{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_54860/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_54860","id":"gutenberg_54860","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/54860","summary":null,"tags":["Aesthetics","Category: Biographies","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Croce, Benedetto, 1866-1952"],"text":"BENEDETTO CROCE\n\nAN INTRODUCTION TO HIS PHILOSOPHY\n\nby\n\nRAFFAELLO PICCOLI\n\nWITH A FOREWORD BY\n\nH. WILDON CARR\n\nJONATHAN CAPE\n\nELEVEN GOWER STREET, LONDON\n\n1922\n\n\n\n\nFOREWORD\n\n\nThis book is the account of the life and activity of one who is\nliving and acting. Herodotus tells us the Greeks had a proverb which\nforbade them to pronounce any man happy before he is dead. We may\ncertainly take his warning to this extent,--that we should refrain\nfrom attempting to fix a philosopher's thought so long as he continues\nto think. Benedetto Croce has, it is true, presented his Philosophy\nof Mind in such \"questionable shape,\" that it gives the student the\nimpression of finality, the feeling that a doctrine which throughout\nthe history of philosophy has been struggling for expression has now\nat last come to light. But this appearance of finality is due to a\ncertain artistic power which Croce possesses in an eminent degree, the\npower of reliving the past and making history interpret life. Beneath\nall his systematization there is the germ of a new life, a new life,\nwhich, will take form in new problems. While then we may say that no\nliving philosopher has given so complete an appearance of finality to\nhis doctrine as Croce has done in his _Philosophy of Mind_ it is really\nthe reflection of a work of art which serves only to conceal the living\nthought.\n\nThe publishers of this Introduction to the philosophy of Benedetto\nCroce by Dr. Raffaello Piccoli have courteously invited me to write\nthis foreword inasmuch as I was the first to introduce this philosophy,\notherwise than by translations, to the attention of English students. I\ndo so very gladly. My own work was confined to the purely philosophical\nwritings, my interest in them having been first aroused by the striking\naddress on \u00c6sthetic delivered by Croce to the International Congress of\nPhilosophy at Heidelberg in 1908. When I wrote my book, the _Philosophy\nof Mind_ consisted of three volumes, the _Estetica_, the _Logica_,\nand the _Pratica_, but before I had completed my account I read in\nCroce's Journal Critica the announcement of the forthcoming publication\nof the fourth volume on the _Theory and History of the Writing of\nHistory_. Croce had, it seemed to me, closed his book on _Practice_\nwith the plain indication, not that he had solved every philosophical\nproblem, nor that philosophy was not an external problem, but that\nhe had given an exhaustive account of the stages or degrees in their\norder as moments of the developing life of the mind, and that outside\nthese degrees there were no others. The new work did not, indeed,\neither negative or qualify this conclusion, but it bore evidence of the\nceaseless activity of his mind. Are we then, because the philosophy of\nCroce is still developing, to refrain from the attempt to interpret\nit on the ground that any meaning we may find in it is indefinite and\ninsecure? Certainly not, for a philosopher's thinking unfolds and\ndevelops like a living thing, it is not constructed like a building,\nnor does it rest on foundations which may be unsound.\n\nDr. Raffaello Piccoli, a professor in the University of Pisa, and\nthe author of this book, was born in Naples, Croce's city, in 1886.\nHe himself as a young student came under the personal spell of the\nphilosopher he writes about, and grew up in the intellectual atmosphere\nwhich his philosophy was creating. To this great advantage he has added\nanother, for first in Australia, and later in the Universities of\nEngland and America he has acquired a perfect command of our language\nand a thorough knowledge of our philosophy. He is specially qualified,\ntherefore, to give a first-hand account of Croce's literary and\nphilosophical activity, and the kind of influence it has had in forming\nthe mind of Modern Italy.\n\nThe author has not confined himself to an exposition of the philosophy\nof Croce in its narrow and technical meaning, he has given us an\naccount of the whole of his literary and historical activity. He\nhas traced the origin of his philosophy in the circumstances of his\nparentage, early life and education, and has followed biographically\nthe formation of his philosophical theories and the direction of his\nphilosophical interest. He has shown how his general trend of thought,\nhis literary tastes and historical studies without any professional\nspur, by the very nature and force of the problems with which they\nconfronted him, led to philosophy as the dominant and culminating\ninterest of life.\n\nPhilosophers and philosophies have had in our generation to undergo the\ntrial of a fiery furnace. The Great War and the passions aroused by\nit and the estrangement between nations nurtured in the same Western\nculture have been a fierce test of principles. In regard to every\ngreat leader we ask first how he reacted to the conflicting emotions\nof the international struggle. Dr. Piccoli has dealt with this latest\nand crucial period of Croce's activity in a very sympathetic spirit.\nCroce's attitude at one time exposed him to an extreme unpopularity.\nThis was largely the result of misunderstanding. He has come through\nthe ordeal with enhanced reputation. This, at least, is the author's\njudgment--the judgment of one who himself fought and suffered severely\nin the War.\n\nThe two great achievements of Croce are in the domain of \u00e6sthetical and\nethical theory. Dr. Piccoli shows us each doctrine in its historical\norigin and in its relation to contemporary philosophy. The first is\na reaction against the intellectualism of Hegel. In its affirmation\nof intuition it is in rather striking agreement with the philosophy\nof Bergson, although as Croce's approach is from the side of art\nand literature, and not like Bergson's from the study of biological\nscience, it rather supplements than elucidates Bergson's theory.\nThe second is a reaction against the school of Karl Marx and its\nmaterialistic interpretation of history.\n\nAt the present time Croce is directing his criticism on the new line of\ndevelopment which his own friends and colleagues are taking in regard\nto his own principles, in particular to the \"actual idealism\" of his\ncolleague Professor Giovanni Gentile. To Croce this new doctrine spells\nmysticism, and of mysticism in all its forms he is the open enemy. On\nthis point we may, I think, detect an inclination on the part of Dr.\nPiccoli to disagree with Croce. It will be seen, therefore, that we\nhave in this book a very full and a very welcome account, brought right\nup to date, of one who is, as far as contemporaries can judge, forming\nthe mind of the present age.\n\nH. Wildon Carr\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nWhen, about a year ago, I undertook to write this little book for its\npresent publishers, all that I had in my mind was a brief exposition\nof the solutions given by Croce to a number of philosophical problems\nof vital interest to the students of what were once called the Moral\nSciences. I thought at the time that it would be possible to abstract\nsuch solutions and problems from the body of his Philosophy of Mind,\nwhich is a coherent and austere theory of knowledge of a kind that in\nthe modern decadence of philosophical studies and of general culture\nis rapidly becoming unintelligible even to the most highly cultivated.\nI hoped that the specialized reader, for whom the larger aspects of\nCroce's thought have no appeal, and therefore no meaning, would be able\nto apply those particular solutions to the problems that confronted him\nin his particular branch of studies, by translating them into terms of\nhis own na\u00efve philosophy.\n\nThis plan had also a personal advantage, inasmuch as it did not compel\nme to a conscious revision of my own position in regard to those\nlarger aspects of Croce's philosophy. But as soon as I began to think\nconsistently of this book, the history of my own reactions to Croce's\nwork came back to me so vividly that I found it impossible to set it\naside; and I discovered that this supposed advantage was a delusion,\ntowards which I had probably been drawn by a very human, very natural\ndesire of avoiding the most obvious difficulties of my task.\n\nAs a young man, in my student days in Italy, I was a fervid and\nenthusiastic follower of Croce's ideas: one of the many who used to\nswear, as we were wont to say, _in verba Crucis._ To the generation\nwho opened the eyes of their intellect in the dawn of the century,\nhe had revealed what seemed to be the only safe path between the two\nprecipices of a pseudo-scientific materialism on one hand, and of a\nmysticism on the other, which in all its many forms (traditionalism,\nmodernism, pragmatism, intuitionism, \u00e6stheticism, super-humanism,\nfuturism) could not be anything less than an abdication of thought for\nthe sake of the emotions. And it should not be wondered at, if Croce's\nbooks, appearing at short intervals between 1900 and 1910, and building\nup what presented itself to us as a complete system of answers to\nall, or practically all, our most pressing spiritual questions, were\nreceived by us with deep gratitude but with very little constructive\ncriticism. They covered such an enormous space on the map of European\nculture, that even for the most ambitious among us, they were very\noften the first introduction to entirely new fields of studies, and all\nwe could do was to follow our guide in his voyages of rediscovery: to\nrepeat within ourselves the strenuous experience of which each of those\nbooks was a report and a testimony.\n\nImpatience with a master who was not of the kind we had been accustomed\nto, who could not be easily digested, surpassed and disposed of, but\nhad as much energy and courage, as light a step and as curious a mind,\nas the most gifted among his pupils, prompted a good deal of immature\nand capricious criticism, which was but a means for an arbitrary\nliberation. It was an amusing sight to see Croce assailed and, to the\nsatisfaction of his critics, destroyed, with weapons that nobody could\nhave provided but Croce himself, and a dwarf victoriously brandishing\nagainst the giant a toothpick for a sword. But there is no epic of\nthought without such comic interludes.\n\nMy own faith in Croce was not shaken until intercourse with one of the\ngreatest critical minds of our day, and the representative of a totally\ndifferent philosophical tradition, a mathematician and a philosopher,\nshowed me the weakness of the foundations not of Croce's, but of my own\nidealism. And a long residence in England, where I became intimately\nacquainted with certain logical habits utterly unlike our Latin ways of\nthought, made me profoundly sceptical of the intellectual advantages of\nwhatever dogmatism might have been in me. Yet I continued for a long\ntime to keep as it were in separate compartments those that had seemed\nto me to be established truths in Croce's system, and speculations of\na quite different order on problems which were forced upon me by my\nown experience of life and by contact with a new moral and cultural\nenvironment.\n\nAll this was in the happy days of peace. The war from its very\nbeginning appeared to me, then living in one of the most purely\nintellectual centres of Europe, at one of the oldest Universities\nof England, as the catastrophe of our whole intellectual life. From\nthe trials of the war I emerged with infinitely less faith in the\nvalue of our intellectual possessions than I ever had had before, and\nat the same time with the firm conviction that intelligence, more\nintelligence, a deeper, purer, more active, charitable, courageous and\npervasive intelligence, is our only hope for the future.\n\nIt was with such a disposition that I took up this work, and read what\nCroce had been writing during the war. Three things, in the course\nof this new acquaintance with him, and while I was meditating and\nlecturing on him during my American peregrinations, became very clear\nto me. The first, that his thought is not a system in the ordinary\nsense of the word, but a method; that therefore it is impossible\nto sever parts of his philosophy from the main body, the truth of\nparticular propositions being dependent upon an understanding of the\nwhole.\n\nThe second, that in the last few years the progress of his thought has\nbeen so considerable that an attempt at giving a general exposition of\nhis philosophy without any regard to the successive stages of growth,\nat describing as a static structure what is a dynamic process, would\ninevitably lead to the construction of a fanciful system, of an image\ntotally different from the original.\n\nThe third, that whatever our individual position may be in relation to\nhis ideas, his work before, during and after the war will remain as the\nmost solemn contemporary monument of that intellectual civilization\nof Europe, of which we have seen so many false idols, so many white\nsepulchres, go under during these seven years of passion.\n\nThe conclusion to be drawn from these considerations was obvious:\nfirst, that I had to give up my former plan, and this with no regret,\nas I ought to have remembered what Croce has taught again and again,\nthat to the na\u00efve philosophy of the specialist his own solutions of his\nparticular problems, however childish they may appear from a higher\nstandpoint, are perfectly adequate, that ready-made, formal solutions\nare no solutions at all, and the only truth is the one that we conquer\nby our own effort, under the impulse of our own need. And second,\nthat, however conscious I was and am of my own limitations, I had to\ntake a first step in the direction of constructive criticism by trying\nto retrace the history, the ideal biography, of the philosophy of\nCroce. With the exception of a little book written by Croce himself,\nthere is very little help to be found for a work of this kind in the\nvast literature that has grown in the last twenty years, in Europe\nand in America, around his work. And I firmly believe that there\nis not one man in Europe or in America who is qualified to do that\nwork of creative interpretation which ought to be at the same time a\nhistory and a criticism of Croce's philosophical activity: least of\nall, the professional philosopher, who has dealt all his life with\nthe conceptual residuum of the problems of life, and has no direct\nexperience of any of them. Croce, as this little book will try to show,\nhas always come to the concept from the concrete, particular problem,\nand has occupied himself with such a variety of problems, going into\nthem so deeply and so thoroughly, that a complete valuation of his work\nwill never be possible to a single man, but will _take place,_ will\n_happen,_ in the history of the various disciplines, and in the general\nhistory of thought, for years and years to come. For the present, and\nas long as he will be alive and thinking, the only creative interpreter\nof Croce is Croce himself.\n\nThis book does not therefore intend to substitute itself, not even as\na summary and a short cut for lazy minds, to the works of Croce. It\nis rather an introduction to those works, and at the same time the\nconfession of one individual experience of that philosophy. It is\nan historical sketch, and implicitly a criticism, since our way of\nunderstanding a thought is our judgment of that thought (when not a\njudgment that that thought passes on us); a sketch which I think I can\nhonestly write because so much of that philosophy has been the daily\nfood of my intellectual life, my own history, for years. Before the\nwar I should probably have been able to write it with less difficulty,\nwith more complete adhesion; but the perspective of these few years\nwill make it perhaps less passionate and more reflective. An explicit\ncriticism of the whole philosophy of Croce it is not, and it does\nnot attempt to be: the reader may find traces of my doubts and of my\npreoccupations in it, but I have humbly tried to give not more, and I\nhope not less, than what he has a right to expect from the title.\n\nI do not write this book for the professors of philosophy. Those among\nthem who know Croce will not need it; and those who either have not as\nyet taken any notice of him, or from a casual acquaintance with one of\nhis books have proceeded to damn most vigorously what they have hardly\nunderstood, are certainly beyond my power. I write it for the young,\nfrom the heart of my own now fast receding youth, trying to raise\nbefore their eyes, in the words of Dante to Brunetto Latini,\n\n    _la cara e buona immagine paterna_\n    _di voi, quando .... ad ora ad ora_\n    _m'insegnavate come l'uom s'eterna._\n\nI trust that they will find in it what they need not less than we of an\nolder generation needed it, and what I know they are thirsting for: an\nexample of intellectual energy and of moral strength converging into\na life of unremitting devotion to the service of that truth which is\nlight and love and joy,--our only light against the menace of darkness.\n\nRaffaello Piccoli.\n\nNorthampton, Mass., June-October, 1931.\n\n\n\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n\nIntroduction\n\n    I. The Beginnings\n   II. Early Environment\n  III. The Origins of his Thought\n\nPART FIRST\n\nFrom Philology to Philosophy (1893-1899)\n\n    I. History as Art\n   II. On Literary Criticism\n  III. History and Economics\n\nPART SECOND\n\nThe Philosophy of Mind (1900-1910)\n\n    I. The Growth of the System\n   II. Intuition and Expression\n  III. The Concept of Art\n   IV. Criticism and Technique\n    V. The Pure Concept\n   VI. The Forms of Knowledge\n  VII. The Theory of Error\n VIII. The Practical Activity\n   IX. Economics and Ethics\n    X. The Laws\n\nPART THIRD\n\nPhilosophy as History (1911-1921)\n\n    I. Works and Days\n   II. The Theory of History\n  III. Criticism and History\n   IV. Veritas filta temporis\n\nBibliographical Note\n\nIndex\n\n\n\n\nBENEDETTO CROCE\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nCroce's family, and early education--His religion--Life in Rome in\nthe eighties--Labriola's influence--Meditations on ethics--Return\nto Naples; life as a scholar--Travels; and the problem of history\n--Philosophus fit--The intellectual conditions of Italy after the\nRisorgimento--Contemporary European culture--American analogies\n--Two leaders of Italian thought--Francesco de Sanctis--Giosu\u00e8\nCarducci--Croce's approach to philosophy, and his method of work--His\nrelations to the philosophical practition--Vico and the philosophy of\nthe Renaissance--Bruno and Campanella--The humanism of Vico--Naturalism\nand spiritualism--A philosophy of the human spirit.\n\n\n\n\nI. The Beginnings\n\n\nBenedetto Croce was born in 1866, in a small town in the Italian\nprovince of Aquila, the only son of an old-fashioned, Catholic, and\nconservative Neapolitan family. His grandfather had been a high\nmagistrate, untouched by the new liberal currents in his devotion to\nthe old r\u00e9gime and to the Bourbon dynasty then reigning in Naples. His\nfather followed the traditional maxim of the \"good people\" of Naples:\nthat an honest man must take care of his family and of his business,\nand keep away from the intrigues of political life. His mother was\na woman of culture and taste, such as the old type of education\nfor women, which is now as completely forgotten as if it had never\nexisted, used to produce. Bertrando Spaventa, the philosopher, and\nSilvio Spaventa, a statesman who had brought to his enthusiasm for the\nnational cause all the traditions of his Neapolitan conservatism, were\nher brothers: both of them, however, estranged from Croce's family\nbecause of their political ideas.\n\nThe child grew in this greyish, subdued atmosphere, in which the only\ntouches of colour were added by his own passion for books of history\nand romance, and by the visits to the beautiful old churches to which\nhe accompanied his mother. To the circumstances of his childhood, Croce\nattributes the relative delay in the development of his political\nfeelings and ideals, for a long time submerged by his interests in\nliterature and erudition. But because every fault brings with itself\nsome compensation, he also owed to them his critical attitude towards\npartisan political legends, his impatience towards the rhetoric of\nliberalism, his vehement dislike of great emphatic words, and of any\nkind of pomp and ceremony, together with a power to appreciate what is\nuseful and effectual in the actions of men, wherever it may come from.\n\nAs a boy, he went to a Catholic \"collegio\" or boarding school, and\nin this too his experience differed from that of the majority of his\ncontemporaries. The insistence on lay education imparted by the State,\nand the preference for the day school, which allows the family to\nsupplement the work of the school, in fact, to take care of the moral\nand social side of education, as distinct from the purely intellectual\none, are characteristics of the new Italian methods, obviously in\nkeeping with the general tendencies of the age. I remember that to\nmyself as a boy it was inexplicable why anybody should be sent to a\n\"collegio\" unless he were an orphan or an unmanageable scamp. But Croce\nseems to have enjoyed his experience, to which he was submitted merely\nin accordance with the habits of his family; and even now he praises\nthe system for breeding in him those feelings of loyalty and honour,\nwhich are the result of life in common with boys of one's own age, and\nof the necessity of adapting oneself to a variety of dispositions and\ntemperaments.\n\nClassical secondary education in Italy roughly corresponds in its\nscope, even to-day, to that which is imparted in Anglo-Saxon countries\nby secondary schools and liberal colleges. It is supposed to end the\n\"formative\" phase of education, and to lead to the higher phase in the\nUniversities, which is, whether cultural or professional, of a highly\nspecialized and \"informative\" kind. It is the direct outcome of the\nhumanistic tradition, and rather more so in the clerical schools, like\nthe one which Croce attended, than in the public ones. By the time he\nwas ready for the University, he must have had a good knowledge of the\nclassics, as a general background to a mainly literary and historical\nculture, in which the elements of scientific knowledge, and a good deal\nof mathematics, had also their place.\n\nThe religion which played such an important part in his family and\nschool life was probably little more than a habit with him: a set\nof answers to certain fundamental problems which, accepted on the\nauthority of parents and teachers, released his mind for the pursuit\nof his favourite studies. And yet, there is no doubt that we can\nfind traces of this religious education in all his work: a personal\nexperience of the catholic catechism and of catholic morality brings\na spirit in contact with some of the great ideas and of the great\nrealities of life in a much more intimate and profound way than the\npurely intellectual apprehensions of the same ideas and realities ever\nwill. It creates habits of mind and moral tastes which will still be\nrecognizable even after the individual mind to which they belong has\nundergone the most radical changes. In a philosopher, in particular, it\nforms a kind of personal background to thought, similar to that which\nmodern philosophy actually has in its own history: it reproduces in the\nyouth of one man that religious phase which corresponds to the youth of\na civilization, and is the source of the intellectual development of a\nmore conscious age. At intervals during his adolescence, Croce's faith\nintensified itself into passing aspirations towards a life of devotion,\nuntil it quietly vanished, so to speak, from his consciousness, through\nno great dramatic crisis, but merely in consequence of a course\nof lessons on the philosophy of religion, which were intended to\nstrengthen it and make it more resistant to criticism, during the last\nyears of his secondary education. At about the same time, having come\nunder the influence of both Carducci and De Sanctis, he began to write,\nand contributed his first articles to a literary weekly, the _Fanfulla\ndella Domenica_, which represented the most vigorous and advanced\ntendencies of the day.\n\nIn 1883, in the earthquake of Casamicciola, in the island of Ischia\nnear Naples, Croce lost both his parents and his only sister, he\nhimself remaining buried for several hours under the ruins, and broken\nin several parts of his body. The years immediately following were\nthe \"saddest and darkest\" of his life, and he spent them in Rome in\nthe house of his uncle Silvio Spaventa, which was one of the most\nconspicuous political and intellectual centres of the capital of\nthe new kingdom. Spaventa was one of the leaders of the Right, or\nConservative party, which had been thrown out of office by the Left, or\nLiberal party, a few years before; by him and by his friends the young\nCroce was strengthened in his mistrust of the prevailing ideas and\nmethods, which he heard bitterly and sarcastically criticised by men of\ngreat culture and of profound political honesty. While his temperament\nand the shadow of his grief kept him away from the brilliant social\nlife of the Roman _jeunesse dor\u00e9e_ his relations with the men of a\nparty which had little hope of ever coming back to power prevented him\nfrom taking any part in active political life, in sharp contrast with\nthe habits of the majority of Italian university students, to whom\npolitics are what the major sports are to Anglo-Saxon students. He\ndivided his time between the University and the great Roman libraries,\namong which the one he loved best was the Casanatense, in those years\nstill served by Dominican monks, a typical old monastic library, its\nbenches provided with old-fashioned inkhorns, sandboxes with golden\nsand, and goose-quills. Anyone seeing him there, buried among his\nancient and curious books, and not suspecting the deep perpetual\ndissatisfaction and unhappiness which accompanied him in a work which\nseemed to be but a work of love, would have prophesied for him the life\nof one of those ascetics of erudition, intoxicated by the romantic dust\nof the past, who still haunt the solemn halls and the dark corridors of\nthe libraries of the old world.\n\nBut the great event of his University life, the one which awakened\nhim from the torpor of mere erudition, and set before him a new goal\nand a higher hope, was the lessons on moral philosophy which he heard\nfrom Antonio Labriola. Croce himself has described this new, decisive\nexperience: \"Those lessons came unexpectedly to meet my harrowing need\nof rebuilding for myself in a rational form a faith in life, and in\nthe aims and duties of life; I had lost the guidance of a religious\ndoctrine, and at the same time I was feeling the obscure danger of\nmaterialistic theories, whether sensistic or associationistic, about\nwhich I had no illusions at all, as I clearly perceived in them the\nsubstantial negation of morality itself, resolved into a more or less\ndisguised egotism. Herbart's ethics taught by Labriola restored in my\nmind the majesty of the ideal, of _that which has to be_ as opposed\nto _that which is,_ and mysterious in its opposition, but because of\nthis same mysteriousness, absolute and uncompromising.\"[1] Labriola's\ninfluence on Croce was not limited to the classroom; the professor\nand the student became friends, and Croce enjoyed the benefit of his\nwonderful gifts as a conversationalist, on which even more than on\nhis academic activity, or on his published work, his fame rests. He\nseems to have been an awakener of souls, an intellectual stimulant in\nthe fashion of the Greek philosophers, a breaker of new paths and a\nspiritual guide such as a younger generation had in the mathematician\nVailati.\n\nThe mind of the young scholar is henceforth constantly occupied by\nmeditations on the concepts of pleasure and duty, of purity and\nimpurity, of actions prompted by the attraction of the pure, moral\nidea, and of actions which result in apparent moral effects through\npsychic associations, through habits, through the impulse of the\npassions. It is easy to discover the dependence of such meditations on\nthe early religious education of Croce; they are the link, in fact,\nbetween his religion and his philosophy, since we find them, at a\nmore mature and elaborate stage, reflected in the third volume of his\n_Philosophy of Mind,_ which, to the eyes of its author, has still an\nalmost autobiographical aspect, entirely concealed from the reader by\nits didascalic form.\n\nThe plan of life that he sketched for himself about this time, was a\ndistinctly disillusioned and pessimistic one: on one hand, he would\npursue his erudite and literary work, partly because of his natural\ninclination towards it, and partly because one has anyhow to do\nsomething in this world; and he would, on the other hand, fulfil his\nmoral duties to the best of his capacity, conceiving them to be above\nall _duties of compassion._ In later years he criticised this view as a\npurely selfish one, since \"the true and high compassion is that which\none practices by setting the whole of one's self in harmony with the\nends of reality, and by compelling others too to move towards those\nends, and a kind heart makes itself truly and seriously kind only\nthrough an ever broader and deeper understanding.\"[2]\n\nAfter three years of residence in Rome, Croce returned to Naples, where\nhe lived in the society of curious and learned old men, librarians\nand archivists, all absorbed in minute and painstaking historical\nresearches. The moderate fortune which he had inherited from his\nparents gave him the independence he needed for his quiet, laborious\ntastes, and allowed him gradually to collect in his own house a very\nlarge and precious library. To it he owed also the possibility of\nlearning without teaching, and therefore of keeping his own work\nentirely free from any academic taint: of subordinating his studies\nrather to the necessities of the development of his own personality\nthan to those of professional specialization.\n\nPractically all the production of the years between 1886 and 1892 is\nconcerned with one aspect or another of the history of Naples. Through\nhis researches on the Neapolitan theatres, on Neapolitan life in the\neighteenth century, and on the literature of the seventeenth century,\nhe acquired an intimate and exhaustive knowledge of the minutest\nliterary, political, social and arch\u00e6ological details of that life\nof his own city, which was the immediate historical background of\nhis own life. Towards the end of this period, this complex activity\ncrystallized itself into two rather ambitious enterprises: the editing\nof a _Biblioteca letteraria napoletana_, for the publication of texts\nand documents of Neapolitan literature; and of a periodical, _Napoli\nNobilissima_, which in the fifteen years of its existence collected an\nenormous amount of material for the history and arch\u00e6ology of Naples,\nand to which Croce himself contributed the essays of his _Storie e\nleggende napoletane_.\n\nWe have here a Croce, who, though not a professor, was yet truly a\nspecialist: one of that great host of local and municipal historians\nwhich are to be met with in even the least important Italian towns.\nAnd undoubtedly this kind of activity offered him, as he willingly\nacknowledges, not only an outlet for his youthful imagination, in\nthe reconstruction of an adventurous and picturesque past, but a\nformal discipline of precision and thoroughness in scientific work.\nBut it must be remembered that municipal or regional history in Italy\nhas in many cases the breadth and depth of national history in other\ncountries, because of the number and variety of divergent political,\nliterary and artistic traditions which are present in the life of each\nItalian city or state. And Naples, though she never had as preponderant\na part in the formation of the national consciousness as either Rome\nor Florence, was a world in herself, with her own art and poetry, with\nher own philosophical and political tendencies, with her peculiar\nrelations to non-Italian states and cultures, such as France and Spain.\nCroce's Neapolitan researches, however specialized and barren they\nmay appear at first sight, were therefore well fitted to give him,\nin one particular instance, that direct and concrete experience of\nhistorical reality, of a complex and variegated historical reality,\nwhich is among the necessary premises of his philosophical thought.\nThey gave him also a clearer consciousness of the processes of thought\nwhich were naturally connected with that particular experience, and\nthey thus helped him to penetrate the minds of his two great Neapolitan\npredecessors, Vico and De Sanctis. And finally, especially through\nhis interest in the cultural relations between Naples and Spain, they\nenlarged his horizon from the problems of local to those of general\nEuropean history.\n\nHe visited, always as a scholar, not only Spain, but France and\nEngland and Germany, constantly widening the range of his excursions\nin libraries and archives. But the more he acquired of the knowledge\nof individual facts, the deeper he felt the futility and vacuity of\ntheir purely material accumulation. There was no end, apparently, to\nthe labor of research and erudition, unless a guiding and limiting\nprinciple should be found: by the mere piling up of historical\ninformation, however minute and exact, it would be forever impossible\nto decipher the secret of the past. No amount of erudition would ever\nmake history. It is no wonder that to a mind which already had been\npreoccupied with religious and moral problems, the problem of its own\nwork should present itself with the same intensity and in the same\nshape as a moral experience. He began to feel a satiety and distaste\nfor that which he had once thought would be the labour of his whole\nlife, and a yearning for a more satisfying, more _intimate_ form of\nactivity. He felt a vague attraction towards a new type of history,\nmoral history, in relation to which all his previous researches\nappeared as a kind of amorphous and unconscious preparation. He planned\na book on the psychological and spiritual history of Italy from the\nRenaissance to our own times, and he undertook a series of studies\non the relations between Spain and Italy, to be followed by similar\nwork in regard to the other nations of Europe, as necessary to a full\nunderstanding of his main theme.\n\nBut his old methods and habits followed him in the new field: again\nit seemed to him that there would be no end to his merely preparatory\nwork, once he had undertaken it in what was practically still his old\nspirit. In fact he had sensed a spiritual need which had announced\nitself by that peculiar feeling so closely resembling one of moral\ndissatisfaction, but he had not been able as yet to formulate the terms\nof his problem. It is probable that what kept him for quite a long time\nfrom doing so was partly the character of his literary education, and\npartly a kind of intellectual humility, which made him distrust his own\npowers, on entering into a completely new form of mental activity.\n\nThe problem which he had to solve for himself was, indeed, not an\nhistorical, or philological, or arch\u00e6ological one, but a purely\nphilosophical one: the problem of the nature of history and of science.\nWe know with what religious awe Croce regarded the professional\nphilosophers at the time; and certainly nothing could have been more\npainful to the young and modest scholar than the thought of stepping\nbeyond the limits of his own specialty, and invading a ground so\npowerfully occupied and defended. But Croce discovered through his\nown experience that you cannot reject a problem, once it is forced\nupon you by the facts of your own life, and that _philosophus fit_\nwith the same kind of necessity with which _poeta nascitur._ It is\nfrom this point that we can observe the transformation of the young\nscholar into a philosopher; his philosophical career will appear to\nus as a continued effort towards the solution of that first problem,\nand of all the problems which followed in its train. The last answer\nto it is in Croce's theory of the identity of history and philosophy;\nand the dependence of this theory on the first impulse from which the\nwhole of his philosophy arose is clearly visible in the desire which\nhe has again and again expressed and partly fulfilled in his latest\nwritings, of going back from abstract and formal philosophy to the\nphilosophy of particular facts or history: _storia pensata_; \"since\nthis is the meaning of the identity of philosophy and history, that we\nphilosophize whenever we think, whatever may be the subject or form of\nour thought.\"[3] The philosophy of Croce, which begins with the raw\nmaterial of history, presenting itself as a dense, impenetrable mass,\nends in a new conception of history, which is permeated in all its\nparts by the vivifying breath of thought.\n\nI may add here, since it will be very hard to interrupt the history\nof his intellectual development with biographical details, that the\nnew direction of his thought did not alter Croce's external mode of\nlife; that the discipline acquired in his early work remained the norm\nof all his later activity; that he accepted public offices in his\nown town, and later as a senator (which in Italy is a life-office)\nand as a Minister of Public Education in the last Giolitti Cabinet,\ncertainly more out of the consciousness of a moral obligation than\nthrough his inclination or his ambition. His life on the whole has been\nand is essentially that of the scholar and of the thinker: his work, a\npolitical work only in the wide meaning which Plato gives to the word.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: _Contributo,_ pp. 21, 22; and _passim_, pp. 1-30, for\npractically the whole substance of this section.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Contributo_, p. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Contributo_, p. 81.]\n\n\n\n\nII. Early Environment\n\n\nBenedetto Croce was thirty-four years old in nineteen hundred: his\neducation (if it is possible to set a term to the education of\na philosopher) is therefore the work of the last quarter of the\nnineteenth century. A rapid examination of the intellectual conditions\nof Italy during those years will help us to see that education in its\ntrue light, that is, as a reaction to, rather than a fruit of, the\nenvironment.\n\nThe Risorgimento, with its fifty years of wars and revolutions\ncoming close on the heels of the great Napoleonic upheaval, left\nItaly materially and morally exhausted. After centuries of foreign\ndomination, of political and spiritual servitude, all the elements\nof Italian culture had been gathered by the two generations of the\nRisorgimento into a new culture, which was much more an instrument\nof combat, for the conquest of unity and independence, considered as\nthe necessary premises of national life, than the best soil for the\nspiritual growth of that life after the conquest. This new culture, in\nthe poets who had announced and formed it, Parini, Alfieri, Foscolo,\nLeopardi, Manzoni, in its philosophers, Rosmini and Gioberti, and in\nits prophet and apostle, Mazzini, had forms and spirits, the value and\nmeaning of which by far transcended the importance of its immediate\nhistorical purpose; but through the difficulties and labors of the\npractical effort, it reached the end of the period shorn of a good deal\nof what was deepest, most beautiful, nearest to the universal, in it.\nItaly in 1870 was very much like the sprinter who wins the race, but\ncollapses at the crossing of the line.\n\nThe culture of Italy had been for centuries oscillating between\nthe pursuit and discovery of certain universal values, which had\ngradually become part of the common European culture (the Roman\nidea, the Christian idea, the main principles, \u00e6sthetic and moral,\nof the Renaissance), and the development of purely local, regional\ncharacteristics. At the end of the Risorgimento, the links that had\nkept Italian culture in constant contact with the rest of Europe were\nbroken, and on the other hand the local cultures found themselves,\nas it were, lost and submerged in the new political readjustment,\nthreatened in their very existence by the new claim of loyalty advanced\nby a literary and abstract national ideal. The duties of Italian\nculture, clearer to us now than to the men who lived in the midst of\nthose events, were then, on one side, to re-establish the connection\nbetween Italian and European culture, and this time more by learning\nthan by teaching--and on the other side to utilize the less particular\nelements of the regional cultures as a foundation for a real and\nconcrete and diffused cultural life in the nation.\n\nThus Italy becomes, at the beginning of her new, unified existence,\nlittle more than a province of European thought. She looks around\nherself and she is compelled to take notice of what had happened beyond\nher frontiers during the last two or three centuries. It is interesting\nto compare the characteristics of the other great nations of Europe\nas they appear to Italy during and after the Risorgimento. England,\nwho had been a symbol of political liberty, a source of political and\neconomic wisdom, reappears as a model of industrial development and\nat the same time as the proclaimer of a new creed to the world, the\ncreed of evolution, which after having infused a fresh spirit in the\nnatural sciences with Darwin, seems to promise a new interpretation of\nhuman life, a new organization of science and of social thought, with\nSpencer. France, the mother of revolutions, the deliverer of the spirit\nof man from the shackles of divine and earthly tyranny, remains, in\na vague and hazy fashion, through the many disappointments that her\npolicies give to her Italian lovers during all this period, the same\nkind of inspiration that she has been ever since the Encyclop\u00e9die and\nthe Revolutions; but contributes to the new effort little more than her\nveristic fiction, in which art itself is reduced to a handmaid of the\ngoddess of the hour, biological and social science.\n\nGermany had saturated with the romantic atmosphere of her poetry the\npassionate struggle of the times, and she had captured a little band\nof thoughtful patriots, among whom we find Croce's uncle, Bertrando\nSpaventa, with the fascination of her new metaphysics, in which they\nfound the fulfilment of all the promises of Italian thought in the\nforegoing centuries; but after her victory over France, the same cause\nthat makes French influence less vigorous, makes also German influence\nless deep and less inspiring. A Germany who has like Faust sold her\nromantic and metaphysical soul, yields only a shadow of her great\nhistorical and philosophical culture of the eighteenth and of the\nfirst half of the nineteenth century, though a tremendously powerful\none, and such that for a long time it overawes the academic mind not\nof Italy only, but of the whole continent. A narrow and materialistic\nphilology, under the name of historical method, becomes the heir to\nthe humanistic tradition, and substitutes itself for every native\nimpulse, even in fields in which Italian thought had been master for\ncenturies, as in that of law: where it mercilessly destroys, of the\nideologies of the Risorgimento, not only that which was arbitrary and\nfanciful, and therefore destined to perish, but even that which through\nthe subsequent course of history was to prove vital and sound. The\nItalian school of international law, the new conception of the Law of\nNations, for instance, which was the fruit of the Italian juridical\ntradition during the experiences of the Risorgimento, and which is\nthe more or less consciously accepted foundation of all the doctrines\nof international relations striving for realization in our times, in\nno country and in no schools was so resolutely repudiated as in the\nItalian universities. And it could not have been otherwise, since the\nnew philology was as static and deterministic a doctrine, only more\nlogically and rigorously so, as the evolutionary positivism which we\nhad learnt from England.\n\nThe faults of Italian culture during this period are therefore the\nfaults of the other European cultures which Italy had to assimilate:\nat a time when Italy was most in need of cultural help from without,\nshe found that, for reasons infinitely complex and totally different\nfrom those which had caused her own exhaustion, the other nations of\nEurope were also spiritually exhausted. And yet it cannot be said that\nfrom these very faults Italy did not draw some useful lessons. The\nso-called historical method, which completely disregarded the great\nforces of history, and made of the least significant historical datum\na _Ding an sich_ in which the mind of the scholar seemed to find its\nultimate object, proved in the end to be a salutary discipline as\nagainst the facile and enthusiastic generalizations of the historians\nof the Risorgimento. Positivism, however barbarous and uncouth in\nitself, was a powerful weapon for the destruction of the last remnants\nof a more or less mythological metaphysics, and in that sense it\nafforded an example of intellectual honesty; and at the same time it\nawakened the consciousness of the continuity of natural and spiritual\nlife, announcing, though in a hasty and imperfect synthesis, what\nevery philosophy of the future will have to be. And about the middle\nof the period which we are now considering, the only real contribution\nof Germany to European thought in the second half of the century\nbecame known in Italy with the advent of Marxism, in which we found\na new conception of history, in so far adequate to the true spirit\nand conditions of the times, as it afforded to blind social forces,\nstriving for political expression, an interpretation of their needs and\na rationalized programme of action.\n\nThe analogies between this general cultural atmosphere, and the present\nconditions of the intellectual world in America, are, provided we\ndo not stress them too hard, so striking that I cannot refrain from\ncalling the attention of the reader to them. I believe this will help\nhim to apply a good many of Croce's criticisms and ideas to tendencies\nand problems with which he is thoroughly familiar. The most recent\nforms of American philosophy, pragmatism, instrumentalism, realism,\nare indigenous elaborations of that same English positivism and\nempiricism which was dominant in Italy a generation ago: the relations\nbetween science and philosophy are seen in the same light in America\nto-day as in Italy before the beginning of this century. And the two\nmost significant and far-reaching directions of research, social\npsychology and psychoanalysis, branching out into every ramification\nof social and moral and \u00e6sthetic thought, are based on assumptions,\nand lead to results, very similar to those of the Spencerian sociology\nand of the Lombrosian theory of insanity and genius. Even in fiction\nAmerica is to-day trying her hand at verism, and in poetry, apart\nfrom a few marked exceptions, she is experimenting in the same spirit\nin which we began to follow, about the end of the period, the most\nrecent fashions of Paris in verslibrism and decadentism. In academic\ncircles German philology has maintained its sway for a much longer\ntime than in Europe, and the war has brought about more an emotional\nthan an intellectual consciousness of the need of a vaster and deeper\nunderstanding of history. Finally, certain aspirations towards ancient\nand totally different systems of moral and \u00e6sthetic standards, embraced\nwith an enthusiasm that is akin to an act of faith--the hope to\ndiscover a refuge and a consolation from the chaos of modernity in a\nrestoration of classical or medi\u00e6val ideals--are American varieties\nof an attitude of mind which found its satisfaction in Italy in\npatterns which we drew after the models of Ruskinism and of French\ntraditionalism.\n\nOn the whole, Italian culture was suffering from the effects of the\nsame delusion which accounts for the straits in which American culture\nis to-day: that European culture could be assimilated through its\nrepresentatives at one particular moment only, and as if it were at\nthe surface of time, rather than by the only legitimate and fruitful\nmethod, which is that of delving beneath that surface for the truly\nfundamental contributions that each nation has made to the common\nmind. Not one of the nations of Europe was then, or is now, at one of\nthose turning points in the history of culture in which principles of\nuniversal value are elaborated within the limits of a single national\ngroup. The only possible exception was that of Russia, sending out to\nan age-worn Europe a fresh message of human pity and Christian love in\na succession of epic masterpieces; but the quality of the message was\nsuch as to affect the heart much more than the intellect, to produce a\nnew and deeper feeling rather than a sounder knowledge.\n\nTwo great individual figures, however, dominate the whole period, and\namong so many contrasting currents of thought and feeling, among the\nfluctuating fashions of the times, connect the new generations with\nthe traditional elements of Italian culture. That breadth of vision,\nthat sense of the perspective of history, which was totally lacking in\nthe prevailing cosmopolitan thought, was a conspicuous characteristic\nof the work of a great critic, Francesco de Sanctis, and of a great\npoet, Giosu\u00e8 Carducci. And what made the secret of the strength of\nthe one as well as of the other, was their fidelity to the regional\ntraditions from which they were issued, coupled with a power to invest\nthem with a much broader significance than they had ever possessed.\nWith De Sanctis, the speculative trend of the Southern Italian mind,\nwith Carducci the humanism of Florence and Tuscany, for the first time\nin history become real elements of a greater national consciousness.\nNeither the one nor the other was, moreover, without a knowledge of,\nand a taste for, foreign cultures; but what they gained from these\nwere elements of more permanent value than the ones which attracted\nthe attention of the crowds, and they both succeeded in grafting those\nforeign elements on their native dispositions in such a way and with\nso little violence that they seemed to belong rightfully to them. This\nis true of what De Sanctis learnt from the idealistic philosophers\nof Germany, and particularly from Hegel, as well as of what Carducci\nacquired from the great poets and historians of the two previous\ngenerations in France, in England, and in Germany. Nor should we marvel\nat this, since by going deep enough or high enough into any of the\nEuropean cultures, it is always possible to find a level that is common\nto all of them.\n\nFrancesco de Sanctis was not a philosopher in the strict meaning\nof the word; yet, among all the European critics of the nineteenth\ncentury, he is the only one from whose works it is possible to derive\na consistent line of \u00e6sthetical thought. His education had been partly\nphilosophical, of old Italian and modern German philosophy; and partly\ngrammatical and rhetorical, in those literary doctrines of the old\nschool which embodied a secular experience, and in comparison with\nwhich the modern _science_ of literature is ineffably shallow and\npuerile. It was through a philosophical elaboration of those doctrines,\nand through a criticism of the intellectualistic \u00e6sthetics of Hegel\nand his followers, for whom art was the sensuous clothing of the\nconcept, that De Sanctis, guided by an unerring taste and by a unique\npower for discerning the essential and vital element in poetry, came\nto his conception of form as not an _a priori,_ a thing by itself and\ndifferent from the content, but something that is generated by the\ncontent itself when active in the mind of the artist. This is the\nprinciple which he had constantly in mind in approaching the concrete\nworks of poetry, and which enabled him to analyze and reproduce the\nterms of the spiritual experiences of which they are an expression.\nThus his _Essays_ and his _History of Italian Literature,_ though\nin a sense the purest and most genuine kind of literary criticism,\nare at the same time a complete spiritual history of a people, as it\nreveals itself in its literary manifestations, such as no other country\npossesses. The immediate influence of his work was not as great as it\nought to have been: the generation of philologists who immediately\nfollowed him was unable to see in him more than a brilliant exponent of\nwhat was then contemptuously called \u00e6sthetic criticism, and could never\nforgive him for his apparent lack of method, due to the circumstances\nof his life as an exile and a politician. It was only unwittingly, and\nthrough the intermediary of a German disciple of De Sanctis, Gaspary,\nwho wrote a standard handbook of Italian literature, that they came to\naccept the greatest part of his interpretations, and followed the main\ndirections of his thought in their own researches.\n\nGiosu\u00e8 Carducci was a disciple of Parini and Alfieri, of Foscolo\nand Leopardi, and in a sense of all that lineage of Italian poets,\nbeginning with Dante and Petrarch, for whom poetry was not less an\narduous discipline for the attainment of a certain standard of formal\nbeauty, set down once and forever by the poets of the classical\ntradition, than a moral and political function in the life of the\nnation. As his predecessors had been, he was not only a poet, but\nalso a student and historian of literature, of literature as the\nonly field in which that life had truly realized itself. But though\nhis contributions to the study of Italian literature were many and\nimportant, and the knowledge and taste which were the instruments of\nhis art made of him an exquisite critic of poetry, yet what even in\nhis historical and critical prose attracts us most is his lyrical\nimagination, his poetry. And his poetry, on the other hand, is mainly\nthe poetry of the history and of the historical and poetical landscape\nof Italy,--of an Italy which was to him not merely one among the\nnations of Europe, but the heir of Greece and of Rome, the cradle of\nwestern civilization; not a land and a community limited in space\nand in time, or not that only, but an ideal of beauty, of freedom,\nof right, of a full and harmonious life, which was Italian, as it\nhad been Greek and Roman, because it was universally human. In his\nearly works, the contrast between this ideal and the actual conditions\nof Italy in his times found expression in a strain of invective\nand satire, from which the poet lifted but rarely his soul to the\ncontemplation of the great deeds and thoughts of the past; of a past\nwhich in some cases was very recent, as some of the men of the French\nRevolution and of the Risorgimento were among his favourite heroes.\nBut later, and especially in his _Odi Barbare,_ for which he adapted a\nnew technique from the metres of ancient Greece, while he added many\npersonal notes to his lyre, his historical inspiration became higher\nand deeper and purer, and Italy had in his poetry that which she had\nlacked in all the course of her literature, a true _epos,_ though in a\nlyrical form, of her secular life, from the fabulous kings and priests\nof Etruria to that most legendary of all her heroes, Garibaldi.\n\nThe influence of Carducci, not a purely literary, but a moral and\npolitical one, on the generation to which Croce belongs, can hardly be\noverestimated; and Croce himself calls his own generation _carducciana_\nAnd the two other great poets that Italy has produced after him,\nD'Annunzio and Pascoli, were both disciples of Carducci at the\nbeginning of their careers. But the formation of their personalities,\nso widely divergent in their later developments, is contemporaneous\nwith what we have called the education of Croce, and therefore outside\nthe scope of this rapid review of the circumstances under which that\neducation took place. The growth of the erotic-heroic poetry of\nD'Annunzio and that of the idyllic-humanitarian poetry of Pascoli are\nno longer among those circumstances but rather products of the same\nenvironment.\n\n\n\n\nIII. The Origins of His Thought\n\n\nThere are philosophers for whom it is possible, and relatively easy,\nto trace the roots of their speculations and of their systems in the\nthought of one or a few predecessors. The research of what we might\ncall their sources, or more precisely of the terms in which certain\nproblems were handed down to them through the particular philosophical\ntradition to which they belong, would probably not lead us very far in\nspace or very deep in time: it might be useful in such cases to preface\nthe history of their thought by a brief summary of these immediate\nantecedents. But in the case of Benedetto Croce, such a summary ought\nto extend, in relation to the problems in which he is or has been\ninterested, to the whole range of the history of human thought. This is\ndue partly to his peculiar approach to the problems of philosophy, and\npartly to his method of work.\n\nPhilosophy is to him neither a special science nor a specialized\ntechnique: not a discipline which requires a scholastic training, and\nwhich you can definitely acquire after a given number of years of\nstudy, but just what it was in the beginning: that love of wisdom\nwhich prompts every man to the exercise of his thinking powers. The\nproblems of philosophy cannot be enumerated and defined, but that which\nhappens to you, or your own doings, in your life, in your conduct, in\nyour work, in your study, is the perpetually renewed material for your\nmeditation. Problems are not given to you from outside, as puzzles at\nwhich you might try your skill or duties imposed by a pedagogue: they\nare your experience, and your philosophy is your conscious logical\nreaction to them.\n\nThis unprofessional and broadly human view of philosophy was not,\nhowever, an obvious and spontaneous attitude of Croce's spirit, but a\nlaborious conquest. In the years of his erudite and unphilosophical\nyouth, at his first coming in contact with philosophy in the strict\nand technical meaning of the word, with philosophical treatises and\ndissertations, his attitude was one of profound respect for the\nprofessors of philosophy, \"as I was persuaded,\" (he tells us in his\nautobiographical notes), \"that they, as specialists, should possess\nthat abstruse science, of whose sacred curtain I had hardly lifted a\nfew folds, and I did not know that in a few years I should with wonder\nand irritation discover that most of them did not possess anything, not\neven that very little which I, merely by my good will to understand,\nhad succeeded in acquiring.\"[4] The fact is that these professors and\nspecialists could hardly be termed philosophers at all, while Croce had\nalready in himself that obscure and tormenting desire for intellectual\nclarity, which is the beginning of philosophy.\n\nBut in this initial ignorance, in his coming as if unaware to the\ngates of the temple, we shall find the reasons of Croce's method of\nwork. When a given problem presents itself to him, not as a subject of\nlearned controversy, but as a spiritual necessity, he becomes suddenly\nconscious of the duty of following the history of that particular\nproblem through centuries of thought. The first impulse may come from\na mere attempt at understanding the terms under which the problem\npresents itself to him: a clarification of words. His mental habits\nare, in fact, those of the conscientious and painstaking philologist,\nand he brings the method and discipline of the severest erudition into\nthe field of logic. There is no problem for him that is purely logical,\nin an abstract and formal sense; still less, purely psychological. The\nmere occasion for his speculation is sometimes offered, as we shall\nsee, by contemporary discussions, but he feels from the very beginning\nthat these discussions are merely concerned with the surface of things,\nare taking place on a plane of thought, mechanical and dilettantesque,\non which all conclusions are equally legitimate and equally irrelevant.\nVery soon, and long before any trace can be found in his writings of\nhis final identification of philosophy with history, he practically\nidentifies each problem with its own history, by retracing, generally\nin an inversely chronological order, the original meanings of terms\nand theories of which contemporary culture gave him only a pale and\ndistorted reflection.\n\nBut this intimate and vital contact with the past never leads him\nto that attitude of reaction, which our forefathers typified in the\n_laudator temporis acti,_ and which even to-day is so abundantly\nexemplified by the scholar who, having laboriously climbed the\nheights of the thought of one man or of one epoch, feels himself\nin the possession of final truth, and smiles contemptuously on the\nchildishness of the moderns. He is as much on his guard against\nthe idols of the school as against the idols of the market place.\nHis relation to the great thinkers of the past is not one of blind\ndiscipleship, but of critical collaboration. The favourite process of\nhis own thought might be defined as one of historical integration.\n\nBy emphasizing one aspect or another of Croce's philosophy, it is\npossible, however, to connect him more particularly with one or another\nphilosopher. The name that is most frequently pronounced in this\nconnection is that of Hegel, probably because Hegel stands, in the mind\nof the positivist and of the pragmatist, for a certain type of thought,\nmuch more ancient than Hegel himself and practically coextensive with\nthe history of philosophy, rather than for what Hegelianism actually\nis. The facile critic of Croce, who condemns and rejects him as a\nHegelian, would probably find it very hard to define the actual\npoints of contact between the two thinkers; but we know that the word\n\"Hegelian\" is more a term of abuse, in such cases, than the expression\nof a critical judgment. Croce himself has defined his attitude towards\nHegel, and generally towards the philosophers of the past, in the\nconclusion of his examination of Hegel's thought: \"I am, and I believe\none has to be, Hegelian; but in the same sense in which any man who\nto-day has a philosophical mind and culture, is and feels himself, at\nthe same time, Eleatic, Heraclitean, Socratic, Platonic, Aristotelian,\nStoic, Sceptic, Neoplatonic, Christian, Buddhist, Cartesian, Spinozian,\nLeibnitzian, Vichian, Kantian, and so on. That is, in the sense that\nno thinker, and no historical movement of thought, can have passed\nwithout fruit, without leaving behind an element of truth, which is an\neither conscious or unconscious part of living and modern thought. A\nHegelian, in the meaning of a servile and bigoted follower, professing\nto accept every word of the master, or of a religious sectarian, who\nconsiders dissension as a sin, no sane person wants to be, and no more\nI. Hegel has discovered, as others have done, one phase of truth; and\nthis phase one has to recognize and defend: this is all. If this shall\nnot take place now, it matters little. 'The Idea is not in haste,' as\nHegel was wont to say. To the same content of truth we shall come,\nsome day, through a different road, and, if we shall not have availed\nourselves of his direct help, looking back on the history of thought\nwe shall have to proclaim him, with many an expression of wonder, a\nforerunner.\"[5]\n\nThis last hypothesis describes what actually happened in the case of\nanother among the ancestors of Croce's Philosophy of Mind. For two\ncenturies either unknown or misunderstood, Vico came into his own only\na few years ago, and mainly through the efforts of Croce himself. In\nVico, that is in Italy at the beginning of the eighteenth century,\npractically all the germs of the idealistic philosophy, and of the\nhistorical and critical culture of the nineteenth century, were already\npresent, as a natural development of the philosophical and humanistic\nRenaissance. And it is through what, in Vichian style, we may call the\ndiscovery of the true Vico, that Croce inserts himself in the central\ntradition of Italian, and European, culture, and is saved from the\ndangers inherent in his catholic attitude towards the philosophers of\nthe past, that of a material, mosaic-like eclecticism on one side, and\nthat of a metaphysical syncretism, such as led Hegel to the dialectic\nconstructions of his Philosophy of History, on the other.\n\nThe philosophy of the Renaissance, in which the fundamental impulses\nthat are the soul of that movement find their clear and distinct\nexpression, had produced a new naturalism and a new spiritualism\nwith Giordano Bruno and Tomaso Campanella: that is, two widely\ndivergent views of reality, which however had sprung from a common\nsource, the opposition to that scholastic synthesis in which all\nthe transcendental elements of Greek and Roman philosophy had been\ngathered to the support of medi\u00e6val theology, in direct relation with\nthe medi\u00e6val description of the cosmos. There has probably never been\nmade in the world, either before or after the Middle Ages, such a\nresolute and comprehensive attempt at an intellectual understanding\nof the moral and material universe, as the one that is the work of\nmedi\u00e6val philosophy: but that attempt had been made possible, and had\nbrought definite results, only through the acceptation of the limits\nof revealed truth, which, however freely accepted, proved in the end\nto be much more compelling than to the modern scientist are the freely\naccepted limits of external reality. Revealed truth could not be a mere\nobject of thought, as it carried within itself, under the mythological\ndisguise, its own metaphysics and its own ethics: a new principle, in\nfact, a more absolute and intimate spirituality than had been known\nto either the Greeks or the Romans, which attracted to itself all the\nkindred elements in ancient thought, and determined the essential\ncharacteristics of medi\u00e6val speculation.\n\nThe discovery and establishment of this spiritual principle, as a\nuniversal reality which transcends nature and the spirit of man,\nand which to this natural and human world is as a law dictated from\noutside and from above, is the message of the Middle Ages, not in\npure philosophy only, but in religion and ethics, in science and in\nthe life of society. The Renaissance is the beginning of our modern\nworld, inasmuch as it is, through the infinite variety of its artistic,\nsocial, religious, scientific manifestations, an effort to see that\nsame spiritual principle no longer as a transcending reality, but as\nthe active, immanent, all-pervading soul of immediate reality, both\nnatural and human. The Ptolemaic cosmography, which is the visible form\nof medi\u00e6val thought, a system of the finite universe, of which the\nEarth is the centre, and which leaves an infinite space for the seat\nof the only real, transcending existences, beyond the compass of the\nheavenly spheres, and as if it were outside itself, loses its hold on\nthe imagination, and therefore on the conscience of men, long before\nCopernicus and Galileo read in the skies a new system of an infinite\nuniverse, within which, or nowhere, the divine principle must live and\nwork.\n\nThe impulse towards the identification of the spirit with nature, on\none side, and with man on the other, had been at work in Italian life\nand thought all through the Renaissance; but it is only at the end of\nthat miraculous spring of Western civilization, between the close of\nthe sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century, that it\nexpresses itself in the philosophies of Bruno and Campanella. Bruno\npresents himself as an expounder and defender of Copernican astronomy,\nand Campanella writes the apology of Galileo. And to each of them the\nscientific discoveries are much more than mere helps and suggestions\nfor metaphysical speculation; they are the revelation, in one field of\nhuman thought, of a new logic which has to be recognized, in one form\nor another, as the fundamental principle of modern civilization.\n\nBoth in Bruno and Campanella, inert remnants of the ancient and\nmedi\u00e6val logic are still part of the structure in which their new\nintuitions try to express themselves; but such remnants are to be met\nwith even in much later philosophers, and constantly reappear, as\nblind spots in the active process of thought, in the whole history\nof European philosophy down to our days. What is significant of each\nthinker, what marks him as the legitimate interpreter of the deepest\nspiritual life of his times, is not his system as a whole, but the\nparticular new intuition on which in each case the system is founded:\nin Bruno, the conception of an infinite universe, and of the infinite\nlife of God in the universe; in Campanella, the affirmation of the\nvalue of human experience and human consciousness, to which God is\npresent _per tactum intrinsecum,_ intrinsically, and in which knowing\nand being coincide.\n\nThe two main directions of modern thought, or rather of all human\nthought, are thus represented in the naturalism of Bruno and in the\nspiritualism of Campanella, at the conclusion of the Renaissance,\nrespectively prefiguring the pantheism of Spinoza and the rationalism\nof Descartes, that is, the two systems through which similar\nconceptions became active and effective in all subsequent developments\nof European philosophy. And it is useful to recall their names as\nan introduction to the exposition of the ideas of a modern Italian\nphilosopher, because we are to-day only too prone to identify certain\nforms of common European thought, originating from Greece and from\nItaly, with what was only their last expression in the great idealistic\nmovement in Germany in the nineteenth century; where Bruno and Spinoza\nreappear in Schelling, and Campanella and Descartes, through the\nintermediary of the English thinkers of the eighteenth century, in Kant\nand Hegel.\n\nI am not trying to establish an Italian pedigree for the kind of\nphilosophy to which Croce belongs: nowhere are national distinctions so\nfutile as in the history of thought. But the Italy of the Renaissance\nshares with India and with Greece the purely material privilege of\nhaving given birth to a vision of the world and its problems, which is\nnational only in the sense that it was elaborated for a certain time at\nleast by minds belonging to a single nation. The value of that vision,\nhowever, does not reside in any tribal or national characteristic, but\nin those elements of universality, which made of the Italian culture\nof the Renaissance, and of its inherent logic, the basis of all modern\nEuropean culture. What can still be recognized as peculiarly Italian,\nor French, or English, or German in the thought of modern philosophers,\nis not that phase of truth, which may be present in it, but the element\nof prejudice, of crowd-mindedness, of spiritual inertia, which even the\ngreatest among them have in common with their weaker brothers.\n\nIn Bruno and Campanella we find an interest in certain problems of\nthought, which we may call either religious or, more technically,\nontological: the problems of the relations of being and knowing. In\nVico, who is infinitely nearer to Croce in intellectual temper, the\ncentre of interest is shifted. Vico is apparently satisfied with\nCatholicism as a religion; and he spends all his efforts in creating\na philosophy out of the purely humanistic and historical side of\nRenaissance culture. And yet, long before Kant's _Prolegomena,_ he\nforesees the necessity of the new metaphysics being the metaphysics,\nas he says, of human ideas, and his theory of knowledge is founded on\na principle which bears an external resemblance to certain aspects of\npragmatism, but is in reality of a quite different, and much deeper,\ncharacter: that of the interchangeability of the _factum_ with the\n_verum,_ of that which we make with that which we know. It was a\ncommonplace of the schools that perfect science is to be found in God\nonly who is the author of all things: Vico transfers this logical\nformula from God to man, and applies it, in the first stage of his\nthought, to mathematics, which appears to him as of man's own _making,_\nin a narrow and abstract sense, and later to the whole world of history\nand human thought and action, which, in a much truer and broader sense,\nis _made_ by man.\n\nVico was brought to this second and final form of his theory of\nknowledge by his studies on the history of law, of religion, of\nlanguage and poetry: his philosophy is essentially a philosophy of\nthe moral sciences, of philology in its widest meaning. And the whole\nof his speculation, in his Scienza Nuova takes the shape of an enquiry\ninto the origins and development of human society: not essentially of\na sociology, an empirical and inductive science of man (though this\naspect is undoubtedly also present in his mind), but rather, through\n\"the unity of the human spirit that informs and gives life to this\nworld of nations,\" of an ideal and eternal history of mankind, a\nphilosophy of the human mind.\n\nA contemporary and an antagonist of Descartes, Vico is one of the last\namong European philosophers to embrace practically the whole range\nof contemporary culture. But while Descartes lays the foundations\nof his theory of knowledge on the certainty of mathematical method,\nmistrusting the imperfection and vagueness of any other form of\nscience, Vico is enabled by his intimate contact with rhetoric\nand history, with that _philology_ which had been the soul of the\nintellectual life of the Renaissance, and which through the erudition\nof his century was preparing the historical consciousness of the\nfollowing one, to anticipate the general principles of idealistic\nphilosophy and, on the theories of art, of language, of law, of\nreligion, as well as on a large number of particular historical\nproblems, the general development of subsequent European thought.\n\nAt a later stage in our exposition, we shall examine in greater detail\nthe indebtedness of Croce to Vico, especially as regards the theory\nof art and language; but the similarities of circumstance and of\ntemperament between the two philosophers are already apparent. Both\nVico and Croce came to philosophy through erudition and philology; and\nin Croce as well as in Vico, the fundamental philosophic attitude,\ntheir theory of knowledge, their idealism (what in the case of Croce\nhas been called his Hegelism), is the intrinsic and necessary logic of\nthe same humanistic tradition, the natural outcome of the centering\nof their intellectual interests on the history of the human spirit\nrather than on the mathematical or natural sciences. It is only after\nDescartes and Vico, and through the independent progress of scientific\nthought in the last two centuries (during the Renaissance, science is\nconstantly in contact with philology, and there is no scientist who\nis not also a humanist)--that the two divergent attitudes of mind\nwhich we have seen exemplified in Bruno and Campanella, naturalism and\nspiritualism, are finally divorced from each other, and respectively\nlinked with the scientific or with the historical aspect of modern\nEuropean culture. Rationalism, intellectualism, positivism, pragmatism,\non one side, are the more and more rarefied logics of science, in\nits progressive estrangement from the humanities; and because of\nthe increasing prestige of scientific thought, we see them making\nconstant inroads even in the fields of the historical and philological\ndisciplines. Idealism, on the other side, represents in its many\nforms the central tradition of European culture, and is heir to the\nreligious thought of the Middle Ages as well as to the humanism of\nthe Renaissance; but in many of its exponents, and to my mind, even\nin some aspects of Croce's philosophy, it suffers from that same\ncondition of things which is the cause of the poverty and narrowness\nof the so-called scientific philosophies: from that inability to\ngrasp both nature and the spirit of man, the world of science and\nthe world of history, which is a characteristic of our times. The\nrecurrence of the realistic position, after every great affirmation\nof idealistic philosophy, is certainly not the mere recurrence of\nerror, the obstinate permanence of human folly after the pronouncements\nof wisdom, but rather the restatement of a logical exigency which\ncannot be entirely satisfied and disposed of by any of the idealistic\nsolutions of the problem of reality. Idealism and realism in modern\nphilosophy are two distinct and divergent elaborations of different\nfields of modern culture: that unity of the intellectual vision, which\nis perfect, within its accepted limitations, in medi\u00e6val philosophy,\nand which is never entirely lost sight of in the thought of the\nRenaissance, is the goal towards which both realism and idealism\ncontinually tend, but which will not be reached by either, until the\n_disiecta membra_ of our intellectual consciousness will be brought\ntogether through a higher synthesis than the one from which they fell\napart at the end of the Renaissance.\n\nWe are now in a position to understand why it would be vain to look\nin the work of Croce for either an organized synthesis of scientific\nthought, understood as a means through which the mind of man grasps the\nreality of nature, or a system of metaphysics attempting to explain\nthe facts of our human life by reference to an order of superhuman and\nsupernatural realities. These are two types of philosophy, a criticism\nof which is implicit in every step of Croce's philosophical career,\nas well as in the quality of his philosophical ancestry. But in their\nplace we shall find a series of meditations on the problems of the\nhuman spirit in its actual historical development; on the distinctions\nand inter-relations of the various forms of spiritual activity, not\nas they appear, in a purely abstract and external consideration, to\nthe eye of the psychologist, but as they reveal themselves in the\nintimacy of those spiritual and historical processes, in which man\ncreates at the same time his own being and his own truth. As we have\nstated already, the philosophy of Croce is essentially a philosophy of\nthe humanistic tradition, of that Italian and European tradition the\nconsciousness of which seems to be fast disappearing even among those\nwho consider themselves as its exponents and defenders; and which in\nhis thought not only justifies and understands itself, but brings that\njustification and that understanding to a greater depth, to a more\ncomprehensive clarity, than it ever reached during the many centuries\nof its existence.\n\n\n[Footnote 4: _Contributo_, p. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 5: _Hegel,_ pp. 147-8.]\n\n\n\n\nPART FIRST\n\n\nFROM PHILOLOGY TO PHILOSOPHY\n\n\n(1893-1899)\n\n\n\n\nI. HISTORY AS ART\n\n\nCroce's first philosophical essay--Is history an art or a science?--The\nessence of art--History as the representation of reality, and\ntherefore, art--The distinction between art and science--A tentative\ndefinition of history.\n\n\nCroce's first philosophical essay is a short memoir, _La Storia ridotta\nsotto il concetto generale dell' Arte_, which he read to the Accademia\nPontaniana of Naples in March, 1893. In his autobiographical notes,\nCroce tells us that this memoir was sketched by him one evening in\nFebruary or March of the same year, \"after a whole day of intense\nmeditation.\"[1] But the reader cannot help feeling that those few\npages are very far from being an improvisation; and this, not only\nbecause of the ease with which the author finds his way among the\nliterature of his subject, but especially because one realizes that\nonly a discipline so constant and so severe as to become a kind of\nsecond nature could give him that sure grasp of the essentials of his\nproblem, which he shows from the very beginning of his speculation.\nThe majority of historians and philologists, when they turn their\nattention to what Croce calls the logic of their discipline, are apt to\ntrust themselves exclusively to their immediate experience of their\nwork, and to disregard the very obvious fact that an inquiry into the\ngeneral principles of a certain branch of knowledge is, and cannot\nbe anything but, philosophy: they are therefore either unwilling or\nunable to follow the implications of that logic on to their ultimate\nconsequences, as this operation would inevitably lead them away from\ntheir own safe and solid ground into a discussion of unfamiliar\nconcepts and ideas. They seem to perceive but dimly that the problems\nof that logic have been intimately connected with the whole development\nof philosophical thought from the Sophists to our day; and therefore\neven when they go back to philosophical authorities in their treatment\nof these problems, when they quote Plato or Aristotle, or Leibnitz or\nHegel, they are content with mere fragments, arbitrarily understood,\nunconnected with the general body of thought from which they derive\ntheir meaning. The result is, at best, a futile rediscovery of truths\nand truisms which have their place in the history of thought, but are\nmeaningless in their modern context. An examination of the greatest\npart of the methodological literature of the last fifty years, both in\nEurope and in America, would easily bear out this contention: that it\nis hard to find a more shallow and imcompetent philosophy than that of\nthe average historian and critic.\n\nWhat saved Croce from the academic weakness which seems to be\ncongenital to this kind of lucubrations was, besides the native temper\nof his mind, an instinctive realization of the true philosophical\nimport of the problems involved. The question, whether History is an\nart or a science, had been a favourite one with the generation to which\nCroce's masters belonged; and it was really threatening to become an\nendless, insoluble one, since no attempt was ever made to solve it\nby the only method which could give positive results, that is, by\nan accurate definition of the concepts of both art and science. The\nmost common answer to it, and the one that most clearly proved the\nconfused state of mind of those who formulated it, was that history\nwas at the same time a science and an art. The traditional humanistic\nview, which considered history as one of the arts, and to which the\ninclusion of Clio in the college of the Muses bears witness, found but\nlittle favour in a time which was entirely under the domination of the\npseudo-scientific philosophy of Herbert Spencer, and could therefore\nhardly admit of any form of knowledge which was not scientific\nknowledge. The third solution, history as a science, was in fact\nthe most usually accepted one, being but one aspect of that general\ntendency of the age, superficial and uncritical, through which all\nforms of knowledge were striving hard to assimilate themselves to the\nmathematical and natural sciences. This tendency which was present\nin all fields of philology, manifested itself in history either in\nthe attempt to transform history into sociology, and to substitute a\nsystem of institutional schemes or of so-called general laws for the\nactual historical processes, or in the raising of the usual canons and\ncriteria of historical method, that is, of a collection of maxims and\nprecepts for the proper handling of sources, documents, and monuments,\nto the dignity of a supposititious science. It is characteristic of\nCroce, that he did not directly attack the English and French and\nItalian sociologism which was so popular in his day: to a mind which\nhad received its first logical training at the hands of a Thomistic\nschoolmaster, and had been introduced to modern philosophy through\nLabriola's Herbartism, the logic of the average sociologist was so\nabhorrent in its barbarity, that it did not even afford him a starting\npoint for his own criticism. The fallacy of sociologism is made evident\nin the course of the discussion, but rather by implication than through\na direct animadversion. He chose his own adversary among the exponents\nof the other form of the same error, among the German critics, whose\nideas were more clearly defined and logically more consistent.\n\nTheir main position can be stated in a few words: history is a science\nand not an art, because its aim is not to give \u00e6sthetic pleasure, but\nknowledge. The premises of this formula are a hedonistic conception of\nart, and the identification of all forms of knowledge with science:\nthat is, a too narrow definition of art, and a too broad definition of\nscience. Croce's demonstration takes the form of a rigorous syllogism:\nhe defines the concept of art and the concept of science, the two\ndefinitions forming so to speak the two horns of a dilemma; history is\nshown by its own definition to be included in the definition of art,\nand the only remaining question is that of the distinction, within the\nsame concept, between art in the strict sense and history.\n\nThe most important part of this demonstration is that which concerns\nart. Croce's object was to discover the nature of history, but his real\nachievement in his first essay was that of stating the \u00e6sthetic problem\nin its true terms. His opinions about history and about science were\ndestined to undergo many changes in the further development of his\nthought; but his whole theory of \u00e6sthetics is already virtually present\nin these few pages about art and the Beautiful.\n\n\"Art is an _activity_ aiming at the production of the Beautiful.\"[2]\nA purely psychological doctrine of \u00e6sthetics, which considers not art\nas an activity, but the objects of art as a collection of stimuli, a\ndoctrine of \u00e6sthetic appreciation rather than of \u00e6sthetic creation, of\nthe land that has flourished in Germany and in England during the last\ntwenty years, especially in the field of the graphic and plastic arts,\nwill therefore be incapable of even grasping that which is the specific\nsubject of \u00e6sthetics. But Croce does not lose his time in attacking\nthe psychologists. The error of their ways has its philosophical\nexpression in Sensualism and in Formalism, which he summarily dismisses\ntogether with Rationalism or Abstract Idealism: the Beautiful as\npleasure, the Beautiful as a system of formal relations, the Beautiful\nas abstractly one with the Good and the True. The fourth solution of\nthe problem of the Beautiful, which he accepts, is that of the Concrete\nIdealism of Hegel and Hartmann: the Beautiful as _expression,_ as the\nsensuous manifestation of the ideal. But Croce was guided by his Latin\nmoderation (and probably also helped by his, at the time, insufficient\nunderstanding of German Idealism) to give to this formula not the\nintellectualistic interpretation which rightly belongs to it, but the\nvery simple meaning of an adequate and efficacious representation of\nreality. The difference between this conception of Art--as an activity\naiming at the representation of reality--and the one that we shall find\nin Croce's later elaborations of his \u00e6sthetic theory, does not lie in\nthe conception itself, but in its context of general thought. Here he\nis still working under the common-sense assumption of a double reality,\nof being and of thought, and this explains why he still speaks of form\nand content, and why he still admits of a category of Beauty of nature\nside by side with artistic Beauty. Later, the relation between form\nand content will transform itself into that of the \u00e6sthetic activity\nwith the other forms of spiritual activity; but even such a momentous\nchange in the foundations of his theory does but slightly impair the\nsubstantial truth of the words in which he first expressed it: \"An\nobject is either beautiful or ugly according to the category through\nwhich we perceive it. Art is a category of apperception, and in art,\nthe whole of natural and human reality--which is either beautiful or\nugly according to its various aspects--becomes beautiful because it is\nperceived as reality in general, which we want to see fully expressed.\nEvery character, or action, or object, entering into the world of art,\nloses, artistically speaking, the qualifications it has in real life,\nand is judged only inasmuch as art represents it with more or less\nperfection. Caliban is a monster in reality, but no longer a monster\nas an artistic creation.\"[3] As to natural Beauty, Croce observes\nthat it is not inanimate, as Hegel and his followers would have it,\nbut animated by the spirit of the beholder, and its contemplation is\ntherefore a kind of artistic creation:[4] but this observation, in\nwhich the later doctrine is present in germ, is set forth timidly in\na note, and remains for the moment sterile and as if incapable able\nof yielding its obvious logical results. If it were admitted that\nhistory is a representation of reality, its inclusion in the concept\nof art would be obvious. But the adverse contention is that history is\na scientific study of reality, or to use Bernheim's definition, the\nscience of the development of men in their activity as social beings.\nCroce's answer is that history is not a science, because history is\nconstantly concerned with the exposition of particular facts, and not\nwith the formation of concepts, which is the proper sphere of science.\nThere may be a science or philosophy of history, investigating the\nphilosophical problems connected with the facts of history, but such\na science or philosophy, which cannot be distinguished as a separate\norganism from the philosophy of reality as a whole, is not history.\nHistory does not elaborate concepts, but reproduces reality in its\nconcreteness: it is therefore not science but art.\n\nSociology, on the other hand, which renounces the concreteness of\nhistory in the quest for the general laws of human development,\nis neither art nor science. When compared with the concepts or\nlaws of science, the laws of sociology appear as vague and empty\ngeneralizations, and sometimes as mere pseudo-scientific enunciations\nof contemporary social and political ideologies. The sociology which\nCroce had in mind in his criticism was, in substance, because of the\nfallacy of its logical premises, either inferior science or poor\nphilosophy; but because of the uncertainty of his own idea of the\nrelations between science and philosophy, it was easier for him to\nreject it than to define it. His reaction was the instinctive one of\na sound logical organism against a mental hybrid. He was certain that\nsociology, whatever else it might have been, was not history.\n\nThis part of Croce's argument is undoubtedly the weakest. His\nconception of science was inadequate, and his discussion of the\nrelations of history with science suffered from this inadequacy: the\nproblem which he had attacked could not be solved at this stage of\nhis speculation. While his \u00e6sthetics was contained in germ in his\nconception of art, his logic was not even adumbrated in his conception\nof science. In fact, the only real function of the latter was to mark\nthe limits of the former: \"In the presence of an object, human mind can\nperform but two operations of knowledge. It can ask itself: what is\nit?, and it can represent to itself that object in its concreteness.\nIt can wish to understand it, or merely to contemplate it. It can\nsubmit it to a scientific elaboration, or to what we are wont to call\nan artistic elaboration.\" \"Either we make science, or we make art.\nWhenever we assume the particular under the general, we make science;\nwhenever we represent the particular as such, we make art.\"[5]\n\nThis distinction is the old Platonic one between _logos_ and _mythos_;\na distinction that appears in one form or another in practically\nevery system of philosophy, but the true import of which has never\nbeen completely grasped before Vico. From Vico Croce quotes in this\nconnection the following passage: \"Metaphysics abstracts the mind from\nthe senses, the poetical faculty must submerge the whole mind in the\nsenses; metaphysics lifts itself above the universal, the poetical\nfaculty must plunge itself in the particulars.\"[6] This quotation\nshows how decisive was Vico's influence in the determination of the\nmain theses of Croce's \u00e6sthetics: of which we already find here the\nthree fundamental ones, that is, the recognition of art, or the\n\u00e6sthetic activity, as one of the fundamental forms of knowledge; the\ndistinction of the \u00e6sthetic activity from, and its opposition to, the\nlogical activity; and, finally, the exclusion of any other form of\nknowledge besides the \u00e6sthetic and the logical, which exhausts the\nwhole of man's theoretical activity.\n\nThe rest of this particular discussion is not as fruitful or as\ninteresting. Having included history in the concept of art, Croce\nproceeds to draw a distinction between art in the strict sense, which\nis a representation of imaginary or merely possible reality, and\nhistory, which represents that portion of reality which has actually\nhappened. His final definition of history is: \"That kind of artistic\nproduction the object of which is to represent that which has really\nhappened.\"[7] The value of this definition is what we might call a\nvalue of reaction against the pseudo-scientific sociology of his day:\nit consists in the emphasis laid on the concreteness and individuality\nof historical processes, against the void schematism of general laws.\nBut by introducing the distinction between the possible and the real,\nCroce had in fact recognized the presence of a conceptual element in\nhistory--a conceptual element totally different from the concepts\nof the sciences, which were all that he could then see outside the\n\u00e6sthetic activity in human knowledge. In a preface to a reprint of his\nearly philosophical essays, written twenty-five years later, Croce\nexplained the conditions which prevented him from perceiving the new\nproblem at once, in a page of admirable self-criticism: \"Why did I not\nperceive it? Because I was full of the first truth which I had found,\nand for the moment I did not feel any other need: I had violently\nrejected the weight of sensism and sociologism, and I could breathe.\nAnd in my culture at that time the impulses towards that other need\nwere lacking; because neither my scholastic logic nor Labriola's\nHerbartism opened my mind to a distinction between the concepts of the\nsciences and the speculative concept; and De Sanctis, entirely given\nto the criticism of poetry, gave little attention to logical problems.\nThe authority of my first masters of philosophy induced me, in regard\nto the problems which I had not experienced in myself, to content\nmyself with temporary formulas and solutions, which attracted me\nthrough some aspects of truth, and to be satisfied with an imagination\nof the Ideal above the real, and of the world of Concepts above the\nworld of representations. By this separation, by this collocation in\nthe Empyrean, it seemed to me that I could better attest my reverence\nfor concepts and ideals, which positivists and evolutionists were\ndragging in the mud, or lowering to the status of superstitions and\nhallucinations. Now, running again through my pages, it is not\npossible for me to think those transcendental doctrines again, not\nbecause I thought them in the past, and what is past is past, but, on\nthe contrary, because I did not truly think them even then, but only\nreceived them or imagined them, so that what I can think now is only\nthe way in which, then, I was brought to imagine them, and to believe\nthat I thought them.\"[8]\n\n\n\n[Footnote 1: _Contributo_, p. 32.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Primi Saggi,_ p. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Primi Saggi,_ p. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 4: _Primi Saggi,_ p. 140.]\n\n[Footnote 5: _Primi Saggi_, p. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 6: _Primi Saggi_, p. 230.]\n\n[Footnote 7: _Primi Saggi_, p. 36.]\n\n[Footnote 8: _Primi Saggi_, pp. XI-XII.]\n\n\n\n\nII. ON LITERARY CRITICISM\n\n\nThe problem of literary criticism--The three phases: exposition,\nvaluation, history--\u00c6sthetic judgment and history of art: the exigency\nof a new \u00c6sthetics--The place of \u00c6sthetics in Croce's thought--Moral\nand logical preoccupations--Croce and Spaventa.\n\n\nAt the end of the following year (1894), Croce interrupted again the\nsteady flow of his erudite production with the publication of a little\nbook, _La Critica Letteraria: questioni teoriche,_ which was the\noutcome of a discussion he had had during the summer with a friend, a\nprofessor of philosophy. As the net result of his first philosophical\neffort had been the conquest of a clearer conception of art, it was\nnatural that he should proceed to investigate the relations between\nhistory and the subject-matter of history in that field in which he\nfelt he had already been able to find some light. The general problem\nof the nature of history, of which he had seen but one aspect, was set\naside for the moment, giving way to a close examination of the methods\nof historical thought in the study of literature.\n\nOnly a few of the conclusions of this particular research were destined\nto have any kind of permanency in Croce's theories; but it is useful\nto recall them, not only as a step in the development of his thought,\nbut as representing a marked progress in that conception of literary\ncriticism which is still predominant wherever the influence of that\nthought has not yet been felt. Croce submitted that conception to a\nprocess similar to what a French critic calls a disassociation of\nideas, trying to establish which can be said to be the essential\noperations of literary criticism, and the relations between these and\nthe various kinds of possible works on literary material. Given this\nmethod, which is that of abstract classification, and having approached\nhis problem through criticism itself instead of starting from the other\nend and deducing the concept of criticism from the concept of art\nand literature, he was bound to reach a number of abstract concepts,\napparently irreducible to each other, and the fundamental unity of\nwhich he could only later affirm through the general progress of his\ntheory of \u00e6sthetics.\n\nLiterary criticism, which until fifty or sixty years ago, stood only\nfor the judgment and valuation of literary works, to-day usually\nincludes, beside the \u00e6sthetic valuation, the study of the historical\ndevelopment, the edition and comment of the text, the biography of\nthe author, the exposition of the work itself, the \u00e6sthetic theory\nof literature, and so on; in fact, every kind of conceivable work\non literature. The danger of this extension of meaning lies in the\nfacility with which we are led to believe that many things, when called\nwith one name, are really one thing: we think of literary criticism as\nof the synthesis of all the above-mentioned operations--a synthesis\nwhich, as Croce observes, when it exists cannot be due to anybody but\nthe printer. Or, again, we may consider that one or another of those\noperations is the true aim of literary criticism--and to that one we\nsubordinate all the others, as merely subservient to the particular\naim we have in sight. This is the origin of the various _schools_ of\ncriticism--\u00e6sthetic, historical, psychological--each of which believes\nitself to be in possession of the only legitimate method. But if we\nsubordinate the history of a work to its \u00e6sthetic valuation, we deny\nthe independence and intrinsic importance of history; if we subordinate\nthe \u00e6sthetic valuation to the historical consideration, we make of\nthe former a useless accessory of the latter; if we subordinate the\nbiography of the author to the historical explanation of the work,\nwe destroy the importance of biography, which, though useful in a\ncertain sense to the explanation of the work, is in itself \"nothing\nbut the history of the development of a moral personality.\"[1] In\nfact, the unity of literary criticism lies not in its aim, but in\nits subject-matter: what we mean by literary criticism is \"a series\nof particular operations having independent aims, without any other\nconnection than that of the material employed in each of them.\"[2]\nCroce does not deny the possibility of using the results of one of\nthese operations for the purposes of another, but this does not change\nthe nature of either: \"the spirit of man is not divided into small\ncompartments: all our experience helps us in whatever work we are\ndoing. To understand Petrarch's poetry, it is useful either to be or\nto have been in love; but it doesn't follow that to make love and to\nunderstand that poetry are one and the same thing.\"[3]\n\nThe study of the principles of literature does not belong to literary\ncriticism, but to \u00c6sthetics; or, to use Vico's distinction, not to\nPhilology but to Philosophy. Textual criticism, and interpretative\ncomment, are preliminaries of literary criticism, which begins only\nwith the contemplation or \u00e6sthetic enjoyment of literature: that is,\nwith that operation of reading which is made possible through the\nestablishment of a correct text, and by the help, when needed, of a\nconvenient commentary. In literary criticism proper Croce distinguishes\nthree successive phases, or moments, answering respectively to the\nquestions: What have I read? What is the value of that which I have\nread? Which is the genesis and fortune of this particular work? The\nfirst is the exposition or description--which in itself is a work\nof art of which another work of art is the subject; the second, the\nvaluation or \u00e6sthetic judgment; the third, the history of the work\nunder consideration. Outside these three moments or phases, Croce does\nnot admit of any other independent critical operation: the research\nof the sources of a work is only part of the history of that work;\ncomparative criticism is an instrument of historical criticism;\nphilology in the strict sense of the word can in turn be used as a\nhelp to each of the three main operations, but when it is exclusively\nconcerned with the general history of a language, it is no longer a\nliterary discipline; bibliography is a mere external element of the\nhistory of the work; the study of the content is a literary study only\nif it is pursued in relation with either the exposition, valuation\nor history of the work, that is, when the work itself is viewed as\nliterature, and not as a document for the purposes of another science\nor discipline; the biography of the author is an element of the genesis\nof the work, and therefore of its history, but its main interest is\nmoral and not literary.\n\nIt is easy to see that, however fruitful as a reaction to the\nprevailing confusion, this abstract partition was still very\nartificial; but it was impossible for Croce to go beyond it, with\nthe help of the mechanical and unhistoric logic which was his only\ninstrument at that time. He still divided a fact from its genesis,\nand the fact and genesis from the judgment, and therefore it was\nimpossible for him to see that the internal history of a work _is_ its\ntrue exposition or characterization, and that such characterization\nis one with the valuation. In regard to the valuation itself, he\nconsidered it to be purely subjective and relative, as he was unable\nto accept either Kant's theory of the objectivity of taste, because of\nits intellectualism, or the psychologists' childish delusion of the\npossibility of drawing a normal or standard taste from the average\nof the \u00e6sthetic likings and judgments of different communities and\ndifferent ages; and on the other hand he was still very far from\ndiscovering that identity of the \u00e6sthetic judgment with the \u00e6sthetic\nactivity, which was to be the foundation of his later doctrine.\n\nThe discussion that follows, on the relations between the \u00e6sthetic\njudgment and the history of a work of art, obviously suffers from the\nimpossibility of drawing useful consequences from a distinction of\npurely abstract concepts; from the fact that that which was Croce's\nonly real discovery at the time, his conception of art, had not yet\nbeen thought out by him in the fulness of its relations with the other\nactivities of the human spirit. As regards history, this little book is\na step forward because it is a valid criticism of a confused and na\u00efve\nstate of mind, in which these abstract concepts could help to introduce\nsome sort of order and method; but, on the whole, though it clarifies\nthe terms of the general problem, it does not bring it appreciably\nnearer to a solution.\n\nCroce was, however, more or less consciously aware of this deficiency.\nIn a long _excursus_ on De Sanctis, whose work he upheld as a model\nof perfect literary criticism, he insisted on the importance of a\nsound theory of art, such as De Sanctis undoubtedly possessed, as an\nessential part of the mental equipment of a literary critic; and the\nchief reproach that he addressed to his contemporaries in the field of\nliterary studies in Italy, was that of neglecting those theoretical\nproblems to which very little attention had been paid in our country\nafter the work of Vico. He pointed to the great development of \u00e6sthetic\nstudies in Germany during the nineteenth century, and affirmed the\nnecessity of \"dismissing every spirit of impatience and false pride,\nand of submitting oneself to the hard labour of extracting the essence\nof the abundant literature created by the philosophic activity of\nthe Germans around those problems.\"[4] His final words contained at\nthe same time an appeal and a programme of work: \"There is a good\ndeal to be expected from a work especially directed towards these\ntwo points: to banish a series of concepts which have introduced\nthemselves in \u00e6sthetics, and which are entirely foreign to it, and\nwith their presence maintain an invincible confusion; and to free the\nconcept of art and of the Beautiful from the limits within which it has\nbeen circumscribed by linguistic habits, acknowledging the intimate\nconnection between the so-called \u00e6sthetic and artistic facts and other\nfacts of the life of the spirit.\"[5] That his attitude towards the\nlater German \u00e6sthetics was, from the very beginning, a critical one, is\nclearly shown by what immediately follows: \"Working in this direction,\nI believe that we shall find ourselves, with a new consciousness and\nwith a wealth of observations gathered in the course of a century,\nto the point from which modern \u00c6sthetics started, to the school of\nLeibnitz and Wolff, and to Baumgarten's conception,\"[6]--that is, to\nBaumgarten's _Meditations_ of 1735, which the word _\u00c6sthetica_ appears\nfor the first time as the name of an independent philosophical cal\ndiscipline, contrasted to Logic in the same sense in which the Greeks\nused to contrast _aisth\u0113ta_ to _no\u0113ta,_ the facts of sensuous knowledge\nto the facts of mental knowledge. Which means that Croce believed the\nscience of \u00c6sthetics to be still in its infancy, and to require a great\ncreative effort which was well worth making, both for the sake of the\ngeneral philosophical problems involved, and for the effects that a\ndeeper view of those problems could not but have on the practical work\nof the literary critic and of the historian.\n\nThrough these first discussions, which at the time appeared to him\nmore as acts of personal liberation than as the beginning of a\nphilosophical career, Croce had really discovered his vocation. From\nDe Sanctis he had learnt that \"art is neither the work of reflection\nand logic, nor the product of craft, but a pure and spontaneous _forma\nfantastica_\":[7] through his own experience of dry erudition, and\nthrough his meditations on the relations between history and criticism,\nhe had verified the validity and usefulness of De Sanctis' conception,\nand had been made aware of the necessity of doing what De Sanctis had\nnot been either willing or capable of doing: \"of creating a philosophy\nwhere he had given nothing but critical essays and delineations of\nliterary history, and a new criticism, a new historiography, as a\nconsequence of the philosophic deepening and systematization of his\nthought.\"[8]\n\nBut from Croce's published work at this time it would be easy to\ngather the fallacious impression that his interest was an exclusively\nliterary one: that he proceeded to create a philosophy of literature\nand art, and that only through the necessities of the system he was\nled to the consideration of logical, economic and ethical facts.\nIf that were true, with the exception of his theory of \u00e6sthetics,\npractically the whole of his philosophy would be opened to the\nreproach that he levelled against the greatest part of the German\n\u00e6sthetic theories of the nineteenth century: \"of not being derived\nfrom spontaneous and direct researches, but rather from the need of\nfilling a compartment in a philosophical system.\"[9] A good many among\nCroce's critics have been the victims of such a misconception of the\nactual genesis of his thought; and have discounted the importance of\nany but his \u00e6sthetic theories, considering all the rest as a kind of\nphilosophical by-product, with the result that they have not been\nable properly to understand even that part of his work in which they\nwere interested. The typical example is given by those moralistic\ncritics of his \u00e6sthetics, who would have been spared many mistakes and\ninanities, if they had thought Croce's ethics and logic worth a little\nconsideration. They would then have realized that their criticisms had\nbeen anticipated and criticized long before they had been uttered. But\nperhaps it is asking too much of the average student of literature,\nonce he has made the effort to think about the problems of art, that\nhe should also try to turn the light of his reason on the obscure\npromptings of his moral consciousness; a suggestion which in many cases\nwould be violently rejected as the height of immorality.\n\nWe shall soon see from which source Croce derived his interest in\neconomic problems and in the history of the practical activities of\nman. Of the permanence of those moral preoccupations which had been\nhis constant companions since his adolescence, we find the traces in\nhis autobiographical notes. In De Sanctis, whose _History of Italian\nLiterature_ is as much a moral as an \u00e6sthetic history of the Italian\npeople, he had the model of \"a sound and simple morality, austere\nwithout exaggerations, and high without fanaticisms.\"[10] But the same\ndifficulties which prevented him from fully understanding De Sanctis'\n\u00e6sthetic principles, and from using them as a vivifying element in his\nliterary work, made him also for a long time accept an inferior moral\nconception, that of Herbart's realism, \"in which the moral ideal was\nenergetically asserted, but as a thing of another world, as having\nman under itself as brute matter, on which its stamp, more or less\nmarked, might or might not be impressed.\" That is, he saw the moral\nideal in relation to the actual life of man, in a position similar\nto that which concepts and ideals had for him in relation to reality\nas a whole: his moral abstractism and rigorism was the counterpart of\nhis logic. \"But that rigorism and abstractism was the way that I had\nnecessarily to follow in order to understand the moral concreteness,\nand to lift it to the plane of a philosophical theory.\" \"And that\nrigorism, which was at the same time a love for sharp distinctions,\nwhile it saved me from associationism and positivism and evolutionism,\nput me on my guard against, and hindered me from falling into the\nerrors of that now naturalistic, now mystic, Hegelianism, which through\na hasty and often mythological dialectic, obliterated or weakened the\ndistinctions which are the life of the dialectic process.\"[11] What\nCroce lacked, in ethics as well as in \u00e6sthetics, was a new logic or\ntheory of knowledge, which would allow him to grasp the concept or\nthe ideal, that is the universal, in the concrete spiritual activity,\nthat is in the particular and individual. Meanwhile, his own dealing\nwith abstract concepts, with purely formal universals, was to be, in\nrelation to the further developments of his logic, what his early\nliterary work, of a purely erudite character, had been in relation\nto his meditations on art and history: that personal experience, of\ndifficulties and errors, without which no truth can ever be reached.\n\nOn the whole, Croce's position at that time was, as he himself defined\nit many years later, a Platonic-Scholastic-Herbartian one; one that,\nin the moral held, had at least the advantage of being \"invulnerable\nto the subtle menace of sensualism and decadentism,\"[12] in the\nEuropean life and thought of the nineties, the acme of spiritual\ndistinction--an illusory reaction to and escape from the prevailing\npositivism and determinism, of which in reality they were but thinly\ndisguised variations. Croce \"never lost, even for an instant, the power\nof discerning sensual refinement from spiritual finesse, erotic flights\nfrom moral elevation, false heroism from sheer duty.\"[13] Here lies the\nfundamental difference, \"of spiritual race,\" between him and his most\nillustrious contemporary, Gabriele d'Annunzio, with whom he has more\nthan once been coupled by superficial critics. The character of their\nrespective influence on the younger Italian generations, of D'Annunzio\nbetween 1890 and 1900, and of Croce between 1900 and 1910, is more than\nsufficient evidence on this point.\n\nIt is something of a surprise to find that he had learnt practically\nnothing from his uncle Bertrando Spaventa, who had been the most\npowerful representative of the Hegelian tradition in Italy. The central\nproblem of Spaventa's speculation had been that of the relations\nbetween knowing and being, of transcendence and immanence; and although\nit was only through a solution of this problem that Croce could hope\nfor progress in any of his particular philosophical researches, yet\nhe could take no interest in it when its discussion was earned on\nindependently of those problems of art, of moral life, of law and\nhistory, towards which his attention was naturally drawn. Croce\nhimself explains this lack of interest as due to his \"unconscious\nimmanentism\": \"as I met with no difficulty in conceiving the relation\nbetween thinking and being; if I had any difficulty, it was rather in\nconceiving a being severed from thought, or a thought severed from\nbeing.\"[14] But in this case he is probably seeing himself in the\nlight of his later experience: that difficulty did exist, and is the\nfundamental difficulty of his early speculation. Only, he could not\nsolve it by Spaventa's methods, which were those of a rigorous and\nformal logician, of a philosopher with a theological background, but\nonly through the elaboration of the materials of his own particular\nmoral and intellectual experience. At a later stage, and when he had\nalready independently arrived at a position much more similar to\nthat of Spaventa, than he would ever have thought possible for him,\nthe influence, if not of Spaventa himself, at least of that attitude\ntowards philosophy which had been his, came back to him through his\nfriend Giovanni Gentile, whose mental temperament was much more akin\nto that of the old Neapolitan thinker, than Croce's ever was. Croce's\nidealism (or Hegelianism) was at this time limited to what he had\nunconsciously absorbed through De Sanctis' conception of art; but his\ntheory of knowledge, not yet logically unfolded, was still oscillating\nbetween intellectualism and naturalism. He was decidedly anti-Hegelian,\non the other hand, in his theory of history and in his general\nconception of the world.\n\n\n\n[Footnote 1: _Primi Saggi,_ pp. 79-80.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Primi Saggi,_ p. 80.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Primi Saggi_, p. 82.]\n\n[Footnote 4: _Primi Saggi,_ p. 163.]\n\n[Footnote 5: _Primi Saggi,_ p. 164.]\n\n[Footnote 6: _Primi Saggi, ib._]\n\n[Footnote 7: _Contributo,_ p. 54.]\n\n[Footnote 8: _Contributo_, pp. 55-56.]\n\n[Footnote 9: _Primi Saggi,_ p. 163.]\n\n[Footnote 10: _Contributo,_ p. 58.]\n\n[Footnote 11: _Contributo,_ p. 59-60.]\n\n[Footnote 12: _Contributo,_ p. 60.]\n\n[Footnote 13: _Contributo,_ p. 61.]\n\n[Footnote 14: _Contributo,_ p. 63.]\n\n\n\n\nIII. HISTORY AND ECONOMICS\n\n\nA new interest: Marxism--Historical materialism--Criticism and\ninterpretation: a new historical canon--Marxian economics as an\napplication of the hypothetic method--The concepts of science and the\neconomic principle--Science and practice--Marxism and morality.\n\n\nIn April, 1895, his old professor at the University of Rome, Antonio\nLabriola, sent to Croce an essay on the _Communist Manifesto,_ in which\nhe submitted to a critical examination the materialistic conception of\nhistory elaborated during the fifty preceding years by Karl Marx and\nFriedrich Engels. Labriola had been probably the first professor in a\nEuropean University to take Historical Materialism as a subject\nfor his academic lectures, his first course on Marxism having been\ndelivered in 1889. But Croce, who had given all his thoughts first to\nhis literary work, and then to his meditations on art and criticism,\nhad not been as yet able to perceive the bearing of the new problems\ndiscussed by his master on that problem of the nature of history which\nhad been the subject of his first philosophical essay, and was to be\nthe centre of his later speculations. Labriola's little book came to\nhim at a moment when he had reached an impasse in the course of his\nresearch, and it opened to him an entirely new field of investigations,\nit afforded him an escape towards studies and meditations, at\nfirst apparently unrelated to his former ones, but the results of\nwhich were destined to react vigorously on them. He plunged with\nyouthful enthusiasm into the literature not of Marxism and historical\nmaterialism only, but of Economics in general. In the five following\nyears, while he continued with unremitting energy his literary labours,\nnow more clearly directed towards an understanding of the historical\nproblems of \u00c6sthetics, and a clarification of the concepts of a\nphilosophical science of \u00c6sthetics, he published a series of critical\nessays on _Materialismo storico ed economia marxistica,_ intended at\nthe same time as a defence and a rectification of Marx's doctrines.\n\nWe shall consider this phase of Croce's work from two distinct points\nof view--as a new individual experience, and as a stage in the\ndevelopment of his philosophy. For the first of them, we shall again\nleave the word to Croce himself: \"That intercourse with the literature\nof Marxism, and the eagerness with which for some time I followed the\nsocialistic press of Germany and Italy, stirred my whole being, and\nfor the first time awakened in me a feeling of political enthusiasm,\nyielding a strange taste of newness to me: I was like a man who having\nfallen in love for the first time when no longer young, should observe\nin himself the mysterious process of the new passion. At that fire\nI burnt also my abstract moralism, and I learnt that the course of\nhistory has a right to drag and to crush the individual. As I had not\nbeen disposed in my family circle to any fanaticism, and not even to a\nliking for the current and conventional liberalism of Italian politics\n... it seemed to me to breathe faith and hope in the vision of the\nrebirth of mankind redeemed by labour and in labour.\"[1] This political\nenthusiasm did not last very long: it disappeared when that which\nwas Croce's true nature, not practical but essentially theoretical,\nreasserted itself, by reducing this new experience into new conceptual\nforms; but without it, the whole of his philosophy of the practical\nactivity would forever have been like a theory of vision in the mind of\na blind man, or a theory of love in that of a keeper of the harem. Art,\nthought, mortality, had already appeared to him as aspects of his own\nlife; to these, a new element was added now, not as a mere object of\nthought, but as a passionate and concrete experience.\n\nThe interpretation of the doctrine of historical materialism presented\na number of difficulties deriving partly from the form in which the\ndoctrine itself had originally appeared--not as a coherent theory,\nbut as a series of pronouncements and observations scattered in a\nvariety of writings, composed at a distance of years, and the aim of\nwhich was rather political and polemical than scientific; and partly\nfrom its association with remnants of old metaphysics, both in its\noriginators and in their followers. In Marx and Engels, as well as\npractically in the whole literature of Marxism, the emphasis being\nlaid on the substantive rather than on the adjective, historical\nmaterialism implied the adhesion to that metaphysical materialism which\nwas one of the children of Hegelian metaphysics. What had been the\nIdea for Hegel, was the Economy of the new metaphysicians: the only\nreality, working beneath the surface of human consciousness, as an\nunder-structure beneath a merely apparent and illusory superstructure.\nGiven this conception, it is easy to understand why historical\nmaterialism appealed so strongly to positivists and evolutionists,\nwho concealed a similar kind of metaphysics under their proclaimed\ncontempt for philosophy. The old philosophies of history had attempted\nto reduce the sequence of history to a scheme of concepts, starting\nwith God, or Providence, or the Hegelian Idea: the new unconscious\nmetaphysicians substituted for the old concepts that of Economy,\nor of Matter, or of Development and Evolution, from which all the\nparticular historical determinations could be deduced with not less\ncertainty than from the old metaphysical entities. And from their\npredecessors they also borrowed those teleological tendencies which\nare implicit in all metaphysics, attributing a will and an end to\ntheir new God, be it called Progress or Matter, and trying to deduce\nthe future course of history from the dialectic of the past. Hence the\ngrowth of a vast literature inquiring into the development of abstract\nsociological schemes or of economic forms reduced to characteristics\nof economic epochs, forcing the concrete materials of history into\nrigid conceptual frames; hence the na\u00efve faith in the deduction of\nsocial predeterminations, of which the most striking was the asserted\nnecessity of the advent of socialism as the only logical outcome of\ncapitalist society.\n\nCroce, pursuing the analysis initiated by Labriola, began by\ndissociating what seemed to him to be the vital element in historical\nmaterialism, from any intrusion of either Hegelian or positivistic\nmetaphysics. His criticism of historical materialism as a philosophy\nof history and, generally, of the possibility of constructing\nany philosophy of history, is the first resolute step towards an\nanti-metaphysical conception of philosophy. Whether by metaphysics\nis meant the knowledge of another world of real essences, of things\nin themselves, beyond the objects of our immediate experience,\nor the creation of abstract concepts duplicating and falsifying\nthe complex world of life, the whole trend of Croce's thought\nwill henceforward oppose any claim on the part of these spurious\nphilosophies, mythological or pseudo-scientific, to furnish an adequate\ninterpretation of reality. Vico's metaphysics of human ideas, which\nis no metaphysics at all, because it does not postulate the existence\nof any reality beyond that of the spirit of man, will more and more\nbecome the model of Croce's own philosophy. That immanentism which\nhe considers as one of the spontaneous attitudes of his mind slowly\nextricates itself from the ruins of his own transcendental logic,\nand shows itself impervious to the allurements of both Platonism and\nPositivism, of the ancient and the new myth.\n\nPurged of its unessential philosophical associations, historical\nmaterialism (or, more precisely, the economic interpretation of\nhistory) appeared to Croce as nothing more than a new canon or\ncriterion of historical interpretation, fixing the attention of the\nhistorian on a mass of new data, the importance of which had not been\nrecognized before. It was neither a new philosophy nor a new method:\nit could not be legitimately employed to draw conclusions on the\nrelations between economic facts and the other facts of history, nor\nto reduce history itself to the operation of a few abstract laws. It\nwas a tendency of historical thought, coinciding with the manifestation\nof certain objective conditions of society (the industrial revolution)\nand their reflexes in political thought, by which the economic element\nin social facts acquired a stronger relief than it had ever had in the\nconsciousness of man. And it seemed to point, both for the historian\nand for the philosopher, towards the existence of a fundamental\nprinciple or form of human activity--economic activity, about the\nnature of which, and its relation with \u00e6sthetic, logic, and moral\nactivity, very little had been thought and written, besides what is\ncontained in the introductions to all classical manuals of political\neconomy. While still insisting that history is art, that is, the\nrepresentation of individual happenings, Croce was thus implicitly\nbrought to admit of the importance of philosophy, that is, of the study\nof the fundamental forms or categories of human activity, for the\nhistorian. His conception of history was undergoing a transformation in\na direction similar to that towards which his conception of philosophy\nwas moving.\n\nWhen he passed from the consideration of the general theory to the\nexamination of more technical aspects of Marx's doctrines, the first\ndifficulty which presented itself to him was that of the relations\nbetween Marxian economics and pure economics, or general economic\nscience. The society whose economic life Marx had studied in _Das\nKapital,_ was neither human society in general, nor any particular\nhistorical society, but a purely ideal and formal society deduced from\na proposition assumed outside the fields of pure economics: that of\nthe equivalence of value and labour. Starting from this postulate,\nMarx had proceeded to inquire into those processes of differentiation\nbetween the assumed standard and the actual prices of commodities in a\ncapitalist society, by which labour itself acquires a price and becomes\na commodity. It was a method of scientific analysis consisting in\nregarding a phenomenon not as it actually exists, but as it would be\nif one of its factors were altered, and in comparing the hypothetical\nwith the real phenomenon, conceiving of the first as diverging from\nthe second which is postulated as fundamental, or the second as\ndiverging from the first, which is postulated in the same manner.\nIt is only when the whole of Marxian economics is considered as the\napplication of such a method, that the concepts of labour-value and of\nsurplus-value acquire a definite and precise meaning: the description\nof economic society as a pure working society (producing no goods which\ncannot be increased by labour) must then be interpreted as a concept\nof difference, or an instrument of elliptical comparison, as against\nthe descriptions of actual economic society given by pure economics.\nIts positive value, not as an abstract hypothesis, but as a means\nof knowledge, depends on the fact that such a society does actually\ncoincide with certain aspects of historical capitalist society; that\nthe equivalence of labour and value is not a purely imaginary fact, but\na fact among other facts, empirically opposed, limited, and distorted\nby other facts. Having assumed this equivalence as a test for the study\nof the social problem of labour, Marx's object was to show the special\nway in which this problem is solved in a capitalist society. And this\nwas the real justification for his employment of the hypothetical\nmethod.\n\nIt is clear that Croce was infinitely more interested in what Marx\nhad actually accomplished, than in what he had intended to do. In\nMarx's own mind, the analysis of the conditions of capitalist society\nled inevitably to the conclusion that a passage from capitalism to\nsocialism was predetermined by the structure of capitalist society\nitself. It is well known that the prevision assumed what claimed to be\na strictly scientific character in the formulation of the law of the\nfall in the rate of profits: the gradual decrease of surplus-values\naccompanying the increase in technical improvements, and automatically\nre-establishing the equivalence of labour and value. Croce offered\na very convincing criticism of this law on Marx's own grounds, by\nshowing that it rested on a confusion between technical and economic\nfacts, thus affording a remarkable example of Marx's uncertainty of his\nown method. It was clear that in this particular case Marx had been\ncarried away by his desire to reduce the metaphysical implications of\nhis economic sociology to the status of an historical law. And Croce's\ncriticism was evidently intended both to deprive Marx's historical\ndeterminism of one of its most powerful instruments, and to confirm\nhis own view of the method which gave validity and importance to such\neconomic speculations as Marx's were.\n\nMarxian economics stood thus interpreted as comparative sociological\neconomics, and by the definition Croce also defined the scope of\nsociological science, and the nature of the logical processes which\nit could legitimately employ. It was a considerable advance in the\nstudy of scientific concepts, as distinct from purely speculative\nconcepts. But he still believed at the time, misled by the economists'\ndiscussions on the nature of the economic principle, that pure\neconomics and the philosophy of economics practically coincided; and\nas he had maintained the legitimacy of Marx's method against the\ncriticisms of the pure, or scientific, economists, he defended pure\neconomics against Marx and his school, as the general science of the\neconomic datum. But he was soon to understand that his own point\nof view and that of the pure economists were widely divergent, and\nthat the methods of pure economics are in fact scientific and not\nphilosophical. In later years, when he came to regard the science of\neconomics as an empirical and mathematical science, Marxian economics\nappeared to him merely as a special branch of economic casuistry,\nemploying methods fundamentally identical with those of pure economics:\na relationship which could be illustrated by a comparison with the\nparallel of non-Euclidean and classical geometry. Although he did\nnot reach this final position at the time, there is no doubt that\nhis experience of the actual scientific processes of economics freed\nhim from his allegiance to Herbartian logic, in which science and\nphilosophy were still formally undifferentiated, and led him gradually\nto the distinction between the scientific and the speculative concept,\nof which the relation established between Marxian and pure economics is\na tentative prefiguration.\n\nBut the most essential gain of his economic studies was in the\ndirection of the affirmation of the merely practical, or economic,\nprinciple, as one of the irreducible forms of human activity, raising\nthe concept of the Useful to the same level (logically speaking) at\nwhich those of the Beautiful, the True, and the Good had been kept by\nthe whole European philosophical tradition since Plato. He was here\nactually elaborating not a scientific, but a speculative concept,\nthough his approach to it was always by means of the discussion\nof particular problems, the solution of which implied a definite\nview of the relations between the economic principle on one side,\nand respectively on the other side, the intellectual and the moral\nprinciple.\n\nAs regards the possibility of inferring practical programmes from\nscientific principles, he objected that neither the desirable nor\nthe practicable are science. Science may be a legitimate means of\nsimplifying problems, making it possible to distinguish in them what\ncan be scientifically ascertained from what can only be partially\nknown; in the case of the Marxian law of the fall in the rate of\nprofits, for instance, if such a law were proved to be scientifically\ncorrect, it could be said, under certain conditions that the end\nof capitalist society was a scientific certainty, though it would\nremain doubtful what would follow it. But logic is not life, and the\nappraisement of social programmes is a matter of empirical observations\nand of practical convictions. The unconquerable indetermination of\nsocial facts brings forth that element of dating in the actions of\npractical men, which is to will what inspiration is to expression,\ninsight to intellect, in the poet and in the scientist.\n\nSocialism could not be called a scientific programme, except in a\nlimited and metaphorical sense, which was not a criticism of socialism\nitself, but of the bad logic of certain Socialists: the Marxian\nprogramme as such, Croce recognized as one of the noblest and boldest,\nand also one of those which obtain the greatest support from the\nobjective conditions of existing society. Having already denied the\ndependence of intellectual truth on economic fact, by criticising\nthe metaphysics of historical materialism, he thus asserted now the\nautonomy of the economic from the logical principle.\n\nOn the other hand, he destroyed the legend of the intrinsic immorality\nof Marxism, which was due to Marx's repeated assertions that the social\nquestion is not a moral question, and to his sharp criticisms of class\nideals and hypocrisies. He pointed to the moral interest which had\nguided Marx's political activity, and which could even be said to have\nprompted the choice of the fundamental hypotheses of his economics.\nWhat Marx had called the impotence of morality was the futile attempt\nat apportioning praise or blame for the natural conditions of the\nsocial order. It is only when such conditions are no longer conceived\nas necessary for the social order in general, but only for a stage\nin its history, and when new conditions appear that make it possible\nto destroy them, that moral condemnation is justified and effective:\nto use another of Marx's phrases, morality condemns what history has\nalready condemned. This is as much as saying that the only real\nmoral problems, as all other problems of human life, are those that\npresent themselves under given historical circumstances, at a given\ntime; concrete, not abstract; and that moral judgments apply not to\nfacts or conditions, but to actions. The passage from such a concrete,\nor historical, view of morality, to a doctrine of moral relativity\nis a very easy one, but Marx's own views on this point, which he\nnever deliberately expounded, are irrelevant to the substance of his\ndoctrine. For his own part, Croce reasserted the value of Kantian\nethics, and the absoluteness of the moral ideal, as an ideal which\nis not above and outside the spirit of man, but rather one of its\nintrinsic forms or categories. And Marx's conclusions in regard to the\nfunction of morality in the social movement, and to the method for the\neducation of the proletariat, though clashing with current prejudices,\ncontain no contradiction of general ethical principles. But Marx's\ninterest was not essentially an ethical one: the moralistic criticisms\nof Marx were similar to the puritanic criticisms of Machiavelli, and\nresolved themselves into a charge that neither the one nor the other\nhad treated problems totally different from those which they had\nactually attempted to clarify. While vindicating the importance of\nMachiavelli in the history of the study of the economic activity of\nman, Croce called Marx himself the Machiavelli of the labour movement,\nimplicitly suggesting a similarity of both object and method between\n_Il Principe_ and _Das Kapital,_ which is singularly illuminating.\n\nThe last essays of the book on _Materialismo Storico_ are two letters\nto Professor Pareto \"On the Economic Principle,\" written in 1900; but\nwith these we reach a time when Croce's thought was already organizing\nitself in the system of the philosophy of mind. In them we find a\nsketch of the system in the form in which it appeared in the first\nedition of the _Estetica_: that is, we already decidedly enter into the\nmaturer phase of Croce's thought. We must here pause on the threshold,\nand looking back on the years of Croce's special interest in economic\nproblems, sum up the new elements that the study of these problems adds\nto his intellectual physiognomy: a more deliberately anti-metaphysical\nattitude, a growing consciousness of the complexity of history and of\nthe concreteness of moral life, a realization of the function of the\neconomic activity, a progress in the analysis of scientific concepts,\nand therefore in the foundations of his logic--but, most important of\nall, a continued practice of philosophical thought under the shape of\nhistorical methodology. Apart from their interest as documents of the\ngrowth of his philosophy, Croce's studies have also a place in the\nhistory of social and economic thought, side by side with those of\nLabriola and of Georges Sorel, as a significant episode in that Latin\ncrisis of Marxism, the ultimate outcome of which are the theories of\nFrench and Italian Syndicalism.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: _Contributo,_ p. 36-37.]\n\n\n\n\nPART SECOND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND\n\n\n(1900-1910)\n\n\nI. THE GROWTH OF THE SYSTEM\n\n\nThe unity of thought--The writing of the Estetica--The method of\nphilosophy--A philosophy of mind--The _Filosofia della Spirito_ and the\n_Critica_--Other activities.\n\n\nThe salient feature of Croce's mind, fully displaying itself in the\nmaturity of his work, is a power to follow different lines of thought\nand research, without either confusing the issues or losing sight of\nthe deep underlying connections. For the average scholar, an incursion\ninto alien ground will generally mark the abandonment of his former\ninterests; or, in the best hypothesis, the creation of a new mental\npersonality coexisting with the original one, but neither reacting on\nit nor being influenced by it. The reason is obvious: the substance\nof each personality is a cross-section of the body of one discipline,\nwhich in its actual history, in its methods, associations and sphere\nof interest, touches the other one at very few points only, if at any\nat all. The establishment of new relations between the two requires\na new personal elaboration, a complete individual mastery of the\nmaterials and methods of each discipline. We are hardly aware of the\nindependence gained by even very closely related fields of research\nthrough the specialists treatment of the last century: how each of\nthem has developed, so to speak, a language of its own, which has its\nfoundation in the peculiar, and inevitable, terminology, but extends\nfar beyond it into the logical structure of the specialist mind. We\nhave more or less consciously built up a world (that is, an implicit\nconception of the world, a na\u00efve philosophy) for the economist, one\nfor the biologist, one for the mathematician, one for the student of\nliterature, and so on. The scholar with the dual personality lives\nalternatively in separate and self-contained worlds; but to melt the\ntwo images into a single one, is far beyond his power. In other cases,\nhe will relate all the experiences legitimately belonging to one\nspecial world, to another one, probably to the one with which he was\nfirst acquainted; but then we have those awkward hybrids, the economics\nof the literary man, or the literature of the biologist, or the biology\nof the economist; and the confusion is so apparent that it generally\nreflects itself in the very quality of the terminology employed.\n\nIt was against this kind of confusion, against the transference of the\nconcepts of one science into another, which was the favourite device\nof positivism, that Croce continually reacted in his criticism of\ncontemporary thought. He instinctively knew the value of distinctions,\nand also the value of unity; but he would never pay for unity at the\nexpense of the fine, precise, necessary distinctions. This explains\nwhy for a certain number of years he may have appeared as a man\noccupied in the pursuit of two quite different and unconnected lines of\nresearch: his literary friends used to look on his economic studies\nwith wonder and distrust, as on a strange whim and a total waste of\ntime, while the economists more or less resented the intrusion of the\noutsider. But it explains also why, when he finally attempted to give\nshape to the conclusions he had reached in regard to one particular\ngroup of problems, his grasp of the essential unity and his power to\nbuild an inclusive and unspecialized conception of reality, were made\nvisible at once. There was no special problem of thought which could be\ntreated apart from an either implicit or explicit view of the whole of\nreality: there was no solution of any particular problem which would\nnot affect, and in turn be affected by, the solution of every other\nproblem. Or, to say the same thing in different words, philosophy was\na system, not in the sense that a rigid logical scheme could once\nand forever fit the ever moving stream of reality, but because it is\nimpossible to think the distinctions without the unity, or the unity\nwithout the distinctions. That which appears to us, psychologically,\nas the main characteristic of Croce's mind, transforms itself into the\nintrinsic logic of his system, in which the principles of unity and of\ndistinction are, as we shall see, fundamental.\n\nIn the year 1899 Croce had been compelled to spend a good part of\nhis time in a more or less practical activity in connection with the\nCentenary of the Neapolitan Republic of 1799, and it was only towards\nthe end of that year that he could dedicate himself entirely to\nthe work he had constantly had in mind since the publication of his\nessays on literary criticism: the exposition of his concept of art\nin the fulness of its relations and determinations. It will be well\nto let Croce himself give us an account of that decisive moment, of\nthe ripening and gathering of his various speculations into their\nfirst coherent and systematic expression. \"When I started my work,\nand began to collect my scattered thoughts, I found myself extremely\nignorant: the gaps multiplied themselves in my sight; those same things\nthat I thought I held well in my grasp wavered and became confused;\nunsuspected questions came forward asking for an answer; and during\nfive months I read almost nothing, walked for hours and hours, spent\nhalf days and whole days lying on a couch, searching assiduously within\nmyself, and putting down on paper notes and thoughts, each of which\nwas a criticism of the other. This torment grew much worse, when in\nNovember I tried to set forth in a concise memoir the fundamental\ntheses of \u00c6sthetics, because, ten times at least, having carried my\nwork up to a certain point, I became aware of the necessity of taking\na step which was not justified logically, and I started all over again\nin order to discover in the beginnings the obscurity or error which had\nbrought me to that quandary; and, having rectified the error, again\nwent my way, and a little further I again stumbled into a similar\ndifficulty. Only after six or seven more months was I able to send\nto the press that memoir in the form in which it has been printed\nunder the title _Tesi fondamentali di un' Estetica come scienza dell'\nespressione e linguistica generale_; arid and abstruse, but from\nwhich, once I had finished it, I came out not only quite oriented in\nregard to the problems of the mind, but also with an awakened and\nsure understanding of almost all the principal problems about which\nclassical philosophers have toiled: an understanding which cannot be\nacquired by merely reading their books, but only by repeating within\noneself, under the stimulus of life, their mental drama.\"[1] We are\nso used to see the intellectual worker surrounded and propped up by\nlibraries, laboratories, files, and statistics, that the sight of a\nman abandoning his books, giving himself up to what by all material\nstandards must be classed as a state of idleness, in order to withdraw\ninto the intimacy of his own consciousness, there to find an answer\nto the problems of reality, cannot but strike us as incongruous and\nanachronistic. If we were frank about ourselves, we should confess that\nour unbounded confidence in the purely material helps is merely a mask\nfor our deep-rooted scepticism, for our absolute lack of confidence\nin the power of reason. What we cannot hope to attain through our\nindividual effort, we expect as the product of a great machine of\nthought, in which man enters as a little wheel, accomplishing a\ngiven function, as mechanical and impersonal as the rest of the\nmachine. We strive for objectivity, and believe in the automatic\nfabrication of truth. Through a false analogy with the methods of the\nnatural sciences, imperfectly understood, and assimilated to those of\nindustrial production, we call this process scientific, and we pretend\nto despise what we fear, the testimony of our consciousness and the\nhardships of personal thought. Reason, the human reason, the ultimate\nsource of all knowledge, we pay lip homage to, but really put in the\nsame category as the obscure intuition of the mystic. Outside our\nmechanical objectivity, we seem unable to see anything but an arbitrary\nsubjectivism, a capricious and empirical individuality.\n\nBut however incongruous and anachronistic it may appear to us, there\nis little doubt that this method is the only philosophical method, the\nmethod of philosophy in all times. Croce's originality consists merely\nin having reasserted its validity in such sharp contrast to all the\ntendencies of the age, and to have shown that true objectivity belongs\nonly to the truth we discover within ourselves, when the eye of our\nmind is not turned on the transient spectacle of our superficial life,\nbut is reaching under it for that universal consciousness which is\nthe foundation of the individual one. There is no scholar who is as\nexacting and punctilious as Croce in the choice and elaboration of his\nmaterial--as conscious of the need of thoroughness and precision--as\nimpatient of any form of improvisation; but he never forgets that\nthe end of all his labours is merely that of _knowing himself,_ in\nthe spirit of the ancient oracle, by acquiring a direct, intimate\nexperience of the processes through which a mind of to-day has come to\nbe what is truly is; of making his own individual consciousness partake\nmore and more of that universality which alone is true consciousness,\nby liberating itself from all casual determinations, and becoming\nhistorically acquainted with itself. It is easy to see how in such a\ngeneral attitude the road to philosophy is also the road to history;\nand how both in philosophy and in history the final test must be not\nthat of the dead material, but of the living spirit.\n\nThe employment of such a method leads to two consequences: the first,\nthat a philosophy thus conceived will be a philosophy of the human\nspirit--_Filosofia dello Spirito_--or, as we, following the habits of\nEnglish-speaking philosophers, shall tentatively call it, a philosophy\nof mind; the second, that the universality which the individual spirit\ndiscovers within itself, not being a static, immovable universality,\nbut merely the form of its ever-changing, historical actuality,\nphilosophy itself will be a continuous progress, and at no particular\nmoment will it be possible to define the thought of the philosopher as\na completed system. As we cannot, however, in the small compass of this\nbook, minutely follow all the successive modifications and accretions\nof Croce's thought, we shall speak of the ten years between 1900 and\n1910 as of the period in which the system of the philosophy of mind\nwas developed and determined, and we shall attempt in the following\nchapters to give a general view of the system itself as it might have\nappeared in 1910 to a conscientious student of all the works of Croce\npublished during that interval of time.\n\nThe _Tesi_ contained already the substance of the _Estetica come\nscienza dell' espressione e linguistica generale_ which was completed\nin 1901 and published in 1902, and with which Croce definitely took\nhis place in modern philosophy. The book is divided in two parts, the\nexposition of the theory and the history of the doctrine. But the two\nparts are very closely related to each other, as the exposition already\ncriticises all the possible aspects of \u00e6sthetic theory, and the history\nmerely disposes the same criticisms in a chronological order, and\nlabels each of them with a name. This plan, with slight alterations, is\nthat of the successive volumes of the _Filosofia dello Spirito_: to the\nreader who is already acquainted with the history of philosophy, the\nhistorical character of the purely theoretical exposition is readily\napparent.\n\nSoon after the publication of the _Estetica,_ Croce began to consider\nhis book merely as a programme and a sketch which needed filling in\nwith further developments,--with the investigation of the other forms\nof human activity, which had been merely postulated in the study of\nthe \u00e6sthetic activity; and with a wide cultural work, to be carried\non especially by means of a review, through which his ideas should\nbe tested in immediate and constant relation with the problems of\ncontemporary Italian and European thought. The enormous activity of the\nfollowing years falls easily into this rough division. On one hand we\nhave the completion of the _Filosofia dello Spirito,_ with the _Logica\ncome scienza del concetto puro,_ the first edition of which appeared\nin 1905 (_Lineamenti di una Logica,_ etc.), and the second, deeply\nmodified by his meditations on the practical activity, in 1909, with\nthe _Filosofia della Pratica: Economica ed Etica,_ written in 1908,\nbut of which some parts had already been given in 1907 in the memoir\n_Riduzione della filosofia del diritto alla filosofia dell' economia_;\nand with the new and fuller formulation of his \u00c6sthetics in a paper\nread to the International Congress of Philosophy in Heidelberg in 1908,\non _L'intuizione pura e il carattere lirico dell' arte_. To these must\nbe added the two monographs on Hegel (1906) and Vico (1910), which are\nat the same time an exposition of their philosophies and a restatement\nof Croce's own main positions, in so far as they coincided with those\nelements of truth which he still recognized as living in their thought.\n\nOn the other hand we have the publication of a bi-monthly review, _La\nCritica,_ the first number of which appeared in January, 1903, and\nwhich is still being published. _La Critica_ announced itself as a\nreview of literature, history and philosophy, but it differed from\nall other publications in the same fields in two main features: the\nfirst, that the number of its contributors was practically limited to\ntwo, Croce himself, and his friend Giovanni Gentile, with whom he had\nfirst been brought in contact through their common interest in Marxian\nstudies, and who followed for some years at least a line of thought\nwhich touched his own at many points; the second, that it imposed upon\nitself a very definite programme of work, each number containing an\nessay, or part of an essay, by Croce on some Italian writer of the\npreceding half-century, and one by Gentile on the Italian philosophers\nof the same period, besides a number of reviews of new Italian and\nforeign books, and notes and comments on contemporary questions of\nculture and moral life. In his own main work for the _Critica,_\nCroce was at the same time aiming at giving concrete examples of the\napplication of \u00e6sthetic theory in the domain of literary criticism, and\nat clearing the ground for the work of the new generation, through an\nappraisement of the literary values of the preceding one. The general\ntemper of the review is clearly expressed in the following words\nfrom the already so often quoted autobiographical notes: \"The ideal\nwhich I cherished was drawn not from my own personality, but from my\nvaried experience, because, having lived sufficiently in the academic\nworld to know both its virtues and its faults, and having at the same\ntime preserved a feeling of real life, and of literature and science\nas being born from it and renovating themselves in it, I addressed\nmy censures and my polemics on one hand against dilettanti and\nunmethodical workers, on the other against the academicians resting in\ntheir prejudices and idling with the externals of art and science.\"[2]\n\nThe greatest part of the writings contributed by Croce to the _Critica_\nduring these years were later collected in volumes, of which however\nonly the _Problemi d'Estetica_ (1910), containing, besides the\nHeidelberg lecture, a large number of essays both on the theory and\nhistory of \u00c6sthetics, appeared before the end of the period we are now\nconsidering. To intensify the action of both his books and his review,\nhe initiated in 1906, in connection with the publisher Laterza of Bari,\nthe publication of a series of _Classici della filosofia moderna_, in\nwhich he published his own translation of Hegel's Encyclopedia; and\nin 1909, of the collection _Scrittori d' Italia_, which is in the way\nto becoming the standard corpus of Italian Literature. He took also\na leading part in the editing of the same publisher's _Biblioteca di\ncultura moderna_, which was enriched through his care and advice with\nreprints of rare works of southern Italian writers of the Risorgimento\nand of the early years of the Unity, and with translations of books\nrepresentative of foreign contemporary thought.\n\nIf we add to all this, a number of scattered essays and monographs,\neditions of texts and documents, and bibliographies, and the generous\ncooperation, extending from the friendly discussion of plans and ideas\nto the humble reading of proofs, with a host of friends and disciples,\nwe have a fairly complete idea of the significance of Croce in the\ncultural life of young Italy. He very rapidly became something like an\ninstitution; he was hailed as the master and spiritual guide of the\nnew generation. His work and his example, the clarity of his thought\nand the rhythm of his steady, harmonious, powerful activity, were an\nelement not of the limited life of the intellectual laboratory only,\nbut of the spiritual life of the nation.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: _Contributo_, pp. 40-41.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Contributo_, p. 48.]\n\n\n\n\nII. INTUITION AND EXPRESSION[1]\n\n\nThe four grades of spiritual activity--Intuition and conceptual\nknowledge--The intuitive consciousness--The limits of intuitive\nknowledge--Identifications of intuition and expression--Art as\nexpression: content and form--Language as expression; the reality of\nwords--Croce's use of the word intuition--The lyrical character of the\npure intuition.\n\n\nThe whole cycle of the philosophy of mind exhausts itself in the\nstudy of the four fundamental forms of human activity, the concepts\nof which we have seen slowly developing through the mazes of Croce's\nearly speculations: the \u00e6sthetic, the logic, the economic and the\nethic; of the distinction and the unity of \u00e6sthetic and logic in the\ntheoretical activity, or knowledge, and of economic and ethic in the\npractical activity, or action; and finally of the relations between\nthe theoretical and the practical, or knowledge and action. This may\nbe said to be the positive aspect of Croce's philosophy: the negative\naspect consists in the criticism and exclusion of any other form of\nactivity from the system of the human spirit, and of that which is not\nthe spirit, or nature, from the system of reality.\n\nTo the four forms or grades of spiritual activity, correspond four\nphilosophical sciences: \u00c6sthetics, Logic, Economics, and Ethics.\nEach of them can be said to be the _organum_ of the particular form\nof activity which it studies; the affirmation of that sphere of\nconsciousness which is proper to it, and of its relations to the other\nforms. Each of them is therefore related to the others in the same\nway as the various forms of activity are related to each other. They\nmight be defined as the projection on the plane of logic of the whole\nsystem of human activity, that is, of the whole of reality. They derive\ntheir intrinsic validity from this perfect coincidence of their several\nobjects with the only conceivable aspects of reality.\n\nWe shall in this and in the following chapters attempt to fill in with\nthe strictly necessary detail this very ample frame. But we can already\npoint to the idealistic character of such a philosophy resulting from\nits method, which is that of the testimony of consciousness, as opposed\nto the naturalistic or psychologic method of indirect observation; from\nits object, which is the human spirit or mind in the fulness of its\ndeterminations; and from the exclusion of any aspect of reality which\nis not immanent in consciousness, that is, both of the naturally and\nthe supernaturally transcendent. As against another kind of idealism,\nof which the typical example is Platonic transcendentalism, Croce's\nidealism is realistic and immanentistic: the task of the philosophy of\nmind is to discover the immanent logic of reality. But against current\nrealism, which considers mind as the mere spectator and observer of\nexternal or natural reality, it asserts the identity of reality and\nconsciousness, which is the basic position of all idealism.\n\nThere are two forms of knowledge: intuitive (or \u00e6sthetic) and\nconceptual (or logical). Intuition is the knowledge of the individual\nor particular; the concept is the knowledge of the universal. This\ndistinction, as we have already seen, corresponds roughly to the old\nclassical distinction of _mythos_ and _logos_, to Vico's definitions\nof poetry and metaphysics, and to the new meaning given by Baumgarten\nto the old antithesis of _aisth\u0113ta_ and _no\u0113ta_. Let us quote Vico\nagain: \"Men first feel without perceiving, then they perceive and are\nperturbed and moved; finally they reflect with pure mind.\" Here we have\nthree successive grades, of which the first is mere sensation, the\nlower limit of mental activity; the second is intuition; the third,\nconcept. For Vico, the second grade is identical with Poetry, and the\nscience of this form of knowledge, which we call \u00c6sthetics, he called\nPoetic Logic, the science of poetry as \"the first operation of the\nhuman mind.\" Vico's discovery consists in this definition of Poetry\n(and Art), not as a casual, capricious, lateral form of spiritual\nactivity, but as the first and necessary grade of knowledge, as an\nessential function of the mind. But Vico's thought was clothed in what\nwe might well call a mythological form: the various grades of spiritual\nactivity were presented by him as successive stages or epochs in the\nhistory of mankind; and the inter-relation of the various grades, as\nthe actual law of the development of human society. Croce unravelled\nVico's philosophy, or ideal history, history of the mind, from Vico's\nconcrete, sociological history, and the result was this new \u00c6sthetics\nwhich is at the same time a science of the first grade of knowledge,\nand of art and language.\n\nOf the reality of intuitive, as distinct from reflected knowledge, we\nhave constant evidence in our immediate experience. If I examine my\nown consciousness, at any particular moment, I find it crowded with\n_things I know_, as, now, this room in which I am writing, the piano\nthat is open before me, the flowers in a little basket, blue fragments\nof sky and green branches washed by the recent rain swaying in the\nclear sunlight, the shrill voice of a child from the road, the light\nsteps of a girl moving about the house. I am not conscious of all\nthese intuitions at once: I write, and I distinctly _know_ this white\npaper only, and the black signs I am tracing, the pen guided by my\nhand, and the edges of a few books on my table: all the rest has faded\naway into a blurred, fused intuition, the intuition of an atmosphere,\ncomposed of mere shreds and shadows of the colours and sounds of which\nI was so distinctly conscious but one minute ago. But now I put down\nmy pen again, and I look at the piano; and I let my mind wander away,\nfrom what I see to what I remember or imagine: the fair-headed figure\nplaying this morning Franck's Prelude, Choral and Fugue, the rapid and\nsure movements of the fingers on the white and black keys, a vague\nimage of the solemn and passionate music, memories of distant days,\na sudden rush of obscure fantasies, evoked by the actual playing,\nand still lingering in the recesses of my mind, returning now with\na fragment of a melody, with a succession of triumphant chords. And\nagain, I look beyond the window, and the little square of green and\nblue expands itself into the vast valley beyond, screened from my view\nby these few trees clustering around the house, and yet mysteriously\npresent to my inner eye: I see a little company of riders cantering\nalong a shaded lane, coming out in an open meadow surrounded by low,\nthick-wooded hills; the sun sets in a pale purple sky, and I hear the\ntramping of the slow, heavy hoofs, as the horses find their way back\nthrough the woods, through a darkness much more opaque and solid than\nthat of the remote twilight, still visible above the highest branches,\nanimated by the first faint glittering of a star. And the woods are\nfull of a myriad small breathing and stirring noises, of the sense of\nthe deep surging inhuman life of trees and shrubs, of the penetrating\nscent of the rich damp earth, of decaying wood, of fallen leaves.\n\nAnd now, I suddenly shut myself out of this world of perceptions and\nimaginations, or rather I keep them all before me, but not because\nof the immediate, individual interest I have in each of them. I try\nto extract the common, the universal element of which I suspect the\nexistence not beyond but within them. I renounce all particular\nintuitions for the concept of intuition. I am no longer an image-making\nmind, no longer engaged in this elementary or \"first\" operation of\nthe human mind, but I have passed on to a different, and manifestly a\n\"secondary\" plane of mental activity, since it would be impossible for\nme to root my thinking anywhere but on the soil of my intuitions.\n\nWhat, then, is intuition? Clearly it is not the mere sensation, the\nformless matter which the mind cannot grasp in itself, as mere matter,\nbut possesses only by imposing its form on it. Without matter no human\nknowledge or activity is possible, but matter is, within ourselves, the\nanimal element, that which is brutal and impulsive, not the spiritual\ndomain, which is humanity. Matter conquered by form gives place to\nthe concrete form. Matter, or content, is what differentiates one\nintuition from another; the form is constant, and the form is the\nspiritual activity. In this way we set the lower limit of intuitive\nknowledge, and we recognize its characters of awareness and activity:\nan intuition is not that which presents itself to me, but that which\nI make my own, by giving form to it. It may be an actual perception,\nbut the distinction between that which is real and that which is\nimaginary is not an intuitive, but a logical or intellectual one;\nthe knowledge of things which I do not perceive, but only remember,\nor even only create with my imagination belongs to the same class,\npartakes of the same formal character. Space and time, which have more\nthan once been considered as intuitions, are in reality categories\nof an intellectual order: they may be found in intuitions, as other\nintellectual elements are found, but as ingredients and not as\nnecessary elements, _materialiter_ and not _formaliter_. In relation to\nthe usual psychological concepts of association and representation, it\ncan be said that an intuition is an association, when by that word we\nmean an active mental synthesis, and not a mechanical juxtaposition of\nabstract sensations; and that it is a representation, not as a complex\nsensation, but as a spiritual elaboration of the sensation.\n\nThe upper limit of intuitive knowledge is given by reflected, or\nintellectual, or logical knowledge, or whatever we may call that\nwhich is no longer knowledge of the individual, of things, but of the\nuniversal, of relations among things, of concepts. Intuitive knowledge\nis independent of intellectual knowledge, as it is possible to form\nintuitions without forming concepts; in the examples which I have\ngiven in the preceding paragraph, practically all the intuitions are\npure intuitions, in the sense that they do not contain any logical\ningredients. But even when such are found, they appear as mere\nintuitions, and not as concepts: as, for instance, Hamlet's philosophy,\nwhich I do not read as a help towards the understanding of metaphysical\nproblems, but as a characterization of an imaginery individual. On the\nother hand, logical knowledge is founded on intuitions, presupposes\nthe world of intuitions as its matter or content. The relation between\n\u00e6sthetic and logical knowledge is one of grade or development: the\nformer stands by itself, rests directly on that which is not yet spirit\nor form, is the first grade of spiritual or human activity; the latter\ngives a further spiritual elaboration to the intuitive material.\nThis relationship, to which we shall return later, is the typical\nprocess of Croce's own logic, the logic of spiritual or mental grades,\nwhich he substitutes throughout his system for the naturalistic or\ntranscendental logic of his early masters.\n\nA further step in the deduction of the concept of intuitive or \u00e6sthetic\nknowledge, is made by identifying intuition with expression. Given the\nactive and conscious character of intuition, we are already prepared to\nadmit that every true intuition is at the same time an expression; that\nwhich cannot objectify itself into an expression is nothing but mere\nsensation. The mind does not actually intuit except by doing, forming,\nand expressing. We must not think only of verbal expressions: there\nare intuitions which cannot be expressed by words, but only by sounds\nor lines or colours. But in any case the two words are interchangeable:\nwhat really exists in our spirit is only what we can express. It is\nonly when we can express ourselves, that we are conscious of actually\npossessing, that is, of having actually formed, our intuitions. It is\nimpossible to distinguish the expression from the intuition because\nthey are not two but one.\n\nThis identification runs counter to a number of very common and very\ndear delusions: we constantly imagine that the difference between\nourselves and a great painter or a great poet does not consist in the\npower of seeing and feeling, but in a supposed gift of merely external\nexpression; and again, we credit ourselves with a number of thoughts\nand images, which we might express if we only wished to. The easiest\nway to free ourselves of such delusions is to try to express whatever\nit seems to us that we possess: it becomes then apparent that our\npictorial or poetical intuitions are really mere fragments, or echoes,\nof intuitions; are, in fact, not more than that which we succeed in\nexpressing. It must however be borne in mind that we give here to the\nword expression a purely mental or spiritual significance: we mean by\nit the image that we form in our mind, and of which the painting or the\npoem, as objects, are the material extrinsications. It requires but\nlittle reflection to realize that there is no painting or poem--there\nis no word that we utter--unless it be a mere _flatus vocis_, which\nhas not been preceded in our mind by an internal image, which is the\ntrue expression.\n\nThe reader will have remarked that, in order to give examples of\nintuitive knowledge, we have now had recourse to poetry and to\npainting. The fact is that there is no difference between intuitive\nknowledge, or expression, and art, except a purely extensive and\nempirical one: that is, we call a poet or an artist a man who possesses\nthis expressive power in a higher degree than the rest of mankind;\nwe call a poem or a work of art an expression which is fuller, more\ncomplex, more elaborate, than those which are the product of our\ncommon intuitive activity, mere waves of the continuous stream of\nspiritual life, in which they are constantly interrupted by and mixed\nwith reflections and volitions, with logical and practical facts. The\ndifference between the genius and the common man, in the \u00e6sthetic as\nwell as in the other spheres of human activity, is a quantitative,\nnot a qualitative one. Art is not a peculiar spiritual function, and\ntherefore a closed circle to which none but the elect are admitted: the\nartist appeals to the intuitive man in each of us, in a language of\nwhich every human mind finds the key within itself.\n\nThe definition of art as expression emphasizes the creative and formal\ncharacter of art; and its immediate consequence is the identification\nof form and content, that is, the solution of one of the oldest and\nmost confused of \u00e6sthetic problems. Art is form, not in the technical\nor formalistic sense, but in the meaning which we have given to the\nword when discussing the relation between sensation and intuition; and\nthe content of a particular work of art cannot be abstracted from the\nwork itself as something that existed before it, and to which a form\nhas been added from outside. There is no content, in art, which is not\nthe content of a particular form, that is, that which has ceased to\nexist as a possible content, and has transformed itself into a definite\nform. This conception of the relations of form and content implies\nalso either a new interpretation, or the repudiation, of the theory\nof art as the imitation of nature, meaningless in a mechanical sense,\ntrue, and synonymous with the theory of intuition, in a creative and\nformative sense. Through the same critical process, all discussions of\nthe relations between art and the senses appear as being founded on a\nconfusion between that which is still beyond the limit of spiritual\nactivity, the sensation or impression, and the actual \u00e6sthetic\nelaboration, which begins only when the mind becomes aware of the\nimpression that has reached it through the channel of the senses.\n\nWe have mentioned, in connection with the identification of intuition\nand expression, the fact that every word that we utter is constantly\npreceded by an internal image; which is as much as saying that\nlanguage is a perpetual spiritual creation, on the same plane as all\nour other expressions, and as art. We are accustomed to seeing dead\nwords and syllables in grammars and dictionaries, and we consider\nthem as something external, as a kind of instrument that we use and\naccommodate to this and that purpose. But words that grammarians\nstudy, through a naturalistic process, as independent elements of\nthe linguistic organism, are really alive and full of their meaning\nonly in the active context of speech. The reality of words is only in\nthe individual spirit that speaks, and every word is new every time\nthat it is employed because it expresses that particular, individual\nmoment of spiritual activity, which cannot be the same as any other\none. Philologists have been divided on the question of the origin of\nlanguage for centuries, some finding it in the logical activity, others\nin a system of mechanical symbols and conventions, a few admitting the\nconception of language as a pure \u00e6sthetic creation only for a mythic,\nprimitive period, which is succeeded in the history of every language\nby a period of development by convention and association. But, as in\nall other branches of spiritual activity, it is here impossible to draw\na distinction between the problem of the origins and the problem of\nthe nature of language: linguistic expressions have fixed themselves\nin the course of centuries and stand before us as a body of language,\nas a reality independent of the individual activity that produces the\nparticular expressions; this is what prevents us from recognizing in\nthe actual linguistic facts the same creative energy that formed the\nfirst words uttered by man.\n\nIn this reduction of the philosophy of language to \u00e6sthetics, Croce\nagain follows Vico, who professed to have found the true origins\nof languages in the principles of poetry, who first asserted the\nfunctional identity of language and poetry. This theory, however,\nseems to clash with the existence of what we might call the implicit\nconceptuality of language, of which we are constantly made aware by our\ngrammatical categories. The fact is that the relation between language\nand concept is the same as between intuition and concept: that is, on\none side, language is the material of our reflected thought, and it\nwould be impossible for the reflection to begin without or before the\nlanguage; but, on the other hand, the concepts appear in language not\nas forms but as matter. In other words, to speak it is not necessary\nto think logically, but it is impossible to think logically without\nspeaking. The grammatical categories are not real elements of language,\nbut products of abstraction, of a purely practical character, of the\nkind that we shall soon have to examine in the rhetoric of the arts.\n\nWhat may help us, in thus conceiving of the active and intuitive\ncharacter of language, is a comparison with other classes of expressive\nfacts. When we speak of musical or pictorial language, we are aware\nthat we are using mere metaphors for the purpose of collecting certain\ngeneral characteristics which are common to some of these facts. The\nvarious musical grammars, the rules of harmony or of orchestration, are\nnothing but summaries of abstractions: in the presence of a certain\nmusic, or of a certain picture, we cannot forget the principle that no\nexpression can give birth to a new expression without first undergoing\na new creative process. And this is as true of the highest forms of\nartistic expression as of the words which we use in our daily life.\n\nA number of objections to Croce's \u00e6sthetics have been prompted by his\nuse of the word intuition. To the reader who has followed our argument,\nit is not necessary to explain that Croce's intuition has nothing in\ncommon either with the mystic intuition of the Neoplatonists or of\nthe ultra-romantics, or with the intuition which Bergson substitutes\nfor the intellect as the proper organ of absolute knowledge. It is\nnot a mysterious instrument of the mind, by which man can either come\nin contact with supernatural realities, or, renouncing that which is\ndistinctively human in him, enter into the actual movement and life\nof nature. The fact that Croce has spent so much time and thought\nin trying to understand this first, na\u00efve, elementary grade of the\ntheoretical activity, does not justify his critics in putting him in\nthe same class either with romantic metaphysicians or with romantic\nnaturalists. That such a confusion has ever been possible is only a\nfurther proof of the immaturity and superficiality of a large part of\nour most solemn contemporary thought. It shows how it has been given to\ngrown-up and apparently educated men, to read a book without knowing\nwhat its subject was, and without even being able to shield themselves\nbehind the saving grace of silence.\n\nAn objection of a quite different order was raised by Croce himself,\nwho found its solution in the elaboration of his philosophy of\nthe practical, or of will. It can be said of the theory of art as\nintuition, that it reduces art to a form of knowledge, to a theoretical\nfunction, while what we look for in works of art is life and movement,\nand the feeling and personality of the artist, that is, something\nthat is not theoretical but practical. The answer might be that the\nfeeling is content and the intuition form; but such a dualistic point\nof view would in reality destroy not only Croce's \u00e6sthetics, but the\nfoundations of his whole philosophy of mind. And we would be back at a\nposition which we thought we had already criticised and surpassed. The\ntruth is that intuition, and the personality, or lyrical character,\nof a work of art, are only different aspects of the same spiritual\nprocess, that where one is, the other too will have to be found. What\nwe can abstract as the psychic content of intuition, since we have\nalready excluded abstractions and concepts, is only what we call\nappetition, tendency, feeling, will--the various facts which constitute\nthe practical form of the human spirit. Pure intuition cannot\nrepresent anything but the will in its manifestations, that is, nothing\nbut states of mind. And the states of mind are that passion, feeling,\nand personality which we find in art, and which determine its lyrical\ncharacter.\n\nIn order properly to understand this new point of view, it must be\nborne in mind that the lyrical character of the poetry does not\nhowever coincide with the practical passion of the poet: the relation\nbetween the emotion and the intuition is not a deterministic one, as\nof cause and effect, but a creative one, as of matter and form. The\npoetical vibration is different in kind from the practical one. If I\ngrasp Croce's meaning correctly, the feeling and movement which we\nfind in art is something that belongs intrinsically to the intuitive\nactivity--it is the dynamic of the creative process itself. And\nin fact, what we look for in the works of art is not the empirical\npersonality of the artist, but the tonality of his individual \u00e6sthetic\nactivity, which is always new and always unmistakably his own,--not\nthe rhythm of his passion but that of his vision or contemplation,\nof his intuition of the passion. Any other way of considering this\nrelation would inevitably lead us back to the conventional distinction\nof form and content, to the attribution of \u00e6sthetic characters to\nthe emotions themselves, and to a definition of intuition not as a\nsimple and primitive fact, but as a combination of the practical and\nthe theoretical, of will and knowledge. I consider this deduction of\nthe lyrical character of intuition as one of the points of Croce's\n\u00e6sthetics which opens the way to new problems and stand in need of\nfurther elaboration; but what is important in it, and already firmly\nestablished, is the recognition of this character, through which the\nwhole doctrine of intuition gains a deeper and richer meaning, and\nbecomes more apt to deal with the concrete facts of our \u00e6sthetic\nexperience.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: This chapter and the following two are founded especially\non the _Estetica_, pp. 1-171; the essay on _L'intuizione pura e\nil carattere lirico dell' arte_, in _Problemi_, pp. 1-30; and the\n_Breviario_, in _Nuovi Saggi_, pp. 1-91.]\n\n\n\n\nIII. THE CONCEPT OF ART\n\n\nFurther determinations of the concept of art--Theoretical and practical\nactivity--The progress of \u00e6sthetic theories--An American instance:\nmorality and art--The typical--The ends of art--The process of \u00e6sthetic\nproduction--Relations of the \u00e6sthetic with the practical activity--The\ndelusion of objective beauty--\u00c6sthetic hedonism--The \u00e6sthetic value.\n\n\nThe determination of the concept of art as pure intuition would be\nlittle more than a verbal variation of older doctrines, if its validity\nand importance could not be proved in the actual practice of thought on\n\u00e6sthetic problems, in the study of the relations of the \u00e6sthetic fact\nwith the other facts of human activity, and in the criticism of errors\nwhich have invaded the field of \u00e6sthetic thought through a confusion of\nthe \u00e6sthetic with the intellectual or the practical. We shall therefore\nnot be able to grasp the new concept in the fulness of its meaning\nuntil we have surveyed the whole ground of the philosophy of mind: the\n\u00e6sthetic concept cannot be said to be fully determined until we have\na clear conception of the other fundamental grades or forms of the\nspirit. For the purposes of our exposition, we may however anticipate a\nsummary or scheme of the essential relations, which will be more fully\ndeveloped in the following chapters.\n\nWe have already seen how the logical activity springs from the soil\nof the pure intuition; how the knowledge of the universal follows the\nknowledge of the individual. The \u00e6sthetic and the logic grade, of which\nthe second implies the first, exhaust the whole of knowledge, the\nwhole theoretical life of man. A third grade or form does not exist:\nnot in history, which Croce still considered, in the first years of\nthis period, as reducible to the concept of art, and differentiated\nfrom it only by its employment of the predicate of existence, of the\ndistinction between reality and imagination; and not in the natural and\nmathematical sciences, which elaborate the data of intuition through\nfictions, hypotheses, and conventions, which are practical and not\ntheoretical processes.\n\nThe relation between the theoretical and the practical activity is\nof the same kind as that between the two grades of the theoretical\nactivity: that is, the first is the basis of the second. We can think\nof a knowing which is independent from the will, but not of a will\nwhich is independent of knowledge: it is impossible to will without\nhistorical intuitions and a knowledge of relations. Within the\npractical activity, we can further distinguish two grades corresponding\nto the two grades of the theoretical activity: the economic, which\nis the will of the individual, of a particular end, and the ethic,\nwhich is the will of the universal, of the rational end. The relation\nbetween the economic and the ethic activity is again the same\ngrade-relation as between the \u00e6sthetic and the logic, the theoretical\nand the practical. The concrete life of the human spirit consists in\nthe perpetually recurring cycle of the four grades of its activity,\nwhich is the law of its unity and development. The concept rises from\nthe intuition, and action from knowledge; ethical activity is not\nconceivable without a theoretical foundation, and the concreteness of\na particular end. At the close of the cycle, the spiritual life itself\nbecomes the object of a new intuition, from which a new concept and a\nnew action are reproduced _ad infinitum_. In the history of \u00e6sthetics,\nthe errors deriving from the confusion of that which is distinctively\n\u00e6sthetic with other forms of theoretical or practical activity,\npresent themselves as a series of doctrines, which can be considered\nas gradual approximations to the definition of art as intuition. It\nis not necessarily, or not only, a chronological series, but rather a\nsuccession of actual moments in the deduction of the concept of art.\nEmpirical \u00e6sthetics recognises the existence of a class of \u00e6sthetic\nor artistic facts, without attempting to reduce them under a single\nconcept; practical (hedonistic or moralistic) \u00e6sthetics makes a first\nattempt at interpreting them by putting them in relation with one\nof the categories of spiritual activity; intellectualiste \u00e6sthetics\ndenies that they belong to the practical sphere, though failing to\ndiscover their precise theoretical character; agnostic \u00e6sthetics\ncriticises all the preceding moments, and is satisfied with a purely\nnegative definition; mystic \u00e6sthetics, conscious of the difference of\n\u00e6sthetic from logical facts, makes a new spiritual category of them,\naffirms their autonomy and independence, but mistakes the nature of\ntheir relation with conceptual knowledge. We are all more or less\nfamiliar with the various aspects of these doctrines, and it can be\nsaid that none of them (with the exception of the first, which is now\nrepresented by psychologic \u00e6sthetics) is now being held consistently\nby any responsible thinker. The truth of the intuitive theory, which\nwe find adumbrated already in classical antiquity in the Aristotelian\ntheory of _mimesis_, and of which artists and critics have always had a\nkind of obscure presentiment, is now implicitly recognised by all who\nhave an intimate contact with and a sincere feeling for art and poetry.\nThe literary and artistic development of the end of the eighteenth and\nof the nineteenth century has been accompanied by such a wealth of\ncritical thought, that a conscious understanding of the nature of art\nis now much more frequent than in former ages. The forces that were\nat work liberating logical and moral thought from the shackles of the\npast, reacted vigorously on \u00e6sthetic thought, and helped to make it\nmore and more independent from both intellectualistic and moralistic\nerrors. It would be possible to extract aphorisms and meditations from\nthe writings of the greatest poets, artists, and musicians of the\nperiod, to show how common among them was and is the knowledge of the\nspiritual autonomy and of the intuitive character of art. But because\nthe task of the artist is not that of elaborating a philosophy of art,\nand a good many critics and \u00e6stheticians, on the other hand, have very\nlittle experience of the actual \u00e6sthetic processes, we find that though\nthe other doctrines are discredited, yet a number of prejudices which\nhave their roots in them are still current,--the artists themselves\nrejecting them, as it were, by instinct and not by reasoning, and the\ncritics and \u00e6stheticians clinging to them because they help them to\ngain a fictitious possession of that artistic reality which escapes\nthem in its purity and actuality. An intellectualiste or moralistic\ncritic can easily mask his lack of \u00e6sthetic taste, his fundamental\nignorance of art, by talking at length and with great solemnity about\nunessentials. Artists and poets, on the other hand, are apt to react\nto these prejudices by falling into the errors of \u00e6stheticism, that\nis by attributing to their empirical selves the freedom that belongs\nto their function, and by denying in the name of art the autonomy\nand dignity of intellectual and moral values. In both cases, what is\nmanifestly lacking is a proper understanding of the meaning of logical,\nor ideal distinctions, for which the artists, I suppose, ought to be\nmore readily forgiven than the critics, though \u00e6stheticism may be as\ndangerous to art as moralism or intellectualism are to thought.\n\nA recent literary polemic in America offered some striking examples of\nthese prejudices. A critic of the older school, in a discussion of the\nmoral tendencies of the age, introduced a criticism of the proposition\nthat art is not concerned either with truth or morality, by affirming\nthat this negative proposition could legitimately be converted into\nthe positive one: the object of art is to deny that which truth and\nmorality affirm. The sophism of this conversion is based on a confusion\nbetween the two logical concepts of distinction and opposition. The\ncritic was not deducing a logical consequence of the first proposition,\nany more than if he were interpreting my saying that I am not\ninterested as a student of literature in the law of gravitation, as\nimplying a disbelief in the law of gravitation: he was merely stating\nhis own conception of art as a conceptual and moral function, and of\nthe value of art as an intellectual and moral value; which is the error\nof intellectualism and moralism. In his reply to the older critic, a\nwriter of the younger generation contended that \u00e6sthetic values are\nhigher than either logical or moral values, and in some mysterious way\ntranscend and comprehend them both. The younger writer was evidently\nusing the same kind of logic as his adversary, and affirming on his own\naccount the error of a variety of \u00e6stheticism.\n\nWhat the original proposition actually implies is that judgments\nregarding the logical truth or the historical verity, the moral merit\nor demerit of a work of art, do not treat art as art, but dissolve the\nwork itself into its abstract elements, and deal with these elements in\nan entirely different context. If I discuss the theology and philosophy\nof Dante, I shall find a number of propositions which to my mind are\nuntrue; but the beauty of Dante's poetry is incommensurable with the\ntruth or falsehood of his logical thought. The beauty of Francesca's\nepisode is not impaired by the quite reasonable suspicion that the\npoetical idealization of a guilty passion might have a dangerous\ninfluence on weak and sentimental souls.\n\nThe imperfect distinction between art and logical or scientific truth\nis responsible for the critical prejudice of art as expressive of\nthe typical. The typical is a product of abstract thought, of the\nkind that is employed in the natural sciences. The expressions of\nart are essentially individual and particular, and when we consider\nthem as typical, we merely use them as the starting point for our\nown abstractions, that is, for the purposes of a quite different\nmental process. Similar to the concept of the typical are those of\nthe allegory and symbol, which are mechanical constructions of the\nintellect, and which art is unable to represent unless it reduces them\nto the particular and concrete.\n\nThe confusion between art and morality, being ultimately founded on\nthe supposition that art is not a theoretical function, but an act of\nthe will, gives rise to the theories of the ends of art, and of the\nso-called choice of the subject. But the end of art is art itself,\nexpression or beauty, or whatever other name we shall give to the\n\u00e6sthetic value, just as the end of science is truth and the end of\nmorality is goodness; that is, the concept of end coincides in every\ncase with the concept of value. And the artist cannot choose his\nsubject, since there is no abstract subject present to his mind, but\nonly the world of his own already formed intuitions and expressions;\nwhich he can neither will nor not will. This is the truth contained in\nthe old idea of poetical inspiration, which was merely another word for\nthe spontaneity and unreflectiveness of art. A choice of the subject\naccording to ends other than \u00e6sthetic is a certain cause of failure.\nThe only conceivable meaning that advice as to the choice of a subject\nmay have, is a kind of artistic _know thyself_, a warning to the artist\nto be true to himself, to follow his inspiration, and that which is\ndeepest and most genuine in it. It is, however, a tautological meaning,\nand the reverse of the one which is given to it by the moralistic\ncritic.\n\nIf it is impossible for us either to will or not will our \u00e6sthetic\nvision, the internal image which is the true \"work of art,\" it is clear\nthat an element of will enters into the production of the physical\nor external image, made of sounds or lines or colours or shapes,\nwhich we call works of art in a naturalistic or empirical sense. The\ncomplete process of \u00e6sthetic production is symbolized by Croce in\nthe four following stages: _a_, the impression; _b_ the expression or\n\u00e6sthetic spiritual synthesis; _c_, the feeling of pleasure or pain\nwhich accompanies the \u00e6sthetic as well as any other form of spiritual\nactivity; d, the translation of the \u00e6sthetic fact into physical\nphenomena. The only true \u00e6sthetic moment of the whole process is in\nb, which alone is real expression, while _d_ is expression in the\nnaturalistic and abstract sense of the word. Such a conception clashes\nagainst a number of deep-rooted fallacies, which in their turn are the\nsource of innumerable \u00e6sthetic prejudices. It is clear, however, that\nwhat we call a printed poem is no poem at all, but only a collection of\nconventional black signs on a white page, which suggest to me a number\nof movements of my vocal organs destined to the production of certain\nsounds; and again, that these sounds are not the poem in itself, apart\nfrom my understanding of their meaning, from my re-creation of the\ninternal image which prompted their original production now recorded in\nthe pages of a book. Physically, a painting is constituted by colours\non a wall, or board, or canvas: here, the first stage of reproduction\nwhich is required for the written poem is not necessary: the material\n(visual, as it was auditive for the poem) on which the original image\nfixed itself is directly present to me; and yet, again, that material\nobject is not the \u00e6sthetic vision, but a mere stimulus for its\nreproduction. Starting from the material object, Croce symbolized the\ninverse process of \u00e6sthetic reproduction in the following series: _e_,\nthe physical stimulus; _d-b_, the perception of physical facts (sound,\ncolours, etc.), which is at the same time the \u00e6sthetic synthesis\npreviously produced; _c_, the \u00e6sthetic pleasure or pain. Here, again,\nthe only moment of true \u00e6sthetic activity is in _b_ where, at least in\nthe hypothesis of a perfect understanding, my vision coincides with the\norignal creation.\n\nIt must be understood, however, that these successive stages are not\nreal, but abstract or symbolical distinctions. We cannot re-create\nan \u00e6sthetic vision except through the sounds or colours in which it\noriginally expressed itself; and those sounds or colours coincide with\nthe original expression. The words and rhythm of a poem are to it what\nthe body is to the soul, and once you have dissolved that form, there\nis nothing left. Hence the theoretical impossibility of a translation,\nwhich can only exist as a new creation. But when we consider those\nwords or that rhythm not within the expressive synthesis, in which\ntheir reality is spiritual and not physical, but outside it, as words,\nas rhythm, we build up by abstraction a category of physical facts,\nto which we attribute a reality not inferior to that of the spiritual\nactivity. _B_ and _d_, in the preceding analysis, are not different\nrealities, but different elaborations, the first, ideal, the second,\nnaturalistic, of the same fact.\n\nWe have now established a relation between the \u00e6sthetic and the\npractical activity: the physical expression is an act of the will,\nand as such it falls legitimately in the domain of both economic and\nethical judgments. We may buy or sell the physical stimuli, books,\nstatues, and paintings, though no amount of wealth can give the\n\u00e6sthetic vision: the possession of the objects of art is of another\norder than the possession of the spiritual creation. We may consider\nthat the communication of a certain intuition is in certain cases\nmorally undesirable, and censure the artist for having willed it,\nor try to prevent him from accomplishing it. The principle of the\nspiritual autonomy of art, necessary to establish the nature of\n\u00e6sthetic value, cannot be understood to imply the absolute practical\nfreedom of the artist from the laws that bind all other men. But even\nfrom this point of view, there is no doubt that art is more likely to\nsuffer from excessive constraint than from excessive freedom; and that\nthe fanatics of morality in art are only too often inclined to mistake\na set of arbitrary rulings for morality, and to overlook the intention\nof the artist. It is a significant fact, and one which deserves more\nattention than it seems to have ever received, that the so-called moral\ncondemnation of a true work of art has never outlasted one or two\ngenerations, and their prejudices and weaknesses.\n\nThe existence of the physical stimuli or material helps for the\n\u00e6sthetic reproduction, fosters the illusion of beauty as an intrinsic\nattribute of physical objects, first as artistic, and then as natural\nbeauty. It is hardly necessary to criticise this illusion at this\npoint of our discussion: beauty is not an objective attribute, but\na spiritual value. In the same way as there is no intrinsic beauty,\nindependent dent of our either creative or re-creative activity, in\nwords or notes or lines or colours, there is also no category of\nnatural beauty. What we call beauty of nature is either that which\nin nature is merely pleasureable from a practical and sensuous\nstandpoint, or the presence of certain stimuli for the reproduction of\na pre\u00ebxistent \u00e6sthetic vision. We recognise the obvious truth of this\nfact, when we remark that the beauty of a certain landscape is not\nvisible to everybody, but only to him who looks at it with an artist's\neye. And it would be possible to write a history of the progressive\ndevelopment of beauty in nature, which would practically coincide\nwith, or follow at a short distance of time, the various stages of the\nhistory of poetry and painting.\n\nClosely related with the confusion between the physical attributes\nof the objects of art, and the true \u00e6sthetic value, are all the\ntheories of \u00e6sthetics which consider that the end of art is pleasure,\nor \u00e6sthetic hedonism in its various forms. Of these the most ancient\nis the one that considers beautiful that which gives pleasure to the\nhigher senses, he hearing and the sight; and other forms of it can\nstill be found, if not among artists and critics, at least among\npsychologists. Two of the most recent interpretations of \u00e6sthetic\nfacts, the theory of empathy or _Einf\u00fchlung_ and the theory of tactile\nvalues, are merely modern scientific variations of the old prejudice.\nBut no hedonistic theory can ever give a consistent account of\n\u00e6sthetic facts, as it is impossible to draw a distinction, on a purely\npsychological plane, between those pleasures of the senses which may\nprecede or accompany the \u00e6sthetic fact, and those that are purely\nsensuous; and the inevitable result is a complete reduction of the\n\u00e6sthetic to the sensual. In such theories, the real \u00e6sthetic problem\ndoes not even reach the stage of being formulated.\n\nThe truth that the hedonist obscurely foresees is that every\nspiritual activity is constantly accompanied by the practical reflex\nof satisfaction and dissatisfaction, pleasure and pain, value and\ndis-value. Value is every activity that unfolds itself freely,\ndis-value is the contrasted, hindered, impeded unfolding of the same\nactivity. If we call beauty the \u00e6sthetic value, then beauty is but the\nsuccessful expression, or better, the expression, since an unsuccessful\nexpression is not an expression at all. And it is not necessary to\nrepeat that by expression we distinctly mean not the physical stimulus,\nbut the spiritual synthesis.\n\nWith this definition of \u00e6sthetic value we reach one of the most\nimportant points of Croce's thought: the solution of what he calls\nthe dualism of values, or ideals, to the concrete realities. As the\nbeautiful expression is simply expression, the true thought is simply\nthought, and so on, so the ugly expression or the false thought are\nnon-expression and non-thought, the non-being which has no reality\noutside the moment of its opposition and criticism.\n\n\n\n\nIV. TECHNIQUE AND CRITICISM\n\n\nArt and technique--Errors deriving from the common conception of\ntechnique--The theories of the particular arts--The literary genres\n--The rhetorical categories--The categories of language--Genius and\ntaste--The \u00e6sthetic judgment--The idolatry of standards--The \u00e6sthetic\nstandard: the true objectivity--Criticism and history.\n\n\nThe relation between the \u00e6sthetic activity and the practical moment of\nthe production of the physical objects of art may be regarded under the\naspect of the relation between art and technique. The only legitimate\nmeaning of the word technique is that of a body of naturalistic\nknowledge in the service of the practical activity of the artist. In\nthis sense we can conceive of a great artist who is a poor technician,\nas in the case of a painter who should use Colours subject to rapid\nchange and deterioration, a musician who should be a bad singer or\npianist, a poet who should not be able to recite his own poetry. But\nin the common language of critics, we mean by technique something\nquite different--in painting what we call drawing or composition, in\nmusic, harmony or orchestration, in poetry, metre and construction.\nNow it is quite clear that we cannot conceive of a great painter who\ncould not draw, a great musician unable to harmonize or to orchestrate,\na great poet whose lines are defective. What we here isolate as\nthe technical handling of an artistic subject is but the process of\n\u00e6sthetic creation itself, the succession and progression of intuitions\nin the artist's mind; using the naturalistic or psychological method,\nwe abstract certain moments of the creative process, and we attribute\na reality to such abstractions. We talk of the technique of a poem\nor of a painting as being something that has been superadded to the\noriginal intuition; we see the poet or the artist engaged in learning\nthe technique of his art; we see him correcting or modifying his\noriginal expression according to certain technical standards. But what\nwe call the technique of a poem or of a painting is that particular\npoem or painting in its concreteness; and no poet or artist can learn\na technique except by re-creating in his own spirit the work of the\ngreat masters, his technical education being but one with his \u00e6sthetic\neducation; and finally, the process of correction or modification is\nmerely a stage of the expressive process itself: no poet can correct a\nline in his poem, no painter change a line or a shade in his picture,\nif the internal image has not first spontaneously undergone such\ncorrections and changes in his mind.\n\nThe consequences of the common conception of technique in criticism\nare more dangerous, because more subtle and affecting a more intimate\nknowledge of art, than those of any other \u00e6sthetic error. The talk\nof the connoisseur and of the average musical or dramatic critic is\nfull of such fallacies as the technical errors of great painters, the\nharmonic or orchestral wonders of poor music, the faulty construction\nof a great play; fallacies which may sometimes have originated\nfrom some real character of the \u00e6sthetic fact, but which are mere\ncontradictions in terms. And the literary critic will speak of the\n_fine frenzy_ and the _quiet eye_, meaning by the one, the abstract\ninspiration, and by the other the abstract production, and so miss the\ntrue \u00e6sthetic moment which is neither the one nor the other, but the\nsynthesis of the two. Or he will oppose romanticism to classicism, in\na similar sense, without realizing that all art is at the same time\nromantic and classic, truly inspired, and because truly inspired, able\nto express itself.\n\nMere variations of the naturalistic or psychological conception of\ntechnique, as an actual moment of the \u00e6sthetic creation, are a series\nof theories which Croce has extensively criticised, and of which we can\ngive but a cursory account.\n\nThe theories of the particular arts and of their limits originate from\nthe manuals of practical precepts useful to architects, sculptors,\npainters or musicians, and are founded on the assumed possibility of\nfinding a field of the \u00e6sthetic activity corresponding to the physical\nmeans employed by each category of artists. But we have already seen\nthat in the \u00e6sthetic fact there is no distinction between means and\nend: we can speak of the various arts in a purely empirical sense, as\nan external classification of the objects of art, but not as classes of\n\u00e6sthetic activity.\n\nA similar kind of classification is the one which gives rise to\nthe literary genre, and to similar abstractions in the other arts:\nlegitimate instruments of work as long as we do not forget that there\ndoes not exist anything like the idea of a tragedy or sonata apart from\nall concrete tragedies or sonatas, and as long as we do not condemn\na new tragedy or a new sonata simply because it is not like the old\nones, that is, as long as we do not transform an abstract type into a\nlaw. Every new \u00e6sthetic creation, far from being bound to obey external\nlaws, establishes new laws, or rather is its own law. It must, and\nwill, answer only for itself, and the only claim that we can put upon\nit is that of internal coherence. Both the theories of the arts and the\ntheories of the genres, when we try to treat them as true and rigorous,\nand not as mere practical expedients, manifest the absurdity of their\ntask through their incapacity to give precise and absolute definitions.\nEvery work of art expresses a state of mind, and every state of mind\nis irreducibly individual and new: a complete classification would\ntherefore be only that in which every class has under itself a single\nintuition.\n\nAnother form of the technical prejudice is the creation of rhetorical\ncategories, which are also abstract classes of expressions tending to\ntransform themselves into precepts. The main prejudice of rhetoric, in\nliterature as well as in all other arts, is that of the distinction\nbetween the simple and the ornate, which is founded on a conception\nof beauty not as the value of the expression, but as something that\ncan be added, so to speak, mechanically, to the expression. Because of\nits preceptive character, rhetoric has done more harm in the history\nof poetry and art, than any of the other classifications of the same\norder; and though it is generally discredited among artists and critics\nto-day, in its pure original form, yet rhetorical prejudices, both in\nthe creation and judgment of art, are still endowed with an obstinately\nvigorous life.\n\nThese naturalistic classifications in art have their counterpart in the\nstudy of language, in the creation of grammatical genres or categories\nor parts of speech, and in the attempts to reduce the empirical\ngrammars to preceptive or normative grammars: that is, a practical\nor pedagogic expedient, to a rhetoric or technique of language. But\nthe individuality and indivisibility of expression is in the nature\nof language as well as of art, and language obeys not the abstract\nprecepts of grammarians, but the law of the \u00e6sthetic spirit which makes\nus find a new expression for every new intuition. Even phonetic laws,\nthe modern scientific instruments of grammar, are mere descriptive\nsummaries of observed facts, of physical moments abstracted from their\nspiritual reality, and therefore abstract or naturalistic laws, and\nnever actually represent the concrete, individually determined facts\nof language.\n\nA coherent theory of \u00e6sthetic (literary and artistic) criticism can\nbe deduced from the concept of art as intuition, and we have already\nanticipated its main theses in the discussion of the concept itself. We\nhave seen that in the process of reproduction of an \u00e6sthetic process,\nthe actual moment in which the original image, through the medium of\nwhat we have abstracted as the physical stimulus, reproduces itself in\na mind other than that of the creator (or, in what we might consider as\na particular case, in the mind of the creator himself at a time other\nthan that of the original creation), is a moment of \u00e6sthetic activity\nidentical with that of creation. Given an identity of circumstances,\nthat which takes place within my mind is the same \u00e6sthetic process\nwhich took place originally in the mind of the artist. If we call\ngenius the creative, and taste the reproductive activity, the corollary\nof these considerations is that of the identity of genius and taste:\nin the act of contemplating and judging a work of art, our spirit\nbecomes one with the spirit of the artist. Though in practice this\nidentity may never be attained (because of variations in the material\nconditions of the physical stimulus, or in the spiritual attitude of\nthe contemplator), yet if we deny it, and establish a difference in\nkind between these two aspects of \u00e6sthetic activity, we find ourselves\ninevitably led to exclude the possibility not of the \u00e6sthetic judgment\nonly, but of all forms of \u00e6sthetic communication. There is a sense\nin which we can speak of the relativity of taste, and which accounts\nfor the actual variety of judgments, not in relation to art only, but\nto all forms of human activity: every judgment is relative to our\nknowledge, at a particular moment, of the actual conditions in which\nthe work of art was originally produced. But this is the intrinsic\nrelativity of all the particular determinations of reality, not a\nrelativity peculiar to \u00e6sthetic values, which are as real, though of a\ndifferent order, as those of logic or morality.\n\nBut the \u00e6sthetic judgment itself is not the mere intuitive reproduction\nof the work of art, made possible by what we call historical criticism\nin the narrow sense of the word, that is, by interpretation and\ncomment. These are the antecedent of the \u00e6sthetic judgment, which\nconsists in a logical proposition of the form: \"A is art,\" or \"A is not\nart,\" \"A is art in a b c, A is not art in d e f\"; or again: \"There is a\nfact, A, which is a work of art,\" \"There is a fact, A, which is falsely\nbelieved to be a work of art.\" The \u00e6sthetic judgment, like all other\njudgments, establishes a relation between a particular, concrete fact,\nand a universal category, which is that of art. And, like all other\njudgments, it is at the same time a judgment of value and an historical\njudgment, which is the obvious consequence of Croce's identification of\nvalue and fact. \u00c6sthetic criticism therefore coincides with the history\nof the \u00e6sthetic activity, with the history of poetry or art.\n\nA frequent reaction to Croce's \u00e6sthetics, and to its implications\nin the theory of criticism, especially among literary critics, is a\nsense of irritation caused by the loss of the so-called standards of\njudgment. It would be interesting to analyze these supposed standards,\nwhich generally are not explicitly enunciated (probably because their\nclear enunciation would manifest their true nature, and annul them\nas standards of \u00e6sthetic judgment), but only more or less obscurely\nreferred to with a mixture of pride and reverence. They would then show\nthemselves to be the critical duplicates of the various \u00e6sthetic errors\nwhich we have already discussed.\n\nIf the standards of which the critics speak are, as is often the case,\nmoral or intellectual ideals, it is clear that Croce's \u00e6sthetics does\nnot question their validity, but only their application. There is a\nlarge number of literary critics, who are such only in name, and whose\nreal interests are intellectual or moral, critics of thought and of\nthe ethical life, and not of art. They use works of art as documents\nand undoubtedly works of art are, in the unity of the human spirit,\ndocuments of intellectual and moral life; but their error begins when\nthey confuse the issues, and censure or praise the art of the past,\nor try to influence the art of the future, with criteria which are no\nlonger intellectual or moral, but, because they have been transposed\noutside their legitimate sphere, intellectualistic and moralistic.\n\nAll other so-called standards are derived from the abstract ideas of\nliterary genres and of rhetorical categories. It is easy to judge of\na new tragedy if you know what a tragedy ought to be, if you have a\ncatalogue of purely external characteristics which you may either find,\nor not find, in the new work that comes before you. This is, of course,\nthe crudest form of rhetorical criticism; there is another which is\nnot less frequent, but more subtle. The critic builds up an ideal of\nwhat art ought to be, not with abstract categories, and classifications\ntransformed into arbitrary \u00e6sthetic precepts or standards, but through\nhis predilection for one particular author, or for one particular\nepoch, the Middle Ages or the Renaissance, the Classics or the\nRomantics: every work of art which is different either in spirit or in\nform from those that have been chosen is condemned in proportion to its\nvariation from the ideal. This form of criticism is often also vitiated\nby the intrusion of intellectualistic and moralistic errors, since an\nideal which is a mere particular determination of the past assumed as a\nuniversal value is likely to be mere rhetoric of thought and morality\nas well as of art.\n\nThe only legitimate standard in \u00e6sthetic criticism is the \u00e6sthetic\nstandard, that of beauty or expression, as against ugliness or\nnon-expression. Our critical judgment is the reaction of our \u00e6sthetic\npersonality in the presence of a work of art, as the moral judgment is\nthe reaction of our moral personality in the presence of an action. Our\nknowledge of a work of art, of a concrete and individual intuition,\nas our knowledge of an action, approaches more or less to the ideal\nlimit, according to the breadth of our experience and the depth of our\nunderstanding; but there exist no external criteria on which we can\nrest our judgment, no mechanical props which will support it. This\ntheory of criticism, far from justifying a capricious and arbitrary\nsubjectivism, requires from the critic a constant vigilance against\nthat which is narrowly personal, capricious, and arbitrary in himself;\na patient, unceasing effort in the labor of recapturing and recreating\nthe material and spiritual circumstances from which the work of art\noriginally sprang; and the quick sensitivity of the artist coupled with\nthe wide understanding of the historian and the philosopher.\n\nWhen \u00e6sthetic criticism is raised to this plane on which it coincides\nwith the history of poetry, or of art, it transforms itself necessarily\ninto a general criticism of life. What to the \u00e6sthetic consciousness\nappears as ugly or non-expressive, since in the world of history there\nare no negative facts, will not, when historically considered, appear\nas a negative value, but as a value of another order, as an intrusion\nof the logical or of the practical spirit in the work of the poet or\nof the artist. What in the Divine Comedy is not poetry is the outcome\nof philosophical or moral preoccupations which have not become art,\nhave not fused themselves into a new, coherent intuition, and must be\napprehended not as art, but as philosophy and morality. The allegory\nof the _F\u00e6rie Queene_ is not art, but it is an expression of certain\naspects of the Protestant spirit in the England of Elizabeth. In a poet\nlike Byron, the presence of practical motives is felt all through his\npoetical production; and the critic cannot limit his work to tracting\nthe gems, and to saying of all the rest: this is not poetry. He must\ntell us what it is, and only by telling what it is, he criticises it\ncompletely as poetry. It is impossible, in fact, to give to art its\nplace, without assigning its place to all the other activities of life.\nThe great \u00e6sthetic critic will also be a critic of philosophy, of\nmorality, of politics; but, as Croce says of De Sanctis, the strength\nof his purely \u00e6sthetic consideration of art will also be the strength\nof his purely moral consideration of morality, of his purely logical\nconsideration of philosophy, and so on. The forms or grades of the\nspirit, which the critic employs as categories for his judgment, are\nideally distinct in the unity of the spirit, but cannot materially be\nseparated from each other or from that unity without losing all their\nvitality. The distinction of \u00e6sthetic criticism from the other forms\nof criticism, of the history of poetry and the arts from the other\nkinds of history, is but an empirical one, pointing to the fact that\nthe attention of the critic or historian is turned towards one aspect\nrather than another of the same indivisible reality.\n\n\n\n\nV. THE PURE CONCEPT[1]\n\n\nThe function of logic in the system--The concept--Logical concepts and\nconceptual fictions--The pure concept as the unity of distinctions--\nSingularity, particularity and universality--The dialectic process\nin Hegel and in Croce--Opposition, distinction and value--The\nexpressiveness of the concept--Definition and individual judgment:\ntheir identity--Classification and numeration--The _a priori_ synthesis.\n\n\nWe have summarily examined in the three preceding chapters the theory\nof \u00e6sthetic, or intuitive, or individual, as distinct from logical, or\nconceptual, or universal, knowledge. We must now leave the \u00e6sthetic\nactivity in the background as the mere antecedent of the logical one,\nand proceed to investigate the latter.\n\nIn a sense it may be said that the key to every system of philosophy\nis to be found in the either implicit or explicit solution given to\ncertain logical problems and that only by understanding the logic of a\nphilosopher can we be sure to give its true meaning and value to his\nthought. The reverse is, as a general rule, also true: any solution of\na particular problem, any particular elaboration of the concept, when\nfully understood, will lead us back to the philosopher's logic, to his\nconcept of the concept. The main points of Croce's logic could easily\nbe deduced from his \u00e6sthetics; but an untrained mind might unwittingly\ntranspose the whole \u00e6sthetic theory on a purely psychological plane,\nand involve it again in the errors and contradictions of which it\naims at being a conclusive refutation. A study of Croce's logic will\nrender such a shifting of the perspective impossible. It will show\nthat a discussion of Croce's \u00e6sthetics has no meaning except on the\nlogical plane on which Croce has put it, and that therefore any serious\nobjection to it ought necessarily to imply either a revision of the\nlogical premises, or a demonstration that the actual logical processes\nare not rigorously in accord with these premises. What is here said\nof Croce's \u00e6sthetics is valid also for Croce's economics or ethics,\nand the reason is obvious. Croce's _Logica_ is not a manual of logic,\nin a scholastic and formalistic sense: it is the exposition of his\nconception of the logical activity, and therefore the philosophy of his\nphilosophy.\n\nThis method of approach to the logical problems, although unusual in\nour times, and antagonistic to the general tendencies of our culture,\nis not only, as its opponents assume, that of Kant and Hegel, but that\nof the whole tradition of European philosophy, beginning with Socrates,\nPlato, and Aristotle. It was only in epochs of philosophical decadence\nthat logic reduced itself to a mere formalism or instrumentalism,\nism, to a doctrine of the means of thought, as opposed to its proper\nfunction, which is that of inquiring into the nature of thought, and\ntherefore, since there is no way by which we can reach reality except\nthrough thought, into the nature of reality itself. To Croce, as\nbefore him to Hegel, the philosophical tradition is not a capricious\nsequel of unrelated speculations, but a series of connected efforts\nthrough which the human mind becomes progressively conscious of its\nown functions and structure. Nothing is more alien from him than that\ntype of philosophical criticism, which exhausts itself in an attempt\nat reducing under a common denominator apparently similar solutions of\nproblems, which in fact are profoundly different in their historical\ndetermination: but this consciousness of the historical factor in\nphilosophy, far from breeding in him a sense of scepticism and of the\nrelativity of truth, impels him to consider every effective thought as\na necessary moment of truth, and to represent therefore the succession\nof effective thoughts, critically separated from what in the various\nconcrete philosophies is merely postulated or imagined, as a perpetual\nintegration of truth. This attitude explains why the immediate\nfoundations of Croce's logic should be Kant's a priori synthesis and\nHegel's dialectic, that is, the highest stages of the development of\nEuropean thought before the positivistic anti-metaphysical reaction\nwhich swept away for a time, not the last traces of transcendental\nmetaphysics only, but philosophy and logic itself; and why also, among\nall the recent critics of Kant and Hegel, Croce should be one of the\nkeenest and sharpest. His sure grasp of fundamentals made it easy\nfor him to demolish all that is artificial and unessential in their\nsystems; as is particularly evident in the case of Hegel, who emerged\nfrom Croce's criticism as the discoverer of one great principle and\nat the same time the creator, through the misapplication of the same\nprinciple, of many a false science.\n\nThis return to the philosophical tradition, which between the end\nof the last and the beginning of this century, was not limited to\nCroce and to Italy only, was accompanied and indirectly favoured by\nthe researches of pure scientists on the method of exact and natural\nsciences. The economic theory of the scientific concept, such as it\nappears especially in the works of Mach and Avenarius, and to an\nunderstanding of which Croce had been prepared by his own studies on\nMarxism, was probably the most efficient instrument in destroying\nfrom within the pseudo-scientific constructions of positivism. The\nscientists themselves, by defining the limits of scientific thought,\nproved the impossibility of building a philosophy which should be at\nthe same time a synthesis of all particular sciences and a system of\nreality. The conclusions of this new scientific methodology are on the\nwhole accepted by Croce, and the fact that they naturally fall into\ntheir proper place in his logic is the most valid justification of his\nmethod, to which the distinction between the concept of philosophy and\nthe concepts of the sciences is essential.\n\nWe need not point to the object of logic, or concept, as we did in a\nformer chapter to the object of \u00e6sthetics, or intuition. The writing\nof this book implies a belief in its existence, and we could take\npractically any page of it as an example of what we mean by concept,\nor logical knowledge. We shall not therefore pause to confute logical\nscepticism, except by repeating the old argument that it is impossible\nto deny the existence of the concept except through the formulation of\na concept. Such affirmations as that there is no other knowledge than\nthe \u00e6sthetic one, or the one which is given by the ineffable intuition\nof the mystic, or by practical fictions, are in their turn neither\n\u00e6sthetic knowledge nor mystical intuitions, nor practical fictions, but\naffirmations, however contradictory in themselves, of a universal value\nand of an absolute character, that is, concepts. Through them, it is\npossible immediately to distinguish the logical form of knowledge, as\nrepresented by such affirmations, from the \u00e6sthetic or representative\none, from the sentimental or practical state of mind of the mystic, and\nfrom those concepts which are mere empirical fictions. It is evident,\nin this last instance, that the theory of the fiction cannot be a\nnew fiction, but must belong to an activity of a different kind, the\nlogical activity, whose value is truth.\n\nOf those three forms of logical scepticism, \u00e6stheticism, mysticism,\nand empiricism, the third one leads us to the distinction between the\nlogical concept and the scientific concepts, or fictions. The logical\nor pure concept is beyond all individual representations, and must\ntherefore not contain any particular representative element; but, on\nthe other hand, being the universal as opposed to the individuality of\nrepresentations, it must refer to all and each of them. If we think,\nfor instance, of the concepts of beauty, truth, quality, development,\nand such like, it will be impossible for us to represent or imagine a\nsufficiently large fragment of reality that will exhaust them, or such\nan infinitesimal one as will not admit them. This is what is meant by\nsaying that the concept is at the same time universal and concrete,\nor, in other words, that it is transcendent in respect to every single\nrepresentation, and yet immanent in all of them. A third characteristic\nof the pure concept, besides those of universality and concreteness,\nis that of expressivity: being a product of knowledge, it must be\nexpressed and spoken, and cannot be a dumb act of the mind, such as\npractical acts are.\n\nThe conceptual fictions, or, as Croce called them on account of\ntheir non-theoretical character, the pseudo-concepts differ from the\npure concept in being either concrete and representative but not\nuniversal, or universal without any possible reference to individual\nrepresentations, that is, without concreteness. The first class is\nthat of empirical concepts, which contain some objects or fragments\nof reality, but not the whole of reality: such as the concepts of\nhouse, cat, rose. The second is that of abstract concepts, which\ncontain no object or fragment of reality: such as those of triangle\nin geometry or of free movement in physics. The first are real, but\nnot rigorous, the second rigorous, but unreal. Neither the ones nor\nthe others can be considered as mistaken concepts or errors, since\nafter having criticised them from a logical point of view, we still\ncontinue to use them for what they are; nor as imperfect concepts, and\npreparatory to the perfect ones, since their formation presupposes the\nexistence of the perfect and rigorous ones: it would be impossible to\nconceive the house, the rose, the triangle, before conceiving quantity,\nquality, existence, and other pure concepts. It is true that in the\nactual development of thought, conceptual fictions have again and\nagain given birth to true concepts; but in that case they have lost\ntheir intrinsic nature, and have assumed the characters of the genuine\nlogical activity. In order to understand the proper function or nature\nof the conceptual fictions, it is necessary to fix our attention on the\nmoment of their formation, which is practical and not logical. Their\njustification lies in their practical end and in their usefulness: they\nare instruments by the help of which we can recall with a single word\nvast groups of representations, or which indicate in a single word what\nkind of operation is required in order to find certain representations.\nThe act of forming intellectual fictions is neither an act of knowledge\nnor of not-knowledge; logically, it is neither rational nor irrational\n(true or untrue); its rationality is of another order, practical and\nnot logical. The activity which produces pure concepts, and that which\nproduces empirical or abstract concepts, have been called respectively\nReason and Abstract Intellect, or Intuition and Intellect; to which\nterminology Croce objects that the word intellect is certainly\ninappropriate to a non-theoretical activity. Croce himself is in no\nneed of a new name for it, since he considers it one with the general\npractical activity, will or action.\n\nThe definition that we have given of the pure concept seems to clash\nagainst an insuperable difficulty arising from the multiplicity of\nconcepts. If the concept is an elaboration of reality as a universal,\nhow can we admit the existence of more than one concept? Beauty\nand truth are both concrete universals, and yet they are not the\nsame universal: they have the same logical form, but they denote\ndifferent aspects of reality. If this variety of the concepts, that\nis, of the aspects of reality, were insuperable, we should fall from\nthe irreducible multiplicity of representations into a not less\nirreductible multiplicity of concepts, which would in the end justify\na new logical scepticism and take us back to a mystical solution of\nthe problem of the unity of reality. The passage from the multiple\nuniversals to the true universal would be logically impossible, and to\nbe performed only by the help of some sort of mystical intuition.\n\nThe solution of this difficulty has already been hinted at in the\ndiscussion of the relations between intuition and concept, and between\nknowledge and will. The theory of the successive grades of reality,\nin their progressive implication, is the true form of the concept.\nCroce affirms the unity of reality, as a consequence of the unity of\nthe concept, of the form through which only reality is known. But if\nwe suppress the distinction, the unity that we reach is an empty and\nineffable one: a whole is a whole only inasmuch as it has parts, as\nit _is_ parts; a unity can be thought only through its distinctions.\nTherefore the unity and the distinctions are both necessary to the\nconcept: the distinctions are not something outside the concept, but\nthe concept itself, which is a unity of distinctions. The mind or\nspirit is one, but it is impossible to think of it as a pure and simple\nunity, outside of the forms in which it realizes itself, and of these\nforms in their necessary relations. Which is but a more comprehensive\nway of saying what we have already said speaking of one of those forms\nin particular, the \u00e6sthetic one, that it is impossible to conceive any\nof them except by determining its relations with the others.\n\nIt is necessary, however, not to convert these distinctions of the\nconcept into abstractions: by approximation, and for a practical\npurpose, we can speak of a given action as a theoretical or practical\none, an economic or moral one. In fact, in every fragment of reality\nwe find the universal, and therefore all the forms of the universal.\nBut on the other hand it is impossible to think any concrete datum,\nand to recognize it as an affirmation of the spirit as a whole, unless\nwe distinguish each of its aspects in the most rigorous fashion. We\nshall then have a criticism of art and poetry, from the \u00e6sthetic point\nof view; or of philosophy, from the logical one; and a moral judgment\nwhich takes into account only the individual moral initiative. The\ndistinctions of the concept are then used as directing principles of\nthought, but not, in the way empirical concepts are used, as criteria\nfor a classification of objects; nor, again, as characteristics of\nepochs of actual historical development, which in the end reduce\nthemselves to types of material classification.\n\nCroce's theory of the unity and distinctions of the concept coincides\nwith the old division of concepts into universal, particular, and\nsingular ones. The true logical definition is reached only by\ndetermining the singularity of a distinction in relation with the other\ndistinctions (particularity), and with the whole (universality). For\ninstance, the concept of beauty is intuition (singularity), knowledge\n(particularity), and finally spirit or mind (universality). The\nsymbol corresponding to this peculiar relation is not that of a fine\nor succession, but of a circle: there is not a first and a last term\nof the series, a beginning and an end, but a perpetual revolution,\nin which every distinction in turn may appear as the beginning and\nthe end of the series. Art or philosophy, knowledge or action, may be\npostulated with equal reason as the end of the spirit: the true end,\nhowever, is not any of the particular forms, but only the spirit or\nmind or reality as a whole.\n\nReaders who are familiar with Hegelian logic will at once perceive\nthe difference between Croce's and Hegel's treatment of logical\ndistinctions. There is no attempt on the part of Croce to apply to them\nthe dialectic process, which pervades the whole of Hegel's philosophy,\nand which is retained by Croce only in its legitimate sphere which is\nnot that of distinctions but of oppositions. The dialectic process, of\nwhich the remote ancestor is Plato, and the more immediate forbears\nthose Renaissance philosophers, Cusanus and Bruno, who more or less\nobscurely affirmed the _principium coincidenti\u00e6 oppositorum_, only\nwith Hegel reaches its rigorous logical expression. The most famous\ninstance of its application is to be found in Hegel's formula of the\nopposition of being and non-being, and of their unity in the becoming:\nthe pure being is identical with the pure non-being, or, to say the\nsame thing in different words, we cannot think the one without the\nother, and we do actually think the one and the other when we think the\nactual reality, which is neither being nor non-being, but becoming.\nBeing and non-being are a true couple of opposites, as ideal and real,\npositive and negative, value and non-value, activity and passivity,\nand so on. By the application of the dialectic process, all these\ncouples are shown to be not couples of concepts, but single concepts,\neach couple containing the affirmation and the negation of a single\nconcept. Croce's criticism of Hegel is founded on an interpretation of\nthe dialectic process as logically valid for such couples only, and\ninapplicable to the distinctions of the concept, or to empirical and\nabstract concepts; and this criticism, while emphasizing the importance\nof Hegel's main contribution to philosophical thought, sweeps away at\none stroke all that in his philosophy has generally been considered as\nmost distinctly Hegelian both by his followers and by his adversaries.\n\nCroce's interest in such couples of opposites as those that we have\nmentioned is very far from being as keen as Hegel's. Their dialectic\nsolution into single concepts is implicit in every phase of Croce's\nphilosophy. This can best be seen in the constant interchange of such\nwords as spirit and reality; each of them, when taken by itself, a\npure, formal spirit, and a pure, material reality, are meaningless,\nwhile, once they have been correlated, both indicate the same concept,\nthe spirit perpetually realizing itself in the concreteness of life:\na formula which contains the whole of Croce's immanentism. But within\nthe distinctions of the concept, the dialectic process is constantly\napplied by Croce to such oppositions as those of good and evil, true\nand false, beautiful and ugly, which are nothing but the double\naspect, affirmative and negative, respectively, of the concepts of\ngoodness, and truth, and beauty. We need only recall what we have said\nof Croce's conception of \u00e6sthetic value, and of value in general.\nThe dialectic process is the logical structure of Croce's concept of\nvalue. The positive element of each concept is the only real one, and\na negative judgment of value is not a purely logical judgment, but\na statement to which is added the expression of a desire or of an\nexigency. If we say: A is immoral, we mean: A follows his own immediate\npleasure (a logical statement), and also: A ought to follow a higher\nend (the expression of a desire). A positive judgment of value, on the\nother hand, coincides entirely with a logical judgment, or a statement\nof fact. The opposition of value to fact is of the same kind as that\nof spirit to reality; verbal and apparent and not logical and real.\nThe underlying reality of the opposition can be grasped only through\nthe distinction; what in the opposition is a negative and therefore a\nmere abstraction can never be anything but a positive value of another\norder, a distinct form of activity. The action that we have judged\nas morally evil, if it is an action at all, belongs to the economic\norder, is economically rational, directed towards a particular end\nwhich confers on it its particular value; and the same applies to\nall the other categories of reality, in which error and evil cannot\nbe introduced except by the substitution of one form for the other.\nIt is impossible to distinguish a concept from its opposite as two\nconcepts; but when a distinction is introduced, the opposition loses\nits negative character, and identifies itself with a distinct but\npositive value. Error and evil as such are never present except in the\nact that transcends them, in the conscience that, realizing itself in a\nhigher sphere, turns against them and condemns them. It is superfluous\nto point to the importance that this process lends to the distinctions\nthemselves, which are now seen at last not as mere logical instruments,\nbut as the actual differentiations of reality, the necessary conditions\nof all life and progress.\n\nThe concept does not exist outside its verbal expression, but the\nrelation between logical thought and language, because of the purely\n\u00e6sthetic or intuitive nature of language, is not of the rigorous\ncharacter which is postulated by the Aristotelian logician, and, in\nmore recent times, by the student of symbolic logic, who both assume\nlanguage to be an essentially logical function. It would be impossible\nfor Croce to fall into that extreme of idealism which is the common\nvice of the verbal realist, for whom propositions, judgments, or\nsyllogisms have a kind of absolute reality of their own, independent\nof the mind that thinks them. It may seem paradoxical to assert that\nnowhere is Croce's realism more apparent than in his treatment of the\nverbal forms of the concept; and yet his criticism of the old logical\nprinciples and forms, running parallel to that of the rhetorical\ncategories and genres in the field of \u00e6sthetics, allows him to reach\nthe actual workings of the logical activity with much greater intimacy\nthan is possible through any kind of formalistic logic.\n\nThe logical judgment, or concept, appears in two main forms: the\ndefinition, and the individual judgment. In the definition, the\nsubject is one with the predicate, both being universal; in the\nindividual judgment, the subject is an individual, the predicate a\nuniversal. \"The intuition is the \u00e6sthetic form of the spirit,\" is a\ndefinition; \"The _Divine Comedy_ is poetry,\" is an individual judgment.\nThe individual judgment is one with the perception, or perceptive\njudgment, with the historical judgment, and, for the reason given\nbefore, with the positive judgment of value; it is the last and most\nperfect form of knowledge. But the distinction between the definition\nand the individual judgment is not an ultimate and irreducible one.\nThe concrete logical act is always an individual judgment, that is,\nthe affirmation of the unity of the individual and the universal in\nrelation to a particular subject; and every definition is an individual\njudgment inasmuch as it cannot be but the solution of a particular\nproblem, individually and historically determined. The particular\nproblem, the group of facts, from which a particular definition\narises, is the individual subject of which the definition predicates\nthe concept. This identification of the definition and the individual\njudgment disposes of the familiar distinctions of formal and material\ntruths, of truths of reason and of fact, and of analytical and\nsynthetical judgments; which all are reduced to mere abstractions,\npartial aspects of the only logical act, consisting in the thinking of\nthe pure concept, as a concrete universal.\n\nThe practical imitations of the concept, or pseudo-concepts, also may\nappear in the double form of definitions and individual judgments.\nFrom the empirical concepts we can form empirical judgments, which\nconsist in the inclusion of an individual subject within a class or\ntype, and therefore can also be called classificatory judgments. From\nthe abstract concepts, the passage to the individual subject cannot be\neffected without the intervention of an empirical concept, that is,\nwithout a previous reduction of the individual subjects to classes and\ntypes: this reduction enables us to form empirico-abstract judgments,\nor judgments of numeration and mensuration. The function of these\njudgments is, as that of the concepts with which they are related, not\ntheoretical, but practical: to classify or to enumerate is not the same\nas to understand, though they are both essential operations of the\nhuman mind. The corresponding judgments are therefore called by Croce\npseudo-judgments, or practical imitations of the individual judgment.\n\nThe reduction of the pure concept to the individual judgment is the\nfundamental innovation of Croce's logic. It entirely disposes of any\nform of transcendental thought, of an Absolute or a Universal as\nsome beyond and above reality, and therefore of the last remnants\nof metaphysics in philosophy. It means, translated into terms of\ncommon language, that there is no thought outside the thinking of\nindividual minds, individually, that is, historically determined; and,\nconversely, that there is no reality outside the reality of thought,\nsince the postulation of an external reality is nothing but one more\nact of thought. In the light of this doctrine, the relation between\nthe intuition and the concept, between \u00e6sthetic and logical knowledge,\ncan be restated by saying that while the intuition is the autonomous,\ncreative mental act, by which the individual is known as individual,\nthe concept is the autonomous, creative mental act, by which the\nindividual is known as universal, that is, not simply known, but\nunderstood. Since Kant, an autonomous creative act of the human mind\nhas received in modern philosophy the name of _a priori_ synthesis, a\nsynthesis which cannot be resolved into its components, or material\nelements, because its form, and therefore its true being, cannot be\ntraced in them, but is imposed on them by the mind. Croce's intuition\nis an \u00e6sthetic _a priori_ synthesis, through which the obscure psychic\nmaterial rises to the light of consciousness; his concept, a logical\n_a priori_ synthesis, in which the intuition is no longer form, but\nmatter, subject to a new form which is judgment and reason. The _a\npriori_ synthesis is thus employed by Croce as the peculiar dialectic\nprocess of the distinctions of the concept, the rigorous logical form\nof the double-grade relation between the individual and the universal,\nbetween intuition and concept, between knowledge and action, and, as we\nshall see in his philosophy of the practical, between the economic and\nthe ethical will. It is, however, not a mere logical form, or rather,\nit is a logical form, because it is the actual process of the spirit,\nwhich cannot either know or act except by forming a priori syntheses\n(\u00e6sthetic or logical, economic or ethical), that is, by constantly\nre-creating itself and its own reality and values.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Logica_, part i, \"Il concetto puro,\" etc., pp.\n1-170.]\n\n\n\n\nVI. THE FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE[1]\n\n\nThe elementary forms of knowledge--Philosophy as the pure concept--\nDevelopment of Croce's theory of history--The identity of history and\nphilosophy--Subjectivity and objectivity--Distinctions and divisions\nof history--The historical determination of philosophy--The economic\ntheory of science--The natural sciences--History and science--The\nnaturalistic method and the concept of nature--Mathematical processes.\n\n\nThe result of Croce's inquiry into the forms of man's theoretical\nactivity can be summed up by saying that there are two pure theoretical\nforms, the intuition and the concept, of which the second can be\nsubdivided for convenience' sake into the definition and the individual\njudgment; and two modes of the practical elaboration of knowledge, the\nempirical concept and the abstract concept, from which are derived\nthe classificatory judgment and the judgment of numeration. Already\nin \u00e6sthetics we have found no rigorous criterion of distinction\nbetween the general intuitive activity of man, as it manifests itself\nin language, and those empirically constituted bodies of particular\nintuitions, which we call Poetry and the Arts: every man is a poet\nand an artist, though we reserve these names only for those among\nourselves in whom the \u00e6sthetic activity manifests itself in a\nhigher degree, dominates the whole life of the individual spirit.\nThe concept and the pseudo-concepts are also elementary, fundamental\nforms of knowledge, of which all men partake: every man, as he is\na poet, is also a philosopher and an historian, a scientist and a\nmathematician: but, again, we reserve these names only for the most\nconspicuous manifestations of those common spiritual activities, and\nform the empirical concepts of Philosophy and History, of Science and\nMathematics. We may speak of vulgar knowledge and of pure or scientific\nknowledge, but only by approximation and without forgetting that the\nonly claim to rationality and intelligibility on the part of pure\nknowledge lies in its relationship with the elementary forms, in the\nsame way as Poetry owes its power and beauty to the language in which\nit spreads its roots. A particular treatment of these higher degrees\nof knowledge is not, therefore, logically justified; the problems\nthat they present are the same that have been met with in the general\ndiscussion of the theoretical activity, and all they will have to offer\nwill be but a confirmation, and in some points a clarification, of what\nhas already been said.\n\nAs Art is intuition, so Philosophy is the pure concept: it is easy to\nsee that all the formal definitions of Philosophy that have ever been\ngiven, as science of the first principles, of the ultimate causes, of\nthe origins of things, of norms, of values, of categories, are mere\nverbal variants of the pure concept. Even the most materialistic and\nrealistic philosophies, since matter itself or nature or reality are\nassumed by them as principles of universal validity, as concepts or\nideas, fall within the limits of this definition. In this sense there\nis no philosophy which is not idealistic: the differences between one\nphilosophy and another are nothing but differences in the elaboration\nof the pure concept. What follows from this identification cation of\nphilosophy with the pure concept is that all philosophies are, of\nnecessity, systematic, inasmuch as it is impossible to think the pure\nconcept as a singular or particular one, outside its relations with\nthe whole. This systematic character belongs to every philosophical\nproposition, and not only to the actual systems of philosophy: the\nsolution of every particular philosophical problem implies a vision\nof that problem in its universality, that is, in the system. We are\nconstantly reminded of this exigency by the fact that a new and\noriginal elaboration of particular problems does actually react on the\nwhole of our thought; and that we are often compelled to revise our\nfundamental opinions by the discovery of a difficulty which at first\npresents itself in one sphere of thought only.\n\nOf such a process, the whole of Croce's philosophy is a continuous\nexemplification, but nowhere so clearly apparent as in the progress\nof his conception of history. His first step had been that of\nreducing history to the general concept of art, thereby emphasizing\nthe concreteness and individuality of history, as opposed to the\nabstractness of the natural sciences, the concepts of which, in that\nearly stage, he could not yet distinguish from those of philosophy. In\nthe _Estetica_ the conception is still practically the same, history\nresulting from the intersection of art and philosophy through the\napplication of the predicate of existence to the intuitive material.\nIn his first _Lineamenti di Logica_, history appears as the ultimate\nproduct of the theoretical spirit, \"the sea to which the river of art\nflowed, swollen by the waters of the river of philosophy.\" But in the\nsame _Lineamenti_ he had not yet arrived at the identification of the\ndefinition and the individual judgment, which in his second _Logica_\nconstitutes the final form of the pure concept, Croce's original\ninterpretation of Kant's _a priori_ synthesis. Between the first\nand the second _Logica_, Croce wrote his _Filosofia della pratica_,\nin which he denied the duality of intention and action, as in the\n_Estetica_ he had denied the duality of intuition and expression: an\nintention which was not also an action appeared to him, as we shall\nsee, inconceivable. It was by analogy with his treatment of this\nduality, that he solved the duality between the concept (in the sense\nof definition) and the individual judgment, which was also a duality\nof philosophy as antecedent and history as consequent, as he perceived\nthat a concept which is not at the same time a judgment of the\nparticular is as unreal as an intention which is not at the same time\nan action.\n\nThese are the successive steps by which Croce reached his doctrine of\nthe identity of history and philosophy, one of the most discussed and\nof the least understood among his theories. We shall come back to it\nlater. But a few more hints on its meaning can already be given here.\nIt is clear that by introducing the predicate of existence as essential\nto history Croce had already abandoned the conception of history as\npure, that is, non-logical, non-intellectualized intuition: but the\npredicate of existence is insufficient to form a judgment, without\nthe addition of the other predicates, that is, of the whole concept.\nThe predicate of existence can only tell us that something exists,\nbut not what it is, that exists: the determination of the singular,\nin its relations with the particular and the universal, is implicit\nin the historical judgment, even when it is not openly enunciated.\nSuch judgments as: This thing is, or has been, seem to present the\nproper form of the historical judgment; no other predicates than that\nof existence are here visible, but my talking of _this thing_ implies\nthat I know what _this thing_ is; the other predicates are concealed\nin the subject. Every historical statement is, therefore, a perfect\nindividual judgment. Its concrete and individual character, which Croce\nhad asserted in his early theory, is here maintained by the presence of\nthe subject, though the subject itself, in history, is seen not in its\nintuitive purity, as in poetry, but as a concrete determination of the\nconcept. The identification of philosophy and history is not so much\nthe effect of a more intellectualized view of the historical processes,\nas of the progressive consciousness acquired by Croce of the inherent\nconcreteness and individuality of the universal--of that realistic\nview of the concept as expressed by his elaboration of the logical _a\npriori_ synthesis.\n\nThe old distinction between a subjective and an objective treatment of\nhistory receives a new light from the foregoing considerations. It is\nimpossible to make history without judgment, and, therefore, history\nis in a sense irreducibly subjective. But the subjectivity of history\nis not the arbitrary and capricious subjectivity of the individual\nhistorian, who introduces his own passions and tendencies into the\nhistorical narrative: it is the subjectivity of thought, of the earnest\nand dispassionate research of truth, which coincides with the only\nconceivable objectivity. What we call objective truth is not reached by\nrenouncing thought, but only by making our thought deeper and truer.\nThe historian who permeates with his thought his recreation of the\npast (and if he did not, he would be recreating the past as poetry,\nand imagination, not as history) needs not add a judgment of value to\nhis statements of fact: the identity of value and fact presents itself\nonce more to us in the intrinsic structure of the historical judgment.\nWhatever the aspect of reality to which we turn our attention, true\nhistory and true criticism coincide.\n\nA consequence of this identification of history and philosophy is that\nthe only legitimate divisions of history are those that correspond to\nthe distinctions of the concept,--history of knowledge and of action,\nof art, of thought, of the practical activity of man; and that the\nrelation among the different branches of history is similar to that of\nthe distinctions of the concept within the concept itself: that is,\nthe history of one particular form of human activity is nothing but\nthe history of the whole spirit of man as it realizes itself under\none of its aspects, a statement that we have already illustrated when\nspeaking of the history of art and poetry. Other divisions of history\nare possible and useful, deduced from empirical concepts (such as the\nstate, the church, the drama, the novel, society, religion, etc.), but\nthey are divisions of practical convenience, mnemonic and didascalie\nexpedients, and not rigorous distinctions. Empirical concepts are,\nin fact, in constant use in history, but as instruments, not as\nconstituents of historical thought. History is of the individual\n_sub specie universalis_, and not of the practical generalizations.\nThis peculiar function of the empirical concept in history marks\nthe distinction between history and the natural sciences, the final\nirreducibility of history to sociology.\n\nAs history is reduced to philosophy through the identification\nof the historical with the individual judgment, so philosophy is\nreduced to history through the identification of the definition with\nthe individual judgment. Since every philosophical proposition is\nan answer to a given question, and every question or problem is\nindividually and historically determined, the whole course of the\nhistory of philosophy is in constant function of the general course of\nhistory. This is the truth contained in Hegel's formula of the identity\nof philosophy and history of philosophy, which had been revived in\nItaly, when Croce was meditating on these problems, by his friend\nGentile: a formula which he finally accepted and transformed into that\nof the identity of history and philosophy, in accordance with his view\nof philosophy as a moment or grade of the spirit of man. The _a priori_\nsynthesis which constitutes the reality both of the definition and\nof the individual judgment is, at the same time, the reality of both\nphilosophy and history. The distinction between the two is a purely\ndidactic one: in the first the emphasis is laid on the definition and\nthe system, in the second on the individual judgment and the narrative.\nBut because the narrative includes the concept, every narrative\nclarifies and solves philosophical problems, and, on the other hand,\nevery system of concepts throws light on the facts which are present\nto the mind. The confirmation of the soundness of the system is in the\npower it displays to interpret and narrate history; the touchstone of\nphilosophy is history. The concept, in affirming itself, conquers the\nwhole of reality, which becomes one with it.\n\nWe shall deal more briefly with Croce's treatment of the organization\nof the empirical and abstract concepts in the natural and mathematical\nsciences because his views coincide in their general lines with the\neconomic theory of science, which is the view of scientific method\nelaborated by the scientists themselves in the last decades, and differ\nfrom it only in so far as they are comprehended in a vaster system of\nthought. Croce's polemic against pseudo-scientific philosophy, which\nwas amply justified at the beginning of his career, has now lost a\ngood deal of its actuality, since the ambitious attempts to organize\nthe concepts of science into a system of ultimate truth have finally\ncollapsed under the blows inflicted on their authors by science itself,\nand are now relegated into a few academic and journalistic backwaters.\nOn the other hand, there is no doubt that his discussion of scientific\nmethods, though sufficient for his purposes, is far from being as\nexhaustive as his discussion of either art or philosophy.\n\nThe natural sciences are systems of empirical concepts, that is, of\npractical elaborations of knowledge, and, therefore, they do not belong\nto the sphere of theoretical, but to that of practical activity. This\nproposition must not be understood as referring to the practical\nends, or applications, of science: action requires a knowledge of the\nindividual fact with which we are to deal, and, therefore, the true\nantecedent of action is not science, but an individual (or historical)\njudgment. The natural sciences are not subservient to action, but\nthey are actions in the service of knowledge. Because of the empirical\nand pragmatic character of their concepts, it is impossible either\nto unify them in a single concept, or to divide them according to\nrigorous distinctions. The natural laws which they evolve are the same\nempirical concepts, which give rise to the creation of classes and\ntypes, expressed in a different form; their empirical character is\nconfirmed by what Boutroux called their contingency, which is nothing\nbut the reflex of their arbitrary formation. Even the most general of\nthose laws, that of the constancy and uniformity of nature, assumed as\nthe foundation of so much pseudo-scientific thought in the nineteenth\ncentury, is a mere postulate of practical opportunity, without which\nit would be hardly possible to construct any science: it is the first\neconomic principle of scientific method, not an attribute of objective\nreality.\n\nThe truth of the natural sciences, that truth of which they and their\nempirical concepts are an abbreviated transcription, is the historical\ndatum, the knowledge of actual individual happenings. History is the\nhot and fluid mass which the naturalist solidifies in the schematic\nmoulds of classes and types. The naturalistic discoverer is, therefore,\nan historical discoverer and the revolutions of the natural sciences\nare steps in the progress of historical knowledge. The difference in\nmethod between history and the natural sciences is not due to the\nsupposed difference between a higher and a lower reality (spirit and\nnature), or to the fact that nature has no history; nature is perpetual\nactivity and change, that is, history, as much as the spirit, but the\nprogress of nature is less clearly perceptible and less interesting\nto us than that of the human reality, and, therefore, an abbreviated\ntranscription is more apt to satisfy our needs in relation to the\nknowledge of what we call nature than to that of the spirit. The\nnature that has no history, and which is opposed in dualistic systems\nof philosophy to the spirit of man, is not the actual, historical\nreality of nature, but the empirical concepts of the natural sciences,\ntheir classes, types and laws, conceived as an objective reality and\nsubstituted for that reality. In this sense, nature is not a special\nobject, but only a method of treatment, as is proved by the fact\nthat that same method, applied to the so-called higher and spiritual\nreality, by such sciences as psychology, sociology, or comparative\nphilology, creates the same kind of naturalistic categories in the\ndomain of the spirit. It is of nature in this sense that the idealist\ndenies the real existence, since the time when Bishop Berkeley\nrepudiated matter as a mere abstraction. And here again, the scientist\ncomes to the support of the idealist with his keen awareness of\nthe pragmatic character of his hypotheses on the ultimate physical\nconstituents of reality.\n\nIt is through this theory of the natural sciences that Croce succeeded\nin eliminating naturalistic transcendence from his thought, and,\nsingularly enough, his first impulse in this direction came to him\nfrom his \u00e6sthetic studies, through his criticism of literary genres,\nof grammars, of the particular arts and of rhetorical forms. He saw\nhow through them \"nature\" introduces itself, as a construction of the\nhuman spirit, in the pure spiritual world of art; and having denied\nits reality in art, he proceeded to discover it everywhere not as\nreality, but as an product of abstracting processes. This must not be\ninterpreted as meaning that the naturalistic method is an illegitimate\nhybrid: it has its uses in its proper place, and not less in the\nstudy of mind than in the study of nature. It is only by mistaking\nits constructions or fictions for realities, that we can be tempted\nto deduce from the natural sciences a philosophy of nature, or from\nthe applications of the naturalistic method to art and to the history\nof man, an \u00e6sthetics or a philosophy of history. But the natural\nsciences themselves are not responsible for the errors of philosophical\nnaturalism. That such errors should not be limited exclusively to\nphilosophers, but very often appear within the body of sciences like\nbiology or psychology or sociology, is easily explained by the fact\nthat no scientist is a pure scientist: but poor philosophy does not\nbecome science simply because it finds place in scientific books.\nThe quarrel between vitalists and mechanicists, for one instance,\nis a philosophical (or historical), not a scientific dispute: and\nit reveals itself, ultimately, as the opposition not of conceivable\nrealities, but merely of different methods in the elaboration of the\nhistorical datum. The coherent and clear-minded biologist is to-day\na mechanicist, not because mechanism is the essence of reality, but\nbecause it is the postulate of his research. The vitalist, on the other\nhand, is inevitably brought by the trend of his thought to abandon\nscience and to become more or less deliberately a philosopher. It is\nenough to mention in this connection such names as Driesch or Bergson.\n\nThe fictitious or conventional character of mathematics is still\nmore apparent than that of the natural sciences; and we shall not\nadd anything to what we have said in the preceding chapter about the\nabstract concept, the non-concrete universal, which is the distinctive\nprocess of mathematical thought. The application of the mathematical\nprocesses, through the empirical concepts, to the historical datum,\ngives origin to what we have called the judgment of numeration (and\nmensuration), and to the mathematical sciences of nature. All that has\nbeen observed of the natural sciences in general is valid for these\nalso. Their truth is still only the truth of the intuitive, historical\ndatum of which the empirical concepts are practical elaborations; the\naddition of a further practical elaboration, the abstract concept,\ncan add to their mnemonic or, as it is more often called, technical\nefficiency, but not to the value of their original content. This\nprocess, as the purely naturalistic one, can be applied to the human as\nwell as to the natural reality, but it is evident that its usefulness\ndecreases in the passage from the one to the other, following the same\nstandards that apply to the natural sciences in general, those of the\nrelative perceptibility and importance of the individual happening.\nIt is at its highest in physics or astronomy, less notable in biology\nor economics; practically inexistent in psychology or sociology, the\ntwo sciences that suffer not less from the delusions of misapplied\nstatistics than from the invasions of cheap philosophy. Croce's theory\nof science, as we have already remarked, differs from the generally\naccepted methodology of modern science only in its context, which\nis usually agnostic in, the pure scientist, while, in Croce, it\nconsists in the affirmation of the pure concept, or of the autonomy of\nphilosophy: a proposition with which the scientist qua scientist has no\nreason to quarrel. In both cases, the autonomy of scientific thought\nis only relative, and the difference of context is a difference in\nthe determination of its limits. In both cases, scientific thought is\nrecognised as thoroughly legitimate only within limits. The cry of the\nbankruptcy of science, of which we heard so much a few years ago, is as\nmeaningless for Croce as for the pure scientist; science cannot become\nbankrupt except by over-stepping its logical limits, that is, by first\nceasing to be science and becoming the ape of philosophy.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Logica_, part ii, La filosofia, la storia, etc., pp.\n171-269.]\n\n\n\n\nVII. THE THEORY OF ERROR[1]\n\n\nThe practical origin of theoretical error--Confirmations of\nthis doctrine--The forms of error--\u00c6stheticism and empiricism;\nmathematicism--Philosophism: the philosophy of history and the\nphilosophy of nature--Mythologism: philosophy and religion--Dualism,\nscepticism, mysticism--The conversion to truth--The function of error.\n\n\nOne of the most original developments of Croce's thought--a doctrine\nthat does not owe its validity only to its connection with the system,\nsince we can find it adumbrated already in such widely divergent\nphilosophies as those of Socrates and Thomas Aquinas, of Descartes\nand Rosmini, but which in Croce's system acquires a new and wider\nmeaning--is the theory of the practical origin of theoretical error,\nwhich we shall briefly discuss in this chapter.\n\nFrom a strictly logical standpoint, every error is mere privation or\nnegativity, the opposite of the logical value which is truth, and\ntherefore inexistent outside the moment of opposition. As there are\nnot two values in \u00e6sthetics, the beautiful and the ugly, but one only,\nbeauty or expression, of which ugliness or non-expression is merely the\nnegative aspect, so in logic also there is but one value, thought or\ntruth, and error is non-thought, that which logically has no being or\nreality. There is no thought which is not a thinking of truth.\n\nLet us pause for one instant to consider this last proposition, which\nat first sight undoubtedly has a somewhat paradoxical air. And yet it\nis impossible not to accept it, unless we are willing to fall into the\nmost radical scepticism, which would imply a renunciation not only of\nevery form of thought, but even, since there is no action which is not\nfounded on knowledge, of every kind of action. If we believed that\nit were possible for our thought to think that which is not true, no\nexternal criterion or standard of truth could even be substituted for\nthat which thought intrinsically would lack, since the apprehension\nof such external standards would in itself be an act of thought, and\ntherefore suffer from the indetermination and uncertainty of thought\nitself. This belief in the validity of human thought is in fact,\nhowever disguised or even openly denied, present in every thinking\nand acting being: every thought, every action of man is an implicit\ndeclaration of this faith. And once we have consciously acquired it,\nas an inalienable, intrinsic characteristic of our whole spiritual\nactivity, it is evident that it leaves no place for faith as such, for\nan obscure, independent faculty, a mystical intuition, different from\nand superior to our human thought, and which could mysteriously endow\nthought itself with the gratuitous gift of truth.\n\nAnd yet, after we have denied the logical existence of error, we are\nstill confronted with the mass of positive errors which we can more\nor less easily identify in the course of history and in our daily\nexperience. Positive errors, that is, affirmations of knowing that\nwhich we do not know, are real products of our activity: but since the\ntheoretical value, truth, is absent from them, they cannot be products\nof the theoretical activity. They must therefore be products of the\nonly other form of spiritual activity, the practical. Ignorance or\nobscurity or doubt are not errors; they are the inexhaustible matter to\nwhich the spirit of man is perpetually giving form and reality. To be\naware of one's ignorance is in fact the first stage in the research of\ntruth, the _init\u00ecum sapient\u00e6_. Thought and truth are affirmation; the\npositive error is an affirmation also, which simulates truth. We cannot\nthink an error, but we can pass from thought to action, by making a\nfalse affirmation, a purely practical affirmation, which consists in\nthe act of producing sounds to which no thought corresponds, or, which\namounts to the same, only a thought without value, without coherence,\nwithout truth. What we have qualified in its negative aspect as a\ntheoretical error manifests itself in its positive aspect as an act of\nwill, directed to a certain end, a practical act, and, as such, having\nits own rationality, which is neither logical, nor moral, but purely\neconomic, consisting in the adequacy of that particular affirmation\nto the individual purpose by which it has been prompted. Morality\nrequires that the thinking spirit should realize itself as truth; and\ntherefore the economic act which is error, though logically unreal,\nthough economically useful, finds inevitably its ultimate sanction in a\nmoral condemnation.\n\nThough this doctrine may appear unfamiliar to the logician, yet we all\nconstantly depend on it in our analysis of error. We know that error is\ndue to the passions or interests of men, which cloud the intellect, and\nthe more an error is foreign to our own ways of thinking, the easier it\nis for us to discover the practical motives which help us to explain\nit away. That category of errors which goes under the name of national\nprejudices, for instance, is transparent in its origins to every man\nbelonging to a nation other than the one in which a particular set\nof such prejudices is commonly accepted. And other categories of\nerrors, social, professional, religious, and so on, are of the same\nkind, affecting only certain classes of men, because of the passions\nor interests or traditions which belong to them by reason of their\npeculiar practical associations. In the field of politics, or in any\nkind of heated discussion, this research of the practical motive is\neven pushed to the extreme, and the bad faith of the adversary becomes\nan obvious axiom. In such cases, the same passions being active on\nboth sides, the research of the practical motive is evidently not pure\nand disinterested, but is itself moved by a practical motive, and\ntherefore likely to produce a new error, rather than a clear judgment.\nTherefore, though rigorously speaking there is no difference between\nthe error which is a deliberate lie and that which is due to a more\nor less justifiable weakness, and there is no error which is not in\nbad faith, which is not due to a deliberate act of will, yet, from\nan empirical standpoint we may distinguish between errors in bad and\nin good faith, and recommend tolerance and indulgence for the latter\nkind. But tolerance is not indifference. Croce went so far, in drawing\nthe consequences of his doctrine, as to justify the Holy Inquisition;\nand in fact all our modern advocates of religious and political\ntolerance have really shaken our faith in its methods, but not in its\nprinciple, which is that of the moral responsibility of error. The Holy\nInquisition moreover was bound to clash with the freedom, which is not\nthe freedom of error but the freedom of truth, because it placed its\nfaith in a static, extrahuman truth, as against the veritas _filia\ntemporis_, the truth which is engendered and conditioned by history, by\nthe peculiar problems and intellectual climate of the age, and which is\nthe object of our modern faith; and therefore defeated its own end by\nstriking at the roots of the value for the upholding of which it had\nbeen established.\n\nPassing from the problem of the nature of error to that of the forms\nactually assumed by philosophic error, Croce accepts Vico's definition\nof error, as an improper combination of ideas, and therefore defines\nsuch forms, by deducing the number of possible improper combinations\nfrom his own conception of the legitimate forms of theoretical\nactivity. This phenomenology of error is one of the main tasks of\nlogic, while the refutation of particular philosophical errors is the\ntask of philosophy as a whole. We shall rapidly survey these general\nforms, in which it will be easy for the reader to recognize the logical\n(or illogical) structure of many particular errors criticised in the\npreceding chapters.\n\nThe pure concept can be improperly combined with, or exchanged for,\nthe pure intuition (art), or the empirical and abstract concept (the\nnatural and mathematical sciences); or it can be improperly split\nin its unity of intuition and concept (_a priori_ synthesis), and\narbitrarily put together again, either as a concept which simulates an\nintuition or as an intuition which simulates a concept. Hence the five\nfundamental forms of error: \u00e6stheticism, empiricism, mathematicism,\nphilosophism, and historicism or mythologism. To these must be added\nother forms originated from combinations of the preceding ones:\ndualism, scepticism, and mysticism.\n\nWe have dealt elsewhere with both \u00e6stheticism and empiricism. Of\nthe first, the most recent form is that which pretends to build a\nphilosophy of pure intuition or of pure experience, that is, of an\nexperience which, not being touched by any intellectual category,\nis also pure intuition. Empiricism is practically all the current\nphilosophy of our times, from the positivism of Comte and Spencer\nto the more modern types of the so-called philosophic elaboration of\nscientific knowledge. Mathematicism is a rarer and more aristocratic\nform of error: it does not consist in the application of the\nmathematical method to the exposition of philosophical concepts,\nwhich is a mere didactic expedient, more or less convenient, but\ninsufficient to characterize the quality of the concepts themselves;\nits true exponents are those philosophers or mathematicians who\ntake mathematical fictions, such as the dimensions of space, for\nrealities, and proceed to speculate on such a foundation. The near\nfuture seems to promise a great extension of this kind of philosophy,\nthrough the prevailing interest in the theory of relativity, which\nis fondly supposed to contain the germs of a revolution in thought.\nBoth empiricism and mathematicism lead to a dualistic conception of\nreality, by opposing either the facts of scientific and historical\nknowledge, that is, a collection of facts limited in space and time,\nto an infinite reality beyond that knowledge, or our actual world of\nspace and time, to worlds, spaces and times mathematically conceivable,\nbut of which we have no experience. The passage from this dualism to\nspiritualism and other kinds of superstition, which in our times seem\nto be so closely associated with certain forms of pseudo-scientific\nthought, is of the easiest. The naturalistic experiments by which\nwe attempt to peer into the mystery of the so-called unknown or\nunknowable, hoping to detect the spirit itself as matter, however\nsubtle or light, and such theories as that of the identity of the\nspiritual world with the four-dimensional space, are evidences of this\nimmediate connection between superstition and science, for which,\nobviously, not science is responsible, and not ignorance even, but\na chain of more or less deliberate errors in each case reducible to\ndefinite practical motives. From the point of view of the ethics of\nintellect, there is no difference between the frank impostor who is\nmoved to speculate on other people's feelings only by greed, and the\nscientist who makes his science minister to his own private feelings,\nand is hardly, if at all, conscious of his fraud.\n\nOf the other two forms of philosophic error, philosophism, consisting\nin the abuse of the purely logical element, and therefore in an\nusurpation on the part of philosophy against either history or science,\ntending to the formation of a philosophy of history and of a philosophy\nof nature, is less common now than in times of more active and original\nspeculation. The most conspicuous examples are to be met with among\nGermany's classical thinkers; and we have already hinted at the\nconnection between one particular logical error, the undue extension\nof the dialectic process to the distinctions of the concept, and to\nthe empirical concept, which is the basis of Hegel's philosophies of\nhistory and nature. Both these sciences attempt an _a priori_ deduction\nof the individual and of the empirical, a process which is in itself\nabsurd and contradictory. They duplicate history and science with a\nseries of concepts, which, unless they are the same which constitute\nhistory and science (in which case we have history and we have science,\nand not a philosophy of history or of nature), are necessarily empty\nof any concrete determinations. But though Croce points to philosophy\nof history and philosophy of nature as to the two typical instances\nof philosophism, yet he is ready to acknowledge that a good deal\nof thought that has gone under those names in the past has had a\nlarge influence in moulding many of our historical and philosophical\nconceptions, and, in the case of the second one, in helping us to\nrealize the unity and spirituality of nature, and to recognize in the\nhistory of nature the same principles operating in the history of man.\nCroce's idealism, in fact, does not divide nature from the spirit\nexcept in the logical sense which has been made clear in the preceding\nchapter; it does not relegate nature in an unknowable sphere beyond\nthe reach of human minds. It unifies spirit and nature, but _a parte\nsubjecti_, and not _a parte objecti_, and reduces nature to the spirit,\nrather than the spirit to nature; which is the only process that makes\nsuch a unification intelligible and significant.\n\nThe last of the five fundamental forms of philosophic error consists\nin the arbitrary separation of the subject from its predicate, of\nhistory from philosophy, and in the consequent position of the subject\nas predicate, that is, of a mere representation as a concept. This\nmay sound rather abstruse, but can immediately be made clear by adding\nthat what Croce has in mind in this definition is the production of\nmyths. This error he therefore calls either historicism (from the\nlogical process by which it is produced), or mythologism (from the\nform which it commonly assumes). A myth is to him not a mere poetic\nor \u00e6sthetic imagination, but necessarily includes an affirmation or\nlogical judgment. It differs also from allegory, in which the relation\nestablished between a poetic fiction and a concept is always more\nor less openly declared to be arbitrary, and the two terms are not\nconfused with each other. In a myth, on the contrary, the poetic\nfiction assumes the actual function of the concept, transforming both\nphilosophy and history into a fable or legend. Errors of this class\nare frequent in every system of philosophy, when the thinker, either\nconsciously and deliberately, as in the case of Plato, or unwittingly,\nas in Kant's _Ding an sich_ or in Schopenhauer's _Will_, fills the\ngaps of his real speculation with a mere image. But mythologism is\nmore generally the form of religious error, since there is no religion\nwithout a logical affirmation embodied in a myth. If myth and religion\ncoincide, as the distinction between myth and philosophy is that of\nerror and truth, of a false and a true philosophy, we must conclude\nthat religion as truth is one with philosophy, or, as Croce expresses\nit, that the true religion is philosophy; and this appears to Croce to\nbe the conclusion of all ancient and modern thought in regard to the\nhistory of religions. Philosophies have sprung up in all times from\nthe soil of religious thought, and more or less completely resolved in\nthemselves, and logically clarified, the obscure substance of myth.\nThis is Croce's clear-cut, unequivocal solution of the problem of the\nrelations between philosophy and religion: there is no place reserved\nanywhere in his system for an either internal or external revelation\nother than that perpetual revelation of truth, which is at the same\ntime history and philosophy.\n\nFrom the possible combinations of these five fundamental forms\nof error, three more complex ones are derived: dualism, when two\ncontradictory methods, one logically legitimate and the other\nillegitimate, or both equally false, are brought together, and\nconsidered to be both philosophically valid; scepticism, when the\nmind, in the presence of confusion and error, asserts the mystery of\nreality, which is the problem itself, but denies its own power to\ndeal with it; and finally, mysticism, when even that last semblance\nof thought, by which the sceptic affirms that there is a mystery, is\nabandoned, and the immediate actuality of life is regarded to be the\nonly truth. Dualism leads inevitably to the conception of a double\nreality, and we have already seen how the whole of Croce's speculation\ncontinually tends towards the logical unification of dualities, as with\nspirit and nature, value and fact. Every philosophical problem seems\nto present itself to his mind as involved in a dualistic difficulty;\nevery solution becomes satisfactory to him only when the last shreds\nof dualism are eliminated from it. While scepticism is a logical error\n(the affirmation of a purely negative position), it contains within\nitself one of the essential moments of every progress in thought, the\nscepsis, or philosophical doubt, which is the negation of an error,\nand therefore the germ of every true affirmation. As for mysticism,\nwe have dealt with it elsewhere as being one of the untenable aspects\nof logical scepticism; we may add that, if it ever obeyed the laws of\ninternal coherence, we should not even be able to discuss it, since its\nonly conceivable expression would be an ecstatic silence.\n\nThe same character of necessity that invests these forms of the logical\nerror is present also in the false solutions of other philosophical\nproblems, and we need only refer the reader to our discussion of\n\u00e6sthetic theories. In both cases, not only the number, but also the\nlogical succession, of the necessary forms of error, depends on the\nnumber of possible arbitrary combinations of the spiritual forms,\nor concepts of reality. But infinite, on the other hand, are the\nindividual forms of error, as infinite are the individual forms of\ntruth: the problems are always historically conditioned and variable,\nand so are also the solutions and the false solutions, determined by\nfeelings, passions, and interests.\n\nFrom error to truth, there is no gradual ascent. The passage is\ndescribed by Croce as a kind of spiritual conversion: the erring\nspirit, fleeing from the light, must convert itself in a researching\nspirit, eager for light; pride must yield to humility; the narrow love\nfor one's abstract individuality, widen and lift itself to an austere\nlove, to an utter devotion to that which is above the individual,\nbecoming Bruno's _eroico furore_, Spinoza's _amor Dei intellectualis_.\nIn this act of love and enthusiasm, the spirit becomes pure thought and\nattains the truth, or, rather, transforms itself into truth. And the\npossession of truth is at the same time possession of its contrary, of\nerror transformed into truth; to possess a concept is to possess it in\nthe fulness of its relations, and therefore to possess, in the same\nact, all the ways in which that concept, for instance, of the \u00e6sthetic\nactivity, is at the same time the concept of hedonism, intellectualism,\nempiricism, and so on. The two kinds of knowledge, that of truth and\nof its contrary, are inseparable: the concept is at the same time\naffirmation and negation.\n\nFrom this absolute possession of truth, we may distinguish a stage\nof research, which is not yet thought, but only the operation of the\npractical will creating certain conditions for thought. Seen in the\nlight of this process, the series of errors through which a mind goes,\nwhen guided by a will to gather its materials and prepare itself to\nthink, transforms itself into a series of attempts or hypotheses. An\nerror is an error when there is a will to err; the hypothesis, however,\ninto which the error is transmuted by the new will is not yet truth,\nand becomes truth only in the act of its verification; but it is no\nlonger an error, because it does not affirm itself as truth, but only\nas a means or help for the conquest of truth.\n\nFrom this double consideration of the nature of error, first, as error\nwhich is conquered and comprehended by truth, and then as attempt or\nhypotheses in the service of truth, Croce derives the identification of\nthe history of error with the history of truth, or philosophy. But not\nin the sense in which Hegel had considered the successive apparition of\nthe various philosophical categories and of the various forms of error,\nseeing in them a kind of gradual revelation of his own philosophy. To\nCroce such a conception of the progress of philosophy is unacceptable.\nPhilosophy as an abstract category, as one of the forms of the\nspiritual activity, has no origin in time, is not limited to the men we\ncall philosophers, but acts in every moment of the life of the spirit\non the material offered by history, which it contributes to create, and\ndoes not, therefore, progress any more than the categories of art or of\nmorality. But it progresses in its concreteness, as art and the whole\nof life do; because life is development, and development is progress.\nEvery affirmation of reality is conditioned by reality and conditions\na new reality, which in its turn is, in its progress, the condition of\na new thought and a new philosophy. In this perpetual cycle, though\nindividual errors are conquered, no form of error can be definitely\nabolished; but they constantly reappear, because of the intrinsic\nnecessity of their structure, and when they reappear not as wilful\nerrors, but as attempts and hypotheses, they have their appointed\nfunction in the progress of truth and reality. To this constancy of\nerror corresponds a constancy of truth: truth is not attained once and\nfor ever, but is true in the act of its affirmation, and in proportion\nto its adequacy to the particular problem, to the individual conditions\nof fact, which necessarily include, at every given moment, the whole\nhistory of the past. Thus, from a different angle, Croce's theory of\nerror reaches the same conclusion as his general theory of logic,\nthe identity of philosophy and history; and philosophy appears as a\nperpetual development, a history that never can repeat itself, since\nevery affirmation of the truth transforms itself into a new element of\nreality, into one of the conditions determining every new problem and\nevery new solution.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Logica_, part iii, \"Le forme degli errori,\" etc., pp.\n271-421.]\n\n\n\n\nVIII. THE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY[1]\n\n\nPhilosophical introspection--Affirmation of the practical activity--The\ncategory of feeling--The theoretical activity as the antecedent of the\npractical--Identity of intention and volition--Identity of volition and\naction--The practical judgment: philosophy and psychology --The problem\nof free will: liberty and necessity--Croce's solution in the context of\nhis philosophy--The practical value: good and evil--The unreality of\nevil, and the function of ideals--The sanction of evil--The volition\nand the passions--The empirical individuality--Development and progress.\n\n\nThe reality of the practical activity as distinct from the theoretical\nactivity, of will as distinct from knowledge, can never be proved\nthrough the naturalistic method of psychology, by merely pointing\nto a class of facts--actions--different from another class of\nfacts--thoughts. The so-called action manifests itself, at a closer\nanalysis, as infinitely complex and rich in purely theoretical\nelements; the so-called thought, as partly at least a work of the\nhuman will. The concrete life of the spirit is always both practical\nand theoretical, and the distinction we are looking for is an ideal\ndistinction, to be ascertained by the method of philosophical, not\npsychological, introspection; by the direct witness of consciousness,\nand by the deduction of its function in the concept of the spirit,\nor of reality, as a whole. The complete affirmation of a form, or\ngrade, of spiritual activity is the philosophy of that form, and of\nits relations with the others; in this case, the philosophy of the\npractical, or of will. It is hardly necessary, at this stage of our\nexposition, to observe that the philosophy of the practical will not\nbe practical philosophy, a collection of rules for the attainment of\nthe useful and the good, any more than the philosophy of art is a\ncollection of \u00e6sthetic precepts: it will be a purely formal science, a\nuniversal concept, the content of which is the infinite wealth of the\nindividual determinations of the will, the history of the practical\nactivity.\n\nIn the following chapter we shall deal more particularly with the two\nforms of the practical activity, economic and ethic, corresponding\nto the two forms of the theoretical, \u00e6sthetic and logic. Here we\nshall consider the undifferentiated practical activity, first, in its\nrelations, and then, in its internal dialectic. The contents of this\nchapter are, therefore, intended as applying both to economics and\nethics, to the useful and to the good.\n\nThere are two typical forms of scepticism regarding the practical\nactivity. The first denies that it is a spiritual activity, by\ndenying that man is conscious of his will, in the process of willing;\nconsciousness comes only after, and is not consciousness of the will,\nbut of our representation of the will. Therefore, the will is nature,\nand consciousness, or spiritual activity, is only our thought. The\nsecond does not exclude the will from consciousness, but affirms that\nthere is no real distinction between will and thought. The first\ndoctrine is evidently founded on a confusion between reflected and\nintrinsic consciousness; and maintains something that is always true\nof reflected consciousness, not in relation to the will only, but to\nevery form of spiritual activity; carried to its extreme consequences,\nit would banish consciousness from the whole life of human mind, since\nevery act of consciousness would always be consciousness of something\nelse, and never of itself. Against this view, Croce insists on the\nconcept of an intrinsic consciousness, which accompanies every act of\nthe spirit: the consciousness of the creative artist, for instance,\nwhich is certainly other than that of the critic, but not less real.\nThe will may be regarded as nature, only when apprehended by the\ntheoretical activity; as every other act of the spirit becomes nature,\noutside its immediate actuality, when consciously reflected upon. The\nsecond form of sceptism, identifying thought and will, cannot maintain\nitself in its purity, because of the difficulties involved by the\ndenial of what seems to be the immediate evidence of consciousness; it,\ntherefore, qualifies itself by recognizing that the will is thought,\nbut of a particular kind, thought impressing itself on nature, or\nrealizing itself in action: which is but an indirect way of admitting\nthe autonomy of the practical activity.\n\nBut do the theoretical and the practical activity exhaust the whole of\nthe spirit of man? There is at least one more psychological category\nwhich clamours for admission within the precincts of philosophy, that\nof feeling or sentiment. For Croce, feeling as a form of spiritual\nactivity does not exist: the corresponding psychological class covers\na number of heterogeneous facts, which cannot be reduced to a single\nconcept. Its function in philosophy has always been that of serving\nas a temporary term for that which philosophy had not yet hilly\ndetermined and understood; in \u00e6sthetics, for the intuitive character\nof art, against the fallacies of hedonism and intellectualism; in the\ntheory of history for the individual and concrete element of history,\nor even for the subjective historical judgment, against positivism\nand sociologism; in logic, for the pure concept against the empirical\nand abstract. Its function in the philosophy of the practical is of\nthe same order: feeling or sentiment are among the names by which the\npeculiarity of the practical activity first began to be recognized,\nbeing labels for classes of psychological facts in which the moment of\nwill is more important than that of reason, practice more essential\nthan theory. But the psychological facts thus classified resolve\nthemselves ultimately either into acts of knowledge or of will; and\nthe witness of direct consciousness does not find feeling or sentiment\nwithin itself as a distinct form of spiritual activity. Obviously,\nthis exclusion does not imply that Croce denies the existence of the\nempirical groups of facts gathered in those classes; it means only\nthat he has reduced those facts to the immediate data of consciousness\nof which they consist, and divested them of that mysterious halo, the\nhalo of ignorance or of deliberate error, with which an appeal to\nsentimental reasons is sure to be accompanied when introduced into a\nphilosophical discussion. When we hear, for instance, that philosophy\nand science belong to the sphere of reason, and religion to that of\nsentiment, since there is no sentiment which is not either reason or\nwill, we at once understand that what is meant is that the speaker is\nwilling to believe, for practical motives, what his reason tells him\nto be untrue; and we know also that this error contains, sometimes at\nleast, an element of truth, which is the affirmation of a truer reason\nthan the one employed by a certain type of philosophy, by a rationalism\nwhich treats the human spirit as a thing of abstract logic. The error\nconsists in the putting of one's will in the place of one's reason;\nthe germinal truth, in the attempt to make one's reason wider, more\ncomprehensive. It is, therefore, one of those positions in which it is\na sin against the spirit to acquiesce, but which are the beginning of\nwisdom in the man of good faith.\n\nThe practical activity presupposes the theoretical activity: no\nwill is conceivable without knowledge, and our will is such as our\nknowledge is. But this presupposition is of an ideal and not of a\ntemporal order: the mind in its concreteness, at every moment of its\nlife, is both practical and theoretical. The a particular kind of\nknowledge which conditions our will is neither the purely intuitive\nnor the abstractly logical one, but the historical or perceptive, or\nconcretely logical knowledge, which is at the same time a knowledge\nof things and of the relations of things, constantly changing with\nthe perpetual development of the world around us, and, therefore,\nconstantly re-creating and renovating itself as the antecedent of\nevery particular volition. No other theoretical fact precedes the act\nof will: the so-called practical judgments or practical concepts,\nwhich some thinkers consider as a necessary intermediate step between\nthe historical judgment and the volition, are nothing but classes\nof historical judgments relating to volitions in the past, mental\nformations similar to the rhetorical categories in the domain of art,\nand, therefore, do not really precede but follow the actual volitions.\nIn the process of willing, the recognition of a certain action as good\nor useful, that is, as belonging to one of the practical categories,\nand, therefore, desirable, is not an act that precedes the volition,\nbut is the volition itself. The qualification of an action as useful\nor good is not distinguishable from the volition except when it comes\nafter the action, and is then a reflection on the act itself, not\ndifferent in kind from any other historical judgment.\n\nThe conclusion to be drawn from these premises is that, in relation to\nevery particular situation, intention and volition coincide; or, that\nwhat we call intention, the abstract volition, the imaginary volition,\nopposed to the concrete and real one, is not a moment of the will\nat all, and the only volition is the one that is determined by the\nconcrete situation, the real and concrete volition. The distinction\nbetween intention and volition has in all times been the fertile\nground for the growth of all kinds of hypocrisy, as it is easy to\nconnect in one's mind a certain concrete volition, which is evil, with\nan imaginary intention of good; and the doctrine that justifies the\nmeans for the sake of the end is but a variety of this process. The\nidentification of intention and volition is, therefore, not merely a\nmatter of good logic; it is the necessary foundation of a realistic\ndoctrine of the will, which cannot will anything but itself, and can\nnever be abstracted from its real basis, from the actual determinations\nof the moment of reality by which it is conditioned.\n\nOnce the concrete character of volition has been recognized, there\nremains no difficulty in the way of further identifying volition and\naction. The relation between the two is analogous to the relation\nbetween intuition and expression in \u00e6sthetics: there is no volition\nwhich is not also an action, and vice versa. Volition and action are\nnot two distinct phases of one process, but two different ways of\nlooking at the same reality: the same fact which is, from the point\nof view of the spirit, a volition, is, naturalistically speaking, an\naction: we are in the presence of one more aspect of the old dualism\nof spirit and nature. And here again the duality vanishes when we\nobserve that there is not a single act of will which does not manifest\nitself in a physical movement, however imperceptible, and that on\nthe other hand there is no physical action, not even the so-called\ninstinctive or habitual ones, which are not either direct or indirect\nproducts of the will. A That which is independent of the will is not\nthe action itself, but the success of the action,--what Croce calls a\nhappening. The volition coincides with the action, which is the work of\nthe individual, and not with the happening, which is collaboration or\ncontrast of wills, the work not of the individual, but of the whole. No\naction ever realizes itself entirely in the happening, and no action,\nhowever hindered in its realization, is ever entirely without influence\non the happening. The measure of the adequacy of the historical\njudgment preceding the action to the particular situation is given in\nsome degree by the relation between the action and the happening; but\nit is impossible, and it is in fact never done, though we may affirm\nour inclination to do it, to derive the value of an action, of the\nactual, concrete volition, from its success. When we praise a practical\nhero for his success, we imply that his success was not accidental,\nnot a mere happening, but entirely due to acts of his will; if the\npraise is misplaced, the error is not in the theory, on which we all\nimplicitly agree, but in our knowledge and judgment of the facts of his\nlife. And when we rise from the consideration of purely economical to\nthat of ethical values, the importance of success gradually diminishes,\nbecause we fix our attention more to the spiritual reality, to the\nquality of the individual soul, and less to the material concomitants.\nThe great majority of mankind's moral heroes would be utter failures\nfrom the standpoint of success, granted that it should be possible to\nspeak of such a contradiction in terms as moral success, a phrase in\nwhich a true spiritual value, morality, is applied to a mere material\nabstraction.\n\nThe practical judgment, which is, as we have already seen, nothing\nbut a particular kind of historical judgment, is a reflection on the\naction and not on the happening; and we shall not repeat here what\nhas been said elsewhere of the relation between fact and value: the\npractical value is the action itself, and cannot be deduced or derived\nfrom standards, principles, ideals, which are but combinations of\npre\u00ebxistent judgments. The practical judgment, economic or moral, is\na philosophical judgment in the sense in which every other judgment\nis also philosophical. A philosophy of the practical activity, not\nin the technical sense in which we speak of treatises and schools\nof philosophy, but in that universal sense in which every man is a\nphilosopher, as he is a poet, is therefore the necessary condition of\nthe practical judgment. But this philosophy is fundamentally distinct\nfrom the psychological or naturalistic elaboration of the facts of\nthe will, though at times it may have been materially connected with\nit. A psychologically descriptive science of the practical activity\nis, however, as legitimate in its own field as all other natural\nsciences; it constitutes a practical rhetoric which has as glorious a\ntradition as the rhetoric of literature, from Theophrastus to Spinoza\nand Descartes. It creates its classes or types of actions, the value\nof which is similar to that of all other empirical concepts, and by\ngiving them a categorical form, it transforms them into maxims, rules,\nand precepts. As long as these types and precepts are taken for what\nthey are, no harm can come from them; we all make similar formations\nas helps to our individual conduct, and find them more than helpful,\nnecessary. But when they are taken as philosophy, then we have the\nusual results of this kind of logical confusion: either the empirical\nconcepts, under a rigorous analysis, lose their consistency, and types\nor rules which were useful instruments for the treatment of particular\nproblems are discarded for philosophical concepts, which are immaterial\nto the discussion, or they are treated as philosophical concepts, and\ninvested with the character of universality and necessity which belongs\nto the latter. Of the first process, we shall give as an example the\nman who maintains that war is necessary and eternal; which is true, if\nby war we mean the perpetual conflict and struggle which is the life of\nreality (a philosophical concept), but which is at least a gratuitous\nassertion, when it is said of that particular kind of war which is\nwaged between state and state, with arms and armies. Of the second, the\nmoralist who identifies morality with a particular system or set of\nprecepts, or the philosopher who turns his philosophy into a special\npleading for his cause or party. Turning now from the discussion of\nthe relations between the practical and the theoretical activity, to\nconsider the intrinsic problems of the will, and the most complex and\ndifficult of all, that of the freedom of the will, we shall find that\nCroce's solution, though reached by a totally different method, is\nvery similar to the one offered by Bergson. Both Croce and Bergson\nrefuse to take sides in the quarrel between free-will and determinism,\nbut transfer it to a higher or deeper ground where the contrasting\nterms acquire more significant, and no longer opposite, meanings.\nBergson accomplishes his abolition of the dilemma through a masterful\npsychological analysis of the immediate data of consciousness, Croce\ncomes to the same result by applying to this problem his logic of the\ndistinctions of the concept, which we have already seen so often at\nwork. Every act of the will is determined, in the sense that it is\nconditioned by a given situation, and varies with the varying of the\nsituation; it is free, inasmuch as it is something new and different,\nwhich was not given in the situation, and without which there would\nbe no change, no growth, no development. Necessity and freedom, which\nso often appear as antagonistic views of the same fact, are both\npresent, though distinct, in the volition, which is the unity of the\ntwo, being at once determined and free. The volition is thus regarded\nas a practical _a priori_ synthesis, the autonomous creative act of\nthe practical mind, as the intuition is the \u00e6sthetic, and the concept\nthe logical _a priori_ synthesis; the spirit never realizes itself\nexcept by acting, and it never acts except under given conditions of\nplace and time. But as these conditions are nothing but what we have\ncalled happenings, which in their turn are complex results of single\nvolitions, the concept of the freedom of the spirit coincides with that\nof its activity.\n\nThis solution is the one that we were obviously led to expect from\nthe whole context of Croce's philosophy, a solution in keeping\nwith his logic and with his general theory of knowledge. A similar\nparallelism we can observe in respect to the other solutions of the\nproblem of the will: determinism is connected with a mechanistic\nmaterialism, as indeterminism with one form or other of mythicism.\nThe doctrine of the double causality, which admits of a double series\nof facts, some subject to a mechanical necessity, others free and\ncreative--a solution which is probably the most commonly accepted\nto-day--corresponds to the logical dualism of nature and spirit. This\nlast one can be considered as an approximation to the abolition of the\ndilemma, as proposed by both Croce and Bergson, when we contrast it\nwith the strictly deterministic position, though it still preserves\nthe opposition of fact and value, of experience and philosophy, of\nreality and spirit. In the new conception of the will, necessity and\nfreedom stand in the same relation as all these other dualities in\nCroce's system; and the emphasis is laid, as usual, on the second term,\nthrough which only we can understand the first. The agreement between\nCroce and Bergson in this particular instance points to a closer\nsimilarity between their respective philosophies than is apparent to\na casual observer. That external reality which seems to confront the\nspirit as a separate existence, and which Bergson considers as the\nproduct of a purely mechanical, practical intellect, corresponds to\nwhat Croce defines as the naturalistic, not theoretical, but practical,\nelaboration of reality; and in Bergson's intuition and _\u00e9lan vital_,\nCroce's concept of reality as spiritual activity is mythically\nadumbrated.\n\nIf activity is freedom, then freedom coincides with the value of\nactivity. If we use the words good and evil, not with any special\nethical connotation, but as the general terms of practical value and\nnon-value, good and evil are activity and non-activity, freedom and\nabsence of freedom. Evil, like all other purely negative values, is\nunreal. This does not mean that the actions that we call evil have no\nreal existence, any more than the unreality of ugliness or falsehood\nimply the non-existence of bad poetry or of logical errors; bad poetry\nand logical errors have no \u00e6sthetic or logical reality, but they are\nproducts of the practical spirit, directed towards the satisfaction of\npractical ends; and every real action, inasmuch as it is an action,\nconsidered in itself as adequate to its particular end, is good. It\nis only by substituting to that end another end, that the first end\nmay appear as evil, and the second as good; but if this substitution\ntakes place before the action, then the action is inevitably directed\ntowards the second end, and therefore again, it is not evil, but good.\nIt is through a psychological delusion that we imagine ourselves in\na position in which we see the good, and yet do the evil: what we do\nis that which appears to us as the most desirable end, and therefore\nas good. The intention, outside the actual volition, is, as we have\nseen, unreal; if it were real, it would realize itself as an action,\nand be one with it. The negative practical judgments, whether economic\nor ethic, are judgments which affirm the reality of a certain action,\nand therefore its value, at the same time comparing that value with a\ndifferent one, which has not been realized in that particular instance.\nThe negative moral judgment usually consists in the affirmation of a\npurely economic value contrasted with an ethical value which is absent\nfrom the action which is the subject of the judgment.\n\nThe doctrine of the unreality of evil has always been regarded with\ndeep mistrust by the practical moralist; but that mistrust is utterly\nunjustified by the doctrine itself. For practical purposes it may be\nconvenient to consider life as intrinsically evil, and to oppose to\nit a set of ideals, or abstract moral values to which we must strive\nto conform our actions; in fact, every one of us is constantly doing\nsomething of the kind, and finding in those ideals a help and an\ninspiration. But shall our ideals lose their value when we understand\nthat they have no separate, transcendent reality? That every action\ncarries its own value within itself, and that therefore unless we\nconstantly realize those ideals in our concrete and individual\nactions, in every one of our actions, the ideals themselves will be\nbut empty shadows? Every ideal, however high and comprehensive, is\nbut an empirical concept derived from a class of actions in which we\nhave recognised a moral value; moral standards have the same character\nas \u00e6sthetic standards, and are useful and active only as long as\nwe understand their nature. But the creation of moral values is a\nconstantly renovated, spontaneous, original activity, in the same sense\nin which art and poetry are. We can be directed, both in our activity\nand in our judgment, by standards and ideals; that is, standards\nand ideals may help us to put ourselves in a position practically\nfavourable to the creation or judgment of \u00e6sthetic or moral values.\nBut the actual creation, as the actual judgment, takes place, both\nin art and morality, so to speak, at the risk of our whole life: it\nis a new activity, in a situation which cannot be identical with any\nprevious situation, and to which no rule will ever give us the key.\n\nWhile on one hand our sense of responsibility is rather heightened\nthan diminished by Croce's conception of value, if we look at the\nsame doctrine from another angle, it tells us that there is no evil\nwhere there is no consciousness of evil; that evil becomes something\npositive, acquires an independent existence, only when it is reflected\nin a higher plane of consciousness. The only conceivable sanction of\nthe evil that we have willed is in the will that, tending towards a\nbetter end, apprehends its former volition as inadequate and therefore\nevil; but until that light has shown itself to the spirit, all other\nsanctions are meaningless. This is the foundation of the Christian\ndoctrine of repentance, of the uses of remorse, or grace; and the\nindividual intimate quality of moral values was first proclaimed by the\nvoice that said: _nolite iudicare_. If the Kingdom of Heaven is not\nwithin you, it is not to be found anywhere else.\n\nWe can consider the actual volition as intrinsically good, if we also\napproach it from the point of view of the multiplicity of possible\nvolitions--impulses, passions, desires--striving to realize themselves\nat every moment of our life. Every single volition is the result of\na struggle from which it emerges after having conquered all the other\npossible volitions. When, in this struggle, the single volition does\nnot assert itself fully, we become the prey of that multiplicity,\nwilling a volition which is not the one that we ought to will, and that\nin a way we feel we will; hence a will that is divided against itself,\nan action which is not positive but negative, not a true action, but\na kind of passivity. When the single volition conquers the passions,\nwhen one impulse or desire becomes the will, all the other possible\nvolitions lose their actual value, multiplicity gives way to unity,\npassivity to action, evil to good, death to life.\n\nThe passions can be empirically regarded as habits of the will, as\ninclinations towards one or another category of actions; by a further\nempirical elaboration, we can divide them into the various classes of\nvirtues and vices, virtues being the passions or habits of rational\nactions, and vices the contrary ones. Individuality or personality,\nas an empirical concept, is nothing but a complex of more or less\nlasting habits, some natural and some acquired, or, more rigorously,\nthe historical situation of the universal spirit in every instant of\ntime, and therefore that complex of habits which historical conditions\nhave produced. These habits are the material out of which we mould our\nlife, and the first duty of every individual consists in exploring\nhis own dispositions, in establishing what attitudes the progress of\nreality has deposited in him, at the moment of his birth and in the\ncourse of his individual life--to acquire a consciousness of what in\nreligious terms we might call his vocation or mission; it is impossible\nfor anyone to act except on the basis of his pre\u00ebxisting personal\nhabits of will. But temperament, or the empirical individuality, is\nnot yet character, or virtue; and the respect that we owe to it, as\nthe necessary condition of our action, must not be confused with the\nultra-modern tendency which expresses itself in the cry for the rights\nof the individual temperament and for the free development of the\npassions. The individual has the duty of seeking his own self, but\nalso that of cultivating himself in the light of reason; his empirical\nindividuality is a mere datum, and his life is his own work. An\neducation aiming only at the expression of individual idiosyncrasies\n(as so much of our modern education, at least in theory, is) is no\neducation at all. The ideal is rather to be sought in such a perfect\nfulfilment of one's individual mission, however humble, that it should\nat the same time fulfil the universal mission of man.\n\nThe law of life is in the unity that conquers the multiplicity, in the\nwill asserting itself above the passions. The reality is perpetual\ndevelopment, an infinite possibility transforming itself into an\ninfinite actuality, gathering itself at every instant from the multiple\ninto the one, only to disrupt itself again and produce a new unity.\nMultiplicity, contradiction, evil, non-being, on one side, and unity,\ncoherence, good, being, on the other, are unthinkable outside the\nsynthesis of life, which is activity, becoming, evolution. This concept\nof becoming or evolution is the one that modern thought has substituted\nfor that of an immobile reality and of a transcendent divinity. And in\nCroce it becomes wide enough to embrace Hegel's speculative dialectic\non one side, and the naturalistic evolutionism of the scientist on\nthe other. The dialectic of will is the dialectic of reality, both\nspiritual and natural--or rather only and always spiritual, since\nnature cannot be distinguished from the spirit as a concrete reality of\nanother order, but only as an abstraction of the practical intellect.\nWhat we call life in nature is consciousness in the spirit, and the\nhistory of nature is not qualitatively different from the history of\nman. The whole course of history cannot be regarded otherwise than as\na continuous progress, a perpetual triumph of life over death; and its\nrationality, which we call Fate or Providence, is not the work of a\ntranscendent Intelligence, but is a Providence realizing itself in die\nindividual, working not outside or above, but within history itself.\nThe mystery of which we are all conscious is not a part of reality, but\nonly the presentment of future realizations, the infinity of evolution.\nThe God transcendent, the empirical immortality, are mere figures and\nmyths for the God living in nature and in the spirit of man, for the\nspirit of man, for the spiritual activity, which is life and death in\none.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Filosofia della Pratica_, part i, \"L'attivit\u00e0 pratica\nin generale,\" pp. 1-209.]\n\n\n\n\nIX. ECONOMICS AND ETHICS[1]\n\n\nThe distinctions of the practical activity--The autonomy of ethics:\nutilitarianism--The autonomy of the economic form: abstract\nmoralism--Relations of the ethical to the economic form--Pleasure\nand duty, happiness and virtue--Importance of the economic\nprinciple--Philosophy and the science of economics--The ethical\nprinciple; material ethics--Ethical formalism; the universality of the\nprinciple--The object of the ethical will--Croce as a moralist.\n\n\nThe preceding chapter deals with the practical activity in general,\nwith the general concept of will or action. We must now introduce in\nthat concept a distinction analogous to that by which the theoretical\nactivity has appeared to us first as the knowledge of die individual or\nintuition, then as the knowledge of the universal or concept. But here,\nagain, we shall not employ the merely descriptive and psychological\nmethod, nor yet attempt to deduce this distinction from the analogy\nbetween the theoretical and the practical activity; we shall appeal\nonce more to the immediate test of consciousness, which in fact reveals\ntwo distinct forms of the will, the economic and the ethic. Economic\nactivity is the one that wills and realizes only that which relates to\nthe conditions of fact in which the individual finds himself; ethical\nactivity, the one that wills and realizes that which, though related to\nthose conditions, at the same time in some way transcends them. To one\ncorrespond individual, to the other, universal ends; on one is based\nthe judgment on the coherence of the action in itself, on its adequacy\nto its individual end; on the other, the judgment on its adequacy to\nuniversal ends, which transcend the individual. If we recognise only\nthe ethical form, we perceive very soon that it implies the other\none, which we intended to exclude, since our action, though universal\nin its meaning, must always be something concrete and individually\ndetermined. We do not realize morality in the universal, but always a\ngiven moral volition, not the abstract virtues, but the concrete works.\nAlthough a moral action is not only our individual pleasure, yet it\nmust be that, too, or we should never be able to realize it. On the\nother hand, the mere economic action, the satisfaction of our immediate\npleasure, though it satisfies us in relation to our individual end, yet\nit leaves constantly unsatisfied that which we are beside and beyond\nour individual determinations, our deepest and truest being. And this\ndissatisfaction will last until we succeed in lifting ourselves above\nthe infinite succession of individual ends, and in inserting in them a\nuniversal value. This passage or conversion from the purely economic to\nthe ethic, from pleasure to duty, is designed by Croce as the conquest\nof that peace which is not of a fabulous future, but of the present\nand real; in every instant is eternity, to him who knows how to reach\nit. Our actions will be always new, because always new problems are put\nbefore us by the course of reality; but in them, if we accomplish them\nwith a pure heart, seeking in them what lifts them above themselves,\nwe shall each time possess the Whole. Such is the character of the\nmoral action; which satisfies us not as individuals but as men, and\nas individuals only because the individual is a man, and as men only\nthrough the medium of individual satisfaction.\n\nThe denial of the autonomy of the ethical form, the attempt to reduce\nthe ethic to the economic, the morally good to the individually\nuseful, is the substance of the many theories that go under the name\nof utilitarianism. But this reduction of the practical activity to\na single principle clashes in every instant of our life against the\ndistinction between mere pleasure and duty, between the useful and the\nhonest action, between the things that have a price and those that\nhave none, between actions which have a moral motive and those that\nhave only a utilitarian one. The utilitarians themselves, unable to\npass over the distinction, have tried to explain it away as a purely\nquantitative one, defining morality as the utility of the greater\nnumber or as the interest or egotism of the race; but it is clear that\nthese so-called quantitative distinctions are really qualitative ones:\nthe utility of the greater number is no longer individual utility or\nimmediate pleasure, the egotism of the race is no longer egotism, but\na value which transcends the individual. A further attempt in the same\ndirection consists in considering morality as born from the association\nbetween certain acts which are means to a pleasure, and that pleasure\nitself: a savage fights to defend his personal liberty or his life, a\ncivilized man, forgetting that the tribe, or the city, or the state,\nare but means to preserve his life and his property, defends them for\nthemselves, and allows himself to be deprived of both his property and\nhis life for love of his country. But only through stupidity is it\npossible to mistake the means for the end, and, therefore, this theory\nactually reduces morality to what is practically irrational, a product\nof confusion and illusion; that is, to the contrary of the practical\nactivity, which is, in its own sphere, rationality and wisdom. The mere\nenunciation of this theory, if true, ought to produce the dissolution\nof those false associations, and, therefore, the destruction of\nmorality; if morality subsists, this is due to its rational character,\nwhich associationism has not succeeded in disproving. The last refuge\nof utilitarianism is in theology and mystery: the utility of moral\nactions is not of this world, but derived from the conception of\nanother world in which God punishes or rewards us for our conduct on\nearth. But this kind of utilitarianism puts itself outside the field\nof philosophy, by emptying the symbols of religion of their moral\ncontent, which is their only logical justification.\n\nThe converse form of error, which consists in eliminating the economic\nmoment from the concept of practical activity, is criticised by Croce\nas abstract moralism. The economic moment has been regarded as purely\ntechnical, that is, as the theoretical moment that precedes action,\naction itself being always and only ethical; but some sort of knowledge\nprecedes every action, and the distinction between the useful and\nthe good cannot be reduced to that between knowledge and will; we\ncan consider the useful as the means and the good as the end, only\nby forgetting that there is as much difference between knowing the\nuseful and willing the useful, as between knowing the good and willing\nthe good. The useful has also been identified with the egotistic and\nimmoral; but the merely useful is amoral, and not immoral, in the same\nsense in which the pure intuition is alogical, and not either logical\nor illogical. The imagination of the poet cannot be submitted to the\nlogical judgment, any more than the immediate pleasure of the child,\nor any action which precedes the awakening of the moral consciousness.\nAnd besides, the useful is so far from being immoral, that there is no\nmoral action which is not also useful, as there is no logical truth\nwhich can express itself except through language. Finally, the useful\nhas been defined as an inferior form of practical consciousness; but\nwhat this definition actually accomplishes is to recognise, though\nimperfectly, the true distinction, which is a relation of higher and\nlower only in the metaphorical sense in which these adjectives can be\nemployed for the relation between the intuition and the concept.\n\nEconomics and ethics are the double grade of the practical activity:\nit is possible to conceive of actions having no moral value, and yet\neconomically effective, but not of moral actions which should not\nat the same time be useful, or economic. Morality lives concretely\nin utility, as the universal in the individual, the eternal in the\ncontingent. But we can never sufficiently emphasize the true character\nof the distinction, which, taken as a purely abstract and psychological\none, might justify the persistence of morally indifferent actions\nwithin the moral consciousness. The moral consciousness, once it\nis awakened, invests the whole life of the practical mind, as the\nlogical consciousness does for the theoretical mind, and it abolishes\nthat condition of innocence, in which the purely economic is not\nyet subject to the moral judgment, in the same way as perception\nand reflection destroy our na\u00efve belief in the reality of purely\npoetical imaginations. On the other hand, there are no actions which\nare economically ally indifferent, or, as they are generally called,\ndisinterested; morality requires that the individual should transform\na universal interest into his individual one, make of morality itself\nhis personal utility, but it cannot ask for the abolition of all\ninterests, which would mean the abolition of morality as well. The\nvalue of a moral action is in direct proportion with the passion\nand fervour with which we identify our individual ends with ends\ntranscending our empirical individuality.\n\nIn the light of this distinction, the old oppositions of pleasure and\nduty, of happiness and virtue, lose a good deal of their rigour and\nsharpness. Pleasure as the positive economic activity or feeling can\nnever be in real contrast with duty as the positive moral activity:\na moral action brings with itself its own satisfaction or pleasure,\nand if it brings pain also, either the good action was not entirely\ngood, not willed with all our heart, or it was accompanied by a new\npractical problem, which has yet to be solved. Similarly, happiness is\nnot necessarily virtue, but there is no virtue which is not happiness;\nthe sorrows of the virtuous are not intrinsic to morality, being but\nthe limits of human activity, which the good share with the wicked.\nWe all can transform our limits into sorrows, by our restlessness\nand unreasonableness; or, through resignation, our sorrows in limits\nand conditions of activity. Asceticism, which regards pleasure and\nhappiness as essentially immoral, is the extreme form of moral\nabstractism; by destroying the economic category, it deprives morality\nof its reality and concreteness. It is, in fact, in the practical\nsphere, the counterpart of mysticism in the theoretical, which makes\nthought impossible by dissociating it from expression.\n\nThe recognition of the autonomy of the economic moment as one of the\nfundamental forms of spiritual activity, and the study of its relations\nwith morality, appears to me as Croce's most important contribution to\nmodern thought. We have seen what light the problems of the ethical\nwill receive, when they are seen in their unity and distinction with\nthe facts of the economic, or individual, will. We shall see in the\nnext chapter what a vast field of human activity, comprising the\nwhole political life of mankind, reveals a new rationality, once it\nis regarded as a legitimate product of the human mind, to be judged\naccording to its own standards and values, and not to standards and\nvalues belonging to a different order of facts. Croce's discovery of\nthe will of the individual as the first grade, the elementary form of\nthe practical spirit, is analogous to Vico's discovery of the purely\nintuitive activity as the first grade of knowledge; and it establishes\nbetween economics and ethics, between politics and morality, the same\nrelation as between \u00e6sthetic and logical values. The \u00e6sthetically true\nis the adequately expressive, as the economically good is the useful;\nbut in both cases, we can never repeat it sufficiently, once the\nlogical and the moral consciousness are awakened, neither the \u00e6sthetic\ncan be apprehended otherwise than as logically true or untrue, nor the\neconomic otherwise than as morally good or bad. The standards which\nare illegitimate when applied to art as art, to politics as politics,\nbecome rational again in the all pervading light of truth and morality.\nThe predecessors of Croce in this line of his speculation are, on\none side, the political writers who, from Aristotle to Machiavelli,\nattempted to define the relations between politics and morality; on the\nother side, the economists, who, by isolating a type of value, which\nwas not an \u00e6sthetic, intellectual, or ethical value, and which could\nnot be identified with the reverse of the ethical value, or egotism,\nhad prepared the ground for the establishment of a philosophy of\neconomics. As a matter of actual, historical derivation, it was from\nhis study of Marxism, from his meditations on contemporary economic\nscience, that Croce drew, as we saw in one of the first chapters of\nthis book, his conception of economic value as one of the universal\nvalues.\n\nAfter what has been said of the general relationship between philosophy\nand science, it will not be difficult to determine the place that\n_economic science_ occupies in Croce's thought, in relation to his\n_philosophy of economics_. Economics as a philosophical science\nis that branch of philosophy, the object of which is the economic\nactivity in its universality, the determination of the concept of\nvolition or action as the volition or action of the individual, that\nis, as the predicate of the economic judgment or judgment of utility.\nThe economic judgment, in its turn, is but a form of historical\njudgment, and, therefore, the concrete form of the philosophy of\neconomics is economic history, the history of the spirit of man as it\nrealizes itself in the individual action or volition. Between that\nphilosophy and that history, there is no place, as we know, for any\nintermediate form of knowledge, but only for the practical (empirical\nor abstract) elaboration, of the economic datum. This is what the\nscience of economics actually is: an applied mathematical science,\nfounded on empirical concepts. The postulates and types of economic\nscience are among the most perfect examples of conscious fictions,\nbeginning with the fundamental one of the _homo \u0153conomicus_: they\nare empirical concepts by which the economic reality is simplified to\nsuch an extent that it becomes possible to submit it to mathematical\ncalculation, and thereby to recognise promptly its necessary aspects\nand consequences. Economic science partakes, therefore, of the rigour\nand absoluteness of mathematics, which is obtained, as we know,\nonly by sacrificing the concreteness of its object. Its laws are\narbitrary and tautological, consisting, like all scientific laws, in\nthe definition of those characteristics of reality which have been\nabstracted to form its postulates or empirical concepts; but it is\nonly through the acceptance of such definitions that it succeeds\nin dominating, ordering, describing, and classifying the mass and\nvariety of economic facts and, most important of all, in treating them\nquantitively. It has, in fact, the same structure as another science\nwith which it has been frequently compared, and which is here assumed\nas typical of the proceedings of applied mathematics--mechanics. I\nbelieve that very few economists would quarrel to-day with Croce's\ncharacterization of economic science, since its mathematical character\nis now universally recognised; but Croce proves conclusively that even\nin its non-mathematical phases, economics has always been a purely\nquantitative science. Volition and action are assumed in it in their\nindistinction; and moral facts being volitions and actions as well as\nthe economic facts, they can also be included in the economic calculus,\nbecause from a merely abstract point of view there is no way of\ndifferentiating them from the latter.\n\nBetween the philosophy and the science of economics there is\nneither agreement nor disagreement, but a total heterogeneity, and,\ntherefore, a reciprocal tolerance. It is only when one invades the\nfield, or adopts the methods, of the other, that conflict and error\narise. Economics as a science may then deny the legitimacy of the\nphilosophical study of the economic moment; or it may attribute a\nuniversal value to its empirical concepts (as it has happened again\nand again in the disputes between free-traders and protectionists, or\nas it constantly happens when economic laws are referred to as endowed\nwith a character of absolute necessity); or, finally it may transform\nits fictions into realities, attributing for instance to the concrete\nhuman being, and to the exclusion of any other quality, the qualities\nit has abstracted for the creation of its homo \u0153conomicus. But, in\nall such cases, though we may meet these errors among the economists,\nthey are not scientific errors but logical errors; or rather, they are\npoor science only because they are bad philosophy. The true function of\nthe abstract economic schemes is that of an instrument in the hands of\nthe historical and sociological observer, who needs many other similar\ninstruments, if he wants to gain a concrete and direct knowledge of\nactual historical and social conditions.\n\nIt is now time for us to return, from this discussion of the two\ndifferent elaborations of the economic datum, to a closer consideration\nof the second form of the practical activity, or of the ethical\nprinciple. In the same way as the empirical concepts of economic\nscience are insufficient to exhaust the infinite wealth of the economic\nprinciple, no single action or group of single actions can define the\nethical principle, which is universal, and therefore merely formal. By\nidentifying the principle with a series, however vast, of particular\ndeterminations, that is, by substituting a material ethics for a formal\none, we fall back inevitably into utilitarianism, since the volition of\na single object or class of objects is not a volition of the universal\nbut of the particular, not an ethical but an economic act. Even the\nhighest forms of moral ideals, such as benevolence, love, altruism,\nhumanitarianism, etc., once they are apprehended materially, and not\nas mere verbal approximations to the formal ethical principle, acquire\na contingent and utilitarian character, and are apt to come in actual\nconflict with the truly moral will. The same criticism applies, and\nwith greater force, to institutionalized ideals, such as the family,\nthe state, the social organism, the interest of the race, etc.;\nnone of them can be the object of the moral will without exceptions\nand restrictions, that is, without losing in the act of the will\nits institutional character, and appearing as one of the particular\nconditions under which the particular moral volition takes place.\nThe religious principles themselves are subject to this reduction\nfrom the ethical to the economic, when, as in the case of theological\nutilitarianism, they are taken as empirical limitations, as particular\nobjects, of the ethical will. The material ethical principles are in\nfact analogous to those material \u00e6sthetic principles which we have\ncriticised as rhetorical; they constitute a rhetoric of the virtues not\nless deadly to the creative moral will than the rhetoric of the arts is\nto the creative intuition.\n\nThe ethical principle must be formal, but not formalistic, and\ntherefore Croce is not satisfied with any of the so-called universal\nlaws or categorical imperatives, or with any of the many formulas\nwhich attempt to define the moral actions through one constant\ndetermination which ought to be present in each of them. Such formulas\nare mere symbols or metaphors, and can be used as the equivalents of\nthe ethical principle, as some of the categories of material ethics\ncan be used; but their danger consists in giving the illusion of\npossessing the true principle, while what we are given is an empty\nand tautological one, which will again give way to purely empirical\ndeterminations and therefore to utilitarianism. This empty formalism,\nor absolute indetermination, of the ethical principle, corresponds to\ntwo conceptions of philosophy, which Croce respectively calls partial\nand discontinuous. According to the first, man may know a portion of\nreality, but never reality as a whole; as regards morality, he may hear\nthe voice of his own conscience, but never grasp with his intellect\nthe content of the moral law. According to the second, he may know the\nreason of morality, but not within the sphere of ethics, whose task\nconsists only in establishing the moral law and deducing the moral\nprecepts; the problem of the essence of morality belongs to another\nscience, metaphysics. The reader who has followed us to this point\nknows that Croce's philosophy is neither partial nor discontinuous;\nthat he does not admit of any limits to human thought, nor of any\ndivision in the body of philosophy. The whole of philosophy is already\nincluded for him in the first philosophical proposition, and though it\nmay didactically be useful to divide the problems of philosophy in\ngroups, or even to deal separately with the particular philosophical\nscience on one hand, and with general philosophy or metaphysics on the\nother, yet truth does not belong to the distinctions outside their\nunity, to the parts outside the whole, to the segments outside the\ncircle. It is this totality and continuity of Croce's philosophy that\nmakes Croce's ethical principle a form, but not an empty one; a form\nwhich is full in a philosophical and universal sense, which is at the\nsame time content, and universal as content not less than as form. He\nhas defined the ethical principle, not, tautologically, as a universal\nform, but as the volition of the universal: a definition which is\nat the same time the distinction of the ethical from the economical\nform, or volition of the individual. We may here recall, to test once\nmore the coherence of Croce's thought, and to make this definition\nclearer, his definition of the concept as knowledge of the universal;\nby it the concept is distinguished from the intuition, or knowledge of\nthe individual, and the logical principle is seen as unidentifiable\neither with an abstract logical form or with any particular system\nof philosophy. The concept is real only in the infinite individual\ndeterminations of actual thought, as the ethical principle in the\ninfinite concrete volitions of the human spirit sub specie universalis.\n\nThe universal which is the object of the ethical volition is not\nsomething that we shall need to define at this point of our exposition,\nsince the whole of Croce's philosophy is nothing but a definition of\nthe universal. The universal is mind or the spirit; it is reality, as\nunity of will and thought; it is life grasped in its depth as that\nsame unity; it is freedom, since a reality thus conceived is perpetual\ndevelopment, creation, progress. Man, in willing the universal, turns\nfrom his individuality to that which transcends it, to the spirit,\nor reality, or life, or freedom, not as abstract ideals, but as they\nrealize themselves in his individual action. The volition of the\nindividual, of one's individual existence, is necessarily the first\nstep; there is no man, however deeply moral, who does not begin by\naffirming his own individual life; without this affirmation, he would\nnever be able to transcend it and to deny it. But he who should limit\nhimself to this affirmation, and accept as a place of rest what is only\nthe beginning of his development, would find himself in contradiction\nwith his real, intimate self. He must will not only his individual\nself, but that self also, which being the same in all selves is their\ncommon Father. It is thus that he promotes the realization of reality,\nlives the full life, and makes his heart beat with the heart of the\nuniverse: _Cor cordium_. The moral individual is conscious that he\nis working for the Whole. Every action which is in accord with the\nethical duty is in accord with Life, and would be contrary to duty and\nimmoral, if instead of promoting life, it should depress and mortify\nit. The most humble moral action resolves itself into this volition\nof the spirit in its universality. The soul of a simple and ignorant\nman wholly devoted to his modest duty is in perfect unison with that of\nthe philosopher whose mind receives within itself the universal spirit.\nWhat one does, the other thinks; and both reach by different roads\ntheir full satisfaction in an act of life, in a fecund embrace with\nreality.\n\nIt is in pages like the ones from which we have extracted this\nenthusiastic definition of morality, that the true quality of Croce's\nphilosophy is best perceived. But what is here affirmed as a principle\nlives as an ever present spirit in innumerable able discussions of\nparticular moral problems in his _Filosofia della Pratica_, in his\nmoral essays, in his literary criticism (there is no living literary\ncritic who has a keener perception of moral values than this implacable\nenemy of moralism), in the whole of his work. It is this moral\nenthusiasm, together with his capacity to see clear and deep, his\ncatholic tolerance for all forms of beauty and truth and goodness,\nhowever distant from his tastes and inclinations, and his courageous,\noutspoken intolerance for all hypocrisies, compromises, half-truths,\nwilful errors, that has given Croce, in the last twenty years, in\nItaly, a right to moral as well as intellectual leadership. He is the\ntrue heir of an infinitely complex moral tradition, and placed high\nenough to do justice to all its elements, though apparently contrasting\nwith each other. But when recognizing the symbolical and practical\nvalue of the various positive ethical systems that appear to him as\ngradual approximations to the full concreteness and universality of the\nethical principle, he emphasizes the connection of his own ethics with\none of those elements in preference to every other, with the religious\nand Christian element, for which morality is already what it is for\nthe philosopher, the love and will of the universal spirit. There is\nno truth of ethics which for him cannot be expressed in the words that\nwe have learned as children from our traditional religion. Between the\nreligious man and the philosopher, between religion and philosophy,\nthere is no enmity, but continuity and development; in the affirmation\nof the ethical principle, which is the crucial test of every philosophy\nas of every religion, the substantial identity of religion and\nphilosophy is finally established.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: _See Filosofia della Pratica_, part ii, \"L'attivit\u00e0\npratica nelle tue forme speciali,\" pp. 211-319.]\n\n\n\n\nX. THE LAWS[1]\n\n\nEconomic society as an empirical concept--The philosophical concept\nof society--Sociology, philosophy of law and political science--The\ndefinition of law--Laws and customs--The laws, the natural laws and the\npractical principles--Mutability of the laws: the _jus naturale_--The\nfunction of the laws--Legalism: the Jesuit and the Puritan--The\nlegislative activity as a generically economic activity--The juridical\nactivity--Law and language.\n\n\nOne of the fundamental empirical concepts of the science of economics\nis that of economic society, which is formed by abstracting certain\nclasses of economic relationships from the mass of relationships of\nall kinds among which the life of the individual realizes itself. Any\ntreatise of economics can be considered as a definition of economic\nsociety; and we know how those definitions are apt to vary according\nto the choice of the groups of facts studied, and the method employed,\nby different schools of economists. The economic society of the\nMarxian is not the economic society of the classical economist; the\nCatholic economist, differing from both, will include in his treatment\nthe consideration of certain ethical relations which give a greater\ncomplexity to his scheme. It would be possible to study the economics\nof the individual in perfect isolation from all other human beings,\nlimiting the elements of this particular form of society to one man,\nand that portion of nature from which he draws his food, his clothing,\nhis shelter; on the other hand, the whole of mankind and the whole of\nnature may enter into a single, all-including, economic body. We may\neven study animal species, in their relations within themselves, or\nwith man, or with other animal species, or with nature at large, from\nan economic standpoint (symbiosis and parasitism are facts bearing a\nclose resemblance with human economy)--and thus form an infinite number\nof new economic societies. Each of these empirical concepts can be\nvaried _ad infinitum_, by the mere inclusion or exclusion of certain\nclasses of relationships.\n\nThe empirical, non-rigorous character of the concept of economic\nsociety is self-evident; and it can therefore be usefully employed to\nprove by analogy the similar character of the concept of society as\nmanufactured by jurists, sociologists, and political scientists. It\nis against such fictions that philosophy reacts by building a concept\nof the isolated individual, that is, of the individual isolated from\nthe particular classes of relationships which enter into the formation\nof particular empirical concepts of society; but it does this only to\nplunge the individual again in the midst of that infinite multiplicity,\nwhich is one aspect, and an essential one, of reality, Society as a\nphilosophical concept cannot be identified with any form of economic\nor political society; of such, as mere abstractions, no philosophical\ntreatment is possible. Society is that real multiplicity, without which\nwe should have neither knowledge nor action, neither art nor thought,\nneither utility nor morality; and from society in this sense, the\nindividual cannot be isolated, without reducing him, in his turn, to a\nmerely abstract concept.\n\nThe sociologist, the jurist, the political scientist use their\nconcepts of society for their purposes, which are, in the sense which\nis now familiar to our reader, scientific purposes. But very often\nthey lose sight of the character of these concepts, and treat these\ninstruments of classification and description as substitutes for\nthe actual reality which they are, by reason of their abstractness,\nutterly unable to reproduce. The sociologist talks of the collective\nmind, and of collective representations, as if they had a reality\noutside the thought and action of the individual; the jurist builds a\nphilosophy of law, in which society is opposed to the individual as\na being to another being, and law, as a product of society, at every\npoint transcends the individual will. The political scientist deals\nwith the community, or the association, or the State, as with concepts\nof which it were possible to give a philosophical definition, valid\nfor all times, and from which the rules of perfect government could be\nrigorously deduced. Of these types of philosophical degenerations of\nlegitimate scientific thought, it can be roughly said that, because of\nthe peculiar cultural development of the various nations of Europe, the\nfirst belongs more particularly to England and France, the second to\nItaly and Germany; though they are all more or less common in European\nculture as a whole. As an Italian, Croce was particularly interested in\nthe second, the philosophical degeneration of juridical thought, and\ntherefore his particular treatment of the economic facts underlying\nthe problems of political society naturally took the shape of an\ninquiry into the nature of law. But it ought not to be difficult for\nthe English or American reader, for whom these problems are not part\nof a practically inexistent philosophy of law, but of a long tradition\nof political science and theory of government, to translate Croce's\nthought into terms of his own cultural experience.\n\nA law is an act of will, whose content is a series or class of actions.\nThis definition excludes from the concept of law any empirical\nsocial determination; it includes within it all laws which are\nmerely individual, the laws that the individual lays down to and for\nhimself, the rules of conduct and programs of life and action, which\nthe individual follows of his own accord. It may be objected that\nindividual laws differ from social and political laws, because the\nlatter are coercive and constrictive, while the former are not. There\nis no law, however, that is truly coercive; the individual is always\nfree either to observe or not to observe the law. What a law does is to\noffer a choice or alternative, and this is as true of individual as of\nsocial laws. We may disregard our own rules of conduct or programs of\naction, and suffer from doing so, and inflict a punishment on ourselves\nfor having done so; or we may alter our individual laws as social laws\nare altered when they no longer respond to the need of a community,\nand are either violently overthrown by rebellion or quietly allowed to\nfall into desuetude through non-observance, or modified by the proper\norgans of legislation. But the importance of the concept of individual\nlaws lies in the fact that the so-called social laws have no reality\noutside the individual: in order to observe a law it is necessary to\nmake it one's own, and to rebel against a law is to expel it from one's\npersonality, of which it was, or tried to become, a part. The only real\nlaws are, therefore, individual laws.\n\nIf the criterion of sanction or coercion is insufficient to draw a\ndistinction between individual and social laws, we can still less\nuse it to divide the social laws into customs or unwritten laws, and\npolitical and juridical laws. Both customs and laws carry with them\nsanctions, though of a different order, or, to put it in more precise\nterms, both offer a choice between probable consequences to the free\nindividual will. This distinction, like every other subdivision of the\nlaws (civil, penal, national, international, laws and by-laws, etc.),\nis a purely empirical one. But the concept of law comprehends these and\nmany more in which the jurists have no interest, such as the literary\nor artistic laws (that a tragedy should have five acts, or, as at one\ntime in England, that a novel should fill three volumes), or the rules\nof religious life, or the precepts of chivalry, down to the statutes\nof a criminal gang and to Balzac's _droit parisien_. In fact, the\nempirical distinctions of the laws are coextensive with the empirical\nconcepts of society, and partake of the same characteristics: to the\npreceding examples of laws correspond respectively the republic of\nletters, a monastery, the order of knighthood, a band of robbers, and\n_le beau monde_. But the only reality, both of the society and of the\nlaw, is the individual assent.\n\nThe laws have one point in common with the so-called natural laws;\nboth are concerned with empirical concepts, or classes. But while the\nnatural laws are mere indicative statements of fact, the laws can\nalways be translated from the indicative to the imperative; that is,\nthey contain a volitive element which is absent from the natural laws.\nThe volitive element is present, on the other hand, in the practical\nprinciples which have some time received the names of moral or economic\nlaws, and which can be converted into such imperatives as Will the\nuniversal, or, in particular, Will the good, the useful, the true, the\nbeautiful. But these principles are concerned with the universal, that\nis, with the spirit of man in the necessary forms of its activity, not\nwith a particular product of the spirit, a class or type of actions, as\ndo laws in the strict meaning of the word. This distinction between the\npractical principles and the laws opens the way to the recognition of a\nvery important character of the laws: while the practical principles,\nbecause of their universality, have no limits and no exceptions\n(and we have already seen that a morally indifferent action is a\ncontradiction in terms), the laws can never exhaust the universal, and\ntherefore will always leave outside themselves a margin of actions,\nnot included in any of the classes to which they refer, and therefore\nlegally indifferent. In more technical language, we may express the\nsame idea by saying that all laws, whether imperative or prohibitive\nor permissive (a law, according to the ancient formula, _aut iubet aut\nvetat aut permittit_), can be reduced to permissive laws: an order is\nalways at the same time a prohibition, and both orders and prohibitions\nimplicitly permit all actions which are not contemplated by the law.\n\nMoreover, while the practical principles are immutable, always capable\nof giving form to the most varied historical material, the laws are in\nperpetual flux and change. The particular modes of change, whether by\nevolution or revolution, do not concern the philosopher, for whom all\ncan be reduced to a angle one: the free will producing a new law under\nnew conditions. Against the perpetual mutability of the laws, due to\nthe contingent and historical character of their content, clashes the\nconcept of an Eternal Code, or Law of Nature (_jus naturale_), which\npresumes to determine the content and form of the laws, according to\nabstract reason, once and forever. This conception is due to an error\nwith which we are now familiar, consisting in the transformation of\nempirical concepts into principals of universal validity. But from\nthis particular error, as from all errors, we must distinguish certain\nelements of actual and concrete thought which have been historically\nassociated with it. In the attempts to establish a Law of Nature, we\nshall then recognise either new concrete legislative programs, the\nnew laws appearing as natural and rational by contrast with the old\nones, or an attempt to deduce from, and through, juridical concepts,\nthe principles of a philosophy of the practical. The principle of\nnationality, fighting for realization against the old dynastic law,\nappears to its defenders as a typical natural right; and Rousseau,\nwhen deducing the principles of the _jus naturale_, warns us that\nhe is not dealing with historical truths, but with hypothetical and\nconventional reasonings, that is, with principles which transcend every\nparticular determination and have not a positive, but an ideal value.\nWe no longer speak of a Law of Nature, but the error which gave rise\nto that conception is still vigorous in current social and political\ndiscussions; every attempt to change legal conditions is always\nadvocated or resisted by an appeal either to natural rights, which are\nbut arbitrary rationalizations of historical contingencies, or to\nabstract reasons, principles, or ideas, of which the particular laws\nor institutions are assumed to be the final and necessary expression.\nBut rationality, morality, and naturality, in the sense in which\nthese qualities are predicated of one or another type of laws and\ninstitutions, do not belong to any particular historical determination\nmore than to another; they belong only to the spirit of man and to the\nconcrete values that it realizes among the ever-changing conditions of\nhistory.\n\nA law, being a volition of a class of actions, and therefore of an\nabstraction, is in itself an abstract or unreal volition. What we\nactually will is not the law, but the single, individual action\nunder the law: the reality of the law is only in its execution. In\nthe individual execution, however, what realizes itself is not the\nlaw, but the practical principle, economic or ethic, of which both\nthe observance and the non-observance of the law are particular\ndeterminations; the individual practical problems can never be foreseen\nseen by the law, which is by its nature general and abstract. What is\nthen, it may be asked, the use of the laws? Croce's answer is that the\nlaws are helps to the real volition, in the same way as the empirical\nand abstract concepts, though not real knowledge themselves, are helps\nto knowledge. In order to determine ourselves to the single action,\nit is useful to begin by fixing our attention to the class of which\nthat single is an element; in order to know either the individual,\nor the universal, it is useful to create, between the universal and\nthe individual, classes and types, general concepts, or, as Croce\ncalls them, relatively constant variables, through which the process\nof actual knowledge is made easier and quicker. We cannot think the\npseudo-concepts, but they help us to think; we cannot will the laws,\nbut they help us to will. The concept of law is akin to that of plan\nor design; in practice, a plan or design, and its execution, are one\nand the same thing, as we act by constantly changing our design,\nbecause reality, which is the foundation of our action, is in perpetual\nchange. But this unreality of the plan, as distinct from the concrete\nindividual action, does not deprive the plan itself of its practical\nuses, which are universally recognized, and which are identical with\nthe uses of law.\n\nWhen we identify the empirical laws with the universal practical\nprinciples, economic or ethic, we fall into \"legalism,\" which can be\ndefined as the belief that universal principles can be definitely\nembodied in a limited number of laws, and that, on the other hand,\nthese laws partake of the character of absoluteness which belongs to\nthose principles. It is especially in the treatment of ethics that\nthis confusion has caused its worst effects. The two outstanding types\nof legalists are the Jesuit, who admits of the morally indifferent,\nthe justification through the intention, the pious fraud, and other\npractical means for the purely literal observance of the law, supposed\nto be a sufficient satisfaction of the moral obligation, and the\nPuritan, who maintains that the unchangeable letter of the law is the\nonly, and always certain, guide of the moral consciousness. Both Jesuit\nand Puritan, or to give them the names they assumed in a historical\ncontroversy, both Molinist and Jansenist, have often been in practice\nmuch better than their theories; but we are here interested only in\ntheir theoretical pronouncements, which, though apparently contrasting,\nyet combine in substituting the letter for the spirit, and in drying\nup, in the name of morality, the living springs of moral activity.\nAnd in both cases, moral legalism is associated with theological\nutilitarianism; it is, in fact, but another aspect of the same error.\n\nThe will that wills classes of actions, the legislative activity, is\neither moral or merely economic, and can therefore be judged as either\nmoral or immoral, economic or anti-economic. But as the laws are will\nin the abstract, our judgment of the laws will also be an abstract\njudgment. To pronounce a concrete judgment, we must turn to the moment\nof the execution of the law, to the individual practical action, in\nwhich the law realizes itself. In this sphere, it is vain to dispute\nwhether a law is essentially economic or moral: the economic or moral\ncharacter of the law is not determined by the abstract intention of the\nlegislator, but by the manner of its execution, by the quality of the\nindividual executor. The punishment which a law assigns for a category\nof crimes may be intended by the legislator either to deter or to\nemend the criminal; but in the man who abstains from that particular\nkind of crime, the law is an economic one if the abstention is entirely\ndue to the fear of the punishment, it is a moral one if it coincides\nwith a sincere abhorrence of the crime. No law, therefore, can be said\nto be intrinsically moral, and if we want to define the legislative\nactivity in its full extension, we must define it as generically\npractical or merely economic.\n\nThe same definition obviously applies to the will that executes the\nlaw, as distinct from the will that formulates it: the juridical\nactivity, as Croce names it, is also generically practical or\nmerely economic, and as such united to and distinct from the moral\nactivity. As the juridical activity, however, does not partake\nof the abstractness of the legislative, but is as concrete and\ndetermined as the economic activity, there is actually no possibility\nof distinguishing the one from the other; the juridical activity\nis therefore identical with the economic activity. This is Croce's\noriginal solution of the fundamental problem of the philosophy of\nlaw; a solution which is closely connected with his recognition of a\nutilitarian practical category, distinct from but not opposed to the\nmoral category, and with his reduction of all laws to individual laws.\nThe reader must recall what has been said elsewhere of the relations\nbetween economic and moral values; and he will then understand in what\nsense it can be said that Croce's theory of law is an answer to the\nsecular disputes on the relations between law and morality, between\npositive and ideal law, historical law and the Law of Nature. And he\nwill also be able to perceive the difference between the reduction of\nthe juridical to the mere economic activity, which, as we know, is\nalso the form through which only morality realizes itself, and the\ntheories of law as the pure embodiment of force and of the positive,\nestablished right as the only conceivable right, which are nothing but\nthe counterpart of moral utilitarianism in the field of law. Croce's\ntheory of law is, as all the rest of his philosophy is, a purely formal\ndoctrine; not intended to defend one type of laws and institutions\nagainst any other, but attempting to furnish a conception of law, as an\nindividual, perpetually new activity of the spirit of man, of which all\nlaws and institutions, all phases and tendencies of political history,\nappear as concrete historical manifestations.\n\nThe philosophy of law has often had recourse to the philosophy of\nlanguage for analogies by which its own problems could be clarified. A\ndoctrinaire view of the juridical and political problem, for which the\norigin of law and society is to be found in an abstract convention,\nand which therefore tends to build up, by new conventions, a model\nlegislation, or an Eternal Code, shows its real nature when related to\nthe corresponding conception of language as a collection of signs, a\npurely symbolical organism, which can be so perfected by reason as to\nbecome an absolute, universal language, embodying in its signs every\nconceivable type of logical operations: a universal language, which\nshould also be a universal symbolic logic. Sharply opposed to the\ndoctrinaire, the traditionalist views certain types of positive laws\nand institutions as endowed with a character of necessity which puts\nthem above the reach of the individual judgment of man; and as he fails\nto discover the ever present creative activity, by which man constructs\nhis juridical and political world, he also withdraws from the human\nspirit the power to create its own language, and makes of words a\ndivine institution. Equally remote from the sociological as from the\ntheological concept, which are the extreme theoretical forms of popular\nerrors, Croce establishes between law and language an analogy by which\nboth manifest their intrinsic creative and human character. The reality\nof law is the individual juridical or economic activity, as the reality\nof language is the concrete intuitive activity. Law is the will of the\nindividual, as language is the knowledge of the individual. Grammars\nand dictionaries are the codes of language, mere abstractions from the\nactual living flux of the creative expression, as the written laws and\ncodes are but the grammars of law, mere abstractions from the actual\nliving flux of political history. Language is not logic, and yet the\nlogical thought cannot realize itself except through language; law\nis not morality, and yet the ethical activity cannot live except by\nincorporating itself in laws and institutions, and in the execution of\nlaws, the concrete, individual life of institutions, that is, in the\njuridical and economic activity.\n\nThus, the end of this exposition of Croce's system, the doctrine of\nlanguage with which the system opens links itself intimately with this\ndoctrine of law, with which it closes. And both as regards language\nand as regards law, the last word is, of necessity, a new implicit\naffirmation of the identity of the philosophical with the historical\nmethod. The true history of a language is not a history of abstract\ngrammatical schemes, but the history of the poetry and literature\nin which that language has realized itself, a history of individual\nexpressions; the true history of law is one with the social and\npolitical history of a people, which is, and cannot be but the history\nof its practical activity in its effective, individual realization,\nthat is, juridical and economic history.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: See _Filosofia della Pratica_, part iii, \"Le Leggi,\" pp.\n321-407.]\n\n\n\n\nPART THIRD PHILOSOPHY AS HISTORY (1911-1921)\n\n\n\n\nI. WORKS AND DAYS\n\n\nA retrospective view of the system--Germs of development--The return to\nhistory--Croce's attitude during the war--Essays on the great poets.\n\n\nTo the reader of the three volumes of the _Filosofia dello Spirito_,\nwhich were published before 1910, the whole of Croce's thought appeared\nas a solidly constructed system, in which the four grades or forms\nof spiritual activity were studied in their intrinsic essence, and\npresented in their relations as completing the cycle of living reality,\nin contrast with that reality which the mind postulates outside its\nliving self, and which the system reduces to a complex practical\nproduct of the mind, a collection of material helps subservient to the\nessential forms of its activity. Knowledge and action, reciprocally\nimplicated, are the substance of reality; and both knowledge and\naction, rising, the first, from the intuition to the concept, the\nsecond, from the economic to the ethical will, attain the universal,\nall-including values which we express by the words Beautiful, True,\nUseful and Good, but only and in so far as they realize themselves\nin the concrete and individual. A universal more universal than that\nwhich is present in the individual act is inexistent, or exists only\nas an impotent abstraction renouncing the concreteness and reality of\nthe individual, and therefore also that true universality which has\nno being outside this action, this thought, this life. The soul of\nthe system, slowly extricating itself from the traces of naturalism\nor intellectualism, which are still visible in the _Estetica_, is the\nlogic of the pure concept, which resolves in the concrete universal the\ndualisms of nature and spirit, of fact and value, of life and thought,\nand, finally, of history and philosophy. But while this logic can be\nseen at work in all the parts of the system, and is, in fact, the form\ntowards which all Croce's thoughts seem to have constantly tended from\nthe time of his earliest philosophical essays, yet, to an attentive\neye, it is possible to discover the successive stages by which it\nactually incorporated itself in the system. In particular, we have been\nable to point to the effects of the later meditations on the philosophy\nof will, on one side, on a more intimate understanding of the pure\nintuition as the lyrical intuition, on the other, on the identification\nof the definition with the individual judgment, and thereby on the\nrelations between history and philosophy. On the whole it can be said\nthat two apparently contrasting directions were at work within the\nsystem itself: one reflecting Croce's mental need for clear and fine\ndistinctions, the other, that deep consciousness of the unity of the\nreal, without which all distinctions tend to solidify themselves into\ndead abstractions.\n\nIf we imagine two students of Croce's philosophy, endowed with\nantagonistic philosophical temperaments, the one a dialectician,\nthe other a mystic, we can easily conceive them as the founders of\ntwo diametrically opposed schools of thought. The first would have\nemphasized the rigorous distinctions, the formal character, the\nintellectual precision of the system; he might have retained the\nidentification of philosophy and history, but to him these words would\nhave stood only for the names of two formal disciplines, and not for\nthe concrete life of the human spirit which is present in them. The\nsecond would have passed lightly over the distinctions, and probably\nconsidered them as partaking of the same unreality which belongs to\nscientific or legal abstractions; and by obliterating the logical\nprocesses without which the mind of man is unable to grasp and to\nexpress itself, he would have taken refuge in an ineffable, though\nnot necessarily silent, contemplation of the underlying unity. This\nhypothesis is not a criticism of Croce's philosophy; it is merely the\nindication of the fact that, when the system appeared as completed,\nnew problems, and therefore new errors or new truths, were bound to\ngrow out of the elements of the system itself. And nobody was more\nconscious of this fact than Croce himself, who concluded his volume on\nthe _Filosofia della Pratica_ by expressly warning his readers of the\ninexhaustibility of thought, which is one with the infinity of reality\nand of life. No philosophical system is final, because life itself\nhas no end. Every system of philosophy, being conditioned by life,\ncan do no more than solve a group of problems historically given, and\nprepare the conditions for new problems and new systems. Of his own\nwork in relation to his readers, he conceived as of nothing more than\nan instrument of work.\n\nIn these last few chapters we shall see Croce himself at work on\nthe new problems generated by his own system, trying \"more rigidly\nto eliminate the last remnants of naturalism, and to put a stronger\naccent on the spiritual unity,\"[1] yet constantly defending his\nconception of the spirit as the unity of distinctions, especially\nagainst the mystical tendencies of the new actual idealism. While\nnever, in the course of his whole life, has he limited his activity to\nmere systematic thinking, during the last eleven years he has shown\na more marked tendency to return from a philosophy, which is all a\nmeditation of the formal problems of history, to those concrete works\nof history, by which he was started on his philosophical career; to\nreturn to them, however, with a mind in which the original uncertainty\nand obscurity has given place to a definite consciousness of the nature\nand purpose of history. The passage from the more philosophical to the\nmore historical stage is marked by the publication of a fourth volume\nof the _Filosofia dello Spirito_, in which, under the title of _Teoria\ne Storia della Storiografia_, he collected a number of essays written\nbetween 1912 and 1913, containing an elaboration of the theory of\nhistory already expounded in the _Logica_. This volume does not form\na new part of the system, but rather the natural conclusion of the\nwhole work, since the problem which it discusses is the one towards\nwhich tended all his former inquiries into the forms of the spirit,\ninto their concrete life which is development and history, and the\nconsciousness of which is historical thought. But before proceeding to\nanalyze this final form of Croce's theory of history, we shall give a\nrapid account of the rest of his intellectual activity from 1910 onward.\n\nAs during the preceding eight years, the _Critica_ continues to this\nday to be the main organ of Croce's work and influence, and in the\nCritica the greatest part of his writings are still published for\nthe first time. The general features of the Critica have remained\npractically unchanged, except that his series of essays on the Italian\nliterature of the last fifty years (which he collected in 1914-15 in\nthe four volumes of _La Letteratura della Nuova Italia_) has been\nfollowed by studies on Italian historiography from the beginning of the\nnineteenth century to our day (since 1914), by essays on some of the\ngreatest European poets (since 1917), by notes on modern Italian and\nforeign literature (since 1917), and by the Frammenti di Etica (since\n1913), containing discussions of particular problems of contemporary\nmorality. But practically all the reviews and essays published in\nthe Critica and elsewhere are now being collected in the edition of\nhis complete works, of which a full list will be found at the end of\nthis volume. In 1912, for the inauguration of the Rice Institute in\nHouston, Texas, he wrote his _Breviario di Estetica_, which we have\npartly utilized in our exposition of his \u00e6sthetic doctrine, and which\nhe reprinted in 1920 in his _Nuovi Saggi di Estetica_, which also\ncontains his most significant philosophical essays of the last four or\nfive years. His _Contributo alla critica di me stesso_ (\"Contribution\nto the Criticism of Myself\") was written in April, 1915, on the eve of\nItaly's entrance into the war, and is the best essay in existence on\nthe development of his thought.\n\nOf Croce's attitude during the war we shall say but a few words. He\nwas one of the very few European philosophers or scholars who did not\ntransform themselves into improvised statesmen, or into passionate\ndefenders of national prejudices and proclaimers of national hatreds.\nDiffering from the Germanized philologist, who was the type prevailing\nin most universities before the war, in that he had not waited for\nthe war to become aware of the many weaknesses and imperfections\nof modern German culture, while on the other hand he had lived for\nyears in true and intimate contact with the great spirits of German\nRomanticism, he resisted with all his power the universal tendency of\nthe time to make of the contingent issues of the war a criterion of\nintellectual truth and of scientific conduct. At the same time, his\ntemper and education reacted violently against the false ideologies of\nthe war, the superstructure of verbal ideals with which on all sides\ncunning statesmen and na\u00efve philosophers attempted to veil the true\nnature of the conflict. Against these, he reasserted his conception\nof the political life and struggles of states as manifestations of\nthe economic, amoral or pre-moral, activity, and of life itself as a\nperpetual struggle, finding its reason and its rest in the struggle\nitself. The theory of the state as justice appeared to him merely as\na theoretical error, the fortune of which lay in the opportunity it\nafforded to give a convenient mask of morality to particular interests,\neither of individuals or of states. The intrinsic morality of the\nwar he conceived as resting on its tragic reality, as reflected in\na severely historical thought, to which it appears as a moment of\nthat historical fate which crushes and destroys states as well as\nindividuals, to create from their ruins always new forms of life.\n\nIt is needless to say that for a time at least Croce shared with\nBertrand Russell and with Romain Rolland, two thinkers in many respects\nvery distant from him, and yet as impervious as he was to the rhetoric\nof the war, the privilege of a vast unpopularity. Looking back now on\nhis writings which were later collected in the volume _Pagine sulla\nguerra_, it is possible to discover among them many attitudes which\nwere justified and useful only as a reaction against the current\nfallacies of the time; and also to realize that the man who speaks to\nus through them is not always and only a pure philosopher, but a man\nwith a given complex of moral and political tastes and passions. But\nthis is, in a way, as it should be; in the same way, between Croce the\nphilosopher of \u00e6sthetics and Croce the critic of poetry, there is a\ndifference which is inherent in the nature of the two different forms\nof intellectual activity; the philosopher is a man of understanding,\nthe critic a man of tastes and passions. In both cases, his ideal\nhas always been to make the critic or the moralist worthy of the\nphilosopher, his particular comprehension of history adequate to his\nconcept of the universal. To say that the equation is never perfect,\nis only another way of saying that every particular historical problem\ncontinually raises new problems of thought, and that Croce's thought\nfinds therefore in itself the motives of its own development, the\nsprings of its own life. Where passion and reason ultimately coincide,\nthe roots of the development are taken away, and death takes the place\nof life.\n\nYet, notwithstanding these limitations, I know of no man whose thought\non the war is on the whole more acceptable to those among us who lived\nthrough the war not as spectators, looking on it as on a vast moral\nabstraction, but as humble actors, in the midst of its human reality. A\nsense of collaboration between one side and the other, of being, here\nas there, employed in a common task, whose meaning was much deeper\nthan any that had been offered to us by the national rhetoricians,--a\ncollaboration which happened to take the aspect of a struggle, and\nimposed duties antagonistic, but of the same nature--was probably the\nmost usual frame of mind among the soldiers who could think; and it\nexisted, subconsciously, even among the unthinking ones, provided that\ntheir duties were of a definite, concrete kind, touched them in the\ndeepest chords of their beings, involved the fundamental issues of life\nand death. To the man who consciously faces death, there is no comfort\nin wilful error; only this realization of an end that transcends all\nparticular ideals, because it is the end of life itself, can be worthy\nof that price. You cannot willingly die for fourteen points any more\nthan for one point, but death which is loathsome in the drama of mere\ncircumstance, however adorned with brilliant rhetoric, is no longer\ndeath but an act of life in the tragedy in which the hero is conscious\nof his fate. There was no war, probably, that was ever more full than\nthe last one of what might be called the material of tragedy; but what\nhave the official celebrators done with it, they who have not feared\nto desecrate, in all our countries, one at least of the concrete,\nindividual tragedies, in order to make of it an empty symbol, to\ntransform an unknown hero into abstract heroism? In some of Croce's\npages, there is a more concrete realization of the ideal tragedy of\nthe war than in any poem or oration that I have seen to this day.\n\nThe last years of the war found Croce at work on some of the greatest\npoetical spirits of modern Europe, Ariosto, Goethe, Corneille,\nShakespeare, bringing to the understanding of their work, to this task\nof concrete history, the deep consciousness of the nature of poetry,\nand of the relations of poetry with life, acquired in twenty years of\nphilosophical meditations. Even his functions as Minister of Public\nEducation during the last two years did not distract him entirely from\nhis studies, and this year of the sixth centenary of Dante's death\nwas celebrated by him with the publication of _La Poesia di Dante_,\nwhich will certainly remain as the most lasting monument raised to the\nmemory of the poet on this occasion. This troubled peace cannot make\nhim deviate from the path of his appointed labour any more than the war\ncould; in peace as in war, his duty is his daily task, here and to-day,\nand his confidence in the morality and usefulness of that work which is\nhis work is as little shaken by the prophets of despair in peace, as\nit was by the messiahs of the promised land who were so loud above the\nturmoil of war. He is probably now noting with a smile that the same\nmen who talked of the war to end all wars, are now very busy preventing\nour civilization from dying away; that is, building a peace in the\nabstract, with programs and words, as they fought a war which was not\nthe war, but a phantasm of their imagination.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: _Contributo_, p. 74.]\n\n\n\n\nII. THE THEORY OF HISTORY\n\n\nTwo meanings of the word history--History as contemporary history--\nHistory and chronicle--The spirit as history--Philology, and\nphilological history--Poetical and rhetorical history--Universal\nhistory--The universality of history: history and philosophy--The\nunity of thought--Philosophy as methodology--The positivity of\nhistory--The humanity of history--Distinctions and divisions--The\nhistory of nature.\n\n\nThere are two meanings to the word history, in English as well as in\nother European languages; on one hand it denotes the actual doing, the\nimmediacy of life, on the other, the thinking that seems to follow\nthe doing, the consciousness of life. In a rough, approximate way, we\nspeak of men who make history, and of other men who think or write\nhistory--though we are all perfectly aware of the fact that we cannot\nmake history without first thinking history, that the action, in other\nwords, follows a judgment of the situation, which is an elementary form\nof historical thought, and is accompanied by its own consciousness,\nwhich is its immediate history. In this sense, the action cannot be\nmaterially severed from its history: the distinction between the two\nis a purely formal and ideal one. And again, the thinking of history,\nin the second meaning of the word, consists in making present to our\nspirit, in re-living, an action or group of actions, which thus\nbecome as actual an experience as any practical doing, a fragment\nof our own life, and, ultimately, the consciousness of our own\nindividual experience. Thus the two meanings which stand out as sharply\ncontrasting when we objectify and solidify them, as an external,\nchronological series of happenings, and as a formal discipline\nattempting to give, in innumerable books, a description and as it were\na verbal duplicate of that series, once we examine them in the light\nof our consciousness, reveal themselves merely as different aspects or\nmoments of the same spiritual process.\n\nCroce's latest writings on history may be puzzling to the average\nreader because this ambiguity cannot be overcome by him unless he is\nwilling to penetrate to the heart of Croce's doctrine, in which the\nword history acquires a more pregnant and fundamental meaning. In\nmany of us there is a tendency to balk at any attempt at filling old\nwords with deeper and more precise connotations; but philosophy is\nnot a matter of words. A new thought will in any case alter the whole\nphysiognomy of our vocabulary, and to stand up for the old meanings\nis as much as to refuse to think, or rather, to refuse to live. For\nhistory as a formal discipline, for the actual writing of history,\nCroce uses the word Historiography; but in his _Teoria e Storia\ndella Storiografia_ (Theory and History of the writing of History),\nhistory still means both the doing and the thinking, life and the\nconsciousness of life, though not in the abstract distinction in which\nthese meanings are generally apprehended. In Croce the distinction is\nalso unity, and there is no doing which is not also a thinking, no life\nwhich is not also the consciousness of life, no consciousness which is\nnot also the consciousness of itself. The ambiguity, some traces of\nwhich could still be seen in the _Logica_, entirely disappears in this\nfourth volume of the system, at least for the reader who has followed\nthe whole development of Croce's thought.\n\nWe call contemporary history the history that is being made, rather\nloosely including in it a more or less extended stretch of time up\nto the actual present. But contemporary history rigorously ought\nto be only history in the actual making, the immediate present and\nthe consciousness of the immediate present. All history, however,\nis contemporary history in this rigorous and precise sense; it is a\ncondition of all history that it should live, be present in the mind\nof the historian; all history springs directly from present life,\nsince only an interest of our present life can induce us to inquire\ninto the past, which, by being made history, is no longer a past but\na present. If, Croce says, \"contemporaneity is not the characteristic\nof one class of histories (as it is held to be, and with good reasons,\nin an empirical classification), but the intrinsic character of all\nhistory, the relation between history and life must be conceived of\nas a relation of unity: not certainly in the sense of an abstract\nidentity, but in that of a synthetic unity, which implies both the\nunity and the distinction of the terms. To speak of a history, of\nwhich we do not possess the documents, will then seem as absurd as\nto speak of the existence of a certain thing, of which we should at\nthe same time affirm that one of the essential conditions for its\nexistence is lacking. A history without relation with the document\nwould be an inverifiable history; and since the reality of history\nlies in this verifiability, and the historical narrative in which it\nrealizes itself is an historical narrative only in so far as it is the\ncritical exposition of the document, a history of that kind, without\nmeaning and without truth, would be inexistent as history. How could\never a history of painting be composed by a man who should not see and\nenjoy the works of which he intends to describe critically the origin\nand development? How, a history of philosophy, without the works, or\nat least the fragments of the works of the philosophers? How, the\nhistory of a feeling or a custom, for instance, of Christian humility\nor of chivalresque honour, without the capacity to re-live, or rather,\nwithout actually re-living those particular states of mind? On the\nother hand, having established the indissoluble connection of life\nand thought in history, the doubts that have been advanced about the\ncertainty and utility of history suddenly and totally disappear, and\nit becomes almost impossible to understand them. How could that ever\nbe uncertain, which is a present product of our spirit? How could a\nknowledge be useless, which solves a problem rising from the womb of\nlife?\"[1]\n\nIf history is thus regarded not as an object but as an activity, not as\nthe irrevocable past but as the living present, the difference between\nhistory and chronicle, which is one of the puzzles of historical\nthought, becomes an important and significant distinction. We are used\nto think that the original form of historical writing is the chronicle,\nand history a later and maturer development. Now if history is the\nconsciousness of a present, it follows that history is contemporary\nwith the event; that, therefore, the most meagre chronicle, in the mind\nof its writer, moved by the actuality of the facts which he records,\nis already a history in the full sense of the word. And the records of\nthe past, whether appearing to us, from a literary point of view, as\nmere chronicles or as true histories, become history again whenever\nthey are apprehended by a new mind as an answer to a present problem,\npartaking of the activity of the mind that thinks them anew. The same\nrecords, on the other hand, are a mere chronicle, an empty narrative,\na truly irrevocable past, whenever they are not re-lived by a living\nmind, either because they do not correspond to any interest of present\nlife, or because the essential conditions for the recreation of that\npast, the documents which enable us to revive within ourselves the\noriginal experience, are irrevocably lost. The true distinction between\nhistory and chronicle is not, therefore, a literary or material one,\nbut a distinction between forms of spiritual activity: history is the\nliving consciousness, and, therefore, an act of thought or knowledge;\nchronicle is the dead record, which we preserve by a mere act of will,\nbecause we know that some day the dead record itself may come back to\nlife, transform itself again, under an impulse rooted not in the past\nbut in the present, into a living thought.\n\n\"These revivals have purely inward motives; and no amount of narratives\nor documents can produce them; on the contrary, it is the inner motive\nthat gathers and brings before itself documents and narratives,\nwhich, without it, would remain dispersed and inert. And it will be\nfor ever impossible to understand the effectual process of historical\nthought, unless one starts from the principle that the spirit itself\nis history, and, in every one of its moments, the maker of history\nand at the same time the result of all foregoing history; so that the\nspirit carries within itself the whole of its history, which in fact\ncoincides with the spirit itself. To forget one aspect of history\nand to remember another is nothing but the rhythm of the life of the\nspirit, which works by determining and individualizing itself, and by\nin-determining and dis-individualizing the preceding determinations\nand individualizations, in order to create new and richer ones. The\nspirit would live over again, so to speak, its history, even without\nthose external objects which we call narratives and documents; but\nthose external objects are instruments that it fashions for itself, and\npreparatory acts that it accomplishes, in order to effect that vital\ninterior evocation, in whose process they resolve themselves. And for\nthis purpose the spirit asserts and jealously preserves the 'memories\nof the past.'\"[2]\n\nThis practical function of the preservation of the dead documents\nand records is the work of the pure scholar, of the erudite, the\narchivist, the arch\u00e6ologist, or what might be termed philology in the\nstrict sense of the word. And it is a legitimate and useful function,\nprovided that it does not pretend to be other than it actually is, and\nto substitute itself for the true process of history, by attempting to\nmake history with the external objects that have been confided to its\ncare. Philological histories are never anything but mere compilations,\nlearned chronicles, useful repertories; and as such, blameless; but\nas histories they lack the living spirit, the creative impulse, which\nalone can transform the document into history. We have only to turn our\nattention to the greatest part of our modern histories of literature,\nwhether written by a single philologist or by a learned society, to\nrealize that that which is philology in them is not history, but\nrepertory; and the rest, which is history, is not philology, but a\nvivid reaction, an act of present life, by which some at least of the\ndocuments of the past (since some philologists are men) have suddenly\nbecome part of the actual experience of the writer, answered his\nspiritual need, stirred that which is still human in his soul. And if\na further confirmation of the philological error is needed, and of the\nfurther errors in which it involves the philological historian, it is\nsufficient to open those same literary histories at the pages in which\nthey attempt to explain the origins of the Renaissance. Because as\nthose writers make history from the sources, so they imagine that life\nitself springs from material sources; and the Renaissance finds its\n_causes_ in the discovery of monuments and documents of the classical\nworld, in the lives and travels of humanists, in the munificence of\npopes and princes. It does not seem to occur to them that monuments\nand manuscripts, which materially had existed in Europe during all the\nso-called Dark and Middle Ages, could not have been discovered unless,\nat a certain moment in the development of European civilization, the\nspirit of the Western nations had not craved those particular helps\nto its own life, because of motives and impulses generated by its own\nactual experience; and that the medi\u00e6val clericus was not less of a\ntraveller than the humanist, and that the economic aspect of life can\nnever be intelligibly conceived as a cause of that life of which it is\nbut a moment. For the philological historian, the Renaissance begins\nbetween the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth\ncentury; but the historian _tout court_ knows that the fundamental\nimpulses and motives by which we empirically ally characterize that\nperiod in the history of the human spirit were already present in the\nItaly of the thirteenth century, and slowly maturing in the other\nEuropean countries long before any of the Italian humanists had come to\nthem as the apostles of a new creed.\n\nIf philological history is not history but pseudo-history, so are also\ntwo other forms of so-called historical thought, poetical history and\nrhetorical history. The first substitutes for the value of history,\nwhich is thought, a purely immediate and sentimental, or \u00e6sthetic\nvalue; it presents itself very often as a reaction to philological\nhistory, but it falls into the opposite error, which is that of putting\nthe imagination in the place of the document. Rhetorical history is\nthat which is animated by practical ends (moralistic, nationalistic,\nor other), and it really consists of two distinct elements, history\nitself, and the particular end towards which the recitation of history\nis directed, converging into a single practical act. Both partake of\nlife much more intensely than philological history; but the life of\nthe one is poetry, that of the other is economic or moral action. They\nare, therefore, legitimate as poetry and as action, and become errors\nonly in so far as they are presented as history. It is important to\nmake this distinction as clear as possible: the actual interest which\nmakes history is not for Croce a sentimental or practical interest,\nbut an interest of thought. In the distinction of the various forms of\nspiritual activity, history is not the sentimental or practical moment,\nbut the moment of ultimate consciousness, the reflection and not either\nthe intuition or the action, the thought which is consciousness of\nlife and not life immediate; neither art nor morality, in a word, but\nphilosophy, if by philosophy, we mean not a formal discipline, but\nall knowledge _sub specie universalis_. The defenders of rhetorical\nhistory have become more frequent during and after the war than they\nwere before it, it being only too natural that in times of exceptional\nstress truth should be made subservient to practical ends, and the man\nof knowledge should be unwittingly transmogrified into a man of action;\nand they insist more than ever on the moral efficacy of history as its\nproper educational value. But \"if by history we mean both that history\nwhich is thought, and those that are poetry, philology or moral will,\nit is clear that 'history' will enter into the educational process not\nunder one only, but under all these forms; though as history proper,\nunder one only, which is not that of moral education, exclusively\nand abstractly considered, but of the education or development of\nthought.\"[3]\n\nThe conception of history as contemporary history, or present thought,\nhelps us to discard that form of historical scepticism, or agnosticism,\nwhich affirms that all we can know of history is but one part, and\na very small part, of the whole. If we should imagine that infinite\nwhole, in its infinite detail, as present for one moment to our mind,\nall we could do, would be instantly to proceed to forget it, in order\nto concentrate our attention on that detail only which answers to\na problem and, therefore, constitutes a living and active history.\nThat whole is not something of which we can affirm the existence at\nany given moment, but the eternal phantasm of the thing in itself,\nthe limiting concept of the infinity of our doing and knowing: a\nnaturalistic construction similar to the external and material reality\nof physical science. It is this naturalistic process that gives birth\nto agnosticism, in history as in science; that is, to the affirmation\nof the impossibility of knowing that which has no reality outside our\nown thought, which has created, or rather posited it, for its own\npurposes. A further consequence is that we must renounce the knowledge\nof universal history, not as a fact, because as such it has never\nexisted, but as a pretence under which, in fact, we are given something\nquite different. The pretence consists (and it will be well to recall\nCroce's own words, written long before some recent attempts, which in\nthose words find their precise valuation) in \"reducing within a single\nframe all the facts of mankind, from its origins on earth to the\npresent day; or rather, since in this way history would not be truly\nuniversal, from the origins of things or from the Creation to the end\nof the world; hence a tendency to fill the abysm of prehistory or of\nthe origins with theological or naturalistic novels, and somehow to\noutline the future, either with revelations or with prophecies, as in\nthe Christian universal history (which extended to the Anti-Christ and\nto the universal judgment), or with forecasts, as in the universal\nhistories of positivism, democraticism, and socialism. Such is the\npretence; but the fact turns out to be different from the intention,\nand what we get is either a more or less heterogeneous chronicle, or\na poetical history expressing some aspiration of the heart, or even a\ntrue history, which is not universal but particular, though embracing\nthe life of many nations and of many epochs; and, more often, in the\nsame literary body we discern these divers elements, one by the side of\nthe other.\"[4]\n\nUniversal history is a utopian ideal similar to those of a universal\nlanguage, or of universal art, or of a law that should be valid for\nall times; the only useful meaning of the word universal when applied\nto history is that of a recommendation to enlarge the sphere of our\nhistorical interests, and to turn from the knowledge of one time and\none people to that of the great facts and currents of history. But a\ndenial of the validity of universal history must not be understood as\nwithdrawing from history the knowledge of the universal. The reader who\nhas followed us through the preceding chapters, and especially through\nour analysis of the historical judgment, knows how the concreteness\nand individuality of history is determined by thought, and therefore\nknown as a universal. History is thought, and, as such, the thought\nof the universal in its concrete and particular determinations. The\nobject of history is never this or that poet, but poetry; not this or\nthat nation or epoch, but culture, civilization, progress, freedom, or\na similar word which denotes the development of the human spirit as a\nwhole, and is therefore a universal. It is of history, thus conceived,\nof contemporary history, as opposed to the naturalistic moment\n(chronicle, or philological history), that Croce asserts the identity\nwith philosophy: history as, the knowledge of the eternal present being\none with the thought of the eternal present, which is philosophy.\nHistory renounces the pretence of an objective universality in the same\nway as philosophy, immanent in and identical with history, abolishes\nthe idea of a universal philosophy: the two negations are but one,\nsince the closed system, the final truth, is as much a cosmological\nnovel as universal history is. \"This tendency was implicit in Hegel's\nphilosophy, but contrasted within it by old prejudices, and wholly\nbetrayed in the execution, so that even that philosophy converted\nitself into a cosmological novel; we can therefore say that that which\nat the beginning of the nineteenth century was a mere presentiment,\nonly at the beginning of the twentieth is transforming itself into a\nfirm consciousness, which defies the fears of the timid, that in this\nway we endanger the knowledge of the universal; maintaining that, on\nthe contrary, in this way only this knowledge is obtained truly and\nfor ever, because in a dynamic mode. History becoming actual history,\nand philosophy becoming historical philosophy, have freed themselves,\none from the dread of not being able to know that which is not known\nonly because either it was or it will be known, and the other, from the\ndespair of never attaining the final truth: that is, both have freed\nthemselves from the phantasm of the 'thing in itself.'\"[5]\n\nThis final affirmation of the unity of human thought, this\nqualification of all thought as at the same time historical and\nphilosophical, is the last answer given by Croce to the problem\nwhich had occupied him for the last twenty years, ever since his\nfirst speculations on history as art. From the consideration of the\nindividual moment which is essential to history, he had slowly raised\nhimself to the contemplation of the pure universal, only to return\nfinally to the individual moment in which only the universal realizes\nitself. And while this answer can be regarded, on the whole, as the\nnatural conclusion of the idealistic movement in philosophy, yet it\ndiffers from Kant in its ultimate repudiation of the _noumenon_, from\nHegel, in that it makes it impossible to build, side by side with a\ndynamic logic, a mythology of the Idea, a philosophy of history and of\nnature, in which the transcendental element, eliminated already from\nthe logic, should find its ultimate refuge. It is to be hoped that\nCroce's critics will not level against him those same criticisms that\nare generally employed against Kant or Hegel, because they would be for\nthe most part ineffectual against a Kantian and Hegelian philosopher\nwho has discarded the whole of Kantian and Hegelian metaphysics.\nFrom this standpoint, Croce is not only the heir of the idealistic,\nbut also of the positivistic or realistic tradition, which he has\nconstantly opposed, not because of its anti-metaphysical character,\nbut because in the external reality of the realist, in the natural or\nhistorical philosophy of the positivist, he is unable to see anything\nbut naturalistic disguises of the old metaphysical entities. A realist\nwho should not in principle refuse to become acquainted with Croce's\nthought, but honestly attempt to understand it, would probably find his\nown realism purified and made more truly realistic by the experience.\n\nA material distinction, as of formal disciplines, between history and\nphilosophy still survives in Croce's theory, philosophy proper being\nconsidered as the categoric or methodological moment of history--a\ndistinction roughly corresponding to the one he made in his logic\nbetween the individual judgment and the definition. But philosophy\nitself is profoundly modified once we fully realize that its historical\ncharacter implies the abandonment of certain features which are\nconstantly associated in our minds with the idea of philosophy, because\nof its early associations with mythology and the positive religions\nions. To these belong the belief in the existence of a fundamental\nproblem of philosophy, which remains the same throughout the history of\nhuman thought, and of which the various philosophies are but successive\napproximations to an answer; the consequent stress laid on the unity\nof the system rather than on the fine and clear distinctions; the\nresearch of an ultimate truth; and finally, the prejudice by which\nthe philosopher is regarded as a Buddha or priest, freed from human\npassions and human illusions, resting in the pure contemplation of\na truth, which, by being tom from the soil of active life that has\nborne it, cannot but wither away and become as empty and unreal as the\nBuddha's own Nirvana frankly professes to be. Metaphysics to Croce is\nthe last incarnation of theology; and the professor of philosophy in\nour universities, with a culture formed exclusively on the books of the\ngreat philosophers of the past, unmoved by the passions and problems\nof life, is but the heir of the medi\u00e6val master of theology. \"A strong\nadvancement of philosophical culture ought to tend towards this result:\nthat all the students of human things, jurists, economists, moralists,\nmen of letters, that is, all the students of historical matters,\nshould become conscious and well-disciplined philosophers; and the\nphilosopher in general, the _purus philosophus_, should no longer find\nplace among the professional specifications of knowledge.\"[6]\n\nWe shall not follow our author in all his developments of the theory\nof history. It suffices to say that these developments are obviously\nbut new presentations, made here and there more precise and more\ncoherent, of the various problems already discussed in the preceding\nvolumes of the _Filosofia dello Spirito_. We shall thus recognise in\nCroce's criticism of the philosophy of history as a special discipline,\ndistinct both from history as such and from a so-called general\nphilosophy, his polemic against transcendence, either metaphysical\nor naturalistic; and in his claim for the positivity of history, his\ntheory of value, by which the only real values are the positive ones,\ncoinciding with the fact, while negative values are but expressions\nof feelings and desires. In the light of this theory, since history\nis obviously concerned with that which is, and not with that which is\nnot, the limits of historical judgment are clearly established, in the\nway in which we saw them established for literary criticism. As the\nliterary critic is never concerned with anything but with expression,\nor art, or beauty, non-expression, non-art, non-beauty being as such\ninexistent, and truly existent only as manifestations of the logical\nor practical activity of man; so the historian at large will never\nmeet negative values, but positive facts only, which assume the aspect\nof ugliness, or error, or immorality, only in the dialectic process of\nreality, in the creation of a higher form of life. His affirmation of\nthe positive fact is sufficient judgment, and it becomes an implicit\nmoral judgment whenever the consciousness of the historian is a moral\nconsciousness, without any need for him to usurp the function of the\nmoralist or of the judge in apportioning praise or blame on the objects\nof his history.\n\nAgainst the humanistic or pragmatic conception of history, which finds\nthe reasons and motives of history in the abstract individual, as\nagainst the opposite view, for which the true history is only that\nof the collectivity, of the institutions, of the human values, Croce\nreasserts his concept of the actuality of the spirit, in regard to\nwhich the individual is as much of an abstraction as the society or\nthe value which does not entirely realize itself in the fact. The\nobject of history is neither Pericles nor Politics, neither Sophocles\nnor Tragedy, neither Plato nor Philosophy; but the universal in the\nindividual, that is, Politics, Tragedy, Philosophy, as Pericles,\nSophocles, and Plato, or Pericles, Sophocles, and Plato as particular\nmoments of Politics, of Tragedy, and of Philosophy.\n\nAs there are no special philosophical sciences, and then a general\nphilosophy, which should be outside or above them, but whenever we\nthink of reality under one of its aspects or distinctions, we think\nof the whole of reality in one of its determinations, so there are no\nspecial histories, the limits of which can be definitely stated, and\nabove them a general history, which would in a new form revive the myth\nof universal history. We have seen how literary history, for instance,\ntends inevitably to become the whole spiritual history of a nation;\nand the same applies to all special histories, whether political or\nmoral, or philosophical. There are divisions of history, according\nto the quality of the objects, to time and space, but such divisions\nare mere empirical classifications, practical instruments or literary\nexpedients; and we can use as the foundation of such divisions even the\nideal distinctions of the fundamental forms of spiritual activity. But\nwhen these distinctions are understood as actual distinctions of the\naspects of the spiritual life, of which we make history, then all the\nother aspects will inevitably be present in the particular distinction,\nonce we truly apprehend it in the fulness of its relations. In this\nsense, history is always special or particular, because it is only in\nthe special and particular that we can grasp the effectual and concrete\nuniversality, the effectual and concrete unity.\n\nFinally, the difference between the history of man and the history of\nnature is not a difference in the object but in the method of history.\nThe whole of reality is spiritual reality, and nature apprehended\nin its concreteness and actuality, if we are able to recreate it\nwithin ourselves, becomes actual, concrete, contemporary history as\nmuch as any part of human history. On the other hand, the application\nof empirical and abstract concepts, the practical manipulation of\nthe data of human history, transforms the history of man into mere\nnatural history. This difference in method we have already analyzed in\nstudying Croce's logic, and we shall only add here that the reader of\nCroce may often be tempted to regard Croce's conception of reality as\nlimited to the human spirit only, and therefore to give a metaphysical\ninterpretation to his exclusion of \"nature.\" The correct interpretation\nis a purely epistemological one, and again and again Croce insists that\nin the whole of reality, which is development or life, man and nature\nare but empirical and abstract distinctions. On the other hand, Croce's\ninterests are certainly more human than natural, and not only in the\nsense in which this is true of every man; in the more precise sense\nalso that the effort to recreate within himself the consciousness of a\nblade of grass, which he advises the historian of nature to perform,\nclearly appeals to him so little, that he may even seem doubtful of its\nsuccess. The accent is continually laid, in Croce's thought, on the\nhistory of man, and on the thought of man; to many of us, our dealings\nwith nature (not the dead nature of Linn\u00e6us, but the living nature of\nVirgil and Shelley) would probably suggest a shifting of the accent\nby which the spirituality of nature, the continuity of the dynamic\nprocess from nature to man would become more emphatically affirmed\nthan it is in any of Croce's writings. We are probably touching here\non one of the possible, and probable, lines of development of Croce's\nphilosophy; which, however, will not become actual until the historical\nproblems of the living nature shall not urge Croce himself, or one of\nhis successors, as powerfully as the problems of human history have\nmoved him. At present, with very rare exceptions, the students of\nthe history of nature are occupied in transforming their historical\nexperience into classes and types and laws; but a time may come when\nfrom the naturalistic constructions we shall be able more frequently\nto recreate the life of which these are but the dead spoils, the\naccumulated vestiges, by the same process by which history re-kindles\nthe old chronicles into new, contemporary life. That such a development\nis implied in Croce's own theory of history can hardly be questioned,\nthough, when realized, it will undoubtedly react on more than one point\nof Croce's logic.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: _Teoria e Storia_, pp. 5-6.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Teoria e Storia_, pp. 15-16.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Teoria e Storia_, pp. 35-6.]\n\n[Footnote 4: _Teoria e Storia_, p. 46.]\n\n[Footnote 5: _Teoria e Storia_, pp. 51-2.]\n\n[Footnote 6: _Teoria e Storia_, p. 145.]\n\n\n\n\nIII. CRITICISM AND HISTORY\n\n\nBeyond the system--The universality of art--The discipline of\nart--Poetry, prose and oratory--Classicism and impressionism--\nPractical personality and poetical personality--The monographic\nmethod in criticism--The reform of \u00e6sthetic history--Criticism as\nphilosophy--Sensibility and intelligence.\n\n\nThe identification of history and philosophy, in the form in which\nwe have expounded it in the preceding chapter, is the turning point\nof Croce's thought; the system which in the first three volumes of\nthe _Filosofia dello Spirito_ had still a somewhat static and rigid\nappearance, is really set to movement, animated as if by a new and\nintenser life, since its implicit dynamism is made explicit in the\nfourth and concluding volume. To Croce himself, the whole of his work\nappears no longer as a system, but as \"a series of systematizations,\"\nand his _Filosofia dello Spirito_, as a series of \"volumes on the\nproblems slowly gathering in his mind since the years of his youth.\"\nNo wonder, therefore, that his later work should contain \"thoughts\nthat break the bars of the so-called system, and give, to a close\nscrutiny, new systems or new 'systematizations,' since always the whole\nmoves with every one of our steps.\" No wonder that he should feel that\nhe will continue to philosophize even if one day he shall abandon\n\"philosophy,\" \"as this is what the unity of philosophy and history\nimplies: that we philosophize whenever we think, and of whatever object\nand in whatever form we may think.\"[1] And in fact, in these last few\nyears, Croce has given many a severe shock to the faithful worshippers\nof his system, sometimes by extending his tolerance, or even his\napproval, to types of speculation apparently remote from his own, but\nin which he recognises, under a radically different aspect, some of\nthe living impulses, and spiritual interests by which his own thought\nis moved; and sometimes by developing new theories, through which\nintellectual positions criticised by him at an earlier stage of his\nwork were re\u00ebstablished as having a new meaning and value, once they\nwere approached from a new and higher standpoint, partly reached by\nmeans of that same critical process which had previously revealed them\nas errors. Croce's conception of the function of error in the history\nof human thought, while making him violently intolerant of actual\nnegative error, leads him to search painstakingly for that element of\ntruth which is the reality of every error; and in this respect too, his\nphilosophical career is as it were roughly divided into two periods,\none of critical dissolution, and the other of critical reconstruction,\nrespectively corresponding to the building up of the system, and to the\nsuccessive liberation from the shackles of the system itself. Croce's\nname will certainly be remembered in the future, if on no other\naccount, as that of the only philosopher who never became the slave\nof his dead thought. His coherence is never of the letter, but of the\nspirit.\n\nThis last phase of Croce's thought offers greater difficulties to the\nexpositor than the preceding ones, partly because it is still in the\nmaking, and therefore lacks the necessary perspective, and partly\nbecause it is embodied not only in purely philosophical essays, but in\nevery page of Croce's historical and critical writings; so that very\noften it would be impossible to give a clear account of it without\nample and minute reference to the underlying historical material.\nThe whole of Croce's thought could indeed be restated through an\nexposition of Croce's historical views, and it would be an alluring\ntask to extract from his writings a kind of outline of the history\nof mankind, considered especially in its \u00e6sthetic and philosophical\ncal manifestations, and indirectly also in its moral and economic\nactivities; but it would take us much beyond the limits which we have\nset to our labour. We shall therefore confine ourselves to examining,\nin this chapter, the latest developments of Croce's \u00e6sthetics,\nespecially in relation with the history of art and poetry; and, in the\nfollowing and concluding one, to considering his theory of truth or of\nthe function of thought, in relation to other types of contemporary\nthought.\n\nWe have followed the evolution, or rather the deepening, of Croce's\nconcept of art as pure intuition, into lyrical intuition, through\nwhich the movement and life which might seem to have been denied to\nthe products of the \u00e6sthetic activity considered as a mere form of\nknowledge, were recognised as intrinsically belonging to them by reason\nof the very nature of that cognitive activity, and of its relations\nwith the practical sphere of the spirit, the states of mind, which can\nbe abstracted as the matter or content of the \u00e6sthetic form. Another\ndifficulty, however, still persisted in Croce's theory, due to the\nsharp distinction between the \u00e6sthetic and the logical activity, which\nreserved to the first the field of individual, to the second that of\nuniversal knowledge--constituting a double-grade relation, in which the\n\u00e6sthetic was implied by the logic activity, but not vice-versa. The\ncorresponding distinction of the two forms of the practical spirit,\nthe economic and the ethic, evolved by Croce at a maturer stage of his\nspeculation, establishes not only a double-grade relation, but also\na reciprocal implication. Croce's essay on _Il carattere di totalit\u00e0\ndella espressione artistica_ (1917) is an attempt at interpreting his\nfirst distinction in the light of the second, thereby recognising the\nuniversal or cosmic character of art. That universality which becomes\nexplicit in the logical judgment is implicit in the intuition, already\nidentified with the category of feeling, with the concrete states of\nmind, on which it imposes its form: \"Since, what is a feeling or a\nstate of mind? is it something that can be detached from the universe\nand developed by itself? have the part and the whole, the individual\nand the cosmos, the finite and the infinite, any reality, one outside\nthe other? One may be inclined to grant that every severance and\nisolation of the two terms of the relation could not be anything\nbut the work of abstraction, for which only there is an abstract\nindividuality and an abstract finite, an abstract unity and an abstract\ninfinite. But the pure intuition, or artistic representation, abhors\nabstraction; or rather it does not even abhor it, since it knows it\nnot, because of its na\u00efve or auroral cognitive character. In it, the\nindividual lives by the life of the whole, and the whole is in the life\nof the individual; and every true artistic representation is itself and\nthe universe, the universe in that individual form, and that individual\nform as the universe. In every accent of a poet, in every creature of\nhis phantasy, there is the whole of human destiny, all the hopes, the\nillusions, the sorrows and the joys, all human greatness and all human\nmisery, the entire drama of reality, which perpetually becomes and\ngrows upon itself, suffering and rejoicing.\"[2]\n\nThis recognition of the implicit universality of the \u00e6sthetic\nexpression does not abolish, as it might seem to a superficial\nobserver, the distinction between \u00e6sthetic and logical knowledge; it\nrather makes it clearer and truer. An imperfect recognition may lead\nto an intellectualistic or mystic theory of art; and intellectualism\nand mysticism in \u00e6sthetics remain for Croce as typical forms of error,\nwhether they are directed towards a confusion between intuition and\njudgment, or towards a symbolical or allegorical interpretation of\nart, or towards a semi-religious theory of art as the revelation of\nthe _Deus absconditus_. But the truth that those errors tried to\nexpress in their imperfect formulas, is finally understood by him to\nbe that character of universality which belongs to every aspect and\nto every fragment of the living reality. Feeling itself, or a state\nof mind, partakes in its actuality of that universal character, but\nwhen expressed in art, it retains its universality only by losing its\npractical nature, and subjecting itself entirely to the form which\nexpresses it. Thus the \u00e6sthetic activity, because bent on realizing\nits own universality, which is the perfection of its form, imposes on\nthe artist a morality and a discipline which cannot be identified with\npractical morality, with the discipline of life. The sincerity of the'\nartist is of another order than that of the practical man, though (we\ncan never repeat it too often) \u00e6sthetic virtues being incommensurable\nwith moral values, his work as an artist does not exempt him from his\nduties as a man.\n\nThis further determination of the concept of expression is used by\nCroce to clarify a distinction which had already been adumbrated\nin the Estetica; the distinction between poetic, intellectual, and\npractical expression, between the word in which the pure intuition\nembodies itself, the word which is a sign or symbol of thought, and\nthe word which is an instrument for the awakening of the emotions, a\npreparation for action. Thus the old categories of poetry, prose, and\noratory reappear, but no longer as criteria of material classification,\nno longer to be identified with classes or genres of expression. They\nbecome synonyms, respectively, of the \u00e6sthetic, the logical, and the\npractical activity; to be used as instruments of literary and artistic\ncriticism, if the critic is willing to renounce all external helps and\nmaterial standards, and to penetrate into the \"individuality of the\nact, where only it is given to him to discern the different spiritual\ndispositions, and what is poetry from what is not poetry. Under the\nsemblance of prose, in a comedy or in a novel, we may find a true and\ndeeply felt lyric; as under that of verse, in a tragedy or in a poem,\nnothing but reflection and oratory.\"[3] It is easy to perceive how this\ndistinction will also react on Croce's theory of language as intuition\nand expression, not by altering its initial position, but by offering\nnew means for the empirical analysis of the facts of language, the\nnature of which is obviously determined by the kind of impulse which\nman obeys in the individual act of expression. By the employment of\nsuch a method, the history of language as \u00e6sthetic expression can be\nqualified and illumined through the consideration of the moments in\nwhich language ceases to be a pure act of \u00e6sthetic creation, and is\nsubordinated, as a symbol or instrument, to the purposes of the logical\nand practical mind.\n\nSimilarly, in the history of poetry or of art, the consideration of\nthe logical and practical moments in the expression will help to\ndefine and isolate that which is purely \u00e6sthetic expression, that is,\npoetry and art. Croce's expressionistic theory, when thus understood,\ndiffers both from other expressionistic theories and from the narrow\ninterpretations of Croce's own theory that have been given by some of\nhis followers and by all his adversaries. It does not, in fact, attempt\nto give an \u00e6sthetic justification of art as the mere passive reception\nof the transient mood; it has no sympathy for that impressionism which\ntransforms the artist into a reed shaken by all winds of circumstance,\nlegitimizing every intrusion of the practical personality in the\n\u00e6sthetic production. It reduces this modern \u00e6sthetics of the immediate\nfeeling to an expression, not of the true spirit of what art and poetry\nis being produced to-day, but of that disease, or passivity, of the\ntimes, the first solemn document of which can be traced in Rousseau's\n_Confessions_. Against it, Croce appeals to the example and the word\nof a Goethe or a Leopardi, who diagnosed the disease in its inception,\nand contrasted the classical naturalness and simplicity of the ancients\nwith the affectation and tumidity of the moderns. But the classicism\nwhich Croce invokes is not a formal and literal ideal, limited to\ncertain models or standards: it is that complete idealization, which\nthe immediate practical data, in all times and climates, will undergo\nat the hands of the true poet and artist, whether he calls himself a\nromanticist or a classicist, an idealist or a realist.\n\nClosely related with this line of thought is Croce's distinction of\nthe practical from the poetical personality of the artist, and of\nbiography from \u00e6sthetic criticism, as we find it in the essay of\n_Alcune massime critiche_, and in the first chapter of his study on\nShakespeare (1919). The knowledge of the facts of an artist's life is\nundoubtedly required for the purposes of biographical or practical\nhistory; but their relation with the \u00e6sthetic personality of the artist\nis not, as it is generally assumed, a relation of cause and effect.\nThey may have an indirect utility for the definition of the \u00e6sthetic\npersonality, and especially for the recognition of that which in the\nworks of art themselves is still purely practical, not yet stamped\nwith the seal of the \u00e6sthetic activity. But in the apprehension of\nart, the critic must prescind from the biographical elements, because\n\"the artist himself has prescinded from them in the act of creation of\nhis work of art, which is a work of art inasmuch as it is the opposite\nof the practical life, and is accomplished by the artist raising\nhimself above the practical plane, abandoning the greatest part of\nhis practical feelings, and transfiguring those even that he seems\nto preserve, because putting them into new relations. The artist, as\nwe say, 'transcends time,' that is, the 'practical time,' and enters\nthe 'ideal time,' where actions do not follow actions, but the eternal\nlives in the present. And he who pretends to explain the ideal time by\nthe practical time, the imaginative creation by the practical action,\nart by biography, unwittingly denies art itself, and reduces it to\na practical business, of the same kind as eating and making love,\nproducing goods or fighting for a political cause.\"[4]\n\nThis concept of the \u00e6sthetic personality, which we find clearly\ndefined in Croce's most recent essays, was the guiding principle\nof all his literary criticism, since the time when he started his\nseries of studies on modern Italian literature. He had inherited\nit from De Sanctis, whose work, in so far as it is \u00e6sthetic and\nnot moral or political history, can be regarded as a collection of\npowerful characterizations of \u00e6sthetic personalities. But, in his\nfirst attempts in literary criticism, Croce employed it tentatively\nin what then appeared to him only as the preparatory stage of his\nwork; beyond the individual characterizations, and once these had\nbeen sufficiently determined, he still thought of the possibility of\na general literary history, in which these should find their place as\nparts of a more complex organism of critical thought. But when he had\ncompleted his task, in a series of remarkable essays, some of which\nwill have fixed for a long time to come the physiognomy of the most\nnotable Italian writers of the last half-century, he perceived that\nhe had practically exhausted the \u00e6sthetic problems which the work of\nthose writers presented to his mind: a general literary history of\nthe period could have been nothing but a new arrangement of the same\nideas and valuations contained in the individual essays. Thus the\nmonographic method .which he had originally adopted for convenience'\nsake, justified itself in the practice of his work, or rather proved\nto be the only legitimate method of literary and general artistic\nhistory. All the vague abstractions with which modern nationalistic or\nsociological histories of art and poetry are crammed, reveal themselves\nultimately as either generalizations of individual characteristics, or\nconcepts borrowed from the economic and moral history of a nation or\npeople, more or less irrelevant to the purposes of \u00e6sthetic criticism.\nThe true unity in the consideration of the history of art cannot be\nreached by the establishment of purely external and material relations\nbetween work and work, between artist and artist, but only by making\none's critical estimate of the individual work or artist sufficiently\nvast and sufficiently deep. \"Contemporaries, related or opposed to the\nindividual poet, his more or less partial and remote forerunners, the\nmoral and intellectual life of his time, and that of the times which\npreceded and prepared it, these and other things are all present (now\nexpressed, now unexpressed) in our spirit, when we reconstruct the\ndialectic of a given artistic personality. Undoubtedly, in considering\na given personality we cannot, in the same act, consider another or\nmany others or all others, each for itself; and psychologists call this\nlack of ubiquity the 'narrowness of the threshold of consciousness,'\nwhile they ought to call it the highest energy of the human spirit,\nwhich sinks itself in the object that in a given moment interests it,\nand does not allow itself under any condition to be diverted from it,\nbecause in the individual it finds all that interests it, and, in a\nword, the Whole.\"[5]\n\nThis is the purport of the essay on _La Riforma della Storia artistica\ne letteraria_ (1917), and this is the method deliberately followed by\nCroce in his recent essays on Ariosto, Goethe, Shakespeare, Corneille\nand Dante, which ought to be studied not only as characterizations of\nthe various poets, of the feeling or tonality which is peculiar to each\nof them and constitutes their \u00e6sthetic personality, but also as sources\nfor the methodology of literary criticism. To his theory Croce brings\na two-fold corroboration, first, from the observation of the fact that\nit coincides with a more and more widespread tendency in both literary\nand artistic history towards the monographic form, the individual\nessay, as the most effectual type of criticism; and second, from the\nanalogy with other forms of history. All history, and not \u00e6sthetic\nhistory only, is essentially monographic; all history is the history\nof a given event or of a given custom or of a given doctrine, and all\nhistory reaches the universal only in and through the individual. The\nonly obstacles to a general acceptation of this view are, on one side,\na persistent inability to distinguish art from the practical and moral\nlife and from philosophy, and on the other, a lack of scientific sense,\nthrough which science is regarded not as critical research, but as a\nmaterial gathering of facts. Prospectuses, handbooks, dictionaries\nand encyclopedias are not the ideal of history: they are instruments\nof which we shall always make use as practical helps for the critical\nresearch; but what is living and real thought in them is but an echo of\nthe actual thinking of individual problems.\n\nAll \u00e6sthetic criticism, and therefore all \u00e6sthetic history, is this\nthinking of logical problems, rooted in the concrete ground of the\nworks of art, which are in their turn solutions of \u00e6sthetic problems.\nFor this the dynamic conception of the human spirit imports that every\none of its acts is a creation, or a doing, in the particular form\nin which the spirit realizes itself; art, a creation, in respect to\nwhich all spiritual antecedents assume the aspect of a given \u00e6sthetic\nproblem; history or philosophy, a creation on the substance of reality\npresenting itself as a logical problem; and the whole sphere of the\ntheoretical spirit, \"a theoretical _doings_ which is the perpetual\nantecedent and the perpetual consequent of the practical doing.\"[6]\nThe mere recreation of the \u00e6sthetic impression given by a work of art\nis not yet criticism; the critic as a mere _artifex additus artifici_\nis not yet a critic, but still an artist. Criticism, like all other\nhistory, is not feeling or intuition, but intelligence and thought.\nEvery history of criticism will therefore ultimately coincide with the\nhistory of \u00e6sthetic theories, with the philosophy of art. We thus reach\nagain, by a new path, the identification of history with philosophy; to\nwhich, in this particular case, the most common objection is that what\nis required in a critic is much more an exquisite \u00e6sthetic sensibility\nthan an elaborate concept of what art is as a category of the human\nmind. But the objection rests on a misunderstanding of the proper\nfunction of criticism. What sensibility can give is but the immediate\napprehension or taste of the work of art, critically dumb in itself;\non the other hand, it is impossible to conceive of a true intelligence\nof art, \"without the conjoined capacity to understand the individual\nworks of art, because philosophy does not develop in the abstract,\nbut is stimulated by the acts of life and imagination, rises for the\npurpose of comprehending them, and understands them by understanding\nitself.\"[7] The mere \u00e6sthetic sensibility makes but a new artist; what\nmakes the critic is his philosophy. Here also, however, as during the\nwhole course of our inquiry, we must not identify philosophy with the\nofficial history of philosophical disciplines, which offers a large\nnumber of theories of \u00e6sthetics only remotely related to the concrete\nworks of art, to the concrete processes of \u00e6sthetic creation, but with\nthe whole history of human thought, with the working out of particular\nproblems successively presented to the intelligence of man by the\nactual developments of poetry and art. The \u00e6sthetic judgment, like\nevery other judgment, is a synthesis of the individual intuition, or\nsubject, and of the universal category, or predicate; and this is but\nanother way of stating the identity of \u00e6sthetic criticism, as of all\nforms of history, with philosophy. The critic must be endowed with a\npower to give new life, within his own mind, to the intuitions of the\nartist, but this is for him but the soil in which his thought must\nspread its roots; it is true that without that power, no criticism\nis possible, but it is equally true that no philosophy of art can\ngrow on any but that same soil. The ultimate test of the validity of\n\u00e6sthetic thought is in its capacity to expand our sphere of \u00e6sthetic\napprehension; and pure \u00e6sthetics is but the methodological moment of\n\u00e6sthetic history or criticism.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: _Contributo_, pp. 79-81.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Nuovi Saggi, di Estetica_, p. 126.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Nuovi Saggi_, p. 142. Also _Conversazioni Critiche_, I,\npp. 58-63.]\n\n[Footnote 4: _Nuovi Saggi_, p. 231.]\n\n[Footnote 5: _Nuovi Saggi_, p. 181.]\n\n[Footnote 6: _L'arte come Creazione_ (1918), in _Nuovi Saggi_, p. 160.]\n\n[Footnote 7: _La Critica Letteraria come Filosofia_ (1918), in _Nuovi\nSaggi_, p. 217.]\n\n\n\n\nIV. VERITAS FILIA TEMPORIS\n\n\n_Quid est veritas?_--Platonism, or transcendental idealism--Naturalism,\nor transcendental realism--The idea of progress--Progress and truth:\nevolutionism--Pragmatism--Croce's new pragmatism--The immanence of\nvalue--The actuality of Truth--Truth as history: the function of error\nand of evil--The foundations of Croce's thought.\n\n\nThere is one problem in the history of human thought, which, however\nconscious we might be of the multiplicity and historical contingency\nof philosophical problems, yet can appear to us as the ultimate or\ncentral one, if only because it is an abstract interrogation describing\nthe attitude of the philosopher, and to which every concrete logical\nresearch, every act of thought, can be reduced. It is Pilate's\nquestion: _Quid est veritas?_ What is truth?\n\nThe question itself has no definite meaning, until it receives from the\nindividual thinker a definite content, which is history or experience,\nand the infinite variety of the answers it has received is due to the\ninfinite variability of that content. But at all times man has been\nurged by a passionate desire to lift his own individual answer from the\nflux of life, to put it as it were over and against that experience\nfrom which it had emerged, not as the truth of his particular problem,\nbut as an abstractly universal truth. It is by violently breaking the\nprocess of thought, and hypostatizing in essence the subject of his\nthought, abstracted from its object, or the object from its subject,\nand both from the creative activity which produces truth, that man has\ncreated, both in philosophy proper and in the minds of the multitude,\na double transcendence, of pure ideas, on one side, of brute matter on\nthe other, from which the two most common meanings of the word truth\nare derived.\n\nThe Platonic idealist, for whom the actual processes of life and\nthought are but shadows and remembrances of the Eternal Ideas in\nthe hyper-uranian space, can be assumed here as the symbol of the\ntranscendental idealist, for whom truth is adequation to an ideal model\nexisting outside the mind. The most disparate types of philosophers\nbelong to this herd, and among them many that commonly go under the\nname of realists, since the idealist who has fixed and objectified\nhis ideas cannot help considering them as real essences, and dealing\nwith them accordingly. The Aristotelian realist, the theologian,\nHegel himself when postulating an original Logos, of which Spirit and\nNature are the temporal explication, all can be gathered together\nin the goodly company of Platonists; and Platonists are to-day both\nthe literal followers of German idealism, and the less barbarous\namong contemporary realists, who are in the habit of attributing\nan independent, absolute existence to logical or mathematical\nabstractions. But neither the ones nor the others seem to be in very\nclose contact with the spirit of the age: what they mean by truth is\nnot what is generally meant by truth to-day, except among those who\nstill cling to the myths in which that form of transcendence expressed\nitself in past ages. The sturdiest, though hardly recognizable,\nsurvivals of Platonism are relics of formalistic logic, still very\nfrequent in contemporary culture, and a belief in what might be called\naverage truth, mechanically extracted from an external and material\nconsensus of opinions. But with this conception of truth, we touch the\nborder line between idealistic and naturalistic transcendentalism.\n\nThe most common attitude of contemporary thought (and the one that is\ntherefore usually designated as common sense, and as such opposed to\nphilosophy) is a naively naturalistic one. But it would be a mistake\nto regard it as a simple and spontaneous attitude, and to identify it,\nfor instance, with the na\u00efve intuition of the artist, with a first\ngrade of knowledge as yet untroubled by logical problems. The artist's\nvision is more distant from naturalism than the philosopher's concept,\nsince common sense, however unreflected and illogical, is in itself\na philosophy, and, though it may sound paradoxical, a transcendental\none. The artist constantly identifies himself with his object; in his\nconsciousness, the distinction between subject and object has not\nyet arisen. But the na\u00efve naturalism of which we are now speaking\nis posterior to the logical judgment, in which that distinction\nfirst appears; and is obtained by keeping separate the two terms of\nthe judgment, each of which exists only in relation to the other,\nand by transforming that relation into a quality of the object. The\nunity thus disrupted is artificially reconstituted by abolishing the\nsubject, that is, by treating the subject itself as merely an object\namong many objects, or as a mere abstract intersection of objects. It\nis with this form of naturalism that realism generally coincides, and\nits abstracting process is the one that has been recently systematized\nby the New Realists. The justification of the naturalistic conception\nof truth, as truth of description, and the motive of its present\npopularity, is that it rests on a method of knowledge which is\nindispensable to the natural and mathematical sciences, and that the\nsciences have come to usurp, in modern times, for reasons which are\nobvious to every one, the place of science. It is not the less true,\nhowever, that wherever that method is applied, it reduces the living\nreality of life and thought to a heap of dead, immovable abstractions.\nThere is no real danger in this as long as the abstractions are taken\nfor what they are, and used as instruments for the purposes of our\ndoing and understanding; but when they are considered as a complete\nequivalent of the living reality, then we become their prisoners, and\nare shut out by them from all possibility of true understanding.\nIt is especially from the misuses of this method in the historical\nand moral sciences, from the degenerations of sociology, psychology,\nand philology, that we must be constantly on guard; lest in the very\nsciences of the human spirit we should miss that which is their true\nobject, the human activity which creates the world of history and the\nvalues of life.\n\nModern thought, at the end of the Renaissance, begins with an attempt\nat eliminating that static conception of truth, in which both Platonism\nand naturalism find the roots of their transcendence. This is the\norigin of the idea of Progress, first established by Bruno, by Bacon,\nby Pascal, by Vico, in the form of a correlation between truth and\ntime. Medi\u00e6val thought had been shackled for centuries by the authority\nof the ancients; the new thinkers invoked the authority of antiquity,\nof old age, and, therefore, of wisdom, not for the distant ages, in\nwhich the world could be said to be still young and inexperienced, but\nfor their own times, in which it was possible to add a perpetually\nnew experience and thought to that which had been bequeathed by the\nthinkers of Greece and Rome. The consequence of this attitude was the\ndiscovery of the immanence of truth in life, the liberation from the\nprinciple of authority (which had been the characteristic medi\u00e6val\nform of transcendence), and a vigorous impulse towards the recognition\nof the dynamic nature of reality, of what an American philosopher\ncalled the continuity of the ideal with the real. The thought that\nwas contained in germ in those early polemics, vaguely and mythically\nin Bruno, and much more consciously in Vico, is substantially that of\nCroce's identification of philosophy with history.\n\nWe do not expect of a new philosophy that it should suddenly, as a\nrevelation or illumination, give us a key to all the problems of\nreality, and resolve, once and forever, the so-called mystery of the\nuniverse. If such a thing should ever happen, it would mean the end of\nlife, which cannot be conceived, in its ultimate essence, otherwise\nthan as a perpetual positing and solution of problems. It must not be\nforgotten that a philosophy is the work of one man, and, therefore,\ncontains only the answers to the problems that are real to him.\nBut if we stop to consider the whole course of thought in the last\ntwo centuries, we shall realize that the idea of Progress, in many\ndifferent and even in contrasting forms, is the one around which all\nour life, theoretical and practical, has centred in modern times. And\nof that idea, Croce's philosophy is the most powerful and coherent\nexpression that has ever appeared. It is only by considering the\nwhole of reality as activity, and the values of reality as coinciding\nwith the forms of that activity, that Progress acquires a definite\nmeaning: a progress which should be a constant approximation towards\na pre\u00ebxistent ideal, or a material process external to ourselves,\nwould be a purely illusory one. In one case, our whole life would tend\ntowards making a duplicate of that which already is--a work, therefore,\nwithout intrinsic worth, and without a real end; in the other, there\nwould be no work at all, no activity, no life.\n\nBut nothing seems more difficult to our mind than to keep together\nthe two ideas of progress and of truth. The natural sciences have\nmade a gallant attempt at assimilating the idea of progress, and at\ntransforming themselves, ultimately, into history. But the static\nconcepts of naturalism resist that assimilation, and scientific\nevolutionism offers but the mechanical outline, the external processes\nof progress, the evolved and not the evolving reality; that is, it\nkeeps its truth at the expense of its progress. This same evolutionism,\nwhen applied to the human sciences, is obviously unable to grasp the\nactuality of spiritual growth and life, and it only reproduces, in\naggravated form, the evils inherent in all naturalistic interpretations\nof the spirit. Bergson's philosophy is a new evolutionism, which\nsucceeds much better than the old one in retaining the idea of\nprogress, and is, therefore, a further step towards the transformation\nof science into history; but what it gains in this respect, it loses\nin relation to its principle of truth, which is mythically represented\nas the lowest form of consciousness, or rather as that which is below\nconsciousness itself.\n\nWhat is vital in Bergson is his criticism of the scientific, or\nnaturalistic, intellect; but the intellect of man has other functions\nbesides those of dissecting and classifying. From a similar beginning,\nthat is, from the economic theory of science, derives another attempt\nat conciliating progress and truth, pragmatism. In pragmatism also, the\ncritical element is more or less sound, but the constructive one is\nweak and arbitrary. Pragmatism does not reject the truth of science,\nbecause of its practical character; on the contrary, having recognized\nthat the foundation of scientific truth is economic, it proceeds\nto deduce all truth from the will, and to verify it in action. The\nresult of this deduction is a closer connection between truth and life\nthan has been ever reached by any system of philosophy; but a merely\napparent one, since truth itself is thus submerged and annulled in the\nimmediacy of practical and passional life. The solution of the problem\nof truth is obtained only by putting truth out of the question at the\nbeginning of the inquiry; as it is dear that for a rigid pragmatist,\nthere is but one truth left, and that is the truth of his theory,\nwhich, however, cannot be verified by the theory itself, since its\nusefulness is, to say the least, very doubtful.\n\nBy some of his adversaries Croce himself has been classed as a\npragmatist. It is no wonder that certain distinctions should escape\nthe attention of men who live to-day as exiles from distant centuries,\nand whose critical sight is, therefore, not clearer then that of an\nowl fluttering in the noonday sun. But the only relation that I\ncan think of between Croce and the pragmatists is that he advocates\nan economic theory not of truth, but of error; that he finds in the\npassions and practical interests of men the root of intellectual\nerror. The problem of the positive relations between life and thought\nhas been treated by him, as we know, in a very different spirit from\nthat of the pragmatists; and in the circle of the human spirit, the\nideal precedence is given by him, not to the practical but to the\ntheoretical. On the other hand, in the actual process of time, all\nforms of human activity are reciprocally conditioned, and under\nthis respect Croce's thought can be called, and has been called by\nhimself, a new pragmatism, but \"of a kind of which pragmatists have\nnever thought, or at least which they have never been able to discern\nfrom the others, and to bring out in full relief. If life conditions\nthought, we have in this fact the clearly established demonstration of\nthe always historically conditioned form of every thought: and not of\nart only, which is always the art of a time, of a soul, of a moment,\nbut of philosophy also, which can solve but the problems that life\nproposes. Every philosophy reflects, and cannot help reflecting, the\npreoccupations, as they are called, of a determined historical moment;\nnot, however, in the quality of its solutions (because in this case it\nwould be a bad philosophy, a partisan or passional philosophy), but in\nthe quality of its problems. And because the problem is historical,\nand the solution eternal, philosophy is at the same time contingent and\neternal, mortal and immortal, temporary and extratemporary.\"[1] Croce's\nconception of truth is his philosophy, and it is not my intention to\nsummarize here what this book presents in what is already so rapid a\nsurvey. I wish only to point again at those doctrines of his, through\nwhich progress and truth are reconciled, without any sacrifice of the\none to the other. Truth is for Croce a universal value or category of\nconsciousness: its absoluteness rests on its character of universality,\nbut, as a universal has no real being outside its concrete actuality,\ntruth is nowhere if not in the individual judgment, that is, in the\nmind that creates it. It is strange that this mode of its manifestation\nshould be considered to impair the quality of truth, while a similar\nobjection would hardly be raised to-day in regard to other forms of\nspiritual activity. That the Beautiful is the value of the concrete,\nhistorical productions of the \u00e6sthetic spirit, or the Good that of the\nconcrete, historically determined moral activity, these are concepts\ncommon to all contemporary thought, though no one, perhaps, has as\nyet expressed them as clearly as Croce. To the artist or to the\nsaint, reality appears at a given moment as an \u00e6sthetic or an ethical\nproblem; the terms of the problem are always particular, contingent,\nhistorical; yet when the artist or the saint impresses on that reality\nthe seal of his own deepest personality, when he creatively reacts to\nit, then the Beautiful and the Good realize themselves, as universal\nvalues, in the individual work of art or of mercy. Our belief in the\nabsoluteness of the \u00e6sthetic or of the moral value is not weakened\nbut strengthened by our inability to fix them in formulas or codes or\nstandards; we see them perpetually transcending the reality in which\nthey express themselves, by the same process by which that reality,\nwhich is all growth and life, transcends itself in the infinite\ncourse of its realization. We cannot think of any number of works\nof art or of mercy as exhausting the categories of the Beautiful or\nof the Good. The identification of these values with the infinite\nseries of their individual expressions fills the soul with a sense of\nreverence and responsibility towards life, that cannot be equalled\nby any faith in static, immovable ideals, by which a term, however\nhigh and remote, is set to the living spirit, no longer recognised\nas the creator of its own \u00e6sthetic and moral world. To the mind that\nhas grasped this relation of the universal to the individual, of the\neternal to the present (and the artist or the saint grasps it in his\nown unphilosophical way, to which his work or his action is witness),\nthe whole of reality, human and natural, appears as linked by a bond of\nspiritual solidarity, moving towards the same end, engaged in the same\nsacred task.\n\nTruth is the value of the logical activity, and therefore it coincides\nwith the positive history of human thought. Its actuality is an\ninfinite progress or development, but not in the sense that the value\nitself may be subject to increase or change from century to century.\nAt no particular point in that history is it possible to point to a\nconversion from error to truth, to a total illumination or revelation.\nEvery single affirmation of truth, from the simplest and humblest\nto the most elaborate and complex, takes possession of the whole of\nreality, in the fulness of its relations; since it is manifestly\nimpossible to affirm the truth of one individual subject, without\nimplicitly determining its position in the universe. Truth, as all\nother values, has no extension; it is incommensurable either with space\nor with time, it is not augmented by accumulation. Degrees in truth,\nand a more and a less, are inconceivable; but each act that affirms\nit contains its whole, since truth itself does not live except in the\nspirit that perpetually creates and recreates it. Truth belongs to the\nthinking mind, that is, to reality as a logical consciousness, as life\nbelongs to the living body. It belongs to us, individually, in relation\nto that universal consciousness, in the mode and measure of our\npartaking of it: which means that however much of it we may conquer,\nhowever constant, laborious, honest, intense our efforts towards\ntruth may be, yet our duty towards it will always remain infinite,\ninexhaustible. The conquered truth is dead in the mind that rests in\nit, that ceases its effort, as life gives place to death in the body\nthat no longer functions.\n\nIn a wider sense, truth belongs to every form of spiritual activity.\nBeauty, utility, goodness are the truths of the artistic, the\npractical, the moral mind. And in the actual life of the spirit, each\nof these values represents all the others in the particular act in\nwhich it realizes itself. This is what Croce means by his circular\nconception of the spirit. And this is why what is said of one value\nseems to apply without any change to the others; why, as we said\nelsewhere, all universals are but one universal. Whether we call this\none Progress or Development, Spirit or Reality, Mind or Nature, we\nknow that our thought is grasping Life itself, not in its abstract\nidentity, but in its infinite actuality, that is, each time, this\nlife, this beauty, this action, this truth. What we aim at is not an\necstatic absorption into the undifferentiated unity, but the finding\nwithin ourselves of a centre of consciousness, capable of introducing\norder and reason into the variegated spectacle of the natural and human\nworld, not from outside and from above, but from its very heart. The\ntruth that we seek is therefore never external to ourselves, but our\nown activity, our own life, our own history.\n\nThis concept of truth as activity and as history, this activistic and\nenergetic philosophy, truly positive in that the course of history\nappears to it as a succession of only positive acts and positive\nvalues, is not however a blind and fatuous optimism. If it is true\nthat nowhere positive error or positive evil can interrupt the process\nof life, that death itself does not end but fulfil it, yet from the\nrelations and implications of the various forms of activity arises\na real dialectic of good and evil, of truth and error, which is the\nspring and motive of life. What to the purely utilitarian conscience\nis the good of now and of to-day, the same conscience, awakened to a\ngreater light, repudiates as evil. The imaginative vision of the poet,\nin which truth expresses itself, sensuous and finite, and yet pregnant\nof its infinity, dissolves like mist in the sun in the clearness\nof the logical concept, and is then restored in its right by the\nhistorical and critical consciousness to which that truth is poetry.\nThe myths and superstitions of the old religions, dead in the letter,\nare revived in the thought itself that seems to destroy them. History\nis but this perpetual cycle of death and resurrection, in which what\nis concrete distinction in the act transforms itself into opposition\nin the process, producing the terms of a new problem and becoming the\nsource of the new creation. Thus the whole method of Croce's philosophy\nreveals itself as directed towards a realistic conception of life, and\nthe distinctions within the concept are not abstract forms, but the\nvery structure of reality.\n\nThe professional philosopher moves always and only in the rarefied\natmosphere of the pure concept. Croce came to philosophy from art and\nfrom economics, and he never lost contact with the elementary forms\nof knowledge and of action. What might be termed as his fundamental\ndiscoveries are his definitions of the \u00e6sthetic and of the economic\nprinciple. On this basis the whole of his thought rests. Without a\nconception of a truth which is sufficient unto itself, and yet is not\nlogical truth, and of a good which has its own justification, and yet\nis not moral good, he would have been compelled to maintain by the side\nof the concepts of truth and of goodness, error and evil as positive\nrealities, or to include the whole of reality within what would have\nbeen truth and goodness in a purely verbal sense. In both cases, he\nwould have been unable to make his philosophy immediately adherent to\nall grades of active consciousness, from the lowest to the highest,\nand thereby to history. Of these discoveries the one that until now\nhas attracted the greatest attention is that of the pure intuition,\nand of art and language as expression. But the establishment of the\neconomic principle, that is of the world of nature, of feeling, of\npassion, as a positive grade of the spiritual process, will probably\nbe counted as Croce's greatest achievement, by those who shall be able\nto look back on his work with an ampler perspective. It is through\nit that his philosophy of the spirit, and in this philosophy, the\nconsciousness of our day, has taken possession of that other world, of\nthat persistent transcendance, which we call nature. In this direction\nlies, undoubtedly, the future course of the thought of an age, to\nwhich, in this afterglow of a great conflagration, all problems seem to\ngather into the one of the subjection to its better and higher self,\nthe utilization for its purer purposes, of its own cumbersome economic\nbody, of its nature and of its passions.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: Filosofia della Pratica, p. 208.]\n\n\n\n\nBIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE\n\n\nCroce's Complete Works form a collection of twenty-eight volumes, in\nfour distinct series, published by Laterza e Figli, of Bari, who are\nalso the publishers of _La Critica_, and of the following collections\ninitiated or directed by Croce: _Scrittori d'Italia, Scrittori\nStranieri, Classici della Filosofia Moderna._\n\nWe give here a full list of the _Opere di Benedetto Croce_, adding to\nthe title of each volume the year of the last available edition, the\nyears of their composition having already been indicated in the text:\n\n_Filosofia dello Spirito_ (\"Philosophy of the Spirit\"):\n\nVol. I, _Estetica_, 1912. (Translated under the tide of \"_\u00c6sthetic_.\")\n\nVol. II, _Logica_, 1917. (Translated under the tide of \"_Logic_.\")\n\nVol. III, _Filosofia della Pratica_, 1915. (Translated under the tide\nof \"_The Philosophy of the Practical: Economics and Ethics._\")\n\nVol. IV, _Teoria e Storia della Storiografia_, 1920. (Translated under\nthe tide of \"_Theory and History of Historiography_\" in England, and\nunder the ride of \"_History: Its Theory and Practice_\" in the United\nStates.)\n\n\nSaggi filosofici (\"_Philosophical Essays_\"):\n\nVol. I, _Problemi di Estetica_, 1910 (\"_Problems of \u00c6sthetics._\")\n\nVol. II, _La Filosofia di Giambattista Fico_, 1911. (Translated under\nthe title of \"_The Philosophy of Vico._\")\n\nVol. III, _Saggio sullo Hegel_, 1913. (\"_Essay on Hegel_,\" followed\nby essays on the history of philosophy; the essay on Hegel translated\nunder the tide of \"What Is Living and What Is Dead in the Philosophy of\nHegel.\")\n\nVol. IV, _Materialismo Storico ed economia marxistica_, 1918.\n(Translated under the title of \"Historical Materialism and Marxian\nEconomics.\")\n\nVol. V, _Nuovi Saggi di Estetica_, 1920. (\"New Essays on \u00c6sthetics\";\ncontains the _Breviario di Estetica_, translated under the title of\n\"The Essence of \u00c6sthetics.\")\n\nVol. VI, _Frammenti di Etica_, 1922. (\"Fragments of Ethics.\")\n\nScritti di Storia letteraria e politica. (\"Writings on Literary and\nPolitical History\"):\n\nVol. I, _Saggi sulla Letteratura italiana del Seicento_, 1911. (\"Essays\non Italian Literature in the Seventeenth Century.\")\n\nVol. II, _La Rivoluzione napoletana del_ 1799, 1912. (\"The Neapolitan\nRevolution of 1799.\")\n\nVols. III-VI, _La Letteratura della nuova Italia_, 1914-15. \"(The\nLiterature of the New Italy.\")\n\nVol. VII, _I Teatri di Napoli_, 1916. (\"The Theatres of Naples.\")\n\nVol. VIII, _La Spagna nella Vita italiana durante la Rinascenza_, 1917.\n(\"Spain in Italian Life during the Renaissance.\")\n\nVols. IX-X, _Conversazioni critiche_, 1918. (\"Critical Conversations.\")\n\nVol. XI, _Storie e leggende napoletane_, 1919. (\"Historical Tales and\nLegends of Naples.\")\n\nVol. XII, Goethe, 1919.\n\nVol. XIII, _Una Famiglia di Patrioti_, 1919. (\"A Family of Patriots\";\nincludes essays on Francesco de Sanctis.)\n\nVol. XIV, _Ariosto, Shakespeare e Corneille_, 1920. (Translated under\nthe title of \"Ariosto, Shakespeare, and Corneille.\")\n\nVols. XV-XVI, _Storia della Storiografia italiana_, 1920. (\"The History\nof Italian Historiography.\")\n\nVol. XVII, _La Poesia di Dante_, 1921. (\"The Poetry of Dante.\")\n\n\n_Scritti varii_. (\"Miscellaneous Writings\"):\n\nVol. I, _Primi Saggi_, 1919. (\"Early Essays.\")\n\nThe following volumes are not included in the Laterza edition of\nCroce's works:\n\n_Cultura e vita morale_, Bari, 1914. (\"Culture and Moral Life.\")\n_Aneddoti e profili settecenteschi_, Palermo, 1914. (\"Anecdotes and\nProfiles of the Eighteenth Century.\")\n\n_Contributo alla critica di me stesso_, Naples, 1918. (\"Contribution\nto a Criticism of Myself\"; one hundred copies printed for private\ndistribution.)\n\n_Curiosit\u00e0 storiche_, Naples, 1920. (\"Historical Curiosities.\")\n\n_Pagine Sparse_, edited by G. Castellano, Naples, 1919-1920.\n(\"Scattered Pages,\" consisting of _Pagine di letteratura e di cultura_,\n2 vols.; _Pagine sulla guerra_; and _Memorie, scritti biografici e\nappunti storici_.)\n\n\nA complete bibliography, cataloguing the whole of Croce's multifarious\nactivity, is outside the scope of this note. The nearest approach to it\ncan be found in G. Castellano's _Introduzione alle opere di B. Croce_,\nBari, 1920, which contains, besides, a full list of translations in\neight languages, a bibliography of the Italian and foreign critical\nliterature on Croce, and a very useful series of abstracts of\ndiscussions and judgments on Croce's work.\n\nBesides articles and essays in American and English magazines and\nreviews, the following works of Croce have been translated into\nEnglish: the four volumes of the _Filosofia dello Spirito_, the essay\non Hegel, the _Essence of \u00c6sthetics_, and the essays on _Ariosto,\nShakespeare, and Corneille_, by Douglas Ainslie; the essay on Vico, by\nR. G. Collingwood, and the essays on Historical Materialism, by C. M.\nMeredith. But the English or American student of Croce ought to rely\nas little as possible on translations; the reading of the Italian text\nwill be found comparatively easy, on the basis of a good acquaintance\nwith Latin or with French. The labour entailed by the surmounting\nof the first difficulties will be largely repaid by the advantages\ngained in coming into direct contact with Croce's thought, and by the\nacquisition of at least a reading knowledge of Italian.\n\nFor the vast critical literature on Croce, scattered through the\nliterary and philosophical reviews of Europe and of America during\nthe last twenty years, we are compelled again to refer the reader to\nCastellano's book. We shall only mark out Croce's own autobiographical\nnotes, the Contributo listed above, which, however, having been printed\nfor private circulation only, is not generally accessible except in\nthe French translation printed in the _Revue de M\u00e9taphysique et de\nMorale_, XXVI, pp. 1-40. The following are the only books which give\na general view of Croce's thought: G. Prezzolini, _Benedetto Croce_,\nNaples, 1909; E. Chiocchetti, _La filosofia di B. Croce_, Florence,\n1915; H. Wildon Carr, _The Philosophy of B. Croce_, London, 1917. The\nfirst is an able, but very cursory sketch; the second examines Croce's\nphilosophy from the standpoint of neoscholasticism; the third is an\nample summary written by a distinguished writer well acquainted with\nthe various currents of modern thought. Each of them ought to be read\nwith a critical and discriminating eye.\n\nIn the English-speaking world, Croce's fame rests emphatically on his\n\u00e6sthetics, and its applications to literary criticism. His influence\non English and American critical thought has already gone much deeper\nthan a mere list of writings on his theories would show; especially in\nEngland, his ideas are, so to speak, in the air, and appear in many\nwriters who have no direct knowledge of his work. The best exposition\nof this phase of his philosophy is to be found in E. F. Carritt's\nbook, _The Theory of Beauty_, 1914, chap. XIV. The writings of A. B.\nWalkley, and of J. E. Spingam, contain the most vigorous prosecution\nof his thought as applied, respectively, to English and to American\nscholarship and criticism.\n\nFor the general history of Italian thought, to which many a reference\nis made in the course of this book, the best helps, besides Croce's\nessay on Vico, and B. Spaventa, _La filosofia italiana_, recently\nreprinted, Bari, 1909, are the historical works of Giovanni Gentile,\nand especially his _Storia della filosofia italiana_, Milano, n.\nd. Gentile is one of the most profound and earnest modern European\nthinkers, and it is desirable that his theoretical works, similar in\ntendency to, but widely divergent in temper from those of Croce, should\nbecome better known to the Anglo-Saxon world. Two of his books, _La\nRiforma dell' Educazione_ and _Teoria generale dello Spirito_, are soon\nto appear in English. Croce's judgment on Gentile's Actual Idealism is\nexpressed in _Una discussione tra filosofi amici_, in _Conversazioni\nCritiche_, II, pp. 67-95. But a complete understanding of the vital\nrelations between the two thinkers can be gathered only through an\nadequate knowledge of both Croce's and Gentile's work.","title":"Benedetto Croce: An Introduction to His Philosophy","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":76447}