his letters, which were published after his\ndeath.[27]\n\n[Sidenote: _L. Tolstoy._]\n\nUnder the influence of V\u00e9ron and his hatred for the concept of beauty,\nLeo Tolstoy wrote his book on art,[28] which, according to the great\nRussian artist, communicates feelings in the same way in which words\ncommunicate thoughts. The meaning of this theory is made clear by the\nparallel he drew between Art and Science, and his conclusion that \"the\nmission of art is to render sensible and capable of assimilation that\nwhich could not be assimilated under the form of argumentation\";\nand that \"true science examines truths considered as important for a\ncertain society at a given epoch and fixes them in the consciousness\nof man, whereas art transports them from the domain of knowledge to\nthat of feeling.\"[29] There is therefore no such thing as art for art's\nsake, any more than science for science' sake. Every human function\nshould be directed to increase morality and to suppress violence.\nThis amounts to saying that nearly all art, from the beginning of the\nworld, is false. Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Dante,\nTasso, Milton, Shakespeare, Raph\u00e6l, Mich\u00e6l Angelo, Bach, Beethoven are\n(according to Tolstoy) \"artificial reputations created by critics.\"[30]\n\n[Sidenote: _F. Nietzsche._]\n\nAmongst artists rather than amongst philosophers must be reckoned\nFriedrich Nietzsche, whom we should wrong (as we said of Ruskin) by\ntrying to expound his \u00e6sthetic doctrines in scientific language and\nthen holding them up to the facile criticism which, so translated,\nthey would draw upon themselves. In none of his books, not even in\nhis first, _The Birth of Tragedy,_[31] in spite of the title, does he\noffer us a real theory of art; what appears to be theory is the mere\nexpression of the author's feelings and tendencies. He shows a kind\nof anxiety concerning the value and aim of art and the problem of its\ninferiority or superiority to science and philosophy, a state of mind\ncharacteristic of the Romantic period of which Nietzsche was, in many\nrespects, a belated but magnificent representative. To Romanticism, as\nwell as to Schopenhauer, belong the elements of thought which issued in\nthe distinction between Apollinesque art (that of serene contemplation,\nto which belong the epic and sculpture) and Dionysiac art (the art of\nagitation and tumult, such as music and the drama). The thought is\nvague and does not bear criticism; but it is supported by a flight of\ninspiration which lifts the mind to a spiritual region seldom if ever\nreached again in the second half of the nineteenth century.\n\n[Sidenote: _An \u00e6sthetician of music: E. Hanslick._]\n\nThe most notable \u00e6sthetic students of that time were perhaps a group\nof persons engaged in constructing theories of particular arts.\nAnd since--as we have seen[32]--philosophical laws or theories of\nindividual arts are inconceivable, it was inevitable that the ideas\npresented by such thinkers should be (as indeed they are) nothing more\nthan general \u00e6sthetic conclusions. First may be mentioned the acute\nBohemian critic Eduard Hanslick, who published his work _On Musical\nBeauty_ in 1854; it was often reprinted and was translated into various\nlanguages.[33] Hanslick waged war against Richard Wagner and in general\nagainst the pretension of finding concepts, feelings and other definite\ncontents in music. \"In the most insignificant musical works, where the\nmost powerful microscope can discover nothing, we are now asked to\nrecognize a _Night Before the Battle,_ a _Summer Night in Norway,_ a\n_Longing for the Sea,_ or some such absurdity, should the cover have\nthe audacity to affirm that this is the subject of the piece.\"[34] With\nequal vivacity he protests against the sentimental hearers who, instead\nof enjoying the work of art, set themselves to extract pathological\neffects of passionate excitement and practical activity. If it be true\nthat Greek music produced effects of this kind, \"if it needed but a\nfew Phrygian strains to animate troops with courage in the face of\nthe enemy, or a melody in the Dorian mode to ensure the fidelity of\na wife whose husband was far away, then the loss of Greek music is\na melancholy thing for generals and husbands; but \u00e6stheticians and\ncomposers need not regret it.\"[35] \"If every senseless _Requiem,_ every\nnoisy funeral march, every wailing _Adagio_ had the power of depressing\nus, who could put up with existence under such conditions? But let a\nreal musical work confront us, clear-eyed and glowing with beauty, and\nwe feel ourselves enslaved by its invincible fascination even if its\nmaterial is all the sorrows of the age.\"[36]\n\n[Sidenote: _Hanslick's concept of form._]\n\nHanslick maintained that the sole aim of music is form, musical\nbeauty. This affirmation won him the goodwill of the Herbartians, who\nhastened to welcome such a vigorous and unexpected ally; by way of\nreturning the compliment, Hanslick felt obliged in later editions of\nhis work to mention Herbart himself and his faithful disciple Robert\nZimmermann who had given (so he said) \"full development to the great\n\u00e6sthetic principle of Form.\"[37] The praises of the Herbartians and the\ncourteous declarations of Hanslick both arose from a misunderstanding:\nfor the words \"beauty\" and \"form\" have one meaning for the former and\nquite another for the latter. Hanslick never thought that symmetry,\npurely acoustical relations and pleasures of the ear constituted\nmusical beauty;[38] mathematics, he held, are utterly useless to\nmusical \u00c6sthetic.[39] Musical beauty is spiritual and significative: it\nhas thoughts, undoubtedly; but those thoughts are musical. \"Sonorous\nforms are not empty, but perfectly filled; they cannot be compared\nwith simple lines delimiting a space; they are the spirit assuming body\nand extracting from itself the stuff of its own incarnation. Rather\nthan an arabesque, music is a picture; but a picture whose subject\ncan neither be expressed in words nor enclosed in precise concept.\nThere are in music both meaning and connexion, but these are of a\nspecifically musical nature; music is a language we understand and\nspeak, but which it is not possible to translate.\"[40] Hanslick asserts\nthat though music does not portray the quality of feelings, it does\nportray their dynamic aspect or tone: if not the substantives, then\nthe adjectives: it depicts not \"murmuring tenderness\" or \"impetuous\ncourage,\" but the \"murmuring\" and the \"impetuous.\"[41] The backbone of\nthe book is the denial that form and content can ever be separated in\nmusic. \"In music there can be no content in opposition to the form,\nsince there can be no form outside the content.\" \"Take a motive, the\nfirst that comes into your head; what is its content, what its form?\nwhere does this begin, and that end? ... What do you wish to call\ncontent? The sounds? Very well: but they have already received a form.\nWhat will you call form? Also the sounds? but they are form already\nfilled; form supplied with content.\"[42] Such observations denote\nacute penetration of the nature of art, though not scientifically\nformulated or framed into a system. Hanslick thought he was dealing\nwith peculiarities of music,[43] instead of with the universal and\nconstitutive character of every form of art, and this prevented him\nfrom taking larger views.\n\n[Sidenote: _\u00c6stheticians of the figurative arts. C. Fiedler._]\n\nAnother specialist \u00e6sthetician is Conrad Fiedler, author of many\nessays on the figurative arts, the most important being his _Origin\nof Artistic Activity_ (1887).[44] No one, perhaps, has better or\nmore eloquently emphasized the activistic character of art, which\nhe compares with language. \"Art begins exactly where intuition\n(perception) ends. The artist is not differentiated from other people\nby any special perceptive attitude enabling him to perceive more or\nwith greater intensity, or endowing his eye with any special power\nof selecting, collecting, transforming, ennobling or illuminating;\nbut rather by his peculiar gift of being able to pass immediately\nfrom perception to intuitive expression; his relation with nature is\nnot perceptive, but expressive.\" \"A man standing passively at gaze\nmay well imagine himself in possession of the visible world as an\nimmense, rich, varied whole: the entire absence of fatigue with which\nhe traverses the infinite mass of visual impressions, the rapidity\nwith which representations dart across his consciousness, convince\nhim that he stands in the midst of an immense visible world, although\nhe may quite well be unable at any one instant to represent it to\nhimself as a whole. But this world, so great, so rich, so immeasurable,\ndisappears the moment art seeks to become its master. The very first\neffort to emerge from this twilight and arrive at clear vision\nrestricts the circle of things to be seen. Artistic activity may be\nconceived as continuation of that concentration by which consciousness\nmakes the first step towards clear vision, which it reaches only by\nself-limitation.\" Spiritual process and bodily process are here an\nindivisible whole, which is expression.\n\n[Sidenote: _Intuition and Expression._]\n\n\"This activity, simply because it is spiritual, must consist of forms\nwholly determinate, tangible, sensibly demonstrative.\" Art is not in\na state of subjection to science. Like the man of science, the artist\ndesires to escape from the natural perceptive state and to make the\nworld his own; but there are regions to which we can penetrate not\nby the forms of thought and science but only through art. Art is,\nstrictly speaking, not imitation of nature; for what is nature save\nthis confused mass of perceptions and representations, whose real\npoverty has been demonstrated already? In another sense, however, art\nmay be called imitation of nature inasmuch as its aim is not to expound\nconcepts or to arouse emotions, that is to create values of intellect\nand feeling. Art does create both these values, if you like to say so;\nbut only in one quite peculiar quality, which consists in complete\nvisibility (_Sichtbarkeit_). Here we have the same sane conception, the\nsame lively comprehension of the true nature of art which we found in\nHanslick, only expressed in a more rigorous and philosophical manner.\nWith Fiedler is connected his friend Adolf Hildebrand, who brought into\nhigh relief the activistic, or architectonic as opposed to imitative,\ncharacter of art, illustrating his theoretical discussions especially\nfrom sculpture, the art which he himself followed.[45]\n\n[Sidenote: _Narrow limits of these theories._]\n\nWhat we chiefly miss in Fiedler and others of the same tendency is the\nconception of the \u00e6sthetic fact not as something exceptional, produced\nby exceptionally gifted men, but as a ceaseless activity of man as\nsuch; for man possesses the world, so far as he does possess it, only\nin the form of representation-expressions, and only knows in so far as\nhe creates.[46] Nor are these writers justified in treating language\nas parallel with art, or art with language; for comparisons are drawn\nbetween things at least partially different, whereas art and language\nare identical.\n\n[Sidenote: _H. Bergson._]\n\nThe same criticism can be made in the case of the French philosopher\nBergson, who in his book on _Laughter_[47] states a theory of art very\nsimilar to that of Fiedler and makes the same mistake of conceiving the\nartistic faculty as something distinct and exceptional in comparison\nwith the language of everyday use. In ordinary life, says Bergson, the\nindividuality of things escapes us; we see only as much of them as\nour practical needs demand. Language helps this simplification; since\nall names, proper names excepted, are names of kinds or classes. Now\nand then, however, nature, as if in a fit of absence of mind, creates\nsouls of a more divisible and detached kind (artists), who discover\nand reveal the riches hidden under the colourless signs and labels\nof everyday life, and help others (non-artists) to catch a glimpse of\nwhat they themselves see, employing for this purpose colours, forms,\nrhythmic connexions of words, and those rhythms of life and breath even\nmore intimate to man, the sounds and notes of music.\n\n[Sidenote: _Attempts to return to Baumgarten. C. Hermann._]\n\nA healthy return to Baumgarten, a revival and correction of the old\nphilosopher's theories in the light of later discoveries, might\nperhaps have given \u00c6sthetic some assistance, after the collapse of\nthe old idealistic metaphysic, towards thinking the concept of art\nin its universality and discovering its identity with pure and true\nintuitive knowledge. But Conrad Hermann, who preached the return to\nBaumgarten[48] in 1876, did bad service to what might have been a good\ncause. According to him \u00c6sthetic and Logic are normative sciences;\nbut Logic does not contain, as does \u00c6sthetic, \"a definite category\nof external objects exclusively and specifically adequate to the\nfaculty of thought\"; and on the other hand \"the products and results\nof scientific thought are not so external and sensibly intuitive as\nthose of artistic invention.\" Logic and \u00c6sthetic alike refer not to the\nempirical thinking and feeling of the soul, but to pure and absolute\nsensation and thought. Art constructs a representation standing midway\nbetween the individual and the universal. Beauty expresses specific\nperfection, the essential or, so to speak, the rightful (_seinsollend_)\ncharacter of things. Form is \"the external sensible limit, or mode of\nappearance of a thing, in opposition to the kernel of the thing itself\nand to its essential and substantial content.\" Content and form are\nboth \u00e6sthetic, and the \u00e6sthetic interest concerns the entirety of the\nbeautiful object. The artistic activity has no special organ such as\nthought possesses in speech. The \u00e6sthetician, like the lexicographer,\nhas the task of compiling a dictionary of tones and colours and of\nthe different meanings which may possibly be attached to them.[49]\nWe can see that Hermann accepted side by side the most inconsistent\npropositions. He welcomes even the \u00e6sthetic law of the golden section,\nand applies it to tragedy; the longer segment of the Une is the tragic\nhero; the punishment which overtakes him (the entire line) exceeds his\ncrime in the same proportion in which he oversteps the common measure\n(the shorter segment of the line).[50] It reads almost like a joke.\n\nWithout direct reference to Baumgarten, a proposal that \u00c6sthetic be\nreformed and treated as the \"science of intuitive knowledge\" was made\nin a miserable little work by one Willy Nef (1898),[51] who makes the\ndumb animals share his \"intuitive knowledge,\" in which he distinguishes\na formal side (intuition) and a material side or content (knowledge),\nand considers the everyday relations between men, their games and their\nart, as belonging to intuitive knowledge.\n\n[Sidenote: _Eclecticism. B. Bosanquet._]\n\nThe English historian of \u00c6sthetic, Bosanquet (1892) tried to find\na reconciliation between content and form in unity of expression.\n\"Beauty,\" says Bosanquet in the Introduction to his _History,_ \"is\nthat which has characteristic and individual expressiveness for\nsensuous perception or imagination, subject to the conditions of\ngeneral or abstract expressiveness by the same means.\" In another\npassage he observes: \"The difficulty of real \u00c6sthetic is to show how\nthe combination of decorative forms in characteristic representations,\nby intensifying the essential character immanent in them from the\nbeginning, subordinates them to a central signification which stands\nto their complex combination as their abstract signification stands to\neach one of them taken singly.\"[52] But the problem, as propounded in a\nway suggested by the antithesis between the two schools (contentism and\nformalism) of German \u00c6sthetic, is in our opinion insoluble.\n\n[Sidenote: _\u00c6sthetic of expression: present state._]\n\nDe Sanctis founded no school of \u00e6sthetic science in Italy. His thought\nwas quickly misunderstood and mutilated by those who presumed to\ncorrect it, and, in fact, only returned to the outworn rhetorical\nconception of art as consisting of a little content and a little\nform. Only within the last ten years has there been a renewal of\nphilosophical studies, arising out of discussions concerning the nature\nof history[53] and the relation in which it stands to art and science,\nand nourished by the controversy excited by the publication of De\nSanctis' posthumous works.[54] The same problem of the relation between\nhistory and science, and their difference or antithesis, reappeared\nalso in Germany, but without being put in its true connexion with the\nproblem of \u00c6sthetic.[55] These inquiries and discussions, and the\nrevival of a Linguistic impregnated by philosophy in the work of Paul\nand some others, appear to us to offer much more favourable ground for\nthe scientific development of \u00c6sthetic than can be found on the summits\nof mysticism or the low plains of positivism and sensationalism.\n\n\n\n[1] A. F. Lange, _Geschichte des Materialismus, u. Kritik seiner\nBedeutung i. d. Gegenwart,_ 1866.\n\n[2] J. F. v. Kirchmann, _\u00c4sthetik auf realistischer Grundlage,_ Berlin,\n1868.\n\n[3] _\u00c4sth. auf real. Grund._ vol. i. pp. 54-57; see above, pp. 80-81.\n\n[4] _Kritische G\u00e4nge,_ vol. v. pp. 25-26, 131.\n\n[5] R. Vischer, _\u00dcber das optische Formgef\u00fchl,_ Leipzig, 1873.\n\n[6] _Der Symbol-Begriff in der neuesten \u00c4sth.,_ Jena, 1876.\n\n[7] _Das Wesen d. \u00e4sth. Anschauung, Psychologische Untersuchungen z.\nTheorie d. Sch\u00f6nen u. d. Kunst,_ Berlin, 1875.\n\n[8] Max Diez, _Theorie des Gef\u00fchls z. Begr\u00fcndung d. \u00c4sthetik,_\nStuttgart, 1892.\n\n[9] Friedr. Jodi, _Lehrb. der Psychologie,_ Stuttgart, 1896, \u00a7 53, pp.\n404-414.\n\n[10] _Komik und Humor, eine psychol. \u00e4sthet. Untersuch.,_\nHamburg-Leipzig, pp. 223-227.\n\n[11] Paul Stern, _Einf\u00fchling u. Association i. d. neueren \u00c4sth.,_ 1898,\nin _Beitr\u00e4ge z. \u00c4sth.,_ ed. Lipps and R. M. Werner (Hamburg-Leipzig).\n\n[12] Alfr. Biese, _Das Associationsprincip u. d. Anthropomorphismus i.\nd. \u00c4sth.,_ 1890; _Die Philosophie des Metaphorischen,_ Hamburg-Leipzig,\n1893.\n\n[13] Konrad Lange, _Die bewusste Selbstt\u00e4uschung als Kern des\nk\u00fcnstlerischen Genusses,_ Leipzig, 1895.\n\n[14] Karl Groos, _Einleitung i. d. \u00c4sthetik,_ Giessen, 1892.\n\n[15] _Op. cit._ pp. 6-46, 83-100.\n\n[16] _Einleitung i. d. \u00c4sth._ pp. 100-147.\n\n[17] _Op. cit._ pp. 168-170.\n\n[18] _Op. cit._ pp. 175-176.\n\n[19] _Op. cit._ pp. 46-50, and all part iii.\n\n[20] _Einleitung i. d. \u00c4sth._ p. 292, note.\n\n[21] See above, pp. 91-92.\n\n[22] _Komik und Humor,_ p. 199 _seqq._\n\n[23] Eug. V\u00e9ron, _L'Esth\u00e9tique,_ 2nd ed. Paris, 1883.\n\n[24] _Op. cit._ p. 89.\n\n[25] See above, pp. 399-400.\n\n[26] _Esth\u00e9tique,_ pp. 38, 109, 123 _seqq._\n\n[27] _Correspondance,_ 1830-1880, 4 vols., new ed., Paris, 1902-1904.\n\n[28] _What is Art?_ Eng. tr.\n\n[29] _Op. cit._ pp. 171-172, 308.\n\n[30] _Op. cit._ pp. 201-202.\n\n[31] _Die Geburt der Trag\u00f6die oder Griechenthum und Pessimismus,_ 1872\n(Ital. trans., Bari, 1907).\n\n[32] See above, p. 114.\n\n[33] _Vom Musikalisch-Sch\u00f6nen,_ Leipzig, 1854; 7th ed. 1885 (French\ntrans., _Du beau dans la musique,_ Paris, 1877).\n\n[34] _Vom Musikalisch-Sch\u00f6nen,_ p. 20.\n\n[35] _Op. cit._ p. 98.\n\n[36] _Op. cit._ p. 101.\n\n[37] _Op. cit._ p. 119, note.\n\n[38] _Op. cit._ p. 50.\n\n[39] _Op. cit._ p. 65.\n\n[40] _Vom Musikalisch-Sch\u00f6nen,_ pp. 50-51.\n\n[41] _Op. cit._ pp. 25-39.\n\n[42] _Op. cit._ p. 122.\n\n[43] _Op. cit._ pp. 52, 67, 113, etc.\n\n[44] Conrad Fiedler, _Der Ursprung der k\u00fcnstlerischen Th\u00e4tigkeit,_\nLeipzig, 1887. Collected with others of same author in _Schriften tiber\ndie Kunst,_ ed. H. Marbach, Leipzig, 1896.\n\n[45] _Das Problem der Form in der bildenden Kunst,_ 2nd ed. 1898 (4th\ned., Strassburg, 1903).\n\n[46] See above, pp. 12-18.\n\n[47] H. Bergson, _Le Rire, essai sur la signification du comique,_\nParis, 1900, pp. 153-161 (Eng. tr., London).\n\n[48] Conrad Hermann, _Die \u00c4sthetik in ihrer Geschichte und ah\nwissenschaftliches System,_ Leipzig, 1876.\n\n[49] _Die \u00c4sthetik,_ etc., _passim._\n\n[50] _Die \u00c4sthetik,_ \u00a7 56.\n\n[51] Willy Nef, _Die \u00c4sthetik als Wissenschaft der anschaulichen\nErkenntniss,_ Leipzig, 1898.\n\n[52] _A History of \u00c6sthetics,_ pp. 4-6, 372, 391, 447, 458, 466.\n\n[53] B. Croce, _La storia ridotta sotto il concetto generale dell'\narte,_ 1893 (2nd ed. entitled _Il concetto della storia nelle sue\nrelazioni col concetto dell' arte,_ Rome, 1896); P. R. Trojano, _La\nstoria come scienza sociale,_ vol. i., Naples, 1897; G. Gentile, _Il\nconcetto della storia_ (in Crivellucci's _Stud\u00ee storici,_ 1889); see\nalso F. de Sarlo, _Il problema estetico,_ in _Saggi di filosofia,_\nvol. ii., Turin, 1897; and by same author, _I dati dell' esperienza\npsichica,_ Florence, 1903, concluding chapter.\n\n[54] _La letteratura italiana nel secolo XIX,_ edited by B. Croce,\nNaples, 1896; also _Scritti var\u00ee,_ ed. Croce, Naples, 1898, 2 vols.\n\n[55] H. Rickert, _Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen\nBegriffsbildung,_ Freiburg i. B., 1896-1902.\n\n\n\n\nXIX\n\n\nHISTORICAL SKETCHES OF SOME PARTICULAR DOCTRINES\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Result of the history of \u00c6sthetic._]\n\n\nWe have reached the end of our history. Having passed in review the\ntravail and doubt through which the discovery of the \u00e6sthetic concept\nwas achieved, the vicissitudes first of neglect, then of revival and\nrediscovery to which it was exposed, the various oscillations and\nfailures in its exact determination, the resurrection, triumphant and\noverwhelming, of ancient errors supposed to be dead and buried; we\nmay now conclude, without appearing to assert anything unproven, that\nof \u00c6sthetic in the proper sense of the word we have seen very little,\neven including the last two centuries' active research. Exceptional\nintellects have hit the mark and have supported their views with\nenergy, with logic, and with consciousness of what they were doing.\nIt would no doubt be possible to extract many true affirmations\nleading to the same point of view from the works of non-philosophical\nwriters, art-critics and artists, from commonly received opinions and\nproverbial sayings; such a collection would show that this handful\nof philosophers does not stand alone, but is surrounded by a throng\nof supporters and is in perfect agreement with the general mind and\nuniversal common sense. But if Schiller was right in saying that the\nrhythm of philosophy is to diverge from common opinion in order to\nreturn with redoubled vigour, it is evident that such divergence is\nnecessary, and constitutes the growth of science, which is science\nitself. During this tedious process \u00c6sthetic made mistakes which were\nat once deviations from the truth and attempts to reach it: such were\nthe hedonism of the sophists and rhetoricians of antiquity and of the\nsensationalists of the eighteenth and second half of the nineteenth\ncentury; the moralistic hedonism of Aristophanes, of the Stoics, of\nthe Roman eclectics, of the medi\u00e6val and Renaissance writers; the\nascetic and logical hedonism of Plato and the Fathers of the Church,\nof some medi\u00e6val and even some quite modern rigorists; and finally,\nthe \u00e6sthetic mysticism which first appeared in Plotinus and reappeared\nagain and again until its last and great triumph in the classical\nperiod of German philosophy. In the midst of these variously erroneous\ntendencies, ploughing the field of thought in every direction, a\ntenuous golden rivulet seems to flow, formed by the acute empiricism\nof Aristotle, the forceful penetration of Vico, the analytical work\nof Schleiermacher, Humboldt, De Sanctis and others who echoed them\nwith weaker voice. This series of thinkers suffices to remind us that\n\u00e6sthetic science no longer remains to be discovered; but at the same\ntime the fact that they are so few and so often despised, ignored or\ncontroverted, proves that it is in its infancy.\n\n[Sidenote: _History of science and history of the scientific criticism\nof particular errors._]\n\nThe birth of a science is like that of a living being: its later\ndevelopment consists, like every life, in fighting the difficulties\nand errors, general and particular, which lurk in its path on every\nside. The forms of error are numerous in the extreme and mingle with\neach other and with the truth in complications equally numerous:\nroot out one, another appears in its stead; the uprooted ones also\nreappear, though never in the same shape. Hence the necessity for\nperpetual scientific criticism and the impossibility of repose or\nfinality in a science and of an end to further discussion. The errors\nwhich may be described as general, negations of the concept of art\nitself, have been touched on from time to time in the course of this\nHistory; whence it may be gathered a simple affirmation of the truth\nhas not always been accompanied by any considerable recapture of enemy\nterritory. As to what we have called particular errors, it is clear\nthat when freed from confusing admixture of other forms and divested\nof fanciful expression, they reduce themselves to three heads, under\nwhich they have already been criticized in the first or theoretical\npart of this work. That is to say, errors may be directed (_a_) against\nthe characteristic quality of the \u00e6sthetic fact; (_b_) against the\nspecific; (_c_) against the generic: they may involve denial of the\ncharacter of intuition, of theoretic contemplation, or of spiritual\nactivity, which together constitute the \u00e6sthetic fact. Among the errors\nwhich fall into these three categories we are now to sketch in outline\nthe history of those which have had, or have to-day, the greatest\nimportance. Rather than a history it will be a historical essay,\nsufficient to show that, even in the criticism of individual errors,\n\u00e6sthetic science is in its infancy. If among these errors some appear\nto be decadent and nearly forgotten, they are not dead; they have not\naccomplished a legal demise at the hands of scientific criticism.\nOblivion or instinctive rejection is not the same thing as scientific\ndenial.\n\n\n\n\nI\n\n\nRHETORIC: OR THE THEORY OF ORNATE FORM\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Rhetoric in the ancient sense._]\n\nProceeding according to rank in importance, we inevitably head the list\nof theories for examination with the theory of Rhetoric, or Ornate Form.\n\nIt will not be superfluous to observe that the meaning given in\nmodern times to the word Rhetoric, namely, the doctrine of ornate\nform, differs from that which it had for the ancients. Rhetoric in\nthe modern sense is above all a theory of elocution, while elocution\n(\u03bb\u03ad\u03be\u03b9\u03c2, \u03c6\u03c1\u03ac\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f11\u03c1\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b1, elocutio) was but one portion, and not\nthe principal one, of ancient Rhetoric. Taken as a whole, it consisted\nstrictly of a manual or _vade-mecum_ for advocates and politicians;\nit concerned itself with the two or the three \"styles\" (judicial,\ndeliberative, demonstrative), and gave advice or furnished models to\nthose striving to produce certain effects by means of speech.\nNo definition of the art is more accurate than that given by its\ninventors the earliest Sicilian rhetoricians, scholars of Empedocles\n(Corax, Tisias, Gorgias): Rhetoric is the creator of persuasion\n(\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03cc\u03c2). It devoted itself to showing the method of\nusing language so as to create a certain belief, a certain state of\nmind, in the hearer; hence the phrase \"making the weaker case stronger\"\n(\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f25\u03c4\u03c4\u03c9 \u03bb\u03ccg\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03c4\u03c4\u03c9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd); the \"increase or diminution\naccording to circumstances\" (_eloquentia in augendo minuendoque\nconsistit_); the advice of Gorgias to \"turn a thing to a jest if the\nadversary takes it seriously, or to a serious matter if he takes it as\na jest,\"[1] and many similar well-known maxims.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticism from moral point of view._]\n\nHe who acts in this manner is not only \u00e6sthetically accomplished,\nas saying beautifully that which he wishes to say; he is also and\nespecially a practical man with a practical end in view. As a practical\nman, however, he cannot evade moral responsibility for his actions;\nthis point was fastened upon by Plato's polemic against Rhetoric, that\nis to say against fluent political charlatans and unscrupulous lawyers\nand journalists. Plato was quite right to condemn Rhetoric (when\ndissociated from a good purpose) as blameworthy and discreditable,\ndirected to arouse the passions, a diet ruinous to health, a paint\ndisastrous to beauty. Even had Rhetoric allied herself to Ethics,\nbecoming a true guide of the soul (\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd);\nhad Plato's criticism been directed solely against her abusers\n(everything being liable to abuse save virtue itself, says Aristotle);\nhad Rhetoric been purified, producing such an orator as Cicero desired,\n_non ex rhetorum officinis sed ex academiae spatiis_[2] and imposing on\nhim, with Quintilian, the duty of being _vir bonus dicendi peritus_;[3]\nyet the unalterable fact remains that Rhetoric can never be considered\na regular science, being formed of a congeries of widely dissimilar\ncognitions.\n\n[Sidenote: _Accumulation without system._]\n\nIt included descriptions of passions and affections, comparisons of\npolitical and judicial institutions, theories of the abbreviated\nsyllogism or enthymeme and of proof leading to a probable conclusion,\npedagogic and popular exposition, literary elocution, declamation and\nmimicry, mnemonic, and so forth.\n\n[Sidenote: _Its fortunes in the Middle Ages and Renaissance._]\n\nThe rich and heterogeneous content of this ancient Rhetoric (which\nreached its highest development in the hands of Hermagoras of Temnos\nin the second century B.C.) gradually diminished in volume with the\ndecadence of the ancient world and the change in political conditions.\nThis is not the place to dwell on its fortunes in the Middle Ages or\nits partial replacement by formularies and _Artes dictandi_ (and later\nby treatises upon the art of preaching), or to quote the reasons given\nby such writers as Patrizzi and Tassoni for its disappearance from the\nworld of their day;[4] such history would be well worth writing, but\nwould be out of place here. We will merely state that whilst conditions\nwere at work on every side corroding this complex of cognitions, Louis\nVives, Peter Ramus and Patrizzi himself were busy criticizing it from\nthe point of view of systematic science.\n\n[Sidenote: _Criticisms by Vives, Ramus and Patrizzi._]\n\nVives emphasized the confused methods of the ancient treatise-writers,\nwho embraced _omnia,_ united eloquence with morality, and insisted that\nthe orator must be _vir bonus._ He rejected four-fifths of ancient\nRhetoric as extraneous: namely, memory, which is necessary in all arts;\ninvention, which is the matter of each individual art; recitation,\nwhich is external; and disposition, which belongs to invention. He\nretained elocution only, not that which treats of _quid dicendum,_ but\nof _quem ad modum,_ extending it beyond the three styles or kinds to\ninclude history, apologue, epistles, novels and poetry.[5] Antiquity\nfurnishes us with few and faint attempts at such extension; now and\nthen a Rhetorician ventures to suggest that the \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd and\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd be included in Rhetoric, and even (in spite of opposition)\n\"infinite\" questions, that is to say merely theoretical questions\nwith no practical application, which amounts to a scientific or\nphilosophical genus;[6] others agreed with Cicero[7] that when one had\nmastered the most difficult of all arts, forensic eloquence, all else\nseemed child's-play (_ludus est homini non hebeti_ ...). Ramus and\nhis pupil Omer Talon reproached Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian with\nhaving confused Dialectic and Rhetoric; and they assigned invention\nand disposition to the former, agreeing with Vives that \"elocution\"\nalone should be allowed to Rhetoric.[8] Patrizzi, on the other hand,\nrefused the name of science to either, recognizing them as simple\nfaculties, containing no individual matter (not even the three genera),\nand differentiating them only by attaching the term Dialectic to the\ndialogue form and proof of the necessary, and Rhetoric to connected\ndiscourse directed to persuasion in matters of opinion. Patrizzi\nobserves that \"conjoined speech\" is used by historians, poets and\nphilosophers, no less than by orators; and thus approaches the view of\nVives.[9]\n\n[Sidenote: _Survival into modern times._]\n\nIn spite of these opinions the body of rhetorical doctrine continued\nto flourish in the schools. Patrizzi was forgotten; if Ramus and Vives\nhad some followers (such as Francisco Sanchez and Keckermann), they\nwere generally held up to odium by the traditionalists. In the end,\nRhetoric found a supporter in philosophy when Campanella made the\nfollowing declaration in his _Rational Philosophy_: \"_quodammodo Magiae\nportiuncula, quae affectus animi moderator et per ipsos voluntatem ciet\nad quaecumque vult sequenda vel fugienda._\"[10] Baumgarten owed to it\nhis tripartition of \u00c6sthetic into heuristic, methodology and semeiotic\n(invention, disposition and elocution), adopted later by Meier. Among\nMeier's numerous works is a little book entitled _Theoretic Doctrine\nof Emotional Disturbances in General_,[11] considered by him to be a\npsychological introduction to \u00e6sthetic doctrine. On the other hand,\nImmanuel Kant in his _Critique of Judgment_ observes that eloquence, in\nthe sense of _ars oratoria_ or art of persuasion by means of beautiful\nappearance and dialectical form, must be distinguished from beautiful\nspeaking (_Wohlredenheit)_; and that the art of oratory, playing upon\nthe weakness of men to gain its own ends, \"is worthy of no esteem\"\n(_gar keiner Achtungw\u00fcrdig)_[12] But in the schools it flourished in\nmany celebrated compilations, including one by the French Jesuit Father\nDominique de Colonne, which was in use until some few decades ago. Even\nto-day, in so-called Literary Institutions, we come across survivals of\nancient Rhetoric, notably in chapters devoted to the art of oratory;\nand fresh manuals on judicial or sacred eloquence (Ortloff, Whately,\netc.[13]) are actually appearing, though rarely, to-day. Still,\nRhetoric in the ancient sense may be said to have disappeared from the\nsystem of the sciences; to-day no philosopher would dream of following\nCampanella in dedicating a special section of rational philosophy to\nRhetoric.\n\n[Sidenote: _Modern signification of Rhetoric. Theory of literary form._]\n\nIn compensation for this process, the theory of elocution and beautiful\nspeech has been in modern times progressively emphasized and thrown\ninto scientific form. But the idea of such a science is ancient, as we\nhave seen; and equally ancient is the style of exposition, consisting\nin the doctrine of a double form and the concept of ornate form.\n\n[Sidenote: _Concept of ornament._]\n\nThe concept of \"ornament\" must have occurred spontaneously to the mind\nas soon as attention was directed to the values of speech by listening\nto poets reciting[14] or to oratorical contests in public gatherings.\nIt must very early have been thought that the difference between\ngood speaking and bad, or between that which gave more pleasure and\nthat which gave less, between grave or solemn, and commonplace or\ncolloquial, consisted in something additional superimposed upon the\ncanvas of ordinary speech like an embroidery by a skilful orator. These\nconsiderations led the Gr\u00e6co-Roman rhetoricians to adopt the practice,\nlike the Indians, who arrived at the distinction independently, to\ndistinguish the bare (\u03c8\u03b9\u03bb\u03ae) or purely grammatical form from another\nform containing an addition which they called ornament, \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2: _ornatum\nest_ (Quintilian will serve, as typical of all the rest) quod perspicuo\nac probabili plus est.[15]\n\nThe notion of ornament as something added on from outside forms the\nbasis of the theory which Aristotle, the philosopher of Rhetoric, gave\nof the queen of ornaments, Metaphor. According to him the high pleasure\naroused by metaphor arises from the collocation of different terms\nand the discovery of relations between species and genera, producing\n\"learning and knowledge by means of the genus\" (\u03bc\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1i \u03b3\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2), and that easy learning which is the greatest of human\npleasures,[16] which amounts to saying that metaphor adds to the\nconcept under consideration a group of minor incidental cognitions, as\na kind of diversion and relief and pleasant instruction for the mind.\n\n[Sidenote: _Classes of ornament._]\n\nOrnaments were divided and subdivided in a number of different ways.\nAristotle (and previously Isocrates, rather differently) classified\nthe ornaments which diversify bare or nude form, under the heads of\ndialect forms, substitutions and epithets, prolongations, truncations\nand abbreviations of words, and other departures from common usage,\nand, finally, rhythm and harmony. Substitutions were of four classes:\nspecies for genus; genus for species; species for species; and\nproportionate.[17] After Aristotle, elocution was especially studied\nby Theophrastus and Demetrius Phalereus; these rhetoricians and their\nfollowers further solidified the classification of ornament by\ndistinguishing tropes from figures (\u03c3\u03c7\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1) and dividing figures\ninto figures of speech (scheimata \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bb\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2) and of thought\n(\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03c2), figures of speech into grammatical and rhetorical,\nand figures of thought into pathetic and ethic. Substitutions were\ndivided into fourteen principal forms, metaphor, synecdoche, metonymy,\nantonomasia, onomatopeia, catachresis, metalepsis, epithet, allegory,\nenigma, irony, periphrase, hyperbaton and hyperbole; each divided\ninto subspecies and contrasted with its relative vice. Figures of\nspeech amounted to a score or so (repetition, anaphora, antistrophe,\nclimax, asyndeton, assonance, etc.); figures of thought to about the\nsame number (interrogation, prosopop\u0153ia, \u00e6tiop\u0153ia, hypotyposis,\ncommotion, simulation, exclamation, apostrophe, aposiopesis, etc.).\nIf these divisions have any value as aids to memory in relation to\nparticular literary forms, considered rationally they are simply\ncapricious, as is evidenced by the fact that many classes of the ornate\nappear now under the heading of tropes, now of figures; sometimes\nunder figures of speech, then as those of thought, no reason for the\nalteration is given except the arbitrary caprice of an individual\nrhetorician which so decrees and disposes. And since one function\nwhich may be fulfilled by the rhetorical categories is to point\nout the divergence between two ways of expressing the same thing,\none of which is arbitrarily selected as \"proper,\"[18] it is easy\nto see why the ancients defined metaphor as \"_verbi vel sermonis a\npropria significatione in aliam cum virtute mutatio,_\" and figure as\n\"_conformatio quaedam orationis remota a communi et primum se offerenti\nratione._\"[19]\n\n[Sidenote: _The concept of the Fitting._]\n\nSo far as we know, antiquity raised no revolt against the theory of\nornament or of double form. We do sometimes hear Cicero, Quintilian,\nSeneca and others saying, _Ipsae res verba rapiunt, Pectus est quod\ndisertos facit et vis mentis, Rem tene, verba sequentur, Curam\nverborum rerum volo esse sollicitudinem,_ or _Nulla est verborum nisi\nrei cohaerentium virtus._ But these maxims did not bear the weighty\nmeanings which we moderns might attach to them; they were perhaps in\ncontradiction with the theory of ornament, but as the contradiction was\nunheeded, it was ineffective: they were the protests of common sense,\npowerless to combat the fallacies of school doctrine. Moreover, the\nlatter was fitted with a safety-valve, a sage contrivance to disguise\nits inherent absurdity. If the ornate consisted of a _plus,_ in what\ndegree should it be used? if it gave pleasure, must we not conclude\nthat the more it were used, the greater the pleasure derived? would its\nextravagant use be attended by extravagant pleasure? Herein was peril:\ninstinctively the rhetoricians hastened to the defence, snatching\nup the first weapon that came to hand, namely, the fitting (\u03c0\u03c1\u03ad\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd)\nOrnament must be used carefully; neither too much too little; _in medio\nvirtus_; as much as is fitting (\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ac \u03c0\u03c1\u03ad\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd). Aristotle recommends\na style seasoned with \"a certain dose\" (\u03b4\u03b5\u1fd1 \u1f03\u03c1\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b5\u03ba\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03af \u03c0\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2.) for ornament should be a condiment, not a food (\u1f24\u03b4\u03c5\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1, \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba\n\u1f12\u03b4\u03b5\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1). [20] The fitting was a concept quite inconsistent with that of\nornament; it was a rival, and enemy, destined to destroy it. Fitting to\nwhat? to expression of course; but that which is fitting to expression\ncannot be called an ornament, an external addition; it coincides with\nexpression itself. But the rhetoricians contented themselves with\nmaintaining peaceful relations between the ornate and the fitting,\nwithout troubling to mediate them through a third concept. The\npseudo-Longinus alone in answer to an observation of his predecessor\nC\u00e6cilius that more than two or three metaphors must not be used in\nthe same place, remarked that a larger number ought to be used where\npassion (\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7) rushes headlong like a torrent, carrying with it as\nnecessaries (\u1f61\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u1fd1\u03bf\u03bd) a multitude of such substitutions.[21]\n\n[Sidenote: _The theory of ornament in the Middle Ages and Renaissance._]\n\nPreserved in the compilations of later antiquity (such as the works of\nDonatus and Priscian and the celebrated allegorical tract of Marcianus\nCapella), and in the compendia of Bede, Rhabanus Maurus and others,\nthe theory of ornament passed to the Middle Ages. Throughout this\nperiod Rhetoric, Grammar and Logic continued to form the _trivium_ of\nthe schools. The theory was to some extent favoured in medi\u00e6val times\nby the fact that writers and scholars made use of a dead language;\nthis helped to reinforce the idea that beautiful form was not a\nspontaneous thing but consisted in an addition or embroidery. Under the\nRenaissance the theory continued to flourish and was revived by study\nof the best classical sources; to the works of Cicero were added the\n_Institutiones_ of Quintilian and the _Rhetoric_ of Aristotle, with the\nhost of minor Latin and Greek rhetoricians, amongst whom was Hermogenes\nwith his celebrated _Ideas,_ brought into fashion by Giulio Camillo.[22]\n\nEven those writers who dared to criticize the organism of ancient\nRhetoric left the theory of ornament unassailed. Vives lamented\nover the \"exaggerated subtlety of the Greeks\" which had multiplied\ndistinctions to infinity in this matter without diffusing light,[23]\nbut he never took up a definite stand against the theory of ornament.\nPatrizzi was dissatisfied with the insufficient definition of\nornament given by the ancients; but he asserted the existence of\nornaments and metaphors as well as seven different modes of \"conjoined\nspeech,\"--narrative, proof, amplification, diminution, ornament with\nits contrary, elevation and depression.[24] The school of Ramus\ncontinued to entrust Rhetoric with the \"embellishment\" of thought.\nOwing to the vast extension and intensification of life and literature\nin the sixteenth century, it would be easy to quote phrases, as we have\ndone from ancient authors, asserting the strict dependence of speech\nupon the things it wishes to express, and lively attacks on pedants\nand pedantic forms and rules for beautiful speech. But what would be\nthe use? The theory of ornament was always in the background, tacitly\nadmitted as indisputable by all. Juan de Vald\u00e9s, for instance, makes\nthe following confession of stylistic faith: \"_Escribo como hablo;\nsolamente tengo cuidado de usar de vocablos que sinifiquen bien lo\nque quiero decir, y d\u00edgolo cuanto m\u00e1s llanamente me es posible,\nporqu\u00e9, \u00e1 mi parecer, en ninguna lengua est\u00e1 bien la afectaci\u00f3n._\"\nBut Vald\u00e9s also says that beautiful language consists \"_en que digais\nlo que quereis con las menos palabras que pudi\u00e9redes, de tal manera\nque ... no se pueda quitar ninguna sin ofender \u00e1 la sentencia, \u00f3\nal encarescimiento, \u00f3 \u00e1 la elegancia._\"[25] Here it seems that\namplification and elegance are conceived as extraneous to the meaning\nor content.--A gleam of truth is visible in Montaigne, who, confronted\nby the laboured categories into which rhetoricians divide ornament,\nobserves: \"_Oyez dire M\u00e9tonymie, M\u00e9taphore, All\u00e9gorie et aultres tels\nnoms de la Grammaire; semble il pas qu'on signifie quelque forme de\nlangage rare et pellegrin? Ce sont tiltres qui touchent le babil de\nvostre chambri\u00e8re._\"[26] That is to say, they are anything but language\nremote from the _primum se offerens ratio._\n\n[Sidenote: Reductio ad absurdum in the seventeenth century.]\n\nThe impossibility of upholding the theory of ornament was first noticed\nduring the decadence of Italian literature in the seventeenth century,\nwhen literary production became but a play of empty forms, and the\nconvenient, long violated in practice, was abandoned and forgotten even\nin theory, and came to be looked on as a limit arbitrarily imposed on\nthe fundamental principle of ornamentation. The opponents of that style\nloaded with conceits which is known as \"secentismo\" from its prevalence\nin the seventeenth century (Matteo Pellegrini, Orsi and others) felt\nthe viciousness of the literary production of their day; they were\naware that decadence was due to the fact that literature was no longer\nthe serious expression of a content; but they were embarrassed by the\nreasoning of the champions of bad taste, who were able to demonstrate\nthat the whole business conformed in every particular with the literary\ntheory of ornament, the common ground of both parties. In vain did the\nformer appeal to the \"convenient,\" the \"moderate,\" the \"avoidance of\naffectation,\" to ornament as \"condiment, not food,\" and all the other\nweapons which had sufficed in times when healthy literary production\nand sound \u00e6sthetic taste had automatically corrected faulty theory:\nthe other party replied, there was no reason to be sparing in use\nof ornament when it lay in masses ready to hand, or to avoid an\nostentatious display of wit when one had an inexhaustible supply.[27]\n\n[Sidenote: _Polemic concerning the theory of ornament._]\n\nThe same reaction against the abuse of ornament, against \"Spanish and\nItalian conceits\" (whose supporters had been Gracian in Spain and\nTesauro in Italy), took place in France. \"... _Laissez \u00e0 l'Italie\nDe tous ces faux brillants l'\u00e9clatante folie\"; \"Ce que l'on con\u00e7oit\nbien s'\u00e9nonce clairement. Et les mots, pour le dire, arrivent\nais\u00e9ment._\"[28] Among the sharpest critics of conceits was the Jesuit\nBouhours, already quoted, author of the _Mani\u00e8re de bien penser dans\nles \u0153uvres d'esprit._ The rhetorical forms were the subject of warm\ncontroversy. Orsi, on national grounds the opponent of Bouhours (1703),\nasserted that all the ornamental devices of wit rested on a middle\nterm and could be reduced to a rhetorical syllogism, and that wit\nconsists of a truth which appears false or a falsehood which appears\ntrue.[29] If this controversy produced no great scientific result at\nthe time, at least it prepared the mind for greater liberty; and, as\nwe have remarked elsewhere,[30] it may have influenced Vico, who, in\nframing his new concept of poetical imagination, recognized that it\nnecessitated a wholesale reconstruction of the theory of rhetoric\nand the conclusion that its figures and tropes are not \"caprices of\npleasure\" but \"necessities of the human mind.\"[31]\n\n[Sidenote: _Du Marsais and metaphor._]\n\nWe find the theory of rhetorical ornament jealously kept intact by\nBaumgarten and Meier, while in France it was as vigorously assailed\nby C\u00e9sar Chesneau du Marsais, who published in 1730 a treatise on\n_Tropes_ (the seventh part of his _General Grammar_)[32] wherein he\ndevelops, on the subject of metaphor, the observation already made by\nMontaigne: indeed he was perhaps inspired by Montaigne, although he\ndoes not mention his name. Du Marsais remarks that it is said that\nfigures are modes of speech and turns of expression removed from the\nordinary and common; which is an empty phrase, as good as saying \"the\nfigured differs from the non-figured and figures are figures and not\nnon-figures.\" On the other hand it is wholly untrue that figures\nare removed from ordinary speech, for \"nothing is more natural,\nordinary and common than figures: more figures of speech are used\nin the town square on a market-day than in many days of academical\ndiscussion\"; and no speech, however short, can be composed entirely of\nnon-figurative expressions. And Du Marsais gives instances of quite\nobvious and spontaneous expressions in which Rhetoric cannot refuse\nto recognize the figures of apostrophe, congeries, interrogation,\nellipsis, prosopop\u0153ia: \"The apostles were persecuted and suffered\ntheir persecutions with patience. What can be more natural than\nthe description given by St. Paul? _Maledicimur et benedicimus;\npersecutionem patimur et sustinemus; blasphemamur et obsecramus._\nYet the apostle makes use of a fine figure of antithesis; cursing is\nthe opposite to blessing; persecution to endurance; blasphemy to\nprayer.\" But further, the very language of the figure is figured,\nsince it is a metaphor.--But after such acute observations, Du Marsais\nends by himself becoming confused and defines figures as \"manners of\nspeech differing from others in a particular modification by which it\nis possible to reduce each one to a species apart, and give a more\nlively, noble or pleasing effect than can be gained by a manner of\nspeech expressing the same content of thought without such particular\nmodification.\"[33]\n\n[Sidenote: _Psychological interpretation._]\n\nBut the psychological interpretation of figures of speech, the first\nstage towards their \u00e6sthetic criticism, was not allowed to drop here.\nIn his _Elements of Criticism,_ Home says that he had long questioned\nwhether that part of Rhetoric concerning figures might not be reduced\nto rational principles, and had finally discovered that figures consist\nin the passional element;[34] he set himself therefore to analyse\nprosopop\u0153ia, apostrophe and hyperbole in the light of the passional\nfaculty. From Du Marsais and Home is derived everything of value in the\n_Lectures on Rhetoric and belles lettres_ of Hugh Blair, professor\nat Edinburgh University from 1759 onwards;[35] published in book form,\nthese lectures had an immense vogue in all the schools of Europe\nincluding those of Italy, and replaced advantageously, by their \"reason\nand good sense,\" works of a much cruder type. Blair defined figures\nin general as \"language suggested by imagination or passion.\"[36]\nSimilar ideas were promulgated in France by Marmontel in his _Elements\nof Literature_.[37] In Italy Cesarotti was contrasting the logical\nelement or \"cypher-terms\" of language with the rhetorical element or\n\"figure-terms,\" and rational eloquence with imaginative eloquence.[38]\nBeccaria, though a shrewd psychological analyst, held to the view of\nliterary style as \"accessory ideas or feelings added to the principal\nin any discourse\"; that is, he failed to free himself from the\ndistinction between the intellectual form intended for the expression\nof the principal ideas, and the literary form, modifying the first by\nthe addition of accessory ideas.[39] In Germany an effort was made by\nHerder to interpret tropes and metaphors as Vico had done, that is to\nsay as essential to primitive language and poetry.\n\n[Sidenote: _Romanticism and Rhetoric. Present day._]\n\nRomanticism was the ruin of the theory of ornament, and caused it\npractically to be thrown on the scrap-heap, but it cannot be said\nto have gone under for good or to have been superseded by a new and\naccurately stated theory. The chief philosophers of \u00c6sthetic (not\nonly Kant, who as we know remained in bondage to the mechanical and\nornamental theory; not only Herder, whose knowledge of art seems to\nhave been confined to a little music and a great deal of rhetoric;\nbut such romantic philosophers as Schelling, Solger and Hegel) still\nretained the sections devoted to metaphor, trope and allegory for\ntradition's sake, without severe scrutiny. Italian Romanticism with\nManzoni at its head destroyed the belief in beautiful and elegant\nwords, and dealt a blow at Rhetoric: but was it killed by the stroke?\nApparently not, judging by the concessions unconsciously made by the\nscholastic treatise-writer Ruggero Bonghi, whose _Critical Letters_\nassert the existence of two styles or forms, which at bottom are\nnothing else than the plain and the ornate.[40] German schools of\nphilology have pretty generally accepted the stylistic theory of\nGr\u00f6ber, who divides style into logical (objective) and affective\n(subjective):[41] an ancient error masked by terminology borrowed from\nthe psychological philosophy in fashion at modern universities. In\nthe same spirit a recent writer rechristens the rhetorical doctrine\nof tropes and figures by the title \"Doctrine of the Forms of \u00c6sthetic\nApperception,\" and divides them into the four categories (the ancient\nwealth of categories reduced to a paltry four!) of personification,\nmetaphor, antithesis, and symbol.[42] Biese has devoted an entire\nbook to metaphor; but one searches it in vain for a serious \u00e6sthetic\nanalysis of this category.[43]\n\nThe best scientific criticism of the theory of ornament is found\nscattered throughout the writings of De Sanctis, who when lecturing on\nrhetoric preached what he called anti-rhetoric.[44] But even here the\ncriticism is not conducted from a strictly systematic point of view. It\nseems to us that the true criticism should be deduced negatively from\nthe very nature of \u00e6sthetic activity, which does not lend itself to\npartition; there is no such thing as activity type _a_ or type _b,_ nor\ncan the same concept be expressed now in one way, now in another. Such\nis the only way of abolishing the double monster of bare form which\nis, no one knows how, deprived of imagination, and ornate form which\ncontains, no one knows how, an addition on the side of imagination.[45]\n\n\n\n[1] For Gorgias' saying see Aristotle, _Rhet._ iii. ch. 18.\n\n[2] Cicero, _Orat. ad Brut.,_ introd.\n\n[3] Quintilian, _Inst. orat._ xii. c. i.\n\n[4] Fran. Patrizzi, _Della rhetorica,_ ten dialogues, Venice, 1582,\ndial. 7; Tassoni, _Pensieri diversi,_ bk. x. ch. 15.\n\n[5] _De causis corruptarum artium,_ 1531, bk. iv.; _De ratione\ndicendi,_ 1533.\n\n[6] Cicero, _De or at:_ i. chs. 10-11; Quintil. _Inst. oral._ iii. ch.\n5.\n\n[7] _De orat._ ii. chs. 16-17.\n\n[8] P. Ramus, _Instil, dialectic\u00e6,_ 1543; _Schol\u00e6 in artes liberales,_\n1555 etc.; Tal\u00e6us, _Instit. orator.,_ 1545.\n\n[9] _Della rhetorica,_ dial. 10, and _passim._\n\n[10] _Ration. Philos.,_ part iii. _Rhetoricorum liber unus juxta\npropria dogmata_ (Paris, 1636), ch. 3.\n\n[11] _Theoretische Lehre von den Gem\u00fcthsbewegungen \u00fcberhaupt,_ Halle,\n1744.\n\n[12] _Kritik d. Urtheils kraft,_ \u00a7 53 and _n._\n\n[13] H. F. Ortloff, _Die gerichtliche Redekunst,_ Neuwied, 1887; R.\nWhately, _Rhetoric,_ 1828 (for _Encyd. Brit._); Ital. trans., Pistoia,\n1889.\n\n[14] Aristotle, _Rhet._ iii. ch. 1.\n\n[15] Quintil. _Inst. orat._ viii. ch. 3.\n\n[16] _Rhet._ iii. ch. 10.\n\n[17] _Poet._ chs. 19-22; cf. _Rhet._ iii. cc. 2, 10.\n\n[18] See above, pp. 68-69.\n\n[19] Quintilian, _Inst. orat._ viii. ch. 6; ix. ch. 1.\n\n[20] Aristotle, _Rhet._ iii. ch. 2; _Poet._ ch. 22.\n\n[21] _De sublimitate_ (in _Rhet. gr\u00e6ci,_ ed. Spengel, vol. 1. \u00a7 32.)\n\n[22] Giulio Camillo Delminio, _Discorso sopra le Idee di Ermogene_ (in\n_Opere,_ Venice, 1560); and trans. of Hermogenes (Udine, 1594).\n\n[23] _De causis corruptarum artium, loc. cit._\n\n[24] _Della rhetorica,_ dial. 6.\n\n[25] _Di\u00e1logo de las lenguas_ (ed. Mayans y Siscar, _Origines de la\nlengua espanola,_ Madrid, 1873), pp. 115, 119.\n\n[26] _Essais,_ i. ch. 52 (ed. Garnier, i. 285); ci. _ibid._ chs. 10,\n25, 39; 10.\n\n[27] Croce, _I trattatisti italiani del concettismo,_ pp. 8-22.\n\n[28] Boileau, _Art po\u00e9tique,_ i. 11. 43-44, 153-154.\n\n[29] G. G. Orsi, _Considerazioni sopra la maniera di ben pensare,_\netc., 1703 (reprinted Modena, 1735, with all polemics relating thereto).\n\n[30] See above, pp. 230-231.\n\n[31] See above, pp. 225-226.\n\n[32] _Des tropes ou des diff\u00e9rens sens dans lesquels on peut prendre un\nm\u00eame mot dans une m\u00eame langue._ Paris, 1730 (_\u0152uvres de Du Marsais,_\nParis, 1797, vol. i.).\n\n[33] _Des tropes ou des diff\u00e9rens sens dans lesquels on peut prendre un\nm\u00eame mot dans une m\u00eame langue,_ part i. art. 1; cf. art. 4.\n\n[34] _Elem. of Criticism,_ iii. ch. 20.\n\n[35] Hugh Blair, _Lectures on Rhetoric and belles lettres_ (London,\n1823).\n\n[36] _Lect. on Rhet. and belles lettres,_ lecture 14.\n\n[37] Marmontel, _\u00c9l\u00e9ments de litt\u00e9ral,_ (in _\u0152uvres,_ Paris, 1819), iv.\np. 559.\n\n[38] Cesarotti, _Saggio sulla filos. del linguaggio,_ part ii.\n\n[39] _Ricerche intorno alla natura dello stile_ (Turin, 1853), ch. 1.\n\n[40] R. Bonghi, _Lettere critiche,_ 1856 (4th ed., Naples, 1884), pp.\n37 65-67, 90, 103.\n\n[41] Gustav Gr\u00f6ber, _Grundriss d. romanischen Philologie,_ vol. 1. pp.\n200-250, K. Vossler, _B. Cellinis Stil in seiner Vita, Versuch einer\npsychol. Stilbetrachtung,_ Halle a. S., 1899; cf. the self-criticism\nof Vossler, _Positivismus u. Idealismus in der Sprachwissenschaft,_\nHeidelberg, 1904 (It. trans., Bari, Laterza, 1908).\n\n[42] Ernst Elsteb, _Principien d. Literaturwissenschaft,_ Halle a. S.,\n1097. vol. i. pp. 359-413.\n\n[43] Biese, _Philos, des Metaphorischen,_ Hamburg-Leipzig, 1893.\n\n[44] _La Giovinezza di Fr. de S._ chs. 23, 25; _Scritti var\u00ee,_ ii. pp.\n272-274.\n\n[45] See above, pp. 67-73.\n\n\n\n\nII\n\n\nHISTORY OF THE ARTISTIC AND LITERARY KINDS\n\n\n[Sidenote: _The kinds in antiquity. Aristotle._]\n\n\nThe theory of artistic and literary kinds and of the laws or rules\nproper to each separate kind has almost always followed the fortunes of\nthe rhetorical theory.\n\nTraces of the threefold division into epic, lyric and dramatic are\nfound in Plato; and Aristophanes gives an example of criticism\naccording to the canon of the kinds, particularly that of tragedy.[1]\nBut the most conspicuous theoretical treatment of the kinds bequeathed\nus by antiquity is precisely the doctrine of Tragedy which forms a\nlarge part of the Aristotelian fragment known as the Poetics. Aristotle\ndefines such a composition as an imitation of a serious and complete\naction, having size, in language adorned in accordance with the\nrequirements of the different parts, its exposition to be by action and\nnot by narration, and using pity or terror as means to free or purify\nus from these same passions;[2] he gives minute details as to the six\nparts of which it is composed, especially the plot and the tragic\ncharacter. It has been often said, ever since the days of Vincenzo\nMaggio in the sixteenth century, that Aristotle treated of the nature\nof poetry, or particular forms of poetry, without claiming to give\nprecepts. But Piccolomini answered that \"all these things and other\nsimilar ones are shown or asserted with no other purpose but that we\nmay see in what way their precepts and laws must be obeyed and carried\nout,\" just as, to make a hammer or saw, one begins by describing\nthe parts of which they are composed.[3] The error of which we take\nAristotle as representative lies in transmuting abstractions and\nempirical partitions into rational concepts: this was almost inevitable\nat the beginnings of \u00e6sthetic reflexion, and the Sanskrit theory of\npoetry employed the same method independently when, for example, it\ndefines and legislates for ten principal and eighteen secondary styles\nof drama; forty-eight varieties of hero; and we know not how many kinds\nof heroines.[4]\n\n[Sidenote: _In the Middle Ages and Renaissance_.]\n\nAfter Aristotle, the theory of poetic kinds does not seem to have been\ncompletely or elaborately developed in antiquity. The Middle Ages may\nbe said to have expressed the doctrine in treatises of the kind known\nas \"rhythmic arts\" or \"methods of composition.\" When the Aristotelian\nfragment was first noticed, it is curious to see the way in which\nthe paraphrase of Averroes distorted the theory of kinds. Averroes\nconceives tragedy as the art of praise, comedy as that of blame,\nwhich amounts to identifying the former with panegyric, the latter\nwith satire; and he believes the _peripeteia_ to be the same thing as\nantithesis, or the artifice of beginning the description of a thing by\ndescribing its opposite.[5] This distortion demonstrates afresh the\nmerely historical character of these kinds and their unintelligibility\nby the methods of pure logic to a thinker living in times and under\ncustoms different from those of the Hellenic world. The Renaissance\nseized upon Aristotle's text, partly expounded it, partly distorted it\nand partly thought it out afresh, and thus succeeded in establishing\na long list of kinds and sub-kinds rigidly defined and subjected to\ninexorable laws. Controversy now began over the correct understanding\nof the unities of epic or dramatic poetry; over the moral quality and\nsocial standing proper to the characters in this kind of poem and in\nthat; over the nature of the plot, and whether it includes passions and\nthoughts, and whether lyrics should or should not be received as true\npoetry; whether the material of tragedy should be historical; whether\nthe dialogue of comedy may be in prose; whether a happy ending may\nbe allowed in tragedy; whether the tragic character may be a perfect\ngentleman; what kind and number of episodes is admissible in the poem,\nand how they should be incorporated in the main plot; and so on.\nGreat anguish was caused by the mysterious rule of catharsis found in\nblack and white in Aristotle's text, and Segni na\u00efvely predicted that\ntragic poetry would be revived in its perfect spectacular entirety\nfor the sake of experiencing the effect spoken of by Aristotle, that\n\"purgation\" which causes \"the birth of tranquillity in the soul and of\nfreedom of all perturbation.\"[6]\n\n[Sidenote: _The doctrine of the three unities._]\n\nAmongst the many undertakings brought to a glorious end by the critics\nand treatise-writers of the sixteenth century, the best known is the\nestablishment of the three unities of time, place and action. One\ncannot indeed see why they are called unities, for in strictness they\ncould at most be spoken of as shortness of time, straitness of space\nand limitation of tragic subjects to a certain class of action. It is\nwell known that Aristotle prescribed unity of action only, and reminded\nhis hearers that theatrical custom alone imposed on the action a\ntime-limit of one day. On this last point the critics of the sixteenth\ncentury accorded six, eight, or twelve hours according to individual\ntaste or humour: some of them (amongst them Segni) allowed twenty-four\nhours, including the night as particularly propitious to assassinations\nand the other acts of violence which usually form the plot of\ntragedies; others extended the limit to thirty-six or forty-eight\nhours. The last, and most curious, unity, that of place, was slowly\ndeveloped by Castelvetro, Riccoboni and Scaliger until the Frenchman\nJean de la Taille joined it as a third to the existing two in 1572, and\nin 1598 Angelo Ingegneri finally formulated it more explicitly.\n\n[Sidenote: _Poetics of the kinds and rules. Scaliger._]\n\nThe Italian treatises were widely read and regarded as authoritative\nall over Europe, and awakened the first effort towards a learned theory\nof poetry in France, Spain. England and Germany. A good representative\nof his class is Julius C\u00e6sar Scaliger, who has been considered, with\nsome exaggeration, as the true founder of French pseudo-classicism or\nneo-classicism; as one who (it has been said) \"laid the first stone of\nthe classical Bastille.\" But if he was neither the first nor the only\none, he certainly helped greatly to reduce \"to a system of doctrines\nthe principal consequences of the sovranty of Reason in works of\nliterature,\" with his minute distinctions and classifications of kinds,\nthe insurmountable barriers he erected between them, and his distrust\nof free inspiration and imagination.[7] Scaliger numbers among his\ndescendants (beside Daniel Heinsius) d'Aubignac, Rapin, Dacier and\nother tyrants of French literature and drama: Boileau turned the rules\nof neo-classicism into neat verses.\n\n[Sidenote: _Lessing._]\n\nIt has been noticed that Lessing entered the same field; his opposition\nto the French rules (which was an opposition of rule to rule, in which\nhe had been forestalled by Italian writers, for example by Calepio in\n1732) is anything but radical. Lessing maintained that Corneille and\nother authors had misinterpreted Aristotle, to whose laws even the\nShakespearian drama could be shown to conform;[8] but on the other\nhand he strongly opposed the abolition of all rules and those who\nshouted \"genius, genius,\" placing genius above the law and saying that\ngenius makes the law. For the very reason that genius is law, replied\nLessing, laws have their value and can be determined: negation of them\nwould entail the confinement of genius to its first trial flights,\nmaking example or practice useless.[9]\n\n[Sidenote: _Compromises and extensions._]\n\nBut the \"kinds\" and their \"limits\" could be maintained for centuries\nsolely by means of infinitely subtle interpretations, analogical\nextensions and more or less concealed compromises. The Italian\nRenaissance critics, while working at their Poetics in the style of\nAristotle, found themselves confronted with chivalric poetry, and had\nto make the best of it; this they did by assigning it to a kind of poem\nnot foreseen by antiquity (Giraldi Cintio).[10] Here and there indeed\na rigorist was heard protesting that romances were in no way different\nfrom heroic poetry, and were only \"badly written heroics\" (Salviati).\nAnd since it was impossible to deny a place in Italian literature to\nDante's poem, Iacopo Mazzoni, in his _Defence of Dante,_ overhauled\nonce more the categories of Poetics in order to find a niche for the\nsacred poem.[11] Farces made their appearance at this time, and Cecchi\n(1585) declares \"Farce is a third novelty, occupying a place between\ntragedy and comedy ...\"[12] The _Pastor fido_ of Guarini was published,\nneither tragedy nor comedy, but tragicomedy; and discovering no heading\namong the kinds deduced from moral or civil philosophy suitable for\nthe intruder, Jason de Nores proceeded to rule it out of existence;\nGuarini made a valiant defence and claimed special protection for his\nbeloved _Pastor_ under a third, or mixed, style, representative of real\nlife.[13] Another rigorist, Fioretti (Udeno Nisieli) proclaimed the\npoem \"a poetic monster, so huge and deformed that centaurs, hippogriffs\nand chim\u00e6ras are comparatively graceful and charming ..., fit to bring\na blush to the cheek of the muse, a disgrace to poetry, a mixture of\ningredients in themselves discordant, inimical and incompatible\";[14]\nbut will this bluster drive the delicious _Pastor fido_ from the hands\nof lovers of poetry? The same thing occurred in the case of Marino's\n_Adone,_ described by Chapelain as \"a poem of peace\" for want of\na better definition, though other supporters called it \"a new form\nof epic poem\";[15] and the same thing happened again in the case of\nthe comedy of art and musical drama. Corneille, who had called down\na furious tempest from Scud\u00e9ry and the Academicians on the head of\nhis _Cid,_ remarked in his discourse on Tragedy, though basing his\nposition on that of Aristotle, that there was necessity for \"_quelque\nmod\u00e9ration, quelque favorable interpr\u00e9tation,... pour n'\u00eatre pas\noblig\u00e9s de condamner beaucoup de po\u00e8mes, que nous avons vu r\u00e9ussir sur\nnos th\u00e9\u00e2tres.\" \"Il est ais\u00e9 de nous accommoder avec Aristote_...\"[16]\nhe says in another place: a piece of literary hypocrisy which startles\nby its verbal resemblance to \"_les accommodements avec le Ciel_\" of\nthe Tartuffian ethics. The following century saw the accepted kinds\naugmented by \"bourgeois tragedy\" and pathetic comedy, nicknamed\n\"lachrymose\" by its enemies; de Chassiron[17] attacked, and Diderot,\nGellert and Lessing[18] defended the new arrival. In this way the\nschematism of the kinds continued to suffer violence and to cut a very\npoor figure; nevertheless, in spite of adversity, it made every effort\nto retain power even at the sacrifice of dignity: just as an absolute\nking turns constitutional by force of circumstance, and chooses the\nlesser evil of squaring his divine right with the will of the nation.\n\n[Sidenote: _Rebellion against rules in general._]\n\nThis retention of power would have been more difficult had any success\nattended the attempts at rebellion against all laws, against law in\ngeneral, which broke out in varying degrees at the end of the sixteenth\ncentury. Pietro Aretino made mock of the most sacred precepts: in a\nprologue to one of his comedies he remarks derisively, \"If you see more\nthan five characters on the stage at once, do not laugh; for chains\nwhich would fasten water-mills to the river could not hold the fools of\nto-day.\"[19]\n\n[Sidenote: _G. Bruno. Guarini._]\n\nA philosopher, Giordano Bruno, entered the lists against the\n\"regulators of poetry\": rules, said he, are derived from poetry: \"there\nare as many genera and species of true rules as there are genera and\nspecies of true poets\"; such an individualization of kinds dealt them\na deathblow. \"How then\" (asks the interlocutory opponent) \"shall\nveritable poets be recognized?\" \"By their singing of verse\" (answers\nBruno); \"of that which, being sung, either delights or instructs, or\ndelights and instructs at the same time.\"[20] In much the same way\nGuarini defended his _Pastor fido_ in 1588, declaring \"the world is the\njudge of poets; against its sentence there is no appeal.\"[21]\n\n[Sidenote: _Spanish critics._]\n\nAmongst European countries, Spain was perhaps the sturdiest in her\nresistance to the pedantic theories of the writers of treatises;\nSpain was the land of freedom in criticism from Vives to Feij\u00f3o, from\nthe sixteenth to the middle of the eighteenth century when decadence\nof the old Spanish spirit allowed Luz\u00e1n, with others, to introduce\nneo-classical poetry of Italian and French origin.[22] That rules\nmust change with the times and with actual conditions; that modern\nliterature demands modern poetics; that work carried out contrary to\nestablished rule does not signify that it is contrary to all rule\nor unwilling to submit itself to a higher law; that nature should\ngive, not receive, laws; that the laws of the three unities are\nas ridiculous as it would be to forbid a painter to paint a large\nlandscape in a small picture; that the pleasure, taste, approbation of\nreaders and spectators are the deciding element in the long run; that\nnotwithstanding the laws of counterpoint, the ear is the true judge of\nmusic; these affirmations and many like them are frequent in Spanish\ncriticism of the period. One critic, Francisco de la Barreda (1622),\nwent so far as to compassionate the strong wits of Italy bound by fear\nand cowardice (_temerosos y acobardados_) to rules that hampered them\non every side;[23] he may have been thinking of Tasso, a memorable case\nof such degradation. Lope de Vega wavered between neglect of rules in\npractice, and obsequious acceptance of them in theory, alleging in\nexcuse for his conduct that he was forced to yield to the demands of\nthe public who paid money to see his plays; he said, \"when I write my\ncomedies, I lock and double-lock the door against the precept-mongers,\nthat they may not rise up and bear witness against me\"; \"Art (that is,\nPoetics) speaks truth which is contradicted by the vulgar ignorant\";\n\"may the rules forgive us when we are induced to violate them.\"[24] But\na contemporary admirer of Lope's work writes of him that \"_en muchas\npartes de sus escritos dice que el no guardar el arte antiguo lo hace\npor conformarse con el gusto de la plebe ... dicelo por su natural\nmodestia, y porqu\u00e9 no atribuya la malicia ignorante \u00e0 arrogancia lo que\nes politica perfeccion._\"[25]\n\n[Sidenote: _G. B. Marino._]\n\nGiambattista Marino also protested \"I assert that I have a more\nthorough knowledge of the rules than have all the pedants in the\nworld; but the only true rule is to know how to break the rules at the\nright place and time, and to conform with the custom and taste of the\nday.\"[26] The drama of Spain, the comedy of art, and other literary\nnovelties of the seventeenth century caused Minturno, Castelvetro and\nother rigid treatise-writers of the preceding century to be looked at\nwith contemptuous pity as \"antiquaries\"; this may be seen in Andrea\nPerucci (1699), the theorist of improvised comedy.[27] Pallavicino\ncriticized the writers on \"the disciplines of beautiful speech\" on\nthe ground that they \"generally base their precepts on observing by\nexperience what things in writers give pleasure, rather than pointing\nout what would naturally conform to the particular affections and\ninstincts implanted by the Creator in the souls of men.\"[28]\n\n[Sidenote: _G. V. Gravina._]\n\nA note of distrust towards the fixed kinds may be heard in the\n_Discorso sull' Endimione_ (1691), wherein Gravina severely blames\nthe \"ambitious and miserly precepts\" of rhetoricians, and makes the\npenetrating comment: \"No work can see the fight without finding itself\nconfronted by a tribunal of critics specially convened to examine it,\nand questioned firstly as to its name and nature. Next begins the\naction which lawyers call prejudicial, and controversy arises as to\nits status, whether it is a poem, a romance, a tragedy, a comedy, or\nanother of the prescribed kinds. And if the said work have ignored the\nslightest precept ... they decree forthwith its exile and perpetual\nbanishment. And yet, however they recast and expand their aphorisms,\nthey will never be able to include all the different kinds that can\nbe freshly created by the varied and ceaseless motion of human wit.\nFor this reason I cannot see why we should not free ourselves from\nthis insolent curb on the soaring grandeur of our imaginations, and\nallow them to follow an open road amongst those immeasurable spaces\nthey are fitted to explore.\" He remarks on the work of Guidi which\nforms the subject of his discourse, \"I know not whether it be tragedy,\ncomedy, tragicomedy, or anything else invented by rhetoricians. It is a\nrepresentation of the loves of Endymion and Diana. If those terms have\nsufficient breadth of extension, they will comprehend this work; if\nthey have not, let another be framed (a power which may be granted to\nany one in so unimportant a matter); if no such term can be invented,\nlet us not, for want of a word, deprive ourselves of a thing so\nbeautiful.\"[29] These remarks have quite a modern ring, but Gravina can\nhardly have thought out their implications very deeply, for later on he\nwrote a special treatise on the rules of the tragic kind.[30] Antonio\nConti too declared at times his antagonism towards the rules, but he\nreferred to the Aristotelian rules only.[31]\n\n[Sidenote: _Fr. Montani._]\n\nMore courage was displayed by Count Francesco Montani of Pesaro in the\npolemic roused by Orsi's book against Bouhours; in 1705 he wrote: \"I\nknow that there are immutable and eternal rules, founded on such sound\ngood sense and solid reason as will remain unshaken as long as mankind\nlives. But these rules, whose incorruptibility gives them authority to\nguide our spirits to the end of time, are rare enough to be counted\nwith the nose, and it seems to me somewhat arbitrary to claim to\ntest and regulate our new works by old laws now wholly abrogated and\nannulled.\"[32]\n\n[Sidenote: _Critics of the eighteenth century._]\n\nIn France the rigorism of Boileau was followed by the rebellion of Du\nBos, who unhesitatingly declared that \"men will always prefer poetry\nwhich moves them to that composed according to rule,\"[33] and the like\nheresies. In 1730, De la Motte made war against the unities of time\nand place, asserting as the most general, and even superior to that of\naction, the unity of interest.[34] Batteux tended to make free with\nthe rules; and Voltaire, though he opposed De la Motte and declared\nthe three unities to be the \"three great laws of good sense,\" uttered\nsome bold sentiments in his _Essay on Epic Poetry,_ and it was he who\nremarked that \"_tous les genres sont bons hors le genre ennuyeux,_\"\nand that the best kind is \"_celui qui est le mieux trait\u00e9._\" Diderot\nwas in certain respects a forerunner of Romanticism, and with him must\nbe mentioned Friedrich Melchior Grimm, who was influenced by him. A\nbreath of liberty was wafted into Italy by Metastasio, Bettinelli,\nBaretti and Cesarotti: in 1766 Buonafede notes in his _Epistola della\nlibert\u00e0 poetica_ that when erudite persons \"define epic poetry, or\ncomedy, or odes, they ought to frame as many definitions as there\nare compositions and authors.\"[35] In Germany the first to rise in\nrebellion against the rules (opposing Gottsched and his disciples)\nwere the representatives of the Swiss school.[36] In England, after\nexamining the definitions by which critics endeavoured to distinguish\nepic poetry from other compositions, Home wrote, \"It affords no little\ndiversion to watch so many profound critics hunting after that which\ndoes not exist. They presuppose--without shadow of proof--that there\nexists a precise criterion by which to distinguish epic poetry from\nall other kinds of composition. But literary compositions melt one\ninto another like colours: and if in their stronger shades it is easy\nto recognize them, they are susceptible of such variety and of so many\ndifferent forms that it is impossible to say where one ends and another\nbegins.\"[37]\n\n[Sidenote: _Romanticism and the \"strict kinds\": Berchet, V. Hugo._]\n\nLiterary thought between the late eighteenth and the first decades of\nthe nineteenth century, that is to say from\" the period of genius\"\nto that of romanticism properly so called, rose in rebellion against\nseparate individual rules and against all rules as such. But to\ndescribe the battles fought, and their more important episodes; to\nrecount the names of captains victorious or discomfited, or to deplore\nthe excesses committed by the conquerors, is no part of our present\ntask. Upon the ruins of the strict kinds, the \"_genres tranch\u00e9s_\"\nbeloved by Napoleon[38] (a Romanticist in the art of war, but a\nClassicist in poetry), flourished the drama, the romance and every\nother mixed kind: upon the ruins of the three unities, flourished the\nunity of _ensemble._ Italy made her protest against rules of style in\nBerchet's famous _Lettera semiseria di Grisostomo_ (1816); and France\nmade hers somewhat later in Victor Hugo's preface to _Cromwell_ (1827).\nHenceforth men discussed not the kinds, but Art. What is the unity of\n_ensemble_ but the demand of art itself, which is always an _ensemble,_\na synthesis? What else is the principle, introduced by August Wilhelm\nSchlegel and adopted by Manzoni and other Italian romanticists, to the\neffect that form of component parts must be \"organic not mechanical,\nresulting from the nature of the subject and its interior development\n... not from the impress of an external and extraneous stamp\"?[39]\n\n[Sidenote: _Their persistence in philosophical theories._]\n\nBut it would be quite wrong to suppose that this victory over the\nrhetoric of kinds was either the cause or the consequence of a final\nvictory over its philosophical presuppositions. In pure theory, none\nof the critics above named wholly abandoned the kinds and the rules.\nBerchet admitted four elementary forms, that is four fundamental\nkinds, in poetry; lyrical, didactic, epic and dramatic, claiming for\nthe poet only the right of \"uniting and fusing together the elementary\nforms in a thousand fashions.\"[40] Manzoni's only real quarrel was\nwith those rules \"founded on special facts instead of on general\nprinciples; on the authority of rhetoricians instead of reason.\"[41]\nEven De Sanctis was satisfied with a concept somewhat vague, though\ntrue enough at bottom: \"the most important rules are not those capable\nof being applied to every content, but those which draw their force _ex\nvisceribus causs\u00e6,_ from the very heart of the content itself.\"[42]\nEven more diverting than the spectacle which had delighted Home, is\nthe sight of German philosophy according the honour of a dialectical\ndeduction to the empirical classification of kinds. We shall give two\nexamples, each representing one extreme end of the chain:\n\n[Sidenote: _Fr. Schelling._]\n\nSchelling at the beginning of the century (1803), and Hartmann at\nthe end (1890). One section of Schelling's _Philosophy of Art_ is\ndevoted to \"the construction of individual poetic kinds\"; in it he\nremarks that were he to follow the historical order, Epic would come\nfirst; whereas in the scientific order the Lyric occupies the first\nplace: indeed, if poetry is the representation of the infinite in\nthe finite, the Lyric, in which difference prevails (the finite, the\nsubject), is its first moment, corresponding with the first power of\nthe ideal series, reflexion, knowledge, consciousness, whereas Epic\ncorresponds with the second power, action.[43] From Epic, which is _par\nexcellence_ the objective kind (as being the identity of subjective and\nobjective), derive the Elegy and the Idyl if subjectivity be placed in\nthe object and objectivity in the poet: if objectivity be placed in\nthe object and subjectivity in the poet, didactic poetry results.[44]\nTo these differentiations of the Epic, Schelling adds the romantic or\nmodern Epic, the poem of chivalry; the novel; and the experiments in\nan epic of ordinary life such as the _Luisa_ of Voss and the _Hermann\nand Dorothea_ of Goethe; and, co-ordinate with all the foregoing, the\n_Comedia_ of Dante, \"an epic kind in itself\" (_eine epische Gattung\nf\u00fcr sich_). Finally, from the union on a higher plane of Lyric with\nEpic, liberty with necessity, arises the third form, the Drama, the\nreconciliation of antitheses in a totality, \"supreme incarnation of the\nessence and the in-itself of all art.\"[45]\n\n[Sidenote: _E. von Hartmann._]\n\nIn Hartmann's _Philosophy of the Beautiful,_ poetry is divided into\nspoken poetry and read poetry. The former is subdivided into Epic,\nLyric and Dramatic, with further subdivisions of Epic into plastic\nEpic, or strictly epic Epic, and pictorial or lyrical Epic; of Lyric\ninto epical Lyric, lyrical Lyric and dramatic Lyric; of Dramatic into\nlyrical Drama, epic Drama and dramatic Drama. Read poetry (_Lese\npoesie_) is again subdivided into predominantly epical, lyrical or\ndramatic form with tertiary partitions of the affecting, the comic, the\ntragic and humorous; and into poems \"to be read at a sitting\" (like the\nshort story) or to be taken up again and again (like the novel).[46]\n\n[Sidenote: _The kinds in the schools._]\n\nWithout these highly philosophical trivialities the divisions of kinds\nstill wander through the books called _Institutions of Literature,_\nwritten by philologists and men of letters, and the ordinary\nschool-books of Italy, France and Germany; and psychologists and\nphilosophers still persist in writing about the \u00c6sthetic of the tragic,\nof the comic and of the humorous.[47] The objectivity of literary kinds\nis frankly maintained by Ferdinand Bruneti\u00e8re, who looks on literary\nhistory as \"the evolution of kinds,\"[48] and gives sharply defined form\nto a superstition which, seldom confessed so truthfully or applied so\nrigorously, survives to contaminate modern literary history.[49]\n\n\n[1] _Republic,_ iii. 394; see also E. M\u00fcller, _Gesch. i. Th. d. Kunst,_\ni. pp. 134-206; ii. pp. 238-239, note.\n\n[2] _Poet._ ch. 6\n\n[3] _Annotazioni,_ introd.\n\n[4] Cf. for Sanskrit poetry S. Levi, _Le Th\u00e9\u00e2tre indien,_ pp. 11-152.\n\n[5] Cf. Menendez y Pelayo, _op. cit._ I., i. pp. 126-154, 2nd ed.\n\n[6] Introd. to his tr. of the _Poetics._\n\n[7] Lintilhac, _Un Coup d'\u00e9tat,_ etc., p. 543.\n\n[8] _Hamburg. Dramat._ Nos. 81, 101-104.\n\n[9] _Op. cit._ Nos. 96, 101-104.\n\n[10] G. B. Giraldi Cintio, _De' romanzi, delle comedie e delle\ntragedie,_ 1554 (ed. D\u00e6lli, 1864).\n\n[11] Iacopo Mazzoni, _Difesa della commedia di Dante,_ Cesena, 1587.\n\n[12] G. M. Cecchi, prologue to _Romanesca,_ 1585.\n\n[13] Cf. besides the two _Veratti,_ the _Compendio della poesia\ntragicomica,_ Venice, 1601.\n\n[14] _Proginn. poet.,_ Florence, 1627, iii. p. 130.\n\n[15] Cf. A. Belloni, _Il seicento,_ Milan, 1898, pp. 162-164.\n\n[16] _Examens,_ and _Discours du po\u00e8me dramatique, de la trag\u00e9die, des\ntrois unit\u00e9s,_ etc.\n\n[17] _R\u00e9flexions sur le comique larmoyant,_ 1749 (trans. by Lessing,\n_Werke, vol. cit._).\n\n[18] Gellert, _De com\u00e6dia commovente,_ 1751; Lessing, _Abhandlungen von\nden weinerlichen oder r\u00fchrenden Lustspiele,_ 1754 (in _Werke,_ vol.\nvii.).\n\n[19] Prologue to the _Cortigiana,_ 1534.\n\n[20] _Degli eroici furori_ in _Opere italiane,_ ed. Gentile, ii. pp.\n310-311.\n\n[21] _Il Veratto_ (against Jason de Nores), Ferrara, 1588.\n\n[22] Menendez y Pelayo, _op. cit._ iii. pp. 174-175 (1st ed.), i.\n\n[23] Menendez y Pelayo, _op. cit._ iii. p. 468 (2nd ed.).\n\n[24] _Arte nuevo de hacer comedias_ (1609), ed. Morel Fatio, 11. 40-41,\n138-140, 157-158.\n\n[25] Menendez y Pelayo, _op. cit._ iii. p. 459.\n\n[26] Marino, letter to G. Preti, in _Lettere,_ Venice, 1627, p. 127.\n\n[27] _Dell' arte rappresentiva meditata e all' improvviso,_ Naples,\n1699; cf. pp. 47, 48, 65.\n\n[28] _Trattato dello stile e del dialogo,_ 1646, preface.\n\n[29] _Discorso su l' Endimione_ (in _Opere italiane, ed. cit._), ii.\npp. 15-16.\n\n[30] _Della tragedia,_ 1715 (_ibid._ vol. i.).\n\n[31] _Prose e poesie, cit.,_ pref. and _passim._\n\n[32] In Orsi, _Considerazioni, ed. cit._ ii. pp. 8, 9.\n\n[33] _R\u00e9flexions, cit._ sect. 34.\n\n[34] _Discours sur la trag\u00e9die,_ 1730.\n\n[35] _Opuscoli_ of Agatopisto Cromaziano, Venice, 1797.\n\n[36] Danzel, _Gottsched,_ p. 206 _seqq._\n\n[37] _Elements of Criticism,_ iii. pp. 144-145, note.\n\n[38] See conversation of Napoleon with Goethe, in Lewes, _The Life and\nWorks of Goethe,_ ii. p. 441. [\nF9] Manzoni, _Epistol._ i. pp. 355-356; cf. _Lettera sul romanticismo,\nibid._ pp. 293-299.\n\n[40] _Lettera di Grisostomo, opere,_ ed. Cusani, p. 227.\n\n[41] _Lettera sul romanticismo, ibid._ p. 280.\n\n[42] _La giovinezza di F. de S._ chs. 26-28.\n\n[43] _Philos, d. Kunst,_ pp. 639-645.\n\n[44] _Op. cit._ pp. 657-659.\n\n[45] _Op. cit._ p. 687.\n\n[46] _Philosophie d. Sch\u00f6nen,_ ch. 2, \u00a7 2.\n\n[47] See, _e.g.,_ Volkelt, _\u00c4sth. d. Tragischen,_ Munich, 1897; Lipps,\n_Der Streit \u00fcber Trag\u00f6die,_ etc.\n\n[48] See his other works, _L'\u00e9volution des genres dans l'histoire de la\nlitt\u00e9rature,_ Paris, 1890 _seqq.,_ and _Manuel de l'hist. de la litt\u00e9r.\nfran\u00e7aise, ibid.,_ 1898.\n\n[49] Croce, _Per la storia della critica e storiografia letter,_ pp.\n23-25.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\n\nTHE THEORY OF THE LIMITS OF THE ARTS\n\n\nTo Lessing must be ascribed the merit and the sole glory of having\ndiscovered that every art has its special character and inviolable\nlimits. But his merit lies not in his own theory, which, in itself,\nis scarcely tenable,[1] but in having, though by an error, aroused\ndiscussion of a highly important \u00e6sthetical point till then wholly\noverlooked. After some slight notice from Du Bos and Batteux, some\npreparation of the field by Diderot[2] and Mendelssohn,[3] and\nlong disquisitions by Meier and other Wolffians upon natural and\nconventional symbols,[4] Lessing was the first to raise clearly the\nquestion of the value attaching to the distinction between the various\narts. Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Renaissance had enumerated\nthe arts according to denominations of current phraseology, and had\ncomposed numbers of technical hand-books distinguishing major and\nminor arts; but in Aristoxenus or Vitruvius, Marchetto da Padova or\nCennino Cennini, Leonardo da Vinci or Leon Battista Alberti, Palladio\nor Scamozzi, it would be vain to look for the problem proposed by\nLessing, for the spirit of these technical treatise-writers is entirely\ndifferent. Some rudiments of the question may be detected in the\ncomparisons made, and the questions of precedence raised, between\npoetry and painting or painting and sculpture, to be found now and\nthen in stray paragraphs of their books (Leonardo da Vinci pressed\nthe claims of painting, Mich\u00e6l Angelo those of sculpture): the theme\neventually became a favourite one for academic discussion, and was not\ndespised by Galileo himself.[5]\n\n[Sidenote: _The limits of the arts in Lessing. Arts of space and arts\nof time._]\n\nLessing was induced to raise the question in the attempt to controvert\nthe strange views of Spence concerning the close union between painting\nand poetry among the ancients, and of Count Caylus, who held that\nthe excellence of a poem must be judged by the number of subjects\nit offers to the brush of the painter. He was further instigated by\nthe comparisons between poetry and painting upon which were commonly\nfounded the most ridiculous rules for tragedy: the maxim _Ut pictura\npo\u00ebsis,_ whose original motive was to emphasize the representative or\nimaginative character of poetry, and the community of nature among the\narts, had been converted by superficial interpretation into a defence\nof the most vicious intellectualistic and realistic prejudices. Lessing\nargued in this wise: \"If painting in its imitations employs precisely\na medium or symbol different from that of poetry (the former employing\nspatial forms and colours, the latter temporal articulated sounds),\nsince the symbol must certainly be in close relation with that\nwhich is signified, coexistent symbols can only express coexistent\nobjects or parts of objects, and consecutive symbols can only express\nconsecutive objects or parts of objects. Objects mutually coexistent,\nor having mutually coexistent parts, are called bodies. Bodies, then,\nthrough their quality of visibility, are the true objects of painting.\nObjects successively consecutive amongst themselves, or whose parts\nare consecutive, are called in general actions. Actions, then, are\nthe suitable objects of poetry.\" Painting, undoubtedly, may represent\naction, but only by means of bodies which indicate it; and poetry may\nrepresent bodies, but only by indicating them by means of actions.\nWhen a poet using language, _i.e._ arbitrary symbols, sets himself\nto describe bodies, he is no longer a poet but a prose-writer, since\na true poet only describes bodies by the effect they produce on the\nsoul.[6] Retouching and developing this distinction, Lessing described\naction or movement in a picture as an addition made by the imagination\nof the beholder; so true is this, says he, that animals perceive\nnothing save immobility in a picture. He further studied the various\nunions of arbitrary with natural symbols, such as that of poetry with\nmusic (in which the former is subordinate to the latter), of music\nwith dancing, of poetry with dancing, and of music and poetry with\ndancing (union of arbitrary consecutive audible symbols with natural\nvisible symbols): of the pantomime of antiquity (union of arbitrary\nconsecutive visible symbols with natural consecutive visible symbols):\nof the language of the dumb (the only art that employs arbitrary\nconsecutive visible symbols): and, lastly, of imperfect unions, such\nas that of painting with poetry. If not every use to which language is\nput is poetic, Lessing holds that not every use of natural coexistent\nsigns is pictorial: painting, like language, has its prose. Prosaic\npainters are those who represent consecutive objects notwithstanding\nthe character of coexistence in their signs, allegorical painters\nthose who make arbitrary use of natural signs, and those who pretend\nto represent the invisible or the audible by means of the visible.\nDesirous of preserving the naturalness of symbolism, Lessing ended by\ncondemning the custom of painting objects on a diminished scale, and\nconcludes: \"I think that the aim of an art should be that only to which\nit is specially adapted, not that which can be performed equally well\nby other arts. I find in Plutarch a comparison which illustrates this\nadmirably: he who would split wood with a key and open the door with an\naxe not only spoils both utensils but deprives himself of the unity of\neach alike.\"[7]\n\n[Sidenote: _Limits and classifications of the arts in later\nphilosophy._]\n\nThe principle of limitations or of the specific character of individual\narts, as laid down by Lessing, occupied the attention of philosophers\nin later days, who, without discussing the principle itself, employed\nit in classifying the arts and arranging them in series.\n\n[Sidenote: _Herder and Kant._]\n\nHerder here and there continued Lessing's examination in his fragment\non _Plastic_ (1769);[8] Heydenreich wrote a treatise (1790) on the\nlimits of the six arts (music, dance, figurative arts gardening,\npoetry and representative art), and criticized the _clavecin oculaire_\nof Father Castel, a contrivance for the combination of colours which\nshould act in the same way as the series of musical notes in harmony\nand melody,[9] Kant appealed to the analogy of a speaking man, and\nclassified the arts according to speech, gesture and tone as arts of\nspeech, figurative arts, and arts producing a mere play of sensations\n(mimicry and colouring).[10]\n\n[Sidenote: _Schelling._]\n\nSchelling differentiated the artistic identity according as it\nconsisted in the infusion of the infinite into the finite, or of the\nfinite into the infinite (ideal art or real art): into poetry and art\nproper. Under the heading of real arts he included the figurative arts,\nmusic, painting, plastic (which comprehended architecture, bas-relief\nand sculpture): in the ideal series were the three corresponding forms\nof poetry, lyrical, epical and dramatic.[11]\n\n[Sidenote: _Solger._]\n\nWith a similar method, Solger placed poetry, the universal art,\nside by side with art strictly so called, which is either symbolical\n(sculpture) or allegorical (painting), and, in either case, is a union\nof concepts and bodies: if you take corporality without concept, you\nhave architecture; if concept without matter, music.[12] Hegel makes\npoetry the bond of union between the two extremes of figurative art and\nof music.[13]\n\n[Sidenote: _Schopenhauer._]\n\nWe have already seen how Schopenhauer destroyed the accepted\nlimitations of art and built them up again, following the order of\nthe ideas which they represent.[14] Herbart clung to Lessing's two\ngroups, simultaneous arts and successive arts, and defined the former\nas \"permitting themselves to be inspected from every side,\" the latter\nas \"rejecting complete investigation and remaining in semi-darkness\":\nin the first group he placed architecture, plastic, church music and\nclassical poetry; in the second ornamental gardening, painting, secular\nmusic and romantic poetry.[15]\n\n[Sidenote: _Herbart._]\n\nHerbart was implacable against those who look in one art for the\nperfections of another; who \"look on music as a sort of painting,\npainting as poetry, poetry as an elevated plastic and plastic as\na species of \u00e6sthetic philosophy,\"[16] while admitting that a\nconcrete work of art, such as a picture, may contain elements of the\npicturesque, the poetic and other kinds, held together by the skill of\nthe artist.[17]\n\n[Sidenote: _Weisse. Zeising._]\n\nWeisse divided the arts into three triads, intended to recall the\nnine Muses.[18] Zeising invented-a cross-division into figurative\narts (architecture, sculpture, painting), musical arts (instrumental\nmusic, song, poetry), and arts of mimicry (dance, musical mimicry,\nrepresentative art), and into macrocosmic arts (architecture,\ninstrumental music, dance), microcosmic arts (sculpture, song, musical\nmimicry) and historical arts (painting, poetry and representative\nart).[19]\n\n[Sidenote: _Vischer._]\n\nVischer classified them according to the three forms of\nimagination (figurative, sensuous and poetic), into objective arts\n(architecture, plastic and painting), a subjective art (music) and an\nobjective-subjective art[20] (poetry). Gerber proposed to recognize a\nspecial \"art of language\" (_Sprachkunst_), distinguishable alike from\nprose and poetry and consisting in the expression of simple movements\nof the soul. Such an art would correspond with plastic in the following\nscheme: arts of the eye--(_a)_ architecture, (_b_) plastic, (c)\npainting; arts of the ear--(_a)_ prose, (_b)_ the art of language, (c)\npoetry.[21]\n\n[Sidenote: _M. Schasler._]\n\nThe two most recent systems of classification are furnished by Schasler\nand Hartmann, who have also submitted the schemes of their predecessors\nto searching criticism. Schasler[22] arranges the arts in two groups,\nadopting the criterion of simultaneity and succession: the arts of\nsimultaneity are architecture, plastic and painting; of succession,\nmusic, mimicry and poetry. He says that by following the series in\nthe order indicated, it will be seen that simultaneity, originally\npredominant, yields place to succession, which predominates in the\nsecond group and subordinates without wholly displacing the other.\nParallel with this, another division is evolved, deduced from the\nrelation between the ideal and material elements in each separate art,\nbetween movement and repose; which begins with architecture \"materially\nthe heaviest, spiritually the lightest of all the arts,\" and ends\nwith poetry, in which the opposite relation is observed. Curious\nanalogies are established by this method between the first and second\ngroup of arts: between architecture and music; between plastic and\nmimicry; between painting in its three forms of landscape, _genre_ and\nhistorical, and poetry in its three forms of lyric (declamatory), epic\n(rhapsodic) and drama (representative).\n\n[Sidenote: _E. v. Hartmann._]\n\nHartmann[23] divides the arts into arts of perception and arts of\nimagination: the former tripartite into spatial or visual (plastic\nand painting), temporal or auditory (instrumental music, linguistic\nmimicry, expressive song) and temporal-spatial or mimic (pantomime,\nmimic dances, art of the actor, art of the opera-singer); the second\ncontains but one single species, which is poetry. Architecture,\ndecoration, gardening, cosmetic and prosewriting are excluded from this\nsystem of classification and lumped together as non-free arts.\n\n[Sidenote: _The supreme art. Richard Wagner._]\n\nParallel with this search for a classification of the arts, the same\nphilosophers were led into the quest of the supreme art. Some favoured\npoetry, others music or sculpture; others again claimed the supremacy\nfor combined arts, especially for Opera, according to the theory of\nit already advanced in the eighteenth century[24] and maintained\nand developed in our day by Richard Wagner.[25] One of the latest\nphilosophers to raise the question \"whether single arts, or arts in\ncombination, had the greater value,\" concluded that single arts as such\npossess their own perfection, yet the perfection of united arts is\nstill greater, notwithstanding the compromises and mutual concessions\nenforced upon them by their union; that single arts, from another\npoint of view, have the greater value; and lastly, that both single\nand combined arts are necessary to the realisation of the concept of\nart.[26]\n\n[Sidenote: _Lotze's attack on classifications._]\n\nThe capriciousness, emptiness and childishness of such problems\nand their solutions must have excited feelings of impatience and\ndisgust, but we rarely find a doubt thrown on their validity. One such\ndissentient is Lotze when he writes: \"It is difficult to see the use\nof such attempts. Knowledge of the nature and laws of individual arts\nis but little increased by indication of the systematic place allotted\nto each.\" He further observed that in real life the arts are variously\nconjoined, forming themselves into no systematic series, while in\nthe world of thought an immense variety of orders can be created; he\ntherefore selected one of these possible orders, not because it was\nthe sole legitimate one, but because it was convenient (_bequem_). His\nseries begins with music, \"the art of free beauty, determined only by\nthe laws of its matter, not by conditions imposed by a given task of\npurpose or of imitation\"; followed by architecture, \"which no longer\nplays freely with forms, but subjects them to the service of an end\";\nand then by sculpture, painting and poetry, excluding minor arts which\ncannot be co-ordinated with the others, since they are incapable of\nexpressing with any approach to completeness the totality of the\nspiritual life.[27] A recent French critic, Basch, opens his treatise\nwith the following excellent remarks: \"Is it necessary to show there is\nno such thing as an absolute art, differentiating itself later by means\nof one knows not what immanent laws? What exists is the particular\nforms of art, or rather artists who have striven to translate, as best\nthey can, according to the material means at their command, the song of\nthe ideal in their souls.\" But later on he thinks it possible to effect\na division of the arts by starting \"from the artist, instead of the\nart in itself,\" by proceeding \"according to the three great types of\nfancy, visual, motor and auditory\"; and as for the debated point of the\nsupreme art, he thinks it must be settled in favour of music.[28]\n\nSchasler is not altogether wrong in his spirited counterattack on\nLotze's criticism; he protests against the principle of indifference\nand convenience, and remarks that \"the classification of the arts\nmust be regarded as the real touchstone, the real differential test\nof the scientific value of an \u00e6sthetic system; for on this point all\ntheoretical questions are concentrated and crowd together to find a\nconcrete solution.\"[29]\n\n[Sidenote: _Contradictions in Lotze._]\n\nThe principle of convenience may be excellent as applied to the\napproximative grouping of botanical or zoological classifications, but\nit has no place in philosophy; and as Lotze, in common with Schasler\nand other \u00e6stheticians, conformed to Lessing's principle of the\nconstancy, limits and peculiar nature of each art, and therefore held\nthat the concepts of the individual arts were speculative and not\nempirical concepts, he could not evade the duty of fixing the mutual\nrelations of these concepts, arranging them in series, subordinating\nand co-ordinating them, and arriving at each of them either deductively\nor dialectically. He ought, in order to get definitely rid of these\nbarren attempts at classification and at discovering the supreme\nart, to have criticized and dissolved Lessing's principle itself: to\nkeep the principle and deny the need for a classification, as Lotze\ndid, was obviously inconsistent. But not a single \u00e6sthetician has\never re-examined or investigated the scientific foundation of the\ndistinctions enunciated by Lessing in his fluent and elegant prose; no\none has probed to the bottom the truth which was illumined by Aristotle\nin a single lightning-flash, when he refused to allow an extrinsic\ndifference, that of metre, as the real distinction between prose and\npoetry:[30] no one, that is to say, save perhaps Schleiermacher, who at\nleast called attention to the difficulties of the current doctrine.\n\n[Sidenote: _Doubts in Schleiermacher._]\n\nHe proposed to start from the general concept of art and prove by\ndeduction the necessity of all its forms; and after finding two sides\nto artistic activity, the objective consciousness (_gegenst\u00e4ndliche)_\nand the immediate consciousness (_unmittelbare)_, and observing that\nart stands wholly neither in the one nor in the other and that the\nimmediate consciousness or representation (_Vorstellung)_ gives rise to\nmimicry and music, while the objective consciousness or image (_Bild_)\ngives rise to the figurative arts, he then, proceeding to analyse a\npainting, found the two forms of consciousness to be in this case\ninseparable, and remarks: \"Here we arrive at the precise opposite:\nsearching for distinction, we find unity.\" Nor did the traditional\ndivision of the arts into simultaneous and successive seem to him\nvery solid, for \"when looked at attentively, it evaporates entirely\";\nin architecture or gardening, contemplation is successive, while in\nthe arts labelled as successive, such as poetry, the chief thing\nis coexistence and grouping: \"from whichever side we look at it,\nthe difference is but secondary and the antithesis between the two\norders of art merely means that every contemplation, like every act of\nproduction, is always successive, but, in thinking out the relation of\nthe two sides in a work of art, both seem indispensable: coexistence\n(_Zugleichsein_) and successive existence (_das Successivsein_).\" In\nanother passage he observes: \"The reality of art as external appearance\nis conditioned by the mode, depending on our physical and corporeal\norganism, in which the internal is externalised: movements, forms,\nwords.... That which is common to all arts is not the external, which\nis rather the element of diversification.\" When these observations\nare compared with the sharp distinction he himself drew between art\nand technique, it would be easy to deduce that he held the partitions\nof the arts and the concepts of the particular arts to be devoid\nof \u00e6sthetic value. But Schleiermacher does not draw this logical\ninference, he wavers and hesitates: he recognizes the inseparability\nof the subjective and objective, musical and figurative, elements in\npoetry, yet he struggles to discover the definitions and limits of\nthe individual arts; sometimes he dreams of a union of the various\narts from which a complete art would spring; and when composing the\nsyllabus of his lectures on \u00c6sthetic, he arranged the arts into arts\nof accompaniment (mimicry and music), figurative arts (architecture,\ngardening, painting, sculpture) and poetry.[31] Nebulous, vague,\ncontradictory as this may be, Schleiermacher had the acumen to distrust\nthe soundness of Lessing's theory and to inquire by what right\nparticular arts are singled out from art in general.\n\n\n\n[1] See above, pp. 113-115.\n\n[2] D. Diderot, _Lettre sur les aveugles,_ 1749; _Lettre sur les sourds\net muets,_ 1751; _Essai sur la peinture,_ 1765.\n\n[3] M. Mendelssohn, _Briefe \u00fcber Empfind.,_ 1755; _Betrachtungen,\ncit.,_ 1757.\n\n[4] J. Chr. Wolff, _Psychol. empirica,_ \u00a7\u00a7 272-312; Meier,\n_Anfangsgr\u00fcnde,_ \u00a7\u00a7 513-528, 708-735; _Betrachtungen,_ \u00a7 126.\n\n[5] Letter to Lodovico Cardi da Cigoli, June 26, 1612.\n\n[6] _Laokoon,_ \u00a7\u00a7 16-20.\n\n[8] _Laokoon,_ appendix, \u00a7 43.\n\n[9] _Plastik einige Wahrnehmungen \u00fcber Form und Gestalt aus Pygmalions\nbildenden Tr\u00e4ume,_ 1778 (Select Works of Herder in the collection\n_Deutsche Nationlitteratur,_ vol. 76, part iii. \u00a7 2).\n\n[10] _System der \u00c4sthetik,_ pp. 154-236.\n\n[11] _Kritik d. Urtheilskr._ \u00a7 51. 5 _Phil. d. Kunst,_ pp. 370-371.\n\n[12] _Vorles. \u00fcb. \u00c4sth._ pp. 257-262.\n\n[13] _Op. cit._ ii. p. 222.\n\n[14] See above, pp. 305-306.\n\n[15] _Einleitung,_ \u00a7 115, pp. 170-171.\n\n[16] _Schriften z. prakt. Phil,_ in _Werke,_ viii. p. 2.\n\n[17] _Einleitung,_ \u00a7 110, pp. 164-165.\n\n[18] Cf. Hartmann, _Dtsche. \u00c4sth. s. Kant,_ pp. 539-540.\n\n[19] _\u00c4sth. Forsch._ pp. 547-549.\n\n[20] _\u00c4sth._ \u00a7\u00a7 404, 535, 537, 838, etc.\n\n[21] Gustav Gerber, _Die Sprache als Kunst,_ Bromberg, 1871-1874.\n\n[22] _Das System der K\u00fcnste,_ 2nd ed., Leipzig-Berlin, 1881.\n\n[23] _Phil. d. Sch._ chs. 9, 10.\n\n[24] _E.g._ by Sulzer, _Allg. Theorie,_ on word _Oper._\n\n[25] Rich. Wagner, _Oper und Drama,_ 1851.\n\n[26] Gustav Engel, _\u00c4sth. der Tonkunst,_ 1884, abstracted in Hartmann,\n_Dtsche. \u00c4sth. s. Kant,_ pp. 579-580.\n\n[27] Lotze, _Geschichte d. \u00c4sth._ pp. 458-460; cf. p. 445.\n\n[28] _Essai critique sur l'Esth. de Kant,_ pp. 89-496.\n\n[29] _Das System der K\u00fcnste,_ p. 47.\n\n[30] _Poet._ ch. i.\n\n[31] _Vorles. \u00fcb. \u00c4sth._ pp. 11, 122-129, 137, 143, 151, 167, 172,\n284-286, 487-488, 508, 635.\n\n\n\n\nIV\n\n\nOTHER PARTICULAR DOCTRINES\n\n\n[Sidenote: _The \u00e6sthetic theory of Natural Beauty._]\n\nI. Schleiermacher also rejected the concept of Natural Beauty, giving\nHegel greater praise than he deserved in the matter, because Hegel's\ndenial of this concept was, as we have seen, more verbal than real.\nAt all events, Schleiermacher's radical denial of the existence of a\nnatural beauty external to and independent of the human mind marked\na victory over a serious error, and appears to us imperfect and\none-sided only so far as it seems to exclude those \u00e6sthetic facts of\nimagination which are attached to objects given in nature.[1] Important\ncontributions towards the correction of this imperfect and one-sided\nelement were supplied by the historical and psychological study of the\n\"feeling for nature,\" promoted successfully by Alexander Humboldt in\nhis dissertation to be found in the second volume of _Cosmos_,[2] and\ncontinued by Laprade, Biese, and others in our own time.[3] In his\ncriticism of his own _\u00c4sthetik,_ Vischer completes the passage from\nthe metaphysical construction of beauty in nature to the psychological\ninterpretation of it, and recognizes the necessity of suppressing\nthe section devoted to Natural Beauty in his first \u00e6sthetic system,\nand incorporating it with the doctrine of imagination: he says that\nsuch treatments do not belong to \u00e6sthetic science, being a medley\nof zoology, sentiment, fantasy and humour, worthy of development in\nmonographs in the style of the poet G. G. Fischer's on the life of\nbirds, or Bratranek's on the \u00e6sthetic of the vegetable world.[4]\nHartmann, as heir of the old metaphysics, reproaches Vischer for\nthis exclusion, and maintains that, in addition to the beauty of\nimagination introduced by man into natural things (_hineingelegte\nSch\u00f6nheit_), there exist a formal and a substantial beauty in nature,\ncoinciding with realisation of the immanent ends or ideas of nature.[5]\nBut the way chosen ultimately by Vischer is the only one by which\nSchleiermacher's thesis can be successfully developed so as to show\nthe precise meaning which may be given to the assertion of (\u00e6sthetic)\nbeauty in nature.\n\n[Sidenote: _The theory of \u00e6sthetic senses._]\n\nII. That \u00e6sthetic senses or superior senses exist and that beauty\nattaches to certain senses only, not to all, is a very old opinion. We\nhave seen already[6] that Socrates, in the _Hippias maior,_ mentions\nthe doctrine of beauty as \"that which pleases hearing and sight\" (\u03c4\u1f78\n\u03ba\u03b1l\u1f78\u03bd e\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u03b9' \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u1fc6s \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f43\u03c8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ae\u03b4\u03cd): and he adds, it seems\nimpossible to deny that we take pleasure in looking at handsome men\nand fine ornaments, pictures and statues with our eyes, and hearing\nbeautiful songs or beautiful voices, music, speeches and conversations\nwith our ears. Nevertheless Socrates himself in the same dialogue\nconfutes this theory by perfectly valid arguments, amongst which is\nthat, besides the difficulty arising from the fact that beautiful\nthings may be found outside the range of the sensible impressions of\neye and ear, there is no reason for creating a special class for the\npleasure arising from impressions on these two senses, to the exclusion\nof others. He also states the more subtle and philosophical objection\nthat that which is pleasing to the sight is not so to the hearing, and\n_vice versa_; whence it follows that the ground of beauty must not be\nsought in visibility or audibility, but in something differing from\neither and common to both.[7]\n\nThe problem was never again, perhaps, attacked with such acumen and\nseriousness as in this ancient dialogue. In the eighteenth century\nHome remarked that beauty depended on sight, and that impressions\nreceived by the other senses might be agreeable but were not\nbeautiful, and distinguished sight and hearing as superior to those\nof touch, taste and smell, the latter being merely bodily in nature\nand without the spiritual refinement of the other two. He held these\nto produce pleasures superior to organic pleasures though inferior to\nintellectual; decorous pleasures, that is to say; elevated, sweet,\nmoderately exhilarating; as far removed from the turbulence of the\npassions as from the languor of indolence, and intended to refresh\nand soothe the spirit.[8] Following suggestions of Diderot, Rousseau\nand Berkeley, Herder drew attention to the importance of the sense of\ntouch (_Gef\u00fchl_) in plastic art: of this \"third sense, which perhaps\ndeserves to be investigated first of all, and is unjustly relegated to\na place amongst the grosser senses.\" Certainly \"touch knows nothing of\nsurface or colour,\" but \"sight, for its part, knows nothing of forms\nand configurations.\" Thus \"touch cannot be so gross a sense as it is\nreputed, if it is the very organ by which we sensate all other bodies,\nand rules over a vast kingdom of subtle and complex concepts. As the\nsurface stands to the body, so does sight stand in respect of touch,\nand it is merely a colloquial abbreviation to speak of seeing bodies as\nsurfaces and to suppose that we see with our eyes that which we have\ngradually learnt in infancy simply by the sense of touch.\" Every beauty\nof form or corporeity is a concept not visible, but palpable.[9] From\nthe triad of \u00e6sthetic senses thus established by Herder (sight for\npainting; hearing for music; touch for sculpture), Hegel returned to\nthe customary dyad, saying that \"the sensory part of art has reference\nonly to the two theoretic senses of sight and hearing\"; that smell,\ntaste and touch must be excluded from artistic pleasures, since they\nare connected with matter as such and the immediate sensible quality it\nmay possess (smell with material volatilization; taste with material\nsolution of objects; and touch with hot, cold, smooth and so forth);\nand that hence they can claim no concern with the objects of art,\nwhich are obliged to keep themselves in real independence, rejecting\nall relation with the merely sensory. That which pleases these senses\nis not the beautiful of art.[10]\n\nIt was Schleiermacher once more who recognized the impossibility of\ndisposing of the matter in this summary fashion. He refused to admit\nthe distinction between confused senses and clear senses, and asserted\nthat the superiority of sight and hearing over the other senses lay in\nthe fact that the others \"are not capable of any free activity, and\nindeed represent the maximum of passivity, whereas sight and hearing\nare capable of an activity proceeding from within, and are able to\nproduce forms and notes without having received impressions from\noutside\"; were eye and ear merely means of perception, there would\nbe no visual or auditory arts, but they also operate as a function\nof voluntary movements which supply a content to the dominion of the\nsenses. From another standpoint, however, Schleiermacher thinks that\n\"the difference seems to be one rather of degree or quantity, and a\nminimum of independence must be recognized as existing in the other\nsenses as well.\"[11] Vischer remains faithful to the traditional \"two\n\u00e6sthetic senses,\" \"free organs and no less spiritual than sensuous,\"\nwhich \"have no reference to the material composition of the object,\"\nbut allow this \"to subsist as a whole and work upon them.\"[12] K\u00f6stlin\nwas of opinion that the inferior senses offer \"nothing intuitible\nseparate from themselves, and are only modifications of ourselves, but\ntaste, smell and touch are not devoid of all \u00e6sthetic importance, since\nthey assist the superior senses; without touch an image could not be\nrecognized by the eye as being hard, resistant or rough; without smell\ncertain images could not be represented as sweet or scented.\"[13]\n\nWe cannot go into a detailed account of all doctrines connected with\nsensationalistic principles,[14] for all the senses are naturally\naccepted as \u00e6sthetic by the sensationalists, who use \"\u00e6sthetic\"\ninterchangeably with\" hedonistic\": it will suffice if we recall the\n\"learned\" Kralik, who was ridiculed by Tolstoy for his theory of the\nfive arts of taste, smell, touch, hearing and sight.[15] The few\nquotations already given show the embarrassing difficulty caused\nby the use of the word \"\u00e6sthetic\" as a qualification of \"sense,\"\ncompelling writers to invent absurd distinctions between various groups\nof senses, or to recognize all senses as being \u00e6sthetic, thus giving\n\u00e6sthetic value to every sensory impression, as such. No way out of\nthis labyrinth can be found save by asserting the impossibility of\neffecting a union between such wholly disparate orders of ideas as the\nconcept of the representative form of the spirit and that of particular\nphysiological organs or a particular matter of sense-impressions.[16]\n\n[Sidenote: _The theory of kinds of style_.]\n\nIII. A variety of the error of literary kinds is to be found in\nthe theory of modes, forms or kinds of style (\u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c1\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03c6\u03c1\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2), considered by the ancients as consisting of three forms,\nthe sublime, the medium and the tenuous, a tripartition due, it would\nseem, to Antisthenes,[17] modified later into _subtile, robustum_\nand _floridum,_ or amplified into a fourfold division, or designated\nby adjectives of historic origin as in the Attic, Asiatic or Rhodian\nstyles. The Middle Ages preserved the tradition of a tripartite\ndivision, sometimes giving it a curious interpretation, to the effect\nthat the sublime style treats of kings, princes and barons (_e.g._ the\n_Aeneid_); the mediocre, of middle-class people (_e.g. Georgies)_; the\nhumble, of the lowest class (_e.g. Bucolics;_) and the three styles\nwere for this reason also called tragic, elegiac and comic.[18] It\nis a well-known fact that kinds in style have never ceased to afford\nmatter for discussion in rhetorical text-books down to modern times;\nfor instance, we find Blair distinguishing styles by such epithets\nas the diffuse, the concise, the nervous, the daring, the soft, the\nelegant, the flowery, etc. In 1818 the Italian Melchiorre Delfico, in\nhis book on _The Beautiful,_ energetically criticized the \"endless\ndivision of styles,\" or the superstition \"that there could be so many\nkinds of style\"; saying that \"style is either good or bad,\" and adding\nthat it is not possible \"it should exist as a preconceived idea in the\nartist's mind,\" but that \"it should be the consequence of the principal\nidea, _i.e._ that conception which determines the invention and the\ncomposition.\"[19]\n\n[Sidenote: _The theory of grammatical forms or parts of speech._]\n\nIV. The same error reappears in the philosophy of language, as the\ntheory of grammatical forms or parts of speech,[20] first created by\nthe sophists (Protagoras is credited with having first distinguished\nthe gender of nouns), adopted by the philosophers, notably by Aristotle\nand the Stoics (the former was acquainted with two or three parts of\nspeech, the latter with four or five), developed and elaborated by the\nAlexandrian grammarians in the famous and endless controversy between\nthe analogists and the anomalists. The analogists (Aristarchus) aimed\nat introducing logical order and regularity into linguistic facts,\nand described as deviations all such as seemed to them irreducible\nto logical form. These they called pleonasm, ellipsis, enallage,\nparallage, and metalepsis. The violence thus wrought by the analogists\nupon spoken and written language was such that (as Quintilian tells\nus) some one wittily (_non invenuste_) remarked that it appeared to\nbe one thing to talk Latin and quite another to talk grammar (_aliud\nesse latine_, _aliud grammatice loqui_).[21] The anomalists must be\ncredited with restoring to language its free imaginative movement: the\nStoic Chrysippus composed a treatise to prove that one thing (one same\nconcept) may be expressed by different sounds, and one and the same\nsound may express different concepts (_similes res dissimilibus verbis\net similibus dissimiles esse vocabulis notatas._) Another anomalist\nwas the celebrated grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus, who rejected\nthe metalepsis, the schemes, and the other artifices by which the\nanalogists tried to explain facts which did not fit their categories,\nand pointed out that the use of one word for another, or one part of\nspeech for another, is not a grammatical figure, but a blunder, a thing\nhardly to be attributed to a poet such as Homer. The upshot of the\ndispute between anomalists and analogists was the science of Grammar\n(\u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03b7 \u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae), as handed down by the ancients to the modern\nworld, which is justly considered as a sort of compromise between the\ntwo opposed parties because, if the schemes of inflection (\u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2)\nsatisfy the demands of the analogists, their variety satisfies those\nof the anomalists; hence the original definition of Grammar as theory\nof analogy was changed subsequently to \"theory of analogy and anomaly\"\n(\u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bdo\u03bco\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1). The concept of correct usage, with\nwhich Varro hoped to settle the controversy, fell into the trap (common\nto compromises), merely stating the contradiction in set terms, like\nthe \"convenient ornament\" of Rhetoric or the kinds accorded a \"certain\nlicence\" in the literature of precept. If language follows usage (that\nis to say, the imagination), it does not follow reason (or logic); if\nit follows reason, it does not follow usage. When the analogists upheld\nlogic as supreme at least inside the individual kinds and sub-kinds,\nthe anomalists hastened to show that even this was not the case. Varro\nhimself was forced to confess that \"this part of the subject really is\nvery difficult\" (_hic locus maxime lubricus est_).[22]\n\nIn the Middle Ages grammar was cultivated to the point of superstition.\nDivine inspiration was found lurking in the eight parts of speech\nbecause \"_octavus numerus frequenter in divinis scripturis sacratis\ninvenitur,_\" and in the three persons of verbal conjugation, created\nsimply \"_ut quod in Trinitatis fide credimus, in eloquiis inesse\nvideatur._\"[23] Grammarians of the Renaissance and later recommenced\nthe study of linguistic problems and worked to death ellipsis,\npleonasm, licence, anomaly and exception; only in comparatively recent\ntimes has Linguistic begun to question the very validity of the concept\nof parts of speech (Pott, Paul and others).[24] If they still survive,\nthe reason may lie in the facts that empirical, practical grammar\ncannot do without them; that their venerable antiquity disguises their\nillegitimate and shady origin; and that energetic opposition has been\nworn down by the fatigue of an endless war.\n\n[Sidenote: _Theory of \u00e6sthetic criticism._]\n\nV. The relativity of taste is a sensationalistic theory which denies\na spiritual value to art. But it is rarely maintained by writers in\nthe ingenuous categorical garb of the old adage: _De gustibus non\nest disputandum_ (concerning which it would be useful to enquire\nwhen the saying was born, and what it fust meant: whether, too, the\nword _gustibus_ referred solely to impressions of the palate, and\nwas only later extended to include \u00e6sthetic impressions); as though\nsensationalists, as if dimly conscious of the higher nature of art,\nhave never been able to resign themselves to the complete relativity\nof taste. Their torments in the matter really move one to pity. \"Is\nthere,\" Batteux asks, \"such a thing as good taste, and is it the only\ngood taste? In what does it consist? Upon what depend? Does it depend\nupon the object itself or the genius at work upon it? Are there, or are\nthere not, rules? Is wit alone, or heart alone, the organ of taste, or\nboth together? How many questions have been raised on this familiar\noften-treated subject, how many obscure and involved answers have\nbeen given!\"[25] This perplexity is shared by Home. Tastes, he says,\nmust not be disputed; neither those of the palate nor those of other\nsenses. A remark which seems highly reasonable from one point of view;\nbut, from another, somewhat exaggerated. But yet how can one dispute\nit? how can one maintain that what actually pleases a man ought not\nto please him? The proposition then must be true. But now no man of\ntaste will assent to it. We speak of good taste and bad taste; are all\ncriticisms which turn upon this distinction to be considered absurd?\nhave these everyday expressions no meaning? Home ends by asserting\na common standard of taste, deduced from the necessity of a common\nlife for mankind or, as he says, from a \"final cause\"; for without\nuniformity of taste, who would trouble to produce works of art, build\nelegant and costly edifices, or lay out beautiful gardens and so forth?\nHe does not fail to draw attention to a second final cause; that of\nthe advisability of attracting citizens to public shows and uniting\nthose whom class-differences and diversity of occupation tend to keep\napart. But how shall a standard of taste be established? This is a new\nperplexity, which one cannot think to be escaped by observing that, as\nin framing moral rules we seek the counsel of the most honourable of\neducated men, not of savages; so to determine the standard of taste\nwe should have recourse to the few who are not worn out by degrading\nbodily labour, not corrupted in taste, and not rendered effeminate\nby pleasure, who have received the gift of good taste from nature,\nand have brought it to perfection by the education and practice of a\nlifetime: if, notwithstanding, controversies arise, then reference\nmust be made to the principles of Criticism as set forth by Home\nhimself in his own book.[26] Similar contradictions and vicious circles\nreappear in David Hume's _Essay on Taste,_ where Hume tries in vain\nto define the distinctive characteristics of the man of taste whose\njudgement must be law, and, while asserting the uniformity of the\ngeneral principles of taste as founded in human nature, and warning\nthe reader against giving undue weight to individual perversions and\nignorances, at the same time asserts that divergences in taste may be\nirreconcilable, insuperable, and yet blameless.[27]\n\nBut a criticism of \u00e6sthetic relativism cannot be based upon the\nopposite doctrine which, by its affirmation of absoluteness, resolves\ntaste into concepts and logical inferences. The eighteenth century\noffers examples of this mistake in Muratori, one of the first to\nmaintain the existence of a rule of taste and a universal beauty\nwhose rules are furnished by Poetics;[28] in Andr\u00e9, who said that\n\"the beauty in a work of art is not that which pleases at the first\nglance of fancy through certain individual dispositions of the mental\nfaculties or bodily organs, but that which has a right to please the\nreason and reflexion by its own inherent excellence or rightness and,\nif the expression be allowed, by its intrinsic agreeableness\";[29]\nin Voltaire, who recognized a \"universal taste\" which was\n\"intellectual\";[30] and in very many others. This intellectualistic\nerror, no less than the sensationalistic, was attacked by Kant; but\neven Kant, by making beauty consist in a symbolism of morality, failed\nto grasp the concept of an imaginative absoluteness of taste.[31]\nSucceeding generations of philosophers met the difficulty by passing it\nover in silence.\n\nNevertheless, this criterion of an imaginative absoluteness, the idea\nthat in order to judge works of art one must place oneself at the\nartist's point of view at the moment of production, and that to judge\nis to reproduce, gathered weight little by little from the beginning\nof the eighteenth century, when its first appearance is seen in the\nwork of the Italian Francesco Montani already quoted (1705), and by\nthe English poet Alexander Pope in his _Essay on Criticism._ (\"A\nperfect judge will read each work of wit With the same spirit that its\nauthor writ.\"[32]) A few years later Antonio Conti recognized part of\nthe truth in the _r\u00e8gle du premier aspect_ advised by Terrasson as\na test for judging poetry, while noting it to be more applicable to\nmodern than to ancient works: \"_quand on n'a pas l'esprit pr\u00e9venu,\net que d'ailleurs on l'a assez p\u00e9n\u00e9trant, on peut voir tout d'un\ncoup si un po\u00e8te a bien imit\u00e9 son objet; car, comme on conna\u00eet\nl'original, c'est-\u00e0-dire les hommes et les m\u0153urs de son si\u00e8cle,\non peut ais\u00e9ment lui confronter la copie, c'est-\u00e0-dire la po\u00e9sie qui\nles imite._\" In judging ancient writers something more is necessary:\n\"_cette r\u00e8gle du premier aspect n'est presque d'aucun usage dans\nl'examen de l'ancienne po\u00e9sie, dont on ne peut pas juger qu'apr\u00e8s\navoir longtemps r\u00e9fl\u00e9chi sur la religion des anciens, sur leurs lois,\nleur m\u0153urs, sur leurs mani\u00e8res de combattre et d'haranguer, etc.\nLes beaut\u00e9s d'un po\u00e8me, ind\u00e9pendantes de toutes ces circonstances\nindividuelles, sont tr\u00e8s rares, et les grands peintres les ont toujours\n\u00e9vit\u00e9es avec soin, car ils voulaient peindre la nature et non pas\nleurs id\u00e9es;_\"[33] the necessary criterion, therefore, is to be found\nin history. The end of the same century saw the concept of congenial\nreproduction sufficiently defined by Heydenreich: \"A philosophical\ncritic of art must himself be possessed of genius for art; reason\nexacts this qualification and grants no dispensation, just as she will\nrefuse to appoint a blind man as judge of colours. The critic must\nnot pretend to be able to feel the attraction of beauty by means of\nsyllogisms (_Vernunftschl\u00fcsse_); beauty must manifest itself to feeling\nwith irresistible self-evidence and, attracted by its fascination,\nreason must find no time to linger over the why and wherefore; the\neffect, with its delightful and unexpected possession and domination\nof the whole being, should suffocate at birth any inquiry into origins\nor causes. But this state of fanatical admiration cannot last long;\nreason must inevitably recover consciousness of itself and direct\nits attention upon the state in which it was during the enjoyment\nof beauty and upon its present memories of that state....\"[34] This\nwas the wholesomely impressionistic theory which prevailed among the\nRomanticists and was accepted even by De Sanctis.[35] Still there\nwas even then no definite theory of criticism, which demanded as its\ncondition of existence a precise concept of art and of the relations\nof the work of art with its historical antecedents.[36] The very\npossibility of \u00e6sthetic criticism was questioned in the second half\nof the nineteenth century, when taste was relegated to a place amongst\nthe facts of individual caprice, and a so-called historical criticism\nwas proclaimed the sole scientific criticism and expounded in works of\nirrelevant learning or buried beneath the preconceptions of positivists\nand materialists. Those who reacted against such extremalism and\nmaterialism generally made the mistake of supporting themselves by a\nkind of intellectualistic dogmatism[37] or an empty \u00e6stheticism.[38]\n\n[Sidenote: _Distinction between taste and genius._]\n\nVI. We have seen that in the seventeenth century, when the words\n\"taste\" and \"genius\" or \"wit\" were in fashion, the facts they\ndesignated were sometimes interchanged amongst themselves and came to\nbe considered as one single fact, while sometimes each was conceived\nas distinct in itself, genius being the faculty of production, and\ntaste the faculty of judgement, taste being further subdivided into\nthe sterile and the fertile: a terminology adopted by Muratori[39] in\nItaly and Ulrich K\u00f6nig[40] in Germany. Batteux said, \"_le go\u00fbt juge\ndes productions du g\u00e9nie_\"[41]; and Kant speaks of defective works\nhaving genius without taste or taste without genius, and of others in\nwhich taste alone suffices;[42] now we find him distinguishing the two\nconcepts as the judging and producing faculties, now he speaks of them\nas a single faculty existing in various degrees. An inherent difference\nbetween taste and genius was accepted by later writers on \u00c6sthetic and\nassumed its most rigid form in the hands of Herbart and his followers.\n\n[Sidenote: _Concept of artistic and literary history._]\n\nVII. The evolutionary theory of art made its appearance towards the\nend of the eighteenth century. This was the time when the distinction\nbetween classical and romantic art was first made; a classification\nlater augmented by an introductory section on Oriental art, owing to\nthe increase of knowledge concerning the pre-Hellenic world. Towards\nthe end of his life Goethe told his friend Eckermann that the concepts\nof classical and romantic had been formed by himself and Schiller, for\nhe himself had upheld the objective method in poetry, whilst Schiller,\nin order to champion the subjective form to which he inclined, had\nwritten the essay _On Na\u00efve and Sentimental Poetry_, in which the word\nna\u00efve (_naiv_) expresses the style later called classical and the\nword sentimental (_sentimentalisch)_ that later called romantic. \"The\nSchlegels,\" continues Goethe, \"seized upon these ideas and disseminated\nthem, so that to-day everyone uses them and speaks of classical and\nromantic, things perfectly unknown fifty years ago\"[43] (Goethe was\nspeaking in 1831). Schiller's essay bears the imprint of Rousseau's\ninfluence and is dated 1795-6.[44] It contains such statements as this:\n\"Poets are above all things the preservers of nature; and when they\ncannot be so entirely, and have tried upon themselves the destructive\nforce of arbitrary and artificial forms or have fought against such\nforms, they stand up to bear witness on her behalf. Poets, therefore,\neither are nature or, having lost her, seek her. Hence arise two wholly\ndistinct kinds of poetic composition, exhausting between them the whole\nfield of poetry; all poets who are worthy of the name must belong,\naccording to the times and conditions in which they flourish, either\nto the category of na\u00efve or to that of sentimental poets.\" Schiller\nrecognized three kinds of sentimental poetry: satirical, elegiac and\nidyllic; he defined a satirical poet as one \"who takes as his object\nthe desertion of nature and the contrast of the real with the ideal.\"\nThe weak point of this division is the concept of two distinct kinds\nof poetry, the reduction of the infinite forms in which poetry appears\nto individuals, to two kinds. If one of these two kinds be taken the\nperfect and the other as the imperfect kind, the mistake is made of\nconverting imperfection into a kind or species, the negative into a\npositive. Wilhelm von Humboldt pointed out to his friend that if\nform is the essence of art, there cannot be a kind of poetry, such\nas the sentimental or romantic is supposed to be, in which matter\npreponderates over form, for that would constitute a pseudo-art, not\na separate kind of art.[45] Schiller attached no historical meaning\nto his classification, in fact he declared explicitly that in using\nthe words \"ancient\" and \"modern\" as equivalent to \"ingenuous\" and\n\"sentimental\" he did not mean to deny that some \"ancient\" poets, in his\nsense of the word, could be found among contemporary writers; the two\ncharacters might even be united in the same poet or the same poetical\nwork, as (to give Schiller's own example) in _Werther_[46] The first to\nassign a historical meaning to the division were Friedrich and Wilhelm\nvon Schlegel; the former in an early work of 1795, the latter in his\ncelebrated lectures on literary history given at Berlin in 1801-4. But\nthe two senses, systematic and historical, were variously alternated\nand mixed by literary men and critics, and other distinctions were\nadded; \"classical\" was sometimes used to describe poetry of a frigid\nand imitative style, while \"romantic\" poetry was the inspired; in some\ncountries the word \"romantic\" came to mean a political reactionary, in\nItaly it stood for \"liberal\"; and so forth. In 1815, when Friedrich\nSchlegel spoke of ancient Persian romantic poems, or when in our times\nattention is called to the romanticism of the Greek, Latin or French\nclassics, the historical signification is lost in the theoretical, the\nsense originally intended by Schiller.\n\nBut the historical sense was prevalent in German idealism, which\ninclined towards the construction of a universal history, including\nthat of literature and art, upon a scheme of ideal evolution. Schelling\nmade a sharp division between pagan and Christian art; the second\nbeing held an advance upon the former which was the lowest step.[47]\nHegel accepted this division and introduced a final regress by\ndividing the history of art into three periods: symbolic (Oriental)\nart, classical (Hellenic) and romantic (modern). Just as he conceived\nRoman art (with its introduction of satire and other kinds indicative\nof a failure to maintain harmony between form and content) as the\ndissolution of classical art, a thought suggested by Schiller, so\nhe found in the subjective humour of Cervantes and Ariosto[48] the\ndissolution of romantic art; and he regarded this series as completing\nthe possibilities of art, though some interpreters think that by a\nself-contradiction he admitted the possibility of a fourth period, an\nart of the modern or future world. Indeed amongst his disciples we\nfind Weiss rejecting the Oriental period in order to save the triadic\ndivision, and placing as third the modern period, synthesis of the\nancient and the medi\u00e6val:[49] Vischer too inclines to recognize a\nmodern or progressive period.[50]\n\nThese arbitrary constructions reappear in the works of positivist\nmetaphysicians in the shape of an evolutionary or progressive history\nof art. Spencer dreamed of writing some sort of treatise on the\nsubject, and in the published programme of his system (1860) we read\nthat the third volume of his _Principles of Sociology_ was to contain\namongst other things a chapter on \u00e6sthetic progress \"with the gradual\ndifferentiation of fine arts from primitive institutions and from each\nother, with their increasing variety in development, their progress in\nreality of expression and superiority of end.\" No grief need be felt\nthat the chapter was left unwritten when we remember the samples of it\npreserved in the _Principles of Psychology_ and already reviewed in\nthese pages.[51]\n\nThe strong historical sense of our own day is leading us further and\nfurther away from the evolutionary or abstractly progressive theories\nwhich falsify the free and original movement of art. Fiedler remarked\nnot without justice that unity and progress cannot be introduced\ninto a history of art, and that the works of artists must be judged\ndiscretely as so many fragments of the life of the universe.[52]\nIn recent times a remarkable student of the history of figurative\nart, Venturi, has tried to bring evolutionism into fashion, and has\nillustrated it in a _History of the Madonna,_ in which the presentment\nof the Virgin is conceived as an organism which is born, grows, attains\nperfection, grows old and dies! Others have claimed for artistic\nhistory its true character, intolerant of outward curb and rule,\ndrawing her ever-varied productions from the well-head of the infinite\nSpirit.[53]\n\n_Conclusion._\n\nThese hurried notes may suffice to show in how narrow a circle has\nhitherto moved the scientific criticism of the errors we have called\n\"particular.\" \u00c6sthetic needs to be surrounded and nourished by a\nwatchful and vigorous critical literature drawing its life from her and\nforming in turn her safeguard and strength.\n\n\n[1] See above, pp. 98-99.\n\n[2] _Das Naturgef\u00fchl nach Verschiedenheit der Zeiten und Volksst\u00e4mme,_\nin _Cosmos,_ ii.\n\n[3] V. Laprade, _Le Sentiment de la nature avant le christianisme,_\n1866; also _chez les modernes,_ 1867; Alfred Biese, _Die Entwicklung\ndes Naturgef\u00fchls den Griechen und R\u00f6mern,_ Kiel, 1882-1884; _Die\nEntwicklung des Naturgef\u00fchls im Mittelalter und in der Neuzeit,_ 2nd\ned., Leipzig, 1892.\n\n[4] _Kritische G\u00e4nge,_ v. pp. 5-23.\n\n[5] _Dtsche. \u00c4sth. s. Kant,_ pp. 217-218; cf. _Philos, d. Sch\u00f6nen,_ bk.\nii. ch. 7.\n\n[6] See above, pp. 164-165.\n\n[7] _Hippias maior, passim._\n\n[8] _Elements of Criticism,_ introd., and cf. ch. 3.\n\n[9] Herder, _Kritische W\u00e4lder_ (in _Werke, ed. cit._ iv.), pp. 47-53;\ncf. _Kaligone (ibid._ vol. xxii.), _passim;_ and fragment on _Plastic._\n\n[10] _Vorles. \u00fcb. \u00c4sth._ i. pp. 50-51.\n\n[11] _Op. cit._ p. 92 _seqq._\n\n[12] _\u00c4sth._ i. p. 181.\n\n[13] _\u00c4sth._ pp. 80-83.\n\n[14] _E.g._ Grant Allen, _Physiological \u00c6sthetics_, chs. 4 and 5.\n\n[15] Tolstoy, _What is Art?_ pp. 19-22. Kralik is the author of\n_Weltsch\u00f6nheit, Versuch einer allgemeinen \u00c4sthetik,_ Vienna, 1894.\n\n[16] See above, pp. 18-20.\n\n[17] Cf. Volkmann, _Rhet. d. G. u. R\u00f6m._ pp. 532-544.\n\n[18] Comparetti, _Virgilio net M. E._ i. p. 172.\n\n[19] _Nuove ricerche sul hello,_ ch. 10.\n\n[20] See above, pp. 145-146.\n\n[21] _Inst. Oral._ i. ch. 6.\n\n[22] For all this cf. the works of Lersch and of Steinthal, which\ncontain the more important texts.\n\n[23] Comparetti, _Virgilio nel M. E.,_ i. pp. 169-170.\n\n[24] Pott, introd. to Humboldt, _cit._ Paul, _Principien d.\nSprachgeschichte,_ ch. 20.\n\n[25] Batteux, _Les Beaux Arts,_ part ii. p. 54.\n\n[26] _Elem. of Criticism,_ iii. ch. 25.\n\n[27] _Essays, Moral, Political and Literary_ (London ed., 1862), ch.\n23: _On the Standard of Taste._\n\n[28] _Perfetta poesia,_ bk. v. ch. 5.\n\n[29] _Essai sur le beau,_ dise. 3.\n\n[30] _Essai sur le go\u00fbt, cil._\n\n[31] See above, pp. 280-282.\n\n[32] _Essay on Criticism,_ 1711, part ii. 11. 233-234.\n\n[33] Letter to Maffei, in _Prose e poesie,_ ii. pp. cxx-cxxi.\n\n[34] _System d. \u00c4sthetik,_ pref. pp. xxi-xxv.\n\n[35] Amongst other places _Saggi critici,_ pp. 355-358.\n\n[36] See above, pp. 123-127.\n\n[37] _E.g._ A. Ricardou, _La Critique litt\u00e9raire,_ Paris, 1896.\n\n[38] _E.g._ A. Conti, _Sul fiume del tempo,_ Naples, 1907.\n\n[39] _Perf. poesia,_ bk. v. ch. 5.\n\n[40] _Untersuchung v. d. guten Geschmack,_ 1727.\n\n[41] _Les Beaux Arts,_ part ii. ch. 1.\n\n[42] _Krit. d. Urtheilskr._ \u00a7 48.\n\n[43] Eckermann, _Gespr\u00e4che mit Goethe,_ under date March 21, 1831.\n\n[44] _\u00dcber naive und sentimentalische Dichtung,_ 1795-1796 (in _Werke,_\ned. Goedecke, vol. xii.).\n\n[45] Quoted in Danzel, _Ges. Aufs._ pp. 21-22.\n\n[46] _\u00dcb. naive u. sentim. Dicht., ed. cit.,_ p. 155, note.\n\n[47] See above, p. 291.\n\n[48] _Vorles. \u00fcb. \u00c4sth.,_ vols. ii. and iii.\n\n[49] Cf. von Hartmann, _Dtsche. \u00c4sth. s. Kant,_ pp. 99-101.\n\n[50] _\u00c4sth._ part iii.\n\n[51] See above, pp. 388-390.\n\n[52] C. Fiedler, _Ursprung d. k\u00fcnstl. Th\u00e4tigkeit,_ p. 136 _seqq._\n\n[53] Ad. Venturi, _La Madonna,_ Milan, 1899. Cf. B. Labanca, in\n_Rivista polit, e lett._ (Rome), Oct. 1899, and in _Rivisla di filos.\ne pedag._ (Bologna), 1900; and B. Croce, in _Nap. nobiliss., Rivista\ndi lopografia e storia dell' arte,_ viii. pp. 161-163, ix. pp. 13-14\n(reprinted in _Probl. di estetica,_ pp. 265-272). On the theory of\nmethod in artistic and literary history cf. above, pp. 128-139.\n\n\n\n\nBIBLIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX\n\n\nThe first attempt at a history of \u00c6sthetic is the work of J. Roller\n(see above, p. 248) mentioned by Zimmermann (_Gesch. d. \u00c4sth._ pref.,\np. v) as being so exceedingly rare that he had never been able to see\na copy of the book. We ourselves have had the good fortune to find the\nbook in the Royal Library of Munich in Bavaria, by the help of our\nfriend Dr. Arturo Farinelli of Innsbruck University, and to obtain the\nloan of it. It bears the title _Entwurf_ | _zur_ | _Geschichte und\nLiteratur_ | _der \u00c6sthetik_ | _von Baumgarten auf die_ | _neueste\nZeit._ | _Herausgegeben_ | _von_ | _J. Koller_. | _Regensburg_ | in\nder Montag und Weissischen Buchhandlung | 1799 (pp. viii-107, small\n8vo); in the preface the author declares his intention of supplying\nyoung men attending Lectures on the Criticism of Taste and the Theory\nof the Fine Arts in the German Universities with a \"lucid summary of\nthe origin and later progress of these studies,\" premising that he will\ntreat of general theories only and that his judgements are frequently\nderived from reviews in literary periodicals. The introduction (\u00a7\u00a7\n1-7) treats of \u00e6sthetic theories from antiquity down to the beginning\nof the eighteenth century; Koller observes that \"the names and form\nof a general Theory of Fine Art and Criticism of Taste were unknown\nto the ancients, whose imperfect ethical theory prevented their\nproducing anything in this field.\" He dedicates \u00a7 5 to the Italians,\n\"who have produced little in theory\"; indeed the only Italian books\nmentioned are the _Entusiasmo_ of Bettinelli and the small work of\nJagemann, _Saggio di buon gusto nelle belle arti ove si spiegano gli\nelementi dell' estetica,_ di Fr. Gaud. Jagemann, Regente agostiniano,\nIn Firenze, MDCCLXXI, Presso Luigi Bastianelli e compagni; 60 pp.\n(concerning this, see B. Croce, _Problemi di estetica,_ pp. 387-390).\nThe section on the History and Literature of \u00c6sthetic begins with the\noft-quoted passage from B\u00fclffinger (\"_Vellem existerent,_ etc.\") and\npasses at once to Baumgarten: \"the theoretical epoch owes its existence\nundeniably to Baumgarten; to him belongs the inalienable merit of\nhaving first conceived an \u00c6sthetic founded on principles of reason and\nwholly developed, and of having tried to put it into practice by the\nmeans offered him by his own philosophy.\" Immediately after this, Meier\nis mentioned, followed by the titles, accompanied by brief extracts\nand remarks--a sort of _catalogue raisonn\u00e9_--of many German books on\n\u00c6sthetic from those of K. W. M\u00fcller (1759) to one by Ramier (1799),\nmixed with various French and English writings under the dates of their\nGerman translations. Special emphasis is laid on Kant (pp. 64-74), with\nthe remark that, prior to the appearance of the _Critique of Judgment,_\n\u00e6stheticians were divided into sceptics, dogmatics and empiricists: the\nmost powerful intellects of the nation inclined towards empiricism, so\nmuch so that had Kant himself \"been asked by what literature he had\nbeen most strongly influenced in the development of his own thought,\nhe would certainly have named the acute empirical writers of England,\nFrance and Germany\"; but \"by no pre-Kantian method had it been possible\nto establish an agreement (_eine Einhelligkeit_) between men upon\nmatters of taste.\" The last pages call attention to the revival of\ninterest in \u00e6sthetic studies, which nobody would now dare call a waste\nof time as in former days. \"May Jacobi, Schiller and Mehmel soon enrich\nliterature by publication of their theories!\" (p. 104).\n\nThe rarity of Koller's book has led us to notice it at some length.\nApart from this the first general history of \u00c6sthetic worthy the\nname is that written by Robert Zimmermann, _Geschichte der \u00c4sthetik\nals philosophischer Wissenschaft,_ Vienna, 1858. It is divided into\nfour books: \"the first of these contains the history of philosophical\nconcepts concerning the beautiful and art from the Greeks down to the\nconstitution of \u00c6sthetic as a philosophical science through the labours\nof Baumgarten\"; the second runs from Baumgarten down to the reform of\n\u00c6sthetic brought about by the _Critique of Judgment_; the third, from\nKant to the \u00c6sthetic of idealism; the fourth, from the beginnings of\nidealistic \u00c6sthetic down to the author's own day (1798-1858). The work\nis on Herbartian lines, and is remarkable for solid research and lucid\nexposition, although the erroneous point of view and neglect of all\n\u00e6sthetic movement other than Gr\u00e6co-Roman or German are grave defects;\nbesides, it is now sixty years out of date.\n\nLess solid and more compilatory in nature, whilst retaining all the\ndefects of the foregoing, is the history by Max Schasler, _Kritische\nGeschichte der \u00c4sthetik,_ Berlin, 1872, divided into three books\ntreating of ancient \u00c6sthetic and that of the eighteenth and nineteenth\ncenturies. The author belongs to the Hegelian school and conceives his\nhistory as a prop\u00e6deutic to theory, \"in order, that is, to attain a\nsupreme principle for the construction of a new system\"; he schematizes\nthe material of facts for each period into three grades of \u00c6sthetic of\nsensation (_Empfindungsurtheil,_) of intellect (_Verstandsurtheil_) and\nof reason (_Vernunfturtheil._)\n\nEnglish literature has Bernard Bosanquet's _History of \u00c6sthetics,_\nLondon, 1892; a sober and well-arranged work, written from an eclectic\npoint of view between the \u00c6sthetic of content and the \u00c6sthetic of\nform. The author, however, is wrong in believing he has passed over\n\"no writer of the first rank\"; he has passed over not only writers but\nsome important movements of ideas, and in general he shows insufficient\nknowledge of the literature of the Latin races. Another general\nhistory of \u00c6sthetic in English is the first volume of _The Philosophy\nof the Beautiful, being Outlines of the History of \u00c6sthetics,_ by\nWilliam Knight, London, Murray, 1895: it consists mainly of a rich\ncollection of extracts and abridgements of ancient and modern books\ntreating of \u00c6sthetic. In this respect the most noteworthy chapters\nare those on Holland, Great Britain and America (10-13); the second\nvolume, published in 1898, has in an appendix, pp. 251-281, notices\nupon \u00c6sthetic in Russia and Denmark. Another recent publication is\nGeorge Saintsbury's _A History of Criticism and Literary Taste in\nEurope from the Earliest Times to the Present Day_; vol. i., Edinburgh\nand London, 1900, concerning classical and medi\u00e6val criticism; vol.\nii., 1902, criticism from the Renaissance to end of the eighteenth\ncentury: vol. iii., 1904, modern criticism. The writer of this History,\nequally skilled in literature and innocent of philosophy, has thought\nit possible to exclude \u00e6sthetic science in the strict sense, \"the\nmore transcendental \u00c6sthetic, those ambitious theories of Beauty and\nartistic pleasure in general which seem so noble and fascinating until\nwe discover them to be but cloud-appearances of Juno,\" and to limit his\ntreatise to \"lofty Rhetoric and Poetic, to the theory and practice of\nCriticism and literary taste\" (book i. ch. I). Thus is produced a book\ninstructive in many ways but wholly deficient in method and definite\nobject. What is lofty Rhetoric and Poetic, the theory of Criticism and\nliterary taste, if not \u00c6sthetic pure and simple? how can the history of\nthese be composed without due notice of metaphysical \u00c6sthetic and other\nmanifestations whose interaction and development are the fabric of\nhistory itself? Perhaps Saintsbury hoped to be able to write a History\nof Criticism as distinct from that of \u00c6sthetic; if that be the case,\nhe has been unsuccessful in writing either one or the other. Cf. _La\nCritica,_ ii. (1904), pp. 59-63.\n\nThe generosity of the Hungarian Academy of Science has enabled us to\nhandle the History of \u00c6sthetic (_Az \u00c6sthetika t\u00f6rt\u00e9nete_) of Bela\nJanosi, Budapesth, 1899-1901, in three volumes; the first volume treats\nthe \u00c6sthetic of Greece; the second, of \u00c6sthetic from the Middle Ages to\nBaumgarten; the third, from Baumgarten to the present day. For us it is\na book sealed with seven seals, save for reviews which have appeared in\nthe _Deutsche Litteraturzeitung_ of Berlin, August 25, 1900, July 12,\n1902, and May 2, 1903.\n\nAmongst Latin countries, France has no special history of \u00c6sthetic,\nfor this title cannot be given to the portion of the second volume\n(pp. 311-570) of the work by Ch. Lev\u00eaque, _La Science du beau_\n(Paris, 1862), under the heading _Examen des principaux syst\u00e8mes\nd'esth\u00e9tique anciens et modernes,_ where eight chapters are devoted\nto an exposition of the theories of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus and\nSt. Augustine, Hutcheson, Andr\u00e9 and Baumgarten, Reid, Kant, Schelling\nand Hegel. Spain, on the other hand, possesses the work of Marcelino\nMenendez y Pelayo, _Historia de las id\u00e9as est\u00e9ticas en Espa\u00f1a,_ 2nd\ned., Madrid, 1890-1901 (5 vols., variously distributed amongst the\n1st ed., 1883-1891, and the 2nd), which is not restricted, as the\ntitle suggests, to Spain alone or to \u00c6sthetic alone but, as the author\nobserves in his preface (i. pp. xx-xxi), includes the metaphysical\ndisquisitions on the beautiful, the speculations of mystics on the\nbeauty of God and on love; the theories of art scattered through\nthe pages of philosophers; the \u00e6sthetic considerations found in\ntreatises upon individual arts (Poetics and Rhetoric, works on\npainting, architecture, etc.); and, finally, ideas enunciated by\nartists concerning their own particular arts. This work is of capital\nimportance on everything to do with Spanish authors, and also in its\ngeneral part contains good treatments of matters generally passed over\nby historians. Menendez y Pelayo inclines to metaphysical idealism,\nyet seems not disinclined to welcome elements from other systems, even\nempirical theories: in our opinion this vagueness has an unfortunate\neffect on the work as a whole. Some years ago Professor V. Spinazzola\nannounced the forthcoming publication of a course of lectures given\nby Francesco de Sanctis in Naples in 1845 on _Storia della critica da\nAristotele ad Hegel._ For the history of \u00c6sthetic in Italy cf. Alfredo\nRolla, _Storia delle idee estetiche in Italia,_ Turin, 1904; on which\nsee Croce, _Problemi di estetica,_ pp. 401-415.\n\nWe need take no notice of the historical remarks or chapters that\ngenerally stand at the beginning of treatises on \u00c6sthetic; the most\nimportant occur in the volumes of Solger, Hegel and Schleiermacher. A\ngeneral history of \u00c6sthetic, from the rigorous point of view of the\nprinciple of Expression, has not been attempted before the present work.\n\nFor the bibliography down to the end of the eighteenth century,\nSulzer's _Allgemeine Theorie der sch\u00f6nen K\u00fcnste,_ 2nd ed., with\nadditions by von Blankenburg, Leipzig, 1792, in four volumes, is\npractically complete and is an inexhaustible mine of information.\nFor the nineteenth century much material is collected by C. Mills\nGayley and Fred Newton Scott in _An Introduction to the Methods and\nMaterials of Literary Criticism. The Bases in \u00c6sthetics and Poetics,_\nBoston, 1899. Besides Sulzer, we may mention \u00e6sthetic dictionaries\nby Gruber, _W\u00f6rterbuch z. Behuf d. \u00c4sth. d. sch\u00f6nen K\u00fcnste,_ Weimar,\n1810: Jeithles, _\u00c4sthetisches Lexikon,_ vol. i. A-K, Vienna, 1835:\nHebenstreit, _Encyklop\u00e4die d. \u00c4sthetik,_ 2nd ed., Vienna, 1848.\n\nThe following notes contain for the convenience of the student several\nbooks which the author has not been able to see.\n\n\nI. Concerning ancient \u00c6sthetic no better or more comprehensive work can\nbe found than the _Geschichte der Theorie der Kunst bei den Alten,_\nby Ed. M\u00fcller, Breslau, 1831-1837, 2 vols. For inquiries concerning\nthe Beautiful special reference should be made to Julius Walter, _Die\nGeschichte der \u00c4sthetik im Alterthum ihren begrifflichen Entwicklung\nnach,_ Leipzig, 1893. See also Em. Egger, _Essai sur l'histoire de la\ncritique chez les Grecs,_ 2nd ed., Paris, 1886: Zimmermann, Bk. I.:\nBosanquet, ch. ii.-v. and Saintsbury, vol. i.\n\nOf the innumerable special monographs: for Plato's \u00c6sthetic see Arn.\nRuge, _Die platonische \u00c4sthetik,_ Halle, 1832: for Aristotle's, D\u00f6ring,\n_Die Kunstlehre des Aristoteles,_ Jena, 1876: C. B\u00e9nard, _L'Esth\u00e9tique\nd'Aristote et de ses successeurs,_ Paris, 1890: S. H. Butcher,\n_Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art,_ 3rd ed., London, 1902. For\nPlotinus, E. Vacherot, _Histoire critique de l'\u00e9cole d'Alexandrie,_\nParis, 1846: E. Brenning, _Die Lehre vom Sch\u00f6nen bei Plotin im\nZusammenhang seines Systems dargestellt,_ G\u00f6ttingen, 1864. On the _Ars\nPoetica_ of Horace, A. Viola, _L' arte poetica di Orazio nella critica\nitaliana e straniera,_ 2 vols. Naples, 1901-1907.\n\nFor the history of ancient Psychology see H. Siebeck, _Geschichte der\nPsychologie,_ 1880; A. E. Chaignet, _Histoire de la psychologie des\nGrecs,_ Paris, 1887; L. Ambrosi, _La psicologia dell' immaginazione\nnella storia della filosofia,_ Rome, 1898. For the history of\nthe philosophy of language see H. Steinthal, _Geschichte der\nSprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und R\u00f6mern mit besonderer R\u00fccksicht\nauf die Logik,_ 2nd ed. Berlin, 1890-1891, 2 vols.\n\n\nII. For the \u00e6sthetic ideas of St. Augustine and early Christian authors\nsee Menendez y Pelayo, _op. cit._ pp. 193-266. For Thomas Aquinas, L.\nTaparelli, _Delle ragioni del bello seconde la dottrina di san Tommaso\nd'Aquino_ (in _Civilt\u00e0 cattolica_ for 1859-1860): P. Vallet, _L'Id\u00e9e\ndu beau dans la philosophie de St. Thomas d'Aquin,_ 1883: M. de Wulf,\n_\u00c9tudes historiques sur l'esth\u00e9tique de St. Thomas,_ Louvain, 1896.\n\nFor the literary doctrines of the Middle Ages see D. Comparetti,\n_Virgilio nel medio evo,_ 2nd ed. Florence, 1893, vol. i., and G.\nSaintsbury, _op. cit.,_ vol. i. pp. 369-486. For the early Renaissance\nsee K. Vossler, _Poetische Theorien in d. italien. Fr\u00fchrenaissance,_\nBerlin, 1900. For the Poetics of the high Renaissance see J. E.\nSpingarn, _History of Literary Criticism in the Renaissance, with\nspecial reference to the influence of Italy,_ New York, 1899 (Italian\ntrans. with corrections and additions, Bari, 1905). See also F. de\nSanctis, _Storia della letteratura italiana,_ Naples, 1870, _passim._\n\nFor the traditions of Platonic and neo-Platonic ideas in the Middle\nAges and Renaissance, for best and fullest information see Menendez y\nPelayo, _op. cit.,_ vol. i. part ii. and vol. ii. For Italian treatises\non beauty and love see Michele Rosi, _Saggi sui trattati d' amore\ndel cinquecento,_ Recanati, 1899, and F. Flamini, _Il cinquecento,_\nMilan, Vallardi, N.D., ch. iv. pp. 378-381. For Tasso see Alfredo\nGiannini, _Il \"Minturno\" di T. Tasso,_ Ariano, 1899: see also E. Proto\nin _Rass. crit. lett. ital._ vi. (Naples, 1901) pp. 127-145. For Leone\nEbreo see Edm. Solmi, _Benedetto Spinoza e L. E., studio su una fonte\nitaliana dimenticata dello spinozismo,_ Modena, 1903: cf. G. Gentile in\n_Critica,_ ii. pp. 313-319.\n\nOn J. C. Scaliger see Eug. Lintilhac, _Un Coup d'\u00c9tat dans la\nr\u00e9publique des lettres: Jules C\u00e9sar Scaliger, fondateur du classicisme\ncent ans avant Boileau_ (in the _Nouv. Revue,_ 1890, vol. lxiv.\npp. 333-346, 528-547). On Fracastoro, Giuseppe Rossi, _Girolamo_\n_Fracastoro in relazione all' aristotelismo e alla scienza nel\nRinascimento,_ Pisa, 1893. On Castelvetro, Ant. Fusco, _La poetica di\nLudovico Castelvetro,_ Naples, 1904. On Patrizzi, Oddone Zenatti, _Fr.\nPatrizzi, Orazio Ariosto, e Torquato Tasso,_ etc. (Verona, per le nozze\nMorpurgo-Franchetti, N.D.).\n\n\nIII. For this period of ferment see H. von Stein, _Die Entstehung\nder neueren \u00c4sthetik,_ Stuttgart, 1886: K. Borinski, _Die Poetik der\nRenaissance und die Anf\u00e4nge der litterarischen Kritik in Deutschland,_\nBerlin, 1886 (esp. the last chapter): also same author's _Baltasar\nGracian und die Hofliteratur in Deutschland,_ Halle a. S., 1894, B.\nCroce, _I trattatisti italiani del Concettismo e B. Gracian,_ Naples,\n1899 (in _Atti dell' Acc. Pont._ vol. xxix., reprinted in _Problemi di\nestetica,_ pp. 309-345), _Elizabethan Critical Essays,_ edited with\nan introduction by G. Gregory Smith, Oxford, 1904, 2 vols.: _Critical\nEssays of the Seventeenth Century,_ edited by J. E. Spingam, Oxford,\n1908, 2 vols.: Leone Donati, _J. J. Bodmer und die italienische\nLitteratur_ (in the vol. _J. J. Bodmer, Denkschrift z. C. C.\nGeburtstag,_ Z\u00fcrich, 1900, pp. 241-312): see also _Probl. di estetica,_\npp. 371-380.\n\nOn Bacon see K. Fischer, _Franz Baco von Verulam,_ Leipzig, 1856 (2nd\ned. 1875), cf. P. Jacquinet, _Fr. Baconis in re litteraria iudicia,_\nParis, 1863. On Gravina, Em. Reich, _G. V. Gravina als \u00c4sthetiker_ (in\nthe Trans, of the Viennese Academy, vol. cxx. 1890): B. Croce, _Di\nalcuni giudizi sul Gravina considerate come estetico,_ Florence, 1901\n(in _Miscellanea d' Ancona,_ pp. 456-464), reprinted in _Probl. di\nest._ pp. 360-370. On Du Bos, Morel,_\u00c9tude sur l'abb\u00e9 du Bos,_ Paris,\n1849: P. Petent, _J. B. Dubos,_ Tramelan, 1902. On Bouhours, Doncieux,\n_Un j\u00e9suite homme de lettres au XVIIe si\u00e8cle,_ Paris, 1886. On the\nBouhours-Orsi controversy, F. Fottano, _Una polemica nel settecento,_\nin _Ricerche letterarie,_ Leghorn, 1897, pp. 313-332: A. Boeri, _Una\ncontesa letteraria franco-italiana nel secolo XVIII,_ Palermo, 1900\n(cf. _Giorn. stor. lett. ital._ xxxvi. pp. 255-256): B. Croce, _Variet\u00e0\ndi storia dell' estetica,_ \u00a7\u00a7 1-2, in _Rass. crit. lett. ital._ cit.,\nvi. 1901, pp. 115-126, reprinted in _Probl. di est._ pp. 346-359.\n\n\nIV. On Cartesianism in literature see \u00c9. Krantz, _L'Esth\u00e9tique de\nDescartes \u00e9tudi\u00e9e dans les rapports de la doctrine cart\u00e9sienne avec\nla litt\u00e9rature classique fran\u00e7aise au XVIIIe si\u00e8cle,_ Paris, 1882;\nsee also the chapter on Andr\u00e9, pp. 311-341, and the introduction by\nV. Cousin to the _\u0153uvres philosophiques du p. Andr\u00e9,_ Paris, 1843:\non Boileau, Borinski, _Poetik d. Renaissance,_ c. 6, pp. 314-329; J.\nBruneti\u00e8re, _L'Esth\u00e9tique de B._ in _Revue des Deux Mondes,_ June 1,\n1899.\n\nOn the English intellectualist \u00e6stheticians see Zimmermann, _op. cit._\npp. 273-301; also von Stein, _op. cit._ pp. 185-216. On Shaftesbury\nand Hutcheson see esp. Gid. Spicker, _Die Philosophie d. Grafen v.\nShaftesbury,_ Freiburg i. B., 1872, part iv. on art and literature, pp.\n196-233: T. Fowler, S. _and Hutcheson,_ London, 1882: William Robert\nScott, _Francis Hutcheson, his life, teaching and position in the\nhistory of philosophy_, Cambridge, 1900.\n\nOn Leibniz, Baumgarten and contemporary German writers see Th. W.\nDanzel, _Gottsched und seine Zeit,_ 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1855: H. G.\nMeyer, _Leibnitz und Baumgarten als Begr\u00fcnder der deutschen \u00c4sthetik,_\nInaugural Dissertation, Halle, 1874: Joh. Schmidt, _L. und B.,_ Halle,\n1875: \u00c9m. Grucker, _Histoire des doctrines litt\u00e9raires et esth\u00e9tiques\nen Allemagne_ (from Opitz to the Swiss writers), Paris, 1883: Fr.\nBraitmaier, _Geschichte der poetischen Theorie und Kritik von den\nDiskursen der Maler his auf Lessing,_ Frauenfeld, 1888-1889. In the\nlast-named book the first part treats of the beginning of Poetics and\ncriticism in Germany, considered in their relation to the doctrines\nof classical, French and English writers: the second part treats of\nan attempt to found an \u00e6sthetic philosophy and theory of poetry upon\na basis of Leibnitian-Wolffian psychology: which includes a long\ndiscussion of Baumgarten and quotations from two dissertations, Raabe's\n_A. G. Baumgarten, \u00e6sthetic\u00e6 in disciplin\u00e6 formam parens et auctor,_\nand Prieger's _Anregung u. metaphysische Grundlage d. \u00c4sth. von A. G.\nBaumgarten,_ 1875 (cf. vol. ii. p. 2).\n\n\nV. On Vico as \u00e6sthetician see B. Zumbini, _Sopra alcuni princip\u00ee\ndi critica letteraria di G. B. V._ (reprinted in _Stud\u00ee di letter.\nitaliana,_ Florence, 1894, pp. 257-268): B. Croce, _G. B. V. primo\nscopritore della scienza estetica,_ Naples, 1901 (reprinted from\n_Flegrea._ April 1901), incorporated in the present volume as has been\nmentioned already: see also G. Gentile in _Rass. crit. della lett.\nital.,_ cit., vi. pp. 254-265: E. Bertana, in _Giorn. stor. lett.\nital._ xxxviii. pp. 449-451: A. Martinazzoli, _Intorno alle dottrine\nvichiane di ragion poetica,_ in _Riv. di filos. e sc. aff._ of Bologna,\nJuly 1902: also the reply of B. Croce, _ibid.,_ August 1902: Giovanni\nRossi, _Il pensiero di G. B. V. intorno alla natura della lingua e all'\nufficio dette lettere,_ Salerno, 1901. The important position occupied\nby Vico in respect to \u00c6sthetic had been remarked earlier by C. Marini,\n_G. B. V. al cospetto del secolo XIX,_ Naples, 1852, c. 7, \u00a7 10. For\nthe influence exercised by Vico, B. Croce, _Per la storia della critica\ne storiografia letteraria,_ Naples, 1903 (in _Atti d. Acc. Pont.,_ vol.\nxxxiii.), pp. 7-8, 26-28 (reprinted in _Probl. di est._ pp. 423-425),\nand G. A. Borgese, _Storia della critica romantica in Italia,_ Naples,\n1905, _passim._\n\nOn Vico's thought in general, as well as on his \u00c6sthetic, see B. Croce,\n_La filosofia di Giambattista Vico,_ Bari, 1911: English translation\nby R. G. Collingwood, 1913. The copious literature concerning Vico is\ngiven by B. Croce in _Bibliografia vichiana,_ Naples, 1904 (reprinted\nfrom _Atti dell' Acad. Pont._ vol. xxxiv.), and _Supplemento, ibid._\n1907, and _Secondo Supplemento,_ 1910 (_Atti_ cit., vols, xxxvii. and\nxli.).\n\n\nVI. On the literary doctrines of Conti see G. Brognoligo, _L' opera\nletteraria di A. Conti,_ in _Arch. veneto,_ 1894, vol. i. pp. 152-209:\non Cesarotti, Vitt. Alemanni, _Un filosofo delle lettere,_ vol. i.\nTurin, 1894: on Pagano, B. Croce, _Variet\u00e0 di storia dell' estetica,_ \u00a7\n3; _Di alcuni estetici italiani della seconda met\u00e0 del secolo XVIII,_\nin _Rass. crit._ cit. vii. 1902, pp. 1-17 (reprinted in _Probl. di\nest._ pp. 381-450).\n\nOn the German \u00e6stheticians, in addition to the various general\nhistories already quoted, see R. Sommer, _Grundz\u00fcge einer Geschichte\nder deutschen Psychologie u. \u00c4sthetik von Wolff-Baumgarten his\nKant-Schiller,_ W\u00fcrzburg, 1892. Greatly inferior is M. Dessoir,\n_Geschichte d. neueren deutschen Psychologie,_ 2nd ed., Berlin, 1897\n(the first half only is published, down to Kant exclusive).\n\nOn Sulzer, Braitmaier, _op. cit._ ii. pp. 55-71: on Mendelssohn,\n_ibid._ pp. 72-279: for Elias Schlegel, _op. cit._ i. p. 249 _seqq._;\non Mendelssohn see also Th. Wilh. Danzel, _Gesammelte Aufs\u00e4tze,_\nLeipzig, Jahn, 1855, pp. 85-98: Kannegiesser, _Stellung Mendelssohns\nin d. Gesch. d. \u00c4sth.,_ 1868. On Riedel, K. F. Wize, _F. J. Riedel u.\nseine \u00c4sthetik,_ Diss., Berlin, 1907. On Herder, Ch. Joiet, _H. et la\nrenaissance litt\u00e9raire en Allemagne au XVIIIe si\u00e8cle,_ Paris, 1875:\nR. Haym, _H. nach seinem Leben u. seinen Werken,_ 2 vols., Berlin,\n1880: G. Jacobi, _H.'s und Kant's \u00c4sth.,_ Leipzig, 1907. For the ideas\nof Hamann and Herder concerning the origins of poetry see Croce in\n_Critica,_ ix. (1911), pp. 469-472. On the history of Linguistic, see\nTh. Benfey, _Geschichte d. Sprachwissenschaft in Deutschland,_ Munich,\n1869, introd.: H. Steinthal, _Der Ursprung der Sprache im Zusammenhange\nmit d. letzen Fragen alles Wissens, eine Darstellung, Kritik und\nFortentwicklung der vorz\u00fcglichsten Ansichten,_ 4th ed., Berlin, 1888.\n\n\nVII. On Batteux see E. v. Danckelmann, _Charles Batteux, sein Leben u.\nsein \u00e4sthetisches Lehrgeb\u00e4ude,_ Rostock, 1902. On Hogarth, Burke and\nHome, Zimmermann, _op. cit._ pp. 223-273; Bosanquet, _op. cit._ pp.\n202-210. On Home esp. J. Wohlgem\u00fcth, _H. Home's \u00c4sthetik,_ Rostock,\n1894: W. Neumann, _Die Bedeutung Homes f\u00fcr d. \u00c4sthetik, u. sein\nEinfl\u00fcss auf d. deutschen \u00c4sthetik,_ Halle, 1894. On Hemsterhuis, \u00c9m.\nGrucker, _Fran\u00e7ois H., sa vie et ses oeuvres,_ Paris, 1866.\n\nOn Winckelmann, Goethe, _W. u. sein Jahrhundert,_ 1805 (in _Werke,_\ned. Goedecke, vol. xxxi.): C. Justi, _W. u. seine Zeitgenossen,_ 2nd\ned., Leipzig, 1898. A criticism of Winckelmann's theory, by H. Hettner,\nappeared in the _Revue Moderne,_ 1866. On Mengs, Zimmermann, _op. cit._\npp. 338-355. On Lessing, Th. Wilh. Danzel, _G. E. Lessing, sein Leben\nund seine Werke,_ Leipzig, 1849-1853: Kuno Fischer, _L. als Reformater\nd. deutschen Litteratur,_ Stuttgart, 1881: \u00c9m. Grucker, _Lessing,_\nParis, 1891: Erich Schmidt, _Lessing,_ 2nd ed., Berlin, 1899: K.\nBorinski, _Lessing,_ Berlin, 1900.\n\nOn Spalletti see B. Croce, _Var.,_ cit., \u00a7 3 (_Probl. d. est._\npp. 392-398). On Meier, Hirth and Goethe, Danzel, _Goethe und die\nWeimarsche Kunstfreunde in ihrem Verh\u00e4ltniss z. Winckelmann,_ in\n_Gesamm. Aufs._ pp. 118-145. On Goethe's \u00c6sthetic esp. see Wilh. Bode,\n_Goethes \u00c4sthetik,_ Berlin, 1901.\n\n\nVIII. Critical expositions of Kant's \u00c6sthetic are very numerous even\nin Italy: for example, O. Colecchi, _Questioni filosofiche,_ Naples,\n1843, vol. iii.; C. Cantoni, _E. Kant,_ Milan, 1884, vol. iii. In\nGerman, esp. H. Cohen, _Kants Begr\u00fcndung der \u00c4sthetik,_ Berlin,\n1889; also an important chapter in Sommer, _op. cit._ pp. 337-352; a\nsufficient representative of a host of others is the elaborate work of\nVictor Basch, _Essai critique sur l'esth\u00e9tique de Kant,_ Paris, 1896.\nSee also, on an Italian trans. of the _Kr. d. Urth.,_ B. Croce in\n_Critica,_ v. (1907), pp. 160-164.\n\nFor Kant's lectures and the historical antecedents of his _Critique of\nJudgment_ (besides the dissertations of H. Falkenheim, _Die Entstehung\nder kantischen \u00c4sthetik,_ Heidelberg, 1890, and Rich. Grundmann, _Die\nEntwickel d. \u00c4sth. Kants,_ Leipzig, 1893) see the exhaustive work of\nOtto Schlapp, _Kant's Lehre vom Genie und die Entstehung d. Kritik d.\nUrtheilskraft,_ G\u00f6ttingen, 1901.\n\n\nIX. For the whole of this period, beside the general histories already\nquoted which treat of it in great detail, see Th. Wilh. Danzel, _\u00dcber\nden gegenw\u00e4rtigen Zustand d. Philosophie d. Kunst u. ihre n\u00e4chste\nAufgabe_ (in the _Zeitschr. f. Phil,_ of Fichte, 1844-1845, and\nreprinted in _Gesammelte Aufs\u00e4tze,_ pp. 1-84): this treats of Kant,\nSchiller, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and, more particularly, of Solger,\npp. 51-84: Herm. Lotze, _Geschichte der \u00c4sthetik in Deutschland,_\nMunich, 1868 (in the coll. \"History of the Sciences in Germany,\"\npublished by the Royal Academy of Sciences of Munich in Bavaria):\nfirst book, history of general points of view from Baumgarten to the\nHerbartian school: second book, history of individual fundamental\n\u00e6sthetic concepts: third book, contributions to the history of the\ntheory of the arts: Ed. v. Hartmann, _Die deutsche \u00c4sthetik s. Kant_\n(first part, historico-critical), Berlin, 1886, divided into two books.\nThe first book discusses the doctrine of the chief \u00e6stheticians and,\nafter an introduction on the foundation of philosophical \u00e6sthetic by\nKant, treats of the \u00c6sthetic of the content, divided into that of\nabstract idealism (Schelling, Schopenhauer, Solger, Krause, Weisse,\nLotze); of concrete idealism (Hegel, Trahndorff, Schleiermacher,\nDeutinger, Oersted, Vischer, Zeising, Carri\u00e8re, Schasler); of the\n\u00c6sthetic of feeling (Kirchmann, Wiener, Horwicz); the \u00c6sthetic of form,\nsubdivided into abstract formalism (Herbart, Zimmermann), and concrete\nformalism (K\u00f6stlin, Siebeck). The second book is concerned with the\nmore important special problems.\n\nOn the \u00c6sthetic of Schiller specially see, amongst numerous monographs,\nDanzel, _Schillers Briefwechsel mit K\u00f6rner,_ in _Ges. Aufs._ pp.\n227-244: G. Zimmermann, _Versuch einer schillerschen \u00c4sthetik,_\nLeipzig, 1889: F. Montargis, _L'Esth\u00e9tique de Schiller,_ Paris, 1890:\nthe chapter in Sommer, _op. cit._ pp. 365-432: V. Basch, _La Po\u00e9tique\nde Schiller,_ Paris, 1901.\n\nOn the \u00c6sthetic of Romanticism, R. Haym, _Die romantische Schule:\nein Beitrag z. Geschichte d. deutschen Geistes,_ Berlin, 1870 (cf.\non Tieck, book i.; on Novalis, book iii.: for criticism of the two\nSchlegels, bk. ii. and bk. iii. ch. 5): N. M. Pichtos, _Die \u00c4sthetik\nAug. W. v. Schlegel in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwickelung,_ Berlin,\n1893. On the \u00c6sthetic of Fichte, G. Tempel, _Fichtes Stellung z.\nKunst,_ Metz, 1901.\n\nOn the \u00c6sthetic of Hegel, Danzel, _\u00dcber d. \u00c4sthetik der hegelschen\nPhilosophie,_ Hamburg, 1844: R. Haym, _Hegel u. seine Zeit,_ Berlin,\n1857, pp. 433-443: J. S. Kedney, _Hegel's \u00c6sthetics: a critical\nexposition,_ Chicago, 1885: Kuno Fischer, _Hegels Leben u. Werke,_\nHeidelberg, 1898-1901, chs. 38-42, pp. 811-947: J. Kohn, _Hegels\n\u00c4sthetik_ in _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Philosophie,_ 1902, vol. 120, fasc. ii.:\nsee also B. Croce, _Cio che \u00e8 vivo e cio che \u00e8 morto della filosofia di\nHegel,_ Bari, 1907, ch. 6; Engl. tr. by D. Ainslie, 1915.\n\n\nX. For the \u00c6sthetic of Schopenhauer, Fr. Sommerlad, _Darstellung u.\nKritik d. \u00e4sth. Grundanschauungen Schopenhauers,_ Diss., Giessen, 1895:\nEd. v. Mayer, _Schopenhauers \u00c4sthetik u. ihr Verh\u00e4ltniss z. d. \u00e4sth.\nLehren Kants u. Schellings,_ Halle, 1897: Ett. Zoccoli, _L' estetica\ndi A. Sch.: propedeutica all' estetica Wagneriana,_ Milan, 1901: G.\nChialvo, _L' estetica di A. Sch., saggio esplicativo-critico,_ Rome,\n1905.\n\nFor the \u00c6sthetic of Herbart, beside Zimmermann, _op. cit._ pp. 754-804,\nsee O. Hostinsky, _Herbarts \u00c4sthetik in ihrer grundlegenden Theilen\nquellenm\u00e4ssig dargestellt u. erl\u00e4utert,_ Hamburg-Leipzig, 1891.\n\n\nXI. Of the \u00c6sthetic of Schleiermacher, the fullest treatment is given\nby Zimmermann, pp. 609-634, and von Hartmann, pp. 156-169.\n\n\nXII. For the history of the theory of Language, beside Benfey, _op.\ncit._ introd., see Max. Leop. Loewe, _Histori\u00e6 critic\u00e6 grammatices\nuniversalis seu philosophic\u00e6 lineamenta,_ Dresden, 1839: A. F. Pott,\n_W. v. Humboldt und die Sprachwissenschaft,_ introd. to the reprint of\nHumboldt's _Verschiedenheit d. menschl. Sprachbaues_ (2nd ed., Berlin,\n1880, vol. i.).\n\nOn Humboldt see esp. Steinthal, _Der Ursprung der Sprache,_ pp. 59-81,\nand Pott's introd. cit., _Wilh. v. Humboldt u. die Sprachwissenschaft._\n\n\nXIII. For this period, treated with unnecessary fulness, see von\nHartmann, _op. cit._ bk. i.: more concisely by Menendez y Pelayo, vol.\niv. (1st ed.), part i. chs. 6-8.\n\nFor the doctrine of the modifications of beauty see Zimmermann, _op.\ncit._ pp. 715-744: Schasler, _op. cit._ \u00a7\u00a7 517-546: Bosanquet, _op.\ncit._ ch. 14, pp. 393-440: in greater detail, v. Hartmann, bk. ii. part\ni. pp. 363-461.\n\nFor the history of the Sublime see also F. Unruh, _Der Begriff des\nErhabenen seit Kant,_ K\u00f6nigsberg, 1898. For Humour see B. Croce, _Dei\nvar\u00ee significanti della parola umorismo e del suo uso nella critica\nletteraria,_ in the _Journal of Comparative Literature_ of New York,\n1903, fasc. iii. (reprinted in _Probl. di est._ pp. 275-286) F.\nBaldensperger, _Les D\u00e9finitions de l'humour,_ in _\u00c9tudes; d'hist.\nlitt._ Paris, 1907. For the history of the concept of the Graceful, F.\nTorraca, _La grazia secondo il Castiglione e secondo lo Spencer_ (in\nMorandi, _Antol. della critica lett. ital._ 2nd ed., Citt\u00e0 di Castello,\n1885, pp. 440-444): F. Braitmaier, _op. cit._ ii. pp. 166-167.\n\n\nXIV. For the history of \u00c6sthetic in France during the nineteenth\ncentury there is nothing so good as Menendez y Pelayo, vol. iii.\npart ii. chs. 3-9; _ibid._ chs. 1-2 give full information concerning\n\u00c6sthetic in England.\n\nFor \u00c6sthetic in Italy in the first half of the nineteenth century,\nKarl Werner, _Idealistische Theorien des Sch\u00f6nen in d. italienischen\nPhilosophie des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts,_ Vienna, 1884 (from Trans,\nof the Imperial and Royal Viennese Academy). On Rosmini see esp. P.\nBellezza, _Antonio Rosmini e la grande questione letteraria del secolo\nXIX_ (in the collection _Per Antonio Rosmini nel primo centenario,_\nMilan, 1897, vol. i. pp. 364-385). On Gioberti, Ad. Faggi, _Vinc.\nGioberti esteta e letterato,_ Palermo, 1901 (from the _Atti della R.\nAccad. di Palermo,_ s. iii. vol. vi.). On Delfico, G. Gentile, _Dal\nGcnovesi al Galluppi,_ Naples, 1903, ch. ii. On Leopardi, E. Bertana\nin _Giorn. stor. lett. ital._ xli. pp. 193-283; R. Giani, _L'estetica\nnei pensieri di G. Leopardi,_ Turin, 1904 (cf. G. Gentile in _Critica,_\nii. pp. 144-147). See also a book quoted by A. Rolla and B. Croce,\n_loc. cit.,_ containing a catalogue of Italian books on \u00c6sthetic of the\nnineteenth century (_Probl. di est._ pp. 401-415).\n\nOn the theories of the Italian Romanticists, F. De Sanctis, _La poetica\ndel Manzoni,_ in _Scritti var\u00ee,_ ed. Croce, i. pp. 23-45; and the same\nauthor's _La letteratura italiana nel secolo XIX,_ ed. Croce, Naples,\n1897, on Tommaseo, pp. 233-243: on Cant\u00f9, pp. 244-273: on Berchet,\npp. 479-493: on Mazzini, pp. 424-441. On Mazzini esp. F. Ricitari,\n_Concetto dell' arte e della critica letteraria nella mente di G.\nMazzini,_ Catania, 1896. For all these see G. A. Borgese, _Storia della\ncritica romantica in Italia,_ cit.\n\n\nXV. For the life of De Sanctis and the bibliography of his works see\n_Scritti var\u00ee,_ ed. Croce, ii. pp. 267-308, also the volume _In memoria\ndi Fr. de S._ edited by M. Mandalari, Naples, 1884.\n\nOn De Sanctis as literary critic, P. Villari, _Commemorazione_: A. C.\nde Meis, _Commem.,_ in the above-mentioned vol. _In memoria_: Marc\nMonnier in _Revue des Deux Mondes,_ April I, 1884: Pio Ferrieri,\n_Fr. de S. e la critica letteraria,_ Milan, 1888: B. Croce, _La\ncritica letteraria,_ Rome, 1896, ch. 5; _Fr. de S. e i suoi critici\nrecenti_ (in _Atti dell' Accad. Pontan._ vol. xxviii. reprinted in\n_Scritti var\u00ee,_ append, ii. 309-352), and prefs. to vols, already\nquoted, _La lett. ital. nel sec. XIX,_ and _Scritti var\u00ee; De Sanctis e\nSchopenhauer,_ in _Atti della Pontaniana,_ xxxii. 1902: Enr. Cocchia,\n_II pensiero critico di Fr. de S. nell' arte e nella politica,_\nNaples, 1899: G. A. Borgese, _op. cit._ last chapter and _passim._\n\n\nXVI. On the last phase of metaphysical \u00c6sthetic, G. Neudecker, _Studien\nz. Geschichte d. deutschen \u00c4sthetik s. Kant,_ W\u00fcrzburg, 1878, which\ndiscusses and criticises more particularly Vischer (self-criticism),\nZimmermann, Lotze, K\u00f6stlin, Siebeck, Fechner and Deutinger. On\nZimmermann, von Hartmann, _op. cit._ pp. 267-304: Bonatelli, in _Nuova\nAntologia,_ October 1867. On Lotze, Fritz Kogel, _Lotzes \u00c4sthetik,_\nG\u00f6ttingen, 1886: A. Matragrin, _Essai sur l'esth\u00e9tique de Lotze,_\nParis, 1901. On K\u00f6stlin, von Hartmann, pp. 304-317. On Schasler, see\nthe same, pp. 248-252, also Bosanquet, pp. 414-424. On Hartmann, Ad.\nFaggi, _Ed. H. e l' estetica tedesca,_ Florence, 1895. On Vischer see\nM. Diez, _Fried. Vischer u. d. \u00e4sth. Formalismus,_ Stuttgart, 1889.\n\nFor French and English \u00e6stheticians, besides Menendez y Pelayo, _op.\ncit.,_ on Ruskin, see J. Milsand, _L'Esth\u00e9tique anglaise, \u00e9tude sur J.\nRuskin,_ Paris, 1864: R. de la Sizeranne, _Ruskin et la religion de la\nbeaut\u00e9,_ 3rd ed., Paris, 1898; cf. part iii. On Fornari, V. Imbriani,\n_Vito Fornari estetico_ (reprinted in _Stud\u00ee letterar\u00ee e bizzarri e\nsatiriche,_ ed. Croce, Bari, 1907). On Tari see Nic. Gallo, _Antonio\nTari, studio critico,_ Palermo, 1884: Croce, in _Critica,_ v. (1907),\npp. 357-361; also in pref. to vol.: _A. Tari, saggi di estetica e\nmetafisica,_ Bari, 1910.\n\n\nXVII. For positivist \u00c6sthetic see Menendez y Pelayo, _op. cit._ iv.\n(1st ed.) vol. ii. pp. 120-136, 326-369: N. Gallo, _La scienza dell'\narte,_ Turin, 1887, chs. 6-8, pp. 162-216.\n\n\nXVIII. On Kirchmann, von Hartmann, pp. 253-265. For various recent\nGerman \u00e6stheticians, Hugo Spitzer, _Kritische Studien z. \u00c4sthet. der\nGegenwart,_ Leipzig, 1897. On Nietzsche, Ettore G. Zoccoli, _Fred.\nNietzsche,_ Modena, 1898, pp. 268-344: Jul. Zeitler, _Nietzsches\n\u00c4sthetik,_ Leipzig, 1900. On Flaubert, A. Fusco, _La teoria dell' arte\nin G. F.,_ Naples, 1907: cf. _Critica,_ vi. (1908), pp. 125-134. For\nbooks on \u00c6sthetic published during the last decade of the nineteenth\ncentury see Luc. Arr\u00e9at, _Dix ann\u00e9es de philosophie,_ 1891-1900, Paris,\n1901, pp. 74-116. A few remarks on contemporary \u00c6sthetic are made by\nK. Groos in _Die Philosophie im Beginn. des XXen Jahrh.,_ ed. by W.\nWindelband, Heidelberg, 1904-1905. For latest books on \u00c6sthetic see\n_Critica,_ ed. B. Croce (Naples), from 1903 onward, which publishes\nreviews of them. There is also a review, started in 1906, published\nat Stuttgart (ed. F. Enke), _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr \u00c4sthetik und allgemeine\nKunstwissenschaft,_ edited by Max Dessoir.\n\n\nXIX. The history of particular problems is usually omitted, or, at\nbest, erroneously treated in histories of \u00c6sthetic: for example, see\nthe difficulty experienced by Ed. M\u00fcller, _Gesch.,_ cit., ii. pref. pp.\nvi-vii, in connecting his treatment of the history of Rhetoric with\nthat of Poetics. Some writers attach Rhetoric to the individual arts or\nto artistic technique; others treat the doctrines of the modification\nof beauty and of natural beauty (in the metaphysical sense) as special\nproblems; others, again, discuss the kinds or classifications in art\nin an incidental manner, without seeking to incorporate them in the\nprincipal \u00e6sthetic problem.\n\n\u00a7 1. On the history of Rhetoric in the ancient sense see Rich.\nVolkmann, _Die Rhetorik der Griechen und R\u00f6mer in systematischer\n\u00dcbersicht dargestellt,_ 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1885, of capital importance:\nA. Ed. Chaignet, _La Rh\u00e9torique et son histoire,_ Paris, 1888; rich in\nmaterial, but ill-arranged and with the preconception that Rhetoric\nis still a defensible body of science. For special treatment see\nCh. Benoist, _Essai historique sur les premiers manuels d'invention\noratoire, jusqu'\u00e0 Aristote,_ Paris, 1846: Georg Thiele, _Hermagoras,\nein Beitrag z. Geschichte d. Rhetorik,_ Strasburg, 1893. There is no\nhistory of rhetoric in modern times. For criticism of Vives and other\nSpaniards see Menendez y Pelayo, _op. cit._ iii. pp. 211-300 (2nd ed.).\nFor Patrizzi see B. Croce, _F. Patrizzi e la critica della rettorica\nantica,_ in the vol. of _Stud\u00ee_ in honour of A. Graf, Bergamo, 1903\n(_Probl. d. est._ pp. 297-308).\n\nFor Rhetoric as theory of literary form in antiquity see Volkmann,\n_op. cit._ pp. 393-566: Chaignet, _op. cit._ pp. 413-539: also Egger,\n_passim,_ and Saintsbury, bks. i. ii. For purposes of comparison see\nPaul Reynaud, _La Rh\u00e9torique sanskrite expos\u00e9e dans son d\u00e9veloppement\nhistorique et ses rapports avec la rh\u00e9torique classique,_ Paris, 1884.\nFor the Middle Ages, Comparetti, _Virgilio nel medio evo,_ vol. i.,\nand Saintsbury, bk. iii. There is need for a work on modern Rhetoric\nin this sense also. For the form it assumed ultimately according to\nthe theory of Gr\u00f6ber see B. Croce, _Di alcuni princip\u00ee di sintassi e\nstilistica psicologiche del Gr\u00f6ber,_ in _Atti dell' Accad. Pontan._\nvol. xxix. 1899: K. Vossler, _Literaturblatt f\u00fcr germ. u. roman.\nPhilologie,_ 1900, N.I.: B. Croce, _Le categorie rettoriche e il prof.\nGr\u00f6ber,_ in _Flegrea,_ April 1900: K. Vossler, _Positivismo e idealismo\nnella scienza del linguaggio,_ Ital. trans. Bari, 1908, pp. 48-61 (cf.\n_Probl. d. est._ pp. 143-171). Very incomplete observations on the\nhistory of the concept of metaphor are made by A. Biese, _Philosophie\nd. Metaphorischen,_ Hamburg-Leipzig, 1893, pp. 1-16; but this book\nhas the merit of calling attention to the importance of the views and\ninfluence of Vico.\n\n\u00a7 2. For the history of the literary kinds in antiquity see the works\nabove quoted by M\u00fcller, Egger, Saintsbury, and the vast literature on\nAristotle's _Poetics._ For comparison with Sanskrit poetics, Sylvain\nLevi, _Le Th\u00e9\u00e2tre indien,_ Paris, 1890, esp. pp. 11, 152. For medi\u00e6val\npoetry see esp. Gio. Mari, _I trattati medievali di ritmica latina,_\nMilan, 1899; and his recent edition of _Poetica magistri Iohannis\nanglici,_ 1901.\n\nFor the history of the kinds under the Renaissance see principally\nSpingarn, _op. cit._ i. chs. 3-4; ii. ch. 2; iii. ch. 3. Also Menendez\ny Pelayo, Borinski, Saintsbury, _passim._\n\nSpecial works: on Pietro Aretino, De Sanctis, _Storia della letteratura\nitaliana,_ ii. pp. 122-144: A. Graf, _Attraverso il cinquecento,_\nTurin, 1888, pp. 87-167: K. Vossler, _P. A.'s k\u00fcnstlerisches\nBekenntniss,_ Heidelberg, 1901. On Guarini, V. Rossi, _G. B. Guarini\ne il Pastor Fido,_ Turin, 1886, pp. 238-250. On Scaliger, Lintilhac,\n_Un Coup d'\u00c9tat,_ cit. For the three unities, L. Morandi, _Baretti\ncontro Voltaire,_ 2nd ed., Citt\u00e0 di Castello, 1884: Breitinger, _Les\nUnit\u00e9s d'Aristote avant le Cid de Corneille,_ 2nd ed., Geneva-Basle,\n1895: J. Ebner, _Beitrag z. einer Geschichte d. dramatischen Einheiten\nin Italien,_ Munich, 1898. On the Spanish polemic concerning comedy\nsee A. Morel Fatio on the defenders of comedy and of the _Arte\nnuevo,_ in the _Bulletin Hispanique_ of Bordeaux, vols. iii. and iv.:\non the dramatic theories see Arnaud, _Les Th\u00e9ories dramatiques au\nXVIIe si\u00e8cle, \u00e9tude sur la vie et les \u0153uvres de l'abb\u00e9 D'Aubignac,_\nParis, 1888: Paul Dupont, _Un Po\u00e8te philosophe au commencement du_\n_XVIII<sup>e</sup> si\u00e8cle, Houdar de la Motte,_ Paris, 1898: Alfredo\nGalletti, _Le teorie drammatiche e la tragedia in Italia nel secolo\nXVIII,_ part i. 1700-1750, Cremona, 1901. On the history of French\nPoetics, F. Bruneti\u00e8re, _L'\u00c9volution des genres dans l'histoire de\nla litt\u00e9rature,_ Paris, 1890, vol. i. introd.: \"_L'\u00e9volution de la\ncritique depuis la Renaissance jusqu'\u00e0 nos jours._\" On that of English\nPoetics, Paul Hamelius, _Die Kritik in d. engl. Literatur des XVII en\nu. XVIII<sup>en</sup> Jahrh.,_ Leipzig, 1897: also the well-filled\nchapter in Gayley-Scott, _op. cit._ pp. 382-422, the sketch of a book\non the subject. For the romantic period see Alfred Michiels, _Histoire\ndes id\u00e9es litt\u00e9raires en France au XIXe si\u00e8cle, et de leurs origines\ndans les si\u00e8cles ant\u00e9rieures,_ 4th ed., Paris, 1863. For Italy see G.\nA. Borgese, _op. cit._\n\n\u00a7 3. For the early history of the distinction and classification of the\narts see the literature quoted above in relation to Lessing, and his\n_Laokoon,_ with notes by Bl\u00fcmner. For subsequent history, H. Lotze,\n_Geschichte,_ cit., bk. iii.: Max Schasler, _Das System der K\u00fcnste\nauf einem neuen, im Wesen der Kunst begr\u00fcndeten Gliederungsprincip,_\n2nd ed., Leipzig-Berlin, 1881, introd.: Ed. v. Hartmann, _Deutsche\n\u00c4sth. s. Kant,_ bk. ii. part ii. especially pp. 524-580: V. Basch,\n_Essai sur l'esth. de Kant,_ pp. 483-496.\n\n\u00a7 4. For the doctrine of styles in antiquity see Volkmann, _op. cit._\npp. 532-566. The history of grammar and parts of speech is treated\nfully so far as Gr\u00e6co-Roman antiquity is concerned in Laur. Lersch,\n_Die Sprachphilosophie der Alten,_ Bonn, 1838-1841: better still by\nSteinthal, _Geschichte,_ cit. vol. ii. For Apollonius Dyscolus see\nEgger, _Apollon Dyscole,_ Paris, 1854. For the history of grammar in\nthe Middle Ages see Ch. Thurot, _Extraits de divers manuscrits latins\npour servir \u00e0 l'histoire des doctrines grammaticales au moyen \u00e2ge,_\nParis, 1869. For modern times, C. Trabalza, _Storia della grammatica\nitaliana,_ Milan, 1908. For the history of Criticism several books\nmentioned under \u00a7 2 may be consulted: in addition to these, B. Croce,\n_Per la storia della critica e storiografia letteraria,_ containing\nItalian examples (_Probl. d. est._ pp. 419-448): for the theories of\nrecent French criticism see \u00c9m. Hennequin, _La Critique scientifique,_\nParis, 1888, and Ernest Tissot, _Les \u00e9volutions de la critique\nfran\u00e7aise,_ Paris, 1890. On the concept of \"romanticism\" see G. Muoni,\n_Note per una poetica storica del romanticismo,_ Milan, 1906: cf. B.\nCroce, _Le definizioni del romanticismo,_ in _Critica,_ iv. pp. 241-245\n(reprinted in _Probl. di estetica,_ pp. 285-294).","title":"\u00c6sthetic as science of expression and general linguistic","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":170993}