{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_5500/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_5500","id":"gutenberg_5500","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5500","summary":null,"tags":["Banned Books from Anne Haight's list","Category: Essays, Letters & Speeches","Category: History - Early Modern (c. 1450-1750)","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Teaching & Education","Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800","Learning -- Philosophy -- Early works to 1800","Logic -- Early works to 1800","Science -- Methodology -- Early works to 1800"],"text":"Transcribed from the 1893 Cassell & Company edition by David Price, email\nccx074@pglaf.org\n\n\nTranscriber\u2019s note:\nChanged \u201cconsidering that the most barbarous, rude, and unlearned\ntimes have been most subject to tumults, seditious, and changes\u201d to\n\u201cconsidering that the most barbarous, rude, and unlearned times have\nbeen most subject to tumults, seditions, and changes\u201d.\n\n\n\n\n                       CASSELL\u2019S NATIONAL LIBRARY.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\n\n\n\n                                   THE\n                               ADVANCEMENT\n                                    OF\n                                LEARNING.\n\n\n                                    BY\n                              FRANCIS BACON.\n\n                      [Picture: Decorative graphic]\n\n                       CASSELL & COMPANY, Limited:\n                      _LONDON_, _PARIS & MELBOURNE_.\n                                  1893.\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\n\n\u201cTHE TVVOO Bookes of Francis Bacon.  Of the proficience and aduancement\nof Learning, divine and humane.  To the King.  At London.  Printed for\nHenrie Tomes, and are to be sould at his shop at Graies Inne Gate in\nHolborne. 1605.\u201d   That was the original title-page of the book now in\nthe reader\u2019s hand\u2014a living book that led the way to a new world of\nthought.  It was the book in which Bacon, early in the reign of James the\nFirst, prepared the way for a full setting forth of his New Organon, or\ninstrument of knowledge.\n\nThe Organon of Aristotle was a set of treatises in which Aristotle had\nwritten the doctrine of propositions.  Study of these treatises was a\nchief occupation of young men when they passed from school to college,\nand proceeded from Grammar to Logic, the second of the Seven Sciences.\nFrancis Bacon as a youth of sixteen, at Trinity College, Cambridge, felt\nthe unfruitfulness of this method of search after truth.  He was the son\nof Sir Nicholas Bacon, Queen Elizabeth\u2019s Lord Keeper, and was born at\nYork House, in the Strand, on the 22nd of January, 1561.  His mother was\nthe Lord Keeper\u2019s second wife, one of two sisters, of whom the other\nmarried Sir William Cecil, afterwards Lord Burleigh.  Sir Nicholas Bacon\nhad six children by his former marriage, and by his second wife two sons,\nAntony and Francis, of whom Antony was about two years the elder.  The\nfamily home was at York Place, and at Gorhambury, near St. Albans, from\nwhich town, in its ancient and its modern style, Bacon afterwards took\nhis titles of Verulam and St. Albans.\n\nAntony and Francis Bacon went together to Trinity College, Cambridge,\nwhen Antony was fourteen years old and Francis twelve.  Francis remained\nat Cambridge only until his sixteenth year; and Dr. Rawley, his chaplain\nin after-years, reports of him that \u201cwhilst he was commorant in the\nUniversity, about sixteen years of age (as his lordship hath been pleased\nto impart unto myself), he first fell into dislike of the philosophy of\nAristotle; not for the worthlessness of the author, to whom he would\nascribe all high attributes, but for the unfruitfulness of the way, being\na philosophy (as his lordship used to say) only strong for disputatious\nand contentions, but barren of the production of works for the benefit of\nthe life of man; in which mind he continued to his dying day.\u201d  Bacon was\nsent as a youth of sixteen to Paris with the ambassador Sir Amyas Paulet,\nto begin his training for the public service; but his father\u2019s death, in\nFebruary, 1579, before he had completed the provision he was making for\nhis youngest children, obliged him to return to London, and, at the age\nof eighteen, to settle down at Gray\u2019s Inn to the study of law as a\nprofession.  He was admitted to the outer bar in June, 1582, and about\nthat time, at the age of twenty-one, wrote a sketch of his conception of\na New Organon that should lead man to more fruitful knowledge, in a\nlittle Latin tract, which he called \u201cTemporis Partus Maximus\u201d (\u201cThe\nGreatest Birth of Time\u201d).\n\nIn November, 1584, Bacon took his seat in the House of Commons as member\nfor Melcombe Regis, in Dorsetshire.  In October, 1586, he sat for\nTaunton.  He was member afterwards for Liverpool; and he was one of those\nwho petitioned for the speedy execution of Mary Queen of Scots.  In\nOctober, 1589, he obtained the reversion of the office of Clerk of the\nCouncil in the Star Chamber, which was worth \u00a31,600 or \u00a32,000 a year; but\nfor the succession to this office he had to wait until 1608.  It had not\nyet fallen to him when he wrote his \u201cTwo Books of the Advancement of\nLearning.\u201d  In the Parliament that met in February, 1593, Bacon sat as\nmember for Middlesex.  He raised difficulties of procedure in the way of\nthe grant of a treble subsidy, by just objection to the joining of the\nLords with the Commons in a money grant, and a desire to extend the time\nallowed for payment from three years to six; it was, in fact, extended to\nfour years.  The Queen was offended.  Francis Bacon and his brother\nAntony had attached themselves to the young Earl of Essex, who was their\nfriend and patron.  The office of Attorney-General became vacant.  Essex\nasked the Queen to appoint Francis Bacon.  The Queen gave the office to\nSir Edward Coke, who was already Solicitor-General, and by nine years\nBacon\u2019s senior.  The office of Solicitor-General thus became vacant, and\nthat was sought for Francis Bacon.  The Queen, after delay and\nhesitation, gave it, in November, 1595, to Serjeant Fleming.  The Earl of\nEssex consoled his friend by giving him \u201ca piece of land\u201d\u2014Twickenham\nPark\u2014which Bacon afterwards sold for \u00a31,800\u2014equal, say, to \u00a312,000 in\npresent buying power.  In 1597 Bacon was returned to Parliament as member\nfor Ipswich, and in that year he was hoping to marry the rich widow of\nSir William Hatton, Essex helping; but the lady married, in the next\nyear, Sir Edward Coke.  It was in 1597 that Bacon published the First\nEdition of his Essays.  That was a little book containing only ten essays\nin English, with twelve \u201cMeditationes Sacr\u00e6,\u201d which were essays in Latin\non religious subjects.  From 1597 onward to the end of his life, Bacon\u2019s\nEssays were subject to continuous addition and revision.  The author\u2019s\nSecond Edition, in which the number of the Essays was increased from ten\nto thirty-eight, did not appear until November or December, 1612, seven\nyears later than these two books on the \u201cAdvancement of Learning;\u201d and\nthe final edition of the Essays, in which their number was increased from\nthirty-eight to fifty-eight, appeared only in 1625; and Bacon died on the\n9th of April, 1626.  The edition of the Essays published in 1597, under\nElizabeth, marked only the beginning of a course of thought that\nafterwards flowed in one stream with his teachings in philosophy.\n\nIn February, 1601, there was the rebellion of Essex.  Francis Bacon had\nseparated himself from his patron after giving him advice that was\ndisregarded.  Bacon, now Queen\u2019s Counsel, not only appeared against his\nold friend, but with excess of zeal, by which, perhaps, he hoped to win\nback the Queen\u2019s favour, he twice obtruded violent attacks upon Essex\nwhen he was not called upon to speak.  On the 25th of February, 1601,\nEssex was beheaded.  The genius of Bacon was next employed to justify\nthat act by \u201cA Declaration of the Practices and Treasons attempted and\ncommitted by Robert late Earle of Essex and his Complices.\u201d  But James of\nScotland, on whose behalf Essex had intervened, came to the throne by the\ndeath of Elizabeth on the 24th of March, 1603.  Bacon was among the crowd\nof men who were made knights by James I., and he had to justify himself\nunder the new order of things by writing \u201cSir Francis Bacon his Apologie\nin certain Imputations concerning the late Earle of Essex.\u201d  He was\nreturned to the first Parliament of James I. by Ipswich and St. Albans,\nand he was confirmed in his office of King\u2019s Counsel in August, 1604; but\nhe was not appointed to the office of Solicitor-General when it became\nvacant in that year.\n\nThat was the position of Francis Bacon in 1605, when he published this\nwork, where in his First Book he pointed out the discredits of learning\nfrom human defects of the learned, and emptiness of many of the studies\nchosen, or the way of dealing with them.  This came, he said, especially\nby the mistaking or misplacing of the last or furthest end of knowledge,\nas if there were sought in it \u201ca couch whereupon to rest a searching and\nrestless spirit; or a terrace for a wandering and variable mind to walk\nup and down with a fair prospect; or a tower of state for a proud mind to\nraise itself upon; or a fort or commanding ground for strife and\ncontention; or a shop for profit or sale; and not a rich storehouse for\nthe glory of the Creator and the relief of man\u2019s estate.\u201d  The rest of\nthe First Book was given to an argument upon the Dignity of Learning; and\nthe Second Book, on the Advancement of Learning, is, as Bacon himself\ndescribed it, \u201ca general and faithful perambulation of learning, with an\ninquiry what parts thereof lie fresh and waste, and not improved and\nconverted by the industry of man; to the end that such a plot made and\nrecorded to memory may both minister light to any public designation and\nalso serve to excite voluntary endeavours.\u201d  Bacon makes, by a sort of\nexhaustive analysis, a ground-plan of all subjects of study, as an\nintellectual map, helping the right inquirer in his search for the right\npath.  The right path is that by which he has the best chance of adding\nto the stock of knowledge in the world something worth labouring for; and\nthe true worth is in labour for \u201cthe glory of the Creator and the relief\nof man\u2019s estate.\u201d\n\n                                                                   H. M.\n\n\n\n\nTHE\nFIRST BOOK OF FRANCIS BACON;\nOF THE PROFICIENCE AND\nADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING,\nDIVINE AND HUMAN.\n\n\n                              _To the King_.\n\nTHERE were under the law, excellent King, both daily sacrifices and\nfreewill offerings; the one proceeding upon ordinary observance, the\nother upon a devout cheerfulness: in like manner there belongeth to kings\nfrom their servants both tribute of duty and presents of affection.  In\nthe former of these I hope I shall not live to be wanting, according to\nmy most humble duty and the good pleasure of your Majesty\u2019s employments:\nfor the latter, I thought it more respective to make choice of some\noblation which might rather refer to the propriety and excellency of your\nindividual person, than to the business of your crown and state.\n\nWherefore, representing your Majesty many times unto my mind, and\nbeholding you not with the inquisitive eye of presumption, to discover\nthat which the Scripture telleth me is inscrutable, but with the\nobservant eye of duty and admiration, leaving aside the other parts of\nyour virtue and fortune, I have been touched\u2014yea, and possessed\u2014with an\nextreme wonder at those your virtues and faculties, which the\nphilosophers call intellectual; the largeness of your capacity, the\nfaithfulness of your memory, the swiftness of your apprehension, the\npenetration of your judgment, and the facility and order of your\nelocution: and I have often thought that of all the persons living that I\nhave known, your Majesty were the best instance to make a man of Plato\u2019s\nopinion, that all knowledge is but remembrance, and that the mind of man\nby Nature knoweth all things, and hath but her own native and original\nnotions (which by the strangeness and darkness of this tabernacle of the\nbody are sequestered) again revived and restored: such a light of Nature\nI have observed in your Majesty, and such a readiness to take flame and\nblaze from the least occasion presented, or the least spark of another\u2019s\nknowledge delivered.  And as the Scripture saith of the wisest king,\n\u201cThat his heart was as the sands of the sea;\u201d which, though it be one of\nthe largest bodies, yet it consisteth of the smallest and finest\nportions; so hath God given your Majesty a composition of understanding\nadmirable, being able to compass and comprehend the greatest matters, and\nnevertheless to touch and apprehend the least; whereas it should seem an\nimpossibility in Nature for the same instrument to make itself fit for\ngreat and small works.  And for your gift of speech, I call to mind what\nCornelius Tacitus saith of Augustus C\u00e6sar: _Augusto profluens_, _et qu\u00e6\nprincipem deceret_, _eloquentia fuit_.  For if we note it well, speech\nthat is uttered with labour and difficulty, or speech that savoureth of\nthe affectation of art and precepts, or speech that is framed after the\nimitation of some pattern of eloquence, though never so excellent; all\nthis hath somewhat servile, and holding of the subject.  But your\nMajesty\u2019s manner of speech is, indeed, prince-like, flowing as from a\nfountain, and yet streaming and branching itself into Nature\u2019s order,\nfull of facility and felicity, imitating none, and inimitable by any.\nAnd as in your civil estate there appeareth to be an emulation and\ncontention of your Majesty\u2019s virtue with your fortune; a virtuous\ndisposition with a fortunate regiment; a virtuous expectation (when time\nwas) of your greater fortune, with a prosperous possession thereof in the\ndue time; a virtuous observation of the laws of marriage, with most\nblessed and happy fruit of marriage; a virtuous and most Christian desire\nof peace, with a fortunate inclination in your neighbour princes\nthereunto: so likewise in these intellectual matters there seemeth to be\nno less contention between the excellency of your Majesty\u2019s gifts of\nNature and the universality and perfection of your learning.  For I am\nwell assured that this which I shall say is no amplification at all, but\na positive and measured truth; which is, that there hath not been since\nChrist\u2019s time any king or temporal monarch which hath been so learned in\nall literature and erudition, divine and human.  For let a man seriously\nand diligently revolve and peruse the succession of the Emperors of Rome,\nof which C\u00e6sar the Dictator (who lived some years before Christ) and\nMarcus Antoninus were the best learned, and so descend to the Emperors of\nGr\u00e6cia, or of the West, and then to the lines of France, Spain, England,\nScotland, and the rest, and he shall find this judgment is truly made.\nFor it seemeth much in a king if, by the compendious extractions of other\nmen\u2019s wits and labours, he can take hold of any superficial ornaments and\nshows of learning, or if he countenance and prefer learning and learned\nmen; but to drink, indeed, of the true fountains of learning\u2014nay, to have\nsuch a fountain of learning in himself, in a king, and in a king born\u2014is\nalmost a miracle.  And the more, because there is met in your Majesty a\nrare conjunction, as well of divine and sacred literature as of profane\nand human; so as your Majesty standeth invested of that triplicity, which\nin great veneration was ascribed to the ancient Hermes: the power and\nfortune of a king, the knowledge and illumination of a priest, and the\nlearning and universality of a philosopher.  This propriety inherent and\nindividual attribute in your Majesty deserveth to be expressed not only\nin the fame and admiration of the present time, nor in the history or\ntradition of the ages succeeding, but also in some solid work, fixed\nmemorial, and immortal monument, bearing a character or signature both of\nthe power of a king and the difference and perfection of such a king.\n\nTherefore I did conclude with myself that I could not make unto your\nMajesty a better oblation than of some treatise tending to that end,\nwhereof the sum will consist of these two parts: the former concerning\nthe excellency of learning and knowledge, and the excellency of the merit\nand true glory in the augmentation and propagation thereof; the latter,\nwhat the particular acts and works are which have been embraced and\nundertaken for the advancement of learning; and again, what defects and\nundervalues I find in such particular acts: to the end that though I\ncannot positively or affirmatively advise your Majesty, or propound unto\nyou framed particulars, yet I may excite your princely cogitations to\nvisit the excellent treasure of your own mind, and thence to extract\nparticulars for this purpose agreeable to your magnanimity and wisdom.\n\nI. (1) In the entrance to the former of these\u2014to clear the way and, as it\nwere, to make silence, to have the true testimonies concerning the\ndignity of learning to be better heard, without the interruption of tacit\nobjections\u2014I think good to deliver it from the discredits and disgraces\nwhich it hath received, all from ignorance, but ignorance severally\ndisguised; appearing sometimes in the zeal and jealousy of divines,\nsometimes in the severity and arrogancy of politics, and sometimes in the\nerrors and imperfections of learned men themselves.\n\n(2) I hear the former sort say that knowledge is of those things which\nare to be accepted of with great limitation and caution; that the\naspiring to overmuch knowledge was the original temptation and sin\nwhereupon ensued the fall of man; that knowledge hath in it somewhat of\nthe serpent, and, therefore, where it entereth into a man it makes him\nswell; _Scientia inflat_; that Solomon gives a censure, \u201cThat there is no\nend of making books, and that much reading is weariness of the flesh;\u201d\nand again in another place, \u201cThat in spacious knowledge there is much\ncontristation, and that he that increaseth knowledge increaseth anxiety;\u201d\nthat Saint Paul gives a caveat, \u201cThat we be not spoiled through vain\nphilosophy;\u201d that experience demonstrates how learned men have been\narch-heretics, how learned times have been inclined to atheism, and how\nthe contemplation of second causes doth derogate from our dependence upon\nGod, who is the first cause.\n\n(3) To discover, then, the ignorance and error of this opinion, and the\nmisunderstanding in the grounds thereof, it may well appear these men do\nnot observe or consider that it was not the pure knowledge of Nature and\nuniversality, a knowledge by the light whereof man did give names unto\nother creatures in Paradise as they were brought before him according\nunto their proprieties, which gave the occasion to the fall; but it was\nthe proud knowledge of good and evil, with an intent in man to give law\nunto himself, and to depend no more upon God\u2019s commandments, which was\nthe form of the temptation.  Neither is it any quantity of knowledge, how\ngreat soever, that can make the mind of man to swell; for nothing can\nfill, much less extend the soul of man, but God and the contemplation of\nGod; and, therefore, Solomon, speaking of the two principal senses of\ninquisition, the eye and the ear, affirmeth that the eye is never\nsatisfied with seeing, nor the ear with hearing; and if there be no\nfulness, then is the continent greater than the content: so of knowledge\nitself and the mind of man, whereto the senses are but reporters, he\ndefineth likewise in these words, placed after that calendar or\nephemerides which he maketh of the diversities of times and seasons for\nall actions and purposes, and concludeth thus: \u201cGod hath made all things\nbeautiful, or decent, in the true return of their seasons.  Also He hath\nplaced the world in man\u2019s heart, yet cannot man find out the work which\nGod worketh from the beginning to the end\u201d\u2014declaring not obscurely that\nGod hath framed the mind of man as a mirror or glass, capable of the\nimage of the universal world, and joyful to receive the impression\nthereof, as the eye joyeth to receive light; and not only delighted in\nbeholding the variety of things and vicissitude of times, but raised also\nto find out and discern the ordinances and decrees which throughout all\nthose changes are infallibly observed.  And although he doth insinuate\nthat the supreme or summary law of Nature (which he calleth \u201cthe work\nwhich God worketh from the beginning to the end\u201d) is not possible to be\nfound out by man, yet that doth not derogate from the capacity of the\nmind; but may be referred to the impediments, as of shortness of life,\nill conjunction of labours, ill tradition of knowledge over from hand to\nhand, and many other inconveniences, whereunto the condition of man is\nsubject.  For that nothing parcel of the world is denied to man\u2019s inquiry\nand invention, he doth in another place rule over, when he saith, \u201cThe\nspirit of man is as the lamp of God, wherewith He searcheth the\ninwardness of all secrets.\u201d  If, then, such be the capacity and receipt\nof the mind of man, it is manifest that there is no danger at all in the\nproportion or quantity of knowledge, how large soever, lest it should\nmake it swell or out-compass itself; no, but it is merely the quality of\nknowledge, which, be it in quantity more or less, if it be taken without\nthe true corrective thereof, hath in it some nature of venom or\nmalignity, and some effects of that venom, which is ventosity or\nswelling.  This corrective spice, the mixture whereof maketh knowledge so\nsovereign, is charity, which the Apostle immediately addeth to the former\nclause; for so he saith, \u201cKnowledge bloweth up, but charity buildeth up;\u201d\nnot unlike unto that which he deilvereth in another place: \u201cIf I spake,\u201d\nsaith he, \u201cwith the tongues of men and angels, and had not charity, it\nwere but as a tinkling cymbal.\u201d  Not but that it is an excellent thing to\nspeak with the tongues of men and angels, but because, if it be severed\nfrom charity, and not referred to the good of men and mankind, it hath\nrather a sounding and unworthy glory than a meriting and substantial\nvirtue.  And as for that censure of Solomon concerning the excess of\nwriting and reading books, and the anxiety of spirit which redoundeth\nfrom knowledge, and that admonition of St. Paul, \u201cThat we be not seduced\nby vain philosophy,\u201d let those places be rightly understood; and they do,\nindeed, excellently set forth the true bounds and limitations whereby\nhuman knowledge is confined and circumscribed, and yet without any such\ncontracting or coarctation, but that it may comprehend all the universal\nnature of things; for these limitations are three: the first, \u201cThat we do\nnot so place our felicity in knowledge, as we forget our mortality;\u201d the\nsecond, \u201cThat we make application of our knowledge, to give ourselves\nrepose and contentment, and not distaste or repining;\u201d the third, \u201cThat\nwe do not presume by the contemplation of Nature to attain to the\nmysteries of God.\u201d  For as touching the first of these, Solomon doth\nexcellently expound himself in another place of the same book, where he\nsaith: \u201cI saw well that knowledge recedeth as far from ignorance as light\ndoth from darkness; and that the wise man\u2019s eyes keep watch in his head,\nwhereas this fool roundeth about in darkness: but withal I learned that\nthe same mortality involveth them both.\u201d  And for the second, certain it\nis there is no vexation or anxiety of mind which resulteth from knowledge\notherwise than merely by accident; for all knowledge and wonder (which is\nthe seed of knowledge) is an impression of pleasure in itself; but when\nmen fall to framing conclusions out of their knowledge, applying it to\ntheir particular, and ministering to themselves thereby weak fears or\nvast desires, there groweth that carefulness and trouble of mind which is\nspoken of; for then knowledge is no more _Lumen siccum_, whereof\nHeraclitus the profound said, _Lumen siccum optima anima_; but it\nbecometh _Lumen madidum_, or _maceratum_, being steeped and infused in\nthe humours of the affections.  And as for the third point, it deserveth\nto be a little stood upon, and not to be lightly passed over; for if any\nman shall think by view and inquiry into these sensible and material\nthings to attain that light, whereby he may reveal unto himself the\nnature or will of God, then, indeed, is he spoiled by vain philosophy;\nfor the contemplation of God\u2019s creatures and works produceth (having\nregard to the works and creatures themselves) knowledge, but having\nregard to God no perfect knowledge, but wonder, which is broken\nknowledge.  And, therefore, it was most aptly said by one of Plato\u2019s\nschool, \u201cThat the sense of man carrieth a resemblance with the sun, which\n(as we see) openeth and revealeth all the terrestrial globe; but then,\nagain, it obscureth and concealeth the stars and celestial globe: so doth\nthe sense discover natural things, but it darkeneth and shutteth up\ndivine.\u201d  And hence it is true that it hath proceeded, that divers great\nlearned men have been heretical, whilst they have sought to fly up to the\nsecrets of the Deity by this waxen wings of the senses.  And as for the\nconceit that too much knowledge should incline a man to atheism, and that\nthe ignorance of second causes should make a more devout dependence upon\nGod, which is the first cause; first, it is good to ask the question\nwhich Job asked of his friends: \u201cWill you lie for God, as one man will\nlie for another, to gratify him?\u201d  For certain it is that God worketh\nnothing in Nature but by second causes; and if they would have it\notherwise believed, it is mere imposture, as it were in favour towards\nGod, and nothing else but to offer to the Author of truth the unclean\nsacrifice of a lie.  But further, it is an assured truth, and a\nconclusion of experience, that a little or superficial knowledge of\nphilosophy may incline the mind of men to atheism, but a further\nproceeding therein doth bring the mind back again to religion.  For in\nthe entrance of philosophy, when the second causes, which are next unto\nthe senses, do offer themselves to the mind of man, if it dwell and stay\nthere it may induce some oblivion of the highest cause; but when a man\npasseth on further and seeth the dependence of causes and the works of\nProvidence; then, according to the allegory of the poets, he will easily\nbelieve that the highest link of Nature\u2019s chain must needs he tied to the\nfoot of Jupiter\u2019s chair.  To conclude, therefore, let no man upon a weak\nconceit of sobriety or an ill-applied moderation think or maintain that a\nman can search too far, or be too well studied in the book of God\u2019s word,\nor in the book of God\u2019s works, divinity or philosophy; but rather let men\nendeavour an endless progress or proficience in both; only let men beware\nthat they apply both to charity, and not to swelling; to use, and not to\nostentation; and again, that they do not unwisely mingle or confound\nthese learnings together.\n\nII. (1) And as for the disgraces which learning receiveth from politics,\nthey be of this nature: that learning doth soften men\u2019s minds, and makes\nthem more unapt for the honour and exercise of arms; that it doth mar and\npervert men\u2019s dispositions for matter of government and policy, in making\nthem too curious and irresolute by variety of reading, or too peremptory\nor positive by strictness of rules and axioms, or too immoderate and\noverweening by reason of the greatness of examples, or too incompatible\nand differing from the times by reason of the dissimilitude of examples;\nor at least, that it doth divert men\u2019s travails from action and business,\nand bringeth them to a love of leisure and privateness; and that it doth\nbring into states a relaxation of discipline, whilst every man is more\nready to argue than to obey and execute.  Out of this conceit Cato,\nsurnamed the Censor, one of the wisest men indeed that ever lived, when\nCarneades the philosopher came in embassage to Rome, and that the young\nmen of Rome began to flock about him, being allured with the sweetness\nand majesty of his eloquence and learning, gave counsel in open senate\nthat they should give him his despatch with all speed, lest he should\ninfect and enchant the minds and affections of the youth, and at unawares\nbring in an alteration of the manners and customs of the state.  Out of\nthe same conceit or humour did Virgil, turning his pen to the advantage\nof his country and the disadvantage of his own profession, make a kind of\nseparation between policy and government, and between arts and sciences,\nin the verses so much renowned, attributing and challenging the one to\nthe Romans, and leaving and yielding the other to the Grecians: _Tu\nregere imperio popules_, _Romane_, _memento_, _H\u00e6 tibi erunt artes_, &c.\nSo likewise we see that Anytus, the accuser of Socrates, laid it as an\narticle of charge and accusation against him, that he did, with the\nvariety and power of his discourses and disputatious, withdraw young men\nfrom due reverence to the laws and customs of their country, and that he\ndid profess a dangerous and pernicious science, which was to make the\nworse matter seem the better, and to suppress truth by force of eloquence\nand speech.\n\n(2) But these and the like imputations have rather a countenance of\ngravity than any ground of justice: for experience doth warrant that,\nboth in persons and in times, there hath been a meeting and concurrence\nin learning and arms, flourishing and excelling in the same men and the\nsame ages.  For as \u2018for men, there cannot be a better nor the hike\ninstance as of that pair, Alexander the Great and Julius C\u00e6sar, the\nDictator; whereof the one was Aristotle\u2019s scholar in philosophy, and the\nother was Cicero\u2019s rival in eloquence; or if any man had rather call for\nscholars that were great generals, than generals that were great\nscholars, let him take Epaminondas the Theban, or Xenophon the Athenian;\nwhereof the one was the first that abated the power of Sparta, and the\nother was the first that made way to the overthrow of the monarchy of\nPersia.  And this concurrence is yet more visible in times than in\npersons, by how much an age is greater object than a man.  For both in\nEgypt, Assyria, Persia, Gr\u00e6cia, and Rome, the same times that are most\nrenowned for arms are, likewise, most admired for learning, so that the\ngreatest authors and philosophers, and the greatest captains and\ngovernors, have lived in the same ages.  Neither can it otherwise he: for\nas in man the ripeness of strength of the body and mind cometh much about\nan age, save that the strength of the body cometh somewhat the more\nearly, so in states, arms and learning, whereof the one correspondeth to\nthe body, the other to the soul of man, have a concurrence or near\nsequence in times.\n\n(3) And for matter of policy and government, that learning, should rather\nhurt, than enable thereunto, is a thing very improbable; we see it is\naccounted an error to commit a natural body to empiric physicians, which\ncommonly have a few pleasing receipts whereupon they are confident and\nadventurous, but know neither the causes of diseases, nor the complexions\nof patients, nor peril of accidents, nor the true method of cures; we see\nit is a like error to rely upon advocates or lawyers which are only men\nof practice, and not grounded in their books, who are many times easily\nsurprised when matter falleth out besides their experience, to the\nprejudice of the causes they handle: so by like reason it cannot be but a\nmatter of doubtful consequence if states be managed by empiric statesmen,\nnot well mingled with men grounded in learning.  But contrariwise, it is\nalmost without instance contradictory that ever any government was\ndisastrous that was in the hands of learned governors.  For howsoever it\nhath been ordinary with politic men to extenuate and disable learned men\nby the names of _pedantes_; yet in the records of time it appeareth in\nmany particulars that the governments of princes in minority\n(notwithstanding the infinite disadvantage of that kind of state)\u2014have\nnevertheless excelled the government of princes of mature age, even for\nthat reason which they seek to traduce, which is that by that occasion\nthe state hath been in the hands of _pedantes_: for so was the state of\nRome for the first five years, which are so much magnified, during the\nminority of Nero, in the hands of Seneca, a _pedenti_; so it was again,\nfor ten years\u2019 space or more, during the minority of Gordianus the\nyounger, with great applause and contentation in the hands of Misitheus,\na _pedanti_: so was it before that, in the minority of Alexander Severus,\nin like happiness, in hands not much unlike, by reason of the rule of the\nwomen, who were aided by the teachers and preceptors.  Nay, let a man\nlook into the government of the Bishops of Rome, as by name, into the\ngovernment of Pius Quintus and Sextus Quintus in our times, who were both\nat their entrance esteemed but as pedantical friars, and he shall find\nthat such Popes do greater things, and proceed upon truer principles of\nstate, than those which have ascended to the papacy from an education and\nbreeding in affairs of state and courts of princes; for although men bred\nin learning are perhaps to seek in points of convenience and\naccommodating for the present, which the Italians call _ragioni di\nstato_, whereof the same Pius Quintus could not hear spoken with\npatience, terming them inventions against religion and the moral virtues;\nyet on the other side, to recompense that, they are perfect in those same\nplain grounds of religion, justice, honour, and moral virtue, which if\nthey be well and watchfully pursued, there will be seldom use of those\nother, no more than of physic in a sound or well-dieted body.  Neither\ncan the experience of one man\u2019s life furnish examples and precedents for\nthe event of one man\u2019s life.  For as it happeneth sometimes that the\ngrandchild, or other descendant, resembleth the ancestor more than the\nson; so many times occurrences of present times may sort better with\nancient examples than with those of the later or immediate times; and\nlastly, the wit of one man can no more countervail learning than one\nman\u2019s means can hold way with a common purse.\n\n(4) And as for those particular seducements or indispositions of the mind\nfor policy and government, which learning is pretended to insinuate; if\nit be granted that any such thing be, it must be remembered withal that\nlearning ministereth in every of them greater strength of medicine or\nremedy than it offereth cause of indisposition or infirmity.  For if by a\nsecret operation it make men perplexed and irresolute, on the other side\nby plain precept it teacheth them when and upon what ground to resolve;\nyea, and how to carry things in suspense, without prejudice, till they\nresolve.  If it make men positive and regular, it teacheth them what\nthings are in their nature demonstrative, and what are conjectural, and\nas well the use of distinctions and exceptions, as the latitude of\nprinciples and rules.  If it mislead by disproportion or dissimilitude of\nexamples, it teacheth men the force of circumstances, the errors of\ncomparisons, and all the cautions of application; so that in all these it\ndoth rectify more effectually than it can pervert.  And these medicines\nit conveyeth into men\u2019s minds much more forcibly by the quickness and\npenetration of examples.  For let a man look into the errors of Clement\nVII., so lively described by Guicciardini, who served under him, or into\nthe errors of Cicero, painted out by his own pencil in his Epistles to\nAtticus, and he will fly apace from being irresolute.  Let him look into\nthe errors of Phocion, and he will beware how he be obstinate or\ninflexible.  Let him but read the fable of Ixion, and it will hold him\nfrom being vaporous or imaginative.  Let him look into the errors of Cato\nII., and he will never be one of the Antipodes, to tread opposite to the\npresent world.\n\n(5) And for the conceit that learning should dispose men to leisure and\nprivateness, and make men slothful: it were a strange thing if that which\naccustometh the mind to a perpetual motion and agitation should induce\nslothfulness, whereas, contrariwise, it may be truly affirmed that no\nkind of men love business for itself but those that are learned; for\nother persons love it for profit, as a hireling that loves the work for\nthe wages; or for honour, as because it beareth them up in the eyes of\nmen, and refresheth their reputation, which otherwise would wear; or\nbecause it putteth them in mind of their fortune, and giveth them\noccasion to pleasure and displeasure; or because it exerciseth some\nfaculty wherein they take pride, and so entertaineth them in good-humour\nand pleasing conceits towards themselves; or because it advanceth any\nother their ends.  So that as it is said of untrue valours, that some\nmen\u2019s valours are in the eyes of them that look on, so such men\u2019s\nindustries are in the eyes of others, or, at least, in regard of their\nown designments; only learned men love business as an action according to\nnature, as agreeable to health of mind as exercise is to health of body,\ntaking pleasure in the action itself, and not in the purchase, so that of\nall men they are the most indefatigable, if it be towards any business\nwhich can hold or detain their mind.\n\n(6) And if any man be laborious in reading and study, and yet idle in\nbusiness and action, it groweth from some weakness of body or softness of\nspirit, such as Seneca speaketh of: _Quidam tam sunt umbratiles_, _ut\nputent in turbido esse quicquid in luce est_; and not of learning: well\nmay it be that such a point of a man\u2019s nature may make him give himself\nto learning, but it is not learning that breedeth any such point in his\nnature.\n\n(7) And that learning should take up too much time or leisure: I answer,\nthe most active or busy man that hath been or can be, hath (no question)\nmany vacant times of leisure while he expecteth the tides and returns of\nbusiness (except he be either tedious and of no despatch, or lightly and\nunworthily ambitious to meddle in things that may be better done by\nothers), and then the question is but how those spaces and times of\nleisure shall be filled and spent; whether in pleasure or in studies; as\nwas well answered by Demosthenes to his adversary \u00c6schines, that was a\nman given to pleasure, and told him \u201cThat his orations did smell of the\nlamp.\u201d  \u201cIndeed,\u201d said Demosthenes, \u201cthere is a great difference between\nthe things that you and I do by lamp-light.\u201d  So as no man need doubt\nthat learning will expel business, but rather it will keep and defend the\npossession of the mind against idleness and pleasure, which otherwise at\nunawares may enter to the prejudice of both.\n\n(8) Again, for that other conceit that learning should undermine the\nreverence of laws and government, it is assuredly a mere depravation and\ncalumny, without all shadow of truth.  For to say that a blind custom of\nobedience should be a surer obligation than duty taught and understood,\nit is to affirm that a blind man may tread surer by a guide than a seeing\nman can by a light.  And it is without all controversy that learning doth\nmake the minds of men gentle, generous, manageable, and pliant to\ngovernment; whereas ignorance makes them churlish, thwart, and mutinous:\nand the evidence of time doth clear this assertion, considering that the\nmost barbarous, rude, and unlearned times have been most subject to\ntumults, seditions, and changes.\n\n(9) And as to the judgment of Cato the Censor, he was well punished for\nhis blasphemy against learning, in the same kind wherein he offended; for\nwhen he was past threescore years old, he was taken with an extreme\ndesire to go to school again, and to learn the Greek tongue, to the end\nto peruse the Greek authors; which doth well demonstrate that his former\ncensure of the Grecian learning was rather an affected gravity, than\naccording to the inward sense of his own opinion.  And as for Virgil\u2019s\nverses, though it pleased him to brave the world in taking to the Romans\nthe art of empire, and leaving to others the arts of subjects, yet so\nmuch is manifest\u2014that the Romans never ascended to that height of empire\ntill the time they had ascended to the height of other arts.  For in the\ntime of the two first C\u00e6sars, which had the art of government in greatest\nperfection, there lived the best poet, Virgilius Maro; the best\nhistoriographer, Titus Livius; the best antiquary, Marcus Varro; and the\nbest or second orator, Marcus Cicero, that to the memory of man are\nknown.  As for the accusation of Socrates, the time must be remembered\nwhen it was prosecuted; which was under the Thirty Tyrants, the most\nbase, bloody, and envious persons that have governed; which revolution of\nstate was no sooner over but Socrates, whom they had made a person\ncriminal, was made a person heroical, and his memory accumulate with\nhonours divine and human; and those discourses of his which were then\ntermed corrupting of manners, were after acknowledged for sovereign\nmedicines of the mind and manners, and so have been received ever since\ntill this day.  Let this, therefore, serve for answer to politiques,\nwhich in their humorous severity, or in their feigned gravity, have\npresumed to throw imputations upon learning; which redargution\nnevertheless (save that we know not whether our labours may extend to\nother ages) were not needful for the present, in regard of the love and\nreverence towards learning which the example and countenance of two so\nlearned princes, Queen Elizabeth and your Majesty, being as Castor and\nPollux, _lucida sidera_, stars of excellent light and most benign\ninfluence, hath wrought in all men of place and authority in our nation.\n\nIII. (1) Now therefore we come to that third sort of discredit or\ndiminution of credit that groweth unto learning from learned men\nthemselves, which commonly cleaveth fastest: it is either from their\nfortune, or from their manners, or from the nature of their studies.  For\nthe first, it is not in their power; and the second is accidental; the\nthird only is proper to be handled: but because we are not in hand with\ntrue measure, but with popular estimation and conceit, it is not amiss to\nspeak somewhat of the two former.  The derogations therefore which grow\nto learning from the fortune or condition of learned men, are either in\nrespect of scarcity of means, or in respect of privateness of life and\nmeanness of employments.\n\n(2) Concerning want, and that it is the case of learned men usually to\nbegin with little, and not to grow rich so fast as other men, by reason\nthey convert not their labours chiefly to lucre and increase, it were\ngood to leave the commonplace in commendation of povery to some friar to\nhandle, to whom much was attributed by Machiavel in this point when he\nsaid, \u201cThat the kingdom of the clergy had been long before at an end, if\nthe reputation and reverence towards the poverty of friars had not borne\nout the scandal of the superfluities and excesses of bishops and\nprelates.\u201d  So a man might say that the felicity and delicacy of princes\nand great persons had long since turned to rudeness and barbarism, if the\npoverty of learning had not kept up civility and honour of life; but\nwithout any such advantages, it is worthy the observation what a reverent\nand honoured thing poverty of fortune was for some ages in the Roman\nstate, which nevertheless was a state without paradoxes.  For we see what\nTitus Livius saith in his introduction: _C\u00e6terum aut me amor negotii\nsuscepti fallit aut nulla unquam respublica nec major_, _nec sanctior_,\n_nec bonis exemplis ditior fuit_; _nec in quam tam sero avaritia\nluxuriaque immigraverint_; _nec ubi tantus ac tam diu paupertati ac\nparsimoni\u00e6 honos fuerit_.  We see likewise, after that the state of Rome\nwas not itself, but did degenerate, how that person that took upon him to\nbe counsellor to Julius C\u00e6sar after his victory where to begin his\nrestoration of the state, maketh it of all points the most summary to\ntake away the estimation of wealth: _Verum h\u00e6c et omnia mala pariter cum\nhonore pecuni\u00e6 desinent_; _si neque magistratus_, _neque alia vulgo\ncupienda_, _venalia erunt_.  To conclude this point: as it was truly said\nthat _Paupertas est virtutis fortuna_, though sometimes it come from\nvice, so it may be fitly said that, though some times it may proceed from\nmisgovernment and accident.  Surely Solomon hath pronounced it both in\ncensure, _Qui festinat ad divitias non erit insons_; and in precept, \u201cBuy\nthe truth, and sell it not; and so of wisdom and knowledge;\u201d judging that\nmeans were to be spent upon learning, and not learning to be applied to\nmeans.  And as for the privateness or obscureness (as it may be in vulgar\nestimation accounted) of life of contemplative men, it is a theme so\ncommon to extol a private life, not taxed with sensuality and sloth, in\ncomparison and to the disadvantage of a civil life, for safety, liberty,\npleasure, and dignity, or at least freedom from indignity, as no man\nhandleth it but handleth it well; such a consonancy it hath to men\u2019s\nconceits in the expressing, and to men\u2019s consents in the allowing.  This\nonly I will add, that learned men forgotten in states and not living in\nthe eyes of men, are like the images of Cassius and Brutus in the funeral\nof Junia, of which, not being represented as many others were, Tacitus\nsaith, _Eo ipso pr\u00e6fulgebant quod non visebantur_.\n\n(3) And for meanness of employment, that which is most traduced to\ncontempt is that the government of youth is commonly allotted to them;\nwhich age, because it is the age of least authority, it is transferred to\nthe disesteeming of those employments wherein youth is conversant, and\nwhich are conversant about youth.  But how unjust this traducement is (if\nyou will reduce things from popularity of opinion to measure of reason)\nmay appear in that we see men are more curious what they put into a new\nvessel than into a vessel seasoned; and what mould they lay about a young\nplant than about a plant corroborate; so as this weakest terms and times\nof all things use to have the best applications and helps.  And will you\nhearken to the Hebrew rabbins?  \u201cYour young men shall see visions, and\nyour old men shall dream dreams:\u201d say they, youth is the worthier age,\nfor that visions are nearer apparitions of God than dreams?  And let it\nbe noted that howsoever the condition of life of _pedantes_ hath been\nscorned upon theatres, as the ape of tyranny; and that the modern\nlooseness or negligence hath taken no due regard to the choice of\nschoolmasters and tutors; yet the ancient wisdom of the best times did\nalways make a just complaint, that states were too busy with their laws\nand too negligent in point of education: which excellent part of ancient\ndiscipline hath been in some sort revived of late times by the colleges\nof the Jesuits; of whom, although in regard of their superstition I may\nsay, _Quo meliores_, _eo deteriores_; yet in regard of this, and some\nother points concerning human learning and moral matters, I may say, as\nAgesilaus said to his enemy Pharnabazus, _Talis quum sis_, _utunam noster\nesses_.  And that much touching the discredits drawn from the fortunes of\nlearned men.\n\n(4) As touching the manners of learned men, it is a thing personal and\nindividual: and no doubt there be amongst them, as in other professions,\nof all temperatures: but yet so as it is not without truth which is said,\nthat _Abeunt studua in mores_, studies have an influence and operation\nupon the manners of those that are conversant in them.\n\n(5) But upon an attentive and indifferent review, I for my part cannot\nfind any disgrace to learning can proceed from the manners of learned\nmen; not inherent to them as they are learned; except it be a fault\n(which was the supposed fault of Demosthenes, Cicero, Cato II., Seneca,\nand many more) that because the times they read of are commonly better\nthan the times they live in, and the duties taught better than the duties\npractised, they contend sometimes too far to bring things to perfection,\nand to reduce the corruption of manners to honesty of precepts or\nexamples of too great height.  And yet hereof they have caveats enough in\ntheir own walks.  For Solon, when he was asked whether he had given his\ncitizens the best laws, answered wisely, \u201cYea, of such as they would\nreceive:\u201d and Plato, finding that his own heart could not agree with the\ncorrupt manners of his country, refused to bear place or office, saying,\n\u201cThat a man\u2019s country was to be used as his parents were, that is, with\nhumble persuasions, and not with contestations.\u201d  And C\u00e6sar\u2019s counsellor\nput in the same caveat, _Non ad vetera instituta revocans qu\u00e6 jampridem\ncorruptis moribus ludibrio sunt_; and Cicero noteth this error directly\nin Cato II. when he writes to his friend Atticus, _Cato optime sentit_,\n_sed nocet interdum reipublic\u00e6_; _loquitur enim tanquam in republic\u00e2\nPlatonis_, _non tanquam in f\u00e6ce Romuli_.  And the same Cicero doth excuse\nand expound the philosophers for going too far and being too exact in\ntheir prescripts when he saith, _Isti ipse pr\u00e6ceptores virtutis et\nmagistri videntur fines officiorum paulo longius quam natura vellet\nprotulisse_, _ut cum ad ultimum animo contendissemus_, _ibi tamen_, _ubi\noportet_, _consisteremus_: and yet himself might have said, _Monitis sum\nminor ipse meis_; for it was his own fault, though not in so extreme a\ndegree.\n\n(6) Another fault likewise much of this kind hath been incident to\nlearned men, which is, that they have esteemed the preservation, good,\nand honour of their countries or masters before their own fortunes or\nsafeties.  For so saith Demosthenes unto the Athenians: \u201cIf it please you\nto note it, my counsels unto you are not such whereby I should grow great\namongst you, and you become little amongst the Grecians; but they be of\nthat nature as they are sometimes not good for me to give, but are always\ngood for you to follow.\u201d  And so Seneca, after he had consecrated that\n_Quinquennium Neronis_ to the eternal glory of learned governors, held on\nhis honest and loyal course of good and free counsel after his master\ngrew extremely corrupt in his government.  Neither can this point\notherwise be, for learning endueth men\u2019s minds with a true sense of the\nfrailty of their persons, the casualty of their fortunes, and the dignity\nof their soul and vocation, so that it is impossible for them to esteem\nthat any greatness of their own fortune can be a true or worthy end of\ntheir being and ordainment, and therefore are desirous to give their\naccount to God, and so likewise to their masters under God (as kings and\nthe states that they serve) in those words, _Ecce tibi lucrefeci_, and\nnot _Ecce mihi lucrefeci_; whereas the corrupter sort of mere politiques,\nthat have not their thoughts established by learning in the love and\napprehension of duty, nor never look abroad into universality, do refer\nall things to themselves, and thrust themselves into the centre of the\nworld, as if all lines should meet in them and their fortunes, never\ncaring in all tempests what becomes of the ship of state, so they may\nsave themselves in the cockboat of their own fortune; whereas men that\nfeel the weight of duty and know the limits of self-love use to make good\ntheir places and duties, though with peril; and if they stand in\nseditious and violent alterations, it is rather the reverence which many\ntimes both adverse parts do give to honesty, than any versatile advantage\nof their own carriage.  But for this point of tender sense and fast\nobligation of duty which learning doth endue the mind withal, howsoever\nfortune may tax it, and many in the depth of their corrupt principles may\ndespise it, yet it will receive an open allowance, and therefore needs\nthe less disproof or excuse.\n\n(7) Another fault incident commonly to learned men, which may be more\nproperly defended than truly denied, is that they fail sometimes in\napplying themselves to particular persons, which want of exact\napplication ariseth from two causes\u2014the one, because the largeness of\ntheir mind can hardly confine itself to dwell in the exquisite\nobservation or examination of the nature and customs of one person, for\nit is a speech for a lover, and not for a wise man, _Satis magnum alter\nalteri theatrum sumus_.  Nevertheless I shall yield that he that cannot\ncontract the sight of his mind as well as disperse and dilate it, wanteth\na great faculty.  But there is a second cause, which is no inability, but\na rejection upon choice and judgment.  For the honest and just bounds of\nobservation by one person upon another extend no further but to\nunderstand him sufficiently, whereby not to give him offence, or whereby\nto be able to give him faithful counsel, or whereby to stand upon\nreasonable guard and caution in respect of a man\u2019s self.  But to be\nspeculative into another man to the end to know how to work him, or wind\nhim, or govern him, proceedeth from a heart that is double and cloven,\nand not entire and ingenuous; which as in friendship it is want of\nintegrity, so towards princes or superiors is want of duty.  For the\ncustom of the Levant, which is that subjects do forbear to gaze or fix\ntheir eyes upon princes, is in the outward ceremony barbarous, but the\nmoral is good; for men ought not, by cunning and bent observations, to\npierce and penetrate into the hearts of kings, which the Scripture hath\ndeclared to be inscrutable.\n\n(8) There is yet another fault (with which I will conclude this part)\nwhich is often noted in learned men, that they do many times fail to\nobserve decency and discretion in their behaviour and carriage, and\ncommit errors in small and ordinary points of action, so as the vulgar\nsort of capacities do make a judgment of them in greater matters by that\nwhich they find wanting in them in smaller.  But this consequence doth\noft deceive men, for which I do refer them over to that which was said by\nThemistocles, arrogantly and uncivilly being applied to himself out of\nhis own mouth, but, being applied to the general state of this question,\npertinently and justly, when, being invited to touch a lute, he said, \u201cHe\ncould not fiddle, but he could make a small town a great state.\u201d  So no\ndoubt many may be well seen in the passages of government and policy\nwhich are to seek in little and punctual occasions.  I refer them also to\nthat which Plato said of his master Socrates, whom he compared to the\ngallipots of apothecaries, which on the outside had apes and owls and\nantiques, but contained within sovereign and precious liquors and\nconfections; acknowledging that, to an external report, he was not\nwithout superficial levities and deformities, but was inwardly\nreplenished with excellent virtues and powers.  And so much touching the\npoint of manners of learned men.\n\n(9) But in the meantime I have no purpose to give allowance to some\nconditions and courses base and unworthy, wherein divers professors of\nlearning have wronged themselves and gone too far; such as were those\ntrencher philosophers which in the later age of the Roman state were\nusually in the houses of great persons, being little better than solemn\nparasites, of which kind, Lucian maketh a merry description of the\nphilosopher that the great lady took to ride with her in her coach, and\nwould needs have him carry her little dog, which he doing officiously and\nyet uncomely, the page scoffed and said, \u201cThat he doubted the philosopher\nof a Stoic would turn to be a Cynic.\u201d  But, above all the rest, this\ngross and palpable flattery whereunto many not unlearned have abased and\nabused their wits and pens, turning (as Du Bartas saith) Hecuba into\nHelena, and Faustina into Lucretia, hath most diminished the price and\nestimation of learning.  Neither is the modern dedication of books and\nwritings, as to patrons, to be commended, for that books (such as are\nworthy the name of books) ought to have no patrons but truth and reason.\nAnd the ancient custom was to dedicate them only to private and equal\nfriends, or to entitle the books with their names; or if to kings and\ngreat persons, it was to some such as the argument of the book was fit\nand proper for; but these and the like courses may deserve rather\nreprehension than defence.\n\n(10) Not that I can tax or condemn the morigeration or application of\nlearned men to men in fortune.  For the answer was good that Diogenes\nmade to one that asked him in mockery, \u201cHow it came to pass that\nphilosophers were the followers of rich men, and not rich men of\nphilosophers?\u201d  He answered soberly, and yet sharply, \u201cBecause the one\nsort knew what they had need of, and the other did not.\u201d  And of the like\nnature was the answer which Aristippus made, when having a petition to\nDionysius, and no ear given to him, he fell down at his feet, whereupon\nDionysius stayed and gave him the hearing, and granted it; and afterwards\nsome person, tender on the behalf of philosophy, reproved Aristippus that\nhe would offer the profession of philosophy such an indignity as for a\nprivate suit to fall at a tyrant\u2019s feet; but he answered, \u201cIt was not his\nfault, but it was the fault of Dionysius, that had his ears in his feet.\u201d\nNeither was it accounted weakness, but discretion, in him that would not\ndispute his best with Adrianus C\u00e6sar, excusing himself, \u201cThat it was\nreason to yield to him that commanded thirty legions.\u201d  These and the\nlike, applications, and stooping to points of necessity and convenience,\ncannot be disallowed; for though they may have some outward baseness, yet\nin a judgment truly made they are to be accounted submissions to the\noccasion and not to the person.\n\nIV. (1) Now I proceed to those errors and vanities which have intervened\namongst the studies themselves of the learned, which is that which is\nprincipal and proper to the present argument; wherein my purpose is not\nto make a justification of the errors, but by a censure and separation of\nthe errors to make a justification of that which is good and sound, and\nto deliver that from the aspersion of the other.  For we see that it is\nthe manner of men to scandalise and deprave that which retaineth the\nstate and virtue, by taking advantage upon that which is corrupt and\ndegenerate, as the heathens in the primitive Church used to blemish and\ntaint the Christians with the faults and corruptions of heretics.  But\nnevertheless I have no meaning at this time to make any exact\nanimadversion of the errors and impediments in matters of learning, which\nare more secret and remote from vulgar opinion, but only to speak unto\nsuch as do fall under or near unto a popular observation.\n\n(2) There be therefore chiefly three vanities in studies, whereby\nlearning hath been most traduced.  For those things we do esteem vain\nwhich are either false or frivolous, those which either have no truth or\nno use; and those persons we esteem vain which are either credulous or\ncurious; and curiosity is either in matter or words: so that in reason as\nwell as in experience there fall out to be these three distempers (as I\nmay term them) of learning\u2014the first, fantastical learning; the second,\ncontentious learning; and the last, delicate learning; vain imaginations,\nvain altercations, and vain affectations; and with the last I will begin.\nMartin Luther, conducted, no doubt, by a higher Providence, but in\ndiscourse of reason, finding what a province he had undertaken against\nthe Bishop of Rome and the degenerate traditions of the Church, and\nfinding his own solitude, being in nowise aided by the opinions of his\nown time, was enforced to awake all antiquity, and to call former times\nto his succours to make a party against the present time.  So that the\nancient authors, both in divinity and in humanity, which had long time\nslept in libraries, began generally to be read and revolved.  This, by\nconsequence, did draw on a necessity of a more exquisite travail in the\nlanguages original, wherein those authors did write, for the better\nunderstanding of those authors, and the better advantage of pressing and\napplying their words.  And thereof grew, again, a delight in their manner\nof style and phrase, and an admiration of that kind of writing, which was\nmuch furthered and precipitated by the enmity and opposition that the\npropounders of those primitive but seeming new opinions had against the\nschoolmen, who were generally of the contrary part, and whose writings\nwere altogether in a differing style and form; taking liberty to coin and\nframe new terms of art to express their own sense, and to avoid circuit\nof speech, without regard to the pureness, pleasantness, and (as I may\ncall it) lawfulness of the phrase or word.  And again, because the great\nlabour then was with the people (of whom the Pharisees were wont to say,\n_Execrabilis ista turba_, _qu\u00e6 non novit legem_), for the winning and\npersuading of them, there grew of necessity in chief price and request\neloquence and variety of discourse, as the fittest and forciblest access\ninto the capacity of the vulgar sort; so that these four causes\nconcurring\u2014the admiration of ancient authors, the hate of the schoolmen,\nthe exact study of languages, and the efficacy of preaching\u2014did bring in\nan affectionate study of eloquence and copy of speech, which then began\nto flourish.  This grew speedily to an excess; for men began to hunt more\nafter words than matter\u2014more after the choiceness of the phrase, and the\nround and clean composition of the sentence, and the sweet falling of the\nclauses, and the varying and illustration of their works with tropes and\nfigures, than after the weight of matter, worth of subject, soundness of\nargument, life of invention, or depth of judgment.  Then grew the flowing\nand watery vein of Osorius, the Portugal bishop, to be in price.  Then\ndid Sturmius spend such infinite and curious pains upon Cicero the Orator\nand Hermogenes the Rhetorician, besides his own books of Periods and\nImitation, and the like.  Then did Car of Cambridge and Ascham with their\nlectures and writings almost deify Cicero and Demosthenes, and allure all\nyoung men that were studious unto that delicate and polished kind of\nlearning.  Then did Erasmus take occasion to make the scoffing echo,\n_Decem annos consuumpsi in legendo Cicerone_; and the echo answered in\nGreek, _One_, _Asine_.  Then grew the learning of the schoolmen to be\nutterly despised as barbarous.  In sum, the whole inclination and bent of\nthose times was rather towards copy than weight.\n\n(3) Here therefore [is] the first distemper of learning, when men study\nwords and not matter; whereof, though I have represented an example of\nlate times, yet it hath been and will be _secundum majus et minus_ in all\ntime.  And how is it possible but this should have an operation to\ndiscredit learning, even with vulgar capacities, when they see learned\nmen\u2019s works like the first letter of a patent or limited book, which\nthough it hath large flourishes, yet it is but a letter?  It seems to me\nthat Pygmalion\u2019s frenzy is a good emblem or portraiture of this vanity;\nfor words are but the images of matter, and except they have life of\nreason and invention, to fall in love with them is all one as to fall in\nlove with a picture.\n\n(4) But yet notwithstanding it is a thing not hastily to be condemned, to\nclothe and adorn the obscurity even of philosophy itself with sensible\nand plausible elocution.  For hereof we have great examples in Xenophon,\nCicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and of Plato also in some degree; and hereof\nlikewise there is great use, for surely, to the severe inquisition of\ntruth and the deep progress into philosophy, it is some hindrance because\nit is too early satisfactory to the mind of man, and quencheth the desire\nof further search before we come to a just period.  But then if a man be\nto have any use of such knowledge in civil occasions, of conference,\ncounsel, persuasion, discourse, or the like, then shall he find it\nprepared to his hands in those authors which write in that manner.  But\nthe excess of this is so justly contemptible, that as Hercules, when he\nsaw the image of Adonis, Venus\u2019 minion, in a temple, said in disdain,\n_Nil sacri es_; so there is none of Hercules\u2019 followers in learning\u2014that\nis, the more severe and laborious sort of inquirers into truth\u2014but will\ndespise those delicacies and affectations, as indeed capable of no\ndivineness.  And thus much of the first disease or distemper of learning.\n\n(5) The second which followeth is in nature worse than the former: for as\nsubstance of matter is better than beauty of words, so contrariwise vain\nmatter is worse than vain words: wherein it seemeth the reprehension of\nSt. Paul was not only proper for those times, but prophetical for the\ntimes following; and not only respective to divinity, but extensive to\nall knowledge: _Devita profanas vocum novitates_, _et oppositiones falsi\nnominis scienti\u00e6_.  For he assigneth two marks and badges of suspected\nand falsified science: the one, the novelty and strangeness of terms; the\nother, the strictness of positions, which of necessity doth induce\noppositions, and so questions and altercations.  Surely, like as many\nsubstances in nature which are solid do putrefy and corrupt into\nworms;\u2014so it is the property of good and sound knowledge to putrefy and\ndissolve into a number of subtle, idle, unwholesome, and (as I may term\nthem) vermiculate questions, which have indeed a kind of quickness and\nlife of spirit, but no soundness of matter or goodness of quality.  This\nkind of degenerate learning did chiefly reign amongst the schoolmen, who\nhaving sharp and strong wits, and abundance of leisure, and small variety\nof reading, but their wits being shut up in the cells of a few authors\n(chiefly Aristotle their dictator) as their persons were shut up in the\ncells of monasteries and colleges, and knowing little history, either of\nnature or time, did out of no great quantity of matter and infinite\nagitation of wit spin out unto us those laborious webs of learning which\nare extant in their books.  For the wit and mind of man, if it work upon\nmatter, which is the contemplation of the creatures of God, worketh\naccording to the stuff and is limited thereby; but if it work upon\nitself, as the spider worketh his web, then it is endless, and brings\nforth indeed cobwebs of learning, admirable for the fineness of thread\nand work, but of no substance or profit.\n\n(6) This same unprofitable subtility or curiosity is of two sorts: either\nin the subject itself that they handle, when it is a fruitless\nspeculation or controversy (whereof there are no small number both in\ndivinity and philosophy), or in the manner or method of handling of a\nknowledge, which amongst them was this\u2014upon every particular position or\nassertion to frame objections, and to those objections, solutions; which\nsolutions were for the most part not confutations, but distinctions:\nwhereas indeed the strength of all sciences is, as the strength of the\nold man\u2019s faggot, in the bond.  For the harmony of a science, supporting\neach part the other, is and ought to be the true and brief confutation\nand suppression of all the smaller sort of objections.  But, on the other\nside, if you take out every axiom, as the sticks of the faggot, one by\none, you may quarrel with them and bend them and break them at your\npleasure: so that, as was said of Seneca, _Verborum minutiis rerum\nfrangit pondera_, so a man may truly say of the schoolmen, _Qu\u00e6stionum\nminutiis scientiarum frangunt soliditatem_.  For were it not better for a\nman in fair room to set up one great light, or branching candlestick of\nlights, than to go about with a small watch-candle into every corner?\nAnd such is their method, that rests not so much upon evidence of truth\nproved by arguments, authorities, similitudes, examples, as upon\nparticular confutations and solutions of every scruple, cavillation, and\nobjection; breeding for the most part one question as fast as it solveth\nanother; even as in the former resemblance, when you carry the light into\none corner, you darken the rest; so that the fable and fiction of Scylla\nseemeth to be a lively image of this kind of philosophy or knowledge;\nwhich was transformed into a comely virgin for the upper parts; but then\n_Candida succinctam latrantibus inguina monstris_: so the generalities of\nthe schoolmen are for a while good and proportionable; but then when you\ndescend into their distinctions and decisions, instead of a fruitful womb\nfor the use and benefit of man\u2019s life, they end in monstrous altercations\nand barking questions.  So as it is not possible but this quality of\nknowledge must fall under popular contempt, the people being apt to\ncontemn truths upon occasion of controversies and altercations, and to\nthink they are all out of their way which never meet; and when they see\nsuch digladiation about subtleties, and matters of no use or moment, they\neasily fall upon that judgment of Dionysius of Syracusa, _Verba ista sunt\nsenum otiosorum_.\n\n(7) Notwithstanding, certain it is that if those schoolmen to their great\nthirst of truth and unwearied travail of wit had joined variety and\nuniversality of reading and contemplation, they had proved excellent\nlights, to the great advancement of all learning and knowledge; but as\nthey are, they are great undertakers indeed, and fierce with dark\nkeeping.  But as in the inquiry of the divine truth, their pride inclined\nto leave the oracle of God\u2019s word, and to vanish in the mixture of their\nown inventions; so in the inquisition of nature, they ever left the\noracle of God\u2019s works, and adored the deceiving and deformed images which\nthe unequal mirror of their own minds, or a few received authors or\nprinciples, did represent unto them.  And thus much for the second\ndisease of learning.\n\n(8) For the third vice or disease of learning, which concerneth deceit or\nuntruth, it is of all the rest the foulest; as that which doth destroy\nthe essential form of knowledge, which is nothing but a representation of\ntruth: for the truth of being and the truth of knowing are one, differing\nno more than the direct beam and the beam reflected.  This vice therefore\nbrancheth itself into two sorts; delight in deceiving and aptness to be\ndeceived; imposture and credulity; which, although they appear to be of a\ndiverse nature, the one seeming to proceed of cunning and the other of\nsimplicity, yet certainly they do for the most part concur: for, as the\nverse noteth\u2014\n\n    \u201cPercontatorem fugito, nam garrulus idem est,\u201d\n\nan inquisitive man is a prattler; so upon the like reason a credulous man\nis a deceiver: as we see it in fame, that he that will easily believe\nrumours will as easily augment rumours and add somewhat to them of his\nown; which Tacitus wisely noteth, when he saith, _Fingunt simul\ncreduntque_: so great an affinity hath fiction and belief.\n\n(9) This facility of credit and accepting or admitting things weakly\nauthorised or warranted is of two kinds according to the subject: for it\nis either a belief of history, or, as the lawyers speak, matter of fact;\nor else of matter of art and opinion.  As to the former, we see the\nexperience and inconvenience of this error in ecclesiastical history;\nwhich hath too easily received and registered reports and narrations of\nmiracles wrought by martyrs, hermits, or monks of the desert, and other\nholy men, and their relics, shrines, chapels and images: which though\nthey had a passage for a time by the ignorance of the people, the\nsuperstitious simplicity of some and the politic toleration of others\nholding them but as divine poesies, yet after a period of time, when the\nmist began to clear up, they grew to be esteemed but as old wives\u2019\nfables, impostures of the clergy, illusions of spirits, and badges of\nAntichrist, to the great scandal and detriment of religion.\n\n(10) So in natural history, we see there hath not been that choice and\njudgment used as ought to have been; as may appear in the writings of\nPlinius, Cardanus, Albertus, and divers of the Arabians, being fraught\nwith much fabulous matter, a great part not only untried, but notoriously\nuntrue, to the great derogation of the credit of natural philosophy with\nthe grave and sober kind of wits: wherein the wisdom and integrity of\nAristotle is worthy to be observed, that, having made so diligent and\nexquisite a history of living creatures, hath mingled it sparingly with\nany vain or feigned matter; and yet on the other side hath cast all\nprodigious narrations, which he thought worthy the recording, into one\nbook, excellently discerning that matter of manifest truth, such\nwhereupon observation and rule was to be built, was not to be mingled or\nweakened with matter of doubtful credit; and yet again, that rarities and\nreports that seem uncredible are not to be suppressed or denied to the\nmemory of men.\n\n(11) And as for the facility of credit which is yielded to arts and\nopinions, it is likewise of two kinds; either when too much belief is\nattributed to the arts themselves, or to certain authors in any art.  The\nsciences themselves, which have had better intelligence and confederacy\nwith the imagination of man than with his reason, are three in number:\nastrology, natural magic, and alchemy; of which sciences, nevertheless,\nthe ends or pretences are noble.  For astrology pretendeth to discover\nthat correspondence or concatenation which is between the superior globe\nand the inferior; natural magic pretendeth to call and reduce natural\nphilosophy from variety of speculations to the magnitude of works; and\nalchemy pretendeth to make separation of all the unlike parts of bodies\nwhich in mixtures of natures are incorporate.  But the derivations and\nprosecutions to these ends, both in the theories and in the practices,\nare full of error and vanity; which the great professors themselves have\nsought to veil over and conceal by enigmatical writings, and referring\nthemselves to auricular traditions and such other devices, to save the\ncredit of impostures.  And yet surely to alchemy this right is due, that\nit may be compared to the husbandman whereof \u00c6sop makes the fable; that,\nwhen he died, told his sons that he had left unto them gold buried\nunderground in his vineyard; and they digged over all the ground, and\ngold they found none; but by reason of their stirring and digging the\nmould about the roots of their vines, they had a great vintage the year\nfollowing: so assuredly the search and stir to make gold hath brought to\nlight a great number of good and fruitful inventions and experiments, as\nwell for the disclosing of nature as for the use of man\u2019s life.\n\n(12) And as for the overmuch credit that hath been given unto authors in\nsciences, in making them dictators, that their words should stand, and\nnot consuls, to give advice; the damage is infinite that sciences have\nreceived thereby, as the principal cause that hath kept them low at a\nstay without growth or advancement.  For hence it hath come, that in arts\nmechanical the first deviser comes shortest, and time addeth and\nperfecteth; but in sciences the first author goeth furthest, and time\nleeseth and corrupteth.  So we see artillery, sailing, printing, and the\nlike, were grossly managed at the first, and by time accommodated and\nrefined; but contrariwise, the philosophies and sciences of Aristotle,\nPlato, Democritus, Hippocrates, Euclides, Archimedes, of most vigour at\nthe first, and by time degenerate and imbased: whereof the reason is no\nother, but that in the former many wits and industries have contributed\nin one; and in the latter many wits and industries have been spent about\nthe wit of some one, whom many times they have rather depraved than\nillustrated; for, as water will not ascend higher than the level of the\nfirst spring-head from whence it descendeth, so knowledge derived from\nAristotle, and exempted from liberty of examination, will not rise again\nhigher than the knowledge of Aristotle.  And, therefore, although the\nposition be good, _Oportet discentem credere_, yet it must be coupled\nwith this, _Oportet edoctum judicare_; for disciples do owe unto masters\nonly a temporary belief and a suspension of their own judgment till they\nbe fully instructed, and not an absolute resignation or perpetual\ncaptivity; and therefore, to conclude this point, I will say no more, but\nso let great authors have their due, as time, which is the author of\nauthors, be not deprived of his due\u2014which is, further and further to\ndiscover truth.  Thus have I gone over these three diseases of learning;\nbesides the which there are some other rather peccant humours than formed\ndiseases, which, nevertheless, are not so secret and intrinsic, but that\nthey fall under a popular observation and traducement, and, therefore,\nare not to be passed over.\n\nV. (1) The first of these is the extreme affecting of two extremities:\nthe one antiquity, the other novelty; wherein it seemeth the children of\ntime do take after the nature and malice of the father.  For as he\ndevoureth his children, so one of them seeketh to devour and suppress the\nother; while antiquity envieth there should be new additions, and novelty\ncannot be content to add but it must deface; surely the advice of the\nprophet is the true direction in this matter, _State super vias\nantiquas_, _et videte qu\u00e6nam sit via recta et bona et ambulate in ea_.\nAntiquity deserveth that reverence, that men should make a stand\nthereupon and discover what is the best way; but when the discovery is\nwell taken, then to make progression.  And to speak truly, _Antiquitas\ns\u00e6culi juventus mundi_.  These times are the ancient times, when the\nworld is ancient, and not those which we account ancient _ordine\nretrogrado_, by a computation backward from ourselves.\n\n(2) Another error induced by the former is a distrust that anything\nshould be now to be found out, which the world should have missed and\npassed over so long time: as if the same objection were to be made to\ntime that Lucian maketh to Jupiter and other the heathen gods; of which\nhe wondereth that they begot so many children in old time, and begot none\nin his time; and asketh whether they were become septuagenary, or whether\nthe law _Papia_, made against old men\u2019s marriages, had restrained them.\nSo it seemeth men doubt lest time is become past children and generation;\nwherein contrariwise we see commonly the levity and unconstancy of men\u2019s\njudgments, which, till a matter be done, wonder that it can be done; and\nas soon as it is done, wonder again that it was no sooner done: as we see\nin the expedition of Alexander into Asia, which at first was prejudged as\na vast and impossible enterprise; and yet afterwards it pleaseth Livy to\nmake no more of it than this, _Nil aliud qu\u00e0m bene ausus vana\ncontemnere_.  And the same happened to Columbus in the western\nnavigation.  But in intellectual matters it is much more common, as may\nbe seen in most of the propositions of Euclid; which till they be\ndemonstrate, they seem strange to our assent; but being demonstrate, our\nmind accepteth of them by a kind of relation (as the lawyers speak), as\nif we had known them before.\n\n(3) Another error, that hath also some affinity with the former, is a\nconceit that of former opinions or sects after variety and examination\nthe best hath still prevailed and suppressed the rest; so as if a man\nshould begin the labour of a new search, he were but like to light upon\nsomewhat formerly rejected, and by rejection brought into oblivion; as if\nthe multitude, or the wisest for the multitude\u2019s sake, were not ready to\ngive passage rather to that which is popular and superficial than to that\nwhich is substantial and profound for the truth is, that time seemeth to\nbe of the nature of a river or stream, which carrieth down to us that\nwhich is light and blown up, and sinketh and drowneth that which is\nweighty and solid.\n\n(4) Another error, of a diverse nature from all the former, is the\nover-early and peremptory reduction of knowledge into arts and methods;\nfrom which time commonly sciences receive small or no augmentation.  But\nas young men, when they knit and shape perfectly, do seldom grow to a\nfurther stature, so knowledge, while it is in aphorisms and observations,\nit is in growth; but when it once is comprehended in exact methods, it\nmay, perchance, be further polished, and illustrate and accommodated for\nuse and practice, but it increaseth no more in bulk and substance.\n\n(5) Another error which doth succeed that which we last mentioned is,\nthat after the distribution of particular arts and sciences, men have\nabandoned universality, or _philosophia prima_, which cannot but cease\nand stop all progression.  For no perfect discovery can be made upon a\nflat or a level; neither is it possible to discover the more remote and\ndeeper parts of any science if you stand but upon the level of the same\nscience, and ascend not to a higher science.\n\n(6) Another error hath proceeded from too great a reverence, and a kind\nof adoration of the mind and understanding of man; by means whereof, men\nhave withdrawn themselves too much from the contemplation of nature, and\nthe observations of experience, and have tumbled up and down in their own\nreason and conceits.  Upon these intellectualists, which are\nnotwithstanding commonly taken for the most sublime and divine\nphilosophers, Heraclitus gave a just censure, saying:\u2014\u201cMen sought truth\nin their own little worlds, and not in the great and common world;\u201d for\nthey disdain to spell, and so by degrees to read in the volume of God\u2019s\nworks; and contrariwise by continual meditation and agitation of wit do\nurge and, as it were, invocate their own spirits to divine and give\noracles unto them, whereby they are deservedly deluded.\n\n(7) Another error that hath some connection with this latter is, that men\nhave used to infect their meditations, opinions, and doctrines with some\nconceits which they have most admired, or some sciences which they have\nmost applied, and given all things else a tincture according to them,\nutterly untrue and improper.  So hath Plato intermingled his philosophy\nwith theology, and Aristotle with logic; and the second school of Plato,\nProclus and the rest, with the mathematics; for these were the arts which\nhad a kind of primogeniture with them severally.  So have the alchemists\nmade a philosophy out of a few experiments of the furnace; and Gilbertus\nour countryman hath made a philosophy out of the observations of a\nloadstone.  So Cicero, when reciting the several opinions of the nature\nof the soul, he found a musician that held the soul was but a harmony,\nsaith pleasantly, _Hic ab arte sua non recessit_, _&c._  But of these\nconceits Aristotle speaketh seriously and wisely when he saith, _Qui\nrespiciunt ad pauca de facili pronunciant_.\n\n(8) Another error is an impatience of doubt, and haste to assertion\nwithout due and mature suspension of judgment.  For the two ways of\ncontemplation are not unlike the two ways of action commonly spoken of by\nthe ancients: the one plain and smooth in the beginning, and in the end\nimpassable; the other rough and troublesome in the entrance, but after a\nwhile fair and even.  So it is in contemplation: if a man will begin with\ncertainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be content to begin\nwith doubts, he shall end in certainties.\n\n(9) Another error is in the manner of the tradition and delivery of\nknowledge, which is for the most part magistral and peremptory, and not\ningenuous and faithful; in a sort as may be soonest believed, and not\neasiest examined.  It is true, that in compendious treatises for practice\nthat form is not to be disallowed; but in the true handling of knowledge\nmen ought not to fall either on the one side into the vein of Velleius\nthe Epicurean, _Nil tam metuens quam ne dubitare aliqua de revideretur_:\nnor, on the other side, into Socrates, his ironical doubting of all\nthings; but to propound things sincerely with more or less asseveration,\nas they stand in a man\u2019s own judgment proved more or less.\n\n(10) Other errors there are in the scope that men propound to themselves,\nwhereunto they bend their endeavours; for, whereas the more constant and\ndevote kind of professors of any science ought to propound to themselves\nto make some additions to their science, they convert their labours to\naspire to certain second prizes: as to be a profound interpreter or\ncommentor, to be a sharp champion or defender, to be a methodical\ncompounder or abridger, and so the patrimony of knowledge cometh to be\nsometimes improved, but seldom augmented.\n\n(11) But the greatest error of all the rest is the mistaking or\nmisplacing of the last or furthest end of knowledge.  For men have\nentered into a desire of learning and knowledge, sometimes upon a natural\ncuriosity and inquisitive appetite; sometimes to entertain their minds\nwith variety and delight; sometimes for ornament and reputation; and\nsometimes to enable them to victory of wit and contradiction; and most\ntimes for lucre and profession; and seldom sincerely to give a true\naccount of their gift of reason to the benefit and use of men: as if\nthere were sought in knowledge a couch whereupon to rest a searching and\nrestless spirit; or a terrace for a wandering and variable mind to walk\nup and down with a fair prospect; or a tower of state, for a proud mind\nto raise itself upon; or a fort or commanding ground, for strife and\ncontention; or a shop, for profit or sale; and not a rich storehouse for\nthe glory of the Creator and the relief of man\u2019s estate.  But this is\nthat which will indeed dignify and exalt knowledge, if contemplation and\naction may be more nearly and straitly conjoined and united together than\nthey have been: a conjunction like unto that of the two highest planets,\nSaturn, the planet of rest and contemplation; and Jupiter, the planet of\ncivil society and action, howbeit, I do not mean, when I speak of use and\naction, that end before-mentioned of the applying of knowledge to lucre\nand profession; for I am not ignorant how much that diverteth and\ninterrupteth the prosecution and advancement of knowledge, like unto the\ngolden ball thrown before Atalanta, which, while she goeth aside and\nstoopeth to take up, the race is hindered,\n\n    \u201cDeclinat cursus, aurumque volubile tollit.\u201d {39}\n\nNeither is my meaning, as was spoken of Socrates, to call philosophy down\nfrom heaven to converse upon the earth\u2014that is, to leave natural\nphilosophy aside, and to apply knowledge only to manners and policy.  But\nas both heaven and earth do conspire and contribute to the use and\nbenefit of man, so the end ought to be, from both philosophies to\nseparate and reject vain speculations, and whatsoever is empty and void,\nand to preserve and augment whatsoever is solid and fruitful; that\nknowledge may not be as a courtesan, for pleasure and vanity only, or as\na bond-woman, to acquire and gain to her master\u2019s use; but as a spouse,\nfor generation, fruit, and comfort.\n\n(12) Thus have I described and opened, as by a kind of dissection, those\npeccant humours (the principal of them) which have not only given\nimpediment to the proficience of learning, but have given also occasion\nto the traducement thereof: wherein, if I have been too plain, it must be\nremembered, _fidelia vulnera amantis_, _sed dolosa oscula malignantis_.\nThis I think I have gained, that I ought to be the better believed in\nthat which I shall say pertaining to commendation; because I have\nproceeded so freely in that which concerneth censure.  And yet I have no\npurpose to enter into a laudative of learning, or to make a hymn to the\nMuses (though I am of opinion that it is long since their rites were duly\ncelebrated), but my intent is, without varnish or amplification justly to\nweigh the dignity of knowledge in the balance with other things, and to\ntake the true value thereof by testimonies and arguments, divine and\nhuman.\n\nVI. (1) First, therefore, let us seek the dignity of knowledge in the\narchetype or first platform, which is in the attributes and acts of God,\nas far as they are revealed to man and may be observed with sobriety;\nwherein we may not seek it by the name of learning, for all learning is\nknowledge acquired, and all knowledge in God is original, and therefore\nwe must look for it by another name, that of wisdom or sapience, as the\nScriptures call it.\n\n(2) It is so, then, that in the work of the creation we see a double\nemanation of virtue from God; the one referring more properly to power,\nthe other to wisdom; the one expressed in making the subsistence of the\nmatter, and the other in disposing the beauty of the form.  This being\nsupposed, it is to be observed that for anything which appeareth in the\nhistory of the creation, the confused mass and matter of heaven and earth\nwas made in a moment, and the order and disposition of that chaos or mass\nwas the work of six days; such a note of difference it pleased God to put\nupon the works of power, and the works of wisdom; wherewith concurreth,\nthat in the former it is not set down that God said, \u201cLet there be heaven\nand earth,\u201d as it is set down of the works following; but actually, that\nGod made heaven and earth: the one carrying the style of a manufacture,\nand the other of a law, decree, or counsel.\n\n(3) To proceed, to that which is next in order from God, to spirits: we\nfind, as far as credit is to be given to the celestial hierarchy of that\nsupposed Dionysius, the senator of Athens, the first place or degree is\ngiven to the angels of love, which are termed seraphim; the second to the\nangels of light, which are termed cherubim; and the third, and so\nfollowing places, to thrones, principalities, and the rest, which are all\nangels of power and ministry; so as this angels of knowledge and\nillumination are placed before the angels of office and domination.\n\n(4) To descend from spirits and intellectual forms to sensible and\nmaterial forms, we read the first form that was created was light, which\nhath a relation and correspondence in nature and corporal things to\nknowledge in spirits and incorporal things.\n\n(5) So in the distribution of days we see the day wherein God did rest\nand contemplate His own works was blessed above all the days wherein He\ndid effect and accomplish them.\n\n(6) After the creation was finished, it is set down unto us that man was\nplaced in the garden to work therein; which work, so appointed to him,\ncould be no other than work of contemplation; that is, when the end of\nwork is but for exercise and experiment, not for necessity; for there\nbeing then no reluctation of the creature, nor sweat of the brow, man\u2019s\nemployment must of consequence have been matter of delight in the\nexperiment, and not matter of labour for the use.  Again, the first acts\nwhich man performed in Paradise consisted of the two summary parts of\nknowledge; the view of creatures, and the imposition of names.  As for\nthe knowledge which induced the fall, it was, as was touched before, not\nthe natural knowledge of creatures, but the moral knowledge of good and\nevil; wherein the supposition was, that God\u2019s commandments or\nprohibitions were not the originals of good and evil, but that they had\nother beginnings, which man aspired to know, to the end to make a total\ndefection from God and to depend wholly upon himself.\n\n(7) To pass on: in the first event or occurrence after the fall of man,\nwe see (as the Scriptures have infinite mysteries, not violating at all\nthe truth of this story or letter) an image of the two estates, the\ncontemplative state and the active state, figured in the two persons of\nAbel and Cain, and in the two simplest and most primitive trades of life;\nthat of the shepherd (who, by reason of his leisure, rest in a place, and\nlying in view of heaven, is a lively image of a contemplative life), and\nthat of the husbandman, where we see again the favour and election of God\nwent to the shepherd, and not to the tiller of the ground.\n\n(8) So in the age before the flood, the holy records within those few\nmemorials which are there entered and registered have vouchsafed to\nmention and honour the name of the inventors and authors of music and\nworks in metal.  In the age after the flood, the first great judgment of\nGod upon the ambition of man was the confusion of tongues; whereby the\nopen trade and intercourse of learning and knowledge was chiefly\nimbarred.\n\n(9) To descend to Moses the lawgiver, and God\u2019s first pen: he is adorned\nby the Scriptures with this addition and commendation, \u201cThat he was seen\nin all the learning of the Egyptians,\u201d which nation we know was one of\nthe most ancient schools of the world: for so Plato brings in the\nEgyptian priest saying unto Solon, \u201cYou Grecians are ever children; you\nhave no knowledge of antiquity, nor antiquity of knowledge.\u201d  Take a view\nof the ceremonial law of Moses; you shall find, besides the prefiguration\nof Christ, the badge or difference of the people of God, the exercise and\nimpression of obedience, and other divine uses and fruits thereof, that\nsome of the most learned Rabbins have travailed profitably and profoundly\nto observe, some of them a natural, some of them a moral sense, or\nreduction of many of the ceremonies and ordinances.  As in the law of the\nleprosy, where it is said, \u201cIf the whiteness have overspread the flesh,\nthe patient may pass abroad for clean; but if there be any whole flesh\nremaining, he is to be shut up for unclean;\u201d one of them noteth a\nprinciple of nature, that putrefaction is more contagious before maturity\nthan after; and another noteth a position of moral philosophy, that men\nabandoned to vice do not so much corrupt manners, as those that are half\ngood and half evil.  So in this and very many other places in that law,\nthere is to be found, besides the theological sense, much aspersion of\nphilosophy.\n\n(10)  So likewise in that excellent hook of Job, if it be revolved with\ndiligence, it will be found pregnant and swelling with natural\nphilosophy; as for example, cosmography, and the roundness of the world,\n_Qui extendit aquilonem super vacuum_, _et appendit terram super\nnihilum_; wherein the pensileness of the earth, the pole of the north,\nand the finiteness or convexity of heaven are manifestly touched.  So\nagain, matter of astronomy: _Spiritus ejus ornavit c\u00e6los_, _et\nobstetricante manu ejus eductus est Coluber tortuoses_.  And in another\nplace, _Nunquid conjungere valebis micantes stellas Pleiadas_, _aut gyrum\nArcturi poteris dissipare_?  Where the fixing of the stars, ever standing\nat equal distance, is with great elegancy noted.  And in another place,\n_Qui facit Arcturum_, _et Oriona_, _et Hyadas_, _et interiora Austri_;\nwhere again he takes knowledge of the depression of the southern pole,\ncalling it the secrets of the south, because the southern stars were in\nthat climate unseen.  Matter of generation: _Annon sicut lac mulsisti\nme_, _et sicut caseum coagulasti me_? &c.  Matter of minerals: _Habet\nargentum venarum suarum principia_; _et auro locus est in quo conflatur_,\n_ferrum de terra tollitur_, _et lapis solutus calore in \u00e6s vertitur_; and\nso forwards in that chapter.\n\n(11) So likewise in the person of Solomon the king, we see the gift or\nendowment of wisdom and learning, both in Solomon\u2019s petition and in God\u2019s\nassent thereunto, preferred before all other terrene and temporal\nfelicity.  By virtue of which grant or donative of God Solomon became\nenabled not only to write those excellent parables or aphorisms\nconcerning divine and moral philosophy, but also to compile a natural\nhistory of all verdure, from the cedar upon the mountain to the moss upon\nthe wall (which is but a rudiment between putrefaction and an herb), and\nalso of all things that breathe or move.  Nay, the same Solomon the king,\nalthough he excelled in the glory of treasure and magnificent buildings,\nof shipping and navigation, of service and attendance, of fame and\nrenown, and the like, yet he maketh no claim to any of those glories, but\nonly to the glory of inquisition of truth; for so he saith expressly,\n\u201cThe glory of God is to conceal a thing, but the glory of the king is to\nfind it out;\u201d as if, according to the innocent play of children, the\nDivine Majesty took delight to hide His works, to the end to have them\nfound out; and as if kings could not obtain a greater honour than to be\nGod\u2019s playfellows in that game; considering the great commandment of wits\nand means, whereby nothing needeth to be hidden from them.\n\n(12) Neither did the dispensation of God vary in the times after our\nSaviour came into the world; for our Saviour himself did first show His\npower to subdue ignorance, by His conference with the priests and doctors\nof the law, before He showed His power to subdue nature by His miracles.\nAnd the coming of this Holy Spirit was chiefly figured and expressed in\nthe similitude and gift of tongues, which are but _vehicula scienti\u00e6_.\n\n(13) So in the election of those instruments, which it pleased God to use\nfor the plantation of the faith, notwithstanding that at the first He did\nemploy persons altogether unlearned, otherwise than by inspiration, more\nevidently to declare His immediate working, and to abase all human wisdom\nor knowledge; yet nevertheless that counsel of His was no sooner\nperformed, but in the next vicissitude and succession He did send His\ndivine truth into the world, waited on with other learnings, as with\nservants or handmaids: for so we see St. Paul, who was only learned\namongst the Apostles, had his pen most used in the Scriptures of the New\nTestament.\n\n(14) So again we find that many of the ancient bishops and fathers of the\nChurch were excellently read and studied in all the learning of this\nheathen; insomuch that the edict of the Emperor Julianus (whereby it was\ninterdicted unto Christians to be admitted into schools, lectures, or\nexercises of learning) was esteemed and accounted a more pernicious\nengine and machination against the Christian Faith than were all the\nsanguinary prosecutions of his predecessors; neither could the emulation\nand jealousy of Gregory, the first of that name, Bishop of Rome, ever\nobtain the opinion of piety or devotion; but contrariwise received the\ncensure of humour, malignity, and pusillanimity, even amongst holy men;\nin that he designed to obliterate and extinguish the memory of heathen\nantiquity and authors.  But contrariwise it was the Christian Church,\nwhich, amidst the inundations of the Scythians on the one side from the\nnorth-west, and the Saracens from the east, did preserve in the sacred\nlap and bosom thereof the precious relics even of heathen learning, which\notherwise had been extinguished, as if no such thing had ever been.\n\n(15) And we see before our eyes, that in the age of ourselves and our\nfathers, when it pleased God to call the Church of Rome to account for\ntheir degenerate manners and ceremonies, and sundry doctrines obnoxious\nand framed to uphold the same abuses; at one and the same time it was\nordained by the Divine Providence that there should attend withal a\nrenovation and new spring of all other knowledges.  And on the other side\nwe see the Jesuits, who partly in themselves, and partly by the emulation\nand provocation of their example, have much quickened and strengthened\nthe state of learning; we see (I say) what notable service and reparation\nthey have done to the Roman see.\n\n(16) Wherefore, to conclude this part, let it be observed, that there be\ntwo principal duties and services, besides ornament and illustration,\nwhich philosophy and human learning do perform to faith and religion.\nThe one, because they are an effectual inducement to the exaltation of\nthe glory of God.  For as the Psalms and other Scriptures do often invite\nus to consider and magnify the great and wonderful works of God, so if we\nshould rest only in the contemplation of the exterior of them as they\nfirst offer themselves to our senses, we should do a like injury unto the\nmajesty of God, as if we should judge or construe of the store of some\nexcellent jeweller by that only which is set out toward the street in his\nshop.  The other, because they minister a singular help and preservative\nagainst unbelief and error.  For our Saviour saith, \u201cYou err, not knowing\nthe Scriptures, nor the power of God;\u201d laying before us two books or\nvolumes to study, if we will be secured from error: first the Scriptures,\nrevealing the will of God, and then the creatures expressing His power;\nwhereof the latter is a key unto the former: not only opening our\nunderstanding to conceive the true sense of the Scriptures by the general\nnotions of reason and rules of speech, but chiefly opening our belief, in\ndrawing us into a due meditation of the omnipotency of God, which is\nchiefly signed and engraven upon His works.  Thus much therefore for\ndivine testimony and evidence concerning the true dignity and value of\nlearning.\n\nVII. (1) As for human proofs, it is so large a field, as in a discourse\nof this nature and brevity it is fit rather to use choice of those things\nwhich we shall produce, than to embrace the variety of them.  First,\ntherefore, in the degrees of human honour amongst the heathen, it was the\nhighest to obtain to a veneration and adoration as a God.  This unto the\nChristians is as the forbidden fruit.  But we speak now separately of\nhuman testimony, according to which\u2014that which the Grecians call\n_apotheosis_, and the Latins _relatio inter divos_\u2014was the supreme honour\nwhich man could attribute unto man, specially when it was given, not by a\nformal decree or act of state (as it was used among the Roman Emperors),\nbut by an inward assent and belief.  Which honour, being so high, had\nalso a degree or middle term; for there were reckoned above human\nhonours, honours heroical and divine: in the attribution and distribution\nof which honours we see antiquity made this difference; that whereas\nfounders and uniters of states and cities, lawgivers, extirpers of\ntyrants, fathers of the people, and other eminent persons in civil merit,\nwere honoured but with the titles of worthies or demigods, such as were\nHercules, Theseus, Minus, Romulus, and the like; on the other side, such\nas were inventors and authors of new arts, endowments, and commodities\ntowards man\u2019s life, were ever consecrated amongst the gods themselves, as\nwas Ceres, Bacchus, Mercurius, Apollo, and others.  And justly; for the\nmerit of the former is confined within the circle of an age or a nation,\nand is like fruitful showers, which though they be profitable and good,\nyet serve but for that season, and for a latitude of ground where they\nfall; but the other is, indeed, like the benefits of heaven, which are\npermanent and universal.  The former again is mixed with strife and\nperturbation, but the latter hath the true character of Divine Presence,\ncoming in _aura leni_, without noise or agitation.\n\n(2) Neither is certainly that other merit of learning, in repressing the\ninconveniences which grow from man to man, much inferior to the former,\nof relieving the necessities which arise from nature, which merit was\nlively set forth by the ancients in that feigned relation of Orpheus\u2019\ntheatre, where all beasts and birds assembled, and, forgetting their\nseveral appetites\u2014some of prey, some of game, some of quarrel\u2014stood all\nsociably together listening unto the airs and accords of the harp, the\nsound whereof no sooner ceased, or was drowned by some louder noise, but\nevery beast returned to his own nature; wherein is aptly described the\nnature and condition of men, who are full of savage and unreclaimed\ndesires, of profit, of lust, of revenge; which as long as they give ear\nto precepts, to laws, to religion, sweetly touched with eloquence and\npersuasion of books, of sermons, of harangues, so long is society and\npeace maintained; but if these instruments be silent, or that sedition\nand tumult make them not audible, all things dissolve into anarchy and\nconfusion.\n\n(3) But this appeareth more manifestly when kings themselves, or persons\nof authority under them, or other governors in commonwealths and popular\nestates, are endued with learning.  For although he might be thought\npartial to his own profession that said \u201cThen should people and estates\nbe happy when either kings were philosophers, or philosophers kings;\u201d yet\nso much is verified by experience, that under learned princes and\ngovernors there have been ever the best times: for howsoever kings may\nhave their imperfections in their passions and customs, yet, if they be\nilluminate by learning, they have those notions of religion, policy, and\nmorality, which do preserve them and refrain them from all ruinous and\nperemptory errors and excesses, whispering evermore in their ears, when\ncounsellors and servants stand mute and silent.  And senators or\ncounsellors, likewise, which be learned, to proceed upon more safe and\nsubstantial principles, than counsellors which are only men of\nexperience; the one sort keeping dangers afar off, whereas the other\ndiscover them not till they come near hand, and then trust to the agility\nof their wit to ward or avoid them.\n\n(4) Which felicity of times under learned princes (to keep still the law\nof brevity, by using the most eminent and selected examples) doth best\nappear in the age which passed from the death of Domitianus the emperor\nuntil the reign of Commodus; comprehending a succession of six princes,\nall learned, or singular favourers and advancers of learning, which age\nfor temporal respects was the most happy and flourishing that ever the\nRoman Empire (which then was a model of the world) enjoyed\u2014a matter\nrevealed and prefigured unto Domitian in a dream the night before he was\nslain: for he thought there was grown behind upon his shoulders a neck\nand a head of gold, which came accordingly to pass in those golden times\nwhich succeeded; of which princes we will make some commemoration;\nwherein, although the matter will be vulgar, and may be thought fitter\nfor a declamation than agreeable to a treatise infolded as this is, yet,\nbecause it is pertinent to the point in hand\u2014_Neque semper arcum tendit\nApollo_\u2014and to name them only were too naked and cursory, I will not omit\nit altogether.  The first was Nerva, the excellent temper of whose\ngovernment is by a glance in Cornelius Tacitus touched to the life:\n_Postquam divus Nerva res oluim insociabiles miscuisset_, _imperium et\nlibertatem_.  And in token of his learning, the last act of his short\nreign left to memory was a missive to his adopted son, Trajan, proceeding\nupon some inward discontent at the ingratitude of the times, comprehended\nin a verse of Homer\u2019s\u2014\n\n    \u201cTelis, Ph\u0153be, tuis, lacrymas ulciscere nostras.\u201d\n\n(5) Trajan, who succeeded, was for his person not learned; but if we will\nhearken to the speech of our Saviour, that saith, \u201cHe that receiveth a\nprophet in the name of a prophet shall have a prophet\u2019s reward,\u201d he\ndeserveth to be placed amongst the most learned princes; for there was\nnot a greater admirer of learning or benefactor of learning, a founder of\nfamous libraries, a perpetual advancer of learned men to office, and\nfamiliar converser with learned professors and preceptors who were noted\nto have then most credit in court.  On the other side how much Trajan\u2019s\nvirtue and government was admired and renowned, surely no testimony of\ngrave and faithful history doth more lively set forth than that legend\ntale of Gregorius Magnum, Bishop of Rome, who was noted for the extreme\nenvy he bare towards all heathen excellency; and yet he is reported, out\nof the love and estimation of Trajan\u2019s moral virtues, to have made unto\nGod passionate and fervent prayers for the delivery of his soul out of\nhell, and to have obtained it, with a caveat that he should make no more\nsuch petitions.  In this prince\u2019s time also the persecutions against the\nChristians received intermission upon the certificate of Plinius\nSecundus, a man of excellent learning and by Trajan advanced.\n\n(6) Adrian, his successor, was the most curious man that lived, and the\nmost universal inquirer: insomuch as it was noted for an error in his\nmind that he desired to comprehend all things, and not to reserve himself\nfor the worthiest things, falling into the like humour that was long\nbefore noted in Philip of Macedon, who, when he would needs overrule and\nput down an excellent musician in an argument touching music, was well\nanswered by him again\u2014\u201cGod forbid, sir,\u201d saith he, \u201cthat your fortune\nshould be so bad as to know these things better than I.\u201d  It pleased God\nlikewise to use the curiosity of this emperor as an inducement to the\npeace of His Church in those days; for having Christ in veneration, not\nas a God or Saviour, but as a wonder or novelty, and having his picture\nin his gallery matched with Apollonius (with whom in his vain imagination\nhe thought its had some conformity), yet it served the turn to allay the\nbitter hatred of those times against the Christian name, so as the Church\nhad peace during his time.  And for his government civil, although he did\nnot attain to that of Trajan\u2019s in glory of arms or perfection of justice,\nyet in deserving of the weal of the subject he did exceed him.  For\nTrajan erected many famous monuments and buildings, insomuch as\nConstantine the Great in emulation was wont to call him _Parietaria_,\n\u201cwall-flower,\u201d because his name was upon so many walls; but his buildings\nand works were more of glory and triumph than use and necessity.  But\nAdrian spent his whole reign, which was peaceable, in a perambulation or\nsurvey of the Roman Empire, giving order and making assignation where he\nwent for re-edifying of cities, towns, and forts decayed, and for cutting\nof rivers and streams, and for making bridges and passages, and for\npolicing of cities and commonalties with new ordinances and\nconstitutions, and granting new franchises and incorporations; so that\nhis whole time was a very restoration of all the lapses and decays of\nformer times.\n\n(7) Antoninus Pius, who succeeded him, was a prince excellently learned,\nand had the patient and subtle wit of a schoolman, insomuch as in common\nspeech (which leaves no virtue untaxed) he was called _Cymini Sector_, a\ncarver or a divider of cummin seed, which is one of the least seeds.\nSuch a patience he had and settled spirit to enter into the least and\nmost exact differences of causes, a fruit no doubt of the exceeding\ntranquillity and serenity of his mind, which being no ways charged or\nencumbered, either with fears, remorses, or scruples, but having been\nnoted for a man of the purest goodness, without all fiction or\naffectation, that hath reigned or lived, made his mind continually\npresent and entire.  He likewise approached a degree nearer unto\nChristianity, and became, as Agrippa said unto St. Paul, \u201chalf a\nChristian,\u201d holding their religion and law in good opinion, and not only\nceasing persecution, but giving way to the advancement of Christians.\n\n(5) There succeeded him the first _Divi fratres_, the two adoptive\nbrethren\u2014Lucius Commodus Verus, son to \u00c6lius Verus, who delighted much in\nthe softer kind of learning, and was wont to call the poet Martial his\nVirgil; and Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: whereof the latter, who obscured\nhis colleague and survived him long, was named the \u201cPhilosopher,\u201d who, as\nhe excelled all the rest in learning, so he excelled them likewise in\nperfection of all royal virtues; insomuch as Julianus the emperor, in his\nbook entitled _C\u00e6rsares_, being as a pasquil or satire to deride all his\npredecessors, feigned that they were all invited to a banquet of the\ngods, and Silenus the jester sat at the nether end of the table and\nbestowed a scoff on everyone as they came in; but when Marcus Philosophus\ncame in, Silenus was gravelled and out of countenance, not knowing where\nto carp at him, save at the last he gave a glance at his patience towards\nhis wife.  And the virtue of this prince, continued with that of his\npredecessor, made the name of Antoninus so sacred in the world, that\nthough it were extremely dishonoured in Commodus, Caracalla, and\nHeliogabalus, who all bare the name, yet, when Alexander Severus refused\nthe name because he was a stranger to the family, the Senate with one\nacclamation said, _Quomodo Augustus_, _sic et Antoninus_.  In such renown\nand veneration was the name of these two princes in those days, that they\nwould have had it as a perpetual addition in all the emperors\u2019 style.  In\nthis emperor\u2019s time also the Church for the most part was in peace; so as\nin this sequence of six princes we do see the blessed effects of learning\nin sovereignty, painted forth in the greatest table of the world.\n\n(9) But for a tablet or picture of smaller volume (not presuming to speak\nof your Majesty that liveth), in my judgment the most excellent is that\nof Queen Elizabeth, your immediate predecessor in this part of Britain; a\nprince that, if Plutarch were now alive to write lives by parallels,\nwould trouble him, I think, to find for her a parallel amongst women.\nThis lady was endued with learning in her sex singular, and rare even\namongst masculine princes\u2014whether we speak of learning, of language, or\nof science, modern or ancient, divinity or humanity\u2014and unto the very\nlast year of her life she accustomed to appoint set hours for reading,\nscarcely any young student in a university more daily or more duly.  As\nfor her government, I assure myself (I shall not exceed if I do affirm)\nthat this part of the island never had forty-five years of better tines,\nand yet not through the calmness of the season, but through the wisdom of\nher regiment.  For if there be considered, of the one side, the truth of\nreligion established, the constant peace and security, the good\nadministration of justice, the temperate use of the prerogative, not\nslackened, nor much strained; the flourishing state of learning, sortable\nto so excellent a patroness; the convenient estate of wealth and means,\nboth of crown and subject; the habit of obedience, and the moderation of\ndiscontents; and there be considered, on the other side, the differences\nof religion, the troubles of neighbour countries, the ambition of Spain,\nand opposition of Rome, and then that she was solitary and of herself;\nthese things, I say, considered, as I could not have chosen an instance\nso recent and so proper, so I suppose I could not have chosen one more\nremarkable or eminent to the purpose now in hand, which is concerning the\nconjunction of learning in the prince with felicity in the people.\n\n(10) Neither hath learning an influence and operation only upon civil\nmerit and moral virtue, and the arts or temperature of peace and\npeaceable government; but likewise it hath no less power and efficacy in\nenablement towards martial and military virtue and prowess, as may be\nnotably represented in the examples of Alexander the Great and C\u00e6sar the\nDictator (mentioned before, but now in fit place to be resumed), of whose\nvirtues and acts in war there needs no note or recital, having been the\nwonders of time in that kind; but of their affections towards learning\nand perfections in learning it is pertinent to say somewhat.\n\n(11) Alexander was bred and taught under Aristotle, the great\nphilosopher, who dedicated divers of his books of philosophy unto him; he\nwas attended with Callisthenes and divers other learned persons, that\nfollowed him in camp, throughout his journeys and conquests.  What price\nand estimation he had learning in doth notably appear in these three\nparticulars: first, in the envy he used to express that he bare towards\nAchilles, in this, that he had so good a trumpet of his praises as\nHomer\u2019s verses; secondly, in the judgment or solution he gave touching\nthat precious cabinet of Darius, which was found among his jewels\n(whereof question was made what thing was worthy to be put into it, and\nhe gave his opinion for Homer\u2019s works); thirdly, in his letter to\nAristotle, after he had set forth his books of nature, wherein he\nexpostulateth with him for publishing the secrets or mysteries of\nphilosophy; and gave him to understand that himself esteemed it more to\nexcel other men in learning and knowledge than in power and empire.  And\nwhat use he had of learning doth appear, or rather shine, in all his\nspeeches and answers, being full of science and use of science, and that\nin all variety.\n\n(12) And herein again it may seem a thing scholastical, and somewhat idle\nto recite things that every man knoweth; but yet, since the argument I\nhandle leadeth me thereunto, I am glad that men shall perceive I am as\nwilling to flatter (if they will so call it) an Alexander, or a C\u00e6sar, or\nan Antoninus, that are dead many hundred years since, as any that now\nliveth; for it is the displaying of the glory of learning in sovereignty\nthat I propound to myself, and not a humour of declaiming in any man\u2019s\npraises.  Observe, then, the speech he used of Diogenes, and see if it\ntend not to the true state of one of the greatest questions of moral\nphilosophy: whether the enjoying of outward things, or the contemning of\nthem, be the greatest happiness; for when he saw Diogenes so perfectly\ncontented with so little, he said to those that mocked at his condition,\n\u201cwere I not Alexander, I would wish to be Diogenes.\u201d  But Seneca\ninverteth it, and saith, \u201c_Plus erat_, _quod hic nollet accipere_, _qu\u00e0m\nquod ille posset dare_.\u201d  There were more things which Diogenes would\nhave refused than those were which Alexander could have given or enjoyed.\n\n(13) Observe, again, that speech which was usual with him,\u2014\u201cThat he felt\nhis mortality chiefly in two things, sleep and lust;\u201d and see if it were\nnot a speech extracted out of the depth of natural philosophy, and liker\nto have come out of the mouth of Aristotle or Democritus than from\nAlexander.\n\n(14) See, again, that speech of humanity and poesy, when, upon the\nbleeding of his wounds, he called unto him one of his flatterers, that\nwas wont to ascribe to him divine honour, and said, \u201cLook, this is very\nblood; this is not such a liquor as Homer speaketh of, which ran from\nVenus\u2019 hand when it was pierced by Diomedes.\u201d\n\n(15) See likewise his readiness in reprehension of logic in the speech he\nused to Cassander, upon a complaint that was made against his father\nAntipater; for when Alexander happened to say, \u201cDo you think these men\nwould have come from so far to complain except they had just cause of\ngrief?\u201d and Cassander answered, \u201cYea, that was the matter, because they\nthought they should not be disproved;\u201d said Alexander, laughing, \u201cSee the\nsubtleties of Aristotle, to take a matter both ways, _pro et contra_,\n&c.\u201d\n\n(16) But note, again, how well he could use the same art which he\nreprehended to serve his own humour: when bearing a secret grudge to\nCallisthenes, because he was against the new ceremony of his adoration,\nfeasting one night where the same Callisthenes was at the table, it was\nmoved by some after supper, for entertainment sake, that Callisthenes,\nwho was an eloquent man, might speak of some theme or purpose at his own\nchoice; which Callisthenes did, choosing the praise of the Macedonian\nnation for his discourse, and performing the same with so good manner as\nthe hearers were much ravished; whereupon Alexander, nothing pleased,\nsaid, \u201cIt was easy to be eloquent upon so good a subject; but,\u201d saith he,\n\u201cturn your style, and let us hear what you can say against us;\u201d which\nCallisthenes presently undertook, and did with that sting and life that\nAlexander interrupted him, and said, \u201cThe goodness of the cause made him\neloquent before, and despite made him eloquent then again.\u201d\n\n(17) Consider further, for tropes of rhetoric, that excellent use of a\nmetaphor or translation, wherewith he taxeth Antipater, who was an\nimperious and tyrannous governor; for when one of Antipater\u2019s friends\ncommended him to Alexander for his moderation, that he did not degenerate\nas his other lieutenants did into the Persian pride, in uses of purple,\nbut kept the ancient habit of Macedon, of black.  \u201cTrue,\u201d saith\nAlexander; \u201cbut Antipater is all purple within.\u201d  Or that other, when\nParmenio came to him in the plain of Arbela and showed him the\ninnumerable multitude of his enemies, specially as they appeared by the\ninfinite number of lights as it had been a new firmament of stars, and\nthereupon advised him to assail them by night; whereupon he answered,\n\u201cThat he would not steal the victory.\u201d\n\n(18) For matter of policy, weigh that significant distinction, so much in\nall ages embraced, that he made between his two friends Heph\u00e6stion and\nCraterus, when he said, \u201cThat the one loved Alexander, and the other\nloved the king:\u201d describing the principal difference of princes\u2019 best\nservants, that some in affection love their person, and other in duty\nlove their crown.\n\n(19) Weigh also that excellent taxation of an error, ordinary with\ncounsellors of princes, that they counsel their masters according to the\nmodel of their own mind and fortune, and not of their masters.  When upon\nDarius\u2019 great offers Parmenio had said, \u201cSurely I would accept these\noffers were I as Alexander;\u201d saith Alexander, \u201cSo would I were I as\nParmenio.\u201d\n\n(20) Lastly, weigh that quick and acute reply which he made when he gave\nso large gifts to his friends and servants, and was asked what he did\nreserve for himself, and he answered, \u201cHope.\u201d  Weigh, I say, whether he\nhad not cast up his account aright, because _hope_ must be the portion of\nall that resolve upon great enterprises; for this was C\u00e6sar\u2019s portion\nwhen he went first into Gaul, his estate being then utterly overthrown\nwith largesses.  And this was likewise the portion of that noble prince,\nhowsoever transported with ambition, Henry Duke of Guise, of whom it was\nusually said that he was the greatest usurer in France, because he had\nturned all his estate into obligations.\n\n(21) To conclude, therefore, as certain critics are used to say\nhyperbolically, \u201cThat if all sciences were lost they might be found in\nVirgil,\u201d so certainly this may be said truly, there are the prints and\nfootsteps of learning in those few speeches which are reported of this\nprince, the admiration of whom, when I consider him not as Alexander the\nGreat, but as Aristotle\u2019s scholar, hath carried me too far.\n\n(22) As for Julius C\u00e6sar, the excellency of his learning needeth not to\nbe argued from his education, or his company, or his speeches; but in a\nfurther degree doth declare itself in his writings and works: whereof\nsome are extant and permanent, and some unfortunately perished.  For\nfirst, we see there is left unto us that excellent history of his own\nwars, which he entitled only a Commentary, wherein all succeeding times\nhave admired the solid weight of matter, and the real passages and lively\nimages of actions and persons, expressed in the greatest propriety of\nwords and perspicuity of narration that ever was; which that it was not\nthe effect of a natural gift, but of learning and precept, is well\nwitnessed by that work of his entitled _De Analogia_, being a grammatical\nphilosophy, wherein he did labour to make this same _Vox ad placitum_ to\nbecome _Vox ad licitum_, and to reduce custom of speech to congruity of\nspeech; and took as it were the pictures of words from the life of\nreason.\n\n(23) So we receive from him, as a monument both of his power and\nlearning, the then reformed computation of the year; well expressing that\nhe took it to be as great a glory to himself to observe and know the law\nof the heavens, as to give law to men upon the earth.\n\n(24) So likewise in that book of his, _Anti-Cato_, it may easily appear\nthat he did aspire as well to victory of wit as victory of war:\nundertaking therein a conflict against the greatest champion with the pen\nthat then lived, Cicero the orator.\n\n(25) So, again, in his book of Apophthegms, which he collected, we see\nthat he esteemed it more honour to make himself but a pair of tables, to\ntake the wise and pithy words of others, than to have every word of his\nown to be made an apophthegm or an oracle, as vain princes, by custom of\nflattery, pretend to do.  And yet if I should enumerate divers of his\nspeeches, as I did those of Alexander, they are truly such as Solomon\nnoteth, when he saith, _Verba sapientum tanquam aculei_, _et tanquam\nclavi in altum defixi_: whereof I will only recite three, not so\ndelectable for elegancy, but admirable for vigour and efficacy.\n\n(26) As first, it is reason he be thought a master of words, that could\nwith one word appease a mutiny in his army, which was thus: The Romans,\nwhen their generals did speak to their army, did use the word _Milites_,\nbut when the magistrates spake to the people they did use the word\n_Quirites_.  The soldiers were in tumult, and seditiously prayed to be\ncashiered; not that they so meant, but by expostulation thereof to draw\nC\u00e6sar to other conditions; wherein he being resolute not to give way,\nafter some silence, he began his speech, _Ego Quirites_, which did admit\nthem already cashiered\u2014wherewith they were so surprised, crossed, and\nconfused, as they would not suffer him to go on in his speech, but\nrelinquished their demands, and made it their suit to be again called by\nthe name of _Milites_.\n\n(27) The second speech was thus: C\u00e6sar did extremely affect the name of\nking; and some were set on as he passed by in popular acclamation to\nsalute him king.  Whereupon, finding the cry weak and poor, he put it off\nthus, in a kind of jest, as if they had mistaken his surname: _Non Rex\nsum_, _sed C\u00e6sar_; a speech that, if it be searched, the life and fulness\nof it can scarce be expressed.  For, first, it was a refusal of the name,\nbut yet not serious; again, it did signify an infinite confidence and\nmagnanimity, as if he presumed C\u00e6sar was the greater title, as by his\nworthiness it is come to pass till this day.  But chiefly it was a speech\nof great allurement toward his own purpose, as if the state did strive\nwith him but for a name, whereof mean families were vested; for _Rex_ was\na surname with the Romans, as well as _King_ is with us.\n\n(28) The last speech which I will mention was used to Metellus, when\nC\u00e6sar, after war declared, did possess himself of this city of Rome; at\nwhich time, entering into the inner treasury to take the money there\naccumulate, Metellus, being tribune, forbade him.  Whereto C\u00e6sar said,\n\u201cThat if he did not desist, he would lay him dead in the place.\u201d  And\npresently taking himself up, he added, \u201cYoung man, it is harder for me to\nspeak it than to do it\u2014_Adolescens_, _durius est mihi hoc dicere qu\u00e0m\nfacere_.\u201d  A speech compounded of the greatest terror and greatest\nclemency that could proceed out of the mouth of man.\n\n(29) But to return and conclude with him, it is evident himself knew well\nhis own perfection in learning, and took it upon him, as appeared when\nupon occasion that some spake what a strange resolution it was in Lucius\nSylla to resign his dictators, he, scoffing at him to his own advantage,\nanswered, \u201cThat Sylla could not skill of letters, and therefore knew not\nhow to dictate.\u201d\n\n(30) And here it were fit to leave this point, touching the concurrence\nof military virtue and learning (for what example should come with any\ngrace after those two of Alexander and C\u00e6sar?), were it not in regard of\nthe rareness of circumstance, that I find in one other particular, as\nthat which did so suddenly pass from extreme scorn to extreme wonder: and\nit is of Xenophon the philosopher, who went from Socrates\u2019 school into\nAsia in the expedition of Cyrus the younger against King Artaxerxes.\nThis Xenophon at that time was very young, and never had seen the wars\nbefore, neither had any command in the army, but only followed the war as\na voluntary, for the love and conversation of Proxenus, his friend.  He\nwas present when Falinus came in message from the great king to the\nGrecians, after that Cyrus was slain in the field, and they, a handful of\nmen, left to themselves in the midst of the king\u2019s territories, cut off\nfrom their country by many navigable rivers and many hundred miles.  The\nmessage imported that they should deliver up their arms and submit\nthemselves to the king\u2019s mercy.  To which message, before answer was\nmade, divers of the army conferred familiarly with Falinus; and amongst\nthe rest Xenophon happened to say, \u201cWhy, Falinus, we have now but these\ntwo things left, our arms and our virtue; and if we yield up our arms,\nhow shall we make use of our virtue?\u201d  Whereto Falinus, smiling on him,\nsaid, \u201cIf I be not deceived, young gentleman, you are an Athenian, and I\nbelieve you study philosophy, and it is pretty that you say; but you are\nmuch abused if you think your virtue can withstand the king\u2019s power.\u201d\nHere was the scorn; the wonder followed: which was that this young\nscholar or philosopher, after all the captains were murdered in parley by\ntreason, conducted those ten thousand foot, through the heart of all the\nking\u2019s high countries, from Babylon to Gr\u00e6cia in safety, in despite of\nall the king\u2019s forces, to the astonishment of the world, and the\nencouragement of the Grecians in times succeeding to make invasion upon\nthe kings of Persia, as was after purposed by Jason the Thessalian,\nattempted by Agesilaus the Spartan, and achieved by Alexander the\nMacedonian, all upon the ground of the act of that young scholar.\n\nVIII. (1) To proceed now from imperial and military virtue to moral and\nprivate virtue; first, it is an assured truth, which is contained in the\nverses:\u2014\n\n    \u201cScilicet ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes\n    Emollit mores nec sinit esse feros.\u201d\n\nIt taketh away the wildness and barbarism and fierceness of men\u2019s minds;\nbut indeed the accent had need be upon _fideliter_; for a little\nsuperficial learning doth rather work a contrary effect.  It taketh away\nall levity, temerity, and insolency, by copious suggestion of all doubts\nand difficulties, and acquainting the mind to balance reasons on both\nsides, and to turn back the first offers and conceits of the mind, and to\naccept of nothing but examined and tried.  It taketh away vain admiration\nof anything, which is the root of all weakness.  For all things are\nadmired, either because they are new, or because they are great.  For\nnovelty, no man that wadeth in learning or contemplation thoroughly but\nwill find that printed in his heart, _Nil novi super terram_.  Neither\ncan any man marvel at the play of puppets, that goeth behind the curtain,\nand adviseth well of the motion.  And for magnitude, as Alexander the\nGreat, after that he was used to great armies, and the great conquests of\nthe spacious provinces in Asia, when he received letters out of Greece,\nof some fights and services there, which were commonly for a passage or a\nfort, or some walled town at the most, he said:\u2014\u201cIt seemed to him that he\nwas advertised of the battles of the frogs and the mice, that the old\ntales went of.\u201d  So certainly, if a man meditate much upon the universal\nframe of nature, the earth with men upon it (the divineness of souls\nexcept) will not seem much other than an ant-hill, whereas some ants\ncarry corn, and some carry their young, and some go empty, and all to and\nfro a little heap of dust.  It taketh away or mitigateth fear of death or\nadverse fortune, which is one of the greatest impediments of virtue and\nimperfections of manners.  For if a man\u2019s mind be deeply seasoned with\nthe consideration of the mortality and corruptible nature of things, he\nwill easily concur with Epictetus, who went forth one day and saw a woman\nweeping for her pitcher of earth that was broken, and went forth the next\nday and saw a woman weeping for her son that was dead, and thereupon\nsaid, \u201c_Heri vidi fragilem frangi_, _hodie vidi mortalem mori_.\u201d  And,\ntherefore, Virgil did excellently and profoundly couple the knowledge of\ncauses and the conquest of all fears together, as _concomitantia_.\n\n    \u201cFelix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,\n    Quique metus omnes, et inexorabile fatum\n    Subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari.\u201d\n\n(2) It were too long to go over the particular remedies which learning\ndoth minister to all the diseases of the mind: sometimes purging the ill\nhumours, sometimes opening the obstructions, sometimes helping digestion,\nsometimes increasing appetite, sometimes healing the wounds and\nexulcerations thereof, and the like; and, therefore, I will conclude with\nthat which hath _rationem totius_\u2014which is, that it disposeth the\nconstitution of the mind not to be fixed or settled in the defects\nthereof, but still to be capable and susceptible of growth and\nreformation.  For the unlearned man knows not what it is to descend into\nhimself, or to call himself to account, nor the pleasure of that\n_suavissima vita_, _indies sentire se fieri meliorem_.  The good parts he\nhath he will learn to show to the full, and use them dexterously, but not\nmuch to increase them.  The faults he hath he will learn how to hide and\ncolour them, but not much to amend them; like an ill mower, that mows on\nstill, and never whets his scythe.  Whereas with the learned man it fares\notherwise, that he doth ever intermix the correction and amendment of his\nmind with the use and employment thereof.  Nay, further, in general and\nin sum, certain it is that _Veritas_ and _Bonitas_ differ but as the seal\nand the print; for truth prints goodness, and they be the clouds of error\nwhich descend in the storms of passions and perturbations.\n\n(3) From moral virtue let us pass on to matter of power and commandment,\nand consider whether in right reason there be any comparable with that\nwherewith knowledge investeth and crowneth man\u2019s nature.  We see the\ndignity of the commandment is according to the dignity of the commanded;\nto have commandment over beasts as herdmen have, is a thing contemptible;\nto have commandment over children as schoolmasters have, is a matter of\nsmall honour; to have commandment over galley-slaves is a disparagement\nrather than an honour.  Neither is the commandment of tyrants much\nbetter, over people which have put off the generosity of their minds;\nand, therefore, it was ever holden that honours in free monarchies and\ncommonwealths had a sweetness more than in tyrannies, because the\ncommandment extendeth more over the wills of men, and not only over their\ndeeds and services.  And therefore, when Virgil putteth himself forth to\nattribute to Augustus C\u00e6sar the best of human honours, he doth it in\nthese words:\u2014\n\n          \u201cVictorque volentes\n    Per populos dat jura, viamque affectat Olympo.\u201d\n\nBut yet the commandment of knowledge is yet higher than the commandment\nover the will; for it is a commandment over the reason, belief, and\nunderstanding of man, which is the highest part of the mind, and giveth\nlaw to the will itself.  For there is no power on earth which setteth up\na throne or chair of estate in the spirits and souls of men, and in their\ncogitations, imaginations, opinions, and beliefs, but knowledge and\nlearning.  And therefore we see the detestable and extreme pleasure that\narch-heretics, and false prophets, and impostors are transported with,\nwhen they once find in themselves that they have a superiority in the\nfaith and conscience of men; so great as if they have once tasted of it,\nit is seldom seen that any torture or persecution can make them\nrelinquish or abandon it.  But as this is that which the author of the\nRevelation calleth the depth or profoundness of Satan, so by argument of\ncontraries, the just and lawful sovereignty over men\u2019s understanding, by\nforce of truth rightly interpreted, is that which approacheth nearest to\nthe similitude of the divine rule.\n\n(4) As for fortune and advancement, the beneficence of learning is not so\nconfined to give fortune only to states and commonwealths, as it doth not\nlikewise give fortune to particular persons.  For it was well noted long\nago, that Homer hath given more men their livings, than either Sylla, or\nC\u00e6sar, or Augustus ever did, notwithstanding their great largesses and\ndonatives, and distributions of lands to so many legions.  And no doubt\nit is hard to say whether arms or learning have advanced greater numbers.\nAnd in case of sovereignty we see, that if arms or descent have carried\naway the kingdom, yet learning hath carried the priesthood, which ever\nhath been in some competition with empire.\n\n(5) Again, for the pleasure and delight of knowledge and learning, it far\nsurpasseth all other in nature.  For, shall the pleasures of the\naffections so exceed the pleasure of the sense, as much as the obtaining\nof desire or victory exceedeth a song or a dinner? and must not of\nconsequence the pleasures of the intellect or understanding exceed the\npleasures of the affections?  We see in all other pleasures there is\nsatiety, and after they be used, their verdure departeth, which showeth\nwell they be but deceits of pleasure, and not pleasures; and that it was\nthe novelty which pleased, and not the quality.  And, therefore, we see\nthat voluptuous men turn friars, and ambitions princes turn melancholy.\nBut of knowledge there is no satiety, but satisfaction and appetite are\nperpetually interchangeable; and, therefore, appeareth to be good in\nitself simply, without fallacy or accident.  Neither is that pleasure of\nsmall efficacy and contentment to the mind of man, which the poet\nLucretius describeth elegantly:\u2014\n\n    \u201cSuave mari magno, turbantibus \u00e6quora ventis, &c.\u201d\n\n\u201cIt is a view of delight,\u201d saith he, \u201cto stand or walk upon the shore\nside, and to see a ship tossed with tempest upon the sea; or to be in a\nfortified tower, and to see two battles join upon a plain.  But it is a\npleasure incomparable, for the mind of man to be settled, landed, and\nfortified in the certainty of truth; and from thence to descry and behold\nthe errors, perturbations, labours, and wanderings up and down of other\nmen.\u201d\n\n(6) Lastly, leaving the vulgar arguments, that by learning man excelleth\nman in that wherein man excelleth beasts; that by learning man ascendeth\nto the heavens and their motions, where in body he cannot come; and the\nlike: let us conclude with the dignity and excellency of knowledge and\nlearning in that whereunto man\u2019s nature doth most aspire, which is\nimmortality, or continuance; for to this tendeth generation, and raising\nof houses and families; to this tend buildings, foundations, and\nmonuments; to this tendeth the desire of memory, fame, and celebration;\nand in effect the strength of all other human desires.  We see then how\nfar the monuments of wit and learning are more durable than the monuments\nof power or of the hands.  For have not the verses of Homer continued\ntwenty-five hundred years, or more, without the loss of a syllable or\nletter; during which the infinite palaces, temples, castles, cities, have\nbeen decayed and demolished?  It is not possible to have the true\npictures or statues of Cyrus, Alexander, C\u00e6sar, no nor of the kings or\ngreat personages of much later years; for the originals cannot last, and\nthe copies cannot but leese of the life and truth.  But the images of\nmen\u2019s wits and knowledges remain in books, exempted from the wrong of\ntime and capable of perpetual renovation.  Neither are they fitly to be\ncalled images, because they generate still, and cast their seeds in the\nminds of others, provoking and causing infinite actions and opinions in\nsucceeding ages.  So that if the invention of the ship was thought so\nnoble, which carrieth riches and commodities from place to place, and\nconsociateth the most remote regions in participation of their fruits,\nhow much more are letters to be magnified, which as ships pass through\nthe vast seas of time, and make ages so distant to participate of the\nwisdom, illuminations, and inventions, the one of the other?  Nay,\nfurther, we see some of the philosophers which were least divine, and\nmost immersed in the senses, and denied generally the immortality of the\nsoul, yet came to this point, that whatsoever motions the spirit of man\ncould act and perform without the organs of the body, they thought might\nremain after death, which were only those of the understanding and not of\nthe affection; so immortal and incorruptible a thing did knowledge seem\nunto them to be.  But we, that know by divine revelation that not only\nthe understanding but the affections purified, not only the spirit but\nthe body changed, shall be advanced to immortality, do disclaim in these\nrudiments of the senses.  But it must be remembered, both in this last\npoint, and so it may likewise be needful in other places, that in\nprobation of the dignity of knowledge or learning, I did in the beginning\nseparate divine testimony from human, which method I have pursued, and so\nhandled them both apart.\n\n(7) Nevertheless I do not pretend, and I know it will be impossible for\nme, by any pleading of mine, to reverse the judgment, either of \u00c6sop\u2019s\ncock, that preferred the barleycorn before the gem; or of Midas, that\nbeing chosen judge between Apollo, president of the Muses, and Pan, god\nof the flocks, judged for plenty; or of Paris, that judged for beauty and\nlove against wisdom and power; or of Agrippina, _occidat matrem_, _modo\nimperet_, that preferred empire with any condition never so detestable;\nor of Ulysses, _qui vetulam pr\u00e6tulit immortalitati_, being a figure of\nthose which prefer custom and habit before all excellency, or of a number\nof the like popular judgments.  For these things must continue as they\nhave been; but so will that also continue whereupon learning hath ever\nrelied, and which faileth not: _Justificata est sapientia a filiis suis_.\n\n\n\n\nTHE SECOND BOOK.\n\n\n                              _To the King_.\n\n1.  IT might seem to have more convenience, though it come often\notherwise to pass (excellent King), that those which are fruitful in\ntheir generations, and have in themselves the foresight of immortality in\ntheir descendants, should likewise be more careful of the good estate of\nfuture times, unto which they know they must transmit and commend over\ntheir dearest pledges.  Queen Elizabeth was a sojourner in the world in\nrespect of her unmarried life, and was a blessing to her own times; and\nyet so as the impression of her good government, besides her happy\nmemory, is not without some effect which doth survive her.  But to your\nMajesty, whom God hath already blessed with so much royal issue, worthy\nto continue and represent you for ever, and whose youthful and fruitful\nbed doth yet promise many the like renovations, it is proper and\nagreeable to be conversant not only in the transitory parts of good\ngovernment, but in those acts also which are in their nature permanent\nand perpetual.  Amongst the which (if affection do not transport me)\nthere is not any more worthy than the further endowment of the world with\nsound and fruitful knowledge.  For why should a few received authors\nstand up like Hercules\u2019 columns, beyond which there should be no sailing\nor discovering, since we have so bright and benign a star as your Majesty\nto conduct and prosper us?  To return therefore where we left, it\nremaineth to consider of what kind those acts are which have been\nundertaken and performed by kings and others for the increase and\nadvancement of learning, wherein I purpose to speak actively, without\ndigressing or dilating.\n\n2.  Let this ground therefore be laid, that all works are over common by\namplitude of reward, by soundness of direction, and by the conjunction of\nlabours.  The first multiplieth endeavour, the second preventeth error,\nand the third supplieth the frailty of man.  But the principal of these\nis direction, for _claudus in via antevertit cursorem extra viam_; and\nSolomon excellently setteth it down, \u201cIf the iron be not sharp, it\nrequireth more strength, but wisdom is that which prevaileth,\u201d signifying\nthat the invention or election of the mean is more effectual than any\nenforcement or accumulation of endeavours.  This I am induced to speak,\nfor that (not derogating from the noble intention of any that have been\ndeservers towards the state of learning), I do observe nevertheless that\ntheir works and acts are rather matters of magnificence and memory than\nof progression and proficience, and tend rather to augment the mass of\nlearning in the multitude of learned men than to rectify or raise the\nsciences themselves.\n\n3.  The works or acts of merit towards learning are conversant about\nthree objects\u2014the places of learning, the books of learning, and the\npersons of the learned.  For as water, whether it be the dew of heaven or\nthe springs of the earth, doth scatter and leese itself in the ground,\nexcept it be collected into some receptacle where it may by union comfort\nand sustain itself; and for that cause the industry of man hath made and\nframed springheads, conduits, cisterns, and pools, which men have\naccustomed likewise to beautify and adorn with accomplishments of\nmagnificence and state, as well as of use and necessity; so this\nexcellent liquor of knowledge, whether it descend from divine\ninspiration, or spring from human sense, would soon perish and vanish to\noblivion, if it were not preserved in books, traditions, conferences, and\nplaces appointed, as universities, colleges, and schools, for the receipt\nand comforting of the same.\n\n4.  The works which concern the seats and places of learning are\nfour\u2014foundations and buildings, endowments with revenues, endowments with\nfranchises and privileges, institutions and ordinances for government\u2014all\ntending to quietness and privateness of life, and discharge of cares and\ntroubles; much like the stations which Virgil prescribeth for the hiving\nof bees:\n\n    \u201cPrincipio sedes apibus statioque petenda,\n    Quo neque sit ventis aditus, &c.\u201d\n\n5.  The works touching books are two\u2014first, libraries, which are as the\nshrines where all the relics of the ancient saints, full of true virtue,\nand that without delusion or imposture, are preserved and reposed;\nsecondly, new editions of authors, with more correct impressions, more\nfaithful translations, more profitable glosses, more diligent\nannotations, and the like.\n\n6.  The works pertaining to the persons of learned men (besides the\nadvancement and countenancing of them in general) are two\u2014the reward and\ndesignation of readers in sciences already extant and invented; and the\nreward and designation of writers and inquirers concerning any parts of\nlearning not sufficiently laboured and prosecuted.\n\n7.  These are summarily the works and acts wherein the merits of many\nexcellent princes and other worthy personages, have been conversant.  As\nfor any particular commemorations, I call to mind what Cicero said when\nhe gave general thanks, _Difficile non aliquem_, _ingratum quenquam\npr\u00e6terire_.  Let us rather, according to the Scriptures, look unto that\npart of the race which is before us, than look back to that which is\nalready attained.\n\n8.  First, therefore, amongst so many great foundations of colleges in\nEurope, I find strange that they are all dedicated to professions, and\nnone left free to arts and sciences at large.  For if men judge that\nlearning should be referred to action, they judge well; but in this they\nfall into the error described in the ancient fable, in which the other\nparts of the body did suppose the stomach had been idle, because it\nneither performed the office of motion, as the limbs do, nor of sense, as\nthe head doth; but yet notwithstanding it is the stomach that digesteth\nand distributeth to all the rest.  So if any man think philosophy and\nuniversality to be idle studies, he doth not consider that all\nprofessions are from thence served and supplied.  And this I take to be a\ngreat cause that hath hindered the progression of learning, because these\nfundamental knowledges have been studied but in passage.  For if you will\nhave a tree bear more fruit than it hath used to do, it is not anything\nyou can do to the boughs, but it is the stirring of the earth and putting\nnew mould about thee roots that must work it.  Neither is it to be\nforgotten, that this dedicating of foundations and dotations to\nprofessory learning hath not only had a malign aspect and influence upon\nthe growth of sciences, but hath also been prejudicial to states, and\ngovernments.  For hence it proceedeth that princes find a solitude in\nregard of able men to serve them in causes of estate, because there is no\neducation collegiate which is free, where such as were so disposed might\ngive themselves in histories, modern languages, books of policy and civil\ndiscourse, and other the like enablements unto service of estate.\n\n9.  And because founders of colleges do plant, and founders of lectures\ndo water, it followeth well in order to speak of the defect which is in\npublic lectures; namely, in the smallness, and meanness of the salary or\nreward which in most places is assigned unto them, whether they be\nlectures of arts, or of professions.  For it is necessary to the\nprogression of sciences that readers be of the most able and sufficient\nmen; as those which are ordained for generating and propagating of\nsciences, and not for transitory use.  This cannot be, except their\ncondition and endowment be such as may content the ablest man to\nappropriate his whole labour and continue his whole age in that function\nand attendance; and therefore must have a proportion answerable to that\nmediocrity or competency of advancement, which may be expected from a\nprofession or the practice of a profession.  So as, if you will have\nsciences flourish, you must observe David\u2019s military law, which was,\n\u201cThat those which stayed with the carriage should have equal part with\nthose which were in the action;\u201d else will the carriages be ill attended.\nSo readers in sciences are indeed the guardians of the stores and\nprovisions of sciences, whence men in active courses are furnished, and\ntherefore ought to have equal entertainment with them; otherwise if the\nfathers in sciences be of the weakest sort or be ill maintained,\n\n    \u201cEt patrum invalidi referent jejunia nati.\u201d\n\n10.  Another defect I note, wherein I shall need some alchemist to help\nme, who call upon men to sell their books, and to build furnaces;\nquitting and forsaking Minerva and the Muses as barren virgins, and\nrelying upon Vulcan.  But certain it is, that unto the deep, fruitful,\nand operative study of many sciences, specialty natural philosophy and\nphysic, books be not only the instrumentals; wherein also the beneficence\nof men hath not been altogether wanting.  For we see spheres, globes,\nastrolabes, maps, and the like, have been provided as appurtenances to\nastronomy and cosmography, as well as books.  We see likewise that some\nplaces instituted for physic have annexed the commodity of gardens for\nsimples of all sorts, and do likewise command the use of dead bodies for\nanatomies.  But these do respect but a few things.  In general, there\nwill hardly be any main proficience in the disclosing of nature, except\nthere be some allowance for expenses about experiments; whether they be\nexperiments appertaining to Vulcanus or D\u00e6dalus, furnace or engine, or\nany other kind.  And therefore as secretaries and spials of princes and\nstates bring in bills for intelligence, so you must allow the spials and\nintelligencers of nature to bring in their bills; or else you shall be\nill advertised.\n\n11.  And if Alexander made such a liberal assignation to Aristotle of\ntreasure for the allowance of hunters, fowlers, fishers, and the like,\nthat he might compile a history of nature, much better do they deserve it\nthat travail in arts of nature.\n\n12.  Another defect which I note is an intermission or neglect in those\nwhich are governors in universities, of consultation, and in princes or\nsuperior persons, of visitation: to enter into account and consideration,\nwhether the readings, exercises, and other customs appertaining unto\nlearning, anciently begun and since continued, be well instituted or no;\nand thereupon to ground an amendment or reformation in that which shall\nbe found inconvenient.  For it is one of your Majesty\u2019s own most wise and\nprincely maxims, \u201cThat in all usages and precedents, the times be\nconsidered wherein they first began; which if they were weak or ignorant,\nit derogateth from the authority of the usage, and leaveth it for\nsuspect.\u201d  And therefore inasmuch as most of the usages and orders of the\nuniversities were derived from more obscure times, it is the more\nrequisite they be re-examined.  In this kind I will give an instance or\ntwo, for example sake, of things that are the most obvious and familiar.\nThe one is a matter, which though it be ancient and general, yet I hold\nto be an error; which is, that scholars in universities come too soon and\ntoo unripe to logic and rhetoric, arts fitter for graduates than children\nand novices.  For these two, rightly taken, are the gravest of sciences,\nbeing the arts of arts; the one for judgment, the other for ornament.\nAnd they be the rules and directions how to set forth and dispose matter:\nand therefore for minds empty and unfraught with matter, and which have\nnot gathered that which Cicero calleth _sylva_ and _supellex_, stuff and\nvariety, to begin with those arts (as if one should learn to weigh, or to\nmeasure, or to paint the wind) doth work but this effect, that the wisdom\nof those arts, which is great and universal, is almost made contemptible,\nand is degenerate into childish sophistry and ridiculous affectation.\nAnd further, the untimely learning of them hath drawn on by consequence\nthe superficial and unprofitable teaching and writing of them, as fitteth\nindeed to the capacity of children.  Another is a lack I find in the\nexercises used in the universities, which do snake too great a divorce\nbetween invention and memory.  For their speeches are either premeditate,\nin _verbis conceptis_, where nothing is left to invention, or merely\nextemporal, where little is left to memory.  Whereas in life and action\nthere is least use of either of these, but rather of intermixtures of\npremeditation and invention, notes and memory.  So as the exercise\nfitteth not the practice, nor the image the life; and it is ever a true\nrule in exercises, that they be framed as near as may be to the life of\npractice; for otherwise they do pervert the motions and faculties of the\nmind, and not prepare them.  The truth whereof is not obscure, when\nscholars come to the practices of professions, or other actions of civil\nlife; which when they set into, this want is soon found by themselves,\nand sooner by others.  But this part, touching the amendment of the\ninstitutions and orders of universities, I will conclude with the clause\nof C\u00e6sar\u2019s letter to Oppius and Balbes, _Hoc quemadmodum fieri possit_,\n_nonnulla mihi in mentem veniunt_, _et multa reperiri possunt_: _de iis\nrebus rgo vos ut cogitationem suscipiatis_.\n\n13.  Another defect which I note ascendeth a little higher than the\nprecedent.  For as the proficience of learning consisteth much in the\norders and institutions of universities in the same states and kingdoms,\nso it would be yet more advanced, if there were more intelligence mutual\nbetween the universities of Europe than now there is.  We see there be\nmany orders and foundations, which though they be divided under several\nsovereignties and territories, yet they take themselves to have a kind of\ncontract, fraternity, and correspondence one with the other, insomuch as\nthey have provincials and generals.  And surely as nature createth\nbrotherhood in families, and arts mechanical contract brotherhoods in\ncommunalties, and the anointment of God superinduceth a brotherhood in\nkings and bishops, so in like manner there cannot but be a fraternity in\nlearning and illumination, relating to that paternity which is attributed\nto God, who is called the Father of illuminations or lights.\n\n14.  The last defect which I will note is, that there hath not been, or\nvery rarely been, any public designation of writers or inquirers\nconcerning such parts of knowledge as may appear not to have been already\nsufficiently laboured or undertaken; unto which point it is an inducement\nto enter into a view and examination what parts of learning have been\nprosecuted, and what omitted.  For the opinion of plenty is amongst the\ncauses of want, and the great quantity of books maketh a show rather of\nsuperfluity than lack; which surcharge nevertheless is not to be remedied\nby making no more books, but by making more good books, which, as the\nserpent of Moses, might devour the serpents of the enchanters.\n\n15.  The removing of all the defects formerly enumerate, except the last,\nand of the active part also of the last (which is the designation of\nwriters), are _opera basilica_; towards which the endeavours of a private\nman may be but as an image in a crossway, that may point at the way, but\ncannot go it.  But the inducing part of the latter (which is the survey\nof learning) may be set forward by private travail.  Wherefore I will now\nattempt to make a general and faithful perambulation of learning, with an\ninquiry what parts thereof lie fresh and waste, and not improved and\nconverted by the industry of man, to the end that such a plot made and\nrecorded to memory may both minister light to any public designation,\nand, also serve to excite voluntary endeavours.  Wherein, nevertheless,\nmy purpose is at this time to note only omissions and deficiences, and\nnot to make any redargution of errors or incomplete prosecutions.  For it\nis one thing to set forth what ground lieth unmanured, and another thing\nto correct ill husbandry in that which is manured.\n\nIn the handling and undertaking of which work I am not ignorant what it\nis that I do now move and attempt, nor insensible of mine own weakness to\nsustain my purpose.  But my hope is, that if my extreme love to learning\ncarry me too far, I may obtain the excuse of affection; for that \u201cIt is\nnot granted to man to love and to be wise.\u201d  But I know well I can use no\nother liberty of judgment than I must leave to others; and I for my part\nshall be indifferently glad either to perform myself, or accept from\nanother, that duty of humanity\u2014_Nam qui erranti comiter monstrat viam_,\n&c.  I do foresee likewise that of those things which I shall enter and\nregister as deficiences and omissions, many will conceive and censure\nthat some of them are already done and extant; others to be but\ncuriosities, and things of no great use; and others to be of too great\ndifficulty, and almost impossibility to be compassed and effected.  But\nfor the two first, I refer myself to the particulars.  For the last,\ntouching impossibility, I take it those things are to be held possible\nwhich may be done by some person, though not by every one; and which may\nbe done by many, though not by any one; and which may be done in the\nsuccession of ages, though not within the hourglass of one man\u2019s life;\nand which may be done by public designation, though not by private\nendeavour.  But, notwithstanding, if any man will take to himself rather\nthat of Solomon, \u201c_Dicit piger_, _Leo est in via_,\u201d than that of Virgil,\n\u201c_Possunt quia posse videntur_,\u201d I shall be content that my labours be\nesteemed but as the better sort of wishes; for as it asketh some\nknowledge to demand a question not impertinent, so it requireth some\nsense to make a wish not absurd.\n\nI. (1) The parts of human learning have reference to the three parts of\nman\u2019s understanding, which is the seat of learning: history to his\nmemory, poesy to his imagination, and philosophy to his reason.  Divine\nlearning receiveth the same distribution; for, the spirit of man is the\nsame, though the revelation of oracle and sense be diverse.  So as\ntheology consisteth also of history of the Church; of parables, which is\ndivine poesy; and of holy doctrine or precept.  For as for that part\nwhich seemeth supernumerary, which is prophecy, it is but divine history,\nwhich hath that prerogative over human, as the narration may be before\nthe fact as well as after.\n\n(2) History is natural, civil, ecclesiastical, and literary; whereof the\nfirst three I allow as extant, the fourth I note as deficient.  For no\nman hath propounded to himself the general state of learning to be\ndescribed and represented from age to age, as many have done the works of\nNature, and the state, civil and ecclesiastical; without which the\nhistory of the world seemeth to me to be as the statue of Polyphemus with\nhis eye out, that part being wanting which doth most show the spirit and\nlife of the person.  And yet I am not ignorant that in divers particular\nsciences, as of the jurisconsults, the mathematicians, the rhetoricians,\nthe philosophers, there are set down some small memorials of the schools,\nauthors, and books; and so likewise some barren relations touching the\ninvention of arts or usages.  But a just story of learning, containing\nthe antiquities and originals of knowledges and their sects, their\ninventions, their traditions, their diverse administrations and\nmanagings, their flourishings, their oppositions, decays, depressions,\noblivions, removes, with the causes and occasions of them, and all other\nevents concerning learning, throughout the ages of the world, I may truly\naffirm to be wanting; the use and end of which work I do not so much\ndesign for curiosity or satisfaction of those that are the lovers of\nlearning, but chiefly for a more serious and grave purpose, which is this\nin few words, that it will make learned men wise in the use and\nadministration of learning.  For it is not Saint Augustine\u2019s nor Saint\nAmbrose\u2019s works that will make so wise a divine as ecclesiastical history\nthoroughly read and observed, and the same reason is of learning.\n\n(3) History of Nature is of three sorts; of Nature in course, of Nature\nerring or varying, and of Nature altered or wrought; that is, history of\ncreatures, history of marvels, and history of arts.  The first of these\nno doubt is extant, and that in good perfection; the two latter are\nbandied so weakly and unprofitably as I am moved to note them as\ndeficient.  For I find no sufficient or competent collection of the works\nof Nature which have a digression and deflexion from the ordinary course\nof generations, productions, and motions; whether they be singularities\nof place and region, or the strange events of time and chance, or the\neffects of yet unknown properties, or the instances of exception to\ngeneral kinds.  It is true I find a number of books of fabulous\nexperiments and secrets, and frivolous impostures for pleasure and\nstrangeness; but a substantial and severe collection of the heteroclites\nor irregulars of Nature, well examined and described, I find not,\nspecially not with due rejection of fables and popular errors.  For as\nthings now are, if an untruth in Nature be once on foot, what by reason\nof the neglect of examination, and countenance of antiquity, and what by\nreason of the use of the opinion in similitudes and ornaments of speech,\nit is never called down.\n\n(4) The use of this work, honoured with a precedent in Aristotle, is\nnothing less than to give contentment to the appetite of curious and vain\nwits, as the manner of Mirabilaries is to do; but for two reasons, both\nof great weight: the one to correct the partiality of axioms and\nopinions, which are commonly framed only upon common and familiar\nexamples; the other because from the wonders of Nature is the nearest\nintelligence and passage towards the wonders of art, for it is no more\nbut by following and, as it were, hounding Nature in her wanderings, to\nbe able to lead her afterwards to the same place again.  Neither am I of\nopinion, in this history of marvels, that superstitious narrations of\nsorceries, witchcrafts, dreams, divinations, and the like, where there is\nan assurance and clear evidence of the fact, be altogether excluded.  For\nit is not yet known in what cases and how far effects attributed to\nsuperstition do participate of natural causes; and, therefore, howsoever\nthe practice of such things is to be condemned, yet from the speculation\nand consideration of them light may be taken, not only for the discerning\nof the offences, but for the further disclosing of Nature.  Neither ought\na man to make scruple of entering into these things for inquisition of\ntruth, as your Majesty hath showed in your own example, who, with the two\nclear eyes of religion and natural philosophy, have looked deeply and\nwisely into these shadows, and yet proved yourself to be of the nature of\nthe sun, which passeth through pollutions and itself remains as pure as\nbefore.  But this I hold fit, that these narrations, which have mixture\nwith superstition, be sorted by themselves, and not to be mingled with\nthe narrations which are merely and sincerely natural.  But as for the\nnarrations touching the prodigies and miracles of religions, they are\neither not true or not natural; and, therefore, impertinent for the story\nof Nature.\n\n(5) For history of Nature, wrought or mechanical, I find some collections\nmade of agriculture, and likewise of manual arts; but commonly with a\nrejection of experiments familiar and vulgar; for it is esteemed a kind\nof dishonour unto learning to descend to inquiry or meditation upon\nmatters mechanical, except they be such as may be thought secrets,\nrarities, and special subtleties; which humour of vain and supercilious\narrogancy is justly derided in Plato, where he brings in Hippias, a\nvaunting sophist, disputing with Socrates, a true and unfeigned\ninquisitor of truth; where, the subject being touching beauty, Socrates,\nafter his wandering manner of inductions, put first an example of a fair\nvirgin, and then of a fair horse, and then of a fair pot well glazed,\nwhereat Hippias was offended, and said, \u201cMore than for courtesy\u2019s sake,\nhe did think much to dispute with any that did allege such base and\nsordid instances.\u201d  Whereunto Socrates answereth, \u201cYou have reason, and\nit becomes you well, being a man so trim in your vestments,\u201d &c., and so\ngoeth on in an irony.  But the truth is, they be not the highest\ninstances that give the securest information, as may be well expressed in\nthe tale so common of the philosopher that, while he gazed upwards to the\nstars, fell into the water; for if he had looked down he might have seen\nthe stars in the water, but looking aloft he could not see the water in\nthe stars.  So it cometh often to pass that mean and small things\ndiscover great, better than great can discover the small; and therefore\nAristotle noteth well, \u201cThat the nature of everything is best seen in his\nsmallest portions.\u201d  And for that cause he inquireth the nature of a\ncommonwealth, first in a family, and the simple conjugations of man and\nwife, parent and child, master and servant, which are in every cottage.\nEven so likewise the nature of this great city of the world, and the\npolicy thereof, must be first sought in mean concordances and small\nportions.  So we see how that secret of Nature, of the turning of iron\ntouched with the loadstone towards the north, was found out in needles of\niron, not in bars of iron.\n\n(6) But if my judgment be of any weight, the use of history mechanical is\nof all others the most radical and fundamental towards natural\nphilosophy; such natural philosophy as shall not vanish in the fume of\nsubtle, sublime, or delectable speculation, but such as shall be\noperative to the endowment and benefit of man\u2019s life.  For it will not\nonly minister and suggest for the present many ingenious practices in all\ntrades, by a connection and transferring of the observations of one art\nto the use of another, when the experiences of several mysteries shall\nfall under the consideration of one man\u2019s mind; but further, it will give\na more true and real illumination concerning causes and axioms than is\nhitherto attained.  For like as a man\u2019s disposition is never well known\ntill he be crossed, nor Proteus ever changed shapes till he was\nstraitened and held fast; so the passages and variations of nature cannot\nappear so fully in the liberty of nature as in the trials and vexations\nof art.\n\nII. (1) For civil history, it is of three kinds; not unfitly to be\ncompared with the three kinds of pictures or images.  For of pictures or\nimages we see some are unfinished, some are perfect, and some are\ndefaced.  So of histories we may find three kinds: memorials, perfect\nhistories, and antiquities; for memorials are history unfinished, or the\nfirst or rough drafts of history; and antiquities are history defaced, or\nsome remnants of history which have casually escaped the shipwreck of\ntime.\n\n(2) Memorials, or preparatory history, are of two sorts; whereof the one\nmay be termed commentaries, and the other registers.  Commentaries are\nthey which set down a continuance of the naked events and actions,\nwithout the motives or designs, the counsels, the speeches, the pretexts,\nthe occasions, and other passages of action.  For this is the true nature\nof a commentary (though C\u00e6sar, in modesty mixed with greatness, did for\nhis pleasure apply the name of a commentary to the best history of the\nworld).  Registers are collections of public acts, as decrees of council,\njudicial proceedings, declarations and letters of estate, orations, and\nthe like, without a perfect continuance or contexture of the thread of\nthe narration.\n\n(3) Antiquities, or remnants of history, are, as was said, _tanquam\ntabula naufragii_: when industrious persons, by an exact and scrupulous\ndiligence and observation, out of monuments, names, words, proverbs,\ntraditions, private records and evidences, fragments of stories, passages\nof books that concern not story, and the like, do save and recover\nsomewhat from the deluge of time.\n\n(4) In these kinds of unperfect histories I do assign no deficience, for\nthey are _tanquam imperfecte mista_; and therefore any deficience in them\nis but their nature.  As for the corruptions and moths of history, which\nare epitomes, the use of them deserveth to be banished, as all men of\nsound judgment have confessed, as those that have fretted and corroded\nthe sound bodies of many excellent histories, and wrought them into base\nand unprofitable dregs.\n\n(5) History, which may be called just and perfect history, is of three\nkinds, according to the object which it propoundeth, or pretendeth to\nrepresent: for it either representeth a time, or a person, or an action.\nThe first we call chronicles, the second lives, and the third narrations\nor relations.  Of these, although the first be the most complete and\nabsolute kind of history, and hath most estimation and glory, yet the\nsecond excelleth it in profit and use, and the third in verity and\nsincerity.  For history of times representeth the magnitude of actions,\nand the public faces and deportments of persons, and passeth over in\nsilence the smaller passages and motions of men and matters.  But such\nbeing the workmanship of God, as He doth hang the greatest weight upon\nthe smallest wires, _maxima \u00e8 minimis_, _suspendens_, it comes therefore\nto pass, that such histories do rather set forth the pomp of business\nthan the true and inward resorts thereof.  But lives, if they be well\nwritten, propounding to themselves a person to represent, in whom\nactions, both greater and smaller, public and private, have a commixture,\nmust of necessity contain a more true, native, and lively representation.\nSo again narrations and relations of actions, as the war of Peloponnesus,\nthe expedition of Cyrus Minor, the conspiracy of Catiline, cannot but be\nmore purely and exactly true than histories of times, because they may\nchoose an argument comprehensible within the notice and instructions of\nthe writer: whereas he that undertaketh the story of a time, specially of\nany length, cannot but meet with many blanks and spaces, which he must be\nforced to fill up out of his own wit and conjecture.\n\n(6) For the history of times, I mean of civil history, the providence of\nGod hath made the distribution.  For it hath pleased God to ordain and\nillustrate two exemplar states of the world for arms, learning, moral\nvirtue, policy, and laws; the state of Gr\u00e6cia and the state of Rome; the\nhistories whereof occupying the middle part of time, have more ancient to\nthem histories which may by one common name be termed the antiquities of\nthe world; and after them, histories which may be likewise called by the\nname of modern history.\n\n(7) Now to speak of the deficiences.  As to the heathen antiquities of\nthe world it is in vain to note them for deficient.  Deficient they are\nno doubt, consisting most of fables and fragments; but the deficience\ncannot be holpen; for antiquity is like fame, _caput inter nubila\ncondit_, her head is muffled from our sight.  For the history of the\nexemplar states, it is extant in good perfection.  Not but I could wish\nthere were a perfect course of history for Gr\u00e6cia, from Theseus to\nPhilop\u0153men (what time the affairs of Gr\u00e6cia drowned and extinguished in\nthe affairs of Rome), and for Rome from Romulus to Justinianus, who may\nbe truly said to be _ultimus Romanorum_.  In which sequences of story the\ntext of Thucydides and Xenophon in the one, and the texts of Livius,\nPolybius, Sallustius, C\u00e6sar, Appianus, Tacitus, Herodianus in the other,\nto be kept entire, without any diminution at all, and only to be supplied\nand continued.  But this is a matter of magnificence, rather to be\ncommended than required; and we speak now of parts of learning\nsupplemental, and not of supererogation.\n\n(8) But for modern histories, whereof there are some few very worthy, but\nthe greater part beneath mediocrity, leaving the care of foreign stories\nto foreign states, because I will not be _curiosus in aliena republica_,\nI cannot fail to represent to your Majesty the unworthiness of the\nhistory of England in the main continuance thereof, and the partiality\nand obliquity of that of Scotland in the latest and largest author that I\nhave seen: supposing that it would be honour for your Majesty, and a work\nvery memorable, if this island of Great Britain, as it is now joined in\nmonarchy for the ages to come, so were joined in one history for the\ntimes passed, after the manner of the sacred history, which draweth down\nthe story of the ten tribes and of the two tribes as twins together.  And\nif it shall seem that the greatness of this work may make it less exactly\nperformed, there is an excellent period of a much smaller compass of\ntime, as to the story of England; that is to say, from the uniting of the\nRoses to the uniting of the kingdoms; a portion of time wherein, to my\nunderstanding, there hath been the rarest varieties that in like number\nof successions of any hereditary monarchy hath been known.  For it\nbeginneth with the mixed adoption of a crown by arms and title; an entry\nby battle, an establishment by marriage; and therefore times answerable,\nlike waters after a tempest, full of working and swelling, though without\nextremity of storm; but well passed through by the wisdom of the pilot,\nbeing one of the most sufficient kings of all the number.  Then followeth\nthe reign of a king, whose actions, howsoever conducted, had much\nintermixture with the affairs of Europe, balancing and inclining them\nvariably; in whose time also began that great alteration in the state\necclesiastical, an action which seldom cometh upon the stage.  Then the\nreign of a minor; then an offer of a usurpation (though it was but as\n_febris ephemera_).  Then the reign of a queen matched with a foreigner;\nthen of a queen that lived solitary and unmarried, and yet her government\nso masculine, as it had greater impression and operation upon the states\nabroad than it any ways received from thence.  And now last, this most\nhappy and glorious event, that this island of Britain, divided from all\nthe world, should be united in itself, and that oracle of rest given to\n\u00c6Neas, _antiquam exquirite matrem_, should now be performed and fulfilled\nupon the nations of England and Scotland, being now reunited in the\nancient mother name of Britain, as a full period of all instability and\nperegrinations.  So that as it cometh to pass in massive bodies, that\nthey have certain trepidations and waverings before they fix and settle,\nso it seemeth that by the providence of God this monarchy, before it was\nto settle in your majesty and your generations (in which I hope it is now\nestablished for ever), it had these prelusive changes and varieties.\n\n(9) For lives, I do find strange that these times have so little esteemed\nthe virtues of the times, as that the writings of lives should be no more\nfrequent.  For although there be not many sovereign princes or absolute\ncommanders, and that states are most collected into monarchies, yet are\nthere many worthy personages that deserve better than dispersed report or\nbarren eulogies.  For herein the invention of one of the late poets is\nproper, and doth well enrich the ancient fiction.  For he feigneth that\nat the end of the thread or web of every man\u2019s life there was a little\nmedal containing the person\u2019s name, and that Time waited upon the shears,\nand as soon as the thread was cut caught the medals, and carried them to\nthe river of Lathe; and about the bank there were many birds flying up\nand down, that would get the medals and carry them in their beak a little\nwhile, and then let them fall into the river.  Only there were a few\nswans, which if they got a name would carry it to a temple where it was\nconsecrate.  And although many men, more mortal in their affections than\nin their bodies, do esteem desire of name and memory but as a vanity and\nventosity,\n\n    \u201cAnimi nil magn\u00e6 laudis egentes;\u201d\n\nwhich opinion cometh from that root, _Non prius laudes contempsimus_,\n_quam laudanda facere desivimus_: yet that will not alter Solomon\u2019s\njudgment, _Memoria justi cum laudibus_, _at impiorum nomen putrescet_:\nthe one flourisheth, the other either consumeth to present oblivion, or\nturneth to an ill odour.  And therefore in that style or addition, which\nis and hath been long well received and brought in use, _felicis\nmemori\u00e6_, _pi\u00e6 memori\u00e6_, _bon\u00e6 memori\u00e6_, we do acknowledge that which\nCicero saith, borrowing it from Demosthenes, that _bona fama propria\npossessio defunctorum_; which possession I cannot but note that in our\ntimes it lieth much waste, and that therein there is a deficience.\n\n(10) For narrations and relations of particular actions, there were also\nto be wished a greater diligence therein; for there is no great action\nbut hath some good pen which attends it.  And because it is an ability\nnot common to write a good history, as may well appear by the small\nnumber of them; yet if particularity of actions memorable were but\ntolerably reported as they pass, the compiling of a complete history of\ntimes might be the better expected, when a writer should arise that were\nfit for it: for the collection of such relations might be as a nursery\ngarden, whereby to plant a fair and stately garden when time should\nserve.\n\n(11) There is yet another partition of history which Cornelius Tacitus\nmaketh, which is not to be forgotten, specially with that application\nwhich he accoupleth it withal, annals and journals: appropriating to the\nformer matters of estate, and to the latter acts and accidents of a\nmeaner nature.  For giving but a touch of certain magnificent buildings,\nhe addeth, _Cum ex dignitate populi Romani repertum sit_, _res illustres\nannalibus_, _talia diurnis urbis actis mandare_.  So as there is a kind\nof contemplative heraldry, as well as civil.  And as nothing doth\nderogate from the dignity of a state more than confusion of degrees, so\nit doth not a little imbase the authority of a history to intermingle\nmatters of triumph, or matters of ceremony, or matters of novelty, with\nmatters of state.  But the use of a journal hath not only been in the\nhistory of time, but likewise in the history of persons, and chiefly of\nactions; for princes in ancient time had, upon point of honour and policy\nboth, journals kept, what passed day by day.  For we see the chronicle\nwhich was read before Ahasuerus, when he could not take rest, contained\nmatter of affairs, indeed, but such as had passed in his own time and\nvery lately before.  But the journal of Alexander\u2019s house expressed every\nsmall particularity, even concerning his person and court; and it is yet\na use well received in enterprises memorable, as expeditions of war,\nnavigations, and the like, to keep diaries of that which passeth\ncontinually.\n\n(12) I cannot likewise be ignorant of a form of writing which some grave\nand wise men have used, containing a scattered history of those actions\nwhich they have thought worthy of memory, with politic discourse and\nobservation thereupon: not incorporate into the history, but separately,\nand as the more principal in their intention; which kind of ruminated\nhistory I think more fit to place amongst books of policy, whereof we\nshall hereafter speak, than amongst books of history.  For it is the true\noffice of history to represent the events themselves together with the\ncounsels, and to leave the observations and conclusions thereupon to the\nliberty and faculty of every man\u2019s judgment.  But mixtures are things\nirregular, whereof no man can define.\n\n(13) So also is there another kind of history manifoldly mixed, and that\nis history of cosmography: being compounded of natural history, in\nrespect of the regions themselves; of history civil, in respect of the\nhabitations, regiments, and manners of the people; and the mathematics,\nin respect of the climates and configurations towards the heavens: which\npart of learning of all others in this latter time hath obtained most\nproficience.  For it may be truly affirmed to the honour of these times,\nand in a virtuous emulation with antiquity, that this great building of\nthe world had never through-lights made in it, till the age of us and our\nfathers.  For although they had knowledge of the antipodes,\n\n    \u201cNosque ubi primus equis Oriens afflavit anhelis,\n    Illic sera rubens accendit lumina Vesper,\u201d\n\nyet that might be by demonstration, and not in fact; and if by travel, it\nrequireth the voyage but of half the globe.  But to circle the earth, as\nthe heavenly bodies do, was not done nor enterprised till these later\ntimes: and therefore these times may justly bear in their word, not only\n_plus ultra_, in precedence of the ancient _non ultra_, and _imitabile\nfulmen_, in precedence of the ancient _non imitabile fulmen_,\n\n    \u201cDemens qui nimbos et non imitabile fulmen,\u201d &c.\n\nbut likewise _imitabile c\u00e6lum_; in respect of the many memorable voyages\nafter the manner of heaven about the globe of the earth.\n\n(14) And this proficience in navigation and discoveries may plant also an\nexpectation of the further proficience and augmentation of all sciences;\nbecause it may seem they are ordained by God to be coevals, that is, to\nmeet in one age.  For so the prophet Daniel speaking of the latter times\nforetelleth, _Plurimi pertransibunt_, _et multiplex erit scientia_: as if\nthe openness and through-passage of the world and the increase of\nknowledge were appointed to be in the same ages; as we see it is already\nperformed in great part: the learning of these later times not much\ngiving place to the former two periods or returns of learning, the one of\nthe Grecians, the other of the Romans.\n\nIII. (1) History ecclesiastical receiveth the same divisions with history\ncivil: but further in the propriety thereof may be divided into the\nhistory of the Church, by a general name; history of prophecy; and\nhistory of providence.  The first describeth the times of the militant\nChurch, whether it be fluctuant, as the ark of Noah, or movable, as the\nark in the wilderness, or at rest, as the ark in the Temple: that is, the\nstate of the Church in persecution, in remove, and in peace.  This part I\nought in no sort to note as deficient; only I would that the virtue and\nsincerity of it were according to the mass and quantity.  But I am not\nnow in hand with censures, but with omissions.\n\n(2) The second, which is history of prophecy, consisteth of two\nrelatives\u2014the prophecy and the accomplishment; and, therefore, the nature\nof such a work ought to be, that every prophecy of the Scripture be\nsorted with the event fulfilling the same throughout the ages of the\nworld, both for the better confirmation of faith and for the better\nillumination of the Church touching those parts of prophecies which are\nyet unfulfilled: allowing, nevertheless, that latitude which is agreeable\nand familiar unto divine prophecies, being of the nature of their Author,\nwith whom a thousand years are but as one day, and therefore are not\nfulfilled punctually at once, but have springing and germinant\naccomplishment throughout many ages, though the height or fulness of them\nmay refer to some one age.  This is a work which I find deficient, but is\nto be done with wisdom, sobriety, and reverence, or not at all.\n\n(3) The third, which is history of Providence, containeth that excellent\ncorrespondence which is between God\u2019s revealed will and His secret will;\nwhich though it be so obscure, as for the most part it is not legible to\nthe natural man\u2014no, nor many times to those that behold it from the\ntabernacle\u2014yet, at some times it pleaseth God, for our better\nestablishment and the confuting of those which are as without God in the\nworld, to write it in such text and capital letters, that, as the prophet\nsaith, \u201cHe that runneth by may read it\u201d\u2014that is, mere sensual persons,\nwhich hasten by God\u2019s judgments, and never bend or fix their cogitations\nupon them, are nevertheless in their passage and race urged to discern\nit.  Such are the notable events and examples of God\u2019s judgments,\nchastisements, deliverances, and blessings; and this is a work which has\npassed through the labour of many, and therefore I cannot present as\nomitted.\n\n(4) There are also other parts of learning which are appendices to\nhistory.  For all the exterior proceedings of man consist of words and\ndeeds, whereof history doth properly receive and retain in memory the\ndeeds; and if words, yet but as inducements and passages to deeds; so are\nthere other books and writings which are appropriate to the custody and\nreceipt of words only, which likewise are of three sorts\u2014orations,\nletters, and brief speeches or sayings.  Orations are pleadings, speeches\nof counsel, laudatives, invectives, apologies, reprehensions, orations of\nformality or ceremony, and the like.  Letters are according to all the\nvariety of occasions, advertisements, advises, directions, propositions,\npetitions, commendatory, expostulatory, satisfactory, of compliment, of\npleasure, of discourse, and all other passages of action.  And such as\nare written from wise men, are of all the words of man, in my judgment,\nthe best; for they are more natural than orations and public speeches,\nand more advised than conferences or present speeches.  So again letters\nof affairs from such as manage them, or are privy to them, are of all\nothers the best instructions for history, and to a diligent reader the\nbest histories in themselves.  For apophthegms, it is a great loss of\nthat book of C\u00e6sar\u2019s; for as his history, and those few letters of his\nwhich we have, and those apophthegms which were of his own, excel all\nmen\u2019s else, so I suppose would his collection of apophthegms have done;\nfor as for those which are collected by others, either I have no taste in\nsuch matters or else their choice hath not been happy.  But upon these\nthree kinds of writings I do not insist, because I have no deficiences to\npropound concerning them.\n\n(5) Thus much therefore concerning history, which is that part of\nlearning which answereth to one of the cells, domiciles, or offices of\nthe mind of man, which is that of the memory.\n\nIV. (1) Poesy is a part of learning in measure of words, for the most\npart restrained, but in all other points extremely licensed, and doth\ntruly refer to the imagination; which, being not tied to the laws of\nmatter, may at pleasure join that which nature hath severed, and sever\nthat which nature hath joined, and so make unlawful matches and divorces\nof things\u2014_Pictoribus atque poetis_, &c.  It is taken in two senses in\nrespect of words or matter.  In the first sense, it is but a character of\nstyle, and belongeth to arts of speech, and is not pertinent for the\npresent.  In the latter, it is\u2014as hath been said\u2014one of the principal\nportions of learning, and is nothing else but feigned history, which may\nbe styled as well in prose as in verse.\n\n(2) The use of this feigned history hath been to give some shadow of\nsatisfaction to the mind of man in those points wherein the nature of\nthings doth deny it, the world being in proportion inferior to the soul;\nby reason whereof there is, agreeable to the spirit of man, a more ample\ngreatness, a more exact goodness, and a more absolute variety, than can\nbe found in the nature of things.  Therefore, because the acts or events\nof true history have not that magnitude which satisfieth the mind of man,\npoesy feigneth acts and events greater and more heroical.  Because true\nhistory propoundeth the successes and issues of actions not so agreeable\nto the merits of virtue and vice, therefore poesy feigns them more just\nin retribution, and more according to revealed Providence.  Because true\nhistory representeth actions and events more ordinary and less\ninterchanged, therefore poesy endueth them with more rareness and more\nunexpected and alternative variations.  So as it appeareth that poesy\nserveth and conferreth to magnanimity, morality and to delectation.  And\ntherefore, it was ever thought to have some participation of divineness,\nbecause it doth raise and erect the mind, by submitting the shows of\nthings to the desires of the mind; whereas reason doth buckle and bow the\nmind unto the nature of things.  And we see that by these insinuations\nand congruities with man\u2019s nature and pleasure, joined also with the\nagreement and consort it hath with music, it hath had access and\nestimation in rude times and barbarous regions, where other learning\nstood excluded.\n\n(3) The division of poesy which is aptest in the propriety thereof\n(besides those divisions which are common unto it with history, as\nfeigned chronicles, feigned lives, and the appendices of history, as\nfeigned epistles, feigned orations, and the rest) is into poesy\nnarrative, representative, and allusive.  The narrative is a mere\nimitation of history, with the excesses before remembered, choosing for\nsubjects commonly wars and love, rarely state, and sometimes pleasure or\nmirth.  Representative is as a visible history, and is an image of\nactions as if they were present, as history is of actions in nature as\nthey are (that is) past.  Allusive, or parabolical, is a narration\napplied only to express some special purpose or conceit; which latter\nkind of parabolical wisdom was much more in use in the ancient times, as\nby the fables of \u00c6sop, and the brief sentences of the seven, and the use\nof hieroglyphics may appear.  And the cause was (for that it was then of\nnecessity to express any point of reason which was more sharp or subtle\nthan the vulgar in that manner) because men in those times wanted both\nvariety of examples and subtlety of conceit.  And as hieroglyphics were\nbefore letters, so parables were before arguments; and nevertheless now\nand at all times they do retain much life and rigour, because reason\ncannot be so sensible nor examples so fit.\n\n(4) But there remaineth yet another use of poesy parabolical, opposite to\nthat which we last mentioned; for that tendeth to demonstrate and\nillustrate that which is taught or delivered, and this other to retire\nand obscure it\u2014that is, when the secrets and mysteries of religion,\npolicy, or philosophy, are involved in fables or parables.  Of this in\ndivine poesy we see the use is authorised.  In heathen poesy we see the\nexposition of fables doth fall out sometimes with great felicity: as in\nthe fable that the giants being overthrown in their war against the gods,\nthe earth their mother in revenge thereof brought forth Fame:\n\n    \u201cIllam terra parens, ira irritat Deorum,\n    Extremam, ut perhibent, C\u0153o Enceladoque soroem,\n    Progenuit.\u201d\n\nExpounded that when princes and monarchs have suppressed actual and open\nrebels, then the malignity of people (which is the mother of rebellion)\ndoth bring forth libels and slanders, and taxations of the states, which\nis of the same kind with rebellion but more feminine.  So in the fable\nthat the rest of the gods having conspired to bind Jupiter, Pallas called\nBriareus with his hundred hands to his aid: expounded that monarchies\nneed not fear any curbing of their absoluteness by mighty subjects, as\nlong as by wisdom they keep the hearts of the people, who will be sure to\ncome in on their side.  So in the fable that Achilles was brought up\nunder Chiron, the centaur, who was part a man and part a beast, expounded\ningeniously but corruptly by Machiavel, that it belongeth to the\neducation and discipline of princes to know as well how to play the part\nof a lion in violence, and the fox in guile, as of the man in virtue and\njustice.  Nevertheless, in many the like encounters, I do rather think\nthat the fable was first, and the exposition devised, than that the moral\nwas first, and thereupon the fable framed; for I find it was an ancient\nvanity in Chrysippus, that troubled himself with great contention to\nfasten the assertions of the Stoics upon the fictions of the ancient\npoets; but yet that all the fables and fictions of the poets were but\npleasure and not figure, I interpose no opinion.  Surely of these poets\nwhich are now extant, even Homer himself (notwithstanding he was made a\nkind of scripture by the later schools of the Grecians), yet I should\nwithout any difficulty pronounce that his fables had no such inwardness\nin his own meaning.  But what they might have upon a more original\ntradition is not easy to affirm, for he was not the inventor of many of\nthem.\n\n(5) In this third part of learning, which is poesy, I can report no\ndeficience; for being as a plant that cometh of the lust of the earth,\nwithout a formal seed, it hath sprung up and spread abroad more than any\nother kind.  But to ascribe unto it that which is due, for the expressing\nof affections, passions, corruptions, and customs, we are beholding to\npoets more than to the philosophers\u2019 works; and for wit and eloquence,\nnot much less than to orators\u2019 harangues.  But it is not good to stay too\nlong in the theatre.  Let us now pass on to the judicial place or palace\nof the mind, which we are to approach and view with more reverence and\nattention.\n\nV. (1) The knowledge of man is as the waters, some descending from above,\nand some springing from beneath: the one informed by the light of nature,\nthe other inspired by divine revelation.  The light of nature consisteth\nin the notions of the mind and the reports of the senses; for as for\nknowledge which man receiveth by teaching, it is cumulative and not\noriginal, as in a water that besides his own spring-head is fed with\nother springs and streams.  So then, according to these two differing\nilluminations or originals, knowledge is first of all divided into\ndivinity and philosophy.\n\n(2) In philosophy the contemplations of man do either penetrate unto God,\nor are circumferred to nature, or are reflected or reverted upon himself.\nOut of which several inquiries there do arise three knowledges\u2014divine\nphilosophy, natural philosophy, and human philosophy or humanity.  For\nall things are marked and stamped with this triple character\u2014the power of\nGod, the difference of nature and the use of man.  But because the\ndistributions and partitions of knowledge are not like several lines that\nmeet in one angle, and so touch but in a point, but are like branches of\na tree that meet in a stem, which hath a dimension and quantity of\nentireness and continuance before it come to discontinue and break itself\ninto arms and boughs; therefore it is good, before we enter into the\nformer distribution, to erect and constitute one universal science, by\nthe name of _philosophia prima_, primitive or summary philosophy, as the\nmain and common way, before we come where the ways part and divide\nthemselves; which science whether I should report as deficient or no, I\nstand doubtful.  For I find a certain rhapsody of natural theology, and\nof divers parts of logic; and of that part of natural philosophy which\nconcerneth the principles, and of that other part of natural philosophy\nwhich concerneth the soul or spirit\u2014all these strangely commixed and\nconfused; but being examined, it seemeth to me rather a depredation of\nother sciences, advanced and exalted unto some height of terms, than\nanything solid or substantive of itself.  Nevertheless I cannot be\nignorant of the distinction which is current, that the same things are\nhandled but in several respects.  As for example, that logic considereth\nof many things as they are in notion, and this philosophy as they are in\nnature\u2014the one in appearance, the other in existence; but I find this\ndifference better made than pursued.  For if they had considered\nquantity, similitude, diversity, and the rest of those extern characters\nof things, as philosophers, and in nature, their inquiries must of force\nhave been of a far other kind than they are.  For doth any of them, in\nhandling quantity, speak of the force of union, how and how far it\nmultiplieth virtue?  Doth any give the reason why some things in nature\nare so common, and in so great mass, and others so rare, and in so small\nquantity?  Doth any, in handling similitude and diversity, assign the\ncause why iron should not move to iron, which is more like, but move to\nthe loadstone, which is less like?  Why in all diversities of things\nthere should be certain participles in nature which are almost ambiguous\nto which kind they should be referred?  But there is a mere and deep\nsilence touching the nature and operation of those common adjuncts of\nthings, as in nature; and only a resuming and repeating of the force and\nuse of them in speech or argument.  Therefore, because in a writing of\nthis nature I avoid all subtlety, my meaning touching this original or\nuniversal philosophy is thus, in a plain and gross description by\nnegative: \u201cThat it be a receptacle for all such profitable observations\nand axioms as fall not within the compass of any of the special parts of\nphilosophy or sciences, but are more common and of a higher stage.\u201d\n\n(3) Now that there are many of that kind need not be doubted.  For\nexample: Is not the rule, _Si in\u0153qualibus \u00e6qualia addas_, _omnia erunt\nin\u00e6qualia_, an axiom as well of justice as of the mathematics? and is\nthere not a true coincidence between commutative and distributive\njustice, and arithmetical and geometrical proportion?  Is not that other\nrule, _Qu\u00e6 in eodem tertio conveniunt_, _et inter se conveniunt_, a rule\ntaken from the mathematics, but so potent in logic as all syllogisms are\nbuilt upon it?  Is not the observation, _Omnia mutantur_, _nil interit_,\na contemplation in philosophy thus, that the _quantum_ of nature is\neternal? in natural theology thus, that it requireth the same omnipotency\nto make somewhat nothing, which at the first made nothing somewhat?\naccording to the Scripture, _Didici quod omnia opera_, _qu\u0153 fecit Deus_,\n_perseverent in perpetuum_; _non possumus eis quicquam addere nec\nauferre_.  Is not the ground, which Machiavel wisely and largely\ndiscourseth concerning governments, that the way to establish and\npreserve them is to reduce them _ad principia_\u2014a rule in religion and\nnature, as well as in civil administration?  Was not the Persian magic a\nreduction or correspondence of the principles and architectures of nature\nto the rules and policy of governments?  Is not the precept of a\nmusician, to fall from a discord or harsh accord upon a concord or sweet\naccord, alike true in affection?  Is not the trope of music, to avoid or\nslide from the close or cadence, common with the trope of rhetoric of\ndeceiving expectation?  Is not the delight of the quavering upon a stop\nin music the same with the playing of light upon the water?\n\n    \u201cSplendet tremulo sub lumine pontus.\u201d\n\nAre not the organs of the senses of one kind with the organs of\nreflection, the eye with a glass, the ear with a cave or strait,\ndetermined and bounded?  Neither are these only similitudes, as men of\nnarrow observation may conceive them to be, but the same footsteps of\nnature, treading or printing upon several subjects or matters.  This\nscience therefore (as I understand it) I may justly report as deficient;\nfor I see sometimes the profounder sort of wits, in handling some\nparticular argument, will now and then draw a bucket of water out of this\nwell for their present use; but the spring-head thereof seemeth to me not\nto have been visited, being of so excellent use both for the disclosing\nof nature and the abridgment of art.\n\nVI. (1) This science being therefore first placed as a common parent like\nunto Berecynthia, which had so much heavenly issue, _omnes c\u0153licolas_,\n_omnes supera alta tenetes_; we may return to the former distribution of\nthe three philosophies\u2014divine, natural, and human.  And as concerning\ndivine philosophy or natural theology, it is that knowledge or rudiment\nof knowledge concerning God which may be obtained by the contemplation of\nHis creatures; which knowledge may be truly termed divine in respect of\nthe object, and natural in respect of the light.  The bounds of this\nknowledge are, that it sufficeth to convince atheism, but not to inform\nreligion; and therefore there was never miracle wrought by God to convert\nan atheist, because the light of nature might have led him to confess a\nGod; but miracles have been wrought to convert idolaters and the\nsuperstitious, because no light of nature extendeth to declare the will\nand true worship of God.  For as all works do show forth the power and\nskill of the workman, and not his image, so it is of the works of God,\nwhich do show the omnipotency and wisdom of the Maker, but not His image.\nAnd therefore therein the heathen opinion differeth from the sacred\ntruth: for they supposed the world to be the image of God, and man to be\nan extract or compendious image of the world; but the Scriptures never\nvouchsafe to attribute to the world that honour, as to be the image of\nGod, but only _the work of His hands_; neither do they speak of any other\nimage of God but man.  Wherefore by the contemplation of nature to induce\nand enforce the acknowledgment of God, and to demonstrate His power,\nprovidence, and goodness, is an excellent argument, and hath been\nexcellently handled by divers, but on the other side, out of the\ncontemplation of nature, or ground of human knowledges, to induce any\nverity or persuasion concerning the points of faith, is in my judgment\nnot safe; _Da fidei qu\u00e6 fidei sunt_.  For the heathen themselves conclude\nas much in that excellent and divine fable of the golden chain, \u201cThat men\nand gods were not able to draw Jupiter down to the earth; but,\ncontrariwise, Jupiter was able to draw them up to heaven.\u201d  So as we\nought not to attempt to draw down or submit the mysteries of God to our\nreason, but contrariwise to raise and advance our reason to the divine\ntruth.  So as in this part of knowledge, touching divine philosophy, I am\nso far from noting any deficience, as I rather note an excess; whereunto\nI have digressed because of the extreme prejudice which both religion and\nphilosophy hath received and may receive by being commixed together; as\nthat which undoubtedly will make an heretical religion, and an imaginary\nand fabulous philosophy.\n\n(2) Otherwise it is of the nature of angels and spirits, which is an\nappendix of theology, both divine and natural, and is neither inscrutable\nnor interdicted.  For although the Scripture saith, \u201cLet no man deceive\nyou in sublime discourse touching the worship of angels, pressing into\nthat he knoweth not,\u201d &c., yet notwithstanding if you observe well that\nprecept, it may appear thereby that there be two things only\nforbidden\u2014adoration of them, and opinion fantastical of them, either to\nextol them further than appertaineth to the degree of a creature, or to\nextol a man\u2019s knowledge of them further than he hath ground.  But the\nsober and grounded inquiry, which may arise out of the passages of Holy\nScriptures, or out of the gradations of nature, is not restrained.  So of\ndegenerate and revolted spirits, the conversing with them or the\nemployment of them is prohibited, much more any veneration towards them;\nbut the contemplation or science of their nature, their power, their\nillusions, either by Scripture or reason, is a part of spiritual wisdom.\nFor so the apostle saith, \u201cWe are not ignorant of his stratagems.\u201d  And\nit is no more unlawful to inquire the nature of evil spirits, than to\ninquire the force of poisons in nature, or the nature of sin and vice in\nmorality.  But this part touching angels and spirits I cannot note as\ndeficient, for many have occupied themselves in it; I may rather\nchallenge it, in many of the writers thereof, as fabulous and\nfantastical.\n\nVII. (1) Leaving therefore divine philosophy or natural theology (not\ndivinity or inspired theology, which we reserve for the last of all as\nthe haven and sabbath of all man\u2019s contemplations) we will now proceed to\nnatural philosophy.  If then it be true that Democritus said, \u201cThat the\ntruth of nature lieth hid in certain deep mines and caves;\u201d and if it be\ntrue likewise that the alchemists do so much inculcate, that Vulcan is a\nsecond nature, and imitateth that dexterously and compendiously, which\nnature worketh by ambages and length of time, it were good to divide\nnatural philosophy into the mine and the furnace, and to make two\nprofessions or occupations of natural philosophers\u2014some to be pioneers\nand some smiths; some to dig, and some to refine and hammer.  And surely\nI do best allow of a division of that kind, though in more familiar and\nscholastical terms: namely, that these be the two parts of natural\nphilosophy\u2014the inquisition of causes, and the production of effects;\nspeculative and operative; natural science, and natural prudence.  For as\nin civil matters there is a wisdom of discourse, and a wisdom of\ndirection; so is it in natural.  And here I will make a request, that for\nthe latter (or at least for a part thereof) I may revive and reintegrate\nthe misapplied and abused name of natural magic, which in the true sense\nis but natural wisdom, or natural prudence; taken according to the\nancient acception, purged from vanity and superstition.  Now although it\nbe true, and I know it well, that there is an intercourse between causes\nand effects, so as both these knowledges, speculative and operative, have\na great connection between themselves; yet because all true and fruitful\nnatural philosophy hath a double scale or ladder, ascendent and\ndescendent, ascending from experiments to the invention of causes, and\ndescending from causes to the invention of new experiments; therefore I\njudge it most requisite that these two parts be severally considered and\nhandled.\n\n(2) Natural science or theory is divided into physic and metaphysic;\nwherein I desire it may be conceived that I use the word metaphysic in a\ndiffering sense from that that is received.  And in like manner, I doubt\nnot but it will easily appear to men of judgment, that in this and other\nparticulars, wheresoever my conception and notion may differ from the\nancient, yet I am studious to keep the ancient terms.  For hoping well to\ndeliver myself from mistaking, by the order and perspicuous expressing of\nthat I do propound, I am otherwise zealous and affectionate to recede as\nlittle from antiquity, either in terms or opinions, as may stand with\ntruth and the proficience of knowledge.  And herein I cannot a little\nmarvel at the philosopher Aristotle, that did proceed in such a spirit of\ndifference and contradiction towards all antiquity; undertaking not only\nto frame new words of science at pleasure, but to confound and extinguish\nall ancient wisdom; insomuch as he never nameth or mentioneth an ancient\nauthor or opinion, but to confute and reprove; wherein for glory, and\ndrawing followers and disciples, he took the right course.  For certainly\nthere cometh to pass, and hath place in human truth, that which was noted\nand pronounced in the highest truth:\u2014_Veni in nomine partis_, _nec\nrecipits me_; _si quis venerit in nomine suo eum recipietis_.  But in\nthis divine aphorism (considering to whom it was applied, namely, to\nantichrist, the highest deceiver), we may discern well that the coming in\na man\u2019s own name, without regard of antiquity or paternity, is no good\nsign of truth, although it be joined with the fortune and success of an\n_eum recipietis_.  But for this excellent person Aristotle, I will think\nof him that he learned that humour of his scholar, with whom it seemeth\nhe did emulate; the one to conquer all opinions, as the other to conquer\nall nations.  Wherein, nevertheless, it may be, he may at some men\u2019s\nhands, that are of a bitter disposition, get a like title as his scholar\ndid:\u2014\n\n    \u201cFelix terrarum pr\u00e6do, non utile mundo\n    Editus exemplum, &c.\u201d\n\nSo,\n\n    \u201cFelix doctrin\u00e6 pr\u00e6do.\u201d\n\nBut to me, on the other side, that do desire as much as lieth in my pen\nto ground a sociable intercourse between antiquity and proficience, it\nseemeth best to keep way with antiquity _usque ad aras_; and, therefore,\nto retain the ancient terms, though I sometimes alter the uses and\ndefinitions, according to the moderate proceeding in civil government;\nwhere, although there be some alteration, yet that holdeth which Tacitus\nwisely noteth, _eadem magistratuum vocabula_.\n\n(3) To return, therefore, to the use and acception of the term metaphysic\nas I do now understand the word; it appeareth, by that which hath been\nalready said, that I intend _philosophia prima_, summary philosophy and\nmetaphysic, which heretofore have been confounded as one, to be two\ndistinct things.  For the one I have made as a parent or common ancestor\nto all knowledge; and the other I have now brought in as a branch or\ndescendant of natural science.  It appeareth likewise that I have\nassigned to summary philosophy the common principles and axioms which are\npromiscuous and indifferent to several sciences; I have assigned unto it\nlikewise the inquiry touching the operation or the relative and adventive\ncharacters of essences, as quantity, similitude, diversity, possibility,\nand the rest, with this distinction and provision; that they be handled\nas they have efficacy in nature, and not logically.  It appeareth\nlikewise that natural theology, which heretofore hath been handled\nconfusedly with metaphysic, I have enclosed and bounded by itself.  It is\ntherefore now a question what is left remaining for metaphysic; wherein I\nmay without prejudice preserve thus much of the conceit of antiquity,\nthat physic should contemplate that which is inherent in matter, and\ntherefore transitory; and metaphysic that which is abstracted and fixed.\nAnd again, that physic should handle that which supposeth in nature only\na being and moving; and metaphysic should handle that which supposeth\nfurther in nature a reason, understanding, and platform.  But the\ndifference, perspicuously expressed, is most familiar and sensible.  For\nas we divided natural philosophy in general into the inquiry of causes\nand productions of effects, so that part which concerneth the inquiry of\ncauses we do subdivide according to the received and sound division of\ncauses.  The one part, which is physic, inquireth and handleth the\nmaterial and efficient causes; and the other, which is metaphysic,\nhandleth the formal and final causes.\n\n(4) Physic (taking it according to the derivation, and not according to\nour idiom for medicine) is situate in a middle term or distance between\nnatural history and metaphysic.  For natural history describeth the\nvariety of things; physic the causes, but variable or respective causes;\nand metaphysic the fixed and constant causes.\n\n    \u201cLimus ut hic durescit, et h\u00e6c ut cera liquescit,\n    Uno eodemque igni.\u201d\n\nFire is the cause of induration, but respective to clay; fire is the\ncause of colliquation, but respective to wax.  But fire is no constant\ncause either of induration or colliquation; so then the physical causes\nare but the efficient and the matter.  Physic hath three parts, whereof\ntwo respect nature united or collected, the third contemplateth nature\ndiffused or distributed.  Nature is collected either into one entire\ntotal, or else into the same principles or seeds.  So as the first\ndoctrine is touching the contexture or configuration of things, as _de\nmundo_, _de universitate rerum_.  The second is the doctrine concerning\nthe principles or originals of things.  The third is the doctrine\nconcerning all variety and particularity of things; whether it be of the\ndiffering substances, or their differing qualities and natures; whereof\nthere needeth no enumeration, this part being but as a gloss or\nparaphrase that attendeth upon the text of natural history.  Of these\nthree I cannot report any as deficient.  In what truth or perfection they\nare handled, I make not now any judgment; but they are parts of knowledge\nnot deserted by the labour of man.\n\n(5) For metaphysic, we have assigned unto it the inquiry of formal and\nfinal causes; which assignation, as to the former of them, may seem to be\nnugatory and void, because of the received and inveterate opinion, that\nthe inquisition of man is not competent to find out essential forms or\ntrue differences; of which opinion we will take this hold, that the\ninvention of forms is of all other parts of knowledge the worthiest to be\nsought, if it be possible to be found.  As for the possibility, they are\nill discoverers that think there is no land, when they can see nothing\nbut sea.  But it is manifest that Plato, in his opinion of ideas, as one\nthat had a wit of elevation situate as upon a cliff, did descry that\nforms were the true object of knowledge; but lost the real fruit of his\nopinion, by considering of forms as absolutely abstracted from matter,\nand not confined and determined by matter; and so turning his opinion\nupon theology, wherewith all his natural philosophy is infected.  But if\nany man shall keep a continual watchful and severe eye upon action,\noperation, and the use of knowledge, he may advise and take notice what\nare the forms, the disclosures whereof are fruitful and important to the\nstate of man.  For as to the forms of substances (man only except, of\nwhom it is said, _Formavit hominem de limo terr\u00e6_, _et spiravit in faciem\nejus spiraculum vit\u00e6_, and not as of all other creatures, _Producant\naqu\u00e6_, _producat terra_), the forms of substances I say (as they are now\nby compounding and transplanting multiplied) are so perplexed, as they\nare not to be inquired; no more than it were either possible or to\npurpose to seek in gross the forms of those sounds which make words,\nwhich by composition and transposition of letters are infinite.  But, on\nthe other side, to inquire the form of those sounds or voices which make\nsimple letters is easily comprehensible; and being known induceth and\nmanifesteth the forms of all words, which consist and are compounded of\nthem.  In the same manner to inquire the form of a lion, of an oak, of\ngold; nay, of water, of air, is a vain pursuit; but to inquire the forms\nof sense, of voluntary motion, of vegetation, of colours, of gravity and\nlevity, of density, of tenuity, of heat, of cold, and all other natures\nand qualities, which, like an alphabet, are not many, and of which the\nessences (upheld by matter) of all creatures do consist; to inquire, I\nsay, the true forms of these, is that part of metaphysic which we now\ndefine of.  Not but that physic doth make inquiry and take consideration\nof the same natures; but how?  Only as to the material and efficient\ncauses of them, and not as to the forms.  For example, if the cause of\nwhiteness in snow or froth be inquired, and it be rendered thus, that the\nsubtle intermixture of air and water is the cause, it is well rendered;\nbut, nevertheless, is this the form of whiteness?  No; but it is the\nefficient, which is ever but _vehiculum form\u00e6_.  This part of metaphysic\nI do not find laboured and performed; whereat I marvel not; because I\nhold it not possible to be invented by that course of invention which\nhath been used; in regard that men (which is the root of all error) have\nmade too untimely a departure, and too remote a recess from particulars.\n\n(6) But the use of this part of metaphysic, which I report as deficient,\nis of the rest the most excellent in two respects: the one, because it is\nthe duty and virtue of all knowledge to abridge the infinity of\nindividual experience, as much as the conception of truth will permit,\nand to remedy the complaint of _vita brevis_, _ars longa_; which is\nperformed by uniting the notions and conceptions of sciences.  For\nknowledges are as pyramids, whereof history is the basis.  So of natural\nphilosophy, the basis is natural history; the stage next the basis is\nphysic; the stage next the vertical point is metaphysic.  As for the\nvertical point, _opus quod operatur Deus \u00e0 principio usque ad finem_, the\nsummary law of nature, we know not whether man\u2019s inquiry can attain unto\nit.  But these three be the true stages of knowledge, and are to them\nthat are depraved no better than the giants\u2019 hills:\u2014\n\n    \u201cTer sunt conati imponere Pelio Ossam,\n    Scilicet atque Oss\u00e6 frondsum involvere Olympum.\u201d\n\nBut to those which refer all things to the glory of God, they are as the\nthree acclamations, _Sante_, _sancte_, _sancte_! holy in the description\nor dilatation of His works; holy in the connection or concatenation of\nthem; and holy in the union of them in a perpetual and uniform law.  And,\ntherefore, the speculation was excellent in Parmenides and Plato,\nalthough but a speculation in them, that all things by scale did ascend\nto unity.  So then always that knowledge is worthiest which is charged\nwith least multiplicity, which appeareth to be metaphysic; as that which\nconsidereth the simple forms or differences of things, which are few in\nnumber, and the degrees and co-ordinations whereof make all this variety.\nThe second respect, which valueth and commendeth this part of metaphysic,\nis that it doth enfranchise the power of man unto the greatest liberty\nand possibility of works and effects.  For physic carrieth men in narrow\nand restrained ways, subject to many accidents and impediments, imitating\nthe ordinary flexuous courses of nature.  But _lat\u00e6 undique sunt\nsapientibus vi\u00e6_; to sapience (which was anciently defined to be _rerum\ndivinarum et humanarum scientia_) there is ever a choice of means.  For\nphysical causes give light to new invention in _simili materia_.  But\nwhosoever knoweth any form, knoweth the utmost possibility of\nsuperinducing that nature upon any variety of matter; and so is less\nrestrained in operation, either to the basis of the matter, or the\ncondition of the efficient; which kind of knowledge Solomon likewise,\nthough in a more divine sense, elegantly describeth: _non arctabuntur\ngressus tui_, _et currens non habebis offendiculum_.  The ways of\nsapience are not much liable either to particularity or chance.\n\n(7) The second part of metaphysic is the inquiry of final causes, which I\nam moved to report not as omitted, but as misplaced.  And yet if it were\nbut a fault in order, I would not speak of it; for order is matter of\nillustration, but pertaineth not to the substance of sciences.  But this\nmisplacing hath caused a deficience, or at least a great improficience in\nthe sciences themselves.  For the handling of final causes, mixed with\nthe rest in physical inquiries, hath intercepted the severe and diligent\ninquiry of all real and physical causes, and given men the occasion to\nstay upon these satisfactory and specious causes, to the great arrest and\nprejudice of further discovery.  For this I find done not only by Plato,\nwho ever anchoreth upon that shore, but by Aristotle, Galen, and others\nwhich do usually likewise fall upon these flats of discoursing causes.\nFor to say that \u201cthe hairs of the eyelids are for a quickset and fence\nabout the sight;\u201d or that \u201cthe firmness of the skins and hides of living\ncreatures is to defend them from the extremities of heat or cold;\u201d or\nthat \u201cthe bones are for the columns or beams, whereupon the frames of the\nbodies of living creatures are built;\u201d or that \u201cthe leaves of trees are\nfor protecting of the fruit;\u201d or that \u201cthe clouds are for watering of the\nearth;\u201d or that \u201cthe solidness of the earth is for the station and\nmansion of living creatures;\u201d and the like, is well inquired and\ncollected in metaphysic, but in physic they are impertinent.  Nay, they\nare, indeed, but _remoras_ and hindrances to stay and slug the ship from\nfurther sailing; and have brought this to pass, that the search of the\nphysical causes hath been neglected and passed in silence.  And,\ntherefore, the natural philosophy of Democritus and some others, who did\nnot suppose a mind or reason in the frame of things, but attributed the\nform thereof able to maintain itself to infinite essays or proofs of\nNature, which they term fortune, seemeth to me (as far as I can judge by\nthe recital and fragments which remain unto us) in particularities of\nphysical causes more real and better inquired than that of Aristotle and\nPlato; whereof both intermingled final causes, the one as a part of\ntheology, and the other as a part of logic, which were the favourite\nstudies respectively of both those persons; not because those final\ncauses are not true and worthy to be inquired, being kept within their\nown province, but because their excursions into the limits of physical\ncauses hath bred a vastness and solitude in that tract.  For otherwise,\nkeeping their precincts and borders, men are extremely deceived if they\nthink there is an enmity or repugnancy at all between them.  For the\ncause rendered, that \u201cthe hairs about the eyelids are for the safeguard\nof the sight,\u201d doth not impugn the cause rendered, that \u201cpilosity is\nincident to orifices of moisture\u2014_muscosi fontes_, &c.\u201d  Nor the cause\nrendered, that \u201cthe firmness of hides is for the armour of the body\nagainst extremities of heat or cold,\u201d doth not impugn the cause rendered,\nthat \u201ccontraction of pores is incident to the outwardest parts, in regard\nof their adjacence to foreign or unlike bodies;\u201d and so of the rest, both\ncauses being true and compatible, the one declaring an intention, the\nother a consequence only.  Neither doth this call in question or derogate\nfrom Divine Providence, but highly confirm and exalt it.  For as in civil\nactions he is the greater and deeper politique that can make other men\nthe instruments of his will and ends, and yet never acquaint them with\nhis purpose, so as they shall do it and yet not know what they do, than\nhe that imparteth his meaning to those he employeth; so is the wisdom of\nGod more admirable, when Nature intendeth one thing and Providence\ndraweth forth another, than if He had communicated to particular\ncreatures and motions the characters and impressions of His Providence.\nAnd thus much for metaphysic; the latter part whereof I allow as extant,\nbut wish it confined to his proper place.\n\nVIII. (1) Nevertheless, there remaineth yet another part of natural\nphilosophy, which is commonly made a principal part, and holdeth rank\nwith physic special and metaphysic, which is mathematic; but I think it\nmore agreeable to the nature of things, and to the light of order, to\nplace it as a branch of metaphysic.  For the subject of it being\nquantity, not quantity indefinite, which is but a relative, and belongeth\nto _philosophia prima_ (as hath been said), but quantity determined or\nproportionable, it appeareth to be one of the essential forms of things,\nas that that is causative in Nature of a number of effects; insomuch as\nwe see in the schools both of Democritus and of Pythagoras that the one\ndid ascribe figure to the first seeds of things, and the other did\nsuppose numbers to be the principles and originals of things.  And it is\ntrue also that of all other forms (as we understand forms) it is the most\nabstracted and separable from matter, and therefore most proper to\nmetaphysic; which hath likewise been the cause why it hath been better\nlaboured and inquired than any of the other forms, which are more\nimmersed in matter.  For it being the nature of the mind of man (to the\nextreme prejudice of knowledge) to delight in the spacious liberty of\ngeneralities, as in a champaign region, and not in the inclosures of\nparticularity, the mathematics of all other knowledge were the goodliest\nfields to satisfy that appetite.  But for the placing of this science, it\nis not much material: only we have endeavoured in these our partitions to\nobserve a kind of perspective, that one part may cast light upon another.\n\n(2) The mathematics are either pure or mixed.  To the pure mathematics\nare those sciences belonging which handle quantity determinate, merely\nsevered from any axioms of natural philosophy; and these are two,\ngeometry and arithmetic, the one handling quantity continued, and the\nother dissevered.  Mixed hath for subject some axioms or parts of natural\nphilosophy, and considereth quantity determined, as it is auxiliary and\nincident unto them.  For many parts of Nature can neither be invented\nwith sufficient subtlety, nor demonstrated with sufficient perspicuity,\nnor accommodated unto use with sufficient dexterity, without the aid and\nintervening of the mathematics, of which sort are perspective, music,\nastronomy, cosmography, architecture, engineery, and divers others.  In\nthe mathematics I can report no deficience, except it be that men do not\nsufficiently understand this excellent use of the pure mathematics, in\nthat they do remedy and cure many defects in the wit and faculties\nintellectual.  For if the wit be too dull, they sharpen it; if too\nwandering, they fix it; if too inherent in the sense, they abstract it.\nSo that as tennis is a game of no use in itself, but of great use in\nrespect it maketh a quick eye and a body ready to put itself into all\npostures, so in the mathematics that use which is collateral and\nintervenient is no less worthy than that which is principal and intended.\nAnd as for the mixed mathematics, I may only make this prediction, that\nthere cannot fail to be more kinds of them as Nature grows further\ndisclosed.  Thus much of natural science, or the part of Nature\nspeculative.\n\n(3) For natural prudence, or the part operative of natural philosophy, we\nwill divide it into three parts\u2014experimental, philosophical, and magical;\nwhich three parts active have a correspondence and analogy with the three\nparts speculative, natural history, physic, and metaphysic.  For many\noperations have been invented, sometimes by a casual incidence and\noccurrence, sometimes by a purposed experiment; and of those which have\nbeen found by an intentional experiment, some have been found out by\nvarying or extending the same experiment, some by transferring and\ncompounding divers experiments the one into the other, which kind of\ninvention an empiric may manage.  Again, by the knowledge of physical\ncauses there cannot fail to follow many indications and designations of\nnew particulars, if men in their speculation will keep one eye upon use\nand practice.  But these are but coastings along the shore, _premendo\nlittus iniquum_; for it seemeth to me there can hardly be discovered any\nradical or fundamental alterations and innovations in Nature, either by\nthe fortune and essays of experiments, or by the light and direction of\nphysical causes.  If, therefore, we have reported metaphysic deficient,\nit must follow that we do the like of natural magic, which hath relation\nthereunto.  For as for the natural magic whereof now there is mention in\nbooks, containing certain credulous and superstitious conceits and\nobservations of sympathies and antipathies, and hidden proprieties, and\nsome frivolous experiments, strange rather by disguisement than in\nthemselves, it is as far differing in truth of Nature from such a\nknowledge as we require as the story of King Arthur of Britain, or Hugh\nof Bourdeaux, differs from C\u00e6sar\u2019s Commentaries in truth of story; for it\nis manifest that C\u00e6sar did greater things _de vero_ than those imaginary\nheroes were feigned to do.  But he did them not in that fabulous manner.\nOf this kind of learning the fable of Ixion was a figure, who designed to\nenjoy Juno, the goddess of power, and instead of her had copulation with\na cloud, of which mixture were begotten centaurs and chimeras.  So\nwhosoever shall entertain high and vaporous imaginations, instead of a\nlaborious and sober inquiry of truth, shall beget hopes and beliefs of\nstrange and impossible shapes.  And, therefore, we may note in these\nsciences which hold so much of imagination and belief, as this degenerate\nnatural magic, alchemy, astrology, and the like, that in their\npropositions the description of the means is ever more monstrous than the\npretence or end.  For it is a thing more probable that he that knoweth\nwell the natures of weight, of colour, of pliant and fragile in respect\nof the hammer, of volatile and fixed in respect of the fire, and the\nrest, may superinduce upon some metal the nature and form of gold by such\nmechanic as longeth to the production of the natures afore rehearsed,\nthan that some grains of the medicine projected should in a few moments\nof time turn a sea of quicksilver or other material into gold.  So it is\nmore probable that he that knoweth the nature of arefaction, the nature\nof assimilation of nourishment to the thing nourished, the manner of\nincrease and clearing of spirits, the manner of the depredations which\nspirits make upon the humours and solid parts, shall by ambages of diets,\nbathings, anointings, medicines, motions, and the like, prolong life, or\nrestore some degree of youth or vivacity, than that it can be done with\nthe use of a few drops or scruples of a liquor or receipt.  To conclude,\ntherefore, the true natural magic, which is that great liberty and\nlatitude of operation which dependeth upon the knowledge of forms, I may\nreport deficient, as the relative thereof is.  To which part, if we be\nserious and incline not to vanities and plausible discourse, besides the\nderiving and deducing the operations themselves from metaphysic, there\nare pertinent two points of much purpose, the one by way of preparation,\nthe other by way of caution.  The first is, that there be made a\ncalendar, resembling an inventory of the estate of man, containing all\nthe inventions (being the works or fruits of Nature or art) which are now\nextant, and whereof man is already possessed; out of which doth naturally\nresult a note what things are yet held impossible, or not invented, which\ncalendar will be the more artificial and serviceable if to every reputed\nimpossibility you add what thing is extant which cometh the nearest in\ndegree to that impossibility; to the end that by these optatives and\npotentials man\u2019s inquiry may be the more awake in deducing direction of\nworks from the speculation of causes.  And secondly, that these\nexperiments be not only esteemed which have an immediate and present use,\nbut those principally which are of most universal consequence for\ninvention of other experiments, and those which give most light to the\ninvention of causes; for the invention of the mariner\u2019s needle, which\ngiveth the direction, is of no less benefit for navigation than the\ninvention of the sails which give the motion.\n\n(4) Thus have I passed through natural philosophy and the deficiences\nthereof; wherein if I have differed from the ancient and received\ndoctrines, and thereby shall move contradiction, for my part, as I affect\nnot to dissent, so I purpose not to contend.  If it be truth,\n\n    \u201cNon canimus surdis, respondent omnia sylv\u00e6,\u201d\n\nthe voice of Nature will consent, whether the voice of man do or no.  And\nas Alexander Borgia was wont to say of the expedition of the French for\nNaples, that they came with chalk in their hands to mark up their\nlodgings, and not with weapons to fight; so I like better that entry of\ntruth which cometh peaceably with chalk to mark up those minds which are\ncapable to lodge and harbour it, than that which cometh with pugnacity\nand contention.\n\n(5) But there remaineth a division of natural philosophy according to the\nreport of the inquiry, and nothing concerning the matter or subject: and\nthat is positive and considerative, when the inquiry reporteth either an\nassertion or a doubt.  These doubts or _non liquets_ are of two sorts,\nparticular and total.  For the first, we see a good example thereof in\nAristotle\u2019s Problems which deserved to have had a better continuance; but\nso nevertheless as there is one point whereof warning is to be given and\ntaken.  The registering of doubts hath two excellent uses: the one, that\nit saveth philosophy from errors and falsehoods; when that which is not\nfully appearing is not collected into assertion, whereby error might draw\nerror, but reserved in doubt; the other, that the entry of doubts are as\nso many suckers or sponges to draw use of knowledge; insomuch as that\nwhich if doubts had not preceded, a man should never have advised, but\npassed it over without note, by the suggestion and solicitation of doubts\nis made to be attended and applied.  But both these commodities do\nscarcely countervail and inconvenience, which will intrude itself if it\nbe not debarred; which is, that when a doubt is once received, men labour\nrather how to keep it a doubt still, than how to solve it, and\naccordingly bend their wits.  Of this we see the familiar example in\nlawyers and scholars, both which, if they have once admitted a doubt, it\ngoeth ever after authorised for a doubt.  But that use of wit and\nknowledge is to be allowed, which laboureth to make doubtful things\ncertain, and not those which labour to make certain things doubtful.\nTherefore these calendars of doubts I commend as excellent things; so\nthat there he this caution used, that when they be thoroughly sifted and\nbrought to resolution, they be from thenceforth omitted, discarded, and\nnot continued to cherish and encourage men in doubting.  To which\ncalendar of doubts or problems I advise be annexed another calendar, as\nmuch or more material which is a calendar of popular errors: I mean\nchiefly in natural history, such as pass in speech and conceit, and are\nnevertheless apparently detected and convicted of untruth, that man\u2019s\nknowledge be not weakened nor embased by such dross and vanity.  As for\nthe doubts or _non liquets_ general or in total, I understand those\ndifferences of opinions touching the principles of nature, and the\nfundamental points of the same, which have caused the diversity of sects,\nschools, and philosophies, as that of Empedocles, Pythagoras, Democritus,\nParmenides, and the rest.  For although Aristotle, as though he had been\nof the race of the Ottomans, thought he could not reign except the first\nthing he did he killed all his brethren; yet to those that seek truth and\nnot magistrality, it cannot but seem a matter of great profit, to see\nbefore them the several opinions touching the foundations of nature.  Not\nfor any exact truth that can be expected in those theories; for as the\nsame phenomena in astronomy are satisfied by this received astronomy of\nthe diurnal motion, and the proper motions of the planets, with their\neccentrics and epicycles, and likewise by the theory of Copernicus, who\nsupposed the earth to move, and the calculations are indifferently\nagreeable to both, so the ordinary face and view of experience is many\ntimes satisfied by several theories and philosophies; whereas to find the\nreal truth requireth another manner of severity and attention.  For as\nAristotle saith, that children at the first will call every woman mother,\nbut afterward they come to distinguish according to truth, so experience,\nif it be in childhood, will call every philosophy mother, but when it\ncometh to ripeness it will discern the true mother.  So as in the\nmeantime it is good to see the several glosses and opinions upon Nature,\nwhereof it may be everyone in some one point hath seen clearer than his\nfellows, therefore I wish some collection to be made painfully and\nunderstandingly _de antiquis philosophiis_, out of all the possible light\nwhich remaineth to us of them: which kind of work I find deficient.  But\nhere I must give warning, that it be done distinctly and severedly; the\nphilosophies of everyone throughout by themselves, and not by titles\npacked and faggoted up together, as hath been done by Plutarch.  For it\nis the harmony of a philosophy in itself, which giveth it light and\ncredence; whereas if it be singled and broken, it will seem more foreign\nand dissonant.  For as when I read in Tacitus the actions of Nero or\nClaudius, with circumstances of times, inducements, and occasions, I find\nthem not so strange; but when I read them in Suetonius Tranquillus,\ngathered into titles and bundles and not in order of time, they seem more\nmonstrous and incredible: so is it of any philosophy reported entire, and\ndismembered by articles.  Neither do I exclude opinions of latter times\nto be likewise represented in this calendar of sects of philosophy, as\nthat of Theophrastus Paracelsus, eloquently reduced into an harmony by\nthe pen of Severinus the Dane; and that of Tilesius, and his scholar\nDonius, being as a pastoral philosophy, full of sense, but of no great\ndepth; and that of Fracastorius, who, though he pretended not to make any\nnew philosophy, yet did use the absoluteness of his own sense upon the\nold; and that of Gilbertus our countryman, who revived, with some\nalterations and demonstrations, the opinions of Xenophanes; and any other\nworthy to be admitted.\n\n(6) Thus have we now dealt with two of the three beams of man\u2019s\nknowledge; that is _radius directus_, which is referred to nature,\n_radius refractus_, which is referred to God, and cannot report truly\nbecause of the inequality of the medium.  There resteth _radius\nreflexus_, whereby man beholdeth and contemplateth himself.\n\nIX. (1) We come therefore now to that knowledge whereunto the ancient\noracle directeth us, which is the knowledge of ourselves; which deserveth\nthe more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth us more nearly.  This\nknowledge, as it is the end and term of natural philosophy in the\nintention of man, so notwithstanding it is but a portion of natural\nphilosophy in the continent of Nature.  And generally let this be a rule,\nthat all partitions of knowledges be accepted rather for lines and veins\nthan for sections and separations; and that the continuance and\nentireness of knowledge be preserved.  For the contrary hereof hath made\nparticular sciences to become barren, shallow, and erroneous, while they\nhave not been nourished and maintained from the common fountain.  So we\nsee Cicero, the orator, complained of Socrates and his school, that he\nwas the first that separated philosophy and rhetoric; whereupon rhetoric\nbecame an empty and verbal art.  So we may see that the opinion of\nCopernicus, touching the rotation of the earth, which astronomy itself\ncannot correct, because it is not repugnant to any of the _phenomena_,\nyet natural philosophy may correct.  So we see also that the science of\nmedicine if it be destituted and forsaken by natural philosophy, it is\nnot much better than an empirical practice.  With this reservation,\ntherefore, we proceed to human philosophy or humanity, which hath two\nparts: the one considereth man segregate or distributively, the other\ncongregate or in society; so as human philosophy is either simple and\nparticular, or conjugate and civil.  Humanity particular consisteth of\nthe same parts whereof man consisteth: that is, of knowledges which\nrespect the body, and of knowledges that respect the mind.  But before we\ndistribute so far, it is good to constitute.  For I do take the\nconsideration in general, and at large, of human nature to be fit to be\nemancipate and made a knowledge by itself, not so much in regard of those\ndelightful and elegant discourses which have been made of the dignity of\nman, of his miseries, of his state and life, and the like adjuncts of his\ncommon and undivided nature; but chiefly in regard of the knowledge\nconcerning the sympathies and concordances between the mind and body,\nwhich being mixed cannot be properly assigned to the sciences of either.\n\n(2) This knowledge hath two branches: for as all leagues and amities\nconsist of mutual intelligence and mutual offices, so this league of mind\nand body hath these two parts: how the one discloseth the other, and how\nthe one worketh upon the other; discovery and impression.  The former of\nthese hath begotten two arts, both of prediction or prenotion; whereof\nthe one is honoured with the inquiry of Aristotle, and the other of\nHippocrates.  And although they have of later time been used to be\ncoupled with superstitions and fantastical arts, yet being purged and\nrestored to their true state, they have both of them a solid ground in\nNature, and a profitable use in life.  The first is physiognomy, which\ndiscovereth the disposition of the mind by the lineaments of the body.\nThe second is the exposition of natural dreams, which discovereth the\nstate of the body by the imaginations of the mind.  In the former of\nthese I note a deficience.  For Aristotle hath very ingeniously and\ndiligently handled the factures of the body, but not the gestures of the\nbody, which are no less comprehensible by art, and of greater use and\nadvantage.  For the lineaments of the body do disclose the disposition\nand inclination of the mind in general; but the motions of the\ncountenance and parts do not only so, but do further disclose the present\nhumour and state of the mind and will.  For as your majesty saith most\naptly and elegantly, \u201cAs the tongue speaketh to the ear so the gesture\nspeaketh to the eye.\u201d  And, therefore, a number of subtle persons, whose\neyes do dwell upon the faces and fashions of men, do well know the\nadvantage of this observation, as being most part of their ability;\nneither can it be denied, but that it is a great discovery of\ndissimulations, and a great direction in business.\n\n(3) The latter branch, touching impression, hath not been collected into\nart, but hath been handled dispersedly; and it hath the same relation or\n_antistrophe_ that the former hath.  For the consideration is\ndouble\u2014either how and how far the humours and affects of the body do\nalter or work upon the mind, or, again, how and how far the passions or\napprehensions of the mind do alter or work upon the body.  The former of\nthese hath been inquired and considered as a part and appendix of\nmedicine, but much more as a part of religion or superstition.  For the\nphysician prescribeth cures of the mind in frenzies and melancholy\npassions, and pretendeth also to exhibit medicines to exhilarate the\nmind, to control the courage, to clarify the wits, to corroborate the\nmemory, and the like; but the scruples and superstitions of diet and\nother regiment of the body in the sect of the Pythagoreans, in the heresy\nof the Manichees, and in the law of Mahomet, do exceed.  So likewise the\nordinances in the ceremonial law, interdicting the eating of the blood\nand the fat, distinguishing between beasts clean and unclean for meat,\nare many and strict; nay, the faith itself being clear and serene from\nall clouds of ceremony, yet retaineth the use of fastlings, abstinences,\nand other macerations and humiliations of the body, as things real, and\nnot figurative.  The root and life of all which prescripts is (besides\nthe ceremony) the consideration of that dependency which the affections\nof the mind are submitted unto upon the state and disposition of the\nbody.  And if any man of weak judgment do conceive that this suffering of\nthe mind from the body doth either question the immortality, or derogate\nfrom the sovereignty of the soul, he may be taught, in easy instances,\nthat the infant in the mother\u2019s womb is compatible with the mother, and\nyet separable; and the most absolute monarch is sometimes led by his\nservants, and yet without subjection.  As for the reciprocal knowledge,\nwhich is the operation of the conceits and passions of the mind upon the\nbody, we see all wise physicians, in the prescriptions of their regiments\nto their patients, do ever consider _accidentia animi_, as of great force\nto further or hinder remedies or recoveries: and more specially it is an\ninquiry of great depth and worth concerning imagination, how and how far\nit altereth the body proper of the imaginant; for although it hath a\nmanifest power to hurt, it followeth not it hath the same degree of power\nto help.  No more than a man can conclude, that because there be\npestilent airs, able suddenly to kill a man in health, therefore there\nshould be sovereign airs, able suddenly to cure a man in sickness.  But\nthe inquisition of this part is of great use, though it needeth, as\nSocrates said, \u201ca Delian diver,\u201d being difficult and profound.  But unto\nall this knowledge _de communi vinculo_, of the concordances between the\nmind and the body, that part of inquiry is most necessary which\nconsidereth of the seats and domiciles which the several faculties of the\nmind do take and occupate in the organs of the body; which knowledge hath\nbeen attempted, and is controverted, and deserveth to be much better\ninquired.  For the opinion of Plato, who placed the understanding in the\nbrain, animosity (which he did unfitly call anger, having a greater\nmixture with pride) in the heart, and concupiscence or sensuality in the\nliver, deserveth not to be despised, but much less to be allowed.  So,\nthen, we have constituted (as in our own wish and advice) the inquiry\ntouching human nature entire, as a just portion of knowledge to be\nhandled apart.\n\nX. (1) The knowledge that concerneth man\u2019s body is divided as the good of\nman\u2019s body is divided, unto which it referreth.  The good of man\u2019s body\nis of four kinds\u2014health, beauty, strength, and pleasure: so the\nknowledges are medicine, or art of cure; art of decoration, which is\ncalled cosmetic; art of activity, which is called athletic; and art\nvoluptuary, which Tacitus truly calleth _eruditus luxus_.  This subject\nof man\u2019s body is, of all other things in nature, most susceptible of\nremedy; but then that remedy is most susceptible of error; for the same\nsubtlety of the subject doth cause large possibility and easy failing,\nand therefore the inquiry ought to be the more exact.\n\n(2) To speak, therefore, of medicine, and to resume that we have said,\nascending a little higher: the ancient opinion that man was\n_microcosmus_\u2014an abstract or model of the world\u2014hath been fantastically\nstrained by Paracelsus and the alchemists, as if there were to be found\nin man\u2019s body certain correspondences and parallels, which should have\nrespect to all varieties of things, as stars, planets, minerals, which\nare extant in the great world.  But thus much is evidently true, that of\nall substances which nature hath produced, man\u2019s body is the most\nextremely compounded.  For we see herbs and plants are nourished by earth\nand water; beasts for the most part by herbs and fruits; man by the flesh\nof beasts, birds, fishes, herbs, grains, fruits, water, and the manifold\nalterations, dressings, and preparations of these several bodies before\nthey come to be his food and aliment.  Add hereunto that beasts have a\nmore simple order of life, and less change of affections to work upon\ntheir bodies, whereas man in his mansion, sleep, exercise, passions, hath\ninfinite variations: and it cannot be denied but that the body of man of\nall other things is of the most compounded mass.  The soul, on the other\nside, is the simplest of substances, as is well expressed:\n\n          \u201cPurumque reliquit\n    \u00c6thereum sensum atque aura\u00ef simplicis ignem.\u201d\n\nSo that it is no marvel though the soul so placed enjoy no rest, if that\nprinciple be true, that _Motus rerum est rapidus extra locum_, _placidus\nin loco_.  But to the purpose.  This variable composition of man\u2019s body\nhath made it as an instrument easy to distemper; and, therefore, the\npoets did well to conjoin music and medicine in Apollo, because the\noffice of medicine is but to tune this curious harp of man\u2019s body and to\nreduce it to harmony.  So, then, the subject being so variable hath made\nthe art by consequent more conjectural; and the art being conjectural\nhath made so much the more place to be left for imposture.  For almost\nall other arts and sciences are judged by acts or masterpieces, as I may\nterm them, and not by the successes and events.  The lawyer is judged by\nthe virtue of his pleading, and not by the issue of the cause; this\nmaster in this ship is judged by the directing his course aright, and not\nby the fortune of the voyage; but the physician, and perhaps this\npolitique, hath no particular acts demonstrative of his ability, but is\njudged most by the event, which is ever but as it is taken: for who can\ntell, if a patient die or recover, or if a state be preserved or ruined,\nwhether it be art or accident?  And therefore many times the impostor is\nprized, and the man of virtue taxed.  Nay, we see [the] weakness and\ncredulity of men is such, as they will often refer a mountebank or witch\nbefore a learned physician.  And therefore the poets were clear-sighted\nin discerning this extreme folly when they made \u00c6sculapius and Circe,\nbrother and sister, both children of the sun, as in the verses\u2014\n\n    \u201cIpse repertorem medicin\u00e6 talis et artis\n    Fulmine Ph\u0153bigenam Stygias detrusit ad undas.\u201d\n\nAnd again\u2014\n\n    \u201cDives inaccessos ubi Solis filia lucos,\u201d &c.\n\nFor in all times, in the opinion of the multitude, witches and old women\nand impostors, have had a competition with physicians.  And what\nfolloweth?  Even this, that physicians say to themselves, as Solomon\nexpresseth it upon a higher occasion, \u201cIf it befall to me as befalleth to\nthe fools, why should I labour to be more wise?\u201d  And therefore I cannot\nmuch blame physicians that they use commonly to intend some other art or\npractice, which they fancy more than their profession; for you shall have\nof them antiquaries, poets, humanists, statesmen, merchants, divines, and\nin every of these better seen than in their profession; and no doubt upon\nthis ground that they find that mediocrity and excellency in their art\nmaketh no difference in profit or reputation towards their fortune: for\nthe weakness of patients, and sweetness of life, and nature of hope,\nmaketh men depend upon physicians with all their defects.  But,\nnevertheless, these things which we have spoken of are courses begotten\nbetween a little occasion and a great deal of sloth and default; for if\nwe will excite and awake our observation, we shall see in familiar\ninstances what a predominant faculty the subtlety of spirit hath over the\nvariety of matter or form.  Nothing more variable than faces and\ncountenances, yet men can bear in memory the infinite distinctions of\nthem; nay, a painter, with a few shells of colours, and the benefit of\nhis eye, and habit of his imagination, can imitate them all that ever\nhave been, are, or may be, if they were brought before him.  Nothing more\nvariable than voices, yet men can likewise discern them personally: nay,\nyou shall have a _buffon_ or _pantomimus_ will express as many as he\npleaseth.  Nothing more variable than the differing sounds of words; yet\nmen have found the way to reduce them to a few simple letters.  So that\nit is not the insufficiency or incapacity of man\u2019s mind, but it is the\nremote standing or placing thereof that breedeth these mazes and\nincomprehensions; for as the sense afar off is full of mistaking, but is\nexact at hand, so is it of the understanding, the remedy whereof is, not\nto quicken or strengthen the organ, but to go nearer to the object; and\ntherefore there is no doubt but if the physicians will learn and use the\ntrue approaches and avenues of nature, they may assume as much as the\npoet saith:\n\n    \u201cEt quoniam variant morbi, variabimus artes;\n    Mille mali species, mille salutis erunt.\u201d\n\nWhich that they should do, the nobleness of their art doth deserve: well\nshadowed by the poets, in that they made \u00c6sculapius to be the son of\n[the] sun, the one being the fountain of life, the other as the\nsecond-stream; but infinitely more honoured by the example of our\nSaviour, who made the body of man the object of His miracles, as the soul\nwas the object of His doctrine.  For we read not that ever He vouchsafed\nto do any miracle about honour or money (except that one for giving\ntribute to C\u00e6sar), but only about the preserving, sustaining, and healing\nthe body of man.\n\n(3) Medicine is a science which hath been (as we have said) more\nprofessed than laboured, and yet more laboured than advanced; the labour\nhaving been, in my judgment, rather in circle than in progression.  For I\nfind much iteration, but small addition.  It considereth causes of\ndiseases, with the occasions or impulsions; the diseases themselves, with\nthe accidents; and the cures, with the preservations.  The deficiences\nwhich I think good to note, being a few of many, and those such as are of\na more open and manifest nature, I will enumerate and not place.\n\n(4) The first is the discontinuance of the ancient and serious diligence\nof Hippocrates, which used to set down a narrative of the special cases\nof his patients, and how they proceeded, and how they were judged by\nrecovery or death.  Therefore having an example proper in the father of\nthe art, I shall not need to allege an example foreign, of the wisdom of\nthe lawyers, who are careful to report new cases and decisions, for the\ndirection of future judgments.  This continuance of medicinal history I\nfind deficient; which I understand neither to be so infinite as to extend\nto every common case, nor so reserved as to admit none but wonders: for\nmany things are new in this manner, which are not new in the kind; and if\nmen will intend to observe, they shall find much worthy to observe.\n\n(5) In the inquiry which is made by anatomy, I find much deficience: for\nthey inquire of the parts, and their substances, figures, and\ncollocations; but they inquire not of the diversities of the parts, the\nsecrecies of the passages, and the seats or nestling of the humours, nor\nmuch of the footsteps and impressions of diseases.  The reason of which\nomission I suppose to be, because the first inquiry may be satisfied in\nthe view of one or a few anatomies; but the latter, being comparative and\ncasual, must arise from the view of many.  And as to the diversity of\nparts, there is no doubt but the facture or framing of the inward parts\nis as full of difference as the outward, and in that is the cause\ncontinent of many diseases; which not being observed, they quarrel many\ntimes with the humours, which are not in fault; the fault being in the\nvery frame and mechanic of the part, which cannot be removed by medicine\nalterative, but must be accommodated and palliated by diets and medicines\nfamiliar.  And for the passages and pores, it is true which was anciently\nnoted, that the more subtle of them appear not in anatomies, because they\nare shut and latent in dead bodies, though they be open and manifest in\nlife: which being supposed, though the inhumanity of _anatomia vivorum_\nwas by Celsus justly reproved; yet in regard of the great use of this\nobservation, the inquiry needed not by him so slightly to have been\nrelinquished altogether, or referred to the casual practices of surgery;\nbut might have been well diverted upon the dissection of beasts alive,\nwhich notwithstanding the dissimilitude of their parts may sufficiently\nsatisfy this inquiry.  And for the humours, they are commonly passed over\nin anatomies as purgaments; whereas it is most necessary to observe, what\ncavities, nests, and receptacles the humours do find in the parts, with\nthe differing kind of the humour so lodged and received.  And as for the\nfootsteps of diseases, and their devastations of the inward parts,\nimpostumations, exulcerations, discontinuations, putrefactions,\nconsumptions, contractions, extensions, convulsions, dislocations,\nobstructions, repletions, together with all preternatural substances, as\nstones, carnosities, excrescences, worms, and the like; they ought to\nhave been exactly observed by multitude of anatomies, and the\ncontribution of men\u2019s several experiences, and carefully set down both\nhistorically according to the appearances, and artificially with a\nreference to the diseases and symptoms which resulted from them, in case\nwhere the anatomy is of a defunct patient; whereas now upon opening of\nbodies they are passed over slightly and in silence.\n\n(6) In the inquiry of diseases, they do abandon the cures of many, some\nas in their nature incurable, and others as past the period of cure; so\nthat Sylla and the Triumvirs never proscribed so many men to die, as they\ndo by their ignorant edicts: whereof numbers do escape with less\ndifficulty than they did in the Roman prescriptions.  Therefore I will\nnot doubt to note as a deficience, that they inquire not the perfect\ncures of many diseases, or extremities of diseases; but pronouncing them\nincurable do enact a law of neglect, and exempt ignorance from discredit.\n\n(7) Nay further, I esteem it the office of a physician not only to\nrestore health, but to mitigate pain and dolors; and not only when such\nmitigation may conduce to recovery, but when it may serve to make a fair\nand easy passage.  For it is no small felicity which Augustus C\u00e6sar was\nwont to wish to himself, that same _Euthanasia_; and which was specially\nnoted in the death of Antoninus Pius, whose death was after the fashion,\nand semblance of a kindly and pleasant sheep.  So it is written of\nEpicurus, that after his disease was judged desperate, he drowned his\nstomach and senses with a large draught and ingurgitation of wine;\nwhereupon the epigram was made, _Hinc Stygias ebrius hausit aquas_; he\nwas not sober enough to taste any bitterness of the Stygian water.  But\nthe physicians contrariwise do make a kind of scruple and religion to\nstay with the patient after the disease is deplored; whereas in my\njudgment they ought both to inquire the skill, and to give the\nattendances, for the facilitating and assuaging of the pains and agonies\nof death.\n\n(5) In the consideration of the cures of diseases, I find a deficience in\nthe receipts of propriety, respecting the particular cures of diseases:\nfor the physicians have frustrated the fruit of tradition and experience\nby their magistralities, in adding and taking out and changing _quid pro\nqua_ in their receipts, at their pleasures; commanding so over the\nmedicine, as the medicine cannot command over the disease.  For except it\nbe treacle and _mithridatum_, and of late _diascordium_, and a few more,\nthey tie themselves to no receipts severely and religiously.  For as to\nthe confections of sale which are in the shops, they are for readiness\nand not for propriety.  For they are upon general intentions of purging,\nopening, comforting, altering, and not much appropriate to particular\ndiseases.  And this is the cause why empirics and old women are more\nhappy many times in their cures than learned physicians, because they are\nmore religious in holding their medicines.  Therefore here is the\ndeficience which I find, that physicians have not, partly out of their\nown practice, partly out of the constant probations reported in books,\nand partly out of the traditions of empirics, set down and delivered over\ncertain experimental medicines for the cure of particular diseases,\nbesides their own conjectural and magistral descriptions.  For as they\nwere the men of the best composition in the state of Rome, which either\nbeing consuls inclined to the people, or being tribunes inclined to the\nsenate; so in the matter we now handle, they be the best physicians,\nwhich being learned incline to the traditions of experience, or being\nempirics incline to the methods of learning.\n\n(9) In preparation of medicines I do find strange, specially considering\nhow mineral medicines have been extolled, and that they are safer for the\noutward than inward parts, that no man hath sought to make an imitation\nby art of natural baths and medicinable fountains: which nevertheless are\nconfessed to receive their virtues from minerals; and not so only, but\ndiscerned and distinguished from what particular mineral they receive\ntincture, as sulphur, vitriol, steel, or the like; which nature, if it\nmay be reduced to compositions of art, both the variety of them will be\nincreased, and the temper of them will be more commanded.\n\n(10) But lest I grow to be more particular than is agreeable either to my\nintention or to proportion, I will conclude this part with the note of\none deficience more, which seemeth to me of greatest consequence: which\nis, that the prescripts in use are too compendious to attain their end;\nfor, to my understanding, it is a vain and flattering opinion to think\nany medicine can be so sovereign or so happy, as that the receipt or miss\nof it can work any great effect upon the body of man.  It were a strange\nspeech which spoken, or spoken oft, should reclaim a man from a vice to\nwhich he were by nature subject.  It is order, pursuit, sequence, and\ninterchange of application, which is mighty in nature; which although it\nrequire more exact knowledge in prescribing, and more precise obedience\nin observing, yet is recompensed with the magnitude of effects.  And\nalthough a man would think, by the daily visitations of the physicians,\nthat there were a pursuance in the cure, yet let a man look into their\nprescripts and ministrations, and he shall find them but inconstancies\nand every day\u2019s devices, without any settled providence or project.  Not\nthat every scrupulous or superstitious prescript is effectual, no more\nthan every straight way is the way to heaven; but the truth of the\ndirection must precede severity of observance.\n\n(11) For cosmetic, it hath parts civil, and parts effeminate: for\ncleanness of body was ever esteemed to proceed from a due reverence to\nGod, to society, and to ourselves.  As for artificial decoration, it is\nwell worthy of the deficiences which it hath; being neither fine enough\nto deceive, nor handsome to use, nor wholesome to please.\n\n(12) For athletic, I take the subject of it largely, that is to say, for\nany point of ability whereunto the body of man may be brought, whether it\nbe of activity, or of patience; whereof activity hath two parts, strength\nand swiftness; and patience likewise hath two parts, hardness against\nwants and extremities, and endurance of pain or torment; whereof we see\nthe practices in tumblers, in savages, and in those that suffer\npunishment.  Nay, if there be any other faculty which falls not within\nany of the former divisions, as in those that dive, that obtain a strange\npower of containing respiration, and the like, I refer it to this part.\nOf these things the practices are known, but the philosophy that\nconcerneth them is not much inquired; the rather, I think, because they\nare supposed to be obtained, either by an aptness of nature, which cannot\nbe taught, or only by continual custom, which is soon prescribed which\nthough it be not true, yet I forbear to note any deficiences; for the\nOlympian games are down long since, and the mediocrity of these things is\nfor use; as for the excellency of them it serveth for the most part but\nfor mercenary ostentation.\n\n(13) For arts of pleasure sensual, the chief deficience in them is of\nlaws to repress them.  For as it hath been well observed, that the arts\nwhich flourish in times while virtue is in growth, are military; and\nwhile virtue is in state, are liberal; and while virtue is in\ndeclination, are voluptuary: so I doubt that this age of the world is\nsomewhat upon the descent of the wheel.  With arts voluptuary I couple\npractices joculary; for the deceiving of the senses is one of the\npleasures of the senses.  As for games of recreation, I hold them to\nbelong to civil life and education.  And thus much of that particular\nhuman philosophy which concerns the body, which is but the tabernacle of\nthe mind.\n\nXI. (1) For human knowledge which concerns the mind, it hath two parts;\nthe one that inquireth of the substance or nature of the soul or mind,\nthe other that inquireth of the faculties or functions thereof.   Unto\nthe first of these, the considerations of the original of the soul,\nwhether it be native or adventive, and how far it is exempted from laws\nof matter, and of the immortality thereof, and many other points, do\nappertain: which have been not more laboriously inquired than variously\nreported; so as the travail therein taken seemeth to have been rather in\na maze than in a way.  But although I am of opinion that this knowledge\nmay be more really and soundly inquired, even in nature, than it hath\nbeen, yet I hold that in the end it must be hounded by religion, or else\nit will be subject to deceit and delusion.  For as the substance of the\nsoul in the creation was not extracted out of the mass of heaven and\nearth by the benediction of a _producat_, but was immediately inspired\nfrom God, so it is not possible that it should be (otherwise than by\naccident) subject to the laws of heaven and earth, which are the subject\nof philosophy; and therefore the true knowledge of the nature and state\nof the soul must come by the same inspiration that gave the substance.\nUnto this part of knowledge touching the soul there be two appendices;\nwhich, as they have been handled, have rather vapoured forth fables than\nkindled truth: divination and fascination.\n\n(2) Divination hath been anciently and fitly divided into artificial and\nnatural: whereof artificial is, when the mind maketh a prediction by\nargument, concluding upon signs and tokens; natural is, when the mind\nhath a presention by an internal power, without the inducement of a sign.\nArtificial is of two sorts: either when the argument is coupled with a\nderivation of causes, which is rational; or when it is only grounded upon\na coincidence of the effect, which is experimental: whereof the latter\nfor the most part is superstitious, such as were the heathen observations\nupon the inspection of sacrifices, the flights of birds, the swarming of\nbees; and such as was the Chaldean astrology, and the like.  For\nartificial divination, the several kinds thereof are distributed amongst\nparticular knowledges.  The astronomer hath his predictions, as of\nconjunctions, aspects, eclipses, and the like.  The physician hath his\npredictions, of death, of recovery, of the accidents and issues of\ndiseases.  The politique hath his predictions; _O urbem venalem_, _et\ncito perituram_, _si emptorem invenerit_! which stayed not long to be\nperformed, in Sylla first, and after in C\u00e6sar: so as these predictions\nare now impertinent, and to be referred over.  But the divination which\nspringeth from the internal nature of the soul is that which we now speak\nof; which hath been made to be of two sorts, primitive and by influxion.\nPrimitive is grounded upon the supposition that the mind, when it is\nwithdrawn and collected into itself, and not diffused into the organs of\nthe body, hath some extent and latitude of prenotion; which therefore\nappeareth most in sleep, in ecstasies, and near death, and more rarely in\nwaking apprehensions; and is induced and furthered by those abstinences\nand observances which make the mind most to consist in itself.  By\ninfluxion, is grounded upon the conceit that the mind, as a mirror or\nglass, should take illumination from the foreknowledge of God and\nspirits: unto which the same regiment doth likewise conduce.  For the\nretiring of the mind within itself is the state which is most susceptible\nof divine influxions; save that it is accompanied in this case with a\nfervency and elevation (which the ancients noted by fury), and not with a\nrepose and quiet, as it is in the other.\n\n(3) Fascination is the power and act of imagination intensive upon other\nbodies than the body of the imaginant, for of that we spake in the proper\nplace.  Wherein the school of Paracelsus, and the disciples of pretended\nnatural magic, have been so intemperate, as they have exalted the power\nof the imagination to be much one with the power of miracle-working\nfaith.  Others, that draw nearer to probability, calling to their view\nthe secret passages of things, and specially of the contagion that\npasseth from body to body, do conceive it should likewise be agreeable to\nnature that there should be some transmissions and operations from spirit\nto spirit without the mediation of the senses; whence the conceits have\ngrown (now almost made civil) of the mastering spirit, and the force of\nconfidence, and the like.  Incident unto this is the inquiry how to raise\nand fortify the imagination; for if the imagination fortified have power,\nthen it is material to know how to fortify and exalt it.  And herein\ncomes in crookedly and dangerously a palliation of a great part of\nceremonial magic.  For it may be pretended that ceremonies, characters,\nand charms do work, not by any tacit or sacramental contract with evil\nspirits, but serve only to strengthen the imagination of him that useth\nit; as images are said by the Roman Church to fix the cogitations and\nraise the devotions of them that pray before them.  But for mine own\njudgment, if it be admitted that imagination hath power, and that\nceremonies fortify imagination, and that they be used sincerely and\nintentionally for that purpose; yet I should hold them unlawful, as\nopposing to that first edict which God gave unto man, _In sudore vultus\ncomedes panem tuum_.  For they propound those noble effects, which God\nhath set forth unto man to be bought at the price of labour, to be\nattained by a few easy and slothful observances.  Deficiences in these\nknowledges I will report none, other than the general deficience, that it\nis not known how much of them is verity, and how much vanity.\n\nXII. (1) The knowledge which respecteth the faculties of the mind of man\nis of two kinds\u2014the one respecting his understanding and reason, and the\nother his will, appetite, and affection; whereof the former produceth\nposition or decree, the latter action or execution.  It is true that the\nimagination is an agent or _nuncius_ in both provinces, both the judicial\nand the ministerial.  For sense sendeth over to imagination before reason\nhave judged, and reason sendeth over to imagination before the decree can\nbe acted.  For imagination ever precedeth voluntary motion.  Saving that\nthis Janus of imagination hath differing faces: for the face towards\nreason hath the print of truth, but the face towards action hath the\nprint of good; which nevertheless are faces,\n\n    \u201cQuales decet esse sororum.\u201d\n\nNeither is the imagination simply and only a messenger; but is invested\nwith, or at least wise usurpeth no small authority in itself, besides the\nduty of the message.  For it was well said by Aristotle, \u201cThat the mind\nhath over the body that commandment, which the lord hath over a bondman;\nbut that reason hath over the imagination that commandment which a\nmagistrate hath over a free citizen,\u201d who may come also to rule in his\nturn.  For we see that, in matters of faith and religion, we raise our\nimagination above our reason, which is the cause why religion sought ever\naccess to the mind by similitudes, types, parables, visions, dreams.  And\nagain, in all persuasions that are wrought by eloquence, and other\nimpressions of like nature, which do paint and disguise the true\nappearance of things, the chief recommendation unto reason is from the\nimagination.  Nevertheless, because I find not any science that doth\nproperly or fitly pertain to the imagination, I see no cause to alter the\nformer division.  For as for poesy, it is rather a pleasure or play of\nimagination than a work or duty thereof.  And if it be a work, we speak\nnot now of such parts of learning as the imagination produceth, but of\nsuch sciences as handle and consider of the imagination.  No more than we\nshall speak now of such knowledges as reason produceth (for that\nextendeth to all philosophy), but of such knowledges as do handle and\ninquire of the faculty of reason: so as poesy had his true place.  As for\nthe power of the imagination in nature, and the manner of fortifying the\nsame, we have mentioned it in the doctrine _De Anima_, whereunto most\nfitly it belongeth.  And lastly, for imaginative or insinuative reason,\nwhich is the subject of rhetoric, we think it best to refer it to the\narts of reason.  So therefore we content ourselves with the former\ndivision, that human philosophy, which respecteth the faculties of the\nmind of man, hath two parts, rational and moral.\n\n(2) The part of human philosophy which is rational is of all knowledges,\nto the most wits, the least delightful, and seemeth but a net of subtlety\nand spinosity.  For as it was truly said, that knowledge is _pabulum\nanimi_; so in the nature of men\u2019s appetite to this food most men are of\nthe taste and stomach of the Israelites in the desert, that would fain\nhave returned _ad ollas carnium_, and were weary of manna; which, though\nit were celestial, yet seemed less nutritive and comfortable.  So\ngenerally men taste well knowledges that are drenched in flesh and blood,\ncivil history, morality, policy, about the which men\u2019s affections,\npraises, fortunes do turn and are conversant.  But this same _lumen\nsiccum_ doth parch and offend most men\u2019s watery and soft natures.  But to\nspeak truly of things as they are in worth, rational knowledges are the\nkeys of all other arts, for as Aristotle saith aptly and elegantly, \u201cThat\nthe hand is the instrument of instruments, and the mind is the form of\nforms;\u201d so these be truly said to be the art of arts.  Neither do they\nonly direct, but likewise confirm and strengthen; even as the habit of\nshooting doth not only enable to shoot a nearer shoot, but also to draw a\nstronger bow.\n\n(3) The arts intellectual are four in number, divided according to the\nends whereunto they are referred\u2014for man\u2019s labour is to invent that which\nis sought or propounded; or to judge that which is invented; or to retain\nthat which is judged; or to deliver over that which is retained.  So as\nthe arts must be four\u2014art of inquiry or invention; art of examination or\njudgment; art of custody or memory; and art of elocution or tradition.\n\nXIII. (1) Invention is of two kinds much differing\u2014the one of arts and\nsciences, and the other of speech and arguments.  The former of these I\ndo report deficient; which seemeth to me to be such a deficience as if,\nin the making of an inventory touching the state of a defunct, it should\nbe set down that there is no ready money.  For as money will fetch all\nother commodities, so this knowledge is that which should purchase all\nthe rest.  And like as the West Indies had never been discovered if the\nuse of the mariner\u2019s needle had not been first discovered, though the one\nbe vast regions, and the other a small motion; so it cannot be found\nstrange if sciences be no further discovered, if the art itself of\ninvention and discovery hath been passed over.\n\n(2) That this part of knowledge is wanting, to my judgment standeth\nplainly confessed; for first, logic doth not pretend to invent sciences,\nor the axioms of sciences, but passeth it over with a _cuique in sua arte\ncredendum_.  And Celsus acknowledgeth it gravely, speaking of the\nempirical and dogmatical sects of physicians, \u201cThat medicines and cures\nwere first found out, and then after the reasons and causes were\ndiscoursed; and not the causes first found out, and by light from them\nthe medicines and cures discovered.\u201d  And Plato in his \u201cThe\u00e6tetus\u201d noteth\nwell, \u201cThat particulars are infinite, and the higher generalities give no\nsufficient direction; and that the pith of all sciences, which maketh the\nartsman differ from the inexpert, is in the middle propositions, which in\nevery particular knowledge are taken from tradition and experience.\u201d  And\ntherefore we see, that they which discourse of the inventions and\noriginals of things refer them rather to chance than to art, and rather\nto beasts, birds, fishes, serpents, than to men.\n\n    \u201cDictamnum genetrix Cret\u00e6a carpit ab Ida,\n    Puberibus caulem foliis et flore camantem\n    Purpureo; non illa feris incognita capris\n    Gramina, cum tergo volucres h\u00e6sere sagitt\u00e6.\u201d\n\nSo that it was no marvel (the manner of antiquity being to consecrate\ninventors) that the Egyptians had so few human idols in their temples,\nbut almost all brute:\n\n    \u201cOmnigenumque Deum monstra, et latrator Anubis,\n    Contra Neptunum, et Venerem, contraque Minervam, &c.\u201d\n\nAnd if you like better the tradition of the Grecians, and ascribe the\nfirst inventions to men, yet you will rather believe that Prometheus\nfirst stroke the flints, and marvelled at the spark, than that when he\nfirst stroke the flints he expected the spark; and therefore we see the\nWest Indian Prometheus had no intelligence with the European, because of\nthe rareness with them of flint, that gave the first occasion.  So as it\nshould seem, that hitherto men are rather beholden to a wild goat for\nsurgery, or to a nightingale for music, or to the ibis for some part of\nphysic, or to the pot-lid that flew open for artillery, or generally to\nchance or anything else than to logic for the invention of arts and\nsciences.  Neither is the form of invention which Virgil describeth much\nother:\n\n    \u201cUt varias usus meditande extunderet artes\n    Paulatim.\u201d\n\nFor if you observe the words well, it is no other method than that which\nbrute beasts are capable of, and do put in ure; which is a perpetual\nintending or practising some one thing, urged and imposed by an absolute\nnecessity of conservation of being.  For so Cicero saith very truly,\n_Usus uni rei deditus et naturam et artem s\u00e6pe vincit_.  And therefore if\nit be said of men,\n\n          \u201cLabor omnia vincit\n    Improbus, et duris urgens in rebus egestas,\u201d\n\nit is likewise said of beasts, _Quis psittaco docuit suum \u03c7\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5_?  Who\ntaught the raven in a drought to throw pebbles into a hollow tree, where\nshe spied water, that the water might rise so as she might come to it?\nWho taught the bee to sail through such a vast sea or air, and to find\nthe way from a field in a flower a great way off to her hive?  Who taught\nthe ant to bite every grain of corn that she burieth in her hill, lest it\nshould take root and grow?  Add then the word _extundere_, which\nimporteth the extreme difficulty, and the word _paulatim_, which\nimporteth the extreme slowness, and we are where we were, even amongst\nthe Egyptians\u2019 gods; there being little left to the faculty of reason,\nand nothing to the duty or art, for matter of invention.\n\n(3) Secondly, the induction which the logicians speak of, and which\nseemeth familiar with Plato, whereby the principles of sciences may be\npretended to be invented, and so the middle propositions by derivation\nfrom the principles; their form of induction, I say, is utterly vicious\nand incompetent; wherein their error is the fouler, because it is the\nduty of art to perfect and exalt nature; but they contrariwise have\nwronged, abused, and traduced nature.  For he that shall attentively\nobserve how the mind doth gather this excellent dew of knowledge, like\nunto that which the poet speaketh of, _A\u00ebrei mellis c\u00e6lestia dona_,\ndistilling and contriving it out of particulars natural and artificial,\nas the flowers of the field and garden, shall find that the mind of\nherself by nature doth manage and act an induction much better than they\ndescribe it.  For to conclude upon an enumeration of particulars, without\ninstance contradictory, is no conclusion, but a conjecture; for who can\nassure (in many subjects) upon those particulars which appear of a side,\nthat there are not other on the contrary side which appear not?  As if\nSamuel should have rested upon those sons of Jesse which were brought\nbefore him, and failed of David which was in the field.  And this form\n(to say truth), is so gross, as it had not been possible for wits so\nsubtle as have managed these things to have offered it to the world, but\nthat they hasted to their theories and dogmaticals, and were imperious\nand scornful toward particulars; which their manner was to use but as\n_lictores_ and _viatores_, for sergeants and whifflers, _ad summovendam\nturbam_, to make way and make room for their opinions, rather than in\ntheir true use and service.  Certainly it is a thing may touch a man with\na religious wonder, to see how the footsteps of seducement are the very\nsame in divine and human truth; for, as in divine truth man cannot endure\nto become as a child, so in human, they reputed the attending the\ninductions (whereof we speak), as if it were a second infancy or\nchildhood.\n\n(4) Thirdly, allow some principles or axioms were rightly induced, yet,\nnevertheless, certain it is that middle propositions cannot be deduced\nfrom them in subject of nature by syllogism\u2014that is, by touch and\nreduction of them to principles in a middle term.  It is true that in\nsciences popular, as moralities, laws, and the like, yea, and divinity\n(because it pleaseth God to apply Himself to the capacity of the\nsimplest), that form may have use; and in natural philosophy likewise, by\nway of argument or satisfactory reason, _Qu\u00e6 assensum parit operis eff\u00e6ta\nest_; but the subtlety of nature and operations will not be enchained in\nthose bonds.  For arguments consist of propositions, and propositions of\nwords, and words are but the current tokens or marks of popular notions\nof things; which notions, if they be grossly and variably collected out\nof particulars, it is not the laborious examination either of\nconsequences of arguments, or of the truth of propositions, that can ever\ncorrect that error, being (as the physicians speak) in the first\ndigestion.  And, therefore, it was not without cause, that so many\nexcellent philosophers became sceptics and academics, and denied any\ncertainty of knowledge or comprehension; and held opinion that the\nknowledge of man extended only to appearances and probabilities.  It is\ntrue that in Socrates it was supposed to be but a form of irony,\n_Scientiam dissimulando simulavit_; for he used to disable his knowledge,\nto the end to enhance his knowledge; like the humour of Tiberius in his\nbeginnings, that would reign, but would not acknowledge so much.  And in\nthe later academy, which Cicero embraced, this opinion also of\n_acatalepsia_ (I doubt) was not held sincerely; for that all those which\nexcelled in copy of speech seem to have chosen that sect, as that which\nwas fittest to give glory to their eloquence and variable discourses;\nbeing rather like progresses of pleasure than journeys to an end.  But\nassuredly many scattered in both academies did hold it in subtlety and\nintegrity.  But here was their chief error: they charged the deceit upon\nthe senses; which in my judgment (notwithstanding all their cavillations)\nare very sufficient to certify and report truth, though not always\nimmediately, yet by comparison, by help of instrument, and by producing\nand urging such things as are too subtle for the sense to some effect\ncomprehensible by the sense, and other like assistance.  But they ought\nto have charged the deceit upon the weakness of the intellectual powers,\nand upon the manner of collecting and concluding upon the reports of the\nsenses.  This I speak, not to disable the mind of man, but to stir it up\nto seek help; for no man, be he never so cunning or practised, can make a\nstraight line or perfect circle by steadiness of hand, which may be\neasily done by help of a ruler or compass.\n\n(5) This part of invention, concerning the invention of sciences, I\npurpose (if God give me leave) hereafter to propound, having digested it\ninto two parts: whereof the one I term _experientia literata_, and the\nother _interpretatio natur\u00e6_; the former being but a degree and rudiment\nof the latter.  But I will not dwell too long, nor speak too great upon a\npromise.\n\n(6) The invention of speech or argument is not properly an invention; for\nto invent is to discover that we know not, and not to recover or resummon\nthat which we already know; and the use of this invention is no other\nbut, out of the knowledge whereof our mind is already possessed to draw\nforth or call before us that which may be pertinent to the purpose which\nwe take into our consideration.  So as to speak truly, it is no\ninvention, but a remembrance or suggestion, with an application; which is\nthe cause why the schools do place it after judgment, as subsequent and\nnot precedent.  Nevertheless, because we do account it a chase as well of\ndeer in an enclosed park as in a forest at large, and that it hath\nalready obtained the name, let it be called invention; so as it be\nperceived and discerned, that the scope and end of this invention is\nreadiness and present use of our knowledge, and not addition or\namplification thereof.\n\n(7) To procure this ready use of knowledge there are two courses,\npreparation and suggestion.  The former of these seemeth scarcely a part\nof knowledge, consisting rather of diligence than of any artificial\nerudition.  And herein Aristotle wittily, but hurtfully, doth deride the\nsophists near his time, saying, \u201cThey did as if one that professed the\nart of shoemaking should not teach how to make up a shoe, but only\nexhibit in a readiness a number of shoes of all fashions and sizes.\u201d  But\nyet a man might reply, that if a shoemaker should have no shoes in his\nshop, but only work as he is bespoken, he should be weakly customed.  But\nour Saviour, speaking of divine knowledge, saith, \u201cThat the kingdom of\nheaven is like a good householder, that bringeth forth both new and old\nstore;\u201d and we see the ancient writers of rhetoric do give it in precept,\nthat pleaders should have the places, whereof they have most continual\nuse, ready handled in all the variety that may be; as that, to speak for\nthe literal interpretation of the law against equity, and contrary; and\nto speak for presumptions and inferences against testimony, and contrary.\nAnd Cicero himself, being broken unto it by great experience, delivereth\nit plainly, that whatsoever a man shall have occasion to speak of (if he\nwill take the pains), he may have it in effect premeditate and handled\n_in thesi_.  So that when he cometh to a particular he shall have nothing\nto do, but to put to names, and times, and places, and such other\ncircumstances of individuals.  We see likewise the exact diligence of\nDemosthenes; who, in regard of the great force that the entrance and\naccess into causes hath to make a good impression, had ready framed a\nnumber of prefaces for orations and speeches.  All which authorities and\nprecedents may overweigh Aristotle\u2019s opinion, that would have us change a\nrich wardrobe for a pair of shears.\n\n(8) But the nature of the collection of this provision or preparatory\nstore, though it be common both to logic and rhetoric, yet having made an\nentry of it here, where it came first to be spoken of, I think fit to\nrefer over the further handling of it to rhetoric.\n\n(9) The other part of invention, which I term suggestion, doth assign and\ndirect us to certain marks, or places, which may excite our mind to\nreturn and produce such knowledge as it hath formerly collected, to the\nend we may make use thereof.  Neither is this use (truly taken) only to\nfurnish argument to dispute, probably with others, but likewise to\nminister unto our judgment to conclude aright within ourselves.  Neither\nmay these places serve only to apprompt our invention, but also to direct\nour inquiry.  For a faculty of wise interrogating is half a knowledge.\nFor as Plato saith, \u201cWhosoever seeketh, knoweth that which he seeketh for\nin a general notion; else how shall he know it when he hath found it?\u201d\nAnd, therefore, the larger your anticipation is, the more direct and\ncompendious is your search.  But the same places which will help us what\nto produce of that which we know already, will also help us, if a man of\nexperience were before us, what questions to ask; or, if we have books\nand authors to instruct us, what points to search and revolve; so as I\ncannot report that this part of invention, which is that which the\nschools call topics, is deficient.\n\n(10) Nevertheless, topics are of two sorts, general and special.  The\ngeneral we have spoken to; but the particular hath been touched by some,\nbut rejected generally as inartificial and variable.  But leaving the\nhumour which hath reigned too much in the schools (which is, to be vainly\nsubtle in a few things which are within their command, and to reject the\nrest), I do receive particular topics; that is, places or directions of\ninvention and inquiry in every particular knowledge, as things of great\nuse, being mixtures of logic with the matter of sciences.  For in these\nit holdeth _ars inveniendi adolescit cum inventis_; for as in going of a\nway, we do not only gain that part of the way which is passed, but we\ngain the better sight of that part of the way which remaineth, so every\ndegree of proceeding in a science giveth a light to that which followeth;\nwhich light, if we strengthen by drawing it forth into questions or\nplaces of inquiry, we do greatly advance our pursuit.\n\nXIV. (1) Now we pass unto the arts of judgment, which handle the natures\nof proofs and demonstrations, which as to induction hath a coincidence\nwith invention; for all inductions, whether in good or vicious form, the\nsame action of the mind which inventeth, judgeth\u2014all one as in the sense.\nBut otherwise it is in proof by syllogism, for the proof being not\nimmediate, but by mean, the invention of the mean is one thing, and the\njudgment of the consequence is another; the one exciting only, the other\nexamining.  Therefore, for the real and exact form of judgment, we refer\nourselves to that which we have spoken of interpretation of Nature.\n\n(2) For the other judgment by syllogism, as it is a thing most agreeable\nto the mind of man, so it hath been vehemently end excellently laboured.\nFor the nature of man doth extremely covet to have somewhat in his\nunderstanding fixed and unmovable, and as a rest and support of the mind.\nAnd, therefore, as Aristotle endeavoureth to prove, that in all motion\nthere is some point quiescent; and as he elegantly expoundeth the ancient\nfable of Atlas (that stood fixed, and bare up the heaven from falling) to\nbe meant of the poles or axle-tree of heaven, whereupon the conversion is\naccomplished, so assuredly men have a desire to have an Atlas or\naxle-tree within to keep them from fluctuation, which is like to a\nperpetual peril of falling.  Therefore men did hasten to set down some\nprinciples about which the variety of their disputatious might turn.\n\n(3) So, then, this art of judgment is but the reduction of propositions\nto principles in a middle term.  The principles to be agreed by all and\nexempted from argument; the middle term to be elected at the liberty of\nevery man\u2019s invention; the reduction to be of two kinds, direct and\ninverted: the one when the proposition is reduced to the principle, which\nthey term a probation ostensive; the other, when the contradictory of the\nproposition is reduced to the contradictory of the principle, which is\nthat which they call _per incommodum_, or pressing an absurdity; the\nnumber of middle terms to be as the proposition standeth degrees more or\nless removed from the principle.\n\n(4) But this art hath two several methods of doctrine, the one by way of\ndirection, the other by way of caution: the former frameth and setteth\ndown a true form of consequence, by the variations and deflections from\nwhich errors and inconsequences may be exactly judged.  Toward the\ncomposition and structure of which form it is incident to handle the\nparts thereof, which are propositions, and the parts of propositions,\nwhich are simple words.  And this is that part of logic which is\ncomprehended in the Analytics.\n\n(5) The second method of doctrine was introduced for expedite use and\nassurance sake, discovering the more subtle forms of sophisms and\nillaqueations with their redargutions, which is that which is termed\n_elenches_.  For although in the more gross sorts of fallacies it\nhappeneth (as Seneca maketh the comparison well) as in juggling feats,\nwhich, though we know not how they are done, yet we know well it is not\nas it seemeth to be; yet the more subtle sort of them doth not only put a\nman besides his answer, but doth many times abuse his judgment.\n\n(6) This part concerning _elenches_ is excellently handled by Aristotle\nin precept, but more excellently by Plato in example; not only in the\npersons of the sophists, but even in Socrates himself, who, professing to\naffirm nothing, but to infirm that which was affirmed by another, hath\nexactly expressed all the forms of objection, fallace, and redargution.\nAnd although we have said that the use of this doctrine is for\nredargution, yet it is manifest the degenerate and corrupt use is for\ncaption and contradiction, which passeth for a great faculty, and no\ndoubt is of very great advantage, though the difference be good which was\nmade between orators and sophisters, that the one is as the greyhound,\nwhich hath his advantage in the race, and the other as the hare, which\nhath her advantage in the turn, so as it is the advantage of the weaker\ncreature.\n\n(7) But yet further, this doctrine of elenches hath a more ample latitude\nand extent than is perceived; namely, unto divers parts of knowledge,\nwhereof some are laboured and other omitted.  For first, I conceive\n(though it may seem at first somewhat strange) that that part which is\nvariably referred, sometimes to logic, sometimes to metaphysic, touching\nthe common adjuncts of essences, is but an _elenche_; for the great\nsophism of all sophisms being equivocation or ambiguity of words and\nphrase, specially of such words as are most general and intervene in\nevery inquiry, it seemeth to me that the true and fruitful use (leaving\nvain subtleties and speculations) of the inquiry of majority, minority,\npriority, posteriority, identity, diversity, possibility, act, totality,\nparts, existence, privation, and the like, are but wise cautions against\nambiguities of speech.  So, again, the distribution of things into\ncertain tribes, which we call categories or predicaments, are but\ncautions against the confusion of definitions and divisions.\n\n(8) Secondly, there is a seducement that worketh by the strength of the\nimpression, and not by the subtlety of the illaqueation\u2014not so much\nperplexing the reason, as overruling it by power of the imagination.  But\nthis part I think more proper to handle when I shall speak of rhetoric.\n\n(9) But lastly, there is yet a much more important and profound kind of\nfallacies in the mind of man, which I find not observed or inquired at\nall, and think good to place here, as that which of all others\nappertaineth most to rectify judgment, the force whereof is such as it\ndoth not dazzle or snare the understanding in some particulars, but doth\nmore generally and inwardly infect and corrupt the state thereof.  For\nthe mind of man is far from the nature of a clear and equal glass,\nwherein the beams of things should reflect according to their true\nincidence; nay, it is rather like an enchanted glass, full of\nsuperstition and imposture, if it be not delivered and reduced.  For this\npurpose, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon us\nby the general nature of the mind, beholding them in an example or two;\nas first, in that instance which is the root of all superstition, namely,\nthat to the nature of the mind of all men it is consonant for the\naffirmative or active to affect more than the negative or privative.  So\nthat a few times hitting or presence countervails ofttimes failing or\nabsence, as was well answered by Diagoras to him that showed him in\nNeptune\u2019s temple the great number of pictures of such as had escaped\nshipwreck, and had paid their vows to Neptune, saying, \u201cAdvise now, you\nthat think it folly to invocate Neptune in tempest.\u201d  \u201cYea, but,\u201d saith\nDiagoras, \u201cwhere are they painted that are drowned?\u201d  Let us behold it in\nanother instance, namely, that the spirit of man, being of an equal and\nuniform substance, doth usually suppose and feign in nature a greater\nequality and uniformity than is in truth.  Hence it cometh that the\nmathematicians cannot satisfy themselves except they reduce the motions\nof the celestial bodies to perfect circles, rejecting spiral lines, and\nlabouring to be discharged of eccentrics.  Hence it cometh that whereas\nthere are many things in Nature as it were _monodica_, _sui juris_, yet\nthe cogitations of man do feign unto them relatives, parallels, and\nconjugates, whereas no such thing is; as they have feigned an element of\nfire to keep square with earth, water, and air, and the like.  Nay, it is\nnot credible, till it be opened, what a number of fictions and fantasies\nthe similitude of human actions and arts, together with the making of man\n_communis mensura_, have brought into natural philosophy; not much better\nthan the heresy of the Anthropomorphites, bred in the cells of gross and\nsolitary monks, and the opinion of Epicurus, answerable to the same in\nheathenism, who supposed the gods to be of human shape.  And, therefore,\nVelleius the Epicurean needed not to have asked why God should have\nadorned the heavens with stars, as if He had been an _\u00e6dilis_, one that\nshould have set forth some magnificent shows or plays.  For if that great\nWork-master had been of a human disposition, He would have cast the stars\ninto some pleasant and beautiful works and orders like the frets in the\nroofs of houses; whereas one can scarce find a posture in square, or\ntriangle, or straight line, amongst such an infinite number, so differing\na harmony there is between the spirit of man and the spirit of Nature.\n\n(10) Let us consider again the false appearances imposed upon us by every\nman\u2019s own individual nature and custom in that feigned supposition that\nPlato maketh of the cave; for certainly if a child were continued in a\ngrot or cave under the earth until maturity of age, and came suddenly\nabroad, he would have strange and absurd imaginations.  So, in like\nmanner, although our persons live in the view of heaven, yet our spirits\nare included in the caves of our own complexions and customs, which\nminister unto us infinite errors and vain opinions if they be not\nrecalled to examination.  But hereof we have given many examples in one\nof the errors, or peccant humours, which we ran briefly over in our first\nbook.\n\n(11) And lastly, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed\nupon us by words, which are framed and applied according to the conceit\nand capacities of the vulgar sort; and although we think we govern our\nwords, and prescribe it well _loquendum ut vulgus sentiendum ut\nsapientes_, yet certain it is that words, as a Tartar\u2019s bow, do shoot\nback upon the understanding of the wisest, and mightily entangle and\npervert the judgment.  So as it is almost necessary in all controversies\nand disputations to imitate the wisdom of the mathematicians, in setting\ndown in the very beginning the definitions of our words and terms, that\nothers may know how we accept and understand them, and whether they\nconcur with us or no.  For it cometh to pass, for want of this, that we\nare sure to end there where we ought to have begun, which is, in\nquestions and differences about words.  To conclude, therefore, it must\nbe confessed that it is not possible to divorce ourselves from these\nfallacies and false appearances because they are inseparable from our\nnature and condition of life; so yet, nevertheless, the caution of them\n(for all elenches, as was said, are but cautions) doth extremely import\nthe true conduct of human judgment.  The particular elenches or cautions\nagainst these three false appearances I find altogether deficient.\n\n(12) There remaineth one part of judgment of great excellency which to\nmine understanding is so slightly touched, as I may report that also\ndeficient; which is the application of the differing kinds of proofs to\nthe differing kinds of subjects.  For there being but four kinds of\ndemonstrations, that is, by the immediate consent of the mind or sense,\nby induction, by syllogism, and by congruity, which is that which\nAristotle calleth demonstration in orb or circle, and not _a notioribus_,\nevery of these hath certain subjects in the matter of sciences, in which\nrespectively they have chiefest use; and certain others, from which\nrespectively they ought to be excluded; and the rigour and curiosity in\nrequiring the more severe proofs in some things, and chiefly the facility\nin contenting ourselves with the more remiss proofs in others, hath been\namongst the greatest causes of detriment and hindrance to knowledge.  The\ndistributions and assignations of demonstrations according to the analogy\nof sciences I note as deficient.\n\nXV. (1) The custody or retaining of knowledge is either in writing or\nmemory; whereof writing hath two parts, the nature of the character and\nthe order of the entry.  For the art of characters, or other visible\nnotes of words or things, it hath nearest conjugation with grammar, and,\ntherefore, I refer it to the due place; for the disposition and\ncollocation of that knowledge which we preserve in writing, it consisteth\nin a good digest of common-places, wherein I am not ignorant of the\nprejudice imputed to the use of common-place books, as causing a\nretardation of reading, and some sloth or relaxation of memory.  But\nbecause it is but a counterfeit thing in knowledges to be forward and\npregnant, except a man be deep and full, I hold the entry of\ncommon-places to be a matter of great use and essence in studying, as\nthat which assureth copy of invention, and contracteth judgment to a\nstrength.  But this is true, that of the methods of common-places that I\nhave seen, there is none of any sufficient worth, all of them carrying\nmerely the face of a school and not of a world; and referring to vulgar\nmatters and pedantical divisions, without all life or respect to action.\n\n(2) For the other principal part of the custody of knowledge, which is\nmemory, I find that faculty in my judgment weakly inquired of.  An art\nthere is extant of it; but it seemeth to me that there are better\nprecepts than that art, and better practices of that art than those\nreceived.  It is certain the art (as it is) may be raised to points of\nostentation prodigious; but in use (as is now managed) it is barren, not\nburdensome, nor dangerous to natural memory, as is imagined, but barren,\nthat is, not dexterous to be applied to the serious use of business and\noccasions.  And, therefore, I make no more estimation of repeating a\ngreat number of names or words upon once hearing, or the pouring forth of\na number of verses or rhymes _extempore_, or the making of a satirical\nsimile of everything, or the turning of everything to a jest, or the\nfalsifying or contradicting of everything by cavil, or the like (whereof\nin the faculties of the mind there is great copy, and such as by device\nand practice may be exalted to an extreme degree of wonder), than I do of\nthe tricks of tumblers, funambuloes, baladines; the one being the same in\nthe mind that the other is in the body, matters of strangeness without\nworthiness.\n\n(3) This art of memory is but built upon two intentions; the one\nprenotion, the other emblem.  Prenotion dischargeth the indefinite\nseeking of that we would remember, and directeth us to seek in a narrow\ncompass, that is, somewhat that hath congruity with our place of memory.\nEmblem reduceth conceits intellectual to images sensible, which strike\nthe memory more; out of which axioms may be drawn much better practice\nthan that in use; and besides which axioms, there are divers more\ntouching help of memory not inferior to them.  But I did in the beginning\ndistinguish, not to report those things deficient, which are but only ill\nmanaged.\n\nXVI. (1) There remaineth the fourth kind of rational knowledge, which is\ntransitive, concerning the expressing or transferring our knowledge to\nothers, which I will term by the general name of tradition or delivery.\nTradition hath three parts: the first concerning the organ of tradition;\nthe second concerning the method of tradition; and the third concerning\nthe illustration of tradition.\n\n(2) For the organ of tradition, it is either speech or writing; for\nAristotle saith well, \u201cWords are the images of cogitations, and letters\nare the images of words.\u201d  But yet it is not of necessity that\ncogitations be expressed by the medium of words.  For whatsoever is\ncapable of sufficient differences, and those perceptible by the sense, is\nin nature competent to express cogitations.  And, therefore, we see in\nthe commerce of barbarous people that understand not one another\u2019s\nlanguage, and in the practice of divers that are dumb and deaf, that\nmen\u2019s minds are expressed in gestures, though not exactly, yet to serve\nthe turn.  And we understand further, that it is the use of China and the\nkingdoms of the High Levant to write in characters real, which express\nneither letters nor words in gross, but things or notions; insomuch as\ncountries and provinces which understand not one another\u2019s language can\nnevertheless read one another\u2019s writings, because the characters are\naccepted more generally than the languages do extend; and, therefore,\nthey have a vast multitude of characters, as many, I suppose, as radical\nwords.\n\n(3) These notes of cogitations are of two sorts: the one when the note\nhath some similitude or congruity with the notion; the other _ad\nplacitum_, having force only by contract or acceptation.  Of the former\nsort are hieroglyphics and gestures.  For as to hieroglyphics (things of\nancient use and embraced chiefly by the Egyptians, one of the most\nancient nations), they are but as continued impresses and emblems.  And\nas for gestures, they are as transitory hieroglyphics, and are to\nhieroglyphics as words spoken are to words written, in that they abide\nnot; but they have evermore, as well as the other, an affinity with the\nthings signified.  As Periander, being consulted with how to preserve a\ntyranny newly usurped, bid the messenger attend and report what he saw\nhim do; and went into his garden and topped all the highest flowers,\nsignifying that it consisted in the cutting off and keeping low of the\nnobility and grandees.  _Ad placitum_, are the characters real before\nmentioned, and words: although some have been willing by curious inquiry,\nor rather by apt feigning, to have derived imposition of names from\nreason and intendment; a speculation elegant, and, by reason it searcheth\ninto antiquity, reverent, but sparingly mixed with truth, and of small\nfruit.  This portion of knowledge touching the notes of things and\ncogitations in general, I find not inquired, but deficient.  And although\nit may seem of no great use, considering that words and writings by\nletters do far excel all the other ways; yet because this part\nconcerneth, as it were, the mint of knowledge (for words are the tokens\ncurrent and accepted for conceits, as moneys are for values, and that it\nis fit men be not ignorant that moneys may be of another kind than gold\nand silver), I thought good to propound it to better inquiry.\n\n(4) Concerning speech and words, the consideration of them hath produced\nthe science of grammar.  For man still striveth to reintegrate himself in\nthose benedictions, from which by his fault he hath been deprived; and as\nhe hath striven against the first general curse by the invention of all\nother arts, so hath he sought to come forth of the second general curse\n(which was the confusion of tongues) by the art of grammar; whereof the\nuse in a mother tongue is small, in a foreign tongue more; but most in\nsuch foreign tongues as have ceased to be vulgar tongues, and are turned\nonly to learned tongues.  The duty of it is of two natures: the one\npopular, which is for the speedy and perfect attaining languages, as well\nfor intercourse of speech as for understanding of authors; the other\nphilosophical, examining the power and nature of words, as they are the\nfootsteps and prints of reason: which kind of analogy between words and\nreason is handled _sparsim_, brokenly though not entirely; and,\ntherefore, I cannot report it deficient, though I think it very worthy to\nbe reduced into a science by itself.\n\n(5) Unto grammar also belongeth, as an appendix, the consideration of the\naccidents of words; which are measure, sound, and elevation or accent,\nand the sweetness and harshness of them: whence hath issued some curious\nobservations in rhetoric, but chiefly poesy, as we consider it, in\nrespect of the verse and not of the argument.  Wherein though men in\nlearned tongues do tie themselves to the ancient measures, yet in modern\nlanguages it seemeth to me as free to make new measures of verses as of\ndances; for a dance is a measured pace, as a verse is a measured speech.\nIn these things this sense is better judge than the art:\n\n       \u201cC\u0153n\u00e6 fercula nostr\u00e6\n    Mallem convivis quam placuisse cocis.\u201d\n\nAnd of the servile expressing antiquity in an unlike and an unfit\nsubject, it is well said, \u201c_Quod tempore antiquum videtur_, _id\nincongruitate est maxime novum_.\u201d\n\n(6) For ciphers, they are commonly in letters or alphabets, but may be in\nwords.  The kinds of ciphers (besides the simple ciphers, with changes,\nand intermixtures of nulls and non-significants) are many, according to\nthe nature or rule of the infolding, wheel-ciphers, key-ciphers, doubles,\n&c.  But the virtues of them, whereby they are to be preferred, are\nthree; that they be not laborious to write and read; that they be\nimpossible to decipher; and, in some cases, that they be without\nsuspicion.  The highest degree whereof is to write _omnia per omnia_;\nwhich is undoubtedly possible, with a proportion quintuple at most of the\nwriting infolding to the writing infolded, and no other restraint\nwhatsoever.  This art of ciphering hath for relative an art of\ndeciphering, by supposition unprofitable, but, as things are, of great\nuse.  For suppose that ciphers were well managed, there be multitudes of\nthem which exclude the decipherer.  But in regard of the rawness and\nunskilfulness of the hands through which they pass, the greatest matters\nare many times carried in the weakest ciphers.\n\n(7) In the enumeration of these private and retired arts it may be\nthought I seek to make a great muster-roll of sciences, naming them for\nshow and ostentation, and to little other purpose.  But let those, which\nare skilful in them, judge whether I bring them in only for appearance,\nor whether in that which I speak of them (though in few words) there be\nnot some seed of proficience.  And this must be remembered, that as there\nbe many of great account in their countries and provinces, which, when\nthey come up to the seat of the estate, are but of mean rank and scarcely\nregarded; so these arts, being here placed with the principal and supreme\nsciences, seem petty things: yet to such as have chosen them to spend\ntheir labours and studies in them, they seem great matters.\n\nXVII. (1) For the method of tradition, I see it hath moved a controversy\nin our time.  But as in civil business, if there be a meeting, and men\nfall at words, there is commonly an end of the matter for that time, and\nno proceeding at all; so in learning, where there is much controversy,\nthere is many times little inquiry.  For this part of knowledge of method\nseemeth to me so weakly inquired as I shall report it deficient.\n\n(2) Method hath been placed, and that not amiss, in logic, as a part of\njudgment.  For as the doctrine of syllogisms comprehendeth the rules of\njudgment upon that which is invented, so the doctrine of method\ncontaineth the rules of judgment upon that which is to be delivered; for\njudgment precedeth delivery, as it followeth invention.  Neither is the\nmethod or the nature of the tradition material only to the use of\nknowledge, but likewise to the progression of knowledge: for since the\nlabour and life of one man cannot attain to perfection of knowledge, the\nwisdom of the tradition is that which inspireth the felicity of\ncontinuance and proceeding.  And therefore the most real diversity of\nmethod is of method referred to use, and method referred to progression:\nwhereof the one may be termed magistral, and the other of probation.\n\n(3) The latter whereof seemeth to be _via deserta et interclusa_.  For as\nknowledges are now delivered, there is a kind of contract of error\nbetween the deliverer and the receiver.  For he that delivereth knowledge\ndesireth to deliver it in such form as may be best believed, and not as\nmay be best examined; and he that receiveth knowledge desireth rather\npresent satisfaction than expectant inquiry; and so rather not to doubt,\nthan not to err: glory making the author not to lay open his weakness,\nand sloth making the disciple not to know his strength.\n\n(4) But knowledge that is delivered as a thread to be spun on ought to be\ndelivered and intimated, if it were possible, in the same method wherein\nit was invented: and so is it possible of knowledge induced.  But in this\nsame anticipated and prevented knowledge, no man knoweth how he came to\nthe knowledge which he hath obtained.  But yet, nevertheless, _secundum\nmajus et minus_, a man may revisit and descend unto the foundations of\nhis knowledge and consent; and so transplant it into another, as it grew\nin his own mind.  For it is in knowledges as it is in plants: if you mean\nto use the plant, it is no matter for the roots\u2014but if you mean to remove\nit to grow, then it is more assured to rest upon roots than slips: so the\ndelivery of knowledges (as it is now used) is as of fair bodies of trees\nwithout the roots; good for the carpenter, but not for the planter.  But\nif you will have sciences grow, it is less matter for the shaft or body\nof the tree, so you look well to the taking up of the roots.  Of which\nkind of delivery the method of the mathematics, in that subject, hath\nsome shadow: but generally I see it neither put in use nor put in\ninquisition, and therefore note it for deficient.\n\n(5) Another diversity of method there is, which hath some affinity with\nthe former, used in some cases by the discretion of the ancients, but\ndisgraced since by the impostures of many vain persons, who have made it\nas a false light for their counterfeit merchandises; and that is\nenigmatical and disclosed.  The pretence whereof is, to remove the vulgar\ncapacities from being admitted to the secrets of knowledges, and to\nreserve them to selected auditors, or wits of such sharpness as can\npierce the veil.\n\n(6) Another diversity of method, whereof the consequence is great, is the\ndelivery of knowledge in aphorisms, or in methods; wherein we may observe\nthat it hath been too much taken into custom, out of a few axioms or\nobservations upon any subject, to make a solemn and formal art, filling\nit with some discourses, and illustrating it with examples, and digesting\nit into a sensible method.  But the writing in aphorisms hath many\nexcellent virtues, whereto the writing in method doth not approach.\n\n(7) For first, it trieth the writer, whether he be superficial or solid:\nfor aphorisms, except they should be ridiculous, cannot be made but of\nthe pith and heart of sciences; for discourse of illustration is cut off;\nrecitals of examples are cut off; discourse of connection and order is\ncut off; descriptions of practice are cut off.  So there remaineth\nnothing to fill the aphorisms but some good quantity of observation; and\ntherefore no man can suffice, nor in reason will attempt, to write\naphorisms, but he that is sound and grounded.  But in methods,\n\n       \u201cTantum series juncturaque pollet,\n    Tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris,\u201d\n\nas a man shall make a great show of an art, which, if it were disjointed,\nwould come to little.  Secondly, methods are more fit to win consent or\nbelief, but less fit to point to action; for they carry a kind of\ndemonstration in orb or circle, one part illuminating another, and\ntherefore satisfy.  But particulars being dispersed do best agree with\ndispersed directions.  And lastly, aphorisms, representing a knowledge\nbroken, do invite men to inquire further; whereas methods, carrying the\nshow of a total, do secure men, as if they were at furthest.\n\n(8) Another diversity of method, which is likewise of great weight, is\nthe handling of knowledge by assertions and their proofs, or by questions\nand their determinations.  The latter kind whereof, if it be immoderately\nfollowed, is as prejudicial to the proceeding of learning as it is to the\nproceeding of an army to go about to besiege every little fort or hold.\nFor if the field be kept, and the sum of the enterprise pursued, those\nsmaller things will come in of themselves: indeed a man would not leave\nsome important piece enemy at his back.  In like manner, the use of\nconfutation in the delivery of sciences ought to be very sparing; and to\nserve to remove strong preoccupations and prejudgments, and not to\nminister and excite disputatious and doubts.\n\n(9) Another diversity of method is, according to the subject or matter\nwhich is handled.  For there is a great difference in delivery of the\nmathematics, which are the most abstracted of knowledges, and policy,\nwhich is the most immersed.  And howsoever contention hath been moved,\ntouching a uniformity of method in multiformity of matter, yet we see how\nthat opinion, besides the weakness of it, hath been of ill desert towards\nlearning, as that which taketh the way to reduce learning to certain\nempty and barren generalities; being but the very husks and shells of\nsciences, all the kernel being forced out and expulsed with the torture\nand press of the method.  And, therefore, as I did allow well of\nparticular topics for invention, so I do allow likewise of particular\nmethods of tradition.\n\n(10) Another diversity of judgment in the delivery and teaching of\nknowledge is, according unto the light and presuppositions of that which\nis delivered.  For that knowledge which is new, and foreign from opinions\nreceived, is to be delivered in another form than that that is agreeable\nand familiar; and therefore Aristotle, when he thinks to tax Democritus,\ndoth in truth commend him, where he saith \u201cIf we shall indeed dispute,\nand not follow after similitudes,\u201d &c.  For those whose conceits are\nseated in popular opinions need only but to prove or dispute; but those\nwhose conceits are beyond popular opinions, have a double labour; the one\nto make themselves conceived, and the other to prove and demonstrate.  So\nthat it is of necessity with them to have recourse to similitudes and\ntranslations to express themselves.  And therefore in the infancy of\nlearning, and in rude times when those conceits which are now trivial\nwere then new, the world was full of parables and similitudes; for else\nwould men either have passed over without mark, or else rejected for\nparadoxes that which was offered, before they had understood or judged.\nSo in divine learning, we see how frequent parables and tropes are, for\nit is a rule, that whatsoever science is not consonant to presuppositions\nmust pray in aid of similitudes.\n\n(11) There be also other diversities of methods vulgar and received: as\nthat of resolution or analysis, of constitution or systasis, of\nconcealment or cryptic, &c., which I do allow well of, though I have\nstood upon those which are least handled and observed.  All which I have\nremembered to this purpose, because I would erect and constitute one\ngeneral inquiry (which seems to me deficient) touching the wisdom of\ntradition.\n\n(12) But unto this part of knowledge, concerning method, doth further\nbelong not only the architecture of the whole frame of a work, but also\nthe several beams and columns thereof; not as to their stuff, but as to\ntheir quantity and figure.  And therefore method considereth not only the\ndisposition of the argument or subject, but likewise the propositions:\nnot as to their truth or matter, but as to their limitation and manner.\nFor herein Ramus merited better a great deal in reviving the good rules\nof propositions\u2014\u039a\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba\u03c5\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 &c.\u2014than he did in\nintroducing the canker of epitomes; and yet (as it is the condition of\nhuman things that, according to the ancient fables, \u201cthe most precious\nthings have the most pernicious keepers\u201d) it was so, that the attempt of\nthe one made him fall upon the other.  For he had need be well conducted\nthat should design to make axioms convertible, if he make them not withal\ncircular, and non-promovent, or incurring into themselves; but yet the\nintention was excellent.\n\n(13) The other considerations of method, concerning propositions, are\nchiefly touching the utmost propositions, which limit the dimensions of\nsciences: for every knowledge may be fitly said, besides the profundity\n(which is the truth and substance of it, that makes it solid), to have a\nlongitude and a latitude; accounting the latitude towards other sciences,\nand the longitude towards action; that is, from the greatest generality\nto the most particular precept.  The one giveth rule how far one\nknowledge ought to intermeddle within the province of another, which is\nthe rule they call \u039a\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf; the other giveth rule unto what degree of\nparticularity a knowledge should descend: which latter I find passed over\nin silence, being in my judgment the more material.  For certainty there\nmust be somewhat left to practice; but how much is worthy the inquiry?\nWe see remote and superficial generalities do but offer knowledge to\nscorn of practical men; and are no more aiding to practice than an\nOrtelius\u2019 universal map is to direct the way between London and York.\nThe better sort of rules have been not unfitly compared to glasses of\nsteel unpolished, where you may see the images of things, but first they\nmust be filed: so the rules will help if they be laboured and polished by\npractice.  But how crystalline they may be made at the first, and how far\nforth they may be polished aforehand, is the question, the inquiry\nwhereof seemeth to me deficient.\n\n(14) There hath been also laboured and put in practice a method, which is\nnot a lawful method, but a method of imposture: which is, to deliver\nknowledges in such manner as men may speedily come to make a show of\nlearning, who have it not.  Such was the travail of Raymundus Lullius in\nmaking that art which bears his name; not unlike to some books of\ntypocosmy, which have been made since; being nothing but a mass of words\nof all arts, to give men countenance, that those which use the terms\nmight be thought to understand the art; which collections are much like a\nfripper\u2019s or broker\u2019s shop, that hath ends of everything, but nothing of\nworth.\n\nXVIII. (1) Now we descend to that part which concerneth the illustration\nof tradition, comprehended in that science which we call rhetoric, or art\nof eloquence, a science excellent, and excellently well laboured.  For\nalthough in true value it is inferior to wisdom (as it is said by God to\nMoses, when he disabled himself for want of this faculty, \u201cAaron shall be\nthy speaker, and thou shalt be to him as God\u201d), yet with people it is the\nmore mighty; for so Solomon saith, _Sapiens corde appellabitur prudens_,\n_sed dulcis eloquio majora reperiet_, signifying that profoundness of\nwisdom will help a man to a name or admiration, but that it is eloquence\nthat prevaileth in an active life.  And as to the labouring of it, the\nemulation of Aristotle with the rhetoricians of his time, and the\nexperience of Cicero, hath made them in their works of rhetoric exceed\nthemselves.  Again, the excellency of examples of eloquence in the\norations of Demosthenes and Cicero, added to the perfection of the\nprecepts of eloquence, hath doubled the progression in this art; and\ntherefore the deficiences which I shall note will rather be in some\ncollections, which may as handmaids attend the art, than in the rules or\nuse of the art itself.\n\n(2)  Notwithstanding, to stir the earth a little about the roots of this\nscience, as we have done of the rest, the duty and office of rhetoric is\nto apply reason to imagination for the better moving of the will.  For we\nsee reason is disturbed in the administration thereof by three means\u2014by\nillaqueation or sophism, which pertains to logic; by imagination or\nimpression, which pertains to rhetoric; and by passion or affection,\nwhich pertains to morality.  And as in negotiation with others, men are\nwrought by cunning, by importunity, and by vehemency; so in this\nnegotiation within ourselves, men are undermined by inconsequences,\nsolicited and importuned by impressions or observations, and transported\nby passions.  Neither is the nature of man so unfortunately built, as\nthat those powers and arts should have force to disturb reason, and not\nto establish and advance it.  For the end of logic is to teach a form of\nargument to secure reason, and not to entrap it; the end of morality is\nto procure the affections to obey reason, and not to invade it; the end\nof rhetoric is to fill the imagination to second reason, and not to\noppress it; for these abuses of arts come in but _ex oblique_, for\ncaution.\n\n(3) And therefore it was great injustice in Plato, though springing out\nof a just hatred to the rhetoricians of his time, to esteem of rhetoric\nbut as a voluptuary art, resembling it to cookery, that did mar wholesome\nmeats, and help unwholesome by variety of sauces to the pleasure of the\ntaste.  For we see that speech is much more conversant in adorning that\nwhich is good than in colouring that which is evil; for there is no man\nbut speaketh more honestly than he can do or think; and it was\nexcellently noted by Thucydides, in Cleon, that because he used to hold\non the bad side in causes of estate, therefore he was ever inveighing\nagainst eloquence and good speech, knowing that no man can speak fair of\ncourses sordid and base.  And therefore, as Plato said elegantly, \u201cThat\nvirtue, if she could be seen, would move great love and affection;\u201d so\nseeing that she cannot be showed to the sense by corporal shape, the next\ndegree is to show her to the imagination in lively representation; for to\nshow her to reason only in subtlety of argument was a thing ever derided\nin Chrysippus and many of the Stoics, who thought to thrust virtue upon\nmen by sharp disputations and conclusions, which have no sympathy with\nthe will of man.\n\n(4) Again, if the affections in themselves were pliant and obedient to\nreason, it were true there should be no great use of persuasions and\ninsinuations to the will, more than of naked proposition and proofs; but\nin regard of the continual mutinies and seditious of the affections\u2014\n\n       \u201cVideo meliora, proboque,\n    Deteriora sequor,\u201d\n\nreason would become captive and servile, if eloquence of persuasions did\nnot practise and win the imagination from the affections\u2019 part, and\ncontract a confederacy between the reason and imagination against the\naffections; for the affections themselves carry ever an appetite to good,\nas reason doth.  The difference is, that the affection beholdeth merely\nthe present; reason beholdeth the future and sum of time.  And,\ntherefore, the present filling the imagination more, reason is commonly\nvanquished; but after that force of eloquence and persuasion hath made\nthings future and remote appear as present, then upon the revolt of the\nimagination reason prevaileth.\n\n(5) We conclude, therefore, that rhetoric can be no more charged with the\ncolouring of the worst part, than logic with sophistry, or morality with\nvice; for we know the doctrines of contraries are the same, though the\nuse be opposite.  It appeareth also that logic differeth from rhetoric,\nnot only as the fist from the palm\u2014the one close, the other at large\u2014but\nmuch more in this, that logic handleth reason exact and in truth, and\nrhetoric handleth it as it is planted in popular opinions and manners.\nAnd therefore Aristotle doth wisely place rhetoric as between logic on\nthe one side, and moral or civil knowledge on the other, as participating\nof both; for the proofs and demonstrations of logic are toward all men\nindifferent and the same, but the proofs and persuasions of rhetoric\nought to differ according to the auditors:\n\n    \u201cOrpheus in sylvis, inter delphinas Arion.\u201d\n\nWhich application in perfection of idea ought to extend so far that if a\nman should speak of the same thing to several persons, he should speak to\nthem all respectively and several ways; though this politic part of\neloquence in private speech it is easy for the greatest orators to want:\nwhilst, by the observing their well-graced forms of speech, they leese\nthe volubility of application; and therefore it shall not be amiss to\nrecommend this to better inquiry, not being curious whether we place it\nhere or in that part which concerneth policy.\n\n(6) Now therefore will I descend to the deficiences, which, as I said,\nare but attendances; and first, I do not find the wisdom and diligence of\nAristotle well pursued, who began to make a collection of the popular\nsigns and colours of good and evil, both simple and comparative, which\nare as the sophisms of rhetoric (as I touched before).  For example\u2014\n\n       \u201cSophisma.\n\n    Quod laudatur, bonum: quod vituperatur, malum.\n\n       Redargutio.\n\n    Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces.\u201d\n\n_Malum est_, _malum est_ (_inquit emptor_): _sed cum recesserit_, _tum\ngloriabitur_!  The defects in the labour of Aristotle are three\u2014one, that\nthere be but a few of many; another, that there elenches are not annexed;\nand the third, that he conceived but a part of the use of them: for their\nuse is not only in probation, but much more in impression.  For many\nforms are equal in signification which are differing in impression, as\nthe difference is great in the piercing of that which is sharp and that\nwhich is flat, though the strength of the percussion be the same.  For\nthere is no man but will be a little more raised by hearing it said,\n\u201cYour enemies will be glad of this\u201d\u2014\n\n    \u201cHoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atrid\u00e6.\u201d\n\nthan by hearing it said only, \u201cThis is evil for you.\u201d\n\n(7) Secondly, I do resume also that which I mentioned before, touching\nprovision or preparatory store for the furniture of speech and readiness\nof invention, which appeareth to be of two sorts: the one in resemblance\nto a shop of pieces unmade up, the other to a shop of things ready made\nup; both to be applied to that which is frequent and most in request.\nThe former of these I will call _antitheta_, and the latter _formul\u00e6_.\n\n(8) _Antitheta_ are theses argued _pro et contra_, wherein men may be\nmore large and laborious; but (in such as are able to do it) to avoid\nprolixity of entry, I wish the seeds of the several arguments to be cast\nup into some brief and acute sentences, not to be cited, but to be as\nskeins or bottoms of thread, to be unwinded at large when they come to be\nused; supplying authorities and examples by reference.\n\n       \u201c_Pro verbis legis_.\n    Non est interpretatio, sed divinatio, qu\u00e6 recedit a litera:\n    Cum receditur a litera, judex transit in legislatorem.\n\n       _Pro sententia legis_.\n    Ex omnibus verbis est eliciendus sensus qui interpretatur singula.\u201d\n\n(9) _Formul\u00e6_ are but decent and apt passages or conveyances of speech,\nwhich may serve indifferently for differing subjects; as of preface,\nconclusion, digression, transition, excusation, &c.  For as in buildings\nthere is great pleasure and use in the well casting of the staircases,\nentries, doors, windows, and the like; so in speech, the conveyances and\npassages are of special ornament and effect.\n\n    \u201c_A conclusion in a deliberative_.\n    So may we redeem the faults passed, and prevent the inconveniences\n    future.\u201d\n\nXIX. (1) There remain two appendices touching the tradition of knowledge,\nthe one critical, the other pedantical.  For all knowledge is either\ndelivered by teachers, or attained by men\u2019s proper endeavours: and\ntherefore as the principal part of tradition of knowledge concerneth\nchiefly writing of books, so the relative part thereof concerneth reading\nof books; whereunto appertain incidently these considerations.  The first\nis concerning the true correction and edition of authors; wherein\nnevertheless rash diligence hath done great prejudice.  For these critics\nhave often presumed that that which they understand not is false set\ndown: as the priest that, where he found it written of St. Paul _Demissus\nest per sportam_, mended his book, and made it _Demissus est per portam_;\nbecause _sporta_ was a hard word, and out of his reading: and surely\ntheir errors, though they be not so palpable and ridiculous, yet are of\nthe same kind.  And therefore, as it hath been wisely noted, the most\ncorrected copies are commonly the least correct.\n\nThe second is concerning the exposition and explication of authors, which\nresteth in annotations and commentaries: wherein it is over usual to\nblanch the obscure places and discourse upon the plain.\n\nThe third is concerning the times, which in many cases give great light\nto true interpretations.\n\nThe fourth is concerning some brief censure and judgment of the authors;\nthat men thereby may make some election unto themselves what books to\nread.\n\nAnd the fifth is concerning the syntax and disposition of studies; that\nmen may know in what order or pursuit to read.\n\n(2) For pedantical knowledge, it containeth that difference of tradition\nwhich is proper for youth; whereunto appertain divers considerations of\ngreat fruit.\n\nAs first, the timing and seasoning of knowledges; as with what to\ninitiate them, and from what for a time to refrain them.\n\nSecondly, the consideration where to begin with the easiest, and so\nproceed to the more difficult; and in what courses to press the more\ndifficult, and then to turn them to the more easy; for it is one method\nto practise swimming with bladders, and another to practise dancing with\nheavy shoes.\n\nA third is the application of learning according unto the propriety of\nthe wits; for there is no defect in the faculties intellectual, but\nseemeth to have a proper cure contained in some studies: as, for example,\nif a child be bird-witted, that is, hath not the faculty of attention,\nthe mathematics giveth a remedy thereunto; for in them, if the wit be\ncaught away but a moment, one is new to begin.  And as sciences have a\npropriety towards faculties for cure and help, so faculties or powers\nhave a sympathy towards sciences for excellency or speedy profiting: and\ntherefore it is an inquiry of great wisdom, what kinds of wits and\nnatures are most apt and proper for what sciences.\n\nFourthly, the ordering of exercises is matter of great consequence to\nhurt or help: for, as is well observed by Cicero, men in exercising their\nfaculties, if they be not well advised, do exercise their faults and get\nill habits as well as good; so as there is a great judgment to be had in\nthe continuance and intermission of exercises.  It were too long to\nparticularise a number of other considerations of this nature, things but\nof mean appearance, but of singular efficacy.  For as the wronging or\ncherishing of seeds or young plants is that that is most important to\ntheir thriving, and as it was noted that the first six kings being in\ntruth as tutors of the state of Rome in the infancy thereof was the\nprincipal cause of the immense greatness of that state which followed, so\nthe culture and manurance of minds in youth hath such a forcible (though\nunseen) operation, as hardly any length of time or contention of labour\ncan countervail it afterwards.  And it is not amiss to observe also how\nsmall and mean faculties gotten by education, yet when they fall into\ngreat men or great matters, do work great and important effects: whereof\nwe see a notable example in Tacitus of two stage players, Percennius and\nVibulenus, who by their faculty of playing put the Pannonian armies into\nan extreme tumult and combustion.  For there arising a mutiny amongst\nthem upon the death of Augustus C\u00e6sar, Bl\u00e6sus the lieutenant had\ncommitted some of the mutineers, which were suddenly rescued; whereupon\nVibulenus got to be heard speak, which he did in this manner:\u2014\u201cThese poor\ninnocent wretches appointed to cruel death, you have restored to behold\nthe light; but who shall restore my brother to me, or life unto my\nbrother, that was sent hither in message from the legions of Germany, to\ntreat of the common cause? and he hath murdered him this last night by\nsome of his fencers and ruffians, that he hath about him for his\nexecutioners upon soldiers.  Answer, Bl\u00e6sus, what is done with his body?\nThe mortalest enemies do not deny burial.  When I have performed my last\nduties to the corpse with kisses, with tears, command me to be slain\nbesides him; so that these my fellows, for our good meaning and our true\nhearts to the legions, may have leave to bury us.\u201d  With which speech he\nput the army into an infinite fury and uproar: whereas truth was he had\nno brother, neither was there any such matter; but he played it merely as\nif he had been upon the stage.\n\n(3) But to return: we are now come to a period of rational knowledges;\nwherein if I have made the divisions other than those that are received,\nyet would I not be thought to disallow all those divisions which I do not\nuse.  For there is a double necessity imposed upon me of altering the\ndivisions.  The one, because it differeth in end and purpose, to sort\ntogether those things which are next in nature, and those things which\nare next in use.  For if a secretary of estate should sort his papers, it\nis like in his study or general cabinet he would sort together things of\na nature, as treaties, instructions, &c.  But in his boxes or particular\ncabinet he would sort together those that he were like to use together,\nthough of several natures.  So in this general cabinet of knowledge it\nwas necessary for me to follow the divisions of the nature of things;\nwhereas if myself had been to handle any particular knowledge, I would\nhave respected the divisions fittest for use.  The other, because the\nbringing in of the deficiences did by consequence alter the partitions of\nthe rest.  For let the knowledge extant (for demonstration sake) be\nfifteen.  Let the knowledge with the deficiences be twenty; the parts of\nfifteen are not the parts of twenty; for the parts of fifteen are three\nand five; the parts of twenty are two, four, five, and ten.  So as these\nthings are without contradiction, and could not otherwise be.\n\nXX. (1) We proceed now to that knowledge which considereth of the\nappetite and will of man: whereof Solomon saith, _Ante omnia_, _fili_,\n_custodi cor tuum_: _nam inde procedunt actiones vit\u00e6_.  In the handling\nof this science, those which have written seem to me to have done as if a\nman, that professed to teach to write, did only exhibit fair copies of\nalphabets and letters joined, without giving any precepts or directions\nfor the carriage of the hand and framing of the letters.  So have they\nmade good and fair exemplars and copies, carrying the draughts and\nportraitures of good, virtue, duty, felicity; propounding them well\ndescribed as the true objects and scopes of man\u2019s will and desires.  But\nhow to attain these excellent marks, and how to frame and subdue the will\nof man to become true and conformable to these pursuits, they pass it\nover altogether, or slightly and unprofitably.  For it is not the\ndisputing that moral virtues are in the mind of man by habit and not by\nnature, or the distinguishing that generous spirits are won by doctrines\nand persuasions, and the vulgar sort by reward and punishment, and the\nlike scattered glances and touches, that can excuse the absence of this\npart.\n\n(2) The reason of this omission I suppose to be that hidden rock\nwhereupon both this and many other barks of knowledge have been cast\naway; which is, that men have despised to be conversant in ordinary and\ncommon matters, the judicious direction whereof nevertheless is the\nwisest doctrine (for life consisteth not in novelties nor subtleties),\nbut contrariwise they have compounded sciences chiefly of a certain\nresplendent or lustrous mass of matter, chosen to give glory either to\nthe subtlety of disputatious, or to the eloquence of discourses.  But\nSeneca giveth an excellent check to eloquence, _Nocet illis eloquentia_,\n_quibus non rerum cupiditatem facit_, _sed sui_.  Doctrine should be such\nas should make men in love with the lesson, and not with the teacher;\nbeing directed to the auditor\u2019s benefit, and not to the author\u2019s\ncommendation.  And therefore those are of the right kind which may be\nconcluded as Demosthenes concludes his counsel, _Qu\u00e6 si feceritis_, _non\noratorem dumtaxat in pr\u00e6sentia laudabitis_, _sed vosmetipsos etiam non\nita multo post statu rerum vestraram meliore_.\n\n(3) Neither needed men of so excellent parts to have despaired of a\nfortune, which the poet Virgil promised himself, and indeed obtained, who\ngot as much glory of eloquence, wit, and learning in the expressing of\nthe observations of husbandry, as of the heroical acts of \u00c6neas:\n\n    \u201cNec sum animi dubius, verbis ea vincere magnum\n    Quam sit, et angustis his addere rebus honorem.\u201d\n\nAnd surely, if the purpose be in good earnest, not to write at leisure\nthat which men may read at leisure, but really to instruct and suborn\naction and active life, these Georgics of the mind, concerning the\nhusbandry and tillage thereof, are no less worthy than the heroical\ndescriptions of virtue, duty, and felicity.  Wherefore the main and\nprimitive division of moral knowledge seemeth to be into the exemplar or\nplatform of good, and the regiment or culture of the mind: the one\ndescribing the nature of good, the other prescribing rules how to subdue,\napply, and accommodate the will of man thereunto.\n\n(4) The doctrine touching the platform or nature of good considereth it\neither simple or compared; either the kinds of good, or the degrees of\ngood; in the latter whereof those infinite disputatious which were\ntouching the supreme degree thereof, which they term felicity, beatitude,\nor the highest good, the doctrines concerning which were as the heathen\ndivinity, are by the Christian faith discharged.  And as Aristotle saith,\n\u201cThat young men may be happy, but not otherwise but by hope;\u201d so we must\nall acknowledge our minority, and embrace the felicity which is by hope\nof the future world.\n\n(5) Freed therefore and delivered from this doctrine of the philosopher\u2019s\nheaven, whereby they feigned a higher elevation of man\u2019s nature than was\n(for we see in what height of style Seneca writeth, _Vere magnum_,\n_habere fragilitatem hominis_, _securitatem Dei_), we may with more\nsobriety and truth receive the rest of their inquiries and labours.\nWherein for the nature of good positive or simple, they have set it down\nexcellently in describing the forms of virtue and duty, with their\nsituations and postures; in distributing them into their kinds, parts,\nprovinces, actions, and administrations, and the like: nay further, they\nhave commended them to man\u2019s nature and spirit with great quickness of\nargument and beauty of persuasions; yea, and fortified and entrenched\nthem (as much as discourse can do) against corrupt and popular opinions.\nAgain, for the degrees and comparative nature of good, they have also\nexcellently handled it in their triplicity of good, in the comparisons\nbetween a contemplative and an active life, in the distinction between\nvirtue with reluctation and virtue secured, in their encounters between\nhonesty and profit, in their balancing of virtue with virtue, and the\nlike; so as this part deserveth to be reported for excellently laboured.\n\n(6) Notwithstanding, if before they had come to the popular and received\nnotions of virtue and vice, pleasure and pain, and the rest, they had\nstayed a little longer upon the inquiry concerning the roots of good and\nevil, and the strings of those roots, they had given, in my opinion, a\ngreat light to that which followed; and specially if they had consulted\nwith nature, they had made their doctrines less prolix and more profound:\nwhich being by them in part omitted and in part handled with much\nconfusion, we will endeavour to resume and open in a more clear manner.\n\n(7) There is formed in everything a double nature of good\u2014the one, as\neverything is a total or substantive in itself; the other, as it is a\npart or member of a greater body; whereof the latter is in degree the\ngreater and the worthier, because it tendeth to the conservation of a\nmore general form.  Therefore we see the iron in particular sympathy\nmoveth to the loadstone; but yet if it exceed a certain quantity, it\nforsaketh the affection to the loadstone, and like a good patriot moveth\nto the earth, which is the region and country of massy bodies; so may we\ngo forward, and see that water and massy bodies move to the centre of the\nearth; but rather than to suffer a divulsion in the continuance of\nnature, they will move upwards from the centre of the earth, forsaking\ntheir duty to the earth in regard of their duty to the world.  This\ndouble nature of good, and the comparative thereof, is much more engraven\nupon man, if he degenerate not, unto whom the conservation of duty to the\npublic ought to be much more precious than the conservation of life and\nbeing; according to that memorable speech of Pompeius Magnus, when being\nin commission of purveyance for a famine at Rome, and being dissuaded\nwith great vehemency and instance by his friends about him, that he\nshould not hazard himself to sea in an extremity of weather, he said only\nto them, _Necesse est ut eam_, _non ut vivam_.  But it may be truly\naffirmed that there was never any philosophy, religion, or other\ndiscipline, which did so plainly and highly exalt the good which is\ncommunicative, and depress the good which is private and particular, as\nthe Holy Faith; well declaring that it was the same God that gave the\nChristian law to men, who gave those laws of nature to inanimate\ncreatures that we spake of before; for we read that the elected saints of\nGod have wished themselves anathematised and razed out of the book of\nlife, in an ecstasy of charity and infinite feeling of communion.\n\n(8) This being set down and strongly planted, doth judge and determine\nmost of the controversies wherein moral philosophy is conversant.  For\nfirst, it decideth the question touching the preferment of the\ncontemplative or active life, and decideth it against Aristotle.  For all\nthe reasons which he bringeth for the contemplative are private, and\nrespecting the pleasure and dignity of a man\u2019s self (in which respects no\nquestion the contemplative life hath the pre-eminence), not much unlike\nto that comparison which Pythagoras made for the gracing and magnifying\nof philosophy and contemplation, who being asked what he was, answered,\n\u201cThat if Hiero were ever at the Olympian games, he knew the manner, that\nsome came to try their fortune for the prizes, and some came as merchants\nto utter their commodities, and some came to make good cheer and meet\ntheir friends, and some came to look on; and that he was one of them that\ncame to look on.\u201d  But men must know, that in this theatre of man\u2019s life\nit is reserved only for God and angels to be lookers on.  Neither could\nthe like question ever have been received in the Church, notwithstanding\ntheir _Pretiosa in oculis Domini mors sanctorum ejus_, by which place\nthey would exalt their civil death and regular professions, but upon this\ndefence, that the monastical life is not simple contemplative, but\nperformeth the duty either of incessant prayers and supplications, which\nhath been truly esteemed as an office in the Church, or else of writing\nor taking instructions for writing concerning the law of God, as Moses\ndid when he abode so long in the mount.  And so we see Enoch, the seventh\nfrom Adam, who was the first contemplative and walked with God, yet did\nalso endow the Church with prophecy, which Saint Jude citeth.  But for\ncontemplation which should be finished in itself, without casting beams\nupon society, assuredly divinity knoweth it not.\n\n(9) It decideth also the controversies between Zeno and Socrates, and\ntheir schools and successions, on the one side, who placed felicity in\nvirtue simply or attended, the actions and exercises whereof do chiefly\nembrace and concern society; and on the other side, the Cyrenaics and\nEpicureans, who placed it in pleasure, and made virtue (as it is used in\nsome comedies of errors, wherein the mistress and the maid change habits)\nto be but as a servant, without which pleasure cannot be served and\nattended; and the reformed school of the Epicureans, which placed it in\nserenity of mind and freedom from perturbation; as if they would have\ndeposed Jupiter again, and restored Saturn and the first age, when there\nwas no summer nor winter, spring nor autumn, but all after one air and\nseason; and Herillus, which placed felicity in extinguishment of the\ndisputes of the mind, making no fixed nature of good and evil, esteeming\nthings according to the clearness of the desires, or the reluctation;\nwhich opinion was revived in the heresy of the Anabaptists, measuring\nthings according to the motions of the spirit, and the constancy or\nwavering of belief; all which are manifest to tend to private repose and\ncontentment, and not to point of society.\n\n(10) It censureth also the philosophy of Epictetus, which presupposeth\nthat felicity must be placed in those things which are in our power, lest\nwe be liable to fortune and disturbance; as if it were not a thing much\nmore happy to fail in good and virtuous ends for the public, than to\nobtain all that we can wish to ourselves in our proper fortune: as\nConsalvo said to his soldiers, showing them Naples, and protesting he had\nrather die one foot forwards, than to have his life secured for long by\none foot of retreat.  Whereunto the wisdom of that heavenly leader hath\nsigned, who hath affirmed that \u201ca good conscience is a continual feast;\u201d\nshowing plainly that the conscience of good intentions, howsoever\nsucceeding, is a more continual joy to nature than all the provision\nwhich can be made for security and repose.\n\n(11) It censureth likewise that abuse of philosophy which grew general\nabout the time of Epictetus, in converting it into an occupation or\nprofession; as if the purpose had been, not to resist and extinguish\nperturbations, but to fly and avoid the causes of them, and to shape a\nparticular kind and course of life to that end; introducing such a health\nof mind, as was that health of body of which Aristotle speaketh of\nHerodicus, who did nothing all his life long but intend his health;\nwhereas if men refer themselves to duties of society, as that health of\nbody is best which is ablest to endure all alterations and extremities,\nso likewise that health of mind is most proper which can go through the\ngreatest temptations and perturbations.  So as Diogenes\u2019 opinion is to be\naccepted, who commended not them which abstained, but them which\nsustained, and could refrain their mind _in pr\u00e6cipitio_, and could give\nunto the mind (as is used in horsemanship) the shortest stop or turn.\n\n(12) Lastly, it censureth the tenderness and want of application in some\nof the most ancient and reverend philosophers and philosophical men, that\ndid retire too easily from civil business, for avoiding of indignities\nand perturbations; whereas the resolution of men truly moral ought to be\nsuch as the same Consalvo said the honour of a soldier should be, _e tel\u00e2\ncrassiore_, and not so fine as that everything should catch in it and\nendanger it.\n\nXXI. (1) To resume private or particular good, it falleth into the\ndivision of good active and passive; for this difference of good (not\nunlike to that which amongst the Romans was expressed in the familiar or\nhousehold terms of _promus_ and _condus_) is formed also in all things,\nand is best disclosed in the two several appetites in creatures; the one\nto preserve or continue themselves, and the other to dilate or multiply\nthemselves, whereof the latter seemeth to be the worthier; for in nature\nthe heavens, which are the more worthy, are the agent, and the earth,\nwhich is the less worthy, is the patient.  In the pleasures of living\ncreatures, that of generation is greater than that of food.  In divine\ndoctrine, _beatius est dare quam accipere_.  And in life, there is no\nman\u2019s spirit so soft, but esteemeth the effecting of somewhat that he\nhath fixed in his desire, more than sensuality, which priority of the\nactive good is much upheld by the consideration of our estate to be\nmortal and exposed to fortune.  For if we might have a perpetuity and\ncertainty in our pleasures, the state of them would advance their price.\nBut when we see it is but _magni \u00e6stimamus mori tardius_, and _ne\nglorieris de crastino_, _nescis partum diei_, it maketh us to desire to\nhave somewhat secured and exempted from time, which are only our deeds\nand works; as it is said, _Opera eorum sequuntur eos_.  The pre-eminence\nlikewise of this active good is upheld by the affection which is natural\nin man towards variety and proceeding, which in the pleasures of the\nsense, which is the principal part of passive good, can have no great\nlatitude.  _Cogita quamdiu eadem feceris_; _cibus_, _somnus_, _ludus per\nhunc circulum curritur_; _mori velle non tantum fortis_, _aut miser_,\n_aut prudens_, _sed etiam fastidiosus potest_.  But in enterprises,\npursuits, and purposes of life, there is much variety; whereof men are\nsensible with pleasure in their inceptions, progressions, recoils,\nreintegrations, approaches and attainings to their ends.  So as it was\nwell said, _Vita sine proposito languida et vaga est_.  Neither hath this\nactive good an identity with the good of society, though in some cases it\nhath an incidence into it.  For although it do many times bring forth\nacts of beneficence, yet it is with a respect private to a man\u2019s own\npower, glory, amplification, continuance; as appeareth plainly, when it\nfindeth a contrary subject.  For that gigantine state of mind which\npossesseth the troublers of the world, such as was Lucius Sylla and\ninfinite other in smaller model, who would have all men happy or unhappy\nas they were their friends or enemies, and would give form to the world,\naccording to their own humours (which is the true theomachy), pretendeth\nand aspireth to active good, though it recedeth furthest from good of\nsociety, which we have determined to be the greater.\n\n(2) To resume passive good, it receiveth a subdivision of conservative\nand effective.  For let us take a brief review of that which we have\nsaid: we have spoken first of the good of society, the intention whereof\nembraceth the form of human nature, whereof we are members and portions,\nand not our own proper and individual form; we have spoken of active\ngood, and supposed it as a part of private and particular good.  And\nrightly, for there is impressed upon all things a triple desire or\nappetite proceeding from love to themselves: one of preserving and\ncontinuing their form; another of advancing and perfecting their form;\nand a third of multiplying and extending their form upon other things:\nwhereof the multiplying, or signature of it upon other things, is that\nwhich we handled by the name of active good.  So as there remaineth the\nconserving of it, and perfecting or raising of it, which latter is the\nhighest degree of passive good.  For to preserve in state is the less, to\npreserve with advancement is the greater.  So in man,\n\n    \u201cIgneus est ollis vigor, et c\u00e6lestis origo.\u201d\n\nHis approach or assumption to divine or angelical nature is the\nperfection of his form; the error or false imitation of which good is\nthat which is the tempest of human life; while man, upon the instinct of\nan advancement, formal and essential, is carried to seek an advancement\nlocal.  For as those which are sick, and find no remedy, do tumble up and\ndown and change place, as if by a remove local they could obtain a remove\ninternal, so is it with men in ambition, when failing of the mean to\nexalt their nature, they are in a perpetual estuation to exalt their\nplace.  So then passive good is, as was said, either conservative or\nperfective.\n\n(3) To resume the good of conservation or comfort, which consisteth in\nthe fruition of that which is agreeable to our natures; it seemeth to be\nmost pure and natural of pleasures, but yet the softest and lowest.  And\nthis also receiveth a difference, which hath neither been well judged of,\nnor well inquired; for the good of fruition or contentment is placed\neither in the sincereness of the fruition, or in the quickness and vigour\nof it; the one superinduced by equality, the other by vicissitude; the\none having less mixture of evil, the other more impression of good.\nWhether of these is the greater good is a question controverted; but\nwhether man\u2019s nature may not be capable of both is a question not\ninquired.\n\n(4) The former question being debated between Socrates and a sophist,\nSocrates placing felicity in an equal and constant peace of mind, and the\nsophist in much desiring and much enjoying, they fell from argument to\nill words: the sophist saying that Socrates\u2019 felicity was the felicity of\na block or stone; and Socrates saying that the sophist\u2019s felicity was the\nfelicity of one that had the itch, who did nothing but itch and scratch.\nAnd both these opinions do not want their supports.  For the opinion of\nSocrates is much upheld by the general consent even of the epicures\nthemselves, that virtue beareth a great part in felicity; and if so,\ncertain it is, that virtue hath more use in clearing perturbations then\nin compassing desires.  The sophist\u2019s opinion is much favoured by the\nassertion we last spake of, that good of advancement is greater than good\nof simple preservation; because every obtaining a desire hath a show of\nadvancement, as motion though in a circle hath a show of progression.\n\n(5) But the second question, decided the true way, maketh the former\nsuperfluous.  For can it be doubted, but that there are some who take\nmore pleasure in enjoying pleasures than some other, and yet,\nnevertheless, are less troubled with the loss or leaving of them?  So as\nthis same, _Non uti ut non appetas_, _non appetere ut non metuas_, _sunt\nanimi pusilli et diffidentis_.  And it seemeth to me that most of the\ndoctrines of the philosophers are more fearful and cautious than the\nnature of things requireth.  So have they increased the fear of death in\noffering to cure it.  For when they would have a man\u2019s whole life to be\nbut a discipline or preparation to die, they must needs make men think\nthat it is a terrible enemy, against whom there is no end of preparing.\nBetter saith the poet:\u2014\n\n    \u201cQui finem vit\u00e6 extremum inter munera ponat\n    Natur\u00e6.\u201d\n\nSo have they sought to make men\u2019s minds too uniform and harmonical, by\nnot breaking them sufficiently to contrary motions; the reasons whereof I\nsuppose to be, because they themselves were men dedicated to a private,\nfree, and unapplied course of life.  For as we see, upon the lute or like\ninstrument, a ground, though it be sweet and have show of many changes,\nyet breaketh not the hand to such strange and hard stops and passages, as\na set song or voluntary; much after the same manner was the diversity\nbetween a philosophical and civil life.  And, therefore, men are to\nimitate the wisdom of jewellers: who, if there be a grain, or a cloud, or\nan ice which may be ground forth without taking too much of the stone,\nthey help it; but if it should lessen and abate the stone too much, they\nwill not meddle with it: so ought men so to procure serenity as they\ndestroy not magnanimity.\n\n(6) Having therefore deduced the good of man which is private and\nparticular, as far as seemeth fit, we will now return to that good of man\nwhich respecteth and beholdeth society, which we may term duty; because\nthe term of duty is more proper to a mind well framed and disposed\ntowards others, as the term of virtue is applied to a mind well formed\nand composed in itself; though neither can a man understand virtue\nwithout some relation to society, nor duty without an inward disposition.\nThis part may seem at first to pertain to science civil and politic; but\nnot if it be well observed.  For it concerneth the regiment and\ngovernment of every man over himself, and not over others.  And as in\narchitecture the direction of framing the posts, beams, and other parts\nof building, is not the same with the manner of joining them and erecting\nthe building; and in mechanicals, the direction how to frame an\ninstrument or engine is not the same with the manner of setting it on\nwork and employing it; and yet, nevertheless, in expressing of the one\nyou incidently express the aptness towards the other; so the doctrine of\nconjugation of men in society differeth from that of their conformity\nthereunto.\n\n(7) This part of duty is subdivided into two parts: the common duty of\nevery man, as a man or member of a state; the other, the respective or\nspecial duty of every man in his profession, vocation, and place.  The\nfirst of these is extant and well laboured, as hath been said.  The\nsecond likewise I may report rather dispersed than deficient; which\nmanner of dispersed writing in this kind of argument I acknowledge to be\nbest.  For who can take upon him to write of the proper duty, virtue,\nchallenge, and right of every several vocation, profession, and place?\nFor although sometimes a looker on may see more than a gamester, and\nthere be a proverb more arrogant than sound, \u201cThat the vale best\ndiscovereth the hill;\u201d yet there is small doubt but that men can write\nbest and most really and materially in their own professions; and that\nthe writing of speculative men of active matter for the most part doth\nseem to men of experience, as Phormio\u2019s argument of the wars seemed to\nHannibal, to be but dreams and dotage.  Only there is one vice which\naccompanieth them that write in their own professions, that they magnify\nthem in excess.  But generally it were to be wished (as that which would\nmake learning indeed solid and fruitful) that active men would or could\nbecome writers.\n\n(8) In which kind I cannot but mention, _honoris causa_, your Majesty\u2019s\nexcellent book touching the duty of a king; a work richly compounded of\ndivinity, morality, and policy, with great aspersion of all other arts;\nand being in some opinion one of the most sound and healthful writings\nthat I have read: not distempered in the heat of invention, nor in the\ncoldness of negligence; not sick of dizziness, as those are who leese\nthemselves in their order, nor of convulsions, as those which cramp in\nmatters impertinent; not savouring of perfumes and paintings, as those do\nwho seek to please the reader more than nature beareth; and chiefly well\ndisposed in the spirits thereof, being agreeable to truth and apt for\naction; and far removed from that natural infirmity, whereunto I noted\nthose that write in their own professions to be subject\u2014which is, that\nthey exalt it above measure.  For your Majesty hath truly described, not\na king of Assyria or Persia in their extern glory, but a Moses or a\nDavid, pastors of their people.  Neither can I ever leese out of my\nremembrance what I heard your Majesty in the same sacred spirit of\ngovernment deliver in a great cause of judicature, which was, \u201cThat kings\nruled by their laws, as God did by the laws of nature; and ought as\nrarely to put in use their supreme prerogative as God doth His power of\nworking miracles.\u201d  And yet notwithstanding in your book of a free\nmonarchy, you do well give men to understand, that you know the plenitude\nof the power and right of a king, as well as the circle of his office and\nduty.  Thus have I presumed to allege this excellent writing of your\nMajesty, as a prime or eminent example of tractates concerning special\nand respective duties; wherein I should have said as much, if it had been\nwritten a thousand years since.  Neither am I moved with certain courtly\ndecencies, which esteem it flattery to praise in presence.  No, it is\nflattery to praise in absence\u2014that is, when either the virtue is absent,\nor the occasion is absent; and so the praise is not natural, but forced,\neither in truth or in time.  But let Cicero be read in his oration _pro\nMarcello_, which is nothing but an excellent table of C\u00e6sar\u2019s virtue, and\nmade to his face; besides the example of many other excellent persons,\nwiser a great deal than such observers; and we will never doubt, upon a\nfull occasion, to give just praises to present or absent.\n\n(9) But to return; there belongeth further to the handling of this part,\ntouching the duties of professions and vocations, a relative or opposite,\ntouching the frauds, cautels, impostures, and vices of every profession,\nwhich hath been likewise handled; but how? rather in a satire and\ncynically, than seriously and wisely; for men have rather sought by wit\nto deride and traduce much of that which is good in professions, than\nwith judgment to discover and sever that which is corrupt.  For, as\nSolomon saith, he that cometh to seek after knowledge with a mind to\nscorn and censure shall be sure to find matter for his humour, but no\nmatter for his instruction: _Qu\u00e6renti derisori scientiam ipsa se\nabscondit_; _sed studioso fit obviam_.  But the managing of this argument\nwith integrity and truth, which I note as deficient, seemeth to me to be\none of the best fortifications for honesty and virtue that can be\nplanted.  For, as the fable goeth of the basilisk\u2014that if he see you\nfirst, you die for it; but if you see him first, he dieth\u2014so is it with\ndeceits and evil arts, which, if they be first espied they leese their\nlife; but if they prevent, they endanger.  So that we are much beholden\nto Machiavel and others, that write what men do, and not what they ought\nto do.  For it is not possible to join serpentine wisdom with the\ncolumbine innocency, except men know exactly all the conditions of the\nserpent; his baseness and going upon his belly, his volubility and\nlubricity, his envy and sting, and the rest\u2014that is, all forms and\nnatures of evil.  For without this, virtue lieth open and unfenced.  Nay,\nan honest man can do no good upon those that are wicked, to reclaim them,\nwithout the help of the knowledge of evil.  For men of corrupted minds\npresuppose that honesty groweth out of simplicity of manners, and\nbelieving of preachers, schoolmasters, and men\u2019s exterior language.  So\nas, except you can make them perceive that you know the utmost reaches of\ntheir own corrupt opinions, they despise all morality.  _Non recipit\nstultus verba prudenti\u00e6_, _nisi ea dixeris qu\u00e6_, _versantur in corde\nejus_.\n\n(10) Unto this part, touching respective duty, doth also appertain the\nduties between husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant.\nSo likewise the laws of friendship and gratitude, the civil bond of\ncompanies, colleges, and politic bodies, of neighbourhood, and all other\nproportionate duties; not as they are parts of government and society,\nbut as to the framing of the mind of particular persons.\n\n(11) The knowledge concerning good respecting society doth handle it\nalso, not simply alone, but comparatively; whereunto belongeth the\nweighing of duties between person and person, case and case, particular\nand public.  As we see in the proceeding of Lucius Brutus against his own\nsons, which was so much extolled, yet what was said?\n\n    \u201cInfelix, utcunque ferent ea fata minores.\u201d\n\nSo the case was doubtful, and had opinion on both sides.  Again, we see\nwhen M. Brutus and Cassius invited to a supper certain whose opinions\nthey meant to feel, whether they were fit to be made their associates,\nand cast forth the question touching the killing of a tyrant being a\nusurper, they were divided in opinion; some holding that servitude was\nthe extreme of evils, and others that tyranny was better than a civil\nwar: and a number of the like cases there are of comparative duty.\nAmongst which that of all others is the most frequent, where the question\nis of a great deal of good to ensue of a small injustice.  Which Jason of\nThessalia determined against the truth: _Aliqua sunt injuste facienda_,\n_ut multa juste fieri possint_.  But the reply is good: _Auctorem\npr\u00e6sentis justiti\u00e6 habes_, _sponsorem futur\u00e6 non habes_.  Men must pursue\nthings which are just in present, and leave the future to the Divine\nProvidence.  So then we pass on from this general part touching the\nexemplar and description of good.\n\nXXII. (1) Now, therefore, that we have spoken of this fruit of life, it\nremaineth to speak of the husbandry that belongeth thereunto, without\nwhich part the former seemeth to be no better than a fair image or\nstatue, which is beautiful to contemplate, but is without life and\nmotion; whereunto Aristotle himself subscribeth in these words: _Necesse\nest scilicet de virtute dicere_, _et quid sit_, _et ex quibus gignatur_.\n_Inutile enum fere fuerit virtutem quidem nosse_, _acquirend\u00e6 autem ejus\nmodos et vias ignorare_.  _Non enum de virtute tantum_, _qua specie sit_,\n_qu\u00e6rendum est_, _sed et quomodo sui copiam faciat_: _utrumque enum\nvolumeus_, _et rem ipsam nosse_, _et ejus compotes fieri_: _hoc autem ex\nvoto non succedet_, _nisi sciamus et ex quibus et quomodo_.  In such full\nwords and with such iteration doth he inculcate this part.  So saith\nCicero in great commendation of Cato the second, that he had applied\nhimself to philosophy, _Non ita disputandi causa_, _sed ita vivendi_.\nAnd although the neglect of our times, wherein few men do hold any\nconsultations touching the reformation of their life (as Seneca\nexcellently saith, _De partibus vit\u00e6 quisque deliberat_, _de summa\nnemo_), may make this part seem superfluous; yet I must conclude with\nthat aphorism of Hippocrates, _Qui gravi morbo correpti dolores non\nsentiunt_, _iis mens \u00e6grotat_.  They need medicine, not only to assuage\nthe disease, but to awake the sense.  And if it be said that the cure of\nmen\u2019s minds belongeth to sacred divinity, it is most true; but yet moral\nphilosophy may be preferred unto her as a wise servant and humble\nhandmaid.  For as the Psalm saith, \u201cThat the eyes of the handmaid look\nperpetually towards the mistress,\u201d and yet no doubt many things are left\nto the discretion of the handmaid to discern of the mistress\u2019 will; so\nought moral philosophy to give a constant attention to the doctrines of\ndivinity, and yet so as it may yield of herself (within due limits) many\nsound and profitable directions.\n\n(2) This part, therefore, because of the excellency thereof, I cannot but\nfind exceeding strange that it is not reduced to written inquiry; the\nrather, because it consisteth of much matter, wherein both speech and\naction is often conversant; and such wherein the common talk of men\n(which is rare, but yet cometh sometimes to pass) is wiser than their\nbooks.  It is reasonable, therefore, that we propound it in the more\nparticularity, both for the worthiness, and because we may acquit\nourselves for reporting it deficient, which seemeth almost incredible,\nand is otherwise conceived and presupposed by those themselves that have\nwritten.  We will, therefore, enumerate some heads or points thereof,\nthat it may appear the better what it is, and whether it be extant.\n\n(3) First, therefore, in this, as in all things which are practical we\nought to cast up our account, what is in our power, and what not; for the\none may be dealt with by way of alteration, but the other by way of\napplication only.  The husbandman cannot command neither the nature of\nthe earth nor the seasons of the weather; no more can the physician the\nconstitution of the patient nor the variety of accidents.  So in the\nculture and cure of the mind of man, two things are without our command:\npoints of Nature, and points of fortune.  For to the basis of the one,\nand the conditions of the other, our work is limited and tied.  In these\nthings, therefore, it is left unto us to proceed by application:\u2014\n\n    \u201cVincenda est omnis fertuna ferendo:\u201d\n\nand so likewise,\n\n    \u201cVincenda est omnis Natura ferendo.\u201d\n\nBut when that we speak of suffering, we do not speak of a dull and\nneglected suffering, but of a wise and industrious suffering, which\ndraweth and contriveth use and advantage out of that which seemeth\nadverse and contrary; which is that properly which we call accommodating\nor applying.  Now the wisdom of application resteth principally in the\nexact and distinct knowledge of the precedent state or disposition, unto\nwhich we do apply; for we cannot fit a garment except we first take\nmeasure of the body.\n\n(4) So, then, the first article of this knowledge is to set down sound\nand true distributions and descriptions of the several characters and\ntempers of men\u2019s natures and dispositions, specially having regard to\nthose differences which are most radical in being the fountains and\ncauses of the rest, or most frequent in concurrence or commixture;\nwherein it is not the handling of a few of them in passage, the better to\ndescribe the mediocrities of virtues, that can satisfy this intention.\nFor if it deserve to be considered, that there are minds which are\nproportioned to great matters, and others to small (which Aristotle\nhandleth, or ought to have bandied, by the name of magnanimity), doth it\nnot deserve as well to be considered that there are minds proportioned to\nintend many matters, and others to few?  So that some can divide\nthemselves: others can perchance do exactly well, but it must be but in\nfew things at once; and so there cometh to be a narrowness of mind, as\nwell as a pusillanimity.  And again, that some minds are proportioned to\nthat which may be dispatched at once, or within a short return of time;\nothers to that which begins afar off, and is to be won with length of\npursuit:\u2014\n\n    \u201cJam tum tenditqus fovetque.\u201d\n\nSo that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity, which is commonly\nalso ascribed to God as a magnanimity.  So further deserved it to be\nconsidered by Aristotle, \u201cThat there is a disposition in conversation\n(supposing it in things which do in no sort touch or concern a man\u2019s\nself) to soothe and please, and a disposition contrary to contradict and\ncross;\u201d and deserveth it not much better to be considered.  \u201cThat there\nis a disposition, not in conversation or talk, but in matter of more\nserious nature (and supposing it still in things merely indifferent), to\ntake pleasure in the good of another; and a disposition contrariwise, to\ntake distaste at the good of another?\u201d which is that properly which we\ncall good nature or ill nature, benignity or malignity; and, therefore, I\ncannot sufficiently marvel that this part of knowledge, touching the\nseveral characters of natures and dispositions, should be omitted both in\nmorality and policy, considering it is of so great ministry and\nsuppeditation to them both.  A man shall find in the traditions of\nastrology some pretty and apt divisions of men\u2019s natures, according to\nthe predominances of the planets: lovers of quiet, lovers of action,\nlovers of victory, lovers of honour, lovers of pleasure, lovers of arts,\nlovers of change, and so forth.  A man shall find in the wisest sort of\nthese relations which the Italians make touching conclaves, the natures\nof the several cardinals handsomely and lively painted forth.  A man\nshall meet with in every day\u2019s conference the denominations of sensitive,\ndry, formal, real, humorous, certain, _huomo di prima impressione_,\n_huomo di ultima impressione_, and the like; and yet, nevertheless, this\nkind of observations wandereth in words, but is not fixed in inquiry.\nFor the distinctions are found (many of them), but we conclude no\nprecepts upon them: wherein our fault is the greater, because both\nhistory, poesy, and daily experience are as goodly fields where these\nobservations grow; whereof we make a few posies to hold in our hands, but\nno man bringeth them to the confectionary that receipts might be made of\nthem for use of life.\n\n(5) Of much like kind are those impressions of Nature, which are imposed\nupon the mind by the sex, by the age, by the region, by health and\nsickness, by beauty and deformity, and the like, which are inherent and\nnot extern; and again, those which are caused by extern fortune, as\nsovereignty, nobility, obscure birth, riches, want, magistracy,\nprivateness, prosperity, adversity, constant fortune, variable fortune,\nrising _per saltum_, _per gradus_, and the like.  And, therefore, we see\nthat Plautus maketh it a wonder to see an old man beneficent, _benignitas\nhujis ut adolescentuli est_.  Saint Paul concludeth that severity of\ndiscipline was to be used to the Cretans, _increpa eos dure_, upon the\ndisposition of their country, _Cretensus semper mendaces_, _mal\u00e6 besti\u00e6_,\n_ventres_.  Sallust noteth that it is usual with kings to desire\ncontradictories: _Sed plerumque regi\u00e6 voluntates_, _ut vehementes sunt_,\n_sic mobiles_, _s\u00e6peque ips\u00e6 sibi advers_.  Tacitus observeth how rarely\nraising of the fortune mendeth the disposition: _solus Vespasianus\nmutatus in melius_.  Pindarus maketh an observation, that great and\nsudden fortune for the most part defeateth men _qui magnam felicitatem\nconcoquere non possunt_.  So the Psalm showeth it is more easy to keep a\nmeasure in the enjoying of fortune, than in the increase of fortune;\n_Diviti\u00e6 si affluant_, _nolite cor apponere_.  These observations and the\nlike I deny not but are touched a little by Aristotle as in passage in\nhis Rhetorics, and are handled in some scattered discourses; but they\nwere never incorporate into moral philosophy, to which they do\nessentially appertain; as the knowledge of this diversity of grounds and\nmoulds doth to agriculture, and the knowledge of the diversity of\ncomplexions and constitutions doth to the physician, except we mean to\nfollow the indiscretion of empirics, which minister the same medicines to\nall patients.\n\n(6) Another article of this knowledge is the inquiry touching the\naffections; for as in medicining of the body, it is in order first to\nknow the divers complexions and constitutions; secondly, the diseases;\nand lastly, the cures: so in medicining of the mind, after knowledge of\nthe divers characters of men\u2019s natures, it followeth in order to know the\ndiseases and infirmities of the mind, which are no other than the\nperturbations and distempars of the affections.  For as the ancient\npolitiques in popular estates were wont to compare the people to the sea,\nand the orators to the winds; because as the sea would of itself be calm\nand quiet, if the winds did not move and trouble it; so the people would\nbe peaceable and tractable if the seditious orators did not set them in\nworking and agitation: so it may be fitly said, that the mind in the\nnature thereof would be temperate and stayed, if the affections, as\nwinds, did not put it into tumult and perturbation.  And here again I\nfind strange, as before, that Aristotle should have written divers\nvolumes of Ethics, and never handled the affections which is the\nprincipal subject thereof; and yet in his Rhetorics, where they are\nconsidered but collaterally and in a second degree (as they may be moved\nby speech), he findeth place for them, and handleth them well for the\nquantity; but where their true place is he pretermitteth them.  For it is\nnot his disputations about pleasure and pain that can satisfy this\ninquiry, no more than he that should generally handle the nature of light\ncan be said to handle the nature of colours; for pleasure and pain are to\nthe particular affections as light is to particular colours.  Better\ntravails, I suppose, had the Stoics taken in this argument, as far as I\ncan gather by that which we have at second hand.  But yet it is like it\nwas after their manner, rather in subtlety of definitions (which in a\nsubject of this nature are but curiosities), than in active and ample\ndescriptions and observations.  So likewise I find some particular\nwritings of an elegant nature, touching some of the affections: as of\nanger, of comfort upon adverse accidents, of tenderness of countenance,\nand other.  But the poets and writers of histories are the best doctors\nof this knowledge; where we may find painted forth, with great life, how\naffections are kindled and incited; and how pacified and refrained; and\nhow again contained from act and further degree; how they disclose\nthemselves; how they work; how they vary; how they gather and fortify:\nhow they are enwrapped one within another; and how they do fight and\nencounter one with another; and other the like particularities.  Amongst\nthe which this last is of special use in moral and civil matters; how, I\nsay, to set affection against affection, and to master one by another;\neven as we used to hunt beast with beast, and fly bird with bird, which\notherwise percase we could not so easily recover: upon which foundation\nis erected that excellent use of _pr\u00e6mium_ and _p\u00e6na_, whereby civil\nstates consist: employing the predominant affections of fear and hope,\nfor the suppressing and bridling the rest.  For as in the government of\nstates it is sometimes necessary to bridle one faction with another, so\nit is in the government within.\n\n(7) Now come we to those points which are within our own command, and\nhave force and operation upon the mind, to affect the will and appetite,\nand to alter manners: wherein they ought to have handled custom,\nexercise, habit, education, example, imitation, emulation, company,\nfriends, praise, reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, books, studies: these\nas they have determinate use in moralities, from these the mind\nsuffereth, and of these are such receipts and regiments compounded and\ndescribed, as may serve to recover or preserve the health and good estate\nof the mind, as far as pertaineth to human medicine: of which number we\nwill insist upon some one or two, as an example of the rest, because it\nwere too long to prosecute all; and therefore we do resume custom and\nhabit to speak of.\n\n(8) The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to me a negligent opinion, that of\nthose things which consist by Nature, nothing can be changed by custom;\nusing for example, that if a stone be thrown ten thousand times up it\nwill not learn to ascend; and that by often seeing or hearing we do not\nlearn to see or hear the better.  For though this principle be true in\nthings wherein Nature is peremptory (the reason whereof we cannot now\nstand to discuss), yet it is otherwise in things wherein Nature admitteth\na latitude.  For he might see that a strait glove will come more easily\non with use; and that a wand will by use bend otherwise than it grew; and\nthat by use of the voice we speak louder and stronger; and that by use of\nenduring heat or cold we endure it the better, and the like: which latter\nsort have a nearer resemblance unto that subject of manners he handleth,\nthan those instances which he allegeth.  But allowing his conclusion,\nthat virtues and vices consist in habit, he ought so much the more to\nhave taught the manner of superinducing that habit: for there be many\nprecepts of the wise ordering the exercises of the mind, as there is of\nordering the exercises of the body, whereof we will recite a few.\n\n(9) The first shall be, that we beware we take not at the first either\ntoo high a strain or too weak: for if too high, in a diffident nature you\ndiscourage, in a confident nature you breed an opinion of facility, and\nso a sloth; and in all natures you breed a further expectation than can\nhold out, and so an insatisfaction in the end: if too weak, of the other\nside, you may not look to perform and overcome any great task.\n\n(10) Another precept is to practise all things chiefly at two several\ntimes, the one when the mind is best disposed, the other when it is worst\ndisposed; that by the one you may gain a great step, by the other you may\nwork out the knots and stonds of the mind, and make the middle times the\nmore easy and pleasant.\n\n(11) Another precept is that which Aristotle mentioneth by the way, which\nis to bear ever towards the contrary extreme of that whereunto we are by\nnature inclined; like unto the rowing against the stream, or making a\nwand straight by bending him contrary to his natural crookedness.\n\n(12) Another precept is that the mind is brought to anything better, and\nwith more sweetness and happiness, if that whereunto you pretend be not\nfirst in the intention, but _tanquam aliud agendo_, because of the\nnatural hatred of the mind against necessity and constraint.  Many other\naxioms there are touching the managing of exercise and custom, which\nbeing so conducted doth prove indeed another nature; but, being governed\nby chance, doth commonly prove but an ape of Nature, and bringeth forth\nthat which is lame and counterfeit.\n\n(13) So if we should handle books and studies, and what influence and\noperation they have upon manners, are there not divers precepts of great\ncaution and direction appertaining thereunto?  Did not one of the fathers\nin great indignation call poesy _vinum d\u00e6monum_, because it increaseth\ntemptations, perturbations, and vain opinions?  Is not the opinion of\nAristotle worthy to be regarded, wherein he saith, \u201cThat young men are no\nfit auditors of moral philosophy, because they are not settled from the\nboiling heat of their affections, nor attempered with time and\nexperience\u201d?  And doth it not hereof come, that those excellent books and\ndiscourses of the ancient writers (whereby they have persuaded unto\nvirtue most effectually, by representing her in state and majesty, and\npopular opinions against virtue in their parasites\u2019 coats fit to be\nscorned and derided), are of so little effect towards honesty of life,\nbecause they are not read and revolved by men in their mature and settled\nyears, but confined almost to boys and beginners?  But is it not true\nalso, that much less young men are fit auditors of matters of policy,\ntill they have been thoroughly seasoned in religion and morality; lest\ntheir judgments be corrupted, and made apt to think that there are no\ntrue differences of things, but according to utility and fortune, as the\nverse describes it, _Prosperum et felix scelus virtus vocatur_; and\nagain, _Ille crucem pretium sceleris tulit_, _hic diadema_: which the\npoets do speak satirically and in indignation on virtue\u2019s behalf; but\nbooks of policy do speak it seriously and positively; for so it pleaseth\nMachiavel to say, \u201cThat if C\u00e6sar had been overthrown, he would have been\nmore odious than ever was Catiline;\u201d as if there had been no difference,\nbut in fortune, between a very fury of lust and blood, and the most\nexcellent spirit (his ambition reserved) of the world?  Again, is there\nnot a caution likewise to be given of the doctrines of moralities\nthemselves (some kinds of them), lest they make men too precise,\narrogant, incompatible; as Cicero saith of Cato, _In Marco Catone h\u00e6c\nbona qu\u00e6 videmus divina et egregia_, _ipsius scitote esse propria_; _qu\u00e6\nnonunquam requirimus ea sunt omnia non a natura_, _sed a magistro_?  Many\nother axioms and advices there are touching those proprieties and\neffects, which studies do infuse and instil into manners.  And so,\nlikewise, is there touching the use of all those other points, of\ncompany, fame, laws, and the rest, which we recited in the beginning in\nthe doctrine of morality.\n\n(14) But there is a kind of culture of the mind that seemeth yet more\naccurate and elaborate than the rest, and is built upon this ground; that\nthe minds of all men are at some times in a state more perfect, and at\nother times in a state more depraved.  The purpose, therefore, of this\npractice is to fix and cherish the good hours of the mind, and to\nobliterate and take forth the evil.  The fixing of the good hath been\npractised by two means, vows or constant resolutions, and observances or\nexercises; which are not to be regarded so much in themselves, as because\nthey keep the mind in continual obedience.  The obliteration of the evil\nhath been practised by two means, some kind of redemption or expiation of\nthat which is past, and an inception or account _de novo_ for the time to\ncome.  But this part seemeth sacred and religious, and justly; for all\ngood moral philosophy (as was said) is but a handmaid to religion.\n\n(15) Wherefore we will conclude with that last point, which is of all\nother means the most compendious and summary, and again, the most noble\nand effectual to the reducing of the mind unto virtue and good estate;\nwhich is, the electing and propounding unto a man\u2019s self good and\nvirtuous ends of his life, such as may be in a reasonable sort within his\ncompass to attain.  For if these two things be supposed, that a man set\nbefore him honest and good ends, and again, that he be resolute,\nconstant, and true unto them; it will follow that he shall mould himself\ninto all virtue at once.  And this indeed is like the work of nature;\nwhereas the other course is like the work of the hand.  For as when a\ncarver makes an image, he shapes only that part whereupon he worketh; as\nif he be upon the face, that part which shall be the body is but a rude\nstone still, till such times as he comes to it.  But contrariwise when\nnature makes a flower or living creature, she formeth rudiments of all\nthe parts at one time.  So in obtaining virtue by habit, while a man\npractiseth temperance, he doth not profit much to fortitude, nor the like\nbut when he dedicateth and applieth himself to good ends, look, what\nvirtue soever the pursuit and passage towards those ends doth commend\nunto him, he is invested of a precedent disposition to conform himself\nthereunto.  Which state of mind Aristotle doth excellently express\nhimself, that it ought not to be called virtuous, but divine.  His words\nare these: _Immanitati autem consentaneum est opponere eam_, _qu\u00e6 supra\nhumanitatem est_, _heroicam sive divinam virtutem_; and a little after,\n_Nam ut fer\u00e6 neque vitium neque virtus est_, _swic neque Dei_: _sed hic\nquidem status altius quiddam virtute est_, _ille aluid quiddam a vitio_.\nAnd therefore we may see what celsitude of honour Plinius Secundus\nattributeth to Trajan in his funeral oration, where he said, \u201cThat men\nneeded to make no other prayers to the gods, but that they would continue\nas good lords to them as Trajan had been;\u201d as if he had not been only an\nimitation of divine nature, but a pattern of it.  But these be heathen\nand profane passages, having but a shadow of that divine state of mind,\nwhich religion and the holy faith doth conduct men unto, by imprinting\nupon their souls charity, which is excellently called the bond of\nperfection, because it comprehendeth and fasteneth all virtues together.\nAnd as it is elegantly said by Menander of vain love, which is but a\nfalse imitation of divine love, _Amor melior Sophista l\u0153vo ad humanam\nvitam_\u2014that love teacheth a man to carry himself better than the sophist\nor preceptor; which he calleth left-handed, because, with all his rules\nand preceptions, he cannot form a man so dexterously, nor with that\nfacility to prize himself and govern himself, as love can do: so\ncertainly, if a man\u2019s mind be truly inflamed with charity, it doth work\nhim suddenly into greater perfection than all the doctrine of morality\ncan do, which is but a sophist in comparison of the other.  Nay, further,\nas Xenophon observed truly, that all other affections, though they raise\nthe mind, yet they do it by distorting and uncomeliness of ecstasies or\nexcesses; but only love doth exalt the mind, and nevertheless at the same\ninstant doth settle and compose it: so in all other excellences, though\nthey advance nature, yet they are subject to excess.  Only charity\nadmitteth no excess.  For so we see, aspiring to be like God in power,\nthe angels transgressed and fell; _Ascendam_, _et ero similis altissimo_:\nby aspiring to be like God in knowledge, man transgressed and fell;\n_Eritis sicut Dii_, _scientes bonum et malum_: but by aspiring to a\nsimilitude of God in goodness or love, neither man nor angel ever\ntransgressed, or shall transgress.  For unto that imitation we are\ncalled: _Diligite inimicos vestros_, _benefacite eis qui oderunt vos_,\n_et orate pro persequentibus et calumniantibus vos_, _ut sitis filii\nPatris vestri qui in c\u0153lis est_, _qui solem suum oriri facit super bonos\net malos_, _et pluit super justos et injustos_.  So in the first platform\nof the divine nature itself, the heathen religion speaketh thus, _Optimus\nMaximus_: and the sacred Scriptures thus, _Miscericordia ejus super omnia\nopera ejus_.\n\n(16) Wherefore I do conclude this part of moral knowledge, concerning the\nculture and regiment of the mind; wherein if any man, considering the\narts thereof which I have enumerated, do judge that my labour is but to\ncollect into an art or science that which hath been pretermitted by\nothers, as matter of common sense and experience, he judgeth well.  But\nas Philocrates sported with Demosthenes, \u201cYou may not marvel (Athenians)\nthat Demosthenes and I do differ; for he drinketh water, and I drink\nwine;\u201d and like as we read of an ancient parable of the two gates of\nsleep\u2014\n\n    \u201cSunt gemin\u00e6 somni port\u00e6: quarum altera fertur\n    Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris:\n    Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto,\n    Sed falsa ad c\u0153lum mittunt insomnia manes:\u201d\n\nso if we put on sobriety and attention, we shall find it a sure maxim in\nknowledge, that the more pleasant liquor (\u201cof wine\u201d) is the more\nvaporous, and the braver gate (\u201cof ivory\u201d) sendeth forth the falser\ndreams.\n\n(17) But we have now concluded that general part of human philosophy,\nwhich contemplateth man segregate, and as he consisteth of body and\nspirit.  Wherein we may further note, that there seemeth to be a relation\nor conformity between the good of the mind and the good of the body.  For\nas we divided the good of the body into health, beauty, strength, and\npleasure, so the good of the mind, inquired in rational and moral\nknowledges, tendeth to this, to make the mind sound, and without\nperturbation; beautiful, and graced with decency; and strong and agile\nfor all duties of life.  These three, as in the body, so in the mind,\nseldom meet, and commonly sever.  For it is easy to observe, that many\nhave strength of wit and courage, but have neither health from\nperturbations, nor any beauty or decency in their doings; some again have\nan elegancy and fineness of carriage which have neither soundness of\nhonesty nor substance of sufficiency; and some again have honest and\nreformed minds, that can neither become themselves nor manage business;\nand sometimes two of them meet, and rarely all three.  As for pleasure,\nwe have likewise determined that the mind ought not to be reduced to\nstupid, but to retain pleasure; confined rather in the subject of it,\nthan in the strength and vigour of it.\n\nXXIII. (1) Civil knowledge is conversant about a subject which of all\nothers is most immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced to axiom.\nNevertheless, as Cato the Censor said, \u201cThat the Romans were like sheep,\nfor that a man were better drive a flock of them, than one of them; for\nin a flock, if you could get but some few go right, the rest would\nfollow:\u201d so in that respect moral philosophy is more difficile than\npolicy.  Again, moral philosophy propoundeth to itself the framing of\ninternal goodness; but civil knowledge requireth only an external\ngoodness; for that as to society sufficeth.  And therefore it cometh oft\nto pass that there be evil times in good governments: for so we find in\nthe Holy story, when the kings were good, yet it is added, _Sed adhuc\npoulus non direxerat cor suum ad Dominum Deum patrum suorum_.  Again,\nstates, as great engines, move slowly, and are not so soon put out of\nframe: for as in Egypt the seven good years sustained the seven bad, so\ngovernments for a time well grounded do bear out errors following; but\nthe resolution of particular persons is more suddenly subverted.  These\nrespects do somewhat qualify the extreme difficulty of civil knowledge.\n\n(2) This knowledge hath three parts, according to the three summary\nactions of society; which are conversation, negotiation, and government.\nFor man seeketh in society comfort, use, and protection; and they be\nthree wisdoms of divers natures which do often sever\u2014wisdom of the\nbehaviour, wisdom of business, and wisdom of state.\n\n(3) The wisdom of conversation ought not to be over much affected, but\nmuch less despised; for it hath not only an honour in itself, but an\ninfluence also into business and government.  The poet saith, _Nec vultu\ndestrue verba tuo_: a man may destroy the force of his words with his\ncountenance; so may he of his deeds, saith Cicero, recommending to his\nbrother affability and easy access; _Nil interest habere ostium apertum_,\n_vultum clausum_: it is nothing won to admit men with an open door, and\nto receive them with a shut and reserved countenance.  So we see Atticus,\nbefore the first interview between C\u00e6sar and Cicero, the war depending,\ndid seriously advise Cicero touching the composing and ordering of his\ncountenance and gesture.  And if the government of the countenance be of\nsuch effect, much more is that of the speech, and other carriage\nappertaining to conversation; the true model whereof seemeth to me well\nexpressed by Livy, though not meant for this purpose: _Ne aut arrogans\nvidear_, _aut obnoxius_; _quorum alterum est \u00e0lien\u00e6 libertatis obliti_,\n_alterum su\u00e6_: the sum of behaviour is to retain a man\u2019s own dignity,\nwithout intruding upon the liberty of others.  On the other side, if\nbehaviour and outward carriage be intended too much, first it may pass\ninto affectation, and then _Quid deformius quam scenam in vitam\ntransferre_\u2014to act a man\u2019s life?  But although it proceed not to that\nextreme, yet it consumeth time, and employeth the mind too much.  And\ntherefore as we use to advise young students from company keeping, by\nsaying, _Amici fures temporis_: so certainly the intending of the\ndiscretion of behaviour is a great thief of meditation.  Again, such as\nare accomplished in that form of urbanity please themselves in it, and\nseldom aspire to higher virtue; whereas those that have defect in it do\nseek comeliness by reputation; for where reputation is, almost everything\nbecometh; but where that is not, it must be supplied by _puntos_ and\ncompliments.  Again, there is no greater impediment of action than an\nover-curious observance of decency, and the guide of decency, which is\ntime and season.  For as Solomon saith, _Qui respicit ad ventos_, _non\nseminat_; _et qui respicit ad nubes_, _non metet_: a man must make his\nopportunity, as oft as find it.  To conclude, behaviour seemeth to me as\na garment of the mind, and to have the conditions of a garment.  For it\nought to be made in fashion; it ought not to be too curious; it ought to\nbe shaped so as to set forth any good making of the mind and hide any\ndeformity; and above all, it ought not to be too strait or restrained for\nexercise or motion.  But this part of civil knowledge hath been elegantly\nhandled, and therefore I cannot report it for deficient.\n\n(4) The wisdom touching negotiation or business hath not been hitherto\ncollected into writing, to the great derogation of learning and the\nprofessors of learning.  For from this root springeth chiefly that note\nor opinion, which by us is expressed in adage to this effect, that there\nis no great concurrence between learning and wisdom.  For of the three\nwisdoms which we have set down to pertain to civil life, for wisdom of\nbehaviour, it is by learned men for the most part despised, as an\ninferior to virtue and an enemy to meditation; for wisdom of government,\nthey acquit themselves well when they are called to it, but that\nhappeneth to few; but for the wisdom of business, wherein man\u2019s life is\nmost conversant, there be no books of it, except some few scattered\nadvertisements, that have no proportion to the magnitude of this subject.\nFor if books were written of this as the other, I doubt not but learned\nmen with mean experience would far excel men of long experience without\nlearning, and outshoot them in their own bow.\n\n(5) Neither needeth it at all to be doubted, that this knowledge should\nbe so variable as it falleth not under precept; for it is much less\ninfinite than science of government, which we see is laboured and in some\npart reduced.  Of this wisdom it seemeth some of the ancient Romans in\nthe saddest and wisest times were professors; for Cicero reporteth, that\nit was then in use for senators that had name and opinion for general\nwise men, as Coruncanius, Curius, L\u00e6lius, and many others, to walk at\ncertain hours in the Place, and to give audience to those that would use\ntheir advice; and that the particular citizens would resort unto them,\nand consult with them of the marriage of a daughter, or of the employing\nof a son, or of a purchase or bargain, or of an accusation, and every\nother occasion incident to man\u2019s life.  So as there is a wisdom of\ncounsel and advice even in private causes, arising out of a universal\ninsight into the affairs of the world; which is used indeed upon\nparticular causes propounded, but is gathered by general observation of\ncauses of like nature.  For so we see in the book which Q. Cicero writeth\nto his brother, _De petitione consulatus_ (being the only book of\nbusiness that I know written by the ancients), although it concerned a\nparticular action then on foot, yet the substance thereof consisteth of\nmany wise and politic axioms, which contain not a temporary, but a\nperpetual direction in the case of popular elections.  But chiefly we may\nsee in those aphorisms which have place amongst divine writings, composed\nby Solomon the king, of whom the Scriptures testify that his heart was as\nthe sands of the sea, encompassing the world and all worldly matters, we\nsee, I say, not a few profound and excellent cautions, precepts,\npositions, extending to much variety of occasions; whereupon we will stay\na while, offering to consideration some number of examples.\n\n(6) _Sed et cunctis sermonibus qui dicuntur ne accommodes aurem tuam_,\n_ne forte audias servum tuum maledicentem tibi_.  Here is commended the\nprovident stay of inquiry of that which we would be loth to find: as it\nwas judged great wisdom in Pompeius Magnus that he burned Sertorius\u2019\npapers unperused.\n\n_Vir sapiens_, _si cum stulto contenderit_, _sive irascatur_, _sive\nrideat_, _non inveniet requiem_.  Here is described the great\ndisadvantage which a wise man hath in undertaking a lighter person than\nhimself; which is such an engagement as, whether a man turn the matter to\njest, or turn it to heat, or howsoever he change copy, he can no ways\nquit himself well of it.\n\n_Qui delicate a pueritia nutrit servum suum_, _postea sentiet eum\ncontumacem_.  Here is signified, that if a man begin too high a pitch in\nhis favours, it doth commonly end in unkindness and unthankfulness.\n\n_Vidisti virum velocem in opere suo_? _coram regibus stabit_, _nec erit\ninter ignobiles_.  Here is observed, that of all virtues for rising to\nhonour, quickness of despatch is the best; for superiors many times love\nnot to have those they employ too deep or too sufficient, but ready and\ndiligent.\n\n_Vidi cunctos viventes qui ambulant sub sole_, _cum adolescente secundo\nqui consurgit pro eo_.  Here is expressed that which was noted by Sylla\nfirst, and after him by Tiberius.  _Plures adorant solem orientem quam\noccidentem vel meridianum_.\n\n_Si spiritus potestatem habentis ascenderit super te_, _locum tuum ne\ndemiseris_; _quia curatio faciet cessare peccata maxima_.  Here caution\nis given, that upon displeasure, retiring is of all courses the\nunfittest; for a man leaveth things at worst, and depriveth himself of\nmeans to make them better.\n\n_Erat civitas parva_, _et pauci in ea viri_: _venit contra eam rex\nmagnus_, _et vallavit eam_, _instruxitque munitones per gyrum_, _et\nperfecta est obsidio_; _inventusque est in ea vir pauper et sapiens_, _et\nliberavit eam per sapientiam suam_; _et nullus deinceps recordatus est\nhuminis illius pauperis_.  Here the corruption of states is set forth,\nthat esteem not virtue or merit longer than they have use of it.\n\n_Millis responsio frangit iram_.  Here is noted that silence or rough\nanswer exasperateth; but an answer present and temperate pacifieth.\n\n_Iter pigrorum quasi sepes spinarum_.  Here is lively represented how\nlaborious sloth proveth in the end; for when things are deferred till the\nlast instant, and nothing prepared beforehand, every step findeth a briar\nor impediment, which catcheth or stoppeth.\n\n_Melior est finis orationis quam principium_.  Here is taxed the vanity\nof formal speakers, that study more about prefaces and inducements, than\nupon the conclusions and issues of speech.\n\n_Qui cognoscit in judicio faciem_, _non bene facit_; _iste et pro\nbuccella panis deseret veritatem_.  Here is noted, that a judge were\nbetter be a briber than a respecter of persons; for a corrupt judge\noffendeth not so lightly as a facile.\n\n_Vir pauper calumnians pauperes simils est imbri vehementi_, _in quo\nparatur fames_.  Here is expressed the extremity of necessitous\nextortions, figured in the ancient fable of the full and the hungry\nhorseleech.\n\n_Fons turbatus pede_, _et vena corrupta_, _est justus cadens coram\nimpio_.  Here is noted, that one judicial and exemplar iniquity in the\nface of the world doth trouble the fountains of justice more than many\nparticular injuries passed over by connivance.\n\n_Qui subtrahit aliquid a patre et a matre_, _et dicit hoc non esse\npeccatum_, _particeps est homicidii_.  Here is noted that, whereas men in\nwronging their best friends use to extenuate their fault, as if they\nmight presume or be bold upon them, it doth contrariwise indeed aggravate\ntheir fault, and turneth it from injury to impiety.\n\n_Noli esse amicus homini iracundo_, _nec ambulato cum homine furioso_.\nHere caution is given, that in the election of our friends we do\nprincipally avoid those which are impatient, as those that will espouse\nus to many factions and quarrels.\n\n_Qui conturbat domum suam_, _possidebit ventum_.  Here is noted, that in\ndomestical separations and breaches men do promise to themselves quieting\nof their mind and contentment; but still they are deceived of their\nexpectation, and it turneth to wind.\n\n_Filius sapiens l\u00e6tificat patrem_: _filius vero stultus m\u00e6stitia est\nmatri su\u00e6_.  Here is distinguished, that fathers have most comfort of the\ngood proof of their sons; but mothers have most discomfort of their ill\nproof, because women have little discerning of virtue, but of fortune.\n\n_Qui celat delictum_, _qu\u00e6rit amicitiam_; _sed qui altero sermone\nrepetit_, _separat f\u00e6deratos_.  Here caution is given, that reconcilement\nis better managed by an amnesty, and passing over that which is past,\nthan by apologies and excuses.\n\n_In omni opere bono erit abundantia_; _ubi autem verba sunt plurima_,\n_ibi frequenter egestas_.  Here is noted, that words and discourse\naboundeth most where there is idleness and want.\n\n_Primus in sua causa justus_: _sed venit altera pars_, _et inquiret in\neum_.  Here is observed, that in all causes the first tale possesseth\nmuch; in sort, that the prejudice thereby wrought will be hardly removed,\nexcept some abuse or falsity in the information be detected.\n\n_Verba bilinguis quasi simplicia_, _et ipsa perveniunt ad interiora\nventris_.  Here is distinguished, that flattery and insinuation, which\nseemeth set and artificial, sinketh not far; but that entereth deep which\nhath show of nature, liberty, and simplicity.\n\n_Qui erudit derisorem_, _ipse sibi injuriam facit_; _et qui arguit\nimpium_, _sibi maculam generat_.  Here caution is given how we tender\nreprehension to arrogant and scornful natures, whose manner is to esteem\nit for contumely, and accordingly to return it.\n\n_Da sapienti occasionem_, _et addetur ei sapientia_.  Here is\ndistinguished the wisdom brought into habit, and that which is but verbal\nand swimming only in conceit; for the one upon the occasion presented is\nquickened and redoubled, the other is amazed and confused.\n\n_Quomodo in aquis resplendent vultus prospicientium_, _sic corda hominum\nmanifesta sunt prudentibus_.  Here the mind of a wise man is compared to\na glass, wherein the images of all diversity of natures and customs are\nrepresented; from which representation proceedeth that application,\n\n    \u201cQui sapit, innumeris moribus aptus erit.\u201d\n\n(7) Thus have I stayed somewhat longer upon these sentences politic of\nSolomon than is agreeable to the proportion of an example; led with a\ndesire to give authority to this part of knowledge, which I noted as\ndeficient, by so excellent a precedent; and have also attended them with\nbrief observations, such as to my understanding offer no violence to the\nsense, though I know they may be applied to a more divine use: but it is\nallowed, even in divinity, that some interpretations, yea, and some\nwritings, have more of the eagle than others; but taking them as\ninstructions for life, they might have received large discourse, if I\nwould have broken them and illustrated them by deducements and examples.\n\n(8) Neither was this in use only with the Hebrews, but it is generally to\nbe found in the wisdom of the more ancient times; that as men found out\nany observation that they thought was good for life, they would gather it\nand express it in parable or aphorism or fable.  But for fables, they\nwere vicegerents and supplies where examples failed: now that the times\nabound with history, the aim is better when the mark is alive.  And\ntherefore the form of writing which of all others is fittest for this\nvariable argument of negotiation and occasions is that which Machiavel\nchose wisely and aptly for government; namely, discourse upon histories\nor examples.  For knowledge drawn freshly and in our view out of\nparticulars, knoweth the way best to particulars again.  And it hath much\ngreater life for practice when the discourse attendeth upon the example,\nthan when the example attendeth upon the discourse.  For this is no point\nof order, as it seemeth at first, but of substance.  For when the example\nis the ground, being set down in a history at large, it is set down with\nall circumstances, which may sometimes control the discourse thereupon\nmade, and sometimes supply it, as a very pattern for action; whereas the\nexamples alleged for the discourse\u2019s sake are cited succinctly, and\nwithout particularity, and carry a servile aspect towards the discourse\nwhich they are brought in to make good.\n\n(9) But this difference is not amiss to be remembered, that as history of\ntimes is the best ground for discourse of government, such as Machiavel\nhandleth, so histories of lives is the most popular for discourse of\nbusiness, because it is more conversant in private actions.  Nay, there\nis a ground of discourse for this purpose fitter than them both, which is\ndiscourse upon letters, such as are wise and weighty, as many are of\nCicero _ad Atticum_, and others.  For letters have a great and more\nparticular representation of business than either chronicles or lives.\nThus have we spoken both of the matter and form of this part of civil\nknowledge, touching negotiation, which we note to be deficient.\n\n(10) But yet there is another part of this part, which differeth as much\nfrom that whereof we have spoken as _sapere_ and _sibi sapere_, the one\nmoving as it were to the circumference, the other to the centre.  For\nthere is a wisdom of counsel, and again there is a wisdom of pressing a\nman\u2019s own fortune; and they do sometimes meet, and often sever.  For many\nare wise in their own ways that are weak for government or counsel; like\nants, which is a wise creature for itself, but very hurtful for the\ngarden.  This wisdom the Romans did take much knowledge of: _Nam pol\nsapiens_ (saith the comical poet) _fingit fortunam sibi_; and it grew to\nan adage, _Faber quisque fortun\u00e6 propri\u00e6_; and Livy attributed it to Cato\nthe first, _In hoc viro tanta vis animi et ingenii inerat_, _ut quocunque\nloco natus esset sibi ipse fortunam facturus videretur_.\n\n(11) This conceit or position, if it be too much declared and professed,\nhath been thought a thing impolitic and unlucky, as was observed in\nTimotheus the Athenian, who, having done many great services to the state\nin his government, and giving an account thereof to the people as the\nmanner was, did conclude every particular with this clause, \u201cAnd in this\nfortune had no part.\u201d  And it came so to pass, that he never prospered in\nanything he took in hand afterwards.  For this is too high and too\narrogant, savouring of that which Ezekiel saith of Pharaoh, _Dicis_,\n_Fluvius est neus et ego feci memet ipsum_; or of that which another\nprophet speaketh, that men offer sacrifices to their nets and snares; and\nthat which the poet expresseth,\n\n    \u201cDextra mihi Deus, et telum quod missile libro,\n    Nunc adsint!\u201d\n\nFor these confidences were ever unhallowed, and unblessed; and,\ntherefore, those that were great politiques indeed ever ascribed their\nsuccesses to their felicity and not to their skill or virtue.  For so\nSylla surnamed himself Felix, not Magnus.  So C\u00e6sar said to the master of\nthe ship, _C\u00e6sarem portas et fortunam ejus_.\n\n(12) But yet, nevertheless, these positions, _Faber quisque fortun\u00e6 su\u00e6_:\n_Sapiens dominabitur astris_: _Invia virtuti null est via_, and the like,\nbeing taken and used as spurs to industry, and not as stirrups to\ninsolency, rather for resolution than for the presumption or outward\ndeclaration, have been ever thought sound and good; and are no question\nimprinted in the greatest minds, who are so sensible of this opinion as\nthey can scarce contain it within.  As we see in Augustus C\u00e6sar (who was\nrather diverse from his uncle than inferior in virtue), how when he died\nhe desired his friends about him to give him a _plaudite_, as if he were\nconscious to himself that he had played his part well upon the stage.\nThis part of knowledge we do report also as deficient; not but that it is\npractised too much, but it hath not been reduced to writing.  And,\ntherefore, lest it should seem to any that it is not comprehensible by\naxiom, it is requisite, as we did in the former, that we set down some\nheads or passages of it.\n\n(13) Wherein it may appear at the first a new and unwonted argument to\nteach men how to raise and make their fortune; a doctrine wherein every\nman perchance will be ready to yield himself a disciple, till he see the\ndifficulty: for fortune layeth as heavy impositions as virtue; and it is\nas hard and severe a thing to be a true politique, as to be truly moral.\nBut the handling hereof concerneth learning greatly, both in honour and\nin substance.  In honour, because pragmatical men may not go away with an\nopinion that learning is like a lark, that can mount and sing, and please\nherself, and nothing else; but may know that she holdeth as well of the\nhawk, that can soar aloft, and can also descend and strike upon the prey.\nIn substance, because it is the perfect law of inquiry of truth, that\nnothing be in the globe of matter, which should not be likewise in the\nglobe of crystal or form; that is, that there be not anything in being\nand action which should not be drawn and collected into contemplation and\ndoctrine.  Neither doth learning admire or esteem of this architecture of\nfortune otherwise than as of an inferior work, for no man\u2019s fortune can\nbe an end worthy of his being, and many times the worthiest men do\nabandon their fortune willingly for better respects: but nevertheless\nfortune as an organ of virtue and merit deserveth the consideration.\n\n(14) First, therefore, the precept which I conceive to be most summary\ntowards the prevailing in fortune, is to obtain that window which Momus\ndid require; who seeing in the frame of man\u2019s heart such angles and\nrecesses, found fault there was not a window to look into them; that is,\nto procure good informations of particulars touching persons, their\nnatures, their desires and ends, their customs and fashions, their helps\nand advantages, and whereby they chiefly stand, so again their weaknesses\nand disadvantages, and where they lie most open and obnoxious, their\nfriends, factions, dependences; and again their opposites, enviers,\ncompetitors, their moods and times, _Sola viri molles aditus et tempora\nnoras_; their principles, rules, and observations, and the like: and this\nnot only of persons but of actions; what are on foot from time to time,\nand how they are conducted, favoured, opposed, and how they import, and\nthe like.  For the knowledge of present actions is not only material in\nitself, but without it also the knowledge of persons is very erroneous:\nfor men change with the actions; and whilst they are in pursuit they are\none, and when they return to their nature they are another.  These\ninformations of particulars, touching persons and actions, are as the\nminor propositions in every active syllogism; for no excellency of\nobservations (which are as the major propositions) can suffice to ground\na conclusion, if there be error and mistaking in the minors.\n\n(15) That this knowledge is possible, Solomon is our surety, who saith,\n_Consilium in corde viri tanquam aqua profunda_; _sed vir prudens\nexhauriet illud_.  And although the knowledge itself falleth not under\nprecept because it is of individuals, yet the instructions for the\nobtaining of it may.\n\n(16) We will begin, therefore, with this precept, according to the\nancient opinion, that the sinews of wisdom are slowness of belief and\ndistrust; that more trust be given to countenances and deeds than to\nwords; and in words rather to sudden passages and surprised words than to\nset and purposed words.  Neither let that be feared which is said,\n_Fronti nulla fides_, which is meant of a general outward behaviour, and\nnot of the private and subtle motions and labours of the countenance and\ngesture; which, as Q. Cicero elegantly saith, is _Animi janua_, \u201cthe gate\nof the mind.\u201d  None more close than Tiberius, and yet Tacitus saith of\nGallus, _Etenim vultu offensionem conjectaverat_.  So again, noting the\ndiffering character and manner of his commending Germanicus and Drusus in\nthe Senate, he saith, touching his fashion wherein he carried his speech\nof Germanicus, thus: _Magis in speciem adornatis verbis_, _quam ut\npenitus sentire crederetur_; but of Drusus thus: _Paucioribus sed\nintentior_, _et fida oratione_; and in another place, speaking of his\ncharacter of speech when he did anything that was gracious and popular,\nhe saith, \u201cThat in other things he was _velut eluctantium verborum_;\u201d but\nthen again, _solutius loquebatur quando subveniret_.  So that there is no\nsuch artificer of dissimulation, nor no such commanded countenance\n(_vultus jussus_), that can sever from a feigned tale some of these\nfashions, either a more slight and careless fashion, or more set and\nformal, or more tedious and wandering, or coming from a man more drily\nand hardly.\n\n(17) Neither are deeds such assured pledges as that they may be trusted\nwithout a judicious consideration of their magnitude and nature: _Fraus\nsibi in parvis fidem pr\u00e6struit ut majore emolumento fallat_; and the\nItalian thinketh himself upon the point to be bought and sold, when he is\nbetter used than he was wont to be without manifest cause.  For small\nfavours, they do but lull men to sleep, both as to caution and as to\nindustry; and are, as Demosthenes calleth them, _Alimenta socordi\u00e6_.  So\nagain we see how false the nature of some deeds are, in that particular\nwhich Mutianus practised upon Antonius Primus, upon that hollow and\nunfaithful reconcilement which was made between them; whereupon Mutianus\nadvanced many of the friends of Antonius, _Simul amicis ejus pr\u00e6fecturas\net tribunatus largitur_: wherein, under pretence to strengthen him, he\ndid desolate him, and won from him his dependents.\n\n(18) As for words, though they be like waters to physicians, full of\nflattery and uncertainty, yet they are not to be despised specially with\nthe advantage of passion and affection.  For so we see Tiberius, upon a\nstinging and incensing speech of Agrippina, came a step forth of his\ndissimulation when he said, \u201cYou are hurt because you do not reign;\u201d of\nwhich Tacitus saith, _Audita h\u00e6c raram occulti pectoris vocem elicuere_:\n_correptamque Gr\u00e6co versu admonuit_, _ideo l\u00e6di quia non regnaret_.  And,\ntherefore, the poet doth elegantly call passions tortures that urge men\nto confess their secrets:\u2014\n\n    \u201cVino torus et ira.\u201d\n\nAnd experience showeth there are few men so true to themselves and so\nsettled but that, sometimes upon heat, sometimes upon bravery, sometimes\nupon kindness, sometimes upon trouble of mind and weakness, they open\nthemselves; specially if they be put to it with a counter-dissimulation,\naccording to the proverb of Spain, _Di mentira_, _y sacar as verdad_:\n\u201cTell a lie and find a truth.\u201d\n\n(19) As for the knowing of men which is at second hand from reports:\nmen\u2019s weaknesses and faults are best known from their enemies, their\nvirtues and abilities from their friends, their customs and times from\ntheir servants, their conceits and opinions from their familiar friends,\nwith whom they discourse most.  General fame is light, and the opinions\nconceived by superiors or equals are deceitful; for to such men are more\nmasked: _Verior fama e domesticis emanat_.\n\n(20) But the soundest disclosing and expounding of men is by their\nnatures and ends, wherein the weakest sort of men are best interpreted by\ntheir natures, and the wisest by their ends.  For it was both pleasantly\nand wisely said (though I think very untruly) by a nuncio of the Pope,\nreturning from a certain nation where he served as lidger; whose opinion\nbeing asked touching the appointment of one to go in his place, he wished\nthat in any case they did not send one that was too wise; because no very\nwise man would ever imagine what they in that country were like to do.\nAnd certainly it is an error frequent for men to shoot over, and to\nsuppose deeper ends and more compass reaches than are: the Italian\nproverb being elegant, and for the most part true:\u2014\n\n    \u201cDi danari, di senno, e di fede,\n    C\u2019\u00e8 ne manco che non credi.\u201d\n\n\u201cThere is commonly less money, less wisdom, and less good faith than men\ndo account upon.\u201d\n\n(21) But princes, upon a far other reason, are best interpreted by their\nnatures, and private persons by their ends.  For princes being at the top\nof human desires, they have for the most part no particular ends whereto\nthey aspire, by distance from which a man might take measure and scale of\nthe rest of their actions and desires; which is one of the causes that\nmaketh their hearts more inscrutable.  Neither is it sufficient to inform\nourselves in men\u2019s ends and natures of the variety of them only, but also\nof the predominancy, what humour reigneth most, and what end is\nprincipally sought.  For so we see, when Tigellinus saw himself\noutstripped by Petronius Turpilianus in Nero\u2019s humours of pleasures,\n_metus ejus rimatur_, he wrought upon Nero\u2019s fears, whereby he broke the\nother\u2019s neck.\n\n(22) But to all this part of inquiry the most compendious way resteth in\nthree things; the first, to have general acquaintance and inwardness with\nthose which have general acquaintance and look most into the world; and\nspecially according to the diversity of business, and the diversity of\npersons, to have privacy and conversation with some one friend at least\nwhich is perfect and well-intelligenced in every several kind.  The\nsecond is to keep a good mediocrity in liberty of speech and secrecy; in\nmost things liberty; secrecy where it importeth; for liberty of speech\ninviteth and provoketh liberty to be used again, and so bringeth much to\na man\u2019s knowledge; and secrecy on the other side induceth trust and\ninwardness.  The last is the reducing of a man\u2019s self to this watchful\nand serene habit, as to make account and purpose, in every conference and\naction, as well to observe as to act.  For as Epictetus would have a\nphilosopher in every particular action to say to himself, _Et hoc volo_,\n_et etiam institutum servare_; so a politic man in everything should say\nto himself, _Et hoc volo_, _ac etiam aliquid addiscere_.  I have stayed\nthe longer upon this precept of obtaining good information because it is\na main part by itself, which answereth to all the rest.  But, above all\nthings, caution must be taken that men have a good stay and hold of\nthemselves, and that this much knowing do not draw on much meddling; for\nnothing is more unfortunate than light and rash intermeddling in many\nmatters.  So that this variety of knowledge tendeth in conclusion but\nonly to this, to make a better and freer choice of those actions which\nmay concern us, and to conduct them with the less error and the more\ndexterity.\n\n(23) The second precept concerning this knowledge is, for men to take\ngood information touching their own person, and well to understand\nthemselves; knowing that, as St. James saith, though men look oft in a\nglass, yet they do suddenly forget themselves; wherein as the divine\nglass is the Word of God, so the politic glass is the state of the world,\nor times wherein we live, in the which we are to behold ourselves.\n\n(24) For men ought to take an impartial view of their own abilities and\nvirtues; and again of their wants and impediments; accounting these with\nthe most, and those other with the least; and from this view and\nexamination to frame the considerations following.\n\n(25) First, to consider how the constitution of their nature sorteth with\nthe general state of the times; which if they find agreeable and fit,\nthen in all things to give themselves more scope and liberty; but if\ndiffering and dissonant, then in the whole course of their life to be\nmore close retired, and reserved; as we see in Tiberius, who was never\nseen at a play, and came not into the senate in twelve of his last years;\nwhereas Augustus C\u00e6sar lived ever in men\u2019s eyes, which Tacitus observeth,\n_alia Tiberio morum via_.\n\n(26) Secondly, to consider how their nature sorteth with professions and\ncourses of life, and accordingly to make election, if they be free; and,\nif engaged, to make the departure at the first opportunity; as we see was\ndone by Duke Valentine, that was designed by his father to a sacerdotal\nprofession, but quitted it soon after in regard of his parts and\ninclination; being such, nevertheless, as a man cannot tell well whether\nthey were worse for a prince or for a priest.\n\n(27) Thirdly, to consider how they sort with those whom they are like to\nhave competitors and concurrents; and to take that course wherein there\nis most solitude, and themselves like to be most eminent; as C\u00e6sar Julius\ndid, who at first was an orator or pleader; but when he saw the\nexcellency of Cicero, Hortensius, Catulus, and others for eloquence, and\nsaw there was no man of reputation for the wars but Pompeius, upon whom\nthe state was forced to rely, he forsook his course begun towards a civil\nand popular greatness, and transferred his designs to a martial\ngreatness.\n\n(28) Fourthly, in the choice of their friends and dependents, to proceed\naccording to the composition of their own nature; as we may see in C\u00e6sar,\nall whose friends and followers were men active and effectual, but not\nsolemn, or of reputation.\n\n(29) Fifthly, to take special heed how they guide themselves by examples,\nin thinking they can do as they see others do; whereas perhaps their\nnatures and carriages are far differing.  In which error it seemeth\nPompey was, of whom Cicero saith that he was wont often to say, _Sylla\npotuit_, _ego non potero_?  Wherein he was much abused, the natures and\nproceedings of himself and his example being the unlikest in the world;\nthe one being fierce, violent, and pressing the fact; the other solemn,\nand full of majesty and circumstance, and therefore the less effectual.\n\nBut this precept touching the politic knowledge of ourselves hath many\nother branches, whereupon we cannot insist.\n\n(30) Next to the well understanding and discerning of a man\u2019s self, there\nfolloweth the well opening and revealing a man\u2019s self; wherein we see\nnothing more usual than for the more able man to make the less show.  For\nthere is a great advantage in the well setting forth of a man\u2019s virtues,\nfortunes, merits; and again, in the artificial covering of a man\u2019s\nweaknesses, defects, disgraces; staying upon the one, sliding from the\nother; cherishing the one by circumstances, gracing the other by\nexposition, and the like.  Wherein we see what Tacitus saith of Mutianus,\nwho was the greatest politique of his time, _Omnium qu\u00e6 dixerat\nfeceratque arte quadam ostentator_, which requireth indeed some art, lest\nit turn tedious and arrogant; but yet so, as ostentation (though it be to\nthe first degree of vanity) seemeth to me rather a vice in manners than\nin policy; for as it is said, _Audacter calumniare_, _semper aliquid\nh\u00e6ret_; so, except it be in a ridiculous degree of deformity, _Audacter\nte vendita_, _semper aluquid h\u00e6ret_.  For it will stick with the more\nignorant and inferior sort of men, though men of wisdom and rank do smile\nat it and despise it; and yet the authority won with many doth\ncountervail the disdain of a few.  But if it be carried with decency and\ngovernment, as with a natural, pleasant, and ingenious fashion; or at\ntimes when it is mixed with some peril and unsafety (as in military\npersons); or at times when others are most envied; or with easy and\ncareless passage to it and from it, without dwelling too long, or being\ntoo serious; or with an equal freedom of taxing a man\u2019s self, as well as\ngracing himself; or by occasion of repelling or putting down others\u2019\ninjury or insolency; it doth greatly add to reputation: and surely not a\nfew solid natures, that want this ventosity and cannot sail in the height\nof the winds, are not without some prejudice and disadvantage by their\nmoderation.\n\n(31) But for these flourishes and enhancements of virtue, as they are not\nperchance unnecessary, so it is at least necessary that virtue be not\ndisvalued and embased under the just price, which is done in three\nmanners\u2014by offering and obtruding a man\u2019s self, wherein men think he is\nrewarded when he is accepted; by doing too much, which will not give that\nwhich is well done leave to settle, and in the end induceth satiety; and\nby finding too soon the fruit of a man\u2019s virtue, in commendation,\napplause, honour, favour; wherein if a man be pleased with a little, let\nhim hear what is truly said: _Cave ne insuetus rebus majoribus videaris_,\n_si h\u00e6c te res parva sicuti magna delectat_.\n\n(32) But the covering of defects is of no less importance than the\nvaluing of good parts; which may be done likewise in three manners\u2014by\ncaution, by colour, and by confidence.  Caution is when men do\ningeniously and discreetly avoid to be put into those things for which\nthey are not proper; whereas contrariwise bold and unquiet spirits will\nthrust themselves into matters without difference, and so publish and\nproclaim all their wants.  Colour is when men make a way for themselves\nto have a construction made of their faults or wants, as proceeding from\na better cause or intended for some other purpose.  For of the one it is\nwell said,\n\n    \u201cS\u00e6pe latet vitium proximitate boni,\u201d\n\nand therefore whatsoever want a man hath, he must see that he pretend the\nvirtue that shadoweth it; as if he be dull, he must affect gravity; if a\ncoward, mildness; and so the rest.  For the second, a man must frame some\nprobable cause why he should not do his best, and why he should dissemble\nhis abilities; and for that purpose must use to dissemble those abilities\nwhich are notorious in him, to give colour that his true wants are but\nindustries and dissimulations.  For confidence, it is the last but the\nsurest remedy\u2014namely, to depress and seem to despise whatsoever a man\ncannot attain; observing the good principle of the merchants, who\nendeavour to raise the price of their own commodities, and to beat down\nthe price of others.  But there is a confidence that passeth this other,\nwhich is to face out a man\u2019s own defects, in seeming to conceive that he\nis best in those things wherein he is failing; and, to help that again,\nto seem on the other side that he hath least opinion of himself in those\nthings wherein he is best: like as we shall see it commonly in poets,\nthat if they show their verses, and you except to any, they will say,\n\u201cThat that line cost them more labour than any of the rest;\u201d and\npresently will seem to disable and suspect rather some other line, which\nthey know well enough to be the best in the number.  But above all, in\nthis righting and helping of a man\u2019s self in his own carriage, he must\ntake heed he show not himself dismantled and exposed to scorn and injury,\nby too much dulceness, goodness, and facility of nature; but show some\nsparkles of liberty, spirit, and edge.  Which kind of fortified carriage,\nwith a ready rescussing of a man\u2019s self from scorns, is sometimes of\nnecessity imposed upon men by somewhat in their person or fortune; but it\never succeedeth with good felicity.\n\n(33) Another precept of this knowledge is by all possible endeavour to\nframe the mind to be pliant and obedient to occasion; for nothing\nhindereth men\u2019s fortunes so much as this: _Idem manebat_, _neque idem\ndecebat_\u2014men are where they were, when occasions turn: and therefore to\nCato, whom Livy maketh such an architect of fortune, he addeth that he\nhad _versatile ingenium_.  And thereof it cometh that these grave solemn\nwits, which must be like themselves and cannot make departures, have more\ndignity than felicity.  But in some it is nature to be somewhat vicious\nand enwrapped, and not easy to turn.  In some it is a conceit that is\nalmost a nature, which is, that men can hardly make themselves believe\nthat they ought to change their course, when they have found good by it\nin former experience.  For Machiavel noted wisely how Fabius Maximus\nwould have been temporising still, according to his old bias, when the\nnature of the war was altered and required hot pursuit.  In some other it\nis want of point and penetration in their judgment, that they do not\ndiscern when things have a period, but come in too late after the\noccasion; as Demosthenes compareth the people of Athens to country\nfellows, when they play in a fence school, that if they have a blow, then\nthey remove their weapon to that ward, and not before.  In some other it\nis a lothness to lose labours passed, and a conceit that they can bring\nabout occasions to their ply; and yet in the end, when they see no other\nremedy, then they come to it with disadvantage; as Tarquinius, that gave\nfor the third part of Sibylla\u2019s books the treble price, when he might at\nfirst have had all three for the simple.  But from whatsoever root or\ncause this restiveness of mind proceedeth, it is a thing most\nprejudicial; and nothing is more politic than to make the wheels of our\nmind concentric and voluble with the wheels of fortune.\n\n(34) Another precept of this knowledge, which hath some affinity with\nthat we last spoke of, but with difference, is that which is well\nexpressed, _Fatis accede deisque_, that men do not only turn with the\noccasions, but also run with the occasions, and not strain their credit\nor strength to over-hard or extreme points; but choose in their actions\nthat which is most passable: for this will preserve men from foil, not\noccupy them too much about one matter, win opinion of moderation, please\nthe most, and make a show of a perpetual felicity in all they undertake:\nwhich cannot but mightily increase reputation.\n\n(35) Another part of this knowledge seemeth to have some repugnancy with\nthe former two, but not as I understand it; and it is that which\nDemosthenes uttereth in high terms: _Et quemadmodum receptum est_, _ut\nexercitum ducat imperator_, _sic et a cordatis viris res ips\u00e6 ducend\u00e6_;\n_ut qu\u00e6ipsis videntur_, _ea gerantur_, _et non ipsi eventus persequi\ncogantur_.  For if we observe we shall find two differing kinds of\nsufficiency in managing of business: some can make use of occasions aptly\nand dexterously, but plot little; some can urge and pursue their own\nplots well, but cannot accommodate nor take in; either of which is very\nimperfect without the other.\n\n(36) Another part of this knowledge is the observing a good mediocrity in\nthe declaring or not declaring a man\u2019s self: for although depth of\nsecrecy, and making way (_qualis est via navis in mari_, which the French\ncalleth _sourdes men\u00e9es_, when men set things in work without opening\nthemselves at all), be sometimes both prosperous and admirable; yet many\ntimes _dissimulatio errores parit_, _qui dissimulatorem ipsum\nillaqueant_.  And therefore we see the greatest politiques have in a\nnatural and free manner professed their desires, rather than been\nreserved and disguised in them.  For so we see that Lucius Sylla made a\nkind of profession, \u201cthat he wished all men happy or unhappy, as they\nstood his friends or enemies.\u201d  So C\u00e6sar, when he went first into Gaul,\nmade no scruple to profess \u201cthat he had rather be first in a village than\nsecond at Rome.\u201d  So again, as soon as he had begun the war, we see what\nCicero saith of him, _Alter_ (meaning of C\u00e6sar) _non recusat_, _sed\nquodammodo postulat_, _ut_ (_ut est_) _sic appelletur tyrannus_.  So we\nmay see in a letter of Cicero to Atticus, that Augustus C\u00e6sar, in his\nvery entrance into affairs, when he was a darling of the senate, yet in\nhis harangues to the people would swear, _Ita parentis honores consequi\nliceat_ (which was no less than the tyranny), save that, to help it, he\nwould stretch forth his hand towards a statue of C\u00e6sar\u2019s that was erected\nin the place: and men laughed and wondered, and said, \u201cIs it possible?\u201d\nor, \u201cDid you ever hear the like?\u201d and yet thought he meant no hurt; he\ndid it so handsomely and ingenuously.  And all these were prosperous:\nwhereas Pompey, who tended to the same ends, but in a more dark and\ndissembling manner as Tacitus saith of him, _Occultior non melior_,\nwherein Sallust concurreth, _Ore probo_, _animo inverecundo_, made it his\ndesign, by infinite secret engines, to cast the state into an absolute\nanarchy and confusion, that the state might cast itself into his arms for\nnecessity and protection, and so the sovereign power be put upon him, and\nhe never seen in it: and when he had brought it (as he thought) to that\npoint when he was chosen consul alone, as never any was, yet he could\nmake no great matter of it, because men understood him not; but was fain\nin the end to go the beaten track of getting arms into his hands, by\ncolour of the doubt of C\u00e6sar\u2019s designs: so tedious, casual, and\nunfortunate are these deep dissimulations: whereof it seemeth Tacitus\nmade this judgment, that they were a cunning of an inferior form in\nregard of true policy; attributing the one to Augustus, the other to\nTiberius; where, speaking of Livia, he saith, _Et cum artibus mariti\nsimulatione filii bene compostia_: for surely the continual habit of\ndissimulation is but a weak and sluggish cunning, and not greatly\npolitic.\n\n(37) Another precept of this architecture of fortune is to accustom our\nminds to judge of the proportion or value of things, as they conduce and\nare material to our particular ends; and that to do substantially and not\nsuperficially.  For we shall find the logical part (as I may term it) of\nsome men\u2019s minds good, but the mathematical part erroneous; that is, they\ncan well judge of consequences, but not of proportions and comparison,\npreferring things of show and sense before things of substance and\neffect.  So some fall in love with access to princes, others with popular\nfame and applause, supposing they are things of great purchase, when in\nmany cases they are but matters of envy, peril, and impediment.  So some\nmeasure things according to the labour and difficulty or assiduity which\nare spent about them; and think, if they be ever moving, that they must\nneeds advance and proceed; as C\u00e6sar saith in a despising manner of Cato\nthe second, when he describeth how laborious and indefatigable he was to\nno great purpose, _H\u00e6c omnia magno studio agebat_.  So in most things men\nare ready to abuse themselves in thinking the greatest means to be best,\nwhen it should be the fittest.\n\n(38) As for the true marshalling of men\u2019s pursuits towards their fortune,\nas they are more or less material, I hold them to stand thus.  First the\namendment of their own minds.  For the removal of the impediments of the\nmind will sooner clear the passages of fortune than the obtaining fortune\nwill remove the impediments of the mind.  In the second place I set down\nwealth and means; which I know most men would have placed first, because\nof the general use which it beareth towards all variety of occasions.\nBut that opinion I may condemn with like reason as Machiavel doth that\nother, that moneys were the sinews of the wars; whereas (saith he) the\ntrue sinews of the wars are the sinews of men\u2019s arms, that is, a valiant,\npopulous, and military nation: and he voucheth aptly the authority of\nSolon, who, when Cr\u0153sus showed him his treasury of gold, said to him,\nthat if another came that had better iron, he would be master of his\ngold.  In like manner it may be truly affirmed that it is not moneys that\nare the sinews of fortune, but it is the sinews and steel of men\u2019s minds,\nwit, courage, audacity, resolution, temper, industry, and the like.  In\nthe third place I set down reputation, because of the peremptory tides\nand currents it hath; which, if they be not taken in their due time, are\nseldom recovered, it being extreme hard to play an after-game of\nreputation.  And lastly I place honour, which is more easily won by any\nof the other three, much more by all, than any of them can be purchased\nby honour.  To conclude this precept, as there is order and priority in\nmatter, so is there in time, the preposterous placing whereof is one of\nthe commonest errors: while men fly to their ends when they should intend\ntheir beginnings, and do not take things in order of time as they come\non, but marshal them according to greatness and not according to\ninstance; not observing the good precept, _Quod nunc instat agamus_.\n\n(39) Another precept of this knowledge is not to embrace any matters\nwhich do occupy too great a quantity of time, but to have that sounding\nin a man\u2019s ears, _Sed fugit interea fugit irreparabile tempus_: and that\nis the cause why those which take their course of rising by professions\nof burden, as lawyers, orators, painful divines, and the like, are not\ncommonly so politic for their own fortune, otherwise than in their\nordinary way, because they want time to learn particulars, to wait\noccasions, and to devise plots.\n\n(40) Another precept of this knowledge is to imitate nature, which doth\nnothing in vain; which surely a man may do if he do well interlace his\nbusiness, and bend not his mind too much upon that which he principally\nintendeth.  For a man ought in every particular action so to carry the\nmotions of his mind, and so to have one thing under another, as if he\ncannot have that he seeketh in the best degree, yet to have it in a\nsecond, or so in a third; and if he can have no part of that which he\npurposed, yet to turn the use of it to somewhat else; and if he cannot\nmake anything of it for the present, yet to make it as a seed of somewhat\nin time to come; and if he can contrive no effect or substance from it,\nyet to win some good opinion by it, or the like.  So that he should exact\nan account of himself of every action, to reap somewhat, and not to stand\namazed and confused if he fail of that he chiefly meant: for nothing is\nmore impolitic than to mind actions wholly one by one.  For he that doth\nso loseth infinite occasions which intervene, and are many times more\nproper and propitious for somewhat that he shall need afterwards, than\nfor that which he urgeth for the present; and therefore men must be\nperfect in that rule, _H\u00e6c oportet facere_, _et illa non imittere_.\n\n(41) Another precept of this knowledge is, not to engage a man\u2019s self\nperemptorily in anything, though it seem not liable to accident; but ever\nto have a window to fly out at, or a way to retire: following the wisdom\nin the ancient fable of the two frogs, which consulted when their plash\nwas dry whither they should go; and the one moved to go down into a pit,\nbecause it was not likely the water would dry there; but the other\nanswered, \u201cTrue, but if it do, how shall we get out again?\u201d\n\n(42) Another precept of this knowledge is that ancient precept of Bias,\nconstrued not to any point of perfidiousness, but to caution and\nmoderation, _Et ama tanquam inimicus futurus et odi tanquam amaturus_.\nFor it utterly betrayeth all utility for men to embark themselves too far\ninto unfortunate friendships, troublesome spleens, and childish and\nhumorous envies or emulations.\n\n(43) But I continue this beyond the measure of an example; led, because I\nwould not have such knowledges, which I note as deficient, to be thought\nthings imaginative or in the air, or an observation or two much made of,\nbut things of bulk and mass, whereof an end is more hardly made than a\nbeginning.  It must be likewise conceived, that in these points which I\nmention and set down, they are far from complete tractates of them, but\nonly as small pieces for patterns.  And lastly, no man I suppose will\nthink that I mean fortunes are not obtained without all this ado; for I\nknow they come tumbling into some men\u2019s laps; and a number obtain good\nfortunes by diligence in a plain way, little intermeddling, and keeping\nthemselves from gross errors.\n\n(44) But as Cicero, when he setteth down an idea of a perfect orator,\ndoth not mean that every pleader should be such; and so likewise, when a\nprince or a courtier hath been described by such as have handled those\nsubjects, the mould hath used to be made according to the perfection of\nthe art, and not according to common practice: so I understand it, that\nit ought to be done in the description of a politic man, I mean politic\nfor his own fortune.\n\n(45) But it must be remembered all this while, that the precepts which we\nhave set down are of that kind which may be counted and called _Bon\u00e6\nArtes_.  As for evil arts, if a man would set down for himself that\nprinciple of Machiavel, \u201cThat a man seek not to attain virtue itself, but\nthe appearance only thereof; because the credit of virtue is a help, but\nthe use of it is cumber:\u201d or that other of his principles, \u201cThat he\npresuppose that men are not fitly to be wrought otherwise but by fear;\nand therefore that he seek to have every man obnoxious, low, and in\nstraits,\u201d which the Italians call _seminar spine_, to sow thorns: or that\nother principle, contained in the verse which Cicero citeth, _Cadant\namici_, _dummodo inimici intercidant_, as the triumvirs, which sold every\none to other the lives of their friends for the deaths of their enemies:\nor that other protestation of L. Catilina, to set on fire and trouble\nstates, to the end to fish in droumy waters, and to unwrap their\nfortunes, _Ego si quid in fortunis meis excitatum sit incendium_, _id non\naqua sed ruina restinguam_: or that other principle of Lysander, \u201cThat\nchildren are to be deceived with comfits, and men with oaths:\u201d and the\nlike evil and corrupt positions, whereof (as in all things) there are\nmore in number than of the good: certainly with these dispensations from\nthe laws of charity and integrity, the pressing of a man\u2019s fortune may be\nmore hasty and compendious.  But it is in life as it is in ways, the\nshortest way is commonly the foulest, and surely the fairer way is not\nmuch about.\n\n(46) But men, if they be in their own power, and do bear and sustain\nthemselves, and be not carried away with a whirlwind or tempest of\nambition, ought in the pursuit of their own fortune to set before their\neyes not only that general map of the world, \u201cThat all things are vanity\nand vexation of spirit,\u201d but many other more particular cards and\ndirections: chiefly that, that being without well-being is a curse, and\nthe greater being the greater curse; and that all virtue is most rewarded\nand all wickedness most punished in itself: according as the poet saith\nexcellently:\n\n    \u201cQu\u00e6 vobis, qu\u00e6 digna, viri pro laudibus istis\n    Pr\u00e6mia posse rear solvi? pulcherrima primum\n    Dii _moresque_ dabunt vestri.\u201d\n\nAnd so of the contrary.  And secondly they ought to look up to the\nEternal Providence and Divine Judgment, which often subverteth the wisdom\nof evil plots and imaginations, according to that scripture, \u201cHe hath\nconceived mischief, and shall bring forth a vain thing.\u201d  And although\nmen should refrain themselves from injury and evil arts, yet this\nincessant and Sabbathless pursuit of a man\u2019s fortune leaveth not tribute\nwhich we owe to God of our time; who (we see) demandeth a tenth of our\nsubstance, and a seventh, which is more strict, of our time: and it is to\nsmall purpose to have an erected face towards heaven, and a perpetual\ngrovelling spirit upon earth, eating dust as doth the serpent, _Atque\naffigit humo divin\u00e6 particulam aur\u00e6_.  And if any man flatter himself\nthat he will employ his fortune well, though he should obtain it ill, as\nwas said concerning Augustus C\u00e6sar, and after of Septimius Severus, \u201cThat\neither they should never have been born, or else they should never have\ndied,\u201d they did so much mischief in the pursuit and ascent of their\ngreatness, and so much good when they were established; yet these\ncompensations and satisfactions are good to be used, but never good to be\npurposed.  And lastly, it is not amiss for men, in their race towards\ntheir fortune, to cool themselves a little with that conceit which is\nelegantly expressed by the Emperor Charles V., in his instructions to the\nking his son, \u201cThat fortune hath somewhat of the nature of a woman, that\nif she he too much wooed she is the farther off.\u201d  But this last is but a\nremedy for those whose tastes are corrupted: let men rather build upon\nthat foundation which is as a corner-stone of divinity and philosophy,\nwherein they join close, namely that same _Primum qu\u00e6rite_.  For divinity\nsaith, _Primum qu\u00e6rite regnum Dei_, _et ista omnia adjicientur vobis_:\nand philosophy saith, _Primum qu\u00e6rite bona animi_; _c\u00e6tera aut aderunt_,\n_aut non oberunt_.  And although the human foundation hath somewhat of\nthe sands, as we see in M. Brutus, when he broke forth into that speech,\n\n    \u201cTe colui (Virtus) ut rem; ast tu nomen inane es;\u201d\n\nyet the divine foundation is upon the rock.  But this may serve for a\ntaste of that knowledge which I noted as deficient.\n\n(47) Concerning government, it is a part of knowledge secret and retired\nin both these respects in which things are deemed secret; for some things\nare secret because they are hard to know, and some because they are not\nfit to utter.  We see all governments are obscure and invisible:\n\n       \u201cTotamque infusa per artus\n    Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.\u201d\n\nSuch is the description of governments.  We see the government of God\nover the world is hidden, insomuch as it seemeth to participate of much\nirregularity and confusion.  The government of the soul in moving the\nbody is inward and profound, and the passages thereof hardly to be\nreduced to demonstration.  Again, the wisdom of antiquity (the shadows\nwhereof are in the poets) in the description of torments and pains, next\nunto the crime of rebellion, which was the giants\u2019 offence, doth detest\nthe offence of futility, as in Sisyphus and Tantalus.  But this was meant\nof particulars: nevertheless even unto the general rules and discourses\nof policy and government there is due a reverent and reserved handling.\n\n(48) But contrariwise in the governors towards the governed, all things\nought as far as the frailty of man permitteth to be manifest and\nrevealed.  For so it is expressed in the Scriptures touching the\ngovernment of God, that this globe, which seemeth to us a dark and shady\nbody, is in the view of God as crystal: _Et in conspectu sedis tanquam\nmare vitreum simile crystallo_.  So unto princes and states, and\nspecially towards wise senates and councils, the natures and dispositions\nof the people, their conditions and necessities, their factions and\ncombinations, their animosities and discontents, ought to be, in regard\nof the variety of their intelligences, the wisdom of their observations,\nand the height of their station where they keep sentinel, in great part\nclear and transparent.  Wherefore, considering that I write to a king\nthat is a master of this science, and is so well assisted, I think it\ndecent to pass over this part in silence, as willing to obtain the\ncertificate which one of the ancient philosophers aspired unto; who being\nsilent, when others contended to make demonstration of their abilities by\nspeech, desired it might be certified for his part, \u201cThat there was one\nthat knew how to hold his peace.\u201d\n\n(49) Notwithstanding, for the more public part of government, which is\nlaws, I think good to note only one deficiency; which is, that all those\nwhich have written of laws have written either as philosophers or as\nlawyers, and none as statesmen.  As for the philosophers, they make\nimaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths, and their discourses are as\nthe stars, which give little light because they are so high.  For the\nlawyers, they write according to the states where they live what is\nreceived law, and not what ought to be law; for the wisdom of a law-maker\nis one, and of a lawyer is another.  For there are in nature certain\nfountains of justice whence all civil laws are derived but as streams;\nand like as waters do take tinctures and tastes from the soils through\nwhich they run, so do civil laws vary according to the regions and\ngovernments where they are planted, though they proceed from the same\nfountains.  Again, the wisdom of a law-maker consisteth not only in a\nplatform of justice, but in the application thereof; taking into\nconsideration by what means laws may be made certain, and what are the\ncauses and remedies of the doubtfulness and uncertainty of law; by what\nmeans laws may be made apt and easy to be executed, and what are the\nimpediments and remedies in the execution of laws; what influence laws\ntouching private right of _meum_ and _tuum_ have into the public state,\nand how they may be made apt and agreeable; how laws are to be penned and\ndelivered, whether in texts or in Acts, brief or large, with preambles or\nwithout; how they are to be pruned and reformed from time to time, and\nwhat is the best means to keep them from being too vast in volume, or too\nfull of multiplicity and crossness; how they are to be expounded, when\nupon causes emergent and judicially discussed, and when upon responses\nand conferences touching general points or questions; how they are to be\npressed, rigorously or tenderly; how they are to be mitigated by equity\nand good conscience, and whether discretion and strict law are to be\nmingled in the same courts, or kept apart in several courts; again, how\nthe practice, profession, and erudition of law is to be censured and\ngoverned; and many other points touching the administration and (as I may\nterm it) animation of laws.  Upon which I insist the less, because I\npurpose (if God give me leave), having begun a work of this nature in\naphorisms, to propound it hereafter, noting it in the meantime for\ndeficient.\n\n(50) And for your Majesty\u2019s laws of England, I could say much of their\ndignity, and somewhat of their defect; but they cannot but excel the\ncivil laws in fitness for the government, for the civil law was _nonhos\nqu\u00e6situm munus in usus_; it was not made for the countries which it\ngoverneth.  Hereof I cease to speak because I will not intermingle matter\nof action with matter of general learning.\n\nXXIV.  Thus have I concluded this portion of learning touching civil\nknowledge; and with civil knowledge have concluded human philosophy; and\nwith human philosophy, philosophy in general.  And being now at some\npause, looking back into that I have passed through, this writing seemeth\nto me (_si nunquam fallit imago_), as far as a man can judge of his own\nwork, not much better than that noise or sound which musicians make while\nthey are in tuning their instruments, which is nothing pleasant to hear,\nbut yet is a cause why the music is sweeter afterwards.  So have I been\ncontent to tune the instruments of the Muses, that they may play that\nhave better hands.  And surely, when I set before me the condition of\nthese times, in which learning hath made her third visitation or circuit\nin all the qualities thereof; as the excellency and vivacity of the wits\nof this age; the noble helps and lights which we have by the travails of\nancient writers; the art of printing, which communicateth books to men of\nall fortunes; the openness of the world by navigation, which hath\ndisclosed multitudes of experiments, and a mass of natural history; the\nleisure wherewith these times abound, not employing men so generally in\ncivil business, as the states of Gr\u00e6cia did, in respect of their\npopularity, and the state of Rome, in respect of the greatness of their\nmonarchy; the present disposition of these times at this instant to\npeace; the consumption of all that ever can be said in controversies of\nreligion, which have so much diverted men from other sciences; the\nperfection of your Majesty\u2019s learning, which as a ph\u0153nix may call whole\nvolleys of wits to follow you; and the inseparable propriety of time,\nwhich is ever more and more to disclose truth; I cannot but be raised to\nthis persuasion, that this third period of time will far surpass that of\nthe Grecian and Roman learning; only if men will know their own strength\nand their own weakness both; and take, one from the other, light of\ninvention, and not fire of contradiction; and esteem of the inquisition\nof truth as of an enterprise, and not as of a quality or ornament; and\nemploy wit and magnificence to things of worth and excellency, and not to\nthings vulgar and of popular estimation.  As for my labours, if any man\nshall please himself or others in the reprehension of them, they shall\nmake that ancient and patient request, _Verbera_, _sed audi_: let men\nreprehend them, so they observe and weigh them.  For the appeal is lawful\n(though it may be it shall not be needful) from the first cogitations of\nmen to their second, and from the nearer times to the times further off.\nNow let us come to that learning, which both the former times were not so\nblessed as to know, sacred and inspired divinity, the Sabbath and port of\nall men\u2019s labours and peregrinations.\n\nXXV. (1) The prerogative of God extendeth as well to the reason as to the\nwill of man: so that as we are to obey His law, though we find a\nreluctation in our will, so we are to believe His word, though we find a\nreluctation in our reason.  For if we believe only that which is\nagreeable to our sense we give consent to the matter, and not to the\nauthor; which is no more than we would do towards a suspected and\ndiscredited witness; but that faith which was accounted to Abraham for\nrighteousness was of such a point as whereat Sarah laughed, who therein\nwas an image of natural reason.\n\n(2) Howbeit (if we will truly consider of it) more worthy it is to\nbelieve than to know as we now know.  For in knowledge man\u2019s mind\nsuffereth from sense: but in belief it suffereth from spirit, such one as\nit holdeth for more authorised than itself and so suffereth from the\nworthier agent.  Otherwise it is of the state of man glorified; for then\nfaith shall cease, and we shall know as we are known.\n\n(3) Wherefore we conclude that sacred theology (which in our idiom we\ncall divinity) is grounded only upon the word and oracle of God, and not\nupon the light of nature: for it is written, _C\u00e6li enarrant gloriam Dei_;\nbut it is not written, _C\u00e6li enarrant voluntatem Dei_: but of that it is\nsaid, _Ad legem et testimonium_: _si non fecerint secundum verbum istud_,\n&c.  This holdeth not only in those points of faith which concern the\ngreat mysteries of the Deity, of the creation, of the redemption, but\nlikewise those which concern the law moral, truly interpreted: \u201cLove your\nenemies: do good to them that hate you; be like to your heavenly Father,\nthat suffereth His rain to fall upon the just and unjust.\u201d  To this it\nought to be applauded, _Nec vox hominem sonat_: it is a voice beyond the\nlight of nature.  So we see the heathen poets, when they fall upon a\nlibertine passion, do still expostulate with laws and moralities, as if\nthey were opposite and malignant to nature: _Et quod natura remittit_,\n_invida jura negant_.  So said Dendamis the Indian unto Alexander\u2019s\nmessengers, that he had heard somewhat of Pythagoras, and some other of\nthe wise men of Gr\u00e6cia, and that he held them for excellent men: but that\nthey had a fault, which was that they had in too great reverence and\nveneration a thing they called law and manners.  So it must be confessed\nthat a great part of the law moral is of that perfection whereunto the\nlight of nature cannot aspire: how then is it that man is said to have,\nby the light and law of nature, some notions and conceits of virtue and\nvice, justice and wrong, good and evil?  Thus, because the light of\nnature is used in two several senses: the one, that which springeth from\nreason, sense, induction, argument, according to the laws of heaven and\nearth; the other, that which is imprinted upon the spirit of man by an\ninward instinct, according to the law of conscience, which is a sparkle\nof the purity of his first estate: in which latter sense only he is\nparticipant of some light and discerning touching the perfection of the\nmoral law; but how? sufficient to check the vice but not to inform the\nduty.  So then the doctrine of religion, as well moral as mystical, is\nnot to be attained but by inspiration and revelation from God.\n\n(4) The use notwithstanding of reason in spiritual things, and the\nlatitude thereof, is very great and general: for it is not for nothing\nthat the apostle calleth religion \u201cour reasonable service of God;\u201d\ninsomuch as the very ceremonies and figures of the old law were full of\nreason and signification, much more than the ceremonies of idolatry and\nmagic, that are full of non-significants and surd characters.  But most\nspecially the Christian faith, as in all things so in this, deserveth to\nbe highly magnified; holding and preserving the golden mediocrity in this\npoint between the law of the heathen and the law of Mahomet, which have\nembraced the two extremes.  For the religion of the heathen had no\nconstant belief or confession, but left all to the liberty of agent; and\nthe religion of Mahomet on the other side interdicteth argument\naltogether: the one having the very face of error, and the other of\nimposture; whereas the Faith doth both admit and reject disputation with\ndifference.\n\n(5) The use of human reason in religion is of two sorts: the former, in\nthe conception and apprehension of the mysteries of God to us revealed;\nthe other, in the inferring and deriving of doctrine and direction\nthereupon.  The former extendeth to the mysteries themselves; but how? by\nway of illustration, and not by way of argument.  The latter consisteth\nindeed of probation and argument.  In the former we see God vouchsafeth\nto descend to our capacity, in the expressing of His mysteries in sort as\nmay be sensible unto us; and doth graft His revelations and holy doctrine\nupon the notions of our reason, and applieth His inspirations to open our\nunderstanding, as the form of the key to the ward of the lock.  For the\nlatter there is allowed us a use of reason and argument, secondary and\nrespective, although not original and absolute.  For after the articles\nand principles of religion are placed and exempted from examination of\nreason, it is then permitted unto us to make derivations and inferences\nfrom and according to the analogy of them, for our better direction.  In\nnature this holdeth not; for both the principles are examinable by\ninduction, though not by a medium or syllogism; and besides, those\nprinciples or first positions have no discordance with that reason which\ndraweth down and deduceth the inferior positions.  But yet it holdeth not\nin religion alone, but in many knowledges, both of greater and smaller\nnature, namely, wherein there are not only _posita_ but _placita_; for in\nsuch there can be no use of absolute reason.  We see it familiarly in\ngames of wit, as chess, or the like.  The draughts and first laws of the\ngame are positive, but how? merely _ad placitum_, and not examinable by\nreason; but then how to direct our play thereupon with best advantage to\nwin the game is artificial and rational.  So in human laws there be many\ngrounds and maxims which are _placita juris_, positive upon authority,\nand not upon reason, and therefore not to be disputed: but what is most\njust, not absolutely but relatively, and according to those maxims, that\naffordeth a long field of disputation.  Such therefore is that secondary\nreason, which hath place in divinity, which is grounded upon the\n_placets_ of God.\n\n(6) Here therefore I note this deficiency, that there hath not been, to\nmy understanding, sufficiently inquired and handled the true limits and\nuse of reason in spiritual things, as a kind of divine dialectic: which\nfor that it is not done, it seemeth to me a thing usual, by pretext of\ntrue conceiving that which is revealed, to search and mine into that\nwhich is not revealed; and by pretext of enucleating inferences and\ncontradictories, to examine that which is positive.  The one sort falling\ninto the error of Nicodemus, demanding to have things made more sensible\nthan it pleaseth God to reveal them, _Quomodo possit homo nasci cum sit\nsenex_?  The other sort into the error of the disciples, which were\nscandalised at a show of contradiction, _Quid est hoc quod dicit nobis_?\n_Modicum et non videbitis me_; _et iterum_, _modicum_, _et videbitis me_,\n&c.\n\n(7) Upon this I have insisted the more, in regard of the great and\nblessed use thereof; for this point well laboured and defined of would in\nmy judgment be an opiate to stay and bridle not only the vanity of\ncurious speculations, wherewith the schools labour, but the fury of\ncontroversies, wherewith the Church laboureth.  For it cannot but open\nmen\u2019s eyes to see that many controversies do merely pertain to that which\nis either not revealed or positive; and that many others do grow upon\nweak and obscure inferences or derivations: which latter sort, if men\nwould revive the blessed style of that great doctor of the Gentiles,\nwould be carried thus, _ego_, _non dominus_; and again, _secundum\nconsilium meum_, in opinions and counsels, and not in positions and\noppositions.  But men are now over-ready to usurp the style, _non ego_,\n_sed dominus_; and not so only, but to bind it with the thunder and\ndenunciation of curses and anathemas, to the terror of those which have\nnot sufficiently learned out of Solomon that \u201cThe causeless curse shall\nnot come.\u201d\n\n(8) Divinity hath two principal parts: the matter informed or revealed,\nand the nature of the information or revelation; and with the latter we\nwill begin, because it hath most coherence with that which we have now\nlast handled.  The nature of the information consisteth of three\nbranches: the limits of the information, the sufficiency of the\ninformation, and the acquiring or obtaining the information.  Unto the\nlimits of the information belong these considerations: how far forth\nparticular persons continue to be inspired; how far forth the Church is\ninspired; and how far forth reason may be used; the last point whereof I\nhave noted as deficient.  Unto the sufficiency of the information belong\ntwo considerations: what points of religion are fundamental, and what\nperfective, being matter of further building and perfection upon one and\nthe same foundation; and again, how the gradations of light according to\nthe dispensation of times are material to the sufficiency of belief.\n\n(9) Here again I may rather give it in advice than note it as deficient,\nthat the points fundamental, and the points of further perfection only,\nought to be with piety and wisdom distinguished; a subject tending to\nmuch like end as that I noted before; for as that other were likely to\nabate the number of controversies, so this is likely to abate the heat of\nmany of them.  We see Moses when he saw the Israelite and the Egyptian\nfight, he did not say, \u201cWhy strive you?\u201d but drew his sword and slew the\nEgyptian; but when he saw the two Israelites fight, he said, \u201cYou are\nbrethren, why strive you?\u201d  If the point of doctrine be an Egyptian, it\nmust be slain by the sword of the Spirit, and not reconciled; but if it\nbe an Israelite, though in the wrong, then, \u201cWhy strive you?\u201d  We see of\nthe fundamental points, our Saviour penneth the league thus, \u201cHe that is\nnot with us is against us;\u201d but of points not fundamental, thus, \u201cHe that\nis not against us is with us.\u201d  So we see the coat of our Saviour was\nentire without seam, and so is the doctrine of the Scriptures in itself;\nbut the garment of the Church was of divers colours and yet not divided.\nWe see the chaff may and ought to be severed from the corn in the ear,\nbut the tares may not be pulled up from the corn in the field.  So as it\nis a thing of great use well to define what, and of what latitude, those\npoints are which do make men mere aliens and disincorporate from the\nChurch of God.\n\n(10) For the obtaining of the information, it resteth upon the true and\nsound interpretation of the Scriptures, which are the fountains of the\nwater of life.  The interpretations of the Scriptures are of two sorts:\nmethodical, and solute or at large.  For this divine water, which\nexcelleth so much that of Jacob\u2019s well, is drawn forth much in the same\nkind as natural water useth to be out of wells and fountains; either it\nis first forced up into a cistern, and from thence fetched and derived\nfor use; or else it is drawn and received in buckets and vessels\nimmediately where it springeth.  The former sort whereof, though it seem\nto be the more ready, yet in my judgment is more subject to corrupt.\nThis is that method which hath exhibited unto us the scholastical\ndivinity; whereby divinity hath been reduced into an art, as into a\ncistern, and the streams of doctrine or positions fetched and derived\nfrom thence.\n\n(11) In this men have sought three things, a summary brevity, a compacted\nstrength, and a complete perfection; whereof the two first they fail to\nfind, and the last they ought not to seek.  For as to brevity, we see in\nall summary methods, while men purpose to abridge, they give cause to\ndilate.  For the sum or abridgment by contraction becometh obscure; the\nobscurity requireth exposition, and the exposition is deduced into large\ncommentaries, or into commonplaces and titles, which grow to be more vast\nthan the original writings, whence the sum was at first extracted.  So we\nsee the volumes of the schoolmen are greater much than the first writings\nof the fathers, whence the master of the sentences made his sum or\ncollection.  So in like manner the volumes of the modern doctors of the\ncivil law exceed those of the ancient jurisconsults, of which Tribonian\ncompiled the digest.  So as this course of sums and commentaries is that\nwhich doth infallibly make the body of sciences more immense in quantity,\nand more base in substance.\n\n(12) And for strength, it is true that knowledges reduced into exact\nmethods have a show of strength, in that each part seemeth to support and\nsustain the other; but this is more satisfactory than substantial, like\nunto buildings which stand by architecture and compaction, which are more\nsubject to ruin than those that are built more strong in their several\nparts, though less compacted.  But it is plain that the more you recede\nfrom your grounds, the weaker do you conclude; and as in nature, the more\nyou remove yourself from particulars, the greater peril of error you do\nincur; so much more in divinity, the more you recede from the Scriptures\nby inferences and consequences, the more weak and dilute are your\npositions.\n\n(13) And as for perfection or completeness in divinity, it is not to be\nsought, which makes this course of artificial divinity the more suspect.\nFor he that will reduce a knowledge into an art will make it round and\nuniform; but in divinity many things must be left abrupt, and concluded\nwith this: _O altitudo sapienti\u00e6 et scienti\u00e6 Dei_! _quam\nincomprehensibilia sunt juducua ejus_, _et non investigabiles vi\u00e6 ejus_.\nSo again the apostle saith, _Ex parte scimus_: and to have the form of a\ntotal, where there is but matter for a part, cannot be without supplies\nby supposition and presumption.  And therefore I conclude that the true\nuse of these sums and methods hath place in institutions or introductions\npreparatory unto knowledge; but in them, or by deducement from them, to\nhandle the main body and substance of a knowledge is in all sciences\nprejudicial, and in divinity dangerous.\n\n(14) As to the interpretation of the Scriptures solute and at large,\nthere have been divers kinds introduced and devised; some of them rather\ncurious and unsafe than sober and warranted.  Notwithstanding, thus much\nmust be confessed, that the Scriptures, being given by inspiration and\nnot by human reason, do differ from all other books in the Author, which\nby consequence doth draw on some difference to be used by the expositor.\nFor the Inditer of them did know four things which no man attains to\nknow; which are\u2014the mysteries of the kingdom of glory, the perfection of\nthe laws of nature, the secrets of the heart of man, and the future\nsuccession of all ages.  For as to the first it is said, \u201cHe that\npresseth into the light shall be oppressed of the glory.\u201d  And again, \u201cNo\nman shall see My face and live.\u201d  To the second, \u201cWhen He prepared the\nheavens I was present, when by law and compass He enclosed the deep.\u201d  To\nthe third, \u201cNeither was it needful that any should bear witness to Him of\nman, for He knew well what was in man.\u201d  And to the last, \u201cFrom the\nbeginning are known to the Lord all His works.\u201d\n\n(15) From the former two of these have been drawn certain senses and\nexpositions of Scriptures, which had need be contained within the bounds\nof sobriety\u2014the one anagogical, and the other philosophical.  But as to\nthe former, man is not to prevent his time: _Videmus nunc per speculum in\n\u00e6nigmate_, _tunc autem facie ad faciem_; wherein nevertheless there\nseemeth to be a liberty granted, as far forth as the polishing of this\nglass, or some moderate explication of this enigma.  But to press too far\ninto it cannot but cause a dissolution and overthrow of the spirit of\nman.  For in the body there are three degrees of that we receive into\nit\u2014aliment, medicine, and poison; whereof aliment is that which the\nnature of man can perfectly alter and overcome; medicine is that which is\npartly converted by nature, and partly converteth nature; and poison is\nthat which worketh wholly upon nature, without that nature can in any\npart work upon it.  So in the mind, whatsoever knowledge reason cannot at\nall work upon and convert is a mere intoxication, and endangereth a\ndissolution of the mind and understanding.\n\n(16) But for the latter, it hath been extremely set on foot of late time\nby the school of Paracelsus, and some others, that have pretended to find\nthe truth of all natural philosophy in the Scriptures; scandalising and\ntraducing all other philosophy as heathenish and profane.  But there is\nno such enmity between God\u2019s Word and His works; neither do they give\nhonour to the Scriptures, as they suppose, but much embase them.  For to\nseek heaven and earth in the Word of God, whereof it is said, \u201cHeaven and\nearth shall pass, but My word shall not pass,\u201d is to seek temporary\nthings amongst eternal: and as to seek divinity in philosophy is to seek\nthe living amongst the dead, so to seek philosophy in divinity is to seek\nthe dead amongst the living: neither are the pots or lavers, whose place\nwas in the outward part of the temple, to be sought in the holiest place\nof all where the ark of the testimony was seated.  And again, the scope\nor purpose of the Spirit of God is not to express matters of nature in\nthe Scriptures, otherwise than in passage, and for application to man\u2019s\ncapacity and to matters moral or divine.  And it is a true rule,\n_Auctoris aliud agentis parva auctoritas_.  For it were a strange\nconclusion, if a man should use a similitude for ornament or illustration\nsake, borrowed from nature or history according to vulgar conceit, as of\na basilisk, a unicorn, a centaur, a Briareus, a hydra, or the like, that\ntherefore he must needs be thought to affirm the matter thereof\npositively to be true.  To conclude therefore these two interpretations,\nthe one by reduction or enigmatical, the other philosophical or physical,\nwhich have been received and pursued in imitation of the rabbins and\ncabalists, are to be confined with a _a noli akryn sapere_, _sed time_.\n\n(17) But the two latter points, known to God and unknown to man, touching\nthe secrets of the heart and the successions of time, doth make a just\nand sound difference between the manner of the exposition of the\nScriptures and all other books.  For it is an excellent observation which\nhath been made upon the answers of our Saviour Christ to many of the\nquestions which were propounded to Him, how that they are impertinent to\nthe state of the question demanded: the reason whereof is, because not\nbeing like man, which knows man\u2019s thoughts by his words, but knowing\nman\u2019s thoughts immediately, He never answered their words, but their\nthoughts.  Much in the like manner it is with the Scriptures, which being\nwritten to the thoughts of men, and to the succession of all ages, with a\nforesight of all heresies, contradictions, differing estates of the\nChurch, yea, and particularly of the elect, are not to be interpreted\nonly according to the latitude of the proper sense of the place, and\nrespectively towards that present occasion whereupon the words were\nuttered, or in precise congruity or contexture with the words before or\nafter, or in contemplation of the principal scope of the place; but have\nin themselves, not only totally or collectively, but distributively in\nclauses and words, infinite springs and streams of doctrine to water the\nChurch in every part.  And therefore as the literal sense is, as it were,\nthe main stream or river, so the moral sense chiefly, and sometimes the\nallegorical or typical, are they whereof the Church hath most use; not\nthat I wish men to be bold in allegories, or indulgent or light in\nallusions: but that I do much condemn that interpretation of the\nScripture which is only after the manner as men use to interpret a\nprofane book.\n\n(18) In this part touching the exposition of the Scriptures, I can report\nno deficiency; but by way of remembrance this I will add.  In perusing\nbooks of divinity I find many books of controversies, and many of\ncommonplaces and treatises, a mass of positive divinity, as it is made an\nart: a number of sermons and lectures, and many prolix commentaries upon\nthe Scriptures, with harmonies and concordances.  But that form of\nwriting in divinity which in my judgment is of all others most rich and\nprecious is positive divinity, collected upon particular texts of\nScriptures in brief observations; not dilated into commonplaces, not\nchasing after controversies, not reduced into method of art; a thing\nabounding in sermons, which will vanish, but defective in books which\nwill remain, and a thing wherein this age excelleth.  For I am persuaded,\nand I may speak it with an _absit invidia verbo_, and nowise in\nderogation of antiquity, but as in a good emulation between the vine and\nthe olive, that if the choice and best of those observations upon texts\nof Scriptures which have been made dispersedly in sermons within this\nyour Majesty\u2019s Island of Brittany by the space of these forty years and\nmore (leaving out the largeness of exhortations and applications\nthereupon) had been set down in a continuance, it had been the best work\nin divinity which had been written since the Apostles\u2019 times.\n\n(19) The matter informed by divinity is of two kinds: matter of belief\nand truth of opinion, and matter of service and adoration; which is also\njudged and directed by the former\u2014the one being as the internal soul of\nreligion, and the other as the external body thereof.  And, therefore,\nthe heathen religion was not only a worship of idols, but the whole\nreligion was an idol in itself; for it had no soul; that is, no certainty\nof belief or confession: as a man may well think, considering the chief\ndoctors of their church were the poets; and the reason was because the\nheathen gods were no jealous gods, but were glad to be admitted into\npart, as they had reason.  Neither did they respect the pureness of\nheart, so they might have external honour and rites.\n\n(20) But out of these two do result and issue four main branches of\ndivinity: faith, manners, liturgy, and government.  Faith containeth the\ndoctrine of the nature of God, of the attributes of God, and of the works\nof God.  The nature of God consisteth of three persons in unity of\nGodhead.  The attributes of God are either common to the Deity, or\nrespective to the persons.  The works of God summary are two, that of the\ncreation and that of the redemption; and both these works, as in total\nthey appertain to the unity of the Godhead, so in their parts they refer\nto the three persons: that of the creation, in the mass of the matter, to\nthe Father; in the disposition of the form, to the Son; and in the\ncontinuance and conservation of the being, to the Holy Spirit.  So that\nof the redemption, in the election and counsel, to the Father; in the\nwhole act and consummation, to the Son; and in the application, to the\nHoly Spirit; for by the Holy Ghost was Christ conceived in flesh, and by\nthe Holy Ghost are the elect regenerate in spirit.  This work likewise we\nconsider either effectually, in the elect; or privately, in the\nreprobate; or according to appearance, in the visible Church.\n\n(21) For manners, the doctrine thereof is contained in the law, which\ndiscloseth sin.  The law itself is divided, according to the edition\nthereof, into the law of nature, the law moral, and the law positive; and\naccording to the style, into negative and affirmative, prohibitions and\ncommandments.  Sin, in the matter and subject thereof, is divided\naccording to the commandments; in the form thereof it referreth to the\nthree persons in Deity: sins of infirmity against the Father, whose more\nspecial attribute is power; sins of ignorance against the Son, whose\nattribute is wisdom; and sins of malice against the Holy Ghost, whose\nattribute is grace or love.  In the motions of it, it either moveth to\nthe right hand or to the left; either to blind devotion or to profane and\nlibertine transgression; either in imposing restraint where God granteth\nliberty, or in taking liberty where God imposeth restraint.  In the\ndegrees and progress of it, it divideth itself into thought, word, or\nact.  And in this part I commend much the deducing of the law of God to\ncases of conscience; for that I take indeed to be a breaking, and not\nexhibiting whole of the bread of life.  But that which quickeneth both\nthese doctrines of faith and manners is the elevation and consent of the\nheart; whereunto appertain books of exhortation, holy meditation,\nChristian resolution, and the like.\n\n(22) For the liturgy or service, it consisteth of the reciprocal acts\nbetween God and man; which, on the part of God, are the preaching of the\nword, and the sacraments, which are seals to the covenant, or as the\nvisible word; and on the part of man, invocation of the name of God; and\nunder the law, sacrifices; which were as visible prayers or confessions:\nbut now the adoration being _in spiritu et veritate_, there remaineth\nonly _vituli labiorum_; although the use of holy vows of thankfulness and\nretribution may be accounted also as sealed petitions.\n\n(23) And for the government of the Church, it consisteth of the patrimony\nof the Church, the franchises of the Church, and the offices and\njurisdictions of the Church, and the laws of the Church directing the\nwhole; all which have two considerations, the one in themselves, the\nother how they stand compatible and agreeable to the civil estate.\n\n(24) This matter of divinity is handled either in form of instruction of\ntruth, or in form of confutation of falsehood.  The declinations from\nreligion, besides the privative, which is atheism and the branches\nthereof, are three\u2014heresies, idolatry, and witchcraft: heresies, when we\nserve the true God with a false worship; idolatry, when we worship false\ngods, supposing them to be true; and witchcraft, when we adore false\ngods, knowing them to be wicked and false.  For so your Majesty doth\nexcellently well observe, that witchcraft is the height of idolatry.  And\nyet we see though these be true degrees, Samuel teacheth us that they are\nall of a nature, when there is once a receding from the Word of God; for\nso he saith, _Quasi peccatum ariolandi est repugnare_, _et quasi scelus\nidololatri\u00e6 nolle acquiescere_.\n\n(25) These things I have passed over so briefly because I can report no\ndeficiency concerning them: for I can find no space or ground that lieth\nvacant and unsown in the matter of divinity, so diligent have men been\neither in sowing of good seed, or in sowing of tares.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\nThus have I made as it were a small globe of the intellectual world, as\ntruly and faithfully as I could discover; with a note and description of\nthose parts which seem to me not constantly occupate, or not well\nconverted by the labour of man.  In which, if I have in any point receded\nfrom that which is commonly received, it hath been with a purpose of\nproceeding in _melius_, and not _in aliud_; a mind of amendment and\nproficiency, and not of change and difference.  For I could not be true\nand constant to the argument I handle if I were not willing to go beyond\nothers; but yet not more willing than to have others go beyond me again:\nwhich may the better appear by this, that I have propounded my opinions\nnaked and unarmed, not seeking to preoccupate the liberty of men\u2019s\njudgments by confutations.  For in anything which is well set down, I am\nin good hope that if the first reading move an objection, the second\nreading will make an answer.  And in those things wherein I have erred, I\nam sure I have not prejudiced the right by litigious arguments; which\ncertainly have this contrary effect and operation, that they add\nauthority to error, and destroy the authority of that which is well\ninvented.  For question is an honour and preferment to falsehood, as on\nthe other side it is a repulse to truth.  But the errors I claim and\nchallenge to myself as mine own.  The good, it any be, is due _tanquam\nadeps sacrificii_, to be incensed to the honour, first of the Divine\nMajesty, and next of your Majesty, to whom on earth I am most bounden.\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES.\n\n\n{39}  Stoops in the rice and takes the speeding gold.  Ovid. Metam, x.\n667.","title":"The Advancement of Learning","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":83821}