{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_54938/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_54938","id":"gutenberg_54938","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/54938","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Economics","Ethics","Will"],"text":"PHILOSOPHY OF THE\n\nPRACTICAL\n\nECONOMIC AND ETHIC\n\nTRANSLATED FROM THE ITALIAN OF\n\n\nBENEDETTO CROCE\n\n\nBY\n\nDOUGLAS AINSLIE\n\nB.A. (OXON.), M.R.A.S.\n\n\nMACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED\n\nST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON\n\n1913\n\n\n\n\nBenedetto Croce's Philosophy of the Spirit, in the English translation\nby Douglas Ainslie, consists of 4 volumes (which can be read separately):\n1. Aesthetic as science of expression and general linguistic. (Second augmented\n   edition. A first ed. is also available at Project Gutenberg.)\n2. Philosophy of the practical: economic and ethic.\n3. Logic as the science of the pure concept.\n4. Theory and history of historiography.\n--Transcriber's note.\n\n\n\n\nNOTE\n\n\nCertain chapters only of the third part of this book were anticipated\nin the study entitled _Reduction of the Philosophy of Law to the\nPhilosophy of Economy,_ read before the Accademia Pontaniana of Naples\nat the sessions of April 21 and May 5, 1907 (_Acts,_ vol. xxxvii.);\nbut I have remodelled them, amplifying certain pages and summarizing\nothers. The concept of economic activity as an autonomous form of the\nspirit, which receives systematic treatment in the second part of the\nbook, was first maintained in certain essays, composed from 1897 to\n1900, and afterwards collected in the volume _Historical Materialism\nand Marxist Economy_ (2nd edition, Palermo, Sandron, 1907).\n\nB. C.\n\nNAPLES,\n\n19_th April_ 1908.\n\n\n\n\nTRANSLATOR'S PREFACE\n\n\n\"A noi sembra che l' opera del Croce sia lo sforzo pi\u00f9 potente che il\npensiero italiano abbia compiuto negli ultimi anni.\"--G. DE RUGGIERO in\n_La Filosofia contemporanea,_ 1912.\n\n\"Il sistema di Benedetto Croce rimane la pi\u00f9 alta conquista del\npensiero contemporaneo.\"--G. NATOLI in _La Voce,_ 19th December 1912.\n\n\nThose acquainted with my translation of Benedetto Croce's _\u00c6sthetic\nas Science of Expression and General Linguistic_ will not need to be\ninformed of the importance of this philosopher's thought, potent in its\ninfluence upon criticism, upon philosophy and upon life, and famous\nthroughout Europe.\n\nIn the Italian, this volume is the third and last of the _Philosophy\nof the Spirit, Logic as Science of the Pure Concept_ coming second in\ndate of publication. But apart from the fact that philosophy is like\na moving circle, which can be entered equally well at any point, I\nhave preferred to place this volume before the _Logic_ in the hands of\nBritish readers. Great Britain has long been a country where moral\nvalues are highly esteemed; we are indeed experts in the practice,\nthough perhaps not in the theory of morality, a lacuna which I believe\nthis book will fill.\n\nIn saying that we are experts in moral practice I do not, of course,\nrefer to the narrow conventional morality, also common with us, which\nso often degenerates into hypocrisy, a legacy of Puritan origin; but\napart from this, there has long existed in many millions of Britons a\nstrong desire to live well, or, as they put it, cleanly and rightly,\nand achieved by many, independent of any close or profound examination\nof the logical foundation of this desire. Theology has for some\ntaken the place of pure thought, while for others, early training\non religious lines has been sufficiently strong to dominate other\ntendencies in practical life. Yet, as a speculative Scotsman, I am\nproud to think that we can claim divided honours with Germany in the\nproduction of Emmanuel Kant (or Cant).\n\nThe latter half of the nineteenth century witnessed with us a great\ndevelopment of materialism in its various forms. The psychological,\nanti-historical speculation contained in the so-called Synthetic\nPhilosophy (really psychology) of Herbert Spencer was but one of the\nmany powerful influences abroad, tending to divert youthful minds\nfrom the true path of knowledge. This writer, indeed, made himself\nnotorious by his attitude of contemptuous intolerance and ignorance\nof the work previously done in connection with subjects which he was\ninvestigating. He accepted little but the evidence of his own senses\nand judgment, as though he were the first philosopher. But time has\nnow taken its revenge, and modern criticism has exposed the Synthetic\nPhilosophy in all its barren and rigid inadequacy and ineffectuality.\nSpencer tries to force Life into a brass bottle of his own making, but\nthe genius will not go into his bottle. The names and writings of J. S.\nMill, of Huxley, and of Bain are, with many others of lesser calibre,\na potent aid to the dissolving influence of Spencer. Thanks to their\nefforts, the spirit of man was lost sight of so completely that I\ncan well remember hearing Kant's great discovery of the synthesis _a\npriori_ described as moonshine, and Kant himself, with his categoric\nimperative, as little better than a Prussian policeman. As for Hegel,\nthe great completer and developer of Kantian thought, his philosophy\nwas generally in even less esteem among the youth; and we find even the\ncontemplative Walter Pater passing him by with a polite apology for\nshrinking from his chilly heights. I do not, of course, mean to suggest\nthat estimable Kantians and Hegelians did not exist here and there\nthroughout the kingdom in late Victorian days (the names of Stirling,\nof Caird, and of Green at once occur to the mind); but they had not\nsufficient genius to make their voices heard above the hubbub of the\nlaboratory. We all believed that the natural scientists had taken the\nmeasure of the universe, could tot it up to a T--and consequently\nturned a deaf ear to other appeals.\n\nElsewhere in Europe Hartmann, Haeckel, and others were busy measuring\nthe imagination and putting fancy into the melting-pot--they offered\nus the chemical equivalent of the wings of Aurora. We believed them,\nbelieved those materialists, those treacherous neo-Kantians, perverters\nof their master's doctrine, who waited for guileless youth with mask\nand rapier at the corner of every thicket. Such as escaped this ambush\nwere indeed fortunate if they shook themselves free of Schopenhauer,\nthe (personally) comfortable philosopher of suicide and despair, and\nfell into the arms of the last and least of the Teutonic giants,\nFriedrich Nietzsche, whose spasmodic paragraphs, full of genius but\noften empty of philosophy, show him to have been far more of a poet\nthan a philosopher. It was indeed a doleful period of transition for\nthose unfortunate enough to have been born into it: we really did\nbelieve that life had little or nothing to offer, or that we were all\nOvermen (a mutually exclusive proposition!), and had only to assert\nourselves in order to prove it.\n\nTo the writings of Pater I have already referred, and of them it may\njustly be said that they are often supremely beautiful, with the\nquality and cadence of great verse, but mostly (save perhaps the volume\non _Plato and Platonism,_ by which he told the present writer that he\nhoped to live) instinct with a profound scepticism, that revelled in\nthe externals of Roman Catholicism, but refrained from crossing the\nthreshold which leads to the penetralia of the creed.\n\nRuskin also we knew, and he too has a beautiful and fresh vein of\npoetry, particularly where free from irrational dogmatism upon Ethic\nand \u00c6sthetic. But we found him far inferior to Pater in depth and\nsuggestiveness, and almost devoid of theoretical capacity. Sesame for\nall its Lilies is no Open Sesame to the secrets of the world. Thus,\nwandering in the obscure forest, it is little to be wondered that we\ndid not anticipate the flood of light to be shed upon us as we crossed\nthe threshold of the twentieth century.\n\nIt was an accident that took me to Naples in 1909, and the accident\nof reading a number of _La Critica,_ as I have described in the\nintroduction to the _\u00c6sthetic,_ that brought me in contact with the\nthought of Benedetto Croce. But it was not only the _\u00c6sthetic,_ it was\nalso the purely critical work of the philosopher that appeared to me at\nonce of so great importance. To read Hegel, for instance, after reading\nCroce's study of him, is a very different experience (at least so I\nfound it) to reading him before so doing.\n\nHegel is an author most deeply stimulative and suggestive, but any\nbeginner is well to take advantage of all possible aid in the difficult\nstudy.\n\nTo bring this thought of Hegel within the focus of the ordinary\nmind has never been an easy task (I know of no one else who has\nsuccessfully accomplished it); and Croce's work, _What is living\nand what is dead of the Philosophy of Hegel,_ as one may render the\nItalian title of the book which I hope to translate, has enormously\naided a just comprehension, both of the qualities and the defects of\nthat philosopher. This work appeared in the Italian not long after the\n_\u00c6sthetic,_ and has had an influence upon the minds of contemporary\nItalians, second only to the _Philosophy of the Spirit._ To clear away\nthe d\u00e9bris of Hegel, his false conception of art and of religion, to\ndemonstrate his erroneous application of his own great discovery of\nthe dialectic to pseudo-concepts, and thus to reveal it in its full\nsplendour, has been one of the most valuable of Croce's inestimable\ncontributions to critical thought.\n\nI shall not pause here to dilate upon the immense achievement of Croce,\nthe youngest of Italian senators, a recognition of his achievement\nby his King and country, but merely mention his numerous historical\nworks, his illuminative study of Vico, which has at last revealed that\nphilosopher as of like intellectual stature to Kant; the immense tonic\nand cultural influence of his review, _La Critica,_ and his general\neditorship of the great collection of _Scrittori d' Italia._ Freed\nat last from that hubbub of the laboratory, from the measures and\nmicroscopes of the natural scientists, excellent in their place, it is\ninteresting to ask if any other contemporary philosopher has made a\ncontribution to ethical theory in any way comparable to the _Philosophy\nof the Practical._ The names of Bergson and of Blondel at once occur to\nthe mind, but the former admits that his complete ideas on ethics are\nnot yet made known, and implies that he may never make them entirely\nknown. The reader of the _Philosophy of the Practical_ will, I think,\nfind that none of Bergson's explanations, \"burdened,\" as he says, with\n\"geometry,\" and as we may say with matter, from the obsession of which\nhe never seems to shake himself altogether free, are comparable in\ndepth or lucidity with the present treatise. The spirit is described by\nBergson as memory, and matter as a succession of images. How does the\none communicate with the other? The formula of the self-creative life\nprocess seems hardly sufficient to explain this, for if with Bergson we\nconceive of life as a torrent, there must be some reason why it should\nflow rather in one channel than in another. But life is supposed to\ncreate and to absorb matter in its progress; and here we seem to have\nentered a vicious circle, for the intuition presupposes, it does not\ncreate its object. As regards the will, too, the Bergsonian theory of\nthe Ego as rarely (sometimes never once in life) fully manifesting\nitself, and our minor actions as under the control of matter, seems\nto lead to a deterministic conception and to be at variance with the\nthesis of the self-creation of life.\n\nAs regards Blondel, the identification of thought and will in the\nphilosophy of action leads him to the position that the infinite is not\nin the universal abstract, but in the single concrete. It is through\nmatter that the divine truth reaches us, and God must pass through\nnature or matter, in order to reach us, and we must effect the contrary\nprocess to reach God. It is a beautiful conception; but, as de Ruggiero\nsuggests, do we not thus return, by a devious and difficult path, to\nthe pre-Hegelian, pre-Kantian, position of religious platonicism?[1]\n\nThis, however, is not the place to discourse at length of other\nphilosophies. What most impresses in the Crocean thought is its\nprofundity, its clarity, and its _completeness,--totus teres atque\nrotundus._ Croce, indeed, alone of the brilliant army of philosophers\nand critics arisen in the new century, has found a complete formula for\nhis thought, complete, that is, at a certain stage; for, as he says,\nthe relative nature of all systems is apparent to all who have studied\nphilosophy. He alone has defined and allocated the activities of the\nhuman spirit; he alone has plumbed and charted its ocean in all its\ndepth and breadth.\n\nA system! The word will sound a mere tinkling of cymbals to many\nstill aground in the abstract superficialities of nineteenth-century\nscepticism; but they are altogether mistaken. To construct a system\nis like building a house: it requires a good architect to build\na good house, and where it is required to build a great palace it\nrequires a great genius to build it successfully. Michael Angelo\nbuilt the Vatican, welding together and condensing the works of many\npredecessors, ruthlessly eliminating what they contained of bad or of\nerroneous: Benedetto Croce has built the Philosophy of the Spirit.\nTo say of either achievement that it will not last for ever, or that\nit will need repair from time to time, is perfectly true; but this\ncriticism applies to all things human; and yet men continue to build\nhouses--for God and for themselves. Croce is the first to admit the\nincompleteness, the lack of finality of all philosophical systems, for\neach one of them deals, as he says, with a certain group of problems\nonly, which present themselves at a definite period of time. The\nsolution of these leads to the posing of new problems, first caught\nsight of by the philosopher as he terminates his labours, to be solved\nby the same or by other thinkers.\n\nAnd here it may be well to state very briefly the basis on which rests\nthe _Philosophy of the Spirit,_ without attempting to do anything more\nthan to give its general outline. The reader should imagine himself\nstanding, like bold Pizarro, on his \"peak of Darien,\" surveying at a\ngreat distance the vast outline of a New World, which yet is as old as\nAsia.\n\nThe Spirit is Reality, it is the whole of Reality, and it has two\nforms: the theoretic and the practical activities. Beyond or outside\nthese _there are no other forms of any kind._ The theoretic activity\nhas two forms, the intuitive and individual, and the intellectual or\nknowledge of the universal: the first of these produces images and is\nknown as _\u00c6sthetic,_ the second concepts and is known as _Logic._ The\nfirst of these activities is altogether independent, self-sufficient,\nautonomous: the second, on the other hand, has need of the first, ere\nit can exist. Their relation is therefore that of double degree. The\npractical activity is the _will,_ which is thought in activity, and\nthis also has two forms, the economic or utilitarian, and the ethical\nor moral, the first autonomous and individual, the second universal,\nand this latter depends upon the first for its existence, in a manner\nanalogous to _Logic_ and to _\u00c6sthetic._\n\nWith the theoretic activity, man understands the universe, with the\npractical, he changes it. There are no grades or degrees of the Spirit\nbeyond these. All other forms are either without activity, or they are\nverbal variants of the above, or they are a mixture of these four in\ndifferent proportions.\n\nThus the Philosophy of the Spirit is divided into _\u00c6sthetic, Logic,\nand Philosophy of the Practical_ (Economic and Ethic). In these it is\ncomplete, and embraces the whole of human activity.\n\nThe discussion of determinism or free will is of course much more\nelaborated here than in the \u00c6sthetic, where exigencies of space\ncompelled the philosopher to offer it in a condensed form. His solution\nthat the will is and must be free, but that it contains two moments,\nthe first conditioned, and that the problem should be first stated in\nterms of the Hegelian dialectic, seems to be the only one consonant\nwith facts. The conclusion that the will is autonomous and that\ntherefore we can _never_ be obliged to do anything against our will may\nseem to be paradoxical, until the overwhelming argument in proof of\nthis has been here carefully studied.\n\nCroce's division of the practical activity into the two grades of\nEconomic and Ethic, to which Kant did not attain and Fichte failed\nfully to perceive, has for the first time rendered comprehensible much\nthat was hitherto obscure in ancient history and contemporary history.\nThe \"merely economic man\" will be recognised by all students of the\n_Philosophy of the Practical,_ where his characteristics are pointed\nout by the philosopher; and a few years hence, when Croce's philosophy\nwill have filtered through fiction and journalism to the level of\nthe general public, the phrase will be as common as is the \"merely\neconomic\" person to-day.\n\nFor indeed, all really new and great discoveries come from the\nphilosophers, gradually filtering down through technical treatises and\nreviews, until they reach the level of prose fiction and of poetry,\nwhich, since the _\u00c6sthetic,_ we know to be one and the same thing with\ndifferent empirical manifestations. In truth, the philosophers alone\ngo deeply enough into the essence of things to reach their roots. Thus\nsome philosophy, generally in an extremely diluted form, becomes part\nof every one's mental furniture and thus the world makes progress and\nthe general level of culture is raised. Thought is democratic in being\nopen to all, aristocratic in being attained only by the few--and that\nis the only true aristocracy: to be on the same level as the best.\n\nAnother discovery of Croce's, set forth in this volume for the first\ntime in all the plenitude of its richness, is the theory of Error.\nThe proof of the practical nature of error, of its necessity, and of\nthe fact that we only err because we will to do so, is a marvel of\nacute and profound analysis. Readers unaccustomed to the dialectic may\nnot at first be prepared to admit the necessary forms of error, that\nerror is not distinct, but opposed to truth and as such its simple\ndialectic negation, and that truth is thought of truth, which develops\nby conquering error, which must always exist in every problem. The full\nunderstanding of the Crocean theory of error throws a flood of light\non all philosophical problems, and has already formed the basis of at\nleast one brilliant study of contemporary philosophy.\n\nTo the reduction of the concept of law to an economic factor, which\ndepends upon the priority and autonomy of Economic in relation to\nEthic, is devoted a considerable portion of the latter part of the\n_Philosophy of the Practical,_ and it is easy to see that an elaborate\ntreatment of this problem was necessary, owing to the confusion as\nto its true nature that has for so long existed in the minds of\nthinkers, owing to their failure to grasp the above distinction. In\nGreat Britain indeed, where precedent counts for so much in law,\nthe ethical element is very often so closely attached as to be\npractically indistinguishable from it, save by the light of the\nCrocean analysis. In the _Logic as Science of the Pure Concept_ will\nbe found much to throw light upon the _Philosophy of the Practical,_\nwhere the foreshortening of certain proofs (due to concentration upon\nother problems) may appear to leave loopholes to objection. Thought\nwill there be found to make use of language for expression, though\nnot itself language; and it will be found useless to seek logic in\nwords, which in themselves are always \u00e6sthetic. For there is a duality\nbetween intuition and concept, which form the two grades or degrees of\ntheoretic knowledge, as described also in the _\u00c6sthetic._ There are\ntwo types of concept, the _pure_ and the _false_ or _pseudo-concept,_\nas Croce calls it. This latter is also divided into two types of\nrepresentation--those that are concrete without being universal (such\nas the cat, the rose), and those that are without a content that can\nbe represented, or universal without being concrete, since they never\nexist in reality (such are the triangle, free motion). The first\nof these are called empirical pseudo-concepts, the second abstract\npseudo-concepts: the first are represented by the natural, the second\nby the mathematical sciences.\n\nOf the _pure concept_ it is predicated that it is ineliminable, for\nwhile the pseudo-concepts in their multiplicity are abolished by\nthought as it proceeds, there will always remain one thought namely,\nthat which thinks their abolition. This concept is opposed to the\npseudo-concepts: it is ultra or omni-representative. I shall content\nmyself with this brief mention of the contents of the _Philosophy of\nthe Practical_ and of the _Logic_ upon which I am now working.\n\nSince the publication of _\u00c6sthetic as Science of Expression and General\nLinguistic,_ there has been some movement in the direction of the study\nof Italian thought and culture, which I advocated in the Introduction\nto that work. But the Alps continue to be a barrier, and the thought of\nFrance and of Germany reaches us, as a rule, far more rapidly than that\nof the home of all the arts and of civilization, as we may call that\nItaly which contains within it the classical Greater Greece. A striking\ninstance of this relatively more rapid distribution of French thought\nis afforded by the celebrated _Lundis_ of Sainte-Beuve, so familiar to\nmany readers; yet a critic, greater in depth than Sainte-Beuve, was\nwriting at the same period--greater in philosophical vision of the\nrelations of things, for the vision of Sainte-Beuve rarely rose above\nthe psychological plane. For one reader acquainted with the _History\nof Italian Literature_ of De Sanctis, a hundred are familiar with the\n_Lundis_ of Sainte-Beuve.\n\nAt the present moment the hegemony of philosophical thought may be\nsaid to be divided between Italy and France, for neither Great Britain\nnor Germany has produced a philosophical mind of the first order.\nThe interest in Continental idealism is becoming yearly more keen,\nsince the publication of Bergson's and of Blondel's treatises, and of\nCroce's _Philosophy of the Spirit._ Mr. Arthur Balfour, being himself\na philosopher, was one of the first to recognise the importance of\nthe latter work, referring to its author in terms of high praise in\nhis oration on Art delivered at Oxford in the Sheldonian Theatre. Mr.\nSaintsbury also has expressed his belief that with the _\u00c6sthetic_ Croce\nhas provided the first instrument for scientific (_i.e._ philosophical,\nnot \"natural\" scientific) criticism of literature. This surely is well,\nand should lead to an era of more careful and less impartial, of more\naccurate because more scientific criticism of our art and poetry.\n\nI trust that a similar service may be rendered to Ethical theory and\npractice by the publication of the present translation, which I believe\nto be rich with great truths of the first importance to humanity,\nhere clearly and explicitly stated for the first time and therefore\n(in Vico's sense of the word) \"created,\" by his equal and compatriot,\nBenedetto Croce.\n\n Then leaning upon the arm of time came Truth, whose radiant face,\n\n Though never so late to the feast she go, hath aye the foremost place.\n\nDOUGLAS AINSLIE.\n\nATHENAEUM CLUB, PALL MALL, _January_ 1913.\n\n\n[1] G. de Ruggiero, _La Filosofia contemporanea,_ Laterza, Bari, 1912.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\nFIRST PART\n\nTHE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY IN GENERAL\n\n\nFIRST SECTION\n\nTHE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY IN ITS RELATIONS\n\n\nI\n\nTHE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY AS A FORM OF THE SPIRIT 3\n\nPractical and theoretic life--Insufficiency of descriptive distinctions\n--Insufficiency of the psychological method in philosophy--Necessity of\nthe philosophical method--Constatation and deduction--Theories which\ndeny the practical form of the spirit--The practical as an unconscious\nfact: critique--Nature and practical activity--Reduction of the\npractical form to the theoretical: critique--The practical as thought\nin action--Recognition of its autonomy.\n\nII\n\nNEGATION OF THE SPIRITUAL FORM OF FEELING 21\n\nThe practical and the so-called third spiritual form: feeling--Various\nmeanings of the word: feeling, a psychological class--Feeling as a\nstate of the spirit--Function of the concept of feeling in the History\nof philosophy: the indeterminate--Feeling as forerunner of the \u00e6sthetic\nform--In Historic: preannouncement of the intuitive element--In\nphilosophical Logic: pre-announcement of the pure concept--Analogous\nfunction in the Philosophy of the practical--Negation of\nfeeling--Deductive exclusion of it.\n\nIII\n\nRELATION OF THE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY WITH THE THEORETICAL 33\n\nPrecedence of the theoretical over the practical--The unity of\nthe spirit and the co-presence of the practical--Critique of\npragmatism--Critique of psychological objections--Nature of theoretic\nprecedence over the practical: historical knowledge--Its continual\nmutability--No other theoretic precedent--Critique of practical\nconcepts and judgments--Posteriority of judgments to the practical\nact--Posteriority of practical concepts--Origin of intellectualistic\nand sentimentalistic doctrines--The concepts of end and means--Critique\nof the end as plan or fixed design--Volition and the unknown--Critique\nof the concept of practical sciences and of a practical Philosophy.\n\nIV\n\nINSEPARABILITY OF ACTION FROM ITS REAL BASE AND PRACTICAL NATURE OF THE\nTHEORETIC ERROR 53\n\nCoincidence of intention and volition--Volition in the abstract\nand in the concrete: critique--Volition thought and real volition:\ncritique--Critique of volition with unknown or ill-known base\n--Illusions in the instances adduced--Impossibility of volition with\nerroneous theoretical base--Forms of the theoretic error and problem\nas to its nature--Distinction between ignorance and error: practical\norigin of latter--Confirmations and proofs--Justification of the\npractical repression of error--Empirical distinctions of errors and the\nphilosophic distinction.\n\nV\n\nIDENTITY OF VOLITION AND ACTION AND DISTINCTION BETWEEN VOLITION AND\nEVENT 73\n\nVolition and action: intuition and expression--Spirit\nand nature--Inexistence of volitions without action and\ninversely--Illusions as to the distinctions between these\nterms--Distinction between action and succession or event--Volition\nand event--Successful and unsuccessful actions: critique--Acting\nand foreseeing: critique--Confirmation of the inderivability of the\nvalue of action from success--Explanation of facts that seem to be at\nvariance.\n\nVI\n\nTHE PRACTICAL JUDGMENT, HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE PRACTICAL 86\n\nPractical taste and judgment--Practical judgment as historical\njudgment--Its Logic--Importance of the practical judgment--Difference\nbetween practical judgment and judgment of event--Progress in action\nand progress in Reality--Precedence of the Philosophy of the practical\nover the practical judgment--Confirmation of the philosophic incapacity\nof the psychological method.\n\nVII\n\nPRACTICAL DESCRIPTION, RULES AND CASUISTIC 103\n\nJustification of the psychological method and of empirical and\ndescriptive disciplines--Practical Description and its literature\n--Extension of practical description--Normative knowledge or\nrules: their nature--Utility of rules--The literature of rules and\nits apparent decadence--Relation between the arts (collections\nof rules) and philosophic doctrines--Casuistic: its nature and\nutility--Jurisprudence as casuistic.\n\nVIII\n\nCRITIQUE OF THE INVASIONS OF PHILOSOPHY INTO PRACTICAL DESCRIPTION AND\nINTO ITS DERIVATIVES 121\n\nFirst form: tendency to generalize--Historical elements that\npersist in the generalizations--Second form: literary union of\nphilosophy and empiria--Third form: attempt to put them in close\nconnection--Science of the practical, and Metaphysic: various\nmeanings--Injurious consequences of the invasions--1st, Dissolution of\nempirical concepts--Examples: war and peace, property and communism,\nand the like--Other examples--Misunderstandings on the part of the\nphilosophers--Historical significance of such questions--2nd, False\ndeduction of the empirical from the philosophic--Affirmations as to\nthe contingent changed into philosophemes--Reasons for the rebellion\nagainst rules--Limits between philosophy and empiria.\n\nIX\n\nHISTORICAL NOTES 144\n\nI. Distinction between history of the practical principle and history\nof liberation from the transcendental--II. Distinction of the practical\nfrom the theoretical--III. Minglings of the Philosophy of the\npractical with Description--Vain attempts at a definition of empirical\nconcepts--Attempts at deduction--IV. Various questions--Practical\nnature of error--Practical taste--V. Doctrines of feeling--The\nWolfians--Jacobi and Schleiermacher--Kant--Hegel--Opponents of the\ndoctrine of the three faculties. Krug--Brentano.\n\n\nSECOND SECTION\n\nTHE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY IN ITS DIALECTIC\n\n\nI\n\nNECESSITY AND FREEDOM IN THE VOLITIONAL ACT 173\n\nThe problem of freedom--Freedom of willing and freedom of action:\ncritique of such distinction--The volitional act, both necessary and\nfree--Comparison with the \u00e6sthetic activity--Critique of determinism\nand arbitrarism--General form of this antithesis: materialism and\nmysticism--Materialistic sophisms of determinism--Mysticism of doctrine\nof free will--Doctrine of necessity-liberty and idealism--Doctrine\nof double causality; of dualism and agnosticism--Its character of\ntransaction and transition.\n\nII\n\nFREEDOM AND ITS OPPOSITE. GOOD AND EVIL 192\n\nFreedom of action as reality of action--Inconceivability of\nthe absolute absence of action--Non-freedom as antithesis and\ncontrariety--Nothingness and arbitrariness of non-liberty--Good as\nfreedom and reality, and evil as its opposite--Critique of abstract\nmonism and of dualism of values--Objections to the irreality of\nevil--Evil in synthesis and out of synthesis--Affirmative judgments\nof evil as negative judgments--Confirmations of the doctrine--The\npoles of feeling (pleasure and pain); and their identity with the\npractical opposites--Doctrine relating to pleasure and happiness:\ncritique--Empirical concepts relating to good and evil--To have to\nbe, ideal, inhibitive, imperative power--Evil, remorse, etc.; good,\nsatisfaction, etc.--Their incapacity for serving as practical\nprinciples--Their character.\n\nIII\n\nTHE VOLITIONAL ACT AND THE PASSIONS 215\n\nThe multiplicity of volitions and the struggle for unity--Multiplicity\nand unity as good and evil--Excluded volitions and passions or\ndesires--Passions and desires as possible volitions--Volition as\nstruggle with the passions--Critique of the freedom of choice--Meaning\nof the so-called precedence of feeling over the volitional\nact--Polipathicism and apathicism--Erroneity of both the opposed\ntheses--Historical and contingent meaning of these--The domination of\nthe passions, and the will.\n\nIV\n\nVOLITIONAL HABITS AND INDIVIDUALITY 229\n\nPassions and states of the soul--Passions understood as volitional\nhabits--Importance and nature of these--Domination of the passions\nin so far as they are volitional habits--Difficulty and reality of\ndominating them--Volitional habits and individuality--Negations of\nindividuality for uniformity and criticism of them--Temperament\nand character--Indifference of temperament--Discovery of one's\nown being--The idea of \"vocation\"--Misunderstanding of the right\nof individuality--Wicked individuality--False doctrines as to the\nconnection between virtues and vices--The universal in the individual,\nand education.\n\nV\n\nDEVELOPMENT AND PROGRESS 246\n\nMultiplicity and unity: development--Becoming as synthesis of\nbeing and not-being--Nature as becoming. Its resolution in the\nSpirit--Optimism and pessimism: critique--Dialectic optimism--Concept\nof cosmic progress--Objections and critique--Individuals and\nHistory--Fate, Fortune, and Providence--The infinity of progress\nand mystery--Confirmation of the impossibility of a Philosophy of\nhistory--Illegitimate transference of the concept of mystery from\nHistory to Philosophy.\n\nVI\n\nTWO EXPLANATIONS RELATING TO HISTORIC AND \u00c6STHETIC 262\n\nRelation between desires and actions; and two problems of Historic\nand \u00c6sthetic--History and art--The concept of existentiality in\nhistory--Its origin in the Philosophy of the practical: action and\nthe existing, desires and the non-existent--History as distinction\nbetween actions and desires, and art as indistinction--Pure fancy and\nimagination--Art as lyrical or representation of feelings--Identity\nof ingenuous reality and feeling--Artists and the will--Actions and\nmyths--Art as pure representation of becoming, and the artistic form of\nthought.\n\nVII\n\nHISTORICAL NOTES 273\n\nI. The problem of freedom--II. The doctrine of evil--III. Will\nand freedom--Conscience and responsibility--IV. The concept of\nduty--Repentance and remorse--The doctrine of the passions--Virtues\nand vices--V. The doctrine of individuality: Schleiermacher--Romantic\ntheories and most modern theories--VI. The concept of development and\nprogress.\n\n\nTHIRD SECTION\n\nUNITY OF THE THEORETICAL AND THE PRACTICAL\n\nDouble result: precedence of the theoretical over the practical, and\nof the practical over the theoretical--Errors of those who maintain\nthe exclusive precedence of the one or the other--Problem of the\nunity of this duality--Not a duality of opposites--Not a duality of\nfinite and infinite--Perfect analogy of the two forms: theoretic and\npractical--Not a parallelism, but a circle--The circle of Reality:\nthought and being, subject and object--Critique of the theories as\nto the primacy of the theoretical or of the practical reason--New\npragmatism: Life conditioning Philosophy--Deductive confirmation of the\ntwo forms, and deductive exclusion of the third (feeling).\n\n\nSECOND PART\n\nTHE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY IN ITS SPECIAL FORMS\n\n\nFIRST SECTION\n\nTHE TWO PRACTICAL FORMS: ECONOMIC AND ETHIC\n\n\nI\n\nDISTINCTION OF THE TWO FORMS IN THE PRACTICAL CONSCIOUSNESS 309\n\nThe utilitarian or economic form, and the moral or ethical\nform--Insufficiency of the descriptive and psychological\ndistinction--Deduction and necessity of integrating it with\ninduction--The two forms as a fact of consciousness--The\neconomic form--The ethical form--Impossibility of eliminating\nthem--Confirmations in fact.\n\nII\n\nCRITIQUE OF THE NEGATIONS OF THE ETHICAL FORM 323\n\nExclusion of materialistic and intellectualistic criticisms--The\ntwo possible negations--The thesis of utilitarianism against the\nexistence of moral acts--Difficulty arising from the presence of\nthese--Attempt to explain them as quantitative distinctions--Criticism\nof it--Attempt to explain them as facts, either extraneous to the\npractical or irrational, and stupid--Associationism and evolutionism.\nCritique--Desperate attempt: theological utilitarianism and mystery.\n\nIII\n\nCRITIQUE OF THE NEGATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC FORM 337\n\nThe thesis of moral abstractionism against the concept of the\nuseful--The useful as means, or as theoretic fact--Technical and\nhypothetical imperatives--Critique: the useful is a practical fact\n--The useful as the egoistic or the immoral--Critique: the useful\nis amoral--The useful as ethical minimum--Critique: the useful\nis premoral--Desperate attempt: the useful as inferior practical\nconscience--Confirmation of the autonomy of the useful.\n\nIV\n\nRELATION BETWEEN ECONOMIC AND ETHICAL FORMS 348\n\nEconomic and ethic as double degree of the practical--Errors\narising from conceiving them as co-ordinated--Disinterested\nactions: critique--Vain polemic conducted with such Supposition\nagainst utilitarianism--Actions morally indifferent, obligatory,\nsupererogatory, etc. Critique--Comparison with the relation between\nart and philosophy--Other erroneous conceptions of modes of\naction--Pleasure and economic activity, happiness and virtue--Pleasure\nand pain and feeling--Coincidence of duty with pleasure--Critique of\nrigorism or asceticism--Relation of happiness and virtue--Critique of\nthe subordination of pleasure to morality--No empire of morality over\nthe forms of the spirit--Non-existence of other practical forms; and\nimpossibility of subdivision of the two established.\n\nV\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMY AND THE SO-CALLED SCIENCE OF ECONOMY 364\n\nProblem of the relations between Philosophy and Science of economy\n--Unreality of the laws and concepts of economic Science--Economic\nScience founded on empirical concepts but not empirical or\ndescriptive--Absoluteness of its laws--Their mathematical\nnature--Its principles and their character of arbitrary postulates\nand definitions--Its utility--Comparison of Economy with Mechanic,\nand reason for its exclusion from ethical, \u00e6sthetic, and logical\nfacts--Errors of philosophism and historicism in Economy--The\ntwo degenerations: extreme abstractism and empiristical\ndisaggregation--Glance at the history of the various directions of\nEconomy--Meaning of the judgment of Hegel as to economic Science.\n\nVI\n\nCRITIQUE OF THE CONFUSIONS BETWEEN ECONOMIC SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF\nECONOMY 382\n\nAdoption of the economic method and formul\u00e6 on the part of\nPhilosophy--Errors that derive from it--1st, Negation of philosophy\nfor economy--2nd, Universal value attributed to empirical concepts.\nExample: free trade and protectionism--3rd, Transformation of the\nfunctions of calculation into reality--The pretended calculus of\npleasures and pains; and doctrines of optimism and pessimism.\n\nVII\n\nHISTORICAL NOTES 391\n\nI. Greek Ethic and its ingenuousness--II. Importance of Christianity\nfor Ethic--The three tendencies that result from it: utilitarianism,\nrigorism, and psychologism--Hobbes, Spinoza--English Ethic--Idealistic\nPhilosophy--III. E. Kant and his affirmation of the ethical\nprinciple--Contradictions of Kant as to the concept of the useful,\nof prudence, of happiness, etc.--Errors that derive from it in\nhis Ethic--IV. Points for a Philosophy of Economy--The inferior\nappetitive faculty--Problem of politics and Machiavellism--Doctrine\nof the passions--Hegel and the concept of the useful--Fichte and the\nelaboration of the Kantian Ethic--V. The problem of the useful and of\nmorality in the thinkers of the nineteenth century--Extrinsic union\nof Ethic and of economic Science, from antiquity to the nineteenth\ncentury--Philosophic questions arising from a more intimate contact\nbetween the two--VII. Theories of the hedonistic calculus: from\nMaupertuis to Hartmann.\n\n\nSECOND SECTION\n\nTHE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE\n\n\nI\n\nCRITIQUE OF MATERIALISTIC AND OF FORMALISTIC ETHIC 425\n\nVarious meanings of \"formal\" and \"material\"--The ethical principle\nas formal (universal) and not material (contingent)--Reduction\nof material Ethic to utilitarian Ethic--Expulsion of material\nprinciples--Benevolence, love, altruism, etc.; and critique of\nthem--Social organism, State, interest of the species, etc. Critique\nof them--Material religious principles. Critique of them--\"Formal\" as\nstatement of a merely logical demand--Critique of a formal Ethic with\nthis meaning: tautologism--Tautological principles: ideal, chief good,\nduty, etc. Critique of them--Tautological significance of certain\nformul\u00e6, material in appearance--Conversion of tautological Ethic into\nmaterial and utilitarian Ethic--In what sense Ethic should be formal;\nand in what other sense material.\n\n\nII\n\nTHE ETHICAL FORM AS ACTUALIZATION OF THE SPIRIT IN UNIVERSAL 440\n\nTautological Ethic, and its partial or discontinuous connection with\nPhilosophy--Rejection of both these conceptions--The ethical form\nas volition of the universal--The universal as the Spirit (Reality,\nLiberty, etc.)--Moral actions as volitions of the Spirit--Critique of\nantimoralism--Confused tendency of tautological, material, religious\nformul\u00e6 in relation to the Ethic of the Spirit--The Ethic of the Spirit\nand religious Ethic.\n\nIII\n\nHISTORICAL NOTES 452\n\nI. Merit of the Kantian Ethic--The predecessors of Kant--Defect of\nthat Ethic: agnosticism--Critique of Hegel and of others--Kant and the\nconcept of freedom--Fichte and Hegel--Ethic in the nineteenth century.\n\n\nTHIRD PART\n\nLAWS\n\n\nI\n\nLAWS AS PRODUCTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL 465\n\nDefinition of law--Philosophical and empirical concept of society--Laws\nas individual product: programmes of individual life--Exclusion of\nthe character of constriction: critique of this concept--Identical\ncharacters of individual and social laws--Individual laws as the sole\nreal in ultimate analysis--Critique of the division of laws into\njudicial and social, and into the sub-classes of these. Empiricity of\nevery division of laws--Extension of the concept of laws.\n\nII\n\nTHE CONSTITUTIVE ELEMENTS OF LAWS. CRITIQUE OF PERMISSIVE LAWS AND OF\nNATURAL LAW 481\n\nThe volitional character and the character of class--Distinction of\nlaws from the so-called laws of nature--Implication of the second\nin the first--Distinction of laws from practical principles--Laws\nand single acts--Identity of imperative, prohibitive, and permissive\nlaws--Permissive character of every law and impermissive character\nof every principle--Changeability of laws--Empirical considerations\nas to modes of change--Critique of the eternal Code or natural\nright--Natural right as the new right--Natural right as Philosophy\nof the practical--Critique of natural right--Theory of natural right\npersisting in judicial judgments and problems.\n\nIII\n\nUNREALITY OF LAW AND REALITY OF EXECUTION. FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE\nPRACTICAL SPIRIT 497\n\nLaw as abstract and unreal volition--Ineffectually of laws\nand effectuality of practical principles--Exemplificatory\nexplanation--Doctrines against the utility of laws--Their\nunmaintainability--Unmaintainability of confutations of them--Empirical\nmeaning of these controversies--Necessity of laws--Laws as preparation\nfor action--Analogy between practical and theoretical Spirit: practical\nlaws and empirical concepts--The promotion of order in reality and in\nrepresentation--Origin of the concept of plan or design.\n\nIV\n\nCONFUSION BETWEEN LAWS AND PRACTICAL PRINCIPLES. CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL\nLEGALISM AND OF JESUITIC MORALITY 511\n\nTransformation of principles into practical laws: legalism--Genesis\nof the concept of the practically licit and indifferent--Its\nconsequence: the arbitrary--Ethical legalism as a simple special case\nof the practical--Critique of the practically indifferent--Contests\nof rigorists and of latitudinarians and their common error--Jesuitic\nmorality as doctrine of fraud on moral law--Concept of legal\nfraud--Absurdity of fraud against oneself and against the\nmoral conscience--Jesuitic morality not explainable by mere\nlegalism--Jesuitic morality as alliance of legalism with theological\nutilitarianism--Distinction between Jesuitic practice and doctrine.\n\nV\n\nJUDICIAL ACTIVITY AS GENERICALLY PRACTICAL ACTIVITY (ECONOMIC) 526\n\nLegislative activity as generically practical--Vanity of disputes as to\nthe character of institutions, whether economic or ethical: punishment,\nmarriage, State, etc.--Legislative activity as economic--Judicial\nactivity: its economic character: its consequent identity with economic\nactivity--Non-recognition of economic form, and meaning of the problem\nas to distinction between morality and rights--Theories of co-action\nand of exteriority, as distinctive characteristics: critique of\nthem--Moralistic theories of rights: critique--Duality of positive and\nideal rights, historical and natural rights, etc.; absurd attempts at\nunification and co-ordination--Value of all these attempts as confused\nglimpse of amoral character of rights--Confirmations of this character\nin ingenuous conscience--Comparison between rights and language.\nGrammar and codes--Logic and language; morality and rights--History\nof language as literary and artistic history--History of rights as\npolitical and social history.\n\nVI\n\nHISTORICAL NOTES 543\n\nI. Distinction between morality and rights, and its importance\nfor the history of the economic principle--Indistinction\nlasting till Tomasio--II. Tomasio and followers--Kant and\nFichte--Hegel--Herbart and Schopenhauer--Rosmini and others--III.\nStahl, Ahrens, Trendelenburg--Utilitarians--IV. Recent writers\nof treatises--Strident contradictions. Stammler--V. Value of\nlaw--In antiquity--Diderot--Romanticism--Jacobi--Hegel--Recent\ndoctrines--VI. Natural rights and their dissolution--Historical\nschool of rights--Comparison between rights and language--VII.\nConcept of law, and studies of comparative rights and of the general\nDoctrine of law--VIII. Legalism and moral casuistic--Probabilitism\nand Jesuitic morality--Critique of the concept of the\nlicit--Fichte--Schleiermacher--Rosmini.\n\n\nCONCLUSION 586\n\nThe Philosophy of the Spirit as the whole of Philosophy--Correspondence\nbetween Logic and System--Dissatisfaction at the end of every system\nand its irrational motive--Rational motive: inexhaustibility of Life\nand of Philosophy.\n\n\n\n\nTRANSLATOR'S NOTE\n\nThis translation of Benedetto Croce's _Philosophy of the Practical_\n(Economic and Ethic) is complete.\n\n\n\n\nFIRST PART\n\n\nTHE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY IN GENERAL\n\n\n\n\nFIRST SECTION\n\n\nTHE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY IN ITS RELATIONS\n\n\n\n\nI\n\n\nTHE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY AS A FORM OF THE SPIRIT\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Practical and theoretic life._]\n\nA glance at the life that surrounds us would seem more than sufficient\nto establish, without the necessity of special demonstration, the\nexistence of a circle of practical activity side by side with the\ntheoretical. We see in life men of thought and men of action, men of\ncontemplation and of action, materially distinct, as it were, from one\nanother: here, lofty brows and slow dreamy eyes; there, narrow brows,\neyes vigilant and mobile; poets and philosophers on the one side; on\nthe other, captains and soldiers of industry, commerce, politics, the\narmy, and the church. Their work seems to differ as do the men. While\nwe are intent upon some discovery just announced, in chemistry or\nin physic, or upon some philosophy that comes to shake old beliefs,\nupon a drama or a romance that revives an artist's dream, we are\nsuddenly interrupted and our attention is called to spectacles of an\naltogether different nature, such as a war between two states, fought\nwith cannon or with custom-house tariffs; or to a colossal strike, in\nwhich thousands upon thousands of workmen make the rest of society feel\nthe power of their numbers and of their strength, and the importance\nof their work in the general total; or a potent organization which\ncollects and binds together the forces of conservative resistance,\nemploying interests and passions, hopes and fears, vices and virtues,\nas the painter his colours, or the poet his words, sometimes making\nlike them a masterpiece, but of a practical nature. The man of action\nis from time to time assailed as it were with nausea at his orgies of\nvolitional effort and eyes with envy the artist or the man of science\nin the same way as polite society used to look upon the monks who had\nknown how to select the best and most tranquil lot in life. But as a\ngeneral rule they do not go beyond this fleeting feeling, or if they\ndo resolve to cease their business on the Ides, they return to it on\nthe Kalends. But the contemplative man in his turn also sometimes\nexperiences this same nausea and this same aspiration; he seems to\nhimself to be idle where so many are working and bleeding, and he cries\nto the combatants: \"Arms, give me arms,\"[1] for he too would be a miner\nwith the miners, would navigate with the navigators, be an emperor\namong the kings of coal. However, as a general rule, he does not make\nmore out of this than a song or a book. Nobody, whatever his efforts,\ncan issue from his own circle. It would seem that nature supplies men\nmade precisely for the one or for the other form of activity, in the\nsame way as she makes males and females for the preservation of the\nspecies.\n\n[Sidenote: _Insufficiency of descriptive distinctions._]\n\nBut this mode of existence with which the practical activity manifests\nitself in life, as though physically limited, has no certainty, when\nseparated from the theoretical life, nor is it, as might be believed,\na fact that imposes itself. Facts never impose themselves, save\nmetaphorically: it is only our thought which _imposes_ them upon\n_itself,_ when it has criticized them and has recognized their reality.\nThat existence and that distinction, which seem so obvious that one\ncan touch them with one's hand, are at bottom nothing but the result\nof primary and superficial philosophic reflection, which posits as\nessentially distinct that which is so only at a first glance and in\nthe mass. Indeed, if we continue to meditate with the same method and\nassumptions as in the first instance, we shall find that those very\ndistinctions, which reflection had established, are by reflection\nannulled. It is not true that men are practical or theoretical.\n\nThe theoretical man is also practical; he lives, he wills, he acts\nlike all the others. The so-called practical man is also theoretical;\nhe contemplates, believes, thinks, reads, writes, loves music and the\nother arts. Those works that had been looked upon as inspired entirely\nby the practical spirit, when examined more closely, are found to\nbe exceedingly complex and rich in theoretic elements--meditations,\nreasonings, historical research, ideal contemplations. Those works\non the other hand that had been assumed to be manifestations of the\npurely artistic or philosophic spirit, are also products of the will,\nfor without the will nothing can be done; the artist cannot prepare\nhimself for his masterpiece for years and years, nor the thinker bring\nto completion his system. Was not the battle of Austerlitz also a\nwork of thought and the _Divine Comedy_ also a work of will? From\nsuch reflections as these, which might be easily multiplied, arises\na mistrust, not only of the statement first made, but also of the\ninquiry that has been undertaken. It is as though one had filled a\nvessel with much difficulty and were then obliged to empty it anew\nwith a like effort, to find oneself again facing the vessel, empty as\nbefore. Or one adheres to the conclusion that neither the theoretic\nnor the practical exists as distinct, but that they are one single\nfact, which is one or other of the two, or a third to be determined,\nmanifesting itself concretely in infinite shades and gradations, which\nwe arbitrarily attempt to reduce to one or more classes, separating and\ndenominating them as distinct in a not less arbitrary manner.\n\n[Sidenote: _Insufficiency of the psychological method in philosophy._]\n\nBy describing this process of ordinary reflection, in relation to\nreality and by demonstrating its philosophic impotence, has at the\nsame time been demonstrated the nature and the _impotence_ of the\n_psychological method,_ applied to philosophical problems. For\npsychological philosophy, though contained in ponderous treatises\nand in solemn academical lectures, does not really achieve more than\nordinary reflection, or rather, is nothing but ordinary reflection.\nHaving classified the images of the infinite manifestations of human\nactivity, placing, for instance, will and action side, by side with\nthought and imagination, it looks upon this classification as reality.\nBut classes are classes and not philosophical distinctions: whoever\ntakes them too seriously, and understands them in this second sense,\nfinds himself eventually obliged to admit that they possess no reality.\nThereupon he declares with shouts and protestations the non-existence\nof the _faculties of the soul,_ or rather their existence as a mere\nmental artifice, without relation to reality. He may do more than this\nand throw overboard the criterion or distinction itself, together with\nthose false distinctions, proclaiming that all spiritual manifestations\nare reducible to a single element. This element turns out in the end\nto be precisely one of the rejected classes; hence the attempt to show\nthat facts of volition are nothing but facts of _representation,_ or\nthat those of representation are nothing but facts of _volition,_ or\nthat both are nothing but facts of _feeling,_ and so on.\n\n[Sidenote: _Necessity of the philosophical method._]\n\nWe must then remain perfectly indifferent to the affirmations or\nnegations of this psychological philosophy. If it affirm the existence\nof the practical activity, we must not put faith in it until we have\nrecognized its existence by the philosophical method, and equally\nso in case it should deny it. The philosophical method demands\ncomplete abstraction from empirical data and from their classes, and\na withdrawal into the recesses of the consciousness, in order to fix\nupon it alone the eye of the mind. It has been affirmed that by this\nmethod the individual consciousness is made the type and measure of\nuniversal reality, and it has been suggested, with a view to obviate\nthis restriction and danger, that we should extend observations, so\nas to include the soul of other individuals, of the present and of\nthe past, of our own and of other civilizations, thus completing (in\nthe accustomed phrase) the psychological with the historical and the\nethnographical methods. But there is no need to fear, because the\nconsciousness which is the object of the philosophical inquiry is not\nthat of the individual as individual, but the universal consciousness,\nwhich is in every individual the basis of his individual consciousness\nand of that of other individuals. The philosopher who withdraws into\nhimself is not seeking his own empirical self: Plato did not seek the\nson of Aristo and of Perictione, nor Baruch Spinoza the poor sickly\nJew; they sought that Plato and that Spinoza, who are not Plato or\nSpinoza, but man, the spirit, universal being. The remedy proposed\nwill therefore seem not only useless, but actually harmful; for in\nan inquiry whose very object is to surpass the empirical itself, is\noffered the aid of a multiplicity of selves, thus increasing the tumult\nand the confusion, where there should be peace and silence; offering,\nin exchange for the universal that was sought, something worse than the\nindividual, namely, the _general,_ which is an arbitrary complex of\nmutilated individualities.\n\n[Sidenote: _Constatation and deduction._]\n\nIt may seem, however, that the result of such an inquiry as to the form\nand the universality of consciousness would merely possess the value of\na statement of fact, not different from any other statement, as when\nwe say, for instance, that the weather is rainy, or that Tizio has\nmarried. If these two last facts be indubitable, because well observed,\nin like manner indubitable, because likewise well observed, will be\nan affirmation concerning the universal consciousness. And since both\naffirmations are true, there is certainly no difference between them,\nor between truth and truth, considered as such. But since single and\ncontingent facts, like the two adduced in the example, are single\nand contingent, precisely because they have not their own reason in\nthemselves, and because the universal is the universal, precisely\nbecause it is a sufficient reason to itself, it clearly results that\nwe cannot assume that truth has been definitely established from the\nuniversal standpoint of consciousness, save when the reason for this\nalso has been seen, that is to say until that aspect has been simply\nenunciated and asserted, as in the case of a single fact. To affirm\nthe existence of the practical form of activity, side by side with the\ntheoretical, means to deduce the one from the other, and both from\nthe unity of the spirit and of the real. We do not intend to withdraw\nourselves from this duty and exigency; and if we limit ourselves\nhere at the beginning to the assertion of its existence and to the\ndemonstration that the arguments brought against it are unfounded, we\ndo so for didascalic reasons, certain that in due course we shall be\nable to free this assertion from what it may contain of provisional,\nthat is to say, from the character itself of assertion.\n\n[Sidenote: _Theories which deny the practical form of the spirit._]\n\nThe doctrines which deny the practical form of the spirit are and\ncannot but be of two fundamental kinds, according to the double\npossibility offered by the proposition itself which they propose to\nrefute. The first doctrine affirms that _the practical form is not\nspiritual activity,_ the second that although it be spiritual activity,\n_yet it is not in any way distinguishable from the already recognized\ntheoretic form of the spirit._ The second, so to speak, denies to it\nspecific, the first generic character.\n\n[Sidenote: _The practical as a fact of unconsciousness._]\n\nThose who maintain the first of these theses say:--We are unconscious\nof the will at the moment of willing and during its real development.\nThis consciousness is only attained after one has willed, that is to\nsay, after the volitional act has been developed. Even then, we are not\nconscious of the will itself, but of our representation of the will.\nTherefore the will, that is to say the practical activity, is not an\nactivity of the spirit. Since it is unconscious, it is nature and not\nspirit. The theoretic activity which follows it is alone spiritual.\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique._]\n\nWere we, however, to allow this argument to pass, the result would be\nthat none of the activities of the spirit would belong to the spirit,\nthat they would all be unconscious and all, therefore, nature. Indeed,\nthe activity of the artist, at the moment when he is really so, that\nis to say in what is called the moment of artistic creation, is not\nconscious of itself: it becomes conscious only afterwards, either in\nthe mind of the critic or of the artist who becomes critic of himself.\nAnd it has also often been said of the activity of the artist, that it\nis unconscious; that it is a natural force, or madness, fury, divine\ninspiration. _Est Deus in nobis_; and we only become conscious of the\ndivinity that burns and agitates us when the agitation is ceasing and\ncooling begun. But what of the activity of the philosopher? It may\nseem strange, but it is precisely the same with the philosopher. At\nthe moment in which he is philosophizing, he is unconscious of his\nwork; in him is God, or nature; he does not reflect upon his thought,\nbut thinks; or rather the thing thinks itself in him, as a microbe\nliving in us nourishes itself, reproduces itself and dies: so that\nsometimes the philosopher has also seemed to be seized with madness.\nThe consciousness of his philosophy is not in him at that moment; but\nit is in the critic and in the historian, or indeed in himself a moment\nafter, in so far as he is critic and historian of himself. And will the\ncritic or the historian at least be conscious? No, he will not be so\neither, because he who will afterwards criticize the historico-critical\nwork is conscious of it, or he himself, in so far as he criticizes\nhimself, and by objectifying himself occupies a place in the history of\ncriticism and of historiography. In short, we should never be conscious\nin any form of the spiritual activity.\n\nBut this negation is founded on a false idea of consciousness:\nspontaneous is confused with reflex consciousness, or that which is\nintrinsic to one activity with that which is intrinsic to another,\nwhich surpasses the first and makes of it its object. In such a\nsense we can certainly not be conscious of the will, save in the\nrepresentation which follows it, as we are not conscious of a poem,\nsave at the moment of criticizing it. But there is also consciousness\nin the act itself of him who reads or composes a poem, and he \"is\nconscious\" (there is no other expression) of its beauty and of its\nugliness, of how the poem should and of how it should not be. This\nconsciousness is not critical, but is not therefore less real and\nefficacious, and without it internal control would be wanting to the\nformative act of the poet. Thus also there is consciousness in the\nvolitional and practical act as such: we are not aware of this act\nin a reflex manner, but we feel, or, if you will, we possess it.\nWithout it there would be no result. It is therefore developed in\nmoments or alternatives of happiness and of unhappiness, of well-being\nand of malaise, of satisfaction and of remorse, of pleasure and of\npain. If this be unconsciousness, we must say that unconsciousness is\nconsciousness itself.\n\n[Sidenote: _Nature and practical activity._]\n\nThe practical activity may appear to be nature in respect of the\ntheoretical, but not as something without the spirit and opposed to\nit, but as a form of the spirit opposed to another form, esthetic\ncontemplation has in like manner, as has already been mentioned,\nappeared to be a natural force creating the world of intuition, which\nthe philosophical activity of man afterwards understands and recreates\nlogically. Hence art can be called nature (and has indeed been so\ncalled), and conversely philosophy has been called spirituality. This\ngives rise to the further problem: whether it be correct to consider\nnature (it is convenient so to call it) that which has afterwards\nbeen recognized in substance as spiritual activity; or whether the\nconcept and the name of spirit should not be reserved for that which\nis truly altogether outside the spirit, and whether this something\nplaced altogether outside the spirit truly exists. This point does\nnot concern us here, although we are much disposed to admit that\none of the mainstays of that absurd conception of nature as of the\nextra-spiritual is precisely the practical or volitional form of the\nspirit, so conspicuously different from the theoretical form and from\nthe sub-forms of the same. We do not therefore hold those philosophers\nto have been so completely in the wrong, who have identified nature and\nwill, for they have thus at any rate discovered one aspect of the truth.\n\n[Sidenote: _Reduction of the practical form to the theoretical._]\n\nPassing to the second thesis, which does not place the will outside\nthe spirit, but denies to it the distinction between practical and\nthe theoretical forms and affirms that the will is thought, there is\nnothing to be objected to it, provided that, as is often the case,\n\"thought\" be taken as synonymous with \"spirit.\" In this case, as in\nthat where it is affirmed that art is thought, we need only inquire,\nwhat form of thought is the will, as in the other what form of thought\nis art. It is not, for instance, logical or historical thought, and\nthe will is neither imaginative, logical nor historical thought: if\nanything, it must be _volitional thought._\n\nBut we have the genuine form of this thesis in the affirmation that\nthe will is the intelligence itself, that to will is to know, and that\naction practically well conducted is truth. This thesis would not have\narisen, had it not found support in the real situation of things (and\nwhat this support is will be seen when studying the relation of the\npractical with the theoretic activity, and the complicated process of\ndeliberation). But, when tested here independently, it proves to be\nunsustainable.\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique._]\n\nWe must not oppose to it the usual observations as to the lack of\nconnection between great intellectual and great volitional development,\nor the cases of those theoreticians who are practically quite\nineffectual, of philosophers who are bad governors of States, of the\n\"very learned\" who are not \"men\" and the like; for the reason already\ngiven, that an observation is not a philosophical argument, but a\nfact which itself has need of an explanation, and when this has been\ndone, it may serve as proof of the philosophical theory, but can never\nbe substituted for it. But it is well to recall to memory the quite\npeculiar character of the will and the practical activity in respect\nof knowledge, intellectual light is cold, the will is hot. When we\npass from theoretic contemplation to action and to the practical, we\nhave almost the feeling of generating, and sons are not made with\nthoughts and words. With the greatest intellectual clearness, we yet\nremain inert, if something does not intervene that rouses to action,\nsomething analogous to the inspiration that makes run a shiver of joy\nand of voluptuousness through the veins of the artist. If the will\nbe not engaged, every argument, however plausible it may seem, every\nsituation, however clear, remains mere theory.\n\nThe education of the will is not effected with theories or definitions,\n\u00e6sthetic or historical culture, but with the exercise of the will\nitself. We teach how to will as we teach how to think, by fortifying\nand intensifying natural dispositions, by example, which suggests\nimitation, by difficulties to be solved (practical problems), by\nrousing energetic initiative and by disciplining it to persist. When\nan act of will has taken place, no argument will extinguish it. As an\nillness is not to be cured with reasons, so an affective and volitional\nstate cannot be altered by these means. Reasoning and knowledge may\nand certainly do assist, but they do not constitute the ultimate and\ndetermining moment. The will alone acts upon the will, not in the sense\nthat the will of one individual can act upon that of another (which\nis merely a fact among the facts perceived by him), but in the sense\nthat the will of the individual himself, causing the previous volition\nto enter upon a crisis, dissolves it and substitutes for it a new\npractical synthesis, with a new volition.\n\n[Sidenote: _The practical as thought which realizes itself. Recognition\nof its autonomy._]\n\nThe evident paradox of the thesis which identifies without any\ndistinction thought and will, theory and practice, has caused it to\nbe modified and to be produced in another form, expressed in the\ndefinition; that the will is thought in so far as it _is translated\ninto act,_ thought in so far as it is _imprinted_ upon nature, thought\nwhen _held_ so _firmly_ before the mind as to _become action,_ and\nso on. Now it remains to determine what may be the relation between\nthought and will, and when this has been done, we shall see what\nis exact and what inexact in the above formul\u00e6, of translating,\nimprinting, and holding fast. These formul\u00e6 are all logically vague,\nhowever imaginative they may be. But what is important to note here is\nthat with the new turn given to the thesis that denies the peculiarity\nof the practical activity, this same peculiarity is unconsciously\naffirmed, because that transforming, that imprinting, that holding\nfast, which did not exist in the simple theory, conceal precisely the\nwill. Thus the ultimate form of the negation comes to join hands with\nthat of the affirmation, and we can consider undisputed the existence\nof a particular form of the spirit, which is the practical activity. We\nmust now examine the relation of this form with the other from which it\nhas been distinguished.\n\n\n[1] Allusion to a verse of Leopardi in _Canzone all' Italia._\n\n\n\n\nII\n\n\nNEGATION OF THE SPIRITUAL FORM OF FEELING\n\n[_Sidenote: The practical activity and the so-called third spiritual\nform: feeling._]\n\nIn affirming the existence of the practical form of activity, we have\nhad in view only the theoretical form and have demonstrated that\nthe one cannot be absorbed and confused in the other, and we have\nreferred only to the theoretic form, when announcing our intention of\ndetermining the relations of the practical with the other forms of the\nspirit. This seems but little correct, and in any case not exhaustive,\nbecause there are or may be other non-theoretical forms of the spirit,\ninto which the practical form could be resolved. Of these it would be\nnecessary to take account. And not to beat too long about the bush,\nthat of which in this case it is question, is the form of _feeling,_\nthe last or intermediary of the three forms into which it is customary\nto divide the spiritual activity: representation, feeling, tendency;\nthought, feeling, will. Attempts have not been wanting to reduce\ntendency or will to feeling, or, as is said, to a sentimental reaction\nfrom perceptions and thoughts. In fact there is hardly a treatise\nof philosophy of the practical without a preliminary study of the\nrelations between the will and feeling. We cannot, then, escape from\nthe dilemma; either we must recognize the omission into which we have\nfallen and hasten to correct it, or else make explicit the supposition\nthat may be contained in that omission (which would thus be intentional\nand conscious), that _a third general form of the spirit, or a form of\nfeeling, does not exist._ We have adopted precisely this last position,\nand it therefore becomes incumbent upon us briefly to expose the\nreasons for which we hold that the concept of feeling must disappear\nfrom the system of the spiritual forms or activities.\n\n[Sidenote: _Various meanings of the word feeling, as a psychological\nclass._]\n\nFeeling may and has been understood in various ways, some of which do\nnot at all concern our thesis. In the first place, the word \"feeling\"\nhas been used to designate a class of psychical facts constructed\naccording to the psychological and naturalistic method. Thus it\nhas happened that, with various times and authors, all the most\nrudimentary, tenuous, and evanescent manifestations of the spirit have\nbeen called \"feelings,\" slight intuitions (or sensations as they are\ncalled), not yet transformed into perceptions, slight perceptions,\nslight tendencies and appetites, in fact all that forms, as it were,\nthe base of the life of the spirit. The name has thus, on the other\nhand, also been given to psychical processes and conditions, in which\nvarious forms follow one another or alternate in relation to a material\nempirically limited. Such are what are called feelings of \"fatherland,\"\n\"love,\" \"nature,\" \"the divine.\" Nothing forbids the formation of such\nclasses and the use of that denomination, but as has already been\ndeclared in relation to the psychological method, they are of no use\nto philosophy, which not only does not receive them within its limits,\nbut does not occupy itself with them at all, save to reject them when\nthey present themselves, as philosophical psychology or psychological\nphilosophy. To classify is not to think philosophically, and philosophy\non the one hand does not recognize criteria of small and great, of\nweak and strong, of more and of less, and a small or smallest thought,\na small or smallest tendency, is for it thought and tendency and not\nfeeling at all; on the other, it does not admit complicated processes\nwithout resolving these into their simple components. Thus the feeling\nof love or of patriotism, and the others made use of in the example,\nare revealed to philosophy as series of acts of thought and of will,\nvariously interlaced. Let the psychologists, then, keep their classes\nand sub-classes of feeling. We, for our part, not only do not dream of\ndi-possessing them of such a treasure, but shall continue to draw from\nit, when necessary, the small change of ordinary conversation.\n\n[Sidenote: _Feeling as a state of the spirit._]\n\nThere also exists another meaning of the word \"feeling,\" of which,\nat present at any rate, we do not take account. This appears when\nthe word is used to designate _the state_ of the spirit or of one of\nthe special forms of the spirit; we should indeed term these more\ncorrectly the _states,_ since the spirit in this case, as is known,\nis polarized in two opposite terms, usually denominated _pleasure and\npain._ Indubitably these two terms can also be taken as psychological\n(and are thus included in the preceding case). Hence it results that\npleasure and pain are represented by psychologists as the two extremes\nof a continuous series, in which there is a passage from the one to\nthe other term by insensible increases and gradations. But we must\nalso recognize that this psychological representation is not the only\none possible, and indeed is not truly the real one, and that the two\nterms have their place and their proper meaning in the philosophy\nof the spirit. They are, as has been said, _opposites;_ and are\ndifferentiated, not only by a more and a less, by a greatest and a\nleast, but also by the special character of distinction that opposites\npossess. The doctrine of opposites and of opposites in the practical\nactivity of the spirit does not, however, appertain to this part of our\nexposition. In denying feeling, we do not here deny the doctrine of\nopposites, and that psychology of the _states_ of the spirit which is\nfounded upon it, but the doctrine of feeling considered as a particular\n_form_ of _activity._\n\n[Sidenote: _Function of the concept of feeling in the History of\nphilosophy; the indeterminate._]\n\nThe conception of feeling as a spiritual activity has answered to a\nwant of research, which may be described as _provisional excogitation._\nWhenever thought has found itself face to face with a form or subform\nof spiritual activity, which it was not possible either to eliminate\nor to absorb in forms already recognized, the problem to be solved\nhas been endorsed with that word \"feeling.\" With many this has passed\nfor a solution. Feeling, in fact, has been the indeterminate in the\nhistory of philosophy, or rather the not yet fully determined, the\n_half-determined._\n\nHence its great importance as an expedient for the indication of\nnew territories to conquer, and as a stimulus against remaining\nobstinately shut up in old and insufficient formul\u00e6. But hence also\nits fate: the problem must not be exchanged for its solution, the\nindeterminate or semi-determinate must be determined. Whenever the\ndetermination of the forms and sub-forms of the spirit has not been\ngiven in a complete manner, the category of feeling will reappear (and\nit will be beneficial); but at the same time will reappear the duty of\nexploring it and of understanding what is concealed beneath it, or at\nleast what unsolved difficulty has caused it to reappear afresh.\n\nNow we have already met with the concept of feeling on more than one\noccasion, when investigating the philosophy of the theoretic spirit,\nas something supplying a theoretical need outside the theoretic forms\ngenerally admitted, or as a special form of theoretic activity. Every\ntime that we have done this, an attentive examination has caused it\nto disappear before our eyes, and has generally helped us, either to\ndiscover something previously unknown, or to confirm the necessity of\ncontested categories.\n\n[Sidenote: _Feeling as herald of the \u00e6sthetic form;_]\n\nThus it happened that when a special _\u00e6sthetic_ function was\nnot recognized and it was attempted to explain it, either\nintellectualistically, as nothing but an inferior form of philosophy,\nor historically, as a reproduction of the historical and natural datum,\nor almost as the satisfaction of certain volitional wants (hedonistic\ntheory), the view of art as neither a form of the intellect nor of\nperception nor of will, but of _feeling,_ was an advance, as also\nwas the appeal to men of _feeling_ to recognize and to judge it.\nAs a result of this insistence, it was eventually discovered that\nart possessed an absolutely simple and ingenuous theoretic form,\nwithout either intellectual or historical contents, the form of the\npure intuition which is that of the \u00e6sthetic and artistic activity.\nWhoever returns to treat of art as a product of feeling, after this\ndiscovery of the pure intuition, falls back from the determinate to the\nsemi-determinate, and is at the mercy of all the dangers which arise\nfrom it.\n\n[Sidenote: _As herald of the intuitive element in Historiography._]\n\nThe theory of historiography owes its progress in like manner to the\ndemonstration that it is impossible to deduce the historical statement\nfrom concepts, but that we must deduce it in final analysis from an\nimmediate _feeling_ of the real, that is to say, from the _intuitive_\nelement, which inevitably exists in every historical reconstruction,\nas in every perception. On the other hand, and in altogether another\nsense, reacting against the false idea of an extra--subjective\nhistorical objectivity, to be found in the mere reproduction of the\ndatum, it was made evident that no historical narration is possible\nwithout the _reaction of feeling_ in respect to the datum. Thus was\ndiscovered the indispensability of the _intellective_ element in the\nhistorical affirmation. Whoever has recourse to feeling as a factor\nin historiography, after this complete constitution of the historical\njudgment, returns from the clear to the confused, from light, if not to\ndarkness, then to twilight.\n\n[Sidenote: _Feeling as herald of the pure concept in philosophical\nLogic._]\n\nThe concept of feeling has also been of capital importance in the\nprogress of the Logic of philosophy. For how could we begin to explain\nthat philosophy is constructed with a method altogether different from\nthat of the exact disciplines (natural sciences and mathematics),\nwithout denying to those sciences the capacity of conquering the\nsupreme truth, the true truth, full reality, and recognizing such\ncapacity on the other hand to a special function called _feeling_\nor _immediate_ knowledge? That function was void, that is to say,\nundetermined, because defined in a negative and not in a positive\nmanner: feeling was something different from the abstract and arbitrary\nprocedure of the exact sciences, from the abstract intellect, but its\ntrue nature was unknown. When this was at last known it was discovered\nthat it was not a question of \"feeling\" or of \"immediate knowledge,\"\nbut of the intellect itself, in its genuine and uncontaminated nature,\nits pure and free activity, of intellect as _reason,_ of thought as\n_speculative_ thought, of that \"immediate knowledge,\" which is true,\nintrinsic, perpetual _mediation._ Whoever henceforth returns to\nfeeling, after the discovery of the pure or speculative concept, and\nbelieves it to be the creator of philosophy and of religion, fighting\nwith it against the natural and mathematical sciences, behaves as he\nwho should wish to return to-day to the flint-lock, for the excellent\nreason that it was an advance upon the bow and the catapult. Thus those\nwho invoke feeling in philosophy are henceforth a little ridiculous.\nThis does not imply that they were not at one time to be taken\nseriously, for this concept has been of great provisional assistance\nand has been as it were the compass of the new idea of philosophy.\n\n[Sidenote: _Analogous function in the Philosophy of the practical._]\n\nThe same will be the case in the investigation that we have begun of\nthe practical form of the spirit and of the problems to which it gives\nrise. This concept of feeling has been mingled with them all, and\npropositions have been formed, of which we shall indicate the true\nsignificance in the proper places. Beginning at once and limiting\nourselves solely to the question of the existence of a peculiar\npractical form, it is easy to understand why it has so often been\nmaintained against the intellectual and theoretical exclusivists, that\nthe will consists, not of knowledge, but of feeling; that the principle\nof action, far from being an intellectual principle, is sentimental\nemotion; that in order to produce a volition, reason, ideas, and facts\nperceived do not suffice, but that it is necessary that all these\nthings be transformed into feelings, which must take possession of the\nsoul; that the base of life lived, that is, of practical life, is not\nthought, but feeling, and so on. With these formul\u00e6 was recognized\nthe peculiarity of the practical activity. The theory of feeling in\nrespect of the practical represents progress as compared with the\nintellectualistic theory, because the appearance of indeterminateness\nis progress as compared with bad determinateness, and contains in\nitself the new and more complete determinateness.\n\n[Sidenote: _Negation of feeling._]\n\nBut in this very way of ours of understanding the value of these\nformul\u00e6, is implied their resolute negation, when they tend to\npersist, after having accomplished their function, and to maintain\nside by side with the theory of the practical a third general form\nof the spirit, namely feeling. No spiritual fact or manifestation of\nactivity can be adduced, which, examined without superficiality, is\nnot reducible to an act of fancy, intellect and perception, that is,\nof theory (when it is not at once revealed as an abstraction or as a\nmerely psychological class of these acts); or to an act of utilitarian\nor ethical volition (when it is not here too a psychological class,\nvariously designated as aspirations, passions, affections, and the\nlike). Let him who will search his spirit and attempt to indicate one\nsingle act, differing from the above, as something new and original and\ndeserving of the special denomination of feeling.\n\n[Sidenote: _Its deductive exclusion._]\n\nThis constatation of fact (we repeat the warning) is but the first\nstep in the complete philosophical demonstration, which demands that\nwe show not only that a third form does not exist, but that _it cannot\nexist._ This demonstration will be given further on, and will coincide\nwith that of the demonstration of the necessity of the two forms,\ntheoretical and practical; a duality that is unity and a unity that is\nduality. Recognizing the legitimacy of the demand for a philosophical\ndeduction of the forms of the spirit, and therefore of a deductive\nexclusion of those that are spurious and wrongly adopted, it seems that\nif it be somewhat delayed, such a mode of exclusion will also yield\nclearer results.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\n\nRELATION OF THE PRACTICAL TO THE THEORETIC ACTIVITY\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Precedence of the theoretical activity._]\n\nFreed from the equivocal third term, which is feeling, and now passing\nto the problem of the relation between the theoretical and the\npractical activity enunciated, we must in the first place declare the\nthesis that _the practical activity presupposes the theoretical._ Will\nis impossible without knowledge; as is knowledge, so is will.\n\n[Sidenote: _The unity of the spirit and the co-presence of the\npractical._]\n\nIn recognizing this precedence of knowledge to will, we do not wish to\nposit as thinkable a theoretical man or a theoretical moment altogether\ndeprived of will. This would be an unreal abstraction, inadmissible\nin philosophy, which operates solely with real abstractions, that is,\nwith universal concretes. The forms of the spirit are distinct and\nnot separate, rand when the spirit is found in one of its forms, or\nis _explicit_ in it, the other forms are also in it, but _implicit,_\nor, as is also said, _concomitant._ If theoretical and cognoscitive\nman were not at the same time volitional, he would not even be able to\nstand on his feet and look at the sky, and, literally speaking, if he\nwere not alive, he would not be able to think (and thinking is both\nan act of life and an act of will, which is called _attention)._ Were\nhe not to will, he would be unable to pass from waking to sleep and\nfrom sleep to waking. Thus in order to be purely theoretical, it is\nnecessary to be at the same time in some degree practical; the energy\nof pure fancy and of pure thought springs from the trunk of volition.\nHence the importance of the will for the \u00e6sthetic and intellectual\nlife; the will is not theory, nor is it the force that makes grain to\ngrow or guides the course of rivers, but as it assists the culture of\ngrain or restrains the destructive impetus of rivers, so it assists and\nrestrains the force of fancy and of thought, causing them to act in\nthe best way, that is, to be as they really ought to be, namely, fancy\nand thought in their purest manifestation. The practical activity,\ntherefore, acts in this way, and as it drags the man of science from\nhis study and the artist from his studio, if it be necessary to defend\nhis country or to watch at the bedside of his sick father, so it\ncommands the artist and the man of science to fulfil their special\nmission and to be themselves in an eminent degree.\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique of pragmatism._]\n\nAll the arguments that have been used in the past and that are used in\nthe present, to maintain the dependence of the theoretical upon the\npractical activity, are of value for what of truth they contain, that\nis, only to demonstrate this unity of the spiritual functions that\nwe have recognized, and the indispensability of the volitional force\nfor the health of the cognoscitive spirit. But the passage from this\nthesis to the other, that the true is the production of the will, is\nnothing but a sophism, founded on the double signification of the word\n\"production.\" It should be clear that to _assist_ the work of thought\nwith the will is one thing and that to _substitute_ the will for the\nwork of thought is another. To claim to substitute the will for the\nwork of thought, is equivalent to the negation of that force that\nshould be assisted; it is the most open proclamation of scepticism,\nthe most complete distrust of the true and of the possibility of\nattaining to it. This attempt is now called _pragmatism,_ or is at\nany rate one of the meanings of the word, with which the school of\nthe greatest confusion that has ever appeared in philosophy adorns\nitself in our day. This school mixes together the most divergent\ntheses--that of the stimulating effect that the will has upon thought,\nthat other of the volitional or arbitrary moment, by means of which\nperceptions and historical data are reduced to abstract types in the\nnatural disciplines, or postulates laid down for the construction\nof mathematical classes. The third form, which might be called the\nBaconian prejudice, maintains the exclusive utility of the natural\nsciences and mathematics for the well-being of life. The fourth\nthesis is positivistic: here it is maintained that we cannot know\nanything save what we ourselves arbitrarily compress into the formula\nand classes of mathematics and of naturalism. The fifth thesis is\na romantic exaggeration of the principle of creative power in man,\nsubstituting the caprice of the individual for the universal spirit.\nThe sixth, something between silliness and Jesuistry, recommends\nthe utility of making one's illusions and believing them to be\ntrue. The seventh is superstitious, occultist and spiritistic--and\nthere are others that we omit. If pragmatism has had and preserves\nany attraction, it owes this to the truth of its first and second\ntheses and to the half truth of the fifth. All the three are however\nheterogeneous in themselves and unreconcilable with the others, which\nare most fallacious. But we repeat with the old philosophers that\nwhoever in thinking says, \"Thus I will it,\" is lost for truth.\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique of psychological objections._]\n\nCertain reservations that are made to the above truth from the point\nof view of that philosophy, which we have called psychological, are\nscarcely deserving of brief mention. We find in treatises of Psychology\nthat knowledge does precede the practical act, but only in the higher\nforms of volition, whereas in its lower forms are found only impulses,\ntendencies, appetites, altogether blind of any knowledge. Thus they\nare able to talk of involuntary forms of the practical activity, of\na will that is not a will, when once the true will has been defined,\nas precisely appetition illumined by previous knowledge. The _blind\nwill_ of certain metaphysicians is derived from such excogitations of\npsychologists, who make of it a practical act without intelligence.\nThey have here attributed the value of reality to a crude concept of\nclass, a thing that happens not infrequently. A blind will is however\nunthinkable. Every form of the practical activity, be it as poor and\nrudimentary as you like (and let as many classes and gradations as you\nwill be formed), presupposes knowledge of some sort. In animals too?\nwill be asked. In animals too, provided they be, and in so far as they\nare centres of life, and so of perceptions and of will. This is also\ntrue of vegetables and of minerals, always with the above hypothesis.\nWe must banish every form of _aristocracy_ from the Philosophy of the\npractical, as we have banished it from \u00c6sthetic, from Logic, from\nHistoric, esteeming it most harmful to the proper understanding of\nthose activities. The aristocratic illusion is closely allied to that\none which makes us believe that we, shut up in the egotism of our\nempirical individuality, are alone aware of the truth, that we alone\nfeel the beautiful, that we alone know how to love, and so on. But\nreality is democratic.\n\nFrom the psychological point of view yet another objection has been\nraised. Knowledge (it is affirmed) cannot be the indispensable base of\nthe will, if, as is the case, the ignorant are often far more effective\nthan many learned men and philosophers. These latter, they say,\nalthough possessing very great knowledge, and no less a stock of good\nintentions, yet do not know how to direct their lives successfully.\nBut it is evident that in these cases the so-called ignorant possess\njust that knowledge which is necessary for the purpose and is lacking\nto the learned and to the philosopher, who would themselves be the\nignorant in such a case. Nicholas Macchiavelli was ignorant as compared\nwith Giovanni dalle Bande Nere, when he kept the spectators waiting two\nhours in the sun, while he was attempting to dispose three thousand\ninfantry according to the directions that he had written. This he would\nnever have succeeded in doing, had not Signor Giovanni, with the help\nof drummers and in the twinkling of an eye caused them to execute the\nvarious man\u0153uvres and afterwards carried Master Nicholas to dine, who,\nsave for him, would not have dined at all that day.[1]\n\n[Sidenote: _Nature of the theoretical precedence of the practical:\nhistorical knowledge._]\n\nThe knowledge required for the practical act is not that of the artist,\nnor of the philosopher, or rather, it is these two also, but only in so\nfar as both are to be found as elements co-operating in that ultimate\nand complete knowledge which is _historical._ If the first be called\nintuition, the second concept, and the third perception, and the third\nbe looked upon as the result of the two preceding, it will be said\nthat the knowledge required for the practical act is _perceptive._\nHence the common saying that praises the sure eye of the practical man;\nhence, too, the close bond between historical sense and practical and\npolitical sense; hence, too, the justifiable diffidence of those who,\nunable to grasp effectual reality, hope to attain to it by force of\nmere syllogisms and abstractions, or believe that they have attained to\nit, when they have erected an imaginary edifice. They prove by so doing\nthat they can never be practical men, at least in the sphere of action\nat which they are then aiming.\n\nSuch knowledge is not of itself the practical act. The historian as\nsuch is a contemplative, not a practical man or politician. If that\nspark which is volition, do not spring forth, the material of knowledge\ndoes not catch fire and is not transformed into the material of the\npractical. But that knowledge is the condition, and if the condition\nbe not the conditioned, yet one cannot have the conditioned without\nthe condition. In this last signification, it is true that action\nis knowledge, will, and wisdom, that is to say, in the sense that\nwilling and acting presuppose knowledge and wisdom. In this sense, and\nconsidered solely in the stage of the cognoscitive investigation which\nwill form the base of action, the deliberation is a theoretical fact.\nThe customary expressions of logical, rational, judicious actions,\nare metaphors, because action may be weak or energetic, coherent or\nincoherent; but it will not have those predicates which are proper to\ntheoretical acts that precede actions, on which the metaphors aforesaid\nare founded. As are these acts, so originate the practical act, will,\nand action. We can act in so far as we have knowledge. Volition is not\nthe surrounding world which the spirit perceives; it is a beginning,\na new fact. But this fact has its roots in the surrounding world,\nthis beginning is irradiated with the colours of things that man has\nperceived as a theoretical spirit, before he took action as a practical\nspirit.\n\n[Sidenote: _Its continual changeability._]\n\nIt is important to observe, as much to prevent an equivoke into which\nmany fall, as because of the consequences that will follow from holding\nit, that we must not look upon the perceptive knowledge of reality\nthat surrounds us as a firm basis, upon which we act, by translating\nthe formed volition into act. For were this so, we should have to\nassume that the surrounding world, perceived by the spirit, stops after\nthe perceptive act, which is not the case. That world changes every\nsecond, the perceptive act perceives the new and the different, and the\nvolitional act changes according to that real and perceived change.\nPerception and volition alternate every instant; in order to will, we\nmust touch the earth at every instant, in order to resume force and\ndirection.\n\n[Sidenote: _No other theoretic precedent._]\n\nContinuous perception and continuous change, that is the necessary\ntheoretic condition of volition. It is necessary and unique. No other\ntheoretical element is needed, because every other is contained in it,\nand beyond it no other is thinkable.\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique of concepts and practical judgments._]\n\nBut if this be true and no other theoretic element save that precede\nthe volition, then we find in the aforesaid theory the criticism of a\nseries of other theories, generally admitted in the Philosophy of the\npractical, not less than in ordinary thought, none of which can be\nretained without alterations and corrections.\n\nOr better, there are not so many various theories to criticize; there\nis rather one theory, which presents itself under different aspects and\nassumes various names. This theory consists substantially in affirming\nthat with the complex of cognitions, of which we have hitherto treated\n(all of which are summed up in the historical judgment), we do not\nyet possess that one which is necessary, before we can proceed to\nvolition and action. A special form of concepts and judgments which\ncan be called _practical,_ must, it is said, appear; these render\nthe will possible, by interposing themselves between the previous\nmerely historical judgment and the will. Is it not indubitable that we\npossess practical concepts, that is, concepts of classes of action or\nof supreme guides to action, concepts of things _good, of ideals, of\nends,_ and that we effect _judgments_ of value by the application of\nthose concepts to the image of given actions? Is it not indubitable\nthat those judgments and those concepts refer, not to the simple\npresent fact, but to the future? How could we will, if we did not know\nwhat is good to will, and that a given possible action corresponds to\nthat concept of good?\n\n[Sidenote: _Posteriority of judgments to the practical act._]\n\nNow it is undeniable that we in fact possess the above-mentioned\nconcepts and judgments. But what we must absolutely deny is that they\ndiffer in any respect from other concepts and theoretical judgments,\nand that they deserve to be distinguished from these as practical and\nthat they have the future for their object. The future, that which\nis not, is not an object of knowledge; the material of the judgment,\nwhether it concern actions or thoughts, does not alter its logical and\ntheoretical character; the concepts of modes of action are concepts\nneither more nor less than those of modes of thought. With this\nnegation we at the same time deny the possibility of their interposing\nthemselves between knowledge and will. Those judgments, far from being\nanterior to the will, are posterior to it.\n\nLet us state a simple case and observe the course of analysis on\nthe lines of the theory here criticized. It is winter-time; I am\ncold; there is a wood close by, and I know that by cutting wood one\ncan light a fire and that fire gives heat: I therefore resolve to\ncut wood. According to that theory, the spiritual process would be\nexpressed in the following chain of propositions: I know the actual\nsituation, that is to say, that I am cold, that wood gives fire and\nfire heat, and that there exists wood that can be cut; I possess the\nconcept that it is a good thing to provide for the health of the body;\nI judge that with heat I shall procure health during the winter, and\nthat in consequence heat is a good thing and the cutting of wood,\nwithout which I cannot procure heat, is also good. Having made all\nthese constatations, I set in motion the spring of my will, and I\n_will_ to cut the wood.--The process as above described seems real\nand controllable by every one; but it is, on the contrary, illusory.\nThe practical judgment: \"I shall act well in cutting the wood\" really\nmeans, \"I will to cut the wood;\" \"this is a good thing\" really means,\n\"I will this.\" I may change my will a moment after, substituting for\nthis volition one that is different or contrary, that does not matter.\nAt the moment that I formed that judgment, I must have seen myself\nin the volitional attitude of a man cutting wood; the will must have\ncome first. Otherwise the judgment would never have existed. Given the\nfirst actual situation and its complete expression in the judgment, no\nother judgment can arise, if the actual situation do not change and\nnothing new supervene. This new thing is always my will, which, when\nthe situation changes (as in the example, if I walk from the house to\nthe tree, or if I simply move my body in an imperceptible, manner in\nthe direction of the action willed), by adding to the actual reality\nsomething that was not there before, provides material for a new\njudgment. This judgment is called practical, but it is theoretical,\nlike the others that precede it; a judgment believed to precede the\nvolition, whereas in reality it follows it; a judgment believed to\ncondition a future act of will, whereas it is in reality the past act\nof will looking at itself in the glass; a judgment that is not really\npractical but _historical._\n\nThe illusion that things happen differently is caused by the fact\nthat we possess judgments concerning our past volitions, which are\nafterwards collected into abstract formul\u00e6, such as that \"it is well\nto cut wood.\" But, on the one hand, those formul\u00e6 and judgments are\nin their turn formed from previous volitions, and on the other, those\nformul\u00e6 do not possess any absolute value in the single and concrete\nsituation, so that they can be modified and substituted for others that\naffirm the opposite. The question is not whether cutting wood has been\nas a rule a good thing for me in the past, nor whether I have generally\nwilled it in the past: the question is to will it at this moment, that\nis, to posit the cutting of wood at this moment as a good thing.\n\n[Sidenote: _Posteriority of the practical concepts._]\n\nAs is the case with the pretended practical judgments and concepts of\nclasses formed upon them, so the concepts that they imply, of _things\ngood, of ideals, of ends, of actions worthy of being willed,_ and so\non, do not precede, but follow the volition that has taken place. These\nconcepts are the incipient reflection, scientific and philosophical,\nupon the spontaneous acts of the will, and we cannot practise science\nnor philosophize save about facts that have already taken place: if\nthe fact do not precede, there can be no theory. Certainly theory\ndoes not do other than seek out the already created and give the\nreal principles of actions in the form of thought principles, in\nthe same manner as Logic discovers those principles that live and\noperate in logical thought. But since the formula of the principle of\ncontradiction is not necessary for thinking without contradiction, but\npresupposes it, so the concepts of ends, of things good, and of ideals\nare not necessary for volitions, but presuppose them.\n\n[Sidenote: _Origin of intellectualist and sentimentalist doctrines._]\n\nThe thesis of the will as knowledge draws support from the mistaken\nbelief in the practical principles and judgments that precede volition,\nas also does the proposition that he who knows what is good for him\nalso wishes it, and that he who does not wish it does not know it.\nThis thesis is to be inverted, because to know what is good for one\nmeans that one has willed it. From the opposite point of view, the\nother thesis, of the impossibility of volition unless _feeling_ be\ninterposed between what is known and the will, is to be attributed to a\nlike mistaken belief. Feeling is held to give, as it were, a particular\nvalue to facts, and to cause them to be felt as they should be felt, or\nto be changed. The customary merit possessed by theories of feeling is\nto be recognized in this thesis: that is to say, it has awakened or\nreawakened consciousness of the peculiarity of the practical act in\nrespect to intellectualistic reductions and identifications. This merit\nis not altogether lacking to the general theory of practical judgments\nitself. These, although called judgments, were classified differently\nto all the others, precisely because they were _practical._\n\n[Sidenote: _The concepts of end and means._]\n\nHaving thus shown that it is not true that man first knows the end\nand then wills it, it is possible to establish with greater precision\nwhat is to be understood by _end._ The end, then, in universal, is the\nconcept itself of will. Considered in the single act, as this or that\nend, it is nothing but this or that determinate volition. Hence is\nalso to be derived a better definition of its relation to the _means,_\nwhich it is usual to conceive empirically and erroneously as a part of\nvolition and action at the service of another part. An act of will is\nan infrangible unity and can be taken as divided only for practical\nconvenience. In the volitional act, all is volition; nothing is means,\nand all is end. The means is nothing but the actual situation, from\nwhich the volitional act takes its start, and is in that way really\ndistinguished from the end. Distinction and unification take place\ntogether, because, as has been remarked, the volition is not the\nsituation, yet, on the other hand, as the volition, so the situation:\nthe one varies as a function of the other. Hence the absurdity of\nthe maxim, that _the end justifies the means._ This maxim is of an\nempirical character and has sometimes been employed to justify actions\nerroneously held to be unjustifiable, and more often to make pass as\njust actions that were unjustifiable. As the end, so the means, but the\nmeans is what is given and has no need of justification. The end is\nwhat has been willed and must be justified in itself.\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique of the end as flan or as fixed design._]\n\nThe idea that we generally have of finality is to be eliminated, owing\nto the continual changeability of the means, that is, of the actual\nsituation, which would posit the end as something fixed, as a _plan_\nto be carried out. The difference between the finality of man and that\nof nature has recently been made to reside in nature: which has seemed\nto act upon a plan which she changes, remakes, and accommodates at\nevery moment, according to contingencies, so that the point of arrival\nis not for her predetermined or predeterminable. But the same can be\nsaid of the human will and of its finality. The will too changes at\nevery moment, as the movement of a swimmer or of an athlete changes\nat every moment, according to the motion of the sea or of the rival\nathlete, and according to the varying measure or quality of his own\nstrength in the course of the volitional process. Man acts, case for\ncase and from instant to instant, realizing his will of every instant,\nnot that abstract conception which is called a plan. Hence also arises\nthe confirmation of the belief that there do not exist fixed types and\nmodels of actions. He who seeks and awaits such models and types does\nnot know how to will. He is without that initiative, that creativeness,\nthat genius, which is not less indispensable to the practical activity\nthan to art and philosophy.\n\n[Sidenote: _The will and the unknown._]\n\nIt will seem that the will thus becomes will of the unknown and is\nat variance in too paradoxical a manner with the sayings, so clearly\nevident, that _voluntas quae non fertur in incognitum_ and _ignoti\nnulla cupido._ But those sayings are true only so far as they confirm\nthe fact that without the precedence of the theoretical act, the\npractical act does not take place. Apart from this signification, it\nshould rather be maintained that _noti nulla cupido_ and that _voluntas\nnon fertur in cognitum._ What is known exists, and it is not possible\nto _will the existence_ of what _exists_: the past is not a content\nof volition. The will is the will of the unknown, that is to say,\nis itself, which, in so far as it wills, does not know itself, and\nknows itself only when it has ceased to will. Our surprise when we\ncome to understand the actions that we have accomplished, is often\nnot small; we realize that we have not done what we thought we had\ndone, and have on the contrary done what we had not foreseen. Hence\nalso the fallacy of the explanations that present volitional man as\nsurrounded with things that he does or does not will; whereas things,\nor rather facts are the mere object of knowledge and cannot be willed\nor not willed, as it is unthinkable to will that Alexander the Great\nhad not existed, or that Babylon had not been conquered. That which is\nwilled is not _things_ but _changes_ in things, that is to say, the\nvolitions themselves. This fallacious conception also arises from the\nsubstitution of abstractions and classes of volitions for the real will.\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique of the concept of practical sciences and of a\npractical philosophy._]\n\nIt is to be observed, finally, that the erroneous concept of a form\nof science called the _practical_ or _normative_ has its roots in the\nconcept of _the end, of the good, of concepts and judgments of value_\nas original facts. When practical concepts and judgments, as a special\ncategory of concepts and judgments, have been destroyed, the idea\nof a practical and normative science has also been destroyed. For\nthis reason, the _Philosophy of the practical_ cannot be _practical\nphilosophy,_ and if it has appeared to constitute an exception\namong all philosophies and that above all others it should preserve\na practical and normative function, this has arisen from a verbal\nmisunderstanding that is most ingenuous and most destructive. For\nour part we have striven to dissipate it, even in the title of our\ntreatise, which, contrary to the usual custom, we have-entitled not\n_practical,_ but _of the practical._\n\n\n[1] Bandello, _Novelle,_ i. 40, intro.\n\n\n\n\nIV\n\n\nINSEPARABILITY OF ACTION FROM ITS REAL BASE AND PRACTICAL NATURE OF THE\nTHEORETICAL ERROR\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Coincidence of intention and volition._]\n\n\nThe connection between the actual situation and will, means and\nend having been made clear, no distinction that it may be desired\nto establish between general and concrete volition, ideal and real\nvolition, that is to say between _intention and volition,_ is\nacceptable. Intention and volition coincide completely, and that\ndistinction, generally suggested with the object of justifying the\nunjustifiable, is altogether arbitrary in both the forms that it\nassumes.\n\n[Sidenote: _Volition in the abstract and in the concrete: critique._]\n\nThe first form is that of the distinction between abstract and\nconcrete, or better, between general and particular. It is maintained,\nthat we can will the good in the abstract and yet be unable to will\nit in the concrete, that we may have good intentions and yet behave\nbadly. But by our reduction of the thing willed to the volition,\nto will the abstract is tantamount to _willing abstractly._ And to\nwill abstractly is tantamount to _not willing,_ if volition imply a\nsituation historically determined, from which it arises as an act\nequally determined and concrete. Hence, of the two terms of the\npretended distinction, the first, volition of the abstract, disappears,\nand the second, concrete volition, which is the true and real volition\nand intention, alone remains.\n\n[Sidenote: _Thought volition and real volition: critique._]\n\nThe second form abandons, it is true, the abstract for the concrete,\nbut assumes two different volitional acts in the same concrete: the\none real, arising from the actual situation, the other, thought or\nimagined, side by side with the former: this would be the volition,\nthat the intention. According to such a theory, it is always possible\nto _direct the intention,_ that is, the real volition can always join\nwith the volitional act imagined and produce a nexus, in which the\nvolition exists in one way, the intention in another; the first bad\nand the second good, or the first good and the second bad. Thus the\nhonourable man approved by the Jesuit, of whom Pascal speaks, although\nhe desire the death of him from whom he expects an inheritance and\nrejoice when it takes place, yet endows his desire with a special\ncharacter, believing that what he wishes to attain is the prosperity\nof his affairs, not the death of his fellow-creature. Or the same man\nmay kill the man who has given him a blow; but in so doing he will fix\nhis thought upon the defence of his honour, not upon the homicide.\nSince he is not able to abstain from the action, he at least (they say)\npurines the intention. The worst of this is that the real situation,\nthe only one of which we can take account, is the historical, not the\nimaginary situation. In the reality of the consequent volition, it is\nnot a question of his own prosperity and nothing more, but of his own\nprosperity coupled with the death of another, or of false prosperity.\nIt is not a question of his own honour and nothing more, but of his own\nhonour in conjunction with the violation of the life of another, that\nis, of false honour. Thus the asserted fact of prosperity and honour\nis changed into two qualified bad actions, and what was honourable\nin the imaginary case, becomes dishonourable in the real case, which\nis indeed the only one of which it is question. It is of no use to\nimagine a situation that differs from reality, because it is to the\nreal situation that the intention is directed, not to the other, and\ntherefore it is not possible to direct, that is to say, to change the\nintention, if the actual situation do not change.\n\nThe antipathy that has been shown for good-hearted and well-intentioned\nmen in recent centuries, and for practical doctrines with intention\nas their principle (the morality of intention, etc.), arises from the\nsophisms that we have here criticized. But since it is henceforward\nclear to us that those so-called well-intentioned and good-hearted\npeople have neither good hearts nor good intentions and are nothing\nbut hypocrites, and because we do not admit any distinction between\nintention and will, we are without fear or antipathy in respect to\nthe use of the word \"intention,\" understanding it as a synonym for\n\"volition.\"\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique of volition with base either unknown or\nimperfectly known._]\n\nBut it will be said that we have here considered the case, in which,\nwhile the real situation is known, there is a hypocritical pretence\nof not knowing it, in order to deceive others and maybe oneself, and\nthat we have justly here declared that in such a case the will and\nthe intention were inseparable. But there is another case, in which,\nthough the situation of affairs be not known, yet it is necessary both\nto will and to act at once. Here the concrete will is separated at\nthe beginning from the intention: the will is what it _can_ be, the\nintention is as the action _would wish_ to be.\n\nBut this instance is equally or even more inconceivable than the\npreceding. It has been clearly established that if we do not know, we\ncannot will. Before arriving at a resolution, man tries to see clearly\nin and about him, and so long as the search continues, so long as the\ndoubt is not dissipated, the will remains in suspense. Nothing can\nmake him resolve, where the elements for coming to a resolution are\nwanting; nothing can make him say to himself \"I know,\" when he does not\nknow; nothing can make him say \"it will be as if I knew,\" because that\n\"as if I knew\" would introduce the arbitrary method into the whole of\nknowledge, and would cause universal doubt to take the place of doubt\ncircumscribed. This would disturb the function of knowledge itself,\nagainst which an act of real felony would be committed. From nothing\nnothing is born.\n\n[Sidenote: _Illusions among the cases that are cited._]\n\nThere are no exceptions to this law, and those that are adduced can be\nonly apparent. A man is cautiously descending the dangerous side of\na mountain, covered with ice: will he or will he not place his foot\non that surface, of which he does not and cannot know the resistance?\nHowever, there is no time to be lost: he must go on and take the risk.\nIt seems evident that in a case like this he wills and operates without\ncomplete knowledge. But the case is not indeed unique or of a special\norder: every act of life implies risk of the unknown, and if there were\nnot in us (as they say) _potestas voluntatem nostram extra limites\nintellectus nostri extendendi,_ it would be impossible to move a step,\nto lift an arm, or to put into one's mouth a morsel of bread, since\n_omnia incerta ac periculis sunt plena._ What must be known in order\nto form the volition is not that which we should know if we were in a\nsituation different from that in which we are (in which case, also,\nthe volition would be different), but that which we can know in the\nsituation in which we really find ourselves. The man on the glacier has\nneither time nor means to verify the resistance of the surface of the\nice; but since he is obliged to proceed further, he does not act in a\nrash, but in a very prudent manner, in putting his foot trustfully on\nthe ice that may be unfaithful to him. He would be acting rashly if,\nhaving the means and the time, he failed to investigate its resistance,\nthat is to say, if he were in _another and imaginary situation,_ not\nin that real and present situation, in which he finds himself. If I\nknew the cards of my adversary, as the cheat knows them, I should\nplay differently, but it cannot be argued that because, as an honest\nplayer, I know only my own, I am therefore playing inconsiderately: I\nam playing as I ought, with the knowledge that I possess, that is, with\nfull knowledge of the real situation in which I find myself.\n\nWith this very simple observation is also solved an old puzzle of\nthe theory of volition. How does it happen that a man can choose\nbetween two dishes of food at an equal distance and moving in the\nsame manner,[1] or between two objects altogether identical, offered\nfor sale to him at the same time, at the same price, by the same\nindividual? First, we must correct the hypothesis, for as two identical\nthings do not exist in nature, so the two objects in question and the\ntwo possible actions of the example are not identical.\n\n[1] This was an example used by the Schoolmen and by Dante.\n\nIndeed the refined connoisseur always discovers some difference between\ntwo objects, which to the ignorant, the absent-minded, and the hasty\nseem to be the same. The question, then, is not of identical objects\nand actions, but of those as in which there is neither time nor mode\n(_majora premunt_) of recognizing the difference. For this reason,\ntherefore, we take no account of this difference, or, as is said,\nthey are looked upon as equal in this respect. But the _adiophora,_\nthe indifferent, do not exist, and owing to that abstraction, we do\nnot take account of other differences that always exist in the real\nsituation, owing to which my volition becomes concrete in a movement\nthat causes me to take the object on my right, because (let us suppose)\nI am wont to turn to the right, or because, owing to a superstition\nthat is not less a matter of habit, I prefer the right to the left,\nor because, through sympathy due to dignity, I prefer the object that\nis offered to me with the right hand to a similar object offered with\nthe left, which, if only for this reason, is, strictly speaking, not\nthe same, but different, and so on. These minute circumstances are\nabsent from consciousness and are not felt by the will, not because\nthey escape as a rule reflection. If we neglect them in analysis as\nnon-existent, this always occurs, because we substitute for the real\nsituation another unreal situation imagined by ourselves. Thus it has\nalso been remarked, as a proof of the irrationality believed to exist\nin our volitions and to be the cause of our acting without precise\nknowledge, that no reason nor any theoretic precedent can be adduced\nas to why, when fixing legal punishments, or in the application of\nsentences, we give forty and not forty-one days' imprisonment, a\nhundred lire fine instead of a hundred and one. But here, too, it is\nclear that the detailed facts are not wanting, the knowledge of which\ncauses us to will the punishment to be so and so. This knowledge is\nto be found in traditions, in the sympathy that we have for certain\nnumbers, in the ease with which they can be remembered or calculated,\nand so on.--To sum up, man forms the volitional act, not because he\npossesses some portentous faculty of extending his will outside the\nlimits of the intellect, but, on the contrary, because he possesses the\nfaculty of circumscribing himself within the limits of his intellect\non each occasion and of willing on that basis and within those limits.\nThat he wills, knowing some things and ignorant of infinite other\nthings, is indubitable. But this means that he is man and not God,\nthat he is a finite and not an infinite being, and that the sum of his\nhistorical knowledge is on each occasion human and finite, as is on\neach occasion the act of will which he forms upon it. Psychologists\nwould say that this arises from _narrowness_ of consciousness, but\nGoethe, on the contrary, remarked with metaphor more apt and thought\nmore profound, that the true artist is revealed in _knowing how to\nlimit himself._ God himself, as it seems, cannot act, save by limiting\nhimself in finite beings.\n\n[Sidenote: _Impossibility of volition with a false theoretic base._]\n\nIf the intention cannot be separated from the volition, because this\nbelongs to the real and not to the imaginary, and proceeds from\nthe known and never from the unknown, there yet remains a third\npossibility, which is, that the will results differently from the\nintention, owing to a _theoretical error_; as when we are said to\nerr _in good faith_ as to the actual situation, that is, we do not\nindeed substitute the unknown for the known, nor do we substitute the\nimaginary for the known, but we simply make a mistake in enunciating\nthe historical judgment to ourselves: intending to perform one action,\nwe perform on the contrary another.\n\nThis third possibility is also an impossibility, because it contradicts\nthe nature of the theoretical error, which, precisely because it is a\nquestion of error and not of truth, cannot be in its turn theoretical\nand must be and is practical, conformably to a theory of error of which\nmany great thinkers have seen or caught sight and which it is now\nfitting to restore and to make clear.\n\n[Sidenote: _Forms of the theoretical error and problem concerning its\nnature._]\n\nWe have elsewhere amply demonstrated how theoretical errors arise\nfrom the undue transference of one theoretical form to another, or\nof one theoretical product into another distinct from it. Thus, the\nartist who substitutes for the representation of the affections,\nreasoning on the affections, mingling art and philosophy, or he who\nin the composition of a work, fills the voids that his fancy has left\nin the composition, with unsuitable elements taken from other works,\ncommits the artistic error, ugliness. Thus too, the philosopher, who\nsolves a philosophical problem in a fantastic way, as would an artist,\nor, instead of a philosopheme, employs the historical, naturalistic\nor mathematical method, and so produces a myth, or a contingent fact\nuniversalized, or an abstraction in place of concreteness, that is\nto say, a philosophical error. It is also a philosophical error to\ntransport philosophical concepts from one order to another and to\ntreat art as though it were philosophy or morality as though it were\neconomy. This also happens in an analogous manner with the historian,\nthe natural scientist, and the mathematician, all of whom are wrong, if\nthey interweave extraneous methods with those that are their own, and\nwith the views, conceptions, and classification of one order, those of\nanother.--But if this be the way in which particular errors and general\nforms of theoretical error arise, what is the origin of the theoretical\nerror in universal? We have not asked this question explicitly\nelsewhere, because only now can it receive the most effective reply.\n\n[Sidenote: _Distinction between ignorance and error: practical genesis\nof the latter._]\n\nError is not ignorance, lack of knowledge, obscurity or doubt. An error\nof which we are altogether without consciousness is not error at all,\nbut that inexhaustible field which the spiritual activity continues to\nfill to infinity. True and proper error is the affirmation of knowing\nwhat we do not know, the substitution of a representation for that\nwhich we do not possess, an extraneous conception for the one that\nis wanting. Now affirmation is thought itself, it is truth itself.\nWhen an inquiry has been completed, a process of cogitation closed,\nthe result is the affirmation that a man makes to himself, not with\na new act added to the foregoing, but with the act itself of thought\nthat has thought. It is therefore impossible that in the circle of the\npure theoretical spirit error should ever arise. Man has in himself\nthe fountain of truth. If it be true that on the death-bed there is\nno lying, because man transcends the finite and communicates with\nthe infinite, then man who thinks is always on his bed of death, the\ndeath-bed of the finite, in contact with the infinite. We may know that\nwe are ignorant, but this consciousness of ignorance is the cogitative\nprocess in its _fieri,_ not yet having attained to its end, certainly\nnot (as has been said) error. Before this last can appear, before\nwe can affirm that we have reached a result, which the testimony of\nthe conscience says has not been reached, something extraneous to\nthe theoretical spirit must intervene, that is to say, a practical\nact which simulates the theoretical. And it simulates it, not indeed\nintrinsically (one does not lie with the depth of oneself or on one's\ndeath-bed), but in taking hold of the external means of communication,\nof the word or expression as sound and physical fact, and diverting\nit to mean what, in the given circumstances, it could not mean. The\nerroneous affirmation has been rendered possible, because something\nelse has followed the true affirmation, which is purely theoretical,\nsomething that is improperly called affirmation in the practical sense,\nwhereas it is only _communication,_ which can be substituted in a\ngreater or less degree for the truth and falsely represent it. Thus the\ntheoretical error _in general_ arises, as do its particular forms and\nmanifestations, from the substitution for, or the illegitimate mating\nof two forms of the spirit. These cannot be both theoretical here, but\nmust be the theoretical and the practical forms, precisely because we\nare here in the field of the spirit in general and of the fundamental\nforms of its activity. We are ignorant, then, because it is necessary\nto be ignorant and to feel oneself ignorant, in order to attain to\ntruth; but we err only because _we wish to err._\n\n[Sidenote: _Proofs and confirmation._]\n\nLike all true doctrines, this of the practical nature of the\ntheoretical error, which at first sight seems most strange (especially\nto professed philosophers), is yet found to be constantly confirmed\nin ordinary thought. For all know and all continually repeat that\n(immoderate) passions and (illegitimate) interests lead insidiously\ninto error, that we err, to be quick and finish or to obtain for\nourselves undeserved repose, that we err by acquiescence in old ideas,\nthat is to say, in order not to allow ourselves to be disturbed in our\nrepose that has been unduly prolonged, and so on. We do not mention\nthose cases in which it is a question of solemn and evident lies,\nthe brazen-faced manifestation of interests openly illegitimate. Let\nus limit ourselves to the modest forms of error, to the venial sins,\nbecause if these be proved to be the result of will, by so much the\nmore will this be proved of the shameless forms, the deadly sins. It is\nalso said that we err in _deafening_ ourselves and others with words,\nwith the verse that sounds and does not create, with the brush that\ncharms but does not express, with the formul\u00e6 that seem to contain a\nthought but contain the void. In this way we come to recognize that\nwill has been rendered possible, owing to the communication being a\npractical fact, of which a bad use can be made by means of a volitional\nact. For the rest, if this were not so, what guarantee would truth\never possess? If it were possible to err even once in perfect good\nfaith and that the mind should confuse true and false, embracing the\nfalse as true, how could we any longer distinguish the one from the\nother? Thought would be radically corrupt, whereas it is incorrupt and\nincorruptible.\n\nIt is vain, therefore, to except the existence or the possibility of\nerrors of good faith, because truth alone is of good faith, and error\nis always in a greater or less or least degree, of bad faith. Were\nthis not so, it would be incorrigible, whereas it is by definition\ncorrigible. Consequently, the last attempt to differentiate intention\nfrom volition fails, since it posits an intention that is frustrated in\nthe volition, as the effect of a theoretical error, a good intention\nthat becomes, through no fault of its own, a bad volition. The\nintention, being volition, takes possession of the whole volitional\nman, causing the intellect to be attentive and indefatigable in the\nsearch for truth, the soul ready to accept it, whatever it be, pure of\nevery passion that is not the passion for truth itself, and eliminates\nthe possibility, or assumes the responsibility of error.\n\nA proof of this is afforded by the fact that to exquisite and delicate\nsouls, to consciences pure and dignified, even what are called their\ntheoretical errors are a biting bitterness, and they blame themselves\nwith them. On the other hand, in the presence of the foolish and the\nwicked, one is often in doubt as to whether their folly and wickedness\ncome from the head or from the heart, whether it be madness rather\nthan set purpose. The truth is that all this evil, which seems to\narise from defective vision, comes really from the heart, for they\nhave themselves forged those false views with their sophisms, their\nillegitimate internal affirmations and suggestions, that they may be\nmore free in their evil inclinations, thus obtaining for themselves\nand for others a false moral _alibi._ We must applaud the former and\nexhort them to continue to persevere in their scruple, the condition\nof theoretical and practical health: we must inculcate to the second\na return to themselves and the removal of the mask that they have\nassumed' as a disguise from themselves, before assuming it towards\nothers.\n\n[Sidenote: _Justification of the practical repression of error._]\n\nA consequence of the principle established is the justification of the\nuse of practical measures to induce those who err theoretically to\ncorrect themselves, castigating them, when this is of assistance, for\nadmonition and example. It will be replied that these are measures of\nother times, and that we are now in an epoch of liberty, when their\nuse is no longer permissible, and that we should now employ only the\npersuasive power of truth. But those who say this are without eyes to\nlook within upon themselves. The Holy Inquisition is truly _holy_ and\nlives for that reason in its _eternal_ idea. The Inquisition that is\ndead was nothing but one of its contingent historical incarnations.\nAnd the Inquisition must have been justified and beneficial, if whole\npeoples invoked and defended it, if men of the loftiest souls founded\nand created it severely and impartially, and its very adversaries\napplied it on their own account, pyre answering to pyre. Thus Christian\nRome persecuted heretics as Imperial Rome had persecuted Christians,\nand Protestants burned Catholics as Catholics had burned Protestants.\nIf certain ferocious practices are now abandoned (are they definitely\nabandoned, or do they not persist in a different form?), we do not for\nthat reason cease from practically oppressing those who promulgate\nerrors. No society can dispense with this discipline, although the\nmode of its application is subject to practical, utilitarian and moral\ndeliberation. We begin with man as a child, whose mental education is\nat once and above all practical and moral education, education for\nwork and for sincerity (and no one has ever been seriously educated\nwho has not received at the least a provident slap or two or had his\nears pulled). This education is continued with the punishments for\nculpable negligence and ignorance threatened in the laws, and so on\nuntil we reach the spontaneous discipline of society, by means of which\nthe artist who produces the ugly and the man of science who teaches\nthe false are rebuked by the intelligent, or fall into discredit with\nthem. Such illegitimate and transitory applause as they may sometimes\nobtain at the hands of the unintelligent and of the multitude is but\na poor and precarious recompense for them. Literary and artistic\ncriticism always has of necessity, and the more so the better it\nunderstands its office, a practical and moral aspect reconcilable with\nthe purest \u00e6stheticity and theoreticity in the intrinsic examination of\nworks.\n\n[Sidenote: _Empirical distinctions of errors and philosophical\ndistinctions._]\n\nWe certainly have good empirical reasons for distinguishing between\nerrors of bad faith and errors of good faith, errors that are avoidable\nand errors that are unavoidable, pardonable and unpardonable,\nmortal and venial. No one would wish to deny that there is a wide\ndifference between a slight distraction that leads to a wide erroneous\naffirmation, and such malice as gives rise to a small and almost\nimperceptible error, to a lie, which, externally considered, is almost\nharmless. We should be as indulgent in respect to the former as we are\nsevere in respect to the latter. And from the empirical standpoint\nwe should recommend in certain cases tolerance and indulgence in\nrespect to the theoretical error, which should be looked upon rather\nas ignorance than as sin. We cannot but take count of all those\naffirmations, which, while they do not represent the firm security\nof the true, are yet offered as points of support, or as provisional\naffirmations, like those _tibicines,_ props or stakes, those bad verses\nthat Virgil allowed to remain in the _Aeneid,_ with the intention of\nreturning to them again. But it was needful to record the true bases\nof the theory of error against the illusions arising from empiricism,\nthe more so since the general tendency of our times (for reasons that\nwe need not here inquire into) has led to their not being recognized.\nThose bases are in the practical spirit, and the practical theory of\nerror is one of the justified forms of pragmatism, although perhaps it\nbe that very truth against which the pragmatists sin.\n\n\n\n\nV\n\nIDENTITY OF VOLITION AND ACTION AND DISTINCTION BETWEEN VOLITION AND\nEVENT\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Volition and action: intuition and expression._]\n\nSuch are the relations between the practical activity and the\ntheoretical, which precedes and conditions it.\n\nAsking ourselves now, what are the relations of this same activity with\nthat which seems to follow it and to be outside the spirit, in company\nwith corporeality, naturality, physic and matter (or however else it\nmay be called)? we find ourselves face to face with a problem which\nwe have already treated and solved in another part of the system of\nthe spirit, and which we shall solve here in an analogous manner. What\nwe may now designate as the problem of the relation between _volition\nand action,_ formerly appeared in the theoretical philosophy as the\nproblem of the relation between _intuition_ and _expression._--Are then\nvolitions and actions two distinct terms that may appear now together,\nnow separate? Can volition remain for its part isolated from action,\nwhereas action is not able to separate itself from volition, or is the\nopposite true?--We reply, as we did on the former occasion, by denying\nthe problem itself and by identifying intuition with expression,\nin such a manner that effective intuition became at the same time\nexpression, and it was declared that a so-called expression, which was\nnot at the same time intuition, was declared to be non-existent.--We\nreply in like manner on this occasion, that _volition and action_ are\n_one,_ and that volition without action or action without volition is\ninconceivable.\n\n[Sidenote: _Spirit and nature._]\n\nIndeed, the relation between spirit and nature (which is a general\nrelation, including the other particulars between intuition and\nexpression, or between volition and action), understood in the way\nthat it is here, is a relation, not between two entities, but only\nbetween two different methods of elaborating one unique reality,\nwhich is spiritual reality: thus it is not truly a relation. Nor are\nthe two modes of elaboration two co-ordinated modes of knowledge,\nfor that would lead back to a duplicity of objects, but the first is\ncognoscitive elaboration and true science, or philosophy, in which\nreality is revealed as activity and spirituality, while the other is an\nabstract elaboration for practical convenience, without cognoscitive\ncharacter. When this has been posited, the spiritual act of volition\nhas not another reality face to face with it, with which it must join\nor combine, in order to become concrete, but is itself full reality.\nThat which is called matter, movement, and material modification from\nthe naturalistic point of view, is already included in the volitional\nspiritual act, of which it might be said without difficulty (as was\nonce said amid much scandal of the Ego) that it is heavy, round,\nsquare, white, red, sonorous, and, therefore, physically determinable.\nThe volition is not followed by a movement of the legs or arms; it\nis those movements themselves that are material for the physical,\nspiritual for the philosopher, extrinsic for the former, at once\nintrinsic and extrinsic for the latter, or better, neither extrinsic\nnor intrinsic (an arbitrary division). As poetry lives in speech and\npainting in colours, so the will lives in actions, not because the one\nis in the other as in an envelope, but because the one is the other and\nwithout the other would be mutilated and indeed inconceivable.\n\n[Sidenote: _Inexistence of volitions without actions and vice versa._]\n\nWe cannot affirm the distinction between volition and action, save in\nforce and as a proof of a dualistic metaphysical view, of an abstract\nspiritualism, with matter as being and substance for correlative\nterm. But this point of view is eliminated by the idealist view,\nwhich recognizes only one unique substance, and that as spirituality\nand subjectivity. Without, however, now basing ourselves upon such\nconsiderations, and according to the order that we follow, applying\nourselves to the examination of the facts of consciousness, we affirm\nthat it would be impossible to adduce one volitional fact that should\nnot be also a movement called physical. Those volitional acts, which\naccording to some philosophers are consumed within the will and are\nin that way distinguished from external facts, are a phantasm. Every\nvolition, be it never so small, sets the organism in motion and\nproduces what are called external facts. The purpose is already an\neffectuation, a beginning of combat; indeed, simple desire is not\nwithout effects, if it be possible to destroy oneself with desires,\nas is in effect maintained On the other hand, it is not possible to\nindicate actions without volitions. Instinctive or habitual acts that\nhave become instinctive are adduced; but these too are not set in\nmotion, save by the will, not one by one, in their particulars, but\nas a whole, in the same way as a single hand sets in motion a most\ncomplicated machine which a thousand hands have previously constructed.\nThere cannot then be volition without action, nor action without\nvolition, as there cannot be intuition without expression or expression\nwithout intuition.\n\n[Sidenote: _Illusions as to the distinction between these terms._]\n\nIt is well, however, to indicate one among the many sources from which\nis derived the illusion of this distinction and separation, effectively\ninexistent. A volitional act, which is a process of some duration,\nmay be interrupted and substituted for other volitional acts; it may\ndeclare itself again and again begin its work (although this will\nalways be more or less modified), and this may give occasion to new\ninterruptions and new beginnings. It seems that in this way the will\nstands on one side, as something formed and definite, and that on the\nother execution pursues its way and is subject to the most varied\naccidents. But volition and execution proceed with equal and indeed\nwith one single step. What we will we execute; the volition changes as\nthe execution changes. In the same way, when we are engaged upon a work\nof art, on a long poem for instance, the illusion arises of an abstract\nconception or plan, which the poet carries out as he versifies. But\nevery poet knows that a poem is not created from an abstract plan, that\nthe initial poetical image is not without rhythm and verse, and that\nit does not need rhythm and verse applied to it afterwards. He knows\nthat it is in reality a primitive intuition-expression, in which all\nis determined and nothing is determined, and what has been already\nintuified is already expressed, and what will afterwards be expressed\nwill only afterwards be intuified. The initial intuition is certainly\nnot an abstract plan, but a living and vital germ; and so is the\nvolitional act.\n\n[Sidenote: _Distinction between action and succession or event._]\n\nWhen, therefore, it is affirmed that a volition is truly such, only\nwhen it produces effects, or that a volition is to be judged by\nits results, it is impossible not to assent, as we assent that an\nunexpressed expression or an unversified verse is neither an expression\nnor a verse. But in this signification only, because those propositions\nhave sometimes assumed another, which on the contrary it is needful\nresolutely to reject. This is that in them action (will-action) has\nbeen confused with _succession or event._ Now, if volition coincide\nwith action, it does not and cannot coincide with _event._\n\n[Sidenote: _Volition and event._]\n\nIt cannot coincide, because what is action and what is event? Action\nis the act of the one; event, is the act of the whole: will is of man,\nevent of God. Or, to put this proposition in a less imaginary form,\nthe volition of the individual is as it were the contribution that he\nbrings to the volitions of all the other beings in the universe, event\nthe aggregate of all the wills and the answer to all the questions. In\nthis answer is included and absorbed the will itself of the individual,\nwhich we have taken and contemplated alone. If, then, we wished to make\nthe volition depend upon event, action upon succession, we should be\nundertaking to make one fact depend upon another fact, of which the\nfirst is a constituent part, placing among the antecedents of action\nwhat is its consequence, among things given those to be created, the\nunknown with the known, the future in the past.\n\n[Sidenote: _Successful and unsuccessful actions: criticism._]\n\nThe concepts of actions that are successful and of those that are\nunsuccessful, of actions that become fully concrete in the fact, and of\nthose that become concrete only in part or not at all, are therefore\ninexact. No action (not even those that are empirically said to be most\nsuccessful, not even the most obvious and ordinary) succeeds fully, in\nthe sense that it alone constitutes the fact: every action diverges by\nnecessity and by definition from succession or happening. If I return\nhome every day by the usual road, my return home is every day new and\ndifferent from that which might have been, imagined. This often amounts\nto a diversity of particulars which we may call of least importance,\nbut which yet are not for that reason the less real. On the other hand,\nno action, however vain it be held (if it be action and not velleity of\naction and intrinsic contradiction, or by as much as it is action and\nnot imagination and contradiction), passes without trace and without\nresult.\n\nIf any action could be rendered altogether vain, this same rendering\nvain would invade all other actions and no fact would happen.\n\n[Sidenote: _Action and foresight: critique._]\n\nThe current proposition that we cannot act without _foreseeing_ is\nalso incorrect. Since the conception of foreseeing is contradictory,\nand since we cannot know a fact if it be not first a fact, that is, if\nit have not happened; if the contradictory hypothesis held, it would\nbe impossible to act. But the truth is that what is called foreseeing\nis nothing but seeing; it is to know the given facts and to reason\nupon them with the universals. That is to say, it is the invariable\ntheoretical base of action, already illustrated. When we will and act,\nwhat we will and do is _our own action_ itself, not that of others or\nof all the others, and so is the resulting event. _Voluntas fertur in\nincognitum,_ but the all intent upon itself does not take count of the\nunknown, which is in this case relatively unknowable and, therefore,\nrelatively non-existent. The individual is aware that when he acts, he\ndoes not aim at anything but the placing of new elements in universal\nreality. He takes care that they shall be energetic and vital, without\nnourishing the foolish illusion that they must be the only ones, or\nthat they alone produce reality. A popular little tale tells how\nGod, who had at first granted to men to know their future lives and\nthe day of their death, afterwards withdrew this knowledge from them\naltogether, because He perceived from experience that such knowledge\nmade them lazy and inert. The new ignorance, on the other hand, revived\nand impelled them to vie with one another in activity, as though it\nhad been granted them to obtain and to enjoy everything.[1] How can we\ndoubt that our good and energetic work can ever be rendered nugatory\nin the event? That is unthinkable, and the saying _fiat justitia et\npereat mundus_ is rectified by that other saying: _fiat justitia ne\npereat mundus._ Bad is not born from good, nor inaction from action.\nEvery volitional man, every man active in goodness, is a contradiction\nto that one-sided attitude in which the will is suppressed to give\nplace to happening, a world unmade is believed to be already made,\narms are crossed or the field deserted. But it also contradicts the\nfatuous security that the future world will conform to the ends of our\nindividual actions taken in isolation; saying with the good sense of\nthe Florentine statesman, that we ourselves control one half of our\nactions, or little less, Fortune the other half. Hence our trust in our\nown strength; hence, too, our apprehension of the pitfalls of Fortune,\ncontinually arising and continually to be conquered. This constitutes\nthe interior drama of true men of action, of the political geniuses\nwho have guided the destinies of man. While the unfit is all anxiety,\nor bewilderment and depression, the fatuous is all over-confidence or\nexpectation of the impossible, also losing himself in bewilderment when\nhe finally discovers that the reality is not what he imagined. Hence\nalso the serenity of the sage, who knows that whatever happen there\nwill always be opportunity for good conduct. _Si fractus illabatur\norbis,_ there will always be a better world to construct. Hope and fear\nare related to action itself in its becoming, not to its result and\nsuccession.\n\n[Sidenote: _Confirmation of the inderivability of the value of action\nfrom its success._]\n\nWe can illustrate the fact that no one seriously thinks of valuing\nan action according to its success, but that all value it at its\nintrinsic value as action, from the circumstance that no one recognizes\nany merit to the action of a marks-man who hits the bull's-eye, when\nshooting at the target with closed eyes; whereas no little merit is\nrecognized to him who, after having taken careful aim, does not hit\nthe mark but goes very near it. We are certainly often deceived in our\npractical judgments, and fortunate men are continually praised to the\nskies as men of great practical capacity, while the unfortunate are\nhurled into the mire as incompetent; for we do not distinguish exactly\nbetween action and success. This is not only so as to judgments of the\npresent life: it is also true of the life of the past, of the pages of\nhistory, where imbeciles are made heroes and heroes calumniated; to\nthe worst of leaders is attributed the honour of victories, ridiculous\nstatesmen credited with ability. On the other hand, the sins of madmen\nare attributed to the wise, or they are accused of faults that are\nnobody's fault, but the result of circumstances. In vain will the\nPericleses of all time ask, as did the ancient Pericles of the people\nof Athens, that the unforeseen misfortunes of the Peloponnesian war\nshould be attributed to him, provided that by way of compensation he\nmight have praise for all the fortunate things that should also happen\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd.[2] All this depends upon an imperfect knowledge of facts\nmore than upon anything else: hence the necessity of criticism. Just as\nthe work of the poet and of the painter is not materially to be laid\nhold of in the poem or in the picture, but requires a re-evocation that\nis often very difficult, so the work of the man of action, which is in\npart fused in events and partly contained in them, as a bud that will\nopen in the future, asks a keen eye and the greatest care in valuation.\nThe history of men of action and of their deeds is easily changed\ninto _legend,_ and legends are never altogether eliminable, because\nmisunderstanding or error is never altogether eliminable.\n\n[Sidenote: _Explanation of apparently conflicting facts._]\n\nOn the other hand, certain commonplaces seem to be in opposition to\nthe criterion itself: for example, that men are judged by success and\nthat it matters little what we have willed and done, when the result\nis not satisfactory. There are also certain popular customs that make\nindividuals responsible for what happens outside their own spheres\nof action, not to mention the well-known historical examples of\nunfortunate leaders crucified at Carthage and guillotined at Paris, for\nno other cause in reality than that of not having won the victory. And\nthere is also the insistence of certain thinkers upon the necessity of\nnever distinguishing the judgment of the act from that of the fact. But\nsuch insistence is nothing but a new aspect of the implacable struggle\nthat it has been necessary to conduct against the morality of the mere\nintention and against the sophisms and the subterfuges that arise from\nit; an insistence that has expressed itself in paradoxical formul\u00e6,\nas are also paradoxical the trivial remarks of ordinary life that\nhave been mentioned. As to the customs and condemnations narrated by\nhistory, these were without doubt extraordinary expedients in desperate\ncases, in which people had placed themselves in such a position that it\nwas impossible or most difficult to verify intentions and actions, and\nto distinguish misfortunes from betrayals; and as all expedients born\nof like situations sometimes hit the mark, that is to say, punish bad\nfaith, so will others increase with irrationality the evil that they\nwould have wished to diminish, since in those cases there has not been\nany bad faith to punish and to correct.\n\n\n[1] _Arch. p. lo st. d. trad, pop.,_ of Pitr\u00e9 (1882), pp. 70-72.\n\n[2] Thuc. ii. 64.\n\n\n\n\nVI\n\n\nTHE PRACTICAL JUDGMENT, THE HISTORY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PRACTICAL\n\n\nWith these last considerations, we are conducted to the theory of\npractical judgments, that is, to those judgments of which we have\ndemonstrated the impossibility, when their precedence to the volitional\nact was asserted; but their conceivability as following it, indeed\ntheir necessity, is clear, by the intrinsic law of the Spirit; which\nconsists in always preserving or in continually attaining to full\npossession of itself.\n\n[Sidenote: _Practical taste and judgment._]\n\nBut we must not confound the practical judgment with what has been\ncalled _practical taste, or the immediate consciousness of value, or\nthe feeling_ of the value of the volitional act. None can doubt that\nsuch a taste, consciousness, or feeling is a real fact. The practical\nact brings with it approbation and disapprobation, joy and sorrow,\nand like facts of consciousness that are altogether unreflective. By\nthese we explain the immediate sympathy that certain actions afford\nus, and the enthusiasms that are often spread through wide circles of\nsociety, and the force of example, which is most successful in arousing\nimitative efforts. Thus at certain moments the soul of all seems to\nvibrate in unison with the soul of one, and the actions of many to be\nprepared and carried out, as though with one accord, without its being\npossible to say at those moments what is willed, what abhorred and what\nadmired. That taste, or consciousness, or feeling is not, however,\ndistinct from the volitional act, and is, indeed, the volitional act\nitself. It is that internal control of which we have already spoken,\nthat immediate feeling of oneself, that immediate consciousness, which\nmakes of it a spiritual act. Abstract it from the volitional act and\nthe volitional act itself disappears from before you.\n\nIf it can take place, not only in the individual who is acting, but\nalso in him who contemplates the action, that is because the individual\nwho contemplates becomes unified in that moment with the individual\nwho acts, he wills imitatively with him, with him suffers and enjoys,\nas the disc-thrower watches with his eye and with his whole person\nthe disc that has been thrown, follows its rapid and direct course\nand the dangers in the form of obstacles that it seems to be about to\nstrike, its turns and deviations, and seems to become himself a running\nturning disc. The denomination \"practical taste\" is very well chosen,\nbecause the analogy with the theoretic activity and with \u00e6sthetic taste\nis here most full. But since \u00e6sthetic taste is not \u00e6sthetic judgment,\nas the mere reproduction of the \u00e6sthetic act is not the criticism of\nit, as the listener to a poem who sings within himself with the poet,\nmust not be confused with the critic, who analyses and understands\nit, any more than the contemplator of a picture, of a statue, or of a\npiece of architecture, who paints with the painter, sculptures with\nthe sculptor, or ideally raises airy masses with the architect; so we\nmust distinguish practical taste and sympathy (or antipathy) from the\npractical judgment. Without taste (\u00e6sthetic or practical), judgment\n(\u00e6sthetic or practical) is not possible; but taste is not judgment,\nwhich demands a further act of the spirit.\n\n[Sidenote: _The practical judgment as historical judgment._]\n\nThe practical judgment is, as has already been observed, a _historical_\njudgment; so that to judge practical acts and to give their history\nis really the same thing. What occurs here is analogous to what was\ndemonstrated of the theoretic and \u00e6sthetic act, when we illustrated\nthe coincidence of literary and artistic criticism with literary and\nartistic history. Criticism, be it practical or theoretic, cannot\nconsist of anything but determining whether a spiritual act has taken\nplace and what it has been. The differences between the one and the\nother criticism arise only from the diversity of content present\nin each case, asking different categories of judgment, but not of\nlogical procedure, which is in both cases the same. Every other\nconception of the judgment, which should make it consist, not of a\nhistorical judgment, but of heaven knows what sort of measurement upon\ntranscendental models, separated from the real world by a measurement\nof which the measure is extraneous to the measured, indeed (as though\nit were something of the other world) extraneous to the real itself,\nruns against insuperable contradictions, and makes judgment arbitrary\nand history grotesque; history would thus have value, not in itself,\nbut outside itself, enjoying it as a loan from others, a gracious\nconcession. But even these contradictions cannot appear in all their\ncrudity, nor the opposite theory in all its unshakable truth, save from\nwhat will be seen further on, and we must here be satisfied with the\nenunciation.\n\n[Sidenote: _Its logic._]\n\nIn order to avoid repetition, we must refer to the analysis of the\nsingle or historical judgment already given and assume its result,\nnamely, that it is the only judgment in which there is a true and\nproper distinction between subject and predicate, and that it is\ncomposed of an intuitive element (subject) and of an intellectual\nelement (predicate). In like manner the practical judgment is not\npossible without a clear representation of the act to be judged and\na conception not less clear of what the practical act is in its\nuniversality and in its particular forms, and so on, specifying in its\nvarious sub-forms and possibilities of individuation. The judgment is\nthe compenetration of the two elements, the historical synthesis which\nestablishes: Peter has accomplished a useful act in tilling a piece\nof land of such and such dimensions; Paul has accomplished an action\nthat is not useful in opening a new manufactory of boots, more costly\nand not better than those already on the market; -Pope Leo III. acted\nwisely, as custodian of the universal character of the Church of Rome,\nin consecrating Charles the Frank emperor, thus restoring the empire of\nthe West;--Louis XVI. acted foolishly in not deciding upon a prompt and\nprofound change of the French political constitution, and in allowing\nhimself to be afterwards dragged unwilling whither he had not known\nhow to go of his own will. And so on. There are therefore two ways of\nsinning against the exactitude of the practical judgment: either by not\nhaving exact information as to the content of the volitional act to be\njudged and understood, or by not having an exact criterion of judgment.\nThe first of these errors can be exemplified by those judgments that\nare so frequently pronounced, without knowledge as to the true sequence\nof events or without placing oneself in the precise conditions in\nwhich the person to be judged found himself. Hence it happens not less\noften, that when the facts are really known, the precise conditions\nunderstood, and the defence of the accused has been heard, the judgment\nmust be altered. A cause of the second error is the substitution\n(likewise a very common occurrence) of one category of judgment for the\nother, as when a moral act is praised and admired for its cleverness,\nor the gestures and the felicitous utterance of a practical man are\npraised, as though it were a question of judging an actor or reciter.\nAs in art, so in life, differences of judgment arise, not so much from\ndifference of understanding, as from these oscillations and undue\ntranspositions of judgments and concepts.\n\nIt is likewise superfluous to enter into disputes as to the\nabsoluteness or relativity of the practical judgment, because these\nhave been superseded by the concept of the historical judgment, which\nis _both absolute and relative:_ absolute for the categories that it\napplies, relative for the matter, always new, to which it applies them.\n\n[Sidenote: _Importance of the practical judgment._]\n\nThe importance of the practical judgment for practical life is of the\ngreatest, and when we are warned: _nolite judicare_ or _noli nimium\njudicare,_ what are meant are not true acts of judgment, but certain\npsychical conditions, which reveal slight spiritual seriousness.\nAnd the importance is of the greatest, precisely because the nature\nof the judgment is historical, and as we know already, historical\nknowledge, knowledge, that is, of actual situations, is the basis of\nfuture actions. For this reason every man who is strongly volitional is\ncontinually submitting himself and others to judgment; for this reason\nwe feel the need of talking to others about our own actions, in order\nto be upheld by the spirit of others in forming a just judgment. This\nis the origin of such social institutions as the confessional, or of\npoems such as the _Divina Commedia._ The only judgment without meaning\nis that _final judgment_ made in the valley Jehoshaphat, because what\nobject can there be in giving oneself the trouble of judging a world\nlooked upon as ended? We judge in order to continue to act, that is,\nto live, and when universal life is at an end, judgment is vain (vain\npraise or paradise, vain cruelty or hell).\n\n[Sidenote: _Difference between the practical judgment and the judgment\nof the event._]\n\nThe value of the volitional act is therefore, as has been demonstrated,\nin the act itself, and we must not expect and derive it from succession\nor event. The practical judgment always concerns the volitional act,\nthe intention, the action (which are all one), and never the result or\nhappening. With this distinction we annul one of the most disputed,\nintricate, and difficult questions: if it be possible to judge, or\nas they say, to try history. Since we know well that judgment and\nhistorical narrative coincide, we must reply in general, as we have\nreplied, in the affirmative. We must in consequence deny all the absurd\nclaims of an objectivity, which is the irrealizable aspiration to the\nabstention from thought and from history itself. We must also deny to\nthe historian that frivolous privilege by which he is allowed to judge,\nalmost tolerating in him an original sin or an incorrigible vice,\nprovided he clearly distinguish between the serious and the facetious,\nbetween the narrative and the judgment, as though the distinction were\never possible. But the prejudice against those who make out a case\nagainst history on the ground that it should have happened in a manner\ndifferent from what actually took place, and describe how this should\nhave been, is well justified. Whoever possesses historical sense,\nor even simple good sense, cannot but agree to this. The question\nshould in reality be asked differently, and in this manner: Is it\ncorrect to apply to history the categories of judgment that we apply\nto volitions and single acts? Is it correct to judge in a utilitarian\nor moral manner historical events and the whole course of history?\nRectified in these terms, the question becomes clear, and requires a\nnegative answer. When we narrate artistic or philosophical, economic\nor ethical history, we place ourselves at the point of view of the\nindividual activity. As we expose \u00e6sthetic or philosophical products,\nuseful or moral actions, we judge them at the same time \u00e6sthetically,\nphilosophically, economically, morally, and we know in every case if\nthe action has been such as it ought. Who would hesitate to affirm that\n(at least, as an affirmative method) the _Africa_ of Petrarch was not\nwhat he wished it to be, a poetic work; or that Emmanuel Kant did not\nsucceed in establishing from his practical postulates, according to his\nintention, the existence of a personal God and the immortality of the\nsoul; or that Themistocles behaved in an undecided manner as regards\nXerxes, not knowing how to resolve to sacrifice his ambitions to the\nsafety of Greece, nor to inflict a grave loss upon his country, in\norder to satisfy his desire for vengeance; or that Napoleon ignored the\nrights of man, and behaved as one without scruples, when he ordered the\narrest and shooting of the Duc d'Enghien? But what can be the advantage\nof asking if the arrest of the Persian expansion in Europe were a bad\nthing or a good? if the creation of the Roman Empire deserve blame?\nif the Catholic Church were wrong in concentrating Western religion\nin herself? if the English revolution of the seventeenth century, the\nFrench of the eighteenth, or the Italian of the nineteenth, could have\nbeen avoided? if Dante could have been born in our day and have sung\nthe Kantian rather than the Thomist philosophy? if Michael Angelo\nmight have painted the victories of the modern industrial world, which\nManzotti has made into a ballet in his _Excelsior,_ instead of the\nvisions of the Last Judgment? Here we have before us, not individual\nspirits, whose work we examine in given circumstances, but facts that\nhave happened, and these are the work, not of the individual, but of\nthe Whole. They are (as has already been said) the work of God, and God\nis not to be judged, or rather He is to be judged, but not from the\nvisual angle at which individual works and actions are to be judged. He\nis not to be judged as a poet or as a philosopher, as a statesman or\na hero, as a finite being working in the infinite. The contemplation\nof His work is at the same time judgment. _Die Weltgeschichte das\nWeltgericht_: the history itself of the world is the judgment of the\nworld, and in recounting the course of history, while not applying the\njudgment of the categories above indicated, which are inapplicable, we\ndo, however, apply a judgment, which is that of necessity and reality.\nThat which has been had to be; and that which is truly real is truly\nrational.\n\nBut we cannot give the justification of this supreme judgment, of this\nworld-embracing judgment (we repeat the refrain), until further on. Let\nit suffice for the present that in discussing the practical judgment\nwe have limited it to all that part of history which contemplates\nactions, that is, to individual activity, to biography and to the\nbiographical element, which is the material of all history. In it,\nthe practical judgment is active and energetic, but is silent before\nthe event, and every history is like an impetuous river of individual\nworks, which flows into a sea, where it is immediately restored to calm\nserene. The rush of actions and of their vicissitudes, of victory and\nof defeat, of wisdom and of folly, of life and of death, are set at\nrest in the solemn peace of the \"historical event.\"\n\n[Sidenote: _Progress of action and progress of Reality._]\n\nAs we have distinguished the practical judgment from the judgment of\nthe event, the historical-individual from the historical-cosmic, so we\nmust distinguish the concept of progress, as the progress which belongs\nto the volitional act and that which belongs to the event. The concept\nof progress (according to the explanations given elsewhere) coincides\nwith the concept of activity. There is progress whenever an activity\ndeclares itself, whenever (not to leave the circle of the practical) we\npass from irresolution to resolution, from conflict to the volitional\nsynthesis, from suspense to action. But the event, which is no longer\naction but result, that is to say, is action, not of the individual\nbut of the Whole, is not to be judged with that concept of progress,\nand in it progress coincides with the fact. That which follows\nchronologically, if it be truly real, represents a progress upon what\nprecedes. Even illness is progress, if there were a latent crisis of\nhealth, and getting over it gives rise to more vigorous health. Even\napparent regression (invasion of barbarians) is progress, if it lead to\nthe ripening of a wider civilization. What is death for the individual\nis life for the Whole.--Hence the insipidity of the question, often\nproposed and still discussed by writers of treatises, whether there be\npractical progress, or as is said when limiting the question, moral\nprogress.\n\nFrom the individual point of view, at every new volitional act,\npracticality and the relative impulse of progress are once more born,\nand they are extinguished with that act, to be born again in a new\none, and so on in a circle of infinite changes. As to cosmic reality,\nwe must declare, as in the previous example of the course of history,\nthat it is itself progress (which is also confirmed by the positivist\nphilosophy, when it declares that reality is evolved), but this is\nprogress of reality and therefore progress without adjective, or at\nleast without practical or moral adjective.\n\n[Sidenote: _Precedence of the philosophy of the practical over the\npractical judgment._]\n\nThe intellectual element, which is constitutive in the practical\njudgment as in every other historical judgment, can also be called\nthe philosophical element. Hence the consequence that a philosophy of\nthe practical activity is a necessary condition of every practical\njudgment. This is another thesis of paradoxical appearance, which,\nhowever, it is not difficult to make plausible with suitable\nreflections, plausible at least to those who do not refuse to reflect.\nFor what is philosophy but the thinking of the concept, and in this\ncase the concept of the practical? The conclusion, then, that a\nphilosophy is necessary for a judgment is irrefutable. The difficulty\nin admitting it comes from the false association of ideas, for which\nthe sound of the word \"philosophy\" suggests the disputes of the\nschools, the treatise, the manual, or the academic lecture whereas\nwe should think of philosophy in all its extension and profundity,\ninborn in the human spirit (we have elsewhere called this _ingenuous\nphilosophy_) before its more complicated forms Every man has his\nown philosophy, more or less developed or rudimentary, more or less\ndefective no one is without any philosophy. The first judgment on the\npractical activity is already guided by the light of a philosophical\nconcept which, if it does not give a light, gives at least a glimmer,\nif not straight and certain, at the least undulating and tremulous,\nproducing therefore tremulous and undulating judgments. Ingenuous\nphilosophy and philosophy in the specific sense are not, therefore,\nseparable from one another, with a clear-cut distinction, and if there\nexist a disability in pronouncing a judgment as to many people and\nto many actions, that arises from difficulties consequent upon the\nphilosophy of the time, which must first of all be solved, before\npassing to the effective judgment. Hence long researches into doctrine\nare sometimes necessary. Thus it is difficult to do justice to the\nwork of a rebel or of a revolutionary, without first clearing away\nprejudices and understanding what a revolution is, and the relative\nvalue of what is called obedience to the existing order of things.\nThus it would be naive to condemn as faithless the Saxon regiments\nwhich deserted Napoleon on the field of Leipzig, or Marshal Ney, who\nreturned to the service of Napoleon from that of Louis XVIII., unless\nwe previously make clear the meaning and the limits of the political\ntreaty and of the military oath, which cannot be the only unconditioned\nthings in a world where nothing is unconditioned save the world itself.\n\n[Sidenote: _Confirmation of the philosophical incapacity of the\npsychological method._]\n\nFrom the recognized precedence of philosophy over the practical\njudgment arises the confirmation of the impossibility of the\npsychological method as the foundation of a Philosophy of the\npractical. Descriptive psychology is based upon practical facts\nhistorically ascertained, or upon practical judgments. Hence, by\nproceeding from particular to particular, it is not only incapable of\nexhausting the infinite and of attaining to the real universal, but by\nthe very choice of particular examples, which should be the foundation\nof philosophical research relating to the practical, it is under the\nnecessity of first possessing a concept of the practical. Hence it\nstands between Scylla and Charybdis, between a vicious _progressus ad\ninfinitum_ and a not less vicious circle.\n\nIn this way is eliminated the problem, monstrous from whatever point\nof view it may arise, as to the historical origin of the practical\nactivity (economy or morality). If these activities be categories,\nwhich constitute fact and judge it reflected in the spirit, they\ncannot have arisen historically, as contingent facts. When we prove\nthe historical origin of anything, with that very proof we destroy\nits universal value. The fears of certain moralists lest, with the\nindication of the historical origin of morality, its value should\ncome to be denied, have therefore been wrongly mocked. Certainly, if\nmorality had a historical origin, it would also have an end, like all\nhistorical formations, even the most grandiose, the Empire of the\nEast or the Empire of the West, the Hunnish Empire of Attila or the\nMongolian Empire of Gengiskhan. The fear manifested by the moralists\nin question was then an instinctive horror of the incorrect method\nof philosophical psychology, which now presupposes, now destroys the\ncategories that it would wish to establish.\n\n\n\n\nVII\n\n\nTHE PRACTICAL METHOD, RULES AND CASUISTRY\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Justification of the psychological method and of empirical\nand descriptive disciplines._]\n\n\nIn repeatedly rejecting the psychological method, as at the end\nof the last chapter, we have been very careful to make use of a\ncautious phraseology. Thus we have employed such expressions as\n\"psycho-philosophical method,\" \"speculative-descriptive method,\"\nand the like, in order to make it quite clear that our hostility is\ndirected against that mixture, or rather against its introduction into\nPhilosophy, but is not directed against Psychology itself, that is,\ndescriptive psychology. This psychology has always been practised,\nsince the world was world, and we all practise it at every instant, and\ncould not propose to banish it from the spirit, save at the risk of\ngoing mad.\n\nIf indeed we know that the true and proper knowledge of theoretical\nphilosophy is resolved into the cycle of art, philosophy, and history,\nand that we possess no other means of knowing the individual, both\ningenuous and reflective, outside the knowledge of the universal given\nby philosophy, then we also know that the spirit needs to arrange and\nto classify the infinite intuitions and perceptions given to it by art\nand history, and to reduce them to classes, the better to possess and\nto manipulate them. We also know that the method called _naturalistic\nor positive_ performs this function, and that hence arise natural\ndisciplines or sciences. These do not, as is the popular belief,\ndeal only with so-called inferior reality (minerals, vegetables, and\nanimals), but with all manifestations of reality, including those most\nstrictly termed spiritual.\n\nThus we can at this point reduce to a more correct meaning a claim\nthat has been usually maintained by those who have treated of the\nPractical and of the Ethical in our day. They demand that a science of\nthe practical and of morality should be preceded by a wide historical\ninquiry and have a great mass of facts as its foundation. If such\nscience be understood as a Philosophy of the practical and as an Ethic,\nsuch a demand is an irrational pretension, because the true relation is\nexactly the opposite: from philosophy to history, not from history to\nphilosophy. But if, on the other hand, this science be understood as a\nnaturalistic and empirical discipline, the claim is rational, because\nit is not possible to construct a discipline of that sort, save with\nmaterial that has been historically-verified.\n\nSidenote: _Practical description and its literature._\n\nThe practical discipline that arranges in groups and classifies the\nspiritual facts concerning man, is _Psychology._ But the writer or the\nprofessor is not the only psychologist. Man himself is a psychologist;\neven the savage constructs in some sort of way his psychology of types\nand classes. And to remain within the circle of volitional acts, their\npsychology or description by types has always existed. A conspicuous\nexample of this was the Comedy of Menander or the New Comedy in Greece.\nThis partly received and gave artistic form to the results of the\nobservations of the moralists and partly served as material for the\nelaboration of treatises, to such an extent that the _Characters_\nof Theophrastus have been looked upon as a repertory or summary of\ntheatrical types. In the _Rhetoric_ of Aristotle, a whole book is\ndevoted to a description of affections, passions, and habits. In modern\ntimes, Descartes lamented the insufficiency of ancient treatises on the\nsubject, and presented as quite a new thing his _Trait\u00e9 des passions._\nIn this treatise, six _primitive_ passions being distinguished\n(admiration, love, hate, desire, joy, and sadness), he maintained that\nall the others were derived from them: esteem, contempt, generosity,\npride, humility, baseness, veneration, disdain, hope, fear, jealousy,\ncertainty, desperation, irresolution, courage, hardihood, emulation,\ncowardice, terror, remorse, mockery, piety, satisfaction, repentance,\nfavour, gratitude, indignation, anger, glory, shame, and so on.\nSpinoza, following the example of Descartes and correcting his\ntheories, devoted the third part of his _Ethic_ to the affections or\npassions, considering them _perinde ac si quaestio de lineis planis aut\nde corporibus esset._ Let it suffice to mention the _Anthropologia_ of\nKant among the other most celebrated treatises upon the argument.\n\n[Sidenote: _Extension of practical description._]\n\nBut although we have recorded as examples these general treatises on\nthe passions, it would be impossible to continue the enumeration,\nbecause descriptive psychology is carried out, so to speak, with\nthe widest divergences and is infinitely subdivided. An ample\nbibliography would not suffice to catalogue all the books dealing\nwith this discipline. These are sometimes arranged in chronological\ndivisions (Psychology of the Renaissance, of the eighteenth century,\nof the Middle Ages, even including prehistoric man!). Sometimes\nthey contain geographical divisions (Psychology of the Englishman,\nof the Frenchman, of the Russian, of the Japanese, and so on),\nwith subdivisions according to regions. Sometimes they combine the\ntwo methods (Psychology of the ancient Greek, of the Roman of the\nDecadence), and sometimes according to their psychical content\n(Psychology of the priest, of the soldier, of the politician, of the\npoet, of the man of science), and so on. And when the treatises that\nbear a title of the kind above mentioned had been catalogued, it would\nbe also necessary to trace a great mass of descriptive psychology\n(and of the best sort) in the books of historians, novelists,\ndramatists, in memoirs and confessions, in maxims and advice for the\nconduct of life in the sketches of satirists and caricaturists. And\nwhen all these had been catalogued (a very difficult task), it would\nbe necessary to take account of all the other psychology, which,\nformed in the spirit of individuals who are not writers, is poured\nforth in speech. This is found, but in small part, in collections of\nproverbs. It would also be necessary not to neglect (an altogether\ndesperate enterprize) everything that each one of us does and forgets\nand substitutes continually in life, according to his own needs and\nexperiences. _Tantae molis_ would be a complete account, precisely\nbecause psychological construction, having for its object actions and\nindividuals in action, is of such common use.\n\n[Sidenote: _Normative knowledge or rules: their nature._]\n\nThere is another class of mental forms intimately connected with\nPsychology, and of this also we have denied the justification in the\nforegoing chapters, but only in the philosophical field, and not at\nall outside it. These are the _norms,_ or _normative_ knowledge and\nscience, _maxims, rules, and precepts._ In truth, if philosophy,\nwhich commands and wills and judges, when its task is on the contrary\nto understand willing and commanding, and to make possible correct\njudgment--if such a philosophy be a contradiction in terms, there\nis yet nothing to prevent our taking the psychological classes, of\nwhich we have indicated the formation, and separating them from one\nanother, according as they do or do not lead to certain other classes,\nwhich are called _ends_ and are _abstract ends._ This is done when\nthose classes are selected which are more efficacious for practical\naction. Psychological classes and rules are therefore the same, save\nthat in the second the character possessed by knowledge as prior to\naction is placed in relief, that is to say, its _technical_ character.\nThis is proved by the easy convertibility of rules into psychological\nobservations, and of the latter into the former. It suffices to add\nthe imperative to the first and to remove it from the second. \"Do\neverything so as to seem good, for that helps in many things; but since\nfalse opinions do not last, you will have difficulty in seeming good\nfor a long period, if you are not so in reality.\" That is a rule of\nFrancesco Guicciardini[1] (or rather of the father of Guicciardini,\nquoted by him). Now if we transfer this proposition from the imperative\nto the indicative mood and remove the predicate of exhortation, we\nhave a mere psychological observation: \"To seem good helps in an\ninfinite number of things; but since false opinions do not last, it is\ndifficult to seem good for long, unless one really be so.\" Here is a\npsychological observation of Vico upon seeming and being: \"It happens\nnaturally that man speaks of nothing but what he affects to be and is\nnot.\"[2] This can be turned into a maxim: \"Watch yourselves, in order\nthat by talking too much of a given advantage, you may not let it be\nseen clearly that you do hot possess it.\" Or in relation to moral\nclasses it can be turned thus: \"Try to be that which you would like to\nappear to others,\" and so on.\n\n[Sidenote: _Usefulness of rules._]\n\nOf rules it can be said that they do not possess absolute value. This\nis to be found written at the beginning of one of the best books of\nrules: _Peu de maximes sont vraies \u00e0 tous \u00e9gards_ (Vauvenargues),\nand he might have said, \"no maxim\"; for if it were ever possible\nto produce one that was absolutely true, by that alone would it be\ndemonstrated not to be a true maxim. But criticism prevails against\nthe distortion of empirical rules into philosophical principles, or\nagainst the confusion between, the psychological and the speculative\nmethods, to which attention has already been drawn. If this distortion\nbe not committed, then rules are altogether innocuous. Not only are\nthey innocuous, they are indispensable. Each of us is constantly\nmaking them for use in his own life. To live without rules would be\nimpossible. Certainly, the man of action makes no practical rule, nor\ndoes he indicate how we should will and act in definite circumstances,\nnor does the poet make any rule of Poetic. Guicciardini himself,\nwhom we have just quoted, and who formulated stupendous maxims, warns\nus: \"These memories are rules that can be written down in books;\nbut special cases, which, since they have a different cause, ask a\ndifferent treatment, can ill be written down _elsewhere than in the\nbook of discretion._\" Action depends upon the quickness of the eye,\nupon the perception of the situation historically given, which has\nnever occurred before, and never will occur again, precisely identical.\nBut it is useful to possess these types of actions to encourage and\nof actions to avoid, in order to sharpen the attention and to find\none's way in the world of action, to facilitate and to discipline the\nexamination of the concrete fact. If, therefore, individual rules are\nmore or less transitory, the formation of rules is immortal.\n\n[Sidenote: _The literature of rules and its apparent decadence._]\n\nThe condition of literature in recent times would seem to be in\ndisagreement with this affirmation, since as a fact there is a great\nfalling off in the appearance of books of rules, compared with the\nenormous mass that remains in our libraries as an inheritance of the\npast. At one time rules of conduct were compiled for everything, not\nonly for the moral life, in the multiplication of treatises relating\nto vice and virtue, to merits and to sins, to things good and evil,\nto duties and to rights, dividing these and entering into minutiae,\nand again, summaries, catechisms, and various \"decalogues,\" relating\nto every part of life. The literature of the Cinquecento gives rules\neven for the procuress and the courtesan, in most elegant little\nbooks, which bear the names of Piccolomini and of Aretino. In this\nsame century, too, Ignatius of Loyola formulated rules for \"tying up\"\nthe will, and for the reduction of the docile individual _perinde ac\ncadaver,_ for the ends of \"sanctity.\" We must further remark that\nall rules, including those on poetry and the arts, have at bottom a\npractical--character. That is to say, they are directed to the will, if\nonly as intermediary. Thus it is necessary to add to the great mass of\npractical rules the unnumbered and innumerable treatises of Grammar,\nRhetoric, Poetry of the figurative arts, of music, of dancing, and so\non. But it is a fact that there are now hardly any treatises containing\nrules, either for morality, politics, or for the arts. Has the world by\nchance become learned on the subject, through inherited aptitude, or\nrather has the inutility of rules been discovered?\n\nNeither the one nor the other. The rules still live in books and\ntreatises; they have only changed their literary form. In literature\nthey have reabsorbed that imperative which they used at first to\ndisplay and to boast of, not only mentally but literally. That has\nbeen made possible by the already established convertibility of rules\ninto psychological classes. Hence in modern times the literary form\nof the psychological observation is preferred to that of rules. This\nwas indeed redundant, pedantic, and at the same time ingenuous, as\nfor instance in the Italian Seicento. It is difficult to restrain\na smile when reading the many books on what was called the _reason\nof State,_ elaborated by the Italians of that day and imitated by\nforeigners, especially Spaniards and Germans. Those _arcana imperii,_\nthose \"secret strokes,\" those impostures, mysteriously inculcated on\nthe printed page, are a true and real \u00e6sthetic contradiction. The\neighteenth century therefore began to give up this form of treatise,\nand as it happens that men are accustomed to attribute to moral virtue\nthat which is necessity or virtue of another kind, the writers of that\ncentury boasted of the moral progress which had set them free from the\npernicious and immodest maxims of the \"reason of State.\"\n\nIt is very amusing to assist at the acts of repulsion and of exorcism,\nwhich a man like the Abb\u00e9 Galiani believes himself obliged to make in\nhis treatise _Dei doveri dei principi neutrali_ (1782). When, having\namply discussed this matter from the point of view of morality, he goes\non to discuss it from the point of view of politics and of the reason\nof State, he despatches it in a few pages, abhorring, as he says,\nthat \"insidious and wicked science\" which formed \"the delight, first\nof Italian and then of almost all European minds of the fifteenth and\nseventeenth centuries.\" He protests at every step that he is \"tired\nof repeating and of developing teachings of cunning and wickedness.\"\nBut what the Abbot Galiani really abhorred was the robed scholastic\ntreatment of a matter that he who was termed _Machiavellino_ by his\nFrench friends, and declared that he did not admit in politics anything\nbut _le machiav\u00e9lisme pur, sans m\u00e9lange, cru, vert, dans toute son\n\u00e2pret\u00e9,_[3] handled with very different ability and elegance in his\nconversations in Parisian _salons_ and in his witty letters to Madame\nd'\u00c9pinay. The rules of the eighteenth century are to be sought in\nthe speeches, essays, political opuscules, tragedies, plays dealing\nwith the life of citizens, fiction, history, and books of memoirs. If\nAretino and Piccolomini provided for the necessities of the respectable\ncourtesans and procuresses of the Cinquecento, in the Settecento,\nGiacomo Casanova constructed the type of the perfect adventurer. He\nbegan with the rules to be followed as a system of life, the _se\nlaisser aller au gr\u00e9 du vent qui pousse,_ and passed to those that\nwere more special and yet fundamental, such as that one should have no\nscruples _de tromper des \u00e9tourdis, des fripons et des sots,_ because\nthey _d\u00e9fient l'esprit_ and _on venge l'esprit quand on trompe un\nsot._ There should be still less scruple in deception in affairs of\nlove, for, _pour ce qui regarde les femmes, ce sont des tromperies\nr\u00e9ciproques, qu'on ne met pas en ligne de compte; car, quand l'amour\ns'en m\u00eale, on est ordinairement dupe de part et d'autre_.[4] Let us\nleave to the reader to investigate, if he please, the rules of life\nthat are concealed beneath the most modern forms of literature; these\nare a continuous, if not always beneficent, guide for daily life.\n\n[Sidenote: _Relation between the arts (collections of rules) and\nphilosophical doctrines._]\n\nAnother circumstance that has led to the belief in the disappearance\nof books of rules is the observation that from those books dealing\nwith the so-called _arts,_ there has come to be a treatment of the\nphilosophy of their subject-matter, in which those treatises have been\ndissolved. Thus from Poetics and Rhetorics has come \u00c6sthetic, from\nGrammatic the Philosophy of language, from the Art of teaching and of\nreasoning Logic and Gnoseology, from the historical Art, Historic,\nfrom the Arts of economic government, the Science of Economy, from the\ntreatises on Natural Law, the Philosophy of Law.\n\nWhen such philosophies, then, had appeared, treatises upon the Arts\nseemed to have become superfluous, and to this is attributed the cause\nof their diminution or disappearance. But although it be impossible not\nto recognize the historical process above described from books on the\narts to books of systems, it is necessary to be careful to interpret\nit exactly and not to confuse it with a passing from empiria to\nphilosophy. Thus it will be seen that the part absorbed and dissolved\nin philosophy has been precisely those philosophical attempts that\nwere mingled with such collections of rules and precepts. For it was\nvery natural that the writers who put them together and had ideas as\nto what should be done and what avoided, were often led to investigate\nthe principles from which sprung the particular rules. Believing\nthat they were strengthening, they really came to surpass them, that\nis, they passed unwittingly from one form of treatment to another,\nfrom Psychology to Philosophy. But not even here has empiricism been\nrefined into philosophy (a refinement which, strictly speaking, is\nimpossible), but a more perfect philosophy has been substituted for one\nless perfect. The dissolution, then, has not been of the rules, but of\nthat imperfect philosophy, a chemical process which has left the rules\nin what they possess of original as residuum. Hence their persistence,\nand indeed the impossibility that they should not persist, side by side\nwith the most pure and perfect of philosophies.\n\n[Sidenote: _Casuistic: its nature and utility._]\n\n_Casuistic_ has had the same fate as the rules, and was also at one\ntime responsible for a very copious literary production. Now it is\ncultivated as literature only by a few Jesuits, who carry on the\nglories of Escobar and of Sanchez, read only by priests preparing\nthemselves for the post of confessor, whose studies are based for\nthe most part upon old books (such as the _Theologia moralis_ of the\nNeapolitan Sant' Alfonso de' Liguori). At one time Casuistic was\nnot confined only to profane or theological morality, to the _casus\nconscientiae. _ There were also books of casuistry composed for all\naspects of life, for politics, for the life of the courtier (\"the\nWise Man at Court\"), for the art of love. When the literary form of\nrules fell into discredit, that of Casuistic fell with it. But this\ndoes not mean that it is dead; it lives and will live as long as rules\nlive. For Casuistic is nothing but the process of reasoning by which\nrules are made always more precise, passing from more general cases to\nthose more particular, so that no one will ever be able to do without\nthem.--If we take for rule of life this maxim: to avoid scientific\npolemics, because they constitute a waste of time, adding little to the\nprogress of knowledge; in what way must we behave if a polemic be such\nthat it enables us to gain on the one hand the time it makes us lose\non the other? Shall we maintain the general rule, or shall we waive\nit on this occasion, if for no other reason than to give variety to\nour occupations? And how shall we behave if not only we retrieve the\ntime lost but avoid losing more time in the future? Shall we wish to\nenter upon the polemic at once? But if our future be looked upon as\nuncertain, if we be far advanced in years or in bad health, will it not\nbe better to renounce the uncertain gain of the future for the certain\ngain of the present?--This is a very simple example of Casuistic,\nwhich a critic and writer (let us suppose that he is the writer of\nthese pages) is obliged to propose to himself and to solve. Naturally,\nno Casuistic will ever furnish the concrete solution (which is the only\none that counts), since, as has been said, no rule can ever furnish\nit. Rules and casuistry do not reach the individuality _omnimodo\ndeterminata,_ which is the historical situation; yet if Casuistic\naid my action, this will always differ from that, as concrete from\nabstract; or better, my action will always truly possess the form, the\ndefiniteness that abstract casuistry cannot possess. Woe to practical\nmen who rely upon collections of maxims and casuistical reasonings,\nand woe to those who rely upon them. Those who argue at length upon\npractical matters and draw subtle distinctions, are to be avoided in\nthe world of affairs and in the world of action. If they have not yet\nprovoked some disaster, they are on the road to doing so now. This, at\nleast, is a good rule; like the supreme rule (which is not a rule but\nphilosophical truth), namely, that we must abandon rules, that is, face\nthe individual case, which, as such, is always irregular.\n\n[Sidenote: _Jurisprudence as casuistry._]\n\nBut if a further proof be wanted of the necessity and perpetuity of\nmaxims and of casuistry, observe how these also persist in literary\nform, as laws, where this form is not eliminable. _Laws,_ as we have\nseen, are not simple rules, but are based upon _formul\u00e6 of rules,_\nand must of necessity make explicit in them decisions as to doing and\nnot doing. Jurisprudence is the Casuistic of law, or all the labour\nof so-called interpretation, which is at bottom the excogitation of\nnew rules. All know that not only is Jurisprudence not of itself\nlegislative, but that it cannot even determine the volitional act of\nthe Statesman, nor the sentence, or decision upon the particular case,\na decision which the judge creates upon each occasion. But no one would\nseriously think of suppressing the work and the function of those\n_casuists,_ or judicial experts, a function which, since it has always\nexisted and continues to exist, cannot but answer to a social need.\nIt is possible to predict a form of social life, less complicated and\nweighty, in which that function would have less scope, but whatever be\nthe case as regards this prediction, the casuistry of judicial experts\nwill continue so long as there are laws and rules, that is to say,\nalways.\n\n\n[1] _Ricordi politici e civili,_ n. xliv. (in _Opere inedite_(2),\nFirenze, 1857; p. 97).\n\n[2] _Scritti inediti,_ ed. Del Giudice, Napoli, 1862, p. 12.\n\n[3] Letter to the d'\u00c9pinay, 5th September 1772.\n\n[4] _M\u00e9moires,_ ed. Paris, Gamier, s.a., i pp. 3-4.\n\n\n\n\nVIII\n\n\nCRITIQUE OF THE INVASIONS BY PHILOSOPHY OF THE DOMAIN OF PRACTICAL\nDESCRIPTION AND OF ITS DERIVATIVES\n\n\nIn demonstrating the legitimacy and necessity of practical description\nand of its derivatives, Regolistic and Casuistic, we have not\nfulfilled, as it were, our whole knightly duty, which binds us to that\ndiscipline, which we have been obliged to maltreat so exceedingly,\nand shall further maltreat, when it has been or shall be presented as\na philosophical method. It is now necessary to defend its existence\nagainst the invasion of philosophy, or rather of philosophers. We must\nmake it obvious that if the empiricists and psychologists, who swell\nthemselves out to philosophers, are bunglers, those too are bunglers\nwho claim to solve empirical questions philosophically. Perhaps they\nare bunglers less worthy of pardon, because it is part of philosophy to\nknow itself clearly, and consequently its own limits.\n\n[Sidenote: _First form: tendency to generalize._]\n\nThe first bad effect that philosophy has upon practical description\nis the tendency to change it from description and collection of\nparticular descriptions into something that has the air of generality\nand comprehensiveness. Because, if practical description be closely\nconnected with the historical conditions of definite individuals and\nsocieties and with their wants, the more specific and near to the\nconcrete it is, the better it will be, and the more useless by as much\nas it goes wandering toward the general. We owe to the evil influence\nof philosophy those verbose treatises upon psychological classes, such\nas virtue, duties, things good, affections, passions, and human types,\nto read which nourishes less than fresh water, which at least refreshes.\n\nLet him who wishes to be convinced compare the books of rules and\nobservations that we owe to men of experience and to men of the\nworld, such as the _Ricordi_ of Guicciardini, the _Maximes_ of\nLarochefoucauld, and the _Oraculo Manual_ of Balthazar Gracian,\nwith the _Trait\u00e9 des passions_ of Descartes, with that section\nof the _Ethica_ of Spinoza that relates to this matter, with the\n_Anthropologia_ and the _Doctrine of Virtue_ of Kant (we prefer to\nrecord great names). He will then see on whose side is the advantage,\nan advantage of originality, of importance, and even of style, which\nis in this case a revelation. Those books by philosophers contain for\nthe most part definitions of vocabulary and of words which there is no\nneed to define, because everybody knows them to such an extent that the\ndefinitions, rather than make them more clear, make them obscure. Who,\nfor example, can resist the philosophical triviality of the _Aphorisms\nfor the Wisdom of Life_ of Arthur Schopenhauer? Take the trouble to\nopen a book to learn that good things are to be divided into personal,\nwealth and imagination, or reputation, and that the first (such as\ngood health and a gay temperament) are pre-eminent over the others.\nDo we not learn more and with greater rapidity and efficacy from such\nproverbs as \"God helps the merry man\"? It is superfluous to observe\nthat those books, in so far as they generalize, can never attain to\nphilosophy. They remain at bottom more or less historical.\n\n[Sidenote: _Historical elements persisting in generalizations._]\n\nThe good and generous wine of the born psychologists and precept-makers\nis diluted in a great deal of water, but that water, however much\nthere be of it, never becomes pure and is always discoloured and of an\nunpleasant taste. Thus in classifications of ancient Ethic the idea of\n\"virtue\" or of \"good\" was announced as the most important, in Christian\nEthic that of \"duty,\" in the same way as in ancient Ethic the political\ncharacter was dominant, in the modern the individualistic, according to\nthe different character of the corresponding civilizations. Historical\nelements differentiate the Ethic of Aristotle, impregnated with sane\nGreek life, from that of the Stoics, in which is foretold the decadence\nof the antique world and the germs of the future discovered (for\ninstance, cosmopolitanism, which precedes the Christian idea of the\nunity of the human race). The four Platonic virtues retain the name,\nbut are filled with a new content, in the four cardinal virtues of the\nChristian Ethic; the seven deadly sins are not to be explained in all\ntheir settemplicity without the ascetic ideal of the Middle Ages.\n\nAmong the various writers of treatises, the foreground is filled, now\nwith the idea of effort or of duty, now with that of enjoyment and\nsatisfaction; ideas are now despotic masters, now smiling friends;\nthe dominant idea is in turn that of justice, of benevolence, of\nenthusiasm, and so on. In the systems of Catholic Ethic are reflected\npolitical absolutism and semi-feudal economy; in those of Protestant\nEthic, constitutionalism, liberalism, the industrial and capitalistic\nworld; a strict probity, not indeed without utilitarianism, and\na hardness of heart, not indeed without austerity. Modern Ethic\nis concerned with property, with the struggle of classes, with\nproletarianism and communism. These are all historical facts and as\nsuch most worthy of attention, but for that very reason they should\nbe examined in all their force and value and not through the medium\nof the pale categories of a universal doctrine, which they disturb\nand falsify and by which they are very often disturbed and falsified.\nWhoever undertakes to write general treatises upon the passions, upon\nthe virtues, and upon the other practical classes, will always show the\nsigns of his time in the categories that he establishes, and the result\nwill be at once banal and empirical, that is to say, badly empirical.\n\n[Sidenote: _Second form: literary union of philosophy and empiria._]\n\nBut hitherto the chief ill has been that useless and tiresome books are\nwritten. Matters begin to look graver when an approach is attempted\nbetween philosophical theories and empirical classifications and they\nare united in one treatise, as the _general_ part and the _particular_\npart, the _abstract_ and the _concrete_ part, the _theoretical_ and\nthe _historical_ part. We do not wish to refuse recognition to an\noccasionally just sense of the intimate relations between philosophy\nand history as among the motives that lead to such unions, the first of\nwhich flows into the second, revives it and is by it in turn revived.\nBut the history, to which philosophy applies the torch, is all history\nin its palpitating reality; it is history represented by all histories\nthat historians have written and will write, and also by those that\nthey have not written and will not write. The history offered by these\nempirical descriptions is only a very small part of history and (what\nis worse) abstract and mutilated. This would, however, be an injury of\nnot too grave a nature, even at this point, provided the incongruity\nwere limited to literary unfitness; in which case, it is true, would be\nadded to inutility the ugliness of a union capricious and artificial,\nbut fortunately extrinsic. But by means of that extrinsic approach,\nthe way is opened to the attempt at an intrinsic approach, and thus\nto the third form of the undue invasion of practical description by\nphilosophy, which constitutes the _morbus philosophico-empiricus_ in\nall its harm fulness.\n\n[Sidenote: _Third form: attempt to place them in intimate connexion._]\n\nThe attempt at intrinsic approach takes place when empirical\nclasses are placed in connection with the philosophical concepts or\ncategories, with pure thought. Nearly all philosophers have fallen\ninto this error, since it is very natural that they should not have\nwished to leave a _hiatus_ between the first and second parts of\ntheir books of Philosophy of the practical, between the general and\nparticular parts, and that they should have striven to connect the\none with the other by passing logically from the concepts of the\nfirst to those of the second. The mistake was indubitably increased\nowing to their small degree of clearness as to the logical nature of\nthe two orders of concepts (concepts and pseudo-concepts), which is\nfundamentally diverse, and we shall not further insist upon this matter.\n\n[Sidenote: _Science of the practical and Metaphysic: various\nsignifications._]\n\nRather let us note that sometimes there has been something rational\nin the minds of those who have required the Science of the practical\nor Ethic to be constructed independently of all Metaphysic. In truth,\nthat programme of the independence of the Science of the practical\nor Ethic of Metaphysic has had various meanings that it will be well\nto enumerate briefly. The first meaning was that the Science of the\npractical, in so far as it was philosophy, should be independent of\nthe _aggregate_ of the philosophical system (Metaphysic). In this\ncase the claim was not acceptable, as we shall see, because it was\nat variance with the nature itself of philosophy, which is unity. The\nsecond meaning was that the Practical, as science, should be kept\nremote from every form of faith, or feeling or fancifulness (which has\nsometimes been called \"Metaphysic\"); and in this case the proposition\nwas inexpugnable, however contestable may have seemed the opportuneity\nof the meaning given to that word. The third meaning was that the\nScience of the practical, in so far as it was descriptive, should stand\nby itself, in order to afford a base for philosophical induction. Use\nwas here made of the erroneous idea, already rejected several times,\nof philosophy as an intensification of the psychological method, or\nas a carrying of it on. But in a fourth sense, it was desired finally\nto withdraw practical description from the perilous care of the\nphilosophers, and it seems to us that with this fourth meaning was\nexpressed a very just demand.\n\n[Sidenote: _Damaging consequences of the invasions._]\n\nWhat are, in fact, the consequences of the care that philosophers\nhave bestowed upon practical description? We would not wish to use an\nover-coloured simile, but what happens is very much what would happen\nif a man were given a baby to suckle. He would press it violently\nagainst his dry and arid breast, incapable of nourishing, but well\ncapable of tormenting it. Philosophy, when it approaches the empirical\nclasses, will either begin to criticize their distinctions and abolish\nthem, reducing several classes to one, and then reducing the reduced\nclasses in their turn to a less number, until none are left at all and\nit finds itself in company with the universal philosophical principle\nalone, or alone with itself;--or it will contrive to preserve them\nas classes, deducing them philosophically, and will thus make them\nrigid and absolute, removing from them that elasticity and fluidity\nwhich they derive from their historical character, and converting them\nfrom useful classes that they were, into bad philosophemes, concepts\ncontradictory in themselves.\n\n[Sidenote: _1a. Dissolution of the empirical concepts._]\n\nBoth these consequences have occurred, for the books of philosophers\nare full of examples, now of destruction, now of corruption of the\nempirical classes of the Practical. The treatment of the doctrine\nof the virtues or of so-called natural rights affords examples of\ndestruction. Striving to distinguish courage from prudence, or justice\nfrom benevolence, or on the other hand, egotism from wickedness, they\nended by recognizing that true courage is prudence, true prudence\ncourage; that benevolence is justice, justice benevolence; that egotism\nis wickedness, wickedness egotism, and so on. In this way, all the\nvirtues became one, the virtue of being virtuous, the will for the\ngood, duty. In like manner, by giving philosophical form to the natural\nrights of life, of liberty, of culture, of property, and so on, they\nended by recognizing that all rights merge in one single right, which\nis that of existence; which latter, indeed, is not a right, but a fact.\nThe passions were reduced from seventy or eighty classes to six or\nseven fundamental, but these six or seven were in their turn reduced\nto two only, pleasure and pain, and of these two; it was finally\ndiscovered that they constituted one only--life, which is pleasure\nand pain together. But virtues, rights, passions, possess value in\npractical description only in so far as they are multiplicity--their\nvalue is always plural, never singular. To reduce them to a single\nclass signifies to annul them, as to blow upon a candle signifies to\nextinguish it and to remain in darkness; darkness is to be understood\nas without empirical light. Now the philosopher should certainly\ndestroy empirical ideas, but only in so far as they present themselves\nas philosophical distinctions, that is, in so far as they are empirico\nphilosophical: and in that case it suffices him to show that they are\nempirical, without pretending to annul them in their own domain also:\n_debellare superbos,_ but _parcere subjectis;_ that is, he should spare\nstrangers who remain quietly in their own house.\n\n[Sidenote: _Examples: war and peace, property and communism, and the\nlike._]\n\nIt might seem desirable to pass in review all these empirical\ndistinctions and questions which the philosophers have thought that\nthey had satisfactorily solved, when they had, on the contrary, passed\nbeyond them. But the theme is inexhaustible, and we cannot here give\neven a rich selection, comprising the most frequent and important\ncases. We must limit ourselves to brief mention.--People discuss every\nday: whether war be an evil, and if it be possible to abolish it;\nif community of goods should take the place of private property; if\nrational government be that of liberty or of authority, of democracy\nor aristocracy, of anarchism or state organization; whether the State\nshould be in the Church or the Church in the State, or side by side and\nindependent; if freedom of thought should be admitted or restrained;\nif instruction should be free or undertaken by the State; and other\nsimilar problems. Now behold the philosopher applying himself to the\nstudy of these ideas. Having tested them, he is astonished that people\ncan find in them opposing terms, and make them argument for dispute.\nIn truth (he says), war is intrinsic to reality, and peace is peace in\nso far as by making an end of one war it prepares another; as Socrates\ndemonstrated in the _Phaedo,_ when, scratching his leg in the place\nwhere it had been pressed by the chain, he realized that he could not\nhave experienced that pleasure had he not previously experienced the\npain. Nor is property different from communism: the individual declares\nhimself by an individual taking possession of things and becoming their\nowner; but by so doing he enters into relations and into communion with\nother individuals, and does business with them. And liberty excludes\nsubjection the less, since _sub lege libertas;_ nor does aristocracy\nexclude democracy, since the true aristocrat is the bearer of those\nuniversal values that are the substance of democracy; hence the more we\nare aristocratic the more we are democratic, and inversely. Nor does\nanarchism exclude State organization, because a collection of men,\nhowever free we suppose it to be, must nevertheless govern itself\naccording to some laws, and these laws are the State. Then, the ideal\nState, being the best government of men for their perfectionment, both\nmaterial and spiritual, accomplishes the work of the Church itself,\nwhich is neither above, nor below, nor beside the State, because it is\nthe State. Thus in like manner, no one can grant or abolish freedom of\nthought, since thought is by definition freedom, and the restraint is\nthought itself, because liberty coincides with necessity. And finally\nState instruction cannot but correspond with rational demands, and the\nfree instruction of citizens, if it be really so and not arbitrary and\ncapricious, will be the same as that of the State, or will be changed\ninto the instruction of the State.\n\n[Sidenote: _Other examples._]\n\nPassing to other orders of fact that are less political, but are also\nargument for practical discussions, we shall refer to the so-called\nconflicts between duty or interest, as symbolized in the legendary\nTitus Manlius, when offered the alternative _aut reipublicae aut sui\nsuorumque obliviscendi_;--or to the so-called question of the two\nmoralities, private and public, in support of which the not legendary\nCamillo Cavour said in 1860, that if he had done in his private\ninterest what he had done for Italy, he would have deserved the\ngalleys;--or we can refer to questions of classification, and ask\nwhether the kind of man who is socially harmless should be placed side\nby side with the criminal;--or to those others, famous in Casuistic,\nrelating to capital punishment, homicide, suicide, lies, whether and\nwhen they should be permitted, and other similar questions. Here, too,\nthe philosopher will smilingly observe that duties and interests can\nnever be in conflict, because in every given case duty is always one\nonly, and interest is always one only, that of the given case;--he\nwill deny that there is one public and one private morality, because\nin man, the private person and the citizen, family relations, or\nthose of friendship, and those of political life, are inseparable and\nindistinguishable;--that every man is bad and good, inoffensive and\ncriminal, and that in the so-called criminal there must also be the\nnon-criminal, if he be given the name of man;--that every punishment is\na punishment of death, that is, it causes something to die, and that it\nis impossible to find a clear distinction between shutting a man up in\nprison and thus taking from him a more or less large slice of physical\nlife, and taking it from him altogether by hanging or shooting\nhim;--that homicide, as such, is so little a crime that in war it is a\nduty to commit it;--that a lie, which is silence as to what one knows,\nis in itself so innocent that no one in the world, save a foolish\nprater, tells all he knows, and that if it be admitted that one can\nand should be silent, that is to say, let others be deceived by our\nsilence (though this is eloquent), there is no reason for not admitting\nthat we can also betray them with speech (often less eloquent), as is\ndone with children in order to send them to bed, and with sick persons\nin order to comfort them;--that, finally, culpable suicide is not\nthe material act of depriving oneself of physical life (a thing done\nwithout incurring blame, and indeed with praise and glory, by those who\nsacrifice themselves for others in war, in epidemics, in dangers of all\nsorts, and by every one who consumes his own vital strength in a worthy\ncause), but the killing of the moral life in oneself.\n\n[Sidenote: _Misunderstanding on the part of philosophers._]\n\nIn all these answers to questions, we have not made our imaginary\nphilosopher commit any blunder; we have indeed put into his mouth\nthings that we believe to be all of them most true and irrefutable,\nbecause we believe them ourselves. And we hold that it is necessary to\nprofess them against those who arbitrarily make questions philosophical\nwhose terms are not philosophical. But when the philosopher offers\nthose solutions to the empirical disputants, he behaves like him who,\nhearing a speech in a language of which he knows little, makes a reply\nthat is in itself most reasonable, but without relation to the previous\nspeech. The empiricist, if he have studied philosophy, will be able\nto reply, as did King Theodore, worn with misery, in the old _op\u00e9ra\nbouffe_ of the Abb\u00e9 Casti, to him who recalls to him the miseries\nsuffered by Marius, Themistocles, and Darius:--\n\n    Good my son, I know them well,\n      For I have heard these tales before;\n    But just at present, truth to tell,\n      'Tis money interests me more.\n\n[Sidenote: _Historical significance of the aforesaid questions._]\n\nMoney, that is, ready money to spend in definite situations\nhistorically given, in order to find one's way in them; for all those\nquestions are without universal signification, but have arisen from\npolitical and individual problems, to which they do and must belong.\nCertainly they are insoluble in the abstract, and this is the defect,\nor rather the nature of empirical questions, which, if they admitted\nof rigorous solution, would not be any longer empirical. Therefore it\nis a foolish thing to discuss them philosophically, as is seen in the\nconspicuous example of certain casuistical enquiries (the homicide of\nthe unjust aggressor, the lie, incest, etc.) which have been treated by\nnearly all philosophers and have been dragged about for centuries in\ndiscussions on Ethic, although every century has left them at the same\npoint as they were in the one preceding.\n\nBut if it be not possible to solve, we can at least _state_ them\nin abstract terms, in the same way as drill and the sham-fight are\nabstract, though certainly of use when the battle is really fought. We\ncan and we should bear in mind these abstract solutions, in order that\nwe may be the better able to solve a series of concrete cases, which\nare not identical, certainly, because identical cases do not exist, but\nmore or less similar, and therefore require solutions that are more or\nless similar.--Can war be done away with? This question refers not to\nthe elimination' of the category \"war,\" but to the possibility or the\nreverse of avoiding in the twentieth century and in European countries\nthat empirical war which is waged with cannons and cruisers, that\ncosts milliards when it is not waged, and tens of milliards when it\nis waged, and out of which the conqueror comes conquered. It is well\nunderstood that some form of war will always continue, because war is\ninherent to life.--Can private property be done away with? This does\nnot mean to ask if it be possible to prevent man from taking possession\nof things, of his food, or of the material that he requires for dress,\nor from inhabiting a house; but whether it be possible to alter, to\nthe advantage of mankind, the proportion that now obtains between\nproduction with private capital and production with collective capital,\ngiving the preference to the latter.\n\nAnd so on, for it would be tiresome to continue to state the historical\nproblems that are grouped beneath each of the recorded formul\u00e6, which\nindeed are easily to be found. Thus when we absolutely forbid the\ntelling of lies, as indecorous and degrading, as that which severs the\nties of human community and of reciprocal faith, as the vice (said\nHerbart) that has the special faculty of stirring up against it all\nthe five moral ideas--justice, benevolence, equity, perfection, and\ninternal liberty--the intention is to forbid what is usually called\nlying; but it is certainly not intended to institute a speculative\nenquiry as to the relation between knowing and making known, between\nthe theoretic act of thought and the practical act of its communication\nto other individuals. Thus again, the prohibition of suicide has in\nview suicide through egoism, which is the most frequent form, and it is\ntherefore useless to identify this with the universal relation between\ndeath and life, and with the proposition that life is preserved by\nmeans of death. Thus too, finally, the conception of the delinquent\nhas been a beneficent rectification of common prejudices relating to\nthe efficacy of certain laws and penalties applied to certain classes\nof individuals who are led to crime as though through unrestrainable\nnatural tendency. For the rest, the wisdom of life teaches us usually\nto take individuals as we find them, with their virtues and vices, and\nwithout claiming to set them violently right, and to remake them from\ntop to bottom. We should rather adapt them in the best way possible\nfor our own ends, or for those of society. This does not, however,\nimply that they are fixed beings, and that each of those classes is\nheterogeneous in respect of the others. If, with the help of a foolish\npositivist philosophy, we make of the idea of the delinquent something\nnecessary, a natural being, as it is called, confounding naturalistic\nwith natural and incorrectly hypostasizing gnoseological procedure,\nthen, and then alone, are we right in reacting and in denying.\n\n[Sidenote: _2a. False deduction of the empirical from the\nphilosophical._]\n\nAnd yet those solutions of philosophers, who think that they are\nsolving empirical questions by annulling or ignoring them, do not yet\nrepresent the worst that happens when philosophy usurps the function\nof empiria. Such misunderstanding, such hardness of hearing, may be\nproof of a spirit so energetically directed to universale that it is\nunable to see anything else, and may even for that reason possess\nsome sympathetic quality. The worst of the worst is the entering upon\nempirical questions, not in order to annul, but to take sides in them\nand to solve them philosophically.\n\n[Sidenote: _Affirmations relating to the contingent changed into\nphilosophemes._]\n\nThis cannot be done, save by supporting empirical concepts with\nrigorous and philosophical concepts, confounding the one with the other\nby a trick of thought, and sometimes of words, making use of synonyms\nand homonyms, and pronouncing in the name of philosophy arbitrary\nsolutions suggested only by caprice or self-interest. This is the\ncomplete corruption, alike of philosophy and of empiria. Not satisfied\nwith making practical classes follow philosophical concepts of the\npractical, it is then sought to deduce the former from the latter,\nand behold them now deriving virtues and duties from the universal\nconcept of practical moral activity, by means of the divisions of\ninternal and external, of part and whole, of individual and society.\nThese are concepts of relations, not susceptible of division, and\ntherefore incapable of serving as base for empirical divisions. Or\nthey have recourse to the triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis,\nwhich is the universal concrete itself, constituting unity, and\ntherefore incapable of serving as basis for division. Or they will\ndeduce the moral virtues according to the three faculties, as virtues\nof representation, feeling and thought, or according to the two of the\nwill and the intellect, as dianoetic and ethical virtues; as though the\nbase of the division of the _practical_ could be that of _theoretical_\nand _practical._ Empirical concepts become in this way all false,\nwhereas, in their real nature, they are neither false nor true.\n\nThere is no thesis, however absurd, which cannot be defended with\nsuch a method. All know that there are aristocratic and democratic\nphilosophers, libertarian and authoritarian, anarchical and\norganicist, socialistic and anti-socialistic, bellicose and pacific,\nfeminist and antifeminist; and there are others who maintain the\nright to lie, the right to suicide, the right to prostitution, the\nright to incest, to making of themselves caterers for the scaffold,\nthe right to the penalty of death. These solutions can be morally and\npolitically justified in certain definite and particular cases. There\nare other solutions rationally unjustifiable in the individual case\nand put forward only through passion, wickedness, or prejudice, but in\nboth hypotheses, they are outside philosophy and within it so false as\nto be odious, as that is odious which is maintained, not by means of\nintrinsic reason, but by imposition altogether extrinsic and external.\n\n[Sidenote: _Reason of the rebellion against rules._]\n\nSuch hatefulness explains the rebellion against moral rules and\nconcepts that has often taken place. This, together with that against\nliterary classes and rules and others of the same sort, forms part\nof the vast movement of rebellion against empirical or empiricized\nphilosophy. In truth, when those rules and ideas are taken by\nthemselves, no rebellion is possible, because they do not exert any\npressure and obey the orders of the man who has made them. But it\nhappens otherwise, when they become rigid and philosophical, and\nas is said, absolute, claiming to substitute themselves as such for\nphilosophy and to provide a base for judgments. In addition to this,\nfrom the enforced union of philosophemes with rules, has arisen the\nfalse idea of philosophizing about the practical (about an Ethic,\nfor example), which showed itself to be _practical,_ or, as is said,\n_normative._\n\n[Sidenote: _Limits between philosophy and empiria._]\n\nPhilosophy, by taking part in empirical questions, ruins both itself\nand them, because it loses the serenity, the dignity, and the utility\nthat are intrinsic to it. In like manner, the empirical disciplines\nruin themselves and philosophy when they claim to philosophize with\ntheir classes, which are not categories, with their pseudo-concepts,\nwhich are not concepts, with their _generalia,_ which are not\n_universalia._ Here too, safety lies in distinction: the observation of\ndistinction alone makes possible beneficent co-operation.\n\n\n\n\nIX\n\n\nHISTORICAL ANNOTATIONS\n\n\nA history of the general theories relating to the practical activity\nis still to write, although we have several relating to particular\ntheories of Ethic. The mode in which such a historical narration should\nbe conducted results from the historical explanations themselves,\nwhich we have exposed and shall continue to expose. Here we cannot\neven offer a rapid summary. We shall limit ourselves to making a--few\nremarks on the subject, and we shall give some historical account of\ncertain problems of the philosophy of the practical, that have had, to\nsome extent, profound treatment, or have at least been sufficiently\ndiscussed (for not a few others are virgin, or almost so), with the\nsole object of serving as a guide.\n\n[Sidenote: _I. Distinction between history of the practiced principle\nand history of the liberation from the transcendental._]\n\nI. A first warning to bear in mind concerns the historical inquiry as\nto the varying _recognition of, or failure to recognize_ the _practical\nreason_ in respect to the other forms of the spirit. This series of\nthoughts is not to be confounded with that _other historical process,_\nso long and so intricate, which had its origin in the debate between\nSt. Augustine and Pelagius (or perhaps rather in the opposition between\nPlatonic mysticism and Aristotelian humanism), and through analogous\ndebates, arising afresh during the Middle Ages and onward to modern\ntimes, culminating in the strife for the independence of morality and\nthe practical reason in general from religion, which took place in\nthe seventeenth century. The account of the various incidents of that\ndebate perhaps occupies a larger space and a different place in the\nspecial histories of Ethic than it deserves. For it is not concerned\nwith an entirely ethical or practical problem, but with that general\nphilosophical movement which produced the progressive elimination of\nthe transcendental and founded the immanentistic consideration of\nthe real: a necessary condition for the conceivability of philosophy\nitself. In this lay the great importance of the affirmation that the\npractical and the moral spirit of man reveals itself as constant in the\nmidst of the most various and opposed religious beliefs. This amounts\nto saying that it is independent of religion and knowable naturally and\nhumanly, without the necessity of having recourse to the authority of\nrevelation and of making shipwreck in mystery. It is customary to say\nthat in the seventeenth century free-thought definitely won the victory\nupon the point most ardently contested, and in this connection are\nrecorded the names of Charron, Grotius, Spinoza, and Pierre Bayle. To\nthese could be added that of G. B. Vico, who conceived of Providence\nas immanent and considered that morality arose from \"a sense common to\nall men,\" from a judgment \"without any sort of reflection,\" foundation\nof the natural rights of man. But should the word \"definite\" be really\nused here? Whenever the idea of the transcendental reappears, even in\nthe timid form of agnosticism, the autonomy of the practical reason is\ndenied, or at least again put in doubt (and with it that of the whole\nhuman spirit).\n\nTwo examples only of this must suffice, but they are conspicuous.\nEmmanuel Kant, not having been able to surpass the mystery that he\nhad formulated--the principle of the practical reason--the categoric\nimperative remained suspended in the void, and in that void it invokes\nin relation to itself faith in a personal God and in a transcendental\nfuture life, which shall conciliate virtue and happiness, at variance\nin the life lived upon earth. This scrap of mystery which Kant\nallowed to remain in his system, suffices to obscure that autonomy\nof the practical reason and that concept of spiritual productivity\nwhich he had affirmed with so much energy. Another example, perhaps\neven more characteristic, is furnished by the Ethic that was prevalent\nfor three centuries in the English School. It was a utilitarian Ethic\nand therefore incapable of truly founding moral reason. What was the\nconsequence of that incapacity when recognized as such? Nothing but\nthe renewed introduction of mystery, the explanation obtained by means\nof the idea of a personal God, assuming that most extravagant form\nknown as \"theological utilitarianism.\" By this theory, moral actions\nthat in this life do not receive adequate recompense and seem to be\nunjustified from the utilitarian point of view, are rewarded by God\nin another life, thus finding their economic motive for being carried\nout in the present life. In our theoretic treatment of the subject, we\ndo not concern ourselves with the controversy, already mooted in the\n_Eutyphron,_ as to whether sanctity be loved by the gods as sanctity,\nor whether it be sanctity because it is beloved by the gods[1]--a\nquestion that in the Middle Ages was transformed into that other one,\ndifferently solved by Ab\u00e9lard, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus: whether the\nmoral law be given by divine decree, or whether the idea of God does\nnot of necessity coincide with the idea of moral law. We do not treat\nof this, since we are occupied with the practical, not with theology\nor antitheology, and consider that the contest between philosophy\nand theology has been already solved and surpassed in the theory of\nknowledge. For the same reason, it seems to us that we should not trace\nits history in the History of the Philosophy of the Practical.[2]\n\n[Sidenote: _II. The distinction of the practical from the theoretical._]\n\nII. The true and proper history of the practical principle, conceived\nas autonomous, and of the problem concerning the identity or the\ndistinction of the practical from theory, has a different line of\ndevelopment. As a rule this problem is referred back to the celebrated\nsayings of Socrates, that virtue is knowledge and vice ignorance, and\nto the corrections that Aristotle, while accepting, proposes in them,\nwhen he takes note of the part that belongs to the non-cognoscitive\nelement. But, as often happens, those sayings and those corrections\nhave been taken as being more profound than they genuinely were and\ncould be. This, if it have not aided the exactness of historical\ninterpretation, has nevertheless stimulated and fecundated thought.\nOn reading without prejudice the parts of the _Memorabilia,_ of the\nPlatonic dialogues, of the _Nicomachean Ethics,_ and of the _Magna\nMoralia_ that relate to it, it appears evident that what is treated\nof in them is the altogether empirical question of the importance\nthat mental development has for practical life, and whether knowledge\nsuffices for this, or natural dispositions and discipline of the\npassions be not also necessary. Aristotle replied to Socrates, who had\ninsisted upon the element of knowing, conceiving virtue as knowledge\n(\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2), by modifying the statement with the assertion that virtue is\nnot indeed simply knowledge, but is _with_ knowledge (\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5).\nIn these very ingenuous considerations is to be found at the most\nimplicitly, but certainly not explicitly, the problem that was only\nstated later on; and it would be rash to classify Socrates as an\nintellectualist and Aristotle as a voluntarist. It is certain that the\nAristotelian philosophy, in accordance with good sense, preserved the\ndistinction between the two forms of the spirit, the theoretical and\nthe practical, the reason and the will, a distinction that has also\npassed into the scholastic philosophy (_ratio cognoscibilis, ratio\nappetibilis_) and into that of the Renaissance. But it remained always\nvague, sometimes brought into prominence, sometimes, on the other hand,\nattenuated. Almost dissipated in those who conceive the principles of\nthe practical as something similar or analogous to mathematical truths\n(Cudworth, Clarke, Wollaston, etc.), it always reaffirms itself when\nimportance is given to the affections and passions, as is the case with\nmany thinkers of the seventeenth century (Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza,\nVico); and the doctrines of the Scottish school of sensationalists\ncontributed not a little to keep it alive.\n\nIt seems indubitable that Emmanuel Kant is to be connected to\nsome extent rather with this last tradition than with that of the\nintellectualists: with Kant the practical reason possessed a domain of\nits own altogether distinct from and almost antithetical to the domain\nof the theoretical. But it is erroneous to present the successors\nof Kant as forgetful of the practical reason and as resolving every\nspiritual manifestation in the theoretical form of the spirit.\nFor instance, Fichte, who had a very strong consciousness of the\npeculiarity of the practical activity, did not do this, nor did Hegel,\nthough as commonly as unjustly accused of being a cold intellectualist.\nIt should suffice to recall how Hegel always opposed that view of\nPlato and of other thinkers (for example Campanella) who assigned the\ngovernment of the State to philosophers, a view in which the resolution\nof the practical into the theoretical spirit and of the will into\nknowledge seemed to become concrete. For Hegel, on the contrary, the\ndomain of _history_ is different from that of _philosophy;_ history\nis indeed the idea, but the idea that shows itself in a _natural and\nunconscious_ manner, and _philosophical_ genius is not _political_\ngenius. Nor must we forget the importance that he accorded to passion,\nto custom, to what is called the heart and is wont to be opposed to\nthe brain and to argument. For Hegel, the will is not thought, but\na special kind of thought, that is to say, thought which translates\nitself into existence, the impulse to give oneself existence. Whereas\nin the theoretical process, the spirit takes possession of the object\nand makes it its own by thinking, that is by universalizing it, in\nthe practical process a difference is also stated and determined,\nwhich on the other hand consists of its own determinations and ends.\nThe theoretical is contained in the practical, since there cannot be\nwill without intelligence; but, on the other hand, the theoretical\ncontains the practical, since to think is also to act. Hegel, in short,\ndistinguishes the practical from the theoretical and unifies them,\nwhile retaining the distinction.[3] What is not perhaps altogether\nclear to him, notwithstanding his view that history is the idea in a\nnatural and unconscious mode, is the unreflective character of willing.\nTo have given relief to this character, although in the exaggerated and\ninacceptable form of the will as blind and unconscious, is the merit of\nArthur Schopenhauer, who is indeed far from standing alone in assigning\nan eminent place to the will, but connects himself with all the Kantian\nand post-Kantian philosophy, and in the first place with Fichte and\nSchelling.\n\n[Sidenote: _III. The mixtures of philosophy of the practical and\ndescription._]\n\nIII. The mixture of philosophical concepts with empirical concepts and\nwith rules is a vice common to nearly all treatises of the Philosophy\nof the practical, beginning with the _Nicomachean Ethic,_ which,\nalthough in certain places loftily philosophical, should be placed in\ngreater part rather at the head of the history of the works of the\nmoralists and of writers on the practical, than of Ethic. The author\nhimself recognized this practical character when he wrote, _\u03c0\u03ac\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03cd\u03c0\u1ff3 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03b2\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f40\u03c6\u03b5\u03af\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9.[4]_ And in\nthis appears the prejudice that practical philosophy should be occupied\nwith the practical: \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f21 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f15\u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03ac\n\u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03b1\u1f31 \u1f05\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03b9 (\u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f35\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f30\u03b4\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03c4\u03af \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f21 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74 \u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1\n\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb' \u1f35\u03bd' \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u1f76 \u03b7\u03b9\u03bd\u03ce\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1, \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u1f76 \u03bf\u03cd\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f03\u03bd \u1f27\u03bd \u1f44\u03c6\u03b5\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2), \u03ba\u03c4\u03bb.[5]\nEven the greatest thinkers of modern times are not exempt from that\ncharacteristic. Emmanuel Kant, while recognizing that the division and\ntreatment of duties do not belong to the Critique of the Sciences (he\nshould therefore have excluded them from philosophy, which is always\n_criticism),_ finally relegates them to what he calls the \"system\"\n(and is in truth the anti-systematic)[6] and writes the _Metaphysic of\nCustoms,_ divided into the doctrines of law and of the virtues. Fichte,\nin his _System of Ethic,_ makes the applied follow the theoretical\npart. Hegel gives the doctrine of duties in the third part of his\n_Philosophy of Law,_ which is entitled Of Ethicity (_Sittlichkeit_.)\nThe Ethic of Herbart is intrinsically descriptive, for the author\nhimself professed to wish simply \"to describe the ideal of virtue,\"[7]\nand the five practical ideas that he takes as principles were at bottom\nnothing but classes of virtue refined into ideas. Treatises of to-day\nare overflowing with empirical elements, as can be seen from those in\nEnglish by Ladd and Seth, and by those in German of Paulsen, Wundt, and\nCathrein. Sometimes a more concrete historical element is coupled in\nthose treatises with the empirical classification of practical examples\nand institutions: as, for instance, in Cathrein, a modernized Jesuit,\nwho exposes at length the moral views, not only of civilized people,\nancient and modern, but also of the savages of Oceania, of Asia, of\nCochin China, of the Hottentots and Boschimans, of the Botocudis, and\nso on. Questions of casuistry also survive in these treatises, such as\nwhether and on what occasions it is permissible to tell a lie; this\nquestion is notably represented in the history of ideas, from the\nSocrates of the _Memorabilia_ to Kant and Schopenhauer.[8] Kant added\nquestions of casuistry to the various sections of the _Metaphysic of\nCustoms,_ as scholia to the system and examples of the way in which the\ntruth of particular questions should be sought.[9]\n\n[Sidenote: _Vain attempts at definitions of empirical concepts._]\n\nBut the efforts of ancient and modern philosophers rigorously to\ndefine empirical concepts afford more interest than the external form\nof treatment, as do their efforts to modify or to simplify, or indeed\nfinally to deduce them rationally. The Platonic dialogues, such as the\n_Charmides,_ the _Lachetes,_ the _Protagoras,_ are most instructive\nin this respect. Here it is sought to define sophrosune, andreia and\nthe other virtues, without arriving at any precise result, or rather\narriving at the contradictory one, that each of these virtues is _the\nwhole of virtue,_ whereas it should only be a _part_ of it. In the\n_Republic_ is sought the relation of the four virtues, or rather of\nthree of them, prudence, temperance, and fortitude, with justice, which\nforms as it were the foundation and unity of the whole. From such\ndiscussions arose the affirmation, to be found also in Cicero, that\nthe virtues are inseparable from one another: _virtutes ita copulatae\nconnexaeque sunt, ut omnes participes sint, nec alia ab alia possit\nseparari._[10] The difficulty of the Platonic inquiry is renewed with\nall those who have given definitions of the virtues and of the other\nempirical concepts, because, when they have achieved with much labour\na definition which appears satisfactory, it is afterwards always found\nto be too narrow or too wide. Thus the definition given by Kant and by\nothers (Fichte, Schopenhauer) of egoism, consisting in their view, of\nconsidering other individuals as means and not ends, is the definition,\nnot of egoism, but of any form of immorality which debases the Spirit\nthat should be the end, by means of its own caprices. The same is to\nbe said of the definitions given by Fichte as to the duties inherent\nto this or that condition and state: the duties, for instance, of the\nlearned, who should love truth, communicate it to others, rectify\nerrors, promote culture,[11] and so on. These are all things that\nform part of the duty, not only of the learned, but of every man. The\nsimplifiers are not more fortunate in their attempts to reduce the\nnumber of empirical concepts, for the concepts excluded by them have\nneither more nor less right to recognition than the others that they\nhave accepted. Schopenhauer, for instance, when he rejects the class\nof duties toward oneself,[12] should also reject that of duties toward\nothers. For others and ourselves are correlative terms, and we cannot\nbe benevolent to others and malevolent to ourselves, just to others\nand unjust to ourselves. If this be met with the objection that the\nempirical self is not the object of duties, we must reply that neither\nare the empirical \"others,\" but only that Spirit which is in all and\nconstitutes all. In reacting against these unifiers and simplifiers,\nother philosophers (as for example Herbart) have maintained the\nindeducibility of the virtues or duties from a single principle, which\nmeans that they have received those concepts into their philosophy\natomistically, and left them there as something not digested and not\ndigestible, an extraneous element. If they had openly admitted this and\ndrawn from it the legitimate consequence, and for that reason excluded\nthose concepts from philosophy, they would really have contributed\ntoward simplifying and unifying, by making it homogeneous. But Herbart,\nif he have no other merit, has at any rate declared that the Philosophy\nof the practical is not capable of solving all the problems that occur\nin life, and that we must always rely upon the answer of the heart,\nupon the delicacy of individual tact. And, therefore, while Kant still\npreserved casuistic questions in Ethic and professed to solve them\nrationally, Herbart showed that they lack the determinations that are\nof true importance in real cases, and that such questions are therefore\nas a rule either without meaning or insoluble (_entweder gar keiner\nFragen, oder im Allgemein unaufl\u00f6slich_).[13]\n\n[Sidenote: _Attempts at eduction._]\n\nAs concerns the attempt to connect and to deduct the empirical part of\ntreatises from the philosophical, the first example is the Aristotelian\ndivision of the virtues into the dianoetic and ethic, with their\nconsequent determination by means of the concept of mediacy (\u03bc\u03b5\u03c3\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2)\nbetween two extremes. But this Aristotelian method, which was continued\nby the Scholastics, seemed to others (as for example Schleiermacher)\nnothing but \"a heap of virtues,\" without any rule and without any\ncertainty; hence he made constant attempts at new classifications and\nnew deductions. Kant recognized that the ethical obligation, that is,\nrespect for the law, is something unique and indivisible, and that to\nattain from that to duties or _ethica officia,_ which are many, it\nis necessary to introduce the consideration of objects.[14] Here he\nshould have stopped, because objects have infinite determinations, are\ninfinite. Hence the enumeration, division and deduction of duties,\nshould be simply pronounced impossible. Instead of doing this, he\npassed at a bound, how far logical we know not, from the general\nethical obligation, to the division of duties into two great classes:\nof man toward man, and of man toward beings that are not human. He\ndivided the first into duties toward oneself and duties toward other\nmen, the second into that of the duties toward beings beneath man\n(animals) and those toward beings above him (God).[15] The strangeness\nof these divisions, which sometimes verge on the comic, can already\nbe seen, though abridged, in the first class of the duties toward\noneself, subdivided in its turn into duties toward oneself as an animal\nor physical being, and duties toward oneself as a moral being; as\nthough human duties are not always to be referred to spirituality and\ncan ever concern physicality or animality. In their first aspect they\nreceive a tripartite division, into the duty of self-preservation,\nwhich is violated by suicide, by allowing oneself to be castrated (in\norder to sing soprano, as used to be done at that time at the San Carlo\nof Naples and at the Opera of Berlin), by allowing a healthy tooth\nto be pulled out in order to sell it (as does poor Fantine in the\nstory of the _Mis\u00e9rables_); into the duty of preserving the species\n(violation: unnatural use of the sexual impulse);--into the duty of\npreserving the use of one's own strength (violation: gluttony). The\nduty of preserving the dignity of man is contained beneath the second\nheading (violation, lying, covetousness, abjection, etc.[16]). The\nfact is that the duty of preserving the dignity of man comprises\nin itself, not only the class that stands first, of duties toward\noneself, but also all the other duties toward men, animals, or gods.\nFichte feels the difficulty, because he sees that conscience is that\nwhich determines our duty on each occasion; but he adds: \"This is not\nenough for science: either we must be able to determine _a priori_\nthat which our conscience will affirm in universal, or we must admit\nthat an Ethic, as a pure applied science, is impossible.\"[17] The\nsecond horn of the dilemma was precisely that of the truth, but\nFichte, like Kant, bowed to the supreme power of tradition and clung\nto the first. He divides duties into mediate and conditioned (toward\noneself) and immediate and unconditioned (toward others), and into\ngeneral and special (those of various states and conditions), deducing\nfrom this the fourfold division, resulting from the meeting of general\nconditioned duties, particular conditioned, general unconditioned,\nand particular unconditioned. Hegel, who in his youthful writings had\ndenied absolute value to the virtues, and consequently the possibility\nof collisions between the virtues (for example, in the _Life of Jesus,_\nrecently published), well defines the altogether empirical character\nof that treatise, calling it, by reason of its natural element and of\nthe quantitive considerations upon which it is founded, \"a natural\nhistory of the spiritual world\" (_eine geistige Naturgeschichte_); but\nsince he did not perceive the identity of the concept of duty with that\nof virtue, he believes in the possibility of a philosophical theory\nof duties.[18] This is developed by him, as has been said, in the\nsection of Ethicity, applying to it the dialectical rhythm proper to\nthe philosophical universal, and distinguishing in it three moments: of\nthe immediate natural spirit, which is the family, of the dissension\nfrom which arises civil society, and of conciliation, whence arises\nthe State. But notwithstanding the external dialectical form, there\nis to be found in all this section of the Ethicity at every point,\nnot so much the philosopher properly so-called, as the historian who\ndescribes and narrates, the acute and well-balanced politician and\nmoralist. The merit of such a treatise resides precisely, therefore,\nin the abhorrence of a sham philosophy; with but slight modifications\nof literary form, it could be developed into a series of excellent\nhistorico-political essays. Certain of the propositions of the writing\non _Natural Law_ (1802-3)[19] would tend to show that Hegel inclined\nto look upon the treatment of duties and institutions as nothing\nmore than a provisional classification of historical and changeable\nmaterial, a thought that is in any case suggested by his whole system.\nSchleiermacher was among the philosophers of that time who laboured,\nperhaps, with the greatest tenacity upon the empirical classes, with\na view to reducing them to philosophical form; but the results were\nunhappy, only revealing, by their contradictions persisting after\nsuch efforts, the impossibility of the task. In fact, Schleiermacher\nsees and does not see the unity of the three spheres of things good,\nof duties, and of virtues; hence they appeared to him to be three\naspects of the same object, and he strangely placed them in analogical\nconnection with three spheres of the natural world, the mechanical, the\nchemical, and the organic. He, too, starting from a double division and\na double antithesis, ideal and temporal, of knowledge and exposition\n(_Darstellen,_) arrived at a quadruple division of the virtues, into\nwisdom and love, discretion and perseverance, which seemed to him to\ncoincide with the four Platonic virtues, of \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7,\n\u03c3\u03c9\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7, and \u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1e\u03afa, or with the four cardinal virtues derived from\nthem, to which would correspond the four duties: of right, of vocation,\nof love, and of conscience.[20] After this, it would be superfluous to\nproceed to enumerate the ethical systems of contemporary philosophy,\nnoteworthy neither for the ingenuity of their artificial deductions nor\nfor the grandeur of their paradoxes.[21]\n\n[Sidenote: _IV. Various questions._]\n\nIV. The very copious empirical element that fills the books on\nthe Philosophy of the practical and the attempt to treat it\nphilosophically have also had the injurious effect of distracting\ntheir authors from entering deeply into the problems of true and\nproper philosophy, to which the practical activity gives rise. Thus\na history of the aforesaid aberrations would be as rich as a history\nof the speculation as to the will would be poor. The problem of the\ntheoretic element in the volitional act, or of the theoretic phase\nof deliberation, has not been developed as it deserved, and as\nthe important pages of the third and seventh books of the _Ethica\nNicomachea_ seemed to augur. The question, too, of the priority of\nthe will over the concepts of the useful and of the good and of the\npractical judgments, is hardly touched by a philosopher here and there,\nand the Herbartian theory of practical judgments failed to excite\nany fervour of examination, criticism, or opposition. The concept\nof good will and of good intention, to which Kant gave a prominent\nplace, is not discussed profoundly, save by Hegel, who goes deeply\ninto the difficult problems of abstract and concrete intention in the\nintroduction and in the second section of the _Philosophy of Law._\nThe other problem, as to the possibility or impossibility of willing\nwithout full knowledge, was not adequately treated after Descartes and\nSpinoza.\n\n[Sidenote: _The practical nature of error._]\n\nIn Descartes are also to be found the most acute observations as to the\npractical nature of error. After having stated that it is impossible\nthat God should have given to man any faculty that was not perfect of\nits kind, he asks himself: \"_D'o\u00f9 est-ce donc que naissent mes erreurs?\nC'est \u00e0 savoir, de cela seul que la volont\u00e9, \u00e9tant beaucoup plus ample\net plus \u00e9tendue que l'entendement, je ne la contiens pas dans les m\u00eames\nlimites, mais que je l'\u00e9tends aussi aux choses que je n'entends pas;\nauxquelles \u00e9tant de soi indiff\u00e9rente, elle s'\u00e9gare fort ais\u00e9ment, et\nchoisit le faux pour le vrai et le mal pour le bien: ce qui fait que\nje me trompe et je p\u00e8che._\" Errors arise from the concourse of two\ncauses, the faculty of knowing and the faculty of choice: \"_car pour\nl'entendement seul je n'assure ni ne nie aucune chose, mais je con\u00e7ois\nseulement les id\u00e9es des choses que je puis assurer ou nier._\"[22] For\nDescartes the affirmation was an act of the will, and here perhaps lies\nhis mistake and the mistake of those who have followed him in this\ntheory (Rosmini for example); that is to say, they have _mistaken_\nthe _affirmation,_ which is theoretical, for the _communication,_\nwhich is practical, or they have taken as being of the same degree the\ngeneral will that is in affirmation through the unity of the spirit,\nand the particular will that is in error. Spinoza opposes Descartes'\ntheory of error, but in conformity with the deterministic nature of\nhis philosophy, his criticism relates only to the point as to whether\nthe will can be the cause of error when it is not more than a mere\nabstraction or _ens rationis;_ hence errors or the _particulares\nvolitiones_ can be determined, not indeed by the will and by liberty,\nbut _a causis externis_[23] The consciousness of the introduction of\nthe will into the theoretical spirit as production of error has been\naffirmed by Schleiermacher as well as by Rosmini:[24] \"It is the will\n(he writes) that conceals men from themselves: the judgment cannot err\nif it turn its gaze really upon itself.\"[25] Baader frankly reduced\nincredulity to ill-will and moral corruption.[26]\n\n[Sidenote: _Practical taste._]\n\nAs to the concept of an immediate form of practical discrimination,\nindependent of the intellectual judgment, it is to be remarked\nthat the faculty of _taste_ in Gracian and in other thinkers of the\nseventeenth century[27] has a practical rather than a theoretical\norigin, and that the sentimentalists of Ethic (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson\nand others) were led to posit a moral tact sense. Before Herbart talked\nof a _moral taste (sittlicher Geschmack[28])_ Jacobi, who saw better\nthan others the analogy between practical and \u00e6sthetic facts, had\nwritten: \"The science of the good, like the science of the beautiful,\nis subject to the condition of _taste,_ without which nothing can be\ndecided, and beyond which nothing can be carried. The taste for the\ngood, like that for the beautiful, is formed by means of models of\nexcellence, and original acts are always the work of genius. By means\nof genius, nature gives laws to art, both as regards the good and the\nbeautiful. Both are _liberal_ arts; they do not allow themselves to be\nlowered to the level of mechanical arts and placed at the service of\nindustry.\"[29]\n\n[Sidenote: _V. The doctrines of feeling._]\n\nV. With the mention of a few facts and names, it can be proved that\nthe function of the term \"feeling\" in the history of philosophy has\nbeen as shown above. We have already said that the peculiarity of the\npractical form has been asserted by the use of the word \"feeling\" or\nsimilar denominations (\"moral sense,\" \"conscience,\" and the like),\nespecially by the Scottish School, in opposition to intellectualist\nreductions. Jacobi appealed to the feeling of duty (_Gef\u00fchl der\nPflicht_) or conscience in his ethical discussions. In our day, too, it\nhas been affirmed (by Simmel[30] and others), in opposition to abstract\nand imperative Ethics, that the practical decision is the product of\nfeeling and is not definable by theoreticians. But the principal cause\nof the importance attached to feeling in the eighteenth century was\nthe \u00e6sthetic problem. This is seen in Dubos's book, in the English\nsentimentalists (who approach the ideas of virtue and of beauty,\ntreating of the moral sense and of the beautiful), and, finally, in\nthe doctrines of Leibnitz himself and of his school, as to _confused\ncognition,_ which led to the _Aesthetica_ of Baumgarten.\n\n[Sidenote: _The Wolfians._]\n\nWe owe the word and the concept of _feeling_ (_Gef\u00fchl_ and sometimes\nalso _Empfindung_) principally to the Leibnitzian-Wolfians and to\nthe German thinkers under the influence of Wolff (Mendelssohn,\nTetens, Sulzer, Riedel).\n\n[Sidenote: _Jacobi and Schleiermacher._]\n\nBy means of the speculation of Jacobi, on the other hand, feeling\nwas called upon to fulfil the functions of a true and proper\nmetaphysical organ. He had demonstrated in a rigorous and irrefutable\nmanner that the form of the empirical sciences and of the abstract\nintellect, since it proceeds by nexus of cause and effect, is incapable\nof attaining to the infinite, and had assigned the affirmation of\nGod to the \"sense of the supersensible,\" to \"immediate knowledge,\"\nand to \"feeling.\" After Jacobi, the same position was assumed by\nSchleiermacher, who maintained that it was impossible to know God by\nmeans of the intellect and to treat Him as an object, since He is\nindifference of thought and being. He can be known only by feeling,\nwhich is indifference of all determinate functions of ideal and real,\nof thought and being. The neocriticists and agnostics of to-day, with\ntheir appeal to feeling in all truly philosophical questions, are\nfollowers, often unconscious and certainly less coherent, of Jacobi and\nSchleiermacher.\n\nThe concept of feeling in the Kantian philosophy can be said to derive\nits importance from the meeting of two unsatisfied wants, namely,\nthat which sought a concept for the \u00e6sthetic activity and that which\nsought a _forma mentis_ proper to philosophy. Indeed, the _Critique\nof Judgment_ corresponds to feeling, the first part of which consists\nof an inquiry into the nature of the beautiful and of art. The second\npart (critique of the theological judgment) is an anticipation of the\n_concrete concept,_ or of that organ of speculative thought which the\n_Critique of Pure Reason_ had not discovered.\n\n[Sidenote: _Hegel._]\n\nFeeling, therefore, cannot but lose importance in the Hegelian\nphilosophy, which makes of art a form of knowledge, and of the\nteleological judgment the logic of the idea or philosophical logic,\nresolving also in it the demand of Jacobi, whose feeling or immediate\nknowledge is shown to be logical knowledge and supreme mediation. In\nHegel feeling is nothing but a class of spiritual facts, the lowest\nof all, that in which theory and practice are still indistinct.\nBut this class has a merely psychological value in his system, not\nphilosophical and real (which is not clearly recognised by him).\nIndeed, feeling, which was absolute knowledge for Jacobi and for\nSchleiermacher, is placed, not in the sphere of the absolute spirit,\nnor in that of the objective or practical spirit, but in the subjective\nspirit, or Psychology. The \"doctrine of the three faculties\"\n(_Dreiverm\u00f6genslehre_), as was called that elaborated from Mendelssohn\nto Kant and promulgated in the Kantian philosophy, did not, however,\nremain without opponents in the nineteenth century; from Krug (1823) to\nthe youthful Fichte, and in more recent times Brentano (1874).\n\n[Sidenote: _Opponents of the doctrine of the three faculties. Krug._]\n\nKrugs confutation is wrongly combated by Hamilton and discredited by\nBrentano, for it proceeds with perfect correctness, and is founded on\nthe correct philosophical principle that' there are no other activities\nof the spirit conceivable, save those directed either inwardly or\noutwardly (immanent or theoretical and transcendent or practical),\nand that therefore there is no place for feeling, which would be a\nmixture of the two activities, and consequently a failure of direction\nor inactivity, nothing, therefore, but a poor, rudimentary knowing or\nwilling, that is, a psychological class, not a philosophical category.\n\n[Sidenote: _Brentano._]\n\nBrentano, returning in a measure to Descartes, constructs the\ndoctrine of the three faculties in a different way, determining them\nas representation (to which he makes art and the \u00e6sthetic activity\ncorrespond), judgment (to which corresponds science), and love and\nhate (to which corresponds the practical). Feeling, therefore, does\nnot find a place of its own in the psyche, and that which is wont to\nbe called feeling is either representation, or love and hate. Brentano\nshows himself inferior to Krug in the philosophical demonstration of\nthe inconceivability of this form of the spirit, but he has the merit\nof having substituted certain positive elements for the indeterminate\nword \"feeling,\" although the function exercised by feeling in the\ndevelopment of philosophical thought is more important than Brentano\nsucceeds in perceiving, for among other things he ignores and fails\nto recognize the relation of the concept of feeling to the demands of\nspeculative thought.[31]\n\n\n\n[1] _Eutyphron,_ 10.\n\n[2] The history of the enfranchising of Ethic from Religion has\nbeen done with especial care by Jodl, _Gesch. d. Ethik als philos.\nWissensch._ vol. I\u00b2. (Stuttgart--Berlin, 1906). For Vico, cf. my book,\n_The Philosophy of G. B. Vico_ (Bari, 1911).\n\n[3] _Phil. d. Rechts,_ \u00a7 4, Zus.; _Gesch. d. Philos._ ii. pp. 66, 169.\n\n[4] _Eth. Nicom._ 1103.\n\n[5] See above.\n\n[6] _Kritik d. prakt. Vern.,_ ed. Kirchmann, pp. 7-8.\n\n[7] _Allg. prakt. Phil.,_ ed. Hartenstein, p. 107.\n\n[8] _Memor._ iv., c. 2, \u00a7\u00a7 14-16. Schopenhauer also exhaustively,\n_Gr\u00fcndl. d. Moral,_ in _Werke,_ ed. Grisebach, iii. pp. 603-607.\n\n[9] _Metaphys. d. Sitten,_ ed. Kirchmann, p. 248.\n\n[10] _De Finibus,_ v, c. 23.\n\n[11] _System der Sittenlehre,_ \u00a7 29, in _Werke,_ iv. 346-347.\n\n[12] _Gr\u00fcndl. d. Moral,_ ed., cit., iii. pp. 506-508.\n\n[13] _Allg. prakt. Philos.,_ ed. Hartenstein, pp. 29-30.\n\n[14] _Metaphys. d. Sitten,_ pp. 247-248.\n\n[15] _Op. cit._ p. 251.\n\n[16] _Metaphys. d. Sitten,_ p. 255 _sqq._\n\n[17] _System d. Sittenlehre,_ pp. 208.\n\n[18] _Philos. d. Rechts,_ \u00a7\u00a7 148, 150.\n\n[19] _Werke,_ i. 323-423.\n\n[20] In the _Entwurf e. Systems d. Sittenlehre_ (in _Werke,_ sec. iii.\nvol. v.), and cf. the collected writings in _Werke,_ iii. I.\n\n[21] For example, F. Paulsen, _System der Ethik,_ Leipzig, 1906.\n\n[22] _M\u00e9dit._ iv.; and _R\u00e9ponses aux 3mes et aux 3mes object_.\n\n[23] Epist. in _Opera,_ ed. Gfr\u00f6rer, p. 523.\n\n[24] Cf., among other places, _Logica,_ \u00a7\u00a7 p. 278 _sq.; Fil. d.\ndiritto_ (Napoli, 1844), I. p. 50.\n\n[25] _Monologen,_ in _Werke,_ i. 363.\n\n[26] Cf. Jodl, _Gesch. d. Eth._ ii. pp. 131-132.\n\n[27] _Estetica_ 4, p. 222.\n\n[28] _Allg. pract. Phil._ pp. 9-22.\n\n[29] _Woldemar_(1779, 1794-95), in _Werke,_ v. p. 78.\n\n[30] _Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft,_ Berlin, 1892-93.\n\n\n[31] For the doctrine of feeling see, chiefly, Volkmann, _Lehrb. d.\nPsychol._ (Cothen, 1885), ii. pp. 301-311; F. Brentano, _Psychol._\n(Leipzig, 1874), 1., ii. c. 5; cf. _Ursprung sitt. Erkennt._ (Leipzig,\n1889) pp. 51-55; A. Palme, _Sulzer's Psychol, u. d. Anf\u00e4nge d.\nDreiverm\u00f6genslehre_ (Berlin, 1905). Cf. also Croce, _Estetica,_ pp.\n226-228, 4th ed.\n\n\n\n\nSECOND SECTION\n\n\nTHE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY IN ITS DIALECTIC\n\n\n\n\nI\n\n\nNECESSITY AND LIBERTY OF THE VOLITIONAL ACT\n\n\nThe relations of the practical form with the other forms of the spirit\nhaving been examined, it is now necessary to re-enter, so to speak, the\ninterior of the volitional activity, and enclose ourselves within it,\nthat we may study its mode of development, its rhythm, its dialectic.\nWe shall no longer ask, therefore, whether the practical activity\nprecede or follow knowledge, or exactly what knowledge it follows and\nwhat it precedes, what the volition is in relation to events, what the\npractical concept or judgment, and the like. But we shall ask what are\ngood and evil, the passions and the forces that dominate them, desires\nand aspirations; and in the first place (this being the problem that\nopens the series and gives the key for the solution of the others) what\nare the _freedom and necessity_ of the volitional act.\n\n\n[Sidenote: _The problem of freedom._]\n\nThis problem of freedom and necessity (that is to say, whether the will\nbe free or determined) has seemed to be and is, from a certain point of\nview, most weighty and complicated, and we shall soon see why this is\nso. But at this point, owing to the premises that we have already laid\ndown in our preceding treatises, and also in the part of the present\ntreatise that has already been developed, it will be convenient to\nsolve it with relative expedition.\n\n[Sidenote: _Freedom of willing and freedom of action: criticism of such\ndistinction._]\n\nFirst of all, we have been able to eliminate the distinction that is\nwont to be made between freedom of willing and freedom of action,\nwith the duplicity of the problem thus entailed. Indeed we know that\nvolition and action coincide, and that it is impossible to conceive\neither a volition which is not at the same time action, or an action\nwhich is not at the same time volition, and that in consequence there\ncannot be freedom of willing on the one hand and freedom of action\non the other. All the instances of the one that are brought forward\ncan be reduced to the other, provided that the word \"freedom\" be not\nused in an improper and metaphorical manner. For example, a paralytic\n(they say) wills to get up and run; his spirit is free, but his\naction is restrained; he has freedom of willing, but not of action.\nBut in reality the paralytic does not seriously will to get up and\nrun; that is, he does not really will anything at all. Were he really\nand seriously to will, that might happen to him which happened to a\nparalytic gentleman in the Neapolitan revolt of 1547. This gentleman\nhad himself carried into the square on the arms of his servants, but he\nwas found, after the tumult, to the great astonishment of all, on the\ntop of the campanile of San Lorenzo, whither he had climbed with his\nown legs; such had been his terror and such his will to be saved.[1]\nAs a rule, on the other hand, the paralytic does not will, because he\nknows that he cannot; at the most, he _would wish_ or desire to find\nhimself in different conditions to those in which he finds himself, in\norder that he may be able to will otherwise than he does now, which is\nto remain quiet. This confirms the identity of volition and action,\nand proves that the two supposed freedoms are one only. Thus, he who\nis threatened and yields to the threat declares that he is deprived of\nfreedom of action, but that this is not exact is already affirmed in\nthe formula: _coacti tamen volunt._ Enforced actions not only do not\nexist, but are not even conceivable. The demand for greater freedom of\naction, such as new political liberties, is nothing but the demand for\ncertain _new conditions of fact_ for future volitions and actions. But\nit is a question of more or less, since, as we know, no countenance of\nimminent tyrant can extinguish the freedom of the soul; no ruler, be he\never so strong and violent, can prevent a rebellion, or, when all else\nfails, a fine death that affirms externally the freedom within. \"The\nwill that wills not cannot be subdued.\"[2]\n\n[Sidenote: _The volitional act: both free and necessary._]\n\nThe question that we have here to treat is, then, single, and concerns\nonly the will, which, as such, includes in itself action. In replying,\nhowever, we cannot accept the dilemma, that the volitional act must\nbe free or determined, and cling to one of the two horns: we must on\nthe contrary deny the form of the question itself and say that the\nvolitional act is _at once free and determined._\n\nVolition, in fact, as has been seen, does not arise in the void, but\nin a definite situation, in unchangeable historical conditions, in\nrelation to an event, which, if it be, is necessary. The volition\ncorresponds to that situation and it is impossible to separate it: when\nthe situation changes, the volition changes; as the situation, so the\nvolition. This amounts to saying, that it is _necessitated_ or always\nconditioned by a situation, and precisely by that situation in which it\narises.\n\nBut this also means that the volition is free. Because if the actual\nsituation be its condition, the volition is not the condition, but the\nconditioned, for it does not remain fixed in the actual situation,\nnor repeats and makes a duplicate of it, which would be superfluous\nand therefore impossible in the effective development of the real,\nwhich does not allow of superfluity. The volition produces something\ndifferent, that is, something new, something that did not exist\npreviously and that now comes into existence: it is initiative,\ncreation, and therefore act of _freedom._ Were this not so, volition\nwould not be volition, and reality would not change, would not become,\nwould not grow upon itself.\n\nAnd since without necessity there cannot be liberty, because without\nan actual situation there cannot be volition, so without liberty there\ncannot be necessity, the actual situations are not formed, which are\nalways new and always necessary in respect to the new volitions. Actual\nsituations are events, and events are the result of the concourse of\nindividual volitions. The two terms cannot be separated, for if one\nbe removed, so is the other; but neither can they be looked upon as\nidentical or synonymous. They are the two moments of the volitional\nact, distinct and united, which act is the _unity_ of both, and\ntherefore, as was said, is at once free and determined.\n\nThis consciousness of necessity and liberty inseparably united is found\nin all men of action, in all political geniuses, who are never inert or\nreckless: they feel themselves at once bound and unbound; they always\nconform to facts, but always to surpass them. The fatuous, on the other\nhand, oscillate between the passivity of the given situation and the\nsterile attempt to overleap it, that is, to leap over their own shadow.\nThey are consequently now inert, now forward. They do not therefore fix\nor conclude anything, they do not act; or, if they do, it is always\naccording to what of the actual situation they have understood, and\nwhat of initiative they have displayed.\n\n[Sidenote: _Comparison with the \u00e6sthetic activity._]\n\nThe best comparison is afforded on this occasion also by the \u00e6sthetic\nactivity. No poet creates his poem outside definite conditions of\nspace and time, and even when he appears to be and is proclaimed \"a\nsoul of other times,\" he belongs to his own time. The historical\nsituation is given to him. The world of his perceptions is such, with\nthose men, those customs, those thoughts, those works of art. But\nwhen the new poem has appeared, there is in the world of reality (in\nthe contemplation of reality) something that was not there before,\nwhich, although connected with the previous situation, yet is not\nidentical with it, is indeed a new form, and therefore a new content,\nand so the revelation of a truth previously unknown. So true is this,\nthat in its turn the new poem conditions a spiritual and practical\nmovement, becomes part of the situation given for future actions and\nfor future poems. He is a true poet who feels himself at once bound\nto his predecessors and free, conservative and revolutionary, like\nHomer, Dante, and Shakespeare, who receive into themselves centuries of\nhistory, of thought and of poetry, and add to those centuries something\nthat is the present and will be the future: _charg\u00e9s du pass\u00e9, gros de\nl'avenir._ The false poet, on the other hand, is now a blind follower\nof tradition and imitator, now a charlatanesque innovator, and if in\nthe vacuity in which he labours he sometimes does produce a fragment of\npoetry, this happens only when he is made to look into himself and to\nhave a vision, be it great or small, of a world that arises.--But the\ncomparison instituted is rather an analogy than a comparison, for that\nwhich happens in the practical sphere happens in that of poetry and in\nall the other spheres of the spiritual activity. The Spirit is freedom,\nand in order to be so, not in the abstract, but in the concrete, it\nmust also be necessity.\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique of determinism and of arbitrarism._]\n\nThis indissoluble connection of necessity and liberty confutes both the\npartial theories which dispute the field in the problem of freedom:\nthe _deterministic_ theory and that of _free will._ The determinists\ndo not see in the volitional act anything but the actual situation;\nthe followers of the theory of free will see nothing but the moment of\nfreedom. These conceive a volition that is as it were a duplication,\ntriplication, quadruplication of the given fact, and so on to the\ninfinite; those a volition that bursts forth from nothing, or rains\ndown from above and then inserts itself, no one knows how, into the\ncourse of the real. Both exaggerate, and since exaggerations are called\nin science errors in sense, both err, and being one-sided are proved\nfalse. But since, on the other hand, it is a quality of errors opposed\nto one another, to become identified and to pass, the one into the\nother, it is given to us to assist at a like spectacle in this case\nalso, and to see the determinists change into arbitrarists and the\nbelievers in free will into determinists. The first, in fact, passing\nfrom cause to cause, abandon the concept of cause at the end of the\nchain, as though (to use the expression of Schopenhauer), they were\ndismissing the hired carriage, made use of during the day for their own\naffairs, and return to free will. The others, being unable to justify\nfreedom in the world of reality and of experience, justify it in a\ntranscendental way, as the effect of a divine cause, which excludes\nfree will, and excludes it also when it concedes it; for by the very\nfact of conceding, it determines, limits, and produces it.\n\n[Sidenote: _General form of this antithesis: materialism and\nmysticism._]\n\nBut with this explanation of our thesis, and of the two theses opposing\nit, we are transported into the heart of one of the greatest problems\nof Gnoseology, so great in fact as to appear to contain in it the whole\nproblem of philosophy. In fact, that which is called determinism and\nfree will in the Philosophy of the practical is the same antithesis\nthat in Gnoseology is called _materialism and mysticism._ And that\nwhich we here oppose to the two one-sided theses, as theory of that\nliberty which is also necessity, is called in Gnoseology, _idealism._\nThe thesis and antithesis are therefore to be found in all the\nparticular problems of philosophy, since they concern the logical form\nin universal. This, then, is the reason why the question of freedom of\nwilling has become so grave and complicated as to appear insoluble. To\nobtain a solution, it was necessary to construct a Logic of philosophy,\nand intrinsically necessary to renew the whole system of philosophy.\nHerbart wisely counselled never to discuss the freedom of the will with\nthe laity, in order not to be misunderstood.[3]\n\nHad this advice been followed, we should not have seen both determinism\nand free will torn asunder by advocates in the law courts, dragging\nin the one or the other to suit their purposes, and thus insulting\ngood sense, which should alone rule in those places. The freedom of\nthe will is doubted and discussed among philosophers, as the reality\nof the external world is doubted and discussed, but this is not done\nbecause it is wished to set in doubt the existence of the boots of\nthis gentleman or of that gentleman's overcoat. If a confirmation be\nsought that the question of the freedom of willing is, as was said, the\nuniversal gnoseological or metaphysical question, let it be observed\nhow the determinists and the advocates of free will affirm or deny the\nfreedom of willing, not only in that field, but in all fields. Indeed,\nwhoever, for instance, should admit spiritual activity to knowledge and\ndeny it to the will, would not, properly speaking, be a determinist,\nbut an intellectualist or an \u00e6sthetician. That is to say, he would be\na theoretician, who, in denying the freedom of the will, would simply\nmean to deny the existence of a practical activity side by side with\nthe theoretic; for freedom is the very essence of every spiritual form,\nand with the denial of the freedom of that form is denied the form\nitself. Determinism, arbitrarism, libertarianism reflect, then, the\nuniversal gnoseological thesis of naturalism and mechanicism in the\nspecial practical field.\n\n[Sidenote: _The materialistic sophisms of determinism._]\n\nDeterminism of the will, like materialism and mechanicism in general,\nconsists in nothing but the transference to philosophical speculation\nof the form proper to the physical disciplines. By dint of classifying\npractical facts and presenting them as empirical concepts, and thus\nas merely related by cause and effect, they end by forgetting that\nthose formul\u00e6 are not thoughts and that their content is not real\nreality; and causes or motives (abstractive transformation of the\nactual situation) are given as agents of the will, and thus the agent\nis destroyed for the cause, the form for the abstract material. Hence\nthese timid phrases that on close inspection turn out to be tautologies\nor mistakes: \"Freedom is an illusion; what prevails is always the\nstrongest motive.\" But if we ask what is the strongest motive, we are\ntold (and no other reply is possible) it is _that which prevails._\nThis, translated into our language, amounts to saying that the actual\nsituation is the actual situation, and conditions the will, which is\nwhat it is and can be no other than it is.--Virtue is a mere product,\nlike vitriol. Certainly, vitriol is also in its way a creation, a\nmanifestation of the spirit, as is virtue, and if it be permitted to\nfalsify vitriol by changing it into something material and mechanical,\nnothing forbids doing the same for virtue. Virtue, too, can be produced\njust like vitriol, that is to say, by setting in motion the spontaneous\nforces of the spirit and of so-called nature, which itself is also\nspirit, and nothing forbids endowing educators with the title of\nchemists and apothecaries of virtue.\n\nBut metaphors are not arguments--Statistics prove the determinism of\nhuman actions, which always reappear in the same way and in the same\nquantity whenever certain actual circumstances appear.--But Statistics,\nif they collect and simplify facts and construct views and tables\nthat are more or less useful, do not thus prove anything; for neither\nare the instances that they give as equivalent, really so, nor the\nrelation that they declare between certain facts a real relation.\nIf we turn from artificial formul\u00e6 to the immediate observation of\nthe real, we find ourselves confronted with nothing but individuated\nvolitional acts, resulting from necessity and liberty.--The individual\nhas a constant character, of which action is the consequence: _operari\nsequitur esse._--But the constant character is nothing but the\nabstraction of the single acts done by the individual. It is therefore\nnatural that the actions should appear to be referable to the character\nwhich is derived from them; but it is not correct to say that there\nis equivalence, for abstraction is not equivalent to concretion.--The\nindividual, even if he can be conceived as free in respect to his\nexternal environment, would be always subject to the law of his own\nnature.--But the law of his own nature is not a contingent thing, but\nthe law itself of the Spirit, or, precisely, freedom, and it is quite\nclear that freedom is not free not to be free.--The social organism\nhas its natural laws, which govern the action of the individual.--The\nsocial organism is also an abstraction, which is turned into a being\nonly by the false interpretation of a metaphor. In all these examples,\nand in the many others that could be brought forward, the error is\nalways the same as has been said: the substitution of the naturalistic\nfor the speculative construction, Physic for Metaphysic. And since\nphysical or naturalistic construction has no material other than given\nhistorical facts, the doctrines above mentioned, when they are not\nfalse, are always tautological and lead to the affirmation that the\nvolitional fact is a fact, or that in it is the moment of necessity.\n\n[Sidenote: _The mysticism of arbitrarism._]\n\nArbitrarism, on the other hand, arises in the same way as mysticism,\nfrom distrust of thought; being unable to dominate the fact that should\nbe explained, recourse is had to the inconceivable, to the absurd, to\nmiracle; subjective and individual ignorance is hypostasized and of\nit is made a metaphysical reality. Arbitrarism, like mysticism, has\nits element of truth, in the negation of determinism, that is, in the\nrecognition of the impotence of the naturalistic method and in the\naffirmation that the truth lies beyond that method, in the concept of\ncreation and of freedom. But freedom separated from its logical and\nnecessary moment becomes transformed into will, just as in mysticism\nin general God is transformed into the mystery, ready to receive all\nindividual caprices into himself, and to confer upon them an appearance\nof truth.\n\n[Sidenote: _The doctrine of necessity-liberty, and idealism._]\n\nThe concept of freedom (necessity-liberty), which is at once scientific\nand not mechanical, and if it surpass the categories of Physic, does\nnot surpass those of Metaphysic, is opposed to both these views. As\nidealist philosophy, it tends in general to conciliate the ideal with\nthe actual, thought with complete reality, philosophy with the whole of\nexperience. With the concept of freedom is eliminated the inertia of\ndeterminism, and the unstable springing about of arbitrarism. The gross\nmaterial conception of the real disappears, because that which seems to\nbe matter is revealed as spirit, the fact as creation, necessity as the\nproduct of liberty. But miracle disappears with them. For if the spirit\nbe the eternal, omnipresent, continuous miracle, unattainable by the\nphysical method,-a continual miracle, omnipresent and eternal, is no\nlonger a miracle, but the same simple and ordinary reality, which each\none of us contributes to create and each one of us can and does think.\n\n[Sidenote: _The doctrine of double causality; dualism and agnosticism._]\n\nStrict determinism and strict arbitrarism are not, however, the\nsole adversaries of the concept of liberty-necessity, as rigorous\nmaterialism and mysticism are not the only adversaries of idealism.\nThere exists another which must be called more dangerous (if\nmisunderstanding be more dangerous than error). This doctrine, since\nit goes by the name of dualism, spiritualism, and neocriticism in\ngeneral philosophy, could be called the doctrine _of double practical\ncausality,_ in the field of the practical problem. The supporters\nof this line of thought, despite many individual differences, are\nall agreed in positing two distinct series of facts: one which obeys\nmechanical causality, another which is initiative and creation, or (as\nthey say) obeys causality through freedom. There are thus two series\nthat interpenetrate one another or alternate at every instant and\nare mutually blended, the one in the other. Hence there is something\nof each in the volitional act, something of the strongest motive and\nsomething of free choice. Such a solution has some external resemblance\nwith that which we maintain, but is intrinsically most different.\nOur solution is _fusion_ of liberty and necessity, while this is\n_juxtaposition;_ our solution is _conciliation,_ this _transaction._\nLike every juxtaposition and transaction it displeases both the\ncontending parties, and falls into the power, now of the one, now of\nthe other. Thus, if, according to the theories of that tendency, it\nbe maintained that freedom exists, but that there are also causes\ntending to diminish it, or that there exist volitional acts, but that\ninvoluntary acts also exist, one does not understand how a series of\nfacts that has its own law in itself (freedom, the will) can ever be\nsubordinated to facts that obey a different law (diminution of freedom,\ninvoluntariness of acts). If this happen sometimes or many times, we\nmust suspect that it happens always, and that the surviving freedom is\na mask of freedom, illusion. Thus, if it be affirmed that side by side\nwith causality, with equivalence of causes and effects, or with the\npossibility of foreseeing the effect by means of the cause, there is\nanother causality, in which the effect is not equivalent to the cause,\nand that not only is it not to be foreseen, but is such that only after\nit has happened does it allow its cause to be discovered; then the\ndoubt arises that one of the two causalities does not exist, because\neither the effect is equivalent to the cause, and so it must always be,\nor it is not equivalent to it, and so it will never be; or it can be\nforeseen by means of the cause, and so it will always be, or it cannot\nbe foreseen, and never will be foreseen. The strict determinists and\narbitrarists have the loyalty of error, and they are rare, because\nenergetic spirits are rare, but the doctrine of double causality is\ntinged with some of the rouge of truth, and thus seduces the many,\nand is proper to weak and irresolute spirits, as indeed are dualism,\nspiritualism, agnosticism, neocriticism, of which this doctrine forms a\nparticular case. When the absurdity of determinism and of arbitrarism\nhas been recognized (and their very presence is an autocriticism), it\nis necessary to satisfy with a new and single concept the claim that\nthey represent, certainly not with _the sum of two errors,_ and the new\nsingle concept is that of true freedom.\n\n[Sidenote: _Its character of transaction and transition._]\n\nThe doctrine of double causality has had its historical importance, not\nbecause it is a _transaction,_ but rather because it is a _transition;_\nthat is, a gradual approximation to the true concept, with the\nintroduction into the naturalistic concept of an element of ferment and\ndissolution: the concept of a causality by means of freedom, that is,\nof a causality that is so only in name. The concept of freedom cannot\ntolerate that of causality at its side, and of the two series posited,\none of the two is not real in itself, but simply a particular product\nof the other: mechanical causality is not a fact, nor a conception, but\nan instrument created for its own ends by spiritual freedom itself.\nAnd only in this sense can it be admitted that freedom avails itself\nof causality for its effectuation, and the truth of the observation be\nrealized, that the classifying of the perceptions in series of cause\nand effect becomes itself also a presupposition of will and action.\nThe historical knowledge as to the actual situation that precedes the\nvolition, since it includes of necessity philosophical universal in\nitself, so it can also include empirical universals, concepts, and\npseudo--concepts: the consciousness of the productivity of the spirit\nand the mnemonic formul\u00e6 in which this productivity is fixed, and\nfor which it certainly appears to be mechanical, but only to him who\nforgets that the formul\u00e6 themselves are mechanical.\n\n\n\n[1] Summonte, _Historia di Napoli,_ ed. 1675, iv. 205, \"Miracle caused\nby fear.\"\n\n[2] Dante, _Parad._ iv. 76.\n\n[3] _Einleit. in die Phil._ \u00a7 128, trad. Vidossich, p. 169.\n\n\n\n\nII\n\n\nFREEDOM AND ITS OPPOSITE. GOOD AND EVIL\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Freedom of action as reality of action._]\n\n\nSince, then, the volitional act is freedom, the question as to whether\nin a given case an individual has or has not been free, is equivalent\nto this other question: _Has there really been volition_ (action) in\nthat case? This question can have and has (as any one who lends an\near to such discussions as are frequently heard can verify) but two\nmeanings. The first is, whether the case under discussion be _action_\nor _event,_ and, therefore, if it be or be not accurate to present it\nas an individual act. For example:--Was Jacobinism the crime or the\nglory of Voltaire and Rousseau? Was the defeat of Waterloo the fault of\nMarshal Grouchy? The second is, if it be really a question of _action,_\nwhat, _precisely,_ has that action been? For example:--What were the\nrespective parts of Voltaire and of Rousseau in the propaganda of the\nrevolutionary spirit and of the Jacobin mode of thought? What did\nMarshal Grouchy really know and will when, instead of listening to\nExelmans and to others of his generals and marching whither the cannon\nwas thundering, he obeyed to the letter the order he had received and\nattacked the Prussian army corps of Thielman?\n\n[Sidenote: _Inconceivability of the absolute absence of action._]\n\nThere is a third meaning that is to be excluded: namely, as to whether\nat a given moment of time there has been any sort of action or, on\nthe contrary, a void and total absence of action. For the only case\nin which the individual does not act is that in which he is dead or\npartially dead, be the death physiological or spiritual, that of a\ncorpse or of a madman. The glory of putting poor madmen on a level\nwith the guilty and the delinquent is to be left to the thinkers of\nthe \"new school of penal law.\" In every other case, man always acts,\nalways wills, and is always responsible and free, because life, so long\nas it lasts, is nothing but a web of volitions and therefore of free\nacts. He is also responsible for the acts that contribute to put man\nin such conditions as amount to madness more or less transitory, and\nso of irresponsibility: such is the case of drunkenness and of moral\ndangers imprudently sought, and so on. At no point of life does the\n_practically indifferent_ exist.\n\nThose actions, too, that appear to be neither willed nor free,\nbecause they have become habitual, mechanicized, instinctive, are\nwilled and free, not indeed because (though this be true enough in\nitself) habitual acts were once acts of will, but because (as we have\nalready had occasion to remark), although they have become facts\nalmost external to the individual willing, yet it is always the will\nthat permits them to act and can always arrest their action: they\nare therefore to be looked upon as conditions of fact that every new\nvolition modifies, even when it accepts them. A machine is not the\nwork of the arm that moves it, but of hundreds and thousands of other\narms that were previously moved in order to construct it. But once\nconstructed, that which sets in motion the machinery is always the\nwork of one arm, an act of will, just as an act of will can stop its\nmovement and finally cause its disaggregation and destruction.\n\n[Sidenote: _Non-freedom as antithesis and contrariety._]\n\nBut excluding the absolute absence of freedom of action (and of\nexistence in so far as it is action), and on the other hand the\npresence of something different from it called causality having been\npreviously excluded from the idea of freedom, it remains nevertheless\nindubitable that in the very bosom of freedom, there is _non-freedom.\n_ Every volition is at the same time nolition, as every affirmation\nis negation. Volition is love, nolition hate; and, as we know, every\nlove is hate, and the more we love, the more we hate. Antigone was\nborn to love intensely, and for that very reason, to hate profoundly.\nWhat can be that which we hate in love and abhor in volition? What can\nthis internal enemy be, which does not consist either in the absence\nof volition or in the presence of an extraneous and indifferent\nelement?--Since it is neither absent nor indifferent, it cannot be\nanything but the _opposite or contrary_ of freedom, anti-freedom, which\nconstitutes the contradiction in its effective concretion.\n\n[Sidenote: _Nullity and arbitrariness of non-freedom._]\n\nFreedom is an indissoluble nexus of necessity and freedom: the force\nthat tends to annul it is anti-freedom, the scission of that nexus, the\nanalysis of that synthesis. On the one hand it aims at making liberty\nfall into nothingness, by compelling it to the inertia of the fact,\nand on the other, to make a leap into the void, by impelling it to\nwill, a sterile endeavour--two movements that are one-sided and absurd,\nand become identified through the considerations already established\nin relation to determinism and arbitrarism. Therefore the opposite\nof freedom is qualified indifferently, either as the _passive,_\ntaken by itself, opposed to the active, the fact that resists the new\ncreation, or as the _active,_ taken by itself and abstract, opposed\nto the passive: will opposed to liberty. Anti-freedom is either the\nmaterial fact or arbitrary choice, but the first is resolved into will,\nthe second into material fact. Only by an act of will can the fact\nthat should continue to develop be fixed as a fact and so appear as a\nmaterial fact, and only by a persistence in that fact, which should\nbe surpassed, can will give itself the appearance of a content. The\nundertaking is contradictory, and the solution, the absence of freedom,\nis a contradiction.\n\n[Sidenote: _Good as freedom and reality, and evil as its opposite._]\n\nFreedom and its opposite, freedom and its internal contradiction,\nfreedom and will, are what is designated by the terms _good and evil._\nWith us these terms are given an altogether generic meaning, as they\nare taken as the representatives of all the other couples of opposites\nthat are wont to be enunciated in the field of practical activity,\nas helpful and harmful, useful and useless, honest and dishonest,\nmeritorious and blameworthy, pious and impious, lawful and sinful, and\nso on. All these formul\u00e6 either answer to the sub-distinctions of the\npractical activity (which we shall study further on), or are the same\ndistinction, variously formulated, with reference to psychological\nclasses. But all are to be reduced to those of good and evil for\nthe purposes of the philosophical study of the practical activity\nin general, without ulterior determinations of them as moral or\nutilitarian good, moral or utilitarian evil, or any other form there\nmay be, and without regard to the various empirical material, with\nwhich they may be filled.\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique of abstract monism and of the dualism of values._]\n\nThat practical good and evil are to be conceived as will and anti-will,\nand the good, therefore, as the reality and the bad as the irreality\nof the will, the good as something positive and the bad as something\nnegative,--is the solution imposed by the impossibility of thinking\nthe two others that differ from it: namely, that which considers the\ndistinction between good and bad as inexistent (abstract monism of\nvalues), and that which considers the good as transcendent in respect\nof reality, which is always evil, unless the good deign to descend\nand modify it (abstract dualism of values). For the criticism of\nthe abstract monistic view, it is necessary to distinguish between\nthose doctrines that deny, not only the distinction between good\nand evil, but also all the analogous distinctions in every field of\nactivity, including that of thought, and the doctrines that allow\nthe distinction to subsist in other fields, but deny it in that of\nthe practical. The first, which deny the distinction between true\nand false, are the suicide of Philosophy, the second, which deny it\nonly between good and evil, are the suicide of the Philosophy of the\npractical: that is to say, both are founded upon errors that we have\nalready criticized and surpassed, and upon which it would therefore\nbe otiose to insist. As to the dualistic view (still common among\nright-thinking professors of philosophy, that is, among the lazy and\nthe most lazy) it will be requisite to discuss this point seriously,\nwhen it has been demonstrated in what way Reality can place itself\nbeneath the yoke of Value and of Goodness, which would be inferior\nto it by hypothesis, through the very fact that they were _unreal._\nReality living, these others dead; Reality like \"the four bedevilled\"\nof Giusti bent upon _doing so,_ they, like the \"two hundred simpletons\"\nof the same poet, bent upon _saying_ no. For if Value and Goodness be\nreal, they will be the true Reality; and that which was first called\nby the name will be feigned reality, altogether identical with what we\nhave indicated as the moment of contradiction and of will, arising in\nthe very bosom of the practical activity.\n\n[Sidenote: _Objections to the reality of evil._]\n\nAn instance that is always formidable has certainly been cited against\nthe thesis of evil as something negative and unreal, and of good as\nitself the only positive and real: it has actually been affirmed that\nthis thesis offends against good sense. What? Is evil unreal? Is it\nnothing? Unreality and nothingness are then the knavish trick of some\nwicked person who starts a calumny, which, being received and believed,\ninjures an honest man? Unreality and nothing, the passion that drags\nthe gambler into economic ruin and moral abjection? So the world is all\ngood, all rose-coloured, all sweet; and crimes, cowardice, foolishness,\nand baseness are illusions, and there is no reason to lament; so the\nfeeling of life should be expressed with a perpetual smile, like that\nupon the lips of the wounded warriors in the marbles of Aegina? -But\nlet good sense and its advocates remain tranquil. If evil be a nothing,\nthat does not mean that it is nothing; if the vanity that seems to be\na person, be vanity and not a person, that does not mean that it has\nnot really the appearance of a person and should not be really combated\nand dissipated. The wise, who having defined evil, deny toothache,\nor like the stoical Posidonio forget the gout that transfixes them,\nneed Giambattista Vico to remind them how no philosophy is able to\nsave them from anxiety on behalf of \"their wives in childbirth\" and\nof \"their sons who languish in disease\"! The world is precisely that\nmixture of good and evil, which good sense says it is, and the sweet\nis always tempered with the _amari aliquid._ It cannot be adequately\nexpressed either with lamentations only, or only with laughter. The\nthesis that we have enunciated wishes to abolish, not the consciousness\nof evil, but the false belief that this is something substantial, and\nthus prevent one evil from being increased by another, evil by error,\n_moral_ trouble by _mental_ confusion.\n\n[Sidenote: _Evil within and without synthesis._]\n\nEvil is either felt as evil, and in this case it means that it is not\nrealized, but that in its place is realized the good. The gambler of\nthe example, at the moment he knows he is doing himself economic harm,\ndoes not play; his hand is held; and it is held, because to _know,_\nin the practical sense, equals to _will_; and to know the harm of\ngambling means to know it as harm, and so to dislike gambling. If he\ntake to dice or cards again, this arises because that knowledge is\nobliterated in him, that is, because he changes his mind; and in this\ncase play is not looked upon any longer as harmful; it is willed,\nand so at that instant again becomes the good for him, because it\nsatisfies one of his wants. The calumniator, if he understand the\nidea that is passing through his mind, or rather the impulse that has\nseized him, as calumny, is for that very reason repugnant to it and\ndoes not pronounce those evil words: in that case indeed he is not\na calumniator, but an honest man who resists a temptation (and no\nother definition of an honest man can be given). But if he pronounce\nthem, this means that the opposing repugnance was not present or is\nno longer present: and therefore those words are no longer for him a\nwicked act of calumny, but a simple satisfaction of a desire to amuse\nhimself, or to reject the evil that has been done to him, and therefore\na good. In the same way, he who asserts what is false, he who renders\nhimself guilty of error, if he be aware of himself as frivolous or a\ncharlatan or disloyal, would be silent: if he talk and write and print\nfalse insinuations, this happens either because the will for truth\ndoes not exist in him, or is for the time being suppressed, and with\nit the desire to seek it out and to diffuse it; that is to say, for\nthat will has been substituted the other of withdrawing from a painful\nlabour, or of obtaining easy praise and gain; so, for one good has been\nsubstituted another. As a rule, it is admitted that we will the good\nand do evil. \"I do not do the good that I will, and I do the evil\nthat I do not will\" (\u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f42 \u03b8\u03ad\u03bb\u03c9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1ff6 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u1f42 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b8\u03ad\u03bb\u03c9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c3\u03c3\u03c9), said St. Paul.[1] But it is a question of psychological\nconfusion, owing to which a series of moments and alternatives is\nsimplified into one single act, inexistent because contradictory.\n\n[Sidenote: _Affirmative judgments of evil as negative judgments._]\n\nThus evil, when real, does not exist save in the good, which opposes\nand conquers it, and therefore does not exist as a positive fact. When\non the contrary it exists as a positive fact, it is not evil, but\ngood (and in its turn has for shadow an evil, with which it strives\nand conquers). The judgments that we give when we judge an action to\nbe foolish or wicked, a statement false, a work of art ugly, are all\nmetaphorical. In delivering them we do not mean to say that there is an\n_existence_ called error, ugliness, foolishness, but only that there is\na given existence and that another is wanting. He who has launched a\ncalumny, dissipated his property, soiled a canvas, printed a worthless\nbook, does not, strictly speaking, deserve negative denominations,\nbecause to judge means to place oneself in the conditions of the person\njudged, and in those conditions there was neither evil nor ugliness\nnor error nor folly; otherwise the acts that are the objects of the\njudgment would not have been accomplished, and in so far as they are\naccomplished they deserve positive judgment. But what is meant by the\nnegative form of those judgments is that such an act is this and not\nanother, that it is utilitarian and not moral, a commercial and not a\nliterary or scientific fact, and so on.\n\n[Sidenote: _Confirmations of the doctrine._]\n\nThere is a very ancient saying to the effect that every one seeks\nhis own good and that no one deliberately wills his own evil, and,\ntherefore, that if the practically good man be the wise, then the\nbad man can but be the ignorant. Now if we remove from the thesis\nits intellectualist veneer, and translate wisdom and ignorance into\npractical terms, we see that wickedness is here looked upon as a limit,\nas a tendency toward the good, that has failed, not as the will for an\nevil. The dispute as to who sins the more, he who is conscious of the\nevil, or he who has no consciousness of it, is also illumined by the\ntheory that we have here exposed, which declares that both parties to\nthe dispute are right and wrong. For instance, he who is completely\nwithout moral consciousness, is morally innocent, whereas he who is\nmore or less possessed of one, is also more or less of a sinner, for\nthe law itself makes him so (\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03b3\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5,\nalso said St. Paul[2]). But with this saying it is not desired to put\nthe innocent above the sinner, but the contrary. That declaration of\nignorance is the gravest condemnation, for it is thus recognized that\nthe individual in question is unable to sin, and therefore unable to do\nright, since the possibility of sinning is all one with that of doing\nright. The poet inspires admiration, but he who does not know how to\nbe anything but a poet, and is therefore unable to reason and to act,\nis deficient. The shrewd man is praised, but he who is _only_ shrewd\ncannot be praised. The animal is a being, worthy of all esteem, but to\ncall a man an animal, that is, to tell him that he is nothing but an\nanimal, is to do him a great injury. In other words, while we recognize\nas good all that a man effectively does, we do not intend to cancel\nthe distinction between one form and another of human activity, and\nbetween one act and another, between the utilitarian and the moral man,\nbetween fanciful and logical production, between animal and man. Nor\ndo we mean that those emphatic expressions of negative character that\nwe continually utter to one another and to ourselves, and by means of\nwhich we urge ourselves and others to more lofty modes of existence,\nare to be abandoned.\n\n[Sidenote: _The poles of feeling (pleasure and pain) and their identity\nwith their practical opposites._]\n\nHere occurs an opportunity of tying a thread that we had left loose\nwhen discussing the theory of feeling, or rather the distinction of\nfeeling into the two poles of _pleasure and pain,_ understood, not as\na psychological distinction of greater or less, or of _mixed states,_\nbut as a philosophical distinction of _pure states,_ or of terms that\nare truly opposed. When the vague and indeterminate term of \"feeling\"\nis directed toward theoretical facts and is determined by theoretical\nphilosophy as \u00e6sthetic activity or speculative thought, or in some\nother way, the terms of pleasure and pain are, strictly speaking, not\napplicable to it. The pure theoretic activity considered in itself,\ncannot be polarized, as has been seen; it will always attain to the\nbeautiful, always to the true. Only in so far as the theoretic activity\nis also practical activity, by the law of the unity of the spirit,\nwill the polarization of good and evil, which in that case are called\nbeautiful and ugly, true and false, take place through it if not in it.\nIf the term \"feeling\" be on the contrary directed to practical facts,\nand its synonymity with the practical activity (of which feeling would\nbe a distinguishing characteristic) made clear by the Philosophy of\nthe practical, it is clear that to it belongs immediately and no longer\nmediately that polarity of good and evil. Good and evil then become\nwhat theoreticians of feeling _call pleasure and pain._ These terms are\nidentical with the preceding, as feeling is a fact identical with the\npractical activity, generically considered.\n\n[Sidenote: _Doctrines concerning pleasure and happiness: critique._]\n\nThis theory of pain and pleasure, as the synonyms of the practical\npositive and negative, helps to put an end to a long series of\nquestions arising in connection with such concepts. Above all, the\ndispute as to whether pleasure be positive or negative will appear\nto be unfounded, and, therefore, whether pain have a positive or a\nnegative value, or, finally, whether both be negative: unfounded,\nsince \"pleasure\" means \"positive\" and \"pain\" \"negative.\" At the most,\nit may be admitted that pain has also a positivity, which is however\nnothing but the positivity of the negative, that is the real existence\nof the negative pole.--The theory that man always proposes to himself\npleasure as an end is, on the contrary, not only not unfounded, but of\nsuch evident truth as not to require enunciation, much less efforts\nto prove it. If pleasure be nothing but activity, it is natural that\nman should have no other end save pleasure, that is, activity, life\nitself. The correction that has been suggested by others, to the\neffect that man wills, not indeed pleasure, but activity, of which\nthe outcome is pleasure, has but slight exactitude, for the two terms\nare not distinguishable, and the result is not separable from the\nactivity; the pleasure of travelling is not separable from travelling.\nThat polemic has value at the most against empiricism, which limits\npleasure to an arbitrarily determined group of pleasurable facts, that\nis to say, circumscribes activity to certain particular manifestations\nof activity, collected in groups or classes, and substituted for\nthe universal concept. Finally, by means of the identification\nof pleasure and pain with good and evil in general which we have\ngiven, all disputes as to the concept of _happiness_ disappear, as\nto whether it be or be not distinct from that of the good action,\npractically coherent, and if man propose to himself _happiness_ as an\nend. \"Happiness\" is equal to \"pleasure,\" and \"pleasure\" is equal to\n\"activity.\" To will the good (that is, to will well and energetically),\nand to be happy, are the same. The objection raised by some, that man\ndoes not will happiness, but a certain happiness, that he does not\nwill pleasure, but a certain pleasure, not the good, but a certain\ngood, is valid; but this only amounts to distinguishing volitional\nman in the act, from the theory of the will, constructed by the\nphilosopher. If Tizio wishes at this moment to go to bed and Caio\nto take a moonlight walk, bed and walk are the affairs of Tizio and\nof Caio; for the philosopher there is no Tizio, no Caio, but man in\nuniversal; there is neither bed nor moon, but pleasure and the good.\n\n[Sidenote: _Empirical concepts relating to good and evil._]\n\nThe practical activity, the will, which is also strife between good\nand evil, can be illuminated now from this side and now from that by\nthat indivisible unity, according to the accidents of discourse and the\nvarying situations of life. In this way arises a series of concepts\nwhich, in so far as they are unilateral, are empirical, and only\nbecome again philosophical in the thought of the unity of which they\nform part. Thus, to make use of a comparison, space in geometry can be\nanalyzed and split up into a first, second, and third dimension; but\nas spatiality, it is a _unicum,_ which does not possess either one or\ntwo or three dimensions; and when in measuring or constructing plans\nof measurement, we proceed to think one of these dimensions, we become\naware that we cannot think them, save all three together, or not as\nthree, but as one. The empirical, practical concepts that arise upon\nthe antithetical and dialectical nature of the will, have had much\nimportance, and it is fitting, therefore, that we should mention and\nexplain at least the principal among them.\n\n[Sidenote: _Duty of being, ideal, inhibitive, and imperative power._]\n\nIf the situations of life lead to the directing of the attention\nchiefly to the aspect of the will striving against inaction and\narbitrary choice, it is posited in this strife, in this becoming, as\nsomething that _is not_ but _must be,_ not as _real,_ but as _ideal._\nIf the greatness of the ideal that is to be and to fill the soul with\njoy, be set in relief in this struggle, then the ideal appears sweet\nand smiling, as a _joy-bringing and beatific vision._ If, on the\nother hand, the effort of its becoming be set in relief, the ideal\ncan be made into a metaphor, as will opposed to will, as legitimate\nagainst rebellious will; and then it assumes a sour, rough, and hard\nappearance, and the names of _inhibitive or imperative power,_ in so\nfar as it impedes the will, or promotes liberty.\n\nThere is no less opportunity and interest in making clear that\nrelation, from the point of view of the negative term, or of evil.\nA series of descriptive concepts then appears, which present the\nconsciousness of evil, now as obstinate _blindness (cor induratum),_\nnow as _disquiet_ and _scruple,_ which induce vigilance and\ncircumspection, now as _humility,_ which does not permit forgetting\nhow easy it is to slip into evil. But it is worthy of note that the\nseries of words and empirical concepts that serve to illuminate\nthe _satisfaction_ of the good, the _victory_ won over oneself,\n_tranquillity_ of conscience, is far less rich. Perhaps this arises\nprecisely because there is less practical interest in celebrating\nthe pleasure of victory than in the inculcation of the necessity for\nstrife and the abhorrence of evil. Why draw attention to joy and to\nrepose when man is already too much inclined to allow himself joy and\nrepose; does not Life allow them to itself and cause other problems\nto follow on each solution, new perils to follow perils overpast, and\nthe necessity for new struggles? It is therefore of importance to\ndirect the greater sum of attention to those aspects from which the eye\nis most frequently turned aside. Finally, these various aspects can\nbe placed in relation with the greater or less frequency with which\neach appears in individuals, thus arriving at the construction of the\nconcepts of _virtue and vice,_ and of the models of _the virtuous\nman, the honest man, the deliberate man, the clever man,_ and their\nopposites, _the vicious, the dishonest, the unreflective, the incapable\nman,_ and so on.\n\n[Sidenote: _Their incapacity for setting as practical principles._]\n\nThe same thing happens with these empirical practical concepts as\nwith all the other empirical concepts, of which we have spoken in\ngeneral. They have been stiffened into philosophical concepts, for\nthe hasty satisfaction of the philosophical need of man. Hence, among\nothers, many of the disputes as to the principle of the Philosophy of\nthe practical. Some indeed maintain that such a principle is to be\nfound in _duty or the imperative; others in the idea or the ideal,\nothers in the joy of good, others in the abhorrence of pain, others in\nvirtue, others in enthusiasm,_ and so on. Each of the above-mentioned\ntheoreticians has the sharpest eyes for the discovery of the defects in\nthe theories of others, but is short-sighted as regards his own. Those\nwho maintain the ideal satirize the form of the categoric imperative\nas suggestive of police or _gendarmerie;_ those of the imperative and\nof duty deride the quietist form and the insipid ecstasy proper to the\ncontemplation of ideals; those of the avoidance of pain do not spare\ntheir sarcasms for the hunters of joy; those of joy call these plunged\nin sorrow hypocrites, who also obtain enjoyments for themselves, if in\nno other way, then secretly: _si non caste, caute._ The truth is that\nall are wrong as philosophers, because they all find the principle of\nthe will, not in itself but in an empirical concept, which gives to it\nan abstract and mutilated appearance. And, on the other hand, all are\nright, because those aspects are all real, and in each one of them the\nothers can be implicitly shown. The categoric imperative, for instance,\ncontains in itself both the will, which, in so far as it commands\nitself, is the true will, the joy of being and the sorrow of not being\nwhat we wish to be, the ideal, and the necessity of self-realization,\nand so of entering into strife against irreality, thus becoming\nimperative, and so on.\n\n[Sidenote: _Its characteristics._]\n\nIf none of the formul\u00e6 given above, owing to their empirical character,\nbe able to indicate with precision the principle of the Philosophy\nof the practical, and all are more or less convenient _synecdoches,_\nfor this reason none of those concepts are to be treated as rigorous\nconcepts. If they be so treated, there is not one of them, however\njustified it may seem to be, that is not able to cause rebellions and\nhas not done so. The type of the dutiful man has been reproached with\nbeing so much preoccupied with duty that he does not really perform\nit, because he forgets the impulse of the heart; of the type of the\nvirtuous man it is said that he, as it were, ceases from being so by\nthe very fact that virtue becomes in him a profession; of the type of\nthe honest man, that there is nothing more base than the race of honest\nmen; of the type of the _pious Aeneas,_ that his piety is egoism; and\nin general of all these cases it has been recalled that a little vice\nis necessary for virtue, as alloy for metals. Repentance and remorse,\ntoo, although they be highly recommended as means of purification,\nhave had their detractors; does it not suffice (they say) that an evil\ndeed has been committed? Must the offence be aggravated by losing\ntime over it, as though anything could be remedied with sorrowing and\nlamentation? But others have replied that, given human iniquity, it is\nbetter to exceed in the matter of remorse than to pass rapidly over\nit. Humility has been opposed with the _sume superbiam_ as being more\nvirile, and with the _laudum immensa cupido_ as being more noble; the\nhabit of self-tormenting with the _servite domino in laetitia,_ as, on\nthe other hand, the over-confident has been admonished with that other\nnot less biblical dictum: _beatus homo qui semper est pavidus._ These\nare objections and replies that may all of them have value for the\nempirical situations to which they refer; but they have neither truth\nnor value in philosophy, for which they are all of them false, because\nthe distinctions from which they derive are not philosophical. Remorse,\nfor instance, has a value, not in itself, but as a passage to activity,\nwithout which such passage would not take place; the virtuous habit has\na value, not in itself, but in so far as it is practised and constantly\npreserved; duty cannot differ from the aspiration of the soul, and\nboth cannot differ from the volitional act; confidence is at the same\ntime trepidation, and humility must be one with the pride of merit. To\nsum up, for, the philosopher, the dialectic of the will is all in the\nconcept of will, with its polarization of good and evil, which is the\nactuality and concreteness of that concept.\n\n\n\n[1] Rom. vii 19.\n\n[2] Rom. vii.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\n\nTHE VOLITIONAL ACT AND THE PASSIONS\n\n\n[Sidenote: _The multiplicity of volitions and the struggle for unity._]\n\nIf the volitions followed one another, so to speak monadistically,\neach one shut up in itself, simple, impenetrable, indecomposible, it\nwould be impossible to understand the moment that there is in them\nof arbitrary choice, of evil, of contradiction. But it is not so.\nThe individual is solicited simultaneously by many or, more exactly,\nby infinite volitions, because the individual is at every moment a\nmicrocosm and in him is reflected the whole cosmos, and he reacts\nagainst the whole cosmos by willing in all directions. This infinity of\nvolitions that is in every individual, can be proved by a very obvious\nfact: by what occurs in the contemplation of works of art, in which\nthe same individual is able to reconstruct in himself the most various\nactions and psychological situations, and to feel himself in turn\nmild and sanguinary, austere and voluptuous, Achilles and Thersites.\nThis would not happen, had he not to some extent in himself the\nexperience of all these various volitional attitudes. But even if we\nwish to restrict ourselves to those volitions that are the most closely\nconnected with the historical situation, thus limited as well as may\nbe (every historical situation is in reality a cosmic situation),\nrestricting ourselves to what are called volitions of the moment, we\nhave always, if not a chaos, certainly a multiplicity, or at the least\na duality, of volitions. Were the individual to abandon himself to that\nchaos, to that multiplicity, to that duality, he would instantly be\nlacerated, broken in pieces, destroyed. But he does not abandon himself\nto it, for he is an individual, volitional and operating just because\nhe renounces that feigned richness of the infinite and that pernicious\nrichness of multiplicity or duality, limiting himself on each occasion\nto one single volition, which is the volition corresponding to the\ngiven situation.\n\n[Sidenote: _Multiplicity and unity as bad and good._]\n\nThis volition is consequently the result of a struggle in which the\nindividual drives back all the other infinite volitions, to attach\nhimself to that one alone which the given situation must and does\narouse in him. And when the given volition does not affirm itself fully\nin this struggle, he falls a victim to multiplicity, in which is found\nthat arbitrary choice attached to a volition which is not the one\nthat should be willed, which he feels he wills and that he does will\nin a way. Hence the will becomes split up in different directions and\ncontradictory, action not positive but negative, not truly action, but\nrather passivity.\n\nThe multiplicity of volitions explains then the moment of arbitrary\nchoice, of evil, in the practical activity. This could be defined as\nthe _volition that conquers the volitions,_ as its contrary arbitrary\nchoice is _the contest of volitions with volition._\n\n[Sidenote: _Excluded volitions and the passions or desires._]\n\nThe volitions that are driven back on every occasion and excluded, to\nmake way for the volitional act, are variously denominated in ordinary\nspeech and by psychologists as _appetites, tendencies, impulses,\naffections, wishes, velleities, desires, aspirations, passions._ But,\nas is usual with us, we do not intend to compose and defend such\nclasses in a naturalistic and psychological sense, nor consequently\nto distinguish appetite from desire, or affection from passion, with\nboundaries that must of necessity be arbitrary and undulating. What is\nof real importance is only the distinction and the precise boundary,\nnot arbitrary but real, between the volition and volitions, or, as we\ncan now say, the relation between true and proper _volition_ and _the\npassions or desires._\n\n[Sidenote: _Passions and desires as possible volitions._]\n\nPassions or desires are and are not volitions: they are not volitions\nin respect to the volitional synthesis, which, by excluding, annuls\nthem as such; they are on the other hand volitions, if considered in\nthemselves, for they are capable of constituting the centre of new\nsyntheses in changed conditions. It has been said that we cannot _will\nthe impossible,_ but that we can perfectly well _desire it._ That is\nnot exact, because the impossible, the contradictory, cannot even be\nthe object of desire. No one wishes to find himself at the same moment\nin two different places, or to construct a triangle that should be at\nthe same time a square: and even if such absurd wishes be manifested\nin words, the words will be absurd, but the desires will either be\ndifferent from what is stated, or they will not exist even as desires.\nIn a certain aspect all desires are desires of the impossible (and not\nonly some of them), if, that is to say, we consider them as volitions\nthat have not been realized and which cannot be realized at that\nmoment: but from another point of view, they are all possible, and can\nindeed be precisely defined as _possible volitions._ This is proved by\ntheir becoming gradually actual as the actual situation changes. If (to\nchoose a very simple illustration) an individual engaged in a certain\nwork repel the desire for food and sleep with his volition and action,\nthat desire is nothing at that point, as actual volition; but it does\nnot for that reason lose its intrinsic volitional character, for\nwhen the hour for the repast or for sleep has struck, it passes from\npossibility to actuality and becomes the will for food and sleep. The\nsophism previously criticized, by means of which a bad and unsuccessful\nact, that is to say one that is dominated by passion and caprice, is\njustified by proving that it has had a legitimate motive and answers to\na good intention, appeals to this character of possibility, possessed\nby all desires, and artfully changes it into a character of actuality,\nthus substituting for the given the imagined situation.\n\n[Sidenote: _Volition as conflict with the passions._]\n\nThe relation that we have defined between volition and passions or\ndesires explains why the will has often seemed to be nothing but\na conflict with the passions, and life itself a battle (_vivere\nmilitare est,_) and at other times itself nothing but passions. The\nwill is indeed homogeneous with the passions, and is opposed, not\nto the nature of the passions, which is its own nature, but to their\nmultiplicity. For this reason, it has been said that only passion acts\nupon the passions: for the will is a passion among passions. Even\nthe poet or the philosopher, who frees himself from the passions by\nobjectifying them and making them material for \u00e6sthetic contemplation\nor for speculative research, succeeds in so doing, only because he is\nable to affirm the passion over the passions: the passion for poetry or\nfor philosophy.\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique of the freedom of choice._]\n\nWe must however beware of enunciating this relation in a false form,\nas happens with the theory called _freedom of choice,_ where the will\nis conceived as the faculty that chooses one volition from among\nothers and makes it its own. The will does not choose a volition\n(save metaphorically), but so to speak chooses the choice itself, or\nmakes itself will among the desires which are not will. Nor should\nthe possible actions that are excluded be looked upon as constituting\na graduation in respect to the spirit, which should will _a_ and not\n_b, c, d, e,_ and so on, attributing to them, nevertheless, different\nvalues, which can be symbolized by the declining series of numbers,\npassing downward from the will which is 10, to 9, 8, 7, 6, and so on.\nIn reality, the volitions that are excluded (_b, c, d, e_) have no\nactual value, for the very reason that they are excluded. They may\nacquire it in other situations different from the one analyzed, but it\nis not possible to present the various situations together in one, and\nfar less to determine them quantitatively and numerically, otherwise\nthan in a symbolical manner. The propositions that present the will\nsometimes as the _strongest_ volition in respect to the passions or\ndesires, and sometimes as the _weakest_ in respect to the passions,\nwhich seem to be the strongest, that is, according as we consider the\nactive or the passive moment of the will, its victory or defeat, are\nalso metaphorical and symbolical.\n\n[Sidenote: _Significance of the so-called precedence of feeling over\nthe volitional act._]\n\nThe relation established receives further light from the generally\nadmitted theory of the necessary precedence of the _feelings_ as\ncondition for the volitional act. The volitional act is preceded by a\njostling multiplicity of volitions, by a swarm of passions and desires,\nwhich it dominates; and therefore it may seem that it follows, not\nthe volition, but something different from the volition, to be called\n_feeling._ It is certainly different, but only because it is the\n_plural_ of that _singular._ The nature of the passions and desires in\nrespect to the volitional act has not been clearly elucidated, and\nthis is another of the reasons that have caused the customary category\nof \"feeling\" to appear and to be retained.\n\n[Sidenote: _Polipathicism and apathicism._]\n\nFinally and always through the established relation, the two opposed\ntheories concerning the passions are excluded: that which makes the\nefficacious explanation of practical life to consist in giving free\ncourse to the passions, holding them all to be sacred as such: this\ntheory could be called _polipathicism_; the other, which makes it\nconsist of the eradication and destruction of all the passions, in\norder to give place to the exclusive domination of reason, of rational\nwill, or of the will that really is will, and could therefore be called\n_apathicism._\n\nPolipathicism has the defect of not taking account among the passions\nof that which is passion _par excellence,_ and which alone becomes\nactual, driving away the others: the will. Apathicism naturally\npossesses the opposite defect and takes account only of the will,\nand therefore not of that either, for the will becomes impotent when\nalone, just as in the other case it becomes a chaotic jumble of all the\npassions.\n\n[Sidenote: _Erroneousness of both opposed theses._]\n\nSuch views as these are so openly unsustainable that they hardly appear\nat all in their strictness and purity, in the course of the history of\nphilosophy, and then fugitively. But it is desirable to be attentive\nnot to identify the theoretic formul\u00e6 given above with the programmes\nof certain groups, sects, associations, or individuals who have\nverbally proclaimed polipathicism and apathicism, whereas they have\nimplied something very different, and could not have done otherwise.\nComplete polipathicism and complete apathicism could only be attained\nby the individual at the cost of disaggregation and annihilation. At\nthe most, sects, groups, societies, and individuals have been able to\nconform to those formul\u00e6 as the simple expression of _tendencies;_\nor those formul\u00e6 are applicable to them by _hyperbole,_ in the\ncondemnation that it has been held desirable to inflict upon certain\nunhealthy tendencies. Certainly there are individuals whose passions\nare in such slight control as to suggest the absence of will; they\nrun after every one of their desires, or leave their soul open to the\nonset of the passions that devastate it as the wind and the hail do the\nfields. Lorenzo the Magnificent (symbolizing with his wonted finesse\na profoundly philosophical conflict) said to his son Piero, who was\naddicted to every pleasure and caprice: \"And I never have any wish but\nyou realize it for yourself.\"[1] The young rake whose adventures were\nsung by De Musset may afford an example of the same disaggregation,\ncomposed of the most violent kind of passions:\n\n    Ce n'\u00e9tait pas Rolla qui gouvernait sa vie:\n    C'\u00e9taient ses passions; il les laissait aller,\n    Comme un p\u00e2tre assoupi regarde l'eau couler....\n\nBut even in these extreme and typical cases the will and the dominion\nof the passions are never altogether absent: otherwise it would be\nimpossible to live, not only a lifetime, but a day, an hour, a minute.\nThus too on the other hand, no individual, be he ever so apathetic\nand ascetic, ever frees himself altogether from the dominion of\nthe passions and the desires. We read in the life of some saint or\nbeatified personage, whose name escapes me, how he had attained to so\ngreat a degree of perfection that whatever food he put into his mouth,\nhe tasted nothing but dry straw. Leaving to specialists the inquiry\nas to how a stomach of so slight a capacity for distinguishing one\naliment from another could perform its function, and also as to the\nconsequences for social productiveness of so strangely perfected an\nindividual, it is certain that in order to nourish himself and live,\nthe saint in question must have had the periodical appetite or desire\nof straw for his food, if for nothing else. Apathy too is often nothing\nbut a most violent and tenacious, though disordered, passion for ease.\nActivity in any case reasserts itself with the dissolving of apathy,\na state nigh to inertia and to death, when it dissolves _grata vice\nveris et Favoni,_ that is, with the appearance of the desires, of those\n\"suave impulses,\" those \"heart-beats,\" that pain, and that pleasure,\nwhich Giacomo Leopardi depicted in his _Risorgimento,_ overcome with\nastonishment, as though face to face with the mystery of life.\n\n[Sidenote: _Their historical and contingent meanings._]\n\nThe formul\u00e6 of polipathicism and of apathicism have had other\ncontingent and historical meanings, but of a positive nature, which\nit is fitting to examine, in order to prevent the usual passage, so\nfruitful of errors, from philosophical to empirical theses. The return\nto the world and to nature, which is one of the characteristics of the\nRenaissance and of the Reformation itself; the rights of the passions,\nwhich is one of the traits of Romanticism in its initial period;\nneo-paganism, which has given to the Italy of our day its most lofty\npoetry in the work of Giosu\u00e8 Carducci, were each in their turn nothing\nbut beneficial reactions against the lazy monastic life of the Middle\nAges, against Protestant pedantry, against degenerate Romanticism,\nwhich despised the real world and dreamed of contradictory ideals.\nOn the other hand, in different times and circumstances, Christian\nascesis, Franciscan poverty, and Puritan strictness were beneficial\nreactions. So true is this, that we are wont to unite in our admiration\nheroes of abstinence and heroes of the passions, assertors of the\nspirit and assertors of the flesh, for all, in different ways, because\nin different historical situations, willed always the elevation of\nhumanity. Every one of those historical manifestations can be and has\nbeen blamed and satirized, but only in its decadence, where it has\nexhausted its proper function, and is no longer truly itself, but its\nown mask.--The friars of the stories of the sixteenth century are not\nthe companions of St. Francis, as the indecent Italians of the late\nRenaissance are not the active merchants, philologists, and artists who\npromoted it, nor is there a greater lack of historical sense than the\ntransference of the characteristics of the one to the other, as is the\nway of vulgar detractors and apologists. One and the same historical\nfact (as has been brilliantly said) always shows itself twice: the\nfirst time as _tragedy,_ the second as _comedy._\n\n[Sidenote: _The domination of the passions and the will._]\n\nThe cases that we have recorded, which have seemed to represent\nunbridled or exhausted passion, possess not a pathological but a\nphysiological character, in so far as they really consist of a\ndomination, a volitional synthesis, which conquers and contains\ndivergent and ruinous passions. And with this we have answered the\nquestion as to whether or no the passions can be dominated, and whether\nman be slave or free. We can dominate them, and in that domination is\nlife; if we do not dominate them, we advance to meet death; to dominate\nor not to dominate them are the very poles of the will, positive and\nnegative, and we cannot think of the one as being abolished without\nthinking of the other as also abolished.\n\nBut the labour of dominating them is hard, as all life, \"sweet life,\"\nis hard. The passions, driven back and restrained again and again by\nthe will, yet rage within us, tumultuous, though conquered. We tear\nout the cumbersome plants, but not their roots and seeds. The man who\nconsiders himself hardened to the trials of life, still feels and\nsuffers: the man who seems calm is yet always agitated within. As the\nlabour that is called physical deposits poison at the base of the\norganism; so does the labour called spiritual in the depths of the\nsoul. Hence the bitterness in those men who have willed and laboured\nmuch; hence their _cupio dissolvi,_ their aspiration for that bourne\nwhere all is peace. The poet sublimely imagines old Luther, after his\nvictories, in the midst of the people awakened by him to a new life:\n\n    Yet with a backward look, he sighed:\n    Call me, O God, to thee, for I am tired,\n    Nor without malediction can I pray!\n\n\n[1] L. Domenichi, _Della scelta de motti, burle et facetie_ (Firenze,\n1566), p. 14.\n\n\n\n\nIV\n\n\nVOLITIONAL HABITS AND THE INDIVIDUALITY\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Passions and states of the soul._]\n\nJust because the passions are possible volitions and therefore\nalways have a definite content, it is no slight error on the part\nof writers of treatises, to consider joy and sorrow, enthusiasm and\ndepression, content and discontent, tranquillity and remorse, and\nother antithetical couples, as passions. These couples are empirical\nconcepts constructed upon the dialectical distinction of freedom and\nanti-freedom, of good and evil; but the groups of the passions must on\nthe contrary be empirical concepts formed upon the basis of the varying\ndetermination of the volitional activity, according to _objects,_ that\nis to say, in its _particular_ determinations. Thus we can talk of the\npassion for celebrity, for science, for art, for politics, for riches,\nfor luxury, for women, for the country, for the city, for sport, for\nfishing, and so on, with infinite subdivisions and complications.\n\n[Sidenote: _Passions understood as volitional habits._]\n\nThe distinction usually drawn between the affections, the impulses,\nthe desires on the one hand and the passions on the other, is on the\ncontrary justified, though it always has an empirical character; these\nbeing considered, not as the single and instantaneous desire or impulse\nthat prompts to a single action, but as an inclination or habit of\nwishing and of willing in a certain direction. In this sense, passion\nwould be a generic concept (always empirical), which could be divided\n(empirically) into the classes of the virtues and vices; for virtue\nis nothing but the passion or habit of rational actions, and vice the\ncontrary.\n\n[Sidenote: _Their importance._]\n\nThese passions and volitional habits are not rigidly fixed, for nothing\nin the field of facts is rigidly fixed. As the bed of the river\nregulates the course of the river and is at the same time continuously\nmodified by it, so is it with the passions and volitional acts, which\nreality keeps forming and modifying, and in modifying, forms anew\nand in forming modifies. For this reason there is always something\narbitrary in defining habits as though they corresponded to a distinct\nand limited reality; and for this reason the concepts of them are\narbitrary and empirical. Habits are not categories, nor do they give\nrise to distinct concepts; but they are the like in the unlike,\nunlike, itself also, in itself, although discernible in a certain way\nfrom other groups of dissimilar facts. Their importance is great,\nbecause they constitute, as it were, the bony structure of the body of\nreality. In them _individuality_ understood as an empirical concept,\nhas its foundation, for which, if it be not substance, neither is it a\ncomplex of casually divergent states.\n\n[Sidenote: _The control of the passions in so far as they are\nvolitional habits._]\n\nThe nature of the passions as volitional habits to be both fixed and\nmobile, that is to say, only relatively fixed and relatively mobile,\nis the principle that aids the solution of several much-debated and\ncertainly important questions of the Philosophy of the practical. And\nin the first place, the passions being understood as habits, the answer\nto the question as to whether or no they can be controlled, and if the\nanswer be in the affirmative, then in what limits, receives a somewhat\ndifferent meaning, which explains the interest which that question\nhas always aroused. Nothing, in fact, removes our consciousness of\nfreedom and personality in so brutal a manner and makes us feel our\nimpotence and misery in so depressing a way, as to find ourselves with\nour good intention and action hardly begun, face to face with the\nunchained forces of our passions and of the habits that oppose it,\nwhich drown with their deafening clamour the weak and timid voice of\nthe incipient action, vex it with their arrogance, and drag it along\npaths well known and abhorred. We fall then into mistrust and baseness,\nbelieve ourselves lost for ever; freedom and will seem to be fables\nfor the adornment of sermons and the books of moralists. The sage who\nrecalls to man the absolute empire that he possesses over his passions\nand exhorts him never to be troubled and to repeat the twenty or\nfour-and-twenty letters of the alphabet, so that the spirit may have\ntime to recuperate its strength, to resist and to conquer, seems to\nutter the insipid babble of one who has never truly loved and hated,\nand to measure the full and overflowing souls of others on the model of\nhis own empty or almost empty soul. We laugh freely at the \"short legs\"\nof ideals and good intentions, and read again with satisfaction not\nundiluted with bitterness, some little story like Voltaire's _Memnon ou\nla sagesse humaine,_ which bears as motto the very appropriate epigraph:\n\n    Nous tromper dans nos entreprises,\n    C'est \u00e0 quoi nous sommes sujets:\n    Le matin je fais des projets,\n    Et le long du jour des sottises;\n\nor at the most they conclude that there is no way to free oneself from\na bad passion save with another one equally bad, from a vice with a\nvice, \"as from a plank we pluck with nail a nail.\"\n\n[Sidenote: _Difficulty and reality of dominating them._]\n\nNevertheless, he who torments himself and gets angry, or laughs and\ndraws such conclusions as these, is not in the right. That is to say,\nhe is right to laugh at ingenuous sages and at odious preachers and\nmoralists, for their theories are certainly simplicist and false. But\nhe is wrong in not understanding that his own theory is also simplicist\nand false, for it runs into the opposite extreme.--Habits and passions\nare habits and passions, because slowly formed: it is therefore a vain\nillusion to attempt to destroy them at a blow. Perhaps it is believed\nthat the passions are tender flowerets or grasses that a child has\nattached to the surface of the soil? They are a rank growth, strong\noaks whose roots dive deep into the earth!--That is most true, but it\nis not for this reason impossible to modify and destroy them. They are\nindeed actually modified, for that very pain, that very disappointment,\nare a beginning of modification; since we do not persist in what we\nabhor and follow, dragged along by force; and little by little we\nend by freeing ourselves. The process of freeing ourselves from\nthe passions, or from vicious habits, then, is effective, but slow,\nas the formation of those habits has been slow. We do not cure an\nillness with a sudden act of will, but nevertheless the will guides\nand directs the process of healing, and can open or close the entrance\nto the medicinal forces of nature. Now the passions or vicious habits\nare maladies that must follow their course, which, in order to be\nbeneficial, must coincide with the cure. The sages who give receipts\nfor freeing ourselves from them immediately are the Dulcamaras of moral\nmaladies; but the existence of the Dulcamaras should not impel us to\ndeny the existence of doctors, and above all of ourselves as doctors\nof ourselves. And we should certainly adopt a very bad and illusory\nmethod of cure, were we to accept the method so often recommended, of\ndestroying passion with passion, or vice with vice, thus adding vice to\nvice, as those who treat the illnesses of the body with narcotics or\nwith stimulants often add malady to malady.\n\n[Sidenote: _Volitional habits and individuality._]\n\nHabits, then, not less than single volitional acts, of which they were\nand are composed, can be and are continually conquered and modified,\nin so far as they are opposed to the new volitional syntheses. This\nconfirms what has already been said in criticizing the polipathetic\nview, which ignores the volition for the volitions, as the virtuous\nhabit is ignored in favour of vicious habits. But the theory of\napathicism is also to be found in this field, and it is needful\nto assert in opposition to it, the great importance proper to the\nvolitional habits in giving concrete form to virtue. This second\ncritical thesis is that which affirms the value of _individuality or\npeculiarity_ in the practical field.\n\n[Sidenote: _Negations of individuality for uniformity and their\ncritique._]\n\nEvery individual is furnished by mother nature with certain definite\nhabits, according to the contingencies of reality among which he enters\nthe world; and he acquires yet others in the course of life, owing\nto the actual conditions through which he passes and to the works\nthat he accomplishes. Those habits which he has from birth are called\naptitudes, dispositions, natural tendencies: the others acquired. The\nindividual in his reality is, as has been said, nothing but these\ngroups of habits and changes as they change. Now is it rational and\npossible (the two questions here form one) that the individual in his\nwilling and acting should rid himself of such habits? Is it possible\nto consider them as things without value? Is it possible to establish\nan antithesis between individuality and rational action, as between\ngood and evil?--The levellers who claim to impose the same task upon\nall and wish to make of the female a male, of the poet a reasoner,\nof the man of science a warrior, of the saint a man of business, and\nthus to give to every one a part of the task of others;--the dreamers\nof a future society, in which all this shall have been done, and the\npoet should attend to his poem, after having played the philosopher\nfor a couple of hours, for another couple of hours the tailor, and for\nyet another two the waiter at an inn;--all the pedants of abstract\nregularity, whom we meet to our great annoyance in life;--behold the\napathicists appear anew, for, as in the theory of the volitional act,\nthey advocated an abstract action, conducted by the rational will\nalone in the void of the passions; so here, they advocate an abstract\nrational habit, in the theory of volitional habits, a model of human\nactivity, to which all individuals would be obliged to conform. Perhaps\nsome such sensible observation as this of Vauvenargues should suffice\nto confute them: _Il ne faut pas beaucoup de r\u00e9flexion pour faire cuire\nun poulet; et, cependant, nous voyons des hommes qui sont toute leur\nvie mauvais r\u00f4tisseurs: tant il est n\u00e9cessaire dans tous les m\u00e9tiers,\nd'y \u00eatre appel\u00e9 par un instinct particulier et comme ind\u00e9pendant de\nla raison._ But since it might be said that we wish to solve a grave\nquestion with a joke, we will recall that the volitional acts and the\npassions, volition and the volitions, are of the same nature (though\nthe one is actual and the others only possible), and that the nature of\nwilling implies actual definite situations, and that for this reason\nwe never will in universal but always in particular. In the same way\nvirtue, the virtuous habit of the will, is not of a different nature to\nthe volitional habits in general, to the passions, but is particular\nand individual as they are. Those who make war upon individual habits\nnever succeed in substituting for them a universal habit, which is\ninconceivable, but at the most other habits, equally particular and\nindividual. The poet who will play the farmer, the tailor, and the\nwaiter, in the imagined society of the future, will do all these things\nas a poet. This may perhaps be an advantage, but may also perhaps be\nthe contrary, as future consumers of grain, of garments, and of repasts\nwill become aware. For the rest, do we not even now see women devoting\nthemselves to the severe studies of philology, of philosophy, and\nof mathematics? But with the rarest exceptions, they remain always\nwomen: their production, which is without originality, is not like\nthat of man, done with the complete dedication of the whole being to\nthe search for truth and of artistic perfection; and if in the midst\nof the most abstruse inquiry, the image of themselves as wife or\nmother pass through their minds, they desert, at the critical moment,\nthe philosophical categories, the formul\u00e6 of flexions, the ruled or\ntangential spaces, and sigh for their unborn sons and for the husband\nthat they have not found. Is this distortion of natural habits useful?\nGenerally speaking, it is not. It is a doing and an undoing, a despisal\nof the riches wisely accumulated and capitalized by Reality in the\ncourse of its evolution.\n\n[Sidenote: _Temperament and character. Indifference of temperament._]\n\nCertainly the disposition natural or acquired is not virtue, and\nthe _temperament_ (since temperament is nothing but the sum of\nhabits and aptitudes) is not _character._ But virtue and character\npresuppose habits and passions, of which they give the rational and\nvolitional synthesis: they are the form of that matter. And as matter\nconsidered in the abstract is neither good nor bad, so the habits and\nthe passions (as has been very well observed) are not in themselves\neither virtues or vices: they are facts. And it is necessary to take\naccount of facts; otherwise, they revenge themselves. On the other\nhand, habits and passions certainly change; but not all of a sudden\nand capriciously, rather, little by little, and always on the basis of\nexisting habits and passions.\n\n[Sidenote: _The discovery of the proper self._]\n\nThe first duty of every individual who wishes to act effectively,\nconsists, therefore, in seeking for himself, in exploring his own\ndispositions, in establishing what aptitudes have been deposited in\nhim by the course of reality, both at the moment of his birth, and\nduring the development of his own individual life: in knowing, that\nis to say, his own habits and passions, not in order to make of them\na _tabula rasa,_ but to use them. The search is not easy and the\npreparatory part of life, namely youth, is spent upon it. Few are the\nfortunate individuals who have at once a clear and certain knowledge\nof their own being and of their duty; the majority seek and find\nit after many wanderings; and if such wanderings sometimes (as is\nwritten in the dedication of the _Scienza nuova_) \"seem misfortunes\nand are opportunities,\" at others they are but a fruitless moving to\nand fro; hence those that are undecided during the whole of their\nlives, the eternal youths, those who aspire to all or to many of the\ndirections of human activity and are incapable in all. But when our own\nbeing unveils itself and we see our path clearly, then to disordered\nagitation succeeds the calm of sure and regular work, with its defeats\nand victories, its joys and sorrows, but with the constant vision of\nthe Aim, that is, of the general direction to be followed. Vainly will\nhe who is endowed and prepared for guiding mankind in political strife\nand has a clear and lively perception of human strength and weakness,\nof what can and of what cannot be done, and is furnished, so to speak,\nwith practical sense (with the sense of complications and slight\ndifferences), will try (save in the rarest and most exceptional cases,\nand this reserve is to be understood in all that we are saying here) to\nacquire a place among those who cultivate the abstract and universal,\noperations demanding almost opposite aptitudes; vainly will he who was\nborn to sing attempt to calculate; vainly will he whose mind and soul\nwere made to accentuate dissensions in their bitter strife bend himself\nto be a conciliator and a peacemaker. It is worse than superfluous, it\nis stupid to weep over one's choleric or phlegmatic temperament. There\nhave been choleric saints that have even used the stick, and phlegmatic\nsaints who have succeeded admirably in patient persuasion: the mild\nFrancis, \"all seraphic in his ardour,\" and the impetuous Dominic \"whose\nblows fell on the boughs of heresy.\" Reality is diversity and has need\nof both, and each is praiseworthy if he do that well to which he has\nbeen _called._\n\n[Sidenote: _The idea of \"vocation.\"_]\n\nThis concept of the _vocation_ has a mystical and religious origin and\npreserves that form; but it is clear that by means of the previous\nconsiderations we have divested it of that form and reduced it to a\nscientific concept. The individual is not a \"monad\" or a \"real,\" he\nis not a \"soul\" created by a God all in a moment and all of a piece;\nthe individual is the historical situation of the universal spirit at\nevery instant of time, and, therefore, the sum of the habits due to\nthe historical situations. Those modes of conceiving and talking of\none _and the same_ individual in two _different_ situations, or of two\n_different_ individuals in the _same_ situation, are to be avoided,\nbecause individual and situation are all one. But when the individual\nhas been thus defined, it remains none the less true that each\nindividual must direct his life according to pre-existing habits and\npersonal dispositions, and thus we discover the true meaning of the\nmythologies and religions that have been mentioned, and the struggles\nto find the suitable employment can be expressed with the words that\nreligion has taught us when we were children: the \"vocation\" and the\nspecial \"mission\" that is allotted to us in life, until the last giving\nof accounts and the words of dismissal and repose: _Nunc dimitte servum\ntuum, Domine!_ We are the children of that Reality which generates us\nand knows more than we, the Reality of which religions have caught a\nglimpse and called it God, father, and eternal wisdom.\n\n[Sidenote: _Misunderstandings as to the rights of individuality. Evil\nindividuality._]\n\nThe affirmation of the rights that belong to individuality in the\npractical field has several times assumed and still assumes (in our\ntime, more than in the past, owing to materialism and naturalism) a\nform, no longer symbolical and mystical, but wrong and irrational, that\nit is desirable to remark upon here, always in order to avoid possible\nequivoques. Indeed many look upon the respect due to their own beings\nas due to their caprice, that is to say, to what is on the contrary\nthe negation of being: the right of the individual as the right to\ncommit follies, or to a disaggregate individuality. The declared\nnecessity of temperament for character is exchanged for admiration of\ntemperament considered in itself, which, as such, is neither admirable\nnor blameworthy; but when separated from character becomes vice and\nfolly. Hence the admiration that has even become a literary fashion,\nfor the dissolute, for the violent, for homicides, for the criminals of\nthe public prisons, illustrated by a few courageous and energetic souls\namong them, whereas they are as a rule weak, vile, and turbid.\n\n[Sidenote: _False doctrines as to the connection of virtues and vices._]\n\nVarious theories are also erroneous, in which it has been sought to\nestablish the relation between the passions and the will, temperament\nand character, passions and temperament being understood as vicious\npassions and evil temperament; that is, not in themselves, but in\ntheir antithesis to the rational will: hence the vain and paradoxical\nattempts to join together and harmonize virtue and vice. Thus it has\nbeen maintained that in certain vices are foreshadowed the virtues\nwhich will or can be developed from them; for instance, military\nvalour in ferocity, industrial capacity in greed; whereas ferocity\nand greed are wilful acts and contradictions incapable of generating\nany virtue, as is seen in the customary cowardice of the ferocious\nand the ineptitude of the greedy and covetous. Such a connection of\nvirtues and vices has on other occasions been presented as a mixture\nor co-temperament, and it has been affirmed that the vices enter into\nthe composition of the virtues, as do poisons into the composition\nof medicines. Finally, virtue and vice have been placed in causal\nrelation, and the causes of civil progress have been found in human\nvices. But the vices, as they are not the antecedents, so are they\nneither the ingredients nor the causes of the virtues. These are\nstrength, those the lack of strength. It is generally affirmed that\nin every individual the virtues are accompanied by their correlative\nvices, but if this possess some approximate value as an empirical\nobservation, strictly speaking it has none, because men can be\nconceived and are actually found, whose virtue, far from yielding to\nexcesses and to vices, is eurythmic and temperate. But perhaps that\ncommon saying aims at something else that it fails of explaining\nwell; namely, that every power has its impotence and every individual\nhis limit; but this does not mean vice or defect; it is nothing but\nthe tautological affirmation that the part is not the whole and the\nindividual not the universal.\n\n[Sidenote: _The universal in the individual and education._]\n\nBut if the individual do not exhaust the universal, the universal\nlives in individuals; Reality in each of its particular manifestations.\nTherefore the affirmation of the right of individuality does not deny\nthe right of universality; or it denies it only in that abstract form\nin which, to tell the truth, it is by itself denied. The individual\nis under the obligation to seek himself, but in order to do this he\nhas also the obligation of cultivating himself as man in universal. A\nschool that represented simply a cultivation of individual aptitudes,\nwould be a training, not an education, a manufactory of utensils, not\na nursery of spiritual and creative activities. The true specialism\nis universalism, and inversely, which means that if the universal do\nnot act without specializing itself, yet specialization is not really\nspecialization if it do not contain universality. If the two terms that\nare by nature indissoluble be divided, there remains only fruitless\ngeneralization or stupid particularization, and if our times have\nsinned in this latter respect, other times have sinned in the opposite.\nHe is well-balanced who between these two forms of degeneration both\nknows and fills his own proper and individual mission so perfectly\nthat he fulfils at the same time with it and through it the universal\nmission of man.\n\n\n\n\nV.\n\n\nDEVELOPMENT AND PROGRESS\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Multiplicity and unity: development._]\n\nThe demonstration hitherto developed, that evil is negativity or\ncontradiction, and that this contradiction takes place owing to the\nmultiplicity of the desires in respect to the singleness of character\nof the volitional act, gives rise to the further question: Why should\nthere be such a multiplicity, concurrent with the demand for unity, and\nthus be generated strife and contradiction? Here it would be fitting\nto observe that we must have filled our mouths very uselessly for a\ncentury with the word evolution, if such a question as this be renewed,\nor we remain bewildered and embarrassed before it. For the reason of\nthat fact, which seems without a reason, is to be found precisely in\nthe concept of _\"evolution.\"_ This concept resumes most ancient views,\nand has been substituted in modern times for that of an immovable\nReality, of a God who exists perfect and satisfied in himself, and\ncreates a world for his own transitory pleasure; or for a complex of\nbeings, eternally the same, with variations that are only apparent.\nThe concept of evolution has entered so profoundly into the blood and\nbones of modern man that even those repeat it who would be incapable\nof analyzing and understanding it; even the least acute of all, the\npositivist philosophers who like to call themselves \"philosophers of\nevolution.\"\n\n[Sidenote: _Becoming as synthesis of being and not-being._]\n\nBut before it acquired, as a vague and confused formula, so great a\npublicity as quite to amount to popularity, a philosopher of genius had\nanalyzed and synthetized it, induced and deduced it in an unsurpassable\nmanner, with the speculative formula of reality as _becoming_; that\nis, as synthesis of being and not-being, being and not-being being\nthus unthinkable separately, and only thinkable in their living\nconnection, which is becoming and _development_ (evolution). Reality is\ndevelopment, that is, infinite possibility that passes into infinite\nactuality and from the multiplicity of every instant takes refuge in\nthe one, to break forth anew in the multiple and produce the new unity.\nThe inquiry into the dialectic of the volitional act enters in this\nway into the very heart of reality. In order to deny multiplicity,\ncontradiction, evil and not-being, it would be necessary to deny at\nthe same time unity, coherence, good and being.\n\n[Sidenote: _Nature as becoming. Its resolution in the spirit._]\n\nBut if by the theory that has been recorded we have explained the\nnecessity of evil for good, or the necessity of the not necessary for\nthe necessary in the volitional act of man, the identification of the\nvolitional act, which is man's, with reality which is of the universal\nwhole, might seem to be too audacious. For (it will be said) the\ncomplex of other beings, that we are wont to separate from the complex\nof human beings and to oppose to it as nature, either is motionless\nand does not develop, or develops without any consciousness of good\nand evil, of pleasure and pain, of value and disvalue. Both theses\nhave been maintained and nature has been represented, now as _without\nhistory, now as developing itself in an unconscious or mechanical\nmanner._ But the contradictions and absurdities of both theses have\nbeen together perceived. \"Motionless beings\" is a phrase without\nmeaning, to such a degree that even empirical science has everywhere\npushed its way into history, and has talked of the evolution of animals\nand vegetables, of the chemical elements, and even of a history of\nlight and heat. The other expression, \"unconscious beings,\" is not\nless empty, because being and activity are not otherwise conceivable\nsave in the way that we know our being, which is consciousness;\nand although empirical science certainly points to more and more\nrudimentary and tenuous forms of consciousness in beings, always\ndifferently individualized, yet it has never been able to demonstrate\nthe absolutely unconscious. If so-called nature be, it develops, and if\nit develop, cannot do so without some consciousness. This deduction is\nnot a matter of conjecture, but a logical and irrefutable consequence.\nWhat is there, then, that persists in men's souls, as an obstacle to\nthe acceptance of this consequence, in accordance with the profound\nbelief of humanity in a community of all beings with one another and\nwith the Whole, as manifested in philosophies and in religions, in\nthe speculations of the learned and in ingenuous popular beliefs? A\nscholastic prejudice, an idol of the intellect, the hypostasis of\nthat concept of \"nature\" that Logic has taught us is nothing but the\nabstract, mechanicizing, classifying function of the human spirit; a\nprejudice arising from the substitution of the naturalistic method for\nreality, by which a function is changed and materialized into a group\nof beings. Those idealists were also slaves of the error of a like\nhypostasis, who, though they thought everything as an activity of the\nspirit, yet stopped when face to face with _Nature,_ making of it an\ninferior grade of the Spirit, or, metaphorically, a spirit alienated\nfrom itself, an unconscious; consciousness, a petrified thought, and\ncreating for it a special philosophy (as though all the other did\nnot suffice), entitled precisely, _Philosophy of nature._ But modern\nthought knows henceforth how man creates for his use that skeleton or\n_mannequin_ of an immobile, external mechanical nature, and he is no\nlonger permitted to fall back into equivoque and substitute this for\nentity or for a complex of entities. Nor should he find any difficulty\nin discovering everywhere activity, development, consciousness, with\nits antitheses of good and evil, of joy and sorrow. Certainly the stars\ndo not smile, nor is the moon pale for sorrow: these are images of\nthe poets. Certainly animals and trees do not reason like men; this,\nwhen it is not poetry, is gross anthropomorphism. But nature, in her\nintimate self, longs for the good and abhors the evil, she is all wet\nwith tears and all a-shiver for joy; strife and victory is everywhere\nand in every moment of universal life.\n\n[Sidenote: _Optimism and pessimism; critique._]\n\nThis conception of reality, which recognizes the indissoluble link\nbetween good and evil, is itself beyond good and evil, and consequently\nsurpasses the visual angles of optimism and pessimism--of optimism\nthat does not discover the evil in life and posits it as illusion, or\nonly as a very small and contingent element, or hopes for a future\nlife (on earth or in heaven) in which evil will be suppressed; and\nof pessimism, that sees nothing but evil and makes of the world an\ninfinite and eternal spasm of pain, that rends itself internally and\ngenerates nothing. It confronts the first with the fact that evil is\ntruly the original sin of reality, ineliminable so long as reality\nexists, and therefore absolutely ineliminable as a category: the\nsecond, with the other category the good, equally ineliminable, for\nwithout it evil could not be. And it is easy to show how the optimist\ndeclares himself a pessimist, the pessimist an optimist, out of\ntheir own mouths. The setting free from individuality and from will,\nwhich the pessimist proposes as a radical remedy, is the remedy that\nreality itself applies at every moment, for we free ourselves from the\ncontradiction of individuality and of wilfulness by the affirmation\nof the rational will, with which the same pessimist cannot dispense,\nfor the effectuation of his programme of ascesis or of suicide, which,\naccording as it is understood, is either not a programme, or a\nprogramme altogether capricious and without universal value. In truth,\nthere is no need to oppose a eulogy of Life with a eulogy of Death,\nsince the eulogy of Life is also a eulogy of Death; for how could we\nlive, if we did not die at every instant?\n\n[Sidenote: _Dialectic optimism._]\n\nThe dialectic conception of reality as development, that is, as a\nsynthesis of being and not-being, can certainly be termed optimistic,\nbut in a very different signification to that of abstract optimism. The\nsynthesis is the thesis enriched with its antithesis, and the thesis is\nthe good, being, not the bad or not-being. But who will wish seriously\nto oppose this logical consequence? Is it not a fact that men hope and\nlive, although in the midst of their sorrows? Is it not a fact that the\nworld is not ended and does not appear to have any intention of ending?\nAnd how would that be possible, if the moment of the good did not\nprevail, just because the positive prevails upon the negative and Life\nconstantly triumphs over Death?\n\n[Sidenote: _Concept of cosmic progress._]\n\nThis continuous triumph of Life over Death constitutes _cosmic\nprogress._ Progress, from the point of view whence we have hitherto\nregarded it, that of individualized activity, is identical with\nactivity; it is the unfolding of this upon passivity. Every volitional\nact, like every theoretical act, is therefore to be considered in\nitself, that is, only in relation to the given situation from which it\nbreaks forth. In every new situation the individual begins his life\nall over again. But from the cosmic point of view, at which we now\nplace ourselves, reality shows itself as a continuous growing upon\nitself; nor is a real regress ever conceivable, because evil being\nthat which is not, is irreal, and that which is is always and only the\ngood. The real is always rational, and the rational is always real.\nCosmic progress, then, is itself also the object of affirmation, not\nproblematic, but apodictic.\n\n[Sidenote: _Objections and critique of them._]\n\nThe difficulties that can be and are opposed to this thesis all arise\nfrom the confusion of the truly rational with that which is falsely so\ncalled, between the true real and that which improperly assumes this\nname, that is, between the real and the unreal. Thus will be remembered\nthe instance of the end of the great Gr\u00e6co-Roman civilization, without\nadequate parallel in universal history, followed by the return of\nbarbarism in the Middle Ages; or the common example of the shipwreck\nof noblest enterprises; or (to remain in the field that more nearly\ninterests us) the philosophic decadence, owing to which, a mean\npositivism was able to follow the idealism of the beginning of the\nnineteenth century, which stands to the former as the eloquence of\nan Attic orator to the stuttering of an ignorant school-boy. Did the\nMiddle Age, then, represent an advance upon that Rome, whose memory\nlingered in the fancy as an image of lost dignity during that same\nMiddle Age? Was the victory of European reaction over the citizen\ncivilization of the Revolution and of the Empire progress? and in\nLombardy, the new Austrian domination following upon the Kingdom of\nItaly? or in the Neapolitan provinces the Bourbon restoration after the\nRepublic of 1799 and the French Decanate? Was Comte an advance upon\nKant, Herbert Spencer upon Hegel? But different points of view are\nconfused under the same name in these questions, and, therefore, we do\nnot succeed in immediately arranging those facts beneath the principle\nthat has been established. It is therefore necessary to analyze. It\nwill then be immediately seen that ancient civilization, in what it\npossessed of truly real, did not die, but was transmitted as thought,\ninstitutions, and even as acquired aptitudes; hence it kept reappearing\nin the course of the centuries and still keeps reappearing: it\ncertainly died in what it had of unreal, that is to say, in its\ncontradictions, for instance, in its incapacity to find political and\neconomic forms answering to the changed conditions of spirits. In like\nmanner, the Middle Age, which was evidently in part progress, because\nit solved problems left unsolved by the preceding civilization, posed\nothers that it did not solve and that were solved in the succeeding\ncenturies; but if the posing of these new problems, which, while\ndestroying the old, failed to substitute provisionally anything, was\napparently not progress, neither was it regress, but the beginning of\nnew progress. The same is to be said of precursors, conquered in their\ntime, but conquerors in history, of the restorations and reactions\nthat are so only in name, because they contain in themselves that with\nwhich they contend, if for no other reason, then for the very reason\nthat they contend: of heroes and initiators, who were conquered and\nmartyrized, yet knew that they were triumphing and did triumph in\ndying; the cross and the pyre will become symbols of victory: _in hoc\nsigno vinces._ And finally, if the positivism of the second half of the\nnineteenth century seem as a whole so greatly inferior to idealism,\nthat comes from its not being philosophy at all, but a hybrid jumble\nof natural sciences and metaphysic, thus intensifying an error that\nalready existed in germ in idealism, and fecundating the problem\nfor a better solution. Many philosophers living to-day are inferior\nto Socrates, because they have not even risen to the knowledge of\nthe concept; but those who in our day have attained to the level of\nSocrates, are superior to him, because besides his thought they contain\nin themselves something that Socrates had not; and those philosophers\nwho are logically on a level with Protagoras, surpass him, just because\nthey are the Protagorases of the twentieth century. There is therefore\nnever real regression in history; but only contradictions that follow\nupon solutions given, and prepare new ones.\n\n[Sidenote: _Individuals and History._]\n\nThe solutions, once attained, are acquired for ever; the problems that\nhave once been solved, do not again occur, or, which is the same thing,\nthey recur in a different way to those of the past. The web of History\nis composed of such labours, to which all individuals collaborate;\nbut it is not the work and cannot be the purpose of any of them in\nparticular, because each one is exclusively intent on his particular\nwork, and only in _rem suam agere,_ does he also do the business of\nthe world. History is happening, which, as has been seen, is not to\nbe judged practically, because it always transcends individuals, and\nto these and not to history is the practical judgment applicable.\nThe judgment of History is in the very fact of its existence: its\nrationality is in its reality.\n\n[Sidenote: _Fate, Fortune, and Providence._]\n\nThis historical web, which is and is not the work of individuals,\nconstitutes, as has been said, the work of the universal Spirit, of\nwhich individuals are manifestations and instruments. In this way are\nimplicitly excluded those views which attribute the course of things\nto Fate, to Fortune, or to Chance, that is, to mechanism or caprice,\nboth of them insufficient and one-sided, like determinism and free\nwill, each one invoking the other when it becomes aware of its own\nimpotence. The idea of mechanical origin, of an evolution that takes\nplace by the addition of very minute elements, is now being abandoned,\neven for that fragment of history called _History of Nature_ (the\nonly true and possible Philosophy of Nature), in which is beginning\nto reappear the theory of successive crises and revolution, and the\nidea of freedom, whose creations are not to be measured or limited\nmathematically. But the supreme rationality that guides the course of\nhistory, should not, on the other hand, be conceived as the work of a\ntranscendent Intelligence or Providence, as is the case in religious\nand semi-fanciful thought, which does not possess other value than that\nof a confused presentiment of the truth. If History be rationality,\nthen a Providence certainly directs it; but of such a kind as becomes\nactual in individuals, and acts, not on, but in them. This affirmation\nof Providence is not conjecture or faith, but evidence of reason.\nWho would feel in him the strength of life without such intimate\npersuasion? Whence could he draw resignation in sorrow, encouragement\nto endure? Surely what the religious man says, with the words \"Let us\nleave it in God's hands,\" is said also by the man of reason with those\nother words: \"Courage, and forward\"?\n\n[Sidenote: _The infinity of progress and mystery._]\n\nThe Spirit, which is infinite possibility passing into infinite\nactuality, has drawn and draws at every moment the cosmos from chaos,\nhas collected diffused life into the concentrated life of the organ,\nhas achieved the passage from animal to human life, has created and\ncreates modes of life ever more lofty. The work of the Spirit is not\nfinished and never will be finished. Our yearning for something higher\nis not vain. The very yearning, the infinity of our desire, is proof\nof the infinity of that progress. The plant dreams of the animal, the\nanimal of man, man of superman; for this, too, is a reality, if it be\nreality that with every historical movement man surpasses himself. The\ntime will come when the great deeds and the great works now our memory\nand our boast will be forgotten, as we have forgotten the works and the\ndeeds, no less great, of those beings of supreme genius who created\nwhat we call human life and seem to us now to have been savages of\nthe lowest grade, almost men-monkeys. They will be forgotten, for the\ndocuments of progress is in _forgetting_; that is, in the fact being\nentirely absorbed into the new fact, in which, and not in itself,\nit has value. But we cannot know what the future states of Reality\nwill be, in their determined physiognomy and succession, owing to the\n\"dignity\" established in the Philosophy of the practical, by which the\nknowledge of the action and of the deed follows and does not precede\nthe action and the deed. _Mystery_ is just _the infinity of evolution_:\nwere this not so, that concept would not arise in the mind of man,\nnor would it be possible to abuse it, as it has been abused by being\ntransported out of its place, that is to say, into the consciousness\nof itself, which the spiritual activity should have and has to the\nfullest degree, that is, the consciousness of its eternal categories.\n\n[Sidenote: _Illegitimate transportation of the concept of mystery from\nhistory to philosophy._]\n\nThe neglect of the moment of mystery is the true reason of the error\nknown as the _Philosophy of history,_ which undertakes to portray the\nplan of Providence and to determine the formula of progress. In this\nattempt (when it does not affirm mere philosophemes, as has very often\nhappened), it makes the vain effort to enclose the infinite in the\nfinite and capriciously to decree concluded that evolution which the\nuniversal Spirit itself cannot conclude, for it would thus come to deny\nitself. In Logic that error has been gnoseologically defined as the\npretension of treating the individual as though it were the universal,\nmaking the universal individual; here it is to be defined in other\nwords as the pretension of treating the finite as though it were the\ninfinite, of making the infinite finite.\n\n[Sidenote: _Confirmation of the impossibility of a Philosophy of\nhistory._]\n\nBut the unjustified transportation of the concept of mystery from\nhistory, where it indicates the future that the past prepares and does\nnot know, into philosophy, causes to be posited as mysteries which\ngive rise to probabilities and conjectures, problems that consist of\nphilosophical terms, and should therefore be philosophically solved.\nBut if the infinite progress and the infinite perfectibility of man\nis to be affirmed, although we do not know the concrete forms that\nprogress and perfectibility will assume (not knowing them, because now\nit imports not to _know,_ but to _do_ them), then there is no meaning\nin positing as a mystery the immortality of the individual soul, or the\nexistence of God; for these are not _facts_ that may or may not happen\nsooner or later, but _concepts_ that must be proved to be in themselves\nthinkable and not contradictory, or to determine in what form they are\nthinkable and not contradictory. Their thinkability will indeed be\na mystery, but of the kind that it is a duty to make clear, because\nsynonymous with obscurity or mental confusion. What has so far been\ndemonstrated has been their unthinkability in the traditional form.\nNor is it true that they correspond to profound demands of the human\nsoul. Man does not seek a God external to himself and almost a despot,\nwho commands and benefits him capriciously; nor does he aspire to an\nimmortality of insipid ease: but he seeks for that God which he has in\nhimself, and aspires to that activity, which is both Life and Death.\n\n\n\n\nVI\n\n\nTWO ELUCIDATIONS RELATING TO HISTORIC AND \u00c6STHETIC\n\n\n[Sidenote: _The relation of desires and actions; and two problems of\nHistoric and of \u00c6sthetic._]\n\nFrom the consideration of the practical activity in its dialectic, and\nin particular from the theory relating to desire and to action, shines\nforth, if we mistake not, the full light that has hitherto perhaps been\ninvoked in vain upon certain capital points of Historic and \u00c6sthetic,\nwhich, when treating of those disciplines, we were obliged either\nhardly to touch upon, or to develop in a manner altogether inadequate.\nThe reason of this was that an adequate development, to be convincing,\ndemanded as presupposition, a minute exposition as to the nature, the\nrelations and the constitution of the practical activity, all of them\nthings that could not be treated incidentally.\n\n[Sidenote: _History and art._]\n\nHistory or historical narrative is, as we know, very closely related\nto art, in contradistinction to the abstract sciences, since both\nart and history do not construct concepts of class, but represent\nconcrete and individuated facts. History, however, is not art pure and\nsimple, but is distinguished from it, because artistic representation\nis in it continually illuminated with the critical distinction\nbetween the real and the possible, what has happened and what has\nbeen imagined, the existing and the inexisting, with the consequent\ndeterminations connected with them, as to this or that particular mode\nof reality, event, and existence, that have taken place. In every\nhistorical narrative are always to be found, understood or implied, the\naffirmations that the narrative is real, that a different narrative\nwould be imaginary, that the reality of the event in question properly\nbelongs to this or that concept of politics, rights, war, diplomacy,\neconomy, and so on. All this is quite absent from art, which is by\nnature ingenuous and free of critical discernment; so much so, that\nhardly have its representations become objects of reflection, than they\nare dissolved as art, to reappear with a changed appearance (no longer\nyouthful, but virile or senile), as history.\n\n[Sidenote: _The concept of existentiality in history._]\n\nBut if this distinction between art and history be precisely determined\ngnoseologically, when it has been said that in history the predicate\nof existentiality is added to mere representation (and, therefore,\nall the other predicates connected with the case, referring to the\nvarious forms of existence), and that therefore, the representative\nand artistic form of history contains in itself rational and\nphilosophical method as precedent, yet there always remains the\nulterior philosophical problem: What is the origin of that predicate\nof reality or existentiality on which all the others lean? We have\nalready demonstrated that it was altogether inadmissible to derive it\nfrom a mysterious faculty called _Faith,_ or to consider it as the\napprehension of something extraneous to the spirit in universal, as _a\ndatum or position._ And we also stated that if the spirit recognize\nits existence, yet it cannot attain to the criterion elsewhere than\nfrom itself; which criterion was nothing but the first reflection of\nthe spirit upon the practical activity itself, giving rise to the\nduplication of reality that has happened and reality only desired, or\nof reality and irreality, of existing and inexisting.\n\n[Sidenote: _Its origin in the Philosophy of the practical: action and\nthe existing, desires and the unexisting._]\n\nAll this now becomes a simple consequence of the connection that\nhas been made clear between desire and action. The cognoscitive\nspirit, when it apprehends and ideally remakes this connection, has,\nin enunciating it, also enunciated for the first time the couples\nof terms that we have already mentioned and that variously express\nthe criterion of existence. To distinguish desires from actions is\ntantamount to distinguishing the unreal from the real, the existing\nfrom the unexisting, and to think the practical act is tantamount\nto thinking the concept of existence and of effectual reality. For\nthe determination of the relation between desire and action, and\nonly for that, the criterion of existence is not necessary, because\nthat relation is itself that criterion. To say \"this is a desire\"\nmeans, \"this does not exist\"; to say \"this is an action\" means, \"this\nexists.\" The desires are possibility; the resolutive and volitional\nact or action, is actuality. And it is also evident that existent\nand inexistent are not separable, as though the inexistent were\nheterogeneous to the existent; the inexistent exists in its way, as\npossibility is possible reality; the phantasm exists in the fancy and\ndesire in the spirit that desires. Thus the posing of the one term is\nalso the posing of the other, as correlative. What is repugnant and\ncontradictory is the introduction of the one term into the other. This\ntakes place, for instance, when in narrating the history, reality that\nhas happened is mingled as one single thing with reality dreamed of or\ndesired, and history is turned into _legend._\n\n[Sidenote: _History as distinction between actions and desires, and art\nas indistinction._]\n\nIt can be said that history always represents actions, and in this is\nimplicit that it represents at the same time also desires, but only in\nso far as it distinguishes them from actions: history, therefore, is\nperception and memory of perception, and in it fancies and imaginations\nare also perceived as such and arranged in their place. And it would\nalso be possible to say that art represents only desires, and is\ntherefore all fancy and never perception, all possible reality and\nnever effectual reality. But since to art is wanting the distinctive\ncriterion between desires and actions, it in truth represents actions\nas desires and desires as actions, the real as possible, and the\npossible as real; hence it would be more correct to say that art is\non the near side of the possible and the real, it is pure of these\ndistinctions, and is therefore pure imagination or _pure intuition._\nDesires and actions are, we know, of the same stuff, and art assumes\nthat stuff just as it is, careless of the new elaboration that it will\nreceive in an ulterior grade of the spirit, which is indeed impossible\nwithout that first and merely fantastic elaboration. Likewise when art\ntakes possession of historical material, it removes from it just the\nhistorical character, the critical elements, and by this very fact\nreduces it once more to mere intuition.\n\n[Sidenote: _The purely fantastic and the imaginary._]\n\nIt must further be noted that the purely fantastic, which is the\nrepresentation of a desire, must not be confounded with the mechanical\ncombination of images, that can be made idly, for amusement, or for\npractical ends. This operation (analogous to that of the intellect upon\nthe pure concepts and representations, when it arbitrarily combines\nthem in the pseudo-concepts), is secondary and derivative; and it\npresupposes the first, which provides it with the material that it cuts\nup and combines. Nothing is more extraneous and repugnant to poetry\nthan this artificial _imagining,_ precisely because it is external and\nrepugnant to reality. Hence his would be a vain objection who should\ncoldly and capriciously combine the most different images and ask for\nan explanation of the whole, with desire as the fundamental principle.\nSuch combinations as these, since they do not belong to poetry, are\nvoid of real psychical content.\n\n[Sidenote: _Art as lyrical or representation of feelings._]\n\nBut if the relation between desire and action be the ultimate reason\nfor the distinction between art and history, and this distinction be\nthe theoretical reflection of that real relation, the conception of\nart as representation of volitional facts, taken in their quite general\nand indeterminate nature, in which desire is as action and action as\ndesire, reveals why art affirms itself as _representation of feeling,_\nand why a work of art does not seem to possess and does not possess\nvalue, save from its _lyrical_ character and from the imprint of the\nartist's personality. The work of art that reasons or instructs as\nto things that have happened, and finds a substitute for intimate\nand lyrical connections in historical reasonings and connections, is\njustly and universally condemned as cold and ineffectual. We do not\nask the artist for a philosophical system nor for a relation of facts\n(if all this is to be found in his work it is _per accidens),_ but\nfor a dream of his own, for nothing but the expression of a world\ndesired or abhorred, or partly desired and partly abhorred. If he\nmake us live again in this dream the rapture of joy or the incubus of\nterror, in solemnity or in humility, in tragedy or in laughter, that\nsuffices. Facts and concepts, and the question as to the metaphysical\nconstitution of reality and how it has been developed in time, are all\nthings that we shall ask of others.\n\n[Sidenote: _Identity of ingenuous reality and feeling._]\n\nIt may seem that in this way the field of art has been much restricted\nand the ingenuous representation of the real excluded from it. But\nthis ingenuous representation is just the representation of reality as\ndream. For reality is nothing (as we henceforth know) than becoming,\npossibility that passes into actuality, desire that becomes action,\nfrom which desire springs forth again unsatiated. The artist who\nrepresents it ingenuously, produces the lyric for this very reason. For\nhim there is no necessity to reach it from without, as a new element:\nif he do this, he is a bad artist, and will be blamed as a hunter of\nemotions, emphatic, convulsive, wearisomely sentimental, forcedly\njocose, an introducer of his own caprice into the coherence of the\nwork, a confounder of his empirical with his artistic personality,\nwhich exists in the empirical individual, but is not equivalent to it.\nThe feeling that the true artist portrays is that of things, _lacrymae\nrerum_; and by the identity of feeling and volition, of volition and\nreality already demonstrated in the Philosophy of the practical, things\nare themselves that feeling. The characteristic that Schelling and\nSchopenhauer noted in music, of reproducing, not indeed the ideas, but\nthe ideal rhythm of the universe, and of objectifying the will itself,\nbelongs equally to all the other forms of art, because it is the\nessence itself of Art, or of pure intuition.\n\n[Sidenote: _Artists and the will._]\n\nAn obvious confirmation of this theory is also the empirical\nobservation often made, that the men who lose themselves in desires\nare rather poets than men of action, dreamers rather than actors; and\nin respect to this, that poets who seem to have the soul overflowing\nwith energetic plans, magnanimous loves, and fierce hatreds are the\nmost incapable in the field of action, and the worst of captains in\npractical struggles; because those plans, those loves and hates, are\nnot will, but desires, and desires already weakened as such, because\nthey are no longer in process of volitional synthetization, but have\nbecome the objects of contemplation and of dream. He who reads the\nbiographies of artists, or has dealings with artists in daily life,\nalmost always has the impression that their gusts of passion are\nnothing but poetry _about to break forth,_ as a green bud that opens\nand breaks the brown sheath. And if this process be painful, that\nis because every travail of birth is painful. One sees, indeed, how\neverything generally ends _par des chansons._ A fine poem and the\nsufferer is calm again.\n\n[Sidenote: _Actions and myths._]\n\nThis also explains why individual actions and practical collective\nmovements are accompanied with hopes, beliefs, and _myths._ These have\nno logical or historical truth, but it is on the other hand impossible\nto criticize them, because they are not error, but fantastic projection\nof the state of soul of individuals and groups of individuals in\naction, and testify to the existence of desires ready to transform\nthemselves into will and action. Utopias are poetry, they are not\npractical acts; but beneath that poetry there is always the reality\nof a desire that is a factor of future history. Hence it also happens\nthat poets are thought of as _seers,_ when the utopia of to-day becomes\nthe reality of the morrow. The Utopian and semi-poetic Address of the\nItalian patriots to the Directory of June 18, 1799,[1] the not less\nUtopian Proclamation of Rimini of 1815, the song of Manzoni, in which\nrang out the fateful verse,\n\n    We shall not be free if we are not one,\n\nwill become, for the Italians of 1860, effective action and _historical\nevent._\n\n[Sidenote: _Art as the pure representation of becoming and the artistic\nform of thought._]\n\nPure intuition, ingenuous representation of reality, representation\nof feeling, lyricism and personal intonation, are then all equivalent\nformul\u00e6, all of them definitions of the \u00e6sthetic activity and of art.\nAnd it would be superfluous to repeat that art thus characterized\nremains the concrete form of the superior theoretical grades of the\nspirit. In fact, logical thought or concept is also volition, owing to\nthe unity of the spirit, and the representation of such volition is the\nlogos made flesh, the concept that incorporates itself in language,\npalpitating with the drama of its becoming. What word of man is there\nthat is not personally and lyrically coloured, whether he communicate\nthe truth of science or narrate the incidents of life? And how could we\ndeny a place among the dramas that agitate human life and art portrays,\nto that drama of dramas, which is the drama of thought and of the\nhistorical comprehension of the real?\n\n\n[1] B. Croce, _Relazioni dei patrioti napoletani col Direttorio e col\nConsolato e l' idea dell' unit\u00e0 italiana,_ Napoli, 1902, pp. 69-73.\n\n\n\n\nVII\n\n\nHISTORICAL ANNOTATIONS\n\n\n[Sidenote: _The problem of freedom._]\n\nI. For the reasons stated in their place, a history of the concept of\nfreedom would end by becoming almost a general history of philosophy.\nDenied in different ways in the mechanistic and deterministic\nconceptions (from the Stoics to Spinoza), and in the theological and\narbitraristic (from Epicurus to St. Augustine and the mystics), that\nconcept afterwards continually assumed a more and more conciliatory\nform; an indication that the question must be put in an altogether\ndifferent way. This movement culminated in the Kantian theory, in\nwhich freedom, defended against the psychologists, is withdrawn from\nnatural causality and affirmed _a priori,_ as causality by means\nof freedom; but, at the same time, Kant did not succeed in fully\njustifying it, owing to his failure in the solution of the antitheses,\nthe defect of the Kantian philosophy, which never really became a\nsystem. The embarrassments and absurdities to which the unsolved\nantithesis between liberty and causality gives rise, are sufficiently\nexemplified in a proposition to be found in the _Critique of Practical\nReason_: \"It would be possible to foresee what man will do in the\nfuture, if we possessed all the facts; yet he would be perfectly\nfree.\"[1] But notwithstanding these contradictions and embarrassments,\nthe energetic affirmation of the principle of freedom by Kant (which\nhad an altogether special certitude in Kant, in respect to the other\ntwo postulates of the practical reason, God and immortality, from\nwhich in this respect it was distinguished) helped to make prevalent\nthe conviction of the impossibility of eliminating that concept or\nof escaping from it, and made of it the field of battle, where the\nfortunes of philosophy were decided. The problem of the freedom of\nwilling is really solved or near to a solution, in those philosophies\nwhich do not fatigue themselves with it as a particular problem, but\ntreat of it as something to be understood of itself, provided there\nbe a non-mechanistic conception of reality, such as would not need\nspecial defence. This happens, not only with sentimentalists and\nmystics such as Jacobi and Schleiermacher, but also and above all in\nthe Hegelian philosophy. Perhaps no philosopher has been less occupied\nwith the problem of liberty than Hegel, just because he was always\noccupied with it. The will is free (he contents himself with saying);\nfreedom is the fundamental determination of the will, as gravity is\nof matter; thus as gravity is matter itself, so is freedom the will.\nHegel consequently saw true in the contest between arbitrarism and\ndeterminism, recognizing in determinism the merit of having given\nits value to the content, the datum, in opposition to the certainty\nof abstract auto-determination, so that freedom understood as free\nwill is considered to be illusion. Free will is both determined and\nindetermined.[2] But how Hegel could conciliate this theory of freedom\nwith the mechanistic concept of nature that persists in him is another\nquestion. His failure to attain to this conciliation was perhaps among\nthe reasons that made his profound solution of the antithesis between\ndeterminism and indeterminism seem a vain playing with words.\n\nAfter Hegel, a return was made to the Kantian doctrine, variously\nmodified, in which is posited, now a double causality, now a\ncomposition of diverging forces, now a double point of view, now two\nworlds, the one included in the other and dominated, the one by the\nprinciple of the conservation of energy, the other by that of increase.\nSuch contradictory doctrines are to be found for example in Lotze\nand Wundt, to the latter of whom belongs the formula that the causal\nexplanation is certainly to be applied to spiritual facts, but _a parte\npost,_ not _a parte ante_[3] The philosophy of Bergson represents in a\ncertain way a return to the sound idealistic view, which declares that\nthe dilemma of determinism and indeterminism is surpassed.[4]\n\n[Sidenote: _The doctrine of evil._]\n\nII. The conception of the relation between bad and good, as reality\nopposed to reality, is mythological and religious (Parseeism,\nManich\u00e6ism, Jewish-Christian doctrine of the devil, etc.). But evil had\nalready begun to reveal itself to the philosophical reflection of the\nancients as the unreal, the not being; and this is explicitly affirmed\nin Neoplatonism. It was not, however, possible to understand this\nfunction of unreality, real in its way, without a general dialectical\nconception, which became very slowly mature. Without a dialectic\nconception, evil, conceived as unreality, becomes mere illusion, not\nso much a moment of the real as an equivocation of man philosophizing.\nThis is clearly to be seen in Spinoza, who opposes the full laws of\nreality to the narrow laws of human nature, saying: _Quidquid nobis\nin natura ridiculum, absurdum aut malum videtur, id inde venit quod\nres tantum ex parte novimus, totiusque naturae ordinem et cohaerentium\nmaxima ex parte ignoramus, et quod omnia ex usu nostrae rationis\ndirigi volumus, cum tamen id, quod malum esse dictat, non malum sit\nrespectu ordinis et legum universae naturae; sed tantum solius nostrae\nnaturae legum respectu._ For indeed, if evil, error and wickedness\nwere something that had essence, God, who is the cause of all that\nhas essence (continues Spinoza), would also be the cause of evil, of\nerror, and of wickedness. But this is not so, because evil is nothing\nreal. _Neronis matricidium_ (he observes) _quatenus aliquid positivum\ncomprehendebat, scelus non erat: nam facinus externum fecit, simulque\nintentionem ad trucidendam matrem Orestes habuit, et tamen, saltem ita\nuti Nero, non accusatur. Quodnam ergo Neronis scelus? Non aliud quam\nquod hoc facinore ostendit se ingratum, immisericordem ac inobedientem\nesse. Certum autem est, nihil horum aliquid essentiae exprimere, et\nidcirco Deum eorum non fuisse catisam, licet causa actus et intentionis\nNeronis fuerit_[5] But Spinoza was not able to determine in what sense\nNero was really ungrateful, implacable, and disobedient, nor in what\nway such a judgment could be justified, owing to his idea of Substance,\nnot as subject, spirit, activity, but as cause.\n\nKant did not succeed in understanding the nature of evil; for him good\nand evil were \"the categories of freedom,\"[6] and the view of Fichte\nwho makes the radical evil to be _vis inertiae,_ laziness (_Tr\u00e4gheit,_)\nwhich is in nature and in man as nature,[7] represents progress in\nrespect to the Kantian position. But only with the Hegelian dialectical\nview of evil, understood as negation, is evil at the same time given\nits right place; and its unreality, contradiction, which is no longer\nthe product of illusion of thought, but of things themselves, in\nintimate contradiction with one another, if it be a blemish, is shown\nto be the blemish, not of human thought, but of reality.[8]\n\n[Sidenote: _Decision and freedom._]\n\nIII. Free will, too, is not considered as a quality and character of\ncomplete liberty, but as its negation, will as contradiction, in the\nHegelian philosophy. It was preceded in this respect, not only by Kant,\nbut also by Descartes. Descartes wrote of the decision of indifference:\n_Cette indiff\u00e9rence que je sens lorsque je ne suis point port\u00e9 vers\nun c\u00f4t\u00e9 plut\u00f4t que vers un autre par le poids d'aucune raison est\nle plus bas degr\u00e9 de ma libert\u00e9, et fait plut\u00f4t para\u00eetre un d\u00e9faut\ndans la connaissance qu'une perfection dans la volont\u00e9: car si je\nconnaissais toujours clairement ce qui est vrai et ce qui est bon, je\nne serais jamais en peine de d\u00e9lib\u00e9rer quel jugement et quel choix je\ndevrais faire; et ainsi je serais enti\u00e8rement libre, sans jamais \u00eatre\nindiff\u00e9rent._[9]\n\nAmong the false formul\u00e6 of the _freedom of choice_ can be mentioned\nthat of Rosmini, who calls it _bilateral_ freedom, or that of\nperforming or not performing a given action.[10] But since the spirit\ncannot be reduced to complete passivity, not to perform a given action\nis equivalent to performing a different one; and if this other action\nthat presents itself before us be also not willed by us, then it will\nbe another, and so on. Thus it is not a question of bilaterality, but\nof multiplicity of tendencies: not of the choice between two volitions,\nbut of the synthesis of many appetites in one, which is the will or\nfreedom.\n\n[Sidenote: _Conscience and responsibility_]\n\nWe may mention the disputes that have been preserved in the\n_Memorabilia_ as to the greater responsibility of him who knows more\n(or wills more), as compared with him who knows less (or wills less),\nas to whether he that acts voluntarily be more unjust than he who\nacts involuntarily (\u1f41 \u1f11\u03ba\u1f7c\u03bd \u1f24 \u1f41 \u1f04\u03ba\u03c9\u03bd). In this connection it is to\nbe observed that he who voluntarily does not write or read well is\ncertainly more grammatical than he who reads and writes ill through\nignorance; and therefore that he who commits injustice while knowing\nwhat is just, is more just than he who commits it because he does not\nknow what is just; and that he is better, who says what is false when\nhe knows what is true, than he who says what is false, not knowing what\nis true. The dispute leads to the celebration of knowledge of self, or,\nas we should say, of knowing and possessing oneself.[11]\n\nThese thoughts are discussed anew in the _Hippias minor,_ where\nthe multiple difficulties are placed in relief and a conclusion\nreached that does not even satisfy those who propose it.[12] It is\nhenceforward clear that the question must be solved in the sense that\nhe who is conscious of sinning is certainly a sinner, whereas he who\nis not conscious of so doing, does not sin at all; but this being even\nincapable of sinning is in itself a sin, and places the man who is in\nsuch a condition yet a degree lower. In the polemic of Pascal with the\nJesuits--who maintained that in order to sin it was necessary to be\nconscious of one's own infirmity and of the suitable remedy, the wish\nto be healed and to ask it of God--the Jesuits were theoretically on\nthe side of reason. _Croira-t-on, sur votre parole_ (wrote Pascal),\n_que ceux qui sont plong\u00e9s dans l'avarice, dans l'impudicit\u00e9, dans\nles blasph\u00e8mes, dans le duel, dans la vengeance, dans les vols, dans\nles sacril\u00e8ges, aient v\u00e9ritablement le d\u00e9sir d'embrasser la chastet\u00e9,\nl'humilit\u00e9 et les autres vertus chr\u00e9tiennes?_ Nevertheless, it is\ninevitably so, if those acts of theirs are to be judged to be vices\n(and if they really are so). Hegel places himself on the side of\nPascal, who accepts and refers to the following argument and reduction\nto the absurd: _Ils seront tous damn\u00e9s ces demi-p\u00e9cheurs qui ont\nquelque amour pour la vertu. Mais pour ces francs-p\u00e9cheurs, sans\nm\u00e9lange, pleins et achev\u00e9s, l'enfer ne les tient pas: ils ont tromp\u00e9 le\ndiable \u00e0 force de s'y abandonner._[13]\n\nA reduction to the absurd which is not such: because the formula given\nas absurd expresses at bottom a very simple truth, which Hegel too\nstated in his own way, when he said that it was necessary to prefer\nself-will, evil, the erring Spirit, to the innocence of plants and\nanimals, or of Nature.[14]\n\n[Sidenote: _The concept of duty._]\n\nIV. A classical example of the disputes as to the principle of the\nPhilosophy of the practical, arising from the consideration of this\nprinciple in its empirical formulations, can be furnished from the\npolemic of Herbart against Kant on the subject of _duty._ Herbart\ndemonstrated that duty is not an original but a derived concept,\nand that it appears only when there is disagreement between the\npractical _ideas_ and the _will_.[15] But it would be possible to\ndemonstrate with the same method that the practical ideas are derived\nconcepts, because they do indeed presuppose the moral will, from the\nmanifestations of which they are constituted by means of abstraction.\nHerbart was in the right against Kant, but he afterwards let the axe\nfall on his own feet. The hard formula of the imperative preferred by\nKant had already been combated by Frederick Schiller, who accentuated\nthe moment of pleasure, sympathy and enthusiasm in the good action.\n\n[Sidenote: _Repentance and remorse._]\n\nAs to the other concepts and to the disputes to which they gave rise,\nit will be opportune to mention repentance and remorse. Spinoza does\nnot see that it has value as a necessary negative moment, for he\ndeclared: _Poenitentia virtus non est, sive ex ratione non oritur; sed\nis qui facti poenitet bis miser, seu impotens est. Nam primo prava\ncupiditate, dein tristitia vinci se patitur;_ and he concludes by\nassigning to it value for altogether empirical motives. Men rarely\nlive (he says) _ex dictamine rationis_; and yet repentance and other\nsimilar affections do more good than harm, and if it be necessary to\nsin _in istam partem potius peccandum. Terret vulgus, nisi metuat._[16]\nBut it was Hegel who instituted a regular persecution of the concept\nof repentance and remorse. There are certain passages in his works\nthat should be read in connection with this question, in order that\nwe may clearly see how he had an eye to contingent and historical\nevents in his criticism. \"In the Christian world in general (he writes)\nthere is in force an ideal of the perfect man, who cannot exist as\nmultitude in a people; and if this ideal is found realized in monks,\nquakers, and such-like pious folk, it must be remarked that a mass of\nthese sad creatures does not constitute a people, just as lice and\nparasitic plants cannot exist by themselves, but only on an organic\nbody. In order to constitute a people, it would be above all desirable\nto destroy that lamblike gentleness of theirs, that vanity which is\noccupied solely with their own persons, the caring for them and holding\nthem dear, and has always before it the image and consciousness of\nits own excellence. For life in the universal and for the universal\ndemands, not such vile and listless gentleness, but an energetic\ngentleness, not a thinking of oneself and one's own sins, but of the\nuniversal and of what should be done for it. To him who nourishes so\nfalse an ideal, men must always appear to be affected with weakness\nand corruption, and that ideal to be so constituted that it can never\nbe translated into reality. They attribute importance to trifles, to\nwhich no reasonable person pays special attention, and believe that\nsuch weaknesses and defects exist, even when they are not remarked.\nNor should we admire their greatness of soul, but note rather that\ntheir corruption lies precisely in standing still and looking at that\nwhich they call weaknesses and errors, and in making out of nothing\nsomething that exists. A man with such weaknesses and defects is\nimmediately quit of them, if he do not attach to them importance.\" The\nobservations that Hegel makes in his _\u00c6sthetic,_ regarding the type of\nthe Magdalen in Italian art, are in this respect especially curious.\n\"In Italian painting the Magdalen appears, both within and without,\nas the _beautiful sinner;_ sin in her is as seductive as conversion.\nBut here neither sin nor sanctity are to be taken too seriously. She\nwas pardoned, because she had loved much; she sinned through love and\nbeauty; and the affecting element lies in this, that she has scruples\nabout her love, and beautiful and sensible as she is, sheds torrents of\ntears. But her error is not that she has loved so much; her beautiful\nand moving error is precisely that she believes herself to be a sinner,\nwhereas her sensitive beauty gives the impression that she could not\nhave been otherwise than noble and of lofty senses in her love.\"[17]\n\n[Sidenote: _The doctrine of the passions._]\n\nV. The relation between the passions or desires and the will has rather\nbeen studied at the moment of strife between the will and the passions,\nthan for itself and within its two terms, although Aristotle had\nalready begun an analysis as to the diversity of appetites or \u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\nin respect to the intention or \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, observing that the intention\nrelates only to what can be done, whereas the appetition relates also\nto things that are impossible.[18] The opposed schools of the Cynics\nand Cyrena\u00efcs, Stoics and Epicureans, and others such, were chiefly\nconcerned with the antithesis of the passions and the rational will;\nbut the formul\u00e6 of all these schools, if they have some empirical value\nas precepts of life more or less suitable for definite individuals,\nclasses and times, possess none or very little for philosophy. Cynics\nand Cyrena\u00efcs, Stoics and Epicureans, they seem rather to be monks\nfollowing this or that rule than philosophers. The question as to the\nmode of freeing oneself from the passions and of dominating them,\nwhich lingered till the treatises of Descartes and Spinoza, has\nalso a chiefly empirical character. G. B. Vico took up a position\nopposed to the two opposed degenerations arising from those practical\ntendencies, that of \"quenching the senses,\" and of \"making a rule of\nthem.\" He despised both Stoics and Epicureans as \"monastic or solitary\nphilosophers,\" and maintained as \"a philosopher politician,\" that it is\nneedful \"not to tear away his own nature from man, nor to abandon him\nin his corruption,\" but \"to moderate the human passions and to make of\nthem human virtues.\"[19] Rarely has the defence of the passions enjoyed\nan equally limpid philosophical enunciation; as a rule, and even in\nHegel, it has been directed chiefly against certain social tendencies,\nrather than against philosophical doctrines.[20] The absolute\nabandonment to the passions or their absolute destruction, are theories\nthat have not had true and proper representatives.--The confusion\nbetween the various meanings of the word \"passion,\" understood now\nas appetition, or concrete and actual passion, now as a state of the\nsoul (joy and sorrow), now as volitional habit, is to be found in the\nvarious treatises that we have already had occasion to record. It is\nnatural that their character of indifference when understood as habits\nshould have often been observed. Thus for Descartes, _elles sont toutes\nbonnes de leur nature et nous n'avons rien \u00e0 \u00e9viter que leurs mauvais\nusages ou leur exc\u00e8s._[21]\n\n[Sidenote: _Virtues and Vices._]\n\nOn the other hand, the erroneous form of the defence of the passions,\nconsisting of making them the preparation or cause of the virtues, is\nalready to be found in the English philosophers of the seventeenth\nand eighteenth centuries (More, Shaftesbury, etc.); and in the\ncelebrated _Fable of the Bees_ of Mandeville, it assumes the aspect of\na paradoxical theory, in which the vices are looked upon as promoters\nand factors of progress, morality as inefficacious and harmful for this\npurpose. And La Rochefoucauld had written: \"_Les vices entrent dans\nla composition des vertus comme les poisons dans la composition des\nrem\u00e8des._\"[22]\n\n[Sidenote: _The doctrine of individuality: Schleiermacher._]\n\nAll these are false or crude forms, in which is involved the doctrine\nof the right to individuality, and they have always constituted and\nstill constitute its danger. This doctrine received its most energetic\nexpression in the romantic and preromantic period, thanks above all to\nSchleiermacher, after it had been referred to in a rather vague way by\nJacobi.[23]\n\n\"For some time\" (writes Schleiermacher in the _Monologues_) \"I too was\nsatisfied that I had discovered Reason; and venerating equality with\nthe _Unique Being_ as that which is most lofty, I believed that there\nwas one single measure for every case, that action should be in all of\nthem the same, and that each one is distinguished from the other only\nin so far as it occupies a place of its own in space. I believed that\nhumanity manifested itself differently only in the variety of external\nfacts; but that the internal man, the individual, was not a being\npeculiarly (_eigenth\u00fcmlich_) constructed, and that each was everywhere\nequal to the other.\" \"But afterwards was revealed to me that which\ninstantly raised me to a high state of exaltation: it became clear that\nevery man must represent humanity in his own way, in an altogether\nindividual combination of its elements, in order that it may manifest\nitself in every mode, and that everything most different may issue from\nits bosom and become effectual in the fulness of time and space....\nOwing to this thought, I felt myself to be a work individually willed\nand therefore elected by the Divinity and such that it must enjoy a\nparticular form and culture; and the free act to which this thought\nbelongs has collected and intimately joined together the elements of\nhuman nature in a peculiar existence.\"\n\n\"While I now do whatever I do according to my spirit and sense,\nmy fancy places before me as very clear proof of the internal\ndetermination, a thousand other modes, in which it would be possible to\nact otherwise without offending the laws of humanity: I rethink myself\nin a thousand different forms, in order to discover with the greater\ncertainty that which is especially mine.\"[24]\n\n[Sidenote: _Romantic and very modern theories._]\n\nBut this peculiarity (_Eigenth\u00fcmlichkeit,_) opportunely placed in\nrelief by Schleiermacher, and a thought much loved by the Romantics\n(Herder, Jacobi, G. Humboldt, the Schlegels, etc.), is often seen to\ndegenerate into individual caprice, even in those times, as may be\nobserved in the sort of caricature which Frederick Schlegel made of the\nFichtian I, become the individual I, and in the notorious _Lucinde,_\nto which the same Schleiermacher inconsiderately devoted a series of\nletters of comment and defence. The last offshoots of the Romantics\nwere Max Stirner and Frederick Nietzsche: in the former the value\nof individuality becomes changed into an affirmation of spasmodic\negotism; in the second there is a continuous mixture of true and false,\nof good and of bad individuality, as is natural in a writer whose\n_Eigenth\u00fcmlichkeit_ was rather that of a poet than of a thinker.\n\n[Sidenote: _The concept of development and progress._]\n\nVI. We have discussed elsewhere Hegel's concept of development, and\nhis thought as synthesis of opposites, which essentially belongs to\nthe Hegelian philosophy and has been superficially treated and adopted\nby other philosophical schools, and this is not the place either to\nretrace their history or to demonstrate into what errors Hegel fell\nthrough abusing the truth that he had discovered. Among the errors of\nthat philosophy (as for that matter of all contemporary philosophies\nand of those that have followed one another down to our own day), is\nto be noted the persistence of the concept of Nature as a mode of\nreality opposed to the mode of the Spirit, whence came a dualism that\nwas not effectually surpassed, save in appearance. The doctrine of\ndevelopment by opposites is to be understood as accepted and maintained\nhere, with the correction of the concept of nature, and also the\ndoctrine of the synthesis of opposites, free from the use or abuse\nof it by Hegel for distinct concepts (and worse still, for empirical\nconcepts). As for the concept of Providence, which is neither Fate\nnor Fortune, nor the work of a transcendent God, this, in its modern\nform, goes back to the _Scienza nuova_ of Vico and is not to be\nconfounded with the personal religious beliefs that Vico held and kept\ndistinct from his philosophical concept as to immanent Providence.\nThe same concept reappears in the Hegelian philosophy under the form\nof the Idea, or of the _astuteness of Reason,_ which avails itself\nof men as its instruments and managers of business.[25] Finally, the\nconception of cosmic progress was extraneous to the oriental world,\nto the Gr\u00e6co-Roman, and to the Christian worlds, prevailing in turn\nin the latter that of decadence from an original state of perfection\nand of circles or returns. In its modern form it takes its origin from\nthinkers free of these religious views, who merge in the philosophies\nof becoming and of evolution. But the concept of progress destroyed\nitself in many of these rationalistic philosophies, the \"disappearance\nof evil\" being posited as possible (Spencer), and a definite state\nof perfection conceived (though transferred from the past into the\nfuture), that is to say a Reality that should be Reality, indeed,\nperfect Reality having ceased to be development, that is to say, itself.\n\n\n\n[1] _Kr. d. prakt. Vern._ p. 119.\n\n[2] _Phil. d. Rechtes,_ \u00a7\u00a7 4, 15.\n\n[3] Lotze, _Grundz\u00fcge der Ethik_ (Leipzig, 1884), pp. 26, 30-31; Wundt,\n_Ethik_\u00b2 (Stuttgart, 1892), pp. 463-464.\n\n[4] _Essai sur les donn\u00e9es imm\u00e9diates de la conscience_ (Paris, 1898).\n\n[5] _Tract, theol.-pol._ vi. c. 6; _Ethica,_ p. iv. intr.; _Epist._36\n(_Opera,_ pp. 208, 378, 597).\n\n[6] _Kr. d. pr. Vernf._ p. 79.\n\n[7] _System der Sittenlehre,_ in _Werke,_ iv. pp. 198-205.\n\n[8] See my study: _Ci\u00f2 che \u00e8 vivo e ci\u00f2 che \u00e8 morto della filosofia di\nHegel_ (Bari, 1907).\n\n[9] _M\u00e9dit._ iv.\n\n[10] For example, _Compendio di Etica_ (Roma, 1907), p. 56.\n\n[11] _Mentor,_ iv. c. 2, \u00a7 19 _sqq._\n\n[12] _Hippias minor,_ 375.\n\n[13] Pascal, _Provine,_ i, iv.; Hegel, _Phil. d. Rechtes,_ \u00a7 40.\n\n[14] _Enc._\u00a7 248.\n\n[15] _Allg. prakt. Phil._ pp. 121-122; _Einl. i. d. Phil._ (trad,\nital.), pp. 118, 171, 224.\n\n[16] _Ethic,_ iv. prop. 54, p. 480.\n\n[17] _Gesch. d. Phil._ ii. 240-241; _Vorles. \u00fcb. Aesth._ ii. 162-163.\n\n[18] _Eth. Nicom._ Bk. iii. cc. 2-3, 1111-1113.\n\n[19] _Scienza nuova seconda,_ degn. 5.\n\n[20] _Ph\u00e4n. d. Geistes,_ pp. 484-486; _Encycl._ \u00a7 474; _Phil. d.\nRechtes,_ \u00a7 124; _Phil. d. Gesch._ pp. 39-41.\n\n[21] _Trait\u00e9 des passions,_ iii. \u00a7 211.\n\n[22] _Maximes,_ n. 182 (Ed. Garnier, p. 43).\n\n[23] _Woldemar,_ pp. 112-113.\n\n[24] _Monologen,_ in _Werke,_ i. 366-368, 372.\n\n[25] See the study of Hegel mentioned.\n\n\n\n\nTHIRD SECTION\n\n\nUNITY OF THE THEORETICAL AND THE PRACTICAL\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Double result; precedence of the theoretical over the\npractical and of the practical over the theoretical._]\n\n\nThe study of the practical activity in its relations that we made in\nthe first section has removed all doubt as to the thesis that the\npractical activity presupposes the theoretical, or that _knowledge is\nthe necessary precedent of volition and action._[1] But the succeeding\nstudy of the practical activity in its dialectic having led to the\nresult that the practical activity is reality itself in its immediacy,\nand that no other reality (or we may say _other nature_) is conceivable\noutside will-action, compels us also to affirm the opposite thesis,\nthat the theoretic activity presupposes the practical, and that\n_the will is the necessary precedent of knowledge_.[2] And it is a\nprecedent, not indeed in the sense admitted from the beginning, of\nthe necessary implication of the will in every theoretical act, as\nwill to know, by means of the unity of the Spirit[3] (for this will\nis subsidiary and not constitutive; but if it become constitutive it\nproduces, as has been seen, wilfulness and the theoretical error[4]),\nbut precisely in the sense of a constitutive will, without which no\nknowledge would be thinkable.\n\nKnowledge, indeed, is knowledge of something: it is the remaking of\na fact, an ideal recreation of a real creation. If there have not\npreviously been a desire, an aspiration, a nostalgia, there cannot be\npoetry; if there have not been an impulse or a heroic deed, the epic\ncannot arise; if the sun do not illumine a landscape, or a soul invoke\na ray of sunlight upon the countryside, the picture of a luminous\nlandscape cannot exist. And if there be not a world of reality that\ngenerates a world of representations, Philosophy, which is the search\nfor the universal, is not conceivable, nor History, the understanding\nof the individual.\n\n[Sidenote: _Error of those who maintain the exclusive precedence of\neither._]\n\nThe indubitability of this affirmation, which no force of sophistry\ncan destroy, renders fallacious both the opposite theses, which have\nseveral times been variously proposed and maintained: the exclusive\npriority of the theoretic, and the exclusive priority of the practical.\n\nThose who maintain them enter into so desperate a contest with\nreality, that in order to issue from it without too much dishonour,\nthey are finally compelled to call in the aid of a third term, which is\nin turn either thought that is not thought, or will that is not will,\nor something grey that contains in itself thought and will, without\nbeing either the one or the other, nor the unity of that duality. On\nthe one hand is postulated a Logos, a thought _in se_ (one does not\nunderstand how this can ever think and be thought), and it is made to\nadopt the resolution (which one does not understand how it can ever\nadopt) of coming forth _from itself_ and creating a nature, in order\nto be able to return finally to itself, by means of this alienation,\nand to be henceforth _per se,_ that is to say, able to think and to\nwill. The defect of this artificial construction, its mythological and\nreligious origin, can be said to have been already revealed, in the\ncomparison employed with reference to it by the author who maintained\nit (Hegel), to the effect that the Logos is God _before_ the creation\nof the world: a God, that is to say, altogether unreal and absurd.\nOn the other hand, the excogitation of a _blind Will_ (Schelling,\nSchopenhauer) completely tallies with this Thought that does not think\nbecause it has not previously willed, and that does not truly will\nbecause it has not previously thought, and all of a sudden fashions\nfor itself the instrument of knowledge, to succeed in surpassing\nitself in this alienation from itself, by means of liberation from\nwilling obtained in the contemplation of the ideas and in asceticism.\nHere, too, we must repeat that the one error passes over and converts\nitself into the other, and this inevitable conversion causes the other\nsecondary and hybrid forms of theory to have but slight interest, those\nin which the priority has been conceived as that of fancy, or feeling,\nor the unconscious, or the indifferentiated, and the like, all of which\nrepresent vain efforts to suppress one of the two fundamental forms of\nthe spirit, or to derive them from a third, which consciousness does\nnot reveal.\n\n[Sidenote: _Problem of the unity of this duality._]\n\nThis however does not mean that the demand to conceive the link of that\nduality, or the unity of the theoretical and the practical, manifested\nin all these erroneous attempts, is not legitimate. But in order to\nconceive this, it is necessary to insist above all upon the reality of\nthis duality, of which is sought the connection and the unity.\n\n[Sidenote: _Not the duality of opposites._]\n\nThis connection cannot be the relation or synthesis of opposites. The\ntheoretical is not the opposite of the practical, nor the practical\nthe opposite of the theoretical: the opposite of the theoretical is\nerror or the false, as the opposite of the practical is the volitional\ncontradiction or evil. The theoretical, far from being negative, is\npositive, not less than the practical, and inversely. Neither form can\ntherefore be in any way debased to a simple opposite. Opposition is\nintrinsic to the spirit and is to be found in each one of its forms:\nhence the general value of the spirit (activity against passivity,\nrationality and reality against irrationality and unreality, being\nagainst not-being) and that of its special forms (beautiful against\nugly, true against false, useful against useless, good against evil).\nBut precisely for this reason, it cannot constitute the character of\none form in respect to the other: neither that of the true against the\ngood, nor that of the beautiful against the useful, and so on.\n\n[Sidenote: _Not duality of finite and infinite._]\n\nNor can the connection be thought as are thought the subdivisions of\nthe theoretic and the practical forms, or according to the relations\nof individual to universal, of finite to infinite, the first of\nwhich terms conditions the second, but is conditioned by it only in\nan implicit manner. Of the two theoretical forms (and we shall see\nfurther on that the forms of the practical are also two), the \u00e6sthetic\nprecedes the logical and is autonomous: a song, a story, a statue, do\nnot express any concept; but the philosophy that gives the concept, is\nat the same time fancy, expression, word: the prose of the philosopher\nis his song. The \u00e6sthetic form is the knowledge of the individual;\nthe logical that of the universal, which is also individual. But this\nrelation that arises within the theoretic, as within the practical\nform, cannot be transported to the relation of the two forms without\nlogical incoherence: the subdivision, so to speak, is not the\ndivision. Thought is not the finite in respect of willing, which is\nthe infinite; nor is the will the finite in respect of thought, which\nis the infinite. Thought and will are both of them at once finite\nand infinite, individual and universal. He who passes from action to\nthought, does not limit his own being by becoming finite; nor does he\nlimit it by passing from thought to action; or better, in both cases he\nmakes himself finite to attain to the infinite; poet to open to himself\nthe way to the thought of the eternally true; man of action, that he\nmay dedicate his work to the eternal good.\n\n[Sidenote: _Perfect analogy of the two forms, theoretic and practical._]\n\nThe two forms, theoretical and practical, both positive, both a\nconnection of finite and infinite, correspond in everything, as has\nalready appeared from our exposition, in which the appeal to the one\nfrom the problems of the other has always aided a better penetration\nof the nature of such problems and the finding of their solution.\nThus in both there is genius and creation (geniuses of art and of\nthought, and geniuses of action); in both, reproduction and judgment\ntake place in the same way (\u00e6sthetic taste, practical taste; history\nof art and history of philosophy, history of actions); in both arise\nrepresentative concepts and empirical rules. The analogy will be\nbetter illustrated by what is to follow, when will be demonstrated the\ncorrespondence between art and economic, logical thought and ethicity,\nhistorical discrimination and ethical discrimination, empirical\nconcepts and laws of action, and so on.\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Not a parallelism, but a circle._]\n\nIf this analogy exclude the possibility of the two forms being\n_unequal,_ it must not, on the other hand, be perverted with the\nobject of conceiving them _parallel,_ as would perhaps be pleasing\nto the parallelists of spirit and nature, soul and body; this is an\nexpedient that is certainly easy, but certainly not satisfying. They\nare not parallel, but are on the contrary bound, the one to the\nother, in such a way that the one proceeds from the other. From the\n\u00e6sthetic apprehension of reality, from philosophical reflection upon\nit, from historical reconstruction, which is its result, is obtained\nthat knowledge of the actual situation, on which alone is formed and\ncan be formed the volitional and practical synthesis, the new action.\nAnd this new action is in its turn the material of the new \u00e6sthetic\nfiguration, of the new philosophical reflection, of the new historical\nreconstruction. In short, knowledge and will, theory and practice,\nare not two parallels, but two lines, such that the head of the one\nis joined to the tail of the other; or, if a geometric symbol also be\ndesired, such that they constitute, not a parallelism, but a _circle._\n\n[Sidenote: _The circle of Reality: thought and being, subject and\nobject._]\n\nThey constitute therefore the circle of reality and of life, which is\nduality-unity of thought and being, of subject and object, in such\na way that to think the subject is the same as to think the subject\nof an object, and to think an object is the same as to think the\nobject of a subject. In truth, it sometimes seems strange and almost\nimpossible that such hard and difficult questions should have arisen\nas to the objectivity of knowledge, and as to whether thought attains\nto being, or whether there be a being beyond thought. Thought is such,\nprecisely because it affirms being, and being is such, precisely\nbecause it is generated by a thought. It is only when we remember\nthat in those questions were included others of a very difficult and\nintricate nature, concerning divine transcendency and the content of\nthe concept of nature (gnoseological questions, which it is the glory\nof modern philosophy to have asked and solved);--it is only then that\nwe understand how the relation of thought and being, of knowing and of\nwilling, has also become obscure. Kant was forced to come to a stop\nbefore the mystery of reality, because he had not altogether conquered\ntranscendency, nor altogether surpassed the false conception of nature\nas _ens,_ given by the naturalists. It revealed itself to him, not\nas a circle, but as an assemblage of lines diverging or joining to\ninfinity. Hegel made two of will and nature, owing to the insufficiency\nof his gnoseological theory relating to the natural sciences, and was\nled to posit a Philosophy of nature in opposition to a Philosophy of\nthe spirit, thus permitting to exist a form of non-mediate dualism,\nafter he had destroyed so many, or making it mediate in the artificial\nmanner to which we have referred. The shadows of that gnoseology having\nbeen dispersed, the relation between theory and practice, subject and\nobject, appears in full light; and the answer becomes very simple to\nthe question as to how, when everything is unconvertible relation of\ncondition and conditioned, thought and being are reciprocally condition\nand conditioned, and as to how the vicious circle is avoided. The\ncriticism of vicious circles includes in itself and affirms the idea\nof a circularity that is not vicious; thought and being are not a\nsuccession of two finites, but an absolute relation, that is, the\nAbsolute itself. To express ourselves mythologically, if the creation\nof the world be the passage from chaos to cosmos, from not-being to\nbeing, this passage does not begin either with the theoretic or with\nthe practical, with the subject, or with the object, but with the\nAbsolute, which is the absolute relation of the two terms. _In the\nbeginning was neither the Word nor the Act; but the Word of the Act and\nthe Act of the Word._\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique of the theories as to the primacy of theoretical\nor of practical reason._]\n\nIt is well to state again that in consequence of the relation and\ncorrelation established, all the questions as to the primacy of\nthought or will, of the contemplative or active life, and speaking\nmore empirically, of the thinker or the man of action, disappear.\nTo pose such problems is as though one were to ask which of the two\nsemicircles of a circle has precedence. Similar questions, always\ninsoluble or badly solved, have their origin in internal obscurity as\nto the fundamental correlation. When man has attained to the summit of\nknowledge (a summit that is certainly not Art; nor, strictly speaking,\nPhilosophy, but History, the knowledge of the concrete real, that\nis, the actuality of philosophy), when he has completely penetrated\nthe actual situation, can he perhaps stop at this point and say _hic\nmanebimus optime?_ Can he arrest life which is raging and demanding\nto be continued? And if he succeed in suspending it for an instant in\nthought, why has he suspended, if not to continue it? Knowledge is\nnot an end, but an instrument of life: knowledge that did not serve\nlife would be superfluous and harmful.--On the other hand, when a man\nhas willed and has thrown himself into action, when he has produced\nanother piece of life, can he blindly continue to produce life for\never? Would not blindness impede the production itself? Therefore he\nmust rise from life to knowing, if he wish to look in the face the\nproduct that he has lived, and surpass it with thought, for which life\nis now means and instrument. Knowledge serves life and life serves\nknowledge; the contemplative life, if it do not wish to become insipid\nease, must lead to activity, and that activity, if it do not wish to\nbecome an irrational and sterile tumult, must lead to contemplation.\nReality, in specifying aptitudes, has formed men of thought and men\nof action, or of prevailing thought or prevailing action, these not\nsuperior to those, for they are collaborators.--Thus the discussions\nas to whether human progress be moral or intellectual, or whether the\npropelling force be the practical and economic activity, or philosophy,\nor religion (Buckle, Kidd, etc.), are shown to be vain.\n\n[Sidenote: _New pragmatism: life conditioning Philosophy._]\n\nIt is rather to be considered that from this bond between theory\nand practice is obtained a pragmatism of a new sort, of which the\npragmatists have never thought, or at least have not been able to\ndistinguish from the others and to give it value. If Life condition\nThought, we have in this the apodictic demonstration of the always\nhistorically conditioned form of every thought; not only of Art, which\nis always the art of a time, of a soul, of a moment; but also of\nPhilosophy which can solve only those problems presented by Life. Every\nphilosophy reflects and cannot but reflect the preoccupations, as\nthey are called, of a definite historical moment; and this, not in the\nquality of its _solutions_ (in which case it would be and is indeed bad\nphilosophy), but in the quality of its _problems._ Thus it is at once\ncontingent and eternal, mortal and immortal, extratemporal and living\nonly in time and history.\n\n[Sidenote: _Deductive confirmation of the two forms and deductive\nexclusion of the third feeling._]\n\nFinally, with the establishment of the duality-unity of the theoretical\nand the practical, we have demonstrated that which at the beginning\nof the exposition had only been asserted and presupposed: namely,\nwhy a _practical_ form of the spirit must be placed beside the\ntheoretical,[5] and why there is no _third_ form beyond these, whether\nit be called _feeling_ or by any other name.[6] The theoretical form\npostulates the practical, because the subject postulates the object;\nbut the spirit does not postulate a third form intermediate between the\ntwo, or unity of the two, because it is itself precisely mediator and\nunity of itself, _subject-object._\n\n\n\n[1] Section I.\n\n[2] Section II.\n\n[3] Section I. c. 3.\n\n[4] Section I. c. 4.\n\n[5] Section I. c. 1.\n\n[6] Section I. c. 2.\n\n\n\n\nSECOND PART\n\nTHE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY IN ITS SPECIAL FORMS\n\n\n\n\nFIRST SECTION\n\n\nTHE TWO PRACTICAL FORMS: ECONOMIC AND ETHIC\n\n\n\n\nI\n\n\nDISTINCTION OF THE TWO FORMS IN THE PRACTICAL CONSCIOUSNESS\n\n\n[Sidenote: _The utilitarian or economic form, and the moral or ethical\nform._]\n\nAll that has been developed in the preceding book concerns the\npractical activity _in general:_ therefore no account has been taken of\nthe special distinctions of the practical forms, as though there were\nnone, or they have only been alluded to as something problematical;\nand when exemplifications have been given, recourse has been had\nindifferently to one or to the other of the forms commonly admitted,\nwhether or no they are to be held philosophically distinguishable.\nNow, on the contrary, we affirm in an explicit manner that the spirit,\nwhich we have seen distinguished as theoretical and practical, is\nsub-distinguished as practical spirit, into two forms, of which the\nfirst may be called utilitarian or _economic,_ the second moral or\n_ethical._\n\n[Sidenote: _Insufficiency of the descriptive and psychological\ndistinction._]\n\nIn affirming this sub-distinction, we are obliged to renounce (as we\nhave already done for the practical in respect to the theoretical) a\ndemonstration by the psychological method, which has already shown\nitself to be vicious. If indeed it were applicable in this field, we\nshould doubtless be able to strike the intellect and persuade the soul\nfor a moment, by pointing to the spectacle of life as a demonstration\nof the two forms, economic and ethic, showing on the one hand, farmers,\ncommercial men, speculators, conquerors of men and of territories,\nwielders of the word or of the sword as instrument of dominion;\nand, on the other hand, educators, benefactors, disinterested and\nself-sacrificing men, martyrs and heroes; on the one hand, economic\ninstitutions (manufactories, mines, exchanges, exploration companies),\nand on the other moral institutions (educators and schools, charitable\nsocieties, orders of Sisters of Charity, or red, white, or blue Cross\nCompanies, and so on). What can be better proof of the reality of the\nbipartition enunciated? Cannot we touch it, as with the hand? However\n(as already in the case of the distinction between the theoretical\nand the practical), what is touched with the hand is not on that\naccount seized by the intellect, and indeed in a little while it also\nescapes the hand which had thought to be its master. For when we better\nobserve the individuals who seemed to be merely economic, they seem to\nbe also moral, and inversely;--moral institutions are also economic,\nand economic moral The benefactor calculates and wishes to attain his\nobject with the same _cupiditas_ as the peasant, all intent upon gain;\nand the peasant in his turn is ennobled in his chase after lucre by\nthe dignity of labour and by the moral impulses that sustain it;--all\ncharitable institutions are economic undertakings, and economic\nundertakings are subject to moral laws, so that in drawing up accounts\nthere is no knowing where is that material distinction between the\neconomic and the ethical activities. The truth is that here too it is\nnot possible to start from contingent facts and from their classes\nwith empirical limitations, to attain to philosophical distinctions,\nbut that it is necessary to start from these, in order to interpret\ncontingent facts, and finally to understand also the mode of formation\nof empirical classes. For this reason the psychological method revolves\nin a circle that is effectively vicious.\n\n[Sidenote: _Deduction and the necessity of integrating it with\ninduction._]\n\nNeither is it possible to proceed with the method that we shall call\ndeductive solely; that is, we see the necessity of the two sub-forms\nof the practical activity, which, being the object of the subject and\ntherefore in every way analogous to the activity of the subject, that\nis, to the theoretical, must have a duplication of forms answering\nto the duplication of the theoretical activity into \u00e6sthetic and\nlogical, and cannot posit the universal practical without positing the\nindividual that shall be its vehicle. This deduction, although in every\nway correct and rigorous, cannot be convincing, save when it is also\ndemonstrated that it responds to fact as revealed by observation, that\nis, when deduction is also induction, as the speculative method demands.\n\n[Sidenote: _The two forms as a fact of consciousness._]\n\nLeaving, therefore, on this occasion also, the deductive proof to the\ncomplete development of the theory, we shall begin by appealing to\nobservation of self, in order that every one may verify in himself\nthe existence of the two different forms of volitional acts, termed\nby us economic and ethic. The economic activity is that which wills\nand effects only what corresponds to the conditions of fact in which\na man finds himself; the ethical activity is that which, although\nit correspond to these conditions, also refers to something that\ntranscends them. To the first correspond what are called individual\nends, to the second universal ends; the one gives rise to the judgment\nconcerning the greater or less coherence of the action taken in itself,\nthe other to that concerning its greater or less coherence in respect\nto the universal end, which transcends the individual.\n\n[Sidenote: _The economic form._]\n\nIf we wish to recognize only the moral form of activity, we soon\nperceive that it draws with it the other, from which it is distinct;\nfor our action, although universal in its meaning, cannot but be\nsomething concrete and individually determined. What is put in practice\nis not morality in universal, but always a determinate moral volition:\nas Hegel remarked in a different connection, we do not eat fruit in\ngeneral, but cherries, pears, plums, or, these cherries, these pears,\nthese plums; we hasten to comfort in this or that way an individual,\nmade in this or that way, who finds himself in this or that state of\nmisfortune; we do justice at this or that point of time and space to\nindividual beings on a definite matter. If a good action be not solely\nour individual pleasure, it must become so: otherwise, how could we\ncarry it out? Thus, by closer examination, we realize that our action\nalways obeys a rational law, even when its moral law is suppressed, so\nthat, when every inclination that transcends the individual has been\nset aside, we do not on that account remain the prey of caprice. We\nshall desire only our own will, we shall follow only our own individual\ninclination; but, even so, it is necessary to will this will and this\ninclination coherently, not to undulate between two or more volitions\nat the same time. And if we succeed in really obtaining our desire,\nif, while the moral conscience is for a moment suspended within us,\nwe abandon ourselves to the execution of a project of vengeance and\nattain to it in spite of many obstacles, thus executing a masterpiece\nof ability, a practical masterpiece; even when, in this case, _populus\nnon plaudit,_ we for our part certainly _nos nobis plaudimus,_ and feel\nmost satisfied, at least so long as lasts the suspension of the moral\nconsciousness; for we have done what we willed to do, we have tasted,\nthough but for a little while, the pleasure of the gods. Whereas if,\nalthough we follow our desire, we do something different from it, or\nmingle several mutually exclusive desires with one, and having decided\nnot to drink wine, for example, in order to obey the advice of the\ndoctor and to remain in good health, we yet yield to the wish to drink\nit, that pleasure is, so to say, poisoned by preoccupation, the taste\nis at the same time distaste, unless we succeed in forgetting for some\nmoments the advice of the doctor, or think that very possibly he does\nnot know what he is saying. We continually apply the same criterion\nto the incidents of life; actions and individuals, of whom we cannot\nmorally approve, drag from us sometimes cries of admiration for the\nability with which they have conducted themselves, for the firmness\nthat they display, worthy (as is said) of a better cause. The Epicurean\nFarinata, who raised himself erect on his red-hot bed, or the impious\nCapaneus who cursed Jove beneath the rain of punishing fire, obtain\nfrom us that esteem which we refuse to those sad souls who lived\nwithout infamy and without praise. Art has celebrated in tragedies and\npoems the strong characters of great criminals, but it has turned to\nridicule in comedies little criminals, the violent who show themselves\ntimid, the astute who let themselves be cheated.\n\n[Sidenote: _The ethical form._]\n\nAs we cannot fail to recognize this form of the practical activity,\nquite individual, hedonistic, utilitarian, and economic, and the\nimportance that it possesses, joined to or separated from morality,\nas the case may be, and the special practical judgments that have\ntheir origin in it (the judgment of convenience, whether it be called\nutilitarian or economic), so it would be impossible not to recognize\nthe moral form. Yes, the volitional act satisfies us as individuals\noccupying a definite point of time and space, but if it fail to\nsatisfy us at the same time as beings transcending time and space,\nour satisfaction will be ephemeral and will rapidly be changed into\ndissatisfaction. To one desire succeeds another, and to this another,\nand so on to infinity; but the one is different from the other, and\nthe new either condemns the old or is by it condemned. If we succeed\nin arranging our pleasures in series and classes, and in subordinating\nand connecting them, certainly there will be some gain; but the gain\nwill not have been a true one on this occasion either. We shall at\nthe most be able to guide our life according to some plan, and for a\ncertain time that has not the exactitude of the moment; instead of the\ninstantaneous will to which succeeds a different will, we shall have\ngeneral ends for which we shall work. We shall propose, for instance,\nto do certain work and to abstain from doing certain other work, in\norder to marry a loved one, to win a seat in Parliament, or to obtain\nliterary fame. But those ends are also merely contingent (they are\ngeneral, not universal), and consequently cannot assuage our thirst.\nWhen we all have attained to them, we shall experience _le d\u00e9boire_\nthat _la cueillaison d'un r\u00eave au c\u0153ur qui l'a cueilli_ always leaves\nbehind. The company of the fair beloved will weary, the political\nambition realized will leave the soul empty, literary fame will seem\nthe shadow of vanity. Perhaps too, we shall change our side, like\nthe sick man who cannot rest on his bed of feathers, and begin to\nfollow other ends; the lover deluded with matrimony will turn to other\nloves; the ambitious man, weary of political life, will think of new\nambitions, or of that of not having any, and of retiring to so-called\ndomestic peace; the seeker for literary fame will long for ease,\nsilence, and forgetting. But in vain: dissatisfaction persists. And it\nwill always persist, and pallid Care will always sit behind us, on the\ncroup of our horse, if we are not able to tear from the contingent its\ncharacter of contingent, breaking its spell, and bringing ourselves to\na full stop in that _progressus ad infinitum_ from thing to thing, from\npleasure to pleasure, to which it impels us, if we be not able to place\nthe eternal in the contingent, the universal in the individual, duty\nin desire. Then only do we acquire that internal peace, which is not\nin the future, but in the present, because eternity is in the moment,\nfor him who knows how to place it there. Our actions will always be\nnew, because reality always places new problems before us, but if we\naccomplish them with lofty souls, and with purity of heart, seeking in\nthem that which surpasses them, we shall on every occasion possess the\nWhole. Such is the character of the moral action, which satisfies us,\nnot as individuals, but as men, and as individuals only in so far as\nwe are men; and in so far as we are men, only by means of individual\nsatisfaction.\n\n[Sidenote: _Impossibility of eliminating it._]\n\nThose men in whom the moral consciousness is wanting, or is confused\nand intermittent, make us fearful--fearful for ourselves, obliged to be\non our guard against them and to ward off their snares and injuries,\nand fearful for them, for if they have not already fallen the prey to\nthe most terrible torments, they certainly will do so. They are like\npeople dancing unconsciously upon ground that has been mined; the\nconscious spectator trembles for them, they do not; but if by chance\nthey escape the danger, they will be retrospectively horrified when\nthey look back. The inebriation evaporates and the clear outlines of\nreality reappear, but that which restores form to those outlines is\nthe eternal, not the contingent, morality, not desire. We see this take\nplace in an intense form in what are called _conversions,_ followed by\nthe intention of leaving the world and its false joys and retiring to a\ncloister; or, without metaphor, of becoming regenerated, of beginning\na new life with new ideal presuppositions. But intensive conversions\nare catastrophes which occur, like popular revolutions, when continuous\nevolution is impeded. The wise man is converted and renewed at every\nmoment, without the solemnity of a conversion, and with the _memorare\nnovissima_ he retains in the contingent, his contact with the eternal.\nHe knows that he must love things and creatures one by one, each in\nits individuality, for he who does not love thus is neither good nor\nbad, not even being a man. He will wish for literary fame, political\npower, matrimony, according to his aptitudes and to the conditions in\nwhich he finds himself; but he will wish for all these things without\nwishing for them; he will wish for them, not for themselves, but for\nthat which they contain of universal and constant; he will love them\nin God, ready to abandon them immediately their ideal content shall\nhave left them; he will seriously desire them with all ardour for\nthemselves, but only when their self is also \"his other self.\" No\nthing, no creature possesses unconditioned value, which belongs only to\nthat which is neither thing nor creature. The value of our individual\nlife is conditioned for each of us, and we must guarantee and defend\nit as vehicle of the universal, and we must be ready to throw it\naway, as a useless and pernicious thing, when it does not serve this\nend, or rebels. But the value of every being dear to us is not less\nconditioned, and Jesus said with reason, when preparing himself for\nhis divine mission, that he had come to separate men from their wives,\ntheir sons, their friends, and from their native land. That separation\nin union, that union in separation, is the moral activity, individual\nand universal.\n\n[Sidenote: _Confirmed by facts._]\n\nThus it happens that art, which has celebrated strong characters, able\nmen and affairs well conducted, has also celebrated, and with greater\nliveliness, those strong men who have placed their strength at the\nservice of that other strength which surpasses them and makes them\neternal. For this reason, no embittered soul, no sceptic and pessimist\nremains long firm in his negation of all moral light; such negations\nare indeed as a rule true _amantium irae. _ The singer of the lesser\nBrutus who had thus ferociously imprecated:\n\n    Foolish Virtue, hollow mists and fields\n              Of restless ghosts\n    Are thy schools, and Repentance turns her back upon\n        thee,...\n\nis the same who, on witnessing a slight act of generosity, exclaims\nwith emotion:\n\n    Fair Virtue, when my spirit becomes aware of thee,\n    It exults, as at a joyous event....\n\nThe coldest and most self-contained philosophers, when they speak of\nit, find themselves sometimes impelled to adopt a poetic tone, and\nAristotle will say of Justice that it is \"a more wonderful thing than\nHesperus or the Morning Star,\"[1] and Emmanuel Kant will compose an\napostrophe to Duty, and will write at the end of the _Critique of\nPractical Reason_: \"Two things fill the soul with ever new and ever\nincreasing veneration and admiration the more often and the longer\nreflection is occupied with them: _the starry heaven_ above me, and\n_the moral law_ within me.\" And even the great mass of rhetoric that\nhas for its object virtue or the moral law is a homage rendered to this\nsupreme force of life, reality of reality.\n\nThe impossibility of suppressing the economic or the moral form of the\nactivity in our practical consciousness, the continual appeal that the\none makes to the other, the revolving of our practical judgment about\nthe two aspects, both of them necessary, of the useful and the honest,\nenergy and goodness, pleasure and duty, explain why the Psychology\nand the Description of practical life have constituted the two kinds\nof types and classes, of economic and of moral men, of economic and\nof moral institutions. Such rough and approximate distinctions have\nhowever at bottom, in this as in other cases, an intimate and rigorous\ndistinction, which every one will find evident in himself, if he look\ninward upon himself and fix his gaze persistently on the universal\nforms of the spirit that acts within him.\n\n\n\n[1] _Eth. Nicom._1. v. c. i, 1129 b.\n\n\n\n\nII\n\n\nCRITIQUE OF THE NEGATIONS OF THE ETHICAL FORM\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Exclusion of materialistic and of intellectualistic\ncriticisms._]\n\nThe distinction of the two forms, well known to the inner\nconsciousness, will appear more clearly when we examine the reasons\nfor which the one or the other of them has been denied. We say the one\nor the other, because we have now freed ourselves from the obligation\nof refuting the theses that have their origin in presuppositions,\nboth materialistic and intellectualiste, and therefore deny the moral\nand economic activities, either because they do not admit the concept\nof spiritual activity itself, or because they do not admit the more\nspecial conception of practical activity. The greater number of\nthose who deny morality are nothing but mechanicists, empiricists,\nmaterialists, and positivists, to whose brains not only do economy and\nmorality appear inconceivable, but also art and science and, in short,\nevery spiritual value. They ask: Where is this moral principle of which\nyou discourse? Point it out to us with your finger. But they also ask:\nWhere are the categories or the pure concept? Where is the \u00e6sthetic\nsynthesis and the pure intuition? Where is the _a priori_ of perception\nand of history? Where are all these fine things you talk of as though\nthey existed, and that we neither see nor touch?--And for our part, we\ncan henceforth let them say what they will, only praying in our hearts\nthat God may illuminate them and make them discover (at least when they\nare near to death and the dense veil of their bodies has become more\nthin) that if the universals were _things_ that it was possible to\nperceive as we do individual things, they would not be universals.\n\n[Sidenote: _The two possible negations._]\n\nWhen the double assumption of a spiritual activity and of a practical\nform of it has been admitted, it is not possible to do otherwise\nthan either to deny the economic for the moral form, or the moral\nfor the economic. What might seem to be a third possibility, that of\ndenying the two forms, is reducible to the first, because, when the\ndistinction of the terms has been suppressed, there remains nothing\nbut the practical activity considered in general, which coincides with\nthe individual and economic activity. We shall begin then with the\nexamination of the negation of morality for economy, which is the\nthesis of _utilitarianism._ Those same materialists have recourse to\nutilitarianism when they wish to present some sort of a Philosophy\nof the practical, but with what little right they avail themselves\nof such aid, is clear from what has already been said: the useful is\nalways value and teleology, and materialism, in all its sub-forms and\nvarieties, is incapable of positing the smallest concept of value and\nfinality.\n\n[Sidenote: _The thesis of utilitarianism against the existence of moral\nacts._]\n\nUtilitarianism affirms that no other volition exists save that\nwhich answers to the merely individual determination, or, as it is\nalso expressed, to the pleasure of the individual, understanding\nby pleasure, not the generic pleasure that also accompanies moral\nsatisfaction in the individual, but that which is exclusively\nindividual. Actions, therefore, as it says, are what concern it, not\ntheir motives, that is, the motive of the individuality of the act\nabstractly conceived, not that of the spirit become concrete in it;\nthus, not killing for fear of punishment and not killing because\nrepugnant to one's own conscience, become the same thing. They are the\nconsequences of different conditions, but in both cases of the same\nmotive, which is personal convenience. And as there does not exist\na pleasure that cannot be and is not substituted for a different\npleasure, so there is not an action, however moral it be called, that\ncannot be interrupted and changed, when different conditions present\nthemselves. Every action, every man has his price: it is all a matter\nof discovering what that price is. He who seems to place the glory\nof his country above all other aspirations, although he cannot, for\nexample, be corrupted by money, by vanity, or by pleasure, will yet\nalways have in him some weak point that a more expert corrupter will\ndiscover or be able to discover; and when the discovery has been made\nand the suitable transaction proposed, the glory of his country will be\nabandoned, because it has been well compensated for by something else.\nThis way of looking upon human actions has appeared to be concrete,\nexact, rational; and the utilitarian theory, if it have often been\ncalled _hedonistic,_ and sometimes even _\u00e6sthetic_ (understanding by\n\u00e6sthetic, individual pleasure), is also wont to be decorated with the\nname of ethical or practical _rationalism, rational morality._\n\n[Sidenote: _Difficulties arising from the presence of these._]\n\nAll would go very well, and the practical activity would in this way be\nentirely explained and unified, if we did not at every moment of life\nrun against the distinction between mere pleasure and duty, between\nthe useful and the honest action, and if there did not arise in our\nconscience an invincible distinction between the things that have a\nprice and those that have none, and if an abyss did not differentiate\namong apparently similar actions that which has a merely utilitarian\nfrom that which has a moral motive. The utilitarians even (who,\nalthough bad philosophers, are men, and as such carry at the bottom of\ntheir souls a far better philosophy than they profess in books and in\nthe schools) are not able to suppress that distinction in themselves\nand to deny all recognition to the power of morality, to which, as men,\nthey submit at every moment. How then are they to behave? How are they\nto explain the genesis of that distinction which, by the premises that\nthey have posited, cannot be other than illusion? What is there that\ngives effective existence to the fallacious category of morality, side\nby side with the veracious one of utility?\n\n[Sidenote: _Attempt to explain them as quantitative distinctions._]\n\nThere have been several attempts to solve that hard resisting term\nof morality. The first, which was logically bound to present itself,\nwas that of considering facts called moral as nothing but empirical\ngroups of utilitarian facts, and of explaining the false category as\nan hypostasis of those empirical groups, arbitrarily reduced to a\nrigorous and philosophical concept. Banking, usury, commerce, industry,\nagriculture, and labour are empirically distinguished, yet are all\neconomic facts. Courage, prudence, temperance, chastity, justice,\nmodesty are empirically distinguished, yet are all moral facts. Why\nnot unite the two series, and recognize the unity and continuity of\nnature by the insertion among them of other types and terms? Morality\nis also utility, but the utility of the _greater number_; interest is\ninterest, but _well understood_; pleasure is pleasure, but pleasure of\n_greater duration and quantity,_ preferred to another less intense, or\nmore fugitive; egoism, egoism of family, of race, of human race, egoism\nof _species,_ altruism; eudemonism, but _social_ eudemonism, enjoyment,\nbut enjoyment of _sympathy,_ utility, but utility of conforming, not\nto one's own individual judgment, but to that of _public opinion._\nThus are moral facts included in utilitarian, in the same way as the\nnumber a hundred thousand is not less a number than two or three and\nthe others inferior to it, because it is composed of three and of two\nand of other numbers less than itself. C\u00e6sar Borgia murders his brother\nand thus gets rid of a rival both in love and in politics, that is, he\nseeks his advantage; but Giordano Bruno also seeks his own advantage,\nand nothing else, when he allows himself to be burned in order to\nassert his philosophy, because, for one constituted as he, with that\ndemoniacal fury of his for philosophical truth, the pyre must have\nseemed a very miserable and negligible thing, just as his brother's\nblood seemed to C\u00e6sar Borgia. Call the one of these actions utility\nof a complexity of ten and the other utility of a complexity of a\nhundred, or give to the complexity a hundred the name of morality, of\nwell-understood self-interest, of sympathy, of altruism, and so on, and\nto the complexity of ten that of utility, of individual interest, of\negoism: the two actions will not thus have been declared of a different\nnature.\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique._]\n\nBut the fact is that they have already been declared of a _different\nnature_ by the utilitarians themselves. No one, indeed, will have been\ndeceived with the ingenious phraseology excogitated: _well-understood_\ninterest is no longer mere self-interest; the egoism of _species_ is\nnot egoism, _durable_ pleasure is not mere pleasure. The difference\nbetween the one term and the other is not quantitative, and even where\na _greater_ quantity is talked of, a _greater_ duration, a _greater_\nnumber, arithmetical definitions are not posited, but symbols pointing\nto qualitative differences. There is a difference, not of complexity\nbut of nature, between the action of C\u00e6sar Borgia and that of Giordano\nBruno; there is no common measure between baseness and moral elevation\nas there is between undulating plains and mountains. The two series, of\nempirical utilitarian concepts and of empirical moral concepts, are not\nonly irreducible to a single series, but remain obstinately distinct\nand irreducible. All that can be done, and has been done, is to unify\nthem verbally; and in this the utilitarians have shown themselves as\nbold as it was possible to be in so miserable an enterprise. But the\nidentity or similarity of words does not suffice to cancel the profound\ndistinctions of things.\n\n[Sidenote: _Attempt to explain them as facts either extraneous to the\npractical or irrational and stupid._]\n\nThere would have been an immediate passage from the consciousness\nof the puerility of such identifications to the recognition of\na distinct ethical form, if purpose and prejudice had not made\nresistance, prompting, on the contrary, the search for new expedients\nfor setting themselves free in theory from the tedious and recurring\nphantom of morality. On this occasion also these expedients must have\nbeen just two: that is, to declare morality or concept _extraneous_\nto the practical, or intrinsic to it indeed, but _contrary._ The\nfirst was attempted, but feebly, when morality was spoken of as the\nfantasticality of poets, as the dream or rosy illusion caressed in\nlife. No attention was paid to the fact that what the poet imagines\ncannot be contradictory and absurd, but must indeed be founded in the\nreality of life and in the nature of things; and that morality is\nnot the \u00e6sthetic form in which it is reproduced and represented, but\npractical form or action. But the unmaintainability of this attempt\nwas too evident for its success. The other expedient, on the contrary,\nhas always had and still has great success. This turns morality into\na practical contradictory concept, that is, into something certainly\npractical, but without motive, incoherent, and in contradiction to the\nhealthy development of the practical. It is true that it is usually\nenunciated in very different words from those used by us. They speak\nas follows: What is called a good and virtuous action is nothing but\nthe product of the association between certain acts that are for us\nthe means to a pleasure, and that pleasure itself; so that gradually,\neven where the primitive pleasure is absent, those acts are sought\nand repeated for themselves, as though in themselves pleasurable.\nThe savage fought against the enemies who assailed his tribe, that\nhe might not be made a slave or sacrificed to the idol of another\ntribe, that is to say, in order to defend his personal liberty or his\nlife; but later on, man, forgetting that the tribe or the city or the\nState were simple means for protecting life and goods, defends them\nfor themselves and allows himself to be despoiled and slain for his\ncountry. In the same way (to employ the classical example), money\nis first sought as a means to enjoyment, and to form a supply for\nprocuring a life more comfortable and secure; but by degrees he who\namasses money turns in his soul the means into the end, and becomes\navaricious, that is, he finds delight in the mere possession of money,\nand sacrifices for that all his other joys, even an easy life, food,\nhouse and sleep, which he originally intended that money should obtain\nfor him. Morality arises entirely from a similar process of association\nbetween means and end, and the case of the miser explains by analogy\nevery act of virtue that cannot be directly reduced to simple pleasure\nand individual utility.\n\n[Sidenote: _Associationism and evolutionism. Critique._]\n\nNow the association here discussed is neither that of logic nor\nof \u00e6sthetic, nor valid association, synthesis, but irrational and\nfallacious association. It is only possible to exchange means for end\nas the result of a bad association of ideas: therefore that association\nis folly and stupidity, as the miser adduced as an example is stupid\nand foolish, being called \"miser\" precisely for this reason, with the\nintention of blaming him (for this word does not mean \"economic\" or\n\"provident\"). And behold! morality should be defined as that which\nis practically irrational, foolish, stupid, the product of illusion\nand confusion, or the _contrary_ of the practical activity, which is\nclear-sightedness, rationality, wisdom. Thus defined, it is at the\nsame time annulled. Indeed, irrationality is that which is condemned\nto be perpetually subjected to the rational; and what is called the\nmoral man, if he were nothing but a false associator of ideas, would be\nconstantly confuted by the man of good sense, by the utilitarian, who\nwould prevent him from committing the stupidity of sacrificing himself\nfor his children, for his country, or for knowledge; or, were he to\npersist, would cover him with contempt and ridicule. The fear that to\ndiscover its origin would be tantamount to abolishing morality would\ntherefore be perfectly justified in this new sense also; or better,\nit would not be a question of a fear, but of a fact: morality would\nbe in a state of progressive annulment, as the effect of increasing\ninstruction, both in the individual and in society. It has been replied\nthat neither this fear nor this fact arises, because that false\nassociation is _indissoluble,_ being a product of _heredity,_ or, to\nspeak of it in proper terms, it is hereditary stupidity (evolutionistic\nutilitarianism). But whether inherited or acquired, it is so dissoluble\nas to be dissolved in the theory proposed: _lux facta est,_ and no\none succeeds in obscuring it any longer. If, notwithstanding that\npretended light, morality be not dissipated, if recourse be had to the\nmiserable subterfuge of insuperable heredity (which is surpassed at\nthe very moment in which its origin is made clear), this means to say\nthat, for the moralist himself, morality is not the irrational, but\nsomething very rational. He does not succeed in identifying it with the\nmerely individually useful, but neither can he reject it as the pure\nand simple negative of this. And since he does not wish to abandon the\nutilitaristic hypothesis, there is no other path open to him but that\nof recourse to _mystery._\n\n[Sidenote: _A desperate attempt: theological utilitarianism and\nmystery._]\n\nThis is precisely what happens in the last form of utilitarianism,\nwhich has seemed to be capricious and extravagant, but is on the\ncontrary profoundly auto-critical, since it reveals the ultimate\nessence and defect of the doctrine: what is known as _theological\nutilitarianism._ Human actions are always inspired by what is merely\nuseful to the individual, and if a number of these seems to diverge\nfrom this criterion, this happens because account is not taken of\nan actual fact, by means of which even the actions which seem to be\ndivergent are reduced to the common measure. This given fact is the\nlife beyond this world, in which God rewards or punishes him who has\nobeyed or disobeyed his will, in the life of this world. He who in this\nlife seems to resist the impulse of his personal advantage and performs\nsacrifices of every sort, even to that of his own life, follows equally\nwith the others his personal advantage; and believing in God, in the\nimmortality of the soul, and in the reward and the punishment that\nawait him, he regulates his action according to these actual facts.\n_Intuitionistic_ Ethic, which places a moral duty at the side of\nindividual pleasure, but indeducible from it, is in reality deduced\nfrom individual pleasure, and is likewise turned into _rational_ or\nutilitarian Ethic by means of the transcendental datum. In this way the\nsolution makes shipwreck in mystery; since God, immortality, the other\nlife, the divine command, punishments and rewards, cannot be defined\nand justified by means of thought and concept. When utilitarianism\nbecomes theological, it abandons the philosophical field, confessing by\nso doing its philosophical defeat. And to philosophical consideration\nthe distinction between the individually useful and that which is\nalso superindividual shines out ever more clearly after the many vain\nattacks of utilitarianism, the affirmation of the moral form, as united\nand distinct from the utilitarian; the _autonomy_ of Ethic against\nevery form of _utilitarianism_ and every _heteronomous Ethic._\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\n\nCRITIQUE OF THE NEGATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC FORM\n\n\n[Sidenote: _The thesis of moral abstracticism against the concept of\nthe useful._]\n\nIf in the course of philosophical history, the theory of utility has\nsought to cause the disappearance of the other practical term, which\nis morality, by swallowing it up, we are not to believe that morality\nhas been for its part more modest and discreet and has not in its\nturn attempted to devour its companion. One exaggeration has been met\nwith another; to utilitarianism has been opposed that error which may\nbe called _moral abstracticism,_ by means of which is refused to the\nconcept of utility the place that belongs to it in the organism of the\nspirit.\n\nSuch a refusal (analogous to our analysis of the utilitarian theory)\ncannot take place, save in three ways: that is, in so far as value is\ndenied to the useful, either as _practical_ concept, or as _positive_\nconcept, or as _philosophical_ concept. Here too we naturally\ndo not take count of the theses of the materialists or of the\nintellectualists, which (especially those of the former) have raged in\nthe field of Economy not less than in that of Ethic, giving rise to\ninsane attempts to explain the useful on mechanical principles, or with\nthe contingencies of historical evolution.\n\n[Sidenote: _The useful as the means or as theoretical fact._]\n\nThe useful (it has been said) is nothing but the _means_ to obtain a\ncertain end. For example, if I take a walk every day with a view to\nkeeping myself in good health, the daily walk is the suitable means and\nis therefore useful; if, on the contrary, I find that it makes me ill,\nthis means that it is not the suitable means and it would be, and I\nshould declare it to be, useless or harmful. Now by the demonstration\ngiven above, it is known that means and end are indistinguishable in\nthe _practical,_ for what is called means is nothing but the actual\nsituation (and the knowledge of it), from which arises the practical\nact, and to which that act corresponds. Thus it is most possible to\nseparate the means from the end; but in so doing, the consideration of\nthe practical act is abandoned, and we pass to that of its theoretical\nantecedent; and if the mere theoretical antecedent be called \"useful\"\nor \"practical\" in ordinary speech (remembering the practical act,\nto which it has been or it is presumed that it may be united) then a\nmetaphor is employed, against which there is nothing to be said. Those,\nthen, who define the useful as the means should once for all realize\nthat with such a definition they remove that concept from the circle\nof the Philosophy of the practical and transport it into Logic, where\nthe relation of means and end is the very same as that of cause and\neffect, and it again becomes part of the theory of empirical concepts,\nin which cause and effect are wont to be posited as terms separately\nconceivable. This has been more or less consciously recognized, when\nthe useful has been defined as the _technical,_ for we know that the\ntechnical is nothing but knowledge thus made into a metaphor, owing to\nthe relation that it has or is presumed to be capable of having, with\nan action that has been done or is about to be done.\n\n[Sidenote: _Technical and hypothetical imperatives._]\n\nThe theoretical character of the technical has, on the contrary,\nbeen obscured, when technical knowledge has received the name\nof _hypothetical imperatives,_ distinct and ranged beside the\n_categorical._ The imperative is will, and is therefore always both\ncategoric and imperative: _a_ is willed (categorically), but _a_ would\nnot be willed if the condition of fact and situation _b_ did not exist\n(hypothetically). The merely hypothetical imperative is the knowledge,\nthat remains when abstraction is made of the practical act or of the\nwill; and is no longer an imperative, but a theoretic affirmation.\nWhere effective will is not, imperatives cannot be talked of.\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique: the useful is a practical fact._]\n\nHaving made clear that the definition of the useful as _means_ implies\nthe negation of the useful as a practical fact and its reduction to a\ntheoretical category already known, we must exclude the possibility\nof such a reduction, for in the useful, the practical character, the\neffectivity of the will, is ineliminable. \"It is useful for me to take\na walk\" means, \"It pleases me to take a walk,\" \"I will to do it.\" It\nis a question, not of contemplation or of reasoning, but of volitional\nmovement. The knowledge that precedes the utilitarian act is one thing,\nthe act itself is another. The old man has the same knowledge as the\nyoung man, he has indeed much more (_si jeunesse savait, si vieillesse\npouvait!_), but he does not will what the young man wills: he knows\nthat by traversing so many kilometers he will arrive at a certain\ndefinite point; but it is not useful for him to go there, because it is\nnot useful for him to traverse those kilometers, or to submit to that\nexertion at the risk of an illness. The utilitarian will is expressed,\nnot in merely hypothetical imperatives, but in those categoric\nimperatives that are at the same time hypothetical. The general formula\nis \"will!\" or \"will that you will!\" or \"be coherent in your willing!\"\nas the individuated forms are those that we are continually repeating\nto ourselves, \"now, to bed!\" \"now, up you get!\" and the like; which,\nwhen developed, mean: \"go to bed\" (if you wish to rest yourself), \"get\nup\" (if you wish to work), and so on. The distinction between the\ncognoscitive and the volitional theses is here evident.\n\n[Sidenote: _The useful as the egoistic or immoral._]\n\nSince then, owing to the unalterably practical character of the\nutilitarian fact, it was not possible to insist upon its reduction to\nthe technical, and since, on the other hand, it was not desired to\nrecognize it as a practical category side by side with the practical\ncategory of morality, they have tried to think of it as something\ncertainly practical, but at the same time of little value, to beware\nof it, to combat it, to free ourselves from it. \"Useful\" has in this\nway become synonymous with wilfulness, with individual caprice, with\nwill more or less perverted, and (looking upon immorality as the\nindividual I, shut up in itself and rebelling against the universal)\nwith _egoism._ This theory is supported by certain common modes of\nspeech, in which the moral man is opposed to the man intent upon what\nis useful to him as an individual, the ethical to the economic life.\nBut it is a question of phrases, true,' perhaps, in a certain sense,\nbut inexact when understood or interpreted as affirmations of a contest\nbetween morality and utility.\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique: the useful is amoral._]\n\nWe discover at once that the contest is inexistent, by merely thinking\nof the case already mentioned, of the man in whom the moral conscience\nis not developed or has been suppressed, or of the case--limit\ncalled _innocence._ What is done in innocence responds, no doubt, to\nindividual pleasure, and so to what is useful for the individual, as\nhe feels it in the given circumstances: were this not so, what is done\nwould not be done. But innocence is not immoral on this account. It\nwill be _amoral,_ because it is merely individual volition deprived\nof the light of the eternal; it will never be _immoral._ Thus (to\nmake use of the comparison and analogy of the theoretic activity) the\nimages that the poet creates will be without philosophy, but will not\nfor this reason be anti-philosophical. Because, were that so, they\nwould have to be partially philosophical, that is to say, to enter into\nstrife with philosophy; but there is no such strife, and, therefore,\nthose images, although philosophically not true, are none the less not\nphilosophically false. Yet they are theoretical acts, in the same way\nthat philosophy is a theoretical act. The philosophical innocence of\nthe poet does not change his intuitive knowledge into bad philosophical\nknowledge, into a negative of philosophy.--Further, the useful not\nonly is not the negative of morality, but, as we know, is also a fact\nthat unites itself very well with morality, as the word is joined to\nthe thought, making it concrete and palpable, so much so that thought\nwithout words is impossible. What honourable man would tolerate being\njudged disuseful? What moral action would be truly moral, were it not\nat the same time useful? The good action is good, because it is not\nbad, that is, it absolutely excludes the bad at the point in which\nit becomes effective; but certainly it is not so, because disuseful;\nindeed, in being good, it is also useful, because it absolutely\ncomprehends the useful in itself at the point in which it becomes\neffective. The union of morality with utility suffices to eliminate the\nconcept of the useful as a negative. Certainly negative and positive\ndo unite to give rise to becoming and to development; but their union\nis that of strife, not of concord.\n\n[Sidenote: _The useful as ethical minimum._]\n\nThe third way of eliminating the concept of the useful from Philosophy,\nor from the Philosophy of the practical, is that which makes of it\na concept of ethical description, or an empirical and psychological\nconcept designating certain groups of very minute ethical facts, the\nrudimentary ethical consciousness. Hence the illusion of the existence\nof volitional acts indifferent in respect to morality. These acts are\nreally indifferentiated for the mind that is examining them, which\nsometimes does not take the trouble to do so minutely, save when such\nan examination is seriously undertaken, and then they are always\ndifferentiated into good or bad. Thus it generally said that eating and\nsleeping, playing at cards or at billiards, are things that appertain,\nnot to morality, but to individual utility, and that each one may\nconduct himself as he wills in respect to them, whereas individual\nchoice is excluded when it is necessary to fulfil one's own obligations\nof social work or of respecting the life of one's neighbour. But if\nwe observe attentively, we see that also in eating or in sleeping, in\nplaying cards or billiards, one acts morally or immorally, since, for\nexample, it is immoral to ruin one's health with eating too much,\nor with sleeping too little, or to corrupt soul and intellect with\ncard-playing and dawdling in billiard-rooms, when one can do something\nbetter.\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique: the useful is premoral._]\n\nBut the useful is none of all these things; it is not the complex of\nethical micro-organisms, in which we discover with the microscope the\nsame facts of life and of death that we observe with the naked eye in\nmacro-organisms. No microscope will ever discern in it the oppositions\nof moral good and evil, because these oppositions are not really there;\nthere are only those of utilitarian or economic good and evil. For the\nuseful is not the moral minimum, but the _premoral._ In this case it\nis a question, not of approximative, but of rigorous difference; not\npsychological, but philosophical.\n\n[Sidenote: _A desperate attempt: the useful as inferior practical\nconscience. Confirmation of the autonomy of the useful._]\n\nFinally, it is necessary to consider the attempt to present the\nutilitarian conscience as a moral conscience, _different and inferior_\nto another moral conscience placed over it, not as a new mode of\neliminating the concept of the useful, by absorbing it in that of\nmorality, but as a confession of the autonomy of that moment of the\nspirit. It would be moral, because there is no contradiction to be\nfound in it that can cause it to be judged immoral, and if it be so\njudged, this happens because it is looked at from the point of view\nof the superior conscience, or because the superior conscience is\nerroneously transported into the inferior. But this has importance\nprecisely because it is not moral, and because the value that it is\nadmitted to possess, far from being morality, is spirituality; that\nis to say, it constitutes a peculiar spiritual value, different from\nmorality. \"Better a will of some sort than no will at all\" is a common\nsaying which means that prior to morality, there is another and more\nelementary spiritual demand. The distinction of the two consciences,\nthen, is philosophical, not one of more or less, a distinction of\ndegrees, but not of empirical degrees, which coincides with our\nconclusion. Thus, to return to the usual comparison, the poetical\nfiguration is true, and can only be judged false by him who looks upon\nit from a philosophical point of view, or himself falsifies it by\nturning it into a bad philosopheme. But the truth of that figuration\nis not philosophical, and remains purely and simply poetical truth.\nIt will be said that morality is implied in utilitarian volition,\nbecause, when the individually useful is posited, the universal, which\nwill dominate and correct it, is promoted, in the same way as it has\nbeen said that philosophy is implied in the \u00e6sthetic intuition,\nsince by positing the individual imagination is posited the claim of\nthe universal, which surpasses and renders it untrue. But since the\n\u00e6sthetic conscience is distinguished from the philosophical, precisely\nbecause that which in the latter is _explicit_ is only _implicit_\nin the former, so, in like manner, the utilitarian conscience is\ndistinguished from the moral conscience, because that morality which\nbecomes explicit and effective in the second, is only implicit or\nactually inexistent in the first. The difference between _implicit_ and\n_explicit_ is another way of enunciating the distinction between the\ntwo consciousnesses or practical forms, the autonomy of both being thus\nrecognized.\n\n\n\n\nIV\n\n\nRELATION BETWEEN THE ECONOMIC AND ETHICAL FORMS\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Economic and ethic as the double degree of the practical._]\n\n\nThe respective distinction and autonomy of the two forms, economic and\nethic, as we have hitherto been expounding it, and as results from the\nwords \"inferior\" and \"superior\" just now used, is that of two degrees,\nat once distinct and united, such that the first can stand without\nthe second, but the second cannot stand without the first. The moment\nof distinction lies in that possibility of existence independent of\nthe first; the moment of unity is in the impossibility of independent\nexistence of the second. If the first were wanting, there would be\nidentity; if the second, there would be abstract distinction or\nseparation. For this reason we have insisted upon showing that there\nare actions without morality, yet which are perfectly economical,\nwhereas moral actions that are not also perfectly useful or economical\ndo not exist. Morality lives in concrete, in utility, the universal\nin the individual, the eternal in the contingent. Hence our reason\nfor reducing the theses that denied the distinction between the two\npractical forms to an exclusive affirmation of the economic form, this\nlatter being as it were the general form, which of itself involves both\nitself and the other.\n\n[Sidenote: _Errors arising from conceiving them as coordinated._]\n\nEven when both the practical forms, economic and ethic, utility and\nmorality, are admitted, the gravest errors arise from failing to\nunderstand the connection of unity-distinction that exists between\nthem, conceiving them as juxtaposed or parallel, and the respective\nconcepts as coordinated.\n\n[Sidenote: _Disinterested actions. Critique._]\n\nIn truth, if utility and morality were coordinate concepts, each\nincluded as species beneath the general concept of practical activity,\nthe first consequence that could be drawn from this (and it has been\ndrawn) is that morality is conceivable without utility. This has given\nrise to the absurd concept of _disinterested_ actions, that is, of\nthose moral actions that should hold themselves aloof from any sort\nof impure contact with utility. But disinterested actions would be\nfoolish actions, that is to say, wilful acts, caprices, non-actions.\nEvery action is and must be interested; indeed, the more profoundly it\nis interested, so much the better. What interest is stronger and more\npersonal than that which impels the man of science to the search for\ntruth, which is his life? Morality requires that the individual should,\nin every case, make his individual interest that of the universal; and\nit reproves those who engage themselves in an insoluble contradiction\nbetween the individual interest of the universal and that which is\nmerely individual. But it cannot claim to suppress the interest, that\nis, itself, in the same way that the volitional act dominates the\npassions, but cannot eradicate them without eradicating itself. Hence,\nas the volitional act triumphs over the passions as the _supreme\npassion,_ so morality triumphs over interests as the _supreme interest._\n\n[Sidenote: _Vain polemic conducted with such an assumption against\nutilitarianism._]\n\nThe polemic of autonomous Ethic against the heteronomous Ethic of\nutilitarianism has had a false and fruitless beginning, owing to this\nfiction of disinterested actions. In the belief of conquering and more\nthan conquering, it has been attempted to show that man accomplishes\nsome actions without any personal interest, whereas on the contrary\nan easy victory has in this way been prepared for the adversary.\nUtilitarianism, in fact, has always been able triumphantly to make\nthe counter-demonstration that there is no action, be it as lofty as\nyou will, that does not answer to a personal end. It is evident that\nthe hero has his personal interest in the _pro patria mori,_ just as\nthe saint, who wishes to direct his soul toward humility, finds his\nown account in allowing himself to be abused, beaten and splashed\nwith mud (\"in this is perfect joy,\" said Francesco of Assisi to Frate\nLeone). Correct polemic should not enter upon the useless task of\ndenying this evidence; it should on the contrary admit, as was admitted\nabove, that there is no action which does not answer to an individual\ndesire, since it is the individual that performs it, and the universal\nis always obliged to avail itself of individuals. But when this point\nhas been conceded and admitted, it will prove, as was proved above,\nthat the useful action can either remain merely personal or progress\nto the action that is universal-personal, ethical-useful. And the\nethical-useful action itself is precisely the new spiritual category\nthat the utilitarian does not see.\n\n[Sidenote: _Actions morally indifferent, obligatory, supererogatory,\netc. Critique._]\n\nA second erroneous but unavoidable consequence of the conception of\nuseful and moral as coordinated concepts is that while, according to\nthat theory, there can be ethical actions economically disinterested\nor indifferent, so there can be actions that are useful and _morally\nindifferent._ The indifferent would not be those that are merely\neconomic, and, therefore, neither moral nor immoral, which we have\nrecognized as the necessary precedent of moral actions, reappearing\nalways when a return is made to the state of innocence, or as soon\nas the moral conscience is abolished or suspended. They would on the\ncontrary be economic actions that should persist as such, that is, as\ningenuous and amoral, when the moral consciousness is already kindled,\nand consequently in the very circle of such a conscientiousness.\nThey are altogether inadmissible when thus conceived, and to have\nadmitted them is equivalent to annulling morality, as the recognition\nof the right of subjects to rebel at their pleasure would be to annul\nsovereignty, or a burlesque contract containing the clause that each\nparty should be free not to observe the other clauses agreed upon, at\nhis pleasure. Indifferent actions do not exist, either for economy\nor for morality, and those to which such a character is generally\nattributed are, as we know, indifferentiated, not indifferent, and\nalways differentiable when more closely examined. Only he who places\nthe useful and the moral, side by side with one another, separate\nand impenetrable, is of necessity led to conceive of useful actions\nmorally indifferent, and as such _licit or permissible._ Hence it\nalso happens that moral actions also seem to be _obligatory_ compared\nwith the first; and that, in order to obtain equilibrium at the other\nextremity, ultramoral or more than moral actions, called _meritorious\nor supererogatory,_ are placed side by side with obligatory actions\nthat hold the mean. But morality does not grant leave _not to do,_ nor\nprizes for _doing more than was required_; it simply imposes _doing,_\ndoing always what is morally good, always realizing the universal, in\nordinary as in extraordinary life, on the occasions that occur every\nday, every hour, every minute, as in those that occur every year, every\nten years, every century. Nothing is indifferent to economy in its\nsphere and nothing to morality in its sphere: in it, economic actions\nwith their premoral character do not persist, but only moral actions\nsubsist. Economicity is certainly the concrete form of morality; but it\nis never an element that possesses a value of its own in the moral life.\n\n[Sidenote: _Comparison with the relation of art and philosophy._]\n\nA comparison with the theoretic activity will serve to make clearer\nthis criticism of the _licit_ or morally indifferent. Artistic\nintuitions or expressions are neither true nor false philosophically,\nso much so that Philosophy, if it wish to exist, must also become\nconcrete itself, as living speech, \u00e6sthetic form, intuition-expression,\nand place itself as an intuition among intuitions, though it be\nan intuition _portans mysteria,_ that is, enclosing in itself the\nuniversal. But the appearance of philosophy reacts upon the pure\nintuitions, or upon the poetic representation of the world, in which\nexistent and inexistent were indistinct; and the world of intuition\ntransforms itself into the world of perceptions, in which those that\nonce were poetic intuitions, are now all of them critical or reflective\nimages penetrated by the concepts, divided into images of existence\nand images of possibility. In the world of perception or of history,\nno poetical element can subsist as such; what was a bewitching truth\nin the field of art, were it introduced into history, would give rise\nto disharmony and become changed into a repugnant lie, as we see is\nactually the case in history mingled with inventions and fables.\nHistory too assumes artistic form; but it cannot tolerate in its bosom\nart as an element standing alone. Utilitarian or economic volitions and\nthe moral-economic volitions (universal and historical perceptions\nor representations of the practical) proceed in a manner perfectly\nanalogous (intuitions of the practical). Moral indifference belongs\nto the first, when they are on this side of the moral conscience,\nbut within this conscience they lose the right to innocence, as in\nhistory the pure intuitions, when they have become perceptions, lose\nthe privilege that they possessed as pure intuitions. The ethical\ndiscrimination of the economic volitions, which takes place through the\nmoral conscience, is then in full correspondence with the historical\ndiscrimination of the \u00e6sthetic intuitions, which takes place through\nthe logical conscience.\n\n[Sidenote: _Other erroneous conceptions of modes of action._]\n\nWe owe to the false conception by coordination, not only the two\nmonstrous little concepts of _disinterested actions_ and of those that\nare morally _indifferent, licit, or permissive,_ but others also, which\nhave been deduced by means of a somewhat different casuistic from the\nsame general hypothesis. Indeed, in the preceding case, useful and\nmoral, posited as apart and parallel, were maintained one extraneous\nto the other and at peace between themselves. But nothing forbade that\nwarlike plans should be attributed to those two entities, just as when\ntwo coordinate animal species are posited, we may suppose, either\nthat the individuals of each one mind their own affairs and allow\nthe individuals of the other species to live and to prosper in peace,\nor that the one takes to persecuting the other, sometimes injuring\nor destroying it and sometimes being by it injured or destroyed.\nThus were and are obtained concepts of _moral anti-economic_ actions\nand of _anti-economic moral_ actions, of _immoral economic_ actions,\nand of _economic immoral_ actions, four concepts which are all four\nto be rejected. Moral action can never be accomplished at a loss:\nmorality is for the moral man the supreme advantage in the situation\nin which he finds himself, and it would be erroneous to measure it\nby comparison with what an individual without morality would do in\nthe same situation, for, as we know, individual and situation are\nall one, in such a way that a like comparison is impossible. In a\nsimilar manner, an anti-economic action can never be moral; at the\nmost it will not even be amoral, or will not even posit the primary\nand generic condition of morality, that is, it will not be action,\nbut inert contemplation. An immoral action can never be economic,\nbecause immorality implies internal disagreement and strife between\none volition directed to the universal and another directed to the\nmerely individual, hence the result will be practical inconclusion\nand infecundity, dissatisfaction and remorse; that is to say, just\nthe opposite of utility and economicity. In like manner, an economic\naction can never be immoral: at the most (when it is merely an economic\naction), it will be amoral.\n\n[Sidenote: Pleasure and the economic activity, happiness and virtue.]\n\nThe bond of unity and distinction that exists between the concepts of\nthe useful and the moral and the consequent negation of the formula of\ncoordination, help to solve in a definite way the intricate questions\nrelating to _pleasure and morality, happiness and virtue._\n\n[Sidenote: _Pleasure, pain and feeling._]\n\nFirst of all, we can here give yet another meaning to the indeterminate\ncategory of _feeling_ with its poles of pleasure and pain, for it is\nclear that when feeling was distinguished from moral activity and set\nat variance with it, we had in view nothing but the pure economic\nactivity. And in truth, of all the tendencies included in that concept\nas sketched out, this of economicity seems on the whole to prevail\nover the others, so much so that we shall henceforth be disposed to\ngive to the word \"feeling\" the name of economic activity. Thus it\nwas reasonably maintained, with implied reference to this meaning,\nthat pleasure and pain are _proper_ to feeling and _extraneous_ to\nthe other spiritual forms, and that they only act in the others as\n_concomitants._ For if the theoretical forms give rise to the dialectic\nof true and false, in so far as the practical spirit can be introduced\ninto them, it is clear that pleasure and pain come to those forms from\nthe practical spirit, with which the theoretic spirit is always in\nunity. In the practical spirit too, the moral activity divides into\npleasure and pain, in so far as it has concrete or economic form; and\ntherefore in so far as it is economic, not in so far as it is moral.\nPleasure and pain belong to feeling alone, because they belong to the\neconomic activity alone, which is the practical in its general form,\ninvolving of itself all the other forms, practical and theoretic.\n\n[Sidenote: _Coincidence of duty with pleasure._]\n\nWhen this has been established, pleasure or economic feeling or\neconomic activity as positive cannot be at strife with duty or with\nthe moral activity in its positivity, for the two terms coincide.\nThe divergence existed only when they were conceived, not in unity\nand distinction, but in coordination. When we speak of a good action\naccompanied with pain, we make an inexact statement, or better, we make\nuse of a mode of expression that must be understood, not literally,\nbut in its spirit. The good action, as such, always brings with it\nsatisfaction and pleasure, and the pain said to accompany it, either\nshows that the action is not yet altogether good, because it has not\nbeen willed with complete internal accord, or that a new practical\nproblem, still unsolved and therefore painful, lies beyond the\npleasurable moral action.\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique of rigorism or asceticism._]\n\nThe other false idea, of _rigoristic or ascetic_ Ethic, which makes war\nupon pleasure as such, derives from the plan of coordination, through\nthe already mentioned casuistic of the conflict between the coordinated\nterms. Indeed, if it be legitimate to combat this or that pleasure,\nwhich enters into a contest with the moral act, it is not possible to\nabolish the category of pleasure, for the reason already given, that\nin this way the category itself of morality, which has its reality and\nconcreteness in pleasure (in economicity), would be abolished: the\nconcrete and real moral act is also pleasurable. The attempt to abolish\npleasure is as insane as would be the wish to speak without words or\nany other form of expression, preserving thought pure of such sensual\ncontacts, that is to say, producing an inexpressed and inexpressible\nthought. This last attempt has been made by _mysticism,_ which either\ndoes not give thoughts at all, or, contradicting itself, gives them\nexpressed and logical, like those of all other doctrines. Asceticism\nprovides a complete counterpart to this in the practical field, for it\nmight be called _mysticism of the practical_ in the same way as the\nname of _asceticism of the theoretical_ would not be unsuitable to\nmysticism.\n\n[Sidenote: _Relation of happiness and virtue._]\n\nWhat has been said of the relation between pleasure and morality, is\nto be repeated of the other between happiness and virtue, a relation\nthat is identical with the preceding, from which it diners only because\nexpressed by means of empirical concepts of class. Happiness is not\nvirtue, as pleasure is not morality, because there exist the pleasure\nof the innocent or of the mentally deficient, and the happiness of the\nchild or the brute, who are without moral conscience. But virtue is\nalways happiness, as morality is always pleasure. It will be said that\na virtuous man may be unhappy, because he suffers atrocious physical\npain or is in financial difficulties, and, therefore, that virtue and\nhappiness do not coincide. But this is a vulgar sophism, because the\nvirtuous man, who should be also happy, must be truly and altogether\nvirtuous; that is to say, he must cure and conquer the ills of the body\nand of fortune with his energy, if he can, or, if it be impossible\nto conquer them, he must resign himself and take them into account\nand develop his own activity within the limits that they lay down.\nEvery individual, not only the unfortunate individual of the example,\nhas his limits; and everyone can transform his limits into pains by\nbeing dissatisfied with them, just as every one can, with resignation,\ntransform his pains into limits and conditions of activity. It will be\nsaid that sometimes the evils that assail the virtuous man are not only\nincurable, but so intolerable as to render all resignation impossible.\nBut he who does not effectively and absolutely resign himself, that is,\ndoes not accommodate himself to life, dies; and the occurrence of the\ndeath of the individual is neither happiness nor unhappiness: it is a\nfact or event.\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique of the subordination of pleasure to morality._]\n\nFinally, the theory that _subordinates_ pleasure or happiness, utility\nor economy, to duty, to virtue, to moral activity, is to be rejected.\nThe subordination of the one term to the other is not possible on this\nside of morality, because only one of the two terms is present; and\nin like manner it is impossible in the moral circle, because, though\nthe terms are certainly two, they are two in one, not one above and\nthe other below; that is to say, they are distinct terms that become\nunified. Morality has complete empire over life, and there is not an\nact of life, be it as small as you will, that morality does not or\nought not to regulate. But morality has no _absolute empire over the\nforms or categories of the spirit,_ and as it cannot destroy or modify\nitself, so it cannot destroy or modify the other spiritual forms, which\nare its necessary support and presupposition.\n\n[Sidenote: _No empire of morality over the forms of the spirit._]\n\nHence is apparent the remarkable fatuity of those who pretend to\nregulate morally the _function_ of art, of science, or of economy and\nprofess _moralistic_ theories of art and philosophy and a _moralized_\neconomic science. The poet, the man of science, the business man, must\nbe as honest as others, but it is not given to them to tear in pieces\nthe nature of poetry, of science and of industry, in the madness of\nhonesty. Indeed, were this done or attempted, and the poet were to\nintroduce extraneous elements into his work of art, through his failure\nto understand morality, or the philosopher to veil or alter the purity\nof truth, or the man of business foolishly to bring his own business\nto ruin, then and only then, would they be dishonest. To substitute\nthe _single acts_ of life that appertain to morality, for _the\nuniversal forms of the spirit,_ and to predicate of these what should\nbe predicated only of those, is so evident an absurdity that it could\nnot be committed by anyone accustomed to philosophical distinctions.\nBut what nonsense is so evident that idle babblers and elegant men of\nletters do not know how to cover with their ratiocinative and \u00e6sthetic\nflowers and to present to society or to the academic world as truth, or\nat least as a theory worthy of reflection and discussion?\n\n[Sidenote: _Inexistence of other practical forms and impossibility of\nsubdivision of the two established._]\n\nSuch, then, are the two forms of the practical activity, and such their\nrelation; and as it is not possible to reduce them to one alone, so\nit is not possible to multiply them beyond the two, which altogether\nexhaust the nexus of finite and infinite. Hence, too, we perceive that\nthe economic and also the ethic-economic activity do not each of them\ngive rise to new subdivisions, because other terms of subdivision are\nnot conceivable beyond the duality of finite and infinite. As there\nare no philosophical and ethical classes, nor categories of expression\n(rhetoric), nor categories of concepts (formalistic logic), so there\nare no economic categories and ethical categories beyond those that\nconstitute utility (volition of the individual) and morality (volition\nof the universal).\n\n\n\n\nV\n\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMY AND THE SO-CALLED SCIENCE OF ECONOMY\n\n[Sidenote: _Problem of the relations between Philosophy and Science of\nEconomy._]\n\nInternal observation, confirming at all points rational necessity,\nhas rendered clear the existence of a special form of practical\nactivity, the utilitarian or economic, and of a correlative Economic\nor Philosophy of economy. But however irrefutable may seem the\ndemonstration that we have given, yet it will never be altogether\nsatisfactory, while a very important point is left obscure: the\nrelation between our _Philosophy of economy_ and the _Science of\neconomy._\n\nThis is a system of doctrine that takes various names and forms, and\nis presented in turn as political, national, pure, or mathematical\nEconomy; it is a system of doctrines which, although not without\nprecedents in antiquity, has been gradually formed, especially in\nrecent centuries, and is now in fullest flower. A saying of Hegel is\noften recorded, not without satisfaction, for even in his time he\npraised Economy as \"a science that does much honour to thought, because\nit extracts the laws from a mass of accidentally.\"[1]\n\nHas it the same object as our Philosophy of economy? If the reply be\nin the affirmative, how does it ever arrive at concepts altogether\ndifferent? Or is it an empirical science, and if so, from what source\ndoes it derive the rigour and absoluteness by which it is removed\nfrom all empiricism and formulates truths of universal character? Two\nstrict sciences with the same object are inconceivable; and yet as\nit seems, there must here be precisely two: hence the perplexity and\ndisorientation that the affirmation of a Philosophy of economy must and\ndoes produce.\n\n[Sidenote: _Unreality of the laws and concepts of economic science._]\n\nIf the economic actions of man be considered, in their uncontaminated\nand undiminished reality, with an eye free from all prejudice, it\nis never possible to establish even a _single one_ of the concepts\nand laws of economic science. Every individual is different at every\nmoment of his life: he wills always in a new and different way, not\ncomparable with the other modes of his or of others' willing. If A\nspent seven soldi to buy a loaf of bread yesterday, and to-day he\nspend the same amount in making the same purchase, the seven soldi of\nto-day are not for this reason those of yesterday, nor is the bread\nthe same as that of yesterday, nor the want that A satisfies to-day\nthe same as that of yesterday, nor is the effort that his action\ncosts him identical with that of yesterday. If the individual B also\nspend seven soldi for a loaf of bread, the action of B is different\nfrom that of A, as that of the A of to-day was different from that\nof yesterday. If we lead the economist on to this ground of reality\n(or rather to the side of this Heraclitean river, in which it is not\npossible to dip the same hands twice in the same water), he will feel\nhimself impotent, for he will not find any point of support for the\nedification of any of his theories.--The value of a piece of goods\n(says a theorem of Economy) depends upon the quantity of it and of all\nthe other goods that are upon the market.--But what does \"goods\" mean?\nBread, for example, or wine? In reality, abstract bread and wine do\nnot exist, but a given piece of bread, a given glass of wine, with a\ngiven individual who will give a treasure or nothing in order to eat\nthe one or to drink the other, according to the conditions in which he\nfinds himself.--Any sort of enjoyment, when protracted, decreases and\nfinally becomes extinguished.--That is the law of Gossen, one of the\nfoundation--stones of economic theory. But what are these enjoyments\nthat are protracted, decrease, and end by becoming extinguished? In\nreality there exist only actions, which assume different positions\nat every moment, owing to the continual changing of surrounding\nreality, in which the volitional individual operates. The difference\nis qualitative, not quantitative: if the individual A eat the bread\nthat he has bought for seven soldi, when swallowing the second or the\ntenth or the last mouthful, he has a pleasure, not inferior to that\nwhich he had when swallowing the first, but different: the last was\nnot less necessary for him, in its way, than the first; otherwise he\nwould have remained unsatisfied in his normal want, in his habit, or in\nhis caprice.--The economic man seeks the maximum of satisfaction with\nthe least effort.--That is the very principle of Economy, but neither\ndoes this principle correspond with reality, most simple and general\nthough it be. The individual A disputes for an-hour, in order to save\ntwo soldi in the purchase of an object, for which he has been asked\nten lire, thus attaining the maximum satisfaction for himself with the\nleast means that is naturally at his disposal on that occasion. The\nindividual B, making boast of his magnificence, lights his cigarette\nwith a banknote of a hundred lire, thus likewise attaining for himself\nthe greatest satisfaction to which he aspired, with the least means\nthat he possessed, namely, by burning that paper money. But if this\nbe so, we have here a question, not of greatest and least, but of\nindividual ends and of relative means adopted, or (owing to the unity\nof means and ends already noted), of actions individually different.\n\n[Sidenote: _Economic Science founded upon empirical concepts, but not\nempirical or descriptive._]\n\nCertainly, it is quite possible to abstract in a greater or less\nmeasure from the infinite variety of actions and to construct a\nseries of types or concepts of classes and of empirical laws, thus\nrendering uniform the formless, within certain limits. Thus is\nobtained the concept of bread and of the consumption of bread, and\nof the various portions of bread and of other objects, for which a\nportion of bread can be exchanged, and so on. In this way are full\nphilosophico-historical reality and the method of logical necessity\nand of realistic observation of facts abandoned for a feigned reality\nand for a method of arbitrary choice, which, as we know, has its good\nreasons for existing in the human spirit, and does great service by\nthe swift recall and easy control of the requisite knowledge. And\nif Economy consisted in the establishment of a series of laws and\nexamples in the above sense (or when understood in this way), it would\njoin the number of the descriptive disciplines; and in that case there\nwould be no necessity for us to speak of it further, for it would\nsuffice to refer back to what has already been said of the relations of\nthe Philosophy of the practical with practical Description, classes,\nrules, and casuistic. But economic Science is not descriptive, and is\nnot developed according to the following formula: goods are divided\ninto the classes _a, b, c, d, e,_ etc., and the class _a_ is exchanged\nwith the class _b_ in the proportion of I to 3, the class _b_ with the\nclass _c_ in the proportion of I to 5, etc. In such a formula is always\nunderstood the _up and down,_ the _for the most part,_ and _the very\nnearly:_ the classes _with their ups and downs_ are as stated; the\nexchanges take place _for the most part_ in the proportions stated; if\nthings are to-day _very nearly_ thus, to-morrow they will be so _very\nnearly,_ in a different way.\n\nOn the contrary, the propositions of the Science of Economy are\nrigorous and necessary. \"Granted that soils of different degrees of\nfertility are cultivated, their possessors will all obtain, besides\nthe absolute rent, a differential rent, with the exception of the\npossessor of the least fertile soil\" (Ricardo's law). \"Bad money drives\nout good\" (Gresham's law). Now, it is not conceivable in any case that\nsoils of different fertility, all of them cultivated, should not give\na differential rent. It will be said that the State can confiscate the\ndifferential rent, or that the possessor, owing to his bad cultivation\nor to his bad administration, may lose it; but the proposition does\nnot remain less sound on this account. Nor is it possible that, when\nan unchangeable paper money is in circulation, gold coins should also\ncirculate indifferently and on a par with it, when the total of the\nmoney in circulation lowers the value of the monetary unit beneath\nthe metallic value of the better money. A madman who might be in\npossession of a hoard of gold pieces at the time of the circulation of\nthe declining paper money (which causes poverty) would perhaps give it\nin exchange for the inferior money; but the wise man will keep it in\nhis safe. The economic proposition expresses the rational necessity,\nnot the madness, which is irrational. Those propositions, like all the\nothers of economic science, are therefore certainly not descriptions,\nbut _theorems._\n\n[Sidenote: _Their mathematical nature._]\n\nThe denomination \"theorems\" makes us think at once of the mathematical\ndisciplines, among which alone can economic Science find a place.\nThe propositions of that science being excluded from philosophical,\nhistorical, or naturalistic science, there remains nothing that they\ncan be, save _mathematical._ Yes, they are mathematical, but not pure\nmathematics, for in that case they would be nothing but arithmetic,\nalgebra, or the calculus, that is, they would belong to the kind of\nmathematical disciplines called _applied,_ because they introduce into\nthe paradigms of the calculus certain data taken from reality, that is\nto say, taken from without the purely numerical conception. Economic\nScience, then, is a mathematic applied to the concept of human action\nand to its sub-species. It does not inquire what human action is; but\nhaving posited certain concepts of action, it creates formul\u00e6 for the\nprompt recognition of the necessary connections.\n\n[Sidenote: _Its principles; their character of arbitrary postulates and\ndefinitions. Their utility._]\n\nIt is not surprising that such propositions examined in their truth\nappear in one respect arbitrary and in another tautological. But it is\nnot thus that they are examined, and it is not thus that propositions\nof mathematics are ever examined, for their value lies solely in the\nservice that they render. Certainly Ricardo's law relating to land of\nvarying fertility is nothing but the definition of lands of various\nfertility, in the same way that Gresham's law relating to bad money is\nnothing but the definition of bad money. The same may be said of any\nother economic law, as, for example, that every protective tariff is\ndestruction of riches, or that a demand for commodities is not a demand\nfor labour, since these, like the preceding, are simply definitions\nof the protective tariff, of the demand for commodities, and of the\ndemand for labour. And it could be proved of all of them that they are\narbitrary, because the concepts of land, tariffs, commodities, money,\nand so on, are arbitrary, and because they become necessary only when\nthat arbitrariness has been admitted as a postulate. But the same\ndemonstration can be given of any theorem in Geometry; since it is not\nless arbitrary and tautological, that the measure of a quadrilateral\nshould be equal to the base multiplied by the height, or that the\nsum of the squares of a cathetic should be equal to the square of\nthe hypotenuse. This does not prevent Geometry from being Geometry,\nor negate the fact that without it we should not have been able to\nbuild the house in which we dwell, nor to measure this star upon which\nwe live, nor the others that revolve around it or around which we\nrevolve. Thus, it would be impossible to find one's way in empirical\nreality without these economic formul\u00e6, and that would happen which\nhappened when economic science was still in its infancy; namely, that\nby its means measures of government were adopted, which were admirably\nsuited to produce in the highest degree those evils which it was\nthought could be avoided by its help, a misfortune of which the Spanish\ngovernment in Lombardy or in the Province of Naples in the seventeenth\ncentury, with its _cries_ and its _pragmatics_ in economic and\nfinancial matters, has left most excellent examples. Or what happens\nnow, when ignorance, or deceitful interest, which profits by ignorance,\nproposes or causes to be adopted ruinous measures under the appearance\nof _publica salus,_ arguing that they are good, or that they are good\nfor different reasons than those for which they could be maintained.\nSuch, for instance, would be the proposal for fresh expenditure on\npublic works that are useless or of little use during a period of\neconomic depression in a country, and instead of relieving, increase\nthe general depression; or the increase of protective tariffs, when\nindustrial progress is slow, which ought to encourage industry, but on\nthe contrary produce an industry that is unstable and artificial, in\nplace of one that is spontaneous and durable.\n\n[Sidenote: _Comparison of Economic with Mechanics, and reason for its\nexclusion from ethical, \u00e6sthetic and logical facts._]\n\nThe special form of application of mathematics, which we find in\neconomic Science, has been compared on several occasions with that\nwhich takes place in Mechanics. \"The economic man\" of the first has\nseemed to be altogether like the \"material point\" of the second, and\nEconomy has been called \"a sort of Mechanics,\" or simply \"Mechanics.\"\nAll this is very natural, for Mechanics are nothing but the complex\nof formul\u00e6 of calculation constructed on reality, which is Spirit and\nBecoming in Metaphysic, and may be abstracted and falsified in Science,\nso as to assume the aspect of Force or a system of forces, for the\nconvenience of calculation. Economy does the same thing, when it cuts\noff from the volitional acts certain groups, which it simplifies and\nmakes rigid with the definition of the \"economic man,\" the laws of\n\"least means,\" and the like. And owing precisely to this mechanicizing\nprocess of economic Science, it is ingenuous to ask oneself why\nethical, logical, or \u00e6sthetic facts are not included in Economy, and\nin what way they can be included. Economic science is the sum of\nabstractive operations effected upon the concept of Will or Action,\nwhich is thus _quantified._ Now since moral facts are also will and\naction, and since economic Science is not occupied with qualitative\ndistinctions, not even with the quality itself of that economic fact\nwhich it employs as its material, it is clear that Science cannot\nlay any stress upon moral distinguished from economic facts, nor can\nit receive them in a special class, because its assumption is the\nindistinction of the two orders of facts, and they are included in that\nindistinction. As to \u00e6sthetic or scientific facts, these, taken by\nthemselves, are not facts, but representations and thoughts of facts,\nand as such escape economic calculation: considered in the unity of the\nspirit, they are certainly facts, that is to say, volitional products,\nbut as such are already found included with these in the indistinction\nof economic Science.\n\n[Sidenote: _Errors of philosophism and historicism in Economy._]\n\nAs a mathematical discipline, economic Science is ultimately\n_quantitative,_ and it remains so, even when it makes use of the\nsmallest possible number of numerical and algebraical signs (even when\nit is not _mathematical Economy_ in the strict sense of the word). The\nattempts, both of philosophism and historicism, which claim to deny\nEconomy, by criticizing its abstractness and its arbitrariness, and to\nmake it philosophical (or as they say _psychological_) and historical\nare therefore to be reproved. If Economy do not give the universal\ntruth of Philosophy, nor the particular truth of History, Philosophy\nand History are in their turn incapable of making the smallest\ncalculation: if Economy have not eyes for the true, Philosophy and\nHistory have not arms to break and to dominate the waves of fact, which\nwould oppress man with their importunity and finally prevent him from\nseeing. Hence the absurdity of _philosophism_ and _historicism_; hence\ntoo, the sound tendency of Economy to constitute itself _pure_ Economy,\nfree of _practical_ questions, which are also, it is clear, historical,\nnot abstract and scientific questions.\n\n[Sidenote: _The two degenerations: extreme abstracticism and\nempiristical disaggregation._]\n\nBut economy has in itself other enemies besides these that are\nexternal, in so far as it is certainly a mathematical discipline, but\nan applied mathematic, that is to say, one that assumes empirical\ndata. These empirical data can be infinitely multiplied, and hence\nresult infinite economic propositions, each distinct from the other;\nand on the other hand, they can be regrouped, simplified and unified,\nso as finally to return to the indistinct _x._ If the first tendency\nprevail, we have what is called economic empiricism, a cumbrous\nmass of disaggregated propositions; if the second, a very general\nformula, which sometimes does not even preserve the smallest vestige\nof that concept of human action from which it started, and becomes\naltogether confounded with the formul\u00e6 of arithmetic, of algebra and\nof the calculus. Sound economic Science must be at once abstract and\nempirical, in accordance with its nature, connecting and unifying\ndisaggregate propositions; but it must not allow distinction to be\nlost in unity, for the one is as necessary as the other. Those who\nare unacquainted with the generalities of Economic Science, and those\nacquainted only with its details, are alike incapable, though for\ndifferent reasons, of calculating the economic consequences of a\nfact. The first see all the facts as one single fact, the second, all\nthe facts as different, without any arrangement by similarities and\nhierarchies. The question as to the relative proportion of generalities\nand particulars to be given in treatises, is one that has been\nmuch discussed, but since this has only a didascalic and pedagogic\nimportance, it is only possible to answer it, case for case, according\nto the nature of the various scholastic institutions that are held in\nview. To maintain that Economy must stop short at this or that degree\nof abstraction, and for example be limited to what are called external\ngoods or riches, excluding services; or to capital, as a concept\ndistinct from land and human labour, without striving to unify these\nthree concepts, is altogether capricious. Every unification, like every\nspecification, can be useful, and haters of abstracticism are also\nabstracticists, but only half so.\n\n[Sidenote: _dance at the History of the various tendencies of Economy._]\n\nAll those acquainted with economic studies will have recognized in\nthe concepts that we have explained, the _logical motives_ of the\nhistory of Economy, the divisions, the polemics, the defeats and the\nvictories of this or that school and the progress of that branch of\nstudies. The quantitative character of economic science already appears\nin its classics; in the inquiries of Aristotle as to prices and value\n(_Politic_ and _Nichomachean Ethic_); and this is apparent also in\nthe rare mentions by Medi\u00e6val and Renaissance writers. Economists\nhave always been mathematicians, even when they have not spoken of\nmathematical Economy. Our writers of the nineteenth century, Galiani,\nGenovesi and Verri, were mathematicians in their methods; Francesco\nFerrara, the greatest Italian economist of the nineteenth century, was\na mathematician. The economic principle, which is all one with the\nexcogitation of the economic man, was formulated by the head of the\nphysiocratic school, Quesnay; and if the title of _political Economy,_\nfirst given to the discipline by Montchr\u00e9tien in 1615, prevailed,\nthat of _social Arithmetic_ also sometimes made its appearance. Its\nprogress has consisted, not only in the discovery of new economic\ntheorems, but also in the connection and unification of those that had\npreviously been posited in isolation, of material and immaterial goods,\nof the cost of production and of rarity, of gross and net produce, of\nagricultural rents and of all the others that are not agricultural, of\nthe production, distribution and circulation of riches, of economic and\nfinancial laws, of social and isolated economy, of the value of utility\nand of the value of exchange. It has even been possible to unite with\nthe body of admitted economic doctrines those of Marx, which seemed\nrevolutionary, for these are only definitions of a particular casuistry\nfounded upon the comparison of different types of economic constitution.\n\nBut to conquer empiricism was not enough; economic Science was menaced\nin its existence by the so-called _historical School,_ which refused\nto recognize abstract definitions and set up against them the infinite\nvariety of historical facts; hence the strife with historicism\nconducted by Menger and the Austrian school. A consequence of the\nstruggle against the political degeneration of economic science was\nthe constitution of Economy as a _pure_ science (Cairnes). This was\nall the more necessary, inasmuch as by confounding the abstract with\nthe concrete, and in the concrete itself, Economy with Ethic, there\nwas a desire manifested upon several occasions among German economists\n(ethical school), and among Catholics of all countries, for an economic\nScience that should have as its base Ethic. The conception of Economy\nas a science deduced from the _egoistic_ hypothesis, has been the\nextreme form of the reaction against ethicism (for example in the\ntreatise of Pantaleoni). The dangers arising from philosophism have\nbeen less, because recent times, in which that discipline has most\nflourished, have not sinned through excessive philosophy.\n\nOf late, owing to the works of Jevons and of other Englishmen, of\nGossen, of the Italians of the school of Ferrara, and of the Austrians,\nEconomy has become at once more and more complicated and more simple,\nowing to the applications, extensions, and reductions that it has\neffected. But if with its progress it be able to become ever more exact\nand perspicuous, yet it will never for that reason become _organic;_\nits character of a quantitative discipline, of an applied mathematic,\nin which the atomism of the postulates and of the definitions is\ninsuperable, does not allow of such metamorphoses.\n\n[Sidenote: _Signification of the judgment of Hegel upon the Science of\nEconomy._]\n\nIn this connection and as the seal upon what we have just been saying,\nit is fitting to observe that the phrase of Hegel referred to above\ncan only have been interpreted as expressing admiration for the degree\nof truth attained by Economy, owing to the ignorance of Hegelian\nphilosophy that has become usual; as though Hegel meant that Economic\nscience did much honour to the _thought,_ that is, to the speculative\nreason. Hegel wished to say, on the contrary, that Economy does much\nhonour to the intellect, that is, to the intellect alone, to that\n_abstractive_ and arbitrary _intellect_ which he hunted down in all\nhis philosophy: that it is not indeed true and philosophical science,\nbut a simple descriptive or quantitative discipline treated with much\nelegance. This praise also contained the demand for a delimitation,\nwhich, however, he did not expressly enunciate, develop and execute.\n\n\n[1] _Philos, d. Rechtes,_ \u00a7 189. _Zus._\n\n\n\n\nVI\n\n\nCRITIQUE OF THE CONFUSIONS BETWEEN ECONOMIC SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF\nECONOMY\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Adoption of the method and of definition of Economy by\nPhilosophy._]\n\nThere is no disagreement, then, between the Philosophy of Economy\ndescribed by us and economic Science or Calculus, of which we have just\ndefined the nature, since there cannot be any between two altogether\nheterogeneous forms, the one moving within the categories of truth, the\nother outside them, with objects of a practical order. This reciprocal\ntolerance can be disturbed only by Philosophy, when it compels itself,\neither to invade the field of economic Science, or to receive within\nitself, to a greater or less extent, the method and the formul\u00e6\nproper to the latter. We have already referred to the first, when we\nnoted the inadmissibility of the economic attempts of philosophism\nand historicism, and we will say no more on the subject. But it is\nopportune to draw attention to the fact that we must distinguish\namong these attempts those that we are accustomed to meet with in\nmany treatises on economy, pure or political, and in the Science of\nfinance (especially in the prologues), which labour to discover what\neconomic action may be, and in what way it differs from morality, what\nare pleasure and pain, utility and value; whether the State be rational\nwill that levies a portion of the riches of the citizens for the ends\nof civilization, or a simple fact resulting from general economic laws\nand the like. In all these efforts of the writers of treatises, we have\nan example of the gradual passage from empiria to philosophy, which is\nto be observed in all the other fields of knowledge, and if it be only\npossible to say in general that the Philosophy of Economy is derived\nfrom economic Science, it is certain, on the other hand, that it finds\nno small incentive in the philosophical doubts and discussions which\neconomic Science supports. On the other hand, the claim to resolve\nphilosophically and historically the economic Science or Calculus\nis, as we have seen, altogether sterile, or contradicts itself in\ndevelopment.\n\n[Sidenote: _Errors that derive from it._]\n\nFrom the second of the cases stated above, that is to say, from the\nmixture of economic with philosophic methods, arises a series of errors\nthat are very common and very grave, and of which it is opportune to\ntake some notice here.\n\nThese errors can be divided into three groups, according as they\nconsist of _(a)_ considering economic Science or Calculus as a method\nexclusive of every other, and alone capable of bestowing upon man all\nthe truth that can ever be attained in the field of human actions;\n_(b)_ in attributing the value of universal thought to the empirical\nthoughts upon which economic calculation is based; _(c)_ in changing\ninto reality the fictions excogitated for the establishment of the\nCalculus.\n\n[Sidenote: _1st. Negation of philosophy for economy._]\n\nOf the three groups, the first, which represents the most extended\nand radical form of the error, is, as usual, the least harmful, for\nthe reason previously given, that the precise and loyal positions are\nthose that are the most completely surpassed. Several cultivators\nof economic Science, among the most strict and mathematical, enter\nupon this desperate struggle against philosophy, which they ridicule\nas empty chatter and do not merely wish to subdue but altogether to\ndestroy, substituting for it the methods of empirical observation and\nof mathematical construction, thus favouring a particular empirical and\nmathematical philosophy of their own, however much they may protest\nto the contrary. That the pretension is unsustainable, is to be seen,\nboth from the contradictions in which they become entangled and from\nthe very fury that animates them, which is, at bottom, vexation at not\nbeing able to free themselves from the contradictions in which they\nhave become involved. For our part, we should like to say to those\nexcellent economists, alike pure and mathematical, did this not appear\nto be pouring oil upon the flames:--Spare yourselves the trouble of\nphilosophizing. Calculate, and do not think!\n\n[Sidenote: _2nd. Universal value attributed to empirical concepts.\nExample: protection and free trade._]\n\nThe other group is represented by a particular case of the empiristical\nerror that we have already several times criticized, and many\npropositions of the kind that one hears in ordinary conversation,\nagainst which simple good sense has often rebelled, are to be reduced\nto it. Thus the empirical consideration of certain human actions as\nconstituting richness and happiness, causes those individuals and\npeoples who possess property of that sort to be called rich and happy;\nbut to this is opposed, with evident truth, that every one is happy\nin his own way and that external conditions are not proof of internal\nsatisfaction, which is alone real and effective. The great dispute on\nfree trade is also to be reduced to the same misunderstanding, for when\nwe undertake to demonstrate that wealth is destroyed by protection, the\ndemonstration is efficacious only if the wealth, said to be destroyed,\nis precisely that of which it was desired to assure the increase by\nprotection; but nothing has been proved if it be a different quality\nof wealth that it may be desirable to acquire, even with the loss\nand the destruction of the other. For example, a people may find it\nadvantageous from a political and military point of view to maintain in\nits territories the cultivation of grain or the construction of ships,\neven if that were to cost more than to provide itself with grain and\nships from abroad; in this case, we should, strictly speaking, talk,\nnot of the destruction of wealth, but rather of the acquisition of\nwealth (presumed national security), paid for with dear grain and dear\nnaval construction. When the empirical ideas of free trade were raised\nto the dignity of _laws of nature_ (reason), there was a rebellion\nagainst the economists, by which it was made clear that those laws\nof nature were laws, not absolute, but empirical, that is to say,\nhistorical and contingent facts, and that the economists who propounded\nthem as absolute, were not at all men of science, but politicians,\nand represented (if not seriously, at least by unconscious suggestion,\nor, if it be preferred, by mere chance) the interests of certain\ndefinite classes or of certain definite peoples. And the rebellion was\nright, although it afterwards degenerated into the inconclusiveness\nof historicism, and absolutely denied to those false practical\napplications the formul\u00e6 and laws of Economy, which are _natural_ in\nquite another sense, as nominal and therefore irrefutable definitions.\nAbstract principles, which are always inadequate to grasp the richness\nof reality, supply with a simple instrument him who passes from them\nto historical and sociological observation, which requires altogether\ndifferent methods. Hence, for instance, the meaning of the school of\nLe Play, which in studying concrete economic conditions took note of\nreligion, of family and political feelings, and of all the other things\nconnected with the first; hence the admitted necessity of completing\nthe analytic method (as it is called) with the synthetic, or (as it\nwould be preferable to say) of neglecting abstractions when dealing\nwith the problems of life and of directly intuiting life itself.\n\n[Sidenote: _3rd. Transformation of the functions of the calculus into\nreality._]\n\nBut what is particular to a philosophy that enters into hybrid wedlock\nwith economic Science, is the transformation of those quantitative\nprinciples, of which we have seen the artificial origin, into effective\nreality. As a result, when this origin has not been observed, or has\nbeen forgotten, we may chance to hear the theories of Gossen on the\ndecline of pleasures, as though they were \"fundamental laws of human\nsensibility\"; or that some _homo economicus_ has appeared, constructor\nof diagrams and calculator of degrees of utility and of curves of\nsatisfaction, as though these were real things. Some false conceptions\nderive from economic principles transported into the philosophy of the\npractical, which we have already had occasion to refute, such as that\nof a _scale of values,_ which the volitional man is supposed to have\nbefore him whenever he deliberates, and that other of the embarrassment\nhe experiences in choosing between _two equal goods;_ and finally the\nbelief that man _wills things,_ whereas what he wills in reality is not\nthings but actions.\n\nThe comparisons, metaphors and symbols, taken from Economy and used\nin ordinary conversation, lead to the false belief that mathematical\nconstructions and those of the economic calculus are the real processes\nof the psyche or of the Spirit.\n\n[Sidenote: _The pretended calculus of pleasures and pains, and the\ndoctrines of optimism and pessimism._]\n\nThe quantification of volitional acts, taken as a real fact and\nintroduced into philosophy, has given origin to the idea of a _calculus\nof pleasures and pains and of a balance of life,_ to be established\nwith the pleasures on the profit side of the account and the sorrows\non the side of loss. And there have even been ravings about a double\nmensuration of pleasures, to be based upon their _intensity_ and\n_duration._ But the real man, at the moment he enjoys, has before him\nonly his own enjoyment, and at the moment that he suffers, only his\nown sorrow: the past is past and life is not to be described like the\nprofit and loss account of a business. The true economic man says to\nhimself what Fra Jacopone sang in one of his lauds:\n\n    So much is mine\n    As enjoyed and bestowed for the love divine!\n\nThe sophisms that assume consistency owing to this false conception,\nare most strange. Let the little dialogue of Leopardi with the seller\nof almanacs suffice for all. No one would wish to live his life again,\nnot because the sorrows always exceed the pleasures, as that dialogue\nsuggests, but rather because man is not, as he believes, a consumer\nof pleasures. He is a creator of life, and for this reason the idea\nof doing again what has already been done, of retreading the same\npath, of reliving the already past, is repugnant to him, even were it\nall made up of pleasures as suggested, because he aspires only and\nalways to the future. _Optimism and pessimism,_ being each of them\nrespectively unable altogether to deny pleasure and pain, are obliged\nto have recourse to these calculations and balances, in order to defend\ntheir preconceived conclusions: but in so doing they fall from Scylla\ninto Charybdis and each reveals its own sophistical nature.\n\nIndeed, a philosophy that calculates is a philosophy that toys\nor dotes, and if we have certainly advised the economists and\nmathematicians to calculate and not to think, we must, on the contrary,\ncry to the philosopher:--Think, and do not calculate! _Qui incipit\nnumerare, incipit errare!_\n\n\n\n\nVII\n\n\nHISTORICAL ANNOTATIONS\n\n\nThe concepts of the useful and of the moral and the various attempts\neither to absorb the one in the other or to distinguish them, while\nrecognizing their relations, are the problem on which has laboured the\nPhilosophy of the practical as Ethic and Economic. Has this problem\never been fully solved? It will be permissible to doubt it, when we\nobserve that a philosophical concept of the useful has been wanting\nuntil our own days; and that in consequence one of morality must also,\nstrictly speaking, have been wanting, for it could not have been\nunderstood in its fulness and purity, owing to the obscure position of\nthe term with which it is united.\n\n[Sidenote: _Greek Ethic and its ingenuousness._]\n\nI. The utilitarian character of Greek Ethic has been affirmed on\nseveral occasions; but one experiences a certain repugnance in applying\nso precise a term to the documents of ancient thought that remain to\nus. Socrates, it is true, posited the useful as the supreme concept\nof morality, and identified the good life with eud\u00e6monia; but for him\nthat useful was nevertheless distinct from the merely pleasing, since\nit consisted in what is useful to man as man, and his eud\u00e6monia bore\nmuch resemblance to the tranquil conscience of him who fulfils his\nproper duties. Plato (for example, in the _Protagoras_) expounds the\ndoctrine that good things are nothing but pleasant things, and bad\nthings painful; but this doctrine is enunciated in order to place in\nrelief the thesis that man does not do wrong, save through ignorance,\nand because the bad seems to him to be the good; without saying that\nin other dialogues the distinction between pleasure and the good is\nrecognized. Nor can the most systematic of the ancient philosophers,\nAristotle, be called without reserve a hedonist, a eud\u00e6monist, or a\nutilitarian, on the strength of his doctrine of happiness. Happiness\nis the supreme good, it is an end for itself; but virtue is already\nincluded for Aristotle in happiness, virtue which is found there, not\nas an adjunct, but intrinsic, for which exterior goods are indeed\nnecessary, but only as instruments. The virtuous man must be a lover\nof himself (\u03c6\u03af\u03bb\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2), that is to say, just, temperate, liberal of his\npossessions, ready to yield honours and offices to his friends; lover\nof himself, then, in the lofty signification of the word (lover, not of\nthe empirical, but of the metempirical ego), as opposed to the wicked\nman, who is his own enemy. Even Epicurus could not be included among\nthe hedonists, since for him pleasure is not an end, but a means for\n_calm,_ which is the true good, and calm is tranquillity of the spirit,\nwhich only the virtuous man can enjoy.\n\nIt is therefore more exact to consider Greek Ethic in its general\ncharacter, not as eud\u00e6monistic and utilitarian, but here also, in\nrelation to the new problem that we now have before us (in the same\nway as was done above, in respect to practical intellectualism), as\n_ingenuous_; for in truth that problem did not constitute the centre\nof inquiries and discussions, as they present themselves in our times,\nnor were the different schools divided upon it. They were distinguished\nfrom one another (as has been already noted in respect to the doctrine\nof the passions), rather by the different rules of life respectively\nlaid down by each as preferable. The antitheses of the Cynics and\nCyrena\u00efcs, of the Epicureans and the Stoics, have but a superficial\nresemblance to those of the ethical rigorists or abstractionists,\nhedonists or utilitarians, which have appeared as the result of the\nantithesis between pleasure and pain explicitly stated in modern times.\nIt would be difficult to point out ethical rigorists and utilitarians\namong thinkers truly and properly so called. In order to discover the\nutilitaristic attitude at that period of history, it would be necessary\nto have recourse to some rhetorician, such as Carneades, ready to\nmaintain indifferently the most opposed paradoxes, or to Callicles and\nThrasymachus, so magnificently portrayed in the Platonic dialogues.\nThese were rather men of the world than philosophers, giving the\nimmediate and violent impression of the struggle for life, and for this\nreason they were at conflict with Socrates, the philosopher, whom they\nsometimes treated as a clown and utterer of paradoxes, sometimes pitied\nas a child, a \"suckling\" child, and objected to him that philosophers\ndo not understand one iota about politics (as often has been and often\nwill be objected by politicians, not altogether without reason). If it\nbe wished, all the same, to find a reference to later utilitarianism\namong the sophists, the hedonists and the Epicureans, or among the\nStoics, with their conception of life as a war against the passions,\nsomething of future rigorism and asceticism, or in certain discussions\namong the Platonic dialogues as to the relation between pleasure and\npain, a first trace of the discussions upon the same argument that have\nbecome most complicated in modern times, by all means let this be done,\nprovided it be never forgotten that it is an affair of glimmers, rather\nthan of vivid light, of antitheses hardly accentuated, not of those\nthat are well defined and stand out clearly.\n\n[Sidenote: _Importance of Christianity for Ethic._]\n\nII. The precise and it may be said violent affirmation of the\nantithesis, was the work of Christianity, which, conceiving pleasure\nand duty, nature and morality to be heterogeneous elements, did\ngreat service, both to the progress of civilization in general and\nin particular to Ethic. It is necessary to insist upon this, for the\nmodern world was bound afterwards to react against this antithesis,\nand necessarily to assume an Antichristian, even a pagan attitude,\nand modern art and poetry are often inspired with an abhorrence of\nthe tenebrous Middle Ages and of sad Christianity, and give a sigh of\nregret for Greece as for a lost Paradise, or a shout of jubilation\nas for a Paradise regained. But reactions are reactions and poetry\nis poetry: humanity never retraces its footsteps, though it is often\nwont to adorn the future with memories of the past. The Greece of our\nhearts is a new Greece, profoundly modified by Christianity; the\nGreece of Goethe and of Hegel is no longer the Greece of Sophocles and\nof Aristotle, but a Greece far richer and more intense. Thought, like\nlife, never turns back, and if it be necessary eventually to attain to\na theoretic conciliation between pleasure and duty, between the useful\nand morality, such a conciliation will be very different from that of\nstill ingenuous Greek Ethic.\n\n[Sidenote: _The three resulting directions: utilitarianism, rigorism,\nand psychologism._]\n\nThe spectacle afforded by modern Ethic, from the Renaissance to the\nbeginning of the nineteenth century, and also (with few exceptions) in\nthe later periods is still altogether dominated by that antithesis, and\ntherefore two currents are to be discerned in it: one that attaches\nitself to the first term of the antithesis, the useful, and denies the\nsecond, or resolves it in the first, the other, which denies the useful\nand retains moral duty as the exclusive form of the practical activity.\nThis latter is _rigoristic_ Ethic, child of Christianity and of ascetic\noriental sources, which flowed into it together by direct filiation;\nthe other is _utilitarianism,_ child also, though illegitimate, of\nthe distinction or rending asunder of the ancient unity of duty\nand pleasure, virtue and happiness, effected by Christianity. The\nantithesis sometimes seems to be solved and a Philosophy of the\npractical appears, which, without clinging exclusively to one term or\nthe other, receives both into itself. But this philosophy, when it\ndoes not reveal itself at bottom (which generally happens), as masked\nutilitarianism, or (a less frequent case) rigorism attenuated in\nexpression, has the defect of being, not philosophy, but an empirical\ndescription of the so-called principles of the practical, placed one\nbeside the other, without a profound definition or deduction of either.\nThis third direction may be called _intuitionism_ or _psychologism._\n\n[Sidenote: _Hobbes, Spinoza._]\n\nUtilitarianism is principally represented by English thought, to which\nbelongs Hobbes, the greatest of all utilitarians, who proclaimed, _in\nstatu naturae_ (that is to say, in genuine reality) _mensuram juris\nesse utilitatem._[1] Similar doctrines are to be found in Spinoza, who\nhas also been looked upon and criticized as a pure utilitarian. But the\nmatter is rather more complicated as regards Spinoza. Of him it should\nrather be said that he would have been the most resolute of ethical\nrigorists, had he ever been able to construct an Ethic. His determinism\nwas an insuperable obstacle to this, for it does not admit distinctions\nof values, but considers the good. like being, in its abstractness,\nand therefore, the being of each one as _suum essere conservare_; hence\nthe appearance of utilitarianism, assumed by the Ethic of Spinoza.\n\n[Sidenote: _English Ethic._]\n\nFrom Hobbes descend Locke, Hartley, Hume, Adam Smith, Warburton,\nPaley, and others such; they are all less courageous and less coherent\nphilosophers than he. Indeed, if Hobbes himself could not but be\nincoherent and could not avoid causing a desire for and therefore\na state of peace to arise from a state of nature or of war, whence\nis discovered to the mind a source of the practical, altogether\ndifferent from that of the useful alone, which was presupposed; with\nthe mean and sophistical efforts of his successors, the incoherence\nbecomes altogether irritating. The aid sought from associationism\nis among these efforts, and the excogitation of the example of the\nmiser (found for the first time in 1731, in a discourse of the Rev.\nJohn Gay),[2] and also the admission of the principle of sympathy\nbeside that of egoism, a principle which with a cast of the dice is\nmade to disappear again, and to become absorbed in egoism itself. The\ninanity of utilitarianism, which has already in Hobbes a tendency to\ndisavow itself, by recognizing as true laws not those of nature, but\nthose revealed by God (_in Scripturis sacris latae_),[3] and in Locke\nretained the divine side by side with the civil laws and those of\npublic opinion,[4] became evident in the theological utilitarianism of\nWarburton and of Paley. As for intuitionists and psychologists, such as\nShaftesbury, Hutcheson, Butler, these either left an unsolved dualism\n(as was above all the case with the last), or, although possessing the\nmost lively consciousness of moral force, they yet strove to deduce\nit in some way from the egoistical and utilitarian principle. The\nFrench materialists of the eighteenth century, such as Helv\u00e9tius and\nD'Holbach, though less subtle, are more consequent.\n\n[Sidenote: _Idealistic Philosophy._]\n\nRigoristic Ethic displayed its strength against anti-ethical\nutilitarianism and anti-philosophical psychologism, not only in\ntraditional scholastic, but also in the explicit polemic undertaken by\nCudworth, Cumberland, Clarke and Price, against Hobbes, Locke, and the\nother utilitarians who followed them. The makers of great systems, too,\nattached themselves to ethical rigorism, Descartes (and in a certain\nsense Spinoza), Malebranche, Leibnitz, and the philosophy of the\nschool of Leibnitz, as the moral consciousness declared itself in its\ntrue nature in Jean Jacques Rousseau against the French materialists.\nBut rigorism also ended by contradicting itself in the same way as\nutilitarianism, owing to its one-sidedness, when it recognized a\nprinciple that was not merely utilitarian or that lost itself in\nmystery, either by reasoning with the utilitarian principle in the\ncourse of its development, or by receiving utilitarianism into itself,\nwithout any mediation, in the form of the morally indifferent. This is\nan old evil, which had already appeared in the _\u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b1_ of Stoicism,\nand in all those exceptions to the rigorous moral law, which ascetic\nChristianity had been obliged to allow, in order to exist side by side\nwith the worldly life.\n\n[Sidenote: _Kant and his affirmation of the ethical principle._]\n\nIII. The strength and the weakness of rigorism are to be clearly seen\nin the greatest ethical system to which it led: the moral doctrine of\nEmmanuel Kant. It was time that the principle of Christian Ethic should\nbe reaffirmed, duty as clearly distinguished from pleasure, giving to\nit that relief which it had been without in the systems of Descartes\nand of Leibnitz, after the materialistic and utilitarian orgy that had\nlasted for more than a century, and after the equivocal attempts at an\napproach and fusion of the useful and the moral. Kant did not indeed in\nthis respect oppose Wolffian Leibnitzianism; and although the ethical\nconcept of _perfectio_ seemed to him to be empty and indeterminate, yet\nhe was never able to prove that it was a eud\u00e6monistic and utilitarian\nconcept.[5] But that concept certainly had not the energy of duty and\nof the Kantian categoric imperative, which are true declarations of war\nagainst every heteronomous morality. This is the merit of Kant, after\nwhom no serious philosopher can be anything but a Kantian in Ethic, as,\nafter Christianity, to no one, not a wind-bag or an extravagant, is it\ngiven to be anything but a Christian. Moral action has no other motive\nthan morality itself: to promote one's own happiness (said Kant) can\nnever be _immediately_ duty, and even less the principle of all duties.\n\n[Sidenote: _Self-contradictions of Kant concerning the concept of the\nuseful, of prudence, of happiness, etc._]\n\nBut the mistake of Kant lies in not having well analyzed the concepts\nof pleasure, of happiness and of the useful, and in having thought that\nhe could free himself from them, by placing them among another set of\nprinciples, which he called _hypothetical_ imperatives and opposed to\nthe _categoric. _ We know that the imperative of those concepts is\nnot less categoric than that of morality: it is a true imperative,\nnot to be confounded with the knowledge of experience, metaphorically\ncalled imperative, because it assumes the appearance of a technique\ndealing with the practical. Kant was to some extent aware of this, for\nhe sub-distinguishes the hypothetical imperatives into _problematical_\nand _assertorial._ The first of these are technical and give rise to\nmaxims of _cleverness_ (_Geschicklichkeit_); the second are _pragmatic_\nand consist of maxims of _prudence._ Observe the difficulties in which\nhe becomes involved, through not wishing to recognize the autonomous\ncharacter of these imperatives compared with the moral imperatives,\nthat is to say, the categoricity of both. The imperatives of prudence\nand of happiness are concerned (he says) \"with an end which can be\nassumed as real among all rational beings (in so far as the imperatives\ncan be applied to them in their quality of dependent beings); and,\ntherefore, an intention, which not only they _may_ possess, but which\nit is assumed with certainty that they _do_ possess, according to a\nnecessity of nature, which is the intention of happiness.\" We should\ntherefore conclude that they are concerned with an end not less\nserious than that of morality. But Kant perceives the poison in the\nargument and strives to turn them again into imperatives concerning\nmeans: \"ability\" (he continues) \"in the choice of the means of one's\nown well-being, may be called _prudence;_ therefore the imperative\nrelating to the choice of the means for one's own happiness, namely the\nprecept of prudence, is always hypothetical; the action is ordered, not\nabsolutely, but only as means for another purpose.\" It is clear that to\nbe able to call that knowledge or ability \"prudence\" is not sufficient\nto change the imperative of happiness into mere ability and knowledge.\nKant perceives this also: \"If it were easy to give a definite concept\nof happiness, the imperatives of prudence would altogether coincide\nwith those of ability and would also be analytic. For it would be\nsaid in the one case as in the other, that he who wishes the end also\nwishes (necessarily, in conformity with reason) the only means for the\npurpose within his power. The concept of happiness is unfortunately\nso indeterminate, that although every one wishes to attain to it, he\nis nevertheless unable ever to say definitely and in accordance with\nhimself exactly what he desires and wishes. The reason is that the\nelements which belong to the concept of happiness are all empirical\nand must therefore all be taken from experience; quired an absolute\nwhole, a maximum of well-being in my present state and in every future\nstate.\" In what shall happiness be placed? In riches? In knowledge? In\nlong life? In good health? None of these things is without dangers. In\nshort, it is impossible to determine with full certainty, according\nto any principle whatever, what would make man truly happy; therefore\nit is not possible to act according to a definite principle, but only\naccording to empirical concepts; and the imperatives of prudence,\nstrictly speaking, command nothing.--As we see, the only effective\nargument of Kant against the admission of the categoric imperatives of\nwell-being, of utility, of happiness, is that he does not know exactly\nwhat they are. This did not authorize him to exclude those imperatives\nand reduce them to pseudo--imperatives, to hypothetic imperatives,\nor to empirical rules. In other passages of his works, Kant tends to\nthe other solution of excluding the maxims of prudence from the pure\npractical reason, because they are maxims of self-love (_Selbstliebe,_)\nor of the practical reason empirically or _pathologically_\nconditioned, since for him every pleasure that precedes the moral law\nand is independent of it, is pathological, that is to say, it belongs\nto the senses, to the inferior appetitive faculty, not to that which\nis superior and to reason. Kant often returns to this point and always\nexperiences the same embarrassments and contradictions, as is proved by\nthe variety of the arguments to which he has recourse.[6]\n\n[Sidenote: _Errors derived from it in his Ethic._]\n\nBut the unrecognized autonomy of the useful, of happiness, of\nwell-being, generally revenges itself; because, surreptitiously\nintroduced, it causes itself to be unduly recognized afterwards. Thus\nit comes about that Kant creates, on the one hand, the monster of\ndisinterested actions, and on the other, does not altogether exclude\nthe concept of actions morally indifferent or permissible.[7] Thus,\ntoo, it happens that owing to the discord that he preserves between\nvirtue and happiness, thinking vain the pretence of the Stoics and\nEpicureans to reconcile them in this life, he is led to postulate\nthe existence of God and of the immortality of the soul, and to\nmake of virtue a means of rendering oneself worthy of happiness in\nanother life. \"The cold duty of Kant\" (wrote Hegel) \"is the last\nundigested morsel given by revelation to reason, and it weighs\nupon its stomach.\"[8] Consequently, the Ethic of Kant, although\nso different in tendencies and inspiration, yet joined hands with\ntheological utilitarianism, ending at length by also declaring that\nmoral obligation is inconceivable, without the idea of a God, who\nrewards and punishes in another life, and by declaring that God and the\nimmortality of the soul cannot be otherwise affirmed than by means of\nmoral exigencies. Moral rigorism, like utilitarianism, makes shipwreck\nin mystery.\n\n[Sidenote: _Occasions for a philosophy of economy._]\n\nIV. Occasions and opportunities for a philosophical concept of the\nuseful were not, to tell the truth, wanting to the thought anterior\nto Kant; but Kant let them all slip. Without attributing too much\nsuggestive power to certain classes of virtues, such as _fortitude_\nor _prudence_ (virtues that are generically economic, not exclusively\nmoral), which had passed from the Greek into the Christian Ethic,\nnor to certain acute aphorisms of psychologists and moralists (for\ninstance: _Il y a des h\u00e9ros en mal comme en bien;--Ce n'est pas\nassez d'avoir des grandes qualit\u00e9s, il en faut avoir l'\u00e9conomie;--La\nsouveraine habilit\u00e9 consiste \u00e0 bien conna\u00eetre le prix des choses,\netc.[9]),_ a first opportunity was certainly afforded by that inferior\nfaculty of appetition, which the Wolffian philosophy had inherited\nfrom the Platonic, Aristotelian, and scholastic tradition.[10] That\nfaculty was parallel with the inferior faculty of knowledge, which\nthat same philosophy had with Baumgarten attempted to develop into an\nindependent science, _Aesthetica,_ a development that should have led\nto the thought of an analogous transformation of the corresponding\npractical faculty, which might have become an _Oeconomica_ or _Ethica\ninferior,_ as from \u00c6sthetic had been made a _Gnoseologia inferior._ But\nKant also rejected \u00c6sthetic, as science of a special theoretic form,\nscience of intuition or fancy, conceiving instead, on the one hand\na transcendental \u00c6sthetic or doctrine of space and time, and on the\nother, a Critique of judgment, or doctrine of finality and morality,\nsymbolized in nature;[11] thus he fell into other difficulties, when\nhe wished to establish an analogy between the other forms of the\npractical reason and that of the theoretical.[12] Although he preserved\nthe division of the faculty of appetition into inferior and superior\n(_untere und obere Begehrungsverm\u00f6gen,_) he failed to realize, as we\nhave seen, the true philosophical concept of the _inferior._\n\n[Sidenote: _The problem of politics and Machiavellism._]\n\nA second opportunity was presented by the series of treatises, which,\nfrom Machiavelli onward, had come to conceive of politics as a fact\nindependent of morality, elaborating in particular those precepts and\nmaxims of the \"reason of state,\" of which we have already had occasion\nto expose the empirical character. But however empirical they were,\nthose mental products gave rise to the problem of the relations between\nmorals and politics, that is to say, as to whether the two terms could\nbe considered as immediately identifiable. The thought of Machiavelli,\nin particular, constituted an enigma that all attempted to interpret\nin the most different ways, most by vituperating, some by defending it\nwith strange reasons (Spinoza was among the defenders[13]), though they\nnever succeeded in freeing themselves from its difficulties, for to\nthat end would have been necessary the understanding of the spiritual\nvalue of the utilitarian will, even if amoral. It was only when this\ndifficult concept was to some extent caught sight of (by De Sanctis)\nthat Machiavelli appeared at once justified and criticized; but while\nthat concept remained obscure, the point of view of Machiavelli was\nnever attained and the work was condemned for reasons of a moralistic\ncharacter (Villari).[14] Kant, too, in his work on _Perpetual Peace,_\ntreated the problem of the relations between morality and politics,\naffirming that no disagreement is possible between them, unless by\npolitics is meant a _doctrine_ of prudence, that is, \"a theory of\nmaxims for the selection of the means best adapted for the objects of\nindividual advantage; that is, when the existence of morality is not\naltogether denied.\"[15] Here too, he was right, when he claimed that\nconcrete political actions should be submitted to morality; but, on the\nother hand, he did not perceive that submission and identity presuppose\na previous independence and distinction.\n\n[Sidenote: _The doctrine of the passions._]\n\nFinally, a third opportunity was offered, in the rehabilitation of the\npassions, begun by the philosophers of the seventeenth century and\nexpressed, as has been said, in a notable manner by Vico. Now if the\npassions in general be the volitional activity itself, considered\nin its dialectic, they are also the soul turned to the particular,\nthe useful in respect to the universal, which is sought by morality.\nThis is to be seen especially in Vico and better still in Hegel, very\nsimilar to Vico in this respect; he admirably developed this moment\nof _particularity,_ which is passion, necessary for the concreteness\nof the universal. As the passions for Vico are human nature itself,\nwhich morality directs but does not destroy, and are neither good\nnor bad in themselves, and _utilitates ex se neque turpes neque\nhonestae, sed earum inaequalitas est turpitudo, aequalitas autem\nhonestas_[16]--so, for Hegel, \"passion is neither good nor bad in its\nformal character and only expresses the fact that a subject has placed\nall the living interest of his spirit, of his talent, of his character,\nof his enjoyment, in a single content. Nothing great can or has been\naccomplished without passion. Only a morality that is dead and too\noften hypocritical can inveigh against the form of passion as such. ...\nEthicity concerns the content, which, as such, is universal, something\ninactive, and has its active element in the subject: the fact that the\ncontent is immanent in it constitutes interest, and in so far as it\ndominates all the efficient subjectivity, passion.\"[17]\n\n[Sidenote: _Hegel and the concept of the useful._]\n\nThe same Hegel once observed: \"As for what concerns utility, morality\nmust not play the disdainful towards it, for every good action is\nactually useful, that is to say, possesses reality and produces\nsomething good. A good action that were not useful would not be an\naction, would not possess reality. The inutility of the good in itself,\nas its unreality, is its abstractness. Not only is it possible to be\nconscious of utility, but we ought to be conscious of it, since it is\ntrue that it is useful to know the good: utility does not mean anything\nbut that we are conscious of our own action. If this be blameworthy, it\nwill also be blameworthy to know the goodness of one's own action.\"[18]\n\nHegel thus discovered the function of the useful when rehabilitating\nthe passions, though in a fugitive manner. But Kant had not attributed\nimportance to the problem of the passions in Ethic, and had not\ntherefore been in a position to avail himself of the suggestion\ncontained in the doctrine of the passions.\n\n[Sidenote: _Fichte and the elaboration of the Kantian Ethic._]\n\nFichte, in re-elaborating the Kantian philosophy, showed the relation\nbetween pleasure and duty in a manner that came very near to the\ntruth. He gave precedence to what he called the _empirical_ over the\nmoral man, the former corresponding entirely to the merely utilitarian\nor economic. What, asks Fichte, will be his maxim of action at this\nstage? \"As there is no other impulse in his consciousness save the\nnatural, and as this is directed only toward enjoyment and has pleasure\nfor its motive, that maxim cannot but be to choose what promises the\nmaximum of pleasure in intensity and extension; that is, the maxim\nof his own happiness. This may likewise be sought in the pleasure of\nothers by means of the sympathetic impulses; but the ultimate scope\nof his action always remains the satisfaction of those impulses and\npleasures which arise from it, and therefore, his own happiness. Man\nat this stage is an intelligent animal.\" \"But,\" he continues, \"it is a\nfault to remain here, and man must raise himself to a stage at which\nhe enjoys an altogether different liberty; he must be free, not only\n_formaliter,_ but also _materialiter,_ that is, he must attain to the\nmoral stage.\"[19] That first stage, then, is formal freedom, and is no\nlonger considered a pathological condition of the spirit, or as that\nmerely technical knowledge of which Kant speaks. This would constitute\nno small progress, if Fichte had been conscious of all the richness of\nthe concept of which he had caught a glimpse, and had made it fructify.\nBut it seems that he was not aware of this, and certainly he took no\nadvantage of it whatever.\n\n[Sidenote: _The problem of the useful and of morality in the thinkers\nof the nineteenth century._]\n\nV. The inventive genius of modern Ethic is exhausted with these\nthinkers. Their successors have reproduced the old situations, one\nafter the other. Some, while accepting the Kantian morality, wished\nto temper and correct its exaggerations, which was not possible,\nsave by a more profound speculative vision of the relation between\npleasure and good, the useful and the moral; whereas they believed that\nthey could attain to it by _also_ taking account of pleasure and of\nhappiness, and by conceiving a doctrine of happiness or eud\u00e6monology\nside by side with Ethic, but subordinate to it (in Italy: Galluppi\nand Rosmini). Schiller had already recognized in Kant's time the\nunilaterality of Kant, and had made it the object of criticism and of\nepigram, which, however, does not mean that he had truly and properly\ncorrected its errors. Others occupied themselves in various ways\nwith the enumeration and juxtaposition of the principles: thus, for\ninstance, Schopenhauer makes compassion arise beside egoism, which\nthen divides into benevolence and justice; and Herbart, although he\nexcludes the useful, because, according to him, \"it refers to a point\nexternal to itself,\"[20] enumerates five practical ideas that are not\nall truly moral. The affinity both of Herbart and of Schopenhauer,\nwith Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and English and Scottish psychologism,\nis clear. The study of the practical ideas of Herbart is not without\ninterest as an unconscious affirmation of the necessity of the\neconomic principle. The first of these, indeed, _internal freedom,_\nconsists in being able to achieve with our own strength the model\nthat we propose to ourselves, and is liberty, but not yet moral\nliberty. \"To be able to decide _according to motives_\" (says Herbart\non one occasion) \"is already a sign of psychical health: to decide\n_according to the best motives_ is the condition of morality.\"[21]\nThe second of the practical ideas, that of _perfection,_ is concerned\nprecisely with the strength of the will, taken in itself, and resembles\na combination of the Hellenic virtues of fortitude and temperance.\nHere willing is considered in itself, independently of its objects,\nand in this consideration there is no other difference, save their\nstrength, between the various Willings: the greater this is, the more\nit is admired; weakness displeases and strength pleases the practical\njudgment, and this even when it is unjust, iniquitous and wicked, and\nnotwithstanding such vices.[22] Lotze, following Herbart, determines\nas requisites of actions, that they must be possible, energetic,\nconscientious on the one hand, and on the other, consequent, habitual,\nindividual, stating that these two series of predicates apply equally\nto moral and immoral actions.[23]--He does not think it worth while to\ntake count of the English utilitarians and post-Kantian intuitionists,\nor of their French, Italian, and German imitators; because, just as the\nappearance of a Hobbes, of a Hume, or of a Shaftesbury, is important\nin their time, so the appearance of a Bentham or of a Spencer out of\ntheir time is insignificant, for these latter amuse themselves with\nthe useful, with association and evolution (which according to them\nshould become the socially useful), and with the double principle of\negoism and of altruism. Stuart Mill alone can afford some interest,\nwhen he says (with that mental inconclusiveness which has seemed to\nmany to be acuteness and equilibrium) that moral pleasures differ from\nthe sensual, not only in degree, but also in genus and in quality (_in\nkind_); and that justice is a class of socially useful actions that\narouses feelings themselves also different, not only in degree, but\nalso in genus and in quality (_in kind_), from those caused by useful\nactions. In short, the philosophy of the nineteenth century has not\nonly been unable to progress, but has not even been able to maintain\nitself on a level with the practical doctrines of Fichte and of Hegel,\nin which a glimpse was caught of the relation of first and second\npractical degree, and there was a tendency to reconcile passion and\nethicity.\n\n[Sidenote: _Extrinsic union of Ethic and of economic Science, from\nantiquity to the nineteenth century._]\n\nVI. Certainly economic science, owing to its empirico-quantitative\ncharacter, already noted, was not made to fill the void and to furnish\na more positive and exact concept of the useful. The contact between\nEconomy and Philosophy remained for a time extrinsic, since economic\nScience appeared in treatises upon the Philosophy of the practical,\ntogether with the other juridical and historical matter, which it was\ncustomary to include with it. The precedent for such a union could be\nfound even in Aristotle's _Nichomachean Ethic,_ which supplies certain\nnotions as to the concept of price and value. Considerations on the\nsame argument abound in the Scholastics, especially in St. Thomas,\nwhose _Oeconomica_ always forms part of his Ethic, as the doctrine for\nthe government of the family. Finally, there is an ample discussion\nof the subject in the treatises of the seventeenth and eighteenth\ncenturies, which took the name of _natural Rights._ It happened that\nthe English moralists of the eighteenth century were also led to\noccupy themselves with Economy and the economists with Ethic, owing\nto the juxtaposition of the two concepts for didascalic reasons and\nfor University convenience. Thus Hutcheson developed Economy, in his\n_Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy_ (1747); and the _Essays_ of\nHume are occupied with moral and economic questions; and Adam Smith\nis the author, not only of _The Wealth of Nations,_ but also of _The\nTheory of the Moral Feelings,_ almost two parts of a Philosophy of the\npractical. The importance of economic studies had become so palpable at\nthat time, that toward the end of the century, Buhle was led to include\nthem in the history of philosophy (and we believe that he was the\nfirst). He exposes at length in his work the ideas of Hume, of Smith,\nof Stewart, attributing it as a merit to the English writers to have\nreduced that material to philosophy by a method of treatment without\nexample (he said) in previous centuries.[24] Finally, Hegel dedicated\ncertain important paragraphs of his _Philosophy of Law,_ in the section\ndealing with civil society,[25] to the \"system of wants,\" or Economy.\nThe cult of Economy has rather increased than diminished in the\nnineteenth century and the much-discussed social problem (especially\ncapitalism and socialism) has not been without a certain influence\nupon treatises of Ethic, where, if we rarely find statements that are\nstrictly economic, there is always plenty of chatter about property and\nproduction and the relations between the working and capitalistic class.\n\n[Sidenote: _Philosophical questions arising from a more intimate\ncontact between the two._]\n\nBut a more intimate bond could not take place, save when attempts to\nunderstand the material of science and to place it in the system of\nthe spirit were united with economic Science, properly so called. For\nsince that science is occupied with human actions and appears to give\nadvice as to conduct, in what relation can it possibly stand to Ethic,\nwhich is also occupied with actions and also gives advice?--Such a\nquestion was in a certain way already implied in the medi\u00e6val idea of\na _justum pretium,_ to be placed beside the effective price, which is\nrealized according to the knowledge and convenience of each; it forms\nthe kernel of the debate between the _subjective and the objective_\nconcept of value, that is, between the purely economic consideration\nand another resulting from moral exigencies, between the value that\nis, and that which in a certain way should be. It began to wax ardent,\nwith the accusation, of being theoreticians of egoism, hurled at the\ngreat English economists, Smith and Ricardo; this accusation, taken\nup and modified by others, became accepted as the true and proper\ndesignation of the function of Economy, which should accordingly be\nthat of studying human actions in their exclusively abstract, egoistic\naspect. But, since abstraction is not full reality, the false task\nassigned to Economy called for the aid of the doctors. Such were\nthe French economists, seized with the mania of teaching generosity\nto the cold Britons (Blanqui, etc.); such too were the Germans, who\nwished to induce Economy to mend its ways and to become conscious of\nits lofty duties towards the human race (Knies); such, finally, were\nthe Christians and Catholics, who thought to purify or to exorcise\nthat worldly and diabolical science by mingling with it ethical and\neconomical considerations. It was rarely suspected that economic\nfacts, as such, are neither egoistic nor altruistic, neither moral nor\nimmoral; and when it was desired to philosophize the subject, some one\ngot out of the difficulty by enumerating five groups of human actions,\nfour egoistic and only one moral: the search for the satisfaction\nof one's own conscience, with the fear of blame attached (Wagner).\nThe problem, especially in Austria, passed from the hands of the\nmathematicians into those of the psychologists. These have undertaken\nto seek out the resemblance and the difference between economic and\nethical values. But on the psychological ground (as we have already\nremarked when discussing intuitionistic solutions), far from solving\nthe antithesis, philosophy is dissolved. The mathematicians on the\nother hand, that is to say the economists, who employ the quantitative\nmethod, fascinated with the evidence of this procedure and failing\nto realize that it is empty evidence, instead of limiting themselves\nto the construction of their most useful formul\u00e6, increase the\nconfusion by beginning to philosophize in the strangest manner; as\nis to be observed in the case of Pareto, one of the most acute and\nlearned of contemporary economists. In one of his recent writings he\nexposes the method of economic science with a string of propositions\nsuch as these: \"_Il faut faire une op\u00e9ration de s\u00e9paration.... Cette\npremi\u00e8re op\u00e9ration accomplie, ... il est n\u00e9cessaire de substituer par\nabstraction, des conceptions simples, au moins relativement, aux objets\nr\u00e9els extr\u00eamement complexes.... Mais la science n'est r\u00e9ellement li\u00e9e\n\u00e0 une abstraction plut\u00f4t qu'\u00e0 une autre.... Pour peu qu'on y trouve un\navantage.... Cela ne suffit pas encore: il faut continuer \u00e0 s\u00e9parer et\n\u00e0 abstraire...._\"\n\nAnd after having thus advised us to treat facts without pity,\nmutilating them, grinding them down, substituting for them names or\nabstractions, Pareto continues undisturbed, as though all this were\nnothing: these theories, \"_telles, au moins que nous les concevons, se\ns\u00e9parant des anciens en ce qu'elles s'attachent aux faits et non aux\nmots_\"![26] If such be the facts, what will be the words?\n\n[Sidenote: _The theories of the hedonistic calculus: from Maupertuis to\nHartmann._]\n\nVII. It is all the more necessary to understand the diversity\nbetween economic Science and the Philosophy of economy, between the\nquantitative and the qualitative processes, owing to the fact that\nsince economic studies first flourished, in the eighteenth century,\nabsurd ideas were introduced into the books of philosophers, as\nto the calculus of pleasures and the balance of life. Maupertuis'\nbook, _Essai de philosophie morale_ (1749), had a great influence\nin this direction. Here, a balance is presented, showing a deficit\non the side of pleasures; and, following this lead, many Italian\nphilosopher-economists of the same period occupied themselves with such\ncalculations and balances (Ortes, Verri, Briganti, etc.), arriving at\nresults, now optimistic, now pessimistic.[27] Galluppi, too, accepted\nthe method as a good one,[28] and it is no marvel that the poet\nLeopardi made it his, steeped as he was in the sensualistic philosophy\nof the preceding century. But not only are the trivial optimistic\nsophisms of the utilitarians founded upon it, but likewise many of the\npessimistic arguments of Schopenhauer and especially of Hartmann, the\nlatter quite unconscious (being in other respects closely connected\nwith the German idealist tradition) that he was accepting an element\nof an altogether anti-idealistic, that is, of a mechanistic origin.\n\nFor all these reasons, it is important to oppose the concept of the\nuseful (which is not indeed a concept, but an abstraction), given by\neconomic Science, with its philosophic concept. This we have attempted\nto do in the preceding theory of Economy, as at once distinct from\nand united with Ethic. In that theory, we have especially striven to\ncollect stray threads of aphorisms and observations of good sense\nas to the value of the will, even when amoral; as to the doctrines\nof happiness and of pleasure, of the inferior appetitive faculty,\nof others dealing with politics and the arts of prudence, of the\nnew conception of the passions, considered as the spirit in its\nindividuality;--we have striven to attach to these that which is as\nit were the philosophical result drawn from economic Science, that\nis to say, the idea of a form of value that would be neither the\nintellectual, the \u00e6sthetic, nor the ethical, and cannot by any means\nbe resolved into an ethical anti-value or egoism;--and finally, we\nhave attempted to unite all these threads into one, in order to form\nthe bond that ethical rigorism has hitherto been unable to place\nbetween itself and reality, between the universal and the practical\nindividual, at the same time justifying utilitarian, activity in its\nautonomy. We believe that this historical sketch will have contributed\nto make clear the necessity of our attempt.\n\n\n[1] _De cive,_ c. i. \u00a7 10.\n\n[2] E. Albee, _A History of English Utilitarianism,_ London, 1902, pp.\n26-27.\n\n[3] _De cive,_ c. iii. \u00a7 33.\n\n[4] _Essay on Human Understanding,_ Book II. c. 28, \u00a7 7 _sqq._\n\n[5] _Gr\u00fcndl. d. Metaphys. d. Sitten,_ p. 70.\n\n[6] _Gr\u00fcndl,_ p. 36 _sq.; Kr. d. prakt. Vernft._ pp. 15, 21-28, 43,\n145; cf. _Metaph. d. Sitt._ pp. 208-209.\n\n[7] _Metaph. d. Sitt._ pp. 22, 23, 246.\n\n[8] _Gesch. d. Phil._ iii. p. 535.\n\n[9] La Rochefoucauld, _Maximes_ (ed. Gamier), nn. 159, 185, 224.\n\n[10] Wolf, _Psych, emp.,_ Frankfort and Leipzig, 1738, \u00a7\u00a7 584, 880.\n\n[11] Croce, _Estetica,_ pp. 324-328.\n\n[12] _Kr. d. prakt. Vern._ pp. 79, 108.\n\n[13] _Tract. theol._ c. iv. \u00a7 7.\n\n[14] Cf. Croce, in De Sanctis, _Scritti vari_ (Napoli, 1898), i. pp.\nxiv-xvi, pref.\n\n[15] _Zum ewigen Friede,_ in _Werke_ (ed. Rosenkranz-Schubert), vol.\nvii. pt. i. p. 370.\n\n[16] _De uno univ. juris principio,_ \u00a7 46.\n\n[17] _Encykl._ \u00a7 474, and cf. other passages: _Ph\u00e4n. d. Geistes,_ pp.\n484-486; _Encykl._ \u00a7 474; _Phil. d. Rechtes,_ \u00a7 124; _Phil. d. Gesch._\npp. 39-41.\n\n[18] _Gesch. d. Phil._ ii. pp. 405-6.\n\n[19] _System der Sittenlehre,_ p. 180 _sq._; cf. p. 15.\n\n[20] _Einleitung,_ \u00a7 82 (Italian transl. p. 102).\n\n[21] _Op. cit._ \u00a7 128 (It. tr. p. 172).\n\n[22] _Allg. prakt. Phil._ p. 35.\n\n[23] _Grundz\u00fcge der Ethik,_ \u00a7\u00a7 12, 14.\n\n[24] _Gesch. d. neueren Philos._ (1796-1804), sect. iv. cap. 18 (Fr.\ntr., Paris, 1816, v. 432-753)\n\n[25] _Phil. d. Rechts,_ \u00a7 189 _sqq._\n\n[26] \"L'\u00c9conomie et la sociologie au point de vue scientifique\" in\n_Rivistetele Scienza,_ i. (1907) 293, 312.\n\n[27] See M. Losacco, _Le dottrine edonistiche italiane del secolo\nXVIII_ (Napoli, 1902).\n\n[28] Galluppi, _Elementi di filosofia_ (Napoli, 1846), ii. 265-266, 406\n_sqq._\n\n\n\n\nSECOND SECTION\n\n\nTHE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE\n\n\n\n\nI\n\n\nCRITIQUE OF MATERIAL AND OF FORMALISTIC ETHIC\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Various meanings of \"formal\" and \"material.\"_]\n\nIt is a much-disputed question whether the Principle of Ethic should be\nconceived as _formal_ or _material._ The question, already difficult in\nitself, has become yet more difficult, so as almost to cause despair\nof its solution, owing to the fact that those terms, \"formal\" and\n\"material,\" are understood (as often happens in philosophy) in a double\nsense. Hence, those who win assent to their thesis as to the formality\nof the ethical principle are afterwards wont to avail themselves of\nthis assent, in order stealthily to introduce another thesis, which,\nalthough it be also beneath the banner of the \"formal,\" yet has nothing\nto do with the first and is as false as that is true. And since those\nwho maintain the material principle do the same thing, both alike\ncome to expose their flanks to one another's blows. In the process of\nunravelling this tangled skein, we shall begin by giving to those two\nwords the meaning that they usually bear in philosophical terminology,\nmeaning by \"formal\" the universal and by \"material\" the contingent. And\nin this signification we affirm, above all, that the principle of Ethic\nis _formal_ and certainly not _material._\n\n[Sidenote: _The ethical principle as formal (universal) and not\nmaterial (contingent)._]\n\nWere it material, it would express itself by means of propositions\nindicating a single volition or a group of single volitions as the true\nand proper essence of the moral volition; and the moral activity would\nconsist of a determinate action or of a determinate group of actions.\nBut the moral act is always that which surpasses the single or the\ngroups of singles: to will and to effect the single and the series of\nsingles as such, does not appertain to the ethical, but to the merely\neconomic form. He who loves things for things' sake (be they such, and\nas many as you will, of this or that kind, one, many, infinite) does\nnot yet love the universal, which is everywhere, and is not exhausted\nin any particular thing, nor in any number of things, however immense.\n\n[Sidenote: _Reduction of material to utilitarian Ethic._]\n\nIf we posit a material principle for Ethic, we relapse as a\nconsequence into _utilitarianism,_ from which we thought we had\nescaped; because, after having asserted the universal, it is now\ndetermined, either as a single or (which amounts to the same thing) as\na feigned universal, a simply general concept of group or series. This\nvicissitude, however, presents itself in every sphere of philosophy:\nwhen the universal and formal principle of that sphere is materialized,\nwe return to the sphere immediately, below it. For example, an\nesthetic that posits as its principle certain single forms of art,\nthus substituting matter for form, relapses from art to life lived,\nwhich is the condition that precedes art and upon which art raises\nitself in order to intuite and to dominate life. Material Ethic has\ntherefore been with reason discredited as heteronomous and utilitarian.\nNot indeed that it is so directly and admits itself so to be: on\nthe contrary, it professes to be anti-utilitarian and does nothing\ndirectly, save to point to a given object as the true content of\nmorality. But that object, being single, implies a merely utilitarian\nvolition; and material Ethic is utilitarian, because, whatever it may\ndo or say, it is logically reducible to utilitarianism.\n\n[Sidenote: _Rejection of material principles._]\n\nThe rejection of all material character from the ethical principle\nis of the greatest importance, for it frees Ethic from a long series\nof concepts, each one of which has been proposed in turn as the true\nethical principle, and several still find many supporters, both in\nordinary thought and in treatises called scientific. For us, those\nconcepts should not be examined comparatively, so as to arrive at\npreferring the one to the other, or a new one of the same type to all\nthe concepts previously enunciated; but they are all false, for one and\nthe same reason, as any other that may in future be excogitated will be\nfalse, if it contain in it anything material.\n\n[Sidenote: _Benevolence, love, altruism, etc.; and critique of them._]\n\nA first group of such material principles is found in relation to\nthe general concept of an action, directed toward the welfare of\nindividuals, other than the individual acting. Morality (they say)\nis _sacrifice of self, benevolence, love, altruism, compassion,\nhumanitarianism,_ or simply _naturalism_ of the Franciscan sort,\nwhich commands us to respect, protect, and love the animals also,\nsince they too are God's creatures (brother Wolf, sister Fox). Such\nformul\u00e6, especially those of _benevolence and altruism,_ have been and\ncontinue to be successful; and hardly a doubt is harboured but that\nthey determine in the most complete and satisfactory manner the proper\nprinciple of morality. But in truth _others,_ as individuals, have no\nrights that I too do not possess as an individual: I am another for\nthe other, and he is an I for himself; and if each one provided for\nthe good of others, neglecting and trampling upon his own good, the\nresult would be perfectly identical to what would happen, were each one\nto provide for himself without concern for others. Morality demands\nthe sacrifice of me for the universal end, but of me only in my merely\nindividual ends; and, therefore, in this case, of me as of others. It\nhas no particular animosity against me, so as to wish to sacrifice me\nat all costs to others. We must be severe, not only with ourselves, but\nwith others also; exigent, not only with ourselves, but with others\nalso; and so, on the contrary, benevolent not only toward others,\nbut also toward ourselves; compassionate, not only toward others,\nbut also towards this instrument of labour that we carry about with\nus and of which we sometimes demand too much; that is, our empirical\nindividuality. Reality is neither democratic nor aristocratic, but\nboth together; it abhors the privilege of some over others as much as\nthat equality, according to which each one must have the same value\nas the other at every moment. All are in turn masters and servants;\nworthy of respect as bearers and representatives of good, worthy of\npunishment and reprehension as clouding and impeding the good. Morality\nnever considers individuals in themselves, but always in their relation\nto the universal; and in this respect there is no one who does not\ndeserve to be saved or to be suppressed; there is no animal or other\nbeing of any kind that should not now be favoured in its existence,\nnow annihilated. No individual is treated as an _end,_ but all as\n_means_ for universal morality; and they only obtain the dignity of\nends, in so far as they are means for universal morality. The rights of\nanimals have been written for and against; but in truth, a lamb has now\nthe duty of being slaughtered, now the right of being left in peace,\naccording to circumstances; in the same way that a man has now the\nright to go for a walk with his friends and to sing serenades beneath\nthe windows of fair ladies, now the duty of putting on a uniform and\nof betaking himself beneath the walls of a citadel, where he will be\nblown in pieces by the enemy's grape-shot. Altruism is as insipid as\negoism, and is reducible at bottom to egoism; in much the same way as\nsensual love, which has justly been called \"egoism for two.\" Indeed,\nwhy should we be ready to sacrifice ourselves for others, and to\npromote their desire in every case and in spite of everything? For what\nreason, save for the blind and irrational attachment to them which\nmakes a man throw away his life or descend to abjection for a wicked\nwoman furiously loved, suffer every shame and torment for an unworthy\nson, or yield to the impulses of sympathy inspired by an individual?\nThis blind and irrational attachment to others is at bottom attachment\nto ourselves, to our nerves, to our fancies, to our convenience, to our\nhabits. It is utility, not morality; for morality wills us to be ready\nto separate ourselves from others as from ourselves, when the occasion\narises, to leave wives and sons and brothers, and follow duty which\ntranscends them all. \"Thou only, O ideal, art true,...\" or rather, by\nmeans of the ideal and of the universal, all things are true; without\nthe ideal, there is not one of them that does not become false, as\nthere is not an organism that does not become vile clay, when abandoned\nby life.\n\n[Sidenote: _Social organism, State, interest of the race, etc. Critique\nof them._]\n\nThere is another group of material principles which seems to surpass\nindividuals, because it makes morality to consist of promoting either\nso-called _laws of nature_ or so-called _institutions._ Of such kind\nare those that place morality in the service of the _social organism\nand of the State, or of the interest of the Species and of Life_ (this\nbeing understood as animal life or very near to animality). But if it\nseem that contingent facts are thus escaped, that is not really so.\nFor none of these concepts expresses the universality of the real, but\nthis or that group of its particular manifestations: the life called\nsocial or political, this or that animal species, this or that vital\nmanifestation. And none of these facts can be ethically willed without\nexceptions. The moral man sacrifices the State to the Church, or the\nChurch to the State, atrophies certain organs and suppresses certain\nvital functions for universal ends, or for the ends of what is called\ncivilization; he defends, preserves and increases certain aptitudes\nof the human race, but lets others disappear or modifies them, always\nadapting the interest of the species to that of the ideal. Were he to\ndo otherwise, he would again be substituting utility for morality,\nhis immediate affection for certain things or for certain single and\nindividual facts, to the affection for them that should always be\n_mediated,_ that is to say, mediated by the universal.\n\n[Sidenote: _Material religious principles. Critique of them._]\n\nA third group of material principles, called religious, which make\nmorality to consist of conforming to the will of God and of the\ngods, is not intrinsically different from these. Where the idea of\nthe transcendental and of religious mystery is introduced, there is\ndarkness; and anything can be put into darkness. In the first place,\nnothing but darkness itself can be put there, and in this case the\nreligious solution is agnosticism, confession of ignorance, such as\nwe have hitherto treated, in criticizing theological utilitarianism\nor abstract ethical rigorism, which, by means of its insoluble\ncontradictions, also leads to the idea of God and of mystery. But one's\nown will, caprice and individual interests can also be put there;\nand then religion becomes attachment to a being or to an order of\nbeings, which, though they be imaginary, are not for that reason less\nindividual; attachment to them is love or fear, sympathy or fear of\nthe evil they can do, and tendency to avoid it by propitiation with\nprayers, adulation, gifts, services, worship. Religious principles,\nthen, understood as material principles, also become converted, as all\nknow, and we may add, know all too well, into utilitarian principles;\nbecause, through intently fixing the gaze upon this aspect of religion,\nthey have forgotten to look at others more important and certainly more\nnoble.\n\n[Sidenote: _Formal principle as affirmation of a merely logical\nexigency._]\n\nThe ethical principle is not adequately expressed, either by the\n_altruistic_ concept, or by that of _natural formations_ and of\n_institutions,_ or by that of the _gods;_ because all of these are\ngeneral concepts, or sometimes merely individual representations; they\nare certainly not universal concepts. And by the necessity of the\nuniversal and the insufficiency of the merely general and individual,\nthe ethical principle must be _formal_ and not _material._ However (and\nhere we enter into the new meaning of this word and into the new debate\nannounced), the formal ethical principle has likewise been understood\nas not susceptible of extension beyond the enunciation of the character\nof universality, which the principle itself should possess. Its formula\nhas seemed to be nothing but that of a _universal law,_ to which all\nmen can conform in complete harmony among themselves; of _respect\ntowards all beings,_ in the degree that appertains to each, of that\nwhich satisfies _the exigencies of reason and of conscience,_ and so\non. Now the formality claimed by this and similar formul\u00e6 has nothing\nto do with the formality first claimed; and since in the preceding\ndebate we took the side of those who maintain formal as against\nmaterial Ethic, so here we must defend material against formal Ethic;\nor better, an Ethic that is not material against an Ethic that is not\nformal, save in the pretentions of those who thus baptize it.\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique of a formal ethic in this sense: tautologism._]\n\nWhat does the formality of Ethic mean in the new sense? Nothing\nbut this: that it is not necessary to inquire _what is the ethical\nprinciple,_ but that we must be satisfied with saying that _whatever\nit be, it must be universal._ But that it must be universal is a\nproposition which belongs, not to Ethic, but to Logic; the principles\nof all philosophical sciences must possess the character of\nuniversality, the logical as the \u00e6sthetic, the principle of Ethic as\nthat of Economic, the moral categoric imperative as the utilitarian\ncategoric. Thus the thesis of formality in the new meaning is reduced\nto placing at the head of Ethic, not the ethical principle, _but the\nlogical exigency of the ethical principle,_ in the same way that a\nsimilar claim in \u00c6sthetic would result in placing at the head of\nthat science, not the formal \u00e6sthetic principle, as for example,\nIntuition-expression, but a formal \u00e6sthetic principle, the claim for\na law, so made that no form of beauty could ever be excluded from\nit. Instead of constructing the science, the affirmation of logical\nnecessity, which that construction must obey, is infinitely repeated;\nbut the thesis of formality in the new sense would be better called the\nthesis of _tautologism._\n\n[Sidenote: _Tautological principles: ideal, chief good, duty, etc., and\ncritique of them._]\n\nBesides the formul\u00e6 to which we have referred, namely those of the\n_categoric imperative, of the universal law, of the respect for being,\nof the rational and of conscience,_ the formul\u00e6 of the _chief good,\nof duty (or of law), of the ideal, of true pleasure, of constant\npleasure, of spiritual pleasure, of personal dignity, of self-esteem,\nof the just mean, of harmony, of proportion, of justice, of perfection,\nof following nature,_ and so on, also belong to the tautological\nprinciples of Ethic; they are all tautologies, because they do not\ndetermine to what object those logical claims are applicable. To ask\nwhat is the form of will that produces a _constant, spiritual and\ntrue_ pleasure, which makes _perfect, gives self-esteem, satisfies our\nconscience, strikes the just mean,_ answers to what _ought_ to be done,\nattains to _the supreme good,_ and so on, is tantamount to asking,\n_What is the ethical form?_ This is precisely what must be answered,\nif we do not wish to fall into tautology, and the reply cannot be the\nquestion itself.\n\n[Sidenote: _Tautological meaning of certain formul\u00e6, material in\nappearance._]\n\nAnd it is convenient to note here that many of the formul\u00e6 that\nwe have criticized as belonging to material Ethic, have also been\nfrequently-employed as tautological formul\u00e6, that is to say, as symbols\nand metaphors of the ethical truth to be determined. The _others,_ of\nwhich altruism speaks, are at bottom not others as physically distinct\nfrom us, but others in an ideal sense, that is, as duty surpassing\nthe empirical ego; _God,_ of which religious Ethic speaks, is that\nindeterminate concept, that logical exigency, which is also called the\n_categoric imperative; the State or Life_ that one pledges oneself\nto serve is not this or that State, this or that particular form of\nlife, but the symbol of the ideal; the _nature_ to be followed is that\nnature, or ethical principle within us, which the speculative reason\nmust determine. Thus do material principles often progress, ceasing\nto be such, in order to become tautological, that is, abandoning the\npossession of undue determination, owing to the consciousness of a\nwant, of a lacuna to be filled.\n\n[Sidenote: _Conversion of tautological Ethic into material and\nutilitarian Ethic._]\n\nThe evil is that tautologism inevitably returns to that undue\npossession, because, imagining that it has established that ethical\nprinciple which it has not established at all, and that it has finally\nconstructed Ethic, of which it has not even laid the foundations, it\nsets to work to explain moral and concrete facts by means of that\nempty form. The consequence of this is that utilitarian motives, as\nusual, fill the empty space. Why should we not violate a deposit that\nhas been entrusted to us? Perhaps because (as they say) the moral law\nis a universal law? That does not suffice. Respect for the deposit\ncannot be deduced from this principle, for a universal law is equally\nthinkable, according to which is deduced in certain cases a respect for\nthe deposit and in certain other cases the contrary. This then is the\nfact: that to restore a deposit confided to us may sometimes happen to\nbe a bad action, as, for instance, to restore the weapon entrusted to\nus, when he who claims it intends to commit suicide or to assassinate.\nThus it happens that not knowing how to put an end to the controversy\nin virtue of the true ethical principle, and wishing nevertheless in\nsome way to use that empty formula, it comes to be filled with the only\nprinciple possessed, namely the utilitarian; and the reason given for\nrespecting the deposit is said to be the desirability of respecting for\nengagements, for the ends of the individual, failing which (it will\nbe said) no business would thenceforth be effected and the world of\naffairs would languish.\n\n[Sidenote: _In what sense Ethic should be formal and in what other\nsense material._]\n\n_Formal_ Ethic, in the new sense, or as it would be better called,\ntautological Ethic, might be called _formalistic,_ owing to its thus\nfalling back into material, heteronomous and utilitarian Ethic, since\n_formalism_ here (as in \u00c6sthetic and Logic) is the caricature of\nformality, and almost a sort of materiality. In maintaining _formal_\nEthic we do not wish that it should be _formalistic_; that is, that it\nshould be again covertly material. And we wish that formal Ethic should\nalso be material, always understanding by this that it must give, not\nthe mere logical condition of the ethical principle, but _this ethical\nprinciple itself_ in its concreteness, determining what moral volition\nis in its reality.\n\n\n\n\nII\n\n\nTHE ETHICAL FORM AS ACTUATION OF THE SPIRIT IN UNIVERSAL\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Tautological Ethic and its connection with Philosophy,\neither partial or discontinuous._]\n\nIf the strange idea of an ethical principle that should be formal,\nin the sense of its not being known exactly what it is and how it is\njustified, has ever been able to arise, this is due to two erroneous\nphilosophical conceptions, of which one can be called _partial,_ the\nother _discontinuous_ philosophy. According to the first conception,\nman is capable of knowing something of reality, certainly, but not\nall: he perceives and arranges the data of experience by means of the\ncategories, but he is aware of the limitation of his thought and of the\nimpossibility of attaining to the heart of the real, which he does, it\nis true, end by attaining in a certain way, but only with the heart,\nnot with thought. This being stated, and coming to the case of Ethic,\nman hears the voice of conscience in himself, the command of the moral\nlaw; he cannot think of any sophism to escape it: but precisely what\nthat law is, he is unable to say; the idea of a divine ordinance of\nthe world which presents itself to his spirit, may also be affirmed by\nthe heart, but never by thought. The second conception is confounded\nby some thinkers with the first and becomes partial philosophy or\nagnosticism; but if we observe closely, it is distinct from the other.\nFor here it is not actually asserted that the foundation of morality\nis unknowable, but it is said to be unknowable in the circle of Ethic,\nor that such knowledge goes beyond that circle. Ethic establishes the\nmoral law, deduces or arranges beneath it ethical precepts and by means\nof them judges single actions. Ethic is ignorant as to whether that\nlaw really exists, or what may be its precise universal content. It\nhands this problem over to Metaphysic, or to general Philosophy, which\nsolves it in its own way, or is presumed to be capable of solving it.\nIn this conception, then, there arises a question as to competence\nand hierarchy between thought and thought, between particular and\ngeneral philosophy; whereas, in the former, is affirmed the absolute\nincompetence of thought.\n\n[Sidenote: _Rejection of both these conceptions._]\n\nBut we do not run the risk of colliding with the obstacle placed\nbefore us with these philosophical views, because we have constantly\nrejected them both throughout the whole of our exposition of the\nPhilosophy of the spirit and have demonstrated their falsity. Partial\nPhilosophy is a contradictory concept: thought either thinks all\nor nothing; and if it had a limit it would have it as thought and\ntherefore as surpassed. Whoso admits something unknowable, declares\neverything unknowable, and inevitably falls into total scepticism. Nor\nis the idea of a discontinuous philosophy divided into a whole and\nits parts, with the whole outside the parts and the parts outside the\nwhole less inconceivable; so that, while Ethic is being studied, the\nwhole (complete Philosophy) seems problematical; and a part (Ethic)\ncan be known to some extent without knowing the whole (the whole\nof Philosophy). This is a false view, ultimately derived from the\nempirical sciences, in which it is possible to apprehend one order\nof phenomena independently of the others; and to apprehend phenomena\nwithout explicitly posing or by dismissing to another occasion the\nphilosophical problem as to their truth. Philosophy is a circle and a\nunity and every point of it is intelligible only in relation to all the\nothers. The didascalic convenience of exposing a group of philosophical\nproblems separately from others--or also (if it please others, as\nit has not pleased us) of dividing the exposition into particular\nphilosophical sciences, and into general Philosophy (also called\nMetaphysic)--should not lead to the misconception that the indivisible\nis really being divided. The whole of Philosophy is at once enunciated\nwith the first philosophical proposition; and the others that come\nafter will all be nothing but explanations of the first.\n\n[Sidenote: _The ethical form as volition of the universal._]\n\nTherefore, since we have never denied faith to thought, nor broken in\npieces the unity of Philosophy, we have no secret to reveal at this\npoint; not even a poor secret, like the exponents of discontinuous\nPhilosophy, who solemnly make known at the end what they have assumed\nfrom the beginning. Our formal ethical principle is never empty form\nthat must only now be filled with a content. It is full form, form\nin the philosophical and universal sense, which is also content and\ntherefore universal content. We have not restricted ourselves to\ndefining the ethical form as universal form, which would have resulted\nin tautologism; but we have defined it _volition of the universal,_\nthus distinguishing it from the economic form, which is simply volition\nof the individual. And if we now ask ourselves what is the universal,\nwe must reply that the answer has already been given, and that whoever\nhas not yet understood, whoever indeed has not understood it for some\ntime, will never understand it. The universal has been the object of\nall our Philosophy of the Spirit, and we have always had to keep it\nbefore our eyes, in studying, not only the practical function, but\nany other function of the spirit; just as we cannot have the idea\nof the branch of a tree without the idea of the trunk from which it\nsprings and without which there would not be the branch of a tree. That\nconcept, then, is not a _deus ex machina_ to appear unexpectedly at the\nend of the play and hastily bring it to a conclusion, but the force\nthat has animated it from the first to the last scene.\n\n[Sidenote: _The universal as the Spirit (Reality, Liberty, etc.)._]\n\nWhat is the universal? It is the Spirit, it is Reality, in so far as\nit is truly real, that is, in so far as it is unity of thought and\nwilling; it is Life, in so far as realized in its profundity as this\nunity itself; it is Freedom, if a reality so conceived be perpetual\ndevelopment, creation, progress. Outside the Spirit nothing is\nthinkable in a truly universal form. \u00c6sthetic, Logic, Historic, this\nvery Philosophy of the practical, have demonstrated and confirmed\nthis truth in every way. Every other concept brought forward reveals\nitself (and has revealed itself beneath our analysis), either as a\nfeigned universal, or as something contingent that has been abstracted\nand generalized, or as the hypostasis of certain of our particular\nspiritual products, such as mathematical formul\u00e6, or as the negation of\nthe Spirit, on which is conferred positive value (first with metaphor\nand then with metaphysic).\n\nAnd the moral individual who wills the universal, or that which\ntranscends him as an individual, turns precisely to the Spirit, to\nreal Reality, to true Life, to Liberty. The universal is in concrete\nthe universal individualized, and the individual is real in so far as\nhe is also universal. He is not able to assert one part of himself\nwithout asserting the other (under the penalty of stopping half-way,\n_dimidiatus vir,_ and so of again becoming nothing). But in order to\nassert them both, he must first posit the one as explicit and the other\nas implicit, and then make the other also explicit. Man as economic\nindividual, at the first moment (so to speak) of his revealing himself\nto life and to existence, cannot will, save individually: will his\nown individual existence. There is no man, however moral he be, who\ndoes not begin in this way. How could he ever surpass and finally\ndeny his own individual life, if he had not first affirmed it and\ndid not reaffirm it at every instant? But he who should stop at that\naffirmation of the individual, regarding the first stage of development\nas the resting-place, would enter into profound contradiction with\nhimself. He should will, not only his own self individualized, but also\nthat self, which, being in all selves, is their common Father. Thus he\npromotes the realization of the Real, lives a full life and makes his\nheart beat in harmony with the universe: _cor cordium._\n\nThe moral individual has this consciousness of working for the Whole.\nEvery action, however diverse, which conforms to ethical duty, conforms\nto Life; and if, instead of promoting Life, it should depress and\nmortify it, for that very reason it would be immoral. Where facts seem\nto demonstrate the contrary, the interpretation of facts is erroneous,\nsince it affirms as a criterion of judgment a life which is not that\ntrue life, which, as we know, we serve even by dying--dying as an\nindividual, as a collectivity, as a social class, or as a people. The\nmost humble moral act can be resolved into this volition of the Spirit\nin universal. Thus it happens that the soul of a simple and ignorant\nman, altogether devoted to his rude duty, vibrates in unison with that\nof the philosopher, whose mind receives into it the universal Spirit:\nwhat the one thinks at that moment, the other does, thus attaining\nby his own path to that full satisfaction, that act of life, that\nfruitful conjunction with the Real, which the other has attained to by\na different path. It may be said that the moral man is a _practical\nphilosopher_ and the philosopher a _theoretic actor._\n\n[Sidenote: _Moral acts as volitions of the Spirit._]\n\nThis criterion of the Spirit, of Progress, of Reality, is the intimate\nmeasure of our acts in the moral conscience, as it is the foundation,\nmore or less clearly expressed, of our moral judgments. Why do we exalt\nGiordano Bruno, who allowed himself to be condemned to the stake for\nasserting his philosophy? Perhaps for the calmness with which he faced\nthe torture? But many fanatics, even malefactors, are capable of this,\nand it may sometimes even be a simple sensual desire, of which we\nhave seen examples in history and of which a modern Italian poet has\nlately sung, exalting the beauty of the flame and the voluptuousness of\nthe pyre. By facing death and refusing to deny his philosophy, Bruno\ncontributed to the creation of a larger form of civilization, and\nfor this reason he is not only a victim, but also a _martyr,_ in the\netymological sense of the word: witness and realizer of a demand of\nthe Spirit in universal.--Why do we praise the charitable man? Perhaps\nbecause he yields to the emotion caused by the spectacle of suffering.\nBut emotion in itself is neither moral nor immoral, and thus to yield\nto it materially is weakness, that is, immorality. The charitable man,\nwhen he removes or mitigates suffering, relights a life and reconquers\na force for the common work, which both he and the person whom he has\nbenefited, must serve.\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique of antimoralism._]\n\nThere is indeed nothing more foolish than antimoralism, so much the\nfashion in our day; it is an ugly echo of unhealthy social conditions,\nof one-sided theories ill understood (Marxism, Nietzscheianism).\nAntimoralism is justified, in so far as it combats moral hypocrisy\nin favour of effective morality instead of that of mere words, but\nit loses all meaning when it inflates empty phrases or combines\ncontradictory propositions and preaches against morality itself. By so\ndoing, it thinks to celebrate strength, health and freedom, but on the\ncontrary exalts servitude to unbridled passions, the apparent health of\nthe invalid and the apparent strength of the maniac. Morality (begging\npardon of literary immoralists), far from being a pedantic fiction or\nthe consolation of the impotent, is _good blood against bad blood._\n\n[Sidenote: _Confused tendencies of tautological, material, religious\nformul\u00e6, etc., toward the Ethic of the Spirit._]\n\nWe must also declare that this truth concerning the ethical principle\nunderstood as will that has for its end the universal or the Spirit,\nis to some extent confirmed by several of the formul\u00e6 that we have\ncriticized, which have erred only in defining it, either confusing\naltogether the universal and the contingent, or have fallen into\ntautologism. Those who posit Life, or the interest of the Species,\nSociety or the State, as the end of morality, have in view that Life,\nthat Species, that Society, or that ideal State, which is the Spirit\nin universal, although they are not able to define it clearly. The\nsame may be said of other formul\u00e6, which often have a better intention\nat starting than that realized in the development of the relative\ndoctrines, or, on the contrary, a development superior to their bad\ninitial intention.\n\n[Sidenote: _The Ethic of the Spirit and religious Ethic._]\n\nThis function of symbol possessed by idealist Ethic, this\naffirmation that the moral act is love and volition of the Spirit\nin universal, is to be found above all in religious and Christian\nEthic, in the Ethic of love and of the anxious search for the divine\npresence. This is the fundamental characteristic of religious Ethic,\nwhich remains unknown to vulgar rationalists and intellectualists, to\nso-called free-thinkers, and to frequenters of masonic lodges, owing to\ntheir narrow party passion or lack of mental subtlety. There is hardly\nan ethical truth (and we have already had occasion to refer to this\nmatter) that cannot be expressed with the words that we have learned\nas children from traditional religion, and which rise spontaneously\nto the lips, as the most elevated, the most appropriate and the most\nbeautiful; words which are certainly impregnated with mythology, but\nare also weighty with profound philosophical content. There is without\ndoubt an exceedingly strong antithesis between the idealist philosopher\nand the religious individual, but it is not greater than that within\nourselves, when, in the imminence of a crisis, we are divided in\nsoul and yet very near to unity and to interior conciliation. If the\nreligious man cannot but see in the philosopher his adversary, his\nmortal foe, the philosopher, on the other hand, sees in him his younger\nbrother, his very self of a moment past. Hence he will feel himself\nmore nearly allied to an austere, emotional, religious Ethic, troubled\nwith phantoms, than to an Ethic that is superficially rationalistic:\nfor this latter is only in appearance more philosophical than the\nother, since if it possess the merit of recognizing (verbally only, or\nwith _psittacism,_ as Leibnitz would have said) the supreme rights of\nreason, yet in plucking thought from the soil in which it has grown and\ndepriving it of vital sap, it exercises them very ill.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\n\nHISTORICAL NOTES\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Merit of the Kantian Ethic._]\n\nI. It is the singular merit of Kant to have put an end, once for all,\nto every material Ethic, by proving its utilitarian character: a\nmerit that is not cancelled by the lacun\u00e6 that exist in other parts\nof his thought, entangling him unawares in the materialism and in the\nutilitarianism that he had surpassed. It would be anti-historical to\ndesire to judge a thinker by the contradictions into which he falls\nand so to declare his work to be a failure and of no importance, when\nit is only imperfect. There are errors in all the works of man, and\nerror is always contradiction; but he who has the eye of the historian\ndiscovers where lies the true strength of a thought and does not deny\nthe light, because of necessity accompanied with shadow. Before Kant,\nethic was either openly utilitarian or such that although presenting\nitself in the deceitful form of Ethic of sympathy, or religious Ethic,\nwas yet reducible to utilitarianism. Kant conducted an implacable and\ndestructive war, not only against admitted utilitarian forms, but also\nagainst those that were masked and spurious, called by him material\nEthic.\n\n[Sidenote: _The predecessors of Kant._]\n\nIn this too, his predecessors are to be found in traditional philosophy\nof Christian origin, or, if it be preferred, Platonic (opposition\nof material to formal Ethic can already be observed in the attitude\nof Aristotle to Plato). If the fathers and the scholastics had been\ndivided as to the question of the relation between moral laws and the\ndivine will, and many of them, especially the mystics, had made that\nlaw to depend upon the divine will and upon nothing else, yet views\nhad not been wanting, according to which the power of changing at\nwill the moral laws, that is to say, of changing his own essence, was\ndenied to God, since he could not be _supra se._ Religious Ethic was\ncleansed of every admixture of arbitrarism and utilitarianism by this\nsolution, accepted by nearly all religious thinkers of the seventeenth\nand eighteenth centuries (by Cudworth, by Malebranche, and finally by\nLeibnitz). On the other hand, we cannot but recognize that many other\nmaterial formul\u00e6 used to be understood in an ideal, or, as we have\nsaid, in a symbolical manner; and certainly that very eud\u00e6monism\nof Aristotle, toward which Kant showed himself too severe, was not\nthe pleasure and happiness of the hedonists and utilitarians, and the\nmediety (\u03bc\u03b5\u03c3\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2) proposed as the distinctive character of virtue,\nalthough without doubt empty and often incoherent, was already almost\na formal principle. The same is to be said of the Stoic principle of\n_following nature_; and coming to the immediate predecessors of Kant,\nof that _perfectio_ already mentioned, which Kant, after wavering a\nlittle, reduced to happiness, not, however, without stating that it is\na more indeterminate concept than any other. With Kant, however, the\npoint was admitted, that the moral law is not to be expressed in any\nformula, which contains representative and contingent elements.\n\n[Sidenote: _Defect of that Ethic: agnosticism._]\n\nThe defect of the Kantian Ethic is the defect of his whole philosophy:\nagnosticism, which prevents his truly surpassing either the phenomenon\nor the thing in itself, leading him, on the one hand, toward\nempiricism, on the other toward that transcendental metaphysic, which\nno one had done more to discredit than himself. He combated the concept\nof the good or supreme good as the principle of Ethic, and he was right\nin so far as he understood it as object of any sort, of \"a good,\" as of\na \"thing.\" But this did not exempt him from the duty of defining the\nsupreme good as that which is not exhausted in any particular object,\nor of determining the universal. Now his philosophy was incapable of\nattaining to the universal.\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique of Hegel and of others._]\n\nHence the involuntary return to utilitarianism, clearly stated by Hegel\nin his youthful essay upon natural Right. The practical principle of\nKant (remarked Hegel) is not a true but a negative absolute; hence\nwith him the principle of morality becomes converted into immorality:\nsince every fact can be thought in the form of universality, it is\nnever known what fact should be received into the law. In the famous\nexample of the deposit, Kant had said that it is necessary to keep\nfaith as regards the deposit, otherwise there would no longer be\ndeposits.[1] But if there were no more deposits, how would this\nconstitute a contradiction to the form of the law? There would perhaps\nbe contradiction and absurdity for material reasons, but it is already\nagreed that this is not to be brought up in the argument. Kant wishes\nto justify property, but he does not attain to more than the tautology,\nthat property, if it be property, must be property, opening the way\nto the free choice of conceiving at will as duties these or those\ncontingent definitions of property. The moral maxims of Kant, owing to\nthe empirical determinations that they assume, are contradictory, not\nonly of one another, but of themselves. This inevitable degeneration\nof the Kantian Ethic was called by Hegel _tautology and formalism_.[2]\nOther thinkers were also affected by the utilitarianism of the\nKantian Ethic: Schopenhauer even declared that his doctrine has no\nother foundation than egoism, since it can be reduced to the concept\nof reciprocity, and he protested against the Kantian theory that we\nshould be compassionate to animals, in order to exercize ourselves\nin the virtue of compassion, judging it to be the effect of the\nJud\u00e6o-Christian views of Kant.[3] Schopenhauer was in some respect\nright in these observations, although as regards animals we must note\nthat the same attitude is found in Spinoza and in other thinkers and\nthat it derives from material and utilitarian Ethic; and for the rest\nthat it would be very unjust to see nothing but egoism in the categoric\nimperative of Kant, for this, we repeat, though it constitute its\ndanger, does not constitute its essential character.\n\n[Sidenote: _Kant and the concept of freedom._]\n\nNevertheless, in Kant himself, in this thinker, so rich in\ncontradictions and suggestions, was indicated the concept which, when\nelaborated, was to constitute the principle, not merely of tautological\nand formalistic, but of concrete and formal Ethic, the concept of\n_freedom._ By means of this concept Kant enters into the heart of the\nreal and reaches that region of which mysticism and religion had from\ntime to time caught a glimpse and had here and there attained. As the\norigin of the rigid Kantian ethical conception and of his abhorrence\nfor the material and mundane is to be found in Christianity (and in\nPaganism), so the origin of the concrete moral idea is to be sought in\nSt. Augustine, and also in St. Paul, in the mystics and in the great\nFrench Christians of the seventeenth century; in that virtue of which\nPascal wrote as _plus haute que celle des pharisiens et des plus sages\ndu paganisme,_ and it operates with omnipotent hand, by means of which\nalone is it possible _d\u00e9gager l'\u00e2me de l'amour du monde, la retirer\nde ce quelle a de plus cher, la faire mourir \u00e0 soi-m\u00eame, la porter et\nl'attacher uniquement et invariablement \u00e0 Dieu._[4] The successors\nof Kant, especially Fichte and Hegel, closed the circle which he had\nleft open, and altogether excluding transcendency, they made of God\nfreedom and of freedom reality. Fichte, who expelled the phantom of the\nthing in itself from theoretical philosophy, removed from the categoric\nimperative the appearance of _qualitas occulta,_ which it had borne in\nthe Philosophy of the practical, illuminating that tenebrous region,\nready to receive any sort of phantasm or superstition, such as belief\nin a moral law arbitrarily imposed by the divinity.[5] Hegel does not\nrecognize duty and the categoric imperative, but freedom only, and as\nhe says, the free spirit is that in which subject and object coincide\nand freedom is freely willed.\n\n[Sidenote: _Ethic in the nineteenth century._]\n\nII. After the classical epoch of modern philosophy, in the general\nregression of Ethic, the concept of the concreteness and universality\nof the practical principle was also lost. Omitting the utilitarians,\nwho no longer have a place here, it must suffice to record how there\nwas a return either to the formalistic principles, which Hegel\ncriticized in Kant (for instance the principle of the Ethic of Rosmini,\nthe _respect for being,_ afterwards combated by Gioberti), or directly\nto those material principles which Kant had already excluded. Such\nare the _compassion_ of Schopenhauer, the _five practical ideas_ of\nHerbart, the love of Feuerbach, _benevolence_ as the supreme ethical\nidea of Lotze, the _theological_ morality of Baader, the _life_ of\nNietzsche, and the like.\n\nThe principles of the first were completed with a religious conception\n(here too Rosmini may afford an example), and those of the second, when\nthey did not reveal themselves as utilitarian or tautological, showed\nan obscure tendency toward the Ethic of Freedom. This must not be\noverlooked in the Ethic of Nietzsche, which despite the rocks and mud\nthat the thought of Nietzsche drags with it, is yet anti-hedonistic and\nanti-utilitarian and quite full of the sense of Life as activity and\npower. Positivistic evolutionism is also often unconscious idealism;\nand the moral actions, united to evolution, can be interpreted as\nthose which correspond to the Spirit in universal. The concepts of the\npessimists alone are altogether incapable of idealistic interpretation\n(for example, Schopenhauer), and those of the semi-pessimist and\nsemi-idealist Hartmann are strangely contradictory. He makes morality\nto consist of the promotion of civilization, whence so lofty a\ncondition of the spirit can be attained that it will be possible to\ndecree universal suicide by means of the vote of all the world.\n\nThe question asked after Kant, whether Ethic should be formal\nor material, is one that we have made more precise in the other\nform, whether Ethic should be abstract or concrete, full or empty,\ntautological or expressive--that is (with even greater precision),\nwhether Ethic can be established before and without a philosophical\nsystem and even be reconciled with agnosticism, has no longer been\nunderstood, even by its pretended followers, the Neocriticists or\nNeokantians. These have either believed they had solved it by means of\nmoderate utilitarianism, or by going outside it and denying the most\nsecure result of the Kantian critique of Ethic; or they have discussed\nit tiresomely, without making a step in advance. Progress indeed was\npossible on one condition alone: that a philosophical system should\nbe constructed not inferior to that of the postkantian idealists. But\nthis would have been tantamount to demanding the death of neokantianism\nor neocriticism, which has not only not attempted to surpass the\nidealistic systems, but has even maintained that we should philosophize\nwithout a system, declaring that a system is altogether inconceivable.\nThe Neokantians can thus be recognized as the descendants of Kant; but\nin the same way as the last descendant of the Hapsburgs in Spain,\nwho was neither emperor, king, soldier, nor man, could be recognized\nas the descendant of Charles the Fifth, who was man, soldier, king,\nand emperor: because, like his great predecessor, he possessed the\ndeformed, hanging lip of the Hapsburgs.\n\n\n[1] _Krit. d. prakt. Vern._ pp. 30-31.\n\n[2] _Ueb. d. wissensch. Behandlungsarten d. Naturrechts,_ in _Werke,_\ni. 353; cf. _Gesch. d. Phil._ iii. 533 sqq.\n\n[3] _Gr\u00fcndl, d. Moral,_ in _Werke,_ ed. cit., iii. 538, 542-543.\n\n[4] _Lettres prov._ 1. 5.\n\n[5] _System d. Sittenlehre,_ pp. 49-51.\n\n\n\n\nTHIRD PART\n\n\nLAWS\n\n\n\n\nI\n\n\nLAWS AS PRODUCTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Definition of law._]\n\n_Law_ is a volitional act, which has for content a _series_ or _class_\nof actions.\n\n[Sidenote: _Philosophical and empirical concepts of society._]\n\nThis definition excludes above all from the concept of law a\ndetermination that is generally considered essential to it, the\ndetermination of _society_; this amounts to saying that it also extends\nthe concept of law to the case of the _isolated individual._ But in\norder that there may be no misunderstanding in relation to a point\nlike this of the highest importance, it will be well to show that the\nword \"society\" has a double meaning, philosophical and empirical, and\nif we exclude its empirical sense from the concept of law, it would\nneither be possible nor our wish, to exclude its philosophical sense.\nReality is unity and multiplicity together, and an individual is\nconceivable, in so far as he is compared with other individuals, and\nthe process of reality is effective, in so far as individuals enter\ninto relations with one another. Without multiplicity there would not\nbe knowledge, action, art or thought, utility or morality; therefore\nthe isolated individual, torn from the reality that constitutes him\nand that he constitutes, is something abstract and absurd. But he\nis no longer absurd, when understood in another way, with polemical\nintention against a false concept; as an individual not absolutely,\nbut relatively isolated, in respect to certain contingent conditions\nwhich had wrongly been held essential: in which case the concept of\nsociety is conversely itself abstract and unreal. \"Society,\" indeed,\nis also used to mean a multiplicity of beings of the same species, and\nit is evident that here an arbitrary element enters into the problem,\nfor the naturalistic concept of sameness of species is arbitrary\nand approximative; hence the pretended sameness might fail and the\nsociety yet exist all the same. A man may not be able to find those\nwho resemble him among a multitude of men and conduct himself as if\nthey did not exist; but this does not prevent his living in the society\nof beings that are called natural, with his dog, his horse, with\nplants, with the earth, with the dead and with God. When he is placed\nin solitude or isolated from the other beings, said to belong to the\nsame species as himself, that other society, or the communion with\nwhat remains to him of reality, will always continue, thus enabling\nhim to continue his life of contemplation, of thought, of action and\nof morality. In order to understand the Spirit in its universality,\nwe must separate it from contingencies, and society in the empirical\nsense is contingency, which the concept of the isolated individual\n(isolated from it and not from reality, from the _societas hominum,_\nnot from the _societas entium_), enables us to surpass. The great\nservices which this concept has rendered to Logic, to \u00c6sthetic and\nespecially to Economy, are known, for the latter only began to develop\nthe philosophical spirit in itself, when it conceived economic facts\nas they take place in the individual, prior to what is called society,\nthus positing the concept of an isolated economy. Conversely, Economic,\n\u00c6sthetic, Ethic and all philosophical problems and sciences lost their\ntrue nature and became bastardized, when gross _sociologism_ replaced\namong social contingencies those universals, which philosophers had\nwith great labour removed from them and thought in their purity.\nDefining laws, then, as facts that occur, not only in society,\nbut also in the isolated individual, our intention is simply to\nconcentrate attention upon the concept of _true society,_ which is _all\nreality,_ and not allow it to be diverted and confused with accidental\ndeterminations, of the kind that may and may not be.\n\n[Sidenote: _Laws as individual product: programmes of individual life._]\n\nNo great art is required to find instances of individuals who make\nlaws for themselves, carry them out and change them, grant rewards to\nthemselves and inflict upon themselves punishments; nor is there any\nneed to incommode the worthy Robinson of the economists to this end.\nWithout being obliged to make the effort of imagining ourselves cast\nupon a desert island and provided only with a sack of corn and the\nBible, it suffices to have eyes and to observe our daily life, for\nnumbers of examples of internal legislation to present themselves.\nThose laws, made for our use and consumption, are called _programmes\nof life._ Who can live without programmes? Who does not decide that he\nwill desire certain actions and avoid certain others? From youth onward\nwe begin to legislate in this way and this production of internal laws\nis interrupted only by death. We say, for instance:--\"I shall devote\nmy life to agriculture: I shall live in the country every year from\nJune to November; from December to February I shall come to town,\nthat I may not lose touch with political or social life; from March\nto May I shall travel, for pleasure and instruction.\" This programme\nis subdivided and completed with other programmes, according to the\nvarious conditions and possibilities taken into consideration; and laws\nare established as to the way one should conduct oneself in respect to\nreligion, family, friends, the State, the Church and also in respect to\nthis or that individual; for (as is observed by Logic) the individual\nconceived as a fixed being, also becomes a concept, abstraction, group,\nseries, or class. He who wished it, would be able to establish a\nparallel between programmes or individual laws and laws that are called\nsocial: in the individual would be found fundamental statutes, laws,\nrules, ordinances, temporary arrangements, contracts, single laws and\nall the other legal forms found in societies. Now in what conceivable\nway do the programmes of the individual differ from those of society?\nAre not those laws _programmes,_ and are not those programmes _laws?_\n\n[Sidenote: _Exclusion of the character of compulsion and critique of\nthis concept._]\n\nTo this interrogation of ours, which does not express a doubt within\nus, but states what seems to be an undeniable fact, defying any sort\nof contradiction, may be objected (and it is a common objection)\nthat there is a great difference between individual laws and those of\nsociety or of the State: these are compulsory, those are not; and for\nthis reason these are true laws, while the others are mere programmes.\nBut we cannot attach any importance to this objection, at least as thus\nformulated; because, having now traversed the whole of the Philosophy\nof the practical, general, and special, we have never met with what\nis called compulsion in the circle of willing and doing, save in the\nnegative sense of deficiency of will and action. No action can ever\nbe compulsory; every action is free, because the Spirit is freedom;\nthere may not be action in a certain case, but a compulsory action\nis inconceivable, since it is a question of terms that exclude one\nanother. Does the fact give the lie to our assertion? Let us examine\nthe fact for a little, face to face and without preconceptions. Let us\nfor this purpose take an extreme case: for instance, that of the law of\na most powerful despot, who, being in command of police, should order a\ngroup of men to bring their first-born to sacrifice to the god in whom\nhe believes, but they do not. Are the men who hear this manifestation\nof will constrained by it? What menace can make him who wishes to say\nno, say yes? That group of men will rebel, will take up arms, will\nrout the troops of the despot, will put him to death, or render him\nincapable of harming; and in this hypothesis the law will not reveal\nany character, of compulsion. But in the other hypothesis also, where\nthey do not rebel and in the meantime bow to the will of the despot,\neither that they may not risk their own lives, or because they defer\ntheir rebellion to a more propitious moment and consign their sons\nto death; they will not have suffered any compulsion, but will have\nfreely willed: they will have willed to preserve their own lives at\nthe expense of their sons'; or to sacrifice some of them in order to\nhave the time to put themselves into such a position that they may be\nable to rebel with the hope of victory. Thus we find in social laws,\nnow observance, now inobservance of the law; but both occur in freedom.\nInobservance may be followed by what is called punishment (that is to\nsay, the legislator who has imposed a given class of actions, will\nadopt certain definite measures against those who do not obey them; to\nwit: he will will another class of actions, destined to render possible\nthe first, because the punishment is a new condition of things set\nbefore the individual, according to which he must alter his previous\nmode of action); but the punishment always finds itself face to face\nwith the freedom of the individual. He will be able freely to observe\nthe law in order to avoid the punishment or its recurrence; but he will\nalso be able freely to rebel against it, as in the instance adduced.\n\n[Sidenote: _Identical characteristics of individual and social laws._]\n\nIf compulsion be wanting to individual laws, this is because it is\nalso always wanting to social laws: while, on the contrary, what is\nreally present in social laws is equally present in the observances and\nrebellions, rewards and punishments of individual laws.\n\nTo return to the former example: the individual who has decided to\ndevote himself to agriculture as programme of life, may be seized\nall of a sudden with a great desire to devote himself to painting or\nto music; and what had previously pleased may henceforward displease\nhim: that intimacy with mother earth, with harvests and vintages,\nwhich seemed to be the very life for him, his true ideal, may come to\nseem to him tiresome and repugnant. But if he be a serious person,\nif he do not will and not will at every moment, if he do not present\nin his own individuality a complete resemblance to those peoples\nwho change in mid-November the laws made in October and proceed\nfrom revolution to revolution, he will examine his situation and\nwill recognize, for instance, that the desire arisen in his soul is\na velleity that does not answer to his true vocation and that the\nfirst programme must remain intact; hence will take place in him a\nstruggle between that programme and the new rebellious volition. It\nmay happen that in this case the individual will sometimes neglect\nthe programme traced, in order to abandon himself to the temptations\nof his pictorial or musical dilettanteism; but since this will happen\nagainst his individual law, and since force must remain on the side of\nlaw, this breach of observance will be followed by special measures,\nsuch as the throwing away of brushes and violin, or by his forbidding\nto himself those moments of recreation in such amusements, which he\nused to allow himself and which have now become dangerous. In other\nwords, the individual inflicts punishments on himself in case of the\nnon-observance of his law, and these punishments must be held to be\nsuch in the strictest sense of the term. And if we accept the other\nhypothesis, analogous to that made in the case of social laws, should\nthe individual find himself possessed with so vehement a desire of\nbecoming a painter or a musician, as to be compelled to believe that\nthe original programme, the original law of his individuality, did\nnot correspond, or no longer corresponded with his true temperament,\nhe will rebel against the law and destroy it in himself, in the same\nmanner as in the other example the people destroyed the law of the\ndespot, by fighting with him, imprisoning, or slaying him.\n\n[Sidenote: _Individual laws as in ultimate analysis alone real._]\n\nIndividual programmes or laws then are laws, and this concept includes\nthe isolated individual as well as society; and therefore the character\nof sociality is not essential to the concept of law. Thus, to be more\nprecise, the only laws that really exist are individual laws and it is\nnot possible to conceive of social and individual laws as two forms\nof the general concept of laws; unless individual and society be both\nunderstood in the empirical sense, thus abandoning philosophical\nconsideration. If the individual be understood in the philosophical\nsense, in which he is the Spirit concrete and individualized, it\nis clear that what are called social laws can also be reduced to\nindividual laws; because, in order to observe a law, we must make\nit our own, that is to say, individualize it, and in order to rebel\nagainst it, we must expel it from our own personality, in which it\nwished unduly to remain or to introduce itself.\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique of the division of laws into judicial and social\nand into their sub-classes. Empiricity of every division of laws._]\n\nThe exclusion of the character of sociality from the concept of law\nfrees philosophy from a series of problems, grafted upon that pretended\ncharacter. The principal of these was that of the distinction of social\nlaws into political and judicial, on the one hand and merely social\non the other; and the further distinction of judicial law into public\nand private, civil and penal, national and international, into laws\nproperly so called and regulations, and so on. If the concept itself of\nsocial law be empirical, then all the distinctions and sub-distinctions\nof it proposed must also be empirical, and altogether without\nphilosophical value. So true is this that it is impossible to decide\nfor one distinction or definition against another, or to correct those\nhitherto given by proposing new ones. Whoever undertakes to examine\nany one of these distinctions, at once realizes the aphilosophical\ncharacter affirmed of them _a priori._ Thus judicial or political laws\nhave been distinguished from the merely social, with the affirmation\nthat those are compulsory, these conventional; whereas compulsion is\nimpossible in both cases, for the reasons given, and if by compulsion\nbe meant the threat of a penalty, this is to be found in merely social\nlaws, not less than in judicial. The law against the falsification\nof public money is usually described as judicial: he who falsifies\nit runs the risk of undergoing some years' imprisonment. It is a law\ncalled social that we must answer a salutation with a salutation: he\nwho does not do this runs the risk of being held ill-bred and excluded\nfrom the society of the well-bred. What essential difference is there\nbetween the two laws? An attempt has been made to differentiate them by\nsaying that the former has emanated from and is sustained by a _supreme\npower,_ vigilant as to its observance, the second from particular\ncircles of individuals. But where is the seat of this supreme power?\nCertainly not in a superindividual, who dominates individuals, but in\nindividuals themselves. And in this case its power and value correspond\nwith the power of the individuals who compose it; that is to say,\nit is the law of a circle, empirically considered to be larger and\nstronger, but whose volitions are realized in so far as the individuals\ncomposing it spontaneously conform to them, because they recognize the\nconvenience of doing so. Monarchs who believed themselves to be most\npowerful, have realized at certain moments that the power did not at\nall reside in their persons or title, but in a universal consensus\nof opinion, failing which their power vanished, or was reduced to a\ngesture of solitary command, not far removed from the ridiculous. Laws\nthat seem to be excellent remain unapplied, because they meet with\ntacit general resistance, or as is said, do not accord with custom:\nthis should suffice to enlighten the mind as to the inseverable unity\nof what is called the State and what is called society. The State\nis not a being, but a mobile complex of varied relations between\nindividuals. It may be convenient to limit this complex as well as\npossible, to make a being of it to oppose other complexes: of this\nthere can be no doubt; and let us leave to jurists the excogitation\nof these and other similar distinctions, fictitious but opportune;\nnor let us consider that their work should be declared in the least\nabsurd. We only say that it must not be forgotten that the fictitious\nis fictitious, as is the claim made to reason about it as rational\nand philosophical, and to fill volumes and volumes with tiresome\ndisquisitions, which are necessarily vain, though the distinctions that\nform their object are not vain in their circle. We who are not jurists\nbut philosophers, and to whom it is therefore not permitted to produce\nand adopt practical distinctions, must conceive as laws and include\nequally in the same category, alike the English _Magna Charta_ and\nthe statute of the Sicilian _Mafia,_ or of the Neapolitan _Camorra;_\nthe _Regula monachorum_ of Saint Benedict and that of the _brigata\nspendereccia_ that was sung in sonnets by Folgore di San Geminiano and\nCene della Chitarra and is recorded by Dante in the _Inferno;_ the\ncanon law and the military code, and that _droit parisien,_ which a\ncertain personage of Balzac had studied for three years in the blue\nboudoir of one lady and in the rosy drawing-room of another, and which,\nalthough no one ever speaks of it, yet constitutes (says the great\nnovelist) _une haute jurisprudence sociale, qui, bien apprise et bien\npratiqu\u00e9e, m\u00e8ne \u00e0 tout._[1] What more can be said? Even those _literary\nand artistic laws are laws_ which express the will to produce works,\npossessing this or that other kind of argument and arrangement, as\nwould be the law that drama should be divided into five or three acts\nor _days,_ and that romances must not exceed four or five hundred\npages, 16mo, and that a monumental statue must be nude or heroically\nclad. It is evident that if anybody violate these laws, he may be\nexcluded (and he was indeed excluded) from the academies of good\ntaste, which did not prevent his being received for that very reason\ninto the anti-academies of the independents: in just the same way as\nto have incurred punishments announced by the penal code is a title of\nadmission to certain criminal societies.\n\n[Sidenote: _Extension of the concept of law._]\n\nThese examples that we have selected among the most extraordinary\nand the most apt to scandalize, help to make it quite clear that the\nconcept of law must be taken in its full logical extension, when\nwe wish to philosophize about it. Among the many obstacles that\nphilosophy meets with is a curious sort of false shame, which looks\nupon contact with certain arguments as injurious to the dignity of\nphilosophy: a contact which is avoided by arbitrarily narrowing and\ntherefore falsifying philosophical concepts. That of law especially\nhas a tradition of _solemnity,_ and brings with it associations that\nmust be broken in pieces. Otherwise it is impossible even to understand\nwhat are those _firm and unwritten laws_ of the gods, which Antigone\nopposed to the decrees of men and how they exercise their efficiency;\nor _the sayings of Lacedaemon,_ in obedience to which fell the three\nhundred at Thermopylae; or _the laws of the fatherland,_ which, with\ntheir irresistible authority, caused Socrates to remain at the moment\nwhen others counselled and facilitated his flight. Life is composed of\nbig and little actions, of least and greatest, or better, of a very\ndense web of very diverse actions; and it is not a too brilliant idea\nto cut that web in pieces and to throw away some of the pieces as less\nbeautiful, in order afterwards to contemplate in those pieces only that\nhave been thus selected, cut out and disconnected, the web that no\nlonger exists.\n\n\n[1] Balzac, _Le P\u00e8re Goriot_ (ed. Paris, Calman L\u00e9vy, 1891), p. 85.\n\n\n\n\nII\n\n\nTHE CONSTITUTIVE ELEMENTS OF LAWS. CRITIQUE OF PERMISSIVE LAWS AND OF\nNATURAL LAW\n\n\n[Sidenote: _The volitional character and the character of class._]\n\nThe undue restrictions and empirical divisions of the concept of\nlaws having been destroyed, if our attention be now directed to the\ncharacter that has been determined as properly belonging to them,\nwe have the means of distinguishing them from the other spiritual\nforms with which they are often confused, partly as the result of the\nmetaphors and homonyms usual in ordinary speech. Laws, as has been\nsaid, are _volitional acts_ concerning _classes_ of actions. Therefore,\nwhere the volitional element or the element of class is wanting, there\ncannot be law, save in name and by metaphor.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Distinction of laws from the so-called laws of nature.]\n\nSo-called _laws of nature_ or _naturalistic laws_ are not laws,\nowing to the absence of the volitional element: they consist of\nsimple enunciations of relations between empirical concepts, that\nis, of rules. This is an instance of what is called a natural law:\nplatinum melts at a temperature of 1780 degrees; or this other of a\ngrammatical law: that in the Greek language masculine nouns of the\nsecond declension have the genitive in _\u03bf\u03c5_(with exceptions, in this\nas in the other case). But they are laws in about the same way as\nthe King of Cups is king; and indeed it is known historically that\nthis denomination was transported by the Stoics from the domain of\npolitics, where it had first appeared, to that of nature. Empirical\nconcepts and rules may, as we know, assume an imperative literary form;\nhence it will be said: \"If you wish to melt platinum, heat it to 1780\ndegrees\"; \"If you wish to speak Greek, decline masculine nouns of the\nsecond declension with an _\u03bf\u03c5_ in the genitive.\" But the literary form\ndoes not change anything of their true nature: those imperatives are\nhypothetical imperatives, that is, false imperatives, improper laws.\nGrammatical and chemical laws will remain mere formul\u00e6, instruments\nof knowledge, and not at all of action, until some one obliges me or\nI oblige myself to talk Greek, or to open a chemical laboratory where\nplatinum is melted. The jurist who elaborates cases and rules is not\nthe legislator: the latter alone (with a sword in one hand) can endow\nthe excogitations cf the other with the character of law.\n\n[Sidenote: _Implication of the second in the first._]\n\nCertainly an act of will is necessary in order to construct empirical\nconcepts, formul\u00e6, and rules (as indeed we know), an act of will\nwhich is not that of the will implied in every act of thought, but\nis a special and explicit act which, by manipulating representations\nand concepts, makes a _quid medium,_ which is neither representation\nnor concept, and although altogether irrational from the theoretical\npoint of view, is of use in the economy of the spirit. But the law in\nits true meaning is a volitional act, which _assumes_ that primary\nvolitional act whence are formed the pseudo-concepts or concepts of\nclass _as already completed;_ precisely because it is the will which\nhas for its _object_ a _class_ of objects. It is not possible to\nimpose speaking according to the rule of the Greek language, or to\nmelt platinum according to its chemical formula, before these rules\nhave been laid down. And here appears very clearly the difference\nbetween those two kinds of spiritual products, which the imperative\nliterary form, given to classes and rules, darkens and confuses. This\ndifference can be recognized in concrete cases by means of a most\nsimple expedient: if the rule (as we have already had occasion to\nprove) can be converted into a statement of class, then the law is\ninconvertible. \"If you wish to melt platinum, heat it to 1780 degrees\"\nis a proposition that is exactly equal to \"platinum melts at 1780\ndegrees.\" But the law, \"Let there be opened in every city a chemical\nlaboratory where platinum is to be melted,\" is not to be converted from\nthe imperative to the indicative, whatever efforts we make.\n\n[Sidenote: _Distinction of laws from practical principles._]\n\nIf the volitional element be wanting to naturalistic laws, it is\ncertainly present in other spiritual formations also denominated and\nconsidered as laws: but not that of _class,_ therefore neither are\nthese laws. Such is the case with economic and moral law, and through\nthem, with logical and \u00e6sthetic laws. The moral law says, \"Will the\nuniversal\"; that is to say, \"Will the good, the useful, the true, the\nbeautiful.\" Therefore (considered in reality and not in scientific\ntheory, where it appears as the concept of itself) it is a volitional\nact. But this volitional act has the spirit itself for object, which\nis and exists, in so far as it wills and affirms itself; it has for\nobject a form or a _universal,_ whereas laws have for object something\nmaterial and at the same time not instantaneous, something more or less\nfixed, something _general:_ a _class,_ not an _idea._ Universal laws\n(that would better be called _principles_) are the Spirit or producer;\ntrue and proper laws are the special product of the spirit; therefore\nthe first can certainly be called laws, but for an altogether different\nreason to the second.\n\n[Sidenote: _Laws and single acts._]\n\nOwing to the absence of the element of generality or of class, no\none would describe a single individuated act as law. The resolution\nand action by which I do not rise from my seat at this moment and go\neagerly to meet the friend whose coming at the wrong moment interrupts\nme at my work, is a volitional act, not a law; such as on the other\nhand would be the volitional act that I might form within myself,\nconsisting in the intention or the programme of receiving my friends\nseated and in a lukewarm way, whenever they should come to visit me in\nthe hours before noon, in order to make them understand by this act of\nmine that they disturb me at my work, and that they should abstain from\ntheir inopportune visits, unless they wish to submit to the penalty of\nmeeting with anything but a cordial reception from their friend.\n\n[Sidenote: _Identity of imperative, prohibitive, and permissive laws._]\n\nFrom the general but not universal character that we must recognize\nto the content of laws, we have the solution of certain controversies\nof the greatest importance which have been and are much discussed,\nhitherto without a satisfactory or duly demonstrated conclusion. In\nthe first place, we must mention the dispute as to whether or no there\nexist _permissive_ laws, and whether the formula that the law _aut\njubet aut vetat aut permittit_ is to be accepted. It has generally been\nadmitted that the law _aut jubet aut vetat,_ and that the permission\nis nothing but the removal of a previous inhibition, that is, the\npartial or total abrogation of a law. But in reality, the law, since it\nis a volitional act, _jubet_ only; to command is to will: to command\nthat a chemical laboratory be opened in every city means to will that\none should be opened. And since every willing is at the same time a\nnot-willing, as every affirmation is at the same time a negation, every\ncommand is at the same time an inhibition, and every _jubeo_ is a\n_veto_ (whether the will be expressed in the literary form of positive\nor negative, of command or of inhibition, is here without importance).\n\n[Sidenote: _Permissive character of every law, and impermissive\ncharacter of every principle._]\n\nAs to permissive laws, these are inconceivable side by side with the\nimperative or prohibitive, not indeed because no law ever permits, but\nbecause by the very fact that those are imperative or prohibitive,\nthey are at the same time permissive: every _jubeo_ or _veto_ is at\nthe same time a _permitto._ Principles, as universal volitions, never\npermit, because nothing escapes their command; but a single volitional\nact, affirming itself, does not exclude for that reason the possibility\nthat other volitional acts, indeed infinite acts, should be affirmed;\nfor the singular never exhausts its universal. And laws are volitions\nof class, they impose groups of single acts--groups that are more or\nless rich, but always contingent: hence a law always leaves all the\nother actions and classes of action that can be the object of will\nunwilled (that is, neither commanded nor prohibited), and, therefore,\n_permitted._ And even if we take all the laws formulated up to a\ngiven moment, all together they do not exhaust the universal; and if\nnew laws be accumulated, one upon the other, be divided and split up\n\"with panting breath,\" to obtain complete exhaustion, a _progressus in\ninfinitum_ will certainly be attained, but never exhaustion, which is\nunattainable. This amounts to saying that outside law or laws, there\nis always _the permitted, the lawful, the indifferent, the privilege,\nthe right,_ or whatever be termed the concept correlative to that\nof command, veto, or duty, a duality of terms that expresses the\n_finitude_ of law; hence, when a determined privilege, a determined\nlegal right, a determined right, has been annulled by a new law, when\nsomething previously indifferent has been differentiated, privilege,\nthe permitted, the indifferent, right, always arise from the bosom of\nthe new law.\n\n[Sidenote: _Mutability of laws._]\n\nAnother contingent character of the content of laws is their\n_mutability._ Laws are changeable, whereas principles, or laws of\nthe universal content, are unchangeable, and ready to give form to\nall the most various historical material. Since actual conditions\nare constantly changing, it is necessary to add new laws to the old,\nto retouch and correct these, or to abolish them altogether. This is\nto be seen equally in the programmes of individual lives, as in the\nprogrammes of social and political laws.\n\n[Sidenote: _Empirical concepts as to the modes of change._]\n\nThe question as to the number of modes of changing that laws possess\ndoes not concern us, because, philosophically speaking, there is never\nbut one mode: the free will that produces the new law in new conditions\nof fact. Involuntary changing can only be a formula for indicating\ncertain changes, always voluntary, that occur in a less solemn way\nthan others; but from these, can never be absent the solemnity of the\nhuman will that celebrates itself. Thus, in like manner, the question\nas to whether we should recognize conservation or revolution as the\nfundamental concept of practical life, does not concern us; for every\nconservative is at the same time a revolutionary, since he is always\nobliged to adapt the law that he wishes to preserve to the new facts;\nand every revolutionary is also a conservative, since he is obliged to\nstart from certain laws that he preserves, at any rate provisionally,\nthat he may change others and substitute for them new laws, which he\nin his turn intends to preserve. Revolution for revolution's sake, the\ncult of the Goddess Revolution, is an insane effort, which is so none\nthe less because it has sometimes appeared in History and like all\ninsane efforts it ends with suicide. Revolution revolutionizes itself\nand turns into reaction. Thus when revolutionaries and conservatives\nare distinguished and opposed to one another, an empirical distinction\nis made there also, the meaning of which is to be found in the\nhistorical circumstances among which it has arisen. Count Cavour was\na conservative in respect to certain problems and revolutionary in\nrespect to certain others, to such a degree that he seemed to the\nMazzinians to be a conservative and to the clericals and legitimists\na revolutionary. Robespierre, if he were a revolutionary for the\nGirondins and at last even for the neo-moderate Danton, yet to the eyes\nof H\u00e9bert and of Chaumette seemed to be a conservative, enemy of the\nfree development of the rights of man.\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique of the eternal Code or natural Right._]\n\nWe should on the other hand be very careful as to the demand so\noften made and also so far as possible put into execution, for _an\neternal code, a limit-legislation or model, a universal, rational, or\nnatural_ justice, as it has been variously termed. Natural justice,\nuniversal legislation, eternal code, claim to fix the transitory\nand are therefore a contradictory concept: contradictory precisely\nto the principle of the mutability of laws, which is the necessary\nconsequence of their contingent and historical character. Were natural\nRight permitted to do what it announces, were God to permit that the\naffairs of Reality should be carried on according to the ill-assorted\nideas of writers and professors, we should witness with the formation\nand application of the eternal Code, the cessation _ipso facto_ of\nDevelopment, the end of History, the death of Life and the dissolution\nof Reality.\n\n[Sidenote: _Natural justice as the new justice._]\n\nThis world-ending does not take place, because, though it be possible\nto dwell in contradiction, it is impossible to make it concrete and\nactual: God, that is to say Reality, does not permit this. Thus it\nhappens that under the name of natural justice, two sorts of products\nhave existed in turn, or sometimes a mixture of those two different\nproducts, which have nothing to do with the programme announced. On the\none hand, projects of new laws that seemed better than the old or good\nby comparison with these judged more or less bad, have been proposed\nas natural or rational justice, and precisely for this reason the old\nlaws were called unnatural and irrational and the new _rational and\nnatural._ Just as passionate and erotic temperaments, uninstructed by\nthe experience of their past, swear with the utmost seriousness that\ntheir new love will be _constant, eternal and their last,_ so man, when\nhe creates new laws, is often seized with the illusion that his laws\nwill not change as did the old ones, forgetting that the old ones were\nonce young and that they \"satisfied divers\" in their heyday, to express\noneself in the words of the old carnavalesque song. Those natural\nlaws are historical, those eternal laws are transitory, like all the\nothers. All know how in certain times and places, religious tolerance,\nfreedom of trade, private property, constitutional monarchy, have been\nproclaimed eternal; and in others, the extirpation of unbelievers,\ncommercial protection, communism, the republic, and anarchy.\n\n[Sidenote: _Natural justice as philosophy of the practical._]\n\nUniversal concepts, which were nothing but the Principles of the\nphilosophy of the practical themselves, have on the other hand had a\ntendency to be classed as natural justice and to surpass the transitory\nand contingent. They are certainly eternal and unchangeable, but no\nlonger laws, for they are formal and not material. Thus treatises of\nnatural justice have sometimes become simply treatises (sometimes\nvery valuable) of the Philosophy of the practical and especially of\nEthic.--When (as to tell the truth has generally been the case) a\npractical description has accompanied a general treatment of Ethic,\nleading to a series of proposals for social, judicial or political\nreform, there has then occurred a _mingling_ of two different\nproductions, which we have mentioned, philosophy and casuistic. But a\nnatural justice has always remained unachieved, because unachievable\nand contradictory.\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique of natural justice._]\n\nIn our times, owing to the increase of the historical sense, the\nconstructions of natural justice and of the eternal Code have almost\naltogether lost the attraction they once exercized. But absurd problems\nhaving their origin in those contradictory concepts still persist\nand absurd methods of treating problems of similar origin legitimate\nwhen taken in their true terms. An example of the first of these two\nkinds of diseased residues is the treating of the _natural rights_ of\nman and the attempt to establish what rights belong to man by nature\nand what by historical contingencies. Among the first are enumerated\nthe right to life, to liberty, to work, to the family and so on; and\namong the second, those that have their origin in the Italian State\nor in special contracts that have been concluded. But no right of any\nsort belongs to man outside society (which in this case means outside\nhistory), that is to say, considered as spirit in universal, save that\nof existing as spirit, which indeed is not a right, but necessary\nreality. Catalogues of natural rights are either tautologies, which\nrepeat that man as spirit has the right (and therefore at the same\ntime the duty) of developing himself as spirit (and he does develop\nin this manner, if he be man and be alive); or they are arbitrary\nrationalizations of historical contingencies, such as the right to\nwork, which is nothing but the formula of the workpeople of the\n_ateliers nationaux_ in forty-eight, or of the insurgents of Lyons; or\nthe right to private property, which was the formula of the burghers\nagainst the bonds of feudalism and is again their formula against the\nmodern proletariat movement.\n\n[Sidenote: _Jusnaturalism persisting in judgments and juridical\nproblems._]\n\nWe must recognize examples of the second kind of error in the\ndiscussions constantly held as to social or political institutions,\nwhen instead of combating them as irrational, or of defending them as\nrational in historical circumstances, they are defended and combated\nbecause they differ from or conform to the true idea of right or to\nthe true idea of those particular institutions, recourse being thus\nhad to abstract reasons, as has very well been said. A reformer will\nmaintain the recognition of the right of women to the administrative\nor political vote, because women also form part of the State and\nhave general and particular interests, which they wish to guarantee\ndirectly, without the inter-position of men, whose interests are\nsometimes at variance with theirs: an argument that a conservative\nwill deny altogether, making appeal to the function of woman, enclosed\nby eternal law in the circle of the family. A reformer will propose\ndivorce as the natural complement to matrimony, because, where\nspiritual agreement ends, there too should end every other tie, whereas\na conservative will oppose the argument as contradictory to the very\nessence of matrimony, comparing such a proposal with concubinage,\nor with what is called free love. And so on.--When such arguments\nare heard, it is remarked that natural rights are not dead. But\nthe question as to the political vote for women may be serious or\nridiculous, according to place and time; as divorce is loftily moral or\nprofoundly immoral, according to time and place, and it is only mental\nnarrowness or ignorance that can place outside humanity, or believe to\nbe living or persisting in immorality, peoples that practise divorce\nor indissoluble matrimony, or those of to-day, who refuse the vote to\nwomen or those of the future who will recognize their right to it, if\nthey do recognize it. But even polygamy or free love is not immoral,\nirrational and unnatural, once it has been an institution considered\nlegitimate in certain times and places; nor even, we insist upon saying\nit (however repugnant to our hearts and to our stomachs of civilized\nEuropeans), anthropophagy, for even among the anthropophagi were men\n(we hope it will be admitted), who felt themselves to be most virtuous\nin their clearest consciousness of self, and who nevertheless ate their\nlike with the same tranquillity that we eat a roast chicken, without\nhatred of the chicken, but being quite well aware, for the moment\nat any rate, that we are not able to do otherwise. The unconscious\nreasoners on the basis of natural law must have forgotten that\npage of Cornelius \u039depos, which, however, they must certainly have\ntranslated in their first years at the gymnasium: _Expertes literarum\nGraecarum nihil rectum nisi quod ipsorum moribus conveniat putabunt.\nHi, si didicerint non eadem omnibus esse honesta atque turpia, SED\nOMNIA MAJORUM INSTITUTIS JUDICARI, non admirabuntur nos in Graiorum\nvirtutibus exponendis mores eorum secutos. Neque enim Cimoni fuit turpe\nAtheniensium summo viro, sororem germanam habere in matrimonium: quippe\nquum ejus cives eodem uterentur instituto; at id quidem nostris moribus\nnefas habetur. Laudi in Graecia ducitur adolescentulis quam plurimos\nhabere amatores. Nulla Lacedaemoni tam est nobilis vidua quae non ad\nscenam eat mercede conducta..._. And he continues to give further\nexamples.[1] So ancient are the unreasonable tendency to be scandalized\nand the reasonable defence of the variety of customs made by good sense.\n\n[1] _Vitae excell. imper.,_ pref.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\n\nUNREALITY OF THE LAW AND REALITY OF ITS EXECUTION. FUNCTION OF LAW IN\nTHE PRACTICAL SPIRIT\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Law as abstract and unreal volition._]\n\nSince law is the volition of a class of actions, it is the volition\nof an _abstract._ But as we already know, to will an abstract is\ntantamount to willing abstractly. And to will abstractly is not truly\nto will, for we will only in concrete, that is, in a determined\nsituation and with a volitional synthesis corresponding to that\nsituation, such that it is immediately translated into action, or\nbetter, is at the same time effective action. Consequently it seems\nthat we should declare the volition that is law to be a pretended\nvolition: contradictory, because lacking a single, unique and\ndetermined situation; ineffectual, because springing from the insecure\nground of an abstract concept; a volition, in fact, that is not willed;\na volitional act, not real, but _unreal._\n\n[Sidenote: _Ineffectuality of laws and effectuality of practical\nprinciples._]\n\nSuch indeed it is. What is really wanted is not the law, but the\nsingle act, done _under_ the law, as it is called, that is to say,\nthe _execution_ of the law. The single volition is the only one that\nis carried out: the execution of the law is the only thing really\nand truly willed and done. When the law has been formulated, life\ncontinues ceaselessly to propound its problems, and these either do not\nenter into the provisions of the law and are solved simply and solely\nwith universal practical principles (economic and ethic), or they do\nenter into them and then it is necessary _to apply_ the law, unless\nit be held to be more convenient to change it, or (this would be a\npathological case) action be not taken against it, although there be\nconsciousness that this is ill done.\n\nBut even when we are in the situations foreseen by the law and act in\naccordance with it, or, as is said, _apply or carry out_ the law, we\nmust not allow ourselves to be misled by all these metaphors; for we\nmust consider that the single situations in which we will and act can\nnever be foreseen by the law, nor is it possible to act in accordance\nwith it, to follow it out and to apply it. Situations are not foreseen,\nbecause nothing is foreseen, and the real fact is always a surprise,\nsomething that happens once only and we can only know it as it is\nafter it has happened. For the new fact a new measure is necessary;\nfor the new body a new suit of clothes. The measure of the law, on the\nother hand, since it is abstract, hesitates between the universal and\nthe individual and is without the strength of either. To carry out the\nlaw? But it is only the pedant of life who proposes to do such a thing,\nas it is only the pedant of art who attempts to apply the rules of art.\nThe true artist follows the impulse of his \u00e6sthetic conscience, the\npractical man the initiative of his practical genius. What is called\nthe single act, observance and execution of the law, obeys, not the\nlaw, but the ethical or practical principle, and obeys it individually.\nThe man who has his head full of laws that he has made for himself or\nhas accepted from others, makes a deep reverence to the Ladies' Law\nwhen the time comes for action, and proceeds on his own initiative.\n\n[Sidenote: _Exemplificatory clarification._]\n\n\nIt is the law that at the age of twenty we must present ourselves in\nour district and do military service for a certain time. Let us for\nthe moment set aside the case in which those called upon to serve\nrebel and, having seized the power of the government, abolish the law\nof conscription, and re-establish that of voluntary enlistment. And\nlet us likewise set aside the other case, in which the conscripts\nviolate the law by deserting and going abroad, or hide in a cave, like\na hero of Padre Bresciani, or (like a good Tolstoian who applies the\nprinciple of non-resistance to evil) allow themselves to be put in\nprison rather than touch arms. Let us select the case of the peaceful\nburgess who becomes a warrior that he may not go to prison; or of the\ngood citizen who recognizes his duty of serving his country and for\nthat reason obeys the law. In presenting himself in his district and\nin the regiment, he has obeyed, not the voice of the law (which is a\nvoice), but his moral conscience, or simply his economic conscience.\nThis has already been demonstrated and we need not insist upon it.\nBut how can he ever obey the law, which directs him to do military\nservice of precisely this or that nature? Each individual has his own\ntemperament, his own talent, his own particular physical strength, and\neach one will lend his services entirely in his own way, different from\nthat of another. And (be it noted) he will not do so only more or less\nwell or observing the law more or less, but really in a different way,\neven when all observe the law with equal diligence and scrupulosity.\nIt may seem as if all carry out a military exercise at the same\nmoment, but the fact is that each man moves in a different way to the\nothers; or that in a parade march all walk in the same way, but, as a\nmatter of fact, all (even in the Prussian army) walk in a different\nway. If we look at it as a whole and from a distance, there seems to\nbe uniformity; if we look at it from near at hand we discover the\ndifference. If we could make the experiment of comparing a regiment\nof fifty years before with one of fifty years after, leaving military\nregulations, arms, accoutrements, and everything else unaltered in\nthe interval, the lack of uniformity of the apparent uniformity would\nleap to the eyes, a lack of uniformity that would have been rendered\npossible by the changes that had taken place in the surrounding life,\nin the culture, the moral education, the political conscience, the\nmode of nourishment, the dwellings, and so on. But the experiment is\npossible, if not in time, then in space, that is to say, by observing\nthe application of the same military regulations upon two different\npopulations. Thus one seems to have in hand one book written in two\ndifferent languages; which is literally no longer the same book,\nbut two different books. Giusti translated into Milanese and Porta\ntranslated into Florentine are no longer Porta or Giusti, but two new\npoets.\n\n[Sidenote: _Doctrines against the utility of laws. Their\nunmaintainability._]\n\nThis indubitable truth, as to the impossibility of applying the law and\nof incorporating it in facts, and as to the necessity of acting in each\ncase, according to historical exigencies, is the true reason for the\nturning of so many people's heads at different times and in different\nplaces, causing them to proclaim nothing less than the inutility\nof laws and to ask for their abolition. If it be necessary to come\neventually to the individual action, and if deliberation and execution\nmust be remitted to the action of the individual, what is the object of\nbinding ourselves with bonds, which it is afterwards necessary to tear\noff and to break, that we may act? What is the object of laboriously\nconstructing instruments, which we are obliged to throw away when we\ncome to practical action, that we may use our naked hands? Owing to\nsuch ingenuous reasonings as these, people have come to long for a\nsociety without laws, in which each will do his own share of work, on\naccount of its attractiveness alone, as we find among the Harmonicists\nof Fourier and in many other anarchical Utopias. Or they have sighed\nfor the absolute paternal government of the good old days, for the\ngeniality of a good-hearted tyrant, untrammelled with laws, who will\nbe able to follow the best dictates of his heart. Or, to descend to\nless strange and more actual examples, it has been proposed that the\njudge should on each occasion create the law, according to the case\nbefore him; that is to say, that he should cease to be a judge (not\nhaving a law to apply, and properly speaking not being able to give\njudgment) and be a free decider of litigation and corrector of customs;\nor at least that he should free himself from _legal fictions_ and judge\naccording to the individual reality of each individual case.\n\n[Sidenote: _Unsustainability of such confutations._]\n\nThese theories are without doubt unsustainable, not excluding the last,\nwhich has the appearance of being moderate; because the so-called\njudicial fiction is intrinsic to the law and exists even when we\nthink that it is not present, for it is always a fiction to place a\nconcrete case in an abstract category. But defenders of the utility of\nlaw have met these erroneous doctrines with the bad argument that law\ndoes not admit of individual solutions, and demands strict obedience,\nbecause the moment of individuality, of inobservance, and of violation\nthat may be called legitimate, does actually exist in the law and is\nintrinsic to its very nature. Both adversaries and defenders of law\nare therefore philosophically wrong, those who assert its inutility and\nthose who claim for it an impossible utility.\n\n[Sidenote: _Empirical meanings of those controversies._]\n\nAnd we say \"philosophically,\" for it is well known that in this case,\nas in so many other disputes of philosophic appearance, are often\nconcealed disputes of a practical and political nature, in which right\nand wrong are divided and connected in an altogether different manner.\nThe adversaries of laws are often nothing but adversaries of too many\nlaws, or legitimately demand a less pedantic and mechanical office\nfor the judge than that which he often has at present; whereas the\nmaintainers of laws are opposed to revolutionaries, who would wish\nto abrogate the definite laws, on which civil progress rests, or to\ndiscredit all laws, and cause society to enter upon a terrible crisis\nthat would not promise good results. But all this is extraneous to the\nphilosophic problem.\n\n[Sidenote: _Necessity of laws._]\n\nIf the defenders of the utility of laws had wished to make use of an\nargument of good sense against their adversaries, of the sort that\nimposes, even when it does not rigorously demonstrate their contention,\nthey might have simply noted the demand for laws, for ordinances,\nfor justice, for the State, which appears at all points of human\nhistory.--Better a bad government than no government at all; better\nlaws that are mediocre, but stable, than the frantic pursuit for\nbetter and better laws, with the instability that is the inevitable\nconsequence! And on the other hand, may God save us from genial\ndespots, from inspired judges, from tribunals that dive into treasures\nof equity!--These are the utterances that we hear in history. Battles\nhave been fought for _legality,_ and rivers of blood have been shed for\nit; for legality are faced the troubles of litigation, and energetic\naction is displayed, which only superficial intellects can consider\na waste of time and trouble; for no trouble is superfluous when we\nare protecting our own rights, and none is more sacred, since it also\nguards the offended majesty of the law, the rights of all. Those who\ndeclaim against laws can well do so with a light heart, for the law\nsurrounds, protects, and preserves their life for them. No sooner had\nall laws disappeared than they would lose the wish to declaim:\n\n    In such wise as when sometimes in the wood\n    The shepherd spies the wolf, and straight has lost\n    Spirit and sense, and words die on his tongue;\n\nand he would be obliged to have speedy recourse to the remedy and make\nlaws of some sort again, whatever they be, that he may again resume\nhis calm, his work and his gossip.\n\n[Sidenote: _Laws as preparation for action._]\n\nPassing from consideration _ad oculos_ to the philosophical, it is to\nbe said, on the other hand, that the utility of law does not at all\nreside in its effectuality, which is something impossible, since the\nsingle act of the individual is alone effectual; but in this, that in\norder to will and to carry out the single act, it is usually necessary\nto address oneself to the general, of which that individual is a single\ncase; that is, to address oneself to the group, of which the individual\nis a component part, just as in aiming we generally begin by aiming at\nthe region where is the point upon which the aim will be fixed. Law is\nnot a real and effectual volition; it is without doubt an imperfect and\ncontradictory volition, but for that very reason a preparation for the\nsynthetic and perfect volition. Law, in short, since it is the volition\nof an abstract, is not a real volition, but an _aid_ to real volition;\nas (to employ the usual comparison) wooden bridges and scaffoldings are\naids to the construction of a house and have not been useless, because\nthey must be pulled down when the house has been built.\n\n[Sidenote: _Analogy between the practical and the theoretical spirit:\npractical laws and empirical concepts._]\n\nHere the analogy between the constitution of the practical and of the\ntheoretical spirit is again shown to be most exact. We meet with\ntheoretical forms in the latter also, which are not really so and are\ncontradictory in themselves, positing representations that function as\nuniversals and universals that are representative: arbitrary forms,\nin which the will undertakes to command what it is not possible to\ncommand, that is to say, representations and concepts, things which\nprecede and do not follow the volitional and practical form. But we\nknow that those fictitious concepts, those formul\u00e6, those laws that\nare not laws, those admitted falsities, which, therefore, are not\nfalsities, serve as a help to memory, and assist thought in finding\nits way amid the multiform spectacle of the world, which it must\npenetrate for itself. We do not think them, but they help us to\nthink; we do not imagine them, but they help us to imagine. Thus the\nphilosopher generally fixes his mind upon the pseudo-concepts, that he\nmay afterwards rise to the universals; and the artist also turns his\nattention to them that he may find beneath them the individual, the\nlively and ingenuous intuition that he seeks. The same pseudo-concepts,\nmade the object of volition and changed from formul\u00e6 to laws, fulfil\nan analogous office in the practical spirit, making it possible for\nthe will to will in a certain direction, where it afterwards meets the\nuseful action, which is always individuated.\n\n[Sidenote: _The promotion of order in reality and representation._]\n\nAnother aspect of the analogy is not less important. The\npseudo-concepts would not be possible, if reality did not offer the\nlike side by side with the unlike; which is not the universal and\nnecessary, but the general, a contingent (so to speak) less contingent\nthan others, a relatively constant variable. Pseudo-concepts are\narbitrary, not because they posit the like where is the unlike, but\nbecause they make that variable rigid, which is only relatively\nconstant, making of it something absolutely constant and changing\nthe like into the identical. Now the practical spirit, which creates\nreality, has need to create not only the unlike, but also the like; not\nonly that which lasts an instant, but also that which endures almost\nunchanged for a year, a century, a millennium, or a millennium of\nmillenniums; not only the individual, but also the species, not only\nthe great man, but also the people, not only the actions that do not\noccur again, but also those that return periodically, similar, though\nnot identical. Laws fulfil this function, for they constitute what\nis called the _social,_ or _cosmic order._ This order, however, is\nalways relative and includes instability in itself; it is a rectilinear\nfigure, which, on being closely examined, reveals itself as also\ncurvilinear. For this reason it is necessary to make laws, and it is\nnecessary to violate, though obeying them in their execution.\n\n[Sidenote: _Origin of the concept of plan or design._]\n\nThis function of law as an unreal volition, aiding nevertheless and\npreparing the real, throws light upon a concept that we have had to\nreject when exposing the nature and method of functioning of the\nvolitional act; that is to say, on the concept of _plan or design or\nmodel,_ as proper to the practical activity, which is said to act by\ncarrying out a pre-established _design._ We have already demonstrated\nthat design and the execution of the design are in reality all one, and\nthat man acts by changing his design at every instant, because reality,\nwhich is the basis of his action, changes. And as in the Philosophy\nof the practical in general, so in particular in Ethic, the concept\nof pre-established design has no place; because, if it be true than\nin ethicity the universal is distinguished from the merely individual\naction, it is also true that the universal does not exist in concrete,\nsave incorporated and individualized as this or that good action. The\nuniversal of ethicity is not a design and cannot be willed for itself\noutside all individuation, in the same way as to fall in love is to\nfall in love with an individual and not with love. But that concept\nof design, proposed for action and carried out by its means, though\nerroneously adopted in Economy and in Ethic, must nevertheless have its\nlegitimate meaning in some special order of facts; otherwise it would\nnot be possible to make even erroneous use of it. This meaning is to be\nfound, as has been seen, in the fact of laws.\n\n\n\n\nIV\n\n\nCONFUSION BETWEEN LAWS AND PRACTICAL PRINCIPLES. CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL\nLEGALISM AND OF JESUITIC MORALITY\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Transformation of principles into practical laws:\nlegalism._]\n\nNothing perhaps better makes clear the true nature of laws than the\nexamination of the very grave errors introduced by their means into\nthe Philosophy of the practical: for, owing to the failure to perceive\nthe character of mere _aid_ proper to their function, laws have been\nconfused with practical principles, these being looked upon as laws and\nthose as principles.\n\n[Sidenote: _Genesis of the concept of the practically licit and\nindifferent._]\n\nWe always live surrounded by innumerable laws, although these are\nalways finite in number. The Decalogue also admonishes: \"Take not\nthe name of God in vain\"; \"Honour thy father and thy, mother\"; \"Thou\nshalt not steal\"; \"Thou shalt commit no murder\"; \"Thou shalt not covet\nthy neighbour's house, nor his wife, nor his man-servant, nor his\nmaid-servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything that is his\"; etc.\nThe decalogue or hectalogue of prudence admonishes us: \"Raise not up\nagainst thee too many enemies \"; \"Mind your own business\"; \"Conciliate\nhim who is more powerful than thou\"; \"Hurt him who hurts thee\"; etc.\nThose laws that are so many and so minute easily lead to the false\nbelief that they suffice together to regulate our economic action and\nour moral life, and that practical principles can be substituted for\nand be fully represented by a Decalogue or code, which should be the\ntrue and proper regulator of human life.\n\nBut the Decalogue, the code, the _Corpus juris,_ ample and minute\nthough they be, are not, as we know, capable of exhausting the infinity\nof actions conditioned by the infinite variety of facts. Every law\nbrings with it, as its necessary correlative, as the shadow of its\nlight, actions that are indifferent and indifferentiable, the legally\nindifferent, the licit, the permissible, the right, the faculty of\ndoing or of not doing. As an inevitable consequence of this, practical\nprinciples having been conceived as a series or complex of laws, the\nconcept of the _practically indifferent_ must also be posited and the\n_licit_ changed from _legal_ to _practical._\n\n[Sidenote: _Consequence of this: the arbitrary._]\n\nAnd this is what happens. At every moment of life we find ourselves\nface to face with actual situations, to which the laws that we possess\neither do not apply at all, or apply only in the approximative way\nthat we have seen; at every moment of life, we find ourselves without\nthe guidance of the law, face to face with the indifferent and the\nindifferentiated. The practical man knows well that the laws were a\nmere help, merely a preparatory stage to action, and that he must in\neach case face the actual situation as it arises, intuite and perceive\nit in its originality, and perform his own action with originality.\nBut he who has accepted the _legalitarian_ conception of the practical\nactivity and has abandoned practical principles as useless or looked\nupon them as non-existent, now that he finds himself abandoned also by\nthe laws, in which he had put too much trust, has no other guide on\nwhich to fall back save his own _will._\n\nAnd will is not a guide but _the lack of a guide_; it is not action\nbut inaction, that is to say, contradictory action; not activity, but\npassivity, not prudence and good, but imprudence and evil.\n\nThus the legalitarian conception of practical principles produces\nneither more nor less than the death of the practical, installing\npassivity in the place of activity, evil in the place of good.\n\nThe legalitarian theory, which proposes to fix and to determine with\nprecision the true concept of freedom, arrives at just the opposite\nresult: the will.\n\n[Sidenote: _Ethical legalism as simply a particular case of practical\nlegalism._]\n\nIt is opportune to remark here that moral legalism, which has hitherto\nalone occupied the attention of critics, is nothing but a particular\ncase of general practical legalism, and if the particular and not\nthe general case has been observed, this has depended upon the\nfailure to recognize the economic form in its autonomy, so common\nwith philosophers. But from the examples that we have given, it has\nclearly resulted that legalism is an error which embraces alike\nEconomy and Ethic, introducing into both the philosophic absurdity of\nthe _practically indifferent._ Even a man without moral conscience,\nor one deprived of it for a moment, if he conceive the guidance of\nhis utilitarian action in the form of laws, loses the compass of his\nutilitarianism and falls into the arbitrary, which is the ruin of his\nown individuality. If (to resume the usual example) I impose upon\nmyself the not drinking of wine as a hygienic law, and it happen to me\nto find myself at a certain moment in such physiological conditions\nthat a glass of wine can accelerate the beating of the heart and\nrestore to me the strength of which I am in need; and if, through faith\nin the established law, I forget that the law is conditional and not\nabsolute and that the only absolute law is to do at a given moment\nwhat is useful at that moment; it is evident that by so reasoning and\nacting, I am substituting superstition and therefore the arbitrary for\nprudence and that I am causing injury to myself.\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique of the practically indifferent._]\n\nIt is necessary to maintain against the morally and practically\nindifferent, that it is a concept altogether external to Ethic and\nEconomic and devastates it terribly whenever it penetrates into it,\nor (what is worse) subtly corrupts it. In Economic as in Ethic, in\nthe true and proper practical field, there is no _faculty_ that is\nnot also _obligation_; there is no _right_ that is not at the same\ntime a _duty;_ there is nothing _licit_ that is not _forbidden;_ nor\n_permitted_ that is not turned into a _command._ \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f14\u03be\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb' \u03bf\u1f50\n\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9, said St. Paul,[1] in obscure but suggestive language\nthat has been much discussed--all is allowed to us but we do not allow\nanything--we should say in explanation; everything can and should be\nspiritually elaborated by the will and receive the form of freedom.\nBut in order to destroy that paradoxical concept at the roots, it\nis necessary to reach the point underground where the concept of\n_practical legalism_ is to be found, and to show, as we have done, its\norigin, in the confusion between _principles and laws._\n\n[Sidenote: _Contests between rigorists and latitudinarians and their\ncommon error._]\n\nIn vain have the _rigorists,_ becoming aware of the ruin that menaced\nthe theory of Ethic, struggled against the theoreticians of the morally\nindifferent, or _latitudinarians._ So long as neither party left the\nlegalitarian field, one side was right against the other and both were\nequally wrong, Pharisees and Sadducees, Jansenists and Molinists.\nThe rigorists clung desperately to the law, refusing to admit that\nit could be _doubtful_ and give rise to the morally indifferent; the\nlaw was _certain._ But the law is never really either doubtful or\ncertain: revolving upon empirical concepts, it never limits anything\nwith precision and therefore is not certain; having for its object,\nnot concrete action, but only preparation for it, does not propose to\nlimit the illimitable and so is neither uncertain nor doubtful: it\nstands on this side or the other of such categories. Thus the rigorists\nalso found themselves face to face with the morally indifferent, and\nhad no way of vanquishing it. They could advise the choice of the\nmost painful and repugnant action, self-denial, self-tormenting; but\nthis too was a kind of wilfulness and evil. The latitudinarians, on\nthe other hand, could enlarge the field of the morally indifferent\nat their pleasure, placing in evidence the dubiety of law and its\nconsequent impotence as a practical principle; but since they did not\nrecognize any practical principle outside the form of law, they were\nfinally obliged to have recourse to it, that they might have some\npoint of orientation in the guidance of their lives. And since they\ncould not find it in the law itself, recognized as doubtful, they were\nobliged to place it in the authority of its interpreters; and when\nthese authorities were at variance, in the adding up of authorities\n(just as is done for the Roman jurists in the law of citation made\nby Theodosius II.); and since, finally, two or three or four or a\nhundred authorities, when they are uncertain, are not of greater value\nthan one who is equally uncertain, any sort of authority finally had\nto suffice them as justification for an action. _Probabilitism,_ far\nfrom being merely an illegitimate degeneration of legalism, is its\nlogical consequence. Reduced as they were to authority, why should\none be of more account than another, when all are estimable people\nworthy of credence? Why should the precedence be given to Papinian\nover Paul or over Ulpian? If Villalobos be of opinion that a priest\nwho has committed a moral sin cannot say mass the same day, Sanchez,\non the other hand, Jopines that he can: why, then, should a priest who\nfinds himself in that case follow Villalobos rather than Sanchez? It\nis true that if he make a blind choice between Villalobos and Sanchez,\nhe becomes the prey of self-will; but self-will and legalism are\nindissoluble, and the more carefully he tries to free himself from the\nbond, the more tightly it winds itself around him.\n\n[Sidenote: _Jesuitic morality as doctrine of fraud against the moral\nlaw._]\n\nPractical legalism can also give rise to a monstrously absurd theory,\nwhich we shall call _Jesuitic morality,_ not because it is peculiar\nto the Jesuits or to Catholicism, but as dutiful homage to the most\nconspicuous and likewise the most celebrated in literature of its\nhistorical incarnations. The theory of Jesuitic morality admits that we\ncan rationally _defraud_ ethical law.\n\n[Sidenote: _Concept of legal fraud._]\n\nThat the law is _defrauded or eluded_ every day, taken in itself, is\nneither moral nor immoral, since it is an expedient of social strife\nlike another, and in certain cases may be a legitimate act of war and\na fraud only in name. A law held to be iniquitous should be combated\nopenly; but if the imposer of the iniquitous law, or he who wishes to\nprofit by it, have committed a mistake in drafting it, so that it can\nbe interpreted in such a way as to become good, or at least better, it\nis very natural that the adversary should profit by the mistake, if\nfor no other reason than that he may discredit the law as equivocal\nand lacking in precision and compel society to discuss it again. Who\ndoes not applaud the fraud of Portia, when it is a question of saving\nthe life of the noble Antonio from a Shylock? And if even the _ferox\nanimus_ of Shylock has found defenders, as symbol of the tenacity with\nwhich we must make our own rights respected, yet Portia also will\nalways find her supporters, as symbol of ingenious rebellion against an\nunjust law.\n\n[Sidenote: _Absurdity of the fraud against ones self and against the\nmoral law._]\n\nBut what is altogether irrational and yet seems to be admitted by\nJesuitic morality, is _the fraud against oneself,_ and so against one's\nown moral conscience. To defraud one's own conscience, to rebel against\nit with violence or with artifice, is contradiction, wilfulness, evil.\nIt sometimes happens that we exert ourselves to still what is called\nthe internal voice of admonition, the Socratic demon, or the guardian\nangel. This happens in the utilitarian, not less than in the moral\nfield; when, for instance, we yield to a pleasure which we know to be\nharmful and had intended to avoid for that reason, and when by dint of\nsubtleties we try to persuade ourselves that it differs from that which\nwe had recognized as harmful. We attempt, but we never really succeed;\nwe may be able to obscure our conscience for an instant, but we can\nnever permanently and altogether darken it; the effort itself calls for\nthe light that we would avoid.\n\n[Sidenote: _Jesuitic morality not explainable as mere legalism._]\n\nBut that pretension of Jesuitic morality cannot on the other hand\nderive from mere ethical legalism, because legalism produces the\ncontradictions that we have already placed in relief; it generates the\nmorally indifferent and at the same time suppresses it; and when it\nhas suppressed again generates, in order again to suppress it; and so\non to infinity, an anxious and sterile doing and undoing. But it never\nauthorizes fraud. Simple legalism will never justify our pretending to\nourselves when a definite action is willed or when we have a definite\nintention, that we will another action and have a different intention;\nor, as they say, _direction of the intention_: the intention is that\nwhich it is and it does not allow itself to be directed at will. To\nobey the letter of the law with the clear intention of breaking it in\nspirit will never be justified.\n\n[Sidenote: _Jesuitic morality as alliance between legalism and\ntheological utilitarianism._]\n\nThe pretension of Jesuitic morality becomes illuminated and transparent\nto the intellect, only when we make the hypothesis of an alliance\nbetween _practical legalism and theological utilitarianism_; that is\nto say, when not only do we conceive morality as a series or complex\nof legislative decisions, but when we likewise consider these to\nbe nothing less than the product of the will of God. They are not\nin themselves moral as such, and to observe them does not arise of\nintrinsic necessity; but they are obeyed as the lesser evil, through\nfear of worse or in hope of future advantage. In this case there is a\nsilent struggle between God the legislator and man, a struggle between\nthe weak and the overbearing, in which the strength of the weak lies in\ningenuity, their tactic in fraud. Hence the dominant concept of Jesuit\nmorality: to get the better of the divine laws as far as possible, to\ndo the least possible of what they command; and when called upon to\ngive an account of one's own actions before the tribunal of confession,\nor before the universal judgment, so to subtilize upon the law, that\nfrom the interpretation thus put upon it, what has been done seems to\nbelong to the licit and permissive. God forbids man to kill man; but\ndoes he intend to forbid this, when the motive for this killing is the\nglory of God himself? When the slayer acts as though he were the hand\nof God himself and is all one with him? Without doubt, no: so that\nit will be lawful for the Jesuit to kill or cause to be killed his\nJansenist adversary, who injures divine interests by disclosing the\ndefects of the holy Company, which is the image of God upon earth: that\nkilling, then, is not only lawful, but ordained. But if he want to kill\nhis adversary, not through zeal for the divine glory, but because of\nthe injury that he causes to the personal and immoral interests of the\nJesuit? This too is permitted, provided that when killing him, though\nanimated with personal hate, he withdraw his regard from the real\nmotive, and _directing_ his intention to the divine glory, thus justify\nthe _means_ by the _end._\n\n[Sidenote: _Distinction between the doctrine and the practice of the\nJesuits._]\n\nSuch is the monstrous logical product, born of the union between\n_legalism_ and the theory of _theological utilitarianism_; such is\nthe essence of Jesuitic morality, which has justly aroused horror and\ndisgust. And we call it _logical_ (or illogical) product, because\nwe wish to make it clear that here as elsewhere we are occupied with\ntheories only and are criticizing them alone. In practical action\nJesuitic morality was often better than the theory would imply; even\nthe Padre Caramuel, who put the question as to the right possessed by\nthe Jesuits of slaying the Jansenists, must have been at bottom a good\nman; because, having almost arrived at an affirmative conclusion to\nhis inquiry by dint of perverting the moral law, he was seized by pity\nand defrauded his own fraud, concluding negatively that the Jansenists\n_occidi non possunt quia nocere non potuerunt,_ because (said he)\nthey are poor devils, unable to obscure the glorious brilliance of\nthe Company, as the owl does not conceal the light of the sun.[2] And\nSaint Alphonso dei Liguori, who is usually looked upon as an example\nof that lurid morality in our day, when he set to work to stir up\nafresh the ugliness of casuistic in connection with the sixth and ninth\ncommandments, experienced all the repugnance of the gallant gentleman\nthat he was, at such a task, imposed upon him by the traditional mode\nof treating Ethic, as is to be seen by his declarations, exclamations,\nand exhortations: _Nunc aegre materiam illam tractandam aggredimur,\ncujus vel solum nomen hominum mentes infidi. Det mihi veniam, quaeso,\ncastus lector!... Ora studiosos ... ut ... eo tempore saepius mentem\nad Deum elevent et Virgini immaculatae se commendent, ne dum aliorum\nanimos Deo student acquirere, ipsi suarum detrimentum patiantur._[3]\nIf Jesuitism were also moral corruption, this was not due to its\nabstract theories, but to the education that it practised, which was\ndepressing, servile, and directed to mortify the strength of the will\nand of the intelligence, to reduce a man to be like _senis baculus,_\na docile and passive instrument in the hands of others; and to the\nconfusion in consciences as to the real motives of actions, which it\nnot only preserved but increased, lulling souls to sleep with sophisms\nand allurements of devotion _ais\u00e9es \u00e0 pratiquer,_ by means of which the\ngates of Paradise could be unlocked, and with _chemins de velours_ on\nwhich one could mount to the sky with every indulgence. The rigorists\nand latitudinarians are philosophically equivalent; but it is a fact\nthat in practice the rigorists were generally energetic and austere\nsouls; which should not cause us to forget that the latitudinarians\nalso, amid their distorted theories, sometimes had a lucid vision of\nthe _complications_ of reality and felt the necessity of a morality\nless abstract and less disharmonic in relation to life, however\nincorrectly they may nevertheless have developed its theory.\n\n\n[1] 1 Cor. x. 23.\n\n[2] Pascal, _Prov._ 1. 7.\n\n[3] _Theol. moralis_ 7, Bassano, 1773, i. 168.\n\n\n\n\nV\n\n\nJUDICIAL ACTIVITY AS AN ACTIVITY GENERICALLY PRACTICAL (ECONOMIC)\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Legislative activity, as generically practical._]\n\nThe will that wills classes of actions, or the activity that makes\nlaws and that we can henceforward term _legislative activity_ without\nfear of misunderstanding, is either moral or merely economic; and\ntherefore, when dialecticized, is either moral or immoral, economic or\nanti-economic. It is true that this will is abstract and indeterminate;\nbut that does not prevent it from being, and from being obliged to be,\neither moral or merely economic; and, therefore, abstractly moral and\nabstractly economic, and so also abstractly immoral and anti-economic.\nA programme of action will be conceived, as they say, wisely or\nfoolishly, to a good or to a bad end, for mere reasons of utility, or\nwith a lively desire for good. The legislator is a volitional man, and\nas such to be judged both utilitarianly and morally. The laws that\nare his volitional product are useful or injurious, good or bad. This\njudgment is also without doubt abstract, for it is necessary first to\nsee the legislator engaged in the practical act of the application of\nhis law, in order to recognize what he can do and who he is. We know\nmany (others or ourselves?) who make plans for the most beautiful\nlives, legislating admirably for themselves and for others; yet these\nshow themselves mean and bad in action: and we not infrequently find\nthe opposite case of men who calumniate themselves and who, after they\nhave declared the most dishonest, or at least the most amoralistic, of\nintentions, when they find themselves face to face with the bad action,\nugly with the ugliness of sin, say, as the old man in the fable said to\nDeath: \"I have not called thee!\"\n\n[Sidenote: _Vanity of disputes as to the character of institutions,\neconomic or ethic: punishment, matrimony, the State, etc._]\n\nFrom these considerations, which seem to be most obvious, a not\nobvious consequence is to be drawn; namely, that it is perfectly vain\nto descant upon the utilitarian or moral character of laws, or of\nthese or those laws; to ask oneself, for instance, whether the object\nof _punishment_ be _deterritio_ or _emendatio_; if _matrimony_ be an\nexchange of services or a sacrament, a union of interests or a society\nwith moral ends; if the _State_ be the result of a contract or of a\nmoral idea, and so on. These questions have an immense literature\ndevoted to them, which has been accumulated for centuries, and although\nthey be vain for us, yet they cannot be so for one who has not yet\nbecome clear as to the special forms of the practical activity and as\nto the nature of law. For him they are not vain, since they represent\nas it were in a concentrated form, the complete philosophical problem\nconcerning the practical; although they must of necessity turn out\nto be insoluble. Punishment can be conceived and willed as a mere\nutilitarian menace, to prevent others from performing certain classes\nof actions, even if they be ethically of the highest value; or as\nmoral solicitude for the amelioration of society and the individual\nhimself who has erred, by obliging him to re-enter himself and change\nhis mind. Even the pain of death can be directed to this end and death\nthat has given or restored to the guilty a day, an hour, an instant\nof that human life, of that contact with the infinite, which he had\nlost, may be held not to have been in vain. Matrimony may be instituted\nfor the more regular satisfaction of the sexual instinct and for\nother similar interests of utilitarian life; and also to secure, that\ninterp\u00e9n\u00e9tration of souls, which is the great mover of the moral life.\nThe State may arise from a mere contract which draws together isolated\nindividuals and groups and unites them for defence and offence; and\nalso form the profound moral aspiration of the individuals, who\nrecognize the universal in themselves and are attentive to realize it\nin modes ever more rich and more lofty. All institutions, all laws may\nreceive this double form; and although there be laws that are merely\nutilitarian, those that are moral are also, as is clear, utilitarian\nor economic, and therefore not useless but useful. An amoral man will\nmake for himself amoral laws; and between an amoral man and an amoral\nwoman no other marriage but that of interest is possible; and between\na hundred amoral individuals, no other State is possible but that\nestablished by contract; and no other punishment will be applicable in\nsuch a State save that of mere _deterritio._ It will be objected that\namoral individuals and multitudes do not exist, and it may be true that\nthey do not exist in a continuous manner: but they do exist at certain\nmoments; and this as we know, suffices to justify, indeed to prove\nnecessary, our theory.\n\n[Sidenote: _Legislative activity as economic._]\n\nThus no other answer is possible to the question asked as to whether\nthe legislative activity be moral or merely economic, save that it may\nbe the one or the other, and therefore, that it is not of necessity\nmoral; thus, defining it in its full extension, it must be called\n_generically practical,_ or taken in itself, _merely economic._\n\n[Sidenote: _Juridical activity: its economic character._]\n\nPassing now from the legislative activity to that of him who realizes\nand executes the law (an activity that we may call _juridical,_ in\norder not to confound it with the other), and asking whether juridical\nactivity be moral or distinct from morality and if distinct, what is\nits distinctive characteristic, the answer cannot but be most simple\nfor us who have attained to our present position. So simple indeed,\nthat to give it would seem to be almost superfluous. Not only must the\nactivity of carrying out the law not be intrinsically diverse from the\nactivity of legislating, but as has been seen, it obeys exclusively\npractical principles, economic and ethic. Hence the 'juridical activity\ncan be merely economic and it can be moral; and seeing that economicity\nis the general form that of itself involves the other, the juridical\nactivity is generically practical, or _economic. _ As such and in so\nfar as it is such, it is at once distinct from and united with the\nmoral form.\n\n[Sidenote: _Its consequent identity with the economic activity._]\n\nBut juridical activity does not merely enter the economic activity;\nit is exactly identical with it: juridical activity and economic\nactivity are _synonyms._ Legislative activity enters economy and\nnevertheless distinguishes itself from it, as volition of the abstract,\nindeterminate volition. The juridical activity is on the other hand\nconcrete and determined, like the other, nor is it distinguished from\nit by any secondary character. It might be attempted to subdistinguish\nthe economic and juridical activity, while admitting the generic\nidentification, and to look upon the latter as such that although\nobeying the economic principle, it is yet developed _under the laws;_\nwhereas the former would exist even where _laws were wanting._ But the\ndistinction would be empirical, of undulating boundaries. Strictly\nspeaking, man is surrounded with laws in all his actions, and he always\nacts under all the laws, and at the same time he effectually acts under\nnone of them, save that of his own practical conscience.\n\nIf the identity and synonymity of law, understood as juridical activity\nwith economy, has not been discovered, that too is connected with the\nlack of recognition of the practical utilitarian category on the part\nof philosophers and with their considering it, as they erroneously\ndid, either as egotism and immorality, or as an altogether empirical\ndivision, to which was added a concept, also empirical, of the\njuridical activity itself, which should be limited to what are called\nlaws emanating from the State, sometimes graciously including in them\nsocial laws, and always altogether ignoring the fundamental form,\nindividual laws.\n\n[Sidenote: _The failure to recognize the economic form and the meaning\nof the problem concerning the distinction between morality and law._]\n\nBut this failure of recognition has not prevented the appearance and\npersistence of the problem of the _combined unity and distinction of\nlaw and morality,_ which has been the most frequent though the most\ncomplicated mode of affirming the claim of a special Philosophy of\neconomy. A serious beginning of meditation upon law had hardly begun,\nwhen something was observed in it that it was impossible to resolve\ninto the concepts of Ethic. Hence the generally admitted recognition\nof the distinction between law and morality and the many attempts\nat determining of what the peculiar character of the former exactly\nconsisted.\n\n[Sidenote: _Theories of compulsion and exteriority, as distinctive\ncharacters: critique._]\n\nThis character was placed most frequently and with greater insistence\nin the two determinations of _compulsion_ and of _exteriority._ And it\nwas said that law is distinguished from morality because it is possible\nto exercize compulsion in the juridical, but not in the moral field;\nor that law deals with the field of external relations, morality with\nthe internal; or that one is the _psychical,_ the other the _physical_\nside of action. But as to the first determination, we have already\nshown that it has no meaning at all when applied to the forms of the\nspiritual activity, where nothing is compulsory and everything is at\nonce free and necessary: the juridical activity, if it be activity,\nmust likewise always be determined by free agreement. The second, which\nis the determination of exteriority, is not less inconceivable; for it\nis not given to separate the external from the internal, since they are\nboth one, nor the word from its meaning, nor the body from its spirit.\nCompulsion and exteriority, taken strictly as concepts, are therefore,\nin this case, void and contradictory formul\u00e6. To fill them somehow with\na thought, it would be necessary to understand as compulsion certain\nmodes of action, as opposed to certain other modes; for instance,\ncompulsion would be the action by which an accused person was conducted\nto prison by two policemen and non-compulsion that of him who should\nbe induced to go and constitute himself a prisoner through the\npersuasion of others; and as exteriority, certain classes of actions\nopposed to certain others; so that, for example, the deportment of\nan individual as communal or provincial councillor would belong to\nexternal life, his relations with his confessor or with his \u00c6sculapius\nto internal life. But compulsion and exteriority, reduced to these\nmeanings, become gross and empirical concepts, of which no use can be\nmade in philosophy and which therefore cannot be of the least value as\nqualifying and distinguishing law from morality.\n\nIn the same way, no value is to be attached to such a distinction,\nwhen determined from what is licit to what is commanded, from rights\nto duties, from what is permitted to what is obligatory; because licit\nand commanded, rights and duties, from what is permitted to what is\nobligatory, are correlative concepts constituting an indissoluble nexus\nand it is not possible to separate and to oppose them to one another.\n\n[Sidenote: _Moralistic theories of rights: critique._]\n\nThe difficulty of conveniently fixing the distinction with the\ncharacters indicated, leads one to think of a different sort of\ntentative, according to which rights would certainly be distinguished\nfrom ethicity, not placed above or beside it, but rather in the\nvery sphere of morality itself, as the species in respect to the\ngenus or the part in respect of the whole. Juridical action would be\nmoral, but it would belong to the inferior levels of morality; it\nwould be occupied with the execution of simple _justice,_ with the\nestablishment of order, proportion, equality; whereas morality would\nrepresent _more than justice,_ and would upset the equilibrium of\nrights with benevolence, generosity, sacrifice, heroism. Rights (it\nis also said) are limited to the _ethical minimum,_ while morality\nstrives for the _maximum;_ rights are concerned with strict rights or\n_perfect_ duties, morality with meritorious and supererogatory actions,\n_imperfect_ duties. But these determinations also pretend to separate\nthe inseparable, by drawing an arbitrary line of division between small\nand great actions, between least and greatest, and they employ concepts\nthat are altogether empirical, as, for instance, that of justice\nas distinct from benevolence, of the strictly obligatory from the\nmeritorious and supererogatory; and worse still than this, metaphors\nand symbols, such as equality, order, regularity; or they operate\ndirectly with the arithmetical and geometrical proportion of actions.\nAnd consciously or unconsciously a return is made to Ethic pure and\nsimple, with the theories that make juridical activity to consist of\nthe recognition of others as _persons,_ or with the search for _general\nutility_ (superindividual). When we act in view of the _person_ in\nother individuals (or in oneself), or of the useful, which is not the\nuseful for the individual, but although it comprehends, yet transcends\nit:--the merely juridical conscience has already been surpassed, it has\nbeen filled with a moral content, that is to say, an ethical form has\nbeen given to the practical activity. The double sense of the terms\n\"rights\" and \"morality\" is in this way preserved in words but denied in\nfact.\n\n[Sidenote: _Duality of positive and ideal, historical and natural\nrights, etc.; and absurd attempts at unification and co-ordination._]\n\nThe dual sense of the terms is also affirmed by the very ancient\ndistinction between _positive and ideal, historical_ and _natural_\nrights, _right_ and _justice,_ or, as it has also been formulated,\nbetween the _two different justices,_ realistic and idealistic,\nfruitful in conjunction. Natural rights, with their homonyms just\nstated, besides the generically practical significations that we have\nalready examined, have also had the narrower one of ethical ideal or\nmorality; and therefore it cannot cause astonishment that it should\nappear now conjoined with, now detached from positive rights. But how\njoined and disjoined? For us it is a question of degrees, whence the\npositivity of both forms is recognized: the second of these is included\nin the first: the ideal right or morality (if it be right, and not\nsimply abstract excogitation willed by no one, or vague desire) is\nboth positive and historical. But those who posited the distinction\nwithout being able to make it definite and so to dominate it were led\nto conceive one or the other term as negative; and therefore both as\nnegative between themselves and existing only in a third: which meant\nto reannul the distinction by reducing it to abstract contradiction.\nIf one of the two were conceived as negative, either the ideal justice\n(that is, the seriousness of moral strength) was denied and turned to\nridicule, or positive justice, that is, the seriousness of volitional\nstrength, was presented as something turbid and impure and at best\nas a human imperfection, to which it was advisable to resign oneself\nsince it would disappear in a society of perfect men or in a future\nlife of perfection. Juridical activity became something contingent\nand mortal. Matters were even worse, if it were found impossible to\neliminate it with similar religious, apocalyptic, or millenary fancies.\nThe negative was then conceived as positive or co-ordinated with the\npositive: hence incredible logical divisions of rights into forms or\nspecies of _moral_ and _immoral rights, of just_ and _unjust_ rights,\nin which the species has the function of _negation of the genus,_\nalmost as though the race of horses were to be divided into two kinds:\n_dead_ and _living_ horses! Unjust or immoral rights are not rights,\nbut a contradiction of them, and if we sometimes describe in this way\na real and effective juridical act (an economic act), it is necessary\nto observe that the denomination is given from the point of view of a\nsuperior form of activity. Rights in themselves as rights, understood\npositively, are never immoral, but only _amoral._\n\n[Sidenote: _Value of all these theories as confused perception of the\namoral character of justice._]\n\nAll these errors, all these sterile tentatives have their origin, as\nhas been said, in the lively consciousness of a distinction existing\nbetween right and morality and at the same time of the impossibility\nof determining this correctly, owing to lack of clarity as to the\npurely economic form of the practical activity. When the juridical\nactivity has been identified with the economic and when juridical\n(economic) activity has in consequence been conceived as at once united\nwith and distinct from morality, we are able to recognize that these\nattempts have nevertheless fulfilled a very useful function; that is\nto say, they have more or less energetically asserted and defended\nthe position that there existed a characteristic distinction between\nright and morality and that it was necessary to seek for it. They are\ntherefore far superior, notwithstanding their errors, to that confused\nethical conception, which receives rights and morality indistinctly\ninto its bosom, or to the utilitaristic conception, which arrives by a\ndifferent route at the same indistinction. This merit belongs to the\ntheories of the moral minimum, of justice, of the two justices and of\nthe contest between positive and ideal rights; but in a much greater\ndegree to that of compulsion, of exteriority, of the licit. With these\nlast was almost unconsciously set in relief the fact that right obeys\na law different from that of Ethic, and may be called _compelled and\nnot free by comparison with it,_ because not founded upon the necessity\nof the universal; that in respect to the supreme _interiority_ of\nEthic it can be considered as something _exterior;_ that in respect\nto the ethical imperative, it appears as something indifferentiated\nor _licit._ These are without doubt symbols, tautologies, vague and\nimprecise phrases, but efficacious in keeping the attention alert and\nin promoting doubt and research.\n\n[Sidenote: _Confirmations of this character in the ingenuous\nconsciousness._]\n\nBut the impossibility of absorbing rights into Ethic altogether and\nwithout leaving residues is proclaimed or confessed, not only in the\ntheories of philosophers, but by simple thought, and especially by the\nconsciousness we have of the real world being governed, not by abstract\nmorality, but, as is said, by _force,_ or by the will in action.\n\"Disarmed prophets\" will be efficacious in poetry, but ridiculous in\npractical reality: _la force prime le droit,_ precedes it and is always\nof greater value than an unreal and contradictory ethical right and\naspiration, afterwards dissolved in the empty and arbitrary. We will\nnot recall proverbs, maxims, historical examples, though this would be\neasy; that little story of Franco Sacchetti which preserves \"a fair\nspeech\" of Messer Ridolfo da Camerino, will suffice for all. One of his\nnephews had been at Bologna studying law for a good twelve years, and\nwhen, having become an excellent lawyer, he returned to Camerino, he\nwent to pay a visit to Messer Ridolfo. When he paid the visit, Messer\nRidolfo said, \"And what didst thou do at Bologna?\" He replied, \"My\nLord, I have learned _reason._\" Said Messer Ridolfo, \"Thou hast spent\nthy time ill.\" The young man replied that the saying seemed to him to\nbe very strange. \"Why was it ill spent, my Lord?\" And Messer Ridolfo\nsaid, \"_Because thou shouldst have learned force, which is worth two\nof the other._\" The youth began to smile, and thinking it over again\nand again, both he and the others that heard, perceived that what\nMesser Ridolfo had said, was true.[1]\n\n[Sidenote: _Comparison between right and language. Grammars and codes._]\n\nAnd here too we are at last able to establish a parallel between\nthe practical and theoretic activity, between the problems of the\nPhilosophy of right and those of Logic and \u00c6sthetic. The comparison of\nright and language has been several times attempted, with very great\ncorrection of thought, although necessarily defective execution, since\nit was customary to conceive both language and right in an abstract\nand empirical manner. Whoever should wish to take up the inquiry\nagain would do great service, were he to insist upon the fact that\nsince it has been impossible to understand what language really is,\nso long as grammars and vocabularies were taken as its reality, so it\nis impossible to understand anything of rights, so long as the eye is\nfixed upon laws and codes, or what is even worse, upon the commentaries\nof jurists, or upon the abstract volitional fact, or altogether upon\nwhat is not a true and proper volitional fact, but the elaboration of\nformul\u00e6 and of general concepts.\n\n[Sidenote: _Logic and language; morality and rights._]\n\nOnly when rights appear as individual and continually new work of\nindividuals, only when the attention is directed to the spectacle of\nreal life and not to the abstractions of legislators and dispenses with\nthe dissertations of jurists, is it possible to state the problem:\nhow does this juridical work coincide with, and how does it differ\nfrom moral work? And here too the comparison with language is fitting,\nalthough language be not logicity, yet logical thought cannot become\nconcrete, save in speaking; so moral activity cannot live, save by\ntranslating itself into laws and institutes, and in the realization of\nlaws and institutes, that is, in the juridical and economic activity.\n\nFinally, just as the history of a language is always arbitrary and\nabstract, so long as it is considered alone, outside the works in which\nthe language is incarnate and the true history of a language is its\npoetry and literature, so _the true history of the rights of a people_\n(of the rights that have really been executed and not merely formulated\nin laws and codes, be often proved to be a dead letter) cannot but be\naltogether one with _the social and political history of that people:_\nan altogether juridical or economic history; a history of _wants_ and\nof _labour._\n\n\n[1] Novelle, xl.\n\n\n\n\nVI\n\n\nHISTORICAL ANNOTATIONS\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Distinction between morality and rights, and its importance\nfor the history of the economic principle._]\n\nI. The history of the distinction between morality and rights is very\nimportant, precisely because, as has been said, it is the manifestation\nof the very strongly--felt desire to posit in some way a philosophy of\nthe aethical or amoral practical form: a manifestation which is the\nmost conspicuous of all those that we have had occasion to note on the\nsubject (theory of politics, theory of the inferior appetitive faculty,\ntheory of the passions, etc.).[1] And owing to the impossibility of\nsatisfying that exigency with the intellectual data possessed, the\nproblem of the relation between rights and morality has become anything\nbut an amusing puzzle, a theme for true vain eloquence.\n\nEmmanuel Kant in the _Critique of Pure Reason,_ wishing to give a\ncharacteristic example of the difficulty of definitions, found nothing\nbetter to record than that jurists were always seeking a definition\nof rights, but had never succeeded in finding one.[2] And a jurist\nphilosopher of our times (Jhering) has called the definition of rights,\nin their difference from morality, the \"Cape Horn,\" or the Cape of\ntempests (or shipwrecks?) of juridical science.\n\n[Sidenote: _Indistinction up to the time of Thomas._]\n\nThe problem of that distinction is on the other hand relatively recent\nand therefore the history of the Philosophy of rights has rightly been\nplaced not further back than the end of the seventeenth century, or not\nmuch beyond Christian Thomas.[3] Up to that time, it is not possible to\nspeak strictly of a Philosophy of rights. Treatises of jurisprudence,\nof rights and of the State, in regard to what of philosophical they\ncontained, were nothing but treatises of Ethic; not indeed because\nthe two sciences were (as they were) materially united in the same\nbooks, but precisely because the two concepts were indistinct. The\nspeculations of antiquity for this part also of the Philosophy of the\npractical have the character of ingenuousness already noted. It would\nbe incorrect to reconstruct a moralistic philosophy from the rights\nof Plato, founding it, for example, upon the theory developed in the\n_Gorgias_ as to the eagerness to purge his punishment that should exist\nin the criminal, similar, in this respect, to the sick man, who knows\nthat the medicine will free him from his disease.[4] The researches\nof Aristotle also as to justice (perhaps the best the classical world\nhas left us on the subject), look upon justice in a narrow sense, as\na virtue among virtues,[5] which should not intrinsically possess any\ngreater reason for distinguishing itself from the other virtues than\nthey for distinguishing among themselves. The pompous definitions\nof the Roman jurists, still the joy of schools of jurisprudence and\nof judges' rhetoric, have no philosophical weight and would in any\ncase confirm the identity of rights with Ethicity, if not absolutely\nwith the entire knowable and practical universe. There is hardly a\nray of the distinction to be traced in the discussions as to whether\nrights exist by nature or by convention and in the concept of a _\u1f01\u03c0\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2\n\u03b4\u03af\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd,_ opposed to that of _\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u03af\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd_ found in Plato, and\nmore explicitly in Aristotle,[6] and rendered popular by Cicero when\nspeaking of the _recta ratio, naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes,\nconstans, sempiterna_; of rights not drawn from the Twelve Tables or\nfrom the pretorian Edict, but _ex intima philosophia_; and of rights\nthat on the other hand are _varie et ad tempus descriptae populis,_\nwhence they have the name of laws _favore magis quam re._[7]\n\nThis rough distinction between natural and positive, absolute and\nrelative rights; this concept of an ideal right placed face to face\nwith real rights, or of which the real should be an imperfect and\npartial translation, also reappears in St. Thomas Aquinas and in other\nscholastics. And there is nothing more than this in those thinkers who\nfounded what was called natural rights in the seventeenth century,\nsuch as Grotius and his followers. It is true that the boast of having\ndistinguished rights from morality and religion has usually been\nattributed to that historical period. But it is hardly necessary to\nrepeat that what was meant by these formul\u00e6 were the great social and\npolitical questions which took the form of wars of religion in the\nEurope of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; that so-called\ndistinction, therefore, the result of long strife, though it have great\npractical value as a sign of social transformation, has no doctrinal\nvalue. The idea of autonomy, proper to the juridical activity, is\nabsent even in the profound treatise of Vico on universal rights, for\nthis contains only an altogether empirical distinction between _virtus_\nand _justitia_; of these the first _cum cupiditate pugnai,_ and the\nsecond _utilitates dirigit et exaequat;_ and both derive their origin\nfrom the _vis veri_ or _ratio humana;_ and as all the virtues are\nconnected and none of them can exist alone (_nulla virtus solitaria_),\nso _virtus_ and _justitia_ are at bottom one.[8] The work of Vico,\nwhich gives a new conception of the relation between ideal and history\nand most original applications of Roman history, turns out to be\nnothing but Ethic, when considered beneath the aspect of Philosophy of\nRights. Nor on the other hand could the problem of the nature of rights\ntruly form the object of enquiry on the part of utilitarians (Hobbes\nand others); with whom, if the absorption of rights in morality was not\nfound, this did not arise because the one was distinguished from the\nother, but because morality itself was denied in what was proper to\nitself: the problem of the distinction disappeared, because its terms\ndisappeared.\n\n[Sidenote: _Thomas and his followers._]\n\nII. Thomas provided the apple of discord, or as might also be said,\ncast the leaven of progress into the treatment of rights, when\nhe distinguished three forms of the _rectum_: the _justum,_ the\n_honestum,_ the _decorum,_ placing the first in opposition to the other\ntwo, the _forum externum_ to the _internum,_ and attributing to rights\nand justice the character of coercibility.[9] The formula had a rapid\nand unsuspected fortune, and became current in the schools. Gundling,\nfor instance, defined right as the \"ordering of external relations.\"[10]\n\n[Sidenote: _Kant and Fichte._]\n\nIt was completely developed and reasoned out, with all the strictness\nthat its erroneity permitted, in the doctrines of Kant and Fichte, who\nwere the greatest of Thomas's scholars for this part of the study.\nKant opposed _legality_ to morality; the juridical imperative is\nexpressed with the formula, \"act externally\" (_handle \u00e4usserlich_);\nright is conjoined with the faculty of compulsion (_zwingen._) Hence\nhis doctrines are often amoralistic or economic as regards individual\njuridical institutions, and this is especially the case when he deals\nwith the State, with matrimony, and with punishment; these were\nfollowed by Fichte, who made some reservations for matrimony alone,\nconsidering it an institution not only juridical, but also natural\nand moral.[11] On the other hand rights were for Kant something that\nsurpassed the individual will and utility; it was the sum of the\nconditions by means of which the will of the one can be united with\nthe will of another, according to a universal law of liberty.[12]\nFichte in like manner conceived of rights as altogether free of every\nadmixture of morality; as an objective order, arising from the fact\nof the individual who coherently affirms himself and his own liberty,\nthus also affirming other individuals and their liberty.[13] Both\nphilosophers thus preserve the moralistic concept of the legal and\nthe _justum_; rights, although armed with compelling power, are never\nforce alone, but the external ordering of freedom, namely, justice.\nFor this reason, Kant explicitly excludes force, in so far as it is\nconstitutive of rights and speaks of a \"force without law\"; and both\nhe and Fichte make coercibility to flow, not from the nature of the\nvolitional force itself, but from the violation of order. It is just,\nsays Kant, to repel force with force, when it would interfere with\nliberty. The right of coercion (repeats Fichte) is founded solely upon\nthe violation of the original right. But it remains obscure what this\npoor legality, justice, coexistence, and harmony of wills may be;\nwhat force may be and why and how it is connected with the preceding\ndefinition is not investigated. The distinction of the juridical from\nthe moral sphere is announced and proclaimed more loudly than perhaps\nwas ever done before or since; but to announce and to proclaim is not\nto carry out. If rights be changed into an ordinance more or less\nrational, to be identified with the concept of justice, one does not\nsee how they can exist independently of morality. Kant and Fichte\nwere prevented from conceiving the juridical function free from every\nelement of morality or immorality, by the function which they assigned\nto compulsion (symbol of law), submitting it to ethical exigencies.\nIn this uncertainty, there cannot be wanting and there is not wanting\nthe thought that rights are not indeed an eternal category, but a\nhistorical and transitory fact; and as Spinoza had already said, _si\ncum humana natura ita comparatum esset ut homines id quod maxime utile\nest maxime cuperent, nulla esset opus arte ad concordiam et fidem_;\nFichte thus looked upon the juridical State simply as a _State of\nnecessity_ opposed to the _State of reason_: and when perfection has\nbeen attained and there is complete accord of all in the common end,\n\"the State\" (he said) \"disappears as a legislative and compulsive\nforce.\"[14]\n\nIn the ulterior phase of his thought, Fichte _Hegel_ afterwards took\nfurther steps toward a closer union between morality and rights. But\nthe complete resolution of the first in the second is effected in the\nsystem of Hegel, though it is customary to blame this philosopher for\nthe opposite fault, namely, that he resolves morality in right. Above\nall, Hegel would hear nothing of the concept of force in right: facts\nof force and of violence, as, for instance, the relation between a\nslave and his master, appertain, according to him, to a circle, which\nlies on this side of right, to the subjective spirit, to a world in\nwhich wrong can still be right. The fact that violence and tyranny are\nmet with in positive rights is an accidental thing and does not affect\nits real nature. For Hegel, as for his predecessors, co-operation\narises only as reaction from the violation of what is just, and is\nviolence preservative of liberty, suppression of the previous violence.\n\"To define abstract and rigorous rights as law which we can be\ncompelled to obey, means\" (writes Hegel) \"to see them as a consequence\nof what takes place only by the cross road of wrong.\" But there is\nmore: abstract rights, which form the first moment of the Philosophy\nof the practical in Hegel, are unreal; he opposes to them the second\nmoment, morality, which also is abstract and unreal, consisting of the\ngood intention, which has not yet been incorporated in action and life:\nthus concrete reality is realized only in the third moment, in the\nethos, which synthetizes the abstract rights and the abstract morality\nof the intention in social life.[15] From this it is clear that the\npurely juridical moment does not possess effective spiritual autonomy\nfor Hegel; _so_ much so, that it is placed by him upon the same plane\nas abstract and unreal morality. In consequence of his identification\nof rights with ethicity, Hegel is opposed to Kant and Fichte in his\ndefinitions of single rights; he rejects the compulsory and contractual\ntheory of the State and (the Kantian) theory of matrimony as a strict\ncontract made between individuals as to the reciprocal use of their\nbodies.[16] The compulsory theory of punishment seemed to him to reduce\nthe latter to a mere economic fact, by means of which \"the State as\njudging power, opens a business with goods called crimes exchangeable\nfor other goods, and the code is _the list of prices._\"[17]\n\n[Sidenote: _Herbart and Schopenhauer._]\n\nHerbart too denies the originality of the character of compulsion\nin the idea of rights, and this is one of his five practical ideas,\nor, \"the agreement of many wills, thought as a rule that eliminates\nstrife.\" But even in this superficial moralistic reduction, force\nreappears all of a sudden, one knows not how: society has need of an\nexternal bond, in order to subsist; force and power (_Macht_) are\nadded to society and _the State_ arises.[18] The same contradictions\nare to be found in Schopenhauer: after he has posited the two virtues\nof justice and benevolence, he makes a chapter of morality out of the\npure doctrine of law. The science of rights in the specific sense\nborrows this chapter in order to study its opposite: all the limits\nthat morality looks upon as not to be passed without intention of\nwrong-doing, on the contrary are considered by the science of rights\nas limits, of which violation by others is not to be tolerated and\nfrom which one has the right to expel others. Thus the distinction\nbetween internal and external is in this way reproduced in all\nits unmaintainability under the denomination of _rights and their\nopposite._ But the bridge of asses is always the junction of rights\nwith force, that is to say, with the element extraneous to Ethic; and\nin this connection Schopenhauer has nothing better to offer than a\ncomparison. \"As there are certain chemical substances never to be found\npure and isolated, but always in some sort of combination with another\nelement, which gives to them the necessary consistency; so rights, when\nthey must set foot in the real world and dominate it, have need of a\nsmall adjunct of will and force, in order to be able (notwithstanding\nits nature, which is really ideal and therefore ethereal) to operate\nand persist in this real and material world, without evaporating and\nflying to heaven, as was the case with Hesiod.\"[19]\n\n[Sidenote: _Rosmini and others._]\n\nRosmini presents the two elements not well harmonized, as the\neud\u00e6monological and the ethical. Rights for him are not mere\neud\u00e6monism, but a eud\u00e6monistic fact, produced by moral right and\nreceiving form from it; hence the science of rights \"stands between\nEud\u00e6monology and Ethic, so that one of its ends extends to the one\nand the other to the other.\" It would not be easy to explain and to\njustify what he calls a mediate science, composed of Eud\u00e6monology\nand Ethic; and it would be far less easy to explain how this science\ncomes to be \"completely distinct\" as regards its components. If rights\nhave a moral form, they are moral and not eud\u00e6monological. Owing to\nthis difficulty Rosmini was led to introduce the concept of the licit\nas criterion of differentiation, defining right as \"a personal faculty\nand power of enjoying, acting and being able to act, a lawful good\nthat must not be impeded by others.\"[20] Juridically understood this\nconstitutes a tautology, ethically something worse. Other Catholic\nauthors (Taparelli, for example) deplore the separation of _ethos_ from\n_jus,_ introduced (they say) by Protestant doctrines and the limitation\nof right to what a man can externally exact from others according to\nlaw; \"whence it happens that in the enumeration of laws, actions are\nsometimes posited that are real moral faults in the agent\"; maintaining\non the contrary the necessity of treating morality and rights together,\n\"for rights are part of morality in the same way that trigonometry and\nconic sections are a part of geometric theories.\"[21]\n\n[Sidenote: _Stahl, Ahrens, Trendelenburg._]\n\nIII. If Catholic doctrines deserve mention for their conservativism, it\nis necessary to record the names of Stahl, Ahrens, and Trendelenburg,\nfor no other reason than the great popularity that they enjoyed in\nthe schools. Stahl divides the ethical action of man into two domains,\ndiffering in content and character. This dualism is founded upon the\ndouble relation of human existence, individual and social, which gives\nrise to two forms of imperatives: to the imperative of the individual\nwill, of religion, and of morality, and to that which aims at moulding\nsocial life and is the imperative of rights. This theory, which has\na varied terminology, can be reduced to the theory of exteriority\n(sociality, rights), and interiority (individuality, morality). In\na very similar way Ahrens includes law in the science of the good\nor Ethic--the fundamental science. He remarks that good intention,\nvirtue, are not sufficient to secure to man that complex of material\nand spiritual goods of which he has need, and therefore there must be\na second mode of effecting in the good, which what is of importance\nwould be, not the motives of the will, but the pursuit of the good and\nits real existence in life. Trendelenburg (who regrets the classical\nconcept of the identity of Ethic and Law and looks upon the time\nwhen they began to be distinguished as a beginning of degeneration)\ndiscovers three sides to rights: the _logical,_ the _ethical,_ and\nthe _physical_ (compulsion),[22] of which none, as we see, is truly\njudicial.\n\n[Sidenote: _Utilitarians._]\n\nFor the reasons already indicated, it is not necessary to pause\nover the juridical ideas of the utilitarians of the eighteenth and\nnineteenth centuries, whose last celebrated representatives were,\nin England, Bentham, Austin and Spencer. The German Kirchmann is to\nbe identified with the utilitarian tendency. He reduces morality to\nthe _respect_ inspired, not by the law, but by the _person_ of the\nlegislator, a respect afterwards converted into respect for the law\n\"owing to a peculiarity of human nature, as the result of long custom\nand exercise.\" According to this view, rights are defined as \"a union\nof pleasure and morality, whether the first calls the second to its\naid or the second the first, in cases when the isolated efficacy of\neither should prove insufficient.\" Thus rights are declared to be, not\nan original principle, but the simple union of two different elements.\nJhering failed to surpass utilitarianism, notwithstanding his profound\njuridical knowledge and his lively intellect. He attempted to impart\nan original character to his utilitarian theory, by declaring that it\nwas _objective_ in respect to the usual utilitarian theories, but\nhe always remained under the obligation that he had undertaken, of\nshowing how the purest ideality of Ethic could be fortified with such,\na conception. The distinctions drawn by Jhering between recompense,\ncompulsion, duty, and love, since they lack a foundation, vacillate and\nprove but little convincing.[23]\n\n[Sidenote: _Recent writers of treatises._]\n\nIV. Running rapidly through other recent philosophers of Rights, we\ndo not meet with original thoughts that compare with those of Kant,\nof Fichte, and of Hegel. Lasson conceives of the philosophy of Rights\nas a part of Ethic and co-ordinates with it three other parts--the\nphilosophy of custom, of morality or doctrine of the virtues and the\ndoctrine of the ethos or of the ethical personality. Rights are the\nfirst of these three ethical moments and is concerned with the willing\nof man as a willing still essentially natural; reason joins it as a\nforce essentially determining and limiting, at first only external; the\nobject of rights is to guarantee the conditions of the common life, in\nso far as it is the condition for all human ends.--Steinthal recognizes\nthat rights undoubtedly \"possess an exteriority altogether opposed to\nthe interiority of Ethic; hence, if they be not apprehended in their\nprofound nature, they may easily be repugnant to moral feeling\": they\nare \"the system of modes of compulsion, by means of which are secured\nsocial ethical ends.\" But (we repeat) since the external cannot be\nseparated from the internal, we do not see in what way ethical ends can\nbe distinguished from their modes of realization. Steinthal also says\nthat \"Ethic is like a river and Rights like the bed of the river\": a\ncomparison that can be variously interpreted, like all comparisons and\nwhich for our part we should be disposed to find excellent, were it\nadmitted that as the bed of the river, when it runs dry, yet remains\nalways the bed of a possible river, so Rights can remain without Ethic\nand yet be always Rights. But the signification in which Steinthal\nemploys that comparison is simply the same as the diad of external and\ninternal; that is to say, he in his turn wishes to distinguish the\nindistinguishable, so that it would on the contrary be necessary to\nreply that the bed of the river and the river are not two things but\none, because a river without a bed cannot exist and a bed without a\nriver is not the bed of a river.--Schuppe denies that Rights and the\nState can claim what is immoral, but affirms that all the same they\nare inferior to the exigencies of morality, because Rights and the\nState concern individuals in their spatial-temporal concretion, but\ndo not attain to the profundity afforded by conscience in universal.\nThe ethical concept of rights preponderates in Wundt, for he does not\nconceive of any other object of rights, subjective and objective, save\nmorality. Cohen, in like manner, does not admit other independence\nto the science of rights save that, of writing in concepts, and of\norganizing as a system of concepts the rights that is eternally\nunwritten, the moral law.[24]\n\nAs we see, if the names of the writers and sometimes their phraseology\nchange, the thoughts that alternate or combine are always the same.\nR\u00fcmelin, who undertook to criticize a series of definitions of rights,\nfrom that of Kant onwards, reproved Kant for having drawn too great a\ndistinction between rights and morality, and others (Ahrens, Stahl,\nTrendelenburg) for having drawn too little. Finally, he gives his\ndefinition in a provisional and tentative manner: \"juridical ordinance\nhas the task of assuring to a people that part of the good adapted\nfor realization by a social force, according to universal norms.\"\nJellinek distinguishes the norms of rights from those of religion, of\nethicity and of custom, by a triple character: _(a)_ because they are\nnorms for the external conduct of men among themselves; _(b)_ because\nthey derive from a recognized external authority; _(c)_ because their\nobligatoriness is guaranteed by external powers.--Stammler attaches\nsecondary importance to the element of compulsion, and although he does\nnot explicitly identify justice and morality, assigns to them the same\nterritory, where they should act with different methods, since the\nperfectionment of the soul, the character and the thought are distinct\nfrom right behaviour. And adopting the turn of phrase of a famous\nproposition of the _Critique of Pure Reason,_ he ends by formulating\nthe following statement: \"Justice without love is empty; compassion\nwithout a right rule is blind.\" The Frenchman Duguit transports with\ngreater frankness the centre of rights into morality: he conceives of\nrights as altogether different from force; not as _political,_ but\nas _limit_ of force; as consciousness of human solidarity, beneath\nwhose rule we are all placed, State and individual, strong and weak,\ngovernors and governed. French philosophers of rights generally oppose\nthe German school, in which the character of force is prominent, so\nthat French juridical philosophy sometimes assumes (for example, in\nFouill\u00e9e) an attitude analogous to that assumed, as we know, by the\n\"generous\" French economic school toward the English economists. And\nmerely that some Italian name should not be absent from this review of\nrecent writers, we will record Miraglia, who repeats the old Kantian\ndivision, making it yet more empirical: \"Morality and rights are part\nof Ethic, because the good can be chiefly developed in the intimate\nrelations of the conscience, or on the contrary can be developed\nby preference in the external relations between man and man and\nbetween man and thing\";--and Vanni, who mixes a little positivistic\nevolutionism with this empirical reduction, affirming that rights are\nnot originally distinct from morality, but that afterwards they were\ngradually differentiated, and rights now have the special function of\nguardianship and guarantee: \"that is to say, the ethical minimum alone\nhas been guaranteed, that much of the ethical field as is most directly\nnecessary for the maintenance of life in common, leaving to other\nforces the task of regulating what is most individual in life.\" And so\non, though it seems that this is enough.[25]\n\n[Sidenote: _Strident contradictions. Stammler._]\n\nSuch are the contradictions in which the Philosophy of rights has\nstruggled for about two centuries. Rights do not seem to be identical\nwith Ethic, but they also do not seem to be simply different; they\nseem to be at once identical and different, but yet it has been found\nimpossible to fix the element of difference with the concepts of\nexternal, of compulsion and others such. The thought of a difference\nbetween the two forms of activity has not been further eliminated;\nbut neither has it been transformed and absorbed. This is a morbid\ncondition, of which the gravest symptom is the logical absurdity of\nthe aforesaid two rights and two justices. R\u00fcmelin talks of the pure\nideal justice, which selects from the evidence and judges on the basis\nof immediate impressions of feeling; and of a realistic, rational,\nempirical, disciplined and developed justice: two justices that must\nhowever act together.[26] Others, seeking relations between those two\nconcepts from a single fact and failing to conquer the difficulty,\nforce logic by distinguishing between _concept_ and _ideal_ of rights,\nor (as Vanni said) between _logical_ concept and concept of the\n_rational exigencies_ of rights: as though a concept could be truly\nlogical, if it do not derive from rational exigencies, and as if these\ncan be valid, if they be not the concept itself. Worse still, Stammler\naffirms the identity of rights with moral rights, and of rights alone\nwith immoral rights, arriving at the already criticized division of\neffective rights (_Gesetzes_) into two classes. It \"is either right\nrights (_richtiges Recht_) or not; and right rights are effective,\nwhose content of will possesses the property of being _right._ Hence,\nright rights stand to effective rights as _species to genus._\"[27]\nTo meditate upon this plan of division is more than sufficient to\nproduce the conviction of the failure of the Philosophy of rights, as\nit has been developed and as it could be developed with the practical\npresuppositions hitherto admitted. As the result of the direction of\nstudies, from Thomas to the most recent, there remains nothing but\nthe problem itself, as originated by the definitions of Thomas, and\nbecome certainly more acute and difficult, owing to later disputes and\ninquiries, but never solved.\n\n[Sidenote: _The value of law._]\n\nV. Less attention has been bestowed upon the concept of _law,_ upon\nwhich it was impossible to obtain full light, on the one hand before\nthe theory of abstract concepts had been developed (representative of\nclass) in their difference from the universal, and on the other before\npreconceptions as to the necessary social and political character of\nlaws had been discarded.\n\n[Sidenote: _In antiquity._]\n\nBut the difficulties contained in that concept had several times been\nobserved in antiquity. In a dialogue between Alcibiades and Pericles,\npreserved in the _Memorabilia,_ it is asked if all laws be laws, or\nonly those that are just; and it is shown that it does not suffice\nthat a law should be a law, in order to ensure its observance.[28]\nNo true solution, however, was reached in this, as in many questions\ndiscussed at this period by Greek philosophy. The _Crito_ is rather a\nstupendous work of art than a philosophical thesis, for it shows to\nthe life the state of soul of Socrates, and the importance that he\nattributed to the laws and to the social order: the reason alleged for\nobedience to them, being placed in the fact that we have tacitly or\nexplicitly agreed to remain within the boundaries of a given state,\nhas in it something of the sophistical. Even in antiquity was seen the\nnecessity of tempering the rigidity of laws by means of the equable,\n\u03c4\u03bf \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03ad\u00e7, which Aristotle defined as the correction of the law\nwhere it sins through its character of generality (\u1f10\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03c1\u03b8\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1 \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f97\n\u1f10\u03bb\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5).[29] But it was not possible to escape from\nempiricism by means of the concept of equity. The law sins, not once,\nbut always, through abstractness, or better, it never sins at all,\nbecause its function resides precisely in that abstractness.--In modern\ntimes Diderot felt and expressed all the gravity of the conflicts that\narise, alike from the observance and from the inobservance of the law,\nand he expresses this in his _Entretien d'un p\u00e8re avec ses enfants sur\nle danger de se mettre au-dessus des lois. \"Mon p\u00e8re_ (remarks one\nof the sons at the end of the dialogue), _c'est qu'\u00e0 la rigueur il\nn'y a pas de lois pour le sage.... Parlez plus bas.... Toutes \u00e9tant\nsujettes \u00e0 des exceptions, c'est \u00e0 lui qu'il appartient de juger des\ncas o\u00f9 il faut s'y soumettre ou s'en affranchir.--Je ne serais pas trop\nf\u00e2ch\u00e9_ (concludes the father), _qu'il y e\u00fbt dans la ville un ou deux\ncitoyens, comme toi; mais je n'y habiterais pas, s'ils pensaient tous\nde m\u00eame._\"[30]\n\n[Sidenote: _Romanticism._]\n\nThe attitude of rebellion to the laws showed itself in German thought\nand literature in the preromanticism of the _Sturm und Drang_ (for\ninstance in the _R\u00e4uber_ of Schiller), and in Romanticism properly\nso called, when among others appeared the theories that limited the\nState, such as those of Wilhelm von Humboldt, and theories of sexual\nrelations, such as those of Friedrich Schlegel. In the _Lucinde_ is\ndisplayed great horror for _bourgeois_ customs and for every sort of\nconstraint, sexual relations being advocated with woman, family, love\nand fidelity, but without matrimony.\n\n[Sidenote: _Jacobi._]\n\nJacobi represents this attitude in several of his writings, with great\nelevation of soul, and especially in the _Woldemar_ (1779, 1794-96),\nthe most lively protest that has ever been made against law in the name\nof the individual. Here the question treated is precisely whether we\nshould follow the inspirations of our own conscience or the laws of\nour own people. Sides are taken against \"the compulsion and violence\nexercised by usages, customs, habits, and against those who do not\nthink, save by means of those laws, holding them sacred, with resolute\nsoul and mind inert\"; and \"that audacious heroic spirit is celebrated,\nwhich raises itself above the laws and common morality that it may\nproduce a new order of things.\" \"His heart alone tells man immediately\nwhat is good; his heart alone, his instincts only, can tell him\nimmediately: to love it is his life. Reflection teaches him to know and\nto practise what leads to good. Habit assures and makes his the wisdom\nthat he has acquired.\" \"But this individual initiative,\" he observes,\n\"may be the cause of abuse and misunderstandings.\" \"Without doubt,\"\nreplied Jacobi, \"but what cannot be misunderstood has little meaning,\nand what cannot be abused has but little force in use.\" Men may be\ndivided into two classes; the one exaggerates fear, the other hope and\ncourage. The former are circumspect, always in doubt, they fear the\ntruth because it may be misunderstood, they fear great qualities, lofty\nvirtue, because of the aberrations to which it may give rise; and they\nhave evil always before their eyes. The latter are the bold (who could\nbe called the irreflective in the Platonic sense) and they behave with\nless exactitude; they are not so perplexed, they trust rather to the\nvoice of their heart than to any word from without; they build rather\nupon courage than upon virtue, which generally keeps them waiting too\nlong. They sometimes ask themselves with Young: Is virtue then alone\nbaptized and are the passions pagan? \"If,\" says Jacobi, \"I must keep\nto one of these classes, I choose the second.\" \"Yes,\" he exclaims\nelsewhere, opposing the abstractness of Kant,--\"yes, I am atheist and\nimpious, yes, I will to lie, in opposition to the will that wills\nnothing, as Desdemona lied when dying, I will to lie and to deceive\nlike Pylades, when he slew himself for the sake of Orestes; I will to\nslay like Timoleon; to break laws and oaths like Epaminondas and John\nde Witt; to commit suicide like Otho; to despoil the temple like David;\nto pluck ears of corn on the Sabbath day, if only because I am hungry\nand the law is made for man, not man for the law. By the sacrosanct\nconscience that I have within me, I know that the _privilegium\naggratiandi_ for such crimes against the pure letter of the law,\nrational, absolute and universal, is the sovran right of man himself,\nthe seal of his dignity, of his divine nature.\"[31] But it must be\nremarked upon reading these effusions (most sincere, as all that came\nfrom the pen of Jacobi), that they are rather manifestations of states\nof the soul than theories, and therefore, strictly speaking, not to be\ntheoretically censured, as is the case with all affirmations that place\nin relief one side of reality, without denying the others by doing so.\n\n[Sidenote: _Hegel._]\n\nHegel discovered this, observing in relation to our last extract:\n\"Neither of the two sides can be wanting to moral beauty, neither\nits liveliness as individuality, by which it does not obey the\ndead concept, nor the form of concept and of law, universality and\nobjectivity, which is the side exclusively considered by Kant, by means\nof the absolute abstraction to which he submitted liveliness, thereby\nsuffocating it. The passage cited as to the liveliness and freedom\nof the moral life does not exclude objectivity, but does not express\nit either.\" Hence the danger of the romantic attitude, which had no\nneed of exhortations such as those of Jacobi, for it already too much\npreferred _magnanimous_ to _honest, noble_ to _moral_ action; and was\nmuch inclined to free itself of the law itself under the pretext of\nfreeing itself from the _letter_ of the law. Meeting empirical with\nempirical observations, Hegel also remarked that the examples of the\nviolation of laws due to the divine majesty of man, adduced by Jacobi,\nwere conditioned by the natural temperament, by actual situations, and\nespecially by circumstances of supreme misfortune, of supreme and rare\nnecessity, in which few individuals find themselves. \"It would be very\nsad for liberty if it could only prove its majesty and become actual\nin extraordinary cases of cruel laceration of the moral and natural\nlife and in extraordinary individuals. The ancients, on the other hand,\nfound the highest morality in the life of a well-ordered State.\" Hegel\nadmitted that the affirmation of Jacobi, \"The law is made for man, not\nman for the law,\" contained a great truth, when it was intended to\nallude in this way to the positive or statutory law. But the opposite\nwas also true, when the allusion was to the moral law, taken as\nuniversal, outside of which, when the individual was separated from it,\nthere was nothing but appetites and sensible impulses, which can only\nbe means for the law.[32]\n\nBut we must not fail to recognize that Hegel does not avail himself of\nthis most exact distinction in his philosophy, for there the dominating\nmotive is respect for the laws and the tendency to attack individual\ninitiative. Hegel repeats many times with complacency the saying of\nthe Pythagorean, that the best way of educating a young man is to\nmake him citizen of a State ruled by good laws; and he remarks that\nHerculeses belong to primitive and barbarous times, and that individual\nvalour has but a small field in times of culture. He was most averse\nto criticism of and rebellion against the authority of the State; for\nthese did not seem to him to correspond to the reality of the spirit.\nThat surface is not the reality; at bottom all desire order; and it is\nnecessary to distinguish apparent political sentiment from that which\nmen really will, for within them they will the thing, but hesitate as\nto particulars, and enjoy the vanity of censuring.[33] Men believe\nthat the State exists and that in it alone are particular interests\nrealized; but habit makes invisible to them that upon which our entire\nexistence depends. There is in short in Hegel, besides the philosopher,\na politician and moralist regretful of the excesses of revolutionaries\nand of unbridled romanticism; and there is also in him the desire for\nan exact inquiry into the function and limits of positive law.[34]\n\n[Sidenote: _Recent doctrines._]\n\nIn recent times there have been many and very various manifestations\nconnected with the concept of this function and of its limits, and\nit would occupy much space to enumerate and to illustrate them all.\nWe shall mention three, very distant and different. The first, which\nbelongs to the political and social field, is the doctrine of anarchy\nand is opposed to laws of all sorts; it is a not purely philosophical\ndoctrine, though it involves philosophical questions.[35] The other\ntwo, which more properly belong to the juridical field, are, the\nassertion of the importance of laws and of the duty of defending their\nexistence, even where their violation by others does not interfere\nwith our individual interests, or when their defence costs individual\nsacrifices (this was the argument of a vigorous little book by\nJhering);[36]--and by way of contrast the demand for a free creation of\nthe law by the judge (_die freie Rechtsfindung,_) which has given rise\nto discussions that are yet burning, more directly provoked by a little\nbook of Kantorowicz (Gnaeus Flavius).[37]\n\n[Sidenote: _Natural rights and their dissolution. The historical school\nof rights._]\n\nVI. If then there has not been a great gain in clearness of\nfundamental concepts, as regards this part of the subject, there has on\nthe contrary been an indubitable advance in consciousness acquired as\nto the mutability of laws and as to the consequent contradictoriness of\nthe idea of natural Rights. This, with its complement, the catalogue\nof innate natural and inalienable rights of man, had great success in\nthe seventeenth century for political and social reasons, attaining\nits highest development in the century following. But it may be said\nthat the doctrine of innate rights was liquidated by Kant in the\n_Metaphysic of Custom,_ when he wrote the proposition that liberty is\nthe only original and innate rights, which belong to man through his\nvery humanity,[38] at the very moment when it was most energetically\naffirmed in a practical form in the _Declaration of the Rights of\nMan._ In the system of Hegel the constructions of natural rights began\nto lose their rigidity; becoming indeed historical categories of\nEthicity or _Sittlichkeit,_ determinations of the spirits of various\npeoples (_Volksgeister,_) which are in their turn determinations of\nthe Absolute or of the Idea. Owing to this view (without taking into\naccount his error of wishing to philosophize and to make dialectical\nwhat is historical and empirical), Hegel connected himself closely\nwith the historical school of rights (Hugo, Savigny, etc.). This,\nnotwithstanding the exaggeration by which he seemed to deny the value\nof the ideal demands made of rights, had the merit of shaking the old\nconception of natural rights. This has retained its place in treatises\nfrom that time onward in a more or less worm-eaten and unstable\ncondition by the force of inertia; or it has been preserved by Catholic\nwriters (by Rosmini not less than by the Padre Taparelli), whose\nconception is of necessity but little historical; or it has reappeared\nin those curious Catholics and anti-historians, the positivists\n(Spencer, Ardig\u00f2). But that natural rights are nothing but _new_\nhistorical rights in the struggle of their becoming, is a conviction\nthat has penetrated the general consciousness.\n\n[Sidenote: _The comparison between rights and language._]\n\nWe also owe to the historical school the comparison between the\nlife of rights and the life of language; this was prepared by the\ndiscoveries of comparative linguistic, which although substantially\ncorrect, yet had, as we have observed, the defect of limiting itself\nto the _grammatical_ form of both facts, not to their genuine and\ndirect reality. Jacobi, in the already quoted effusions of _Woldemar,_\nhad recourse to the same comparison, for other reasons and with a\nmore exact understanding of its terms; speaking there of the moral\ninfraction of laws, he wrote: \"For such exceptions, for such _licences\nof lofty poetry,_ the grammar of virtue has no definite rules and\ntherefore does not mention them No grammar, least of all the general\nand philosophical, could contain in itself all that appertains to a\nliving language, and teach how, in every epoch, every dialect must be\nformed. But it would be unwise to affirm that every one may speak as\nthey feel inclined.\" And again, \"Virtue is free art; and as artistic\ngenius gives laws to art by its creations, so moral genius gives laws\nto human conduct: just, good, noble, excellent, is what the just, good,\nnoble, and excellent man practises, achieves and produces in conformity\nwith his character; he _invents virtue,_ procures and generates\nadequate expression for human dignity.\"[39]\n\n[Sidenote: _The concept of law, and the studies of comparative Rights\nand of the general Doctrine of Rights._]\n\nVII. The study of the concept of law is also progressing, and\nhenceforth is not confined to so-called juridical laws and to\nlegislations and codes. Researches into primitive rights and into\nthose of savage and barbarous peoples, known as juridical Ethnography\nor comparative rights, have greatly contributed to destroy many\nprejudices; as also the attention that has been directed to facts\ncalled social, that is to say, not strictly political. A school that\nhas had independent yet partly similar manifestations in England\n(Austin, Sumner Maine, etc.) and in Germany, where it has taken\nthe name of school of _the general Doctrine of Rights (allgemeine\nRechtslehre,_ according to the denomination given to it by Adolph\nMerkel), studies in particular the concept of law in its various\nclasses and subclasses; and from it there cannot but issue a more\ncorrect understanding of the concept of law, as from the refinement\nof political Economy into pure Economy has come, first Psychology and\nthen the Philosophy of economy. Meanwhile (and as far as we know)\nthe literature of the school, dominated as it is by the needs of\njurisprudence, maintains an empirical or _intellectualistic_ character;\nand jurists, rather than philosophers themselves, are those that most\ncultivate it. The distinctions and sub-distinctions of the laws are\nconducted with subtlety, but are without solid foundation, because the\nconcept posited as basis of law is uncertain and arbitrary. Limiting\nourselves to a single example, let us mention Bierling, perhaps the\nmost philosophical of those various writers. Bierling first of all\nexcludes from the concept of law the modes of man's conduct toward\nGod, toward himself, and toward animals; but he gives no serious\nreason for this. He then arrives, by a mere arbitrary act, at the\nlimiting of the concept of law to the manner of men's conduct among\nthemselves, and defines rights in the juridical sense (as he calls it:\n\"in general, all that men living together in any sort of community\nreciprocally recognize as a norm and rule of this living together\"). He\nthen introduces into the concept thus defined, not by deduction, but\nas the result of a second arbitrary act, the concept of exteriority,\nadding that, \"the object of law is a definite _external_ procedure\nof man toward man.\"[40] In all this is evident the bad influence of\njurisprudence and of its empirical preoccupations.\n\n[Sidenote: _legalism and moral casuistic._]\n\nVIII. Ethical legalism became a bitter question for Christianity,\nprecisely because of the contest between lofty Christian morality and\nits legalitarian form, chiefly inherited from Judaism. In the ancient\nworld there is almost no trace of the question, just because the\nstruggle was never acute.[41] Hence the difficulties debated among the\npatristics and the scholastics as to derogability from divine laws\nand the consequent distinctions between a perfect and an imperfect\nmoral life, between precepts and counsels; and as recourse is had to\nprecedents in judicial questions, so here with these ethical problems\nconcerning exceptions made by God to the moral law, to the precepts\nof the Bible (where some were not beautiful).[42] The practical needs\nof confession give origin to books on casuistic, of which collections\nexist dating from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The\nReformation manifested aversion to these treatises: Luther said that\nmoral theologians had first extinguished in men the fear of God and had\nthen placed soft cushions beneath their hands and feet; and Melanchthon\nlamented that the Christian Republic was honoured _theologastrorum\nsententiis de conscientiae casiobus, inestricabilibus, ubi nunquam\nnon ex quaestione quaestio nascitur,_ and called them _conscientiarum\ncauteria._[43]\n\n[Sidenote: _Probabilitism and Jesuitic morality._]\n\nThe inconclusiveness of legalism was converted into a most powerful\npoison by the Jesuits, with their _probabilitism,_ of which precursors\nwere not wanting in the Middle Ages, but it received definite form\nfrom the Dominican Bartolomeo Medina in 1577. From that time onward\nprobabilitism began to be surrounded with a copious literature, which\ncontinually increased in the course of the seventeenth century, to\ndecline in the century following. The opposition originated by the\nJansenists, whose capital literary document, the _Provinciales_ of\nPascal also dates from the seventeenth century (1656), was the period\nof the greatest vigour of the doctrine. But if the most perfect\nand most Christian moral conscience dwelt in the Jansenists and in\nPascal and if the absurd consequences to which probabilitism led\nbecame clearly evident in that polemic, yet it cannot be said that\nphilosophically the error was finally superseded. Ere this could have\nhappened, it would have been necessary, on the one hand to destroy\nall possibility of theological utilitarianism (which was impossible\nto carry out in a religious and transcendental Ethic, owing to its\nmystical and irrationalistic character) and on the other to destroy\nlegalism. Pascal himself (and St. Augustine, to whom he appeals) was\nalways confined in the legislative conception of morality; hence\nhe speaks of the laws of \"not slaying,\" which it was necessary to\nobey strictly, save in the cases established by God or when he gives\nparticular orders to put certain persons to death. The Catholic\nChurch, always astutely political, condemned without hesitation the\nextreme _rigorists,_ who wish that the law should always be followed\nand the extreme _latitudinarians,_ who think that any sort of\nreasons, however slight and improbable, suffice for not observing the\nlaw; allowing intermediate sects to discuss among themselves until\nthey were out of breath, that is to say, _the moderate rigorists,\nthe probabiliorists or tutiorists, the equiprobabilitists and the\nprobabilitists._ Sant Alfonso dei Liguori adhered to these last, who\nwere of opinion that it is always permissible to do what we wish,\nprovided always that there be probable reasons, though less probable\nthan those that militate in favour of the law. In his _Dissertatio de\nusu moderato opinionis probabilis,_[44] he thus exposed the principal\nargument of his thesis: _Peto ab adversariis ut indicent (si possunt)\ntibinam legem hanc esse scriptam invenerint, quod teneamur inter\nopiniones probabiles probabiliores sequi? Haec lex quidem, prout\nuniversalis, deberet omnibus esse nota et certa: at quomodo ista lex\ncerta dici potest, cum communis sententia doctorum, saltem longe major\nillorum pars, post tantum discrimen absolute asserant, hanc legem non\nadesse? Usque dum igitur de tali lege dubitatum, opinio quod adsit haec\nlex sequendi probabiliora, quamvis alicui videatur probabilior, nunquam\ntamen lex dici potest, sed appellanda erit mera opinio, utpote ex\nfallibili motivo deducta, quae vim nequaquam habet, ut lex, obligandi._\nThis doctrine still retains in our day very firm supporters among the\nJesuits (Cathrein,[45] Lehmkuhl,[46] etc.).\n\n[Sidenote: _Critique of the concept of the licit._]\n\nBut if the destruction of theological utilitarianism has been brought\nabout by the criticism of the transcendental and by idealistic Ethic,\nthat of legalism, with its expression as the licit, the permissible,\nor morally indifferent, appears in Fichte and in Schleiermacher. Kant\ndid not treat the question explicitly and, as observed, we can deduce\nfrom certain of his utterances that he did not altogether abandon the\nconcept of the licit.[47]\n\n[Sidenote: _Fichte._]\n\nBut Fichte, in a note to his _Natural Rights,_ wrote: \"A right is\nevidently something of which a man can avail himself or not; and\nis therefore the result of a law that is merely permissive. ...\nThe permission is not expressly given by the law and is deduced by\ninterpretation from its limitation. And the limitation of a law\nis shown by the fact of its being something conditioned. It is not\nabsolutely apparent, therefore, that a permissive law which commands in\nan unconditioned manner and therefore extends to all, can be deduced\nfrom the moral law.\"[48]\n\n[Sidenote: _Schleiermacher._]\n\nWhat was a mere mention in Fichte became an ample demonstration in the\ncelebrated memoir of Schleiermacher, _On the Concept of the Licit_\n(1826), which resolutely drove the licit out of the field of Ethic,\nby demonstrating its altogether juridical nature: \"The original seat\nof this concept cannot be the domain of Ethic, in which it is not\nadmissible: it appertains to the domain of law and of positive law; and\nthere is something originally licit in civil life, precisely in this\nsense that there is something half-way between what is commanded and\nwhat is forbidden, the proper object of law.\"[49]\n\n[Sidenote: _Rosmini._]\n\nRosmini, owing to having ignored this origin of the lawful, proceeded\nto divide human actions into four classes: the prohibited, the\nlicit, the commanded, and the superogatory; the last three were all\ninnocent, but the licit was simply innocent, while the commanded and\nthe superogatory were also furnished with moral value. Hence arose\ngrave errors in his Ethic and in his Philosophy of law and definitions\nthat it is impossible to grasp, such as the following relating to\nsuperogatory actions: \"The obligatory consists in preserving the moral\norder, but the superogatory consists in preserving the said order in\na more excellent and perfect manner, with fuller, more frequent, and\nmore ardent acts of the will. These second not only preserve the moral\norder, but augment it, almost creating a part of it themselves with\ntheir activity; they make themselves not only followers of the good,\nbut authors of the good itself.\" Rosmini also considered that the\nposing of the question of probabilitism represented progress in Ethic;\nthat is, upon \"what man should do, if he found himself in doubt as\nto performing or omitting to perform an action.\" But the solution of\nthe question that he gave on his account amounted (be it said to his\nhonour) to the annihilation of legalism, since for him a doubtful law\ndoes not oblige when it is positive Rights, but it does oblige when\nit is moral law, that is, when there is a fear of offending against\nthe supreme and necessary law, which wills absolutely to be always\nfulfilled.[50] In other terms, the true practical law is never (even\nwhen it appears to be so) positive law; and the concept of law, which\nalways has a positive meaning, is extraneous to Ethic and to the\nPhilosophy of the practical: a result to which Rosmini does not attain,\nor at least is not conscious of attaining.\n\n\n\n[1] See above, pp. 286, 287.\n\n[2] _Krit. d. rein. Vern._ (ed. Kirchmann), p. 572.\n\n[3] Lasson, _System der Rechtsphilosophie_ (Berlin, 1882), p. 2.\n\n[4] _Gorgias,_ 476-478.\n\n[5] _Eth. Nicom._ 3, v. c. 1-2.\n\n[6] _Ibid._ v. c. 7, 9; _Magna Moralia,_ i. c. 34.\n\n[7] _De repudi,_ iii. c. 22; _De legibus,_ ii. c. 5.\n\n[8] _De imo univ. jur. princ._ \u00a7\u00a741, 43, 86.\n\n[9] _Fundamenta juris nat. et gentium_ (1705).\n\n[10] Windelband, _Geschichte d. Phil._ p. 424.\n\n[11] _Gr\u00fcndl. d. Naturr._ (1796), append., sect. I.\n\n[12] _Metaphys. d. Sitten,_ 1797 (ed. Kirchmann), pp. 31-35.\n\n[13] _Gr\u00fcndl, d. Naturr._ pt. i. sect. 1.\n\n[14] Spinoza, _Tract, pol._ c. 6, \u00a7 3; Fichte, _System d. Sittenlehre,_\n\u00a7 18 _in fine._\n\n[15] _Phil. d. Rechts,_ passim, concerning force and violence, \u00a7\u00a7 3,\n57, 94.\n\n[16] _Op. cit._\u00a7 158, _sqq._ 161, 258.\n\n[17] _Werke,_ I., p. 371.\n\n[18] _Allg. prakt. Phil._ pp. 48, 126-128.\n\n[19] _Werke,_ i. 441-445; cf. v. 259-260.\n\n[20] _Fil. d. diritto_ (Napoli, 1844), i. 20-21, 88-89, 94-97.\n\n[21] _Saggio teor. d. dir. nat._ (Palermo, 1857), _in princ._\n\n[22] Stahl, _Rechts-u. Staatslehre_\u00b2 (Heidelberg, 1845), b. ii. ch. I;\nAhrens, _Naturr._ (It. tr., Napoli, 1860), i. 219 _sq._; Trendelenburg,\n_Naturrecht auf d. Grunde d. Ethik_ (Leipzig, 1860).\n\n[23] Kirchmann, _Begr. d. Rechtes u. d. Moral_\u00b2 (Berlin, 1873), pp.\n107114; see Jhering, _Der Zweck i. Reckt_ (i.2, 1883; ii.3, 1886).\n\n[24] Lasson, _op. cit.;_ Steinthal, _Allg. Ethik_ (Berlin, 1885), pp.\n135-8; Schuppe, _Ethik u. Rechtsphil._ (Breslau, 1881), pp. 283-4;\nWundt, _Ethik_\u00b2 (Stuttgart, 1892),.p. 565 _sq._; Cohen, _Ethik d.\nreinen Willens_ (Berlin, 1904), p. 567.\n\n[25] R\u00fcmelin, _Reden u. Aufs\u00e4tze,_ new series (Freiburg i. B., 1881),\np. 342; Jellinek, _Allgemeine Staatslehre_ (Berlin, 1900), p. 302\n_sq.;_ Stammler, _Lehre v. richtig. Rechte_ (Berlin, 1902); Duguit,\n_L'\u00c9tat, le droit objectif et la loi positive_ (Paris, 1901); Fouill\u00e9e,\n_L'Id\u00e9e moderne du droit en Allem., en Angl. et en France_ (Paris,\n1876); Miraglia, _Fil. d. dir._ (Napoli, 1903), p. 80; Vanni, _Lez. d.\nfil. d. dir._ (Bologna, 1904), pp. 113-114.\n\n[26] R\u00fcmelin, _op. cit._ pp. 176-202. Cp. Lasson, p. 215 _sq._\n\n[27] _Op. cit._ p. 22. Cf. Bergbohm, _Jurisprudenz u.\nRechtsphilosophie_ (Leipzig, 1892), i. 141-147 _n._\n\n[28] _Mem._ i. 2. 40 _sq._\n\n[29] _Eth. Nicom._ Bk. v, c. II.\n\n[30] _\u0152uvres,_ edit. Ass\u00e9zat et Tourneux, v. (Paris, Gamier, 1875), pp.\n307-8.\n\n[31] _Woldemar,_ passim.\n\n[32] _Werke,_ i. 52 _sq.;_ xvi. 21 _sq._\n\n[33] _Phil. d. Rechts,_ sect. II. _passim;_ cf. pp. 150, 153.\n\n[34] _Op. cit._ \u00a7 268, _Zus._\n\n[35] An ample exposition of such doctrines is to be found in E.\nZoccoli, _De Anarchia,_ Turin, 1907.\n\n[36] _La Lotta pel diritto,_ It. tr., Milan, 1875.\n\n[37] _La Lotta per la scienza del diritto_ (It. tr., Palermo, 1908);\ncf. _Critica,_ vi. pp. 199-201.\n\n[38] _Metaphys. d. Sitt._ p. 40.\n\n[39] _Woldemar,_ pp. in, 416, and _passim._\n\n[40] Bierling, _Juristische Prinzipienlehre_ (Freiburg i. B., 1894-98,\n2 vols.).\n\n[41] Sidgwick, _History of Ethics,_ London, 1892, p. III _sq._\n\n[42] A. Bonucci, _La derogabilit\u00e0 del diritto naturale nella\nScolastica,_ Perugia, 1906.\n\n[43] Hist. remarks in dissert., _De casuisticae theologiae originibus,\nlocis atque praestantia_ (together with De Ligorio, _Theol. mor.,_ ed.\ncit., pp. xxiv-lxxvi).\n\n[44] In _Theol. mor._ i. 10-24.\n\n[45] Cathrein, _Moralphilosophie, 4_ i. 428-437.\n\n[46] _Probabilismus vindicatus_ (Freiburg, Bk. i., 1906).\n\n[47] See above, p. 405; cf. also _Krit. d. rein. Vern._ pp. 10-11 _n._\n\n[48] _Gr\u00fcndl. d. Naturr._ introd. \u00a7 iii. _n._\n\n[49] _Werke,_ sect, iii., vol. ii., pp. 418-445; cf. G. Mayer, _Die\nLehre vom Erlaubten in der Gesch. d. Ethik seit Schleiermacher,_\nLeipzig, 1899.\n\n\n[50] _Compendio di Etica,_ pp. 48, 96, 284-285.\n\n\n\n\nCONCLUSION\n\n\n[Sidenote: _The Philosophy of the Spirit as the whole of Philosophy._]\n\nWith the Philosophy of the practical terminates the exposition that\nwe had proposed to give of the Philosophy of the Spirit; and the\nexposition of the whole of Philosophy also terminates, because the\nSpirit is the whole of Reality.\n\nHere at the end, this proposition has no need of such proof or\nverification as is customary in calculation. Because the proof\nof Philosophy is intrinsic to it and consists of the reciprocal\nconfronting of the development of thought and its demands, between\nthe System and Logic. And Logic, as we know, if it be in a certain\nsense the whole of Philosophy (philosophy in brief or in idea or in\npotentiality), is also a part among the parts of the philosophical\nsystem; so that the confrontation of the System and of Logic, of\nthought in act and thought in idea, between thought and the thought\nof thought, has been continuously present and active in the course of\nthe exposition, and the coincidence of the two processes and their\nconfluence into one has been clearly demonstrated.\n\n[Sidenote: _Correspondence between Logic and System._]\n\nLogic affirms the thinkability of the real and the inconceivability\nof any limit that could be put to thought, of every excogitation of\nthe unknowable. And Philosophy, examining every part of the real,\nhas not found any place in which to lodge the unknowable in thought.\nLogic posits as the ideal of the concept, that it should be universal\nand not general, concrete and not abstract; that it should be pure\nof intuitions such as those of mathematics and differ from them in\nbeing necessary and not conventional; fruitful in intuitions like\nthose of the empirical sciences, but differing from them by its\ninfinite fecundity which dominates every possible manifestation of\nthe real. And the system has effectively shown that this desideratum\nof Logic is not a chim\u00e6ra and that the Spirit is indeed that concept\nwhich corresponds to the ideal of the concept: there is nothing that\nis not a manifestation of the Spirit (an effectual manifestation,\nnot conventional or metaphorical). Logic, rejecting all dualism or\npluralism, wills that the philosophical concept shall be a unique\nconcept or of the One, and does not suffer heterogeneous concepts\nat its side. And the system has confirmed that the concept of the\nSpirit alone fulfils the logical condition of the concept; and that\nthe concept of Nature, far from being a concept of something real, is\nthe hypostasis of a manner of elaborating reality, not philosophical\nbut practical; thus the concept itself of Nature, in so far as it is\neffectual, is nothing but the product of a function of the Spirit.\n\nOn the other hand, the Logic of the idea of the concept deduces\nthat it must be a synthesis of itself and of its opposite. For its\nopposite, far from being heterogeneous and different, is flesh of the\nflesh and blood of the blood of the concept itself, as negation is of\naffirmation. And the system has led us before the Spirit or Reality as\ndevelopment, which is the true reality of the real and synthesis of\nopposites. Logic deduces that the concept is synthesis of itself and\nof the distinct from itself, of the universal and of the individual,\nand that therefore Philosophy must flow into History, and mediate its\ncomprehension. And the system shows the capacity of its principles for\ninterpreting the complex reality of History, and above all the history\nof philosophy itself, by solving its problems. Logic does not admit\nother distinctions of the concept than those that are the outcome\nof its own nature, such as the relations of subject-object and of\nindividual-universal; and the system has confirmed these distinctions,\nduplicating itself as Philosophy of knowledge and Philosophy of action,\nof theory and of practice; subdividing itself as to the first, into\n\u00c6sthetic and Logic; as to the second, into Economic and Ethic. And\nsince the demand of the concept has been entirely satisfied, when these\ndivisions have been exhausted, we have not found the possibility of new\nsubdivisions, for example into various \u00e6sthetic or into various ethical\ncategories among the particular sub-forms of the Spirit.\n\n[Sidenote: _Dissatisfaction at the end of every system, and its\nirrational motive._]\n\nSome are seized as with a sense of dissatisfaction and delusion when\nthey arrive at the end of the philosophical system and at the result\nthat there is no reality save the Spirit and no other Philosophy save\nthe Philosophy of the Spirit; and they do not wish to resign themselves\nto accepting that and nothing else as Reality, although obliged to do\nso by logical necessity. A world beyond which there is no other seems\nto them poor indeed; an immanent Spirit, trammelled and far inferior\nby comparison with a transcendental Spirit, an omnipotent God outside\nthe world; a Reality penetrable by thought, less poetical than one\nsurrounded with mystery; the vague and indeterminate, more beautiful\nthan the precise and determined. But we know that they are involved in\na psychological illusion, similar to his who should dream of an art\nso sublime that every work of art really existing would by comparison\nappear contemptible; and the dreamer of this turbid dream, should not\nsucceed in achieving a single verse. Impotent are those poets most\nrefined; impotent those insatiable philosophers.\n\n[Sidenote: _Rational motive: the inexhaustibility of Life and of\nPhilosophy._]\n\nBut precisely because we know the genesis of their psychological\nillusion, we know that there is in it (and there could not fail to be)\nan element of truth. The infinite, inexhaustible by the thought of\nthe individual, is Reality itself, which ever creates new forms; Life\nis the true mystery, not because impenetrable by thought, but because\nthought penetrates it to the infinite with power equal to its own. And\nsince every moment, however beautiful, would become ugly, were we to\ndwell in it, so would life become ugly, were it ever to linger in one\nof its contingent forms. And because Philosophy, not less than Art, is\nconditioned by Life, so no particular philosophical system can ever\ncontain in itself all the philosophable; no philosophical system is\n_definite,_ because Life itself is never _definite._ A philosophical\nsystem solves a group of problems historically given and prepares the\nconditions for the posing of other problems, that is, of new systems.\nThus it has always been and thus it will always be.\n\nIn such a sense, Truth is always surrounded with mystery, an ascending\nto ever higher heights, which are without a summit, as Life is without\na summit. At the end of one of his researches every philosopher just\nperceives the uncertain outlines of another, which he himself, or he\nwho comes after him, will achieve. And with this _modesty,_ which is of\nthe nature of things themselves, not my personal sentiment; with this\nmodesty, which is also confidence that I have not thought in vain, I\nbring my work to a conclusion, offering it to the well disposed as an\n_instrument of labour._\n\n\nTHE END","title":"The Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and Ethic","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":129611}