{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_55046/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_55046","id":"gutenberg_55046","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/55046","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Evolution","Knowledge, Theory of","Philosophy and religion"],"text":"FIRST\n PRINCIPLES.\n\n\n BY\n\n HERBERT SPENCER,\n\n AUTHOR OF \u201cSOCIAL STATICS,\u201d \u201cTHE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY,\u201d \u201cESSAYS:\n SCIENTIFIC, POLITICAL, AND SPECULATIVE,\u201d \u201cEDUCATION,\u201d ETC.\n\n\n SECOND THOUSAND.\n\n\n LONDON:\n WILLIAMS AND NORGATE, 14, HENRIETTA STREET,\n COVENT GARDEN.\n 1863.\n\n _The Right of Translation is reserved._\n\n\n\n\n JOHN CHILDS AND SON, PRINTERS.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n\n\n PREFACE.\n\n\nThis volume is the first of a series described in a prospectus\noriginally distributed in March, 1860. Of that prospectus, the annexed\nis a reprint.\n\n\n A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY.\n\nMr. Herbert Spencer proposes to issue in periodical parts a connected\nseries of works which he has for several years been preparing. Some\nconception of the general aim and scope of this series may be gathered\nfrom the following Programme.\n\n\n FIRST PRINCIPLES.\n\n PART I. THE UNKNOWABLE.\u2014Carrying a step further the doctrine put\n into shape by Hamilton and Mansel; pointing out the various\n directions in which Science leads to the same conclusions; and\n showing that in this united belief in an Absolute that transcends\n not only human knowledge but human conception, lies the only\n possible reconciliation of Science and Religion.\n\n PART II. LAWS OF THE KNOWABLE.\u2014A statement of the ultimate\n principles discernible throughout all manifestations of the\n Absolute\u2014those highest generalizations now being disclosed by\n Science which are severally true not of one class of phenomena but\n of _all_ classes of phenomena; and which are thus the keys to all\n classes of phenomena.[1]\n\n [_In logical order should here come the application of these First\n Principles to Inorganic Nature. But this great division it is\n proposed to pass over: partly because, even without it, the scheme\n is too extensive; and partly because the interpretation of Organic\n Nature after the proposed method, is of more immediate importance.\n The second work of the series will therefore be_\u2014]\n\n\n THE PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY.\n\n\n VOL. I.\n\n PART I. THE DATA OF BIOLOGY.\u2014Including those general truths of\n Physics and Chemistry with which rational Biology must set out.\n\n II. THE INDUCTIONS OF BIOLOGY.\u2014A statement of the leading\n generalizations which Naturalists, Physiologists, and Comparative\n Anatomists, have established.\n\n III. THE EVOLUTION OF LIFE.\u2014Concerning the speculation commonly\n known as \u201cThe Development Hypothesis\u201d\u2014its _\u00e0 priori_ and _\u00e0\n posteriori_ evidences.\n\n\n VOL. II.\n\n IV. MORPHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT.\u2014Pointing out the relations that are\n everywhere traceable between organic forms and the average of the\n various forces to which they are subject; and seeking in the\n cumulative effects of such forces a theory of the forms.\n\n V. PHYSIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT.\u2014The progressive differentiation of\n functions similarly traced; and similarly interpreted as\n consequent upon the exposure of different parts of organisms to\n different sets of conditions.\n\n VI. THE LAWS OF MULTIPLICATION.\u2014Generalizations respecting the\n rates of reproduction of the various classes of plants and\n animals; followed by an attempt to show the dependence of these\n variations upon certain necessary causes.[2]\n\n\n THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.\n\n\n VOL. I.\n\n PART I. THE DATA OF PSYCHOLOGY.\u2014Treating of the general connexions\n of Mind and Life and their relations to other modes of the\n Unknowable.\n\n II. THE INDUCTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY.\u2014A digest of such generalizations\n respecting mental phenomena as have already been empirically\n established.\n\n III. GENERAL SYNTHESIS.\u2014A republication, with additional chapters,\n of the same part in the already-published _The Principles of\n Psychology_.\n\n IV. SPECIAL SYNTHESIS.\u2014A republication, with extensive revisions\n and additions, of the same part, &c. &c.\n\n V. PHYSICAL SYNTHESIS.\u2014An attempt to show the manner in which the\n succession of states of consciousness conforms to a certain\n fundamental law of nervous action that follows from the First\n Principles laid down at the outset.\n\n\n VOL. II.\n\n VI. SPECIAL ANALYSIS.\u2014As at present published, but further\n elaborated by some additional chapters.\n\n VII. GENERAL ANALYSIS.\u2014As at present published, with several\n explanations and additions.\n\n VIII. COROLLARIES.\u2014Consisting in part of a number of derivative\n principles which form a necessary introduction to Sociology.[3]\n\n\n THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY.\n\n\n VOL. I.\n\n PART I. THE DATA OF SOCIOLOGY.\u2014A statement of the several sets of\n factors entering into social phenomena\u2014human ideas and feelings\n considered in their necessary order of evolution; surrounding\n natural conditions; and those ever complicating conditions to\n which Society itself gives origin.\n\n II. THE INDUCTIONS OF SOCIOLOGY.\u2014General facts, structural and\n functional, as gathered from a survey of Societies and their\n changes: in other words, the empirical generalizations that are\n arrived at by comparing different societies, and successive phases\n of the same society.\n\n III. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION.\u2014The evolution of governments, general\n and local, as determined by natural causes; their several types\n and metamorphoses; their increasing complexity and specialization;\n and the progressive limitation of their functions.\n\n\n VOL. II.\n\n IV. ECCLESIASTICAL ORGANIZATION.\u2014Tracing the differentiation of\n religious government from secular; its successive complications\n and the multiplication of sects; the growth and continued\n modification of religious ideas, as caused by advancing knowledge\n and changing moral character; and the gradual reconciliation of\n these ideas with the truths of abstract science.\n\n V. CEREMONIAL ORGANIZATION.\u2014The natural history of that third kind\n of government which, having a common root with the others, and\n slowly becoming separate from and supplementary to them, serves to\n regulate the minor actions of life.\n\n VI. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION.\u2014The development of productive and\n distributive agencies, considered, like the foregoing, in its\n necessary causes: comprehending not only the progressive division\n of labour, and the increasing complexity of each industrial\n agency, but also the successive forms of industrial government as\n passing through like phases with political government.\n\n\n VOL. III.\n\n VII. LINGUAL PROGRESS.\u2014The evolution of Languages regarded as a\n psychological process determined by social conditions.\n\n VIII. INTELLECTUAL PROGRESS.\u2014Treated from the same point of view:\n including the growth of classifications; the evolution of science\n out of common knowledge; the advance from qualitative to\n quantitative prevision, from the indefinite to the definite, and\n from the concrete to the abstract.\n\n IX. \u00c6STHETIC PROGRESS.\u2014The Fine Arts similarly dealt with: tracing\n their gradual differentiation from primitive institutions and from\n each other; their increasing varieties of development; and their\n advance in reality of expression and superiority of aim.\n\n X. MORAL PROGRESS.\u2014Exhibiting the genesis of the slow emotional\n modifications which human nature undergoes in its adaptation to\n the social state.\n\n XI. THE CONSENSUS.\u2014Treating of the necessary interdependence of\n structures and of functions in each type of society, and in the\n successive phases of social development.[4]\n\n\n THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY.\n\n\n VOL. I.\n\n PART I. THE DATA OF MORALITY.\u2014Generalizations furnished by\n Biology, Psychology and Sociology, which underlie a true theory of\n right living: in other words, the elements of that equilibrium\n between constitution and conditions of existence, which is at once\n the moral ideal and the limit towards which we are progressing.\n\n II. THE INDUCTIONS OF MORALITY.\u2014Those empirically-established\n rules of human action which are registered as essential laws by\n all civilized nations: that is to say\u2014the generalizations of\n expediency.\n\n III. PERSONAL MORALS.\u2014The principles of private conduct\u2014physical,\n intellectual, moral and religious\u2014that follow from the conditions\n to complete individual life: or, what is the same thing\u2014those\n modes of private action which must result from the eventual\n equilibration of internal desires and external needs.\n\n\n VOL. II.\n\n IV. JUSTICE.\u2014The mutual limitations of men\u2019s actions necessitated\n by their co-existence as units of a society\u2014limitations, the\n perfect observance of which constitutes that state of equilibrium\n forming the goal of political progress.\n\n V. NEGATIVE BENEFICENCE.\u2014Those secondary limitations, similarly\n necessitated, which, though less important and not cognizable by\n law, are yet requisite to prevent mutual destruction of happiness\n in various indirect ways: in other words\u2014those minor\n self-restraints dictated by what may be called passive sympathy.\n\n VI. POSITIVE BENEFICENCE.\u2014Comprehending all modes of conduct,\n dictated by active sympathy, which imply pleasure in giving\n pleasure\u2014modes of conduct that social adaptation has induced and\n must render ever more general; and which, in becoming universal,\n must fill to the full the possible measure of human happiness.[5]\n\n In anticipation of the obvious criticism that the scheme here\n sketched out is too extensive, it may be remarked that an\n exhaustive treatment of each topic is not intended; but simply the\n establishment of _principles_, with such illustrations as are\n needed to make their bearings fully understood. It may also be\n pointed out that, besides minor fragments, one large division\n (_The Principles of Psychology_) is already, in great part,\n executed. And a further reply is, that impossible though it may\n prove to execute the whole, yet nothing can be said against an\n attempt to set forth the First Principles and to carry their\n applications as far as circumstances permit.\n\n The price per Number to be half-a-crown; that is to say, the four\n Numbers yearly issued to be severally delivered, post free, to all\n annual subscribers of Ten Shillings.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThis Programme I have thought well to reprint for two reasons:\u2014the one\nbeing that readers may, from time to time, be able to ascertain what\ntopics are next to be dealt with; the other being that an outline of the\nscheme may remain, in case it should never be completed.\n\nThe successive instalments of which this volume consists, were issued to\nthe subscribers at the following dates:\u2014Part I. (pp. 1\u201380) in October,\n1860; Part II. (pp. 81\u2013176) in January, 1861; Part III. (pp. 177\u2013256) in\nApril, 1861; Part IV. (pp. 257\u2013334) in October, 1861; Part V. (pp.\n335\u2013416) in March, 1862; and Part VI. (pp. 417\u2013504) in June, 1862.\n\n _London, June 5th, 1862_\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 1:\n\n One of these generalizations is that currently known as \u201cthe\n Conservation of Force;\u201d a second may be gathered from a published\n essay on \u201cProgress: its Law and Cause;\u201d a third is indicated in a\n paper on \u201cTranscendental Physiology;\u201d and there are several others.\n\nFootnote 2:\n\n The ideas to be developed in the second volume of the _Principles of\n Biology_ the writer has already briefly expressed in sundry\n Review-Articles. Part IV. will work out a doctrine suggested in a\n paper on \u201cThe Laws of Organic Form,\u201d published in the\n _Medico-Chirurgical Review_ for January, 1859. The germ of Part V. is\n contained in the essay on \u201cTranscendental Physiology:\u201d See _Essays_,\n pp. 280\u201390. And in Part VI. will be unfolded certain views crudely\n expressed in a \u201cTheory of Population,\u201d published in the _Westminster\n Review_ for April, 1852.\n\nFootnote 3:\n\n Respecting the several additions to be made to the _Principles of\n Psychology_, it seems needful only to say that Part V. is the\n unwritten division named in the preface to that work\u2014a division of\n which the germ is contained in a note on page 544, and of which the\n scope has since been more definitely stated in a paper in the\n _Medico-Chirurgical Review_ for Jan. 1859.\n\nFootnote 4:\n\n Of this treatise on Sociology a few small fragments may be found in\n already-published essays. Some of the ideas to be developed in Part\n II. are indicated in an article on \u201cThe Social Organism,\u201d contained in\n the last number of the _Westminster Review_; those which Part V. will\n work out, may be gathered from the first half of a paper written some\n years since on \u201cManners and Fashion;\u201d of Part VIII. the germs are\n contained in an article on the \u201cGenesis of Science;\u201d two papers on\n \u201cThe Origin and Function of Music\u201d and \u201cThe Philosophy of Style,\u201d\n contain some ideas to be embodied in Part IX.; and from a criticism of\n Mr. Bain\u2019s work on \u201cThe Emotions and the Will,\u201d in the last number of\n the _Medico-Chirurgical Review_, the central idea to be developed in\n Part X. may be inferred.\n\nFootnote 5:\n\n Part IV. of the _Principles of Morality_ will be co-extensive (though\n not identical) with the first half of the writer\u2019s _Social Statics_.\n\n\n\n\n CONTENTS.\n\n\n PART I.\u2014THE UNKNOWABLE.\n\n CHAP. PAGE\n\n I.\u2014 RELIGION AND SCIENCE 3\n\n II.\u2014 ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS 25\n\n III.\u2014 ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS 47\n\n IV.\u2014 THE RELATIVITY OF ALL KNOWLEDGE 68\n\n V.\u2014 THE RECONCILIATION 98\n\n\n PART II.\u2014LAWS OF THE KNOWABLE.\n\n I.\u2014 LAWS IN GENERAL 127\n\n II.\u2014 THE LAW OF EVOLUTION 146\n\n III.\u2014 THE LAW OF EVOLUTION (CONTINUED) 175\n\n IV.\u2014 THE CAUSES OF EVOLUTION 219\n\n V.\u2014 SPACE, TIME, MATTER, MOTION, AND FORCE 224\n\n VI.\u2014 THE INDESTRUCTIBILITY OF MATTER 238\n\n VII.\u2014 THE CONTINUITY OF MOTION 246\n\n VIII.\u2014 THE PERSISTENCE OF FORCE 251\n\n IX.\u2014 THE CORRELATION AND EQUIVALENCE OF FORCES 259\n\n X.\u2014 THE DIRECTION OF MOTION 286\n\n XI.\u2014 THE RHYTHM OF MOTION 313\n\n XII.\u2014 THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO EVOLUTION 335\n\n XIII.\u2014 THE INSTABILITY OF THE HOMOGENEOUS 358\n\n XIV.\u2014 THE MULTIPLICATION OF EFFECTS 388\n\n XV.\u2014 DIFFERENTIATION AND INTEGRATION 416\n\n VI.\u2014 EQUILIBRATION 440\n\n XVII.\u2014 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 487\n\n\n\n\n PART I.\n\n THE UNKNOWABLE.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER I.\n RELIGION AND SCIENCE.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. We too often forget that not only is there \u201ca soul of goodness in\nthings evil,\u201d but very generally also, a soul of truth in things\nerroneous. While many admit the abstract probability that a falsity has\nusually a nucleus of reality, few bear this abstract probability in\nmind, when passing judgment on the opinions of others. A belief that is\nfinally proved to be grossly at variance with fact, is cast aside with\nindignation or contempt; and in the heat of antagonism scarcely any one\ninquires what there was in this belief which commended it to men\u2019s\nminds. Yet there must have been something. And there is reason to\nsuspect that this something was its correspondence with certain of their\nexperiences: an extremely limited or vague correspondence perhaps; but\nstill, a correspondence. Even the absurdest report may in nearly every\ninstance be traced to an actual occurrence; and had there been no such\nactual occurrence, this preposterous misrepresentation of it would never\nhave existed. Though the distorted or magnified image transmitted to us\nthrough the refracting medium of rumour, is utterly unlike the reality;\nyet in the absence of the reality there would have been no distorted or\nmagnified image. And thus it is with human beliefs in general. Entirely\nwrong as they may appear, the implication is that they germinated out of\nactual experiences\u2014originally contained, and perhaps still contain, some\nsmall amount of verity.\n\nMore especially may we safely assume this, in the case of beliefs that\nhave long existed and are widely diffused; and most of all so, in the\ncase of beliefs that are perennial and nearly or quite universal. The\npresumption that any current opinion is not wholly false, gains in\nstrength according to the number of its adherents. Admitting, as we\nmust, that life is impossible unless through a certain agreement between\ninternal convictions and external circumstances; admitting therefore\nthat the probabilities are always in favour of the truth, or at least\nthe partial truth, of a conviction; we must admit that the convictions\nentertained by many minds in common are the most likely to have some\nfoundation. The elimination of individual errors of thought, must give\nto the resulting judgment a certain additional value. It may indeed be\nurged that many widely-spread beliefs are received on authority; that\nthose entertaining them make no attempts at verification; and hence it\nmay be inferred that the multitude of adherents adds but little to the\nprobability of a belief. But this is not true. For a belief which gains\nextensive reception without critical examination, is thereby proved to\nhave a general congruity with the various other beliefs of those who\nreceive it; and in so far as these various other beliefs are based upon\npersonal observation and judgment, they give an indirect warrant to one\nwith which they harmonize. It may be that this warrant is of small\nvalue; but still it is of some value.\n\nCould we reach definite views on this matter, they would be extremely\nuseful to us. It is important that we should, if possible, form\nsomething like a general theory of current opinions; so that we may\nneither over-estimate nor under-estimate their worth. Arriving at\ncorrect judgments on disputed questions, much depends on the attitude of\nmind we preserve while listening to, or taking part in, the controversy;\nand for the preservation of a right attitude, it is needful that we\nshould learn how true, and yet how untrue, are average human beliefs. On\nthe one hand, we must keep free from that bias in favour of received\nideas which expresses itself in such dogmas as \u201cWhat every one says must\nbe true,\u201d or \u201cThe voice of the people is the voice of God.\u201d On the other\nhand, the fact disclosed by a survey of the past, that majorities have\nusually been wrong, must not blind us to the complementary fact, that\nmajorities have usually not been _entirely_ wrong. And the avoidance of\nthese extremes being a prerequisite to catholic thinking, we shall do\nwell to provide ourselves with a safe-guard against them, by making a\nvaluation of opinions in the abstract. To this end we must contemplate\nthe kind of relation that ordinarily subsists between opinions and\nfacts. Let us do so with one of those beliefs which under various forms\nhas prevailed among all nations in all times.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 2. The earliest traditions represent rulers as gods or demigods. By\ntheir subjects, primitive kings were regarded as superhuman in origin,\nand superhuman in power. They possessed divine titles; received\nobeisances like those made before the altars of deities; and were in\nsome cases actually worshipped. If there needs proof that the divine and\nhalf-divine characters originally ascribed to monarchs were ascribed\nliterally, we have it in the fact that there are still existing savage\nraces, among whom it is held that the chiefs and their kindred are of\ncelestial origin, or, as elsewhere, that only the chiefs have souls. And\nof course along with beliefs of this kind, there existed a belief in the\nunlimited power of the ruler over his subjects\u2014an absolute possession of\nthem, extending even to the taking of their lives at will: as even still\nin Fiji, where a victim stands unbound to be killed at the word of his\nchief; himself declaring, \u201cwhatever the king says must be done.\u201d\n\nIn times and among races somewhat less barbarous, we find these beliefs\na little modified. The monarch, instead of being literally thought god\nor demigod, is conceived to be a man having divine authority, with\nperhaps more or less of divine nature. He retains however, as in the\nEast to the present day, titles expressing his heavenly descent or\nrelationships; and is still saluted in forms and words as humble as\nthose addressed to the Deity. While the lives and properties of his\npeople, if not practically so completely at his mercy, are still in\ntheory supposed to be his.\n\nLater in the progress of civilization, as during the middle ages in\nEurope, the current opinions respecting the relationship of rulers and\nruled are further changed. For the theory of divine origin, there is\nsubstituted that of divine right. No longer god or demigod, or even\ngod-descended, the king is now regarded as simply God\u2019s vice-gerent. The\nobeisances made to him are not so extreme in their humility; and his\nsacred titles lose much of their meaning. Moreover his authority ceases\nto be unlimited. Subjects deny his right to dispose at will of their\nlives and properties; and yield allegiance only in the shape of\nobedience to his commands.\n\nWith advancing political opinion has come still greater restriction of\nimperial power. Belief in the supernatural character of the ruler, long\nago repudiated by ourselves for example, has left behind it nothing more\nthan the popular tendency to ascribe unusual goodness, wisdom, and\nbeauty to the monarch. Loyalty, which originally meant implicit\nsubmission to the king\u2019s will, now means a merely nominal profession of\nsubordination, and the fulfilment of certain forms of respect. Our\npolitical practice, and our political theory, alike utterly reject those\nregal prerogatives which once passed unquestioned. By deposing some, and\nputting others in their places, we have not only denied the divine\nrights of certain men to rule; but we have denied that they have any\nrights beyond those originating in the assent of the nation. Though our\nforms of speech and our state-documents still assert the subjection of\nthe citizens to the ruler, our actual beliefs and our daily proceedings\nimplicitly assert the contrary. We obey no laws save those of our own\nmaking. We have entirely divested the monarch of legislative power; and\nshould immediately rebel against his or her exercise of such power, even\nin matters of the smallest concern. In brief, the aboriginal doctrine is\nall but extinct among us.\n\nNor has the rejection of primitive political beliefs, resulted only in\ntransferring the authority of an autocrat to a representative body. The\nviews entertained respecting governments in general, of whatever form,\nare now widely different from those once entertained. Whether popular or\ndespotic, governments were in ancient times supposed to have unlimited\nauthority over their subjects. Individuals existed for the benefit of\nthe State; not the State for the benefit of individuals. In our days,\nhowever, not only has the national will been in many cases substituted\nfor the will of the king; but the exercise of this national will has\nbeen restricted to a much smaller sphere. In England, for instance,\nthough there has been established no definite theory setting bounds to\ngovernmental authority; yet, in practice, sundry bounds have been set to\nit which are tacitly recognized by all. There is no organic law formally\ndeclaring that the legislature may not freely dispose of the citizens\u2019\nlives, as early kings did when they sacrificed hecatombs of victims; but\nwere it possible for our legislature to attempt such a thing, its own\ndestruction would be the consequence, rather than the destruction of\ncitizens. How entirely we have established the personal liberties of the\nsubject against the invasions of State-power, would be quickly\ndemonstrated, were it proposed by Act of Parliament forcibly to take\npossession of the nation, or of any class, and turn its services to\npublic ends; as the services of the people were turned by primitive\nrulers. And should any statesman suggest a re-distribution of property\nsuch as was sometimes made in ancient democratic communities, he would\nbe met by a thousand-tongued denial of imperial power over individual\npossessions. Not only in our day have these fundamental claims of the\ncitizen been thus made good against the State, but sundry minor claims\nlikewise. Ages ago, laws regulating dress and mode of living fell into\ndisuse; and any attempt to revive them would prove the current opinion\nto be, that such matters lie beyond the sphere of legal control. For\nsome centuries we have been asserting in practice, and have now\nestablished in theory, the right of every man to choose his own\nreligious beliefs, instead of receiving such beliefs on State-authority.\nWithin the last few generations we have inaugurated complete liberty of\nspeech, in spite of all legislative attempts to suppress or limit it.\nAnd still more recently we have claimed and finally obtained under a few\nexceptional restrictions, freedom to trade with whomsoever we please.\nThus our political beliefs are widely different from ancient ones, not\nonly as to the proper depositary of power to be exercised over a nation,\nbut also as to the extent of that power.\n\nNot even here has the change ended. Besides the average opinions which\nwe have just described as current among ourselves, there exists a less\nwidely-diffused opinion going still further in the same direction. There\nare to be found men who contend that the sphere of government should be\nnarrowed even more than it is in England. The modern doctrine that the\nState exists for the benefit of citizens, which has now in a great\nmeasure supplanted the ancient doctrine that the citizens exist for the\nbenefit of the State, they would push to its logical results. They hold\nthat the freedom of the individual, limited only by the like freedom of\nother individuals, is sacred; and that the legislature cannot equitably\nput further restrictions upon it, either by forbidding any actions which\nthe law of equal freedom permits, or taking away any property save that\nrequired to pay the cost of enforcing this law itself. They assert that\nthe sole function of the State is the protection of persons against each\nother, and against a foreign foe. They urge that as, throughout\ncivilization, the manifest tendency has been continually to extend the\nliberties of the subject, and restrict the functions of the State, there\nis reason to believe that the ultimate political condition must be one\nin which personal freedom is the greatest possible and governmental\npower the least possible: that, namely, in which the freedom of each has\nno limit but the like freedom of all; while the sole governmental duty\nis the maintenance of this limit.\n\nHere then in different times and places we find concerning the origin,\nauthority, and functions of government, a great variety of\nopinions\u2014opinions of which the leading genera above indicated subdivide\ninto countless species. What now must be said about the truth or falsity\nof these opinions? Save among a few barbarous tribes the notion that a\nmonarch is a god or demigod is regarded throughout the world as an\nabsurdity almost passing the bounds of human credulity. In but few\nplaces does there survive a vague notion that the ruler possesses any\nsupernatural attributes. Most civilized communities, which still admit\nthe divine right of governments, have long since repudiated the divine\nright of kings. Elsewhere the belief that there is anything sacred in\nlegislative regulations is dying out: laws are coming to be considered\nas conventional only. While the extreme school holds that governments\nhave neither intrinsic authority, nor can have authority given to them\nby convention; but can possess authority only as the administrators of\nthose moral principles deducible from the conditions essential to social\nlife. Of these various beliefs, with their innumerable modifications,\nmust we then say that some one alone is wholly right and all the rest\nwholly wrong; or must we say that each of them contains truth more or\nless completely disguised by errors? The latter alternative is the one\nwhich analysis will force upon us. Ridiculous as they may severally\nappear to those not educated under them, every one of these doctrines\nhas for its vital element the recognition of an unquestionable fact.\nDirectly or by implication, each of them insists on a certain\nsubordination of individual actions to social requirements. There are\nwide differences as to the power to which this subordination is due;\nthere are wide differences as to the motive for this subordination;\nthere are wide differences as to its extent; but that there must be\n_some_ subordination all are agreed. From the oldest and rudest idea of\nallegiance, down to the most advanced political theory of our own day,\nthere is on this point complete unanimity. Though, between the savage\nwho conceives his life and property to be at the absolute disposal of\nhis chief, and the anarchist who denies the right of any government,\nautocratic or democratic, to trench upon his individual freedom, there\nseems at first sight an entire and irreconcilable antagonism; yet\nultimate analysis discloses in them this fundamental community of\nopinion; that there are limits which individual actions may not\ntransgress\u2014limits which the one regards as originating in the king\u2019s\nwill, and which the other regards as deducible from the equal claims of\nfellow-citizens.\n\nIt may perhaps at first sight seem that we here reach a very unimportant\nconclusion; namely, that a certain tacit assumption is equally implied\nin all these conflicting political creeds\u2014an assumption which is indeed\nof self-evident validity. The question, however, is not the value or\nnovelty of the particular truth in this case arrived at. My aim has been\nto exhibit the more general truth, which we are apt to overlook, that\nbetween the most opposite beliefs there is usually something in\ncommon,\u2014something taken for granted by each; and that this something, if\nnot to be set down as an unquestionable verity, may yet be considered to\nhave the highest degree of probability. A postulate which, like the one\nabove instanced, is not consciously asserted but unconsciously involved;\nand which is unconsciously involved not by one man or body of men, but\nby numerous bodies of men who diverge in countless ways and degrees in\nthe rest of their beliefs; has a warrant far transcending any that can\nbe usually shown. And when, as in this case, the postulate is\nabstract\u2014is not based on some one concrete experience common to all\nmankind, but implies an induction from a great variety of experiences,\nwe may say that it ranks next in certainty to the postulates of exact\nscience.\n\nDo we not thus arrive at a generalization which may habitually guide us\nwhen seeking for the soul of truth in things erroneous? While the\nforegoing illustration brings clearly home the fact, that in opinions\nseeming to be absolutely and supremely wrong something right is yet to\nbe found; it also indicates the method we should pursue in seeking the\nsomething right. This method is to compare all opinions of the same\ngenus; to set aside as more or less discrediting one another those\nvarious special and concrete elements in which such opinions disagree;\nto observe what remains after the discordant constituents have been\neliminated; and to find for this remaining constituent that abstract\nexpression which holds true throughout its divergent modifications.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a73. A candid acceptance of this general principle and an adoption of the\ncourse it indicates, will greatly aid us in dealing with those chronic\nantagonisms by which men are divided. Applying it not only to current\nideas with which we are personally unconcerned, but also to our own\nideas and those of our opponents, we shall be led to form far more\ncorrect judgments. We shall be ever ready to suspect that the\nconvictions we entertain are not wholly right, and that the adverse\nconvictions are not wholly wrong. On the one hand we shall not, in\ncommon with the great mass of the unthinking, let our beliefs be\ndetermined by the mere accident of birth in a particular age on a\nparticular part of the Earth\u2019s surface; and, on the other hand, we shall\nbe saved from that error of entire and contemptuous negation, which is\nfallen into by most who take up an attitude of independent criticism.\n\nOf all antagonisms of belief, the oldest, the widest, the most profound\nand the most important, is that between Religion and Science. It\ncommenced when the recognition of the simplest uniformities in\nsurrounding things, set a limit to the previously universal fetishism.\nIt shows itself everywhere throughout the domain of human knowledge:\naffecting men\u2019s interpretations alike of the simplest mechanical\naccidents and of the most complicated events in the histories of\nnations. It has its roots deep down in the diverse habits of thought of\ndifferent orders of minds. And the conflicting conceptions of nature and\nlife which these diverse habits of thought severally generate, influence\nfor good or ill the tone of feeling and the daily conduct.\n\nAn unceasing battle of opinion like this which has been carried on\nthroughout all ages under the banners of Religion and Science, has of\ncourse generated an animosity fatal to a just estimate of either party\nby the other. On a larger scale, and more intensely than any other\ncontroversy, has it illustrated that perennially significant fable\nconcerning the knights who fought about the colour of a shield of which\nneither looked at more than one face. Each combatant seeing clearly his\nown aspect of the question, has charged his opponent with stupidity or\ndishonesty in not seeing the same aspect of it; while each has wanted\nthe candour to go over to his opponent\u2019s side and find out how it was\nthat he saw everything so differently.\n\nHappily the times display an increasing catholicity of feeling, which we\nshall do well in carrying as far as our natures permit. In proportion as\nwe love truth more and victory less, we shall become anxious to know\nwhat it is which leads our opponents to think as they do. We shall begin\nto suspect that the pertinacity of belief exhibited by them must result\nfrom a perception of something we have not perceived. And we shall aim\nto supplement the portion of truth we have found with the portion found\nby them. Making a more rational estimate of human authority, we shall\navoid alike the extremes of undue submission and undue rebellion\u2014shall\nnot regard some men\u2019s judgments as wholly good and others as wholly bad;\nbut shall rather lean to the more defensible position that none are\ncompletely right and none are completely wrong.\n\nPreserving, as far as may be, this impartial attitude, let us then\ncontemplate the two sides of this great controversy. Keeping guard\nagainst the bias of education and shutting out the whisperings of\nsectarian feeling, let us consider what are the _\u00e0 priori_ probabilities\nin favour of each party.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a74. When duly realized, the general principle above illustrated must\nlead us to anticipate that the diverse forms of religious belief which\nhave existed and which still exist, have all a basis in some ultimate\nfact. Judging by analogy the implication is, not that any one of them is\naltogether right; but that in each there is something right more or less\ndisguised by other things wrong. It may be that the soul of truth\ncontained in erroneous creeds is very unlike most, if not all, of its\nseveral embodiments; and indeed, if, as we have good reason to expect,\nit is much more abstract than any of them, its unlikeness necessarily\nfollows. But however different from its concrete expressions, some\nessential verity must be looked for. To suppose that these multiform\nconceptions should be one and all _absolutely_ groundless, discredits\ntoo profoundly that average human intelligence from which all our\nindividual intelligences are inherited.\n\nThis most general reason we shall find enforced by other more special\nones. To the presumption that a number of diverse beliefs of the same\nclass have some common foundation in fact, must in this case be added a\nfurther presumption derived from the omnipresence of the beliefs.\nReligious ideas of one kind or other are almost if not quite universal.\nEven should it be true, as alleged, that there exist tribes of men who\nhave nothing approaching to a theory of creation\u2014even should it be true\nthat only when a certain phase of intelligence is reached do the most\nrudimentary of such theories make their appearance; the implication is\npractically the same. Grant that among all races who have passed a\ncertain stage of intellectual development there are found vague notions\nconcerning the origin and hidden nature of surrounding things; and there\narises the inference that such notions are necessary products of\nprogressing intelligence. Their endless variety serves but to strengthen\nthis conclusion: showing as it does a more or less independent\ngenesis\u2014showing how, in different places and times, like conditions have\nled to similar trains of thought, ending in analogous results. That\nthese countless different, and yet allied, phenomena presented by all\nreligions are accidental or factitious, is an untenable supposition. A\ncandid examination of the evidence quite negatives the doctrine\nmaintained by some, that creeds are priestly inventions. Even as a mere\nquestion of probabilities it cannot rationally be concluded that in\nevery society, past and present, savage and civilized, certain members\nof the community have combined to delude the rest, in ways so analogous.\nTo any who may allege that some primitive fiction was devised by some\nprimitive priesthood, before yet mankind had diverged from a common\ncentre, a reply is furnished by philology; for philology proves the\ndispersion of mankind to have commenced before there existed a language\nsufficiently organized to express religious ideas. Moreover, were it\notherwise tenable, the hypothesis of artificial origin fails to account\nfor the facts. It does not explain why, under all changes of form,\ncertain elements of religious belief remain constant. It does not show\nus how it happens that while adverse criticism has from age to age gone\non destroying particular theological dogmas, it has not destroyed the\nfundamental conception underlying these dogmas. It leaves us without any\nsolution of the striking circumstance that when, from the absurdities\nand corruptions accumulated around them, national creeds have fallen\ninto general discredit, ending in indifferentism or positive denial,\nthere has always by and by arisen a re-assertion of them: if not the\nsame in form, still the same in essence. Thus the universality of\nreligious ideas, their independent evolution among different primitive\nraces, and their great vitality, unite in showing that their source must\nbe deep-seated instead of superficial. In other words, we are obliged to\nadmit that if not supernaturally derived as the majority contend, they\nmust be derived out of human experiences, slowly accumulated and\norganized.\n\nShould it be asserted that religious ideas are products of the religious\nsentiment, which, to satisfy itself, prompts imaginations that it\nafterwards projects into the external world, and by and by mistakes for\nrealities; the problem is not solved, but only removed further back.\nWhether the wish is father to the thought, or whether sentiment and idea\nhave a common genesis, there equally arises the question\u2014Whence comes\nthe sentiment? That it is a constituent in man\u2019s nature is implied by\nthe hypothesis; and cannot indeed be denied by those who prefer other\nhypotheses. And if the religious sentiment, displayed habitually by the\nmajority of mankind, and occasionally aroused even in those seemingly\ndevoid of it, must be classed among human emotions, we cannot rationally\nignore it. We are bound to ask its origin and its function. Here is an\nattribute which, to say the least, has had an enormous influence\u2014which\nhas played a conspicuous part throughout the entire past as far back as\nhistory records, and is at present the life of numerous institutions,\nthe stimulus to perpetual controversies, and the prompter of countless\ndaily actions. Any Theory of Things which takes no account of this\nattribute, must, then, be extremely defective. If with no other view,\nstill as a question in philosophy, we are called on to say what this\nattribute means; and we cannot decline the task without confessing our\nphilosophy to be incompetent.\n\nTwo suppositions only are open to us: the one that the feeling which\nresponds to religious ideas resulted, along with all other human\nfaculties, from an act of special creation; the other that it, in common\nwith the rest, arose by a process of evolution. If we adopt the first of\nthese alternatives, universally accepted by our ancestors and by the\nimmense majority of our contemporaries, the matter is at once settled:\nman is directly endowed with the religious feeling by a creator; and to\nthat creator it designedly responds. If we adopt the second alternative,\nthen we are met by the questions\u2014What are the circumstances to which the\ngenesis of the religious feeling is due? and\u2014What is its office? We are\nbound to entertain these questions; and we are bound to find answers to\nthem. Considering all faculties, as we must on this supposition, to\nresult from accumulated modifications caused by the intercourse of the\norganism with its environment, we are obliged to admit that there exist\nin the environment certain phenomena or conditions which have determined\nthe growth of the feeling in question; and so are obliged to admit that\nit is as normal as any other faculty. Add to which that as, on the\nhypothesis of a development of lower forms into higher, the end towards\nwhich the progressive changes directly or indirectly tend, must be\nadaptation to the requirements of existence; we are also forced to infer\nthat this feeling is in some way conducive to human welfare. Thus both\nalternatives contain the same ultimate implication. We must conclude\nthat the religious sentiment is either directly created, or is created\nby the slow action of natural causes; and whichever of these conclusions\nwe adopt, requires us to treat the religious sentiment with respect.\n\nOne other consideration should not be overlooked\u2014a consideration which\nstudents of Science more especially need to have pointed out. Occupied\nas such are with established truths, and accustomed to regard things not\nalready known as things to be hereafter discovered, they are liable to\nforget that information, however extensive it may become, can never\nsatisfy inquiry. Positive knowledge does not, and never can, fill the\nwhole region of possible thought. At the uttermost reach of discovery\nthere arises, and must ever arise, the question\u2014What lies beyond? As it\nis impossible to think of a limit to space so as to exclude the idea of\nspace lying outside that limit; so we cannot conceive of any explanation\nprofound enough to exclude the question\u2014What is the explanation of that\nexplanation? Regarding Science as a gradually increasing sphere, we may\nsay that every addition to its surface does but bring it into wider\ncontact with surrounding nescience. There must ever remain therefore two\nantithetical modes of mental action. Throughout all future time, as now,\nthe human mind may occupy itself, not only with ascertained phenomena\nand their relations, but also with that unascertained something which\nphenomena and their relations imply. Hence if knowledge cannot\nmonopolize consciousness\u2014if it must always continue possible for the\nmind to dwell upon that which transcends knowledge; then there can never\ncease to be a place for something of the nature of Religion; since\nReligion under all its forms is distinguished from everything else in\nthis, that its subject matter is that which passes the sphere of\nexperience.\n\nThus, however untenable may be any or all the existing religious creeds,\nhowever gross the absurdities associated with them, however irrational\nthe arguments set forth in their defence, we must not ignore the verity\nwhich in all likelihood lies hidden within them. The general probability\nthat widely-spread beliefs are not absolutely baseless, is in this case\nenforced by a further probability due to the omnipresence of the\nbeliefs. In the existence of a religious sentiment, whatever be its\norigin, we have a second evidence of great significance. And as in that\nnescience which must ever remain the antithesis to science, there is a\nsphere for the exercise of this sentiment, we find a third general fact\nof like implication. We may be sure therefore that religions, though\neven none of them be actually true, are yet all adumbrations of a truth.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 5. As, to the religious, it will seem absurd to set forth any\njustification for Religion; so, to the scientific, will it seem absurd\nto defend Science. Yet to do the last is certainly as needful as to do\nthe first. If there exists a class who, in contempt of its follies and\ndisgust at its corruptions, have contracted towards Religion a\nrepugnance which makes them overlook the fundamental verity contained in\nit; so, too, is there a class offended to such a degree by the\ndestructive criticisms men of science make on the religious tenets they\nregard as essential, that they have acquired a strong prejudice against\nScience in general. They are not prepared with any avowed reasons for\ntheir dislike. They have simply a remembrance of the rude shakes which\nScience has given to many of their cherished convictions, and a\nsuspicion that it may perhaps eventually uproot all they regard as\nsacred; and hence it produces in them a certain inarticulate dread.\n\nWhat is Science? To see the absurdity of the prejudice against it, we\nneed only remark that Science is simply a higher development of common\nknowledge; and that if Science is repudiated, all knowledge must be\nrepudiated along with it. The extremest bigot will not suspect any harm\nin the observation that the sun rises earlier and sets later in the\nsummer than in the winter; but will rather consider such an observation\nas a useful aid in fulfilling the duties of life. Well, Astronomy is an\norganized body of similar observations, made with greater nicety,\nextended to a larger number of objects, and so analyzed as to disclose\nthe real arrangements of the heavens, and to dispel our false\nconceptions of them. That iron will rust in water, that wood will burn,\nthat long kept viands become putrid, the most timid sectarian will teach\nwithout alarm, as things useful to be known. But these are chemical\ntruths: Chemistry is a systematized collection of such facts,\nascertained with precision, and so classified and generalized as to\nenable us to say with certainty, concerning each simple or compound\nsubstance, what change will occur in it under given conditions. And thus\nis it with all the sciences. They severally germinate out of the\nexperiences of daily life; insensibly as they grow they draw in remoter,\nmore numerous, and more complex experiences; and among these, they\nascertain laws of dependence like those which make up our knowledge of\nthe most familiar objects. Nowhere is it possible to draw a line and\nsay\u2014here Science begins. And as it is the function of common observation\nto serve for the guidance of conduct; so, too, is the guidance of\nconduct the office of the most recondite and abstract inquiries of\nScience. Through the countless industrial processes and the various\nmodes of locomotion which it has given to us, Physics regulates more\ncompletely our social life than does his acquaintance with the\nproperties of surrounding bodies regulate the life of the savage.\nAnatomy and Physiology, through their effects on the practice of\nmedicine and hygiene, modify our actions almost as much as does our\nacquaintance with the evils and benefits which common environing\nagencies may produce on our bodies. All Science is prevision; and all\nprevision ultimately aids us in greater or less degree to achieve the\ngood and avoid the bad. As certainly as the perception of an object\nlying in our path warns us against stumbling over it; so certainly do\nthose more complicated and subtle perceptions which constitute Science,\nwarn us against stumbling over intervening obstacles in the pursuit of\nour distant ends. Thus being one in origin and function, the simplest\nforms of cognition and the most complex must be dealt with alike. We are\nbound in consistency to receive the widest knowledge which our faculties\ncan reach, or to reject along with it that narrow knowledge possessed by\nall. There is no logical alternative between accepting our intelligence\nin its entirety, or repudiating even that lowest intelligence which we\npossess in common with brutes.\n\nTo ask the question which more immediately concerns our argument\u2014whether\nScience is substantially true?\u2014is much like asking whether the sun gives\nlight. And it is because they are conscious how undeniably valid are\nmost of its propositions, that the theological party regard Science with\nso much secret alarm. They know that during the two thousand years of\nits growth, some of its larger divisions\u2014mathematics, physics,\nastronomy\u2014have been subject to the rigorous criticism of successive\ngenerations; and have notwithstanding become ever more firmly\nestablished. They know that, unlike many of their own doctrines, which\nwere once universally received but have age by age been more frequently\ncalled in question, the doctrines of Science, at first confined to a few\nscattered inquirers, have been slowly growing into general acceptance,\nand are now in great part admitted as beyond dispute. They know that men\nof science throughout the world subject each other\u2019s results to the most\nsearching examination; and that error is mercilessly exposed and\nrejected as soon as discovered. And, finally, they know that still more\nconclusive testimony is to be found in the daily verification of\nscientific predictions, and in the never-ceasing triumphs of those arts\nwhich Science guides.\n\nTo regard with alienation that which has such high credentials is a\nfolly. Though in the tone which many of the scientific adopt towards\nthem, the defenders of Religion may find some excuse for this\nalienation; yet the excuse is a very insufficient one. On the side of\nScience, as on their own side, they must admit that short-comings in the\nadvocates do not tell essentially against that which is advocated.\nScience must be judged by itself: and so judged, only the most perverted\nintellect can fail to see that it is worthy of all reverence. Be there\nor be there not any other revelation, we have a veritable revelation in\nScience\u2014a continuous disclosure, through the intelligence with which we\nare endowed, of the established order of the Universe. This disclosure\nit is the duty of every one to verify as far as in him lies; and having\nverified, to receive with all humility.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a76. On both sides of this great controversy, then, truth must exist. An\nunbiassed consideration of its general aspects forces us to conclude\nthat Religion, everywhere present as a weft running through the warp of\nhuman history, expresses some eternal fact; while it is almost a truism\nto say of Science that it is an organised mass of facts, ever growing,\nand ever being more completely purified from errors. And if both have\nbases in the reality of things, then between them there must be a\nfundamental harmony. It is an incredible hypothesis that there are two\norders of truth, in absolute and everlasting opposition. Only on some\nManichean theory, which among ourselves no one dares openly avow however\nmuch his beliefs may be tainted by it, is such a supposition even\nconceivable. That Religion is divine and Science diabolical, is a\nproposition which, though implied in many a clerical declamation, not\nthe most vehement fanatic can bring himself distinctly to assert. And\nwhoever does not assert this, must admit that under their seeming\nantagonism lies hidden an entire agreement.\n\nEach side, therefore, has to recognize the claims of the other as\nstanding for truths that are not to be ignored. He who contemplates the\nUniverse from the religious point of view, must learn to see that this\nwhich we call Science is one constituent of the great whole; and as such\nought to be regarded with a sentiment like that which the remainder\nexcites. While he who contemplates the universe from the scientific\npoint of view, must learn to see that this which we call Religion is\nsimilarly a constituent of the great whole; and being such, must be\ntreated as a subject of science with no more prejudice than any other\nreality. It behoves each party to strive to understand the other, with\nthe conviction that the other has something worthy to be understood; and\nwith the conviction that when mutually recognized this something will be\nthe basis of a complete reconciliation.\n\nHow to find this something\u2014how to reconcile them, thus becomes the\nproblem which we should perseveringly try to solve. Not to reconcile\nthem in any makeshift way\u2014not to find one of those compromises we hear\nfrom time to time proposed, which their proposers must secretly feel are\nartificial and temporary; but to arrive at the terms of a real and\npermanent peace between them. The thing we have to seek out, is that\nultimate truth which both will avow with absolute sincerity\u2014with not the\nremotest mental reservation. There shall be no concession\u2014no yielding on\neither side of something that will by and by be reasserted; but the\ncommon ground on which they meet shall be one which each will maintain\nfor itself. We have to discover some fundamental verity which Religion\nwill assert, with all possible emphasis, in the absence of Science; and\nwhich Science, with all possible emphasis, will assert in the absence of\nReligion\u2014some fundamental verity in the defence of which each will find\nthe other its ally.\n\nOr, changing the point of view, our aim must be to co-ordinate the\nseemingly opposed convictions which Religion and Science embody. From\nthe coalescence of antagonist ideas, each containing its portion of\ntruth, there always arises a higher development. As in Geology when the\nigneous and aqueous hypotheses were united, a rapid advance took place;\nas in Biology we are beginning to progress through the fusion of the\ndoctrine of types with the doctrine of adaptations; as in Psychology the\narrested growth recommences now that the disciples of Kant and those of\nLocke have both their views recognized in the theory that organized\nexperiences produce forms of thought; as in Sociology, now that it is\nbeginning to assume a positive character, we find a recognition of both\nthe party of progress and the party of order, as each holding a truth\nwhich forms a needful complement to that held by the other; so must it\nbe on a grander scale with Religion and Science. Here too we must look\nfor a conception which combines the conclusions of both; and here too we\nmay expect important results from their combination. To understand how\nScience and Religion express opposite sides of the same fact\u2014the one its\nnear or visible side, and the other its remote or invisible side\u2014this it\nis which we must attempt; and to achieve this must profoundly modify our\ngeneral Theory of Things.\n\nAlready in the foregoing pages the method of seeking such a\nreconciliation has been vaguely foreshadowed. Before proceeding further,\nhowever, it will be well to treat the question of method more\ndefinitely. To find that truth in which Religion and Science coalesce,\nwe must know in what direction to look for it, and what kind of truth it\nis likely to be.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 7. We have found _\u00e0 priori_ reason for believing that in all\nreligions, even the rudest, there lies hidden a fundamental verity. We\nhave inferred that this fundamental verity is that element common to all\nreligions, which remains after their discordant peculiarities have been\nmutually cancelled. And we have further inferred that this element is\nalmost certain to be more abstract than any current religious doctrine.\nNow it is manifest that only in some highly abstract proposition, can\nReligion and Science find a common ground. Neither such dogmas as those\nof the trinitarian and unitarian, nor any such idea as that of\npropitiation, common though it may be to all religions, can serve as the\ndesired basis of agreement; for Science cannot recognize beliefs like\nthese: they lie beyond its sphere. Hence we see not only that, judging\nby analogy, the essential truth contained in Religion is that most\nabstract element pervading all its forms; but also that this most\nabstract element is the only one in which Religion is likely to agree\nwith Science.\n\nSimilarly if we begin at the other end, and inquire what scientific\ntruth can unite Science and Religion. It is at once manifest that\nReligion can take no cognizance of special scientific doctrines; any\nmore than Science can take cognizance of special religious doctrines.\nThe truth which Science asserts and Religion indorses cannot be one\nfurnished by mathematics; nor can it be a physical truth; nor can it be\na truth in chemistry: it cannot be a truth belonging to any particular\nscience. No generalization of the phenomena of space, of time, of\nmatter, or of force, can become a Religious conception. Such a\nconception, if it anywhere exists in Science, must be more general than\nany of these\u2014must be one underlying all of them. If there be a fact\nwhich Science recognizes in common with Religion, it must be that fact\nfrom which the several branches of Science diverge, as from their common\nroot.\n\nAssuming then, that since these two great realities are constituents of\nthe same mind, and respond to different aspects of the same Universe,\nthere must be a fundamental harmony between them; we see good reason to\nconclude that the most abstract truth contained in Religion and the most\nabstract truth contained in Science must be the one in which the two\ncoalesce. The largest fact to be found within our mental range must be\nthe one of which we are in search. Uniting these positive and negative\npoles of human thought, it must be the ultimate fact in our\nintelligence.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 8. Before proceeding in the search for this common datum let me\nbespeak a little patience. The next three chapters, setting out from\ndifferent points and converging to the same conclusion, will be\ncomparatively unattractive. Students of philosophy will find in them\nmuch that is more or less familiar; and to most of those who are\nunacquainted with the literature of modern metaphysics, they may prove\nsomewhat difficult to follow.\n\nOur argument however cannot dispense with these chapters; and the\ngreatness of the question at issue justifies even a heavier tax on the\nreader\u2019s attention. The matter is one which concerns each and all of us\nmore than any other matter whatever. Though it affects us little in a\ndirect way, the view we arrive at must indirectly affect us in all our\nrelations\u2014must determine our conception of the Universe, of Life, of\nHuman Nature\u2014must influence our ideas of right and wrong, and so modify\nour conduct. To reach that point of view from which the seeming\ndiscordance of Religion and Science disappears, and the two merge into\none, must cause a revolution of thought fruitful in beneficial\nconsequences, and must surely be worth an effort.\n\nHere ending preliminaries, let us now address ourselves to this\nall-important inquiry.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER II.\n ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS.\n\n\n\u00a7 9. When, on the sea-shore, we note how the hulls of distant vessels\nare hidden below the horizon, and how, of still remoter vessels, only\nthe uppermost sails are visible, we realize with tolerable clearness the\nslight curvature of that portion of the sea\u2019s surface which lies before\nus. But when we seek in imagination to follow out this curved surface as\nit actually exists, slowly bending round until all its meridians meet in\na point eight thousand miles below our feet, we find ourselves utterly\nbaffled. We cannot conceive in its real form and magnitude even that\nsmall segment of our globe which extends a hundred miles on every side\nof us; much less the globe as a whole. The piece of rock on which we\nstand can be mentally represented with something like completeness: we\nfind ourselves able to think of its top, its sides, and its under\nsurface at the same time; or so nearly at the same time that they seem\nall present in consciousness together; and so we can form what we call a\nconception of the rock. But to do the like with the Earth we find\nimpossible. If even to imagine the antipodes as at that distant place in\nspace which it actually occupies, is beyond our power; much more beyond\nour power must it be at the same time to imagine all other remote points\non the Earth\u2019s surface as in their actual places. Yet we habitually\nspeak as though we had an idea of the Earth\u2014as though we could think of\nit in the same way that we think of minor objects.\n\nWhat conception, then, do we form of it? the reader may ask. That its\nname calls up in us some state of consciousness is unquestionable; and\nif this state of consciousness is not a conception, properly so called,\nwhat is it? The answer seems to be this:\u2014We have learnt by indirect\nmethods that the Earth is a sphere; we have formed models approximately\nrepresenting its shape and the distribution of its parts; generally when\nthe Earth is referred to, we either think of an indefinitely extended\nmass beneath our feet, or else, leaving out the actual Earth, we think\nof a body like a terrestrial globe; but when we seek to imagine the\nEarth as it really is, we join these two ideas as well as we can\u2014such\nperception as our eyes give us of the Earth\u2019s surface we couple with the\nconception of a sphere. And thus we form of the Earth, not a conception\nproperly so called, but only a symbolic conception.[6]\n\nA large proportion of our conceptions, including all those of much\ngenerality, are of this order. Great magnitudes, great durations, great\nnumbers, are none of them actually conceived, but are all of them\nconceived more or less symbolically; and so, too, are all those classes\nof objects of which we predicate some common fact. When mention is made\nof any individual man, a tolerably complete idea of him is formed. If\nthe family he belongs to be spoken of, probably but a part of it will be\nrepresented in thought: under the necessity of attending to that which\nis said about the family, we realize in imagination only its most\nimportant or familiar members, and pass over the rest with a nascent\nconsciousness which we know could, if requisite, be made complete.\nShould something be remarked of the class, say farmers, to which this\nfamily belongs, we neither enumerate in thought all the individuals\ncontained in the class, nor believe that we could do so if required; but\nwe are content with taking some few samples of it, and remembering that\nthese could be indefinitely multiplied. Supposing the subject of which\nsomething is predicated be Englishmen, the answering state of\nconsciousness is a still more inadequate representative of the reality.\nYet more remote is the likeness of the thought to the thing, if\nreference be made to Europeans or to human beings. And when we come to\npropositions concerning the mammalia, or concerning the whole of the\nvertebrata, or concerning animals in general, or concerning all organic\nbeings, the unlikeness of our conceptions to the objects named reaches\nits extreme. Throughout which series of instances we see, that as the\nnumber of objects grouped together in thought increases, the concept,\nformed of a few typical samples joined with the notion of multiplicity,\nbecomes more and more a mere symbol; not only because it gradually\nceases to represent the size of the group, but also because as the group\ngrows more heterogeneous, the typical samples thought of are less like\nthe average objects which the group contains.\n\nThis formation of symbolic conceptions, which inevitably arises as we\npass from small and concrete objects to large and to discrete ones, is\nmostly a very useful, and indeed necessary, process. When, instead of\nthings whose attributes can be tolerably well united in a single state\nof consciousness, we have to deal with things whose attributes are too\nvast or numerous to be so united, we must either drop in thought part of\ntheir attributes, or else not think of them at all\u2014either form a more or\nless symbolic conception, or no conception. We must predicate nothing of\nobjects too great or too multitudinous to be mentally represented; or we\nmust make our predications by the help of extremely inadequate\nrepresentations of such objects\u2014mere symbols of them.\n\nBut while by this process alone we are enabled to form general\npropositions, and so to reach general conclusions, we are by this\nprocess perpetually led into danger, and very often into error. We\nhabitually mistake our symbolic conceptions for real ones; and so are\nbetrayed into countless false inferences. Not only is it that in\nproportion as the concept we form of any thing or class of things,\nmisrepresents the reality, we are apt to be wrong in any assertion we\nmake respecting the reality; but it is that we are led to suppose we\nhave truly conceived a great variety of things which we have conceived\nonly in this fictitious way; and further to confound with these certain\nthings which cannot be conceived in any way. How almost unavoidably we\nfall into this error it will be needful here to observe.\n\nFrom objects readily representable in their totality, to those of which\nwe cannot form even an approximate representation, there is an\ninsensible transition. Between a pebble and the entire Earth a series of\nmagnitudes might be introduced, each of which differed from the adjacent\nones so slightly that it would be impossible to say at what point in the\nseries our conceptions of them became inadequate. Similarly, there is a\ngradual progression from those groups of a few individuals which we can\nthink of as groups with tolerable completeness, to those larger and\nlarger groups of which we can form nothing like true ideas. Whence it is\nmanifest that we pass from actual conceptions to symbolic ones by\ninfinitesimal steps. Note next that we are led to deal with our symbolic\nconceptions as though they were actual ones, not only because we cannot\nclearly separate the two, but also because, in the great majority of\ncases, the first serve our purposes nearly or quite as well as the\nlast\u2014are simply the abbreviated signs we substitute for those more\nelaborate signs which are our equivalents for real objects. Those very\nimperfect representations of ordinary things which we habitually make in\nthinking, we know can be developed into adequate ones if needful. Those\nconcepts of larger magnitudes and more extensive classes which we cannot\nmake adequate, we still find can be verified by some indirect process of\nmeasurement or enumeration. And even in the case of such an utterly\ninconceivable object as the Solar System, we yet, through the fulfilment\nof predictions founded on our symbolic conception of it, gain the\nconviction that this symbolic conception stands for an actual existence,\nand, in a sense, truly expresses certain of its constituent relations.\nThus our symbolic conceptions being in the majority of cases capable of\ndevelopment into complete ones, and in most other cases serving as steps\nto conclusions which are proved valid by their correspondence with\nobservation, we acquire a confirmed habit of dealing with them as true\nconceptions\u2014as real representations of actualities. Learning by long\nexperience that they can, if needful, be verified, we are led habitually\nto accept them without verification. And thus we open the door to some\nwhich profess to stand for known things, but which really stand for\nthings that cannot be known in any way.\n\nTo sum up, we must say of conceptions in general, that they are complete\nonly when the attributes of the object conceived are of such number and\nkind that they can be represented in consciousness so nearly at the same\ntime as to seem all present together; that as the objects conceived\nbecome larger and more complex, some of the attributes first thought of\nfade from consciousness before the rest have been represented, and the\nconception thus becomes imperfect; that when the size, complexity, or\ndiscreteness of the object conceived becomes very great, only a small\nportion of its attributes can be thought of at once, and the conception\nformed of it thus becomes so inadequate as to be a mere symbol; that\nnevertheless such symbolic conceptions, which are indispensable in\ngeneral thinking, are legitimate, provided that by some cumulative or\nindirect process of thought, or by the fulfilment of predictions based\non them, we can assure ourselves that they stand for actualities; but\nthat when our symbolic conceptions are such that no cumulative or\nindirect processes of thought can enable us to ascertain that there are\ncorresponding actualities, nor any predictions be made whose fulfilment\ncan prove this, then they are altogether vicious and illusive, and in no\nway distinguishable from pure fictions.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 10. And now to consider the bearings of this general truth on our\nimmediate topic\u2014Ultimate Religious Ideas.\n\nTo the aboriginal man and to every civilized child the problem of the\nUniverse suggests itself. What is it? and whence comes it? are questions\nthat press for solution, when, from time to time, the imagination rises\nabove daily trivialities. To fill the vacuum of thought, any theory that\nis proposed seems better than none. And in the absence of others, any\ntheory that is proposed easily gains a footing and afterwards maintains\nits ground: partly from the readiness of mankind to accept proximate\nexplanations; partly from the authority which soon accumulates round\nsuch explanations when given.\n\nA critical examination, however, will prove not only that no current\nhypothesis is tenable, but also that no tenable hypothesis can be\nframed.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 11. Respecting the origin of the Universe three verbally intelligible\nsuppositions may be made. We may assert that it is self-existent; or\nthat it is self-created; or that it is created by an external agency.\nWhich of these suppositions is most credible it is not needful here to\ninquire. The deeper question, into which this finally merges, is,\nwhether any one of them is even conceivable in the true sense of the\nword. Let us successively test them.\n\nWhen we speak of a man as self-supporting, of an apparatus as\nself-acting, or of a tree as self-developed, our expressions, however\ninexact, stand for things that can be realized in thought with tolerable\ncompleteness. Our conception of the self-development of a tree is\ndoubtless symbolic. But though we cannot really represent in\nconsciousness the entire series of complex changes through which the\ntree passes, yet we can thus represent the leading features of the\nseries; and general experience teaches us that by long continued\nobservation we could gain the power to realize in thought a series of\nchanges more fully representing the actual series: that is, we know that\nour symbolic conception of self-development can be expanded into\nsomething like a real conception; and that it expresses, however\ninaccurately, an actual process in nature. But when we speak of\nself-existence, and, helped by the above analogies, form some vague\nsymbolic conception of it, we delude ourselves in supposing that this\nsymbolic conception is of the same order as the others. On joining the\nword _self_ to the word _existence_, the force of association makes us\nbelieve we have a thought like that suggested by the compound word\nself-acting. An endeavour to expand this symbolic conception, however,\nwill undeceive us. In the first place, it is clear that by\nself-existence we especially mean, an existence independent of any\nother\u2014not produced by any other: the assertion of self-existence is\nsimply an indirect denial of creation. In thus excluding the idea of any\nantecedent cause, we necessarily exclude the idea of a beginning; for to\nadmit the idea of a beginning\u2014to admit that there was a time when the\nexistence had not commenced\u2014is to admit that its commencement was\ndetermined by something, or was caused; which is a contradiction.\nSelf-existence, therefore, necessarily means existence without a\nbeginning; and to form a conception of self-existence is to form a\nconception of existence without a beginning. Now by no mental effort can\nwe do this. To conceive existence through infinite past-time, implies\nthe conception of infinite past-time, which is an impossibility.\n To this let us add, that even were self-existence conceivable, it\nwould not in any sense be an explanation of the Universe. No one will\nsay that the existence of an object at the present moment is made easier\nto understand by the discovery that it existed an hour ago, or a day\nago, or a year ago; and if its existence now is not made in the least\ndegree more comprehensible by its existence during some previous finite\nperiod of time, then no accumulation of such finite periods, even could\nwe extend them to an infinite period, would make it more comprehensible.\nThus the Atheistic theory is not only absolutely unthinkable, but, even\nif it were thinkable, would not be a solution. The assertion that the\nUniverse is self-existent does not really carry us a step beyond the\ncognition of its present existence; and so leaves us with a mere\nre-statement of the mystery.\n\nThe hypothesis of self-creation, which practically amounts to what is\ncalled Pantheism, is similarly incapable of being represented in\nthought. Certain phenomena, such as the precipitation of invisible\nvapour into cloud, aid us in forming a symbolic conception of a\nself-evolved Universe; and there are not wanting indications in the\nheavens, and on the earth, which help us to render this conception\ntolerably definite. But while the succession of phases through which the\nUniverse has passed in reaching its present form, may perhaps be\ncomprehended as in a sense self-determined; yet the impossibility of\nexpanding our symbolic conception of self-creation into a real\nconception, remains as complete as ever. Really to conceive\nself-creation, is to conceive potential existence passing into actual\nexistence by some inherent necessity; which we cannot do. We\ncannot form any idea of a potential existence of the universe, as\ndistinguished from its actual existence. If represented in thought at\nall, potential existence must be represented as _something_, that is as\nan actual existence; to suppose that it can be represented as nothing,\ninvolves two absurdities\u2014that nothing is more than a negation, and can\nbe positively represented in thought; and that one nothing is\ndistinguished from all other nothings by its power to develope into\nsomething. Nor is this all. We have no state of consciousness answering\nto the words\u2014an inherent necessity by which potential existence became\nactual existence. To render them into thought, existence, having for an\nindefinite period remained in one form, must be conceived as passing\nwithout any external or additional impulse, into another form; and this\ninvolves the idea of a change without a cause\u2014a thing of which no idea\nis possible. Thus the terms of this hypothesis do not stand for real\nthoughts; but merely suggest the vaguest symbols incapable of any\ninterpretation. Moreover, even were it true that potential\nexistence is conceivable as a different thing from actual existence; and\nthat the transition from the one to the other can be mentally realized\nas a self-determined change; we should still be no forwarder: the\nproblem would simply be removed a step back. For whence the potential\nexistence? This would just as much require accounting for as actual\nexistence; and just the same difficulties would meet us. Respecting the\norigin of such a latent power, no other suppositions could be made than\nthose above named\u2014self-existence, self-creation, creation by external\nagency. The self-existence of a potential universe is no more\nconceivable than we have found the self-existence of the actual universe\nto be. The self-creation of such a potential universe would involve over\nagain the difficulties here stated\u2014would imply behind this potential\nuniverse a more remote potentiality; and so on in an infinite series,\nleaving us at last no forwarder than at first. While to assign as the\nsource of this potential universe an external agency, would be to\nintroduce the notion of a potential universe for no purpose whatever.\n\nThere remains to be examined the commonly-received or theistic\nhypothesis\u2014creation by external agency. Alike in the rudest creeds and\nin the cosmogony long current among ourselves, it is assumed that the\ngenesis of the Heavens and the Earth is effected somewhat after the\nmanner in which a workman shapes a piece of furniture. And this\nassumption is made not by theologians only, but by the immense\nmajority of philosophers, past and present. Equally in the writings of\nPlato, and in those of not a few living men of science, we find it\ntaken for granted that there is an analogy between the process of\ncreation and the process of manufacture. Now in the first place,\nnot only is this conception one that cannot by any cumulative process\nof thought, or the fulfilment of predictions based on it, be shown to\nanswer to anything actual; and not only is it that in the absence of\nall evidence respecting the process of creation, we have no proof of\ncorrespondence even between this limited conception and some limited\nportion of the fact; but it is that the conception is not even\nconsistent with itself\u2014cannot be realized in thought, when all its\nassumptions are granted. Though it is true that the proceedings of a\nhuman artificer may vaguely symbolize to us a method after which the\nUniverse might be shaped, yet they do not help us to comprehend the\nreal mystery; namely, the origin of the material of which the Universe\nconsists. The artizan does not make the iron, wood, or stone, he uses;\nbut merely fashions and combines them. If we suppose suns, and\nplanets, and satellites, and all they contain to have been similarly\nformed by a \u201cGreat Artificer,\u201d we suppose merely that certain\npre-existing elements were thus put into their present arrangement.\nBut whence the pre-existing elements? The comparison helps us not in\nthe least to understand that; and unless it helps us to understand\nthat, it is worthless. The production of matter out of nothing is the\nreal mystery, which neither this simile nor any other enables us to\nconceive; and a simile which does not enable us to conceive this, may\njust as well be dispensed with. Still more manifest does the\ninsufficiency of this theory of creation become, when we turn from\nmaterial objects to that which contains them\u2014when instead of matter we\ncontemplate space. Did there exist nothing but an immeasurable void,\nexplanation would be needed as much as now. There would still arise\nthe question\u2014how came it so? If the theory of creation by external\nagency were an adequate one, it would supply an answer; and its answer\nwould be\u2014space was made in the same manner that matter was made. But\nthe impossibility of conceiving this is so manifest, that no one dares\nto assert it. For if space was created, it must have been previously\nnon-existent. The non-existence of space cannot, however, by any\nmental effort be imagined. It is one of the most familiar truths that\nthe idea of space as surrounding us on all sides, is not for a moment\nto be got rid of\u2014not only are we compelled to think of space as now\neverywhere present, but we are unable to conceive its absence either\nin the past or the future. And if the non-existence of space is\nabsolutely inconceivable, then, necessarily, its creation is\nabsolutely inconceivable. Lastly, even supposing that the\ngenesis of the Universe could really be represented in thought as the\nresult of an external agency, the mystery would be as great as ever;\nfor there would still arise the question\u2014how came there to be an\nexternal agency? To account for this only the same three hypotheses\nare possible\u2014self-existence, self-creation, and creation by external\nagency. Of these the last is useless: it commits us to an infinite\nseries of such agencies, and even then leaves us where we were. By the\nsecond we are practically involved in the same predicament; since, as\nalready shown, self-creation implies an infinite series of potential\nexistences. We are obliged therefore to fall back upon the first,\nwhich is the one commonly accepted and commonly supposed to be\nsatisfactory. Those who cannot conceive a self-existent universe; and\nwho therefore assume a creator as the source of the universe; take for\ngranted that they can conceive a self-existent creator. The mystery\nwhich they recognize in this great fact surrounding them on every\nside, they transfer to an alleged source of this great fact; and then\nsuppose that they have solved the mystery. But they delude themselves.\nAs was proved at the outset of the argument, self-existence is\nrigorously inconceivable; and this holds true whatever be the nature\nof the object of which it is predicated. Whoever agrees that the\natheistic hypothesis is untenable because it involves the impossible\nidea of self-existence, must perforce admit that the theistic\nhypothesis is untenable if it contains the same impossible idea.\n\nThus these three different suppositions respecting the origin of things,\nverbally intelligible though they are, and severally seeming to their\nrespective adherents quite rational, turn out, when critically examined,\nto be literally unthinkable. It is not a question of probability, or\ncredibility, but of conceivability. Experiment proves that the elements\nof these hypotheses cannot even be put together in consciousness; and we\ncan entertain them only as we entertain such pseud-ideas as a square\nfluid and a moral substance\u2014only by abstaining from the endeavour to\nrender them into actual thoughts. Or, reverting to our original mode of\nstatement, we may say that they severally involve symbolic conceptions\nof the illegitimate and illusive kind. Differing so widely as they seem\nto do, the atheistic, the pantheistic, and the theistic hypotheses\ncontain the same ultimate element. It is impossible to avoid making the\nassumption of self-existence somewhere; and whether that assumption be\nmade nakedly, or under complicated disguises, it is equally vicious,\nequally unthinkable. Be it a fragment of matter, or some fancied\npotential form of matter, or some more remote and still less imaginable\ncause, our conception of its self-existence can be formed only by\njoining with it the notion of unlimited duration through past time. And\nas unlimited duration is inconceivable, all those formal ideas into\nwhich it enters are inconceivable; and indeed, if such an expression is\nallowable, are the more inconceivable in proportion as the other\nelements of the ideas are indefinite. So that in fact, impossible as it\nis to think of the actual universe as self-existing, we do but multiply\nimpossibilities of thought by every attempt we make to explain its\nexistence.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 12. If from the origin of the Universe we turn to its nature, the like\ninsurmountable difficulties rise up before us on all sides\u2014or rather,\nthe same difficulties under new aspects. We find ourselves on the one\nhand obliged to make certain assumptions; and yet on the other hand we\nfind these assumptions cannot be represented in thought.\n\nWhen we inquire what is the meaning of the various effects produced upon\nour senses\u2014when we ask how there come to be in our consciousness\nimpressions of sounds, of colours, of tastes, and of those various\nattributes which we ascribe to bodies; we are compelled to regard them\nas the effects of some cause. We may stop short in the belief that this\ncause is what we call matter. Or we may conclude, as some do, that\nmatter is only a certain mode of manifestation of spirit; which is\ntherefore the true cause. Or, regarding matter and spirit as proximate\nagencies, we may attribute all the changes wrought in our consciousness\nto immediate divine power. But be the cause we assign what it may, we\nare obliged to suppose _some_ cause. And we are not only obliged to\nsuppose some cause, but also a first cause. The matter, or spirit, or\nwhatever we assume to be the agent producing on us these various\nimpressions, must either be the first cause of them or not. If it is the\nfirst cause, the conclusion is reached. If it is not the first cause,\nthen by implication there must be a cause behind it; which thus becomes\nthe real cause of the effect. Manifestly, however complicated the\nassumptions, the same conclusion must inevitably be reached. We cannot\nthink at all about the impressions which the external world produces on\nus, without thinking of them as caused; and we cannot carry out an\ninquiry concerning their causation, without inevitably committing\nourselves to the hypothesis of a First Cause.\n\nBut now if we go a step further, and ask what is the nature of this\nFirst Cause, we are driven by an inexorable logic to certain further\nconclusions. Is the First Cause finite or infinite? If we say finite we\ninvolve ourselves in a dilemma. To think of the First Cause as finite,\nis to think of it as limited. To think of it as limited, necessarily\nimplies a conception of something beyond its limits: it is absolutely\nimpossible to conceive a thing as bounded without conceiving a region\nsurrounding its boundaries. What now must we say of this region? If the\nFirst Cause is limited, and there consequently lies something outside of\nit, this something must have no First Cause\u2014must be uncaused. But if we\nadmit that there can be something uncaused, there is no reason to assume\na cause for anything. If beyond that finite region over which the First\nCause extends, there lies a region, which we are compelled to regard as\ninfinite, over which it does not extend\u2014if we admit that there is an\ninfinite uncaused surrounding the finite caused; we tacitly abandon the\nhypothesis of causation altogether. Thus it is impossible to consider\nthe First Cause as finite. And if it cannot be finite it must be\ninfinite.\n\nAnother inference concerning the First Cause is equally unavoidable. It\nmust be independent. If it is dependent it cannot be the First Cause;\nfor that must be the First Cause on which it depends. It is not enough\nto say that it is partially independent; since this implies some\nnecessity which determines its partial dependence, and this necessity,\nbe it what it may, must be a higher cause, or the true First Cause,\nwhich is a contradiction. But to think of the First Cause as totally\nindependent, is to think of it as that which exists in the absence of\nall other existence; seeing that if the presence of any other existence\nis necessary, it must be partially dependent on that other existence,\nand so cannot be the First Cause. Not only however must the First Cause\nbe a form of being which has no necessary relation to any other form of\nbeing, but it can have no necessary relation within itself. There can be\nnothing in it which determines change, and yet nothing which prevents\nchange. For if it contains something which imposes such necessities or\nrestraints, this something must be a cause higher than the First Cause,\nwhich is absurd. Thus the First Cause must be in every sense perfect,\ncomplete, total: including within itself all power, and transcending all\nlaw. Or to use the established word, it must be absolute.\n\nHere then respecting the nature of the Universe, we seem committed to\ncertain unavoidable conclusions. The objects and actions surrounding us,\nnot less than the phenomena of our own consciousness, compel us to ask a\ncause; in our search for a cause, we discover no resting place until we\narrive at the hypothesis of a First Cause; and we have no alternative\nbut to regard this First Cause as Infinite and Absolute. These are\ninferences forced upon us by arguments from which there appears no\nescape. It is hardly needful however to show those who have followed\nthus far, how illusive are these reasonings and their results. But that\nit would tax the reader\u2019s patience to no purpose, it might easily be\nproved that the materials of which the argument is built, equally with\nthe conclusions based on them, are merely symbolic conceptions of the\nillegitimate order. Instead, however, of repeating the disproof used\nabove, it will be desirable to pursue another method; showing the\nfallacy of these conclusions by disclosing their mutual contradictions.\n\nHere I cannot do better than avail myself of the demonstration which Mr\nMansel, carrying out in detail the doctrine of Sir William Hamilton, has\ngiven in his \u201cLimits of Religious Thought.\u201d And I gladly do this, not\nonly because his mode of presentation cannot be improved, but also\nbecause, writing as he does in defence of the current Theology, his\nreasonings will be the more acceptable to the majority of readers.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 13. Having given preliminary definitions of the First Cause, of the\nInfinite, and of the Absolute, Mr Mansel says:\u2014\n\n\u201cBut these three conceptions, the Cause, the Absolute, the Infinite, all\nequally indispensable, do they not imply contradiction to each other,\nwhen viewed in conjunction, as attributes of one and the same Being? A\nCause cannot, as such, be absolute: the Absolute cannot, as such, be a\ncause. The cause, as such, exists only in relation to its effect: the\ncause is a cause of the effect; the effect is an effect of the cause. On\nthe other hand, the conception of the Absolute implies a possible\nexistence out of all relation. We attempt to escape from this apparent\ncontradiction, by introducing the idea of succession in time. The\nAbsolute exists first by itself, and afterwards becomes a Cause. But\nhere we are checked by the third conception, that of the Infinite. How\ncan the Infinite become that which it was not from the first? If\nCausation is a possible mode of existence, that which exists without\ncausing is not infinite; that which becomes a cause has passed beyond\nits former limits.\u201d * * *\n\n\u201cSupposing the Absolute to become a cause, it will follow that it\noperates by means of freewill and consciousness. For a necessary cause\ncannot be conceived as absolute and infinite. If necessitated by\nsomething beyond itself, it is thereby limited by a superior power; and\nif necessitated by itself, it has in its own nature a necessary relation\nto its effect. The act of causation must therefore be voluntary; and\nvolition is only possible in a conscious being. But consciousness again\nis only conceivable as a relation. There must be a conscious subject,\nand an object of which he is conscious. The subject is a subject to the\nobject; the object is an object to the subject; and neither can exist by\nitself as the absolute. This difficulty, again, may be for the moment\nevaded, by distinguishing between the absolute as related to another and\nthe absolute as related to itself. The Absolute, it may be said, may\npossibly be conscious, provided it is only conscious of itself. But this\nalternative is, in ultimate analysis, no less self-destructive than the\nother. For the object of consciousness, whether a mode of the subject\u2019s\nexistence or not, is either created in and by the act of consciousness,\nor has an existence independent of it. In the former case, the object\ndepends upon the subject, and the subject alone is the true absolute. In\nthe latter case, the subject depends upon the object, and the object\nalone is the true absolute. Or if we attempt a third hypothesis, and\nmaintain that each exists independently of the other, we have no\nabsolute at all, but only a pair of relatives; for coexistence, whether\nin consciousness or not, is itself a relation.\u201d\n\n\u201cThe corollary from this reasoning is obvious. Not only is the Absolute,\nas conceived, incapable of a necessary relation to anything else; but it\nis also incapable of containing, by the constitution of its own nature,\nan essential relation within itself; as a whole, for instance, composed\nof parts, or as a substance consisting of attributes, or as a conscious\nsubject in antithesis to an object. For if there is in the absolute any\nprinciple of unity, distinct from the mere accumulation of parts or\nattributes, this principle alone is the true absolute. If, on the other\nhand, there is no such principle, then there is no absolute at all, but\nonly a plurality of relatives. The almost unanimous voice of philosophy,\nin pronouncing that the absolute is both one and simple, must be\naccepted as the voice of reason also, so far as reason has any voice in\nthe matter. But this absolute unity, as indifferent and containing no\nattributes, can neither be distinguished from the multiplicity of finite\nbeings by any characteristic feature, nor be identified with them in\ntheir multiplicity. Thus we are landed in an inextricable dilemma. The\nAbsolute cannot be conceived as conscious, neither can it be conceived\nas unconscious: it cannot be conceived as complex, neither can it be\nconceived as simple: it cannot be conceived by difference, neither can\nit be conceived by the absence of difference: it cannot be identified\nwith the universe, neither can it be distinguished from it. The One and\nthe Many, regarded as the beginning of existence, are thus alike\nincomprehensible.\u201d\n\n\u201cThe fundamental conceptions of Rational Theology being thus\nself-destructive, we may naturally expect to find the same antagonism\nmanifested in their special applications. * * * How, for example, can\nInfinite Power be able to do all things, and yet Infinite Goodness be\nunable to do evil? How can Infinite Justice exact the utmost penalty for\nevery sin, and yet Infinite Mercy pardon the sinner? How can Infinite\nWisdom know all that is to come, and yet Infinite Freedom be at liberty\nto do or to forbear? How is the existence of Evil compatible with that\nof an infinitely perfect Being; for if he wills it, he is not infinitely\ngood; and if he wills it not, his will is thwarted and his sphere of\naction limited?\u201d * * *\n\n\u201cLet us, however, suppose for an instant that these difficulties are\nsurmounted, and the existence of the Absolute securely established on\nthe testimony of reason. Still we have not succeeded in reconciling this\nidea with that of a Cause: we have done nothing towards explaining how\nthe absolute can give rise to the relative, the infinite to the finite.\nIf the condition of casual activity is a higher state than that of\nquiescence, the Absolute, whether acting voluntarily or involuntarily,\nhas passed from a condition of comparative imperfection to one of\ncomparative perfection; and therefore was not originally perfect. If the\nstate of activity is an inferior state to that of quiescence, the\nAbsolute, in becoming a cause, has lost its original perfection. There\nremains only the supposition that the two states are equal, and the act\nof creation one of complete indifference. But this supposition\nannihilates the unity of the absolute, or it annihilates itself. If the\nact of creation is real, and yet indifferent, we must admit the\npossibility of two conceptions of the absolute, the one as productive,\nthe other as non-productive. If the act is not real, the supposition\nitself vanishes.\u201d * * *\n\n\u201cAgain, how can the relative be conceived as coming into being? If it is\na distinct reality from the absolute, it must be conceived as passing\nfrom non-existence into existence. But to conceive an object as\nnon-existent, is again a self-contradiction; for that which is conceived\nexists, as an object of thought, in and by that conception. We may\nabstain from thinking of an object at all; but, if we think of it, we\ncannot but think of it as existing. It is possible at one time not to\nthink of an object at all, and at another to think of it as already in\nbeing; but to think of it in the act of becoming, in the progress from\nnot being into being, is to think that which, in the very thought,\nannihilates itself.\u201d * * *\n\n\u201cTo sum up briefly this portion of my argument. The conception of the\nAbsolute and Infinite, from whatever side we view it, appears\nencompassed with contradictions. There is a contradiction in supposing\nsuch an object to exist, whether alone or in conjunction with others;\nand there is a contradiction in supposing it not to exist. There is a\ncontradiction in conceiving it as one; and there is a contradiction in\nconceiving it as many. There is a contradiction in conceiving it as\npersonal; and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as impersonal.\nIt cannot, without contradiction, be represented as active; nor, without\nequal contradiction, be represented as inactive. It cannot be conceived\nas the sum of all existence; nor yet can it be conceived as a part only\nof that sum.\u201d\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 14. And now what is the bearing of these results on the question\nbefore us? Our examination of Ultimate Religious Ideas has been carried\non with the view of making manifest some fundamental verity contained in\nthem. Thus far however we have arrived at negative conclusions only.\nCriticising the essential conceptions involved in the different orders\nof beliefs, we find no one of them to be logically defensible. Passing\nover the consideration of credibility, and confining ourselves to that\nof conceivability, we see that Atheism, Pantheism, and Theism, when\nrigorously analysed, severally prove to be absolutely unthinkable.\nInstead of disclosing a fundamental verity existing in each, our\ninvestigation seems rather to have shown that there is no fundamental\nverity contained in any. To carry away this conclusion, however, would\nbe a fatal error; as we shall shortly see.\n\nLeaving out the accompanying moral code, which is in all cases a\nsupplementary growth, every Religion may be defined as an _\u00e0 priori_\ntheory of the Universe. The surrounding facts being given, some form of\nagency is alleged which, in the opinion of those alleging it, accounts\nfor these facts. Be it in the rudest Fetishism, which assumes a separate\npersonality behind every phenomenon; be it in Polytheism, in which these\npersonalities are partially generalized; be it in Monotheism, in which\nthey are wholly generalized; or be it in Pantheism, in which the\ngeneralized personality becomes one with the phenomena; we equally find\nan hypothesis which is supposed to render the Universe comprehensible.\nNay, even that which is commonly regarded as the negation of all\nReligion\u2014even positive Atheism, comes within the definition; for it,\ntoo, in asserting the self-existence of Space, Matter, and Motion, which\nit regards as adequate causes of every appearance, propounds an _\u00e0\npriori_ theory from which it holds the facts to be deducible. Now every\ntheory tacitly asserts two things: firstly, that there is something to\nbe explained; secondly, that such and such is the explanation. Hence,\nhowever widely different speculators may disagree in the solutions they\ngive of the same problem; yet by implication they agree that there is a\nproblem to be solved. Here then is an element which all creeds have in\ncommon. Religions diametrically opposed in their overt dogmas, are yet\nperfectly at one in the tacit conviction that the existence of the world\nwith all it contains and all which surrounds it, is a mystery ever\npressing for interpretation. On this point, if on no other, there is\nentire unanimity.\n\nThus we come within sight of that which we seek. In the last chapter,\nreasons were given for inferring that human beliefs in general, and\nespecially the perennial ones, contain, under whatever disguises of\nerror, some soul of truth; and here we have arrived at a truth\nunderlying even the grossest superstitions. We saw further that this\nsoul of truth was most likely to be some constituent common to\nconflicting opinions of the same order; and here we have a constituent\nwhich may be claimed alike by all religions. It was pointed out that\nthis soul of truth would almost certainly be more abstract than any of\nthe beliefs involving it; and the truth we have arrived at is one\nexceeding in abstractness the most abstract religious doctrines. In\nevery respect, therefore, our conclusion answers to the requirements. It\nhas all the characteristics which we inferred must belong to that\nfundamental verity expressed by religions in general.\n\nThat this is the vital element in all religions is further proved by the\nfact, that it is the element which not only survives every change, but\ngrows more distinct the more highly the religion is developed.\nAboriginal creeds, though pervaded by the idea of personal agencies\nwhich are usually unseen, yet conceive these agencies under perfectly\nconcrete and ordinary forms\u2014class them with the visible agencies of men\nand animals; and so hide a vague perception of mystery in disguises as\nunmysterious as possible. The Polytheistic conceptions in their advanced\nphases, represent the presiding personalities in greatly idealized\nshapes, existing in a remote region, working in subtle ways, and\ncommunicating with men by omens or through inspired persons; that is,\nthe ultimate causes of things are regarded as less familiar and\ncomprehensible. The growth of a Monotheistic faith, accompanied as it is\nby a denial of those beliefs in which the divine nature is assimilated\nto the human in all its lower propensities, shows us a further step in\nthe same direction; and however imperfectly this higher faith is at\nfirst realized, we yet see in altars \u201cto the unknown and unknowable\nGod,\u201d and in the worship of a God that cannot by any searching be found\nout, that there is a clearer recognition of the inscrutableness of\ncreation. Further developments of theology, ending in such assertions as\nthat \u201ca God understood would be no God at all,\u201d and \u201cto think that God\nis, as we can think him to be, is blasphemy,\u201d exhibit this recognition\nstill more distinctly; and it pervades all the cultivated theology of\nthe present day. Thus while other constituents of religious creeds one\nby one drop away, this remains and grows even more manifest; and so is\nshown to be the essential constituent.\n\nNor does the evidence end here. Not only is the omnipresence of\nsomething which passes comprehension, that most abstract belief which is\ncommon to all religions, which becomes the more distinct in proportion\nas they develope, and which remains after their discordant elements have\nbeen mutually cancelled; but it is that belief which the most unsparing\ncriticism of each leaves unquestionable\u2014or rather makes ever clearer. It\nhas nothing to fear from the most inexorable logic; but on the contrary\nis a belief which the most inexorable logic shows to be more profoundly\ntrue than any religion supposes. For every religion, setting out though\nit does with the tacit assertion of a mystery, forthwith proceeds to\ngive some solution of this mystery; and so asserts that it is not a\nmystery passing human comprehension. But an examination of the solutions\nthey severally propound, shows them to be uniformly invalid. The\nanalysis of every possible hypothesis proves, not simply that no\nhypothesis is sufficient, but that no hypothesis is even thinkable. And\nthus the mystery which all religions recognize, turns out to be a far\nmore transcendent mystery than any of them suspect\u2014not a relative, but\nan absolute mystery.\n\nHere, then, is an ultimate religious truth of the highest possible\ncertainty\u2014a truth in which religions in general are at one with each\nother, and with a philosophy antagonistic to their special dogmas. And\nthis truth, respecting which there is a latent agreement among all\nmankind from the fetish-worshipper to the most stoical critic of human\ncreeds, must be the one we seek. If Religion and Science are to be\nreconciled, the basis of reconciliation must be this deepest, widest,\nand most certain of all facts\u2014that the Power which the Universe\nmanifests to us is utterly inscrutable.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 6:\n\n Those who may have before met with this term, will perceive that it is\n here used in quite a different sense.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER III.\n ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS.\n\n\n\u00a7 15. What are Space and Time? Two hypotheses are current respecting\nthem: the one that they are objective, and the other that they are\nsubjective\u2014the one that they are external to, and independent of,\nourselves, the other that they are internal, and appertain to our own\nconsciousness. Let us see what becomes of these hypotheses under\nanalysis.\n\nTo say that Space and Time exist objectively, is to say that they are\nentities. The assertion that they are non-entities is self-destructive:\nnon-entities are non-existences; and to allege that non-existences exist\nobjectively, is a contradiction in terms. Moreover, to deny that Space\nand Time are things, and so by implication to call them nothings,\ninvolves the absurdity that there are two kinds of nothing. Neither can\nthey be regarded as attributes of some entity; seeing, not only that it\nis impossible really to conceive any entity of which they are\nattributes, but seeing further that we cannot think of them as\ndisappearing, even if everything else disappeared; whereas attributes\nnecessarily disappear along with the entities they belong to. Thus as\nSpace and Time cannot be either non-entities, nor the attributes of\nentities, we have no choice but consider them as entities. But\nwhile, on the hypothesis of their objectivity, Space and Time must be\nclassed as things, we find, on experiment, that to represent them in\nthought as things is impossible. To be conceived at all, a thing must be\nconceived as having attributes. We can distinguish something from\nnothing, only by the power which the something has to act on our\nconsciousness; the several affections it produces on our consciousness\n(or else the hypothetical causes of them), we attribute to it, and call\nits attributes; and the absence of these attributes is the absence of\nthe terms in which the something is conceived, and involves the absence\nof a conception. What now are the attributes of Space? The only one\nwhich it is possible for a moment to think of as belonging to it, is\nthat of extension; and to credit it with this implies a confusion of\nthought. For extension and Space are convertible terms: by extension, as\nwe ascribe it to surrounding objects, we mean occupancy of Space; and\nthus to say that Space is extended, is to say that Space occupies Space.\nHow we are similarly unable to assign any attribute to Time, scarcely\nneeds pointing out. Nor are Time and Space unthinkable as entities\nonly from the absence of attributes; there is another peculiarity,\nfamiliar to readers of metaphysics, which equally excludes them from the\ncategory. All entities which we actually know as such, are limited; and\neven if we suppose ourselves either to know or to be able to conceive\nsome unlimited entity, we of necessity in so classing it positively\nseparate it from the class of limited entities. But of Space and Time we\ncannot assert either limitation or the absence of limitation. We find\nourselves totally unable to form any mental image of unbounded Space;\nand yet totally unable to imagine bounds beyond which there is no Space.\nSimilarly at the other extreme: it is impossible to think of a limit to\nthe divisibility of Space; yet equally impossible to think of its\ninfinite divisibility. And, without stating them, it will be seen that\nwe labour under like impotencies in respect to Time. Thus we\ncannot conceive Space and Time as entities, and are equally disabled\nfrom conceiving them as either the attributes of entities or as\nnon-entities. We are compelled to think of them as existing; and yet\ncannot bring them within those conditions under which existences are\nrepresented in thought.\n\nShall we then take refuge in the Kantian doctrine? shall we say that\nSpace and Time are forms of the intellect,\u2014\u201c_\u00e0 priori_ laws or\nconditions of the conscious mind\u201d? To do this is to escape from great\ndifficulties by rushing into greater. The proposition with which Kant\u2019s\nphilosophy sets out, verbally intelligible though it is, cannot by any\neffort be rendered into thought\u2014cannot be interpreted into an idea\nproperly so called, but stands merely for a pseud-idea. In the\nfirst place, to assert that Space and Time, as we are conscious of them,\nare subjective conditions, is by implication to assert that they are not\nobjective realities: if the Space and Time present to our minds belong\nto the _ego_, then of necessity they do not belong to the _non-ego_. Now\nit is absolutely impossible to think this. The very fact on which Kant\nbases his hypothesis\u2014namely that our consciousness of Space and Time\ncannot be suppressed\u2014testifies as much; for that consciousness of Space\nand Time which we cannot rid ourselves of, is the consciousness of them\nas existing objectively. It is useless to reply that such an inability\nmust inevitably result if they are subjective forms. The question here\nis\u2014What does consciousness directly testify? And the direct testimony of\nconsciousness is, that Time and Space are not within but without the\nmind; and so absolutely independent of it that they cannot be conceived\nto become non-existent even were the mind to become non-existent.\n Besides being positively unthinkable in what it tacitly denies,\nthe theory of Kant is equally unthinkable in what it openly affirms. It\nis not simply that we cannot combine the thought of Space with the\nthought of our own personality, and contemplate the one as a property of\nthe other\u2014though our inability to do this would prove the\ninconceivableness of the hypothesis\u2014but it is that the hypothesis\ncarries in itself the proof of its own inconceivableness. For if Space\nand Time are forms of thought, they can never be thought of; since it is\nimpossible for anything to be at once the _form_ of thought and the\n_matter_ of thought. That Space and Time are objects of consciousness,\nKant emphatically asserts by saying that it is impossible to suppress\nthe consciousness of them. How then, if they are _objects_ of\nconsciousness, can they at the same time be _conditions_ of\nconsciousness? If Space and Time are the conditions under which we\nthink, then when we think of Space and Time themselves, our thoughts\nmust be unconditioned; and if there can thus be unconditioned thoughts,\nwhat becomes of the theory?\n\nIt results therefore that Space and Time are wholly incomprehensible.\nThe immediate knowledge which we seem to have of them, proves, when\nexamined, to be total ignorance. While our belief in their objective\nreality is insurmountable, we are unable to give any rational account of\nit. And to posit the alternative belief (possible to state but\nimpossible to realize) is merely to multiply irrationalities.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 16. Were it not for the necessities of the argument, it would be\ninexcusable to occupy the reader\u2019s attention with the threadbare, and\nyet unended, controversy respecting the divisibility of matter. Matter\nis either infinitely divisible or it is not: no third possibility can be\nnamed. Which of the alternatives shall we accept? If we say that Matter\nis infinitely divisible, we commit ourselves to a supposition not\nrealizable in thought. We can bisect and re-bisect a body, and\ncontinually repeating the act until we reduce its parts to a size no\nlonger physically divisible, may then mentally continue the process\nwithout limit. To do this, however, is not really to conceive the\ninfinite divisibility of matter, but to form a symbolic conception\nincapable of expansion into a real one, and not admitting of other\nverification. Really to conceive the infinite divisibility of matter, is\nmentally to follow out the divisions to infinity; and to do this would\nrequire infinite time. On the other hand, to assert that matter is not\ninfinitely divisible, is to assert that it is reducible to parts which\nno conceivable power can divide; and this verbal supposition can no more\nbe represented in thought than the other. For each of such ultimate\nparts, did they exist, must have an under and an upper surface, a right\nand a left side, like any larger fragment. Now it is impossible to\nimagine its sides so near that no plane of section can be conceived\nbetween them; and however great be the assumed force of cohesion, it is\nimpossible to shut out the idea of a greater force capable of overcoming\nit. So that to human intelligence the one hypothesis is no more\nacceptable than the other; and yet the conclusion that one or other must\nagree with the fact, seems to human intelligence unavoidable.\n\nAgain, leaving this insoluble question, let us ask whether substance\nhas, in reality, anything like that extended solidity which it presents\nto our consciousness. The portion of space occupied by a piece of metal,\nseems to eyes and fingers perfectly filled: we perceive a homogeneous,\nresisting mass, without any breach of continuity. Shall we then say that\nMatter is as actually solid as it appears? Shall we say that whether it\nconsists of an infinitely divisible element or of ultimate units\nincapable of further division, its parts are everywhere in actual\ncontact? To assert as much entangles us in insuperable difficulties.\nWere Matter thus absolutely solid, it would be, what it is\nnot\u2014absolutely incompressible; since compressibility, implying the\nnearer approach of constituent parts, is not thinkable unless there is\nunoccupied space between the parts. Nor is this all. It is an\nestablished mechanical truth, that if a body, moving at a given\nvelocity, strikes an equal body at rest in such wise that the two move\non together, their joint velocity will be but half that of the striking\nbody. Now it is a law of which the negation is inconceivable, that in\npassing from any one degree of magnitude to any other, all intermediate\ndegrees must be passed through. Or, in the case before us, a body moving\nat velocity 4, cannot, by collision, be reduced to velocity 2, without\npassing through all velocities between 4 and 2. But were Matter truly\nsolid\u2014were its units absolutely incompressible and in absolute\ncontact\u2014this \u201claw of continuity,\u201d as it is called, would be broken in\nevery case of collision. For when, of two such units, one moving at\nvelocity 4 strikes another at rest, the striking unit must have its\nvelocity 4 instantaneously reduced to velocity 2; must pass from\nvelocity 4 to velocity 2 without any lapse of time, and without passing\nthrough intermediate velocities; must be moving with velocities 4 and 2\nat the same instant, which is impossible.\n\nThe supposition that Matter is absolutely solid being untenable, there\npresents itself the Newtonian supposition, that it consists of solid\natoms not in contact but acting on each other by attractive and\nrepulsive forces, varying with the distances. To assume this, however,\nmerely shifts the difficulty: the problem is simply transferred from the\naggregated masses of matter to these hypothetical atoms. For granting\nthat Matter, as we perceive it, is made up of such dense extended units\nsurrounded by atmospheres of force, the question still arises\u2014What is\nthe constitution of these units? We have no alternative but to regard\neach of them as a small piece of matter. Looked at through a mental\nmicroscope, each becomes a mass of substance such as we have just been\ncontemplating. Exactly the same inquiries may be made respecting the\nparts of which each atom consists; while exactly the same difficulties\nstand in the way of every answer. And manifestly, even were the\nhypothetical atom assumed to consist of still minuter ones, the\ndifficulty would re-appear at the next step; nor could it be got rid of\neven by an infinite series of such assumptions.\n\nBoscovich\u2019s conception yet remains to us. Seeing that Matter could not,\nas Leibnitz suggested, be composed of unextended monads (since the\njuxtaposition of an infinity of points having no extension, could not\nproduce that extension which matter possesses); and perceiving\nobjections to the view entertained by Newton; Boscovich proposed an\nintermediate theory, uniting, as he considered, the advantages of both\nand avoiding their difficulties. His theory is, that the constituents of\nMatter are centres of force\u2014points without dimensions, which attract and\nrepel each other in suchwise as to be kept at specific distances apart.\nAnd he argues, mathematically, that the forces possessed by such centres\nmight so vary with the distances, that under given conditions the\ncentres would remain in stable equilibrium with definite interspaces;\nand yet, under other conditions, would maintain larger or smaller\ninterspaces. This speculation however, ingeniously as it is elaborated,\nand eluding though it does various difficulties, posits a proposition\nwhich cannot by any effort be represented in thought: it escapes all the\ninconceivabilities above indicated, by merging them in the one\ninconceivability with which it sets out. A centre of force absolutely\nwithout extension is unthinkable: answering to these words we can form\nnothing more than a symbolic conception of the illegitimate order. The\nidea of resistance cannot be separated in thought from the idea of an\nextended body which offers resistance. To suppose that central forces\ncan reside in points not infinitesimally small but occupying no space\nwhatever\u2014points having position only, with nothing to mark their\nposition\u2014points in no respect distinguishable from the surrounding\npoints that are not centres of force;\u2014to suppose this, is utterly beyond\nhuman power.\n\nHere it may possibly be said, that though all hypotheses respecting the\nconstitution of Matter commit us to inconceivable conclusions when\nlogically developed, yet we have reason to think that one of them\ncorresponds with the fact. Though the conception of Matter as consisting\nof dense indivisible units, is symbolic and incapable of being\ncompletely thought out, it may yet be supposed to find indirect\nverification in the truths of chemistry. These, it is argued,\nnecessitate the belief that Matter consists of particles of specific\nweights, and therefore of specific sizes. The general law of definite\nproportions seems impossible on any other condition than the existence\nof ultimate atoms; and though the combining weights of the respective\nelements are termed by chemists their \u201cequivalents,\u201d for the purpose of\navoiding a questionable assumption, we are unable to think of the\ncombination of such definite weights, without supposing it to take place\nbetween definite numbers of definite particles. And thus it would appear\nthat the Newtonian view is at any rate preferable to that of Boscovich.\n A disciple of Boscovich, however, may reply that his master\u2019s\ntheory is involved in that of Newton; and cannot indeed be escaped.\n\u201cWhat,\u201d he may ask, \u201cis it that holds together the parts of these\nultimate atoms?\u201d. \u201cA cohesive force,\u201d his opponent must answer. \u201cAnd\nwhat,\u201d he may continue, \u201cis it that holds together the parts of any\nfragments into which, by sufficient force, an ultimate atom might be\nbroken?\u201d Again the answer must be\u2014a cohesive force. \u201cAnd what,\u201d he may\nstill ask, \u201cif the ultimate atom were, as we can imagine it to be,\nreduced to parts as small in proportion to it, as it is in proportion to\na tangible mass of matter\u2014what must give each part the ability to\nsustain itself, and to occupy space?\u201d Still there is no answer but\u2014a\ncohesive force. Carry the process in thought as far as we may, until the\nextension of the parts is less than can be imagined, we still cannot\nescape the admission of forces by which the extension is upheld; and we\ncan find no limit until we arrive at the conception of centres of force\nwithout any extension.\n\nMatter then, in its ultimate nature, is as absolutely incomprehensible\nas Space and Time. Frame what suppositions we may, we find on tracing\nout their implications that they leave us nothing but a choice between\nopposite absurdities.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 17. A body impelled by the hand is clearly perceived to move, and to\nmove in a definite direction: there seems at first sight no possibility\nof doubting that its motion is real, or that it is towards a given\npoint. Yet it is easy to show that we not only may be, but usually are,\nquite wrong in both these judgments. Here, for instance, is a ship\nwhich, for simplicity\u2019s sake, we will suppose to be anchored at the\nequator with her head to the West. When the captain walks from stem to\nstern, in what direction does he move? East is the obvious answer\u2014an\nanswer which for the moment may pass without criticism. But now the\nanchor is heaved, and the vessel sails to the West with a velocity equal\nto that at which the captain walks. In what direction does he now move\nwhen he goes from stem to stern? You cannot say East, for the vessel is\ncarrying him as fast towards the West as he walks to the East; and you\ncannot say West for the converse reason. In respect to surrounding space\nhe is stationary; though to all on board the ship he seems to be moving.\nBut now are we quite sure of this conclusion?\u2014Is he really stationary?\nWhen we take into account the Earth\u2019s motion round its axis, we find\nthat instead of being stationary he is travelling at the rate of 1000\nmiles per hour to the East; so that neither the perception of one who\nlooks at him, nor the inference of one who allows for the ship\u2019s motion,\nis anything like the truth. Nor indeed, on further consideration, shall\nwe find this revised conclusion to be much better. For we have forgotten\nto allow for the Earth\u2019s motion in its orbit. This being some 68,000\nmiles per hour, it follows that, assuming the time to be midday, he is\nmoving, not at the rate of 1000 miles per hour to the East, but at the\nrate of 67,000 miles per hour to the West. Nay, not even now have we\ndiscovered the true rate and the true direction of his movement. With\nthe Earth\u2019s progress in its orbit, we have to join that of the whole\nSolar system towards the constellation Hercules; and when we do this, we\nperceive that he is moving neither East nor West, but in a line inclined\nto the plane of the Ecliptic, and at a velocity greater or less\n(according to the time of the year) than that above named. To which let\nus add, that were the dynamic arrangements of our sidereal system fully\nknown to us, we should probably discover the direction and rate of his\nactual movement to differ considerably even from these. How\nillusive are our ideas of Motion, is thus made sufficiently manifest.\nThat which seems moving proves to be stationary; that which seems\nstationary proves to be moving; while that which we conclude to be going\nrapidly in one direction, turns out to be going much more rapidly in the\nopposite direction. And so we are taught that what we are conscious of\nis not the real motion of any object, either in its rate or direction;\nbut merely its motion as measured from an assigned position\u2014either the\nposition we ourselves occupy or some other. Yet in this very process of\nconcluding that the motions we perceive are not the real motions, we\ntacitly assume that there are real motions. In revising our successive\njudgments concerning a body\u2019s course or velocity, we take for granted\nthat there is an actual course and an actual velocity\u2014we take for\ngranted that there are fixed points in space with respect to which all\nmotions are absolute; and we find it impossible to rid ourselves of this\nidea. Nevertheless, absolute motion cannot even be imagined, much less\nknown. Motion as taking place apart from those limitations of space\nwhich we habitually associate with it, is totally unthinkable. For\nmotion is change of place; but in unlimited space, change of place is\ninconceivable, because place itself is inconceivable. Place can be\nconceived only by reference to other places; and in the absence of\nobjects dispersed through space, a place could be conceived only in\nrelation to the limits of space; whence it follows that in unlimited\nspace, place cannot be conceived\u2014all places must be equidistant from\nboundaries that do not exist. Thus while we are obliged to think that\nthere is an absolute motion, we find absolute motion incomprehensible.\n\nAnother insuperable difficulty presents itself when we contemplate the\ntransfer of Motion. Habit blinds us to the marvelousness of this\nphenomenon. Familiar with the fact from childhood, we see nothing\nremarkable in the ability of a moving thing to generate movement in a\nthing that is stationary. It is, however, impossible to understand it.\nIn what respect does a body after impact differ from itself before\nimpact? What is this added to it which does not sensibly affect any of\nits properties and yet enables it to traverse space? Here is an object\nat rest and here is the same object moving. In the one state it has no\ntendency to change its place; but in the other it is obliged at each\ninstant to assume a new position. What is it which will for ever go on\nproducing this effect without being exhausted? and how does it dwell in\nthe object? The motion you say has been communicated. But how?\u2014What has\nbeen communicated? The striking body has not transferred a _thing_ to\nthe body struck; and it is equally out of the question to say that it\nhas transferred an _attribute_. What then has it transferred?\n\nOnce more there is the old puzzle concerning the connexion between\nMotion and Rest. We daily witness the gradual retardation and final\nstoppage of things projected from the hand or otherwise impelled; and we\nequally often witness the change from Rest to Motion produced by the\napplication of force. But truly to represent these transitions in\nthought, we find impossible. For a breach of the law of continuity seems\nnecessarily involved; and yet no breach of it is conceivable. A body\ntravelling at a given velocity cannot be brought to a state of rest, or\nno velocity, without passing through all intermediate velocities. At\nfirst sight nothing seems easier than to imagine it doing this. It is\nquite possible to think of its motion as diminishing insensibly until it\nbecomes infinitesimal; and many will think equally possible to pass in\nthought from infinitesimal motion to no motion. But this is an error.\nMentally follow out the decreasing velocity as long as you please, and\nthere still remains _some_ velocity. Halve and again halve the rate of\nmovement for ever, yet movement still exists; and the smallest movement\nis separated by an impassable gap from no movement. As something,\nhowever minute, is infinitely great in comparison with nothing; so is\neven the least conceivable motion, infinite as compared with rest.\n The converse perplexities attendant on the transition from Rest to\nMotion, need not be specified. These, equally with the foregoing, show\nus that though we are obliged to think of such changes as actually\noccurring, their occurrence cannot be realized.\n\nThus neither when considered in connexion with Space, nor when\nconsidered in connexion with Matter, nor when considered in connexion\nwith Rest, do we find that Motion is truly cognizable. All efforts to\nunderstand its essential nature do but bring us to alternative\nimpossibilities of thought.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 18. On lifting a chair, the force exerted we regard as equal to that\nantagonistic force called the weight of the chair; and we cannot think\nof these as equal without thinking of them as like in kind; since\nequality is conceivable only between things that are connatural. The\naxiom that action and reaction are equal and in opposite directions,\ncommonly exemplified by this very instance of muscular effort _versus_\nweight, cannot be mentally realized on any other condition. Yet,\ncontrariwise, it is incredible that the force as existing in the chair\nreally resembles the force as present to our minds. It scarcely needs to\npoint out that the weight of the chair produces in us various feelings\naccording as we support it by a single finger, or the whole hand, or the\nleg; and hence to argue that as it cannot be like all these sensations\nthere is no reason to believe it like any. It suffices to remark that\nsince the force as known to us is an affection of consciousness, we\ncannot conceive the force existing in the chair under the same form\nwithout endowing the chair with consciousness. So that it is absurd to\nthink of Force as in itself like our sensation of it, and yet necessary\nso to think of it if we realize it in consciousness at all.\n\nHow, again, can we understand the connexion between Force and Matter?\nMatter is known to us only through its manifestations of Force: our\nultimate test of Matter is the ability to resist: abstract its\nresistance and there remains nothing but empty extension. Yet, on the\nother hand, resistance is equally unthinkable apart from Matter\u2014apart\nfrom something extended. Not only, as pointed out some pages back, are\ncentres of force devoid of extension unimaginable; but, as an inevitable\ncorollary, we cannot imagine either extended or unextended centres of\nforce to attract and repel other such centres at a distance, without the\nintermediation of some kind of matter. We have here to remark, what\ncould not without anticipation be remarked when treating of Matter, that\nthe hypothesis of Newton, equally with that of Boscovich, is open to the\ncharge that it supposes one thing to act upon another through a space\nwhich is absolutely empty\u2014a supposition which cannot be represented in\nthought. This charge is indeed met by the introduction of a hypothetical\nfluid existing between the atoms or centres. But the problem is not thus\nsolved: it is simply shifted, and re-appears when the constitution of\nthis fluid is inquired into. How impossible it is to elude the\ndifficulty presented by the transfer of Force through space, is best\nseen in the case of astronomical forces. The Sim acts upon us in such\nway as to produce the sensations of light and heat; and we have\nascertained that between the cause as existing in the Sun, and the\neffect as experienced on the Earth, a lapse of about eight minutes\noccurs: whence unavoidably result in us, the conceptions of both a force\nand a motion. So that for the assumption of a luminiferous ether, there\nis the defence, not only that the exercise of force through 95,000,000\nof miles of absolute vacuum is inconceivable, but also that it is\nimpossible to conceive motion in the absence of something moved.\nSimilarly in the case of gravitation. Newton described himself as unable\nto think that the attraction of one body for another at a distance,\ncould be exerted in the absence of an intervening medium. But now let us\nask how much the forwarder we are if an intervening medium be assumed.\nThis ether whose undulations according to the received hypothesis\nconstitute heat and light, and which is the vehicle of gravitation\u2014how\nis it constituted? We must regard it, in the way that physicists do\nregard it, as composed of atoms which attract and repel each\nother\u2014infinitesimal it may be in comparison with those of ordinary\nmatter, but still atoms. And remembering that this ether is\nimponderable, we are obliged to conclude that the ratio between the\ninterspaces of these atoms and the atoms themselves, is incommensurably\ngreater than the like ratio in ponderable matter; else the densities\ncould not be incommensurable. Instead then of a direct action by the Sun\nupon the Earth without anything intervening, we have to conceive the\nSun\u2019s action propagated through a medium whose molecules are probably as\nsmall relatively to their interspaces as are the Sun and Earth compared\nwith the space between them: we have to conceive these infinitesimal\nmolecules acting on each other through absolutely vacant spaces which\nare immense in comparison with their own dimensions. How is this\nconception easier than the other? We still have mentally to represent a\nbody as acting where it is not, and in the absence of anything by which\nits action may be transferred; and what matters it whether this takes\nplace on a large or a small scale? We see therefore that the\nexercise of Force is altogether unintelligible. We cannot imagine it\nexcept through the instrumentality of something having extension; and\nyet when we have assumed this something, we find the perplexity is not\ngot rid of but only postponed. We are obliged to conclude that matter,\nwhether ponderable or imponderable, and whether aggregated or in its\nhypothetical units, acts upon matter through absolutely vacant space;\nand yet this conclusion is positively unthinkable.\n\nAgain, Light, Heat, Gravitation and all central forces, vary inversely\nas the squares of the distances; and physicists in their investigations\nassume that the units of matter act upon each other according to the\nsame law\u2014an assumption which indeed they are obliged to make; since this\nlaw is not simply an empirical one, but one deducible mathematically\nfrom the relations of space\u2014one of which the negation is inconceivable.\nBut now, in any mass of matter which is in internal equilibrium, what\nmust follow? The attractions and repulsions of the constituent atoms are\nbalanced. Being balanced, the atoms remain at their present distances;\nand the mass of matter neither expands nor contracts. But if the forces\nwith which two adjacent atoms attract and repel each other both vary\ninversely as the squares of the distances, as they must; and if they are\nin equilibrium at their present distances, as they are; then,\nnecessarily, they will be in equilibrium at all other distances. Let the\natoms be twice as far apart, and their attractions and repulsions will\nboth be reduced to one fourth of their present amounts. Let them be\nbrought within half the distance, and their attractions and repulsions\nwill both be quadrupled. Whence it follows that this matter will as\nreadily as not assume any other density; and can offer no resistance to\nany external agents. Thus we are obliged to say that these antagonist\nmolecular forces do not both vary inversely as the squares of the\ndistances, which is unthinkable; or else that matter does not possess\nthat attribute of resistance by which alone we distinguish it from empty\nspace, which is absurd.\n\nWhile then it is impossible to form any idea of Force in itself, it is\nequally impossible to comprehend either its mode of exercise or its law\nof variation.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 19. Turning now from the outer to the inner world, let us contemplate,\nnot the agencies to which we ascribe our subjective modifications, but\nthe subjective modifications themselves. These constitute a series.\nDifficult as we find it distinctly to separate and individualize them,\nit is nevertheless beyond question that our states of consciousness\noccur in succession.\n\nIs this chain of states of consciousness infinite or finite? We cannot\nsay infinite; not only because we have indirectly reached the conclusion\nthat there was a period when it commenced, but also because all infinity\nis inconceivable\u2014an infinite series included. We cannot say finite; for\nwe have no knowledge of either of its ends. Go back in memory as far as\nwe may, we are wholly unable to identify our first states of\nconsciousness: the perspective of our thoughts vanishes in a dim\nobscurity where we can make out nothing. Similarly at the other extreme.\nWe have no immediate knowledge of a termination to the series at a\nfuture time; and we cannot really lay hold of that temporary termination\nof the series reached at the present moment. For the state of\nconsciousness recognized by us as our last, is not truly our last. That\nany mental affection may be contemplated as one of the series, it must\nbe remembered\u2014_represented_ in thought, not _presented_. The truly last\nstate of consciousness is that which is passing in the very act of\ncontemplating a state just past\u2014that in which we are thinking of the one\nbefore as the last. So that the proximate end of the chain eludes us, as\nwell as the remote end.\n\n\u201cBut,\u201d it may be said, \u201cthough we cannot directly _know_ consciousness\nto be finite in duration, because neither of its limits can be actually\nreached; yet we can very well _conceive_ it to be so.\u201d No: not even this\nis true. In the first place, we cannot _con_ceive the terminations of\nthat consciousness which alone we really know\u2014our own\u2014any more than we\ncan _per_ceive its terminations. For in truth the two acts are here one.\nIn either case such terminations must be, as above said, not presented\nin thought, but represented; and they must be represented as in the act\nof occurring. Now to represent the termination of consciousness as\noccurring in ourselves, is to think of ourselves as contemplating the\ncessation of the last state of consciousness; and this implies a\nsupposed continuance of consciousness after its last state, which is\nabsurd. In the second place, if we regard the matter objectively\u2014if we\nstudy the phenomena as occurring in others, or in the abstract, we are\nequally foiled. Consciousness implies perpetual change and the perpetual\nestablishment of relations between its successive phases. To be known at\nall, any mental affection must be known as such or such\u2014as like these\nforegoing ones or unlike those: if it is not thought of in connexion\nwith others\u2014not distinguished or identified by comparison with others,\nit is not recognized\u2014is not a state of consciousness at all. A last\nstate of consciousness, then, like any other, can exist only through a\nperception of its relations to previous states. But such perception of\nits relations must constitute a state later than the last, which is a\ncontradiction. Or to put the difficulty in another form:\u2014If ceaseless\nchange of state is the condition on which alone consciousness exists,\nthen when the supposed last state has been reached by the completion of\nthe preceding change, change has ceased; therefore consciousness has\nceased; therefore the supposed last state is not a state of\nconsciousness at all; therefore there can be no last state of\nconsciousness. In short, the perplexity is like that presented by the\nrelations of Motion and Rest. As we found it was impossible really to\nconceive Rest becoming Motion or Motion becoming Rest; so here we find\nit is impossible really to conceive either the beginning or the ending\nof those changes which constitute consciousness.\n\nHence, while we are unable either to believe or to conceive that the\nduration of consciousness is infinite, we are equally unable either to\nknow it as finite, or to conceive it as finite.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 20. Nor do we meet with any greater success when, instead of the\nextent of consciousness, we consider its substance. The question\u2014What is\nthis that thinks? admits of no better solution than the question to\nwhich we have just found none but inconceivable answers.\n\nThe existence of each individual as known to himself, has been always\nheld by mankind at large, the most incontrovertible of truths. To say\u2014\u201cI\nam as sure of it as I am sure that I exist,\u201d is, in common speech, the\nmost emphatic expression of certainty. And this fact of personal\nexistence, testified to by the universal consciousness of men, has been\nmade the basis of sundry philosophies; whence may be drawn the\ninference, that it is held by thinkers, as well as by the vulgar, to be\nbeyond all facts unquestionable.\n\nBelief in the reality of self, is, indeed, a belief which no hypothesis\nenables us to escape. What shall we say of these successive impressions\nand ideas which constitute consciousness? Shall we say that they are the\naffections of something called mind, which, as being the subject of\nthem, is the real _ego_? If we say this, we manifestly imply that the\n_ego_ is an entity. Shall we assert that these impressions and ideas are\nnot the mere superficial changes wrought on some thinking substance, but\nare themselves the very body of this substance\u2014are severally the\nmodified forms which it from moment to moment assumes? This hypothesis,\nequally with the foregoing, implies that the individual exists as a\npermanent and distinct being; since modifications necessarily involve\nsomething modified. Shall we then betake ourselves to the sceptic\u2019s\nposition, and argue that we know nothing more than our impressions and\nideas themselves\u2014that these are to us the only existences; and that the\npersonality said to underlie them is a mere fiction? We do not even thus\nescape; since this proposition, verbally intelligible but really\nunthinkable, itself makes the assumption which it professes to\nrepudiate. For how can consciousness be wholly resolved into impressions\nand ideas, when an impression of necessity implies something impressed?\nOr again, how can the sceptic who has decomposed his consciousness into\nimpressions and ideas, explain the fact that he considers them as _his_\nimpressions and ideas? Or once more, if, as he must, he admits that he\nhas an impression of his personal existence, what warrant can he show\nfor rejecting this impression as unreal while he accepts all his other\nimpressions as real? Unless he can give satisfactory answers to these\nqueries, which he cannot, he must abandon his conclusions; and must\nadmit the reality of the individual mind.\n\nBut now, unavoidable as is this belief\u2014established though it is, not\nonly by the assent of mankind at large, endorsed by divers philosophers,\nbut by the suicide of the sceptical argument\u2014it is yet a belief\nadmitting of no justification by reason: nay, indeed, it is a belief\nwhich reason, when pressed for a distinct answer, rejects. One of the\nmost recent writers who has touched upon this question\u2014Mr Mansel\u2014does\nindeed contend that in the consciousness of self, we have a piece of\nreal knowledge. The validity of immediate intuition he holds in this\ncase unquestionable: remarking that \u201clet system-makers say what they\nwill, the unsophisticated sense of mankind refuses to acknowledge that\nmind is but a bundle of states of consciousness, as matter is (possibly)\na bundle of sensible qualities.\u201d On which position the obvious comment\nis, that it does not seem altogether a consistent one for a Kantist, who\npays but small respect to \u201cthe unsophisticated sense of mankind\u201d when it\ntestifies to the objectivity of space. Passing over this, however, it\nmay readily be shown that a cognition of self, properly so called, is\nabsolutely negatived by the laws of thought. The fundamental condition\nto all consciousness, emphatically insisted upon by Mr Mansel in common\nwith Sir William Hamilton and others, is the antithesis of subject and\nobject. And on this \u201cprimitive dualism of consciousness,\u201d \u201cfrom which\nthe explanations of philosophy must take their start,\u201d Mr Mansel founds\nhis refutation of the German absolutists. But now, what is the corollary\nfrom this doctrine, as bearing on the consciousness of self? The mental\nact in which self is known, implies, like every other mental act, a\nperceiving subject and a perceived object. If, then, the object\nperceived is self, what is the subject that perceives? or if it is the\ntrue self which thinks, what other self can it be that is thought of?\nClearly, a true cognition of self implies a state in which the knowing\nand the known are one\u2014in which subject and object are identified; and\nthis Mr Mansel rightly holds to be the annihilation of both.\n\nSo that the personality of which each is conscious, and of which the\nexistence is to each a fact beyond all others the most certain, is yet a\nthing which cannot truly be known at all: knowledge of it is forbidden\nby the very nature of thought.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 21. Ultimate Scientific Ideas, then, are all representative of\nrealities that cannot be comprehended. After no matter how great a\nprogress in the colligation of facts and the establishment of\ngeneralizations ever wider and wider\u2014after the merging of limited and\nderivative truths in truths that are larger and deeper has been carried\nno matter how far; the fundamental truth remains as much beyond reach as\never. The explanation of that which is explicable, does but bring out\ninto greater clearness the inexplicableness of that which remains\nbehind. Alike in the external and the internal worlds, the man of\nscience sees himself in the midst of perpetual changes of which he can\ndiscover neither the beginning nor the end. If, tracing back the\nevolution of things, he allows himself to entertain the hypothesis that\nthe Universe once existed in a diffused form, he finds it utterly\nimpossible to conceive how this came to be so; and equally, if he\nspeculates on the future, he can assign no limit to the grand succession\nof phenomena ever unfolding themselves before him. In like manner if he\nlooks inward, he perceives that both ends of the thread of consciousness\nare beyond his grasp; nay, even beyond his power to think of as having\nexisted or as existing in time to come. When, again, he turns from the\nsuccession of phenomena, external or internal, to their intrinsic\nnature, he is just as much at fault. Supposing him in every case able to\nresolve the appearances, properties, and movements of things, into\nmanifestations of Force in Space and Time; he still finds that Force,\nSpace, and Time pass all understanding. Similarly, though the analysis\nof mental actions may finally bring him down to sensations, as the\noriginal materials out of which all thought is woven, yet he is little\nforwarder; for he can give no account either of sensations themselves or\nof that something which is conscious of sensations. Objective and\nsubjective things he thus ascertains to be alike inscrutable in their\nsubstance and genesis. In all directions his investigations eventually\nbring him face to face with an insoluble enigma; and he ever more\nclearly perceives it to be an insoluble enigma. He learns at once the\ngreatness and the littleness of the human intellect\u2014its power in dealing\nwith all that comes within the range of experience; its impotence in\ndealing with all that transcends experience. He realizes with a special\nvividness the utter incomprehensibleness of the simplest fact,\nconsidered in itself. He, more than any other, truly _knows_ that in its\nultimate essence nothing can be known.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER IV.\n THE RELATIVITY OF ALL KNOWLEDGE.\n\n\n\u00a7 22. The same conclusion is thus arrived at, from whichever point we\nset out. If, respecting the origin and nature of things, we make some\nassumption, we find that through an inexorable logic it inevitably\ncommits us to alternative impossibilities of thought; and this holds\ntrue of every assumption that can be imagined. If, contrariwise, we make\nno assumption, but set out from the sensible properties of surrounding\nobjects, and, ascertaining their special laws of dependence, go on to\nmerge these in laws more and more general, until we bring them all under\nsome most general laws; we still find ourselves as far as ever from\nknowing what it is which manifests these properties to us: clearly as we\nseem to know it, our apparent knowledge proves on examination to be\nutterly irreconcilable with itself. Ultimate religious ideas and\nultimate scientific ideas, alike turn out to be merely symbols of the\nactual, not cognitions of it.\n\nThe conviction, so reached, that human intelligence is incapable of\nabsolute knowledge, is one that has been slowly gaining ground as\ncivilization has advanced. Each new ontological theory, from time to\ntime propounded in lieu of previous ones shown to be untenable, has been\nfollowed by a new criticism leading to a new scepticism. All possible\nconceptions have been one by one tried and found wanting; and so the\nentire field of speculation has been gradually exhausted without\npositive result: the only result arrived at being the negative one above\nstated\u2014that the reality existing behind all appearances is, and must\never be, unknown. To this conclusion almost every thinker of note has\nsubscribed. \u201cWith the exception,\u201d says Sir William Hamilton, \u201cof a few\nlate Absolutist theorisers in Germany, this is, perhaps, the truth of\nall others most harmoniously re-echoed by every philosopher of every\nschool.\u201d And among these he names\u2014Protagoras, Aristotle, St. Augustin,\nBoethius, Averroes, Albertus Magnus, Gerson, Leo Hebr\u00e6us, Melancthon,\nScaliger, Francis Piccolomini, Giordano Bruno, Campanella, Bacon,\nSpinoza, Newton, Kant.\n\nIt yet remains to point out how this belief may be established\nrationally, as well as empirically. Not only is it that, as in the\nearlier thinkers above named, a vague perception of the inscrutableness\nof things in themselves results from discovering the illusiveness of\nsense-impressions; and not only is it that, as shown in the foregoing\nchapters, definite experiments evolve alternative impossibilities of\nthought out of every ultimate conception we can frame; but it is that\nthe relativity of our knowledge is demonstrable analytically. The\ninduction drawn from general and special experiences, may be confirmed\nby a deduction from the nature of our intelligence. Two ways of reaching\nsuch a deduction exist. Proof that our cognitions are not, and never can\nbe, absolute, is obtainable by analyzing either the _product_ of\nthought, or the _process_ of thought. Let us analyze each.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 23. If, when walking through the fields some day in September, you\nhear a rustle a few yards in advance, and on observing the ditch-side\nwhere it occurs, see the herbage agitated, you will probably turn\ntowards the spot to learn by what this sound and motion are produced. As\nyou approach there flutters into the ditch, a partridge; on seeing which\nyour curiosity is satisfied\u2014you have what you call an _explanation_ of\nthe appearances. The explanation, mark, amounts to this; that whereas\nthroughout life you have had countless experiences of disturbance among\nsmall stationary bodies, accompanying the movement of other bodies among\nthem, and have generalized the relation between such disturbances and\nsuch movements, you consider this particular disturbance explained, on\nfinding it to present, an instance of the like relation. Suppose\nyou catch the partridge; and, wishing to ascertain why it did not\nescape, examine it, and find at one spot, a slight trace of blood upon\nits feathers. You now _understand_, as you say, what has disabled the\npartridge. It has been wounded by a sportsman\u2014adds another case to the\nmany cases already seen by you, of birds being killed or injured by the\nshot discharged at them from fowling-pieces. And in assimilating this\ncase to other such cases, consists your understanding of it. But\nnow, on consideration, a difficulty suggests itself. Only a single shot\nhas struck the partridge, and that not in a vital place: the wings are\nuninjured, as are also those muscles which move them; and the creature\nproves by its struggles that it has abundant strength. Why then, you\ninquire of yourself, does it not fly? Occasion favouring, you put the\nquestion to an anatomist, who furnishes you with _a solution_. He points\nout that this solitary shot has passed close to the place at which the\nnerve supplying the wing-muscles of one side, diverges from the spine;\nand that a slight injury to this nerve, extending even to the rupture of\na few fibres, may, by preventing a perfect co-ordination in the actions\nof the two wings, destroy the power of flight. You are no longer\npuzzled. But what has happened?\u2014what has changed your state from one of\nperplexity to one of _comprehension_? Simply the disclosure of a class\nof previously known cases, along with which you can include this case.\nThe connexion between lesions of the nervous system and paralysis of\nlimbs has been already many times brought under your notice; and you\nhere find a relation of cause and effect that is essentially similar.\n\nLet us suppose you are led on to make further inquiries concerning\norganic actions, which, conspicuous and remarkable as they are, you had\nnot before cared to understand. How is respiration effected? you ask\u2014why\ndoes air periodically rush into the lungs? The answer is that in the\nhigher vertebrata, as in ourselves, influx of air is caused by an\nenlargement of the thoracic cavity, due, partly to depression of the\ndiaphragm, partly to elevation of the ribs. But how does elevation of\nthe ribs enlarge the cavity? In reply the anatomist shows you that the\nplane of each pair of ribs makes an acute angle with the spine; that\nthis angle widens when the moveable ends of the ribs are raised; and he\nmakes you realize the consequent dilatation of the cavity, by pointing\nout how the area of a parallelogram increases as its angles approach to\nright angles\u2014you understand this special fact when you see it to be an\ninstance of a general geometrical fact. There still arises, however, the\nquestion\u2014why does the air rush into this enlarged cavity? To which comes\nthe answer that, when the thoracic cavity is enlarged, the contained\nair, partially relieved from pressure, expands, and so loses some of its\nresisting power; that hence it opposes to the pressure of the external\nair a less pressure; and that as air, like every other fluid, presses\nequally in all directions, motion must result along any line in which\nthe resistance is less than elsewhere; whence follows an inward current.\nAnd this _interpretation_ you recognize as one, when a few facts of like\nkind, exhibited more plainly in a visible fluid such as water, are cited\nin illustration. Again, when it was pointed out that the limbs are\ncompound levers acting in essentially the same way as levers of iron or\nwood, you might consider yourself as having obtained a partial\n_rationale_ of animal movements. The contraction of a muscle, seeming\nbefore utterly unaccountable, would seem less unaccountable were you\nshown how, by a galvanic current, a series of soft iron magnets could be\nmade to shorten itself, through the attraction of each magnet for its\nneighbours:\u2014an alleged analogy which especially answers the purpose of\nour argument; since, whether real or fancied, it equally illustrates the\nmental illumination that results on finding a class of cases within\nwhich a particular case may possibly be included. And it may be further\nnoted how, in the instance here named, an additional feeling of\ncomprehension arises on remembering that the influence conveyed through\nthe nerves to the muscles, is, though not positively electric, yet a\nform of force nearly allied to the electric. Similarly when you\nlearn that animal heat arises from chemical combination, and so is\nevolved as heat is evolved in other chemical combinations\u2014when you learn\nthat the absorption of nutrient fluids through the coats of the\nintestines, is an instance of osmotic action\u2014when you learn that the\nchanges undergone by food during digestion, are like changes\nartificially producible in the laboratory; you regard yourself as\n_knowing_ something about the natures of these phenomena.\n\nObserve now what we have been doing. Turning to the general question,\nlet us note where these successive interpretations have carried us. We\nbegan with quite special and concrete facts. In explaining each, and\nafterwards explaining the more general facts of which they are\ninstances, we have got down to certain highly general facts:\u2014to a\ngeometrical principle or property of space, to a simple law of\nmechanical action, to a law of fluid equilibrium\u2014to truths in physics,\nin chemistry, in thermology, in electricity. The particular phenomena\nwith which we set out, have been merged in larger and larger groups of\nphenomena; and as they have been so merged, we have arrived at solutions\nthat we consider profound in proportion as this process has been carried\nfar. Still deeper explanations are simply further steps in the same\ndirection. When, for instance, it is asked why the law of action of the\nlever is what it is, or why fluid equilibrium and fluid motion exhibit\nthe relations which they do, the answer furnished by mathematicians\nconsists in the disclosure of the principle of virtual velocities\u2014a\nprinciple holding true alike in fluids and solids\u2014a principle under\nwhich the others are comprehended. And similarly, the insight obtained\ninto the phenomena of chemical combination, heat, electricity, &c.,\nimplies that a rationale of them, when found, will be the exposition of\nsome highly general fact respecting the constitution of matter, of which\nchemical, electrical, and thermal facts, are merely different\nmanifestations.\n\nIs this process limited or unlimited? Can we go on for ever explaining\nclasses of facts by including them in larger classes; or must we\neventually come to a largest class? The supposition that the process is\nunlimited, were any one absurd enough to espouse it, would still imply\nthat an ultimate explanation could not be reached; since infinite time\nwould be required to reach it. While the unavoidable conclusion that it\nis limited (proved not only by the finite sphere of observation open to\nus, but also by the diminution in the number of generalizations that\nnecessarily accompanies increase of their breadth) equally implies that\nthe ultimate fact cannot be understood. For if the successively deeper\ninterpretations of nature which constitute advancing knowledge, are\nmerely successive inclusions of special truths in general truths, and of\ngeneral truths in truths still more general; it obviously follows that\nthe most general truth, not admitting of inclusion in any other, does\nnot admit of interpretation. Manifestly, as the _most_ general cognition\nat which we arrive cannot be reduced to a _more_ general one, it cannot\nbe understood. Of necessity, therefore, explanation must eventually\nbring us down to the inexplicable. The deepest truth which we can get\nat, must be unaccountable. Comprehension must become something other\nthan comprehension, before the ultimate fact can be comprehended.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 24. The inference which we thus find forced upon us when we analyze\nthe product of thought, as exhibited objectively in scientific\ngeneralizations, is equally forced upon us by an analysis of the process\nof thought, as exhibited subjectively in consciousness. The\ndemonstration of the necessarily relative character of our knowledge, as\ndeduced from the nature of intelligence, has been brought to its most\ndefinite shape by Sir William Hamilton. I cannot here do better than\nextract from his essay on the \u201cPhilosophy of the Unconditioned,\u201d the\npassage containing the substance of his doctrine.\n\n\u201cThe mind can conceive,\u201d he argues, \u201cand consequently can know,\u201d only\nthe _limited, and the conditionally limited_. The unconditionally\nunlimited, or the _Infinite_, the unconditionally limited, or the\n_Absolute_, cannot positively be construed to the mind; they can be\nconceived, only by a thinking away from, or abstraction of, those very\nconditions under which thought itself is realized; consequently, the\nnotion of the Unconditioned is only negative,\u2014negative of the\nconceivable itself. For example, on the one hand we can positively\nconceive, neither an absolute whole, that is, a whole so great, that we\ncannot also conceive it as a relative part of a still greater whole; nor\nan absolute part, that is, a part so small, that we cannot also conceive\nit as a relative whole, divisible into smaller parts. On the other hand,\nwe cannot positively represent, or realize, or construe to the mind (as\nhere understanding and imagination coincide), an infinite whole, for\nthis could only be done by the infinite synthesis in thought of finite\nwholes, which would itself require an infinite time for its\naccomplishment; nor, for the same reason, can we follow out in thought\nan infinite divisibility of parts. The result is the same, whether we\napply the process to limitation in _space_, in _time_, or in _degree_.\nThe unconditional negation, and the unconditional affirmation of\nlimitation; in other words, the _infinite_ and _absolute, properly so\ncalled_, are thus equally inconceivable to us.\n\nAs the conditionally limited (which we may briefly call the\n_conditioned_) is thus the only possible object of knowledge and of\npositive thought\u2014thought necessarily supposes conditions. To _think_ is\nto _condition_; and conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the\npossibility of thought. For, as the greyhound cannot outstrip his\nshadow, nor (by a more appropriate simile) the eagle outsoar the\natmosphere in which he floats, and by which alone he may be supported;\nso the mind cannot transcend that sphere of limitation, within and\nthrough which exclusively the possibility of thought is realized.\nThought is only of the conditioned; because, as we have said, to think\nis simply to condition. The _absolute_ is conceived merely by a negation\nof conceivability; and all that we know, is only known as\n\n \u2014\u2014\u2018won from the void and formless _infinite_.\u2019\n\nHow, indeed, it could ever be doubted that thought is only of the\nconditioned, may well be deemed a matter of the profoundest\nadmiration. Thought cannot transcend consciousness; consciousness is\nonly possible under the antithesis of a subject and object of thought,\nknown only in correlation, and mutually limiting each other; while,\nindependently of this, all that we know either of subject or object,\neither of mind or matter, is only a knowledge in each of the\nparticular, of the plural, of the different, of the modified, of the\nphenomenal. We admit that the consequence of this doctrine is,\u2014that\nphilosophy, if viewed as more than a science of the conditioned, is\nimpossible. Departing from the particular, we admit, that we can\nnever, in our highest generalizations, rise above the finite; that our\nknowledge, whether of mind or matter, can be nothing more than a\nknowledge of the relative manifestations of an existence, which in\nitself it is our highest wisdom to recognize as beyond the reach of\nphilosophy,\u2014in the language of St Austin,\u2014\u2018_cognoscendo ignorari, et\nignorando cognosci_.\u2019\n\n\u201cThe conditioned is the mean between two extremes,\u2014two inconditionates,\nexclusive of each other, neither of which _can be conceived as\npossible_, but of which, on the principles of contradiction and excluded\nmiddle, one _must be admitted as necessary_. On this opinion, therefore,\nreason is shown to be weak, but not deceitful. The mind is not\nrepresented as conceiving two propositions subversive of each other, as\nequally possible; but only, as unable to understand as possible, either\nof two extremes; one of which, however, on the ground of their mutual\nrepugnance, it is compelled to recognize as true. We are thus taught the\nsalutary lesson, that the capacity of thought is not to be constituted\ninto the measure of existence; and are warned from recognizing the\ndomain of our knowledge as necessarily co-extensive with the horizon of\nour faith. And by a wonderful revelation, we are thus, in the very\nconsciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the relative and\nfinite, inspired with a belief in the existence of something\nunconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensible reality.\u201d\n\nClear and conclusive as this statement of the case appears when\ncarefully studied, it is expressed in so abstract a manner as to be not\nvery intelligible to the general reader. A more popular presentation of\nit, with illustrative applications, as given by Mr Mansel in his \u201cLimits\nof Religious Thought,\u201d will make it more fully understood. The following\nextracts, which I take the liberty of making from his pages, will\nsuffice.\n\n\u201cThe very conception of consciousness, in whatever mode it may be\nmanifested, necessarily implies _distinction between one object and\nanother_. To be conscious, we must be conscious of something; and that\nsomething can only be known, as that which it is, by being distinguished\nfrom that which it is not. But distinction is necessarily limitation;\nfor, if one object is to be distinguished from another, it must possess\nsome form of existence which the other has not, or it must not possess\nsome form which the other has. But it is obvious the Infinite cannot be\ndistinguished, as such, from the Finite, by the absence of any quality\nwhich the Finite possesses; for such absence would be a limitation. Nor\nyet can it be distinguished by the presence of an attribute which the\nFinite has not; for, as no finite part can be a constituent of an\ninfinite whole, this differential characteristic must itself be\ninfinite; and must at the same time have nothing in common with the\nfinite. We are thus thrown back upon our former impossibility; for this\nsecond infinite will be distinguished from the finite by the absence of\nqualities which the latter possesses. A consciousness of the Infinite as\nsuch thus necessarily involves a self-contradiction; for it implies the\nrecognition, by limitation and difference, of that which can only be\ngiven as unlimited and indifferent. * * *\n\n\u201cThis contradiction, which is utterly inexplicable on the supposition\nthat the infinite is a positive object of human thought, is at once\naccounted for, when it is regarded as the mere negation of thought. If\nall thought is limitation;\u2014if whatever we conceive is, by the very act\nof conception, regarded as finite,\u2014_the infinite_, from a human point of\nview, is merely a name for the absence of those conditions under which\nthought is possible. To speak of a _Conception of the Infinite_ is,\ntherefore, at once to affirm those conditions and to deny them. The\ncontradiction, which we discover in such a conception, is only that\nwhich we have ourselves placed there, by tacitly assuming the\nconceivability of the inconceivable. The condition of consciousness is\ndistinction; and condition of distinction is limitation. We can have no\nconsciousness of Being in general which is not some Being in particular:\na _thing_, in consciousness, is one thing out of many. In assuming the\npossibility of an infinite object of consciousness, I assume, therefore,\nthat it is at the same time limited and unlimited;\u2014actually something,\nwithout which it could not be an object of consciousness, and actually\nnothing, without which it could not be infinite. * * *\n\n\u201cA second characteristic of Consciousness is, that it is only possible\nin the form of a _relation_. There must be a Subject, or person\nconscious, and an Object, or thing of which he is conscious. There can\nbe no consciousness without the union of these two factors; and, in that\nunion, each exists only as it is related to the other. The subject is a\nsubject, only in so far as it is conscious of an object: the object is\nan object, only in so far as it is apprehended by a subject: and the\ndestruction of either is the destruction of consciousness itself. It is\nthus manifest that a consciousness of the Absolute is equally\nself-contradictory with that of the Infinite. To be conscious of the\nAbsolute as such, we must know that an object, which is given in\nrelation to our consciousness, is identical with one which exists in its\nown nature, out of all relation to consciousness. But to know this\nidentity, we must be able to compare the two together; and such a\ncomparison is itself a contradiction. We are in fact required to compare\nthat of which we are conscious with that of which we are not conscious;\nthe comparison itself being an act of consciousness, and only possible\nthrough the consciousness of both its objects. It is thus manifest that,\neven if we could be conscious of the absolute, we could not possibly\nknow that it is the absolute: and, as we can be conscious of an object\nas such, only by knowing it to be what it is, this is equivalent to an\nadmission that we cannot be conscious of the absolute at all. As an\nobject of consciousness, every thing is necessarily relative; and what a\nthing may be out of consciousness, no mode of consciousness can tell us.\n\n\u201cThis contradiction, again, admits of the same explanation as the\nformer. Our whole notion of existence is necessarily relative; for it is\nexistence as conceived by us. But _Existence_, as we conceive it, is but\na name for the several ways in which objects are presented to our\nconsciousness,\u2014a general term, embracing a variety of relations. _The\nAbsolute_, on the other hand, is a term expressing no object of thought,\nbut only a denial of the relation by which thought is constituted. To\nassume absolute existence as an object of thought, is thus to suppose a\nrelation existing when the related terms exist no longer. An object of\nthought exists, as such, in and through its relation to a thinker; while\nthe Absolute, as such, is independent of all relation. The _Conception\nof the Absolute_ thus implies at the same time the presence and absence\nof the relation by which thought is constituted; and our various\nendeavours to represent it are only so many modified forms of the\ncontradiction involved in our original assumption. Here, too, the\ncontradiction is one which we ourselves have made. It does not imply\nthat the Absolute cannot exist; but it implies, most certainly, that we\ncannot conceive it as existing.\u201d\n\nHere let me point out how the same general inference may be evolved from\nanother fundamental condition of thought, omitted by Sir W. Hamilton,\nand not supplied by Mr Mansel;\u2014a condition which, under its obverse\naspect, we have already contemplated in the last section. Every complete\nact of consciousness, besides distinction and relation, also implies\nlikeness. Before it can become an idea, or constitute a piece of\nknowledge, a mental state must not only be known as separate in kind\nfrom certain foregoing states to which it is known as related by\nsuccession; but it must further be known as of the same kind with\ncertain other foregoing states. That organization of changes which\nconstitutes thinking, involves continuous integration as well as\ncontinuous differentiation. Were each new affection of the mind\nperceived simply as an affection in some way contrasted with the\npreceding ones\u2014were there but a chain of impressions, each of which as\nit arose was merely distinguished from its predecessors; consciousness\nwould be an utter chaos. To produce that orderly consciousness which we\ncall intelligence, there requires the assimilation of each impression to\nothers, that occurred earlier in the series. Both the successive mental\nstates, and the successive relations which they bear to each other, must\nbe classified; and classification involves not only a parting of the\nunlike, but also a binding together of the like. In brief, a true\ncognition is possible only through an accompanying recognition.\n Should it be objected that if so, there cannot be a first\ncognition, and hence there can be no cognition; the reply is, that\ncognition proper arises gradually\u2014that during the first stage of\nincipient intelligence, before the feelings produced by intercourse with\nthe outer world have been put into order, there _are_ no cognitions,\nstrictly so called; and that, as every infant shows us, these slowly\nemerge out of the confusion of unfolding consciousness as fast as the\nexperiences are arranged into groups\u2014as fast as the most frequently\nrepeated sensations, and their relations to each other, become familiar\nenough to admit of their recognition as such or such, whenever they\nrecur. Should it be further objected that if cognition pre-supposes\nrecognition, there can be, no cognition, even by an adult, of an object\nnever before seen; there is still the sufficient answer that in so far\nas it is not assimilated to previously-seen objects, it is _not_ known,\nand that it _is_ known in so far as it is assimilated to them. Of this\nparadox the interpretation is, that an object is classifiable in various\nways, with various degrees of completeness. An animal hitherto _unknown_\n(mark the word), though not referable to any established species or\ngenus, is yet _recognized_ as belonging to one of the larger\ndivisions\u2014mammals, birds, reptiles, or fishes; or should it be so\nanomalous that its alliance with any of these is not determinable, it\nmay yet be classed as vertebrate or invertebrate; or if it be one of\nthose organisms of which it is doubtful whether the animal or vegetal\ncharacteristics predominate, it is still known as a living body; even\nshould it be questioned whether it is organic, it remains beyond\nquestion that it is a material object, and it is cognized by being\nrecognized as such. Whence it is manifest that a thing is perfectly\nknown only when it is in all respects like certain things previously\nobserved; that in proportion to the number of respects in which it is\nunlike them, is the extent to which it is unknown; and that hence when\nit has absolutely no attribute in common with anything else, it must be\nabsolutely beyond the bounds of knowledge.\n\nObserve the corollary which here concerns us. A cognition of the Real,\nas distinguished from the Phenomenal, must, if it exists, conform to\nthis law of cognition in general. The First Cause, the Infinite, the\nAbsolute, to be known at all, must be classed. To be positively thought\nof, it must be thought of as such or such\u2014as of this or that kind. Can\nit be like in kind to anything of which we have sensible experience?\nObviously not. Between the creating and the created, there must be a\ndistinction transcending any of the distinctions existing between\ndifferent divisions of the created. That which is uncaused cannot be\nassimilated to that which is caused: the two being, in the very naming,\nantithetically opposed. The Infinite cannot be grouped along with\nsomething that is finite; since, in being so grouped, it must be\nregarded as not-infinite. It is impossible to put the Absolute in the\nsame category with anything relative, so long as the Absolute is defined\nas that of which no necessary relation can be predicated. Is it then\nthat the Actual, though unthinkable by classification with the Apparent,\nis thinkable by classification with itself? This supposition is equally\nabsurd with the other. It implies the plurality of the First Cause, the\nInfinite, the Absolute; and this implication is self-contradictory.\nThere cannot be more than one First Cause; seeing that the existence of\nmore than one would involve the existence of something necessitating\nmore than one, which something would be the true First Cause. How\nself-destructive is the assumption of two or more Infinites, is manifest\non remembering that such Infinites, by limiting each other, would become\nfinite. And similarly, an Absolute which existed not alone but along\nwith other Absolutes, would no longer be an absolute but a relative. The\nUnconditioned therefore, as class-able neither with any form of the\nconditioned nor with any other Unconditioned, cannot be classed at all.\nAnd to admit that it cannot be known as of such or such kind, is to\nadmit that it is unknowable.\n\nThus, from the very nature of thought, the relativity of our knowledge\nis inferable in three several ways. As we find by analyzing it, and as\nwe see it objectively displayed in every proposition, a thought involves\n_relation_, _difference_, _likeness_. Whatever does not present each of\nthese does not admit of cognition. And hence we may say that the\nUnconditioned, as presenting none of them, is trebly unthinkable.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 25. From yet another point of view we may discern the same great\ntruth. If, instead of examining our intellectual powers directly as\nexhibited in the act of thought, or indirectly as exhibited in thought\nwhen expressed by words, we look at the connexion between the mind and\nthe world, a like conclusion is forced upon us. In the very definition\nof Life, when reduced to its most abstract shape, this ultimate\nimplication becomes visible.\n\nAll vital actions, considered not separately but in their ensemble, have\nfor their final purpose the balancing of certain outer processes by\ncertain inner processes. There are unceasing external forces tending to\nbring the matter of which organic bodies consist, into that state of\nstable equilibrium displayed by inorganic bodies; there are internal\nforces by which this tendency is constantly antagonized; and the\nperpetual changes which constitute Life, may be regarded as incidental\nto the maintenance of the antagonism. To preserve the erect posture, for\ninstance, we see that certain weights have to be neutralized by certain\nstrains: each limb or other organ, gravitating to the Earth and pulling\ndown the parts to which it is attached, has to be preserved in position\nby the tension of sundry muscles; or in other words, the group of forces\nwhich would if allowed bring the body to the ground, has to be\ncounterbalanced by another group of forces. Again, to keep up the\ntemperature at a particular point, the external process of radiation and\nabsorption of heat by the surrounding medium, must be met by a\ncorresponding internal process of chemical combination, whereby more\nheat may be evolved; to which add, that if from atmospheric changes the\nloss becomes greater or less, the production must become greater or\nless. And similarly throughout the organic actions in general.\n\nWhen we contemplate the lower kinds of life, we see that the\ncorrespondences thus maintained are direct and simple; as in a plant,\nthe vitality of which mainly consists in osmotic and chemical actions\nresponding to the co-existence of light, heat, water, and carbonic acid\naround it. But in animals, and especially in the higher orders of them,\nthe correspondences become extremely complex. Materials for growth and\nrepair not being, like those which plants require, everywhere present,\nbut being widely dispersed and under special forms, have to be found, to\nbe secured, and to be reduced to a fit state for assimilation. Hence the\nneed for locomotion; hence the need for the senses; hence the need for\nprehensile and destructive appliances; hence the need for an elaborate\ndigestive apparatus. Observe, however, that these successive\ncomplications are essentially nothing but aids to the maintenance of the\norganic balance in its integrity, in opposition to those physical,\nchemical, and other agencies which tend to overturn it. And observe,\nmoreover, that while these successive complications subserve this\nfundamental adaptation of inner to outer actions, they are themselves\nnothing else but further adaptations of inner to outer actions. For what\nare those movements by which a predatory creature pursues its prey, or\nby which its prey seeks to escape, but certain changes in the organism\nfitted to meet certain changes in its environment? What is that compound\noperation which constitutes the perception of a piece of food, but a\nparticular correlation of nervous modifications, answering to a\nparticular correlation of physical properties? What is that process by\nwhich food when swallowed is reduced to a fit form for assimilation, but\na set of mechanical and chemical actions responding to the mechanical\nand chemical actions which distinguish the food? Whence it becomes\nmanifest, that while Life in its simplest form is the correspondence of\ncertain inner physico-chemical actions with certain outer\nphysico-chemical actions, each advance to a higher form of Life consists\nin a better preservation of this primary correspondence by the\nestablishment of other correspondences.\n\nDivesting this conception of all superfluities and reducing it to its\nmost abstract shape, we see that Life is definable as the continuous\nadjustment of internal relations to external relations. And when we so\ndefine it, we discover that the physical and the psychial life are\nequally comprehended by the definition. We perceive that this which we\ncall Intelligence, shows itself when the external relations to which the\ninternal ones are adjusted, begin to be numerous, complex, and remote in\ntime or space; that every advance in Intelligence essentially consists\nin the establishment of more varied, more complete, and more involved\nadjustments; and that even the highest achievements of science are\nresolvable into mental relations of co-existence and sequence, so\nco-ordinated as exactly to tally with certain relations of co-existence\nand sequence that occur externally. A caterpillar, wandering at random\nand at length finding its way on to a plant having a certain odour,\nbegins to eat\u2014has inside of it an organic relation between a particular\nimpression and a particular set of actions, answering to the relation\noutside of it, between scent and nutriment. The sparrow, guided by the\nmore complex correlation of impressions which the colour, form, and\nmovements of the caterpillar gave it; and guided also by other\ncorrelations which measure the position and distance of the caterpillar;\nadjusts certain correlated muscular movements in such way as to seize\nthe caterpillar. Through a much greater distance in space is the hawk,\nhovering above, affected by the relations of shape and motion which the\nsparrow presents; and the much more complicated and prolonged series of\nrelated nervous and muscular changes, gone through in correspondence\nwith the sparrow\u2019s changing relations of position, finally succeed when\nthey are precisely adjusted to these changing relations. In the fowler,\nexperience has established a relation between the appearance and flight\nof a hawk and the destruction of other birds, including game; there is\nalso in him an established relation between those visual impressions\nanswering to a certain distance in space, and the range of his gun; and\nhe has learned, too, by frequent observation, what relations of position\nthe sights must bear to a point somewhat in advance of the flying bird,\nbefore he can fire with success. Similarly if we go back to the\nmanufacture of the gun. By relations of co-existence between colour,\ndensity, and place in the earth, a particular mineral is known as one\nwhich yields iron; and the obtainment of iron from it, results when\ncertain correlated acts of ours, are adjusted to certain correlated\naffinities displayed by ironstone, coal, and lime, at a high\ntemperature. If we descend yet a step further, and ask a chemist to\nexplain the explosion of gunpowder, or apply to a mathematician for a\ntheory of projectiles, we still find that special or general relations\nof co-existence and sequence between properties, motions, spaces &c.,\nare all they can teach us. And lastly, let it be noted that what we call\n_truth_, guiding us to successful action and the consequent maintenance\nof life, is simply the accurate correspondence of subjective to\nobjective relations; while _error_, leading to failure and therefore\ntowards death, is the absence of such accurate correspondence.\n\nIf, then, Life in all its manifestations, inclusive of Intelligence in\nits highest forms, consists in the continuous adjustment of internal\nrelations to external relations, the necessarily relative character of\nour knowledge becomes obvious. The simplest cognition being the\nestablishment of some connexion between subjective states, answering to\nsome connexion between objective agencies; and each successively more\ncomplex cognition being the establishment of some more involved\nconnexion of such states, answering to some more involved connexion of\nsuch agencies; it is clear that the process, no matter how far it be\ncarried, can never bring within the reach of Intelligence, either the\nstates themselves or the agencies themselves. Ascertaining which things\noccur along with which, and what things follow what, supposing it to be\npursued exhaustively, must still leave us with co-existences and\nsequences only. If every act of knowing is the formation of a relation\nin consciousness parallel to a relation in the environment, then the\nrelativity of knowledge is self-evident\u2014becomes indeed a truism.\nThinking being relationing, no thought can ever express more than\nrelations.\n\nAnd here let us not omit to mark how that to which our intelligence is\nconfined, is that with which alone our intelligence is concerned. The\nknowledge within our reach, is the only knowledge that can be of service\nto us. This maintenance of a correspondence between internal actions and\nexternal actions, which both constitutes our life at each moment and is\nthe means whereby life is continued through subsequent moments, merely\nrequires that the agencies acting upon us shall be known in their\nco-existences and sequences, and not that they shall be known in\nthemselves. If _x_ and _y_ are two uniformly connected properties in\nsome outer object, while _a_ and _b_ are the effects they produce in our\nconsciousness; and if while the property _x_ produces in us the\nindifferent mental state _a_, the property _y_ produces in us the\npainful mental state _b_ (answering to a physical injury); then, all\nthat is requisite for our guidance, is, that _x_ being the uniform\naccompaniment of _y_ externally, _a_ shall be the uniform accompaniment\nof _b_ internally; so that when, by the presence of _x_, _a_ is produced\nin consciousness, _b_, or rather the idea of _b_, shall follow it, and\nexcite the motions by which the effect of _y_ may be escaped. The sole\nneed is that _a_ and _b_ and the relation between them, shall always\nanswer to _x_ and _y_ and the relation between them. It matters nothing\nto us if _a_ and _b_ are like _x_ and _y_ or not. Could they be exactly\nidentical with them, we should not be one whit the better off; and their\ntotal dissimilarity is no disadvantage to us.\n\nDeep down then in the very nature of Life, the relativity of our\nknowledge is discernible. The analysis of vital actions in general,\nleads not only to the conclusion that things in themselves cannot be\nknown to us; but also to the conclusion that knowledge of them, were it\npossible, would be useless.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 26. There still remains the final question\u2014What must we say concerning\nthat which transcends knowledge? Are we to rest wholly in the\nconsciousness of phenomena?\u2014is the result of inquiry to exclude utterly\nfrom our minds everything but the relative? or must we also believe in\nsomething beyond the relative?\n\nThe answer of pure logic is held to be, that by the limits of our\nintelligence we are rigorously confined within the relative; and that\nanything transcending the relative can be thought of only as a pure\nnegation, or as a non-existence. \u201cThe _absolute_ is conceived merely by\na negation of conceivability,\u201d writes Sir William Hamilton. \u201cThe\n_Absolute_ and the _Infinite_\u201d says Mr Mansel, \u201care thus, like the\n_Inconceivable_ and the _Imperceptible_, names indicating, not an object\nof thought or of consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the\nconditions under which consciousness is possible.\u201d From each of which\nextracts may be deduced the conclusion, that since reason cannot warrant\nus in affirming the positive existence of what is cognizable only as a\nnegation, we cannot rationally affirm the positive existence of anything\nbeyond phenomena.\n\nUnavoidable as this conclusion seems, it involves, I think, a grave\nerror. If the premiss be granted, the inference must doubtless be\nadmitted; but the premiss, in the form presented by Sir William\nHamilton and Mr Mansel, is not strictly true. Though, in the foregoing\npages, the arguments used by these writers to show that the Absolute\nis unknowable, have been approvingly quoted; and though these\narguments have been enforced by others equally thoroughgoing; yet\nthere remains to be stated a qualification, which saves us from that\nscepticism otherwise necessitated. It is not to be denied that so long\nas we confine ourselves to the purely logical aspect of the question,\nthe propositions quoted above must be accepted in their entirety; but\nwhen we contemplate its more general, or psychological, aspect, we\nfind that these propositions are imperfect statements of the truth:\nomitting, or rather excluding, as they do, an all-important fact. To\nspeak specifically:\u2014Besides that _definite_ consciousness of which\nLogic formulates the laws, there is also an _indefinite_ consciousness\nwhich cannot be formulated. Besides complete thoughts, and besides the\nthoughts which though incomplete admit of completion, there are\nthoughts which it is impossible to complete; and yet which are still\nreal, in the sense that they are normal affections of the intellect.\n\nObserve in the first place, that every one of the arguments by which the\nrelativity of our knowledge is demonstrated, distinctly postulates the\npositive existence of something beyond the relative. To say that we\ncannot know the Absolute, is, by implication, to affirm that there _is_\nan Absolute. In the very denial of our power to learn _what_ the\nAbsolute is, there lies hidden the assumption _that_ it is; and the\nmaking of this assumption proves that the Absolute has been present to\nthe mind, not as a nothing, but as a something. Similarly with every\nstep in the reasoning by which this doctrine is upheld. The Noumenon,\neverywhere named as the antithesis of the Phenomenon, is throughout\nnecessarily thought of as an actuality. It is rigorously impossible to\nconceive that our knowledge is a knowledge of Appearances only, without\nat the same time conceiving a Reality of which they are appearances; for\nappearance without reality is unthinkable. Strike out from the argument\nthe terms Unconditioned, Infinite, Absolute, with their equivalents, and\nin place of them write, \u201cnegation of conceivability,\u201d or \u201cabsence of the\nconditions under which consciousness is possible,\u201d and you find that the\nargument becomes nonsense. Truly to realize in thought any one of the\npropositions of which the argument consists, the Unconditioned must be\nrepresented as positive and not negative. How then can it be a\nlegitimate conclusion from the argument, that our consciousness of it is\nnegative? An argument, the very construction of which assigns to a\ncertain term a certain meaning, but which ends in showing that this term\nhas no such meaning, is simply an elaborate suicide. Clearly, then, the\nvery demonstration that a _definite_ consciousness of the Absolute is\nimpossible to us, unavoidably presupposes an _indefinite_ consciousness\nof it.\n\nPerhaps the best way of showing that by the necessary conditions of\nthought, we are obliged to form a positive though vague consciousness of\nthis which transcends distinct consciousness, is to analyze our\nconception of the antithesis between Relative and Absolute. It is a\ndoctrine called in question by none, that such antinomies of thought as\nWhole and Part, Equal and Unequal, Singular and Plural, are necessarily\nconceived as correlatives: the conception of a part is impossible\nwithout the conception of a whole; there can be no idea of equality\nwithout one of inequality. And it is admitted that in the same manner,\nthe Relative is itself conceivable as such, only by opposition to the\nIrrelative or Absolute. Sir William Hamilton however, in his\ntrenchant (and in most parts unanswerable) criticism on Cousin,\ncontends, in conformity with his position above stated, that one of\nthese correlatives is nothing whatever beyond the negation of the other.\n\u201cCorrelatives\u201d he says \u201ccertainly suggest each other, but correlatives\nmay, or may not, be equally real and positive. In thought\ncontradictories necessarily imply each other, for the knowledge of\ncontradictories is one. But the reality of one contradictory, so far\nfrom guaranteeing the reality of the other, is nothing else than its\nnegation. Thus every positive notion (the concept of a thing by what it\nis) suggests a negative notion (the concept of a thing by what it is\nnot); and the highest positive notion, the notion of the conceivable, is\nnot without its corresponding negative in the notion of the\ninconceivable. But though these mutually suggest each other, the\npositive alone is real; the negative is only an abstraction of the\nother, and in the highest generality, even an abstraction of thought\nitself.\u201d Now the assertion that of such contradictories \u201cthe\nnegative is _only_ an abstraction of the other\u201d\u2014\u201cis _nothing_ else than\nits negation,\u201d\u2014is not true. In such correlatives as Equal and Unequal,\nit is obvious enough that the negative concept contains something\nbesides the negation of the positive one; for the things of which\nequality is denied are not abolished from consciousness by the denial.\nAnd the fact overlooked by Sir William Hamilton, is, that the like holds\neven with those correlatives of which the negative is inconceivable, in\nthe strict sense of the word. Take for example the Limited and the\nUnlimited. Our notion of the Limited is composed, firstly of a\nconsciousness of some kind of being, and secondly of a consciousness of\nthe limits under which it is known. In the antithetical notion of the\nUnlimited, the consciousness of limits is abolished; but not the\nconsciousness of some kind of being. It is quite true that in the\nabsence of conceived limits, this consciousness ceases to be a concept\nproperly so called; but it is none the less true that it remains as a\nmode of consciousness. If, in such cases, the negative contradictory\nwere, as alleged, \u201c_nothing else_\u201d than the negation of the other, and\ntherefore a mere nonentity, then it would clearly follow that negative\ncontradictories could be used interchangeably: the Unlimited might be\nthought of as antithetical to the Divisible; and the Indivisible as\nantithetical to the Limited. While the fact that they cannot be so used,\nproves that in consciousness the Unlimited and the Indivisible are\nqualitatively distinct, and therefore positive or real; since\ndistinction cannot exist between nothings. The error, (very naturally\nfallen into by philosophers intent on demonstrating the limits and\nconditions of consciousness,) consists in assuming that consciousness\ncontains _nothing but_ limits and conditions; to the entire neglect of\nthat which is limited and conditioned. It is forgotten that there is\nsomething which alike forms the raw material of definite thought and\nremains after the definiteness which thinking gave to it has been\ndestroyed. Now all this applies by change of terms to the last and\nhighest of these antinomies\u2014that between the Relative and the\nNon-relative. We are conscious of the Relative as existence under\nconditions and limits; it is impossible that these conditions and limits\ncan be thought of apart from something to which they give the form; the\nabstraction of these conditions and limits, is, by the hypothesis, the\nabstraction of them _only_; consequently there must be a residuary\nconsciousness of something which filled up their outlines; and this\nindefinite something constitutes our consciousness of the Non-relative\nor Absolute. Impossible though it is to give to this consciousness any\nqualitative or quantitative expression whatever, it is not the less\ncertain that it remains with us as a positive and indestructible element\nof thought.\n\nStill more manifest will this truth become when it is observed that our\nconception of the Relative itself disappears, if our conception of the\nAbsolute is a pure negation. It is admitted, or rather it is contended,\nby the writers I have quoted above, that contradictories can be known\nonly in relation to each other\u2014that Equality, for instance, is\nunthinkable apart from its correlative Inequality; and that thus the\nRelative can itself be conceived only by opposition to the Non-relative.\nIt is also admitted, or rather contended, that the consciousness of a\nrelation implies a consciousness of both the related members. If we are\nrequired to conceive the relation between the Relative and Non-relative\nwithout being conscious of both, \u201cwe are in fact\u201d (to quote the words of\nMr Mansel differently applied) \u201crequired to compare that of which we are\nconscious with that of which we are not conscious; the comparison itself\nbeing an act of consciousness, and only possible through the\nconsciousness of both its objects.\u201d What then becomes of the assertion\nthat \u201cthe Absolute is conceived merely by a negation of conceivability,\u201d\nor as \u201cthe mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is\npossible?\u201d If the Non-relative or Absolute, is present in thought only\nas a mere negation, then the relation between it and the Relative\nbecomes unthinkable, because one of the terms of the relation is absent\nfrom consciousness. And if this relation is unthinkable, then is the\nRelative itself unthinkable, for want of its antithesis: whence results\nthe disappearance of all thought whatever.\n\nLet me here point out that both Sir Wm Hamilton and Mr Mansel, do, in\nother places, distinctly imply that our consciousness of the Absolute,\nindefinite though it is, is positive and not negative. The very passage\nalready quoted from Sir Wm Hamilton, in which he asserts that \u201cthe\n_absolute_ is conceived merely by a negation of conceivability,\u201d itself\nends with the remark that, \u201cby a wonderful revelation, we are thus, in\nthe very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the\nrelative and finite, inspired with a belief in the existence of\nsomething unconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensible\nreality.\u201d The last of these assertions practically admits that which the\nother denies. By the laws of thought as Sir Wm Hamilton has interpreted\nthem, he finds himself forced to the conclusion that our consciousness\nof the Absolute is a pure negation. He nevertheless finds that there\ndoes exist in consciousness an irresistible conviction of the real\n\u201cexistence of something unconditioned.\u201d And he gets over the\ninconsistency by speaking of this conviction as \u201ca wonderful\nrevelation\u201d\u2014\u201ca belief\u201d with which we are \u201cinspired:\u201d thus apparently\nhinting that it is supernaturally at variance with the laws of thought.\nMr Mansel is betrayed into a like inconsistency. When he says that \u201cwe\nare compelled, by the constitution of our minds, to believe in the\nexistence of an Absolute and Infinite Being,\u2014a belief which appears\nforced upon us, as the complement of our consciousness of the relative\nand the finite;\u201d he clearly says by implication that this consciousness\nis positive, and not negative. He tacitly admits that we are obliged to\nregard the Absolute as something more than a negation\u2014that our\nconsciousness of it is _not_ \u201cthe mere absence of the conditions under\nwhich consciousness is possible.\u201d\n\nThe supreme importance of this question must be my apology for taxing\nthe reader\u2019s attention a little further, in the hope of clearing up the\nremaining difficulties. The necessarily positive character of our\nconsciousness of the Unconditioned, which, as we have seen, follows from\nan ultimate law of thought, will be better understood on contemplating\nthe process of thought.\n\nOne of the arguments used to prove the relativity of our knowledge, is,\nthat we cannot conceive Space or Time as either limited or unlimited. It\nis pointed out that when we imagine a limit, there simultaneously arises\nthe consciousness of a space or time existing beyond the limit. This\nremoter space or time, though not contemplated as definite, is yet\ncontemplated as real. Though we do not form of it a conception proper,\nsince we do not bring it within bounds, there is yet in our minds the\nunshaped material of a conception. Similarly with our consciousness of\nCause. We are no more able to form a circumscribed idea of Cause, than\nof Space or Time; and we are consequently obliged to think of the Cause\nwhich transcends the limits of our thought as positive though\nindefinite. Just in the same manner that on conceiving any bounded\nspace, there arises a nascent consciousness of space outside the bounds;\nso, when we think of any definite cause, there arises a nascent\nconsciousness of a cause behind it: and in the one case as in the other,\nthis nascent consciousness is in substance like that which suggests it,\nthough without form. The momentum of thought inevitably carries us\nbeyond conditioned existence to unconditioned existence; and this ever\npersists in us as the body of a thought to which we can give no shape.\n\nHence our firm belief in objective reality\u2014a belief which metaphysical\ncriticisms cannot for a moment shake. When we are taught that a piece of\nmatter, regarded by us as existing externally, cannot be really known,\nbut that we can know only certain impressions produced on us, we are\nyet, by the relativity of our thought, compelled to think of these in\nrelation to a positive cause\u2014the notion of a real existence which\ngenerated these impressions becomes nascent. If it be proved to us that\nevery notion of a real existence which we can frame, is utterly\ninconsistent with itself\u2014that matter, however conceived by us, cannot be\nmatter as it actually is, our conception, though transfigured, is not\ndestroyed: there remains the sense of reality, dissociated as far as\npossible from those special forms under which it was before represented\nin thought. Though Philosophy condemns successively each attempted\nconception of the Absolute\u2014though it proves to us that the Absolute is\nnot this, nor that, nor that\u2014though in obedience to it we negative, one\nafter another, each idea as it arises; yet, as we cannot expel the\nentire contents of consciousness, there ever remains behind an element\nwhich passes into new shapes. The continual negation of each particular\nform and limit, simply results in the more or less complete abstraction\nof all forms and limits; and so ends in an indefinite consciousness of\nthe unformed and unlimited.\n\nAnd here we come face to face with the ultimate difficulty\u2014How can there\npossibly be constituted a consciousness of the unformed and unlimited,\nwhen, by its very nature, consciousness is possible only under forms and\nlimits? If every consciousness of existence is a consciousness of\nexistence as conditioned, then how, after the negation of conditions,\ncan there be any residuum?. Though not directly withdrawn by the\nwithdrawal of its conditions, must not the raw material of consciousness\nbe withdrawn by implication? Must it not vanish when the conditions of\nits existence vanish? That there must be a solution of this\ndifficulty is manifest; since even those who would put it, do, as\nalready shown, admit that we have some such consciousness; and the\nsolution appears to be that above shadowed forth. Such consciousness is\nnot, and cannot be, constituted by any single mental act; but is the\nproduct of many mental acts. In each concept there is an element which\npersists. It is alike impossible for this element to be absent from\nconsciousness, and for it to be present in consciousness alone: either\nalternative involves unconsciousness\u2014the one from the want of the\nsubstance; the other from the want of the form. But the persistence of\nthis element under successive conditions, _necessitates_ a sense of it\nas distinguished from the conditions, and independent of them. The sense\nof a something that is conditioned in every thought, cannot be got rid\nof, because the something cannot be got rid of. How then must the sense\nof this something be constituted? Evidently by combining successive\nconcepts deprived of their limits and conditions. We form this\nindefinite thought, as we form many of our definite thoughts, by the\ncoalescence of a series of thoughts. Let me illustrate this. A\nlarge complex object, having attributes too numerous to be represented\nat once, is yet tolerably well conceived by the union of several\nrepresentations, each standing for part of its attributes. On thinking\nof a piano, there first rises in imagination its visual appearance, to\nwhich are instantly added (though by separate mental acts) the ideas of\nits remote side and of its solid substance. A complete conception,\nhowever, involves the strings, the hammers, the dampers, the pedals; and\nwhile successively adding these to the conception, the attributes first\nthought of lapse more or less completely out of consciousness.\nNevertheless, the whole group constitutes a representation of the piano.\nNow as in this case we form a definite concept of a special existence,\nby imposing limits and conditions in successive acts; so, in the\nconverse case, by taking away the limits and conditions in successive\nacts, we form an indefinite notion of general existence. By fusing a\nseries of states of consciousness, in each of which, as it arises, the\nlimitations and conditions are abolished, there is produced a\nconsciousness of something unconditioned. To speak more\nrigorously:\u2014this consciousness is not the abstract of any one group of\nthoughts, ideas, or conceptions; but it is the abstract of _all_\nthoughts, ideas, or conceptions. That which is common to them all, and\ncannot be got rid of, is what we predicate by the word existence.\nDissociated as this becomes from each of its modes by the perpetual\nchange of those modes, it remains as an indefinite consciousness of\nsomething constant under all modes\u2014of being apart from its appearances.\nThe distinction we feel between special and general existence, is the\ndistinction between that which is changeable in us, and that which is\nunchangeable. The contrast between the Absolute and the Relative in our\nminds, is really the contrast between that mental element which exists\nabsolutely, and those which exist relatively.\n\nBy its very nature, therefore, this ultimate mental element is at once\nnecessarily indefinite and necessarily indestructible. Our consciousness\nof the unconditioned being literally the unconditioned consciousness, or\nraw material of thought to which in thinking we give definite forms, it\nfollows that an ever-present sense of real existence is the very basis\nof our intelligence. As we can in successive mental acts get rid of all\nparticular conditions and replace them by others, but cannot get rid of\nthat undifferentiated substance of consciousness which is conditioned\nanew in every thought; there ever remains with us a sense of that which\nexists persistently and independently of conditions. At the same time\nthat by the laws of thought we are rigorously prevented from forming a\nconception of absolute existence; we are by the laws of thought equally\nprevented from ridding ourselves of the consciousness of absolute\nexistence: this consciousness being, as we here see, the obverse of our\nself-consciousness. And since the only possible measure of relative\nvalidity among our beliefs, is the degree of their persistence in\nopposition to the efforts made to change them, it follows that this\nwhich persists at all times, under all circumstances, and cannot cease\nuntil consciousness ceases, has the highest validity of any.\n\nTo sum up this somewhat too elaborate argument:\u2014We have seen how in the\nvery assertion that all our knowledge, properly so called, is Relative,\nthere is involved the assertion that there exists a Non-relative. We\nhave seen how, in each step of the argument by which this doctrine is\nestablished, the same assumption is made. We have seen how, from the\nvery necessity of thinking in relations, it follows that the Relative is\nitself inconceivable, except as related to a real Non-relative. We have\nseen that unless a real Non-relative or Absolute be postulated, the\nRelative itself becomes absolute; and so brings the argument to a\ncontradiction. And on contemplating the process of thought, we have\nequally seen how impossible it is to get rid of the consciousness of an\nactuality lying behind appearances; and how, from this impossibility,\nresults our indestructible belief in that actuality.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER V.\n THE RECONCILIATION.\n\n\n\u00a7 27. Thus do all lines of argument converge to the same conclusion. The\ninference reached _\u00e0 priori_. in the last chapter, confirms the\ninferences which, in the two preceding chapters, were reached _\u00e0\nposteriori_. Those imbecilities of the understanding that disclose\nthemselves when we try to answer the highest questions of objective\nscience, subjective science proves to be necessitated by the laws of\nthat understanding. We not only learn by the frustration of all our\nefforts, that the reality underlying appearances is totally and for ever\ninconceivable by us; but we also learn why, from the very nature of our\nintelligence, it must be so. Finally we discover that this conclusion,\nwhich, in its unqualified form, seems opposed to the instinctive\nconvictions of mankind, falls into harmony with them when the missing\nqualification is supplied. Though the Absolute cannot in any manner or\ndegree be known, in the strict sense of knowing, yet we find that its\npositive existence is a necessary datum of consciousness; that so long\nas consciousness continues, we cannot for an instant rid it of this\ndatum; and that thus the belief which this datum constitutes, has a\nhigher warrant than any other whatever.\n\nHere then is that basis of agreement we set out to seek. This conclusion\nwhich objective science illustrates, and subjective science shows to be\nunavoidable,\u2014this conclusion which, while it in the main expresses the\ndoctrine of the English school of philosophy, recognizes also a soul of\ntruth in the doctrine of the antagonist German school\u2014this conclusion\nwhich brings the results of speculation into harmony with those of\ncommon sense; is also the conclusion which reconciles Religion with\nScience. Common Sense asserts the existence of a reality; Objective\nScience proves that this reality cannot be what we think it; Subjective\nScience shows why we cannot think of it as it is, and yet are compelled\nto think of it as existing; and in this assertion of a Reality utterly\ninscrutable in nature, Religion finds an assertion essentially\ncoinciding with her own. We are obliged to regard every phenomenon as a\nmanifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon; phenomena being,\nso far as we can ascertain, unlimited in their diffusion, we are obliged\nto regard this Power as omnipresent; and criticism teaches us that this\nPower is wholly incomprehensible. In this consciousness of an\nIncomprehensible Omnipresent Power, we have just that consciousness on\nwhich Religion dwells. And so we arrive at the point where Religion and\nScience coalesce.\n\nTo understand fully how real is the reconciliation thus reached, it will\nbe needful to look at the respective attitudes that Religion and Science\nhave all along maintained towards this conclusion. We must observe how,\nall along, the imperfections of each have been undergoing correction by\nthe other; and how the final out-come of their mutual criticisms, can be\nnothing else than an entire agreement on this deepest and widest of all\ntruths.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 28. In Religion let us recognize the high merit that from the\nbeginning it has dimly discerned the ultimate verity, and has never\nceased to insist upon it. In its earliest and crudest forms it\nmanifested, however vaguely and inconsistently, an intuition forming the\ngerm of this highest belief in which all philosophies finally unite. The\nconsciousness of a mystery is traceable in the rudest fetishism. Each\nhigher religious creed, rejecting those definite and simple\ninterpretations of Nature previously given, has become more religious by\ndoing this. As the quite concrete and conceivable agencies alleged as\nthe causes of things, have been replaced by agencies less concrete and\nconceivable, the element of mystery has of necessity become more\npredominant. Through all its successive phases the disappearance of\nthose positive dogmas by which the mystery was made unmysterious, has\nformed the essential change delineated in religious history. And so\nReligion has ever been approximating towards that complete recognition\nof this mystery which is its goal.\n\nFor its essentially valid belief, Religion has constantly done battle.\nGross as were the disguises under which it first espoused this belief,\nand cherishing this belief, though it still does, under disfiguring\nvestments, it has never ceased to maintain and defend it. It has\neverywhere established and propagated one or other modification of the\ndoctrine that all things are manifestations of a Power that transcends\nour knowledge. Though from age to age, Science has continually defeated\nit wherever they have come in collision, and has obliged it to\nrelinquish one or more of its positions; it has still held the remaining\nones with undiminished tenacity. No exposure of the logical\ninconsistency of its conclusions\u2014no proof that each of its particular\ndogmas was absurd, has been able to weaken its allegiance to that\nultimate verity for which it stands. After criticism has abolished all\nits arguments and reduced it to silence, there has still remained with\nit the indestructible consciousness of a truth which, however faulty the\nmode in which it had been expressed, was yet a truth beyond cavil. To\nthis conviction its adherence has been substantially sincere. And for\nthe guardianship and diffusion of it, Humanity has ever been, and must\never be, its debtor.\n\nBut while from the beginning, Religion has had the all-essential office\nof preventing men from being wholly absorbed in the relative or\nimmediate, and of awakening them to a consciousness of something beyond\nit, this office has been but very imperfectly discharged. Religion has\never been more or less irreligious; and it continues to be partially\nirreligious even now. In the first place, as implied above, it has\nall along professed to have some knowledge of that which transcends\nknowledge; and has so contradicted its own teachings. While with one\nbreath it has asserted that the Cause of all things passes\nunderstanding, it has, with the next breath, asserted that the Cause of\nall things possesses such or such attributes\u2014can be in so far\nunderstood. In the second place, while in great part sincere in\nits fealty to the great truth it had had to uphold, it has often been\ninsincere, and consequently irreligious, in maintaining the untenable\ndoctrines by which it has obscured this great truth. Each assertion\nrespecting the nature, acts, or motives of that Power which the Universe\nmanifests to us, has been repeatedly called in question, and proved to\nbe inconsistent with itself, or with accompanying assertions. Yet each\nof them has been age after age insisted on, in spite of a secret\nconsciousness that it would not bear examination. Just as though unaware\nthat its central position was impregnable, Religion has obstinately held\nevery outpost long after it was obviously indefensible. And this\nnaturally introduces us to the third and most serious form of irreligion\nwhich Religion has displayed; namely, an imperfect belief in that which\nit especially professes to believe. How truly its central position _is_\nimpregnable, Religion has never adequately realized. In the devoutest\nfaith as we habitually see it, there lies hidden an innermost core of\nscepticism; and it is this scepticism which causes that dread of inquiry\ndisplayed by Religion when face to face with Science. Obliged to abandon\none by one the superstitions it once tenaciously held, and daily finding\nits cherished beliefs more and more shaken, Religion shows a secret fear\nthat all things may some day be explained; and thus itself betrays a\nlurking doubt whether that Incomprehensible Cause of which it is\nconscious, is really incomprehensible.\n\nOf Religion then, we must always remember, that amid its many errors and\ncorruptions it has asserted and diffused a supreme verity. From the\nfirst, the recognition of this supreme verity, in however imperfect a\nmanner, has been its vital element; and its various defects, once\nextreme but gradually diminishing, have been so many failures to\nrecognize in full that which it recognized in part. The truly religious\nelement of Religion has always been good; that which has proved\nuntenable in doctrine and vicious in practice, has been its irreligious\nelement; and from this it has been ever undergoing purification.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 29. And now observe that all along, the agent which has effected the\npurification has been Science. We habitually overlook the fact that this\nhas been one of its functions. Religion ignores its immense debt to\nScience; and Science is scarcely at all conscious how much Religion owes\nit. Yet it is demonstrable that every step by which Religion has\nprogressed from its first low conception to the comparatively high one\nit has now reached, Science has helped it, or rather forced it, to take;\nand that even now, Science is urging further steps in the same\ndirection.\n\nUsing the word Science in its true sense, as comprehending all positive\nand definite knowledge of the order existing among surrounding\nphenomena, it becomes manifest that from the outset, the discovery of an\nestablished order has modified that conception of disorder, or\nundetermined order, which underlies every superstition. As fast as\nexperience proves that certain familiar changes always happen in the\nsame sequence, there begins to fade from the mind the conception of a\nspecial personality to whose variable will they were before ascribed.\nAnd when, step by step, accumulating observations do the like with the\nless familiar changes, a similar modification of belief takes place with\nrespect to them.\n\nWhile this process seems to those who effect, and those who undergo it,\nan anti-religious one, it is really the reverse. Instead of the specific\ncomprehensible agency before assigned, there is substituted a less\nspecific and less comprehensible agency; and though this, standing in\nopposition to the previous one, cannot at first call forth the same\nfeeling, yet, as being less comprehensible, it must eventually call\nforth this feeling more fully. Take an instance. Of old the Sun\nwas regarded as the chariot of a god, drawn by horses. How far the idea\nthus grossly expressed, was idealized, we need not inquire. It suffices\nto remark that this accounting for the apparent motion of the Sun by an\nagency like certain visible terrestrial agencies, reduced a daily wonder\nto the level of the commonest intellect. When, many centuries after,\nKepler discovered that the planets moved round the Sun in ellipses and\ndescribed equal areas in equal times, he concluded that in each planet\nthere must exist a spirit to guide its movements. Here we see that with\nthe progress of Science, there had disappeared the idea of a gross\nmechanical traction, such as was first assigned in the case of the Sun;\nbut that while for this there was substituted an indefinite and\nless-easily conceivable force, it was still thought needful to assume a\nspecial personal agent as a cause of the regular irregularity of motion.\nWhen, finally, it was proved that these planetary revolutions with all\ntheir variations and disturbances, conformed to one universal law\u2014when\nthe presiding spirits which Kepler conceived were set aside, and the\nforce of gravitation put in their place; the change was really the\nabolition of an imaginable agency, and the substitution of an\nunimaginable one. For though the _law_ of gravitation is within our\nmental grasp, it is impossible to realize in thought the _force_ of\ngravitation. Newton himself confessed the force of gravitation to be\nincomprehensible without the intermediation of an ether; and, as we have\nalready seen, (\u00a7 18,) the assumption of an ether does not in the least\nhelp us. Thus it is with Science in general. Its progress in\ngrouping particular relations of phenomena under laws, and these special\nlaws under laws more and more general, is of necessity a progress to\ncauses that are more and more abstract. And causes more and more\nabstract, are of necessity causes less and less conceivable; since the\nformation of an abstract conception involves the dropping of certain\nconcrete elements of thought. Hence the most abstract conception, to\nwhich Science is ever slowly approaching, is one that merges into the\ninconceivable or unthinkable, by the dropping of all concrete elements\nof thought. And so is justified the assertion, that the beliefs which\nScience has forced upon Religion, have been intrinsically more religious\nthan those which they supplanted.\n\nScience however, like Religion, has but very incompletely fulfilled its\noffice. As Religion has fallen short of its function in so far as it has\nbeen irreligious; so has Science fallen short of its function in so far\nas it has been unscientific. Let us note the several parallelisms.\n In its earlier stages, Science, while it began to teach the\nconstant relations of phenomena, and so discredited the belief in\nseparate personalities as the causes of them, itself substituted the\nbelief in causal agencies which, if not personal, were yet concrete.\nWhen certain facts were said to show \u201cNature\u2019s abhorrence of a vacuum,\u201d\nwhen the properties of gold were explained as due to some entity called\n\u201caureity,\u201d and when the phenomena of life were attributed to \u201ca vital\nprinciple;\u201d there was set up a mode of interpreting the facts, which,\nwhile antagonistic to the religious mode, because assigning other\nagencies, was also unscientific, because it professed to know that about\nwhich nothing was known. Having abandoned these metaphysical\nagencies\u2014having seen that they were not independent existences, but\nmerely special combinations of general causes, Science has more recently\nascribed extensive groups of phenomena to electricity, chemical\naffinity, and other like general powers. But in speaking of these as\nultimate and independent entities, Science has preserved substantially\nthe same attitude as before. Accounting thus for all phenomena, those of\nLife and Thought included, it has not only maintained its seeming\nantagonism to Religion, by alleging agencies of a radically unlike kind;\nbut, in so far as it has tacitly assumed a knowledge of these agencies,\nit has continued unscientific. At the present time, however, the most\nadvanced men of science are abandoning these later conceptions, as their\npredecessors abandoned the earlier ones. Magnetism, heat, light &c,\nwhich were awhile since spoken of as so many distinct imponderables,\nphysicists are now beginning to regard as different modes of\nmanifestation of some one universal force; and in so doing are ceasing\nto think of this force as comprehensible. In each phase of its\nprogress, Science has thus stopped short with superficial solutions\u2014has\nunscientifically neglected to ask what was the nature of the agents it\nso familiarly invoked. Though in each succeeding phase it has gone a\nlittle deeper, and merged its supposed agents in more general and\nabstract ones, it has still, as before, rested content with these as if\nthey were ascertained realities. And this, which has all along been the\nunscientific characteristic of Science, has all along been a part cause\nof its conflict with Religion.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 30. We see then that from the first, the faults of both Religion and\nScience have been the faults of imperfect development. Originally a mere\nrudiment, each has been growing into a more complete form; the vice of\neach has in all times been its incompleteness; the disagreements between\nthem have throughout been nothing more than the consequences of their\nincompleteness; and as they reach their final forms, they come into\nentire harmony.\n\nThe progress of intelligence has throughout been dual. Though it has not\nseemed so to those who made it, every step in advance has been a step\ntowards both the natural and the supernatural. The better interpretation\nof each phenomenon has been, on the one hand, the rejection of a cause\nthat was relatively conceivable in its nature but unknown in the order\nof its actions, and, on the other hand, the adoption of a cause that was\nknown in the order of its actions but relatively inconceivable in its\nnature. The first advance out of universal fetishism, manifestly\ninvolved the conception of agencies less assimilable to the familiar\nagencies of men and animals, and therefore less understood; while, at\nthe same time, such newly-conceived agencies in so far as they were\ndistinguished by their uniform effects, were better understood than\nthose they replaced. All subsequent advances display the same double\nresult. Every deeper and more general power arrived at as a cause of\nphenomena, has been at once less comprehensible than the special ones it\nsuperseded, in the sense of being less definitely representable in\nthought; while it has been more comprehensible in the sense that its\nactions have been more completely predicable. The progress has thus been\nas much towards the establishment of a positively unknown as towards the\nestablishment of a positively known. Though as knowledge approaches its\nculmination, every unaccountable and seemingly supernatural fact, is\nbrought into the category of facts that are accountable or natural; yet,\nat the same time, all accountable or natural facts are proved to be in\ntheir ultimate genesis unaccountable and supernatural. And so there\narise two antithetical states of mind, answering to the opposite sides\nof that existence about which we think. While our consciousness of\nNature under the one aspect constitutes Science, our consciousness of it\nunder the other aspect constitutes Religion.\n\nOtherwise contemplating the facts, we may say that Religion and Science\nhave been undergoing a slow differentiation; and that their ceaseless\nconflicts have been due to the imperfect separation of their spheres and\nfunctions. Religion has, from the first, struggled to unite more or less\nscience with its nescience; Science has, from the first, kept hold of\nmore or less nescience as though it were a part of science. Each has\nbeen obliged gradually to relinquish that territory which it wrongly\nclaimed, while it has gained from the other that to which it had a\nright; and the antagonism between them has been an inevitable\naccompaniment of this process. A more specific statement will make this\nclear. Religion, though at the outset it asserted a mystery, also\nmade numerous definite assertions respecting this mystery\u2014professed to\nknow its nature in the minutest detail; and in so far as it claimed\npositive knowledge, it trespassed upon the province of Science. From the\ntimes of early mythologies, when such intimate acquaintance with the\nmystery was alleged, down to our own days, when but a few abstract and\nvague propositions are maintained, Religion has been compelled by\nScience to give up one after another of its dogmas\u2014of those assumed\ncognitions which it could not substantiate. In the mean time, Science\nsubstituted for the personalities to which Religion ascribed phenomena,\ncertain metaphysical entities; and in doing this it trespassed on the\nprovince of Religion; since it classed among the things which it\ncomprehended, certain forms of the incomprehensible. Partly by the\ncriticisms of Religion, which has occasionally called in question its\nassumptions, and partly as a consequence of spontaneous growth, Science\nhas been obliged to abandon these attempts to include within the\nboundaries of knowledge that which cannot be known; and has so yielded\nup to Religion that which of right belonged to it. So long as this\nprocess of differentiation is incomplete, more or less of antagonism\nmust continue. Gradually as the limits of possible cognition are\nestablished, the causes of conflict will diminish. And a permanent peace\nwill be reached when Science becomes fully convinced that its\nexplanations are proximate and relative; while Religion becomes fully\nconvinced that the mystery it contemplates is ultimate and absolute.\n\nReligion and Science are therefore necessary correlatives. As already\nhinted, they stand respectively for those two antithetical modes of\nconsciousness which cannot exist asunder. A known cannot be thought of\napart from an unknown; nor can an unknown be thought of apart from a\nknown. And by consequence neither can become more distinct without\ngiving greater distinctness to the other. To carry further a metaphor\nbefore used,\u2014they are the positive and negative poles of thought; of\nwhich neither can gain in intensity without increasing the intensity of\nthe other.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 31. Thus the consciousness of an Inscrutable Power manifested to us\nthrough all phenomena, has been growing ever clearer; and must\neventually be freed from its imperfections. The certainty that on the\none hand such a Power exists, while on the other hand its nature\ntranscends intuition and is beyond imagination, is the certainty towards\nwhich intelligence has from the first been progressing. To this\nconclusion Science inevitably arrives as it reaches its confines; while\nto this conclusion Religion is irresistibly driven by criticism. And\nsatisfying as it does the demands of the most rigorous logic at the same\ntime that it gives the religious sentiment the widest possible sphere of\naction, it is the conclusion we are bound to accept without reserve or\nqualification.\n\nSome do indeed allege that though the Ultimate Cause of things cannot\nreally be thought of by us as having specified attributes, it is yet\nincumbent upon us to assert these attributes. Though the forms of our\nconsciousness are such that the Absolute cannot in any manner or degree\nbe brought within them, we are nevertheless told that we must represent\nthe Absolute to ourselves under these forms. As writes Mr Mansel, in the\nwork from which I have already quoted largely\u2014\u201cIt is our duty, then, to\nthink of God as personal; and it is our duty to believe that He is\ninfinite.\u201d\n\nThat this is not the conclusion here adopted, needs hardly be said. If\nthere be any meaning in the foregoing arguments, duty requires us\nneither to affirm nor deny personality. Our duty is to submit ourselves\nwith all humility to the established limits of our intelligence; and not\nperversely to rebel against them. Let those who can, believe that there\nis eternal war set between our intellectual faculties and our moral\nobligations. I for one, admit no such radical vice in the constitution\nof things.\n\nThis which to most will seem an essentially irreligious position, is an\nessentially religious one\u2014nay is _the_ religious one, to which, as\nalready shown, all others are but approximations. In the estimate it\nimplies of the Ultimate Cause, it does not fall short of the alternative\nposition, but exceeds it. Those who espouse this alternative position,\nmake the erroneous assumption that the choice is between personality and\nsomething lower than personality; whereas the choice is rather between\npersonality and something higher. Is it not just possible that there is\na mode of being as much transcending Intelligence and Will, as these\ntranscend mechanical motion? It is true that we are totally unable to\nconceive any such higher mode of being. But this is not a reason for\nquestioning its existence; it is rather the reverse. Have we not seen\nhow utterly incompetent our minds are to form even an approach to a\nconception of that which underlies all phenomena? Is it not proved that\nthis incompetency is the incompetency of the Conditioned to grasp the\nUnconditioned? Does it not follow that the Ultimate Cause cannot in any\nrespect be conceived by us because it is in every respect greater than\ncan be conceived? And may we not therefore rightly refrain from\nassigning to it any attributes whatever, on the ground that such\nattributes, derived as they must be from our own natures, are not\nelevations but degradations? Indeed it seems somewhat strange that men\nshould suppose the highest worship to lie in assimilating the object of\ntheir worship to themselves. Not in asserting a transcendant difference,\nbut in asserting a certain likeness, consists the element of their creed\nwhich they think essential. It is true that from the time when the\nrudest savages imagined the causes of all things to be creatures of\nflesh and blood like themselves, down to our own time, the degree of\nassumed likeness has been diminishing. But though a bodily form and\nsubstance similar to that of man, has long since ceased, among\ncultivated races, to be a literally-conceived attribute of the Ultimate\nCause\u2014though the grosser human desires have been also rejected as unfit\nelements of the conception\u2014though there is some hesitation in ascribing\neven the higher human feelings, save in greatly idealized shapes; yet it\nis still thought not only proper, but imperative, to ascribe the most\nabstract qualities of our nature. To think of the Creative Power as in\nall respects anthropomorphous, is now considered impious by men who yet\nhold themselves bound to think of the Creative Power as in some respects\nanthropomorphous; and who do not see that the one proceeding is but an\nevanescent form of the other. And then, most marvellous of all, this\ncourse is persisted in even by those who contend that we are wholly\nunable to frame any conception whatever of the Creative Power. After it\nhas been shown that every supposition respecting the genesis of the\nUniverse commits us to alternative impossibilities of thought\u2014after it\nhas been shown that each attempt to conceive real existence ends in an\nintellectual suicide\u2014after it has been shown why, by the very\nconstitution of our minds, we are eternally debarred from thinking of\nthe Absolute; it is still asserted that we ought to think of the\nAbsolute thus and thus. In all imaginable ways we find thrust upon us\nthe truth, that we are not permitted to know\u2014nay are not even permitted\nto conceive\u2014that Reality which is behind the veil of Appearance; and yet\nit is said to be our duty to believe (and in so far to conceive) that\nthis Reality exists in a certain defined manner. Shall we call this\nreverence? or shall we call it the reverse?\n\nVolumes might be written upon the impiety of the pious. Through the\nprinted and spoken thoughts of religious teachers, may almost everywhere\nbe traced a professed familiarity with the ultimate mystery of things,\nwhich, to say the least of it, seems anything but congruous with the\naccompanying expressions of humility. And surprisingly enough, those\ntenets which most clearly display this familiarity, are those insisted\nupon as forming the vital elements of religious belief. The attitude\nthus assumed, can be fitly represented only by further developing a\nsimile long current in theological controversies\u2014the simile of the\nwatch. If for a moment we made the grotesque supposition that the\ntickings and other movements of a watch constituted a kind of\nconsciousness; and that a watch possessed of such a consciousness,\ninsisted on regarding the watchmaker\u2019s actions as determined like its\nown by springs and escapements; we should simply complete a parallel of\nwhich religious teachers think much. And were we to suppose that a watch\nnot only formulated the cause of its existence in these mechanical\nterms, but held that watches were bound out of reverence so to formulate\nthis cause, and even vituperated, as atheistic watches, any that did not\nventure so to formulate it; we should merely illustrate the presumption\nof theologians by carrying their own argument a step further. A\nfew extracts will bring home to the reader the justice of this\ncomparison. We are told, for example, by one of high repute among\nreligious thinkers, that the Universe is \u201cthe manifestation and abode of\na Free Mind, like our own; embodying His personal thought in its\nadjustments, realizing His own ideal in its phenomena, just as we\nexpress own inner faculty and character through the natural language of\nan external life. In this view, we interpret Nature by Humanity; we find\nthe key to her aspects in such purposes and affections as our own\nconsciousness enables us to conceive; we look everywhere for physical\nsignals of an ever-living Will; and decipher the universe as the\nautobiography of an Infinite Spirit, repeating itself in miniature\nwithin our Finite Spirit.\u201d The same writer goes still further. He not\nonly thus parallels the assimilation of the watchmaker to the watch,\u2014he\nnot only thinks the created can \u201cdecipher\u201d \u201cthe autobiography\u201d of the\nCreating; but he asserts that the necessary limits of the one are\nnecessary limits of the other. The primary qualities of bodies, he says,\n\u201cbelong eternally to the material datum objective to God\u201d and control\nhis acts; while the secondary ones are \u201cproducts of pure Inventive\nReason and Determining Will\u201d\u2014constitute \u201cthe realm of Divine\noriginality.\u201d * * * \u201cWhile on this Secondary field His Mind and ours are\nthus contrasted, they meet in resemblance again upon the Primary: for\nthe evolutions of deductive Reason there is but one track possible to\nall intelligences; no _merum arbitrium_ can interchange the false and\ntrue, or make more than one geometry, one scheme of pure Physics, for\nall worlds; and the Omnipotent Architect Himself, in realizing the\nKosmical conception, in shaping the orbits out of immensity and\ndetermining seasons out of eternity, could but follow the laws of\ncurvature, measure and proportion.\u201d That is to say, the Ultimate Cause\nis like a human mechanic, not only as \u201cshaping\u201d the \u201cmaterial datum\nobjective to\u201d Him, but also as being obliged to conform to the necessary\nproperties of that \u201cdatum.\u201d Nor is this all. There follows some account\nof \u201cthe Divine psychology,\u201d to the extent of saying that \u201cwe learn\u201d \u201cthe\ncharacter of God\u2014the order of affections in Him\u201d from \u201cthe distribution\nof authority in the hierarchy of our impulses.\u201d In other words, it is\nalleged that the Ultimate Cause has desires that are to be classed as\nhigher and lower like our own.[7] Every one has heard of the king\nwho wished he had been present at the creation of the world, that he\nmight have given good advice. He was humble however compared with those\nwho profess to understand not only the relation of the Creating to the\ncreated, but also how the Creating is constituted. And yet this\ntranscendant audacity, which claims to penetrate the secrets of the\nPower manifested to us through all existence\u2014nay even to stand behind\nthat Power and note the conditions to its action\u2014this it is which passes\ncurrent as piety! May we not without hesitation affirm that a sincere\nrecognition of the truth that our own and all other existence is a\nmystery absolutely and for ever beyond our comprehension, contains more\nof true religion than all the dogmatic theology ever written?\n\nMeanwhile let us recognize whatever of permanent good there is in these\npersistent attempts to frame conceptions of that which cannot be\nconceived. From the beginning it has been only through the successive\nfailures of such conceptions to satisfy the mind, that higher and higher\nones have been gradually reached; and doubtless, the conceptions now\ncurrent are indispensable as transitional modes of thought. Even more\nthan this may be willingly conceded. It is possible, nay probable, that\nunder their most abstract forms, ideas of this order will always\ncontinue to occupy the background of our consciousness. Very likely\nthere will ever remain a need to give shape to that indefinite sense of\nan Ultimate Existence, which forms the basis of our intelligence. We\nshall always be under the necessity of contemplating it as _some_ mode\nof being; that is\u2014of representing it to ourselves in _some_ form of\nthought, however vague. And we shall not err in doing this so long as we\ntreat every notion we thus frame as merely a symbol, utterly without\nresemblance to that for which it stands. Perhaps the constant formation\nof such symbols and constant rejection of them as inadequate, may be\nhereafter, as it has hitherto been, a means of discipline. Perpetually\nto construct ideas requiring the utmost stretch of our faculties, and\nperpetually to find that such ideas must be abandoned as futile\nimaginations, may realize to us more fully than any other course, the\ngreatness of that which we vainly strive to grasp. Such efforts and\nfailures may serve to maintain in our minds a due sense of the\nincommensurable difference between the Conditioned and the\nUnconditioned. By continually seeking to know and being continually\nthrown back with a deepened conviction of the impossibility of knowing,\nwe may keep alive the consciousness that it is alike our highest wisdom\nand our highest duty to regard that through which all things exist as\nThe Unknowable.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 32. An immense majority will refuse with more or less of indignation,\na belief seeming to them so shadowy and indefinite. Having always\nembodied the Ultimate Cause so far as was needful to its mental\nrealization, they must necessarily resent the substitution of an\nUltimate Cause which cannot be mentally realized at all. \u201cYou offer us,\u201d\nthey say, \u201can unthinkable abstraction in place of a Being towards whom\nwe may entertain definite feelings. Though we are told that the Absolute\nis real, yet since we are not allowed to conceive it, it might as well\nbe a pure negation. Instead of a Power which we can regard as having\nsome sympathy with us, you would have us contemplate a Power to which no\nemotion whatever can be ascribed. And so we are to be deprived of the\nvery substance of our faith.\u201d\n\nThis kind of protest of necessity accompanies every change from a lower\ncreed to a higher. The belief in a community of nature between himself\nand the object of his worship, has always been to man a satisfactory\none; and he has always accepted with reluctance those successively less\nconcrete conceptions which have been forced upon him. Doubtless, in all\ntimes and places, it has consoled the barbarian to think of his deities\nas so exactly like himself in nature, that they could be bribed by\nofferings of food; and the assurance that deities could not be so\npropitiated, must have been repugnant, because it deprived him of an\neasy method of gaining supernatural protection. To the Greeks it was\nmanifestly a source of comfort that on occasions of difficulty they\ncould obtain, through oracles, the advice of their gods,\u2014nay, might even\nget the personal aid of their gods in battle; and it was probably a very\ngenuine anger which they visited upon philosophers who called in\nquestion these gross ideas of their mythology. A religion which teaches\nthe Hindoo that it is impossible to purchase eternal happiness by\nplacing himself under the wheel of Juggernaut, can scarcely fail to seem\na cruel one to him; since it deprives him of the pleasurable\nconsciousness that he can at will exchange miseries for joys. Nor is it\nless clear that to our Catholic ancestors, the beliefs that crimes could\nbe compounded for by the building of churches, that their own\npunishments and those of their relatives could be abridged by the saying\nof masses, and that divine aid or forgiveness might be gained through\nthe intercession of saints, were highly solacing ones; and that\nProtestantism, in substituting the conception of a God so comparatively\nunlike ourselves as not to be influenced by such methods, must have\nappeared to them hard and cold. Naturally, therefore, we must expect a\nfurther step in the same direction to meet with a similar resistance\nfrom outraged sentiments. No mental revolution can be accomplished\nwithout more or less of laceration. Be it a change of habit or a change\nof conviction, it must, if the habit or conviction be strong, do\nviolence to some of the feelings; and these must of course oppose it.\nFor long-experienced, and therefore definite, sources of satisfaction,\nhave to be substituted sources of satisfaction that have not been\nexperienced, and are therefore indefinite. That which is relatively well\nknown and real, has to be given up for that which is relatively unknown\nand ideal. And of course such an exchange cannot be made without a\nconflict involving pain. Especially then must there arise a strong\nantagonism to any alteration in so deep and vital a conception as that\nwith which we are here dealing. Underlying, as this conception does, all\nothers, a modification of it threatens to reduce the superstructure to\nruins. Or to change the metaphor\u2014being the root with which are connected\nour ideas of goodness, rectitude, or duty, it appears impossible that it\nshould be transformed without causing these to wither away and die. The\nwhole higher part of the nature almost of necessity takes up arms\nagainst a change which, by destroying the established associations of\nthought, seems to eradicate morality.\n\nThis is by no means all that has to be said for such protests. There is\na much deeper meaning in them. They do not simply express the natural\nrepugnance to a revolution of belief, here made specially intense by the\nvital importance of the belief to be revolutionized; but they also\nexpress an instinctive adhesion to a belief that is in one sense the\nbest\u2014the best for those who thus cling to it, though not abstractedly\nthe best. For here let me remark that what were above spoken of as\nthe imperfections of Religion, at first great but gradually diminishing,\nhave been imperfections only as measured by an absolute standard; and\nnot as measured by a relative one. Speaking generally, the religion\ncurrent in each age and among each people, has been as near an\napproximation to the truth as it was then and there possible for men to\nreceive: the more or less concrete forms in which it has embodied the\ntruth, have simply been the means of making thinkable what would\notherwise have been unthinkable; and so have for the time being served\nto increase its impressiveness. If we consider the conditions of\nthe case, we shall find this to be an unavoidable conclusion. During\neach stage of evolution, men must think in such terms of thought as they\npossess. While all the conspicuous changes of which they can observe the\norigins, have men and animals as antecedents, they are unable to think\nof antecedents in general under any other shapes; and hence creative\nagencies are of necessity conceived by them in these shapes. If during\nthis phase, these concrete conceptions were taken from them, and the\nattempt made to give them comparatively abstract conceptions, the result\nwould be to leave their minds with none at all; since the substituted\nones could not be mentally represented. Similarly with every successive\nstage of religious belief, down to the last. Though, as accumulating\nexperiences slowly modify the earliest ideas of causal personalities,\nthere grow up more general and vague ideas of them; yet these cannot be\nat once replaced by others still more general and vague. Further\nexperiences must supply the needful further abstractions, before the\nmental void left by the destruction of such inferior ideas can be filled\nby ideas of a superior order. And at the present time, the refusal to\nabandon a relatively concrete notion for a relatively abstract one,\nimplies the inability to frame the relatively abstract one; and so\nproves that the change would be premature and injurious. Still\nmore clearly shall we see the injuriousness of any such premature\nchange, on observing that the effects of a belief upon conduct must be\ndiminished in proportion as the vividness with which it is realized\nbecomes less. Evils and benefits akin to those which the savage has\npersonally felt, or learned from those who have felt them, are the only\nevils and benefits he can understand; and these must be looked for as\ncoming in ways, like those of which he has had experience. His deities\nmust be imagined to have like motives and passions and methods with the\nbeings around him; for motives and passions and methods of a higher\ncharacter, being unknown to him, and in great measure unthinkable by\nhim, cannot be so realized in thought as to influence his deeds. During\nevery phase of civilization, the actions of the Unseen Reality, as well\nas the resulting rewards and punishments, being conceivable only in such\nforms as experience furnishes, to supplant them by higher ones before\nwider experiences have made higher ones conceivable, is to set up vague\nand uninfluential motives for definite and influential ones. Even now,\nfor the great mass of men, unable through lack of culture to trace out\nwith due clearness those good and bad consequences which conduct brings\nround through the established order of the Unknowable, it is needful\nthat there should be vividly depicted future torments and future\njoys\u2014pains and pleasures of a definite kind, produced in a manner direct\nand simple enough to be clearly imagined. Nay still more must be\nconceded. Few if any are as yet fitted wholly to dispense with such\nconceptions as are current. The highest abstractions take so great a\nmental power to realize with any vividness, and are so inoperative upon\nconduct unless they are vividly realized, that their regulative effects\nmust for a long period to come be appreciable on but a small minority.\nTo see clearly how a right or wrong act generates consequences, internal\nand external, that go on branching out more widely as years progress,\nrequires a rare power of analysis. To mentally represent even a single\nseries of these consequences, as it stretches out into the remote\nfuture, requires an equally rare power of imagination. And to estimate\nthese consequences in their totality, ever multiplying in number while\ndiminishing in intensity, requires a grasp of thought possessed by none.\nYet it is only by such analysis, such imagination, and such grasp, that\nconduct can be rightly guided in the absence of all other control: only\nso can ultimate rewards and penalties be made to outweigh proximate\npains and pleasures. Indeed, were it not that throughout the progress of\nthe race, men\u2019s experiences of the effects of conduct have been slowly\ngeneralized into principles\u2014were it not that these principles have been\nfrom generation to generation insisted on by parents, upheld by public\nopinion, sanctified by religion, and enforced by threats of eternal\ndamnation for disobedience\u2014were it not that under these potent\ninfluences, habits have been modified, and the feelings proper to them\nmade innate\u2014were it not, in short, that we have been rendered in a\nconsiderable degree organically moral; it is certain that disastrous\nresults would ensue from the removal of those strong and distinct\nmotives which the current belief supplies. Even as it is, those who\nrelinquish the faith in which they have been brought up, for this most\nabstract faith in which Science and Religion unite, may not uncommonly\nfail to act up to their convictions. Left to their organic morality,\nenforced only by general reasonings imperfectly wrought out and\ndifficult to keep before the mind, their defects of nature will often\ncome out more strongly than they would have done under their previous\ncreed. The substituted creed can become adequately operative only when\nit becomes, like the present one, an element in early education, and has\nthe support of a strong social sanction. Nor will men be quite ready for\nit until, through the continuance of a discipline which has already\npartially moulded them to the conditions of social existence, they are\ncompletely moulded to those conditions.\n\nWe must therefore recognize the resistance to a change of theological\nopinion, as in great measure salutary. It is not simply that strong and\ndeep-rooted feelings are necessarily excited to antagonism\u2014it is not\nsimply that the highest moral sentiments join in the condemnation of a\nchange which seems to undermine their authority; but it is that a real\nadaptation exists between an established belief and the natures of those\nwho defend it; and that the tenacity of the defence measures the\ncompleteness of the adaptation. Forms of religion, like forms of\ngovernment, must be fit for those who live under them; and in the one\ncase as in the other, that form which is fittest is that for which there\nis an instinctive preference. As certainly as a barbarous race needs a\nharsh terrestrial rule, and habitually shows attachment to a despotism\ncapable of the necessary rigour; so certainly does such a race need a\nbelief in a celestial rule that is similarly harsh, and habitually shows\nattachment to such a belief. And just in the same way that the sudden\nsubstitution of free institutions for tyrannical ones, is sure to be\nfollowed by a reaction; so, if a creed full of dreadful ideal penalties\nis all at once replaced by one presenting ideal penalties that are\ncomparatively gentle, there will inevitably be a return to some\nmodification of the old belief. The parallelism holds yet further.\nDuring those early stages in which there is an extreme incongruity\nbetween the relatively best and the absolutely best, both political and\nreligious changes, when at rare intervals they occur, are necessarily\nviolent; and necessarily entail violent retrogressions. But as the\nincongruity between that which is and that which should be, diminishes,\nthe changes become more moderate, and are succeeded by more moderate\nretrogressions; until, as these movements and counter-movements decrease\nin amount and increase in frequency, they merge into an almost\ncontinuous growth. That adhesion to old institutions and beliefs, which,\nin primitive societies, opposes an iron barrier to any advance, and\nwhich, after the barrier has been at length burst through, brings back\nthe institutions and beliefs from that too-forward position to which the\nmomentum of change had carried them, and so helps to re-adapt social\nconditions to the popular character\u2014this adhesion to old institution and\nbeliefs, eventually becomes the constant check by which the constant\nadvance is prevented from being too rapid. This holds true of religious\ncreeds and forms, as of civil ones. And so we learn that theological\nconservatism, like political conservatism, has an all-important\nfunction.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 33. That spirit of toleration which is so marked a characteristic of\nmodern times, and is daily growing more conspicuous, has thus a far\ndeeper meaning than is supposed. What we commonly regard simply as a due\nrespect for the right of private judgment, is really a necessary\ncondition to the balancing of the progressive and conservative\ntendencies\u2014is a means of maintaining the adaptation between men\u2019s\nbeliefs and their natures. It is therefore a spirit to be fostered; and\nit is a spirit which the catholic thinker, who perceives the functions\nof these various conflicting creeds, should above all other men display.\n Doubtless whoever feels the greatness of the error to which his\nfellows cling and the greatness of the truth which they reject, will\nfind it hard to show a due patience. It is hard for him to listen calmly\nto the futile arguments used in support of irrational doctrines, and to\nthe misrepresentation of antagonist doctrines. It is hard for him to\nbear the manifestation of that pride of ignorance which so far exceeds\nthe pride of science. Naturally enough such a one will be indignant when\ncharged with irreligion because he declines to accept the\ncarpenter-theory of creation as the most worthy one. He may think it\nneedless as it is difficult, to conceal his repugnance to a creed which\ntacitly ascribes to The Unknowable a love of adulation such as would be\ndespised in a human being. Convinced as he is that all punishment, as we\nsee it wrought out in the order of nature, is but a disguised\nbeneficence, there will perhaps escape from him an angry condemnation of\nthe belief that punishment is a divine vengeance, and that divine\nvengeance is eternal. He may be tempted to show his contempt when he is\ntold that actions instigated by an unselfish sympathy or by a pure love\nof rectitude, are intrinsically sinful; and that conduct is truly good\nonly when it is due to a faith whose openly-professed motive is\nother-worldliness. But he must restrain such feelings. Though he may be\nunable to do this during the excitement of controversy, or when\notherwise brought face to face with current superstitions, he must yet\nqualify his antagonism in calmer moments; so that his mature judgment\nand resulting conduct may be without bias.\n\nTo this end let him ever bear in mind three cardinal facts\u2014two of them\nalready dwelt upon, and one still to be pointed out. The first is\nthat with which we set out; namely the existence of a fundamental verity\nunder all forms of religion, however degraded. In each of them there is\na soul of truth. Through the gross body of dogmas traditions and rites\nwhich contain it, it is always visible\u2014dimly or clearly as the case may\nbe. This it is which gives vitality even to the rudest creed; this it is\nwhich survives every modification; and this it is which we must not\nforget when condemning the forms under which it is presented. The\nsecond of these cardinal facts, set forth at length in the foregoing\nsection, is, that while those concrete elements in which each creed\nembodies this soul of truth, are bad as measured by an absolute\nstandard, they are good as measured by a relative standard. Though from\nhigher perceptions they hide the abstract verity within them; yet to\nlower perceptions they render this verity more appreciable than it would\notherwise be. They serve to make real and influential over men, that\nwhich would else be unreal and uninfluential. Or we may call them the\nprotective envelopes, without which the contained truth would die.\n The remaining cardinal fact is, that these various beliefs are\nparts of the constituted order of things; and not accidental but\nnecessary parts. Seeing how one or other of them is everywhere present;\nis of perennial growth; and when cut down, redevelops in a form but\nslightly modified; we cannot avoid the inference that they are needful\naccompaniments of human life, severally fitted to the societies in which\nthey are indigenous. From the highest point of view, we must recognize\nthem as elements in that great evolution of which the beginning and end\nare beyond our knowledge or conception\u2014as modes of manifestation of The\nUnknowable; and as having this for their warrant.\n\nOur toleration therefore should be the widest possible. Or rather, we\nshould aim at something beyond toleration, as commonly understood. In\ndealing with alien beliefs, our endeavour must be, not simply to refrain\nfrom injustice of word or deed; but also to do justice by an open\nrecognition of positive worth. We must qualify our disagreement with as\nmuch as may be of sympathy.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 34. These admissions will perhaps be held to imply, that the current\ntheology should be passively accepted; or, at any rate, should not be\nactively opposed. \u201cWhy,\u201d it may be asked, \u201cif all creeds have an average\nfitness to their times and places, should we not rest content with that\nto which we are born? If the established belief contains an essential\ntruth\u2014if the forms under which it presents this truth, though\nintrinsically bad, are extrinsically good\u2014if the abolition of these\nforms would be at present detrimental to the great majority\u2014nay, if\nthere are scarcely any to whom the ultimate and most abstract belief can\nfurnish an adequate rule of life; surely it is wrong, for the present at\nleast, to propagate this ultimate and most abstract belief.\u201d\n\nThe reply is, that though existing religious ideas and institutions have\nan average adaptation to the characters of the people who live under\nthem; yet, as these characters are ever changing, the adaptation is ever\nbecoming imperfect; and the ideas and institutions need remodelling with\na frequency proportionate to the rapidity of the change. Hence, while it\nis requisite that free play should be given to conservative thought and\naction, progressive thought and action must also have free play. Without\nthe agency of both, there cannot be those continual re-adaptations which\norderly progress demands.\n\nWhoever hesitates to utter that which he thinks the highest truth, lest\nit should be too much in advance of the time, may reassure himself by\nlooking at his acts from an impersonal point of view. Let him duly\nrealize the fact that opinion is the agency through which character\nadapts external arrangements to itself\u2014that his opinion rightly forms\npart of this agency\u2014is a unit of force, constituting, with other such\nunits, the general power which works out social changes; and he will\nperceive that he may properly give full utterance to his innermost\nconviction: leaving it to produce what effect it may. It is not for\nnothing that he has in him these sympathies with some principles and\nrepugnance to others. He, with all his capacities, and aspirations, and\nbeliefs, is not an accident, but a product of the time. He must remember\nthat while he is a descendant of the past, he is a parent of the future;\nand that his thoughts are as children born to him, which he may not\ncarelessly let die. He, like every other man, may properly consider\nhimself as one of the myriad agencies through whom works the Unknown\nCause; and when the Unknown Cause produces in him a certain belief, he\nis thereby authorized to profess and act out that belief. For, to render\nin their highest sense the words of the poet\u2014\n\n \u2014\u2014Nature is made better by no mean,\n But nature makes that mean: over that art\n Which you say adds to nature, is an art\n That nature makes.\n\nNot as adventitious therefore will the wise man regard the faith which\nis in him. The highest truth he sees he will fearlessly utter; knowing\nthat, let what may come of it, he is thus playing his right part in the\nworld\u2014knowing that if he can effect the change he aims at\u2014well: if\nnot\u2014well also; though not _so_ well.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 7:\n\n These extracts are from an article entitled \u201cNature and God,\u201d\n published in the _National Review_ for October, 1860.\n\n\n\n\n PART II.\n\n LAWS OF THE KNOWABLE.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER I.\n LAWS IN GENERAL.\n\n\n\u00a7 35. We have seen that intellectual advance has been dual\u2014has been\ntowards the establishment of both a positively unknown and a positively\nknown. In making ever more certain the inaccessibility of one kind of\ntruth, experience has made ever more certain the accessibility of\nanother kind. The differentiation of the knowable from the unknowable,\nis shown as much in the reduction of the one to perfect clearness, as in\nthe reduction of the other to impenetrable mystery. Progressing\nenlightenment discloses a definite limit to human intelligence; and\nwhile all which lies on the other side of the limit, is, with increasing\ndistinctness, seen to transcend our finite faculties, it grows more and\nmore obvious that all which lies on this side of the limit may become an\nindisputable possession.\n\nTo speak specifically\u2014it has been shown that though we can never learn\nthe _nature_ of that which is manifested to us, we are daily learning\nmore completely the _order_ of its manifestations. We are conscious of\neffects produced in us by something separate from ourselves. The effects\nof which we are conscious\u2014the changes of consciousness which make up our\nmental life, we ascribe to the forces of an external world. The\nintrinsic character of these forces\u2014of this external world\u2014of that which\nunderlies all appearances, we find inscrutable; as is also the internal\nsomething whose changes constitute consciousness, but at the same time\nwe find that among the changes of consciousness thus produced, there\nexist various constant relations; and we have no choice but to ascribe\nconstancy to the relations which subsist among the inscrutable causes of\nthese changes. Observation early discloses certain invariable connexions\nof coexistence and sequence among phenomena. Accumulating experiences\ntend continually to augment the number of invariable connexions\nrecognized. When, as in the later stages of civilization, there arises\nnot only a diligent gathering together of experiences but a critical\ncomparison of them, more remote and complex connexions are added to the\nlist. And gradually there grows up the habit of regarding these\nuniformities of relation as characterizing all manifestations of the\nUnknowable. Under the endless variety and seeming irregularity, there is\never more clearly discerned that \u201cconstant course of procedure\u201d which we\ncall Law.\n\nThe growing belief in the universality of Law, is so conspicuous to all\ncultivated minds as scarcely to need illustration. None who read these\npages will ask for proof that this has been the central element of\nintellectual progress. But though the fact is sufficiently familiar, the\nphilosophy of the fact is not so; and it will be desirable now to\nconsider it. Partly because the development of our conception of Law\nwill so be rendered more comprehensible; but chiefly because our\nsubsequent course will thus be facilitated; I propose here to enumerate\nthe several conditions that determine the order in which the various\nrelations among phenomena are discovered. Seeing, as we shall, the\nconsequent necessity of this order; and enabled, as we shall also be, to\nestimate the future by inference from the past; we shall perceive how\ninevitable is our advance towards the ultimatum that has been indicated.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 36. The recognition of Law, being the recognition of uniformity of\nrelations among phenomena, it follows that the order in which different\ngroups of phenomena are reduced to law, must depend on the frequency and\ndistinctness with which the uniform relations they severally present,\nare experienced. At any given stage of progress, those uniformities will\nbe most recognized with which men\u2019s minds have been oftenest and most\nstrongly impressed. In proportion partly to the number of times a\nrelation has been presented to consciousness (not merely to the senses);\nand in proportion partly to the vividness with which the terms of the\nrelation have been cognized; will be the degree in which the constancy\nof connexion is perceived.\n\nThe frequency and impressiveness with which different classes of\nrelations are repeated in conscious experience, thus primarily\ndetermining the succession in which they are generalized, there result\ncertain derivative principles to which this succession must more\nimmediately and obviously conform. First in importance comes _the\ndirectness with which personal welfare is affected_. While, among\nsurrounding things, many do not appreciably influence the body in any\nway, some act detrimentally and some beneficially, in various degrees;\nand manifestly, those things whose actions on the organism are most\ninfluential, will, c\u00e6teris paribus, be those whose laws of action are\nearliest observed. Second in order, is _the conspicuousness of one\nor both the phenomena between which a relation is to be perceived_. On\nevery side are countless phenomena so concealed as to be detected only\nby close observation; others not obtrusive enough to attract notice;\nothers which moderately solicit the attention; others so imposing or\nvivid as to force themselves upon consciousness; and supposing\nincidental conditions to be the same, these last will of course be among\nthe first to have their relations generalized. In the third place,\nwe have _the absolute frequency with which the relations occur_. There\nare coexistences and sequences of all degrees of commonness, from those\nwhich are ever present to those which are extremely rare; and it is\nclear that the rare coexistences and sequences, as well as the sequences\nwhich are very long in taking place, will not be reduced to law so soon\nas those which are familiar and rapid. Fourthly has to be added\n_the relative frequency of occurrence_. Many events and appearances are\nmore or less limited to times and places; and as a relation which does\nnot exist within the environment of an observer, cannot be cognized by\nhim, however common it may be elsewhere or in another age, we have to\ntake account of the surrounding physical circumstances, as well as the\nstate of society, of the arts, and of the sciences\u2014all of which affect\nthe frequency with which certain groups of facts are exposed to\nobservation. The fifth corollary to be noticed, is, that the\nsuccession in which different classes of phenomena are reduced to law,\ndepends in part on their _simplicity_. Phenomena presenting great\ncomposition of causes or conditions, have their essential relations so\nmasked, that it requires accumulated experiences to impress upon\nconsciousness the true connexion of antecedents and consequents they\ninvolve. Hence, other things equal, the progress of generalization will\nbe from the simple to the complex; and this it is which M. Comte has\nwrongly asserted to be the sole regulative principle of the progress.\n Sixth, and last, comes _the degree of abstractness_. Concrete\nrelations are the earliest acquisitions. The colligation of any group of\nthese into a general relation, which is the first step in abstraction,\nnecessarily comes later than the discovery of the relations colligated.\nThe union of a number of these lowest generalizations into a higher and\nmore abstract generalization, is necessarily subsequent to the formation\nof such lowest generalizations. And so on continually, until the highest\nand most abstract generalizations have been reached.\n\nThese then are the several derivative principles. The frequency and\nvividness with which uniform relations are repeated in conscious\nexperience, determining the recognition of their uniformity; and this\nfrequency and vividness depending on the above conditions; it follows\nthat the order in which different classes of facts are generalized, must\ndepend on the extent to which the above conditions are fulfilled in each\nclass. Let us mark how the facts harmonize with this conclusion: taking\nfirst a few that elucidate the general truth, and afterwards some that\nare illustrative of the several special truths which we here see follow\nfrom it.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 37. The relations earliest known as uniformities, are those subsisting\nbetween the common physical properties of matter\u2014tangibility,\nvisibility, cohesion, weight &c. We have no trace of an era in human\nhistory when the resistance offered by every visible object, was\nregarded as caused by the will of the object; or when the pressure of a\nbody on the hand supporting it, was ascribed to the direct agency of a\nliving being. And accordingly, we see that these are the relations\noftenest repeated in consciousness; being as they are, objectively\nfrequent, conspicuous, simple, concrete, and of immediate personal\nconcern.\n\nSimilarly with respect to the ordinary phenomena of motion. The fall of\na mass on the withdrawal of its support, is a sequence which directly\naffects bodily welfare, is conspicuous, simple, concrete, and very often\nrepeated. Hence it is one of the uniformities recognized before the dawn\nof tradition. We know of no time when movements due to terrestrial\ngravitation were attributed to volition. Only when the relation is\nobscured\u2014only, as in the case of an aerolite, where the antecedent of\nthe descent is unperceived, do we find the fetishistic conception\npersistent. On the other hand, motions of intrinsically the same\norder as that of a falling stone\u2014those of the heavenly bodies\u2014long\nremain ungeneralized; and until their uniformity is seen, are construed\nas results of will. This difference is clearly not dependent on\ncomparative complexity or abstractness; since the motion of a planet in\nan ellipse, is as simple and concrete a phenomenon as the motion of a\nprojected arrow in a parabola. But the antecedents are not conspicuous;\nthe sequences are of long duration; and they are infrequently repeated.\nHence in a given period, there cannot be the same multiplied experiences\nof them. And that this is the chief cause of their slow reduction to\nlaw, we see in the fact that they are severally generalized in the order\nof their frequency and conspicuousness\u2014the moon\u2019s monthly cycle, the\nsun\u2019s annual change, the periods of the inferior planets, the periods of\nthe superior planets.\n\nWhile astronomical sequences were still ascribed to volition, certain\nterrestrial sequences of a different kind, but some of them equally\nwithout complication, were interpreted in like manner. The\nsolidification of water at a low temperature, is a phenomenon that is\nsimple, concrete, and of much personal concern. But it is neither so\nfrequent as those which we saw are earliest generalized, nor is the\npresence of the antecedent so uniformly conspicuous. Though in all but\ntropical climates, mid-winter displays the relation between cold and\nfreezing with tolerable constancy; yet, during the spring and autumn,\nthe occasional appearance of ice in the mornings has no very manifest\nconnexion with coldness of the weather. Sensation being so inaccurate a\nmeasure, it is not possible for the savage to experience the definite\nrelation between a temperature of 32\u00b0 and the congealing of water; and\nhence the long-continued conception of personal agency. Similarly, but\nstill more clearly, with the winds. The absence of regularity and the\ninconspicuousness of the antecedents, allowed the mythological\nexplanation to survive for a great period.\n\nDuring the era in which the uniformity of many quite simple inorganic\nrelations was still unrecognized, certain classes of organic relations,\nintrinsically very complex and special, were generalized. The constant\ncoexistence of feathers and a beak, of four legs with a bony internal\nframework, of a particular leaf with poisonous berries, are facts which\nwere, and are, familiar to every savage. Did a savage find a bird with\nteeth, or a mammal clothed with feathers, he would be as much surprised\nas an instructed naturalist; and would probably make a fetish of the\nanomalous form: so showing that while the exceptional relation suggested\nthe notion of a personal cause, the habitual relation did not. Now these\nuniformities of organic structure which are so early perceived, are of\nexactly the same class as those more numerous ones later established by\nbiology. The constant coexistence of mammary glands with two occipital\ncondyles in the skull, of vertebr\u00e6 with teeth lodged in sockets, of\nfrontal horns with the habit of rumination, are generalizations as\npurely empirical as those known to the aboriginal hunter. The vegetal\nphysiologist cannot in the least understand the complex relation between\nthe kind of leaf and the kind of fruit borne by a particular plant: he\nknows these and like connexions simply in the same manner that the\nbarbarian knows them. But the fact that sundry of the uniform relations\nwhich chiefly make up the organic sciences, were very early recognized,\nis due to the high degree of vividness and frequency with which they\nwere presented to consciousness. Though the connexion between the form\nof a given creature and the sound it makes, or the quality of its fur,\nor the nature of its flesh, is extremely involved; yet the two terms of\nthe relation are conspicuous; are usually observed in close\njuxtaposition in time and space; are so observed perhaps daily, or many\ntimes a day; and above all a knowledge of their connexion has a direct\nand obvious bearing on personal welfare. Meanwhile, we see that\ninnumerable other relations of exactly the same order, which are\ndisplayed with even greater frequency by surrounding plants and animals,\nremain for thousands of years unrecognized, if they are unobtrusive or\nof no apparent moment.\n\nWhen, passing from this primitive stage to a more advanced stage, we\ntrace the discovery of those less familiar uniformities which constitute\nwhat is technically distinguished as Science, we find the order of\ndiscovery to be still determined in the same manner. We shall most\nclearly see this in contemplating separately the influence of each\nderivative condition; as was proposed in the last section.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 38. How relations that have an immediate bearing on the maintenance of\nlife, are, other things equal, necessarily fixed in the mind before\nthose which have no such immediate bearing, is abundantly illustrated in\nthe history of Science. The habits of existing uncivilized races, who\nfix times by moons and barter so many of one article for so many of\nanother, show us that numeration, which is the germ of mathematical\nscience, commenced under the immediate pressure of personal wants; and\nit can scarcely be doubted that those laws of numerical relations which\nare embodied in the rules of arithmetic, were first brought to light\nthrough the practice of mercantile exchange. Similarly with Geometry.\nThe derivation shows us that it originally included only certain methods\nof partitioning ground and laying out buildings. The properties of the\nscales and the lever, involving the first principle in mechanics, were\nearly generalized under the stimulus of commercial and architectural\nneeds. To fix the times of religious festivals and agricultural\noperations, were the motives which led to the establishment of the\nsimpler astronomic periods. Such small knowledge of chemical relations\nas was involved in ancient metallurgy, was manifestly obtained in\nseeking how to improve tools and weapons. In the alchemy of later times,\nwe see how greatly an intense hope of private benefit contributed to the\ndisclosure of a certain class of uniformities. Nor is our own age barren\nof illustrations. \u201cHere,\u201d says Humboldt when in Guiana, \u201cas in many\nparts of Europe, the sciences are thought worthy to occupy the mind,\nonly so far as they confer some immediate and practical benefit on\nsociety.\u201d \u201cHow is it possible to believe,\u201d said a missionary to him,\n\u201cthat you have left your country to come and be devoured by mosquitoes\non this river, and to measure lands that are not your own.\u201d Our coasts\nfurnish like instances. Every sea-side naturalist knows how great is the\ncontempt with which fishermen regard the collection of objects for the\nmicroscope or aquarium: their incredulity as to the possible value of\nsuch things, being so great, that they can scarcely be induced even by\nbribes to preserve the refuse of their nets. Nay, we need not go for\nevidence beyond daily table-talk. The demand for \u201cpractical science\u201d\u2014for\na knowledge that can be brought to bear on the business of life; joined\nto the ridicule commonly vented on pursuits that have no obvious use;\nsuffice to show that the order in which different coexistences and\nsequences are discovered, greatly depends on the directness with which\nthey affect our welfare.\n\nThat, when all other conditions are the same, obtrusive relations will\nbe generalized before unobtrusive ones, is so nearly a truism that\nexamples appear almost superfluous. If it be admitted that by the\naboriginal man, as by the child, the co-existent properties of large\nsurrounding objects are noticed before those of minute objects; and that\nthe external relations which bodies present are generalized before their\ninternal ones; it must be admitted that in all subsequent stages of\nprogress, the comparative conspicuousness of relations has greatly\naffected the order in which they were recognized as uniform. Hence it\nhappened that after the establishment of those very manifest sequences\nconstituting a lunation, and those less manifest ones marking a year,\nand those still less manifest ones marking the planetary periods,\nAstronomy occupied itself with such inconspicuous sequences as those\ndisplayed in the repeating cycle of lunar eclipses, and those which\nsuggested the theory of epicycles and eccentrics; while modern Astronomy\ndeals with still more inconspicuous sequences: some of which, as the\nplanetary rotations, are nevertheless the simplest which the heavens\npresent. In Physics, the early use of canoes implied an empirical\nknowledge of certain hydrostatic relations that are intrinsically more\ncomplex than sundry static relations then unknown; but these hydrostatic\nrelations were thrust upon observation. Or if we compare the solution of\nthe problem of specific gravity by Archimedes, with the discovery of\natmospheric pressure by Torricelli, (the two involving mechanical\nrelations of exactly the same kind,) we perceive that the much earlier\noccurrence of the first than the last, was determined neither by a\ndifference in their bearings on personal welfare, nor by a difference in\nthe frequency with which illustrations of them come under observation,\nnor by relative simplicity; but solely by the greater obtrusiveness of\nthe connexion between antecedent and consequent in the one case than in\nthe other. Similarly with Chemistry. The burning of wood, the rusting of\niron, the putrefaction of dead bodies, were early known as consequents\nuniformly related to certain antecedents; but not until long after was\nthere reached a like empirical knowledge of the effect produced by air\nin the decomposition of soil: a phenomenon of equal simplicity, equal or\ngreater importance, and greater frequency; but one that is extremely\nunobtrusive. Among miscellaneous illustrations, it may be pointed out\nthat the connexions between lightning and thunder and between rain and\nclouds, were established long before others of the same order; simply\nbecause they thrust themselves on the attention. Or the long-delayed\ndiscovery of the microscopic forms of life, with all the phenomena they\npresent, may be named as very clearly showing how certain groups of\nrelations that are not ordinarily perceptible, though in all other\nrespects like long-familiar relations, have to wait until changed\nconditions render them perceptible. But, without further details, it\nneeds only to consider the inquiries which now occupy the electrician,\nthe chemist, the physiologist, to see that Science has advanced and is\nadvancing from the more conspicuous phenomena to the less conspicuous\nones.\n\nHow the degree of absolute frequency of a relation affects the\nrecognition of its uniformity, we see in contrasting certain biological\nfacts. Death and disease are near akin in most of their relations to us;\nwhile in respect of complexity, conspicuousness, and the directness with\nwhich they personally concern us, diseases in general may be put pretty\nnearly on a level with each other. But there are great differences in\nthe times at which the natural sequences they severally exhibit are\nrecognized as such. The connexion between death and bodily injury,\nconstantly displayed not only in men but in all inferior creatures, was\nknown as an established uniformity while yet diseases were thought\nsupernatural. Among diseases themselves, it is observable that\ncomparatively unusual ones were regarded as of demoniacal origin during\nages when the more frequent were ascribed to ordinary causes: a truth\nparalleled indeed among our own peasantry, who by the use of charms show\na lingering superstition with respect to rare disorders, which they do\nnot show with respect to common ones, such as colds. Passing to physical\nillustrations, we may note that within the historic period, whirlpools\nwere accounted for by the agency of water-spirits; but we do not find\nthat within the same period the disappearance of water on exposure\neither to the sun or to artificial heat was interpreted in an analogous\nway: though a much more marvellous occurrence, and a much more complex\none, its great frequency led to the early establishment of it as a\nnatural uniformity. Rainbows and comets do not differ greatly in\nconspicuousness, and a rainbow is intrinsically the more involved\nphenomenon; but chiefly because of their far greater commonness,\nrainbows were perceived to have a direct dependence on sun and rain\nwhile yet comets were regarded as supernatural appearances.\n\nThat races living inland must long have remained ignorant of the daily\nand monthly sequences of the tides, and that intertropical races could\nnot early have comprehended the phenomena of northern winters, are\nextreme illustrations of the influence which relative frequency has on\nthe recognition of uniformities. Animals which, where they are\nindigenous, call forth no surprise by their structure or habits, because\nthese are so familiar, when taken to a part of the earth where they have\nnever been seen, are looked at with an astonishment approaching to\nawe\u2014are even thought supernatural: a fact which will suggest numerous\nothers that show how the localization of phenomena, in part controls the\norder in which they are reduced to law. Not only however does their\nlocalization in space affect the progression, but also their\nlocalization in time. Facts which are rarely if ever manifested during\none era, are rendered very frequent in another, simply through the\nchanges wrought by civilization. The lever, of which the properties are\nillustrated in the use of sticks and weapons, is vaguely understood by\nevery savage\u2014on applying it in a certain way he rightly anticipates\ncertain effects; but the action of the equally simple wedge, which is\nnot commonly displayed till tool-making has made some progress, is less\nearly generalized; while the wheel and axle, pulley, and screw, cannot\nhave their powers either empirically or rationally known till the\nadvance of the arts has more or less familiarized them. Through those\nvarious means of exploration which we have inherited and are ever\nincreasing, we have become acquainted with a vast range of chemical\nrelations that were relatively non-existent to the primitive man: to\nhighly developed industries we owe both the substances and the apparatus\nthat have disclosed to us countless uniformities which our ancestors had\nno opportunity of seeing, and therefore could not recognize. These and\nsundry like instances that will occur to the reader, show that the\naccumulated materials, and processes, and appliances, and products,\nwhich characterize the environments of complex societies, greatly\nincrease the accessibility of various classes of relations; and by so\nmultiplying the experiences of them, or making them relatively frequent,\nfacilitate their generalization. To which add, that various classes of\nphenomena presented by society itself, as for instance those which\npolitical economy formulates, become relatively frequent and therefore\nrecognizable in advanced social states; while in less advanced ones they\nare too rarely displayed to have their relations perceived, or, as in\nthe least advanced ones, are not displayed at all.\n\nThat, where no other circumstances interfere, the order in which\ndifferent uniformities are established varies as their complexity, is\nmanifest. The geometry of straight lines was understood before the\ngeometry of curved lines; the properties of the circle before the\nproperties of the ellipse, parabola and hyperbola; and the equations of\ncurves of single curvature were ascertained before those of curves of\ndouble curvature. Plane trigonometry comes in order of time and\nsimplicity before spherical trigonometry; and the mensuration of plane\nsurfaces and solids before the mensuration of curved surfaces and\nsolids. Similarly with mechanics: the laws of simple motion were\ngeneralized before those of compound motion; and those of rectilinear\nmotion before those of curvilinear motion. The properties of equal-armed\nlevers, or scales, were understood before those of the lever with\nunequal arms; and the law of the inclined plane was formulated earlier\nthan that of the screw, which involves it. In chemistry, the progress\nhas been from the simple inorganic compounds, to the more involved\norganic ones. And where, as in most of the other sciences, the\nconditions of the exploration are more complicated, we still may clearly\ntrace relative complexity as one of the determining circumstances.\n\nThe progression from concrete relations to abstract ones, and from the\nless abstract to the more abstract, is equally obvious. Numeration,\nwhich in its primary form concerned itself only with groups of actual\nobjects, came earlier than simple arithmetic: the rules of which deal\nwith numbers apart from objects. Arithmetic, limited in its sphere to\nconcrete numerical relations, is alike earlier and less abstract than\nAlgebra, which deals with the relations of these relations. And in like\nmanner, the Infinitesimal Calculus comes after Algebra, both in order of\nevolution and in order of abstractness. In Astronomy, the progress has\nbeen from special generalizations, each expressing the motions of a\nparticular planet, to the generalizations of Kepler, expressing the\nmotions of the planets at large; and then to Newton\u2019s generalization,\nexpressing the motions of all heavenly bodies whatever. Similarly with\nPhysics, Chemistry and Biology, there has ever been an advance from the\nrelations of particular facts and particular classes of facts, to the\nrelations presented by still wider classes\u2014to truths of a high\ngenerality or greater abstractness.\n\nBrief and rude as is this sketch of a mental development that has been\nlong and complicated, it fulfils its end if it displays the several\nconditions that have regulated the course of the development. I venture\nto think it shows inductively, what was deductively inferred, that the\norder in which separate groups of uniformities are recognized, depends\nnot on one circumstance but on several circumstances. A survey of the\nfacts makes it manifest that the various classes of relations are\ngeneralized in a certain succession, not solely because of one\nparticular kind of difference in their natures; but also because they\nare variously placed with respect to time, space, other relations, and\nour own constitutions: our perception of them being influenced by all\nthese conditions in endless combinations. The comparative degrees of\nimportance, of obtrusiveness, of absolute frequency, of relative\nfrequency, of simplicity, of concreteness, are every one of them\nfactors; and from their union in proportions that are more or less\ndifferent in every case, there results a highly complex process of\nmental evolution. But while it thus becomes manifest that the proximate\ncauses of the succession in which relations are reduced to law, are\nnumerous and involved; it also becomes manifest that there is one\nultimate cause to which these proximate ones are subordinate. As the\nseveral circumstances that determine the early or late recognition of\nuniformities, are circumstances that determine the number and strength\nof the impressions which these uniformities make on the mind; it follows\nthat the progression conforms to a certain fundamental principle of\npsychology. We see _\u00e0 posteriori_, what we concluded _\u00e0 priori_, that\nthe order in which relations are generalized, depends on the frequency\nand impressiveness with which they are repeated in conscious experience.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 39. And now to observe the bearings of these truths on our general\nargument. Having roughly analyzed the progress of the past, let us take\nadvantage of the light thus thrown on the present, and consider what is\nimplied respecting the future.\n\nNote first that the likelihood of the universality of Law, has been ever\ngrowing greater. Out of the countless coexistences and sequences with\nwhich mankind are environed, they have been continually transferring\nsome from the group whose order was supposed to be arbitrary, to the\ngroup whose order is known to be uniform. Age by age, the number of\nrecognized connexions of phenomena has been increasing; and that of\nunrecognized connexions decreasing. And manifestly, as fast as the class\nof ungeneralized relations becomes smaller, the probability that among\nthem there may be some that do not conform to law, becomes less. To put\nthe argument numerically\u2014It is clear that when out of surrounding\nphenomena a hundred of several kinds have been found to occur in\nconstant connexions, there arises a slight presumption that all\nphenomena occur in constant connexions. When uniformity has been\nestablished in a thousand cases, more varied in their kinds, the\npresumption gains strength. And when the established cases of uniformity\nmount to myriads, including many of each variety, it becomes an ordinary\ninduction that uniformity exists everywhere. Just as from the numerous\nobserved cases in which heavenly bodies have been found to move in\nharmony with the law of gravitation, it is inferred that all heavenly\nbodies move in harmony with the law of gravitation; so, from the\ninnumerable observed cases in which phenomena are found to stand in\ninvariable connexions, it is inferred that in all cases phenomena stand\nin invariable connexions.\n\nSilently and insensibly their experiences have been pressing men on\ntowards the conclusion thus drawn. Not out of a conscious regard for\nthese abstract reasons, but from a habit of thought which these abstract\nreasons formulate and justify, all minds have been advancing towards a\nbelief in the constancy of surrounding coexistences and sequences.\nFamiliarity with special uniformities, has generated the abstract\nconception of uniformity\u2014the idea of _Law_; and this idea has been in\nsuccessive generations slowly gaining fixity and clearness. Especially\nhas it been thus among those whose knowledge of natural phenomena is the\nmost extensive\u2014men of science. The Mathematician, the Physicist, the\nAstronomer, the Chemist, severally acquainted with the vast\naccumulations of uniformities established by their predecessors, and\nthemselves daily adding new ones as well as verifying the old, acquire a\nfar stronger faith in Law than is ordinarily possessed. With them this\nfaith, ceasing to be merely passive, becomes an active stimulus to\ninquiry. Wherever there exist phenomena of which the dependence is not\nyet ascertained, these most cultivated intellects, impelled by the\nconviction that here too there is some invariable connexion, proceed to\nobserve, compare, and experiment; and when they discover the law to\nwhich the phenomena conform, as they eventually do, their general belief\nin the universality of law is further strengthened. So overwhelming is\nthe evidence, and such the effect of this discipline, that to the\nadvanced student of nature, the proposition that there are lawless\nphenomena, has become not only incredible but almost inconceivable.\n\nHence we may see how inevitably there must spread among mankind at\nlarge, this habitual recognition of law which already distinguishes\nmodern thought from ancient thought. Not only is it that each conquest\nof generalization over a region of fact hitherto ungeneralized, and each\nmerging of lower generalizations in a higher one, adds to the\ndistinctness of this recognition among those immediately concerned\u2014not\nonly is it that the fulfilment of the predictions made possible by every\nnew step, and the further command so gained of nature\u2019s forces, prove to\nthe uninitiated the validity of these generalizations and the doctrine\nthey illustrate; but it is that widening education is daily diffusing\namong the mass of men, that knowledge of generalizations which has been\nhitherto confined to the few. And as fast as this diffusion goes on,\nmust the belief of the scientific become the belief of the world at\nlarge. The simple accumulation of instances, must inevitably establish\nin the general mind, a conviction of the universality of law; even were\nthe influence of this accumulation to be aided by no other.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 40. But it will be aided by another. From the evidence above set\nforth, it may be inferred that a secondary influence will by and by\nenforce this primary one. That law is universal, will become an\nirresistible conclusion when it is perceived that _the progress in the\ndiscovery of laws itself conforms to law_; and when it is hence\nunderstood why certain groups of phenomena have been reduced to law,\nwhile other groups are still unreduced. When it is seen that the order\nin which uniformities are recognized, must depend upon the frequency and\nvividness with which they are repeated in conscious experience; when it\nis seen that, as a matter of fact, the most common, important,\nconspicuous, concrete and simple uniformities were the earliest\nrecognized, because they were experienced oftenest and most distinctly;\nwhen it is further seen that from the beginning the advance has been to\nthe recognition of uniformities which, from one or other circumstance,\nwere less often experienced; it will by implication be seen that long\nafter the great mass of phenomena have been generalized, there must\nremain phenomena which, from their rareness, or unobtrusiveness, or\nseeming unimportance, or complexity, or abstractness, are still\nungeneralized. Thus will be furnished a solution to a difficulty\nsometimes raised. When it is asked why the universality of law is not\nalready fully established, there will be the answer that the directions\nin which it is not yet established are those in which its establishment\nmust necessarily be latest. That state of things which is inferable\nbeforehand, is just the state which we find to exist. If such\ncoexistences and sequences as those of Biology and Sociology are not yet\nreduced to law, the presumption is not that they are irreducible to law,\nbut that their laws elude our present means of analysis. Having long ago\nproved uniformity throughout all the lower classes of relations; and\nhaving been step by step proving uniformity throughout classes of\nrelations successively higher and higher; if we have not at present\nsucceeded with the highest classes, it may be fairly concluded that our\npowers are at fault, rather than that the uniformity does not exist. And\nunless we make the absurd assumption that the process of generalization,\nnow going on with unexampled rapidity, has reached its limit, and will\nsuddenly cease, we must infer that ultimately mankind will discover a\nconstant order of manifestation even in the most involved, obscure, and\nabstract phenomena.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 41. Not even yet, however, have we exhausted the evidence. The\nforegoing arguments have to be merged in another, still more cogent,\nwhich fuses all fragmentary proofs into one general proof.\n\nThus far we have spoken of laws that are more or less special; and from\nthe still-continuing disclosure of special laws, each formulating some\nnew class of phenomena, have inferred that eventually all classes of\nphenomena will be formulated. If, now, we find that there are laws of\nfar higher generality, to which those constituting the body of Science\nare subordinate; the fact must greatly strengthen the proof that Law is\nuniversal. If, underneath different groups of concrete phenomena,\nMechanical, Chemical, Thermal, Electric, &c., we discern certain\nuniformities of action common to them all; we have a new and weighty\nreason for believing that uniformity of action pervades the whole of\nnature. And if we also see that these most general laws hold not only of\nthe inorganic but of the organic worlds\u2014if we see that the phenomena of\nLife, of Mind, of Society, whose special laws are yet unestablished,\nnevertheless conform to these most general laws; the proof of the\nuniversality of Law amounts to demonstration.\n\nThat there are laws of this transcendant generality, has now to be\nshown. To specify and illustrate them, will be the purpose of the\nsucceeding chapters. And while, in contemplating them, we shall perceive\nhow irresistible is the conclusion that the workings of the Unknowable\nare distinguished from those of finite agents by their absolute\nuniformity; we shall at the same time familiarize ourselves with those\nprimary facts through which all other facts are to be interpreted.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER II.\n THE LAW OF EVOLUTION.[8]\n\n\n\u00a7 42. The class of phenomena to be considered under the title of\nEvolution, is in a great measure co-extensive with the class commonly\nindicated by the word Progress. But the word Progress is here\ninappropriate, for several reasons. To specify these reasons will\nperhaps be the best way of showing what is to be understood by\nEvolution.\n\nIn the first place, the current conception of Progress is shifting and\nindefinite. Sometimes it comprehends little more than simple growth\u2014as\nof a nation in the number of its members and the extent of territory\nover which it has spread. At other times it has reference to quantity of\nmaterial products\u2014as when the advance of agriculture and manufactures is\nthe topic. Now the superior quality of these products is contemplated;\nand then the new or improved appliances by which they are produced.\nWhen, again, we speak of moral or intellectual progress, we refer to the\nstate of the individual or people exhibiting it; while, when the\nprogress of Knowledge, of Science, of Art, is commented upon, we have in\nview certain abstract results of human thought and action. In the\nsecond place, besides being more or less vague, the ordinary idea of\nProgress is in great measure erroneous. It takes in not so much the\nreality as its accompaniments\u2014not so much the substance as the shadow.\nThat progress in intelligence seen during the growth of the child into\nthe man, or the savage into the philosopher, is commonly regarded as\nconsisting in the greater number of facts known and laws understood;\nwhereas the actual progress consists in those internal modifications of\nwhich this increased knowledge is the expression. Social progress is\nsupposed to consist in the produce of a greater quantity and variety of\nthe articles required for satisfying men\u2019s wants\u2014in the increasing\nsecurity of person and property\u2014in widening freedom of action; whereas,\nrightly understood, social progress consists in those changes of\nstructure in the social organism which have entailed these consequences.\nThe interpretation is a teleological one. The phenomena are contemplated\nsolely as bearing on human happiness. Only those changes are held to\nconstitute progress, which directly or indirectly tend to heighten human\nhappiness. And they are thought to constitute progress simply _because_\nthey tend to heighten human happiness. In the third place, in\nconsequence of its teleological implications, the term Progress is\nrendered scarcely applicable to a wide range of phenomena which are\nintrinsically of the same nature as those included under it. The\nmetamorphoses of an insect are only by analogy admitted within the scope\nof the word, as popularly accepted; though, considered in themselves,\nthey have as much right there as the changes which constitute\ncivilization. Having no apparent bearing on human interests, an\nincreasing complication in the arrangement of ocean-currents, would not\nordinarily be regarded as progress; though really of the same character\nas phenomena which are so regarded.\n\nHence the need for another word. Our purpose here is to analyze the\nvarious class of changes usually considered as Progress, together with\nothers like them which are not so considered; and to see what is their\nintrinsic peculiarity\u2014what is their essential nature apart from their\nbearings on our welfare. And that we may avoid the confusion of thought\nlikely to result from pre-established associations, it will be best to\nsubstitute for the term Progress, the term Evolution. Our question is\nthen\u2014what is Evolution?\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 43. In respect to that evolution which individual organisms display,\nthis question has been answered. Pursuing an idea which Harvey set\nafloat, Wolff, Goethe, and Von Baer, have established the truth that the\nseries of changes gone through during the development of a seed into a\ntree, or an ovum into an animal, constitute an advance from homogeneity\nof structure to heterogeneity of structure. In its primary stage, every\ngerm consists of a substance that is uniform throughout, both in texture\nand chemical composition. The first step is the appearance of a\ndifference between two parts of this substance; or, as the phenomenon is\ncalled in physiological language, a differentiation. Each of these\ndifferentiated divisions presently begins itself to exhibit some\ncontrast of parts; and by and by these secondary differentiations become\nas definite as the original one. This process is continuously\nrepeated\u2014is simultaneously going on in all parts of the growing embryo;\nand by endless such differentiations there is finally produced that\ncomplex combination of tissues and organs, constituting the adult animal\nor plant. This is the history of all organisms whatever. It is settled\nbeyond dispute that organic evolution consists in a change from the\nhomogeneous to the heterogeneous.\n\nNow I propose in the first place to show, that this law of organic\nevolution is the law of all evolution. Whether it be in the development\nof the Earth, in the development of Life upon its surface, in the\ndevelopment of Society, of Government, of Manufactures, of Commerce, of\nLanguage, Literature, Science, Art, this same advance from the simple to\nthe complex, through successive differentiations, holds uniformly. From\nthe earliest traceable cosmical changes down to the latest results of\ncivilization, we shall find that the transformation of the homogeneous\ninto the heterogeneous, is that in which Evolution essentially consists.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 44. With the view of showing that _if_ the Nebular Hypothesis be true,\nthe genesis of the solar system supplies one illustration of this law,\nlet us assume that the matter of which the sun and planets consist was\nonce in a diffused form; and that from the gravitation of its atoms\nthere resulted a gradual concentration. By the hypothesis, the solar\nsystem in its nascent state existed as an indefinitely extended and\nnearly homogeneous medium\u2014a medium almost homogeneous in density, in\ntemperature, and in other physical attributes. The first advance towards\nconsolidation resulted in a differentiation between the occupied space\nwhich the nebulous mass still filled, and the unoccupied space which it\npreviously filled. There simultaneously resulted a contrast in density\nand a contrast in temperature, between the interior and the exterior of\nthis mass. And at the same time there arose throughout it, rotatory\nmovements, whose velocities varied according to their distances from its\ncentre. These differentiations increased in number and degree until\nthere was evolved the organized group of sun, planets, and satellites,\nwhich we now know\u2014a group which presents numerous contrasts of structure\nand action among its members. There are the immense contrasts between\nthe sun and the planets, in bulk and in weight; as well as the\nsubordinate contrasts between one planet and another, and between the\nplanets and their satellites. There is the similarly marked contrast\nbetween the sun as almost stationary, and the planets as moving round\nhim with great velocity; while there are the secondary contrasts between\nthe velocities and periods of the several planets, and between their\nsimple revolutions and the double ones of their satellites, which have\nto move round their primaries while moving round the sun. There is the\nyet further strong contrast between the sun and the planets in respect\nof temperature; and there is reason to suppose that the planets and\nsatellites differ from each other in their proper heat, as well as in\nthe heat they receive from the sun. When we bear in mind that, in\naddition to these various contrasts, the planets and satellites also\ndiffer in respect to their distances from each other and their primary;\nin respect to the inclinations of their orbits, the inclinations of\ntheir axes, their times of rotation on their axes, their specific\ngravities, and their physical constitutions; we see what a high degree\nof heterogeneity the solar system exhibits, when compared with the\nalmost complete homogeneity of the nebulous mass out of which it is\nsupposed to have originated.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 45. Passing from this hypothetical illustration, which must be taken\nfor what it is worth, without prejudice to the general argument, let us\ndescend to a more certain order of evidence.\n\nIt is now generally agreed among geologists that the Earth was at first\na mass of molten matter; and that it is still fluid and incandescent at\nthe distance of a few miles beneath its surface. Originally, then, it\nwas homogeneous in consistence, and, because of the circulation that\ntakes place in heated fluids, must have been comparatively homogeneous\nin temperature; and it must have been surrounded by an atmosphere\nconsisting partly of the elements of air and water, and partly of those\nvarious other elements which assume a gaseous form at high temperatures.\nThat slow cooling by radiation which is still going on at an\ninappreciable rate, and which, though originally far more rapid than\nnow, necessarily required an immense time to produce any decided change,\nmust ultimately have resulted in the solidification of the portion most\nable to part with its heat; namely, the surface. In the thin crust thus\nformed, we have the first marked differentiation. A still further\ncooling, a consequent thickening of this crust, and an accompanying\ndeposition of all solidifiable elements contained in the atmosphere,\nmust finally have been followed by the condensation of the water\npreviously existing as vapour. A second marked differentiation must thus\nhave arisen; and as the condensation must have taken place on the\ncoolest parts of the surface\u2014namely, about the poles\u2014there must thus\nhave resulted the first geographical distinction of parts.\n\nTo these illustrations of growing heterogeneity, which, though deduced\nfrom the known laws of matter, may be regarded as more or less\nhypothetical, Geology adds an extensive series that have been\ninductively established. Its investigations show that the Earth has been\ncontinually becoming more heterogeneous through the multiplication of\nthe strata which form its crust; further, that it has been becoming more\nheterogeneous in respect of the composition of these strata, the latter\nof which, being made from the detritus of the older ones, are many of\nthem rendered highly complex by the mixture of materials they contain;\nand that this heterogeneity has been vastly increased by the action of\nthe Earth\u2019s still molten nucleus upon its envelope: whence have resulted\nnot only a great variety of igneous rocks, but the tilting up of\nsedimentary strata at all angles, the formation of faults and metallic\nveins, the production of endless dislocations and irregularities. Yet\nagain, geologists teach us that the Earth\u2019s surface has been growing\nmore varied in elevation\u2014that the most ancient mountain systems are the\nsmallest, and the Andes and Himalayas the most modern; while, in all\nprobability, there have been corresponding changes in the bed of the\nocean. As a consequence of these ceaseless differentiations, we now find\nthat no considerable portion of the Earth\u2019s exposed surface is like any\nother portion, either in contour, in geologic structure, or in chemical\ncomposition; and that in most parts it changes from mile to mile in all\nthese characteristics.\n\nMoreover, it must not be forgotten that there has been simultaneously\ngoing on a gradual differentiation of climates. As fast as the Earth\ncooled and its crust solidified, there arose appreciable differences in\ntemperature between those parts of its surface most exposed to the sun\nand those less exposed. Gradually, as the cooling progressed, these\ndifferences became more pronounced; until there finally resulted the\nmarked contrasts between regions of perpetual ice and snow, regions\nwhere winter and summer alternately reign for periods varying according\nto the latitude, and regions where summer follows summer with scarcely\nan appreciable variation. At the same time, the successive elevations\nand subsidences of different portions of the Earth\u2019s crust, tending as\nthey have done to the present irregular distribution of land and sea,\nhave entailed various modifications of climate beyond those dependent on\nlatitude; while a yet further series of such modifications have been\nproduced by increasing differences of elevation in the land, which have\nin sundry places brought arctic, temperate, and tropical climates to\nwithin a few miles of each other. And the general result of these\nchanges is, that not only has every extensive region its own\nmeteorologic conditions, but that every locality in each region differs\nmore or less from others in those conditions: as in its structure, its\ncontour, its soil.\n\nThus, between our existing Earth, the phenomena of whose varied crust\nneither geographers, geologists, mineralogists nor meteorologists have\nyet enumerated, and the molten globe out of which it was evolved, the\ncontrast in heterogeneity is sufficiently striking.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 46. When from the Earth itself we turn to the plants and animals that\nhave lived, or still live, upon its surface, we find ourselves in some\ndifficulty from lack of facts. That every existing organism has been\ndeveloped out of the simple into the complex, is indeed the first\nestablished truth of all; and that every organism which has existed was\nsimilarly developed, is an inference that no physiologist will hesitate\nto draw. But when we pass from individual forms of life to Life in\ngeneral, and inquire whether the same law is seen in the _ensemble_ of\nits manifestations,\u2014whether modern plants and animals are of more\nheterogeneous structure than ancient ones, and whether the Earth\u2019s\npresent Flora and Fauna are more heterogeneous than the Flora and Fauna\nof the past,\u2014we find the evidence so fragmentary, that every conclusion\nis open to dispute. Two-thirds of the Earth\u2019s surface being covered by\nwater; a great part of the exposed land being inaccessible to, or\nuntravelled by, the geologist; the greater part of the remainder having\nbeen scarcely more than glanced at; and even the most familiar portions,\nas England, having been so imperfectly explored, that a new series of\nstrata has been added within these few years,\u2014it is manifestly\nimpossible for us to say with any certainty what creatures have, and\nwhat have not, existed at any particular period. Considering the\nperishable nature of many of the lower organic forms, the metamorphosis\nof many sedimentary strata, and the gaps that occur among the rest, we\nshall see further reason for distrusting our deductions. On the one\nhand, the repeated discovery of vertebrate remains in strata previously\nsupposed to contain none,\u2014of reptiles where only fish were thought to\nexist,\u2014of mammals where it was believed there were no creatures higher\nthan reptiles; renders it daily more manifest how small is the value of\nnegative evidence. On the other hand, the worthlessness of the\nassumption that we have discovered the earliest, or anything like the\nearliest, organic remains, is becoming equally clear. That the oldest\nknown aqueous formations have been greatly changed by igneous action,\nand that still older ones have been totally transformed by it, is\nbecoming undeniable. And the fact that sedimentary strata earlier than\nany we know, have been melted up, being admitted, it must also be\nadmitted that we cannot say how far back in time this destruction of\nsedimentary strata has been going on. Thus it is manifest that the title\n_Pal\u00e6ozoic_, as applied to the earliest known fossiliferous strata,\ninvolves a _petitio principii_; and that, for aught we know to the\ncontrary, only the last few chapters of the Earth\u2019s biological history\nmay have come down to us.\n\nAll inferences drawn from such scattered facts as we find, must thus be\nextremely questionable. If, looking at the general aspect of evidence, a\nprogressionist argues that the earliest known vertebrate remains are\nthose of Fishes, which are the most homogeneous of the vertebrata; that\nReptiles, which are more heterogeneous, are later; and that later still,\nand more heterogeneous still, are Mammals and Birds; it may be replied\nthat the Pal\u00e6ozoic deposits, not being estuary deposits, are not likely\nto contain the remains of terrestrial vertebrata, which may nevertheless\nhave existed at that era. The same answer may be made to the argument\nthat the vertebrate fauna of the Pal\u00e6ozoic period, consisting so far as\nwe know, entirely of Fishes, was less heterogeneous than the modern\nvertebrate fauna, which includes Reptiles, Birds and Mammals, of\nmultitudinous genera; or the uniformitarian may contend with great show\nof truth, that this appearance of higher and more varied forms in later\ngeologic eras, was due to progressive immigration\u2014that a continent\nslowly upheaved from the ocean at a point remote from pre-existing\ncontinents, would necessarily be peopled from them in a succession like\nthat which our strata display. At the same time the\ncounter-arguments may be proved equally inconclusive. When, to show that\nthere cannot have been a continuous evolution of the more homogeneous\norganic forms into the more heterogeneous ones, the uniformitarian\npoints to the breaks that occur in the succession of these forms; there\nis the sufficient answer that current geological changes show us why\nsuch breaks must occur, and why, by subsidences and elevations of large\narea, there must be produced such marked breaks as those which divide\nthe three great geologic epochs. Or again, if the opponent of the\ndevelopment hypothesis cites the facts set forth by Professor Huxley in\nhis lecture on \u201cPersistent Types\u201d\u2014if he points out that \u201cof some two\nhundred known orders of plants, not one is exclusively fossil,\u201d while\n\u201camong animals, there is not a single totally extinct class; and of the\norders, at the outside not more than seven per cent. are unrepresented\nin the existing creation\u201d\u2014if he urges that among these some have\ncontinued from the Silurian epoch to our own day with scarcely any\nchange\u2014and if he infers that there is evidently a much greater average\nresemblance between the living forms of the past and those of the\npresent, than consists with this hypothesis; there is still a\nsatisfactory reply, on which in fact Prof. Huxley insists; namely, that\nwe have evidence of a \u201cpre-geologic era\u201d of unknown duration. And\nindeed, when it is remembered, that the enormous subsidences of the\nSilurian period show the Earth\u2019s crust to have been approximately as\nthick then as it is now\u2014when it is concluded that the time taken to form\nso thick a crust, must have been immense as compared with the time which\nhas since elapsed\u2014when it is assumed, as it must be, that during this\ncomparatively immense time the geologic and biologic changes went on at\ntheir usual rates; it becomes manifest, not only that the\npal\u00e6ontological records which we find, do not negative the theory of\nevolution, but that they are such as might rationally be looked for.\n\nMoreover, it must not be forgotten that though the evidence suffices\nneither for proof nor disproof, yet some of its most conspicuous facts\nsupport the belief, that the more heterogeneous organisms and groups of\norganisms, have been evolved from the less heterogeneous ones. The\naverage community of type between the fossils of adjacent strata, and\nstill more the community that is found between the latest tertiary\nfossils and creatures now existing, is one of these facts. The discovery\nin some modern deposits of such forms as the Pal\u00e6otherium and\nAnaplotherium, which, if we may rely on Prof. Owen, had a type of\nstructure intermediate between some of the types now existing, is\nanother of these facts. And the comparatively recent appearance of Man,\nis a third fact of this kind, which possesses still greater\nsignificance. Hence we may say, that though our knowledge of past life\nupon the Earth, is too scanty to justify us in asserting an evolution of\nthe simple into the complex, either in individual forms or in the\naggregate of forms; yet the knowledge we have, not only consists with\nthe belief that there has been such an evolution, but rather supports it\nthan otherwise.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 47. Whether an advance from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous is or\nis not displayed in the biological history of the globe, it is clearly\nenough displayed in the progress of the latest and most heterogeneous\ncreature\u2014Man. It is alike true that, during the period in which the\nEarth has been peopled, the human organism has grown more heterogeneous\namong the civilized divisions of the species; and that the species, as a\nwhole, has been made more heterogeneous by the multiplication of races\nand the differentiation of these races from each other. In proof\nof the first of these positions, we may cite the fact that, in the\nrelative development of the limbs, the civilized man departs more widely\nfrom the general type of the placental mammalia, than do the lower human\nraces. Though often possessing well-developed body and arms, the Papuan\nhas extremely small legs: thus reminding us of the quadrumana, in which\nthere is no great contrast in size between the hind and fore limbs. But\nin the European, the greater length and massiveness of the legs has\nbecome very marked\u2014the fore and hind limbs are relatively more\nheterogeneous. Again, the greater ratio which the cranial bones bear to\nthe facial bones, illustrates the same truth. Among the vertebrata in\ngeneral, evolution is marked by an increasing heterogeneity in the\nvertebral column, and more especially in the segments constituting the\nskull: the higher forms being distinguished by the relatively larger\nsize of the bones which cover the brain, and the relatively smaller size\nof those which form the jaws, &c. Now, this characteristic, which is\nstronger in Man than in any other creature, is stronger in the European\nthan in the savage. Moreover, judging from the greater extent and\nvariety of faculty he exhibits, we may infer that the civilized man has\nalso a more complex or heterogeneous nervous system than the uncivilized\nman; and indeed the fact is in part visible in the increased ratio which\nhis cerebrum bears to the subjacent ganglia. If further elucidation be\nneeded, we may find it in every nursery. The infant European has sundry\nmarked points of resemblance to the lower human races; as in the\nflatness of the al\u00e6 of the nose, the depression of its bridge, the\ndivergence and forward opening of the nostrils, the form of the lips,\nthe absence of a frontal sinus, the width between the eyes, the\nsmallness of the legs. Now, as the developmental process by which these\ntraits are turned into those of the adult European, is a continuation of\nthat change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous displayed during\nthe previous evolution of the embryo, which every physiologist will\nadmit; it follows that the parallel developmental process by which the\nlike traits of the barbarous races have been turned into those of the\ncivilized races, has also been a continuation of the change from the\nhomogeneous to the heterogeneous. The truth of the second\nposition\u2014that Mankind, as a whole, have become more heterogeneous\u2014is so\nobvious as scarcely to need illustration. Every work on Ethnology, by\nits divisions and subdivisions of races, bears testimony to it. Even\nwere we to admit the hypothesis that Mankind originated from several\nseparate stocks, it would still remain true that as, from each of these\nstocks, there have sprung many now widely different tribes, which are\nproved by philological evidence to have had a common origin, the race as\na whole is far less homogeneous than it once was. Add to which, that we\nhave, in the Anglo-Americans, an example of a new variety arising within\nthese few generations; and that, if we may trust to the descriptions of\nobservers, we are likely soon to have another such example in Australia.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 48. On passing from Humanity under its individual form, to Humanity as\nsocially embodied, we find the general law still more variously\nexemplified. The change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, is\ndisplayed equally in the progress of civilization as a whole, and in the\nprogress of every tribe or nation; and is still going on with increasing\nrapidity.\n\nAs we see in existing barbarous tribes, society in its first and lowest\nform is a homogeneous aggregation of individuals having like powers and\nlike functions: the only marked difference of function being that which\naccompanies difference of sex. Every man is warrior, hunter, fisherman,\ntool-maker, builder; every woman performs the same drudgeries; every\nfamily is self-sufficing, and, save for purposes of aggression and\ndefence, might as well live apart from the rest. Very early, however, in\nthe process of social evolution, we find an incipient differentiation\nbetween the governing and the governed. Some kind of chieftainship seems\ncoeval with the first advance from the state of separate wandering\nfamilies to that of a nomadic tribe. The authority of the strongest\nmakes itself felt among a body of savages, as in a herd of animals, or a\nposse of school-boys. At first, however, it is indefinite, uncertain; is\nshared by others of scarcely inferior power; and is unaccompanied by any\ndifference in occupation or style of living: the first ruler kills his\nown game, makes his own weapons, builds his own hut, and, economically\nconsidered, does not differ from others of his tribe. Gradually, as the\ntribe progresses, the contrast between the governing and the governed\ngrows more decided. Supreme power becomes hereditary in one family; the\nhead of that family, ceasing to provide for his own wants, is served by\nothers; and he begins to assume the sole office of ruling. At the\nsame time there has been arising a co-ordinate species of\ngovernment\u2014that of Religion. As all ancient records and traditions\nprove, the earliest rulers are regarded as divine personages. The maxims\nand commands they uttered during their lives are held sacred after their\ndeaths, and are enforced by their divinely-descended successors; who in\ntheir turns are promoted to the pantheon of the race, there to be\nworshipped and propitiated along with their predecessors: the most\nancient of whom is the supreme god, and the rest subordinate gods. For a\nlong time these connate forms of government\u2014civil and religious\u2014continue\nclosely associated. For many generations the king continues to be the\nchief priest, and the priesthood to be members of the royal race. For\nmany ages religious law continues to contain more or less of civil\nregulation, and civil law to possess more or less of religious sanction;\nand even among the most advanced nations these two controlling agencies\nare by no means completely differentiated from each other. Having\na common root with these, and gradually diverging from them, we find yet\nanother controlling agency\u2014that of Manners or ceremonial usages. All\ntitles of honour are originally the names of the god-king; afterwards of\nGod and the king; still later of persons of high rank; and finally come,\nsome of them, to be used between man and man. All forms of complimentary\naddress were at first the expressions of submission from prisoners to\ntheir conqueror, or from subjects to their ruler, either human or\ndivine\u2014expressions that were afterwards used to propitiate subordinate\nauthorities, and slowly descended into ordinary intercourse. All modes\nof salutation were once obeisances made before the monarch and used in\nworship of him after his death. Presently others of the god-descended\nrace were similarly saluted; and by degrees some of the salutations have\nbecome the due of all.[9] Thus, no sooner does the originally\nhomogeneous social mass differentiate into the governed and the\ngoverning parts, than this last exhibits an incipient differentiation\ninto religious and secular\u2014Church and State; while at the same time\nthere begins to be differentiated from both, that less definite species\nof government which rides our daily intercourse\u2014a species of government\nwhich, as we may see in heralds\u2019 colleges, in books of the peerage, in\nmasters of ceremonies, is not without a certain embodiment of its own.\n Each of these kinds of government is itself subject to successive\ndifferentiations. In the course of ages, there arises, as among\nourselves, a highly complex political organization of monarch,\nministers, lords and commons, with their subordinate administrative\ndepartments, courts of justice, revenue offices, &c., supplemented in\nthe provinces by municipal governments, county governments, parish or\nunion governments\u2014all of them more or less elaborated. By its side there\ngrows up a highly complex religious organization, with its various\ngrades of officials from archbishops down to sextons, its colleges,\nconvocations, ecclesiastical courts, &c.; to all which must be added the\never-multiplying independent sects, each with its general and local\nauthorities. And at the same time there is developed a highly complex\naggregation of customs, manners, and temporary fashions, enforced by\nsociety at large, and serving to control those minor transactions\nbetween man and man which are not regulated by civil and religious law.\nMoreover, it is to be observed that this ever-increasing heterogeneity\nin the governmental appliances of each nation, has been accompanied by\nan increasing heterogeneity in the governmental appliances of different\nnations: all of which are more or less unlike in their political systems\nand legislation, in their creeds and religious institutions, in their\ncustoms and ceremonial usages.\n\nSimultaneously there has been going on a second differentiation of a\nmore familiar kind; that, namely, by which the mass of the community\nhas been segregated into distinct classes and orders of workers. While\nthe governing part has undergone the complex development above\ndetailed, the governed part has undergone an equally complex\ndevelopment; which has resulted in that minute division of labour\ncharacterizing advanced nations. It is needless to trace out\nthis progress from its first stages, up through the caste divisions of\nthe East and the incorporated guilds of Europe, to the elaborate\nproducing and distributing organization existing among ourselves.\nPolitical economists have long since indicated the evolution which,\nbeginning with a tribe whose members severally perform the same\nactions, each for himself ends with a civilized community whose\nmembers severally perform different actions for each other; and they\nhave further pointed out the changes through which the solitary\nproducer of any one commodity, is transformed into a combination of\nproducers who, united under a master, take separate parts in the\nmanufacture of such commodity. But there are yet other and\nhigher phases of this advance from the homogeneous to the\nheterogeneous in the industrial organization of society. Long after\nconsiderable progress has been made in the division of labour among\nthe different classes of workers, there is still little or no division\nof labour among the widely separated parts of the community: the\nnation continues comparatively homogeneous in the respect that in each\ndistrict the same occupations are pursued. But when roads and other\nmeans of transit become numerous and good, the different districts\nbegin to assume different functions, and to become mutually dependent.\nThe calico-manufacture locates itself in this county, the\nwoollen-manufacture in that; silks are produced here, lace there;\nstockings in one place, shoes in another; pottery, hardware, cutlery,\ncome to have their special towns; and ultimately every locality grows\nmore or less distinguished from the rest by the leading occupation\ncarried on in it. Nay, more, this subdivision of functions shows\nitself not only among the different parts of the same nation, but\namong different nations. That exchange of commodities which free-trade\npromises so greatly to increase, will ultimately have the effect of\nspecializing, in a greater or less degree, the industry of each\npeople. So that beginning with a barbarous tribe, almost if not\nquite homogeneous in the functions of its members, the progress has\nbeen, and still is, towards an economic aggregation of the whole human\nrace; growing ever more heterogeneous in respect of the separate\nfunctions assumed by separate nations, the separate functions assumed\nby the local sections of each nation, the separate functions assumed\nby the many kinds of makers and traders in each town, and the separate\nfunctions assumed by the workers united in producing each commodity.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 49. Not only is the law thus clearly exemplified in the evolution of\nthe social organism, but it is exemplified with equal clearness in the\nevolution of all products of human thought and action; whether concrete\nor abstract, real or ideal. Let us take Language as our first\nillustration.\n\nThe lowest form of language is the exclamation, by which an entire idea\nis vaguely conveyed through a single sound; as among the lower animals.\nThat human language ever consisted solely of exclamations, and so was\nstrictly homogeneous in respect of its parts of speech, we have no\nevidence. But that language can be traced down to a form in which nouns\nand verbs are its only elements, is an established fact. In the gradual\nmultiplication of parts of speech out of these primary ones\u2014in the\ndifferentiation of verbs into active and passive, of nouns into abstract\nand concrete\u2014in the rise of distinctions of mood, tense, person, of\nnumber and case\u2014in the formation of auxiliary verbs, of adjectives,\nadverbs, pronouns, prepositions, articles\u2014in the divergence of those\norders, genera, species, and varieties of parts of speech by which\ncivilized races express minute modifications of meaning\u2014we see a change\nfrom the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. And it may be remarked, in\npassing, that it is more especially in virtue of having carried this\nsubdivision of functions to a greater extent and completeness, that the\nEnglish language is superior to all others. Another aspect under\nwhich we may trace the development of language, is the differentiation\nof words of allied meanings. Philology early disclosed the truth that in\nall languages words may be grouped into families having a common\nancestry. An aboriginal name, applied indiscriminately to each of an\nextensive and ill-defined class of things or actions, presently\nundergoes modifications by which the chief divisions of the class are\nexpressed. These several names springing from the primitive root,\nthemselves become the parents of other names still further modified. And\nby the aid of those systematic modes which presently arise, of making\nderivatives and forming compound terms expressing still smaller\ndistinctions, there is finally developed a tribe of words so\nheterogeneous in sound and meaning, that to the uninitiated it seems\nincredible they should have had a common origin. Meanwhile, from other\nroots there are being evolved other such tribes, until there results a\nlanguage of some sixty thousand or more unlike words, signifying as many\nunlike objects, qualities, acts. Yet another way in which language\nin general advances from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, is in the\nmultiplication of languages. Whether, as Max M\u00fcller and Bunsen think,\nall languages have grown from one stock, or whether, as some\nphilologists say, they have grown from two or more stocks, it is clear\nthat since large families of languages, as the Indo-European, are of one\nparentage, they have become distinct through a process of continuous\ndivergence. The same diffusion over the Earth\u2019s surface which has led to\nthe differentiation of the race, has simultaneously led to a\ndifferentiation of their speech: a truth which we see further\nillustrated in each nation by the peculiarities of dialect found in\nseparate districts. Thus the progress of Language conforms to the\ngeneral law, alike in the evolution of languages, in the evolution of\nfamilies of words, and in the evolution of parts of speech.\n\nOn passing from spoken to written language, we come upon several classes\nof facts, all having similar implications. Written language is connate\nwith Painting and Sculpture; and at first all three are appendages of\nArchitecture, and have a direct connexion with the primary form of all\nGovernment\u2014the theocratic. Merely noting by the way the fact that sundry\nwild races, as for example the Australians and the tribes of South\nAfrica, are given to depicting personages and events upon the walls of\ncaves, which are probably regarded as sacred places, let us pass to the\ncase of the Egyptians. Among them, as also among the Assyrians, we find\nmural paintings used to decorate the temple of the god and the palace of\nthe king (which were, indeed, originally identical); and as such they\nwere governmental appliances in the same sense that state-pageants and\nreligious feasts were. Further, they were governmental appliances in\nvirtue of representing the worship of the god, the triumphs of the\ngod-king, the submission of his subjects, and the punishment of the\nrebellious. And yet again they were governmental, as being the products\nof an art reverenced by the people as a sacred mystery. From the\nhabitual use of this pictorial representation, there naturally grew up\nthe but slightly-modified practice of picture-writing\u2014a practice which\nwas found still extant among the Mexicans at the time they were\ndiscovered. By abbreviations analogous to those still going on in our\nown written and spoken language, the most familiar of these pictured\nfigures were successively simplified; and ultimately there grew up a\nsystem of symbols, most of which had but a distant resemblance to the\nthings for which they stood. The inference that the hieroglyphics of the\nEgyptians were thus produced, is confirmed by the fact that the\npicture-writing of the Mexicans was found to have given birth to a like\nfamily of ideographic forms; and among them, as among the Egyptians,\nthese had been partially differentiated into the _kuriological_ or\nimitative, and the _tropical_ or symbolic: which were, however, used\ntogether in the same record. In Egypt, written language underwent a\nfurther differentiation; whence resulted the _hieratic_ and the\n_epistolographic_ or _enchorial_: both of which are derived from the\noriginal hieroglyphic. At the same time we find that for the expression\nof proper names, which could not be otherwise conveyed, phonetic symbols\nwere employed; and though it is alleged that the Egyptians never\nactually achieved complete alphabetic writing, yet it can scarcely be\ndoubted that these phonetic symbols occasionally used in aid of their\nideographic ones, were the germs out of which alphabetic writing grew.\nOnce having become separate from hieroglyphics, alphabetic writing\nitself underwent numerous differentiations\u2014multiplied alphabets were\nproduced: between most of which, however, more or less connexion can\nstill be traced. And in each civilized nation there has now grown up,\nfor the representation of one set of sounds, several sets of written\nsigns, used for distinct purposes. Finally, through a yet more important\ndifferentiation came printing; which, uniform in kind as it was at\nfirst, has since become multiform.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 50. While written language was passing through its earlier stages of\ndevelopment, the mural decoration which formed its root was being\ndifferentiated into Painting and Sculpture. The gods, kings, men, and\nanimals represented, were originally marked by indented outlines and\ncoloured. In most cases these outlines were of such depth, and the\nobject they circumscribed so far rounded and marked out in its leading\nparts, as to form a species of work intermediate between intaglio and\nbas-relief. In other cases we see an advance upon this: the raised\nspaces between the figures being chiselled off, and the figures\nthemselves appropriately tinted, a painted bas-relief was produced. The\nrestored Assyrian architecture at Sydenham, exhibits this style of art\ncarried to greater perfection\u2014the persons and things represented, though\nstill barbarously coloured, are carved out with more truth and in\ngreater detail; and in the winged lions and bulls used for the angles of\ngateways, we may see a considerable advance towards a completely\nsculptured figure; which, nevertheless, is still coloured, and still\nforms part of the building. But while in Assyria the production of a\nstatue proper, seems to have been little, if at all, attempted, we may\ntrace in Egyptian art the gradual separation of the sculptured figure\nfrom the wall. A walk through the collection in the British Museum will\nclearly show this; while it will at the same time afford an opportunity\nof observing the evident traces which the independent statues bear of\ntheir derivation from bas-relief: seeing that nearly all of them not\nonly display that union of the limbs with the body which is the\ncharacteristic of bas-relief, but have the back of the statue united\nfrom head to foot with a block which stands in place of the original\nwall. Greece repeated the leading stages of this progress. As in\nEgypt and Assyria, these twin arts were at first united with each other\nand with their parent, Architecture; and were the aids of Religion and\nGovernment. On the friezes of Greek temples, we see coloured bas-reliefs\nrepresenting sacrifices, battles, processions, games\u2014all in some sort\nreligious. On the pediments we see painted sculptures more or less\nunited with the tympanum, and having for subjects the triumphs of gods\nor heroes. Even when we come to statues that are definitely separated\nfrom the buildings to which they pertain, we still find them coloured;\nand only in the later periods of Greek civilization, does the\ndifferentiation of sculpture from painting appear to have become\ncomplete. In Christian art we may clearly trace a parallel\nre-genesis. All early paintings and sculptures throughout Europe, were\nreligious in subject\u2014represented Christs, crucifixions, virgins, holy\nfamilies, apostles, saints. They formed integral parts of church\narchitecture, and were among the means of exciting worship: as in Roman\nCatholic countries they still are. Moreover, the early sculptures of\nChrist on the cross, of virgins, of saints, were coloured; and it needs\nbut to call to mind the painted madonnas and crucifixes still abundant\nin continental churches and highways, to perceive the significant fact\nthat painting and sculpture continue in closest connexion with each\nother, where they continue in closest connexion with their parent. Even\nwhen Christian sculpture was pretty clearly differentiated from\npainting, it was still religious and governmental in its subjects\u2014was\nused for tombs in churches and statues of kings; while, at the same\ntime, painting, where not purely ecclesiastical, was applied to the\ndecoration of palaces, and besides representing royal personages, was\nalmost wholly devoted to sacred legends. Only in quite recent times have\npainting and sculpture become entirely secular arts. Only within these\nfew centuries has painting been divided into historical, landscape,\nmarine, architectural, genre, animal, still-life, &c., and sculpture\ngrown heterogeneous in respect of the variety of real and ideal subjects\nwith which it occupies itself.\n\nStrange as it seems then, we find it no less true, that all forms of\nwritten language, of painting, and of sculpture, have a common root in\nthe politico-religious decorations of ancient temples and palaces.\nLittle resemblance as they now have, the bust that stands on the\nconsole, the landscape that hangs against the wall, and the copy of the\n_Times_ lying upon the table, are remotely akin; not only in nature, but\nby extraction. The brazen face of the knocker which the postman has just\nlifted, is related not only to the woodcuts of the _Illustrated London\nNews_ which he is delivering, but to the characters of the _billet-doux_\nwhich accompanies it. Between the painted window, the prayer-book on\nwhich its light falls, and the adjacent monument, there is\nconsanguinity. The effigies on our coins, the signs over shops, the\nfigures that fill every ledger, the coat of arms outside the\ncarriage-panel, and the placards inside the omnibus, are, in common with\ndolls, blue-books and paper-hangings, lineally descended from the rude\nsculpture-paintings in which the Egyptians represented the triumphs and\nworship of their god-kings. Perhaps no example can be given which more\nvividly illustrates the multiplicity and heterogeneity of the products\nthat in course of time may arise by successive differentiations from a\ncommon stock.\n\nBefore passing to other classes of facts, it should be observed that the\nevolution of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous is displayed not\nonly in the separation of Painting and Sculpture from Architecture and\nfrom each other, and in the greater variety of subjects they embody; but\nit is further shown in the structure of each work. A modern picture or\nstatue is of far more heterogeneous nature than an ancient one. An\nEgyptian sculpture-fresco represents all its figures as on one\nplane\u2014that is, at the same distance from the eye; and so is less\nheterogeneous than a painting that represents them as at various\ndistances from the eye. It exhibits all objects as exposed to the same\ndegree of light; and so is less heterogeneous than a painting which\nexhibits different objects, and different parts of each object, as in\ndifferent degrees of light. It uses scarcely any but the primary\ncolours, and these in their full intensity; and so is less heterogeneous\nthan a painting which, introducing the primary colours but sparingly,\nemploys an endless variety of intermediate tints, each of heterogeneous\ncomposition, and differing from the rest not only in quality but in\nintensity. Moreover, we see in these earliest works a great\nuniformity of conception. The same arrangement of figures is perpetually\nreproduced\u2014the same actions, attitudes, faces, dresses. In Egypt the\nmodes of representation were so fixed that it was sacrilege to introduce\na novelty; and indeed it could have been only in consequence of a fixed\nmode of representation that a system of hieroglyphics became possible.\nThe Assyrian bas-reliefs display parallel characters. Deities, kings,\nattendants, winged-figures and animals, are severally depicted in like\npositions, holding like implements, doing like things, and with like\nexpression or non-expression of face. If a palm-grove is introduced, all\nthe trees are of the same height, have the same number of leaves, and\nare equidistant. When water is imitated, each wave is a counterpart of\nthe rest; and the fish, almost always of one kind, are evenly\ndistributed over the surface. The beards of the kings, the gods, and the\nwinged-figures, are everywhere similar; as are the manes of the lions,\nand equally so those of the horses. Hair is represented throughout by\none form of curl. The king\u2019s beard is quite architecturally built up of\ncompound tiers of uniform curls, alternating with twisted tiers placed\nin a transverse direction, and arranged with perfect regularity; and the\nterminal tufts of the bulls\u2019 tails are represented in exactly the same\nmanner. Without tracing out analogous facts in early Christian\nart, in which, though less striking, they are still visible, the advance\nin heterogeneity will be sufficiently manifest on remembering that in\nthe pictures of our own day the composition is endlessly varied; the\nattitudes, faces, expressions, unlike; the subordinate objects different\nin size, form, position, texture; and more or less of contrast even in\nthe smallest details. Or, if we compare an Egyptian statue, seated bolt\nupright on a block, with hands on knees, fingers outspread and parallel,\neyes looking straight forward, and the two sides perfectly symmetrical\nin every particular, with a statue of the advanced Greek or the modern\nschool, which is asymmetrical in respect of the position of the head,\nthe body, the limbs, the arrangement of the hair, dress, appendages, and\nin its relations to neighbouring objects, we shall see the change from\nthe homogeneous to the heterogeneous clearly manifested.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 51. In the co-ordinate origin and gradual differentiation of Poetry,\nMusic, and Dancing, we have another series of illustrations. Rhythm in\nspeech, rhythm in sound, and rhythm in motion, were in the beginning,\nparts of the same thing; and have only in process of time become\nseparate things. Among various existing barbarous tribes we find them\nstill united. The dances of savages are accompanied by some kind of\nmonotonous chant, the clapping of hands, the striking of rude\ninstruments: there are measured movements, measured words, and measured\ntones; and the whole ceremony, usually having reference to war or\nsacrifice, is of governmental character. In the early records of the\nhistoric races we similarly find these three forms of metrical action\nunited in religious festivals. In the Hebrew writings we read that the\ntriumphal ode composed by Moses on the defeat of the Egyptians, was sung\nto an accompaniment of dancing and timbrels. The Israelites danced and\nsung \u201cat the inauguration of the golden calf. And as it is generally\nagreed that this representation of the Deity was borrowed from the\nmysteries of Apis, it is probable that the dancing was copied from that\nof the Egyptians on those occasions.\u201d There was an annual dance in\nShiloh on the sacred festival; and David danced before the ark. Again,\nin Greece the like relation is everywhere seen: the original type being\nthere, as probably in other cases, a simultaneous chanting and mimetic\nrepresentation of the life and adventures of the god. The Spartan dances\nwere accompanied by hymns and songs; and in general the Greeks had \u201cno\nfestivals or religious assemblies but what were accompanied with songs\nand dances\u201d\u2014both of them being forms of worship used before altars.\nAmong the Romans, too, there were sacred dances: the Salian and\nLupercalian being named as of that kind. And even in Christian\ncountries, as at Limoges in comparatively recent times, the people have\ndanced in the choir in honour of a saint. The incipient separation\nof these once united arts from each other and from religion, was early\nvisible in Greece. Probably diverging from dances partly religious,\npartly warlike, as the Corybantian, came the war-dances proper, of which\nthere were various kinds; and from these resulted secular dances.\nMeanwhile Music and Poetry, though still united, came to have an\nexistence separate from dancing. The aboriginal Greek poems, religious\nin subject, were not recited but chanted; and though at first the chant\nof the poet was accompanied by the dance of the chorus, it ultimately\ngrew into independence. Later still, when the poem had been\ndifferentiated into epic and lyric\u2014when it became the custom to sing the\nlyric and recite the epic\u2014poetry proper was born. As during the same\nperiod musical instruments were being multiplied, we may presume that\nmusic came to have an existence apart from words. And both of them were\nbeginning to assume other forms besides the religious. Facts\nhaving like implications might be cited from the histories of later\ntimes and peoples; as the practices of our own early minstrels, who sang\nto the harp heroic narratives versified by themselves to music of their\nown composition: thus uniting the now separate offices of poet,\ncomposer, vocalist, and instrumentalist. But, without further\nillustration, the common origin and gradual differentiation of Dancing,\nPoetry, and Music will be sufficiently manifest.\n\nThe advance from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous is displayed not\nonly in the separation of these arts from each other and from religion,\nbut also in the multiplied differentiations which each of them\nafterwards undergoes. Not to dwell upon the numberless kinds of dancing\nthat have, in course of time, come into use; and not to occupy space in\ndetailing the progress of poetry, as seen in the development of the\nvarious forms of metre, of rhyme, and of general organization; let us\nconfine our attention to music as a type of the group. As argued\nby Dr. Burney, and as implied by the customs of still extant barbarous\nraces, the first musical instruments were, without doubt,\npercussive\u2014sticks, calabashes, tom-toms\u2014and were used simply to mark the\ntime of the dance; and in this constant repetition of the same sound, we\nsee music in its most homogeneous form. The Egyptians had a lyre with\nthree strings. The early lyre of the Greeks had four, constituting their\ntetrachord. In course of some centuries lyres of seven and eight strings\nwere employed. And, by the expiration of a thousand years, they had\nadvanced to their \u201cgreat system\u201d of the double octave. Through all which\nchanges there of course arose a greater heterogeneity of melody.\nSimultaneously there came into use the different modes\u2014Dorian, Ionian,\nPhrygian, \u00c6olian, and Lydian\u2014answering to our keys: and of these there\nwere ultimately fifteen. As yet, however, there was but little\nheterogeneity in the time of their music. Instrumental music during this\nperiod being merely the accompaniment of vocal music, and vocal music\nbeing completely subordinated to words,\u2014the singer being also the poet,\nchanting his own compositions and making the lengths of his notes agree\nwith the feet of his verses; there unavoidably arose a tiresome\nuniformity of measure, which, as Dr Burney says, \u201cno resources of melody\ncould disguise.\u201d Lacking the complex rhythm obtained by our equal bars\nand unequal notes, the only rhythm was that produced by the quantity of\nthe syllables, and was of necessity comparatively monotonous. And\nfurther, it may be observed that the chant thus resulting, being like\nrecitative, was much less clearly differentiated from ordinary speech\nthan is our modern song. Nevertheless, considering the extended range of\nnotes in use, the variety of modes, the occasional variations of time\nconsequent on changes of metre, and the multiplication of instruments,\nwe see that music had, towards the close of Greek civilization, attained\nto considerable heterogeneity: not indeed as compared with our music,\nbut as compared with that which preceded it. As yet, however,\nthere existed nothing but melody: harmony was unknown. It was not until\nChristian church-music had reached some development, that music in parts\nwas evolved; and then it came into existence through a very unobtrusive\ndifferentiation. Difficult as it may be to conceive, _\u00e0 priori_, how the\nadvance from melody to harmony could take place without a sudden leap,\nit is none the less true that it did so. The circumstance which prepared\nthe way for it, was the employment of two choirs singing alternately the\nsame air. Afterwards it became the practice (very possibly first\nsuggested by a mistake) for the second choir to commence before the\nfirst had ceased; thus producing a fugue. With the simple airs then in\nuse, a partially harmonious fugue might not improbably thus result; and\na very partially harmonious fugue satisfied the ears of that age, as we\nknow from still preserved examples. The idea having once been given, the\ncomposing of airs productive of fugal harmony would naturally grow up;\nas in some way it _did_ grow up out of this alternate choir-singing. And\nfrom the fugue to concerted music of two, three, four, and more parts,\nthe transition was easy. Without pointing out in detail the\nincreasing complexity that resulted from introducing notes of various\nlengths, from the multiplication of keys, from the use of accidentals,\nfrom varieties of time, from modulations and so forth, it needs but to\ncontrast music as it is, with music as it was, to see how immense is the\nincrease of heterogeneity. We see this if, looking at music in its\n_ensemble_, we enumerate its many different genera and species\u2014if we\nconsider the divisions into vocal, instrumental, and mixed; and their\nsubdivisions into music for different voices and different\ninstruments\u2014if we observe the many forms of sacred music, from the\nsimple hymn, the chant, the canon, motet, anthem, &c., up to the\noratorio; and the still more numerous forms of secular music, from the\nballad up to the serenata, from the instrumental solo up to the\nsymphony. Again, the same truth is seen on comparing any one sample of\naboriginal music with a sample of modern music\u2014even an ordinary song for\nthe piano; which we find to be relatively highly heterogeneous, not only\nin respect of the varieties in the pitch and in the length of the notes,\nthe number of different notes sounding at the same instant in company\nwith the voice, and the variations of strength with which they are\nsounded and sung, but in respect of the changes of key, the changes of\ntime, the changes of _timbre_ of the voice, and the many other\nmodifications of expression. While between the old monotonous\ndance-chant and a grand opera of our own day, with its endless\norchestral complexities and vocal combinations, the contrast in\nheterogeneity is so extreme that it seems scarcely credible that the one\nshould have been the ancestor of the other.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 52. Were they needed, many further illustrations might be cited. Going\nback to the early time when the deeds of the god-king, chanted and\nmimetically represented in dances round his altar, were further narrated\nin picture-writings on the walls of temples and palaces, and so\nconstituted a rude literature, we might trace the development of\nLiterature through phases in which, as in the Hebrew Scriptures it\npresents in one work, theology, cosmogony, history, biography, civil\nlaw, ethics, poetry; through other phases in which, as in the Iliad, the\nreligious, martial, historical, the epic, dramatic, and lyric elements\nare similarly commingled; down to its present heterogeneous development,\nin which its divisions and subdivisions are so numerous and varied as to\ndefy complete classification. Or we might track the evolution of\nScience: beginning with the era in which it was not yet differentiated\nfrom Art, and was, in union with Art, the handmaid of Religion; passing\nthrough the era in which the sciences were so few and rudimentary, as to\nbe simultaneously cultivated by the same philosophers; and ending with\nthe era in which the genera and species are so numerous that few can\nenumerate them, and no one can adequately grasp even one genus. Or we\nmight do the like with Architecture, with the Drama, with Dress. But\ndoubtless the reader is already weary of illustrations; and my promise\nhas been amply fulfilled. I believe it has been shown beyond question,\nthat that which the German physiologists have found to be the law of\norganic development, is the law of all development. The advance from the\nsimple to the complex, through a process of successive differentiations,\nis seen alike in the earliest changes of the Universe to which we can\nreason our way back, and in the earliest changes which we can\ninductively establish; it is seen in the geologic and climatic evolution\nof the Earth, and of every single organism on its surface; it is seen in\nthe evolution of Humanity, whether contemplated in the civilized\nindividual, or in the aggregation of races; it is seen in the evolution\nof Society, in respect alike of its political, its religious, and its\neconomical organization; and it is seen in the evolution of all those\nendless concrete and abstract products of human activity, which\nconstitute the environment of our daily life. From the remotest past\nwhich Science can fathom, up to the novelties of yesterday, that in\nwhich Evolution essentially consists, is the transformation of the\nhomogeneous into the heterogeneous.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 8:\n\n The substance of this chapter is nearly identical with the first half\n of an essay on \u201cProgress: its Law and Cause,\u201d which was originally\n published in the _Westminster Review_ for April 1857: only a few\n unimportant additions and alterations have been made. The succeeding\n chapter, however, in which the subject is continued, is, with the\n exception of a fragment embodied in it, wholly new.\n\nFootnote 9:\n\n For detailed proof of these assertions see essay on _Manners and\n Fashion_.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER III.\n THE LAW OF EVOLUTION, CONTINUED.\n\n\n\u00a7 53. But now, does this generalization express the whole truth? Does it\ninclude all the phenomena of Evolution? and does it exclude all other\nphenomena? A careful consideration of the facts, will show that it does\nneither.\n\nThat there are changes from the less heterogeneous to the more\nheterogeneous, which do not come within what we call Evolution, is\nproved in every case of local disease. A portion of the body in which\nthere arises a cancer, or other morbid growth, unquestionably displays a\nnew differentiation. Whether this morbid growth be, or be not, more\nheterogeneous than the tissues in which it is seated, is not the\nquestion. The question is, whether the structure of the organism as a\nwhole, is, or is not, rendered more heterogeneous by the addition of a\npart unlike every pre-existing part, both in form and composition. And\nto this question there can be none but an affirmative answer.\n Again, it might with apparent truth be contended, that the earlier\nstages of decomposition in a dead body, similarly involve an increase of\nheterogeneity. Supposing the chemical changes to commence in some parts\nof the body earlier than in other parts, as they commonly do; and to\naffect different tissues in different, ways, as they must; it seems to\nbe a necessary admission that the entire body, made up of undecomposed\nparts and parts decomposed in different ways and degrees, has become\nmore heterogeneous than it was. Though greater homogeneity will be the\neventual result, the immediate result is the opposite. And yet this\nimmediate result is certainly not evolution. But perhaps of all\nillustrations the least debatable are those furnished by social\ndisorders and disasters. When in any nation there occurs a rebellion,\nwhich, while leaving some provinces undisturbed, developes itself here\nin secret societies, there in public demonstrations, and elsewhere in\nactual appeal to arms, leading probably to conflict and bloodshed; it\nmust be admitted that the society, regarded as a whole, has so been\nrendered more heterogeneous. Or when a dearth causes commercial panic\nwith its entailed bankruptcies, closed factories, discharged operatives,\npolitical agitations, food riots, incendiarisms; it is manifest that as,\nthroughout the rest of society, there still exists the ordinary\norganization displaying the usual phenomena, these new phenomena must be\nregarded as adding to the complexity previously existing. Nevertheless,\nit is clear that such changes so far from constituting a further stage\nof evolution, are steps towards dissolution.\n\nThere is good reason to think then, that the definition arrived at in\nthe last chapter, is an imperfect one. We may suspect, not that the\nprocess of evolution is different from the process there described; but\nthat the description did not contain all that it should. The changes\nabove instanced as coming within the formula as it now stands, are so\nobviously different from the rest, that the inclusion of them implies\nsome oversight\u2014some distinction hitherto overlooked. Such further\ndistinction we shall find really exists.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 54. At the same time that all evolution is a change from the\nhomogeneous to the heterogeneous, it is also a change from the\nindefinite to the definite. As well as an advance from simplicity to\ncomplexity, there is an advance from confusion to order\u2014from\nundetermined arrangement to determined arrangement. In the process of\ndevelopment, no matter what sphere it is displayed in, there is not only\na gradual multiplication of unlike parts; but there is a gradual\nincrease in the distinctness with which these parts are marked off from\neach other. And so is that increase of heterogeneity which characterizes\nEvolution, distinguished from that increase of heterogeneity which does\nnot. For proof of this, it needs only to reconsider the instances\ngiven above. The structural changes constituting a disease, have no such\ndefiniteness, either in locality, extent, or outline, as the structural\nchanges constituting development. Though certain morbid growths arise\nmuch more commonly in some parts of the body than in others (as warts on\nthe hands, cancer on the breasts, tubercle in the lungs), yet they are\nnot confined to these parts; nor, when found on them, are they anything\nlike so precise in their relative positions as are the normal parts\naround them. In size, again, they are extremely variable\u2014they bear no\nsuch constant proportion to the body as organs do. Their forms, too, are\nfar less specific than organic forms. And they are extremely irregular\nor confused in their internal structures. That is to say, they are in\nall respects comparatively indefinite. The like peculiarity may be\ntraced in decomposition. That state of total indefiniteness to which a\ndead body is finally reduced, is a state towards which the putrefactive\nchanges have tended from their commencement. Each step in the\ndestruction of the organic compounds, is accompanied by a blurring of\nthe minute structure\u2014diminishes its distinctness. From the portions that\nhave undergone most decomposition, there is a gradual transition to the\nless decomposed portions. And step by step the lines of organization,\nonce so precise, disappear. Similarly with social changes of an\nabnormal kind. A political outbreak rising finally to a rebellion, tends\nfrom the very first to obliterate the specializations, governmental and\nindustrial, which previously existed. The disaffection which originates\nsuch an outbreak, itself implies a loosening of those ties by which the\ncitizens are bound up into distinct classes and sub-classes. Agitation,\ngrowing into revolutionary meetings, shows us a decided tendency towards\nthe fusion of ranks that are usually separated. Acts of open\ninsubordination exhibit a breaking through of those definite limits to\nindividual conduct which were previously observed; and a disappearance\nof the lines previously existing between those in authority and those\nbeneath them. At the same time, by the arrest of trade, artizans and\nothers lose their occupations; and in so ceasing to be functionally\ndistinguished, become fused into a mass from which the demarcations in\ngreat part vanish. And when at last there comes positive insurrection,\nall magisterial and official powers, all class distinctions, and all\nindustrial differences, at once cease: organized society lapses into an\nunorganized aggregation of social units. How the like holds true of such\nsocial disasters as are entailed by famine, needs not be pointed out. On\ncalling to mind that in cases of this kind the changes are from order\ntowards disorder, it will at once be seen that like the foregoing they\nare changes from definite arrangements to indefinite arrangements.\n\nThus then is that increase of heterogeneity which constitutes Evolution,\ndistinguished from that increase of heterogeneity which does not do so.\nThough in disease and death, individual or social, the earliest\nmodifications may be construed as additions to the heterogeneity\npreviously existing; yet they cannot be construed as additions to the\ndefiniteness previously existing. They begin from the very outset to\ndestroy this definiteness; and so, gradually produce a heterogeneity\nthat is indeterminate instead of determinate. Just in the same way that\na city, already multiform in its variously arranged structures of\nvarious architecture, may be made more multiform by an earthquake, which\nleaves part of it standing and overthrows other parts in different ways\nand degrees, and yet is at the same time reduced from definite\narrangement to indefinite arrangement; so may organized bodies be made\nfor a time more multiform by changes which are nevertheless\ndisorganizing changes. And in the one case as in the other, it is the\nabsence of definiteness which distinguishes the multiformity of\nregression from the multiformity of progression.\n\nIf the advance from the indefinite to the definite is an essential\ncharacteristic of Evolution, we shall of course find it everywhere\ndisplayed; as in the last Chapter we found the advance from the\nhomogeneous to the heterogeneous. With a view of showing that it is so,\nlet us now briefly reconsider the same several classes of facts.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 55. Beginning as before with a hypothetical illustration, we have to\nnote that each further stage in the evolution of the Solar System,\nsupposing it to have originated from diffused matter, was an advance\ntowards more definite forms, and times, and forces. At first irregular\nin shape and with indistinct margins, the attenuated substance, as it\nconcentrated and acquired a rotatory motion, must have assumed the shape\nof an oblate spheroid; which, with every increase of density, became\nmore specific in general outline, and had its surface more sharply\nmarked off from the surrounding void. At the same time, the constituent\nportions of nebulous matter, instead of independently moving towards\ntheir common centre of gravity from all points, and tending to revolve\nround it in various planes, as they would at first do, must have had\nthese planes more and more merged into a single plane; and this plane\nmust have gained greater precision as the concentration progressed. To\nwhich add that in the gradual establishment of a common and determinate\nangular velocity, instead of the various and conflicting angular\nvelocities of different parts, we have a further change of like nature.\n According to the hypothesis, change from indistinct\ncharacteristics to distinct ones, was repeated in the evolution of each\nplanet and satellite; and may in them be traced to a much greater\nextent. A gaseous spheroid is less definitely marked off from the space\naround it than a fluid spheroid, since it is subject to larger and more\nrapid undulations of surface, and to much greater distortions of general\nform; and similarly a fluid spheroid, covered as it must be with waves\nof various magnitudes, is less definite than a solid spheroid. Nor is it\nonly in greater fixity of surface that a planet in its last stage, is\ndistinguished from a planet in its earlier stages. Its general form,\ntoo, is more precise. The sphere, to which in the end it very closely\napproximates, is a perfectly specific figure; while the spheroid, under\nwhich figure it previously existed, being infinitely variable in\noblateness, is an imperfectly specific figure. And further, a planet\nhaving an axis inclined to the plane of its orbit, must, while its form\nis very oblate, have its plane of rotation greatly disturbed by the\nattraction of external bodies; whereas its approach to a spherical form,\ninvolving a less extreme precessional motion, implies less marked\nvariations in the direction of its axis. Nor is it only in respect\nof space-relations that the Solar System in general and in detail has\nbecome more precise. The like is true of time-relations. During the\nprocess of concentration the various portions of the nebulous mass must\nnot only differ more or less from each other in their angular\nvelocities, but each of them must gradually change the period in which\nit moves round the general axis. In every detached ring however, and in\nthe resulting planet, this progressive alteration ceases: there results\na determinate period of revolution. And similarly the time of axial\nrotation, which, during the formation of each planet, is continually\ndiminishing, becomes at last practically fixed: as in the case of the\nEarth, whose day is not a second less than it was 2000 years ago.\n It is scarcely needful to point out that the force-relations have\nsimultaneously become more and more settled. The exact calculations of\nphysical astronomy, show us how definite these force-relations now are;\nwhile the great indefiniteness which once characterized them, is implied\nin the extreme difficulty, if not impossibility, of subjecting the\nnebular hypothesis to mathematical treatment.\n\nFrom that originally molten state of the Earth inferable from\nestablished geological data\u2014a state in harmony with the nebular\nhypothesis but inexplicable on any other\u2014the transition to its existing\nstate has been through stages in which the characters became more\ndeterminate. Besides being, as above pointed out, comparatively unstable\nin surface and contour, a fluid spheroid is less definite than a solid\nspheroid in having no fixed distribution of parts. Currents of molten\nmatter, though kept to certain general circuits by the conditions of\nequilibrium, cannot in the absence of solid boundaries be precise or\npermanent in direction: all parts must be in motion with respect to\nother parts. But a solidification of the surface, even though but\npartial, is manifestly a step towards the establishment of definite\nrelations of position. In a thin crust however, frequently ruptured as\nit must be by disturbing forces, and moved by every tidal undulation,\nsuch fixity of relative position can be but temporary. Only as the crust\nslowly increases in thickness, can there arise distinct and settled\ngeographical relations. Observe too that when, on a crust that has\ncooled to the requisite degree, there begins to precipitate the water\nfloating above as vapour, the water which is precipitated cannot\nmaintain any definiteness either of state or place. Falling on a surface\nnot thick enough to preserve anything beyond slight variations of level,\nit must form small shallow deposits over areas sufficiently cool to\npermit condensation; which areas must not only pass insensibly into\nothers that are too hot for this, but must themselves from time to time\nbe so raised in temperature as to drive off the water lying on them.\nWith progressive refrigeration, however,\u2014with an increasing thickness of\ncrust, a consequent formation of larger elevations and depressions, and\nthe condensation of more atmospheric water, there comes an arrangement\nof parts that is comparatively fixed in both time and space; and the\ndefiniteness of state and position increases, until there results such a\ndistribution of continents and oceans as we now see\u2014a distribution that\nis not only topographically precise, but also in its cliff-marked\ncoast-lines presents a more definite division of land from water than\ncould have existed during the period when islands of low elevation had\nshelving beaches up which the tide ebbed and flowed to great distances.\n Respecting the characteristics technically classed as geological,\nwe may draw parallel inferences. While the Earth\u2019s crust was thin,\nmountain-chains were impossibilities: there could not have been long and\nwell-defined axes of elevation, with distinct water-sheds and areas of\ndrainage. Moreover, from small islands admitting of but small rivers,\nand tidal streams both feeble and narrow, there would result no\nclearly-marked sedimentary strata. Confused and varying masses of\ndetritus, such as those now found at the mouths of brooks, must have\nbeen the prevailing formations. And these could give place to distinct\nstrata, only as there arose continents and oceans, with their great\nrivers, long coast-lines, and wide-spreading marine currents. How\nthere must simultaneously have resulted more definite meteorological\ncharacters, need not be pointed out in detail. That differences of\nclimates and seasons must have grown relatively decided as the heat of\nthe Sun became distinguishable from the proper heat of the Earth; that\nthe establishment through this cause of comparatively constant\natmospheric currents, must have similarly produced more specific\nconditions in each locality; and that these effects must have been aided\nby increasing permanence in the distribution of land and sea and of\nocean currents; are conclusions which are sufficiently obvious.\n\nLet us turn now to the evidence furnished by organic bodies. In place of\ndeductive illustrations like the foregoing, we shall here find numerous\nillustrations which, as being inductively established, are less open to\ncriticism. The process of mammalian development, for example, will\nsupply us with numerous proofs ready-described by embryologists.\n The first change which the ovum of a mammal undergoes, after\ncontinued segmentation has reduced its yelk to a mulberry-like mass, is\nthe appearance of a greater definiteness in the peripheral cells of this\nmass: each of which acquires a distinct enveloping membrane. These\nperipheral cells, vaguely distinguished from the internal ones both by\ntheir greater completeness and by their minuter subdivision, coalesce to\nform the blastoderm or germinal membrane. One portion of the blastoderm\npresently becomes contrasted with the rest, through the accumulation of\ncells still more subdivided, which, together, form an opaque roundish\nspot. This _area germinativa_, as it is called, is not sharply\ndelineated, but shades off gradually into the surrounding parts of the\nblastoderm; and the _area pellucida_, subsequently formed in the midst\nof this germinal area, is similarly without any precise margin. The\n\u201cprimitive trace,\u201d which makes its appearance in the centre of the _area\npellucida_, and is the rudiment of that vertebrate axis which is to be\nthe fundamental characteristic of the mature animal, is shown by its\nname to be at first indefinite\u2014a mere trace. Beginning as a shallow\ngroove, this becomes slowly more pronounced: its sides grow higher,\ntheir summits overlap, and at last unite; and so the indefinite groove\npasses into a definite tube, forming the vertebral canal. In this\nvertebral canal the leading divisions of the brain are at first\ndiscernible only as slight bulgings; while the vertebr\u00e6 commence as\nindistinct modifications of the tissue bounding the canal.\nSimultaneously, the outer portion of the blastoderm has been undergoing\nseparation from the inner portion: there has been a division into the\nserous and mucous layers\u2014a division at the outset indistinct, and\ntraceable only about the germinal area, but which insensibly spreads\nthroughout nearly the whole germinal membrane, and becomes definite.\nFrom the mucous layer, the development of the alimentary canal proceeds\nas that of the vertebral canal does from the serous layer. Originally a\nsimple channel along the under surface of the embryonic mass, the\nintestine is rendered step by step more distinct by the bending down, on\neach side, of ridges which finally join to form a tube\u2014the permanent\nabsorbing surface is by degrees clearly cut off from that temporary\nabsorbing surface of which it was at first a part like all the rest. And\nin an analogous manner the entire embryo, which at first lies outspread\nupon the surface of the yelk-sack, gradually rises up from it, and, by\nthe infolding of its ventral surface, becomes a separate mass, connected\nwith the yelk-sack only by a narrow duct. These changes through\nwhich the general structure of the embryo is marked out with\nslowly-increasing precision, are paralleled in the evolution of each\norgan. The heart is at first a mere aggregation of cells, of which the\ninner liquify to form the cavity, while the outer are transformed into\nthe walls; and when thus sketched out, the heart is indefinite not only\nas being unlined by limiting membrane, but also as being but vaguely\ndistinguishable from the great blood-vessels: of which it is little more\nthan a dilatation. By and by the receiving portion of the cavity becomes\ndistinct from the propelling portion. Afterwards there begins to be\nformed across the ventricle, a septum, which, however, is some time\nbefore it completely shuts off the two halves from each other; while the\nlater-formed septum of the auricle remains incomplete during the whole\nof f\u0153tal life. Again, the liver commences as a multiplication of certain\ncells in the wall of the intestine. The thickening produced by this\nmultiplication \u201cincreases so as to form a projection upon the exterior\nof the canal;\u201d and at the same time that the organ grows and becomes\ndistinct from the intestine, the channels which permeate it are\ntransformed into ducts having clearly-marked walls. Similarly, by the\nincrease of certain cells of the external coat of the alimentary canal\nat its upper portion, are produced buds from which the lungs are\ndeveloped; and these, in their general outlines and detailed structure,\nacquire distinctness step by step. Changes of this order continue\nlong after birth; and, in the human being, are some of them not\ncompleted till middle life. During youth, most of the articular surfaces\nof the bones remain rough and fissured\u2014the calcareous deposit ending\nirregularly in the surrounding cartilage. But between puberty and the\nage of thirty, the articular surfaces are finished off by the addition\nof smooth, hard, sharply-cut \u201cepiphyses.\u201d Thus we may say that during\nEvolution, an increase of definiteness continues long after there ceases\nto be any appreciable increase of heterogeneity. And, indeed, there is\nreason to think that those structural modifications which take place\nafter maturity, ending in old age and death, are modifications of this\nnature; since they result in a growing rigidity of structure, a\nconsequent restriction of movement and of functional pliability, a\ngradual narrowing of the limits within which the vital processes go on,\nending at length in an organic adjustment too precise\u2014too narrow in its\nmargin of possible variation to permit the requisite adaptation to\nexternal changes of condition.\n\nTo demonstrate that the Earth\u2019s Flora and Fauna, regarded either as\nwholes or in their separate species, have progressed in definiteness, is\nof course no more possible than it was to demonstrate that they have\nprogressed in heterogeneity: lack of facts being an obstacle to the one\nconclusion as to the other. If, however, we allow ourselves to reason\nfrom the hypothesis, now daily rendered more probable, that every\nspecies of organic form up to the most complex, has arisen out of the\nsimplest through the accumulation of modifications upon modifications,\njust as every individual organic form arises; we shall see that in such\ncase there must have been a progress from the indeterminate to the\ndeterminate, both in the particular forms and in the groups of forms.\n We may set out with the significant fact that many of the lowest\nliving organisms (which are analogous in structure to the germs of all\nhigher ones) are so indefinite in character that it is difficult, if not\nimpossible, to decide whether they are plants or animals. Respecting\nsundry of them there are unsettled disputes between zoologists and\nbotanists; and it has even been proposed to group them into a separate\nkingdom, forming a common basis to the animal and vegetal kingdoms. Note\nnext that among the _Protozoa_, extreme indefiniteness of shape is very\ngeneral. In the shell-less Rhizopods and their allies, not only is the\nform so irregular as to admit of no description, but it is neither alike\nin any two individuals nor in the same individual at successive moments.\nBy the aggregation of such creatures, are produced, among other\nindefinite bodies, the sponges\u2014bodies that are indefinite in size, in\ncontour, in internal arrangement, and in the absence of an external\nlimiting membrane. As further showing the relatively indeterminate\ncharacter of the simplest organisms, it may be mentioned that their\nstructures vary very greatly with surrounding conditions: so much so\nthat, among the _Protozoa_ and _Protophyta_, many forms which were once\nclassed as distinct species, and even as distinct genera, are found to\nbe merely varieties of one species. If now we call to mind how precise\nin their attributes are the highest organisms\u2014how sharply cut their\noutlines, how invariable their proportions, and how comparatively\nconstant their structures under changed conditions, we cannot deny that\ngreater definiteness is one of their characteristics; and that if they\nhave been evolved out of lower organisms, an increase of definiteness\nhas been an accompaniment of their evolution. That in course of\ntime, species have become more sharply marked off from other species,\ngenera from genera, and orders from orders, is a conclusion not\nadmitting of a more positive establishment than the foregoing; and must,\nindeed, stand or fall with it. If, however, species and genera and\norders have resulted from the process of \u201cnatural selection,\u201d then, as\nMr. Darwin shows, there must have been a tendency to divergence, causing\nthe contrasts between groups to become more and more pronounced. By the\ndisappearance of intermediate forms, less fitted for special spheres of\nexistence than the extreme forms they connected, the differences between\nthe extreme forms must be rendered more decided; and so, from indistinct\nand unstable varieties, must slowly be produced distinct and stable\nspecies. Of which inference it may be remarked, not only that it follows\nfrom a process to which the organic creation is of necessity ever\nsubject, but also that it is in harmony with what we know respecting\nraces of men and races of domestic animals.\n\nEvidence that in the course of psychial development, there is a change\nfrom the vague to the distinct, may be seen in every nursery. The\nconfusion of the infant\u2019s perceptions is shown by its inability to\ndistinguish persons. The dimness of its ideas of direction and distance,\nmay be inferred from the ill-guided movements of its hands, and from its\nendeavours to grasp objects far out of reach. Only by degrees does the\nsense of equilibrium, needful for safe standing and moving, gain the\nrequisite precision. Through the insensible steps that end in\ncomprehensible speech, we may trace an increase in the accuracy with\nwhich sounds are discriminated and in the nicety with which they are\nimitated. And similarly during education, the change is towards the\nestablishment of internal relations more perfectly corresponding to\nexternal ones\u2014to exactness in calculations, to a better representation\nof objects drawn, to a more correct spelling, to a completer conformity\nto the rules of speech, to clearer ideas respecting the affairs of life.\n How in the further progress to maturity the law still holds, needs\nnot here be pointed out; more especially as it will presently be shown\nin treating of the evolution of intelligence during the advance of\ncivilization. The only further fact calling for remark, is, that this\nincrease of mental definiteness is, in some ways, manifested even during\nthe advance from maturity to old age. The habits of life grow more and\nmore fixed; the character becomes less capable of change; the quantity\nof knowledge previously acquired ceases to have its limits alterable by\nadditions; and the opinions upon every point admit of no modification.\n\nStill more manifestly do the successive phases through which societies\npass, display the progress from indeterminate arrangement to determinate\narrangement. A wandering tribe of savages, as being fixed neither in its\nlocality nor in the relative positions of its parts, is far less\ndefinite than a nation, covering a territory clearly marked out, and\nformed of individuals grouped together in towns and villages. In such a\ntribe the social relations are similarly confused and unsettled.\nPolitical authority is neither well established nor precise.\nDistinctions of rank are neither clearly marked nor impassable.\n\u201cMedicine-men\u201d and \u201crain-makers\u201d form a class by no means as distinct\nfrom the rest of the community as eventually becomes the priesthood they\nforeshadow. And save in the different occupations of men and women,\nthere are no complete industrial divisions. Only in tribes of\nconsiderable size, which have enslaved other tribes, is the economical\ndifferentiation decided. Any one of these primitive societies\nhowever that developes, becomes step by step more specific. Increasing\nin size, consequently ceasing to be so nomadic, and restricted in its\nrange by neighbouring tribes, it acquires, after prolonged border\nwarfare, a more settled territorial boundary. The distinction between\nthe royal race and the people, grows so extreme as to amount in the\npopular apprehension to a difference of nature. The warrior-class\nattains a perfect separation from classes devoted to the cultivation of\nthe soil or other occupations regarded as servile. And there arises a\npriesthood that is defined in its rank, its functions, its privileges.\nThis sharpness of definition, growing both greater and more variously\nexemplified as societies advance to maturity, is extremest in those that\nhave reached their full development or are declining. Of ancient Egypt\nwe read that its social divisions were strongly-marked and its customs\nrigid. Recent investigations make it more than ever clear, that among\nthe Assyrians and surrounding peoples, not only were the laws\nunalterable, but even the minor habits, down to those of domestic\nroutine, possessed a sacredness which insured their permanence. In India\nat the present day, the unchangeable distinctions of caste, not less\nthan the constancy in modes of dress, industrial processes, and\nreligious observances, show us how fixed are the arrangements where the\nantiquity is great. Nor does China with its long-settled political\norganization, its elaborate and precise conventions, and its\nunprogressive literature, fail to exemplify the same truth. The\nsuccessive phases of our own and neighbouring societies, furnish facts\nsomewhat different in kind but similar in meaning. After our leading\nclass-divisions had become tolerably well-established, it was long\nbefore they acquired their full precision. Originally, monarchical\nauthority was more baronial, and baronial authority more monarchical,\nthan they afterwards became. Between modern priests and the priests of\nold times, who while officially teachers of religion were also warriors,\njudges, architects, there is a marked difference in definiteness of\nfunction. And among the people engaged in productive occupations, the\nlike contrast would be found to hold: the industrial office has become\nmore distinct from the military; and its various divisions from each\nother. A history of our constitution, reminding us how, after prolonged\nstruggles, the powers of King, Lords, and Commons, have been gradually\nsettled, would clearly exhibit analogous changes. Countless facts\nbearing the like construction would meet us, were we to trace the\ndevelopment of legislation: in the successive stages of which, we should\nfind statutes made more precise in their provisions\u2014more specific in\ntheir applications to particular cases. Even at the present time we see\nthat each new law, beginning as a vague proposition, is, in the course\nof enactment, elaborated into specific clauses; and further that only\nafter its interpretation has been established by judges\u2019 decisions in\ncourts of justice, does it reach its final definiteness. From the\nhistory of minor institutions like evidence may be gathered. Religious,\ncharitable, literary, and all other societies, beginning with ends and\nmethods roughly sketched out and easily modifiable, show us how, by the\naccumulation of rules and precedents, the purposes become more distinct\nand the modes of action more restricted; until at last death often\nresults from a fixity which admits of no adaptation to new conditions.\nShould it be objected that among civilized nations there are examples of\ndecreasing definiteness, (instance the breaking down of limits between\nranks,) the reply is, that such apparent exceptions are the\naccompaniments of a social metamorphosis\u2014a change from the military or\npredatory type of social structure, to the industrial or mercantile\ntype, during which the old lines of organization are disappearing and\nthe new ones becoming more marked.\n\nThat all organized results of social action, pass in the course of\ncivilization through parallel phases, is demonstrable. Being, as they\nare, objective products of subjective processes, they must display\ncorresponding changes; and that they do this, the cases of Language, of\nScience, of Art, clearly prove.\n\nIf we strike out from our sentences everything but nouns and verbs, we\nshall perceive how extremely vague is the expression of ideas in\nundeveloped tongues. When we note how each inflection of a verb or\naddition by which the case of a noun is marked, serves to limit the\nconditions of action or of existence, we see that these constituents of\nspeech enable men more precisely to communicate their thoughts. That the\napplication of an adjective to a noun or an adverb to a verb, narrows\nthe class of things or changes indicated, implies that these additional\nwords serve further to define the meaning. And similarly with other\nparts of speech. The like effect results from the multiplication\nof words of each order. When the names for objects, and acts, and\nqualities, are but few, the range of each is proportionately wide, and\nits meaning therefore unspecific. The similes and metaphors so\nabundantly used by aboriginal races, are simply vehicles for indirectly\nand imperfectly conveying ideas, which lack of words disables them from\nconveying directly and perfectly. In contrasting these figurative\nexpressions, interpretable in various senses, with the expressions which\nwe should use in place of them, the increase of exactness which wealth\nof language gives, is rendered very obvious. Or to take a case from\nordinary life, if we compare the speech of the peasant, who, out of his\nlimited vocabulary, can describe the contents of the bottle he carries,\nonly as \u201cdoctor\u2019s-stuff\u201d which he has got for his \u201csick\u201d wife, with the\nspeech of the physician, who tells those educated like himself the\nparticular composition of the medicine, and the particular disorder for\nwhich he has prescribed it; we have vividly brought home to us, the\nprecision which language gains by the multiplication of terms.\n Again, in the course of its evolution, each tongue acquires a\nfurther accuracy through processes which fix the meaning of each word.\nIntellectual intercourse tends gradually to diminish laxity of\nexpression. By and by dictionaries give definitions. And eventually,\namong the most cultivated, indefiniteness is not tolerated, either in\nthe terms used or in their grammatical combinations. Once more,\nlanguages considered as wholes, become gradually more distinct from each\nother, and from their common parent: as witness in early times the\ndivergence from the same root of two languages so unlike as Greek and\nLatin, and in later times the development of three Latin dialects into\nItalian, French, and Spanish.\n\nIn his \u201cHistory of the Inductive Sciences,\u201d Dr. Whewell says that the\nGreeks failed in physical philosophy because their \u201cideas were not\ndistinct, and appropriate to the facts.\u201d I do not quote this remark for\nits luminousness; since it would be equally proper to ascribe the\nindistinctness and inappropriateness of their ideas to the imperfection\nof their physical philosophy; but I quote it because it serves as good\nevidence of the indefiniteness of primitive science. The same work and\nits fellow on \u201cThe Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences,\u201d supply other\nevidences equally good, because equally independent of any such\nhypothesis as is here to be established. Respecting mathematics we have\nthe fact that geometrical theorems grew out of empirical methods; and\nthat these theorems, at first isolated, did not acquire the clearness\nwhich complete demonstration gives, until they were arranged by Euclid\ninto a series of dependent propositions. At a later period the same\ngeneral truth was exemplified in the progress from the \u201cmethod of\nexhaustions\u201d and the \u201cmethod of indivisibles\u201d to the \u201cmethod of limits;\u201d\nwhich is the central idea of the infinitesimal calculus. In early\nmechanics, too, may be traced a dim perception that action and re-action\nare equal and opposite; though for ages after, this truth remained\nunformulated. And similarly, the property of inertia, though not\ndistinctly comprehended until Kepler lived, was vaguely recognized long\npreviously. \u201cThe conception of statical force,\u201d \u201cwas never presented in\na distinct form till the works of Archimedes appeared;\u201d and \u201cthe\nconception of accelerating force was confused, in the mind of Kepler and\nhis contemporaries, and did not become clear enough for purposes of\nsound scientific reasoning before the succeeding century.\u201d To which\nspecific assertions may be added the general remark, that \u201cterms which\noriginally, and before the laws of motion were fully known, were used in\na very vague and fluctuating sense, were afterwards limited and rendered\nprecise.\u201d When we turn from abstract scientific conceptions to the\nconcrete previsions of science, of which astronomy furnishes us with\nnumerous examples, the like contrast is visible. The times at which\ncelestial phenomena will occur, have been predicted with ever-increasing\naccuracy: errors once amounting to days, have been reduced down to\nseconds. The correspondence between the real and supposed forms of\norbits, has been growing gradually more precise. Originally thought\ncircular, then epicyclical, then elliptical, orbits are now ascertained\nto be curves which always deviate more or less from perfect ellipses,\nand which are ever undergoing change. But the general advance of\nScience in definiteness, is best shown by the contrast between its\nqualitative stage, and its quantitative stage. At first, the facts\nascertained were, that between such and such phenomena some connexion\nexisted\u2014that the appearances _a_ and _b_ always occurred together or in\nsuccession; but it was neither known what was the nature of the relation\nbetween _a_ and _b_, nor how much of _a_ accompanied so much of _b_. The\ndevelopment of Science has in part been the reduction of these vague\nconnexions to distinct ones. Most relations have been determined as\nbelonging to the classes mechanical, chemical, thermal, electric,\nmagnetic, &c.; and we have learnt to infer the amounts of the\nantecedents and consequents from each other with an exactness that\nbecomes ever greater. Were there space to state them, illustrations of\nthis truth might be cited from all departments of physics; but it must\nsuffice here to instance the general progress of chemistry. Besides the\nconspicuous fact that we have positively ascertained the constituent\nelements of an immense number of compounds which our ancestors could not\nanalyze, and of a far greater number which they never even saw, there is\nthe still more conspicuous fact that the combining equivalents of these\nelements are accurately calculated. The beginnings of a like advance\nfrom qualitative to quantitative prevision, may be traced even in some\nof the higher sciences. Physiology shows it in the weighing and\nmeasuring of organic products, and of the materials consumed. By\nPathology it is displayed in the use of the statistical method of\ndetermining the sources of diseases, and the effects of treatment. In\nZoology and Botany, the numerical comparisons of Floras and Faunas,\nleading to specific conclusions respecting their sources and\ndistributions, illustrate it. And in Sociology, questionable as are the\nconclusions usually drawn from the classified sum-totals of the census,\nfrom Board-of-Trade tables, and from criminal returns, it must be\nadmitted that these imply a progress towards more accurate conceptions\nof social phenomena. That an essential characteristic of advancing\nScience is increase in definiteness, appears indeed almost a truism,\nwhen we remember that Science may be described as definite knowledge, in\ncontradistinction to that indefinite knowledge possessed by the\nuncultured. And if, as we cannot question, Science has, in the slow\ncourse of ages, been evolved out of this indefinite knowledge of the\nuncultured; then, the gradual acquirement of that great definiteness\nwhich now distinguishes it, must have been a leading trait in its\nevolution.\n\nThe Arts, industrial and \u00e6sthetic, furnish illustrations perhaps still\nmore striking. Flint implements of the kind recently found in certain of\nthe later geologic deposits\u2014implements so rude that some have held them\nto be of natural rather than of artificial origin\u2014show the extreme want\nof precision in men\u2019s first handyworks. Though a great advance on these\nis seen in the tools and weapons of existing savage tribes, yet an\ninexactness in forms and fittings, more than anything else distinguishes\nsuch tools and weapons from those of civilized races. In a less degree,\nthe productions of semi-barbarous nations are characterized by like\ndefects. A Chinese junk with all its contained furniture and appliances,\nnowhere presents a perfectly straight line, a uniform curve, or a true\nsurface. Nor do the utensils and machines of our ancestors fail to\nexhibit a similar inferiority to our own. An antique chair, an old\nfireplace, a lock of the last century, or almost any article of\nhousehold use that has been preserved for a few generations, will prove\nby contrast how greatly the industrial products of our time excel those\nof the past in their accuracy. Since planing machines have been\ninvented, it has become possible to produce absolutely straight lines,\nand surfaces so truly level as to be air-tight when applied to each\nother. While in the dividing-engine of Troughton, in the micrometer of\nWhitworth, and in microscopes that show fifty thousand divisions to the\ninch, we have an exactness as far exceeding that reached in the works of\nour great-grandfathers, as theirs exceeded that of the aboriginal\ncelt-makers. In the Fine Arts there has been a parallel process.\nFrom the rudely carved and painted idols of savages, through the early\nsculptures characterized by limbs having no muscular detail,\nwooden-looking drapery, and faces devoid of individuality, up to the\nlater statues of the Greeks or some of those now produced, the increased\naccuracy of representation is conspicuous. Compare the mural paintings\nof the Egyptians with the paintings of medieval Europe, or these with\nmodern paintings, and the more precise rendering of the appearances of\nobjects is manifest. So too is it with the delineations of fiction and\nthe drama. In the marvellous tales current among Eastern nations, in the\nromantic legends of feudal Europe, as well as in the mystery-plays and\nthose immediately succeeding them, we see great want of correspondence\nto the realities of life; not only in the predominance of supernatural\nevents and extremely improbable coincidences, but also in the\nvaguely-indicated personages, who are nothing more than embodiments of\nvirtue and vice in general, or at best of particular virtues and vices.\nThrough transitions that need not be specified, there has been a\nprogressive diminution, in both fiction and the drama, of whatever is\nunnatural\u2014whatever does not answer to real life. And now, novels and\nplays are applauded in proportion to the fidelity with which they\nexhibit individual characters with their motives and consequent actions;\nimprobabilities, like the impossibilities which preceded them, are\ndisallowed; and there is even an incipient abandonment of those\nelaborate plots which the realities of life rarely if ever furnish.\n\nWere it needful, it would be easy to accumulate evidences of various\nother kinds. The progress from myths and legends, extreme in their\nmisrepresentations, to a history that has slowly become, and is still\nbecoming, more accurate; the establishment of settled systematic methods\nof doing things, instead of the indeterminate ways at first pursued; and\nthe great increase in the number of points on which conflicting opinion\nhas settled down into exact knowledge; might severally be used further\nto exemplify the general truth enunciated. The basis of induction is,\nhowever, already sufficiently wide. Proof that all Evolution is from the\nindefinite to the definite, we find to be not less abundant than proof\nthat all Evolution is from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. The one\nkind of change is co-extensive with the other\u2014is equally with it\nexhibited throughout Nature.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 56. To form a complete conception of Evolution, we have to contemplate\nit under yet another aspect. This advance from the indefinite to the\ndefinite, is obviously not primary but secondary\u2014is an incidental result\nattendant on the finishing of certain changes. The transformation of a\nwhole that was originally uniform, into a combination of multiform\nparts, implies a progressive separation. While this is going on there\nmust be indistinctness. Only as each separated division draws into its\ngeneral mass those diffused peripheral portions which are at first\nimperfectly disunited from the peripheral portions of neighbouring\ndivisions, can it acquire anything like a precise outline. And it cannot\nbecome perfectly definite until its units are aggregated into a compact\nwhole. That is to say, the acquirement of definiteness is simply a\nconcomitant of complete union of the elements constituting each\ncomponent division. Thus, Evolution is characterized not only by a\ncontinuous multiplication of parts, but also by a growing oneness in\neach part. And while an advance in heterogeneity results from\nprogressive differentiation, an advance in definiteness results from\nprogressive integration. The two changes are simultaneous; or are rather\nopposite aspects of the same change. This change, however, cannot be\nrightly comprehended without looking at both its sides. Let us then once\nmore consider Evolution under its several manifestations; for the\npurpose of noting how it is throughout a process of integration.\n\nThe illustrations furnished by the Solar System, supposing it to have\nhad a nebular origin, are so obvious as scarcely to need indicating.\nThat as a whole, it underwent a gradual concentration while assuming its\npresent distribution of parts; and that there subsequently took place a\nlike concentration of the matter forming each planet and satellite, is\nthe leading feature of the hypothesis. The process of integration is\nhere seen in its simplest and most decided form.\n\nGeologic evolution, if we trace it up from that molten state of the\nEarth\u2019s substance which we are obliged to postulate, supplies us with\nmore varied facts of like meaning. The advance from a thin crust, at\nfirst everywhere fissured and moveable, to a crust so solid and thick as\nto be but now and then very partially dislocated by disturbing forces,\nexemplifies the unifying process; as does likewise the advance from a\nsurface covered with small patches of land and water, to one divided\ninto continents and oceans\u2014an advance also resulting from the Earth\u2019s\ngradual solidification. Moreover, the collection of detritus into strata\nof great extent, and the union of such strata into extensive \u201csystems,\u201d\nbecomes possible only as surfaces of land and water become wide, and\nsubsidences great, in both area and depth; whence it follows that\nintegrations of this order must have grown more pronounced as the\nEarth\u2019s crust thickened. Different and simpler instances of the\nprocess through which mixed materials are separated, and the kindred\nunits aggregated into masses, are exhibited in the detailed structure of\nthe Earth. The phenomena of crystallization may be cited _en masse_, as\nshowing how the unifications of similar elements take place wherever the\nconditions permit. Not only do we see this where there is little or no\nhindrance to the approach of the particles, as in the cases of crystals\nformed from solutions, or by sublimation; but it is also seen where\nthere are great obstacles to their approach. The flints and the nodules\nof iron pyrites that are found in chalk, as well as the silicious\nconcretions which occasionally occur in limestone, can be interpreted\nonly as aggregations of atoms of silex or sulphuret of iron, originally\ndiffused almost uniformly through the deposit, but gradually collected\nround certain centres, notwithstanding the solid or semi-solid state of\nthe surrounding matter. Iron-stone as it ordinarily occurs, presents a\nsimilar phenomenon to be similarly explained; and what is called bog\niron-ore supplies the conditions and the result in still more obvious\ncorrelation.\n\nDuring the evolution of an organism, there occurs, as every physiologist\nknows, not only separation of parts, but coalescence of parts. In the\nmammalian embryo, the heart, at first a long pulsating blood-vessel, by\nand by twists upon itself and becomes integrated. The layer of\nbile-cells constituting the rudimentary liver, do not simply become\ndifferent from the wall of the intestine in which they at first lie; but\nthey simultaneously diverge from it and consolidate into an organ. The\nanterior segments of the cerebro-spinal axis, which are at first\ncontinuous with the rest, and distinguished only by their larger size,\nundergo a gradual union; and at the same time the resulting head\nconsolidates into a mass clearly marked off from the rest of the\nvertebral column. The like process, variously exemplified in other\norgans, is meanwhile exhibited by the body as a whole; which becomes\nintegrated, somewhat in the same way that the contents of an outspread\nhandkerchief become integrated when its edges are drawn in and fastened\nto make a bundle. Analogous changes go on long after birth, and continue\neven up to old age. In the human being that gradual solidification of\nthe bony framework, which, during childhood, is seen in the coalescence\nof portions of the same bone ossified from different centres, is\nafterwards seen in the coalescence of bones that were originally\ndistinct. The appendages of the vertebr\u00e6 unite with the vertebral\ncentres to which they belong\u2014a change not completed until towards\nthirty. At the same time the epiphyses, formed separately from the main\nbodies of their respective bones, have their cartilaginous connexions\nturned into osseous ones\u2014are fused to the masses beneath them. The\ncomponent vertebr\u00e6 of the sacrum, which remain separate till about the\nsixteenth year, then begin to unite; and in ten or a dozen years more\ntheir union is complete. Still later occurs the coalescence of the\ncoccygeal vertebr\u00e6; and there are some other bony unions which are not\ncompleted until advanced age. To which add that the increase of density\nand toughness, going on throughout the tissues in general during life,\nmay be regarded as the formation of a more highly integrated substance.\n The species of change thus illustrated under its several aspects\nin the unfolding of the human body, may be traced in all animals. That\nmode of it which consists in the union of homogeneous parts originally\nseparate, has been described by Milne-Edwards and others, as exhibited\nin various of the invertebrata; though it does not seem to have been\nincluded by them as an essential peculiarity in the process of organic\ndevelopment. We shall, however, be led strongly to suspect that\nprogressive integration should form part of the definition of this\nprocess, when we find it displayed not only in tracing up the stages\npassed through by every embryo, but also in ascending from the lower\nliving creatures to the higher. And here, as in the evolution of\nindividual organisms, it goes on both longitudinally and transversely:\nunder which different forms we may indeed most conveniently consider it.\n Of _longitudinal integration_, the sub-kingdom _Annulosa_ supplies\nabundant examples. Its lower members, such as worms and myriapods, are\nmostly characterized by the great number of segments composing them:\nreaching in some cases to several hundreds. But in the higher\ndivisions\u2014crustaceans, insects, and spiders\u2014we find this number reduced\ndown to twenty-two, thirteen, or even fewer; while, accompanying the\nreduction, there is a shortening or integration of the whole body,\nreaching its extreme in the crab and the spider. The significance of\nthese contrasts, as bearing upon the general doctrine of Evolution, will\nbe seen when it is pointed out that they are parallel to those which\narise during the development of individual _Annulosa_. In the lobster,\nthe head and thorax form one compact box, made by the union of a number\nof segments which in the embryo were separable. Similarly, the butterfly\nshows us segments so much more closely united than they were in the\ncaterpillar, as to be, some of them, no longer distinguishable from each\nother. The _Vertebrata_ again, throughout their successively higher\nclasses, furnish like instances of longitudinal union. In most fishes,\nand in reptiles that have no limbs, the only segments of the spinal\ncolumn that coalesce, are those forming the skull. In most mammals and\nin birds, a variable number of vertebr\u00e6 become fused together to form\nthe sacrum; and in the higher quadrumana and man, the caudal vertebr\u00e6\nalso lose their separate individualities in a single _os coccygis_.\n That which we may distinguish as _transverse integration_, is well\nillustrated among the _Annulosa_ in the development of the nervous\nsystem. Leaving out those most degraded forms which do not present\ndistinct ganglia, it is to be observed that the lower annulose animals,\nin common with the larv\u00e6 of the higher, are severally characterized by a\ndouble chain of ganglia running from end to end of the body; while in\nthe more perfectly formed annulose animals, this double chain becomes\nmore or less completely united into a single chain. Mr. Newport has\ndescribed the course of this concentration as exhibited in insects; and\nby Rathke it has been traced in crustaceans. During the early stages of\nthe _Astacus fluviatilis_, or common cray-fish, there is a pair of\nseparate ganglia to each ring. Of the fourteen pairs belonging to the\nhead and thorax, the three pairs in advance of the mouth consolidate\ninto one mass to form the brain, or cephalic ganglion. Meanwhile, out of\nthe remainder, the first six pairs severally unite in the median line,\nwhile the rest remain more or less separate. Of these six double ganglia\nthus formed, the anterior four coalesce into one mass; the remaining two\ncoalesce into another mass; and then these two masses coalesce into one.\nHere we see longitudinal and transverse integration going on\nsimultaneously; and in the highest crustaceans they are both carried\nstill further. The _Vertebrata_ clearly exhibit transverse integration\nin the development of the generative system. The lowest of the\nmammalia\u2014the _Monotremata_\u2014in common with birds, to which they are in\nmany respects allied, have oviducts which towards their lower\nextremities are dilated into cavities, severally performing in an\nimperfect way the function of a uterus. \u201cIn the _Marsupialia_ there is a\ncloser approximation of the two lateral sets of organs on the median\nline; for the oviducts converge towards one another and meet (without\ncoalescing) on the median line; so that their uterine dilatations are in\ncontact with each other, forming a true \u2018double uterus....\u2019 As we ascend\nthe series of \u2018placental\u2019 mammals, we find the lateral coalescence\nbecoming more and more complete.... In many of the _Rodentia_ the uterus\nstill remains completely divided into two lateral halves; whilst in\nothers these coalesce at their lower portions, forming a rudiment of the\ntrue \u2018body\u2019 of the uterus in the human subject. This part increases at\nthe expense of the lateral \u2018cornua\u2019 in the higher herbivora and\ncarnivora; but even in the lower quadrumana the uterus is somewhat cleft\nat its summit.\u201d[10]\n\nIn the social organism integrative changes are not less clearly and\nabundantly exemplified. Uncivilized societies display them when\nwandering families, such as the bushmen show us, unite into tribes of\nconsiderable numbers. Among these we see a further progress of like\nnature everywhere manifested in the subjugation of weaker tribes by\nstronger ones; and in the subordination of their respective chiefs to\nthe conquering chief. The partial combinations thus resulting, which\namong aboriginal races are being continually formed and continually\nbroken up, become, among the superior races, both more complete and more\npermanent. If we trace the metamorphoses through which our own society,\nor any adjacent one, has passed, we see this unification from time to\ntime repeated on a larger scale and with increasing stability. The\naggregation of juniors and the children of juniors under elders and the\nchildren of elders; the consequent establishment of groups of vassals\nbound to their respective nobles; the subordination afterwards\nestablished of groups of inferior nobles to dukes or earls; and the\nstill later establishment of the kingly power over dukes or earls; are\nso many instances of increasing consolidation. This process through\nwhich petty tenures are combined into feuds, feuds into provinces,\nprovinces into kingdoms, and finally contiguous kingdoms into a single\none, slowly completes itself by destroying the original lines of\ndemarcation. And it may be further remarked of the European nations as a\nwhole, that in the tendency to form alliances more or less lasting, in\nthe restraining influences exercised by the several governments over\neach other, in the system that is gradually establishing itself of\nsettling international disputes by congresses, as well as in the\nbreaking down of commercial barriers and the increasing facilities of\ncommunication, we may trace the incipient stage of a European\nconfederation\u2014a still larger integration than any now established.\n But it is not only in these external unions of groups with groups,\nand of the compound groups with each other, that the general law is\nexemplified. It is exemplified also in unions that take place\ninternally, as the groups become more highly organized. These, of which\nthe most conspicuous are commercial in their origin and function, are\nwell illustrated in our own society. We have integrations consequent on\nthe simple growth of adjacent parts performing like functions: as, for\ninstance, the junction of Manchester with its calico-weaving suburbs. We\nhave other integrations that arise when, out of several places producing\na particular commodity, one monopolizes more and more of the business,\nand leaves the rest to dwindle: as witness the growth of the Yorkshire\ncloth-districts at the expense of those in the west of England; or the\nabsorption by Staffordshire of the pottery-manufacture, and the\nconsequent decay of the establishments that once flourished at\nWorcester, Derby, and elsewhere. And we have those yet other\nintegrations produced by the actual approximation of the\nsimilarly-occupied parts: whence result such facts as the concentration\nof publishers in Paternoster Row; of lawyers in the Temple and\nneighbourhood; of corn-merchants about Mark Lane; of civil engineers in\nGreat George Street; of bankers in the centre of the city. Industrial\ncombinations that consist, not in the approximation or fusion of parts,\nbut in the establishment of common centres of connexion, are exhibited\nin the Bank clearing-house and the Railway clearing-house. While of yet\nanother genus are those unions which bring into relation the more or\nless dispersed citizens who are occupied in like ways: as traders are\nbrought by the Exchange and the Stock-Exchange; and as are professional\nmen by institutes, like those of Civil Engineers, Architects, &c.\n\nHere, as before, it is manifest that a law of Evolution which holds of\norganisms, must hold too of all objective results of their activity; and\nthat hence Language, and Science, and Art, must not only in the course\nof their development display increasing heterogeneity and definiteness,\nbut also increasing integration. We shall find this conclusion to be in\nharmony with the facts.\n\nAmong uncivilized races, the many-syllabled terms used for not uncommon\nobjects, as well as the descriptive character of proper names, show us\nthat the words used for the less familiar things are formed by\ncompounding the words used for the more familiar things. This process of\ncomposition is sometimes found in its incipient stage\u2014a stage in which\nthe component words are temporarily united to signify some unnamed\nobject, and do not (from lack of frequent use) permanently cohere. But\nin the majority of inferior languages, the process of \u201cagglutination,\u201d\nas it is called, has gone far enough to produce considerable stability\nin the compound words: there is a manifest integration. How small is the\ndegree of this integration, however, when compared with that reached in\nwell-developed languages is shown both by the great length of the\ncompound words used for things and acts of constant occurrence, and by\nthe separableness of their elements. Certain North-American tongues very\nwell illustrate this. In a Ricaree vocabulary extending to fifty names\nof common objects, which in English are nearly all expressed by single\nsyllables, there is not one monosyllabic word; and in the nearly-allied\nvocabulary of the Pawnees, the names for these same common objects are\nmonosyllabic in but two instances. Things so familiar to these hunting\ntribes as _dog_ and _bow_, are, in the Pawnee language, _ashakish_ and\n_teeragish_; the _hand_ and the _eyes_ are respectively _iksheeree_ and\n_keereekoo_; for _day_ the term is _shakoorooeeshairet_, and for _devil_\nit is _tsaheekshkakooraiwah_; while the numerals are composed of from\ntwo syllables up to five, and in Ricaree up to seven. That the great\nlength of these familiar words implies a low degree of development, and\nthat in the formation of higher languages out of lower there is a\nprogressive integration, which reduces the polysyllables to dissyllables\nand monosyllables, is an inference fully confirmed by the history of our\nown language. Anglo-Saxon _steorra_ has been in course of time\nconsolidated into English _star_, _mona_ into _moon_, and _nama_ into\n_name_. The transition through the intermediate semi-Saxon is clearly\ntraceable. _Sunu_ became in semi-Saxon _sune_, and in English _son_: the\nfinal _e_ of _sune_ being an evanescent form of the original _u_. The\nchange from the Anglo-Saxon plural, formed by the distinct syllable\n_as_, to our plural formed by the appended consonant _s_, shows us the\nsame thing: _smithas_ in becoming _smiths_, and _endas_ in becoming\n_ends_, illustrate progressive coalescence. So too does the\ndisappearance of the terminal _an_ in the infinitive mood of verbs; as\nshown in the transition from the Anglo-Saxon _cuman_ to the semi-Saxon\n_cumme_, and to the English _come_. Moreover the process has been slowly\ngoing on, even since what we distinguish as English was formed. In\nElizabeth\u2019s time, verbs were still very frequently pluralized by the\naddition of _en_\u2014we _tell_ was we _tellen_; and in some rural districts\nthis form of speech may even now be heard. In like manner the terminal\n_ed_ of the past tense, has united with the word it modifies. _Burn-ed_\nhas in pronunciation become _burnt_; and even in writing the terminal\n_t_ has in some cases taken the place of the _ed_. Only where antique\nforms in general are adhered to, as in the church-service, is the\ndistinctness of this inflection still maintained. Further, we see that\nthe compound vowels have been in many cases fused into single vowels.\nThat in _bread_ the _e_ and _a_ were originally both sounded, is proved\nby the fact that they are still so sounded in parts where old habits\nlinger. We, however, have contracted the pronunciation into _bred_; and\nwe have made like changes in many other common words. Lastly, let it be\nnoted that where the frequency of repetition is greatest, the process is\ncarried furthest; as instance the contraction of _lord_ (originally\n_laford_) into _lud_ in the mouths of Barristers; and still better the\ncoalescence of _God be with you_ into _Good bye_. Besides\nexhibiting in this way the integrative process, Language equally\nexhibits it throughout all grammatical development. The lowest kinds of\nhuman speech, having merely nouns and verbs without inflections to them,\nmanifestly permit no such close union of the elements of a proposition\nas results when the relations are either marked by inflections or by\nwords specially used for purposes of connexion. Such speech is\nnecessarily what we significantly call \u201cincoherent.\u201d To a considerable\nextent, incoherence is seen in the Chinese language. \u201cIf, instead of\nsaying _I go_ to _London_, _figs come_ from _Turkey_, _the sun shines_\nthrough _the air_, we said, _I go_ end _London_, _figs come_ origin\n_Turkey_, _the sun shines_ passage _air_, we should discourse of the\nmanner of the Chinese.\u201d From this \u201captotic\u201d form, there is clear\nevidence of a transition by coalescence to a form in which the\nconnexions of words are expressed by the addition to them of certain\ninflectional words. \u201cIn Languages like the Chinese,\u201d remarks Dr Latham,\n\u201cthe separate words most in use to express relation may become adjuncts\nor annexes.\u201d To this he adds the fact that \u201cthe numerous inflexional\nlanguages fall into two classes. In one, the inflexions have no\nappearance of having been separate words. In the other, their origin as\nseparate words is demonstrable.\u201d From which the inference drawn is, that\nthe \u201captotic\u201d languages, by the more and more constant use of adjuncts,\ngave rise to the \u201cagglutinate\u201d languages, or those in which the original\nseparateness of the inflexional parts can be traced; and that out of\nthese, by further use, arose the \u201camalgamate\u201d languages, or these in\nwhich the original separateness of the inflexional parts can no longer\nbe traced. Strongly corroborative of this inference is the\nunquestionable fact, that by such a process there have grown out of the\namalgamate languages, the \u201canaptotic\u201d languages; of which our own is the\nmost perfect example\u2014languages in which, by further consolidation,\ninflexions have almost disappeared, while, to express the verbal\nrelations, certain new kinds of words have been developed. When we see\nthe Anglo-Saxon inflexions gradually lost by contraction during the\ndevelopment of English, and, though to a less degree, the Latin\ninflexions dwindling away during the development of French, we cannot\ndeny that grammatical structure is modified by integration; and seeing\nhow clearly the earlier stages of grammatical structure are explained by\nit, we can scarcely doubt that it has been going on from the first.\n And now mark that in proportion to the degree of the integration\nabove described, is the extent to which integration of another order is\nshown. Aptotic languages are, as already pointed out, necessarily\nincoherent\u2014the elements of a proposition cannot be tied into a definite\nand complete whole. But as fast as coalescence produces inflected words,\nit becomes possible to unite them into sentences of which the parts are\nso mutually dependent that no considerable change can be made without\ndestroying the meaning. Yet a further stage in this process may be\nnoted. After the development of those grammatical forms which make\ndefinite statements possible, we do not at first find them used to\nexpress anything beyond statements of a simple kind. A single subject\nwith a single predicate, accompanied by but few qualifying terms, are\nusually all. If we compare, for instance, the Hebrew scriptures with\nwritings of modern times, a marked difference of aggregation among the\ngroups of words, is visible. In the number of subordinate propositions\nwhich accompany the principal one; in the various complements to\nsubjects and predicates; and in the numerous qualifying clauses\u2014all of\nthem united into one complex whole\u2014many sentences in modern composition\nexhibit a degree of integration not to be found in ancient ones.\n\nThe history of Science presents facts of the same meaning at every step.\nIndeed the integration of groups of like entities and like relations,\nmay be said to constitute the most conspicuous part of scientific\nprogress. A glance at the classificatory sciences, shows us not only\nthat the confused aggregations which the vulgar make of natural objects,\nare differentiated into groups that are respectively more homogeneous,\nbut also that these groups are gradually rendered complete and compact.\nWhile, instead of considering all marine creatures as fish, shell-fish,\nand jelly-fish, Zoology establishes divisions and sub-divisions under\nthe heads _Vertebrata_, _Annulosa_, _Mollusca_, &c.\u2014while in place of\nthe wide and vague assemblage popularly described as \u201ccreeping things,\u201d\nit makes the specific classes _Annelida_, _Myriopoda_, _Insecta_,\n_Arachnida_; it at the same time gives to these an increasing\nconsolidation. The several orders and genera of which each consists, are\narranged according to their affinities and bound together under common\ndefinitions; at the same time that, by extended observation and rigorous\ncriticism, the previously unknown and undetermined forms are integrated\nwith their respective congeners. Nor is the same process less\nclearly manifested in those sciences which have for their\nsubject-matter, not classified objects, but classified relations. Under\none of its chief aspects, the advance of Science is the advance of\ngeneralization; and generalization is the uniting into groups all like\nco-existencies and sequences among phenomena. Not only, however, does\nthe colligation of a number of concrete relations into a generalization\nof the lowest order, exemplify the principle enunciated; but it is again\nand again exemplified in the colligation of these lowest generalizations\ninto higher ones, and these into still higher ones. Year by year are\nestablished certain connexions among orders of phenomena that seem\nwholly unallied; and these connexions, multiplying and strengthening,\ngradually bring the seemingly unallied orders under a common bond. When,\nfor example, Humboldt quotes the saying of the Swiss\u2014\u201cit is going to\nrain because we hear the murmur of the torrents nearer,\u201d\u2014when he remarks\nthe relation between this and an observation of his own, that the\ncataracts of the Orinoco are heard at a greater distance by night than\nby day\u2014when he notes the essential parallelism existing between these\nfacts and the fact that the unusual visibility of remote objects is also\nan indication of coming rain\u2014and when he points out that the common\ncause of these variations is the smaller hindrance offered to the\npassage of both light and sound, by media which are comparatively\nhomogeneous, either in temperature or hygrometric state; he helps in\nbringing under one generalization the phenomena of light and those of\nsound. Experiment having shown that these conform to like laws of\nreflection and refraction, the conclusion that they are both produced by\nundulations gains probability: there is an incipient integration of two\ngreat orders of phenomena, between which no connexion was suspected in\ntimes past. A still more decided integration has been of late taking\nplace between the once independent sub-sciences of Electricity,\nMagnetism, and Light. And indeed it must be obvious to those who are\nfamiliar with the present state of Science, that there will eventually\ntake place a far wider integration, by which all orders of phenomena\nwill be combined as differently conditioned forms of one ultimate fact.\n\nNor do the industrial and \u00e6sthetic Arts fail to supply us with equally\nconclusive evidence. The progress from rude, small, and simple tools, to\nperfect, complex, and large machines, illustrates not only a progress in\nheterogeneity and in definiteness, but also in integration. Among what\nare classed as the mechanical powers, the advance from the lever to the\nwheel-and-axle is an advance from a simple agent to an agent made up of\nseveral simple ones combined together. On comparing the wheel-and-axle,\nor any of the machines used in early times with those used now, we find\nan essential difference to be, that in each of our machines several of\nthe primitive machines are united into one. A modern apparatus for\nspinning or weaving, for making stockings or lace, contains not simply a\nlever, an inclined plane, a screw, a wheel-and-axle, united together;\nbut several of each integrated into one complex whole. Again, in early\nages, when horse-power and man-power were alone employed, the motive\nagent was not bound up with the tool moved; but the two have now become\nin many cases fused together: the fire-box and boiler of a locomotive\nare combined with the machinery which the steam works. Nor is this the\nmost extreme case. A still more extensive integration is exhibited in\nevery large factory. Here we find a large number of complicated\nmachines, all connected by driving shafts with the same steam-engine\u2014all\nunited with it into one vast apparatus. Contrast the mural\ndecorations of the Egyptians and Assyrians with modern historical\npaintings, and there becomes manifest a great advance in unity of\ncomposition\u2014in the subordination of the parts to the whole. One of these\nancient frescoes is in truth made up of a number of pictures that have\nlittle mutual dependence. The several figures of which each group\nconsists, show very imperfectly by their attitudes, and not at all by\ntheir expressions, the relations in which they stand to each other; the\nrespective groups might be separated with but little loss of meaning;\nand the centre of chief interest, which should link all parts together,\nis often inconspicuous. The same trait may be noted in the tapestries of\nmedieval days. Representing perhaps a hunting scene, one of these\nexhibits men, horses, dogs, beasts, birds, trees, and flowers,\nmiscellaneously dispersed: the living objects being variously occupied,\nand mostly with no apparent consciousness of each other\u2019s proximity. But\nin the paintings since produced, faulty as many of them are in this\nrespect, there is always a more or less manifest co-ordination of\nparts\u2014an arrangement of attitudes, expressions, lights, and colours,\nsuch as to combine the picture into an organic whole; and the success\nwith which unity of effect is educed from variety of components, is a\nchief test of merit. In music, progressive integration is\ndisplayed in still more numerous ways. The simple cadence embracing but\na few notes, which in the chants of savages is monotonously repeated,\nbecomes among civilized races, a long series of different musical\nphrases combined into one whole; and so complete is the integration,\nthat the melody cannot be broken off in the middle, nor shorn of its\nfinal note, without giving us a painful sense of incompleteness. When to\nthe air, a bass, a tenor, and an alto are added; and when to the harmony\nof different voice-parts there is added an accompaniment; we see\nexemplified integrations of another order, which grow gradually more\nelaborate. And the process is carried a stage higher when these complex\nsolos, concerted pieces, choruses, and orchestral effects, are combined\ninto the vast ensemble of a musical drama; of which, be it remembered,\nthe artistic perfection largely consists in the subordination of the\nparticular effects to the total effect. Once more the Arts of\nliterary delineation, narrative and dramatic, furnish us with parallel\nillustrations. The tales of primitive times, like those with which the\nstory-tellers of the East still daily amuse their listeners, are made up\nof successive occurrences that are not only in themselves unnatural, but\nhave no natural connexion: they are but so many separate adventures put\ntogether without necessary sequence. But in a good modern work of\nimagination, the events are the proper products of the characters\nworking under given conditions; and cannot at will be changed in their\norder or kind, without injuring or destroying the general effect. And\nfurther, the characters themselves, which in early fictions play their\nrespective parts without showing us how their minds are modified by each\nother or by the events, are now presented to us as held together by\ncomplex moral relations, and as acting and re-acting upon each other\u2019s\nnatures.\n\nEvolution, then, is in all cases a change from a more diffused or\nincoherent form, to a more consolidated or coherent form. This proves to\nbe a characteristic displayed equally in those earliest changes which\nthe Universe as a whole is supposed to have undergone, and in those\nlatest changes which we trace in society and the products of social\nlife. Nor is it only that in the development of a planet, of an\norganism, of a society, of a science, of an art, the process of\nintegration is seen in a more complete aggregation of each whole and of\nits constituent parts; but it is also shown in an increasing mutual\ndependence of the parts. Dimly foreshadowed as this mutual dependence is\namong inorganic phenomena, both celestial and terrestrial, it becomes\ndistinct among organic phenomena. From the lowest living forms upwards,\nthe degree of development is marked by the degree in which the several\nparts constitute a mutually-dependent whole. The advance from those\ncreatures which live on in each part when cut in pieces, up to those\ncreatures which cannot lose any considerable part without death, nor any\ninconsiderable part without great constitutional disturbance, is clearly\nan advance to creatures which are not only more integrated in respect of\ntheir solidification, but are also more integrated as consisting of\norgans that live for and by each other. The like contrast between\nundeveloped and developed societies, need not be shown in detail: the\never-increasing co-ordination of parts, is conspicuous to all. And it\nmust suffice just to indicate that the same thing holds true of social\nproducts: as, for instance, of Science; which has become highly\nintegrated not only in the sense that each division is made up of\nmutually-dependent propositions, but also in the sense that the several\ndivisions are mutually-dependent\u2014cannot carry on their respective\ninvestigations without aid from each other.\n\nIt seems proper to remark that the generalization here variously\nillustrated, is akin to one enunciated by Schelling, that Life is the\ntendency to individuation. Struck by the fact that an aggregative\nprocess is traceable throughout nature, from the growth of a crystal up\nto the development of a man; and by the fact that the wholes resulting\nfrom this process, completer in organic than in inorganic bodies, are\ncompletest where the vital manifestations are the highest; Schelling\nconcluded that this characteristic was the essential one. According to\nhim, the formation of individual bodies is not incident to Life, but is\nthat in which Life fundamentally consists. This position is, for\nseveral reasons, untenable. In the first place, it requires the\nconception of Life to be extended so as to embrace inorganic phenomena;\nsince in crystallization, and even in the formation of amorphous masses\nof matter, this tendency to individuation is displayed. Schelling, fully\nperceiving this, did indeed accept the implication; and held that\ninorganic bodies had life lower only in degree than that of organic\nbodies\u2014their degree of life being measured by their degree of\nindividuation. This bold assumption, which Schelling evidently made to\nsave his definition, is inadmissible. Rational philosophy cannot ignore\nthose broad distinctions which the general sense of mankind has\nestablished. If it transcends them, it must at the same time show what\nis their origin; how far only they are valid; and why they disappear\nfrom a higher point of view. Note next that the more complete\nindividuality which Schelling pointed out as characterizing bodies\nhaving the greatest amount of life, is only _one_ of their structural\ntraits. The greater degree of heterogeneity which they exhibit, is, as\nwe have seen, a much more conspicuous peculiarity; and though it might\npossibly be contended that greater heterogeneity is remotely implied by\ngreater individuality, it must be admitted that in defining Life as the\ntendency to individuation, no hint is given that the bodies which live\nmost are the most heterogeneous bodies. Moreover it is to be\nremarked that this definition of Schelling, refers much more to the\nstructures of living bodies than to the processes which constitute Life.\nNot Life, but the invariable accompaniment of Life, is that which his\nformula alone expresses. The formation of a completer organic whole, a\nmore fully individuated body, is truly a necessary concomitant of a\nhigher life; and the development of a higher life must therefore be\naccompanied by a tendency to greater individuation. But to represent\nthis tendency as Life itself, is to mistake an incidental result for an\noriginal cause. Life, properly so called, consists of multiform changes\nunited together in various ways; and is not expressed either by an\nanatomical description of the organism which manifests it, or by a\nhistory of the modifications through which such organism has reached its\npresent structure. Yet it is only in such description and such history\nthat the tendency to individuation is seen. Lastly, this\ndefinition which Schelling gave of Life is untenable, not only because\nit refers rather to the organism than to the actions going on in it; but\nalso because it wholly ignores that connexion between the organism and\nthe external world, on which Life depends. All organic processes,\nphysical and psychial, having for their object the maintenance of\ncertain relations with environing agencies and objects; it is impossible\nthat there should be a true definition of Life, in which the environment\nis not named. Nevertheless, Schelling\u2019s conception was not a\nbaseless one. Though not a truth, it was yet the adumbration of a truth.\nIn defining Life as the tendency to individuation, he had in view that\nformation of a more compact, complete, and mutually-dependent whole,\nwhich, as we have seen, is one characteristic of Evolution in general.\nHis error was, firstly, in regarding it as a characteristic of Life,\ninstead of a characteristic of living bodies, displayed, though in a\nless degree, by other bodies; and, secondly, in regarding it as the sole\ncharacteristic of such bodies. It remains only to add, that for\nexpressing this aspect of the process of Evolution, the word integration\nis for several reasons preferable to the word individuation. Integration\nis the true antithesis of differentiation; it has not that tacit\nreference to living bodies which the word individuation cannot be wholly\nfreed from; it expresses the aggregative tendency not only as displayed\nin the formation of more complete wholes, but also as displayed in the\nconsolidation of the several parts of which such wholes are made up; and\nit has not the remotest teleological implication. In short, it simply\nformulates in the most abstract manner, a wide induction untainted by\nany hypothesis.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 57. Thus we find that to complete the definition arrived at in the\nlast chapter, much has to be added. What was there alleged is true; but\nit is not the whole truth. Evolution is unquestionably a change from a\nhomogeneous state to a heterogeneous state; but, as we have seen, there\nare some advances in heterogeneity which cannot be included in the idea\nof Evolution. This undue width of the definition, implies the omission\nof some further peculiarity by which Evolution is distinguished; and\nthis peculiarity we find to be that the more highly developed things\nbecome, the more definite they become. Advance from the indefinite to\nthe definite, is as constantly and variously displayed as advance from\nthe homogeneous to the heterogeneous. And we are thus obliged to regard\nit as an essential characteristic of Evolution. Further analysis,\nhowever, shows us that this increase of definiteness is not an\nindependent process; but is rather the necessary concomitant of another\nprocess. A very little consideration of the facts proves that a change\nfrom the indefinite to the definite, can arise only through a completer\nconsolidation of the respective parts, and of the whole which they\nconstitute. And so we find that while Evolution is a transformation of\nthe homogeneous into the heterogeneous, and of the indefinite into the\ndefinite, it is also a transformation of the incoherent into the\ncoherent. Along with the differentiation shown in increasing contrasts\nof parts with each other, there goes on an integration, by which the\nparts are rendered distinct units, as well as closely united components\nof one whole. These clauses here added to the definition, are\nessential ones; not only as being needful to distinguish Evolution from\nthat which is not Evolution, but likewise as being needful to express\nall which the idea of Evolution includes. Progressive integration with\nthe growing definiteness necessarily resulting from it, is of\nco-ordinate importance with the progressive differentiation before dwelt\nupon\u2014nay, from one point of view, may be held of greater importance. For\norganization, in which what we call Evolution is most clearly and\nvariously displayed, consists even more in the union of many parts into\none whole, than in the formation of many parts. The Evolution which we\nsee throughout inorganic nature, is lower than that which organic nature\nexhibits to us, for the especial reason that the mutual dependence of\nparts is extremely indefinite, even when traceable at all. In an\namorphous mass of matter, you may act mechanically or chemically upon\none part without appreciably affecting the other parts. Though their\nelectrical or thermal states may be for the moment altered, their\noriginal states are soon resumed. Even in the highest inorganic\naggregation\u2014a crystal\u2014the apex may be broken off and leave the rest\nintact: the only clear evidence of mutual dependence of parts, being,\nthe ability of the crystal to regenerate its apex if replaced in the\nsolution from which it was formed. But the constituent parts of organic\nbodies can severally maintain their existing states, only while\nremaining in connexion. Even in the lowest living forms, mutilation\ncannot be carried beyond a certain point without decomposition ensuing.\nAs we advance through the higher up to the highest forms, we see a\ngradual narrowing of the limits within which the mutilation does not\ncause destruction: a progressive increase of mutual dependence or\nintegration which is, at the same time, the condition to greater\nfunctional perfection. In societies this truth is equally manifest. That\nthe component units slowly segregate into groups of different ranks and\noccupations, is a fact scarcely more conspicuous than is the fact that\nthese groups are necessary to each other\u2019s existence. And we cannot\ncontemplate the still-progressing division of labour, without seeing\nthat the interdependence becomes ever greater as the evolution becomes\nhigher. It remains only to point out definitely, what has been\nalready implied, that these several forms of change which have been\nsuccessively described as making up the process of Evolution, are not in\nreality separate forms of change, but different aspects of the same\nchange. Intrinsically the transformation is one and indivisible. The\nestablishment of differences that become gradually more decided, is\nevidently but the beginning of an action which cannot be pushed to its\nextreme without producing definite divisions between the parts, and\nreducing each part to a separate mass. But with our limited faculties,\nit is not possible to take in the entire process at one view; nor have\nwe any single terms by which the process can be described. Hence we are\nobliged to contemplate each of its aspects separately, and to find a\nseparate expression for its characteristic.\n\nHaving done this, we are now in a position to frame a true idea of\nEvolution. Combining these partial definitions we get a complete\ndefinition, which may be most conveniently expressed thus\u2014_Evolution is\na change from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to a definite,\ncoherent heterogeneity; through continuous differentiations and\nintegrations._\n\nIt may perhaps be remarked that the last of these clauses is\nsuperfluous; since the differentiation and integration are implied in\nthe first clause. This is true: the transition which the first clause\nspecifies, is impossible save through the process specified in the\nsecond. Nevertheless, a mere statement of the two extreme stages with\nwhich Evolution begins and ends, omitting all reference to changes\nconnecting them, leaves the mind with but an incomplete idea. The idea\nbecomes much more concrete when these changes are described. Hence,\nthough not logically necessary, the second clause of the definition is\npractically desirable.\n\nBefore closing the chapter, a few words must be added respecting certain\nother modes of describing Evolution. Organic bodies, from the changes of\nwhich the idea of Evolution has arisen, and to the changes of which\nalone it is usually applied, are often said to progress from simplicity\nto complexity. The transformation of the simple into the complex, and of\nthe homogeneous into the heterogeneous, are used as equivalent phrases;\nor, if any difference is recognized between them, it is to the advantage\nof the first, which is held to be the more specific. After what has been\nsaid, however, it must be obvious that Evolution cannot be thus\nadequately formulated. No hint is given of that increased definiteness\nwhich we have found to be a concomitant of development. Nor is there\nanything implying the greater mutual dependence of parts. Nevertheless,\nthe brevity of the expression gives it a value for ordinary purposes;\nand I shall probably hereafter frequently use it, both in those cases\nwhere more precise language is not demanded, and in those cases where it\nindicates the particular aspect of Evolution referred to. Another\ndescription frequently given of Evolution, is, that it is a change from\nthe general to the special. The more or less spherical germ from which\nevery organism, animal and vegetal, proceeds, is comparatively general:\nalike in the sense that in appearance and chemical nature it is very\nsimilar to all other germs; and also in the sense that its form is less\nmarkedly distinguished from the average forms of objects at large, than\nis that of the mature organism\u2014a contrast which equally holds of\ninternal structure. But this progress from the more general to the more\nspecial, is rather a derivative than an original characteristic. An\nincrease of speciality being really an increase in the number of\nattributes\u2014an addition of traits not possessed by bodies that are in\nother respects similar\u2014is a necessary result of multiplying\ndifferentiations. In other words, general and special are subjective or\nideal distinctions involved in our conceptions of classes, rather than\nobjective or real distinctions presented in the bodies classified.\nNevertheless, this abstract formula is not without its use. It expresses\na fact of much significance; and one which we shall have constantly to\nrefer to when dealing with the relations between organic bodies and\ntheir surrounding conditions.\n\nThe law of Evolution however, be it expressed in full as above, or in\nthese shorter but less specific phrases, is essentially that which has\nbeen exhibited in detail throughout the foregoing pages. So far as we\ncan ascertain, this law is universal. It is illustrated with endless\nrepetition, and in countless ways, wherever the facts are abundant; and\nwhere the facts do not suffice for induction, deduction goes far to\nsupply its place. Among all orders of phenomena that lie within the\nsphere of observation, we see ever going on the process of change above\ndefined; and many significant indications warrant us in believing, that\nthe same process of change went on throughout that remote past which\nlies beyond the sphere of observation. If we must form any conclusion\nrespecting the general course of things, past, present, and future, the\none which the evidence as far as it goes justifies, and the only one for\nwhich there is any justification, is, that the change from an\nindeterminate uniformity to a determinate multiformity which we\neverywhere see going on, has been going on from the first, and will\ncontinue to go on.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 10:\n\n Carpenter\u2019s Prin. of Comp. Phys., p. 617.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER IV.\n THE CAUSES OF EVOLUTION.\n\n\n\u00a7 58. Is this law ultimate or derivative? Must we rest satisfied with\nthe conclusion that throughout all classes of concrete phenomena such is\nthe mode of evolution? Or is it possible for us to ascertain _why_ such\nis the mode of evolution? May we seek for some all-pervading principle\nwhich underlies this all-pervading process? Can we by a further step\nreduce our empirical generalization to a rational generalization?\n\nManifestly this community of result implies community of causation. It\nmay be that of such causation no account can be given, further than that\nthe Unknowable is manifested to us after this manner. Or, it may be,\nthat the mode of manifestation is reducible to simpler ones, from which\nthese many complex consequences follow. Analogy suggests the latter\ninference. At present, the conclusion that every kind of Evolution is\nfrom a state of indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a state of definite\ncoherent heterogeneity, stands in the same position as did the once\nultimate conclusion that every kind of organized body undergoes, when\ndead, a more or less rapid decay. And as, for the various kinds of\ndecomposition through which animal and vegetal products pass, we have\nnow discovered a rationale in the chemical affinities of their\nconstituent elements; so, possibly, this universal transformation of the\nsimple into the complex may be affiliated upon certain simple primordial\nprinciples.\n\nSuch cause or causes of Evolution, may be sought for without in the\nleast assuming that the ultimate mystery can be fathomed. Fully\nconscious that an absolute solution is for ever beyond us, we may still\nlook for a relative solution\u2014may try to reduce the problem to its lowest\nterms. Just as it was possible to interpret Kepler\u2019s laws as necessary\nconsequences of the law of gravitation, and then to admit that\ngravitation transcends analysis; so it may be possible to interpret the\nlaw of Evolution as the necessary consequence of some deeper law, beyond\nwhich we may nevertheless be unable to go.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 59. The probability of common causation, and the possibility of\nformulating it, being granted, it will be well before going further, to\nconsider what must be the general characteristics of such causation, and\nin what direction we ought to look for it. We can with certainty predict\nthat be it simple or compound, the cause has a high degree of\ngenerality; seeing that it is common to such infinitely varied\nphenomena: in proportion to the universality of its application must be\nthe abstractness of its character. Whatever be the agency and the\nconditions under which it acts, we need not expect to see in them an\nobvious explanation of this or that species of Evolution, because they\nequally underlie species of Evolution of quite a different order.\nDetermining Evolution of every kind\u2014astronomic, geologic, organic,\nethnologic, social, economic, artistic, &c.\u2014they must be concerned with\nsomething common to all these; and to see what these possess in common,\nwill therefore be the best method of guiding ourselves towards the\ndesired solution.\n\nThe only obvious respect in which all kinds of Evolution are alike, is,\nthat they are modes of _change_. Every phenomenon to which we apply the\nterm, presents us with a succession of states; and when such succession\nceases, we no longer predicate Evolution. Equally in those past forms of\nit which are more or less hypothetical, and in those forms of it which\nwe see going on around, this is the common characteristic. Note\nnext, that the kind of change which constitutes Evolution, is broadly\ndistinguished from change of an equally general kind, in this, that it\nis change of internal relations instead of change of external relations.\nAll things in motion through space are the subjects of change; but while\nin this which we call mechanical motion, the relative position as\nmeasured from surrounding objects is continually altered, there is not\nimplied any alteration in the positions of the parts of the moving body\nin respect to each other. Conversely, a body exhibiting what we call\nEvolution, while it either may or may not display new relations of\nposition to the things around it, _must_ display new relations of\nposition among the parts of which it is made up. Thus we narrow the\nfield of inquiry by recognizing the change in which Evolution consists,\nas _a change in the arrangement of parts_: of course using the word\nparts in its most extended sense, as signifying both ultimate units and\nmasses of such units. Further, we have to remember that this\nchange in the arrangement of parts which constitutes Evolution, is a\ncertain order of such change. As we saw in the last chapter, there is a\nchange in the arrangement of parts which is not Evolution but\nDissolution\u2014a destructive change as opposed to a constructive change\u2014a\nchange by which the definite is gradually rendered indefinite, the\ncoherent slowly becomes incoherent, and the heterogeneous eventually\nlapses into comparative homogeneity. Thus then we reduce that\nwhich we have to investigate to its most abstract shape. Our task is to\nfind the cause or causes of a certain order of change that takes place\nin the arrangement of parts.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 60. Evidently the problem, as thus expressed, brings us face to face\nwith the ultimate elements of phenomena in general. It is impossible to\naccount for a certain change in the arrangement of the parts of any\nmass, without involving\u2014first, the _matter_ which makes up the parts\nthus re-arranged; next, the _motion_ exhibited during the\nre-arrangement; and then, the _force_ producing this motion. The problem\nis a dynamical one; and there can be no truly scientific solution of it,\nsave one given in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force\u2014terms in which all\nother dynamical problems are expressed and solved.\n\nThe proposal thus to study the question from a purely physical point of\nview, will most likely, notwithstanding what has been said in the first\npart of this work, raise in some minds either alarm or prejudice.\nHaving, throughout life, constantly heard the charge of materialism made\nagainst those who ascribed the more involved phenomena to agencies like\nthose seen in the simplest phenomena, most persons have acquired a\nrepugnance to such methods of interpretation; and when it is proposed to\napply them universally, even though it is premised that the solution\nthey give can be but relative, more or less of the habitual feeling will\nprobably arise. Such an attitude of mind, however, is significant, not\nso much of a reverence for the Unknown Cause, as of an irreverence for\nthose omnipresent forms in which the Unknown Cause is manifested to us.\nMen who have not risen above that vulgar conception which unites with\nMatter the contemptuous epithets \u201cgross\u201d and \u201cbrute,\u201d may naturally\nenough feel dismay at the proposal to reduce the phenomena of Life, of\nMind, and of Society, to a level with those which they think so\ndegraded. But whoever remembers that the forms of existence which the\nuncultivated speak of with so much scorn, are not only shown by the man\nof science to be the more marvellous in their attributes the more they\nare investigated, but are also proved to be in their ultimate nature\nabsolutely incomprehensible\u2014as absolutely incomprehensible as sensation,\nor the conscious something which perceives it\u2014whoever fully realizes\nthis truth, I say, will see that the course proposed does not imply a\ndegradation of the so-called higher, but an elevation of the so-called\nlower. Perceiving, as he will, that the Materialist and Spiritualist\ncontroversy is a mere war of words, in which the disputants are equally\nabsurd\u2014each thinking he understands that which it is impossible for any\nman to understand\u2014he will perceive how utterly groundless is the fear\nreferred to. Being fully convinced that whatever nomenclature is used,\nthe ultimate mystery must remain the same, he will be as ready to\nformulate all phenomena in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force, as in any\nother terms; and will rather indeed anticipate, that only in a doctrine\nwhich recognizes the Unknown Cause as co-extensive with all orders of\nphenomena, can there be a consistent Religion, or a consistent Science.\n\nOn the other hand, the conclusion that Evolution, considered under its\nmost abstract form, is a certain change in the arrangement of parts; and\nthat the causes of this change can be expressed only in terms of Matter,\nMotion, and Force; may in critical minds raise the question\u2014What are\nMatter, Motion, and Force? Referring back in thought to the reasonings\ncontained in the chapter on \u201cUltimate Scientific Ideas;\u201d and remembering\nhow it was there shown that absolute knowledge of Matter, Motion, and\nForce, is impossible; some readers will perhaps conclude that any such\ninterpretation as the one above proposed, must be visionary. It may be\nasked\u2014How can a comprehensible account of Evolution be given in terms\nthat are themselves incomprehensible?\n\nBefore proceeding, this question must be met. There can be no sound\nphilosophy without clearly defined terms; and as, on the meanings of the\nterms to be here used, doubts have probably been cast by the reasonings\ncontained in the chapter referred to, such doubts must be removed. If,\nas was shown, our ideas of things do not correspond with things in\nthemselves, it becomes necessary to inquire in what way they are to be\naccepted. If they are not absolutely true, then what is the exact\nmeaning of the assertion that they are relatively true? To this question\nlet us now address ourselves.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER V.\n SPACE, TIME, MATTER, MOTION, AND FORCE.\n\n\n\u00a7 61. That sceptical state of mind which the criticisms of Philosophy\nusually produce, is, in great measure, caused by the misinterpretation\nof words. A sense of universal illusion ordinarily follows the reading\nof metaphysics; and is strong in proportion as the argument has appeared\nconclusive. This sense of universal illusion would probably never have\narisen, had the terms used been always rightly construed. Unfortunately,\nthese terms have by association acquired meanings that are quite\ndifferent from those given to them in philosophical discussions; and the\nordinary meanings being unavoidably suggested, there results more or\nless of that dreamlike idealism which is so incongruous with our\ninstinctive convictions. The word _phenomenon_ and its equivalent word\n_appearance_, are in great part to blame for this. In ordinary speech,\nthese are uniformly employed in reference to visual perceptions. Habit,\nalmost, if not quite, disables us from thinking of _appearance_ except\nas something seen; and though _phenomenon_ has a more generalized\nmeaning, yet we cannot rid it of associations with _appearance_, which\nis its verbal equivalent. When, therefore, Philosophy proves that our\nknowledge of the external world can be but phenomenal\u2014when it concludes\nthat the things of which we are conscious are appearances; it inevitably\narouses in us the notion of an illusiveness like that to which our\nvisual perceptions are so liable in comparison with our tactual\nperceptions. Good pictures show us that the aspects of things may be\nvery nearly simulated by colours on canvass. The looking-glass still\nmore distinctly proves how deceptive is sight when unverified by touch.\nAnd the frequent cases in which we misinterpret the impressions made on\nour eyes, and think we see something which we do not see, further shake\nour faith in vision. So that the implication of uncertainty has infected\nthe very word _appearance_. Hence, Philosophy, by giving it an extended\nmeaning, leads us to think of all our senses as deceiving us in the same\nway that the eyes do; and so makes us feel ourselves floating in a world\nof phantasms. Had _phenomenon_ and _appearance_ no such misleading\nassociations, little, if any, of this mental confusion would result. Or\ndid we in place of them use the term _effect_, which is equally\napplicable to all impressions produced on consciousness through any of\nthe senses, and which carries with it in thought the necessary\ncorrelative _cause_, with which it is equally real, we should be in\nlittle danger of falling into the insanities of idealism.\n\nSuch danger as there might still remain, would disappear on making a\nfurther verbal correction. At present, the confusion resulting from the\nabove misinterpretation, is made greater by an antithetical\nmisinterpretation. We increase the seeming unreality of that phenomenal\nexistence which we can alone know, by contrasting it with a noumenal\nexistence which we imagine would, if we could know it, be more truly\nreal to us. But we delude ourselves with a verbal fiction. What is\nthe meaning of the word _real_? This is the question which underlies\nevery metaphysical inquiry; and the neglect of it is the remaining cause\nof the chronic antagonisms of metaphysicians. In the interpretation put\non the word _real_, the discussions of philosophy retain one element of\nthe vulgar conception of things, while they reject all its other\nelements; and create confusion by the inconsistency. The peasant, on\ncontemplating an object, does not regard that which he contemplates as\nsomething in himself, but believes the thing of which he is conscious to\nbe the external object\u2014imagines that his consciousness extends to the\nvery place where the object lies: to him the appearance and the reality\nare one and the same thing. The metaphysician, however, is convinced\nthat consciousness cannot embrace the reality, but only the appearance\nof it; and so he transfers the appearance into consciousness and leaves\nthe reality outside. This reality left outside of consciousness, he\ncontinues to think of much in the same way as the ignorant man thinks of\nthe appearance. Though the reality is asserted to be out of\nconsciousness, yet the _realness_ ascribed to it is constantly spoken of\nas though it were a knowledge possessed apart from consciousness. It\nseems to be forgotten that the conception of reality can be nothing more\nthan some mode of consciousness; and that the question to be considered\nis\u2014What is the relation between this mode and other modes?\n\nBy reality we mean _persistence_ in consciousness: a persistence that is\neither unconditional, as our consciousness of space, or that is\nconditional, as our consciousness of a body while grasping it. The real,\nas we conceive it, is distinguished solely by the test of persistence;\nfor by this test we separate it from what we call the unreal. Between a\nperson standing before us, and the idea of such a person, we\ndiscriminate by our ability to expel the idea from consciousness, and\nour inability, while looking at him, to expel the person from\nconsciousness. And when in doubt as to the validity or illusiveness of\nsome impression made upon us in the dusk, we settle the matter by\nobserving whether the impression persists on closer observation; and we\npredicate reality if the persistence is complete. How truly\npersistence is what we mean by reality, is shown in the fact that when,\nafter criticism has proved that the real as we are conscious of it is\nnot the objectively real, the indefinite notion which we form of the\nobjectively real, is of something which persists absolutely, under all\nchanges of mode, form, or appearance. And the fact that we cannot form\neven an indefinite notion of the absolutely real, except as the\nabsolutely persistent, clearly implies that persistence is our ultimate\ntest of the real as present to consciousness.\n\nReality then, as we think it, being nothing more than persistence in\nconsciousness, the result must be the same to us whether that which we\nperceive be the Unconditioned itself, or an effect invariably wrought on\nus by the Unconditioned. If some mode of the Unconditioned uniformly\nproduces some mode of consciousness\u2014if the mode of consciousness so\nproduced, is as persistent as would be such mode of the Unconditioned\nwere it immediately known; it follows that the reality will be to our\nconsciousness as complete in the one case as in the other. Were the\nUnconditioned itself present in thought, it could but be persistent; and\nif instead of it, there is present its persistent effect, the resulting\nconsciousness of reality must be exactly the same.\n\nHence there may be drawn these conclusions:\u2014First, that we have an\nindefinite consciousness of an absolute reality transcending relations,\nwhich is produced by the absolute persistence in us of something which\nsurvives all changes of relation. Second, that we have a definite\nconsciousness of relative reality, which unceasingly persists in us\nunder one or other of its forms, and under each form so long as the\nconditions of presentation are fulfilled; and that the relative reality,\nbeing thus continuously persistent in us, is as real to us as would be\nthe absolute reality could it be immediately known. Third, that thought\nbeing possible only under relation, the relative reality can be\nconceived as such only in connexion with an absolute reality; and the\nconnexion between the two being absolutely persistent in our\nconsciousness, is real in the same sense as the terms it unites are\nreal.\n\nThus then we may resume, with entire confidence, those realistic\nconceptions which philosophy at first sight seems to dissipate. Though\nreality under the forms of our consciousness, is but a conditioned\neffect of the absolute reality, yet this conditioned effect standing in\nindissoluble relation with its unconditioned cause, and being equally\npersistent with it so long as the conditions persist, is, to the\nconsciousness supplying those conditions, equally real. The persistent\nimpressions being the persistent results of a persistent cause, are for\npractical purposes the same to us as the cause itself; and may be\nhabitually dealt with as its equivalents. Somewhat in the same way that\nour visual perceptions, though merely symbols found to be the\nequivalents of tactual perceptions, are yet so identified with those\ntactual perceptions that we actually appear to see the solidity and\nhardness which we do but infer, and thus conceive as objects what are\nonly the signs of objects; so, on a higher stage, do we deal with these\nrelative realities as though they were absolutes instead of effects of\nthe absolute. And we may legitimately continue so to deal with them as\nlong as the conclusions to which they help us are understood as relative\nrealities and not absolute ones.\n\nThis general conclusion it now remains to interpret specifically, in its\napplication to each of our ultimate scientific ideas.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 62.[11] We think in relations. This is truly the form of all thought;\nand if there are any other forms, they must be derived from this. We\nhave seen (Chap. iii. Part I.) that the several ultimate modes of being\ncannot be known or conceived as they exist in themselves; that is, out\nof _relation_ to our consciousness. We have seen, by analyzing the\nproduct of thought, (\u00a7 23,) that it always consists of _relations_; and\ncannot include anything beyond the most general of these. On analyzing\nthe process of thought, we found that cognition of the Absolute was\nimpossible, because it presented neither _relation_, nor its\nelements\u2014difference and likeness. Further, we found that not only\nIntelligence but Life itself, consists in the establishment of internal\n_relations_ in correspondence with external relations. And lastly, it\nwas shown that though by the relativity of our thought we are eternally\ndebarred from knowing or conceiving Absolute Being; yet that this very\n_relativity_ of our thought, necessitates that vague consciousness of\nAbsolute Being which no mental effort can suppress. That _relation_ is\nthe universal form of thought, is thus a truth which all kinds of\ndemonstration unite in proving.\n\nBy the transcendentalists, certain other phenomena of consciousness are\nregarded as forms of thought. Presuming that relation would be admitted\nby them to be a universal mental form, they would class with it two\nothers as also universal. Were their hypothesis otherwise tenable\nhowever, it must still be rejected if such alleged further forms are\ninterpretable as generated by the primary form. If we think in\nrelations, and if relations have certain universal forms, it is manifest\nthat such universal forms of relations will become universal forms of\nour consciousness. And if these further universal forms are thus\nexplicable, it is superfluous, and therefore unphilosophical, to assign\nthem an independent origin. Now relations are of two\norders\u2014relations of sequence, and relations of co-existence; of which\nthe one is original and the other derivative. The relation of sequence\nis given in every change of consciousness. The relation of co-existence,\nwhich cannot be originally given in a consciousness of which the states\nare serial, becomes distinguished only when it is found that certain\nrelations of sequence have their terms presented in consciousness in\neither order with equal facility; while the others are presented only in\none order. Relations of which the terms are not reversible, become\nrecognized as sequences proper; while relations of which the terms occur\nindifferently in both directions, become recognized as co-existences.\nEndless experiences, which from moment to moment present both orders of\nthese relations, render the distinction between them perfectly definite;\nand at the same time generate an abstract conception of each. The\nabstract of all sequences is Time. The abstract of all co-existences is\nSpace. From the fact that in thought, Time is inseparable from sequence,\nand Space from co-existence, we do not here infer that Time and Space\nare original conditions of consciousness under which sequences and\nco-existences are known; but we infer that our conceptions of Time and\nSpace are generated, as other abstracts are generated from other\nconcretes: the only difference being, that the organization of\nexperiences has, in these cases, been going on throughout the entire\nevolution of intelligence.\n\nThis synthesis is confirmed by analysis. Our consciousness of Space is a\nconsciousness of co-existent positions. Any limited portion of space can\nbe conceived only by representing its limits as co-existing in certain\nrelative positions; and each of its imagined boundaries, be it line or\nplane, can be thought of in no other way than as made up of co-existent\npositions in close proximity. And since a position is not an\nentity\u2014since the congeries of positions which constitute any conceived\nportion of space, and mark its bounds, are not sensible existences; it\nfollows that the co-existent positions which make up our consciousness\nof Space, are not co-existences in the full sense of the word (which\nimplies realities as their terms), but are the blank forms of\nco-existences, left behind when the realities are absent; that is, are\nthe abstracts of co-existences. The experiences out of which,\nduring the evolution of intelligence, this abstract of all co-existences\nhas been generated, are experiences of individual positions as\nascertained by touch; and each of such experiences involves the\nresistance of an object touched, and the muscular tension which measures\nthis resistance. By countless unlike muscular adjustments, involving\nunlike muscular tensions, different resisting positions are disclosed;\nand these, as they can be experienced in one order as readily as\nanother, we regard as co-existing. But since, under other circumstances,\nthe same muscular adjustments do not produce contact with resisting\npositions, there result the same states of consciousness, minus the\nresistances\u2014blank forms of co-existence from which the co-existent\nobjects before experienced are absent. And from a building up of these,\ntoo elaborate to be here detailed, results that abstract of all\nrelations of co-existence which we call Space. It remains only to\npoint out, as a thing which we must not forget, that the experiences\nfrom which the consciousness of Space arises, are experiences of\n_force_. A certain correlation of the muscular forces we ourselves\nexercise, is the index of each position as originally disclosed to us;\nand the resistance which makes us aware of something existing in that\nposition, is an equivalent of the pressure we consciously exert. Thus,\nexperiences of forces variously correlated, are those from which our\nconsciousness of Space is abstracted.\n\nThat which we know as Space being thus shown, alike by its genesis and\ndefinition, to be purely relative, what are we to say of that which\ncauses it? Is there an absolute Space which relative Space in some sort\nrepresents? Is Space in itself a form or condition of absolute\nexistence, producing in our minds a corresponding form or condition of\nrelative existence? These are unanswerable questions. Our conception of\nSpace is produced by some mode of the Unknowable; and the complete\nunchangeableness of our conception of it simply implies a complete\nuniformity in the effects wrought by this mode of the Unknowable upon\nus. But therefore to call it a necessary mode of the Unknowable, is\nillegitimate. All we can assert is, that Space is a relative reality;\nthat our consciousness of this unchanging relative reality implies an\nabsolute reality equally unchanging in so far as we are concerned; and\nthat the relative reality may be unhesitatingly accepted in thought as a\nvalid basis for our reasonings; which, when rightly carried on, will\nbring us to truths that have a like relative reality\u2014the only truths\nwhich concern us or can possibly be known to us.\n\nConcerning Time, relative and absolute, a parallel argument leads to\nparallel conclusions. These are too obvious to need specifying in\ndetail.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 63. Our conception of Matter, reduced to its simplest shape, is that\nof co-existent positions that offer resistance; as contrasted with our\nconception of Space, in which the co-existent positions offer no\nresistance. We think of Body as bounded by surfaces that resist; and as\nmade up throughout of parts that resist. Mentally abstract the\nco-existent resistances, and the consciousness of Body disappears;\nleaving behind it the consciousness of Space. And since the group of\nco-existing resistent positions constituting a portion of matter, is\nuniformly capable of giving us impressions of resistance in combination\nwith various muscular adjustments, according as we touch its near, its\nremote, its right, or its left side; it results that as different\nmuscular adjustments habitually indicate different co-existences, we are\nobliged to conceive every portion of matter as containing more than one\nresistent position\u2014that is, as occupying Space. Hence the necessity we\nare under of representing to ourselves the ultimate elements of Matter\nas being at once extended and resistent: this being the universal form\nof our sensible experiences of Matter, becomes the form which our\nconception of it cannot transcend, however minute the fragments which\nimaginary subdivisions produce. Of these two inseparable elements,\nthe resistance is primary, and the extension secondary. Occupied\nextension, or Body, being distinguished in consciousness from unoccupied\nextension, or Space, by its resistance, this attribute must clearly have\nprecedence in the genesis of the idea. Such a conclusion is, indeed, an\nobvious corollary from that at which we arrived in the foregoing\nsection. If, as was there contended, our consciousness of Space is a\nproduct of accumulated experiences, partly our own but chiefly\nancestral\u2014if, as was pointed out, the experiences from which our\nconsciousness of Space is abstracted, can be received only through\nimpressions of resistance made upon the organism; the necessary\ninference is, that experiences of resistance being those from which the\nconception of Space is generated, the resistance-attribute of Matter\nmust be regarded as primordial and the space-attribute as derivative.\n Whence it becomes manifest that our experience of _force_, is that\nout of which the idea of Matter is built. Matter as opposing our\nmuscular energies, being immediately present to consciousness in terms\nof force; and its occupancy of Space being known by an abstract of\nexperiences originally given in terms of force; it follows that forces,\nstanding in certain correlations, form the whole content of our idea of\nMatter.\n\nSuch being our cognition of the relative reality, what are we to say of\nthe absolute reality? We can only say that it is some mode of the\nUnknowable, related to the Matter we know, as cause to effect. The\nrelativity of our cognition of Matter is shown alike by the above\nanalysis, and by the contradictions which are evolved when we deal with\nthe cognition as an absolute one (\u00a7 16). But, as we have lately seen,\nthough known to us only under relation, Matter is as real in the true\nsense of that word, as it would be could we know it out of relation; and\nfurther, the relative reality which we know as Matter, is necessarily\nrepresented to the mind as standing in a persistent or real relation to\nthe absolute reality. We may therefore deliver ourselves over\nwithout hesitation, to those terms of thought which experience has\norganized in us. We need not in our physical, chemical, or other\nresearches, refrain from dealing with Matter as made up of extended and\nresistent atoms; for this conception, necessarily resulting from our\nexperiences of Matter, is not less legitimate, than the conception of\naggregate masses as extended and resistent. The atomic hypothesis, as\nwell as the kindred hypothesis of an all-pervading ether consisting of\nmolecules, is simply a necessary development of those universal forms\nwhich the actions of the Unknowable have wrought in us. The conclusions\nlogically worked out by the aid of these hypotheses, are sure to be in\nharmony with all others which these same forms involve, and will have a\nrelative truth that is equally complete.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 64. The conception of Motion as presented or represented in the\ndeveloped consciousness, involves the conceptions of Space, of Time, and\nof Matter. A something that moves; a series of positions occupied in\nsuccession; and a group of co-existent positions united in thought with\nthe successive ones\u2014these are the constituents of the idea. And since,\nas we have seen, these are severally elaborated from experiences of\n_force_ as given in certain correlations, it follows that from a further\nsynthesis of such experiences, the idea of Motion is also elaborated. A\ncertain other element in the idea, which is in truth its fundamental\nelement, (namely, the necessity which the moving body is under to go on\nchanging its position), results immediately from the earliest\nexperiences of force. Movements of different parts of the organism in\nrelation to each other, are the first presented in consciousness. These,\nproduced by the action of the muscles, necessitate reactions upon\nconsciousness in the shape of sensations of muscular tension.\nConsequently, each stretching-out or drawing-in of a limb, is originally\nknown as a series of muscular tensions, varying in intensity as the\nposition of the limb changes. And this rudimentary consciousness of\nMotion, consisting of serial impressions of force, becomes inseparably\nunited with the consciousness of Space and Time as fast as these are\nabstracted from further impressions of force. Or rather, out of this\nprimitive conception of Motion, the adult conception of it is developed\nsimultaneously with the development of the conceptions of Space and\nTime: all three being evolved from the more multiplied and varied\nimpressions of muscular tension and objective resistance. Motion, as we\nknow it, is thus traceable, in common with the other ultimate scientific\nideas, to experiences of force.\n\nThat this relative reality answers to some absolute reality, it is\nneedful only for form\u2019s sake to assert. What has been said above,\nrespecting the Unknown Cause which produces in us the effects called\nMatter, Space, and Time, will apply, on simply changing the terms, to\nMotion.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 65. We come down then finally to Force, as the ultimate of ultimates.\nThough Space, Time, Matter, and Motion, are apparently all necessary\ndata of intelligence, yet a psychological analysis (here indicated only\nin rude outline) shows us that these are either built up of, or\nabstracted from, experiences of Force. Matter and Motion, as we know\nthem, are differently conditioned manifestations of Force. Space and\nTime, as we know them, are disclosed along with these different\nmanifestations of Force as the conditions under which they are\npresented. Matter and Motion are concretes built up from the _contents_\nof various mental relations; while Space and Time are abstracts of the\n_forms_ of these various relations. Deeper down than these, however, are\nthe primordial experiences of Force, which, as occurring in\nconsciousness in different combinations, supply at once the materials\nwhence the forms of relations are generalized, and the related objects\nbuilt up. A single impression of force is manifestly receivable by a\nsentient being devoid of mental forms: grant but sensibility, with no\nestablished power of thought, and a force producing some nervous change,\nwill still be presentable at the supposed seat of sensation. Though no\nsingle impression of force so received, could itself produce\nconsciousness (which implies relations between different states), yet a\nmultiplication of such impressions, differing in kind and degree, would\ngive the materials for the establishment of relations, that is, of\nthought. And if such relations differed in their forms as well as in\ntheir contents, the impressions of such forms would be organized\nsimultaneously with the impressions they contained. Thus all other modes\nof consciousness are derivable from experiences of Force; but\nexperiences of Force are not derivable from anything else. Indeed, it\nneeds but to remember that consciousness consists of changes, to see\nthat the ultimate datum of consciousness must be that of which change is\nthe manifestation; and that thus the force by which we ourselves produce\nchanges, and which serves to symbolize the cause of changes in general,\nis the final disclosure of analysis.\n\nIt is a truism to say that the nature of this undecomposable element of\nour knowledge is inscrutable. If, to use an algebraic illustration, we\nrepresent Matter, Motion, and Force, by the symbols _x_, _y_, and _z_;\nthen, we may ascertain the values of _x_ and _y_ in terms of _z_; but\nthe value of _z_ can never be found: _z_ is the unknown quantity which\nmust for ever remain unknown; for the obvious reason that there is\nnothing in which its value can be expressed. It is within the possible\nreach of our intelligence to go on simplifying the equations of all\nphenomena, until the complex symbols which formulate them are reduced to\ncertain functions of this ultimate symbol; but when we have done this,\nwe have reached that limit which eternally divides science from\nnescience.\n\nThat this undecomposable mode of consciousness into which all other\nmodes may be decomposed, cannot be itself the Power manifested to us\nthrough phenomena, has been already proved (\u00a7 18). We saw that to assume\nan identity of nature between the cause of changes as it absolutely\nexists, and that cause of change of which we are conscious in our own\nmuscular efforts, betrays us into alternative impossibilities of\nthought. Force, as we know it, can be regarded only as a certain\nconditioned effect of the Unconditioned Cause\u2014as the relative reality\nindicating to us an Absolute Reality by which it is immediately\nproduced. And here, indeed, we see even more clearly than before, how\ninevitable is that transfigured realism to which sceptical criticism\nfinally brings us round. Getting rid of all complications, and\ncontemplating pure Force, we are irresistibly compelled by the\nrelativity of our thought, to vaguely conceive some unknown force as the\ncorrelative of the known force. Conditioned effect and unconditioned\ncause, are here presented in their primordial relation as two sides of\nthe same change; of which we are obliged to regard the conditioned and\nthe unconditioned sides as equally real: the only difference being that\nthe reality of the one is made relative by the imposition of the forms\nand limits of our consciousness, while the reality of the other, in the\nabsence of those forms and limits, remains absolute.\n\nThus much respecting the nature of our ultimate scientific ideas. Before\nproceeding to our general inquiry concerning the causes of Evolution, we\nhave still to consider certain ultimate scientific truths.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 11:\n\n For the psychological conclusions briefly set forth in this and the\n three sections following it, the justification will be found in the\n writer\u2019s _Principles of Psychology_.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER VI.\n THE INDESTRUCTIBILITY OF MATTER.\n\n\n\u00a7 66. Not because the truth is unfamiliar, is it needful here to say\nsomething concerning the indestructibility of Matter; but partly because\nthe symmetry of our argument demands the enunciation of this truth, and\npartly because the evidence on which it is accepted requires\nexamination. Could it be shown, or could it with any rationality be even\nsupposed, that Matter, either in its aggregates or in its units, ever\nbecame non-existent, there would be an end to the inquiry on which we\nare now setting out. Evolution, considered as a re-arrangement of parts,\ncould not be scientifically explained, if, during its course, any of the\nparts might arise out of nothing or might lapse into nothing. The\nquestion would no longer be one comprehending only the forces and\nmotions by which the re-arrangement is effected; but would involve an\nincalculable element, and would hence be insoluble. Clearly, therefore,\nthe indestructibility of Matter is an indispensable axiom.\n\nSo far from being admitted as a self-evident truth, this would, in\nprimitive times, have been rejected as a self-evident error. There was\nonce universally current, a notion that things could vanish into\nabsolute nothing, or arise out of absolute nothing. If we analyze early\nsuperstitions, or that faith in magic which was general in later times\nand even still survives among the uncultured, we find one of its\npostulates to be, that by some potent spell Matter can be called out of\nnonentity, and can be made non-existent. If men did not believe this in\nthe strict sense of the word (which would imply that the process of\ncreation or annihilation was clearly represented in consciousness), they\nstill believed that they believed it; and how nearly, in their confused\nthoughts, the one was equivalent to the other, is shown by their\nconduct. Nor, indeed, have dark ages and inferior minds alone betrayed\nthis belief. The current theology, in its teachings respecting the\nbeginning and end of the world, is clearly pervaded by it; and it may be\neven questioned whether Shakespeare, in his poetical anticipation of a\ntime when all things should disappear and \u201cleave not a wrack behind,\u201d\nwas not under its influence. The gradual accumulation of\nexperiences however, and still more the organization of experiences, has\ntended slowly to reverse this conviction; until now, the doctrine that\nMatter is indestructible has become a common-place. Whatever may be true\nof it absolutely, we have learnt that relatively to our consciousness,\nMatter never either comes into existence or ceases to exist. Cases which\nonce gave an apparent support to the illusion that something could come\nout of nothing, a wider knowledge has one by one cancelled. The comet\nthat is all at once discovered in the heavens and nightly waxes larger,\nis proved not to be a newly-created body, but a body that was until\nlately beyond the range of vision. The cloud which in the course of a\nfew minutes forms in the sky, consists not of substance that has just\nbegun to be, but of substance that previously existed in a more diffused\nand transparent form. And similarly with a crystal or precipitate in\nrelation to the fluid depositing it. Conversely, the seeming\nannihilations of Matter turn out, on closer observation, to be only\nchanges of state. It is found that the evaporated water, though it has\nbecome invisible, may be brought by condensation to its original shape.\nThe discharged fowling-piece gives evidence that though the gunpowder\nhas disappeared, there have appeared in place of it certain gases,\nwhich, in assuming a larger volume, have caused the explosion.\n Not, however, until the rise of quantitative chemistry, could the\nconclusion suggested by such experiences be reduced to a certainty.\nWhen, having ascertained not only the combinations into which various\nsubstances enter, but also the proportions in which they combine,\nchemists were enabled to account for the matter that had made its\nappearance or become invisible, the proof was rendered complete. When,\nin place of the candle that had slowly burnt away, it was shown that\ncertain calculable quantities of carbonic acid and water had\nresulted\u2014when it was demonstrated that the joint weight of the carbonic\nacid and water thus produced, was equal to the weight of the candle plus\nthat of the oxygen uniting with its constituents during combustion; it\nwas put beyond doubt that the carbon and hydrogen forming the candle,\nwere still in existence, and had simply changed their state. And of the\ngeneral conclusion thus exemplified, the exact analyses daily made, in\nwhich the same portion of matter is pursued through numerous\ntransformations and finally separated, furnish never-ceasing\nconfirmations.\n\nSuch has become the effect of this specific evidence, joined to that\ngeneral evidence which the continued existence of familiar objects\nunceasingly gives us; that the indestructibility of Matter is now\nrecognized by many as a truth of which the negation is inconceivable.\nHabitual experiences being no longer met by any counter-experiences, as\nthey once seemed to be; but these apparent counter-experiences\nfurnishing new proof that Matter exists permanently, even where the\nsenses fail to detect it; it has grown into an axiom of science, that\nwhatever metamorphoses Matter undergoes, its quantity is fixed. The\nchemist, the physicist, and the physiologist, not only one and all take\nthis for granted, but would severally profess themselves unable to\nrealize any supposition to the contrary.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 67. This last fact naturally raises the question, whether we have any\nhigher warrant for this fundamental belief, than the warrant of\nconscious induction. The indestructibility of Matter is proved\nexperimentally to be an absolute uniformity within the range of our\nexperience. But absolute uniformities of experience, generate absolute\nuniformities of thought. Does it not follow, then, that this ultimate\ntruth must be a cognition involved in our mental organization? An\naffirmative answer we shall find unavoidable.\n\nWhat is termed the ultimate incompressibility of Matter, is an admitted\nlaw of thought. Though it is possible to imagine a piece of matter to be\ncompressed without limit, yet however small the bulk to which we\nconceive it reduced, it is impossible to conceive it reduced into\nnothing. While we can represent to ourselves the parts of the matter as\nindefinitely approximated, and the space occupied as indefinitely\ndecreased, we cannot represent to ourselves the quantity of matter as\nmade less. To do this would imply an imagined disappearance of some of\nthe constituent parts\u2014would imply that some of the constituent parts\nwere in thought compressed into nothing; which is no more possible than\nthe compression of the whole into nothing. Whence it is an obvious\ncorollary, that the total quantity of matter in the Universe, cannot\nreally be conceived as diminished, any more than it can be conceived as\nincreased. Our inability to conceive Matter becoming non-existent,\nis immediately consequent on the very nature of thought. Thought\nconsists in the establishment of relations. There can be no relation\nestablished, and therefore no thought framed, when one of the related\nterms is absent from consciousness. Hence it is impossible to think of\nsomething becoming nothing, for the same reason that it is impossible to\nthink of nothing becoming something\u2014the reason, namely, that nothing\ncannot become an object of consciousness. The annihilation of Matter is\nunthinkable for the same reason that the creation of Matter is\nunthinkable; and its indestructibility thus becomes an _\u00e0 priori_\ncognition of the highest order\u2014not one that results from a long\ncontinued registry of experiences gradually organized into an\nirreversible mode of thought; but one that is given in the form of all\nexperiences whatever.\n\nDoubtless it will be considered strange that a truth only in modern\ntimes accepted as unquestionable, and then only by men of science,\nshould be classed as an _\u00e0 priori_ truth; not only of equal certainty\nwith those commonly so classed, but of even higher certainty. To set\ndown as a proposition which cannot be thought, one which mankind once\nuniversally professed to think, and which the great majority profess to\nthink even now, seems absurd. The explanation is, that in this, as in\ncountless other cases, men have supposed themselves to think what they\ndid not think. As was shown at the outset, the greater part of our\nconceptions are symbolic. Many of these symbolic conceptions, though\nrarely developed into real ones, admit of being so developed; and, being\ndirectly or indirectly proved to correspond with actualities, are valid.\nBut along with these there pass current others which cannot be\ndeveloped\u2014cannot by any direct or indirect process be realized in\nthought; much less proved to correspond with actualities. Not being\nhabitually tested, however, the legitimate and illegitimate symbolic\nconceptions are confounded together; and supposing themselves to have\nliterally thought, that which they have thought only symbolically, men\nsay they believe propositions of which the terms cannot even be put\ntogether in consciousness. Hence the ready acceptance given to sundry\nhypotheses respecting the origin of the Universe, which yet are\nabsolutely unthinkable. And as before we found the commonly asserted\ndoctrine that Matter was created out of nothing, to have been never\nreally conceived at all, but to have been conceived only symbolically;\nso here we find the annihilation of Matter to have been conceived only\nsymbolically, and the symbolic conception mistaken for a real one.\n Possibly it will be objected that the words _thought_, and\n_belief_, and _conception_, are here employed in new senses; and that it\nis a misuse of language to say that men did not really think that which\nhas nevertheless so profoundly influenced their conduct. It must be\nconfessed that there is an inconvenience in so restricting the meanings\nof these words. There is no remedy however. Definite conclusions can be\nreached, only by the use of well-defined terms. Questions touching the\nvalidity of any portion of our knowledge, cannot be profitably discussed\nunless the words _knowing_, and _thinking_, have specific\ninterpretations. We must not include under them whatever confused\nprocesses of consciousness the popular speech applies them to; but only\nthe distinct processes of consciousness. And if this obliges us to\nreject a large part of human thinking as not thinking at all, but merely\npseudo-thinking, there is no help for it.\n\nReturning to the general question, we find the results to be:\u2014that we\nhave positive experience of the continued existence of Matter; that the\nform of our thought renders it impossible for us to have experience of\nMatter passing into non-existence, since such experience would involve\ncognition of a relation having one of its terms not representable in\nconsciousness; that hence the indestructibility of Matter is in\nstrictness an _\u00e0 priori_ truth; that nevertheless, certain illusive\nexperiences, suggesting the notion of its annihilation, have produced in\nundisciplined minds not only the supposition that Matter could be\nconceived to become non-existent, but the notion that it did so; but\nthat careful observation, showing the supposed annihilations to have\nnever taken place, has confirmed, _\u00e0 posteriori_, the _\u00e0 priori_\ncognition which Psychology shows to result from a uniformity of\nexperience that can never be met by counter-experience.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 68. The fact, however, which it most concerns us here to observe, is,\nthe nature of the perceptions by which the permanence of Matter is\nperpetually illustrated to us, and from which Science draws the\ninference that Matter is indestructible. These perceptions, under all\ntheir forms, amount simply to this\u2014that the _force_ which a given\nquantity of matter exercises, remains always the same. This is the proof\non which common sense and exact science alike rely. When, for\nexample, somebody known to have existed a few years since is said to\nexist still, by one who yesterday saw him, his assertion amounts to\nthis\u2014that an object which in past time wrought on his consciousness a\ncertain group of changes, still exists because a like group of changes\nhas been again wrought on his consciousness: the continuance of the\npower thus to impress him, he holds to prove the continuance of the\nobject. Should some auditor allege a mistake in identity, the witness is\nadmitted to give conclusive proof when he says that he not only saw, but\nshook hands with this person, and remarked while grasping his hand, that\nabsence of the index finger which was his known peculiarity: the\nimplication being, that an object which through a special combination of\nforces, produces special tactual impressions, is concluded still to\nexist while it continues still to do this. Even more clearly do we see\nthat force is our ultimate measure of Matter, in those cases where the\nshape of the matter has been changed. A piece of gold given to an\nartizan to be worked into an ornament, and which when brought back\nappears to be less, is placed in the scales; and if it balances a much\nsmaller weight than it did in its rough state, we infer that much has\nbeen lost either in manipulation or by direct abstraction. Here the\nobvious postulate is, that the quantity of Matter is finally\ndeterminable by the quantity of gravitative force it manifests.\n And this is the kind of evidence on which Science bases its\nexperimentally-established induction that Matter is indestructible.\nWhenever a piece of substance lately visible and tangible, has been\nreduced to an invisible, intangible shape, but is proved by the weight\nof the gas into which it has been transformed to be still existing; the\nassumption is, that though otherwise insensible to us, the amount of\nmatter is the same, if it still tends towards the Earth with the same\nforce. Similarly, every case in which the weight of an element present\nin combination, is inferred from the known weight of another element\nwhich it neutralizes, is a case in which the quantity of matter is\nexpressed in terms of the quantity of chemical force it exerts; and in\nwhich this specific chemical force is assumed to be the necessary\ncorrelative of a specific gravitative force.\n\nThus then by the indestructibility of Matter, we really mean the\nindestructibility of the _force_ with which Matter affects us. As we\nbecome conscious of Matter only through that resistance which it opposes\nto our muscular energy, so do we become conscious of the permanence of\nMatter only through the permanence of this resistance; as either\nimmediately or mediately proved to us. And this truth is made manifest\nnot only by analysis of the _\u00e0 posteriori_ cognition, but equally so by\nanalysis of the _\u00e0 priori_ one. For that which we cannot conceive to be\ndiminished by the continued compression of Matter, is not its occupancy\nof space, but its ability to resist.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER VII.\n THE CONTINUITY OF MOTION.\n\n\n\u00a7 69. Another general truth of the same order with the foregoing, must\nhere be specified\u2014one which, though not so generally recognized, has yet\nlong been familiar among men of science. The continuity of Motion, like\nthe indestructibility of Matter, is clearly an axiom underlying the very\npossibility of a rational theory of Evolution. That kind of change in\nthe arrangement of parts, which we have found to constitute Evolution,\ncould not be deductively explained were it possible for Motion either to\nappear or disappear. If those motions through which the parts pass into\na new arrangement, might either proceed from nothing or lapse into\nnothing, there would be an end to scientific interpretation of them.\nEach constituent change might as well as not be supposed to begin and\nend of itself.\n\nThe axiomatic character of the truth that Motion is continuous, is\nrecognized only after the discipline of exact science has given\nprecision to the conceptions. Aboriginal men, our uneducated population,\nand even most of the so-called educated, think in an extremely\nindefinite manner. From careless observations, they pass by careless\nreasoning, to conclusions of which they do not contemplate the\nimplications\u2014conclusions which they never develope for the purpose of\nseeing whether they are consistent. Accepting without criticism the\ndicta of unaided perception, to the effect that surrounding bodies when\nput in motion soon return to rest, the great majority tacitly assume\nthat the motion is actually lost. They do not consider whether the\nphenomenon can be otherwise interpreted; or whether the interpretation\nthey put on it can be mentally realized. They are content with a\ncolligation of mere appearances. But the establishment of certain\nfacts having quite an opposite implication, led to inquiries which have\ngradually proved such appearances to be illusive. The discovery that the\nplanets revolve round the Sun with undiminishing speed, raised the\nsuspicion that a moving body, when not interfered with, will go on for\never without change of velocity; and suggested the question whether\nbodies which lose their motion, do not at the same time communicate as\nmuch motion to other bodies. It was a familiar fact that a stone would\nglide further over a smooth surface, such as ice, presenting no small\nobjects to which it could part with its motion by collision, than over a\nsurface strewn with such small objects; and that a projectile would\ntravel a far greater distance through a rare medium like air, than\nthrough a dense medium like water. Thus the primitive notion that moving\nbodies had an inherent tendency gradually to lose their motion and\nfinally stop\u2014a notion of which the Greeks did not get rid, but which\nlasted till the time of Galileo\u2014began to give way. It was further shaken\nby such experiments as those of Hooke, which proved that the spinning of\na top continued long in proportion as it was prevented from\ncommunicating movement to surrounding matter\u2014experiments which, when\nrepeated with the aid of modern appliances, have shown that _in vacuo_\nsuch rotation, retarded only by the friction of the axis, will continue\nfor nearly an hour. Thus have been gradually dispersed, the obstacles to\nthe reception of the first law of motion;\u2014the law, namely, that when not\ninfluenced by external forces, a moving body will go on in a straight\nline with a uniform velocity. And this law is in our day being merged in\nthe more general one, that Motion, like Matter, is indestructible; and\nthat whatever is lost by any one portion of matter is transferred to\nother portions\u2014a conclusion which, however much at variance it seems\nwith cases of sudden arrest from collision with an immovable object, is\nyet reconciled with such cases by the discovery that the motion\napparently lost continues under new forms, though forms not directly\nperceptible.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 70. And here it may be remarked of Motion, as it was before of Matter,\nthat its indestructibility is not only to be inductively inferred, but\nthat it is a necessity of thought: its destructibility never having been\ntruly conceived at all, but having always been, as it is now, a mere\nverbal proposition that cannot be realized in consciousness\u2014a\npseud-idea. Whether that absolute reality which produces in us the\nconsciousness we call Motion, be or be not an eternal mode of the\nUnknowable, it is impossible for us to say; but that the relative\nreality which we call Motion never can come into existence, or cease to\nexist, is a truth involved in the very nature of our consciousness. To\nthink of Motion as either being created or annihilated\u2014to think of\nnothing becoming something, or something becoming nothing\u2014is to\nestablish in consciousness a relation between two terms of which one is\nabsent from consciousness, which is impossible. The very nature of\nintelligence, negatives the supposition that Motion can be conceived\n(much less known) to either commence or cease.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 71. It remains to be pointed out that the continuity of Motion, as\nwell as the indestructibility of Matter, is really known to us in terms\nof _force_. That a certain manifestation of force remains for ever\nundiminished, is the ultimate content of the thought; whether reached _\u00e0\nposteriori_ or _\u00e0 priori_.\n\nFrom terrestrial physics let us take the case of sound propagated to a\ngreat distance. Whenever we are directly conscious of the causation of\nsound (namely, when we produce it ourselves), its invariable antecedent\nis force. The immediate sequence of this force we know to be\nmotion\u2014first, of our own organs, and then of the body which we set\nvibrating. The vibrations so generated we can discern both through the\nfingers and through the ears; and that the sensations received by the\nears are the equivalents of mechanical force communicated to the air,\nand by it impressed on surrounding objects, we have clear proof when\nobjects are fractured: as windows by the report of a cannon; or a glass\nvessel by a powerful voice. On what, then, rests the reasoning when, as\noccasionally happens under favourable circumstances, men on board a\nvessel a hundred miles from shore, hear the ringing of church-bells on\nplacing their ears in the focus of the main sail; and when it is\ninferred that atmospheric undulations have traversed this immense\ndistance? Manifestly, the assertion that the motion of the clapper,\ntransformed into the vibrations of the bell, and communicated to the\nsurrounding air, has propagated itself thus far on all sides,\ndiminishing in intensity as the mass of air moved became greater, is\nbased solely upon a certain change produced in consciousness through the\nears. The listeners are not conscious of motion; they are conscious of\nan impression produced on them\u2014an impression which implies a force as\nits necessary correlative. With force they begin, and with force they\nend: the intermediate motion being simply inferred. Again, where,\nas in celestial physics, the continuity of motion is quantitatively\nproved, the proof is not direct but inferential; and forces furnish the\ndata for the inference. A particular planet can be identified only by\nits constant power to affect our visual organs in a special way\u2014to\nimpress upon the retina a group of forces standing in a particular\ncorrelation. Further, such planet has not been _seen_ to move by the\nastronomical observer; but its motion is _inferred_ from a comparison of\nits present position with the position it before occupied. If rigorously\nexamined, this comparison proves to be a comparison between the\ndifferent impressions produced on him by the different adjustments of\nthe observing instruments. Going a step further back, it turns out that\nthis difference is meaningless until shown to correspond with a certain\ncalculated position which the planet must occupy, supposing that no\nmotion has been lost. And if, finally, we examine the implied\ncalculation, we find that it makes allowances for those accelerations\nand retardations which ellipticity of the orbit involves, as well as\nthose variations of velocity caused by adjacent planets\u2014we find, that\nis, that the motion is concluded to be indestructible not from the\nuniform velocity of the planet, but from the constant quantity of motion\nexhibited when allowance is made for the motion communicated to, or\nreceived from, other celestial bodies. And when we ask how this\ncommunicated motion is estimated, we discover that the estimate is based\nupon certain laws of force; which laws, one and all, embody the\npostulate that force cannot be destroyed. Without the axiom that action\nand re-action are equal and opposite, astronomy could not make its exact\npredictions; and we should lack the rigorous inductive proof they\nfurnish that motion can never be lost, but can only be transferred.\n\nSimilarly with the _\u00e0 priori_ conclusion that Motion is continuous. That\nwhich defies suppression in thought, is really the force which the\nmotion indicates. The unceasing change of position, considered by\nitself, may be mentally abolished without difficulty. We can readily\nimagine retardation and stoppage to result from the action of external\nbodies. But to imagine this, is not possible without an abstraction of\nthe force implied by the motion. We are obliged to conceive this force\nas impressed in the shape of re-action on the bodies that cause the\narrest. And the motion that is communicated to them, we are compelled to\nregard, not as directly communicated, but as a product of the\ncommunicated force. We can mentally diminish the velocity or\nspace-element of motion, by diffusing the momentum or force-element over\na larger mass of matter; but the quantity of this force-element, which\nwe regard as the cause of the motion, is unchangeable in thought.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER VIII.\n THE PERSISTENCE OF FORCE.[12]\n\n\n\u00a7 72. Before taking a first step in the rational interpretation of\nEvolution, it is needful to recognize, not only the facts that Matter is\nindestructible and Motion continuous, but also the fact that Force\npersists. An attempt to assign the _causes_ of Evolution, would\nmanifestly be absurd, if that agency to which the metamorphosis in\ngeneral and in detail is due, could either come into existence or cease\nto exist. The succession of phenomena would in such case be altogether\narbitrary; and deductive science impossible.\n\nHere, indeed, the necessity is even more imperative than in the two\npreceding cases. For the validity of the proofs given that Matter is\nindestructible and Motion continuous, really depends upon the validity\nof the proof that Force is persistent. An analysis of the reasoning\ndemonstrated that in both cases, the _\u00e0 posteriori_ conclusion involves\nthe assumption that unchanged quantities of Matter and Motion are proved\nby unchanged manifestations of Force; and in the _\u00e0 priori_ cognition we\nfound this to be the essential constituent. Hence, that the quantity of\nForce remains always the same, is the fundamental cognition in the\nabsence of which these derivative cognitions must disappear.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 73. But now on what grounds do we assert the persistence of Force?\nInductively we can allege no evidence except such as is presented to us\nthroughout the world of sensible phenomena. No force however, save that\nof which we are conscious during our own muscular efforts, is\nimmediately known to us. All other force is mediately known through the\nchanges we attribute to it. Since, then, we cannot infer the persistence\nof Force from our own sensation of it, which does not persist; we must\ninfer it, if it is inferred at all, from the continuity of Motion, and\nthe undiminished ability of Matter to produce certain effects. But to\nreason thus is manifestly to reason in a circle. It is absurd to allege\nthe indestructibility of Matter, because we find experimentally that\nunder whatever changes of form a given mass of matter exhibits the same\ngravitation, and then afterwards to argue that gravitation is constant\nbecause a given mass of matter exhibits always the same quantity of it.\nWe cannot prove the continuity of Motion by assuming that Force is\npersistent, and then prove the persistence of Force by assuming that\nMotion is continuous.\n\nThe data of both objective and subjective science being involved in this\nquestion touching the nature of our cognition that Force is persistent,\nit will be desirable here to examine it more closely. At the risk of\ntrying the reader\u2019s patience, we must reconsider the reasoning through\nwhich the indestructibility of Matter and the continuity of Motion are\nestablished; that we may see how impossible it is to arrive by parallel\nreasoning at the persistence of Force. In all three cases the\nquestion is one of quantity:\u2014does the Matter, or Motion, or Force, ever\ndiminish in quantity? Quantitative science implies measurement; and\nmeasurement implies a unit of measure. The units of measure from which\nall others of any exactness are derived, are units of linear extension.\nFrom these, through the medium of the equal-armed lever or scales, we\nderive our equal units of weight, or gravitative force. And it is by\nmeans of these equal units of extension and equal units of weight, that\nwe make those quantitative comparisons by which the truths of exact\nscience are reached. Throughout the investigations leading the chemist\nto the conclusion that of the carbon which has disappeared during\ncombustion, no portion has been lost, and that in any compound\nafterwards formed by the resulting carbonic acid the whole of the\noriginal carbon is present, what is his repeatedly assigned proof? That\nafforded by the scales. In what terms is the verdict of the scales\ngiven? In grains\u2014in units of weight\u2014in units of gravitative force. And\nwhat is the total content of the verdict? That as many units of\ngravitative force as the carbon exhibited at first, it exhibits still.\nThe quantity of matter is asserted to be the same, if the number of\nunits of force it counter-balances is the same. The validity of the\ninference, then, depends entirely upon _the constancy of the units of\nforce_. If the force with which the portion of metal called a\ngrain-weight, tends towards the Earth, has varied, the inference that\nMatter is indestructible is vicious. Everything turns on the truth of\nthe assumption that the gravitation of the weights is persistent; and of\nthis no proof is assigned, or can be assigned. In the reasonings\nof the astronomer there is a like implication; from which we may draw\nthe like conclusion. No problem in celestial physics can be solved\nwithout the assumption of some unit of force. This unit need not be,\nlike a pound or a ton, one of which we can take direct cognizance. It is\nrequisite only that the mutual attraction which some two of the bodies\nconcerned exercise at a given distance, should be taken as one; so that\nthe other attractions with which the problem deals, may be expressed in\nterms of this one. Such unit being assumed, the momenta which the\nrespective masses will generate in each other in a given time, are\ncalculated; and compounding these with the momenta they already have,\ntheir places at the end of that time are predicted. The prediction is\nverified by observation. From this, either of two inferences may be\ndrawn. Assuming the masses to be fixed, the motion may be proved to be\nundiminished; or assuming the motion to be undiminished, the masses may\nbe proved to be fixed. But the validity of one or other inference,\ndepends wholly on the truth of the assumption that the unit of force is\nunchanged. Let it be supposed that the gravitation of the two bodies\ntowards each other at the given distance, has varied, and the\nconclusions drawn are no longer true. Nor is it only in their\nconcrete data that the reasonings of terrestrial and celestial physics\nassume the persistence of Force. They equally assume it in the abstract\nprinciple with which they set out; and which they repeat in\njustification of every step. The equality of action and reaction is\ntaken for granted from beginning to end of either argument; and to\nassert that action and reaction are equal and opposite, is to assert\nthat Force is persistent. The allegation really amounts to this, that\nthere cannot be an isolated force beginning and ending in nothing; but\nthat any force manifested, implies an equal antecedent force from which\nit is derived, and against which it is a reaction. Further, that the\nforce so originating cannot disappear without result; but must expend\nitself in some other manifestation of force, which, in being produced,\nbecomes its reaction; and so on continually. Clearly then the\npersistence of Force is an ultimate truth of which no inductive proof is\npossible.\n\nWe might indeed be certain, even in the absence of any such analysis as\nthe foregoing, that there must exist some principle which, as being the\nbasis of science, cannot be established by science. All reasoned-out\nconclusions whatever, must rest on some postulate. As before shown (\u00a7\n23), we cannot go on merging derivative truths in those wider and wider\ntruths from which they are derived, without reaching at last a widest\ntruth which can be merged in no other, or derived from no other. And\nwhoever contemplates the relation in which it stands to the truths of\nscience in general, will see that this truth transcending demonstration\nis the persistence of Force.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 74. But now what is the force of which we predicate persistence? It is\nnot the force we are immediately conscious of in our own muscular\nefforts; for this does not persist. As soon as an outstretched limb is\nrelaxed, the sense of tension disappears. True, we assert that in the\nstone thrown or in the weight lifted, is exhibited the effect of this\nmuscular tension; and that the force which has ceased to be present in\nour consciousness, exists elsewhere. But it does not exist elsewhere\nunder any form cognizable by us. It was proved (\u00a7 18), that though, on\nraising an object from the ground, we are obliged to think of its\ndownward pull as equal and opposite to our upward pull; and though it is\nimpossible to represent these pulls as equal without representing them\nas like in kind; yet, since their likeness in kind would imply in the\nobject a sensation of muscular tension, which cannot be ascribed to it,\nwe are compelled to admit that force as it exists out of our\nconsciousness, is not force as we know it. Hence the force of which we\nassert persistence is that Absolute Force of which we are indefinitely\nconscious as the necessary correlate of the force we know. Thus,\nby the persistence of Force, we really mean the persistence of some\nPower which transcends our knowledge and conception. The manifestations,\nas occurring either in ourselves or outside of us, do not persist; but\nthat which persists is the Unknown Cause of these manifestations. In\nother words, asserting the persistence of Force, is but another mode of\nasserting an Unconditioned Reality, without beginning or end.\n\nThus, quite unexpectedly, we come down once more to that ultimate truth\nin which, as we saw, Religion and Science coalesce. On examining the\ndata underlying a rational theory of Evolution, we find them all at last\nresolvable into that datum without which consciousness was shown to be\nimpossible\u2014the continued existence of an Unknowable as the necessary\ncorrelative of the Knowable. Once commenced, the analysis of the truths\ntaken for granted in scientific inquiries, inevitably brings us down to\nthis deepest truth, in which Common Sense and Philosophy are reconciled.\n\nThe arguments and conclusion contained in this and the foregoing three\nchapters, supply, indeed, the complement to the arguments and conclusion\nset forth in the preceding part of this work. It was there first shown,\nby an examination of our ultimate religious ideas, that knowledge of\nAbsolute Being is impossible; and the impossibility of knowing Absolute\nBeing, was also shown by an examination of our ultimate scientific\nideas. In a succeeding chapter a subjective analysis proved, that while,\nby the very conditions of thought, we are prevented from knowing\nanything beyond relative being; yet that by these very same conditions\nof thought, an indefinite consciousness of Absolute Being is\nnecessitated. And here, by objective analysis, we similarly find that\nthe axiomatic truths of physical science, unavoidably postulate Absolute\nBeing as their common basis.\n\nThus there is even a more profound agreement between Religion and\nScience than was before shown. Not only are they wholly at one on the\nnegative proposition that the Non-relative cannot be known; but they are\nwholly at one on the positive proposition that the Non-relative is an\nactual existence. Both are obliged by the demonstrated untenability of\ntheir supposed cognitions, to confess that the Ultimate Reality is\nincognizable; and yet both are obliged to assert the existence of an\nUltimate Reality. Without this, Religion has no subject-matter; and\nwithout this, Science, subjective and objective, lacks its indispensable\ndatum. We cannot construct a theory of internal phenomena without\npostulating Absolute Being; and unless we postulate Absolute Being, or\nbeing which persists, we cannot construct a theory of external\nphenomena.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 75. A few words must be added respecting the nature of this\nfundamental consciousness. Already it has been looked at from several\npoints of view; and here it seems needful finally to sum up the results.\n\nIn Chapter IV. we saw that the Unknown Power of which neither beginning\nnor end can be conceived, is present to us as that unshaped material of\nconsciousness which is shaped afresh in every thought. Our inability to\nconceive its limitation, is thus simply the obverse of our inability to\nput an end to the thinking subject while still continuing to think.\n In the two foregoing chapters, we contemplated this fundamental\ntruth under another aspect. The indestructibility of Matter and the\ncontinuity of Motion, we saw to be really corollaries from the\nimpossibility of establishing in thought a relation between something\nand nothing. What we call the establishment of a relation in thought, is\nthe passage of the substance of consciousness, from one form into\nanother. To think of something becoming nothing, would involve that this\nsubstance of consciousness having just existed under a given form,\nshould next assume no form; or should cease to be consciousness. And\nthus our inability to conceive Matter and Motion destroyed, is our\ninability to suppress consciousness itself. What, in these two\nforegoing chapters, was proved true of Matter and Motion, is, _\u00e0\nfortiori_, true of the Force out of which our conceptions of Matter and\nMotion are built. Indeed, as we saw, that which is indestructible in\nmatter and motion, is the force they present. And, as we here see, the\ntruth that Force is indestructible, is the obverse of the truth that the\nUnknown Cause of the changes going on in consciousness is\nindestructible. So that the persistence of consciousness, constitutes at\nonce our immediate experience of the persistence of Force, and imposes\non us the necessity we are under of asserting its persistence.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 76. Thus, in all ways there is forced on us the fact, that here is an\nultimate truth given in our mental constitution. It is not only a datum\nof science, but it is a datum which even the assertion of our nescience\ninvolves. Whoever alleges that the inability to conceive a beginning or\nend of the Universe, is a _negative_ result of our mental structure,\ncannot deny that our consciousness of the Universe as persistent, is a\n_positive_ result of our mental structure. And this persistence of the\nUniverse, is the persistence of that Unknown Cause, Power, or Force,\nwhich is manifested to us through all phenomena.\n\nSuch then is the foundation of any possible system of positive\nknowledge. Deeper than demonstration\u2014deeper even than definite\ncognition\u2014deep as the very nature of mind, is the postulate at which we\nhave arrived. Its authority transcends all other whatever; for not only\nis it given in the constitution of our own consciousness, but it is\nimpossible to imagine a consciousness so constituted as not to give it.\nThought, involving simply the establishment of relations, may be readily\nconceived to go on while yet these relations have not been organized\ninto the abstracts we call Space and Time; and so there is a conceivable\nkind of consciousness which does not contain the truths, commonly called\n_\u00e0 priori_, involved in the organization of these forms of relations.\nBut thought cannot be conceived to go on without some element between\nwhich its relations may be established; and so there is no conceivable\nkind of consciousness which does not imply continued existence as its\ndatum. Consciousness without this or that particular _form_ is possible;\nbut consciousness without _contents_ is impossible.\n\nThe sole truth which transcends experience by underlying it, is thus the\npersistence of Force. This being the basis of experience, must be the\nbasis of any scientific organization of experiences. To this an ultimate\nanalysis brings us down; and on this a rational synthesis must build up.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 12:\n\n Some two years ago, I expressed to my friend Professor Huxley, my\n dissatisfaction with the current expression\u2014\u201cConservation of Force;\u201d\n assigning as reasons, first, that the word \u201cconservation\u201d implies a\n conserver and an act of conserving; and, second, that it does not\n imply the existence of the force before that particular manifestation\n of it with which we commence. In place of \u201cconservation,\u201d Professor\n Huxley suggested _persistence_. This entirely meets the first of the\n two objections; and though the second may be urged against it, no\n other word less faulty in this respect can be found. In the absence of\n a word specially coined for the purpose, it seems the best; and as\n such I adopt it.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER IX.\n THE CORRELATION AND EQUIVALENCE OF FORCES.\n\n\n\u00a7 77. When, to the unaided senses, Science began to add supplementary\nsenses in the shape of measuring instruments, men began to perceive\nvarious phenomena which eyes and fingers could not distinguish. Of known\nforms of force, minuter manifestations became appreciable; and forms of\nforce before unknown were rendered cognizable and measurable. Where\nforces had apparently ended in nothing, and had been carelessly supposed\nto have actually done so, instrumental observation proved that effects\nhad in every instance been produced: the forces reappearing in new\nshapes. Hence there has at length arisen the inquiry whether the force\ndisplayed in each surrounding change, does not in the act of expenditure\nundergo metamorphosis into an equivalent amount of some other force or\nforces. And to this inquiry experiment is giving an affirmative answer,\nwhich becomes day by day more decisive. Grove, Helmholtz, and Meyer, are\nmore than any others to be credited with the clear enunciation of this\ndoctrine. Let us glance at the evidence on which it rests.\n\nMotion, wherever we can directly trace its genesis, we find to pre-exist\nas some other mode of force. Our own voluntary acts have always certain\nsensations of muscular tension as their antecedents. When, as in letting\nfall a relaxed limb, we are conscious of a bodily movement requiring no\neffort, the explanation is that the effort was exerted in raising the\nlimb to the position whence it fell. In this case, as in the case of an\ninanimate body descending to the Earth, the force accumulated by the\ndownward motion is just equal to the force previously expended in the\nact of elevation. Conversely, Motion that is arrested produces,\nunder different circumstances, heat, electricity, magnetism, light. From\nthe warming of the hands by rubbing them together, up to the ignition of\na railway-brake by intense friction\u2014from the lighting of detonating\npowder by percussion, up to the setting on fire a block of wood by a few\nblows from a steam-hammer; we have abundant instances in which heat\narises as Motion ceases. It is uniformly found, that the heat generated\nis great in proportion as the Motion lost is great; and that to diminish\nthe arrest of motion, by diminishing the friction, is to diminish the\nquantity of heat evolved. The production of electricity by Motion is\nillustrated equally in the boy\u2019s experiment with rubbed sealing-wax, in\nthe common electrical machine, and in the apparatus for exciting\nelectricity by the escape of steam. Wherever there is friction between\nheterogeneous bodies, electrical disturbance is one of the consequences.\nMagnetism may result from Motion either immediately, as through\npercussion on iron, or mediately as through electric currents previously\ngenerated by Motion. And similarly, Motion may create light; either\ndirectly, as in the minute incandescent fragments struck off by violent\ncollisions, or indirectly, as through the electric spark. \u201cLastly,\nMotion may be again reproduced by the forces which have emanated from\nMotion; thus, the divergence of the electrometer, the revolution of the\nelectrical wheel, the deflection of the magnetic needle, are, when\nresulting from frictional electricity, palpable movements reproduced by\nthe intermediate modes of force, which have themselves been originated\nby motion.\u201d\n\nThat mode of force which we distinguish as Heat, is now generally\nregarded by physicists as molecular motion\u2014not motion as displayed in\nthe changed relations of sensible masses to each other, but as occurring\namong the units of which such sensible masses consist. If we cease to\nthink of Heat as that particular sensation given to us by bodies in\ncertain conditions, and consider the phenomena otherwise presented by\nthese bodies, we find that motion, either in them or in surrounding\nbodies, or in both, is all that we have evidence of. With one or two\nexceptions which are obstacles to every theory of Heat, heated bodies\nexpand; and expansion can be interpreted only as a movement of the units\nof a mass in relation to each other. That so-called radiation through\nwhich anything of higher temperature than things around it, communicates\nHeat to them, is clearly a species of motion. Moreover, the evidence\nafforded by the thermometer that Heat thus diffuses itself, is simply a\nmovement caused in the mercurial column. And that the molecular motion\nwhich we call Heat, may be transformed into visible motion, familiar\nproof is given by the steam-engine; in which \u201cthe piston and all its\nconcomitant masses of matter are moved by the molecular dilatation of\nthe vapour of water.\u201d Where Heat is absorbed without apparent\nresult, modern inquiries show that decided though unobtrusive changes\nare produced: as on glass, the molecular state of which is so far\nchanged by heat, that a polarized ray of light passing through it\nbecomes visible, which it does not do when the glass is cold; or as on\npolished metallic surfaces, which are so far changed in structure by\nthermal radiations from objects very close to them, as to retain\npermanent impressions of such objects. The transformation of Heat into\nelectricity, occurs when dissimilar metals touching each other are\nheated at the point of contact: electric currents being so induced.\nSolid, incombustible matter introduced into heated gas, as lime into the\noxyhydrogen flame, becomes incandescent; and so exhibits the conversion\nof Heat into light. The production of magnetism by Heat, if it cannot be\nproved to take place directly, may be proved to take place indirectly\nthrough the medium of electricity. And through the same medium may be\nestablished the correlation of Heat and chemical affinity\u2014a correlation\nwhich is indeed implied by the marked influence that Heat exercises on\nchemical composition and decomposition.\n\nThe transformations of Electricity into other modes of force, are still\nmore clearly demonstrable. Produced by the motion of heterogeneous\nbodies in contact, Electricity, through attractions and repulsions, will\nimmediately reproduce motion in neighbouring bodies. Now a current of\nElectricity generates magnetism in a bar of soft iron; and now the\nrotation of a permanent magnet generates currents of Electricity. Here\nwe have a battery in which from the play of chemical affinities an\nelectric current results; and there, in the adjacent cell, we have an\nelectric current effecting chemical decomposition. In the conducting\nwire we witness the transformation of Electricity into heat; while in\nelectric sparks and in the voltaic arc we see light produced. Atomic\narrangement, too, is changed by Electricity: as instance the transfer of\nmatter from pole to pole of a battery; the fractures caused by the\ndisruptive discharge; the formation of crystals under the influence of\nelectric currents. And whether, conversely, Electricity be or be not\ndirectly generated by re-arrangement of the atoms of matter, it is at\nany rate indirectly so generated through the intermediation of\nmagnetism.\n\nHow from Magnetism the other physical forces result, must be next\nbriefly noted\u2014briefly, because in each successive case the illustrations\nbecome in great part the obverse forms of those before given. That\nMagnetism produces motion is the ordinary evidence we have of its\nexistence. In the magneto-electric machine we see a rotating magnet\nevolving electricity. And the electricity so evolved may immediately\nafter exhibit itself as heat, light, or chemical affinity. Faraday\u2019s\ndiscovery of the effect of Magnetism on polarized light, as well as the\ndiscovery that change of magnetic state is accompanied by heat, point to\nfurther like connexions. Lastly, various experiments show that the\nmagnetization of a body alters its internal structure; and that\nconversely, the alteration of its internal structure, as by mechanical\nstrain, alters its magnetic condition.\n\nImprobable as it seemed, it is now proved that from Light also may\nproceed the like variety of agencies. The solar rays change the atomic\narrangements of particular crystals. Certain mixed gases, which do not\notherwise combine, combine in the sunshine. In some compounds Light\nproduces decomposition. Since the inquiries of photographers have drawn\nattention to the subject, it has been shown that \u201ca vast number of\nsubstances, both elementary and compound, are notably affected by this\nagent, even those apparently the most unalterable in character, such as\nmetals.\u201d And when a daguerreotype plate is connected with a proper\napparatus \u201cwe get chemical action on the plate, electricity circulating\nthrough the wires, magnetism in the coil, heat in the helix, and motion\nin the needles.\u201d\n\nThe genesis of all other modes of force from Chemical Action, scarcely\nneeds pointing out. The ordinary accompaniment of chemical combination\nis heat; and when the affinities are intense, light also is, under fit\nconditions, produced. Chemical changes involving alteration of bulk,\ncause motion, both in the combining elements and in adjacent masses of\nmatter: witness the propulsion of a bullet by the explosion of\ngunpowder. In the galvanic battery we see electricity resulting from\nchemical composition and decomposition. While through the medium of this\nelectricity, Chemical Action produces magnetism.\n\nThese facts, the larger part of which are culled from Mr. Grove\u2019s work\non \u201cThe Correlation of Physical Forces,\u201d show us that each force is\ntransformable, directly or indirectly, into the others. In every change\nForce undergoes metamorphosis; and from the new form or forms it\nassumes, may subsequently result either the previous one or any of the\nrest, in endless variety of order and combination. It is further\nbecoming manifest that the physical forces stand not simply in\nqualitative correlations with each other, but also in quantitative\ncorrelations. Besides proving that one mode of force may be transformed\ninto another mode, experiments illustrate the truth that from a definite\namount of one, definite amounts of others always arise. Ordinarily it is\nindeed difficult to show this; since it mostly happens that the\ntransformation of any force is not into some one of the rest but into\nseveral of them: the proportions being determined by the ever-varying\nconditions. But in certain cases, positive results have been reached.\nMr. Joule has ascertained that the fall of 772 lbs. through one foot,\nwill raise the temperature of a pound of water one degree of Fahrenheit.\nThe investigations of Dulong, Petit and Neumann, have proved a relation\nin amount between the affinities of combining bodies and the heat\nevolved during their combination. Between chemical action and voltaic\nelectricity, a quantitative connexion has also been established:\nFaraday\u2019s experiments implying that a specific measure of electricity is\ndisengaged by a given measure of chemical action. The well-determined\nrelations between the quantities of heat generated and water turned into\nsteam, or still better the known expansion produced in steam by each\nadditional degree of heat, may be cited in further evidence. Whence it\nis no longer doubted that among the several forms which force assumes,\nthe quantitative relations are fixed. The conclusion tacitly agreed on\nby physicists, is, not only that the physical forces undergo\nmetamorphoses, but that a certain amount of each is the constant\nequivalent of certain amounts of the others.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 78. Throughout Evolution under all its phases, this truth of course\ninvariably holds. Every successive change or group of changes forming\npart of it, is of necessity limited by the conditions thus implied. The\nforces which any step in Evolution exhibits, must be affiliable on the\nlike or unlike forces previously existing; while from the forces so\ngenerated must thereafter be derived others more or less transformed.\nAnd besides recognizing the forces at any time existing, as necessarily\nlinked with those preceding and succeeding them, we must also recognize\nthe amounts of these forces successively manifested as determinate,\u2014as\nnecessarily producing such and such quantities of results, and as\nnecessarily limited to those quantities.\n\nInvolved as are the phenomena of Evolution, it is not to be expected\nthat a _definite_ quantitative relation can in each case, or indeed in\nany case, be shown between the forces expended in successive phases. We\nhave not adequate data for this; and probably shall never have them. The\nantecedents of the simpler forms of Evolution, belong to a remote past\nrespecting which we can have nothing but inferential knowledge; while\nthe antecedents of the only kind of Evolution which is traceable from\nbeginning to end (namely, that of individual organisms) are too complex\nto be dealt with by exact methods. Hence we cannot hope to establish\n_equivalence_ among the successive manifestations of force which each\norder of Evolution affords. The most we can hope is to establish a\nqualitative correlation that is indefinitely quantitative\u2014quantitative\nin so far as involving something like a due proportion between causes\nand effects. If this can be done, however, some progress will be made\ntowards the solution of our problem. Though it may be beyond our power\nto show a measurable relation between the force or group of forces which\nany phase of Evolution displays, and the force or group of forces\nimmediately succeeding it; yet if we can show that there always are\nantecedent forces, and that the effects they produce always become the\nantecedents of further ones\u2014if while unable to calculate how much of\neach change will be produced, we can prove that a change of that kind\nwas necessitated\u2014if we can discern even the vaguest correspondence\nbetween the amount of such change and the amount of the pre-existing\nforce; we shall advance a step towards interpreting the transformation\nof the simple into the complex.\n\nWith the view of attempting this, let us now reconsider the different\ntypes of Evolution awhile since delineated: taking them in the same\norder as before.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 79. On contemplating our Solar System the first fact which strikes us,\nis, that all its members are in motion; and that their motion is of a\ntwo-fold, or rather of a three-fold, kind. Each planet and satellite has\na movement of rotation and a movement of translation; besides the\nmovement through space which all have in common with their rotating\nprimary. Whence this unceasing change of place?\n\nThe hypothesis of Evolution supplies us with an answer. Impossible as it\nis to assign a reason for the pre-existence of matter in the diffused\nform supposed; yet assuming its pre-existence in that form, we have in\nthe gravitation of its parts a cause of motion adequate to the results.\nSo far too as the evidence carries us, we can perceive some quantitative\nrelation between the motions produced, and the gravitative forces\nexpended in producing them. The planets formed from that matter which\nhas travelled the shortest distance towards the common centre of\ngravity, have the smallest velocities: the uniform law being that in\nadvancing from the outermost to the innermost planets, the rate of\norbital motion progressively increases. It may indeed be remarked that\nthis is explicable on the teleological hypothesis; since it is a\ncondition to equilibrium. But without dwelling on the fact that this is\nbeside the question, it will suffice to point out that the like cannot\nbe said of the planetary rotations. No such final cause can be assigned\nfor the rapid axial movement of Jupiter and Saturn, or the slow axial\nmovement of Mercury. But if in pursuance of the doctrine of correlation\nwe look for the antecedents of these gyrations which all planets\nexhibit, the theory of Evolution furnishes us with equivalent ones; and\nones which bear manifest quantitative relations to the motions\ndisplayed. For the planets that turn on their axes with extreme\nrapidity, are those having great masses and large orbits\u2014those, that is,\nof which the once diffused elements moved to their centres of gravity\nthrough immense spaces, and so acquired high velocities. While,\nconversely, there has resulted the smallest axial movement where the\norbit and the mass are both the smallest.\n\n\u201cBut what,\u201d it may be asked, \u201chas in such case become of all that motion\nwhich brought about the aggregation of this diffused matter into solid\nbodies?\u201d The rotation of each body can be but a residuary result of\nconcentration\u2014a result due to the imperfect balancing of gravitative\nmovements from opposite points towards the common centre. Such\ngravitative movements from opposite points must in great measure destroy\neach other. What then has become of these mutually-destroyed motions?\nThe answer which the doctrine of correlation suggests is\u2014they must have\nbeen radiated in the form of heat and light. And this answer the\nevidence, so far as it goes, confirms. Apart from any speculation\nrespecting the genesis of the solar system, the inquiries of geologists\nlead to the conclusion that the heat of the Earth\u2019s still molten nucleus\nis but a remnant of the heat which once made molten the entire Earth.\nThe mountainous surfaces of the Moon and of Venus (which alone are near\nenough to be scrutinized), indicating, as they do, crusts that have,\nlike our own, been corrugated by contraction, imply that these bodies\ntoo have undergone refrigeration\u2014imply in each of them a primitive heat,\nsuch as the hypothesis necessitates. Lastly, we have in the Sun a\nstill-continued production of this heat and light, which must result\nfrom the arrest of diffused matter moving towards a common centre of\ngravity. Here also, as before, a quantitative relation is\ntraceable. Among the bodies which make up the Solar System, those\ncontaining comparatively small amounts of matter whose centripetal\nmotion has been destroyed, have already lost nearly all the produced\nheat: a result which their relatively larger surfaces have facilitated.\nBut the Sun, a thousand times as great in mass as the largest planet,\nand having therefore to give off an enormously greater quantity of heat\nand light due to arrest of moving matter, is still radiating with great\nintensity.\n\nThus we see that when, in pursuance of the doctrine of correlation, we\nask whence come the forces which our Solar System displays, the\nhypothesis of Evolution gives us a proximate explanation. If the Solar\nSystem once existed in a state of indefinite, incoherent homogeneity,\nand has progressed to its present state of definite, coherent\nheterogeneity; then the Motion, Heat, and Light now exhibited by its\nmembers, are interpretable as the correlatives of pre-existing forces;\nand between them and their antecedents we may discern relations that are\nnot only qualitative, but also rudely quantitative. How matter came to\nexist under the form assumed, is a mystery which we must regard as\nultimate. But grant such a previous form of existence, and the\nhypothesis of Evolution interpreted by the laws of correlation, explains\nfor us the forces as we now see them.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 80. If we inquire the origin of those forces which have wrought the\nsurface of our planet into its present shape, we find them traceable to\nthe same primordial source as that just assigned. Assuming the solar\nsystem to have been evolved, then geologic changes are either direct or\nindirect results of the unexpended heat caused by nebular condensation.\nThese changes are commonly divided into igneous and aqueous:\u2014heads under\nwhich we may most conveniently consider them.\n\nAll those periodic disturbances which we call earthquakes, all those\nelevations and subsidences which they severally produce, all those\naccumulated effects of many such elevations and subsidences exhibited in\nocean-basins, islands, continents, table-lands, mountain-chains, and all\nthose formations which are distinguished as volcanic, geologists now\nregard as modifications of the Earth\u2019s crust produced by the\nstill-molten matter occupying its interior. However untenable may be the\ndetails of M. Elie de Beaumont\u2019s theory, there is good reason to accept\nthe general proposition that the disruptions and variations of level\nwhich take place at intervals on the terrestrial surface, are due to the\nprogressive collapse of the Earth\u2019s solid envelope upon its cooling and\ncontracting nucleus. Even supposing that volcanic eruptions, extrusions\nof igneous rock, and upheaved mountain-chains, could be otherwise\nsatisfactorily accounted for, which they cannot; it would be impossible\notherwise to account for those wide-spread elevations and depressions\nwhence continents and oceans result. The conclusion to be drawn is,\nthen, that the forces displayed in these so-called igneous changes, are\nderived positively or negatively from the unexpended heat of the Earth\u2019s\ninterior. Such phenomena as the fusion or agglutination of sedimentary\ndeposits, the warming of springs, the sublimation of metals into the\nfissures where we find them as ores, may be regarded as positive results\nof this residuary heat; while fractures of strata and alterations of\nlevel are its negative results, since they ensue on its escape. The\noriginal cause of all these effects is still, however, as it has been\nfrom the first, the gravitating movement of the Earth\u2019s matter towards\nthe Earth\u2019s centre; seeing that to this is due both the internal heat\nitself and the collapse which takes place as it is radiated into space.\n\nWhen we inquire under what forms previously existed the force which\nworks out the geological changes classed as aqueous, the answer is less\nobvious. The effects of rain, of rivers, of winds, of waves, of marine\ncurrents, do not manifestly proceed from one general source. Analysis,\nnevertheless, proves to us that they have a common genesis. If we\nask,\u2014Whence comes the power of the river-current, bearing sediment down\nto the sea? the reply is,\u2014The gravitation of water throughout the tract\nwhich this river drains. If we ask,\u2014How came the water to be dispersed\nover this tract? the reply is,\u2014It fell in the shape of rain. If we\nask,\u2014How came the rain to be in that position whence it fell? the reply\nis,\u2014The vapour from which it was condensed was drifted there by the\nwinds. If we ask,\u2014How came this vapour to be at that elevation? the\nreply is,\u2014It was raised by evaporation. And if we ask,\u2014What force thus\nraised it? the reply is,\u2014The sun\u2019s heat. Just that amount of gravitative\nforce which the sun\u2019s heat overcame in raising the atoms of water, is\ngiven out again in the fall of those atoms to the same level. Hence the\ndenudations effected by rain and rivers, during the descent of this\ncondensed vapour to the level of the sea, are indirectly due to the\nsun\u2019s heat. Similarly with the winds that transport the vapours hither\nand thither. Consequent as atmospheric currents are on differences of\ntemperature (either general, as between the equatorial and polar\nregions, or special as between tracts of the Earth\u2019s surface of unlike\nphysical characters) all such currents are due to that source from which\nthe varying quantities of heat proceed. And if the winds thus originate,\nso too do the waves raised by them on the sea\u2019s surface. Whence it\nfollows that whatever changes waves produce\u2014the wearing away of shores,\nthe breaking down of rocks into shingle, sand, and mud\u2014are also\ntraceable to the solar rays as their primary cause. The same may be said\nof ocean-currents. Generated as the larger ones are by the excess of\nheat which the ocean in tropical climates continually acquires from the\nSun; and generated as the smaller ones are by minor local differences in\nthe quantities of solar heat absorbed; it follows that the distribution\nof sediment and other geological processes which these marine currents\neffect, are affiliable upon the force which the sun radiates. The only\naqueous agency otherwise originating is that of the tides\u2014an agency\nwhich, equally with the others, is traceable to unexpended astronomical\nmotion. But making allowance for the changes which this works, we reach\nthe conclusion that the slow wearing down of continents and gradual\nfilling up of seas, by rain, rivers, winds, waves, and ocean-streams,\nare the indirect effects of solar heat.\n\nThus the implication forced on us by the doctrine of correlation, that\nthe forces which have moulded and re-moulded the Earth\u2019s crust must have\npre-existed under some other shape, is quite in conformity with the\ntheory of Evolution; since this pre-supposes certain forces that are\nboth adequate to the results, and cannot be expended without producing\nthe results. We see that while the geological changes classed as\nigneous, result from the still-progressing motion of the Earth\u2019s\nsubstance to its centre of gravity; the antagonistic changes classed as\naqueous, result from the still-progressing motion of the Sun\u2019s substance\ntowards its centre of gravity\u2014a motion which, transformed into heat and\nradiated to us, is here re-transformed, directly into motions of the\ngaseous and liquid matters on the Earth\u2019s surface, and indirectly into\nmotions of the solid matters.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 81. That the forces exhibited in vital actions, vegetal and animal,\nare similarly derived, is so obvious a deduction from the facts of\norganic chemistry, that it will meet with ready acceptance from readers\nacquainted with these facts. Let us note first the physiological\ngeneralizations; and then the generalizations which they necessitate.\n\nPlant-life is all directly or indirectly dependant on the heat and light\nof the sun\u2014directly dependant in the immense majority of plants, and\nindirectly dependant in plants which, as the fungi, flourish in the\ndark: since these, growing as they do at the expense of decaying organic\nmatter, mediately draw their forces from the same original source. Each\nplant owes the carbon and hydrogen of which it mainly consists, to the\ncarbonic acid and water contained in the surrounding air and earth. The\ncarbonic acid and water must, however, be decomposed before their carbon\nand hydrogen can be assimilated. To overcome the powerful affinities\nwhich hold their elements together, requires the expenditure of force;\nand this force is supplied by the Sun. In what manner the decomposition\nis effected we do not know. But we know that when, under fit conditions,\nplants are exposed to the Sun\u2019s rays, they give off oxygen and\naccumulate carbon and hydrogen. In darkness this process ceases. It\nceases too when the quantities of light and heat received are greatly\nreduced, as in winter. Conversely, it is active when the light and heat\nare great, as in summer. And the like relation is seen in the fact that\nwhile plant-life is luxuriant in the tropics, it diminishes in temperate\nregions, and disappears as we approach the poles. Thus the irresistible\ninference is, that the forces by which plants abstract the materials of\ntheir tissues from surrounding inorganic compounds\u2014the forces by which\nthey grow and carry on their functions, are forces that previously\nexisted as solar radiations.\n\nThat animal life is immediately or mediately dependant on vegetal life\nis a familiar truth; and that, in the main, the processes of animal life\nare opposite to those of vegetal life is a truth long current among men\nof science. Chemically considered, vegetal life is chiefly a process of\nde-oxidation, and animal life chiefly a process of oxidation: chiefly,\nwe must say, because in so far as plants are expenders of force for the\npurposes of organization, they are oxidizers (as is shown by the\nexhalation of carbonic acid during the night); and animals, in some of\ntheir minor processes, are probably de-oxidizers. But with this\nqualification, the general truth is that while the plant, decomposing\ncarbonic acid and water and liberating oxygen, builds up the detained\ncarbon and hydrogen (along with a little nitrogen and small quantities\nof other elements elsewhere obtained) into branches, leaves, and seeds;\nthe animal, consuming these branches, leaves, and seeds, and absorbing\noxygen, recomposes carbonic acid and water, together with certain\nnitrogenous compounds in minor amounts. And while the decomposition\neffected by the plant, is at the expense of certain forces emanating\nfrom the sun, which are employed in overcoming the affinities of carbon\nand hydrogen for the oxygen united with them; the recomposition effected\nby the animal, is at the profit of these forces, which are liberated\nduring the combination of such elements. Thus the movements, internal\nand external, of the animal, are re-appearances in new forms of a power\nabsorbed by the plant under the shape of light and heat. Just as, in the\nmanner above explained, the solar forces expended in raising vapour from\nthe sea\u2019s surface, are given out again in the fall of rain and rivers to\nthe same level, and in the accompanying transfer of solid matters; so,\nthe solar forces that in the plant raised certain chemical elements to a\ncondition of unstable equilibrium, are given out again in the actions of\nthe animal during the fall of these elements to a condition of stable\nequilibrium.\n\nBesides thus tracing a qualitative correlation between these two great\norders of organic activity, as well as between both of them and\ninorganic agencies, we may rudely trace a quantitative correlation.\nWhere vegetal life is abundant, we usually find abundant animal life;\nand as we advance from torrid to temperate and frigid climates, the two\ndecrease together. Speaking generally, the animals of each class reach a\nlarger size in regions where vegetation is abundant, than in those where\nit is sparse. And further, there is a tolerably apparent connexion\nbetween the quantity of energy which each species of animal expends, and\nthe quantity of force which the nutriment it absorbs gives out during\noxidation.\n\nCertain phenomena of development in both plants and animals, illustrate\nstill more directly the ultimate truth enunciated. Pursuing the\nsuggestion made by Mr. Grove, in the first edition of his work on the\n\u201cCorrelation of the Physical Forces,\u201d that a connexion probably exists\nbetween the forces classed as vital and those classed as physical, Dr.\nCarpenter has pointed out that such a connexion is clearly exhibited\nduring incubation. The transformation of the unorganized contents of an\negg into the organized chick, is altogether a question of heat: withhold\nheat and the process does not commence; supply heat and it goes on while\nthe temperature is maintained, but ceases when the egg is allowed to\ncool. The developmental changes can be completed only by keeping the\ntemperature with tolerable constancy at a definite height for a definite\ntime; that is\u2014only by supplying a definite quantity of heat. In the\nmetamorphoses of insects we may discern parallel facts. Experiments show\nnot only that the hatching of their eggs is determined by temperature,\nbut also that the evolution of the pupa into the imago is similarly\ndetermined; and may be immensely accelerated or retarded according as\nheat is artificially supplied or withheld. It will suffice just to add\nthat the germination of plants presents like relations of cause and\neffect\u2014relations so similar that detail is superfluous.\n\nThus then the various changes exhibited to us by the organic creation,\nwhether considered as a whole, or in its two great divisions, or in its\nindividual members, conform, so far as we can ascertain, to the law of\ncorrelation. Where, as in the transformation of an egg into a chick, we\ncan investigate the phenomena apart from all complications, we find that\nthe re-arrangement of parts which constitutes evolution, involves\nexpenditure of a pre-existing force. Where it is not, as in the egg or\nthe chrysalis, merely the change of a fixed quantity of matter into a\nnew shape, but where, as in the growing plant or animal, we have an\nincorporation of matter existing outside, there is still a pre-existing\nexternal force at the cost of which this incorporation is effected. And\nwhere, as in the higher division of organisms, there remain over and\nabove the forces expended in organization, certain surplus forces\nexpended in movement, these too are indirectly derived from this same\npre-existing external force.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 82. Even after all that has been said in the foregoing part of this\nwork, many will be alarmed by the assertion, that the forces which we\ndistinguish as mental, come within the same generalization. Yet there is\nno alternative but to make this assertion: the facts which justify, or\nrather which necessitate it, being abundant and conspicuous. They fall\ninto the following groups.\n\nAll impressions from moment to moment made on our organs of sense, stand\nin direct correlation with physical forces existing externally. The\nmodes of consciousness called pressure, motion, sound, light, heat, are\neffects produced in us by agencies which, as otherwise expended, crush\nor fracture pieces of matter, generate vibrations in surrounding\nobjects, cause chemical combinations, and reduce substances from a solid\nto a liquid form. Hence if we regard the changes of relative position,\nof aggregation, or of chemical state, thus arising, as being transformed\nmanifestations of the agencies from which they arise; so must we regard\nthe sensations which such agencies produce in us, as new forms of the\nforces producing them. Any hesitation to admit that, between the\nphysical forces and the sensations there exists a correlation like that\nbetween the physical forces themselves, must disappear on remembering\nhow the one correlation, like the other, is not qualitative only but\nquantitative. Masses of matter which, by scales or dynamometer, are\nshown to differ greatly in weight, differ as greatly in the feelings of\npressure they produce on our bodies. In arresting moving objects, the\nstrains we are conscious of are proportionate to the momenta of such\nobjects as otherwise measured. Under like conditions the impressions of\nsounds given to us by vibrating strings, bells, or columns of air, are\nfound to vary in strength with the amount of force applied. Fluids or\nsolids proved to be markedly contrasted in temperature by the different\ndegrees of expansion they produce in the mercurial column, produce in us\ncorrespondingly different degrees of the sensation of heat. And\nsimilarly unlike intensities in our impressions of light, answer to\nunlike effects as measured by photometers.\n\nBesides the correlation and equivalence between external physical\nforces, and the mental forces generated by them in us under the form of\nsensations, there is a correlation and equivalence between sensations\nand those physical forces which, in the shape of bodily actions, result\nfrom them. The feelings we distinguish as light, heat, sound, odour,\ntaste, pressure, &.c, do not die away without immediate results; but are\ninvariably followed by other manifestations of force. In addition to the\nexcitements of secreting organs, that are in some cases traceable, there\narises a contraction of the involuntary muscles, or of the voluntary\nmuscles, or of both. Sensations increase the action of the\nheart\u2014slightly when they are slight; markedly when they are marked; and\nrecent physiological inquiries imply not only that contraction of the\nheart is excited by every sensation, but also that the muscular fibres\nthroughout the whole, vascular system, are at the same time more or less\ncontracted. The respiratory muscles, too, are stimulated into greater\nactivity by sensations. The rate of breathing is visibly and audibly\naugmented both by pleasurable and painful impressions on the nerves,\nwhen these reach any intensity. It has even of late been shown that\ninspiration becomes more frequent on transition from darkness into\nsunshine,\u2014a result probably due to the increased amount of direct and\nindirect nervous stimulation involved. When the quantity of sensation is\ngreat, it generates contractions of the voluntary muscles, as well as of\nthe involuntary ones. Unusual excitement of the nerves of touch, as by\ntickling, is followed by almost incontrollable movements of the limbs.\nViolent pains cause violent struggles. The start that succeeds a loud\nsound, the wry face produced by the taste of anything extremely\ndisagreeable, the jerk with which the hand or foot is snatched out of\nwater that is very hot, are instances of the transformation of feeling:\ninto motion; and in these cases, as in all others, it is manifest that\nthe quantity of bodily action is proportionate to the quantity of\nsensation. Even where from pride there is a suppression of the screams\nand groans expressive of great pain (also indirect results of muscular\ncontraction), we may still see in the clenching of the hands, the\nknitting of the brows, and the setting of the teeth, that the bodily\nactions developed are as great, though less obtrusive in their results.\n If we take emotions instead of sensations, we find the correlation\nand equivalence equally manifest. Not only are the modes of\nconsciousness directly produced in us by physical forces,\nre-transformable into physical forces under the form of muscular motions\nand the changes they initiate; but the like is true of those modes of\nconsciousness which are not directly produced in us by the physical\nforces. Emotions of moderate intensity, like sensations of moderate\nintensity, generate little beyond excitement of the heart and vascular\nsystem, joined sometimes with increased action of glandular organs. But\nas the emotions rise in strength, the muscles of the face, body, and\nlimbs, begin to move. Of examples may be mentioned the frowns, dilated\nnostrils, and stampings of anger; the contracted brows, and wrung hands,\nof grief; the smiles and leaps of joy; and the frantic struggles of\nterror or despair. Passing over certain apparent, but only apparent,\nexceptions, we see that whatever be the kind of emotion, there is a\nmanifest relation between its amount, and the amount of muscular action\ninduced: alike from the erect carriage and elastic step of exhilaration,\nup to the dancings of immense delight, and from the fidgetiness of\nimpatience up to the almost convulsive movements accompanying great\nmental agony. To these several orders of evidence must be joined\nthe further one, that between our feelings and those voluntary motions\ninto which they are transformed, there comes the sensation of muscular\ntension, standing in manifest correlation with both\u2014a correlation that\nis distinctly quantitative: the sense of strain varying, other things\nequal, directly as the quantity of momentum generated.\n\n\u201cBut how,\u201d it may be asked, \u201ccan we interpret by the law of correlation\nthe genesis of those thoughts and feelings which, instead of following\nexternal stimuli, arise spontaneously? Between the indignation caused by\nan insult, and the loud sounds or violent acts that follow, the alleged\nconnexion may hold; but whence come the crowd of ideas and the mass of\nfeelings that expend themselves in these demonstrations? They are\nclearly not equivalents of the sensations produced by the words on the\nears; for the same words otherwise arranged, would not have caused them.\nThe thing said bears to the mental action it excites, much the same\nrelation that the pulling of a trigger bears to the subsequent\nexplosion\u2014does not produce the power, but merely liberates it. Whence\nthen arises this immense amount of nervous energy which a whisper or a\nglance may call forth?\u201d The reply is, that the immediate\ncorrelates of these and other such modes of consciousness, are not to be\nfound in the agencies acting on us externally, but in certain internal\nagencies. The forces called vital, which we have seen to be correlates\nof the forces called physical, are the immediate sources of these\nthoughts and feelings; and are expended in producing them. The proofs of\nthis are various. Here are some of them. It is a conspicuous fact\nthat mental action is contingent on the presence of a certain nervous\napparatus; and that, greatly obscured as it is by numerous and involved\nconditions, a general relation may be traced between the size of this\napparatus and the quantity of mental action as measured by its results.\nFurther, this apparatus has a particular chemical constitution on which\nits activity depends; and there is one element in it between the amount\nof which and the amount of function performed, there is an ascertained\nconnexion: the proportion of phosphorus present in the brain being the\nsmallest in infancy, old age and idiotcy, and the greatest during the\nprime of life. Note next, that the evolution of thought and\nemotion varies, other things equal, with the supply of blood to the\nbrain. On the one hand, a cessation of the cerebral circulation, from\narrest of the heart\u2019s action, immediately entails unconsciousness. On\nthe other hand, excess of cerebral circulation (unless it is such as to\ncause undue pressure) results in an excitement rising finally to\ndelirium. Not the quantity only, but also the condition of the\nblood passing through the nervous system, influences the mental\nmanifestations. The arterial currents must be duly aerated, to produce\nthe normal amount of cerebration. At the one extreme, we find that if\nthe blood is not allowed to exchange its carbonic acid for oxygen, there\nresults asphyxia, with its accompanying stoppage of ideas and feelings.\nWhile at the other extreme, we find that by the inspiration of nitrous\noxide, there is produced an excessive, and indeed irrepressible, nervous\nactivity. Besides the connexion between the development of the\nmental forces and the presence of sufficient oxygen in the cerebral\narteries, there is a kindred connexion between the development of the\nmental forces and the presence in the cerebral arteries of certain other\nelements. There must be supplied special materials for the nutrition of\nthe nervous centres, as well as for their oxidation. And how what we may\ncall the quantity of consciousness, is, other things equal, determined\nby the constituents of the blood, is unmistakably seen in the exaltation\nthat follows when certain chemical compounds, as alcohol and the\nvegeto-alkalies, are added to it. The gentle exhilaration which tea and\ncoffee create, is familiar to all; and though the gorgeous imaginations\nand intense feelings of happiness produced by opium and hashish, have\nbeen experienced by few, (in this country at least,) the testimony of\nthose who have experienced them is sufficiently conclusive. Yet\nanother proof that the genesis of the mental energies is immediately\ndependent on chemical change, is afforded by the fact, that the effete\nproducts separated from the blood by the kidneys, vary in character with\nthe amount of cerebral action. Excessive activity of mind is habitually\naccompanied by the excretion of an unusual quantity of the alkaline\nphosphates. Conditions of abnormal nervous excitement bring on analogous\neffects. And the \u201cpeculiar odour of the insane,\u201d implying as it does\nmorbid products in the perspiration, shows a connexion between insanity\nand a special composition of the circulating fluids\u2014a composition which,\nwhether regarded as cause or consequence, equally implies correlation of\nthe mental and the physical forces. Lastly we have to note that\nthis correlation too, is, so far as we can trace it, quantitative.\nProvided the conditions to nervous action are not infringed on, and the\nconcomitants are the same, there is a tolerably constant ratio between\nthe amounts of the antecedents and consequents. Within the implied\nlimits, nervous stimulants and an\u00e6sthetics produce effects on the\nthoughts and feelings, proportionate to the quantities administered. And\nconversely, where the thoughts and feelings form the initial term of the\nrelation, the degree of reaction on the bodily energies is great, in\nproportion as they are great: reaching in extreme cases a total\nprostration of physique.\n\nVarious classes of facts thus unite to prove that the law of\nmetamorphosis, which holds among the physical forces, holds equally\nbetween them and the mental forces. Those modes of the Unknowable which\nwe call motion, heat, light, chemical affinity, &c., are alike\ntransformable into each other, and into those modes of the Unknowable\nwhich we distinguish as sensation, emotion, thought: these, in their\nturns, being directly or indirectly re-transformable into the original\nshapes. That no idea or feeling arises, save as a result of some\nphysical force expended in producing it, is fast becoming a common place\nof science; and whoever duly weighs the evidence will see, that nothing\nbut an overwhelming bias in favour of a pre-conceived theory, can\nexplain its non-acceptance. How this metamorphosis takes place\u2014how\na force existing as motion, heat, or light, can become a mode of\nconsciousness\u2014how it is possible for aerial vibrations to generate the\nsensation we call sound, or for the forces liberated by chemical changes\nin the brain to give rise to emotion\u2014these are mysteries which it is\nimpossible to fathom. But they are not profounder mysteries than the\ntransformations of the physical forces into each other. They are not\nmore completely beyond our comprehension than the natures of Mind and\nMatter. They have simply the same insolubility as all other ultimate\nquestions. We can learn nothing more than that here is one of the\nuniformities in the order of phenomena.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 83. Of course if the law of correlation and equivalence holds of the\nforces we class as vital and mental, it must hold also of those which we\nclass as social. Whatever takes place in a society is due to organic or\ninorganic agencies, or to a combination of the two\u2014results either from\nthe undirected physical forces around, from these physical forces as\ndirected by men, or from the forces of the men themselves. No change can\noccur in its organization, its modes of activity, or the effects it\nproduces on the face of the Earth, but what proceeds, mediately or\nimmediately, from these. Let us consider first the correlation between\nthe phenomena which societies display, and the vital phenomena.\n\nSocial power and life varies, other things equal, with the population.\nThough different races, differing widely in their fitness for\ncombination, show us that the forces manifested in a society are not\nnecessarily proportionate to the number of people; yet we see that under\ngiven conditions, the forces manifested are confined within the limits\nwhich the number of people imposes. A small society, no matter how\nsuperior the character of its members, cannot exhibit the same quantity\nof social action as a large one. The production and distribution of\ncommodities must be on a comparatively small scale. A multitudinous\npress, a prolific literature, or a massive political agitation, is not\npossible. And there can be but a small total of results in the shape of\nart-products and scientific discoveries. The correlation of the\nsocial with the physical forces through the intermediation of the vital\nones, is, however, most clearly shown in the different amounts of\nactivity displayed by the same society according as its members are\nsupplied with different amounts of force from the external world. In the\neffects of good and bad harvests, we yearly see this relation\nillustrated. A greatly deficient yield of wheat is soon followed by a\ndiminution of business. Factories are worked half-time, or close\nentirely; railway traffic falls; retailers find their sales much\nlessened; house-building is almost suspended; and if the scarcity rises\nto famine, a thinning of the population still more diminishes the\nindustrial vivacity. Conversely, an unusually abundant harvest,\noccurring under conditions not otherwise unfavourable, both excites the\nold producing and distributing agencies and sets up new ones. The\nsurplus social energy finds vent in speculative enterprises. Capital\nseeking investment carries out inventions that have been lying\nunutilized. Labour is expended in opening new channels of communication.\nThere is increased encouragement to those who furnish the luxuries of\nlife and minister to the \u00e6sthetic faculties. There are more marriages,\nand a greater rate of increase in population. Thus the social organism\ngrows larger, more complex, and more active. When, as happens with\nmost civilized nations, the whole of the materials for subsistence are\nnot drawn from the area inhabited, but are partly imported, the people\nare still supported by certain harvests elsewhere grown at the expense\nof certain physical forces. Our own cotton-spinners and weavers supply\nthe most conspicuous instance of a section in one nation living, in\ngreat part, on imported commodities, purchased by the labour they expend\non other imported commodities. But though the social activities of\nLancashire are due chiefly to materials not drawn from our own soil,\nthey are none the less evolved from physical forces elsewhere stored up\nin fit forms and then brought here.\n\nIf we ask whence come these physical forces from which, through the\nintermediation of the vital forces, the social forces arise, the reply\nis of course as heretofore\u2014the solar radiations. Based as the life of a\nsociety is on animal and vegetal products; and dependent as these animal\nand vegetal products are on the light and heat of the sun; it follows\nthat the changes going on in societies are effects of forces having a\ncommon origin with those which produce all the other orders of changes\nthat have been analyzed. Not only is the force expended by the horse\nharnessed to the plough, and by the labourer guiding it, derived from\nthe same reservoir as is the force of the falling cataract and the\nroaring hurricane; but to this same reservoir are eventually traceable\nthose subtler and more complex manifestations of force which humanity,\nas socially embodied, evolves. The assertion is a startling one, and by\nmany will be thought ludicrous; but it is an unavoidable deduction which\ncannot here be passed over.\n\nOf the physical forces that are directly transformed into social ones,\nthe like is to be said. Currents of air and water, which before the use\nof steam were the only agencies brought in aid of muscular effort for\nthe performance of industrial processes, are, as we have seen, generated\nby the heat of the sun. And the inanimate power that now, to so vast an\nextent, supplements human labour, is similarly derived. The late George\nStephenson was one of the first to recognize the fact that the force\nimpelling his locomotive, originally emanated from the sun. Step by step\nwe go back\u2014from the motion of the piston to the evaporation of the\nwater; thence to the heat evolved during the oxidation of coal; thence\nto the assimilation of carbon by the plants of whose imbedded remains\ncoal consists; thence to the carbonic acid from which their carbon was\nobtained; and thence to the rays of light that de-oxidized this carbonic\nacid. Solar forces millions of years ago expended on the Earth\u2019s\nvegetation, and since locked up beneath its surface, now smelt the\nmetals required for our machines, turn the lathes by which the machines\nare shaped, work them when put together, and distribute the fabrics they\nproduce. And in so far as economy of labour makes possible the support\nof a larger population; gives a surplus of human power that would else\nbe absorbed in manual occupations; and so facilitates the development of\nhigher kinds of activity; it is clear that these social forces which are\ndirectly correlated with physical forces anciently derived from the sun,\nare only less important than those whose correlates are the vital forces\nrecently derived from it.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 84. Regarded as an induction, the doctrine set forth in this chapter\nwill most likely be met by a demurrer. Many who admit that among\nphysical phenomena at least, the correlation of forces is now\nestablished, will probably say that inquiry has not yet gone far enough\nto enable us to predicate equivalence. And in respect of the forces\nclassed as vital, mental, and social, the evidence assigned, however\nlittle to be explained away, they will consider by no means conclusive\neven of correlation, much less of equivalence.\n\nTo those who think thus, it must now however be pointed out, that the\nuniversal truth above illustrated under its various aspects, is a\nnecessary corollary from the persistence of force. Setting out with the\nproposition that force can neither come into existence, nor cease to\nexist, the several foregoing general conclusions inevitably follow. Each\nmanifestation of force can be interpreted only as the effect of some\nantecedent force: no matter whether it be an inorganic action, an animal\nmovement, a thought, or a feeling. Either this must be conceded, or else\nit must be asserted that our successive states of consciousness are\nself-created. Either mental energies, as well as bodily ones, are\nquantitatively correlated to certain energies expended in their\nproduction, and to certain other energies which they initiate; or else\nnothing must become something and something must become nothing. The\nalternatives are, to deny the persistence of force, or to admit that\nevery physical and psychial change is generated by certain antecedent\nforces, and that from given amounts of such forces neither more nor less\nof such physical and psychial changes can result. And since the\npersistence of force, being a datum of consciousness, cannot be denied,\nits unavoidable corollary must be accepted. This corollary cannot\nindeed be made more certain by accumulating illustrations. The truth as\narrived at deductively, cannot be inductively confirmed. For every one\nof such facts as those above detailed, is established only through the\nindirect assumption of that persistence of force, from which it really\nfollows as a direct consequence. The most exact proof of correlation and\nequivalence which it is possible to reach by experimental inquiry, is\nthat based on measurement of the forces expended and the forces\nproduced. But, as was shown in the last chapter, any such process of\nmeasurement implies the use of some unit of force which is assumed to\nremain constant; and for this assumption there can be no warrant but\nthat it is a corollary from the persistence of force. How then can any\nreasoning based on this corollary, prove the equally direct corollary\nthat when a given quantity of force ceases to exist under one form, an\nequal quantity must come into existence under some other form or forms?\nClearly the _\u00e0 priori_ truth expressed in this last corollary, cannot be\nmore firmly established by any _\u00e0 posteriori_ proofs which the first\ncorollary helps us to.\n\n\u201cWhat then,\u201d it may be asked, \u201cis the use of these investigations by\nwhich the correlation and equivalence of forces is sought to be\nestablished as an inductive truth? Surely it will not be alleged that\nthey are useless. Yet if this correlation cannot be made more certain by\nthem than it is already, does not their uselessness necessarily follow?\u201d\nNo. They are of value as disclosing the many particular implications\nwhich the general truth does not specify. They are of value as teaching\nus how much of one mode of force is the equivalent of so much of another\nmode. They are of value as determining under what conditions each\nmetamorphosis occurs. And they are of value as leading us to inquire in\nwhat shape the remnant of force has escaped, when the apparent results\nare not equivalent to the cause.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER X.\n THE DIRECTION OF MOTION.\n\n\n\u00a7 85. The Absolute Cause of changes, inclusive of those constituting\nEvolution, is not less incomprehensible in respect of the unity or\nduality of its action, than in all other respects. We cannot decide\nbetween the alternative suppositions, that phenomena are due to the\nvariously-conditioned workings of a single force, and that they are due\nto the conflict of two forces. Whether, as some contend, everything is\nexplicable on the hypothesis of universal pressure, whence what we call\ntension results differentially from inequalities of pressure in opposite\ndirections; or whether, as might be with equal propriety contended,\nthings are to be explained on the hypothesis of universal tension, from\nwhich pressure is a differential result; or whether, as most physicists\nhold, pressure and tension everywhere co-exist; are questions which it\nis impossible to settle. Each of these three suppositions makes the\nfacts comprehensible, only by postulating an inconceivability. To assume\na universal pressure, confessedly requires us to assume an infinite\nplenum\u2014an unlimited space full of something which is everywhere pressed\nby something beyond; and this assumption cannot be mentally realized.\nThat universal tension is the immediate agency to which phenomena are\ndue, is an idea open to a parallel and equally fatal objection. And\nhowever verbally intelligible may be the proposition that pressure and\ntension everywhere co-exist, yet we cannot truly represent to ourselves\none ultimate unit of matter as drawing another while resisting it.\n\nNevertheless, this last belief is one which we are compelled to\nentertain. Matter cannot be conceived except as manifesting forces of\nattraction and repulsion. Body is distinguished in our consciousness\nfrom Space, by its opposition to our muscular energies; and this\nopposition we feel under the two-fold form of a cohesion that hinders\nour efforts to rend, and a resistance that hinders our efforts to\ncompress. Without resistance there can be merely empty extension.\nWithout cohesion there can be no resistance. Probably this conception of\nantagonistic forces, is originally derived from the antagonism of our\nflexor and extensor muscles. But be this as it may, we are obliged to\nthink of all objects as made up of parts that attract and repel each\nother; since this is the form of our experience of all objects.\n\nBy a higher abstraction results the conception of attractive and\nrepulsive forces pervading space. We cannot dissociate force from\noccupied extension, or occupied extension from force; because we have\nnever an immediate consciousness of either in the absence of the other.\nNevertheless, we have abundant proof that force is exercised through\nwhat appears to our senses a vacuity. Mentally to represent this\nexercise, we are hence obliged to fill the apparent vacuity with a\nspecies of matter\u2014an etherial medium. The constitution we assign to this\netherial medium, however, like the constitution we assign to solid\nsubstance, is necessarily an abstract of the impressions received from\ntangible bodies. The opposition to pressure which a tangible body offers\nto us, is not shown in one direction only, but in all directions; and so\nlikewise is its tenacity. Suppose countless lines radiating from its\ncentre on every side, and it resists along each of these lines and\ncoheres along each of these lines. Hence the constitution of those\nultimate units through the instrumentality of which phenomena are\ninterpreted. Be they atoms of ponderable matter or molecules of ether,\nthe properties we conceive them to possess are nothing else than these\nperceptible properties idealized. Centres of force attracting and\nrepelling each other in all directions, are simply insensible portions\nof matter having the endowments common to sensible portions of\nmatter\u2014endowments of which we cannot by any mental effort divest them.\nIn brief, they are the invariable elements of the conception of matter,\nabstracted from its variable elements\u2014size, form, quality, &c. And so to\ninterpret manifestations of force which cannot be tactually experienced,\nwe use the terms of thought supplied by our tactual experiences; and\nthis for the sufficient reason that we must use these or none.\n\nAfter all that has been before shown, and after the hint given above, it\nneeds scarcely be said that these universally co-existent forces of\nattraction and repulsion, must not be taken as realities, but as our\nsymbols of the reality. They are the forms under which the workings of\nthe Unknowable are cognizable by us\u2014modes of the Unconditioned as\npresented under the conditions of our consciousness. But while knowing\nthat the ideas thus generated in us are not absolutely true, we may\nunreservedly surrender ourselves to them as relatively true; and may\nproceed to evolve a series of deductions having a like relative truth.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 86. From universally co-existent forces of attraction and repulsion,\nthere result certain laws of direction of all movement. Where attractive\nforces alone are concerned, or rather are alone appreciable, movement\ntakes place in the direction of their resultant; which may, in a sense,\nbe called the line of greatest traction. Where repulsive forces alone\nare concerned, or rather are alone appreciable, movement takes place\nalong their resultant; which is usually known as the line of least\nresistance. And where both attractive and repulsive forces are\nconcerned, or are appreciable, movement takes place along the resultant\nof all the tractions and resistances. Strictly speaking, this last is\nthe sole law; since, by the hypothesis, both forces are everywhere in\naction. But very frequently the one kind of force is so immensely in\nexcess that the effect of the other kind may be left out of\nconsideration. Practically we may say that a body falling to the Earth,\nfollows the line of greatest traction; since, though the resistance of\nthe air must, if the body be irregular, cause some divergence from this\nline, (quite perceptible with feathers and leaves,) yet ordinarily the\ndivergence is so slight that we may omit it. In the same manner, though\nthe course taken by the steam from an exploding boiler, differs somewhat\nfrom that which it would take were gravitation out of the question; yet,\nas gravitation affects its course infinitesimally, we are justified in\nasserting that the escaping steam follows the line of least resistance.\nMotion then, we may say, always follows the line of greatest traction,\nor the line of least resistance, or the resultant of the two: bearing in\nmind that though the last is alone strictly true, the others are in many\ncases sufficiently near the truth for practical purposes.\n\nMovement set up in any direction is itself a cause of further movement\nin that direction, since it is the embodiment of a surplus force in that\ndirection. This holds equally with the transit of matter through space,\nthe transit of matter through matter, and the transit through matter of\nany kind of vibration. In the case of matter moving through space, this\nprinciple is expressed in the law of inertia\u2014a law on which the\ncalculations of physical astronomy are wholly based. In the case of\nmatter moving through matter, we trace the same truth under the familiar\nexperience that any breach made by one solid through another, or any\nchannel formed by a fluid through a solid, becomes a route along which,\nother things equal, subsequent movements of like nature take place. And\nin the case of motion passing through matter under the form of an\nimpulse communicated from part to part, the facts of magnetization go to\nshow that the establishment of undulations along certain lines,\ndetermines their continuance along those lines.\n\nIt further follows from the conditions, that the direction of movement\ncan rarely if ever be perfectly straight. For matter in motion to pursue\ncontinuously the exact line in which it sets out, the forces of\nattraction and repulsion must be symmetrically disposed around its path;\nand the chances against this are infinitely great. The impossibility of\nmaking an absolutely true edge to a bar of metal\u2014the fact that all which\ncan be done by the best mechanical appliances, is to reduce the\nirregularities of such an edge to amounts that cannot be perceived\nwithout magnifiers\u2014sufficiently exemplifies how, in consequence of the\nunsymmetrical distribution of forces around the line of movement, the\nmovement is rendered more or less indirect. It may be well to add\nthat in proportion as the forces at work are numerous and varied, the\ncurve a moving body describes is necessarily complex: witness the\ncontrast between the flight of an arrow and the gyrations of a stick\ntossed about by breakers.\n\nWe have now to trace these laws of direction of movement throughout the\nprocess of Evolution, under its various forms. We have to note how every\nchange in the arrangement of parts, takes place along the line of\ngreatest traction, of least resistance, or of their resultant; how the\nsetting up of motion along a certain line, becomes a cause of its\ncontinuance along that line; how, nevertheless, change of relations to\nexternal forces, always renders this line indirect; and how the degree\nof its indirectness increases with every addition to the number of\ninfluences at work.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 87. If we assume the first stage in nebular condensation to be the\nprecipitation into flocculi of denser matter previously diffused through\na rarer medium, (a supposition both physically justified, and in harmony\nwith certain astronomical observations,) we shall find that nebular\nmotion is interpretable in pursuance of the above general laws. Each\nportion of such vapour-like matter must begin to move towards the common\ncentre of gravity. The tractive forces which would of themselves carry\nit in a straight line to the centre of gravity, are opposed by the\nresistant forces of the medium through which it is drawn. The direction\nof movement must be the resultant of these\u2014a resultant which, in\nconsequence of the unsymmetrical form of the flocculus, must be a curve\ndirected, not to the centre of gravity, but towards one side of it. And\nit may be readily shown that in an aggregation of such flocculi,\nseverally thus moving, there must, by composition of forces, eventually\nresult a rotation of the whole nebula in one direction.\n\nMerely noting this hypothetical illustration for the purpose of showing\nhow the law applies to the case of nebular evolution, supposing it to\nhave taken place, let us pass to the phenomena of the Solar System as\nnow exhibited. Here the general principles above set forth are every\ninstant exemplified. Each planet and satellite has a momentum which\nwould, if acting alone, carry it forward in the direction it is at any\ninstant pursuing. This momentum hence acts as a resistance to motion in\nany other direction. Each planet and satellite, however, is drawn by a\nforce which, if unopposed, would take it in a straight line towards its\nprimary. And the resultant of these two forces is that curve which it\ndescribes\u2014a curve manifestly consequent on the unsymmetrical\ndistribution of the forces around its path. This path, when more closely\nexamined, supplies us with further illustrations. For it is not an exact\ncircle or ellipse; which it would be were the tangential and centripetal\nforces the only ones concerned. Adjacent members of the Solar System,\never varying in their relative positions, cause what we call\nperturbations; that is, slight divergences in various directions from\nthat circle or ellipse which the two chief forces would produce. These\nperturbations severally show us in minor degrees, how the line of\nmovement is the resultant of all the forces engaged; and how this line\nbecomes more complicated in proportion as the forces are multiplied.\n If instead of the motions of the planets and satellites as wholes,\nwe consider the motions of their parts, we meet with comparatively\ncomplex illustrations. Every portion of the Earth\u2019s substance in its\ndaily rotation, describes a curve which is in the main a resultant of\nthat resistance which checks its nearer approach to the centre of\ngravity, that momentum which would carry it off at a tangent, and those\nforces of gravitation and cohesion which keep it from being so carried\noff. If this axial motion be compounded with the orbital motion, the\ncourse of each part is seen to be a much more involved one. And we find\nit to have a still greater complication on taking into account that\nlunar attraction which mainly produces the tides and the precession of\nthe equinoxes.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 88. We come next to terrestrial changes: present ones as observed, and\npast ones as inferred by geologists. Let us set out with the\nhourly-occurring alterations in the Earth\u2019s atmosphere; descend to the\nslower alterations in progress on its surface; and then to the still\nslower ones going on beneath.\n\nMasses of air, absorbing heat from surfaces warmed by the sun, expand,\nand so lessen the weight of the atmospheric columns of which they are\nparts. Hence they offer to adjacent atmospheric columns, diminished\nlateral resistance; and these, moving in the directions of the\ndiminished resistance, displace the expanded air; while this, pursuing\nan upward course, displays a motion along that line in which there is\nleast pressure. When again, by the ascent of such heated masses from\nextended areas like the torrid zone, there is produced at the upper\nsurface of the atmosphere, a protuberance beyond the limits of\nequilibrium\u2014when the air forming this protuberance begins to overflow\nlaterally towards the poles; it does so because, while the tractive\nforce of the Earth is nearly the same, the lateral resistance is greatly\ndiminished. And throughout the course of each current thus generated, as\nwell as throughout the course of each counter-current flowing: into the\nvacuum that is left, the direction is always the resultant of the\nEarth\u2019s tractive force and the resistance offered by the surrounding\nmasses of air: modified only by conflict with other currents similarly\ndetermined, and by collision with prominences on the Earth\u2019s crust.\n The movements of water, in both its gaseous and liquid states,\nfurnish further examples. In conformity with the mechanical theory of\nheat, it may be shown that evaporation is the escape of particles of\nwater in the direction of least resistance; and that as the resistance\n(which is due to the pressure of the water diffused in a gaseous state)\ndiminishes, the evaporation increases. Conversely, that rushing together\nof particles called condensation, which takes place when any portion of\natmospheric vapour has its temperature much lowered, may be interpreted\nas a diminution of the mutual pressure among the condensing particles,\nwhile the pressure of surrounding particles remains the same; and so is\na motion taking place in the direction of lessened resistance. In the\ncourse followed by the resulting rain-drops, we have one of the simplest\ninstances of the joint effect of the two antagonist forces. The Earth\u2019s\nattraction, and the resistance of atmospheric currents ever varying in\ndirection and intensity, give as their resultants, lines which incline\nto the horizon in countless different degrees and undergo perpetual\nvariations. More clearly still is the law exemplified by these same\nrain-drops when they reach the ground. In the course they take while\ntrickling over its surface, in every rill, in every larger stream, and\nin every river, we see them descending as straight as the antagonism of\nsurrounding objects permits. From moment to moment, the motion of water\ntowards the Earth\u2019s centre is opposed by the solid matter around and\nunder it; and from moment to moment its route is the resultant of the\nlines of greatest traction and least resistance. So far from a cascade\nfurnishing, as it seems to do, an exception, it furnishes but another\nillustration. For though all solid obstacles to a vertical fall of the\nwater are removed, yet the water\u2019s horizontal momentum is an obstacle;\nand the parabola in which the stream leaps from the projecting ledge, is\ngenerated by the combined gravitation and momentum. It may be well\njust to draw attention to the degree of complexity here produced in the\nline of movement by the variety of forces at work. In atmospheric\ncurrents, and still more clearly in water-courses (to which might be\nadded ocean-streams), the route followed is too complex to be defined,\nsave as a curve of three dimensions with an ever varying equation.\n\nThe Earth\u2019s solid crust undergoes changes that supply another group of\nillustrations. The denudation of lands and the depositing of the removed\nsediment in new strata at the bottoms of seas and lakes, is a process\nthroughout which motion is obviously determined in the same way as is\nthat of the water effecting the transport. Again, though we have no\ndirect inductive proof that the forces classed as igneous, expend\nthemselves along lines of least resistance; yet what little we know of\nthem is in harmony with the belief that they do so. Earthquakes\ncontinually revisit the same localities, and special tracts undergo for\nlong periods together successive elevations or subsidences,\u2014facts which\nimply that already-fractured portions of the Earth\u2019s crust are those\nmost prone to yield under the pressure caused by further contractions.\nThe distribution of volcanoes along certain lines, as well as the\nfrequent recurrence of eruptions from the same vents, are facts of like\nmeaning.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 89. That organic growth takes place in the direction of least\nresistance, is a proposition that has been set forth and illustrated by\nMr. James Hinton, in the _Medico-Chirurgical Review_ for October, 1858.\nAfter detailing a few of the early observations which led him to this\ngeneralization, he formulates it thus:\u2014\n\n\u201cOrganic form is the result of motion.\u201d\n\n\u201cMotion takes the direction of least resistance.\u201d\n\n\u201cTherefore organic form is the result of motion in the direction of\nleast resistance.\u201d\n\nAfter an elucidation and defence of this position, Mr. Hinton proceeds\nto interpret, in conformity with it, sundry phenomena of development.\nSpeaking of plants he says:\u2014\n\n\u201cThe formation of the root furnishes a beautiful illustration of the law\nof least resistance, for it grows by insinuating itself, cell by cell,\nthrough the interstices of the soil; it is by such minute additions that\nit increases, winding and twisting whithersoever the obstacles it meets\nin its path determine, and growing there most, where the nutritive\nmaterials are added to it most abundantly. As we look on the roots of a\nmighty tree, it appears to us as if they had forced themselves with\ngiant violence into the solid earth. But it is not so; they were led on\ngently, cell added to cell, softly as the dews descended, and the\nloosened earth made way. Once formed, indeed, they expand with an\nenormous power, but the spongy condition of the growing radicles utterly\nforbids the supposition that they are forced into the earth. Is it not\nprobable, indeed, that the enlargement of the roots already formed may\ncrack the surrounding soil, and help to make the interstices into which\nthe new rootlets grow?\u201d * * *\n\n\u201cThroughout almost the whole of organic nature the spiral form is more\nor less distinctly marked. Now, motion under resistance takes a spiral\ndirection, as may be seen by the motion of a body rising or falling\nthrough water. A bubble rising rapidly in water describes a spiral\nclosely resembling a corkscrew, and a body of moderate specific gravity\ndropped into water may be seen to fall in a curved direction, the spiral\ntendency of which may be distinctly observed. * * * In this prevailing\nspiral form of organic bodies, therefore, it appears to me, that there\nis presented a strong _prima facie_ case for the view I have maintained.\n* * * The spiral form of the branches of many trees is very apparent,\nand the universally spiral arrangement of the leaves around the stem of\nplants needs only to be referred to. * * * The heart commences as a\nspiral turn, and in its perfect form a manifest spiral may be traced\nthrough the left ventricle, right ventricle, right auricle, left auricle\nand appendix. And what is the spiral turn in which the heart commences\nbut a necessary result of the lengthening, under a limit, of the\ncellular mass of which it then consists?\u201d * * *\n\n\u201cEvery one must have noticed the peculiar curling up of the young leaves\nof the common fern. The appearance is as if the leaf were rolled up, but\nin truth this form is merely a phenomenon of growth. The curvature\nresults from the increase of the leaf, it is only another form of the\nwrinkling up, or turning at right angles by extension under limit.\u201d\n\n\u201cThe rolling up or imbrication of the petals in many flower-buds is a\nsimilar thing; at an early period the small petals may be seen lying\nside by side, afterwards growing within the capsule, they become folded\nround one another.\u201d * * *\n\n\u201cIf a flower-bud be opened at a sufficiently early period, the stamens\nwill be found as if moulded in the cavity between the pistil and the\ncorolla, which cavity the antlers exactly fill; the stalks lengthen at\nan after period. I have noticed also in a few instances, that in those\nflowers in which the petals are imbricated, or twisted together, the\npistil is tapering as growing up between the petals; in some flowers\nwhich have the petals so arranged in the bud as to form a dome (as the\nhawthorn; e. g.), the pistil is flattened at the apex, and in the bud\noccupies a space precisely limited by the stamens below, and the\nenclosing petals above and at the sides. I have not, however, satisfied\nmyself that this holds good in all cases.\u201d\n\nWithout endorsing all Mr. Hinton\u2019s illustrations, to some of which\nexception might be taken, his conclusion may be accepted as a large\ninstalment of the truth. It is, however, to be remarked, that in the\ncase of organic growth, as in all other cases, the line of movement is\nin strictness the resultant of tractive and resistant forces; and that\nthe tractive forces here form so considerable an element that the\nformula is scarcely complete without them. The shapes of plants are\nmanifestly modified by gravitation: the direction of each branch is not\nwhat it would have been were the tractive force of the Earth absent; and\nevery flower and leaf is somewhat altered in the course of development\nby the weight of its parts. Though in animals such effects are less\nconspicuous, yet the instances in which flexible organs have their\ndirections in great measure determined by gravity, justify the assertion\nthat throughout the whole organism the forms of parts must be affected\nby this force.\n\nThe organic movements which constitute growth, are not, however, the\nonly organic movements to be interpreted. There are also those which\nconstitute function. And throughout these the same general principles\nare discernible. That the vessels along which blood, lymph, bile, and\nall the secretions, find their ways, are channels of least resistance,\nis a fact almost too conspicuous to be named as an illustration. Less\nconspicuous, however, is the truth, that the currents setting along\nthese vessels are affected by the tractive force of the Earth: witness\nvaricose veins; witness the relief to an inflamed part obtained by\nraising it; witness the congestion of head and face produced by\nstooping. And in the fact that dropsy in the legs gets greater by day\nand decreases at night, while, conversely, that \u0153dematous fullness under\nthe eyes common in debility, grows worse during the hours of reclining\nand decreases after getting up, shows us how the transudation of fluid\nthrough the walls of the capillaries, varies according as change of\nposition changes the effect of gravity in different parts of the body.\n\nIt may be well in passing just to note the bearing of the principle on\nthe development of species. From a dynamic point of view, \u201cnatural\nselection\u201d is the evolution of Life along lines of least resistance. The\nmultiplication of any kind of plant or animal in localities that are\nfavourable to it, is a growth where the antagonistic forces are less\nthan elsewhere. And the preservation of varieties that succeed better\nthan their allies in coping with surrounding conditions, is the\ncontinuance of vital movement in those directions where the obstacles to\nit are most eluded.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 90. Throughout the phenomena of mind the law enunciated is not so\nreadily established. In a large part of them, as those of thought and\nemotion, there is no perceptible movement. Even in sensation and\nvolition, which show us in one part of the body an effect produced by a\nforce applied to another part, the intermediate movement is inferential\nrather than visible. Such indeed are the difficulties that it is not\npossible here to do more than briefly indicate the proofs which might be\ngiven did space permit.\n\nSupposing the various forces throughout an organism to be previously in\nequilibrium, then any part which becomes the seat of a further force,\nadded or liberated, must be one from which the force, being resisted by\nsmaller forces around, will initiate motion towards some other part of\nthe organism. If elsewhere in the organism there is a point at which\nforce is being expended, and which so is becoming minus a force which it\nbefore had, instead of plus a force which it before had not, and thus is\nmade a point at which the re-action against surrounding forces is\ndiminished; then, manifestly, a motion taking place between the first\nand the last of these points is a motion along the line of least\nresistance. Now a sensation implies a force added to, or evolved in,\nthat part of the organism which is its seat; while a mechanical movement\nimplies an expenditure or loss of force in that part of the organism\nwhich is its seat. Hence if, as we find to be the fact, motion is\nhabitually propagated from those parts of an organism to which the\nexternal world adds forces in the shape of nervous impressions, to those\nparts of an organism which react on the external world through muscular\ncontractions, it is simply a fulfilment of the law above enunciated.\n From this general conclusion we may pass to a more special one.\nWhen there is anything in the circumstances of an animal\u2019s life,\ninvolving that a sensation in one particular place is habitually\nfollowed by a contraction in another particular place\u2014when there is thus\na frequently-repeated motion through the organism between these places;\nwhat must be the result as respects the line along which the motions\ntake place? Restoration of equilibrium between the points at which the\nforces have been increased and decreased, must take place through some\nchannel. If this channel is affected by the discharge\u2014if the obstructive\naction of the tissues traversed, involves any reaction upon them,\ndeducting from their obstructive power; then a subsequent motion between\nthese two points will meet with less resistance along this channel than\nthe previous motion met with; and will consequently take this channel\nstill more decidedly. If so, every repetition will still further\ndiminish the resistance offered by this route; and hence will gradually\nbe formed between the two a permanent line of communication, differing\ngreatly from the surrounding tissue in respect of the ease with which\nforce traverses it. We see, therefore, that if between a particular\nimpression and a particular motion associated with it, there is\nestablished a connexion producing what is called reflex action, the law\nthat motion follows the line of least resistance, and that, if the\nconditions remain constant, resistance in any direction is diminished by\nmotion occurring in that direction, supplies an explanation.\n Without further details it will be manifest that a like\ninterpretation may be given to the succession of all other nervous\nchanges. If in the surrounding world there are objects, attributes, or\nactions, that usually occur together, the effects severally produced by\nthem in the organism will become so connected by those repetitions which\nwe call experience, that they also will occur together. In proportion to\nthe frequency with which any external connexion of phenomena is\nexperienced, will be the strength of the answering internal connexion of\nnervous states. Thus there will arise all degrees of cohesion among\nnervous states, as there are all degrees of commonness among the\nsurrounding co-existences and sequences that generate them: whence must\nresult a general correspondence between associated ideas and associated\nactions in the environment.[13]\n\nThe relation between emotions and actions may be similarly construed. As\na first illustration let us observe what happens with emotions that are\nundirected by volitions. These, like feelings in general, expend\nthemselves in generating organic changes, and chiefly in muscular\ncontractions. As was pointed out in the last chapter, there result\nmovements of the involuntary and voluntary muscles, that are great in\nproportion as the emotions are strong. It remains here to be pointed\nout, however, that the order in which these muscles are affected is\nexplicable only on the principle above set forth. Thus, a pleasurable or\npainful state of mind of but slight intensity, does little more than\nincrease the pulsations of the heart. Why? For the reason that the\nrelation between nervous excitement and vascular contraction, being\ncommon to every genus and species of feeling, is the one of most\nfrequent repetition; that hence the nervous connexion is, in the way\nabove shown, the one which offers the least resistance to a discharge;\nand is therefore the one along which a feeble force produces motion. A\nsentiment or passion that is somewhat stronger, affects not only the\nheart but the muscles of the face, and especially those around the\nmouth. Here the like explanation applies; since these muscles, being\nboth comparatively small, and, for purposes of speech, perpetually used,\noffer less resistance than other voluntary muscles to the nerve-motor\nforce. By a further increase of emotion the respiratory and vocal\nmuscles become perceptibly excited. Finally, under strong passion, the\nmuscles in general of the trunk and limbs are violently contracted.\nWithout saying that the facts can be thus interpreted in all their\ndetails (a task requiring data impossible to obtain) it may be safely\nsaid that the order of excitation is from muscles that are small and\nfrequently acted on, to those which are larger and less frequently acted\non. The single instance of laughter, which is an undirected discharge of\nfeeling that affects first the muscles round the mouth, then those of\nthe vocal and respiratory apparatus, then those of the limbs, and then\nthose of the spine;[14] suffices to show that when no special route is\nopened for it, a force evolved in the nervous centres produces motion\nalong channels which offer the least resistance, and if it is too great\nto escape by these, produces motion along channels offering successively\ngreater resistance.\n\nProbably it will be thought impossible to extend this reasoning so as to\ninclude volitions. Yet we are not without evidence that the transition\nfrom special desires to special muscular acts, conforms to the same\nprinciple. It may be shown that the mental antecedents of a voluntary\nmovement, are antecedents which temporarily make the line along which\nthis movement takes place, the line of least resistance. For a volition,\nsuggested as it necessarily is by some previous thought connected with\nit by associations that determine the transition, is itself a\nrepresentation of the movements that are willed, and of their sequences.\nBut to represent in consciousness certain of our own movements, is\npartially to arouse the sensations accompanying such movements,\ninclusive of those of muscular tension\u2014is partially to excite the\nappropriate motor-nerves and all the other nerves implicated. That is to\nsay, the volition is itself an incipient discharge along a line which\nprevious experiences have rendered a line of least resistance. And the\npassing of volition into action is simply a completion of the discharge.\n\nOne corollary from this must be noted before proceeding; namely, that\nthe particular set of muscular movements by which any object of desire\nis reached, are movements implying the smallest total of forces to be\novercome. As each feeling generates motion along the line of least\nresistance, it is tolerably clear that a group of feelings, constituting\na more or less complex desire, will generate motion along a series of\nlines of least resistance. That is to say, the desired end will be\nachieved with the smallest expenditure of effort. Should it be objected\nthat through want of knowledge or want of skill, a man often pursues the\nmore laborious of two courses, and so overcomes a larger total of\nopposing forces than was necessary; the reply is, that relatively to his\nmental state the course he takes is that which presents the fewest\ndifficulties. Though there is another which in the abstract is easier,\nyet his ignorance of it, or inability to adopt it, is, physically\nconsidered, the existence of an insuperable obstacle to the discharge of\nhis energies in that direction. Experience obtained by himself, or\ncommunicated by others, has not established in him such channels of\nnervous communication as are required to make this better course the\ncourse of least resistance to him.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 91. As in individual animals, inclusive of man, motion follows lines\nof least resistance, it is to be inferred that among aggregations of\nmen, the like will hold good. The changes in a society, being due to the\njoint actions of its members, the courses of such changes will be\ndetermined as are those of all other changes wrought by composition of\nforces.\n\nThus when we contemplate a society as an organism, and observe the\ndirection of its growth, we find this direction to be that in which the\naverage of opposing forces is the least. Its units have energies to be\nexpended in self-maintenance and reproduction. These energies are met by\nvarious environing energies that are antagonistic to them\u2014those of\ngeological origin, those of climate, of wild animals, of other human\nraces with whom they are at enmity or in competition. And the tracts the\nsociety spreads over, are those in which there is the smallest total\nantagonism. Or, reducing the matter to its ultimate terms, we may say\nthat these social units have jointly and severally to preserve\nthemselves and their offspring from those inorganic and organic forces\nwhich are ever tending to destroy them (either indirectly by oxidation\nand by undue abstraction of heat, or directly by bodily mutilation);\nthat these forces are either counteracted by others which are available\nin the shape of food, clothing, habitations, and appliances of defence,\nor are, as far as may be, eluded; and that population spreads in\nwhichever directions there is the readiest escape from these forces, or\nthe least exertion in obtaining the materials for resisting them, or\nboth. For these reasons it happens that fertile valleys where\nwater and vegetal produce abound, are early peopled. Sea-shores, too,\nsupplying a large amount of easily-gathered food, are lines along which\nmankind have commonly spread. The general fact that, so far as we can\njudge from the traces left by them, large societies first appeared in\nthose tropical regions where the fruits of the earth are obtainable with\ncomparatively little exertion, and where the cost of maintaining bodily\nheat is but slight, is a fact of like meaning. And to these instances\nmay be added the allied one daily furnished by emigration; which we see\ngoing on towards countries presenting the fewest obstacles to the\nself-preservation of individuals, and therefore to national growth.\n Similarly with that resistance to the movements of a society which\nneighbouring societies offer. Each of the tribes or nations inhabiting\nany region, increases in numbers until it outgrows its means of\nsubsistence. In each there is thus a force ever pressing outwards on to\nadjacent areas\u2014a force antagonized by like forces in the tribes or\nnations occupying those areas. And the ever-recurring wars that\nresult\u2014the conquests of weaker tribes or nations, and the over-running\nof their territories by the victors, are instances of social movements\ntaking place in the directions of least resistance. Nor do the conquered\npeoples, when they escape extermination or enslavement, fail to show us\nmovements that are similarly determined. For migrating as they do to\nless fertile regions\u2014taking refuge in deserts or among mountains\u2014moving\nin a direction where the resistance to social growth is comparatively\ngreat; they still do this only under an excess of pressure in all other\ndirections: the physical obstacles to self-preservation they encounter,\nbeing really less than the obstacles offered by the enemies from whom\nthey fly.\n\nInternal social movements may also be thus interpreted. Localities\nnaturally fitted for producing particular commodities\u2014that is,\nlocalities in which such commodities are got at the least cost of\nforce\u2014that is, localities in which the desires for these commodities\nmeet with the least resistance; become localities especially devoted to\nthe obtainment of these commodities. Where soil and climate render wheat\na profitable crop, or a crop from which the greatest amount of\nlife-sustaining power is gained by a given quantity of effort, the\ngrowth of wheat becomes the dominant industry. Where wheat cannot be\neconomically produced, oats, or rye, or maize, or rice, or potatoes, is\nthe agricultural staple. Along sea-shores men support themselves with\nleast effort by catching fish; and hence choose fishing as an\noccupation. And in places that are rich in coal or metallic ores, the\npopulation, finding that labour devoted to the raising of these\nmaterials brings a larger return of food and clothing than when\notherwise directed, becomes a population of miners. This last\ninstance introduces us to the phenomena of exchange; which equally\nillustrate the general law. For the practice of barter begins as soon as\nit facilitates the fulfilment of men\u2019s desires, by diminishing the\nexertion needed to reach the objects of those desires. When instead of\ngrowing his own corn, weaving his own cloth, sewing his own shoes, each\nman began to confine himself to farming, or weaving, or shoemaking; it\nwas because each found it more laborious to make everything he wanted,\nthan to make a great quantity of one thing and barter the surplus for\nthe rest: by exchange, each procured the necessaries of life without\nencountering so much resistance. Moreover, in deciding what commodity to\nproduce, each citizen was, as he is at the present day, guided in the\nsame manner. For besides those local conditions which determine whole\nsections of a society towards the industries easiest for them, there are\nalso individual conditions and individual aptitudes which to each\ncitizen render certain occupations preferable; and in choosing those\nforms of activity which their special circumstances and faculties\ndictate, these social units are severally moving towards the objects of\ntheir desires in the directions which present to them the fewest\nobstacles. The process of transfer which commerce pre-supposes,\nsupplies another series of examples. So long as the forces to be\novercome in procuring any necessary of life in the district where it is\nconsumed, are less than the forces to be overcome in procuring it from\nan adjacent district, exchange does not take place. But when the\nadjacent district produces it with an economy that is not out-balanced\nby cost of transit\u2014when the distance is so small and the route so easy\nthat the labour of conveyance plus the labour of production is less than\nthe labour of production in the consuming district, transfer commences.\nMovement in the direction of least resistance is also seen in the\nestablishment of the channels along which intercourse takes place. At\nthe outset, when goods are carried on the backs of men and horses, the\npaths chosen are those which combine shortness with levelness and\nfreedom from obstacles\u2014those which are achieved with the smallest\nexertion. And in the subsequent formation of each highway, the course\ntaken is that which deviates horizontally from a straight line so far\nonly as is needful to avoid vertical deviations entailing greater labour\nin draught. The smallest total of obstructive forces determines the\nroute, even in seemingly exceptional cases; as where a detour is made to\navoid the opposition of a landowner. All subsequent improvements, ending\nin macadamized roads, canals, and railways, which reduce the antagonism\nof friction and gravity to a minimum, exemplify the same truth. After\nthere comes to be a choice of roads between one point and another, we\nstill see that the road chosen is that along which the cost of transit\nis the least: cost being the measure of resistance. Even where, time\nbeing a consideration, the more expensive route is followed, it is so\nbecause the loss of time involves loss of force. When, division of\nlabour having been carried to a considerable extent and means of\ncommunication made easy, there arises a marked localization of\nindustries, the relative growths of the populations devoted to them may\nbe interpreted on the same principle. The influx of people to each\nindustrial centre, as well as the rate of multiplication of those\nalready inhabiting it, is determined by the payment for labour; that\nis\u2014by the quantity of commodities which a given amount of effort will\nobtain. To say that artisans flock to places where, in consequence of\nfacilities for production, an extra proportion of produce can be given\nin the shape of wages; is to say that they flock to places where there\nare the smallest obstacles to the support of themselves and families.\nHence, the rapid increase of number which occurs in such places, is\nreally a social growth at points where the opposing forces are the\nleast.\n\nNor is the law less clearly to be traced in those functional changes\ndaily going on. The flow of capital into businesses yielding the largest\nreturns; the buying in the cheapest market and selling in the dearest;\nthe introduction of more economical modes of manufacture; the\ndevelopment of better agencies for distribution; and all those\nvariations in the currents of trade that are noted in our newspapers and\ntelegrams from hour to hour; exhibit movement taking place in directions\nwhere it is met by the smallest total of opposing forces. For if we\nanalyze each of these changes\u2014if instead of interest on capital we read\nsurplus of products which remains after maintenance of labourers; if we\nso interpret large interest or large surplus to imply labour expended\nwith the greatest results; and if labour expended with the greatest\nresults means muscular action so directed as to evade obstacles as far\nas possible; we see that all these commercial phenomena are complicated\nmotions set up along lines of least resistance.\n\nObjections of two opposite kinds will perhaps be made to these\nsociological applications of the law. By some it may be said that the\nterm force as here used, is used metaphorically\u2014that to speak of men as\n_impelled_ in certain directions by certain desires, is a figure of\nspeech and not the statement of a physical fact. The reply is, that the\nforegoing illustrations are to be interpreted literally, and that the\nprocesses described _are_ physical ones. The pressure of hunger is an\nactual force\u2014a sensation implying some state of nervous tension; and the\nmuscular action which the sensation prompts is really a discharge of it\nin the shape of bodily motion\u2014a discharge which, on analyzing the mental\nacts involved, will be found to follow lines of least resistance. Hence\nthe motions of a society whose members are impelled by this or any other\ndesire, are actually, and not metaphorically, to be understood in the\nmanner shown. An opposite objection may possibly be, that the\nseveral illustrations given are elaborated truisms; and that the law of\ndirection of motion being once recognized, the fact that social\nmovements, in common with all others, must conform to it, follows\ninevitably. To this it may be rejoined, that a mere abstract assertion\nthat social movements must do this, would carry no conviction to the\nmajority; and that it is needful to show _how_ they do it. For social\nevolution to be interpreted after the method proposed, it is requisite\nthat such generalisations as those of political economy shall be reduced\nto equivalent propositions expressed in terms of force and motion.\n\nSocial movements of these various orders severally conform to the two\nderivative principles named at the outset. In the first place we may\nobserve how, once set up in given directions, such movements, like all\nothers, tend to continue in these directions. A commercial mania or\npanic, a current of commodities, a social custom, a political agitation,\nor a popular delusion, maintains its course for a long time after its\noriginal source has ceased; and requires antagonistic forces to arrest\nit. In the second place it is to be noted that in proportion to the\ncomplexity of social forces is the tortuousness of social movements. The\ninvolved series of muscular contractions gone through by the artizan,\nthat he may get the wherewithal to buy a loaf lying at the baker\u2019s next\ndoor, show us how extreme becomes the indirectness of motion when the\nagencies at work become very numerous\u2014a truth still better illustrated\nby the more public social actions; as those which end in bringing a\nsuccessful man of business, towards the close of his life, into\nparliament.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 92. And now of the general truth set forth in this chapter, as of that\ndealt with in the last, let us ask\u2014what is our ultimate evidence? Must\nwe accept it simply as an empirical generalization? or is it to be\nestablished as a corollary from a still deeper truth? The reader will\nanticipate the answer. We shall find it deducible from that datum of\nconsciousness which underlies all science.\n\nSuppose several tractive forces, variously directed, to be acting on a\ngiven body. By what is known among mathematicians as the composition of\nforces, there may be found for any two of these, a single force of such\namount and direction as to produce on the body an exactly equal effect.\nIf in the direction of each of them there be drawn a straight line, and\nif the lengths of these two straight lines be made proportionate to the\namounts of the forces; and if from the end of each line there be drawn a\nline parallel to the other, so as to complete a parallelogram; then the\ndiagonal of this parallelogram represents the amount and direction of a\nforce that is equivalent to the two. Such a resultant force, as it is\ncalled, may be found for any pair of forces throughout the group.\nSimilarly, for any pair of such resultants a single resultant may be\nfound. And by repeating this course, all of them may be reduced to two.\nIf these two are equal and opposite\u2014that is, if there is no line of\ngreatest traction, motion does not take place. If they are opposite but\nnot equal, motion takes place in the direction of the greater. And if\nthey are neither equal nor opposite, motion takes place in the direction\nof their resultant. For in either of these cases there is an\nunantagonized force in one direction. And this residuary force that is\nnot neutralized by an opposing one, must move the body in the direction\nin which it is acting. To assert the contrary is to assert that a force\ncan be expended without effect\u2014without generating an equivalent force;\nand by so implying that force can cease to exist, this involves a denial\nof the persistence of force. It needs scarcely be added that if in\nplace of tractions we take resistances, the argument equally holds; and\nthat it holds also where both tractions and resistances are concerned.\nThus the law that motion follows the line of greatest traction, or the\nline of least resistance, or the resultant of the two, is a necessary\ndeduction from that primordial truth which transcends proof.\n\nReduce the proposition to its simplest form, and it becomes still more\nobviously consequent on the persistence of force. Suppose two weights\nsuspended over a pulley or from the ends of an equal-armed lever; or\nbetter still\u2014suppose two men pulling against each other. In such cases\nwe say that the heavier weight will descend, and that the stronger man\nwill draw the weaker towards him. But now, if we are asked how we know\nwhich is the heavier weight or the stronger man; we can only reply that\nit is the one producing motion in the direction of its pull. Our only\nevidence of excess of force is the movement it produces. But if of two\nopposing tractions we can know one as greater than the other only by the\nmotion it generates in its own direction, then the assertion that motion\noccurs in the direction of greatest traction is a truism. When, going a\nstep further back, we seek a warrant for the assumption that of the two\nconflicting forces, that is the greater which produces motion in its own\ndirection, we find no other than the consciousness that such part of the\ngreater force as is unneutralized by the lesser, must produce its\neffect\u2014the consciousness that this residuary force cannot disappear, but\nmust manifest itself in some equivalent change\u2014the consciousness that\nforce is persistent. Here too, as before, it may be remarked that\nno amount of varied illustrations, like those of which this chapter\nmainly consists, can give greater certainty to the conclusion thus\nimmediately drawn from the ultimate datum of consciousness. For in all\ncases, as in the simple ones just given, we can identify the greatest\nforce only by the resulting motion. It is impossible for us ever to get\nevidence of the occurrence of motion in any other direction than that of\nthe greatest force; since our measure of relative greatness among forces\nis their relative power of generating motion. And clearly, while the\ncomparative greatness of forces is thus determined, no multiplication of\ninstances can add certainty to a law of direction of movement which\nfollows immediately from the persistence of force.\n\nFrom this same primordial truth, too, may be deduced the principle that\nmotion once set up along any line, becomes itself a cause of subsequent\nmotion along that line. The mechanical axiom that, if left to itself,\nmatter moving in any direction will continue in that direction with\nundiminished velocity, is but an indirect assertion of the persistence\nof force; since it is an assertion that the force manifested in the\ntransfer of a body along a certain length of a certain line in a certain\ntime, cannot disappear without producing some equal manifestation\u2014a\nmanifestation which, in the absence of conflicting forces, must be a\nfurther transfer in the same direction at the same velocity. In\nthe case of matter traversing matter the like inference is necessitated.\nHere indeed the actions are much more complicated. A liquid that follows\na certain channel through or over a solid, as water along the Earth\u2019s\nsurface, loses part of its motion in the shape of heat, through friction\nand collision with the matters forming its bed. A further amount of its\nmotion may be absorbed in overcoming forces which it liberates; as when\nit loosens a mass which falls into, and blocks up, its channel. But\nafter these deductions by transformation into other modes of force, any\nfurther deduction from the motion of the water is at the expense of a\nreaction on the channel, which by so much diminishes its obstructive\npower: such reaction being shown in the motion acquired by the detached\nportions which are carried away. The cutting out of river-courses is a\nperpetual illustration of this truth. Still more involved is the\ncase of motion passing through matter by impulse from part to part; as a\nnervous discharge through animal tissue. Some chemical change may be\nwrought along the route traversed, which may render it less fit than\nbefore for conveying a current. Or the motion may itself be in part\nmetamorphosed into some obstructive form of force; as in metals, the\nconducting power of which is, for the time, decreased by the heat which\nthe passage of electricity itself generates. The real question is,\nhowever, what structural modification, if any, is produced throughout\nthe matter traversed, apart from _incidental_ disturbing forces\u2014apart\nfrom everything but the _necessary_ resistance of the matter: that,\nnamely, which results from the inertia of its units. If we confine our\nattention to that part of the motion which, escaping transformation,\ncontinues its course, then it is a corollary from the persistence of\nforce that as much of this remaining motion as is taken up in changing\nthe positions of the units, must leave these by so much less able to\nobstruct subsequent motion in the same direction.\n\nThus in all the changes heretofore and at present displayed by the Solar\nSystem; in all those that have gone on and are still going on in the\nEarth\u2019s crust; in all processes of organic development and function; in\nall mental actions and the effects they work on the body; and in all\nmodifications of structure and activity in societies; the implied\nmovements are of necessity determined in the manner above set forth.\nEvery alteration in the arrangement of parts, constituting Evolution\nunder each of its phases, must conform to this universal principle.\nWherever we see motion, its direction must be that of the greatest\nforce. And wherever we see the greatest force to be acting in a given\ndirection, in that direction motion must ensue.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 13:\n\n This paragraph is a re-statement, somewhat amplified, of an idea set\n forth in the _Medico-Chirurgical Review_ for January, 1859 (pp. 189\n and 190); and contains the germ of the intended fifth part of the\n _Principles of Psychology_, which was withheld for the reasons given\n in the preface to that work.\n\nFootnote 14:\n\n For details see a paper on \u201cThe Physiology of Laughter,\u201d published in\n _Macmillan\u2019s Magazine_ for March 1860.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XI.\n THE RHYTHM OF MOTION.\n\n\n\u00a7 93. When the pennant of a vessel lying becalmed first shows the coming\nbreeze, it does so by gentle undulations that travel from its fixed to\nits free end. Presently the sails begin to flap; and their blows against\nthe mast increase in rapidity as the breeze rises. Even when, being\nfully bellied out, they are in great part steadied by the strain of the\nyards and cordage, their free edges tremble with each stronger gust. And\nshould there come a gale, the jar that is felt on laying hold of the\nshrouds shows that the rigging vibrates; while the rush and whistle of\nthe wind prove that in it, also, rapid undulations are generated. Ashore\nthe conflict between the current of air and the things it meets results\nin a like rhythmical action. The leaves all shiver in the blast; each\nbranch oscillates; and every exposed tree sways to and fro. The blades\nof grass and dried bents in the meadows, and still better the stalks in\nthe neighbouring corn-fields, exhibit the same rising and falling\nmovement. Nor do the more stable objects fail to do the like, though in\na less manifest fashion; as witness the shudder that may be felt\nthroughout a house during the paroxysms of a violent storm.\n Streams of water produce in opposing objects the same general\neffects as do streams of air. Submerged weeds growing in the middle of a\nbrook, undulate from end to end. Branches brought down by the last\nflood, and left entangled at the bottom where the current is rapid, are\nthrown into a state of up and down movement that is slow or quick in\nproportion as they are large or small; and where, as in great rivers\nlike the Mississippi, whole trees are thus held, the name \u201csawyers,\u201d by\nwhich they are locally known, sufficiently describes the rhythm produced\nin them. Note again the effect of the antagonism between the current and\nits channel. In shallow places, where the action of the bottom on the\nwater flowing over it is visible, we see a ripple produced\u2014a series of\nundulations. And if we study the action and re-action going on between\nthe moving fluid and its banks, we still find the principle illustrated,\nthough in a different way. For in every rivulet, as in the mapped-out\ncourse of every great river, the bends of the stream from side to side\nthroughout its tortuous course constitute a lateral undulation\u2014an\nundulation so inevitable that even an artificially straightened channel\nis eventually changed into a serpentine one. Analogous phenomena may be\nobserved where the water is stationary and the solid matter moving. A\nstick drawn laterally through the water with much force, proves by the\nthrob which it communicates to the hand that it is in a state of\nvibration. Even where the moving body is massive, it only requires that\ngreat force should be applied to get a sensible effect of like kind:\ninstance the screw of a screw-steamer, which instead of a smooth\nrotation falls into a rapid rhythm that sends a tremor through the whole\nvessel. The sound which results when a bow is drawn over a\nviolin-string, shows us vibrations produced by the movement of a solid\nover a solid. In lathes and planing machines, the attempt to take off a\nthick shaving causes a violent jar of the whole apparatus, and the\nproduction of a series of waves on the iron or wood that is cut. Every\nboy in scraping his slate-pencil finds it scarcely possible to help\nmaking a ridged surface. If you roll a ball along the ground or over the\nice, there is always more or less up and down movement\u2014a movement that\nis visible while the velocity is considerable, but becomes too small and\nrapid to be seen by the unaided eye as the velocity diminishes. However\nsmooth the rails, and however perfectly built the carriages, a\nrailway-train inevitably gets into oscillations, both lateral and\nvertical. Even where moving matter is suddenly arrested by collision,\nthe law is still illustrated; for both the body striking and the body\nstruck are made to tremble; and trembling is rhythmical movement. Little\nas we habitually observe it, it is yet certain that the impulses our\nactions impress from moment to moment on surrounding objects, are\npropagated through them in vibrations. It needs but to look through a\ntelescope of high power, to be convinced that each pulsation of the\nheart gives a jar to the whole room. If we pass to motions of\nanother order\u2014those namely which take place in the etherial medium\u2014we\nstill find the same thing. Every fresh discovery confirms the hypothesis\nthat light consists of undulations. The rays of heat, too, are now found\nto have a like fundamental nature; their undulations differing from\nthose of light only in their comparative length. Nor do the movements of\nelectricity fail to furnish us with an illustration; though one of a\ndifferent order. The northern aurora may often be observed to pulsate\nwith waves of greater brightness; and the electric discharge through a\nvacuum shows us by its stratified appearance that the current is not\nuniform, but comes in gushes of greater and lesser intensity.\n Should it be said that at any rate there are some motions, as\nthose of projectiles, which are not rhythmical, the reply is, that the\nexception is apparent only; and that these motions would be rhythmical\nif they were not interrupted. It is common to assert that the trajectory\nof a cannon ball is a parabola; and it is true that (omitting\natmospheric resistance) the curve described differs so slightly from a\nparabola that it may practically be regarded as one. But, strictly\nspeaking, it is a portion of an extremely eccentric ellipse, having the\nEarth\u2019s centre of gravity for its remoter focus; and but for its arrest\nby the substance of the Earth, the cannon ball would travel round that\nfocus and return to the point whence it started; again to repeat this\nslow rhythm. Indeed, while seeming at first sight to do the reverse, the\ndischarge of a cannon furnishes one of the best illustrations of the\nprinciple enunciated. The explosion produces violent undulations in the\nsurrounding air. The whizz of the shot, as it flies towards its mark, is\ndue to another series of atmospheric undulations. And the movement to\nand from the Earth\u2019s centre, which the cannon ball is beginning to\nperform, being checked by solid matter, is transformed into a rhythm of\nanother order; namely, the vibration which the blow sends through\nneighbouring bodies.[15]\n\nRhythm is very generally not simple but compound. There are usually at\nwork various forces, causing undulations differing in rapidity; and\nhence it continually happens that besides the primary rhythms there are\nsecondary rhythms, produced by the periodic coincidence and antagonism\nof the primary ones. Double, triple, and even quadruple rhythms, are\nthus generated. One of the simplest instances is afforded by what in\nacoustics are known as \u201cbeats:\u201d recurring intervals of sound and silence\nwhich are perceived when two notes of nearly the same pitch are struck\ntogether; and which are due to the alternate correspondence and\nantagonism of the atmospheric waves. In like manner the various\nphenomena due to what is called interference of light, severally result\nfrom the periodic agreement and disagreement of etherial\nundulations\u2014undulations which, by alternately intensifying and\nneutralizing each other, produce intervals of increased and diminished\nlight. On the sea-shore may be noted sundry instances of compound\nrhythm. We have that of the tides, in which the daily rise and fall\nundergoes a fortnightly increase and decrease, due to the alternate\ncoincidence and antagonism of the solar and lunar attractions. We have\nagain that which is perpetually furnished by the surface of the sea:\nevery large wave bearing smaller ones on its sides, and these still\nsmaller ones; with the result that each flake of foam, along with the\nportion of water bearing it, undergoes minor ascents and descents of\nseveral orders while it is being raised and lowered by the greater\nbillows. A quite different and very interesting example of compound\nrhythm, occurs in the little rills which, at low tide, run over the sand\nout of the shingle banks above. Where the channel of one of these is\nnarrow, and the stream runs strongly, the sand at the bottom is raised\ninto a series of ridges corresponding to the ripple of the water. On\nwatching for a short time, it will be seen that these ridges are being\nraised higher and the ripple growing stronger; until at length, the\naction becoming violent, the whole series of ridges is suddenly swept\naway, the stream runs smoothly, and the process commences afresh.\nInstances of still more complex rhythms might be added; but they will\ncome more appropriately in connexion with the several forms of\nEvolution, hereafter to be dealt with.\n\nFrom the ensemble of the facts as above set forth, it will be seen that\nrhythm results wherever there is a conflict of forces not in\nequilibrium. If the antagonist forces at any point are balanced, there\nis rest; and in the absence of motion there can of course be no rhythm.\nBut if instead of a balance there is an excess of force in one\ndirection\u2014if, as necessarily follows, motion is set up in that\ndirection; then for that motion to continue uniformly in that direction,\nit is requisite that the moving matter should, notwithstanding its\nunceasing change of place, present unchanging relations to the sources\nof force by which its motion is produced and opposed. This however is\nimpossible. Every further transfer through space must alter the ratio\nbetween the forces concerned\u2014must increase or decrease the predominance\nof one force over the other\u2014must prevent uniformity of movement. And if\nthe movement cannot be uniform, then, in the absence of acceleration or\nretardation continued through infinite time and space, (results which\ncannot be conceived) the only alternative is rhythm.\n\nA secondary conclusion must not be omitted. In the last chapter we saw\nthat motion is never absolutely rectilinear; and here it remains to be\nadded that, as a consequence, rhythm is necessarily incomplete. A truly\nrectilinear rhythm can arise only when the opposing forces are in\nexactly the same line; and the probabilities against this are infinitely\ngreat. To generate a perfectly circular rhythm, the two forces concerned\nmust be exactly at right angles to each other, and must have exactly a\ncertain ratio; and against this the probabilities are likewise\ninfinitely great. All other proportions and directions of the two forces\nwill produce an ellipse of greater or less eccentricity. And when, as\nindeed always happens, above two forces are engaged, the curve described\nmust be more complex; and cannot exactly repeat itself. So that in fact\nthroughout nature, this action and re-action of forces never brings\nabout a complete return to a previous state. Where the movement is very\ninvolved, and especially where it is that of some aggregate whose units\nare partially independent, anything like a regular curve is no longer\ntraceable; we see nothing more than a general oscillation. And on the\ncompletion of any periodic movement, the degree in which the state\narrived at differs from the state departed from, is usually marked in\nproportion as the influences at work are numerous.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 94. That spiral arrangement so general among the more diffused\nnebul\u00e6\u2014an arrangement which must be assumed by matter moving towards a\ncentre of gravity through a resisting medium\u2014shows us the progressive\nestablishment of revolution, and therefore of rhythm; in those remote\nspaces which the nebul\u00e6 occupy. Double stars, moving round common\ncentres of gravity in periods some of which are now ascertained, exhibit\nsettled rhythmical actions in distant parts of our sidereal system. And\nanother fact which, though of a different order, has a like general\nsignificance, is furnished by variable stars\u2014stars which alternately\nbrighten and fade.\n\nThe periodicities of the planets, satellites, and comets, are so\nfamiliar that it would be inexcusable to name them, were it not needful\nhere to point out that they are so many grand illustrations of this\ngeneral law of movement. But besides the revolutions of these bodies in\ntheir orbits (all more or less excentric) and their rotations on their\naxes, the Solar System presents us with various rhythms of a less\nmanifest and more complex kind. In each planet and satellite there is\nthe revolution of the nodes\u2014a slow change in the position of the\norbit-plane, which after completing itself commences afresh. There is\nthe gradual alteration in the length of the axis major of the orbit; and\nalso of its excentricity: both of which are rhythmical alike in the\nsense that they alternate between maxima and minima, and in the sense\nthat the progress from one extreme to the other is not uniform, but is\nmade with fluctuating velocity. Then, too, there is the revolution of\nthe line of apsides, which in course of time moves round the heavens\u2014not\nregularly, but through complex oscillations. And further we have\nvariations in the directions of the planetary axes\u2014that known as\nnutation, and that larger gyration which, in the case of the Earth,\ncauses the precession of the equinoxes. These rhythms, already\nmore or less compound, are compounded with each other. Such an instance\nas the secular acceleration and retardation of the moon, consequent on\nthe varying excentricity of the Earth\u2019s orbit, is one of the simplest.\nAnother, having more important consequences, results from the changing\ndirection of the axes of rotation in planets whose orbits are decidedly\nexcentric. Every planet, during a certain long period, presents more of\nits northern than of its southern hemisphere to the sun at the time of\nits nearest approach to him; and then again, during a like period,\npresents more of its southern hemisphere than of its northern\u2014a\nrecurring coincidence which, though causing in some planets no sensible\nalterations of climate, involves in the case of the Earth an epoch of\n21,000 years, during which each hemisphere goes through a cycle of\ntemperate seasons, and seasons that are extreme in their heat and cold.\nNor is this all. There is even a variation of this variation. For the\nsummers and winters of the whole Earth become more or less strongly\ncontrasted, as the excentricity of its orbit increases and decreases.\nHence during increase of the excentricity, the epochs of moderately\ncontrasted seasons and epochs of strongly contrasted seasons, through\nwhich alternately each hemisphere passes, must grow more and more\ndifferent in the degrees of their contrasts; and contrariwise during\ndecrease of the excentricity. So that in the quantity of light and heat\nwhich any portion of the Earth receives from the sun, there goes on a\nquadruple rhythm: that of day and night; that of summer and winter; that\ndue to the changing position of the axis at perihelion and aphelion,\ntaking 21,000 years to complete; and that involved by the variation of\nthe orbit\u2019s excentricity, gone through in millions of years.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 95. Those terrestrial processes whose dependence on the solar heat is\ndirect, of course exhibit a rhythm that corresponds to the periodically\nchanging amount of heat which each part of the Earth receives. The\nsimplest, though the least obtrusive, instance is supplied by the\nmagnetic variations. In these there is a diurnal increase and decrease,\nan annual increase and decrease, and a decennial increase and decrease;\nthe latter answering to a period during which the solar spots become\nalternately abundant and scarce: besides which known variations there\nare probably others corresponding with the astronomical cycles just\ndescribed. More obvious examples are furnished by the movements of the\nocean and the atmosphere. Marine currents from the equator to the poles\nabove, and from the poles to the equator beneath, show us an unceasing\nbackward and forward motion throughout this vast mass of water\u2014a motion\nvarying in amount according to the seasons, and compounded with smaller\nlike motions of local origin. The similarly-caused general currents in\nthe air, have similar annual variations similarly modified. Irregular as\nthey are in detail, we still see in the monsoons and other tropical\natmospheric disturbances, or even in our own equinoctial gales and\nspring east winds, a periodicity sufficiently decided. Again, we\nhave an alternation of times during which evaporation predominates with\ntimes during which condensation predominates: shown in the tropics by\nstrongly marked rainy seasons and seasons of drought, and in the\ntemperate zones by corresponding changes of which the periodicity,\nthough less definite, is still traceable. The diffusion and\nprecipitation of water, besides the slow alternations answering to\ndifferent parts of the year, furnish us with examples of rhythm of a\nmore rapid kind. During wet weather, lasting, let us say, over some\nweeks, the tendency to condense, though greater than the tendency to\nevaporate, does not show itself in continuous rain; but the period is\nmade up of rainy days and days that are wholly or partially fair. Nor is\nit in this rude alternation only that the law is manifested. During any\nday throughout this wet weather a minor rhythm is traceable; and\nespecially so when the tendencies to evaporate and to condense are\nnearly balanced. Among mountains this minor rhythm and its causes may be\nstudied to great advantage. Moist winds, which do not precipitate their\ncontained water in passing over the comparatively warm lowlands, lose so\nmuch heat when they reach the cold mountain peaks, that condensation\nrapidly takes place. Water, however, in passing from the gaseous to the\nfluid state, gives out a considerable amount of heat; and hence the\nresulting clouds are warmer than the air that precipitates them, and\nmuch warmer than the high rocky surfaces round which they fold\nthemselves. Hence in the course of the storm, these high rocky surfaces\nare raised in temperature, partly by radiation from the enwrapping\ncloud, partly by contact of the falling rain-drops. Giving off more heat\nthan before, they no longer lower so greatly the temperature of the air\npassing over them; and so cease to precipitate its contained water. The\nclouds break; the sky begins to clear; and a gleam of sunshine promises\nthat the day is going to be fine. But the small supply of heat which the\ncold mountain\u2019s sides have received, is soon lost: especially when the\ndispersion of the clouds permits free radiation into space. Very soon,\ntherefore, these elevated surfaces, becoming as cold as at first, (or\nperhaps even colder in virtue of the evaporation set up,) begin again to\ncondense the vapour in the air above; and there comes another storm,\nfollowed by the same effects as before. In lowland regions this action\nand reaction is usually less conspicuous, because the contrast of\ntemperatures is less marked. Even here, however, it may be traced; and\nthat not only on showery days, but on days of continuous rain; for in\nthese we do not see uniformity: always there are fits of harder and\ngentler rain that are probably caused as above explained.\n\nOf course these meteorologic rhythms involve something corresponding to\nthem in the changes wrought by wind and water on the Earth\u2019s surface.\nVariations in the quantities of sediment brought down by rivers that\nrise and fall with the seasons, must cause variations in the resulting\nstrata\u2014alternations of colour or quality in the successive lamin\u00e6. Beds\nformed from the detritus of shores worn down and carried away by the\nwaves, must similarly show periodic differences answering to the\nperiodic winds of the locality. In so far as frost influences the rate\nof denudation, its recurrence is a factor in the rhythm of sedimentary\ndeposits. And the geological changes produced by glaciers and icebergs\nmust similarly have their alternating periods of greater and less\nintensity.\n\nThere is evidence also that modifications in the Earth\u2019s crust due to\nigneous action have a certain periodicity. Volcanic eruptions are not\ncontinuous but intermittent, and as far as the data enable us to judge,\nhave a certain average rate of recurrence; which rate of recurrence is\ncomplicated by rising into epochs of greater activity and falling into\nepochs of comparative quiescence. So too is it with earthquakes and the\nelevations or depressions caused by them. At the mouth of the\nMississippi, the alternation of strata gives decisive proof of\nsuccessive sinkings of the surface, that have taken place at tolerably\nequal intervals. Everywhere, in the extensive groups of conformable\nstrata that imply small subsidences recurring with a certain average\nfrequency, we see a rhythm in the action and reaction between the\nEarth\u2019s crust and its molten contents\u2014a rhythm compounded with those\nslower ones shown in the termination of groups of strata, and the\ncommencement of other groups not conformable to them. There is\neven reason for suspecting a geological periodicity that is immensely\nslower and far wider in its effects; namely, an alternation of those\nvast upheavals and submergencies by which continents are produced where\nthere were oceans, and oceans where there were continents. For\nsupposing, as we may fairly do, that the Earth\u2019s crust is throughout of\ntolerably equal thickness, it is manifest that such portions of it as\nbecome most depressed below the average level, must have their inner\nsurfaces most exposed to the currents of molten matter circulating\nwithin, and will therefore undergo a larger amount of what may be called\nigneous denudation; while, conversely, the withdrawal of the inner\nsurfaces from these currents where the Earth\u2019s crust is most elevated,\nwill cause a thickening more or less compensating the aqueous denudation\ngoing on externally. Hence those depressed areas over which the deepest\noceans lie, being gradually thinned beneath and not covered by much\nsedimentary deposit above, will become areas of least resistance, and\nwill then begin to yield to the upward pressure of the Earth\u2019s contents;\nwhence will result, throughout such areas, long-continued elevations,\nceasing only when the reverse state of things has been brought about.\nWhether this speculation be well or ill founded, does not however affect\nthe general conclusion. Apart from it we have sufficient evidence that\ngeologic processes are rhythmical.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 96. Perhaps nowhere are the illustrations of rhythm so numerous and so\nmanifest as among the phenomena of life. Plants do not, indeed, usually\nshow us any decided periodicities, save those determined by day and\nnight and by the seasons. But in animals we have a great variety of\nmovements in which the alternation of opposite extremes goes on with all\ndegrees of rapidity. The swallowing of food is effected by a wave of\nconstriction passing along the \u0153sophagus; its digestion is accompanied\nby a muscular action of the stomach that is also undulatory; and the\nperistaltic motion of the intestines is of like nature. The blood\nobtained from this food is propelled not in a uniform current but in\npulses; and it is aerated by lungs that alternately contract and expand.\nAll locomotion results from oscillating movements: even where it is\napparently continuous, as in many minute forms, the microscope proves\nthe vibration of cilia to be the agency by which the creature is moved\nsmoothly forwards.\n\nPrimary rhythms of the organic actions are compounded with secondary\nones of longer duration. These various modes of activity have their\nrecurring periods of increase and decrease. We see this in the periodic\nneed for food, and in the periodic need for repose. Each meal induces a\nmore rapid rhythmic action of the digestive organs; the pulsation of the\nheart is accelerated; and the inspirations become more frequent. During\nsleep, on the contrary, these several movements slacken. So that in the\ncourse of the twenty-four hours, those small undulations of which the\ndifferent kinds of organic action are constituted, undergo one long wave\nof increase and decrease, complicated with several minor waves.\n Experiments have shown that there are still slower rises and falls\nof functional activity. Waste and assimilation are not balanced by every\nmeal, but one or other maintains for some time a slight excess; so that\na person in ordinary health is found to undergo an increase and decrease\nof weight during recurring intervals of tolerable equality. Besides\nthese regular periods there are still longer and comparatively irregular\nones; namely, those alternations of greater and less vigour, which even\nhealthy people experience. So inevitable are these oscillations that\neven men in training cannot be kept stationary at their highest power,\nbut when they have reached it begin to retrograde. Further\nevidence of rhythm in the vital movements is furnished by invalids.\nSundry disorders are named from the intermittent character of their\nsymptoms. Even where the periodicity is not very marked, it is mostly\ntraceable. Patients rarely if ever get uniformly worse; and\nconvalescents have usually their days of partial relapse or of less\ndecided advance.\n\nAggregates of living creatures illustrate the general truth in other\nways. If each species of organism be regarded as a whole, it displays\ntwo kinds of rhythm. Life as it exists in all the members of such\nspecies, is an extremely complex kind of movement, more or less distinct\nfrom the kinds of movement which constitutes life in other species. In\neach individual of the species, this extremely complex kind of movement\nbegins, rises to its climax, declines, and ceases in death. And every\nsuccessive generation thus exhibits a wave of that peculiar activity\ncharacterizing the species as a whole. The other form of rhythm is\nto be traced in that variation of number which each tribe of animals and\nplants is ever undergoing. Throughout the unceasing conflict between the\ntendency of a species to increase and the antagonistic tendencies, there\nis never an equilibrium: one always predominates. In the case even of a\ncultivated plant or domesticated animal, where artificial means are used\nto maintain the supply at a uniform level, we still see that\noscillations of abundance and scarcity cannot be avoided. And among the\ncreatures uncared for by man, such oscillations are usually more marked.\nAfter a race of organisms has been greatly thinned by enemies or lack of\nfood, its surviving members become more favourably circumstanced than\nusual. During the decline in their numbers their food has grown\nrelatively more abundant; while their enemies have diminished from want\nof prey. The conditions thus remain for some time favourable to their\nincrease; and they multiply rapidly. By and by their food is rendered\nrelatively scarce, at the same time that their enemies have become more\nnumerous; and the destroying influences being thus in excess, their\nnumber begins to diminish again. Yet one more rhythm, extremely\nslow in its action, may be traced in the phenomena of Life, contemplated\nunder their most general aspect. The researches of pal\u00e6ontologists show,\nthat there have been going on, during the vast period of which our\nsedimentary rocks bear record, successive changes of organic forms.\nSpecies have appeared, become abundant, and then disappeared. Genera, at\nfirst constituted of but few species, have for a time gone on growing\nmore multiform; and then have begun to decline in the number of their\nsubdivisions; leaving at last but one or two representatives, or none at\nall. During longer epochs whole orders have thus arisen, culminated, and\ndwindled away. And even those wider divisions containing many orders\nhave similarly undergone a gradual rise, a high tide, and a\nlong-continued ebb. The stalked _Crinoidea_, for example, which, during\nthe carboniferous epoch, became abundant, have almost disappeared: only\na single species being extant. Once a large family of molluscs, the\n_Brachiopoda_ have now become rare. The shelled Cephalopods, at one time\ndominant among the inhabitants of the ocean, both in number of forms and\nof individuals, are in our day nearly extinct. And after an \u201cage of\nreptiles,\u201d there has come an age in which reptiles have been in great\nmeasure supplanted by mammals. Whether these vast rises and falls of\ndifferent kinds of life ever undergo anything approaching to\nrepetitions, (which they may possibly do in correspondence with those\nvast cycles of elevation and subsidence that produce continents and\noceans,) it is sufficiently clear that Life on the Earth has not\nprogressed uniformly, but in immense undulations.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 97. It is not manifest that the changes of consciousness are in any\nsense rhythmical. Yet here, too, analysis proves both that the mental\nstate existing at any moment is not uniform, but is decomposable into\nrapid oscillations; and also that mental states pass through longer\nintervals of increasing and decreasing intensity.\n\nThough while attending to any single sensation, or any group of related\nsensations constituting the consciousness of an object, we seem to\nremain for the time in a persistent and homogeneous condition of mind, a\ncareful self-examination shows that this apparently unbroken mental\nstate is in truth traversed by a number of minor states, in which\nvarious other sensations and perceptions are rapidly presented and\ndisappear. From the admitted fact that thinking consists in the\nestablishment of relations, it is a necessary corollary that the\nmaintenance of consciousness in any one state to the entire exclusion of\nother states, would be a cessation of thought, that is, of\nconsciousness. So that any seemingly continuous feeling, say of\npressure, really consists of portions of that feeling perpetually\nrecurring after the momentary intrusion of other feelings and\nideas\u2014quick thoughts concerning the place where it is felt, the external\nobject producing it, its consequences, and other things suggested by\nassociation. Thus there is going on an extremely rapid departure from,\nand return to, that particular mental state which we regard as\npersistent. Besides the evidence of rhythm in consciousness which direct\nanalysis thus affords, we may gather further evidence from the\ncorrelation between feeling and movement. Sensations and emotions expend\nthemselves in producing muscular contractions. If a sensation or emotion\nwere strictly continuous, there would be a continuous discharge along\nthose motor nerves acted upon. But so far as experiments with artificial\nstimuli enable us to judge, a continuous discharge along the nerve\nleading to a muscle, does not contract it: a broken discharge is\nrequired\u2014a rapid succession of shocks. Hence muscular contraction\npre-supposes that rhythmic state of consciousness which direct\nobservation discloses. A much more conspicuous rhythm, having\nlonger waves, is seen during the outflow of emotion into dancing,\npoetry, and music. The current of mental energy that shows itself in\nthese modes of bodily action, is not continuous, but falls into a\nsuccession of pulses. The measure of a dance is produced by the\nalternation of strong muscular contractions with weaker ones; and, save\nin measures of the simplest order such as are found among barbarians and\nchildren, this alternation is compounded with longer rises and falls in\nthe degree of muscular excitement. Poetry is a form of speech which\nresults when the emphasis is regularly recurrent; that is, when the\nmuscular effort of pronunciation has definite periods of greater and\nless intensity\u2014periods that are complicated with others of like nature\nanswering to the successive verses. Music, in still more various ways,\nexemplifies the law. There are the recurring bars, in each of which\nthere is a primary and a secondary beat. There is the alternate increase\nand decrease of muscular strain, implied by the ascents and descents to\nthe higher and lower notes\u2014ascents and descents composed of smaller\nwaves, breaking the rises and falls of the larger ones, in a mode\npeculiar to each melody. And then we have, further, the alternation of\n_piano_ and _forte_ passages. That these several kinds of rhythm,\ncharacterizing \u00e6sthetic expression, are not, in the common sense of the\nword, artificial, but are intenser forms of an undulatory movement\nhabitually generated by feeling in its bodily discharge, is shown by the\nfact that they are all traceable in ordinary speech; which in every\nsentence has its primary and secondary emphases, and its cadence\ncontaining a chief rise and fall complicated with subordinate rises and\nfalls; and which is accompanied by a more or less oscillatory action of\nthe limbs when the emotion is great. Still longer undulations may\nbe observed by every one, in himself and in others, on occasions of\nextreme pleasure or extreme pain. Note, in the first place, that pain\nhaving its origin in bodily disorder, is nearly always perceptibly\nrhythmical. During hours in which it never actually ceases, it has its\nvariations of intensity\u2014fits or paroxysms; and then after these hours of\nsuffering there usually come hours of comparative ease. Moral pain has\nthe like smaller and larger waves. One possessed by intense grief does\nnot utter continuous moans, or shed tears with an equable rapidity; but\nthese signs of passion come in recurring bursts. Then after a time\nduring which such stronger and weaker waves of emotion alternate, there\ncomes a calm\u2014a time of comparative deadness; to which again succeeds\nanother interval, when dull sorrow rises afresh into acute anguish, with\nits series of paroxysms. Similarly in great delight, especially as\nmanifested by children who have its display less under control, there\nare visible variations in the intensity of feeling shown\u2014fits of\nlaughter and dancing about, separated by pauses in which smiles, and\nother slight manifestations of pleasure, suffice to discharge the\nlessened excitement. Nor are there wanting evidences of mental\nundulations greater in length than any of these\u2014undulations which take\nweeks, or months, or years, to complete themselves. We continually hear\nof moods which recur at intervals. Very many persons have their epochs\nof vivacity and depression. There are periods of industry following\nperiods of idleness; and times at which particular subjects or tastes\nare cultivated with zeal, alternating with times at which they are\nneglected. Respecting which slow oscillations, the only qualification to\nbe made is, that being affected by numerous influences, they are\ncomparatively irregular.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 98. In nomadic societies the changes of place, determined as they\nusually are by exhaustion or failure of the supply of food, are\nperiodic; and in many cases show a recurrence answering to the seasons.\nEach tribe that has become in some degree fixed in its locality, goes on\nincreasing, till under the pressures of unsatisfied desires, there\nresults migration of some part of it to a new region\u2014a process repeated\nat intervals. From such excesses of population, and such successive\nwaves of migration, come conflicts with other tribes; which are also\nincreasing and tending to diffuse themselves. This antagonism, like all\nothers, results not in an uniform motion, but in an intermittent one.\nWar, exhaustion, recoil\u2014peace, prosperity, and renewed aggression:\u2014see\nhere the alternation more or less discernible in the military activities\nof both savage and civilized nations. And irregular as is this rhythm,\nit is not more so than the different sizes of the societies, and the\nextremely involved causes of variation in their strengths, would lead us\nto anticipate.\n\nPassing from external to internal changes, we meet with this backward\nand forward movement under many forms. In the currents of commerce it is\nespecially conspicuous. Exchange during early times is almost wholly\ncarried on at fairs, held at long intervals in the chief centres of\npopulation. The flux and reflux of people and commodities which each of\nthese exhibits, becomes more frequent as national development leads to\ngreater social activity. The more rapid rhythm of weekly markets begins\nto supersede the slow rhythm of fairs. And eventually the process of\nexchange becomes at certain places so active, as to bring about daily\nmeetings of buyers and sellers\u2014a daily wave of accumulation and\ndistribution of cotton, or corn, or capital. If from exchange we\nturn to production and consumption, we see undulations, much longer\nindeed in their periods, but almost equally obvious. Supply and demand\nare never completely adapted to each other; but each of them from time\nto time in excess, leads presently to an excess of the other. Farmers\nwho have one season produced wheat very abundantly, are disgusted with\nthe consequent low price; and next season, sowing a much smaller\nquantity, bring to market a deficient crop; whence follows a converse\neffect. Consumption undergoes parallel undulations that need not be\nspecified. The balancing of supplies between different districts, too,\nentails analogous oscillations. A place at which some necessary of life\nis scarce, becomes a place to which currents of it are set up from other\nplaces where it is relatively abundant; and these currents from all\nsides lead to a wave of accumulation where they meet\u2014a glut: whence\nfollows a recoil\u2014a partial return of the currents. But the\nundulatory character of these actions is perhaps best seen in the rises\nand falls of prices. These, given in numerical measures which may be\ntabulated and reduced to diagrams, show us in the clearest manner how\ncommercial movements are compounded of oscillations of various\nmagnitudes. The price of consols or the price of wheat, as thus\nrepresented, is seen to undergo vast ascents and descents whose highest\nand lowest points are reached only in the course of years. These largest\nwaves of variation are broken by others extending over periods of\nperhaps many months. On these again come others having a week or two\u2019s\nduration. And were the changes marked in greater detail, we should have\nthe smaller undulations that take place each day, and the still smaller\nones which brokers telegraph from hour to hour. The whole outline would\nshow a complication like that of a vast ocean-swell, on whose surface\nthere rise large billows, which themselves bear waves of moderate size,\ncovered by wavelets, that are roughened by a minute ripple. Similar\ndiagrammatic representations of births, marriages, and deaths, of\ndisease, of crime, of pauperism, exhibit involved conflicts of\nrhythmical motions throughout society under these several aspects.\n\nThere are like characteristics in social changes of a more complex kind.\nBoth in England and among continental nations, the action and reaction\nof political progress have come to be generally recognized. Religion,\nbesides its occasional revivals of smaller magnitude, has its long\nperiods of exaltation and depression\u2014generations of belief and\nself-mortification, following generations of indifference and laxity.\nThere are poetical epochs, and epochs in which the sense of the\nbeautiful seems almost dormant. Philosophy, after having been awhile\npredominant, lapses for a long season into neglect; and then again\nslowly revives. Each science has its eras of deductive reasoning, and\nits eras when attention is chiefly directed to collecting and\ncolligating facts. And how in such minor but more obtrusive phenomena as\nthose of fashion, there are ever going on oscillations from one extreme\nto the other, is a trite observation.\n\nAs may be foreseen, social rhythms well illustrate the irregularity that\nresults from combination of many causes. Where the variations are those\nof one simple element in national life, as the supply of a particular\ncommodity, we do indeed witness a return, after many involved movements,\nto a previous condition\u2014the price may become what it was before:\nimplying a like relative abundance. But where the action is one into\nwhich many factors enter, there is never a recurrence of exactly the\nsame state. A political reaction never brings round just the old form of\nthings. The rationalism of the present day differs widely from the\nrationalism of the last century. And though fashion from time to time\nrevives extinct types of dress, these always re-appear with decided\nmodifications.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 99. The universality of this principle suggests a question like that\nraised in foregoing cases. Rhythm being manifested in all forms of\nmovement, we have reason to suspect that it is determined by some\nprimordial condition to action in general. The tacit implication is that\nit is deducible from the persistence of force. This we shall find to be\nthe fact.\n\nWhen the prong of a tuning-fork is pulled on one side by the finger, a\ncertain extra tension is produced among its cohering particles; which\nresist any force that draws them out of their state of equilibrium. As\nmuch force as the finger exerts in pulling the prong aside, so much\nopposing force is brought into play among the cohering particles. Hence,\nwhen the prong is liberated, it is urged back by a force equal to that\nused in deflecting it. When, therefore, the prong reaches its original\nposition, the force impressed on it during its recoil, has generated in\nit a corresponding amount of momentum\u2014an amount of momentum nearly\nequivalent, that is, to the force originally impressed (nearly, we must\nsay, because a certain portion has gone in communicating motion to the\nair, and a certain other portion has been transformed into heat). This\nmomentum carries the prong beyond the position of rest, nearly as far as\nit was originally drawn in the reverse direction; until at length, being\ngradually used up in producing an opposing tension among the particles,\nit is all lost. The opposing tension into which the expended momentum\nhas been transformed, then generates a second recoil; and so on\ncontinually\u2014the vibration eventually ceasing only because at each\nmovement a certain amount of force goes in creating atmospheric and\netherial undulations. Now it needs but to contemplate this repeated\naction and reaction, to see that it is, like every action and reaction,\na consequence of the persistence of force. The force exerted by the\nfinger in bending the prong cannot disappear. Under what form then does\nit exist? It exists under the form of that cohesive tension which it has\ngenerated among the particles. This cohesive tension cannot cease\nwithout an equivalent result. What is its equivalent result? The\nmomentum generated in the prong while being carried back to its position\nof rest. This momentum too\u2014what becomes of it? It must either continue\nas momentum, or produce some correlative force of equal amount. It\ncannot continue as momentum, since change of place is resisted by the\ncohesion of the parts; and thus it gradually disappears by being\ntransformed into tension among these parts. This is re-transformed into\nthe equivalent momentum; and so on continuously. If instead of\nmotion that is directly antagonized by the cohesion of matter, we\nconsider motion through space, the same truth presents itself under\nanother form. Though here no opposing force seems at work, and therefore\nno cause of rhythm is apparent, yet its own accumulated momentum must\neventually carry the moving body beyond the body attracting it; and so\nmust become a force at variance with that which generated it. From this\nconflict, rhythm necessarily results as in the foregoing case. The force\nembodied as momentum in a given direction, cannot be destroyed; and if\nit eventually disappears, it re-appears in the reaction on the retarding\nbody; which begins afresh to draw the now arrested mass back from its\naphelion. The only conditions under which there could be absence of\nrhythm\u2014the only conditions, that is, under which there could be a\ncontinuous motion through space in the same straight line for ever,\nwould be the existence of an infinity void of everything but the moving\nbody. And neither of these conditions can be represented in thought.\nInfinity is inconceivable; and so also is a motion which never had a\ncommencement in some pre-existing source of power. Thus, then,\nrhythm is a necessary characteristic of all motion. Given the\ncoexistence everywhere of antagonist forces\u2014a postulate which, as we\nhave seen, is necessitated by the form of our experience\u2014and rhythm is\nan inevitable corollary from the persistence of force.\n\nHence, throughout that re-arrangement of parts which constitutes\nEvolution, we must nowhere expect to see the change from one position of\nthings to another, effected by continuous movement in the same\ndirection. Be it in that kind of Evolution which the inorganic creation\npresents, or in that presented by the organic creation, we shall\neverywhere find a periodicity of action and reaction\u2014a backward and\nforward motion, of which progress is a differential result.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 15:\n\n After having for some years supposed myself alone in the belief that\n all motion is rhythmical, I discovered that my friend Professor\n Tyndall also held this doctrine.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XII.\n THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO EVOLUTION.\n\n\n\u00a7 100. One more preliminary is needful before proceeding. We have still\nto study the conditions under which alone, Evolution can take place.\n\nThe process to be interpreted is, as already said, a certain change in\nthe arrangement of parts. That increase of heterogeneity commonly\ndisplayed throughout Evolution, is not an increase in the number of\nkinds of ultimate or undecomposable units which an aggregate contains;\nbut it is a change in the distribution of such units. If it be assumed\nthat what we call chemical elements, are absolutely simple (which is,\nhowever, an hypothesis having no better warrant than the opposite one);\nthen it must be admitted that in respect to the number of kinds of\nmatter contained in it, the Earth is not more heterogeneous at present\nthan it was at first\u2014that in this respect, it would be as heterogeneous\nwere all its undecomposable parts uniformly mixed, as it is now, when\nthey are arranged and combined in countless different ways. But the\nincrease of heterogeneity with which we have to deal, and of which alone\nour senses can take cognizance, is that produced by the passage from\nunity of distribution to variety of distribution. Given an aggregate\nconsisting of several orders of primitive units that are unchangeable;\nthen, these units may be so uniformly dispersed among each other, that\nany portion of the mass shall be like any other portion in its sensible\nproperties; or they may be so segregated, simply and in endless\ncombinations, that the various portions of the mass shall not be like\neach other in their sensible properties. A transformation of one of\nthese arrangements into the other, is that which constitutes Evolution.\nWe have to analyze the process through which structural uniformity\nbecomes structural multiformity\u2014to ascertain how the originally equal\nrelations of position among the mixed units, pass into relations of\nposition that are more and more unequal, and more and more numerous in\ntheir kinds of inequality; and how this takes place throughout all the\nascending grades of compound units, until we come even to those of which\nsocieties are made up.\n\nChange in the relations of position among the component units, simple or\ncomplex, being the phenomenon we have to interpret; we must first\ninquire what are the circumstances which prevent its occurrence, and\nwhat are the circumstances which facilitate it.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 101. The constituents of an aggregate cannot be re-arranged, unless\nthey are moveable: manifestly, they must not be so firmly bound together\nthat the incident force fails to alter their positions. No bodies are,\nindeed, possessed of this absolute rigidity; since an incident force in\nbeing propagated through a body, always produces temporary alterations\nin the relative positions of its units, if not permanent alterations. It\nis true also, that even permanent re-arrangements of the units may be\nthus wrought throughout the interiors of comparatively dense masses,\nwithout any outward sign: as happens with certain crystals, which, on\nexposure to sunlight, undergo molecular changes so great as to alter\ntheir planes of cleavage. Nevertheless, since total immobility of the\nparts must totally negative their re-arrangement; and since that\ncomparative immobility which we see in very coherent matter, is a great\nobstacle to re-arrangement; it is self-evident that Evolution can be\nexhibited in any considerable degree, only where there is comparative\nmobility of parts. On the other hand, those definite distributive\nchanges which constitute Evolution, cannot be extensively or variously\ndisplayed, where the mobility of the parts is extreme. In liquids, the\ncohesion of the units is so slight that there is no permanency in their\nrelations of position to each other. Such re-arrangement as any incident\nforce generates, is immediately destroyed again by the momentum of the\nconstituents moved; and so, nothing but that temporary heterogeneity\nseen in circulating currents, can be produced. The like still more\nobviously holds of gases. Thus, while the theoretical limits\nbetween which Evolution is possible, are absolute immobility of parts\nand absolute mobility of parts; we may say that practically, Evolution\ncannot go on to any considerable extent where the mobility is very great\nor very little. A few examples will facilitate the realization of this\ntruth.\n\nThe highest degrees of Evolution are found in semi-solid bodies, or\nbodies that come midway between the two extremes specified. Even\nsemi-solid bodies of the inorganic class, exhibit the segregation of\nmixed units with comparative readiness: witness the fact to which\nattention was first drawn by Mr. Babbage, that when the pasty mixture of\nground flints and kaolin, prepared for the manufacture of porcelain, is\nkept some time, it becomes gritty and unfit for use, in consequence of\nthe particles of silica separating themselves from the rest, and uniting\ntogether in grains; or witness the fact known to every housewife, that\nin long-kept currant-jelly the sugar takes the shape of imbedded\ncrystals. While throughout the immense majority of the semi-solid\nbodies, namely, the organic bodies, the proclivity to a re-arrangement\nof parts is so comparatively great, as to be usually taken for a\ndistinctive characteristic of them. Among organic bodies\nthemselves, we may trace contrasts having a like significance. It is an\naccepted generalization that, other things equal, the rate of Evolution\nis greatest where the plasticity is most marked. In that portion of an\negg which displays the formative processes during the early stages of\nincubation, the changes of arrangement are more rapid than those which\nan equal portion of the body of a hatched chick undergoes. As may be\ninferred from their respective powers to acquire habits and aptitudes,\nthe structural modifiability of a child is greater than that of an adult\nman; and the structural modifiability of an adult man is greater than\nthat of an old man: contrasts which are accompanied by corresponding\ncontrasts in the densities of the tissues; since the ratio of water to\nsolid matter diminishes with advancing age. The most decisive\nproof, however, is furnished by those marked retardations or arrests of\norganic change, that take place when the tissues suffer a great loss of\nwater. Certain of the lower animals, as the _Rotifera_, may be rendered\napparently lifeless by desiccation, and will yet revive when wetted: as\ntheir substance passes from the fluid-solid to the solid state, it\nceases to be the seat of those changes which constitute functional\nactivity and cause structural advance; and such changes recommence as\ntheir substance passes from the solid to the fluid-solid state.\nAnalogous instances occur among much higher animals. When the African\nrivers which it inhabits are dried up, the _Lepidosiren_ remains torpid\nin the hardened mud, until the return of the rainy season brings water.\nHumboldt states that during the summer drought, the alligators of the\nPampas lie buried in a state of suspended animation beneath the parched\nsurface, and struggle up out of the earth as soon as it becomes humid.\nNow though we have no proof that these partial arrests of vital\nactivity, are consequent on the reduction of the fluid-solid tissues to\na more solid form; yet their occurrence along with a cessation in the\nsupply of water, is reason for suspecting that this is the case. And\nsimilarly, though in the more numerous instances where loss of water\nleads to complete arrest of vital activity, we are unable to say that\nthe immediate cause is a stoppage of molecular changes that results from\na diminution of molecular mobility; yet it seems not improbable that\nthis is the rationale of death by thirst.\n\nProbably few will expect to find this same condition to Evolution,\nillustrated in aggregates so widely different in kind as societies. Yet\neven here it may be shown that no considerable degree of Evolution is\nexhibited, where there is either great mobility of the parts, or great\nimmobility of them. In such tribes as those inhabiting Australia, we see\nextremely little cohesion among the units: there is neither that partial\nfixity of relative positions which results from the commencement of\nagriculture, nor that partial fixity of relative positions implied by\nthe establishment of social grades. And along with this want of\ncohesion, we find an absence of permanent differentiations. Conversely,\nin societies of the oriental type, where accumulated traditions, laws,\nand usages, and long-fixed class-arrangements, exercise great\nrestraining power over individual actions, we find Evolution almost\nstopped. Through the medium of institutions and opinions, the forces\nbrought to bear on each unit by the rest, are so great as to prevent the\nunits from sensibly yielding to forces tending to re-arrange them. The\ncondition most favourable to increase of social heterogeneity, is a\nmedium coherence among the parts\u2014a moderate facility of change in the\nrelations of citizens, joined with a moderate resistance to such\nchange\u2014a considerable freedom of individual actions, qualified by a\nconsiderable restraint over individual actions\u2014a certain attachment to\npre-established arrangements, and a certain readiness to be impelled by\nnew influences into new arrangements\u2014a compromise between fixity and\nunfixity such as that which we, perhaps as much as any nation, exhibit.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 102. Another condition to Evolution, of the same order as the last\nthough of a different genus, must be noted. We have found that permanent\nre-arrangement among the units of an aggregate, can take place only when\nthey have neither extreme immobility nor extreme mobility. The mobility\nand immobility thus far considered (at least in all aggregates except\nsocial ones) are those due to mechanical cohesion. There is, however,\nwhat we must call chemical cohesion, which also influences the mobility\nof the units, and consequently the re-arrangement of them. Manifestly,\nif two or more kinds of units contained in any aggregate, are united by\npowerful affinities, an incident force, failing to destroy their\ncohesions, will not cause such various re-arrangements as it would,\ncould it produce new chemical combinations as well as new mechanical\nadjustments. On the other hand, chemical affinities that are easily\novercome, must be favourable to multiplied re-arrangements of the units.\n\nThis condition, as well as the preceding one, is fulfilled in the\nhighest degree, by those aggregates which most variously display the\ntransformation of the uniform into the multiform. Organic bodies are on\nthe average distinguished from inorganic bodies, by the readiness with\nwhich the compounds they consist of undergo decomposition, and\nrecomposition: the chemical cohesions of their components are so\ncomparatively small, that small incident forces suffice to overcome them\nand cause transpositions of the components. Further, between the two\ngreat divisions of organisms, we find a contrast in the degree of\nEvolution co-existing with a contrast in the degree of chemical\nmodifiability. As a class, the nitrogenous compounds are peculiarly\nunstable; and, speaking generally, these are present in much larger\nquantities in animal tissues than they are in vegetal tissues; while,\nspeaking generally, animals are much more heterogeneous than plants.\n\nUnder this head it may be well also to point out that, other things\nequal, the structural variety which is possible in any aggregate, must\nbear a relation to the number of kinds of units contained in the\naggregate. A body made up of units of one order, cannot admit of so many\ndifferent re-arrangements, as one made up of units of two orders. And\neach additional order of units must increase, in a geometrical\nproportion, the number of re-arrangements that may be made.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 103. Yet one more condition to be specified, is the state of agitation\nin which the constituents of an aggregate are kept. A familiar\nexpedience will introduce us to this condition. When a vessel has been\nfilled to the brim with loose fragments, shaking the vessel causes them\nto settle down into less space, so that more may be put in. And when\namong these fragments, there are some of much greater specific gravity\nthan the rest, these will, in the course of a prolonged shaking, find\ntheir way to the bottom. What now is the meaning of these two results,\nwhen expressed in general terms? We have a group of units acted on by an\nincident force\u2014the attraction of the Earth. So long as these units are\nnot agitated, this incident force produces no changes in their relative\npositions; agitate them, and immediately their loose arrangement passes\ninto a more compact arrangement. Again, so long as they are not\nagitated, the incident force cannot separate the heavier units from the\nlighter; agitate them, and immediately the heavier units begin to\nsegregate. By these illustrations, a rude idea will be conveyed of the\neffect which vibration has in facilitating those re-arrangements which\nconstitute Evolution. What here happens with visible units subject to\nvisible oscillations, happens also with invisible units subject to\ninvisible oscillations.\n\nOne or two cases in which these oscillations are of mechanical origin,\nmay first be noted. When a bar of steel is suspended in the magnetic\nmeridian, and repeatedly so struck as to send vibrations through it, it\nbecomes magnetized: the magnetic force of the Earth, which does not\npermanently affect it while undisturbed, alters its internal state when\na mechanical agitation is propagated among its particles; and the\nalteration is believed by physicists, to be a molecular re-arrangement.\nIt may be fairly objected that this re-arrangement is hypothetical; and\ndid the fact stand alone, it would be of little worth. It gains\nsignificance, however, when joined with the fact that in the same\nsubstance, long-continued mechanical vibrations are followed by\nmolecular re-arrangements that are abundantly visible. A piece of iron\nwhich, when it leaves the workshop, is fibrous in structure, will become\ncrystalline if exposed to a perpetual jar. Though the polar forces\nmutually exercised by the atoms, fail to change their disorderly\narrangement into an orderly arrangement while the atoms are relatively\nquiescent, these forces produce this change when the atoms are kept in a\nstate of intestine disturbance.\n\nBut the effects which visible oscillations and oscillations sensible to\ntouch, have in facilitating the re-arrangement of parts by an incident\nforce, are insignificant compared with the effects which insensible\noscillations have in aiding such change of structure. It is a doctrine\nnow generally accepted among men of science, that the particles of\ntangible matter, as well as the particles of ether, undulate. As\ninterpreted in conformity with this doctrine, the heat of a body is\nsimply its state of molecular motion. A mass which feels cold, is one\nhaving but slight molecular motion, and conveying but slight molecular\nmotion to the surrounding medium or to the hand touching it. A mass hot\nenough to radiate a sensible warmth, is one of which the more violently\nagitated molecules, communicate increased undulations to the surrounding\nethereal medium; while the burn inflicted by it on the skin, is the\nexpression of increased undulations of the organic molecules. Such\nfurther heat as produces softening and a consequent distortion of the\nmass, is an agitation so much augmented that the units can no longer\ncompletely maintain their relative positions. Fusion is an agitation so\nextreme, that the relative positions of the units are changeable with\nease. When, finally, at a still higher temperature, the liquid is\ntransformed into a gas, the explanation is, that the oscillations are so\nviolent as to overbalance that force which held the units in close\ncontiguity\u2014so violent as to keep the units at those relatively great\ndistances apart to which they are now thrown. Since the\nestablishment of the correlation between heat and motion first gave\nprobability to this hypothesis, it has been receiving various\nconfirmations\u2014especially by recent remarkable discoveries respecting the\nabsorption of heat by gases. Prof. Tyndall has proved that the quantity\nof heat which any gas takes up from rays of heat passing through it, has\na distinct relation to the complexity of the atoms composing the gas.\nThe simple gases abstract but little; the gases composed of binary atoms\nabstract, say in round numbers, a hundred times as much; while the gases\ncomposed of atoms severally containing three, four, or more simple ones,\nabstract something like a thousand times as much. These differences\nProf. Tyndall regards as due to the different abilities of the different\natoms to take up, in the increase of their own undulations, those\nundulations of the ethereal medium which constitute heat\u2014an\ninterpretation in perfect accordance with the late results of\nspectrum-analysis; which go to show that the various elementary atoms,\nwhen in an aeriform state, intercept those luminiferous vibrations of\nthe ether which are in unison or harmony with their own. And since it\nholds of solid as of gaseous matters, that those consisting of simple\nunits transmit heat far more readily than those consisting of complex\nunits; we get confirmation of the inference otherwise reached, that the\nunits of matter in whatever state of aggregation they exist, oscillate,\nand that variations of temperature are variations in the amounts of\ntheir oscillations.\n\nProceeding on this hypothesis, which it would be out of place here to\ndefend at greater length, we have now to note how the re-arrangement of\nparts is facilitated by these insensible vibrations, as we have seen it\nto be by sensible vibrations. One or two cases of physical\nre-arrangement may first be noted. When some molten glass is\ndropped into water, and when its outside is thus, by sudden\nsolidification, prevented from partaking in that contraction which the\nsubsequent cooling of the inside tends to produce; the units are left in\nsuch a state of tension, that the mass flies into fragments if a small\nportion of it be broken off. But now, if this mass be kept for a day or\ntwo at a considerable heat, though a heat not sufficient to alter its\nform or produce any sensible diminution of hardness, this extreme\nbrittleness disappears: the component particles being thrown into\ngreater agitation, the tensile forces are enabled to re-arrange them\ninto a state of equilibrium. An illustration of another order is\nfurnished by the subsidence of fine precipitates. These sink down very\nslowly from solutions that are cold; while warm solutions deposit them\nwith comparative rapidity. That is to say, an increase of molecular\nvibration throughout the mass, allows the suspended particles to\nseparate more readily from the particles of fluid. The effect of\nheat on chemical re-arrangement is so familiar, that examples are\nscarcely needed. Be the substances concerned gaseous, liquid, or solid,\nit equally holds that their chemical unions and disunions are aided by a\nrise of temperature. Affinities which do not suffice to effect the\nre-arrangement of mixed units that are in a state of feeble agitation,\nsuffice to effect it when the agitation is raised to a certain point.\nAnd so long as this molecular motion is not great enough to prevent\nthose chemical cohesions which the affinities tend to produce, increase\nof it gives increased facility of chemical re-arrangement.\n\nThis condition, in common with the preceding ones, is fulfilled most\ncompletely in those aggregates which exhibit the phenomena of Evolution\nin the highest degree; namely, the organic aggregates. And throughout\nthe various orders and states of these, we find minor contrasts showing\nthe relation between amount of molecular vibration and activity of the\nmetamorphic changes. Such contrasts may be arranged in the several\nfollowing groups. Speaking generally, the phenomena of Evolution\nare manifested in a much lower degree throughout the vegetal kingdom\nthan throughout the animal kingdom; and speaking generally, the heat of\nplants is less than that of animals. Among plants themselves, the\norganic changes vary in rate as the temperature varies. Though light is\nthe agent which effects those molecular changes causing vegetal growth,\nyet we see that in the absence of heat, such changes are not effected:\nin winter there is enough light, but the heat being insufficient,\nplant-life is suspended. That this is the sole cause of the suspension,\nis proved by the fact that at the same season, plants contained in\nhot-houses, where they receive even a smaller amount of light, go on\nproducing leaves and flowers. A comparison of the several\ndivisions of the animal kingdom with each other, shows among them\nparallel relations. Regarded as a whole, vertebrate animals are higher\nin temperature than invertebrate ones; and they are as a whole higher in\norganic activity and development. Between subdivisions of the vertebrata\nthemselves, like differences in the state of molecular vibration,\naccompany like differences in the degree of evolution. The least\nheterogeneous of the vertebrata are the fishes; and in most cases, the\nheat of fishes is nearly the same as that of the water in which they\nswim: only some of them being decidedly warmer. Though we habitually\nspeak of reptiles as cold-blooded; and though they have not much more\npower than fishes of maintaining a temperature above that of their\nmedium; yet since their medium (which is, in the majority of cases, the\nair of warm climates) is on the average warmer than the medium inhabited\nby fishes, the temperature of the class of reptiles is higher than that\nof the class of fishes; and we see in them a correspondingly higher\ncomplexity. The much more active molecular agitation in mammals and\nbirds, is associated with a considerably greater multiformity of\nstructure and a very much greater vivacity. And though birds, which are\nhotter blooded than mammals, do not show us a greater multiformity; yet,\njudging from their apparently greater locomotive powers, we may infer\nmore rapid functional changes, which, equally with structural changes,\nimply molecular re-arrangement. The most instructive contrasts,\nhowever, are those presented by the same organic aggregates at different\ntemperatures. Thus we see that ova undergoing development, must be kept\nmore or less warm\u2014that in the absence of a certain molecular vibration,\nthe re-arrangement of parts does not go on. We see, again, that in\nhybernating animals, loss of heat carried to a particular point, results\nin extreme retardation of the organic changes. Yet further, we see that\nin animals which do not hybernate, as in man, prolonged exposure to\nextreme cold, produces an irresistible tendency to sleep (which implies\na lowering of the functional activity); and then, if the abstraction of\nheat continues, this sleep ends in death, or arrest of functional\nactivity. Lastly, we see that when the temperature is lowered till the\ncontained water solidifies, there is a stoppage not only of those\nmolecular re-arrangements which constitute life and development, but\nalso of those molecular re-arrangements which constitute decomposition.\n\nEvidently then, both sensible and insensible agitations among the\ncomponents of an aggregate, facilitate any re-distributions to which\nthere may be a tendency. When that rhythmic change in the relative\npositions of the units which constitutes vibration, is considerable, the\nrelative positions of the units more readily undergo permanent changes\nthrough the action of incident forces.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 104. These special conditions to Evolution, are clearly but different\nforms of one general condition. The abstract proposition, that a\npermanent re-arrangement of units is possible only when they have\nneither absolute immobility nor absolute mobility with respect to each\nother, we saw to be practically equivalent to the proposition, that\nextreme cohesion and extreme want of cohesion among the units are\nunfavourable to Evolution. Be this cohesion or want of cohesion that\nwhich physically characterizes the matter as we ordinarily know it; be\nit that cohesion or want of cohesion distinguished as chemical; or be it\nthat cohesion or want of cohesion consequent on the degree of molecular\nvibration; matters not, in so far as the general conclusion is\nconcerned. Inductively as well as deductively, we find that the genesis\nof such permanent changes in the relative positions of parts, as can be\neffected without destroying the continuity of the aggregate, implies a\nmedium stability in the relative positions of the parts: be this\nstability physical, chemical, or that which varies with the state of\nagitation. And as might be anticipated _\u00e0 priori_, it is proved _\u00e0\nposteriori_, that this re-arrangement of parts goes on most actively in\nthose aggregates whose units are moderately influenced by all these\nforces which affect their mobility.\n\nHere also may properly be added the remark, that to effect these changes\nin the relative positions of parts, the incident forces must range\nwithin certain limits. It is wholly a question of the ratio between\nthose agencies which hold the units in their positions, and those\nagencies which tend to change their positions. Having given intensities\nin the powers that oppose re-arrangement, there need proportionate\nintensities in the powers that work re-arrangement. As there must be\nneither too great nor too little cohesion; so there must be neither too\nlittle nor too great amounts of the influences antagonistic to cohesion.\nWhile a slight mechanical strain produces no lasting alterations in the\nrelative positions of parts, an excessive mechanical strain causes\ndisruption\u2014causes so great an alteration in the relative positions of\nparts as to destroy their union in one aggregate. While a very feeble\nchemical affinity brought to bear on the associated units, fails to work\nany re-arrangement of them; a chemical affinity that is extremely\nintense, destroys their structural continuity, and reduces such complex\nre-arrangements as have been made, to comparatively simple ones. And\nwhile in the absence of adequate thermal undulations, the units have not\nfreedom enough to obey the re-arranging influences impressed on them,\nthe incidence of violent thermal undulations gives them such extreme\nfreedom that they break their connexions, and the aggregate lapses into\na liquid or gaseous form.\n\nOn the one hand, therefore, the statical forces which uphold the state\nof aggregation must not be so great as wholly to prevent those changes\nof relative position among the units which the dynamical forces tend to\nproduce; and, on the other hand, the dynamical forces must not be so\ngreat as wholly to overcome the statical forces, and destroy the state\nof aggregation. The excess of the dynamical forces must be sufficient to\nproduce Evolution, but not sufficient to produce Dissolution.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 105. And now we are naturally introduced to a consideration which,\nthough it does not come quite within the limits of this chapter as\nexpressed in its title, may yet be more conveniently dealt with here\nthan elsewhere. Hitherto we have studied the metamorphosis of things,\nonly as exhibited in the changed distribution of matter. It remains to\nlook at it as exhibited in the changed distribution of motion. The\ndefinition of Evolution in its material aspect, has to be supplemented\nby a definition of Evolution in its dynamical aspect.\n\nOn inquiring the source of the sensible motions seen in every kind of\nEvolution, we find them all traceable to insensible motions; either of\nthat tangible matter which we perceive as constituting the objects\naround us, or of that intangible matter which we infer as occupying\nspace. A brief reconsideration of the facts will make this obvious.\n The formation of celestial bodies, supposing it caused by the\nunion of dispersed units, must, from the beginning, have involved a\ndiminished motion of these units with respect to each other; and such\nmotion as each resulting body acquired, must previously have existed in\nthe motions of its units. If concrete matter has arisen by the\naggregation of diffused matter, then concrete motion has arisen by the\naggregation of diffused motion. That which now exists as the movement of\nmasses, implies the cessation of an equivalent molecular movement.\n Those transpositions of matter which constitute geological\nchanges, are clearly referable to the same source. As before shown, the\ndenudation of lands and deposit of new strata, are effected by water in\nthe course of its descent from the clouds to the sea, or during the\narrest of those undulations produced on it by winds; and, as before\nshown, the elevation of water to the height whence it fell, is due to\nsolar heat, as is also the genesis of those aerial currents which drift\nit about when evaporated and agitate its surface when condensed. That is\nto say, the molecular motion of the etherial medium, is transformed into\nthe motion of gases, thence into the motion of liquids, and thence into\nthe motion of solids\u2014stages in each of which, successively, a certain\namount of molecular motion is lost and an equivalent motion of masses\nproduced. If we seek the origin of vital movements, we soon reach\na like conclusion. The actinic rays issuing from the Sun, enable the\nplant to reduce special elements existing in gaseous combination around\nit, to a solid form,\u2014enable the plant, that is, to grow and carry on its\nfunctional changes. And since growth, equally with circulation of sap,\nis a mode of sensible motion, while those rays which have been expended\nin generating it consist of insensible motions, we have here, too, a\ntransformation of the kind alleged. Animals, derived as their forces\nare, directly or indirectly, from plants, carry this transformation a\nstep further. The automatic movements of the viscera, together with the\nvoluntary movements of the limbs and body at large, arise at the expense\nof certain molecular movements throughout the nervous and muscular\ntissues; and these originally arose at the expense of certain other\nmolecular movements propagated by the Sun to the Earth; so that both the\nstructural and functional motions which organic Evolution displays, are\nmotions of aggregates generated by the arrested motions of units.\n Even with the aggregates of these aggregates the same rule holds.\nFor among associated men, the progress is ever towards a merging of\nindividual actions in the actions of corporate bodies. An undeveloped\nsociety is composed of members between whom there is little concert:\nthey fulfil their several wants without mutual aid; and only on\noccasions of aggression or defence, act together\u2014occasions on which\ntheir combination, small as it is in extent, frequently fails because it\nis so imperfect. In the course of civilization, however, co-operation\nbecomes step by step more decided. As tribes grow into nations, there\nresult larger aggregates, each of which has a joint political life\u2014a\ncommon policy and movement with respect to other aggregates. Legislative\nand administrative progress, involves an increase in the number of\nrestraining agents brought into united and simultaneous action. In\nmilitary organization, we see an advance from small undisciplined hordes\nof armed men, to vast bodies of regular troops, so drilled that the\nmovements of the units are entirely subordinated to the movements of the\nmasses. Nor does industrial development fail to show parallel changes.\nBeginning with independent workers, and passing step by step to the\nemployment of several assistants by one master, there has ever been, and\nstill is, a progress towards the co-operation of greater masses of\nlabourers in the same establishment, and towards the union of\ncapitalists into more numerous and larger companies: in both which kinds\nof combined action, equivalent amounts of individual action disappear.\n Under all its forms, then, Evolution, considered dynamically, is a\ndecrease in the relative movements of parts, and an increase in the\nrelative movements of wholes\u2014using the words parts and wholes in their\nwidest senses. From the infinitesimal motions of those infinitesimal\nunits composing the etherial medium, to the larger though still\ninsensible motions of the larger though still insensible units composing\ngaseous, fluid, and solid matter, and thence to the visible motions of\nvisible aggregates, the advance is from molecular motion to the motion\nof masses.\n\nBut now what of the converse process? If the foregoing proposition is\ntrue, then a change from the motion of masses to molecular motion, is\nthe opposite to Evolution\u2014is Dissolution. Is this so? Of inorganic\ndissolution we have but little experience; or at least, our experience\nof it is on too small a scale to exhibit it as the antithesis of\nEvolution. We know, indeed, that when solids are dissolved in liquids,\ntheir dissolution implies increased movements of their units, at the\nexpense of diminished movements among the units of their solvents; and\nwe know that when a liquid evaporates, its dissipation or dissolution\nsimilarly implies greater relative movements of the units, and decrease\nof such combined movement as they before had. But since these small\naggregates of inorganic matter, do not exhibit the phenomena of\nEvolution, save in the form of simple integration; so they do not\nexhibit the phenomena of dissolution, save in the form of simple\ndisintegration. Of organic dissolution, however, our experience\nsuffices to show that it is a decrease of combined motion, and an\nincrease in the motion of uncombined parts. The gradual cessation of\nfunctions, vegetal or animal, is a cessation of the sensible movements\nof fluids and solids. In animals, the impulsions of the body from place\nto place, first cease; presently the limbs cannot be stirred; later\nstill the respiratory actions stop; finally the heart becomes\nstationary, and, with it, the circulating fluids. That is, the\ntransformation of molecular motion into the motion of masses, comes to\nan end. What next takes place? We cannot say that sensible movements are\ntransformed into insensible movements; for sensible movements no longer\nexist. Nevertheless, the process of decay involves an increase of\ninsensible movements; since this is far greater in the gases generated\nby decomposition, than it is in the fluid-solid matters generating them.\nIndeed, it might be contended that as, during Dissolution, there is a\nchange from the vibration of large compound atoms to the vibration of\nsmall and comparatively simple ones, the process is strictly\nantithetical to that of Evolution. In conformity with the now current\nconception lately explained, each of the highly complex chemical units\ncomposing an organic body, possesses a rhythmic movement\u2014a movement in\nwhich its many component units jointly partake. When decomposition\nbreaks up these highly complex atoms, and their constituents assume a\ngaseous form, there is both an increase of molecular motion implied by\nthe diffusion, and a further increase implied by the resolving of such\nmotions as the aggregate atoms possessed, into motions of their\nconstituent atoms. So that in organic dissolution we have, first, an end\nput to that transformation of the motion of units into the motion of\naggregates, which constitutes Evolution, dynamically considered; and we\nhave also, though in a subtler sense, a transformation of the motion of\naggregates into the motion of units. The formula equally applies\nto the dissolution of a society. When social ties, be they governmental\nor industrial, are destroyed, the combined actions of citizens lapse\ninto uncombined actions. Those general forces which restrained\nindividual doings, having disappeared, the only remaining restraints are\nthose separately exercised by individuals on each other. There are no\nlonger any of the joint operations by which men satisfy their wants;\nand, in so far as they can, they satisfy their wants by separate\noperations. That is to say, the movement of parts replaces the movement\nof wholes.\n\nUnder its dynamical aspect then, Evolution, so far as we can trace it,\nis a change from molecular motion to the motion of masses; while\nDissolution, so far as we can trace it, is a change from the motion of\nmasses to molecular motion.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 106. To these abstract definitions may be added concrete ones. Besides\nan integration of motions corresponding to the integration of masses,\nEvolution involves an increase in the multiformity of the motions,\ncorresponding to the increase in the multiformity of the masses. If,\ncontemplating it as materially displayed, we find Evolution to consist\nin the change from an indefinite, homogeneous distribution of parts to a\ndefinite, heterogeneous distribution of parts; then, contemplating\nEvolution as dynamically displayed, it consists in a change from\nindefinite, homogeneous motions to definite, heterogeneous motions.\n\nThis change takes place under the form of an increased variety of\nrhythms. We have already seen that all motion is rhythmical, from the\ninfinitesimal vibrations of infinitesimal molecules, up to those vast\noscillations between perihelion and aphelion performed by vast celestial\nbodies. And as the contrast between these extreme cases suggests, a\nmultiplication of rhythms must accompany a multiplication in the degrees\nand modes of aggregation, and in the relations of the aggregated masses\nto incident forces. The degree or mode of aggregation will not, indeed,\naffect the rate or extent of rhythm where the incident force increases\nas the aggregate increases, which is the case with gravitation: here the\nonly cause of variation in rhythm, is difference of relation to the\nincident forces; as we see in a pendulum, which, though unaffected in\nits movements by a change in the weight of the bob, alters its rate of\noscillation when taken to the equator. But in all cases where the\nincident forces do not vary as the masses, every new order of\naggregation initiates a new order of rhythm: witness the conclusion\ndrawn from the recent researches into radiant heat and light, that the\natoms of different gases have different rates of undulation. So that\nincreased multiformity in the arrangement of matter, has necessarily\ngenerated increased multiformity of rhythm; both through increased\nvariety in the sizes and forms of aggregates, and through increased\nvariety in their relations to the forces which move them. The\nadvancing heterogeneity of motion, thus entailed by advancing\nheterogeneity in the distribution of matter, does not, however, end\nhere. Besides multiplication in the kinds of rhythm, there is a\nprogressing complexity in their combinations. As there arise wholes\ncomposed of heterogeneous parts, each of which has its own rhythm, there\nmust arise compound rhythms proportionately heterogeneous. We before saw\nthat this is visible even in the cyclical perturbations of the Solar\nSystem\u2014simple as are its structure and movements. And when we\ncontemplate highly-developed organic bodies, we find the complication of\nrhythms so great, that it defies definite analysis, and from moment to\nmoment works out in resultants that are incalculable.\n\nThis conception of Evolution forms a needful complement to that on which\nwe have hitherto chiefly dwelt. To comprehend the phenomena in their\nentirety, we have to contemplate both the increasing multiformity of\nparts, and the increasing multiformity of the actions simultaneously\nassumed by these parts. At the same time that there are differentiations\nand integrations of the matter, there are differentiations and\nintegrations of its motion. And this increasingly heterogeneous\ndistribution of motion, constitutes Evolution _functionally_ considered;\nas distinguished from that increasingly heterogeneous distribution of\nmatter, which constitutes Evolution _structurally_ considered. While of\ncourse, Dissolution exhibits the transition to a reverse distribution,\nboth structurally and functionally.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 107. One other preliminary must be set down. When specifically\ninterpreting Evolution, we shall have to consider under their concrete\nforms, the various resolutions of force that follow its conflict with\nmatter. Here it will be well to contemplate such resolutions under their\nmost general or abstract forms.\n\nAny incident force is primarily resolvable or divisible into its\n_effective_ and _non-effective_ portions. In mechanical impact, the\nentire momentum of a striking body is never communicated to the body\nstruck: even under those most favourable conditions in which the\nstriking body loses all its sensible motion, there still remains with it\na portion of the original momentum, under the shape of that insensible\nmotion produced among its particles by the collision. Of the light or\nheat falling on any mass, a part, more or less considerable, is\nreflected; and only the remaining part works molecular changes in the\nmass. Next it is to be noted that the effective force, is itself\ndivisible into the _temporarily effective_ and the _permanently\neffective_. The units of an aggregate acted on, may undergo those\nrhythmical changes of relative position which constitute increased\nvibration, as well as other changes of relative position which are not\nfrom instant to instant neutralized by opposite ones. Of these, the\nfirst, disappearing in the shape of radiating undulations, leave the\nmolecular arrangement as it originally was; while the second conduce to\nthat re-arrangement constituting Evolution. Yet a further\ndistinction has to be made. The permanently effective force works out\nchanges of relative position of two kinds\u2014the _insensible_ and the\n_sensible_. The insensible transpositions among the units are those\nconstituting what we call chemical composition and decomposition; and it\nis these which we recognize as the qualitative differences that arise in\nan aggregate. The sensible transpositions are such as result when\ncertain of the units, instead of being put into different relations with\ntheir immediate neighbours, are carried away from them and united\ntogether elsewhere.\n\nConcerning these divisions and sub-divisions of any force affecting an\naggregate, the fact which it chiefly concerns us to observe, is, that\nthey are complementary to each other. Of the whole incident force, the\neffective must be that which remains after deducting the non-effective.\nThe two parts of the effective force must vary inversely as each other:\nwhere much of it is temporarily effective, little of it can be\npermanently effective; and _vice vers\u00e2_. Lastly, the permanently\neffective force, being expended in working both the insensible\nre-arrangements which constitute chemical modification, and the sensible\nre-arrangements which result in structure, must generate of either kind\nan amount that is great or small in proportion as it has generated a\nsmall or great amount of the other.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 108. And now of the propositions grouped together in this chapter, it\nmay be well to remark that, in common with foregoing propositions, they\nhave for their warrant the fundamental truth with which our synthesis\nset out.\n\nThat when a given force falls on any aggregate, the permanently\neffective part of it will produce an amount of re-arrangement that is\ninversely proportional to the cohesion existing among the parts of the\naggregate, is demonstrable _\u00e0 priori_. Whether the cohesion be\nmechanical or chemical, or whether it be temporarily modified by a\nchanged degree of molecular vibration, matters not to the general\nconclusion. In all these cases it follows from the persistence of force,\nthat in proportion as the units offer great resistance to alteration in\ntheir relative positions, must the amount of motion which a given force\nimpresses on them be small. The proposition is in fact an identical one;\nsince the cohesion of units is known to be great or small, only by the\nsmallness or greatness of the re-arrangement which a given incident\nforce produces.\n\nThe continuity of motion we found to be a corollary from the persistence\nof force; and from the continuity of motion, it follows that molecular\nmotion and the motion of masses can be respectively increased only at\neach other\u2019s expense. Hence, if in the course of Evolution there arises\na motion of masses that did not before exist, there must have ceased an\nequivalent molecular motion; and if in the course of Dissolution there\narises a molecular motion that did not before exist, an equivalent\nmotion of masses must have disappeared.\n\nEqually necessary is the conclusion that the several results of the\nforce expended on any aggregate, must be complementary to each other. It\nis not less obviously a corollary from the persistence of force, that of\nthe whole incident force the effective is the part which remains after\ndeducting the non-effective; than it is, that of the effective force,\nwhatever does not work permanent results, works temporary results, and\nthat such amount of the permanently effective force as is not absorbed\nin producing insensible re-arrangements, will produce sensible\nre-arrangements.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XIII.\n THE INSTABILITY OF THE HOMOGENEOUS.[16]\n\n\n\u00a7 109. Thus far our steps towards the interpretation of Evolution have\nbeen preparatory. We have dealt with the factors of the process, rather\nthan the process itself. After the ultimate truth that, Matter, Motion,\nand Force, as cognizable by human intelligence, can neither come into\nexistence nor cease to exist, we have considered certain other ultimate\ntruths concerning the modes in which Force and Motion are manifested\nduring the changes they produce in Matter. Now we have to study the\nchanges themselves. We have here to analyze that re-arrangement in the\nparts of Matter, which occurs under the influence of Force, that is\nunchangeable in quantity though changeable in form, through the medium\nof Motion taking place rhythmically along lines of least resistance. The\nproposition which comes first in logical order, is, that some\nre-arrangement must result; and this proposition may be best dealt with\nunder the more specific shape, that the condition of homogeneity is a\ncondition of unstable equilibrium.\n\nFirst, as to the meaning of the terms; respecting which some readers may\nneed explanation. The phrase _unstable equilibrium_ is one used in\nmechanics to express a balance of forces of such kind, that the\ninterference of any further force, however minute, will destroy the\narrangement previously subsisting; and bring about a totally different\narrangement. Thus, a stick poised on its lower end is in unstable\nequilibrium: however exactly it may be placed in a perpendicular\nposition, as soon as it is left to itself it begins, at first\nimperceptibly, to lean on one side, and with increasing rapidity falls\ninto another attitude. Conversely, a stick suspended from its upper end\nis in stable equilibrium: however much disturbed, it will return to the\nsame position. The proposition is, then, that the state of homogeneity,\nlike the state of the stick poised on its lower end, is one that cannot\nbe maintained. Let us take a few illustrations.\n\nOf mechanical ones the most familiar is that of the scales. If they be\naccurately made, and not clogged by dirt or rust, it is impossible to\nkeep a pair of scales perfectly balanced: eventually one scale will\ndescend and the other ascend\u2014they will assume a heterogeneous relation.\nAgain, if we sprinkle over the surface of a fluid a number of\nequal-sized particles, having an attraction for each other, they will,\nno matter how uniformly distributed, by and by concentrate irregularly\ninto one or more groups. Were it possible to bring a mass of water into\na state of perfect homogeneity\u2014a state of complete quiescence, and\nexactly equal density throughout\u2014yet the radiation of heat from\nneighbouring bodies, by affecting differently its different parts, would\ninevitably produce inequalities of density and consequent currents; and\nwould so render it to that extent heterogeneous. Take a piece of red-hot\nmatter, and however evenly heated it may at first be, it will quickly\ncease to be so: the exterior, cooling faster than the interior, will\nbecome different in temperature from it. And the lapse into\nheterogeneity of temperature, so obvious in this extreme case, takes\nplace more or less in all cases. The action of chemical forces\nsupplies other illustrations. Expose a fragment of metal to air or\nwater, and in course of time it will be coated with a film of oxide,\ncarbonate, or other compound: that is\u2014its outer parts will become unlike\nits inner parts. Usually the heterogeneity produced by the action of\nchemical forces on the surfaces of masses, is not striking; because the\nchanged portions are soon washed away, or otherwise removed. But if this\nis prevented, comparatively complex structures result. Quarries of\ntrap-rock contain some striking examples. Not unfrequently a piece of\ntrap may be found reduced, by the action of the weather, to a number of\nloosely-adherent coats, like those of an onion. Where the block has been\nquite undisturbed, we may trace the whole series of these, from the\nangular, irregular outer one, through successively included ones in\nwhich the shape becomes gradually rounded, ending finally in a spherical\nnucleus. On comparing the original mass of stone with this group of\nconcentric coats, each of which differs from the rest in form, and\nprobably in the state of decomposition at which it has arrived, we get a\nmarked illustration of the multiformity to which, in lapse of time, a\nuniform body may be brought by external chemical action. The\ninstability of the homogeneous is equally seen in the changes set up\nthroughout the interior of a mass, when it consists of units that are\nnot rigidly bound together. The atoms of a precipitate never remain\nseparate, and equably distributed through the fluid in which they make\ntheir appearance. They aggregate either into crystalline grains, each\ncontaining an immense number of atoms, or they aggregate into flocculi,\neach containing a yet larger number; and where the mass of fluid is\ngreat, and the process prolonged, these flocculi do not continue\nequidistant, but break up into groups. That is to say, there is a\ndestruction of the balance at first subsisting among the diffused\nparticles, and also of the balance at first subsisting among the groups\ninto which these particles unite. Certain solutions of\nnon-crystalline substances in highly volatile liquids, exhibit in the\ncourse of half an hour a whole series of changes that are set up in the\nalleged way. If for example a little shell-lac-varnish (made by\ndissolving shell-lac in coal-naphtha until it is of the consistence of\ncream) be poured on a piece of paper, the surface of the varnish will\nshortly become marked by polygonal divisions, which, first appearing\nround the edge of the mass, spread towards its centre. Under a lense\nthese irregular polygons of five or more sides, are seen to be severally\nbounded by dark lines, on each side of which there are light-coloured\nborders. By the addition of matter to their inner edges, the borders\nslowly broaden, and thus encroach on the areas of the polygons; until at\nlength there remains nothing but a dark spot in the centre of each. At\nthe same time the boundaries of the polygons become curved; and they end\nby appearing like spherical sacs pressed together; strangely simulating\n(but only simulating) a group of nucleated cells. Here a rapid loss of\nhomogeneity is exhibited in three ways:\u2014First, in the formation of the\nfilm, which is the seat of these changes; second, in the formation of\nthe polygonal sections into which this film divides; and third, in the\ncontrast that arises between the polygonal sections round the edge,\nwhere they are small and early formed, and those in the centre which are\nlarger and formed later.\n\nThe instability thus variously illustrated is obviously consequent on\nthe fact, that the several parts of any homogeneous aggregation are\nnecessarily exposed to different forces\u2014forces that differ either in\nkind or amount; and being exposed to different forces they are of\nnecessity differently modified. The relations of outside and inside, and\nof comparative nearness to neighbouring sources of influence, imply the\nreception of influences that are unlike in quantity or quality, or both;\nand it follows that unlike changes will be produced in the parts thus\ndissimilarly acted upon.\n\nFor like reasons it is manifest that the process must repeat itself in\neach of the subordinate groups of units that are differentiated by the\nmodifying forces. Each of these subordinate groups, like the original\ngroup, must gradually, in obedience to the influences acting upon it,\nlose its balance of parts\u2014must pass from a uniform into a multiform\nstate. And so on continuously. Whence indeed it is clear that not\nonly must the homogeneous lapse into the non-homogeneous, but that the\nmore homogeneous must tend ever to become less homogeneous. If any given\nwhole, instead of being absolutely uniform throughout, consist of parts\ndistinguishable from each other\u2014if each of these parts, while somewhat\nunlike other parts, is uniform within itself; then, each of them being\nin unstable equilibrium, it follows that while the changes set up within\nit must render it multiform, they must at the same time render the whole\nmore multiform than before. The general principle, now to be followed\nout in its applications, is thus somewhat more comprehensive than the\ntitle of the chapter implies. No demurrer to the conclusions drawn, can\nbe based on the ground that perfect homogeneity nowhere exists; since,\nwhether that state with which we commence be or be not one of perfect\nhomogeneity, the process must equally be towards a relative\nheterogeneity.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 110. The stars are distributed with a three-fold irregularity. There\nis first the marked contrast between the plane of the milky way and\nother parts of the heavens, in respect of the quantities of stars within\ngiven visual areas. There are secondary contrasts of like kind in the\nmilky way itself, which has its thick and thin places; as well as\nthroughout the celestial spaces in general, which are much more closely\nstrewn in some regions than in others. And there is a third order of\ncontrasts produced by the aggregation of stars into small clusters.\nBesides this heterogeneity of distribution of the stars in general,\nconsidered without distinction of kinds, a further such heterogeneity is\ndisclosed when they are classified by their differences of colour, which\ndoubtless answer to differences of physical constitution. While the\nyellow stars are found in all parts of the heavens, the red and blue\nstars are not so: there are wide regions in which both red and blue\nstars are rare; there are regions in which the blue occur in\nconsiderable numbers, and there are other regions in which the red are\ncomparatively abundant. Yet one more irregularity of like significance\nis presented by the nebul\u00e6,\u2014aggregations of matter which, whatever be\ntheir nature, most certainly belong to our sidereal system. For the\nnebul\u00e6 are not dispersed with anything like uniformity; but are abundant\naround the poles of the galactic circle and rare in the neighbourhood of\nits plane. No one will expect that anything like a definite\ninterpretation of this structure can be given on the hypothesis of\nEvolution, or any other hypothesis. The most that can be looked for is\nsome reason for thinking that irregularities, not improbably of these\nkinds, would occur in the course of Evolution, supposing it to have\ntaken place. Any one called on to assign such reason might argue, that\nif the matter of which stars and all other celestial bodies consist, be\nassumed to have originally existed in a diffused form throughout a space\nfar more vast even than that which our sidereal system now occupies, the\ninstability of the homogeneous would negative its continuance in that\nstate. In default of an absolute balance among the forces with which the\ndispersed particles acted on each other (which could not exist in any\naggregation having limits) he might show that motion and consequent\nchanges of distribution would necessarily result. The next step in the\nargument would be that in matter of such extreme tenuity and feeble\ncohesion there would be motion towards local centres of gravity, as well\nas towards the general centre of gravity; just as, to use a humble\nillustration, the particles of a precipitate aggregate into flocculi at\nthe same time that they sink towards the earth. He might urge that in\nthe one case as in the other, these smallest and earliest local\naggregations must gradually divide into groups, each concentrating to\nits own centre of gravity,\u2014a process which must repeat itself on a\nlarger and larger scale. In conformity with the law that motion once set\nup in any direction becomes itself a cause of subsequent motion in that\ndirection, he might further infer that the heterogeneities thus set up\nwould tend ever to become more pronounced. Established mechanical\nprinciples would justify him in the conclusion that the motions of these\nirregular masses of slightly aggregated nebular matter towards their\ncommon centre of gravity must be severally rendered curvelinear, by the\nresistance of the medium from which they were precipitated; and that in\nconsequence of the irregularities of distribution already set up, such\nconflicting curvelinear motions must, by composition of forces, end in a\nrotation of the incipient sidereal system. He might without difficulty\nshow that the resulting centrifugal force must so far modify the process\nof general aggregation, as to prevent anything like uniform distribution\nof the stars eventually formed\u2014that there must arise a contrast such as\nwe see between the galactic circle and the rest of the heavens. He might\ndraw the further not unwarrantable inference, that differences in the\nprocess of local concentration would probably result from the unlikeness\nbetween the physical conditions existing around the general axis of\nrotation and those existing elsewhere. To which he might add, that after\nthe formation of distinct stars, the ever-increasing irregularities of\ndistribution due to continuance of the same causes would produce that\npatchiness which distinguishes the heavens in both its larger and\nsmaller areas. We need not here however commit ourselves to such\nfar-reaching speculations. For the purposes of the general argument it\nis needful only to show, that any finite mass of diffused matter, even\nthough vast enough to form our whole sidereal system, could not be in\nstable equilibrium; that in default of absolute sphericity, absolute\nuniformity of composition, and absolute symmetry of relation to all\nforces external to it; its concentration must go on with an\never-increasing irregularity; and that thus the present aspect of the\nheavens is not, so far as we can judge, incongruous with the hypothesis\nof a general evolution consequent on the instability of the homogeneous.\n\nDescending to that more limited form of the nebular hypothesis which\nregards the solar system as having resulted by gradual concentration;\nand assuming this concentration to have advanced so far as to produce a\nrotating spheroid of nebulous matter; let us consider what further\nconsequence the instability of the homogeneous necessitates. Having\nbecome oblate in figure, unlike in the densities of its centre and\nsurface, unlike in their temperatures, and unlike in the velocities with\nwhich its parts move round their common axis, such a mass can no longer\nbe called homogeneous; and therefore any further changes exhibited by it\nas a whole, can illustrate the general law, only as being changes from a\nmore homogeneous to a less homogeneous state. Changes of this kind are\nto be found in the transformations of such of its parts as are still\nhomogeneous within themselves. If we accept the conclusion of Laplace,\nthat the equatorial portion of this rotating and contracting spheroid\nwill at successive stages acquire a centrifugal force great enough to\nprevent any nearer approach to the centre round which it rotates, and\nwill so be left behind by the inner parts of the spheroid in its\nstill-continued contraction; we shall find, in the fate of the detached\nring, a fresh exemplification of the principle we are following out.\nConsisting of gaseous matter, such a ring, even if absolutely uniform at\nthe time of its detachment, cannot continue so. To maintain its\nequilibrium there must be an almost perfect uniformity in the action of\nall external forces upon it (almost, we must say, because the cohesion,\neven of extremely attenuated matter, might suffice to neutralize very\nminute disturbances); and against this the probabilities are immense. In\nthe absence of equality among the forces, internal and external, acting\non such a ring, there must be a point or points at which the cohesion of\nits parts is less than elsewhere\u2014a point or points at which rupture will\ntherefore take place. Laplace assumed that the ring would rupture at one\nplace only; and would then collapse on itself. But this is a more than\nquestionable assumption\u2014such at least I know to be the opinion of an\nauthority second to none among those now living. So vast a ring,\nconsisting of matter having such feeble cohesion, must break up into\nmany parts. Nevertheless, it is still inferrable from the instability of\nthe homogeneous, that the ultimate result which Laplace predicted would\ntake place. For even supposing the masses of nebulous matter into which\nsuch a ring separated, were so equal in their sizes and distances as to\nattract each other with exactly equal forces (which is infinitely\nimprobable); yet the unequal action of external disturbing forces would\ninevitably destroy their equilibrium\u2014there would be one or more points\nat which adjacent masses would begin to part company. Separation once\ncommenced, would with ever-accelerating speed lead to a grouping of the\nmasses. And obviously a like result would eventually take place with the\ngroups thus formed; until they at length aggregated into a single mass.\n\nLeaving the region of speculative astronomy, let us consider the Solar\nSystem as it at present exists. And here it will be well, in the first\nplace, to note a fact which may be thought at variance with the\nforegoing argument\u2014namely, the still-continued existence of Saturn\u2019s\nrings; and especially of the internal nebulous ring lately discovered.\nTo the objection that the outer rings maintain their equilibrium, the\nreply is that the comparatively great cohesion of liquid or solid\nsubstance would suffice to prevent any slight tendency to rupture from\ntaking effect. And that a nebulous ring here still preserves its\ncontinuity, does not really negative the foregoing conclusion; since it\nhappens under the quite exceptional influence of those symmetrically\ndisposed forces which the external rings exercise on it. Here\nindeed it deserves to be noted, that though at first sight the Saturnian\nsystem appears at variance with the doctrine that a state of homogeneity\nis one of unstable equilibrium, it does in reality furnish a curious\nconfirmation of this doctrine. For Saturn is not quite concentric with\nhis rings; and it has been proved mathematically that were he and his\nrings concentrically situated, they could not remain so: the homogeneous\nrelation being unstable, would gravitate into a heterogeneous one. And\nthis fact serves to remind us of the allied one presented throughout the\nwhole Solar System. All orbits, whether of planets or satellites, are\nmore or less excentric\u2014none of them are perfect circles; and were they\nperfect circles they would soon become ellipses. Mutual perturbations\nwould inevitably generate excentricities. That is to say, the\nhomogeneous relations would lapse into heterogeneous ones.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 111. Already so many references have been made to the gradual\nformation of a crust over the originally incandescent Earth, that it may\nbe thought superfluous again to name it. It has not, however, been\nbefore considered in connexion with the general principle under\ndiscussion. Here then it must be noted as a necessary consequence of the\ninstability of the homogeneous. In this cooling down and solidification\nof the Earth\u2019s surface, we have one of the simplest, as well as one of\nthe most important, instances, of that change from a uniform to a\nmultiform state which occurs in any mass through exposure of its\ndifferent parts to different conditions. To the differentiation of\nthe Earth\u2019s exterior from its interior thus brought about, we must add\none of the most conspicuous differentiations which the exterior itself\nafterwards undergoes, as being similarly brought about. Were the\nconditions to which the surface of the Earth is exposed, alike in all\ndirections, there would be no obvious reason why certain of its parts\nshould become permanently unlike the rest. But being unequally exposed\nto the chief external centre of force\u2014the Sun\u2014its main divisions become\nunequally modified: as the crust thickens and cools, there arises that\ncontrast, now so decided, between the polar and equatorial regions.\n\nAlong with these most marked physical differentiations of the Earth,\nwhich are manifestly consequent on the instability of the homogeneous,\nthere have been going on numerous chemical differentiations, admitting\nof similar interpretation. Without raising the question whether, as some\nthink, the so-called simple substances are themselves compounded of\nunknown elements (elements which we cannot separate by artificial heat,\nbut which existed separately when the heat of the Earth was greater than\nany which we can produce),\u2014without raising this question, it will\nsuffice the present purpose to show how, in place of that comparative\nhomogeneity of the Earth\u2019s crust, chemically considered, which must have\nexisted when its temperature was high, there has arisen, during its\ncooling, an increasing chemical heterogeneity: each element or compound,\nbeing unable to maintain its homogeneity in presence of various\nsurrounding affinities, having fallen into heterogeneous combinations.\nLet us contemplate this change somewhat in detail. There is every\nreason to believe that at an extreme heat, the bodies we call elements\ncannot combine. Even under such heat as can be generated artificially,\nsome very strong affinities yield; and the great majority of chemical\ncompounds are decomposed at much lower temperatures. Whence it seems not\nimprobable that, when the Earth was in its first state of incandescence,\nthere were no chemical combinations at all. But without drawing this\ninference, let us set out with the unquestionable fact that the\ncompounds which can exist at the highest temperatures, and which must\ntherefore have been the first formed as the Earth cooled, are those of\nthe simplest constitutions. The protoxides\u2014including under that head the\nalkalies, earths, &c.\u2014are, as a class, the most fixed compounds known:\nthe majority of them resisting decomposition by any heat we can\ngenerate. These, consisting severally of one atom of each component\nelement, are combinations of the simplest order\u2014are but one degree less\nhomogeneous than the elements themselves. More heterogeneous than these,\nmore decomposable by heat, and therefore later in the Earth\u2019s history,\nare the deutoxides, tritoxides, peroxides, &c.; in which two, three,\nfour, or more atoms of oxygen are united with one atom of metal or other\nbase. Still less able to resist heat, are the salts; which present us\nwith compound atoms each made up of five, six, seven, eight, ten,\ntwelve, or more atoms, of three, if not more, kinds. Then there are the\nhydrated salts, of a yet greater heterogeneity, which undergo partial\ndecomposition at much lower temperatures. After them come the\nfurther-complicated supersalts and double salts, having a stability\nagain decreased; and so throughout. After making a few unimportant\nqualifications demanded by peculiar affinities, I believe no chemist\nwill deny it to be a general law of these inorganic combinations that,\nother things equal, the stability decreases as the complexity increases.\nAnd then when we pass to the compounds that make up organic bodies, we\nfind this general law still further exemplified: we find much greater\ncomplexity and much less stability. An atom of albumen, for instance,\nconsists of 482 ultimate atoms of five different kinds. Fibrine, still\nmore intricate in constitution, contains in each atom, 298 atoms of\ncarbon, 49 of nitrogen, 2 of sulphur, 228 of hydrogen, and 92 of\noxygen\u2014in all, 660 atoms; or, more strictly speaking\u2014equivalents. And\nthese two substances are so unstable as to decompose at quite moderate\ntemperatures; as that to which the outside of a joint of roast meat is\nexposed. Possibly it will be objected that some inorganic compounds, as\nphosphuretted hydrogen and chloride of nitrogen, are more decomposable\nthan most organic compounds. This is true. But the admission may be made\nwithout damage to the argument. The proposition is not that _all_ simple\ncombinations are more fixed than _all_ complex ones. To establish our\ninference it is necessary only to show that, as an _average fact_, the\nsimple combinations can exist at a higher temperature than the complex\nones. And this is wholly beyond question. Thus it is manifest that\nthe present chemical heterogeneity of the Earth\u2019s surface has arisen by\ndegrees as the decrease of heat has permitted; and that it has shown\nitself in three forms\u2014first, in the multiplication of chemical\ncompounds; second, in the greater number of different elements contained\nin the more modern of these compounds; and third, in the higher and more\nvaried multiples in which these more numerous elements combine.\n\nWithout specifying them, it will suffice just to name the meteorologic\nprocesses eventually set up in the Earth\u2019s atmosphere, as further\nillustrating the alleged law. They equally display that destruction of a\nhomogeneous state which results from unequal exposure to incident\nforces.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 112. Take a mass of unorganized but organizable matter\u2014either the body\nof one of the lowest living forms, or the germ of one of the higher.\nConsider its circumstances. Either it is immersed in water or air, or it\nis contained within a parent organism. Wherever placed, however, its\nouter and inner parts stand differently related to surrounding\nagencies\u2014nutriment, oxygen, and the various stimuli. But this is not\nall. Whether it lies quiescent at the bottom of the water or on the leaf\nof a plant; whether it moves through the water preserving some definite\nattitude; or whether it is in the inside of an adult; it equally results\nthat certain parts of its surface are more exposed to surrounding\nagencies than other parts\u2014in some cases more exposed to light, heat, or\noxygen, and in others to the maternal tissues and their contents. Hence\nmust follow the destruction of its original equilibrium. This may take\nplace in one of two ways. Either the disturbing forces may be such as to\noverbalance the affinities of the organic elements, in which case there\nresult those changes which are known as decomposition; or, as is\nordinarily the case, such changes are induced as do not destroy the\norganic compounds, but only modify them: the parts most exposed to the\nmodifying forces being most modified. To elucidate this, suppose we take\na few cases.\n\nNote first what appear to be exceptions. Certain minute animal forms\npresent us either with no appreciable differentiations or with\ndifferentiations so obscure as to be made out with great difficulty. In\nthe Rhizopods, the substance of the jelly-like body remains throughout\nlife unorganized, even to the extent of having no limiting membrane; as\nis proved by the fact that the thread-like processes protruded by the\nmass, coalesce on touching each other. Whether or not the nearly allied\n_Am\u0153ba_, of which the less numerous and more bulky processes do not\ncoalesce, has, as lately alleged, something like a cell-wall and a\nnucleus, it is clear that the distinction of parts is very slight; since\nparticles of food pass bodily into the inside through any part of the\nperiphery, and since when the creature is crushed to pieces, each piece\nbehaves as the whole did. Now these cases, in which there is either no\ncontrast of structure between exterior and interior or very little,\nthough seemingly opposed to the above inference, are really very\nsignificant evidences of its truth. For what is the peculiarity of this\ndivision of the _Protozoa_? Its members undergo perpetual and irregular\nchanges of form\u2014they show no persistent relation of parts. What lately\nformed a portion of the interior is now protruded, and, as a temporary\nlimb, is attached to some object it happens to touch. What is now a part\nof the surface will presently be drawn, along with the atom of nutriment\nsticking to it, into the centre of the mass. Either the relations of\ninner and outer have no permanent existence, or they are very slightly\nmarked. But by the hypothesis, it is only because of their unlike\npositions with respect to modifying forces, that the originally like\nunits of a living mass become unlike. We must therefore expect no\nestablished differentiation of parts in creatures which exhibit no\nestablished differences of position in their parts; and we must expect\nextremely little differentiation of parts where the differences of\nposition are but little determined\u2014which is just what we find.\n This negative evidence is borne out by positive evidence. When we\nturn from these proteiform specks of living jelly to organisms having an\nunchanging distribution of substance, we find differences of tissue\ncorresponding to differences of relative position. In all the higher\n_Protozoa_, as also in the _Protophyta_, we meet with a fundamental\ndifferentiation into cell-membrane and cell-contents; answering to that\nfundamental contrast of conditions implied by the terms outside and\ninside. On passing from what are roughly classed as unicellular\norganisms, to the lowest of those which consist of aggregated cells, we\nequally observe the connection between structural differences and\ndifferences of circumstance. Negatively, we see that in the sponge,\npermeated throughout by currents of sea-water, the indefiniteness of\norganization corresponds with the absence of definite unlikeness of\nconditions: the peripheral and central portions are as little contrasted\nin structure as in exposure to surrounding agencies. While positively,\nwe see that in a form like the _Thalassicolla_, which, though equally\nhumble, maintains its outer and inner parts in permanently unlike\ncircumstances, there is displayed a rude structure obviously\nsubordinated to the primary relations of centre and surface: in all its\nmany and important varieties, the parts exhibit a more or less\nconcentric arrangement.\n\nAfter this primary modification, by which the outer tissues are\ndifferentiated from the inner, the next in order of constancy and\nimportance is that by which some part of the outer tissues is\ndifferentiated from the rest; and this corresponds with the almost\nuniversal fact that some part of the outer tissues is more exposed to\ncertain environing influences than the rest. Here, as before, the\napparent exceptions are extremely significant. Some of the lowest\nvegetal organisms, as the _Hematococci_ and _Protococci_, evenly\nimbedded in a mass of mucus, or dispersed through the Arctic snow,\ndisplay no differentiations of surface; the several parts of their\nsurfaces being subjected to no definite contrasts of conditions.\nCiliated spheres such as the _Volvox_ have no parts of their periphery\nunlike other parts; and it is not to be expected that they should have;\nsince, as they revolve in all directions, they do not, in traversing the\nwater, permanently expose any part to special conditions. But when we\ncome to organisms that are either fixed, or while moving preserve\ndefinite attitudes, we no longer find uniformity of surface. The most\ngeneral fact which can be asserted with respect to the structures of\nplants and animals, is, that however much alike in shape and texture the\nvarious parts of the exterior may at first be, they acquire unlikenesses\ncorresponding to the unlikenesses of their relations to surrounding\nagencies. The ciliated germ of a Zoophyte, which, during its locomotive\nstage, is distinguishable only into outer and inner tissues, no sooner\nbecomes fixed, than its upper end begins to assume a different structure\nfrom its lower. The disc-shaped _gemm\u00e6_ of the _Marchantia_, originally\nalike on both surfaces, and falling at random with either side\nuppermost, immediately begin to develop rootlets on the under side, and\n_stomata_ on the upper side: a fact proving beyond question, that this\nprimary differentiation is determined by this fundamental contrast of\nconditions.\n\nOf course in the germs of higher organisms, the metamorphoses\nimmediately due to the instability of the homogeneous, are soon masked\nby those due to the assumption of the hereditary type. Such early\nchanges, however, as are common to all classes of organisms, and so\ncannot be ascribed to heredity, entirely conform to the hypothesis. A\ngerm which has undergone no developmental modifications, consists of a\nspheroidal group of homogeneous cells. Universally, the first step in\nits evolution is the establishment of a difference between some of the\nperipheral cells and the cells which form the interior\u2014some of the\nperipheral cells, after repeated spontaneous fissions, coalesce into a\nmembrane; and by continuance of the process this membrane spreads until\nit speedily invests the entire mass, as in mammals, or, as in birds,\nstops short of that for some time. Here we have two significant facts.\nThe first is, that the primary unlikeness arises between the exterior\nand the interior. The second is, that the change which thus initiates\ndevelopment, does not take place simultaneously over the whole exterior;\nbut commences at one place, and gradually involves the rest. Now these\nfacts are just those which might be inferred from the instability of the\nhomogeneous. The surface must, more than any other part, become unlike\nthe centre, because it is most dissimilarly conditioned; and all parts\nof the surface cannot simultaneously exhibit this differentiation,\nbecause they cannot be exposed to the incident forces with absolute\nuniformity. One other general fact of like implication remains.\nWhatever be the extent of this peripheral layer of cells, or blastoderm\nas it is called, it presently divides into two layers\u2014the serous and\nmucous; or, as they have been otherwise called, the ectoderm and the\nendoderm. The first of these is formed from that portion of the layer\nwhich lies in contact with surrounding agents; and the second of them is\nformed from that portion of the layer which lies in contact with the\ncontained mass of yelk. That is to say, after the primary\ndifferentiation, more or less extensive, of surface from centre, the\nresulting superficial portion undergoes a secondary differentiation into\ninner and outer parts\u2014a differentiation which is clearly of the same\norder with the preceding, and answers to the next most marked contrast\nof conditions.\n\nBut, as already hinted, this principle, understood in the simple form\nhere presented, supplies no key to the detailed phenomena of organic\ndevelopment. It fails entirely to explain generic and specific\npeculiarities; and indeed leaves us equally in the dark respecting those\nmore important distinctions by which families and orders are marked out.\nWhy two ova, similarly exposed in the same pool, should become the one a\nfish, and the other a reptile, it cannot tell us. That from two\ndifferent eggs placed under the same hen, should respectively come forth\na duckling and a chicken, is a fact not to be accounted for on the\nhypothesis above developed. We have here no alternative but to fall back\nupon the unexplained principle of hereditary transmission. The capacity\npossessed by an unorganized germ of unfolding into a complex adult,\nwhich repeats ancestral traits in the minutest details, and that even\nwhen it has been placed in conditions unlike those of its ancestors, is\na capacity we cannot at present understand. That a microscopic portion\nof seemingly structureless matter should embody an influence of such\nkind, that the resulting man will in fifty years after become gouty or\ninsane, is a truth which would be incredible were it not daily\nillustrated. Should it however turn out, as we shall hereafter\nfind reason for suspecting, that these complex differentiations which\nadults exhibit, are themselves the slowly accumulated and transmitted\nresults of a process like that seen in the first changes of the germ; it\nwill follow that even those embryonic changes due to hereditary\ninfluence, are remote consequences of the alleged law. Should it be\nshown that the slight modifications wrought during life on each adult,\nand bequeathed to offspring along with all like preceding modifications,\nare themselves unlikenesses of parts that are produced by unlikenesses\nof conditions; then it will follow that the modifications displayed in\nthe course of embryonic development, are partly direct consequences of\nthe instability of the homogeneous, and partly indirect consequences of\nit. To give reasons for entertaining this hypothesis, however, is\nnot needful for the justification of the position here taken. It is\nenough that the most conspicuous differentiations which incipient\norganisms universally display, correspond to the most marked differences\nof conditions to which their parts are subject. It is enough that the\nhabitual contrast between outside and inside, which we _know_ is\nproduced in inorganic masses by unlikeness of exposure to incident\nforces, is strictly paralleled by the first contrast that makes its\nappearance in all organic masses.\n\nIt remains to point out that in the assemblage of organisms\nconstituting a species, the principle enunciated is equally traceable.\nWe have abundant materials for the induction that each species will\nnot remain uniform, but is ever becoming to some extent multiform; and\nthere is ground for the deduction that this lapse from homogeneity to\nheterogeneity is caused by the subjection of its members to unlike\nsets of circumstances. The fact that in every species, animal and\nvegetal, the individuals are never quite alike; joined with the fact\nthat there is in every species a tendency to the production of\ndifferences marked enough to constitute varieties; form a sufficiently\nwide basis for the induction. While the deduction is confirmed by the\nfamiliar experience that varieties are most numerous and decided\nwhere, as among cultivated plants and domestic animals, the conditions\nof life depart from the original ones, most widely and in the most\nnumerous ways. Whether we regard \u201cnatural selection\u201d as wholly, or\nonly in part, the agency through which varieties are established,\nmatters not to the general conclusion. For as the survival of any\nvariety proves its constitution to be in harmony with a certain\naggregate of surrounding forces\u2014as the multiplication of a variety and\nthe usurpation by it of an area previously occupied by some other part\nof the species, implies different effects produced by such aggregate\nof forces on the two, it is clear that this aggregate of forces is the\nreal cause of the differentiation\u2014it is clear that if the variety\nsupplants the original species in some localities but not in others,\nit does so because the aggregate of forces in the one locality is\nunlike that in the other\u2014it is clear that the lapse of the species\nfrom a state of homogeneity to a state of heterogeneity arises from\nthe exposure of its different parts to different aggregates of forces.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 113. Among mental phenomena it is difficult to establish the alleged\nlaw without an analysis too extensive for the occasion. To show\nsatisfactorily how states of consciousness, originally homogeneous,\nbecome heterogeneous through differences in the changes wrought by\ndifferent forces, would require us carefully to trace out the\norganization of early experiences. Were this done it would become\nmanifest that the development of intelligence, is, under one of its\nchief aspects, a dividing into separate classes, the unlike things\npreviously confounded together in one class\u2014a formation of sub-classes\nand sub-sub-classes, until the once confused aggregate of objects known,\nis resolved into an aggregate which unites extreme heterogeneity among\nits multiplied groups, with complete homogeneity among the members of\neach group. If, for example, we followed, through ascending grades of\ncreatures, the genesis of that vast structure of knowledge acquired by\nsight, we should find that in the first stage, where eyes suffice for\nnothing beyond the discrimination of light from darkness, the only\npossible classifications of objects seen, must be those based on the\nmanner in which light is obstructed, and the degree in which it is\nobstructed. We should find that by such undeveloped visual organs, the\nshadows traversing the rudimentary retina would be merely distinguished\ninto those of the stationary objects which the creature passed during\nits own movements, and those of the moving objects which came near the\ncreature while it was at rest; and that so the extremely general\nclassification of visible things into stationary and moving, would be\nthe earliest formed. We should find that whereas the simplest eyes are\nnot fitted to distinguish between an obstruction of light caused by a\nsmall object close to, and an obstruction caused by a large object at\nsome distance, eyes a little more developed must be competent to such a\ndistinction; whence must result a vague differentiation of the class of\nmoving objects, into the nearer and the more remote. We should find that\nsuch further improvements in vision as those which make possible a\nbetter estimation of distances by adjustment of the optic axes, and\nthose which, through enlargement and subdivision of the retina, make\npossible the discrimination of shapes, must have the effects of giving\ngreater definiteness to the classes already formed, and of sub-dividing\nthese into smaller classes, consisting of objects less unlike. And we\nshould find that each additional refinement of the perceptive organs,\nmust similarly lead to a multiplication of divisions and a sharpening of\nthe limits of each division. In every infant might be traced the\nanalogous transformation of a confused aggregate of impressions of\nsurrounding objects, not recognized as differing in their distances,\nsizes, and shapes, into separate classes of objects unlike each other in\nthese and various other respects. And in the one case as in the other,\nit might be shown that the change from this first indefinite, incoherent\nand comparatively homogeneous consciousness, to a definite, coherent,\nand heterogeneous one, is due to differences in the actions of incident\nforces on the organism. These brief indications of what might be\nshown, did space permit, must here suffice. Probably they will give\nadequate clue to an argument by which each reader may satisfy himself\nthat the course of mental evolution offers no exception to the general\nlaw. In further aid of such an argument, I will here add an illustration\nthat is comprehensible apart from the process of mental evolution as a\nwhole.\n\nIt has been remarked (I am told by Coleridge, though I have been unable\nto find the passage) that with the advance of language, words which were\noriginally alike in their meanings acquire unlike meanings\u2014a change\nwhich he expresses by the formidable word \u201cdesynonymization.\u201d Among\nindigenous words this loss of equivalence cannot be clearly shown;\nbecause in them the divergencies of meaning began before the dawn of\nliterature. But among words that have been coined, or adopted from other\nlanguages, since the writing of books commenced, it is demonstrable. In\nthe old divines, _miscreant_ is used in its etymological sense of\n_unbeliever_; but in modern speech it has entirely lost this sense.\nSimilarly with _evil-doer_ and _malefactor_: exactly synonymous as these\nare by derivation, they are no longer synonymous by usage: by a\n_malefactor_ we now understand a convicted criminal, which is far from\nbeing the acceptation of _evil-doer_. The verb _produce_, bears in\nEuclid its primary meaning\u2014to _prolong_, or _draw out_; but the now\nlargely developed meanings of _produce_ have little in common with the\nmeanings of _prolong_, or _draw out_. In the Church of England liturgy,\nan odd effect results from the occurrence of _prevent_ in its original\nsense\u2014_to come before_, instead of its modern specialized sense\u2014_to come\nbefore with the effect of arresting_. But the most conclusive cases are\nthose in which the contrasted words consist of the same parts\ndifferently combined; as in _go under_ and _undergo_. We _go under_ a\ntree, and we _undergo_ a pain. But though, if analytically considered,\nthe meanings of these expressions would be the same were the words\ntransposed, habit has so far modified their meanings that we could not\nwithout absurdity speak of _undergoing_ a tree and _going under_ a pain.\n Countless such instances might be brought to show that between two\nwords which are originally of like force, an equilibrium cannot be\nmaintained. Unless they are daily used in exactly equal degrees, in\nexactly similar relations (against which there are infinite\nprobabilities), there necessarily arises a habit of associating one\nrather than the other with particular acts, or objects. Such a habit,\nonce commenced, becomes confirmed; and gradually their homogeneity of\nmeaning disappears. In each individual we may see the tendency which\ninevitably leads to this result. A certain vocabulary and a certain set\nof phrases, distinguish the speech of each person: each person\nhabitually uses certain words in places where other words are habitually\nused by other persons; and there is a continual recurrence of favourite\nexpressions. This inability to maintain a balance in the use of verbal\nsymbols, which characterizes every man, characterizes, by consequence,\naggregates of men; and the desynonymization of words is the ultimate\neffect.\n\nShould any difficulty be felt in understanding how these mental changes\nexemplify a law of physical transformations that are wrought by physical\nforces, it will disappear on contemplating acts of mind as nervous\nfunctions. It will be seen that each loss of equilibrium above\ninstanced, is a loss of functional equality between some two elements of\nthe nervous system. And it will be seen that, as in other cases, this\nloss of functional equality is due to differences in the incidence of\nforces.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 114. Masses of men, in common with all other masses, show a like\nproclivity similarly caused. Small combinations and large societies\nequally manifest it; and in the one, as in the other, both governmental\nand industrial differentiations are initiated by it. Let us glance at\nthe facts under these two heads.\n\nA business partnership, balanced as the authorities of its members may\ntheoretically be, practically becomes a union in which the authority of\none partner is tacitly recognized as greater than that of the other or\nothers. Though the shareholders have given equal powers to the directors\nof their company, inequalities of power soon arise among them; and\nusually the supremacy of some one director grows so marked, that his\ndecisions determine the course which the board takes. Nor in\nassociations for political, charitable, literary, or other purposes, do\nwe fail to find a like process of division into dominant and subordinate\nparties; each having its leader, its members of less influence, and its\nmass of uninfluential members. These minor instances in which\nunorganized groups of men, standing in homogeneous relations, may be\nwatched gradually passing into organized groups of men standing in\nheterogeneous relations, give us the key to social inequalities.\nBarbarous and civilized communities are alike characterized by\nseparation into classes, as well as by separation of each class into\nmore important and less important units; and this structure is\nmanifestly the gradually-consolidated result of a process like that\ndaily exemplified in trading and other combinations. So long as men are\nconstituted to act on one another, either by physical force or by force\nof character, the struggles for supremacy must finally be decided in\nfavour of some one; and the difference once commenced must tend to\nbecome ever more marked. Its unstable equilibrium being destroyed, the\nuniform must gravitate with increasing rapidity into the multiform. And\nso supremacy and subordination must establish themselves, as we see they\ndo, throughout the whole structure of a society, from the great\nclass-divisions pervading its entire body, down to village cliques, and\neven down to every posse of school-boys. Probably it will be\nobjected that such changes result, not from the homogeneity of the\noriginal aggregations, but from their non-homogeneity\u2014from certain\nslight differences existing among their units at the outset. This is\ndoubtless the proximate cause. In strictness, such changes must be\nregarded as transformations of the relatively homogeneous into the\nrelatively heterogeneous. But it is abundantly clear that an aggregation\nof men, absolutely alike in their endowments, would eventually undergo a\nsimilar transformation. For in the absence of perfect uniformity in the\nlives severally led by them\u2014in their occupations, physical conditions,\ndomestic relations, and trains of thought and feeling\u2014there must arise\ndifferences among them; and these must finally initiate social\ndifferentiations. Even inequalities of health caused by accidents, must,\nby entailing inequalities of physical and mental power, disturb the\nexact balance of mutual influences among the units; and the balance once\ndisturbed, must inevitably be lost. Whence, indeed, besides seeing that\na body of men absolutely homogeneous in their governmental relations,\nmust, like all other homogeneous bodies, become heterogeneous, we also\nsee that it must do this from the same ultimate cause\u2014unequal exposure\nof its parts to incident forces.\n\nThe first industrial divisions of societies are much more obviously due\nto unlikenesses of external circumstances. Such divisions are absent\nuntil such unlikenesses are established. Nomadic tribes do not\npermanently expose any groups of their members to special local\nconditions; nor does a stationary tribe, when occupying only a small\narea, maintain from generation to generation marked contrasts in the\nlocal conditions of its members; and in such tribes there are no decided\neconomical differentiations. But a community which, growing populous,\nhas overspread a large tract, and has become so far settled that its\nmembers live and die in their respective districts, keeps its several\nsections in different physical circumstances; and then they no longer\nremain alike in their occupations. Those who live dispersed continue to\nhunt or cultivate the earth; those who spread to the sea-shore fall into\nmaritime occupations; while the inhabitants of some spot chosen, perhaps\nfor its centrality, as one of periodical assemblage, become traders, and\na town springs up. Each of these classes undergoes a modification of\ncharacter consequent on its function, and better fitting it to its\nfunction. Later in the process of social evolution these local\nadaptations are greatly multiplied. A result of differences in soil and\nclimate, is that the rural inhabitants in different parts of the kingdom\nhave their occupations partially specialized; and become respectively\ndistinguished as chiefly producing cattle, or sheep, or wheat, or oats,\nor hops, or cyder. People living where coal-fields are discovered are\ntransformed into colliers; Cornishmen take to mining because Cornwall is\nmetalliferous; and the iron-manufacture is the dominant industry where\nironstone is plentiful. Liverpool has assumed the office of importing\ncotton, in consequence of its proximity to the district where cotton\ngoods are made; and for analogous reasons, Hull has become the chief\nport at which foreign wools are brought in. Even in the establishment of\nbreweries, of dye-works, of slate-quarries, of brickyards, we may see\nthe same truth. So that both in general and in detail, the\nspecializations of the social organism which characterize separate\ndistricts, primarily depend on local circumstances. Those divisions of\nlabour which under another aspect were interpreted as due to the setting\nup of motion in the directions of least resistance (\u00a7 91), are here\ninterpreted as due to differences in the incident forces; and the two\ninterpretations are quite consistent with each other. For that which in\neach case _determines_ the direction of least resistance, is the\ndistribution of the forces to be overcome; and hence unlikenesses of\ndistribution in separate localities, entails unlikenesses in the course\nof human action in those localities\u2014entails industrial differentiations.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 115. In common with the general truths set forth in preceding\nchapters, the instability of the homogeneous is demonstrable _\u00e0 priori_.\nIt, like each of them, is a corollary from the persistence of force.\nAlready this has been tacitly implied by assigning unlikeness in the\nexposure of its part to surrounding agencies, as the reason why a\nuniform mass loses its uniformity. But here it will be proper to expand\nthis tacit implication into definite proof.\n\nOn striking a mass of matter with such force as either to indent it or\nmake it fly to pieces, we see both that the blow affects differently its\ndifferent parts, and that the differences are consequent on the unlike\nrelations of its parts to the force impressed. The part with which the\nstriking body comes in contact, receiving the whole of the communicated\nmomentum, is driven in towards the centre of the mass. It thus\ncompresses and tends to displace the more centrally situated portions of\nthe mass. These, however, cannot be compressed or thrust out of their\nplaces without pressing on all surrounding portions. And when the blow\nis violent enough to fracture the mass, we see, in the radial dispersion\nof its fragments, that the original momentum, in being distributed\nthroughout it, has been divided into numerous minor momenta, unlike in\ntheir directions. We see that these directions are determined by the\npositions of the parts with respect to each other, and with respect to\nthe point of impact. We see that the parts are differently affected by\nthe disruptive force, because they are differently related to it in\ntheir directions and attachments\u2014that the effects being the joint\nproducts of the cause and the conditions, cannot be alike in parts which\nare differently conditioned. A body on which radiant heat is\nfalling, exemplifies this truth still more clearly. Taking the simplest\ncase (that of a sphere) we see that while the part nearest to the\nradiating centre receives the rays at right angles, the rays strike the\nother parts of the exposed side at all angles from 90\u00b0 down to 0\u00b0.\nAgain, the molecular vibrations propagated through the mass from the\nsurface which receives the heat, must proceed inwards at angles\ndiffering for each point. Further, the interior parts of the sphere\naffected by the vibrations proceeding from all points of the heated\nside, must be dissimilarly affected in proportion as their positions are\ndissimilar. So that whether they be on the recipient area, in the\nmiddle, or at the remote side, the constituent atoms are all thrown into\nstates of vibration more or less unlike each other.\n\nBut now, what is the ultimate meaning of the conclusion that a uniform\nforce produces different changes throughout a uniform mass, because the\nparts of the mass stand in different relations to the force? Fully to\nunderstand this, we must contemplate each part as simultaneously subject\nto other forces\u2014those of gravitation, of cohesion, of molecular motion,\n&c. The effect wrought by an additional force, must be a resultant of it\nand the forces already in action. If the forces already in action on two\nparts of any aggregate, are different in their directions, the effects\nproduced on these two parts by like forces must be different in their\ndirections. Why must they be different? They must be different because\nsuch unlikeness as exists between the two sets of factors, is made by\nthe presence in the one of some specially-directed force that is not\npresent in the other; and that this force will produce an effect,\nrendering the total result in the one case unlike that in the other, is\na necessary corollary from the persistence of force. Still more\nmanifest does it become that the dissimilarly-placed parts of any\naggregate must be dissimilarly modified by an incident force, when we\nremember that the _quantities_ of the incident force to which they are\nseverally subject, are not equal, as above supposed; but are nearly\nalways very unequal. The outer parts of masses are usually alone exposed\nto chemical actions; and not only are their inner parts shielded from\nthe affinities of external elements, but such affinities are brought to\nbear unequally on their surfaces; since chemical action sets up currents\nthrough the medium in which it takes place, and so brings to the various\nparts of the surface unequal quantities of the active agent. Again, the\namounts of any external radiant force which the different parts of an\naggregate receive, are widely contrasted: we have the contrast between\nthe quantity falling on the side next the radiating centre, and the\nquantity, or rather no quantity, falling on the opposite side; we have\ncontrasts in the quantities received by differently-placed areas on the\nexposed side; and we have endless contrasts between the quantities\nreceived by the various parts of the interior. Similarly when mechanical\nforce is expended on any aggregate, either by collision, continued\npressure, or tension, the amounts of strain distributed throughout the\nmass are manifestly unlike for unlike positions. But to say the\ndifferent parts of an aggregate receive different quantities of any\nincident force, is to say that their states are modified by it in\ndifferent degrees\u2014is to say that if they were before homogeneous in\ntheir relations they must be rendered to a proportionate extent\nheterogeneous; since, force being persistent, the different quantities\nof it falling on the different parts, must work in them different\nquantities of effect\u2014different changes. Yet one more kindred\ndeduction is required to complete the argument. We may, by parallel\nreasoning, reach the conclusion that, even apart from the action of any\nexternal force, the equilibrium of a homogeneous aggregate must be\ndestroyed by the unequal actions of its parts on each other. That mutual\ninfluence which produces aggregation (not to mention other mutual\ninfluences) must work different effects on the different parts; since\nthey are severally exposed to it in unlike amounts and directions. This\nwill be clearly seen on remembering that the portions of which the whole\nis made up, may be severally regarded as minor wholes; that on each of\nthese minor wholes, the action of the entire aggregate then becomes an\nexternal incident force; that such external incident force must, as\nabove shown, work unlike changes in the parts of any such minor whole;\nand that if the minor wholes are severally thus rendered heterogeneous,\nthe entire aggregate is rendered heterogeneous.\n\nThe instability of the homogeneous is thus deducible from that\nprimordial truth which underlies our intelligence. One stable\nhomogeneity only, is hypothetically possible. If centres of force,\nabsolutely uniform in their powers, were diffused with absolute\nuniformity through unlimited space, they would remain in equilibrium.\nThis however, though a verbally intelligible supposition, is one that\ncannot be represented in thought; since unlimited space is\ninconceivable. But all finite forms of the homogeneous\u2014all forms of it\nwhich we can know or conceive, must inevitably lapse into heterogeneity.\nIn three several ways does the persistence of force necessitate this.\nSetting external agencies aside, each unit of a homogeneous whole must\nbe differently affected from any of the rest by the aggregate action of\nthe rest upon it. The resultant force exercised by the aggregate on each\nunit, being in no two cases alike in both amount and direction, and\nusually not in either, any incident force, even if uniform in amount and\ndirection, cannot produce like effects on the units. And the various\npositions of the parts in relation to any incident force, preventing\nthem from receiving it in uniform amounts and directions, a further\ndifference in the effects wrought on them is inevitably produced.\n\nOne further remark is needed. To the conclusion that the changes with\nwhich Evolution _commences_, are thus necessitated, remains to be added\nthe conclusion that these changes must _continue_. The absolutely\nhomogeneous must lose its equilibrium; and the relatively homogeneous\nmust lapse into the relatively less homogeneous. That which is true of\nany total mass, is true of the parts into which it segregates. The\nuniformity of each such part must as inevitably be lost in multiformity,\nas was that of the original whole; and for like reasons. And thus the\ncontinued changes which characterize Evolution, in so far as they are\nconstituted by the lapse of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous, and\nof the less heterogeneous into the more heterogeneous, are necessary\nconsequences of the persistence of force.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 16:\n\n The idea developed in this chapter originally formed part of an\n article on \u201cTranscendental Physiology,\u201d published in 1857. See\n _Essays_, pp. 279\u2013290.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XIV.\n THE MULTIPLICATION OF EFFECTS.\n\n\n\u00a7 116. To the cause of increasing complexity set forth in the last\nchapter, we have in this chapter to add another. Though secondary in\norder of time, it is scarcely secondary in order of importance. Even in\nthe absence of the cause already assigned, it would necessitate a change\nfrom the homogeneous to the heterogeneous; and joined with it, it makes\nthis change both more rapid and more involved. To come in sight of it,\nwe have but to pursue a step further, that conflict between force and\nmatter already delineated. Let us do this.\n\nWhen a uniform aggregate is subject to a uniform force, we have seen\nthat its constituents, being differently conditioned, are differently\nmodified. But while we have contemplated the various parts of the\naggregate as thus undergoing unlike changes, we have not yet\ncontemplated the unlike changes simultaneously produced on the various\nparts of the incident force. These must be as numerous and important as\nthe others. Action and re-action being equal and opposite, it follows\nthat in differentiating the parts on which it falls in unlike ways, the\nincident force must itself be correspondingly differentiated. Instead of\nbeing as before, a uniform force, it must thereafter be a multiform\nforce\u2014a group of dissimilar forces. A few illustrations will make this\ntruth manifest.\n\nA single force is divided by conflict with matter into forces that\nwidely diverge. In the case lately cited, of a body shattered by violent\ncollision, besides the change of the homogeneous mass into a\nheterogeneous group of scattered fragments, there is a change of the\nhomogeneous momentum into a group of momenta, heterogeneous in both\namounts and directions. Similarly with the forces we know as light and\nheat. After the dispersion of these by a radiating body towards all\npoints, they are re-dispersed towards all points by the bodies on which\nthey fall. Of the Sun\u2019s rays, issuing from him on every side, some few\nstrike the Moon. These being reflected at all angles from the Moon\u2019s\nsurface, some few of them strike the Earth. By a like process the few\nwhich reach the Earth are again diffused through surrounding space. And\non each occasion, such portions of the rays as are absorbed instead of\nreflected, undergo refractions that equally destroy their parallelism.\n More than this is true. By conflict with matter, a uniform force\nis in part changed into forces differing in their directions; and in\npart it is changed into forces differing in their kinds. When one body\nis struck against another, that which we usually regard as the effect,\nis a change of position or motion in one or both bodies. But a moment\u2019s\nthought shows that this is a very incomplete view of the matter. Besides\nthe visible mechanical result, sound is produced; or, to speak\naccurately, a vibration in one or both bodies, and in the surrounding\nair: and under some circumstances we call this the effect. Moreover, the\nair has not simply been made to vibrate, but has had currents raised in\nit by the transit of the bodies. Further, if there is not that great\nstructural change which we call fracture, there is a disarrangement of\nthe particles of the two bodies around their point of collision;\namounting in some cases to a visible condensation. Yet more, this\ncondensation is accompanied by disengagement of heat. In some cases a\nspark\u2014that is, light\u2014results, from the incandescence of a portion struck\noff; and occasionally this incandescence is associated with chemical\ncombination. Thus, by the original mechanical force expended in the\ncollision, at least five, and often more, different kinds of forces have\nbeen produced. Take, again, the lighting of a candle. Primarily, this is\na chemical change consequent on a rise of temperature. The process of\ncombination having once been set going by extraneous heat, there is a\ncontinued formation of carbonic acid, water, &c.\u2014in itself a result more\ncomplex than the extraneous heat that first caused it. But along with\nthis process of combination there is a production of heat; there is a\nproduction of light; there is an ascending column of hot gases\ngenerated; there are currents established in the surrounding air. Nor\ndoes the decomposition of one force into many forces end here. Each of\nthe several changes worked becomes the parent of further changes. The\ncarbonic acid formed, will by and by combine with some base; or under\nthe influence of sunshine give up its carbon to the leaf of a plant. The\nwater will modify the hygrometric state of the air around; or, if the\ncurrent of hot gases containing it come against a cold body, will be\ncondensed: altering the temperature, and perhaps the chemical state, of\nthe surface it covers. The heat given out melts the subjacent tallow,\nand expands whatever it warms. The light, falling on various substances,\ncalls forth from them reactions by which it is modified; and so divers\ncolours are produced. Similarly even with these secondary actions, which\nmay be traced out into ever-multiplying ramifications, until they become\ntoo minute to be appreciated. Universally, then, the effect is\nmore complex than the cause. Whether the aggregate on which it falls be\nhomogeneous or otherwise, an incident force is transformed by the\nconflict into a number of forces that differ in their amounts, or\ndirections, or kinds; or in all these respects. And of this group of\nvariously-modified forces, each ultimately undergoes a like\ntransformation.\n\nLet us now mark how the process of evolution is furthered by this\nmultiplication of effects. An incident force decomposed by the reactions\nof a body into a group of unlike forces\u2014a uniform force thus reduced to\na multiform force\u2014becomes the cause of a secondary increase of\nmultiformity in the body which decomposes it. In the last chapter we saw\nthat the several parts of an aggregate are differently modified by any\nincident force. It has just been shown that by the reactions of the\ndifferently modified parts, the incident force itself must be divided\ninto differently modified parts. Here it remains to point out that each\ndifferentiated division of the aggregate, thus becomes a centre from\nwhich a differentiated division of the original force is again diffused.\nAnd since unlike forces must produce unlike results, each of these\ndifferentiated forces must produce, throughout the aggregate, a further\nseries of differentiations. This secondary cause of the change\nfrom homogeneity to heterogeneity, obviously becomes more potent in\nproportion as the heterogeneity increases. When the parts into which any\nevolving whole has segregated itself, have diverged widely in nature,\nthey will necessarily react very diversely on any incident force\u2014they\nwill divide an incident force into so many strongly contrasted groups of\nforces. And each of them becoming the centre of a quite distinct set of\ninfluences, must add to the number of distinct secondary changes wrought\nthroughout the aggregate. Yet another corollary must be added. The\nnumber of unlike parts of which an aggregate consists, as well as the\ndegree of their unlikeness, is an important factor in the process. Every\nadditional specialized division is an additional centre of specialized\nforces. If a uniform whole, in being itself made multiform by an\nincident force, makes the incident force multiform; if a whole\nconsisting of two unlike sections, divides an incident force into two\nunlike groups of multiform forces; it is clear that each new unlike\nsection must be a further source of complication among the forces at\nwork throughout the mass\u2014a further source of heterogeneity. The\nmultiplication of effects must proceed in geometrical progression. Each\nstage of evolution must initiate a higher stage.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 117. The force of aggregation acting on irregular masses of rare\nmatter, diffused through a resisting medium, will not cause such masses\nto move in straight lines to their common centre of gravity; but, as\nbefore said, each will take a curvilinear path, directed to one or other\nside of the centre of gravity. All of them being differently\nconditioned, gravitation will impress on each a motion differing in\ndirection, in velocity, and in the degree of its curvature\u2014uniform\naggregative force will be differentiated into multiform momenta. The\nprocess thus commenced, must go on till it produces a single mass of\nnebulous matter; and these independent curvilinear motions must result\nin a movement of this mass round its axis: a simultaneous condensation\nand rotation in which we see how two effects of the aggregative force,\nat first but slightly divergent, become at last widely differentiated. A\ngradual increase of oblateness in this revolving spheroid, must take\nplace through the joint action of these two forces, as the bulk\ndiminishes and the rotation grows more rapid; and this we may set down\nas a third effect. The genesis of heat, which must accompany\naugmentation of density, is a consequence of yet another order\u2014a\nconsequence by no means simple; since the various parts of the mass,\nbeing variously condensed, must be variously heated. Acting throughout a\ngaseous spheroid, of which the parts are unlike in their temperatures,\nthe forces of aggregation and rotation must work a further series of\nchanges: they must set up circulating currents, both general and local.\nAt a later stage light as well as heat will be generated. Thus without\ndwelling on the likelihood of chemical combinations and electric\ndisturbances, it is sufficiently manifest that, supposing matter to have\noriginally existed in a diffused state, the once uniform force which\ncaused its aggregation, must have become gradually divided into\ndifferent forces; and that each further stage of complication in the\nresulting aggregate, must have initiated further subdivisions of this\nforce\u2014a further multiplication of effects, increasing the previous\nheterogeneity.\n\nThis section of the argument may however be adequately sustained,\nwithout having recourse to any such hypothetical illustrations as the\nforegoing. The astronomical attributes of the Earth, will even alone\nsuffice our purpose. Consider first the effects of its momentum round\nits axis. There is the oblateness of its form; there is the alternation\nof day and night; there are certain constant marine currents; and there\nare certain constant a\u00ebrial currents. Consider next the secondary series\nof consequences due to the divergence of the Earth\u2019s plane of rotation\nfrom the plane of its orbit. The many differences of the seasons, both\nsimultaneous and successive, which pervade its surface, are thus caused.\nExternal attraction acting on this rotating oblate spheroid with\ninclined axis, produces the motion called nutation, and that slower and\nlarger one from which follows the precession of the equinoxes, with its\nseveral sequences. And then by this same force are generated the tides,\naqueous and atmospheric.\n\nPerhaps, however, the simplest way of showing the multiplication of\neffects among phenomena of this order, will be to set down the\ninfluences of any member of the Solar System on the rest. A planet\ndirectly produces in neighbouring planets certain appreciable\nperturbations, complicating those otherwise produced in them; and in the\nremoter planets it directly produces certain less visible perturbations.\nHere is a first series of effects. But each of the perturbed planets is\nitself a source of perturbations\u2014each directly affects all the others.\nHence, planet A having drawn planet B out of the position it would have\noccupied in A\u2019s absence, the perturbations which B causes are different\nfrom what they would else have been; and similarly with C, D, E, &c.\nHere then is a secondary series of effects: far more numerous though far\nsmaller in their amounts. As these indirect perturbations must to some\nextent modify the movements of each planet, there results from them a\ntertiary series; and so on continually. Thus the force exercised by any\nplanet works a different effect on each of the rest; this different\neffect is from each as a centre partially broken up into minor different\neffects on the rest; and so on in ever multiplying and diminishing waves\nthroughout the entire system.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 118. If the Earth was formed by the concentration of diffused matter,\nit must at first have been incandescent; and whether the nebular\nhypothesis be accepted or not, this original incandescence of the Earth\nmust now be regarded as inductively established\u2014or, if not established,\nat least rendered so probable that it is a generally admitted geological\ndoctrine. Several results of the gradual cooling of the Earth\u2014as the\nformation of a crust, the solidification of sublimed elements, the\nprecipitation of water, &c., have been already noticed\u2014and I here again\nrefer to them merely to point out that they are simultaneous effects of\nthe one cause, diminishing heat. Let us now, however, observe the\nmultiplied changes afterwards arising from the continuance of this one\ncause. The Earth, falling in temperature, must contract. Hence the\nsolid crust at any time existing, is presently too large for the\nshrinking nucleus; and being unable to support itself, inevitably\nfollows the nucleus. But a spheroidal envelope cannot sink down into\ncontact with a smaller internal spheroid, without disruption: it will\nrun into wrinkles, as the rind of an apple does when the bulk of its\ninterior decreases from evaporation. As the cooling progresses and the\nenvelope thickens, the ridges consequent on these contractions must\nbecome greater; rising ultimately into hills and mountains; and the\nlater systems of mountains thus produced must not only be higher, as we\nfind them to be, but they must be longer, as we also find them to be.\nThus, leaving out of view other modifying forces, we see what immense\nheterogeneity of surface arises from the one cause, loss of heat\u2014a\nheterogeneity which the telescope shows us to be paralleled on the Moon,\nwhere aqueous and atmospheric agencies have been absent. But we\nhave yet to notice another kind of heterogeneity of surface, similarly\nand simultaneously caused. While the Earth\u2019s crust was still thin, the\nridges produced by its contraction must not only have been small, but\nthe tracts between them must have rested with comparative smoothness on\nthe subjacent liquid spheroid; and the water in those arctic and\nantarctic regions where it first condensed, must have been evenly\ndistributed. But as fast as the crust grew thicker and gained\ncorresponding strength, the lines of fracture from time to time caused\nin it, necessarily occurred at greater distances apart; the intermediate\nsurfaces followed the contracting nucleus with less uniformity; and\nthere consequently resulted larger areas of land and water. If any one,\nafter wrapping an orange in wet tissue paper, and observing both how\nsmall are the wrinkles and how evenly the intervening spaces lie on the\nsurface of the orange, will then wrap it in thick cartridge-paper, and\nnote both the greater height of the ridges and the larger spaces\nthroughout which the paper does not touch the orange, he will realize\nthe fact, that as the Earth\u2019s solid envelope thickened, the areas of\nelevation and depression became greater. In place of islands more or\nless homogeneously scattered over an all-embracing sea, there must have\ngradually arisen heterogeneous arrangements of continent and ocean, such\nas we now know. This double change in the extent and in the\nelevation of the lands, involved yet another species of\nheterogeneity\u2014that of coast-line. A tolerably even surface raised out of\nthe ocean will have a simple, regular sea-margin; but a surface varied\nby table-lands and intersected by mountain-chains, will, when raised out\nof the ocean, have an outline extremely irregular, alike in its leading\nfeatures and in its details. Thus endless is the accumulation of\ngeological and geographical results slowly brought about by this one\ncause\u2014the escape of the Earth\u2019s primitive heat.\n\nWhen we pass from the agency which geologists term igneous, to aqueous\nand atmospheric agencies, we see a like ever-growing complication of\neffects. The denuding actions of air and water have, from the beginning,\nbeen modifying every exposed surface: everywhere working many different\nchanges. As already shown (\u00a7 80) the original source of those gaseous\nand fluid motions which effect denudation, is the solar heat. The\ntransformation of this into various modes of force, according to the\nnature and condition of the matter on which it falls, is the first stage\nof complication. The sun\u2019s rays, striking at all angles a sphere, that\nfrom moment to moment presents and withdraws different parts of its\nsurface, and each of them for a different time daily throughout the\nyear, would produce a considerable variety of changes even were the\nsphere uniform. But falling as they do on a sphere surrounded by an\natmosphere in some parts of which wide areas of cloud are suspended, and\nwhich here unveils vast tracts of sea, there of level land, there of\nmountains, there of snow and ice, they initiate in its several parts\ncountless different movements. Currents of air of all sizes, directions,\nvelocities, and temperatures, are set up; as are also marine currents\nsimilarly contrasted in their characters. In this region the surface is\ngiving off water in the state of vapour; in that, dew is being\nprecipitated; and in the other rain is descending\u2014differences that arise\nfrom the ever-changing ratio between the absorption and radiation of\nheat in each place. At one hour, a rapid fall in temperature leads to\nthe formation of ice, with an accompanying expansion throughout the\nmoist bodies frozen; while at another, a thaw unlocks the dislocated\nfragments of these bodies. And then, passing to a second stage of\ncomplication, we see that the many kinds of motion directly or\nindirectly caused by the sun\u2019s rays, severally produce results that vary\nwith the conditions. Oxidation, drought, wind, frost, rain, glaciers,\nrivers, waves, and other denuding agents effect disintegrations that are\ndetermined in their amounts and qualities by local circumstances. Acting\nupon a tract of granite, such agents here work scarcely an appreciable\neffect; there cause exfoliations of the surface, and a resulting heap of\n_d\u00e9bris_ and boulders; and elsewhere, after decomposing the feldspar\ninto a white clay, carry away this with the accompanying quartz and\nmica, and deposit them in separate beds, fluviatile and marine. When the\nexposed land consists of several unlike formations, sedimentary and\nigneous, changes proportionably more heterogeneous are wrought. The\nformations being disintegrable in different degrees, there follows an\nincreased irregularity of surface. The areas drained by different rivers\nbeing differently constituted, these rivers carry down to the sea unlike\ncombinations of ingredients; and so sundry new strata of distinct\ncomposition arise. And here indeed we may see very simply illustrated,\nthe truth, that the heterogeneity of the effects increases in a\ngeometrical progression, with the heterogeneity of the object acted\nupon. A continent of complex structure, presenting many strata\nirregularly distributed, raised to various levels, tilted up at all\nangles, must, under the same denuding agencies, give origin to immensely\nmultiplied results: each district must be peculiarly modified; each\nriver must carry down a distinct kind of detritus; each deposit must be\ndifferently distributed by the entangled currents, tidal and other,\nwhich wash the contorted shores; and every additional complication of\nsurface must be the cause of more than one additional consequence. But\nnot to dwell on these, let us, for the fuller elucidation of this truth\nin relation to the inorganic world, consider what would presently follow\nfrom some extensive cosmical revolution\u2014say the subsidence of Central\nAmerica. The immediate results of the disturbance would themselves be\nsufficiently complex. Besides the numberless dislocations of strata, the\nejections of igneous matter, the propagation of earthquake vibrations\nthousands of miles around, the loud explosions, and the escape of gases,\nthere would be the rush of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans to supply the\nvacant space, the subsequent recoil of enormous waves, which would\ntraverse both these oceans and produce myriads of changes along their\nshores, the corresponding atmospheric waves complicated by the currents\nsurrounding each volcanic vent, and the electrical discharges with which\nsuch disturbances are accompanied. But these temporary effects would be\ninsignificant compared with the permanent ones. The complex currents of\nthe Atlantic and Pacific would be altered in directions and amounts. The\ndistribution of heat achieved by these currents would be different from\nwhat it is. The arrangement of the isothermal lines, not only on the\nneighbouring continents, but even throughout Europe, would be changed.\nThe tides would flow differently from what they do now. There would be\nmore or less modification of the winds in their periods, strengths,\ndirections, qualities. Rain would fall scarcely anywhere at the same\ntimes and in the same quantities as at present. In short, the\nmeteorological conditions thousands of miles off, on all sides, would be\nmore or less revolutionized. In these many changes, each of which\ncomprehends countless minor ones, the reader will see the immense\nheterogeneity of the results wrought out by one force, when that force\nexpends itself on a previously complicated area; and he will readily\ndraw the corollary that from the beginning the complication has advanced\nat an increasing rate.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 119. We have next to trace throughout organic evolution, this same\nall-pervading principle. And here, where the transformation of the\nhomogeneous into the heterogeneous was first observed, the production of\nmany changes by one cause is least easy to demonstrate. The development\nof a seed into a plant, or an ovum into an animal, is so gradual; while\nthe forces which determine it are so involved, and at the same time so\nunobtrusive; that it is difficult to detect the multiplication of\neffects which is elsewhere so obvious. Nevertheless, by indirect\nevidence we may establish our proposition; spite of the lack of direct\nevidence.\n\nObserve, first, how numerous are the changes which any marked stimulus\nworks on an adult organism\u2014a human being, for instance. An alarming\nsound or sight, besides impressions on the organs of sense and the\nnerves, may produce a start, a scream, a distortion of the face, a\ntrembling consequent on general muscular relaxation, a burst of\nperspiration, an excited action of the heart, a rush of blood to the\nbrain, followed possibly by arrest of the heart\u2019s action and by syncope;\nand if the system be feeble, an illness with its long train of\ncomplicated symptoms may set in. Similarly in cases of disease. A minute\nportion of the small-pox virus introduced into the system, will, in a\nsevere case, cause, during the first stage, rigors, heat of skin,\naccelerated pulse, furred tongue, loss of appetite, thirst, epigastric\nuneasiness, vomiting, headache, pains in the back and limbs, muscular\nweakness, convulsions, delirium, &c.; in the second stage, cutaneous\neruption, itching, tingling, sore throat, swelled fauces, salivation,\ncough, hoarseness, dyspn\u0153a, &c.; and in the third stage, \u0153dematous\ninflammations, pneumonia, pleurisy, diarrh\u0153a, inflammation of the brain,\nophthalmia, erysipelas, &c.: each of which enumerated symptoms is itself\nmore or less complex. Medicines, special foods, better air, might in\nlike manner be instanced as producing multiplied results. Now it\nneeds only to consider that the many changes thus wrought by one force\non an adult organism, must be partially paralleled in an\nembryo-organism, to understand how here also the production of many\neffects by one cause is a source of increasing heterogeneity. The\nexternal heat and other agencies which determine the first complications\nof the germ, will, by acting on these, superinduce further\ncomplications; on these still higher and more numerous ones; and so on\ncontinually: each organ as it is developed, serving, by its actions and\nreactions on the rest, to initiate new complexities. The first\npulsations of the f\u0153tal heart must simultaneously aid the unfolding of\nevery part. The growth of each tissue, by taking from the blood special\nproportions of elements, must modify the constitution of the blood; and\nso must modify the nutrition of all the other tissues. The distributive\nactions, implying as they do a certain waste, necessitate an addition to\nthe blood of effete matters, which must influence the rest of the\nsystem, and perhaps, as some think, initiate the formation of excretory\norgans. The nervous connections established among the viscera must\nfurther multiply their mutual influences. And so with every modification\nof structure\u2014every additional part and every alteration in the ratios of\nparts. Still stronger becomes the proof when we call to mind the\nfact, that the same germ may be evolved into different forms according\nto circumstances. Thus, during its earlier stages, every embryo is\nsexless\u2014becomes either male or female as the balance of forces acting on\nit determines. Again, it is well-known that the larva of a working-bee\nwill develop into a queen-bee, if, before a certain period, its food be\nchanged to that on which the larv\u00e6 of queen-bees are fed. Even more\nremarkable is the case of certain entozoa. The ovum of a tape-worm,\ngetting into the intestine of one animal, unfolds into the form of its\nparent; but if carried into other parts of the system, or into the\nintestine of some unlike animal, it becomes one of the sac-like\ncreatures, called by naturalists _Cysticerci_, or _C\u0153nuri_, or\n_Echinococci_\u2014creatures so extremely different from the tape-worm in\naspect and structure, that only after careful investigations have they\nbeen proved to have the same origin. All which instances imply that each\nadvance in embryonic complication results from the action of incident\nforces on the complication previously existing. Indeed, the now\naccepted doctrine of epigenesis necessitates the conclusion that organic\nevolution proceeds after this manner. For since it is proved that no\ngerm, animal or vegetal, contains the slightest rudiment, trace, or\nindication of the future organism\u2014since the microscope has shown us that\nthe first process set up in every fertilized germ is a process of\nrepeated spontaneous fissions, ending in the production of a mass of\ncells, not one of which exhibits any special character; there seems no\nalternative but to conclude that the partial organization at any moment\nsubsisting in a growing embryo, is transformed by the agencies acting on\nit into the succeeding phase of organization, and this into the next,\nuntil, through ever-increasing complexities, the ultimate form is\nreached. Thus, though the subtlety of the forces and the slowness\nof the metamorphosis, prevent us from _directly_ tracing the genesis of\nmany changes by one cause, throughout the successive stages which every\nembryo passes through; yet, _indirectly_, we have strong evidence that\nthis is a source of increasing heterogeneity. We have marked how\nmultitudinous are the effects which a single agency may generate in an\nadult organism; that a like multiplication of effects must happen in the\nunfolding organism, we have inferred from sundry illustrative cases;\nfurther, it has been pointed out that the ability which like germs have\nto originate unlike forms, implies that the successive transformations\nresult from the new changes superinduced on previous changes; and we\nhave seen that structureless as every germ originally is, the\ndevelopment of an organism out of it is otherwise incomprehensible.\nDoubtless we are still in the dark respecting those mysterious\nproperties which make the germ, when subject to fit influences, undergo\nthe special changes beginning this series of transformations. All here\ncontended is, that given a germ possessing these mysterious properties,\nthe evolution of an organism from it depends, in part, on that\nmultiplication of effects which we have seen to be a cause of evolution\nin general, so far as we have yet traced it.\n\nWhen, leaving the development of single plants and animals, we pass to\nthat of the Earth\u2019s flora and fauna, the course of the argument again\nbecomes clear and simple. Though, as before admitted, the fragmentary\nfacts Pal\u00e6ontology has accumulated, do not clearly warrant us in saying\nthat, in the lapse of geologic time, there have been evolved more\nheterogeneous organisms, and more heterogeneous assemblages of\norganisms; yet we shall now see that there _must_ ever have been a\ntendency towards these results. We shall find that the production of\nmany effects by one cause, which, as already shown, has been all along\nincreasing the physical heterogeneity of the Earth, has further\nnecessitated an increasing heterogeneity in its flora and fauna,\nindividually and collectively. An illustration will make this clear.\n Suppose that by a series of upheavals, occurring, as they are now\nknown to do, at long intervals, the East Indian Archipelago were to be\nraised into a continent, and a chain of mountains formed along the axis\nof elevation. By the first of these upheavals, the plants and animals\ninhabiting Borneo, Sumatra, New Guinea, and the rest, would be subjected\nto slightly-modified sets of conditions. The climate in general would be\naltered in temperature, in humidity, and in its periodical variations;\nwhile the local differences would be multiplied. These modifications\nwould affect, perhaps inappreciably, the entire flora and fauna of the\nregion. The change of level would produce additional modifications;\nvarying in different species, and also in different members of the same\nspecies, according to their distance from the axis of elevation. Plants,\ngrowing only on the sea-shore in special localities, might become\nextinct. Others, living only in swamps of a certain humidity, would, if\nthey survived at all, probably undergo visible changes of appearance.\nWhile more marked alterations would occur in some of the plants that\nspread over the lands newly raised above the sea. The animals and\ninsects living on these modified plants, would themselves be in some\ndegree modified by change of food, as well as by change of climate; and\nthe modification would be more marked where, from the dwindling or\ndisappearance of one kind of plant, an allied kind was eaten. In the\nlapse of the many generations arising before the next upheaval, the\nsensible or insensible alterations thus produced in each species, would\nbecome organized\u2014in all the races that survived there would be a more or\nless complete adaptation to the new conditions. The next upheaval would\nsuperinduce further organic changes, implying wider divergences from the\nprimary forms; and so repeatedly. Now however let it be observed that\nthis revolution would not be a substitution of a thousand modified\nspecies for the thousand original species; but in place of the thousand\noriginal species there would arise several thousand species, or\nvarieties, or changed forms. Each species being distributed over an area\nof some extent, and tending continually to colonize the new area\nexposed, its different members would be subject to different sets of\nchanges. Plants and animals migrating towards the equator would not be\naffected in the same way with others migrating from it. Those which\nspread towards the new shores, would undergo changes unlike the changes\nundergone by those which spread into the mountains. Thus, each original\nrace of organisms would become the root from which diverged several\nraces, differing more or less from it and from each other; and while\nsome of these might subsequently disappear, probably more than one would\nsurvive in the next geologic period: the very dispersion itself\nincreasing the chances of survival. Not only would there be certain\nmodifications thus caused by changes of physical conditions and food;\nbut also in some cases other modifications caused by changes of habit.\nThe fauna of each island, peopling, step by step, the newly-raised\ntracts, would eventually come in contact with the faunas of other\nislands; and some members of these other faunas would be unlike any\ncreatures before seen. Herbivores meeting with new beasts of prey,\nwould, in some cases, be led into modes of defence or escape differing\nfrom those previously used; and simultaneously the beasts of prey would\nmodify their modes of pursuit and attack. We know that when\ncircumstances demand it, such changes of habit _do_ take place in\nanimals; and we know that if the new habits become the dominant ones,\nthey must eventually in some degree alter the organization.\n Observe now, however, a further consequence. There must arise not\nsimply a tendency towards the differentiation of each race of organisms\ninto several races; but also a tendency to the occasional production of\na somewhat higher organism. Taken in the mass, these divergent\nvarieties, which have been caused by fresh physical conditions and\nhabits of life, will exhibit alterations quite indefinite in kind and\ndegree; and alterations that do not necessarily constitute an advance.\nProbably in most cases the modified type will be not appreciably more\nheterogeneous than the original one. But it _must_ now and then occur,\nthat some division of a species, falling into circumstances which give\nit rather more complex experiences, and demand actions somewhat more\ninvolved, will have certain of its organs further differentiated in\nproportionately small degrees\u2014will become slightly more heterogeneous.\nHence, there will from time to time arise an increased heterogeneity\nboth of the Earth\u2019s flora and fauna, and of individual races included in\nthem. Omitting detailed explanations, and allowing for the\nqualifications which cannot here be specified, it is sufficiently clear\nthat geological mutations have all along tended to complicate the forms\nof life, whether regarded separately or collectively. That\nmultiplication of effects which has been a part-cause of the\ntransformation of the Earth\u2019s crust from the simple into the complex,\nhas simultaneously led to a parallel transformation of the Life upon its\nsurface.[17]\n\nThe deduction here drawn from the established truths of geology and the\ngeneral laws of life, gains immensely in weight on finding it to be in\nharmony with an induction drawn from direct experience. Just that\ndivergence of many races from one race, which we inferred must have been\ncontinually occurring during geologic time, we know to have occurred\nduring the pre-historic and historic periods, in man and domestic\nanimals. And just that multiplication of effects which we concluded must\nhave been instrumental to the first, we see has in a great measure\nwrought the last. Single causes, as famine, pressure of population, war,\nhave periodically led to further dispersions of mankind and of dependent\ncreatures: each such dispersion initiating new modifications, new\nvarieties of type. Whether all the human races be or be not derived from\none stock, philology makes it clear that whole groups of races, now\neasily distinguishable from each other, were originally one race\u2014that\nthe diffusion of one race into different climates and conditions of\nexistence has produced many altered forms of it. Similarly with domestic\nanimals. Though in some cases (as that of dogs) community of origin will\nperhaps be disputed, yet in other cases (as that of the sheep or the\ncattle of our own country) it will not be questioned that local\ndifferences of climate, food, and treatment, have transformed one\noriginal breed into numerous breeds, now become so far distinct as to\nproduce unstable hybrids. Moreover, through the complication of effects\nflowing from single causes, we here find, what we before inferred, not\nonly an increase of general heterogeneity, but also of special\nheterogeneity. While of the divergent divisions and subdivisions of the\nhuman race, many have undergone changes not constituting an advance;\nothers have become decidedly more heterogeneous. The civilized European\ndeparts more widely from the vertebrate archetype than does the savage.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 120. A sensation does not expend itself in arousing some single state\nof consciousness; but the state of consciousness aroused is made up of\nvarious represented sensations connected by co-existence, or sequence\nwith the presented sensation. And that, in proportion as the grade of\nintelligence is high, the number of ideas suggested is great, may be\nreadily inferred. Let us, however, look at the proof that here too, each\nchange is the parent of many changes; and that the multiplication\nincreases in proportion as the area affected is complex.\n\nWere some hitherto unknown bird, driven say by stress of weather from\nthe remote north, to make its appearance on our shores, it would excite\nno speculation in the sheep or cattle amid which it alighted: a\nperception of it as a creature like those constantly flying about, would\nbe the sole interruption of that dull current of consciousness which\naccompanies grazing and rumination. The cow-herd, by whom we may suppose\nthe exhausted bird to be presently caught, would probably gaze at it\nwith some slight curiosity, as being unlike any he had before seen\u2014would\nnote its most conspicuous markings, and vaguely ponder on the questions,\nwhere it came from, and how it came. The village bird-stuffer would have\nsuggested to him by the sight of it, sundry forms to which it bore a\nlittle resemblance; would receive from it more numerous and more\nspecific impressions respecting structure and plumage; would be reminded\nof various instances of birds brought by storms from foreign parts\u2014would\ntell who found them, who stuffed them, who bought them. Supposing the\nunknown bird taken to a naturalist of the old school, interested only in\nexternals, (one of those described by the late Edward Forbes, as\nexamining animals as though they were merely skins filled with straw,)\nit would excite in him a more involved series of mental changes: there\nwould be an elaborate examination of the feathers, a noting of all their\ntechnical distinctions, with a reduction of these perceptions to certain\nequivalent written symbols; reasons for referring the new form to a\nparticular family, order, and genus would be sought out and written\ndown; communications with the secretary of some society, or editor of\nsome journal, would follow; and probably there would be not a few\nthoughts about the addition of the _ii_ to the describer\u2019s name, to form\nthe name of the species. Lastly, in the mind of a comparative anatomist,\nsuch a new species, should it happen to have any marked internal\npeculiarity, might produce additional sets of changes\u2014might very\npossibly suggest modified views respecting the relationships of the\ndivision to which it belonged; or, perhaps, alter his conceptions of the\nhomologies and developments of certain organs; and the conclusions drawn\nmight not improbably enter as elements into still wider inquiries\nconcerning the origin of organic forms.\n\nFrom ideas let us turn to emotions. In a young child, a father\u2019s anger\nproduces little else than vague fear\u2014a disagreeable sense of impending\nevil, taking various shapes of physical suffering or deprivation of\npleasures. In elder children, the same harsh words will arouse\nadditional feelings: sometimes a sense of shame, of penitence, or of\nsorrow for having offended; at other times, a sense of injustice, and a\nconsequent anger. In the wife, yet a further range of feelings may come\ninto existence\u2014perhaps wounded affection, perhaps self-pity for\nill-usage, perhaps contempt for groundless irritability, perhaps\nsympathy for some suffering which the irritability indicates, perhaps\nanxiety about an unknown misfortune which she thinks has produced it.\nNor are we without evidence that among adults, the like differences of\ndevelopment are accompanied by like differences in the number of\nemotions that are aroused, in combination or rapid succession\u2014the lower\nnatures being characterized by that impulsiveness which results from the\nuncontrolled action of a few feelings; and the higher natures being\ncharacterized by the simultaneous action of many secondary feelings,\nmodifying those first awakened.\n\nPossibly it will be objected that the illustrations here given, are\ndrawn from the functional changes of the nervous system, not from its\nstructural changes; and that what is proved among the first, does not\nnecessarily hold among the last. This must be admitted. Those, however,\nwho recognize the truth that the structural changes are the slowly\naccumulated results of the functional changes, will readily draw the\ncorollary, that a part-cause of the evolution of the nervous system, as\nof other evolution, is this multiplication of effects which becomes ever\ngreater as the development becomes higher.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 121. If the advance of Man towards greater heterogeneity in both body\nand mind, is in part traceable to the production of many effects by one\ncause, still more clearly may the advance of Society towards greater\nheterogeneity be so explained. Consider the growth of an industrial\norganization. When, as must occasionally happen, some individual of a\ntribe displays unusual aptitude for making an article of general use (a\nweapon, for instance) which was before made by each man for himself,\nthere arises a tendency towards the differentiation of that individual\ninto a maker of weapons. His companions (warriors and hunters all of\nthem) severally wish to have the best weapons that can be made; and are\ntherefore certain to offer strong inducements to this skilled individual\nto make weapons for them. He, on the other hand, having both an unusual\nfaculty, and an unusual liking, for making weapons (the capacity and the\ndesire for any occupation being commonly associated), is predisposed to\nfulfil these commissions on the offer of adequate rewards: especially as\nhis love of distinction is also gratified. This first specialization of\nfunction, once commenced, tends ever to become more decided. On the side\nof the weapon-maker, continued practice gives increased skill\u2014increased\nsuperiority to his products. On the side of his clients, cessation of\npractice entails decreased skill. Thus the influences that determine\nthis division of labour grow stronger in both ways: this social movement\ntends ever to become more decided in the direction in which it was first\nset up; and the incipient heterogeneity is, on the average of cases,\nlikely to become permanent for that generation, if no longer. Such\na process, besides differentiating the social mass into two parts, the\none monopolizing, or almost monopolizing, the performance of a certain\nfunction, and the other having lost the habit, and in some measure the\npower, of performing that function, has a tendency to initiate other\ndifferentiations. The advance described implies the introduction of\nbarter: the maker of weapons has, on each occasion, to be paid in such\nother articles as he agrees to take in exchange. Now he will not\nhabitually take in exchange one kind of article, but many kinds. He does\nnot want mats only, or skins, or fishing-gear; but he wants all these;\nand on each occasion will bargain for the particular things he most\nneeds. What follows? If among the members of the tribe there exist any\nslight differences of skill in the manufacture of these various things,\nas there are almost sure to do, the weapon-maker will take from each one\nthe thing which that one excels in making: he will exchange for mats\nwith him whose mats are superior, and will bargain for the fishing-gear\nof whoever has the best. But he who has bartered away his mats or his\nfishing-gear, must make other mats or fishing-gear for himself; and in\nso doing must, in some degree, further develop his aptitude. Thus it\nresults that the small specialities of faculty possessed by various\nmembers of the tribe will tend to grow more decided. If such\ntransactions are from time to time repeated, these specializations may\nbecome appreciable. And whether or not there ensue distinct\ndifferentiations of other individuals into makers of particular\narticles, it is clear that incipient differentiations take place\nthroughout the tribe: the one original cause produces not only the first\ndual effect, but a number of secondary dual effects, like in kind but\nminor in degree. This process, of which traces may be seen among\ngroups of school-boys, cannot well produce a lasting distribution of\nfunctions in an unsettled tribe; but where there grows up a fixed and\nmultiplying community, such differentiations become permanent, and\nincrease with each generation. An addition to the number of citizens,\ninvolving a greater demand for every commodity, intensifies the\nfunctional activity of each specialized person or class; and this\nrenders the specialization more definite where it already exists, and\nestablishes it where it is but nascent. By increasing the pressure on\nthe means of subsistence, a larger population again augments these\nresults; since every individual is forced more and more to confine\nhimself to that which he can do best, and by which he can gain most. And\nthis industrial progress, by aiding future production, opens the way for\nfurther growth of population, which reacts as before. Presently,\nunder the same stimuli, new occupations arise. Competing workers,\nseverally aiming to produce improved articles, occasionally discover\nbetter processes or better materials. In weapons and cutting-tools, the\nsubstitution of bronze for stone entails on him who first makes it, a\ngreat increase of demand\u2014so great an increase that he presently finds\nall his time occupied in making the bronze for the articles he sells,\nand is obliged to depute the fashioning of these articles to others; and\neventually the making of bronze, thus gradually differentiated from a\npre-existing occupation, becomes an occupation by itself. But now mark\nthe ramified changes which follow this change. Bronze soon replaces\nstone, not only in the articles it was first used for, but in many\nothers; and so affects the manufacture of them. Further, it affects the\nprocesses which such improved utensils subserve, and the resulting\nproducts\u2014modifies buildings, carvings, dress, personal decorations. Yet\nagain, it sets going sundry manufactures which were before impossible,\nfrom lack of a material fit for the requisite tools. And all these\nchanges react on the people\u2014increase their manipulative skill, their\nintelligence, their comfort\u2014refine their habits and tastes.\n\nIt is out of the question here to follow through its successive\ncomplications, this increasing social heterogeneity that results from\nthe production of many effects by one cause. But leaving the\nintermediate phases of social development, let us take an illustration\nfrom its passing phase. To trace the effects of steam-power, in its\nmanifold applications to mining, navigation, and manufactures, would\ncarry us into unmanageable detail. Let us confine ourselves to the\nlatest embodiment of steam-power\u2014the locomotive engine. This, as the\nproximate cause of our railway-system, has changed the face of the\ncountry, the course of trade, and the habits of the people. Consider,\nfirst, the complicated sets of changes that precede the making of every\nrailway\u2014the provisional arrangements, the meetings, the registration,\nthe trial-section, the parliamentary survey, the lithographed plans, the\nbooks of reference, the local deposits and notices, the application to\nParliament, the passing Standing-Orders Committee, the first, second,\nand third readings: each of which brief heads indicates a multiplicity\nof transactions, and the further development of sundry occupations, (as\nthose of engineers, surveyors, lithographers, parliamentary agents,\nshare-brokers,) and the creation of sundry others (as those of\ntraffic-takers, reference-takers). Consider, next, the yet more marked\nchanges implied in railway construction\u2014the cuttings, em-bankings,\ntunnellings, diversions of roads; the building of bridges and stations;\nthe laying down of ballast, sleepers, and rails; the making of engines,\ntenders, carriages, and wagons: which processes, acting upon numerous\ntrades, increase the importation of timber, the quarrying of stone, the\nmanufacture of iron, the mining of coal, the burning of bricks;\ninstitute a variety of special manufactures weekly advertised in the\n_Railway Times_; and call into being some new classes of\nworkers\u2014drivers, stokers, cleaners, plate-layers, &c. &c. Then come the\nchanges, more numerous and involved still, which railways in action\nproduce on the community at large. The organization of every business is\nmore or less modified: ease of communication makes it better to do\ndirectly what was before done by proxy; agencies are established where\npreviously they would not have paid; goods are obtained from remote\nwholesale houses instead of near retail ones; and commodities are used\nwhich distance once rendered inaccessible. The rapidity and small cost\nof carriage, tend to specialize more than ever the industries of\ndifferent districts\u2014to confine each manufacture to the parts in which,\nfrom local advantages, it can be best carried on. Economical\ndistribution equalizes prices, and also, on the average, lowers prices:\nthus bringing divers articles within the means of those before unable to\nbuy them, and so increasing their comforts and improving their habits.\nAt the same time the practice of travelling is immensely extended.\nClasses who before could not afford it, take annual trips to the sea;\nvisit their distant relations; make tours; and so we are benefited in\nbody, feelings, and intellect. The more prompt transmission of letters\nand of news produces further changes\u2014makes the pulse of the nation\nfaster. Yet more, there arises a wide dissemination of cheap literature\nthrough railway book-stalls, and of advertisements in railway carriages:\nboth of them aiding ulterior progress. And the innumerable changes here\nbriefly indicated are consequent on the invention of the locomotive\nengine. The social organism has been rendered more heterogeneous, in\nvirtue of the many new occupations introduced, and the many old ones\nfurther specialized; prices in all places have been altered; each trader\nhas, more or less, modified his way of doing business; and every person\nhas been affected in his actions, thoughts, emotions.\n\nThe only further fact demanding notice, is, that we here see more\nclearly than ever, that in proportion as the area over which any\ninfluence extends, becomes heterogeneous, the results are in a yet\nhigher degree multiplied in number and kind. While among the primitive\ntribes to whom it was first known, caoutchouc caused but few changes,\namong ourselves the changes have been so many and varied that the\nhistory of them occupies a volume. Upon the small, homogeneous community\ninhabiting one of the Hebrides, the electric telegraph would produce,\nwere it used, scarcely any results; but in England the results it\nproduces are multitudinous.\n\nSpace permitting, the synthesis might here be pursued in relation to all\nthe subtler products of social life. It might be shown how, in Science,\nan advance of one division presently advances other divisions\u2014how\nAstronomy has been immensely forwarded by discoveries in Optics, while\nother optical discoveries have initiated Microscopic Anatomy, and\ngreatly aided the growth of Physiology\u2014how Chemistry has indirectly\nincreased our knowledge of Electricity, Magnetism, Biology, Geology\u2014how\nElectricity has reacted on Chemistry and Magnetism, developed our views\nof Light and Heat, and disclosed sundry laws of nervous action. In\nLiterature the same truth might be exhibited in the still-multiplying\nforms of periodical publications that have descended from the first\nnewspaper, and which have severally acted and reacted on other forms of\nliterature and on each other; or in the bias given by each book of power\nto various subsequent books. The influence which a new school of\nPainting (as that of the pre-Raphaelites) exercises on other schools;\nthe hints which all kinds of pictorial art are deriving from\nPhotography; the complex results of new critical doctrines; might\nseverally be dwelt on as displaying the like multiplication of effects.\nBut it would needlessly tax the reader\u2019s patience to detail, in their\nmany ramifications, these various changes: here become so involved and\nsubtle as to be followed with some difficulty.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 122. After the argument which closed the last chapter, a parallel one\nseems here scarcely required. For symmetry\u2019s sake, however, it will be\nproper briefly to point out how the multiplication of effects, like the\ninstability of the homogeneous, is a corollary from the persistence of\nforce.\n\nThings which we call different are things which react in different ways;\nand we can know them as different only by the differences in their\nreactions. When we distinguish bodies as hard and soft, rough and\nsmooth, we simply mean that certain like muscular forces expended on\nthem are followed by unlike sets of sensations\u2014unlike re-active forces.\nObjects that are classed as red, blue, yellow, &c., are objects that\ndecompose light in strongly-contrasted ways; that is, we know contrasts\nof colour as contrasts in the changes produced in a uniform incident\nforce. Manifestly, any two things which do not work unequal effects on\nconsciousness, either by unequally opposing our own energies, or by\nimpressing our senses with unequally modified forms of certain external\nenergies, cannot be distinguished by us. Hence the proposition that the\ndifferent parts of any whole must react differently on a uniform\nincident force, and must so reduce it to a group of multiform forces, is\nin essence a truism. A further step will reduce this truism to its\nlowest terms.\n\nWhen, from unlikeness between the effects they produce on consciousness,\nwe predicate unlikeness between two objects, what is our warrant? and\nwhat do we mean by the unlikeness, objectively considered? Our warrant\nis the persistence of force. Some kind or amount of change has been\nwrought in us by the one, which has not been wrought by the other. This\nchange we ascribe to some force exercised by the one which the other has\nnot exercised. And we have no alternative but to do this, or to assert\nthat the change had no antecedent; which is to deny the persistence of\nforce. Whence it is further manifest that what we regard as the\nobjective unlikeness is the presence in the one of some force, or set of\nforces, not present in the other\u2014something in the kinds or amounts or\ndirections of the constituent forces of the one, which those of the\nother do not parallel. But now if things or parts of things which we\ncall different, are those of which the constituent forces differ in one\nor more respects; what must happen to any like forces, or any uniform\nforce, falling on them? Such like forces, or parts of a uniform force,\nmust be differently modified. The force which is present in the one and\nnot in the other, must be an element in the conflict\u2014must produce its\nequivalent reaction; and must so affect the total reaction. To say\notherwise is to say that this differential force will produce no effect;\nwhich is to say that force is not persistent.\n\nI need not develop this corollary further. It manifestly follows that a\nuniform force, falling on a uniform aggregate, must undergo dispersion;\nthat falling on an aggregate made up of unlike parts, it must undergo\ndispersion from each part, as well as qualitative differentiations; that\nin proportion as the parts are unlike, these qualitative\ndifferentiations must be marked; that in proportion to the number of the\nparts, they must be numerous; that the secondary forces so produced,\nmust undergo further transformations while working equivalent\ntransformations in the parts that change them; and similarly with the\nforces they generate. Thus the conclusions that a part-cause of\nEvolution is the multiplication of effects; and that this increases in\ngeometrical progression as the heterogeneity becomes greater; are not\nonly to be established inductively, but are deducible from the deepest\nof all truths.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 17:\n\n Had this paragraph, first published in the _Westminster Review_ in\n 1857, been written after the appearance of Mr. Darwin\u2019s work on _The\n Origin of Species_, it would doubtless have been otherwise expressed.\n Reference would have been made to the process of \u201cnatural selection,\u201d\n as greatly facilitating the differentiations described. As it is,\n however, I prefer to let the passage stand in its original shape:\n partly because it seems to me that these successive changes of\n conditions would produce divergent varieties or species, apart from\n the influence of \u201cnatural selection\u201d (though in less numerous ways as\n well as less rapidly); and partly because I conceive that in the\n absence of these successive changes of conditions, \u201cnatural selection\u201d\n would effect comparatively little. Let me add that though these\n positions are not enunciated in _The Origin of Species_, yet a mutual\n friend gives me reason to think that Mr. Darwin would coincide in\n them; if he did not indeed consider them as tacitly implied in his\n work.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XV.\n DIFFERENTIATION AND INTEGRATION.\n\n\n\u00a7 123. The general interpretation of Evolution is far from being\ncompleted in the preceding chapters. We must contemplate its changes\nunder yet another aspect, before we can form a definite conception of\nthe process constituted by them. Though the laws already set forth,\nfurnish a key to the re-arrangement of parts which Evolution exhibits,\nin so far as it is an advance from the uniform to the multiform; they\nfurnish no key to this re-arrangement in so far as it is an advance from\nthe indefinite to the definite. On studying the actions and re-actions\neverywhere going on, we have found it to follow inevitably from a\ncertain primordial truth, that the homogeneous must lapse into the\nheterogeneous, and that the heterogeneous must become more\nheterogeneous; but we have not discovered why the differently-affected\nparts of any simple whole, become clearly marked off from each other, at\nthe same time that they become unlike. Thus far no reason has been\nassigned why there should not ordinarily arise a vague chaotic\nheterogeneity, in place of that orderly heterogeneity displayed in\nEvolution. It still remains to find out the cause of that integration of\nparts which accompanies their differentiation\u2014that gradually-completed\nsegregation of like units into a group, distinctly separated from\nneighbouring groups which are severally made up of other kinds of units.\nThe rationale will be conveniently introduced by a few instances in\nwhich we may watch this segregative process taking place.\n\nWhen towards the end of September, the trees are gaining their autumn\ncolours, and we are hoping shortly to see a further change increasing\nstill more the beauty of the landscape, we are not uncommonly\ndisappointed by the occurrence of an equinoxial gale. Out of the mixed\nmass of foliage on each branch, the strong current of air carries away\nthe decaying and brightly-tinted leaves, but fails to detach those which\nare still green. And while these last, frayed and seared by\nlong-continued beatings against each other, and the twigs around them,\ngive a sombre colour to the woods, the red and yellow and orange leaves\nare collected together in ditches and behind walls and in corners where\neddies allow them to settle. That is to say, by the action of that\nuniform force which the wind exerts on both kinds, the dying leaves are\npicked out from among their still living companions and gathered in\nplaces by themselves. Again, the separation of particles of different\nsizes, as dust and sand from pebbles, may be similarly effected; as we\nsee on every road in March. And from the days of Homer downwards, the\npower of currents of air, natural and artificial, to part from one\nanother units of unlike specific gravities, has been habitually utilized\nin the winnowing of chaff from wheat. In every river we see how\nthe mixed materials carried down, are separately deposited\u2014how in rapids\nthe bottom gives rest to nothing but boulders and pebbles; how where the\ncurrent is not so strong, sand is let fall; and how, in still places,\nthere is a sediment of mud. This selective action of moving water, is\ncommonly applied in the arts to obtain masses of particles of different\ndegrees of fineness. Emery, for example, after being ground, is carried\nby a slow current through successive compartments; in the first of which\nthe largest grains subside; in the second of which the grains that reach\nthe bottom before the water has escaped, are somewhat smaller; in the\nthird smaller still; until in the last there are deposited only those\nfinest particles which fall so slowly through the water, that they have\nnot previously been able to reach the bottom. And in a way that is\ndifferent though equally significant, this segregative effect of water\nin motion, is exemplified in the carrying away of soluble from insoluble\nmatters\u2014an application of it hourly made in every laboratory. The\neffects of the uniform forces which aerial and aqueous currents\nexercise, are paralleled by those of uniform forces of other orders.\nElectric attraction will separate small bodies from large, or light\nbodies from heavy. By magnetism, grains of iron may be selected from\namong other grains; as by the Sheffield grinder, whose magnetized gauze\nmask filters out the steel-dust which his wheel gives off, from the\nstone-dust that accompanies it. And how the affinity of any agent acting\ndifferently on the components of a given body, enables us to take away\nsome component and leave the rest behind, is shown in almost every\nchemical experiment.\n\nWhat now is the general truth here variously presented? How are these\nseveral facts and countless similar ones, to be expressed in terms that\nembrace them all? In each case we see in action a force which may be\nregarded as simple or uniform\u2014fluid motion in a certain direction at a\ncertain velocity; electric or magnetic attraction of a given amount;\nchemical affinity of a particular kind: or rather, in strictness, the\nacting force is compounded of one of these and certain other uniform\nforces, as gravitation, etc. In each case we have an aggregate made up\nof unlike units\u2014either atoms of different substances combined or\nintimately mingled, or fragments of the same substance of different\nsizes, or other constituent parts that are unlike in their specific\ngravities, shapes, or other attributes. And in each case these unlike\nunits, or groups of units, of which the aggregate consists, are, under\nthe influence of some resultant force acting indiscriminately on them\nall, separated from each other\u2014segregated into minor aggregates, each\nconsisting of units that are severally like each other and unlike those\nof the other minor aggregates. Such being the common aspect of these\nchanges, let us look for the common interpretation of them.\n\nIn the chapter on \u201cThe Instability of the Homogeneous,\u201d it was shown\nthat a uniform force falling on any aggregate, produces unlike\nmodifications in its different parts\u2014turns the uniform into the\nmultiform and the multiform into the more multiform. The transformation\nthus wrought, consists of either insensible or sensible changes of\nrelative position among the units, or of both\u2014either of those molecular\nre-arrangements which we call chemical, or of those larger\ntranspositions which are distinguished as mechanical, or of the two\nunited. Such portion of the permanently effective force as reaches each\ndifferent part, or differently-conditioned part, may be expended in\nmodifying the mutual relations of its constituents; or it may be\nexpended in moving the part to another place; or it may be expended\npartially in the first and partially in the second. Hence, so much of\nthe permanently effective force as does not work the one kind of effect,\nmust work the other kind. It is manifest that if of the permanently\neffective force which falls on some compound unit of an aggregate,\nlittle, if any, is absorbed in re-arranging the ultimate components of\nsuch compound unit, much or the whole, must show itself in motion of\nsuch compound unit to some other place in the aggregate; and conversely,\nif little or none of this force is absorbed in generating mechanical\ntransposition, much or the whole must go to produce molecular\nalterations. What now must follow from this? In cases where none\nor only part of the force generates chemical re-distributions, what\nphysical re-distributions must be generated? Parts that are similar to\neach other will be similarly acted on by the force; and will similarly\nreact on it. Parts that are dissimilar will be dissimilarly acted on by\nthe force; and will dissimilarly react on it. Hence the permanently\neffective incident force, when wholly or partially transformed into\nmechanical motion of the units, will produce like motions in units that\nare alike, and unlike motions in units that are unlike. If then, in an\naggregate containing two or more orders of mixed units, those of the\nsame order will be moved in the same way, and in a way that differs from\nthat in which units of other orders are moved, the respective orders\nmust segregate. A group of like things on which are impressed motions\nthat are alike in amount and direction, must be transferred as a group\nto another place, and if they are mingled with some group of other\nthings, on which the motions impressed are like each other, but unlike\nthose of the first group in amount or direction or both, these other\nthings must be transferred as a group to some other place\u2014the mixed\naggregate must undergo a simultaneous differentiation and integration.\n\nIn further elucidation of this process, it will be well here to set down\na few instances in which we may see that, other things equal, the\ndefiniteness of the separation is in proportion to the definiteness of\nthe difference between the units. Take a handful of any pounded\nsubstance, containing fragments of all sizes; and let it fall to the\nground while a gentle breeze is blowing. The large fragments will be\ncollected together on the ground almost immediately under the hand;\nsomewhat smaller fragments will be carried a little to the leeward;\nstill smaller ones a little further; and those minute particles which we\ncall dust, will be drifted a long way before they reach the earth: that\nis, the integration is indefinite where the difference among the\nfragments is indefinite, though the divergence is greatest where the\ndifference is greatest. If, again, the handful be made up of quite\ndistinct orders of units\u2014as pebbles, coarse sand, and dust\u2014these will,\nunder like conditions, be segregated with comparative definiteness: the\npebbles will drop almost vertically; the sand will fall in an inclined\ndirection, and deposit itself within a tolerably circumscribed space\nbeyond the pebbles; while the dust will be blown almost horizontally to\na great distance. A case in which another kind of force comes into play,\nwill still better illustrate this truth. Through a mixed aggregate of\nsoluble and insoluble substances, let water slowly percolate. There will\nin the first place be a distinct parting of the substances that are the\nmost widely contrasted in their relations to the acting forces: the\nsoluble will be carried away; the insoluble will remain behind. Further,\nsome separation, though a less definite one, will be effected among the\nsoluble substances; since the first part of the current will remove the\nmost soluble substances in the largest amounts, and after these have\nbeen all dissolved, the current will still continue to bring out the\nremaining less soluble substances. Even the undissolved matters will\nhave simultaneously undergone a certain segregation; for the percolating\nfluid will carry down the minute fragments from among the large ones,\nand will deposit those of small specific gravity in one place, and those\nof great specific gravity in another. To complete the elucidation\nwe must glance at the obverse fact; namely, that mixed units which\ndiffer but slightly, are moved in but slightly-different ways by\nincident forces, and can therefore be separated only by such adjustments\nof the incident forces as allow slight differences to become appreciable\nfactors in the result. This truth is made manifest by antithesis in the\ninstances just given; but it may be made much more manifest by a few\nsuch instances as those which chemical analysis supplies in abundance.\nThe parting of alcohol from water by distillation is a good one. Here we\nhave atoms consisting of oxygen and hydrogen, mingled with atoms\nconsisting of oxygen, hydrogen, and carbon. The two orders of atoms have\na considerable similarity of nature: they similarly maintain a fluid\nform at ordinary temperatures; they similarly become gaseous more and\nmore rapidly as the temperature is raised; and they boil at points not\nvery far apart. Now this comparative likeness of the atoms is\naccompanied by difficulty in segregating them. If the mixed fluid is\nunduly heated, much water distils over with the alcohol: it is only\nwithin a narrow range of temperature, that the one set of atoms are\ndriven off rather than the others; and even then not a few of the others\naccompany them. The most interesting and instructive example, however,\nis furnished by certain phenomena of crystallization. When several salts\nthat have little analogy of constitution, are dissolved in the same body\nof water, they are separated without much trouble, by crystallization:\ntheir respective units moved towards each other, as physicists suppose,\nby polar forces, segregate into crystals of their respective kinds. The\ncrystals of each salt do, indeed, usually contain certain small amounts\nof the other salts present in the solution\u2014especially when the\ncrystallization has been rapid; but from these other salts they are\nseverally freed by repeated resolutions and crystallizations. Mark now,\nhowever, that the reverse is the case when the salts contained in the\nsame body of water are chemically homologous. The nitrates of baryta and\nlead, or the sulphates of zinc, soda, and magnesia, unite in the same\ncrystals; nor will they crystallize separately if these crystals be\ndissolved afresh, and afresh crystallized, even with great care. On\nseeking the cause of this anomaly, chemists found that such salts were\nisomorphous\u2014that their atoms, though not chemically identical, were\nidentical in the proportions of acid, base, and water, composing them,\nand in their crystalline forms: whence it was inferred that their atoms\nare nearly alike in structure. Thus is clearly illustrated the truth,\nthat units of unlike kinds are differentiated and integrated with a\nreadiness proportionate to the degree of their unlikeness. In the first\ncase we see that being dissimilar in their forms, but similar in so far\nas they are soluble in water of a certain temperature, the atoms\nsegregate, though imperfectly. In the second case we see that the atoms,\nhaving not only the likeness implied by solubility in the same\nmenstruum, but also a great likeness of structure, do not segregate\u2014are\ndifferentiated and integrated only under quite special conditions, and\nthen very incompletely. That is, the incident force of mutual polarity\nimpresses unlike motions on the mixed units in proportion as they are\nunlike; and therefore, in proportion as they are unlike, tends to\ndeposit them in separate places.\n\nThere is a converse cause of segregation, which it is needless here to\ntreat of with equal fulness. If different units acted on by the same\nforce, must be differently moved; so, too, must units of the same kind\nbe differently moved by different forces. Supposing some group of units\nforming part of a homogeneous aggregate, are unitedly exposed to a force\nthat is unlike in amount or direction to the force acting on the rest of\nthe aggregate; then this group of units will separate from the rest,\nprovided that, of the force so acting on it, there remains any portion\nnot dissipated in molecular vibrations, nor absorbed in producing\nmolecular re-arrangements. After all that has been said above, this\nproposition needs no defence.\n\nBefore ending our preliminary exposition, a complementary truth must be\nspecified; namely, that mixed forces are segregated by the reaction of\nuniform matters, just as mixed matters are segregated by the action of\nuniform forces. Of this truth a complete and sufficient illustration is\nfurnished by the dispersion of refracted light. A beam of light, made up\nof ethereal undulations of different orders, is not uniformly deflected\nby a homogeneous refracting body; but the different orders of\nundulations it contains, are deflected at different angles: the result\nbeing that these different orders of undulations are separated and\nintegrated, and so produce what we know as the colours of the spectrum.\nA segregation of another kind occurs when rays of light traverse an\nobstructing medium. Those rays which consist of comparatively short\nundulations, are absorbed before those which consist of comparatively\nlong ones; and the red rays, which consist of the longest undulations,\nalone penetrate when the obstruction is very great. How, conversely,\nthere is produced a separation of like forces by the reaction of unlike\nmatters, is also made manifest by the phenomena of refraction: since\nadjacent and parallel beams of light, falling on, and passing through,\nunlike substances, are made to diverge.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 124. On the assumption of their nebular origin, stars and planets\nexemplify that cause of material integration last assigned\u2014the action of\nunlike forces on like units.\n\nIn a preceding chapter (\u00a7 110) we saw that if matter ever existed in a\ndiffused form, it could not continue uniformly distributed, but must\nbreak up into masses. It was shown that in the absence of a perfect\nbalance of mutual attractions among atoms dispersed through unlimited\nspace, there must arise breeches of continuity throughout the aggregate\nformed by them, and a concentration of it towards centres of dominant\nattraction. Where any such breech of continuity occurs, and the atoms\nthat were before adjacent separate from each other; they do so in\nconsequence of a difference in the forces to which they are respectively\nsubject. The atoms on the one side of the breech are exposed to a\ncertain surplus attraction in the direction in which they begin to move;\nand those on the other to a surplus attraction in the opposite\ndirection. That is, the adjacent groups of like units are exposed to\nunlike resultant forces; and accordingly separate and integrate.\n\nThe formation and detachment of a nebulous ring, illustrates the same\ngeneral principle. To conclude, as Laplace did, that the equatorial\nportion of a rotating nebulous spheroid, will, during concentration,\nacquire a centrifugal force sufficient to prevent it from following the\nrest of the contracting mass, is to conclude that such portions will\nremain behind as are in common subject to a certain differential force.\nThe line of division between the ring and the spheroid, must be a line\ninside of which the aggregative force is greater than the force\nresisting aggregation; and outside of which the force resisting\naggregation is greater than the aggregative force. Hence the alleged\nprocess conforms to the law that among like units, separation and\nintegration is produced by the action of unlike forces.\n\nAstronomical phenomena do not furnish any other than these hypothetical\nexamples. In its present comparatively settled condition, the Solar\nSystem exhibits no direct evidence of progressing integration: unless\nindeed under the insignificant form of the union of meteoric masses with\nthe Earth, and, occasionally perhaps, of cometary matter with the Sun.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 125. Those geologic changes usually classed as aqueous, display under\nnumerous forms the segregation of unlike units by a uniform incident\nforce. On sea-shores, the waves are ever sorting-out and separating the\nmixed materials against which they break. From each mass of fallen\ncliff, the rising and ebbing tide carries away all those particles which\nare so small as to remain long suspended in the water; and, at some\ndistance from shore, deposits them in the shape of fine sediment. Large\nparticles, sinking with comparative rapidity, are accumulated into beds\nof sand near low water-mark. The coarse grit and small pebbles collect\ntogether on the incline up which the breakers rush. And on the top lie\nthe larger stones and boulders. Still more specific segregations may\noccasionally be observed. Flat pebbles, produced by the breaking down of\nlaminated rock, are sometimes separately collected in one part of a\nshingle bank. On this shore the deposit is wholly of mud; on that it is\nwholly of sand. Here we find a sheltered cove filled with small pebbles\nalmost of one size; and there, in a curved bay one end of which is more\nexposed than the other, we see a progressive increase in the massiveness\nof the stones as we walk from the less exposed to the more exposed end.\nIndeed, our sedimentary strata form one vast series of illustrations of\nthe alleged law. Trace the history of each deposit, and we are quickly\nled down to the fact, that mixed fragments of matter, differing in their\nsizes or weights, are, when exposed to the momentum and friction of\nwater, joined with the attraction of the Earth, selected from each\nother, and united into groups of comparatively like fragments. We see\nthat, other things equal, the separation is definite in proportion as\nthe differences of the units are marked; and that, under the action of\nthe same aggregate of forces, the most widely unlike units are most\nwidely removed from each other.\n\nAmong igneous changes we do not find so many examples of the process\ndescribed. When specifying the conditions to Evolution, it was pointed\nout (\u00a7 104) that molecular vibration exceeding a certain intensity, does\nnot permit those integrations which result from the action of minor\ndifferential forces. Nevertheless, geological phenomena of this order\nare not barren of illustrations. Where the mixed matters composing the\nEarth\u2019s crust have been raised to a very high temperature, segregation\nhabitually takes place as the temperature diminishes. Sundry of the\nsubstances that escape in a gaseous form from volcanoes, sublime into\ncrystals on coming against cool surfaces; and solidifying, as these\nsubstances do, at different temperatures, they are deposited at\ndifferent parts of the crevices through which they are emitted together.\nThe best illustration, however, is furnished by the changes that occur\nduring the slow cooling of igneous rock. When, through one of the\nfractures from time to time made in the solid shell which forms the\nEarth\u2019s crust, a portion of the molten nucleus is extruded; and when\nthis is cooled with comparative rapidity, through free radiation and\ncontact with cold masses; it forms a substance known as trap or basalt\u2014a\nsubstance that is uniform in texture, though made up of various\ningredients. But when, not escaping through the superficial strata, such\na portion of the molten nucleus is slowly cooled, it becomes what we\nknow as granite: the mingled particles of quartz, feldspar, and mica,\nbeing kept for a long time in a fluid and semi-fluid state\u2014a state of\ncomparative mobility\u2014undergo those changes of position which the forces\nimpressed on them by their fellow units necessitate. Having time in\nwhich to generate the requisite motions of the atoms, the differential\nforces arising from mutual polarity, segregate the quartz, feldspar, and\nmica, into crystals. How completely this is dependent on the\nlong-continued agitation of the mixed particles, and consequent\nlong-continued mobility by small differential forces, is proved by the\nfact that in granite dykes, the crystals in the centre of the mass,\nwhere the fluidity or semi-fluidity continued for a longer time, are\nmuch larger than those at the sides, where contact with the neighbouring\nrock caused more rapid cooling and solidification.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 126. The actions going on throughout an organism are so involved and\nsubtle, that we cannot expect to identify the particular forces by which\nparticular integrations are effected. Among the few instances admitting\nof tolerably definite interpretation, the best are those in which\nmechanical pressures and tensions are the agencies at work. We shall\ndiscover several on studying the bony frame of the higher animals.\n\nThe vertebral column of a man, is subject, as a whole, to certain\ngeneral strains\u2014the weight of the body, together with the reactions\ninvolved by all considerable muscular efforts; and in conformity with\nthis, it has a certain general integration. At the same time, being\nexposed to different forces in the course of those lateral bendings\nwhich the movements necessitate, its parts retain a certain\nseparateness. And if we trace up the development of the vertebral column\nfrom its primitive form of a cartilaginous cord in the lowest fishes, we\nsee that, throughout, it maintains an integration corresponding to the\nunity of the incident forces, joined with a division into segments\ncorresponding to the variety of the incident forces. Each segment,\nconsidered apart, exemplifies the truth more simply. A vertebra is not a\nsingle bone, but consists of a central mass with sundry appendages or\nprocesses; and in rudimentary types of vertebr\u00e6, those appendages are\nquite separate from the central mass, and, indeed, exist before it makes\nits appearance. But these several independent bones, constituting a\nprimitive spinal segment, are subject to a certain aggregate of forces\nwhich agree more than they differ: as the fulcrum to a group of muscles\nhabitually acting together, they perpetually undergo certain reactions\nin common. And accordingly, we see that in the course of development\nthey gradually coalesce. Still clearer is the illustration\nfurnished by spinal segments that become fused together where they are\ntogether exposed to some predominant strain. The sacrum consists of a\ngroup of vertebr\u00e6 firmly united. In the ostrich and its congeners there\nare from seventeen to twenty sacral vertebr\u00e6; and besides being\nconfluent with each other, these are confluent with the iliac bones,\nwhich run on each side of them. If now we assume these vertebr\u00e6 to have\nbeen originally separate, as they still are in the embryo bird; and if\nwe consider the mechanical conditions to which they must in such case\nhave been exposed; we shall see that their union results in the alleged\nway. For through these vertebr\u00e6 the entire weight of the body is\ntransferred to the legs: the legs support the pelvic arch; the pelvic\narch supports the sacrum; and to the sacrum is articulated the rest of\nthe spine, with all the limbs and organs attached to it. Hence, if\nseparate, the sacral vertebr\u00e6 must be held firmly together by\nstrongly-contracted muscles; and must, by implication, be prevented from\npartaking in those lateral movements which the other vertebr\u00e6\nundergo\u2014they must be subject to a common strain, while they are\npreserved from strains which would affect them differently; and so they\nfulfil the conditions under which integration occurs. But the\ncases in which cause and effect are brought into the most obvious\nrelation, are supplied by the limbs. The metacarpal bones (those which\nin man support the palm of the hand) are separate from each other in the\nmajority of mammalia: the separate actions of the toes entailing on them\nslight amounts of separate movements. This is not so however in the\nox-tribe and the horse-tribe. In the ox-tribe, only the middle\nmetacarpals (third and fourth) are developed; and these, attaining\nmassive proportions, coalesce to form the cannon bone. In the\nhorse-tribe, the integration is what we may distinguish as indirect: the\nsecond and fourth metacarpals are present only as rudiments united to\nthe sides of the third, while the third is immensely developed; thus\nforming a cannon bone which differs from that of the ox in being a\nsingle cylinder, instead of two cylinders fused together. The metatarsus\nin these quadrupeds exhibits parallel changes. Now each of these\nmetamorphoses occurs where the different bones grouped together have no\nlonger any different functions, but retain only a common function. The\nfeet of oxen and horses are used solely for locomotion\u2014are not put like\nthose of unguiculate mammals to purposes which involve some relative\nmovements of the metacarpals. Thus there directly or indirectly results\na single mass of bone where the incident force is single. And for the\ninference that these facts have a causal connexion, we find confirmation\nthroughout the entire class of birds; in the wings and legs of which,\nlike integrations are found under like conditions. While this\nsheet is passing through the press, a fact illustrating this general\ntruth in a yet more remarkable manner, has been mentioned to me by Prof.\nHuxley; who kindly allows me to make use of it while still unpublished\nby him. The _Glyptodon_, an extinct mammal found fossilized in South\nAmerica, has long been known as a large uncouth creature allied to the\nArmadillo, but having a massive dermal armour consisting of polygonal\nplates closely fitted together so as to make a vast box, inclosing the\nbody in such way as effectually to prevent it from being bent, laterally\nor vertically, in the slightest degree. This bony box, which must have\nweighed several hundred-weight, was supported on the spinous processes\nof the vertebr\u00e6, and on the adjacent bones of the pelvic and thoracic\narches. And the significant fact now to be noted, is, that here, where\nthe trunk vertebr\u00e6 were together exposed to the pressure of this heavy\ndermal armour, at the same time that, by its rigidity, they were\npreserved from all relative movements, the entire series of them were\nunited into one solid, continuous bone.\n\nThe formation and maintenance of a species, considered as an assemblage\nof similar organisms, is interpretable in an analogous way. We have\nalready seen that in so far as the members of a species are subject to\ndifferent sets of incident forces, they are differentiated, or divided\ninto varieties. And here it remains to add that in so far as they are\nsubject to like sets of incident forces, they are integrated, or reduced\nto, and kept in, the state of a uniform aggregate. For by the process of\n\u201cnatural selection,\u201d there is a continual purification of each species\nfrom those individuals which depart from the common type in ways that\nunfit them for the conditions of their existence. Consequently, there is\na continual leaving behind of those individuals which are in all\nrespects fit for the conditions of their existence; and are therefore\nvery nearly alike. The circumstances to which any species is exposed,\nbeing, as we before saw, an involved combination of incident forces; and\nthe members of the species having mixed with them some that differ more\nthan usual from the average structure required for meeting these forces;\nit results that these forces are constantly separating such divergent\nindividuals from the rest, and so preserving the uniformity of the\nrest\u2014keeping up its integrity as a species. Just as the changing autumn\nleaves are picked out by the wind from among the green ones around them,\nor just as, to use Prof. Huxley\u2019s simile, the smaller fragments pass\nthrough the sieve while the larger are kept back; so, the uniform\nincidence of external forces affects the members of a group of organisms\nsimilarly in proportion as they are similar, and differently in\nproportion as they are different; and thus is ever segregating the like\nby parting the unlike from them. Whether these separated members are\nkilled off, as mostly happens, or whether, as otherwise happens, they\nsurvive and multiply into a distinct variety, in consequence of their\nfitness to certain partially unlike conditions, matters not to the\nargument. The one case conforms to the law, that the unlike units of an\naggregate are differentiated and integrated when uniformly subject to\nthe same incident forces; and the other to the converse law, that the\nlike units of an aggregate are differentiated and integrated when\nsubject to different incident forces. And on consulting Mr. Darwin\u2019s\nremarks on divergence of character, it will be seen that the\nsegregations thus caused tend ever to become more definite.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 127. Mental evolution under one of its leading aspects, we found to\nconsist in the formation of groups of like objects and like\nrelations\u2014a differentiation of the various things originally\nconfounded together in one assemblage, and an integration of each\nseparate order of things into a separate group (\u00a7 113). Here it\nremains to point out that while unlikeness in the incident forces is\nthe cause of such differentiations, likeness in the incident forces is\nthe cause of such integrations. For what is the process through which\nclassifications are established? At first, in common with the\nuninitiated, the botanist recognizes only such conventional divisions\nas those which agriculture has established\u2014distinguishes a few\nvegetables and cereals, and groups the rest together into the one\nmiscellaneous aggregate of wild plants. How do these wild plants\nbecome grouped in his mind into orders, genera, and species? Each\nplant he examines yields him a certain complex impression. Every now\nand then he picks up a plant like one before seen; and the recognition\nof it is the production in him of a like connected group of\nsensations, by a like connected group of attributes. That is to say,\nthere is produced throughout the nerves concerned, a combined set of\nchanges, similar to a combined set of changes before produced.\nConsidered analytically, each such combined set of changes is a\ncombined set of molecular modifications wrought in the affected part\nof the organism. On every repetition of the impression, a like\ncombined set of molecular modifications is superposed on the previous\nones, and makes them greater: thus generating an internal idea\ncorresponding to these similar external objects. Meanwhile, another\nkind of plant produces in the brain of the botanist another set of\ncombined changes or molecular modifications\u2014a set which does not agree\nwith and deepen the one we have been considering, but disagrees with\nit; and by repetition of such there is generated a different idea\nanswering to a different species. What now is the nature of this\nprocess expressed in general terms? On the one hand there are the like\nand unlike things from which severally emanate the groups of forces by\nwhich we perceive them. On the other hand, there are the organs of\nsense and percipient centres, through which, in the course of\nobservation, these groups of forces pass. In passing through these\norgans of sense and percipient centres, the like groups of forces are\nsegregated, or separated from the unlike groups of forces; and each\nsuch differentiated and integrated series of groups of forces,\nanswering to an external genus or species, constitutes a state of\nconsciousness which we call our idea of the genus or species. We\nbefore saw that as well as a separation of mixed matters by the same\nforce, there is a separation of mixed forces by the same matter; and\nhere we may further see that the unlike forces so separated, work\nunlike structural changes in the aggregate that separates\nthem\u2014structural changes each of which thus represents, and is\nequivalent to, the integrated series of motions that has produced it.\n\nBy a parallel process, the connexions of co-existence and sequence among\nimpressions, become differentiated and integrated simultaneously with\nthe impressions themselves. When two phenomena that have been\nexperienced in a given order, are repeated in the same order, those\nnerves which before were affected by the transition are again affected;\nand such molecular modification as they received from the first motion\npropagated through them, is increased by this second motion along the\nsame route. Each such motion works a structural alteration, which, in\nconformity with the general law set forth in Chapter X., involves a\ndiminution of the resistance to all such motions that afterwards occur.\nThe integration of these successive motions (or more strictly, the\npermanently effective portions of them expended in overcoming\nresistance) thus becomes the cause of, and the measure of, the mental\nconnexion between the impressions which the phenomena produce.\nMeanwhile, phenomena that are recognized as different from these, being\nphenomena that therefore affect different nervous elements, will have\ntheir connexions severally represented by motions along other routes;\nand along each of these other routes, the nervous discharges will\nseverally take place with a readiness proportionate to the frequency\nwith which experience repeats the connexion of phenomena. The\nclassification of relations must hence go on _pari passu_ with the\nclassification of the related things. In common with the mixed\nsensations received from the external world, the mixed relations it\npresents, cannot be impressed on the organism without more or less\nsegregation of them resulting. And through this continuous\ndifferentiation and integration of changes or motions, which constitutes\nnervous function, there is gradually wrought that differentiation and\nintegration of matter, which constitutes nervous structure.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 128. In social evolution, the collecting together of the like and the\nseparation of the unlike, by incident forces, is primarily displayed in\nthe same manner as we saw it to be among groups of inferior creatures.\nThe human races tend to differentiate and integrate, as do races of\nother living forms. Of the forces which effect and maintain the\nsegregations of mankind, may first be named those external ones which we\nclass as physical conditions. The climate and food that are favourable\nto an indigenous people, are more or less detrimental to a people of\ndifferent bodily constitution, coming from a remote part of the Earth.\nIn tropical regions the northern races cannot permanently exist: if not\nkilled off in the first generation, they are so in the second; and, as\nin India, can maintain their footing only by the artificial process of\ncontinuous immigration and emigration. That is to say, the external\nforces acting equally on the inhabitants of a given locality, tend to\nexpel all who are not of a certain type; and so to keep up the\nintegration of those who are of that type. Though elsewhere, as among\nEuropean nations, we see a certain amount of permanent intermixture,\notherwise brought about, we still see that this takes place between\nraces of not very different types, that are naturalized to not very\ndifferent conditions. The other forces conspiring to produce these\nnational integrations, are those mental ones which show themselves in\nthe affinities of men for others like themselves. Emigrants usually\ndesire to get back among their own people; and where their desire does\nnot take effect, it is only because the restraining ties are too great.\nUnits of one society who are obliged to reside in another, very\ngenerally form colonies in the midst of that other\u2014small societies of\ntheir own. Races which have been artificially severed, show strong\ntendencies to re-unite. Now though these integrations that result from\nthe mutual affinities of kindred men, do not seem interpretable as\nillustrations of the general principle above enunciated, they really are\nthus interpretable. When treating of the direction of motion (\u00a7 91), it\nwas shown that the actions performed by men for the satisfaction of\ntheir wants, were always motions along lines of least resistance. The\nfeelings characterizing a member of a given race, are feelings which get\ncomplete satisfaction only among other members of that race\u2014a\nsatisfaction partly derived from sympathy with those having like\nfeelings, but mainly derived from the adapted social conditions which\ngrow up where such feelings prevail. When, therefore, a citizen of any\nnation is, as we see, attracted towards others of his nation, the\nrationale is, that certain agencies which we call desires, move him in\nthe direction of least resistance. Human motions, like all other\nmotions, being determined by the distribution of forces, it follows that\nsuch integrations of races as are not produced by incident external\nforces, are produced by forces which the units of the races exercise on\neach other.\n\nDuring the development of each society, we see analogous segregations\ncaused in analogous ways. A few of them result from minor natural\naffinities; but those most important ones which constitute political and\nindustrial organization, result from the union of men in whom\nsimilarities have been produced by education\u2014using education in its\nwidest sense, as comprehending all processes by which citizens are\nmoulded to special functions. Men brought up to bodily labour, are men\nwho have had wrought in them a certain likeness\u2014a likeness which, in\nrespect of their powers of action, obscures and subordinates their\nnatural differences. Those trained to brain-work, have acquired a\ncertain other community of character which makes them, as social units,\nmore like each other than like those trained to manual occupations. And\nthere arise class-integrations answering to these superinduced\nlikenesses. Much more definite integrations take place among the much\nmore definitely assimilated members of any class who are brought up to\nthe same calling. Even where the necessities of their work forbid\nconcentration in one locality, as among artizans happens with masons and\nbrick-layers, and among traders happens with the retail distributors,\nand among professionals happens with the medical men; there are not\nwanting Operative Builders Unions, and Grocers Societies, and Medical\nAssociations, to show that these artificially-assimilated citizens\nbecome integrated as much as the conditions permit. And where, as among\nthe manufacturing classes, the functions discharged do not require the\ndispersion of the citizens thus artificially assimilated, there is a\nprogressive aggregation of them in special localities; and a consequent\nincrease in the definiteness of the industrial divisions. If now\nwe seek the causes of these integrations, considered as results of force\nand motion, we find ourselves brought to the same general principle as\nbefore. This likeness generated in any class or subclass by training, is\nan aptitude acquired by its members for satisfying their wants in like\nways. That is, the occupation to which each man has been brought up, has\nbecome to him, in common with those similarly brought up, a line of\nleast resistance. Hence under that pressure which determines all men to\nactivity, these similarly-modified social units are similarly affected,\nand tend to take similar courses. If then there be any locality which,\neither by its physical peculiarities or by peculiarities wrought on it\nduring social evolution, is rendered a place where a certain kind of\nindustrial action meets with less resistance than elsewhere; it follows\nfrom the law of direction of motion that those social units who have\nbeen moulded to this kind of industrial action, will move towards this\nplace, or become integrated there. If, for instance, the proximity of\ncoal and iron mines to a navigable river, gives to Glasgow a certain\nadvantage in the building of iron ships\u2014if the total labour required to\nproduce the same vessel, and get its equivalent in food and clothing, is\nless there than elsewhere; a concentration of iron-ship builders is\nproduced at Glasgow: either by keeping there the population born to\niron-ship building; or by immigration of those elsewhere engaged in it;\nor by both\u2014a concentration that would be still more marked did not other\ndistricts offer counter-balancing facilities. The principle equally\nholds where the occupation is mercantile instead of manufacturing.\nStock-brokers cluster together in the city, because the amount of effort\nto be severally gone through by them in discharging their functions, and\nobtaining their profits, is less there than in other localities. A place\nof exchange having once been established, becomes a place where the\nresistance to be overcome by each is less than elsewhere; and the\npursuit of the course of least resistance by each, involves their\naggregation around this place.\n\nOf course, with units so complicated as those which constitute a\nsociety, and with forces so involved as those which move them, the\nresulting differentiations and integrations must be far more entangled,\nor far less definite, than those we have hitherto considered. But though\nthere may be pointed out many anomalies which at first sight seem\ninconsistent with the alleged law, a closer study shows that they are\nbut subtler illustrations of it. For men\u2019s likenesses being of various\nkinds, lead to various order of integration. There are likenesses of\ndisposition, likenesses of taste, likenesses produced by intellectual\nculture, likenesses that result from class-training, likenesses of\npolitical feeling; and it needs but to glance round at the\ncaste-divisions, the associations for philanthropic, scientific, and\nartistic purposes, the religious parties and social cliques; to see that\nsome species of likeness among the component members of each body\ndetermines their union. Now these different integrations, by traversing\neach other, and often by their indirect antagonism, more or less obscure\neach other; and prevent any one kind of integration from becoming\ncomplete. Hence the anomalies referred to. But if this cause of\nincompleteness be duly borne in mind, social segregations will be seen\nto conform entirely to the same principle as all other segregations.\nAnalysis will show that either by external incident forces, or by what\nwe may in a sense regard as mutual polarity, there are ever being\nproduced in society integrations of those units which have either a\nnatural likeness or a likeness generated by training.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 129. Can the general truth thus variously illustrated be deduced from\nthe persistence of force, in common with foregoing ones? Probably the\nexposition at the beginning of the chapter will have led most readers to\nconclude that it can be so deduced.\n\nThe abstract propositions involved are these:\u2014First, that like units,\nsubject to a uniform force capable of producing motion in them, will be\nmoved to like degrees in the same direction. Second, that like units if\nexposed to unlike forces capable of producing motion in them, will be\ndifferently moved\u2014moved either in different directions or to different\ndegrees in the same direction. Third, that unlike units if acted on by a\nuniform force capable of producing motion in them, will be differently\nmoved\u2014moved either in different directions or to different degrees in\nthe same direction. Fourth, that the incident forces themselves must be\naffected in analogous ways: like forces falling on like units must be\nsimilarly modified by the conflict; unlike forces falling on like units\nmust be dissimilarly modified; and like forces falling on unlike units\nmust be dissimilarly modified. These propositions admit of reduction to\na still more abstract form. They all of them amount to this:\u2014that in the\nactions and reactions of force and matter, an unlikeness in either of\nthe factors necessitates an unlikeness in the effects; and that in the\nabsence of unlikeness in either of the factors the effects must be\nalike.\n\nWhen thus generalized, the immediate dependence of these propositions on\nthe persistence of force, becomes obvious. Any two forces that are not\nalike, are forces which differ either in their amounts or directions or\nboth; and by what mathematicians call the resolution of forces, it may\nbe proved that this difference is constituted by the presence in the one\nof some force not present in the other. Similarly, any two units or\nportions of matter which are unlike in size, weight, form, or other\nattribute, can be known by us as unlike only through some unlikeness in\nthe forces they impress on our consciousness; and hence this unlikeness\nalso, is constituted by the presence in the one of some force or forces\nnot present in the other. Such being the common nature of these\nunlikenesses, what is the inevitable corollary? Any unlikeness in the\nincident forces, where the things acted on are alike, must generate a\ndifference between the effects; since otherwise, the differential force\nproduces no effect, and force is not persistent. Any unlikeness in the\nthings acted on, where the incident forces are alike, must generate a\ndifference between the effects; since otherwise, the differential force\nwhereby these things are made unlike, produces no effect, and force is\nnot persistent. While, conversely, if the forces acting and the things\nacted on, are alike, the effects must be alike; since otherwise, a\ndifferential effect can be produced without a differential cause, and\nforce is not persistent.\n\nThus these general truths being necessary implications of the\npersistence of force, all the re-distributions above traced out as\ncharacterizing Evolution in its various phases, are also implications of\nthe persistence of force. Such portions of the permanently effective\nforces acting on any aggregate, as produce sensible motions in its\nparts, cannot but work the segregations which we see take place. If of\nthe mixed units making up such aggregate, those of the same kind have\nlike motions impressed on them by a uniform force, while units of\nanother kind are moved by this uniform force in ways more or less unlike\nthe ways in which those of the first kind are moved, the two kinds must\nseparate and integrate. If the units are alike and the forces unlike, a\ndivision of the differently affected units is equally necessitated. Thus\nthere inevitably arises the demarcated grouping which we everywhere see.\nBy virtue of this segregation that grows ever more decided while there\nremains any possibility of increasing it, the change from uniformity to\nmultiformity is accompanied by a change from indistinctness in the\nrelations of parts to distinctness in the relations of parts. As we\nbefore saw that the transformation of the homogeneous into the\nheterogeneous is inferrable from that ultimate truth which transcends\nproof; so we here see, that from this same truth is inferrable the\ntransformation of an indefinite homogeneity into a definite\nheterogeneity.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XVI.\n EQUILIBRATION.\n\n\n\u00a7 130. And now towards what do these changes tend? Will they go on for\never? or will there be an end to them? Can things increase in\nheterogeneity through all future time? or must there be a degree which\nthe differentiation and integration of Matter and Motion cannot pass? Is\nit possible for this universal metamorphosis to proceed in the same\ngeneral course indefinitely? or does it work towards some ultimate\nstate, admitting no further modification of like kind? The last of these\nalternative conclusions is that to which we are inevitably driven.\nWhether we watch concrete processes, or whether we consider the question\nin the abstract, we are alike taught that Evolution has an impassable\nlimit.\n\nThe re-distributions of matter that go on around us, are ever being\nbrought to conclusions by the dissipation of the motions which effect\nthem. The rolling stone parts with portions of its momentum to the\nthings it strikes, and finally comes to rest; as do also, in like\nmanner, the various things it has struck. Descending from the clouds and\ntrickling over the Earth\u2019s surface till it gathers into brooks and\nrivers, water, still running towards a lower level, is at last arrested\nby the resistance of other water that has reached the lowest level. In\nthe lake or sea thus formed, every agitation raised by a wind or the\nimmersion of a solid body, propagates itself around in waves that\ndiminish as they widen, and gradually become lost to observation in\nmotions communicated to the atmosphere and the matter on the shores. The\nimpulse given by a player to the harp-string, is transformed through its\nvibrations into aerial pulses; and these, spreading on all sides, and\nweakening as they spread, soon cease to be perceptible; and finally die\naway in generating thermal undulations that radiate into space. Equally\nin the cinder that falls out of the fire, and in the vast masses of\nmolten lava ejected by a volcano, we see that the molecular agitation\nknown to us as heat, disperses itself by radiation; so that however\ngreat its amount, it inevitably sinks at last to the same degree as that\nexisting in surrounding bodies. And if the actions observed be\nelectrical or chemical, we still find that they work themselves out in\nproducing sensible or insensible movements, that are dissipated as\nbefore; until quiescence is eventually reached. The proximate\nrationale of the process exhibited under these several forms, lies in\nthe fact dwelt on when treating of the Multiplication of Effects, that\nmotions are ever being decomposed into divergent motions, and these into\nre-divergent motions. The rolling stone sends off the stones it hits in\ndirections differing more or less from its own; and they do the like\nwith the things they hit. Move water or air, and the movement is quickly\nresolved into radiating movements. The heat produced by pressure in a\ngiven direction, diffuses itself by undulations in all directions; and\nso do the light and electricity similarly generated. That is to say,\nthese motions undergo division and subdivision; and by continuance of\nthis process without limit, they are, though never lost, gradually\nreduced to insensible motions.\n\nIn all cases then, there is a progress toward equilibration. That\nuniversal co-existence of antagonist forces which, as we before saw,\nnecessitates the universality of rhythm, and which, as we before saw,\nnecessitates the decomposition of every force into divergent forces, at\nthe same time necessitates the ultimate establishment of a balance.\nEvery motion being motion under resistance, is continually suffering\ndeductions; and these unceasing deductions finally result in the\ncessation of the motion.\n\nThe general truth thus illustrated under its simplest aspect, we must\nnow look at under those more complex aspects it usually presents\nthroughout Nature. In nearly all cases, the motion of an aggregate is\ncompound; and the equilibration of each of its components, being carried\non independently, does not affect the rest. The ship\u2019s bell that has\nceased to vibrate, still continues those vertical and lateral\noscillations caused by the ocean-swell. The water of the smooth stream\non whose surface have died away the undulations caused by the rising\nfish, moves as fast as before onward to the sea. The arrested bullet\ntravels with undiminished speed round the Earth\u2019s axis. And were the\nrotation of the Earth destroyed, there would not be implied any\ndiminution of the Earth\u2019s movement with respect to the Sun and other\nexternal bodies. So that in every case, what we regard as equilibration\nis a disappearance of some one or more of the many movements which a\nbody possesses, while its other movements continue as before. That\nthis process may be duly realized and the state of things towards which\nit tends fully understood, it will be well here to cite a case in which\nwe may watch this successive equilibration of combined movements more\ncompletely than we can do in those above instanced. Our end will best be\nserved, not by the most imposing, but by the most familiar example. Let\nus take that of the spinning top. When the string which has been wrapped\nround a top\u2019s axis is violently drawn off, and the top falls on to the\ntable, it usually happens that besides the rapid rotation, two other\nmovements are given to it. A slight horizontal momentum, unavoidably\nimpressed on it when leaving the handle, carries it away bodily from the\nplace on which it drops; and in consequence of its axis being more or\nless inclined, it falls into a certain oscillation, described by the\nexpressive though inelegant word\u2014\u201cwabbling.\u201d These two subordinate\nmotions, variable in their proportions to each other and to the chief\nmotion, are commonly soon brought to a close by separate processes of\nequilibration. The momentum which carries the top bodily along the\ntable, resisted somewhat by the air, but mainly by the irregularities of\nthe surface, shortly disappears; and the top thereafter continues to\nspin on one spot. Meanwhile, in consequence of that opposition which the\naxial momentum of a rotating body makes to any change in the plane of\nrotation, (so beautifully exhibited by the gyroscope,) the \u201cwabbling\u201d\ndiminishes; and like the other is quickly ended. These minor motions\nhaving been dissipated, the rotatory motion, interfered with only by\natmospheric resistance and the friction of the pivot, continues some\ntime with such uniformity that the top appears stationary: there being\nthus temporarily established a condition which the French mathematicians\nhave termed _equilibrium mobile_. It is true that when the axial\nvelocity sinks below a certain point, new motions commence, and increase\ntill the top falls; but these are merely incidental to a case in which\nthe centre of gravity is above the point of support. Were the top,\nhaving an axis of steel, to be suspended from a surface adequately\nmagnetized, all the phenomena described would be displayed, and the\nmoving equilibrium having been once arrived at, would continue until the\ntop became motionless, without any further change of position. Now\nthe facts which it behoves us here to observe, are these. First, that\nthe various motions which an aggregate possesses are separately\nequilibrated: those which are smallest, or which meet with the greatest\nresistance, or both, disappearing first; and leaving at last, that which\nis greatest, or meets with least resistance, or both. Second, that when\nthe aggregate has a movement of its parts with respect to each other,\nwhich encounters but little external resistance, there is apt to be\nestablished an _equilibrium mobile_. Third, that this moving equilibrium\neventually lapses into complete equilibrium.\n\nFully to comprehend the process of equilibration, is not easy; since we\nhave simultaneously to contemplate various phases of it. The best course\nwill be to glance separately at what we may conveniently regard as its\nfour different orders. The first order includes the comparatively\nsimple motions, as those of projectiles, which are not prolonged enough\nto exhibit their rhythmical character; but which, being quickly divided\nand subdivided into motions communicated to other portions of matter,\nare presently dissipated in the rhythm of ethereal undulations. In\nthe second order, comprehending the various kinds of vibration or\noscillation as usually witnessed, the motion is used up in generating a\ntension which, having become equal to it or momentarily equilibrated\nwith it, thereupon produces a motion in the opposite direction, that is\nsubsequently equilibrated in like manner: thus causing a visible rhythm,\nthat is, however, soon lost in invisible rhythms. The third order\nof equilibration, not hitherto noticed, obtains in those aggregates\nwhich continually receive as much motion as they expend. The steam\nengine (and especially that kind which feeds its own furnace and boiler)\nsupplies an example. Here the force from moment to moment dissipated in\novercoming the resistance of the machinery driven, is from moment to\nmoment replaced from the fuel; and the balance of the two is maintained\nby a raising or lowering of the expenditure according to the variation\nof the supply: each increase or decrease in the quantity of steam,\nresulting in a rise or fall of the engine\u2019s movement, such as brings it\nto a balance with the increased or decreased resistance. This, which we\nmay fitly call the _dependent_ moving equilibrium, should be specially\nnoted; since it is one that we shall commonly meet with throughout\nvarious phases of Evolution. The equilibration to be distinguished\nas of the fourth order, is the _independent_ or perfect moving\nequilibrium. This we see illustrated in the rhythmical motions of the\nSolar System; which, being resisted only by a medium of inappreciable\ndensity, undergo no sensible diminution in such periods of time as we\ncan measure.\n\nAll these kinds of equilibration may, however, from the highest point of\nview, be regarded as different modes of one kind. For in every case the\nbalance arrived at is relative, and not absolute\u2014is a cessation of the\nmotion of some particular body in relation to a certain point or points,\ninvolving neither the disappearance of the relative motion lost, which\nis simply transformed into other motions, nor a diminution of the body\u2019s\nmotions with respect to other points. Thus understanding equilibration,\nit manifestly includes that _equilibrium mobile_, which at first sight\nseems of another nature. For any system of bodies exhibiting, like those\nof the Solar System, a combination of balanced rhythms, has this\npeculiarity;\u2014that though the constituents of the system have relative\nmovements, the system as a whole has no movement. The centre of gravity\nof the entire group remains fixed. Whatever quantity of motion any\nmember of it has in any direction, is from moment to moment\ncounter-balanced by an equivalent motion in some other part of the group\nin an opposite direction; and so the aggregate matter of the group is in\na state of rest. Whence it follows that the arrival at a state of moving\nequilibrium, is the disappearance of some movement which the aggregate\nhad in relation to external things, and a continuance of those movements\nonly which the different parts of the aggregate have in relation to each\nother. Thus generalizing the process, it becomes clear that all forms of\nequilibration are intrinsically the same; since in every aggregate, it\nis the centre of gravity only that loses its motion: the constituents\nalways retaining some motion with respect to each other\u2014the motion of\nmolecules if none else.\n\nThose readers who happen to bear in mind a proposition concerning the\nfunctional characteristics of Evolution, which was set forth in Chapter\nXII, will probably regard it as wholly at variance with that set forth\nin this Chapter. It was there alleged that throughout Evolution,\nintegration of matter is accompanied by integration of such motion as\nthe matter previously had; and that thus there is a transformation of\ndiffused motion into aggregated motion, parallel to the transformation\nof diffused matter into aggregated matter. Here however, it is asserted\nthat every aggregate motion is constantly undergoing diffusion\u2014every\nintegrated motion undergoing perpetual disintegration. And so the motion\nof masses, which before was said gradually to arise out of molecular\nmotion, is here said to be gradually lost in molecular motion. Doubtless\nthese statements, if severally accepted without qualification, are\ncontradictory. Neither of them, however, expresses the whole truth. Each\nneeds the other as its indispensable complement. It is quite true, as\nbefore alleged, that there goes on an integration of motion\ncorresponding to the integration of matter; and that this essential\ncharacteristic of Evolution, functionally considered, is clearly\ndisplayed in proportion as the Evolution is active. But the\ndisintegration of motion, which, as we before saw, constitutes\nDissolution, functionally considered, is all along going on; and though\nat first it forms but a small deduction from the change constituting\nEvolution, it gradually becomes equal to it, and eventually exceeding\nit, entails reverse changes. The aggregation of matter never being\ncomplete, but leaving behind less aggregated or unaggregated matter, in\nthe shape of liquid, aeriform, or ethereal media; it results that from\nthe beginning, the integrated motion of integrated masses, is ever being\nobstructed by these less integrated or unintegrated media. So that\nthough while the integration of matter is rapidly going on, there is an\nincrease of integrated motion, spite of the deductions thus continually\nmade from it, there comes a time when the integration of matter and\nconsequently of motion, ceases to increase, or increases so slowly that\nthe deductions counterbalance it; and thenceforth these begin to\ndecrease it, and, by its perpetual diffusion, to bring about a relative\nequilibration. From the beginning, the process of Evolution is\nantagonized by a process of Dissolution; and while the first for a long\ntime predominates, the last finally arrests and reverses it.\n\nReturning from this parenthetical explanation, we must now especially\nnote two leading truths brought out by the foregoing exposition: the one\nconcerning the ultimate, or rather the penultimate, state of motion\nwhich the processes described tend to bring about; the other concerning\nthe concomitant distribution of matter. This penultimate state of\nmotion is the moving equilibrium; which, as we have seen, tends to arise\nin an aggregate having compound motions, as a transitional state on the\nway towards complete equilibrium. Throughout Evolution of all kinds,\nthere is a continual approximation to, and more or less complete\nmaintenance of, this moving equilibrium. As in the Solar System there\nhas been established an independent moving equilibrium\u2014an equilibrium\nsuch that the relative motions of the constituent parts are continually\nso counter-balanced by opposite motions, that the mean state of the\nwhole aggregate never varies; so is it, though in a less distinct\nmanner, with each form of dependent moving equilibrium. The state of\nthings exhibited in the cycles of terrestrial changes, in the balanced\nfunctions of organic bodies that have reached their adult forms, and in\nthe acting and re-acting processes of fully-developed societies, is\nsimilarly one characterized by compensating oscillations. The involved\ncombination of rhythms seen in each of these cases, has an average\ncondition which remains practically constant during the deviations ever\ntaking place on opposite sides of it. And the fact which we have here\nparticularly to observe, is, that as a corollary from the general law of\nequilibration above set forth, the evolution of every aggregate must go\non until this _equilibrium mobile_ is established; since, as we have\nseen, an excess of force which the aggregate possesses in any direction,\nmust eventually be expended in overcoming resistances to change in that\ndirection: leaving behind only those movements which compensate each\nother, and so form a moving equilibrium. Respecting the structural\nstate simultaneously reached, it must obviously be one presenting an\narrangement of forces that counterbalance all the forces to which the\naggregate is subject. So long as there remains a residual force in any\ndirection\u2014be it excess of a force exercised by the aggregate on its\nenvironment, or of a force exercised by its environment on the\naggregate, equilibrium does not exist; and therefore the re-distribution\nof matter must continue. Whence it follows that the limit of\nheterogeneity towards which every aggregate progresses, is the formation\nof as many specializations and combinations of parts, as there are\nspecialized and combined forces to be met.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 131. Those successively changed forms which, if the nebular hypothesis\nbe granted, must have arisen during the evolution of the Solar System,\nwere so many transitional kinds of moving equilibrium; severally giving\nplace to more permanent kinds on the way towards complete equilibration.\nThus the assumption of an oblate spheroidal figure by condensing\nnebulous matter, was the assumption of a temporary and partial moving\nequilibrium among the component parts\u2014a moving equilibrium that must\nhave slowly grown more settled, as local conflicting movements were\ndissipated. In the formation and detachment of the nebulous rings,\nwhich, according to this hypothesis, from time to time took place, we\nhave instances of progressive equilibration ending in the establishment\nof a complete moving equilibrium. For the genesis of each such ring,\nimplies a perfect balancing of that aggregative force which the whole\nspheroid exercises on its equatorial portion, by that centrifugal force\nwhich the equatorial portion has acquired during previous concentration:\nso long as these two forces are not equal, the equatorial portion\nfollows the contracting mass; but as soon as the second force has\nincreased up to an equality with the first, the equatorial portion can\nfollow no further, and remains behind. While, however, the resulting\nring, regarded as a whole connected by forces with external wholes, has\nreached a state of moving equilibrium; its parts are not balanced with\nrespect to each other. As we before saw (\u00a7 110) the probabilities\nagainst the maintenance of an annular form by nebulous matter, are\nimmense: from the instability of the homogeneous, it is inferrable that\nnebulous matter so distributed must break up into portions; and\neventually concentrate into a single mass. That is to say, the ring must\nprogress towards a moving equilibrium of a more complete kind, during\nthe dissipation of that motion which maintained its particles in a\ndiffused form: leaving at length a planetary body, attended perhaps by a\ngroup of minor bodies, severally having residuary relative motions that\nare no longer resisted by sensible media; and there is thus constituted\nan _equilibrium mobile_ that is all but absolutely perfect.[18]\n\nHypothesis aside, the principle of equilibration is still perpetually\nillustrated in those minor changes of state which the Solar System is\nundergoing. Each planet, satellite, and comet, exhibits to us at its\naphelion a momentary equilibrium between that force which urges it\nfurther away from its primary, and that force which retards its retreat;\nsince the retreat goes on until the last of these forces exactly\ncounterpoises the first. In like manner at perihelion a converse\nequilibrium is momentarily established. The variation of each orbit in\nsize, in eccentricity, and in the position of its plane, has similarly a\nlimit at which the forces producing change in the one direction, are\nequalled by those antagonizing it; and an opposite limit at which an\nopposite arrest takes place. Meanwhile, each of these simple\nperturbations, as well as each of the complex ones resulting from their\ncombination, exhibits, besides the temporary equilibration at each of\nits extremes, a certain general equilibration of compensating deviations\non either side of a mean state. That the moving equilibrium thus\nconstituted, tends, in the course of indefinite time, to lapse into a\ncomplete equilibrium, by the gradual decrease of planetary motions and\neventually integration of all the separate masses composing the Solar\nSystem, is a belief suggested by certain observed cometary retardations,\nand entertained by some of high authority. The received opinion that the\nappreciable diminution in the period of Encke\u2019s comet, implies a loss of\nmomentum caused by resistance of the ethereal medium, commits\nastronomers who hold it, to the conclusion that this same resistance\nmust cause a loss of planetary motions\u2014a loss which, infinitesimal\nthough it may be in such periods as we can measure, will, if\nindefinitely continued, bring these motions to a close. Even should\nthere be, as Sir John Herschel suggests, a rotation of the ethereal\nmedium in the same direction with the planets, this arrest, though\nimmensely postponed, would not be absolutely prevented. Such an\neventuality, however, must in any case be so inconceivably remote as to\nhave no other than a speculative interest for us. It is referred to\nhere, simply as illustrating the still-continued tendency towards\ncomplete equilibrium, through the still-continued dissipation of\nsensible motion, or transformation of it into insensible motion.\n\nBut there is another species of equilibration going on in the Solar\nSystem, with which we are more nearly concerned\u2014the equilibration of\nthat molecular motion known as heat. The tacit assumption hitherto\ncurrent, that the Sun can continue to give off an undiminished amount of\nlight and heat through all future time, is fast being abandoned.\nInvolving as it does, under a disguise, the conception of power produced\nout of nothing, it is of the same order as the belief that misleads\nperpetual-motion schemers. The spreading recognition of the truth that\nforce is persistent, and that consequently whatever force is manifested\nunder one shape must previously have existed under another shape, is\ncarrying with it a recognition of the truth that the force known to us\nin solar radiations, is the changed form of some other force of which\nthe Sun is the seat; and that by the gradual dissipation of these\nradiations into space, this other force is being slowly exhausted. The\naggregative force by which the Sun\u2019s substance is drawn to his centre of\ngravity, is the only one which established physical laws warrant us in\nsuspecting to be the correlate of the forces thus emanating from him:\nthe only source of a known kind that can be assigned for the insensible\nmotions constituting solar light and heat, is the sensible motion which\ndisappears during the progressing concentration of the Sun\u2019s substance.\nWe before saw it to be a corollary from the nebular hypothesis, that\nthere is such a progressing concentration of the Sun\u2019s substance. And\nhere remains to be added the further corollary, that just as in the case\nof the smaller members of the Solar System, the heat generated by\nconcentration, long ago in great part radiated into space, has left only\na central residue that now escapes but slowly; so in the case of that\nimmensely larger mass forming the Sun, the immensely greater quantity of\nheat generated and still in process of rapid diffusion, must, as the\nconcentration approaches its limit, diminish in amount, and eventually\nleave only an inappreciable internal remnant. With or without the\naccompaniment of that hypothesis of nebular condensation, whence, as we\nsee, it naturally follows, the doctrine that the Sun is gradually losing\nhis heat, has now gained considerable currency; and calculations have\nbeen made, both respecting the amount of heat and light already\nradiated, as compared with the amount that remains, and respecting the\nperiod during which active radiation is likely to continue. Prof.\nHelmholtz estimates, that since the time when, according to the nebular\nhypothesis, the matter composing the Solar System extended to the orbit\nof Neptune, there has been evolved by the arrest of sensible motion, an\namount of heat 454 times as great as that which the Sun still has to\ngive out. He also makes an approximate estimate of the rate at which\nthis remaining 1/454th is being diffused: showing that a diminution of\nthe Sun\u2019s diameter to the extent of 1/10,000, would produce heat, at the\npresent rate, for more than 2000 years; or in other words, that a\ncontraction of 1/20,000,000 of his diameter, suffices to generate the\namount of light and heat annually emitted; and that thus, at the present\nrate of expenditure, the Sun\u2019s diameter will diminish by something like\n1/20 in the lapse of the next million years.[19] Of course these\nconclusions are not to be considered as more than rude approximations to\nthe truth. Until quite recently, we have been totally ignorant of the\nSun\u2019s chemical composition; and even now have obtained but a superficial\nknowledge of it. We know nothing of his internal structure; and it is\nquite possible (probable, I believe,) that the assumptions respecting\ncentral density, made in the foregoing estimates, are wrong. But no\nuncertainty in the data on which these calculations proceed, and no\nconsequent error in the inferred rate at which the Sun is expending his\nreserve of force, militates against the general proposition that this\nreserve of force _is_ being expended; and must in time be exhausted.\nThough the residue of undiffused motion in the Sun, may be much greater\nthan is above concluded; though the rate of radiation cannot, as\nassumed, continue at a uniform rate, but must eventually go on with\nslowly-decreasing rapidity; and though the period at which the Sun will\ncease to afford us adequate light and heat, is very possibly far more\ndistant than above implied; yet such a period must some time be reached,\nand this is all which it here concerns us to observe.\n\nThus while the Solar System, if evolved from diffused matter, has\nillustrated the law of equilibration in the establishment of a complete\nmoving equilibrium; and while, as at present constituted, it illustrates\nthe law of equilibration in the balancing of all its movements; it also\nillustrates this law in the processes which astronomers and physicists\ninfer are still going on. That motion of masses produced during\nEvolution, is being slowly re-diffused in molecular motion of the\nethereal medium; both through the progressive integration of each mass,\nand the resistance to its motion through space. Infinitely remote as may\nbe the state when all the motions of masses shall be transformed into\nmolecular motion, and all the molecular motion equilibrated; yet such a\nstate of complete integration and complete equilibration, is that\ntowards which the changes now going on throughout the Solar System\ninevitably tend.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 132. A spherical figure is the one which can alone equilibrate the\nforces of mutually-gravitating atoms. If the aggregate of such atoms has\na rotatory motion, the form of equilibrium becomes a spheroid of greater\nor less oblateness, according to the rate of rotation; and it has been\nascertained that the Earth is an oblate spheroid, diverging just as much\nfrom sphericity as is requisite to counterbalance the centrifugal force\nconsequent on its velocity round its axis. That is to say, during the\nevolution of the Earth, there has been reached a complete equilibrium of\nthose forces which affect its general outline. The only other\nprocess of equilibration which the Earth as a whole can exhibit, is the\nloss of its axial motion; and that any such loss is going on, we have no\ndirect evidence. It has been contended, however, by Prof. Helmholtz,\nthat inappreciable as may be its effect within known periods of time,\nthe friction of the tidal wave must be slowly diminishing the Earth\u2019s\nrotatory motion, and must eventually destroy it. Now though it seems an\noversight to say that the Earth\u2019s rotation can thus be destroyed, since\nthe extreme effect, to be reached only in infinite time by such a\nprocess, would be an extension of the Earth\u2019s day to the length of a\nlunation; yet it seems clear that this friction of the tidal wave is a\nreal cause of decreasing rotation. Slow as its action is, we must\nrecognize it as exemplifying, under another form, the universal progress\ntowards equilibrium.\n\nIt is needless to point out, in detail, how those movements which the\nSun\u2019s rays generate in the air and water on the Earth\u2019s surface, and\nthrough them in the Earth\u2019s solid substance,[20] one and all teach the\nsame general truth. Evidently the winds and waves and streams, as well\nas the denudations and depositions they effect, perpetually illustrate\non a grand scale, and in endless modes, that gradual dissipation of\nmotions described in the first section; and the consequent tendency\ntowards a balanced distribution of forces. Each of these sensible\nmotions, produced directly or indirectly by integration of those\ninsensible motions communicated from the Sun, becomes, as we have seen,\ndivided and subdivided into motions less and less sensible; until it is\nfinally reduced to insensible motions, and radiated from the Earth in\nthe shape of thermal undulations. In their totality, these complex\nmovements of aerial, liquid, and solid matter on the Earth\u2019s crust,\nconstitute a dependent moving equilibrium. As we before saw, there is\ntraceable throughout them an involved combination of rhythms. The\nunceasing circulation of water from the ocean to the land, and from the\nland back to the ocean, is a type of these various compensating actions;\nwhich, in the midst of all the irregularities produced by their mutual\ninterferences, maintain an average. And in this, as in other\nequilibrations of the third order, we see that the power from moment to\nmoment in course of dissipation, is from moment to moment renewed from\nwithout: the rises and falls in the supply, being balanced by rises and\nfalls in the expenditure; as witness the correspondence between the\nmagnetic variations and the cycle of the solar spots. But the fact\nit chiefly concerns us to observe, is, that this process must go on\nbringing things ever nearer to complete rest. These mechanical\nmovements, meteorologic and geologic, which are continually being\nequilibrated, both temporarily by counter-movements and permanently by\nthe dissipation of such movements and counter-movements, will slowly\ndiminish as the quantity of force received from the Sun diminishes. As\nthe insensible motions propagated to us from the centre of our system\nbecome feebler, the sensible motions here produced by them must\ndecrease; and at that remote period when the solar heat has ceased to be\nappreciable, there will no longer be any appreciable re-distributions of\nmatter on the surface of our planet.\n\nThus from the highest point of view, all terrestrial changes are\nincidents in the course of cosmical equilibration. It was before pointed\nout, (\u00a7 80) that of the incessant alterations which the Earth\u2019s crust\nand atmosphere undergo, those which are not due to the still-progressing\nmotion of the Earth\u2019s substance towards its centre of gravity, are due\nto the still-progressing motion of the Sun\u2019s substance towards its\ncentre of gravity. Here it is to be remarked, that this continuance of\nintegration in the Earth and in the Sun, is a continuance of that\ntransformation of sensible motion into insensible motion which we have\nseen ends in equilibration; and that the arrival in each case at the\nextreme of integration, is the arrival at a state in which no more\nsensible motion remains to be transformed into insensible motion\u2014a state\nin which the forces producing integration and the forces opposing\nintegration, have become equal.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 133. Every living body exhibits, in a four-fold form, the process we\nare tracing out\u2014exhibits it from moment to moment in the balancing of\nmechanical forces; from hour to hour in the balancing of functions; from\nyear to year in the changes of state that compensate changes of\ncondition; and finally in the complete arrest of vital movements at\ndeath. Let us consider the facts under these heads.\n\nThe sensible motion constituting each visible action of an organism, is\nsoon brought to a close by some adverse force within or without the\norganism. When the arm is raised, the motion given to it is antagonized\npartly by gravity and partly by the internal resistances consequent on\nstructure; and its motion, thus suffering continual deduction, ends when\nthe arm has reached a position at which the forces are equilibrated. The\nlimits of each systole and diastole of the heart, severally show us a\nmomentary equilibrium between muscular strains that produce opposite\nmovements; and each gush of blood requires to be immediately followed by\nanother, because the rapid dissipation of its momentum would otherwise\nsoon bring the mass of circulating fluid to a stand. As much in the\nactions and re-actions going on among the internal organs, as in the\nmechanical balancing of the whole body, there is at every instant a\nprogressive equilibration of the motions at every instant produced.\n Viewed in their aggregate, and as forming a series, the organic\nfunctions constitute a dependent moving equilibrium\u2014a moving\nequilibrium, of which the motive power is ever being dissipated through\nthe special equilibrations just exemplified, and is ever being renewed\nby the taking in of additional motive power. Food is a store of force\nwhich continually adds to the momentum of the vital actions, as much as\nis continually deducted from them by the forces overcome. All the\nfunctional movements thus maintained, are, as we have seen, rhythmical\n(\u00a7 96); by their union compound rhythms of various lengths and\ncomplexities are produced; and in these simple and compound rhythms, the\nprocess of equilibration, besides being exemplified at each extreme of\nevery rhythm, is seen in the habitual preservation of a constant mean,\nand in the re-establishment of that mean when accidental causes have\nproduced divergence from it. When, for instance, there is a great\nexpenditure of motion through muscular activity, there arises a\nre-active demand on those stores of latent motion which are laid up in\nthe form of consumable matter throughout the tissues: increased\nrespiration and increased rapidity of circulation, are instrumental to\nan extra genesis of force, that counter-balances the extra dissipation\nof force. This unusual transformation of molecular motion into sensible\nmotion, is presently followed by an unusual absorption of food\u2014the\nsource of molecular motion; and in proportion as there has been a\nprolonged draft upon the spare capital of the system, is there a\ntendency to a prolonged rest, during which that spare capital is\nreplaced. If the deviation from the ordinary course of the functions has\nbeen so great as to derange them, as when violent exertion produces loss\nof appetite and loss of sleep, an equilibration is still eventually\neffected. Providing the disturbance is not such as to overturn the\nbalance of the functions, and destroy life (in which case a complete\nequilibration is suddenly effected), the ordinary balance is by and by\nre-established: the returning appetite is keen in proportion as the\nwaste has been large; while sleep, sound and prolonged, makes up for\nprevious wakefulness. Not even in those extreme cases where some excess\nhas wrought a derangement that is never wholly rectified, is there an\nexception to the general law; for in such cases the cycle of the\nfunctions is, after a time, equilibrated about a new mean state, which\nthenceforth becomes the normal state of the individual. Thus, among the\ninvolved rhythmical changes constituting organic life, any disturbing\nforce that works an excess of change in some direction, is gradually\ndiminished and finally neutralized by antagonistic forces; which\nthereupon work a compensating change in the opposite direction, and so,\nafter more or less of oscillation, restore the medium condition. And\nthis process it is, which constitutes what physicians call the _vis\nmedicatrix natur\u00e6_. The third form of equilibration displayed by\norganic bodies, is a necessary sequence of that just illustrated. When\nthrough a change of habit or circumstance, an organism is permanently\nsubject to some new influence, or different amount of an old influence,\nthere arises, after more or less disturbance of the organic rhythms, a\nbalancing of them around the new average condition produced by this\nadditional influence. As temporary divergences of the organic rhythms\nare counteracted by temporary divergences of a reverse kind; so there is\nan equilibration of their permanent divergences by the genesis of\nopposing divergences that are equally permanent. If the quantity of\nmotion to be habitually generated by a muscle, becomes greater than\nbefore, its nutrition becomes greater than before. If the expenditure of\nthe muscle bears to its nutrition, a greater ratio than expenditure\nbears to nutrition in other parts of the system; the excess of nutrition\nbecomes such that the muscle grows. And the cessation of its growth is\nthe establishment of a balance between the daily waste and the daily\nrepair\u2014the daily expenditure of force, and the amount of latent force\ndaily added. The like must manifestly be the case with all organic\nmodifications consequent on change of climate or food. This is a\nconclusion which we may safely draw without knowing the special\nre-arrangements that effect the equilibration. If we see that a\ndifferent mode of life is followed, after a period of functional\nderangement, by some altered condition of the system\u2014if we see that this\naltered condition, becoming by and by established, continues without\nfurther change; we have no alternative but to say, that the new forces\nbrought to bear on the system, have been compensated by the opposing\nforces they have evoked. And this is the interpretation of the process\nwhich we call _adaptation_. Finally, each organism illustrates the\nlaw in the _ensemble_ of its life. At the outset it daily absorbs under\nthe form of food, an amount of force greater than it daily expends; and\nthe surplus is daily equilibrated by growth. As maturity is approached,\nthis surplus diminishes; and in the perfect organism, the day\u2019s\nabsorption of potential motion balances the day\u2019s expenditure of actual\nmotion. That is to say, during adult life, there is continuously\nexhibited an equilibration of the third order. Eventually, the daily\nloss, beginning to out-balance the daily gain, there results a\ndiminishing amount of functional action; the organic rhythms extend less\nand less widely on each side of the medium state; and there finally\nresults that complete equilibration which we call death.\n\nThe ultimate structural state accompanying that ultimate functional\nstate towards which an organism tends, both individually and as a\nspecies, may be deduced from one of the propositions set down in the\nopening section of this chapter. We saw that the limit of heterogeneity\nis arrived at whenever the equilibration of any aggregate becomes\ncomplete\u2014that the re-distribution of matter can continue so long only as\nthere continues any motion unbalanced. Whence we found it to follow that\nthe final structural arrangements, must be such as will meet all the\nforces acting on the aggregate, by equivalent antagonist forces. What is\nthe implication in the case of organic aggregates; the equilibrium of\nwhich is a moving one? We have seen that the maintenance of such a\nmoving equilibrium, requires the habitual genesis of internal forces\ncorresponding in number, directions, and amounts to the external\nincident forces\u2014as many inner functions, single or combined, as there\nare single or combined outer actions to be met. But functions are the\ncorrelatives of organs; amounts of functions are, other things equal,\nthe correlatives of sizes of organs; and combinations of functions the\ncorrelatives of connections of organs. Hence the structural complexity\naccompanying functional equilibration, is definable as one in which\nthere are as many specialized parts as are capable, separately and\njointly, of counteracting the separate and joint forces amid which the\norganism exists. And this is the limit of organic heterogeneity; to\nwhich man has approached more nearly than any other creature.\n\nGroups of organisms display this universal tendency towards a balance\nvery obviously. In \u00a7 96, every species of plant and animal was shown to\nbe perpetually undergoing a rhythmical variation in number\u2014now from\nabundance of food and absence of enemies rising above its average; and\nthen by a consequent scarcity of food and abundance of enemies being\ndepressed below its average. And here we have to observe that there is\nthus maintained an equilibrium between the sum of those forces which\nresult in the increase of each race, and the sum of those forces which\nresult in its decrease. Either limit of variation is a point at which\nthe one set of forces, before in excess of the other, is counterbalanced\nby it. And amid these oscillations produced by their conflict, lies that\naverage number of the species at which its expansive tendency is in\nequilibrium with surrounding repressive tendencies. Nor can it be\nquestioned that this balancing of the preservative and destructive\nforces which we see going on in every race, must necessarily go on.\nSince increase of number cannot but continue until increase of mortality\nstops it; and decrease of number cannot but continue until it is either\narrested by fertility or extinguishes the race entirely.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 134. The equilibrations of those nervous actions which constitute what\nwe know as mental life, may be classified in like manner with those\nwhich constitute what we distinguish as bodily life. We may deal with\nthem in the same order.\n\nEach pulse of nervous force from moment to moment generated, (and it was\nshown in \u00a7 97 that nervous currents are not continuous but rhythmical)\nis met by counteracting forces; in overcoming which it is dispersed and\nequilibrated. When tracing out the correlation and equivalence of\nforces, we saw that each sensation and emotion, or rather such part of\nit as remains after the excitation of associated ideas and feelings, is\nexpended in working bodily changes\u2014contractions of the involuntary\nmuscles, the voluntary muscles, or both; as also in a certain\nstimulation of secreting organs. That the movements thus initiated are\never being brought to a close by the opposing forces they evoke, was\npointed out above; and here it is to be observed that the like holds\nwith the nervous changes thus initiated. Various facts prove that the\narousing of a thought or feeling, always involves the overcoming of a\ncertain resistance: instance the fact that where the association of\nmental states has not been frequent, a sensible effort is needed to call\nup the one after the other; instance the fact that during nervous\nprostration there is a comparative inability to think\u2014the ideas will not\nfollow one another with the habitual rapidity; instance the converse\nfact that at times of unusual energy, natural or artificial, the\nfriction of thought becomes relatively small, and more numerous, more\nremote, or more difficult connections of ideas are formed. That is to\nsay, the wave of nervous energy each instant generated, propagates\nitself throughout body and brain, along those channels which the\nconditions at the instant render lines of least resistance; and\nspreading widely in proportion to its amount, ends only when it is\nequilibrated by the resistances it everywhere meets. If we\ncontemplate mental actions us extending over hours and days, we discover\nequilibrations analogous to those hourly and daily established among the\nbodily functions. In the one case as in the other, there are rhythms\nwhich exhibit a balancing of opposing forces at each extreme, and the\nmaintenance of a certain general balance. This is seen in the daily\nalternation of mental activity and mental rest\u2014the forces expended\nduring the one being compensated by the forces acquired during the\nother. It is also seen in the recurring rise and fall of each desire:\neach desire reaching a certain intensity, is equilibrated either by\nexpenditure of the force it embodies, in the desired actions, or, less\ncompletely, in the imagination of such actions: the process ending in\nthat satiety, or that comparative quiescence, forming the opposite limit\nof the rhythm. And it is further manifest under a two-fold form, on\noccasions of intense joy or grief: each paroxysm of passion, expressing\nitself in vehement bodily actions, presently reaches an extreme whence\nthe counteracting forces produce a return to a condition of moderate\nexcitement; and the successive paroxysms finally diminishing in\nintensity, end in a mental equilibrium either like that before existing,\nor partially differing from it in its medium state. But the\nspecies of mental equilibration to be more especially noted, is that\nshown in the establishment of a correspondence between relations among\nour states of consciousness and relations in the external world. Each\nouter connection of phenomena which we are capable of perceiving,\ngenerates, through accumulated experiences, an inner connection of\nmental states; and the result towards which this process tends, is the\nformation of a mental connection having a relative strength that answers\nto the relative constancy of the physical connection represented. In\nconformity with the general law that motion pursues the line of least\nresistance, and that, other things equal, a line once taken by motion is\nmade a line that will be more readily pursued by future motion; we have\nseen that the ease with which nervous impressions follow one another,\nis, other things equal, great in proportion to the number of times they\nhave been repeated together in experience. Hence, corresponding to such\nan invariable relation as that between the resistance of an object and\nsome extension possessed by it, there arises an indissoluble connection\nin consciousness; and this connection, being as absolute internally as\nthe answering one is externally, undergoes no further change\u2014the inner\nrelation is in perfect equilibrium with the outer relation. Conversely,\nit hence happens that to such uncertain relations of phenomena as that\nbetween clouds and rain, there arise relations of ideas of a like\nuncertainty; and if, under given aspects of the sky, the tendencies to\ninfer fair or foul weather, correspond to the frequencies with which\nfair or foul weather follow such aspects, the accumulation of\nexperiences has balanced the mental sequences and the physical\nsequences. When it is remembered that between these extremes there are\ncountless orders of external connections having different degrees of\nconstancy, and that during the evolution of intelligence there arise\nanswering internal associations having different degrees of cohesion; it\nwill be seen that there is a progress towards equilibrium between the\nrelations of thought and the relations of things. This equilibration can\nend only when each relation of things has generated in us a relation of\nthought, such that on the occurrence of the conditions, the relation in\nthought arises as certainly as the relation in things. Supposing this\nstate to be reached (which however it can be only in infinite time)\nexperience will cease to produce any further mental evolution\u2014there will\nhave been reached a perfect correspondence between ideas and facts; and\nthe intellectual adaptation of man to his circumstances will be\ncomplete. The like general truths are exhibited in the process\nmoral of adaptation; which is a continual approach to equilibrium\nbetween the emotions and the kinds of conduct necessitated by\nsurrounding conditions. The connections of feelings and actions, are\ndetermined in the same way as the connections of ideas: just as\nrepeating the association of two ideas, facilitates the excitement of\nthe one by the other; so does each discharge of feeling into action,\nrender the subsequent discharge of such feeling into such action more\neasy. Hence it happens that if an individual is placed permanently in\nconditions which demand more action of a special kind than has before\nbeen requisite, or than is natural to him\u2014if the pressure of the painful\nfeelings which these conditions entail when disregarded, impels him to\nperform this action to a greater extent\u2014if by every more frequent or\nmore lengthened performance of it under such pressure, the resistance is\nsomewhat diminished; then, clearly, there is an advance towards a\nbalance between the demand for this kind of action and the supply of it.\nEither in himself, or in his descendants continuing to live under these\nconditions, enforced repetition must eventually bring about a state in\nwhich this mode of directing the energies will be no more repugnant than\nthe various other modes previously natural to the race. Hence the limit\ntowards which emotional modification perpetually tends, and to which it\nmust approach indefinitely near (though it can absolutely reach it only\nin infinite time) is a combination of desires that correspond to all the\ndifferent orders of activity which the circumstances of life call\nfor\u2014desires severally proportionate in strength to the needs for these\norders of activity; and severally satisfied by these orders of activity.\nIn what we distinguish as acquired habits, and in the moral differences\nof races and nations produced by habits that are maintained through\nsuccessive generations, we have countless illustrations of this\nprogressive adaptation; which can cease only with the establishment of a\ncomplete equilibrium between constitution and conditions.\n\nPossibly some will fail to see how the equilibrations described in this\nsection, can be classed with those preceding them; and will be inclined\nto say that what are here set down as facts, are but analogies.\nNevertheless such equilibrations are as truly physical as the rest. To\nshow this fully, would require a more detailed analysis than can now be\nentered on. For the present it must suffice to point out, as before (\u00a7\n82), that what we know subjectively as states of consciousness, are,\nobjectively, modes of force; that so much feeling is the correlate of so\nmuch motion; that the performance of any bodily action is the\ntransformation of a certain amount of feeling into its equivalent amount\nof motion; that this bodily action is met by forces which it is expended\nin overcoming; and that the necessity for the frequent repetition of\nthis action, implies the frequent recurrence of forces to be so\novercome. Hence the existence in any individual of an emotional stimulus\nthat is in equilibrium with certain external requirements, is literally\nthe habitual production of a certain specialized portion of nervous\nenergy, equivalent in amount to a certain order of external resistances\nthat are habitually met. And thus the ultimate state, forming the limit\ntowards which Evolution carries us, is one in which the kinds and\nquantities of mental energy daily generated and transformed into\nmotions, are equivalent to, or in equilibrium with, the various orders\nand degrees of surrounding forces which antagonize such motions.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 135. Each society taken as a whole, displays the process of\nequilibration in the continuous adjustment of its population to its\nmeans of subsistence. A tribe of men living on wild animals and fruits,\nis manifestly, like every tribe of inferior creatures, always\noscillating about that average number which the locality can support.\nThough by artificial production, and by successive improvements in\nartificial production, a superior race continually alters the limit\nwhich external conditions put to population; yet there is ever a\nchecking of population at the temporary limit reached. It is true that\nwhere the limit is being so rapidly changed as among ourselves, there is\nno actual stoppage: there is only a rhythmical variation in the rate of\nincrease. But in noting the causes of this rhythmical variation\u2014in\nwatching how, during periods of abundance, the proportion of marriages\nincreases, and how it decreases during periods of scarcity; it will be\nseen that the expansive force produces unusual advance whenever the\nrepressive force diminishes, and _vice vers\u00e2_; and thus there is as near\na balancing of the two as the changing conditions permit.\n\nThe internal actions constituting social functions, exemplify the\ngeneral principle no less clearly. Supply and demand are continually\nbeing adjusted throughout all industrial processes; and this\nequilibration is interpretable in the same way as preceding ones. The\nproduction and distribution of a commodity, is the expression of a\ncertain aggregate of forces causing special kinds and amounts of motion.\nThe price of this commodity, is the measure of a certain other aggregate\nof forces expended by the labourer who purchases it, in other kinds and\namounts of motion. And the variations of price represent a rhythmical\nbalancing of these forces. Every rise or fall in the rate of interest,\nor change in the value of a particular security, implies a conflict of\nforces in which some, becoming temporarily predominant, cause a movement\nthat is presently arrested or equilibrated by the increase of opposing\nforces; and amid these daily and hourly oscillations, lies a more\nslowly-varying medium, into which the value ever tends to settle; and\nwould settle but for the constant addition of new influences. As\nin the individual organism so in the social organism, functional\nequilibrations generate structural equilibrations. When on the workers\nin any trade there comes an increased demand, and when in return for the\nincreased supply, there is given to them an amount of other commodities\nlarger than was before habitual\u2014when, consequently, the resistances\novercome by them in sustaining life are less than the resistances\novercome by other workers; there results a flow of other workers into\nthis trade. This flow continues until the extra demand is met, and the\nwages so far fall again, that the total resistance overcome in obtaining\na given amount of produce, is as great in this newly-adopted occupation\nas in the occupations whence it drew recruits. The occurrence of motion\nalong lines of least resistance, was before shown to necessitate the\ngrowth of population in those places where the labour required for\nself-maintenance is the smallest; and here we further see that those\nengaged in any such advantageous locality, or advantageous business,\nmust multiply till there arises an approximate balance between this\nlocality or business and others accessible to the same citizens. In\ndetermining the career of every youth, we see an estimation by parents\nof the respective advantages offered by all that are available, and a\nchoice of the one which promises best; and through the consequent influx\ninto trades that are at the time most profitable, and the withholding of\nrecruits from over-stocked trades, there is insured a general equipoise\nbetween the power of each social organ and the function it has to\nperform.\n\nThe various industrial actions and re-actions thus continually\nalternating, constitute a dependent moving equilibrium like that which\nis maintained among the functions of an individual organism. And this\ndependent moving equilibrium parallels those already contemplated, in\nits tendency to become more complete. During early stages of social\nevolution, while yet the resources of the locality inhabited are\nunexplored, and the arts of production undeveloped, there is never\nanything more than a temporary and partial balancing of such actions,\nunder the form of acceleration or retardation of growth. But when a\nsociety approaches the maturity of that type on which it is organized,\nthe various industrial activities settle down into a comparatively\nconstant state. Moreover, it is observable that advance in organization,\nas well as advance in growth, is conducive to a better equilibrium of\nindustrial functions. While the diffusion of mercantile information is\nslow, and the means of transport deficient, the adjustment of supply to\ndemand is extremely imperfect: great over-production of each commodity\nfollowed by great under-production, constitute a rhythm having extremes\nthat depart very widely from the mean state in which demand and supply\nare equilibrated. But when good roads are made, and there is a rapid\ndiffusion of printed or written intelligence, and still more when\nrailways and telegraphs come into existence\u2014when the periodical fairs of\nearly days lapse into weekly markets, and these into daily markets;\nthere is gradually produced a better balance of production and\nconsumption. Extra demand is much more quickly followed by augmented\nsupply; and the rapid oscillations of price within narrow limits on\neither side of a comparatively uniform mean, indicate a near approach to\nequilibrium. Evidently this industrial progress has for its limit,\nthat which Mr. Mill has called \u201cthe stationary state.\u201d When population\nshall have become dense over all habitable parts of the globe; when the\nresources of every region have been fully explored; and when the\nproductive arts admit of no further improvements; there must result an\nalmost complete balance, both between the fertility and mortality of\neach society, and between its producing and consuming activities. Each\nsociety will exhibit only minor deviations from its average number, and\nthe rhythm of its industrial functions will go on from day to day and\nyear to year with comparatively insignificant perturbations. This limit,\nhowever, though we are inevitably advancing towards it, is indefinitely\nremote; and can never indeed be absolutely reached. The peopling of the\nEarth up to the point supposed, cannot take place by simple spreading.\nIn the future, as in the past, the process will be carried on\nrhythmically, by waves of emigration from new and higher centres of\ncivilization successively arising; and by the supplanting of inferior\nraces by the superior races they beget; and the process so carried on\nmust be extremely slow. Nor does it seem to me that such an\nequilibration will, as Mr. Mill suggests, leave scope for further mental\nculture and moral progress; but rather that the approximation to it must\nbe simultaneous with the approximation to complete equilibrium between\nman\u2019s nature and the conditions of his existence.\n\nOne other kind of social equilibration has still to be considered:\u2014that\nwhich results in the establishment of governmental institutions, and\nwhich becomes complete as these institutions fall into harmony with the\ndesires of the people. There is a demand and supply in political affairs\nas in industrial affairs; and in the one case as in the other, the\nantagonist forces produce a rhythm which, at first extreme in its\noscillations, slowly settles down into a moving equilibrium of\ncomparative regularity. Those aggressive impulses inherited from the\npre-social state\u2014those tendencies to seek self-satisfaction regardless\nof injury to other beings, which are essential to a predatory life,\nconstitute an anti-social force, tending ever to cause conflict and\neventual separation of citizens. Contrariwise, those desires whose ends\ncan be achieved only by union, as well as those sentiments which find\nsatisfaction through intercourse with fellow-men, and those resulting in\nwhat we call loyalty, are forces tending to keep the units of a society\ntogether. On the one hand, there is in each citizen, more or less of\nresistance against all restraints imposed on his actions by other\ncitizens: a resistance which, tending continually to widen each\nindividual\u2019s sphere of action, and reciprocally to limit the spheres of\naction of other individuals, constitutes a repulsive force mutually\nexercised by the members of a social aggregate. On the other hand, the\ngeneral sympathy of man for man, and the more special sympathy of each\nvariety of man for others of the same variety, together with sundry\nallied feelings which the social state gratifies, act as an attractive\nforce, tending ever to keep united those who have a common ancestry. And\nsince the resistances to be overcome in satisfying the totality of their\ndesires when living separately, are greater than the resistances to be\novercome in satisfying the totality of their desires when living\ntogether, there is a residuary force that prevents their separation.\nLike all other opposing forces, those exerted by citizens on each other,\nare ever producing alternating movements, which, at first extreme,\nundergo a gradual diminution on the way to ultimate equilibrium. In\nsmall, undeveloped societies, marked rhythms result from these\nconflicting tendencies. A tribe whose members have held together for a\ngeneration or two, reaches a size at which it will not hold together;\nand on the occurrence of some event causing unusual antagonism among its\nmembers, divides. Each primitive nation, depending largely for its\ncontinued union on the character of its chief, exhibits wide\noscillations between an extreme in which the subjects are under rigid\nrestraint, and an extreme in which the restraint is not enough to\nprevent disorder. In more advanced nations of like type, we always find\nviolent actions and reactions of the same essential nature\u2014\u201cdespotism\ntempered by assassination,\u201d characterizing a political state in which\nunbearable repression from time to time brings about a bursting of all\nbonds. In this familiar fact, that a period of tyranny is followed by a\nperiod of license and _vice vers\u00e2_, we see how these opposing forces are\never equilibrating each other; and we also see, in the tendency of such\nmovements and counter-movements to become more moderate, how the\nequilibration progresses towards completeness. The conflicts between\nConservatism (which stands for the restraints of society over the\nindividual) and Reform (which stands for the liberty of the individual\nagainst society), fall within slowly approximating limits; so that the\ntemporary predominance of either, produces a less marked deviation from\nthe medium state. This process, now so far advanced among\nourselves that the oscillations are comparatively unobtrusive, must go\non till the balance between the antagonist forces approaches\nindefinitely near perfection. For, as we have already seen, the\nadaptation of man\u2019s nature to the conditions of his existence, cannot\ncease until the internal forces which we know as feelings are in\nequilibrium with the external forces they encounter. And the\nestablishment of this equilibrium, is the arrival at a state of human\nnature and social organization, such that the individual has no desires\nbut those which may be satisfied without exceeding his proper sphere of\naction, while society maintains no restraints but those which the\nindividual voluntarily respects. The progressive extension of the\nliberty of citizens, and the reciprocal removal of political\nrestrictions, are the steps by which we advance towards this state. And\nthe ultimate abolition of all limits to the freedom of each, save those\nimposed by the like freedom of all, must result from the complete\nequilibration between man\u2019s desires and the conduct necessitated by\nsurrounding conditions.\n\nOf course in this case, as in the preceding ones, there is thus involved\na limit to the increase of heterogeneity. A few pages back, we reached\nthe conclusion that each advance in mental evolution, is the\nestablishment of some further internal action, corresponding to some\nfurther external action\u2014some additional connection of ideas or feelings,\nanswering to some before unknown or unantagonized connection of\nphenomena. We inferred that each such new function, involving some new\nmodification of structure, implies an increase of heterogeneity; and\nthat thus, increase of heterogeneity must go on, while there remain any\nouter relations affecting the organism which are unbalanced by inner\nrelations. Whence we saw it to follow that increase of heterogeneity can\ncome to an end only as equilibration is completed. Evidently the like\nmust simultaneously take place with society. Each increment of\nheterogeneity in the individual, must directly or indirectly involve, as\ncause or consequence, some increment of heterogeneity in the\narrangements of the aggregate of individuals. And the limit to social\ncomplexity can be arrived at, only with the establishment of the\nequilibrium, just described, between social and individual forces.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 136. Here presents itself a final question, which has probably been\ntaking a more or less distinct shape in the minds of many, while reading\nthis chapter. \u201cIf Evolution of every kind, is an increase in complexity\nof structure and function that is incidental to the universal process of\nequilibration\u2014if equilibration, passing through the gradually-perfected\nforms of moving equilibrium, must end in complete rest; what is the fate\ntowards which all things tend? If the bodies constituting our Solar\nSystem are slowly dissipating the forces they possess\u2014if the Sun is\nlosing his heat at a rate which, though insignificant as stated in terms\nof our chronology, will tell in millions of years\u2014if geologic and\nmeteorologic processes cannot but diminish in activity as the Sun\u2019s\nradiations diminish\u2014if with the diminution of these radiations there\nmust also go on a diminution in the quantity of vegetal and animal\nexistence\u2014if Man and Society, however high the degree of evolution at\nwhich they arrive, are similarly dependent on this supply of force that\nis gradually coming to an end\u2014if thus the highest, equally with the\nlowest, terrestrial life, must eventually dwindle and disappear; are we\nnot manifestly progressing towards omnipresent death? And have we thus\nto contemplate, as the out-come of things, a universe of extinct suns\nround which circle planets devoid of life?\u201d\n\nThat such a state must be the proximate end of the processes everywhere\ngoing on, seems beyond doubt. But the further question tacitly involved,\nwhether this state will continue eternally, is quite a different one. To\ngive a positive answer to this further question would be quite\nillegitimate; since to affirm any proposition into which unlimited time\nenters as one of the terms, is to affirm a proposition of which one term\ncannot be represented in consciousness\u2014is to affirm an unthinkable\nproposition. At a first glance it may appear that the reverse conclusion\nmust be equally illegitimate; and that so the question is altogether\ninsoluble. But further consideration will show that this is not true. So\nlong as the terms to which we confine our reasonings are finite, the\nfinite conclusions reached are not necessarily illegitimate. Though, if\nthe general argument, when carried out, left no apparent escape from the\ninference that the state of rest to which Evolution is carrying things,\nmust, when arrived at, last for ever, this inference would be invalid,\nas transcending the scope of human intelligence; yet if, on pushing\nfurther the general argument, we bring out the inference that such a\nstate will not last for ever, this inference is not necessarily invalid:\nsince, by the hypothesis, it contains no terms necessarily transcending\nthe scope of human intelligence. It is permissible therefore, to\ninquire, what are the probable ulterior results of this process which\nmust bring Evolution to a close in Universal Death. Without being so\nrash as to form anything like a positive conclusion on a matter so vast\nand so far beyond the boundaries of exact science; we may still inquire\nwhat _seems_ to be the remote future towards which the facts point.\n\nIt has been already shown that all equilibration, so far as we can trace\nit, is relative. The dissipation of a body\u2019s motion by communication of\nit to surrounding matter, solid, liquid, gaseous, and ethereal, tends to\nbring the body to a fixed position in relation to the matter that\nabstracts its motion. But all its other motions continue as before. The\narrest of a cannon-shot does not diminish its movement towards the East\nat a thousand miles an hour, along with the wall it has struck; and a\ngradual dispersion of the Earth\u2019s rotatory motion, would abstract\nnothing from the million and a half miles per day through which the\nEarth speeds in its orbit. Further, we have to bear in mind that this\nmotion, the disappearance of which causes relative equilibration, is not\nlost but simply transferred; and by continual division and subdivision\nfinally reduced to ethereal undulations and radiated through space.\nWhether the sensible motion dissipated during relative equilibration, is\ndirectly transformed into insensible motion, as happens in the case of\nthe Sun; or whether, as in the sensible motions going on around us, it\nis directly transformed into smaller sensible motions, and these into\nstill smaller, until they become insensible, matters not. In every\ninstance the ultimate result is, that whatever motion of masses is lost,\nre-appears as molecular motion pervading space. Thus the questions we\nhave to consider, are\u2014Whether after the completion of all the relative\nequilibrations above contemplated as bringing Evolution to a close,\nthere remain any further equilibrations to be effected?\u2014Whether there\nare any other motions of masses that must eventually be transformed into\nmolecular motion?\u2014And if there are such other motions, what must be the\nconsequence when the molecular motion generated by their transformation,\nis added to that which already exists?\n\nTo the first of these questions the answer is, that there _do_ remain\nmotions which are undiminished by all the relative equilibrations thus\nfar considered; namely, the motions of translation possessed by those\nvast masses of incandescent matter called stars\u2014masses now known to be\nsuns that are in all probability, like our own, surrounded by circling\ngroups of planets. The belief that the stars are literally fixed, has\nlong since been exploded: observation has proved many of them to have\nsensible proper motions. Moreover, it has been ascertained by\nmeasurement, that in relation to the stars nearest to us, our own star\nis moving at the rate of about half a million miles per day; and if, as\nis admitted to be not improbable by sundry astronomers, our own star is\ntraversing space in the same direction with adjacent stars, its absolute\nvelocity may be, and most likely is, immensely greater than this. Now no\nsuch changes as those taking place within the Solar System, even when\ncarried to the extent of integrating the whole of its matter into one\nmass, and diffusing all its relative movements in an insensible form\nthrough space, can affect these sidereal movements. Hence, there appears\nno alternative but to infer, that these sidereal movements must remain\nto be equilibrated by some subsequent process.\n\nThe next question that arises, if we venture to inquire the probable\nnature of this process, is\u2014To what law do sidereal motions conform? And\nto this question Astronomy replies\u2014the law of gravitation. The relative\nmotions of binary stars have proved this. When it was discovered that\ncertain of the double stars are not optically double but physically\ndouble, and move round each other, it was at once suspected that their\nrevolutions might be regulated by a mutual attraction like that which\nregulates the revolutions of planets and satellites. The requisite\nmeasurements having been from time to time made, the periodic times of\nsundry binary stars were calculated on this assumption; and the\nsubsequent performances of their revolutions in the predicted periods,\nhave completely verified the assumption. If, then, it is demonstrated\nthat these remote bodies are centres of gravitation\u2014if we infer that all\nother stars are centres of gravitation, as we may fairly do\u2014and if we\ndraw the unavoidable corollary, that this gravitative force which so\nconspicuously affects stars that are comparatively near each other, must\naffect remote stars; we find ourselves led to the conclusion that all\nthe members of our Sidereal System gravitate, individually and as an\naggregate.\n\nBut if these widely-dispersed moving masses mutually gravitate, what\nmust happen? There appears but one tenable answer. Even supposing they\nwere all absolutely equal in weight, and arranged into an annulus with\nabsolute regularity, and endowed with exactly the amounts of centrifugal\nforce required to prevent nearer approach to their common centre of\ngravity; the condition would still be one which the slightest disturbing\nforce would destroy. Much more then are we driven to the inference, that\nour actual Sidereal System cannot preserve its present arrangement: the\nirregularities of its distribution being such as to render even a\ntemporary moving equilibrium impossible. If the stars are so many\ncentres of an attractive force that varies inversely as the square of\nthe distance, there appears to be no escape from the conclusion, that\nthe structure of our galaxy must be undergoing change; and must continue\nto undergo change.\n\nThus, in the absence of tenable alternatives, we are brought to the\npositions:\u20141, that the stars are in motion;\u20142, that they move in\nconformity with the law of gravitation;\u20143, that, distributed as they\nare, they cannot move in conformity with the law of gravitation, without\nundergoing change of arrangement. If now we permit ourselves to take a\nfurther step, and ask the nature of this change of arrangement, we find\nourselves obliged to infer a progressive concentration. Whether we do or\ndo not suppose the clustering which is now visible, to have been caused\nby mutual gravitation acting throughout past eras, as the hypothesis of\nEvolution implies, we are equally compelled to conclude that this\nclustering must increase throughout future eras. Stars at present\ndispersed, must become locally aggregated; existing aggregations, at the\nsame time that they are enlarged by the drawing in of adjacent stars,\nmust grow more dense; and aggregations must coalesce with each other:\neach greater degree of concentration augmenting the force by which\nfurther concentration is produced.\n\nAnd now what must be the limit of this concentration? The mutual\nattraction of two individual stars, when it so far predominates over\nother attractions as to cause approximation, almost certainly ends in\nthe formation of a binary star; since the motions generated by other\nattractions, prevent the two stars from moving in straight lines to\ntheir common centre of gravity. Between small clusters, too, having also\ncertain proper motions as clusters, mutual attraction may lead, not to\ncomplete union, but to the formation of binary clusters. As the process\ncontinues however, and the clusters become larger, it seems clear that\nthey must move more directly towards each other, thus forming clusters\nof increasing density; and that eventually all clusters must unite into\none comparatively close aggregation. While, therefore, during the\nearlier stages of concentration, the probabilities are immense against\nthe actual contact of these mutually-gravitating masses; it is tolerably\nmanifest, that as the concentration increases, collision must become\nprobable, and ultimately certain. This is an inference not lacking the\nsupport of high authority. Sir John Herschel, treating of those numerous\nand variously-aggregated clusters of stars revealed by the telescope,\nand citing with apparent approval his father\u2019s opinion, that the more\ndiffused and irregular of these, are \u201cglobular clusters in a less\nadvanced state of condensation;\u201d subsequently remarks, that \u201camong a\ncrowd of solid bodies of whatever size, animated by independent and\npartially opposing impulses, motions opposite to each other _must_\nproduce collision, destruction of velocity, and subsidence or near\napproach towards the centre of preponderant attraction; while those\nwhich conspire, or which remain outstanding after such conflicts, _must_\nultimately give rise to circulation of a permanent character.\u201d Now what\nis here alleged of these minor sidereal aggregations, cannot be denied\nof the large aggregations; and thus the above-described process of\nconcentration, appears certain to bring about an increasingly-frequent\nintegration of masses.\n\nWe have next to consider the consequences of the accompanying loss of\nvelocity. The sensible motion which disappears, cannot be destroyed; but\nmust be transformed into insensible motion. What will be the effect of\nthis insensible motion? Some approach to a conception of it, will be\nmade by considering what would happen were the comparatively\ninsignificant motion of our planet thus transformed. In his essay on\n\u201cThe Inter-action of Natural Forces,\u201d Prof. Helmholtz states the thermal\nequivalent of the Earth\u2019s movement through space; as calculated on the\nnow received datum of Mr. Joule. \u201cIf our Earth,\u201d he says, \u201cwere by a\nsudden shock brought to rest in her orbit,\u2014which is not to be feared in\nthe existing arrangement of our system\u2014by such a shock a quantity of\nheat would be generated equal to that produced by the combustion of\nfourteen such Earths of solid coal. Making the most unfavourable\nassumption as to its capacity for heat, that is, placing it equal to\nthat of water, the mass of the Earth would thereby be heated 11,200\ndegrees; it would therefore be quite fused, and for the most part\nreduced to vapour. If then the Earth, after having been thus brought to\nrest, should fall into the Sun, which of course would be the case, the\nquantity of heat developed by the shock would be 400 times greater.\u201d Now\nso relatively small a momentum as that acquired by the Earth in falling\nthrough 95,000,000 of miles to the Sun, being equivalent to a molecular\nmotion such as would reduce the Earth to gases of extreme rarity; what\nmust be the molecular motion generated by the mutually-arrested momenta\nof two stars, that have moved to their common centre of gravity through\nspaces immeasurably greater? There seems no alternative but to conclude,\nthat this molecular motion must be so great, as to reduce the matter of\nthe stars to an almost inconceivable tenuity\u2014a tenuity like that which\nwe ascribe to nebular matter. Such being the immediate effect of\nthe integration of any two stars in a concentrating aggregate, what must\nbe the ulterior effect on the aggregate as a whole? Sir John Herschel,\nin the passage above quoted, describing the collisions that must arise\nin a mutually-gravitating group of stars, adds that those stars \u201cwhich\nremain outstanding after such conflicts, _must_ ultimately give rise to\ncirculation of a permanent character.\u201d The problem, however, is here\ndealt with purely as a mechanical one: the assumption being, that the\nmutually-arrested masses will continue as masses\u2014an assumption to which\nno objection was apparent at the time when Sir John Herschel wrote this\npassage; since the doctrine of the correlation of forces was not then\nrecognized. But obliged as we now are to conclude, that stars moving at\nthe high velocities acquired during concentration, will, by mutual\narrest, be dissipated into gases of great tenuity, the problem becomes\ndifferent; and a different inference appears unavoidable. For the\ndiffused matter produced by such conflicts, must form a resisting\nmedium, occupying that central region of the aggregate through which its\nmembers from time to time pass in describing their orbits\u2014a resisting\nmedium which they cannot move through without having their velocities\ndiminished. Every further such collision, by augmenting this resisting\nmedium, and making the losses of velocity greater, must further aid in\npreventing the establishment of that equilibrium which would else arise;\nand so must conspire to produce more frequent collisions. And the\nnebulous matter thus formed, presently enveloping and extending beyond\nthe whole aggregate, must, by continuing to shorten their gyrations,\nentail an increasingly-active integration and re-active disintegration\nof the moving masses; until they are all finally dissipated. This,\nindeed, is the conclusion which, leaving out all consideration of the\nprocess gone through, presents itself as a simple deduction from the\npersistence of force. If the stars have been, and still are,\nconcentrating however indirectly on their common centre of gravity, and\nmust eventually reach it; it is a corollary from the persistence of\nforce, that the quantities of motion they have severally acquired, must\nsuffice to carry them away from the common centre of gravity to those\nremote regions whence they originally began to move towards it. And\nsince, by the conditions of the case, they cannot return to these remote\nregions in the shape of concrete masses, they must return in the shape\nof diffused masses. Action and reaction being equal and opposite, the\nmomentum producing dispersion, must be as great as the momentum acquired\nby aggregation; and being spread over the same quantity of matter, must\ncause an equivalent distribution through space, whatever be the form of\nthe matter. One condition, however, essential to the literal\nfulfilment of this result, must be specified; namely, that the quantity\nof molecular motion produced and radiated into space by each star in the\ncourse of its formation from diffused matter, shall be compensated by an\nequal quantity of molecular motion radiated from other parts of space\ninto the space which our Sidereal System occupies. In other words, if we\nset out with that amount of molecular motion implied by the existence of\nthe matter of our Sidereal System in a nebulous form; then it follows\nfrom the persistence of force, that if this matter undergoes the\nre-distribution constituting Evolution, the quantity of molecular motion\ngiven out during the integration of each mass, plus the quantity of\nmolecular motion given out during the integration of all the masses,\nmust suffice again to reduce it to the same nebulous form. Here\nindeed we arrive at an impassable limit to our reasonings; since we\ncannot know whether this condition is or is not fulfilled. On the\nhypothesis of an unlimited space, containing, at certain intervals,\nSidereal Systems like our own, it may be that the quantity of molecular\nmotion radiated into the region occupied by our Sidereal System, is\nequal to that which our Sidereal System radiates; in which case the\nquantity of motion possessed by it, remaining undiminished, our Sidereal\nSystem may continue during unlimited time, to repeat this alternate\nconcentration and diffusion. But if, on the other hand, throughout\nboundless space there exist no other Sidereal Systems subject to like\nchanges, or if such other Sidereal Systems exist at more than a certain\naverage distance from each other; then it seems an unavoidable\nconclusion that the quantity of motion possessed, must diminish by\nradiation into unoccupied space; and that so, on each successive\nresumption of the nebulous form, the matter of our Sidereal System will\noccupy a less space; until at the end of an infinite time it reaches\neither a state in which its concentrations and diffusions are relatively\nsmall, or a state of complete aggregation and rest. Since, however, we\nhave no evidence showing the existence or non-existence of Sidereal\nSystems throughout remote space; and since, even had we such evidence, a\nlegitimate conclusion could not be drawn from premises of which one\nelement (unlimited space) is inconceivable; we must be for ever without\nanswer to this transcendent question. All we can say is, that so far as\nthe data enable us to judge, the integration of our Sidereal System will\nbe followed by disintegration; that such integration and disintegration\nwill be repeated; and that, for anything we know to the contrary, the\nalternation of them may continue without limit.\n\nBut leaving this ultimate insoluble problem, and confining ourselves to\nthe proximate and not necessarily insoluble one, we find reason for\nthinking that after the completion of those various equilibrations which\nbring to a close all the forms of Evolution we have contemplated, there\nmust still continue an equilibration of a far wider kind. When that\nintegration everywhere in progress throughout our Solar System, has\nreached its climax, there will remain to be effected the immeasurably\ngreater integration of our Solar System, with all other such systems. As\nin those minor forms now going on around us, this integration with its\nconcomitant equilibration, involves the change of aggregate motion into\ndiffused motion; so in those vaster forms hereafter to be carried out,\nthere must similarly be gained in molecular motion what is lost in the\nmotion of masses; and the inevitable transformation of this motion of\nmasses into molecular motion, cannot take place without reducing the\nmasses to a nebulous form. Thus we seem led to the conclusion that the\nentire process of things, as displayed in the aggregate of the visible\nUniverse, is analogous to the entire process of things as displayed in\nthe smallest aggregates. Where, as in organic bodies, the whole series\nof changes constituting Evolution can be traced, we saw that,\ndynamically considered, Evolution is a change from molecular motion to\nthe motion of masses; and this change, becoming more active during the\nascending phase of Evolution while the masses increase in bulk and\nheterogeneity, eventually begins to get less active; until, passing\nthrough stages in which the integration grows greater, and the\nequilibrium more definite, it finally ceases; whereupon there arises, by\nan ulterior process, an increase of molecular motion, ending in the more\nor less complete dissolution of the aggregate. And here we find reason\nto believe that, along with each of the thousands of similar ones\ndispersed through the heavens, our Solar System, after passing through\nstages during which the motion of masses is produced at the expense of\nlost molecular motion, and during which there goes on an increasingly\nactive differentiation and integration, arrives at a climax whence these\nchanges, beginning to decline in activity, slowly bring about that\ncomplete integration and equilibration which in other cases we call\ndeath; and that there afterwards comes a time, when the still-remaining\nmotions of masses are transformed into a molecular motion which causes\ndissolution of the masses. Motion as well as Matter being fixed in\nquantity, it would seem that the change in the distribution of Matter\nwhich Motion effects, coming to a limit in whichever direction it is\ncarried, the indestructible Motion thereupon necessitates a reverse\ndistribution. Apparently, the universally-coexistent forces of\nattraction and repulsion, which, as we have seen, necessitate rhythm in\nall minor changes throughout the Universe, also necessitate rhythm in\nthe totality of its changes\u2014produce now an immeasurable period during\nwhich the attractive forces predominating, cause universal\nconcentration, and then an immeasurable period during which the\nrepulsive forces predominating, cause universal diffusion\u2014alternate eras\nof Evolution and Dissolution. And thus there is suggested the conception\nof a past during which there have been successive Evolutions similar to\nthat which is now going on; and a future during which successive other\nsuch Evolutions may go on.\n\nLet none suppose, however, that this is to be taken as anything more\nthan a speculation. In dealing with times and spaces and forces so\nimmensely transcending those of which we have definite experience, we\nare in danger of passing the limits to human intelligence. Though these\ntimes and spaces and forces cannot literally be classed as infinite; yet\nthey are so utterly beyond the possibility of definite conception, as to\nbe almost equally unthinkable with the infinite. What has been above\nsaid, should therefore be regarded simply as a possible answer to a\npossible doubt. When, pushing to its extreme the argument that Evolution\nmust come to a close in complete equilibrium or rest, the reader\nsuggests that for aught which appears to the contrary, the Universal\nDeath thus implied will continue indefinitely; it is legitimate to point\nout how, on carrying the argument still further, we are led to infer a\nsubsequent Universal Life. But while this last inference may fitly be\naccepted as a demurrer to the first, it would be unwise to accept it in\nany more positive sense.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 137. Returning from this parenthetical discussion, concerning the\nprobable or possible state of things that may arise after Evolution has\nrun its course; and confining ourselves to the changes constituting\nEvolution, with which alone we are immediately concerned; we have now to\ninquire whether the cessation of these changes, in common with all their\ntransitional characteristics, admits of _\u00e0 priori_ proof. It will soon\nbecome apparent that equilibration, not less than the preceding general\nprinciples, is deducible from the persistence of force.\n\nWe have seen (\u00a7 85) that phenomena are interpretable only as the results\nof universally-coexistent forces of attraction and repulsion. These\nuniversally-coexistent forces of attraction and repulsion, are, indeed,\nthe complementary aspects of that absolutely persistent force which is\nthe ultimate datum of consciousness. Just in the same way that the\nequality of action and re-action is a corollary from the persistence of\nforce, since their inequality would imply the disappearance of the\ndifferential force into nothing, or its appearance out of nothing; so,\nwe cannot become conscious of an attractive force without becoming\nsimultaneously conscious of an equal and opposite repulsive force. For\nevery experience of a muscular tension, (under which form alone we can\nimmediately know an attractive force,) presupposes an equivalent\nresistance\u2014a resistance shown in the counter-balancing pressure of the\nbody against neighbouring objects, or in that absorption of force which\ngives motion to the body, or in both\u2014a resistance which we cannot\nconceive as other than equal to the tension, without conceiving force to\nhave either appeared or disappeared, and so denying the persistence of\nforce. And from this necessary correlation, results our inability,\nbefore pointed out, of interpreting any phenomena save in terms of these\ncorrelatives\u2014an inability shown alike in the compulsion we are under to\nthink of the statical forces which tangible matter displays, as due to\nthe attraction and repulsion of its atoms, and in the compulsion we are\nunder to think of dynamical forces exercised through space, by regarding\nspace as filled with atoms similarly endowed. Thus from the existence of\na force that is for ever unchangeable in quantity, there follows, as a\nnecessary corollary, the co-extensive existence of these opposite forms\nof force\u2014forms under which the conditions of our consciousness oblige us\nto represent that absolute force which transcends our knowledge.\n\nBut the forces of attraction and repulsion being universally\nco-existent, it follows, as before shown, that all motion is motion\nunder resistance. Units of matter, solid, liquid, a\u00ebriform, or ethereal,\nfilling the space which any moving body traverses, offer to such body\nthe resistance consequent on their cohesion, or their inertia, or both.\nIn other words, the denser or rarer medium which occupies the places\nfrom moment to moment passed through by such moving body, having to be\nexpelled from them, as much motion is abstracted from the moving body as\nis given to the medium in expelling it from these places. This being the\ncondition under which all motion occurs, two corollaries result. The\nfirst is, that the deductions perpetually made by the communication of\nmotion to the resisting medium, cannot but bring the motion of the body\nto an end in a longer or shorter time. The second is, that the motion of\nthe body cannot cease until these deductions destroy it. In other words,\nmovement must continue till equilibration takes place; and equilibration\nmust eventually take place. Both these are manifest deductions from the\npersistence of force. To say that the whole or part of a body\u2019s motion\ncan disappear, save by transfer to something which resists its motion,\nis to say that the whole or part of its motion can disappear without\neffect; which is to deny the persistence of force. Conversely, to say\nthat the medium traversed can be moved out of the body\u2019s path, without\ndeducting from the body\u2019s motion, is to say that motion of the medium\ncan arise out of nothing; which is to deny the persistence of force.\nHence this primordial truth is our immediate warrant for the\nconclusions, that the changes which Evolution presents, cannot end until\nequilibrium is reached; and that equilibrium must at last be reached.\n\nEqually necessary, because equally deducible from this same truth that\ntranscends proof, are the foregoing propositions respecting the\nestablishment and maintenance of moving equilibria, under their several\naspects. It follows from the persistence of force, that the various\nmotions possessed by any aggregate, either as a whole or among its\nparts, must be severally dissipated by the resistances they severally\nencounter; and that thus, such of them as are least in amount, or meet\nwith greatest opposition, or both, will be brought to a close while the\nothers continue. Hence in every diversely moving aggregate, there\nresults a comparatively early dissipation of motions which are smaller\nand much resisted; followed by long-continuance of the larger and\nless-resisted motions; and so there arise dependent and independent\nmoving equilibria. Hence also may be inferred the tendency to\nconservation of such moving equilibria; since, whenever the new motion\ngiven to the parts of a moving equilibrium by a disturbing force, is not\nof such kind and amount that it cannot be dissipated before the\npre-existing motions (in which case it brings the moving equilibrium to\nan end) it must be of such kind and amount that it can be dissipated\nbefore the pre-existing motions (in which case the moving equilibrium is\nre-established).\n\nThus from the persistence of force follow, not only the various direct\nand indirect equilibrations going on around, together with that cosmical\nequilibration which brings Evolution under all its forms to a close; but\nalso those less manifest equilibrations shown in the re-adjustments of\nmoving equilibria that have been disturbed. By this ultimate principle\nis proveable the tendency of every organism, disordered by some unusual\ninfluence, to return to a balanced state. To it also may be traced the\ncapacity, possessed in a slight degree by individuals, and in a greater\ndegree by species, of becoming adapted to new circumstances. And not\nless does it afford a basis for the inference, that there is a gradual\nadvance towards harmony between man\u2019s mental nature and the conditions\nof his existence. After finding that from it are deducible the various\ncharacteristics of Evolution, we finally draw from it a warrant for the\nbelief, that Evolution can end only in the establishment of the greatest\nperfection and the most complete happiness.\n\n-----\n\nFootnote 18:\n\n Sir David Brewster has recently been citing with approval, a\n calculation by M. Babinet, to the effect that on the hypothesis of\n nebular genesis, the matter of the Sun, when it filled the Earth\u2019s\n orbit, must have taken 3181 years to rotate; and that therefore the\n hypothesis cannot be true. This calculation of M. Babinet may pair-off\n with that of M. Comte, who, contrariwise, made the time of this\n rotation agree very nearly with the Earth\u2019s period of revolution round\n the Sun; for if M. Comte\u2019s calculation involved a _petitio principii_,\n that of M. Babinet is manifestly based on two assumptions, both of\n which are gratuitous, and one of them totally inconsistent with the\n doctrine to be tested. He has evidently proceeded on the current\n supposition respecting the Sun\u2019s internal density, which is not\n proved, and from which there are reasons for dissenting; and he has\n evidently taken for granted that all parts of the nebulous spheroid,\n when it filled the Earth\u2019s orbit, had the same angular velocity;\n whereas if (as is implied in the nebular hypothesis, rationally\n understood) this spheroid resulted from the concentration of far more\n widely-diffused matter, the angular velocity of its equatorial portion\n would obviously be immensely greater than that of its central portion.\n\nFootnote 19:\n\n See paper \u201cOn the Inter-action of Natural Forces,\u201d by Prof. Helmholtz,\n translated by Prof. Tyndall, and published in the _Philosophical\n Magazine_, supplement to Vol. XI. fourth series.\n\nFootnote 20:\n\n Until I recently consulted his \u201cOutlines of Astronomy\u201d on another\n question, I was not aware that so far back as 1833, Sir John Herschel\n had enunciated the doctrine that \u201cthe sun\u2019s rays are the ultimate\n source of almost every motion which takes place on the surface of the\n earth.\u201d He expressly includes all geologic, meteorologic, and vital\n actions; as also those which we produce by the combustion of coal. The\n late George Stephenson appears to have been wrongly credited with this\n last idea.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER XVII.\n SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.\n\n\n\u00a7 138. In the chapter on \u201cLaws in general,\u201d after delineating the\nprogress of mankind in recognizing uniformities of relation among\nsurrounding phenomena\u2014after showing how the actual succession in the\nestablishment of different orders of co-existences and sequences,\ncorresponds with the succession deducible _\u00e0 priori_ from the conditions\nto human knowledge\u2014after showing how, by the ever-multiplying\nexperiences of constant connections among phenomena, there has been\ngradually generated the conception of universal conformity to law; it\nwas suggested that this conception will become still clearer, when it is\nperceived that there are laws of wider generality than any of those at\npresent accepted.\n\nThe existence of such more general laws, is, indeed, almost implied by\nthe _ensemble_ of the facts set forth in the above-named chapter; since\nthey make it apparent, that the process hitherto carried on, of bringing\nphenomena under fewer and wider laws, has not ceased, but is advancing\nwith increasing rapidity. Apart, however, from evidence of this kind,\nthe man of science, hourly impressed with new proof of uniformity in the\nrelations of things, until the conception of uniformity has become with\nhim a necessity of thought, tacitly entertains the conclusion that the\nminor uniformities which Science has thus far established, will\neventually be merged in uniformities that are universal. Taught as he is\nby every observation and experiment, to regard phenomena as\nmanifestations of Force; and learning as he does to contemplate Force as\nunchangeable in amount; there tends to grow up in him a belief in\nunchangeable laws common to Force under all its manifestations. Though\nhe may not have formulated it to himself, he is prepared to recognize\nthe truth, that, being fixed in quantity, fixed in its two ultimate\nmodes of presentation (Matter and Motion), and fixed in the conditions\nunder which it is presented (Time and Space); Force must have certain\nequally fixed laws of action, common to all the changes it produces.\n\nHence to the classes who alone are likely to read these pages, the\nhypothesis of a fundamental unity, extending from the simplest inorganic\nactions up to the most complex associations of thought and the most\ninvolved social processes, will have an _\u00e0 priori_ probability. All\nthings being recognized as having one source, will be expected to\nexhibit one method. Even in the absence of a clue to uniformities\nco-extensive with all modes of Force, as the mathematical uniformities\nare co-extensive with Space and Time, it will be inferred that such\nuniformities exist. And thus a certain presumption will result in favour\nof any formula, of a generality great enough to include concrete\nphenomena of every order.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 139. In the chapters on the \u201cLaw of Evolution,\u201d there was set forth a\nprinciple, which, so far as accessible evidence enables us to judge,\npossesses this universality. The order of material changes, first\nperceived to have certain constant characteristics in cases where it\ncould be readily traced from beginning to end, we found to have these\nsame characteristics in cases where it could be less readily traced; and\nwe saw numerous indications that these same characteristics were\ndisplayed during past changes of which we have no direct knowledge. The\ntransformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous, first observed\nby naturalists to be exhibited during the development of every plant and\nanimal, proved to be also exhibited during the development of every\nsociety; both in its political and industrial organization, and in all\nthe products of social life,\u2014language, science, art, and literature.\nFrom the disclosures of geology, we drew adequate support for the\nconclusion, that in the structure of the Earth there has similarly been\na progress from uniformity, through ever-increasing degrees of\nmultiformity, to the complex state which we now see. And on the\nassumption of that nebular origin to which so many facts point, we\ninferred that a like transition from unity to variety of distribution,\nmust have been undergone by our Solar System; as well as by that vast\nassemblage of such systems constituting the visible Universe. This\ndefinition of the metamorphosis, first asserted by physiologists of\norganic aggregates only, but which we thus found reason to think, holds\nof all other aggregates, proved on further inquiry to be too wide. Its\nundue width was shown to arise from the omission of certain other\ncharacteristics, that are, not less than the foregoing one, displayed\nthroughout all kinds of Evolution. We saw that simultaneously with the\nchange from homogeneity to heterogeneity, there takes place a change\nfrom indefiniteness of arrangement to definiteness of arrangement\u2014a\nchange everywhere equally traceable with that which it accompanies.\nFurther consideration made it apparent, that the increasing definiteness\nthus manifested along with increasing heterogeneity, necessarily results\nfrom increasing integration of the parts severally rendered unlike. And\nthus we finally reached the conclusion, that there has been going on\nthroughout an immeasurable past, is still going on, and will continue to\ngo on, an advance from a diffused, indeterminate, and uniform\ndistribution of Matter, to a concentrated, determinate, and multiform\ndistribution of it.\n\nAt a subsequent stage of our inquiry, we discovered that this\nprogressive change in the arrangement of Matter, is accompanied by a\nparallel change in the arrangement of Motion\u2014that every increase in the\nstructural complexity of things, involves a corresponding increase in\ntheir functional complexity. It was shown that along with the\nintegration of molecules into masses, there arises an integration of\nmolecular motion into the motion of masses; and that as fast as there\nresults variety in the sizes and forms of aggregates and their relations\nto incident forces, there also results variety in their movements.\nWhence it became manifest, that the general process of things is from a\nconfused simplicity to an orderly complexity, in the distribution of\nboth Matter and Motion.\n\nIt was pointed out, however, that though this species of transformation\nis universal, in the sense of holding throughout all classes of\nphenomena, it is not universal in the sense of being continued without\nlimit in all classes of phenomena. Those aggregates which exhibit the\nentire change from uniformity to multiformity of structure and function,\nin comparatively short periods, eventually show us a reverse set of\nchanges: Evolution is followed by Dissolution. The differentiations and\nintegrations of Matter and Motion, finally reach a degree which the\nconditions do not allow them to pass; and there then sets in a process\nof disintegration and assimilation, of both the parts and the movements\nthat were before growing more united and more distinct.\n\nBut under one or the other of these processes, all observable\nmodifications in the arrangement of things may be classed. Every change\ncomes under the head of integration or disintegration, material or\ndynamical; or under the head of differentiation or assimilation,\nmaterial or dynamical; or under both. Each inorganic mass is either\nundergoing increase by the combination with it of surrounding elements\nfor which its parts have affinity; or undergoing decrease by the solvent\nand abraiding action of surrounding elements; or both one and the other\nin varied succession and combination. By perpetual additions and losses\nof heat, it is having its parts temporarily differentiated from each\nother, or temporarily assimilated to each other, in molecular state. And\nthrough the actions of divers agents, it is also undergoing certain\npermanent molecular re-arrangements; rendering it either more uniform or\nmore multiform in structure. These opposite kinds of change, thus\nvaguely typified in every surrounding fragment of matter, are displayed\nin all aggregates with increasing distinctness in proportion as the\nconditions essential to re-arrangement of parts are fulfilled. So that\nuniversally, the process of things is either in the one direction or the\nother. There is in all cases going on that ever-complicating\ndistribution of Matter and Motion which we call Evolution; save in those\ncases where it has been brought to a close and reversed by what we call\nDissolution.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 140. Whether this omnipresent metamorphosis admits of interpretation,\nwas the inquiry on which we next entered. Recognizing the changes thus\nformulated as consisting in Motions of Matter that are produced by\nForce, we saw that if they are interpretable at all, it must be by the\naffiliation of them on certain ultimate laws of Matter, Motion, and\nForce. We therefore proceeded to inquire what these ultimate laws are.\n\nWe first contemplated under its leading aspects, the principle of\ncorrelation and equivalence among forces. The genesis of sensible motion\nby insensible motion, and of insensible motion by sensible motion, as\nwell as the like reciprocal production of those forms of insensible\nmotion which constitute Light, Heat, Electricity, Magnetism, and\nChemical Action, was shown to be a now accepted doctrine, that involves\ncertain corollaries respecting the processes everywhere going on around\nus. Setting out with the probability that the insensible motion radiated\nby the Sun, is the transformed product of the sensible motion lost\nduring the progressive concentration of the solar mass; we saw that by\nthis insensible motion, are in turn produced the various kinds of\nsensible motion on the Earth\u2019s surface. Besides the inorganic\nterrestrial changes, we found that the changes constituting organic life\nare thus originated. We were obliged to conclude that within this\ncategory, come the vital phenomena classed as mental, as well as those\nclassed as physical. And it appeared inevitably to follow that of social\nchanges, too, the like must be said. We next saw that phenomena\nbeing cognizable by us only as products of Force, manifested under the\ntwo-fold form of attraction and repulsion, there results the general law\nthat all Motion must occur in the direction of least resistance, or in\nthe direction of greatest traction, or in the direction of their\nresultant. It was pointed out that this law is every instant illustrated\nin the movements of the celestial bodies. The innumerable transpositions\nof matter, gaseous, liquid, and solid, going on over the Earth\u2019s\nsurface, were shown to conform to it. Evidence was given that this same\nultimate principle of motion underlies the structural and functional\nchanges of organisms. Throughout the succession of those nervous actions\nwhich constitute thought and feeling, as also in the discharge of\nfeeling into action, we no less found this principle conspicuous. Nor\ndid we discover any exception to it in the movements, temporary and\npermanent, that go on in societies. From the universal coexistence\nof opposing forces, there also resulted the rhythm of motion. It was\nshown that this is displayed from the infinitesimal vibrations of\nmolecules up to the enormous revolutions and gyrations of planets; that\nit is traceable throughout all meteorologic and geologic changes; that\nthe functions of every organic body exemplify it in various forms; that\nmental activities too, intellectual and emotional, exhibit periodicities\nof sundry kinds; and that actions and reactions illustrating this law\nunder a still more complex form, pervade social processes.\n\nSuch being the principles to which conform all changes produced by\nForce on the distribution of Matter, and all changes re-actively\nproduced by Matter on the distribution of Force, we proceeded to\ninquire what must be the consequent nature of any re-distributions\nproduced: having first noted the limiting conditions between which\nsuch re-distributions are possible, and the medium conditions that are\nmost favourable to them. The first conclusion arrived at, was,\nthat any finite homogeneous aggregate must inevitably lose its\nhomogeneity, through the unequal exposure of its parts to incident\nforces. We observed how this was shown in surrounding things, by the\nhabitual establishment of differences between inner and outer parts,\nand parts otherwise dissimilarly circumstanced. It was pointed out\nthat the production of diversities of structure by forces acting under\ndiverse conditions, has been illustrated in astronomic evolution,\nsupposing such evolution to have taken place; and that a like\nconnection of cause and effect is seen in the large and small\nmodifications undergone by our globe. In the early changes of organic\ngerms, we discovered further evidence that unlikenesses of structure\nfollow unlikenesses of relations to surrounding agencies\u2014evidence\nenforced by the tendency of the differently-placed members of each\nspecies to diverge into varieties. We found that the principle is also\nconformed to in the establishment of distinctions among our ideas; and\nthat the contrasts, political and industrial, that arise between the\nparts of societies are no less in harmony with it. The instability of\nthe homogeneous thus caused, and thus everywhere exemplified, we also\nsaw must hold of the unlike parts into which any uniform whole lapses;\nand that so the less heterogeneous must tend continually to become\nmore heterogeneous\u2014an inference which we also found to be everywhere\nconfirmed by fact. Carrying a step further our inquiry into\nthese actions and reactions between Force and Matter, there was\ndisclosed a secondary cause of increasing multiformity. Every\ndifferentiated part becomes, we found, a parent of further\ndifferentiations; not only in the sense that it must lose its own\nhomogeneity in heterogeneity, but also in the sense that it must, in\ngrowing unlike other parts, become a centre of unlike reactions on\nincident forces; and by so adding to the diversity of forces at work,\nmust add to the diversity of effects produced. This multiplication of\neffects, likewise proved to be manifest throughout all Nature. That\nforces modified in kind and direction by every part of every\naggregate, are gradually expended in working changes that grow more\nnumerous and more varied as the forces are subdivided, is shown in the\nactions and reactions going on throughout the Solar System, in the\nnever-ceasing geologic complications, in the involved symptoms\nproduced in organisms by disturbing influences, in the many thoughts\nand feelings generated by single impressions, and in the\never-ramifying results of each new agency brought to bear on a\nsociety. To which add the corollary, confirmed by abundant facts, that\nthe multiplication of effects must increase in a geometrical\nprogression, as the heterogeneity increases. Completely to\ninterpret the structural changes constituting Evolution, there\nremained to assign a reason for that increasingly-distinct demarcation\nof parts, which accompanies the production of differences between\nparts. This reason we discovered to be, the segregation of mixed units\nunder the action of forces capable of moving them. We saw that when\nthe parts of an aggregate have been made qualitatively unlike by\nunlike incident forces\u2014that is, when they have become contrasted in\nthe natures of their component units; there necessarily arises a\ntendency to separation of the dissimilar orders of units from each\nother, and to aggregation of those units which are similar. This cause\nof the integration that accompanies differentiation, turned out to be\nlikewise exemplified by all kinds of Evolution\u2014by the formation of\ncelestial bodies, by the moulding of the Earth\u2019s crust, by organic\nmodifications, by the establishment of mental distinctions, by the\ngenesis of social divisions. And we inferred, what we may everywhere\nsee, that the segregation thus produced goes on so long as there\nremains a possibility of making it more complete. At length, to\nthe query whether the processes thus traced out have any limit, there\ncame the answer that they must end in equilibration. That continual\ndivision and subdivision of forces, which is instrumental in changing\nthe uniform into the multiform and the multiform into the more\nmultiform, we saw to be at the same time a process by which force is\nperpetually dissipated; and that dissipation, continuing as long as\nthere remains any force unbalanced by an opposing force, must end in\nrest. It was shown that when, as happens with aggregates of various\norders, a number of movements are going on in combination, the earlier\ndispersion of the smaller and more resisted movements, entails the\nestablishment of different kinds of moving equilibria: forming\ntransitional stages on the way to complete equilibrium. And further\ninquiry made it apparent that for the same reason, these moving\nequilibria have a certain self-conserving power; shown in the\nneutralization of perturbations, and the adjustment to new conditions.\nThis general principle, like the preceding ones, proved to be\ntraceable throughout all forms of Evolution\u2014astronomic, geologic,\nbiologic, mental and social. And our concluding inference was, that\nthe penultimate stage of this process, in which the extremest degree\nof multiformity and completest form of moving equilibrium is\nestablished, must be one implying the highest conceivable state of\nhumanity.\n\nThus it became apparent that this transformation of on indefinite,\nincoherent homogeneity into a definite coherent heterogeneity, which\ngoes on everywhere, until it brings about a reverse transformation, is\nconsequent on certain simple laws of force. Given those universal modes\nof action which are from moment to moment illustrated in the commonest\nchanges around us, and it follows that there cannot but result the\nobserved metamorphosis of an indeterminate uniformity into a determinate\nmultiformity.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 141. Finally, we have asked whether, for these universal modes of\naction, any common cause is assignable\u2014whether these wide truths are\ndependent on any single widest truth. And to this question we found a\npositive answer. These several principles are corollaries from that\nprimordial principle which transcends human intelligence by underlying\nit.\n\nIn the first part of this work it was shown, by analysis of both our\nreligious and our scientific ideas, that while knowledge of the cause\nwhich produces effects on our consciousness is impossible, the existence\nof a cause for these effects is a datum of consciousness. Though Being\nis cognizable by us only under limits of Time and Space, yet Being\nwithout limits of Time and Space was proved to be the indefinite\ncognition forming the necessary basis of our definite cognitions. We saw\nthat the belief in an Omnipresent Power of which no commencement or\ncessation can be conceived, is that fundamental element in Religion\nwhich survives all its changes of form. We saw that all Philosophies\navowedly or tacitly recognize this same ultimate truth:\u2014that while the\nRelativist rightly repudiates those definite assertions which the\nAbsolutist makes respecting real existence, he is yet at last compelled\nto unite with him in predicating real existence. And this inexpugnable\nconsciousness in which Religion and Philosophy are at one with Common\nSense, proved to be likewise that on which all exact Science is founded.\nWe found that subjective Science can give no account of those\nconditioned modes of existence which constitute consciousness, without\npostulating unconditioned existence. And we found that objective Science\ncan give no account of the existence which we know as external, without\nregarding its changes of form as manifestations of an existence that\ncontinues constant under all forms. Absolute Being, or Being which\npersists without beginning or end, was shown to be the common datum of\nall human thought; for the sufficient reason that the consciousness of\nit cannot be suppressed, without the suppression of consciousness\nitself.\n\nFrom this truth which transcends proof, we have seen that the general\nprinciples above set down, are deducible. That the power or force\nmanifested to us in all phenomena, continues unaltered in quantity,\nhowever its mode of manifestation be altered, is a proposition in which\nthese several propositions are involved. It was shown that on the\nPersistence of Force are based the demonstrations that Matter is\nindestructible and Motion continuous. When its proofs were examined, the\ncorrelation and equivalence of forces was found to follow from the\nPersistence of Force. The necessity we are under of conceiving Force\nunder the two-fold form of attraction and repulsion, turns out to be but\nan implication of the necessity we are under of conceiving Force as\npersistent. On the Persistence of Force, we saw that the law of\ndirection of Motion is dependent; and from it also we saw that the\nrhythm of Motion necessarily results. Passing to those changes of\ndistribution which, by the Motion it generates, Force produces in\nMatter, it was pointed out that from the Persistence of Force are\nseverally deducible, the instability of the homogeneous, the\nmultiplication of effects, and that increasing definiteness of structure\nto which continuous differentiation and integration leads. And lastly we\nsaw that Force being persistent, Evolution cannot cease until\nequilibrium is reached; and that equilibrium must eventually be reached.\n\nSo that given Force manifested in Time and Space, under the forms of\nMatter and Motion; and it is demonstrable, _\u00e0 priori_, that there must\ngo on such transformations as we find going on.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 142. See then the accumulation of proofs. The advance of human\nintelligence in establishing laws continually wider in generality,\nraises the presumption that there are all-comprehensive laws. Turning to\nthe facts, we discern a pervading uniformity in the general course of\nthings where this can be watched, and indications of such uniformity\nwhere it cannot be watched. Considering this uniformity analytically, we\nfind it to result from certain simpler uniformities in the actions of\nForce. And these uniformities prove to be so many necessary implications\nof that primordial truth which underlies all knowledge\u2014the Persistence\nof Force. The aspect of things raises a presumption; extended\nobservations lead to an induction that fulfils this presumption; this\ninduction is deductively confirmed; and the laws whence it is deduced\nare corollaries from that datum without which thought is impossible.\n\nNo higher degree of verification than this can be imagined. An induction\nbased on facts so numerous and varied, and falling short of universality\nonly where the facts are beyond observation, possesses of itself a\nvalidity greater than that of most scientific inductions. When it is\nshown that the proposition thus arrived at _\u00e0 posteriori_, may also be\narrived at _\u00e0 priori_, starting from certain simple laws of force; it is\nraised to a level with those generalizations of concrete science which\nare accepted as proved. And when these simple laws of force are\naffiliated upon that ultimate truth which transcends proof; this\ndependent proposition takes rank with those propositions of abstract\nscience which are our types of the greatest conceivable certainty.\n\nLet no one suppose that any such degree of certainty is alleged of the\nvarious minor propositions brought in illustration of the general\nargument. Such an assumption would be so manifestly absurd, that it\nseems scarcely needful to disclaim it. But the truth of the doctrine as\na whole, is unaffected by errors in the details of its presentation. As\nthe first principles of mathematics are not invalidated by mistakes made\nin working out particular equations; so the first principles set forth\nin the foregoing pages, do not stand or fall with each special statement\nmade in them. If it can be shown that the Persistence of Force is not a\ndatum of consciousness; or if it can be shown that the several laws of\nforce above specified are not corollaries from it; then, indeed, it will\nbe shown that the theory of Evolution has not the certainty here claimed\nfor it. But nothing short of this can invalidate the general conclusions\narrived at.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 143. If these conclusions be accepted\u2014if it be admitted that they\ninevitably follow from the truth transcending all others in authority\u2014if\nit be agreed that the phenomena going on everywhere are parts of the\ngeneral process of Evolution, save where they are parts of the reverse\nprocess of Dissolution; then it must be inferred that all phenomena\nreceive their complete interpretation, only when recognized as parts of\nthese processes. Regarded from the point of view here reached, each\nchange that takes place, is an incident in the course of the\never-complicating distribution of Matter and Motion, except where it is\nan incident in the course of the reverse distribution; and each such\nchange is fully understood, only when brought under those universal\nprinciples of change, to which these transformations necessarily\nconform. Whence, indeed, it appears to be an unavoidable\nconclusion, that the limit towards which Science is advancing, must be\nreached when these formul\u00e6 are made all-comprehensive. Manifestly, the\nperfection of Science, is a state in which all phenomena are seen to be\nnecessary implications of the Persistence of Force. In such a state, the\ndependence of each phenomenon on the Persistence of Force, must be\nproved either directly or indirectly\u2014either by showing that it is a\ncorollary of the Persistence of Force, or by showing that it is a\ncorollary from some general proposition deduced from the Persistence of\nForce. And since all phenomena are incidents in the re-distributions of\nMatter and Motion; and since there are certain general principles,\ndeducible from the Persistence of Force, to which all these\nre-distributions conform; it seems inferrable that ultimately all\nphenomena, where not classed as consequences of the Persistence of\nForce, must be classed as consequences of these derivative principles.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 144. Of course this development of Science into an organized aggregate\nof direct and indirect deductions from the Persistence of Force, can be\nachieved only in the remote future; and indeed cannot be completely\nachieved even then. Scientific progress, is progress in that\nequilibration of thought and things which we saw is going on, and must\ncontinue to go on; but which cannot arrive at perfection in any finite\nperiod, because it advances more slowly the further it advances. But\nthough Science can never be entirely reduced to this form; and though\nonly at a far distant time can it be brought nearly to this form; yet\nmuch may even now be done in the way of rude approximation. Those who\nare familiar with the present aspects of Science, must recognize in them\nthe broken outlines of a general organization. The possibility of\narranging the facts already accumulated, into the order rudely exhibited\nin the foregoing pages, will itself incline them to the belief that our\nknowledge may be put into a more connected shape than it at present has.\nThey will see the probability that many now isolated inductions, may be\nreduced to the form of deductions from first principles. They will\nsuspect that inferences drawn from the ultimate laws of force, will lead\nto the investigation and generalization of classes of facts hitherto\nunexamined. And they will feel, not only that a greater degree of\ncertainty must be acquired by Science, as fast as its propositions are\ndirectly or indirectly deduced from the highest of all truths; but also\nthat it must so be rendered a more efficient agent of further inquiry.\n\nTo bring scientific knowledge to such degree of logical coherence as is\nat present possible, is a task to be achieved only by the combined\nefforts of many. No one man can possess that encyclopedic information\nrequired for rightly arranging even the truths already established. But\nas progress is effected by increments\u2014as all organization, beginning in\nfaint and blurred outlines, is completed by successive modifications and\nadditions; advantage may accrue from an attempt, however rude, to reduce\nthe facts already accumulated\u2014or rather certain classes of them\u2014to\nsomething like co-ordination. Such must be the plea for the several\nvolumes which are to succeed this.\n\n * * * * *\n\n\u00a7 145. A few closing words must be said, concerning the general bearings\nof the doctrines that are now to be further developed. Before proceeding\nto interpret the detailed phenomena of Life, and Mind, and Society, in\nterms of Matter, Motion, and Force, the reader must be reminded in what\nsense the interpretations are to be accepted. In spite of everything\nsaid at the outset, there are probably some who have gained the\nimpression that those most general truths set forth in the preceding\nchapters, together with the truths deducible from them, claim to be\nsomething more than relative truths. And, notwithstanding all evidence\nto the contrary, there will probably have arisen in not a few minds, the\nconviction that the solutions which have been given, along with those to\nbe derived from them, are essentially materialistic. Let none persist in\nthese misconceptions.\n\nAs repeatedly shown in various ways, the deepest truths we can reach,\nare simply statements of the widest uniformities in our experience of\nthe relations of Matter, Motion, and Force; and Matter, Motion, and\nForce are but symbols of the Unknown Reality. That Power of which the\nnature remains for ever inconceivable, and to which no limits in Time or\nSpace can be imagined, works in us certain effects. These effects have\ncertain likenesses of kind, the most general of which we class together\nunder the names of Matter, Motion, and Force; and between these effects\nthere are likenesses of connection, the most constant of which we class\nas laws of the highest certainty. Analysis reduces these several kinds\nof effect to one kind of effect; and these several kinds of uniformity\nto one kind of uniformity. And the highest achievement of Science is the\ninterpretation of all orders of phenomena, as differently-conditioned\nmanifestations of this one kind of effect, under differently-conditioned\nmodes of this one kind of uniformity. But when Science has done this, it\nhas done nothing more than systematize our experience; and has in no\ndegree extended the limits of our experience. We can say no more than\nbefore, whether the uniformities are as absolutely necessary, as they\nhave become to our thought relatively necessary. The utmost possibility\nfor us, is an interpretation of the process of things as it presents\nitself to our limited consciousness; but how this process is related to\nthe actual process, we are unable to conceive, much less to know.\n\nSimilarly, it must be remembered that while the connection between the\nphenomenal order and the ontological order is for ever inscrutable; so\nis the connection between the conditioned forms of being and the\nunconditioned form of being, for ever inscrutable. The interpretation of\nall phenomena in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force, is nothing more\nthan the reduction of our complex symbols of thought, to the simplest\nsymbols; and when the equation has been brought to its lowest terms the\nsymbols remain symbols still. Hence the reasonings contained in the\nforegoing pages, afford no support to either of the antagonist\nhypotheses respecting the ultimate nature of things. Their implications\nare no more materialistic than they are spiritualistic; and no more\nspiritualistic than they are materialistic. Any argument which is\napparently furnished to either hypothesis, is neutralized by as good an\nargument furnished to the other. The Materialist, seeing it to be a\nnecessary deduction from the law of correlation, that what exists in\nconsciousness under the form of feeling, is transformable into an\nequivalent of mechanical motion, and by consequence into equivalents of\nall the other forces which matter exhibits; may consider it therefore\ndemonstrated that the phenomena of consciousness are material phenomena.\nBut the Spiritualist, setting out with the same data, may argue with\nequal cogency, that if the forces displayed by matter are cognizable\nonly under the shape of those equivalent amounts of consciousness which\nthey produce, it is to be inferred that these forces, when existing out\nof consciousness, are of the same intrinsic nature as when existing in\nconsciousness; and that so is justified the spiritualistic conception of\nthe external world, as consisting of something essentially identical\nwith what we call mind. Manifestly, the establishment of correlation and\nequivalence between the forces of the outer and the inner worlds, may be\nused to assimilate either to the other; according as we set out with one\nor other term. But he who rightly interprets the doctrine contained in\nthis work, will see that neither of these terms can be taken as\nultimate. He will see that though the relation of subject and object\nrenders necessary to us these antithetical conceptions of Spirit and\nMatter; the one is no less than the other to be regarded as but a sign\nof the Unknown Reality which underlies both.\n\n\n THE END.\n\n\n JOHN CHILDS AND SON, PRINTERS.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n\n\n TRANSCRIBER\u2019S NOTES\n\n\n 1. Changed \u201cwhich takes place\u201d to \u201cwhich take place\u201d on p. 315.\n 2. Duplicated the large spaces in the original text.\n 3. Silently corrected typographical errors.\n 4. Retained anachronistic and non-standard spellings as printed.\n 5. Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.","title":"First Principles","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":166758}