{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_54642/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_54642","id":"gutenberg_54642","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/54642","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Other","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Historiography"],"text":"THEORY & HISTORY\n\nOF HISTORIOGRAPHY\n\nby\n\nBENEDETTO CROCE\n\nauthorized translation\n\nBY\n\nDOUGLAS AINSLIE\n\n\nLONDON\n\nGEORGE G. HARRAP & COMPANY\n\n1921\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\nTO THE FIRST ITALIAN EDITION\n\n\nAlmost all the writings which compose the present treatise were printed\nin the proceedings of Italian academies and in Italian reviews between\n1912 and 1913. Since they formed part of a general scheme, their\ncollection in book form presented no difficulties. This volume has\nappeared in German under the title _Zur Theorie und Geschichte der\nHistoriographie_ (T\u00fcbingen, Mohr, 1915).\n\nOn publishing in book form in Italian, I made a few slight alterations\nhere and there and added three brief essays, placed as an appendix to\nthe first part.\n\nThe description of the volume as forming the fourth of my _Philosophy\nof the Spirit_ requires some explanation; for it does not really form\na new systematic part of the philosophy, and is rather to be looked\nupon as a deepening and amplification of the theory of historiography,\nalready outlined in certain chapters of the second part, namely the\n_Logic_. But the problem of historical comprehension is that toward\nwhich pointed all my investigations as to the modes of the spirit,\ntheir distinction and unity, their truly concrete life, which is\ndevelopment and history, and as to historical thought, which is the\nself-consciousness of this life. In a certain sense, therefore, this\nresumption of the treatment of historiography on the completion of the\nwide circle, this drawing forth of it from the limits of the first\ntreatment of the subject, was the most natural conclusion that could\nbe given to the whole work. The character of 'conclusion' both explains\nand justifies the literary form of this last volume, which is more\ncompressed and less didactic than that of the previous volumes.\n\nB. C.\n\nNaples: May 1916\n\n\n\n\nTRANSLATOR'S NOTE\n\n\nThe author himself explains the precise connexion of the present work\nwith the other three volumes of the _Philosophy of the Spirit_, to\nwhich it now forms the conclusion.\n\nI had not contemplated translating this treatise, when engaged upon\nthe others, for the reason that it was not in existence in its present\nform, and an external parallel to its position as the last, the late\ncomer of the four masterpieces, is to be found in the fact of its\npublication by another firm than that which produced the preceding\nvolumes. This diversity in unity will, I am convinced, by no means act\nas a bar to the dissemination of the original thought contained in its\npages, none of which will, I trust, escape the diligent reader through\nthe close meshes of the translation.\n\nThe volume is similar in format to the _Logic_, the _Philosophy of the\nPractical_, and the _\u00c6sthetic_. The last is now out of print, but will\nreappear translated by me from the definitive fourth Italian edition,\ngreatly exceeding in bulk the previous editions.\n\nThe present translation is from the second Italian edition, published\nin 1919. In this the author made some slight verbal corrections and\na few small additions. I have, as always, followed the text with the\nclosest respect.\n\n\nD. A.\n\nThe Athen\u00e6um, London\n\nNovember 1920\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n    PART I\n\n    THEORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY\n\n        I.   History and Chronicle\n       II.   Pseudo-Histories\n      III.   History as History of the Universal.\n             Criticism of 'Universal History'\n       IV.   Ideal Genesis and Dissolution of the 'Philosophy of History'\n        V.   The Positivity of History\n       VI.   The Humanity of History\n      VII.   Choice and Periodization\n     VIII.   Distinction (Special Histories) and Division\n       IX.   The 'History of Nature' and History\n\n             APPENDICES\n        I.   Attested Evidence\n       II.   Analogy and Anomaly of Special Histories\n      III.   Philosophy and Methodology\n\n    PART II\n\n    CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY\n\n        I.   Preliminary Questions\n       II.   Gr\u00e6co-Roman Historiography\n      III.   Medieval Historiography\n       IV.   The Historiography of the Renaissance\n        V.   The Historiography of the Enlightenment\n       VI.   The Historiography of Romanticism\n      VII.   The Historiography of Positivism\n     VIII.   The New Historiography. Conclusion\n\n    Index of Names\n\n\n\n\n\nPART I\n\n\nTHEORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY\n\n\nI\n\n\nHISTORY AND CHRONICLE\n\n\n\nI\n\n\n'Contemporary history' is wont to be called the history of a passage\nof time, looked upon as a most recent past, whether it be that of the\nlast fifty years, a decade, a year, a month, a day, or indeed of the\nlast hour or of the last minute. But if we think and speak rigorously,\nthe term 'contemporaneous' can be applied only to that history which\ncomes into being immediately after the act which is being accomplished,\nas consciousness of that act: it is, for instance, the history that\nI make of myself while I am in the act of composing these pages; it\nis the thought of my composition, linked of necessity to the work\nof composition. 'Contemporary' would be well employed in this case,\njust because this, like every act of the spirit, is outside time (of\nthe first and after) and is formed 'at the same time' as the act to\nwhich it is linked, and from which it is distinguished by means of a\ndistinction not chronological but ideal. 'Non-contemporary history,'\n'past history,' would, on the other hand, be that which finds itself\nin the presence of a history already formed, and which thus comes into\nbeing as a criticism of that history, whether it be thousands of years\nor hardly an hour old.\n\nBut if we look more closely, we perceive that this history\nalready formed, which is called or which we would like to call\n'non-contemporary' or 'past' history, if it really is history, that\nis to say, if it mean something and is not an empty echo, is also\n_contemporary_, and does not in any way differ from the other. As in\nthe former case, the condition of its existence is that the deed of\nwhich the history is told must vibrate in the soul of the historian,\nor (to employ the expression of professed historians) that the\ndocuments are before the historian and that they are intelligible.\nThat a narrative or a series of narratives of the fact is united\nand mingled with it merely means that the fact has proved more\nrich, not that it has lost its quality of being present: what were\nnarratives or judgments before are now themselves facts, 'documents'\nto be interpreted and judged. History is never constructed from\nnarratives, but always from documents, or from narratives that have\nbeen reduced to documents and treated as such. Thus if contemporary\nhistory springs straight from life, so too does that history which\nis called non-contemporary, for it is evident that only an interest\nin the life of the present can move one to investigate past fact.\nTherefore this past fact does not answer to a past interest, but to a\npresent interest, in so far as it is unified with an interest of the\npresent life. This has been said again and again in a hundred ways by\nhistorians in their empirical formulas, and constitutes the reason, if\nnot the deeper content, of the success of the very trite saying that\nhistory is _magister vit\u00e6_.\n\nI have recalled these forms of historical technique in order to remove\nthe aspect of paradox from the proposition that 'every true history is\ncontemporary history.' But the justice of this proposition is easily\nconfirmed and copiously and perspicuously exemplified in the reality\nof historiographical work, provided always that we do not fall into\nthe error of taking the works of the historians all together, or\ncertain groups of them confusedly, and of applying them to an abstract\nman or to ourselves considered abstractly, and of then asking what\npresent interest leads to the writing or reading of such histories: for\ninstance, what is the present interest of the history which recounts\nthe Peloponnesian or the Mithradatic War, of the events connected with\nMexican art, or with Arabic philosophy. For me at the present moment\nthey are without interest, and therefore for me at this present moment\nthose histories are not histories, but at the most simply titles of\nhistorical works. They have been or will be histories in those that\nhave thought or will think them, and in me too when I have thought\nor shall think them, re-elaborating them according to my spiritual\nneeds. If, on the other hand, we limit ourselves to real history, to\nthe history that one really thinks in the act of thinking, it will be\neasily seen that this is perfectly identical with the most personal and\ncontemporary of histories. When the development of the culture of my\nhistorical moment presents to me (it would be superfluous and perhaps\nalso inexact to add to myself as an individual) the problem of Greek\ncivilization or of Platonic philosophy or of a particular mode of\nAttic manners, that problem is related to my being in the same way as\nthe history of a bit of business in which I am engaged, or of a love\naffair in which I am indulging, or of a danger that threatens me. I\nexamine it with the same anxiety and am troubled with the same sense of\nunhappiness until I have succeeded in solving it. Hellenic life is on\nthat occasion present in me; it solicits, it attracts and torments me,\nin the same way as the appearance of the adversary, of the loved one,\nor of the beloved son for whom one trembles. Thus too it happens or has\nhappened or will happen in the case of the Mithradatic War, of Mexican\nart, and of all the other things that I have mentioned above by way of\nexample.\n\nHaving laid it down that contemporaneity is not the characteristic\nof a class of histories (as is held with good reason in empirical\nclassifications), but an intrinsic characteristic of every history,\nwe must conceive the relation of history to life as that of _unity_;\ncertainly not in the sense of abstract identity, but of synthetic\nunity, which implies both the distinction and the unity of the terms.\nThus to talk of a history of which the documents are lacking would\nappear to be as extravagant as to talk of the existence of something as\nto which it is also affirmed that it is without one of the essential\nconditions of existence. A history without relation to the document\nwould be an unverifiable history; and since the reality of history lies\nin this verifiability, and the narrative in which it is given concrete\nform is historical narrative only in so far as it is a _critical\nexposition_ of the document (intuition and reflection, consciousness\nand auto-consciousness, etc.), a history of that sort, being without\nmeaning and without truth, would be inexistent as history. How could\na history of painting be composed by one who had not seen and enjoyed\nthe works of which he proposed to describe the genesis critically? And\nhow far could anyone understand the works in question who was without\nthe artistic experience assumed by the narrator? How could there be a\nhistory of philosophy without the works or at least fragments of the\nworks of the philosophers? How could there be a history of a sentiment\nor of a custom, for example that of Christian humility or of knightly\nchivalry, without the capacity for living again, or rather without an\nactual living again of these particular states of the individual soul?\n\nOn the other hand, once the indissoluble link between life and thought\nin history has been effected, the doubts that have been expressed as to\nthe _certainty_ and the _utility_ of history disappear altogether in\na moment. How could that which is a _present_ producing of our spirit\never be _uncertain_? How could that knowledge be _useless_ which solves\na problem that has come forth from the bosom of _life_?\n\n\n\n\nII\n\n\nBut can the link between document and narrative, between life and\nhistory, ever be broken? An affirmative answer to this has been given\nwhen referring to those histories of which the documents have been\nlost, or, to put the case in a more general and fundamental manner,\nthose histories whose documents are no longer alive in the human\nspirit. And this has also been implied when saying that we all of us in\nturn find ourselves thus placed with respect to this or that part of\nhistory. The history of Hellenic painting is in great part a history\nwithout documents for us, as are all histories of peoples concerning\nwhom one does not know exactly where they lived, the thoughts and\nfeelings chat they experienced, or the individual appearance of the\nworks that they accomplished; those literatures and philosophies, too,\nas to which we do not know their theses, or even when we possess these\nand are able to read them through, yet fail to grasp their intimate\nspirit, either owing to the lack of complementary knowledge or because\nof our obstinate temperamental reluctance, or owing to our momentary\ndistraction.\n\nIf, in these cases, when that connexion is broken, we can no longer\ncall what remains history (because history was nothing but that\nconnexion), and it can henceforth only be called history in the sense\nthat we call a man the corpse of a man, what remains is not for\nthat reason nothing (not even the corpse is really nothing). Were\nit nothing, it would be the same as saying that the connexion is\nindissoluble, because nothingness is never effectual. And if it be not\nnothing, if it be something, what is narrative without the document?\n\nA history of Hellenic painting, according to the accounts that have\nbeen handed down or have been constructed by the learned of our times,\nwhen closely inspected, resolves itself into a series of names of\npainters (Apollodorus, Polygnotus, Zeuxis, Apelles, etc.), surrounded\nwith biographical anecdotes, and into a series of subjects for\npainting (the burning of Troy, the contest of the Amazons, the battle\nof Marathon, Achilles, Calumny, etc.), of which certain particulars\nare given in the descriptions that have reached us; or a graduated\nseries, going from praise to blame, of these painters and their works,\ntogether with names, anecdotes, subjects, judgments, arranged more or\nless chronologically. But the names of painters separated from the\ndirect knowledge of their works are empty names; the anecdotes are\nempty, as are the descriptions of subjects, the judgment of approval\nor of disapproval, and the chronological arrangement, because merely\narithmetical and lacking real development; and the reason why we do\nnot realize it in thought is that the elements which should constitute\nit are wanting. If those verbal forms possess any significance, we owe\nit to what little we know of antique paintings from fragments, from\nsecondary works that have come down to us in copies, or in analogous\nworks in the other arts, or in poetry. With the exception, however, of\nthat little, the history of Hellenic art is, as such, a tissue of empty\nwords.\n\nWe can, if we like, say that it is 'empty of determinate content,'\nbecause we do not deny that when we pronounce the name of a painter\nwe think of some painter, and indeed of a painter who is an Athenian,\nand that when we utter the word 'battle,' or 'Helen,' we think of\na battle, indeed of a battle of hoplites, or of a beautiful woman,\nsimilar to those familiar to us in Hellenic sculpture. But we can\nthink indifferently of any one of the numerous facts that those names\nrecall. For this reason their content is indeterminate, and this\nindetermination of content is their emptiness.\n\n\nAll histories separated from their living documents resemble these\nexamples and are empty narratives, and since they are empty they are\nwithout truth. Is it true or not that there existed a painter named\nPolygnotus and that he painted a portrait of Miltiades in the Poecile?\nWe shall be told that it is true, because one person or several\npeople, who knew him and saw the work in question, bear witness to\nits existence. But we must reply that it was true for this or that\nwitness, and that for us it is neither true nor false, or (which comes\nto the same thing) that it is true only on the evidence of those\nwitnesses--that is to say, for an extrinsic reason, whereas truth\nalways requires intrinsic reasons. And since that proposition is not\ntrue (neither true nor false), it is not useful either, because where\nthere is nothing the king loses his rights, and where the elements of a\nproblem are wanting the effective will and the effective need to solve\nit are also wanting, along with the possibility of its solution. Thus\nto quote those empty judgments is quite useless for our actual lives.\nLife is a present, and that history which has become an empty narration\nis a past: it is an irrevocable past, if not absolutely so, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8' \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u03cc,\nthen certainly for the present moment.\n\nThe empty words remain, and the empty words are sounds, or the graphic\nsigns which represent them, and they hold together and maintain\nthemselves, not by an act of thought that thinks them (in which case\nthey would soon be filled), but by an act of will, which thinks it\nuseful for certain ends of its own to preserve those words, however\nempty or half empty they may be. Mere narrative, then, is nothing but a\ncomplex of empty words or formulas asserted by an act of the will.\n\nNow with this definition we have succeeded in giving neither more\nnor less than the true distinction, hitherto sought in vain, between\n_history_ and _chronicle_. It has been sought in vain, because it has\ngenerally been sought in a difference in the _quality_ of the facts\nwhich each difference took as its object. Thus, for instance, the\nrecord of _individual_ facts has been attributed to chronicle, to\nhistory that of _general_ facts; to chronicle the record of _private_,\nto history that of _public_ facts: as though the general were not\nalways individual and the individual general, and the public were not\nalways also private and the private public! Or else the record of\n_important_ facts (memorable things) has been attributed to history, to\nchronicle that of the _unimportant_: as though the importance of facts\nwere not relative to the situation in which we find ourselves, and as\nthough for a man annoyed by a mosquito the evolutions of the minute\ninsect were not of greater importance than the expedition of Xerxes!\nCertainly, we are sensible of a just sentiment in these fallacious\ndistinctions--namely, that of placing the difference between history\nand chronicle in the conception of what _interests_ and of what does\nnot _interest_ (the general interests and not the particular, the\ngreat interests and not the little, etc.). A just sentiment is also\nto be noted in other considerations that are wont to be adduced, such\nas the close bond between events that there is in history and the\n_disconnectedness_ that appears on the other hand in chronicle, the\n_logical_ order of the first, the purely _chronological_ order of the\nsecond, the penetration of the first into the _core_ of events and\nthe limitation of the second to the superficial or _external_, and\nthe like. But the differential character is here rather metaphorized\nthan thought, and when metaphors are not employed as simple forms\nexpressive of thought we lose a moment after what has just been gained.\nThe truth is that chronicle and history are not distinguishable as\ntwo forms of history, mutually complementary, or as one subordinate\nto the other, but as two different spiritual _attitudes_. History is\nliving chronicle, chronicle is dead history; history is contemporary\nhistory, chronicle is past history; history is principally an act of\nthought, chronicle an act of will. Every history becomes chronicle\nwhen it is no longer thought, but only recorded in abstract words,\nwhich were once upon a time concrete and expressive. The history of\nphilosophy even is chronicle, when written or read by those who do not\nunderstand philosophy: history would even be what we are now disposed\nto read as chronicle, as when, for instance, the monk of Monte Cassino\nnotes: 1001. _Beatus Dominicus migravit ad Christum_. 1002. _Hoc anno\nvenerunt Saraceni super Capuam_. 1004. _Terremotus ingens hunc montem\nexagitavit_, etc.; for those facts were present to him when he wept\nover the death of the departed Dominic, or was terrified by the natural\nhuman scourges that convulsed his native land, seeing the hand of God\nin that succession of events. This does not prevent that history from\nassuming the form of chronicle when that same monk of Monte Cassino\nwrote down cold formulas, without representing to himself or thinking\ntheir content, with the sole intention of not allowing those memories\nto be lost and of handing them down to those who should inhabit Monte\nCassino after him.\n\nBut the discovery of the real distinction between chronicle and\nhistory, which is a formal distinction (that is to say, a truly real\ndistinction), not only frees us from the sterile and fatiguing search\nafter material distinctions (that is to say, imaginary distinctions),\nbut it also enables us to reject a very common presupposition--namely,\nthat of the _priority_ of chronicle in respect to history. _Primo\nannales_ [chronicles] _fuere, post histori\u00e6 fact\u00e6 sunt_, the saying of\nthe old grammarian, Mario Vittorino, has been repeated, generalized,\nand universalized. But precisely the opposite of this is the outcome of\nthe inquiry into the character and therefore into the genesis of the\ntwo operations or attitudes: _first comes history, then chronicle_.\nFirst comes the living being, then the corpse; and to make history the\nchild of chronicle is the same thing as to make the living be born from\nthe corpse, which is the residue of life, as chronicle is the residue\nof history.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\n\nHistory, separated from the living document and turned into chronicle,\nis no longer a spiritual act, but a thing, a complex of sounds and\nof other signs. But the document also, when separated from life, is\nnothing but a thing like another, a complex of sounds or of other\nsigns--for example, the sounds and the letters in which a law was once\ncommunicated; the lines cut into a block of marble, which manifested a\nreligious sentiment by means of the figure of a god; a heap of bones,\nwhich were at one time the expression of a man or of an animal.\n\nDo such things as empty narratives and dead documents exist? In a\ncertain sense, no, because external things do not exist outside the\nspirit; and we already know that chronicle, as empty narrative, exists\nin so far as the spirit produces it and holds it firmly with an act of\nwill (and it may be opportune to observe once more that such an act\ncarries always with it a new act of consciousness and of thought):\nwith an act of will, which abstracts the sound from the thought,\nin which dwelt the certainty and concreteness of the sound. In the\nsame way, these dead documents exist to the extent that they are the\nmanifestations of a new life, as the lifeless corpse is really itself\nalso a process of vital creation, although it appears to be one of\ndecomposition and something dead in respect of a particular form of\nlife. But in the same way as those empty sounds, which once contained\nthe thought of a history, are eventually called _narratives_, in memory\nof the thought they contained, thus do those manifestations of a new\nlife continue to be looked upon as remnants of the life that preceded\nthem and is indeed extinguished.\n\nNow observe how, by means of this string of deductions, we have\nput ourselves into the position of being able to account for the\npartition of historical _sources_ into _narratives_ and _documents_,\nas we find it among some of our modern methodologists, or, as it\nis also formulated, into _traditions_ and _residues_ or _remains_\n(_\u00dcberbleibsel_, _\u00dcberreste_). This partition is irrational from\nthe empirical point of view, and may be of use as indicating the\ninopportunity of the introduction of a speculative thought into\nempiricism. It is so irrational that one immediately runs against\nthe difficulty of not being able to distinguish what one wished to\ndistinguish. An empty 'narrative' considered as a thing is tantamount\nto any other thing whatever which is called a 'document.' And, on\nthe other hand, if we maintain the distinction we incur the further\ndifficulty of having to base our historical construction upon two\ndifferent orders of data (one foot on the bank and the other in\nthe river)--that is to say, we shall have to recur to two parallel\ninstances, one of which is perpetually referring us back to the other.\nAnd when we seek to determine the relation of the two kinds of sources\nwith a view to avoiding the inconvenient parallelism, what happens is\nthis: either the relation is stated to depend upon the superiority\nof the one over the other, and the distinction vanishes, because the\nsuperior form absorbs into itself and annuls the inferior form; or\na third term is established, in which the two forms are supposed to\nbecome united with a distinction: but this is another way of declaring\nthem to be inexistent in that abstractness. For this reason it does not\nseem to me to be without significance that the partition of accounts\nand documents should not have been adopted by the most empirical of the\nmethodologists. They do not involve themselves in these subtleties,\nbut content themselves with grouping the historical sources into those\nthat are _written_ and those that are _represented_, or in other\nsimilar ways. In Germany, however, Droysen availed himself of these\ndistinctions between narratives and documents, traditions, etc., in\nhis valuable _Elements of Historicism_ (he had strong leanings toward\nphilosophy), and they have been employed also by other methodologists,\nwho are hybrid empiricists, 'systematists,' or 'pedants,' as they\nare looked upon in our Latin countries. This is due to the copious\nphilosophical traditions of Germany. The pedantry certainly exists,\nand it is to be found just in that inopportune philosophy. But what\nan excellent thing is that pedantry and the contradictions which it\nentails, how it arouses the mind from its empirical slumbers and makes\nit see that in place of supposed things there are in reality spiritual\nacts, where the terms of an irreconcilable dualism were supposed\nto be in conflict, relation and unity, on the contrary, prevail!\nThe partition of the sources into narratives and documents, and the\nsuperiority attributed to documents over narratives, and the alleged\nnecessity of narrative as a subordinate but ineradicable element,\nalmost form a mythology or allegory, which represents in an imaginative\nmanner the relation between life and thought, between document and\ncriticism in historical thought.\n\nAnd document and criticism, life and thought, are the true _sources_\nof history--that is to say, the two elements of historical synthesis;\nand as such, they do not stand face to face with history, or face to\nface with the synthesis, in the same way as fountains are represented\nas being face to face with those who go to them with a pail, but they\nform part of history itself, they are within the synthesis, they\nform a constituent part of it and are constituted by it. Hence the\nidea of a history with its sources outside itself is another fancy\nto be dispelled, together with that of history being the opposite of\nchronicle. The two erroneous fancies converge to form one. Sources, in\nthe extrinsic sense of the empiricists, like things, are equally with\nchronicle, which is a class of those things, not anterior but posterior\nto history. History would indeed be in a fix if it expected to be\nborn of what comes after it, to be born of external things! Thing, not\nthought, is born of thing: a history derived from things would be a\nthing--that is to say, just the inexistent of which we were talking a\nmoment ago.\n\nBut there must be a reason why chronicle as well as documents seems\nto precede history and to be its extrinsic source. The human spirit\npreserves the mortal remains of history, empty narratives and\nchronicles, and the same spirit collects the traces of past life,\nremains and documents, striving as far as possible to preserve them\nunchanged and to restore them as they deteriorate. What is the object\nof these acts of will which go to the preservation of what is empty\nand dead? Perhaps illusion or foolishness, which preserves a little\nwhile the worn-out elements of mortality on the confines of Dis by\nmeans of the erection of mausoleums and sepulchres? But sepulchres\nare not foolishness and illusion; they are, on the contrary, an act\nof morality, by which is affirmed the immortality of the work done by\nindividuals. Although dead, they live in our memory and will live in\nthe memory of times to come. And that collecting of dead documents and\nwriting down of empty histories is an act of life which serves life.\nThe moment will come when they will serve to reproduce past history,\nenriched and made present to our spirit.\n\nFor dead history revives, and past history again becomes present, as\nthe development of life demands them. The Romans and the Greeks lay\nin their sepulchres, until awakened at the Renaissance by the new\nmaturity of the European spirit. The primitive forms of civilization,\nso gross and so barbaric, lay forgotten, or but little regarded, or\nmisunderstood, until that new phase of the European spirit, which was\nknown as Romanticism or Restoration, 'sympathized' with them--that is\nto say, recognized them as its own proper present interest. Thus great\ntracts of history which are now chronicle for us, many documents now\nmute, will in their turn be traversed with new flashes of life and will\nspeak again.\n\nThese revivals have altogether interior motives, and no wealth of\ndocuments or of narratives will bring them about; indeed, it is they\nthemselves that copiously collect and place before themselves the\ndocuments and narratives, which without them would remain scattered\nand inert. And it will be impossible ever to understand anything of\nthe effective process of historical thought unless we start from the\nprinciple that the spirit itself is history, maker of history at every\nmoment of its existence, and also the result of all anterior history.\nThus the spirit bears with it all its history, which coincides with\nitself. To forget one aspect of history and to remember another one\nis nothing but the rhythm of the life of the spirit, which operates\nby determining and individualizing itself, and by always rendering\nindeterminate and disindividualizing previous determinations and\nindividualizations, in order to create others more copious. The spirit,\nso to speak, lives again its own history without those external\nthings called narratives and documents; but those external things are\ninstruments that it makes for itself, acts preparatory to that internal\nvital evocation in whose process they are resolved. The spirit asserts\nand jealously preserves 'records of the past' for that purpose.\n\nWhat we all of us do at every moment when we note dates and other\nmatters concerning our private affairs (chronicles) in our\npocket-books, or when we place in their little caskets ribbons and\ndried flowers (I beg to be allowed to select these pleasant images,\nwhen giving instances of the collection of 'documents'), is done on a\nlarge scale by a certain class of workers called _philologists_, as\nthough at the invitation of the whole of society. They are specially\nknown as the _erudite_ when they collect evidence and narrations,\nas _arch\u00e6ologists_ and _archivists_ when they collect documents and\nmonuments, as the places where such objects are kept (the \"silent white\nabodes of the dead\") are called libraries, archives, and museums.\nCan there be any ill-feeling against these men of erudition, these\narchivists and arch\u00e6ologists, who fulfil a necessary and therefore\na useful and important function? The fact remains that there is a\ntendency to mock at them and to regard them with compassion. It is\ntrue enough that they sometimes afford a hold for derision with their\ningenuous belief that they have history under lock and key and are\nable to unlock the 'sources' at which thirsty humanity may quench its\ndesire for knowledge; but we know that history is in all of us and that\nits sources are in our own breasts. For it is in our own breasts alone\nthat is to be found that crucible in which the _certain_ is converted\ninto the _true_, and _philology_, joining with _philosophy_, produces\n_history_.\n\n\n\n\nII\n\n\nPSEUDO-HISTORIES\n\n\nHistory, chronicle, and philology, of which we have seen the origin,\nare series of mental forms, which, although distinct from one another,\nmust all of them be looked upon as physiological--that is to say, true\nand rational. But logical sequence now leads me from physiology to\npathology--to those forms that are not forms but deformations, not true\nbut erroneous, not rational but irrational.\n\nThe ingenuous belief cherished by the philologists that they have\nhistory locked up in their libraries, museums, and archives (something\nin the same manner as the genius of the _Arabian Nights_, who was\nshut up in a small vase in the form of compressed smoke) does not\nremain inactive, and gives rise to the idea of a history constructed\nwith things, traditions, and documents (empty traditions and dead\ndocuments), and this affords an instance of what may be called\n_philological_ history. I say the idea and not the reality, because\nit is simply impossible to compose a history with external things,\nwhatever efforts may be made and whatever trouble be taken. Chronicles\nthat have been weeded, chopped up into fragments, recombined,\nrearranged, always remain nevertheless chronicles--that is to say,\nempty narratives; and documents that have been restored, reproduced,\ndescribed, brought into line, remain documents--that is to say, silent\nthings. Philological history consists of the pouring out of one or\nmore books into a new book. This operation bears an appropriate name\nin current language and is known as 'compilation.' These compilations\nare frequently convenient, because they save the trouble of having\nrecourse to several books at the same time; but they do not contain\nany historical thought. Modern chronological philologists regard\nmedieval chroniclers and the old Italian historians (from Machiavelli\nand Guicciardini down to Giannone) with a feeling of superiority.\nThese writers 'transcribed,' as they called it, their 'sources' in\nthe parts of their books that are devoted to narrative--that is\nto say, chronicle. Yet they themselves do not and cannot behave\notherwise, because when history is being composed from 'sources' as\nexternal things there is never anything else to do but to transcribe\nthe sources. Transcription is varied by sometimes summarizing and\nsometimes altering the words, and this is sometimes a question of\ngood taste and sometimes a literary pretence; it is also a verifying\nof quotations, which is sometimes a proof of loyalty and exactitude,\nsometimes a make-believe and a making oneself believe that the feet\nare planted firmly on the earth, on the soil of truth, believed to\nbe narrative and quotation from the document. How very many of such\nphilological historians there are in our time, especially since the\nso-called 'philological method' has been exaggerated--that is to say,\na one-sided value has been attributed to it! These histories have\nindeed a dignified and scientific appearance, but unfortunately _fehlt\nleider! das geistige Band_, the spiritual tie is wanting. They really\nconsist at bottom of nothing but learned or very learned 'chronicles,'\nsometimes of use for purposes of consultation, but lacking words that\nnourish and keep warm the minds and souls of men.\n\nNevertheless, since we have demonstrated that philological history\nreally presents chronicles and documents and not histories, it might\nbe asked upon what possible ground do we accuse it of irrationality\nand error, seeing that we have regarded the formation of chronicles,\nthe collection of documents, and all the care that is expended Upon\nthem as most rational? But error never lies in the fact, but only in\nthe 'claim' or 'idea' that accompanies the fact. And in this case\nthe idea or claim is that which has been defined above as properly\nbelonging to philological history--namely, that of composing histories\nwith documents and narratives. This claim can be said to exercise a\nrational function also, to the extent that it lays down the claim,\nthough without satisfying it, that history should go beyond the mere\nchronicle or document. But in so far as it makes the claim, without\nitself fulfilling it, this mode of history must be characterized as\ncontradictory and absurd.\n\nAnd since the claim is absurd, philological history remains without\ntruth as being that which, like chronicle, has not got truth within\nit, but derives it from the authority to which it appeals. It will be\nclaimed for philology that it tests authorities and selects those most\nworthy of faith. But without dwelling upon the fact that chronicle\nalso, and chronicle of the crudest, most ignorant and credulous sort,\nproceeded in a like manner by testing and selecting those authorities\nwhich seemed to it to be the most worthy of faith, it is always a\nquestion of faith (that is to say, of the thought of others and of\nthought belonging to the past) and not of criticism (that is to say,\nof our own thought in the act), of verisimilitude and not of that\ncertainty which is truth. Hence philological history can certainly be\n_correct_, but not _true_ (_richtig_ and not _wahr_). And as it is\nwithout truth, so is it without true historical interest--that is to\nsay, it sheds no light upon an order of facts answering to a practical\nand ethical want; it may embrace any matter indifferently, however\nremote it be from the practical and ethical soul of the compiler.\nThus, as a pure philologist, I enjoy the free choice of indifference,\nand the history of Italy for the last half-century has the same value\nfor me as that of the Chinese dynasty of the Tsin. I shall turn from\none to the other, moved, no doubt, by a certain interest, but by an\nextra-historical interest, of the sort formed in the special circle of\nphilology.\n\nThis procedure, which is without truth and without passion, and is\nproper to philological history, explains the marked contrast so\nconstantly renewed between the philological historians and historians\nproperly so called. These latter, intent as they are upon the solution\nof vital problems, grow impatient to find themselves offered in reply\nthe frigid products of philology, or become angry at the persistent\nassertion that such is history, and that it must be treated in such\na spirit and with such methods. Perhaps the finest explosion of such\na feeling of anger and annoyance is to be found in the _Letters on\nthe Study of History_ (1751) of Bolingbroke, in which erudition is\ntreated as neither more nor less than sumptuous ignorance, and learned\ndisquisitions upon ancient or primitive history are admitted at the\nmost as resembling those 'eccentric preludes' which precede concerts\nand aid in setting the instruments in tune and that can only be\nmistaken for harmony by some one without ear, just in the same way as\nonly he who is without historic sense can confuse those exhibitions of\nerudition with true history. As an antithesis to them he suggests as\nan ideal a kind of 'political maps,' for the use of the intellect and\nnot of the memory, indicating the _Storie fiorentine_ of Machiavelli\nand the _Trattato dei benefici_ of Fra Paolo as writings that approach\nthat ideal. Finally he maintains that for true and living history we\nshould not go beyond the beginning of the sixteenth century, beyond\nCharles V and Henry VIII, when the political and social history of\nEurope first appeared--a system which still persisted at the beginning\nof the eighteenth century. He then proceeds to paint a picture of those\ntwo centuries of history, for the use, not of the curious and the\nerudite, but of politicians, too one, I think, would wish to deny the\njust sentiment for history which animates these demands, set forth in\nso vivacious a manner. Bolingbroke, however, did not rise, nor was it\npossible for him to rise, to the conception of the death and rebirth of\nevery history (which is the rigorously speculative concept of 'actual'\nand 'contemporary' history), owing to the conditions of culture of\nhis time, nor did he suspect that primitive barbaric history, which\nhe threw into a corner as useless dead leaves, would reappear quite\nfresh half a century later, as the result of the reaction against\nintellectualism and Jacobinism, and that this reaction would have as\none of its principal promoters a publicist of his own country, Burke,\nnor indeed that it had already reappeared in his own time in a corner\nof Italy, in the mind and soul of Giambattista Vico. I shall not adduce\nfurther instances of the conflict between effective and philological\nhistorians, after this conspicuous one of Bolingbroke, because it is\nexceedingly well known, and the strife is resumed under our very eyes\nat every moment. I shall only add that it is certainly deplorable\n(though altogether natural, because blows are not measured in a\nstruggle) that the polemic against the 'philologists' should have been\ntransferred so as to include also the philologues pure and simple. For\nthese latter, the poor learned ones, archivists and arch\u00e6ologists, are\nharmless, beneficent little souls. If they should be destroyed, as is\nsometimes prophesied in the heat of controversy, the fertility of the\nspiritual field would be not only diminished, but ruined altogether,\nand we should be obliged to promote to the utmost of our power the\nreintroduction of those coefficients of our culture, very much in the\nsame way as is said to have been the case with French agriculture after\nthe improvident harrying of the harmless and beneficent wasps which\nwent on for several years.\n\nWhatever of justified or justifiable is to be found in the statements\nas to the _uncertainty_ and _uselessness_ of history is also due to\nthe revolt of the pure historic sense against philological history.\nThis is to be assumed from observing that even the most radical of\nthose opponents (Fontenelle, Volney, Delfico, etc.) end by admitting\nor demanding some form of history as not useless or uncertain, or not\naltogether useless and uncertain, and from the fact that all their\nshafts are directed against philological history and that founded upon\nauthority, of which the only appropriate definition is that of Rousseau\n(in the _\u00c9mile_), as _l'art de choisir entre plusieurs mensonges, celui\nqui ressemble mieux \u00e0 la v\u00e9rit\u00e9._\n\nIn all other respects--that is to say, as regards the part due to\nsensational and naturalistic assumptions--historical scepticism\ncontradicts itself here, like every form of scepticism, for the natural\nsciences themselves, thus raised to the rank of model, are founded upon\nperceptions, observations, and experiments--that is to say, upon facts\nhistorically ascertained--and the 'sensations,' upon which the whole\ntruth of knowledge is based, are not themselves knowledge, save to the\nextent that they assume the form of affirmations--that is to say, in so\nfar as they are history.\n\nBut the truth is that philological history, like every other sort of\nerror, does not fall before the enemy's attack, but rather solely\nfrom internal causes, and it is its own professors that destroy it,\nwhen they conceive of it as without connexion with life, as merely\na learned exercise (note the many histories that are treatments of\nscholastic themes, undertaken with a view to training in the art of\nresearch, interpretation, and exposition, and the many others that\nare continuations of this direction outside the school and are due to\ntendency there imparted), and when they themselves evince uncertainty,\nsurrounding every statement that they make with _doubts_. The\ndistinction between _criticism_ and _hypercriticism_ has been drawn\nwith a view to arresting this spontaneous dissolution of historical\nphilology; thus we find the former praised and allowed, while the\nlatter is blamed and forbidden. But the distinction is one of the\ncustomary sort, by means of which lack of intelligence disguised as\nlove of moderation contrives to chip off the edges from the antitheses\nthat it fails to solve. Hypercriticism is the prosecution of criticism;\nit is criticism itself, and to divide criticism into a more and a less,\nand to admit the less and deny the more, is extravagant, to say the\nleast of it. No 'authorities' are certain while others are uncertain,\nbut all are uncertain, varying in uncertainty in an extrinsic and\nconjectural manner. Who can guarantee himself against the false\nstatement made by the usually diligent and trustworthy witness in a\nmoment of distraction or of passion? A sixteenth-century inscription,\nstill to be read in one of the old byways of Naples, wisely prays\nGod (and historical philologists should pray to Him fervently every\nmorning) to deliver us now and for ever from _the lies of honest\nmen_. Thus historians who push criticism to the point of so-called\nhypercriticism perform a most instructive philosophical duty when they\nrender the whole of such work vain, and therefore fit to be called\nby the title of Sanchez's work _Quod nihil scitur_. I recollect the\nremark made to me when I was occupied with research work in my young\ndays by a friend of but slight literary knowledge, to whom I had lent\na very critical, indeed hypercritical, history of ancient Rome. When\nhe had finished reading it he returned the book to me, remarking that\nhe had acquired the proud conviction of being \"the most learned of\nphilologists,\" because the latter arrive at the conclusion that they\nknow nothing as the result of exhausting toil, while he knew nothing\nwithout any effort at all, simply as a generous gift of nature.[1]\n\n\n\nII\n\n\nThe consequence of this spontaneous dissolution of philological history\nshould be the negation of history claimed to have been written with\nthe aid of narratives and documents conceived as external things, and\nthe consignment of these to their proper lower place as mere aids to\nhistorical knowledge, as it determines and redetermines itself in the\ndevelopment of the spirit. But if such consequences are distasteful\nand the project is persevered in of thus writing history in spite of\nrepeated failures, the further problem then presents itself as to\nhow the cold indifference of philological history and its intrinsic\nuncertainty can be healed without changing those presumptions. The\nproblem, itself fallacious, can receive but a fallacious solution,\nexpressed by the substitution of the interest of _sentiment_ for\nthe lack of interest of thought and of _\u00e6sthetic_ coherence of\nrepresentation for the logical coherence here unobtainable. The new\nerroneous form of history thus obtained is _poetical history._\n\nNumerous examples of this kind of history are afforded by the\naffectionate biographies of persons much beloved and venerated and by\nthe satirical biographies of the detested; patriotic histories which\nvaunt the glory and lament the misadventures of the people to which the\nauthor belongs and with which he sympathizes, and those that shed a\nsinister light upon the enemy people, adversary of his own; universal\nhistory, illuminated with the ideals of liberalism or humanitarianism,\nthat composed by a socialist, depicting the acts, as Marx said, of the\n\"cavalier of the sorry countenance,\" in other words of the capitalist,\nthat of the anti-Semite, who shows the Jew to be everywhere the source\nof human misfortune and of human turpitude and the persecution of the\nJew to be the acme of human splendour and happiness. Nor is poetical\nhistory exhausted with this fundamental and general description of\nlove and hate (love that is hate and hate that is love), for it passes\nthrough all the most intricate forms, the fine gradations of sentiment.\nThus we have poetical histories which are amorous, melancholy,\nnostalgic, pessimistic, resigned, confident, cheerful, and as many\nother sorts as one can imagine. Herodotus celebrates the romance of the\njealousies of the gods, Livy the epos of Roman virtue, Tacitus composes\nhorrible tragedies, Elizabethan dramas in sculptural Latin prose. If\nwe turn to the most modern among the moderns, we find Droysen giving\nexpression to his lyrical aspiration toward the strong centralized\nstate in his history of Macedonia, that Prussia of Hellas; Grote to his\naspirations toward democratic institutions, as symbolized in Athens;\nMommsen to those directed toward empire, as symbolized in C\u00e6sar;\nBalbo pouring forth all his ardours for Latin independence, employing\nfor that purpose all the records of Latin battles and beginning with\nnothing less than those between the Itali and Etrusci against the\nPelasgi; Thierry celebrating the middle class in the history of the\nThird Estate represented by Jacques Bonhomme; the Goncourts writing\nvoluptuous fiction round the figures of Mme de Pompadour, of Mme Du\nBarry, of Marie Antoinette, more careful of the material and cut of\ngarments than of thoughts; and, finally, De Barante, in his history of\nthe Dukes of Burgundy, having his eye upon knights and ladies, arms and\nlove.\n\nIt may seem that the indifference of philological history is thus\ntruly conquered and historical material dominated by a principle and\ncriterion of _values_. This is the demand persistently addressed to\nhistory from all sides in our day by methodologists and philosophers.\nBut I have avoided the word 'value' hitherto, owing to its equivocal\nmeaning, apt to deceive many. For since history is history of the\nspirit, and since spirit is value, and indeed the only value that is\npossible to conceive, that history is clearly always history of values;\nand since the spirit becomes transparent to itself as thought in the\nconsciousness of the historian, the value that rules the writing of\nhistory is the value of thought. But precisely for this reason its\nprinciple of determination cannot be the value known as the value of\n'sentiment,' which is life and not thought, and when this life finds\nexpression and representation, before it has been dominated by thought,\nwe have poetry, not history. In order to turn poetical biography into\ntruly historical biography we must repress our loves, our tears, our\nscorn, and seek what function the individual has fulfilled in social\nactivity or civilization; and we must do the same for national history\nas for that of humanity, and for every group of facts, small or great,\nas for every order of events. We must supersede--that is to say,\ntransform--values of _sentiment_ with values of _thought_. If we do not\nfind ourselves able to rise to this 'subjectivity' of thought, we shall\nproduce poetry and not history: the historical problem will remain\nintact, or, rather, it will not yet have come into being, but will do\nso when the requisite conditions are present. The interest that stirs\nus in the former case is not that of life which becomes thought, but of\nlife which becomes intuition and imagination.\n\nAnd since we have entered the domain of poetry, while the historical\nproblem remains beyond, erudition Or philology, from which we seem\nto have started, remains something on this side--that is to say, is\naltogether surpassed. In philological history, notwithstanding the\nclaims made by it, chronicles and documents persist in their crude\nnatural and undigested state. But these are profoundly changed in\npoetical history; or, to speak with greater accuracy, they are simply\ndissolved. Let us ignore the case (common enough) of the historian\nwho, with a view to obtaining artistic effects, intentionally mingles\nhis inventions with the data provided by the chronicles and documents,\nendeavouring to make them pass for history--that is to say, he renders\nhimself guilty of a lie and is the cause of confusion. But the\nalteration that is continuous and inherent to historiography consists\nof the choice and connexion of the details themselves, selected from\nthe 'sources,' rather owing to motives of sentiment than of thought.\nThis, closely considered, is really an invention or imagining of the\nfacts; the new connexion becomes concrete in a newly imagined fact. And\nsince the data that are taken from the 'sources' do not always lend\nthemselves with docility to the required connexion, it is considered\npermissible to _solliciter doucement les textes_ (as, if I am not\nmistaken, Renan, one of the historian-poets, remarked) and to add\nimaginary particulars, though in a conjectural form, to the actual\ndata. Vossius blamed those Grecian historians, and historians of other\nnations, who, when they invent fables, _ad effugiendam vanitatis notam\nsatis fore putant si addant solemne suum 'aiunt,' 'fertur,' vel aliquid\nquod tantundem valeat_. But even in our own day it would be diverting\nand instructive to catalogue the forms of insinuation employed by\nhistorians who pass for being most weighty, with a view to introducing\ntheir own personal imaginings: 'perhaps,' 'it would seem,' 'one would\nsay,' 'it is pleasant to think,' 'we may infer,' 'it is probable,' 'it\nis evident,' and the like; and to note how they sometimes come to omit\nthese warnings and recount things that they have themselves imagined\nas though they had seen them, in order to complete their picture,\nregarding which they would be much embarrassed if some one, indiscreet\nas an _enfant terrible_, should chance to ask them: \"How do you know\nit?\" \"Who told you this?\" Recourse has been had to the methodological\ntheory of \"imagination necessary for the historian who does not wish\nto become a mere chronicler,\" to an imagination, that is to say, which\nshall be reconstructive and integrating; or, as is also said, to\n\"the necessity of integrating the historical datum with our personal\npsychology or psychological knowledge.\" This theory, similar to that\nof value in history, also contains an equivocation. For doubtless\nimagination is indispensable to the historian: empty criticism, empty\nnarrative, the concept without intuition or imagination, are altogether\nsterile; and this has been said and said again in these pages, when\nwe have demanded the vivid experience of the events whose history we\nhave undertaken to relate, which also means their re-elaboration as\nintuition and imagination. Without this imaginative reconstruction or\nintegration it is not possible to write history, or to read it, or to\nunderstand it. But this sort of imagination, which is really quite\nindispensable to the historian, is the imagination that is inseparable\nfrom the historical synthesis, the imagination in and for thought, the\nconcreteness of thought, which is never an abstract concept, but always\na relation and a judgment, not indetermination but determination. It\nis nevertheless to be radically distinguished from the free poetic\nimagination, dear to those historians who see and hear the face and\nthe voice of Jesus on the Lake of Tiberias, or follow Heraclitus on\nhis daily walks among the hills of Ephesus, or repeat again the secret\ncolloquies between Francis of Assisi and the sweet Umbrian countryside.\n\nHere too we shall be asked of what error, then, we can accuse poetical\nhistory, if it be poetry (a necessary form of the spirit and one of the\ndearest to the heart of man) and not history. But here also we must\nreply--in manner analogous to our reply in the case of philological\nhistory--that the error does not lie in what is done, but in what is\nclaimed to be done: not in creating poetry, but in calling histories\nthat are poetry poetical histories, which is a contradiction in terms.\nSo far am I from entertaining the thought of objecting to poetry\nwoven out of historical data that I wish to affirm that a great part\nof pure poetry, especially in modern times, is to be found in books\nthat are called histories. The epic, for instance, did not, as is\nbelieved, die in the nineteenth century, but it is not to be found in\nthe 'epic poems' of Botta, of Bagnoli, of Bellini, or of Bandettini,\nwhere it is sought by short-sighted classifiers of literature, but in\nnarratives of the history of the Risorgimento, where are poured forth\nepic, drama, satire, idyll, elegy, and as many other 'kinds of poetry'\nas may be desired. The historiography of the Risorgimento is in great\npart a poetical historiography, rich in legends which still await\nthe historian, or have met with him only occasionally and by chance,\nexactly like ancient or medieval epic, which, if it were really poetry,\nwas yet believed by its hearers, and often perhaps by its composers\nthemselves, to be history. And I claim for others and for myself\nthe right to imagine history as dictated by my personal feeling; to\nimagine, for instance, an Italy as fair as a beloved woman, as dear as\nthe tenderest of mothers, as austere as a venerated ancestress, to seek\nout her doings through the centuries and even to prophesy her future,\nand to create for myself in history idols of hatred and of love, to\nembellish yet more the charming, if I will, and to make the unpleasant\nyet more unpleasant. I claim to seek out every memory and every\nparticular, the expressions of countenance, the gestures, the garments,\nthe dwellings, every kind of insignificant particular (insignificant\nfor others or in other respects, but not for me at that moment), almost\nphysically to approach my friends and my mistresses, of both of which\nI possess a fine circle or harem in history. But it remains evident\nthat when I or others have the intention of writing history, true\nhistory and not poetical history, we shall clear away myths and idols,\nfriends and mistresses, devoting our attention solely to the problem of\nhistory, which is spirit or value (or if less philosophical and more\ncolloquial terms be preferred, culture, civilization, progress), and we\nshall look upon them with the two eyes and the single sight of thought.\nAnd when some one, in that sphere or at that altitude, begins to talk\nto us of the sentiments that but a short while ago were tumultuous in\nour breasts, we shall listen to him as to one who talks of things that\nare henceforth distant and dead, in which we no longer participate,\nbecause the only sentiment that now fills our soul is the sentiment of\ntruth, the search for historical truth.\n\n\n[1] See Appendix I.\n\n\n\nIII\n\n\nWith poetical history--that is to say, with the falling back of history\ninto a form ideally anterior, that of poetry--the cycle of erroneous\nforms of history (or of erroneous theoretical forms) is complete.\nBut my discourse would not perhaps be complete were I to remain\nsilent as to a so-called form of history which had great importance\nin antiquity when it developed its own theory. It continues to have\nsome importance in our own day, although now inclined to conceal its\nface, to change its garments, and to disguise itself. This is the\nhistory known in antiquity as _oratory_ or _rhetoric_. Its object was\nto teach philosophy by example, to incite to virtuous conduct, to\nimpart instruction as to the best political and military institutions,\nor simply to delight, according to the various intentions of the\nrhetoricians. And even in our own day this type of history is demanded\nand supplied not only in the elementary schools (where it seems to\nbe understood that the bitter of wisdom should be imbibed by youth\nmingled with the sweet of fable), but among grown men. It is closely\nlinked up with politics, where it is a question of politics, or with\nreligion, philosophy, morality, and the like, where they are concerned,\nor with diversions, as in the case of anecdotes, of strange events,\nof scandalous and terrifying histories. But can this, I ask, be\nconsidered, I do not say history, but an erroneous (theoretical) form\nof history? The structure of rhetorical history presupposes a _history\nthat already exists_, or at least a poetical history, narrated with\na _practical end_. The end would be to induce an emotion leading to\nvirtue, to remorse, to shame, or to enthusiasm; or perhaps to provide\nrepose for the soul, such as is supplied by games; or to introduce into\nthe mind a historical, philosophical, or scientific truth (_movere,\ndelectare, docere,_ or in whatever way it may be decided to classify\nthese ends); but it will always be an end--that is to say, a practical\nact, which avails itself of the telling of the history as a means\nor as one of its means. Hence rhetorical history (which would be\nmore correctly termed _practicistical_ history) is composed of two\nelements, history and the practical end, converging into one, which\nis the practical act. For this reason one cannot attack it, but only\nits theory, which is the already mentioned theory, so celebrated in\nantiquity, of history as opus oratorium, as \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03b3\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd,\nas \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae, as \u03bd\u03af\u03ba\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b3\u03cd\u03bc\u03bd\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1 (if warlike), or \u03b3\u03bd\u03c9\u03bc\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03af\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03bc\u03b1 (if\npolitical), or as evocative of \u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae, and the like. This doctrine is\naltogether analogous to the hedonistic and pedagogic doctrine relating\nto poetry which at that time dominated. It was believed possible to\nassign an end to poetry, whereas an _extrinsic end_ was assigned to it,\nand poetry was thus passed over without being touched. Practicistical\nhistory (which, however, is not history) is exempt from censure as\na practical act: each one of us is not content with inquiring into\nhistory, but also acts, and in acting can quite well avail himself of\nthe re-evocation of this or that image, with a view to stimulating his\nown work, or (which comes to the same thing) the work of others. He\ncan, indeed, read and re-read all the books that have from time to time\nbeen of assistance to him, as Cato the younger had recourse to reading\nthe _Ph\u00e6do_ in order to prepare himself for suicide, while others have\nprepared themselves for it by reading _Werther, Ortis,_ or the poems of\nLeopardi. From the time of the Renaissance to the eighteenth century,\nmany others prepared themselves for conspiracies and tyrannicides by\nreading Plutarch, and so much was this the case that one of them, the\nyouthful Boscoli, when condemned to death for a conspiracy against the\nMedici, remarked in his last hour to Della Robbia (who recounts the\nincident), \"Get Brutus out of my head!\"--Brutus, not, that is to say,\nthe history of Brutus that he had read and thought about, but that by\nwhich he had been fascinated and urged on to commit the crime. For the\nrest, true and proper history is not that Brutus which procreated the\nmodern Bruti with their daggers, but Brutus as thought and situated in\nthe world of thought.\n\nOne might be induced to assign a special place to the history now known\nas biased, because, on the one hand, it seems that it is not a simple\nhistory of sentiment and poetry, since it has an end to attain, and\non the other because such end is not imposed upon it from without,\nbut coincides with the conception of history itself. Hence it would\nseem fitting to look upon it as a form of history standing half-way\nbetween poetry and practicism, a mixture of the two. But mixed forms\nand hybrid products exist only in the fictitious classifications\nof empiricists, never in the reality of the spirit, and biased\nhistory, when closely examined, is really either poetical history or\npracticistical history. An exception must always be made of the books\nin which the two moments are sometimes to be found side by side, as\nindeed one usually finds true history and chronicle and the document\nand philological and poetical history side by side. What gives the\nillusion of a mingling or of a special form of history is the fact that\nmany take their point of departure from poetical inspiration (love of\ncountry, faith in their country, enthusiasm for a great man, and so on)\nand end with practical calculations: they begin with poetry and end\nwith the allegations of the special pleader, and sometimes, although\nmore rarely, they follow an opposite course. This duplication is to be\nobserved in the numerous histories of parties that have been composed\nsince the world was a world, and it is not difficult to discover in\nwhat parts of them we have manifestations of poetry and in what parts\nof calculation. Good taste and criticism are continually effecting this\nseparation for history, as for art and poetry in general.\n\nIt is true that good taste loves and accepts poetry and discriminates\nbetween the practical intentions of the poet and those of the\nhistorian-poet; but those intentions are received and admitted by the\nmoral conscience, provided always that they are good intentions and\nconsequently good actions; and although people are disposed to speak\nill of advocates in general, it is certain that the honest advocate\nand the prudent orator cannot be dispensed with in social life. Nor\nhas so-called practicistical history ever been dispensed with, either\naccording to the Gr\u00e6co-Roman practice, which was that of proposing\nportraits of statesmen, of captains, and of heroic women as models for\nthe soul, or according to that of the Middle Ages, which was to repeat\nthe lives of saints and hermits of the desert, or of knights strong\nof arm and of unshakable faith, or in our own modern world, which\nrecommends as edifying and stimulating reading the lives and 'legends'\nof inventors, of business men, of explorers, and of millionaires.\nEducative histories, composed with the view of promoting definite\npractical or moral dispositions, really exist, and every Italian knows\nhow great were the effects of Colletta's and Balbo's histories and the\nlike during the period of the Risorgimento, and everyone knows books\nthat have 'inspired' him or inculcated in him the love of his own\ncountry, of his town and steeple.\n\nThis moral efficacy, which belongs to morality and not to history, has\nhad so strong a hold upon the mind that the prejudice still survives\nof assigning a moral function to history (as also to poetry) in the\nfield of teaching. This prejudice is still to be found inspiring even\nLabriola's pedagogic essay on _The Teaching of History_. But if we\nmean by the word 'history' both history that is thought as well as\nthat which, on the contrary, is poetry, philology, or moral will, it\nis clear that 'history' will enter the educational process not under\none form alone, but under all these forms. But as history proper it\nwill only enter it under one of them, which is not that of moral\neducation, exclusively or abstractly considered, but of the education\nor development of thought.\n\n\n\nIV\n\n\nMuch is said, now even more than formerly, of the necessity of a\n'reform of history,' but to me there does not seem to be anything\nto reform. Nothing to reform in the sense attributed to such a\ndemand--namely, that of moulding a _new form of history_ or of creating\nfor the first time _true history_. History is, has been, and always\nwill be the same, what we have called living history, history that is\n(ideally) contemporary; and chronicle, philological history, poetical\nhistory, and (let us call it history nevertheless) practicistical\nhistory are, have been, and always will be the same. Those who\nundertake the task of creating a new history always succeed in setting\nup philological history against poetical history, or poetical history\nagainst philological history, or contemporary history against both\nof them, and so on. Unless, indeed, as is the case with Buckle and\nthe many tiresome sociologists and positivists of the last ten years,\nthey lament with great pomposity and no less lack of intelligence as\nto what history is that it lacks the capacity of observation and of\nexperiment (that is to say, the naturalistic abstraction of observation\nand experiment), boasting that they 'reduce history to natural\nscience'--that is to say, by the employment of a circle, as vicious as\nit is grotesque, to a mental form which is its pale derivative.\n\nIn another sense, everything is certainly to be reformed in\nhistory, and history is at every moment labouring to render herself\nperfect--that is to say, is enriching herself and probing more deeply\ninto herself. There is no history that completely satisfies us,\nbecause any construction of ours generates new facts and new problems\nand solicits new solutions. Thus the history of Rome, of Greece, and\nof Christianity, of the Reformation, of the French Revolution, of\nphilosophy, of literature, and of any other subject is always being\ntold afresh and always differently. But history reforms herself,\nremaining herself always, and the strength of her development lies\nprecisely in thus enduring.\n\nThe demand for radical or abstract reform also cannot be given that\nother meaning of a reform of the 'idea of history,' of the discovery\nthat is to be made or is finally made of the _true concept_ of\nhistory. At all periods the distinction has to some extent been\nmade between histories that are histories and those others that\nare works of imagination or chronicles. This could be demonstrated\nfrom the observations met with at all times among historians and\nmethodologists, and from the confessions that even the most confused of\nthem involuntarily let fall. It is also to be inferred with certainty\nfrom the nature itself of the human spirit, although the words in\nwhich those distinctions are expressed have not been written or are\nnot preserved. And such a concept and distinction are renewed at\nevery moment by history itself, which becomes ever more copious, more\nprofound. This is to be looked upon as certain, and is for that matter\nmade evident by the history of historiography, which has certainly\naccomplished some progress since the days of Diogenes of Halicarnassus\nand of Cicero to those of Hegel and of Humboldt. Other problems have\nbeen formed in our own day, some of which I attempt to solve in this\nbook. I am well aware that it affords solutions only to some among the\nmany, and especially that it does not solve (simply because it cannot)\nthose that are not yet formed, but which will inevitably be formed in\nthe future.\n\nIn any case it will be thought that the clearness acquired by the\nhistorical consciousness as to the nature of its own work will at\nleast avail to destroy the erroneous forms of history, that since we\nhave shown that philological history or chronicle is not history, and\nthat poetical history is poetry and not history, the 'facts' that\ncorrespond to those beliefs must disappear, or become ever more limited\nin extension, to the point of disappearing altogether in a near or\ndistant future, as catapults have disappeared before guns and as we see\ncarriages disappearing before, automobiles.\n\nAnd this would be truly possible were these erroneous forms to become\nconcrete in 'facts,' were they not, as I have said above, mere\n'claims.' If error and evil were a fact, humanity would have long ago\nabolished it--that is to say, superseded it, in the same way as it has\nsuperseded slavery and serfdom and the method of simple barter and so\nmany other things that were facts, that is to say, its own transitory\nforms. But error (and evil, which is one with it) is not a fact; it\ndoes not possess empirical existence; it is nothing but the negative or\ndialectical moment of the spirit, necessary for the concreteness of the\npositive moment, for the reality of the spirit. For this reason it is\neternal and indestructible, and to destroy it by abstraction (since it\ncannot be done by thought) is equivalent to imagining the death of the\nspirit, as confirmed in the saying that abstraction is death.\n\nAnd without occupying further space with the ex-position of a doctrine\nthat would entail too wide a digression,[1] I shall observe that a\nglance at the history of history proves the salutary nature of error,\nwhich is not a Caliban, but rather an Ariel, who breathes everywhere,\ncalling forth and exciting, but can never be grasped as a solid thing.\nAnd with a view to seeking examples only in those general forms that\nhave been hitherto examined, polemical and tendencious historiography\nis certainly to be termed error. This prevailed during the period of\nthe enlightenment, and reduced history to a pleading against priests\nand tyrants. But who would have wished simply to return from this to\nthe learned and apathetic history of the Benedictines and of the other\nauthors of folios? The polemic and its direction expressed the need\nfor living history, though not in an altogether satisfactory form,\nand this need was followed by the creation of a new historiography\nduring the period of romanticism. The type of merely philological\nhistory, promulgated in Germany after 1820, and afterward disseminated\nthroughout Europe, was also certainly error; but it was likewise an\ninstrument of liberation from the more or less fantastic and arbitrary\nhistories improvised by the philosophers. But who would wish to turn\nback from them to the 'philosophies of history'? The type of history,\nsometimes tendencious, but more often poetical, which followed in the\nwake of the national Italian movement, was also error--that is to say,\nit led to the loss of historical calm. But that poetical consciousness\nwhich surpassed itself when laying claim to historical truth was\nbound sooner or later to generate (as had been the case on a larger\nscale in the eighteenth century) a history linked with the interests\nof life without becoming servile and allowing itself to be led away\nby the phantoms of love and hate suggested by them. Further examples\ncould be adduced, but the example of examples is that which happens\nwithin each of us when we are dealing with historical material. We\nsee our sympathies and antipathies arise in turn as we proceed (our\npoetical history), our intentions as practical men (our rhetorical\nhistory), our chroniclistical memories (our philological history); we\nmentally supersede these forms in turn, and in doing so find ourselves\nin possession of a new and more profound historical truth. Thus does\nhistory affirm itself, distinguishing itself from non-histories and\nconquering the dialectical moments which arise from these. It was\nfor this reason that I said that there is never anything of anything\nto reform in the _abstract,_ but _everything of everything_ in the\n_concrete_.\n\n\n[1] See _Logic as Science of Pure Concept._--D. A.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\n\nHISTORY AS HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSAL CRITICISM OF 'UNIVERSAL HISTORY\n\n\nI\n\n\nReturning from this dialectical round to the concept of history as\n'contemporary history,' a new doubt assails and torments us. For if\nthe proof given has freed that concept from one of the most insistent\nforms of historical scepticism (the scepticism that arises from the\nlack of reliability of 'testimony'), it does not seem that it has been\nfreed or ever can be freed from that other form of scepticism, more\nproperly termed 'agnosticism,' which does not absolutely deny the truth\nof history, but denies to it _complete_ truth. But in ultimate analysis\nthis is to deny to it real knowledge, because unsound knowledge, half\nknowledge, also reduces the vigour of the part that it asserts to be\nknown. It is, however, commonly asserted that only a part of history, a\nvery small part, is known to us: a faint glimmer which renders yet more\nsensible the vast gloom that surrounds our knowledge on all sides.\n\nIn truth, what do we know of the origins of Rome or of the Greek\nstates, and of the people who preceded the Greek and Roman\ncivilizations in those countries, notwithstanding all the researches\nof the learned? And if a fragment of the life of these people does\nremain to us, how uncertain is its interpretation! If some tradition\nhas been handed down to us, how poor, confused, and contradictory it\nis! And we know still less of the people who preceded those people, of\nthe immigrations from Asia and Africa into Europe or inversely, and of\nrelations with other countries beyond the ocean, even with the Atlantis\nof the myths. And the monogenesis or polygenesis of the human race is a\ndesperate head-splitter, open to all conjectures. The appearance upon\nthe earth of the _genus homo_ is open to vain conjectures, as is his\naffinity or relationship to the animals. The history of the earth, of\nthe solar system, of the whole cosmos, is lost in the obscurity of its\norigin. But obscurity does not dwell alone among the 'origins'; the\nwhole of history, even that of modern Europe which is nearest to us,\nis obscure. Who can really say what motives determined a Danton or a\nRobespierre, a Napoleon or an Alexander of Russia? And how numerous are\nthe obscurities and the lacun\u00e6 that relate to the acts themselves--that\nis to say, to their externalization! Mountains of books have been\nwritten upon the days of September, upon the eighteenth of Brumaire,\nupon the burning of Moscow; but who can tell how these things really\nhappened? Even those who were direct witnesses are not able to say, for\nthey have handed down to us diverse and conflicting narratives. But\nlet us leave great history. Will it not at least be possible for us to\nknow a little history completely, we will not say that of our country,\nof our town, or of our family, but the least little history of any one\nof ourselves: what he really wanted when (many years ago or yesterday)\nhe abandoned himself to this or that motive of passion, and uttered\nthis or that word; how he reached this or that particular conclusion\nor decided upon some particular course of action; whether the motives\nthat urged him in a particular direction were lofty or base, moral or\negoistic, inspired by duty or by vanity, pure or impure?\n\nIt is enough to make one lose one's head, as those scrupulous people\nare aware, who the more they attempt to perfect their examination\nof conscience the more they are confused. No other counsel can be\noffered to them than that of examining themselves certainly, but not\novermuch, of looking rather ahead than behind, or only looking behind\nto the extent that it is necessary to look. We certainly know our own\nhistory and that of the world that surrounds us, but how little and how\nmeagrely in comparison with our infinite desire for knowledge!\n\nThe best way of ending this vexation of spirit is that which I have\nfollowed, that of pushing it to its extreme limit, and then of\nimagining for a moment that all the interrogations mentioned, together\nwith the infinite others that could be mentioned, have been satisfied;\nsatisfied as interrogations that continued to the infinite can be\nsatisfied--that is to say, by affording an immediate answer to them,\none after the other, and by causing the spirit to enter the path of a\nvertiginous process of satisfactions, always obtained to the infinite.\nNow, were all those interrogations satisfactorily answered, were we\nin possession of all the answers to them, what should we do? The road\nof progress to the infinite is as wide as that to hell, and if it\ndoes not lead to hell it certainly leads to the madhouse. And that\ninfinite, which grows bigger the moment we first touch it, does not\navail us; indeed it fills us with fear. Only the poor finite assists\nus, the determined, the concrete, which is grasped by thought and which\nlends itself as base for our existence and as point of departure for\nour action. Thus even were all the particular infinities of infinite\nhistory offered for the gratification of our desire, there would be\nnothing else left for us to do but to clear our minds of them, to\n_forget_ them, and to concentrate upon that particular point alone\nwhich corresponds to a problem and constitutes living, active history,\n_contemporary history_.\n\nAnd this is what the spirit in its development accomplishes, because\nthere is no fact that is not known at the moment of its being done, by\nmeans of the consciousness that germinates perpetually upon action;\nand there is no fact that is not forgotten sooner or later, but may\nbe recalled, as we remarked when speaking of dead history revived at\nthe touch of life, of the past that by means of the contemporaneous\nbecomes again contemporaneous. Tolstoi got this thought fixed in his\nmind: not only is no one, not even a Napoleon, able to predetermine\nwith exactitude the happenings of a battle, but no one can know how\nit really did happen, because on the very evening of its ending an\nartificial, legendary history appears, which only a credulous spirit\ncould mistake for real history; yet it is upon this that professional\nhistorians work, integrating or tempering imagination with imagination.\nBut the battle is known as it gradually develops, and then as the\nturmoil that it causes is dissipated, so too is dissipated the turmoil\nof that consciousness, and the only thing of importance is the\nactuality of the new situation and the 'new disposition of soul that\nhas been produced, expressed in poetical legends or availing itself\nof artificial fictions. And each one of us at every moment knows and\nforgets the majority of his thoughts and acts (what a misfortune\nit would be if he did not do so, for his life would be a tiresome\ncomputation of his smallest movements!); but he does not forget, and\npreserves for a greater or less time, those thoughts and sentiments\nwhich represent memorable crises and problems relating to his future.\nSometimes we assist with astonishment at the awakening in us of\nsentiments and thoughts that we had believed to be irrevocable. Thus\nit must be said that we know at every moment all the history that we\nneed to know; and since what remains over does not matter to us, we do\nnot possess the means of knowing it, or we shall possess it when the\nneed arises. That 'remaining' history is the eternal phantom of the\n'thing in itself,' which is neither 'thing' nor 'in itself,' but only\nthe imaginative projection of the infinity of our action and of our\nknowledge.\n\nThe imaginative projection of the thing in itself, with the agnosticism\nthat is its result, is caused in philosophy by the natural sciences,\nwhich posit a reality made extrinsic and material and therefore\nunintelligible. Chroniclism also occasions historical agnosticism\nin an analogous manner at the naturalistic moment of history, for\nit posits a dead and unintelligible history. Allowing itself to be\nseduced by this allurement it strays from the path of concrete truth,\nwhile the soul feels itself suddenly filled with infinite questions,\nmost vain and desperate. In like manner, he who strays from or has\nnot yet entered the fruitful path of a diligent life, feels his soul\nfull to overflowing of infinite desires, of actions that cannot be\nrealized, of pleasures out of reach, and consequently suffers the pains\nof a Tantalus. But the wisdom of life warns us not to lose ourselves\nin _absurd desires_, as the wisdom of thought warns us not to lose\nourselves in _problems that are vain_.\n\n\n\nII\n\n\nBut if we cannot know anything but the finite and the particular,\nalways indeed only _this_ particular and _this_ finite, must we then\nrenounce (a dolorous renunciation 1) knowledge of _universal history_?\nWithout doubt, but with the double corollary that we are renouncing\nwhat we have never possessed, because we could not possess it, and that\nin consequence such renunciation is not at all painful.\n\n'Universal history,' too, is not a concrete act or tact, but a 'claim,'\nand a claim due to chroniclism and to its 'thing in itself,' and\nto the strange proposal of closing the infinite progression, which\nhad been improperly opened, by means of progress to the infinite.\nUniversal history really tries to form a picture of all the things\nthat have happened to the human race, from its origins upon the earth\nto the present moment. Indeed, it claims to do this from the origin of\nthings, or the creation, to the end of the world, since it would not\notherwise be truly universal. Hence its tendency to fill the abysses\nof prehistory and of the origins with theological or naturalistic\nfictions and to trace somehow the future, either with revelations\nand prophecies, as in Christian universal history (which went as far\nas Antichrist and the Last Judgment), or with previsions, as in the\nuniversal histories of positivism, democratism, and socialism.\n\nSuch was its claim, but the result turns out to be different from\nthe intention, and it gets what it can--that is to say, a chronicle\nthat is always more or less of a mixture, or a poetical history\nexpressing some aspiration of the heart of man, or a true and proper\nhistory, which is not universal, but _particular_, although it\nembraces the lives of many peoples and of many times. Most frequently\nthese different elements are to be discerned side by side in the\nsame literary composition. Omitting chronicles more or less wide in\nscope (though always narrow), poetical histories, and the various\ncontaminations of several different forms, we immediately perceive,\nnot as a result of logical deduction alone, but with a simple glance\nat any one of the 'universal histories,' that 'universal histories,'\nin so far as they are histories, or in that part of them in which they\nare histories, resolve themselves into nothing else but particular\nhistories'--that is to say, they are due to a particular interest\ncentred in a particular problem, and comprehend only those facts that\nform part of that interest and afford an answer to that particular\nproblem. For antiquity the example of the work of Polybius should\nsuffice for all, since it was he who most vigorously insisted upon\nthe need for a 'universal history' (\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae \u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1, \u03ae \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c3\u03b0\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03be\u03b9\u03c2). For the Christian period we may cite the Civitas\nDei of Augustine, and for modern times the _Philosophy of History_\nof Hegel (he also called it universal history, or _philosophische\nWeltgeschichte_). But we observe here that the universal history which\nPolybius desired and created was that more vast, more complex, more\npolitical, and graver history which Roman hegemony and the formation\nof the Roman world required, and therefore that it embraced only those\npeoples which came into relation and conflict with Rome, and limited\nitself almost altogether to the history of political institutions and\nof military dispositions, according to the spiritual tendencies of\nthe author. Augustine, in his turn, attempted to render intelligible\nthe penetration of Paganism by Christianity, and with this object in\nview he made use of the idea of two enemy cities, the terrestrial\nand the celestial, of which the first was sometimes the adversary of\nand sometimes preparatory to the second. Finally, Hegel treated the\nsame problem in his universal history as in his particular history\nof philosophy--that is to say, the manner in which the spirit of a\nphilosophy of servitude to nature, or to the transcendental God, has\nelevated itself to the consciousness of liberty. He cut out prehistory\nfrom the philosophy of history, as he had cut it out from the history\nof philosophy, and considered Oriental history very summarily, since it\ndid not offer much of interest to the prosecution of his design.\n\nNaturalistic or cosmological romances will always be composed by those\nwho feel inspired to write them, and they will always find eager and\nappreciative readers, especially among the lazy, who are pleased to\npossess the 'secret of the world' in a few pages. And more or less\nvast compilations will always be made of the histories of the East\nand the West, of the Americas and Africa and Oceania. The strength\nof a single individual does not suffice for these, even as regards\ntheir compilation, so we now find groups of learned men or compilers\nassociated in that object (as though to give ocular evidence of the\nabsence of all intimate connexion). We have even seen recently certain\nattempts at universal histories arranged on geographical principles,\nlike so many histories set side by side--European, Asiatic, African,\nand so on--which insensibly assume the form of a historical dictionary.\nAnd this or that particular history can always usefully take the name\nof a 'universal history,' in the old sense of Polybius--that is to\nsay, as opposed to books that are less actual, less serious, and less\nsatisfactory, the books of those 'writers of particular things' (\u03bf\u1f31 \u03c4\u03ac\u03c2\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03af \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b3\u03c1\u03ac\u03c6\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2) who are led to make little things great\n(\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u1f70 \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03ac\u03bb\u03b1 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd1\u03bd) and to indulge in lengthy anecdotes unworthy\nof being recorded (\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03bd\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03c2 \u03ac\u03be\u03b9\u03c9\u03bd), and that owing to the\nlack of a criterion (\u03b4\u03af' \u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd). In this sense, those times and\npeoples whose politico-social development had produced, as it were,\na narrowing of the historical circle would be well advised to break\naway from minute details and to envisage 'universal history'--that\nis to say, a vaster history, which lies beyond particular histories.\nThis applies in particular to our Italy, which, since it had a\nuniversalistic function at the time of the Renaissance, had universal\nvision, and told the history of all the peoples in its own way, and\nthen limited itself to local history, then again elevated itself\nto national history, and should now, even more than in the past,\nextend itself over the vast fields of the history of all times past\nand present. But the word 'universal,' which has value for the ends\nabove mentioned, will never designate the possession of a 'universal\nhistory,' in the sense that we have refused to it. Such a history\ndisappears in the world of illusions, together with similar Utopias,\nsuch, for instance, as the art that should serve as model for all\ntimes, or universal justice valid for all time.\n\n\nIII\n\nBut in the same way that by the dissipation of the illusion of\nuniversal art and of universal justice the intrinsically universal\ncharacter of particular art and of particular justice is not cancelled\n(of the _Iliad_ or of the constitution of the Roman family), to negate\nuniversal history does not mean to negate the universal in history.\nHere, too, must be repeated what was said of the vain search for God\nthroughout the infinite series of the finite and found at every point\nof it: _Und du bist ganz vor mir!_ That particular and that finite\nis determined, in its particularity and finitude, by thought, and\ntherefore known together with the universal, the universal in that\nparticular form. The merely finite and particular does not exist\nsave as an abstraction. There is no abstract finite in poetry and in\nart itself, which is the reign of the individual; but there is the\ningenuous finite, which is the undistinguished unity of finite and\ninfinite, which will be distinguished in the sphere of thought and\nwill in that way attain to a more lofty form of unity. And history\nis thought, and, as such, thought of the universal, of the universal\nin its concreteness, and therefore always determined in a particular\nmanner. There is no fact, however small it be, that can be otherwise\nconceived (realized and qualified) than as universal. In its most\nsimple form--that is to say, in its essential form--history expresses\nitself with judgments, inseparable syntheses of individual and\nuniversal. And the individual is called the _subject_ of the judgment,\nthe universal the _predicate_, by old terminological tradition,\nwhich it will perhaps be convenient to preserve. But for him who\ndominates words with thought, the _true subject_ of history is just\nthe _predicate_, and the _true predicate_ the _subject_--that is to\nsay, the universal is determined in the judgment by individualizing\nit. If this argument seems too abstruse and amounts to a philosophical\nsubtlety, it may be rendered obvious and altogether different from\na private possession of those known as philosophers by means of the\nsimple observation that everyone who reflects, upon being asked what is\nthe subject of the history of poetry, will certainly not reply Dante\nor Shakespeare, or Italian or English poetry, or the series of poems\nthat are known to us, but _poetry_--that is to say, a universal; and\nagain, when asked what is the subject of social and political history,\nthe answer will not be Greece or Rome, France or Germany, or even all\nthese and others such combined, but _culture, civilization, progress,\nliberty,_ or any other similar word--that is to say, a universal.\n\nAnd here we can remove a great stumbling-block to the recognition\nof the _identity of philosophy with history_. I have attempted to\nrenovate, modify, and establish this doctrine with many analyses and\nwith many arguments in another volume of my works.[1] It is, however,\nfrequently very difficult, being rather an object of irresistible\nargument than of complete persuasion and adhesion. Seeking for the\nvarious causes of this difficulty, I have come upon one which seems\nto me to be the principal and fundamental. This is precisely the\nconception of history not as living contemporary history, but as\nhistory that is dead and belongs to the past, as _chronicle_ (or\nphilological history, which, as we know, can be reduced to chronicle).\nIt is undeniable that when history is taken as chronicle its identity\nwith philosophy cannot be made clear to the mind, because it does not\nexist. But when chronicle has been reduced to its proper practical and\nmnemonical function, and history has been raised to the knowledge of\nthe _eternal present_, it reveals itself as all one with philosophy,\nwhich for its part is never anything but the thought of the eternal\npresent. This, be it well understood, provided always that the dualism\nof ideas and facts has been superseded, of _v\u00e9rit\u00e9s de raison_ and\n_v\u00e9rit\u00e9s de fait_, the concept of philosophy as contemplation of\nv\u00e9rit\u00e9s de raison, and that of history as the amassing of brute facts,\nof coarse _v\u00e9rit\u00e9s de fait_. We have recently found this tenacious\ndualism in the act of renewing itself, disguised beneath the axiom that\n_le propre de l'histoire est de savoir, le propre de la philosophie\nest de comprendre_. This amounts to the absurd distinction of knowing\nwithout understanding and of understanding without knowing, which would\nthus be the doubly dis-heartening theoretical fate of man. But such a\ndualism and the conception of the world which accompanies it, far from\nbeing true philosophy, are the perpetual source whence springs that\nimperfect attempt at philosophizing which is called _religion_ when\none is within its magic circle, _mythology_ when one has left it. Will\nit be useful to attack transcendency, and to claim the character of\nimmanence for reality and for philosophy? It will certainly be of use;\nbut I do not feel the necessity of doing so, at any rate here and now.\n\nAnd since history, properly understood, abolishes the idea of a\n_universal history_, so philosophy, immanent and identical with\nhistory, abolishes the idea of a _universal philosophy_--that is to\nsay, of the _closed_ system. The two negations correspond and are\nindeed fundamentally one (because closed systems, like universal\nhistories, are cosmological romances), and both receive empirical\nconfirmation from the tendency of the best spirits of our day to\nrefrain from 'universal histories' and from 'definitive systems,'\nleaving both to compilers, to believers, and to the credulous of\nevery sort. This tendency was implicit in the last great philosophy,\nthat of Hegel, but it was opposed in its own self by old survivals\nand altogether betrayed in execution, so that this philosophy also\nconverts itself into a cosmological romance. Thus it may be said\nthat what at the beginning of the nineteenth century was merely a\nsimple _presentiment_ becomes changed into _firm consciousness_ at\nthe beginning of the twentieth. This defies the fears of the timid\nlest the knowledge of the universal should be thus compromised,\nand indeed maintains that only in this way can such knowledge be\ntruly and perpetually acquired, because dynamically obtained. Thus\nhistory becoming _actual history_ and philosophy becoming _historical\nphilosophy_ have freed themselves, the one from the anxiety of not\nbeing able to know that which is not known, only because it was or will\nbe known, and the other from the despair of never being able to attain\nto definite truth--that is to say, both are freed from the phantom of\nthe 'thing in itself.'\n\n\n[1] In the _Logic_, especially in Part II, Chapter IV.\n\n\n\n\nIV\n\n\nIDEAL GENESIS AND DISSOLUTION OF THE 'PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY'\n\n\n\nI\n\n\nThe conception of the so-called 'philosophy of history' is perpetually\nopposed to and resisted by the deterministic conception of history. Not\nonly is this clearly to be seen from inspection, but it is also quite\nevident logically, because the 'philosophy of history' represents the\ntranscendental conception of the real, determinism the immanent.\n\nBut on examining the facts it is not less certain that historical\ndeterminism perpetually generates the 'philosophy of history'; nor\nis this fact less evidently logical than the preceding, because\ndeterminism is naturalism, and therefore immanent, certainly, but\ninsufficiently and falsely immanent. Hence it should rather be\nsaid that it wishes to be, but is not, immanent, and whatever its\nefforts may be in the contrary direction, it becomes converted into\ntranscendency. All this does not present any difficulty to one who\nhas clearly in mind the conceptions of the transcendent and of the\nimmanent, of the philosophy of history as transcendency and of the\ndeterministic or naturalistic conception of history as a false\nimmanence. But it will be of use to see in more detail how this process\nof agreements and oppositions is developed and solved with reference to\nthe problem of history.\n\n\"First collect the facts, then connect them causally\"; this is the way\nthat the work of the historian is represented in the deterministic\nconception. _Apr\u00e8s la collection des faits, la recherche des causes,_\nto repeat the very common formula in the very words of one of the most\neloquent and picturesque theorists of that school, Taine. Facts are\nbrute, dense, real indeed, but not illumined with the light of science,\nnot intellectualized. This intelligible character must be conferred\nupon them by means of the search for causes. But it is very well known\nwhat happens when one fact is linked to another as its cause, forming a\nchain of causes and effects: we thus inaugurate an infinite regression,\nand we never succeed in finding the cause or causes to which we can\nfinally attach the chain that we have been so industriously putting\ntogether.\n\nSome, maybe many, of the theorists of history get out of the difficulty\nin a truly simple manner: they break or let fall at a certain point\ntheir chain, which is already broken at another point at the other\nend (the effect which they have undertaken to consider). They operate\nwith their fragment of chain as though it were something perfect and\nclosed in itself, as though a straight line divided at two points\nshould include space and be a figure. Hence, too, the doctrine that we\nfind among the methodologists of history: that it is only necessary\nfor history to seek out 'proximate' causes. This doctrine is intended\nto supply a logical foundation to the above process. But who can ever\nsay what are the 'proximate causes'? Thought, since it is admitted\nthat it is unfortunately obliged to think according to the chain of\ncauses, will never wish to know anything but 'true' causes, be they\nnear or distant in space and time (space, like time, _ne fait rien\n\u00e0 l'affaire_). In reality, this theory is a fig-leaf, placed there\nto cover a proceeding of which the historian, who is a thinker and a\ncritic, is ashamed, an act of will which is useful, but which for that\nvery reason is wilful. The fig-leaf, however, is a sign of modesty, and\nas such has its value, because, if shame be lost, there is a risk that\nit will finally be declared that the 'causes' at which an arbitrary\nhalt has been made are the 'ultimate' causes, the 'true' causes, thus\nraising the caprice of the individual to the rank of an act creative\nof the world, treating it as though it were God, the God of certain\ntheologians, whose caprice is truth. I should not wish again to quote\nTaine just after having said this, for he is a most estimable author,\nnot on account of his mental constitution, but of his enthusiastic\nfaith in science; yet it suits me to quote him nevertheless. Taine,\nin his search for causes, having reached a cause which he sometimes\ncalls the 'race' and sometimes the 'age,' as for instance in his\nhistory of English literature, when he reaches the concept of the\n'man of the North' or 'German,' with the character and intellect that\nwould be suitable to such a person--coldness of the senses, love\nof abstract ideas, grossness of taste, and contempt for order and\nregularity--gravely affirms: _L\u00e0 s'arr\u00eate la recherche: on est tomb\u00e9\nsur quelque disposition primitive, sur quelque trait propre \u00e0 toutes\nles sensations, \u00e0 toutes les conceptions d'un si\u00e8cle ou d'une race, sur\nquelque particularit\u00e9 ins\u00e9parable de toutes les d\u00e9marches de son esprit\net de son cour. Ce sont l\u00e0 les grandes causes, les causes universelles\net permanentes._ What that primitive and insurmountable thing contained\nwas known to Taine's imagination, but criticism is ignorant of it; for\ncriticism demands that the genesis of the facts or groups of facts\ndesignated as 'age' and 'race' should be given, and in demanding their\ngenesis declares that they are neither 'universal' nor 'permanent,'\nbecause no universal and permanent 'facts' are known, as far as I\nam aware, certainly not _le Germain_ and _l'homme du Nord_; nor are\nmummies facts, though they last some thousands of years, but not for\never--they change gradually, but they do change.\n\nThus whoever adopts the deterministic conception of history, provided\nthat he decides to abstain from cutting short the inquiry that he has\nundertaken in an arbitrary and fanciful manner, is of necessity obliged\nto recognize that the method adopted does not attain the desired end.\nAnd since he has begun to think history, although by means of an\ninsufficient method, no course remains to him save that of beginning\nall over again and following a different path, or that of going\nforward but changing his direction. The naturalistic presupposition,\nwhich still holds its ground (\"first collect the facts, then seek\nthe causes\": what is more evident and more unavoidable than that?),\nnecessarily leads to the second alternative. But to adopt the second\nalternative is to supersede determinism, it is to transcend nature\nand its causes, it is to propose a method opposite to that hitherto\nfollowed--that is to say, to renounce the category of cause for\nanother, which cannot be anything but that of end, an extrinsic and\ntranscendental end, which is the analogous opposite, corresponding to\nthe cause. Now the search for the transcendental end is the 'philosophy\nof history.'\n\nThe consequent naturalist (I mean by this he who 'continues to think,'\nor, as is generally said, to draw the consequences) cannot avoid this\ninquiry, nor does he ever avoid it, in whatever manner he conceive\nhis new inquiry. This he cannot even do, when he tries, by declaring\nthat the end or 'ultimate cause' is unknowable, because (as elsewhere\nremarked) an unknowable affirmed is an unknowable in some way known.\nNaturalism is always crowned with a philosophy of history, whatever\nits mode of formulation: whether it explain the universe as composed\nof atoms that strike one another and produce history by means of their\nvarious shocks and gyrations, to which they can also put an end by\nreturning to their primitive state of dispersion, whether the hidden\nGod be termed Matter or the Unconscious or something else, or whether,\nfinally, He be conceived as an Intelligence which avails itself of\nthe chain of causes in order to actualize His counsels. And every\nphilosopher of history is on the other hand a naturalist, because he\nis a dualist and conceives a God and a world, an idea and a fact in\naddition to or beneath the Idea, a kingdom of ends and a kingdom or\nsub-kingdom of causes, a celestial city and one that is more or less\ndiabolical or terrene. Take any deterministic historical work and you\nwill find or discover in it, explicit or understood, transcendency (in\nTaine, for example, it goes by the name of 'race' or of '_si\u00e8cle,_'\nwhich are true and proper deities); take any work of 'philosophy of\nhistory' and dualism and naturalism will be found there (in Hegel, for\nexample, when he admits rebellious and impotent facts which resist or\nare unworthy the dominion of the idea). And we shall see more and more\nclearly how from the entrails of naturalism comes inevitably forth the\n'philosophy of history.'\n\n\n\nII\n\n\nBut the 'philosophy of history' is just as contradictory as the\ndeterministic conception from which it arises and to which it is\nopposed. Having both accepted and superseded the method of linking\nbrute facts together, it no longer finds facts to link (for these\nhave already been linked together, as well as might be, by means\nof the category of cause), but brute facts, on which it must confer\nrather a 'meaning' than a linking, representing them as aspects of a\ntranscendental process, a theophany. Now those facts, in so far as\nthey are brute facts, are mute, and the transcendency of the process\nrequires an organ, not that of thought that thinks or produces facts,\nbut an extra-logical organ, in order to be conceived and represented\n(such, for example, as thought which proceeds abstractly _a priori,_\nin the manner of Fichte), and this is not to be found in the spirit,\nsave as a negative moment, as the void of effective logical thought.\nThe void of logical thought is immediately filled with _praxis,_ or\nwhat is called sentiment, which then appears as poetry, by theoretical\nrefraction. There is an evident poetical character running through all\n'philosophies of history.' Those of antiquity represented historical\nevents as strife between the gods of certain peoples or of certain\nraces or protectors of certain individuals, or between the god of light\nand truth and the powers of darkness and lies. They thus expressed the\naspirations of peoples, groups, or individuals toward hegemony, or of\nman toward goodness and truth. The most modern of modern forms is that\ninspired by various national and ethical feelings (the Italian, the\nGermanic, the Slav, etc.), or which represents the course of history as\nleading to the kingdom of liberty, or as the passage from the Eden of\nprimitive communism, through the Middle Ages of slavery, servitude, and\nwages, toward the restoration of communism, which shall no longer be\nunconscious but conscious, no longer Edenic but human. In poetry, facts\nare no longer facts but words, not reality but images, and so there\nwould be no occasion to censure them, if it remained pure poetry.\nBut it does not so remain, because those images and words are placed\nthere as ideas and facts--that is to say, as myths: progress, liberty,\neconomy, technique, science are myths, in so far as they are looked\nupon as agents external to the facts. They are myths no less than God\nand the Devil, Mars and Venus, Jove and Baal, or any other cruder forms\nof divinity. And this is the reason why the deterministic conception,\nafter it has produced the 'philosophy of history,' which opposes it,\nis obliged to oppose its own daughter in its turn, and to appeal from\nthe realm of ends to that of causal connexions, from imagination to\nobservation, from myths to facts.\n\nThe reciprocal confutation of historical determinism and the philosophy\nof history, which makes of each a void or a nothing--that is to say,\na single void or nothing--seems to the eclectics as usual to be the\nreciprocal fulfilment of two entities, which effect or should effect\nan alliance for mutual support. And since eclecticism flourishes in\ncontemporary philosophy, mutato nomine, it is not surprising that\nbesides the duty of investigating the causes to history also is\nassigned that of ascertaining the 'meaning' or the 'general plan' of\nthe course of history (see the works on the philosophy of history of\nLabriola, Simmel, and Rickert). Since, too, writers on method are\nwont to be empirical and therefore eclectic, we find that with them\nalso history is divided into the history which unites and criticizes\ndocuments and reconstructs events, and 'philosophy of history' (see\nBernheim's manual, typical of all of them). Finally, since ordinary\nthought is eclectic, nothing is more easy than to find agreement as to\nthe thesis that simple history, which presents the series of facts,\ndoes not suffice, but that it is necessary that thought should return\nto the already constituted chain of events, in order to discover\nthere the hidden design and to answer the questions as to whence we\ncome and whither we go. This amounts to saying that a 'philosophy of\nhistory' must be posited side by side with history. This eclecticism,\nwhich gives substance to two opposite voids and makes them join\nhands, sometimes attempts to surpass itself and to mingle those two\nfallacious sciences or parts of science. Then we hear 'philosophy of\nhistory' defended, but with the caution that it must be conducted with\n'scientific' and 'positive' method, by means of the search for the\ncause, thus revealing the action of divine reason or providence.[1]\nOrdinary thought quickly consents to this programme, but afterward\nfails to carry it out.[2]\n\nThere is nothing new here either for those who know: 'philosophy\nof history' to be constructed by means of 'positive methods,'\ntranscendency to be demonstrated by means of the methods of false\nimmanence, is the exact equivalent in the field of historical studies\nto that \"metaphysic to be constructed by means of the experimental\nmethod\" which was recommended by the neocritics (Zeller and others),\nfor it claimed, not indeed to supersede two voids that reciprocally\nconfute one another, but to make them agree together, and, after\nhaving given substance to them, to combine them in a single substance.\nI should not like to describe the impossibilities contained in the\nabove as the prodigies of an alchemist (the metaphor seems to be too\nlofty), but rather as the medleys of bad cooks.\n\n\n[1] See, for example, the work of Flint; but since, less radical than\nFlint, Hegel and the Hegelians themselves also ended in admitting the\nconcourse of the two opposed methods, traces of this perversion are\nalso to be found in their 'philosophies of history.' Here, too, is to\nbe noted the false analogy by which Hegel was led to discover the same\nrelation between a priori and historical facts as between mathematics\nand natural facts: _Man muss mit dem Kreise dessen, worin die\nPrinzipien fallen, wenn man es so nennen will, a priori vertraut sein,\nso gut als Kepler mit den Ellipsen, mit Kuben und Quadraten und mit den\nGedanken von Verh\u00e4ltnissen derselben_ a priori _schon vorher bekannt\nsein musste, ehe er aus den empirischen Daten seine unsterblichen\nGesetze, welche aus Bestimmungen jener Kreise von Vorstellungen\nbestehen, erfinden konnte._ (_Cf. Vorles. \u00fcb. d. Philos, d. Gesch.,_\ned. Brunst\u00e4d, pp. 107-108.)\n\n[2] Not even the above-mentioned Flint carried it out, for he lost\nhim-self in preliminaries of historical documentation and never\nproceeded to the promised construction.\n\n\n\nIII\n\n\nThe true remedy for the contradictions of historical determinism and of\nthe 'philosophy of history' is quite other than this. To obtain it, we\nmust accept the result of the preceding confutation, which shows that\nboth are futile, and reject, as lacking thought, both the 'designs'\nof the philosophy of history and the causal chains of determinism.\nWhen these two shadows have been dispersed we shall find ourselves\nat the starting-place: we are again face to face with disconnected\nbrute facts, with facts that are connected, but not understood, for\nwhich determinism had tried to employ the cement of causality, the\n'philosophy of history,' the magic wand of finality. What shall we\ndo with these facts? How shall we make them clear rather than dense\nas they were, organic rather than inorganic, intelligible rather\nthan unintelligible? Truly, it seems difficult to do anything with\nthem, especially to effect their desired transformation. The spirit\nis helpless before that which is, or is supposed to be, external to\nit. And when facts are understood in that way we are apt to assume\nagain that attitude of contempt of the philosophers for history which\nhas been well-nigh constant since antiquity almost to the end of the\neighteenth century (for Aristotle history was \"less philosophical\" and\nless serious than poetry, for Sextus Empiricus it was \"unmethodical\nmaterial\"; Kant did not feel or understand history). The attitude\namounts to this: leave ideas to the philosophers and brute facts to the\nhistorians--let us be satisfied with serious things and leave their\ntoys to the children.\n\nBut before having recourse to such a temptation, it will be prudent\nto ask counsel of methodical doubt (which is always most useful), and\nto direct the attention precisely upon those brute and disconnected\nfacts from which the causal method claims to start and before which we,\nwho are now abandoned by it and by its complement, the philosophy of\nhistory, appear to find ourselves again. Methodical doubt will suggest\nabove all things the thought that those facts are a _presupposition_\nthat has _not been proved_, and it will lead to the inquiry as to\n_whether the proof can be obtained_. Having attempted the proof, we\nshall finally arrive at the conclusion that _those facts really do not\nexist._\n\nFor who, as a matter of fact, affirms their existence? Precisely the\nspirit, at the moment when it is about to undertake the search for\ncauses. But when accomplishing that act the spirit does not already\npossess the brute facts (_d'abord la collection des faits_) and then\nseek the causes (_apr\u00e8s, la recherche des causes_); but it makes\nthe _facts brute_ by that very act--that is to say, it posits them\nitself in that way, because it is of use to it so to posit them.\nThe search for causes, undertaken by history, is not in any way\ndifferent from the procedure of naturalism, already several times\nillustrated, which abstractly analyses and classifies reality. And\nto illustrate abstractly and to classify implies at the same time to\njudge in classifying--that is to say, to treat facts, not as acts of\nthe spirit, conscious in the spirit that thinks them, but as external\nbrute facts. The _Divine Comedy_ is that poem which we create again\nin our imagination in all its particulars as we read it and which we\nunderstand critically as a particular determination of the spirit,\nand to which we therefore assign its place in history, with all its\nsurroundings and all its relations. But when this actuality of our\nthought and imagination has come to an end--that is to say, when that\nmental process is completed--we are able, by means of a new act of\nthe spirit, separately to analyse its elements. Thus, for instance,\nwe shall classify the concepts relating to 'Florentine civilization,'\nor to 'political poetry,' and say that the _Divine Comedy_ was an\neffect of Florentine civilization, and this in its turn an effect\nof the strife of the communes, and the like. We shall also thus\nhave prepared the way for those absurd problems which used to annoy\nde Sanctis so much in relation to the work of Dante, and which he\nadmirably described when he said that they arise only when lively\n\u00e6sthetic expression has grown cold and poetical work has fallen into\nthe hands of dullards addicted to trifles. But if we stop in time and\ndo not enter the path of those absurdities, if we restrict ourselves\npurely and simply to the naturalistic moment, to classification, and\nto the classificatory judgment (which is also causal connexion), in an\naltogether practical manner, without drawing any deductions from it, we\nshall have done nothing that is not perfectly legitimate; indeed, we\nshall be exercising our right and bowing to a rational necessity, which\nis that of naturalizing, when naturalization is of use, but not beyond\nthose limits. Thus the materialization of the facts and the external\nor causal binding of them together are altogether justified as pure\nnaturalism. And even the maxim which bids us to stop at 'proximate'\ncauses--that is to say, not to force classification so far that it\nloses all practical utility--will find its justification. To place\nthe concept of the _Divine Comedy_ in relation to that of 'Florentine\ncivilization' may be of use, but it will be of no use whatever,\nor infinitely less use, to place it in relation to the class of\n'Indo-European civilization' or to the 'civilization of the white man.'\n\n\n\nIV\n\n\nLet us then return with greater confidence to the point of departure,\nthe true point of departure--that is to say, not to that of facts\nalready disorganized and naturalized, but to that of the mind\nthat thinks and constructs the fact. Let us raise up the debased\ncountenances of the calumniated 'brute facts,' and we shall see the\nlight of thought resplendent upon their foreheads. And that true point\nof departure will reveal itself not merely as a point of departure, but\nboth as a point of arrival and of departure, not as the first step in\nhistorical construction, but the whole of history in its construction,\nwhich is also its self-construction. Historical determinism, and all\nthe more 'philosophy of history,' leave the _reality of history_ behind\nthem, though they directed their journey thither, a journey which\nbecame so erratic and so full of useless repetitions.\n\nWe shall make the ingenuous Taine confess that what we are saying\nis the truth when we ask him what he means by the _collection des\nfaits_ and learn from him in reply that the collection in question\nconsists of two stages or moments, in the first of which documents\nare revived in order to attain, _\u00e0 travers la distance des temps,\nl'homme vivant, agissant, dou\u00e9 de passions, muni d'habitudes, avec\nsa voix et sa physionomie, avec ses gestes et ses habits, distinct\net complet comme celui que tout \u00e0 l'heure nous avons quitt\u00e9 dans la\nrue;_ and in the second is sought and found _sous l'homme ext\u00e9rieur\nl'homme int\u00e9rieur, \"l'homme invisible,\" \"le centre,\" \"le groupe des\nfacult\u00e9s et des sentiments qui produit le reste,\" \"le drame int\u00e9rieur,\"\n\"la psychologie.\"_ Something very different, then, from collections\nde faits I If the things mentioned by our author really do come to\npass, if we really do make live again in imagination individuals and\nevents, and if we think what is within them--that is to say, if we\nthink the synthesis of intuition and concept, which is thought in its\nconcreteness--history is already achieved: what more is wanted? There\nis nothing more to seek. Taine replies: \"We must seek causes.\" That is\nto say, we must slay the living 'fact' thought by thought, separate\nits abstract elements--a useful thing, no doubt, but useful for memory\nand practice. Or, as is the custom of Taine, we must misunderstand and\nexaggerate the value of the function of this abstract analysis, to lose\nourselves in the mythology of races and ages, or in other different but\nnone the less similar things. Let us beware how we slay poor facts, if\nwe wish to think as historians, and in so far as we are such and really\nthink in that way we shall not feel the necessity for having recourse\neither to the extrinsic bond of causes, historical determinism, or to\nthat which is equally extrinsic of transcendental ends, philosophy of\nhistory. The fact historically thought has no cause and no end outside\nitself, but only in itself, coincident with its real qualities and with\nits qualitative reality. Because (it is well to note in passing) the\ndetermination of facts as real facts indeed, but of _unknown nature_,\nasserted but not understood, is itself also an illusion of naturalism\n(which thus heralds its other illusion, that of the 'philosophy of\nhistory'). In thought, reality and quality, existence and essence, are\nall one, and it is not possible to affirm a fact as real without at the\nsame time knowing what fact it is--that is, without qualifying it.\n\nReturning to and remaining in or moving in the concrete fact, or,\nrather, making of oneself thought that thinks the fact concretely, we\nexperience the continual formation and the continual progress of our\nhistorical thought and also make clear to ourselves the history of\nhistoriography, which proceeds in the same manner. And we see how (I\nlimit myself to this, in order not to allow the eye to wander too far)\nfrom the days of the Greeks to our own historical understanding has\nalways been enriching and deepening itself, not because abstract causes\nand transcendental ends of human things have ever been recovered,\nbut only because an ever increasing consciousness of them has been\nacquired. Politics and morality, religion and philosophy and art,\nscience and culture and economy, have become more complex concepts and\nat the same time better determined and unified both in themselves and\nwith respect to the whole. Correlatively with this, the histories of\nthese forms of activity have become ever more complex and more firmly\nunited. We know 'the causes' of civilization as little as did the\nGreeks; and we know as little as they of the god or gods who control\nthe fortunes of humanity. But we know the theory of civilization better\nthan did the Greeks, and, for instance, we know (as they did not know,\nor did not know with equal clearness and security) that poetry is an\neternal form of the theoretic spirit, that regression or decadence is a\nrelative concept, that the world is not divided into ideas and shadows\nof ideas, or into potencies and acts, that slavery is not a category\nof the real, but a historical form of economic, and so forth. Thus it\nno longer occurs to anyone (save to the survivals or fossils, still to\nbe found among us) to write the history of poetry on the principle of\nthe pedagogic ends that the poets are supposed to have had in view:\non the contrary, we strive to determine the forms expressive of their\nsentiments. We are not at all bewildered when we find ourselves before\nwhat are called 'decadences,' but we seek out what new and greater\nthing was being developed by means of their dialectic. We do not\nconsider the work of man to be miserable and illusory, and aspiration\nand admiration for the skies and for the ascesis joined thereunto\nand averse to earth as alone worthy of admiration and imitation. We\nrecognize the reality of power in the act, and in the shadows the\nsolidity of the ideas, and on earth heaven. Finally, we do not find\nthat the possibility of social life is lost owing to the disappearance\nof the system of slavery. Such a disappearance would have been the\ncatastrophe of reality, if slaves were natural to reality--and so forth.\n\nThis conception of history and the consideration of historiographical\nwork in itself make it possible for us to be just toward historical\ndeterminism and to the 'philosophy of history,' which, by their\ncontinual reappearance, have continually pointed to the gaps in our\nknowledge, both historical and philosophical, and with their false\nprovisional solutions have heralded the correct solutions of the new\nproblems which we have been propounding. Nor has it been said that\nthey will henceforth cease to exercise such a function (which is the\nbeneficial function of Utopias of every sort). And although historical\ndeterminism and the 'philosophy of history' have no history, because\nthey do not develop, they yet receive a content from the relation in\nwhich they stand to history, which does develop--that is to say,\nhistory develops in them, notwithstanding their covering, extrinsic\nto their content, which compels to think even him who proposes to\nschematize and to imagine without thinking. For there is a great\ndifference between the determinism that can now appear, after Descartes\nand Vico and Kant and Hegel, and that which appeared after Aristotle;\nbetween the philosophy of history of Hegel and Marx and that of\ngnosticism and Christianity. Transcendency and false immanency are at\nwork in both these conceptions respectively; but the abstract forms\nand mythologies that have appeared in more mature epochs of thought\ncontain this new maturity in themselves. In proof of this, let us\npause but a moment (passing by the various forms of naturalism) at\nthe case of the 'philosophy of history.' We observe already a great\ndifference between the philosophy of history, as it appears in the\nHomeric world, and that of Herodotus, with whom the conception of the\nanger of the gods is a simulacrum of the moral law, which spares the\nhumble and treads the proud underfoot; from Herodotus to the Fate of\nthe Stoics, a law to which the gods themselves are subjected, and from\nthis to the conception of Providence, which appears in late antiquity\nas wisdom that rules the world; from this pagan providence again to\nChristianity, which is divine justice, evangelical preparation, and\neducative care of the human race, and so on, to the refined providence\nof the theologians, which as a rule excludes divine intervention\nand operates by means of secondary causes, to that of Vico, which\noperates as dialectic of the spirit, to the Idea of Hegel, which is the\ngradual conquest of the consciousness of self, which liberty achieves\nduring the course of history, till we finally reach the mythology of\nprogress and of civilization, which still persists and is supposed to\ntend toward the final abolition of prejudices and superstitions, to\nbe carried out by means of the increasing power and divulgation of\npositive science.\n\nIn this way the 'philosophy of history' and historical determinism\nsometimes attain to the thinness and transparency of a veil, which\ncovers and at the same time reveals the concreteness of the real in\nthought. Mechanical causes thus appear idealized, transcendent deities\nhumanized, and facts are in great part divested of their brutal aspect.\nBut however thin the veil may be, it remains a veil, and however\nclear the truth may be, it is not altogether clear, for at bottom\nthe false persuasion still persists that history is constructed with\nthe 'material' of brute facts, with the 'cement' of causes, and with\nthe 'magic' of ends, as with three successive or concurrent methods.\nThe same thing occurs with religion, which in lofty minds liberates\nitself almost altogether from vulgar beliefs, as do its ethics from the\nheteronomy of the divine command and from the utilitarianism of rewards\nand punishments. Almost altogether, but not altogether, and for this\nreason religion will never be philosophy, save by negating itself, and\nthus the 'philosophy of history' and historical determinism will become\nhistory only by negating themselves. The reason is that as long as they\nproceed in a positive manner dualism will also persist, and with it the\ntorment of scepticism and agnosticism as a consequence.\n\nThe negation of the philosophy of history, in history understood\nconcretely, is its ideal dissolution, and since that so-called\nphilosophy is nothing but an abstract and negative moment, our reason\nfor affirming that _the philosophy of history_ is dead is clear. It\nis dead in its positivity, dead as a body of doctrine, dead in this\nway, with all the other conceptions and forms of the transcendental.\nI do not wish to attach to my brief (but in my opinion sufficient)\ntreatment of the argument the addition of an explanation which to some\nwill appear to be (as it appears to me) but little philosophical and\neven somewhat trivial. Notwithstanding, since I prefer the accusation\nof semi-triviality to that of equivocation, I shall add that since the\ncriticism of the 'concepts' of cause and transcendental finality does\nnot forbid the use of these 'words,' when they are simple words (to\ntalk, for example, in an imaginative way of liberty as of a goddess, or\nto say, when about to undertake a study of Dante, that our intention is\nto 'seek the cause' or 'causes' of this or that work or act of his),\nso nothing forbids our continuing to talk of 'philosophy of history'\nand of philosophizing history, meaning the necessity of treating or of\na better treatment of this or that historical problem. Neither does\nanything forbid our calling the researches of historical gnoseology\n'philosophy of history,' although in this case we are treating the\nhistory, not properly of _history_, but of _historiography_, two things\nwhich are wont to be designated with the same word in Italian as in\nother languages. Neither do we wish to prevent the statement (as did a\nGerman professor years ago) that the 'philosophy of history' must be\ntreated as 'sociology'--that is to say, the adornment with that ancient\ntitle of so-called sociology, the empirical science of the state, of\nsociety and of culture.\n\nThese denominations are all permissible in virtue of the same right\nas that invoked by the adventurer Casanova when he went before the\nmagistrates in order to justify himself for having changed his\nname--\"the right of every man to the letters of the alphabet.\" But the\nquestion treated above is not one of the letters of the alphabet. The\n'philosophy of history,' of which we have briefly shown the genesis and\nthe dissolution, is not one that is used in various senses, but a most\ndefinite mode of conceiving history--the transcendental mode.\n\n\n\n\nV\n\n\nTHE POSITIVITY OF HISTORY\n\n\nWe therefore meet the well-known saying of Fustel de Coulanges that\nthere are certainly \"history and philosophy, but not the philosophy\nof history,\" with the following: there is neither philosophy nor\nhistory, nor philosophy of history, but history which is philosophy\nand philosophy which is history and is intrinsic to history. For this\nreason, all the controversies--and foremost of all those concerned\nwith progress--which philosophers, methodologists of history, and\nsociologists believe to belong to their especial province, and flaunt\nat the beginning and the end of their treatises, are reduced for us to\nsimple problems of philosophy, with historical motivation, all of them\nconnected with the problems of which philosophy treats.\n\nIn controversies relating to progress it is asked whether the work of\nman be fertile or sterile, whether it be lost or preserved, whether\nhistory have an end, and if so of what sort, whether this end be\nattainable in time or only in the infinite, whether history be progress\nor regress, or an interchange between progress and regress, greatness\nand decadence, whether good or evil prevail in it, and the like. When\nthese questions have been considered with a little attention we shall\nsee that they resolve themselves substantially into three points: the\nconception of development, that of end, and that of value. That is to\nsay, they are concerned with the whole of reality, and with history\nonly when it is precisely the whole of reality. For this reason they\ndo not belong to supposed particular sciences, to the philosophy of\nhistory, or to sociology, but to philosophy and to history in so far\nas it is philosophy. When the ordinary current terminology has been\ntranslated into philosophical terms it calls forth immediately the\nthesis, antithesis, and synthesis by means of which those problems\nhave been thought and solved during the course of philosophy, to\nwhich the reader desirous of instruction must be referred. We can\nonly mention here that the conception of reality as development is\nnothing but the synthesis of the two one-sided opposites, consisting\nof permanency without change and of change without permanency, of\nan identity without diversity and of a diversity without identity,\nfor development is a perpetual surpassing, which is at the same\ntime a perpetual conservation. From this point of view one of the\nconceptions that has had the greatest vogue in historical books, that\nof _historical circles,_ is revealed as an equivocal attempt to issue\nforth from a double one-sidedness and a falling back into it, owing to\nan equivocation. Because either the series of circles is conceived as\ncomposed of identicals and we have only permanency, or it is conceived\nas of things diverse and we have only change. But if, on the contrary,\nwe conceive it as circularity that is perpetually identical and at the\nsame time perpetually diverse, in this sense it coincides with the\nconception of development itself.\n\nIn like manner, the opposite theses, as to the attainment or the\nimpossibility of attainment of the end of history, reveal their common\ndefect of positing the end as _extrinsic_ to history, conceiving\nof it either as that which can be reached in time (_progressus ad\nfinitum_), or as that which can never be attained, but only infinitely\napproximated (_progressus ad infinitum_). But where the end has been\ncorrectly conceived as _internal_--that is to say, all one with\ndevelopment itself--we must conclude that it is attained at every\ninstant, and at the same time not attained, because every attainment\nis the formation of a new prospect, whence we have at every moment the\nsatisfaction of possession, and arising from this the dissatisfaction\nwhich drives us to seek a new possession.[1]\n\nFinally, the conceptions of history as a passage from evil to good\n(progress), or from good to evil (decadence, regression), take their\norigin from the same error of entifying and making extrinsic good and\nevil, joy and sorrow (which are the dialectical construction of reality\nitself). To unite them in the eclectic conception of an alternation of\ngood and evil, of progress and regress, is incorrect. The true solution\nis that of progress understood not as a passage from evil to good, as\nthough from one state to another, but as the passage from the good to\nthe better, in which the evil is the good itself seen in the light of\nthe better.\n\nThese are all philosophical solutions which are at variance with\nthe superficial theses of controversialists (dictated to them by\nsentimental motives or imaginative combinations, really mythological\nor resulting in mythologies), to the same extent that they are in\naccordance with profound human convictions and with the tireless toil,\nthe trust, the courage, which constitute their ethical manifestations.\n\nBy drawing the consequences of the dialectical conception of progress\nsomething more immediately effective can be achieved in respect to the\npractice and history of historiography. For we find in that conception\nthe origin of a historical maxim, in the mouth of every one, yet\nfrequently misunderstood and frequently violated--that is to say, that\nto history pertains not to _judge,_ but to _explain,_ and that it\nshould be not _subjective_ but _objective._\n\nMisunderstood, because the judging in question is often taken in the\nsense of logical judgment, of that judgment which is thinking itself,\nand the subjectivity, which would thus be excluded, would be neither\nmore nor less than the subjectivity of thought. In consequence of this\nmisunderstanding we hear historians being advised to purge themselves\nof theories, to refrain from the disputes arising from them, to\nrestrict themselves to facts, collecting, arranging, and squeezing out\nthe sap (even by the statistical method). It is impossible to follow\nsuch advice as this, as may easily be seen, for such 'abstention from\nthought' reveals itself as really abstention from 'seriousness of\nthought,' as a surreptitious attaching of value to the most vulgar and\ncontradictory thoughts, transmitted by tradition, wandering about idly\nin the mind, or flashing out as the result of momentary caprice. The\nmaxim is altogether false, understood or misunderstood in this way,\nand it must be taken by its opposite--namely, that history must always\njudge strictly, and that it must always be energetically subjective\nwithout allowing itself to be confused by the conflicts in which\nthought engages or by the risks that it runs. For it is thought itself,\nand thought alone, which gets over its own difficulties and dangers,\nwithout falling even here into that frivolous eclecticism which tries\nto find a middle term between our judgment and that of others, and\nsuggests various neutral and insipid forms of judgment.\n\nBut the true and legitimate meaning, the original motive for that\n'judging,' that 'subjectivity,' which it condemns, is that history\nshould not apply to the deeds and the personages that are its material\nthe qualifications of good and evil, as though there really were\ngood and evil facts in the world, people who are good and people\nwho are evil. And it is certainly not to be denied that innumerable\nhistoriographers, or those who claim to be historiographers, have\nreally striven and still strive along those lines, in the vain and\npresumptuous attempt to reward the good and punish the evil, to qualify\nhistorical epochs as representing progress or decadence--in a word,\nto settle what is good and what is evil, as though it were a question\nof separating one element from another in a compound, hydrogen from,\noxygen.\n\nWhoever desires to observe intrinsically the above maxim, and by\ndoing so to set himself in accordance with the dialectic conception\nof progress, must in truth look upon every trace or vestige of\npropositions affirming evil, regression, or decadence as real facts,\nas a sign of imperfection--in a word, he must condemn every trace\nor vestige of _negative_ judgments. If the course of history is not\nthe passage from evil to good, or alternative good and evil, but the\npassage from the good to the better, if history should explain and\nnot condemn, it will pronounce only _positive_ judgments, and will\nforge chains of good, so solid and so closely linked that it will\nnot be possible to introduce into them even a little link of evil or\nto interpose empty spaces, which in so far as they are empty would\nnot represent good but evil. A fact that seems to be only evil, an\nepoch that appears to be one of complete decadence, can be nothing\nbut a _non-historical_ fact--that is to say, one which has not been\nhistorically treated, not penetrated by thought, and which has remained\nthe prey of sentiment and imagination.\n\nWhence comes the phenomenology of good and evil, of sin and repentance,\nof decadence and resurrection, save from the consciousness of the\nagent, from the act which is in labour to produce a new form of\nlife?[2] And in that act the adversary who opposed us is in the\nwrong; the state from which we wish to escape, and from which we\nare escaping, is unhappy; the new one toward which we are tending\nbecomes symbolized as a dreamed-of felicity to be attained, or as\na past condition to restore, which is therefore most beautiful in\nrecollection (which here is not recollection, but imagination). Every\none knows how these things present them-selves to us in the course\nof history, manifesting themselves in poetry, in Utopias, in stories\nwith a moral, in detractions, in apologies, in myths of love, of\nhate, and the like. To the heretics of the Middle Ages and to the\nProtestant reformers the condition of the primitive Christians seemed\nto be most lovely and most holy, that of papal Christians most evil\nand debased. The Sparta of Lycurgus and the Rome of Cincinnatus seemed\nto the Jacobins to be as admirable as France under the Carlovingians\nand the Capetians was detestable. The humanists looked upon the lives\nof the ancient poets and sages as luminous and the life of the Middle\nAges as dense darkness. Even in times near our own has been witnessed\nthe glorification of the Lombard communes and the depreciation of\nthe Holy Roman Empire, and the very opposite of this, according as\nthe facts relating to these historical events were reflected in the\nconsciousness of an Italian longing for the independence of Italy or\nof a German upholding the holy German empire of Prussian hegemony.\nAnd this will always happen, because such is the phenomenology of the\npractical consciousness, and these practical valuations will always\nbe present to some extent in the works of historians. As works, these\nare not and cannot ever be pure history, quintessential history; if in\nno other way, then in their phrasing and use of metaphors they will\nreflect the repercussion of practical needs and efforts directed toward\nthe future. But the historical consciousness, as such, is logical and\nnot practical consciousness, and indeed makes the other its object;\nhistory once lived has become in it thought, and the antitheses of will\nand feeling that formerly offered resistance have no longer a place in\nthought.\n\nFor if there are no good and evil facts, but facts that are always good\nwhen understood in their intimate being and concreteness, there are not\nopposite sides, but that wider side that embraces both the adversaries\nand which happens just to be historical consideration. Historical\nconsideration, therefore, recognizes as of equal right the Church of\nthe catacombs and that of Gregory VII, the tribunes of the Roman people\nand the feudal barons, the Lombard League and the Emperor Barbarossa.\nHistory never metes out justice, but always _justifies_; she could not\ncarry out the former act without making herself unjust--that is to say,\nconfounding thought with life, taking the attractions and repulsions of\nsentiment for the judgments of thought.\n\nPoetry is satisfied with the expression of sentiment, and it is worthy\nof note that a considerable historian, Schlosser, wishing to reserve\nfor himself the right and duty of judging historical facts with\nKantian austerity and abstraction, kept his eyes fixed on the _Divine\nComedy_--that is to say, a poetical work--as his model of treatment.\nAnd since there are poetical elements in all myths, we understand why\nthe conception of history known as _dualistic_--that is to say, of\nhistory as composed of two currents, which mix but never resolve in one\nanother their waters of good and evil, truth and error, rationality and\nirrationality--should have formed a conspicuous part, not only of the\nChristian religion, but also of the mythologies (for they really are\nsuch) of humanism and of illuminism. But the detection of this problem\nof the duality of values and its solution in the superior unity of\nthe conception of development is the work of the nineteenth century,\nwhich on this account and on account of other solutions of the same\nkind (certainly not on account of its philological and arch\u00e6ological\nrichness, which was relatively common to the four preceding centuries)\nhas been well called 'the century of history.'\n\nNot only, therefore, is history unable to discriminate between facts\nthat are good and facts that are evil, and between epochs that are\nprogressive and those that are regressive, but it does not begin until\nthe psychological conditions which rendered possible such antitheses\nhave been superseded and substituted by an act of the spirit, which\nseeks to ascertain what function the fact or the epoch previously\ncondemned has fulfilled--that is to say, what it has produced of its\nown in the course of development, and therefore what it has produced.\nAnd since all facts and epochs are productive in their own way, not\nonly is not one of them to be condemned in the light of history, but\nall are to be praised and venerated. A condemned fact, a fact that is\nrepugnant, is not yet a historical proposition, it is hardly even the\npremiss of a historical problem to be formulated. A negative history is\na non-history so long as its negative process substitutes itself for\nthought, which is affirmative, and does not maintain itself within its\npractical and moral bounds and limit itself to poetical expressions and\nempirical modes of representation, in respect of all of which we can\ncertainly speak (speak and not think), as we do speak at every moment,\nof bad men and periods of decadence and regression.\n\nIf the vice of negative history arises from the separation, the\nsolidification, and the opposition of the dialectical antitheses\nof good and evil and the transformation of the ideal moments of\ndevelopment into entities, that other deviation of history which\nmay be known as elegiac history arises from the misunderstanding of\nanother necessity of that conception--that is to say, the perpetual\nconstancy, the perpetual conservation of what has been acquired. But\nthis is also false by definition. What is preserved and enriched\nin the course of history is history itself, spirituality. The past\ndoes not live otherwise than in the present, as the force of the\npresent, resolved and transformed in the present. Every particular\nform, individual, action, institution, work, thought, is destined to\nperish: even art, which is called eternal (and is so in a certain\nsense), perishes, for it does not live, save to the extent that it\nis reproduced, and therefore transfigured and surrounded with new\nlight, in the spirit of posterity. Finally, truth itself perishes,\nparticular and determined truth, because it is not rethinkable, save\nwhen included in the system of a vaster truth, and therefore at the\nsame time transformed. But those who do not rise to the conception of\npure historical consideration, those who attach themselves with their\nwhole soul to an individual, a work, a belief, an institution, and\nattach themselves so strongly that they cannot separate themselves\nfrom it in order to objectify it before themselves and think it, are\nprone to attribute the immortality which belongs to the spirit in\nuniversal to the spirit in one of its particular and determined forms;\nand since that form, notwithstanding their efforts, dies, and dies\nin their arms, the universe darkens before their gaze, and the only\nhistory that they can relate is the sad one of the agony and death of\nbeautiful things. This too is poetry, and very lofty poetry. Who can do\notherwise than weep at the loss of a beloved one, at separation from\nsomething dear to him, cannot see the sun extinguished and the earth\ntremble and the birds cease their flight and fall to earth, like Dante,\non the loss of his beloved \"who was so beautiful\"? But history is never\n_history of death_, but _history of life_, and all know that the proper\ncommemoration of the dead is the knowledge of what they did in life,\nof what they produced that is working in us, the history of their life\nand not of their death, which it behoves a gentle soul to veil, a soul\nbarbarous and perverse to exhibit in its miserable nakedness and to\ncontemplate with unhealthy persistence. For this reason all histories\nwhich narrate the death and not the life of peoples, of states, of\ninstitutions, of customs, of literary and artistic ideals, of religious\nconceptions, are to be considered false, or, we repeat, simply poetry,\nwhere they attain to the level of poetry. People grow sad and suffer\nand lament because that which was is no longer. This would resolve\nitself into a mere tautology (because if it was, it is evident that it\nis no longer), were it not conjoined to the neglect of recognizing what\nof that past has not perished--that is to say, that past in so far as\nit is not past but present, the eternal life of the past. It is in this\nneglect, in the incorrect view arising out of it, that the falsity of\nsuch histories resides.\n\nIt sometimes happens that historians, intent upon narrating those\nscenes of anguish in a lugubrious manner and upon celebrating the\nfunerals which it pleases them to call histories, remain partly\nastounded and partly scandalized when they hear a peal of laughter, a\ncry of joy, a sigh of satisfaction, or find an enthusiastic impulse\nspringing up from the documents that they are searching. How, they\nask, could men live, make love, reproduce their species, sing, paint,\ndiscuss, when the trumps were sounding east and west to announce the\nend of the world? But they do not see that such an end of the world\nexists only in their own imaginations, rich in elegiac motives, but\npoor in understanding. They do not perceive that such importunate\ntrumpet-calls have never in reality existed. These are very useful,\non the other hand, for reminding those who may have forgotten it that\nhistory always pursues her indefatigable work, and that her apparent\nagonies are the travail of a new birth, and that what are believed to\nbe her expiring sighs are moans that announce the birth of a new world.\nHistory differs from the individual who dies because, in the words of\nAlcm\u00e6on of Crete, he is not able \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03ac\u03c8\u03b1\u03b9, to join\nhis beginning to his end: history never dies, because she always joins\nher beginning to her end.\n\n\n[1] For the complete development of these conceptions, see my study\nof _The Conception of Becoming_, in the _Saggio sullo Hegel seguito\nda altri scritti di storia della filosofia_, pp. 149-175 (Bari,\n1913). (English translation of the work on Hegel by Douglas Ainslie.\nMacmillan, London.)\n\n[2] For what relates to this section, see my treatment of _Judgments of\nValue,_ in the work before cited.\n\n\n\n\nVI\n\n\nTHE HUMANITY OF HISTORY\n\n\nEnfranchising itself from servitude to extra-mundane caprice and\nto blind natural necessity, freeing itself from transcendency and\nfrom false immanence (which is in its turn transcendency), thought\nconceives history as the work of man, as the product of human will\nand intellect, and in this manner enters that form of history which\nwe shall call _humanistic._ This humanism first appears as in simple\ncontrast to nature or to extra-mundane powers, and posits dualism.\nOn the one side is man, with his strength, his intelligence, his\nreason, his prudence, his will for the good; on the other there is\nsomething that resists him, strives against him, upsets his wisest\nplans, breaks the web that he has been weaving and obliges him to weave\nit all over again. History, envisaged from the view-point of this\nconception, is developed entirely from the first of these two sides,\nbecause the other does not afford a dialectical element which can be\ncontinually met and superseded by the first, giving rise to a sort of\ninterior collaboration, but represents the absolutely extraneous, the\ncapricious, the accidental, the meddler, the ghost at the feast. Only\nin the former do we find rationality combined with human endeavour,\nand thus the possibility of a rational explication of history. What\ncomes from the other side is announced, but not explained: it is not\nmaterial for history, but at the most for chronicle. This first form of\nhumanistic history is known under the various names of _rationalistic,\nintellectualistic, abstractistic, individualistic, psychological_\nhistory, and especially under that of _pragmatic_ history. It is a\nform generally condemned by the consciousness of our times, which has\nemployed these designations, especially _rationalism_ and _pragmatism_,\nto represent a particular sort of historiographical insufficiency and\ninferiority, and has made proverbial the most characteristic pragmatic\nexplanations of institutions and events, as types of misrepresentation\ninto which one must beware of falling if one wish to think history\nseriously. But as happens in the progress of culture and science, even\nif the condemnation be cordially accepted and no hesitation entertained\nas to drawing practical consequences from it in the field of actuality,\nthere is not an equally clear consciousness of the reasons for this,\nor of the thought process by means of which it has been attained. This\nprocess we may briefly describe as follows.\n\nPragmatic finds the reasons for historical facts in man, but in man\n_in so far as he is an individual made abstract_, and thus opposed\nas such not only to the universe, but to other men, who have also\nbeen made abstract. History thus appears to consist of the mechanical\naction and reaction of beings, each one of whom is shut up in himself.\nNow no historical process is intelligible under such an arrangement,\nfor the sum of the addition is always superior to the numbers added.\nTo such an extent is this true that, not knowing which way to turn\nin order to make the sum come out right, it became necessary to\nexcogitate the doctrine of 'little causes,' which were supposed to\nproduce 'great effects.' This doctrine is absurd, for it is clear\nthat great effects can only have real causes (if the illegitimate\nconceptions of great and small, of cause and effect, be applicable\nhere). Such a formula, then, far from expressing the law of historical\nfacts, unconsciously expresses the defects of the doctrine, which\nis inadequate for its purpose. And since the rational explanation\nfails, there arise crowds of fancies to take its place, which are all\nconceived upon the fundamental motive of the abstract individual. The\npragmatic explanation of religions is characteristic of this; these\nare supposed to have been produced and maintained in the world by the\neconomic cunning of the priests, taking advantage of the ignorance\nand credulity of the masses. But historical pragmatic does not\nalways present itself in the guise of this egoistic and pessimistic\ninspiration. It is not fair to accuse it of egoism and utilitarianism,\nwhen the true accusation should, as we have already said, be levelled\nat its abstract individualism. This abstract individualism could be and\nsometimes was conceived even as highly moral, for we certainly find\namong the pragmatics sage legislators, good kings, and great men, who\nbenefit humanity by means of science, inventions, and well-organized\ninstitutions. And if the greedy priest arranged the deceit of\nreligions, if the cruel despot oppressed weak and innocent people, and\nif error was prolific and engendered the strangest and most foolish\ncustoms, yet the goodness of the enlightened monarch and legislator\ncreated the happy epochs, caused the arts to flourish, encouraged\npoets, aided discoveries, encouraged industries. From these pragmatic\nconceptions is derived the verbal usage whereby we speak of the age of\nPericles, of that of Augustus, of that of Leo X, or of that of Louis\nXIV. And since fanciful explanations do not limit themselves merely\nto individuals physically existing, but also employ facts and small\ndetails, which are also made abstract and shut up in themselves, being\nthus also turned into what Vico describes as 'imaginative universals,'\nin like manner all these modes of explanation known as 'catastrophic'\nand making hinge the salvation or the ruin of a whole society upon the\nvirtue of some single fact are also derived from pragmatic. Examples\nof this, which have also become proverbial, because they refer to\nconcepts that have been persistently criticized by the historians of\nour time, are the fall of the Roman Empire, explained as the result\nof barbarian invasions, European civilization of the twelfth and\nthirteenth centuries, as the result of the Crusades, the renascence\nof classical literatures, as the result of the Turkish conquest of\nConstantinople and of the immigration of the learned Byzantines into\nItaly--and the like. And in just the same way as when the conception\nof the single individual did not furnish a sufficient explanation\nrecourse was for that reason had to a multiplicity of individuals, to\ntheir co-operation and conflicting action, so here, when the sole cause\nadduced soon proved itself too narrow, an attempt was made to make up\nfor the insufficiency of the method by the search for and enumeration\nof multiple historical causes. This enumeration threatened to proceed\nto the infinite, but, finite or infinite as it might be, it never\nexplained the process to be explained, for the obvious reason that the\ncontinuous is never made out of the discontinuous, however much the\nlatter may be multiplied and solidified. The so-called theory of the\ncauses or factors of history, which survives in modern consciousness,\ntogether with several other mental habits of pragmatic, although\ngenerally inclined to follow other paths, is rather a confession of\npowerlessness to dominate history by means of individual causes,\nor causes individually conceived, than a theory; far from being a\nsolution, it is but a reopening of the problem.\n\nPragmatic therefore fails to remain human--that is to say, to develop\nitself as rationality; even in the human side to which it clings and\nin which it wishes to maintain and oppose itself to the natural or\nextra-natural; and having already made individuals irrational and\nunhuman by making them abstract, it gradually has recourse to other\nhistorical factors, and arrives finally at natural causes, which do\nnot differ at all in their abstractness from other individual causes.\nThis means that pragmatic, which had previously asserted itself as\nhumanism, falls back into naturalism, from which it had distinctly\nseparated itself. And it falls into it all the more, seeing that, as\nhas been noted, human individuals have been made abstract, not only\namong themselves, but toward the rest of the universe, which remains\nfacing them, as though it were an enemy. What is it that really rules\nhistory according to this conception? Is it man, or extra-human powers,\nnatural or divine? The claim that history exists only as an individual\nexperience is not maintainable; and in the pragmatic conception another\nagent in history is always presumed, an extra-human being which, at\ndifferent times and to different thinkers, is known as fate, chance,\nfortune, nature, God, or by some other name. During the period at which\npragmatic history flourished, and there was much talk of reason and\nwisdom, an expression of a monarchical or courtly tinge is to be found\nupon the lips of a monarch and of a philosopher who was his friend:\nhomage was paid to _sa Majest\u00e9 le Hasard!_ Here too there is an attempt\nto patch up the difficulty and to seek eclectic solutions; in order\nto get out of it, we find pragmatic affirming that human affairs are\nconducted half by prudence and half by fortune, that intelligence\ncontributes one part, fortune another, and so on. But who will assign\nthe just share to the two competitors? Will not he who does assign it\nbe the true and only maker of history? And since he who does assign\nit cannot be man, we see once again how pragmatic leads directly to\ntranscendency and irrationality through its naturalism. It leads to\nirrationality, accompanied by all its following of inconveniences\nand by all the other dualisms that it brings with it and which are\nparticular aspects of itself, such as the impossibility of development,\nregressions, the triumph of evil. The individual, engaged with external\nforces however conceived, sometimes wins, at other times loses; his\nvictory itself is precarious, and the enemy is always victorious,\ninflicting losses upon him and making his victories precarious.\nIndividuals are ants crushed by a piece of rock, and if some ant\nescapes from the mass that falls upon it and reproduces the species,\nwhich begins again the labour from the beginning, the rock will fall,\nor always may fall, upon the new generation and may crush all of its\nmembers, so that it is the arbiter of the lives of the industrious\nants, to which it does much injury and no good. This is as pessimistic\na view as can be conceived.\n\nThese difficulties and vain-tentatives of pragmatic historiography have\ncaused it to be looked upon with disfavour and to be rejected in favour\nof a superior conception, which preserves the initial humanistic motive\nand, removing from it the abstractness of the atomicized individual,\nassures it against any falling back into agnosticism, transcendency,\nor the despair caused by pessimism. The conception that has completed\nthe criticism of pragmatic and the redemption of humanism has been\nvariously and more or less well formulated in the course of the\nhistory of thought as mind or reason that constructs history, as the\n'providence' of mind or the 'astuteness' of reason.\n\nThe great value of this conception is that it changes humanism from\nabstract to concrete, from monadistic or atomistic to idealistic,\nfrom something barely human into something cosmic, from unhuman\nhumanism, such as that of man shut up in himself and opposed to man,\ninto humanism that is really human, the humanity common to men,\nindeed to the whole universe, which is all humanity, even in its most\nhidden recesses--that is to say, spirituality. And history, according\nto this conception, as it is no longer the work of nature or of an\nextra-mundane God, so it is not the impotent work of the empirical\nand unreal individual, interrupted at every moment, but the work\nof that individual which is truly real and is the eternal spirit\nindividualizing itself. For this reason it has no adversary at all\nopposed to it, but every adversary is at the same time its subject\n--that is to say, is one of the aspects of that dialecticism which\nconstitutes its inner being. Again, it does not seek its principle of\nexplanation in a particular act of thought or will, or in a single\nindividual or in a multitude of individuals, or in an event given as\nthe cause of other events, or in a collection of events that form the\ncause of a single event, but seeks and places it in the process itself,\nwhich is born of thought and returns to thought, and is intelligible\nthrough the auto-intelligibility of thought, which never has need of\nappealing to anything external to itself in order to understand itself.\nThe explanation of history becomes so truly, because it coincides with\nits explication; whereas explanation by means of abstract causes is a\nbreaking up of the process; the living having been slain, there is a\nforced attempt made to obtain life by setting the severed head again\nupon the shoulders.\n\nWhen the historians of our day, and the many sensible folk who do not\nmake a profession of philosophy, repeat that the history of the world\ndoes not depend upon the will of individuals, upon such accidents as\nthe length of Cleopatra's nose, or upon anecdotes; that no historical\nevent has ever been the result of deception or misunderstanding, but\nthat all have been due to persuasion and necessity; that there is some\none who has more intelligence than any individual whatever--the world;\nthat the explanation of a fact is always to be sought in the entire\norganism and not in a single part torn from the other parts; that\nhistory could not have been developed otherwise than it has developed,\nand that it obeys its own iron logic; that every fact has its reason\nand that no individual is completely wrong; and numberless propositions\nof the same sort, which I have assembled promiscuously--they are\nperhaps not aware that with such henceforth obvious statements they\nare repeating the criticism of pragmatic history (and implicitly that\nof theological and naturalistic history) and affirming the truth of\nidealistic history. Were they aware of this, they would not mingle\nwith these propositions others which are their direct contradiction,\nrelating to causes, accidents, decadences, climates, races, and so\non, which represent the detritus of the conception that has been\nsuperseded. For the rest, it is characteristic of the consciousness\ncalled common or vulgar to drag along with it an abundant detritus of\nold, dead concepts mingled with the new ones; but this does not detract\nfrom the importance of its enforced recognition of the new concept,\nwhich it substantially follows in its judgments.\n\nOwing to the already mentioned resolution of all historiographical\nquestions into general philosophy, it would not be possible to\ngive copious illustrations of the new concept of history which the\nnineteenth century has accepted in place of the pragmatic conception\nwithout giving a lengthy exposition of general philosophy, which, in\naddition to the particular inconvenience its presence would have here,\nwould lead to the repetition of things elsewhere explained. Taking the\nposition that history is the work, not of the abstract individual, but\nof reason or providence, as admitted, I intend rather to correct an\nerroneous mode of expressing that doctrine which I believe that I have\ndetected. I mean the form given to it by Vico and by Hegel, according\nto which Providence or Reason makes use of the particular ends and\npassions of men, in order to conduct them unconsciously to more lofty\nspiritual conditions, making use for this purpose of benevolent cunning.\n\nWere this form exact, or were it necessary to take it literally (and\nnot simply as an imaginative and provisional expression of the truth),\nI greatly fear that a shadow of dualism and transcendency would appear\nin the heart of the idealistic conception. For in this position of\ntheirs toward the Idea or Providence, individuals would have to be\nconsidered, if not as _deluded_ (satisfied indeed beyond their desires\nand hopes), then certainly as _illuded_, even though benevolently\nilluded. Individuals and Providence, or individuals and Reason, would\nnot make one, but two; and the individual would be inferior and the\nIdea superior--that is to say, dualism and the reciprocal transcendency\nof God and the world would persist. This, on the other hand, would not\nbe at variance from the historical point of view with what has been\nseveral times observed as to the theological residue at the bottom\nof Hegel's, and yet more of Vico's, thought. Now the claim of the\nidealistic conception is that individual and Idea make one and not\ntwo--that is to say, perfectly coincide and are identified. For this\nreason, there must be no talking (save metaphorically) of the wisdom of\nthe Idea and of the folly or illusion of individuals.\n\nNevertheless it seems indubitably certain that the individual acts\nthrough the medium of infinite illusions, proposing to himself ends\nthat he fails to attain and attaining ends that he has not seen.\nSchopenhauer (imitating Hegel) has made popular the illusions of\nlove, by means of which the will leads the individual to propagate\nthe species; and we all know that illusions are not limited to those\nthat men and women exercise toward one another (_les tromperies\nr\u00e9ciproques_), but that they enter into our every act, which is always\naccompanied by hopes and mirages that are not followed by realization.\nAnd the illusion of illusions seems to be this: that the individual\nbelieves himself to be toiling to live and to intensify his life more\nand more, whereas he is really toiling to die. He wishes to see his\nwork completed as the affirmation of his life, and its completion is\nthe passing away of the work; he toils to obtain peace in life, but\npeace is on the contrary death, which alone is peace. How then are we\nto deny this dualism between the illusion of the individual and the\nreality of the work, between the individual and the Idea? How are we to\nrefute the only explanation which seems to compose in some measure the\ndiscord--namely, that the Idea turns the illusions of the individual to\nits own ends, even though this doctrine lead inevitably to a sort of\ntranscendency of the Idea?\n\nBut the real truth is that what results from the observations and\nobjections above exposed is not the illusion of the individual who\nloves, who tries to complete his work, who sighs for peace, but rather\nthe illusion of him who believes that the individual is illuded: the\nillusory is the illusion itself. And this illusion appears in the\nphenomenology of the spirit as the result of the well-known abstractive\nprocess, which breaks up unity in an arbitrary manner and in this case\nseparates the result from the process or actual acting, in which alone\nthe former is real; the accompaniment from the accompanied, which is\nall one with the accompaniment, because there is not spirit and its\nescort, but only the one spirit in its development, the single moments\nof the process, of the continuity, which is their soul; and so on.\nThat illusion arises in the individual when he begins to reflect upon\nhimself, and at the beginning of that reflection, which is at the same\ntime a dialectical process. But in concrete reflection, or rather in\nconcrete consciousness, he discovers that there is no end that has not\nbeen realized, as well as it could, in the process, in which it was\nnever an absolute end--that is to say, an abstract end, but both a\nmeans and an end.\n\nTo return to the popular theory of Schopenhauer, only he who looks\nupon men as animals, or worse than animals, can believe that love is a\nprocess that leads only to the biological propagation of the species,\nwhen every man knows that he fecundates his own soul above all prior\nto the marriage couch, and that images and thoughts and projects and\nactions are created before children and in addition to them. Certainly,\nwe are conscious of the moments of an action as it develops--that is\nto say, of its passage and not of its totality seen in the light of\na new spiritual situation, such as we strive to obtain when, as we\nsay, we leave the tumult behind us and set ourselves to write our own\nhistory. But there is no illusion, either now or then; neither now nor\nthen is there the abstract individual face to face with a Providence\nwho succeeds in deceiving him for beneficial ends, acting rather as\na doctor than as a serious educator, and treating the race of men as\nthough they were animals to train and make use of, instead of men to\neducate--that is to say, develop.\n\nAfter having concentrated the mind upon a thought of Vico and of\nHegel, can it be possible to set ourselves down to examine those of\nothers which afford material to the controversies of historians and\nmethodologists of history of our time? These represent the usual form\nin which appear the problems concerning the relation between the\nindividual and the Idea, between pragmatic and idealistic history.\nPerhaps the patience necessary for the descent into low haunts is\nmeritorious and our duty; perhaps there may be some useful conclusion\nto be drawn from these common disputes; but I must beg to be excused\nfor not taking part in them and for limiting myself to the sole remark\nthat the question which has been for some time discussed, whether\nhistory be the history of 'masses' or of 'individuals,' would be\nlaughable in its very enunciation, if we were to understand by 'mass'\nwhat the word implies, a complex of individuals. And since it is not\na good method to attribute laughable ideas to adversaries, it may be\nsupposed that on this occasion what is meant by 'mass' is something\nelse, which moves the mass of individuals. In this case, anyone can see\nthat the problem is the same as that which has just been examined. The\nconflict between 'collectivistic' and 'individualistic' historiography\nwill never be composed so long as the former assigns to collectivity\nthe power that is creative of ideas and institutions, and the latter\nassigns it to the individual of genius, for both affirmations are true\nin what they include and false in what they exclude--that is to say,\nnot only in their exclusion of the opposed thesis, but also in the\ntacit exclusion, which they both make, of totality as idea.\n\nA warning as to a historiographical method, so similar in appearance\nto that which I have been defending as to be confounded with it, may\nperhaps be more opportune. This method, which is variously called\n_sociological, institutional,_ and _of values,_ preserves among the\nvariety of its content and the inequality of mental level noticeable\nin its supporters the general and constant characteristic of believing\nthat true history consists of the history of societies, institutions,\nand human values, not of individual values. The history of individuals,\naccording to this view, is excluded, as being a parallel or inferior\nhistory, and its inferiority is held to be due either to the slight\ndegree of interest that it is capable of arousing or to its lack of\nintelligibility. In the latter case (by an inversion on this occasion\nof the attitude of contempt which was noted in pragmatic history) it\nis handed over to chronicle or romance. But in such dualism as this,\nand in the disagreement which persists owing to that dualism, lies the\nprofound difference between the empirical and naturalistic conceptions\nof value, of institutions, and of societies, and the idealistic\nconception. This conception does not contemplate the establishment of\nan abstract history of the spirit, of the abstract universal, side by\nside with or beyond abstract individualistic or pragmatic history,\nbut the understanding that individual and idea, taken separately, are\ntwo equivalent abstractions, each equally unfitted for supplying\nits subject to history, and that true history is the history of the\nindividual in so far as he is universal and of the universal in so\nfar as individual. It is not a question of abolishing Pericles to the\nadvantage of politics, or Plato to the advantage of philosophy, or\nSophocles to the advantage of tragedy; but to think and to represent\npolitics, philosophy, and tragedy as Pericles, Plato, and Sophocles,\nand these as each one of the others in one of their particular\nmoments. Because if each one of these is the shadow of a dream outside\nits relation with the spirit, so likewise is the spirit outside its\nindividualizations, and to attain to universality in the conception of\nhistory is to render both equally secure with that security which they\nmutually confer upon one another. Were the existence of Pericles, of\nSophocles, and of Plato indifferent, would not the existence of the\nidea have for that very reason been pronounced indifferent? Let him who\ncuts individuals out of history but pay close attention and he will\nperceive that either he has not cut them out at all, as he imagined, or\nhe has cut out with them history itself.\n\n\n\n\nVII\n\n\nCHOICE AND PERIODIZATION\n\n\nSince a fact is historical in so far as it is thought, and since\nnothing exists outside thought, there can be no sense whatever in the\nquestion, What are _historical facts_ and what are _non-historical\nfacts?_ A non-historical fact would be a fact that has not been thought\nand would therefore be non-existent, and so far no one has yet met\nwith a non-existent fact. A historical thought links itself to and\nfollows another historical thought, and then another, and yet another;\nand however far we navigate the great sea of being, we never leave the\nwell-defined sea of thought. But it remains to be explained how the\nillusion is formed that there are two orders of facts, historical and\nnon-historical. The explanation is easy when we recollect what has been\nsaid as to the chroniclizing of history which dies as history, leaving\nbehind it the mute traces of its life, and also as to the function of\nerudition or philology, which preserves these traces for the ends of\nculture, arranging scattered items of news, documents, and monuments\nin an orderly manner. News, documents, and monuments are innumerable,\nand to collect them all would not only be impossible, but contrary to\nthe ends themselves of culture, which, though aided in its work by the\nmoderate and even copious supply of such things, would be hindered and\nsuffocated by their exuberance, not to say infinity. We consequently\nobserve that the annotator of news transcribes some items and omits\nthe rest; the collector of papers arranges and ties up in a bundle a\ncertain number of them, tearing up or burning or sending to the dealer\nin such things a very large quantity, which forms the majority; the\ncollector of antiques places some objects in glass cases, others in\ntemporary safe custody, others he resolutely destroys or allows to be\ndestroyed; if he does otherwise, he is not an intelligent collector,\nbut a maniacal amasser, well fitted to provide (as he has provided)\nthe comic type of the antiquarian for fiction and comedy. For this\nreason, not only are papers jealously collected and preserved in\npublic archives, and lists made of them, but efforts are also made\nto discard those that are useless. It is for this reason that in the\nrecensions of philologists we always hear the same song in praise of\nthe learned man who has made a 'sober' use of documents, of blame for\nhim who has followed a different method and included what is vain and\nsuperfluous in his volumes of annals, of selections from archives,\nor of collections of documents. All learned men and philologists, in\nfact, select, and all are advised to select. And what is the logical\ncriterion of this selection? There is none: no logical criterion can\nbe named that shall determine what news or what documents are or are\nnot useful and important, just because we are here occupied with a\npractical and not with a scientific problem. Indeed, this lack of a\nlogical criterion is the foundation of the sophism that tyrannizes\nover maniacal collectors, who reasonably affirm that everything can\nbe of use, and would therefore unreasonably preserve everything--they\nwear themselves out in accumulating old clothes and odds and ends\nof all sorts, over which they mount guard with jealous affection.\nThe criterion is the choice itself, conditioned, like every economic\nact, by knowledge of the actual situation, and in this case by the\npractical and scientific needs of a definite moment or epoch. This\nselection is certainly conducted with intelligence, but not with the\napplication of a philosophic criterion, and is justified only in and\nby itself. For this reason we speak of the fine tact, or scent, or\ninstinct of the collector or learned man. Such a process of selection\nmay quite well make use of apparent logical distinctions, as those\nbetween public and private facts, capital and secondary documents,\nbeautiful or ugly, significant or insignificant monuments; but in\nfinal analysis the decision is always given from practical motives,\nand is summed up in the act of preserving or neglecting. Now from this\npreserving or neglecting, in which our action is realized, is afterward\ninvented an _objective_ quality, attributed to facts, which leads to\ntheir being spoken of as 'facts that are worthy' and 'facts that are\nnot worthy of history,' of 'historical' and 'non-historical' facts. But\nall this is an affair of imagination, of vocabulary, and of rhetoric,\nwhich in no way changes the substance of things.\n\nWhen history is confounded with erudition and the methods of the\none are unduly transferred to the other, and when the metaphorical\ndistinction that has just been noted is taken in a literal sense, we\nare asked how it is possible to avoid going astray in the infinity of\nfacts, and with what criterion it is possible to effect the separation\nof 'historical' facts from 'those that are not worthy of history.'\nBut there is no fear of going astray in history, because, as we have\nseen, the problem is in every case prepared by life, and in every case\nthe problem is solved by thought, which passes from the confusion of\nlife to the distinctness of consciousness; a given problem with a\ngiven solution: a problem that generates other problems, but is never\na problem of choice between two or more facts, but on each occasion\na creation of the unique fact, the fact thought. Choice does not\nappear in it, any more than in art, which passes from the obscurity\nof sentiment to the clearness of the representation, and is never\nembarrassed between the images to be chosen, because itself creates the\nimage, the unity of the image.\n\nBy thus confounding two things, not only is an insoluble problem\ncreated, but the very distinction between facts that can and facts\nthat cannot be neglected is also denaturalized and rendered void.\nThis distinction is quite valid as regards erudition, for facts that\ncan be neglected are always facts--that is to say, they are traces of\nfacts, in the form of news, documents, and monuments, and for this\nreason one can understand how they can be looked upon as a class to\nbe placed side by side with the other class of facts that cannot be\nneglected. But non-historical facts--that is to say, facts that have\nnot been thought--would be nothing, and when placed beside historical\nfacts--that is to say, thought as a species of the same genus--they\nwould communicate their nullity to those also, and would dissolve their\nown distinctness, together with the concept of history.\n\nAfter this, it does not seem necessary to examine the characteristics\nthat have been proposed as the basis for this division of facts into\nhistorical and non-historical. The assumption being false, the manner\nin which it is treated in its particulars remains indifferent and\nwithout importance in respect to the fundamental criticism of the\ndivision itself. It may happen (and this is usually the case) that\nthe characteristics and the differences enunciated have some truth in\nthemselves, or at least offer some problem for solution: for example,\nwhen by historical facts are meant general facts and by non-historical\nfacts those that are individual. Here we find the problem of the\nrelation of the individual and the universal. Or, again, by historical\nfacts are sometimes meant those that treat of history proper, and by\nnon-historical the stray references of chronicles, and here we find the\nproblem as to the relation between history and chronicle. But regarded\nas an attempt to decide logically of what facts history should treat\nand what neglect, and to assign to each its quality, such divisions are\nall equally erroneous.\n\nThe _periodization_ of history is subject to the same criticism. To\n_think_ history is certainly _to divide it into periods_, because\nthought is organism, dialectic, drama, and as such has its periods, its\nbeginning, its middle, and its end, and all the other ideal pauses that\na drama implies and demands. But those pauses are ideal and therefore\ninseparable from thought, with which they are one, as the shadow is one\nwith the body, silence with sound: they are identical and changeable\nwith it. Christian thinkers divided history into that which preceded\nand that which followed the redemption, and this periodization was not\nan addition to Christian thought, but Christian thought itself. We\nmodern Europeans divide it into antiquity, the Middle Ages, and modern\ntimes. This periodization has been subject to a great deal of refined\ncriticism on the part of those who hold that it came to be introduced\nanyhow, almost dishonestly, without the authority of great names, and\nwithout the advice of the philosophers and the methodologists being\nasked on the matter. But it has maintained itself and will maintain\nitself so long as our consciousness shall persist in its present phase.\nThe fact of its having been insensibly formed would appear to be\nrather a merit than a demerit, because this means that it was not due\nto the caprice of an individual, but has followed the development of\nmodern consciousness itself. When antiquity has nothing more to tell us\nwho still feel the need of studying Greek and Latin, Greek philosophy\nand Roman law; when the Middle Ages have been superseded (and they have\nnot been superseded yet); when a new social form, different from that\nwhich emerged from the ruins of the Middle Ages, has supplanted our\nown; then the problem itself and the historical outlook which derives\nfrom it will also be changed, and perhaps antiquity and the Middle Ages\nand modern times will all be contained within a single epoch, and the\npauses be otherwise distributed. And what has been said of these great\nperiods is to be understood of all the others, which vary according to\nthe variety of historical material and the various modes of viewing it.\nIt has sometimes been said that every periodization has a 'relative'\nvalue. But we must say 'both relative and absolute,' like all thought,\nit being understood that the periodization is intrinsic to thought and\ndetermined by the determination of thought.\n\nHowever, the practical needs of chroniclism and of learning make\nthemselves felt here also. Just as in metrical treatises the internal\nrhythm of a poem is resolved into external rhythm and divided into\nsyllables and feet, into long and short vowels, tonic and rhythmic\naccents, into strophes and series of strophes, and so on, so the\ninternal time of historical thought (that time which is thought\nitself) is derived from chroniclism converted into external time, or\ntemporal series, of which the elements are spatially separated from one\nanother. Scheme and facts are no longer one, but two, and the facts\nare disposed according to the scheme, and divided according to the\nscheme into major and minor cycles (for example, according to hours,\ndays, months, years, centuries, and millenniums, where the calculation\nis based upon the rotations and revolutions of the earth upon itself\nand round the sun). Such is _chronology_, by means of which we know\nthat the histories of Sparta, Athens, and Rome filled the thousand\nyears preceding Christ, that of the Lombards, the Visigoths, and the\nFranks the first millennium after Christ, and that we are still in the\nsecond millennium. This mode of chronology can be pursued by means of\nparticularizing incidents thus: that the Empire of the West ended in\nA.D. 476 (although it did not really end then or had already ended\npreviously); that Charlemagne the Frank was crowned Emperor at Rome\nby Pope Leo III in the year 800; that America was discovered in 1492,\nand that the Thirty Years War ended in 1648. It is of the greatest\nuse to us to know these things, or (since we really _know_ nothing\nin this way) to acquire the capacity of so checking references to\nfacts that we are able to find them easily and promptly when occasion\narises. Certainly no one thinks of speaking ill of chronologies and\nchronographies and tables and synoptic views of history, although in\nusing them we run the risk (and in what thing done by man does he not\nrun a risk?) of seeing worthy folk impressed with the belief that the\nnumber produces the event, as the hand of the clock, when it touches\nthe sign of the hour, makes the clock strike; or (as an old professor\nof mine used to say) that the curtain fell upon the acting of ancient\nhistory in 476, to rise again immediately afterward on the beginning of\nthe Middle Ages.\n\nBut such fancies are not limited to the minds of the ingenuous and\ninattentive; they constitute the base of that error owing to which a\ndistinction of periods, which shall be what is called _objective and\nnatural_, is desired and sought after. Christian chronographers had\nalready introduced this ontological meaning into chronology, making\nthe millenniums of the world's history correspond with the days of\nthe creation or the ages of man's life. Finally, Ferrari in Italy and\nLorenz in Germany (the latter ignorant of his Italian predecessor)\nconceived a theory of historical periods according to generations,\ncalculated in periods of thirty-one years and a fraction, or of\nthirty-three years and a fraction, and grouped as tetrads or triads, in\nperiods of a hundred and twenty-five years or a century. But, without\ndwelling upon numerical and chronographic schemes, all doctrines that\nrepresent the history of nations as proceeding according to the stages\nof development of the individual, of his psychological development,\nof the categories of the spirit, or of anything else, are due to\nthe same error, which is that of rendering periodization external\nand natural. All are mythological, if taken in the naturalistic\nsense, save when these designations are employed empirically--that\nis to say, when chronology is used in chroniclism and erudition in a\nlegitimate manner. We must also repeat a warning as to the care to be\nemployed in recognizing important problems, which sometimes have first\nappeared through the medium of those erroneous inquiries, and as to\nthe truths that have been seen or caught a glimpse of by these means.\nThis exempts us (as we remarked above in relation to the criteria of\nchoice) from examining those doctrines in the particularity of their\nvarious determinations, because in this respect, if their assumption be\nobviously fantastic, their value is consequently _nil_. _Nil_, as the\nvalue of all those \u00e6sthetic constructions is _nil_ which claim to pass\nfrom the abstractions, by means of which they reduce the organism of\nthe work of art to fragments for practical ends, to the explanation of\nthe nature of art and to the judgment and history of the creations of\nhuman imagination.\n\n\n\n\nVIII\n\n\nDISTINCTION (SPECIAL HISTORIES) AND DIVISION\n\n\nThe conception of history that we have reached--namely, that which has\nnot its documents outside itself, but in itself, which has not its\nfinal and causal explanation outside itself, but within itself, which\nhas not philosophy outside itself, but coincides with philosophy, which\nhas not the reason for its definite form and rhythm outside itself, but\nwithin itself--identifies history with the act of thought itself, which\nis always philosophy and history together. And with this it debarrasses\nit of the props and plasters applied to it as though to an invalid in\nneed of external assistance. For they really did produce an infirmity\nthrough their very insistence in first imagining and then treating a\nnon-existent infirmity.\n\nDoubtless the autonomy thus attained is a great advantage; but at first\nsight it is not free from a grave objection. When all the fallacious\ndistinctions formerly believed in have been cancelled, it seems that\nnothing remains for history as an act of thought but the immediate\nconsciousness of the individual-universal, in which all distinctions\nare submerged and lost. And this is mysticism, which is admirably\nadapted for feeling oneself at unity with God, but is not adapted for\nthinking the world nor for acting in the world.\n\nNor does it seem useful to add that unity with God does not exclude\nconsciousness of diversity, of change, of becoming. For it can\nbe objected that consciousness of diversity either derives from\nthe individual and intuitive element, and in this case it is\nincomprehensible how such an element can subsist in its proper form of\nintuition, in thought, which always universalizes; or if it is said\nto be the result of the act of thought itself, then the distinction,\nbelieved to have been abolished, reappears in a strengthened form,\nand the asserted indistinct simplicity of thought remains shaken. A\nmysticism which should insist upon particularity and diversity, a\n_historical mysticism,_ in fact, would be a contradiction in terms, for\nmysticism is unhistorical and anti-historical by its very nature.\n\nBut these objections retain their validity precisely when the act of\nthought is conceived in the mystical manner--that is to say, not as\nan act of thought, but as something negative, the simple result of\nthe negation by reason of empirical distinctions, which certainly\nleaves thought free of illusions, but not yet truly full of itself.\nTo sum up, mysticism, which is a violent reaction from naturalism and\ntranscendency, yet retains traces of what it has denied, because it\nis incapable of substituting anything for it, and thus maintains its\npresence, in however negative a manner. But the really efficacious\nnegation of empiricism and transcendency, their positive negation, is\nbrought about not by means of mysticism, but of _idealism_; not in\nthe immediate, but in the _mediated_ consciousness; not in indistinct\nunity, but in the unity that is _distinction_, and as such truly\nthought.\n\nThe act of thought is the consciousness of the spirit that is\nconsciousness; and therefore that act is auto-consciousness. And\nauto-consciousness implies distinction in unity, distinction between\nsubject and object, theory and practice, thought and will, universal\nand particular, imagination and intellect, utility and morality, or\nhowever these distinctions of and in unity are formulated, and whatever\nmay be the historical forms and denominations which the eternal system\nof distinctions, _perennis philosophia,_ may assume. To think is to\njudge, and to judge is to distinguish while unifying, in which the\ndistinguishing is not less real than the unifying, and the unifying\nthan the distinguishing--that is to say, they are real, not as two\ndiverse realities, but as one reality, which is dialectical unity\n(whether it be called unity or distinction).\n\nThe first consequence to be drawn from this conception of the spirit\nand of thought is that when empirical distinctions have been overthrown\nhistory does not fall into the indistinct; when the will-o'-the-wisps\nhave been extinguished, darkness does not supervene, because the light\nof the distinction is to be found in history itself. History is thought\nby judging it, with that judgment which is not, as we have shown,\nthe evaluation of sentiments, but the intrinsic knowledge of facts.\nAnd here its unity with philosophy is all the more evident, because\nthe better philosophy penetrates and refines its distinctions, the\nbetter it penetrates the particular; and the closer its embrace of the\nparticular, the closer its possession of its own proper conceptions.\nPhilosophy and historiography progress together, indissolubly united.\n\nAnother consequence to be deduced from the above, and one which\nwill perhaps seem to be more clearly connected with the practice of\nhistoriography, is the refutation of the false idea of a _general\nhistory,_ superior to _special histories._ This has been called a\nhistory of histories, and is supposed to be true and proper history,\nhaving beneath it political, economic, and institutional histories,\nmoral history or the history of the sentiments and ethical ideals, the\nhistory of poetry and art, the history of thought and of philosophy.\nBut were this so, a dualism would arise, with the usual result of every\ndualism, that each one of the two terms, having been ill distinguished,\nreveals itself as empty. In this case, either general history shows\nitself to be empty, having nothing to do when the special histories\nhave accomplished their work, or particular histories do so, when\nthey fail even to pick up the crumbs of the banquet, all of which has\nbeen voraciously devoured by the other. Sometimes recourse is had to\na feeble expedient, and to general history is accorded the treatment\nof one of the subjects of the special histories, the latter being\nthen grouped apart from that. Of this arrangement the best that can\nbe said is that it is purely verbal and does not designate a logical\ndistinction and opposition, and the worst that can happen is that a\nreal value should be attributed to it, because in this case a fantastic\nhierarchy is established, which makes it impossible to understand the\ngenuine development of the facts. And there is practically no special\nhistory that has not been promoted to be a general history, now as\n_political_ or _social_ history, to which those of literature, art,\nphilosophy, religion, and the lesser sides of life should supply an\nappendix; now as _history of the ideas or progress of the mind,_ where\nsocial history and all the others are placed in the second line; now as\n_economic history,_ where all the others are looked upon as histories\nor chronicles of 'superstructures' derived from economic development in\nan illusory manner, while the former is held to have developed in some\nmysterious way by means of unknown powers, without thought and will,\nor producing thought and will, in fancies and velleities, like so many\nbubbles on the surface of its course. We must be firm in maintaining\nagainst the theory of _general_ history that there _does not exist\nanything real but special histories,_ because thought thinks facts to\nthe extent that it discerns a special aspect of them, and only and\nalways constructs histories of ideas, of imaginations, of political\nactions, of apostolates, and the like.\n\nBut it is equally just and advantageous to maintain the opposite\nthesis: that _nothing exists but general history._ In this way is\nrefuted the false notion of the speciality of histories, understood as\na juxtaposition of specialities. This fallacy is correctly noted by the\ncritics in all histories which expose the various orders of facts one\nafter the other as so many strata and (to employ the critics' word)\ncompartments or little boxes, containing political history, industrial\nand commercial history, history of customs, religious history, history\nof literature and of art, and so on, under so many separate headings.\nThese divisions are merely literary, they may possess some utility as\nsuch, but in the case under consideration they do not fulfil merely\na literary function, but attempt that of historical understanding,\nand thereby give evidence of their defect, in thus presenting these\nhistories as without relation between one another, not dialecticized,\nbut aggregated. It is quite clear that _history_ remains to be\nwritten after the writing of those _histories_ in this disjointed\nmanner. Abstract distinction and abstract unity are both equally\nmisunderstandings of concrete distinction and concrete unity, which is\nrelation.\n\nAnd when the relation is not broken and history is thought in the\nconcrete, it is seen that to think one aspect is to think all the\nothers at the same time. Thus it is impossible to understand completely\nthe doctrine, say, of a philosopher, without having to some extent\nrecourse to the personality of the man himself, and, by distinguishing\nthe philosopher from the man, at the same time qualifying not only the\nphilosopher but the man, and uniting these two distinct characteristics\nas a relation of life and philosophy. The same is to be said of the\ndistinction between the philosopher as philosopher and as orator\nor artist, as subject to his private passions or as rising to the\nexecution of his duty, and so on. This means that we cannot think the\nhistory of philosophy save as at the same time social, political,\nliterary, religious, and ethical history, and so on. This is the source\nof the illusion that one in particular of these histories is the\nwhole of them, or that that one from which a start is made, and which\nanswers to the predilections and to the competence of the writer, is\nthe foundation of all the others. It also explains why it is sometimes\nsaid that the 'history of philosophy' is also the 'philosophy of\nhistory,' or that 'social history' is the true 'history of philosophy,'\nand so on. A history of philosophy thoroughly thought out is truly the\nwhole of history (and in like manner a history of literature or of any\nother form of the spirit), not because it annuls the other in itself,\nbut because all the others are present in it. Hence the demand that\nhistorians shall acquire universal minds and a doctrine that shall\nalso be in a way universal, and the hatred of specialist historians,\npure philosophers, pure men of letters, pure politicians, or pure\neconomists, who, owing precisely to their one-sidedness, fail even to\nunderstand the speciality that they claim to know in its purity, but\npossess only in skeleton form that is to say, in its abstractness.\n\nAnd here a distinction becomes clear to us, with which it is impossible\nto dispense in thinking history: the distinction between _form_ and\n_matter_, owing to which, for example, we understand art by referring\nit to matter (emotions, sentiments, passions, etc.) to which the artist\nhas given form; or philosophy by referring it to the facts which\ngave rise to the problems that the thinker formulated and solved, or\nthe action of the politician by referring it to the aspirations and\nideas with which he was faced, and which supplied the material he has\nshaped with genius, as an artist of practical life--that is to say, we\nunderstand these things by always distinguishing an _external_ from\nan _internal_ history, or an external history that is made into an\ninternal history. This distinction of matter and form, of external and\ninternal, would give rise again to the worst sort of dualism, would\nlead us to think of the pragmatical imagination of man who strives\nagainst his enemy nature, if it did not assume an altogether internal\nand dialectical meaning in its true conception. Because from what has\nbeen said it is easy to see that external and internal are not two\nrealities or two forms of reality, but that external and internal,\nmatter and form, both appear in turn as form in respect to one another,\nand this materialization of each to idealize itself in the other\nis the perpetual movement of the spirit as relation and circle: a\ncircle that is progress just because neither of these forms has the\nprivilege of functioning solely as form, and neither has the misfortune\nof functioning solely as matter. What is the matter of artistic and\nphilosophical history? What is called social and moral history? And\nwhat is the matter of this history? Artistic and philosophical history.\nFrom this clearing up of the relation between matter and form, that\nfalse mode of history is refuted which sets facts on one side and ideas\non the other, as two rival elements, and is therefore never able to\npay its debt and show how ideas are generated from facts and facts\nfrom ideas, because that generation must be conceived in its truth as a\nperpetually rendering vain of one of the elements in the unity of the\nother.\n\nIf history is based upon distinction (unity) and coincides with\nphilosophy, the high importance that research into the autonomy of one\nor the other special history attains in historiographical development\nis perfectly comprehensible, but this is merely the reflection of\nphilosophical research, and is often troubled and lacking in precision.\nAll know what a powerful stimulus the new conception of imagination\nand art gave to the conception of history, and therefore also to\nmythology and religion, which were being developed with slowness and\ndifficulty during the eighteenth to triumph at the beginning of the\nnineteenth century. This is set down to the creation of the history\nof poetry and myth in the works of Vico in the first place and then\nof Herder and others, and of the history of the figurative arts in\nthe works of Winckelmann and others. And to the clearer conception of\nphilosophy, law, customs, and language is due their renewal in the\nrespective historiographical fields, at the hands of Hegel, Savigny,\nand Humboldt, and other creators and improvers of history, celebrated\non this account. This also explains why there has been so much dispute\nas to whether history should be described as history of the state or as\nhistory of culture, and as to whether the history of culture represents\nan original aspect beyond that of the state or greater than it, as to\nwhether the progress narrated in history is only intellectual or also\npractical and moral, and so on. These discussions must be referred to\nthe fundamental philosophical inquiry into the forms of the spirit,\ntheir distinction and relation, and to the precise mode of relation of\neach one to the other.[1]\n\nBut although history distinguishes and unifies, it never\n_divides_--that is to say, _separates_; and the _divisions of history_\nwhich have been and are made do not originate otherwise than as the\nresult of the same practical and abstractive process that we have\nseen break up the actuality of living history to collect and arrange\nthe inert materials in the temporal scheme, rendered extrinsic.\nHistories already produced, and as such past, receive in this way\ntitles (every thought is 'without title' in its actuality--that is to\nsay, it has only itself for title), and each one is separated from\nthe other, and all of them, thus separated, are classified under more\nor less general empirical conceptions, by means of classifications\nthat more or less cross one another. We may admire copious lists of\nthis sort in the books of methodologists, all of them proceeding,\nas is inevitable, according to one or the other of these general\ncriteria: the criterion of the _quality_ of the objects (histories\nof religions, customs, ideas, institutions, etc., etc.), and that of\n_temporal-spatial_ arrangement (European, Asiatic, American, ancient,\nmedieval, of modern times, of ancient Greece, of ancient Rome, of\nmodern Greece, of the Rome of the Middle Ages, etc.); in conformity\nwith the abstract procedure which, when dividing the concept, is led\nto posit on the one hand _abstract forms of the spirit_ (objects) and\non the other _abstract intuitions_ (space and time). I shall not say\nthat those titles and divisions are useless, nor even those tables,\nbut shall limit myself to the' remark that the history of philosophy,\nof art, or of any other ideally distinct history, when understood as a\ndefinite book or discourse, becomes empirical for the reason already\ngiven, that true distinction is ideal, and a discourse or a book in\nits concreteness contains not only distinction but unity and totality,\nand to look upon either as incorporating only one side of the real is\narbitrary. And I shall also observe that as there are histories of\nphilosophy and of art in the empirical sense, so also nothing forbids\nour talking in the same sense of a general history, separate from\nspecial histories, indeed even of a history of progress and one of\ndecadence, of good and evil, of truth and error.\n\nThe confusion between division and distinction--that is to say, between\nthe empirical consideration that breaks up history into special\nhistories and the philosophical consideration which always unifies\nand distinguishes as it unifies--is the cause of errors analogous to\nthose that we have seen to result from such a process. To this are due\nabove all the many disquisitions on the 'problem' and on the 'limits'\nof this or that history or group of special histories empirically\nconstituted. The problem does not exist, and the limits are impossible\nto assign because they are conventional, as is finally recognized with\nmuch trouble, and as could be recognized with much less trouble if a\nstart were made, not from the periphery, but from the centre--that is\nto say, from gnoseological analysis. A graver error is the creation of\nan infinity of _entia imaginationis_, taken for metaphysical entities\nand forms of the spirit, and the pretension that arises from this of\ndeveloping the history of abstractions as though they were so many\nforms of the spirit with independent lives of their own, whereas the\nspirit is one. Hence the innumerable otiose problems with fantastic\nsolutions met with in historical books, which it is here unnecessary\nto record. Every one is now able to draw these obvious consequences\nfor himself and to make appropriate reflections concerning them. It\nis further obvious that the _entia imaginations,_ in the same way as\nthe 'choice' of facts, and the chronological schematization or dating\nof them, enter as a subsidiary element into any concrete exposition of\nhistorical thought, because the distinction of thinking and abstraction\nis an ideal distinction, which operates only in the unity of the spirit.\n\n\n[1] See Appendix II.\n\n\n\n\nIX\n\n\nTHE 'HISTORY OF NATURE' AND HISTORY\n\n\nWe must cease the process of classifying referred to just now, and\nalso that of the illusion of naturalism connected with it, by means\nof which imaginary entities created by abstraction are changed into\nhistorical facts and classificatory schemes into history, if we wish\nto understand the difference between history that is history and that\ndue to what are called the natural sciences. This is also called\nhistory--_'history of nature'_--but is so only in name. Some few years\nago a lively protest was made[1] against the confusion of these two\nforms of mental labour, one of which offers us genuine history, such as\nmight, for instance, be that of the Peloponnesian War or of Hannibal's\nwars or of ancient Egyptian civilization, and the other a spurious\nhistory, such as that known as the history of animal organisms, of the\nearth's structure or geology, of the formation of the solar system\nor cosmogony. It was observed with reason that in many treatises\nthe one has been wrongly connected with the other--that is to say,\nhistory of civilization with history of nature, as though the former\nfollows the latter historically. The bottomless abyss between the two\nwas pointed out. This has been observed, however, in a confused way\nby all, and better by historians of purely historical temperament,\nwho have an instinctive repugnance for natural history and hold\nthemselves carefully aloof from it. It was remembered with reason that\nthe history of historians has always the individually determinate as\nits object, and proceeds by internal reconstruction, whereas that of\nthe naturalists depends upon types and abstractions and proceeds by\nanalogies. Finally, this so-called history or _quasi-history_ was very\naccurately defined as an apparently chronological arrangement of things\nspatially distinct, and it was proposed to describe it with a new and\nproper name, that of _Metastoria._\n\nIndeed, constructions of this sort are really nothing but\nclassificatory schemes, from the more simple to the more complex.\nTheir terms are obtained by abstract analyses and generalization, and\ntheir series appears to the imagination as a history of the successive\ndevelopment of the more complex from the more simple. Their right to\nexist as classificatory schemes is incontestable, and their utility is\nalso incontestable, for they avail themselves of imagination to assist\nlearning and to aid the memory.\n\nThis only becomes contestable when they are estranged from themselves,\nlose their real nature, lay claim to illegitimate functions, and\ntake their imaginary historicity too seriously. We find this in the\nmetaphysic of naturalism, especially in _evolutionism,_ which has\nbeen its most recent form. This is due, not so much to the men of\nscience (who are as a rule cautious and possess a more or less clear\nconsciousness of the limits of those schemes and series) as to the\ndilettante scientists and dilettante philosophers to whom we owe the\nmany books that undertake to narrate the origin of the world, and\nwhich, aided by the acrisia of their authors, run on without meeting\nany obstacle, from the cell, indeed from the nebula, to the French\nRevolution, and even to the socialist movements of the nineteenth\ncentury. 'Universal histories,' and therefore cosmological romances\n(as we have already remarked in relation to universal histories), are\ncomposed, not of pure thought, which is criticism, but of thought\nmingled with imagination, which finds its outlet in myths. It is\nuseless to prove in detail that the evolutionists of to-day are\ncreators of myths, and that they weary themselves with attempts to\nwrite the first chapters of Genesis in modern style (their description\nis more elaborate, but they confuse such description with history in\na manner by no means inferior to that of Babylonian or Israelitish\npriests), because this becomes evident as soon as such works are placed\nin their proper position. Their logical origin will at once make clear\ntheir true character.\n\nBut setting aside these scientific monstrosities, already condemned\nby the constant attitude of restraint and scepsis toward them on the\npart of all scientifically trained minds--condemned, too, by the\nvery fact that they have had to seek and have found their fortune\nat the hands of the crowd or 'great public,' and have fallen to the\nrank of popular propaganda--we must here determine more precisely\nhow these classificatory schemes of historiographical appearance are\nformed and how they operate. With this object, it is well to observe\nthat classificatory schemes and apparent histories do not appear to\nbe confined to the field of what are called the natural sciences or\nsub-human world, but appear also in that of the moral sciences or\nsciences of the human world. And to adduce simple and perspicuous\nexamples, it often happens that in the abstract analysis of language\nand the positing of the types of the parts of speech, noun, verb,\nadjective, pronoun, and so on, or in the analysis of the word into\nsyllables and sounds, or of style into proper or metaphorical words\nand into various classes of metaphors, we construct classes that go\nfrom the more simple to the more complex. This gives rise to the\nillusion of history of language, exposed as the successive acquisition\nof the various parts of speech or as the passage from the single\nsound to the syllable (monosyllabic languages), from the syllable to\nthe aggregate of syllables (plurisyllabic languages), from words to\npropositions, metres, rhymes, and so on. These are imaginary histories\nthat have never been developed elsewhere than in the studies of\nscientists. In like manner, literary styles that have been abstractly\ndistinguished and arranged in series of increasing complexity (for\nexample, lyric, epic, drama) have given rise and continue to give\nrise to the thought of a schematic arrangement of poetry, which, for\nexample, should appear during a first period as lyric, a second as\nepic, a third as drama.\n\nThe same has happened with regard to the classifications of abstract\npolitical, economic, philosophical forms, and so on, all of which have\nbeen followed by their shadows in the shape of imaginative history. The\nrepugnance that historians experience in attaching their narratives\nto naturalistic-mythological prologues--that is to say, in linking\ntogether in matrimony a living being and a corpse--is also proved by\ntheir reluctance to admit scraps of abstract history into concrete\nhistory, for they at once reveal their heterogeneity in regard to one\nanother by their mere appearance. De Sanctis has often been reproached\nfor not having begun his _History of Italian Literature_ with an\naccount of the origins of the Italian language and of its relations\nwith Latin, and even with the linguistic family of Indo-European\nlanguages, and of the races that inhabit the various parts of Italy.\nAn attempt has even been made to correct the design of that classic\nwork by supplying, with a complete lack of historical sense, the\nintroductions and additions that are not needed. But de Sanctis,\nwho took great pains to select the best point of departure for the\nnarrative of the history of Italian literature, and finally decided\nto begin with a brief sketch of the state of culture at the Suabian\ncourt and of the Sicilian poetical school, did not hesitate a moment\nin rejecting all abstractions of languages and races which to his true\nhistorical sense did not appear to be reconcilable with the _tenzone_\nof Ciullo, with the rhythms of Friar Jacob, or with the ballades of\nGuido Cavalcanti, which are quite concrete things.\n\nWe must also remember that plans for classification and\npseudo-historical arrangements of their analogies are created not only\nupon the bodies of histories that are living and really reproducible\nand rethinkable, but also upon those that are dead--that is to say,\nupon news items, documents, and monuments. This observation makes\nmore complete the identification of imaginary histories arising from\nthe natural sciences with those which have their source in the moral\nsciences. The foundation of both is therefore very often not historical\nintelligence, but, on the contrary, the lack of it, and their end not\nonly that of aiding living history and keeping it alive, but also the\nmediate end of assisting in the prompt handling of the remains and the\ncinders of the vanished world, the inert residues of history.\n\nThe efficacy of this enlargement of the concept of abstract history,\nwhich is analogical or naturalizing in respect to the field known\nas 'spiritual' (and thus separated from that empirically known as\n'natural'), cannot be doubted by one who knows and remembers the great\nconsequences that philosophy draws from the resolution of the realistic\nconcept of 'nature' in the idealistic conception of 'construction,'\nwhich the human spirit makes of reality, looking upon it as nature.\nKant worked upon the solution of this problem indefatigably and with\nsubtlety; he gave to it the direction that it has followed down to\nour own days. And the consequence that we draw from it, in respect\nto the problem that now occupies us, is that an error was committed\nwhen, moved by the legitimate desire of distinguishing abstract from\nconcrete history, naturalizing history from thinking history, genuine\nfrom fictitious history, a sort of agnosticism was reached, as a final\nresult, by means of limiting history to the field of humanity, which\nwas said to be cognoscible, and declaring all the rest to be the object\nof metastoria and the limit of human knowledge. This conclusion would\nlead again to a sort of dualism, though in a lofty sphere. But if\nmetastoria also appears, as we have seen, in the human field, it is\nclear that the distinction as formulated stands in need of correction;\nand the agnosticism founded upon it vacillates and falls. There is not\na double object before thought, man and nature, the one capable of\ntreatment in one way, the other in another way, the first cognizable,\nand the second uncognizable and capable only of being constructed\nabstractly; but thought always thinks history, the history of reality\nthat is one, and beyond thought there is nothing, for the natural\nobject becomes a myth when it is affirmed as object, and shows itself\nin its true reality as nothing else but the human spirit itself, which\nschematized history that has been lived and thought, or the materials\nof the history that has already been lived and thought. The saying that\nnature has no history is to be understood in the sense that nature as\na rational being capable of thought has not history, because it is\nnot--or, let us say, it is nothing that is real. The opposite saying,\nthat nature is also formative and possesses historical life, is to be\ntaken in the other sense that reality, the sole reality (comprehending\nman and nature in itself, which are only empirically and abstractly\nseparate), is all development and life.\n\nWhat substantial difference can ever be discovered on the one hand\nbetween geological stratifications and the remains of vegetables\nand animals, of which it is possible to construct a prospective and\nindeed a serial arrangement, but which it is never possible to rethink\nin the living dialectic of their genesis, and on the other hand the\nrelics of what is called human history, and not only that called\nprehistorical, but even the historical documents of our history of\nyesterday, which we have forgotten and no longer understand, and which\nwe can certainly classify and arrange in a series, and build castles\nin the air about or allow our fancies to wander among, but which it is\nno longer possible really to think again? Both cases, which have been\narbitrarily distinguished, are reducible to one single case. Even in\nwhat is called 'human history' there exists a 'natural history,' and\nwhat is called 'natural history' also was once 'human' history--that\nis to say, spiritual, although to us who have left it so far behind\nit seems to be almost foreign, so mummified and mechanicized has it\nbecome, if we glance at it but summarily and from the outside. Do you\nwish to understand the true history of a Ligurian or Sicilian neolithic\nman? First of all, try if it be possible to make yourself mentally\ninto a Ligurian or Sicilian neolithic man; and if it be not possible,\nor you do not care to do this, content yourself with describing and\nclassifying and arranging in a series the skulls, the utensils, and\nthe inscriptions belonging to those neolithic peoples. Do you wish to\nunderstand the history of a blade of grass? First and foremost, try\nto make yourself into a blade of grass, and if you do not succeed,\ncontent yourself with analysing the parts and even with disposing them\nin a kind of imaginative history. This leads to the idea from which\nI started in making these observations about historiography, as to\nhistory being _contemporary_ history and chronicle being past history.\nWe take advantage of the idea and at the same time confirm that truth\nby solving with its aid the antithesis between a history that is\n'history' and a 'history of nature,' which, although it is history,\nwas supposed to obey laws strangely at variance with those of the only\nhistory. It solves this antithesis by placing the second in the lower\nrank of _pseudo-history._\n\n\n[1] By the economist Professor Gotti, at the seventh congress of\nGerman historians, held at Heidelberg. The lecture can be read in\nprint under the anything but clear or exact title of _Die Grenzen der\nGeschichte_ (Leipzig, Duncker u. Humblot, 1904).\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX I\n\n\nATTESTED EVIDENCE\n\n\nIf true history is that of which an interior verification is possible,\nand is therefore history ideally contemporary and present, and if\nhistory by witnesses is lacking in truth and is not even false, but\njust neither false nor true (not a _hoc est_ but a _fertur_), a\nlegitimate question arises as to the origin and function of those\ninnumerable propositions resumed from evidence critically thrashed out\nand 'held to be true,' although not verified, and perhaps never to be\nverified, but nevertheless employed even in most serious historical\ntreatment. When we are writing the history of the doctrine known as\nthe _coincidentia oppositorum,_ or of the poem called _I sepolcri,_\nthe Latin of the Cardinal di Cusa and the verse of Foscolo obviously\nbelong to us, both as to the thoughts and the actual words, pronounced\nby ourselves to ourselves, and the certainty of those historical facts\nis at the same time logical truth. But that the _De docta ignorantia_\nwas written between the end of 1439 and the early part of 1440, and\nFoscolo's poem on the return of the poet to Italy after his long\nmilitary service in France, is evidence founded upon proofs, as to\nwhich we can only say that they are to be considered valid, because\nthey have been to some extent _attested,_ but we cannot claim them to\nbe true. No amount of acute mental labour upon them can prevent another\ndocument or the better reading of an old document destroying them.\nNevertheless, no one will treat of the works of the Cusan or of Foscolo\nwithout availing himself of the biographical details as to their\nauthors which have been preserved.\n\nAn esteemed methodologist of our day has been tempted to found the\nfaith placed in this order of evidence upon a sort of telepathy of\nthe past, an almost spiritualistic revival. But there is nothing\nso mysterious in the genesis of that belief as to need a risky and\nfantastic explanation, to which even Horace's Jew would not give\ncredence. On the contrary, it is a question of something that we can\nobserve in process of formation in our private life of every day. We\nare noting down in our diary, for instance, certain of our acts, or\nstriking the balance of our account. After a certain interval has\nelapsed those facts fade from memory and the only way of affirming to\nourselves that they have happened and must be considered true is the\nevidence of our notes: the document bears witness; trust the book. We\nbehave in a similar way in respect to the statements of others on the\nauthority of their diaries or account-books. We presume that if the\nthing has been written down it answers to the truth. Doubtless this\nassumption, like every assumption, may turn out to be false in fact,\nowing to the note having been made in a moment of distraction or of\nhallucination, or too late, when the memory of the fact was already\nimprecise and lacking in certainty, or because it was capriciously\nmade or made with the object of deceiving others. But just for this\nreason, written evidence is not usually accepted with closed eyes;\nits verisimilitude is examined and we confront it with other written\nevidence, we investigate the probity and accuracy of the writer or\nwitness. It is just for this reason that the penal code threatens with\npains and penalties those who alter or falsify documents. And although\nthese and other subtle and severe precautions do not in certain cases\nprevent fraud, deception, and error (in the same way that the tribunals\nestablished for the purpose of condemning the guilty often send away\nthe guilty unpunished and sometimes condemn the innocent), yet the use\nof documents and evidence works out on the whole in accordance with the\ntruth; it is held to be useful and worthy of support and encouragement,\nbecause the injuries that it is liable to cause are greatly inferior to\nthose that it prevents.\n\nNow what men do with regard to their private affairs in daily life may\nbe said to be done on a large scale by the human race when it delivers\nitself of the load of innumerable facts and fixes them externally where\nthey are recoverable in a weakened form as unverifiable documentary\nevidence, yet are nevertheless such that as a whole we are justified\nin looking upon them end treating them as true. Historical faith\nthen is not the result of telepathy or spiritualism, but of a wise\neconomic provision, which the spirit continues to realize. In this\nway we understand historical work directed toward the prevention of\nalterations and deformations, and its acceptation of certain testimony,\nas 'what must be held to be true in the present state of science,' and\nits graduation of the rest as uncertain, probable, and most probable\nto be sometimes accepted in the expectation of ulterior inquiries.\nFinally, it explains the dislike of 'hypercriticism' when, not content\nwith a constant refinement of criticism, hypercriticism contests the\nvalue of the most ingenuous and authoritative testimony. The reason is\nthat it thus breaks the rules of the game that is being played _sub\nregula,_ and only serves at the most to remind those apt to forget it\nthat history by evidence is at bottom an altogether external history,\nnever fundamental, true history, which is contemporary and present.\n\nThis genesis or nature of 'attested' evidence already contains the\nanswer to the other question as to its function. It is clear that this\ncannot be to posit true history or to take its place, but to supply it\nwith those secondary particulars which it would not be worth while to\nmake the effort of keeping alive and complete in the mind, for this\neffort would result in damaging what is most important to us. Finally,\nwhether the De docta ignorantia were written some time earlier or\nlater is something that may quite well be determined by a different\ninterpretation of this or that thought of Cusanus, but it does not\naffect the function that the doctrine of the coincidence of opposites\nexercises in the formation of logical science. Again, whether the\nSepolcri was composed or planned prior to Foscolo's visit to France\nwould without doubt change to some extent our representation of the\ngradual development of the soul and genius of the poet, but it would\nhardly at all change our mode of interpreting his great ode. Those\nwho despair of historical truth, owing to the lack of a verifiable\ncertainty of some particulars, or to the uncertainty and dubiety that\nsurrounds it, resemble him who, having forgotten the chronicle of his\nlife in this or that year, should think that he did not know himself\nin his present condition, which is both the recapitulation of his past\nand carries with it his past in all that it really concerns him to\nknow. But, on the other hand, attested evidence that has been field\nto be true is a stimulus to us to search ourselves more closely, an\nenrichment of what we have found by means of analysis and meditation\nand a confirmation or proof of our thoughts, which are not to be\nneglected, especially when true evidence and attested evidence agree\nwith one another. To refuse the assistance and the facilities afforded\nby attested evidence, owing to the fear that some of it may prove\nfalse, or because all of it possesses an external and somewhat general\nand vague character, would be to refuse _the authority of the human\nrace,_ and so to commit the sin of Descartes and of Malebranche. This\ngreat refusal does not concern or assist the understanding of history.\nAll that does matter and does assist is that authority--including the\nauthority of the human race--should never be allowed to take the place\nof the _thought of humanity,_ to which, in any case, belongs the first\nplace.\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX II\n\n\nANALOGY AND ANOMALY OF SPECIAL HISTORIES\n\n\nIn the course of the preceding theoretical explanations we have denied\nboth the idea of a _universal history_ (in time and space)[1] and that\nof a _general history_ (of the spirit in its indiscriminate generality\nor unity),[2] and have insisted instead upon the opposite view with its\ntwo clauses: that history is always _particular_ and always _special,_\nand that these two determinations constitute precisely concrete and\neffective _universality_ and concrete and effective _unity._ What has\nbeen declared impossible, then, does not represent in any way a loss,\nfor it is on the one hand fictitious universality or the universality\nof _fancy,_ and on the other abstract _universality,_ or, if it be\npreferred, _confused_ universality. So-called universal histories\nhave therefore shown themselves to be particular histories, which\nhave assumed that title for purposes of literary notoriety, or as\ncollections, views, and chroniclistical compilations of particular\nhistories, or, finally, as romances. In like manner, general inclusive\nhistories are either so only in name, or set different histories side\nby side, or they are metaphysical and metaphorical playthings.\n\nAs a result of this double but converging negation, it is also\nadvisable to refute a common and deeply rooted belief (which we\nourselves at one time shared to some extent)[3] that we should arrive\nat the re-establishment of the universality of the fancy: or that\nthere are some among the special histories, constituted according\nto the various forms of the spirit (general and individual only\nin so far as every form of the spirit is the whole spirit in that\nform), which require universal treatment and others only treatment\nas monographs. The typical instance generally adduced is that of\nthe difference between the history of philosophy and the history of\npoetry or of art. The subject of the former is supposed to be the one\ngreat philosophical problem that interests all men, of the latter\nthe sentimental or imaginative problems of particular moments, or at\nthe most of particular artists. Thus the former is supposed to be\ncontinuous, the latter discontinuous, the former capable of complete\nuniversal vision, the second only of a sequence of particular visions.\nBut a more 'realistic' conception of philosophy deprives it of this\nprivilege as compared with the history of art and poetry or of any\nother special history; for, appearances notwithstanding, it is not\ntrue that men have concentrated upon one philosophical problem only,\nwhose successive solutions, less and less inadequate, compose a single\nline of progress, the universal history of the human spirit, affording\nsupport and unification to all other histories. The opposite is the\ntruth: the philosophical problems that men have treated of and will\ntreat of are infinite, and each one of them is always particularly\nand individually determined. The illusion as to the uniqueness of the\nproblem is due to logical misapprehension, increased by historical\ncontingencies, whence a problem which owing to religious motives seemed\nsupreme has been looked upon as unique or fundamental, and groupings\nand generalizations made for practical ends have been held to be real\nidentity and unity.[4] 'Universal' histories of philosophy, too, like\nthe others, when we examine them with a good magnifying glass, are\nrevealed as either particular histories of the problem that engages the\nphilosopher-historian, or arbitrary artificial constructions, or tables\nand collections of many different historical sequences, in the manner\nof a manual or encyclop\u00e6dia of philosophical history. Certainly nothing\nforbids the composition of abridgments of philosophical histories,\ncontaining classifications of particular problems and representing the\nprincipal thinkers of all peoples and of all times as occupied with one\nor another class of problem. This, however, is always a chroniclistical\nand naturalistic method of treating the history of philosophy, which\nonly really lives when a new thinker connects the problems already set\nin the past and its intrinsic antecedents with the definite problem\nthat occupies his attention. He provisionally sets aside others with\na different connexion, though without for that reason suppressing\nthem, intending rather to recall them when another problem makes\ntheir presence necessary. It is for this reason that even in those\nabridgments that seem to be the most complete and 'objective' (that\nis to say, 'material') a certain selection does appear, due to the\ntheoretical interest of the writer, who never altogether ceases to be a\nhistoriographer-philosopher. The procedure is in fact just that of the\nhistory of art and poetry, where what is really historical treatment,\nliving and complete, is the thought or criticism of individual poetical\npersonalities, and the rest a table of criticisms, an abridgment due\nto contiguity of time or place, affinity of matter or similarity of\ntemperament, or to degrees of artistic excellence. Nor must we say that\nevery philosophic problem is linked to all the others and is always a\nproblem of the whole of philosophy, thus differing from the cases of\npoetry and art, for there is no diversity here either, and the whole of\nhistory and the entire universe are immanent in every single work of\nart.\n\nNow that we have likewise reduced philosophies of history to the rank\nof particular histories, it is scarcely necessary to demonstrate\nthat the demand being made in several quarters for a 'universal'\nor 'general' history of science is without foundation. For such\na history would be impossible to write, even if we were able to\nidentify or compare the history of science with chat of philosophy.\nBut it is doubly impossible both because there are comprised under\nthe name of 'science' such diverse forms as sciences of observation\nand mathematical sciences, and also because in each of these classes\nthemselves the several disciplines remain separate, owing to the\nirreducible variety of data and postulates from which they spring.\nIf, as we have pointed out, every particular philosophical problem\nlinks and places itself in harmony with all other philosophical\nproblems, every scientific problem tends, on the contrary, to shut\nitself up in itself, and there is no more destructive tendency in\nscience than that of 'explaining' all the facts by means of a 'single\nprinciple,' substituting, that is to say, an unfruitful metaphysic\nfor fruitful science, allowing an empty word to act as a magic wand,\nand by 'explaining everything' to 'explain' nothing at all. The unity\nadmitted by the history of the sciences is not that which connects\none theory with another and one science with another in an imaginary\ngeneral history of science, but that which connects each science and\neach theory with the intellectual and social complex of the moment in\nwhich it appeared. But even here too we must utter the warning that in\nthus explaining their true nature we do not wish to contest the right\nto existence of tables and encyclop\u00e6dias of the history of science,\nfar less to throw discredit upon the present direction of studies, by\nmeans of which, at the call of the history of the sciences, useful\nResearch is stimulated in directions that have been long neglected.\nNor do we intend to move any objection to histories of science in the\nform of tables and encyclop\u00e6dias on the ground that it is impossible\nfor the same student to be equally competent as to problems of quite\ndifferent nature, such as are those of the various sciences; for it\nis inconceivable that a philosopher exists with a capacity equal to\nthe understanding of each and every philosophical problem (indeed, the\nmind of the best solver of certain problems is usually the more closed\nto others); or that a critic and historian of poetry and art exists\nwho tastes and enjoys equally all forms of poetry and art, however\nversatile he be. Each one has his sphere marked out more or less\nnarrowly, and each is universal only by means of his particularity.\n\nFinally, we shall not repeat the same demonstration for political\nhistory and ethics, where the claim to represent the whole of history\nin a single line of development has had less occasion to manifest\nitself. It is usually more readily admitted there that every history\nis particular--that is to say, determined by the political and ethical\nproblem or problems with which history is concerned in time and place,\nand which every history therefore occasionally rethinks from the\nbeginning. The _analogy,_ then, between different kinds of special\nhistory is to be considered perfect, and the anomaly between them\nexcluded, for they all obey the principle of particularity, that is,\nparticular universality (whatever be the appearance to the contrary).\nBut if, as histories, they all proceed according to the nature of what\nwe have explained as historiography, in so far as they are _special_\neach one conforms to the concept of its speciality. It is in this sense\nalone that each one is anomalous in respect to the others, preserving,\nthat is to say, its own peculiar nature. We have explained that the\nclaim to treat the history of poetry and of art in the same way as\nphilosophy is erroneous, not only because it misconceives the true\nconcept of history, but also because it misrepresents the nature of\nart, conceiving it as philosophy and dissipating it in a dialectic\nof concepts, or because it leaves out, in the history of art, just\nthat by reason of which art is art, looking upon it as something\nsecondary, or at best giving it a place beside the social or conceptual\nactivities. This error is precisely analogous to that of those who\nfrom time to time suggest what they term the 'psychological' reform of\nphilosophy--that is to say, they would like to treat it as dependent\nupon the psychology of philosophers and of the social environment, thus\nplacing it on a level, sometimes with the history of the sentiments,\nat others with that of fancies and Utopias, or with what is not\nthe history of philosophizing. Such persons lack the knowledge of\nwhat _philosophy_ is, as the others lack the knowledge of _poetry_\nand _art_. Anyone desirous of arriving at a rapid knowledge of the\ndifference between the history of philosophy and the history of poetry\nshould observe how the one, owing to the nature of its object, is led\nto examine theories in so far as they are the _work of pure mind,_\nand therefore to develop a history in which thoughts represent the\n_dramatis person\u00e6,_ while the other is led by the nature of its object\nto examine works of art in so far as they are works of imagination,\nwhich gives expression to movements of feeling, and therefore to\ndevelop a history of imaginative and sensitive points of view. The\nformer, therefore, though it does not neglect actions, events, and\nimagination, regards them as the _humus_ of pure thought and takes\nthe form of a history of concepts _without persons,_ either real or\nimaginary, while the latter, which also does not neglect actions,\nevents, and thoughts in its turn regards them as the humus of imaginary\ncreations and takes the form of a history of ideal or imaginary\n_personalities,_ which have divested themselves of the ballast of\npractical interests and of the curb of concepts. The plans, too, which\nthey draw up and with which they cannot dispense, any more than can any\nhuman dialectic, answer to these different tendencies--that is to say,\nwith the one they are schemes or general types of modes of thinking,\nwith the other schemes containing ideal personalities.\n\nIf the history of philosophy has several times tried to devour the\nhistory of poetry and art, it may also be said to have several times\ntried to devour the _history of practice,_ that of politics and ethics,\nor 'social history,' as people prefer to call it in our day. It has\nalso been asserted that such history should be set free from the\nchroniclism in which it had become involved and assume a scientific and\nrigorous form. To do this, it was heedful to reduce it to a history\nof 'ideas,' which are the true and essential practical acts, because\nthey generate them--that is to say, the error which we noted above in\nrespect to poetry and art has here been repeated. What is peculiar to\npractical acts has been neglected, and only the 'ideas,' which are\ntheir antecedents and consequents, have been retained. But on other\noccasions the 'ideas' to which it was claimed to reduce practical\nacts were not really ideas or intellectual formations, but truly\npractical acts, sentiments, dispositions, customs, institutions. The\noriginality of political and ethical history was thus unconsciously\nconfirmed. Its object is just what can be designated with the single\nword _institutions,_ taking the word in its widest signification--that\nis to say, understanding by it all practical arrangements of human\nindividuals and societies, from the most recondite sentiments to the\nmost obvious modes of life (which, too, are always will in action).\nAll are equally historical productions, the sole effective historical\nproductions perceivable according to the practical form of the\nspirit. If the patrimony of judgments, as the capital with and upon\nwhich our modern thought works, is the result of a long history, of\nwhich we become conscious from time to time, illustrating now one\nand now another of its particular aspects at the solicitation of new\nneeds, so also what we can now practically _do_, all our sentiments\nas so-called civilized men--courage, honour, dignity, love, modesty,\nand the like--all our institutions in the strict sense of the term\n(which are themselves due to attitudes of the spirit, utilitarian or\nmoral)--the family, the state, commerce, industry, military affairs,\nand so on--have a long history; and according as one or other of those\nsentiments or institutions enters upon a crisis, as the result of new\nwants, we attempt to ascertain its true 'nature'--that is to say, its\nhistorical genesis. Anyone who has followed the developments of modern\nsocial historiography with care and attention has been able to see\nclearly that its aim is precisely to arrange the _chroniclistic chaos_\nof disaggregated notes of events in _ordered series of histories of\nsocial values,_ and that its field of research is the history of the\nhuman soul in its practical aspect; either when it produces general\nhistories of _civilization_ (always due to particular motives and\nlimited by them), or when it presents histories _of classes, peoples,\nsocial currents, sentiments, institutions,_ and so forth.\n\n_Biography,_ too (only when not limited to a mere chroniclistic\ncollection of the experiences of an individual or to a poetical\nportrait, improperly regarded as a historical work), is the history of\nan 'institution' in the philosophical acceptation of the word and forms\npart of the history of practice: because the individual, in the same\nway as a people or a social class, is the formation of a character, or\ncomplex of specific attitudes and actions consequent upon them; and it\nis of this that historical biography consists, not of the individual\nlooked upon as external or private or physical, or whatever it be\ncalled.\n\nWe might be expected to indicate the place or function of the _history\nof science_ and of _religion,_ in order to render to a certain extent\ncomplete this rapid review of special histories, in which general\nhistory realizes itself in turn--it never exists outside of them. But\nif science differs from philosophy in being partly theoretical and\npartly practical, and religion is an attempt to explain reality by\nmeans of myth and to direct the work of man according to an ideal, it\nis evident that the history of science enters to some extent into the\nhistory of philosophical thought and to some extent forms part of that\nof needs and institutions; indeed, since the moment which sets science\nto work and endows it with its peculiar character is the practical or\nsuitable moment, it really belongs to the history of institutions in\nthe very wide sense described; and the history of religion forms to\nsome extent part of the history of institutions and to some extent\npart of the history of philosophy; indeed, since the dominating moment\nis here mythical conception or philosophical effort, the history of\nreligion is substantially that of philosophy. Other more particular\ndisquisitions in connexion with this argument would be out of place\nin the present treatise, which is not especially concerned with the\ntheory and methodology of particular special histories (coincident with\nthe treatment of the various spheres of philosophy, \u00e6sthetics, logic,\netc.), and aims only at indicating the directions in which they must\nnecessarily develop.[5]\n\n\n[1] _Supra,_ pp. 55-59.\n\n[2] _Supra,_ pp. 119-122.\n\n[3] In the _\u00c6sthetic,_ I, ch. xvii.\n\n[4] See Appendix III.\n\n[5] It will be of further use to draw attention here, in a note, to\nthe already mentioned distinction between the history of practice in\npolitics and in ethics, because thus alone can be set at rest the\nvariance which runs through historiography, between political history\nor history of states and history of humanity or of civilization,\nespecially from the eighteenth century onward. In Germany it is\none of the elements in the intricate debate between _Geschichte_\nand _Kulturgeschichte,_ and it has sometimes been described as a\nconflict between French historiography (Voltaire and his followers),\nor _histoire de la civilisation,_ and the Germanic (M\u00f6ser and his\nfollowers), or history of the state. One side would absorb and\nsubject the history of culture or social history to that of the\nstate, the other would do the opposite; and the eclectics, as usual,\nwithout knowing much about it, place the one beside the other, inert,\nhistory of politics and history of civilization, thus destroying the\nunity of history. The truth is that political history and history\nof civilization have the same relations between one another in the\npractical field as those between the history of poetry or of art and\nthe history of philosophy or thought in the theoretical field. They\ncorrespond to two eternal moments of the spirit--that of the pure will,\nor economic moment, and that of the ethical will. Hence we also see why\nsome will always be attracted rather by the one than the other form of\nhistory: according as to whether they are moved chiefly by political or\nchiefly by moral interests.\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX III\n\n\nPHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY\n\n\nHaving established the unity of philosophy and historiography, and\nshown that the division between the two has but a literary and didactic\nvalue, because it is founded upon the possibility of placing in the\nforeground of verbal exposition now one and now the other of the two\ndialectical elements of that unity, it is well to make quite clear what\nis the true object of the treatises bearing the traditional title of\nphilosophic 'theory' or 'system': to what (in a word) _philosophy can\nbe reduced._\n\nPhilosophy, in consequence of the new relation in which it has been\nplaced, cannot of necessity be anything but the _methodological moment\nof historiography_: a dilucidation of the categories constitutive\nof historical judgments, or of the concepts that direct historical\ninterpretation. And since historiography has for content the concrete\nlife of the spirit, and this life is life of imagination and of\nthought, of action and of morality (or of something else, if anything\nelse can be thought of), and in this variety of its forms remains\nalways one, the dilucidation moves in distinguishing between \u00e6sthetic\nand logic, between economic and ethic, uniting and dissolving them\nall in the philosophy of the spirit. If a philosophical problem shows\nitself to be altogether sterile for the historical judgment, we have\nthere the proof that such problem is otiose, badly stated, and in\nreality does not exist. If the solution of a problem--that is to\nsay, of a philosophical proposition--instead of making history more\nintelligible, leaves it obscure or confounds it with others, or leaps\nover it and lightly condemns or negates it, we have there the proof\nthat such proposition and the philosophy with which it is connected\nare arbitrary, though it may preserve interest in other respects, as a\nmanifestation of sentiment or of imagination.\n\nThe definition of philosophy as 'methodology' is not at first exempt\nfrom doubts, even on the part of one ready to accept in general the\ntendency that it represents; because philosophy and methodology are\nterms often contrasted, and a philosophy that leads to a methodology\nis apt to be tainted with empiricism. But certainly the methodology\nof which we are here speaking is not at all empirical; indeed, it\nappears just for the purpose of correcting and taking the place of the\nempirical methodology of professional historians and of other such\nspecialists in all that greater part of it where it is a true and\nproper, though defective, attempt toward the philosophical solution\nof the theoretical problems raised by the study of history, or toward\nphilosophical methodology and philosophy as methodology.\n\nIf, however, the above-mentioned dispute is settled as soon as stated,\nthis cannot be said of another, where our position finds itself opposed\nto a widely diffused and ancient conception of philosophy as the\nsolver of the mystery of the universe, knowledge of ultimate reality,\nrevelation of the world of noumena, which is held to be beyond the\nworld of phenomena, in which we move in ordinary life and in which\nhistory also moves. This is not the place to give the history of that\nidea; but we must at least say this, that its origin is religious or\nmythological, and that it persisted even among those philosophers\nwho were most successful in directing thought toward our earth as the\nsole reality, and initiated the new philosophy as methodology of the\njudgment or of historical knowledge. It persisted in Kant, who admitted\nit as the limit of his criticism; it persisted in Hegel, who framed his\nsubtle researches in logic and philosophy of the spirit in a sort of\nmythology of the Idea.\n\nNevertheless, the diversity of the two conceptions manifested itself\nin an ever-increasing ratio, finding expression in various formulas\nof the nineteenth century, such as _psychology against metaphysic,_\na philosophy of _experience and immanence, aprioristic_ against\n_transcendental_ philosophy, _positivism_ against _idealism_; and\nalthough the polemic was as a rule ill conducted, going beyond the\nmark and ending by unconsciously embracing that very metaphysic,\ntranscendency, and apriority, that very abstract idealism, which it\nhad set out to combat, the sentiment that inspired it was legitimate.\nAnd the philosophy of methodology has made it its own, has combated\nthe same adversary with better arms, has certainly insisted upon a\npsychological view, but a speculative psychological view, immanent\nin history, but dialectically immanent, differing in this from\npositivism, that while the latter made necessary the contingent, it\nmade the contingent necessary, thus affirming the right of thought to\nthe hegemony. Such a philosophy is just philosophy as history (and so\nhistory as philosophy), and the determination of the philosophical\nmoment in the purely categorical and methodological moment.\n\nThe greater vigour of this conception in respect to the opposite,\nthe superiority of philosophy as _methodology_ over philosophy as\n_metaphysic,_ is shown by the capacity of the former to solve the\nproblems of the latter by criticizing them and pointing out their\norigin. Metaphysic, on the other hand, is incapable of solving not only\nthe problems of methodology, but even its own problems, without having\nrecourse to the fantastic and arbitrary. Thus questions as to the\nreality of the external world, of soul-substance, of the unknowable,\nof dualisms and of antitheses, and so forth, have disappeared in\ngnoseological doctrines, which have substituted better conceptions for\nthose which we formerly possessed concerning the logic of the sciences,\nexplaining those questions as eternally renascent aspects of the\ndialectic or phenomenology of knowledge.\n\nThe view of philosophy as metaphysic is, however, so inveterate and so\ntenacious that it is not surprising that it should still give some sign\nof life in the minds of those who have set themselves free of it in\ngeneral, but have not applied themselves to eradicating it in all its\nparticulars, nor closed all the doors by which it may return in a more\nor less unexpected manner. And if we rarely find it openly and directly\ndisplayed now, we may yet discern or suspect it in one or other of its\naspects or attitudes, persisting like kinks of the mind, or unconscious\npreconceptions, which threaten to drive philosophy as methodology back\ninto the wrong path, and to prepare the return, though but for a brief\nperiod, of the metaphysic that has been superseded.\n\nIt seems to me opportune to provide here a clear statement of some of\nthese preconceptions, tendencies, and habits, pointing out the errors\nwhich they contain and entail.\n\nFirst of all the survivals of the past that are still common comes the\nview of philosophy as having a fundamental problem to solve. Now the\nconception of a fundamental problem is intrinsically at variance with\nthat of philosophy as history, and with the treatment of philosophy\nas methodology of history, which posits, and cannot do otherwise\nthan posit, the _infinity_ of philosophical problems, all certainly\nconnected with one another, but not one of which can be considered\nfundamental, for just the same reason that no single part of an\norganism is the foundation of all the others, but each one is in its\nturn foundation and founded. If, indeed, methodology take the substance\nof its problems from history, history in its most modest but concrete\nform of history of ourselves, of each one of us as an individual, this\nshows us that we pass on from one to another particular philosophical\nproblem at the promptings of our life as it is lived, and that one or\nthe other group or class of problems holds the field or has especial\ninterest for us, according to the epochs of our life. And we find the\nsame to be the case if we look at the wider but less definite spectacle\nafforded by the already mentioned general history of philosophy--that\nis to say, that according to times and peoples, philosophical problems\nrelating sometimes to morality, sometimes to politics, to religion,\nor to the natural sciences and mathematics, have in turn the upper\nhand. Every particular philosophical problem has been a problem of the\nwhole of philosophy, either openly or by inference, but we never meet\nwith a _general problem of philosophy,_ owing to the contradiction\nthereby implied. And if there does seem to be one (and it certainly\ndoes seem so), it is really a question of appearances, due to the\nfact that modern philosophy, which comes to us from the Middle Ages\nand was elaborated during the religious struggles of the Renaissance,\nhas preserved a strong imprint of _theology_ in its didactic form,\nnot less than in the psychological disposition of the greater part of\nthose addicted to it. Hence arises the fundamental and almost unique\nimportance usurped by the problem of thought and being, which after\nall was nothing more than the old problem of this world and the next,\nof earth and heaven, in a critical and gnoseological form. But those\nwho destroyed or who initiated the destruction of heaven and of the\nother world and of transcendental philosophy by immanent philosophy\nbegan at the same moment to corrode the conception of a fundamental\nproblem, although they were not fully aware of this (for we have said\nabove that they remained trammelled in the philosophy of the Thing\nin Itself or in the Mythology of the Idea). That problem was rightly\nfundamental for religious spirits, who held that the whole intellectual\nand practical dominion of the world was nothing, unless they had saved\ntheir own souls or their own thought in another world, in the knowledge\nof a world of noumena and reality. But such it was not destined to\nremain for the philosophers, henceforth restricted to the world alone\nor to nature, which has no skin and no kernel and is all of a piece.\nWhat would happen were we to resume belief in a fundamental problem,\ndominating all others? The other problems would either have to be\nconsidered as all dependent upon it and therefore solved with it, or\nas problems no longer philosophical but empirical. That is to say, all\nthe problems appearing every day anew in science and life would lose\ntheir value, either becoming a tautology of the fundamental solution or\nbeing committed to empirical treatment. Thus the distinction between\nphilosophy and methodology, between metaphysic and philosophy of the\nspirit, would reappear, the first transcendental as regards the second,\nthe second aphilosophical as regards the first.\n\nAnother view, arising from the old metaphysical conception of the\nfunction of philosophy, leads to the rejection of distinction in favour\nof _unity,_ thus conforming to the theological conception that all\ndistinctions are unified by absorption in God, and to the religious\npoint of view, which forgets the world and its necessities in the\nvision of God. From this ensues a disposition which may be described\nas something between indifferent, accommodating, or weak, in respect\nof particular problems, and the pernicious doctrine of the double\nfaculty is almost tacitly renewed, that is, of intellectual intuition\nor other superior cognoscitive faculty, peculiar to the philosopher\nand leading to the vision of true reality, and of criticism or thought\nprone to interest itself in the contingent and thus greatly inferior\nin degree and free to proceed with a lack of speculative rigour not\npermissible in the other. Such a disposition led to the worst possible\nconsequences in the philosophical treatises of the Hegelian school,\nwhere the disciples (differing from the master) generally gave evidence\nof having meditated but little or not at all upon the problems of the\nvarious spiritual forms, freely accepting vulgar opinions concerning\nthem, or engaging in them with the indifference of men sure of the\nessential, and therefore cutting and mutilating them without pity, in\norder to force them into their pre-established schemes with all haste,\nthus getting rid of difficulties by means of this illusory arrangement.\nHence the emptiness and tiresomeness of their philosophies, from\nwhich the historian, or the man whose attention is directed to the\nunderstanding of the particular and the concrete, failed to learn\nanything that could be of use to him in the direction of his own\nstudies and in the clearer formulation of his own judgments. And since\nthe mythology of the idea reappeared in positivism as mythology of\nevolution, here too particular problems (which are indeed the only\nphilosophical problems) received merely schematic and empty treatment\nand did not progress at all. Philosophy as history and methodology of\nhistory restores honour to the virtue of acuteness or discernment,\nwhich the theological unitarianism of metaphysic tended to depreciate:\ndiscernment, which is prosaic but severe, hard and laborious but\nprolific, which sometimes assumes the unsympathetic aspect of\nscholasticism and pedantry, but is also of use in this aspect, like\nevery discipline, and holds that the neglect of distinction for unity\nis also intimately opposed to the conception of philosophy as history.\n\nA third tendency (I beg to be allowed to proceed by enumeration of the\nvarious sides of the same mental attitude for reasons of convenience),\na third tendency also seeks the _definitive_ philosophy, untaught by\nthe historical fact that no philosophy has ever been definitive or has\nset a limit to thought, or has ever been thoroughly convinced that\nthe perpetual changing of philosophy with the world which perpetually\nchanges is not by any means a defect, but is the nature itself of\nthought and reality. Or, rather, such teaching, and the proposition\nthat follows it, do not fail altogether of acceptance, and they are\nled to believe that the spirit, ever growing upon itself, produces\nthoughts and systems that are ever new. But since they have retained\nthe presupposition of a fundamental problem which (as we have said)\nsubstantially consists of the ancient problem of religion alone,\nand each problem well determined implies a single solution, the\nsolution given of the 'fundamental problem' naturally claims to be\nthe definitive solution of the problem of philosophy itself. A new\nsolution could not appear without a new problem (owing to the logical\nunity of problem and solution); but that problem, which is superior\nto all the others, is on the contrary the only one. Thus a definitive\nphilosophy, assumed in the conception of the fundamental problem, is at\nvariance with historical experience, and more irreconcilably, because\nin a more evidently logical manner, with philosophy as history, which,\nadmitting infinite problems, denies the claim for and the expectation\nof a definitive philosophy. Every philosophy is definitive for the\nproblem which it solves, but not for the one that appears immediately\nafterward, at the foot of the first, nor for the other problems which\nwill arise from the solution of this. To close the series would be to\nturn from philosophy to religion and to rest in God.\n\nIndeed, the fourth preconception, which we now proceed to state, and\nwhich links itself with the preceding, and, together with all the\npreceding, to the theological nature of the old metaphysic, concerns\nthe _figure of the philosopher,_ as Buddha or the Awakened One, who\nposits himself as superior to others (and to himself in the moments\nwhen he is not a philosopher), because he holds himself to be free from\nhuman passions, illusions, and agitations by means of philosophy. This\nis the case with the believer, who fixes his mind upon God and shakes\noff earthly cares, like the lover, who feels himself blessed in the\npossession of the beloved and defies the whole world. But the world\nsoon takes its revenge both upon the believer and the lover, and does\nnot fail to insist upon its rights. Such an illusion is impossible for\nthe philosophical historian, who differs from the other in feeling\nhimself irresistibly involved in the course of history, as at once both\nsubject and object, and who is therefore led to negate felicity or\nbeatitude, as he negates every other abstraction (because, as has been\nwell said, _le bonheur est le contraire de la sensation de vivre_), and\nto accept life as it is, as joy that overcomes sorrow and perpetually\nproduces new sorrows and new unstable joys. And history, which he\nthinks as the only truth, is the work of tireless thought, which\nconditions practical work, as practical work conditions the new work of\nthought. Thus the primacy formerly attributed to the contemplative life\nis now transferred not to active life, but to life in its integrity,\nwhich is at once thought and action. And every man is a philosopher\n(in his circle, however wide or narrow it may appear), and every\nphilosopher is a man, indissolubly linked to the conditions of human\nlife, which it is not given to anyone to transcend. The mystical or\napocalyptic philosopher of the Gr\u00e6co-Roman decadence was well able to\nseparate himself from the world: the great thinkers, like Hegel, who\ninaugurated the epoch of modern philosophy, although they denied the\nprimacy of the abstract contemplative life, were liable to fall back\ninto the error of belief in this supremacy and to conceive a sphere of\nabsolute spirit, a process of liberation through art, religion, and\nphilosophy, as a means of reaching it; but the once sublime figure of\nthe philosopher blessed in the absolute, when we try to revive it in\nthis modern world of ours, becomes tinged with the comic. It is true\nthat satire has now but little material upon which to exercise itself,\nand is reduced to aiming its shafts at the 'professors of philosophy'\n(according to the type of philosopher that has been created by modern\nuniversities, which is partly the heir of the 'master of theology'\nof the Middle Ages): against the professors, that is to say, to the\nextent that they continue to repeat mechanically abstract general\npropositions, and seem to be unmoved by the passions and the problems\nthat press upon them from all sides and vainly ask for more concrete\nand actual treatment. But the function and the social figure of the\nphilosopher have profoundly changed, and we have not said that the\nmanner of being of the 'professors of philosophy' will not also change\nin its turn--that is to say, that the way of teaching philosophy in\nthe universities and schools is not on the verge of experiencing a\ncrisis, which will eliminate the last remains of the medieval fashion\nof formalistic philosophizing. A strong advance in philosophical\nculture should lead to this result: that all students of human affairs,\njurists, economists, moralists, men of letters--in other words, all\nstudents of historical matters--should become conscious and disciplined\nphilosophers, and that thus the philosopher in general, the _purus\nphilosophus,_ should find no place left for him among the professional\nspecifications of knowledge. With the disappearance of the philosopher\n'in general' would also disappear the last social vestige of the\nteleologist or metaphysician, and of the Buddha or Awakened One.\n\nThere is also a prejudice which to some extent inquinates the manner\nof _culture_ of students of philosophy. They are accustomed to have\nrecourse almost exclusively to the books of philosophers, indeed of\nphilosophers 'in general,' of the metaphysical system-makers, in the\nsame way as the student of theology formed himself upon the sacred\ntexts. This method of culture, which is perfectly consequent when\na start is made from the presupposition of a fundamental or single\nproblem, of which it is necessary to know the different diverging\nand progressive solutions which have been attempted, is altogether\ninconsequent and inadequate in the case of a historical and immanent\nphilosophy, which draws its material from all the most varied\nimpressions of life and from all intuitions and reflections upon life.\nThat form of culture is the reason for the aridity of the treatment of\ncertain particular problems, for which is necessary a continued contact\nwith daily experience (art and art criticism for \u00e6sthetic, politics,\neconomy, judicial trials for the philosophy of rights, positive and\nmathematical sciences for the gnoseology of the sciences, and so on).\nTo it is also due the aridity of treatment of those parts of philosophy\nthemselves which are traditionally considered to constitute 'general\nphilosophy,' for they too had their origin in life, and we must refer\nthem back to life if we are to give a satisfactory interpretation of\ntheir propositions; we must plunge them into life again to develop\nthem and to find in them new aspects. The _whole of history_ is the\nfoundation of philosophy as history, and to limit its foundation to\nthe _history of philosophy_ alone, and of 'general' or 'metaphysical'\nphilosophy, is impossible, save by unconsciously adhering to the old\nidea of philosophy, not as methodology but as metaphysic, which is the\nfifth of the prejudices that we are enumerating.\n\nThis enumeration can be both lengthened and ended with the mention of a\nsixth preconception, relating to _philosophical exposition._ Owing to\nthis, philosophy is expected to have either an architectural form, as\nthough it were a temple consecrated to the Eternal, or a warm poetical\nform, as though it were a hymn to the Eternal. But these forms were\npart of the old content, and that form is now changed. Philosophy\nshows itself to be a dilucidation of the categories of historical\ninterpretation rather than the grandiose architecture of a temple or a\nsacred hymn running on conventional lines. Philosophy is discussion,\npolemic, rigorous didactic exposition, which is certainly coloured\nwith the sentiments of the writer, like every other literary form,\nable also at times to raise its voice (or on the other hand to become\nslight and playful, according to circumstances), but not constrained to\nobserve rules which appear to be proper to a theological or religious\ncontent. Philosophy treated as methodology has, so to speak, caused\nphilosophical exposition to descend from poetry to prose.\n\nAll the preconceptions, habits, and tendencies which I have briefly\ndescribed should in my opinion be carefully sought out and eliminated,\nfor it is they that impede philosophy from taking the form and\nproceeding in the mode suitable and adequate to the consciousness of\nthe unity with history which it has reached. If we look merely at\nthe enormous amount of psychological observations and moral doubts\naccumulated in the course of the nineteenth century by poetry, fiction,\nand drama, those voices of our society, and consider that in great part\nit remains without critical treatment, some idea can be formed of the\nimmense amount of work that falls to philosophy to accomplish. And if\non the other hand we observe the multitude of anxious questions that\nthe great European War has everywhere raised--as to the state, as to\nhistory, as to rights, as to the functions of the different peoples, as\nto civilization, culture, and barbarism, as to science, art, religion,\nas to the end and ideal of life, and so on--we realize the duty of\nphilosophers to issue forth from the theologico-metaphysical circle in\nwhich they remain confined even when they refuse to hear of theology\nand metaphysic. For notwithstanding their protests, and notwithstanding\nthe new conception accepted and professed by them, they really remain\nintellectually and spiritually attached to the old ideas.\n\nEven the _history itself of philosophy_ has hitherto been renewed only\nto a small extent, in conformity with the new conception of philosophy.\nThis new conception invites us to direct our attention to thoughts\nand thinkers, long neglected or placed in the second rank and not\nconsidered to be truly philosophers because they did not treat directly\nthe 'fundamental problem' of philosophy or the great _peut-\u00eatre,_ but\nwere occupied with 'particular problems.' These particular problems,\nhow-ever, were destined to produce eventually a change of view as\nregards the 'general problem,' which emerged itself reduced to the\nrank of a 'particular' problem. It is simply the result of prejudice\nto look upon a Machiavelli, who posited the conception of the modern\nstate, a Baltasar Gracian, who examined the question of acuteness in\npractical matters, a Pascal, who criticized the spirit of Jesuitry, a\nVico, who renewed all the sciences of the spirit, or a Hamann, with\nhis keen sense of the value of tradition, as minor philosophers, I do\nnot say in comparison with some metaphysician of little originality,\nbut even when compared with a Descartes or a Spinoza, who dealt with\n_other_ but not _superior_ problems. A schematic and bloodless history\nof philosophy corresponded, in fact, with the philosophy of the\n'fundamental problem.' A far richer, more varied and pliant philosophy\nshould correspond with philosophy as methodology, which holds to be\nphilosophy not only what appertains to the problems of immanency, of\ntranscendency, of this world and the next, but everything that has\nbeen of avail in increasing the patrimony of guiding conceptions, the\nunderstanding of actual history, and the formation of the reality of\nthought in which we live.\n\n\n\n\nPART II\n\n\nCONCERNING THE HISTORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY\n\n\n\n\nI\n\n\nPRELIMINARY QUESTIONS\n\n\nWe possess many works relating to the history of historiography, both\nspecial, dealing with individual authors, and more or less general,\ndealing with groups of authors (histories of historiography confined\nto one people and to a definite period, or altogether 'universal'\nhistories). Not only have we bibliographical works and works of\nerudition, but criticism, some of it excellent, especially in the case\nof German scientific literature, ever the most vigilant of all in not\nleaving unexplored any nook or cranny of the dominion of knowledge.\nIt cannot, therefore, form part of my design to treat the theme from\nits foundations: but I propose to make a sort of appendix or critical\nannotation to the collection of books and essays that I have read upon\nthe argument. I will not say that these are all, or even that they are\nall those of any importance, but they ire certainly a considerable\nnumber. By means of this annotation I shall try to establish, on the\none hand, in an exact manner and in conformity with the principles\nexplained, the method of such a history, regarding which I observe\nthat there still exist confusion and perplexity, even among the best,\nwhich lead to errors of judgment or at least of plan, and on the\nother hand I shall try to outline the principal periods in a summary\nmanner, both with the view of exemplifying the method established,\nand, as it were, of illustrating historically the concepts exposed in\nthe preceding theoretical pages, which might otherwise retain here and\nthere something of an abstract appearance.\n\nBeginning with methodical delimitations, I shall note in the first\nplace that in a history of historiography as such, historical writings\ncannot be looked upon from the point of view proper to a _history of\nliterature_--that is to say, as expressions of individual sentiments,\nas forms of art. Doubtless they are this also, and have a perfect right\nto form part of histories of literature, as the treatises and systems\nof the philosophers, the writings of Plato and Aristotle, of Bruno,\nof Leibnitz, and of Hegel; but in this case both are regarded not as\nworks of history and of philosophy, but of literature and poetry; and\nthe empirical scale of values which constitute the different modes\nof history in the cases of the same authors is different, because\nin a history of literature the place of a Plato will always be more\nconsiderable than that of an Aristotle, that of a Bruno than that of\na Leibnitz, owing to the greater amount of passion and the greater\nrichness of artistic problems contained in the former of each pair.\nThe fact that in many volumes of literary history such diversity of\ntreatment is not observed, and historians are talked of historically\nand not in a literary manner and philosophers philosophically rather\nthan in a literary manner, is due to the substitution in such\nworks of incoherent compilation for work that is properly critical\nand scientific. But the distinction between the two aspects is\nimportant for this reason also, that erroneous judgments, praise, and\ncensure, alike unjustified, are apt to appear, owing to the careless\ntransference of the scale of values from one history to another. The\nslight esteem in which Polybius was held in antiquity and for some\ntime after, because 'he did not write well' in comparison with the\nsplendour of Livy or with the emotional intensity of Tacitus, is an\ninstance of this, as is likewise in Italy the excessive praise lavished\nupon certain historians who were little more than correct and elegant\nwriters of prose in comparison with others who were negligent and crude\nin their form, but serious students. Ulrici,[1] in his youthful book\non ancient historiography, which despite its heaviness and verbosity\nof exposition has great merits, after having discussed the 'scientific\nvalue' of that historiography, also speaks at great length of 'artistic\nvalue'; but setting aside what of arbitrary is to be found in some of\nthe laws that he applies to historiography as art, in conformity with\nthe \u00e6sthetic ideas of his time, it is evident that the second subject\nof which he treats does not coalesce with the first and is only placed\nside by side with it in the same way as those sections of works dealing\nwith historical method are not connected but simply juxtaposed, and\nafter having studied in their own way the formation of historical\nthought, the collection of materials or 'heuristic,' up to final\n'comprehension,' begin to discuss the form of the 'exposition,' and in\nso doing continue without being aware of it the method of rhetorical\ntreatises on the art of history composed during the Renaissance. These\nhave their chief exponent in Vossius (1623). We cannot abstain from\nsometimes mentioning the literary form of the works of historians,\nnor from according their laurels to works of remarkable literary\nvalue, while noting their unsatisfactory historiographical methods;\nbut to touch here and there upon, to discuss, to characterize, to\neliminate, is of secondary importance and does not form part of the\nproper function of historiography, whose object is the _development of\nhistoriographical thought._\n\nThe distinction between this history and that of _philology_ or\n_erudition_ is less apparent but not less indubitable, always, be it\nwell understood, in the sense explained, of a distinction that is not\na separation. This warning should be understood in respect of other\nexclusions that we are about to effect, without our being obliged\nto repeat it at every step; for the connexion between history and\nphilology is undeniable, not less than that between history and art,\nor history and practical life. But that does not prevent philology\nin itself being the collection, the rearrangement, the purification\nof material, and not history. Owing to this quality it forms a part\nrather of the history of culture than of that of thought. It would be\nimpossible to disassociate it from the history of libraries, archives,\nmuseums, universities, seminaries, _\u00e9coles des chartes,_ academical\nand editorial enterprises, and from other institutions and proceedings\nof an entirely practical nature. Fueter has therefore been right in\nexcluding from his theme in his recent work on the history of modern\nhistoriography[2] \"the history of merely philological research and\ncriticism.\" This has not prevented him from taking store where apposite\nof the school of Biondo or of that of Maurini, or of the perfecting of\nthe method of seeking for the sources attained by the German school\nin the nineteenth century. The confusion and lack of development\nobservable in the old and solid work of Wachler[3] is perhaps due to\nhis having failed to make this distinction, to which recourse can also\nbe had with advantage elsewhere. Wachler's work, entitled and conceived\nas \"history of research and of the historical art from the Renaissance\nof letters in Europe onward,\" ended by assuming the appearance of a\nrepertory or bibliographical catalogue.\n\nThe obstacles to be encountered by the distinction between the history\nof historiography and that of the _practical tendencies,_ or tendencies\nof the _social and political spirit,_ are more intricate. These indeed\nbecome incorporated with or at least leave their mark upon the works\nof historians; but it is just because we can only with difficulty\nperceive the line of demarcation that it is indispensable to make it\nquite clear. Such tendencies, such social and political spirit, belong\nrather to the matter than to the theoretical form of history; they are\nnot so much historiography as history in the act and in its _fieri._\nMachiavelli is a historian in so far as he tries to understand the\ncourse of events; he is a politician, or at least a publicist, when\nhe posits and desires a prince, founder of a strong national state,\nas his ideal, reflecting this in his history. This history, in so\nfar as it portrays that ideal and the inspiration and teaching that\naccompany it, here and there becomes fable (_fabula docet_). Thus\nMachiavelli belongs partly to the history of thought in the Renaissance\nand partly to the history of the practice of the Renaissance. Nor does\nthis happen solely in political and social historiography, but also\nin literary and artistic, because there is not perhaps a critic in\nthe world, however unprejudiced and broad in his ideas, who does not\nmanifest tendencies in the direction of a literary renovation of his\nepoch together with his actual judgments and reconstructions. Now to\nthe extent that he does this, even if it be in the same book and on\nthe same page or in the same period, he is no longer a critic, but\na practical reformer of art. In one domain of history alone is this\npacific accompaniment of interpretations and aspirations impossible--in\nthe history of philosophy, because when, as here, there is a difference\nbetween historical interpretation and the tendency of the philosopher,\nthe difference reveals the insufficiency of the interpretation itself:\nin other words, if the theory of the historian of philosophy is at war\nwith the theories of which he claims to expound the history, his theory\nmust be false, just because it does not avail to justify the history\nof the theories. But this exception does not annul the distinction\nin other fields; indeed, it confirms it, and is not an exception in\nthe empirical sense, as it appears to be: thought distinguishes and\nis distinguished from sentiment and will, but it is not distinguished\nfrom itself, precisely because it is the principle of distinction.\nA methodological corollary of this distinction between history of\nhistoriography and history of practical tendencies is that the\nintroduction into the first of considerations belonging to the second\nis to be held erroneous. Here I think Fueter has sinned to some extent\nin the book to which I have already referred, where he divides his\nmaterial into humanistic, political, party, imperial, particularist,\nProtestant, Catholic, Jesuitic, illuministic, romanticist, erudite,\nlirico-subjective, national, statolatral, historiographical, and the\nlike. Only some of the above divisions belong to, or can properly be\nreduced to, historiographical concepts, while the majority refer to\nsocial and political life. Hence the lack of sound organization that\nwe observe in this book, which is yet so lively and ingenious: its\ndivisions follow one another without sufficient logicality, continuity,\nand necessity, and are not the result of a single thought which posits\nthem and develops itself through them. If, on the other hand, the\ngenuinely historiographical portions, which have become mingled with\nit, should be eliminated, what remained could certainly be organized,\nbut as social and political history, no longer as historiography,\nbecause the works of historians would be consulted only as documents\nshowing the tendencies of the times in which they were written.\nMachiavelli, for instance, (to use the same example) would there figure\nas an Italian patriot and defender of absolute power, while Vico (a\nmuch greater historian than Machiavelli) would not be able to appear at\nall, or hardly at all, because his relation with the political life of\nhis time was remote and general.\n\nWhat I have been expounding may be resumed by saying that the history\nof historiography is neither _literary_ history nor the history of\ncultural, social, political, moral doings, which are of a _practical_\nnature, but that it is certainly all these things, by reason of the\nunbreakable unity of history, though with it the _accent_ does not fall\nupon practical facts, but rather upon _historiographical thought,_\nwhich is its proper subject.\n\nHaving pointed out or recalled these distinctions, which, as we have\nseen, are sometimes neglected with evil results, we must now utter a\nwarning against other distinctions, employed without rational basis,\nwhich rather overcloud and trouble the history of historiography than\nshed light upon it.\n\nFueter (I cite him again, although the error is not peculiar to\nhim) declares that he has dealt in his book with _historiographical\ntheories_ and with _historical method_ only in so far as they seem\nto have had influence upon actual historiography. The history of\nhistoricity (here is the reason he gives for the method he has\nfollowed) is as little the history of historiography as is the history\nof dramatic theories the history of the drama. This he considers to\nbe proved by the fact that theory and practice often follow different\npaths, as, for instance, in Lope de Vega, whose theory of the drama\nand actual dramatic work were two different things, to such an extent\nthat it was said of the Spanish dramatist that although he reverenced\nthe poetical art, when he sat down to compose \"he locked up the correct\nrules under seven keys.\" This argument is without doubt specious, and I\nwas myself formerly seduced by it; but it is fallacious, as I realized\nwhen I thought it over again, and I now affirm it to be an error with\nall the conviction and authority of one who criticizes an error at one\ntime his own. The argument is founded upon a false analogy between the\nproduction of art and that of history. Art, which is the work of the\nimagination, can be well distinguished from the theory of art, which\nis the work of reflection; artistic genius produces the former, the\nspeculative intellect the latter, and it often happens with artists\nthat the speculative intellect is inferior to their genius, so that\nthey do one thing and say another, or say one thing and do another,\nwithout its being possible to accuse them of logical incoherence,\nbecause the incoherence is between two discordant thoughts, never\nbetween a thought and an act of the imagination. But history and theory\nof history are both of them works of thought, bound to one another in\nthe same way as thought is bound to itself, since it is one. Thus no\nhistorian but possesses in a more or less reflective way his theory of\nhistory, because, not to put too fine a point upon it, every historian\nimplicitly or explicitly conducts a polemic against other historians\n(against other 'versions' and 'judgments' of a fact), and how could\nhe ever conduct a polemic or criticize others if he did not himself\npossess a conception of what history is and ought to be, to which to\nrefer, a theory of history? The artist, on the other hand, in so far\nas he is an artist, does not polemize or criticize, but forms. It\nmay quite well happen that an erroneous theory of historiography is\nexpounded, while on the contrary the history as narrated may turn out\nto be well constructed. This is, of course, to be incoherent, but is\nso neither more nor less than when progress is effected in one branch\nof historiography, while there is backwardness in another. There may\nobtain, on the contrary, an excellent theory of history, where history\nitself is bad; but in the same way that in one field of historiography\nthere is the sense of and striving for a better method, while there\nis adherence to old methods in all the other fields. The history of\nhistoriography is the history of historical thought; and here it is\nimpossible to distinguish theory of history from history.\n\nAnother exclusion which Fueter declares that he has made is that of\nthe _philosophy of history._ He does not give the reason for this, but\nallows it to be understood, for he evidently holds that philosophies of\nhistory do not possess a purely scientific character and are lacking\nin truth. But not only are what are called 'philosophies of history'\nerroneous conceptions of history, but so also are the naturalistic or\ndeterministic conceptions opposed to them, and all the various forms of\npseudo-history which have been described above, philological history,\npoetical history, rhetorical history. I do not find that he has\nexcluded these from his history, any more than he has really excluded\nthe theological and transcendental conception of history (philosophy\nof history); indeed, he constantly refers to it. Justice and logic\nwould insist upon all or none being excluded--all really excluded,\nand not merely in words. But to exclude all of them, it may be said,\nwould be anything but intelligent, because how could the history of\nhistory ever be told in such a void? What is this history but the\nstruggle of scientific historiography against inadequate scientific\nformulas? Certainly the former is the protagonist, but how could a\ndrama be presented with a protagonist lacking antagonists? And even\nif historical philology be not considered directly, but referred back\nto philology, if poetical history be referred back to literature,\nrhetorical or practical to social and political history, it would\nnevertheless be necessary always to take account of the conversion that\noften occurs of those various mental constructions into assertions\nof reality, taken in exchange for and given the value of true and\nproper histories. In this sense they become in turn _deterministic_\nor _transcendental_ conceptions of history, and both of them logical\nor illogical representations of all the others, and end by becoming\nequivalent to one another dialectically, and are always before the\neyes of the historian, because the perpetual condition and the\nperpetual sign of the progress of historical thought reside in their\nmovement, which passes from transcendency or false immanence to pure\nimmanence, to return to them and enter into a more profound conception\nof immanency. To exclude philosophies of history from the history of\nhistoriography does not, therefore, seem to me to be justifiable,\nfor the same reason as it seems to be unjustifiable to exclude from\nit historiographical theories, which are the consciousness that\nhistoriography acquires of itself: owing to their homogeneity, I say,\nowing indeed to their identity with history, of which they do not form\naccidental ingredients or material elements, but constitute the very\nessence. A proof of this is to be found in the _Historical Philosophy\nof France_ of Flint. He proceeds from a presumption that is perhaps the\nopposite of that of Fueter--that is to say, he treats of the philosophy\nof history, and not of history, but finds it impossible to maintain\nthe dykes between the two. His treatise, therefore, when artificial\nobstacles have been overcome, runs like a single river and reveals\nto our view the whole history of historical French thought, to which\nBossuet and Rollin, Condorcet and Voltaire, Auguste Comte and Michelet\nor Tocqueville equally belong.\n\nAt this point it will probably be objected (although Fueter does not\npropound this objection, it is probable that it is at the back of\nhis mind) that what is desired in a history of historiography is not\nso much a history of _historical thought_ as a history of _history\nin the concrete_: of the _Storie fiorentine_ of Machiavelli, of the\n_Si\u00e8cle de Louis XIV_ of Voltaire, or of the _R\u00f6mische Geschichte_ of\nNiebuhr: that would be a general history, while what is desired is a\nspecific history. But it is well to pay close attention to the meaning\nof such a request and to the possibility of what is asked. If I set\nout to write the history of the _Storie fiorentine_ of Machiavelli, in\nrespect to the particular material with which it deals, I shall rewrite\nthe history of Florence, criticizing and completing Machiavelli, and\nshall thus be, for instance, a Villari, a Davidsohn, or a Salvemini.\nIf I set out to write the history of the material of Voltaire's work,\nI shall criticize Voltaire and outline a new _Si\u00e8cle de Louis XIV_,\nas has been done, for example, by Philippson. And if I set to work to\nexamine and rethink the work of Niebuhr in respect to its particular\nmaterial, I shall be a new historian of Rome, a Mommsen or (to quote\nthe most recent writers) a Hector Pais or a Gaetano de Sanctis. But is\nthis what is desired? Certainly not. But if this be not desired, if the\nparticular materials of those histories are not to be taken account of,\nwhat else remains save the 'way' in which they have been conceived, the\n'mental form' by means of which they construct their narratives, and\ntherefore their theory and their historical 'thought'?\n\nNow, if this truth be admitted (and I do not see how it can be\ncontested) it is not possible to reject an ulterior consequence which,\nalthough it is wont to arouse in some the sensation of a paradox,\ndoes not do so in us, for we find it altogether in accordance with\nthe conception of the identity of history with, philosophy that we\nhave defended. Is a thought that is not thought conceivable? Is it\npermissible to distinguish between the _thought of the historian_ and\nthe _thought of the philosopher_? Are there perhaps two different\nthoughts in the world? To persist in maintaining that the thought of\nthe historian thinks the fact and not the theory is prevented by the\npreceding admission, if by nothing else: that the historian always\nthinks at least both the theory of history and the historical fact. But\nthis admission entails his thinking the theory of all the things that\nhe narrates, together with the theory of history. And indeed he could\nnot narrate without understanding them. Fueter extols the merit of\nWinckelmann, who was the first to conceive a history, not of artists,\nbut of art, of a pure spiritual activity, and that of Giannone, who\nwas the first to attempt a history of the life of jurisprudence. But\nthese writers made the progress they did because they had a new\nand more accurate conception of art and of rights, and if they went\nwrong as to certain points, that is because they did not always think\nthose conceptions with equal exactitude. Winckelmann, for instance,\nmaterialized the spiritual activity of the artist when he posited an\nabstract, fixed material ideal of beauty, and gave an abstract history\nof artistic styles without regard to the temperaments, historical\ncircumstances, and individualities of the artists themselves. Giannone\nfailed to supersede the dualism of Church and State. Without indulging\nin other too particular examples, it is evident at the first glance\nthat ancient historiography concords with the ancient conception of\nreligion of the state, of ethic, and of the whole of reality; the\nmedieval with Christian theology and ethic; that of the first half of\nthe nineteenth century with the idealistic and romantic philosophy,\nthat of the second half with naturalistic and positivistic philosophy.\nThus, _ex parte historicorum_, there is no way of distinguishing\nhistorical and philosophical thought, which are perfectly commingled in\nthe narratives. But there is also no possibility of maintaining such\na distinction _ex parte philosophorum_ either, because, as all know,\nor at least say, each period has the philosophy proper to it, which\nis the consciousness of that period, and as such is its history, at\nleast in germ; or, as we have put it, philosophy and history coincide.\nAnd if they coincide, the history of philosophy and the history of\nhistoriography also coincide: the one is not only not distinguishable\nfrom the other, but is not even subordinate to the other, for it is all\none with it.\n\nThe historiography of philosophy has already begun to open its arms,\ninviting and receiving the works of the historians. Every day it\nunderstands better that a history of Greek thought is not complete\nwithout taking count of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Polybius, nor of\nRoman thought without Livy and Tacitus, nor of the thought of the\nRenaissance without Machiavelli and Guicciardini. It must open them yet\nwider and clasp to its bosom even the humble medieval historiographers\nwho noted the _Gesta episcoporum_ or _Historiol\u00e6 translationum_ or Vit\u00e6\nsanctorum, or who bear witness to the Christian faith, according to\ntheir powers and in their own way, it is true, but not less than the\ngreat Augustine according to his powers. It must receive not only the\nhagiographical writers, but even obtuse philologists or sociologists\nwho have amused us during the last decades and bear witness to the\ncreed of positivism not other-wise than as Spencer or Haeckel in their\nsystems. By means of this amplification of concepts and enrichment of\nmaterial, the historiography of philosophy will place itself in the\nposition of being able to show that philosophy is a force diffused\nthroughout life, and not the particular invention and cult of certain\nmen who are philosophers, and will obtain the means that have hitherto\nbeen lacking to effect a close conjunction with the whole historical\nmovement.\n\nIn its turn the history of historiography will gain by the fusion,\nbecause it will find its own directive principles in philosophy, and by\nits means will be rendered capable of understanding both the problems\nof history in general and those of its various aspects as history of\nart and of philosophy, of economic and moral life. To seek elsewhere\nthe criterion of explanation is vain. Fueter, who takes a glance at\nthe most recent historiography, that posterior to 1870, at the end of\nhis book, discerns in it the new consciousness that gives the highest\nplace to political and military power and marks the end of the old\nliberalism, the strengthening of such consciousness by means of the\nDarwinian theories concerning the struggle for life, the influence of\na more intense economical and industrial life and a greater intensity\nof world politics, the repercussion of Egyptian and Orientalistic\ndiscoveries, which have aided in disproving the illusion of Europe as\nthe centre of the world, the attraction exercised by the theory of\nraces, and so on. These observations are just, but they do not reach\nthe heart and brain of the most recent historiography; they merely\nrevolve round its body. The heart or brain is, as I have observed,\nnaturalism, the ideal of historical culture inspired and to be inspired\nby the natural sciences. So true is this that Fueter himself burns a\nfew grains of incense before this idol, sighing for a form of history\nthat shall be beautiful with the beauty of a well-made machine,\nrivalling a book on physics such as the _Theory of Tones_ of Helmholtz.\nThe truth is that the ideal of the natural sciences, instead of being\nthe perfection, is one of the many crises that historical thought has\npassed through and will pass through. Historical thought is dialectic\nof development, and not by any means a deterministic explanation by\nmeans of causes which does not explain anything because it does not\ndevelop anything. But whatever we may think of this, it is certain that\nnaturalism--that is, the criticism of naturalism--can alone supply the\nclue for unravelling the web of the historiography of the last ten\nyears; the same events and historical movements enumerated above have\nacted in the particular way in which they have acted owing to being\nconstantly framed in naturalistic thought.\n\nFor the rest, nothing forbids, and it may even serve a useful purpose,\nthat the history of philosophy and the history of historiography\nshould receive literary treatment in different books, for altogether\npractical reasons, such, for instance, as the abundance of material and\nthe different training and acquirements needed for the treatment of the\ndifferent classes of material. But what is _apparently disunited_ by\npractice thought _really_ unifies; and this real unification is what\nI have wished to inculcate, without the pedantic idea ever passing\nthrough my mind of dictating rules for composing books, as to which\nit is desirable to leave all liberty of inclusion and exclusion to\nwriters, in conformity with their various intentions.\n\n\n[1] _Charakteristik der antiken Historiographie_ (Berlin, 1833).\n\n[2] _Geschichte der neueren Historiographie_ (M\u00fcnchen u. Berlin,\nOldenburg, 1911).\n\n[3] _Geschichte der historischen Forschung und Kunst seit der\nWiederherstellung der literarischen Cultur in Europa_ (G\u00f6ttingen,\n1812-20).\n\n\n\n\nII\n\n\nGR\u00c6CO-ROMAN HISTORIOGRAPHY\n\n\nAfter what we have said as to the nature of periodization,[1] the\nusual custom, to which I too bow here, of beginning the history of\nhistoriography with that of the Greeks, and with the Greeks of the\nfifth or sixth century before Christ, will be taken for what it is\nreally worth, but it must not be thought that we thus intend to\nannounce the beginning of historiography, its first appearance in the\nworld, when, on the contrary, all we wish to say is that our interest\nin the investigation of its course becomes more vivid at that point.\nHistory, like philosophy, has no historical beginning, but only an\nideal or metaphysical beginning, in so far as it is an activity of\nthought, which is outside time. Historically speaking, it is quite\nclear that prior to Herodotus, prior to the logographs, prior indeed\nto Hesiod and to Homer, history was already, because it is impossible\nto conceive of men who do not think and do not narrate their deeds in\nsome way or other. This explanation might seem to be superfluous if the\nconfusion between historical beginning and ideal beginning had not led\nto the fancy of a 'first philosophical step,' made by Thales or Zeno,\nor by somebody else, by means of which thinking the first stone is\nsupposed to have been laid, as it was believed that by thinking another\nlast step the pinnacle of the edifice of philosophy was or would be\nattained. But Thales and Herodotus should really be called rather the\n'sons' of our interest in the development of those disciplines than\nthe 'fathers' of philosophy and history, and it is we whom those sons\nsalute as their 'fathers.' We have not usually much interest in what\noccurred prior to them or among people more distant than they from\nour point of view, not only because there is a scarcity of surviving\ndocuments concerning them, but above all because they are forms of\nthought which have but little connexion with our own actual problems.\n\nFrom its point of view, too, the distinction that we laid down between\nhistory and philology suggests refraining from the search hitherto\nmade for the beginnings of Gr\u00e6co-Roman historiography by means of\ncomposing lists of magistrates and of adding to these brief mention\nof wars, treatises, embassies from colonies, religious festivities,\nearthquakes, inundations, and the like, in the \u1ff7\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9 and in the _annales\npontificum,_ in archives and museums made in temples, or indeed in the\nchronological nails fixed to the walls, spoken of by Perizonius. Such\nthings are extrinsic to historiography and form the precedent, not of\nit, but of chronicle and philology, which were not born for the first\ntime in the nineteenth or seventeenth century, or at any rate during\nthe Alexandrine period, but belong to all times, for in all times men\ntake note of what they remember and attempt to preserve such memorials\nintact, to restore and to increase them. The precedent of history\ncannot be something different from history, but is history itself, as\nphilosophy is the precedent of philosophy and the living of the living.\nNevertheless the thought of Herodotus and of the logographs really\ndoes unite itself with religions, myths, theogonies, cosmogonies,\ngenealogies, and with legendary and epical tales, which were not\nindeed poetry, or were not only poetry but also thoughts--that is to\nsay, metaphysics and histories. The whole of later historiography\ndeveloped from them by a dialectical process, for which they supplied\nthe presuppositions--that is to say, concepts, propositions of fact and\nfancy mingled, and with that the stimulus better to seek out the truth\nand to dissipate fancies. This dissipation took place more rapidly at\nthe time which it is usual to fix by convention as the beginning of\nGreek historiography.\n\nAt that time thought deserts mythological history and its ruder\nform, prodigious or miraculous history, and enters earthly or human\nhistory--that is to say, the general conception that is still ours, so\nmuch so that it has been possible for an illustrious living historian\nto propose the works of Thucydides as an example and model to the\nhistorians of our times. Certainly that exit and that entrance did\nnot represent for the Greeks a complete breaking with the past; and\nsince earthly history could not have been altogether wanting in the\npast, so it is not to be believed that the Greeks from the sixth and\nseventh centuries onward should have abandoned all faith in mythology\nand prodigies. These things persisted not only with the people and\namong lesser or vulgar historiographers, but also left their traces\namong some of the greatest. Nevertheless, looking at the whole from\nabove, as one should look at it, it is evident that the environment\nis altogether changed from what it was. Even the many fables that we\nread in Herodotus, and which were to be read in the logographs, are\nrarely (as has been justly observed) put forward ingenuously, but are\nusually given as by one who collects what others believe, and does\nnot for that reason accept those beliefs, even if he does not openly\nevince his disbelief; or he collects them because he does not know\nwhat to substitute for them, and rather as matter for reflection\nand inquiry: _qu\u00e6 nec confirmare argumentis neque refellere in animo\nest,_ as Tacitus says, when he recounts the fables of the Germans:\n_plura transcribo quam credo,_ declared Quintus Curtius. Herodotus is\ncertainly not Voltaire, nor is he indeed Thucydides (Thucydides, 'the\natheist'); but certainly he is no longer Homer or Hesiod.\n\nThe following are a few examples of leading problems which ancient\nhistorians had before them, dictated by the conditions and events\nof Greek and Roman life; they were treated from a mental point of\nview, which no longer found in those facts episodes of the rivalry of\nAphrodite and Hera (as formerly in the Trojan War), but varying complex\nhuman struggles, due to human interests, expressing themselves in human\nactions. How did the wars between the Greeks and the Persians originate\nand develop? What were the origins of the Peloponnesian War? of the\nexpedition of Cyrus against Artaxerxes? How was the Roman power formed\nin Latium, and how did it afterward extend in Italy and in the whole\nworld? How did the Romans succeed in depriving the Carthaginians of the\nhegemony of the Mediterranean? What were the political institutions\ndeveloped in Athens, Rome, and Sparta, and what form did the social\nstruggle take in those cities? What did the Athenian _demos,_ the Roman\n_plebs,_ the _eupatrides,_ and the _patres_ desire? What were the\nvirtues, the dispositions, the points of view, of the various peoples\nwhich entered into conflict among themselves, Athenians, Lacedemonians,\nPersians, Macedonians, Romans, Gauls, and Germans? What were the\ncharacters of the great men who guided the destinies of the peoples,\nThemistocles, Pericles, Alexander, Hannibal, and Scipio? These problems\nwere solved in a series of classical works by Thucydides, Xenophon,\nPolybius, Livy, Tacitus, etc., and they will certainly not be blamed\nfor failing to exhaust their themes--that is, for failing to sound the\nbottom of the universe, because there is no sounding the bottom of the\nuniverse--nor because they solve those problems only in the terms in\nwhich they had proposed them, neither more nor less than as we solve\nthe problems of our day in our own terms. Nor must we forget that since\nmodern historiography is still much as it was left by the Greeks, the\ngreater part of those events are still thought as they were by the\nancients, and although something has been added and a different light\nillumines the whole, the work of the ancient historians is preserved in\nour own: a true \"eternal possession,\" as Thucydides intended that his\nhistory should be.\n\nAnd just as historical thought had become invigorated in its passage\nfrom the mythological to the human stage, so did research and philology\ngrow. Herodotus was already travelling, asking questions, and listening\nto answers, distinguishing between the things that he had seen\nwith his own eyes and those which depended upon hearsay, opinion,\nand conjecture; Thucydides was submitting to criticism different\ntraditions relating to the same fact, and even inserting documents in\nhis narrative. Later appeared legions of learned men and critics, who\ncompiled 'antiquities' and 'libraries,' and busied themselves also with\nthe reading of texts, with chronology and geography, thus affording\ngreat assistance to historical studies. Such a fervour of philological\nstudies was eventually attained that it was recognized as necessary to\ndraw a clear distinction between the 'histories of antiquaries' (of\nwhich a considerable number survive either entire or in fragments)\nand 'histories of historians,' and Polybius several times said that it\nis easy to compose history from books, because it suffices to take up\none's residence in a city where there exist rich libraries, but that\ntrue history requires acquaintance with political and military affairs\nand direct knowledge of places and of people; and Lucian repeated\nthat it is indispensable for the historian to have political sense,\n\u03ac\u03b4\u03af\u03b4\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03ad\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u1ff6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd, a gift of nature not to be learned (the maxims\nand practices praised as quite novel by M\u00f6ser and Niebuhr are therefore\nby no means new). The fact is that a more profound theoretical\nconsciousness corresponded with a more vigorous historiography, so\ninseparable is the theory of history from history, advancing with it.\nIt was also known that history should not be made a simple instrument\nof practice, of political intrigue, or of amusement, and that its\nfunction is above all to aim at truth: _ne quid falsi dicere audeat,\nne quid veri non audeat._ In consequence of this, partisanship, even\nfor one's own country, was condemned (although it was recognized\nchat solicitude and sympathy were permissible); and _quidquid Gr\u00e6cia\nmendax audet in historia_ was blamed. It was known that history is not\nchronicle (annales), which is limited to external things, recording (in\nthe words of Asellio, the ancient Roman historian) _quod factum, quoque\nanno gestum sit,_ whereas history tries to understand _quo Consilio,\nquaque ratione gesta sint._ And it was also known that history cannot\nset herself the same task as poetry. We find Thucydides referring with\ndisdain to histories written with the object of gaining the prize in\noratorical competitions, and to those which indulge in fables to please\nthe vulgar. Polybius too inveighed against those who seek to emphasize\nmoving details, and depict women dishevelled and in tears, and\ndreadful scenes, as though composing tragedies and as though it were\ntheir business to create the marvellous and pleasing and not impart\ntruth and instruction. If it be a fact that rhetorical historiography\n(a worsening of the imaginative and poetic) abounded in antiquity and\nintroduced its false gold even into some masterpieces, the general\ntendency of the better historians was to set themselves free of ornate\nrhetoricians and of cheap eloquence. But the ancient historians will\nnever fail of lofty poetical power and elevation for this reason (not\neven the 'prosaic' Polybius, who sometimes paints most effective\npictures), but will ever retain what is proper to lofty historical\nnarrative. Cicero and Quintilian, Diogenes and Lucian, all recognize\nthat history must adopt _verba ferme poetarum,_ that it is _proxima\npoetis et quodammodo carmen solutum,_ that _scribitur ad narrandum,\nnon ad demonstrandum,_ that \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd, and the like. What the\nbest historians and theorists sought at that time was not the aridity\nand dryness of mathematical or physical treatment (such as we often\nhear desired in our day), but gravity, abstention from fabulous and\npleasing tales, or if not from fabulous then from frivolous tales, in\nfact from competition with the rhetoricians and composers of histories\nthat were romances or gross caricatures of such. Above all they desired\nthat history should remain faithful to real life, since it is the\ninstrument of life, and a form of knowledge useful to the statesman and\nto the lover of his country, and by no means docile to the capricious\nrequirements of the unoccupied seeking amusement.\n\nThis theory of historiography, which may be found here and there in\na good many special treatises and in general treatises on the art of\nspeech, finds nowhere such complete and conscious expression as in the\nfrequent polemical interludes of Polybius in his _Histories,_ where\nthe polemic itself endows it with precision, concreteness, and savour.\nPolybius is the Aristotle of ancient historiography: an Aristotle who\nis both historical and theoretical, completing the Stagirite, who in\nthe vast expanse of his work had taken but little interest in history\nproperly so called. And since so great a part of the ancient narratives\nlives in our own, so there is not one of the propositions recorded\nthat has not been included and has not been worthy of being included\nin our treatises. And if, for example, the maxim that history should\nbe narrated by men of the world and not by the simply erudite or by\nphilologists, that it is born of practice and assists in practice,\nhas been often neglected, the blame falls on those who neglect it. A\nfurther blunder committed by such writers has been to forget completely\nthe \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd and to pay court to an ideal of history something like\nan anatomical map or a treatise of mechanics.\n\nBut the defect that ancient historiography exposes to our gaze is of\nanother sort. The ancients did not observe it as a defect, or only\nsometimes, in a vague and fugitive manner, without attaching weight to\nit, for otherwise they would have remedied it when it occurred. The\nmodern spirit inquires how the sentiments and conceptions which are now\nour ideal patrimony, and the institutions in which they are realized,\nhave been gradually formed. It wishes to understand the revolutionary\npassages from primitive and Oriental to Gr\u00e6co-Roman culture, how\nmodern ethic was attained through ancient ethic, the modern through\nthe ancient state, the vast industry and international commerce of\nthe modern world through the ancient mode of economic production,\nthe passage from the myths of the Aryans to our philosophies, from\nMycenean to French or Swedish or Italian art of the twentieth century.\nHence there are special histories of culture, of philosophy, of poetry,\nof the sciences, of technique, of economy, of morality, of religions,\nand so on, which are preferred to histories of individuals or of\nstates themselves, in so far as they are abstract individuals. They\nare illuminated and inspired throughout with the ideas of liberty, of\ncivilization, of humanity, and of progress. All this is not to be found\nin ancient historiography, although it cannot be said to be altogether\nabsent, for with what could the mind of man have ever been occupied,\nsave by human ideals or 'values'? Nor should the error be made of\nconsidering 'epochs' as something compact and static, whereas they are\nvarious and in motion, or of rendering those divisions natural and\nexternal which, as has been demonstrated, are nothing but the movement\nof our thought as we think history, a fallacy linked with the other one\nconcerning the absolute beginning of history and the rendering temporal\nof the forms of the spirit. Whoever is gifted with the patience of\nthe collector will meet here and there with suggestions and buddings\nof those historiographical conceptions of which, generally speaking,\nwe have denied the existence in the writings of the ancients. He who\nfinds diversion in modernizing the old may travesty the thoughts of\nthe ancients, as they have been travestied, so as to render them\nalmost altogether similar to those of the moderns. In the first book\nof Aristotle's _Metaphysics_, for instance, is to be admired a sketch\nof the development of Greek philosophy, of the various naturalistic\ninterpretations which have been in turn proposed for the explanation\nof the cosmos, and so on, up to the new orientation of the mind, when,\n\"compelled by truth itself,\" it turned toward a different order of\nprinciples--that is to say, till the time of Anaxagoras, \"who seems\nto be a sober man among the intoxicated,\" thus continuing up to the\ntime of Socrates, who founded ethic and discovered the universal and\nthe definition. A sketch of the history of civilization is to be found\nat the beginning of the _History_ of Thucydides, and Polybius will be\nfound discoursing of the progress that had been made in all the arts,\nwhile Cicero, Quintilian, and several others trace the progress of\nrights and of literature. There are also touches of human value in\nconflict with one another in the narratives of the struggles between\nGreeks and barbarians, between the truly civil and active life of\nthe former and the proud, lazy habits of the latter. Other similar\nconceptions of human values will be found in many comparisons of\npeoples, and above all in the way that Tacitus describes the Germans\nas a new moral power rising up against that of ancient Rome, and\nperhaps also in the repugnance which the same historian experiences\nat seeing before him the Jews, who follow rites _contrarius ceteris\nmortalibus._ Finally, Rome, mistress of the world, will sometimes\nassume in our eyes the aspect of a transparent symbol of the human\nideal, analogous to Roman law, gradually idealized in the form of\nnatural law. But here it is rather a question of symbols than of\nconceptions, of our own conclusions than of the thoughts proper to the\nancients. When, for instance, we examine the history of philosophy\nof Aristotle as outlined by him, we find that it consists above all\nin a rapid critical account to serve as prop\u00e6deutic to his system;\nand literary and artistic histories and histories of civilization\nseem often to be weakened by the prejudice that these are not really\nnecessary mental forms, but luxuries and refinements. At the utmost\nwe can speak of exceptions, incidents, tentatives; which does not in\nany way alter the comprehensive impression and general conclusion to\nthe effect that the ancients never possessed explicit histories of\ncivilization, philosophy, religions, literature, art, or rights: none,\nin fact, of the many possessed by ourselves. Nor did they possess\n'biography' in the sense that we do, as the history of the ideal\nfunction of an individual in his own time and in the life of humanity,\nnor the sense of development, and when they speak of primitive times\nthey rarely feel that they are primitive, but are rather disposed to\ntransfigure them poetically, in the same way that Dante did by the\nmouth of Cacciaguida that Fiorenza which \"stood soberly and modestly at\npeace\" within the circle of the ancient days. It was one of the \"severe\nlabours\" of our Vico to recover the crude reality of history beneath\nthese poetic idylls. In this work he was assisted, not by the ancient\nhistoriographers, but by documents and mostly by languages.\n\nThe physiognomy of the histories of the ancients as described very\naccurately reflects the character of their philosophy, which never\nattained to the conception of the spirit, and therefore also failed\nto attain to that of humanity, liberty, and progress, which are\naspects or synonyms of the former. It certainly passed from physiology\nor cosmology to ethic, logic, and rhetoric; but it schematized and\nmaterialized these spiritual disciplines because it treated them\nempirically. Thus their ethic did not rise above the custom of\nGreece and Rome, nor their logic above abstract forms of reasoning\nand discussing, nor their poetic above classes of literature. For\nthis reason all assume the form of precepts. 'Anti-historical\nphilosophy' has been universally recognized and described, but it\nis anti-historical because anti-spiritual, anti-historical because\nnaturalistic. The ancients also failed to notice the deficiency\nobserved by us, for they were entirely occupied with the joy of the\neffort of passing from myth to science and thus to the collection and\nclassification of the facts of reality. That is to say, they were\nengrossed upon the sole problem which they set themselves to solve,\nand solved so successfully that they supplied naturalism with the\ninstruments which it still employs: formal logic, grammar, the doctrine\nof the virtues, the doctrine of literary classes, categories of civil\nrights, and so forth. These were all Gr\u00e6co-Roman creations.\n\nBut that ancient historians and philosophers were not explicitly aware\nof the above defect in its proper terms, or rather in our modern terms,\ndoes not mean that they were not to some extent exercised by it. In\nevery historical period exist problems theoretically formulated and for\nthat very reason solved, while others have not yet arrived at complete\ntheoretical maturity, but are seen, intuited, though not yet adequately\nthought. If the former are the positive contribution of that time to\nthe chain whose links form the human spirit, the latter represent an\nunsatisfied demand, which binds that time in another way to the coming\ntime. The great attention paid to the negative aspect of every epoch\nsometimes leads to the forgetting of the other aspect, and to the\nconsequent imagining of a humanity that passes not from satisfaction\nto satisfaction through dissatisfaction, but from dissatisfaction\nto dissatisfaction and from error to error. But obscurities and\ndiscordances are possible in so far as light and concord have been\npreviously attained. Thus they represent in their way progress, as is\nto be seen from the history that we are recounting, where we find them\nvery numerous for the very reason that the age of mythologies and of\nprodigies has been left behind. If Greece and Rome had not been both\nmore than Greece and more than Rome, if they had not been the human\nspirit, which is infinitely greater than any Greece and any Rome--its\ntransitory individuations--they would have been satisfied with the\nhuman portraits of their historians and would not have sought beyond.\nBut they did seek beyond--that is to say, those very historians and\nphilosophers sought; and since they had before them so many episodes\nand dramas of human life, reconstructed by their thought, they asked\nthemselves what was the cause of those events, reasonably concluding\nthat such a cause might be one fact or another, a particular fact; and\nfor this reason they began to distinguish between facts and causes,\nand, in the order of causes themselves, between cause and occasion,\nas does Thucydides, or between beginning, cause, and occasion \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03ae,\n\u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1, \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, like Polybius. They thus became involved in disputes\nas to the true cause of this or that event, and ever since antiquity\nattempts have been made to solve the enigma of the 'greatness' of\nRome, assuming in modern times the guise of a solemn experimentum of\nhistorical thought and thus forming the diversion of those historians\nwho linger behind. The question was often generalized in the other\nquestion as to the motive power behind all history; and here too appear\ndoctrines, afterward drawn out to great length, such as that the form\nof the political constitution was the cause of all the rest, and that\nother doctrine relating to climate and to the temperaments of peoples.\nThe doctrine principally proposed and accepted was that of the natural\nlaw of the circle in human affairs, the perpetual alternation of\ngood and evil, or the passage through political forms, which always\nreturns to the form from which it has taken its start, or as growth\nfrom infancy to manhood, declining into old age and decrepitude and\nending in death. But a law of this sort, which satisfied and still\nsatisfies the Oriental mind, did not satisfy the classical mind,\nwhich had a lively sense of human effort and of the stimulus received\nfrom obstacles encountered and conflicts endured. Hence therefore the\nfurther questions: Does fate or immutable necessity oppress man, or is\nhe not rather the plaything of capricious fortune, or is he ruled by a\nwise and sagacious providence? It was also asked whether the gods are\ninterested in human affairs or not. These questions met with answers\nthat are sometimes pious, advocating submission to the divine will and\nwisdom, sometimes, again, inspired with the notion that the gods are\nnot concerned with human affairs themselves, but solely with vengeance\nand punishment. All these conceptions lack firmness, and are for the\nmost part confused, since a general uncertainty and confession of\nignorance prevails in them: _in incerto judicium est,_ said Tacitus,\nalmost summing up the ancient argument on the subject in this epigram,\nor rather finding non-thought, failure to understand, to be the result\nof the argument.\n\nWhat we do not understand we do not dominate; on the contrary, it\ndominates us, or at least menaces us, taking the form of evil; hence\nthe psychological attitude of the ancients toward history must be\ndescribed as pessimistic. They saw much greatness fall, but they never\ndiscovered the greatness that does not fall and that rises up greater\nafter every fall. For this reason a flood of bitterness inundates\ntheir histories. Happiness, beauty of human life, always seemed to be\nsomething that had been and was no longer, and were it present would\nhave soon been lost. For the Romans and those professing the cult of\nRome, it was primitive, austere, victorious Rome; and all the Roman\nhistorians, big and little, Livy, Sallust, and Tacitus, Paterculus and\nFlorus, fix their gaze upon that image, as they lament the corruption\nof later days. Once it was Rome that trampled the world underfoot;\nbut they knew that the triumphant queen must some day become slave\nfrom queen that once she was. This thought manifests itself in the\nmost various forms, from the melancholy meditations of Scipio upon the\nruins of Carthage to the fearful expectation of the lordship which--as\nPersia to Babylonia and Macedonia to Persia--must succeed to that of\nthe Romans (the theory of the 'four monarchies' has its origin in the\nGr\u00e6co-Roman world, whence it filtered into Palestine and into the\nBook of Daniel). Sometimes repressed, sometimes outspoken, we hear\nthe anxious question: Who will be the successor and the gravedigger?\nWill it be the menacing Parthian? Will it be the Germans, so rich in\nnew and mysterious energy?--all this, despite the proud consciousness\nof ancient times that had uttered the words \"Rome, the eternal city.\"\nCertainly, that general pessimism is not altogether coherent, for no\npessimism can be so altogether, and here and there appear fugitive\nhints of a perception of human progress in this or that part of life.\nWe find, for instance, Tacitus, bitterest of men, remarking that _nec\nomnia apud priores meliora, sed nostra quoque \u00e6tas multa laudis et\nartium imitanda tulit,_ and one of the speakers in the _De oratoribus_\nobserves that literary forms change with the times and that it is\nowing to the _vitio malignitatis humana_ that we hear the perpetual\npraise of ancient things and the perpetual abuse of things modern.\nAnother interlocutor in the same dialogue draws attention to the\ndialectic connexion between the turbulence of life and the greatness of\nart, whence Rome _donec erravit, donec se partibus et dissensionibus\nconfecit,_ precisely at that time _tulit valentiorem eloquentiam._\nThis linking together of good and evil is not altogether absent in\nancient philosophy, and is also to be found here and there in ancient\nhistoriography. Sallust, for example, is of opinion that Rome remained\nin good health so long as she had Carthage opposed to her and giving\nher trouble. Readers of Cicero and of Seneca will be aware that the\nidea of humanity also made considerable progress during the last\ndays of the Republic and the first days of the Empire, owing to the\ninfluence of Stoicism. Divine providence too is courted, as was not\nformerly the case, and we also find Diodorus Siculus undertaking to\ntreat the affairs of all nations as those of a single city (\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\n\u03bc\u03b9\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03ad\u03c9\u03c2). But these promises remain still weak, vague, and inert\n(the _promissor_ Diodorus, for example, carried out none of his\ngrandiose prologue), and in any case they foretell the dissolution\nof the classical world. During this epoch the problem as to the\nsignification of history remains unsolved, because the contradictory\nconceptions above mentioned of fortune or of the gods, the belief in\na universal worsening of things, in a fall or a regression, which had\nalready been expressed in many ancient myths, were not by any means\nsolutions.\n\nOwing to their failure to realize spiritual value as the immanent\nprogressive force in history, even the loftiest of the ancient\nhistorians were not able to maintain the unity and autonomy of\nhistoriographical work, which in other respects they had discovered\nand asserted. Although they had penetrated the deception exercised by\nthose histories that are really poetry, or lies and partisanship, or\ncollections of material and unintelligent piling up of erudition, or\ninstruments of pleasure, affording marvel for simple folk, yet they\nwere on the other hand incapable of ever setting themselves free of\nthe preconception of history as directed to an end of edification\nand chiefly of instruction. This real heteronomy then appeared to\nbe autonomy. They are all agreed as to this: Thucydides proposed to\nnarrate past events in order to predict from them future events,\nidentical or similar, the perpetual return of human fortunes; Polybius\nsought out the causes of facts in order that he might apply them to\nanalogous cases, and held those unexpected events to be of inferior\nimportance whose irregularities place them outside rules; Tacitus, in\nconformity with his chief interest, which was rather moralistic than\nsocial or political, held his chief end to be the collection of facts\nnotable for the vice or virtue which they contained, _ne virtutes\nsileantur utque pravis dictis fact\u00ecsque ex posteritate et infamia metus\nsit._ Behind them came all the minor historians, all the hypocrites,\nwho repeated by imitation or involuntary echo or false unction and in a\nsuperficial way what in the greater writers was the result of profound\nthought, as, for instance, the Sallusts, the Diogenes, the Diodori,\nthe Plutarchs, and those that resemble them. Then there were all the\nextractors of historical quintessences, of memorable deeds and words of\nstatesmen, captains, and philosophers, and even of women (the \u03b3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03af). Ancient historiography has been called 'pragmatical,' and\nsuch it is, in the double sense of the word, ancient and modern: in so\nfar as it limits itself to the earthly side of things and especially\nto the political (the 'pragmatic' of Polybius), and in so far as it\nadorns them with reflections and advice (the 'apodictic' of the same\nhistorian-theorist).\n\nThis heteronomous theory of history does not always remain merely\ntheory, prologue, or frame, but sometimes operates so as to lead to\nthe mingling of elements that are not historiographical with history,\nsuch as, for instance, is the case with the 'speeches' or 'orations' of\nhistorical personages, not delivered or not in agreement with what was\nreally said, but invented or arranged by the historian and put into the\nmouths of the personages. This, in my opinion, has been wrongly looked\nupon as a survival of the 'epic spirit' in ancient historiography, or\nas a simple proof of the rhetorical ability of the narrators, because,\nif the first explanation hold as to some of the popular writers and the\nsecond as to certain rhetoricians, the origin of those falsifications\nwas with the greater historians nothing but the fulfilment of the\nobligation of teaching and counselling accepted by them. But when such\nends had been assigned to history, its intrinsic quality of truth\nand the line of demarcation which it drew between real and imaginary\ncould not but vacillate to some extent, since the imaginary sometimes\nserved excellently well and even better than the real for those ends.\nAnd setting aside Plato, who despised all knowledge save that of the\ntranscendental ideas, did not Aristotle himself ask whether the greater\ntruth belonged to history or to poetry? Had he not indeed said that\nhistory is 'less philosophical' than poetry? And if so why should not\nhistory have availed itself of the aid of poetry and of imagination?\nIn any case, resistance could be opposed to this ulterior perversion\nby seeking the truth with vigilant eye, and also by reducing the\nshare of the imaginary speeches and other parerga co the smallest\ndimensions. But it was impossible to dispense with belief in the end\nof instruction, because it was in any case necessary that history\nshould have some end, and a true end had not been discovered, and\nthe end of instruction performed almost the function of a metaphor of\nthe truth, since it was to some extent the nearest to the truth. In\nPolybius critical vigilance, scientific austerity, a keen desire for\nample and severe history, attain to so high a level that one would feel\ndisposed to treat the historian of Megalopolis like one of those great\npagans that medieval imagination admitted to Paradise, or at least to\nPurgatory, as worthy of having known the true God by extraordinary\nmeans and as a reward for their intense moral conscience. But if we\nenvisage the matter with greater calmness we shall have to consign\nPolybius also to the Limbo where those who \"were before Christianity\"\nand \"did not duly adore God\" are received. They were men of great value\nand reached the boundary, even touching it, but they never passed\nbeyond.\n\n\n[1] See pp. 112-116.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\n\nMEDIEVAL HISTORIOGRAPHY\n\n\nFor the same reason that we must not look upon the beginning of\nany history as an absolute beginning, or conceive of epochs in a\nsimplicistic manner, as though they were strictly limited to the\ndeterminations represented by their general character, we must\nbe careful not to identify the humanistic conception of history\nwith the ancient epoch of historiography which it characterizes or\nsymbolizes--in fact, we must not make historical the ideal categories,\nwhich are eternal. Gr\u00e6co-Roman historiography was without doubt\nhumanistic, but it was a Gr\u00e6co-Roman humanism--that is to say, it not\nonly had all the limitations that we have been pointing out, but also\nthe special physiognomy which such humanism assumes in the ancient\nhistorians and thinkers, varying more or less in each one of them.\nNot only was it thus humanistic, but other formations of the same\nsort probably preceded, as they certainly followed, it in the course\nof the centuries. It is perhaps attractive, but it is also artificial\n(and contrary to the true concept of progress), to conceive of the\nhistory of philosophy and of historiography as of a series of ideal\nphases, which are traversed once only, and to transform philosophers\ninto categories and categories into philosophers, making synonymous\nDemocritus and the atom, Plato and the transcendental idea, Descartes\nand dualism, Spinoza and pantheism, Leibnitz and monadism, whittling\ndown history to the dimensions of a _Dynastengeschichte_, as a German\ncritic has satirically described it, or treating it according to a\nsort of 'line of buckets' theory, as an Englishman has humorously\ndescribed it. Hence, too, the view that history has not yet appeared in\nthe world, or that it has appeared for the first time and by flashes,\nin response to the invocations made by the historian and the critic of\nthe present day. But every thinking of history is always adequate to\nthe moment at which it appears and always inadequate to the moment that\nfollows.\n\nThe opportuneness of this warning is confirmed by the astonishment of\nthose who consider the passage from ancient to Christian or medieval\nhistoriography; for what can be the meaning of this passage, in which\nwe find ourselves faced with a miraculous and mythological world all\nover again, identical as it seems, in its general characteristics,\nwith that of the ancient historians, which has disappeared? It is\ncertainly not progress, but rather falling into a ditch, into which\nalso fall all the dearest illusions relating to the perpetual advance\nof humanity. And the Middle Ages did seem to be a ditch or a declivity,\nsometimes during the period itself and most clearly at the Renaissance,\nand this image is still represented in common belief. Restricting\nourselves solely to the domain of historiography, and following up\nthe impression of astonishment at first caused by it, we end by\nrepresenting events at the beginning of the Middle Ages somewhat in the\nway they appeared to our writer Adolfo Bartoli, in his introductory\nvolume to the _History of Italian Literature,_ which is all broken up\nwith cries of horror and with the gesture of covering the face lest\nhe should see so much ugliness. \"We are in a world,\" writes Bartoli,\nwhen speaking of Gregory of Tours, \"where thought has descended so low\nas to cause pity, in a world where a conception of history no longer\nexists,\" and history also becomes \"a humble handmaid to theology--that\nis to say, an aberration of the spirit.\" And after Gregory of Tours\n(continues Bartoli) there is a further fall: \"Behold Fredigarius, in\nwhom credulity, ignorance, and confusion surpass every limit... there\nsurvives in him nothing of a previous civilization.\" After Fredigarius,\nwith the monastic chronicle, we take another step down-ward toward\nnothingness, though this would seem to be impossible. Here \"we seem to\nsee the lean monk putting his trembling head out of the narrow window\nof his cell every five or eleven years, to make sure that men are not\nall dead, and then shutting himself up again in the prison, where he\nlives only in the expectation of death.\" We must protest against such\nshrinking back (which makes the critic of to-day look like the \"lean\nmonk\" whose appearance he has so vividly portrayed); we must assert\nthat mythology and miracle and transcendency certainly returned in\nthe Middle Ages--that is to say, that these ideal categories again\nacted with almost equal force and that they almost reassumed their\nancient bulk, but they did not return _historically identical_ with\nthose of the pre-Hellenic world. We must seek in the heart of their\nnew manifestations for the effective progress which is certainly\naccomplished by Gregory of Tours and Fredigarius, and even by the\nmonkish chroniclers.\n\nThe divinity descends again to mingle anthropomorphically with the\naffairs of men, as a most powerful or ultra-powerful personage among\nthe less powerful; the gods are now the saints, and Peter and Paul\nintervene in favour of this or that people; St Mark, St Gregory,\nSt Andrew, or St January lead the array of the combatants, the one\nvying with the other, and sometimes against the other, playing\nmalicious tricks upon one another; and in the performance or the\nnon-performance of an act of worship is again placed the loss or gain\nof a battle: medieval poems and chronicles are full of such stories.\nThese conceptions are analogous to the antique, and indeed they are\ntheir historical continuation. This is not only so (as has so often\nbeen pointed out) owing to the attachment of this or that particular\nof ancient faith to popular religion and to the transformation of\ngods into saints and demons, but also, and above all, to a more\nsubstantial reason. Ancient thought had left fortune, the divinity,\nthe inscrutable, at the edge of its humanism, with the result that\nthe prodigious was never completely eliminated even from the most\nsevere historians--the door at any rate was left open by which it\ncould return. All are aware with how many 'superstitions' philosophy,\nscience, history, and customs were impregnated during late antiquity,\nwhich in this respect was not intellectually superior, but indeed\ninferior, to the new Christian religion. In the latter the fables\ngradually formed and miracles which were believed became spiritualized\nand ceased to be 'superstitions'--that is to say, something extraneous\nor discordant to the general humanistic conception--and set themselves\nin harmony with the new supernaturalistic and transcendental\nconception, of which they were the accompaniment. Thus myth and\nmiracle, becoming intensified in Christianity, became at the same time\ndifferent from ancient myths and miracles.\n\nThey were different and more lofty, because they contained a more lofty\nthought: the thought of spiritual worth, which was not peculiar to this\nor to that people, but common to the whole of humanity. The ancients\nhad indeed touched upon this thought in speculation, but they had never\npossessed it, and their philosophers had sought it in vain or attained\nto it only in abstract speculation not capable of investing the whole\nsoul, as is the case with thoughts that are profoundly thought, and\nas was the case with Christianity. Paulus Orosius expresses this in\nhis _Histor\u00e6 adversus paganos_, in such accents as no Gr\u00e6co-Roman\nhistorian had been able to utter: _Ubique patria, ubique lex et\nreligio mea est.... Latitudo orientis, septentrionis copiositas,\nmeridiana diffusio, magnarum insularum largissim\u00e6 tutissim\u00e6que sedes\nmei juris et nominis sunt, quia ad Christianos et Romanos Romanus et\nChristianus accedo._ To the virtue of the citizen is added that of man,\nof spiritual man, who puts himself on a level with the truth by means\nof his religious faith and by his work, which is humanly good. To the\nillustrious men among the pagans are opposed illustrious men among the\nChristians who are better than illustrious, being saints; and the new\nPlutarch is found in the _Vit\u00e6 patrum_ or _eremitarum,_ in the lives\nof the confessors of Christ, of the martyrs, of the propagators of\nthe true faith; the new epics describe the conflicts of the faithful\nagainst unbelievers, of Christians against heretics and Islamites.\nThere is here a greater consciousness of conflict than the Greeks had\nof the conflict between Greeks and barbarians, or freedmen and slaves,\nwhich were usually looked upon rather as representing differences of\nnature than of spiritual values. _Ecclesiastical history_ now appears,\nno longer that of Athens or of Rome, but of religion and of the Church\nwhich represented it in its strifes and in its triumphs--that is to\nsay, the strifes and triumphs of the truth. This was a thing without\nprecedent in the ancient world, whose histories of culture, of art\nor philosophy, did not go beyond the empirical stage, as we have\nseen, whereas ecclesiastical history has a spiritual value as its\nsubject, by means of which it illuminates and judges facts. To censure\necclesiastical history because it overrules and oppresses profane\nhistory will perhaps be justified, as we shall see, from certain\npoints of view and in a certain sense; but it is not justifiable as a\ngeneral criticism of the idea of that history, and, indeed, when we\nformulate the censure in these terms we are unconsciously pronouncing\na warm eulogy of it. The _historia spiritalis_ (as we may also call\nit, employing the title of Avito's poem) could not and in truth would\nnot consent to be a mere part, or to suffer rivals at its side: it\nmust dominate and affirm itself as the whole. And since history\nbecomes history of the truth with Christianity, it abandons at the\nsame time the fortuitous and chance, to which the ancients had often\nabandoned it, and recognizes its own proper law, which is no longer\na natural law, blind fate, or even the influence of the stars (St\nAugustine confutes this doctrine of the pagans), but rationality,\nintelligence, _providence._ This conception was not unknown to ancient\nphilosophy, but is now set free from the frost of intellectualism and\nabstractionism and becomes warm and fruitful. Providence guides and\ndisposes the course of events, directing them to an end, permitting\nevils as punishments and as instruments of education, determining the\ngreatness and the catastrophes of empires, in order to prepare the\nkingdom of God. This means that for the first time is really broken the\nidea of the _circle,_ of the perpetual return of human affairs to their\nstarting-point, of the vain labour of the Dana\u00efds (St Augustine also\ncombats the _circuitus_); history for the first time is here understood\n_as progress_: a progress that the ancient historians did not succeed\nin discovering, save in rare glimpses, thus falling into unconsolable\npessimism, whereas Christian pessimism is irradiated with hope. Hence\nthe importance to be attributed to the _succession of empires_ and to\nthe function fulfilled by each of them, and especially with regard\nto the Roman Empire, which politically unified the world that Christ\ncame to unify spiritually, to the position of Judaism as opposed to\nChristianity, and the like. These questions have been answered in\nvarious ways, but on the common assumption that divine intelligence\nhad willed those events, that greatness and that decadence, those joys\nand afflictions, and therefore that all had been necessary means of\nthe divine work, and that all had competed in and were competing in\nthe final end of history, linked one with the other, not as effects\nfollowing from a blind cause, but as stages of a process. Hence, too,\nhistory understood as _universal_ history, no longer in the sense of\nPolybius, who narrates the transactions of those states which enter\ninto relations with one another, but in the profounder sense of a\nhistory of the universal, of the universal by excellence, which is\nhistory in labour with God and toward God. By means of this spirit\nwhich invests them, even the most neglected of the chronicles become\nsurrounded with a halo, which is wanting to the classical histories of\nGreece and Rome, and which, however distant they be from our particular\nview-points, yet in their general aspect makes them very near to our\nheart and mind.\n\nSuch are the new problems and the new solutions which Christianity\nbrought to historical thought, and it may be said of them, as of the\npolitical and humanistic thought of the ancients, that they constitute\na solid possession of perpetual efficacy for the human spirit. Eusebius\nof C\u00e6sarea is to be placed beside Herodotus as 'father' of modern\nhistoriography, however little disposed it may be to recognize its\nparents in that barbaric author and in the others who were called\n'fathers of the Church,' to whom, and particularly to St Augustine, it\nyet owes so great a part of itself. What are our histories of culture,\nof civilization, of progress, of humanity, of truth, save the form of\necclesiastical history in harmony with our times--that is to say, of\nthe triumph and propagation of the faith, of the strife against the\npowers of darkness, of the successive treatments of the new evangel, or\ngood news, made afresh with each succeeding epoch? Do not the modern\nhistories, which narrate the function performed or the pre-eminence\nassumed by this or that nation in the work of civilization, correspond\nto the _Gesta Dei per Francos_ and to other like formulas of medieval\nhistoriography? And our universal histories are such not only in the\nsense of Polybius, but also of the universal as ideal, purified and\nelevated in the Christian sense; hence the religious sentiment which we\nexperience on approaching the solemnity of history.\n\nIt will be observed that in presenting it in this way we to some extent\nidealize the Christian conception; and this is true, but in the same\nway and in the same measure as we have idealized ancient humanism,\nwhich was not only humanism, but also transcendency and mystery.\nChristian historiography, like ancient historiography, solved the\nproblems that were set to it, but it did not solve other problems that\nwere only formed afterward, because they were not set to it. A proof\nof this is to be found in the caprices and the myths that accompanied\nits fundamental conception. The prodigious and the miraculous, which,\nas already observed, surrounded Christian historiography, bore witness\nprecisely to the incomplete ideality of the new and loftier God,\nthe thought of whom became converted into a myth, his action into\nfabulous anecdotes. Yet when it was not a question of miracles, or when\nthese were reduced to small compass, attenuated and held back, if not\nrefuted, there nevertheless remained the miracle of the divinity and\nof the truth, conceived as transcendent, separated from and opposed to\nhuman affairs. This too was an attestation of the Christian spirit, in\nso far as it surpassed the ancient spirit, not with the calmness and\nsecurity of thought, but with the violence of sentiment and with the\nenthusiasm of the imagination. Transcendency led to a consideration of\nworldly things as external and rebellious to divine things: hence the\ndualism of God and the world, of a _civitas colestis_ and of another\nthat was _terrena,_ of a _civitas_ Dei and of a _civitas diaboli_ which\nrevived most ancient Oriental conceptions, such as Parseeism, and was\ntempered, if not internally corrected, by means of the providential\ncourse of history, internally compromised by that unconquered dualism.\nThe city of God destroyed the earthly city and took its place, but\ndid not justify it, although it tried to do so here and there,\nin accordance with the logic of its providential and progressive\nprinciple. St Augustine, obliged to explain the reasons of the fortune\nof Rome, escaped from the difficulty with the sophism that God conceded\nthat greatness to the Romans as a reward for their virtues, earthly\nthough they were and not such as to lead to the attainment of heavenly\nglories, but yet worthy the fleeting reward of earthly glory. Thus the\nRomans remained always reprobate, but less reprehensible than other\nreprobates; there could not have been true virtue where there had not\nbeen true religion. The contests of ideas did not appear as conflicting\nforms of the true in its becoming, but simply diabolical suggestions,\nwhich disturbed the truth, which was complete and possessed by the\nChurch. Eusebius of C\u00e6sarea treated heresies as the work of the\ndevil, because it was the devil who prompted Simon Magus, and then\nMenander, and the two currents of gnosis represented by Saturninus and\nBasil. Otto of Frisia contemplated the Roman Empire succeeding to the\nBabylonian as son to father, and the kings of the Persians and the\nGreeks almost as its tutors and pedagogues. In the political unity of\nRome he discovers a prelude to Christian unity, in order that the minds\nof men should form themselves _ad majora intelligenda promptiores et\ncapaciores,_ be disciplined to the cult of a single man, the emperor,\nand to the fear of a single dominant city, that they should learn _unam\nquoque fidem tenendam._ But the same Otto imagines the whole world _a\nprimo homine ad Christum ... exceptis de Israelitico populo paucis,\nerrore deceptus, vanis superstitionibus deditus, d\u00e6monum ludicris\ncaptus, mundi illecebris irretitus,_ fighting _sub principe mundi\ndiabolo, until venit plenitudo temporis_ and God sent His son to earth.\nThe doctrine of salvation as a grace due to the good pleasure of God,\nindebita Dei gratia, is not at all an accidental excrescence upon this\nconception, but is its foundation or logical complement. Christian\nhumanity was destined to make itself unhuman, and St Augustine, however\nmuch reverence he excites by the energy of his temperament, by his\ngaze ever fixed above, offends us to an equal degree by his lack of\nhuman sympathy, his harshness and cruelty; and the 'grace' of which he\nspeaks assumes in our eyes the aspect of odious favouritism and undue\nexercise of power. It is nevertheless well to remember that by means\nof these oscillations and deviations of sentiment and imagination\nChristian historiography prepared the problem of the surpassing of\ndualism. For if the search for the Christianity of the non-Christians,\nfor grace due to all men from their very character of men, the truth\nof heresies, the goodness of pagan virtue, was a historical task that\nhas matured slowly in modern times, the division and opposition of\nthe two histories and the two cities, introduced by Christianity, was\na fundamental necessity, as their unity thought in the providential\ndivine Unity was a good preparation for it.\n\nAnother well-known aspect of this dualism is _dogmatism,_ the\nincapacity to understand the concrete particularization of itself by\nthe spirit in its various activities and forms. This explains the\naccusation levelled against ecclesiastical history of overriding and\ntyrannically oppressing the whole of the rest of history. This did in\nfact take place, because ecclesiastical history, instead of developing\nitself in the concrete universal of the spirit, remained rooted in a\nparticular determination of it. All human values were reduced to a\nsingle value--that is to say, to firmness of Christian faith and to\nservice of the Church. This value, thus abstractly conceived, became\ndeprived of its natural virtue and declined to the level of a material\nand immobile fact, and indeed the vivid, fluid Christian consciousness\nafter some centuries of development became solidified in dogmas. That\nmaterialized and motionless dogma necessarily prevailed as a universal\nmeasure, and men of all times were judged according to whether they had\nor had not been touched with the divine grace, were pious or impious,\nand the lives of the holy fathers and of believers were a Plutarch,\nwho excluded every other profane Plutarch. This was the dogmatism of\ntranscendency, which therefore resolved itself into _asceticism,_ in\nthe name of which the whole actual history of mankind is covered with\ncontempt, with horror, and with lamentation. This is particularly\nnoticeable in Augustine, in Orosius, and in Otto of Frisia, but is to\nbe perceived at least in germ as a tendency among all the historians or\nchroniclers of the early Middle Ages. What thoughts are suggested by\nthe battle of Thermopyl\u00e6 to Otto of Frisia? _T\u00e6det hic inextricabilem\nmalorum texere cratem; tamen ad ostendendam mortalium miseriam,\nsummatim ea attingere volo._ And what by the deeds of Alexander?_\nRegni Macedonum monarchia, qu\u00e6 al ipso c\u0153pit, ipso mortuo cum ipso\nfinitur.... Civitas autem Christi firmata supra firmam petram_.... With\nasceticism is linked the often noted and often ridiculed credulity\nof the medieval historians (not to be confounded with the belief in\nmiracles, originating from religion): this credulity is generally\nattributed to the prevalence of imagination, or to social conditions,\nwhich rendered books rare and critical capacity difficult to find--that\nis to say, to things which required to be explained in their turn.\n\nIndifference is, indeed, one of the principal sources of credulity,\nbecause no one is ever credulous in the things that touch him closely\nand of which he treats, while on the other hand all (as is proved\nin daily life) are ready to lend an ear to more or less indifferent\ntalk. Asceticism, diminishing the interest for things of the world\nand for history, assisted in the neglect and dispersion of books\nand documents, promoted credulity toward everything heard or read,\nunbridling the imagination, ever desirous of the wonderful and\ncurious, to the disadvantage of discernment. It did this not only\nin history properly so called, but also in the science of nature or\nnatural history, which was also indifferent to one, who possessed the\nultimate truth of religion. The weak capacity for individualization\nnoticeable in medieval historiography must be attributed to ascetism,\nwhich is usually satisfied with the general character of goodness\nor badness (the 'portrait' is very rare in it, as in the figurative\narts of the same age), and it has even less consciousness of the\nhistorical differences of place and time, travestying persons and\nevents in contemporary costume. It even goes so far as to compose\nimaginary histories and false documents, which portray the supposed\ntype. This extends from Agnello of Ravenna, who declared that he wrote\nalso the lives of those bishops of Ravenna about whom he possessed no\ninformation, _et credo_ (he said) _non mentitum esse,_ because, if\nthey filled so high a past, they must of necessity have been good,\ncharitable, zealous, and so forth, down to the false decretals of the\npseudo-Isidore. We also owe to asceticism the _form of chronicle_ as\nits intimate cause, because, when the meaning of particular facts\nwas neglected, it only remained to note them as they were observed\nor related, without any ideological connexion and with only the\nchronological connexion. Thus we frequently find among the historians\nof the Middle Ages the union (at first sight strange, yet not without\nlogical coherence) of a grandiose history, beginning with the creation\nof the world and the dispersion of the races, and an arid chronicle,\nfollowing the other principle and becoming ever more particular and\nmore contingent as approach is gradually made to the times of the\nauthors.\n\nWhen on the one hand the two cities, the heavenly and the earthly, and\non the other the transcendency of the principle of explanation had\nbeen conceived, the composition of dualism could not be sought for in\nintelligence, but in myth, which put an end to the strife with the\ntriumph of one of the two adversaries: the myth of the fall, of the\nredemption, of the expected reign of Christ, of the Last Judgment, and\nof the final separation of the two cities, one ascending to Paradise\nwith the elect, the other driven back into hell with the wicked. This\nmythology had its precedent in the Judaic expectations of a Messiah,\nand also, from some points of view, in Orphism, and continued to\ndevelop through gnosis, millenarism, and other heretical tentatives\nand heresies, until it took a definite or almost a definite form in\nSt Augustine. It has been remarked that in this conception metaphysic\nbecame identified with history, as an entirely new thought, altogether\nopposed to Greek thought, and that it is a philosophical contribution\naltogether novel and proper to Christianity. But we must add here that,\nas mythology, it did not unite, but indeed confounded, metaphysic and\nhistory, making the finite infinite, avoiding the fallacy of the circle\nas perpetual return of things, but falling into the other fallacy of a\nprogress beginning and ending in time. History was therefore arranged\nin spiritual epochs or phases, through which humanity was born, grew\nup, and attained completion: there were six, seven, or eight epochs,\naccording to the various ways of dividing and calculating, which\nsometimes corresponded to the ages of human life, sometimes to the days\nof the creation, sometimes to both these schemes combined; or where\nthe hermeneutic of St Jerome upon the Book of Daniel was accepted,\nthe succession of events was distributed among the four _monarchies,_\nof which the last was the Roman, not only in order of time, but also\nin that of the idea, because after the Roman Empire (the Middle Ages,\nas we know, long nourished the illusion that that empire persisted in\nthe form of the Holy Roman Empire) there would be nothing else, and\nthe reign of Christ or of the Church and then of Antichrist and the\nuniversal judgment were expected to follow without any intermission.\nThe end which history had not yet reached chronologically, being also\nintrinsic to the system, was ideally constructible, as the Apocalypses\nhad already ideally constructed it, pervading theological works and\neven histories, which in their last section (see the works of Otto of\nFrisia for all of them) described the coming of Antichrist and the end\nof the world: hence the idea of a _history of things future,_ continued\nby the paradoxical Francesco Patrizzi, who gave utterance to his theory\nin the sixteenth century in his dialogues _Upon History_ (1560). This\ngeneral historical picture might be here and there varied in its\nparticulars, but never shattered and confuted; it varied in orthodoxy\nup to the time of Augustine, and afterward among the dissentients and\nthe heretics: most noteworthy of these variations was the _Eternal\nEvangel_ of the followers of Gioacchino di Flora, who divided history\ninto three epochs, corresponding to the three persons of the Trinity:\nthe first that of the Old Testament or of the Father, the second\nthat of the New Testament or of the Son, the third and last, that of\nthe Spirit. These are but artificial combinations and transactions,\nby means of which life always seeks to find a passage between the\npreconceived schemes which compress and threaten to suffocate it.\n\nBut such transactions did not avail to get the better of the discord\nbetween reality and plan which everywhere revealed itself. Hence the\nnecessity of the _allegorical interpretation,_ so dear to the Middle\nAges. This consisted substantially in placing an imaginary figure\nbetween the plan and the historical reality, a mixture of both, like a\nbridge, but a bridge which could be crossed only in imagination. Thus\npersonages and events of sacred and profane history were allegorized,\nand subtle numerical calculations made and continually reinforced with\nnew imaginary contributions, in order to discover correspondences\nand parallelisms; and not only were the ages of life and the days of\ncreation placed on a parallel line with historical epochs, but so\nalso were the virtues and other conceptions. Such notions are still\nto be found in books of devotion and in the preaching of the less\nacute and less modernized of sacred orators. The 'reign of nature'\nwas also included in allegorical interpretation; and since history\nand metaphysic had been set at variance with one another, so in like\nmanner was natural science set at variance with both of them, and all\nappeared together in allegorical forms in the medieval encyclop\u00e6dias,\nthe _Pantheons_ and _Mirrors of the World._\n\nNotwithstanding these inevitable strayings, the new idea of history\nas the spiritual drama of humanity, although it inclined toward myth,\nyet acted with such energy as to weaken the ancient heteronomous\nconception of history as directed toward the administration of abstract\ninstruction, useful in actual practice. History itself was now the\nteaching, the knowledge of the life of the human race from its creation\nupon the earth, through its struggles, up to its final state, which\nwas indicated in the near or remote horizon. History thus became the\nwork of God, teaching by His direct word and presence, which is to be\nseen and heard in every part of it. Declarations are certainly not\nwanting, indeed they abound, that the reading of histories is useful\nas counselling, and particularly as inculcating, good behaviour and\nabstention from evil. Sometimes it is a question of traditional and\nconventional declarations, at others of particular designs: but\nmedieval historiography was not conceived, because it could not be\nconceived, heteronomously.\n\nIf asceticism mortified minds, and if the miraculous clouded them, it\nis not necessary to believe, on the other hand, that either had the\npower to depress reality altogether and for a long period. Indeed,\nprecisely because asceticism was arbitrary, and mythology imaginary,\nthey remained more or less abstract, in the same way as allegorical\ninterpretation, which was impotent to suppress the real determinations\nof fact. It was all very well to despise and condemn the earthly city\nin words, but it forced itself upon the attention, and if it did not\nspeak to the intellect it spoke to the souls and to the passions of\nmen. In its period of youthful vigour, also, Christianity was obliged\nto tolerate profane history, dictated by economic, political, and\nmilitary interests, side by side with sacred history. And as in the\ncourse of the Middle Ages, in addition to the religious poetry of the\nsacred hymns and poems, there also existed an epic of territorial\nconquests, of the shock of peoples and of feudal strife, so there\ncontinued to exist a worldly history, more or less mingled and tempered\nwith religious history. We find even fervent Christians and the most\npious of priests yielding to the desire of collecting and handing down\nthe memory of their race: thus Gregory of Tours told of the Franks,\nPaulus Diaconus of the Lombards, Bede of the Angles, Widekind of the\nSaxons. Their gentle hearts of political partisans do not cease to\nbeat. Not only do they lament the misery and wickedness of humanity\nin general, but also give vent to their particular feelings, as we\nobserve, for instance, in the monk Erchempertus, who, _ex intimo corde\nducens alta suspiria,_ resumes the thread of Paul's history to narrate\nthe deeds of his glorious Lombards (now hunted back into the southern\npart of Italy alone and assaulted and imbushed on every side), _non\nregnum sed excidium, non felicitatem sed miseriam, non triumphum sed\nperniciem._ And Liutprand of Cremona, although he makes the deity\nintervene as ruler and punisher on every occasion, and even the saints\nin person do battle, does not fail, for instance, to note that when\nBerengarius proceeded to take possession of the kingdom after the\ndeath of Guido, the followers of the latter called for King Lambert,\n_quia semper Itali geminis uti dominis volunt, quatinus alterum\nalterius terrore coherceant_: which is also the definition of feudal\nsociety. They were most credulous in many things, far from profound\nand abandoned to their imagination, but they were not credulous,\nindeed they were clear-sighted, shrewd and diffident in what concerned\nthe possessions and privileges of the churches and monasteries, of\nfamilies, and of the feudal group and the order of citizenship to which\neach belonged. It is to these interests that we owe the formation of\narchives, registers, chronologies, and the exercise of criticism as to\nthe authenticity and genuineness of documents. The conception of the\nnew Christian virtue oppressed, but did not quench, admiration (though\nheld sinful by the most severe) for the great name of ancient Rome, and\nthe many works of pagan civilization, its eloquence, its poetry, its\ncivil wisdom. Nor did it forbid admiration for Arabic or Judaic-Arabic\nwisdom, of which the works were well received, notwithstanding\nreligious strife. Hence we may say that in the same way as Gr\u00e6co-Roman\nhumanism did not altogether exclude the supernatural, so the Christian\nsupernatural did not prevent human consideration of worldly passions\nand earthly transactions.\n\nThis becomes more and more evident as we pass from the early to the\nlate Middle Ages, when profane historiography progresses, as the result\nof the struggles between Church and State, of the communal movement,\nof the more frequent commercial communications between Europe and the\nEast, and the like. These are themselves the result of the development,\nthe maturing, and the modernization of thought, which grows with life\nand makes life grow. Neither life nor thought remained attached to the\nconceptions of the fathers of the Church, of Augustine, of Orosius,\nto whom history offered nothing but the proof of the infinite evils\nthat afflict humanity, of the unceasing punishments of God, and of\nthe \"deaths of the persecutors.\" In Otto of Frisia himself, who holds\nmore firmly than the others to the doctrines of Augustine, we find the\nasperity of doctrine tempered by grace; and when he afterward proceeds\nto narrate the struggle between the Church and the Empire, if it cannot\nbe said that he takes the side of the Empire, it also cannot be said\nthat he resolutely defends that of the Church, for the eschatological\nvisions that form so great a part of his work do not blind his\npractical sense and political judgment. The party of the faith against\nthe faithless remained, however, always the 'great party,' the great\n'struggle of classes' (elect and reprobate) and of 'states' (celestial\nand earthly cities). But within this large framework we perceive other\nfigures more closely particularized, other parties and interests,\nwhich gradually come to occupy the first, second, and third planes,\nso that the struggle between God and the devil is forced ever more\nand more into the background and becomes somewhat vague, something\nalways assumed to be present, but not felt to be active and urgent in\nthe soul, as something which is still talked of, but is not deeply\nfelt, or at least felt with the energy that the words would wish us\nto believe, the words themselves often sounding like a refrain, as\npious as it is conventional. The miraculous gradually fills less and\nless space and appears more rarely: God acts more willingly by means\nof secondary causes, and respects natural laws; He rarely intervenes\ndirectly in a revolutionary manner. The form of the chronicles, too,\nbecomes also less accidental and arid, the better among the chroniclers\nhere and there seeking a different 'order'--that is to say, really, a\nbetter understanding--and we find (particularly from the thirteenth\ncentury onward) the _ordo artificialis_ or internal opposed to the\n_ordo naturalis_ or external chronological order. There are also\nto be found those who distinguish between the _sub singulis annis\ndescribere_ and the _sub stilo historico conglutinare_--that is to\nsay, the grouping together according to things described. The general\naspect of historiography changes not a little. Limiting ourselves\nto Italian historiography alone, there are no longer little books\nupon the miracles and the translations of the bodies of saints and\nbishops, but chronicles of communes, all of them full of affection for\nthe feudal superiors or for the archbishop, for the imperial or the\nanti-imperial side, for Milan or for Bergamo, or for Lodi. The sense\nof tragedy, which weighed so heavily upon Erchempertus, returns with\nnew and stronger accents in the narrative of the deeds of Barbarossa\nat Milan, entitled _Libellus tristititi\u00e6 et doloris, angusti\u00e6 et\ntribulationis, passionum et tormentorum._ Love for one's city usurps\nmuch of the space previously devoted to things celestial, and praises\nof Milan, of Bergamo, of Venice, of Amalfi, of Naples, resound in the\npages of their chroniclers. Thus those vast chronicles are reached\nwhich, although they begin with the Tower of Babel, yet lead to the\nhistory of that city or of that event which makes the strongest appeal\nto the feelings and best stimulates the industry of the writer, and\nbecome mingled with the persons and things of the present or future\nlife. Giovanni Villani, a pilgrim to Rome to celebrate the papal\njubilee, is not inspired with the ascetic spirit or raised to heaven by\nthat solemn spectacle; but, on the contrary, \"since he finds himself\nin the holy city of Rome on that blessed pilgrimage, inspecting its\n_great_ and _ancient possessions,_ and reading the _histories and the\ngreat deeds_ of the Romans,\" he is inspired to compose the history of\nhis native Fiorenza, \"daughter and creation of Rome\" (of ancient Rome\nprior to Christianity). His Fiorenza resembled Rome in its rise to\ngreatness and its following after great things, and was like Rome in\nits fall. Thus the 'holy' and the 'blessed' do not lead him to holy\nand blessed thoughts, but to thoughts of worldly greatness. To the\nhistoriography of the communes answers the more seriously worldly, the\nmore formally and historically elaborated historiography of the Norman\nand Suabian kingdom of Sicily. In the proem to its _Constitutiones_\nsovereigns are declared to be instituted _ipsa rerum necessitate\ncogente, nec minus divin\u00e6 provisionis instinctu_; with its Romualdo\nGuarna, its Abbot Telesino, its Malaterra, its Hugo Falcando and Pietro\nda Eboli, its Riccardo da San Germano, with the pseudo-Jamsilla, and\nSaba Malaspina. All of these have their heroes, Roger and William the\nNormans, Frederick and Manfred the Suabians, and what they praise in\nthem is the sound political basis which they knew how to establish\nand to maintain with a firm hand. _Eo tempore,_ says Falcando of\nRoger, _Regnum Sicilia, strenuis et pr\u00e6claris viris abundans, cum\nterra marique plurimum posset, vicinis circumquoque gentibus terrorem\nincusserat, summaque pace ac tranquillitate maxima fruebatur._ And\nthe so-called Jamsilla, of Frederick II: _Vir fuit magni cordis,\nsed magnanitatem suam multa, qua in eo fuit, sapientia superavit,\nut nequaquam impetus eum ad aliquid faciendum impelleret, sed ad\nomnia cum rationis maturitate procederet;... utpote qui philosophis\u00e6\nstudiosus erat quam et ipse in se coluit, et in regno suo propagare\nordinavit. Tunc quidem ipsius felici tempore in regno Sicili\u00e6 erant\nlitterati pauci vel nulli; ipse vero imperator liberalium artium et\nomnis approbat\u00e6 scientia scholas in regno ipso constituit ... ut\nomnis conditionis et fortuna homines nullius occasione indigenti\u00e6\na philosophi\u00e6 studio retraherentur._ The state, profane culture,\n'philosophy,' impersonated in the heresiarch Frederick, are thus set in\nclear relief. And while on the one hand more and more laical theories\nof the state become joined to these political and cultural currents\n(from Dante, indeed from Thomas Aquinas, to Marsilio of Padua), and\nthe first outlines of literary history (lives of the poets and of men\nfamous for their knowledge, and the rise of vernacular literatures) and\nhistories of manners (as in certain passages in Ricobaldo of Ferrara),\non the other hand scholasticism found its way to such problems and\nconceptions by means of the works of Aristotle, which represented as\nit were a first brief summary of ancient knowledge. It is unnecessary\nto say that Dante's poem is the chief monument of this condition of\nspirit, where the ideas of the Middle Ages are maintained, but the\npolitical, poetical, and philosophical affections, the love of fame and\nof glory, prove their vigour, although subordinated to those ideas and\nrestrained, as far as possible, by them.\n\nBut those ideas are nevertheless maintained, even among the\nimperialists and adversaries of the Church, and it is only in rare\nspirits that we find a partly sceptical and partly mocking negation\nof them. Transcendency, the prescience of God, Who ordains, directs,\nand disposes of everything according to His will, bestows rewards\nand punishments, and intervenes mysteriously, always maintains its\nplace in the distant background, in Dante as in Giovanni Villani,\nas in all the historians and chroniclers. Toward the close of the\nfifteenth century the theological conception makes a curious appearance\nin the French historian Comines, arm in arm with the most alert and\nunprejudiced policy of success at all costs. Worldliness, so rich,\nso various, and so complex, was yet without an ideal standard of\ncomparison, and for this reason it was rather lived than thought,\nshowing itself rather in richness of detail than systematically. The\nancient elements of culture, which had passed from Aristotelianism\ninto scholasticism, failed to act powerfully, because that part of\nAristotelianism was particularly selected which was in harmony with\nChristian thought already translated into Platonic terms and dogmatized\nin a transcendental form by the fathers of the Church. Hence it has\neven been possible to note a pause in historiographical interest,\nwhere scholasticism has prevailed, a compendium of the type of that of\nMartin Polonus being held sufficient to serve the end of quotations for\ndemonstration or for legal purposes. What was required upon entering\na new period of progress (there is always progress, but 'periods of\nprogress' are those in which the motion of the spirit seems to become\naccelerated and the fruit that has been growing ripe for centuries is\nrapidly plucked) was a direct conscious negation of transcendency and\nof Christian miracle, of ascesis and of eschatology, both in life\nand in thought a negation whose terms (heavenly and earthly life) had\ncertainly been noted by medieval historiography, but had been allowed\nto endure and to progress, the one beside the other, without true and\nproper contact and conflict arising between them.\n\n\n\n\nIV\n\n\nTHE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE\n\n\nThe negation of Christian transcendency was the work of the age of\nthe Renaissance, when, to employ the expression used by Fueter,\nhistoriography became 'secularized.' In the histories of Leonardo Bruni\nand of Bracciolini, who gave the first conspicuous examples of the\nnew attitude of historiographical thought, and in all others of the\nsame sort which followed them--among them those of Machiavelli and of\nGuicciardini shine forth conspicuously--we find hardly any trace of\n'miracles.' These are recorded solely with the intention of mocking at\nthem and of explaining them in an altogether human manner. An acute\nanalysis of individual characters and interests is substituted for the\nintervention of divine providence and the actions of the popes, and\nreligious strifes themselves are apt to be interpreted according to\nutilitarian passions and solely with an eye to their political bearing.\nThe scheme of the four monarchies with the advent of Antichrist\nconnected with it is allowed to disappear; histories are now narrated\n_ab inclinatione imperii,_ and even universal histories, like the\n_Enneads_ of Sabellicus, do not adhere to traditional ecclesiastical\ntradition. Chronicles of the world, universal miraculous histories,\nboth theological and apocalyptic, become the literature of the people\nand of those with little culture, or persist in countries of backward\nculture, such as Germany at that time, or finally are limited to the\ncircle of Catholic or Protestant confessional historiography, both\nof which retain so much of the Middle Ages, the Protestant perhaps\nmore than the Catholic (at least at a first glance), for the latter\ncontrived at least here and there to temporize and to accommodate\nitself to the times. All this is shown very clearly and minutely by\nFueter, and I shall now proceed to take certain observations and some\ninformation from his book, which I shall rearrange and complete with\nsome more of my own. In the political historiography of the late Middle\nAges, the theological conception had been, as we have said, thrown into\nthe background; but henceforward it is not to be found even there,\nand if at times we hear its formulas, they are just like those of the\nCrusade against the Turks, preaching the liberation of the tomb of\nChrist. These were still repeated by preachers, writers of verse, and\nrhetoricians (and continued to be repeated for three centuries), but\nthey found no response in political reality and in the conscience of\nthe people, because they were but empty sound. Nor was the negation\nof theologism and the secularization of history accomplished only in\npractice, unaccompanied with complete consciousness; for, although\nmany minds really did turn in the direction indicated by fate, or in\nother words by the new mental necessity, and although the polemic\nwas not always open, but on the contrary often surrounded with many\nprecautions, evidence abounds of the agreement of the practice with\nthe theory of historiography. The criticism of so grave a theorist of\nhistory as Bodin is opposed to the scheme of the four monarchies. He\nmakes it his object to combat the _inveteratum errorem de quattuor\nimperiis,_ proving that the notion was capriciously taken from the\ndream of Daniel, and that it in no way corresponded with the real\ncourse of events. It would be superfluous to record here the celebrated\nepigrams of Machiavelli and of Guicciardini, who satirized theology\nand miracles. Guicciardini noted that all religions have boasted of\nmiracles, and therefore they are not proofs of any one of them, and\nare perhaps nothing but \"secrets of nature.\" He advised his readers\nnever to say that God had aided so-and-so because he was good and\nhad made so-and-so suffer because he was wicked, for we \"often see\nthe opposite,\" and the counsels of divine providence are in fact\nan abyss. Paolo Sarpi, although he admits that \"it is a pious and\nreligious thought to attribute the disposition of every event to divine\nprovidence,\" yet holds it \"presumption\" to determine \"to what end\nevents are directed by that highest wisdom\"; for men, being emotionally\nattached to their opinions, \"are persuaded that they are as much loved\nand favoured by God as by themselves.\" Hence, for example, they argued\nthat God had caused Zwingli and Hecolampadius to die almost at the\nsame time, in order that he might punish and remove the ministers of\ndiscord, whereas it is certain that \"after the death of these two, the\nevangelical cantons have made greater progress in the doctrine that\nthey received from both of them.\" Such a disposition of religious and\ncautious spirits is yet more significant than that of the radical and\nimpetuous, openly irreverent, in the same way as the new importance\nattributed to history is notable in the increase of historiographical\nlabour that is then everywhere noticeable, and in the formation of a\ntrue and proper philological school, not only for antiquity, but for\nthe Middle Ages (Valla, Flavio Biondo, Calchi, Sigonio, Beato Renano,\netc.), which publishes and restores texts, criticizes the authenticity\nand the value of sources, is occupied with the establishment of a\ntechnical method of examining witnesses, and composes learned histories.\n\nNothing is more natural than that the new form of historiography\nshould seem to be a return to Gr\u00e6co-Roman antiquity, as Christianity\nhad seemed to be a return to the story of Eden (the interlude of\npaganism having been brought to an end by the redemption), or that the\nMiddle Ages should still seem to some to-day to be a falling back into\nbarbarous pre-Hellenic times. The illusion of the return was expressed\nin the cult of classical antiquity, and in all those manifestations,\nliterary, artistic, moral, and customary, familiar to those who know\nthe Renaissance. In the special field with which we are at present\noccupied, we find a curious document in support of the difficulty that\nphilologists and critics experienced in persuading themselves that the\nGreek and Roman writers had perhaps been able to deceive themselves, to\nlie, to falsify, to be led astray by passions and blinded by ignorance,\nin the same way as those of the Middle Ages. Thus the latter were\nseverely criticized while the former were reverenced and accepted, for\nit needed much time and labour to attain to an equal mental freedom\nregarding the ancients, and the criticism of texts and of sources was\ndeveloped in respect to medieval history long before it attained to\na like freedom in respect to ancient history. But the greatest proof\nand monument of the illusion of the return was the formation of the\n_humanistic_ type of historiography, opposed to the medieval. This\nhad been chiefly confined to the form of chronicle and humanistic\nhistoriography, although it accepted the arrangement by years and\nseasons according to the examples set by the Greeks and Romans,\ncancelled as far as possible numerical indications, and exerted itself\nto run on unbrokenly, without chronological cuts and cross-cuts.\nLatin had become barbarous in the Middle Ages and had accepted the\nvocabularies of vulgar tongues, or those which designated new things\nin a new way, whereas the humanistic historiographers translated and\ndisguised every thought and every narrative in Ciceronian Latin, or\nat least Latin of the Golden Age. We frequently find picturesque\nanecdotes in the medieval chronicles, and humanism, while it restored\nits dignity to history, deprived it of that picturesque element, or\nattenuated and polished it as it had done the things and customs of the\nbarbaric centuries. This humanistic type of historiography, like the\nnew philological erudition and criticism and the whole movement of the\nRenaissance, was Italian work, and in Italy histories in the vulgar\ntongue were soon modelled upon it, which found in the latinized prose\nof Boccaccio an instrument well suited to their ends. From Italy it was\ndiffused among other countries, and as always happens when an industry\nis transplanted into virgin soil, and workmen and technical experts are\ninvited to come from the country of its origin, so the first humanistic\nhistorians of the other parts of Europe were Italians. Paolo Emilio\nthe Veronese, who _Gallis condidit historias,_ gave the French the\nhumanistic history of France in his _De rebus gestis Francorum,_ and\nPolydore Virgil did the like for England, Lucio Marineo for Spain, and\nmany others for other countries, until indigenous experts appeared and\nthe aid of Italians became unnecessary. Later on it became necessary to\nthrow off this cloak, which was too loose or too tight--indeed, was not\ncut to the model of modern thought. What there was in it of artificial,\nof swollen, of false, was blamed--these defects being indeed clearly\nindicated in the constructive principle of this literary form, which\nwas that of imitation. But anyone with a feeling for the past will\nenjoy that historical humanistic prose as the expression of love for\nantiquity and of the desire to rise to its level. This love and this\ndesire were so keen that they had no hesitation in reproducing things\nexternal and indifferent in addition to what was better and sometimes\nin default of it. Giambattista Vico, sometimes so sublimely puerile, is\nstill found lamenting, three centuries after the creation of humanistic\nhistoriography, that \"no sovereign has been found into whose mind has\nentered the thought of preserving for ever in the best Latin style\na record of the famous War of the Spanish Succession, than which a\ngreater has never happened in the world since the Second Carthaginian\nWar, that of C\u00e6sar with Pompey, and of Alexander with Darius.\" But what\nof this? Quite recently, during the war in Tripoli, came the proposal\nfrom the depths of one of the meridional provinces of Italy, one of\nthose little countrysides where the shadow of a humanist still exists,\nthat a Latin commentary should be composed upon that war entitled\n_De bello libico._ This proposal was received with much laughter and\nmade even me smile, yet the smile was accompanied with a sort of\ntender emotion, when I recalled how long and devotedly our fathers and\nforefathers had pursued the ideal of a beautiful antiquity and of a\ndecorous historiography.\n\nNevertheless, the belief in the effectivity or possibility of such a\nreturn was, as we have said, an illusion; nothing of what has been\nreturns, nothing of what has been can be abolished; even when we\nreturn to an old thought the new adversary makes the defence new and\nthe thought itself new. I read some time ago the work of a learned\nFrench Catholic. While clearing the Middle Ages of certain absurd\naccusations and confuting errors commonly circulated about them, he\nmaintained that the Middle Ages are the truly modern time, modern with\nthe eternal modernity of the true, and that therefore they should\nnot be called the Middle Ages, which term should be applied to the\nperiod that has elapsed between the fifteenth century and our own\nday, between the Reformation and positivism. As I read, I reflected\nthat such a theory is the worthy pendant to that other theory, which\nplaces the Middle Ages beneath antiquity, and that both had some time\nago shown themselves false to historical thought, which knows nothing\nof returns, but knows that the Middle Ages preserved antiquity deep\nin its heart as the Renaissance preserved the Middle Ages. And what\nis 'humanism' but a renewed formula of that 'humanity' of which the\nancient world knew little or nothing, and which Christianity and the\nMiddle Ages had so profoundly felt? What is the word 'renaissance'\nor 'renewal' but a metaphor taken from the language of religion? And\nsetting aside the word, is not the conception of humanism perhaps the\naffirmation of a spiritual and universal value, and in so far as it is\nthat, altogether foreign, as we know, to the mind of antiquity, and an\nintrinsic continuation of the 'ecclesiastical' and 'spiritual' history\nwhich appeared with Christianity? The conception of spiritual value\nhad without doubt become changed or enriched, for it contained within\nitself more than a thousand years of mental experiences, thoughts, and\nactions. But while it thus grew more rich, it preserved its original\ncharacter, and constituted the religion of the new times, with its\npriests and martyrs, its polemic and its apologetic, its intolerance\n(it destroyed or allowed to perish the monuments of the Middle Ages\nand condemned its writers to oblivion), and sometimes even imitated the\nforms of its worship (Navagaro used to burn a copy of Martial every\nyear as a holocaust to pure Latinity). And since humanity, philosophy,\nscience, literature, and especially art, politics, activity in all its\nforms, now fill that conception of value which the Middle Ages had\nplaced in Christian religious faith alone, histories or outlines of\nhistories continue to appear as the outcome of these determinations,\nwhich were certainly new in respect to medieval literature, but were\nnot less new in respect to Gr\u00e6co-Roman literature, where there was\nnothing to compare to them, or only treatises composed in an empirical\nand extrinsic manner. The new histories of values presented them selves\ntimidly, imitating in certain respects the few indent examples, but\nthey gave evidence of a fervour, an intelligence, an afflatus, which\nled to a hope for that increase and development wanting to their\npredecessors, which, instead of developing, had gradually become more\nsuperficial and finally disappeared again into vagueness. Suffice it to\nmention as representative of them all Vasari's _Lives of the Painters,_\nwhich are connected with the meditations and the researches upon art\ncontained in so many treatises, dialogues, and letters of Italians, and\nare here and there shot through with flashes such as never shone in\nantiquity. The same may be said of treatises on poetry and rhetoric,\nand of the judgments which they contain as to poetry and of the new\nhistory of poetry, then being attempted with more or less successful\nresults. The 'state' too, which forms the object of the meditations\nof Machiavelli, is not the simple state of antiquity, city or empire,\nbut is almost the national state felt as something divine, to which\neven the salvation of the soul must be sacrificed--that is to say,\nas the institution in which the true salvation of the soul is to be\nfound. Even the pagan virtue which he and others opposed to Christian\nvirtue is very different from the pure Gr\u00e6co-Roman disposition of mind.\nAt that time a start was also made in the direction of investigating\nthe theory of rights, of political forms, of myths and beliefs, of\nphilosophical systems, to-day in full flower. And since that same\nconsciousness which had produced humanism had also widened the\nboundaries of the known world, and had sought for and found people of\nwhom the Bible preserved no record and of whom the Gr\u00e6co-Roman writers\nknew nothing, there appeared at that time a literature relating to\nsavages and to the indigenous civilizations of America (and also of\ndistant Asia, which had been better explored), from which arose the\nfirst notions as to the primitive forms of human life. Thus were\nwidened the spiritual boundaries of humanity at the same time as the\nmaterial.\n\nWe are not alone in perceiving the illusion of the 'return to\nantiquity,' for the men of the Renaissance were not slow in doing this.\nNot every one was content to suit himself to the humanistic literary\ntype. Some, like Machiavelli, threw away that cloak, too ample in its\nfolds and in its train, preferring to it the shorter modern dress.\nProtests against pedantry and imitation are indeed frequently to be\nheard during the course of the century. Philosophers rebelled against\nAristotle (first against the medieval and then against the ancient\nAristotle), and appeals were made to truth, which is superior both to\nPlato and to Aristotle; men of letters advocated the new 'classes,'\nand artists repeated that the great masters were 'nature' and the\n'idea.' One feels in the air that the time is not far distant when the\nquestion, \"Who are the true ancients?\"--that is to say, \"Who are the\nintellectually expert and mature?\"--will be answered with, \"We are\";\nthe symbol of antiquity will be broken and there will be found within\nit the reality which is human thought, ever new in its manifestations.\nSuch an answer may possibly be slow in becoming clear and certain as an\nobject of common conviction, though it will eventually become so, and\nnow suffices to explain the true quality of that return antiquity, by\npreventing the taking of the symbol for the thing symbolized.\n\nThis symbolical covering, cause of prejudices and misunderstandings,\nwhich enfolded the whole of humanism, was not the sole vice from\nwhich the historiography of the Renaissance suffered. We do not,\nof course, speak here of the bias with which all histories were\nvariously affected, according as they were written by men of letters\nwho were also courtiers and supported the interests of their masters,\nor official historians of aristocratic and conservative states like\nVenice, or men taking one or the other side in the conflicts within the\nsame state, such as the _ottimani_ (or aristocratic) and the popular\nparty of Florence, or upholders of opposed religious beliefs, such as\nthe group of reformed divines of Magdeburg and Baronio. We do not speak\nhere of the historians who became story-writers (they sometimes take to\nhistory, like Bandello), or of those who collected information with a\nview to exciting curiosity and creating scandal. These are things that\nbelong to all periods, and are not sufficient to qualify a particular\nhistoriographical age. But if we examine only that which is or wished\nto be historical thought, the historiography of the Renaissance\nsuffered from two other defects, each of which it had inherited from\none of its progenitors, antiquity and the Middle Ages. And above all\nthere came to it from antiquity the humanistic-abstract or pragmatical\nconception, as it is called, which inclines to explain facts by the\nindividual in his singularity and in his atomism, or by means of\nabstract political forms, and the like. For Machiavelli, the prince is\nnot only the ideal but the criterion that he adopts for the explanation\nof events. He does not only appear in his treatises and political\nopuscules, but in the Florentine Histories, where we meet with him at\nthe very beginning--after the terrible imaginative description of\nthe condition of Italy in the fifth century--in the great figure of\nTheodoric, by whose 'virtue' and 'goodness' not only Rome and Italy,\nbut all the other parts of the Western empire, \"arose free from the\ncontinual scourgings which they had supported for so many years from so\nmany invasions, and became again happy and well-ordered communities.\"\nThe same figure reappears in many different forms in the course of\nthe centuries described in those histories. Finally, at the end of\nthe description of the social struggles of Florence, we read that\n\"this city had reached such a point that it could be easily adapted to\n_any form of government_ by _a wise law-giver._\" In like manner, the\n_History of Italy_ by Guicciardini begins with the description of the\nhappiness of Italy at the end of the fifteenth century, \"acquired at\nvarious times and preserved for many reasons,\" not the least of which\nwas \"the industry and genius of Lorenzo de' Medici,\" who \"strove in\nevery way so to balance Italian affairs that they should not incline\nmore in one direction than another.\" He had allies in Ferdinand of\nAragon and Ludovic the Moor, \"partly for the same and partly for other\nreasons,\" and the Venetians were held in check by all three of them.\nThis perfect system of equilibrium was broken by the deaths of Lorenzo,\nof Ferdinand, and of the Pope. All historians of this period express\nthemselves in the same way, and although a lively consciousness of the\nspiritual values of humanity was in process of formation, as has been\nseen, yet these were spoken of as though they depended upon the will\nand the intelligence of individuals who were their masters, not the\ncontrary. In the history of painting, for example, the 'prince' for\nVasari is Giotto, \"who, although born among inexpert artisans, alone\nrevived painting and reduced it to such a form as might be described as\ngood.\" Biographies are also constantly individualistic, for they never\nsucceed in perfectly uniting the individual with the work which he\ncreates and which in turn creates him.\n\nThe idea of chance or fortune persisted alongside the pragmatic\nconception, its ancient companion. Machiavelli assigns the course of\nevents half to fortune and half to human prudence, and although the\naccent falls here upon prudence, the acknowledgment of the one does\nnot abolish the force of the other, so mysterious and transcendent.\nGuicciardini attacks those who, while attributing everything to\nprudence and virtue, exclude \"the power of fortune,\" because we\nsee that human affairs \"receive at all times great impulsions from\nfortuitous events, which it is not within the power of man either to\nforesee or to escape, and although the care and understanding of man\nmay moderate many things, nevertheless that alone does not suffice,\nbut good fortune is also necessary.\" It is true that here and there\nthere seems to appear another conception in Machiavelli, that of the\nstrength and logic of things, but it is only a fleeting shadow. It is\nalso a shadow for Guicciardini, when he adds that even if we wish to\nattribute everything to prudence and virtue, \"must at least admit that\nit is necessary to fall upon or be born in times when the virtues or\nqualities for which you value yourself are esteemed.\" Guicciardini\nremains perplexed as to one point only, as though he had caught a\nglimpse of something that is neither caprice of the individual nor\ncontingency of fortune: \"When I consider to what accidents and dangers\nof illness, of chance, of violence, of infinite sorts, is exposed the\nlife of man, the concurrence of how many things is needful that the\nharvest of the year should be good, nothing surprises me more than to\nsee an old man or a good harvest.\" But even here we do not get beyond\nuncertainty, which in this case manifests itself as astonishment. With\nthe renewal of the idea of fortune, even to a partial extent, with\nthe restitution of the cult of this pagan divinity, not only does\nthe God of Christianity disappear, but also the idea of rationality,\nof finality, of development, affirmed during the medieval period.\nThe ancient Oriental idea of the circle in human affairs returns;\nit dominated all the historians of the Renaissance, and above all\nMachiavelli. History is an alternation of lives and deaths, of goods\nand ills, of happiness and misery, of splendour and decadence. Vasari\nunderstands the history of painting in the same way as that of all\nthe arts, which, \"like human bodies, have their birth, their growth,\ntheir old age, and their death.\" He is solicitous of preserving in his\nbook the memory of the artistic capacity of his time, lest the art\nof painting, \"either owing to the neglect of men or to the malignity\nof the ages or to decree of heaven (which does not appear to wish\nto maintain things here below for long in the same state), should\nencounter the same disorder and ruin\" as befell it in the Middle\nAges. Bodin, while criticizing and rejecting the scheme of the four\nmonarchies, and demonstrating the fallaciousness of the assertion that\ngold deteriorates into copper, or even into clay, and celebrating the\nsplendour of letters, of commerce, of the geographical discoveries of\nhis age, does not, however, conclude in favour of progress, but of\nthe circle, blaming those who find everything inferior in antiquity,\n_cum, \u00e6terna quadam lege natur\u00e6, conversiti omnium rerum velut in orbem\nredire videatur, ut aqua vitia virtutibus, ignoratio scienti\u00e6, turpe\nhonesto consequens sit, ac tenebr\u00e6 luci._ The sad, bitter, pessimistic\ntone which we observe among ancient historians, which sometimes\nbursts forth into the tragic, is also often to be met with among the\nhistorians of the Renaissance, for they saw perish many things that\nwere very dear to them, and were constrained to tremble for those which\nthey still enjoyed, or at least to fear for them by anticipation,\ncertain that sooner or later they would yield their place to their\ncontraries.\n\nAnd since history thus conceived does not represent progress but a\ncircle, and is not directed by the historical law of development,\nbut by the natural law of the circle, which gives it regularity and\nuniformity, it follows that the historiography of the Renaissance,\nlike the Gr\u00e6co-Roman, has its end outside itself, and affords nothing\nbut material suitable for exhortations toward the useful and the good,\nfor various forms of pleasure or as ornament for abstract truths.\nHistorians and theorists of history are all in agreement as to this,\nwith the exception of such eccentrics as Patrizzi, who expressed\ndoubts as to the utility of knowing what had happened and as to\nthe truth itself of narratives, but ended by contradicting himself\nand also laying down an extrinsic end. \"Each one of us can find,\nboth on his own account and on that of the public weal, many useful\ndocuments in the knowledge of these so different and so important\nexamples,\" writes Guicciardini in the proem to his History of Italy.\n\"Hence will clearly appear, as the result of innumerable examples,\nthe instability of things human, how harmful they are often wont to\nbe to themselves, but ever to the people, the ill-conceived counsels\nof those who rule, when, having only before their eyes either vain\nerrors or present cupidities, they are not mindful of the frequent\nvariations of fortune, and converting the power that has been granted\nthem for the common weal into an injury to others, they become the\nauthors of new perturbations, either as the result of lack of prudence\nor of too much ambition.\" And Bodin holds that _non solum pr\u00e6sentia\ncommode explicantur, sed etiam futura colliguntur, certissimaque rerum\nexpetendarum ac fugiendarum pr\u00e6cepta constantur,_ from historical\nnarratives. Campanella thinks that history should be composed _ut sit\nscientiarum fundamentum sufficiens_; Vossius formulates the definition\nthat was destined to appear for centuries in treatises: _cognitio\nsingularium, quorum memoriam conservari utile sit ad bene beateque\nvivendum._ Historical knowledge therefore seemed at that time to be\nthe lowest and easiest form of knowledge (and this view has been held\ndown to our own days); to such an extent that Bodin, in addition\nto the _utilitas_ and the _oblectatio,_ also recognized to history\n_facilitas,_ so great a facility _ut, sine ullius artis adjumento, ipsa\nper sese ab omnibus intelligatur._ When truth had been placed outside\nhistorical narrative, all the historians of the Renaissance, like\ntheir Greek and Roman predecessors, practised, and all the theorists\n(from Pontanus in the _Actius_ to Vossius in the _Ars historica_)\ndefended, the use of more or less imaginary orations and exhortations,\nnot only as the result of bowing to ancient example, but through their\nown convictions. Eventually M. de la Popelini\u00e8re, in his _Histoire\ndes histoires, avec l'id\u00e9e de l'histoire accomplie_ (1599), where\nhe inculcates in turn historical exactitude and sincerity with such\nwarm eloquence, suddenly turns round to defend imaginary _harangues\net concions,_ for this fine reason, that what is necessary is 'truth'\nand not 'the words' in which it is expressed! The truth of history\nwas thus not history, but oratory and political science; and if the\nhistorians of the Renaissance were hardly ever able to exercise oratory\n(for which the political constitution of the time allowed little\nscope), all or nearly all were authors of treatises upon political\nscience, differently inspired as compared with those of the Middle\nAges, which had ethical and religious thought behind them, resuming\nand advancing the speculations of Aristotle and of ancient political\nwriters. In like manner, treatises on historical art, unknown to the\nMiddle Ages, but which rapidly multiplied in the Renaissance (see a\ngreat number of them in the _Penus artis historic\u00e6_ of 1579), resumed\nand fertilized the researches of Gr\u00e6co-Roman theorists. It is to be\nexpected that the historiography of this period should represent some\nof the defects of medieval historiography in another form, owing to\nits character of reaction already mentioned and to the new divinity\nthat it had raised up upon the altars in place of the ancient divinity,\nhumanity. The Renaissance everywhere reveals its effort to oppose the\none term to the other, and since scholasticism had sought the things\nof God and of the soul, it wished to restrict itself to the things\nof nature. We find Guicciardini and a chorus of others describing the\ninvestigations of philosophers and theologians and \"of all those who\nwrite things above nature or such as are not seen\" as 'madnesses';\nand because scholasticism had defined science in the Aristotelian\nmanner as _de universalibus,_ Campanella opposed to this definition\nhis _Scientia est de singularibus._ In like manner its men of letters,\nprejudiced in favour of Latin, at first refused to recognize the new\nlanguages that had been formed during the Middle Ages, as well as\nmedieval literature and poetry; its jurists rejected the feudal in\nfavour of the Roman legal code, its politicians representative forms\nin favour of absolute lordship and monarchy. It was then that first\nappeared the conception of the Middle Ages as a whole, opposed to\nanother whole, formed of the ancient and the ancient-modern, into\nwhich the Middle Ages were inserted like an irksome and painful wedge.\nThe word 'medieval' was certainly late in appearing as an official\ndesignation, employed in the divisions and titles of histories (toward\nthe end of the seventeenth century, as it would seem, in the manuals\nof Cellario); previously it had only just occurred here and there; but\nthe thought contained in it had been in the air for some time--that is\nto say, in the soul of everybody--eked out with other words, such as\n'barbarous' or 'Gothic' ages, and Vasari expresses it by means of the\ndistinction between ancient and 'old,' calling those things ancient\nwhich occurred before the existence of Constantine, of Corinth, of\nAthens, of Rome, and of other very famous cities built up to the time\nof Nero, of the Vespasians, of Trajan, Hadrian, and Antoninus, and\n'old' those \"which had their origin from St Silvester onward.\" In\nany case, the distinction was clear: on the one hand most brilliant\nlight, on the other dense darkness. After Constantine, writes the\nsame Vasari, \"every sort of virtue\" was lost, \"beautiful\" souls and\n\"lofty\" intellects became corrupted into \"most ugly\" and \"basest,\"\nand the fervent zeal of the new religion did infinite damage to the\narts. This means neither more nor less than that _dualism,_ one of the\ncapital traits of the Middle Ages, was retained, although differently\ndetermined, for now the god was (although not openly acknowledged)\nantiquity, art, science, Greek and Roman life, and its adversary, the\nreprobate and rebel, was the Middle Age, 'Gothic' temples, theology and\nphilosophy bristling with difficulties, the clumsy and cruel customs of\nthat age. But just because the respective functions of the two terms\nwere merely inverted, their opposition remained, and if Christianity\ndid not succeed in understanding Paganism and in recognizing its\nfather, so the Renaissance failed to recognize itself as the son of\nthe Middle Ages, and did not understand the positive and durable value\nof the period that was closing. For this reason, both ages destroyed\nor allowed to disappear the monuments of the previous age. This was\ncertainly far less the case with the Renaissance, which expressed\nitself less violently and was deeply imbued with the thought of the\nMiddle Ages, and, owing to the idea of humanity, had an obscure feeling\nof the importance of its predecessor. So much was this the case that\nthe school of learned men and philologists already mentioned was formed\nat that time, with the new of investigating medieval antiquities. But\nthe learned are the learned--that is to say, they do not take an active\npart in the struggles of their time, though busied with the collection\nand arrangement of its chronicles and remains, which they often judge\nin accordance with the vulgar opinion of their own time, so that it is\nquite customary to find them despising the subject of their labours,\ndeclaring that the poet whom they are studying has no value, or that\nthe period to which they are consecrating their entire life is ugly\nand displeasing. It needed much to free the flame of intelligence from\nthe heaps of medieval antiquities accumulated for centuries by the\nlearned, and the Middle Ages were abhorred during the Renaissance,\neven when they were investigated. The drama of love and hatred was not\ndissimilar in its forms, nor less bitterly dualistic, although vastly\nmore interesting, than that which was then being played out between\nCatholics and Protestants. The latter called the Pope Antichrist, and\nthe primacy of the Roman Church _mysterium iniquitatis,_ and compiled\na catalogue _testium veritatis_ of those who had opposed that iniquity\neven while it prevailed. The Catholics returned the compliment with\nremarks about Luther and the Reformation, and composed catalogues\nof heretics, Satan's witnesses. But this strife was a relic of the\npast, and would have ended by becoming gradually attenuated and\ndispersed; whereas the other was an element of the future, and could\nonly be conquered by long effort and a new conception of the loftiest\ncharacter.\n\n\n\n\nV\n\n\nTHE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT\n\n\nMeanwhile the historiography which immediately followed pushed the\ndouble aporia of antiquity and of the Middle Ages to the extreme; and\nit was owing to this radical unprejudiced procedure that it acquired\nits definite physiognomy and the right of being considered a particular\nhistoriographical period. The symbolical vesture, woven of memories of\nthe Gr\u00e6co-Roman world, with which the modern spirit had first clothed\nitself, is now torn and thrown away. The thought that the ancients had\nnot been the oldest and wisest among the peoples, but the youngest\nand the least expert, and that the true ancients, that is to say, the\nmost expert and mature in mind, are co be found in the men of the\nmodern world, had little by little made its way and become universally\naccepted. Reason in its nudity, henceforth saluted by its proper\nname, succeeds the example and the authority of the Gr\u00e6co-Romans,\nwhich represented reason opposed to barbaric culture and customs.\nHumanitarianism, the cult of humanity, also idolized by the name of\n'nature,' that is to say, ingenuous general human nature, succeeds to\nhumanism, with its one-sided admirations for certain peoples and for\ncertain forms of life. Histories written in Latin become scarce or\nare confined to the learned, and those written in national languages\nare multiplied; criticism is exercised not only upon medieval\nfalsifications and fables, upon the writings of credulous and ignorant\nmonks in monasteries, but upon the pages of ancient historians, and the\nfirst doubts appear as to the truth of the historical Roman tradition.\nA feeling of sympathy, however, toward the ancients still persists,\nwhereas repugnance and abhorrence for the Middle Ages continue to\nincrease. All feel and say that they have emerged, not only from\ndarkness, but from the twilight before dawn, that the sun of reason\nis high on the horizon, illuminating the intellect and irradiating\nit with most vivid light. 'Light,' 'illumination,' and the like are\nwords pronounced on every occasion and with ever increasing conviction\nand energy; hence the title 'age of light,' of 'enlightenment' or\nof 'illumination,' given to the period extending from Descartes to\nKant. Another term began to circulate, at first used rarely and in\na restricted sense--'progress.' It gradually becomes more insistent\nand familiar, and finally succeeds in supplying a criterion for the\njudgment of facts, for the conduct of life, for the construction of\nhistory, becomes the subject of special investigations, and of a new\nkind of history, the history of the _progresses_ of the human spirit.\n\nBut here we observe the persistence and the potency of Christian and\ntheological thought. The progress so much discussed was, so to speak,\na progress without _development,_ manifesting itself chiefly in a sigh\nof satisfaction and security, as of one, favoured by fortune, who has\nsuccessfully encountered many obstacles and now looks serenely upon\nthe present, secure as to the future, with mind averted from the past,\nor returning to it now and then for a brief moment only, in order to\nlament its ugliness, to despise and to smile at it. Take as an example\nof all the most intelligent and at the same time the best of the\nhistorical representatives of enlightenment M. de Voltaire, who wrote\nhis _Essai sur les m\u0153urs_ in order to aid his friend the Marquise du\nCh\u00e2telet to _surmonter le d\u00e9go\u00fbt_ caused her by _l'histoire moderne\ndepuis la d\u00e9cadence de l'Empire romain,_ treating the subject in a\nsatirical vein. Or take Condorcet's work, _l'Esquisse d'un tableau\nhistorique des progr\u00e8s de l'esprit humain,_ which appears at its end\nlike a last will and testament (and also as the testament of the man\nwho wrote it), and where we find the whole century in compendium.\nIt is as happy in the present, even in the midst of the slaughters\nof the Revolution, as rosy in its views as to the future, as it is\nfull of contempt and sarcasm for the past, which had generated that\npresent. The felicity of the period upon which they were entering\nwas clearly stated. Voltaire says that at this time _les hommes ont\nacquis plus de lumi\u00e8res d'un bout de l'Europe \u00e0 l'autre que dans\ntous les \u00e2ges pr\u00e9c\u00e9dents._ Man now brandishes the arm which none can\nresist: _la seule arme contre le monstre, c'est la Raison: la seule\nmani\u00e8re d'emp\u00eacher les hommes d'\u00eatre absurdes et m\u00e9chants, c'est de\nles \u00e9clairer; pour rendre le fanatisme ex\u00e9crable, il ne faut que le\npeindre._ Certainly it was not denied that there had been something\nof good and beautiful in the past. They must have existed, if they\nsuffered from superstition and oppression. _On voit dans l'histoire\nles erreurs et les pr\u00e9jug\u00e9s se succ\u00e9der tour \u00e0 tour, et chasser la\nv\u00e9rit\u00e9 et la raison: on voit les habiles et les heureux encha\u00eener\nles imb\u00e9ciles et \u00e9craser les infortun\u00e9s; et encore ces habiles et\nces heureux sont eux-m\u00eames les jouets de la fortune, ainsi quelles\nesclaves qu'ils gouvernent._ And not only had the good existed, though\noppressed, but it had also been efficient in a certain measure: _au\nmilieu de ces saccagements et de ces destructions nous voyons un amour\nde l'ordre qui anime en secret le genre humain et qui a pr\u00e9venu sa\nruine totale: c'est un des ressorts de la nature, qui reprend toujours\nsa force...._ And then the 'great epochs' must not be forgotten, the\n'centuries' in which the arts nourished as the result of the work\nof wise men and monarchs, les quatre \u00e2ges heureux of history. But\nbetween this sporadic good, weak or acting covertly, or appearing\nonly for a time and then disappearing, and that of the new era, the\nquantitative and energetic difference is such that it is turned into\na qualitative difference: a moment comes when men learn to think, to\nrectify their ideas, and past history seems like a tempestuous sea\nto one who has landed upon solid earth. Certainly everything is not\nto be praised in the new times; indeed, there is much to blame: _les\nabus servent de lois dans presque toute la terre; et si les plus sages\ndes hommes s'assemblaient pour faire des lois, o\u00f9 est l'\u00c9tat dont\nla forme subsist\u00e2t enti\u00e8re?_ The distance from the ideal of reason\nwas still great and the new century had still to consider itself as\na simple step toward complete rationality and felicity. We find the\nfancy of a social form limit even in Kant, who dragged after him\nso much old intellectualistic and scholastic philosophy. Sometimes\nindeed its final form was not discovered, and its place was taken by a\nvertiginous succession of more and more radiant social forms. But the\nseries of these radiant forms, the progress toward the final form and\nthe destruction of abuses, really began in the age of enlightenment,\nafter some episodic attempts in that direction during previous ages,\nfor this age alone had entered upon the just, the wide, the sure\npath, the path illumined with the light of reason. It sometimes even\nhappened in the course of that period that a doctrine leading to\nRousseau's inverted the usual view and placed _reason,_ not in modern\ntimes or in the near or distant future, but in the past, and not in\nthe medieval, Gr\u00e6co-Roman, or Oriental past, but in the prehistoric\npast, in the 'state of nature,' from which history represented the\ndeviation. But this theory, though differing in its mode of expression,\nwas altogether identical in substance with that generally accepted,\nbecause a prehistoric 'state of nature' never had any existence in the\nreality, which is history, but expressed an ideal to be attained in a\nnear or distant future, which had first been perceived in modern times\nand was therefore really capable of moving in that direction, whether\nin the sense of realization or return. The religious character of all\nthis new conception of the world cannot be obscure to anyone, for it\nrepeats the Christian conceptions of God as truth and justice (the lay\nGod), of the earthly paradise, the redemption, the millennium, and so\non, in laical terms, and in like manner with! Christianity sets the\nwhole of previous history in opposition to itself, to condemn it, while\nhardly admiring here and there some consoling ray of itself. What does\nit matter that religion, and especially Christianity, was then the\ntarget for fiercest blows and shame and mockery, that all reticence was\nabandoned, and people were no longer satisfied with the discreet smile\nthat had once blossomed on the lips of the Italian humanists, but broke\nout into open and fanatical warfare? Even lay fanaticism is the result\nof dogmatism. What does it matter that pious folk were shocked and saw\nthe ancient Satan in the lay God, as the enlightened discovered the\ncapricious, domineering, cruel tribal deity in the old God represented\nby the priest? The possibility of reciprocal accusations confirms the\n_dualism,_ active in the new as in the old conception, and rendering\nit unsuitable for the understanding of development and of history.\n\nThe historiographical _aporia_ of antiquity was also being increased\nby abstract individualism or the 'pragmatic' conception. So true was\nthis that it was precisely at that time that the formula was resumed,\nand pragmatism, as history of human ideas, sentiments, calculations,\nand actions, as a narrative embellished with reflections, was opposed\nto theological or medieval history and to the old ingenuous chronicles\nor erudite collections of information and documents. Voltaire, who\ncombats and mocks at belief in divine designs and punishments and in\nthe leadership of a small barbarous population called upon to act as an\nelect people and to be the axle of universal history (so that he may\nsubstitute for it the lay theology which has been described), is the\nsame Voltaire who praises in Guicciardini and in Machiavelli the first\nappearance of an _histoire bien faite._ The pragmatic mode of treatment\nwas extended even to the narrative of events relating to religion and\nthe Church and was applied by Mosheim and others in Germany. Owing to\nthis penetration of rationalism into ecclesiastical historiography and\ninto Protestant philosophy, it afterward seemed that the Reformation\nhad caused thought to progress, whereas, as regards this matter,\nthe Reformation simply received humanistic thought in the new form,\nto which it had previously been opposed. If, in other respects, it\naided the advance of the historical conception in an original manner,\nthis was brought about, as we shall see, by means of another element\nseething within it, mysticism. But meanwhile not even Catholicism\nremained immune from the pragmatic, of which we find traces in the\n_Discours_ of Bossuet, who represents the Augustinian conception, shorn\nof its accessories, reduced and modernized, lacking the irreconcilable\ndualism of the two cities and the Roman Empire as the ultimate and\neverlasting empire, allowing natural causes preordained by God and\nregulated by the laws to operate side by side with divine intervention,\nand conceding a large share to the social and political conditions of\nthe various peoples. We do not speak of the last step taken by the same\nauthor in his _Histoire des variations des \u00e9glises_, when he conceived\nthe history of the Reformation objectively and in its internal motives,\npresenting it as a rebellious movement directed against authority.\nEven his adversary Voltaire recognized that Bossuet had not omitted\n_d'autres causes_ in addition to the divine will favouring the elect\npeople, because he had several times taken count de l'esprit des\nnations. Such was the strength of _l'esprit du si\u00e8cle._ The pragmatic\nconceptions of that time are still so well known and so near to us,\nso persistent in so many of our narratives and historical manuals,\nthat it would be useless to describe them. When we direct our thoughts\nto the historical works of the eighteenth century, there immediately\nrises to the memory the general outline of a history in which priests\ndeceive, courtiers intrigue, wise monarchs conceive and realize good\ninstitutions, combated and rendered almost vain through the malignity\nof others and the ignorance of the people, though they remain\nnevertheless a perpetual object of admiration for enlightened spirits.\nThe image of chance or caprice appears with the evocation of that\nimage, and mingling with the histories of these conflicts makes them\nyet more complicated, their results yet stranger and more astonishing.\nAnd what was the use, that is to say, the end, of historical narrative\nin the view of those historians? Here also the reading of a few lines\nof Voltaire affords the explanation: _Cet avantage consiste surtout\ndans la comparaison qu'un homme d'\u00e9tat, un citoyen, peut faire des lois\net des mours \u00e9trang\u00e8res avec celles de son pays: c'est ce qui excite\nl'\u00e9mulation des nations modernes dans les arts, dans l''agriculture,\ndans le commerce. Les grandes fautes pass\u00e9es servent beaucoup \u00e0 tout\ngenre. On ne saurait trop remettre devant les yeux les crimes et\nles malheurs: on peut, quoi qu'on en dise, pr\u00e9venir les uns et les\nautres._ This thought is repeated with many verbal variations and is\nto be found in nearly all the books of historiographie theory of the\ntime, continuing the Italian mode of the Renaissance in an easier\nand more popular style. The words 'philosophy of history,' which had\nlater so much success, at first served to describe the assistance\nobtainable from history in the shape of advice and useful precepts,\nwhen investigated without prejudice--that is to say, with the one\n'assumption' of reason.\n\nThe external end assigned to history led to the same results as in\nantiquity, when history became oratorical and even historico-pedagogic\nromances were composed, and as in the Renaissance, when 'declamatory\norations' were preserved, and history was treated as material more\nor less well adapted to certain ends, whence arose a certain amount\nof indifference toward its truth, so that Machiavelli, for instance,\ndeduced laws and precepts from the decades of Livy, not only assuming\nthem to be true, but accepting them in those parts which he must have\nrecognized to be demonstrably fabulous. Orations began to disappear,\nbut their disappearance was due to good literary taste rather than\nto anything else, which recognized how out of harmony were those\nexpedients with the new popular, prosaic, polemical tone that narrative\nassumed in the eighteenth century. In exchange they got something\nworse: lack of esteem for history, which was considered to be an\ninferior reality, unworthy of the philosopher, who seeks for laws, for\nwhat is constant, for the uniform, the general, and can find it in\nhimself and in the direct observation of external and internal nature,\nnatural and human, without making that long, useless, and dangerous\ntour of facts narrated in the histories. Descartes, Malebranche, and\nthe long list of their successors do not need especial mention here,\nfor it is well known how mathematics and naturalism dominated and\ndepressed history at this period. But was historical truth at least an\ninferior truth? After fuller reflection, it did not seem possible to\ngrant even this. In history, said Voltaire, the word 'certain,' which\nis used to designate such knowledge as that \"two and two make four,\" \"I\nthink,\" \"I suffer,\" \"I exist,\" should be used very rarely, and in the\nsole sense of \"very probable.\" Others held that even this was saying\ntoo much, for they altogether denied the truth of history and declared\nthat it was a collection of fables, of inventions and equivocations, or\nof undemonstrable affirmations. Hence the scepticism or Pyrrhonism of\nthe eighteenth century, which showed itself on several occasions and\nhas left us a series of curious little books as a document of itself.\nSuch is, indeed, the inevitable result when historical knowledge is\nlooked upon as a mass of individual testimonies, dictated or altered by\nthe passions, or misunderstood through ignorance, good at the best for\nsupplying edifying and terrible examples in confirmation of the eternal\ntruths of reason, which, for the rest, shine with their own light.\n\nIt would nevertheless be altogether erroneous to found upon the\nexaggeration to which the theological and pragmatical views attained\nin the historiography of the enlightenment, and see in it a decadence\nor regression similar to that of the Renaissance and of other\npredecessors. Not only were germs of error evolved at that time, not\nonly did the difficulties that had appeared in the previous period\nbecome more acute, but there was also developed, and elevated to a\nhigh degree of efficiency, that historiography of spiritual values\nwhich Christian historiography had intensified and almost created, and\nwhich the Renaissance had begun to transfer to the earth. Voltaire\nas historiographer deserves to be defended (and this has recently\nbeen done by several writers, admirably by Fueter), because he has\na lively perception of the need of bringing history back from the\ntreatment of the external to that of the internal and strives to\nsatisfy this need. For this reason, books that gave accounts of wars,\ntreaties, ceremonies, and solemnities seemed to him to be nothing but\n'archives' or 'historical dictionaries,' useful for consultation on\ncertain occasions, but history, true history, he held to be something\naltogether different. The duty of true history could not be to weight\nthe memory with external or material facts, or as he called them\nevents (\u00e9v\u00e9nements), but to discover what was the society of men in\nthe past, _la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 des hommes, comment on vivait dans l'int\u00e9rieur\ndes familles, quels arts \u00e9taient cultiv\u00e9s,_ and to paint 'manners'\n(_les mours_); not to lose itself in the multitude of insignificant\nparticulars (_petits faits_), but to collect only those that were of\nimportance (_consid\u00e9rables_) and to explain the spirit (_l'esprit_)\nthat had produced them. Owing to this preference that Voltaire accords\nto manners over battles we find in him the conception (although it\nremains without adequate treatment and gets lost in the ardour of\npolemic) that it is not for history to trace the portrait of human\nsplendours and miseries (_les d\u00e9tails de la splendeur et de la mis\u00e8re\nhumaine_) but only of manners and of the arts, that is, of the\npositive work; in his _Si\u00e8cle de Louis XIV_ he says that he wishes to\nillustrate the government of that monarch, not in so far as il a fait\ndu bien aux fran\u00e7ais, but in so far as il a fait du lien aux hommes.\nWhat Voltaire undertook, and to no small extent achieved, forms the\nprincipal object of all historians' labours at this period. Whoever\nwishes to do so can see in Fueter's book how the great pictures\nto be found in Voltaire's _Essai sur les mours_ and _Si\u00e8cle_ were\nimitated in the pages both of French writers and in those of other\nEuropean countries--for instance, in the celebrated introduction by\nRobertson to his history of Charles V. It will also be noticed how the\nspecial histories of this or that aspect of culture are multiplied\nand perfected, as though several of the _desiderata_ mentioned by\nBacon in his classification of history had been thus supplied. The\nhistory of philosophy abandons more and more the type of collections\nof anecdotes and utterances of philosophers, to become the history\nof systems, from Brucker to Buhle and to Tiedemann. The history of\nart takes the shape of a special problem in Winckelmann's work and in\nthe works of his successors. In Voltaire's own books and in those of\nhis school it assumes that of literature; in those of Dubos and of\nMontesquieu that of rights and of institutions; in Germany it leads to\nthe production of a work as original and realistic as the history of\nOsnabr\u00fcck by M\u00f6ser. In the specialist work of Heeren, the history of\nindustry and commerce separates itself from the historical divisions\nor digressions of economic treatises and takes a form of its own. The\nhistory of social customs investigates (as in Sainte-Palaye's book\non _Ancienne chevalerie_) even the minutest aspects of social and\nmoral life. Had not Voltaire remarked about tournaments that _il se\nfait des r\u00e9volutions dans les plaisirs comme dans tout le reste?_ And\nto limit ourselves to Italy, which at that time was also acting on\nthe initiative, though she soon afterward withdrew and received her\nimpulse from the other countries of Europe, it is well to remember\nthat in the eighteenth century Pietro Giannone, expressing the desires\nand the attempts at their realization of a multitude of Neapolitan\ncompatriots and contemporaries, traced the civil history of the Kingdom\nof Naples, giving much space to the relations between Church and State\nand to the incidents of legislation. Many followed this example in\nItaly and outside it (among the many were Montesquieu and Gibbon). In\nItaly, too, Ludovico Antonio Muratori illustrated medieval life in\nhis _Antiquitates Itali\u00e6,_ and Tiraboschi composed a great history of\nItalian literature (understood as that of the whole culture of Italy),\nnotable not less for its erudition than for its clearness of design,\nwhile other lesser writers, like Napoli Signorelli, in his _Vicende\ndella cultura delle due Sicilie_, particularized in certain regions,\nsprinkling their history with the philosophy current at the time. The\nJesuit Bettinelli, too, imitated the historical books of Voltaire\nfor the history of letters, arts, and customs in Italy, Bonafede the\nwork of Brucker for the history of philosophy, and Lanzi, in a manner\nfar superior to those just mentioned, continued the path followed by\nWinckelmann in his _History of Painting._\n\nNot only did the historiography of the enlightenment render history\nmore 'interior' and develop it in its interiority, but it also\nbroadened it in space and time. Here too Voltaire represents in an\neminent degree the needs of his age, with his continual accusations of\nnarrowness and meanness levelled at the traditional image of universal\nhistory, as composed of Hebrew or sacred history and Gr\u00e6co-Roman or\nprofane history, or, as he says, _histoires pr\u00e9tendues universelles,\nfabriqu\u00e9es dans notre Occident._ A beginning was made with the use of\nthe material discovered, transported, and accumulated by explorers and\ntravellers from the Renaissance onward, of which a considerable part\nhad been contributed by the Jesuits and by missionaries. India and\nChina attracted attention, both on account of their antiquity and of\nthe high grade of civilization to which they had attained. Translations\nof religious and literary Oriental texts were soon added to this,\nand it became possible to discuss that civilization, not merely at\nsecond-hand and according to the narratives of travellers. This\nincrease of knowledge relating to the East is paralleled by increase\nof knowledge not only in relation to antiquity (these studies were\nnever dropped, but changed their centre, first from Italy to France\nand Holland, then to England, and then to Germany), but also in regard\nto the Middle Ages, in the works of the Benedictines, of Leibnitz,\nMuratori, and very many others, who here also specialized both as\nregards the objects of their researches and as to the regions or cities\nin which they conducted them, as for instance De Meo in his _Annali\ncritici del Regno di Napoli._\n\nWith the increase of erudition, of the variety of documents and\ninformation available, went hand in hand a more refined criticism as\nto the authenticity of the one and of the value as evidence of the\nother. Fueter does well to note the progress in method accomplished by\nthe Benedictines and by Leibnitz (who did not surpass those excellent\nand learned monks in this respect, although he was a philosopher) up\nto Muratori, who did not restrict himself to testing the genuineness\nof tradition, but initiated criticism of the tendencies of individual\nwitnesses, of the interests and passions which colour and give\ntheir shape to narratives. The en-lightened, with Voltaire at their\nhead, initiated another kind of criticism of a more intrinsic sort,\ndirected to things and to the knowledge of things (to literary, moral,\npolitical, and military experience), recognizing the impossibility\nthat things should have happened in the way that they are said to have\nhappened by superficial, credulous, or prejudiced historians, and\nattempting to reconstruct them in the only way that they could have\nhappened. We shall admire in Voltaire (especially in the _Si\u00e8cle_) his\nlack of confidence in the reports of courtiers and servants, accustomed\nto forge calumnies and to interpret maliciously and anecdotically the\nexternal actions of sovereigns and statesmen.\n\nThis happened because the historiography of the enlightenment, while\nit preserved and even exaggerated pragmatism, yet on the other\nhand refined and spiritualized it, as will have been observed in\nthe expressions preferred by Voltaire and even in the theologizing\nBossuet: _l'esprit des nations, l'esprit du temps._ What that _esprit_\nwas naturally remained vague, because the support of philosophy,\nin which at that time those newly imported concepts introduced an\nunexpected element of conflict, was lacking to refer it to the ideal\ndeterminations of the spirit in its development and to conceive the\nvarious epochs and the various nations as each playing its own part in\nthe spiritual drama. Thus it often happened that _esprit_ was perverted\ninto a fixed quality, such as _race_, if it were a question of nations,\nand into a current or mode, if periods were spoken of, and was thus\nnaturalized and pragmatized. _Trois choses,_ wrote Voltaire, _influent\nsans cesse sur l'esprit des hommes, le climat, le gouvernement, et\nla religion: c'est la seule mani\u00e8re d'expliquer l'\u00e9nigme du monde:_\nwhere the 'spirit' is lowered to the position of a product of natural,\nand social circumstances. The suggestive word had, however, been\npronounced, and a clear consciousness of the terms themselves of the\nsocial, political, and cultural struggle that was being carried on\nwould have little by little emerged. For the time being, climate,\ngovernment, religion, genius of the peoples, genius of the time, were\nall more or less happy attempts to go beyond pragmatism and to place\ncausality in a universal order. This effort, and at the same time its\nlimit--that is to say, the falling back into the abstract and pragmatic\nform of explanation--is also shown in the doctrine of the 'single\nevent,' which was believed to determine at a stroke the new epoch of\nbarbarism or of civilization. Thus at this time it was customary to\nassign enormous importance to the Crusades or to the Turkish occupation\nof Constantinople, as Fueter records, with special reference to\nRichardson's history. Another consequence of the same embarrassment\nwas the slight degree of fusion attained in the various histories of\nculture, of customs, and of the arts that were composed it this time.\nThe various manifestations of life were set down one after the other\nwithout any success, or even any attempt at developing them organically.\n\nDoubtless the new and vigorous historiographical tendencies of the\nenlightenment were then attacking other barriers opposed to them by\nthe already mentioned lay-theological dualism, in addition to those of\npragmatism and of naturalism. This lay-theology ended by negating the\nprinciple of development itself, because the judgment of the past as\nconsisting of darkness and errors precluded any serious conception of\nreligion, poetry, philosophy, or of primitive and bygone institutions.\nWhat did an institution of the great importance of 'divination' in\nprimitive civilizations amount to for Voltaire in the formative process\nof observation and scientific deduction? The invention _du premier\nfripon qui rencontra un imb\u00e9cile._ Or oracles, also of such importance\nin the life of antiquity? _Des fourberies._ To what amounted the\ntheological struggles between Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists\nin connexion with the Eucharist? To the ridiculous spectacle of the\nPapists _who mangeaient Dieu pour pain, les luth\u00e9riens du pain et Dieu,\nles calvinistes mang\u00e8rent le pain et ne mang\u00e8rent point Dieu._ What\nwas the only end that could be attained by the Jansenists? Boredom: a\nsequence of tiresome _querelles th\u00e9ologiques_ and of petty querelles\nde plume, so that nothing remains of the writers of that time who took\npart in them but geometry, reasoned grammar, logic--that is to say,\nonly what _appartient \u00e0 la raison; the querelles th\u00e9ologiques were\nune maladie de plus dans l'esprit humain._ Nor does the philosophy\nof earlier times receive better treatment. That of Plato was nothing\nbut _une mauvaise m\u00e9taphysique,_ a tissue of arguments so bad that\nit seems impossible they could have been admired and added to by\nothers yet more extravagant from century to century, until Locke was\nreached: Locke, _qui seul a d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 l'entendement humain dans un\nlivre o\u00f9 il n'y a que des v\u00e9rit\u00e9s, et, ce qui rend l'ouvrage parfait,\ntoutes les v\u00e9rit\u00e9s sont claires._ In poetry, modern work was placed\nabove ancient, the Gerusalemme above the Iliad, the Orlando above the\nOdyssey, Dante seems obscure and awkward, Shakespeare a barbarian not\nwithout talent. Medieval literature was beneath consideration: _On a\nrecueilli quelques malheureuses compositions de ce temps: c'est faire\nun amas de cailloux tir\u00e9s dantiques masures quand on est entour\u00e9 de\npalais._ Frederick of Prussia, who here showed himself a consistent\nVoltairean, did not receive the new edition of the Nibelungenlied and\nthe other epic monuments of Germany graciously. In a word, the whole\nof the past lost its value, or preserved only the negative value\nof evil: _Que les citoyens d'une ville immense, o\u00f9 les arts, les\nplaisirs, et la paix r\u00e9gnent aujourd'hui, o\u00f9 la raison m\u00eame commence \u00e0\ns'introduire, comparent les temps, et qu'ils se plaignent, s'ils osent.\nC'est une r\u00e9flexion qu'il faut faire presque \u00e0 chaque page de cette\nhistoire._ The lack of the conception of development rendered sterile\nthe very acquisition of knowledge of distant things and people; and\nalthough there was in certain respects merit in introducing India and\nChina into universal history, and although the criticism and satire\nof the 'four monarchies' and of 'sacred' history was to a certain\nextent justified, it is well to remember that in the notion mocked at\nwas satisfied the legitimate need for understanding history in its\nrelations with Christian and European civilized life; and that if it\nhad not been found possible (and it never was at that time) to form a\nmore complete chain, in which were Arabia, India and China, and the\nAmerican civilizations, and all the other newly discovered things,\nthese additional contributions to knowledge would have remained a mere\nobject for curiosity or imagination. India, China, and the East in\ngeneral were therefore of little more use in the eighteenth century\nthan to manifest an affection for tolerance, indeed for religious\nindifferentism. Those distant countries, in which there was no\nproselytizing frenzy, and which did not send missionaries to weary\nEurope--though Europe did not spare them such visitations--were not\ntreated as historical realities, nor did they obtain their place in\nthe reality of spiritual development, but became longed-for ideals,\ncountries of dream. Those who in our day renew praises of Asiatic\ntoleration, contrasting it with European intolerance, and wax tender\nover such wisdom and meekness, are not aware that in so doing they\nare repeating uselessly and inopportunely what Voltaire has already\ndone; and if in this matter he did not aid the better understanding\nof history, he at any rate fulfilled a practical and moral function\nwhich was necessary for the conditions of his own time. The defective\nconception of development, and not accidental circumstances, such as\nthe publicistic, journalistic, and literary tendencies of the original\namong those historians, is also the profound reason for the failure of\ncontact and of union between the immense mass of erudition accumulated\nby the sixteenth century philologists, and the historiography of the\nenlightenment. How were those documents and collections to be employed\nin the slow and laborious development of the spirit, if, according to\nthe new conception, instead of developing, the spirit was to leap, and\nhad indeed already made a great leap and left the past far behind? It\nwas sufficient to rummage from time to time among them and extract some\ncurious detail, which should fit in with the polemic of the moment.\n_C'est un vaste magasin, o\u00f9 vous prendrez ce qui est \u00e0 votre usage,_\nsaid Voltaire. Thus the learned and the enlightened, both of them\nchildren of their time, remained divided among themselves, the former\nincapable of rising to the level of history owing to their slight\nvivacity of spirit, the latter overrunning it owing to their too great\nvivacity, and reducing it to a form of journalism.\n\nAll these limits, just because they are limits, assign its proper\nsphere to the historiography of the enlightenment, but they must\nnot be taken as meaning that it had not made any progress. That\nhistoriography, plunged in the work at the moment most urgent,\nsurrounded with the splendour of the truths that it was in the act\nof revealing around it, failed to see those limits and its own\ndeficiencies, or saw them rarely and with difficulty. It was aware only\nthat it progressed and progressed rapidly, nor was it wrong in this\nbelief. Nor are those critics (among whom is Fueter) wrong who now\ndefend it from the bad reputation that has befallen it and celebrate\nits many virtues, which we also have set in a clear light and have\nadded to, and whose connexion and unity we have proved. Yet we must\nnot leave that bad reputation unexplained, for it sounds far more\nserious than the usual depreciation by every historical period of the\none that has preceded it, with the view of showing its inferiority\nto the present. Here, on the contrary, we find a particular judgment\nof depreciation, pronounced even by comparison with the periods\nthat preceded the enlightenment, so that this period, and not, for\nexample, the Renaissance, has especially received the epithet of\n'anti-historical' (\"the anti-historical eighteenth century\"). We find\nthe explanation of this when we think of the dissipation then taking\nplace of all symbolical veils, received from _venerable antiquity,_ and\nof the crude dualism and conflict which were being instigated at that\ntime between history and religion. The Renaissance was also itself an\naffirmation of human reason, but at the moment of its breaking with\nmedieval tradition it was felt to be all the same tied to classical\ntradition, which gave it an appearance of historical consciousness (an\nappearance and not the reality). The philosophers of the Renaissance\noften invoked and placed themselves under the protection of the\nancient philosophers, Plato against Aristotle, or the Greek Aristotle\nagainst the Aristotle of the commentators. The lettered men of the\nperiod sought to justify the new works of art and the new judgments\nupon them by appealing to the precepts of antiquity, although they\nsophisticated and subtilized what they found there. Philosophers,\nartists, and critics turned their shoulders upon antiquity only when\nand where no sort of conciliation was possible, and it was only the\nboldest among them who ventured to do even this. The ancient republics\nwere taken as an example by the politicians, with Livy as their text,\nas the Bible was by the Christians. Religion, which was exhausted or\nhad been extinguished in the souls of the cultured, was of necessity\npreserved for the people as an instrument of government, a vulgar form\nof philosophy: almost all are agreed as to this, from Machiavelli to\nBruno. The sage legislator or the 'prince' of Machiavelli and the\nenlightened despot of Voltaire, who were both of them idealizations\nof the absolute monarchies that had moulded Europe politically to\ntheir will, have substantial affinities; but the sixteenth-century\npolitician, expert in human weaknesses and charged with all the\nexperience of the rich history of Greece and of Rome, studied finesse\nand transactions, where the enlightened man of the eighteenth century,\nencouraged by the ever renewed victories of the _Reason,_ raised\nReason's banner, and for her took his sword from the scabbard, without\nfeeling the smallest necessity for covering his face with a mask. King\nNuma created a religion in order to deceive the people, and was praised\nfor it by Machiavelli; but Voltaire would have abused him for doing\nso, as he abused all inventors of dogmas and promoters of fanaticism.\nWhat more is to be said? The rationalism of the Renaissance was\nespecially the work of the Italian genius, so well balanced, so careful\nto avoid excesses, so accommodating, so artistic; enlightenment, which\nwas especially the work of the French genius, was radical, consequent,\napt to run into extremes, logistical.\n\nWhen the genius of the two countries and the two epochs is compared,\nthe enlightenment is bound to appear anti-historical with respect\nto the Renaissance, which, owing to the comparison thus drawn and\ninstituted with such an object, becomes endowed with a historical\nsense and with a sense of development which it did not possess, having\nalso been essentially rationalistic and anti-historical, and, in a\ncertain sense, more so than the enlightenment. I say more than the\nenlightenment, not only because the latter, as I have shown, greatly,\nincreased historical knowledge and ideas, but also precisely because it\ncaused all the contradictions latent in the Renaissance to break out.\nThis was an apparent regression in historical knowledge, but in reality\nit was an addition to life, and therefore to historical consciousness\nitself, as we clearly see immediately afterward. The triumph and\nthe catastrophe of the enlightenment was the French Revolution; and\nthis was at the same time the triumph and the catastrophe of its\nhistoriography.\n\n\n\n\nVI\n\n\nTHE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF ROMANTICISM\n\n\nThe reaction manifested itself with the sentimental return to the past,\nand with the defence undertaken by the politicians of old institutions\nworthy of being preserved or accorded new life. Hence arose two forms\nof historical representation, which certainly belong in a measure to\nall periods, but which were very vigorous at the romantic period:\n_nostalgic_ historiography and historiography which _restored._ And\nsince the past of their desires, which supplied the material for\npractical recommendations, was just that which the enlightenment\nand the Revolution had combated and overthrown--the Middle Ages and\neverything that resembled or seemed to resemble the Middle Ages--both\nkinds of history were, so to say, medievalized. Just as a watercourse\nwhich has been forcibly diverted from its natural bed noisily returns\nto it as soon as obstructions are removed, so a great sigh of joy and\nsatisfaction, a warm emotion of tenderness, welled up in and reanimated\nall breasts as, after so long a rationalistic ascesis, they again took\nto themselves the old religion, the old national customs, regional and\nlocal, again entered the old houses and castles and cathedrals, sang\nagain the old songs, dreamed again the old legends. In this tumult of\nsentiment we do not at first observe the profound and irremediable\nchange that has taken place in the souls of all, borne witness to\nby the anxiety, the emotion, the pathos of that apparent return. It\nwould be to belittle the nostalgic historiography of the romantic\nmovement to make it consist of certain special literary works, for in\nreality it penetrated all or almost all the writings of that time, like\nan irresistible current, to be found not only in lesser and poorer\nspirits, such as De Barante, nor only in the more poetically disposed,\nsuch as Chateaubriand, but in historians who present some of the most\nimportant or purely scientific thoughts, for example Niebuhr. The life\nof chivalry, the life of the cloister, the Crusades, the Hohenstaufen,\nthe Lombard and Flemish communes, the Christian kings of Spain at\nstrife with the Arabs, the Arabs themselves, England divided between\nSaxons and Normans, the Switzerland of William Tell, the _chansons\nde geste,_ the songs of the troubadours, _Gothic_ architecture\n(characteristic vicissitude of a name, applied in contempt and then\nturned into a symbol of affection), became at this time the object of\nuniversal and national sympathy, as did the rough, ingenuous popular\nliterature, poetry, and art: translations or abbreviations of the\nmedieval chronicles were even reprinted for the enjoyment of a large\nand eager circle of readers; the first medieval museums were formed;\nan attempt was made to restore and complete ancient churches, castles,\nand city palaces. Historiography entered into close relations and\nexchange of ideas with the new literary form of historical romance,\nwhich expressed the same nostalgia, first with Walter Scott and then\nwith his innumerable followers in all countries. (This literary form\nwas therefore quite different from the historical fiction of Manzoni,\nwhich is free from such sentiment and whose historical element has a\nmoral foundation.) I have already remarked that this nostalgia was\nfar more modern of content than at first supposed; so much so that\nevery one was attracted to it by the motive that most appealed to\nhimself, whether religious or political, Old Catholic, mystical,\nmonarchical, constitutional, communal-republican, national-independent,\nliberal-democratic, or aristocratic. Nevertheless, when the past was\ntaken as a poetic theme, there was a risk that the idealizing tendency\nof the images would be at strife with critical reflection: hence the\ncult of the Middle Ages, which had become a superstition, came to a\nridiculous end. Fueter quotes an acute remark of Ranke, relating to one\nof the last worthy representatives of the romantic school, Giesebrecht,\nauthor of the History of the German Empire, admirer and extoller of\nthe 'Christian-Germanic virtues,' of the power and excellence of the\nmedieval heroes. Ranke described all this as \"at once too virile and\ntoo puerile.\" But the puerility discernible at the sources of this\nideal current, before it falls into the comic, is rather the sublime\npuerility of the poet's dream.\n\nThe actual modern motives, which present themselves as sentiments in\nnostalgic historiography, acquired a reflex form with the same or\nother writers, as tendencies to the service of which their narratives\nwere bent. Here, too, it would be superfluous to give an account of\nall the various forms and specifications of these tendencies (which\nFueter has already done admirably), from the persistent Rousseauism\nof Giovanni M\u00fcller to Sismondi, or from the ideal of a free peasantry\nof Niebuhr, the ultramontane ideal of Leo, the imperialistic-medieval\nideal of the already mentioned Giesebrecht and Ficker, the old liberal\nof Raumer, the neo-liberal of Rotteck and Gervinus, the anglicizing\nof Guizot and Dahlmann, or the democratic ideal of Michelet, to\nthe neo-Guelfish ideal of Troya and Balbo and Father Tosti, to the\nPrussian hegemony of Droysen and of Treitschke, and so on. But all of\nthese, and other historians with a particular bias, lean, with rare\nexceptions, on the past, and find the justification of their bias in\nthe dialectic of tradition or in tradition itself. Nobody any longer\ncared to compose by the light of abstract reason alone. The extreme\ntypical instance is afforded by the socialistic school, which took the\nromantic form in the person of its chief representative, Marx, who\nendowed it with historiographical and scientific value. His work was\nin complete opposition to the socialistic ideals that had appeared in\nthe eighteenth century, and he therefore boasted that they had passed\nfrom the state of being a Utopia to that of a science. His science\nwas nothing less than historical necessity attributed to the new era\nthat he prophesied, and materialism itself no longer wished to be the\nnaturalistic materialism of a d'Holbach or a Helv\u00e9tius, but presented\nitself as 'historical materialism.'\n\nIf nostalgic historiography is poetry and that with a purpose is\npractical and political, the historiography, the true historiography,\nof romanticism is not to be placed in either of the two, in so far as\nit is considered an epoch in the history of thought. Certainly, poetry\nand practice arose from a thought and led to a thought as its material\nor problem: the French Revolution was certainly not the cause or the\neffect of a philosophy, but both the cause and the effect, a philosophy\nin the act, born from and generating the life that was then developed.\nBut thought in the form of thought, and not in the form of sentimental\nlove of the past or effort to revive a false past, is what determines\nthe scientific character of that historiography, which we desire to set\nin a clear light. And it reacted in the form of thought against the\nthought of the enlightenment, so crudely dualistic, by opposing to it\nthe conception of development.\n\nNot indeed that this concept was something entirely new, which had then\nburst forth in bud for the first time: no speculative conception that\nis really such can be absent at one time and appear at another. The\ndifference lies in this, that at a given period scientific problems\nseem to apply to one rather than to another aspect of thought, which\nis always present in its totality. So that when we say that the\nconception of development was absent from antiquity and from the\neighteenth century, we utter a hyperbole. There are good reasons for\nthis hyperbole, but it remains a hyperbole and should not be taken\nliterally and understood materially. Nor are we to believe that there\nwas no suspicion or anticipation of the important scientific conception\nof development prior to the romantic period. Traces of it may be found\nin the pantheism of the great philosophers of the Renaissance, and\nespecially in Bruno, and in mysticism itself, in so far as it included\npantheism, and yet more distinctly in the reconstruction of the bare\nbones of the theological conception with the conception of the course\nof historical events as a gradual education of the human race, in\nwhich the successive revelations should be the communication of books\nof a gradually less and less elementary nature, from the first Hebrew\nscriptures to the Gospels and to the revisions of the Gospels. Lessing\noffers an example of this. Nor were the theorists of the enlightenment\nalways so terribly dualistic as those that I have mentioned, but here\nand there one of them, such as Turgot, although he did not altogether\nabandon the presupposition as to epochs of decadence, yet recognized\nthe progress of Christianity over antiquity and of modern times over\nChristianity, and attempted even to trace the line of development\npassing through the three ages, the mythological, the metaphysical,\nand the scientific. Other thinkers, like Montesquieu, noticed the\nrelativity of institutions to customs and to periods; others, like\nRousseau, attached great importance to the strength of sentiment.\nEnlightenment had also its adversaries during its own period, not\nonly as represented by political abstraction and fatuous optimism\n(such as that of Galiani, for instance), but also in more important\nrespects, destined later to form the special subject of criticism,\nsuch as contempt for tradition, for religion, and for poetry and arid\nnaturalism. Hence the smile of Hamann at the blind faith of Voltaire\nand of Hume in the Newtonian astronomical doctrines and at their lack\nof sense for moral doctrines. He held that a revival of poetry and\na linking of it with history were necessary, and considered history\nto be (here he was just the opposite of Bodin) not the easiest but\nthe most difficult of all mental labours. But in the _Scienza nuova_\nof Vico (1725) was to be found a very rich and organic anticipation\nof romantic thought (as should now be universally recognized and\nknown). Vico criticized the enlightenment only in its beginnings (when\nit was still only natural jurisprudence and Cartesianism), yet he\nnevertheless penetrated more deeply than others who came after him\ninto its hidden motives and measured more accurately its logical and\npractical consequences. Thus he opposed to the superficial contempt\nfor the past in the name of abstract reason the unfolding of the human\nmind in history, as sense, imagination, and intellect, as the divine\nor animal age, the heroic age, and the human age. He held further\nthat no human age was in the wrong, for each had its own strength and\nbeauty, and each was the effect of its predecessor and the necessary\npreparation for the one to follow, aristocracy for democracy, democracy\nfor monarchy, each one appearing at the right moment, or as the justice\nof that moment.\n\nThe conception of development did not, however, in the romantic\nperiod, remain the thought of a solitary thinker without an audience,\nbut broadened until it became a general conviction; it did not\nappear timidly shadowed forth, or contradictorily affirmed, but took\non body, coherence, and vigour, and dominated spirits. It is the\nformative principle of the idealist philosophy, which culminated in\nthe system of Hegel. Few there were who resisted its strength, and\nthese, like Herbart, were still shut up in pre-Kantian dogmatism,\nor tried to resist it and are more or less tinged with it, as is\nthe case with Schopenhauer and yet more with Comte and later with\npositivistic evolutionism. It gives its intellectual backbone to the\nwhole of historiography (with the exception here too of lingerers and\nreactionaries), and that historiography corrects for it, in greater or\nless measure, the same one-sided tendencies which came to it from the\nsentimental and political causes already described, from tenderness for\nthe near past or for \"the good old times,\" and for the Middle Ages.\nThe whole of history is now understood as necessary development, and\nis therefore implicitly, and more or less explicitly, all redeemed; it\nis all learned with the feeling that it is sacred, a feeling reserved\nin the Middle Ages for those parts of it only which represented the\nopposition of God to the power of the devil. Thus the conception of\ndevelopment was extended to classical antiquity, and then, with the\nincrease of knowledge and of attention, to Oriental civilizations.\nThus the Romans, the Ionians, the Dorians, the Egyptians, and the\nIndians got back their life and were justified and loved in their\nturn almost as much as the world of chivalry and the Christian world\nhad been loved. But the logical extension of the conception did not\nfind any obstacle among the philosophers and historians, even in the\nrepugnance that was felt for the times to which modern times were\nopposed, such as the eighteenth century. The spectacle was witnessed\nof the consecration of Jacobinism and of the French Revolution in\nthe very books of their adversaries, Hegel, for instance, finding in\nthose events both the triumph and the death, the one not less than the\nother, the 'triumphant death' of the modern abstract subjectivity,\ninaugurated by Descartes. Not only did the adversaries, but also the\nexecutioners and their victims, make peace, and Socrates, the martyr of\nfree thought and the victim of intolerance, such as he was understood\nto be by the intellectualists of the eighteenth century and those who\nsuperstitiously repeat them in our own day, was condemned to the death\nthat he had well deserved, in the name of History, which does not admit\nof spiritual revolutions without tragedies. The drafter, too, of the\n_Manifesto of the Communists,_ as he was hastening on the business of\nputting an end to the burgess class, both with his prayers and with\nhis works, gave vent to a warm and grandiose eulogium of the work\nachieved by the burgess class, and in so doing showed himself to be the\nfaithful child of romantic thought; because, for anyone who held to the\nideology of the eighteenth century, capitalism and the burgess class\nshould have appeared to be nothing but distortions due to ignorance,\nstupidity, and egoism, unworthy of any praise beyond a funeral\noration. The passions of the greater part of those historians were\nmost inflammable, not less than those of the enlightened, yet satire,\nsarcasm, invective, at least among the superior intellects, vividly\nencircled the historical understanding of the time, but did not oppress\nor negate it. The general impression experienced from those narratives\nis that of a serious effort to render justice to all, and we owe it to\nthe discipline thus imparted to the minds and souls of the thinkers\nand historians of romanticism that it is only the least cultivated or\nmost fanatical among the priests and Catholics in general who continue\nto curse Voltaire and the eighteenth century as the work of the devil.\nIn the same way, it is only vulgar democrats and anti-clericals,\nakin to the former in their anachronism and the rest, who treat the\nreaction, the restoration, and the Middle Ages with equal grossness.\nEnlightenment and the Jacobinism connected with it was a religion,\nas we have shown, and when it died it left behind it survivals or\nsuperstitions.\n\nTo conceive history as development is to conceive it as history of\nideal values, the only ones that have value, and it was for this\nreason that in the romantic period there was an ever increasing\nmultiplication of those histories which had already increased to so\nconsiderable an extent in the preceding period. But their novelty did\nnot consist in their external multiplication, but in their internal\nmaturation, which corrected those previously composed, consisting\neither of learned collections of disconnected items of information, or\njudgments indeed, but judgments based upon an external model, which\nclaimed to be constructed by pure reason and was in reality constructed\nby arbitrary and capricious abstraction and imagination. And now the\nhistory of poetry and of literature is no longer measured according\nto the standard of the Roman-humanistic ideal, or according to the\nclassical ideal of the age of Louis XIV, or of the ratiocinative and\nprosaic ideal of the eighteenth century, but discovers by degrees\nits own measure in itself, and beginning with the first attempts of\nHerder, of the Schlegels, and then of Villemain, of Sainte-Beuve, and\nof Gervinus, and for antiquity of Wolf and M\u00fcller, finally reaches\nthe high standard represented by the _History of Italian Literature_\nof de Sanctis. Suddenly the history of art feels itself embarrassed\nby the too narrow ideal of Lessing and of Winckelmann, and there is\na movement toward colour, toward landscape, toward pre-Hellenic and\npost-Hellenic art, toward the romantic, the Gothic, the Renaissance,\nand the baroque, a movement that extends from Meyer and Hirth to\nRumohr, Kluger, Schnaase, till it reaches Burckhardt and Ruskin. It\nalso tries here and there to break down the barriers of the schools and\nto attain the really artistic personality of the artists. The history\nof philosophy has its great crisis with Hegel, who leads it from the\nabstract subjectivism of the followers of Kant to objectivity, and\nrecognizes the only true existence of philosophy to consist of the\nhistory of thought, considered in its entirety, without neglecting any\none of its forms. Zeller, Fischer, and Erdmann in Germany, Cousin and\nhis school in France, Spaventa in Italy, follow Hegel in such objective\nresearch. The like takes place in the history of religion, which tries\nto adopt intrinsic criteria of judgment, after Spittler and Planck, the\nlast representatives of the rationalistic school, with Marheinecke,\nNeander, Hase, and finds a peculiarly scientific form with Strauss,\nBaur, and the T\u00fcbingen school; and from Eichhorn to Savigny, Gans, and\nLassalle in the history of rights. The conception of the State always\nyields the leadership more and more to that of the nation in the\nhistory called political, and 'nationality' substitutes the names of\n'humanity,' 'liberty,' and 'equality,' and all the other ideas of the\npreceding age that once were full of radiance, but are now dimmed. This\nnationalism has wrongly been looked upon as a regression, in respect\nof that universalism and cosmopolitanism, because (notwithstanding\nits well-known sentimental exaggerations) it notably assists the\nconcrete conception of the universal living only in its historical\ncreations, such as nations, which are both products and factors of its\ndevelopment. And the value of Europeanism is revived as the result\nof this acquisition of consciousness of the value of nations. It had\nbeen too much trampled upon during the period of the enlightenment,\nowing to the naturalistic spirit which dominated at that time, and to\nthe reaction taking place against the historical schemes of antiquity\nand Christianity, although it was surely evident that history written\nby Europeans could not but be 'Europocentric,' and that it is only in\nrelation to the course of Gr\u00e6co-Roman civilization, which was Christian\nand Occidental, that the civilizations developed along other lines\nbecome actual and comprehensible to us, provided always that we do\nnot wish to change history into an exhibition of the different types\nof civilization, with a prize for the best of them The difference is\nalso made clear for the same reason between history and pre-history,\nbetween the history of man and the history of nature, which had been\nillegitimately linked by the materialists and the naturalists. This is\nto be found even in the works of Herder, who retains a good many of\nthe elements of the century of his birth mingled with those of the new\nperiod. But it is above all in romantic historiography that we observe\nthe search for and very often the happy realization of an organic\nlinking together of all particular histories of spiritual values, by\nrelating religious, philosophical, poetical, artistic, juridical, and\nmoral facts as a function of a single motive of development. It then\nbecomes a commonplace that a literature cannot be understood without\nunderstanding ideas and customs, or politics without philosophy, or\n(as was realized rather later) rights and customs and ideas without\neconomy. And it is worth while recording as we pass by that there is\nhardly one of these histories of values which has not been previously\npresented or sketched by Vico, together with the indication of their\nintrinsic unity. Histories of poetry, histories of myth, of rights, of\nlanguages, of constitutions, of explicative or philosophical reason,\nall are in Vico, although sometimes wrapped up in the historical\nor sociological epoch with which each one of them was particularly\nconnected. Even modern biography (which illustrates what the individual\ndoes and suffers in relation to the mission which he fulfils and to the\naspect of the Idea which becomes actual in him) has its first or one of\nits first notable monuments in the autobiography of Vico--that is to\nsay, in the history of the works which Providence commanded and guided\nhim to accomplish \"in diverse ways that seemed to be obstacles, but\nwere opportunities.\"\n\nThis transformation of biography does not imply failure to recognize\nindividuality, but is, on the contrary, its elevation, for it finds\nits true meaning in its relation with the universal, as the universal\nits concreteness in the individual. And indeed individualizing power,\nperception of physiognomies, of states of the soul, of the various\nforms of the ideas, sense of the differences of times and places,\nmay be said to show themselves for the first time in romantic\nhistoriography. That is to say, they do not show themselves rarely or\nas by accident, nor any longer in the negative and summary form of\nopposition between new and old, civil and barbarous, patriotic and\nextraneous. It does not mean anything that some of those historians\nlost themselves (though this happened rarely) in an abstract dialectic\nof ideas, and that others more frequently allowed ideas to be submerged\nin the external picturesqueness of customs and anecdotes, because we\nfind exaggerations, one-sidedness, lack of balance, at all periods and\nin all progress of thought. Nor is the accusation of great importance\nthat the colouring of times and places preferred by the romantics\nwas false, because the important thing was precisely this attempt to\ncolour, whether the result were happy or the reverse (if the latter,\nthe picture had to be coloured again, but always coloured). A further\nreason for this is that, as has been already admitted, there were\nfancies and tendencies at work in romanticism beyond true and proper\nhistoriography, which bestowed upon the times and places illustrated\nthat imaginary and exaggerated colouring suggested by the various\nsentiments and interests. History, which is thought, was sometimes\nidealized at this period as an imaginary living again in the past, and\npeople asked of history to be carried back into the old castles and\nmarket-places of the Middle Ages; for their enjoyment they asked to\nsee the personages of the time in their own proper clothes and as they\nmoved about, to hear them speak the language, with the accent of the\ntime, to be made contemporary with the facts and to acquire them with\nthe ingenuous spirit of a contemporary. But to do this is not only\nimpossible for thought, but also for art, because art too surpasses\nlife, and it would be something useless, because it is not desired,\nfor what man really desires is to reproduce in imagination and to\nrethink the past _from the present,_ not to tear himself away from the\npresent and fall back into the dead past. Certainly this last was an\nillusion, proper to several romantics (who for that matter have their\nsuccessors in our own day), and in so far as it was an illusion either\nremained a sterile effort or diffused itself in a lyrical sigh; but\nan illusion of that kind was one of many aspects and did not form an\nessential part of romantic historiography.\n\nWe also owe it to romanticism that a relation was established for\nthe first time and a fusion effected between the learned and the\nhistorians, between those who sought out material and thinkers. This,\nas we have said, had not happened in the eighteenth century, nor,\nto tell the truth, before it, in the great epochs of erudition of\nItalian or Alexandrian humanism, for then antiquaries and politicians\neach followed their own path, indifferent to one another, and the\nonly political ideal that sometimes gleamed from the bookshelves of\nthe antiquary (as Fueter acutely observes of Flavius Blondus) was\nthat of a government which by ensuring calm should permit the learned\nto follow their peaceful avocations! But the watchword of romantic\nhistoriography was anticipated in respect to this matter also by Vico,\nin his formula of the _union_ of _philosophy_ with _philology,_ and of\nthe reciprocal _conversion_ of the _true_ with the _certain,_ of the\nidea with the fact. This formula proves (we give it passing mention)\nthat the historical saying of Manzoni, to the effect that Vico should\nbe united with Muratori, was not altogether historically exact--that\nis to say, philosophy with erudition, for Vico had already united\nthese two things, and their union constitutes the chief value of his\nwork. Nevertheless, notwithstanding its inaccuracy, the saying of\nManzoni also proves how romantic historiography had noted the intimate\nconnexion that prevails between erudition and thought in history,\nwhich is the living and thinking again of the document that has been\npreserved or restored by erudition, and indeed demands erudition that\nit may be sought out and prepared. Neither did romanticism limit\nitself to stating this claim in the abstract, but really created the\ntype of the philologist-thinker (who was sometimes also a poet), from\nNiebuhr to Mommsen, from Thierry to Fustel de Coulanges, from Troya\nto Balbo or Tosti. Then for the first time were the great collections\nand repertories of the erudition of the seventeenth and eighteenth\ncenturies valued at their true worth; then were new collections\npromoted, supplementary to or correcting them according to criteria\nthat were ever more rigorous in relation to the subject and to the\ngreater knowledge and means at disposal. Thus arose the work known\nas the _Monumenta Germania historica_ and the German philological\nschool (which was once the last and became the first), the one a model\nof undertakings of this sort, the other of the disciplines relating\nto them, for the rest of Europe. The philological claim of the new\nhistoriography, aided by the sentiment of nationality, also gave life\nin our Italy to those historical societies, to those collections of\nchronicles, of laws, of charters, of 'historical archives' or reviews,\ninstitutions with which historiographical work is concerned in our day.\nA notable example of the power to promote the most patient philology\ninspired with purely historical needs is to be found, among others, in\nthe _Corpus inscriptionum latinarum,_ conceived and carried out by a\nhistorian endowed with the passionate energy and the synthetic mind of\na Mommsen. In the eighteenth century (with one or two very rare and\npartial exceptions) historians disdained parchment and in-folios, or\nopened them impatiently, _bibentes et fugientes_ but in the nineteenth\ncentury no serious spirit dared to affirm any longer that it was\npossible to compose history without accurate, scrupulous, meticulous\nstudy of the documents upon which it is to be founded.\n\nThe pragmatic histories of the last centuries, therefore, melted\naway at the simple touch of these new historiographical convictions,\nrather than owing to direct and open criticism or polemic. The\nword 'pragmatic,' which used to be a title of honour, began to be\npronounced with a tinge of contempt, to designate an inadequate form\nof historical thought, and the historians of the enlightenment fell\ninto discredit, not only Voltaire and the French, but the Humes, the\nRobertsons, and other English historians. They appeared now to be quite\nwithout colour, lacking in historical sense, their minds fixed only\non the political aspect of things, superficial, vainly attempting to\nexplain great events by the intentions of individuals and by means of\nlittle things or single details. The theory, too, of history as the\norator and teacher of virtue and prudential maxims also disappeared.\nThis theory had enjoyed a long and vigorous life during Gr\u00e6co-Roman\nantiquity and again from the Renaissance onward (when I say that all\nthese things disappeared, the exception of the fossils is always to\nbe understood, for these persisted at that time and persist in our\nown day, with the air of being alive). The attitude of the Christian\nspirit toward history was resumed. This spirit contemplates it as\na single process, which does not repeat itself, as the work of\nGod, which teaches directly by means of His presence, not as matter\nthat exemplifies abstract teaching, extraneous to itself. The word\n'pragmatic' was indeed pronounced with a smile from that time onward,\nas were the formulas of _historia magister vit\u00e6_ or that directed _ad\nbene beateque vivendum_: let him who will believe these formulas--that\nis to say, he who echoes traditional thoughts without rethinking them\nand is satisfied with traditional and vulgar conceptions. What is the\nuse of history? \"History itself,\" was the answer, and truly that is not\na little thing.\n\nThe new century glorified itself with the title of 'the century of\nhistory,' owing to its new departures, which were born or converged\nin one. It had deified and at the same time humanized history, as had\nnever been done before, and had made of it a centre of reality and of\nthought. That title of honour should be confirmed, if not to the whole\nof the nineteenth century, then to its romantic or idealistic period.\nBut this confirmation should not prevent our observing, with equal\nclearness, the _limit_ of that historicity, without which it would not\nbe possible to understand its later and further advance. History was\nthen at once deified and humanized; but did the divinity and humanity\ntruly flow together in one, or was there not at bottom some separation\nbetween the two of them? Was the disagreement between ancient worldly\nthought and ultramundane Christian thought really healed, or did it not\npresent itself again in a new form, though this form was attenuated and\nmore critical intellectually? And which of the two elements prevailed\nin this disagreement in its abstractness, the human or rather the\ndivine?\n\nThese questions suggest the answer, which is further suggested by\na memory familiar to all, namely, that the romantic period was not\nonly the splendid age of the great evolutionary histories, but also\nthe fatal age of the _philosophies of history,_ the transcendental\nhistories. And indeed, although the thought of immanence had grown\ngradually more and more rich and profound during the Renaissance and\nthe enlightenment, and that of transcendency ever more evanescent,\nthe first had not for that reason absorbed the second in itself,\nbut had merely purified and rationalized it, as Hellenic philosophy\nand Christian theology had tried to do in their own ways in their\nown times. In the romantic period, purification and rationalization\ncontinue, and here was the mistake as well as the merit of romanticism,\nfor it was no longer a question of setting right that ancient opinion,\nbut of radically inverting and remaking it. The transcendental\nconception of history was no longer at that time called revelation\nand apocalypse, but _philosophy of history,_ a title taken from the\nenlightenment (principally from Voltaire), although it no longer had\nthe meaning formerly attributed to it of history examined with an\nunprejudiced or philosophical spirit adorned with moral and political\nreflections, but the meaning, altogether different, of a philosophical\nsearch of the sphere above or below that of history--in fact, of\na theological search, which remained theological, however lay or\nspeculative it may have been. And since a search of this sort always\nleads to a rationalized mythology, there is no reason why the name of\n'mythology' should not be extended to the philosophy of history, or\nthe name of 'philosophy of history,' to mythology, as I have extended\nit, calling all transcendental conceptions of history 'philosophy of\nhistory,' for they all separate the fact and the idea, the event and\nits explication, action and end, the world and God. And since the\nphilosophy of history is transcendental in its internal structure,\nit is not surprising that it showed itself to be such in all the\nvery varied forms that it assumed in the romantic period, even among\nphilosophers as avid of immanence as Hegel, a great destroyer of\nPlatonism, who yet remained to a considerable extent engaged in it,\nso tenacious is that enemy which every thinker carries in himself and\nwhich he should tear from his heart, yet cannot resist.\n\nBut without entering into a particular account of the assumptions\nmade by the romantics and idealists in the construction of their\n'philosophies of history,' it will be sufficient to observe the\nconsequences, in order to point out the transcendental tendency\nof their constructions. These were such as to compromise romantic\nhistories in the method and to damage them in the execution, though\nthey were at first so vigorously conceived as a unity of philosophy\nand philology. One of the consequences was precisely the falling again\ninto contempt of erudition among those very people who adopted and\npromoted it, and on other occasions a recommendation of it in words and\na contempt of it in deeds. This contradictory attitude was troubled\nwith an evil conscience, so much so that its recommendations sound but\nlittle sincere, the contempt timid, when it shows itself, though it\nis more often concealed. Nevertheless one discovers fleeting words of\nrevelation among these tortuosities and pretences, such as that of an\n_a priori history_ (Fichte, Schelling, Krause, and, to a certain extent\nat least, Hegel), which should be true history, deduced from the pure\nconcepts, or rendered divine in some vision of the seer of Patmos, a\nhistory which should be more or less different from the confusion\nof human events and facts, as philosophical history, leaving outside\nit as refuse a merely _narrative_ history, which should serve as raw\nmaterial or as text for the sermons and precepts of the moralists and\npoliticians. And we see rising from the bosom of a philosophy, which\nhad tried to make history of itself, by making philosophy also history\n(proof that the design had not been really translated into act), the\ndistinction between philosophy and history, between the historical and\nthe philosophical way of thinking, and the mutual antipathy and mutual\nunfriendliness of the two orders of researchers. The 'professional'\nhistorians were obliged to defend themselves against their progenitors\n(the philosophers), and they ended by losing all pity for them, by\ndenying that they were philosophers and treating them as intruders and\ncharlatans.\n\nUnpleasantness and ill-will were all the more inevitable in that the\n'philosophers of history'--that is to say, the historians obsessed\nwith transcendency--did not always remain content (nor could they do\nso, speaking strictly) with the distinction between philosophical and\nnarrative history, and, as was natural, attempted to harmonize the\ntwo histories, to make the facts harmonize with the schemes which\nthey had imagined or deduced. With this purpose in view, they found\nthemselves led to use violence toward facts, in favour of their system,\nand this resulted in certain most important parts being cut out, in a\nProcrustean manner, and in others that were accepted being perverted\nto suit a meaning that was not genuine but imposed upon them. Even\nthe chronological divisions, which formed a merely practical aid to\nnarratives, were tortured (as was the custom in the Middle Ages) that\nthey might be elevated to the rank of ideal divisions. And not only\nwas the light of truth extinguished in the pursuit of these caprices,\nnot only were individual sympathies and antipathies introduced (take\nas an instance typical of all of them the idealization of Hellas and\nof this or that one of the Hellenic races), but there appeared a\nthing yet more personally offensive to the victims--that is to say,\nthere penetrated into history, under the guise of lofty philosophy,\nthe personal loves and hates of the historian, in so far as he was a\nparty man, a churchman, or belonged to this or that people, state,\nor race. This ended in the invention of Germanism, the crown and\nperfection of the human race, a Germanism which, claiming to be the\npurest expression of Arianism, would have restored the idea of the\nelect people, and have one day undertaken the journey to the East.\nThus were in turn celebrated semi-absolute monarchy as the absolute\nform of states, speculative Lutheranism as the absolute form of\nreligion, and other suchlike vainglorious vaunts, with which the pride\nof Germany oppressed the European peoples and indeed the whole world,\nand thus exacted payment in a certain way for the new philosophy with\nwhich Germany had endowed the world. But it must not be imagined that\nthe pride of Germany was not combated with its own arms, for if the\nEnglish speculated but little and the French were too firm in their\nbelief in the _Gesta Dei per Francos_ (become the gestes of reason\nand civilization), yet the peoples who found themselves in less happy\nconditions, and felt more keenly the censure of inferiority or of\nsenility thus inflicted upon them, reacted: Gioberti wrote a _Primato\nd'Italia,_ and Ciezkowski a _Paternostro,_ which foretold the future\nprimacy of the Slavonic people and more especially of the Poles.\n\nYet another consequence of the 'philosophies of history' was the\nreflourishing of 'universal histories,' in the fallacious signification\nof complete histories of humanity, indeed of the cosmos, which the\nMiddle Ages had narrated in the chronicles ab origine mundi and _de\nduabus civitatibus and de quattuor imperiis_, and the Renaissance and\nenlightenment had reduced to mere vulgar compilations, finding the\ncentre for its own interest elsewhere. The _imagines mundi_ returned\nwith the philosophies of history, and such they were themselves,\ntranscendental universal histories, with the 'philosophy of nature'\nbelonging to them. The succession of the nations there took the place\nof the series of empires: to each nation, as formerly to each empire,\nwas assigned a special function, which once fulfilled, it disappeared\nor fell to pieces, having passed on the lamp of life, which must not\npass through the hands of any nation more than once. The German nation\nwas to play there the part of the Roman Empire, which should never\ndie, but exist perpetually, or until the consummation of the ages and\nthe Kingdom of God. To develop the various forms of the philosophy of\nhistory would aid in making clear the internal contradictions of the\ndoctrine and in ascribing the reasons for the introduction of certain\ncorrections for the purpose of doing away with the contradictions\nin question, but which in so doing introduced others. And in making\nan examination of this kind a special place should be reserved for\nVico, who offers a 'philosophy of history' of a very complex sort,\nwhich on the one side does not negate, but passes by in silence the\nChristian and medieval conception (as it does not deny St Augustine's\nconception of the two cities or of the elect and Gentile people, but\nonly seriously examines the history of the latter), while on the other\nside it resumes the ancient Oriental motive of the circles (courses\nand recourses), but understands the course as growth and development,\nand the recourse as a dialectical return, which on the other hand\ndoes not seem to give rise to progress, although it does not seem to\nexclude it, and also does not exclude the autonomy of the free will or\nthe exception of contingency. In this conception the Middle Ages and\nantiquity ferment, producing romantic and modern thought.[1] But in the\nromantic period the idea of the circle (which yet contained a great\nmental claim that demanded satisfaction) gave place to the idea of a\nlinear course, taken from Christianity and from progress to an end,\nwhich concludes with a certain state as limit or with entrance into a\nparadise of indefinite progress, of incessant joy without sorrow. In\na conception of this kind there is at one time a mixture of theology\nand of illuminism, as in Herder, at another an attempt at a history\naccording to the ages of life and the forms of the spirit, as with\nFichte and his school; then again the idea realizes its logical ideal\nin time, as in Hegel, or the shadow of a God reappears, as in the\ndeism of Laurent and of several others, or the God is that of the old\nreligion, but modernized, noble, judicious, liberal, as in moderate\nCatholicism and Protestantism. And since the course has necessarily an\nend in all these schemes, announced and described and therefore already\nlived and passed by, attempts to prolong, to prorogue, or to vary that\nend have not been wanting, such personages as the Abbots Gioacchini\narising and calling themselves the 'Slav apocalyptics' or by some other\nname, and adding new eras to those described. But this did not change\nanything in the general conception. And there was no change effected in\nit by the philosophies of history of the second Schelling, for example,\nwhich are usually called irrationalistic, or of the pessimists, because\nit is clear that the decadence which they describe is a progress in the\nopposite sense, a progress in evil and in suffering, having its end in\nthe acme of evil and pain, or leading indeed to a redemption and then\nbecoming a progress toward the good. But if the idea of circles, which\nrepeat themselves identically, oppresses historical consciousness,\nwhich is the consciousness of perennial individuality and diversity,\nthis idea of progress to an end oppresses it in another way, because\nit declares that all the creations of history are imperfect, save\nthe last, in which history comes to a standstill and which therefore\nalone has absolute value, and which thus takes away from the value of\nreality in favour of an abstraction, from existence in favour of the\ninexistent. And both of these--that is to say, all the philosophies of\nhistory, in whatever way determined--lay in ambush to overwhelm the\nconceptions of development and the increase in historiographical value\nobtained through it by romanticism; and when this injury did not occur\n(as in several notable historians, who narrated history admirably,\nalthough they professed to obey the rules of the abstract philosophy\nof history, which they saluted from near or far, but took care not to\nintroduce into their narratives), it was a proof that the contradiction\nhad not been perceived, or at least perceived as we now perceive it,\nin its profound dissonance. It was a sign that romanticism too had\nproblems upon which it laboured long and probed deeply, and others upon\nwhich it did not work at all or only worked a little and kept waiting,\nsatisfying them more or less. History too, like the individual who\nworks, does 'one thing at a time,' neglecting or allowing to run on\nwith the help of slight provisional improvements the problems to which\nit cannot for the time being attend, but ready to direct full attention\nto them when its hands are free.\n\n\n[1] The exposition and criticism of Vico's thought are copiously dealt\nwith in the second volume of my _Saggi filosofici i La filosofia di\nGiambattista Vico_ (Bari, 1911).\n\n\n\n\nVII\n\n\nTHE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF POSITIVISM\n\n\nThe philosophies of history offended the historical consciousness\nin three points, as to which it has every right to be jealous: the\nintegrity of historical events, the unity of the narration with the\ndocument, and the immanence of development. And the opposition to the\n'philosophy of history,' and to the historiography of romanticism in\ngeneral, broke out precisely at these three points, and was often\nviolent. This opposition had at bottom a common motive, as has been\nshown clearly by the frequent sympathy and fraternizing among those\nwho represent it, though dissensions as to details are common among\nthem. It is, however, best to consider it in its triplicity for reasons\nof clearness, and to describe it as that of the _historians,_ the\n_philologists,_ and the _philosophers._\n\nTo the historians, by whom we mean those who had a special disposition\nfor the investigation of particular facts rather than theories, and a\ngreater acquaintance with and practice of historical than speculative\nliterature, is due the saying that history _should be history and\nnot philosophy._ Not that they ventured to deny philosophy, for on\nthe contrary they protested their reverence for it and even for\nreligion and theology, and condescended to make an occasional rapid\nand cautious excursion into those waters; but they generally desired\nto steer their way through the placid gulfs of historical truth,\navoiding the tempestuous oceans of the other discipline: philosophy was\nrelegated to the horizon of their works. Nor did they even contest,\nat least in principle, the right of existence of those grandiose\nconstructions of 'universal history,' but they recommended and\npreferred national or otherwise monographical histories, which can be\nsufficiently studied in their particulars, substituting for universal\nhistories collections of histories of states and of peoples. And since\nromanticism had introduced into those universal histories and into\nthe national histories themselves its various practical tendencies\n(which the philosophy of history had then turned into dogmas), the\nhistorians placed abstention from national and party tendencies upon\ntheir programme, although they reserved the right of making felt their\npatriotic and political aspirations, but, as they said, without for\nthat reason altering the narrative of the facts, which were supposed\nto move along independently of their opinions, or chime in with them\nspontaneously in the course of their natural development. And since\npassion and the philosophic judgment had been confused and mutually\ncontaminated in romanticism, the abstention was extended also to\nthe judgment as to the quality of the facts narrated; the _reality_\nand not the value of the fact being held to be the province of the\nhistorian, appeal being made to what theorists and philosophers had\nthought about it, where a more profound consideration of the problem\nwas demanded. History should not be either German or French, Catholic\nor Protestant, but it should also not pretend to apply a more ample\nconception to the solution of these or similar antitheses, as the\nphilosophers of history had tried to do, but rather should neutralize\nthem all in a wise scepticism or agnosticism, and attenuate them in a\nform of exposition conducted in the tone of a presidential summing-up,\nwhere careful attention is paid to the opinions of opposed parties and\ncourtesy is observed toward all. There was diplomacy in this, and it\nis not astonishing that many diplomatists or disciples of diplomacy\nshould collaborate in this form of history, and that the greatest of\nall the historians of this school, Leopold Ranke, in whom are to be\nfound all the traits that we have described, should have had a special\npredilection for diplomatic sources. He always, indeed, combated\nphilosophy, especially the Hegelian philosophy, and greatly contributed\nto discredit it with the historians, but he did this decorously,\ncarefully avoiding the use of any word that might sound too rough or\ntoo strong, professing the firm conviction that the hand of God shows\nitself in history, a hand that we cannot grasp with ours, but which\ntouches our face and informs us of its action. He completed his long\nand very fruitful labours in the form of monographs, avoiding universal\nconstructions. When, at the end of his life, he set to work to compose\na Weltgeschichte, he carefully separated it from the universe,\ndeclaring that it would have been \"lost in phantasms and philosophemes\"\nhad he abandoned the safe ground of national histories and sought for\nany other sort of universality than that of nations, which \"acting upon\none another, appear one after the other and constitute a living whole.\"\nIn his first book he protested with fine irony that he was not able\nto accept the grave charge of judging the past or of instructing the\npresent as to the future, which had been assigned to history, but he\nfelt himself capable only of showing \"how things really had happened\"\n(wie es eigentlich gewesen) this was his object in all his work, and he\nheld fast to it, thus culling laurels unobtainable by others, attaining\neven to the writing of the history of the popes of the period of the\nCounter-Reformation, although he was a Lutheran and remained so all his\nlife. This history was received with favour in all Catholic countries.\nHis greatest achievement was to write of French history in a manner\nthat did not displease the French. A writer of the greatest elegance,\nhe was able to steer between the rocks, without even letting appear his\nown religious or philosophical convictions, and without ever finding\nhimself under the obligation of forming a definite resolution, and\nin any case never pressing too hard upon the conceptions themselves\nto which he had recourse, such as 'historical ideas,' the perpetual\nstruggle between Church and State, and the conception of the State.\nRanke was the ideal and the master to many historians within, and to\nsome without, his own country. But even without his direct influence,\nthe type of history that he represented germinated everywhere, a little\nearlier or later according to position and to the calming down of the\ngreat political passions and philosophical fervour in the different\ncountries. This took place, for instance, in France earlier than in\nItaly, where the idealistic philosophy and the national movement made\ntheir strength felt in historiography after 1848, and even up to 1860.\nBut the type of history which I should almost be disposed to baptize\nwith the name of 'diplomatic,' taking seriously the designation that\nI had at first employed jocosely, still meets with success among\nthe moderately disposed, who are lovers of culture, but do not wish\nto become infected with party passions or to rack their brains with\nphilosophical speculations: but, as may be imagined, it is not always\ntreated with the intelligence, the balance, and the finesse of a\nLeopold Ranke.\n\nThe ambition of altogether rejecting the admission of thought into\nhistory, which has been lacking to the diplomatic historians (because\nthey were without the necessary innocence for such an ambition), was,\non the other hand, possessed by the philologists, a most innocent\ngroup. They were all the more disposed to abound in this sense, since\ntheir opinion of themselves, which had formerly been most modest, had\nbeen so notably increased, owing to the high degree of perfection\nattained by research into chronicles and documents and by the recent\nfoundation (which indeed had not been a creation ex nihilo) of the\ncritical or historical method, which was employed in a fine and close\nexamination into the origin of sources and the reduction of these, and\nin the internal criticism of texts. This pride of the philologists\nprevailed, the method reaching its highest development in a country\nlike Germany, where haughty pedantry flourishes better than elsewhere,\nand where, as a result of that most admirable thing, scientific\nseriousness, 'scientificism' is much idolized. This word was also\nambitiously adopted for everything that concerns the surroundings and\nthe instruments of true and proper science, such as is the case with\nthe collection and criticism of narratives and documents. The old\nschool of learned men, French and Italian, who did not effect less\nprogress in 'method' than was attained during the nineteenth century in\nGermany, did not dream that they were thus producing 'science,' much\nless did they dream of vying with philosophy and theology, or that\nthey could drive them from their positions and take their places with\nthe documentary method. But in Germany every mean little copier of a\ntext, or collector of variants, or examiner of the relations of texts\nand conjecturer as to the genuine text, raised himself to the level of\na scientific man and critic, and not only dared to look upon himself\nas the equal of such men as Schelling, Hegel, Herder, or Schlegel,\nbut did so with disdain and contempt, calling them 'anti-methodical.'\nThis pseudo-scientific haughtiness diffused itself from Germany over\nthe other European countries, and has now reached America, though in\nother countries than Germany it met more frequently with irreverent\nspirits, who laughed at it. Then for the first time there manifested\nitself that mode of historiography which I have termed 'philological'\nor 'erudite' history. That is to say, the more or less judicious\ncompilations of sources which used to be called _Antiquitates, Annales,\nPenus, Thesauri,_ presented themselves disguised as histories, which\nalone were dignified and scientific. The faith of these historians\nwas reposed in a narrative of which every word could be supported by\na text, and there was nothing else whatever in their work, save what\nwas contained in the texts, torn from their contexts and repeated\nwithout being thought by the philologist narrator. Their object\nwas that their histories should reach the rank of comprehensive\ncompilations, starting from those relating to particular times,\nregions, and events, and finally attaining to the arrangement of the\nwhole of historical knowledge in great encyclop\u00e6dias, out of which\narticles are to be supplied, systematic or definitional, put together\nby groups of specialists, directed by a specialist, for classical,\nromantic, Germanic, Indo-European, and Semitic philology. With a view\nto alleviating the aridity of their labours, the philologists sometimes\nallowed themselves a little ornament in the shape of emotional\naffections and ideal view-points. With this purpose, they had recourse\nto memories of their student days, to the philosophical catchwords\nwhich had been the fashion at the time, and to the ordinary sentiments\nof the day toward politics, art, and morality. But they did all this\nwith great moderation, that they might not lose their reputation for\nscientific gravity, and that they might not fail in respect toward\nscientific philological history, which disdains the vain ornaments in\nwhich philosophers, dilettantes, and charlatans delight. They ended\nby tolerating historians of the type above described, but as a lesser\nevil, and as a general rule inclined to pardon the sins arising out\nof their commerce with 'ideas' in favour of the 'new documents' which\nthey had discovered or employed, and which they could always dig out of\ntheir books as a useful residue, while purifying them from 'subjective'\nadmixtures--that is to say, from the elaboration of them which had\nbeen attempted. Philosophy was known to them only as 'philosophy of\nhistory,' but even thus rather by reason of its terrible ill-fame than\nfrom direct acquaintance. They remembered and were ever ready to repeat\nfive or six anecdotes concerning errors in names and dates into which\ncelebrated philosophers had actually fallen, easily forgetful of the\ninnumerable errors into which they fell themselves (being more liable\nas more exposed to danger); they almost persuaded themselves that\nphilosophy had been invented to alter the names and confuse the dates\nwhich, had been confided to their amorous care, that it was the abyss\nopened by the fiend to lead to the perdition of serious 'documentary\nhistory.'\n\nThe third band of those opposed to the philosophy of history was\ncomposed of philosophers or of historian--philosophers, but of those\nwho rejected the name and selected another less open to suspicion,\nor tempered it with some adjective, or accepted it indeed, but\nwith opportune explanations: they styled themselves positivists,\nnaturalists, sociologists, empiricists, criticists, or something of\nthat sort. Their purpose was to do something different from what the\nphilosophers of history had done, and since these had worked with the\nconception of the _end,_ they all of them swore that they would work\nwith the conception of the _cause;_ they would search out the cause\nof every fact, thus generalizing more and more widely the causes or\nthe cause of the entire course of history: those others had attempted\na _dynamic_ of history; they would work at a _mechanic_ of history, a\nsocial physics. A special science arose, opposed to the philosophy of\nhistory, in which that naturalistic and positivistic tendency became\nexalted in its own eyes: sociology. Sociology classified facts of human\norigin and determined the laws of mutual dependence which regulated\nthem, furnishing the narratives of historians with the principles of\nexplanation, by means of these laws. Historians, on the other hand,\ndiligently collected facts and offered them to sociology, that it might\npress the juice out of them--that is to say, that it might classify\nand deduce the laws that governed them. History and sociology, then,\nstood to one another in the same relation as physiology and zoology,\nphysics and mineralogy, or in another relation of the same sort; they\ndiffered from the physical and natural sciences only by their greater\ncomplexity. The introduction of mathematical calculation seemed to\nbe the condition of progress for history as for all the sciences,\nphysical and natural. A new 'science' came forward to support this\nnotion, in the shape of that humble servant of practical administration\nand inspired creation of bureaucracy known as statistics. And since\nthe whole of science was being modelled upon the idea of a factory\nof condensation, so were 'syntheses' invoked and outlined for\nhistory--that is to say, historical frameworks, in which the laws and\nfacts chat dominate single histories should be resumed, as though in a\nsort of table or atlas, which should show at a glance causes and the\nfacts which arose from them. Need we recall the names and supporters\nof this school--Comte, Buckle, Taine, and so on, until we come to those\nrecent historians who follow them, such as Lamprecht and Breysig? Need\nwe recall the most consequent and the most paradoxical programmes or\nthe school, as, for instance, Buckle's introduction to his history of\ncivilization or Bourdeau's book on the _Histoire des historiens?_ These\nand similar positivistic doctrines are present to the memory, either\nbecause they are nearest to us chronologically, or because the echo\nof the noise they made in the world has not yet ceased, and we see\neverywhere traces of their influence. Everywhere we see it, and above\nall in the prejudice which they have solidly established (and which we\nmust patiently corrode and dissolve), that history, true history, is to\nbe constructed by means of the _naturalistic_ method, and that _causal_\ninduction should be employed. Then there are the manifold naturalistic\nconceptions with which they have imbued modern thought: race, heredity,\ndegeneration, imitation, influence, climate, historical factors, and so\nforth. And here, too, as in the case of the philosophies of history,\nsince it suffices us to select only the essential in each fact, we\nshall not dwell upon the various particular forms of it--that is to\nsay, upon the various modes in which historical causes were enunciated\nand enumerated, and upon the various claims that one or other of them\nwas supreme: now the race, now the climate, now economy, now technique,\nand so forth. Here, too, the study of the particular forms would be of\nuse to anyone who wished to develop in particular the dialectic and to\ntrace the internal dissolution of that school, to demonstrate in its\nparticular modes its intrinsic tendency to surpass itself, though it\nfailed to do so by that path.\n\nWe have already mentioned that the three classes of opponents of\nthe 'philosophies of history' and the three methods by which they\nproposed to supplant it--diplomatic, philological, and positivistic\nhistory--showed that they disagreed among themselves. Confirmation of\nthis may now be found in the contempt of the diplomatic historians\nfor mere erudition and in their diffidence for the constructions of\npositivism, the erudite, for their part, being fearful of perversions\nof names and dates and shaking their heads at diplomatic histories\nand the careless style of the men of the world who composed them.\nFinally, the positivists looked upon the latter as people who did not\ngo to the bottom of things, to their general or natural causes, and\nreproved the erudite with their incapacity for rising to the level\nof laws and to the establishment of facts in accordance with these\nlaws, sociological, physiological, or pathological. But there is\nfurther confirmation of what has been noted in respect to the common\nconception that animated them all and of their substantial affinity,\nbecause when the erudite wished to cloak themselves in a philosophy\nof some sort, they very readily strutted about draped in some shreds\nof positivistic thought or phraseology. They also participated in the\nreserve and in the agnosticism of the positivists and the diplomatic\nhistorians toward speculative problems, and in like manner it was\nimpossible not to recognize the justice of their claim that evidence\nshould be reliable and documents authentic. The diplomatic historians\nagreed with them in the formula that history should not be philosophy\nand that research should dispense with finality and follow the line\nof causality. In fact, all three sorts of opponents, at one with the\ntranscendency of the philosophy of history, negated the unity of\nhistory with philosophy, but in various degrees and with various\nparticular meanings, with various preliminary studies and in various\nways. And although these schools were in agreement as to what they\nnegated, all three of them become for us exposed to a criticism which\nunites them beneath a single negation. For not even do the ability and\nthe intelligence of a Ranke avail to give vigour to the moderatism\nand to maintain firmly the eclecticism of diplomatic history, and\nthe transaction breaks down before the failure on the part of those\nwho attempted it, owing to its being contrary to their own powers\nand intrinsically impossible. The idea of an agnostic history turns\nout to be fallacious--that is to say, of a history that is not\nphilosophical but does not deny philosophy, that is not theological\nbut is not anti-theological, limiting itself to nations and to their\nreciprocal influence upon one another, because Ranke himself was\nobliged to recognize powers or ideals that are superior to nations and\nthat as such require to be speculatively justified in a philosophy or\nin a theology. In this way he laid himself open to the accusations\nof the positivists, who discredited his ideas as 'mystical.' For the\nsame reason others were proceeding to reduce them little by little\nfrom the position of ideals or movements of the spirit to natural and\nphysiological products, as was attempted by Lorenz, an ardent follower\nof Ranke, who, with his doctrine of generation and of heredity, fell\ninto that physiologism and naturalism from which the master had\npreserved himself. And when this passage from spirituality to nature\nwas accomplished, the dividing line between history and pre-history,\nbetween history of civilization and history of nature, was also not\nrespected. On the other hand, a return was made to the 'philosophies\nof history,' when ideas were interpreted as transcendental and as\nanswering to the designs of the divine will, which governs the world\naccording to a law and conducts it according to a plan of travel. The\nboasted impartiality and objectivity, which was based upon a literary\ndevice of half-words, of innuendoes, of prudent silences, was also\nequally illusory, and the Jesuit who objected to Ranke and his history\nof the popes will always prevail from the point of view of rigorous\ncriticism--either the Papacy is always and everywhere what it affirms\nitself to be, an institution of the Son of God made man, or it is a\nlie. Respect and caution are out of place here. _Tertium non datur._\nIndeed, it was not possible to escape from taking sides by adopting\nthat point of view; at the most a third party was thus formed,\nconsisting of the tolerant, the tepid, and the indifferent. The slight\ncoherence of Ranke's principles can be observed in that part of his\n_Universal History_ where, when speaking of Tacitus he touches upon\nhis own experience as a teacher of history, he declares that \"it is\nimpossible to speak of a tranquil and uniform progressive development\nof historiography either among the ancients or the moderns, because the\nobject itself is formed in the course of time and is always different,\nand conceptions depend upon the circumstances among which the author\nlives and writes.\" He thus comes to perform an act of resignation\nbefore blind contingentism, and the present historical sketch shows\nhow unjust this is, for it has traced the organic and progressive\ndevelopment of historical thought from the Greeks to modern times. And\nthe whole of the _Universal History_ is there to prove, on the other\nhand, that his slight coherence of ideas, or web of ideas that he left\nintentionally vague, made it difficult for him to give life to a vast\nhistorical narrative, so lacking in connexion, so heavy, and sometimes\neven issuing in extraneous reflections, such, for example, as those\nin the first pages of the first volume, where there is a comparison\nof Saul and Samuel with the emperors at strife with the popes, and of\nthe policy of Rehoboam and Jeroboam with the political strife between\nthe centralizing states and the centrifugal regions of modern times.\nWe find in general in Ranke an inevitable tendency to subside into the\npragmatic method. And what has been said of Ranke is to be repeated\nof his disciples and of those who cultivated the same conciliatory\ntype of history. As for philological history, the description that\nhas been given of the programme makes clear its nullity, for it leads\nby a most direct route to a double absurdity. When the most rigorous\nmethods of examining witnesses is really applied, there is no witness\nthat cannot be suspected and questioned, and philological history\nleads to the negation of the truth of that history which it wishes to\nconstruct. And if value be attributed to certain evidence arbitrarily\nand for external reasons, there is no extravagance that may not be\naccepted, because there is no extravagance that may not have honest,\ncandid, and intelligent men on its side. It is not possible to reject\neven miracles by the philological method, since these repose upon the\nsame attestations which make certain a war or a peace treaty, as Lorenz\nhas shown by examining the miracles of St Bernard in the light of the\nseverest philological criticism. In order to save himself from the\nadmission of the inconceivable and of the nullification of history,\nwhich follows the nullification of witnesses, there remains nothing\nbut appeal to thought, which reconstitutes history from the inside,\nand is evidence to itself, and denies what is unthinkable for the very\nreason that it is not to be thought. This appeal is the declaration of\nbankruptcy for philological history. We may certainly say that this\nform of history more or less sustains itself as history, to the extent\nthat it has recourse to all the aids furnished by history proper, and\ncontradicts itself; or it contradicts itself and yet does not sustain\nitself, or only for a little while and in appearance, by again adopting\nthe methods of pragmaticism, of transcendency, and of positivism. And\nthe last of these in its turn encounters the same experiences in a\ndifferent order, because its principle of history that explains facts\ncausally presupposes the facts, which as such are thought and therefore\nare in a way already explained. Hence a vicious circle, evident in the\nconnexion between history and sociology, each one of which is to be\nbased upon and at the same time to afford a base for the other, much\nin the same way as a column which should support a capital and at the\nsame time spring from it. But if, with a view to breaking the circle,\nhistory be taken as the base and sociology as its fulfilment, then the\nlatter will no longer be the explanation of the former, which will find\nits explanation elsewhere. And this will be, according to taste, either\nan unknown principle or some form of thought that acts in the same way\nas God, and in both cases a transcendental principle. Hence we have the\nfact of positivism leading to philosophies of history, as exemplified\nin the Apocalypses and the Gospels of Comte, of Buckle, and of others\nof like sort: they are all most reverent theologians, but chaotic,\nfalling back into those fallacious conceptions which had been refuted\nby romantic historiography.\n\nTruly, when faced with such histories as these, superficial or\nunintelligent or rude and fantastic, romanticism, conscious of the\naltitude to which it had elevated the study of the development of human\naffairs, might have exclaimed (and indeed it did exclaim by the mouth\nof its epigoni) to its adversaries and successors, in imitation of the\ntone of Bonaparte on the 18th of Brumaire: \"What have you done with the\nhistory which I left to you so brilliant? Were these the new methods,\nby means of which you promised to solve the problems which I had not\nbeen able to solve? I see nothing in them but _revers et mis\u00e8re!_\" But\nwe who have never met with absolute regressions during the secular\ndevelopment of historiography shall not allow ourselves to be carried\naway upon the polemical waves now beating against the positivistic and\nnaturalistic school which is our present or recent adversary, to the\npoint of losing sight of what it possessed that was substantially its\nown, and owing to which it really did represent progress. We shall also\nrefrain from drawing comparisons between romanticism and positivism,\nby measuring the merits of both, and concluding with the assertion\nof the superiority of the former; because it is well known that such\nexaminations of degrees of merit, the field of professors, are not\npermissible in history, where what follows ideally after is virtually\nsuperior to that from which it is derived, notwithstanding appearances\nto the contrary. And in the first place, it would be erroneous,\nstrictly speaking, to believe that what had been won by romanticism had\nbeen lost in positivism, because when the histories of this period are\nlooked upon from other points of view and with greater attention, we\nsee how they were all preserved. Romanticism had abolished historical\ndualism, for which there existed in reality positive and negative,\nelect and outcast, facts. Positivism repeated that all facts are\nfacts and all have an equal right to enter history. Romanticism had\nsubstituted the conception of development for the abysses and the\nchasms that previous historiography had introduced into the course\nof events, and positivism repeated that conception, calling it\n_evolution._ Romanticism had established periods in development, either\nin the form of a cycle of phases, like Vico, or as phases without\na circle and in linear order, like the German romantics, and had\nexemplified the various phases as a series of the forms of the spirit\nor of psychological forms, and positivism renewed these conceptions\n(although owing to the lack of culture usual with its adherents it\noften believed that it had made discoveries never made before), as can\nbe proved by a long series of examples. These range from the _three\nages_ of mental development of Comte to the _eight phases_ of social\ndevelopment or _four political periods_ which are respectively the\n'novelties' of the contemporaries Lamprecht and Breysig. Romanticism,\njudging that the explanation of events by means of the caprices, the\ncalculations, and the designs of individuals taken atomistically was\nfrivolous, took as the subject of history the universals, the Idea,\nideas, the spirit, nations and liberty and positivism; it also rejected\nindividualistic atomicism, talking of _masses, races, societies,\ntechnique, economy, science, social tendencies_; of everything, in\nfact, with the exception that the caprice of Tizius and Caius was\nnow no longer admitted. Romanticism had now not only reinforced the\nhistories of ideal values, but had conceived them as in organic\nconnexion; positivism in its turn insisted upon the _interdependence\nof social factors_ and upon the unity of the real, and attempted to\nfill up the interstices of the various special histories by means of\nthe history of _civilization_ and of _culture,_ and so-called _social_\nhistory, containing in itself politics, literature, philosophy,\nreligion, and every other class of facts. Romanticism had overthrown\nheteronomous, instructive, moralizing, serviceable history, and\npositivism in its turn boasted that its history was a _science,_ an\nend in itself, like every other science, although like every science\nit afforded the basis for practice, and was therefore capable of\napplication. Romanticism had enhanced the esteem for erudition, and\nhad given an impetus to intercourse between it and history. But whence\ndid the erudition and philology of the positivistic period derive\nthat pride which made them believe that they were themselves history,\nsave from the consciousness that they had inherited from romanticism,\nwhich they had preserved and exaggerated? Whence did they inherit the\nsubstance of their method save (as Fueter well notes) from the romantic\nsearch for the primitive, the genuine, the ingenuous, which manifested\nitself in Wolf, who inaugurated the method? It is well to remember that\nWolf was a pre-romantic, an admirer of Ossian and of popular poetry.\nAnd, finally, what is the meaning of the efforts of positivism to\nseek out the _causes_ of history, the series of historical facts, the\n_unity_ of the factors and their dependence upon a _supreme cause,_\nsave the speculations of the romantics themselves upon the manner,\nthe end, and the value of development? Whoever pays attention to all\nthese and other resemblances which we could enumerate must conclude\nthat positivism is to romanticism as was the enlightenment to the\nRenaissance--that is to say, it is not so much its antithesis as it is\nthe logical prosecution and the exaggeration of its presuppositions.\nEven its final conversion into theology corresponds to that of\nromanticism. This is for the rest an obvious matter, for transcendency\nis always transcendency, whether it be thought of as that of a God\nor of reason, of nature or of matter. But thinking of it as Matter\nor Nature, this naturalistic and materialistic travesty, which at\nfirst seems odious or ridiculous, of the problems and conceptions of\nromanticism, of the idea into cause, of development into evolution,\nof the spirit into mass and the like, to which one would at first be\ninclined to attribute the inferiority of positivistic historiography,\nis, on the contrary, for the close observer the progress made by it\nupon romanticism. That travesty contains the energetic negation of\nhistory as moved by extramundane forces, by external finalities,\nby transcendental laws, just both in its motive and in its general\ntendency, and the correlative affirmation that its law must be sought\nin reality, which is one and is called 'nature.' The positivism,\nwhich on no account wished to hear anything of 'metaphysic,' had in\nmind the dogmatic and transcendental metaphysic, which had filtered\ninto the thought of Kant and of his successors; and the target of its\ncontempt was a good one, although it ended by confusing metaphysic\nwith philosophy in general, or dogmatic with critical metaphysic,\nthe metaphysic of being with that of the mind, and was not itself\naltogether free from that which it undertook to combat. But this does\nnot prevent its repugnance to 'metaphysic' and, restricting ourselves\nto what is our more immediate interest, to the 'philosophy of history'\nfrom having produced durable results. Thanks to positivism historical\nworks became less na\u00efve and richer in facts, especially in that class\nof facts which romanticism had neglected, such as the dispositions\nthat are called natural, the processes that are called degenerative or\npathological, the spiritual complications that are called psychological\nillusions, the interests that are called material, the production and\nthe distribution of wealth, or economic activity, the facts of force\nand violence, or of political and revolutionary power. Positivism,\nintent upon the negation of transcendency and upon the observation of\nwhat appertained to it, felt itself to be, and was in that respect, in\nthe right. And each one of us who pays due attention to that order of\nthings and renews that negation is gathering the fruit of positivism,\nand in that respect is a positivist. Its very contradictions had the\nmerit of making more evident the contradictions latent in romantic\nhistoriography. This merit must be admitted to the most extravagant\ndoctrines of the positivists, such as that of Taine, that knowledge\nis a true hallucination and that human wisdom is an accident (_une\nrencontre_), which presumed irrationality to be the normal condition,\nmuch as Lombroso believed that genius is madness. Another instance\nof this is the attempt to discover in what way heterogeneity and\nhistorical diversity come into existence, if homogeneity is posited;\nand again the methodical canon that the explanation of history is to\nbe found in causality, but is to stop at genius and virtue, which are\nwithout it, because they refuse to accept of causal explanation, or\nthe frightful Unknowable, which was placed at the head of histories\nof the real, after so great a fuss being made about that Titan\nscience which was ready to scale the skies. But since romanticism\nhad left spirit and nature without fusion, the one facing the other,\nit was just that if in the first place spirit swallowed up nature\nwithout being able to digest it (because, as had been laid down, it\nwas indigestible), now nature was engaged in doing the same thing to\nspirit, and with the same result. So just and logical was this that\nnot a few of the old idealists went over to the crassest materialism\nand positivism, and that confession of not being able to see their way\nin the confusion was at once instructive and suggestive, as was also\nthe perplexity decorated with the name of 'agnosticism.' And as the\nprecise affirmation of the positivity of history represented an advance\nin thought, so the antithesis of materialism, pushed to an extreme, was\nan advance in the preparation of the new problem and in the new way of\nsolving the relation between spirit and nature. _Oportet ut scandala,\neveniant,_ and this means that even scandal, the scandal of the absurd,\nand of offensive false criticisms of human conscience, is an advance.\n\n\n\n\nVIII\n\n\nTHE NEW HISTORIOGRAPHY CONCLUSION\n\n\nThe romantic current not only maintained itself in its excesses during\nthe dominion of positivism, and, as we have shown, insinuated itself\neven into its naturalistic antithesis, but it also persisted in its\ngenuine form. And although we have not spoken of pedantic imitators\nand conservatives--whose significance is slight in the history of\nthought, that is to say, confined to the narrow sphere in which they\nwere compelled to think for themselves--we have nevertheless recorded\nthe preservation of romanticism in the eclecticism of Ranke, who\nadhered to the theories of Humboldt (another 'diplomatist'). Idealistic\nand romantic motives continued to illuminate the intellect and soul\namong the philosophers, from Humboldt to Lotze and from Hartmann to\nWundt and those who corresponded to them in other countries. The like\noccurred in historiography properly so called, and could not but\nhappen, because, if the formulas of agnosticism and of positivism had\nbeen followed to the letter, all light of thought would have been\nextinguished in blind mechanicism--that is to say, in nothing--and no\nhistorical representation would have been possible. Thus political,\nsocial, philosophical, literary, and artistic history continued to\nmake acquisitions, if not equally important with those of the romantic\nperiod (the surroundings were far more favourable to the natural\nsciences and to mathematics than to history), yet noteworthy. This is\nset forth in a copious volume upon historiography (I refer to the work\nof Fueter already several times mentioned in this connexion). There\ndue honour will be found accorded to the great work accomplished by\nRanke, which the rapidity of my course of exposition has induced me to\nillustrate rather in its negative aspects, causing me, for instance,\nto allude solely to the contradictions in the _History of the Popes,_\nwhich is notwithstanding a masterpiece. The cogent quality of the\nromantic spirit at its best is revealed in the typical instance of\nTaine, who is so ingenuously naturalistic in his propositions and in\nthe directive principles of his work, yet so unrestrainedly romantic\nin particular instances, as, for example, in his characterization of\nthe French poets or of the Dutch and Italian painters. All this led to\nhis ending in the exaggerated anti-Jacobin romanticism of his _Origines\nde la France contemporaine,_ in the same way that Zola and the other\nverists, those verbal enemies of romanticism, were lyrical in all\ntheir fiction, and the leader of the school was induced to conclude\nhis works with the abstract lyricism of the _Quatre \u00e9vangiles._ What\nhas been observed of Taine is to be applied to Buckle and to the\nother naturalists and positivists, obliged to be historical against\ntheir will, and to the positivists who became followers of historical\nmaterialism, and found the dialectic established in their house without\nbeing able to explain what it was or whence it came. Not all theorists\nof historiography showed themselves to be so resolutely and madly\nnaturalistic as Bourdeau and one or two others; indeed these were few\nin number and of inferior reputation. Eclecticism prevailed among\nthe majority of them, a combination of necessity and of liberty, of\nmasses and individuals, of cause and end, of nature and spirit: even\nthe philosophy of history was admitted, if in no other form, then as a\n_desideratum_ or a problem to be discussed at a convenient time (even\nthough that were the Greek Kalends). Eclecticism, too, presented the\ngreatest variety, from the low level of a trivial arranging of concepts\nin an artificial manner to the lofty heights of interior labour, from\nwhich it seemed at every moment that a new gospel, no longer eclectic,\nmust issue.\n\nThis last form of eclecticism and the open attempts to renew romantic\nidealism more or less completely, as well as romantic methods of\nhistoriography, have become more frequent since modern consciousness\nhas withdrawn itself from positivism and has declared its bankruptcy.\nBut all this is of importance rather as a symptom of a real advance in\nthought. And the new modern philosophies of intuition and philosophy\nof values must be looked upon rather as symptoms than as representing\nprogress in thought (I mean in general, and not in the particular\nthoughts and theories which often form a real contribution). The former\nof these, however, while it correctly criticizes science as an economic\nconstruction useless for true knowledge, then proceeds to shut itself\nup in immediate consciousness, a sort of mysticism, where historical\ndialectic finds itself submerged and suffocated; and the latter,\nplacing the conception of value as guardian of the spirit in opposition\nto the conceptions of science like \"a philosophical _cave canem_\" (as\nour imaginative Tari would have said), leaves open a dualism, which\nstands in the way of the unity of history and of thought as history.\nWhen we look around us, therefore, we do not discover that _new\nphilosophy_ which shall lay the foundations and at the same time afford\njustification for the new historiography by solving the antithesis\nbetween imaginative romanticism and materialistic positivism. And it\nis clear that we are not even able to discuss such a philosophy as a\n_demand,_ because the demand for a particular philosophy is itself the\nthinking of that particular philosophy, and therefore is not a demand\nbut an actuality. Hence the dilemma either of saying nothing about it,\nand in this case of not speaking even of positivism as a period that\nhas been closed and superseded, or of speaking of the new philosophy as\nof something that lives and exists, precisely because it does live and\nexist. And since to renounce talking of it has been rendered impossible\nby the very criticism chat we have devoted to it, nothing remains save\nto recognize that philosophy as something that exists, not as something\nto be invoked. Only we must not _look around us_ in order to see where\nit is, but return to _ourselves_ and have recourse to the thought\nthat has animated this historical sketch of historiography and to all\nthe historical explanations that have preceded it. In the philosophy\nthat we have delineated, reality is affirmed to be spirit, not such\nthat it is above the world or wanders about the world, but such as\ncoincides with the world; and nature has been shown as a moment and a\nproduct of this spirit itself, and therefore the dualism (at least that\nwhich has troubled thought from Thales to Spencer) is superseded, and\ntranscendency of all sorts, whether materialistic or theological in its\norigin, has also been superseded with it. Spirit, which is the world,\nis the spirit which develops, and is therefore both one and diverse, an\neternal solution and an eternal problem, and its self-consciousness is\nphilosophy, which is its history, or history, which is its philosophy,\neach substantially identical with the other; and consciousness is\nidentical with self-consciousness--that is to say, distinct and one\nwith it at the same time, as life and thought. This philosophy, which\nis in us and is ours, enables us to recognize it--that is to say, to\nrecognize ourselves outside of us--in the thought of other men which is\nalso our thought, and to discover it more or less clearly and perfectly\nin the other forms of contemporary philosophy, and more or less clearly\nin contemporary historiography. We have frequent opportunities of\neffecting this recognition, which is productive of much spiritual\ncomfort. Quite lately, for instance, while I was writing these pages,\nthe historical work of a historian, a pure historian, came into my\nhands (I select this instance among many) where I read words at the\nvery beginning which seemed to be my very own: \"My book is based upon\nthe conviction that German historical inquiry must elevate itself to\nfreer movement and contact with the great forces of political life and\nculture, without renouncing the precious tradition of its method, and\nthat it must plunge into philosophy and politics, without experiencing\ninjury in its end or essence, for thus alone can it develop its\nintimate essence and be both universal and national.\"[1] This is the\nphilosophy of our time, which is the initiator of a new philosophical\nand historiographical period. But it is not possible to write the\nhistory of this philosophy and of this historiography, which is subject\nand not _object_, not for the reason generally adopted, which we\nhave found to be false, since it separates the fact of consciousness\nfrom the fact, but for the other reason that the history which we\nare constructing is a history of 'epochs' or of 'great periods,' and\nthe new period is new, just because it is not a period--that is\nto say, something closed. Not only are we not able to describe its\nchronological and geographical outline, because we are ignorant as to\nwhat measure of time it will fill (will it develop rapidly in thirty\nor forty years, or will it encounter obstacles, yet nevertheless\ncontinue its course for centuries?), what extent of countries it\nwill include (will it remain for long Italian or German, confined to\ncertain Italian or German circles, or will it diffuse itself rapidly\nin all countries, both in general culture and in public instruction?),\nbut we are unable to limit _logically_ what may be its value outside\nthese considerations. The reason for this is that in order to be able\nto describe its limitations, it must necessarily have developed its\nantitheses--that is to say, the new problems that will infallibly arise\nfrom its solutions, and this has not happened: we are ourselves on\nthe waves and we have not furled our sails in port preparatory to a\nnew voyage. _Bis hierher ist das Bewusstsein gekommen_ (Knowledge has\nreached this point in its development), said Hegel, at the end of his\nlectures upon the philosophy of history; and yet he had not the right\nto say so, because his development, which went from the unconsciousness\nof liberty to the full consciousness of it in the German world and in\nthe system of absolute idealism, did not admit of prosecution. But\nwe are well able to say so, for we have overcome the abstractness of\nHegelianism.\n\n\n[1] Friedrich Meinecke, _Weltb\u00fcrgerthum und Nationalstaat: Studien zur\nGenesis des deutschen Nationalstaates,_ second edition, preface, p.\nvii. (M\u00fcnchen u. Berlin, Oldenburg, 1911.)","title":"Theory & History of Historiography","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":88835}