{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_55108/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_55108","id":"gutenberg_55108","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/55108","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Logic"],"text":"THE LOGIC OF HEGEL\n\n_TRANSLATED FROM_\n\n_THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE\nPHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES_\n\nWILLIAM WALLACE, M.A, LL.D.\n\nFELLOW OF MERTON COLLEGE\nAND WHYTE'S PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY\nIN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD\n\nSECOND EDITION, REVISED AND AUGMENTED\n\nOXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS\n\n1892\n\n\n\n\nNOTE\n\n\nThe present volume contains a translation, which has been revised\nthroughout and compared with the original, of the Logic as given in the\nfirst part of Hegel's _Encyclopaedia,_ preceded by a bibliographical\naccount of the three editions and extracts from the prefaces of that\nwork, and followed by notes and illustrations of a philological rather\nthan a philosophical character on the text. This introductory chapter\nand these notes were not included in the previous edition.\n\nThe volume containing my Prolegomena is under revision and will be\nissued shortly.\n\n                                                              W. W.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\nBIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTICE ON THE THREE EDITIONS AND THREE PREFACES OF THE\nENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES\n\n_THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC._\n\n\n                              CHAPTER I.\n                             INTRODUCTION\n\n                              CHAPTER II.\n                          PRELIMINARY NOTION\n\n                             CHAPTER III.\n               FIRST ATTITUDE OF THOUGHT TO OBJECTIVITY\n\n                              CHAPTER IV.\n              SECOND ATTITUDE OF THOUGHT TO OBJECTIVITY:\n                         I. _Empiricism_\n                  II. _The Critical Philosophy_\n\n                              CHAPTER V.\n              THIRD ATTITUDE OF THOUGHT TO OBJECTIVITY:--\n                _Immediate or Intuitive Knowledge_\n\n                              CHAPTER VI.\n                   LOGIC FURTHER DEFINED AND DIVIDED\n\n                             CHAPTER VII.\n       FIRST SUBDIVISION OF LOGIC:--_The Doctrine of Being_\n\n                             CHAPTER VIII.\n     SECOND SUBDIVISION OF LOGIC:--_The Doctrine of Essence_\n\n                              CHAPTER IX.\n    THIRD SUBDIVISION OF LOGIC:--_The Doctrine of the Notion_\n\n                       NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.\n\n\n                              ON CHAPTER\n                                  I\n                                 II\n                                III\n                                 IV\n                                  V\n                                 VI\n                                VII\n                               VIII\n                                 IX\n\n\n\n\n\n\nBIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTICE\n\n\nON THE THREE EDITIONS AND THREE PREFACES OF THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA\n\n\nTHE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES IN OUTLINE is the third\nin time of the four works which Hegel published. It was preceded by\nthe _Phenomenology of Spirit,_ in 1807, and the _Science of Logic_ (in\ntwo volumes), in 1812-16, and was followed by the _Outlines of the\nPhilosophy of Law_ in 1820. The only other works which came directly\nfrom his hand are a few essays, addresses, and reviews. The earliest\nof these appeared in the _Critical Journal of Philosophy,_ issued by\nhis friend Schelling and himself, in 1802--when Hegel was one and\nthirty, which, as Bacon thought, 'is a great deal of sand in the\nhour-glass'; and the latest were his contributions to the _Jahrb\u00fccher\nf\u00fcr wissenschaftliche Kritik,_ in the year of his death (1831).\n\nThis _Encyclopaedia_ is the only complete, matured, and authentic\nstatement of Hegel's philosophical system. But, as the title-page\nbears, it is only an outline; and its primary aim is to supply a manual\nfor the guidance of his students. In its mode of exposition the free\nflight of speculation is subordinated to the needs of the professorial\nclass-room. Pegasus is put in harness. Paragraphs concise in form and\nsaturated with meaning postulate and presuppose the presiding spirit\nof the lecturer to fuse them into continuity and raise them to higher\nlucidity. Yet in two directions the works of Hegel furnish a supplement\nto the defects of the _Encyclopaedia._\n\nOne of these aids to comprehension is the _Phenomenology of Spirit,_\npublished in his thirty-seventh year. It may be going too far to say\nwith David Strauss that it is the Alpha and Omega of Hegel, and his\nlater writings only extracts from it.[1] Yet here the Pegasus of mind\nsoars free through untrodden fields of air, and tastes the joys of\nfirst love and the pride of fresh discovery in the quest for truth. The\nfire of young enthusiasm has not yet been forced to hide itself and\nsmoulder away in apparent calm. The mood is Olympian--far above the\nturmoil and bitterness of lower earth, free from the bursts of temper\nwhich emerge later, when the thinker has to mingle in the fray and\nendure the shafts of controversy. But the _Phenomenology,_ if not less\nthan the _Encyclopaedia_ it contains the diamond purity of Hegelianism,\nis a key which needs consummate patience and skill to use with\nadvantage. If it commands a larger view, it demands a stronger wing of\nhim who would join its voyage through the atmosphere of thought up to\nits purest empyrean. It may be the royal road to the Idea, but only a\nkingly soul can retrace its course.\n\nThe other commentary on the _Encyclopaedia_ is supplied partly by\nHegel's other published writings, and partly by the volumes (IX-XV in\nthe Collected works) in which his editors have given his Lectures on\nthe Philosophy of History, on Aesthetic, on the Philosophy of Religion,\nand on the History of Philosophy. All of these lectures, as well as\nthe _Philosophy of Law,_ published by himself, deal however only with\nthe third part of the philosophic system. That system (p. 28) includes\n(i) Logic, (ii) Philosophy of Nature, and (iii) Philosophy of Spirit.\nIt is this third part--or rather it is the last two divisions therein\n(embracing the great general interests of humanity, such as law and\nmorals, religion and art, as well as the development of philosophy\nitself) which form the topics of Hegel s most expanded teaching. It\nis in this region that he has most appealed to the liberal culture of\nthe century, and influenced (directly or by reaction) the progress of\nthat philosophical history and historical philosophy of which our own\ngeneration is reaping the fast-accumulating fruit. If one may foist\nsuch a category into systematic philosophy, we may say that the study\nof the 'Objective' and 'Absolute Spirit' is the most _interesting_ part\nof Hegel.\n\nOf the second part of the system there is less to be said. For nearly\nhalf a century the study of nature has passed almost completely out\nof the hands of the philosophers into the care of the specialists of\nscience. There are signs indeed everywhere--and among others Helmholtz\nhas lately reminded us--that the higher order of scientific students\nare ever and anon driven by the very logic of their subject into the\nprecincts or the borders of philosophy. But the name of a Philosophy\nof Nature still recalls a time of hasty enthusiasms and over-grasping\nambition of thought which, in its eagerness to understand the mystery\nof the universe jumped to conclusions on insufficient grounds, trusted\nto bold but fantastic analogies, and lavished an unwise contempt on the\nplodding industry of the mere hodman of facts and experiments. Calmer\nretrospection will perhaps modify this verdict, and sift the various\ncontributions (towards a philosophical unity of the sciences) which\nare now indiscriminately damned by the title of _Naturphilosophie._\nFor the present purpose it need only be said that, for the second\npart of the Hegelian system, we are restricted for explanations\nto the notes collected by the editors of Vol. VII. part i. of the\nCollected works--notes derived from the annotations which Hegel himself\nsupplied in the eight or more courses of lectures which he gave on the\nPhilosophy of Nature between 1804 and 1830.\n\nQuite other is the case with the Logic--the first division of the\n_Encyclopaedia._ There we have the collateral authority of the\n'Science of Logic,' the larger Logic which appeared whilst Hegel was\nschoolmaster at N\u00fcrnberg. The idea of a new Logic formed the natural\nsequel to the publication of the _Phenomenology_ in 1807. In that\nyear Hegel was glad to accept, as a stop-gap and pot-boiler, the post\nof editor of the Bamberg Journal. But his interests lay in other\ndirections, and the circumstances of the time and country helped to\ndetermine their special form. 'In Bavaria,' he says in a letter[2],\n'it looks as if organisation were the current business.' A very mania\nof reform, says another, prevailed. Hegel's friend and fellow-Swabian,\nNiethammer, held an important position in the Bavarian education\noffice, and wished to employ the philosopher in the work of carrying\nout his plans of re-organising the higher education of the Protestant\nsubjects of the crown. He asked if Hegel would write a logic for school\nuse, and if he cared to become rector of a grammar school. Hegel, who\nwas already at work on his larger Logic, was only half-attracted by\nthe suggestion. 'The traditional Logic,' he replied[3], 'is a subject\non which there are text-books enough, but at the same time it is one\nwhich can by no means remain as it is: it is a thing nobody can make\nanything of: 'tis dragged along like an old heirloom, only because\na substitute--of which the want is universally felt--is not yet in\nexistence. The whole of its rules, still current, might be written\non two pages: every additional detail beyond these two is perfectly\nfruitless scholastic subtlety;--or if this logic is to get a thicker\nbody, its expansion must come from psychological paltrinesses,' Still\nless did he like the prospect of instructing in theology, as then\nrationalised. 'To write a logic and to be theological instructor is as\nbad as to be white-washer and chimney-sweep at once.' 'Shall he, who\nfor many long years built his eyry on the wild rock beside the eagle\nand learned to breathe the free air of the mountains, now learn to feed\non the carcases of dead thoughts or the still-born thoughts of the\nmoderns, and vegetate in the leaden air of mere babble[4]?'\n\nAt N\u00fcrnberg he found the post of rector of the 'gymnasium' by no\nmeans a sinecure. The school had to be made amid much lack of funds\nand general bankruptcy of apparatus:--all because of an all-powerful\nand unalterable destiny which is called the course of business.' One\nof his tasks was 'by graduated exercises to introduce his pupils to\nspeculative thought,'--and that in the space of four hours weekly[5].\nOf its practicability--and especially with himself as instrument--he\nhad grave doubts. In theory, he held that an intelligent study of\nthe ancient classics was the best introduction to philosophy; and\npractically he preferred starting his pupils with the principles\nof law, morality and religion, and reserving the logic and higher\nphilosophy for the highest class. Meanwhile he continued to work on\nhis great Logic, the first volume of which appeared in two parts, 1812,\n1813, and the second in 1816.\n\nThis is the work which is the real foundation of the Hegelian\nphilosophy. Its aim is the systematic reorganisation of the\ncommonwealth of thought. It gives not a criticism, like Kant; not\na principle, like Fichte; not a bird's eye view of the fields of\nnature and history, like Schelling; it attempts the hard work of\nre-constructing, step by step, into totality the fragments of the\norganism of intelligence. It is scholasticism, if scholasticism means\nan absolute and all-embracing system; but it is a protest against\nthe old school-system and those who tried to rehabilitate it through\ntheir comprehensions of the Kantian theory. Apropos of the logic of\nhis contemporary Fries (whom he did not love), published in 1811, he\nremarks: 'His paragraphs are mindless, quite shallow, bald, trivial;\nthe explanatory notes are the dirty linen of the professorial chair,\nutterly slack and unconnected.'[6] Of himself he thus speaks: 'I am\na schoolmaster who has to teach philosophy,--who, possibly for that\nreason, believes that philosophy like geometry is teachable, and\nmust no less than geometry have a regular structure. But again, a\nknowledge of the facts in geometry and philosophy is one thing, and the\nmathematical or philosophical talent which procreates and discovers is\nanother: my province is to discover that scientific form, or to aid\nin the formation of it[7].' So he writes to an old college friend;\nand in a letter to the rationalist theologian Paulus, in 1814[8], he\nprofesses: 'You know that I have had too much to do not merely with\nancient literature, but even with mathematics, latterly with the higher\nanalysis, differential calculus, chemistry, to let myself be taken in\nby the humbug of Naturphilosophie, philosophising without knowledge of\nfact and by mere force of imagination, and treating mere fancies, even\nimbecile fancies, as Ideas.'\n\nIn the autumn of 1816 Hegel became professor of philosophy at\nHeidelberg. In the following year appeared the first edition of his\n_Encyclopaedia_: two others appeared in his lifetime (in 1827 and\n1830). The first edition is a thin octavo volume of pp. xvi. 288,\npublished (like the others) at Heidelberg. The Logic in it occupies\npp. 1-126 (of which 12 pp. are Einleitung and 18 pp. Vorbegriff); the\nPhilosophy of Nature, pp. 127-204; and the Philosophy of Mind (Spirit),\npp. 205-288.\n\nIn the Preface the book is described (p. iv) as setting forth 'a new\ntreatment of philosophy on a method which will, as I hope, yet be\nrecognised as the only genuine method identical with the content.'\nContrasting his own procedure with a mannerism of the day which\nused an assumed set of formulas to produce in the facts a show of\nsymmetry even more arbitrary and mechanical than the arrangements\nimposed _ab extra_ in the sciences, he goes on: 'This wilfulness we\nsaw also take possession of the contents of philosophy and ride out\non an intellectual knight-errantry--for a while imposing on honest\ntrue-hearted workers, though elsewhere it was only counted grotesque,\nand grotesque even to the pitch of madness. But oftener and more\nproperly its teachings--far from seeming imposing or mad--were found\nout to be familiar trivialities, and its form seen to be a mere trick\nof wit, easily acquired, methodical and premeditated, with its quaint\ncombinations and strained eccentricities,--the mien of earnestness only\ncovering self-deception and fraud upon the public. On the other side,\nagain, we saw shallowness and unintelligence assume the character of\na scepticism wise in its own eyes and of a criticism modest in its\nclaims for reason, enhancing their vanity and conceit in proportion\nas their ideas grew more vacuous. For a space of time these two\nintellectual tendencies have befooled German earnestness, have tired\nout its profound craving for philosophy, and have been succeeded by\nan indifference and even a contempt for philosophic science, till at\nlength a self-styled modesty has the audacity to let its voice be heard\nin controversies touching the deepest philosophical problems, and to\ndeny philosophy its right to that cognition by reason, the form of\nwhich was what formerly was called _demonstration._'\n\n'The first of these phenomena may be in part explained as the youthful\nexuberance of the new age which has risen in the realm of science no\nless than in the world of politics. If this exuberance greeted with\nrapture the dawn of the intellectual renascence, and without profounder\nlabour at once set about enjoying the Idea and revelling for a while in\nthe hopes and prospects which it offered, one can more readily forgive\nits excesses; because it is sound at heart, and the surface vapours\nwhich it had suffused around its solid worth must spontaneously clear\noff. But the other spectacle is more repulsive; because it betrays\nexhaustion and impotence, and tries to conceal them under a hectoring\nconceit which acts the censor over the philosophical intellects of all\nthe centuries, mistaking them, but most of all mistaking itself.\n\n'So much the more gratifying is another spectacle yet-to be noted; the\ninterest in philosophy and the earnest love of higher knowledge which\nin the presence of both tendencies has kept itself single-hearted and\nwithout affectation. Occasionally this interest may have taken too\nmuch to the language of intuition and feeling; yet its appearance\nproves the existence of that inward and deeper-reaching impulse of\nreasonable intelligence which alone gives man his dignity,--proves it\nabove all, because that standpoint can only be gained as a _result_\nof philosophical consciousness; so that what it seems to disdain is\nat least admitted and recognised as a condition. To this interest\nin ascertaining the truth I dedicate this attempt to supply an\nintroduction and a contribution towards its satisfaction.'\n\nThe second edition appeared in 1827. Since the autumn of 1818 Hegel\nhad been professor at Berlin: and the manuscript was sent thence (from\nAugust 1826 onwards) to Heidelberg, where Daub, his friend--himself\na master in philosophical theology--attended to the revision of the\nproofs. 'To the Introduction,' writes Hegel[9], 'I have given perhaps\ntoo great an amplitude: but it, above all, would have cost me time and\ntrouble to bring within narrower compass. Tied down and distracted\nby lectures, and sometimes here in Berlin by other things too, I\nhave--without a general survey--allowed myself so large a swing that\nthe work has grown upon me, and there was a danger of its turning into\na book. I have gone through it several times. The treatment of the\nattitudes (of thought) which I have distinguished in it was to meet an\ninterest of the day. The rest I have sought to make more definite, and\nso far as may be clearer; but the main fault is not mended--to do which\nwould require me to limit the detail more, and on the other hand make\nthe whole more surveyable, so that the contents should better answer\nthe title of an Encyclopaedia.' Again, in Dec. 1826, he writes[10]: 'In\nthe Naturphilosophie I have made essential changes, but could not help\nhere and there going too far into a detail which is hardly in keeping\nwith the tone of the whole. The second half of the Geistesphilosophie\nI shall have to modify entirely.' In May 1827, Hegel offers his\nexplanation of delay in the preface, which, like the concluding\nparagraphs, touches largely on contemporary theology. By August of that\nyear the book was finished, and Hegel off to Paris for a holiday.\n\nIn the second edition, which substantially fixed the form of the\n_Encyclopaedia_, the pages amount to xlii, 534--nearly twice as many\nas the first, which, however, as Professor Caird remarks, 'has a\ncompactness, a brief energy and conclusiveness of expression, which\nhe never surpassed.' The Logic now occupies pp. 1214, Philosophy of\nNature 215-354, and Philosophy of Spirit from 355-534. The second part\ntherefore has gained least; and in the third part the chief single\nexpansions occur towards the close and deal with the relations of\nphilosophy, art, and religion in the State; viz. \u00a7 563 (which in the\nthird edition is transposed to \u00a7 552), and \u00a7 573 (where two pages are\nenlarged to 18). In the first part, or the Logic, the main increase\nand alteration falls within the introductory chapters, where 96 pages\ntake the place of 30. The Vorbegriff (preliminary notion) of the first\nedition had contained the distinction of the three logical 'moments'\n(see p. 142), with a few remarks on the methods, first, of metaphysic,\nand then (after a brief section on empiricism), of the 'Critical\nPhilosophy through which philosophy has reached its close.' Instead\nof this the second edition deals at length, under this head, with the\nthree 'attitudes (or positions) of thought to objectivity;' where,\nbesides a more lengthy criticism of the Critical philosophy, there is a\ndiscussion of the doctrines of Jacobi and other Intuitivists.\n\nThe Preface, like much else in this second edition, is an assertion\nof the right and the duty of philosophy to treat independently of\nthe things of God, and an emphatic declaration that the result of\nscientific investigation of the truth is, not the subversion of\nthe faith, but 'the restoration of that sum of absolute doctrine\nwhich thought at first would have put behind and beneath itself--a\nrestoration of it however in the most characteristic and the freest\nelement of the mind.' Any opposition that may be raised against\nphilosophy on religious grounds proceeds, according to Hegel, from a\nreligion which has abandoned its true basis and entrenched itself in\nformulae and categories that pervert its real nature. 'Yet,' he adds\n(p. vii), 'especially where religious subjects are under discussion,\nphilosophy is expressly set aside, as if in that way all mischief were\nbanished and security against error and illusion attained;' ... 'as if\nphilosophy--the mischief thus kept at a distance--were anything but\nthe investigation of Truth, but with a full sense of the nature and\nvalue of the intellectual links which give unity and form to all fact\nwhatever.' 'Lessing,' he continues (p. xvi), 'said in his time that\npeople treat Spinoza like a dead dog[11]. It cannot be said that in\nrecent times Spinozism and speculative philosophy in general have been\nbetter treated.'\n\nThe time was one of feverish unrest and unwholesome irritability. Ever\nsince the so-called Carlsbad decrees of 1819 all the agencies of the\nhigher literature and education had been subjected to an inquisitorial\nsupervision which everywhere surmised political insubordination and\nreligious heresy. A petty provincialism pervaded what was then still\nthe small Residenz-Stadt Berlin; and the King, Frederick William\nIII, cherished to the full that paternal conception of his position\nwhich has not been unusual in the royal house of Prussia. Champions\nof orthodoxy warned him that Hegelianism was unchristian, if not even\nanti-christian. Franz von Baader, the Bavarian religious philosopher\n(who had spent some months at Berlin during the winter of 1823-4,\nstudying the religious and philosophical teaching of the universities\nin connexion with the revolutionary doctrines which he saw fermenting\nthroughout Europe), addressed the king in a communication which\ndescribed the prevalent Protestant theology as infidel in its very\nsource, and as tending directly to annihilate the foundations of\nthe faith. Hegel himself had to remind the censor of heresy that\n'all speculative philosophy on religion maybe carried to atheism:\nall depends on who carries it; the peculiar piety of our times and\nthe malevolence of demagogues will not let us want carriers[12].'\nHis own theology was suspected both by the Rationalists and by the\nEvangelicals. He writes to his wife (in 1827) that he had looked at\nthe university buildings in Louvain and Li\u00e8ge with the feeling that\nthey might one day afford him a resting-place 'when the parsons in\nBerlin make the Kupfergraben completely intolerable for him[13].' 'The\nRoman Curia,' he adds, 'would be a more honourable opponent than the\nmiserable cabals of a miserable boiling of parsons in Berlin.' Hence\nthe tone in which the preface proceeds (p. xviii).\n\n'Religion is the kind and mode of consciousness in which the Truth\nappeals to all men, to men of every degree of education; but the\nscientific ascertainment of the Truth is a special kind of this\nconsciousness, involving a labour which not all but only a few\nundertake. The substance of the two is the same; but as Homer says of\nsome stars that they have two names, the one in the language of the\ngods, the other in the language of ephemeral men--so for that substance\nthere are two languages,--the one of feeling, of pictorial thought,\nand of the limited intellect that makes its home in finite categories\nand inadequate abstractions, the other the language of the concrete\nnotion. If we propose then to talk of and to criticise philosophy from\nthe religious point of view, there is more requisite than to possess\na familiarity with the language of the ephemeral consciousness. The\nfoundation of scientific cognition is the substantiality at its core,\nthe indwelling idea with its stirring intellectual life; just as the\nessentials of religion are a heart fully disciplined, a mind awake to\nself-collectedness, a wrought and refined substantiality. In modern\ntimes religion has more and more contracted the intelligent expansion\nof its contents and withdrawn into the intensiveness of piety, or even\nof feeling,--a feeling which betrays its own scantiness and emptiness.\nSo long however as it still has a creed, a doctrine, a system of dogma,\nit has what philosophy can occupy itself with and where it can find for\nitself a point of union with religion. This however is not to be taken\nin the wrong separatist sense (so dominant in our modern religiosity)\nrepresenting the two as mutually exclusive, or as at bottom so capable\nof separation that their union is only imposed from without. Rather,\neven in what has gone before, it is implied that religion may well\nexist without philosophy, but philosophy not without religion--which\nit rather includes. True religion--intellectual and spiritual\nreligion--must have body and substance, for spirit and intellect are\nabove all consciousness, and consciousness implies an _objective_ body\nand substance.\n\n'The contracted religiosity which narrows itself to a point in the\nheart must make that heart's softening and contrition the essential\nfactor of its new birth; but it must at the same time recollect that it\nhas to do with the heart of a spirit, that the spirit is the appointed\nauthority over the heart, and that it can only have such authority so\nfar as it is itself born again. This new birth of the spirit out of\nnatural ignorance and natural error takes place through instruction and\nthrough that faith in objective truth and substance which is due to the\nwitness of the spirit. This new birth of the spirit is besides _ipso\nfacto_ a new birth of the heart out of that vanity of the one-sided\nintellect (on which it sets so much) and its discoveries that finite is\ndifferent from infinite, that philosophy must either be polytheism, or,\nin acuter minds, pantheism, &c. It is, in short, a new birth out of the\nwretched discoveries on the strength of which pious humility holds its\nhead so high against philosophy and theological science. If religiosity\npersists in clinging to its unexpanded and therefore unintelligent\nintensity, then it can be sensible only of the contrast which divides\nthis narrow and narrowing form from the intelligent expansion of\ndoctrine as such, religious not less than philosophical.'\n\nAfter an appreciative quotation from Franz von Baader, and noting his\nreference to the theosophy of B\u00f6hme, as a work of the past from which\nthe present generation might learn the speculative interpretation of\nChristian doctrines, he reverts to the position that the only mode in\nwhich thought will admit a reconciliation with religious doctrines, is\nwhen these doctrines have learned to 'assume their worthiest phase--the\nphase of the notion, of necessity, which binds, and thus also makes\nfree everything, fact no less than thought.' But it is not from B\u00f6hme\nor his kindred that we are likely to get the example of a philosophy\nequal to the highest theme--to the comprehension of divine things. 'If\nold things are to be revived--an old phase, that is; for the burden\nof the theme is ever young--the phase of the Idea such as Plato and,\nstill better, as Aristotle conceived it, is far more deserving of being\nrecalled,--and for the further reason that the disclosure of it, by\nassimilating it into our system of ideas, is, _ipso facto,_ not merely\nan interpretation of it, but a progress of the science itself. But\nto interpret such forms of the Idea by no means lies so much on the\nsurface as to get hold of Gnostic and Cabbalistic phantasmagorias; and\nto develope Plato and Aristotle is by no means the sinecure that it is\nto note or to hint at echoes of the Idea in the medievalists.'\n\nThe third edition of the _Encyclopaedia,_ which appeared in 1830,\nconsists of pp. lviii, 600--a slight additional increase. The increase\nis in the Logic, eight pages; in the Philosophy of Nature, twenty-three\npages; and in the Philosophy of Spirit, thirty-four pages. The concrete\ntopics, in short, gain most.\n\nThe preface begins by alluding to several criticisms on his\nphilosophy,--'which for the most part have shown little vocation for\nthe business'--and to his discussion of them in the _Jahrb\u00fccher_ of\n1829 (_Vermischte Schriften,_ ii. 149). There is also a paragraph\ndevoted to the quarrel originated by the attack in Hengstenberg's\nEvangelical Journal on the rationalism of certain professors at Halle\n(notably Gesenius and Wegscheider),--(an attack based on the evidence\nof students' note-books), and by the protest of students and professors\nagainst the insinuations. 'It seemed a little while ago,' says Hegel\n(p. xli), 'as if there was an initiation, in a scientific spirit\nand on a wider range, of a more serious inquiry, from the region of\ntheology and even of religiosity, touching God, divine things, and\nreason. But the very beginning of the movement checked these hopes;\nthe issue turned on personalities, and neither the pretensions of the\naccusing pietists nor the pretensions of the free reason they accused,\nrose to the real subject, still less to a sense that the subject\ncould only be discussed on philosophic soil. This personal attack, on\nthe basis of very special externalities of religion, displayed the\nmonstrous assumption of seeking to decide by arbitrary decree as to\nthe Christianity of individuals, and to stamp them accordingly with\nthe seal of temporal and eternal reprobation. Dante, in virtue of the\nenthusiasm of divine poesy, has dared to handle the keys of Peter, and\nto condemn by name to the perdition of hell many--already deceased\nhowever--of his contemporaries, even Popes and Emperors. A modern\nphilosophy has been made the subject of the infamous charge that in\nit human individuals usurp the rank of God; but such a fictitious\ncharge--reached by a false logic--pales before the actual assumption\nof behaving like judges of the world, prejudging the Christianity of\nindividuals, and announcing their utter reprobation. The Shibboleth\nof this absolute authority is the name of the Lord Christ, and the\nassertion that the Lord dwells in the hearts of these judges.' But the\nassertion is ill supported by the fruits they exhibit,--the monstrous\ninsolence with which they reprobate and condemn.\n\nBut the evangelicals are not alone to blame for the bald and\nundeveloped nature of their religious life; the same want of free and\nliving growth in religion characterises their opponents. 'By their\nformal, abstract, nerveless reasoning, the rationalists have emptied\nreligion of all power and substance, no less than the pietists by the\nreduction of all faith to the Shibboleth of Lord! Lord! One is no\nwhit better than the other: and when they meet in conflict there is\nno material on which they could come into contact, no common ground,\nand no possibility of carrying on an inquiry which would lead to\nknowledge and truth. \"Liberal\" theology on its side has not got beyond\nthe formalism of appeals to liberty of conscience, liberty of thought,\nliberty of teaching, to reason itself and to science. Such liberty no\ndoubt describes the _infinite right_ of the spirit, and the second\nspecial condition of truth, supplementary to the first, faith. But\nthe rationalists steer clear of the material point: they do not tell\nus the reasonable principles and laws involved in a free and genuine\nconscience, nor the import and teaching of free faith and free thought;\nthey do not get beyond a bare negative formalism and the liberty to\nembody their liberty at their fancy and pleasure--whereby in the end\nit matters not how it is embodied. There is a further reason for\ntheir failure to reach a solid doctrine. The Christian community must\nbe, and ought always to be, unified by the tie of a doctrinal idea,\na confession of faith; but the generalities and abstractions of the\nstale, not living, waters of rationalism forbid the specificality of\nan inherently definite and fully developed body of Christian doctrine.\nTheir opponents, again, proud of the name Lord! Lord! frankly and\nopenly disdain carrying out the faith into the fulness of spirit,\nreality, and truth.'\n\nIn ordinary moods of mind there is a long way from logic to religion.\nBut almost every page of what Hegel has called Logic is witness to\nthe belief in their ultimate identity. It was no new principle of\nlater years for him. He had written in post-student days to his\nfriend Schelling: 'Reason and freedom remain our watch-word, and our\npoint of union the invisible church[14].' His parting token of faith\nwith another youthful comrade, the poet H\u00f6lderlin, had been 'God's\nkingdom[15].'\n\nBut after 1827 this religious appropriation of philosophy becomes\nmore apparent, and in 1829 Hegel seemed deliberately to accept the\nposition of a Christian philosopher which G\u00f6schel had marked out for\nhim. 'A philosophy without heart and a faith without intellect,' he\nremarks[16], 'are abstractions from the true life of knowledge and\nfaith. The man whom philosophy leaves cold, and the man whom real faith\ndoes not illuminate may be assured that the fault lies in them, not in\nknowledge and faith. The former is still an alien to philosophy, the\nlatter an alien to faith.'\n\nThis is not the place--in a philological chapter--to discuss the issues\ninvolved in the announcement that the truth awaits us ready to hand[17]\n'in all genuine consciousness, in all religions and philosophies.'\nYet one remark may be offered against hasty interpretations of a\n'speculative' identity. If there is a double edge to the proposition\nthat the actual is the reasonable, there is no less caution necessary\nin approaching and studying from both sides the far-reaching import\nof that equation to which Joannes Scotus Erigena gave expression ten\ncenturies ago: '_Non alia est philosophia, i.e. sapientiae studium,\net alia religio. Quid est aliud de philosophia tractare nisi verae\nreligionis regulas exponere?_'\n\n\n[1] _Christian M\u00e4rklin,_ cap. 3.\n\n[2] Hegel's _Briefe,_ i. 141.\n\n[3] _Ibid._ i. 172.\n\n[4] Hegel's _Briefe,_ i. 138.\n\n[5] _Ibid._ i. 339.\n\n[6] Hegel's _Briefe,_ i. 328.\n\n[7] _Ibid._ i. 273.\n\n[8] _Ibid._ i. 373.\n\n[9] Hegel's _Briefe,_ ii. 204.\n\n[10] _Ibid._ ii. 230.\n\n[11] Jacobi's _Werke,_ iv. A, p. 63.\n\n[12] Hegel's _Briefe,_ ii. 54.\n\n[13] _Ibid._ ii. 276.\n\n[14] Hegel's _Briefe,_ i. 13.\n\n[15] H\u00f6lderlin's _Leben_ (Litzmann), p. 183.\n\n[16] _Verm. Sehr._ ii. 144.\n\n[17] Hegel's _Briefe,_ ii. 80.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n_The following Errata in the Edition of the Logic as given in the\nCollected Works (Vol. VI.) are corrected in the translation. The\nreferences in brackets are to the_ German text.\n\nPage 95, line 1. Und Objektivit\u00e4t has dropped out after der\nSubjektivit\u00e4t. [VI. 98, l. 10 from bottom.]\n\nP. 97, l. 2. The 2nd ed. reads (die Gedanken) nicht in Solchem, instead\nof nicht als in Solchem (3rd ed.). [VI. p. 100, l. 3 from bottom.]\n\nP. 169, l. 13 from bottom. Instead of the reading of the _Werke_ and of\nthe 3rd ed. read as in ed. II. Also ist dieser Gegenstand nichts. [VI.\np. 178, l. 11.]\n\nP. 177, l. 3 from bottom. Verstandes; Gegenstandes is a mistake for\nVerstandes; Gegensatzes, as in edd. II and III. [VI. p. 188, l. 2.]\n\nP. 231, l. 19. weiten should be weitern. [VI. p. 251, l. 3 from bottom.]\n\nP. 316, l. 15. Dinglichkeit is a misprint for Dingheit, as in Hegel's\nown editions. [VI. p. 347, l. 1.]\n\nP. 352, l. 14 from bottom, for seine Realit\u00e4t read seiner Realit\u00e4t.\n[VI. p. 385, l. 8.]\n\n\n\n\nTHE SCIENCE OF LOGIC\n\n\n(_THE FIRST PART OF THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES IN\nOUTLINE_)\n\n\nBY G. W. F. HEGEL\n\n\n\n\nTHE SCIENCE OF LOGIC\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\n\n1.] PHILOSOPHY misses an advantage enjoyed by the other sciences. It\ncannot like them rest the existence of its objects on the natural\nadmissions of consciousness, nor can it assume that its method of\ncognition, either for starting or for continuing, is one already\naccepted. The objects of philosophy, it is true, are upon the whole the\nsame as those of religion. In both the object is Truth, in that supreme\nsense in which God and God only is the Truth. Both in like manner go on\nto treat of the finite worlds of Nature and the human Mind, with their\nrelation to each other and to their truth in God. Some _acquaintance_\nwith its objects, therefore, philosophy may and even must presume, that\nand a certain interest in them to boot, were it for no other reason\nthan this: that in point of time the mind makes general _images_ of\nobjects, long before it makes _notions_ of them, and that it is only\nthrough these mental images, and by recourse to them, that the thinking\nmind rises to know and comprehend _thinkingly._\n\nBut with the rise of this thinking study of things, it soon becomes\nevident that thought will be satisfied with nothing short of showing\nthe _necessity_ of its facts, of demonstrating the existence of\nits objects, as well as their nature and qualities. Our original\nacquaintance with them is thus discovered to be inadequate. We can\nassume nothing, and assert nothing dogmatically; nor can we accept the\nassertions and assumptions of others. And yet we must make a beginning:\nand a beginning, as primary and underived, makes an assumption, or\nrather is an assumption. It seems as if it were impossible to make a\nbeginning at all.\n\n2.] This _thinking study of things_ may serve, in a general way, as\na description of philosophy. But the description is too wide. If it\nbe correct to say, that thought makes the distinction between man and\nthe lower animals, then everything human is human, for the sole and\nsimple reason that it is due to the operation of thought. Philosophy,\non the other hand, is a peculiar mode of thinking--a mode in which\nthinking becomes knowledge, and knowledge through notions. However\ngreat therefore may be the identity and essential unity of the two\nmodes of thought, the philosophic mode gets to be different from the\nmore general thought which acts in all that is human, in all that gives\nhumanity its distinctive character. And this difference connects itself\nwith the fact that the strictly human and thought-induced phenomena of\nconsciousness do not originally appear in the form of a thought, but as\na feeling, a perception, or mental image--all of which aspects must be\ndistinguished from the form of thought proper.\n\nAccording to an old preconceived idea, which has passed into a trivial\nproposition, it is thought which marks the man off from the animals.\nYet trivial as this old belief may seem, it must, strangely enough,\nbe recalled to mind in presence of certain preconceived ideas of the\npresent day. These ideas would put feeling and thought so far apart as\nto make them opposites, and would represent them as so antagonistic,\nthat feeling, particularly religious feeling, is supposed to be\ncontaminated, perverted, and even annihilated by thought. They also\nemphatically hold that religion and piety grow out of, and rest upon\nsomething else, and not on thought. But those who make this separation\nforget meanwhile that only man has the capacity for religion, and that\nanimals no more have religion than they have law and morality.\n\nThose who insist on this separation of religion from thinking usually\nhave before their minds the sort of thought that may be styled\n_after-thought._ They mean 'reflective' thinking, which has to deal\nwith thoughts as thoughts, and brings them into consciousness.\nSlackness to perceive and keep in view this distinction which\nphilosophy definitely draws in respect of thinking is the source of\nthe crudest objections and reproaches against philosophy. Man,--and\nthat just because it is his nature to think,--is the only being that\npossesses law, religion, and morality. In these spheres of human life,\ntherefore, thinking, under the guise of feeling, faith, or generalised\nimage, has not been inactive: its action and its productions are\nthere present and therein contained. But it is one thing to have such\nfeelings and generalised images that have been moulded and permeated by\nthought, and another thing to have thoughts about them. The thoughts,\nto which after-thought upon those modes of consciousness gives rise,\nare what is comprised under reflection, general reasoning, and the\nlike, as well as under philosophy itself.\n\nThe neglect of this distinction between thought in general and the\nreflective thought of philosophy has also led to another and more\nfrequent misunderstanding. Reflection of this kind has been often\nmaintained to be the condition, or even the only way, of attaining a\nconsciousness and certitude of the Eternal and True. The (now somewhat\nantiquated) metaphysical proofs of God's existence, for example, have\nbeen treated, as if a knowledge of them and a conviction of their truth\nwere the only and essential means of producing a belief and conviction\nthat there is a God. Such a doctrine would find its parallel, if we\nsaid that eating was impossible before we had acquired a knowledge\nof the chemical, botanical, and zoological characters of our food;\nand that we must delay digestion till we had finished the study of\nanatomy and physiology. Were it so, these sciences in their field,\nlike philosophy in its, would gain greatly in point of utility; in\nfact, their utility would rise to the height of absolute and universal\nindispensableness. Or rather, instead of being indispensable, they\nwould not exist at all.\n\n3.] The _Content,_ of whatever kind it be, with which our consciousness\nis taken up, is what constitutes the qualitative character of our\nfeelings, perceptions, fancies, and ideas; of our aims and duties;\nand of our thoughts and notions. From this point of view, feeling,\nperception, &c. are the _forms_ assumed by these contents. The contents\nremain one and the same, whether they are felt, seen, represented, or\nwilled, and whether they are merely felt, or felt with an admixture of\nthoughts, or merely and simply thought. In any one of these forms, or\nin the admixture of several, the contents confront consciousness, or\nare its _object._ But when they are thus objects of consciousness, the\nmodes of the several forms ally themselves with the contents; and each\nform of them appears in consequence to give rise to a special object.\nThus what is the same at bottom, may look like a different sort of\nfact.\n\nThe several modes of feeling, perception, desire, and will, so far\nas we are _aware_ of them, are in general called ideas (mental\nrepresentations): and it may be roughly said, that philosophy puts\nthoughts, categories, or, in more precise language, adequate _notions,_\nin the place of the generalised images we ordinarily call ideas. Mental\nimpressions such as these may be regarded as the metaphors of thoughts\nand notions. But to have these figurate conceptions does not imply\nthat we appreciate their intellectual significance, the thoughts and\nrational notions to which they correspond. Conversely, it is one thing\nto have thoughts and intelligent notions, and another to know what\nimpressions, perceptions, and feelings correspond to them.\n\nThis difference will to some extent explain what people call the\nunintelligibility of philosophy. Their difficulty lies partly in an\nincapacity--which in itself is nothing but want of habit--for abstract\nthinking; _i.e._ in an inability to get hold of pure thoughts and move\nabout in them. In our ordinary state of mind, the thoughts are clothed\nupon and made one with the sensuous or spiritual material of the hour;\nand in reflection, meditation, and general reasoning, we introduce a\nblend of thoughts into feelings, percepts, and mental images. (Thus,\nin propositions where the subject-matter is due to the senses--_e.g._\n'This leaf is green'--we have such categories introduced, as being and\nindividuality.) But it is a very different thing to make the thoughts\npure and simple our object.\n\nBut their complaint that philosophy is unintelligible is as much due to\nanother reason; and that is an impatient wish to have before them as a\nmental picture that which is in the mind as a thought or notion. When\npeople are asked to apprehend some notion, they often complain that\nthey do not know what they have to think. But the fact is that in a\nnotion there is nothing further to be thought than the notion itself.\nWhat the phrase reveals, is a hankering after an image with which we\nare already familiar. The mind, denied the use of its familiar ideas,\nfeels the ground where it once stood firm and at home taken away from\nbeneath it, and, when transported into the region of pure thought,\ncannot tell where in the world it is.\n\nOne consequence of this weakness is that authors, preachers, and\norators are found most intelligible, when they speak of things which\ntheir readers or hearers already know by rote,--things which the latter\nare conversant with, and which require no explanation.\n\n4.] The philosopher then has to reckon with popular modes of thought,\nand with the objects of religion. In dealing with the ordinary modes\nof mind, he will first of all, as we saw, have to prove and almost\nto awaken the need for his peculiar method of knowledge. In dealing\nwith the objects of religion, and with truth as a whole, he will have\nto show that philosophy is capable of apprehending them from its own\nresources; and should a difference from religious conceptions come to\nlight, he will have to justify the points in which it diverges.\n\n5.] To give the reader a preliminary explanation of the distinction\nthus made, and to let him see at the same moment that the real import\nof our consciousness is retained, and even for the first time put\nin its proper light, when translated into the form of thought and\nthe notion of reason, it may be well to recall another of these old\nunreasoned beliefs. And that is the conviction that to get at the truth\nof any object or event, even of feelings, perceptions, opinions, and\nmental ideas, we must think it over. Now in any case to think things\nover is at least to transform feelings, ordinary ideas, &c. into\nthoughts.\n\nNature has given every one a faculty of thought. But thought is all\nthat philosophy claims as the form proper to her business: and thus\nthe inadequate view which ignores the distinction stated in \u00a7 3, leads\nto a new delusion, the reverse of the complaint previously mentioned\nabout the unintelligibility of philosophy. In other words, this science\nmust often submit to the slight of hearing even people who have never\ntaken any trouble with it talking as if they thoroughly understood all\nabout it. With no preparation beyond an ordinary education they do\nnot hesitate, especially under the influence of religious sentiment,\nto philosophise and to criticise philosophy. Everybody allows that\nto know any other science you must have first studied it, and that\nyou can only claim to express a judgment upon it in virtue of such\nknowledge. Everybody allows that to make a shoe you must have learned\nand practised the craft of the shoemaker, though every man has a model\nin his own foot, and possesses in his hands the natural endowments for\nthe operations required. For philosophy alone, it seems to be imagined,\nsuch study, care, and application are not in the least requisite.\n\nThis comfortable view of what is required for a philosopher has\nrecently received corroboration through the theory of immediate or\nintuitive knowledge.\n\n6.] So much for the form of philosophical knowledge. It is no less\ndesirable, on the other hand, that philosophy should understand that\nits content is no other than _actuality,_ that core of truth which,\noriginally produced and producing itself within the precincts of the\nmental life, has become the _world,_ the inward and outward world, of\nconsciousness. At first we become aware of these contents in what we\ncall Experience. But even Experience, as it surveys the wide range\nof inward and outward existence, has sense enough to distinguish\nthe mere appearance, which is transient and meaningless, from what\nin itself really deserves the name of actuality. As it is only in\nform that philosophy is distinguished from other modes of attaining\nan acquaintance with this same sum of being, it must necessarily be\nin harmony with actuality and experience. In fact, this harmony may\nbe viewed as at least an extrinsic means of testing the truth of a\nphilosophy. Similarly it may be held the highest and final aim of\nphilosophic science to bring about, through the ascertainment of this\nharmony, a reconciliation of the self-conscious reason with the reason\nwhich _is_ in the world,--in other words, with actuality.\n\nIn the preface to my Philosophy of Law, p. xix, are found the\npropositions:\n\n         What is reasonable is actual;\n    and, What is actual is reasonable.\n\nThese simple statements have given rise to expressions of surprise and\nhostility, even in quarters where it would be reckoned an insult to\npresume absence of philosophy, and still more of religion. Religion\nat least need not be brought in evidence; its doctrines of the divine\ngovernment of the world affirm these propositions too decidedly. For\ntheir philosophic sense, we must pre-suppose intelligence enough to\nknow, not only that God is actual, that He is the supreme actuality,\nthat He alone is truly actual; but also, as regards the logical\nbearings of the question, that existence is in part mere appearance,\nand only in part actuality. In common life, any freak of fancy, any\nerror, evil and everything of the nature of evil, as well as every\ndegenerate and transitory existence whatever, gets in a casual way\nthe name of actuality. But even our ordinary feelings are enough to\nforbid a casual (fortuitous) existence getting the emphatic name of an\nactual; for by fortuitous we mean an existence which has no greater\nvalue than that of something possible, which may as well not be as\nbe. As for the term Actuality, these critics would have done well to\nconsider the sense in which I employ it. In a detailed Logic I had\ntreated amongst other things of actuality, and accurately distinguished\nit not only from the fortuitous, which, after all, has existence,\nbut even from the cognate categories of existence and the other\nmodifications of being.\n\nThe actuality of the rational stands opposed by the popular fancy\nthat Ideas and ideals are nothing but chimeras, and philosophy a mere\nsystem of such phantasms. It is also opposed by the very different\nfancy that Ideas and ideals are something far too excellent to have\nactuality, or something too impotent to procure it for themselves. This\ndivorce between idea and reality is especially dear to the analytic\nunderstanding which looks upon its own abstractions, dreams though they\nare, as something true and real, and prides itself on the imperative\n'ought,' which it takes especial pleasure in prescribing even on the\nfield of politics. As if the world had waited on it to learn how it\nought to be, and was not! For, if it were as it ought to be, what would\ncome of the precocious wisdom of that 'ought'? When understanding\nturns this 'ought' against trivial external and transitory objects,\nagainst social regulations or conditions, which very likely possess a\ngreat relative importance for a certain time and special circles, it\nmay often be right. In such a case the intelligent observer may meet\nmuch that fails to satisfy the general requirements of right; for\nwho is not acute enough to see a great deal in his own surroundings\nwhich is really far from being as it ought to be? But such acuteness\nis mistaken in the conceit that, when it examines these objects and\npronounces what they ought to be, it is dealing with questions of\nphilosophic science. The object of philosophy is the Idea: and the Idea\nis not so impotent as merely to have a right or an obligation to exist\nwithout actually existing. The object of philosophy is an actuality of\nwhich those objects, social regulations and conditions, are only the\nsuperficial outside.\n\n7.] Thus reflection--thinking things over--in a general way involves\nthe principle (which also means the beginning) of philosophy. And when\nthe reflective spirit arose again in its independence in modern times,\nafter the epoch of the Lutheran Reformation, it did not, as in its\nbeginnings among the Greeks, stand merely aloof, in a world of its own,\nbut at once turned its energies also upon the apparently illimitable\nmaterial of the phenomenal world. In this way the name philosophy came\nto be applied to all those branches of knowledge, which are engaged\nin ascertaining the standard and Universal in the ocean of empirical\nindividualities, as well as in ascertaining the Necessary element, or\nLaws, to be found in the apparent disorder of the endless masses of\nthe fortuitous. It thus appears that modern philosophy derives its\nmaterials from our own personal observations and perceptions of the\nexternal and internal world, from nature as well as from the mind and\nheart of man, when both stand in the immediate presence of the observer.\n\nThis principle of Experience carries with it the unspeakably important\ncondition that, in order to accept and believe any fact, we must be\nin contact with it; or, in more exact terms, that we must find the\nfact united and combined with the certainty of our own selves. We must\nbe in touch with our subject-matter, whether it be by means of our\nexternal senses, or, else, by our profounder mind and our intimate\nself-consciousness.--This principle is the same as that which has in\nthe present day been termed faith, immediate knowledge, the revelation\nin the outward world, and, above all, in our own heart.\n\nThose sciences, which thus got the name of philosophy, we call\n_empirical_ sciences, for the reason that they take their departure\nfrom experience. Still the essential results which they aim at and\nprovide, are laws, general propositions, a theory--the thoughts of what\nis found existing. On this ground the Newtonian physics was called\nNatural Philosophy. Hugo Grotius, again, by putting together and\ncomparing the behaviour of states towards each other as recorded in\nhistory, succeeded, with the help of the ordinary methods of general\nreasoning, in laying down certain general principles, and establishing\na theory which may be termed the Philosophy of International Law. In\nEngland this is still the usual signification of the term philosophy.\nNewton continues to be celebrated as the greatest of philosophers: and\nthe name goes down as far as the price-lists of instrument-makers.\nAll instruments, such as the thermometer and barometer, which do not\ncome under the special head of magnetic or electric apparatus, are\nstyled philosophical instruments[1]. Surely thought, and not a mere\ncombination of wood, iron, &c. ought to be called the instrument of\nphilosophy! The recent science of Political Economy in particular,\nwhich in Germany is known as Rational Economy of the State, or\nintelligent national economy, has in England especially appropriated\nthe name of philosophy.[2]\n\n8.] In its own field this empirical knowledge may at first give\nsatisfaction; but in two ways it is seen to come short. In the first\nplace there is another circle of objects which it does not embrace.\nThese are Freedom, Spirit, and God. They belong to a different\nsphere, not because it can be said that they have nothing to do with\nexperience; for though they are certainly not experiences of the\nsenses, it is quite an identical proposition to say that whatever is\nin consciousness is experienced. The real ground for assigning them to\nanother field of cognition is that in their scope and _content_ these\nobjects evidently show themselves as infinite.\n\nThere is an old phrase often wrongly attributed to Aristotle, and\nsupposed to express the general tenor of his philosophy. '_Nihil\nest in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu_': there is nothing in\nthought which has not been in sense and experience. If speculative\nphilosophy refused to admit this maxim, it can only have done so from\na misunderstanding. It will, however, on the converse side no less\nassert: '_Nihil est in sensu quod non fuerit in intellectu._' And this\nmay be taken in two senses. In the general sense it means that \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 or\nspirit (the more profound idea of \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 in modern thought) is the cause\nof the world. In its special meaning (see \u00a7 2) it asserts that the\nsentiment of right, morals, and religion is a sentiment (and in that\nway an experience) of such scope and such character that it can spring\nfrom and rest upon thought alone.\n\n9.] But in the second place in point of _form_ the subjective reason\ndesires a further satisfaction than empirical knowledge gives; and\nthis form, is, in the widest sense of the term, Necessity (\u00a7 1). The\nmethod of empirical science exhibits two defects. The first is that the\nUniversal or general principle contained in it, the genus, or kind, &c,\nis, on its own account, indeterminate and vague, and therefore not on\nits own account connected with the Particulars or the details. Either\nis external and accidental to the other; and it is the same with the\nparticular facts which are brought into union: each is external and\naccidental to the others. The second defect is that the beginnings are\nin every case data and postulates, neither accounted for nor deduced.\nIn both these points the form of necessity fails to get its due. Hence\nreflection, whenever it sets itself to remedy these defects, becomes\nspeculative thinking, the thinking proper to philosophy. As a species\nof reflection, therefore, which, though it has a certain community\nof nature with the reflection already mentioned, is nevertheless\ndifferent from it, philosophic thought thus possesses, in addition to\nthe common forms, some forms of its own, of which the Notion may be\ntaken as the type.\n\nThe relation of speculative science to the other sciences may be\nstated in the following terms. It does not in the least neglect the\nempirical facts contained in the several sciences, but recognises and\nadopts them: it appreciates and applies towards its own structure the\nuniversal element in these sciences, their laws and classifications:\nbut besides all this, into the categories of science it introduces, and\ngives currency to, other categories. The difference, looked at in this\nway, is only a change of categories. Speculative Logic contains all\nprevious Logic and Metaphysics: it preserves the same forms of thought,\nthe same laws and objects,--while at the same time remodelling and\nexpanding them with wider categories.\n\nFrom _notion_ in the speculative sense we should distinguish what\nis ordinarily called a notion. The phrase, that no notion can ever\ncomprehend the Infinite, a phrase which has been repeated over and over\nagain till it has grown axiomatic, is based upon this narrow estimate\nof what is meant by notions.\n\n10.] This thought, which is proposed as the instrument of philosophic\nknowledge, itself calls for further explanation. We must understand in\nwhat way it possesses necessity or cogency: and when it claims to be\nequal to the task of apprehending the absolute objects (God, Spirit,\nFreedom), that claim must be substantiated. Such an explanation,\nhowever, is itself a lesson in philosophy, and properly falls within\nthe scope of the science itself. A preliminary attempt to make matters\nplain would only be unphilosophical, and consist of a tissue of\nassumptions, assertions, and inferential pros and cons, _e.g._ of\ndogmatism without cogency, as against which there would be an equal\nright of counter-dogmatism.\n\nA main line of argument in the Critical Philosophy bids us pause before\nproceeding to inquire into God or into the true being of things, and\ntells us first of all to examine the faculty of cognition and see\nwhether it is equal to such an effort. We ought, says Kant, to become\nacquainted with the instrument, before we undertake the work for which\nit is to be employed; for if the instrument be insufficient, all our\ntrouble will be spent in vain. The plausibility of this suggestion has\nwon for it general assent and admiration; the result of which has been\nto withdraw cognition from an interest in its objects and absorption in\nthe study of them, and to direct it back upon itself; and so turn it to\na question of form. Unless we wish to be deceived bywords, it is easy\nto see what this amounts to. In the case of other instruments, we can\ntry and criticise them in other ways than by setting about the special\nwork for which they are destined. But the examination of knowledge can\nonly be carried out by an act of knowledge. To examine this so-called\ninstrument is the same thing as to know it. But to seek to know before\nwe know is as absurd as the wise resolution of Scholasticus, not to\nventure into the water until he had learned to swim.\n\nReinhold saw the confusion with which this style of commencement is\nchargeable, and tried to get out of the difficulty by starting with a\nhypothetical and problematical stage of philosophising. In this way he\nsupposed that it would be possible, nobody can tell how, to get along,\nuntil we found ourselves, further on, arrived at the primary truth\nof truths. His method, when closely looked into, will be seen to be\nidentical with a very common practice. It starts from a substratum\nof experiential fact, or from a provisional assumption which has\nbeen brought into a definition; and then proceeds to analyse this\nstarting-point. We can detect in Reinhold's argument a perception of\nthe truth, that the usual course which proceeds by assumptions and\nanticipations is no better than a hypothetical and problematical mode\nof procedure. But his perceiving this does not alter the character of\nthis method; it only makes clear its imperfections.\n\n11.] The special conditions which call for the existence of philosophy\nmaybe thus described. The mind or spirit, when it is sentient or\nperceptive, finds its object in something sensuous; when it imagines,\nin a picture or image; when it wills, in an aim or end. But in contrast\nto, or it may be only in distinction from, these forms of its existence\nand of its objects, the mind has also to gratify the cravings of\nits highest and most inward life. That innermost self is thought.\nThus the mind renders thought its object. In the best meaning of the\nphrase, it comes to itself; for thought is its principle, and its\nvery unadulterated self. But while thus occupied, thought entangles\nitself in contradictions, _e.g._ loses itself in the hard-and-fast\nnon-identity of its thoughts, and so, instead of reaching itself,\nis caught and held in its counterpart. This result, to which honest\nbut narrow thinking leads the mere understanding, is resisted by the\nloftier craving of which we have spoken. That craving expresses the\nperseverance of thought, which continues true to itself, even in this\nconscious loss of its native rest and independence, 'that it may\novercome' and work out in itself the solution of its own contradictions.\n\nTo see that thought in its very nature is dialectical, and that, as\nunderstanding, it must fall into contradiction,--the negative of\nitself, will form one of the main lessons of logic. When thought\ngrows hopeless of ever achieving, by its own means, the solution of\nthe contradiction which it has by its own action brought upon itself,\nit turns back to those solutions of the question with which the mind\nhad learned to pacify itself in some of its other modes and forms.\nUnfortunately, however, the retreat of thought has led it, as Plato\nnoticed even in his time, to a very uncalled-for hatred of reason\n(misology); and it then takes up against its own endeavours that\nhostile attitude of which an example is seen in the doctrine that\n'immediate' knowledge, as it is called, is the exclusive form in which\nwe become cognisant of truth.\n\n12.] The rise of philosophy is due to these cravings of thought. Its\npoint of departure is Experience; including under that name both our\nimmediate consciousness and the inductions from it. Awakened, as it\nwere, by this stimulus, thought is vitally characterised by raising\nitself above the natural state of mind, above the senses and inferences\nfrom the senses into its own unadulterated element, and by assuming,\naccordingly, at first a stand-aloof and negative attitude towards\nthe point from which it started. Through this state of antagonism to\nthe phenomena of sense its first satisfaction is found in itself, in\nthe Idea of the universal essence of these phenomena: an Idea (the\nAbsolute, or God) which may be more or less abstract. Meanwhile, on\nthe other hand, the sciences, based on experience, exert upon the\nmind a stimulus to overcome the form in which their varied contents\nare presented, and to elevate these contents to the rank of necessary\ntruth. For the facts of science have the aspect of a vast conglomerate,\none thing coming side by side with another, as if they were merely\ngiven and presented,--as in short devoid of all essential or necessary\nconnexion. In consequence of this stimulus thought is dragged out\nof its unrealised universality and its fancied or merely possible\nsatisfaction, and impelled onwards to a development from itself. On\none hand this development only means that thought incorporates the\ncontents of science, in all their speciality of detail as submitted. On\nthe other it makes these contents imitate the action of the original\ncreative thought, and present the aspect of a free evolution determined\nby the logic of the fact alone.\n\nOn the relation between 'immediacy' and 'mediation' in consciousness\nwe shall speak later, expressly and with more detail. Here it may be\nsufficient to premise that, though the two 'moments' or factors present\nthemselves as distinct, still neither of them can be absent, nor can\none exist apart from the other. Thus the knowledge of God, as of every\nsupersensible reality, is in its true character an exaltation above\nsensations or perceptions: it consequently involves a negative attitude\nto the initial data of sense, and to that extent implies mediation.\nFor to mediate is to take something as a beginning and to go onward to\na second thing; so that the existence of this second thing depends on\nour having reached it from something else contradistinguished from it.\nIn spite of this, the knowledge of God is no mere sequel, dependent\non the empirical phase of consciousness: in fact, its independence is\nessentially secured through this negation and exaltation.--No doubt, if\nwe attach an unfair prominence to the fact of mediation, and represent\nit as implying a state of conditionedness, it may be said--not that the\nremark would mean much--that philosophy is the child of experience, and\nowes its rise to _a posteriori_ fact. (As a matter of fact, thinking\nis always the negation of what we have immediately before us.) With\nas much truth however we may be said to owe eating to the means of\nnourishment, so long as we can have no eating without them. If we take\nthis view, eating is certainly represented as ungrateful: it devours\nthat to which it owes itself. Thinking, upon this view of its action,\nis equally ungrateful.\n\nBut there is also an _a priori_ aspect of thought, where by a\nmediation, not made by anything external but by a reflection into self,\nwe have that immediacy which is universality, the self-complacency\nof thought which is so much at home with itself that it feels an\ninnate indifference to descend to particulars, and in that way to the\ndevelopment of its own nature. It is thus also with religion, which,\nwhether it be rude or elaborate, whether it be invested with scientific\nprecision of detail or confined to the simple faith of the heart,\npossesses, throughout, the same intensive nature of contentment and\nfelicity. But if thought never gets further than the universality of\nthe Ideas, as was perforce the case in the first philosophies (when\nthe Eleatics never got beyond Being, or Heraclitus beyond Becoming),\nit is justly open to the charge of formalism. Even in a more advanced\nphase of philosophy, we may often find a doctrine which has mastered\nmerely certain abstract propositions or formulae, such as, 'In the\nabsolute all is one,' 'Subject and object are identical,'--and only\nrepeating the same thing when it comes to particulars. Bearing in\nmind this first period of thought, the period of mere generality, we\nmay safely say that experience is the real author of _growth_ and\n_advance_ in philosophy. For, firstly, the empirical sciences do not\nstop short at the mere observation of the individual features of a\nphenomenon. By the aid of thought, they are able to meet philosophy\nwith materials prepared for it, in the shape of general uniformities,\n_i.e._ laws, and classifications of the phenomena. When this is done,\nthe particular facts which they contain are ready to be received into\nphilosophy. This, secondly, implies a certain compulsion on thought\nitself to proceed to these concrete specific truths. The reception into\nphilosophy of these scientific materials, now that thought has removed\ntheir immediacy and made them cease to be mere data, forms at the same\ntime a development of thought out of itself. Philosophy, then, owes\nits development to the empirical sciences. In return it gives their\ncontents what is so vital to them, the freedom of thought,--gives them,\nin short, an _a priori_ character. These contents are now warranted\nnecessary, and no longer depend on the evidence of facts merely, that\nthey were so found and so experienced. The fact as experienced thus\nbecomes an illustration and a copy of the original and completely\nself-supporting activity of thought.\n\n13.] Stated in exact terms, such is the origin and development of\nphilosophy. But the History of Philosophy gives us the same process\nfrom an historical and external point of view. The stages in the\nevolution of the Idea there seem to follow each other by accident, and\nto present merely a number of different and unconnected principles,\nwhich the several systems of philosophy carry out in their own way.\nBut it is not so. For these thousands of years the same Architect has\ndirected the work: and that Architect is the one living Mind whose\nnature is to think, to bring to self-consciousness what it is, and,\nwith its being thus set as object before it, to be at the same time\nraised above it, and so to reach a higher stage of its own being.\nThe different systems which the history of philosophy presents are\ntherefore not irreconcilable with unity. We may either say, that it\nis one philosophy at different degrees of maturity: or that the\nparticular principle, which is the groundwork of each system, is\nbut a branch of one and the same universe of thought. In philosophy\nthe latest birth of time is the result of all the systems that have\npreceded it, and must include their principles; and so, if, on other\ngrounds, it deserve the title of philosophy, will be the fullest, most\ncomprehensive, and most adequate system of all.\n\nThe spectacle of so many and so various systems of philosophy suggests\nthe necessity of defining more exactly the relation of Universal to\nParticular. When the universal is made a mere form and co-ordinated\nwith the particular, as if it were on the same level, it sinks into a\nparticular itself. Even common sense in every-day matters is above the\nabsurdity of setting a universal _beside_ the particulars. Would any\none, who wished for fruit, reject cherries, pears, and grapes, on the\nground that they were cherries, pears, or grapes, and not fruit? But\nwhen philosophy is in question, the excuse of many is that philosophies\nare so different, and none of them is _the_ philosophy,--that each is\nonly _a_ philosophy. Such a plea is assumed to justify any amount of\ncontempt for philosophy. And yet cherries too are fruit. Often, too, a\nsystem, of which the principle is the universal, is put on a level with\nanother of which the principle is a particular, and with theories which\ndeny the existence of philosophy altogether. Such systems are said to\nbe only different views of philosophy. With equal justice, light and\ndarkness might be styled different kinds of light.\n\n14.] The same evolution of thought which is exhibited in the history\nof philosophy is presented in the System of Philosophy itself. Here,\ninstead of surveying the process, as we do in history, from the\noutside, we see the movement of thought clearly defined in its native\nmedium. The thought, which is genuine and self-supporting, must be\nintrinsically concrete; it must be an Idea; and when it is viewed in\nthe whole of its universality, it is the Idea, or the Absolute. The\nscience of this Idea must form a system. For the truth is concrete;\nthat is, whilst it gives a bond and principle of unity, it also\npossesses an internal source of development. Truth, then, is only\npossible as a universe or totality of thought; and the freedom of the\nwhole, as well as the necessity of the several sub-divisions, which it\nimplies, are only possible when these are discriminated and defined.\n\nUnless it is a system, a philosophy is not a scientific production.\nUnsystematic philosophising can only be expected to give expression to\npersonal peculiarities of mind, and has no principle for the regulation\nof its contents. Apart from their interdependence and organic union,\nthe truths of philosophy are valueless, and must then be treated as\nbaseless hypotheses, or personal convictions. Yet many philosophical\ntreatises confine themselves to such an exposition of the opinions and\nsentiments of the author.\n\nThe term _system_ is often misunderstood. It does not denote a\nphilosophy, the principle of which is narrow and to be distinguished\nfrom others. On the contrary, a genuine philosophy makes it a principle\nto include every particular principle.\n\n15.] Each of the parts of philosophy is a philosophical whole, a circle\nrounded and complete in itself. In each of these parts, however, the\nphilosophical Idea is found in a particular specificality or medium.\nThe single circle, because it is a real totality, bursts through the\nlimits imposed by its special medium, and gives rise to a wider circle.\nThe whole of philosophy in this way resembles a circle of circles. The\nIdea appears in each single circle, but, at the same time, the whole\nIdea is constituted by the system of these peculiar phases, and each is\na necessary member of the organisation.\n\n16.] In the form of an Encyclopaedia, the science has no room for a\ndetailed exposition of particulars, and must be limited to setting\nforth the commencement of the special sciences and the notions of\ncardinal importance in them.\n\nHow much of the particular parts is requisite to constitute a\nparticular branch of knowledge is so far indeterminate, that the part,\nif it is to be something true, must be not an isolated member merely,\nbut itself an organic whole. The entire field of philosophy therefore\nreally forms a single science; but it may also be viewed as a total,\ncomposed of several particular sciences.\n\nThe encyclopaedia of philosophy must not be confounded with ordinary\nencyclopaedias. An ordinary encyclopaedia does not pretend to be more\nthan an aggregation of sciences, regulated by no principle, and merely\nas experience offers them. Sometimes it even includes what merely bear\nthe name of sciences, while they are nothing more than a collection of\nbits of information. In an aggregate like this, the several branches of\nknowledge owe their place in the encyclopaedia to extrinsic reasons,\nand their unity is therefore artificial: they are _arranged,_ but we\ncannot say they form a _system._ For the same reason, especially as the\nmaterials to be combined also depend upon no one rule or principle,\nthe arrangement is at best an experiment, and will always exhibit\ninequalities.\n\nAn encyclopaedia of philosophy excludes three kinds of partial science.\nI. It excludes mere aggregates of bits of information. Philology in\nits _prima facie_ aspect belongs to this class. II. It rejects the\nquasi-sciences, which are founded on an act of arbitrary will alone,\nsuch as Heraldry. Sciences of this class are positive from beginning to\nend. III. In another class of sciences, also styled positive, but which\nhave a rational basis and a rational beginning, philosophy claims that\nconstituent as its own. The positive features remain the property of\nthe sciences themselves.\n\nThe positive element in the last class of sciences is of different\nsorts. (I) Their commencement, though rational at bottom, yields to the\ninfluence of fortuitousness, when they have to bring their universal\ntruth into contact with actual facts and the single phenomena of\nexperience. In this region of chance and change, the adequate notion\nof science must yield its place to reasons or grounds of explanation.\nThus, _e.g._ in the science of jurisprudence, or in the system of\ndirect and indirect taxation, it is necessary to have certain points\nprecisely and definitively settled which lie beyond the competence of\nthe absolute lines laid down by the pure notion. A certain latitude\nof settlement accordingly is left: and each point may be determined\nin one way on one principle, in another way on another, and admits of\nno definitive certainty. Similarly the Idea of Nature, when parcelled\nout in detail, is dissipated into contingencies. Natural history,\ngeography, and medicine stumble upon descriptions of existence, upon\nkinds and distinctions, which are not determined by reason, but by\nsport and adventitious incidents. Even history comes under the same\ncategory. The Idea is its essence and inner nature; but, as it appears,\neverything is under contingency and in the field of voluntary action.\n(II) These sciences are positive also in failing to recognise the\nfinite nature of what they predicate, and to point out how these\ncategories and their whole sphere pass into a higher. They assume their\nstatements to possess an authority beyond appeal. Here the fault lies\nin the finitude of the form, as in the previous instance it lay in\nthe matter. (III) In close sequel to this, sciences are positive in\nconsequence of the inadequate grounds on which their conclusions rest:\nbased as these are on detached and casual inference, upon feeling,\nfaith, and authority, and, generally speaking, upon the deliverances\nof inward and outward perception. Under this head we must also class\nthe philosophy which proposes to build upon anthropology,' facts of\nconsciousness, inward sense, or outward experience. It may happen,\nhowever, that empirical is an epithet applicable only to the form of\nscientific exposition; whilst intuitive sagacity has arranged what are\nmere phenomena, according to the essential sequence of the notion. In\nsuch a case the contrasts between the varied and numerous phenomena\nbrought together serve to eliminate the external and accidental\ncircumstances of their conditions, and the universal thus comes clearly\ninto view. Guided by such an intuition, experimental physics will\npresent the rational science of Nature,--as history will present the\nscience of human affairs and actions--in an external picture, which\nmirrors the philosophic notion.\n\n17.] It may seem as if philosophy, in order to start on its course,\nhad, like the rest of the sciences, to begin with a subjective\npresupposition. The sciences postulate their respective objects, such\nas space, number, or whatever it be; and it might be supposed that\nphilosophy had also to postulate the existence of thought. But the\ntwo cases are not exactly parallel. It is by the free act of thought\nthat it occupies a point of view, in which it is for its own self, and\nthus gives itself an object of its own production. Nor is this all.\nThe very point of view, which originally is taken on its own evidence\nonly, must in the course of the science be converted to a result,--the\nultimate result in which philosophy returns into itself and reaches\nthe point with which it began. In this manner philosophy exhibits the\nappearance of a circle which closes with itself, and has no beginning\nin the same way as the other sciences have. To speak of a beginning of\nphilosophy has a meaning only in relation to a person who proposes to\ncommence the study, and not in relation to the science as science. The\nsame thing may be thus expressed. The notion of science--the notion\ntherefore with which we start--which, for the very reason that it is\ninitial, implies a separation between the thought which is our object,\nand the subject philosophising which is, as it were, external to the\nformer, must be grasped and comprehended by the science itself. This\nis in short the one single aim, action, and goal of philosophy--to\narrive at the notion of its notion, and thus secure its return and its\nsatisfaction.\n\n18.] As the whole science, and only the whole, can exhibit what the\nIdea or system of reason is, it is impossible to give in a preliminary\nway a general impression of a philosophy. Nor can a division of\nphilosophy into its parts be intelligible, except in connexion with the\nsystem. A preliminary division, like the limited conception from which\nit comes, can only be an anticipation. Here however it is premised that\nthe Idea turns out to be the thought which is completely identical\nwith itself, and not identical simply in the abstract, but also in its\naction of setting itself over against itself, so as to gain a being of\nits own, and yet of being in full possession of itself while it is in\nthis other. Thus philosophy is subdivided into three parts:\n\nI. Logic, the science of the Idea in and for itself.\n\nII. The Philosophy of Nature: the science of the Idea in its otherness.\n\nIII. The Philosophy of Mind: the science of the Idea come back to\nitself out of that otherness.\n\nAs observed in \u00a7 15, the differences between the several philosophical\nsciences are only aspects or specialisations of the one Idea or system\nof reason, which and which alone is alike exhibited in these different\nmedia. In Nature nothing else would have to be discerned, except the\nIdea: but the Idea has here divested itself of its proper being. In\nMind, again, the Idea has asserted a being of its own, and is on the\nway to become absolute. Every such form in which the Idea is expressed,\nis at the same time a passing or fleeting stage: and hence each of\nthese subdivisions has not only to know its contents as an object which\nhas being for the time, but also in the same act to expound how these\ncontents pass into their higher circle. To represent the relation\nbetween them as a division, therefore, leads to misconception; for it\nco-ordinates the several parts or sciences one beside another, as if\nthey had no innate development, but were, like so many species, really\nand radically distinct.\n\n\n[1] The journal, too, edited by Thomson is called 'Annals of\nPhilosophy; or, Magazine of Chemistry, Mineralogy, Mechanics, Natural\nHistory, Agriculture, and Arts.' We can easily guess from the title\nwhat sort of subjects are here to be understood under the term\n'philosophy.' Among the advertisements of books just published, I\nlately found the following notice in an English newspaper: 'The Art of\nPreserving the Hair, on Philosophical Principles, neatly printed in\npost 8vo, price seven shillings.' By philosophical principles for the\npreservation of the hair are probably meant chemical or physiological\nprinciples.\n\n\n[2] In connexion with the general principles of Political Economy,\nthe term 'philosophical' is frequently heard from the lips of English\nstatesmen, even in their public speeches. In the House of Commons, on\nthe 2nd Feb. 1825, Brougham, speaking oh the address in reply to the\nspeech from the throne, talked of 'the statesman-like and philosophical\nprinciples of Free-trade,--for philosophical they undoubtedly are--upon\nthe acceptance of which his majesty this day congratulated the House.'\nNor is this language confined to members of the Opposition. At the\nshipowners' yearly dinner in the same month, under the chairmanship\nof the Premier Lord Liverpool, supported by Canning the Secretary of\nState, and Sir C. Long the Paymaster-General of the Army, Canning\nin reply to the toast which had been proposed said: 'A period has\njust begun, in which ministers have it in their power to apply to\nthe administration of this country the sound maxims of a profound\nphilosophy.' Differences there may be between English and German\nphilosophy: still, considering that elsewhere the name of philosophy\nis used only as a nickname and insult, or as something odious, it is\na matter of rejoicing to see it still honoured in the mouth of the\nEnglish Government.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\n\nPRELIMINARY NOTION.\n\n\n19.] LOGIC IS THE SCIENCE OF THE PURE IDEA; pure, that is, because the\nIdea is in the abstract medium of Thought.\n\nThis definition, and the others which occur in these introductory\noutlines, are derived from a survey of the whole system, to which\naccordingly they are subsequent. The same remark applies to all\nprefatory notions whatever about philosophy.\n\nLogic might have been defined as the science of thought, and of its\nlaws and characteristic forms. But thought, as thought, constitutes\nonly the general medium, or qualifying circumstance, which renders\nthe Idea distinctively logical. If we identify the Idea with thought,\nthought must not be taken in the sense of a method or form, but in the\nsense of the self-developing totality of its laws and peculiar terms.\nThese laws are the work of thought itself, and not a fact which it\nfinds and must submit to.\n\nFrom different points of view, Logic is either the hardest or the\neasiest of the sciences, Logic is hard, because it has to deal not with\nperceptions, nor, like geometry, with abstract representations of the\nsenses, but with pure abstractions; and because it demands a force and\nfacility of withdrawing into pure thought, of keeping firm hold on it,\nand of moving in such an element. Logic is easy, because its facts are\nnothing but our own thought and its familiar forms or terms: and these\nare the acme of simplicity, the abc of everything else. They are also\nwhat we are best acquainted with: such as, 'Is' and 'Is not': quality\nand magnitude: being potential and being actual: one, many, and so on.\nBut such an acquaintance only adds to the difficulties of the study;\nfor while, on the one hand, we naturally think it is not worth our\ntrouble to occupy ourselves any longer with things so familiar, on the\nother hand, the problem is to become acquainted with them in a new way,\nquite opposite to that in which we know them already.\n\nThe utility of Logic is a matter which concerns its bearings upon the\nstudent, and the training it may give for other purposes. This logical\ntraining consists in the exercise in thinking which the student has\nto go through (this science is the thinking of thinking): and in the\nfact that he stores his head with thoughts, in their native unalloyed\ncharacter. It is true that Logic, being the absolute form of truth, and\nanother name for the very truth itself, is something more than merely\nuseful. Yet if what is noblest, most liberal and most independent is\nalso most useful, Logic has some claim to the latter character. Its\nutility must then be estimated at another rate than exercise in thought\nfor the sake of the exercise.\n\n(1) The first question is: What is the object of our science? The\nsimplest and most intelligible answer to this question is that Truth\nis the object of Logic. Truth is a noble word, and the thing is nobler\nstill. So long as man is sound at heart and in spirit, the search for\ntruth must awake all the enthusiasm of his nature. But immediately\nthere steps in the objection--Are _we_ able to know truth? There\nseems to be a disproportion between finite beings like ourselves and\nthe truth which is absolute: and doubts suggest themselves whether\nthere is any bridge between the finite and the infinite. God is\ntruth: how shall we know Him? Such an undertaking appears to stand in\ncontradiction with the graces of lowliness and humility.--Others who\nask whether we can know the truth have a different purpose. They want\nto justify themselves in living on contented with their petty, finite\naims. And humility of this stamp is a poor thing.\n\nBut the time is past when people asked: How shall I, a poor worm of the\ndust, be able to know the truth? And in its stead we find vanity and\nconceit: people claim, without any trouble on their part, to breathe\nthe very atmosphere of truth. The young have been flattered into the\nbelief that they possess a natural birthright of moral and religious\ntruth. And in the same strain, those of riper years are declared to\nbe sunk, petrified, ossified in falsehood. Youth, say these teachers,\nsees the bright light of dawn: but the older generation lies in the\nslough and mire of the common day. They admit that the special sciences\nare something that certainly ought to be cultivated, but merely as\nthe means to satisfy the needs of outer life. In all this it is not\nhumility which holds back from the knowledge and study of the truth,\nbut a conviction that we are already in full possession of it. And no\ndoubt the young carry with them the hopes of their elder compeers; on\nthem rests the advance of the world and science. But these hopes are\nset upon the young, only on the condition that, instead of remaining as\nthey are, they undertake the stern labour of mind.\n\nThis modesty in truth-seeking has still another phase: and that is the\ngenteel indifference to truth, as we see it in Pilate's conversation\nwith Christ. Pilate asked 'What is truth?' with the air of a man who\nhad settled accounts with everything long ago, and concluded that\nnothing particularly matters:--he meant much the same as Solomon when\nhe says: 'All is vanity.' When it comes to this, nothing is left but\nself-conceit.\n\nThe knowledge of the truth meets an additional obstacle in timidity.\nA slothful mind finds it natural to say: 'Don't let it be supposed\nthat we mean to be in earnest with our philosophy. We shall be glad\n_inter alia_ to study Logic: but Logic must be sure to leave us as\nwe were before.' People have a feeling that, if thinking passes the\nordinary range of our ideas and impressions, it cannot but be on the\nevil road. They seem to be trusting themselves to a sea on which they\nwill be tossed to and fro by the waves of thought, till at length they\nagain reach the sandbank of this temporal scene, as utterly poor as\nwhen they left it. What coines of such a view, we see in the world. It\nis possible within these limits to gain varied information and many\naccomplishments, to become a master of official routine, and to be\ntrained for special purposes. But it is quite another thing to educate\nthe spirit for the higher life and to devote our energies to its\nservice. In our own day it may be hoped a longing for something better\nhas sprung up among the young, so that they will not be contented with\nthe mere straw of outer knowledge.\n\n(2) It is universally agreed that thought is the object of Logic. But\nof thought our estimate may be very mean, or it may be very high. On\none hand, people say: 'It is _only_ a thought.' In their view thought\nis subjective, arbitrary and accidental--distinguished from the thing\nitself, from the true and the real. On the other hand, a very high\nestimate may be formed of thought; when thought alone is held adequate\nto attain the highest of all things, the nature of God, of which the\nsenses can tell us nothing. God is a spirit, it is said, and must be\nworshipped in spirit and in truth. But the merely felt and sensible,\nwe admit, is not the spiritual; its heart of hearts is in thought;\nand only spirit can know spirit. And though it is true that spirit\ncan demean itself as feeling and sense--as is the case in religion,\nthe mere feeling, as a mode of consciousness, is one thing, and its\ncontents another. Feeling, as feeling, is the general form of the\nsensuous nature which we have in common with the brutes. This form,\nviz. feeling, may possibly seize and appropriate the full organic\ntruth: but the form has no real congruity with its contents. The form\nof feeling is the lowest in which spiritual truth can be expressed.\nThe world of spiritual existences, God himself, exists in proper\ntruth, only in thought and as thought. If this be so, there fore,\nthought, far from being a mere thought, is the highest and, in strict\naccuracy, the sole mode of apprehending the eternal and absolute.\n\nAs of thought, so also of the science of thought, a very high or a\nvery low opinion may be formed. Any man, it is supposed, can think\nwithout Logic, as he can digest without studying physiology. If he\nhave studied Logic, he thinks afterwards as he did before, perhaps\nmore methodically, but with little alteration. If this were all, and\nif Logic did no more than make men acquainted with the action of\nthought as the faculty of comparison and classification, it would\nproduce nothing which had not been done quite as well before. And in\npoint of fact Logic hitherto had no other idea of its duty than this.\nYet to be well-informed about thought, even as a mere activity of the\nsubject-mind, is honourable and interesting for man. It is in knowing\nwhat he is and what he does, that man is distinguished from the brutes.\nBut we may take the higher estimate of thought--as what alone can get\nreally in touch with the supreme and true. In that case, Logic as the\nscience of thought occupies a high ground. If the science of Logic\nthen considers thought in its action and its productions (and thought\nbeing no resultless energy produces thoughts and the particular thought\nrequired), the theme of Logic is in general the supersensible world,\nand to deal with that theme is to dwell for a while in that world.\nMathematics is concerned with the abstractions of time and space. But\nthese are still the object of sense, although the sensible is abstract\nand idealised. Thought bids adieu even to this last and abstract\nsensible: it asserts its own native independence, renounces the field\nof the external and internal sense, and puts away the interests and\ninclinations of the individual. When Logic takes this ground, it is a\nhigher science than we are in the habit of supposing.\n\n(3) The necessity of understanding Logic in a deeper sense than as\nthe science of the mere form of thought is enforced by the interests\nof religion and politics, of law and morality. In earlier days men\nmeant no harm by thinking: they thought away freely and fearlessly.\nThey thought about God, about Nature, and the State; and they felt\nsure that a knowledge of the truth was obtainable through thought\nonly, and not through the senses or any random ideas or opinions.\nBut while they so thought, the principal ordinances of life began\nto be seriously affected by their conclusions. Thought deprived\nexisting institutions of their force. Constitutions fell a victim to\nthought: religion was assailed by thought: firm religious beliefs\nwhich had been always looked upon as revelations were undermined, and\nin many minds the old faith was upset. The Greek philosophers, for\nexample, became antagonists of the old religion, and destroyed its\nbeliefs. Philosophers were accordingly banished or put to death, as\nrevolutionists who had subverted religion and the state, two things\nwhich were inseparable. Thought, in short, made itself a power in the\nreal world, and exercised enormous influence. The matter ended by\ndrawing attention to the influence of thought, and its claims were\nsubmitted to a more rigorous scrutiny, by which the world professed to\nfind that thought arrogated too much and was unable to perform what\nit had undertaken. It had not--people said--learned the real being of\nGod, of Nature and Mind. It had not learned what the truth was. What\nit had done, was to overthrow religion and the state. It became urgent\ntherefore to justify thought, with reference to the results it had\nproduced: and it is this examination into the nature of thought and\nthis justification which in recent times has constituted one of the\nmain problems of philosophy.\n\n20.] If we take our _prima facie_ impression of thought, we find on\nexamination first (a) that, in its usual subjective acceptation,\nthought is one out of many activities or faculties of the mind,\nco-ordinate with such others as sensation, perception, imagination,\ndesire, volition, and the like. The product of this activity, the form\nor character peculiar to thought, is the UNIVERSAL, or, in general,\nthe abstract. Thought, regarded as an _activity,_ may be accordingly\ndescribed as the _active_ universal, and, since the deed, its product,\nis the universal once more, may be called a self-actualising universal.\nThought conceived as a _subject_ (agent) is a thinker, and the subject\nexisting as a thinker is simply denoted by the term 'I.'\n\nThe propositions giving an account of thought in this and the following\nsections are not offered as assertions or opinions of mine on the\nmatter. But in these preliminary chapters any deduction or proof would\nbe impossible, and the statements may be taken as matters in evidence.\nIn other words, every man, when he thinks and considers his thoughts,\nwill discover by the experience of his consciousness that they possess\nthe character of universality as well as the other aspects of thought\nto be afterwards enumerated. We assume of course that his powers of\nattention and abstraction have undergone a previous training, enabling\nhim to observe correctly the evidence of his consciousness and his\nconceptions.\n\nThis introductory exposition has already alluded to the distinction\nbetween Sense, Conception, and Thought. As the distinction is of\ncapital importance for understanding the nature and kinds of knowledge,\nit will help to explain matters if we here call attention to it. For\nthe explanation of _Sense,_ the readiest method certainly is, to refer\nto its external source--the organs of sense. But to name the organ\ndoes not help much to explain what is apprehended by it. The real\ndistinction between sense and thought lies in this--that the essential\nfeature of the sensible is individuality, and as the individual (which,\nreduced to its simplest terms, is the atom) is also a member of a\ngroup, sensible existence presents a number of mutually exclusive\nunits,--of units, to speak in more definite and abstract formulae,\nwhich exist side by side with, and after, one another. _Conception_ or\npicture-thinking works with materials from the same sensuous source.\nBut these materials when _conceived_ are expressly characterised as in\nme and therefore mine: and secondly, as universal, or simple, because\nonly referred to self. Nor is sense the only source of materialised\nconception. There are conceptions constituted by materials emanating\nfrom self-conscious thought, such as those of law, morality, religion,\nand even of thought itself, and it requires some effort to detect\nwherein lies the difference between such conceptions and thoughts\nhaving the same import. For it is a thought of which such conception is\nthe vehicle, and there is no want of the form of universality, without\nwhich no content could be in me, or be a conception at all. Yet here\nalso the peculiarity of conception is, generally speaking, to be sought\nin the individualism or isolation of its contents. True it is that, for\nexample, law and legal provisions do not exist in a sensible space,\nmutually excluding one another. Nor as regards time, though they appear\nto some extent in succession, are their contents themselves conceived\nas affected by time, or as transient and changeable in it. The fault\nin conception lies deeper. These ideas, though implicitly possessing\nthe organic unity of mind, stand isolated here and there on the broad\nground of conception, with its inward and abstract generality. Thus\ncut adrift, each is simple, unrelated: Right, Duty, God. Conception in\nthese circumstances either rests satisfied with declaring that Right\nis Right, God is God: or in a higher grade of culture, it proceeds to\nenunciate the attributes; as, for instance, God is the Creator of the\nworld, omniscient, almighty, &c. In this way several isolated, simple\npredicates are strung together: but in spite of the link supplied\nby their subject, the predicates never get beyond mere contiguity.\nIn this point Conception coincides with Understanding: the only\ndistinction being that the latter introduces relations of universal\nand particular, of cause and effect, &c., and in this way supplies a\nnecessary connexion to the isolated ideas of conception; which last has\nleft them side by side in its vague mental spaces, connected only by a\nbare 'and.'\n\nThe difference between conception and thought is of special importance:\nbecause philosophy may be said to do nothing but transform conceptions\ninto thoughts,--though it works the further transformation of a mere\nthought into a notion.\n\nSensible existence has been characterised by the attributes of\nindividuality and mutual exclusion of the members. It is well to\nremember that these very attributes of sense are thoughts and general\nterms. It will be shown in the Logic that thought (and the universal)\nis not a mere opposite of sense: it lets nothing escape it, but,\noutflanking its other, is at once that other and itself. Now language\nis the work of thought: and hence all that is expressed in language\nmust be universal. What I only mean or suppose is mine: it belongs\nto me,--this particular individual. But language expresses nothing\nbut universality; and so I cannot say what I merely _mean._ And the\nunutterable,--feeling or sensation,--far from being the highest truth,\nis the most unimportant and untrue. If I say 'The individual,' 'This\nindividual,' 'here,' 'now,' all these are universal terms. Everything\nand anything is an individual, a 'this,' and if it be sensible, is\nhere and now. Similarly when I say, 'I,' I _mean_ my single self to\nthe exclusion of all others: but what I _say,_ viz. 'I,' is just\nevery 'I,' which in like manner excludes all others from itself. In\nan awkward expression which Kant used, he said that I _accompany_\nall my conceptions,--sensations, too, desires, actions, &c. 'I' is\nin essence and act the universal: and such partnership is a form,\nthough an external form, of universality. All other men have it in\ncommon with me to be 'I': just as it is common to all my sensations\nand conceptions to be mine. But 'I,' in the abstract, as such, is the\nmere act of self-concentration or self-relation, in which we make\nabstraction from all conception and feeling, from every state of mind\nand every peculiarity of nature, talent, and experience. To this\nextent, 'I' is the existence of a wholly _abstract_ universality, a\nprinciple of abstract freedom. Hence thought, viewed as a subject, is\nwhat is expressed by the word 'I': and since I am at the same time in\nall my sensations, conceptions, and states of consciousness, thought\nis everywhere present, and is a category that runs through all these\nmodifications.\n\nOur first impression when we use the term thought is of a subjective\nactivity--one amongst many similar faculties, such as memory,\nimagination and will. Were thought merely an activity of the\nsubject-mind and treated under that aspect by logic, logic would\nresemble the other sciences in possessing a well-marked object. It\nmight in that case seem arbitrary to devote a special science to\nthought, whilst will, imagination and the rest were denied the same\nprivilege. The selection of one faculty however might even in this view\nbe very well grounded on a certain authority acknowledged to belong to\nthought, and on its claim to be regarded as the true nature of man, in\nwhich consists his distinction from the brutes. Nor is it unimportant\nto study thought even as a subjective energy. A detailed analysis\nof its nature would exhibit rules and laws, a knowledge of which is\nderived from experience. A treatment of the laws of thought, from this\npoint of view, used once to form the body of logical science. Of that\nscience Aristotle was the founder. He succeeded in assigning to thought\nwhat properly belongs to it. Our thought is extremely concrete: but\nin its composite contents we must distinguish the part that properly\nbelongs to thought, or to the abstract mode of its action. A subtle\nspiritual bond, consisting in the agency of thought, is what gives\nunity to all these contents, and it was this bond, the form as form,\nthat Aristotle noted and described. Up to the present day, the logic\nof Aristotle continues to be the received system. It has indeed been\nspun out to greater length, especially by the labours of the medieval\nSchoolmen who, without making any material additions, merely refined\nin details. The moderns also have left their mark upon this logic,\npartly by omitting many points of logical doctrine due to Aristotle and\nthe Schoolmen, and partly by foisting in a quantity of psychological\nmatter. The purport of the science is to become acquainted with the\nprocedure of finite thought: and, if it is adapted to its pre-supposed\nobject, the science is entitled to be styled correct. The study of this\nformal logic undoubtedly has its uses. It sharpens the wits, as the\nphrase goes, and teaches us to collect our thoughts and to abstract\n--whereas in common consciousness we have to deal with sensuous\nconceptions which cross and perplex one another. Abstraction moreover\nimplies the concentration of the mind on a single point, and thus\ninduces the habit of attending to our inward selves. An acquaintance\nwith the forms of finite thought may be made a means of training the\nmind for the empirical sciences, since their method is regulated by\nthese forms: and in this sense logic has been designated Instrumental.\nIt is true, we may be still more liberal, and say: Logic is to be\nstudied not for its utility, but for its own sake; the super-excellent\nis not to be sought for the sake of mere utility. In one sense this is\nquite correct: but it may be replied that the super-excellent is also\nthe most useful: because it is the all-sustaining principle which,\nhaving a subsistence of its own, may therefore serve as the vehicle of\nspecial ends which it furthers and secures. And thus, special ends,\nthough they have no right to be set first, are still fostered by the\npresence of the highest good. Religion, for instance, has an absolute\nvalue of its own; yet at the same time other ends flourish and succeed\nin its train. As Christ says: 'Seek ye first the kingdom of God, and\nall these things shall be added unto you.' Particular ends can be\nattained only in the attainment of what absolutely is and exists in its\nown right.\n\n21.] (b) Thought was described as active. We now, in the second place,\nconsider this action in its bearings upon objects, or as reflection\nupon something. In this case the universal or product of its operation\ncontains the value of the thing--is the essential, inward, and true.\n\nIn \u00a7 5 the old belief was quoted that the reality in object,\ncircumstance, or event, the intrinsic worth or essence, the thing on\nwhich everything depends, is not a self-evident datum of consciousness,\nor coincident with the first appearance and impression of the object;\nthat, on the contrary, Reflection is required in order to discover the\nreal constitution of the object--and that by such reflection it will be\nascertained.\n\nTo reflect is a lesson which even the child has to learn. One of his\nfirst lessons is to join adjectives with substantives. This obliges\nhim to attend and distinguish: he has to remember a rule and apply it\nto the particular case. This rule is nothing but a universal: and the\nchild must see that the particular adapts itself to this universal.\nIn life, again, we have ends to attain. And with regard to these we\nponder which is the best way to secure them. The end here represents\nthe universal or governing principle: and we have means and instruments\nwhose action we regulate in conformity to the end. In the same way\nreflection is active in questions of conduct. To reflect here means to\nrecollect the right, the duty,--the universal which serves as a fixed\nrule' to guide our behaviour in the given case. Our particular act\nmust imply and recognise the universal law.--We find the same thing\nexhibited in our study of natural phenomena. For instance, we observe\nthunder and lightning. The phenomenon is a familiar one, and we often\nperceive it. But man is not content with a bare acquaintance, or with\nthe fact as it appears to the senses; he would like to get behind the\nsurface, to know what it is, and to comprehend it. This leads him to\nreflect: he seeks to find out the cause as something distinct from\nthe mere phenomenon: he tries to know the inside in its distinction\nfrom the outside. Hence the phenomenon becomes double, it splits into\ninside and outside, into force and its manifestation, into cause and\neffect. Once more we find the inside or the force identified with the\nuniversal and permanent: not this or that flash of lightning, this\nor that plant--but that which continues the same in them all. The\nsensible appearance is individual and evanescent: the permanent in\nit is discovered by. reflection. Nature shows us a countless number\nof individual forms and phenomena. Into this variety we feel a need\nof introducing unity: we compare, consequently, and try to find the\nuniversal of each single case. Individuals are born and perish: the\nspecies abides and recurs in them all: and its existence is only\nvisible to reflection. Under the same head fall such laws as those\nregulating the motion of the heavenly bodies. To-day we see the stars\nhere, and to-morrow there: and our mind finds something incongruous, in\nthis chaos--something in which it can put no faith, because it believes\nin order and in a simple, constant, and universal law. Inspired by this\nbelief, the mind has directed its reflection towards the phenomena,\nand learnt their laws. In other words, it has established the movement\nof the heavenly bodies to be in accordance with a universal law from\nwhich every change of position may be known and predicted. The case is\nthe same with the influences which make themselves felt in the infinite\ncomplexity of human conduct. There, too, man has the belief in the sway\nof a general principle.--From all these examples it may be gathered\nhow reflection is always seeking for something fixed and permanent,\ndefinite in itself and governing the particulars. This universal which\ncannot be apprehended by the senses counts as the true and essential.\nThus, duties and rights are all-important in the matter of conduct: and\nan action is true when it conforms to those universal formulae.\n\nIn thus characterising the universal, we become aware of its antithesis\nto something else. This something else is the merely immediate,\noutward and individual, as opposed to the mediate, inward and\nuniversal. The universal does not exist externally to the outward eye\nas a universal. The kind as kind cannot be perceived: the laws of the\ncelestial motions are not written on the sky. The universal is neither\nseen nor heard, its existence is only for the mind. Religion leads us\nto a universal, which embraces all else within itself, to an Absolute\nby which all else is brought into being: and this Absolute is an object\nnot of the senses but of the mind and of thought.\n\n22.] (c) By the act of reflection something is _altered_ in the way in\nwhich the fact was originally presented in sensation, perception, or\nconception. Thus, as it appears, an alteration of the object must be\ninterposed before its true nature can be discovered.\n\nWhat reflection elicits, is a product of our thought. Solon, for\ninstance, produced out of his head the laws he gave to the Athenians.\nThis is half of the truth: but we must not on that account forget\nthat the universal (in Solon's case, the laws) is the very reverse of\nmerely subjective, or fail to note that it is the essential, true,\nand objective being of things. To discover the truth in things,\nmere attention is not enough; we must call in the action of our own\nfaculties to transform what is immediately before us. Now, at first\nsight, this seems an inversion of the natural order, calculated to\nthwart the very purpose on which knowledge is bent. But the method is\nnot so irrational as it seems. It has been the conviction of every age\nthat the only way of reaching the permanent substratum was to transmute\nthe given phenomenon by means of reflection. In modern times a doubt\nhas for the first time been raised on this point in connexion with the\ndifference alleged to exist between the products of our thought and the\nthings in their own nature. This real nature of things, it is said,\nis very different from what we make out of them. The divorce between\nthought and thing is mainly the work of the Critical Philosophy,\nand runs counter to the conviction of all previous ages, that their\nagreement was a matter of course. The antithesis between them is\nthe hinge on which modern philosophy turns. Meanwhile the natural\nbelief of men gives the lie to it. In common life we reflect, without\nparticularly reminding ourselves that this is the process of arriving\nat the truth, and we think without hesitation, and in the firm belief\nthat thought coincides with thing. And this belief is of the greatest\nimportance. It marks the diseased state of the age when we see it adopt\nthe despairing creed that our knowledge is only subjective, and that\nbeyond this subjective we cannot go. Whereas, rightly understood, truth\nis objective, and ought so to regulate the conviction of every one,\nthat the conviction of the individual is stamped as wrong when it does\nnot agree with this rule. Modern views, on the contrary, put great\nvalue on the mere fact of conviction, and hold that to be convinced is\ngood for its own sake, whatever be the burden of our conviction,--there\nbeing no standard by which we can measure its truth.\n\nWe said above that, according to the old belief, it was the\ncharacteristic right of the mind to know the truth. If this be so, it\nalso implies that everything we know both of outward and inward nature,\nin one word, the objective world, is in its own self the same as it is\nin thought, and that to think is to bring out the truth of our object,\nbe it what it may. The business of philosophy is only to bring into\nexplicit consciousness what the world in all ages has believed about\nthought. Philosophy therefore advances nothing new; and our present\ndiscussion has led us to a conclusion which agrees with the natural\nbelief of mankind.\n\n23.] (d) The real nature of the object is brought to light in\nreflection; but it is no less true that this exertion of thought is\n_my_ act. If this be so, the real nature is a _product_ of _my_ mind,\nin its character of thinking subject--generated by me in my simple\nuniversality, self-collected and removed from extraneous influences,\n--in one word, in my Freedom.\n\nThink for yourself, is a phrase which people often use as if it had\nsome special significance. The fact is, no man can think for another,\nany more than he can eat or drink for him: and the expression is a\npleonasm. To think is in fact _ipso facto_ to be free, for thought as\nthe action of the universal is an abstract relating of self to self,\nwhere, being at home with ourselves, and as regards our subjectivity,\nutterly blank, our consciousness is, in the matter of its contents,\nonly in the fact and its characteristics. If this be admitted, and\nif we apply the term humility or modesty to an attitude where our\nsubjectivity is not allowed to interfere by act or quality, it is\neasy to appreciate the question touching the humility or modesty and\npride of philosophy. For in point of contents, thought is only true in\nproportion as it sinks itself in the facts; and in point of form it\nis no private or particular state or act of the subject, but rather\nthat attitude of consciousness where the abstract self, freed from\nall the special limitations to which its ordinary states or qualities\nare liable, restricts itself to that universal action in which it is\nidentical with all individuals. In these circumstances philosophy may\nbe acquitted of the charge of pride. And when Aristotle summons the\nmind to rise to the dignity of that attitude, the dignity he seeks is\nwon by letting slip all our individual opinions and prejudices, and\nsubmitting to the sway of the fact.\n\n24.] With these explanations and qualifications, thoughts may be termed\nObjective Thoughts,--among which are also to be included the forms\nwhich are more especially discussed in the common logic, where they are\nusually treated as forms of conscious thought only. _Logic therefore\ncoincides with Metaphysics, the science of things set and held in\nthoughts,_--thoughts accredited able to express the essential reality\nof things.\n\nAn exposition of the relation in which such forms as notion, judgment,\nand syllogism stand to others, such as causality, is a matter for the\nscience itself. But this much is evident beforehand. If thought tries\nto form a notion of things, this notion (as well as its proximate\nphases, the judgment and syllogism) cannot be composed of articles and\nrelations which are alien and irrelevant to the things. Reflection, it\nwas said above, conducts to the universal of things: which universal\nis itself one of the constituent factors of a notion. To say that\nReason or Understanding is in the world, is equivalent in its import\nto the phrase 'Objective Thought.' The latter phrase however has the\ninconvenience that thought is usually confined to express what belongs\nto the mind or consciousness only, while objective is a term applied,\nat least primarily, only to the non-mental.\n\n(1) To speak of thought or objective thought as the heart [and soul\nof the world, may seem to be ascribing consciousness to the things of\nnature. We feel a certain repugnance against making thought the inward\nfunction of things, especially as we speak of thought as marking the\ndivergence of man from nature. It would be necessary, therefore, if\nwe use the term thought at all, to speak of nature as the system of\nunconscious thought, or, to use Schelling's expression, a petrified\nintelligence. And in order to prevent misconception, thought-form or\nthought-type should be substituted for the ambiguous term thought.\n\nFrom what has been said the principles of logic are to be sought\nin a system of thought-types or fundamental categories, in which\nthe opposition between subjective and objective, in its usual\nsense, vanishes. The signification thus attached to thought and its\ncharacteristic forms may be illustrated by the ancient saying that\n'\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe7\u03c2 governs the world,' or by our own phrase that 'Reason is in the\nworld: which means that Reason is the soul of the world it inhabits,\nits immanent principle, its most proper and inward nature, its\nuniversal. Another illustration is offered by the circumstance that\nin speaking of some definite animal we say it is (an) animal. Now,\nthe animal, _qu\u00e2_ animal, cannot be shown; nothing can be pointed out\nexcepting some special animal. Animal, _qu\u00e2_ animal, does not exist: it\nis merely the universal nature of the individual animals, whilst each\nexisting animal is a more concretely, defined and particularised thing.\nBut to be an animal,--the law of kind which is the universal in this\ncase,--is the property of the particular animal, and constitutes its\ndefinite essence. Take away from the dog its animality, and it becomes\nimpossible to say what it is. All things have a permanent inward\nnature, as well as an outward existence. They live and die, arise and\npass away; but their essential and universal part is the kind; and this\nmeans much more than something _common_ to them all.\n\nIf thought is the constitutive substance of external things, it is also\nthe universal substance of what is spiritual. In all human perception\nthought is present; so too thought is the universal in all the acts of\nconception and recollection; in short, in every mental activity, in\nwilling, wishing and the like. All these faculties are only further,\nspecialisations of thought. When it is presented in this light, thought\nhas a different part to play from what it has if we speak of a faculty\nof thought, one among a crowd of other faculties, such as perception,\nconception and will, with which it stands on the same level. When it\nis seen, to be the true universal of all that nature and mind contain,\nit extends its scope far beyond all these, and becomes the basis of\neverything. From this view of thought, in its objective meaning as\n[greek: nous], we may next pass to consider the subjective sense of the\nterm. We say first, Man is a being that thinks; but we also say at the\nsame time, Man is a being that perceives and wills. Man is a thinker,\nand is universal: but he is a thinker only because he feels his own\nuniversality. The animal too is by implication universal, but the\nuniversal is not consciously felt by it to be universal: it feels only\nthe individual. The animal sees a singular object, for instance, its\nfood, or a man. For the animal all this never goes beyond an individual\nthing. Similarly, sensation has to do with nothing but singulars, such\nas _this_ pain or _this_ sweet taste. Nature does not bring its \"\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2\"\ninto consciousness: it is man who first makes himself double so as\nto be a universal for a universal. This first happens when man knows\nthat he is 'I.' By the term 'I' I mean myself, a single and altogether\ndeterminate person. And yet I really utter nothing peculiar to myself,\nfor every one else is an 'I' or 'Ego,' and when I call myself 'I,'\nthough I indubitably mean the single person myself, I express a\nthorough universal. 'I,' therefore, is mere being-for-self, in which\neverything peculiar or marked is renounced and buried out of sight;\nit is as it were the ultimate and unanalysable point of consciousness\nWe may say 'I' I and thought are the same, or, more definitely, 'I'\nis thought as a thinker. What I have in my consciousness, is for me.\n'I' is the vacuum or receptacle for anything and everything: for which\neverything is and which stores up everything in itself. Every man is a\nwhole world of conceptions, that lie buried in the night of the 'Ego.'\nIt follows that the 'Ego' is the universal in which we leave aside all\nthat is particular, and in which at the same time all the particulars\nhave a latent existence. In other words, it is not a mere universality\nand nothing more, but the universality which includes in it everything.\nCommonly we use the word 'I' without attaching much importance to it,\nnor is it an object of study except to philosophical analysis. In the\n'Ego,' we have thought before us in its utter purity. While the brute\ncannot say 'I,' man can, because it is his nature to think. Now in the\n'Ego' there are a variety of contents, derived both from within and\nfrom, without, and according to the nature of these contents our state\nmay be described as perception, or conception, or reminiscence. But\nin all of them the 'I' is found: or in them all thought is present.\nMan, therefore, is always thinking, even in his perceptions: if he\nobserves anything, he always observes it as a universal, fixes on a\nsingle point which he places in relief, thus withdrawing his attention\nfrom other points, and takes it as abstract and universal, even if the\nuniversality be only in form.\n\nIn the case of our ordinary conceptions, two things may happen. Either\nthe contents are moulded by thought, but not the form: or, the form\nbelongs to thought and not the contents. In using such terms, for\ninstance, as anger, rose, hope, I am speaking of things which I have\nlearnt in the way of sensation, but I express these contents in a\nuniversal mode, that is, in the form of thought. I have left out much\nthat is particular and given the contents in their generality: but\nstill the contents remain sense-derived. On the other hand, when I\nrepresent God, the content is undeniably a product of pure thought,\nbut the form still retains the sensuous limitations which it has as\nI find it immediately present in myself. In these generalised images\nthe content is not merely and simply sensible, as it is in a visual\ninspection; but either the content is sensuous and the form appertains\nto thought, or _vice vers\u00e2._ In the first case the material is given to\nus, and our thought supplies the form: in the second case the content\nwhich has its source in thought is by means of the form turned into a\nsomething given, which accordingly reaches the mind from without.\n\n(2) Logic is the study of thought pure and simple, or of the pure\nthought-forms. In the ordinary sense of the term, by thought we\ngenerally represent to ourselves something more than simple and\nunmixed thought; we mean some thought, the material of which is from\nexperience. Whereas in logic a thought is understood to include nothing\nelse but what depends on thinking and what thinking has brought into\nexistence. It is in these circumstances that thoughts are _pure_\nthoughts. The mind is then in its own home-element and therefore free:\nfor freedom means that the other thing with which you deal is a second\nself--so that you never leave your own ground but give the law to\nyourself. In the impulses or appetites the beginning is from something\nelse, from something which we feel to be external. In this case then\nwe speak of dependence. For freedom it is necessary that we should\nfeel no presence of something else which is not ourselves. The natural\nman, whose motions follow the rule only of his appetites, is not his\nown master. Be he as self-willed as he may, the constituents of his\nwill and opinion are not his own, and his freedom is merely formal.\nBut when we _think,_ we renounce our selfish and particular being,\nsink ourselves in the thing, allow thought to follow its own course,\nand,--if we add anything of our own, we think ill.\n\nIf in pursuance of the foregoing remarks we consider-, Logic to be\nthe system of the pure types of thought, we find that the other\nphilosophical sciences, the Philosophy of I Nature and the Philosophy\nof Mind, take the place, as it were, of an Applied Logic, and that\nLogic is the soul which animates them both. Their problem in that\ncase is only to recognise the logical forms under the shapes they\nassume in Nature and Mind,--shapes which are only a particular mode\nof expression for the forms of pure thought. If for instance we take\nthe syllogism (not as it was understood in the old formal logic, but\nat its real value), we shall find it gives expression to the law that\nthe particular is the middle term which fuses together the extremes of\nthe universal and the singular. The syllogistic form is a universal\nform of all things. Everything that exists is a particular, which\ncouples together the universal and the singular. But Nature is weak\nand fails to exhibit the logical forms in their purity. Such a feeble\nexemplification of the syllogism may be seen in the magnet. In the\nmiddle or point of indifference of a magnet, its two poles, however\nthey may be distinguished, are brought into one. Physics also teaches\nus to see the universal or essence in Nature: and the only difference\nbetween it and the Philosophy of Nature is that the latter brings\nbefore our mind the adequate forms of the notion in the physical world.\n\nIt will now be understood that Logic is the all-animating spirit of\nall the sciences, and its categories the spiritual hierarchy. They\nare the heart and centre of things: and yet at the same time they\nare always on our lips, and, apparently at least, perfectly familiar\nobjects. But things thus familiar are usually the greatest strangers.\nBeing, for example, is a category of pure thought: but to make 'Is'\nan object of investigation never occurs to us. Common fancy puts the\nAbsolute far away in a world beyond. The Absolute is rather directly\nbefore us, so present that so long as we think, we must, though without\nexpress consciousness of it, always carry it with us and always use it.\nLanguage is the main depository of these types of thought; and one use\nof the grammatical instruction which children receive is unconsciously\nto turn their attention to distinctions of thought.\n\nLogic is usually said to be concerned with forms _only_ and to derive\nthe material for them from elsewhere. But this 'only,' which assumes\nthat the logical thoughts are nothing in comparison with the rest\nof the contents, is not the word to use about forms which are the\nabsolutely-real ground of everything. Everything else rather is an\n'only' compared with these thoughts. To make such abstract forms a\nproblem pre-supposes in the inquirer a higher level of culture than\nordinary; and to study them in themselves and for their own sake\nsignifies in addition that these thought-types must be deduced out of\nthought itself, and their truth or reality examined by the light of\ntheir own laws. We do not assume them as data from without, and then\ndefine them or exhibit their value and authority by comparing them with\nthe shape they take in our minds. If we thus acted, we should proceed\nfrom observation and experience, and should, for instance, say we\nhabitually employ the term 'force' in such a case, and such a meaning.\nA definition like that would be called correct, if it agreed with the\nconception of its object present in our ordinary state of mind. The\ndefect of this empirical method is that a notion is not defined as it\nis in and for itself, but in terms of something assumed, which is then\nused as a criterion and standard of correctness. No such test need be\napplied: we have merely to let the thought-forms follow the impulse of\ntheir own organic life.\n\nTo ask if a category is true or not, must sound strange to the ordinary\nmind: for a category apparently becomes true only when it is applied\nto a given object, and apart from this application it would seem\nmeaningless to inquire into its truth. But this is the very question on\nwhich everything turns. We must however in the first place understand\nclearly what we mean by Truth. In common life truth means the agreement\nof an object with our conception of it. We thus pre-suppose an object\nto which our conception must conform. In the philosophical sense of the\nword, on the other hand, truth may be described, in general abstract\nterms, as the agreement of a thought-content with itself. This meaning\nis quite different from the one given above. At the same time the\ndeeper and philosophical meaning of truth can be partially traced even\nin the ordinary usage of language. Thus we speak of a true friend; by\nwhich we mean a friend whose manner of conduct accords with the notion\nof friendship. In the same way we speak of a true work of Art. Untrue\nin this sense means the same as bad, or self-discordant. In this sense\na bad state is an untrue state; and evil and untruth may be said to\nconsist in the contradiction subsisting between the function or notion\nand the existence of the object. Of such a bad object we may form\na correct representation, but the import of such representation is\ninherently false. Of these correctnesses; which are at the same time\nuntruths, we may have many in our heads.--God alone is the thorough\nharmony of notion and reality. All finite things involve an untruth:\nthey have a notion and an existence, but their existence does not meet\nthe requirements of the notion. For this reason they must perish, and\nthen the incompatibility between their notion and their existence\nbecomes manifest. It is in the kind that the individual animal has its\nnotion: and the kind liberates itself from this individuality by death.\n\nThe study of truth, or, as it is here explained to mean, consistency,\nconstitutes the proper problem of logic. In our every-day mind we\nare never troubled with questions about the truth of the forms of\nthought.--We may also express the problem of logic by saying that it\nexamines the forms of thought touching their capability to hold truth.\nAnd the question comes to this: What are the forms of the infinite, and\nwhat are the forms of the finite? Usually no suspicion attaches to the\nfinite forms of thought; they are allowed to pass unquestioned. But it\nis from conforming to finite categories in thought and action that all\ndeception originates.\n\n(3) Truth may be ascertained by several methods, each of which however\nis no more than a form. Experience is the first of these methods. But\nthe method is only a form: it has no intrinsic value of its own. For\nin experience everything depends upon the mind we bring to bear upon\nactuality. A great mind is great in its experience; and in the motley\nplay of phenomena at once perceives the point of real significance. The\nidea is present, in actual shape, not something, as it were, over the\nhill and far away. The genius of a Goethe, for example, looking into\nnature or history, has great experiences, catches sight of the living\nprinciple, and gives expression to it. A second method of apprehending\nthe truth is Reflection, which defines it by intellectual relations of\ncondition and conditioned. But in these two modes the absolute truth\nhas not yet found its appropriate form. The most perfect method of\nknowledge proceeds in the pure form of thought: and here the attitude\nof man is one of entire freedom.\n\nThat the form of thought is the perfect form, and that it presents\nthe truth as it intrinsically and actually is, is the general dogma\nof all philosophy. To give a proof of the dogma there is, in the\nfirst instance, nothing to do but show that these other forms of\nknowledge are finite. The grand Scepticism of antiquity accomplished\nthis task when it exhibited the contradictions contained in every\none of these forms. That Scepticism indeed went further: but when\nit ventured to assail the forms of reason, it began by insinuating\nunder them something finite upon which it might fasten. All the\nforms of finite thought will make their appearance in the course of\nlogical development, the order in which they present themselves being\ndetermined by necessary laws. Here in the introduction they could only\nbe unscientifically assumed as something given. In the theory of logic\nitself these forms will be exhibited, not only on their negative, but\nalso on their positive side.\n\nWhen we compare the different forms of ascertaining truth with one\nanother, the first of them, immediate knowledge, may perhaps seem the\nfinest, noblest and most appropriate. It includes everything which\nthe moralists term innocence as well as religious feeling, simple\ntrust, love, fidelity, and natural faith. The two other forms, first\nreflective, and secondly philosophical cognition, must leave that\nunsought natural harmony behind. And so far as they have this in\ncommon, the methods which claim to apprehend the truth by thought\nmay naturally be regarded as part and parcel of the pride which leads\nman to trust to his own powers for a knowledge of the truth. Such a\nposition involves a thorough-going disruption, and, viewed in that\nlight, might be regarded as the source of all evil and wickedness--the\noriginal transgression. Apparently therefore they only way of being\nreconciled and restored to peace is to surrender all claims to think or\nknow.\n\nThis lapse from natural unity has not escaped notice, and nations from\nthe earliest times have asked the meaning of the wonderful division of\nthe spirit against itself. No such inward disunion is found in nature:\nnatural things do nothing wicked.\n\nThe Mosaic legend of the Fall of Man has preserved an ancient picture\nrepresenting the origin and consequences of this disunion. The\nincidents of the legend form the basis of an essential article of the\ncreed, the doctrine of original sin in man and his consequent need of\nsuccour. It may be well at the commencement of logic to examine the\nstory which treats of the origin and the bearings of the very knowledge\nwhich logic has to discuss. For, though philosophy must not allow\nherself to be overawed by religion, or accept the position of existence\non sufferance, she cannot afford to neglect these popular conceptions.\nThe tales and allegories of religion, which have enjoyed for thousands\nof years the veneration of nations, are not to be set aside as\nantiquated even now.\n\nUpon a closer inspection of the story of the Fall we find, as was\nalready said, that it exemplifies the universal bearings of knowledge\nupon the spiritual life. In its instinctive and natural stage,\nspiritual life wears the garb of innocence and confiding simplicity:\nbut the very essence of spirit implies the absorption of this immediate\ncondition in something higher. The spiritual is distinguished from the\nnatural, and more especially from the animal, life, in the circumstance\nthat it does not continue a mere stream of tendency, but sunders itself\nto self-realisation. But this position of severed life has in its turn\nto be suppressed, and the spirit has by its own act to win its way\nto concord again. The final concord then is spiritual; that is, the\nprinciple of restoration is found in thought, and thought only. The\nhand that inflicts the wound is also the hand which heals it.\n\nWe are told in our story that Adam and Eve, the first human beings,\nthe types of humanity, were placed in a garden, where grew a tree of\nlife and a tree of the knowledge of good and evil. God, it is said,\nhad forbidden them to eat of the fruit of this latter tree: of the\ntree of life for the present nothing further is said. These words\nevidently assume that man is not intended to seek knowledge, and ought\nto remain in the state of innocence. Other meditative races, it may\nbe remarked, have held the same belief that the primitive state of\nmankind was one of innocence and harmony. Now all this is to a certain\nextent correct. The disunion that appears throughout humanity is not\na condition to rest in. But it is a mistake to regard the natural and\nimmediate harmony as the right state. The mind is not mere instinct:\non the contrary, it essentially involves the tendency to reasoning\nand meditation. Childlike innocence no doubt has in it something\nfascinating and attractive: but only because it reminds us of what the\nspirit must win for itself. The harmoniousness of childhood is a gift\nfrom the hand of nature: the second harmony must spring from the labour\nand culture of the spirit. And so the words of Christ, 'Except ye\n_become_ as little children,' &c., are very far from telling us that we\nmust always remain children.\n\nAgain, we find in the narrative of Moses that the occasion which led\nman to leave his natural unity is attributed to solicitation from\nwithout. The serpent was the tempter. But the truth is, that the step\ninto opposition, the awakening of consciousness, follows from the\nvery nature of man: and the same history repeats itself in every son\nof Adam. The serpent represents likeness to God as consisting in the\nknowledge of good and evil: and it is just this knowledge in which man\nparticipates when he breaks with the unity of his instinctive being\nand eats of the forbidden fruit. The first reflection of awakened\nconsciousness in men told them that they were naked. This is a na\u00efve\nand profound trait. For the sense of shame bears evidence to the\nseparation of man from his natural and sensuous life. The beasts never\nget so far as this separation, and they feel no shame. And it is in\nthe human feeling of shame that we are to seek the spiritual and moral\norigin of dress, compared with which the merely physical need is a\nsecondary matter.\n\nNext comes the Curse, as it is called, which God pronounced upon\nman. The prominent point in that curse turns chiefly on the contrast\nbetween man and nature. Man must work in the sweat of his brow: and\nwoman bring forth in sorrow. As to work, if it is the result of the\ndisunion, it is also the victory over it. The beasts have nothing more\nto do but to pick up the materials required to satisfy their wants: man\non the contrary can only satisfy his wants by himself producing and\ntransforming the necessary means. Thus even in these outside things man\nis dealing with himself.\n\nThe story does not close with the expulsion from Paradise. We are\nfurther told, God said, 'Behold Adam is become as one of us, to\nknow good and evil.' Knowledge is now spoken of as divine, and not,\nas before, as something wrong and forbidden. Such words contain a\nconfutation of the idle talk that philosophy pertains only to the\nfinitude of the mind. Philosophy is knowledge, and it is through\nknowledge that man first realises his original vocation, to be the\nimage of God. When the record adds that God drove men out of the Garden\nof Eden to prevent their eating of the tree of life, it only means\nthat on his natural side certainly man is finite and mortal, but in\nknowledge infinite.\n\nWe all know the theological dogma that man's nature is evil, tainted\nwith what is called Original Sin. Now while we accept the dogma, we\nmust give up the setting of incident which represents original sin as\nconsequent upon an accidental act of the first man. For the very notion\nof spirit is enough to show that man is evil by nature, and it is an\nerror to imagine that he could ever be otherwise. To such extent as man\nis and acts like a creature of nature, his whole behaviour is what it\nought not to be. For the spirit it is a duty to be free, and to realise\nitself by its own act. Nature is for man only the starting-point which\nhe has to transform. The theological doctrine of original sin is a\nprofound truth; but modern enlightenment prefers to believe that man is\nnaturally good, and that he acts right so long as he continues true to\nnature.\n\nThe hour when man leaves the path of mere natural being marks the\ndifference between him, a self-conscious agent, and the natural world.\nBut this schism, though it forms a necessary element in the very notion\nof spirit, is not the final goal of man. It is to this state of inward\nbreach that the whole finite action of thought and will belongs.\nIn that finite sphere man pursues ends of his own and draws from\nhimself the material of his conduct. While he pursues these aims to\nthe uttermost, while his knowledge and his will seek himself, his own\nnarrow self apart from the universal, he is evil; and his evil is to be\nsubjective.\n\nWe seem at first to have a double evil here: but both are really the\nsame. Man in so far as he is spirit is not the creature of nature: and\nwhen he behaves as such, and follows the cravings of appetite, he wills\nto be so. The natural wickedness of man is therefore unlike the natural\nlife of animals. A mere natural life may be more exactly defined by\nsaying that the natural man as such is an individual: for nature in\nevery part is in the bonds of individualism. Thus when man wills to be\na creature of nature, he wills in the Same degree to be an individual\nsimply. Yet against such impulsive and appetitive action, due to\nthe individualism of nature, there also steps in the law or general\nprinciple. This law may either be an external force, or have the form\nof divine authority. So long as he continues in his natural state, man\nis in bondage to the law.--It is true that among the instincts and\naffections of man, there are social or benevolent inclinations, love,\nsympathy, and others, reaching beyond his selfish isolation. But so\nlong as these tendencies are instinctive, their virtual universality\nof scope and purport is vitiated by the subjective form which always\nallows free play to self-seeking and random action.\n\n25.] The term 'Objective Thoughts' indicates the _truth_--the truth\nwhich is to be the absolute _object_ of philosophy, and not merely the\ngoal at which it aims. But the very expression cannot fail to suggest\nan opposition, to characterise and appreciate which is the main motive\nof the philosophical attitude of the present time, and which forms the\nreal problem of the question about truth and our means of ascertaining\nit. If the thought-forms are vitiated by a fixed antithesis, _i.\ne._ if they are only of a finite character, they are unsuitable for\nthe self-centred universe of truth, and truth can find no adequate\nreceptacle in thought. Such thought, which--- can produce only limited\nand partial categories and I proceed by their means; is what in the\nstricter sense of the word is termed Understanding. The finitude,\nfurther, of these categories lies in two points. Firstly, they are only\nsubjective, and the antithesis of an objective permanently clings to\nthem. Secondly, they are always of restricted content, and so persist\nin antithesis to one another and still more to the Absolute. In order\nmore fully to explain the position and import here attributed to logic,\nthe attitudes in which thought is supposed to stand to objectivity will\nnext be examined by way of further introduction.\n\nIn my Phenomenology of the Spirit, which on that account was at its\npublication described as the first part of the System of Philosophy,\nthe method adopted was to begin with the first and simplest phase of\nmind, immediate consciousness, and to show how that stage gradually\nof necessity worked onward to the philosophical point of view, the\nnecessity of that view being proved by the process. But in these\ncircumstances it was impossible to restrict the quest to the mere form\nof consciousness. For the stage of philosophical knowledge is the\nrichest in material and organisation, and therefore, as it came before\nus in the shape of a result, it pre-supposed the existence of the\nconcrete formations of consciousness, such as individual and social\nmorality, art and religion. In the development of consciousness, which\nat first sight appears limited to the point of form merely, there is\nthus at the same time included the development of the matter or of the\nobjects discussed in the special branches of philosophy. But the latter\nprocess must, so to speak, go on behind consciousness, since those\nfacts are the essential nucleus which is raised into consciousness.\nThe exposition accordingly is rendered more intricate, because so much\nthat properly belongs to the concrete branches is prematurely dragged\ninto the introduction. The survey which follows in the present work has\neven more the inconvenience of being only historical and inferential in\nits method. But it tries especially to show how the questions men have\nproposed, outside the school, on the nature of Knowledge, Faith and the\nlike,--questions which they imagine to have no connexion with abstract\nthoughts,--are really reducible to the simple categories, which first\nget cleared up in Logic.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\n\nFIRST ATTITUDE OF THOUGHT TO OBJECTIVITY.\n\n\n28.] The first of these attitudes of thought is seen in the method\nwhich has no doubts and no sense of the contradiction in thought, or of\nthe hostility of thought against itself. It entertains an unquestioning\nbelief that reflection is the means of ascertaining the truth, and of\nbringing the objects before the mind as they really are. And in this\nbelief it advances straight upon its objects, takes the materials\nfurnished by sense and perception, and reproduces them from itself as\nfacts of thought; and then, believing this result to be the truth, the\nmethod is content. Philosophy in its earliest stages, all the sciences,\nand even the daily action and movement of consciousness, live in this\nfaith.\n\n27.] This method of thought has never become aware, of the antithesis\nof subjective and objective: and to that extent there is nothing to\nprevent its statements from possessing a genuinely philosophical and\nspeculative character, though it is just as possible that they may\nnever get beyond finite categories, or the stage where the antithesis\nis still unresolved. In the present introduction the main question\nfor us is to observe this attitude of thought in its extreme form;\nand we shall accordingly first of all examine its second and inferior\naspect as a philosophic system. One of the clearest instances of it,\nand one lying nearest to ourselves, may be found in the Metaphysic of\nthe Past as it subsisted among us previous to the philosophy of Kant.\nIt is however only in reference to the history of philosophy that this\nMetaphysic can be said to belong to the past: the thing is always and\nat all places to be found, as the view which the abstract understanding\ntakes of the objects of reason. And it is in this point that the real\nand immediate good lies of a closer examination of its main scope and\nits _modus operandi._\n\n28.] This metaphysical system took the laws and forms of thought to be\nthe fundamental laws and forms of things. It assumed that to think a\nthing was the means of finding its very self and nature: and to that\nextent it occupied higher ground than the Critical. Philosophy which\nsucceeded it. But in the first instance (i) _these terms of thought\nwere cut off from their connexion,_ their solidarity; each was believed\nvalid by itself and capable of serving as a predicate of the truth. It\nwas the general assumption of this metaphysic that a knowledge of the\nAbsolute was gained by assigning predicates to it. It neither inquired\nwhat the terms of the understanding specially meant or what they were\nworth, nor did it test the method which characterises the Absolute by\nthe assignment of predicates.\n\nAs an example of such predicates may be taken; Existence, in the\nproposition, 'God has existence:' Finitude or Infinity, as in the\nquestion, 'Is the world-finite or infinite?': Simple and Complex,\nin the proposition, 'The soul is simple,'--or again, 'The thing is\na unity, a whole,' &c. Nobody asked whether such predicates had any\nintrinsic and independent truth, or if the propositional form could be\na form of truth.\n\nThe Metaphysic of the past assumed, as unsophisticated belief always\ndoes that thought apprehends the very self of things, and that things,\nto become what they truly are, require to be thought. For Nature and\nthe human soul are a very Proteus in their perpetual transformations;\nand it soon occurs to the observer that the first crude impression of\nthings is not their essential being.--This is a point of view the very\nreverse of the result arrived at by the Critical Philosophy; a result,\nof which it may be said, that it bade man go and feed on mere husks and\nchaff.\n\nWe must look more closely into the procedure of that old metaphysic.\nIn the first place it never went beyond the province of the analytic\nunderstanding. Without preliminary inquiry it adopted the abstract\ncategories of thought and let them rank as predicates of truth. But in\nusing the term thought we must not forget the difference between finite\nor discursive thinking and the thinking which is infinite and rational.\nThe categories, as they meet us _prima facie_ and in isolation, are\nfinite forms. But truth is always infinite, and cannot be expressed\nor presented to consciousness in finite terms. The phrase _infinite\nthought_ may excite surprise, if we adhere to the modern conception\nthat thought is always limited. But it is, speaking rightly, the very\nessence of thought to be infinite. The nominal explanation of calling\na thing finite is that it has an end, that it exists up to a certain\npoint only, where it comes into contact with, and is limited by, its\nother. The finite therefore subsists in reference to its other, which\nis its negation and presents itself as its limit. Now thought is always\nin its own sphere; its relations are with itself, and it is its own\nobject. In having a thought for object, I am at home with myself.\nThe thinking power, the 'I,' is therefore infinite, because, when it\nthinks, it is in relation to an object which is itself. Generally\nspeaking, an object means a something else, a negative confronting me.\nBut in the case where thought thinks itself, it has an object which\nis at the same time no object: in other words, its objectivity is\nsuppressed and transformed into an idea. Thought, as thought, therefore\nin its unmixed nature involves no limits; it is finite only when it\nkeeps to limited categories, which it believes to be ultimate. Infinite\nor speculative thought, on the contrary, while it no less defines,\ndoes in the very act of limiting and defining make that defect vanish.\nAnd so infinity is not, as most frequently happens, to be conceived as\nan abstract away and away for ever and ever, but in the simple manner\npreviously indicated.\n\nThe thinking of the old metaphysical system was finite. Its whole mode\nof action was regulated by categories, the limits of which it believed\nto be permanently fixed and not subject to any further negation. Thus,\none of its questions was: Has God existence? The question supposes that\nexistence is an altogether positive term, a sort of _ne plus ultra._\nWe shall see however at a later point that existence is by no means a\nmerely positive term, but one which is toe low for the Absolute Idea,\nand unworthy of God. A second question in these metaphysical systems\nwas: Is the world finite or infinite? The very terms of the question\nassume that the finite is a permanent contradictory to the infinite:\nand one can easily see that, when they are so opposed, the infinite,\nwhich of course ought to be the whole, only appears as a single aspect\nand suffers restriction from the finite. But a restricted infinity is\nitself only a finite. In the same way it was asked whether the soul was\nsimple or composite. Simpleness was, in other words, taken to be an\nultimate characteristic, giving expression to a whole truth. Far from\nbeing so, simpleness is the expression of a half-truth, as one-sided\nand abstract as existence:--a term of thought, which, as we shall\nhereafter see, is itself untrue and hence unable to hold truth. If the\nsoul be viewed as merely and abstractly simple, it is characterised in\nan inadequate and finite way.\n\nIt was therefore the main question of the pre-Kantian metaphysic to\ndiscover whether predicates of the kind mentioned were to be ascribed\nto its objects. Now these predicates are after all only limited\nformulae of the understanding which, instead of expressing the truth,\nmerely impose a limit. More than this, it should be noted that the\nchief feature of the method lay in 'assigning' or 'attributing'\npredicates to the object that was to be cognised, for example, to\nGod. But attribution is no more than an external reflection about the\nobject: the predicates by which the object is to be determined are\nsupplied from the resources of picture-thought, and are applied in\na mechanical way. Whereas, if we are to have genuine cognition, the\nobject must characterise its own self and not derive its predicates\nfrom without. Even supposing we follow the method of predicating, the\nmind cannot help feeling that predicates of this sort fail to exhaust\nthe object. From the same point of view the Orientals are quite correct\nin calling God the many-named or the myriad-named One. One after\nanother of these finite categories leaves the soul unsatisfied, and\nthe Oriental sage is compelled unceasingly to seek for more and more\nof such predicates. In finite things it is no doubt the case that they\nhave to be characterised through finite predicates: and with these\nthings the understanding finds proper scope for its special action.\nItself finite, it knows only the nature of the finite. Thus, when\nI call some action a theft, I have characterised the action in its\nessential facts: and such a knowledge is sufficient for the judge.\nSimilarly, finite things stand to each other as cause and effect,\nforce and exercise, and when they are apprehended in these categories,\nthey are known in their finitude. But the objects of reason cannot be\ndefined by these finite predicates. To try to do so was the defect of\nthe old metaphysic.\n\n29.] Predicates of this kind, taken individually, have but a limited\nrange of meaning, and no one can fail to perceive how inadequate they\nare, and how far they fall below the fulness of detail which our\nimaginative thought gives, in the case, for example, of God, Mind, or\nNature. Besides, though the fact of their being all predicates of one\nsubject supplies them with a certain connexion, their several meanings\nkeep them apart: and consequently each is brought in as a stranger in\nrelation to the others.\n\nThe first of these defects the Orientals sought to remedy, when, for\nexample, they defined God by attributing to Him many names; but still\nthey felt that the number of names would have had to be infinite.\n\n30.] (2) In the second place, _the metaphysical systems adopted a\nwrong criterion._ Their objects were no doubt totalities which in\ntheir own proper selves belong to reason,--that is, to the organised\nand systematically-developed universe, of thought. But these\ntotalities--God, the Soul, the World,--were taken by the metaphysician\nas subjects made and ready, to form the basis for an application of\nthe categories of the understanding. They were assumed from popular\nconception. Accordingly popular conception was the only canon for\nsettling whether or not the predicates were suitable and sufficient.\n\n31.] The common conceptions of God, the Soul, the World, may be\nsupposed to afford thought a firm and fast footing. They do not really\ndo so. Besides having, a particular and subjective character clinging\nto them, and thus leaving room for great variety of interpretation,\nthey themselves first of all require a firm and fast definition by\nthought. This may be seen in any of these propositions where the\npredicate, or in philosophy the category, is needed to indicate what\nthe subject, or the conception we start with, is.\n\nIn such a sentence as 'God is eternal,' we begin with the conception of\nGod, not knowing as yet what he is: to tell us that, is the business of\nthe predicate. In the principles of logic, accordingly, where the terms\nformulating the subject-matter are those of thought only, it is not\nmerely superfluous to make these categories predicates to propositions\nin which God, or, still vaguer, the Absolute, is the subject, but it\nwould also have the disadvantage of suggesting another canon than\nthe nature of thought. Besides, the propositional form (and for\nproposition, it would be more correct to substitute judgment) is not\nsuited to express the concrete--and the true is always concrete--or\nthe speculative. Every judgment is by its form one-sided and, to that\nextent, false.\n\nThis metaphysic was not free or objective thinking. Instead of letting\nthe object freely and spontaneously expound its own characteristics,\nmetaphysic pre-supposed it ready-made. If any one wishes to know what\nfree thought means, he must go to Greek philosophy: for Scholasticism,\nlike these metaphysical systems, accepted its facts, and accepted them\nas a dogma from the authority of the Church. We moderns, too, by our\nwhole up-bringing, have been initiated into ideas which it is extremely\ndifficult to overstep, on account of their far-reaching significance.\nBut the ancient philosophers were in a different position. They were\nmen who lived wholly in the perceptions of the senses, and who,\nafter their rejection of mythology and its fancies, pre-supposed\nnothing but the heaven above and the earth around. In these material,\nnon-metaphysical surroundings, thought is free and enjoys its own\nprivacy,--cleared of everything material, and thoroughly at home. This\nfeeling that we are all our own is characteristic of free thought--of\nthat voyage into the open, where nothing is below us or above us, and\nwe stand in solitude with ourselves alone.\n\n32.] (3) In the third place, _this system of metaphysic turned into\nDogmatism._ When our thought never ranges beyond narrow and rigid\nterms, we are forced to assume that of two opposite assertions, such as\nwere the above propositions, the one must be true and the other false.\n\nDogmatism may be most simply described as the contrary of Scepticism.\nThe ancient Sceptics gave the name of Dogmatism to every philosophy\nwhatever holding a system of definite doctrine. In this large sense\nScepticism may apply the name even to philosophy which is properly\nSpeculative. But in the narrower sense, Dogmatism consists in the\ntenacity which draws a hard and fast line between certain terms\nand others opposite to them. We may see this clearly in the strict\n'Either--or': for instance, The world is either finite or infinite;\nbut one of these two it must be. The contrary of this rigidity is the\ncharacteristic of all Speculative truth. There no such inadequate\nformulae are allowed, nor can they possibly exhaust it. These formulae\nSpeculative truth holds in union as a totality, whereas, Dogmatism\ninvests them in their isolation with a title to fixity and truth.\n\nIt often happens in philosophy that the half-truth takes its place\nbeside the whole truth and assumes on its own account the position\nof something permanent. But the fact is that the half-truth, instead\nof being a fixed or self-subsistent principle, is a mere element\nabsolved and included in the whole. The metaphysic of understanding is\ndogmatic, because it maintains half-truths in their isolation: whereas\nthe idealism of speculative philosophy carries out the principle of\ntotality and shows that it can reach beyond the inadequate formularies\nof abstract thought. Thus idealism would say:--The soul is neither\nfinite only, nor infinite only; it is really the one just as much as\nthe other, and in that way neither the one nor the other. In other\nwords; such formularies in their isolation are inadmissible, and only\ncome into account as formative elements in a larger notion. Such\nidealism we see even in the ordinary phases of consciousness. Thus we\nsay of sensible things, that they are changeable: that is, they _are,_\nbut it is equally true that they are _not._ We show more obstinacy\nin dealing with the categories of the understanding. These are terms\nwhich we believe to be somewhat firmer--or even absolutely firm and\nfast. We look upon them as separated from each other by an infinite\nchasm, so that opposite categories can never get at each other. The\nbattle of reason is the struggle to break up the rigidity to which the\nunderstanding has reduced everything.\n\n33.] The _first_ part of this metaphysic in its systematic form is\nOntology, or the doctrine of the abstract characteristics of Being.\nThe multitude of these characteristics, and the limits set to their\napplicability, are not founded upon any principle. They have in\nconsequence to be enumerated as experience and circumstances direct,\nand the import ascribed to them is founded only upon common sensualised\nconceptions, upon assertions that particular words are used in a\nparticular sense, and even perhaps upon etymology. If experience\npronounces the list to be complete, and if the usage of language, by\nits agreement, shows the analysis to be correct, the metaphysician is\nsatisfied; and the intrinsic and independent truth and necessity of\nsuch characteristics is never made a matter of investigation at all.\n\nTo ask if being, existence, finitude, simplicity, complexity, &c. are\nnotions intrinsically and independently true, must surprise those who\nbelieve that a question about truth can only concern propositions (as\nto whether a notion is or is not with truth to be attributed, as the\nphrase is, to a subject), and that falsehood lies in the contradiction\nexisting between the subject in our ideas, and the notion to be\npredicated of it. Now as the notion is concrete, it and every character\nof it in general is essentially a self-contained unity of distinct\ncharacteristics. If truth then were nothing more than the absence\nof contradiction, it would be first of all necessary in the case of\nevery-notion to examine whether it, taken individually, did not contain\nthis sort of intrinsic contradiction.\n\n34.] The _second_ branch of the metaphysical system was Rational\nPsychology or Pneumatology. It dealt with the metaphysical nature of\nthe Soul,--that is, of the Mind regarded as a thing. It expected to\nfind immortality in a sphere dominated by the laws of composition,\ntime, qualitative change, and quantitative increase or decrease.\n\nThe name 'rational,' given to this species of psychology, served\nto contrast it with empirical modes of observing the phenomena of\nthe soul. Rational psychology viewed the soul in its metaphysical\nnature, and through the categories supplied by abstract thought. The\nrationalists endeavoured to ascertain the inner nature of the soul as\nit is in itself and as it is for thought.--In philosophy at present we\nhear little of the soul: the favourite term now is mind (spirit). The\ntwo are distinct, soul being as it were the middle term between body\nand spirit, or the bond between the two. The mind, as soul, is immersed\nin corporeity, and the soul is the animating principle of the body.\n\nThe pre-Kantian metaphysic, we say, viewed the soul as a thing. 'Thing'\nis a very ambiguous word. By a thing, we mean, firstly, an immediate\nexistence, something we represent in sensuous form: and in this meaning\nthe term has been applied to the soul. Hence the question regarding the\nseat of the soul. Of course, if the soul have a seat, it is in space\nand sensuously envisaged. So, too, if the soul be viewed as a thing,\nwe can ask whether the soul is simple or composite. The question is\nimportant as bearing on the immortality of the soul, which is supposed\nto depend on the absence of composition. But the fact is, that in\nabstract simplicity we have a category, which as little corresponds to\nthe nature of the soul, as that of compositeness.\n\nOne word on the relation of rational to empirical psychology. The\nformer, because it sets itself to apply thought to cognise mind and\neven to demonstrate the result of such thinking, is the higher; whereas\nempirical psychology starts from perception, and only recounts and\ndescribes what perception supplies. But if we propose to think the\nmind, we must not be quite so shy of its special phenomena. Mind is\nessentially active in the same sense as the Schoolmen said that God\nis 'absolute actuosity.' But if the mind is active it must as it were\nutter itself. It is wrong therefore to take the mind for a processless\n_ens,_ as did the old metaphysic which divided the processless inward\nlife of the mind from its outward life. The mind, of all things, must\nbe looked at in its concrete actuality, in its energy; and in such a\nway that its manifestations are seen to be determined by its inward\nforce.\n\n35.] The _third_ branch of metaphysics was Cosmology. The topics\nit embraced were the world, its contingency, necessity, eternity,\nlimitation in time and space: the laws (only formal) of its changes:\nthe freedom of man and the origin of evil.\n\nTo these topics it applied what were believed to be thorough-going\ncontrasts: such as contingency and necessity; external and internal\nnecessity; efficient and final cause, or causality in general and\ndesign; essence or substance and phenomenon; form and matter; freedom\nand necessity; happiness and pain; good and evil.\n\nThe object of Cosmology comprised not merely Nature, but Mind too, in\nits external complication in its phenomenon--in fact, existence in\ngeneral, or the sum of finite things. This object however it viewed not\nas a concrete whole, but only under certain abstract points of view.\nThus the questions Cosmology attempted to solve were such as these: Is\naccident or necessity dominant in the world? Is the world eternal or\ncreated? It was therefore a chief concern of this study to lay down\nwhat were called general Cosmological laws: for instance, that Nature\ndoes not act by fits and starts. And by fits and starts (_saltus_) they\nmeant a qualitative difference or qualitative alteration showing itself\nwithout any antecedent determining mean: whereas, on the contrary, a\ngradual change (of quantity) is obviously not without intermediation.\n\nIn regard to Mind as it makes itself felt in the world, the questions\nwhich Cosmology chiefly discussed turned upon the freedom of man and\nthe origin of evil. Nobody can deny that these are questions of the\nhighest importance. But to give them a satisfactory answer, it is above\nall things necessary not to claim finality for the abstract formulae\nof understanding, or to suppose that each of the two terms in an\nantithesis has an independent-subsistence or can be treated in its\nisolation as a complete and self-centred truth. This however is the\ngeneral position taken by the metaphysicians before Kant, and appears\nin their cosmological discussions, which for that reason were incapable\nof compassing their purpose, to understand the phenomena of the world.\nObserve how they proceed with the distinction between freedom and\nnecessity, in their application of these categories to Nature and\nMind. Nature they regard as subject in its workings to necessity;\nMind they hold to be free. No doubt there is a real foundation for\nthis distinction in the very core of the Mind itself: but freedom and\nnecessity, when thus abstractly opposed, are terms applicable only in\nthe finite world to which, as such, they belong. A freedom involving no\nnecessity, and mere necessity without freedom, are abstract and in this\nway untrue formulae of [thought. Freedom is no blank indeterminateness:\nessentially concrete, and unvaryingly self-determinate, it is so far at\nthe same time necessary. Necessity, again, in the ordinary acceptation\nof the term in popular philosophy, means determination from without\nonly,--as in finite mechanics, where a body moves only when it is\nstruck by another body, and moves in the direction communicated to it\nby the impact.--This however is a merely external necessity, not the\nreal inward necessity which is identical with freedom.\n\nThe case is similar with the contrast of Good and Evil,--the favourite\ncontrast of the introspective modern world. If we regard Evil as\npossessing a fixity of its own, apart and distinct from Good, we are\nto a certain extent right: there is an opposition between them: nor\ndo those who maintain the apparent and relative character of the\nopposition mean that Evil and Good in the Absolute are one, or, in\naccordance with the modern phrase, that a thing first becomes evil\nfrom our way of looking at it. The error arises when we take Evil as a\npermanent positive, instead of--what it really is--a negative which,\nthough it would fain assert itself, has no real persistence, and is, in\nfact, only the absolute sham-existence of negativity in itself.\n\n36.] The _fourth_ branch of metaphysics is Natural or Rational\nTheology. The notion of God, or God as a possible being, the proofs of\nhis existence, and his properties, formed the study of this branch.\n\n(a) When understanding thus discusses the Deity, its main purpose is\nto find what predicates correspond or not to the fact we have in our\nimagination as God. And in so doing it assumes the contrast between\npositive and negative to be absolute; and hence, in the long run,\nnothing is left for the notion as understanding takes it, but the empty\nabstraction of indeterminate Being, of mere reality or positivity, the\nlifeless product of modern 'Deism.'\n\n(b) The method of demonstration employed in finite knowledge must\nalways lead to an inversion of the true order. For it requires the\nstatement of some objective ground for God's being, which thus acquires\nthe appearance of being derived from something else. This mode of\nproof, guided as it is by the canon of mere analytical identity,\nis embarrassed by the difficulty of passing from the finite to the\ninfinite. Either the finitude of the existing world, which is left as\nmuch a fact as it was before, clings to the notion of Deity, and God\nhas to be defined as the immediate substance of that world,--which is\nPantheism: or He remains an object set over against the subject, and in\nthis way, finite,--which is Dualism.\n\n(c) The attributes of God which ought to be various and precise, had,\nproperly speaking, sunk and disappeared in the abstract notion of pure\nreality, of indeterminate Being. Yet in our material thought, the\nfinite world continues, meanwhile, to have a real being, with God as a\nsort of antithesis: and thus arises the further picture of different\nrelations of God to the world. These, formulated as properties, must,\non the one hand, as relations to finite circumstances, themselves\npossess a finite character (giving us such properties as just,\ngracious, mighty, wise, &c.); on the other hand they must be infinite.\nNow on this level of thought the only means, and a hazy one, of\nreconciling these opposing requirements was quantitative exaltation\nof the properties, forcing them into indeterminateness,--into the\n_sensus eminentior._ But it was an expedient which really destroyed the\nproperty and left a mere name.\n\nThe object of the old metaphysical theology was to see how far\nunassisted reason could go in the knowledge of God. Certainly a\nreason-derived knowledge of God is the highest problem of philosophy.\nThe earliest teachings of religion are figurate conceptions of God.\nThese conceptions, as the Creed arranges them, are imparted to us in\nyouth. They are the doctrines of our religion, and in so far as the\nindividual rests his faith on these doctrines and feels them to be\nthe truth, he has all he needs as a Christian. Such is faith: and the\nscience of this faith is Theology. But until Theology is something more\nthan a bare enumeration and compilation of these doctrines _ab extra,_\nit has no right to the title of science. Even the method so much in\nvogue at present--the purely historical mode of treatment--which for\nexample reports what has been said by this or the other Father of the\nChurch--does not invest theology with a scientific character. To get\nthat, we must go on to comprehend the facts by thought,--which is the\nbusiness of philosophy. Genuine theology is thus at the same time a\nreal philosophy of religion, as it was, we may add, in the Middle Ages.\n\nAnd now let us examine this rational theology more narrowly. It was\na science which approached God not by reason but by understanding,\nand, in its mode of thought, employed the terms without any sense of\ntheir mutual limitations and connexions. The notion of God formed the\nsubject of discussion; and yet the criterion of our knowledge was\nderived from such an extraneous source as the materialised conception\nof God. Now thought must be free in its movements. It is no doubt to\nbe remembered, that the result of independent thought harmonises with\nthe import of the Christian religion:--for the Christian religion is\na revelation of reason. But such a harmony surpassed the efforts of\nrational theology. It proposed to define the figurate conception of God\nin terms of thought; but it resulted in a notion of God which was what\nwe may call the abstract of positivity or reality, to the exclusion\nof all negation. God was accordingly defined to be the most real of\nall beings. Any one can see however that this most real of beings, in\nwhich negation forms no part, is the very opposite of what it ought\nto be and of what understanding supposes it to be. Instead of being\nrich and full above all measure, it is so narrowly conceived that it\nis, on the contrary, extremely poor and altogether empty. It is with\nreason that the heart craves a concrete body of truth; but without\ndefinite feature, that is, without negation, contained in the notion,\nthere can only be an abstraction. When the notion of God is apprehended\nonly as that of the abstract or most real being, God is, as it were,\nrelegated to another world beyond: and to speak of a knowledge of him\nwould be meaningless. Where there is no definite quality, knowledge is\nimpossible. Mere light is mere darkness.\n\nThe second problem of rational theology was to prove the existence\nof God. Now, in this matter, the main point to be noted is\nthat demonstration, as the understanding employs it, means the\ndependence of one truth on another. In such proofs we have a\npre-supposition--something firm and fast, from which something else\nfollows; we exhibit the dependence of some truth from an assumed\nstarting-point. Hence, if this mode of demonstration is applied to the\nexistence of God, it can only mean that the being of God is to depend\non other terms, which will then constitute the ground of his being.\nIt is at once evident that this will lead I to some mistake: for God\nmust be simply and solely the I ground of everything, and in so far\nnot dependent upon anything else. And a perception of this danger has\nin modern times led some to say that God's existence is not capable\nof proof, but must be immediately or intuitively apprehended. Reason,\nhowever, and even sound common sense give demonstration a meaning quite\ndifferent from that of the understanding. The demonstration of reason\nno doubt starts from something which is not God. But, as it advances,\nit does not leave the starting-point a mere unexplained fact, which is\nwhat it was. On the contrary it exhibits that point as derivative and\ncalled into being, and then God is seen to be primary, truly immediate\nand self-subsisting, with the means of derivation wrapt up and absorbed\nin himself. Those who say: 'Consider Nature, and Nature will-lead you\nto God; you will find an absolute final cause: 'do not mean that God\nis something derivative: they mean that it is we who proceed to God\nhimself from another; and in this way God, though the consequence, is\nalso the absolute' ground of the initial step. The relation of the two\nthings is reversed; and what came as a consequence, being shown to be\nan antecedent, the original antecedent is reduced to a consequence.\nThis is always the way, moreover, whenever reason demonstrates.\n\nIf in the light of the present discussion we cast one glance more on\nthe metaphysical method as a whole, we find its main characteristic\nwas to make abstract identity its principle and to try to apprehend\nthe objects of reason by the abstract and finite categories of the\nunderstanding. But this infinite of the understanding, this pure\nessence, is still finite: it has excluded all the variety of particular\nthings, which thus limit and deny it. Instead of winning a concrete,\nthis metaphysic stuck fast on an abstract, identity. Its good point was\nthe perception that thought alone constitutes the essence of all that\nis. It derived its materials from earlier philosophers, particularly\nthe Schoolmen. In speculative philosophy the understanding undoubtedly\nforms a stage, but not a stage at which we should keep for ever\nstanding. Plato is no metaphysician of this imperfect type, still less\nAristotle, although the contrary is generally believed.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\n\nSECOND ATTITUDE OF THOUGHT TO OBJECTIVITY.\n\n\nI. _Empiricism._\n\n\n37.] Under these circumstances a double want began to be felt. Partly\nit was the need of a concrete subject-matter, as a counterpoise to the\nabstract theories of the understanding, which is unable to advance\nunaided from its generalities to specialisation and determination.\nPartly, too, it was the demand for something fixed and secure, so as\nto exclude the possibility of proving anything and everything in the\nsphere, and according to the method, of the finite formulae of thought.\nSuch was the genesis of Empirical philosophy, which abandons the search\nfor truth in thought itself, and goes to fetch it from Experience, the\noutward and the inward present.\n\nThe rise of Empiricism is due to the need thus stated of concrete\ncontents, and a firm footing--needs which the abstract metaphysic of\nthe understanding failed to satisfy. Now by concreteness of contents\nit is meant that we must know the objects of consciousness as\nintrinsically determinate and as the unity of distinct characteristics.\nBut, as we have already seen, this is by no means the case with the\nmetaphysic of understanding, if it conform to its principle. With the\nmere understanding, thinking is limited to the form of an abstract\nuniversal, and can never advance to the particularisation of this\nuniversal. Thus we find the metaphysicians engaged in an attempt to\nelicit by the instrumentality of thought, what was the essence or\nfundamental attribute of the Soul The Soul, they said, is simple.\nThe simplicity thus ascribed to the Soul meant a mere and utter\nsimplicity, from which difference is excluded: difference, or in other\nwords composition, being made the fundamental attribute of body, or\nof matter in general. Clearly, in simplicity of this narrow type we\nhave a very shallow category, quite incapable of embracing the wealth\nof the soul or of the mind. When it thus appeared that abstract\nmetaphysical thinking was inadequate, it was felt that resource must be\nhad to empirical psychology. The same happened in the case of Rational\nPhysics. The current phrases there were, for instance, that space is\ninfinite, that Nature makes no leap, &c. Evidently this phraseology was\nwholly unsatisfactory in presence of the plenitude and life of nature.\n\n38.] To some extent this source from which Empiricism draws is common\nto it with metaphysic. It is in our materialised conceptions, _i.e._\nin facts which emanate, in the first instance, from experience,\nthat metaphysic also finds the guarantee for the correctness of its\ndefinitions (including both its initial assumptions and its more\ndetailed body of doctrine). But, on the other hand, it must be noted\nthat the single sensation is not the same thing as experience, and\nthat the Empirical School elevates the facts included under sensation,\nfeeling, and perception into the form of general ideas, propositions or\nlaws. This, however, it does with the reservation that these general\nprinciples (such as force), are to have no further import or validity\nof their own beyond that taken from the sense-impression, and that\nno connexion shall be deemed legitimate except what can be shown to\nexist in phenomena. And on the subjective side Empirical cognition has\nits stable footing in the fact that in a sensation consciousness is\ndirectly present and certain of itself.\n\nIn Empiricism lies the great principle that whatever is true must\nbe in the actual world and present to sensation. This principle\ncontradicts that 'ought to be' on the strength of which 'reflection'\nis vain enough to treat the actual present with scorn and to point to\na scene beyond--a scene which is assumed to have place and being only\nin the understanding of those who talk of it. No less than Empiricism,\nphilosophy (\u00a7 7) recognises only what is, and has nothing to do with\nwhat merely ought to be and what is thus confessed not to exist. On the\nsubjective side, too, it is right to notice the valuable principle of\nfreedom involved in Empiricism. For the main lesson of Empiricism is\nthat man must see for himself and feel that he is present in every fact\nof knowledge which he has to accept.\n\nWhen it is carried out to its legitimate consequences,\nEmpiricism--being in its facts limited to the finite sphere--denies the\nsuper-sensible in general, or at least any knowledge of it which would\ndefine its nature; it leaves thought no powers except abstraction and\nformal universality and identity. But there is a fundamental delusion\nin all scientific empiricism. It employs the metaphysical categories of\nmatter, force, those of one, many, generality, infinity, &c.; following\nthe clue given by these categories it proceeds to draw conclusions, and\nin so doing pre-supposes and applies the syllogistic form. And all the\nwhile it is unaware that it contains metaphysics--in wielding which, it\nmakes use of those categories and their combinations in a style utterly\nthoughtless and uncritical.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nFrom Empiricism came the cry: 'Stop roaming in empty abstractions, keep\nyour eyes open, lay hold on man and nature as they are here before\nyou, enjoy the present moment.' Nobody can deny that there is a good\ndeal of truth in these words. The every-day world, what is here and\nnow, was a good exchange for the futile other-world--for the mirages\nand the chimeras of the abstract understanding. And thus was acquired\nan infinite principle,--that solid footing so much missed in the old\nmetaphysic. Finite principles are the most that the understanding\ncan pick out--and these being essentially unstable and tottering,\nthe structure they supported must collapse with a crash. Always the\ninstinct of reason was to find an infinite principle. As yet, the\ntime had not come for finding it in thought. Hence, this instinct\nseized upon the present, the Here, the This,--where doubtless there is\nimplicit infinite form, but not in the genuine existence of that form.\nThe external world is the truth, if it could but know it: for the truth\nis actual and must exist. The infinite principle, the self-centred\ntruth, therefore, is in the world for reason to discover: though it\nexists in an individual and sensible shape, and not in its truth.\n\nBesides, this school makes sense-perception the form in which fact\nis to be apprehended: and in this consists the defect of Empiricism.\nSense-perception as such is always individual, always transient: not\nindeed that the process of knowledge stops short at sensation: on the\ncontrary, it proceeds to find out the universal and permanent element\nin the individual apprehended by sense. This is the process leading\nfrom simple perception to experience.\n\nIn order to form experiences, Empiricism makes especial use of the\nform of Analysis. In the impression of sense we have a concrete of\nmany elements, the several attributes of which we are expected to\npeel off one by one, like the coats of an onion. In thus dismembering\nthe thing, it is understood that we disintegrate and take to pieces\nthese attributes which have coalesced, and add nothing but our own\nact of disintegration. Yet analysis is the process from the immediacy\nof sensation to thought: those attributes, which the object analysed\ncontains in union, acquire the form of universality by being separated.\nEmpiricism therefore labours under a delusion, if it supposes that,\nwhile analysing the objects, it leaves them as they were: it really\ntransforms the concrete into an abstract. And as a consequence of this\nchange the living thing is killed: life can exist only in the concrete\nand one. Not that we can do without this division, if it be our\nintention to comprehend. Mind itself is an inherent division. The error\nlies in forgetting that this is only one-half of the process, and that\nthe main point is the re-union of what has been parted. And it is where\nanalysis never gets beyond the stage of partition that the words of the\npoet are true:\n\n    _'Encheiresin Naturae_ nennt's die Chemie,\n    Spottet ihrer Selbst, und weiss nicht, wie:\n    Hat die Teile in Ihrer Hand\n    Fehlt leider nur das geistige Band.'\n\nAnalysis starts from the concrete; and the possession of this material\ngives it a considerable advantage over the abstract thinking of the\nold metaphysics. It establishes the differences in things: and this is\nvery important: but these very differences are nothing after all but\nabstract attributes, _e.g._ thoughts. These thoughts, it is assumed,\ncontain the real essence of the objects; and thus once more we see the\naxiom of bygone metaphysics reappear, that the truth of things lies in\nthought.\n\nLet us next compare the empirical theory with that of metaphysics in\nthe matter of their respective contents. We find the latter, as already\nstated, taking for its theme the universal objects of the reason, viz.\nGod, the Soul, and the World: and these themes, accepted from popular\nconception, it was the problem of philosophy to reduce into the form\nof thoughts. Another specimen of the same method was the Scholastic\nphilosophy, the theme pre-supposed by which was formed by the dogmas\nof the Christian Church: and it aimed at fixing their meaning and\ngiving them a systematic arrangement through thought.--The facts on\nwhich Empiricism is based are of entirely different kind. They are\nthe sensible facts of nature and the facts of the finite mind. In\nother words, Empiricism deals with a finite material--and the old\nmetaphysicians had an infinite,--though, let us add, they made this\ninfinite content finite by the finite form of the understanding. The\nsame finitude of form reappears in Empiricism--but here the facts are\nfinite also. To this exigent, then, both modes of philosophising have\nthe same method; both proceed from data or assumptions, which they\naccept as ultimate. Generally speaking, Empiricism finds the truth in\nthe outward world; and even if it allow a super-sensible world, it\nholds knowledge of that world to be impossible, and would restrict us\nto the province of sense-perception. This doctrine when systematically\ncarried out produces what has been latterly termed Materialism.\nMaterialism of this stamp looks upon matter, _qu\u00e2_ matter, as the\ngenuine objective world. But with matter we are at once introduced\nto an abstraction, which as such cannot be perceived: and it may be\nmaintained that there is no matter, because, as it exists, it is always\nsomething definite and concrete. Yet the abstraction we term matter is\nsupposed to lie at the basis of the whole world of sense, and expresses\nthe sense-world in its simplest terms as out-and-out individualisation,\nand hence a congeries of points in mutual exclusion. So long then as\nthis sensible sphere is and continues to be for Empiricism a mere\ndatum, we have a doctrine of bondage: for we become free, when we\nare confronted by no absolutely alien world, but depend upon a fact\nwhich we ourselves are. Consistently with the empirical point of view,\nbesides, reason and unreason can only be subjective: in other words,\nwe must take what is given just as it is, and we have no right to ask\nwhether and to what extent it is rational in its own nature.\n\n39.] Touching this principle it has been justly observed that in\nwhat we call Experience, as distinct from mere single perception of\nsingle facts, there are two elements. The one is the matter, infinite\nin its multiplicity, and as it stands a mere set of singulars: the\nother is the form, the characteristics of universality and necessity.\nMere experience no doubt offers many, perhaps innumerable cases of\nsimilar perceptions: but, after all, no multitude, however great,\ncan be the same thing as universality. Similarly, mere experience\naffords perceptions of changes succeeding each other and of objects in\njuxtaposition; but it presents no necessary connexion. If perception,\ntherefore, is to maintain its claim to be the sole basis of what\nmen hold for truth, universality and necessity appear something\nillegitimate: they become an accident of our minds, a mere custom, the\ncontent of which might be otherwise constituted than it is.\n\nIt is an important corollary of this theory, that on this empirical\nmode of treatment legal and ethical principles and laws, as well as the\ntruths of religion, are exhibited as the work of chance, and stripped\nof their objective character and inner truth.\n\nThe scepticism of Hume, to which this conclusion was chiefly due,\nshould be clearly marked off from Greek scepticism. Hume assumes the\ntruth of the empirical element, feeling and sensation, and proceeds to\nchallenge universal principles and laws, because they have no warranty\nfrom sense-perception. So far was ancient scepticism from making\nfeeling and sensation the canon of truth, that it turned against the\ndeliverances of sense first of all. (On Modern Scepticism as compared\nwith Ancient, see Schelling and Hegel's Critical Journal of Philosophy:\n1802, vol. I. i.)\n\n\n\nII. _The Critical Philosophy._\n\n\n40.] In common with Empiricism the Critical Philosophy assumes that\nexperience affords the one sole foundation for cognitions; which\nhowever it does not allow to rank as truths, but only as knowledge of\nphenomena.\n\nThe Critical theory starts originally from the distinction of elements\npresented in the analysis of experience, viz. the matter of sense, and\nits universal relations. Taking into account Hume's criticism on this\ndistinction as given in the preceding section, viz. that sensation\ndoes not explicitly apprehend more than an individual or more than a\nmere event, it insists at the same time on the _fact_ that universality\nand necessity are seen to perform a function equally essential in\nconstituting what is called experience. This element, not being derived\nfrom the empirical facts as such, must belong to the spontaneity of\nthought; in other words, it is _a priori._ The Categories or Notions\nof the Understanding constitute the _objectivity_ of experiential\ncognitions. In every case they involve a connective reference, and\nhence through their means are formed synthetic judgments _a priori,_\nthat is, primary and underivative connexions of opposites.\n\nEven Hume's scepticism does not deny that the characteristics of\nuniversality and necessity are found in cognition. And even in Kant\nthis fact remains a presupposition after all; it may be said, to use\nthe ordinary phraseology of the sciences, that Kant did no more than\noffer another _explanation_ of the fact.\n\n41.] The Critical Philosophy proceeds to test the value of the\ncategories employed in metaphysic, as well as in other sciences\nand in ordinary conception. This scrutiny however is not directed\nto the content of these categories, nor does it inquire into the\nexact relation they bear to one another: but simply considers them\nas affected by the contrast between subjective and objective. The\ncontrast, as we are to understand it here, bears upon the distinction\n(see preceding \u00a7) of the two elements in experience. The name of\nobjectivity is here given to the element of universality and necessity,\n_i.e._ to the categories themselves, or what is called the _a priori_\nconstituent. The Critical Philosophy however widened the contrast in\nsuch away, that the subjectivity comes to embrace the _ensemble_ of\nexperience, including both of the aforesaid elements; and nothing\nremains on the other side but the 'thing-in-itself.'\n\nThe special forms of the _a priori_ element, in other words, of\nthought, which in spite of its objectivity is looked upon as a purely\nsubjective act, present themselves as follows in a systematic order\nwhich, it may be remarked, is solely based upon psychological and\nhistorical grounds.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n(1) A very important step was undoubtedly made, when the terms of the\nold metaphysic were subjected to scrutiny. The plain thinker pursued\nhis unsuspecting way in those categories which had offered themselves\nnaturally. It never occurred to him to ask to what extent these\ncategories had a value and authority of their own. If, as has been\nsaid, it is characteristic of free thought to allow no assumptions to\npass unquestioned, the old metaphysicians were not free thinkers. They\naccepted their categories as they were, without further trouble, as an\n_a priori_ datum, not yet tested by reflection. The Critical philosophy\nreversed this. Kant undertook to examine how far the forms of thought\nwere capable of leading to the knowledge of truth. In particular he\ndemanded a criticism of the faculty of cognition as preliminary to\nits exercise. That is a fair demand, if it mean that even the forms\nof thought must be made an object of investigation. Unfortunately\nthere soon creeps in the misconception of already knowing before _you_\nknow,--the error of refusing to enter the water until you have learnt\nto swim. True, indeed, the forms of thought should be subjected to a\nscrutiny before they are used: yet what is this scrutiny but _ipso\nfacto_ a cognition? So that what we want is to combine in our process\nof inquiry the action of the forms of thought with a criticism of\nthem. The forms of thought must be studied in their essential nature\nand complete development: they are at once the object of research and\nthe action of that object. Hence they examine themselves: in their own\naction they must determine their limits, and point out their defects.\nThis is that action of thought, which will hereafter be specially\nconsidered under the name of Dialectic, and regarding which we need\nonly at the outset observe that, instead of being brought to bear upon\nthe categories from without, it is immanent in their own action.\n\nWe may therefore state the first point in Kant's philosophy as follows:\nThought must itself investigate its own capacity of knowledge. People\nin the present day have got over Kant and his philosophy: everybody\nwants to get further. But there are two ways of going further--a\nback-, ward and a forward. The light of criticism soon shows that many\nof our modern essays in philosophy are mere repetitions of the old\nmetaphysical method, an endless and uncritical thinking in a groove\ndetermined by the natural bent of each man's mind.\n\n(2) Kant's examination of the categories suffers from the grave defect\nof viewing them, not absolutely and for their own sake, but in order to\nsee whether they are _subjective_ or _objective._ In the language of\ncommon life we mean by objective what exists outside of us and reaches\nus from without by means of sensation. What Kant did, was to deny that\nthe categories, such as cause and effect, were, in this sense of the\nword, objective, or given in sensation, and to maintain on the contrary\nthat they belonged to our own thought itself, to the spontaneity of\nthought. To that extent therefore, they were subjective. And yet in\nspite of this, Kant gives the name objective to what is thought, to the\nuniversal and necessary, while he describes as subjective whatever is\nmerely felt. This arrangement apparently reverses the first-mentioned\nuse of the word, and has caused Kant to be charged with confusing\nlanguage. But the charge is unfair if we more narrowly consider the\nfacts of the case. The vulgar believe that the objects of perception\nwhich confront them, such as an individual animal, or a single star,\nare independent and permanent existences, compared with which, thoughts\nare unsubstantial and dependent on something else. In fact however\nthe perceptions of sense are the properly dependent and secondary\nfeature, while the thoughts are really independent and primary. This\nbeing so, Kant gave the title objective to the intellectual factor, to\nthe universal and necessary: and he was quite justified in so doing.\nOur sensations on the other hand are subjective; for sensations lack\nstability in their own nature, and are no less fleeting and evanescent\nthan thought is permanent and self-subsisting. At the present day, the\nspecial line of distinction established by Kant between the subjective\nand objective is adopted by the phraseology of the educated world. Thus\nthe criticism of a work of art ought, it is said, to be not subjective,\nbut objective; in other words, instead of springing from the particular\nand accidental feeling or temper of the moment, it should keep its eye\non those general points of view which the laws of art establish. In\nthe same acceptation we can distinguish in any scientific pursuit the\nobjective and the subjective interest of the investigation.\n\nBut after all, objectivity of thought, in Kant's sense, is again to\na certain extent subjective. Thoughts, according to Kant, although\nuniversal and necessary categories, are _only our_ thoughts--separated\nby an impassable gulf from the thing, as it exists apart from our\nknowledge. But the true, objectivity of thinking means that the\nthoughts, far from being merely ours, must at the same time be the real\nessence of the things, and of whatever is an object to us.\n\nObjective and subjective are convenient expressions in current use,\nthe employment of which may easily lead to confusion. Up to this\npoint, the discussion has shown three meanings of objectivity. First,\nit means what has external existence, in distinction from which the\nsubjective is what is only supposed, dreamed, &c. Secondly, it has\nthe meaning, attached to it by Kant, of the universal and necessary,\nas distinguished from the particular, subjective and occasional\nelement which belongs to our sensations. Thirdly, as has been just\nexplained, it means the thought-apprehended essence of the existing\nthing, in contradistinction from what is merely _our_ thought, and what\nconsequently is still separated from the thing itself, as it exists in\nindependent essence.\n\n42.] (a) The Theoretical Faculty.--Cognition _qu\u00e2_ cognition.\nThe specific ground of the categories is declared by the Critical\nsystem to lie in the primary identity of the 'I' in thought,--what\nKant calls the 'transcendental unity of self-consciousness.'\nThe impressions from feeling and perception are, if we look to\ntheir contents, a multiplicity or miscellany of elements: and the\nmultiplicity is equally conspicuous in their form. For sense is marked\nby a mutual exclusion of members; and that under two aspects, namely\nspace and time, which, being the forms, that is to say, the universal\ntype of perception, are themselves _a priori._ This congeries,\nafforded by sensation and perception, must however be reduced to an\nidentity or primary synthesis. To accomplish this the 'I' brings it in\nrelation to itself and unites it there in _one_ consciousness which\nKant calls 'pure apperception.' The specific modes in which the Ego\nrefers to itself the multiplicity of sense are the pure concepts of the\nunderstanding, the Categories.\n\nKant, it is well known, did not put himself to much trouble in\ndiscovering the categories. 'I,' the unity of self-consciousness,\nbeing quite abstract and completely indeterminate, the question\narises, how are we to get at the specialised forms of the 'I,' the\ncategories? Fortunately, the common logic offers to our hand an\nempirical classification of the kinds of _judgment._ Now, to judge\nis the same as to _think_ of a determinate object. Hence the various\nmodes of judgment, as enumerated to our hand, provide us with the\nseveral categories of thought. To the philosophy of Fichte belongs\nthe great merit of having called attention to the need of exhibiting\nthe _necessity_ of these categories and giving a genuine _deduction_\nof them. Fichte ought to have produced at least one effect on the\nmethod of logic. One might have expected that the general laws of\nthought, the usual stock-in-trade of logicians, or the classification\nof notions, judgments, and syllogisms, would be no longer taken merely\nfrom observation and so only empirically treated, but be deduced from\nthought itself. If thought is to be capable of proving anything at all,\nif logic must insist upon the necessity of proofs, and if it proposes\nto teach the theory of demonstration, its first care should be to give\na reason for its own subject-matter, and to see that it is necessary.\n\n(i) Kant therefore holds that the categories have their source in the\n'Ego,' and that the 'Ego' consequently supplies the characteristics\nof universality and necessity. If we observe what we have before us\nprimarily, we may describe it as a congeries or diversity: and in the\ncategories we find the simple points or units, to which this congeries\nis made to converge. The world of sense is a scene of mutual exclusion:\nits being is outside itself. That is the fundamental feature of the\nsensible. 'Now' has no meaning except in reference to a before and a\nhereafter. Red, in the same way, only subsists by being opposed to\nyellow and blue. Now this other thing is outside the sensible; which\nlatter is, only in so far as it is not the other, and only in so far\nas that other is. But thought, or the 'Ego,' occupies a position the\nvery reverse of the sensible, with its mutual exclusions, and its\nbeing outside itself. The 'I' is the primary identity--at one with\nitself and all at home in itself. The word 'I' expresses the mere act\nof bringing-to-bear-upon-self: and whatever is placed in this unit or\nfocus, is affected _by_ it and transformed into it. The 'I' is as it\nwere the crucible and the fire which consumes the loose plurality of\nsense and reduces it to unity. This is the process which Kant calls\npure apperception in distinction from the common apperception, to\nwhich the plurality it receives is a plurality still; whereas pure\napperception is rather an act by which the 'I' makes the materials\n'mine.'\n\nThis view has at least the merit of giving a correct expression to the\nnature of all consciousness. The tendency of all man's endeavours is to\nunderstand the world, to appropriate and subdue it to himself: and to\nthis end the positive reality of the world must be as it were crushed\nand pounded, in other words, idealised. At the same time we must note\nthat it is not the mere act of _our_ personal self-consciousness, which\nintroduces an absolute unity into the variety of sense. Rather, this\nidentity is itself the absolute. The absolute is, as it were, so kind\nas to leave individual things to their own enjoyment, and it again\ndrives them back to the absolute unity.\n\n(2) Expressions like 'transcendental unity of self-consciousness' have\nan ugly look about them, and suggest a monster in the background:\nbut their meaning is not so abstruse as it looks. Kant's meaning of\ntranscendental may be gathered by the way he distinguishes it from\ntranscendent. The _transcendent_ may be said to be what steps out\nbeyond the categories of the understanding: a sense in which the term\nis first employed in mathematics. Thus in geometry you are told to\nconceive the circumference of a circle as formed of an infinite number\nof infinitely small straight lines. In other words, characteristics\nwhich the understanding holds to be totally different, the straight\nline and the curve, are expressly invested with identity. Another\ntranscendent of the same kind is the self-consciousness which is\nidentical with itself and infinite in itself, as distinguished from\nthe ordinary consciousness which derives its form and tone from finite\nmaterials. That unity of self-consciousness, however, Kant called\n_transcendental_ only; and he meant thereby that the unity was only in\nour minds and did not attach to the objects apart from our knowledge of\nthem.\n\n(3) To regard the categories as subjective only, _i.e._ as a part\nof ourselves, must seem very odd to the natural mind; and no doubt\nthere is something queer about it. It is quite true however that the\ncategories are not contained in the sensation as it is given us. When,\nfor instance, we look at a piece of sugar, we find it is hard, white,\nsweet, &c. All these properties we say are united in one object. Now\nit is this unity that is not found in the sensation. The same thing\nhappens if we conceive two events to stand in the relation of cause\nand effect. The senses only inform us of the two several occurrences\nwhich follow each other in time. But that the one is cause, the other\neffect,--in other words, the causal nexus between the two,--is not\nperceived by sense; it is only evident to thought. Still, though the\ncategories, such as unity, or cause and effect, are strictly the\nproperty of thought, it by no means follows that they must be ours\nmerely and not also characteristics of the objects. Kant however\nconfines them to the subject-mind, and his philosophy may be styled\nsubjective idealism: for he holds that both the form and the matter of\nknowledge are supplied by the Ego--or knowing subject--the form by our\nintellectual, the matter by our sentient ego.\n\nSo far as regards the content of this subjective idealism, not a word\nneed be wasted. It might perhaps at first sight be imagined, that\nobjects would lose their reality when their unity was transferred to\nthe subject. But neither we nor the objects would have anything to gain\nby the mere fact that they possessed being. The main point is not,\nthat they are, but what they are, and whether or not their content\nis true. It does no good to the things to say merely that they have\nbeing. What has being, will also cease to be when time creeps over it.\nIt might also be alleged that subjective idealism tended to promote\nself-conceit. But surely if a man's world be the sum of his sensible\nperceptions, he has no reason to be vain of such a world. Laying aside\ntherefore as unimportant this distinction between subjective and\nobjective, we are chiefly interested in knowing what a thing is: _i.e._\nits content, which is no more objective than it is subjective. If mere\nexistence be enough to make objectivity, even a crime is objective: but\nit is an existence which is nullity at the core, as is definitely made\napparent when the day of punishment comes.\n\n43.] The Categories may be viewed in two aspects. On the one hand it\nis by their instrumentality that the mere perception of sense rises to\nobjectivity and experience. On the other hand these notions are unities\nin our consciousness merely: they are consequently conditioned by the\nmaterial given to them, and having nothing of their own they can be\napplied to use only within the range of experience. But the other\nconstituent of experience, the impressions of feeling and perception,\nis not one whit less subjective than the categories.\n\nTo assert that the categories taken by themselves are empty can\nscarcely be right, seeing that they have a content, at all events, in\nthe special stamp and significance which they possess. Of course the\ncontent of the categories is not perceptible to the senses, nor is it\nin time and space: but that is rather a merit than a defect. A glimpse\nof this meaning of _content_ may be observed to affect our ordinary\nthinking. _A_ book or a speech for example is said to have a great\ndeal in it, to be full of content, in proportion to the greater number\nof thoughts and general results to be found in it: whilst, on the\ncontrary, we should never say that any book, _e.g._ novel, had much in\nit, because it included a great number of single incidents, situations,\nand the like. Even the popular voice thus recognises that something\nmore than the facts of sense is needed to make a work pregnant with\nmatter. And what is this additional desideratum but thoughts, or in the\nfirst instance the categories? And yet it is not altogether wrong, it\nshould be added, to call the categories of themselves empty, if it be\nmeant that they and the logical Idea, of which they are the members, do\nnot constitute the whole of philosophy, but necessarily lead onwards in\ndue progress to the real departments of Nature and Mind. Only let the\nprogress not be misunderstood. The logical Ideal does not thereby come\ninto possession of a content originally foreign to it: but by its own\nnative action is specialised and developed to Nature and Mind.\n\n44.] It follows that the categories are no fit terms to express\nthe Absolute--the Absolute not being given in perception;--and\nUnderstanding, or knowledge by means of the categories, is consequently\nincapable of knowing the Things-in-themselves.\n\nThe Thing-in-itself (and under 'thing' is embraced even Mind and God)\nexpresses the object when we leave out of sight all that consciousness\nmakes of it, all its emotional aspects, and all specific thoughts\nof it. It is easy to see what is left,--utter abstraction, total\nemptiness, only described still as an 'other-world'--the negative of\nevery image, feeling, and definite thought. Nor does it require much\npenetration to see that this _caput mortuum_ is still only a product\nof thought, such as accrues when thought is carried on to abstraction\nunalloyed: that it is the work of the empty 'Ego,' which makes an\nobject out of this empty self-identity of its own. The _negative_\ncharacteristic which this abstract identity receives as an _object,_ is\nalso enumerated among the categories of Kant, and is no less familiar\nthan the empty identity aforesaid. Hence one can only read with\nsurprise the perpetual remark that we do not know the Thing-in-itself.\nOn the contrary there is nothing we can know so easily.\n\n45.] It is Reason, the faculty of the Unconditioned, which discovers\nthe conditioned nature of the knowledge comprised in experience. What\nis thus called the object of Reason, the Infinite or Unconditioned,\nis nothing but self-sameness, or the primary identity of the 'Ego'\nin thought (mentioned in \u00a7 42). Reason itself is the name given to\nthe abstract 'Ego' or thought, which makes this pure identity its aim\nor object (cf. note to the preceding \u00a7). Now this identity, having\nno definite attribute at all, can receive no illumination from the\ntruths of experience, for the reason that these refer always to\ndefinite facts. Such is the sort of Unconditioned that is supposed to\nbe the absolute truth of Reason,--what is termed the _Idea;_ whilst\nthe cognitions of experience are reduced to the level of untruth and\ndeclared to be appearances.\n\nKant was the first definitely to signalise the distinction between\nReason and Understanding. The object of the former, as he applied the\nterm, was the infinite and unconditioned, of the latter the finite\nand conditioned. Kant did valuable service when he enforced the finite\ncharacter of the cognitions of the understanding founded merely upon\nexperience, and stamped their contents with the name of appearance.\nBut his mistake was to stop at the purely negative point of view, and\nto limit the unconditionality of Reason to an abstract self-sameness\nwithout any shade of distinction. It degrades Reason to a finite and\nconditioned thing, to identify it with a mere stepping beyond the\nfinite and conditioned range of understanding. The real infinite,\nfar from being a mere transcendence of the finite, always involves\nthe absorption of the finite into its own fuller nature. In the same\nway Kant restored the Idea to its proper dignity: vindicating it for\nReason, as a thing distinct from abstract analytic determinations or\nfrom the merely sensible conceptions which usually appropriate to\nthemselves the name of ideas. But as respects the Idea also, he never\ngot beyond its negative aspect, as what ought to be but is not.\n\nThe view that the objects of immediate consciousness, which constitute\nthe body of experience, are mere appearances (phenomena), was another\nimportant result of the Kantian philosophy. Common Sense, that mixture\nof sense and understanding, believes the objects of which it has\nknowledge to be severally independent and self-supporting; and when\nit becomes evident that they tend towards and limit one another, the\ninterdependence of one upon another is reckoned something foreign to\nthem and to their true nature. The very opposite is the truth. The\nthings immediately known are mere appearances--in other words, the\nground of their being is not in themselves but in something else.\nBut then comes the important step of defining what this something\nelse is. According to Kant, the things that we know about are _to us_\nappearances only, and we can never know their essential nature, which\nbelongs to another world we cannot approach. Plain minds have not\nunreasonably taken exception to this subjective idealism, with its\nreduction of the facts of consciousness to a purely personal world,\ncreated by ourselves alone. For the true statement of the case is\nrather as follows. The things of which we have direct consciousness\nare mere phenomena, not for us only, but in their own nature; and the\ntrue and proper case of these things, finite as they are, is to have\ntheir existence founded not in themselves but in the universal divine\nIdea. This view of things, it is true, is as idealist as Kant's;\nbut in contradistinction to the subjective idealism of the Critical\nphilosophy should be termed absolute idealism. Absolute idealism,\nhowever, though it is far in advance of vulgar realism, is by no means\nmerely restricted to philosophy. It lies at the root of all religion;\nfor religion too believes the actual world we see, the sum total of\nexistence, to be created and governed by God.\n\n46.] But it is not enough simply to indicate the existence of the\nobject of Reason. Curiosity impels us to seek for knowledge of this\nidentity, this empty thing-in-itself. Now _knowledge_ means such\nan acquaintance with the object as apprehends its distinct and\nspecial subject-matter. But such subject-matter involves a complex\ninter-connexion in the object itself, and supplies a ground of\nconnexion with many other objects. In the present case, to express the\nnature of the features of the Infinite or Thing-in-itself, Reason would\nhave nothing except the categories: and in any endeavour so to employ\nthem Reason becomes over-soaring or 'transcendent.'\n\nHere begins the second stage of the Criticism of Reason--which, as\nan independent piece of work, is more valuable than the first. The\nfirst part, as has been explained above, teaches that the categories\noriginate in the unity of self-consciousness; that any knowledge which\nis gained by their means has nothing objective in it, and that the\nvery objectivity claimed for them is only subjective. So far as this\ngoes, the Kantian Criticism presents that 'common' type of idealism\nknown as Subjective Idealism. It asks no questions about the meaning\nor scope of the categories, but simply considers the abstract form of\nsubjectivity and objectivity, and that even in such a partial way, that\nthe former aspect, that of subjectivity, is retained as a final and\npurely affirmative term of thought. In the second part, however, when\nKant examines the _application,_ as it is called, which Reason makes\nof the categories in order to know its objects, the content of the\ncategories, at least in some points of view, comes in for discussion:\nor, at any rate, an opportunity presented itself for a discussion of\nthe question. It is worth while to see what decision Kant arrives at on\nthe subject of metaphysic, as this application of the categories to the\nunconditioned is called. His method of procedure we shall here briefly\nstate and criticise.\n\n47.] (a) The first of the unconditioned entities which Kant examines\nis the Soul (see above, \u00a7 34). 'In my consciousness,' he says, 'I\nalways find that I (1) am the determining subject: (2) am singular, or\nabstractly simple: (3) am identical, or one and the same, in all the\nvariety of what I am conscious of: (4) distinguish myself as thinking\nfrom all the things outside me.'\n\nNow the method of the old metaphysic, as Kant correctly states it,\nconsisted in substituting for these statements of experience the\ncorresponding categories or metaphysical terms. Thus arise these four\nnew propositions: _(a)_ the Soul is a substance: _(b)_ it is a simple\nsubstance: _(c)_ it is numerically identical at the various periods of\nexistence: _(d)_ it stands in relation to space.\n\nKant discusses this translation, and draws attention to the Paralogism\nor mistake of confounding one kind of truth with another. He points out\nthat empirical attributes have here been replaced by categories: and\nshows that we are not entitled to argue from the former to the latter,\nor to put the latter in place of the former.\n\nThis criticism obviously but repeats the observation of Hume\n(\u00a7 39) that the categories as a whole,--ideas of universality\nand necessity,--are entirely absent from sensation; and that the\nempirical fact both in form and contents differs from its intellectual\nformulation.\n\nIf the purely empirical fact were held to constitute the credentials\nof the thought, then no doubt it would be indispensable to be able\nprecisely to identify the 'idea' in the 'impression.'\n\nAnd in order to make out, in his criticism of the metaphysical\npsychology, that the soul cannot be described as substantial, simple,\nself-same, and as maintaining its independence in intercourse with\nthe material world, Kant argues from the single ground, that the\nseveral attributes of the soul, which consciousness lets us feel in\n_experience,_ are not exactly the same attributes as result from the\naction of _thought_ thereon. But we have seen above, that according\nto Kant all knowledge, even experience, consists in thinking our\nimpressions--in other words, in transforming into intellectual\ncategories the attributes primarily belonging to sensation.\n\nUnquestionably one good result of the Kantian criticism was that\nit emancipated mental philosophy from the 'soul-thing,' from the\ncategories, and, consequently, from questions about the simplicity,\ncomplexity, materiality, &c. of the soul. But even for the common sense\nof ordinary men, the true point of view, from which the inadmissibility\nof these forms best appears, will be, not that they are thoughts, but\nthat thoughts of such a stamp neither can nor do contain truth.\n\nIf thought and phenomenon do not perfectly correspond to one another,\nwe are free at least to choose which of the two shall be held the\ndefaulter. The Kantian idealism, where it touches on the world of\nReason, throws the blame on the thoughts; saying that the thoughts are\ndefective, as not being exactly fitted to the sensations and to a mode\nof mind wholly restricted within the range of sensation, in which as\nsuch there are no traces of the presence of these thoughts. But as to\nthe actual content of the thought, no question is raised.\n\nParalogisms are a species of unsound syllogism, the especial vice of\nwhich consists in employing one and the same word in the two premisses\nwith a different meaning. According to Kant the method adopted by the\nrational psychology of the old metaphysicians, when they assumed that\nthe qualities of the phenomenal soul, as given in experience, formed\npart of its own real essence, was based upon such a Paralogism. Nor\ncan it be denied that predicates like simplicity, permanence, &c, are\ninapplicable to the soul. But their unfitness is not due to the ground\nassigned by Kant, that Reason, by applying them, would exceed its\nappointed bounds. The true ground is that this style of abstract terms\nis not good enough for the soul, which is very; much more than a mere\nsimple or unchangeable sort of thing. And thus, for example, while the\nsoul may be admitted to be simple self-sameness, it is at the same time\nactive and institutes distinctions in its own nature. But whatever\nis merely or abstractly simple is as such also a mere dead thing. By\nhis polemic against the metaphysic of the past Kant discarded those\npredicates from the soul or mind. He did well; but when he came to\nstate his reasons, his failure is apparent.\n\n48.] (\u00df) The second unconditioned object is the World (\u00a7 35). In the\nattempt which reason makes to comprehend the unconditioned nature of\nthe World, it falls into what are called Antinomies. In other words\nit maintains two opposite propositions about the same object, and in\nsuch a way that each of them has to be maintained with equal necessity.\nFrom this it follows that the body of cosmical fact, the specific\nstatements descriptive of which run into contradiction, cannot be a\nself-subsistent reality, but only an appearance. The explanation\noffered by Kant alleges that the contradiction does not affect the\nobject in its own proper essence, but attaches only to the Reason which\nseeks to comprehend it.\n\nIn this way the suggestion was broached that the contradiction is\noccasioned by the subject-matter itself, or by the intrinsic quality\nof the categories. And to offer the idea that the contradiction\nintroduced into the world of Reason by the categories of Understanding\nis inevitable and essential, was to make one of the most important\nsteps in the progress of Modern Philosophy. But the more important the\nissue thus raised the more trivial was the solution. Its only motive\nwas an excess of tenderness for the things of the world. The blemish\nof contradiction, it seems, could not be allowed to mar the essence of\nthe world: but there could be no objection to attach it to the thinking\nReason, to the essence of mind. Probably nobody will feel disposed to\ndeny that the phenomenal world presents contradictions to the observing\nmind; meaning by 'phenomenal' the world as it presents itself to the\nsenses and understanding, to the subjective mind. But if a comparison\nis instituted between the essence of the world and the essence of the\nmind, it does seem strange to hear how calmly and confidently the\nmodest dogma has been advanced by one, and repeated by others, that\nthought or Reason, and not the World, is the seat of contradiction.\nIt is no escape to turn round and explain that Reason falls into\ncontradiction only by applying the categories. For this application\nof the categories is maintained to be necessary, and Reason is not\nsupposed to be equipped with any other forms but the categories for\nthe purpose of cognition. But cognition is determining and determinate\nthinking: so that, if Reason be mere empty indeterminate thinking, it\nthinks nothing. And if in the end Reason be reduced to mere identity\nwithout diversity (see next \u00a7), it will in the end also win a happy\nrelease from contradiction at the slight sacrifice of all its facts and\ncontents.\n\nIt may also be noted that his failure to make a more thorough study\nof Antinomy was one of the reasons why Kant enumerated only _four_\nAntinomies. These four attracted his notice, because, as may be seen\nin his discussion of the so-called Paralogisms of Reason, he assumed\nthe list of the categories as a basis of his argument. Employing\nwhat has subsequently become a favourite fashion, he simply put the\nobject under a rubric otherwise ready to hand, instead of deducing\nits characteristics from its notion. Further deficiencies in the\ntreatment of the Antinomies I have pointed out, as occasion offered,\nin my 'Science of Logic' Here it will be sufficient to say that\nthe Antinomies are not confined to the four special objects taken\nfrom Cosmology: they appear in all objects of every kind, in all\nconceptions, notions and Ideas. To be aware of this and to know objects\nin this property of theirs, makes a vital part in a philosophical\ntheory. For the property thus indicated is what we shall afterwards\ndescribe as the Dialectical influence in logic.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe principles of the metaphysical philosophy gave rise to the belief\nthat, when cognition lapsed into contradictions, it was a mere\naccidental aberration, due to some subjective mistake in argument\nand inference. According to Kant, however, thought has a natural\ntendency to issue in contradictions or antinomies, whenever it seeks\nto apprehend the infinite. We have in the latter part of the above\nparagraph referred to the philosophical importance of the antinomies of\nreason, and shown how the recognition of their existence helped largely\nto get rid of the rigid dogmatism of the metaphysic of understanding,\nand to direct attention to the Dialectical movement of thought. But\nhere too Kant, as we must add, never got beyond the negative result\nthat the thing-in-itself is unknowable, and never penetrated to the\ndiscovery of what the antinomies really and positively mean. That true\nand positive meaning of the antinomies is this: that every actual\nthing involves a coexistence of opposed, elements. Consequently to\nknow, or, in other words, to comprehend an object is equivalent to\nbeing conscious of it as a concrete unity of opposed determinations.\nThe old. metaphysic, as we have already seen, when it studied the\nobjects of which it sought a metaphysical knowledge, went to work by\napplying categories abstractly and to the exclusion of their opposites.\nKant, on the other hand, tried to prove that the statements, issuing\nthrough this method, could be met by other statements of contrary\nimport with equal warrant and equal necessity. In the enumeration of\nthese antinomies he narrowed his ground to the cosmology of the old\nmetaphysical system, and in his discussion made out four antinomies, a\nnumber which rests upon the list of the categories. The first antinomy\nis on the question: Whether we are or are not to think the world\nlimited in space and time. In the second antinomy we have a discussion\nof the dilemma: Matter must be conceived either as endlessly divisible,\nor as consisting of atoms. The third antinomy bears upon the antithesis\nof freedom and necessity, to such extent as it is embraced in the\nquestion, Whether everything in the world must be supposed subject to\nthe condition of causality, or if we can also assume free beings, in\nother words, absolute initial points of action, in the world. Finally,\nthe fourth antinomy is the dilemma: Either the world as a whole has a\ncause or it is uncaused.\n\nThe method which Kant follows in discussing these antinomies is as\nfollows. He puts the two propositions implied in the dilemma over\nagainst each other as thesis and antithesis, and seeks to prove both:\nthat is to say he tries to exhibit them as inevitably issuing from\nreflection on the question. He particularly protests against the charge\nof being a special pleader and of grounding his reasoning on illusions.\nSpeaking honestly, however, the arguments which Kant offers for his\nthesis and antithesis are mere shams of demonstration. The thing to\nbe proved is invariably implied in the assumption he starts from, and\nthe speciousness of his proofs is only due to his prolix and apagogic\nmode of procedure. Yet it was, and still is, a great achievement for\nthe Critical philosophy, when it exhibited these antinomies: for\nin this way it gave some expression (at first certainly subjective\nand unexplained) to the actual unity of those categories which are\nkept persistently separate by the understanding. The first of the\ncosmological antinomies, for example, implies a recognition of the\ndoctrine that space and time present a discrete as well as a continuous\naspect: whereas the old metaphysic, laying exclusive emphasis on the\ncontinuity, had been led to treat the world as unlimited in space\nand time. It is quite correct to say that we can go beyond every\n_definite_ space and beyond every _definite_ time: but it is no less\ncorrect that space and time are real and actual only when they are\ndefined or specialised into 'here' and 'now,'--a specialisation which\nis involved in the very notion of them. The same observations apply to\nthe rest of the antinomies. Take, for example, the antinomy of freedom\nand necessity. The main gist of itis that freedom and necessity as\nunderstood by abstract thinkers are not independently real, as these\nthinkers suppose, but merely ideal factors (moments) of the true\nfreedom and the true necessity, and that to abstract and isolate either\nconception is to make it false.\n\n49.] (y) The third object of the Reason is God (\u00a736): He also must\nbe known and defined in terms of thought. But in comparison with\nan unalloyed identity, every defining term as such seems to the\nunderstanding to be only a limit and a negation: every reality\naccordingly must be taken as limitless, _i.e._ undefined. Accordingly\nGod, when He is defined to be the sum of all realities, the most real\nof beings, turns into a _mere abstract._ And the only term under which\nthat most real of real, things can be defined is that of Being--itself\nthe height of abstraction. These are the two elements, abstract\nidentity, on one hand, which is spoken of in this place as the notion;\nand Being on the other,--which Reason seeks to unify. And their union\nis the _Ideal_ of Reason.\n\n50.] To carry out this unification two ways or two forms are\nadmissible. Either we may begin with Being and proceed to the\n_abstraction_ of Thought: or the movement may begin with the\nabstraction and end in Being.\n\nWe shall, in the first place, start from Being. But Being, in its\nnatural aspect, presents itself to view as a Being of infinite variety,\na World in all its plenitude. And this world may be regarded in two\nways: first, as a collection of innumerable unconnected facts; and\nsecond, as a collection of innumerable facts in mutual relation,\ngiving evidence of design. The first aspect is emphasised in the\nCosmological proof: the latter in the proofs of Natural Theology.\nSuppose now that this fulness of being passes under the agency of\nthought. Then it is stripped of its isolation and unconnectedness, and\nviewed as a universal and absolutely necessary being which determines\nitself and acts by general purposes or laws. And this necessary and\nself-determined being, different from the being at the commencement, is\nGod.\n\nThe main force of Kant's criticism on this process attacks it for being\na syllogising, _i.e._ a transition. Perceptions, and that aggregate\nof perceptions we call the world, exhibit as they stand no traces of\nthat universality which they afterwards receive from the purifying act\nof thought. The empirical conception of the world therefore gives no\nwarrant for the idea of universality. And so any attempt on the part\nof thought to ascend from the empirical conception of the world to\nGod is checked by the argument of Hume (as in the paralogisms, \u00a7 47),\naccording to which we have no right to think sensations, that is, to\nelicit universality and necessity from them.\n\nMan is essentially a thinker: and therefore sound Common Sense, as well\nas Philosophy, will not yield up their right of rising to God from\nand out of the empirical view of the world. The only basis on which\nthis rise is possible is the thinking study of the world, not the bare\nsensuous, animal, attuition of it. Thought and thought alone has eyes\nfor the essence, substance, universal power, and ultimate design of the\nworld. And what men call the proofs of God's existence are, rightly\nunderstood, ways of describing and analysing the native course of the\nmind, the course of _thought_ thinking the _data_ of the senses. The\nrise of thought beyond the world of sense, its passage from the finite\nto the infinite, the leap into the super-sensible which it takes when\nit snaps asunder the chain of sense, all this transition is thought and\nnothing but thought. Say there is no such passage, and you say there is\nto be no thinking. And in sooth, animals make no such transition. They\nnever get further than sensation and the perception of the senses, and\nin consequence they have no religion.\n\nBoth on general grounds, and in the particular case, there are two\nremarks to be made upon the criticism of this exaltation in thought.\nThe first remark deals with the question of form. When the exaltation\nis exhibited in a syllogistic process, in the shape of what we call\n_proofs_ of the being of God, these reasonings cannot but start from\nsome sort of theory of the world, which makes it an aggregate either\nof contingent facts or of final causes and relations involving design.\nThe merely syllogistic thinker may deem this starting-point a solid\nbasis and suppose that it remains throughout in the same empirical\nlight, left at last as it was at the first. In this case, the bearing\nof the beginning upon the conclusion to which it leads has a purely\naffirmative aspect, as if we were only reasoning from one thing which\n_is_ and continues to _be,_ to another thing which in like manner\nis. But the great error is to restrict our notions of the nature\nof thought to its form in understanding alone. To think think the\nphenomenal world rather, means to re-cast its form, and transmute it\ninto a universal. And thus the action-of-thought, has also, _negative_\neffect upon its basis: and the matter of sensation, when it receives\nthe stamp of universality, at once loses its first and phenomenal\nshape. By the removal and negation of the shell, the kernel within the\nsense; v percept is brought to the light (\u00a7\u00a7 13 and 23). And it is\nbecause they do not, with sufficient prominence, express the negative\nfeatures implied in the exaltation of the mind from the world to God,\nthat the metaphysical proofs of the being of a God are defective\ninterpretations and descriptions of the process. If the world is only a\nsum of incidents, it follows that it is also deciduous and phenomenal,\nin _esse_ and _posse_ null. That upward spring of the mind signifies,\nthat the being which the world has is only a semblance, no real being,\nno absolute truth; it signifies that, beyond and above that appearance,\ntruth abides in God, so that true being is another name for God. The\nprocess of exaltation might thus appear to be transition and to involve\na means, but it is not a whit less true, that every trace of transition\nand means is absorbed; since the world, which might have seemed to be\nthe means of reaching God, is explained to be a nullity. Unless the\nbeing of the world is nullified, the _point d'appui_ for the exaltation\nis lost. In this way the apparent means vanishes, and the process\nof derivation is cancelled in the very act by which it proceeds. It\nis the affirmative aspect of this relation, as supposed to subsist\nbetween two things, either of which _is_ as much as the other, which\nJacobi mainly has in his eye when he attacks the demonstrations of the\nunderstanding. Justly censuring them for seeking conditions (_i.e._\nthe world) for the unconditioned, he remarks that the Infinite or\nGod must on such a method be presented as dependent and derivative.\nBut that elevation, as it takes place in the mind, serves to correct\nthis semblance: in fact, it has no other meaning than to correct that\nsemblance. Jacobi, however, failed to recognise the genuine nature of\nessential thought--by which it cancels the mediation in the very act of\nmediating; and consequently, his objection, though it tells against the\nmerely 'reflective' understanding, is false when applied to thought as\na whole, and in particular to reasonable thought.\n\nTo explain what we mean by the neglect of the negative factor in\nthought, we may refer by way of illustration to the charges of\nPantheism and Atheism brought against the doctrines of Spinoza. The\nabsolute Substance of Spinoza certainly falls short of absolute spirit,\nand it is a right and proper requirement that God should be defined\nas absolute spirit. But when the definition in Spinoza is said to\nidentify the world with God, and to confound God with nature and the\nfinite world, it is implied that the finite world possesses a genuine\nactuality and affirmative reality. If this assumption be admitted, of\ncourse a union of God with the world renders God completely finite,\nand degrades Him to the bare finite and adventitious congeries of\nexistence. But there are two objections to be noted. In the first place\nSpinoza does not define God as the unity of God with the world, but as\nthe union of thought with extension, that is, with the material world.\nAnd secondly, even if we accept this awkward popular statement as to\nthis unity, it would still be true that the system of Spinoza was not\nAtheism but Acosmism, defining the world to be an appearance lacking in\ntrue reality. A philosophy, which affirms that God and God-alone is,\nshould not be stigmatised as atheistic, when even those nations which\nworship the ape, the cow, or images of stone and brass, are credited\nwith some religion. But as things stand the imagination of ordinary men\nfeels a vehement reluctance to surrender its dearest conviction, that\nthis aggregate of finitude, which it calls a world, has actual reality;\nand to hold that there is no world is a way of thinking they are fain\nto believe impossible, or at least much less possible than to entertain\nthe idea that there is no God. Human nature, not much to its credit, is\nmore ready to believe that a system denies God, than that it denies the\nworld. A denial of God seems so much more intelligible than a denial of\nthe world.\n\nThe second remark bears on the criticism of the material propositions\nto which that elevation in thought in the first instance leads. If\nthese propositions have for their predicate such terms as substance of\nthe world, its necessary essence, cause which regulates and directs it\naccording to design, they are certainly inadequate to express what is\nor ought to be understood by God. Yet apart from the trick of adopting\na preliminary popular conception of God, and criticising a result by\nthis assumed standard, it is certain that these characteristics have\ngreat value, and are necessary factors in the idea of God. But if we\nwish in this way to bring before thought the genuine idea of God,\nand give its true value and expression to the central truth, we must\nbe careful not to start from a subordinate level of facts. To speak\nof the 'merely contingent' things of the world is a very inadequate\ndescription of the premisses. The organic structures, and the evidence\nthey afford of mutual adaptation, belong to a higher province, the\nprovince of animated nature. But even without taking into consideration\nthe possible blemish which the study of animated nature and of the\nother teleological aspects of existing things may contract from the\npettiness of the final causes, and from puerile instances of them and\ntheir bearings, merely animated nature is, at the best, incapable of\nsupplying the material for a truthful expression to the idea of God.\nGod is more than life: He is Spirit. And therefore if the thought of\nthe Absolute takes a starting-point for its rise, and desires to take\nthe nearest, the most true and adequate starting-point will be found in\nthe nature of spirit alone.\n\n51.] The other way of unification by which to realise the Ideal of\nReason is to set out from the _abstractum_ of Thought and seek to\ncharacterise it: for which purpose Being is the only available term.\nThis is the method of the Ontological proof. The opposition, here\npresented from a merely subjective point of view, lies between Thought\nand Being; whereas in the first way of junction, being is common to the\ntwo sides of the antithesis, and the contrast lies only between its\nindividualisation and universality. Understanding meets this second way\nwith what is implicitly the same objection, as it made to the first.\nIt denied that the empirical involves the universal: so it denies that\nthe universal involves the specialisation, which specialisation in this\ninstance is being. In other words it says: Being cannot be deduced from\nthe notion by any analysis.\n\nThe uniformly favourable reception and acceptance which attended\nKant's criticism of the Ontological proof was undoubtedly due to the\nillustration which he made use of. To explain the difference between\nthought and being, he took the instance of a hundred sovereigns,\nwhich, for anything it matters to the notion, are the same hundred\nwhether they are real or only possible, though the difference of the\ntwo cases is very perceptible in their effect on a man's purse. Nothing\ncan be more obvious than that anything we only think or conceive is not\non that account actual: that mental representation, and even notional\ncomprehension, always falls short of being. Still it may not unfairly\nbe styled a barbarism in language, when the name of notion is given\nto things like a hundred sovereigns. And, putting that mistake aside,\nthose who perpetually urge against the philosophic Idea the difference\nbetween Being and Thought, might have admitted that philosophers\nwere not wholly ignorant of the fact. Can there be any proposition\nmore trite than this? But after all, it is well to remember, when we\nspeak of God, that we have an object of another kind than any hundred\nsovereigns, and unlike any one particular notion, representation, or\nhowever else it may be styled. It is in fact this and this alone which\nmarks everything finite:--its being in time and space is discrepant\nfrom its notion. God, on the contrary, expressly has to be what can\nonly be 'thought as existing'; His notion involves being. It is this\nunity of the notion and being that constitutes the notion of God.\n\nIf this were all, we should have only a formal expression of the divine\nnature which would not really go beyond a statement of the nature of\nthe notion itself. And that the notion, in its most abstract terms,\ninvolves being is plain. For the notion, whatever other determination\nit may receive, is at least reference back on itself, which results\nby abolishing the intermediation, and thus is immediate. And what is\nthat reference to self, but being? Certainly it would be strange if the\nnotion, the very inmost of mind, if even the 'Ego,' or above all, the\nconcrete totality we call God, were not rich enough to include so poor\na category as being, the very poorest and most abstract of all. For,\nif we look at the thought it holds, nothing can be more insignificant\nthan being. And yet there may be something still more insignificant\nthan being,--that which at first sight is perhaps supposed to _be,_ an\nexternal and sensible existence, like that of the paper lying before\nme. However, in this matter, nobody proposes to speak of the sensible\nexistence of a limited and perishable thing. Besides, the petty\nstricture of the _Kritik_ that 'thought and being are different' can at\nmost molest the path of the human mind from the thought of God to the\ncertainty that He _is_: it cannot take it away. It is this process of\ntransition, depending on the absolute inseparability of the _thought_\nof God from His being, for which its proper authority has been\nre-vindicated in the theory of faith or immediate knowledge,--whereof\nhereafter.\n\n52.] In this way thought, at its highest pitch, has to go outside for\nany determinateness: and although it is continually termed Reason, is\nout-and-out abstract thinking. And the result of all is that Reason\nsupplies nothing beyond the formal unity required to simplify and\nsystematise experiences; it is a _canon,_ not an _organon_ of truth,\nand can furnish only a _criticism_ of knowledge, not a _doctrine_ of\nthe infinite. In its final analysis this criticism is summed up in the\nassertion that in strictness thought is only the indeterminate unity\nand the action of this indeterminate unity.\n\n    Kant undoubtedly held reason to be the faculty of the\n    unconditioned; but if reason be reduced to abstract identity\n    only, it by implication renounces its unconditionality and is\n    in reality no better than empty understanding. For reason is\n    unconditioned, only in so far as its character and quality are not\n    due to an extraneous and foreign content, only in so far as it\n    is self-characterising, and thus, in point of content, is its own\n    master. Kant, however, expressly explains that the action of reason\n    consists solely in applying the categories to systematise the\n    matter given by perception, _e._ to place it in an outside order,\n    under the guidance of the principle of non-contradiction.\n\n53.] (b) The Practical Reason is understood by Kant to mean a\n_thinking_ Will, _i.e._ a Will that determines itself on universal\nprinciples. Its office is to give objective, imperative laws of\nfreedom,--laws, that is, which state what ought to happen. The warrant\nfor thus assuming thought to be an activity which makes itself felt\nobjectively, that is, to be really a Reason, is the alleged possibility\nof proving practical freedom by experience, that is, of showing it in\nthe phenomenon of self-consciousness. This experience in consciousness\nis at once met by all that the Necessitarian produces from contrary\nexperience, particularly by the sceptical induction (employed amongst\nothers by Hume) from the endless diversity of what men regard as right\nand duty,--_i.e._ from the diversity apparent in those professedly\nobjective laws of freedom.\n\n54.] What, then, is to serve as the law which the Practical\nReason embraces and obeys, and as the criterion in its act of\nself-determination? There is no rule at hand but the same abstract\nidentity of understanding as before: There must be no contradiction in\nthe act of self-determination. Hence the Practical Reason never shakes\noff the formalism which is represented as the climax of the Theoretical\nReason.\n\nBut this Practical Reason does not confine the universal principle of\nthe Good to its own inward regulation: it first becomes _practical,_\nin the true sense of the word, when it insists on the Good being\nmanifested in the world with an outward objectivity, and requires that\nthe thought shall be objective throughout, and not merely subjective.\nWe shall speak of this postulate of the Practical Reason afterwards.\n\n    The free self-determination which Kant denied to the speculative,\n    he has expressly vindicated for the practical reason. To many minds\n    this particular aspect of the Kantian philosophy made it welcome;\n    and that for good reasons. To estimate rightly what we owe to\n    Kant in the matter, we ought to set before our minds the form of\n    practical philosophy and in particular of 'moral philosophy,' which\n    prevailed in his time. It may be generally described as a system\n    of Eudaemonism, which, when asked what man's chief end ought to\n    be, replied Happiness. And by happiness Eudaemonism understood the\n    satisfaction of the private appetites, wishes and wants of the\n    man: thus raising the contingent and particular into a principle\n    for the will and its actualisation. To this Eudaemonism, which was\n    destitute of stability and consistency, and which left the 'door\n    and gate' wide open for every whim and caprice, Kant opposed the\n    practical reason, and thus emphasised the need for a principle\n    of will which should be universal and lay the same obligation\n    on all. The theoretical reason, as has been made evident in the\n    preceding paragraphs, is identified by Kant with the negative\n    faculty of the infinite; and as it has no positive content of its\n    own, it is restricted to the function of detecting the finitude of\n    experiential knowledge. To the practical reason, on the contrary,\n    he has expressly allowed a positive infinity, by ascribing to the\n    will the power of modifying itself in universal modes, _i.e._ by\n    thought. Such a power the will undoubtedly has: and it is well\n    to remember that man is free only in so far as he possesses it\n    and avails himself of it in his conduct. But a recognition of the\n    existence of this power is not enough and does not avail to tell\n    us what are the contents of the will or practical reason. Hence to\n    say, that a man must make the Good the content of his will, raises\n    the question, what that content is, and what are the means of\n    ascertaining what good is. Nor does one get over the difficulty by\n    the principle that the will must be consistent with itself, or by\n    the precept to do duty for the sake of duty.\n\n55.] (c) The Reflective Power of Judgment is invested by Kant\nwith the function of an Intuitive Understanding. That is to say,\nwhereas the particulars had hitherto appeared, so far as the universal\nor abstract identity was concerned, adventitious and incapable of\nbeing deduced from it, the _Intuitive_ Understanding apprehends the\nparticulars as moulded and formed by the universal itself. Experience\npresents such universalised particulars in the products of Art and of\n_organic_ nature.\n\nThe capital feature in Kant's Criticism of the Judgment is, that in\nit he gave a representation and a name, if not even an intellectual\nexpression, to the Idea. Such a representation, as an Intuitive\nUnderstanding, or an inner adaptation, suggests a universal which\nis at the same time apprehended as essentially a concrete unity, It\nis in these aper\u00e7us alone that the Kantian philosophy rises to the\nspeculative height. Schiller, and others, have found in the idea of\nartistic beauty, where thought and sensuous conception have grown\ntogether into one, a way of escape from the abstract and separatist\nunderstanding. Others have found the same relief in the perception\nand consciousness of life and of living things, whether that life\nbe natural or intellectual.--The work of Art, as well as the living\nindividual, is, it must be owned, of limited content. But in the\npostulated harmony of nature (or necessity) and free purpose,--in the\nfinal purpose of the world conceived as realised, Kant has put before\nus the Idea, comprehensive even in its content. Yet what may be called\nthe laziness of thought, when dealing with this supreme Idea, finds a\ntoo easy mode of evasion in the 'ought to be': instead of the actual\nrealisation of the ultimate end, it clings hard to the disjunction\nof the notion from reality. Yet if thought will not _think_ the ideal\nrealised, the senses and the intuition can at any rate _see_ it in the\npresent reality of living organisms and of the beautiful in Art. And\nconsequently Kant's remarks on these objects were well adapted to lead\nthe mind on to grasp and think the concrete Idea.\n\n56.] We are thus led to conceive a different relation between the\nuniversal of understanding and the particular of perception, than that\non which the theory of the Theoretical and Practical Reason is founded.\nBut while this is so, it is not supplemented by a recognition that the\nformer is the genuine relation and the very truth. Instead of that,\nthe unity (of universal with particular) is accepted only as it exists\nin finite phenomena, and is adduced only as a fact of experience.\nSuch experience, at first only personal, may come from two sources.\nIt may spring from Genius, the faculty which produces 'aesthetic\nideas'; meaning by aesthetic ideas, the picture-thoughts of the free\nimagination which subserve an idea and suggest thoughts, although their\ncontent is not expressed in a notional form, and even admits of no\nsuch expression. It may also be due to Taste, the feeling of congruity\nbetween the free play of intuition or imagination and the uniformity of\nunderstanding.\n\n57.] The principle by which the Reflective faculty of Judgment\nregulates and arranges the products of animated nature is described\nas the End or final cause,--the notion in action, the universal at\nonce determining and determinate in itself. At the same time Kant is\ncareful to discard the conception of external or finite adaptation, in\nwhich the End is only an adventitious form for the means and material\nin which it is realised. In the living organism, on the contrary, the\nfinal cause is a moulding principle and an energy immanent in the\nmatter, and every member is in its turn a means as well as an end.\n\n58.] Such an Idea evidently radically transforms the relation which the\nunderstanding institutes between means and ends, between subjectivity\nand objectivity. And yet in the face of this unification, the End or\ndesign is subsequently explained to be a cause which exists and acts\nsubjectively, _i.e._ as our idea only: and teleology is accordingly\nexplained to be only a principle of criticism, purely personal to _our_\nunderstanding.\n\nAfter the Critical philosophy had settled that Reason can know\nphenomena only, there would still have been an option for animated\nnature between two equally subjective modes of thought. Even according\nto Kant's own exposition, there would have been an obligation to admit,\nin the case of natural productions, a knowledge not confined to the\ncategories of quality, cause and effect, composition, constituents,\nand so on. The principle of inward adaptation or design, had it been\nkept to and carried out in scientific application, would have led to a\ndifferent and a higher method of observing nature.\n\n59.] If we adopt this principle, the Idea, when all limitations were\nremoved from it, would appear as follows. The universality moulded by\nReason, and described as the absolute and final end or the Good, would\nbe realised in the world, and realised moreover by means of a third\nthing, the power which proposes this End as well as realises it,--that\nis, God. Thus in Him, who is the absolute truth, those oppositions of\nuniversal and individual, subjective and objective, are solved and\nexplained to be neither self-subsistent nor true.\n\n80.] But Good,--which is thus put forward as the final cause of the\nworld,--has been already described as only _our_ good, the moral law\nof _our_ Practical Reason. This being so, the unity in question\ngoes no further than make the state of the world and the course of\nits events harmonise with our moral standards.[1] Besides, even with\nthis limitation, the final cause, or Good, is a vague abstraction,\nand the same vagueness attaches to what is to be Duty. But, further,\nthis harmony is met by the revival and re-assertion of the antithesis,\nwhich it by its own principle had nullified. The harmony is then\ndescribed as merely subjective, something which merely ought to be,\nand which at the same time is not real,--a mere article of faith,\npossessing a subjective certainty, but without truth, or that\nobjectivity which is proper to the Idea. This contradiction may seem\nto be disguised by adjourning the realisation of the Idea to a future,\nto a _time_ when the Idea will also be. But a sensuous condition like\ntime is the reverse of a reconciliation of the discrepancy; and an\ninfinite progression--which is the corresponding image adopted by the\nunderstanding--on the very face of it only repeats and re-enacts the\ncontradiction.\n\nA general remark may still be offered on the result to which the\nCritical philosophy led as to the nature of knowledge; a result\nwhich has grown one of the current 'idols' or axiomatic beliefs of\nthe day. In every dualistic system, and especially in that of Kant,\nthe fundamental defect makes itself visible in the inconsistency of\nunifying at one moment, what a moment before had been explained to\nbe independent and therefore incapable of unification. And then, at\nthe very moment after unification has been alleged to be the truth,\nwe suddenly come upon the doctrine that the two elements, which, in\ntheir true status of unification, had been refused all independent\nsubsistence, are only true and actual in their state of separation.\nPhilosophising of this kind wants the little penetration needed to\ndiscover, that this shuffling only evidences how unsatisfactory each\none of the two terms is. And it fails simply because it is incapable\nof bringing two thoughts together. (And in point of form there are\nnever more than two.) It argues an utter want of consistency to say,\non the one hand, that the understanding only knows phenomena, and, on\nthe other, assert the absolute character of this knowledge, by such\nstatements as 'Cognition can go no further'; 'Here is the _natural_ and\nabsolute limit of human knowledge.' But 'natural' is the wrong word\nhere. The things of nature are limited and are natural things only to\nsuch extent as they are not aware of their universal limit, or to such\nextent as their mode or quality is a limit from our point of view,\nand not from their own. No one knows, or even feels, that anything\nis a limit or defect, until he is at the same time above and beyond\nit. Living beings, for example, possess the privilege of pain which\nis denied to the inanimate: even with living beings, a single mode or\nquality passes into the feeling of a negative. For living beings as\nsuch possess within them a universal vitality, which overpasses and\nincludes the single mode; and thus, as they maintain themselves in\nthe negative of themselves, they feel the contradiction to _exist_\nwithin them. But the contradiction is within them, only in so far as\none and the same subject includes both the universality of their sense\nof life, and the individual mode which is in negation with it. This\nillustration will show how a limit or imperfection in knowledge comes\nto be termed a limit or imperfection, only when it is compared with the\nactually-present Idea of the universal, of a total and perfect. A very\nlittle consideration might show, that to call a thing finite or limited\nproves by implication the very presence of the infinite and unlimited,\nand that our knowledge of a limit can only be when the unlimited is _on\nthis side_ in consciousness.\n\nThe result however of Kant's view of cognition suggests a second\nremark. The philosophy of Kant could have no influence on the method of\nthe sciences. It leaves the categories and method of ordinary knowledge\nquite unmolested. Occasionally, it may be, in the first sections of a\nscientific work of that period, we find propositions borrowed from the\nKantian philosophy: but the course of the treatise renders it apparent\nthat these propositions were superfluous decoration, and that the few\nfirst pages might have been omitted without producing the least change\nin the empirical contents.[2]\n\nWe may next institute a comparison of Kant with the metaphysics of the\nempirical school. Natural plain Empiricism, though it unquestionably\ninsists most upon sensuous perception, still allows a super-sensible\nworld or spiritual reality, whatever may be its structure and\nconstitution, and whether derived from intellect, or from imagination,\n&c. So far as form goes, the facts of this super-sensible world rest on\nthe authority of mind, in the same way as the other facts, embraced\nin empirical knowledge, rest on the authority of external perception.\nBut when Empiricism becomes reflective and logically consistent, it\nturns its arms against this dualism in the ultimate and highest species\nof fact; it denies the independence of the thinking principle and of\na spiritual world which developes itself in thought. Materialism or\nNaturalism, therefore, is the consistent and thorough-going system\nof Empiricism. In direct opposition to such an Empiricism, Kant\nasserts the principle of thought and freedom, and attaches himself\nto the first-mentioned form of empirical doctrine, the general\nprinciples of which he never departed from. There is a dualism in\nhis philosophy also. On one side stands the world of sensation, and\nof the understanding which reflects upon it. This world, it is true,\nhe alleges to be a world of appearances. But that is only a title\nor formal description; for the source, the facts, and the modes of\nobservation continue quite the same as in Empiricism. On the other side\nand independent stands a self-apprehending thought, the principle of\nfreedom, which Kant has in common with ordinary and bygone metaphysic,\nbut emptied of all that it held, and without his being able to infuse\ninto it anything new. For, in the Critical doctrine, thought, or, as it\nis there called, Reason, is divested of every specific form, and thus\nbereft of all authority. The main effect of the Kantian philosophy has\nbeen to revive the consciousness of Reason, or the absolute inwardness\nof thought. Its abstractness indeed prevented that inwardness from\ndeveloping into anything, or from originating any special forms,\nwhether cognitive principles or moral laws; but nevertheless it\nabsolutely refused to accept or indulge anything possessing the\ncharacter of an externality. Henceforth the principle of the\nindependence of Reason, or of its absolute self-subsistence, is made\na general principle of philosophy, as well as a foregone conclusion of\nthe time.\n\n(1) The Critical philosophy has one great negative merit. It has\nbrought home the conviction that the categories of understanding are\nfinite in their range, and that any cognitive process confined within\ntheir pale falls short of the truth. But Kant had only a sight of\nhalf the truth. He explained the finite nature of the categories to\nmean that they were subjective only, valid only for our thought, from\nwhich the thing-in-itself was divided by an impassable gulf. In fact,\nhowever, it is not because they are subjective, that the categories are\nfinite: they are finite by their very nature, and it is on their own\nselves that it is requisite to exhibit their finitude. Kant however\nholds that what we think is false, because it is we who think it. A\nfurther deficiency in the system is that it gives only an historical\ndescription of thought, and a mere enumeration of the factors of\nconsciousness. The enumeration is in the main correct: but not a word\ntouches upon the necessity of what is thus empirically colligated. The\nobservations, made on the various stages of consciousness, culminate\nin the summary statement, that the content of all we are acquainted\nwith is only an appearance. And as it is true at least that all finite\nthinking is concerned with appearances, so far the conclusion is\njustified. This stage of 'appearance' however--the phenomenal world--is\nnot the terminus of thought: there is another and a higher region. But\nthat region was to the Kantian philosophy an inaccessible 'other world.'\n\n(2) After all it was only formally, that the Kantian system established\nthe principle that thought is spontaneous and self-determining. Into\ndetails of the manner and the extent of this self-determination of\nthought, Kant never went. It was Fichte who first noticed the omission;\nand who, after he had called attention to the want of a deduction for\nthe categories, endeavoured really to supply something of the kind.\nWith Fichte, the 'Ego' is the starting-point in the philosophical\ndevelopment: and the outcome of its action is supposed to be visible\nin the categories. But in Fichte the 'Ego' is not really presented\nas a free, spontaneous energy; it is supposed to receive its first\nexcitation by a shock or impulse from without. Against this shock\nthe 'Ego' will, it is assumed, react, and only through this reaction\ndoes it first become conscious of itself. Meanwhile, the nature of\nthe impulse remains a stranger beyond our pale: and the 'Ego,' with\nsomething else always confronting it, is weighted with a condition.\nFichte, in consequence, never advanced beyond Kant's conclusion, that\nthe finite only is knowable, while the infinite transcends the range\nof thought. What Kant calls the thing-by-itself, Fichte calls the\nimpulse from without--that abstraction of something else than 'I,' not\notherwise describable or definable than as the negative or non-Ego in\ngeneral. The 'I' is thus looked at as standing in essential relation\nwith the not-I, through which its act of self-determination is first\nawakened. And in this manner the 'I' is but the continuous act of\nself-liberation from this impulse, never gaining a real freedom,\nbecause with the surcease of the impulse the 'I,' whose being is\nits action, would also cease to be. Nor is the content produced by\nthe action of the 'I' at all different from the ordinary content of\nexperience, except by the supplementary remark, that this content is\nmere appearance.\n\n\n\n[1] Even Hermann's 'Handbook of Prosody' begins with paragraphs of\nKantian philosophy. In \u00a7 8 it is argued that a law of rhythm must be\n(1) objective, (a) formal, and (3) determined _\u00e0 priori._ With these\nrequirements and with the principles of Causality and Reciprocity which\nfollow later, it were well to compare the treatment of the various\nmeasures, upon which those formal principles do not exercise the\nslightest influence.\n\n[2] In Kant's own words (Criticism of the Power of Judgment, p. 427):\n'Final Cause is merely a notion of our practical reason. It cannot\nbe deduced from any data of experience as a theoretical criterion of\nnature, nor can it be applied to know nature. No employment of this\nnotion is possible except solely for the practical reason, by moral\nlaws. The final purpose of the Creation is that constitution of the\nworld which harmonises with that to which alone we can give definite\nexpression on universal principles, viz. the final purpose of our pure\npractical reason, and with that in so far as it means to be practical.'\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\n\nTHIRD ATTITUDE OF THOUGHT TO OBJECTIVITY.\n\n\n_Immediate or Intuitive Knowledge._\n\n\n61.] If we are to believe the Critical philosophy, thought is\nsubjective, and its ultimate and invincible mode is _abstract\nuniversality_ or formal identity. Thought is thus set in opposition\nto Truth, which is no abstraction, but concrete universality. In this\nhighest mode of thought, which is entitled Reason, the Categories\nare left out of account.--The extreme theory on the opposite side\nholds thought to be an act of the _particular_ only, and on that\nground declares it incapable of apprehending the Truth. This is the\nIntuitional theory.\n\n62.] According to this theory, thinking, a private and particular\noperation, has its whole scope and product in the Categories. But,\nthese Categories, as arrested by the understanding, are limited\nvehicles of thought, forms of the conditioned, of the dependent\nand derivative. A thought limited to these modes has no sense of\nthe Infinite and the True, and cannot bridge over the gulf that\nseparates it from them. (This stricture refers to the proofs of God's\nexistence.) These inadequate modes or categories are also spoken of as\n_notions_: and to get a notion of an object therefore can only mean,\nin this language, to grasp it under the form of being conditioned and\nderivative. Consequently, if the object in question be the True, the\nInfinite, the Unconditioned, we change it by our notions into a finite\nand conditioned; whereby, instead of apprehending the truth by thought,\nwe have perverted it into untruth.\n\nSuch is the one simple line of argument advanced for the thesis that\nthe knowledge of God and of truth must be immediate, or intuitive. At\nan earlier period all sort of anthropomorphic conceptions, as they\nare termed, were banished from God, as being finite and therefore\nunworthy of the infinite; and in this way God had been reduced to\na tolerably blank being. But in those days the thought-forms were\nin general not supposed to come under the head of anthropomorphism.\nThought was believed rather to strip finitude from the conceptions of\nthe Absolute,--in agreement with the above-mentioned conviction of all\nages, that reflection is the only road to truth. But now, at length,\neven the thought-forms are pronounced anthropomorphic, and thought\nitself is described as a mere faculty of finitisation.\n\nJacobi has stated this charge most distinctly in the seventh supplement\nto his Letters on Spinoza,--borrowing his line of argument from the\nworks of Spinoza himself, and applying it as a weapon against knowledge\nin general. In his attack knowledge is taken to mean knowledge of\nthe finite only, a process of thought from one condition in a series\nto another, each of which is at once conditioning and conditioned.\nAccording to such a view, to explain and to get the notion of\nanything, is the same as to show it to be derived from something else.\nWhatever such knowledge embraces, consequently, is partial, dependent\nand finite, while the infinite or true, _i.e._ God, lies outside\nof the mechanical inter-connexion to which knowledge is said to be\nconfined.--It is important to observe that, while Kant makes the finite\nnature of the Categories consist mainly in the formal circumstance\nthat they are subjective, Jacobi discusses the Categories in their\nown proper character, and pronounces them to be in their very import\nfinite. What Jacobi chiefly had before his eyes, when he thus described\nscience, was the brilliant successes of the physical or 'exact'\nsciences in ascertaining natural forces and laws. It is certainly not\non the finite ground occupied by these sciences that we can expect to\nmeet the in-dwelling presence of the infinite. Lalande was right when\nhe said he had swept the whole heaven with his glass, and seen no God.\n(See note to \u00a7 60.) In the field of physical science, the universal,\nwhich is the final result of analysis, is only the indeterminate\naggregate,--of the external finite,--in one word, Matter: and Jacobi\nwell perceived that there was no other issue obtainable in the way of a\nmere advance from one explanatory clause or law to another.\n\n63.] All the while the doctrine that truth exists for the mind was so\nstrongly maintained by Jacobi, that Reason alone is declared to be that\nby which man lives. This Reason is the knowledge of God. But, seeing\nthat derivative knowledge is restricted to the compass of finite facts,\nReason is knowledge underivative, or Faith.\n\nKnowledge, Faith, Thought, Intuition are the categories that we meet\nwith on this line of reflection. These terms, as presumably familiar to\nevery one, are only too frequently subjected to an arbitrary use, under\nno better guidance than the conceptions and distinctions of psychology,\nwithout any investigation into their nature and notion, which is the\nmain question after all. Thus, we often find knowledge contrasted with\nfaith, and faith at the same time explained to be an underivative\nor intuitive knowledge:--so that it must be at least some sort of\nknowledge. And, besides, it is unquestionably a fact of experience,\nfirstly, that what we believe is in our consciousness,---which implies\nthat we _know about it;_ and secondly, that this belief is a certainty\nin our consciousness,--which implies that we _know it._ Again, and\nespecially, we find thought opposed to immediate knowledge and faith,\nand, in particular, to intuition. But if this intuition be qualified\nas intellectual, we must really mean intuition which thinks, unless,\nin a question about the nature of God, we are willing to interpret\nintellect to mean images and representations of imagination. The word\nfaith or belief, in the dialect of this system, comes to be employed\neven with reference to common objects that are present to the senses.\nWe believe, says Jacobi, that we have a body,--we believe in the\nexistence of the things of sense. But if we are speaking of faith in\nthe True and Eternal, and saying that God is given and revealed to us\nin immediate knowledge OF intuition, we are concerned not with the\nthings of sense, but with objects special to our thinking mind, with\ntruths of inherently universal significance. And when the individual\n'I,' or in other words personality, is under discussion--not the 'I' of\nexperience, or a single private person--above all, when the personality\nof God is before us, we are speaking of personality unalloyed,--of a\npersonality in its own nature universal. Such personality is a thought,\nand falls within the province of thought only. More than this. Pure and\nsimple intuition is completely the same as pure and simple thought.\nIntuition and belief, in the first instance, denote the definite\nconceptions we attach to these words in our ordinary employment of\nthem: and to this extent they differ from thought in certain points\nwhich nearly every one can understand. But here they are taken in a\nhigher sense, and must be interpreted to mean a belief in God, or an\nintellectual intuition of God; in short, we must put aside all that\nespecially distinguishes thought on the one side from belief and\nintuition on the other. How belief and intuition, when transferred to\nthese higher regions, differ from thought, it is impossible for any one\nto say. And yet, such are the barren distinctions of words, with which\nmen fancy that they assert an important truth: even while the formulae\nthey maintain are identical with those which they impugn.\n\nThe term _Faith_ brings with it the special advantage of suggesting\nthe faith of the Christian religion; it seems to include Christian\nfaith, or perhaps even to coincide with it; and thus the Philosophy of\nFaith has a thoroughly orthodox and Christian look, on the strength of\nwhich it takes the liberty of uttering its arbitrary dicta with greater\npretension and authority. But we must not let ourselves be deceived by\nthe semblance surreptitiously secured by a merely verbal similarity.\nThe two things are radically distinct. Firstly, the Christian faith\ncomprises in it an authority of the Church: but the faith of Jacobi's\nphilosophy has no other authority than that of a personal revelation.\nAnd, secondly, the Christian faith is a copious body of objective\ntruth, a system of knowledge and doctrine: while the scope of the\nphilosophic faith is so utterly indefinite, that, while it has room for\nthe faith of the Christian, it equally admits a belief in the divinity\nof the Dalai-lama, the ox, or the monkey,--thus, so far as it goes,\nnarrowing Deity down to its simplest terms, a 'Supreme Being.' Faith\nitself, taken in this professedly philosophical sense, is nothing but\nthe sapless abstract of immediate knowledge,--a purely formal category\napplicable to very different facts; and it ought never to be confused\nor identified with the spiritual fulness of Christian faith, whether we\nlook at that faith in the heart of the believer and the in-dwelling of\nthe Holy Spirit, or in the system of theological doctrine.\n\nWith what is here called faith or immediate knowledge must also be\nidentified inspiration, the heart's revelations, the truths implanted\nin man by nature, and also in particular, healthy reason or Common\nSense, as it is called. All these forms agree in adopting as their\nleading principle the immediacy, or self-evident way, in which a fact\nor body of truths is presented in consciousness.\n\n84.] This immediate knowledge consists in knowing that the Infinite,\nthe Eternal, the God which is in our idea, really _is_: or, it asserts\nthat in our consciousness there is immediately and inseparably bound up\nwith this idea the certainty of its actual being.\n\nTo seek to controvert these maxims of immediate knowledge is the last\nthing philosophers would think of. They may rather find occasion for\nself-gratulation when these ancient doctrines, expressing as they\ndo the general tenor of philosophic teaching, have, even in this\nunphilosophical fashion, become to some extent universal convictions\nof the age. The true marvel rather is that any one could suppose that\nthese principles were opposed to philosophy,--the maxims, viz., that\nwhatever is held to be true is immanent in the mind, and that there\nis truth for the mind (\u00a7 63). From a formal point of view, there is a\npeculiar interest in the maxim that the being of God is immediately and\ninseparably bound up with the thought of God, that objectivity is bound\nup with the subjectivity which the thought originally presents. Not\ncontent with that, the philosophy of immediate knowledge goes so far in\nits one-sided view, as to affirm that the attribute of existence, even\nin perception, is quite as inseparably connected with the conception\nwe have of our own bodies and of external things, as it is with the\nthought of God. Now it is the endeavour of philosophy to _prove_ such\na unity, to show that it lies in the very nature of thought and\nsubjectivity, to be inseparable from being and objectivity. In these\ncircumstances therefore, philosophy, whatever estimate may be formed of\nthe character of these proofs, must in any case be glad to see it shown\nand maintained that its maxims are facts of consciousness, and thus\nin harmony with experience. The difference between philosophy and the\nasseverations of immediate knowledge rather centres in the exclusive\nattitude which immediate knowledge adopts, when it sets itself up\nagainst philosophy.\n\nAnd yet it was as a self-evident or immediate truth that the 'Cogito,\nergo sum,' of Descartes, the maxim on which may be said to hinge the\nwhole interest of Modern Philosophy, was first stated by its author.\nThe man who calls this a syllogism, must know little more about a\nsyllogism than that the word 'Ergo' occurs in it. Where shall we look\nfor the middle term? And a middle term is a much more essential point\nof a syllogism than the word 'Ergo.' If we try to justify the name, by\ncalling the combination of ideas in Descartes an 'immediate' syllogism,\nthis superfluous variety of syllogism is a mere name for an utterly\nunmediated synthesis of distinct terms of thought. That being so, the\nsynthesis of being with our ideas, as stated in the maxim of immediate\nknowledge, has no more and no less claim to the title of syllogism than\nthe axiom of Descartes has. From Hotho's 'Dissertation on the Cartesian\nPhilosophy' (published 1826), I borrow the quotation in which Descartes\nhimself distinctly declares that the maxim 'Cogito, ergo sum,' is no\nsyllogism. The passages are Respons. ad II Object.: De Methodo IV:\nEp. I. 118. From the first passage I quote the words more immediately\nto the point. Descartes says: 'That we are thinking beings is \"_prima\nquaedam notio quae ex nullo syllogismo concluditur_\"' (a certain\nprimary notion, which is deduced from no syllogism); and goes on:\n_'neque cum quis dicit; Ego cogito, ergo sum sive existo, existentiam\nex cogitatione per syllogismum deducit.'_ (Nor, when one says, I think,\ntherefore I am or exist, does he deduce existence from thought by means\nof a syllogism.) Descartes knew what it implied in a syllogism, and\nso he adds that, in order to make the maxim admit of a deduction by\nsyllogism, we should have to add the major premiss: _'Illud omne quod\ncogitat, est sive existit.'_ (Everything which thinks, is or exists.)\nOf course, he remarks, this major premiss itself has to be deduced from\nthe original statement.\n\nThe language of Descartes on the maxim that the 'I' which _thinks_ must\nalso at the same time _be,_ his saying that this connexion is given and\nimplied in the simple perception of consciousness,--that this connexion\nis the absolute first, the principle, the most certain and evident of\nall things, so that no scepticism can be conceived so monstrous as not\nto admit it:--all this language is so vivid and distinct, that the\nmodern statements of Jacobi and others on this immediate connexion can\nonly pass for needless repetitions.\n\n65.] The theory of which we are speaking is not satisfied when it has\nshown that mediate knowledge taken separately is an adequate vehicle\nof truth. Its distinctive doctrine is that immediate knowledge alone,\nto the total exclusion of mediation, can possess a content which is\ntrue. This exclusiveness is enough to show that the theory is a relapse\ninto the metaphysical understanding, with its pass-words 'Either--or.'\nAnd thus it is really a relapse into the habit of external mediation,\nthe gist of which consists in clinging to those narrow and one-sided\ncategories of the finite, which it falsely imagined itself to have left\nfor ever behind. This point, however, we shall not at present discuss\nin detail. An exclusively immediate knowledge is asserted as a fact\nonly, and in the present Introduction we can only study it from this\nexternal point of view. The real significance of such knowledge will\nbe explained, when we come to the logical question of the opposition\nbetween mediate and immediate. But it is characteristic of the view\nbefore us to decline to examine the nature of the fact, that is, the\nnotion of it; for such an examination would itself be a step towards\nmediation and even towards knowledge. The genuine discussion on logical\nground, therefore, must be deferred till we come to the proper province\nof Logic itself.\n\nThe whole of the second part of Logic, the Doctrine of Essential Being,\nis a discussion of the intrinsic and self-affirming unity of immediacy\nand mediation.\n\n66.] Beyond this point then we need not go: immediate knowledge is\nto be accepted as a _fact._ Under these circumstances examination is\ndirected to the field of experience, to a psychological phenomenon. If\nthat be so, we need only note, as the commonest of experiences, that\ntruths, which we well know to be results of complicated and highly\nmediated trains of thought, present themselves immediately and without\neffort to the mind of any man who is familiar with the subject. The\nmathematician, like every one who has mastered a particular science,\nmeets any problem with ready-made solutions which pre-suppose most\ncomplicated analyses: and every educated man has a number of general\nviews and maxims which he can muster without trouble, but which\ncan only have sprung from frequent reflection and long experience.\nThe facility we attain in any sort of knowledge, art, or technical\nexpertness, consists in having the particular knowledge or kind of\naction present to our mind in any case that occurs, even we may say,\nimmediate in our very limbs, in an out-going activity. In all these\ninstances, immediacy of knowledge is so far from excluding mediation,\nthat the two things are linked together,--immediate knowledge being\nactually the product and result of mediated knowledge.\n\nIt is no less obvious that immediate _existence_ is bound up with\nits mediation. The seed and the parents are immediate and initial\nexistences in respect of the off-spring which they generate. But the\nseed and the parents, though they exist and are therefore immediate,\nare yet in their turn generated: and the child, without prejudice to\nthe mediation of its existence, is immediate, because it _is._ The fact\nthat I am in Berlin, my immediate presence here, is mediated by my\nhaving made the journey hither.\n\n67.] One thing may be observed with reference to the immediate\nknowledge of God, of legal and ethical principles (including under\nthe head of immediate knowledge, what is otherwise termed Instinct,\nImplanted or Innate Ideas, Common Sense, Natural Reason, or whatever\nform, in short, we give to the original spontaneity). It is a matter\nof general experience that education or development is required to\nbring out into consciousness what is therein contained. It was so even\nwith the Platonic reminiscence; and the Christian rite of baptism,\nalthough a sacrament, involves the additional obligation of a Christian\nup-bringing. In short, religion and morals, however much they may be\nfaith or immediate knowledge, are still on every side conditioned by\nthe mediating process which is termed development, education, training.\n\nThe adherents, no less than the assailants, of the doctrine of Innate\nIdeas have been guilty throughout of the like exclusiveness and\nnarrowness as is here noted. They have drawn a hard and fast line\nbetween the essential and immediate union (as it may be described) of\ncertain universal principles with the soul, and another union which has\nto be brought about in an external fashion, and through the channel of\n_given_ objects and conceptions, There is one objection, borrowed from\nexperience, which was raised against the doctrine of Innate ideas. All\nmen, it was said, must have these ideas; they must have, for example,\nthe maxim of contradiction, present in the mind,--they must be aware\nof it; for this maxim and others like it were included in the class\nof Innate ideas. The objection may be set down to misconception; for\nthe principles in question, though innate, need not on that account\nhave the form of ideas or conceptions of something we are aware of.\nStill, the objection completely meets and overthrows the crude theory\nof immediate knowledge, which expressly maintains its formulae in so\nfar as they are in consciousness.--Another point calls for notice. We\nmay suppose it admitted by the intuitive school, that the special case\nof religious faith involves supplementing by a Christian or religious\neducation and development. In that case it is acting capriciously when\nit seeks to ignore this admission when speaking about faith, or it\nbetrays a want of reflection not to know, that, if the necessity of\neducation be once admitted, mediation is pronounced indispensable.\n\n    The reminiscence of ideas spoken of by Plato is equivalent to\n    saying that ideas implicitly exist in man, instead of being, as\n    the Sophists assert, a foreign importation into his mind. But to\n    conceive knowledge as reminiscence does not interfere with, or\n    set aside as useless, the development of what is implicitly in\n    man;--which development is another word for mediation. The same\n    holds good of the innate ideas that we find in Descartes and the\n    Scotch philosophers. These ideas are only potential in the first\n    instance, and should be looked at as being a sort of mere capacity\n    in man.\n\n88.] In the case of these experiences the appeal turns upon something\nthat shows itself bound up with immediate consciousness. Even if\nthis combination be in the first instance taken as an external and\nempirical connexion, still, even for empirical observation, the fact\nof its being constant shows it to be essential and inseparable. But,\nagain, if this immediate consciousness, as exhibited in experience,\nbe taken separately, so far as it is a consciousness of God and\nthe divine nature, the state of mind which it implies is generally\ndescribed as an exaltation above the finite, above the senses, and\nabove the instinctive desires and affections of the natural heart:\nwhich exaltation passes over into, and terminates in, faith in God and\na divine order. It is apparent, therefore, that, though faith may be an\nimmediate knowledge and certainty, it equally implies the interposition\nof this process as its antecedent and condition.\n\nIt has been already observed, that the so-called proofs of the being\nof God, which start from finite being, give an expression to this\nexaltation. In that light they are no inventions of an over-subtle\nreflection, but the necessary and native channel in which the movement\nof mind runs: though it may be that, in their ordinary form, these\nproofs have not their correct and adequate expression.\n\n69.] It is the passage (\u00a7 64) from the subjective Idea to being which\nforms the main concern of the doctrine of immediate knowledge. A\nprimary and self-evident inter-connexion is declared to exist between\nour Idea and being. Yet precisely this central point of transition,\nutterly irrespective of any connexions which show in experience,\nclearly involves a mediation. And the mediation is of no imperfect or\nunreal kind, where the mediation takes place with and through something\nexternal, but one comprehending both antecedent and conclusion.\n\n70.] For, what this theory asserts is that truth lies neither in the\nIdea as a merely subjective thought, nor in mere being on its own\naccount;--that mere being _per se,_ a being that is not of the Idea,\nis the sensible finite being of the world. Now all this only affirms,\nwithout demonstration, that the Idea has truth only by means of being,\nand being has truth only by means of the Idea. The maxim of immediate\nknowledge rejects an indefinite empty immediacy (and such is abstract\nbeing, or pure unity taken by itself), and affirms in its stead the\nunity of the Idea with being. And it acts rightly in so doing. But it\nis stupid not to see that the unity of distinct terms or modes is not\nmerely a purely immediate unity, _i.e._ unity empty and indeterminate,\nbut that--with equal emphasis--the one term is shown to have truth only\nas mediated through the other;--or, if the phrase be preferred, that\neither term is only mediated with truth through the other. That the\nquality of mediation is involved in the very immediacy of intuition\nis thus exhibited as a fact, against which understanding, conformably\nto the fundamental maxim of immediate knowledge that the evidence of\nconsciousness is infallible, can have nothing to object. It is only\nordinary abstract understanding which takes the terms of mediation and\nimmediacy, each by itself absolutely, to represent an inflexible line\nof distinction, and thus draws upon its own head the hopeless task of\nreconciling them. The difficulty, as we have shown, has no existence in\nthe fact, and it vanishes in the speculative notion.\n\n71.] The one-sidedness of the intuitional school has certain\ncharacteristics attending upon it, which we shall proceed to point out\nin their main features, now that we have discussed the fundamental\nprinciple. The _first_ of these corollaries is as follows. Since the\ncriterion of truth is found, not in the nature of the content, but in\nthe mere fact of consciousness, every alleged truth has no other basis\nthan subjective certitude and the assertion that we discover a certain\nfact in our consciousness. What I discover in my consciousness is thus\nexaggerated into a fact of the consciousness of all, and even passed\noff for the very nature of consciousness.\n\nAmong the so-called proofs of the existence of God, there used to stand\nthe _consensus gentium,_ to which appeal is made as early as Cicero.\nThe _consensus gentium_ is a weighty authority, and the transition is\neasy and natural, from the circumstance that a certain fact is found\nin the consciousness of every one, to the conclusion that it is a\nnecessary element in the very nature of consciousness. In this category\nof general agreement there was latent the deep-rooted perception, which\ndoes not escape even the least cultivated mind, that the consciousness\nof the individual is at the same time particular and accidental. Yet\nunless we examine the nature of this consciousness itself, stripping\nit of its particular and accidental elements and, by the toilsome\noperation of reflection, disclosing the universal in its entirety and\npurity, it is only a _unanimous_ agreement upon a given point that can\nauthorize a decent presumption that that point is part of the very\nnature of consciousness. Of course, if thought insists on seeing the\nnecessity of what is presented as a fact of general occurrence, the\n_consensus gentium_ is certainly not sufficient. Yet even granting the\nuniversality of the fact to be a satisfactory proof, it has been found\nimpossible to establish the belief in God on such an argument, because\nexperience shows that there are individuals and nations without any\nsuch faith.[1] But there can be nothing shorter and more convenient\nthan to have the bare assertion to make, that we discover a fact in\nour consciousness, and are certain that it is true: and to declare\nthat this certainty, instead of proceeding from our particular mental\nconstitution only, belongs to the very nature of the mind.\n\n72.] A _second_ corollary which results from holding immediacy of\nconsciousness to be the criterion of truth is that all superstition\nor idolatry is allowed to be truth, and that an apology is prepared\nfor any contents of the will, however wrong and immoral. It is because\nhe believes in them, and not from the reasoning and syllogism of\nwhat is termed mediate knowledge, that the Hindoo finds God in the\ncow, the monkey, the Brahmin, or the Lama. But the natural desires\nand affections spontaneously carry and deposit their interests in\nconsciousness, where also immoral aims make themselves naturally at\nhome: the good or bad character would thus express the _definite being_\nof the will, which would be known, and that most immediately, in the\ninterests and aims.\n\n73.] _Thirdly_ and lastly, the immediate consciousness of God goes no\nfurther than to tell us _that_ He is: to tell us _what_ He is, would be\nan act of cognition, involving mediation. So that God as an object of\nreligion is expressly narrowed down to the indeterminate supersensible,\nGod in general: and the significance of religion is reduced to a\nminimum.\n\nIf it were really needful to win back and secure the bare belief that\nthere is a God, or even to create it, we might well wonder at the\npoverty of the age which can see a gain in the merest pittance of\nreligious consciousness, and which in its church has sunk so low as to\nworship at the altar that stood in Athens long ago, dedicated to the\n'Unknown God.'\n\n74.] We have still briefly to indicate the general nature of the\nform of immediacy. For it is the essential one-sidedness of the\ncategory, which makes whatever comes under it one sided and, for\nthat reason, finite. And, first, it makes the universal no better\nthan an abstraction external to the particulars, and God a being\nwithout determinate quality. But God can only be called a spirit\nwhen He is known to be at once the beginning and end, as well as\nthe mean, in the process of mediation. Without this unification of\nelements He is neither concrete, nor living, nor a spirit. Thus the\nknowledge of God as a spirit necessarily implies mediation. The form\nof immediacy, secondly, invests the particular with the character of\nindependent or self-centred being. But such predicates contradict the\nvery essence of the particular,--which is to be referred to something\nelse outside. They thus invest the finite with the character of an\nabsolute. But, besides, the form of immediacy is altogether abstract:\nit has no preference for one set of contents more than another,\nbut is equally susceptible of all: it may as well sanction what is\nidolatrous and immoral as the reverse. Only when we discern that the\ncontent,--the particular, is not self-subsistent, but derivative from\nsomething else, are its finitude and untruth shown in their proper\nlight. Such discernment, where the content we discern carries with\nit the ground of its dependent nature, is a knowledge which involves\nmediation. The only content which can be held to be the truth is one\nnot mediated with something else, not limited by other things: or,\notherwise expressed, it is one mediated by itself, where mediation and\nimmediate reference-to-self coincide. The understanding that fancies\nit has got clear of finite knowledge, the identity of the analytical\nmetaphysicians and the old 'rationalists,' abruptly takes again as\nprinciple and criterion of truth that immediacy which, as an abstract\nreference-to-self, is the same as abstract identity. Abstract thought\n(the scientific form used by 'reflective' metaphysic) and abstract\nintuition (the form used by immediate knowledge) are one and the same.\n\n    The stereotyped opposition between the form of immediacy and that\n    of mediation gives to the former a halfness and inadequacy, that\n    affects every content which is brought under it. Immediacy means,\n    upon the whole, an abstract reference-to-self, that is, an abstract\n    identity or abstract universality. Accordingly the essential and\n    real universal, when taken merely in its immediacy, is a mere\n    abstract universal; and from this point of view God is conceived\n    as a being altogether without determinate quality. To call God\n    spirit is in that case only a phrase: for the consciousness and\n    self-consciousness, which spirit implies, are impossible without a\n    distinguishing of it from itself and from something else, _i.e._\n    without mediation.\n\n75.] It was impossible for us to criticise this, the third attitude,\nwhich thought has been made to take towards objective truth, in any\nother mode than what is naturally indicated and admitted in the\ndoctrine itself. The theory asserts that immediate knowledge is a\nfact. It has been shown to be untrue in fact to say that there is an\nimmediate knowledge, a knowledge without mediation either by means of\nsomething else or in itself. It has also been explained to be false\nin fact to say that thought advances through finite and conditioned\ncategories only, which are always mediated by a something else, and to\nforget that in the very act of mediation the mediation itself vanishes.\nAnd to show that, in point of fact, there is a knowledge which advances\nneither by unmixed immediacy nor by unmixed mediation, we can point to\nthe example of Logic and the whole of philosophy.\n\n76.] If we view the maxims of immediate knowledge in connexion with the\nuncritical metaphysic of the past from which we started, we shall learn\nfrom the comparison the reactionary nature of the school of Jacobi. His\ndoctrine is a return to the modern starting-point of this metaphysic\nin the Cartesian philosophy. Both Jacobi and Descartes maintain the\nfollowing three points:\n\n(1) The simple inseparability of the thought and being of the\nthinker. '_Cogito, ergo sum_' is the same doctrine as that the being,\nreality, and existence of the 'Ego' is immediately revealed to me\nin consciousness. (Descartes, in fact, is careful to state that by\nthought he means consciousness in general. Princip. Phil. I. 9.) This\ninseparability is the absolutely first and most certain knowledge, not\nmediated or demonstrated.\n\n(2) The inseparability of existence from the conception of God: the\nformer is necessarily implied in the latter, or the conception never\ncan be without the attribute of existence, which is thus necessary and\neternal.[2]\n\n(3) The immediate consciousness of the existence of external things.\nBy this nothing more is meant than sense-consciousness. To have such\na thing is the slightest of all cognitions: and the only thing worth\nknowing about it is that such immediate knowledge of the being of\nthings external is error and delusion, that the sensible world as such\nis altogether void of truth; that the being of these external things is\naccidental and passes away as a show; and that their very nature is to\nhave only an existence which is separable from their essence and notion.\n\n77.] There is however a distinction between the two points of view:\n\n(1) The Cartesian philosophy, from these unproved postulates, which\nit assumes to be unprovable, proceeds to wider and wider details of\nknowledge, and thus gave rise to the sciences of modern times. The\nmodern theory (of Jacobi), on the contrary, (\u00a7 62) has come to what is\nintrinsically a most important conclusion that cognition, proceeding\nas it must by finite mediations, can know only the finite, and never\nembody the truth; and would fain have the consciousness of God go no\nfurther than the aforesaid very abstract belief that God _is_.[3]\n\n(2) The modern doctrine on the one hand makes no change in the\nCartesian method of the usual scientific knowledge, and conducts on\nthe same plan the experimental and finite sciences that have sprung\nfrom it. But, on the other hand, when it comes to the science which\nhas infinity for its scope, it throws aside that method, and thus,\nas it knows no other, it rejects all methods. It abandons itself to\nwild vagaries of imagination and assertion, to a moral priggishness\nand sentimental arrogance, or to a reckless dogmatising and lust\nof argument, which is loudest against philosophy and philosophic\ndoctrines. Philosophy of course tolerates no mere assertions or\nconceits, and checks the free play of argumentative see-saw.\n\n78.] We must then reject the opposition between an independent\nimmediacy in the contents or facts of consciousness and an equally\nindependent mediation, supposed incompatible with the former. The\nincompatibility is a mere assumption, an arbitrary assertion. All other\nassumptions and postulates must in like manner be left behind at the\nentrance to philosophy, whether they are derived from the intellect or\nthe imagination. For philosophy is the science, in which every such\nproposition must first be scrutinised and its meaning and oppositions\nbe ascertained.\n\nScepticism, made a negative science and systematically applied to all\nforms of knowledge, might seem a suitable introduction, as pointing out\nthe nullity of such assumptions. But a sceptical introduction would\nbe not only an ungrateful but also a useless course; and that because\nDialectic, as we shall soon make appear, is itself an essential element\nof affirmative science. Scepticism, besides, could only get hold of\nthe finite forms as they were suggested by experience, taking them\nas given, instead of deducing them scientifically. To require such\na scepticism accomplished is the same as to insist on science being\npreceded by universal doubt, or a total absence of presupposition.\nStrictly speaking, in the resolve that _wills pure thought,_ this\nrequirement is accomplished by freedom which, abstracting from\neverything, grasps its pure abstraction, the simplicity of thought.\n\n\n\n[1] In order to judge of the greater or less extent lo which Experience\nshows cases of Atheism or of the belief in God, it is all-important\nto know if the mere general conception of deity suffices, or if a\nmore definite knowledge of God is required. The Christian world would\ncertainly refuse the title of God to the idols of the Hindoos and the\nChinese, to the fetiches of the Africans, and even to the gods of\nGreece themselves. If so, a believer in these idols would not be a\nbeliever in God. If it were contended, on the other hand, that such\na belief in idols implies some sort of belief in God, as the species\nimplies the genus, then idolatry would argue not faith in an idol\nmerely, but faith in God. The Athenians took an opposite view. The\npoets and philosophers who explained Zeus to be a cloud, and maintained\nthat there was only one God, were treated as atheists at Athens.\n\nThe danger in these questions lies in looking at what the mind may make\nout of an object, and not what that object actually and explicitly\nis. If we fail to note this distinction, the commonest perceptions of\nmen's senses will be religion: for every such perception, and indeed\nevery act of mind, implicitly contains the principle which, when it\nis purified and developed, rises to religion. But to be capable of\nreligion is one thing, to have it another. And religion yet implicit is\nonly a capacity or a possibility.\n\nThus in modern times, travellers have found tribes (as Captains Ross\nand Parry found the Esquimaux) which, as they tell us, have not even\nthat small modicum of religion possessed by African sorcerers, the\n_go\u00ebtes_ of Herodotus. On the other hand, an Englishman, who spent the\nfirst months of the last Jubilee at Rome, says, in his account of the\nmodern Romans, that the common people are bigots, whilst those who can\nread and write are atheists to a man.\n\nThe charge of Atheism is seldom heard in modern times: principally\nbecause the facts and the requirements of religion are reduced to a\nminimum. (See \u00a7 73.)\n\n\n[2] Descartes, Princip. Phil. I. 15: _Magis hoc (ens summe perfectum\nexistere) credet, si attendat, nullius alterius rei ideam apud\nse inveniri, in qua eodem modo necessariam existentiam contineri\nanimadveriat;--intelliget illam ideam exhibere veram et immutabilem\nnaturam, quaeque non potest non existere, cum necessaria existentia in\nea contineatur._ (The reader will be more disposed to _believe_ that\nthere exists a being supremely perfect, if he notes that in the case\nof nothing else is there found in him an idea, in which he notices\nnecessary existence to be contained in the same way. He will see that\nthat idea exhibits a true and unchangeable nature,--a nature which\n_cannot but exist,_ since necessary existence is _contained in it._) A\nremark which immediately follows, and which sounds like mediation or\ndemonstration, does not really prejudice the original principle.\n\nIn Spinoza we come upon the same statement that the essence or\nabstract conception of God implies existence. The first of Spinoza's\ndefinitions, that of the _Causa Sui_ (or Self-Cause), explains it to\nbe _cujus essentia involvit existentiam, sive id cujus natura non\npotest concipi nisi existens_ (that of which the essence involves\nexistence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived except as\nexisting). The inseparability of the notion from being is the main\npoint and fundamental hypothesis in his system. But what notion is\nthus inseparable from being? Not the notion of finite things, for they\nare so constituted as to have a contingent and a created existence.\nSpinoza's 11th proposition, which follows with a proof that God exists\nnecessarily, and his 20th, showing that God's existence and his essence\nare one and the same, are really superfluous, and the proof is more\nin form than in reality. To say, that God is Substance, the only\nSubstance, and that, as Substance is _Causa Sui,_ God therefore exists\nnecessarily, is merely stating that God is that of which the notion and\nthe being are inseparable.\n\n\n[3] Anselm on the contrary says: _Negligentiae mihi videtur, si\npost-quam confirmati sumus in fide, non studemus, quod credimus,\nintelligere._ (Methinks it is _carelessness,_ if, after we have been\nconfirmed in the faith, we do not _exert ourselves to see the meaning\nof what we believe._) [Tractat. Cur Deus Homo?] These words of Anselm,\nin connexion with the concrete truths of Christian doctrine, offer a\nfar harder problem for investigation, than is contemplated by this\nmodern faith.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\n\nLOGIC FURTHER DEFINED AND DIVIDED.\n\n\n79.] In point of form Logical doctrine has three sides: (\u03b1) the\nAbstract side, or that of understanding: (_\u00df_) the Dialectical, or that\nof negative reason: (y) the Speculative, or that of positive reason.\n\nThese three sides do not make three _parts_ of logic, but are stages\nor 'moments' in every logical entity, that is, of every notion and\ntruth whatever. They may all be put under the first stage, that of\nunderstanding, and so kept isolated from each other; but this would\ngive an inadequate conception of them.--The statement of the dividing\nlines and the characteristic aspects of logic is at this point no more\nthan historical and anticipatory.\n\n80.] (\u03b1) Thought, as _Understanding,_ sticks to fixity of characters\nand their distinctness from one another: every such limited abstract it\ntreats as having a subsistence and being of its own.\n\nIn our ordinary usage of the term thought and even notion, we often\nhave before our eyes nothing more than the operation of Understanding.\nAnd no doubt thought is primarily an exercise of Understanding:--only\nit goes further, and the notion is not a function of Understanding\nmerely. The action of Understanding may be in general described as\ninvesting its subject-matter with the form of universality. But this\nuniversal is an abstract universal: that is to say, its opposition to\nthe particular is so rigorously maintained, that it is at the same\ntime also reduced to the character of a particular again. In this\nseparating and abstracting attitude towards its objects, Understanding\nis the reverse of immediate perception and sensation, which, as such,\nkeep completely to their native sphere of action in the concrete.\n\nIt is by referring to this opposition of Understanding to sensation or\nfeeling that we must explain the frequent attacks made upon thought\nfor being hard and narrow, and for leading, if consistently developed,\nto ruinous and pernicious results. The answer to these charges, in so\nfar as they are warranted by their facts, is, that they do not touch\nthinking in general, certainly not the thinking of Reason, but only the\nexercise of Understanding. It must be added however, that the merit and\nrights of the mere Understanding should unhesitatingly be admitted. And\nthat merit lies in the fact, that apart from Understanding there is no\nfixity or accuracy in the region either of theory or of practice.\n\nThus, in theory, knowledge begins by apprehending existing objects in\ntheir specific differences. In the study of nature, for example, we\ndistinguish matters, forces, genera and the like, and stereotype each\nin its isolation. Thought is here acting in its analytic capacity,\nwhere its canon is identity, a simple reference of each attribute to\nitself. It is under the guidance of the same identity that the process\nin knowledge is effected from one scientific truth to another. Thus,\nfor example, in mathematics magnitude is the feature which, to the\nneglect of any other, determines our advance. Hence in geometry we\ncompare one figure with another, so as to bring out their identity.\nSimilarly in other fields of knowledge, such as jurisprudence, the\nadvance is primarily regulated by identity. In it we argue from one\nspecific law or precedent to another: and what is this but to proceed\non the principle of identity?\n\nBut Understanding is as indispensable in practice as it is in theory.\nCharacter is an essential in conduct, and a man of character is an\nunderstanding man, who in that capacity has definite ends in view and\nundeviatingly pursues them. The man who will do something great must\nlearn, as Goethe says, to limit himself. The man who, on the contrary,\nwould do everything, really would do nothing, and fails. There is a\nhost of interesting things in the world: Spanish poetry, chemistry,\npolitics, and music are all very interesting, and if any one takes\nan interest in them we need not find fault. But for a person in a\ngiven situation to accomplish anything, he must stick to one definite\npoint, and not dissipate his' forces in many directions. In every\ncalling, too, the great thing is to pursue it with understanding. Thus\nthe judge must stick to the law, and give his verdict in accordance\nwith, it, undeterred by one motive or another, allowing no excuses;\nand looking neither left nor right. Understanding, too, is always an\nelement in thorough training. The trained-intellect is not satisfied\nwith cloudy and indefinite impressions, but grasps the objects in their\nfixed character: whereas the uncultivated man wavers unsettled, and it\noften costs a deal of trouble to come to an understanding with him on\nthe matter under discussion, and to bring him to fix his eye on the\ndefinite point in question.\n\nIt has been already explained that the Logical principle in general,\nfar from being merely a subjective action in our minds, is rather the\nvery universal, which as such is also objective. This doctrine is\nillustrated in the case of understanding, the first form of logical\ntruths. Understanding in this larger sense corresponds to what we call\nthe goodness of God, so far as that means that finite things are and\nsubsist. In nature, for example, we recognise the goodness of God in\nthe fact that the various classes or species of animals and plants are\nprovided with whatever they need for their preservation and welfare.\nNor is man excepted, who, both as an individual and as a nation,\npossesses partly in the given circumstances of climate, of quality\nand products of soil, and partly in his natural parts or talents, all\nthat is required for his maintenance and development. Under this shape\nUnderstanding is visible in every department of the objective world;\nand no object in that world can ever be wholly perfect which does\nnot give full satisfaction to the canons of understanding. A state,\nfor example, is imperfect, so long as it has not reached a clear\ndifferentiation of orders and callings, and so long as those functions\nof politics and government, which are different in principle, have not\nevolved for themselves special organs, in the same way as we see, for\nexample, the developed animal organism provided with separate organs\nfor the functions of sensation, motion, digestion, &c.\n\nThe previous course of the discussion may serve to show, that\nunderstanding is indispensable even in those spheres and regions of\naction which the popular fancy would deem furthest from it, and that in\nproportion as understanding, is absent from them, imperfection is the\nresult. This particularly holds good of Art, Religion, and Philosophy.\nIn Art, for example, understanding is visible where the forms of\nbeauty, which differ in principle, are kept distinct and exhibited in\ntheir purity. The same thing holds good also of single works of art.\nIt is part of the beauty and perfection of a dramatic poem that the\ncharacters of the several persons should be closely and faithfully\nmaintained, and that the different aims and interests involved should\nbe plainly and decidedly exhibited. Or again, take the province of\nReligion. The superiority of Greek over Northern mythology (apart from\nother differences of subject-matter and conception) mainly consists in\nthis: that in the former the individual gods are fashioned into forms\nof sculpture-like distinctness of outline, while in the latter the\nfigures fade away vaguely and hazily into one another. Lastly comes\nPhilosophy. That Philosophy never can get on without the understanding\nhardly calls for special remark after what has been said. Its foremost\nrequirement is that every thought shall be grasped in its full\nprecision, and nothing allowed to remain vague and indefinite.\n\nIt is usually added that understanding must not go too far. Which is\nso far correct, that understanding is not an ultimate, but on the\ncontrary finite, and so constituted that when carried to extremes it\nveers round to its opposite. It is the fashion of youth to dash about\nin abstractions: but the man who has learnt to know life steers clear\nof the abstract 'either--or,' and keeps to the concrete.\n\n81.] (\u00df) In the Dialectical stage these finite characterisations or\nformulae supersede themselves, and pass into their opposites.\n\n(1) But when the Dialectical principle is employed by the understanding\nseparately and independently,--especially as seen in its application\nto philosophical theories, Dialectic becomes Scepticism; in which the\nresult that ensues from its action is presented as a mere negation.\n\n(2) It is customary to treat Dialectic as an adventitious art, which\nfor very wantonness introduces confusion and a mere semblance of\ncontradiction into definite notions. And in that light, the semblance\nis the nonentity, while the true reality is supposed to belong to the\noriginal dicta of understanding. Often, indeed, Dialectic is nothing\nmore than a subjective see-saw of arguments _pro_ and _con,_ where\nthe absence of sterling thought is disguised by the subtlety which\ngives birth to such arguments. But in its true and proper character.\nDialectic is the very nature and essence of everything predicated by\nmere understanding,--the law of things and of the finite as a whole.\nDialectic is different from 'Reflection.' In the first instance,\nReflection is that movement out beyond the isolated predicate of a\nthing which gives it some reference, and brings out its relativity,\nwhile still in other respects leaving it its isolated validity. But\nby Dialectic is meant the in-dwelling tendency outwards by which the\none-sidedness and limitation of the predicates of understanding is seen\nin its true light, and shown to be the negation of them. For anything\nto be finite is just to suppress itself and put itself aside. Thus\nunderstood the Dialectical principle constitutes the life and soul of\nscientific progress, the dynamic which alone gives immanent connexion\nand necessity to the body of science; and, in a word, is seen to\nconstitute the real and true, as opposed to the external, exaltation\nabove the finite.\n\n(1) It is of the highest importance to ascertain and understand rightly\nthe nature of Dialectic. Wherever there is movement, wherever there is\nlife, wherever anything is carried into effect in the actual world,\nthere Dialectic is at work. It is also the soul of all knowledge\nwhich is truly scientific. In the popular way of looking at things,\nthe refusal to be bound by the abstract deliverances of understanding\nappears as fairness, which, according to the proverb Live and let\nlive, demands that each should have its turn; we admit the one, but\nwe admit the other also. But when we look more closely, we find that\nthe limitations of the finite do not merely come from without; that\nits own nature is the cause of its abrogation, and that by its own\nact it passes into its counterpart. We say, for instance, that man is\nmortal, and seem to think that the ground of his death is in external\ncircumstances only; so that if this way of looking were correct, man\nwould have two special properties, vitality and--also--mortality. But\nthe true view of the matter is that life, as life, involves the germ\nof death, and that the finite, being radically self-contradictory,\ninvolves its own self-suppression.\n\nNor, again, is Dialectic to be confounded with mere Sophistry. The\nessence of Sophistry lies in giving authority to a partial and abstract\nprinciple, in its isolation, as may suit the interest and particular\nsituation of the individual at the time. For example, a regard to my\nexistence, and my having the means of existence, is a vital motive\nof conduct, but if I exclusively emphasise this consideration or\nmotive of my welfare, and draw the conclusion that I may steal or\nbetray my country, we have a case of Sophistry. Similarly, it is a\nvital principle in conduct that I should be subjectively free, that\nis to say, that I should have an insight into what I am doing, and\na conviction that it is right. But if my pleading insists on this\nprinciple alone I fall into Sophistry, such as would overthrow all the\nprinciples of morality. From this sort of party-pleading Dialectic is\nwholly different; its purpose is to study things in their own being and\nmovement and thus to demonstrate the finitude of the partial categories\nof understanding.\n\nDialectic, it may be added, is no novelty in philosophy. Among the\nancients Plato is termed the inventor of Dialectic; and his right to\nthe name rests on the fact, that the Platonic philosophy first gave\nthe free scientific, and thus at the same time the objective, form to\nDialectic. Socrates, as we should expect from the general character\nof his philosophising, has the dialectical element in a predominantly\nsubjective shape, that of Irony. He used to turn his Dialectic,\nfirst against ordinary consciousness, and then especially against\nthe Sophists. In his conversations he used to simulate the wish for\nsome clearer knowledge about the subject under discussion, and after\nputting all sorts of questions with that intent, he drew on those with\nwhom he conversed to the opposite of what their first impressions\nhad pronounced correct. If, for instance, the Sophists claimed to\nbe teachers, Socrates by a series of questions forced the Sophist\nProtagoras to confess that all learning is only recollection. In his\nmore strictly scientific dialogues Plato employs the dialectical method\nto show the finitude of all hard and fast terms of understanding.\nThus in the Parmenides he deduces the many from the one, and shows\nnevertheless that the many cannot but define itself as the one. In\nthis grand style did Plato treat Dialectic. In modern times it was,\nmore than any other, Kant who resuscitated the name of Dialectic, and\nrestored it to its post of honour. He did it, as we have seen (\u00a7 48),\nby working out the Antinomies of the reason. The problem of these\nAntinomies is no mere subjective piece of work oscillating between\none set of grounds and another; it really serves to show that every\nabstract proposition of understanding, taken precisely as it is given,\nnaturally veers round into its opposite.\n\nHowever reluctant Understanding may be to admit the action of\nDialectic, we must not suppose that the recognition if its existence\nis peculiarly confined to the philosopher. It would be truer to say\nthat Dialectic gives expression to a law which is felt in all other\ngrades of consciousness, and in general experience. Everything that\nsurrounds us may be viewed as an instance of Dialectic. We are aware\nthat everything finite, instead of being stable and ultimate, is rather\nchangeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by that\nDialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than\nwhat it is, is forced beyond its own immediate or natural being to\nturn suddenly into its opposite. We have before this (\u00a7 80) identified\nUnderstanding with what is implied in the popular idea of the goodness\nof God; we may now remark of Dialectic, in the same objective\nsignification, that its principle answers to the idea of his power.\nAll things, we say,--that is, the finite world as such,--are doomed;\nand in saying so, we have a vision of Dialectic as the universal and\nirresistible power before which nothing can stay, however secure and\nstable it may deem itself. The category of power does not, it is true,\nexhaust the depth of the divine nature or the notion of God; but it\ncertainly forms a vital element in all religious consciousness.\n\nApart from this general objectivity of Dialectic, we find traces of its\npresence in each of the particular provinces and phases of the natural\nand the spiritual world. Take as an illustration the motion of the\nheavenly bodies. At this moment the planet stands in this spot, but\nimplicitly it is the possibility of being in another spot; and that\npossibility of being otherwise the planet brings into existence by\nmoving. Similarly the 'physical' elements prove to be Dialectical. The\nprocess of meteorological action is the exhibition of their Dialectic.\nIt is the same dynamic that lies at the root of every other natural\nprocess, and, as it were, forces nature out of itself. To illustrate\nthe presence of Dialectic in the spiritual world, especially in the\nprovinces of law and morality, we have only to recollect how general\nexperience shows us the extreme of one state or action suddenly\nshifting into its opposite: a Dialectic which is recognised in many\nways in common proverbs. Thus _summum jus summa injuria:_ which means,\nthat to drive an abstract right to its extremity is to do a wrong.\nIn political life, as every one knows, extreme anarchy and extreme\ndespotism naturally lead to one another. The perception of Dialectic\nin the province of individual Ethics is seen in the well-known adages,\nPride comes before a fall: Too much wit outwits itself. Even feeling,\nbodily as well as mental, has its Dialectic. Every one knows how\nthe extremes of pain and pleasure pass into each other: the heart\noverflowing with joy seeks relief in tears, and the deepest melancholy\nwill at times betray its presence by a smile.\n\n(2) Scepticism should not be looked upon merely as a doctrine of doubt.\nIt would be more correct to say that the Sceptic has no doubt of his\npoint, which is the nothingness of all finite existence. He who only\ndoubts still clings to the hope that his doubt may be resolved, and\nthat one or other of the definite views, between which he wavers,\nwill turn out solid and true. Scepticism properly so called is a\nvery different thing: it is complete hopelessness about all which\nunderstanding counts stable, and the feeling to which it gives birth\nis one of unbroken calmness and inward repose. Such at least is the\nnoble Scepticism of antiquity, especially as exhibited in the writings\nof Sextus Empiricus, when in the later times of Rome it had been\nsystematised as a complement to the dogmatic systems of Stoic and\nEpicurean. Of far other stamp, and to be strictly distinguished from\nit, is the modern Scepticism already mentioned \u00a7 (39), which partly\npreceded the Critical Philosophy, and partly sprung out of it. That\nlater Scepticism consisted solely in denying the truth and certitude\nof the super-sensible, and in pointing to the facts of sense and of\nimmediate sensations as what we have to keep to.\n\nEven to this day Scepticism is often spoken of as the irresistible\nenemy of all positive knowledge, and hence of philosophy, in so far\nas philosophy is concerned with positive knowledge. But in these\nstatements there is a misconception. It is only the finite thought\nof abstract understanding which has to fear Scepticism, because\nunable to withstand it: philosophy includes the sceptical principle\nas a subordinate function of its own, in the shape of Dialectic. In\ncontradistinction to mere Scepticism, however, philosophy does not\nremain content with the purely negative result of Dialectic. The\nsceptic mistakes the true value of his result, when he supposes it to\nbe no more than a negation pure and simple. For the negative, which\nemerges as the result of dialectic, is, because a result, at the same\ntime the positive: it contains what it results from, absorbed into\nitself, and made part of its own nature. Thus conceived, however, the\ndialectical stage has the features characterising the third grade of\nlogical truth, the speculative form, or form of positive reason.\n\n82.] (y) The Speculative stage, or stage of Positive Reason,\napprehends the unity of terms (propositions) in their opposition,--the\naffirmative, which is involved in their disintegration and in their\ntransition.\n\n(1) The result of Dialectic is positive, because it has a definite\ncontent, or because its result is not empty and abstract nothing, but\nthe negation of certain specific propositions which are contained in\nthe result,--for the very reason that it is a resultant and not an\nimmediate nothing. (2) It follows from this that the 'reasonable'\nresult, though it be only a thought and abstract, is still a concrete,\nbeing not a plain formal unity, but a unity of distinct propositions.\nBare abstractions or formal thoughts are therefore no business of\nphilosophy, which has to deal only with concrete thoughts. (3) The\nlogic of mere Understanding is involved in Speculative logic, and\ncan at will be elicited from it, by the simple process of omitting\nthe dialectical and 'reasonable' element. When that is done, it\nbecomes what the common logic is, a descriptive collection of sundry\nthought-forms and rules which, finite though they are, are taken to be\nsomething infinite.\n\nIf we consider only what it contains, and not how it contains it,\nthe true reason-world, so far from being the exclusive property of\nphilosophy, is the right of every human being on whatever grade of\nculture or mental growth he may stand; which would justify man's\nancient title of rational being. The general mode by which experience\nfirst makes us aware of the reasonable order of things is by accepted\nand unreasoned belief; and the character of the rational, as already\nnoted (\u00a7 45), is to be unconditioned, and thus to be self-contained,\nself-determining. In this sense man above all things becomes aware of\nthe reasonable order, when he knows of God, and knows Him to be the\ncompletely self-determined. Similarly, the consciousness a citizen has\nof his country and its laws is a perception of the reason-world, so\nlong as he looks up to them as unconditioned and likewise universal\npowers, to which he must subject his individual will. And in the same\nsense, the knowledge and will of the child is rational, when he knows\nhis parents' will, and wills it.\n\nNow, to turn these rational (of course positively-rational) realities\ninto speculative principles, the only thing needed is that they be\n_thought._ The expression 'Speculation' in common life is often used\nwith a very vague and at the same time secondary sense, as when we\nspeak of a matrimonial or a commercial speculation. By this we only\nmean two things: first, that what is immediately at hand has to be\npassed and left behind; and secondly, that the subject-matter of such\nspeculations, though in the first place only subjective, must not\nremain so, but be realised or translated into objectivity.\n\nWhat was some time ago remarked respecting the Idea, may be applied\nto this common usage of the term 'speculation': and we may add that\npeople who rank themselves amongst the educated expressly speak of\nspeculation even as if it were something purely subjective. A certain\ntheory of some conditions and circumstances of nature or mind may be,\nsay these people, very fine and correct as a matter of speculation,\nbut it contradicts experience and nothing of the sort is admissible in\nreality. To this the answer is, that the speculative is in its true\nsignification, neither preliminarily nor even definitively, something\nmerely subjective: that, on the contrary, it expressly rises above\nsuch oppositions as that between subjective and objective, which the\nunderstanding cannot get over, and absorbing them in itself, evinces\nits own concrete and all-embracing nature. A one-sided proposition\ntherefore can never even give expression to a speculative truth. If\nwe say, for example, that the absolute is the unity of subjective and\nobjective, we are undoubtedly in the right, but so far one-sided, as we\nenunciate the unity only and lay the accent upon it, forgetting that in\nreality the subjective and objective are not merely identical but also\ndistinct.\n\nSpeculative truth, it may also be noted, means very much the same as\nwhat, in special connexion with religious experience and doctrines,\nused to be called Mysticism. The term Mysticism is at present used,\nas a rule, to designate what is mysterious and incomprehensible: and\nin proportion as their general culture and way of thinking vary, the\nepithet is applied by one class to denote the real and the true, by\nanother to name everything connected with superstition and deception.\nOn which we first of all remark that there is mystery in the mystical,\nonly however for the understanding which is ruled by the principle\nof abstract identity; whereas the mystical, as synonymous with the\nspeculative, is the concrete unity of those propositions, which\nunderstanding only accepts in their separation and opposition. And if\nthose who recognise Mysticism as the highest truth are content to leave\nit in its original utter mystery, their conduct only proves that for\nthem too, as well as for their antagonists, thinking means abstract\nidentification, and that in their opinion, therefore, truth can only be\nwon by renouncing thought, or as it is frequently expressed, by leading\nthe reason captive. But, as we have seen, the abstract thinking of\nunderstanding is so far from being either ultimate or stable, that it\nshows a perpetual tendency to work its own dissolution and swing round\ninto its opposite. Reasonableness, on the contrary, just, consists in\nembracing within itself these opposites as unsubstantial elements. Thus\nthe reason-world may be equally styled mystical,--not however because\nthought cannot both reach and comprehend it, but merely because it lies\nbeyond the compass of understanding.\n\n83.] Logic is subdivided into three parts:--\n\nI. The Doctrine of Being:\n\nII. The Doctrine of Essence:\n\nIII. The Doctrine of Notion and Idea.\n\nThat is, into the Theory of Thought:\n\nI. In its immediacy: the notion implicit and in germ.\n\nII. In its reflection and mediation: the being-for-self and show of the\nnotion.\n\nIII. In its return into itself, and its developed abiding by itself:\nthe notion in and for itself.\n\nThe division of Logic now given, as well as the whole of the previous\ndiscussion on the nature of thought, is anticipatory: and the\njustification, or proof of it, can only result from the detailed\ntreatment of thought itself. For in philosophy, to prove means to\nshow how the subject by and from itself makes itself what it is. The\nrelation in which these three leading grades of thought, or of the\nlogical Idea, stand to each other must be conceived as follows. Truth\ncomes only with the notion: or, more precisely, the notion is the\ntruth of being and essence, both of which, when separately maintained\nin their isolation, cannot but be untrue, the former because it is\nexclusively immediate, and the latter because it is exclusively\nmediate. Why then, it may be asked, begin with the false and not at\nonce with the true? To which we answer that truth, to deserve the name,\nmust authenticate its own truth: which authentication, here within the\nsphere of logic, is given, when the notion demonstrates itself to be\nwhat is mediated by and with itself, and thus at the same time to be\ntruly immediate. This relation between the three stages of the logical\nIdea appears in a real and concrete shape thus: God, who is the truth,\nis known by us in His truth, that is, as absolute spirit, only in so\nfar as we at the same time recognise that the world which He created,\nnature and the finite spirit, are, in their difference from God,\nuntrue.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\n\nFIRST SUB-DIVISION OF LOGIC.\n\n\nTHE DOCTRINE OF BEING.\n\n\n84.] Being is the notion implicit only: its special forms have the\npredicate 'is'; when they are distinguished they are each of them an\n'other': and the shape which dialectic takes in them, _i.e._ their\nfurther specialisation, is a passing over into another. This further\ndetermination, or specialisation, is at once a forth-putting and in\nthat way a disengaging of the notion implicit in being; and at the\nsame time the withdrawing of being inwards, its sinking deeper into\nitself. Thus the explication of the notion in the sphere of being does\ntwo things: it brings out the totality of being, and it abolishes the\nimmediacy of being, or the form of being as such.\n\n85.] Being itself and the special sub-categories of it which\nfollow, as well as those of logic in general, may be looked upon as\ndefinitions of the Absolute, or metaphysical definitions of God: at\nleast the first and third category in every triad may,--the first,\nwhere the thought-form of the triad is formulated in its simplicity,\nand the third, being the return from differentiation to a simple\nself-reference. For a metaphysical definition of God is the expression\nof His nature in thoughts as such: and logic embraces all thoughts so\nlong as they continue in the thought-form. The second sub-category in\neach triad, where the grade of thought is in its differentiation,\ngives, on the other hand, a definition of the finite. The objection to\nthe form of definition is that it implies a something in the mind's eye\non which these predicates may fasten. Thus even the Absolute (though\nit purports to express God in the style and character of thought) in\ncomparison with its predicate (which really and distinctly expresses\nin thought what the subject does not), is as yet only an inchoate\npretended thought--the indeterminate subject of predicates yet to\ncome. The thought, which is here the matter of sole importance, is\ncontained only in the predicate: and hence the propositional form, like\nthe said subject, viz. the Absolute, is a mere superfluity (cf. \u00a7 31,\nand below, on the Judgment).\n\nEach of the three spheres of the logical idea proves to be a systematic\nwhole of thought-terms, and a phase of the Absolute. This is the case\nwith Being, containing the three grades of quality, quantity, and\nmeasure. Quality is, in the first place, the character identical with\nbeing: so identical, that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses\nits quality. Quantity, on the contrary, is the character external\nto being, and does not affect the being at all. Thus _e.g._ a house\nremains what it is, whether it be greater or smaller; and red remains\nred, whether it be brighter or darker. Measure, the third grade of\nbeing, which is the unity of the first two, is a qualitative quantity.\nAll things have their measure: _i.e._ the quantitative terms of their\nexistence, their being so or so great, does not matter within certain\nlimits; but when these limits are exceeded by an additional more or\nless, the things cease to be what they were. From measure follows the\nadvance to the second sub-division of the idea, Essence.\n\nThe three forms of being here mentioned, just because they are the\nfirst, are also the poorest, _i.e._ the most abstract. Immediate\n(sensible) consciousness, in so far as it simultaneously includes\nan intellectual element, is especially restricted to the abstract\ncategories of quality and quantity. The sensuous consciousness is in\nordinary estimation the most concrete and thus also the richest; but\nthat is only true as regards materials, whereas, in reference to the\nthought it contains, it is really the poorest and most abstract.\n\n\nA.--QUALITY.\n\n(a) Being.\n\n86.] Pure Being makes the beginning: because it is on one hand pure\nthought, and on the other immediacy itself, simple and indeterminate;\nand the first beginning cannot be mediated by anything, or be further\ndetermined.\n\nAll doubts and admonitions, which might be brought against beginning\nthe science with abstract empty being, will disappear, if we only\nperceive what a beginning naturally implies. It is possible to define\nbeing as 'I = I,' as 'Absolute Indifference' or Identity, and so on.\nWhere it is felt necessary to begin either with what is absolutely\ncertain, _i.e._ the certainty of oneself, or with a definition or\nintuition of the absolute truth, these and other forms of the kind\nmay be looked on as if they must be the first. But each of these\nforms contains a mediation, and hence cannot be the real first: for\nall mediation implies advance made from a first on to a second, and\nproceeding from something different. If I = I, or even the intellectual\nintuition, are really taken to mean no more than the first, they are in\nthis mere immediacy identical with being: while conversely, pure being,\nif abstract no longer, but including in it mediation, is pure thought\nor intuition.\n\nIf we enunciate Being as a predicate of the Absolute, we get the first\ndefinition of the latter. The Absolute is Being. This is (in thought)\nthe absolutely initial definition, the most abstract and stinted.\nIt is the definition given by the Eleatics, but at the same time is\nalso the well-known definition of God as the sum of all realities. It\nmeans, in short, that we are to set aside that limitation which is in\nevery reality, so that God shall be only the real in all reality, the\nsuperlatively real. Or, if we reject reality, as implying a reflection,\nwe get a more immediate or unreflected statement of the same thing,\nwhen Jacobi says that the God of Spinoza is the _principium_ of being\nin all existence.\n\n(1) When thinking is to begin, we have nothing but thought in its\nmerest indeterminateness: for we cannot determine unless there is\nboth one and another; and in the beginning there is yet no other. The\nindeterminate, as we here have it, is the blank we begin with, not a\nfeaturelessness reached by abstraction, not the elimination of all\ncharacter, but the original featurelessness which precedes all definite\ncharacter and is the very first of all. And this we call Being. It is\nnot to be felt, or perceived by sense, or pictured in imagination:\nit is only and merely thought, and as such it forms the beginning.\nEssence also is indeterminate, but in another sense: it has traversed\nthe process of mediation and contains implicit the determination it has\nabsorbed.\n\n(2) In the history of philosophy the different stages of the logical\nIdea assume the shape of successive systems, each based on a particular\ndefinition of the Absolute. As the logical Idea is seen to unfold\nitself in a process from the abstract to the concrete, so in the\nhistory of philosophy the earliest systems are the most abstract, and\nthus at the same time the poorest. The relation too of the earlier\nto the later; systems of philosophy is much like the relation of the\ncorresponding stages of the logical Idea: in other words, the earlier\nare preserved in the later; but subordinated and submerged. This is\nthe true meaning of a much misunderstood phenomenon in the history of\nphilosophy--the refutation of one system by another, of an earlier by\na later. Most commonly the refutation is taken in a purely negative\nsense to mean that the system refuted has ceased to count for anything,\nhas been set aside and done for. Were it so, the history of philosophy\nwould be of all studies most saddening, displaying, as it does,\nthe refutation of every system which time has brought forth. Now,\nalthough it may be admitted that every philosophy has been refuted,\nit must be in an equal degree maintained, that no philosophy has been\nrefuted, nay, or can be refuted. And that in two ways. For first,\nevery philosophy that deserves the name always embodies the Idea: and\nsecondly, every system represents one particular factor or particular\nstage in the evolution of the Idea. The refutation of a philosophy,\ntherefore, only means that its barriers are crossed, and its special\nprinciple reduced to a factor in the completer principle that follows.\nThus the history of philosophy, in its true meaning, deals not with a\npast, but with an eternal and veritable present: and, in its results,\nresembles not a museum of the aberrations of the human intellect,\nbut a Pantheon of Godlike figures. These figures of Gods are the\nvarious stages of the Idea, as they come forward one after another in\ndialectical development. To the historian of philosophy it belongs to\npoint out more precisely, how far the gradual evolution of his theme\ncoincides with, or swerves from, the dialectical unfolding of the pure\nlogical Idea. It is sufficient to mention here, that logic begins\nwhere the proper history of philosophy begins. Philosophy began in the\nEleatic school, especially with Parmenides. Parmenides, who conceives\nthe absolute as Being, says that 'Being alone is and Nothing is not.'\nSuch was the true starting-point of philosophy, which is always\nknowledge by thought: and here for the first time we find pure thought\nseized and made an object to itself.\n\nMen indeed thought from the beginning: (for thus only were they\ndistinguished from the animals). But thousands of years had to elapse\nbefore they came to apprehend thought in its purity, and to see in it\nthe truly objective. The Eleatics are celebrated as daring thinkers.\nBut this nominal admiration is often accompanied by the remark that\nthey went too far, when they made Being alone true, and denied the\ntruth of every other object of consciousness. We must go further than\nmere Being, it is true: and yet it is absurd to speak of the other\ncontents of our consciousness as somewhat as it were outside and beside\nBeing, or to say that there are other things, as well as Being. The\ntrue state of the case is rather as follows. Being, as Being, is\nnothing fixed or ultimate: it yields to dialectic and sinks into its\nopposite, which, also taken immediately, is Nothing. After all, the\npoint is, that Being is the first pure Thought; whatever else you may\nbegin with (the I = I, the absolute indifference, or God Himself),\nyou begin with a figure of materialised conception, not a product of\nthought; and that, so far as its thought content is concerned, such\nbeginning is merely Being.\n\n87.] But this mere Being, as it is mere abstraction, is therefore the\nabsolutely negative: which, in a similarly immediate aspect, is just\nNothing.\n\n(1) Hence was derived the second definition of the Absolute; the\nAbsolute is the Nought. In fact this definition is implied in saying\nthat the thing-in-itself is the indeterminate, utterly without form\nand so without content,--or in saying that God is only the supreme\nBeing and nothing more; for this is really declaring Him to be the same\nnegativity as above. The Nothing which the Buddhists make the universal\nprinciple, as well as the final aim and goal of everything, is the same\nabstraction.\n\n(2) If the opposition in thought is stated in this immediacy as Being\nand Nothing, the shock of its nullity is too great not to stimulate\nthe attempt to fix Being and secure it against the transition into\nNothing. With this intent, reflection has recourse to the plan of\ndiscovering some fixed predicate for Being, to mark it off from\nNothing. Thus we find Being identified with what persists amid all\nchange, with _matter,_ susceptible of innumerable determinations,--or\neven, unreflectingly, with a single existence, any chance object of\nthe senses or of the mind. But every additional and more concrete\ncharacterisation causes Being to lose that integrity and simplicity it\nhas in the beginning. Only in, and by virtue of, this mere generality\nis it Nothing, something inexpressible, whereof the distinction from\nNothing is a mere intention or _meaning._\n\nAll that is wanted is to realise that these beginnings are nothing but\nthese empty abstractions, one as empty as the other. The instinct that\ninduces us to attach a settled import to Being, or to both, is the very\nnecessity which leads to the onward movement of Being and Nothing,\nand gives them a true or concrete significance. This advance is the\nlogical deduction and the movement of thought exhibited in the sequel.\nThe reflection which finds a profounder connotation for Being and\nNothing is nothing but logical thought, through which such connotation\nis evolved, not, however, in an accidental, but a necessary way. Every\nsignification, therefore, in which they afterwards appear, is only a\nmore precise specification and truer definition of the Absolute. And\nwhen that is done, the mere abstract Being and Nothing are replaced\nby a concrete in which both these elements form an organic part.--The\nsupreme form of Nought as a separate principle would be Freedom: but\nFreedom is negativity in that stage, when it sinks self-absorbed to\nsupreme intensity, and is itself an affirmation, and even absolute\naffirmation.\n\nThe distinction between Being and Nought is, in the first place,\nonly implicit, and not yet actually made: they only _ought_ to be\ndistinguished. A distinction of course implies two things, and that one\nof them possesses an attribute which is not found in the other. Being\nhowever is an absolute absence of attributes, and so is Nought. Hence\nthe distinction between the two is only meant to be; it is a quite\nnominal distinction, which is at the same time no distinction. In all\nother cases of difference there is some common point which comprehends\nboth things. Suppose _e.g._ we speak of two different species: the\ngenus forms a common ground for both. But in the case of mere Being and\nNothing, distinction is without a bottom to stand upon: hence there can\nbe no distinction, both determinations being the same bottomlessness.\nIf it be replied that Being and Nothing are both of them thoughts, so\nthat thought may be reckoned common ground, the objector forgets that\nBeing is not a particular or definite thought, and hence, being quite\nindeterminate, is a thought not to be distinguished from Nothing.--It\nis natural too for us to represent Being as absolute riches, and\nNothing as absolute poverty. But if when we view the whole world we\ncan only say that everything _is,_ and nothing more, we are neglecting\nall speciality and, instead of absolute plenitude, we have absolute\nemptiness. The same stricture is applicable to those who define God\nto be mere Being; a definition not a whit better than that of the\nBuddhists, who make God to be Nought, and who from that principle draw\nthe further conclusion that self-annihilation is the means by which man\nbecomes God.\n\n88.] Nothing, if it be thus immediate and equal to itself, is also\nconversely the same as Being is. The truth of Being and of Nothing is\naccordingly the unity of the two: and this unity is Becoming.\n\n(1) The proposition that Being and Nothing is the same seems so\nparadoxical to the imagination or understanding, that it is perhaps\ntaken for a joke. And indeed it is one of the hardest things thought\nexpects itself to do: for Being and Nothing exhibit the fundamental\ncontrast in all its immediacy,--that is, without the one term being\ninvested with any attribute which would involve its connexion with\nthe other. This attribute however, as the above paragraph points out,\nis implicit in them--the attribute which is just the same in both. So\nfar the deduction of their unity is completely analytical: indeed the\nwhole progress of philosophising in every case, if it be a methodical,\nthat is to say a necessary, progress, merely renders explicit what\nis implicit in a notion.--It is as correct however to say that Being\nand Nothing are altogether different, as to assert their unity. The\none is _not_ what the other is. But since the distinction has not at\nthis point assumed definite shape (Being and Nothing are still the\nimmediate), it is, in the way that they have it, something unutterable,\nwhich we merely _mean._\n\n(2) No great expenditure of wit is needed to make fun of the maxim that\nBeing and Nothing are the same, or rather to adduce absurdities which,\nit is erroneously asserted, are the consequences and illustrations of\nthat maxim.\n\nIf Being and Nought are identical, say these objectors, it follows that\nit makes no difference whether my home, my property, the air I breathe,\nthis city, the sun, the law, mind, God, are or are not. Now in some of\nthese cases, the objectors foist in private aims, the utility a thing\nhas for me, and then ask, whether it be all the same to me if the\nthing exist and if it do not. For that matter indeed, the teaching of\nphilosophy is precisely what frees man from the endless crowd of finite\naims and intentions, by making him so insensible to them, that their\nexistence or non-existence is to him a matter of indifference. But it\nis never to be forgotten that, once mention something substantial, and\nyou thereby create a connexion with other existences and other purposes\nwhich are _ex hypothesi_ worth having: and on such hypothesis it comes\nto depend whether the Being and not-Being of a determinate subject are\nthe same or not. A substantial distinction is in these cases secretly\nsubstituted for the empty distinction of Being and Nought. In others\nof the cases referred to, it is virtually absolute existences and\nvital ideas and aims, which are placed under the mere category of\nBeing or not-Being. But there is more to be said of these concrete\nobjects, than that they merely are or are not. Barren abstractions,\nlike Being and Nothing--the initial categories which, for that reason,\nare the scantiest anywhere to be found--are utterly inadequate to\nthe nature of these objects. Substantial truth is something far\nabove these abstractions and their oppositions.--And always when a\nconcrete existence is disguised under the name of Being and not-Being,\nempty-headedness makes its usual mistake of speaking about, and having\nin the mind an image of, something else than what is in question: and\nin this place the question is about abstract Being and Nothing.\n\n(3) It may perhaps be said that nobody can form a notion of the\nunity of Being and Nought. As for that, the notion of the unity is\nstated in the sections preceding, and that is all: apprehend that,\nand you have comprehended this unity. What the objector really means\nby comprehension--by a notion--is more than his language properly\nimplies: he wants a richer and more complex state of mind, a pictorial\nconception which will propound the notion as a concrete case and one\nmore familiar to the ordinary operations of thought. And so long as\nincomprehensibility means only the want of habituation for the effort\nneeded to grasp an abstract thought, free from all sensuous admixture,\nand to seize a speculative truth, the reply to the criticism is, that\nphilosophical knowledge is undoubtedly distinct in kind from the\nmode of knowledge best known in common life, as well as from that\nwhich reigns in the other sciences. But if to have no notion merely\nmeans that we cannot represent in imagination the oneness of Being\nand Nought, the statement is far from being true; for every one has\ncountless ways of envisaging this unity. To say that we have no such\nconception can only mean, that in none of these images do we recognise\nthe notion in question, and that we are not aware that they exemplify\nit. The readiest example of it is Becoming.; Every one has a mental\nidea of Becoming, and will even allow that it is _one_ idea: he will\nfurther allow that, when it is analysed, it involves the attribute\nof Being, and also what is the very reverse of Being, viz. Nothing:\nand that these two attributes lie undivided in the one idea: so that\nBecoming is the unity of Being and Nothing.--Another tolerably plain\nexample is a Beginning. In its beginning, the thing is not yet, but\nit is more than merely nothing, for its Being is already in the\nbeginning. Beginning is itself a case of Becoming; only the former term\nis employed with an eye to the further advance.--If we were to adapt\nlogic to the more usual method of the sciences, we might start with the\nrepresentation of a Beginning as abstractly thought, or with Beginning\nas such, and then analyse this representation, and perhaps people\nwould more readily admit, as a result of this analysis, that Being and\nNothing present themselves as undivided in unity.\n\n(4) It remains to note that such phrases as 'Being and Nothing are\nthe same,' or 'The unity of Being and Nothing'--like all other\nsuch unities, that of subject and object, and others--give rise to\nreasonable objection. They misrepresent the facts, by giving an\nexclusive prominence to the unity, and leaving the difference which\nundoubtedly exists in it (because it is Being and Nothing, for example,\nthe unity of which is declared) without any express mention or notice.\nIt accordingly seems as if the diversity had been unduly put out of\ncourt and neglected. The fact is, no speculative principle can be\ncorrectly expressed by any such propositional form, for the unity has\nto be conceived _in_ the diversity, which is all the while present and\nexplicit. 'To become' is the true expression for the resultant of 'To\nbe' and 'Not to be'; it is the unity of the two; but not only is it\nthe unity, it is also inherent unrest,--the unity, which is no mere\nreference-to-self and therefore without movement, but which, through\nthe diversity of Being and Nothing that is in it, is at war within\nitself.--Determinate being, on the other hand, is this unity, or\nBecoming in this form of unity: hence all that 'is there and so,' is\none-sided and finite. The opposition between the two factors seems to\nhave vanished; it is only implied in the unity, it is not explicitly\nput in it.\n\n(5) The maxim of Becoming, that Being is the passage into Nought,\nand Nought the passage into Being, is controverted by the maxim of\nPantheism, the doctrine of the eternity of matter, that from nothing\ncomes nothing, and that something can only come out of something. The\nancients saw plainly that the maxim, 'From nothing comes nothing,\nfrom something something,' really abolishes Becoming: for what it\ncomes from and what it becomes are one and the same. Thus explained,\nthe proposition is the maxim of abstract identity as upheld by the\nunderstanding. It cannot but seem strange, therefore, to hear such\nmaxims as, 'Out of nothing comes nothing: Out of something comes\nsomething,' calmly taught in these days, without the teacher being in\nthe least aware that they are the basis of Pantheism, and even without\nhis knowing that the ancients have exhausted all that is to be said\nabout them.\n\nBecoming is the first concrete thought, and therefore the first\nnotion: whereas Being and Nought are empty abstractions. The notion\nof Being, therefore, of which we sometimes speak, must mean Becoming;\nnot the mere point of Being, which is empty Nothing, any more than\nNothing, which is empty Being. In Being then we have Nothing, and in\nNothing Being: but this Being which does not lose itself in Nothing\nis Becoming. Nor must we omit the distinction, while we emphasise the\nunity of Becoming: without that distinction we should once more return\nto abstract Being. Becoming is only the explicit statement of what\nBeing is in its truth.\n\nWe often hear it maintained that thought is opposed to being. Now in\nthe face of such a statement, our first question ought to be, what is\nmeant by being. If we understand being as it is defined by reflection,\nall that we can say of it is that it is what is wholly identical and\naffirmative. And if we then look at thought, it cannot escape us that\nthought also is at least what is absolutely identical with itself. Both\nI therefore, being as well as thought, have the same attribute.\n\nThis identity of being and thought is not however to be I taken in\na concrete sense, as if we could say that a stone, so far as it has\nbeing, is the same as a thinking man. A concrete thing is always very\ndifferent from the abstract category as such. And in the case of being,\nwe are speaking of nothing concrete: for being is the utterly abstract.\nSo far then the question regarding the _being_ of God--a being which is\nin itself concrete above all measure--is of slight importance.\n\nAs the first concrete thought-term, Becoming is the first adequate\nvehicle of truth. In the history of philosophy, this stage of the\nlogical Idea finds its analogue in the system of Heraclitus. When\nHeraclitus says 'All is flowing' (\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1fe5\u03b5\u1fd6), he enunciates Becoming\nas the fundamental feature of all existence, whereas the Eleatics,\nas already remarked, saw the only truth in Being, rigid processless\nBeing. Glancing at the principle of the Eleatics, Heraclitus then goes\non to say: Being no more is than not-Being (\u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bbon \u03c4\u1f78 \u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bc\u1f74\n\u1f45\u03bd\u03c4os \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03af): a statement expressing the negativity of abstract Being,\nand its identity with not-Being, as made explicit in Becoming: both\nabstractions being alike untenable. This maybe looked at as an instance\nof the real refutation of one system by another. To refute a Philosophy\nis to exhibit the dialectical movement in its principle, and thus\nreduce it to a constituent member of a higher concrete form of the?\nIdea. Even Becoming however, taken at its best on its own ground, is an\nextremely poor term: it needs to grow in depth and weight of meaning.\nSuch deepened force we find _e.g._ in Life. Life is a Becoming; but\nthat is not enough to exhaust the notion of life. A still higher form\nis found in Mind. Here too is Becoming, but richer and more intensive\nthan mere logical Becoming. The elements, whose unity constitutes\nmind, are not the bare abstracts of Being and of Nought, but the system\nof the logical Idea and of Nature.\n\n(b) _Being Determinate._\n\n89.] In Becoming the Being which is one with Nothing, and the Nothing\nwhich is one with Being, are only vanishing factors; they are and\nthey are not. Thus by its inherent contradiction Becoming collapses\ninto the unity in which the two elements are absorbed. This result is\naccordingly Being Determinate (Being there and so).\n\nIn this first example we must call to mind, once for all, what was\nstated in \u00a7 82 and in the note there: the only way to secure any growth\nand progress in knowledge is to hold results fast in their truth. There\nis absolutely nothing whatever in which we cannot and must not point\nto contradictions or opposite attributes; and the abstraction made by\nunderstanding therefore means a forcible insistence on a single aspect,\nand a real effort to obscure and remove all consciousness of the other\nattribute which is involved. Whenever such contradiction, then, is\ndiscovered in any object or notion, the usual inference is, _Hence_\nthis object is _nothing._ Thus Zeno, who first showed the contradiction\nnative to motion, concluded that there is no motion: and the ancients,\nwho recognised origin and decease, the two species of Becoming, as\nuntrue categories, made use of the expression that the One or Absolute\nneither arises nor perishes. Such a style of dialectic looks only at\nthe negative aspect of its result, and fails to notice, what is at the\nsame time really present, the definite result, in the present case a\npure nothing, but a Nothing which includes Being, and, in like manner,\na Being which includes Nothing. Hence Being Determinate is (1) the\nunity of Being and Nothing, in which we get rid of the immediacy in\nthese determinations, and their contradiction vanishes in their mutual\nconnexion,--the unity in which they are only constituent elements. And\n(2) since the result is the abolition of the contradiction, it comes\nin the shape of a simple unity with itself: that is to say, it also\nis Being, but Being with negation or determinateness: it is Becoming\nexpressly put in the form of one of its elements, viz. Being.\n\nEven our ordinary conception of Becoming implies that somewhat\ncomes out of it, and that Becoming therefore has a result. But this\nconception gives rise to the question, how Becoming does not remain\nmere Becoming, but has a result The answer to this question follows\nfrom what Becoming has already shown itself to be. Becoming always\ncontains Being and Nothing in such a way, that these two are always\nchanging into each other, and reciprocally cancelling each other.\nThus Becoming stands before us in utter restlessness--unable however\nto maintain itself in this abstract restlessness: for since Being and\nNothing vanish in Becoming (and that is the very notion of Becoming),\nthe latter must vanish also. Becoming is as it were a fire, which\ndies out in itself, when it consumes its material. The result of this\nprocess however is not an empty Nothing but Being identical with the\nnegation,--what we call Being Determinate (being then and there): the\nprimary import of which evidently is that it _has become._\n\n90.] (\u03b1) Determinate Being is Being with a character or mode--which\nsimply _is_; and such un-mediated character is Quality. And as\nreflected into itself in this its character or mode, Determinate Being\nis a somewhat, an existent.--The categories, which issue by a closer\nanalysis of Determinate Being, need only be mentioned briefly.\n\nQuality may be described as the determinate mode immediate and\nidentical with Being--as distinguished from Quantity (to come\nafterwards), which, although a mode of Being, is no longer immediately\nidentical with Being, but a mode indifferent and external to it. A\nSomething is what it is in virtue of its quality, and losing its\nquality it ceases to be what it is. Quality, moreover, is completely a\ncategory only of the finite, and for that reason too it has its proper\nplace in Nature, not in the world of Mind. Thus, for example, in Nature\nwhat are styled the elementary bodies, oxygen, nitrogen, &c, should\nbe regarded as existing qualities. But in the sphere of mind, Quality\nappears in a subordinate way only, and not as if its qualitativeness\ncould exhaust any specific aspect of mind. If, for example, we consider\nthe subjective mind, which forms the object of psychology, we may\ndescribe what is called (moral and mental) character, as in logical\nlanguage identical with Quality. This however does not mean that\ncharacter is a mode of being which pervades the soul and is immediately\nidentical with it, as is the case in the natural world with the\nelementary bodies before mentioned. Yet a more distinct manifestation\nof Quality as such, in mind even, is found in the case of besotted or\nmorbid conditions, especially in states of passion and when the passion\nrises to derangement. The state of mind of a deranged person, being one\nmass of jealousy, fear, &c, may suitably be described as Quality.\n\n91.] Quality, as determinateness which _is,_ as contrasted with the\nNegation which is involved in it but distinguished from it, is\nReality. Negation is no longer an abstract nothing, but, as\na determinate being and somewhat, is only a form on such being--it\nis as Otherness. Since this otherness, though a determination of\nQuality itself, is in the first instance distinct from it, Quality is\nBeing-for-another--an expansion of the mere point of Determinate\nBeing, or of Somewhat. The Being as such of Quality, contrasted with\nthis reference to somewhat else, is Being-by-self.\n\nThe foundation of all determinateness is negation (as Spinoza says,\n_Omnis determinatio est negatio_). The unreflecting observer supposes\nthat determinate things are merely positive, and pins them down under\nthe form of being. Mere being however is not the end of the matter:--it\nis, as we have already seen, utter emptiness and instability besides.\nStill, when abstract being is contused in this way with being modified\nand determinate, it implies some perception of the fact that, though\nin determinate being there is involved an element of negation, this\nelement is at first wrapped up, as it were, and only comes to the\nfront and receives its due in Being-for-self.--If we go on to consider\ndeterminate Being as a determinateness which _is,_ we get in this way\nwhat is called Reality. We speak, for example, of the reality of a\nplan or a purpose, meaning thereby that they are no longer inner and\nsubjective, but have passed into being-there-and-then. In the same\nsense the body may be called the reality of the soul, and the law the\nreality of freedom, and the world altogether the reality of the divine\nidea. The word 'reality' is however used in another acceptation to mean\nthat something behaves conformably to its essential characteristic or\nnotion. For example, we use the expression: This is a real occupation:\nThis is a real man. Here the term does not merely mean outward and\nimmediate existence: but rather that some existence agrees with its\nnotion. In which sense, be it added, reality is not distinct from the\nideality which we shall in the first instance become acquainted with in\nthe shape of Being-for-self.\n\n92.] (\u00df) Being, if kept distinct and apart from its determinate\nmode, as it is in Being-by-self (Being implicit), would be only the\nvacant abstraction of Being. In Being (determinate there and then),\nthe determinateness is one with Being; yet at the same time, when\nexplicitly made a negation, it is a Limit, a Barrier. Hence the\notherness is not something indifferent and outside it, but a function\nproper to it. Somewhat is by its quality,--firstly finite,--secondly\nalterable; so that finitude and variability appertain to its being.\n\nIn Being-there-and-then, the negation is still directly one with the\nBeing, and this negation is what we call a Limit (Boundary). A thing\nis what it is, only in and by reason of its limit. We cannot therefore\nregard the limit as only paternal to being which is then and there. It\nrather goes through and through the whole of such existence. The view\nof limit, as merely an external characteristic of being-there-and-then,\narises from a confusion of quantitative with qualitative limit. Here\nwe are speaking primarily of the qualitative limit. If, for example,\nwe observe a piece of ground, three acres large, that circumstance is\nits quantitative limit. But, in addition, the ground is, it may be, a\nmeadow, not a wood or a pond. This is its qualitative limit.--Man,\nif he wishes to be actual, must be-there-and-then, and to this end he\nmust set a limit to himself. People who are too fastidious towards the\nfinite never reach actuality, but linger lost in abstraction, and their\nlight dies away.\n\nIf we take a closer look at what a limit implies, we see it involving a\ncontradiction in itself, and thus evincing its dialectical nature. On\nthe one side the limit makes the reality of a thing; on the other it\nis its negation. But, again, the limit, as the negation of something,\nis not an abstract nothing but a nothing which _is,--_what we call an\n'other.' Given something, and up starts an other to us: we know that\nthere is not something only, but an other as well. Nor, again, is the\nother of such a nature that we can think something apart from it; a\nsomething is implicitly the other of itself, and the somewhat sees\nits limit become objective to it in the other. If we now ask for the\ndifference between something and another, it turns out that they are\nthe same: which sameness is expressed in Latin by calling the pair\n_aliud--aliud._ The other, as opposed to the something, is itself a\nsomething, and hence we say some other, or something else; and so on\nthe other hand the first something when opposed to the other, also\ndefined as something, is itself an other. When we say 'something\nelse' our first impression is that something taken separately is only\nsomething, and that the quality of being another attaches to it only\nfrom outside considerations. Thus we suppose that the moon, being\nsomething else than the sun, might very well exist without the sun.\nBut really the moon, as a something, has its other implicit in it:\nPlato says: God made the world out of the nature of the 'one' and the\n'other' (\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5): having brought these together, he formed from\nthem a third, which is of the nature of the 'one' and the 'other.'\nIn these words we have in general terms a statement of the nature\nof the finite, which, as something, does not meet the nature of the\nother as if it had no affinity to it, but, being implicitly the other\nof itself, thus undergoes alteration. Alteration thus exhibits the\ninherent contradiction which originally attaches to determinate being,\nand which forces it out of its own bounds. To materialised conception\nexistence stands in the character of something solely positive, and\nquietly abiding within its own limits: though we also know, it is\ntrue, that everything finite (such as existence) is subject to change.\nSuch changeableness in existence is to the superficial eye a mere\npossibility, the realisation of which is not a consequence of its own\nnature. But the fact is, mutability lies in the notion of existence,\nand change is only the manifestation of what it implicitly is. The\nliving die, simply because as living they bear in themselves the germ\nof death.\n\n93.] Something becomes an other: this other is itself somewhat:\ntherefore it likewise becomes an other, and so on _ad infinitum._\n\n94.] This Infinity is the wrong or negative infinity: it is only a\nnegation of a finite: but the finite rises again the same as ever, and\nis never got rid of and absorbed. In other words, this infinite only\nexpresses the _ought-to-be_ elimination of the finite. The progression\nto infinity never gets further than a statement of the contradiction\ninvolved in the finite, viz. that it is somewhat as well as somewhat\nelse. It sets up with endless iteration the alternation between these\ntwo terms, each of which calls up the other.\n\nIf we let somewhat and another, the elements of determinate Being,\nfall asunder, the result is that some becomes other, and this other\nis itself a somewhat, which then as such changes likewise, and so\non _ad infinitum._ This result seems to superficial reflection\nsomething very grand, the grandest possible. Besuch a progression to\ninfinity is not the real infinite. That consists in being at home\nwith itself in its other, or, if enunciated as a process, in coming\nto itself in its other. Much depends on rightly apprehending the\nnotion of infinity, and not stopping short at the wrong infinity of\nendless progression. When time and space, for example, are spoken of\nas infinite, it is in the first place the infinite progression on\nwhich our thoughts fasten. We say, Now, This time, and then we keep\ncontinually going forwards and backwards beyond this limit. The case\nis the same with space, the infinity of which has formed the theme of\nbarren declamation to astronomers with a talent for edification. In the\nattempt to contemplate such an infinite, our thought, we are commonly\ninformed, must sink exhausted. It is true indeed that we must abandon\nthe unending contemplation, not however because the occupation is too\nsublime, but because it is too tedious. It is tedious to expatiate in\nthe contemplation of this infinite progression, because the same thing\nis constantly recurring. We lay down a limit: then we pass it: next we\nhave a limit once more, and so on for ever. All this is but superficial\nalternation, which never leaves the region of the finite behind. To\nsuppose that by stepping out and away into that infinity we release\nourselves from the finite, is in truth but to seek the release which\ncomes by flight. But the man who flees is not yet free: in fleeing he\nis still conditioned by that from which he flees. If it be also said,\nthat the infinite is unattainable, the statement is true, but only\nbecause to the idea of infinity has been attached the circumstance\nof being simply and solely negative. With such empty and other world\nstuff philosophy has nothing to do. What philosophy has to do with is\nalways--something concrete and in the highest sense present.\n\nNo doubt philosophy has also sometimes been set the task of finding\nan answer to the question, how the infinite comes to the resolution\nof issuing out of itself. This question, founded, as it is, upon the\nassumption of a rigid opposition between finite and infinite, may be\nanswered by saying that the opposition is false, and that in point\nof fact the infinite eternally proceeds out of itself, and yet does\nnot proceed out of itself. If we further say that the infinite is the\nnot-finite, we have in point of fact virtually expressed the truth:\nfor as the finite itself is the first negative, the not-finite is the\nnegative of that negation, the negation which is identical with itself\nand thus at the same time a true affirmation.\n\nThe infinity of reflection here discussed is only an _attempt_ to\nreach the true Infinity, a wretched neither-one-thing-nor-another.\nGenerally speaking, it is the point of view which has in recent times\nbeen emphasised in Germany. The finite, this theory tells us, _ought_\nto be absorbed; the infinite _ought_ not to be a negative merely, but\nalso a positive. That 'ought to be' betrays the incapacity of actually\nmaking good a claim which is at the same time recognised to be right.\nThis stage was never passed by the systems of Kant and Fichte, so far\nas ethics are concerned. The utmost to which this way brings us is only\nthe postulate of a never-ending approximation to the law of Reason:\nwhich postulate has been made an argument for the immortality of the\nsoul.\n\n95.] (\u03b3) What we now in point of fact have before us, is that somewhat\ncomes to be an other, and that the other generally comes to be an\nother. Thus essentially relative to another, somewhat is virtually an\nother against it: and since what is passed into is quite the same as\nwhat passes over, since both have one and the same attribute, viz.\nto be an other, it follows that something in its passage into other\nonly joins with itself. To be thus self-related in the passage, and\nin the other, is the genuine Infinity. Or, under a negative aspect:\nwhat is altered is the other, it becomes the other of the other. Thus\nBeing, but as negation of the negation, is restored again: it is now\nBeing-for-self.\n\nDualism, in putting an insuperable opposition between finite and\ninfinite, fails to note the simple circumstance that the infinite is\nthereby only one of two, and is reduced to a particular, to which the\nfinite forms the other particular. Such an infinite, which is only a\nparticular, is co-terminous with the finite which makes for it a limit\nand a barrier: it is not what it ought to be, that is, the infinite,\nbut is only finite. In such circumstances, where the finite is on this\nside, and the infinite on that,--this world as the finite and the other\nworld as the infinite,--an equal dignity of permanence and independence\nis ascribed to finite and to infinite. The being of the finite is made\nan absolute being, and by this dualism gets independence and stability.\nTouched, so to speak, by the infinite, it would be annihilated. But\nit must not be touched by the infinite. There must be an abyss, an\nimpassable gulf between the two, with the infinite abiding on yonder\nside and the finite steadfast on this. Those who attribute to the\nfinite this inflexible persistence in comparison with the infinite\nare not, as they imagine, far above metaphysic: they are still on the\nlevel of the most ordinary metaphysic of understanding. For the same\nthing occurs here as in the infinite progression. At one time it is\nadmitted that the finite has no independent actuality, no absolute\nbeing, no root and development of its own, but is only a transient.\nBut next moment this is straightway forgotten; the finite, made a mere\ncounterpart to the infinite, wholly separated from it, and rescued from\nannihilation, is conceived to be persistent in its independence. While\nthought thus imagines itself elevated to the infinite, it meets with\nthe opposite fate: it comes to an infinite which is only a finite, and\nthe finite, which it had left behind, has always to be retained and\nmade into an absolute.\n\nAfter this examination (with which it were well to compare Plato's\nPhilebus), tending to show the nullity of the distinction made by\nunderstanding between the finite and the infinite, we are liable\nto glide into the statement that the infinite and the finite are\ntherefore one, and that the genuine infinity, the truth, must be\ndefined and enunciated as the unity of the finite and infinite. Such\na statement would be to some extent correct; but is just as open to\nperversion and falsehood as the unity of Being and Nothing already\nnoticed. Besides it may very fairly be charged with reducing the\ninfinite to finitude and making a finite infinite. For, so far as\nthe expression goes, the finite seems left in its place,--it is not\nexpressly stated to be absorbed. Or, if we reflect that the finite,\nwhen identified with the infinite, certainly cannot remain what it\nwas out of such unity, and will at least suffer some change in its\ncharacteristics--as an alkali, when combined with an acid, loses some\nof its properties, we must see that, the same fate awaits the infinite,\nwhich, as the negative, will on its part likewise have its edge, as\nit were, taken off on the other. And this does really happen with the\nabstract one-sided infinite of understanding. The genuine infinite\nhowever is not merely in the position of the one-sided acid, and so\ndoes not lose itself. The negation of negation is not a neutralisation:\nthe infinite is the affirmative, and it is only the finite which is\nabsorbed.\n\nIn Being-for-self enters the category of Ideality.\nBeing-there-and-then, as in the first instance apprehended in its being\nor affirmation, has reality (\u00a7 91): and thus even finitude in the first\ninstance is in the category of reality. But the truth of the finite is\nrather its ideality. Similarly, the infinite of understanding, which\nis co-ordinated with the finite, is itself only one of two finites,\nno whole truth, but a non-substantial element. This ideality of the\nfinite is the chief maxim of philosophy; and for that reason every\ngenuine philosophy is idealism. But everything depends upon not taking\nfor the infinite what, in the very terms of its characterisation, is.\nat the same time made a particular and finite.--For this reason we\nhave bestowed a greater amount of attention on this distinction. The\nfundamental notion of philosophy, the genuine infinite, depends upon\nit. The distinction is cleared up by the simple, and for that reason\nseemingly insignificant, but incontrovertible reflections, contained in\nthe first paragraph of this section.\n\n(c) _Being-for-self._\n\n96.] (\u03b1) Being-for self, as reference to itself, is immediacy, and\nas reference of the negative to itself, is a self-subsistent, the\nOne. This unit, being without distinction in itself, thus\nexcludes the other from itself.\n\nTo be for self--to be one--is completed Quality, and as such, contains\nabstract Being and Being modified as non-substantial elements. As\nsimple Being, the One is simple self-reference; as Being modified it\nis determinate: but the determinateness is not in this case a finite\ndeterminateness--a somewhat in distinction from an other--but infinite,\nbecause it contains distinction absorbed and annulled in itself.\n\nThe readiest instance of Being-for-self is found in the 'I.' We know\nourselves as existents, distinguished in the first place from other\nexistents, and with certain relations thereto. But we also come to\nknow this expansion of existence (in these relations) reduced, as it\nwere, to a point in the simple form of being-for-self. When we say 'I,'\nwe express the reference-to-self which is infinite, and at the same\ntime negative. Man, it may be said, is distinguished from the animal\nworld, and in that way from nature altogether, by knowing himself as\n'I': which amounts to saying that natural things never attain a free\nBeing-for-self, but as limited to Being-there-and-then, are always and\nonly Being for an other.--Again, Being-for-self may be described as\nideality, just as Being-there-and-then was described as reality. It is\nsaid, that besides reality there is _also_ an ideality. Thus the two\ncategories are made equal and parallel. Properly speaking, ideality is\nnot somewhat outside of and beside reality: the notion of ideality\njust lies in its being the truth of reality. That is to say, when\nreality is explicitly put as what it implicitly is, it is at once seen\nto be ideality. Hence ideality has not received its proper estimation,\nwhen you allow that reality is not all in all, but that an ideality\nmust be recognised outside of it. Such an ideality, external to or it\nmay be even beyond reality, would be no better than an empty name.\nIdeality only has a meaning when it is the ideality of something: but\nthis something is not a mere indefinite this or that, but existence\ncharacterised as reality, which, if retained in isolation, possesses\nno truth. The distinction between Nature and Mind is not improperly\nconceived, when the former is traced back to reality, and the latter\nto ideality as a fundamental category. Nature however is far from\nbeing so fixed and complete, as to subsist even without Mind: in Mind\nit first, as it were, attains its goal and its truth. And similarly,\nMind on its part is not merely a world beyond Nature and nothing more:\nit is really, and with full proof, seen to be mind, only when it\ninvolves Nature as absorbed in itself.--_Apropos_ of this, we should\nnote the double meaning of the German word _aufheben_ (to put by, or\nset aside). We mean by it (1) to clear away, or annul: thus, we say, a\nlaw or a regulation is set aside: (2) to keep, or preserve: in which\nsense we use it when we say: something is well put by. This double\nusage of language, which gives to the same word a positive and negative\nmeaning, is not an accident, and gives no ground for reproaching\nlanguage as a cause of confusion. We should rather recognise in it the\nspeculative spirit of our language rising above the mere 'Either--or'\nof understanding.\n\n97.] (\u03b2) The relation of the negative to itself is a negative relation,\nand so a distinguishing of the One from itself, the repulsion of\nthe One; that is, it makes Many Ones. So far as regards the\nimmediacy of the self-existents, these Many _are:_ and the repulsion of\nevery One of them becomes to that extent their repulsion against each\nother as existing units,--in other words, their reciprocal exclusion.\n\nWhenever we speak of the One, the Many usually come into our mind at\nthe same time. Whence, then, we are forced to ask, do the Many come?\nThis question is unanswerable by the consciousness which pictures the\nMany as a primary datum, and-treats the One as only one among the Many.\nBut the philosophic notion teaches, contrariwise, that the One forms\nthe pre-supposition of the Many: and in the thought of the One is\nimplied that it explicitly make itself Many. The self-existing unit is\nnot, like Being, void of all connective reference: it is a reference,\nas well as Being-there-and-then was, not however a reference connecting\nsomewhat with an other, but, as unity of the some and the other, it is\na connexion with itself, and this connexion be it noted is a negative\nconnexion. Hereby the One manifests an utter incompatibility with\nitself, a self-repulsion: and what it makes itself explicitly be, is\nthe Many. We may denote this side in the process of Being-for-self\nby the figurative term Repulsion. Repulsion is a term originally\nemployed in the study of matter, to mean that matter, as a Many, in\neach of these many Ones, behaves as exclusive to all the others. It\nwould be wrong however to view the process of repulsion, as if the\nOne were the repellent and the Many the repelled. The One, as already\nremarked, just is self-exclusion and explicit putting itself as the\nMany. Each of the Many however is itself a One, and in virtue of its so\nbehaving, this all-round repulsion is by one stroke converted into its\nopposite,--Attraction.\n\n98.] (\u03b3) But the Many are one the same as another: each is One, or\neven one of the Many; they are consequently one and the same. Or when\nwe study all that Repulsion involves, we see that as a negative\nattitude of many Ones to one another, it is just as essentially a\nconnective reference of them to each other; and as those to which the\nOne is related in its act of repulsion are ones, it is in them thrown\ninto relation with itself. The repulsion therefore has an equal right\nto be called Attraction; and the exclusive One, or Being-for-self,\nsuppresses itself. The qualitative character, which in the One or unit\nhas reached the extreme point of its characterisation, has thus passed\nover into determinateness (quality) suppressed, _i.e._ into Being as\nQuantity.\n\nThe philosophy of the Atomists is the doctrine in which the Absolute\nis formulated as Being-for-self, as One, and many ones. And it is\nthe repulsion, which shows itself in the notion of the One, which\nis assumed as the fundamental force in these atoms. But instead of\nattraction, it is Accident, that is, mere unintelligence, which\nis expected to bring them together. So long as the One is fixed\nas one, it is certainly impossible to regard its congression with\nothers as anything but external and mechanical. The Void, which is\nassumed as the complementary principle to the atoms, is repulsion\nand nothing else, presented under the image of the nothing existing\nbetween the atoms.--Modern Atomism--and physics is still in principle\natomistic--has surrendered the atoms so far as to pin its faith\non molecules or particles. In so doing, science has come closer\nto sensuous conception, at the cost of losing the precision of\nthought.--To put an attractive by the side of a repulsive force, as\nthe moderns have done, certainly gives completeness to the contrast:\nand the discovery of this natural force, as it is called, has been a\nsource of much pride. But the mutual implication of the two, which\nmakes what is true and concrete in them, would have to be wrested from\nthe obscurity and confusion in which they were left even in Kant's\nMetaphysical Rudiments of Natural Science.--In modern times the\nimportance of the atomic theory is even more evident in political than\nin physical science. According to it, the will of individuals as such\nis the creative principle of the State: the attracting force is the\nspecial wants and inclinations of individuals; and the Universal, or\nthe State itself, is the external nexus of a compact.\n\n(1) The Atomic philosophy forms a vital stage in the historical\nevolution of the Idea. The principle of that system may be described\nas Being-for-self in the shape of the Many. At present, students of\nnature who are anxious to avoid metaphysics turn a favourable ear to\nAtomism. But it is not possible to escape metaphysics and cease to\ntrace nature back to terms of thought, by throwing ourselves into the\narms of Atomism. The atom, in fact, is itself a thought; and hence the\ntheory which holds matter to consist of atoms is a metaphysical theory.\nNewton gave physics an express warning to beware of metaphysics, it is\ntrue; but, to his honour be it said, he did not by any means obey his\nown warning. The only mere physicists are the animals: they alone do\nnot think: while man is a thinking being and a born metaphysician. The\nreal question is not whether we shall apply metaphysics, but whether\nour metaphysics are of the right kind: in other words, whether we are\nnot, instead of the concrete logical Idea, adopting one-sided forms of\nthought, rigidly fixed by understanding, and making these the basis of\nour theoretical as well as our practical work. It is on this ground\nthat one objects to the Atomic philosophy. The old Atomists viewed the\nworld as a many, as their successors often do to this day. On chance\nthey laid the task of collecting the atoms which float about in the\nvoid. But, after all, the nexus binding the many with one another is\nby no means a mere accident: as we have already remarked, the nexus is\nfounded on their very nature. To Kant we owe the completed theory of\nmatter as the unity of repulsion and attraction. The theory is correct,\nso far as it recognises attraction to be the other of the two elements\ninvolved in the notion of Being-for-self: and to be an element no less\nessential than repulsion to constitute matter. Still this dynamical\nconstruction of matter, as it is termed, has the fault of taking for\ngranted, instead of deducing, attraction and repulsion. Had they been\ndeduced, we should then have seen the How and the Why of a unity which\nis merely asserted. Kant indeed was careful to inculcate that Matter\nmust not be taken to be in existence _per se,_ and then as it were\nincidentally to be provided with the two forces mentioned, but must\nbe regarded as consisting solely in their unity. German physicists\nfor some time accepted this pure dynamic. But in spite of this, the\nmajority of these physicists i n modern times have found it more\nconvenient to return to the Atomic point of view, and in spite of the\nwarnings of K\u00e4stner, one of their number, have begun to regard Matter\nas consisting of infinitesimally small particles, termed 'atoms'--which\natoms have then to be brought into relation with one another by the\nplay of forces attaching to them,--attractive, repulsive, or whatever\nthey may be. This too is metaphysics; and metaphysics which, for its\nutter unintelligence, there would be sufficient reason to guard against.\n\n(2) The transition from Quality to Quantity, indicated in the paragraph\nbefore us, is not found in our ordinary way of thinking, which deems\neach of these categories to exist independently beside the other. We\nare in the habit of saying that things are not merely qualitatively,\nbut also quantitatively defined; but whence these categories originate,\nand how they are related to each other, are questions not further\nexamined. The fact is, quantity just means quality superseded and\nabsorbed: and it is by the dialectic of quality here examined that this\nsupersession is effected. First of all, we had Being: as the truth of\nBeing, came Becoming: which formed the passage to Being Determinate:\nand the truth of that we found to be Alteration. And in its result\nAlteration showed itself to be Being-for-self, exempt from implication\nof another and from passage into another;--which Being-for-self,\nfinally, in the two sides of its process, Repulsion and Attraction,\nwas clearly seen to annul itself, and thereby to annul quality in the\ntotality of its stages. Still this superseded and absorbed quality is\nneither an abstract nothing, nor an equally abstract and featureless\nbeing: it is only being as indifferent to determinateness or character.\nThis aspect of being is also what appears as quantity in our ordinary\nconceptions. We observe things, first of all, with an eye to their\nquality--which we take to be the character identical with the being\nof the thing. If we proceed to consider their quantity, we get the\nconception of an indifferent and external character or mode, of such a\nkind that a thing remains what it is, though its quantity is altered,\nand the thing becomes greater or less.\n\nB.--QUANTITY.\n\n(\u03b1) _Pure Quantity._\n\n99.] Quantity is pure being, where the mode or character is\nno longer taken as one with the being itself, but explicitly put as\nsuperseded or indifferent.\n\n(i) The expression Magnitude especially marks _determinate_\nQuantity, and is for that reason not a suitable name for Quantity\nin general. (2) Mathematics usually define magnitude as what can be\nincreased or diminished. This definition has the defect of containing\nthe thing to be defined over again: but it may serve to show that the\ncategory of magnitude is explicitly understood to be changeable and\nindifferent, so that, in spite of its being altered by an increased\nextension or intension, the thing, a house, for example, does not cease\nto be a house, and red to be red. (3) The Absolute is pure Quantity.\nThis point of view is upon the whole the same as when the Absolute is\ndefined to be Matter, in which, though form undoubtedly is present, the\nform is a characteristic of no importance one way or another. Quantity\ntoo constitutes the main characteristic of the Absolute, when the\nAbsolute is regarded as absolute indifference, and only admitting of\nquantitative distinction.--Otherwise pure space, time, &c. may be taken\nas examples of Quantity, if we allow ourselves to regard the real as\nwhatever fills up space and time, it matters not with what.\n\nThe mathematical definition of magnitude as what may be increased\nor diminished, appears at first sight to be more plausible and\nperspicuous than the exposition of the notion in the present\nsection. When closely examined, however, it involves, under cover\nof pre-suppositions and images, the same elements as appear in the\nnotion of quantity reached by the method of logical development. In\nother words, when we say that the notion of magnitude lies in the\npossibility of being increased or diminished, we state that magnitude\n(or more correctly, quantity), as distinguished from quality, is a\ncharacteristic of such kind that the characterised thing is not in the\nleast affected by any change in it. What then, it may be asked, is\nthe fault which we have to find with this definition? It is that to\nincrease and to diminish is the same thing as to characterise magnitude\notherwise. If this aspect then were an adequate account of it, quantity\nwould be described merely as whatever can be altered. But quality is\nno less than quantity open to alteration; and the distinction here\ngiven between quantity and quality is expressed by saying increase\n_or_ diminution: the meaning being that, towards whatever side the\ndetermination of magnitude be altered, the thing still remains what it\nis.\n\nOne remark more. Throughout philosophy we do not seek merely for\ncorrect, still less for plausible definitions, whose correctness\nappeals directly to the popular imagination; we seek approved or\nverified definitions, the content of which is not assumed merely as\ngiven, but is seen and known to warrant itself, because warranted\nby the free self-evolution of thought. To apply this to the present\ncase. However correct and self-evident the definition of quantity\nusual in Mathematics may be, it will still fail to satisfy the wish to\nsee how far this particular thought is founded in universal thought,\nand in that way necessary. This difficulty, however, is not the only\none. If quantity is not reached through the action of thought, but\ntaken uncritically from our generalised image of it, we are liable\nto exaggerate the range of its validity, or even to raise it to the\nheight of an absolute category. And that such a danger is real, we see\nwhen the title of exact science is restricted to those sciences the\nobjects of which can be submitted to mathematical calculation. Here we\nhave another trace of the bad metaphysics (mentioned in \u00a7 98, note)\nwhich replace the concrete idea by partial and inadequate categories of\nunderstanding. Our knowledge would be in a very awkward predicament if\nsuch objects as freedom, law, morality, or even God Himself, because\nthey cannot be measured and calculated, or expressed in a mathematical\nformula, were to be reckoned beyond the reach of exact knowledge, and\nwe had to put up with a vague generalised image of them, leaving their\ndetails or particulars to the pleasure of each individual, to make\nout of them what he will. The pernicious consequences, to which such\na theory gives rise in practice, are at once evident. And this mere\nmathematical view, which identifies with the Idea one of its special\nstages, viz. quantity, is no other than the principle of Materialism.\nWitness the history of the scientific modes of thought, especially in\nFrance since the middle of last century. Matter, in the abstract, is\njust what, though of course there is form in it, has that form only as\nan indifferent and external attribute.\n\nThe present explanation would be utterly misconceived if it were\nsupposed to disparage mathematics. By calling the quantitative\ncharacteristic merely external and indifferent, we provide no excuse\nfor indolence and superficiality, nor do we assert that quantitative\ncharacteristics may be left to mind themselves, or at least require no\nvery careful handling. Quantity, of course, is a stage of the Idea: and\nas such it must have its due, first as a logical category, and then\nin the world of objects, natural as well as spiritual. Still even so,\nthere soon emerges the different importance attaching to the category\nof quantity according as its objects belong to the natural or to the\nspiritual world. For in Nature, where the form of the Idea is to be\nother than, and at the same time outside, itself, greater importance is\nfor that very reason attached to quantity than in the spiritual world,\nthe world of free inwardness. No doubt we regard even spiritual facts\nunder a quantitative point of view; but it is at once apparent that in\nspeaking of God as a Trinity, the number three has by no means the same\nprominence, as when we consider the three dimensions of space or the\nthree sides of a triangle;--the fundamental feature of which last is\njust to be a surface bounded by three lines. Even inside the realm of\nNature we find the same distinction of greater or less importance of\nquantitative features. In the inorganic world, Quantity plays, so to\nsay, a more prominent part than in the organic. Even in organic nature\nwhen we distinguish mechanical functions from what are called chemical,\nand in the narrower sense, physical, there is the same difference.\nMechanics is of all branches of science, confessedly, that in which the\naid of mathematics can be least dispensed with,--where indeed we cannot\ntake one step without them. On that account mechanics is regarded next\nto mathematics as the science _par excellence_; which leads us to\nrepeat the remark about the coincidence of the materialist with the\nexclusively mathematical point of view. After all that has been said,\nwe cannot but hold it, in the interest of exact and thorough knowledge,\none of the most hurtful prejudices, to seek all distinction and\ndeterminateness of objects merely in quantitative considerations. Mind\nto be sure is more than Nature and the animal is more than the plant:\nbut we know very little of these objects and the distinction between\nthem, if a more and less is enough for us, and if we do not proceed to\ncomprehend them in their peculiar, that is their qualitative character.\n\n100.] Quantity, as we saw, has two sources: the exclusive unit, and\nthe identification or equalisation of these units. When we look\ntherefore at its immediate relation to self, or at the characteristic\nof self-sameness made explicit by attraction, quantity is Continuous\nmagnitude; but when we look at the other characteristic, the One\nimplied in it, it is Discrete magnitude. Still continuous quantity has\nalso a certain discreteness, being but a continuity of the Many: and\ndiscrete quantity is no less continuous, its continuity being the One\nor Unit, that is, the self-same point of the many Ones.\n\n(1) Continuous and Discrete magnitude, therefore, must not be supposed\ntwo species of magnitude, as if the characteristic of the one did not\nattach to the other. The only distinction between them is that the\nsame whole (of quantity) is at one time explicitly put under the one,\nat another under the other of its characteristics. (2) The Antinomy of\nspace, of time, or of matter, which discusses the question of their\nbeing divisible for ever, or of consisting of indivisible units, just\nmeans that we maintain quantity as at one time Discrete, at\nanother Continuous. If we explicitly invest time, space, or matter with\nthe attribute of Continuous quantity alone, they are divisible _ad\ninfinitum._ When, on the contrary, they are invested with the attribute\nof Discrete quantity, they are potentially divided already, and consist\nof indivisible units. The one view is as inadequate as the other.\n\nQuantity, as the proximate result of Being-for-self, involves the\ntwo sides in the process of the latter, attraction and repulsion, as\nconstitutive elements of its own idea. It is consequently Continuous\nas well as Discrete. Each of these two elements involves the other\nalso, and hence there is no such thing as a merely Continuous or a\nmerely Discrete quantity. We may speak of the two as two particular and\nopposite species of magnitude; but that is merely the result of our\nabstracting reflection, which in viewing definite magnitudes waives now\nthe one, now the other, of the elements contained in inseparable unity\nin the notion of quantity. Thus, it may be said, the space occupied by\nthis room is a continuous magnitude, and the hundred men, assembled\nin it, form a discrete magnitude. And yet the space is continuous and\ndiscrete at the same time; hence we speak of points of space, or we\ndivide space, a certain length, into so many feet, inches, &c, which\ncan be done only on the hypothesis that space is also potentially\ndiscrete. Similarly, on the other hand, the discrete magnitude, made\nup of a hundred men, is also continuous: and the circumstance on which\nthis continuity depends, is the common element, the species man, which\npervades all the individuals and unites them with each other.\n\n(b) _Quantum (How Much)._\n\n101.] Quantity, essentially invested with the exclusionist character\nwhich it involves, is Quantum (or How Much): _i.e._ limited\nquantity.\n\nQuantum is, as it were, the determinate Being of quantity: whereas mere\nquantity corresponds to abstract Being, and the Degree, which is next\nto be considered, corresponds to Being-for-self. As for the details\nof the advance from mere quantity to quantum, it is founded on this:\nthat whilst in mere quantity the distinction, as a distinction of\ncontinuity and discreteness, is at first only implicit, in a quantum\nthe distinction is actually made, so that quantity in general now\nappears as distinguished or limited. But in this way the quantum breaks\nup at the same time into an indefinite multitude of Quanta or definite\nmagnitudes. Each of these definite magnitudes, as distinguished from\nthe others, forms a unity, while on the other hand, viewed _per se,_ it\nis a many. And, when that is done, the quantum is described as Number.\n\n102.] In Number the quantum reaches its development and perfect\nmode. Like the One, the medium in which it exists, Number involves two\nqualitative factors or functions; Annumeration or Sum, which depends on\nthe factor discreteness, and Unity, which depends on continuity.\n\nIn arithmetic the several kinds of operation are usually presented as\naccidental modes of dealing with numbers. If necessity and meaning\nis to be found in these operations, it must be by a principle: and\nthat must come from the characteristic elements in the notion of\nnumber itself. (This principle must here be briefly exhibited.) These\ncharacteristic elements are Annumeration on the one hand, and Unity on\nthe other, which together constitute number. But Unity, when applied\nto empirical numbers, is only the equality of these numbers: hence the\nprinciple of arithmetical operations must be to put numbers in the\nratio of Unity and Sum (or amount), and to elicit the equality of these\ntwo modes.\n\nThe Ones or the numbers themselves are indifferent towards each other,\nand hence the unity into which they are translated by the arithmetical\noperation takes the aspect of an external colligation. All reckoning is\ntherefore making up the tale: and the difference between the species of\nit lies only in the qualitative constitution of the numbers of which we\nmake up the tale. The principle for this constitution is given by the\nway we fix Unity and Annumeration.\n\nNumeration comes first: what we may call, making number; a colligation\nof as many units as we please. But to get a _species_ of calculation,\nit is necessary that what we count up should be numbers already, and no\nlonger a mere unit.\n\nFirst, and as they naturally come to hand, Numbers are quite vaguely\nnumbers in general, and so, on the whole, unequal. The colligation, or\ntelling the tale of these, is Addition.\n\nThe second point of view under which we regard numbers is as equal,\nso that they make one unity, and of such there is an annumeration or\nsum before us. To tell the tale of these is Multiplication. It makes\nno matter in the process, how the functions of Sum and Unity are\ndistributed between the two numbers, or factors of the product; either\nmay be Sum and either may be Unity.\n\nThe third and final point of view is the equality of Sum (amount) and\nUnity. To number together numbers when so characterised is Involution;\nand in the first instance raising them to the square power. To\nraise the number to \u00e4 higher power means in point of form to go on\nmultiplying a number with itself an indefinite amount of times.--Since\nthis third type of calculation exhibits the complete equality of the\nsole existing distinction in number, viz. the distinction between Sum\nor amount and Unity, there can be no more than these three modes of\ncalculation. Corresponding to the integration we have the dissolution\nof numbers according to the same features. Hence besides the three\nspecies mentioned, which may to that extent be called positive, there\nare three negative species of arithmetical operation.\n\nNumber, in general, is the quantum in its complete specialisation.\nHence we may employ it not only to determine what we call discrete, but\nwhat are called continuous magnitudes as well. For that reason even\ngeometry must call in the aid of number, when it is required to specify\ndefinite figurations of space and their ratios.\n\n(c) _Degree._\n\n103.] The limit (in a quantum) is identical with the whole of the\nquantum itself. As _in itself_ multiple, the limit is Extensive\nmagnitude; as in itself _simple_ determinateness (qualitative\nsimplicity), it is Intensive magnitude or Degree.\n\nThe distinction between Continuous and Discrete magnitude differs\nfrom that between Extensive and Intensive in the circumstance that\nthe former apply to quantity in general, while the latter apply to\nthe limit or determinateness of it as such. Intensive and Extensive\nmagnitude are not, any more than the other, two species, of which the\none involves a character not possessed by the other: what is Extensive\nmagnitude is just as much Intensive, and _vice vers\u00e2._\n\nIntensive magnitude or Degree is in its notion distinct from Extensive\nmagnitude or the Quantum. It is therefore inadmissible to refuse,\nas many do, to recognise this distinction, and without scruple to\nidentify the two forms of magnitude. They are so identified in\nphysics, when difference of specific gravity is explained by saying,\nthat a body, with a specific gravity twice that of another, contains\nwithin the same space twice as many material parts (or atoms) as the\nother. So with heat and light, if the various degrees of temperature\nand brilliancy were to be explained by the greater or less number of\nparticles (or molecules) of heat and light. No doubt the physicists,\nwho employ such a mode of explanation, usually excuse themselves, when\nthey are remonstrated with on its untenableness, by saying that the\nexpression is without prejudice to the confessedly unknowable essence\nof such phenomena, and employed merely for greater convenience. This\ngreater convenience is meant to point to the easier application of the\ncalculus: but it is hard to see why Intensive magnitudes, having, as\nthey do, a definite numerical expression of their own, should not be\nas convenient for calculation as Extensive magnitudes. If convenience\nbe all that is desired, surely it would be more convenient to banish\ncalculation and thought altogether. A further point against the apology\noffered by the physicists is, that, to engage in explanations of this\nkind, is to overstep the sphere of perception and experience, and\nresort to the realm of metaphysics and of what at other times would be\ncalled idle or even pernicious speculation. It is certainly a fact of\nexperience that, if one of two purses filled with shillings is twice\nas heavy as the other, the reason must be, that the one contains, say\ntwo hundred, and the other only one hundred shillings. These pieces\nof money we can see and feel with our senses: atoms, molecules, and\nthe like, are on the contrary beyond the range of sensuous perception;\nand thought alone can decide whether they are admissible, and have\na meaning. But (as already noticed in \u00a7 98, note) it is abstract\nunderstanding which stereotypes the factor of multeity (involved in the\nnotion of Being-for-self) in the shape of atoms, and adopts it as an\nultimate principle. It is the same abstract understanding which, in\nthe present instance, at equal variance with unprejudiced perception\nand with real concrete thought, regards Extensive magnitude as the\nsole form of quantity, and, where Intensive magnitudes occur, does not\nrecognise them in their own character, but makes a violent attempt by a\nwholly untenable hypothesis to reduce them to Extensive magnitudes.\n\nAmong the charges made against modern philosophy, one is heard more\nthan another. Modern philosophy, it is said, reduces everything to\nidentity. Hence its nickname, the Philosophy of Identity. But the\npresent discussion may teach that it is philosophy, and philosophy\nalone, which insists on distinguishing what is logically as well as\nin experience different; while the professed devotees of experience\nare the people who erect abstract identity into the chief principle\nof knowledge. It is their philosophy which might more appropriately\nbe termed one of identity. Besides it is quite correct that there are\nno merely Extensive and merely Intensive magnitudes, just as little\nas there are merely continuous and merely discrete magnitudes. The\ntwo characteristics of quantity are not opposed as independent kinds.\nEvery Intensive magnitude is also Extensive, and _vice vers\u00e2._ Thus a\ncertain degree of temperature is an Intensive magnitude, which has a\nperfectly simple sensation corresponding to it as such. If we look at a\nthermometer, we find this degree of temperature has a certain expansion\nof the column of mercury corresponding to it; which Extensive magnitude\nchanges simultaneously with the temperature or Intensive magnitude. The\ncase is similar in the world of mind: a more intensive character has a\nwider range with its effects than a less intensive.\n\n104.] In Degree the notion of quantum is explicitly put. It is\nmagnitude as indifferent on its own account and simple: but in such\na way that the character (or modal being) which makes it a quantum\nlies quite outside it in other magnitudes. In this contradiction,\nwhere the _independent_ indifferent limit is absolute _externality,_\nthe Infinite Quantitative Progression is made explicit--an immediacy\nwhich immediately veers round into its counterpart, into mediation (the\npassing beyond and over the quantum just laid down), and _vice vers\u00e2._\n\nNumber is a thought, but thought in its complete self-externalisation.\nBecause it is a thought, it does not belong to perception: but it is a\nthought which is characterised by the externality of perception.--Not\nonly therefore _may_ the quantum be increased or diminished without\nend: the very notion of quantum is thus to push out and out beyond\nitself. The infinite quantitative progression is only the meaningless\nrepetition of one and the same contradiction, which attaches to the\nquantum, both generally and, when explicitly invested with its special\ncharacter, as degree. Touching the futility of enunciating this\ncontradiction in the form of infinite progression, Zeno, as quoted by\nAristotle, rightly says, 'It is the same to say a thing once, and to\nsay it for ever.'\n\n(1) If we follow the usual definition of the mathematicians, given in\n\u00a7 99, and say that magnitude is what can be increased or diminished,\nthere may be nothing to urge against the correctness of the perception\non which it is founded; but the question remains, how we come to\nassume such a capacity of increase or diminution. If we simply appeal\nfor an answer to experience, we try an unsatisfactory course; because\napart from the fact that we should merely have a material image of\nmagnitude, and not the thought of it, magnitude would come out as a\nbare possibility (of increasing or diminishing) and we should have no\nkey to the necessity for its exhibiting this behaviour. In the way of\nour logical evolution, on the contrary, quantity is obviously a grade\nthe process of self-determining thought; and it has been shown that it\nlies in the very notion of quantity to shoot out beyond itself. In that\nway, the increase or diminution (of which we have heard) is not merely\npossible, but necessary.\n\n(2) The quantitative infinite progression is what the reflective\nunderstanding usually relies upon when it is engaged with the\ngeneral question of Infinity. The same thing however holds good of\nthis progression, as was already remarked on the occasion of the\nqualitatively, infinite progression. As was then said, it is not the\nexpression of a true, but of a wrong infinity; it never gets further\nthan a bare 'ought,' and thus really remains within the limits\nof finitude. The quantitative form of this infinite progression,\nwhich Spinoza rightly calls a mere imaginary infinity (_infinitum\nimaginationis,_) is an image often employed by poets, such as Haller\nand Klopstock, to depict the infinity, not of Nature merely, but even\nof God Himself. Thus we find Haller, in a famous description of God's\ninfinity, saying:\n\n    Ich h\u00e4ufe ungeheure Zahlen,\n    Gebirge Millionen auf,\n    Ich sesse Zeit auf Zeit\n    Und Welt auf Welt zu Hauf,\n    Und wenn ich von der grausen H\u00f6h'\n    Mit Schwindel wieder nach Dir seh:\n    Ist alle Macht der Zahl,\n    Vermehrt zu Tausendmal,\n    Noch nicht ein Theil von Dir.\n\n[I heap up monstrous numbers, mountains of millions; I pile time upon\ntime, and world on the top of world; and when from the awful height I\ncast a dizzy look towards Thee, all the power of number, multiplied a\nthousand times, is not yet one part of Thee.]\n\nHere then we meet, in the first place, that continual extrusion of\nquantity, and especially of number, beyond itself, which Kant describes\nas 'eery.' The only really 'eery' thing about it is the wearisomeness\nof ever fixing, and anon unfixing a limit, without advancing a single\nstep. The same poet however well adds to that description of false\ninfinity the closing line:\n\n    Ich zieh sie ab, und Du liegst ganz vor mir.\n\n[These I remove, and Thou liest all before me.]\n\nWhich means, that the true infinite is more than a mere world beyond\nthe finite, and that we, in order to become conscious of it, must\nrenounce that _progressus in infinitum._\n\n(3) Pythagoras, as is well known, philosophised in numbers, and\nconceived number as the fundamental principle of things. To the\nordinary mind this view must at first glance seem an utter paradox,\nperhaps a mere craze. What, then, are we to think of it? To answer\nthis question, we must, in the first place, remember that the problem\nof philosophy consists in tracing back things to thoughts, and, of\ncourse, to definite thoughts. Now, number is undoubtedly a thought: it\nis the thought nearest the sensible, or, more precisely expressed, it\nis the thought of the sensible itself, if we take the sensible to mean\nwhat is many, and in reciprocal exclusion. The attempt to apprehend\nthe universe as number is therefore the first step to metaphysics. In\nthe history of philosophy, Pythagoras, as we know, stands between the\nIonian philosophers and the Eleatics. While the former, as Aristotle\nsays, never get beyond viewing the essence of things as material (\u1f55\u03bb\u03b7),\nand the latter, especially Parmenides, advanced as far as pure thought,\nin the shape of Being, the principle of the Pythagorean philosophy\nforms, as it were, the bridge from the sensible to the super-sensible.\n\nWe may gather from this, what is to be said of those who suppose that\nPythagoras undoubtedly went too far, when he conceived the essence\nof things as mere number. It is true, they admit, that we can number\nthings; but, they contend, things are far more than mere numbers. But\nin what respect are they more? The ordinary sensuous consciousness,\nfrom its own point of view, would not hesitate to answer the question\nby handing us over to sensuous perception, and remarking, that things\nare not merely numerable, but also visible, odorous, palpable, &c. In\nthe phrase of modern times, the fault of Pythagoras would be described\nas an excess of idealism. As may be gathered from what has been said\non the historical position of the Pythagorean school, the real state\nof the case is quite the reverse. Let it be conceded that things are\nmore than numbers; but the meaning of that admission must be that the\nbare thought of number is still insufficient to enunciate the definite\nnotion or essence of things. Instead, then, of saying that Pythagoras\nwent too far with his philosophy of number, it would be nearer the\ntruth to say that he did not go far enough; and in fact the Eleatics\nwere the first to take the further step to pure thought.\n\nBesides, even if there are not things, there are states of things, and\nphenomena of nature altogether, the character of which mainly rests on\ndefinite numbers and proportions. This is especially the case with the\ndifference of tones and their harmonic concord, which, according to a\nwell-known tradition, first suggested to Pythagoras to conceive the\nessence of things as number. Though it is unquestionably important to\nscience to trace back these phenomena to the definite numbers on which\nthey are based, it is wholly inadmissible to view the characterisation\nby thought as a whole, as merely numerical. We may certainly feel\nourselves prompted to associate the most general characteristics of\nthought with the first numbers: saying, 1 is the simple and immediate;\n2 is difference and mediation; and 3 the unity of both of these. Such\nassociations however are purely external: there is nothing in the mere\nnumbers to make them express these definite thoughts. With every step\nin this method, the more arbitrary grows the association of definite\nnumbers with definite thoughts. Thus, we may view 4 as the unity of\n1 and 3, and of the thoughts associated with them, but 4 is just as\nmuch the double of 2; similarly 9 is not merely the square of 3, but\nalso the sum of 8 and I, of 7 and 2, and so on. To attach, as do some\nsecret societies of modern times, importance to all sorts of numbers\nand figures, is to some extent an innocent amusement, but it is also a\nsign of deficiency of intellectual resource. These numbers, it is said,\nconceal a profound meaning, and suggest a deal to think about. But the\npoint in philosophy is, not what you may think, but what you do think:\nand the genuine air of thought is to be sought in thought itself, and\nnot in arbitrarily selected symbols.\n\n105.] That the Quantum in its independent character is external to\nitself, is what constitutes its quality. In that externality it\nis itself and referred connectively to itself. There is a union in\nit of externality, _i.e._ the quantitative, and of independency\n(Being-for-self),--the qualitative. The Quantum when explicitly put\nthus in its own self, is the Quantitative Ratio, a mode of being\nwhich, while, in its Exponent, it is an immediate quantum, is also\nmediation, viz. the reference of some one quantum to another, forming\nthe two sides of the ratio. But the two quanta are not reckoned at\ntheir immediate value: their value is only in this relation.\n\nThe quantitative infinite progression appears at first as a continual\nextrusion of number beyond itself. On looking closer, it is, however,\napparent that in this progression quantity returns to itself: for\nthe meaning of this progression, so far as thought goes, is the fact\nthat number is determined by number. And this gives the quantitative\nratio. Take, for example, the ratio 2:4. Here we have two magnitudes\n(not counted in their several immediate values) in which we are only\nconcerned with their mutual relations. This relation of the two terms\n(the exponent of the ratio) is itself a magnitude, distinguished from\nthe related magnitudes by this, that a change in it is followed by a\nchange of the ratio, whereas the ratio is unaffected by the change of\nboth its sides, and remains the same so long as the exponent is not\nchanged. Consequently, in place of 2:4, we can put 3:6 without changing\nthe ratio; as the exponent 2 remains the same in both cases.\n\n106.] The two sides of the ratio are still immediate quanta: and the\nqualitative and quantitative characteristics still external to one\nanother. But in their truth, seeing that the quantitative itself in its\nexternality is relation to self, or seeing that the independence and\nthe indifference of the character are combined, it is Measure.\n\nThus quantity by means of the dialectical movement so far studied\nthrough its several stages, turns out to be a return to quality. The\nfirst notion of quantity presented to us was that of quality abrogated\nand absorbed. That is to say, quantity seemed an external character not\nidentical with Being, to which it is quite immaterial. This notion, as\nwe have seen, underlies the mathematical definition of magnitude as\nwhat can be increased or diminished. At first sight this definition\nmay create the impression that quantity is merely whatever can be\naltered:--increase and diminution alike implying determination of\nmagnitude otherwise--and may tend to confuse it with determinate Being,\nthe second stage of quality, which in its notion is similarly conceived\nas alterable. We can, however, complete the definition by adding, that\nin quantity we have an alterable, which in spite of alterations still\nremains the same. The notion of quantity, it thus turns out, implies an\ninherent contradiction. This, contradiction is what forms the dialectic\nof quantity. The result of the dialectic however is not a mere return\nto quality, as if that were the true and quantity the false notion, but\nan advance to the unity and truth of both, to qualitative quantity, or\nMeasure.\n\nIt may be well therefore at this point to observe that whenever in\nour study of the objective world we are engaged in quantitative\ndeterminations, it is in all cases Measure which we have in view, as\nthe goal of our operations. This is hinted at even in language, when\nthe ascertainment of quantitative features and relations is called\nmeasuring. We measure, _e.g._ the length of different chords that have\nbeen put into a state of vibration, with an eye to the qualitative\ndifference of the tones caused by their vibration, corresponding to\nthis difference of length. Similarly, in chemistry, we try to ascertain\nthe quantity of the matters brought into combination, in order to find\nout the measures or proportions conditioning such combinations, that\nis to say, those quantities which give rise to definite qualities.\nIn statistics, too, the numbers with which the study is engaged are\nimportant only from the qualitative results conditioned by them. Mere\ncollection of numerical facts, prosecuted without regard to the ends\nhere noted, is justly called an exercise of idle curiosity, of neither\ntheoretical nor practical interest.\n\n107.] Measure is the qualitative quantum, in the first place as\nimmediate,--a quantum, to which a determinate being or a quality is\nattached.\n\nMeasure, where quality and quantity are in one, is thus the completion\nof Being. Being, as we first apprehend it, is something utterly\nabstract and characterless: but it is the very essence of Being to\ncharacterise itself, and its complete characterisation is reached\nin Measure. Measure, like the other stages of Being, may serve as a\ndefinition of the Absolute: God, it has been said, is the Measure of\nall things. It is this idea which forms the ground-note of many of the\nancient Hebrew hymns, in which the glorification of God tends in the\nmain to show that He has appointed to everything its bound: to the\nsea and the solid land, to the rivers and mountains; and also to the\nvarious kinds of plants and animals. To the religious sense of the\nGreeks the divinity of measure, especially in respect of social ethics,\nwas represented by Nemesis. That conception implies a general theory\nthat all human things, riches, honour, and power, as well as joy and\npain, have their definite measure, the transgression of which brings\nruin and destruction. In the world of objects, too, we have measure. We\nsee, in the first place, existences in Nature, of which measure forms\nthe essential structure. This is the case, for example, with the solar\nsystem, which may be described as the realm of free measures. As we\nnext proceed to the study of inorganic nature, measure retires, as it\nwere, into the background; at least we often find the quantitative and\nqualitative characteristics showing indifference to each other. Thus\nthe quality of a rock or a river is not tied to a definite magnitude.\nBut even these objects when closely inspected are found not to be quite\nmeasureless: the water of a river, and the single constituents of a\nrock, when chemically analysed, are seen to be qualities conditioned\nby quantitative ratios between the matters they contain. In organic\nnature, however, measure again rises full into immediate perception.\nThe various kinds of plants and animals, in the whole as well as in\ntheir parts, have a certain measure: though it is worth noticing that\nthe more imperfect forms, those which are least removed from inorganic\nnature, are partly distinguished from the higher forms by the greater\nindefiniteness of their measure. Thus among fossils, we find some\nammonites discernible only by the microscope, and others as large as a\ncart-wheel. The same vagueness of measure appears in several plants,\nwhich stand on a low level of organic development,--for instance, ferns.\n\n108.] In so far as in Measure quality and quantity are only in\n_immediate_ unity, to that extent their difference presents itself in\na manner equally immediate. Two cases are then possible. Either the\nspecific quantum or measure is a bare quantum, and the definite being\n(there-and-then) is capable of an increase or a diminution, without\nMeasure (which to that extent is a Rule) being thereby set completely\naside. Or the alteration of the quantum is also an alteration of the\nquality.\n\nThe identity between quantity and quality, which is found in Measure,\nis at first only implicit, and not yet explicitly realised. In other\nwords, these two categories, which unite in Measure, each claim an\nindependent authority. On the one hand, the quantitative features of\nexistence may be altered, without affecting its quality. On the other\nhand, this increase and diminution, immaterial though it be, has\nits limit, by exceeding which the quality suffers change. Thus the\ntemperature of water is, in the first place, a point of no consequence\nin respect of its liquidity: still with the increase or diminution\nof the temperature of the liquid water, there comes a point where\nthis state of cohesion suffers a qualitative change, and the water\nis converted into steam or ice. A quantitative change takes place,\napparently without any further significance: but there is something\nlurking behind, and a seemingly innocent change of quantity acts as a\nkind of snare, to catch hold of the quality. The antinomy of Measure\nwhich this implies was exemplified under more than one garb among the\nGreeks. It was asked, for example, whether a single grain makes a heap\nof wheat, or whether it makes a bald-tail to tear out a single hair\nfrom the horse's tail. At first, no doubt, looking at the nature of\nquantity as an indifferent and external character of Being, we are\ndisposed to answer these questions in the negative. And yet, as we\nmust admit, this indifferent increase and diminution has its limit:\na point is finally reached, where a single additional grain makes a\nheap of wheat; and the bald-tail is produced, if we continue plucking\nout single hairs. These examples find a parallel in the story of the\npeasant who, as his ass trudged cheerfully along, went on adding ounce\nafter ounce to its load, till at length it sunk under the unendurable\nburden. It would be a mistake to treat these examples as pedantic\nfutility; they really turn on thoughts, an acquaintance with which is\nof great importance in practical life, especially in ethics. Thus in\nthe matter of expenditure, there is a certain latitude within which\na more or less does not matter; but when the Measure, imposed by the\nindividual circumstances of the special case, is exceeded on the one\nside or the other, the qualitative nature of Measure (as in the above\nexamples of the different temperature of water) makes itself felt,\nand a course, which a moment before was held good economy, turns into\navarice or prodigality. The same principle may be applied in politics,\nwhen the constitution of a state has to be looked at as independent of,\nno less than as dependent on, the extent of its territory, the number\nof its inhabitants, and other quantitative points of the same kind. If\nwe look _e.g._ at a state with a territory of ten thousand square miles\nand a population of four millions, we should, without hesitation, admit\nthat a few square miles of land or a few thousand inhabitants more or\nless could exercise no essential influence on the character of its\nconstitution. But, on the other hand, we must not forget, that by the\ncontinual increase or diminishing of a state, we finally get to a point\nwhere, apart from all other circumstances, this quantitative alteration\nalone necessarily draws with it an alteration in the quality of the\nconstitution. The constitution of a little Swiss canton does not suit\na great kingdom; and, similarly, the constitution of the Roman republic\nwas unsuitable when transferred to the small imperial towns of Germany.\n\n109.] In this second case, when a measure through its quantitative\nnature has gone in excess of its qualitative character, we meet, what\nis at first an absence of measure, the Measureless. But seeing\nthat the second quantitative ratio, which in comparison with the first\nis measureless, is none the less qualitative, the measureless is also a\nmeasure. These two transitions, from quality to quantum, and from the\nlatter back again to quality, may be represented under the image of an\ninfinite progression--as the self-abrogation and restoration of measure\nin the measureless.\n\nQuantity, as we have seen, is not only capable of alteration, _i.e._\nof increase or diminution: it is naturally and necessarily a tendency\nto exceed itself. This tendency is maintained even in measure. But if\nthe quantity present in measure exceeds a certain limit, the quality\ncorresponding to it is also put in abeyance. This however is not a\nnegation of quality altogether, but only of this definite quality, the\nplace of which is at once occupied by another. This process of measure,\nwhich appears alternately as a mere change in quantity, and then as a\nsudden revulsion of quantity into quality, may be envisaged under the\nfigure of a nodal (knotted) line. Such lines we find in Nature under\na variety of forms. We have already referred to the qualitatively\ndifferent states of aggregation water exhibits under increase or\ndiminution of temperature. The same phenomenon is presented by the\ndifferent degrees in the oxidation of metals. Even the difference of\nmusical notes may be regarded as an example of what takes place in\nthe process of measure,--the revulsion from what is at first merely\nquantitative into qualitative alteration.\n\n110.] What really takes place here is that the immediacy, which still\nattaches to measure as such, is set aside. In measure, at first,\nquality and quantity itself are immediate, and measure is only their\n'relative' identity. But measure shows itself absorbed and superseded\nin the measureless: yet the measureless, although it be the negation\nof measure, is itself a unity of quantity and quality. Thus in the\nmeasureless the measure is still seen to meet only with itself.\n\n111.] Instead of the more abstract factors, Being and Nothing, some\nand other, &c., the Infinite, which is affirmation as a negation\nof negation, now finds its factors in quality and quantity. These\n(\u03b1) have in the first place passed over, quality into quantity, (\u00a7\n98), and quantity into quality (\u00a7 105), and thus are both shown up\nas negations, (\u00df) But in their unity, that is, in measure, they are\noriginally distinct, and the one is only through the instrumentality of\nthe other. And (\u03b3) after the immediacy of this unity has turned out to\nbe self-annulling, the unity is explicitly put as what it implicitly\nis, simple relation-to-self, which contains in it being and all its\nforms absorbed.--Being or immediacy, which by the negation of itself\nis a mediation with self and a reference to self,--which consequently\nis also a mediation which cancels itself into reference-to-self, or\nimmediacy,--is Essence.\n\nThe process of measure, instead of being only the wrong infinite of\nan endless progression, in the shape of an ever-recurrent recoil\nfrom quality to quantity, and from quantity to quality, is also\nthe true infinity of coincidence with self in another. In measure,\nquality and quantity originally confront each other, like some and\nother. But quality is implicitly quantity, and conversely quantity\nis implicitly quality. In the process of measure, therefore, these\ntwo pass into each other: each of them becomes what it already was\nimplicitly: and thus we get Being thrown into abeyance and absorbed,\nwith its several characteristics negatived. Such Being is Essence.\nMeasure is implicitly Essence; and its process consists in realising\nwhat it is implicitly.--The ordinary consciousness conceives things\nas being, and studies them in quality, quantity, and measure. These\nimmediate characteristics however soon show themselves to be not fixed\nbut transient; and Essence is the result of their dialectic. In the\nsphere of Essence one category does not pass into another, but refers\nto another merely. In Being, the form of reference is purely due to\nour reflection on what takes place: but it is the special and proper\ncharacteristic of Essence. In the sphere of Being, when somewhat\nbecomes another, the somewhat has vanished. Not so in Essence: here\nthere is no real other, but only diversity, reference of the one\nto _its_ other. The transition of Essence is therefore at the same\ntime no transition: for in the passage of different into different,\nthe different does not vanish: the different terms remain in their\nrelation. When we speak of Being and Nought, Being is independent, so\nis Nought. The case is otherwise with the Positive and the Negative.\nNo doubt these possess the characteristic of Being and Nought. But\nthe positive by itself has no sense; it is wholly in reference to the\nnegative. And it is the same with the negative. In the sphere of Being\nthe reference of one term to another is only implicit; in Essence on\nthe contrary it is explicit And this in general is the distinction\nbetween the forms of Being and Essence: in Being everything is\nimmediate, in Essence everything is relative.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\n\nSECOND SUB-DIVISION OF LOGIC.\n\n\nTHE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE.\n\n\n112.] The terms in Essence are always mere pairs of correlatives, and\nnot yet absolutely reflected in themselves: hence in essence the actual\nunity of the notion is not realised, but only postulated by reflection.\nEssence,--which is Being coming into mediation with itself through the\nnegativity of itself--is self-relatedness, only in so far as it is\nrelation to an Other,--this Other however coming to view at first not\nas something which _is,_ but as postulated and hypothetised.--Being has\nnot vanished: but, firstly, Essence, as simple self-relation, is Being,\nand secondly as regards its one-sided characteristic of immediacy,\nBeing is deposed to a mere negative, to a seeming or reflected\nlight--Essence accordingly is Being thus reflecting light into itself.\n\nThe Absolute is the Essence. This is the same definition as the\nprevious one that the Absolute is Being, in so far as Being likewise\nis simple self-relation. But it is at the same time higher, because\nEssence is Being that has gone into itself: that is to say, the\nsimple self-relation (in Being) is expressly put as negation of\nthe negative, as immanent self-mediation.--Unfortunately when the\nAbsolute is defined to be the Essence, the negativity which this\nimplies is often taken only to mean the withdrawal of all determinate\npredicates. This negative action of withdrawal or abstraction thus\nfalls outside of the Essence--which is thus left as a mere result apart\nfrom its premisses,--the _caput mortuum_ of abstraction. But as this\nnegativity, instead of being external to Being, is its own dialectic,\nthe truth of the latter, viz. Essence, will be Being as retired within\nitself,--immanent Being. That reflection, or light thrown into itself,\nconstitutes the distinction between Essence and immediate Being, and is\nthe peculiar characteristic of Essence itself.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nAny mention of Essence implies that we distinguish it from Being:\nthe latter is immediate, and, compared with the Essence, we look upon\nit as mere seeming. But this seeming is not an utter nonentity and\nnothing at all, but Being superseded and put by. The point of view\ngiven by the Essence is in general the standpoint of 'Reflection.'\nThis word 'reflection' is originally applied, when a ray of light in\na straight line impinging upon the surface of a mirror is thrown back\nfrom it. In this phenomenon we have two things,--first an immediate\nfact which is, and secondly the deputed, derivated, or transmitted\nphase of the same.--Something of this sort takes place when we reflect,\nor think upon an object; for here we want to know the object, not in\nits immediacy, but as derivative or mediated. The problem or aim of\nphilosophy is often represented as the ascertainment of the essence of\nthings: a phrase which only means that things instead of being left\nin their immediacy, must be shown to be mediated by, or based upon,\nsomething else. The immediate Being of things is thus conceived under\nthe image of a rind or curtain behind which the Essence lies hidden.\n\nEverything, it is said, has an Essence; that is, things really are not\nwhat they immediately show themselves. There is therefore something\nmore to be done than merely rove from one quality to another, and\nmerely to advance from qualitative to quantitative, and _vice vers\u00e2:_\nthere is a permanent in things, and that permanent is in the first\ninstance their Essence. With respect to other meanings and uses of the\ncategory of Essence, we may note that in the German auxiliary verb\n_'sein'_ the past tense is expressed by the term for Essence (_Wesen_):\nwe designate past being as _gewesen._ This anomaly of language implies\nto some extent a correct perception of the relation between Being and\nEssence. Essence we may certainly regard as past Being, remembering\nhowever meanwhile that the past is not utterly denied, but only laid\naside and thus at the same time preserved. Thus, to say, Caesar _was_\nin Gaul, only denies the immediacy of the event, but not his sojourn\nin Gaul altogether. That sojourn is just what forms the import of\nthe proposition, in which however it is represented as over and\ngone.--'_Wesen_' in ordinary life frequently means only a collection\nor aggregate: Zeitungswesen (the Press), Postwesen (the Post-Office),\nSteuerwesen (the Revenue). All that these terms mean is that the things\nin question are not to be taken single, in their immediacy, but as a\ncomplex, and then, perhaps, in addition, in their various bearings.\nThis usage of the term is not very different in its implication from\nour own.\n\nPeople also speak of _finite_ Essences, such as man. But the very term\nEssence implies that we have made a step beyond finitude: and the title\nas applied to man is so far inexact. It is often added that there is\na supreme Essence (Being): by which is meant God. On this two remarks\nmay be made. In the first place the phrase 'there is' suggests a\nfinite only: as when we say, there are so many planets, or, there are\nplants of such a constitution and plants of such an other. In these\ncases we are speaking of something which has other things beyond and\nbeside it. But God, the absolutely infinite, is not something outside\nand beside whom there are other essences. All else outside f God, if\nseparated from Him, possesses no essentiality: in its I isolation it\nbecomes a mere show or seeming, without stay or essence of its own.\nBut, secondly, it is a poor way of talking to call God the _highest_\nor supreme Essence. The category of quantity which the phrase employs\nhas its proper place within the compass of the finite. When we call\none mountain the highest on the earth, we have a vision of other\nhigh mountains beside it. So too when we call any one the richest or\nmost learned in his country. But God, far from being _a_ Being, even\nthe highest, is _the_ Being. This definition, however, though such\na representation of God is an important and necessary stage in the\ngrowth of the religious consciousness, does not by any means exhaust\nthe depth of the ordinary Christian idea of God. If we consider God as\nthe Essence only, and nothing more, we know Him only as the universal\nand irresistible Power; in other words, as the Lord. Now the fear of\nthe Lord is, doubtless, the beginning,--but _only_ the beginning, of\nwisdom. To look at God in this light, as the Lord, and the Lord alone,\nis especially characteristic of Judaism and also of Mohammedanism.\nThe defect of these religions lies in their scant recognition of the\nfinite, which, be it as natural things or as finite phases of mind,\nit is characteristic of the heathen and (as they also for that reason\nare) polytheistic religions to maintain intact. Another not uncommon\nassertion is that God, as the supreme Being, cannot be known. Such is\nthe view taken by modern 'enlightenment' and abstract understanding,\nwhich is content to say, _Il y a un \u00eatre supr\u00eame_: and there lets\nthe matter rest. To speak thus, and treat God merely as the supreme\nother-world Being, implies that we look upon the world before us in\nits immediacy as something permanent and positive, and forget that\ntrue Being is just the superseding of all that is immediate. If God\nbe the abstract super-sensible Being, outside whom therefore lies all\ndifference and all specific character, He is only a bare name, a mere\n_caput mortuum_ of abstracting understanding. The true knowledge of God\nbegins when we know that things, as they immediately are, have no truth.\n\nIn reference also to other subjects besides God the category of Essence\nis often liable to an abstract use, by which, in the study of anything,\nits Essence is held to be something unaffected by, and subsisting in\nindependence of, its definite phenomenal embodiment. Thus we say, for\nexample, of people, that the great thing is not what they do or how\nthey behave, but what they are. This is correct, if it means that a\nman's conduct should be looked at, not in its immediacy, but only as\nit is explained by his inner self, and as a revelation of that inner\nself. Still it should be remembered that the only means by which the\nEssence and the inner self can be verified, is their appearance in\noutward reality; whereas the appeal which men make to the essential\nlife, as distinct from the material facts of conduct, is generally\nprompted by a desire to assert their own subjectivity and to elude an\nabsolute and objective judgment.\n\n113.] Self-relation in Essence is the form of Identity or of\nreflection-into-self, which has here taken the place of the immediacy\nof Being. They are both the same abstraction,--self-relation.\n\nThe unintelligence of sense, to take everything limited and finite for\nBeing, passes into the obstinacy of understanding, which views the\nfinite as self-identical, not inherently self-contradictory.\n\n114.] This identity, as it has descended from Being, appears in the\nfirst place only charged with the characteristics of Being, and\nreferred to Being as to something external. This external Being, if\ntaken in separation from the true Being (of Essence), is called the\nUnessential. But that turns out a mistake. Because Essence is\nBeing-in-self, it is essential only to the extent that it has in itself\nits negative, _e._ reference to another, or mediation. Consequently,\nit has the unessential as its own proper seeming (reflection) in\nitself. But in seeming or mediation there is distinction involved:\nand since what is distinguished (as distinguished from the identity\nout of which it arises, and in which it is not, or lies as seeming,)\nreceives itself the form of identity, the semblance is still in the\nmode of Being, or of self-related immediacy. The sphere of Essence\nthus turns out to be a still imperfect combination of immediacy and\nmediation. In it every term is expressly invested with the character\nof self-relatedness, while yet at the same time one is forced beyond\nit. It has Being,--reflected being, a being in which another shows,\nand which shows in another. And so it is also the sphere in which the\ncontradiction, still implicit in the sphere of Being, is made explicit.\n\nAs the one notion is the common principle underlying all logic, there\nappear in the development of Essence the same attributes or terms as\nin the development of Being, but in a reflex form. Instead of Being\nand Nought we have now the forms of Positive and Negative; the former\nat first as Identity corresponding to pure and uncontrasted Being, the\nlatter developed (showing in itself) as Difference. So also, we have\nBecoming represented by the Ground of determinate Being: which itself,\nwhen reflected upon the Ground, is Existence.\n\nThe theory of Essence is the most difficult branch of Logic. It\nincludes the categories of metaphysic and of the sciences in general.\nThese are products of reflective understanding, which, while it assumes\nthe differences to possess a footing of their own, and at the same\ntime also expressly affirms their relativity, still combines the two\nstatements, side by side, or one after the other, by an 'Also,' without\nbringing these thoughts into one, or unifying them into the notion.\n\nA.--ESSENCE AS GROUND OF EXISTENCE.\n\n(a) _The pure principles or categories of Reflection._\n\n(\u03b1) Identity.\n\n115.] The Essence lights up _in itself_ or is mere reflection: and\ntherefore is only self-relation, not as immediate but as reflected. And\nthat reflex relation is self-Identity.\n\nThis Identity becomes an Identity in form only, or of the\nunderstanding, if it be held hard and fast, quite aloof from\ndifference. Or, rather, abstraction is the imposition of this Identity\nof form, the transformation of something inherently concrete into this\nform of elementary simplicity. And this may be done in two ways. Either\nwe may neglect a part of the multiple features which are found in the\nconcrete thing (by what is called analysis) and select only one of\nthem; or, neglecting their variety, we may concentrate the multiple\ncharacters into one.\n\nIf we associate Identity with the Absolute, making the Absolute the\nsubject of a proposition, we get: The Absolute is what is identical\nwith itself. However true this proposition may be, it is doubtful\nwhether it be meant in its truth: and therefore it is at least\nimperfect in the expression. For it is left undecided, whether it means\nthe abstract Identity of understanding,--abstract, that is, because\ncontrasted with the other characteristics of Essence, or the Identity\nwhich is inherently concrete. In the latter case, as will be seen,\ntrue Identity is first discoverable in the Ground, and, with a higher\ntruth, in the Notion.--Even the word Absolute is often used to mean no\nmore than 'abstract.' Absolute space and absolute time, for example, is\nanother way of saying abstract space and abstract time.\n\nWhen the principles of Essence are taken as essential principles of\nthought they become predicates of a pre-supposed subject, which,\nbecause they are essential, is 'Everything,' The propositions thus\narising have been stated as universal Laws of Thought. Thus the first\nof them, the maxim of Identity, reads: Everything is identical with\nitself, A=A: and, negatively, A cannot at the same time be A and not\nA.--This maxim, instead of being a true law of thought, is nothing\nbut the law of abstract understanding. The propositional form itself\ncontradicts it: for a proposition always promises a distinction\nbetween subject and predicate; while the present one does not fulfil\nwhat its form requires. But the Law is particularly set aside by\nthe following so-called Laws of Thought, which make laws out of its\nopposite.--It is asserted that the maxim of Identity, though it\ncannot be proved, regulates the procedure of every consciousness,\nand that experience shows it to be accepted as soon as its terms\nare apprehended. To this alleged experience of the logic-books may\nbe opposed the universal experience that no mind thinks or forms\nconceptions or speaks, in accordance with this law, and that no\nexistence of any kind whatever conforms to it. Utterances after the\nfashion of this pretended law (A planet is--a planet; Magnetism\nis--magnetism; Mind is--mind) are, as they deserve to be, reputed\nsilly. That is certainly matter of general experience. The logic which\nseriously propounds such laws and the scholastic world in which alone\nthey are valid have long been discredited with practical common sense\nas well as with the philosophy of reason.\n\n*       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIdentity is, in the first place, the repetition of what we had earlier\nas Being, but as _become,_ through supersession of its character of\nimmediateness. It is therefore Being as Ideality.--It is important\nto come to a proper understanding on the true meaning of Identity:\nand, for that purpose, we must especially guard against taking it\nas abstract Identity, to the exclusion of all Difference. That is\nthe touchstone for distinguishing all bad philosophy from what alone\ndeserves the name of philosophy. Identity in its truth, as an Ideality\nof what immediately is, is a high category for our religious modes\nof mind as well as all other forms of thought and mental activity.\nThe true knowledge of God, it may be said, begins when we know Him as\nidentity,--as absolute identity. To know so much is to see that all\nthe power and glory of the world sinks into nothing in God's presence,\nand subsists only as the reflection of His power and His glory. In\nthe same way, Identity, as self-consciousness, is what distinguishes\nman from nature, particularly from the brutes which never reach the\npoint of comprehending themselves as 'I,' that is, pure self-contained\nunity. So again, in connexion with thought, the main thing is not to\nconfuse the true Identity, which contains Being and its characteristics\nideally transfigured in it, with an abstract Identity, identity of bare\nform. All the charges of narrowness, hardness, meaninglessness, which\nare so often directed against thought from the quarter of feeling and\nimmediate perception, rest on the perverse assumption that thought\nacts only as a faculty of abstract Identification. The Formal Logic\nitself confirms this assumption by laying down the supreme law of\nthought (so-called) which has been discussed above. If thinking were no\nmore than an abstract Identity, we could not but own it to be a most\nfutile and tedious business. No doubt the notion, and the idea too, are\nidentical with themselves: but identical only in so far as they at the\nsame time involve distinction.\n\n(\u03b2) _Difference._\n\n116.] Essence is mere Identity and reflection in itself only as it is\nself-relating negativity, and in that way self-repulsion. It contains\ntherefore essentially the characteristic of Difference.\n\nOther-being is here no longer qualitative, taking the shape of the\ncharacter or limit. It is now in Essence, in self-relating essence, and\ntherefore the negation is at the same time a relation,--is, in short,\nDistinction, Relativity, Mediation.\n\nTo ask, 'How Identity comes to Difference,' assumes that Identity as\nmere abstract Identity is something of itself, and Difference also\nsomething else equally independent. This supposition renders an answer\nto the question impossible. If Identity is viewed as diverse from\nDifference, all that we have in this way is but Difference; and hence\nwe cannot demonstrate the advance to difference, because the person\nwho asks for the How of the progress thereby implies that for him\nthe starting-point is non-existent. The question then when put to\nthe test has obviously no meaning, and its proposer may be met with\nthe question what he means by Identity; whereupon we should soon see\nthat he attaches no idea to it at all, and that Identity is for him\nan empty name. As we have seen, besides, Identity is undoubtedly a\nnegative,--not however an abstract empty Nought, but the negation of\nBeing and its characteristics. Being so, Identity is at the same time\nself-relation, and, what is more, negative self-relation; in other\nwords, it draws a distinction between it and itself.\n\n117.] Difference is, first of all, (1) immediate difference, _e.g._\nDiversity or Variety. In Diversity the different things are each\nindividually what they are, and unaffected by the relation in which\nthey stand to each other. This relation is therefore external to them.\nIn consequence of the various things being thus indifferent to the\ndifference between them, it falls outside them into a third thing, the\nagent of Comparison. This external difference, as an identity of the\nobjects related, is Likeness; as a non-identity of them, is Unlikeness.\n\nThe gap which understanding allows to divide these characteristics, is\nso great, that although comparison has one and the same substratum for\nlikeness and unlikeness, which are explained to be different aspects\nand points of view in it, still likeness by itself is the first of the\nelements alone, viz. identity, and unlikeness by itself is difference.\n\nDiversity has, like Identity, been transformed into a maxim:\n'Everything is various or different': or,'There are no two things\ncompletely like each other.' Here Everything is put under a predicate,\nwhich is the reverse of the identity attributed to it in the first\nmaxim; and therefore under a law contradicting the first. However there\nis an explanation. As the diversity is supposed due only to external\ncomparison, anything taken _per se_ is expected and understood always\nto be identical with itself, so that the second law need not interfere\nwith the first. But, in that case, variety does not belong to the\nsomething or everything in question: it constitutes no intrinsic\ncharacteristic of the subject: and the second maxim on this showing\ndoes not admit of being stated at all. If, on the other hand, the\nsomething _itself_ is as the maxim says diverse, it must be in virtue\nof its own proper character: but in this case the specific difference,\nand not variety as such, is what is intended. And this is the meaning\nof the maxim of Leibnitz.\n\nWhen understanding sets itself to study Identity, it has already passed\nbeyond it, and is looking at Difference in the shape of bare Variety.\nIf we follow the so-called law of Identity, and say,--The sea is the\nsea, The air is the air, The moon is the moon, these objects pass for\nhaving no bearing on one another. What we have before us therefore is\nnot Identity, but Difference. We do not stop at this point however, or\nregard things merely as different. We compare them one with another,\nand thus discover the features of likeness and unlikeness. The work of\nthe finite sciences lies to a great extent in the application of these\ncategories, and the phrase 'scientific treatment' generally means no\nmore than the method which has for its aim comparison of the objects\nunder examination. This method has undoubtedly led to some important\nresults;--we may particularly mention the great advance of modern times\nin the provinces of comparative anatomy and comparative linguistic.\nBut it is going too far to suppose that the comparative method can be\nemployed with equal success in all branches of knowledge. Nor--and this\nmust be emphasised--can mere comparison ever ultimately satisfy the\nrequirements of science. Its results are indeed indispensable, but they\nare still labours only preliminary to truly intelligent cognition.\n\nIf it be the office of comparison to reduce existing differences to\nIdentity, the science, which most perfectly fulfils that end, is\nmathematics. The reason of that is, that quantitative difference is\nonly the difference which is quite external. Thus, in geometry, a\ntriangle and a quadrangle, figures qualitatively different, have this\nqualitative difference discounted by abstraction, and are equalised to\none another in magnitude. It follows from what has been formerly said\nabout the mere Identity of understanding that, as has also been pointed\nout (\u00a7 99, note), neither philosophy nor the empirical sciences need\nenvy this superiority of Mathematics.\n\nThe story is told that, when Leibnitz propounded the maxim of Variety,\nthe cavaliers and ladies of the court, as they walked round the garden,\nmade efforts to discover two leaves indistinguishable from each other,\nin order to confute the law stated by the philosopher. Their device was\nunquestionably a convenient method of dealing with metaphysics,--one\nwhich has not ceased to be fashionable. All the same, as regards the\nprinciple of Leibnitz, difference must be understood to mean not an\nexternal and indifferent diversity merely, but difference essential.\nHence the very nature of things implies that they must be different.\n\n\n118.] Likeness is an Identity only of those things which are not\nthe same, not identical with each other: and Unlikeness is a\nrelation of things unlike. The two therefore do not fall on different\naspects or points of view in the thing, without any mutual affinity:\nbut one throws light into the other. Variety thus comes to be reflexive\ndifference, or difference (distinction) implicit and essential,\ndeterminate or specific difference.\n\n*       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWhile things merely various show themselves unaffected by each other,\nlikeness and unlikeness on the contrary are a pair of characteristics\nwhich are in completely reciprocal relation. The one of them cannot\nbe thought without the other. This advance from simple variety to\nopposition appears in our common acts of thought, when we allow that\ncomparison has a meaning only upon the hypothesis of an existing\ndifference, and that on the other hand we can distinguish only on the\nhypothesis of existing similarity.\n\nHence, if the problem be the discovery of a difference, we attribute\nno great cleverness to the man who only distinguishes those objects,\nof which the difference is palpable, _e.g._ a pen and a camel:\nand similarly, it implies no very advanced faculty of comparison,\nwhen the objects compared, _e.g._ a beech and an oak, a temple and\na church, are near akin. In the case of difference, in short, we\nlike to sec identity, and in the case of identity we like to see\ndifference. Within the range of the empirical sciences however, the\none of these two categories is often allowed to put the other out of\nsight and mind. Thus the scientific problem at one time is to reduce\nexisting differences to identity; on another occasion, with equal\none-sidedness, to discover new differences. We see this especially in\nphysical science. There the problem consists, in the first place, in\nthe continual search for new 'elements,' new forces, new genera, and\nspecies. Or, in another direction, it seeks to show that all bodies\nhitherto believed to be simple are compound: and modern physicists and\nchemists smile at the ancients, who were satisfied with four elements,\nand these not simple. Secondly, and on the other hand, mere identity\nis made the chief question. Thus electricity and chemical affinity\nare regarded as the same, and even the organic processes of digestion\nand assimilation are looked upon as a mere chemical operation. Modern\nphilosophy has often been nicknamed the Philosophy of Identity. But, as\nwas already remarked (\u00a7 103, note), it is precisely philosophy, and in\nparticular speculative logic, which lays bare the nothingness of the\nabstract, undifferentiated identity, known to understanding; though it\nalso undoubtedly urges its disciples not to rest at mere diversity, but\nto ascertain the inner unity of all existence.\n\n119.] Difference implicit is essential difference, the Positive\nand the Negative: and that is this way. The Positive is the\nidentical self-relation in such a way as not to be the Negative, and\nthe Negative is the different by itself so as not to be the Positive.\nThus either has an existence of its own in proportion as it is not the\nother. The one is made visible in the other, and is only in so far as\nthat other is. Essential difference is therefore Opposition; according\nto which the different is not confronted by _any_ other but by _its_\nother. That is, either of these two (Positive and Negative) is stamped\nwith a characteristic of its own only in its relation to the other: the\none is only reflected into itself as it is reflected into the other.\nAnd so with the other. Either in this way is the other's _own_ other.\n\nDifference implicit or essential gives the maxim, Everything is\nessentially distinct; or, as it has also been expressed, Of two\nopposite predicates the one only can be assigned to anything, and\nthere is no third possible. This maxim of Contrast or Opposition\nmost expressly controverts the maxim of Identity: the one says a\nthing should be only self-relation, the other says that it must be\nan opposite, a relation to its other. The native unintelligence of\nabstraction betrays itself by setting in juxtaposition two contrary\nmaxims, like these, as laws, without even so much as comparing\nthem.--The Maxim of Excluded Middle is the maxim of the definite\nunderstanding, which would fain avoid contradiction, but in so doing\nfalls into it. A must be either + A or - A, it says. It virtually\ndeclares in these words a third A which is neither + nor--, and which\nat the same time is yet invested with + and - characters. If + W mean\n6 miles to the West, and - W mean 6 miles to the East, and if the +\nand - cancel each other, the 6 miles of way or space remain what they\nwere with and without the contrast. Even the mere _plus_ and _minus_ of\nnumber or abstract direction have, if we like, zero, for their third:\nbut it need not be denied that the empty contrast, which understanding\ninstitutes between _plus_ and _minus,_ is not without its value in such\nabstractions as number, direction, &c.\n\nIn the doctrine of contradictory concepts, the one notion is, say,\nblue (for in this doctrine even the sensuous generalised image of a\ncolour is called a notion) and the other not-blue. This other then\nwould not be an affirmative, say, yellow, but would merely be kept at\nthe abstract negative.--That the Negative in its own nature is quite as\nmuch Positive (see next \u00a7), is implied in saying that what is opposite\nto another is _its_ other. The inanity of the opposition between what\nare called contradictory notions is fully exhibited in what we may call\nthe grandiose formula of a general law, that Everything has the one and\nnot the other of _all_ predicates which are in such opposition. In this\nway, mind is either white or not-white, yellow or not-yellow, &c, _ad\ninfinitum._\n\nIt was forgotten that Identity and Opposition are themselves opposed,\nand the maxim of Opposition was taken even for that of Identity,\nin the shape of the principle of Contradiction. A notion, which\npossesses neither or both of two mutually contradictory marks, _e.g._\na quadrangular circle, is held to be logically false. Now though a\nmultangular circle and a rectilineal arc no less contradict this\nmaxim, geometers never hesitate to treat the circle as a polygon with\nrectilineal sides. But anything like a circle (that is to say its mere\ncharacter or nominal definition) is still no notion. In the notion\nof a circle, centre and circumference are equally essential: both\nmarks belong to it: and yet centre and circumference are opposite and\ncontradictory to each other.\n\nThe conception of Polarity, which is so dominant in physics, contains\nby implication the more correct definition of Opposition. But physics\nfor its theory of the laws of thought adheres to the ordinary logic; it\nmight therefore well be horrified in case it should ever work out the\nconception of Polarity, and get at the thoughts which are implied in it.\n\n(1) With the positive we return to identity, but in its higher truth\nas identical self-relation, and at the same time with the note that it\nis not the negative. The negative _per se_ is the same as difference\nitself. The identical as such is primarily the yet uncharacterised:\nthe positive on the other hand is what is self-identical, but with the\nmark of antithesis to an other. And the negative is difference as such,\ncharacterised as not identity. This is the difference of difference\nwithin its own self.\n\nPositive and negative are supposed to express an absolute difference.\nThe two however are at bottom the same: the name of either might be\ntransferred to the other. Thus, for example, debts and assets are not\ntwo particular, self-subsisting species of property. What is negative\nto the debtor, is positive to the creditor. A way to the east is also\na way to the west. Positive and negative are therefore intrinsically\nconditioned by one another, and are only in relation to each other. The\nnorth pole of the magnet cannot be without the south pole, and _vice\nvers\u00e2._ If we cut a magnet in two, we have not a north pole in one\npiece, and a south pole in the other. Similarly, in electricity, the\npositive and the negative are not two diverse and independent fluids.\nIn opposition, the different is not confronted by any other, but by\n_its_ other. Usually we regard different things as unaffected by each\nother. Thus we say: I am a human being, and around me are air, water,\nanimals, and all sorts of things. Everything is thus put outside of\nevery other. But the aim of philosophy is to banish indifference, and\nto ascertain the necessity of things. By that means the other is seen\nto stand over against _its_ other. Thus, for example, inorganic nature\nis not to be considered merely something else than organic nature, but\nthe necessary antithesis of it. Both are in essential relation to one\nanother; and the one of the two is, only in so far as it excludes the\nother from it, and thus relates itself thereto. Nature in like manner\nis not without mind, nor mind without nature. An important step has\nbeen taken, when we cease in thinking to use phrases like: Of course\nsomething else is also possible. While we so speak, we are still\ntainted with contingency: and all true thinking, we have already said,\nis a thinking of necessity.\n\nIn modern physical science the opposition, first observed to exist\nin magnetism as polarity, has come to be regarded as a universal law\npervading the whole of nature. This would be a real scientific advance,\nif care were at the same time taken not to let mere variety revert\nwithout explanation, as a valid category, side by side with opposition.\nThus at one time the colours are regarded as in polar opposition to one\nanother, and called complementary colours: at another time they are\nlooked at in their indifferent and merely quantitative difference of\nred, yellow, green, &c.\n\n(2) Instead of speaking by the maxim of Excluded Middle (which is the\nmaxim of abstract understanding) we should rather say: Everything is\nopposite. Neither in heaven nor in earth, neither in the world of\nmind nor of nature, is there anywhere such an abstract 'Either--or'\nas the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with\ndifference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things will then\nlie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being, and\nwhat they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is\nimplicitly at the same time the base: in other words, its only being\nconsists in its relation to its other. Hence also the acid is not\nsomething that persists quietly in the contrast: it is always in effort\nto realise what it potentially is. Contradiction is the very moving\nprinciple of the world: and it is ridiculous to say that contradiction\nis unthinkable. The only thing correct in that statement is that\ncontradiction is not the end of the matter, but cancels itself. But\ncontradiction, when cancelled, does not leave abstract identity; for\nthat is itself only one side of the contrariety. The proximate result\nof opposition (when realised as contradiction) is the Ground, which\ncontains identity as well as difference superseded and deposed to\nelements in the completer notion.\n\n120.] Contrariety then has two forms. The Positive is the aforesaid\nvarious (different) which is understood to be independent, and yet\nat the same not to be unaffected by its relation to its other. The\nNegative is to be, no less independently, negative self-relating,\nself-subsistent, and yet at the same time as Negative must on every\npoint have this its self-relation, _i.e._ its Positive, only in the\nother. Both Positive and Negative are therefore explicit contradiction;\nboth are potentially the same. Both are so actually also; since either\nis the abrogation of the other and of itself. Thus they fall to the\nGround.--Or as is plain, the essential difference, as a difference, is\nonly the difference of it from itself, and thus contains the identical:\nso that to essential and actual difference there belongs itself as\nwell as identity. As self-relating difference it is likewise virtually\nenunciated as the self-identical. And the opposite is in general that\nwhich includes the one and its other, itself and its opposite. The\nimmanence of essence thus defined is the Ground.\n\n(\u03b3) _The Ground._\n\n121.] The Ground is the unity of identity and difference, the\ntruth of what difference and identity have turned out to be,--the\nreflection-into-self, which is equally a reflection-into-an-other, and\n_vice vers\u00e2._ It is essence put explicitly as a totality.\n\nThe maxim of the Ground runs thus: Everything has its Sufficient\nGround: that is, the true essentiality of any thing is not the\npredication of it as identical with itself, or as different (various),\nor merely positive, or merely negative, but as having its Being in\nan other, which, being its self-same, is its essence. And to this\nextent the essence is not abstract reflection into self, but into an\nother. The Ground is the essence in its own inwardness; the essence is\nintrinsically a ground; and it is a ground only when it is a ground of\nsomewhat, of an other.\n\nWe must be careful, when we say that the ground is the unity of\nidentity and difference, not to understand by this unity an abstract\nidentity. Otherwise we only change the name, while we still think the\nidentity (of understanding) already seen to be false. To avoid this\nmisconception we may say that the ground, besides being the unity,\nis also the difference of identity and difference. In that case in\nthe ground, which promised at first to supersede contradiction, a new\ncontradiction seems to arise. It is however a contradiction which, so\nfar from persisting quietly in itself, is rather the expulsion of it\nfrom itself. The ground is a ground only to the extent that it affords\nground: but the result which thus issued from the ground is only\nitself. In this lies its formalism. The ground and what is grounded are\none and the same content: the difference between the two is the mere\ndifference of form which separates simple self-relation, on the one\nhand, from mediation or derivativeness on the other. Inquiry into the\ngrounds of things goes with the point of view which, as already noted\n(note to \u00a7 112), is adopted by Reflection. We wish, as it were, to see\nthe matter double, first in its immediacy, and secondly in its ground,\nwhere it is no longer immediate. This is the plain meaning of the law\nof sufficient ground, as it is called; it asserts that things should\nessentially be viewed as mediated. The manner in which Formal Logic\nestablishes this law of thought, sets a bad example to other sciences.\nFormal Logic asks these sciences not to accept their subject-matter as\nit is immediately given; and yet herself lays down a law of thought\nwithout deducing it,--in other words, without exhibiting its mediation.\nWith the same justice as the logician maintains our faculty of thought\nto be so constituted that we must ask for the ground of everything,\nmight the physicist, when asked why a man who falls into water is\ndrowned, reply that man happens to be so organised that he cannot live\nunder water; or the jurist, when asked why a criminal is punished,\nreply that civil society happens to be so constituted that crimes\ncannot be left unpunished.\n\nYet even if logic be excused the duty of giving a ground for the law\nof the sufficient ground, it might at least explain what is to be\nunderstood by a ground. The common explanation, which describes the\nground as what has a consequence, seems at the first glance more lucid\nand intelligible than the preceding definition in logical terms. If you\nask however what the consequence is, you are told that it is what has\na ground; and it becomes obvious that the explanation is intelligible\nonly because it assumes what in our case has been reached as the\ntermination of an antecedent movement of thought. And this is the\ntrue business of logic: to show that those thoughts, which as usually\nemployed merely float before consciousness neither understood nor\ndemonstrated, are really grades in the self-determination of thought.\nIt is by this means that they are understood and demonstrated.\n\nIn common life, and it is the same in the finite sciences, this\nreflective form is often employed as a key to the secret of the real\ncondition of the objects under investigation. So long as we deal with\nwhat may be termed the household needs of knowledge, nothing can be\nurged against this method of study. But it can never afford definitive\nsatisfaction, either in theory or practice. And the reason why it\nfails is that the ground is yet without a definite content of its own;\nI so that to regard anything as resting upon a ground merely gives\nthe formal difference of mediation in place of immediacy. We see an\nelectrical phenomenon, for example, and we ask for its ground (or\nreason): we are told that electricity is the ground of this phenomenon.\nWhat is this but the same content as we had immediately before us, only\ntranslated into the form of inwardness?\n\nThe ground however is not merely simple self-identity, but also\ndifferent: hence various grounds may be alleged for the same sum\nof fact. This variety of grounds, again, following the logic of\ndifference, culminates in opposition of grounds _pro_ and _contra._\nIn any action, such as a theft, there is a sum of fact in which\nseveral aspects may be distinguished. The theft has violated the\nrights of property: it has given the means of satisfying his wants to\nthe needy thief: possibly too the man, from whom the theft was made,\nmisused his property. The violation of property is unquestionably\nthe decisive point of view before which the others must give way:\nbut the bare law of the ground cannot settle that question. Usually\nindeed the law is interpreted to speak of a sufficient ground, not\nof any ground whatever: and it might be supposed therefore, in the\naction referred to, that, although other points of view besides the\nviolation of property might be held as grounds, yet they would not be\nsufficient grounds. But here comes a dilemma. If we use the phrase\n'sufficient ground,' the epithet is either otiose, or of such a kind\nas to carry us past the mere category of ground. The predicate is\notiose and tautological, if it only states the capability of giving a\nground or reason: for the ground is a ground, only in so far as it has\nthis capability. If a soldier runs away from battle to save his life,\nhis conduct is certainly a violation of duty: but it cannot be held\nthat the ground which led him so to act was insufficient, otherwise\nhe would have remained at his post. Besides, there is this also to\nbe said. On one hand any ground suffices: on the other no ground\nsuffices as mere ground; because, as already said, it is yet void of\na content objectively and intrinsically determined, and is therefore\nnot self-acting and productive. A content thus objectively and\nintrinsically determined, and hence self-acting, will hereafter come\nbefore us as the notion: and it is the notion which Leibnitz had in his\neye when he spoke of sufficient ground, and urged the study of things\nunder its point of view. His remarks were originally directed against\nthat merely mechanical method of conceiving things so much in vogue\neven now; a method which he justly pronounces insufficient. We may\nsee an instance of this mechanical theory of investigation, when the\norganic process of the circulation of the blood is traced back merely\nto the contraction of the heart; or when certain theories of criminal\nlaw explain the purpose of punishment to lie in deterring people from\ncrime, in rendering the criminal harmless, or in other extraneous\ngrounds of the same kind. It is unfair to Leibnitz to suppose that he\nwas content with anything so poor as this formal law of the ground. The\nmethod of investigation which he inaugurated is the very reverse of a\nformalism which acquiesces in mere grounds, where a full and concrete\nknowledge is sought. Considerations to this effect led Leibnitz to\ncontrast _causae efficientes_ and _causae finales,_ and to insist in\nthe place of final causes as the conception to which the efficient were\nto lead up. If we adopt this distinction, light, heat, and moisture\nwould be the _causae efficientes,_ not the _causa finalis_ of the\ngrowth of plants: the _causa finalis_ is the notion of the plant itself.\n\nTo get no further than mere grounds, especially on questions of law and\nmorality, is the position and principle of the Sophists. Sophistry,\nas we ordinarily conceive it, is a method of investigation which aims\nat distorting what is just and true, and exhibiting things in a false\nlight. Such however is not the proper or primary tendency of Sophistry:\nthe standpoint of which is no other than that of 'Raisonnement.' The\nSophists came on the scene at a time when the Greeks had begun to grow\ndissatisfied with mere authority and tradition and felt the need of\nintellectual justification for what they were to accept as obligatory.\nThat desideratum the Sophists supplied by teaching their countrymen\nto seek for the various points of view under which things may be\nconsidered: which points of view are the same as grounds. But the\nground, as we have seen, has no essential and objective principles of\nits own, and it is as easy to discover grounds for what is wrong and\nimmoral as for what is moral and right. Upon the observer therefore it\ndepends to decide what points are to have most weight. The decision in\nsuch circumstances is prompted by his individual views and sentiments.\nThus the objective foundation of what ought to have been of absolute\nand essential obligation, accepted by all, was undermined: and\nSophistry by this destructive action deservedly brought upon itself\nthe bad name previously mentioned. Socrates, as we all know, met the\nSophists at every point, not by a bare re-assertion of authority and\ntradition against their argumentations, but by showing dialectically\nhow untenable the mere grounds were, and by vindicating the obligation\nof justice and goodness,--by reinstating the universal or notion of the\nwill. In the present day such a method of argumentation is not quite\nout of fashion. Nor is that the case only in the discussion of secular\nmatters. It occurs even in sermons, such as those where every possible\nground of gratitude to God is propounded. To such pleading Socrates\nand Plato would not have scrupled to apply the name of Sophistry.\nFor Sophistry has nothing to do with what is taught:--that may very\npossibly be true. Sophistry lies in the formal circumstance of teaching\nit by grounds which are as available for attack as for defence. In a\ntime so rich in reflection and so devoted to _raisonnement_ as our\nown, he must be a poor creature who cannot advance a good ground for\neverything, even for what is worst and most depraved. Everything in the\nworld that has become corrupt has had good ground for its corruption.\nAn appeal to grounds at first makes the hearer think of beating a\nretreat: but when experience has taught him the real state of these\nmatters, he closes his ears against them, and refuses to be imposed\nupon any more.\n\n\n\n122.] As it first comes, the chief feature of Essence is show in itself\nand intermediation in itself. But when it has completed the circle\nof intermediation, its unity with itself is explicitly put as the\nself-annulling of difference, and therefore of intermediation. Once\nmore then we come back to immediacy or Being,--but Being in so far as\nit is intermediated by annulling the intermediation. And that Being is\nExistence.\n\nThe ground is not yet determined by objective principles of its\nown, nor is it an end or final cause: hence it is not active, nor\nproductive. An Existence only _proceeds from_ the ground. The\ndeterminate ground is therefore a formal matter: that is to say, any\npoint will do, so long as it is expressly put as self-relation, as\naffirmation, in correlation with the immediate existence depending on\nit. If it be a ground at all, it is a good ground: for the term 'good'\nis employed abstractly as equivalent to affirmative; and any point (or\nfeature) is good which can in any way be enunciated as confessedly\naffirmative. So it happens that a ground can be found and adduced for\neverything: and a good ground (for example, a good motive for action)\nmay effect something or may not, it may have a consequence or it may\nnot. It becomes a motive (strictly so called) and effects something,\n_e.g._ through its reception into a will; there and there only it\nbecomes active and is made a cause.\n\n(b) _Existence._\n\n123.] Existence is the immediate unity of reflection-into-self and\nreflection-into-another. It follows from this that existence is the\nindefinite multitude of existents as reflected-into-themselves, which\nat the same time equally throw light upon one another,--which, in\nshort, are co-relative, and form a world of reciprocal dependence and\nof infinite interconnexion between grounds and consequents. The grounds\nare themselves existences: and the existents in like manner are in many\ndirections grounds as well as consequents.\n\nThe phrase 'Existence' (derived from _existere_) suggests the fact of\nhaving proceeded from something. Existence is Being which has proceeded\nfrom the ground, and been reinstated by annulling its intermediation.\nThe Essence, as Being set aside and absorbed, originally came\nbefore us as shining or showing in self, and the categories of this\nreflection are identity, difference and ground. The last is the unity\nof identity and difference; and because it unifies them it has at the\nsame time to distinguish itself from itself. But that which is in\nthis way distinguished from the ground is as little mere difference,\nas the ground itself is abstract sameness. The ground works its\nown suspension: and when suspended, the result of its negation is\nexistence. Having issued from the ground, existence contains the ground\nin it 'the ground does not remain, as it were, behind existence, but by\nits very nature supersedes itself and translates itself into existence.\nThis is exemplified even in our ordinary mode of thinking, when we\nlook upon the ground of a thing, not as something abstractly inward,\nbut as itself also an existent. For example, the lightning-flash\nwhich has set a house on fire would be considered the ground of the\nconflagration: or the manners of a nation and the condition of its\nlife would be regarded as the ground of its constitution. Such indeed\nis the ordinary aspect in which the existent world originally appears\nto reflection,--an indefinite crowd of things existent, which being\nsimultaneously reflected on themselves and on one another are related\nreciprocally as ground and consequence. In this motley play of the\nworld, if we may so call the sum of existents, there is nowhere a\nfirm footing to be found: everything bears an aspect of relativity,\nconditioned by and conditioning something else. The reflective\nunderstanding makes it its business to elicit and trace these\nconnexions running out in every direction; but the question touching an\nultimate design is so far left unanswered, and therefore the craving of\nthe reason after knowledge passes with the further development of the\nlogical Idea beyond this position of mere relativity.\n\n124.] The reflection-on-another of the existent is however inseparable\nfrom the reflection-on-self: the ground is their unity, from which\nexistence has issued. The existent therefore includes relativity, and\nhas on its own part its multiple interconnexions with other existents:\nit is reflected on itself as its ground. The existent is, when so\ndescribed, a Thing.\n\nThe 'thing-by-itself' (or thing in the abstract), so famous in the\nphilosophy of Kant, shows itself here in its genesis. It is seen to be\nthe abstract reflection-on-self, which is clung to, to the exclusion of\nreflection-on-other-things and of all predication of difference. The\nthing-by-itself therefore is the empty substratum for these predicates\nof relation.\n\nIf to know means to comprehend an object in its concrete character,\nthen the thing-by-itself, which is nothing but the quite abstract\nand indeterminate thing in general, must certainly be as unknowable\nas it is alleged to be. With as much reason however as we speak\nof the thing-by-itself, we might speak of quality-by-itself or\nquantity-by-itself, and of any other category. The expression would\nthen serve to signify that these categories are taken in their abstract\nimmediacy, apart from their development and inward character. It is\nno better than a whim of the understanding, therefore, if we attach\nthe qualificatory 'in or by-itself' to the _thing_ only. But this\n'in or by-itself' is also applied to the facts of the mental as well\nas the natural world: as we speak of electricity or of a plant in\nitself, so we speak of man or the state in itself. By this 'in-itself'\nin these objects we are meant to understand what they strictly and\nproperly are. This usage is liable to the same criticism as the\nphrase 'thing-in-itself.' For if we stick to the mere 'in-itself' of\nan object, we apprehend it not in its truth, but in the inadequate\nform of mere abstraction. Thus the man, by or in himself, is the\nchild. And what the child has to do is to rise out of this abstract\nand undeveloped 'in-himself,' and become 'for himself what he is at\nfirst only 'in-himself,' a free and reasonable being. Similarly, the\nstate-in-itself is the yet immature and patriarchal state, where the\nvarious political functions, latent in the notion of the state, have\nnot received the full logical constitution which the logic of political\nprinciples demands. In the same sense, the germ may be called the\nplant-in-itself. These examples may show the mistake of supposing\nthat the 'thing-in-itself' or the 'in-itself' of things is something\ninaccessible to our cognition. All things are originally in-themselves,\nbut that is not the end of the matter. As the germ, being the\nplant-in-itself, means self-development, so the thing in general passes\nbeyond its in-itself, (the abstract reflection on self,) to manifest\nitself further as a reflection on other things. It is in this sense\nthat it has properties.\n\n(c) _The Thing._\n\n125.] (\u03b1) The Thing is the totality--the development in explicit\nunity--of the categories of the ground and of existence. On the side\nof one of its factors, viz. reflection-on-other-things, it has in it\nthe differences, in virtue of which it is a characterised and concrete\nthing. These characteristics are different from one another; they have\ntheir reflection-into-self not on their own part, but on the part of\nthe thing. They are Properties of the thing: and their relation to the\nthing is expressed by the word 'have.'\n\nAs a term of relation, 'to have' takes the place of 'to be.' True,\nsomewhat has qualities on its part too: but this transference of\n'Having' into the sphere of Being is inexact, because the character as\nquality is directly one with the somewhat, and the somewhat ceases to\nbe when it loses its quality. But the thing is reflection-into-self:\nfor it is an identity which is also distinct from the difference,\n_i.e._ from its attributes.--In many languages 'have' is employed\nto denote past time. And with reason: for the past is absorbed or\nsuspended being, and the mind is its reflection-into-self; in the mind\nonly it continues to subsist,--the mind however distinguishing from\nitself this being in it which has been absorbed or suspended.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn the Thing all the characteristics of reflection recur as existent.\nThus the thing, in its initial aspect, as the thing-by-itself, is the\nself-same or identical. But identity, it was proved, is not found\nwithout difference: so the properties, which the thing has, are the\nexistent difference in the form of diversity. In the case of diversity\nor variety each diverse member exhibited an indifference to every\nother, and they had no other relation to each other, save what was\ngiven by a comparison external to them. But now in the thing we have a\nbond which keeps the various properties in union. Property, besides,\nshould not be confused with quality. No doubt, we also say, a thing\nhas qualities. But the phraseology is a misplaced one: 'having' hints\nat an independence, foreign to the 'Somewhat,' which is still directly\nidentical with its quality. Somewhat is what it is only by its\nquality: whereas, though the thing indeed exists only as it has its\nproperties, it is not confined to this or that definite property, and\ncan therefore lose it, without ceasing to be what it is.\n\n126.] (\u00df) Even in the ground, however, the reflection-on-something-else\nis directly convertible with reflection-on-self. And hence the\nproperties are not merely different from each other; they are also\nself-identical, independent, and relieved from their attachment to the\nthing. Still, as they are the characters of the thing distinguished\nfrom one another (as reflected-into-self), they are not themselves\nthings, if things be concrete; but only existences reflected\ninto themselves as abstract characters. They are what are called\nMatters.\n\nNor is the name 'things' given to Matters, such as magnetic and\nelectric matters. They are qualities proper, a reflected Being,--one\nwith their Being,--they are the character that has reached immediacy,\nexistence: they are 'entities.'\n\nTo elevate the properties, which the Thing has, to the independent\nposition of matters, or materials of which it consists, is a proceeding\nbased upon the notion of a Thing: and for that reason is also found\nin experience. Thought and experience however alike protest against\nconcluding from the fact that certain properties of a thing, such\nas colour, or smell, may be represented as particular colouring or\nodorific matters, that we are then at the end of the inquiry, and\nthat nothing more is needed to penetrate to the true secret of things\nthan a disintegration of them into their component materials. This\ndisintegration into independent matters is properly restricted to\ninorganic nature only. The chemist is in the right therefore when,\nfor example, he analyses common salt or gypsum into its elements, and\nfinds that the former consists of muriatic acid and soda, the latter of\nsulphuric acid and calcium. So too the geologist does well to regard\ngranite as a compound of quartz, felspar, and mica. These matters,\nagain, of which the thing consists, are themselves partly things,\nwhich in that way may be once more reduced to more abstract matters.\nSulphuric acid, for example, is a compound of sulphur and oxygen. Such\nmatters or bodies can as a matter of fact be exhibited as subsisting by\nthemselves: but frequently we find other properties of things, entirely\nwanting this self-subsistence, also regarded as particular matters.\nThus we hear caloric, and electrical or magnetic matters spoken of.\nSuch matters are at the best figments of understanding. And we see\nhere the usual procedure of the abstract reflection of understanding.\nCapriciously adopting single categories, whose value entirely depends\non their place in the gradual evolution of the logical idea, it employs\nthem in the pretended interests of explanation, but in the face of\nplain, unprejudiced perception and experience, so as to trace back to\nthem every object investigated. Nor is this all. The theory, which\nmakes things consist of independent matters, is frequently applied in a\nregion where it has neither meaning nor force. For within the limits of\nnature even, wherever there is organic life, this category is obviously\ninadequate. An animal may be said to consist of bones, muscles, nerves,\n&c.: but evidently we are here using the term 'consist' in a very\ndifferent sense from its use when we spoke of the piece of granite as\nconsisting of the above-mentioned elements. The elements of granite are\nutterly indifferent to their combination: they could subsist as well\nwithout it. The different parts and members of an organic body on the\ncontrary subsist only in their union: they cease to exist as such, when\nthey are separated from each other.\n\n127.] Thus Matter is the mere abstract or indeterminate\nreflection-into-something-else, or reflection-into-self at the same\ntime as determinate; it is consequently Thinghood which then and there\nis,--the subsistence of the thing. By this means the thing has on the\npart of the matters its reflection-into-self (the reverse of \u00a7 125);\nit subsists not on its own part, but consists of the matters, and is\nonly a superficial association between them, an external combination of\nthem.\n\n128.] (\u03b3) Matter, being the immediate unity of existence with itself,\nis also indifferent towards specific character. Hence the numerous\ndiverse matters coalesce into the one Matter, or into existence\nunder the reflective characteristic of identity. In contrast to this\none Matter these distinct properties and their external relation which\nthey have to one another in the thing, constitute the _Form_,--the\nreflective category of difference, but a difference which exists and is\na totality.\n\nThis one featureless Matter is also the same as the Thing-by-itself\nwas: only the latter is intrinsically quite abstract, while the former\nessentially implies relation to something else, and in the first place\nto the Form.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe various matters of which the thing consists are potentially the\nsame as one another. Thus we get one Matter in general to which the\ndifference is expressly attached externally and as a bare form. This\ntheory which holds things all round to have one and the same matter at\nbottom, and merely to differ externally in respect of form, is much in\nvogue with the reflective understanding. Matter in that case counts for\nnaturally indeterminate, but susceptible of any determination; while at\nthe same time it is perfectly permanent, and continues the same amid\nall change and alteration. And in finite things at least this disregard\nof matter for any determinate form is certainly exhibited. For example,\nit matters not to a block of marble, whether it receive the form of\nthis or that statue or even the form of a pillar. Be it noted however\nthat a block of marble can disregard form only relatively, that is, in\nreference to the sculptor: it is by no means purely formless. And so\nthe mineralogist considers the relatively formless marble as a special\nformation of rock, differing from other equally special formations,\nsuch as sandstone or porphyry. Therefore we say it is an abstraction\nof the understanding which isolates matter into a certain natural\nformlessness. For properly speaking the thought of matter includes the\nprinciple of form throughout, and no formless matter therefore appears\nanywhere even in experience as existing. Still the conception of\nmatter as original and pre-existent, and as naturally formless, is a\nvery ancient one; it meets us even among the Greeks, at first in the\nmythical shape of Chaos, which is supposed to represent the unformed\nsubstratum of the existing world. Such a conception must of necessity\ntend to make God not the Creator of the world, but a mere world-moulder\nor demiurge. A deeper insight into nature reveals God as creating the\nworld out of nothing. And that teaches two things. On the one hand it\nenunciates that matter, as such, has no independent subsistence, and on\nthe other that the form does not supervene upon matter from without,\nbut as a totality involves the principle of matter in itself. This free\nand infinite form will hereafter come before us as the notion.\n\n129.] Thus the Thing suffers a disruption into Matter and Form. Each\nof these is the totality of thinghood and subsists for itself. But\nMatter, which is meant to be the positive and indeterminate existence,\ncontains, as an existence, reflection-on-another, every whit as\nmuch as it contains self-enclosed being. Accordingly as uniting\nthese characteristics, it is itself the totality of Form. But Form,\nbeing a complete whole of characteristics, _ipso facto_ involves\nreflection-into-self; in other words, as self-relating Form it has the\nvery function attributed to Matter. Both are at bottom the same. Invest\nthem with this unity, and you have the relation of Matter and Form,\nwhich are also no less distinct.\n\n130.] The Thing, being this totality, is a contradiction. On the side\nof its negative unity it is Form in which Matter is determined and\ndeposed to the rank of properties (\u00a7 125). At the same time it consists\nof Matters, which in the reflection-of-the-thing-into-itself are as\nmuch independent as they are at the same time negatived. Thus the thing\nis the essential existence, in such a way as to be an existence that\nsuspends or absorbs itself in itself. In other words, the thing is an\nAppearance or Phenomenon.\n\nThe negation of the several matters, which is insisted on in the\nthing no less than their independent existence, occurs in Physics as\n_porosity._ Each of the several matters (colouring matter, odorific\nmatter, and if we believe some people, even sound-matter,--not\nexcluding caloric, electric matter, &c:) is also negated: and in this\nnegation of theirs, or as interpenetrating their pores, we find the\nnumerous other independent matters, which, being similarly porous,\nmake room in turn for the existence of the rest. Pores are not\nempirical facts; they are figments of the understanding, which uses\nthem to represent the element of negation in independent matters.\nThe further working-out of the contradictions is concealed by the\nnebulous imbroglio in which all matters are independent and all no less\nnegated in each other.--If the faculties or activities are similarly\nhypostatised in the mind, their living unity similarly turns to the\nimbroglio of an action of the one on the others.\n\nThese pores (meaning thereby not the pores in an organic body, such as\nthe pores of wood or of the skin, but those in the so-called 'matters,'\nsuch as colouring matter, caloric, or metals, crystals, &c.) cannot be\nverified by observation. In the same way matter itself,--furthermore\nform which is separated from matter,--whether that be the thing as\nconsisting of matters, or the view that the thing itself subsists and\nonly has proper ties,--is all a product of the reflective understanding\nwhich, while it observes and professes to record only what it observes,\nis rather creating a metaphysic, bristling with contradictions of which\nit is unconscious.\n\n\nB.--APPEARANCE.\n\n131.] The Essence must appear or shine forth. Its shining or reflection\nin it is the suspension and translation of it to immediacy, which,\nwhilst as reflection-on-self it is matter or subsistence, is also form,\nreflection-on-something-else, a subsistence which sets itself aside. To\nshow or shine is the characteristic by which essence is distinguished\nfrom being,--by which it is essence; and it is this show which, when\nit is developed, shows itself, and is Appearance. Essence accordingly\nis not something beyond or behind appearance, but just because it\nis the essence which exists--the existence is Appearance\n(Forth-shining).\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nExistence stated explicitly in its contradiction is Appearance. But\nappearance (forth-shining) is not to be confused with a mere show\n(shining). Show is the proximate truth of Being or immediacy. The\nimmediate, instead of being, as we suppose, something independent,\nresting on its own self, is a mere show, and as such it is packed or\nsummed up under the simplicity of the immanent essence. The essence\nis, in the first place, the sum total of the showing itself, shining\nin itself (inwardly); but, far from abiding in this inwardness, it\ncomes as a ground forward into existence; and this existence being\ngrounded not in itself, but on something else, is just appearance.\nIn our imagination we ordinarily combine with the term appearance\nor phenomenon the conception of an indefinite congeries of things\nexisting, the being of which is purely relative, and which consequently\ndo not rest on a foundation of their own, but are esteemed only as\npassing stages. But in this conception it is no less implied that\nessence does not linger behind or beyond appearance. Rather it is, we\nmay say, the Infinite kindness which lets its own show freely issue\ninto immediacy, and graciously allows it the joy of existence. The\nappearance which is thus created does not stand on its own feet, and\nhas its being not in itself but in something else. God who is the\nessence, when He lends existence to the passing stages of His own show\nin Himself, may be described as the goodness that creates a world: but\nHe is also the power above it, and the righteousness, which manifests\nthe merely phenomenal character of the content of this existing world,\nwhenever it tries to exist in independence.\n\nAppearance is in every way a very important grade of the logical idea.\nIt may be said to be the distinction of philosophy from ordinary\nconsciousness that it sees the merely phenomenal character of what the\nlatter supposes to have a self-subsistent being. The significance of\nappearance however must be properly grasped, or mistakes will arise.\nTo say that anything is a _mere_ appearance may be misinterpreted to\nmean that, as compared with what is merely phenomenal, there is greater\ntruth in the immediate, in that which _is._ Now in strict fact, the\ncase is precisely the reverse. Appearance is higher than mere Being,--a\nricher category because it holds in combination the two elements of\nreflection-into-self and reflection-into-another: whereas Being (or\nimmediacy) still mere relationlessness and apparently rests upon itself\nalone. Still, to say that anything is _only_ an appearance suggests a\nreal flaw, which consists in this, that Appearance is still divided\nagainst itself and without intrinsic stability. Beyond and above mere\nappearance comes in the first place Actuality, the third grade of\nEssence, of which we shall afterwards speak.\n\nIn the history of Modern Philosophy, Kant has the merit of first\nrehabilitating this distinction between the common and the philosophic\nmodes of thought. He stopped half-way however, when he attached to\nAppearance a subjective meaning only, and put the abstract essence\nimmovable outside it as the thing-in-itself beyond the reach of our\ncognition. For it is the very nature of the world of immediate objects\nto be appearance only. Knowing it to be so, we know at the same time\nthe essence, which, far from staying behind or beyond the appearance,\nrather manifests its own essentiality by deposing the world to a mere\nappearance. One can hardly quarrel with the plain man who, in his\ndesire for totality, cannot acquiesce in the doctrine of subjective\nidealism, that we are solely concerned with phenomena. The plain man,\nhowever, in his desire to save the objectivity of knowledge, may very\nnaturally return to abstract immediacy, and maintain that immediacy\nto be true and actual. In a little work published under the title,\n_A Report, clear as day, to the larger Public touching the proper\nnature of the Latest Philosophy: an Attempt to force the reader to\nunderstand,'_ Fichte examined the opposition between subjective\nidealism and immediate consciousness in a popular form, under the shape\nof a dialogue between the author and the reader, and tried hard to\nprove that the subjective idealist's point of view was right. In this\ndialogue the reader complains to the author that he has completely\nfailed to place himself in the idealist's position, and is inconsolable\nat the thought that things around him are no real things but mere\nappearances. The affliction of the reader can scarcely be blamed when\nhe is expected to consider himself hemmed in by an impervious circle\nof purely subjective conceptions. Apart from this subjective view of\nAppearance, however, we have all reason to rejoice that the things\nwhich environ us are appearances and not steadfast and independent\nexistences; since in that case we should soon perish of hunger, both\nbodily and mental.\n\n(a) _The World of Appearance._\n\n132.] The Apparent or Phenomenal exists in such a way, that its\nsubsistence is _ipso facto_ thrown into abeyance or suspended and\nis only one stage in the form itself. The form embraces in it the\nmatter or subsistence as one of its characteristics. In this way\nthe phenomenal has its ground in this (form) as its essence, its\nreflection-into-self in contrast with its immediacy, but, in so doing,\nhas it only in another aspect of the form. This ground of its is no\nless phenomenal than itself, and the phenomenon accordingly goes on to\nan endless mediation of subsistence by means of form, and thus equally\nby non-subsistence. This endless inter-mediation is at the same time\na unity of self-relation; and existence is developed into a totality,\ninto a world of phenomena,--of reflected finitude.\n\n(b) _Content and Form._\n\n133.] Outside one another as the phenomena in this phenomenal\nworld are, they form a totality, and are wholly contained in their\nself-relatedness. In this way the self-relation of the phenomenon is\ncompletely specified, it has the Form in itself: and because it\nis in this identity, has it as essential subsistence. So it comes about\nthat the form is Content: and in its mature phase is the Law\nof the Phenomenon. When the form, on the contrary, is not reflected\ninto self, it is equivalent to the negative of the phenomenon, to\nthe non-independent and changeable: and that sort of form is the\nindifferent or External Form.\n\nThe essential point to keep in mind about the opposition of Form and\nContent is that the content is not formless, but has the form in its\nown self, quite as much as the form is external to it. There is thus\na doubling of form. At one time it is reflected into itself; and then\nis identical with the content. At another time it is not reflected\ninto itself, and then is the external existence, which does not at\nall affect the content. We are here in presence, implicitly, of the\nabsolute correlation of content and form: viz. their reciprocal\nrevulsion, so that content is nothing but the revulsion of form into\ncontent, and form nothing but the revulsion of content into form. This\nmutual revulsion is one of the most important laws of thought. But it\nis not explicitly brought out before the Relations of Substance and\nCausality.\n\nForm and content are a pair of terms frequently employed by the\nreflective understanding, especially with a habit of looking on the\ncontent as the essential and independent, the form on the contrary as\nthe unessential and dependent. Against this it is to be noted that both\nare in fact equally essential; and that, while a formless _content_ can\nbe as little found as a formless _matter,_ the two (content and matter)\nare distinguished by this circumstance, that matter, though implicitly\nnot without form, still in its existence manifests a disregard of form,\nwhereas the content, as such, is what it is only because the matured\nform is included in it. Still the form comes before us sometimes as\nan existence indifferent and external to content, and does so for\nthe reason that the whole range of Appearance still suffers from\nexternality. In a book, for instance, it certainly has no bearing upon\nthe content, whether it be written or printed, bound in paper or in\nleather. That however does not in the least imply that apart from such\nan indifferent and external form, the content of the book is itself\nformless. There are undoubtedly books enough which even in reference\nto their content may well be styled formless: but want of form in this\ncase is the same as bad form, and means the defect of the right form,\nnot the absence of all form whatever. So far is this right form from\nbeing unaffected by the content that it is rather the content itself. A\nwork of art that wants the right form is for that very reason no right\nor true work of art: and it is a bad way of excusing an artist, to say\nthat the content of his works is good and even excellent, though they\nwant the right form. Real works of art are those where content and form\nexhibit a thorough identity. The content of the Iliad, it may be said,\nis the Trojan war, and especially the wrath of Achilles. In that we\nhave everything, and yet very little after all; for the Iliad is made\nan Iliad by the poetic form, in which that content is moulded. The\ncontent of Romeo and Juliet may similarly be said to be the ruin of two\nlovers through the discord between their families: but something more\nis needed to make Shakespeare's immortal tragedy.\n\nIn reference to the relation of form and content in the field of\nscience, we should recollect the difference between philosophy and\nthe rest of the sciences. The latter are finite, because their mode\nof thought, as a merely formal act, derives its content from without.\nTheir content therefore is not known as moulded from within through\nthe thoughts which lie at the ground of it, and form and content do\nnot thoroughly interpenetrate each other. This partition disappears in\nphilosophy, and thus justifies its title of infinite knowledge. Yet\neven philosophic thought is often held to be a merely formal act; and\nthat logic, which confessedly deals only with thoughts _qu\u00e2_ thoughts,\nis merely formal, is especially a foregone conclusion. And if content\nmeans no more than what is palpable and obvious to the senses, all\nphilosophy and logic in particular must be at once acknowledged to\nbe void of content, that is to say, of content perceptible to the\nsenses. Even ordinary forms of thought however, and the common usage of\nlanguage, do not in the least restrict the appellation of content to\nwhat is perceived by the senses, or to what has a being in place and\ntime. A book without content is, as every one knows, not a book with\nempty leaves, but one of which the content is as good as none. We shall\nfind as the last result on closer analysis, that by what is called\ncontent an educated mind means nothing but the presence and power of\nthought. But this is to admit that thoughts are not empty forms without\naffinity to their content, and that in other spheres as well as in art\nthe truth and the sterling value of the content essentially depend on\nthe content showing itself identical with the form.\n\n134.] But immediate existence is a character of the subsistence itself\nas well as of the form: it is consequently external to the character of\nthe content; but in an equal degree this externality, which the content\nhas through the factor of its subsistence, is essential to it. When\nthus explicitly stated, the phenomenon is relativity or correlation:\nwhere one and the same thing, viz. the content or the developed\nform, is seen as the externality and antithesis of independent\nexistences, and as their reduction to a relation of identity, in which\nidentification alone the two things distinguished are what they are.\n\n(c) _Relation or Correlation._\n\n135.] (\u03b1) The immediate relation is that of the Whole and the\nParts. The content is the whole, and consists of the parts (the\nform), its counterpart. The parts are diverse one from another. It is\nthey that possess independent being. But they are parts, only when they\nare identified by being related to one another; or, in so far as they\nmake up the whole, when taken together. But this 'Together' is the\ncounterpart and negation of the part.\n\nEssential correlation is the specific and completely universal\nphase in which things appear. Everything that exists stands in\ncorrelation, and this correlation is the veritable nature of every\nexistence. The existent thing in this way has no being of its own, but\nonly in something else: in this other however it is self-relation; and\ncorrelation is the unity of the self-relation and relation-to-others.\n\nThe relation of the whole and the parts is untrue to this extent, that\nthe notion and the reality of the relation are not in harmony. The\nnotion of the whole is to contain parts: but if the whole is taken\nand made what its notion implies, _i.e._ if it is divided, it at once\nceases to be a whole. Things there are, no doubt, which correspond\nto this relation: but for that very reason they are low and untrue\nexistences. We must remember however what 'untrue' signifies. When\nit occurs in a philosophical discussion, the term 'untrue' does not\nsignify that the thing to which it is applied is non-existent. A bad\nstate or a sickly body may exist all the same; but these things are\nuntrue, because their notion and their reality are out of harmony.\n\nThe relation of whole and parts, being the immediate relation, comes\neasy to reflective understanding; and for that reason it often\nsatisfies when the question really turns on profounder ties. The limbs\nand organs, for instance, of an organic body are not merely parts of\nit: it is only in their unity that they are what they are, and they\nare unquestionably affected by that unity, as they also in turn affect\nit. These limbs and organs become mere parts, only when they pass under\nthe hands of the anatomist, whose occupation, be it remembered, is not\nwith the living body but with the corpse. Not that such analysis is\nillegitimate: we only mean that the external and mechanical relation of\nwhole and parts is not sufficient for us, if we want to study organic\nlife in its truth. And if this be so in organic life, it is the case\nto a much greater extent when we apply this relation to the mind and\nthe formations of the spiritual world. Psychologists may not expressly\nspeak of parts of the soul or mind, but the mode in which this\nsubject is treated by the analytic understanding is largely founded\non the analogy of this finite relation. At least that is so, when the\ndifferent forms of mental activity are enumerated and described merely\nin their isolation one after another, as so-called special powers and\nfaculties.\n\n136.] (\u03b2) The one-and-same of this correlation (the self-relation\nfound in it) is thus immediately a negative self-relation. The\ncorrelation is in short the mediating process whereby one and the\nsame is first unaffected towards difference, and secondly is the\nnegative self-relation, which repels itself as reflection-into-self to\ndifference, and invests itself (as reflection-into-something-else) with\nexistence, whilst it conversely leads back this reflection-into-other\nto self-relation and indifference. This gives the correlation of\nForce and its Expression.\n\nThe relationship of whole and part is the immediate and therefore\nunintelligent (mechanical) relation,--a revulsion of self-identity\ninto mere variety. Thus we pass from the whole to the parts, and from\nthe parts to the whole: in the one we forget its opposition to the\nother, while each on its own account, at one time the whole, at another\nthe parts, is taken to be an independent existence. In other words,\nwhen the parts are declared to subsist in the whole, and the whole\nto consist of the parts, we have either member of the relation at\ndifferent times taken to be permanently subsistent, while the other is\nnon-essential. In its superficial form the mechanical nexus consists in\nthe parts being independent of each other and of the whole.\n\nThis relation may be adopted for the progression _ad infinitum,_\nin the case of the divisibility of matter: and then it becomes an\nunintelligent alternation with the two sides. A thing at one time is\ntaken as a whole: then we go on to specify the parts: this specifying\nis forgotten, and what was a part is regarded as a whole: then the\nspecifying of the part comes up again, and so on for ever. But if this\ninfinity be taken as the negative which it is, it is the _negative_\nself-relating element in the correlation,--Force, the self-identical\nwhole, or immanency; which yet supersedes this immanency and gives\nitself expression;--and conversely the expression which vanishes and\nreturns into Force.\n\nForce, notwithstanding this infinity, is also finite: for the content,\nor the one and the same of the Force and its out-putting, is this\nidentity at first only for the observer: the two sides of the relation\nare not yet, each on its own account, the concrete identity of that\none and same, not yet the totality. For one another they are therefore\ndifferent, and the relationship is a finite one. Force consequently\nrequires solicitation from without: it works blindly: and on account of\nthis defectiveness of form, the content is also limited and accidental.\nIt is not yet genuinely identical with the form: not yet is it _as_ a\nnotion and an end; that is to say, it is not intrinsically and actually\ndeterminate. This difference is most vital, but not easy to apprehend:\nit will assume a clearer formulation when we reach Design. If it be\noverlooked, it leads to the confusion of conceiving God as Force, a\nconfusion from which Herder's God especially suffers.\n\nIt is often said that the nature of Force itself is unknown and only\nits manifestation apprehended. But, in the first place, it may be\nreplied, every article in the import of Force is the same as what\nis specified in the Exertion: and the explanation of a phenomenon\nby a Force is to that extent a mere tautology. What is supposed to\nremain unknown, therefore, is really nothing but the empty form of\nreflection-into-self, by which alone the Force is distinguished from\nthe Exertion,--and that form too is something familiar. It is a form\nthat does not make the slightest addition to the content and to the\nlaw, which have to be discovered from the phenomenon alone. Another\nassurance always given is that to speak of forces implies no theory as\nto their nature: and that being so, it is impossible to see why the\nform of Force has been introduced into the sciences at all. In the\nsecond place the nature of Force is undoubtedly unknown: we are still\nwithout any necessity binding and connecting its content together in\nitself, as we are without necessity in the content, in so far as it is\nexpressly limited and hence has its character by means of another thing\noutside it.\n\n(1) Compared with the immediate relation of whole and parts, the\nrelation between force and its putting-forth may be considered\ninfinite. In it that identity of the two sides is realised, which in\nthe former relation only existed for the observer. The whole, though\nwe can see that it consists of parts, ceases to be a whole when it\nis divided: whereas force is only shown to be force when it exerts\nitself, and in its exercise only comes back to itself. The exercise is\nonly force once more. Yet, on further examination even this relation\nwill appear finite, and finite in virtue of this mediation: just\nas, conversely, the relation of whole and parts is obviously finite\nin virtue of its immediacy. The first and simplest evidence for the\nfinitude of the mediated relation of force and its exercise is, that\neach and every force is conditioned and requires something else than\nitself for its subsistence. For instance, a special vehicle of magnetic\nforce, as is well known, is iron, the other properties of which, such\nas its colour, specific weight, or relation to acids, are independent\nof this connexion with magnetism. The same thing is seen in all other\nforces, which from one end to the other are found to be conditioned\nand mediated by something else than themselves. Another proof of\nthe finite nature of force is that it requires solicitation before\nit can put itself forth. That through which the force is solicited,\nis itself another exertion of force, which cannot put itself forth\nwithout similar solicitation. This brings us either to a repetition of\nthe infinite progression, or to a reciprocity of soliciting and being\nsolicited. In either case we have no absolute beginning of motion.\nForce is not as yet, like the final cause, inherently self-determining:\nthe content is given to it as determined, and force, when it exerts\nitself, is, according to the phrase, blind in its working. That phrase\nimplies the distinction between abstract force-manifestation and\nteleological action.\n\n(2) The oft-repeated statement, that the exercise of the force and\nnot the force itself admits of being known, must be rejected as\ngroundless. It is the very essence of force to manifest itself, and\nthus in the totality of manifestation, conceived as a law, we at the\nsame time discover the force itself. And yet this assertion that force\nin its own self is unknowable betrays a well-grounded presentiment\nthat this relation is finite. The several manifestations of a force at\nfirst meet us in indefinite multiplicity, and in their isolation seem\naccidental: but, reducing this multiplicity to its inner unity, which\nwe term force, we see that the apparently contingent is necessary, by\nrecognising the law that rules it. But the different forces themselves\nare a multiplicity again, and in their mere juxtaposition seem to be\ncontingent. Hence in empirical physics, we speak of the forces of\ngravity, magnetism, electricity, &c, and in empirical psychology of\nthe forces of memory, imagination, will, and all the other faculties.\nAll this multiplicity again excites a craving to know these different\nforces as a single whole, nor would this craving be appeased even if\nthe several forces were traced back to one common primary force. Such\na primary force would be really no more than an empty abstraction,\nwith as little content as the abstract thing-in-itself. And besides\nthis, the correlation of force and manifestation is essentially a\nmediated correlation (of reciprocal dependence), and it must therefore\ncontradict the notion of force to view it as primary or resting on\nitself.\n\nSuch being the case with the nature of force, though we may consent to\nlet the world be called a manifestation of divine forces, we should\nobject to have God Himself viewed as a mere force. For force is after\nall a subordinate and finite category. At the so-called renascence of\nthe sciences, when steps were taken to trace the single phenomena of\nnature back to underlying forces, the Church branded the enterprise\nas impious. The argument of the Church was as follows. If it be the\nforces of gravitation, of vegetation, &c. which occasion the movements\nof the heavenly bodies, the growth of plants, &c., there is nothing\nleft for divine providence, and God sinks to the level of a leisurely\non-looker, surveying this play of forces. The students of nature, it is\ntrue, and Newton more than others, when they employed the reflective\ncategory of force to explain natural phenomena, have expressly pleaded\nthat the honour of God, as the Creator and Governor of the world, would\nnot thereby be impaired. Still the logical issue of this explanation\nby means of forces is that the inferential understanding proceeds to\nfix each of these forces, and to maintain them in their finitude as\nultimate. And contrasted with this deinfinitised world of independent\nforces and matters, the only terms in which it is possible still to\ndescribe God will present Him in the abstract infinity of an unknowable\nsupreme Being in some other world far away. This is precisely the\nposition of materialism, and of modern 'free-thinking,' whose theology\nignores what God is and restricts itself to the mere fact _that_ He\nis. In this dispute therefore the Church and the religious mind have\nto a certain extent the right on their side. The finite forms of\nunderstanding certainly fail to fulfil the conditions for a knowledge\neither of Nature or of the formations in the world of Mind as they\ntruly are. Yet on the other side it is impossible to overlook the\nformal right which, in the first place, entitles the empirical sciences\nto vindicate the right of thought to know the existent world in all\nthe speciality of its content, and to seek something further than the\nbare statement of mere abstract faith that God creates and governs the\nworld. When our religious consciousness, resting upon the authority of\nthe Church, teaches us that God created the world by His almighty will,\nthat He guides the stars in their courses, and vouchsafes to all His\ncreatures their existence and their well-being, the question Why? is\nstill left to answer. Now it is the answer to this question which forms\nthe common task of empirical science and of philosophy. When religion\nrefuses to recognise this problem, or the right to put it, and appeals\nto the unsearchableness of the decrees of God, it is taking up the same\nagnostic ground as is taken by the mere Enlightenment of understanding.\nSuch an appeal is no better than an arbitrary dogmatism, which\ncontravenes the express command of Christianity, to know God in spirit\nand in truth, and is prompted by a humility which is not Christian, but\nborn of ostentatious bigotry.\n\n137.] Force is a whole, which is in its own self negative\nself-relation; and as such a whole it continually pushes\nitself off from itself and puts itself forth. But since this\nreflection-into-another (corresponding to the distinction between the\nParts of the Whole) is equally a reflection-into-self, this out-putting\nis the way and means by which Force that returns back into itself is\nas a Force. The very act of out-putting accordingly sets in abeyance\nthe diversity of the two sides which is found in this correlation,\nand expressly states the identity which virtually constitutes their\ncontent. The truth of Force and utterance therefore is that relation,\nin which the two sides are distinguished only as Outward and Inward.\n\n138.] (\u03b3) The Inward (Interior) is the ground, when it\nstands as the mere form of the one side of the Appearance and\nthe Correlation,--the empty form of reflection-into-self. As a\ncounterpart to it stands the Outward (Exterior),--Existence,\nalso as the form of the other side of the correlation, with the\nempty characteristic of reflection-into-something-else. But Inward\nand Outward are identified: and their identity is identity brought\nto fulness in the content, that unity of reflection-into-self and\nreflection-into-other which was forced to appear in the movement of\nforce. Both are the same one totality, and this unity makes them the\ncontent.\n\n139.] In the first place then, Exterior is the same content as\nInterior. What is inwardly is also found outwardly, and _vice vers\u00e2._\nThe appearance shows nothing that is not in the essence, and in the\nessence there is nothing but what is manifested.\n\n140.] In the second place, Inward and Outward, as formal terms,\nare also reciprocally opposed, and that thoroughly. The one is the\nabstraction of identity with self; the other, of mere multiplicity\nor reality. But as stages of the one form, they are essentially\nidentical: so that whatever is at first explicitly put only in the one\nabstraction, is also as plainly and at one step only in the other.\nTherefore what is only internal is also only external: and what is only\nexternal, is so far only at first internal.\n\nIt is the customary mistake of reflection to take the essence to be\nmerely the interior. If it be so taken, even this way of looking at\nit is purely external, and that sort of essence is the empty external\nabstraction.\n\n    Ins Innere der Natur\n    Dringt sein erschaffner Geist,\n    Zu gl\u00fccklich wenn er nur\n    Die \u00e4u\u00dfere Schaale weist.[1]\n\nIt ought rather to have been said that, if the essence of nature is\never described as the inner part, the person who so describes it\nonly knows its outer shell. In Being as a whole, or even in mere\nsense-perception, the notion is at first only an inward, and for that\nvery reason is something external to Being, a subjective thinking\nand being, devoid of truth.--In Nature as well as in Mind, so long\nas the notion, design, or law are at first the inner capacity, mere\npossibilities, they are first only an external, inorganic nature,\nthe knowledge of a third person, alien force, and the like. As a man\nis outwardly, that is to say in his actions (not of course in his\nmerely bodily outwardness), so is he inwardly: and if his virtue,\nmorality, &c. are only inwardly his,--that is if they exist only in his\nintentions and sentiments, and his outward acts are not identical with\nthem, the one half of him is as hollow and empty as the other.\n\nThe relation of Outward and Inward unites the two relations that\nprecede, and at the same time sets in abeyance mere relativity and\nphenomenality in general. Yet so long as understanding keeps the Inward\nand Outward fixed in their separation, they are empty forms, the one\nas null as the other. Not only in the study of nature, but also of the\nspiritual world, much depends on a just appreciation of the relation\nof inward and outward, and especially on avoiding the misconception\nthat the former only is the essential point on which everything turns,\nwhile the latter is unessential and trivial. We find this mistake made\nwhen, as is often done, the difference between nature and mind is\ntraced back to the abstract difference between inner and outer. As for\nnature, it certainly is in the gross external, not merely to the mind,\nbut even on its own part. But to call it external 'in the gross' is\nnot to imply an abstract externality--for there is no such thing. It\nmeans rather that the Idea which forms the common content of nature and\nmind, is found in nature as outward only, and for that very reason only\ninward. The abstract understanding, with its 'Either--or,' may struggle\nagainst this conception of nature. It is none the less obviously found\nin our other modes of consciousness, particularly in religion. It is\nthe lesson of religion that nature, no less than the spiritual world,\nis a revelation of God: but with this distinction, that while nature\nnever gets so far as to be conscious of its divine essence, that\nconsciousness is the express problem of the mind, which in the matter\nof that problem is as yet finite. Those who look upon the essence of\nnature as mere inwardness, and therefore inaccessible to us, take up\nthe same line as that ancient creed which regarded God as envious and\njealous; a creed which both Plato and Aristotle pronounced against long\nago. All that God is, He imparts and reveals; and He does so, at first,\nin and through nature.\n\nAny object indeed is faulty and imperfect when it is only inward, and\nthus at the same time only outward, or, (which is the same thing,) when\nit is only an outward and thus only an inward. For instance, a child,\ntaken in the gross as human being, is no doubt a rational creature;\nbut the reason of the child as child is at first a mere inward, in the\nshape of his natural ability or vocation, &c. This mere inward, at the\nsame time, has for the child the form of a more outward, in the shape\nof the will of his parents, the attainments of his teachers, and the\nwhole world of reason that environs him. The education and instruction\nof a child aim at making him actually and for himself what he is at\nfirst potentially and therefore for others, viz. for his grown-up\nfriends. The reason, which at first exists in the child only as an\ninner possibility, is actualised through education: and conversely, the\nchild by these means becomes conscious that the goodness, religion, and\nscience which he had at first looked upon as an outward authority, are\nhis own and inward nature. As with the child so it is in this matter\nwith the adult, when, in opposition to his true destiny, his intellect\nand will remain in the bondage of the natural man. Thus, the criminal\nsees the punishment to which he has to submit as an act of violence\nfrom without: whereas in fact the penalty is only the manifestation of\nhis own criminal will.\n\nFrom what has now been said, we may learn what to think of a man who,\nwhen blamed for his shortcomings, it may be, his discreditable acts,\nappeals to the (professedly) excellent intentions and sentiments of\nthe inner self he distinguishes therefrom. There certainly may be\nindividual cases, where the malice of outward circumstances frustrates\nwell-meant designs, and disturbs the execution of the best-laid plans.\nBut in general even here the essential unity between inward and outward\nis maintained. We are thus justified in saying that a man is what he\ndoes; and the lying vanity which consoles itself with the feeling of\ninward excellence, may be confronted with the words of the gospel: 'By\ntheir fruits ye shall know them.' That grand saying applies primarily\nin a moral and religious aspect, but it also holds good in reference\nto performances in art and science. The keen eye of a teacher who\nperceives in his pupil decided evidences of talent, may lead him to\nstate his opinion that a Raphael or a Mozart lies hidden in the boy:\nand the result will show how far such an opinion was well-founded.\nBut if a daub of a painter, or a poetaster, soothe themselves by the\nconceit that their head is full of high ideals, their consolation is\na poor one; and if they insist on being judged not by their actual\nworks but by their projects, we may safely reject their pretensions\nas unfounded and unmeaning. The converse case however also occurs. In\npassing judgment on men who have accomplished something great and good,\nwe often make use of the false distinction between inward and outward.\nAll that they have accomplished, we say, is outward merely; inwardly\nthey were acting from some very different motive, such as a desire to\ngratify their vanity or other unworthy passion. This is the spirit of\nenvy. Incapable of any great action of its own, envy tries hard to\ndepreciate greatness and to bring it down to its own level. Let us,\nrather, recall the fine expression of Goethe, that there is no remedy\nbut Love against great superiorities of others. We may seek to rob\nmen's great actions of their grandeur, by the insinuation of hypocrisy;\nbut, though it is possible that men in an instance now and then may\ndissemble and disguise a good deal, they cannot conceal the whole of\ntheir inner self, which infallibly betrays itself in the _decursus\nvitae._ Even here it is true that a man is nothing but the series of\nhis actions.\n\nWhat is called the 'pragmatic' writing of history has in modern times\nfrequently sinned in its treatment of great historical characters, and\ndefaced and tarnished the true conception of them by this fallacious\nseparation of the outward from the inward. Not content with telling\nthe unvarnished tale of the great acts which have been wrought by\nthe heroes of the world's history, and with acknowledging that their\ninward being corresponds with the import of their acts, the pragmatic\nhistorian fancies himself justified and even obliged to trace the\nsupposed secret motives that lie behind the open facts of the record.\nThe historian, in that case, is supposed to write with more depth in\nproportion as he succeeds in tearing away the aureole from all that\nhas been heretofore held grand and glorious, and in depressing it, so\nfar as its origin and proper significance are concerned, to the level\nof vulgar mediocrity. To make these pragmatical researches in history\neasier, it is usual to recommend the study of psychology, which is\nsupposed to make us acquainted with the real motives of human actions.\nThe psychology in question however is only that petty knowledge of\nmen, which looks away from the essential and permanent in human\nnature to fasten its glance on the casual and private features shown\nin isolated instincts and passions. A pragmatical psychology ought\nat least to leave the historian, who investigates the motives at the\nground of great actions, a choice between the 'substantial' interests\nof patriotism, justice, religious truth and the like, on the one hand,\nand the subjective and 'formal' interests of vanity, ambition, avarice\nand the like, on the other. The latter however are the motives which\nmust be viewed by the pragmatist as really efficient, otherwise the\nassumption of a contrast between the inward (the disposition of the\nagent) and the outward (the import of the action) would fall to the\nground. But inward and outward have in truth the same content; and the\nright doctrine is the very reverse of this pedantic judicially. If the\nheroes of history had been actuated by subjective and formal interests\nalone, they would never have accomplished what they have. And if we\nhave due regard to the unity between the inner and the outer, we must\nown that great men willed what they did, and did what they willed.\n\n141.] The empty abstractions, by means of which the one identical\ncontent perforce continues in the two correlatives, suspend themselves\nin the immediate transition, the one in the other. The content is\nitself nothing but their identity (\u00a7 138): and these abstractions are\nthe seeming of essence, put as seeming. By the manifestation of force\nthe inward is put into existence: but this putting is the mediation by\nempty abstractions. In its own self the intermediating process vanishes\nto the immediacy, in which the inward and the outward are absolutely\nidentical and their difference is distinctly no more than assumed and\nimposed. This identity is Actuality.\n\n\nC.--ACTUALITY.\n\n142.] Actuality is the unity, become immediate, of essence with\nexistence, or of inward with outward. The utterance of the actual\nis the actual itself: so that in this utterance it remains just as\nessential, and only is essential, in so far as it is in immediate\nexternal existence.\n\nWe have ere this met Being and Existence as forms of the immediate.\nBeing is, in general, unreflected immediacy and transition into\nanother. Existence is immediate unity of being and reflection; hence\nappearance: it comes from the ground, and falls to the ground. In\nactuality this unity is explicitly put, and the two sides of the\nrelation identified. Hence the actual is exempted from transition, and\nits externality is its energising. In that energising it is reflected\ninto itself: its existence is only the manifestation of itself, not of\nan other.\n\nActuality and thought (or Idea) are often absurdly opposed. How\ncommonly we hear people saying that, though no objection can be urged\nagainst the truth and correctness of a certain thought, there is\nnothing of the kind to be seen in actuality, or it cannot be actually\ncarried out! People who use such language only prove that they have\nnot properly apprehended the nature either of thought or of actuality.\nThought in such a case is, on one hand, the synonym for a subjective\nconception, plan, intention or the like, just as actuality, on the\nother, is made synonymous with external and sensible existence. This\nis all very well in common life, where great laxity is allowed in the\ncategories and the names given to them: and it may of course happen\nthat _e.g._ the plan, or so-called idea, say of a certain method of\ntaxation, is good and advisable in the abstract, but that nothing of\nthe sort is found in so-called actuality, or could possibly be carried\nout under the given conditions. But when the abstract understanding\ngets hold of these categories and exaggerates the distinction they\nimply into a hard and fast line of contrast, when it tells us that in\nthis actual world we must knock ideas out of our heads, it is necessary\nenergetically to protest against these doctrines, alike in the name of\nscience and of sound reason. For on the one hand Ideas are not confined\nto our heads merely, nor is the Idea, upon the whole, so feeble as to\nleave the question of its actualisation or non-actualisation dependent\nin our will. The Idea is rather the absolutely active as well I as\nactual. And on the other hand actuality is not so bad and irrational,\nas purblind or wrong-headed and muddle-brained would-be reformers\nimagine. So far is actuality, as distinguished from mere appearance,\nand primarily presenting a unity of inward and outward, from being in\ncontrariety with reason, that it is rather thoroughly reasonable, and\neverything which is not reasonable must on that very ground cease to\nbe held actual. The same view may be traced in the usages of educated\nspeech, which declines to give the name of real poet or real statesman\nto a poet or a statesman who can do nothing really meritorious or\nreasonable.\n\nIn that vulgar conception of actuality which mistakes for it what is\npalpable and directly obvious to the senses, we must seek the ground\nof a wide-spread prejudice about the relation of the philosophy of\nAristotle to that of Plato. Popular opinion makes the difference to be\nas follows. While Plato recognises the idea and only the idea as the\ntruth, Aristotle, rejecting the idea, keeps to what is actual, and is\non that account to be considered the founder and chief of empiricism.\nOn this it may be remarked: that although actuality certainly is\nthe principle of the Aristotelian philosophy, it is not the vulgar\nactuality of what is immediately at hand, but the idea as actuality.\nWhere then lies the controversy of Aristotle against Plato? It lies in\nthis. Aristotle calls the Platonic idea a mere \u03b4\u03af\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2, and establishes\nin opposition to Plato that the idea, which both equally recognise to\nbe the only truth, is essentially to be viewed as an \u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, in other\nwords, as the inward which is quite to the fore, or as the unity of\ninner and outer, or as actuality, in the emphatic sense here given to\nthe word.\n\n143.] Such a concrete category as Actuality includes the\ncharacteristics aforesaid and their difference, and is therefore also\nthe development of them, in such a way that, as it has them, they are\nat the same time plainly understood to be a show, to be assumed or\nimposed (\u00a7 141).\n\n(\u03b1) Viewed as an identity in general, Actuality is first of all\nPossibility--the reflection-into-self which, as in contrast with\nthe concrete unity of the actual, is taken and made an abstract and\nunessential essentiality. Possibility is what is essential to reality,\nbut in such a way that it is at the same time only a possibility.\n\nIt was probably the import of Possibility which induced Kant to regard\nit along with necessity and actuality as Modalities, 'since these\ncategories do not in the least increase the notion as object, but only\nexpress its relation to the faculty of knowledge.' For Possibility is\nreally the bare abstraction of reflection-into-self,--what was formerly\ncalled the Inward, only that it is now taken to mean the external\ninward, lifted out of reality and with the being of a mere supposition,\nand is thus, sure enough, supposed only as a bare modality, an\nabstraction which comes short, and, in more concrete terms, belongs\nonly to subjective thought. It is otherwise with Actuality and\nNecessity. They are anything but a mere sort and mode for something\nelse: in fact the very reverse of that. If they are supposed, it is as\nthe concrete, not merely supposititious, but intrinsically complete.\n\nAs Possibility is, in the first instance, the mere form of\nidentity-with-self (as compared with the concrete which is actual),\nthe rule for it merely is that a thing must not be self-contradictory.\nThus everything is possible; for an act of abstraction can give any\ncontent this form of identity. Everything however is as impossible as\nit is possible. In every content,--which is and must be concrete,--the\nspeciality of its nature may be viewed as a specialised contrariety\nand in that way as a contradiction. Nothing therefore can be more\nmeaningless than to speak of such possibility and impossibility. In\nphilosophy, in particular, there should never be a word said of showing\nthat 'It is possible,' or 'There is still another possibility,' or, to\nadopt another phraseology, 'It is conceivable.' The same consideration\nshould warn the writer of history against employing a category which\nhas now been explained to be on its own merits untrue: but the subtlety\nof the empty understanding finds its chief pleasure in the fantastic\ningenuity of suggesting possibilities and lots of possibilities.\n\nOur picture-thought is at first disposed to see in possibility the\nricher and more comprehensive, in actuality the poorer and narrower\ncategory. Everything, it is said, is possible, but everything which\nis possible is not on that account actual. In real truth, however, if\nwe deal with them as thoughts, actuality is the more comprehensive,\nbecause it is the concrete thought which includes possibility as an\nabstract element. And that superiority is to some extent expressed\nin our ordinary mode of thought when we speak of the possible, in\ndistinction from the actual, as _only_ possible. Possibility is often\nsaid to consist in a thing's being thinkable. 'Think,' however, in this\nuse of the word, only means to conceive any content under the form of\nan abstract identity. Now every content can be brought under this form,\nsince nothing is required except to separate it from the relations in\nwhich it stands. Hence any content, however absurd and nonsensical, can\nbe viewed as possible. It is possible that the moon might fall upon\nthe earth to-night; for the moon is a body separate from the earth,\nand may as well fall down upon it as a stone thrown into the air does.\nIt is possible that the Sultan may become Pope; for, being a man, he\nmay be converted to the Christian faith, may become a Catholic priest,\nand so on. In language like this about possibilities, it is chiefly\nthe law of the sufficient ground or reason which is manipulated in the\nstyle already explained. Everything, it is said, is possible, for which\nyou can state some ground. The less education a man has, or, in other\nwords, the less he knows of the specific connexions of the objects\nto which he directs his observations, the greater is his tendency to\nlaunch out into all sorts of empty possibilities. An instance of this\nhabit in the political sphere is seen in the pot-house politician.\nIn practical life too it is no uncommon thing to see ill-will and\nindolence slink behind the category of possibility, in order to escape\ndefinite obligations. To such conduct the same remarks apply as were\nmade in connexion with the law of sufficient ground. Reasonable and\npractical men refuse to be imposed upon by the possible, for the simple\nground that it is possible only. They stick to the actual (not meaning\nby that word merely whatever immediately is now and here). Many of\nthe proverbs of common life express the same contempt for what is\nabstractly possible. 'A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.'\n\nAfter all there is as good reason for taking everything to be\nimpossible, as to be possible: for every content (a content is always\nconcrete) includes not only diverse but even opposite characteristics.\nNothing is so impossible, for instance, as this, that I am: for 'I' is\nat the same time simple self-relation and, as undoubtedly, relation\nto something else. The same may be seen in every other fact in the\nnatural or spiritual world. Matter, it may be said, is impossible:\nfor it is the unity of attraction and repulsion. The same is true of\nlife, law, freedom, and above all, of God Himself, as the true, _e.g._\nthe triune God,--a notion of God, which the abstract 'Enlightenment'\nof Understanding, in conformity with its canons, rejected on the\nallegation that it was contradictory in thought. Generally speaking,\nit is the empty understanding which haunts these empty forms: and\nthe business of philosophy in the matter is to show how null and\nmeaningless they are. Whether a thing is possible or impossible,\ndepends altogether on the subject-matter: that is, on the sum total of\nthe elements in actuality, which, as it opens itself out, discloses\nitself to be necessity.\n\n144.] (\u00df) But the Actual in its distinction from possibility (which\nis reflection-into-self) is itself only the outward concrete, the\nunessential immediate. In other words, to such extent as the actual\nis primarily (\u00a7 142) the simple merely immediate unity of Inward\nand Outward, it is obviously made an unessential outward, and thus\nat the same time (\u00a7 140) it is merely inward, the abstraction of\nreflection-into-self. Hence it is itself characterised as a merely\npossible. When thus valued at the rate of a mere possibility, the\nactual is a Contingent or Accidental, and, conversely,\npossibility is mere Accident itself or Chance.\n\n146.] Possibility and Contingency are the two factors of\nActuality,--Inward and Outward, put as mere forms which constitute the\nexternality of the actual. They have their reflection-into-self on the\nbody of actual fact, or content, with its intrinsic definiteness which\ngives the essential ground of their characterisation. The finitude of\nthe contingent and the possible lies, therefore, as we now see, in the\ndistinction of the form-determination from the content: and, therefore,\nit depends on the content alone whether anything is contingent and\npossible.\n\nAs possibility is the mere _inside_ of actuality, it is for that\nreason a mere _outside_ actuality, in other words, Contingency. The\ncontingent, roughly speaking, is what has the ground of its being\nnot in itself but in somewhat else. Such is the aspect under which\nactuality first comes before consciousness, and which is often mistaken\nfor actuality itself. But the contingent is only one side of the\nactual,--the side, namely, of reflection on somewhat else. It is the\nactual, in the signification of something merely possible. Accordingly\nwe consider the contingent to be what may or may not be, what may be\nin one way or in another, whose being or not-being, and whose being\non this wise or otherwise, depends not upon itself but on something\nelse. To overcome this contingency is, roughly speaking, the problem\nof science on the one hand; as in the range of practice, on the other,\nthe end of action is to rise above the contingency of the will, or\nabove caprice. It has however often happened, most of all in modern\ntimes, that contingency has been unwarrantably elevated, and had a\nvalue attached to it, both in nature and the world of mind, to which\nit has no just claim. Frequently Nature--to take it first,--has been\nchiefly admired for the richness and variety of its structures. Apart,\nhowever, from what disclosure it contains of the Idea, this richness\ngratifies none of the higher interests of reason, and in its vast\nvariety of structures, organic and inorganic, affords us only the\nspectacle of a contingency losing itself in vagueness. At any rate,\nthe chequered scene presented by the several varieties of animals and\nplants, conditioned as it is by outward circumstances,--the complex\nchanges in the figuration and grouping of clouds, and the like, ought\nnot to be ranked higher than the equally casual fancies of the mind\nwhich surrenders itself to its own caprices. The wonderment with which\nsuch phenomena are welcomed is a most abstract frame of mind, from\nwhich one should advance to a closer insight into the inner harmony and\nuniformity of nature.\n\nOf contingency in respect of the Will it is especially important to\nform a proper estimate. The Freedom of the Will is an expression that\noften means mere free-choice, or the will in the form of contingency.\nFreedom of choice, or the capacity of determining ourselves towards one\nthing or another, is undoubtedly a vital element in the will (which in\nits very notion is free); but instead of being freedom itself, it is\nonly in the first instance a freedom in form. The genuinely free will,\nwhich includes free choice as suspended, is conscious to itself that\nits content is intrinsically firm and fast, and knows it at the same\ntime to be thoroughly its own. A will, on the contrary, which remains\nstanding on the grade of option, even supposing it does decide in\nfavour of what is in import right and true, is always haunted by the\nconceit that it might, if it had so pleased, have decided in favour of\nthe reverse course. When more narrowly examined, free choice is seen\nto be a contradiction, to this extent that its form and content stand\nin antithesis. The matter of choice is given, and known as a content\ndependent not on the will itself,'but on outward circumstances. In\nreference to such a given content, freedom lies only in the form of\nchoosing, which, as it is only a freedom in form, may consequently be\nregarded as freedom only in supposition. On an ultimate analysis it\nwill be seen that the same outwardness of circumstances, on which is\nfounded the content that the will finds to its hand, can alone account\nfor the will giving its decision for the one and not the other of the\ntwo alternatives.\n\nAlthough contingency, as it has thus been shown, is only one aspect in\nthe whole of actuality, and therefore not to be mistaken for actuality\nitself, it has no less than the rest of the forms of the idea its due\noffice in the world of objects. This is, in the first place, seen in\nNature. On the surface of Nature, so to speak, Chance ranges unchecked,\nand that contingency must simply be recognised, without the pretension\nsometimes erroneously ascribed to philosophy, of seeking to find in it\na could-only-be-so-and-not-otherwise. Nor is contingency less visible\nin the world of Mind. The will, as we have already remarked, includes\ncontingency under the shape of option or free-choice, but only as a\nvanishing and abrogated element. In respect of Mind and its works,\njust as in the case of Nature, we must guard against being so far\nmisled by a well-meant endeavour after rational knowledge, as to try\nto exhibit the necessity of phenomena which are marked by a decided\ncontingency, or, as the phrase is, to construe them _a priori._ Thus\nin language (although it be, as it were, the body of thought) Chance\nstill unquestionably plays a decided part; and the same is true of the\ncreations of law, of art, &c. The problem of science, and especially of\nphilosophy, undoubtedly consists in eliciting the necessity concealed\nunder the semblance of contingency. That however is far from meaning\nthat the contingent belongs to our subjective conception alone, and\nmust therefore be simply set aside, if we wish to get at the truth.\nAll scientific researches which pursue this tendency exclusively,\nlay themselves fairly open to the charge of mere jugglery and an\nover-strained precisianism.\n\n146.] When more closely examined, what the aforesaid outward side\nof actuality implies is this. Contingency, which is actuality\nin its immediacy, is the self-identical, essentially only as a\nsupposition which is no sooner made than it is revoked and leaves\nan existent externality. In this way, the external contingency is\nsomething pre-supposed, the immediate existence of which is at the\nsame time a possibility, and has the vocation to be suspended, to\nbe the possibility of something else. Now this possibility is the\nCondition.\n\nThe Contingent, as the immediate actuality, is at the same time\nthe possibility of somewhat else,--no longer however that abstract\npossibility which we had at first, but the possibility which _is._ And\na possibility existent is a Condition. By the Condition of a thing\nwe mean first, an existence, in short an immediate, and secondly\nthe vocation of this immediate to be suspended and subserve the\nactualising of something else.--Immediate actuality is in general\nas such never what it ought to be; it is a finite actuality with an\ninherent flaw, and its vocation is to be consumed. But the other\naspect of actuality is its essentiality. This is primarily the inside,\nwhich as a mere possibility is no less destined to be suspended.\nPossibility thus suspended is the issuing of a new actuality, of which\nthe first immediate actuality was the pre-supposition. Here we see\nthe alternation which is involved in the notion of a Condition. The\nConditions of a thing seem at first sight to involve no bias anyway.\nReally however an immediate actuality of this kind includes in it\nthe germ of something else altogether. At first this something else\nis only a possibility: but the form of possibility is soon suspended\nand translated into actuality. This new actuality thus issuing is the\nvery inside of the immediate actuality which it uses up. Thus there\ncomes into being quite an other shape of things, and yet itis not an\nother: for the first actuality is only put as what it in essence was.\nThe conditions which are sacrificed, which fall to the ground and are\nspent, only unite with themselves in the other actuality. Such in\ngeneral is the nature of the process of actuality. The actual is no\nmere case of immediate Being, but, as essential Being, a suspension of\nits own immediacy, and thereby mediating itself with itself.\n\n147.] (\u03b3) When this externality (of actuality) is thus developed into\na circle of the two categories of possibility and immediate actuality,\nshowing the intermediation of the one by the other, it is what is\ncalled Real Possibility. Being such a circle, further, it\nis the totality, and thus the content, the actual fact or affair in\nits all-round definiteness. Whilst in like manner, if we look at the\ndistinction between the two characteristics in this unity, it realises\nthe concrete totality of the form, the immediate self-translation\nof inner into outer, and of outer into inner. This self-movement of\nthe form is Activity, carrying into effect the fact or affair as a\n_real_ ground which is self-suspended to actuality, and carrying into\neffect the contingent actuality, the conditions; _i.e._ it is their\nreflection-in-self, and their self-suspension to an other actuality,\nthe actuality of the actual fact. If all the conditions are at hand,\nthe fact (event) _must_ be actual; and the fact itself is one of the\nconditions: for being in the first place only inner, it is at first\nitself only pre-supposed. Developed actuality, as the coincident\nalternation of inner and outer, the alternation of their opposite\nmotions combined into a single motion, is Necessity.\n\nNecessity has been defined, and rightly so, as the union of possibility\nand actuality. This mode of expression, however, gives a superficial\nand therefore unintelligible description of the very difficult notion\nof necessity. It is difficult because it is the notion itself, only\nthat its stages or factors are still as actualities, which are yet at\nthe same time to be viewed as forms only, collapsing and transient. In\nthe two following paragraphs therefore an exposition of the factors\nwhich constitute necessity must be given at greater length.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWhen anything is said to be necessary, the first question we ask is,\nWhy? Anything necessary accordingly comes before us as something due to\na supposition, the result of certain antecedents. If we go no further\nthan mere derivation from antecedents however, we have not gained a\ncomplete notion of what necessity means. What is merely derivative,\nis what it is, not through itself, but through something else; and in\nthis way it too is merely contingent. What is necessary, on the other\nhand, we would have be what it is through itself; and thus, although\nderivative, it must still contain the antecedent whence it is derived\nas a vanishing element in itself. Hence we say of what is necessary,\n'It is.' We thus hold it to be simple self-relation, in which all\ndependence on something else is removed.\n\nNecessity is often said to be blind. If that means that in the process\nof necessity the End or final cause is not explicitly and overtly\npresent, the statement is correct. The process of necessity begins\nwith the existence of scattered circumstances which appear to have no\ninter-connexion and no concern one with another. These circumstances\nare an immediate actuality which collapses, and out of this negation\na new actuality proceeds. Here we have a content which in point of\nform is doubled, once as content of the final realised fact, and once\nas content of the scattered circumstances which appear as if they\nwere positive, and make themselves at first felt in that character.\nThe latter content is in itself nought and is accordingly inverted\ninto its negative, thus becoming content of the realised fact. The\nimmediate circumstances fall to the ground as conditions, but are at\nthe same time retained as content of the ultimate reality. From such\ncircumstances and conditions there has, as we say, proceeded quite\nanother thing, and it is for that reason that we call this process of\nnecessity blind. If on the contrary we consider teleological action, we\nhave in the end of action a content which is already fore-known. This\nactivity therefore is not blind but seeing. To say that the world is\nruled by Providence implies that design, as what has been absolutely\npre-determined, is the active principle, so that the issue corresponds\nto what has been fore-known and fore-willed.\n\nThe theory however which regards the world as determined through\nnecessity and the belief in a divine providence are by no means\nmutually excluding points of view. The intellectual principle\nunderlying the idea of divine providence will hereafter be shown to be\nthe notion. But the notion is the truth of necessity, which it contains\nin suspension in itself; just as, conversely, necessity is the notion\nimplicit. Necessity is blind only so long as it is not understood.\nThere is nothing therefore more mistaken than the charge of blind\nfatalism made against the Philosophy of History, when it takes for its\nproblem to understand the necessity of every event. The philosophy of\nhistory rightly understood takes the rank of a Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e; and those,\nwho fancy they honour Divine Providence by excluding necessity from\nit, are really degrading it by this exclusiveness to a blind and\nirrational caprice. In the simple language of the religious mind which\nspeaks of God's eternal and immutable decrees, there is implied an\nexpress recognition that necessity forms part of the essence of God. In\nhis difference from God, man, with his own private opinion and will,\nfollows the call of caprice and arbitrary humour, and thus often finds\nhis acts turn out something quite different from what he had meant and\nwilled. But God knows what He wills, is determined in His eternal will\nneither by accident from within nor from without, and what He wills He\nalso accomplishes, irresistibly.\n\nNecessity gives a point of view which has important bearings upon our\nsentiments and behaviour. When we look upon events as necessary, our\nsituation seems at first sight to lack freedom completely. In the\ncreed of the ancients, as we know, necessity figured as Destiny. The\nmodern point of view, on the contrary, is that of Consolation. And\nConsolation means that, if we renounce our aims and interests, we do so\nonly in prospect of receiving compensation. Destiny, on the contrary,\nleaves no room for Consolation. But a close examination of the ancient\nfeeling about destiny, will not by any means reveal a sense of bondage\nto its power. Rather the reverse. This will clearly appear, if we\nremember, that the sense of bondage springs from inability to surmount\nthe antithesis, and from looking at what _is,_ and what happens, as\ncontradictory to what _ought_ to be and happen. In the ancient mind the\nfeeling was more of the following kind: Because such a thing is, it\nis, and as it is, so ought it to be. Here there is no contrast to be\nseen, and therefore no sense of bondage, no pain, and no sorrow. True,\nindeed, as already remarked, this attitude towards destiny is void of\nconsolation. But then, on the other hand, it is a frame of mind which\ndoes not need consolation, so long as personal subjectivity has not\nacquired its infinite significance. It is this point on which special\nstress should be laid in comparing the ancient sentiment with that of\nthe modern and Christian world.\n\nBy Subjectivity, however, we may understand, in the first place, only\nthe natural and finite subjectivity, with its contingent and arbitrary\ncontent of private interests and inclinations,--all, in short, that\nwe call person as distinguished from thing: taking 'thing' in the\nemphatic sense of the word (in which we use the (correct) expression\nthat it is a question of _things_ and not of _persons)._ In this sense\nof sub-activity we cannot help admiring the tranquil resignation of\nthe ancients to destiny, and feeling that it is a much higher and\nworthier mood than that of the moderns, who obstinately pursue their\nsubjective aims, and when they find themselves constrained to resign\nthe hope of reaching them, console themselves with the prospect of a\nreward in some other shape. But the term subjectivity is not to be\nconfined merely to the bad and finite kind of it which is contrasted\nwith the thing (fact). In its truth subjectivity is immanent in the\nfact, and as a subjectivity thus infinite is the very truth of the\nfact. Thus regarded, the doctrine of consolation receives a newer and\na higher significance. It is in this sense that the Christian religion\nis to be regarded as the religion of consolation, and even of absolute\nconsolation. Christianity, we know, teaches that God wishes all men\nto be saved. That teaching declares that subjectivity has an infinite\nvalue. And that consoling power of Christianity just lies in the fact\nthat God Himself is in it known as the absolute subjectivity, so that,\ninasmuch as subjectivity involves the element of particularity, _our_\nparticular personality too is recognised not merely as something to be\nsolely and simply nullified, but as at the same time something to be\npreserved. The gods of the ancient world were also, it is true, looked\nupon as personal; but the personality of a Zeus and an Apollo is not\na real personality: it is only a figure in the mind. In other words,\nthese gods are mere personifications, which, being such, do not know\nthemselves, and are only known. An evidence of this defect and this\npowerlessness of the old gods is found even in the religious beliefs\nof antiquity. In the ancient creeds not only men, but even gods,\nwere represented as subject to destiny (\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03c1\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd or \u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7), a\ndestiny which we must conceive as necessity not unveiled, and thus as\nsomething wholly impersonal, selfless, and blind. On the other hand,\nthe Christian God is God not known merely, but also self-knowing; He is\na personality not merely figured in our minds, but rather absolutely\nactual.\n\nWe must refer to the Philosophy of Religion for a further discussion of\nthe points here touched. But we may note in passing how important it\nis for any man to meet everything that befalls him with the spirit of\nthe old proverb which describes each man as the architect of his own\nfortune. That means that it is only himself after all of which a man\nhas the usufruct. The other way would be to lay the blame of whatever\nwe experience upon other men, upon unfavourable circumstances, and the\nlike. And this is a fresh example of the language of unfreedom, and at\nthe same time the spring of discontent. If man saw, on the contrary,\nthat whatever happens to him is only the outcome of himself, and that\nhe only bears his own guilt, he would stand free, and in everything\nthat came upon him would have the consciousness that he suffered no\nwrong. A man who lives in dispeace with himself and his lot, commits\nmuch that is perverse and amiss, for no other reason than because of\nthe false opinion that he is wronged by others. No doubt too there is a\ngreat deal of chance in what befalls us. But the chance has its root in\nthe 'natural' man. So long however as a man is otherwise conscious that\nhe is free, his harmony of soul and peace of mind will not be destroyed\nby the disagreeables that befall him. It is their view of necessity,\ntherefore, which is at the root of the content and discontent of men,\nand which in that way determines their destiny itself.\n\n148.] Among the three elements in the process of necessity--the\nCondition, the Fact, and the Activity--\n\na. The Condition is (\u03b1) what is pre-supposed or ante-stated, _e.g._\nit is not only supposed or stated, and so only a correlative to the\nfact, but also prior, and so independent, a contingent and external\ncircumstance which exists without respect to the fact. While thus\ncontingent, however, this pre-supposed or ante-stated term, in respect\nwithal of the fact, which is the totality, is a complete circle of\nconditions, (\u00df) The conditions are passive, are used as materials for\nthe fact, into the content of which they thus enter. They are likewise\nintrinsically conformable to this content, and already contain its\nwhole characteristic.\n\nb. The Fact is also (\u03b1) something pre-supposed or ante-stated, _i.e._\nit is at first, and as supposed, only inner and possible, and also,\nbeing prior, an independent content by itself, (\u00df) By using up the\nconditions, it receives its external existence, the realisation of\nthe articles of its content, which reciprocally correspond to the\nconditions, so that whilst it presents itself out of these as the fact,\nit also proceeds from them.\n\nc. The Activity similarly has (\u03b1) an independent existence of its own\n(as a man, a character), and at the same time it is possible only\nwhere the conditions are and the fact, (\u00df) It is the movement which\ntranslates the conditions into fact, and the latter into the former as\nthe side of existence, or rather the movement which educes the fact\nfrom the conditions in which it is potentially present, and which gives\nexistence to the fact by abolishing the existence possessed by the\nconditions.\n\nIn so far as these three elements stand to each other in the shape\nof independent existences, this process has the aspect of an outward\nnecessity. Outward necessity has a limited content for its fact. For\nthe fact is this whole, in phase of singleness. But since in its form\nthis whole is external to itself, it is self-externalised even in its\nown self and in its content, and this externality, attaching to the\nfact, is a limit of its content.\n\n149.] Necessity, then, is potentially the one essence, self-same but\nnow full of content, in the reflected light of which its distinctions\ntake the form of independent realities. This self-sameness is at the\nsame time, as absolute form, the activity which reduces into dependency\nand mediates into immediacy.--Whatever is necessary is through an\nother, which is broken up into the mediating ground (the Fact and\nthe Activity) and an immediate actuality or accidental circumstance,\nwhich is at the same time a Condition. The necessary, being through\nan other, is not in and for itself: hypothetical, it is a mere result\nof assumption. But this intermediation is just as immediately however\nthe abrogation of itself. The ground and contingent condition is\ntranslated into immediacy, by which that dependency is now lifted up\ninto actuality, and the fact has closed with itself. In this return\nto itself the necessary simply and positively _is,_ as unconditioned\nactuality. The necessary is so, mediated through a circle of\ncircumstances: it is so, because the circumstances are so, and at the\nsame time it is so, unmediated: it is so, because it is.\n\n(a) _Relationship of Substantiality._\n\n150.] The necessary is in itself an absolute correlation of elements,\n_i.e._ the process developed (in the preceding paragraphs), in which\nthe correlation also suspends itself to absolute identity.\n\nIn its immediate form it is the relationship of Substance and Accident.\nThe absolute self-identity of this relationship is Substance as such,\nwhich as necessity gives the negative to this form of inwardness, and\nthus invests itself with actuality, but which also gives the negative\nto this outward thing. In this negativity, the actual, as immediate,\nis only an accidental which through this bare possibility passes over\ninto another actuality. This transition is the identity of substance,\nregarded as form-activity (\u00a7\u00a7 148, 149).\n\n151.] Substance is accordingly the totality of the Accidents,\nrevealing itself in them as their absolute negativity, (that is to\nsay, as absolute power,) and at the same time as the wealth of all\ncontent. This content however is nothing but that very revelation,\nsince the character (being reflected in itself to make content) is\nonly a passing stage of the form which passes away in the power of\nsubstance. Substantiality is the absolute form-activity and the power\nof necessity: all content is but a vanishing element which merely\nbelongs to this process, where there is an absolute revulsion of form\nand content into one another.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn the history of philosophy we meet with Substance as the principle\nof Spinoza's system. On the import and value of that much-praised and\nno less decried philosophy there has been great misunderstanding and\na deal of talking since the days of Spinoza. The atheism and, as a\nfurther charge, the pantheism of the system has formed the commonest\nground of accusation. These cries arise because of Spinoza's conception\nof God as substance, and substance only. What we are to think of this\ncharge follows, in the first instance, from the place which substance\ntakes in the system of the logical idea. Though an essential stage in\nthe evolution of the idea, substance is not the same with absolute\nIdea, but the idea under the still limited form of necessity. It is\ntrue that God is necessity, or, as we may also put it, that He is the\nabsolute Thing: He is however no less the absolute Person. That He is\nthe absolute Person however is a point which the philosophy of Spinoza\nnever reached: and on that side it falls short of the true notion of\nGod which forms the content of religious consciousness in Christianity.\nSpinoza was by descent a Jew; and it is upon the whole the Oriental way\nof seeing things, according to which the nature of the finite world\nseems frail and transient, that has found its intellectual expression\nin his system. This Oriental view of the unity of substance certainly\ngives the basis for all real further development. Still it is not the\nfinal idea. It is marked by the absence of the principle of the Western\nWorld, the principle of individuality, which first appeared under a\nphilosophic shape, contemporaneously with Spinoza, in the Monadology of\nLeibnitz.\n\nFrom this point we glance back to the alleged atheism of Spinoza. The\ncharge will be seen to be unfounded if we remember that his system,\ninstead of denying God, rather recognises that He alone really is.\nNor can it be maintained that the God of Spinoza, although he is\ndescribed as alone true, is not the true God, and therefore as good as\nno God. If that were a just charge, it would only prove that all other\nsystems, where speculation has not gone beyond a subordinate stage\nof the idea,--that the Jews and Mohammedans who know God only as the\nLord,--and that even the many Christians for whom God is merely the\nmost high, unknowable, and transcendent being, are as much atheists as\nSpinoza. The so-called atheism of Spinoza is merely an exaggeration of\nthe fact that he defrauds the principle of difference or finitude of\nits due. Hence his system, as it holds that there is properly speaking\nno world, at any rate that the world has no positive being, should\nrather be styled Acosmism, These considerations will also show what is\nto be said of the charge of Pantheism. If Pantheism means, as it often\ndoes, the doctrine which takes finite things in their finitude and in\nthe complex of them to be God, we must acquit the system of Spinoza of\nthe crime of Pantheism. For in that system, finite things and the world\nas a whole are denied all truth. On the other hand, the philosophy\nwhich is Acosmism is for that reason certainly pantheistic.\n\nThe shortcoming thus acknowledged to attach to the content turns out\nat the same time to be a shortcoming in respect of form. Spinoza puts\nsubstance at the head of his system, and defines it to be the unity\nof thought and extension, without demonstrating how he gets to this\ndistinction, or how he traces it back to the unity of substance. The\nfurther treatment of the subject proceeds in what is called the\nmathematical method. Definitions and axioms are first laid down: after\nthem comes a series of theorems, which are proved by an analytical\nreduction of them to these unproved postulates. Although the system\nof Spinoza, and that even by those who altogether reject its contents\nand results, is praised for the strict sequence of its method, such\nunqualified praise of the form is as little justified as an unqualified\nrejection of the content. The defect of the content is that the form\nis not known as immanent in it, and therefore only approaches it as an\nouter and subjective form. As intuitively accepted by Spinoza without a\nprevious mediation by dialectic, Substance, as the universal negative\npower, is as it were a dark shapeless abyss which engulfs all definite\ncontent as radically null, and produces from itself nothing that has a\npositive subsistence of its own.\n\n152.] At the stage, where substance, as absolute power, is the\nself-relating power (itself a merely inner possibility) which thus\ndetermines itself to accidentality,--from which power the externality\nit thereby creates is distinguished--necessity is a correlation\nstrictly so called, just as in the first form of necessity, it is\nsubstance. This is the correlation of Causality.\n\n(b) _Relationship of Causality._\n\n153.] Substance is Cause, in so far as substance reflects into\nself as against its passage into accidentality and so stands as the\n_primary_ fact, but again no less suspends this reflection-into-self\n(its bare possibility), lays itself down as the negative of itself, and\nthus produces an Effect, an actuality, which, though so far only\nassumed as a sequence, is through the process that effectuates it at\nthe same time necessary.\n\nAs primary fact, the cause is qualified as having absolute independence\nand a subsistence maintained in face of the effect: but in the\nnecessity, whose identity constitutes that primariness itself, it\nis wholly passed into the effect. So far again as we can speak of a\ndefinite content, there is no content in the effect that is not in\nthe cause. That identity in fact is the absolute content itself: but\nit is no less also the form-characteristic. The primariness of the\ncause is suspended in the effect in which the cause makes itself a\ndependent being. The cause however does not for that reason vanish and\nleave the effect to be alone actual. For this dependency is in like\nmanner directly suspended, and is rather the reflection of the cause\nin itself, its primariness: in short, it is in the effect that the\ncause first becomes actual and a cause. The cause consequently is in\nits full truth _causa sui._--Jacobi, sticking to the partial conception\nof mediation (in his Letters on Spinoza, second edit. p. 416), has\ntreated the _causa sui_ (and the _effectus sui_ is the same), which is\nthe absolute truth of the cause, as a mere formalism. He has also made\nthe remark that God ought to be defined not as the ground of things,\nbut essentially as cause. A more thorough consideration of the nature\nof cause would have shown that Jacobi did not by this means gain what\nhe intended. Even in the finite cause and its conception we can see\nthis identity between cause and effect in point of content. The rain\n(the cause) and the wet (the effect) are the self-same existing water.\nIn point of form the cause (rain) is dissipated or lost in the effect\n(wet): but in that case the result can no longer be described as\neffect; for without the cause it is nothing, and we should have only\nthe unrelated wet left.\n\nIn the common acceptation of the causal relation the cause is finite,\nto such extent as its content is so (as is also the case with finite\nsubstance), and so far as cause and effect are conceived as two several\nindependent existences; which they are, however, only when we leave\nthe causal relation out of sight. In the finite sphere we never get\nover the difference of the form-characteristics in their relation: and\nhence we turn the matter round and define the cause also as something\ndependent or as an effect. This again has another cause, and thus there\ngrows up a progress from effects to causes _ad infinitum._ There is a\ndescending progress too: the effect, looked at in its identity with the\ncause, is itself defined as a cause, and at the same time as another\ncause, which again has other effects, and so on for ever.\n\nThe way understanding bristles up against the idea of substance is\nequalled by its readiness to use the relation of cause and effect.\nWhenever it is proposed to view any sum of fact as necessary, it\nis especially the relation of causality to which the reflective\nunderstanding makes a point of tracing it back. Now, although this\nrelation does undoubtedly belong to necessity, it forms only one aspect\nin the process of that category. That process equally requires the\nsuspension of the mediation involved in causality and the exhibition\nof it as simple self-relation. If we stick to causality as such, we\nhave it not in its truth. Such a causality is merely finite, and its\nfinitude lies in retaining the distinction between cause and effect\nunassimilated. But these two terms, if they are distinct, are also\nidentical. Even in ordinary consciousness that identity may be found.\nWe say that a cause is a cause, only when it has an effect, and _vice\nvers\u00e2._ Both cause and effect are thus one and the same content: and\nthe distinction between them is primarily only that the one lays down,\nand the other is laid down. This formal difference however again\nsuspends itself, because the cause is not only a cause of something\nelse, but also a cause of itself; while the effect is not only an\neffect of something else, but also an effect of itself. The finitude\nof things consists accordingly in this. While cause and effect are in\ntheir notion identical, the two forms present themselves severed so\nthat, though the cause is also an effect, and the effect also a cause,\nthe cause is not an effect in the same connexion as it is a cause, nor\nthe effect a cause in the same connexion as it is an effect. This\nagain gives the infinite progress, in the shape of an endless series\nof causes, which shows itself at the same time as an endless series of\neffects.\n\n154.] The effect is different from the cause. The former as such has\na being dependent on the latter. But such a dependence is likewise\nreflection-into-self and immediacy: and the action of the cause, as it\nconstitutes the effect, is at the same time the pre-constitution of\nthe effect, so long as effect is kept separate from cause. There is\nthus already in existence another substance on which the effect takes\nplace. As immediate, this substance is not a self-related negativity\nand _active,_ but _passive._ Yet it is a substance, and it is therefore\nactive also: it therefore suspends the immediacy it was originally put\nforward with, and the effect which was put into it: it reacts, _e.g._\nsuspends the activity of the first substance. But this first substance\nalso in the same way sets aside its own immediacy, or the effect which\nis put into it; it thus suspends the activity of the other substance\nand reacts. In this manner causality passes into the relation of\nAction and Reaction, or Reciprocity.\n\nIn Reciprocity, although causality is not yet invested with its true\ncharacteristic, the rectilinear movement out from causes to effects,\nand from effects to causes, is bent round and back into itself, and\nthus the progress _ad infinitum_ of causes and effects is, as a\nprogress, really and truly suspended. This bend, which transforms, the\ninfinite progression into a self-contained relationship, is here as\nalways the plain reflection that in the above meaningless repetition\nthere is only one and the same thing, viz. one cause and another, and\ntheir connexion with one another. Reciprocity--which is the development\nof this relation-itself however only distinguishes turn and turn\nabout (--not causes, but) factors of causation, in each of which--just\nbecause they are inseparable (on the principle of the identity that the\ncause is cause in the effect, and _vice vers\u00e2_)--the other factor is\nalso equally supposed.\n\n(c) _Reciprocity or Action and Reaction._\n\n155.] The characteristics which in Reciprocal Action are retained as\ndistinct are (\u03b1) potentially the same. The one side is a cause, is\nprimary, active, passive, &c, just as the other is. Similarly the\npre-supposition of another side and the action upon it, the immediate\nprimariness and the dependence produced by the alternation, are one and\nthe same on both sides. The cause assumed to be first is on account\nof its immediacy passive, a dependent being, and an effect. The\ndistinction of the causes spoken of as two is accordingly void: and\nproperly speaking there is only one cause, which, while it suspends\nitself (as substance) in its effect, also rises in this operation only\nto independent existence as a cause.\n\n156.] But this unity of the double cause is also (\u03b2) actual. All this\nalternation is properly the cause in act of constituting itself and in\nsuch constitution lies its being. The nullity of the distinctions is\nnot only potential, or a reflection of ours (\u00a7 155). Reciprocal action\njust means that each characteristic we impose is also to be suspended\nand inverted into its opposite, and that in this way the essential\nnullity of the 'moments' is explicitly stated. An effect is introduced\ninto the primariness; in other words, the primariness is abolished: the\naction of a cause becomes reaction, and so on.\n\nReciprocal action realises the causal relation in its complete\ndevelopment. It is this relation, therefore, in which reflection\nusually takes shelter when the conviction grows that things can no\nlonger be studied satisfactorily from a causal point of view, on\naccount of the infinite progress already spoken of. Thus in historical\nresearch the question may be raised in a first form, whether the\ncharacter and manners of a nation are the cause of its constitution and\nits laws, or if they are not rather the effect. Then, as the second\nstep, the character and manners on one side and the constitution and\nlaws on the other are conceived on the principle of reciprocity: and\nin that case the cause in the same connexion as it is a cause will at\nthe same time be an effect, and _vice vers\u00e2._ The same thing is done\nin the study of Nature, and especially of living organisms. There\nthe several organs and functions are similarly seen to stand to each\nother in the relation of reciprocity. Reciprocity is undoubtedly the\nproximate truth of the relation of cause and effect, and stands, so\nto say, on the threshold of the notion; but on that very ground,\nsupposing that our aim is a thoroughly comprehensive idea, we should\nnot rest content with applying this relation. If we get no further than\nstudying a given content under the point of view of reciprocity, we are\ntaking up an attitude which leaves matters utterly incomprehensible.\nWe are left with a mere dry fact; and the call for mediation, which\nis the chief motive in applying the relation of causality, is still\nunanswered. And it we look more narrowly into the dissatisfaction\nfelt in applying the relation of reciprocity, we shall see that it\nconsists in the circumstance, that this relation, instead of being\ntreated as an equivalent for the notion, ought, first of all, to be\nknown and understood in its own nature. And to understand the relation\nof action and reaction we must not let the two sides rest in their\nstate of mere given facts, but recognise them, as has been shown in\nthe two paragraphs preceding, for factors of a third and higher, which\nis the notion and nothing else. To make, for example, the manners of\nthe Spartans the cause of their constitution and their constitution\nconversely the cause of their manners, may no doubt be in a way\ncorrect. But, as we have comprehended neither the manners nor the\nconstitution of the nation, the result of such reflections can never\nbe final or satisfactory. The satisfactory point will be reached only\nwhen these two, as well as all other, special aspects of Spartan life\nand Spartan history are seen to be founded in this notion.\n\n157.] This pure self-reciprocation is therefore Necessity unveiled\nor realised. The link of necessity _qu\u00e2_ necessity is identity, as\nstill inward and concealed, because it is the identity of what are\nesteemed actual things, although their very self-subsistence is bound\nto be necessity. The circulation of substance through causality\nand reciprocity therefore only expressly makes out or states that\nself-subsistence is the infinite negative self-relation--a relation\n_negative,_ in general, for in it the act of distinguishing and\nintermediating becomes a primariness of actual things independent\none against the other,--and _infinite self-relation,_ because their\nindependence only lies in their identity.\n\n158.] This truth of necessity, therefore, is _Freedom:_ and the\ntruth of substance is the Notion,--an independence which, though\nself-repulsive into distinct independent elements, yet in that\nrepulsion is self-identical, and in the movement of reciprocity still\nat home and conversant only with itself.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nNecessity is often called hard, and rightly so, if we keep only to\nnecessity as such, _i.e._ to its immediate shape. Here we have,\nfirst of all, some state or, generally speaking, fact, possessing an\nindependent subsistence: and necessity primarily implies that there\nfalls upon such a fact something else by which it is brought low.\nThis is what is hard and sad in necessity immediate or abstract. The\nidentity of the two things, which necessity presents as bound to each\nother and thus bereft of their independence, is at first only inward,\nand therefore has no existence for those under the yoke of necessity.\nFreedom too from this point of view is only abstract, and is preserved\nonly by renouncing all that we immediately are and have. But, as we\nhave seen already, the process of necessity is so directed that it\novercomes the rigid externality which it first had and reveals its\ninward nature. It then appears that the members, linked to one another,\nare not really foreign to each other, but only elements of one whole,\neach of them, in its connexion with the other, being, as it were, at\nhome, and combining with itself. In this way necessity is transfigured\ninto freedom,--not the freedom that consists in abstract negation,\nbut freedom concrete and positive. From which we may learn what a\nmistake it is to regard freedom and necessity as mutually exclusive.\nNecessity indeed _qu\u00e2_ necessity is far from being freedom: yet\nfreedom pre-supposes necessity, and contains it as an unsubstantial\nelement in itself. A good man is aware that the tenor of his conduct\nis essentially obligatory and necessary. But this consciousness is\nso far from making any abatement from his freedom, that without it\nreal and reasonable freedom could not be distinguished from arbitrary\nchoice,--a freedom which has no reality and is merely potential. A\ncriminal, when punished, may look upon his punishment as a restriction\nof his freedom. Really the punishment is not foreign constraint to\nwhich he is subjected, but the manifestation of his own act: and if he\nrecognises this, he comports himself as a free man. In short, man is\nmost independent when he knows himself to be determined by the absolute\nidea throughout. It was this phase of mind and conduct which Spinoza\ncalled _Amor intellectualis Dei._\n\n159.] Thus the Notion is the truth of Being and Essence, inasmuch as\nthe shining or show of self-reflection is itself at the same time\nindependent immediacy, and this being of a different actuality is\nimmediately only a shining or show on itself.\n\nThe Notion has exhibited itself as the truth of Being and Essence, as\nthe ground to which the regress of both leads. Conversely it has been\ndeveloped out of being as its ground. The former aspect of the advance\nmay be regarded as a concentration of being into its depth, thereby\ndisclosing its inner nature: the latter aspect as an issuing of the\nmore perfect from the less perfect. When such development is viewed on\nthe latter side only, it does prejudice to the method of philosophy.\nThe special meaning which these superficial thoughts of more imperfect\nand more perfect have in this place is to indicate the distinction of\nbeing, as an immediate unity with itself, from the notion, as free\nmediation with itself. Since being has shown that it is an element in\nthe notion, the latter has thus exhibited itself as the truth of being.\nAs this its reflection in itself and as an absorption of the mediation,\nthe notion is the pre-supposition of the immediate--a pre-supposition\nwhich is identical with the return to self; and in this identity lie\nfreedom and the notion. If the partial element therefore be called the\nimperfect, then the notion, or the perfect, is certainly a development\nfrom the imperfect; since its very nature is thus to suspend its\npre-supposition. At the same time it is the notion alone which, in the\nact of supposing itself, makes its pre-supposition; as has been made\napparent in causality in general and especially in reciprocal action.\n\nThus in reference to Being and Essence the Notion is defined as Essence\nreverted to the simple immediacy of Being,--the shining or show of\nEssence thereby having actuality, and its actuality being at the same\ntime a free shining or show in itself. In this manner the notion has\nbeing as its simple self-relation, or as the immediacy of its immanent\nunity. Being is so poor a category that it is the least thing which can\nbe shown to be found in the notion.\n\nThe passage from necessity to freedom, or from actuality into the\nnotion, is the very hardest, because it proposes that independent\nactuality shall be thought as having all its substantiality in the\npassing over and identity with the other independent actuality. The\nnotion, too, is extremely hard, because it is itself just this very\nidentity. But the actual substance as such, the cause, which in its\nexclusiveness resists all invasion, is _ipso facto_ subjected to\nnecessity or the destiny of passing into dependency: and it is this\nsubjection rather where the chief hardness lies. To think necessity, on\nthe contrary, rather tends to melt that hardness. For thinking means\nthat, in the other, one meets with one's self.--It means a liberation,\nwhich is not the flight of abstraction, but consists in that which is\nactual having itself not as something else, but as its own being and\ncreation, in the other actuality with which it is bound up by the force\nof necessity. As existing in an individual form, this liberation is\ncalled I: as developed to its totality, it is free Spirit; as feeling,\nit is Love; and as enjoyment, it is Blessedness.--The great vision\nof substance in Spinoza is only a potential liberation from finite\nexclusiveness and egoism: but the notion itself realises for its own\nboth the power of necessity and actual freedom.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWhen, as now, the notion is called the truth of Being and Essence,\nwe must expect to be asked, why we do not begin with the notion? The\nanswer is that, where knowledge by thought is our aim, we cannot begin\nwith the truth, because the truth, when it forms the beginning, must\nrest on mere assertion. The truth when it is thought must as such\nverify itself to thought. If the notion were put at the head of Logic,\nand defined, quite correctly in point of content, as the unity of\nBeing and Essence, the following question would come up: What are we\nto think under the terms 'Being' and 'Essence,' and how do they come\nto be embraced in the unity of the Notion? But if we answered these\nquestions, then our beginning with the notion would be merely nominal.\nThe real start would be made with Being, as we have here done: with\nthis difference, that the characteristics of Being as well as those\nof Essence would have to be accepted uncritically from figurate\nconception, whereas we have observed Being and Essence in their own\ndialectical development and learnt how they lose themselves in the\nunity of the notion.\n\n\n[1] Compare Goethe's indignant outcry--'To Natural Science,' vol. i.\npt. 3:\n\n    Das h\u00f6r' ich sechzig Jahre wiederholen,\n    Und fluche drauf, aber verstohlen,--\n    Natur hat weder Kern noch Schaale,\n    Alles ist sie mit einem Male.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\n\nTHIRD SUB-DIVISION OF LOGIC.\n\n\nTHE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION.\n\n\n160.] The Notion is the principle of freedom, the power of\nsubstance self-realised. It is a systematic whole, in which each of its\nconstituent functions is the very total which the notion is, and is put\nas indissolubly one with it. Thus in its self-identity it has original\nand complete determinateness.\n\nThe position taken up by the notion is that of absolute idealism.\nPhilosophy is a knowledge through notions because it sees that what\non other grades of consciousness is taken to have Being, and to be\nnaturally or immediately independent, is but a constituent stage in the\nIdea. In the logic of understanding, the notion is generally reckoned\na mere form of thought, and treated as a general conception. It is to\nthis inferior view of the notion that the assertion refers, so often\nurged on behalf of the heart and sentiment, that notions as such are\nsomething dead, empty, and abstract. The case is really quite the\nreverse. The notion is, on the contrary, the principle of all life, and\nthus possesses at the same time a character of thorough concreteness.\nThat it is so follows from the whole logical movement up to this point,\nand need not be here proved. The contrast between form and content,\nwhich is thus used to criticise the notion when it is alleged to be\nmerely formal, has, like all the other contrasts upheld by reflection,\nbeen already left behind and overcome dialectically or through itself.\nThe notion, in short, is what contains all the earlier categories of\nthought merged in it. It certainly is a form, but an infinite and\ncreative form, which includes, but at the same time releases from\nitself, the fulness of all content. And so too the notion may, if it\nbe wished, be styled abstract, if the name concrete is restricted to\nthe concrete facts of sense or of immediate perception. For the notion\nis not palpable to the touch, and when we are engaged with it, hearing\nand seeing must quite fail us. And yet, as it was before remarked, the\nnotion is a true concrete; for the reason that it involves Being and\nEssence, and the total wealth of these two spheres with them, merged in\nthe unity of thought.\n\nIf, as was said at an earlier point, the different stages of the\nlogical idea are to be treated as a series of definitions of the\nAbsolute, the definition which now results for us is that the Absolute\nis the Notion. That necessitates a higher estimate of the notion,\nhowever, than is found in formal conceptualist Logic, where the notion\nis a mere form of our subjective thought, with no original content of\nits own. But if Speculative Logic thus attaches a meaning to the term\nnotion so very different from that usually given, it may be asked why\nthe same word should be employed in two contrary acceptations, and an\noccasion thus given for confusion and misconception. The answer is\nthat, great as the interval is between the speculative notion and the\nnotion of Formal Logic, a closer examination shows that the deeper\nmeaning is not so foreign to the general usages of language as it\nseems at first sight. We speak of the deduction of a content from the\nnotion, _e.g._ of the specific provisions of the law of property from\nthe notion of property; and so again we speak of tracing back these\nmaterial details to the notion. We thus recognise that the notion is no\nmere form without a content of its own: for if it were, there would be\nin the one case nothing to deduce from such a form, and in the other\ncase to trace a given body of fact back to the empty form of the notion\nwould only rob the fact of its specific character, without making it\nunderstood.\n\n161.] The onward movement of the notion is no longer either\na transition into, or a reflection on something else, but\nDevelopment. For in the notion, the elements distinguished are\nwithout more ado at the same time declared to be identical with one\nanother and with the whole, and the specific character of each is a\nfree being of the whole notion.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTransition into something else is the dialectical process within the\nrange of Being: reflection (bringing something else into light), in\nthe range of Essence. The movement of the Notion is _development_: by\nwhich that only is explicit which is already implicitly present. In\nthe world of nature it is organic life that corresponds to the grade\nof the notion. Thus _e.g._ the plant is developed from its germ. The\ngerm virtually involves the whole plant, but does so only ideally or in\nthought: and it would therefore be a mistake to regard the development\nof the root, stem, leaves, and other different parts of the plant, as\nmeaning that they were _realiter_ present, but in a very minute form,\nin the germ. That is the so-called 'box-within-box' hypothesis; a\ntheory which commits the mistake of supposing an actual existence of\nwhat is at first found only as a postulate of the completed thought.\nThe truth of the hypothesis on the other hand lies in its perceiving\nthat in the process of development the notion keeps to itself and\nonly gives rise to alteration of form, without making any addition in\npoint of content. It is this nature of the notion--this manifestation\nof itself in its process as a development of its own self,--which is\nchiefly in view with those who speak of innate ideas, or who, like\nPlato, describe all learning merely as reminiscence. Of course that\nagain does not mean that everything which is embodied in a mind, after\nthat mind has been formed by instruction, had been present in that mind\nbeforehand, in its definitely expanded shape.\n\nThe movement of the notion is as it were to be looked upon merely as\nplay: the other which it sets up is in reality not an other. Or, as\nit is expressed in the teaching of Christianity: not merely has God\ncreated a world which confronts Him as an other; He has also from all\neternity begotten a Son in whom He, a Spirit, is at home with Himself.\n\n162.] The doctrine of the notion is divided into three parts. (1) The\nfirst is the doctrine of the Subjective or Formal Notion.\n(2) The second is the doctrine of the notion invested with the\ncharacter of immediacy, or of Objectivity. (3) The third is the\ndoctrine of the Idea, the subject-object, the unity of notion\nand objectivity, the absolute truth.\n\nThe Common Logic covers only the matters which come before us here\nas a portion of the third part of the whole system, together with\nthe so-called Laws of Thought, which we have already met; and in the\nApplied Logic it adds a little about cognition. This is combined with\npsychological, metaphysical, and all sorts of empirical materials,\nwhich were introduced because, when all was done, those forms of\nthought could not be made to do all that was required of them. But\nwith these additions the science lost its unity of aim. Then there was\na further circumstance against the Common Logic. Those forms, which\nat least do belong to the proper domain of Logic, are supposed to be\ncategories of conscious thought only, of thought too in the character\nof understanding, not of reason.\n\nThe preceding logical categories, those viz. of Being and Essence, are,\nit is true, no mere logical modes or entities: they are proved to be\nnotions in their transition or their dialectical element, and in their\nreturn into themselves and totality. But they are only in a modified\nform notions (cp. \u00a7\u00a7 84 and 112), notions rudimentary, or, what is\nthe same thing, notions for us. The antithetical term into which each\ncategory passes, or in which it shines, so producing correlation, is\nnot characterised as a particular. The third, in which they return\nto unity, is not characterised as a subject or an individual: nor is\nthere any explicit statement that the category: is identical in its\nantithesis,--in other words, its freedom is not expressly stated: and\nall this because the category is not universality.--What generally\npasses current under the name of a notion is a mode of understanding,\nor, even, a mere general representation, and therefore, in short, a\nfinite mode of thought (cp. \u00a7 62).\n\nThe Logic of the Notion is usually treated as a science of form only,\nand understood to deal with the form of notion, judgment, and syllogism\nas form, without in the least touching the question whether anything\nis true. The answer to that question is supposed to depend on the\ncontent only. If the logical forms of the notion were really dead and\ninert receptacles of conceptions and thoughts, careless of what they\ncontained, knowledge about them would be an idle curiosity which the\ntruth might dispense with. On the contrary they really are, as forms\nof the notion, the vital spirit of the actual world. That only is\ntrue of the actual which is true in virtue of these forms, through\nthem and in them. As yet, however, the truth of these forms has never\nbeen considered or examined on their own account any more than their\nnecessary interconnexion.\n\n\nA.--THE SUBJECTIVE NOTION.\n\n(a) _The Notion as Notion._\n\n163.] The Notion as Notion contains the three following 'moments' or\nfunctional parts. (1) The first is _Universality_--meaning that it\nis in free equality with itself in its specific character. (2) The\nsecond is Particularity--that is, the specific character, in\nwhich the universal continues serenely equal to itself. (3) The third\nis Individuality--meaning the reflection-into-self of the\nspecific characters of universality and particularity;--which negative\nself-unity has complete and original determinateness, without any loss\nto its self-identity or universality.\n\nIndividual and actual are the same thing: only the former has issued\nfrom the notion, and is thus, as a universal, stated expressly as a\nnegative identity with itself. The actual, because it is at first no\nmore than a potential or immediate unity of essence and existence,\n_may_ possibly have effect: but the individuality of the notion is\nthe very source of effectiveness, effective moreover no longer as the\ncause is, with a show of effecting something else, but effective of\nitself.--Individuality, however, is not to be understood to mean the\nimmediate or natural individual, as when we speak of individual things\nor individual men: for that special phase of individuality does not\nappear till we come to the judgment. Every function and 'moment' of\nthe notion is itself the whole notion (\u00a7 160); but the individual or\nsubject is the notion expressly put as a totality.\n\n(1) The notion is generally associated in our minds with abstract\ngenerality, and on that account it is often described as a general\nconception. We speak, accordingly, of the notions of colour, plant,\nanimal, &c. They are supposed to be arrived at by neglecting the\nparticular features which distinguish the different colours, plants,\nand animals from each other, and by retaining those common to them all.\nThis is the aspect of the notion which is familiar to understanding;\nand feeling is in the right when it stigmatises such hollow and empty\nnotions as mere phantoms and shadows. But the universal of the notion\nis not a mere sum of features common to several things, confronted\nby a particular which enjoys an existence of its own. It is, on the\ncontrary, self-particularising or self-specifying, and with undimmed\nclearness finds itself at home in its antithesis. For the sake both of\ncognition and of our practical conduct, it is of the utmost importance\nthat the real universal should not be confused with what is merely held\nin common. All those charges which the devotees of feeling make against\nthought, and especially against philosophic thought, and the reiterated\nstatement that it is dangerous to carry thought to what they call too\ngreat lengths, originate in the confusion of these two things.\n\nThe universal in its true and comprehensive meaning is a thought\nwhich, as we know, cost thousands of years to make it enter into the\nconsciousness of men. The thought did not gain its full recognition\ntill the days of Christianity. The Greeks, in other respects so\nadvanced, knew neither God nor even man in their true universality.\nThe gods of the Greeks were only particular powers of the mind; and\nthe universal God, the God of all nations, was to the Athenians still\na God concealed. They believed in the same way that an absolute gulf\nseparated themselves from the barbarians. Man as man was not then\nrecognised to be of infinite worth and to have infinite rights.\nThe question has been asked, why slavery has vanished from modern\nEurope. One special circumstance after another has been adduced in\nexplanation of this phenomenon. But the real ground why there are\nno more slaves in Christian Europe is only to be found in the very\nprinciple of Christianity itself, the religion of absolute freedom.\nOnly in Christendom is man respected as man, in his infinitude and\nuniversality. What the slave is without, is the recognition that he is\na person: and the principle of personality is universality. The master\nlooks upon his slave not as a person, but as a selfless thing. The\nslave is not himself reckoned an 'I';--his 'I' is his master.\n\nThe distinction referred to above between what is merely in common, and\nwhat is truly universal, is strikingly expressed by Rousseau in his\nfamous 'Contrat Social,' when he says that the laws of a state must\nspring from the universal will (_volont\u00e9 g\u00e9n\u00e9rale,_) but need not on\nthat account be the will of all (_volont\u00e9 de tous._) Rousseau would\nhave made a sounder contribution towards a theory of the state, if he\nhad always keep this distinction in sight. The general will is the\nnotion of the will: and the laws are the special clauses of this will\nand based upon the notion of it.\n\n(2) We add a remark upon the account of the origin and formation of\nnotions which is usually given in the Logic of Understanding. It is\nnot _we_ who frame the notions. The notion is not something which\nis originated at all. No doubt the notion is not mere Being, or the\nimmediate: it involves mediation, but the mediation lies in itself. In\nother words, the notion is what is mediated through itself and with\nitself. It is a mistake to imagine that the objects which form the\ncontent of our mental ideas come first and that our subjective agency\nthen supervenes, and by the aforesaid operation of abstraction, and\nby colligating the points possessed in common by the objects, frames\nnotions of them. Rather the notion is the genuine first; and things\nare what they are through the action of the notion, immanent in them,\nand revealing itself in them. In religious language we express this\nby saying that God created the world out of nothing. In other words,\nthe world and finite things have issued from the fulness of the divine\nthoughts and the divine decrees. Thus religion recognises thought and\n(more exactly) the notion to be the infinite form, or the free creative\nactivity, which can realise itself without the help of a matter that\nexists outside it.\n\n164.] The notion is concrete out and out: because the negative\nunity with itself, as characterisation pure and entire, which is\nindividuality, is just what constitutes its self-relation, its\nuniversality. The functions or 'moments' of the notion are to this\nextent indissoluble. The categories of 'reflection' are expected to be\nseverally apprehended and separately accepted as current, apart from\ntheir opposites. But in the notion, where their identity is expressly\nassumed, each of its functions can be immediately apprehended only from\nand with the rest.\n\nUniversality, particularity, and individuality are, taken in the\nabstract, the same as identity, difference, and ground. But the\nuniversal is the self-identical, with the express qualification,\nthat it simultaneously contains the particular and the individual.\nAgain, the particular is the different or the specific character, but\nwith the qualification that it is in itself universal and is as an\nindividual. Similarly the individual must be understood to be a subject\nor substratum, which involves the genus and species in itself and\npossesses a substantial existence. Such is the explicit or realised\ninseparability of the functions of the notion in their difference (\u00a7\n160)--what may be called the clearness of the notion, in which each\ndistinction causes no dimness or interruption, but is quite as much\ntransparent.\n\nNo complaint is oftener made against the notion than that it is\n_abstract._ Of course it is abstract, if abstract means that the medium\nin which the notion exists is thought in general and not the sensible\nthing in its empirical concreteness. It is abstract also, because the\nnotion falls short of the idea. To this extent the subjective notion\nis still formal. This however does not mean that it ought to have\nor receive another content than its own. It is itself the absolute\nform, and so is all specific character, but as that character is in\nits truth. Although it be abstract therefore, it is the concrete,\nconcrete altogether, the subject as such. The absolutely concrete is\nthe mind (see end of \u00a7 159)--the notion when it _exists_ as notion\ndistinguishing itself from its objectivity, which notwithstanding the\ndistinction still continues to be its own. Everything else which is\nconcrete, however rich it be, is not so intensely identical with itself\nand therefore not so concrete on its own part,--least of all what is\ncommonly supposed to be concrete, but is only a congeries held together\nby external influence.--What are called notions, and in fact specific\nnotions, such as man, house, animal, &c, are simply denotations\nand abstract representations. These abstractions retain out of all\nthe functions of the notion only that of universality; they leave\nparticularity and individuality out of account and have no development\nin these directions. By so doing they just miss the notion.\n\n165.] It is the element of Individuality which first explicitly\ndifferentiates the elements of the notion. Individuality is the\nnegative reflection of the notion into itself, and it is in that way at\nfirst the free differentiating of it as the first negation, by which\nthe specific character of the notion is realised, but under the form\nof particularity. That is to say, the different elements are in the\nfirst place only qualified as the several elements of the notion, and,\nsecondly, their identity is no less explicitly stated, the one being\nsaid to be the other. This realised particularity of the notion is the\nJudgment.\n\nThe ordinary classification of notions, as _clear, distinct_ and\n_adequate,_ is no part of the notion; it belongs to psychology.\nNotions, in fact, are here synonymous with mental representations;\na _clear_ notion is an abstract simple representation: a _distinct_\nnotion is one where, in addition to the simplicity, there is one 'mark'\nor character emphasised as a sign for subjective cognition. There is\nno more striking mark of the formalism and decay of Logic than the\nfavourite category of the 'mark.' The _adequate_ notion comes nearer\nthe notion proper, or even the Idea: but after all it expresses only\nthe formal circumstance that a notion or representation agrees with its\nobject, that is, with an external thing.--The division into what are\ncalled _subordinate_ and _co-ordinate_ notions implies a mechanical\ndistinction of universal from particular which allows only a mere\ncorrelation of them in external comparison. Again, an enumeration\nof such kinds as _contrary_ and _contradictory, affirmative_ and\n_negative_ notions, &c, is only a chance-directed gleaning of logical\nforms which properly belong to the sphere of Being or Essence, (where\nthey have been already examined,) and which have nothing to do with\nthe specific notional character as such. The true distinctions in the\nnotion, universal, particular, and individual, may be said also to\nconstitute species of it, but only when they are kept severed from\neach other by external reflection. The immanent differentiating and\nspecifying of the notion come to sight in the judgment: for to judge is\nto specify the notion.\n\n(b) _The Judgment._\n\n166.] The Judgment is the notion in its particularity, as a\nconnexion which is also a distinguishing of its functions, which are\nput as independent and yet as identical with themselves, not with one\nanother.\n\nOne's first impression about the Judgment is the independence of the\ntwo extremes, the subject and the predicate. The former we take to be\na thing or term _per se,_ and the predicate a general term outside\nthe said subject and somewhere in our heads. The next point is for us\nto bring the latter into combination with the former, and in this way\nframe a Judgment. The copula 'is' however enunciates the predicate _of_\nthe subject, and so that external subjective subsumption is again put\nin abeyance, and the Judgment taken as a determination of the object\nitself.--The etymological meaning of the Judgment (_Urtheil_) in\nGerman goes deeper, as it were declaring the unity of the notion to be\nprimary, and its distinction to be the original partition. And that is\nwhat the Judgment really is.\n\nIn its abstract terms a Judgment is expressible in the proposition:\n'The individual is the universal.' These are the terms under which\nthe subject and the predicate first confront each other, when the\nfunctions of the notion are taken in their immediate character or\nfirst abstraction. [Propositions such as, 'The particular is the\nuniversal,' and 'The individual is the particular,' belong to the\nfurther specialisation of the judgment.] It shows a strange want\nof observation in the logic-books, that in none of them is the fact\nstated, that in _every_ judgment there is such a statement made, as,\nThe individual is the universal, or still more definitely, The subject\nis the predicate: (_e.g._ God is absolute spirit). No doubt there is\nalso a distinction between terms like individual and universal, subject\nand predicate: but it is none the less the universal fact, that every\njudgment states them to be identical.\n\nThe copula 'is' springs from the nature of the notion, to be\nself-identical even in parting with its own. The individual and\nuniversal are _its_ constituents, and therefore characters which\ncannot be isolated. The earlier categories (of reflection) in their\ncorrelations also refer to one another: but their interconnexion is\nonly 'having' and not 'being,' _i.e._ it is not the identity which is\nrealised as identity or universality. In the judgment, therefore, for\nthe first time there is seen the genuine particularity of the notion:\nfor it is the speciality or distinguishing of the latter, without\nthereby losing universality.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nJudgments are generally looked upon as combinations of notions, and,\nbe it added, of heterogeneous notions. This theory of judgment is\ncorrect, so far as it implies that it is the notion which forms the\npresupposition of the judgment, and which in the judgment comes up\nunder the form of difference. But on the other hand, it is false to\nspeak of notions differing in kind. The notion, although concrete,\nis still as a notion essentially one, and the functions which it\ncontains are not different kinds of it. It is equally false to speak\nof a combination of the two sides in the judgment, if we understand\nthe term 'combination' to imply the independent existence of the\ncombining members apart from the combination. The same external view\nof their nature is more forcibly apparent when judgments are described\nas produced by the ascription of a predicate to the subject. Language\nlike this looks upon the subject as self-subsistent outside, and the\npredicate as found somewhere in our head. Such a conception of the\nrelation between subject and predicate however is at once contradicted\nby the copula 'is.' By saying 'This rose is red,' or 'This picture\nis beautiful,' we declare, that it is not we who from outside attach\nbeauty to the picture or redness to the rose, but that these are the\ncharacteristics proper to these objects. An additional fault in the\nway in which Formal Logic conceives the judgment is, that it makes\nthe judgment look as if it were something merely contingent, and\ndoes not offer any proof for the advance from notion on to judgment.\nFor the notion does not, as understanding supposes, stand still in\nits own immobility. It is rather an infinite form, of boundless\nactivity, as it were the _punctum saliens_ of all vitality, and\nthereby self-differentiating. This disruption of the notion into the\ndifference of its constituent functions',--a disruption imposed by the\nnative act of the notion, is the judgment. A judgment therefore means\nthe particularising of the notion. No doubt the notion is implicitly\nthe particular. But in the notion as notion the particular is not yet\nexplicit, and still remains in transparent unity with the universal.\nThus, for example, as we remarked before (\u00a7 160, note), the germ of a\nplant contains its particular, such as root, branches, leaves, &c.:\nbut these details are at first present only potentially, and are not\nrealised till the germ uncloses. This unclosing is, as it were, the\njudgment of the plant. The illustration may also serve to show how\nneither the notion nor the judgment are merely found in our head, or\nmerely framed by us. The notion is the very heart of things, and makes\nthem what they are. To form a notion of an object means therefore to\nbecome aware of its notion: and when we proceed to a criticism or\njudgment of the object, we are not performing a subjective act, and\nmerely ascribing this or that predicate to the object. We are, on the\ncontrary, observing the object in the specific character imposed by its\nnotion.\n\n167.] The Judgment is usually taken in a subjective sense as an\noperation and a form, occurring merely in self-conscious thought. This\ndistinction, however, has no existence on purely logical principles,\nby which the judgment is taken in the quite universal signification\nthat all things are a judgment. That is to say, they are individuals,\nwhich are a universality or inner nature in themselves,--a universal\nwhich is individualised. Their universality and individuality are\ndistinguished, but the one is at the same time identical with the other.\n\nThe interpretation of the judgment, according to which it is assumed\nto be merely subjective, as if _we_ ascribed a predicate to a subject,\nis contradicted by the decidedly objective expression of the judgment.\nThe rose _is_ red; Gold _is_ a metal. It is not by us that something\nis first ascribed to them.--A judgment is however distinguished from a\nproposition. The latter contains a statement about the subject, which\ndoes not stand to it in any universal relationship, but expresses some\nsingle action, or some state, or the like. Thus, 'Caesar was born at\nRome in such and such a year, waged war in Gaul for ten years, crossed\nthe Rubicon, &c.,' are propositions, but not judgments. Again it is\nabsurd to say that such statements as, 'I slept well last night,' or\n'Present arms!' may be turned into the form of a judgment. 'A carriage\nis passing by'--would be a judgment, and a subjective one at best, only\nif it were doubtful, whether the passing object was a carriage, or\nwhether it and not rather the point of observation was in motion:--in\nshort, only if it were desired to specify a conception which was still\nshort of appropriate specification.\n\n168.] The judgment is an expression of finitude. Things from its point\nof view are said to be finite, because they are a judgment, because\ntheir definite being and their universal nature, (their body and their\nsoul,) though united indeed (otherwise the things would be nothing),\nare still elements in the constitution which are already different and\nalso in any case separable.\n\n169.] The abstract terms of the judgment, 'The individual is the\nuniversal,' present the subject (as negatively self-relating) as what\nis immediately _concrete,_ while the predicate is what is _abstract,_\nindeterminate, in short, the universal. But the two elements are\nconnected together by an 'is': and thus the predicate (in its\nuniversality) must also contain the speciality of the subject, must,\nin short, have particularity: and so is realised the identity between\nsubject and predicate; which, being thus unaffected by this difference\nin form, is the content.\n\nIt is the predicate which first gives the subject, which till then was\non its own account a bare mental representation or an empty name, its\nspecific character and content. In judgments like 'God is the most\nreal of all things,' or 'The Absolute is the self-identical,' God and\nthe Absolute are mere names; what they _are_ we only learn in the\npredicate. What the subject may be in other respects, as a concrete\nthing, is no concern of _this_ judgment. (Cp. \u00a7 31.)\n\nTo define the subject as that of which something is said, and the\npredicate as what is said about it, is mere trifling. It gives no\ninformation about the distinction between the two. In point of\nthought, the subject is primarily the individual, and the predicate\nthe universal. As the judgment receives further development, the\nsubject ceases to be merely the immediate individual, and the predicate\nmerely the abstract universal: the former acquires the additional\nsignifications of particular and universal,--the latter the additional\nsignifications of particular and individual. Thus while the same names\nare given to the two terms of the judgment, their meaning passes\nthrough a series of changes.\n\n170.] We now go closer into the speciality of subject and predicate.\nThe subject as negative self-relation (\u00a7\u00a7 163, 166) is the stable\nsubstratum in which the predicate has its subsistence and where it\nis ideally present. The predicate, as the phrase is, _inheres_ in\nthe subject. Further, as the subject is in general and immediately\nconcrete, the specific connotation of the predicate is only one of the\nnumerous characters of the subject. Thus the subject is ampler and\nwider than the predicate.\n\nConversely, the predicate as universal is self-subsistent, and\nindifferent whether this subject is or not. The predicate outflanks\nthe subject, subsuming it under itself: and hence on its side is wider\nthan the subject. The specific content of the predicate (\u00a7 169) alone\nconstitutes the identity of the two.\n\n171.] At first, subject, predicate, and the specific content or the\nidentity are, even in their relation, still put in the judgment\nas different and divergent. By implication, however, that is, in\ntheir notion, they are identical. For the subject is a concrete\ntotality,--which means not any indefinite multiplicity, but\nindividuality alone, the particular and the universal in an identity:\nand the predicate too is the very same unity (\u00a7 170).--The copula\nagain, even while stating the identity of subject and predicate,\ndoes so at first only by an abstract 'is.' Conformably to such an\nidentity the subject has to be _put_ also in the characteristic of the\npredicate. By this means the latter also receives the characteristic of\nthe former: so that the copula receives its full complement and full\nforce. Such is the continuous specification by which the judgment,\nthrough a copula charged with content, comes to be a syllogism. As it\nis primarily exhibited in the judgment, this gradual specification\nconsists in giving to an originally abstract, sensuous universality the\nspecific character of allness, of species, of genus, and finally of the\ndeveloped universality of the notion.\n\nAfter we are made aware of this continuous specification of the\njudgment, we can see a meaning and an interconnexion in what are\nusually stated as the kinds of judgment. Not only does the ordinary\nenumeration seem purely casual, but it is also superficial, and even\nbewildering in its statement of their distinctions. The distinction\nbetween positive, categorical and assertory judgments, is either a pure\ninvention of fancy, or is left undetermined. On the right theory, the\ndifferent judgments follow necessarily from one another, and present\nthe continuous specification of the notion; for the judgment itself is\nnothing but the notion specified.\n\nWhen we look at the two preceding spheres of Being and Essence, we see\nthat the specified notions as judgments are reproductions of these\nspheres, but put in the simplicity of relation peculiar to the notion.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe various kinds of judgment are no empirical aggregate. They are\na systematic whole based on a principle; and it was one of Kant's\ngreat merits to have first emphasised the necessity of showing\nthis. His proposed division, according to the headings in his table\nof categories, into judgments of quality, quantity, relation and\nmodality, can not be called satisfactory, partly from the merely formal\napplication of this categorical rubric, partly on account of their\ncontent. Still it rests upon a true perception of the fact that the\ndifferent species of judgment derive their features from the universal\nforms of the logical idea itself. If we follow this clue, it will\nsupply us with three chief kinds of judgment parallel to the stages\nof Being, Essence, and Notion. The second of these kinds, as required\nby the character of Essence, which is the stage of differentiation,\nmust be doubled. We find the inner ground for this systematisation of\njudgments in the circumstance that when the Notion, which is the unity\nof Being and Essence in a comprehensive thought, unfolds, as it does in\nthe judgment, it must reproduce these two stages in a transformation\nproper to the notion. The notion itself meanwhile is seen to mould and\nform the genuine grade of judgment.\n\nFar from occupying the same level, and being of equal value, the\ndifferent species of judgment form a series of steps, the difference\nof which rests upon the logical significance of the predicate. That\njudgments differ in value is evident even in our ordinary ways of\nthinking. We should not hesitate to ascribe a very slight faculty of\njudgment to a person who habitually framed only such judgments as,\n'This wall is green,' 'This stove is hot.' On the other hand we should\ncredit with a genuine capacity of judgment the person whose criticisms\ndealt with such questions as whether a certain work of art was\nbeautiful, whether a certain action was good, and so on. In judgments\nof the first-mentioned kind the content forms only an abstract quality,\nthe presence of which can be sufficiently detected by immediate\nperception. To pronounce a work of art to be beautiful, or an action to\nbe good, requires on the contrary a comparison of the objects with what\nthey ought to be, _i.e._ with their notion.\n\n(\u03b1) Qualitative Judgment.\n\n172.] The immediate judgment is the judgment of definite Being. The\nsubject is invested with a universality as its predicate, which is\nan immediate, and therefore a sensible quality. It may be (1) a\nPositive judgment: The individual is a particular. But the\nindividual is not a particular: or in more precise language, such\na single quality is not congruous with the concrete nature of the\nsubject. This is (2) a Negative judgment.\n\nIt is one of the fundamental assumptions of dogmatic Logic that\nQualitative judgments such as, 'The rose is red,' or 'is not red,' can\ncontain _truth. Correct_ they may be, _i.e._ in the limited circle\nof perception, of finite conception and thought: that depends on the\ncontent, which likewise is finite, and, on its own merits, untrue.\nTruth, however, as opposed to correctness, depends solely on the form,\nviz. on the notion as it is put and the reality corresponding to it.\nBut truth of that stamp is not found in the Qualitative judgment.\n\nIn common life the terms _truth_ and _correctness_ are often treated\nas synonymous: we speak of the truth of a content, when we are only\nthinking of its correctness. Correctness, generally speaking, concerns\nonly the formal coincidence between our conception and its content,\nwhatever the constitution of this content may be. Truth, on the\ncontrary, lies in the coincidence of the object with itself, that is,\nwith its notion. That a person is sick, or that some one has committed\na theft, may certainly be correct. But the content is untrue. A sick\nbody is not in harmony with the notion of body, and there is a want\nof congruity between theft and the notion of human conduct. These\ninstances may show that an immediate judgment, in which an abstract\nquality is predicated of an immediately individual thing, however\ncorrect it may be, cannot contain truth. The subject and predicate of\nit do not stand to each other in the relation of reality and notion.\n\nWe may add that the untruth of the immediate judgment lies in the\nincongruity between its form and content. To say 'This rose is red,'\ninvolves (in virtue of the copula 'is') the coincidence of subject and\npredicate. The rose however is a concrete thing, and so is not red\nonly: it has also an odour, a specific form, and many other features\nnot implied in the predicate red. The predicate on its part is an\nabstract universal, and does not apply to the rose alone. There are\nother flowers and other objects which are red too. The subject and\npredicate in the immediate judgment touch, as it were, only in a single\npoint, but do not cover each other. The case is different with the\nnotional judgment. In pronouncing an action to be good, we frame a\nnotional judgment. Here, as we at once perceive, there is a closer and\na more intimate relation than in the immediate judgment. The predicate\nin the latter is some abstract quality which may or may not be applied\nto the subject. In the judgment of the notion the predicate is, as it\nwere, the soul of the subject, by which the subject, as the body of\nthis soul, is characterised through and through.\n\n173.] This negation of a particular quality, which is the first\nnegation, still leaves the connexion of the subject with the predicate\nsubsisting. The predicate is in that manner a sort of relative\nuniversal, of which a special phase only has been negatived. [To say,\nthat the rose is not red, implies that it is still coloured--in the\nfirst place with another colour; which however would be only one more\npositive judgment.] The individual however is not a universal. Hence\n(3) the judgment suffers disruption into one of two forms. It is either\n(a) the Identical judgment, an empty identical relation stating\nthat the individual is the individual; or it is (b) what is called the\nInfinite judgment, in which we are presented with the total\nincompatibility of subject and predicate.\n\nExamples of the latter are: 'The mind is no elephant:' 'A lion is\nno table;' propositions which are correct but absurd, exactly like\nthe identical propositions: 'A lion is a lion;' 'Mind is mind.'\nPropositions like these are undoubtedly the truth of the immediate, or,\nas it is called, Qualitative judgment. But they are not judgments at\nall, and can only occur in a subjective thought where even an untrue\nabstraction may hold its ground.--In their objective aspect, these\nlatter judgments express the nature of what is, or of sensible things,\nwhich, as they declare, suffer disruption into an empty identity on the\none hand, and on the other a fully-charged relation--only that this\nrelation is the qualitative antagonism of the things related, their\ntotal incongruity.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe negatively-infinite judgment, in which the subject has no relation\nwhatever to the predicate, gets its place in the Formal Logic solely as\na nonsensical curiosity. But the infinite judgment is not really a mere\ncasual form adopted by subjective thought. It exhibits the proximate\nresult of the dialectical process in the immediate judgments preceding\n(the positive and simply-negative), and distinctly displays their\nfinitude and untruth. Crime may be quoted as an objective instance of\nthe negatively-infinite judgment. The person committing a crime, such\nas a theft, does not, as in a suit about civil rights, merely deny\nthe particular right of another person to some one definite thing.\nHe denies the right of that person in general, and therefore he is\nnot merely forced to restore what he has stolen, but is punished in\naddition, because he has violated law as law, _i.e._ law in general.\nThe civil-law suit on the contrary is an instance of the negative\njudgment pure and simple where merely the particular law is violated,\nwhilst law in general is so far acknowledged. Such a dispute is\nprecisely paralleled by a negative judgment, like, 'This flower is not\nred:' by which we merely deny the particular colour of the flower, but\nnot its colour in general, which may be blue, yellow, or any other.\nSimilarly death, as a negatively-infinite judgment, is distinguished\nfrom disease as simply-negative. In disease, merely this or that\nfunction of life is checked or negatived: in death, as we ordinarily\nsay, body and soul part, _i.e._ subject and predicate utterly diverge.\n\n(\u00df) _Judgment of Reflection._\n\n174.] The individual put as individual (_i.e._ as reflected-into-self)\ninto the judgment, has a predicate, in comparison with which the\nsubject, as self-relating, continues to be still _an other_ thing.--In\nexistence the subject ceases to be immediately qualitative, it is in\ncorrelation, and inter-connexion with an other thing,--with an external\nworld. In this way the universality of the predicate comes to signify\nthis relativity--(_e.g._) useful, or dangerous; weight or acidity; or\nagain, instinct; are examples of such relative predicates.\n\nThe Judgment of Reflection is distinguished from the Qualitative\njudgment by the circumstance that its predicate is not an immediate\nor abstract quality, but of such a kind as to exhibit the subject\nas in relation to something else. When we say, _e.g._ 'This rose is\nred.' we regard the subject in its immediate individuality, and\nwithout reference to anything else. If, on the other hand, we frame\nthe judgment, 'This plant is medicinal,' we regard the subject, plant,\nas standing in connexion with something else (the sickness which it\ncures), by means of its predicate (its medicinality). The case is the\nsame with judgments like: This body is elastic: This instrument is\nuseful: This punishment has a deterrent influence. In every one of\nthese instances the predicate is some category of reflection. They all\nexhibit an advance beyond the immediate individuality of the subject,\nbut none of them goes so far as to indicate the adequate notion of it.\nIt is in this mode of judgment that ordinary _raisonnement_ luxuriates.\nThe greater the concreteness of the object in question, the more points\nof view does it offer to reflection; by which however its proper nature\nor notion is not exhausted.\n\n175.] (1) Firstly then the subject, the individual as individual (in\nthe Singular judgment), is a universal. But (2) secondly, in\nthis relation it is elevated above its singularity. This enlargement is\nexternal, due to subjective reflection, and at first is an indefinite\nnumber of particulars. (This is seen in the Particular judgment,\nwhich is obviously negative as well as positive: the individual is\ndivided in itself: partly it is self-related, partly related to\nsomething else.) (3) Thirdly, Some are the universal: particularity is\nthus enlarged to universality: or universality is modified through the\nindividuality of the subject, and appears as allness Community,\nthe ordinary universality of reflection.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe subject, receiving, as in the Singular judgment, a universal\npredicate, is carried out beyond its mere individual self. To say,\n'This plant is wholesome,' implies not only that this single plant is\nwholesome, but that some or several are so. We have thus the particular\njudgment (some plants are wholesome, some men are inventive, &c). By\nmeans of particularity the immediate individual comes to lose its\nindependence, and enters into an inter-connexion with something else.\nMan, as _this_ man, is not this single man alone: he stands beside\nother men and becomes one in the crowd, just by this means however he\nbelongs to his universal, and is consequently raised.--The particular\njudgment is as much negative as positive. If only some bodies are\nelastic, it is evident that the rest are not elastic.\n\nOn this fact again depends the advance to the third form of the\nReflective judgment, viz. the judgment of allness (all men are mortal,\nall metals conduct electricity). It is as 'all' that the universal\nis in the first instance generally encountered by reflection. The\nindividuals form for reflection the foundation, and it is only our\nsubjective action which collects and describes them as 'all.' So far\nthe universal has the aspect of an external fastening, that holds\ntogether a number of independent individuals, which have not the least\naffinity towards it. This semblance of indifference is however unreal:\nfor the universal is the ground and foundation, the root, and substance\nof the individual. If _e.g._ we take Caius, Titus, Sempronius, and\nthe other inhabitants of a town or country, the fact that all of them\nare men is not merely something which they have in common, but their\nuniversal or kind, without which these individuals would not be at all.\nThe case is very different with that superficial generality falsely\nso called, which really means only what attaches, or is common, to\nall the individuals. It has been remarked, for example, that men,\nin contradistinction from the lower animals, possess in common the\nappendage of ear-lobes. It is evident, however, that the absence of\nthese ear-lobes in one man or another would not affect the rest of\nhis being, character, or capacities: whereas it would be nonsense\nto suppose that Caius, without being a man, would still be brave,\nlearned, &c. The individual man is what he is in particular, only in so\nfar as he is before all things a man as man and in general. And that\ngenerality is not something external to, or something in addition to\nother abstract qualities, or to mere features discovered by reflection.\nIt is what permeates and includes in it everything particular.\n\n176.] The subject being thus likewise characterised as a universal,\nthere is an express identification of subject and predicate, by which\nat the same time the speciality of the judgment form is deprived of\nall importance. This unity of the content (the content being the\nuniversality which is identical with the negative reflection-in-self of\nthe subject) makes the connexion in judgment a necessary one.\n\nThe advance from the reflective judgment of allness to the judgment\nof necessity is found in our usual modes of thought, when we say that\nwhatever appertains to all, appertains to the species, and is therefore\nnecessary. To say all plants, or all men, is the same thing as to say\n_the_ plant, or _the_ man.\n\n(\u03b3) _Judgment of Necessity._\n\n177.] The Judgment of Necessity, _i.e._ of the identity of the content\nin its difference (1), contains, in the predicate, partly the substance\nor nature of the subject, the concrete universal, the _genus_; partly,\nseeing that this universal also contains the specific character as\nnegative, the predicate represents the exclusive essential character,\nthe _species._ This is the Categorical judgment.\n\n(2) Conformably to their substantiality, the two terms receive the\naspect of independent actuality. Their identity is then inward only;\nand thus the actuality of the one is at the same time not its own, but\nthe being of the other. This is the Hypothetical judgment.\n\n(3) If, in this self-surrender and self-alienation of the notion,\nits inner identity is at the same time explicitly put, the universal\nis the genus which is self-identical in its mutually-exclusive\nindividualities. This judgment, which has this universal for both its\nterms, the one time as a universal, the other time as the circle of\nits self-excluding particularisation in which the 'either--or' as much\nas the 'as well as' stands for the genus, is the Disjunctive\njudgment. Universality, at first as a genus, and now also as the\ncircuit of its species, is thus described and expressly put as a\ntotality.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe Categorical judgment (such as 'Gold is a metal,' 'The rose is a\nplant') is the un-mediated judgment of necessity, and finds within the\nsphere of Essence its parallel in the relation of substance. All things\nare a Categorical judgment. In other words, they have their substantial\nnature, forming their fixed and unchangeable substratum. It is only\nwhen things are studied from the point of view of their kind, and as\nwith necessity determined by the kind, that the judgment first begins\nto be real. It betrays a defective logical training to place upon the\nsame level judgments like 'gold is dear,' and judgments like 'gold\nis a metal.' That 'gold is dear' is a matter of external connexion\nbetween it and our wants or inclinations, the costs of obtaining it,\nand other circumstances. Gold remains the same as it was, though that\nexternal reference is altered or removed. Metalleity, on the contrary,\nconstitutes the substantial nature of gold, apart from which it, and\nall else that is in it, or can be predicated of it, would be unable to\nsubsist. The same is the case if we say, 'Caius is a man.' We express\nby that, that whatever else he may be, has worth and meaning, only when\nit corresponds to his substantial nature or manhood.\n\nBut even the Categorical judgment is to a certain extent defective. It\nfails to give due place to the function or element of particularity.\nThus 'gold is a metal,' it is true; but so are silver, copper, iron:\nand metalleity as such has no leanings to any of its particular\nspecies. In these circumstances we must advance from the Categorical to\nthe Hypothetical judgment, which may be expressed in the formula: If\n_A_ is, _B_ is. The present case exhibits the same advance as formerly\ntook place from the relation of substance to the relation of cause. In\nthe Hypothetical judgment the specific character of the content shows\nitself mediated and dependent on something else: and this is exactly\nthe relation of cause and effect. And if we were to give a general\ninterpretation to the Hypothetical judgment, we should say that it\nexpressly realises the universal in its particularising. This brings\nus to the third form of the Judgment of Necessity, the Disjunctive\njudgment. _A_ is either _B_ or _C_ or _D._ A work of poetic art is\neither epic or lyric or dramatic. Colour is either yellow or blue or\nred. The two terms in the Disjunctive judgment are identical. The genus\nis the sum total of the species, and the sum total of the species\nis the genus. This unity of the universal and the particular is the\nnotion: and it is the notion which, as we now see, forms the content of\nthe judgment.\n\n(\u03b4) _Judgment of the Notion._\n\n178.] The Judgment of the Notion has for its content the notion, the\ntotality in simple form, the universal with its complete speciality.\nThe subject is, (1) in the first place, an individual, which has\nfor its predicate the reflection of the particular existence on its\nuniversal; or the judgment states the agreement or disagreement of\nthese two aspects. That is, the predicate is such a term as good, true,\ncorrect. This is the Assertory judgment.\n\nJudgments, such as whether an object, action, &c. is good, bad, true,\nbeautiful, &c, are those to which even ordinary language first applies\nthe name of judgment. We should never ascribe judgment to a person who\nframed positive or negative judgments like, This rose is red, This\npicture is red, green, dusty, &c.\n\nThe Assertory judgment, although rejected by society as out of place\nwhen it claims authority on its own showing, has however been made the\nsingle and all-essential form of doctrine, even in philosophy, through\nthe influence of the principle of immediate knowledge and faith. In the\nso-called philosophic works which maintain this principle, we may read\nhundreds and hundreds of assertions about reason, knowledge, thought,\n&c. which, now that external authority counts for little, seek to\naccredit themselves by an endless restatement of the same thesis.\n\n179.] On the part of its at first un-mediated subject, the Assertory\njudgment does not contain the relation of particular with universal\nwhich is expressed in the predicate. This judgment is consequently\na mere subjective particularity, and is confronted by a contrary\nassertion with equal right, or rather want of right. It is therefore\nat once turned into (2) a Problematical judgment. But when we\nexplicitly attach the objective particularity to the subject and make\nits speciality the constitutive feature of its existence, the subject\n(3) then expresses the connexion of that objective particularity with\nits constitution, _i.e._ with its genus; and thus expresses what\nforms the content of the predicate (see \u00a7 178). [This (_the immediate\nindividuality_) house (_the genus,_) being so and so constituted\n(_particularity,_) is good or bad.] This is the Apodictic\njudgment. All things are a genus (_i.e._ have a meaning and purpose) in\nan _individual_ actuality of a _particular_ constitution. And they are\nfinite, because the particular in them may and also may not conform to\nthe universal.\n\n180.] In this manner subject and predicate are each the whole judgment.\nThe immediate constitution of the subject is at first exhibited as\nthe intermediating ground, where the individuality of the actual\nthing meets with its universality, and in this way as the ground of\nthe judgment. What has been really made explicit is the oneness of\nsubject and predicate, as the notion itself, filling up the empty 'is'\nof the copula. While its constituent elements are at the same time\ndistinguished as subject and predicate, the notion is put as their\nunity, as the connexion which serves to intermediate them: in short, as\nthe Syllogism.\n\n(c) _The Syllogism._\n\n181.] The Syllogism brings the notion and the judgment into one.\nIt is notion,--being the simple identity into which the distinctions of\nform in the judgment have retired. It is judgment,--because it is at\nthe same time set in reality, that is, put in the distinction of its\nterms. The Syllogism is the reasonable, and everything reasonable.\n\nEven the ordinary theories represent the Syllogism to be the form of\nreasonableness, but only a subjective form; and no inter-connexion\nwhatever is shown to exist between it and any other reasonable content,\nsuch as a reasonable principle, a reasonable action, idea, &c. The name\nof reason is much and often heard, and appealed to: but no one thinks\nof explaining its specific character, or saying what it is,--least of\nall that it has any connexion with Syllogism. But formal Syllogism\nreally presents what is reasonable in such a reasonless way that it\nhas nothing to do with any reasonable matter. But as the matter in\nquestion can only be rational in virtue of the same quality by which\nthought is reason, it can be made so by the form only: and that\nform is Syllogism. And what is a Syllogism but an explicit putting,\n_i.e._ realising of the notion, at first in form only, as stated\nabove? Accordingly the Syllogism is the essential ground of whatever\nis true: and at the present stage the definition of the Absolute is\nthat it is the Syllogism, or stating the principle in a proposition:\nEverything is a Syllogism. Everything is a notion, the existence of\nwhich is the differentiation of its members or functions, so that the\nuniversal nature of the Notion gives itself external reality by means\nof particularity, and thereby, and as a negative reflection-into-self,\nmakes itself an individual. Or, conversely: the actual thing is an\nindividual, which by means of particularity rises to universality and\nmakes itself identical with itself.--The actual is one: but it is also\nthe divergence from each other of the constituent elements of the\nnotion; and the Syllogism represents the orbit of intermediation of its\nelements, by which it realises its unity.\n\nThe Syllogism, like the notion and the judgment, is usually described\nas a form merely of our subjective thinking. The Syllogism, it is said,\nis the process of proving the judgment. And certainly the judgment does\nin every case refer us to the Syllogism. The step from the one to the\nother however is not brought about by our subjective action, but by the\njudgment itself which puts itself as Syllogism, and in the conclusion\nreturns to the unity of the notion. The precise point by which we\npass to the Syllogism is found in the Apodictic judgment. In it we\nhave an individual which by means of its qualities connects itself\nwith its universal or notion. Here we see the particular becoming the\nmediating mean between the individual and the universal. This gives\nthe fundamental form of the Syllogism, the gradual specification of\nwhich, formally considered, consists in the fact that universal and\nindividual also occupy this place of mean. This again paves the way for\nthe passage from subjectivity to objectivity.\n\n182.] In the 'immediate' Syllogism the several aspects of the notion\nconfront one another abstractly, and stand in an external relation\nonly. We have first the two extremes, which are Individuality and\nUniversality; and then the notion, as the mean for locking the two\ntogether, is in like manner only abstract Particularity. In this way\nthe extremes are put as independent and without affinity either towards\none another or towards their mean. Such a Syllogism contains reason,\nbut in utter notionlessness,--the formal Syllogism of Understanding. In\nit the subject is coupled with an _other_ character; or the universal\nby this mediation subsumes a subject external to it. In the rational\nSyllogism, on the contrary, the subject is by means of the mediation\ncoupled with itself. In this manner it first comes to be a subject: or,\nin the subject we have the first germ of the rational Syllogism.\n\nIn the following examination, the Syllogism of Understanding, according\nto the interpretation usually put upon it, is expressed in its\nsubjective shape; the shape which it has when _we_ are said to make\nsuch Syllogisms. And it really is only a subjective syllogising. Such\nSyllogism however has also an objective meaning; it expresses only the\nfinitude of things, but does so in the specific mode which the form\nhas here reached. In the case of finite things their subjectivity,\nbeing only thinghood, is separable from their properties or their\nparticularity, but also separable from their universality: not only\nwhen the universality is the bare quality of the thing and its external\ninter-connexion with other things, but also when it is its genus and\nnotion.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nOn the above-mentioned theory of syllogism, as the rational form _par\nexcellence,_ reason has been defined as the faculty of syllogising,\nwhilst understanding is defined as the faculty of forming notions. We\nmight object to the conception on which this depends, and according to\nwhich the mind is merely a sum of forces or faculties existing side\nby side. But apart from that objection, we may observe in regard to\nthe parallelism of understanding with the notion, as well as of reason\nwith syllogism, that the notion is as little a mere category of the\nunderstanding as the syllogism is without qualification definable\nas rational. For, in the first place, what the Formal Logic usually\nexamines in its theory of syllogism, is really nothing but the mere\nsyllogism of understanding, which has no claim to the honour of being\nmade a form of rationality, still less to be held as the embodiment of\nall reason. The notion, in the second place, so far from being a form\nof understanding, owes its degradation to such a place entirely to\nthe influence of that abstract mode of thought. And it is not unusual\nto draw such a distinction between a notion of understanding and a\nnotion of reason. The distinction however does not mean that notions\nare of two kinds. It means that our own action often stops short at\nthe mere negative and abstract form of the notion, when we might also\nhave proceeded to apprehend the notion in its true nature, as at once\npositive and concrete. It is _e.g._ the mere understanding, which\nthinks liberty to be the abstract contrary of necessity, whereas the\nadequate rational notion of liberty requires the element of necessity\nto be merged in it. Similarly the definition of God, given by what is\ncalled Deism, is merely the mode in which the understanding thinks God:\nwhereas Christianity, to which He is known as the Trinity, contains the\nrational notion of God.\n\n(\u03b1) _Qualitative Syllogism._\n\n183.] The first syllogism is a syllogism of definite being,--a\nQualitative Syllogism, as stated in the last paragraph. Its form (1) is\nI--P--U: _i.e._ a subject as Individual is coupled (concluded) with a\nUniversal character by means of a (Particular) quality.\n\nOf course the subject (_terminus minor_) has other characteristics\nbesides individuality, just as the other extreme (the predicate of the\nconclusion, or _terminus major_) has other characteristics than mere\nuniversality. But here the interest turns only on the characteristics\nthrough which these terms make a syllogism.\n\nThe syllogism of existence is a syllogism of understanding merely, at\nleast in so far as it leaves the individual, the particular, and the\nuniversal to confront each other quite abstractly. In this syllogism\nthe notion is at the very height of self-estrangement. We have in it\nan immediately individual thing as subject: next some one particular\naspect or property attaching to this subject is selected, and by means\nof this property the individual turns out to be a universal. Thus we\nmay say, This rose is red: Red is a colour: Therefore, this rose\nis a coloured object. It is this aspect of the syllogism which the\ncommon logics mainly treat of. There was a time when the syllogism was\nregarded as an absolute rule for all cognition, and when a scientific\nstatement was not held to be valid until it had been shown to follow\nfrom a process of syllogism. At present, on the contrary, the different\nforms of the syllogism are met nowhere save in the manuals of Logic;\nand an acquaintance with them is considered a piece of mere pedantry,\nof no further use either in practical life or in science. It would\nindeed be both useless and pedantic to parade the whole machinery of\nthe formal syllogism on every occasion. And yet the several forms of\nsyllogism make themselves constantly felt in our cognition. If any one,\nwhen awaking on a winter morning, hears the creaking of the carriages\non the street, and is thus led to conclude that it has frozen hard in\nthe night, he has gone through a syllogistic operation:--an operation\nwhich is every day repeated under the greatest variety of conditions.\nThe interest, therefore, ought at least not to be less in becoming\nexpressly conscious of this daily action of our thinking selves, than\nconfessedly belongs to the study of the functions of organic life, such\nas the processes of digestion, assimilation, respiration, or even the\nprocesses and structures of the nature around us. We do not, however,\nfor a moment deny that a study of Logic is no more necessary to teach\nus how to draw correct conclusions, than a previous study of anatomy\nand physiology is required in order to digest or breathe.\n\nAristotle was the first to observe and describe the different forms,\nor, as they are called, figures of syllogism, in their subjective\nmeaning: and he performed his work so exactly and surely, that no\nessential addition has ever been required. But while sensible of the\nvalue of what he has thus done, we must not forget that the forms of\nthe syllogism of understanding, and of finite thought altogether,\nare not what Aristotle has made use of in his properly philosophical\ninvestigations. (See \u00a7 189.)\n\n184.] This syllogism is completely contingent (\u03b1) in the matter of its\nterms. The Middle Term, being an abstract particularity, is nothing\nbut any quality whatever of the subject: but the subject, being\nimmediate and thus empirically concrete, has several others, and could\ntherefore be coupled with exactly as many other universalities as it\npossesses single qualities. Similarly a single particularity may have\nvarious characters in itself, so that the same _medius terminus_ would\nserve to connect the subject with several different universals.\n\nIt is more a caprice of fashion, than a sense of its incorrectness,\nwhich has led to the disuse of ceremonious syllogising. This and the\nfollowing section indicate the uselessness of such syllogising for the\nends of truth.\n\nThe point of view indicated in the paragraph shows how this style of\nsyllogism can 'demonstrate' (as the phrase goes) the most diverse\nconclusions. All that is requisite is to find a _medius terminus_ from\nwhich the transition can be made to the proposition sought. Another\n_medius terminus_ would enable us to demonstrate something else, and\neven the contrary of the last. And the more concrete an object is, the\nmore aspects it has, which may become such middle terms. To determine\nwhich of these aspects is more essential than another, again, requires\na further syllogism of this kind, which fixing on the single quality\ncan with equal ease discover in it some aspect or consideration by\nwhich it can make good its claims to be considered necessary and\nimportant.\n\nLittle as we usually think on the Syllogism of Understanding in the\ndaily business of life, it never ceases to play its part there. In\na civil suit, for instance, it is the duty of the advocate to give\ndue force to the legal titles which make in favour of his client. In\nlogical language, such a legal title is nothing but a middle term.\nDiplomatic transactions afford another illustration of the same, when,\nfor instance, different powers lay claim to one and the same territory.\nIn such a case the laws of inheritance, the geographical position of\nthe country, the descent and the language of its inhabitants, or any\nother ground, may be emphasised as a _medius terminus._\n\n185.] (\u00df) This syllogism, if it is contingent in point of its terms,\nis no less contingent in virtue of the form of relation which is\nfound in it. In the syllogism, according to its notion, truth lies in\nconnecting two distinct things by a Middle Term in which they are one.\nBut connexions of the extremes with the Middle Term (the so-called\n_premisses,_ the major and the minor premiss) are in the case of this\nsyllogism much more decidedly _immediate_ connexions. In other words,\nthey have not a proper Middle Term.\n\nThis contradiction in the syllogism exhibits a new case of the infinite\nprogression. Each of the premisses evidently calls for a fresh\nsyllogism to demonstrate it: and as the new syllogism has two immediate\npremisses, like its predecessor, the demand for proof is doubled at\nevery step, and repeated without end.\n\n186.] On account of its importance for experience, there has been\nhere noted a defect in the syllogism, to which in this form absolute\ncorrectness had been ascribed. This defect however must lose itself in\nthe further specification of the syllogism. For we are now within the\nsphere of the notion; and here therefore, as well as in the judgment,\nthe opposite character is not merely present potentially, but is\nexplicit. To work out the gradual specification of the syllogism,\ntherefore, there need only be admitted and accepted what is at each\nstep realised by the syllogism itself.\n\nThrough the immediate syllogism I--P--U, the Individual is mediated\n(through a Particular) with the Universal, and in this conclusion put\nas a universal. It follows that the individual subject, becoming itself\na universal, serves to unite the two extremes, and to form their ground\nof intermediation. This gives the second figure of the syllogism, (2)\nU--I--P. It expresses the truth of the first; it shows in other words\nthat the intermediation has taken place in the individual, and is thus\nsomething contingent.\n\n187.] The universal, which in the first conclusion was specified\nthrough individuality, passes over into the second figure and there\nnow occupies the place that belonged to the immediate subject. In the\nsecond figure it is concluded with the particular. By this conclusion\ntherefore the universal is explicitly put as particular--and is now\nmade to mediate between the two extremes, the places of which are\noccupied by the two others (the particular and the individual). This is\nthe third figure of the syllogism: (3) P--U--I.\n\nWhat are called the Figures of the syllogism (being three in\nnumber, for the fourth is a superfluous and even absurd addition of\nthe Moderns to the three known to Aristotle) are in the usual mode of\ntreatment put side by side, without the slightest thought of showing\ntheir necessity, and still less of pointing out their import and value.\nNo wonder then that the figures have been in later times treated as an\nempty piece of formalism. They have however a very real significance,\nderived from the necessity for every function or characteristic\nelement of the notion to become the whole itself, and to stand as\nmediating ground.--But to find out what 'moods' of the propositions\n(such as whether they may be universals, or negatives) are needed\nto enable us to draw a correct conclusion in the different figures,\nis a mechanical inquiry, which its purely mechanical nature and its\nintrinsic meaninglessness have very properly consigned to oblivion.\nAnd Aristotle would have been the last person to give any countenance\nto those who wish to attach importance to such inquiries or to the\nsyllogism of understanding in general. It is true that he described\nthese, as well as numerous other forms of mind and nature, and that\nhe examined and expounded their specialities. But in his metaphysical\ntheories, as well as his theories of nature and mind, he was very\nfar from taking as basis, or criterion, the syllogistic forms of the\n'understanding.' Indeed it might be maintained that not one of these\ntheories would ever have come into existence, or been allowed to exist,\nif it had been compelled to submit to the laws of understanding. With\nall the descriptiveness and analytic faculty which Aristotle after his\nfashion is substantially strong in, his ruling principle is always the\nspeculative notion; and that syllogistic of 'understanding' to which he\nfirst gave such a definite expression is never allowed to intrude in\nthe higher domain of philosophy.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn their objective sense, the three figures of the syllogism declare\nthat everything rational is manifested as a triple syllogism; that\nis to say, each one of the members takes in turn the place of the\nextremes, as well as of the mean which reconciles them. Such, for\nexample, is the case with the three branches of philosophy; the Logical\nIdea, Nature, and Mind. As we first see them, Nature is the middle\nterm which links the others together. Nature, the totality immediately\nbefore us, unfolds itself into the two extremes of the Logical Idea\nand Mind. But Mind is Mind only when it is mediated through nature.\nThen, in the second place, Mind, which we know as the principle of\nindividuality, or as the actualising principle, is the mean; and Nature\nand the Logical Idea are the extremes. It is Mind which cognises the\nLogical Idea in Nature and which thus raises Nature to its essence.\nIn the third place again the Logical Idea itself becomes the mean: it\nis the absolute substance both of mind and of nature, the universal\nand all-pervading principle. These are the members of the Absolute\nSyllogism.\n\n188.] In the round by which each constituent function assumes\nsuccessively the place of mean and of the two extremes, their specific\ndifference from each other has been superseded. In this form, where\nthere is no distinction between its constituent elements, the syllogism\nat first has for its connective link equality, or the external identity\nof understanding. This is the Quantitative or Mathematical Syllogism:\nif two things are equal to a third, they are equal to one another.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nEverybody knows that this Quantitative syllogism appears as a\nmathematical axiom, which like other axioms is said to be a principle\nthat does not admit of proof, and which indeed being self-evident does\nnot require such proof. These mathematical axioms however are really\nnothing but logical propositions, which, so far as they enunciate\ndefinite and particular thoughts, are deducible from the universal and\nself-characterising thought. To deduce them, is to give their proof.\nThat is true of the Quantitative syllogism, to which mathematics\ngives the rank of an axiom. It is really the proximate result of\nthe qualitative or immediate syllogism. Finally, the Quantitative\nsyllogism is the syllogism in utter formlessness. The difference\nbetween the terms which is required by the notion is suspended.\nExtraneous circumstances alone can decide what propositions are to be\npremisses here: and therefore in applying this syllogism we make a\npre-supposition of what has been elsewhere proved and established.\n\n189.] Two results follow as to the form. In the first place, each\nconstituent element has taken the place and performed the function of\nthe mean and therefore of the whole, thus implicitly losing its partial\nand abstract character (\u00a7 182 and \u00a7 184); secondly, the mediation has\nbeen completed (\u00a7 185), though the completion too is only implicit,\nthat is, only as a circle of mediations which in turn pre-suppose each\nother. In the first figure I--P--U the two premisses I is P and P is\nU are yet without a mediation. The former premiss is mediated in the\nthird, the latter in the second figure. But each of these two figures,\nagain, for the mediation of its premisses pre-supposes the two others.\n\nIn consequence of this, the mediating unity of the notion must be put\nno longer as an abstract particularity, but as a developed unity of the\nindividual and universal--and in the first place a reflected unity of\nthese elements. That is to say, the individuality gets at the same time\nthe character of universality. A mean of this kind gives the Syllogism\nof Reflection.\n\n(\u03b2) _Syllogism of Reflection._\n\n190.] If the mean, in the first place, be not only an abstract\nparticular character of the subject, but at the same time all the\nindividual concrete subjects which possess that character, but possess\nit only along with others, (1) we have the Syllogism of Allness.\nThe major premiss, however, which has for its subject the particular\ncharacter, the _terminus medius,_ as allness, pre-supposes the very\nconclusion which ought rather to have pre-supposed it. It rests\ntherefore (2) on an Induction, in which the mean is given by the\ncomplete list of individuals as such,--a, b, c, d, &c. On account of\nthe disparity, however, between universality and an immediate and\nempirical individuality, the list can never be complete. Induction\ntherefore rests upon (3) Analogy. The middle term of Analogy\nis an individual, which however is understood as equivalent to its\nessential universality, its genus, or essential character.--The first\nsyllogism for its intermediation turns us over to the second, and the\nsecond turns us over to the third. But the third no less demands an\nintrinsically determinate Universality, or an individuality as type of\nthe genus, after the round of the forms of external connexion between\nindividuality and universality has been run through in the figures of\nthe Reflective Syllogism.\n\nBy the Syllogism of Allness the defect in the first form of the\nSyllogism of Understanding, noted in \u00a7 184, is remedied, but only to\ngive rise to a new defect. This defect is that the major premiss itself\npre-supposes what really ought to be the conclusion, and pre-supposes\nit as what is thus an 'immediate' proposition. All men are mortal,\ntherefore Caius is mortal: All metals conduct electricity, therefore\n_e.g._ copper does so. In order to enunciate these major premisses,\nwhich when they say 'all' mean the 'immediate' individuals and are\nproperly intended to be empirical propositions, it is requisite that\nthe propositions about the individual man Caius, or the individual\nmetal copper, should previously have been ascertained to be correct.\nEverybody feels not merely the pedantry, but the unmeaning formalism of\nsuch syllogisms as: All men are mortal, Caius is a man, therefore Caius\nis mortal.\n\nThe syllogism of Allness hands us over to the syllogism of Induction,\nin which the individuals form the coupling mean. 'All metals conduct\nelectricity,' is an empirical proposition derived from experiments\nmade with each of the individual metals. We thus get the syllogism of\nInduction I in the following shape P--I--U. I . . .\n\nGold is a metal: silver is a metal: so is copper, lead, &c. This is\nthe major premiss. Then comes the minor premiss: All these bodies\nconduct electricity; and hence results the conclusion, that all metals\nconduct electricity. The point which brings about a combination here\nis individuality in the shape of allness. But this syllogism once\nmore hands us over to another syllogism. Its mean is constituted by\nthe complete list of the individuals. That pre-supposes that over\na certain region observation and experience are completed. But the\nthings in question here are individuals; and so again we are landed\nin the progression _ad infinitum_ (i, i, i, &c.). In other words, in\nno Induction can we ever exhaust the individuals. The 'all metals,'\n'all plants,' of our statements, mean only all the metals, all the\nplants, which we have hitherto become acquainted with. Every Induction\nis consequently imperfect. One and the other observation, many it may\nbe, have been made: but all the cases, all the individuals, have not\nbeen observed. By this defect of Induction we are led on to Analogy.\nIn the syllogism of Analogy we conclude from the fact that some things\nof a certain kind possess a certain quality, that the same quality is\npossessed by other things of the same kind. It would be a syllogism of\nAnalogy, for example, if we said: In all planets hitherto discovered\nthis has been found to be the law of motion, consequently a newly\ndiscovered planet will probably move according to the same law. In the\nexperiential sciences Analogy deservedly occupies a high place, and\nhas led to results of the highest importance. Analogy is the instinct\nof reason, creating an anticipation that this or that characteristic,\nwhich experience has discovered, has its root in the inner nature or\nkind of an object, and arguing on the faith of that anticipation.\nAnalogy it should be added may be superficial or it may be thorough.\nIt would certainly be a very bad analogy to argue that since the man\nCaius is a scholar, and Titus also is a man, Titus will probably be a\nscholar too: and it would be bad because a man's learning is not an\nunconditional consequence of his manhood. Superficial analogies of\nthis kind however are very frequently met with. It is often argued,\nfor example: The earth is a celestial body, so is the moon, and it\nis therefore in all probability inhabited as well as the earth. The\nanalogy is not one whit better than that previously mentioned. That\nthe earth is inhabited does not depend on its being a celestial body,\nbut in other conditions, such as the presence of an atmosphere, and of\nwater in connexion with the atmosphere, &c.: and these are precisely\nthe conditions which the moon, so far as we know, does not possess.\nWhat has in modern times been called the Philosophy of Nature consists\nprincipally in a frivolous play with empty and external analogies,\nwhich, however, claim to be considered profound results. The natural\nconsequence has been to discredit the philosophical study of nature.\n\n(\u03b3) _Syllogism of Necessity._\n\n191.] The Syllogism of Necessity, if we look to its purely abstract\ncharacteristics or terms, has for its mean the Universal in the same\nway as the Syllogism of Reflection has the Individual, the latter\nbeing in the second, and the former in the third figure (\u00a7 187).\nThe Universal is expressly put as in its very nature intrinsically\ndeterminate. In the first place (1) the Particular, meaning by the\nparticular the specific genus or species, is the term for mediating\nthe extremes--as is done in the Categorical syllogism. (2) The\nsame office is performed by the Individual, taking the individual as\nimmediate being, so that it is as much mediating as mediated:--as\nhappens in the Hypothetical syllogism. (3) We have also the\nmediating Universal explicitly put as a totality of its particular\nmembers, and as a single particular, or exclusive individuality:--which\nhappens in the Disjunctive syllogism. It is one and the same\nuniversal which is in these terms of the Disjunctive syllogism; they\nare only different forms for expressing it.\n\n192.] The syllogism has been taken conformably to the distinctions\nwhich it contains; and the general result of the course of their\nevolution has been to show that these differences work out their own\nabolition and destroy the notion's outwardness to its own self. And,\nas we see, in the first place, (1) each of the dynamic elements has\nproved itself the systematic whole of these elements, in short a whole\nsyllogism,--they are consequently implicitly identical. In the second\nplace, (2) the negation of their distinctions and of the mediation of\none through another constitutes independency; so that it is one and\nthe same universal which is in these forms, and which is in this way\nalso explicitly put as their identity. In this ideality of its dynamic\nelements, the syllogistic process may be described as essentially\ninvolving the negation of the characters through which its course runs,\nas being a mediative process through the suspension of mediation,--as\ncoupling the subject not with another, but with a suspended other, in\none word, with itself.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn the common logic, the doctrine of syllogism is supposed to conclude\nthe first part, or what is called the 'elementary' theory. It is\nfollowed by the second part, the doctrine of Method, which proposes\nto show how a body of scientific knowledge is created by applying to\nexisting objects the forms of thought discussed in the elementary part.\nWhence these objects originate, and what the thought of objectivity\ngenerally speaking implies, are questions to which the Logic of\nUnderstanding vouchsafes no further answer. It believes thought to\nbe a mere subjective and formal activity, and the objective fact,\nwhich confronts thought, to have a separate and permanent being. But\nthis dualism is a half-truth: and there is a want of intelligence in\nthe procedure which at once accepts, without inquiring into their\norigin, the categories of subjectivity and objectivity. Both of them,\nsubjectivity as well as objectivity, are certainly thoughts--even\nspecific thoughts: which must show themselves founded on the universal\nand self-determining thought. This has here been done--at least for\nsubjectivity. We have recognised it, or the notion subjective (which\nincludes the notion proper, the judgment, and the syllogism) as the\ndialectical result of the first two main stages of the Logical Idea,\nBeing and Essence. To say that the notion is subjective and subjective\nonly, is so far quite correct: for the notion certainly is subjectivity\nitself. Not less subjective than the notion are also the judgment and\nsyllogism: and these forms, together with the so-called Laws of Thought\n(the Laws of Identity, Difference, and Sufficient Ground), make up the\ncontents of what is called the 'Elements' in the common logic. But we\nmay go a step further. This subjectivity, with its functions of notion,\njudgment, and syllogism, is not like a set of empty compartments which\nhas to get filled from without by separately-existing objects. It would\nbe truer to say that it is subjectivity itself which, as dialectical,\nbreaks through its own barriers and opens out into objectivity by means\nof the syllogism.\n\n193.] This 'realisation' of the notion,--a realisation in which the\nuniversal is this one totality withdrawn back into itself (of which\nthe different members are no less the whole, and) which has given\nitself a character of 'immediate' unity by merging the mediation:--this\nrealisation of the notion is the Object.\n\nI his transition from the Subject, the notion in general, and\nespecially the syllogism, to the Object, may, at the first glance,\nappear strange, particularly if we look only at the Syllogism\nof Understanding, and suppose syllogising to be only an act of\nconsciousness. But that strangeness imposes on us no obligation to seek\nto make the transition plausible to the image-loving conception. The\nonly question which can be considered is, whether our usual conception\nof what is called an 'object' approximately corresponds to the object\nas here described. By 'object' is commonly understood not an abstract\nbeing, or an existing thing merely, or any sort of actuality, but\nsomething independent, concrete, and self-complete, this completeness\nbeing the totality of the notion. That the object (_Objekt_) is also\nan object to us (_Gegenstand_) and is external to something else,\nwill be more precisely seen, when it puts itself in contrast with\nthe subjective. At present, as that into which the notion has passed\nfrom its mediation, it is only immediate object and nothing more,\njust as the notion is not describable as subjective, previous to the\nsubsequent contrast with objectivity.\n\nFurther, the Object in general is the one total, in itself still\nunspecified, the Objective World as a whole, God, the Absolute Object.\nThe object, however, has also difference attaching to it: it falls\ninto pieces, indefinite in their multiplicity (making an objective\nworld); and each of these individualised parts is also an object, an\nintrinsically concrete, complete, and independent existence.\n\nObjectivity has been compared with being, existence, and actuality;\nand so too the transition to existence and actuality (not to being,\nfor _it_ is the primary and quite abstract immediate) maybe compared\nwith the transition to objectivity. The ground from which existence\nproceeds, and the reflective correlation which is merged in actuality,\nare nothing but the as yet imperfectly realised notion. They are only\nabstract aspects of it,--the ground being its merely essence-bred\nunity, and the correlation only the connexion of real sides which are\nsupposed to have only self-reflected being. The notion is the unity of\nthe two; and the object is not a merely essence-like, but inherently\nuniversal unity, not only containing real distinctions, but containing\nthem as totalities in itself.\n\nIt is evident that in all these transitions there is a further purpose\nthan merely to show the indissoluble connexion between the notion or\nthought and being. It has been more than once remarked that being is\nnothing more than simple self-relation, and this meagre category is\ncertainly implied in the notion, or even in thought. But the meaning\nof these transitions is not to accept characteristics or categories,\nas only implied;--a fault which mars even the Ontological argument for\nGod's existence, when it is stated that being is one among realities.\nWhat such a transition does, is to take the notion, as it ought to be\nprimarily characterised _per se_ as a notion, with which this remote\nabstraction of being, or eve of objectivity, has as yet nothing to do,\nand looking at its specific character as a notional character alone, to\nsee when and whether it passes over into a form which is different from\nthe character as it belongs to the notion and appears in it.\n\nIf the Object, the product of this transition, be brought into relation\nwith the notion, which, so far as its special form is concerned, has\nvanished in it, we may give a correct expression to the result, by\nsaying that notion or, if it be preferred, subjectivity and object are\n_implicitly_ the same. But it is equally correct to say that they are\ndifferent. In short, the two modes of expression are equally correct\nand incorrect. The true state of the case can be presented in no\nexpressions of this kind. The 'implicit' is an abstraction, still more\npartial and inadequate than the notion itself, of which the inadequacy\nis upon the whole suspended, by suspending itself to the object with\nits opposite inadequacy. Hence that implicitness also must, by its\nnegation, give itself the character of explicitness. As in every case,\nspeculative identity is not the above-mentioned triviality of an\n_implicit_ identity of subject and object. This has been said often\nenough. Yet it could not be too often repeated, if the intention were\nreally to put an end to the stale and purely malicious misconception in\nregard to this identity:--of which however there can be no reasonable\nexpectation.\n\nLooking at that unity in a quite general way, and raising no objection\nto the one-sided form of its implicitness, we find it as the well-known\npre-supposition of the ontological proof for the existence of God.\nThere, it appears as supreme perfection. Anselm, in whom the notable\nsuggestion of this proof first occurs, no doubt originally restricted\nhimself to the question whether a certain content was in our thinking\nonly. His words are briefly these: '_Certe id quo majus cogitari\nnequit, non potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim vel in solo\nintellectu est, potest cogitari esse_ et in re: _quod majus est.\nSi ergo id quo majus cogitari non potest, est in solo intellectu; id\nipsum quo majus cogitari non potest, est quo majus cogitari potest.\nSed certe hoc esse non potest._' (Certainly that, than which nothing\ngreater can be thought, cannot be in the intellect alone. For even\nif it is in the intellect alone, it can also be thought to exist in\nfact: and that is greater. If then that, than which nothing greater\ncan be thought, is in the intellect alone; then the very thing, which\nis greater than anything which can be thought, can be exceeded in\nthought. But certainly this is impossible.) The same unity received\na more objective expression in Descartes, Spinoza and others: while\nthe theory of immediate certitude or faith presents it, on the\ncontrary, in somewhat the same subjective aspect as Anselm. These\nIntuitionalists hold that _in our consciousness_ the attribute of being\nis indissolubly associated with the conception of God. The theory of\nfaith brings even the conception of external finite things under the\nsame inseparable nexus between the consciousness and the being of\nthem, on the ground that _perception_ presents them conjoined with the\nattribute of existence: and in so saying, it is no doubt correct. It\nwould be utterly absurd, however, to suppose that the association in\nconsciousness between existence and our conception of finite things\nis of the same description as the association between existence and\nthe conception of God. To do so would be to forget that finite things\nare changeable and transient, _i.e._ that existence is associated\nwith them for a season, but that the association is neither eternal\nnor inseparable. Speaking in the phraseology of the categories before\nus, we may say that, to call a thing finite, means that its objective\nexistence is not in harmony with the thought of it, with its universal\ncalling, its kind and its end. Anselm, consequently, neglecting any\nsuch conjunction as occurs in finite things, has with good reason\npronounced that only to be the Perfect which exists not merely in a\nsubjective, but also in an objective mode. It does no good to put\non airs against the Ontological proof, as it is called, and against\nAnselm thus denning the Perfect. The argument is one latent in every\nunsophisticated mind, and it recurs in every philosophy, even against\nits wish and without its knowledge--as may be seen in the theory of\nimmediate belief.\n\nThe real fault in the argumentation of Anselm is one which is\nchargeable on Descartes and Spinoza, as well as on the theory of\nimmediate knowledge. It is this. This unity which is enunciated as the\nsupreme perfection or, it may be, subjectively, as the true knowledge,\nis pre-supposed, _i.e._ it is assumed only as potential. This identity,\nabstract as it thus appears, between the two categories may be at\nonce met and opposed by their diversity; and this was the very answer\ngiven to Anselm long ago. In short, the conception and existence of\nthe finite is set in antagonism to the infinite; for, as previously\nremarked, the finite possesses objectivity of such a kind as is at\nonce incongruous with and different from the end or aim, its essence\nand notion. Or, the finite is such a conception and in such a way\nsubjective, that it does not involve existence. This objection and this\nantithesis are got over, only by showing the finite to be untrue and\nthese categories in their separation to be inadequate and null. Their\nidentity is thus seen to be one into which they spontaneously pass\nover, and in which they are reconciled.\n\nB.--THE OBJECT.\n\n194.] The Object is immediate being, because insensible to difference,\nwhich in it has suspended itself. It is, further, a totality in itself,\nwhilst at the same time (as this identity is only the _implicit_\nidentity of its dynamic elements) it is equally indifferent to its\nimmediate unity. It thus breaks up into distinct parts, each of which\nis itself the totality. Hence the object is the absolute contradiction\nbetween a complete independence of the multiplicity, and the equally\ncomplete non-independence of the different pieces.\n\nThe definition, which states that the Absolute is the Object, is most\ndefinitely implied in the Leibnizian Monad. The Monads are each an\nobject, but an object implicitly 'representative,' indeed the total\nrepresentation of the world. In the simple unity of the Monad, all\ndifference is merely ideal, not independent or real. Nothing from\nwithout comes into the monad: It is the whole notion in itself, only\ndistinguished by its own greater or less development. None the less,\nthis simple totality parts into the absolute multeity of differences,\neach becoming an independent monad. In the monad of monads, and the\nPre-established Harmony of their inward developments, these substances\nare in like manner again reduced to 'ideality' and unsubstantiality.\nThe philosophy of Leibnitz, therefore, represents contradiction in its\ncomplete development.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nAs Fichte in modern times has especially and with justice insisted,\nthe theory which regards the Absolute or God as the Object and there\nstops, expresses the point of view taken by superstition and slavish\nfear. No doubt God is the Object, and, indeed, the Object out and\nout, confronted with which our particular or subjective opinions and\ndesires have no truth and no validity. As absolute object however, God\ndoes not therefore take up the position of a dark and hostile power\nover against subjectivity. He rather involves it as a vital element in\nHimself. Such also is the meaning of the Christian doctrine, according\nto which God has willed that all men should be saved and all attain\nblessedness. The salvation and the blessedness of men are attained when\nthey come to feel themselves at one with God, so that God, on the other\nhand, ceases to be for them mere object, and, in that way, an object\nof fear and terror, as was especially the case with the religious\nconsciousness of the Romans. But God in the Christian religion is\nalso known as Love, because in His Son, who is one with Him, He has\nrevealed Himself to men as a man amongst men, and thereby redeemed\nthem. All which is only another way of saying that the antithesis of\nsubjective and objective is implicitly overcome, and that it is our\naffair to participate in this redemption by laying aside our immediate\nsubjectivity (putting off the old Adam), and learning to know God as\nour true and essential self.\n\nJust as religion and religious worship consist in overcoming the\nantithesis of subjectivity and objectivity, so science too and\nphilosophy have no other task than to overcome this antithesis by the\nmedium of thought. The aim of knowledge is to divest the objective\nworld that stands opposed to us of its strangeness, and, as the phrase\nis, to find ourselves at home in it: which means no more than to trace\nthe objective world back to the notion,--to our innermost self. We\nmay learn from the present discussion the mistake of regarding the\nantithesis of subjectivity and objectivity as an abstract and permanent\none. The two are wholly dialectical. The notion is at first only\nsubjective: but without the assistance of any foreign material or stuff\nit proceeds, in obedience to its own action, to objectify itself. So,\ntoo, the object is not rigid and processless. Its process is to show\nitself as what is at the same time subjective, and thus form the step\nonwards to the idea. Any one who, from want of familiarity with the\ncategories of subjectivity and objectivity, seeks to retain them in\ntheir abstraction, will find that the isolated categories slip through\nhis fingers before he is aware, and that he says the exact contrary of\nwhat he wanted to say.\n\n(2) Objectivity contains the three forms of Mechanism, Chemism,\nand Teleology. The object of mechanical type is the immediate and\nundifferentiated object. No doubt it contains difference, but the\ndifferent pieces stand, as it were, without affinity to each other,\nand their connexion is only extraneous. In chemism, on the contrary,\nthe object exhibits an essential tendency to differentiation, in such\na way that the objects are what they are only by their relation to\neach other: this tendency to difference constitutes their quality.\nThe third type of objectivity, the teleological relation, is the\nunity of mechanism and chemism. Design, like the mechanical object,\nis a self-contained totality, enriched however by the principle of\ndifferentiation which came to the fore in chemism, and thus referring\nitself to the object that stands over against it. Finally, it is the\nrealisation of design which forms the transition to the Idea.\n\n(a) _Mechanism._\n\n196.] The object (1) in its immediacy is the notion only potentially;\nthe notion as subjective is primarily outside it; and all its\nspecific character is imposed from without. As a unity of differents,\ntherefore, it is a composite, an aggregate; and its capacity of\nacting on anything else continues to be an external relation. This is\nFormal Mechanism.--Notwithstanding, and in this connexion and\nnon-independence, the objects remain independent and offer resistance,\nexternal to each other.\n\nPressure and impact are examples of mechanical relations. Our knowledge\nis said to be mechanical or by rote, when the words have no meaning\nfor us, but continue external to sense, conception, thought; and\nwhen, being similarly external to each other, they form a meaningless\nsequence. Conduct, piety, &c. are in the same way mechanical, when a\nman's behaviour is settled for him by ceremonial laws, by a spiritual\nadviser, &c.; in short, when his own mind and will are not in his\nactions, which in this way are extraneous to himself.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nMechanism, the first form of objectivity, is also the category which\nprimarily offers itself to reflection, as it examines the objective\nworld. It is also the category beyond which reflection seldom goes.\nIt is, however, a shallow and superficial mode of observation, one\nthat cannot carry us through in connexion with Nature and still less\nin connexion with the world of Mind. In Nature it is only the veriest\nabstract relations of matter in its inert masses which obey the law of\nmechanism. On the contrary the phenomena and operations of the province\nto which the term 'physical' in its narrower sense is applied, such as\nthe phenomena of light, heat, magnetism, and electricity, cannot be\nexplained by any mere mechanical processes, such as pressure, impact,\ndisplacement of parts, and the like. Still less satisfactory is it\nto transfer these categories and apply them in the field of organic\nnature; at least if it be our aim to understand the specific features\nof that field, such as the growth and nourishment of plants, or, it\nmay be, even animal sensation. It is at any rate a very deep-seated,\nand perhaps the main, defect of modern researches into nature, that,\neven where other and higher categories than those of mere mechanism\nare in operation, they still stick obstinately to the mechanical laws;\nalthough they thus conflict with the testimony of unbiassed perception,\nand foreclose the gate to an-adequate knowledge of nature. But even\nin considering the formations in the world of Mind, the mechanical\ntheory has been repeatedly invested with an authority which it has no\nright to. Take as an instance the remark that man consists of soul and\nbody. In this language, the two things stand each self-subsistent, and\nassociated only from without. Similarly we find the soul regarded as a\nmere group of forces and faculties, subsisting independently side by\nside.\n\nThus decidedly must we reject the mechanical mode of inquiry when it\ncomes forward and arrogates to itself the place of rational cognition\nin general, and seeks to get mechanism accepted as an absolute\ncategory. But we must not on that account forget expressly to vindicate\nfor mechanism the right and import of a general logical category. It\nwould be, therefore, a mistake to restrict it to the special physical\ndepartment from which it derives its name. There is no harm done, for\nexample, in directing attention to mechanical actions, such as that\nof gravity, the lever, &c, even in departments, notably in physics\nand in physiology, beyond the range of mechanics proper. It must\nhowever be remembered, that within these spheres the laws of mechanism\ncease to be final or decisive, and sink, as it were, to a subservient\nposition. To which may be added, that, in Nature, when the higher\nor organic functions are in any way checked or disturbed in their\nnormal efficiency, the otherwise subordinate category of mechanism\nis immediately seen to take the upper hand. Thus a sufferer from\nindigestion feels pressure on the stomach, after partaking of certain\nfood in slight quantity; whereas those whose digestive organs are sound\nremain free from the sensation, although they have eaten as much. The\nsame phenomenon occurs in the general feeling of heaviness in the\nlimbs, experienced in bodily indisposition. Even in the world of Mind,\nmechanism has its place; though there, too, it is a subordinate one. We\nare right in speaking of mechanical memory, and all sorts of mechanical\noperations, such as reading, writing, playing on musical instruments,\n&c. In memory, indeed, the mechanical quality of the action is\nessential: a circumstance, the neglect of which has not unfrequently\ncaused great harm in the training of the young, from the misapplied\nzeal of modern educationalists for the freedom of intelligence. It\nwould betray bad psychology, however, to have recourse to mechanism for\nan explanation of the nature of memory, and to apply mechanical laws\nstraight off to the soul. The mechanical feature in memory lies merely\nin the fact that certain signs, tones, &c. are apprehended in their\npurely external association, and then reproduced in this association,\nwithout attention being expressly directed to their meaning and inward\nassociation. To become acquainted with these conditions of mechanical\nmemory requires no further study of mechanics, nor would that study\ntend at all to advance the special inquiry of psychology.\n\n196.] The want of stability in itself which allows the object to suffer\nviolence, is possessed by it (see preceding \u00a7) only in so far as it\nhas a certain stability. Now as the object is implicitly invested\nwith the character of notion, the one of these characteristics is not\nmerged into its other; but the object, through the negation of itself\n(its lack of independence), closes with itself, and not till it so\ncloses, is it independent. Thus at the same time in distinction from\nthe outwardness, and negativing that outwardness in its independence,\ndoes this independence form a negative unity with self,--Centrality\n(subjectivity). So conceived, the object itself has direction and\nreference towards the external. But this external object is similarly\ncentral in itself, and being so, is no less only referred towards the\nother centre; so that it no less has its centrality in the other. This\nis (2) Mechanism with Affinity (with bias, or 'difference'), and\nmay be illustrated by gravitation, appetite, social instinct, &c.\n\n197.] This relationship, when fully carried out, forms a syllogism. In\nthat syllogism the immanent negativity, as the central individuality\nof an object, (abstract centre,) relates itself to non-independent\nobjects, as the other extreme, by a mean which unites the centrality\nwith the non-independence of the objects, (relative centre.) This is\n(3) Absolute Mechanism.\n\n198.] The syllogism thus indicated (I--P--U) is a triad of syllogisms.\nThe wrong individuality of non-independent objects, in which formal\nMechanism is at home, is, by reason of that non-independence, no\nless universality, though it be only external. Hence these objects\nalso form the mean between the absolute and the relative centre\n(the form of syllogism being U--I--P): for it is by this want of\nindependence that those two are kept asunder and made extremes, as\nwell as related to one another. Similarly absolute centrality, as the\npermanently-underlying universal substance (illustrated by the gravity\nwhich continues identical), which as pure negativity equally includes\nindividuality in it, is what mediates between the relative centre and\nthe non-independent objects (the form of syllogism being P--U--I). It\ndoes so no less essentially as a disintegrating force, in its character\nof immanent individuality, than in virtue of universality, acting as an\nidentical bond of union and tranquil self-containedness.\n\nLike the solar system, so for example in the practical sphere the state\nis a system of three syllogisms. (1) The Individual or person, through\nhis particularity or physical or mental needs (which when carried\nout to their full development give _civil_ society), is coupled with\nthe universal, _i.e._ with society, law, right, government. (2) The\nwill or action of the individuals is the intermediating force which\nprocures for these needs satisfaction in society, in law, &c, and\nwhich gives to society, law, &c. their fulfilment and actualisation.\n(3) But the universal, that is to say the state, government, and law,\nis the permanent underlying mean in which the individuals and their\nsatisfaction have and receive their fulfilled reality, inter-mediation,\nand persistence. Each of the functions of the notion, as it is brought\nby intermediation to coalesce with the other extreme, is brought\ninto union with itself and produces itself: which production is\nself-preservation.--It is only by the nature of this triple coupling,\nby this triad of syllogisms with the name _termini,_ that a whole is\nthoroughly understood in its organisation.\n\n199.] The immediacy of existence, which the objects have in Absolute\nMechanism, is implicitly negatived by the fact that their independence\nis derived from, and due to, their connexions with each other, and\ntherefore to their own want of stability. Thus the object must be\nexplicitly stated as in its existence having an Affinity (or a\nbias) towards its other,--as not-indifferent.\n\n(b) _Chemism_.\n\n200.] The not-indifferent (biassed) object has an immanent mode which\nconstitutes its nature, and in which it has existence. But as it is\ninvested with the character of total notion, it is the contradiction\nbetween this totality and the special mode of its existence.\nConsequently it is the constant endeavour to cancel this contradiction\nand to make its definite being equal to the notion.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nChemism is a category of objectivity which, as a rule, is not\nparticularly emphasised, and is generally put under the head of\nmechanism. The common name of mechanical relationship is applied to\nboth, in contra-distinction to the teleological. There is a reason for\nthis in the common feature which belongs to mechanism and chemism. In\nthem the notion exists, but only implicit and latent, and they are thus\nboth marked off from teleology where the notion has real independent\nexistence. This is true: and yet chemism and mechanism are very\ndecidedly distinct. The object, in the form of mechanism, is primarily\nonly an indifferent reference to self, while the chemical object is\nseen to be completely in reference to something else. No doubt even\nin mechanism, as it develops itself, there spring up references to\nsomething else: but the nexus of mechanical objects with one another is\nat first only an external nexus, so that the objects in connexion with\none another still retain the semblance of independence. In nature, for\nexample; the several celestial bodies, which form our solar system,\ncompose a kinetic system, and thereby show that they are related to\none another. Motion, however, as the unity of time and space, is a\nconnexion which is purely abstract and external. And it seems therefore\nas if these celestial bodies, which are thus externally connected with\neach other, would continue to be what they are, even apart from this\nreciprocal relation. The case is quite different with chemism. Objects\nchemically biassed are what they are expressly by that bias alone.\nHence they are the absolute impulse towards integration by and in one\nanother.\n\n201.] The product of the chemical process consequently is the Neutral\nobject, latent in the two extremes, each on the alert. The notion\nor concrete universal, by means of the bias of the objects (the\nparticularity), coalesces with the individuality (in the shape of the\nproduct), and in that only with itself. In this process too the other\nsyllogisms are equally involved. The place of mean is taken both by\nindividuality as activity, and by the concrete universal, the essence\nof the strained extremes; which essence reaches definite being in the\nproduct.\n\n202.] Chemism, as it is a reflectional nexus of objectivity, has\npre-supposed, not merely the bias or non-indifferent nature of the\nobjects, but also their immediate independence. The process of chemism\nconsists in passing to and fro from one form to another; which forms\ncontinue to be as external as before.--In the neutral product the\nspecific properties, which the extremes bore towards each other, are\nmerged. But although the product is conformable to the notion, the\ninspiring principle of active differentiation does not exist in it; for\nit has sunk back to immediacy. The neutral body is therefore capable\nof disintegration. But the discerning principle, which breaks up the\nneutral body into biassed and strained extremes, and which gives to\nthe indifferent object in general its affinity and animation towards\nanother;--that principle, and the process as a separation with tension,\nfalls outside of that first process.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe chemical process does not rise above a conditioned and finite\nprocess. The notion as notion is only the heart and core of the\nprocess, and does not in this stage come to an existence of its own.\nIn the neutral product the process is extinct, and the existing cause\nfalls outside it.\n\n203.] Each of these two processes, the reduction of the biassed\n(not-indifferent) to the neutral, and the differentiation of the\nindifferent or neutral, goes its own way without hindrance from the\nother. But that want of inner connexion shows that they are finite,\nby their passage into products in which they are merged and lost.\nConversely the process exhibits the nonentity of the pre-supposed\nimmediacy of the not-indifferent objects.--By this negation of\nimmediacy and of externalism in which the notion as object was sunk,\nit is liberated and invested with independent being in face of that\nexternalism and immediacy. In these circumstances it is the End (Final\nCause).\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe passage from chemism to the teleological relation is implied in the\nmutual cancelling of both of the forms of the chemical process. The\nresult thus attained is the liberation of the notion, which in chemism\nand mechanism was present only in the germ, and not yet evolved. The\nnotion in the shape of the aim or end thus comes into independent\nexistence.\n\n(c) _Teleology._\n\n204.] In the End the notion has entered on free existence\nand has a being of its own, by means of the negation of immediate\nobjectivity. It is characterised as subjective, seeing that this\nnegation is, in the first place, abstract, and hence at first the\nrelation between it and objectivity still one of contrast. This\ncharacter of subjectivity, however, compared with the totality of the\nnotion, is one-sided, and that, be it added, for the End itself, in\nwhich all specific characters have been put as subordinated and merged.\nFor it therefore even the object, which it pre-supposes, has only\nhypothetical (ideal) reality,--essentially no-reality. The End in short\nis a contradiction of its self-identity against the negation stated in\nit, _i.e._ its antithesis to objectivity, and being so, contains the\neliminative or destructive activity which negates the antithesis and\nrenders it identical with itself. This is the realisation of the End:\nin which, while it turns itself into the other of its subjectivity and\nobjectifies itself, thus cancelling the distinction between the two, it\nhas only closed with itself, and retained itself.\n\nThe notion of Design or End, while on one hand called redundant, is on\nanother justly described as the rational notion, and contrasted with\nthe abstract universal of understanding. The latter only _subsumes_\nthe particular, and so connects it with itself: but has it not in its\nown nature.--The distinction between the End or _final cause,_ and the\nmere _efficient cause_ (which is the cause ordinarily so called), is of\nsupreme importance. Causes, properly so called, belong to the sphere of\nnecessity, blind, and not yet laid bare. The cause therefore appears\nas passing into its correlative, and losing its primordiality there by\nsinking into dependency. It is only by implication, or for us, that\nthe cause is in the effect made for the first time a cause, and that\nit there returns into itself. The End, on the other hand, is expressly\nstated as containing the specific character in its own self,--the\neffect, namely, which in the purely causal relation is never free from\notherness. The End therefore in its efficiency does not pass over, but\nretains itself, _i.e._ it carries into effect itself only, and is at\nthe end what it was in the beginning or primordial state. Until it thus\nretains itself, it is not genuinely primordial.--The End then requires\nto be speculatively apprehended as the notion, which itself in the\nproper unity and ideality of its characteristics contains the judgment\nor negation,--the antithesis of subjective and objective,--and which to\nan equal extent suspends that antithesis.\n\nBy End however we must not at once, nor must we ever merely, think\nof the form which it has in consciousness as a mode of mere mental\nrepresentation. By means of the notion of Inner Design Kant has\nresuscitated the Idea in general and particularly the idea of life.\nAristotle's definition of life virtually implies inner design, and is\nthus far in advance of the notion of design in modern Teleology, which\nhad in view finite and outward design only.\n\nAnimal wants and appetites are some of the readiest instances of\nthe End. They are the _felt_ contradiction, which exists _within_\nthe living subject, and pass into the activity of negating this\nnegation which mere subjectivity still is. The satisfaction of the\nwant or appetite restores the peace between subject and object. The\nobjective thing which, so long as the contradiction exists, _i.e._\nso long as the want is felt, stands on the other side, loses this\nquasi-independence, by its union with the subject. Those who talk of\nthe permanence and immutability of the finite, as well subjective as\nobjective, may see the reverse illustrated in the operations of every\nappetite. Appetite is, so to speak, the conviction that the subjective\nis only a half-truth, no more adequate than the objective. But appetite\nin the second place carries out its conviction. It brings about the\nsupersession of these finites: it cancels the antithesis between the\nobjective which would be and stay an objective only, and the subjective\nwhich in like manner would be and stay a subjective only.\n\nAs regards the action of the End, attention may be called to the fact,\nthat in the syllogism, which represents that action, and shows the end\nclosing with itself by the means of realisation, the radical feature is\nthe negation of the _termini._ That negation is the one just mentioned\nboth of the immediate subjectivity appearing in the End as such, and\nof the immediate objectivity as seen in the means and the objects\npre-supposed. This is the same negation, as is in operation when the\nmind leaves the contingent things of the world as well as its own\nsubjectivity and rises to God. It is the 'moment' or factor which (as\nnoticed in the Introduction and \u00a7 192) was overlooked and neglected in\nthe analytic form of syllogisms, under which the so-called proofs of\nthe Being of a God presented this elevation.\n\n205.] In its primary and immediate aspect the Teleological relation\nis _external_ design, and the notion confronts a pre-supposed object.\nThe End is consequently finite, and that partly in its content,\npartly in the circumstance that it has an external condition in the\nobject, which has to be found existing, and which is taken as material\nfor its realisation. Its self-determining is to that extent in form\nonly. The un-mediatedness of the End has the further result that\nits particularity or content--which as form-characteristic is the\nsubjectivity of the End--is reflected into self, and so different from\nthe totality of the form, subjectivity in general, the notion. This\nvariety constitutes the finitude of Design within its own nature. The\ncontent of the End. in this way, is quite as limited, contingent, and\ngiven, as the object is particular and found ready to hand.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nGenerally speaking, the final cause is taken to mean nothing more\nthan external design. In accordance with this view of it, things are\nsupposed not to carry their vocation in themselves, but merely to be\nmeans employed and spent in realising a purpose which lies outside\nof them. That may be said to be the point of view taken by Utility,\nwhich once played a great part even in the sciences, but of late has\nfallen into merited disrepute, now that people have begun to see that\nit failed to give a genuine insight into the nature of things. It is\ntrue that finite things as finite ought in justice to be viewed as\nnon-ultimate, and as pointing beyond themselves. This negativity of\nfinite things however is their own dialectic, and in order to ascertain\nit we must pay attention to their positive content.\n\nTeleological observations on things often proceed from a well-meant\nwish to display the wisdom of God as it is especially revealed in\nnature. Now in thus trying to discover final causes for which the\nthings serve as means, we must remember that we are stopping short\nat the finite, and are liable to fall into trifling reflections: as,\nfor instance, if we not merely studied the vine in respect of its\nwell-known use for man, but proceeded to consider the cork-tree in\nconnexion with the corks which are cut from its bark to put into the\nwine-bottles. Whole books used to be written in this spirit. It is easy\nto see that they promoted the genuine interest neither of religion nor\nof science. External design stands immediately in front of the idea:\nbut what thus stands on the threshold often for that reason is least\nadequate.\n\n206.] The teleological relation is a syllogism in which the subjective\nend coalesces with the objectivity external to it, through a middle\nterm which is the unity of both. This unity is on one hand the\n_purposive_ action, on the other the _Means, i.e._ objectivity made\ndirectly subservient to purpose.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe development from End to Idea ensues by three stages, first,\nSubjective End; second, End in process of accomplishment; and third,\nEnd accomplished. First of all we have the Subjective End; and that,\nas the notion in independent being, is itself the totality of the\nelementary functions of the notion. The first of these functions\nis that of self-identical universality, as it were the neutral\nfirst water, in which everything is involved, but nothing as yet\ndiscriminated. The second of these elements is the particularising\nof this universal, by which it acquires a specific content. As this\nspecific content again is realised by the agency of the universal, the\nlatter returns by its means back to itself, and coalesces with itself.\nHence too when we set some end before us, we say that we 'conclude' to\ndo something: a phrase which implies that we were, so to speak, open\nand accessible to this or that determination. Similarly we also at a\nfurther step speak of a man 'resolving' to do something, meaning that\nthe agent steps forward out of his self-regarding inwardness and enters\ninto dealings with the environing objectivity. This supplies the step\nfrom the merely Subjective End to the purposive action which tends\noutwards.\n\n207.] (1) The first syllogism of the final cause represents the\nSubjective End. The universal notion is brought to unite with\nindividuality by means of particularity, so that the individual\nas self-determination acts as judge. That is to say, it not only\nparticularises or makes into a determinate content the still\nindeterminate universal, but also explicitly puts an antithesis of\nsubjectivity and objectivity, and at the same time is in its own self\na return to itself; for it stamps the subjectivity of the notion,\npre-supposed as against objectivity, with the mark of defect, in\ncomparison with the complete and rounded totality, and thereby at the\nsame time turns outwards.\n\n208.] (2) This action which is directed outwards is the individuality,\nwhich in the Subjective End is identical with the particularity\nunder which, along with the content, is also comprised the external\nobjectivity. It throws itself in the first place immediately upon the\nobject, which it appropriates to itself as a Means. The notion is this\nimmediate power; for the notion is the self-identical negativity, in\nwhich the being of the object is characterised as wholly and merely\nideal.--The whole Means then is this inward power of the notion, in the\nshape of an agency, with which the object as Means is 'immediately'\nunited and in obedience to which it stands.\n\nIn finite teleology the Means is thus broken up into two elements\nexternal to each other, (a) the action and (b) the object which serves\nas Means. The relation of the final cause as power to this object, and\nthe subjugation of the object to it, is immediate (it forms the first\npremiss in the syllogism) to this extent, that in the teleological\nnotion as the self-existent ideality the object is put as potentially\nnull. This relation, as represented in the first premiss, itself\nbecomes the Means, which at the same time involves the syllogism, that\nthrough this relation--in which the action of the End is contained and\ndominant--the End is coupled with objectivity.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe execution of the End is the mediated mode of realising the End; but\nthe immediate realisation is not less needful. The End lays hold of the\nobject immediately, because it is the power over the object, because\nin the End particularity, and in particularity objectivity also, is\ninvolved.--A living being has a body; the soul takes possession of it\nand without intermediary has objectified itself in it. The human soul\nhas much to do, before it makes its corporeal nature into a means. Man\nmust, as it were, take possession of his body, so that it may be the\ninstrument of his soul.\n\n209.] (3) Purposive action, with its Means, is still directed outwards,\nbecause the End is also _not_ identical with the object, and must\nconsequently first be mediated with it. The Means in its capacity of\nobject stands, in this second premiss, in direct relation to the other\nextreme of the syllogism, namely, the material or objectivity which is\npre-supposed. This relation is the sphere of chemism and mechanism,\nwhich have now become the servants of the Final Cause, where lies their\ntruth and free notion. Thus the Subjective End, which is the power\nruling these processes, in which the objective things wear themselves\nout on one another, contrives to keep itself free from them, and to\npreserve itself in them. Doing so, it appears as the Cunning of reason.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nReason is as cunning as it is powerful. Cunning may be said to lie\nin the inter-mediative action which, while it permits the objects to\nfollow their own bent and act upon one another till they waste away,\nand does not itself directly interfere in the process, is nevertheless\nonly working out its own aims. With this explanation, Divine Providence\nmay be said to stand to the world and its process in the capacity of\nabsolute cunning. God lets men do as they please with their particular\npassions and interests; but the result is the accomplishment of--not\ntheir plans, but His, and these differ decidedly from the ends\nprimarily sought by those whom He employs.\n\n210.] The realised End is thus the overt unity of subjective and\nobjective. It is however essentially characteristic of this unity, that\nthe subjective and objective are neutralised and cancelled only in the\npoint of their one-sidedness, while the objective is subdued and made\nconformable to the End, as the free notion, and thereby to the power\nabove it. The End maintains itself against and in the objective\nfor it is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is also the\nconcrete universal, the implicit identity of both. This universal, as\nsimply reflected in itself, is the content which remains unchanged\nthrough all the three _termini_ of the syllogism and their movement.\n\n211.] In finite design, however, even the executed End has the same\nradical rift or flaw as had the Means and the initial End. We have\ngot therefore only a form extraneously impressed on a pre-existing\nmaterial: and this form, by reason of the limited content of the End,\nis also a contingent characteristic. The End achieved consequently is\nonly an object, which again becomes a Means or material for other Ends,\nand so on for ever.\n\n212.] But what virtually happens in the realising of the End is that\nthe one-sided subjectivity and the show of objective independence\nconfronting it are both cancelled. In laying hold of the means, the\nnotion constitutes itself the very implicit essence of the object. In\nthe mechanical and chemical processes the independence of the object\nhas been already dissipated implicitly, and in the course of their\nmovement under the dominion of the End, the show of that independence,\nthe negative which confronts the notion, is got rid of. But in the fact\nthat the End achieved is characterised only as a Means and a material,\nthis object, viz. the teleological, is there and then put as implicitly\nnull, and only 'ideal.' This being so, the antithesis between form\nand content has also vanished. While the End by the removal and\nabsorption of all form-characteristics coalesces with itself, the form\nas self-identical is thereby put as the content, so that the notion,\nwhich is the action of form, has only itself for content. Through this\nprocess, therefore, there is made explicitly manifest what was the\nnotion of design: viz. the implicit unity of subjective and objective\nis now realised. And this is the Idea.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThis finitude of the End consists in the circumstance, that, in the\nprocess of realising it, the material, which is employed as a means,\nis only externally subsumed under it and made conformable to it. But,\nas a matter of fact, the object is the notion implicitly: and thus\nwhen the notion, in the shape of End, is realised in the object, we\nhave but the manifestation of the inner nature of the object itself.\nObjectivity is thus, as it were, only a covering under which the notion\nlies concealed. Within the range of the finite we can never see or\nexperience that the End has been really secured. The consummation of\nthe infinite End, therefore, consists merely in removing the illusion\nwhich makes it seem yet unaccomplished. The Good, the absolutely Good,\nis eternally accomplishing itself in the world: and the result is that\nit needs not wait upon us, but is already by implication, as well as in\nfull actuality, accomplished. This is the illusion under which we live.\nIt alone supplies at the same time the actualising force on which the\ninterest in the world reposes. In the course of its process the Idea\ncreates that illusion, by setting an antithesis to confront it; and its\naction consists in getting rid of the illusion which it has created.\nOnly out of this error does the truth arise. In this fact lies the\nreconciliation with error and with finitude. Error or other-being, when\nsuperseded, is still a necessary dynamic element of truth: for truth\ncan only be where it makes itself its own result.\n\n\nC.--THE IDEA.\n\n213.] The Idea is truth in itself and for itself,--the absolute\nunity of the notion and objectivity. Its 'ideal' content is nothing\nbut the notion in its detailed terms: its 'real' content is only the\nexhibition which the notion gives itself in the form of external\nexistence, whilst yet, by enclosing this shape in its ideality, it\nkeeps it in its power, and so keeps itself in it.\n\nThe definition, which declares the Absolute to be the Idea, is itself\nabsolute. All former definitions come back to this. The Idea is\nthe Truth: for Truth is the correspondence of objectivity with the\nnotion:--not of course the correspondence of external things with my\nconceptions,--for these are only _correct_ conceptions held by _me,_\nthe individual person. In the idea we have nothing to do with the\nindividual, nor with figurate conceptions, nor with external things.\nAnd yet, again, everything actual, in so far as it is true, is the\nIdea, and has its truth by and in virtue of the Idea alone. Every\nindividual being is some one aspect of the Idea: for which, therefore,\nyet other actualities are needed, which in their turn appear to have\na self-subsistence of their own. It is only in them altogether and\nin their relation that the notion is realised. The individual by\nitself does not correspond to its notion. It is this limitation of its\nexistence which constitutes the finitude and the ruin of the individual.\n\nThe Idea itself is not to be taken as an idea of something or other,\nany more than the notion is to be taken as merely a specific notion.\nThe Absolute is the universal and one idea, which, by an act of\n'judgment,' particularises itself to the system of specific ideas;\nwhich after all are constrained by their nature to come back to the one\nidea where their truth lies. As issued out of this 'judgment' the Idea\nis _in the first place_ only the one universal _substance:_ but its\ndeveloped and genuine actuality is to be as a _subject_ and in that way\nas mind.\n\nBecause it has no _existence_ for starting-point and _point d'appui,_\nthe Idea is frequently treated as a mere logical form. Such a view must\nbe abandoned to those theories, which ascribe so-called reality and\ngenuine actuality to the existent thing and all the other categories\nwhich have not yet penetrated as far as the Idea. It is no less false\nto imagine the Idea to be mere abstraction. It is abstract certainly,\nin so far as everything untrue is consumed in it: but in its own self\nit is essentially concrete, because it is the free notion giving\ncharacter to itself, and that character, reality. It would be an\nabstract form, only if the notion, which is its principle, were taken\nas an abstract unity, and not as the negative return of it into self\nand as the subjectivity which it really is.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTruth is at first taken to mean that I _know_ how something _is._ This\nis truth, however, only in reference to consciousness; it is formal\ntruth, bare correctness. Truth in the deeper sense consists in the\nidentity between objectivity and the notion. It is in this deeper sense\nof truth that we speak of a true state, or of a true work of art. These\nobjects are true, if they are as they ought to be, _i.e._ if their\nreality corresponds to their notion. When thus viewed, to be untrue\nmeans much the same as to be bad. A bad man is an untrue man, a man\nwho does not behave as his notion or his vocation requires. Nothing\nhowever can subsist, if it be _wholly_ devoid of identity between the\nnotion and reality. Even bad and untrue things have being, in so far\nas their reality still, somehow, conforms to their notion. Whatever\nis thoroughly bad or contrary to the notion, is for that very reason\non the way to ruin. It is by the notion alone that the things in the\nworld have their subsistence; or, as it is expressed in the language of\nreligious conception, things are what they are, only in virtue of the\ndivine and thereby creative thought which dwells within them.\n\nWhen we hear the Idea spoken of, we need not imagine something far\naway beyond this mortal sphere. The idea is rather what is completely\npresent: and it is found, however confused and degenerated, in\nevery consciousness. We conceive the world to ourselves as a great\ntotality which is created by God, and so created that in it God has\nmanifested Himself to us. We regard the world also as ruled by Divine\nProvidence: implying that the scattered and divided parts of the world\nare continually brought back, and made conformable, to the unity from\nwhich they have issued. The purpose of philosophy has always been the\nintellectual ascertainment of the Idea; and everything deserving the\nname of philosophy has constantly been based on the consciousness\nof an absolute unity where the understanding sees and accepts only\nseparation.--It is too late now to ask for proof that the Idea is\nthe truth. The proof of that is contained in the whole deduction and\ndevelopment of thought up to this point. The idea is the result of\nthis course of dialectic. Not that it is to be supposed that the idea\nis mediate only, _i.e._ mediated through something else than itself.\nIt is rather its own result, and being so, is no less immediate than\nmediate. The stages hitherto considered, viz. those of Being and\nEssence, as well as those of Notion and of Objectivity, are not, when\nso distinguished, something permanent, resting upon themselves. They\nhave proved to be dialectical; and their only truth is that they are\ndynamic elements of the idea.\n\n214.] The Idea may be described in many ways. It may be called reason\n(and this is the proper philosophical signification of reason);\nsubject-object; the unity of the ideal and the real, of the finite and\nthe infinite, of soul and body; the possibility which has its actuality\nin its own self; that of which the nature can be thought only as\nexistent, &c. All these descriptions apply, because the Idea contains\nall the relations of understanding, but contains them in their infinite\nself-return and self-identity.\n\nIt is easy work for the understanding to show that everything said\nof the Idea is self-contradictory. But that can quite as well be\nretaliated, or rather in the Idea the retaliation is actually made. And\nthis work, which is the work of reason, is certainly not so easy as\nthat of the understanding. Understanding may demonstrate that the Idea\nis self-contradictory: because the subjective is subjective only and is\nalways confronted by the objective,--because being is different from\nnotion and therefore cannot be picked out of it,--because the finite\nis finite only, the exact antithesis of the infinite, and therefore\nnot identical with it; and so on with every term of the description.\nThe reverse of all this however is the doctrine of Logic. Logic shows\nthat the subjective which is to be subjective only, the finite which\nwould be finite only, the infinite which would be infinite only, and so\non, have no truth, but contradict themselves, and pass over into their\nopposites. Hence this transition, and the unity in which the extremes\nare merged and become factors, each with a merely reflected existence,\nreveals itself as their truth.\n\nThe understanding, which addresses itself to deal with the Idea,\ncommits a double misunderstanding. It takes _first_ the extremes of\nthe Idea (be they expressed as they will, so long as they are in their\nunity), not as they are understood when stamped with this concrete\nunity, but as if they remained abstractions outside of it. It no less\nmistakes the relation between them, ever when it has been expressly\nstated. Thus, for example it overlooks even the nature of the copula\nin the judgment, which affirms that the individual, or subject, is\nafter all not individual, but universal. But, in the _second_ place,\nthe understanding believes _its_ 'reflection,'--that the self-identical\nIdea contains its own negative, or contains contradiction,--to be an\nexternal reflection which does not lie within the Idea itself. But the\nreflection is really no peculiar cleverness of the understanding. The\nIdea itself is the dialectic which for ever divides and distinguishes\nthe self-identical from the differentiated, the subjective from the\nobjective, the finite from the infinite, soul from body. Only on\nthese terms is it an eternal creation, eternal vitality, and eternal\nspirit. But while it thus passes or rather translates itself into the\nabstract understanding, it for ever remains reason. The Idea is the\ndialectic which again makes this mass of understanding and diversity\nunderstand its finite nature and the pseudo-independence in its\nproductions, and which brings the diversity back to unity. Since this\ndouble movement is not separate or distinct in time, nor indeed in any\nother way--otherwise it would be only a repetition of the abstract\nunderstanding--the Idea is the eternal vision of itself in the other,\n--notion which in its objectivity _has_ carried out _itself,_--object\nwhich is inward design, essential subjectivity.\n\nThe different modes of apprehending the Idea as unity of ideal and\nreal, of finite and infinite, of identity and difference, &c. are more\nor less formal. They designate some one stage of the _specific_ notion.\nOnly the notion itself, however, is free and the genuine universal:\nin the Idea, therefore, the specific character of the notion is\nonly the notion itself,--an objectivity, viz. into which it, being\nthe universal, continues itself, and in which it has only its own\ncharacter, the total character. The Idea is the infinite judgment, of\nwhich the terms are severally the independent totality; and in which,\nas each grows to the fulness of its own nature, it has thereby at the\nsame time passed into the other. None of the other specific notions\nexhibits this totality complete on both its sides as the notion itself\nand objectivity.\n\n215.] The Idea is essentially a process, because its identity is the\nabsolute and free identity of the notion, only in so far as it is\nabsolute negativity and for that reason dialectical. It is the round of\nmovement, in which the notion, in the capacity of universality which\nis individuality, gives itself the character of objectivity and of the\nantithesis thereto; and this externality which has the notion for its\nsubstance, finds its way back to subjectivity through its immanent\ndialectic.\n\nAs the idea is (a) a process, it follows that such an expression for\nthe Absolute as _unity_ of thought and being, of finite and infinite,\n&c. is false; for unity expresses an abstract and merely quiescent\nidentity. As the Idea is (b) subjectivity, it follows that the\nexpression is equally false on another account. That unity of which\nit speaks expresses a merely virtual or underlying presence of the\ngenuine unity. The infinite would thus seem to be merely _neutralised_\nby the finite, the subjective by the objective, thought by being. But\nin the negative unity of the Idea, the infinite overlaps and includes\nthe finite, thought overlaps being, subjectivity overlaps objectivity.\nThe unity of the Idea is thought, infinity, and subjectivity, and\nis in consequence to be essentially distinguished from the Idea as\n_substance,_ just as this overlapping subjectivity, thought, or\ninfinity is to be distinguished from the one-sided subjectivity,\none-sided thought, one-sided infinity to which it descends in judging\nand defining.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe idea as a process runs through three stages in its development.\nThe first form of the idea is Life: that is, the idea in the form of\nimmediacy. The second form is that of mediation or differentiation;\nand this is the idea in the form of Knowledge, which appears under\nthe double aspect of the Theoretical and Practical idea. The process\nof knowledge eventuates in the restoration of the unity enriched by\ndifference. This gives the third form of the idea, the Absolute Idea:\nwhich last stage of the logical idea evinces itself to be at the same\ntime the true first, and to have a being due to itself alone.\n\n(a) _Life._\n\n216.] The _immediate_ idea is Life. As _soul,_ the notion is\nrealised in a body of whose externality the soul is the immediate\nself-relating universality. But the soul is also its particularisation,\nso that the body expresses no other distinctions than follow from the\ncharacterisations of its notion. And finally it is the Individuality\nof the body as infinite negativity,--the dialectic of that bodily\nobjectivity, with its parts lying out of one another, conveying\nthem away from the semblance of independent subsistence back into\nsubjectivity, so that all the members are reciprocally momentary\nmeans as well as momentary ends. Thus as life is the initial\nparticularisation, so it results in the negative self-asserting unity:\nin the dialectic of its corporeity it only coalesces with itself.\nIn this way life is essentially something alive, and in point of\nits immediacy this individual living thing. It is characteristic of\nfinitude in this sphere that, by reason of the immediacy of the idea,\nbody and soul are separable. This constitutes the mortality of the\nliving being. It is only, however, when the living being is dead, that\nthese two sides of the idea are different _ingredients._\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe single members of the body are what they are only by and in\nrelation to their unity. A hand _e.g._ when hewn off from the body is,\nas Aristotle has observed, a hand in name only, not in fact. From the\npoint of view of understanding, life is usually spoken of as a mystery,\nand in general as incomprehensible. By giving it such a name, however,\nthe Understanding only confesses its own finitude and nullity. So far\nis life from being incomprehensible, that in it the very notion is\npresented to us, or rather the immediate idea existing as a notion. And\nhaving said this, we have indicated the defect of life. Its notion and\nreality do not thoroughly correspond to each other. The notion of life\nis the soul, and this notion has the body for its reality. The soul is,\nas it were, infused into its corporeity; and in that way it is at first\nsentient only, and not yet freely self-conscious. The process of life\nconsists in getting the better of the immediacy with which it is still\nbeset: and this process, which is itself threefold, results in the idea\nunder the form of judgment, _i.e._ the idea as Cognition.\n\n217.] A living being is a syllogism, of which the very elements are in\nthemselves systems and syllogisms (\u00a7\u00a7 198, 201, 207). They are however\nactive syllogisms or processes; and in the subjective unity of the\nvital agent make only one process. Thus the living being is the process\nof its coalescence with itself, which runs on through three processes.\n\n218.] (1) The first is the process of the living being inside itself.\nIn that process it makes a split on its own self, and reduces its\ncorporeity to its object or its inorganic nature. This corporeity, as\nan aggregate of correlations, enters in its very nature into difference\nand opposition of its elements, which mutually become each other's\nprey, and assimilate one another, and are retained by producing\nthemselves. Yet this action of the several members (organs), is only\nthe living subject's one act to which their productions revert; so that\nin these productions nothing is produced except the subject: in other\nwords, the subject only reproduces itself.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe process of the vital subject within its own limits has in Nature\nthe threefold form of Sensibility, Irritability, and Reproduction. As\nSensibility, the living being is immediately simple self-relation--it\nis the soul omnipresent in its body, the outsideness of each member of\nwhich to others has for it no truth. As Irritability, the living being\nappears split up in itself; and as Reproduction, it is perpetually\nrestoring itself from the inner distinction of its members and organs.\nA vital agent only exists as this continually self-renewing process\nwithin its own limits.\n\n219.] (2) But the judgment of the notion proceeds, as free, to\ndischarge the objective or bodily nature as an independent totality\nfrom itself; and the negative relation of the living thing to itself\nmakes, as immediate individuality, the pre-supposition of an inorganic\nnature confronting it. As this negative of the animate is no less a\nfunction in the notion of the animate itself, it exists consequently\nin the latter (which is at the same time a concrete universal) in the\nshape of a defect or want. The dialectic by which the object, being\nimplicitly null, is merged, is the action of the self-assured living\nthing, which in this process against an inorganic nature thus retains,\ndevelops, and objectifies itself.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe living being stands face to face with an inorganic nature, to which\nit comports itself as a master and which it assimilates to itself.\nThe result of the assimilation is not, as in the chemical process, a\nneutral product in which the independence of the two confronting sides\nis merged; but the living being shows itself as large enough to embrace\nits other which cannot withstand its power. The inorganic nature\nwhich is subdued by the vital agent suffers this fate, because it is\n_virtually_ the same as what life is _actually._ Thus in the other the\nliving being only coalesces with itself. But when the soul has fled\nfrom the body, the elementary powers of objectivity begin their play.\nThese powers are, as it were, continually on the spring, ready to begin\ntheir process in the organic body; and life is the constant battle\nagainst them.\n\n220.] (3) The living individual, which in its first process comports\nitself as intrinsically subject and notion, through its second\nassimilates its external objectivity and thus puts the character of\nreality into itself. It is now therefore implicitly a Kind, with\nessential universality of nature. The particularising of this Kind is\nthe relation of the living subject to another subject of its Kind: and\nthe judgment is the tie of Kind over these individuals thus appointed\nfor each other. This is the Affinity of the Sexes.\n\n221.] The process of Kind brings it to a being of its own. Life being\nno more than the idea immediate, the product of this process breaks\nup into two sides. On the one hand, the living individual, which was\nat first pre-supposed as immediate, is now seen to be mediated and\ngenerated. On the other, however, the living individuality, which, on\naccount of its first immediacy, stands in a negative attitude towards\nuniversality, sinks in the superior power of the latter.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe living being dies, because it is a contradiction. Implicitly it is\nthe universal or Kind, and yet immediately it exists as an individual\nonly. Death shows the Kind to be the power that rules the immediate\nindividual. For the animal the process of Kind is the highest point of\nits vitality. But the animal never gets so far in its Kind as to have\na being of its own; it succumbs to the power of Kind. In the process\nof Kind the immediate living being mediates itself with itself, and\nthus rises above its immediacy, only however to sink back into it\nagain. Life thus runs away, in the first instance, only into the false\ninfinity of the progress _ad infinitum._ The real result, however,\nof the process of life, in the point of its notion, is to merge and\novercome that immediacy with which the idea, in the shape of life, is\nstill beset.\n\n222.] In this manner however the idea of life has thrown off not some\none particular and immediate 'This,' but this first immediacy as a\nwhole. It thus comes to itself, to its truth: it enters upon existence\nas a free Kind self-subsistent. The death of merely immediate and\nindividual vitality is the 'procession' of spirit.\n\n\n(b) _Cognition in general._\n\n223.] The idea exists free for itself, in so far as it has universality\nfor the medium of its existence,--as objectivity itself has\nnotional being,--as the idea is its own object. Its subjectivity,\nthus universalised, is _pure_ self-contained distinguishing of the\nidea,--intuition which keeps itself in this identical universality.\nBut, as _specific_ distinguishing, it is the further judgment of\nrepelling itself as a totality from itself, and thus, in the first\nplace, pre-supposing itself as an external universe. There are two\njudgments, which though implicitly identical are not yet explicitly put\nas identical.\n\n224.] The relation of these two ideas, which implicitly and as life are\nidentical, is thus one of correlation: and it is that correlativity\nwhich constitutes the characteristic of finitude in this sphere. It\nis the relationship of reflection, seeing that the distinguishing of\nthe idea in its own self is only the first judgment--presupposing the\nother and not yet supposing itself to constitute it. And thus for the\nsubjective idea the objective is the immediate world found ready to\nhand, or the idea as life is in the phenomenon of individual existence.\nAt the same time, in so far as this judgment is pure distinguishing\nwithin its own limits (\u00a7 223), the idea realises in one both itself and\nits other. Consequently it is the certitude of the virtual identity\nbetween itself and the objective world.--Reason comes to the world\nwith an absolute faith in its ability to make the identity actual, and\nto raise its certitude to truth; and with the instinct of realising\nexplicitly the nullity of that contrast which it sees to be implicitly\nnull.\n\n225.] This process is in general terms Cognition. In Cognition\nin a single act the contrast is virtually superseded, as regards both\nthe one-sidedness of subjectivity and the one-sidedness of objectivity.\nAt first, however, the supersession of the contrast is but implicit.\nThe process as such is in consequence immediately infected with the\nfinitude of this sphere, and splits into the twofold movement of the\ninstinct of reason, presented as two different movements. On the one\nhand it supersedes the one-sidedness of the Idea's subjectivity by\nreceiving the existing world into itself, into subjective conception\nand thought; and with this objectivity, which is thus taken to be\nreal and true, for its content it fills up the abstract certitude of\nitself. On the other hand, it supersedes the one-sidedness of the\nobjective world, which is now, on the contrary, estimated as only a\nmere semblance, a collection of contingencies and shapes at bottom\nvisionary. It modifies and informs that world by the inward nature of\nthe subjective, which is here taken to be the genuine objective. The\nformer is the instinct of science after Truth, Cognition properly so\ncalled:--the Theoretical action of the idea. The latter is the instinct\nof the Good to fulfil the same--the Practical activity of the idea or\nVolition.\n\n(\u03b1) _Cognition proper._\n\n226.] The universal finitude of Cognition, which lies in the\none judgment, the pre-supposition of the contrast (\u00a7 224),--a\npre-supposition in contradiction of which its own act lodges protest,\nspecialises itself more precisely on the face of its own idea. The\nresult of that specialisation is, that its two elements receive the\naspect of being diverse from each other, and, as they are at least\ncomplete, they take up the relation of 'reflection,' not of 'notion,'\nto one another. The assimilation of the matter, therefore, as a datum,\npresents itself in the light of a reception of it into categories which\nat the same time remain external to it, and which meet each other in\nthe same style of diversity. Reason is active here, but it is reason in\nthe shape of understanding. The truth which such Cognition can reach\nwill therefore be only finite: the infinite truth (of the notion) is\nisolated and made transcendent, an inaccessible goal in a world of its\nown. Still in its external action cognition stands under the guidance\nof the notion, and notional principles form the secret clue to its\nmovement.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe finitude of Cognition lies in the pre-supposition of a world\nalready in existence, and in the consequent view of the knowing subject\nas a _tabula rasa._ The conception is one attributed to Aristotle;\nbut no man is further than Aristotle from such an outside theory of\nCognition. Such a style of Cognition does not recognise in itself the\nactivity of the notion--an activity which it is implicitly, but not\nconsciously. In its own estimation its procedure is passive. Really\nthat procedure is active.\n\n227.] Finite Cognition, when it pre-supposes what is distinguished\nfrom it to be something already existing and confronting it,--to be\nthe various facts of external nature or of consciousness--has, in the\nfirst place, (1) Formal identity or the abstraction of universality for\nthe form of its action. Its activity therefore consists in analysing\nthe given concrete object, isolating its differences, and giving them\nthe form of abstract universality. Or it leaves the concrete thing as\na ground, and by setting aside the unessential-looking particulars,\nbrings into relief a concrete universal, the Genus, or Force and Law.\nThis is the Analytical Method.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nPeople generally speak of the analytical and synthetical methods,\nas if it depended solely on our choice which we pursued. This is\nfar from the case. It depends on the form of the objects of our\ninvestigation, which of the two methods, that are derivable from the\nnotion of finite cognition, ought to be applied. In the first place,\ncognition is analytical. Analytical cognition deals with an object\nwhich is presented in detachment, and the aim of its action is to\ntrace back to a universal the individual object before it. Thought\nin such circumstances means no more than an act of abstraction or of\nformal identity. That is the sense in which thought is understood by\nLocke and all empiricists. Cognition, it is often said, can never do\nmore than separate the given concrete objects into their abstract\nelements, and then consider these elements in their isolation. It is,\nhowever, at once apparent that this turns things upside down, and that\ncognition, if its purpose be to take things as they are, thereby falls\ninto contradiction with itself. Thus the chemist _e.g._ places a piece\nof flesh in his retort, tortures it in many ways, and then informs us\nthat it consists of nitrogen, carbon, hydrogen, &c. True: but these\nabstract matters have ceased to be flesh. The same defect occurs in\nthe reasoning of an empirical psychologist when he analyses an action\ninto the various aspects which it presents, and then sticks to these\naspects in their separation. The object which is subjected to analysis\nis treated as a sort of onion from which one coat is peeled off after\nanother.\n\n228.] This universality is (2) also a specific universality. In this\ncase the line of activity follows the three 'moments' of the notion,\nwhich (as it has not its infinity in finite cognition) is the specific\nor definite notion of understanding. The reception of the object into\nthe forms of this notion is the Synthetic Method.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe movement of the Synthetic method is the reverse of the Analytical\nmethod. The latter starts from the individual, and proceeds to the\nuniversal; in the former the starting-point is given by the universal\n(as a definition), from which we proceed by particularising (in\ndivision) to the individual (the theorem). The Synthetic method thus\npresents itself as the development of the 'moments' of the notion on\nthe object.\n\n229.] (\u03b1) When the object has been in the first instance brought by\ncognition into the form of the specific notion in general, so that\nin this way its genus and its universal character or speciality are\nexplicitly stated, we have the Definition. The materials and the\nproof of Definition are procured by means of the Analytical method (\u00a7\n227). The specific character however is expected to be a 'mark' only:\nthat is to say it is to be in behoof only of the purely subjective\ncognition which is external to the object.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\nDefinition involves the three organic elements of the\nnotion: the universal or proximate genus _genus proximum,_\nthe particular or specific character of the genus (_qualitas\nspecified,_) and the individual, or object defined.--The first\nquestion that definition suggests, is where it comes from.\nThe general answer to this question is to say, that definitions\noriginate by way of analysis. This will explain how it\nhappens that people quarrel about the correctness of proposed\ndefinitions; for here everything depends on what\nperceptions we started from, and what points of view we\nhad before our eyes in so doing. The richer the object to\nbe defined is, that is, the more numerous are the aspects\nwhich it offers to our notice, the more various are the definitions\nwe may frame of it. Thus there are quite a host of\ndefinitions of life, of the state, &c. Geometry, on the contrary,\ndealing with a theme so abstract as space, has an easy\ntask in giving definitions. Again, in respect of the matter or\ncontents of the objects defined, there is no constraining\nnecessity present. We are expected to admit that space\nexists, that there are plants, animals, &c, nor is it the business\nof geometry, botany, &c. to demonstrate that the objects\nin question necessarily are. This very circumstance makes\nthe synthetical method of cognition as little suitable for\nphilosophy as the analytical: for philosophy has above all\nthings to leave no doubt of the necessity of its objects. And\nyet several attempts have been made to introduce the synthetical\nmethod into philosophy. Thus Spinoza, in particular,\nbegins with definitions. He says, for instance, that\nsubstance is the _causa sui._ His definitions are unquestionably\na storehouse of the most speculative truth, but it takes the\nshape of dogmatic assertions. The same thing is also true\nof Schelling.\n\n230.] (\u00df) The statement of the second element of the notion, _i.e._ of\nthe specific character of the universal as particularising, is given by\nDivision in accordance with some external consideration.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nDivision we are told ought to be complete. That requires a principle\nor ground of division so constituted, that the division based upon it\nembraces the whole extent of the region designated by the definition\nin general. But, in division, there is the further requirement that\nthe principle of it must be borrowed from the nature of the object in\nquestion. If this condition be satisfied, the division is natural and\nnot merely artificial, that is to say, arbitrary. Thus, in zoology,\nthe ground of division adopted in the classification of the mammalia\nis mainly afforded by their teeth and claws. That is so far sensible,\nas the mammals themselves distinguish themselves from one another by\nthese parts of their bodies; back to which therefore the general type\nof their various classes is to be traced. In every case the genuine\ndivision must be controlled by the notion. To that extent a division,\nin the first instance, has three members: but as particularity\nexhibits itself as double, the division may go to the extent even\nof four members. In the sphere of mind trichotomy is predominant, a\ncircumstance which Kant has the credit of bringing into notice.\n\n231.] (\u03b3) In the concrete individuality, where the mere unanalysed\nquality of the definition is regarded as a correlation of elements,\nthe object is a synthetical nexus of distinct characteristics. It is\na Theorem. Being different, these characteristics possess but\na mediated identity. To supply the materials, which form the middle\nterms, is the office of Construction: and the process of mediation\nitself, from which cognition derives the necessity of that nexus, is\nthe Demonstration.\n\nAs the difference between the analytical and synthetical methods is\ncommonly stated, it seems entirely optional which of the two we employ.\nIf we assume, to start with, the concrete thing which the synthetic\nmethod presents as a result, we can analyse from it as consequences\nthe abstract propositions which formed the pre-suppositions and the\nmaterial for the proof. Thus, algebraical definitions of curved lines\nare theorems in the method of geometry. Similarly even the Pythagorean\ntheorem, if made the definition of a right-angled triangle, might yield\nto analysis those propositions which geometry had already demonstrated\non its behoof. The optionalness of either method is due to both alike\nstarting from an external pre-supposition. So far as the nature of\nthe notion is concerned, analysis is prior; since it has to raise the\ngiven material with its empirical concreteness into the form of general\nabstractions, which may then be set in the front of the synthetical\nmethod as definitions.\n\nThat these methods, however indispensable and brilliantly successful\nin their own province, are unserviceable for philosophical cognition,\nis self-evident. They have pre-suppositions; and their style of\ncognition is that of understanding, proceeding under the canon of\nformal identity. In Spinoza, who was especially addicted to the use of\nthe geometrical method, we are at once struck by its characteristic\nformalism. Yet his ideas were speculative in spirit; whereas the system\nof Wolf, who carried the method out to the height of pedantry, was\neven in subject-matter a metaphysic of the understanding. The abuses\nwhich these methods with their formalism once led to in philosophy\nand science have in modern times been followed by the abuses of what\nis called 'Construction.' Kant brought into vogue the phrase that\nmathematics 'construes' its notions. All that was meant by the phrase\nwas that mathematics has not to do with notions, but with abstract\nqualities of sense-perceptions. The name 'Construction (_construing_)\nof notions' has since been given to a sketch or statement of sensible\nattributes which were picked up from perception, quite guiltless\nof any influence of the notion, and to the additional formalism of\nclassifying scientific and philosophical objects in a tabular form\non some pre-supposed rubric, but in other respects at the fancy and\ndiscretion of the observer. In the background of all this, certainly,\nthere is a dim consciousness of the Idea, of the unity of the notion\nand objectivity,--a consciousness, too, that the idea is concrete. But\nthat play of what is styled 'construing' is far from presenting this\nunity adequately--a unity which is none other than the notion properly\nso called: and the sensuous concreteness of perception is as little the\nconcreteness of reason and the idea.\n\nAnother point calls for notice. Geometry works with the sensuous but\nabstract perception of space; and in space it experiences no difficulty\nin isolating and defining certain simple analytic modes. To geometry\nalone therefore belongs in its perfection the synthetical method of\nfinite cognition. In its course, however (and this is the remarkable\npoint), it finally stumbles upon what are termed irrational and\nincommensurable quantities; and in their case any attempt at further\nspecification drives it beyond the principle of the understanding.\nThis is only one of many instances in terminology, where the title\nrational is perversely applied to the province of understanding,\nwhile we stigmatise as irrational that which shows a beginning and a\ntrace of rationality. Other sciences, removed as they are from the\nsimplicity of space or number, often and necessarily reach a point\nwhere understanding permits no further advance: but they get over the\ndifficulty without trouble. They make a break in the strict sequence\nof their procedure, and assume whatever they require, though it be\nthe reverse of what preceded, from some external quarter,--opinion,\nperception, conception or any other source. Its inobservancy as to\nthe nature of its methods and their relativity to the subject-matter\nprevents this finite cognition from seeing that, when it proceeds by\ndefinitions and divisions, &c., it is really led on by the necessity\nof the laws of the notion. For the same reason it cannot see when it\nhas reached its limit; nor, if it have transgressed that limit, does it\nperceive that it is in a sphere where the categories of understanding,\nwhich it still continues rudely to apply, have lost all authority.\n\n232.] The necessity, which finite cognition produces in the\nDemonstration, is, in the first place, an external necessity, intended\nfor the subjective intelligence alone. But in necessity as such,\ncognition itself has left behind its presupposition and starting-point,\nwhich consisted in accepting its content as given or found.\nNecessity _qu\u00e2_ necessity is implicitly the self-relating notion. The\nsubjective idea has thus implicitly reached an original and objective\ndeterminateness,--a something not-given, and for that reason immanent\nin the subject. It has passed over into the idea of Will.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe necessity which cognition reaches by means of the demonstration is\nthe reverse of what formed its starting-point. In its starting-point\ncognition had a given and a contingent content; but now, at the close\nof its movement, it knows its content to be necessary. This necessity\nis reached by means of subjective agency. Similarly, subjectivity\nat starting was quite abstract, a bare _tabula rasa._ It now shows\nitself as a modifying and determining principle. In this way we pass\nfrom the idea of cognition to that of will. The passage, as will be\napparent on a closer examination, means that the universal, to be\ntruly apprehended, must be apprehended as subjectivity, as a notion\nself-moving, active, and form-imposing.\n\n\n(\u00df) _Volition._\n\n233.] The subjective idea as original and objective determinateness,\nand as a simple uniform content, is the Good. Its impulse\ntowards self-realisation is in its behaviour the reverse of the idea of\ntruth, and rather directed towards moulding the world it finds before\nit into a shape conformable to its purposed End.--This Volition has,\non the one hand, the certitude of the nothingness of the pre-supposed\nobject; but, on the other, as finite, it at the same time pre-supposes\nthe purposed End of the Good to be a mere subjective idea, and the\nobject to be independent.\n\n234.] This action of the Will is finite: and its finitude lies in\nthe contradiction that in the inconsistent terms applied to the\nobjective world the End of the Good is just as much not executed\nas executed,--the end in question put as unessential as much as\nessential,--as actual and at the same, time as merely possible. This\ncontradiction presents itself to imagination as an endless progress in\nthe actualising of the Good; which is therefore set up and fixed as\na mere 'ought,' or goal of perfection. In point of form however this\ncontradiction vanishes when the action supersedes the subjectivity of\nthe purpose, and along with it the objectivity, with the contrast which\nmakes both finite; abolishing subjectivity as a whole and not merely\nthe one-sidedness of this form of it. (For another new subjectivity of\nthe kind, that is, a new generation of the contrast, is not distinct\nfrom that which is supposed to be past and gone.) This return into\nitself is at the same time the content's own 'recollection' that it\nis the Good and the implicit identity of the two sides,--it is a\n'recollection' of the pre-supposition of the theoretical attitude\nof mind (\u00a7 224) that the objective world is its own truth and\nsubstantiality.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWhile Intelligence merely proposes to take the world as it is, Will\ntakes steps to make the world what it ought to be. Will looks upon\nthe immediate and given present not as solid being, but as mere\nsemblance without reality. It is here that we meet those contradictions\nwhich are so bewildering from the standpoint of abstract morality.\nThis position in its 'practical' bearings is the one taken by the\nphilosophy of Kant, and even by that of Fichte. The Good, say these\nwriters, has to be realised: we have to work in order to produce it:\nand Will is only the Good actualising itself. If the world then were\nas it ought to be, the action of Will would be at an end. The Will\nitself therefore requires that its End should not be realised. In\nthese words, a correct expression is given to the _finitude_ of Will.\nBut finitude was not meant to be the ultimate point: and it is the\nprocess of Will itself which abolishes finitude and the contradiction\nit involves. The reconciliation is achieved, when Will in its result\nreturns to the pre-supposition made by cognition. In other words, it\nconsists in the unity of the theoretical and practical idea. Will\nknows the end to be its own, and Intelligence apprehends the world as\nthe notion actual. This is the right attitude of rational cognition.\nNullity and transitoriness constitute only the superficial features\nand not the real essence of the world. That essence is the notion in\n_posse_ and in _esse:_ and thus the world is itself the idea. All\nunsatisfied endeavour ceases, when we recognise that the final purpose\nof the world is accomplished no less than ever accomplishing itself.\nGenerally speaking, this is the man's way of looking; while the young\nimagine that the world is utterly sunk in wickedness, and that the\nfirst thing needful is a thorough transformation. The religious mind,\non the contrary, views the world as ruled by Divine Providence, and\ntherefore correspondent with what it ought to be. But this harmony\nbetween the 'is' and the 'ought to be' is not torpid and rigidly\nstationary. Good, the final end of the world, has being, only while it\nconstantly produces itself. And the world of spirit and the world of\nnature continue to have this distinction, that the latter moves only in\na recurring cycle, while the former certainly also makes progress.\n\n235.] Thus the truth of the Good is laid down as the unity of the\ntheoretical and practical idea in the doctrine that the Good is\nradically and really achieved, that the objective world is in itself\nand for itself the Idea, just as it at the same time eternally lays\nitself down as End, and by action brings about its actuality. This life\nwhich has returned to itself from the bias and finitude of cognition,\nand which by the activity of the notion has become identical with it,\nis the Speculative or Absolute Idea.\n\n\n(c) _The Absolute Idea._\n\n236.] The Idea, as unity of the Subjective and Objective Idea, is\nthe notion of the Idea,--a notion whose object (_Gegenstand_) is the\nIdea as such, and for which the objective (_Objekt_) is Idea,--an\nObject which embraces all characteristics in its unity. This unity\nis consequently I the absolute and all truth, the Idea which thinks\nitself,--and here at least as a thinking or Logical Idea.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe Absolute Idea is, in the first place, the unity of the theoretical\nand practical idea, and thus at the same time the unity of the idea\nof life with the idea of cognition. In cognition we had the idea in a\nbiassed, one-sided shape. The process of cognition has issued in the\noverthrow of this bias and the restoration of that unity, which as\nunity, and in its immediacy, is in the first instance the Idea of Life.\nThe defect of life lies in its being only the idea implicit or natural:\nwhereas cognition is in an equally one-sided way the merely conscious\nidea, or the idea for itself. The unity and truth of these two is the\nAbsolute Idea, which is both in itself and for itself. Hitherto _we_\nhave had the idea in development through its various grades as _our_\nobject, but now the idea comes to be its _own object._ This is the\n\u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bd\u03bf\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 which Aristotle long ago termed the supreme form of the\nidea.\n\n237.] Seeing that there is in it no transition, or presupposition,\nand in general no specific character other than what is fluid and\ntransparent, the Absolute Idea is for itself the pure form of the\nnotion, which contemplates its content as its own self. It is its own\ncontent, in so far as it ideally distinguishes itself from itself,\nand the one of the two things distinguished is a self-identity in\nwhich however is contained the totality of the form as the system of\nterms describing its content. This content is the system of Logic. All\nthat is at this stage left as form for the idea is the Method of this\ncontent,--the specific consciousness of the value and currency of the\n'moments' in its development.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTo speak of the absolute idea may suggest the conception that we are\nat length reaching the right thing and the sum of the whole matter.\nIt is certainly possible to indulge in a vast amount of senseless\ndeclamation about the idea absolute. But its true content is only the\nwhole system of which we have been hitherto studying the development.\nIt may also be said in this strain that the absolute idea is the\nuniversal, but the universal not merely as an abstract form to which\nthe particular content is a stranger, but as the absolute form, into\nwhich all the categories, the whole fullness of the content it has\ngiven being to, have retired. The absolute idea may in this respect be\ncompared to the old man who utters the same creed as the child, but\nfor whom it is pregnant with the significance of a lifetime. Even if\nthe child understands the truths of religion, he cannot but imagine\nthem to be something outside of which lies the whole of life and the\nwhole of the world. The same may be said to be the case with human life\nas a whole and the occurrences with which it is fraught. All work is\ndirected only to the aim or end; and when it is attained, people are\nsurprised to find nothing else but just the very thing which they had\nwished for. The interest lies in the whole movement. When a man traces\nup the steps of his life, the end may appear to him very restricted:\nbut in it the whole _decursus vitae_ is comprehended. So, too, the\ncontent of the absolute idea is the whole breadth of ground which has\npassed under our view up to this point. Last of all comes the discovery\nthat the whole evolution is what constitutes the content and the\ninterest. It is indeed the prerogative of the philosopher to see that\neverything, which, taken apart, is narrow and restricted, receives\nits value by its connexion with the whole, and by forming an organic\nelement of the idea. Thus it is that we have had the content already,\nand what we have now is the knowledge that the content is the living\ndevelopment of the idea. This simple retrospect is contained in the\n_form_ of the idea. Each of the stages hitherto reviewed is an image\nof the absolute, but at first in a limited mode, and thus it is forced\nonwards to the whole, the evolution of which is what we termed Method.\n\n238.] The several steps or stages of the Speculative Method are,\nfirst of all, (a) the Beginning, which is Being or Immediacy:\nself-subsistent, for the simple reason that it is the beginning. But\nlooked at from the speculative idea, Being is its self-specialising\nact, which as the absolute negativity or movement of the notion makes\na judgment and puts itself as its own negative. Being, which to the\nbeginning as beginning seems mere abstract affirmation, is thus rather\nnegation, dependency, derivation, and pre-supposition. But it is the\nnotion, of which Being is the negation: and the notion is completely\nself-identical in its otherness, and is the certainty of itself. Being\ntherefore is the notion implicit, before it has been explicitly put as\na notion. This Being therefore, as the still unspecified notion,--a\nnotion that is only implicitly or 'immediately' specified--is equally\ndescribable as the Universal.\n\nWhen it means immediate being, the beginning is taken from sensation\nand perception--the initial stage in the analytical method of finite\ncognition. When it means universality, it is the beginning of the\nsynthetic method. But since the Logical Idea is as much a universal as\nit is in being--since it is pre-supposed by the notion as much as it\nitself immediately _is,_ its beginning is a synthetical as well as an\nanalytical beginning.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nPhilosophical method is analytical as well as synthetical, not indeed\nin the sense of a bare juxtaposition or mere alternating employment\nof these two methods of finite cognition, but rather in such a way\nthat it holds them merged in itself. In every one of its movements\ntherefore it displays an attitude at once analytical and synthetical.\nPhilosophical thought proceeds analytically, in so far as it only\naccepts its object, the Idea, and while allowing it its own way, is\nonly, as it were, an on-looker at its movement and development. To this\nextent philosophising is wholly passive. Philosophic thought however is\nequally synthetic, and evinces itself to be the action of the notion\nitself. To that end, however, there is required an effort to keep back\nthe incessant impertinence of our own fancies and private opinions.\n\n239.] (b) The Advance renders explicit the _judgment_ implicit in\nthe Idea. The immediate universal, as the notion implicit, is the\ndialectical force which on its own part deposes its immediacy and\nuniversality to the level of a mere stage or 'moment.' Thus is put\nthe negative of the beginning, its specific character: it supposes a\ncorrelative, a relation of different terms,--the stage of Reflection.\n\nSeeing that the immanent dialectic only states explicitly what was\ninvolved in the immediate notion, this advance is Analytical; but\nseeing that in this notion this distinction was not yet stated,--it is\nequally Synthetical.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn the advance of the idea, the beginning exhibits itself as what\nit is implicitly. It is seen to be mediated and derivative, and\nneither to have proper being nor proper immediacy. It is only for\nthe consciousness which is itself immediate, that Nature forms the\ncommencement or immediacy, and that Spirit appears as what is mediated\nby Nature. The truth is that Nature is the creation of Spirit, and it\nis Spirit itself which gives itself a pre-supposition in Nature.\n\n240.] The abstract form of the advance is, in Being, an other and\ntransition into an other; in Essence showing or reflection in the\nopposite; in Notion, the distinction of individual from universality,\nwhich continues itself as such into, and is as an identity with, what\nis distinguished from it.\n\n241.] In the second sphere the primarily implicit notion has come as\nfar as shining, and thus is already the idea in germ. The development\nof this sphere becomes a regress into the first, just as the\ndevelopment of the first is a transition into the second.\n\nIt is only by means of this double movement, that the difference first\ngets its due, when each of the two members distinguished, observed\non its own part, completes itself to the totality, and in this way\nworks out its unity with the other. It is only by both merging their\none-sidedness on their own part, that their unity is kept from becoming\none-sided.\n\n242.] The second sphere developes the relation of the differents to\nwhat it primarily is,--to the contradiction in its own nature. That\ncontradiction which is seen in the infinite progress is resolved\n(c) into the end or terminus, where the differenced is explicitly\nstated as what it is in notion. The end is the negative of the first,\nand as the identity with that, is the negativity of itself. It is\nconsequently the unity in which both of these Firsts, the immediate\nand the real First, are made constituent stages in thought, merged,\nand at the same time preserved in the unity. The notion, which from\nits implicitness thus comes by means of its differentiation and the\nmerging of that differentiation to close with itself, is the realised\nnotion,--the notion which contains the relativity or dependence of its\nspecial features in its own independence. It is the idea which, as\nabsolutely first (in the method), regards this terminus as merely the\ndisappearance of the show or semblance, which made the beginning appear\nimmediate, and made itself seem a result. It is the knowledge that the\nidea is the one systematic whole.\n\n243.] It thus appears that the method is not an extraneous form,\nbut the soul and notion of the content, from which it is only\ndistinguished, so far as the dynamic elements of the notion even on\ntheir own part come in their own specific character to appear as the\ntotality of the notion. This specific character, or the content, leads\nitself with the form back to the idea; and thus the idea is presented\nas a systematic totality which is only one idea, of which the several\nelements are each implicitly the idea, whilst they equally by the\ndialectic of the notion produce the simple independence of the idea.\nThe science in this manner concludes by apprehending the notion of\nitself, as of the pure idea for which the idea is.\n\n244.] The Idea which is independent or for itself, when viewed on the\npoint of this its unity with itself, is Perception or Intuition, and\nthe percipient Idea is Nature. But as intuition the idea is, through\nan external 'reflection,' invested with the one-sided characteristic\nof immediacy, or of negation. Enjoying however an absolute liberty,\nthe Idea does not merely pass over into life, or as finite cognition\nallow life to show in it: in its own absolute truth it resolves to let\nthe 'moment' of its particularity, or of the first characterisation\nand other-being, the immediate idea, as its reflected image, go forth\nfreely as Nature.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWe have now returned to the notion of the Idea with which we began.\nThis return to the beginning is also an advance. We began with Being,\nabstract Being: where we now are we also have the Idea as Being: but\nthis Idea which has Being is Nature.\n\n\n\n\nNOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\n\nPage 5, \u00a7 2. After-thought = Nachdenken, _e.g._ thought which retraces\nand reproduces an original, but submerged, thought (cf. Hegel's\n_Werke_, vi. p. xv): to be distinguished from Reflexion (cf.\n_Werke_, i. 174).\n\nP. 7, \u00a7 3. On the blending of universal (thought) and individual\n(sensation) in what is called perception (Wahrnehmen) see _Encycl._ \u00a7\u00a7\n420, 421.\n\nP. 8, \u00a7 3. Cf. Fichte, _Werke_, ii. 454: 'Hence for the common sort of\nhearers and readers the uncommon intelligibility of certain sermons and\nlectures and writings, not one word of which is intelligible to the\nman who thinks for himself,--because there is really no intelligence\nin them. The old woman who frequents the church--for whom by the way I\ncherish all possible respect--finds a sermon very intelligible and very\nedifying which contains lots of texts and verses of hymns she knows\nby rote and can repeat. In the same way readers, who fancy themselves\nfar superior to her, find a work very instructive and clear which\ntells them what they already know, and proofs very stringent which\ndemonstrate what they already believe. The pleasure the reader takes in\nthe writer is a concealed pleasure in himself. What a great man! (he\nsays to himself); it is as if I heard or read myself.\n\nP. 10, \u00a7 6. Cf. Hegel, _Werke>_ viii. 17: 'In this conviction (that\nwhat is reasonable is actual, and what is actual is reasonable) stands\nevery plain man, as well as the philosopher; and from it philosophy\nstarts in the study both of the spiritual and of the natural\nuniverse----The great thing however is, in the show of the temporal\nand the transient to recognise the substance which is immanent and the\neternal which is present. For the work of reason (which is synonymous\nwith the Idea), when in its actuality it simultaneously enters external\nexistence, emerges with an infinite wealth of forms, phenomena and\nphases, and envelopes its kernel with the motley rind with which\nconsciousness is earliest at home,--a rind which the notion must\npenetrate before it can find the inward pulse and feel it still beating\neven in the outward phases. But the infinite variety of circumstance\nwhich is formed in this externality by the light of the essence shining\nin it,--all this infinite material, with its regulations,--is not\nthe object of philosophy.... To comprehend _what is,_ is the task of\nphilosophy: for _what is_ is reason. As regards the individual, each,\nwhatever happens, is a son of his time. So too philosophy is its\ntime apprehended in thoughts. It is just as foolish to fancy that a\nphilosophy can overleap its present world as that an individual can\noverleap his time. If his theory really goes beyond actualities, if it\nconstructs an ideal, a world as it ought to be, then such existence\nas it has is only in his intentions--a yielding element in which\nanything you please may be fancy-formed.' Cf. Schelling, _Werke,_ iv.\n390: 'There are very many things, actions, &c. of which we may judge,\nafter vulgar semblance, that they are unreasonable. All the same we\npresuppose and assume that everything which is or which happens is\nreasonable, and that reason is, in one word, the prime matter and the\nreal of all being.'\n\nP. 11, \u00a7 6. Actuality (Wirklichkeit) in _Werke,_ iv. 178 _seqq._\n\nP. 12, \u00a7 7. Cf. Fichte, _Werke,_ ii. 333: 'Man has nothing at all\nbut experience; and everything he comes to be comes to only through\nexperience, through life itself. All his thinking, be it loose or\nscientific, common or transcendental, starts from experience and has\nexperience ultimately in view. Nothing has unconditional value and\nsignificance but life; all other thinking, conception, knowledge has\nvalue only in so far as in some way or other it refers to the fact of\nlife, starts from it, and has in view a subsequent return to it.'\n\nP. 13, \u00a7 7 (note). Thomas Thomson (1773-1852), Professor of Chemistry\nat Glasgow, distinguished in the early history of chemistry and allied\nsciences. The _Annals of Philosophy_ appeared from 1813 to 1826.--_The\nart of preserving the hair_ was published (anonymous) at London in 1825.\n\nP. 14, \u00a7 7 (note). The speech from the throne was read on Feb. 3rd,\n1825.\n\nThe shipowners' dinner was on Feb. 12. The _Times_ of Feb. 14 gives as\nCanning's the words 'the just and wise maxims of sound not spurious\nphilosophy.'\n\nP. 17, \u00a7 10. 'Scholasticus' is the guileless 'freshman,' hero of\ncertain Facetiae (attributed to the Pythagorean philosopher Hierocles)\nwhich used occasionally to form part of the early Greek reading of\nschoolboys.\n\nK. L. Reinhold (1754-1823) presents in his intellectual history a\npicture of the development of ideas in his age. At the beginning\nhis _Attempt of a new theory of the human representative faculty_\n(1789) is typical of the tendency to give a subjective psychological\ninterpretation of Kant's theory of knowledge But the period of\nReinhold's teaching here referred to is that of _Contributions to an\neasier survey of the condition of philosophy at the beginning of the\nnineteenth century_ (Beitr\u00e4ge, 1801): the tendency which Hegel, who\nreviewed him in the _Critical Journal of Philosophy_ (_Werke,_ i. 267\n_seqq._), calls 'philosophising before philosophy.'--A similar spirit\nis operative in Krug's proposal (in his _Fundamental Philosophy,_ 1803)\nto start with what he called 'philosophical problematics.'\n\nP. 19, \u00a7 11. Plato, _Phaedo,_ p. 89, where Socrates protests against\nthe tendency to confound the defect of a particular piece of reasoning\nwith the incompetence of human reason altogether.\n\nP. 22, \u00a7 13. The dictum that the historical succession of philosophical\nsystems is identical with their logical sequence should not be\ntaken too literally and mechanically. Its essential point is simply\nthe theorem that history is not a casual series of unconnected\nevents--the deeds of particular persons, but is an evolution under\nlaws and uniformities:--it is this theorem applied to philosophies.\nBut difficulties may easily arise in the application of the general\nprinciple: _e.g._ it will be seen (by comparison of \u00a7 86 and \u00a7\n104) that though Pythagoras precedes Parmenides, and number is a\nstepping-stone to pure thought still pure Being comes at an earlier\nstage than Quantity.\n\nP. 23, \u00a7 13. There is a silent reference to what Reinhold professed\nto make the subject of his teaching at Jena--'philosophy without\nsurnames' (ohne Beinamen),--_i.e._ not a 'critical' philosophy;--or\nto the 'Philosophy which may not bear any man's name of Beck. As Hegel\nsays, _Werke,_ xvi. 138, 'The solicitude and apprehension against being\none-sided is only too often part of the weakness which is capable only\nof many-sided illogical superficiality.'\n\nP. 27, \u00a7 16. By 'anthropology' is meant not the anthropology of modern\nwriters, who use the name to denote mainly the history of human culture\nin its more rudimentary stages, and as exhibited chiefly in material\nproducts, but the study of those aspects of psychology which are most\nclosely allied with physiological conditions.\n\nWith the power of the intuition of genius to give almost all that\nlogical synthesis can produce, cf. _Werke,_ I. 331: 'In this way\na grand and pure intuition is able, in the purely architectonic\nfeatures of its picture, though the inter-connection of necessity and\nthe mastery of form does not come forward into visibility, to give\nexpression to the genuine ethical organism--like a building which\nsilently exhibits the spirit of its author in the several features of\nits mass, without the image of that spirit being set forth anywhere\nin one united shape. In such a delineation, made by help of notions,\nit is only a want of technical skill which prevents reason from\nraising the principle it embraces and pervades into the \"ideal\" form\nand becoming aware of it as the Idea. If the intuition only remains\ntrue to itself and does not let analytic intellect disconcert it, it\nwill probably--just because it cannot dispense with notions for its\nexpression--behave awkwardly in dealing with them, assume distorted\nshapes in its passage through consciousness, and be (to the speculative\neye) both incoherent and contradictory: but the arrangement of the\nparts and of the self-modifying characters betray the inward spirit of\nreason, however invisible. And so far as this appearance of that spirit\nis regarded as a product and a result, it will as product completely\nharmonise with the Idea.' Probably Goethe is before Hegel's mind.\n\nP. 28, \u00a7 17. The triplicity in unity of thought--its forthgoing\n'procession,' (cf. p. 362 _seqq._) and its return, which is yet an\nabiding in itself (Bei:sich:sein) was first explicitly schematised\nby Proclus, the consummator of Neo-Platonism. In his _Institutio\nTheologica_ he lays it down that the essential character of all\nspiritual reality (a\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd) is to be \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd, _e.g._\nto return upon itself, or to be a unity in and with difference,--to\nbe an original and spontaneous principle of movement (c. 15): or, as\nin C 31: \u03c0\u1f70\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1o\u1fd2\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03cc \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4' \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03ad\u03c6\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf\n\u1f00\u03c6' \u03bf\u1f57 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd. Its movement, therefore, is circular \u03ba\u03c5\u03ba\u03bb\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\n\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd (c. 33): for everything must at the same time remain\naltogether in the cause, and proceed from it, and revert to it (c. 35).\nSuch an essence is self-subsistent (\u03b1\u1f50\u03b8\u03c5\u03c0\u03cc\u03c2\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd),--is at once agent\n(\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd) and patient (\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd). This 'mysticism' (of a trinity\nwhich is also unity of motion which is also rest), with its \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bf\u03b4o\u03c2,\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4ro\u03c6\u03ae, and \u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae, is taken up, in his own way, by Scotus Erigena\n(De Divisione Naturae) as _processio_ (or _divisio_), _reditus,_\nand _adunatio._ From God 'proceed'--by an _eternal_ creation--the\ncreatures, who however are not outside the divine nature; and to God\nall things created _eternally_ return.\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nP. 31, \u00a7 19. Truth:--as early as _Werke,_ i. 82, _i.e._ 1801, Hegel had\ncome--perhaps influenced by the example of Jacobi--to the conclusion\nthat 'Truth is a word which, in philosophical discourse, deserves to be\nused only of the certainty of the Eternal and non-empirical Actual.'\n(And so Spinoza, ii. 310.)\n\nP. 32. 'The young have been flattered'--_e.g._ by Fichte, _Werke,_ i.\n435: 'Hence this science too promises itself few proselytes amongst men\nalready formed: if it can hope for any at all, it hopes for them rather\nfrom the young world, whose inborn force has not yet been ruined in the\nlaxity of the age.'\n\nP. 38, \u00a7 20. What Kant actually said (_Kritik der reinen Vernunft:\nElementarlehre,_ \u00a7 16), was 'The _I think_ must be able to accompany\nall my conceptions' (Vorstellungen). Here, as often elsewhere. Hegel\nseems to quote from memory,--with some shortcoming from absolute\naccuracy.\n\nFrom this point Fichte's idealism takes its spring, _e.g. Werke,_ ii.\n505: 'The ground of all certainty,--of all consciousness of fact in\nlife, and of all demonstrative knowledge in science, is this: _In_ and\n_with_ the single thing we affirm (setzen) (and whatever we affirm is\nnecessarily something single) we also affirm the absolute totality as\nsuch.... Only in so far as we have so affirmed anything, is it certain\nfor us,--from the single unit we have comprehended under it away to\nevery single thing in the infinity we shall comprehend under it,--from\nthe one individual who has comprehended it, to all individuals who\nwill comprehend it.... Without this absolute \"positing\" of the absolute\ntotality in the individual, we cannot (to employ a phrase of Jacobi's)\ncome to bed and board.'\n\n'Obviously therefore you enunciate not the judgment of a single\nobservation, but you embrace and \"posit\" the sheer infinitude and\ntotality of all possible observations:--an infinity which is not at\nall compounded out of finites, but out of which, conversely, the\nfinites themselves issue, and of which finite things are the mere\nalways-uncompleted analysis. This--how shall I call it, procedure,\npositing, or whatever you prefer--this \"manifestation\" of the absolute\ntotality, I call intellectual vision (Anschauung). I regard it--just\nbecause I cannot in any way get beyond intelligence--as immanent in\nintelligence, and name it so far egoity (Ichheit),--not objectivity\nand not subjectivity, but the absolute identity of the two:--an\negoity, however, which it was to be hoped would not be taken to mean\nindividuality. There lies in it, what you' (he is addressing Reinhold,\nwho here follows Bardili)' call a repetibility _ad infinitum._ For me,\ntherefore, the essence of the finite is composed of an immediate vision\nof the absolutely timeless infinite (with an absolute identity of\nsubjectivity and objectivity), and of a separation of the two latter,\nand an analysis (continued _ad infinitum_) of the infinite. In that\nanalysis consists the temporal life: and the starting-point of this\ntemporal life is the separation into subject and object, which through\nthe intellectual vision (intuition) are still both held together.'\n\nP. 44, \u00a7 22, _the mere fact of conviction._ Cf. _Rechtsphilosophie,_\n\u00a7 140 (_Werke,_ viii. 191): 'Finally the mere conviction which holds\nsomething to be right is given out as what decides the morality of\nan action. The good we will to do not yet having any content, the\nprinciple of conviction adds the information that the subsumption of an\naction under the category of good is purely a personal matter. If this\nbe so, the very pretence of an ethical objectivity is utterly lost. A\ndoctrine like this is closely allied with the self-styled philosophy\nwhich denies that the true is cognoscible: because for the Will,\ntruth--_i.e._ the rationality of the Will--lies in the moral laws.\nGiving out, as such a system does, that the cognition of the true is an\nempty vanity, far transcending the range of science (which recognises\nonly appearance), it must, in the matter of conduct, also find its\nprinciple in the apparent; whereby moral distinctions are reduced to\nthe peculiar theory of life held by the individual and to his private\nconviction. At first no doubt the degradation into which philosophy has\nthus sunk seems an affair of supreme indifference, a mere incident in\nthe futilities of the scholastic world: but the view necessarily makes\nitself a home in ethics, which is an essential part of philosophy; and\nit is then in the actual world that the world learns the true meaning\nof such theories.\n\n'As the view spreads that subjective conviction, and it alone, decides\nthe morality of an action, it follows that the charge of hypocrisy,\nonce so frequent, is now rarely heard. You can only qualify wickedness\nas hypocrisy on the assumption that certain actions are inherently\nand actually misdeeds, vices, and crimes, and that the defaulter\nnecessarily is aware of them as such, because he is aware of and\nrecognises the principles and outward acts of piety and honesty, even\nin the pretence to which he misapplies them. In other words, it was\ngenerally assumed as regards immorality that it is a duty to know the\ngood, and to be aware of its distinction from the bad. In any case it\nwas an absolute injunction which forbade the commission of vicious and\ncriminal acts, and which insisted on such actions being imputed to the\nagent, so far as he was a man, not a beast. But if the good heart,\nthe good intention, the subjective conviction, are set forth as the\ntrue sources of moral worth, then there is no longer any hypocrisy, or\nimmorality at all: for whatever one does, he can always justify it by\nthe reflection on it of good aims and motives; and by the influence of\nthat conviction it is good. There is no longer anything _inherently_\nvicious or criminal: instead of the frank and free, hardened and\nunperturbed sinner, comes the person whose mind is completely justified\nby intention and conviction. My good intention in my act, and my\nconviction of its goodness, make it good. We speak of judging and\nestimating an _act._ But on this principle it is only the aim and\nconviction of the agent--his faith--by which he ought to be judged.\nAnd that not in the sense in which Christ requires faith in objective\ntruth, so that for one who has a bad faith, _e.g._ a conviction bad\nin its content, the judgment to be pronounced must be bad, _e.g._\nconformable to this bad content. But faith here means only fidelity to\nconviction. Has the man (we ask) in acting kept true to his conviction?\nIt is formal subjective conviction on which alone the obligation of\nduty is made to depend.\n\n'A principle like this, where conviction is expressly made something\nsubjective, cannot but suggest the thought of possible error, with the\nfurther implied presupposition of an absolutely-existing law. But the\nlaw is no agent: it is only the actual human being who acts; and in the\naforesaid principle the only question in estimating human actions is\nhow far he has received the law into his conviction. If, therefore, it\nis not the actions which are to be estimated and generally measured by\nthat law, it is impossible to see what the law is for, and what end it\ncan serve. Such a law is degraded to a mere outside letter, in fact an\nempty word; which is only made a law, _i.e._ invested with obligatory\nforce, by my conviction.\n\n'Such a law may claim its authority from God or the State: it may even\nhave the authority of tens of centuries during which it served as\nthe bond that gave men, with all their deed and destiny, subsistence\nand coherence. And these are authorities in which are condensed the\nconvictions of countless individuals. And for me to set against that\nthe authority of my single conviction--for as my subjective conviction\nits sole validity is authority--that self-conceit, monstrous as it at\nfirst seems, is, in virtue of the principle that subjective conviction\nis to be the rule, pronounced to be no self-conceit at all.\n\n'Even if reason and conscience--which shallow science and bad sophistry\ncan never altogether expel--admit, with a noble illogicality, that\nerror is possible, still by describing crime and wickedness as\nonly an error we minimise the fault. For to err is human:--Who has\nnot been mistaken on one point or another, whether he had fresh or\npickled cabbage for dinner, and about innumerable things more or less\nimportant? But the difference of more or less importance disappears if\neverything turns on the subjectivity of conviction and on persistency\nin it. But the said noble illogicality which admits error to be\npossible, when it comes round to say that a wrong conviction is only an\nerror, really only falls into a further illogicality--the illogicality\nof dishonesty. One time conviction is made the basis of morality and\nof man's supreme value, and is thus pronounced the supreme and holy.\nAnother time all we have to do with is an error: my conviction is\nsomething trivial and casual, strictly speaking something outside,\nthat may turn out this way or that. And, really, my being convinced\n_is_ something supremely trivial? if I cannot _know_ truth, it is\nindifferent how I think; and all that is left to my thinking is that\nempty good,--a mere abstraction of generalisation.\n\n'It follows further that, on this principle of justification by\nconviction, logic requires me, in dealing with the way others act\nagainst my action, to admit that, so far as they in their belief and\nconviction hold my actions to be crimes, they are quite in the right.\nOn such logic not merely do I gain nothing, I am even deposed from the\npost of liberty and honour into a situation of slavery and dishonour.\nJustice--which in the abstract is mine as well as theirs--I feel only\nas a foreign subjective conviction, and in the execution of justice I\nfancy myself to be only treated by an external force.'\n\nP. 44, \u00a7 23. Selbstdenken--to think and not merely to read or listen is\nthe recurrent cry of Fichte (_e.g. Werke,_ ii. 329). According to the\neditors of _Werke,_ xv. 582, the reference here is to Schleiermacher\nand to his Monologues. Really it is to the Romantic principle in\ngeneral, especially F. Schlegel.\n\nP. 45, \u00a7 23. 'Fichte' _Werke,_ ii, 404: 'Philosophy\n(Wissenschaftslehre), besides (for the reason above noted that it has\nno auxiliary, no vehicle of the intuition at all, except the intuition\nitself), elevates the human mind higher than any geometry can It gives\nthe mind not only attentiveness, dexterity, stability, but at the same\ntime absolute independence, forcing it to be alone with itself, and\nto live and manage by itself. Compared with it, every other mental\noperation is infinitely easy; and to one who has been exercised in\nit nothing comes hard. Besides as it prosecutes all objects of human\nlore to the centre it accustoms the eye to hit the proper point at\nfirst glance' in everything presented to it, and to prosecute it\nundeviatingly For such a practical philosopher therefore there can be\nnothing dark, complicated, and confused, if only he is acquainted with\nthe object of discussion. It comes always easiest to him to construct\neverything afresh and _ab initio,_ because he carries within him plans\nfor every scientific edifice. He finds his way easily, therefore, in\nany complicated structure. Add to this the security and confidence of\nglance which he has acquired in philosophy--the guide which conducts in\nall _raisonnement_ and the imperturbability with which his eye meets\nevery divergence from the accustomed path and every paradox. It would\nbe quite different with all human concerns, if men could only resolve\nto believe their eyes. At present they inquire at their neighbours and\nat antiquity what they really see, and by this distrust in themselves\nerrors are eternalised. Against this distrust the possessor of\nphilosophy is for ever protected. In a word, by philosophy the mind\nof man comes to itself, and from henceforth rests on itself without\nforeign aid, and is completely master of itself, as the dancer of his\nfeet, or the boxer of his hands.'\n\nP. 45, \u00a7 23. Aristotle, _Metaph._ i. 2, 19 (cf. _Eth._ x. 7). See also\n_Werke,_ xiv. 280 _seqq._\n\nP. 46, \u00a7 24. Schelling's expression, 'petrified intelligence.' The\nreference is to some verses of Schelling in _Werke,_ iv. 546 (first\npublished in _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr speculative Physik,_ 1800). We have no\nreason to stand in awe of the world, he says, which is a tame and quiet\nbeast--\n\n    Sterft zwar ein Riesengeist darinnen,\n    Ist aber versteinert mit allen Sinnen;\n    In todten und lebendigen Dingen\n    Thut nach Bewustseyn m\u00e4chtig ringen.\n\nIn human shape he at length awakes from the iron sleep, from the long\ndream: but as man he feels himself a stranger and exile; he would\nfain return to great Nature; he fears what surrounds him and imagines\nspectres, not knowing he might say of Nature to himself--\n\n    Ich bin der Gott, den sie im Busen hegt,\n    Der Geist, der sich in allem bewegt:\n    Vom fr\u00fchsten Ringen dunkler Kr\u00e4fte\n    Bis zum Erguss der ersten Lebenss\u00e4fte,\n    .    .    .    .    .    .    .\n    herauf zu des Gedankens Jugendkraft\n    Wodurch Natur verj\u00fcngt sich wieder schafft,\n    Ist eine kraft, ein Wechselspiel und Weben,\n    Ein Trieb und Drang nach immer h\u00f6herm Leben.\n\nCf. Oken, _Naturphilosophie,_\u00a7 2913: 'A natural body is a thought of\nthe primal act, turned rigid and crystallised,--a word of God.'\n\nPhrases of like import are not infrequent in Schelling's works (about\n1800-1), _e.g. Werke,_1. Abth. iii. 341: 'The dead and unconscious\nproducts of nature are only unsuccessful attempts to \"reflect\" itself;\nso-called dead nature is in all cases an immature intelligence'\n(unreife Intelligenz), or iv. 77, 'Nature itself is an intelligence,\nas it were, turned to rigidity (erstarrte) with all its sensations and\nperceptions'; and ii. 226 (_Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur,_\n1797), 'Hence nature is only intelligence turned into the rigidity of\nbeing; its qualities are sensations extinguished to being; bodies are\nits perceptions, so to speak, killed.'\n\nA close approach to the phrase quoted is found in the words of another\nof the 'Romantic' philosophers: 'Nature is a petrified magic-city'\n(versteinerte Zauberstadt). (Novalis, _Schriften,_ ii. 149.)\n\nP. 48, \u00a7 24. Cf. Fichte to Jacobi: (Jacobi's _Briefwechsel,_ ii. 208)\n'My absolute Ego is obviously not the individual: that explanation\ncomes from injured snobs and peevish philosophers, seeking to\nimpute to me the disgraceful doctrine of practical egoism. But the\n_individual must be deduced from the absolute ego._ To that task my\nphilosophy will proceed in the \"Natural Law.\" A finite being--it may\nbe deductively shown--can only think itself as a sense-being in a\nsphere of sense-beings,--on one part of which (that which has no power\nof origination) it has causality, while with the other part (to which\nit attributes a subjectivity like its own) it stands in reciprocal\nrelations. In such circumstances it is called an individual, and the\nconditions of individuality are called rights. As surely as it affirms\nits individuality, so surely does it affirm such a sphere the two\nconceptions indeed are convertible. So long as we look upon ourselves\nas individuals--and we always so regard ourselves in life, though not\nin philosophy and abstract imagination--we stand on what I call the\n\"practical\" point of view in our reflections (while to the standpoint\nof the absolute ego I give the name \"speculative\"). From the former\npoint of view there exists for us a world independent of us,--a world\nwe can only modify; whilst the pure ego (which even on this altitude\ndoes not altogether disappear from us,) is put outside us and called\nGod. How else could we get the properties we ascribe to God and deny to\nourselves, did we not after all find them within us, and only refuse\nthem to ourselves in a certain respect, i.e., as individuals? When this\n\"practical\" point of view predominates in our reflections, realism\nis supreme: when speculation itself deduces and recognises that\nstandpoint, there results a complete reconciliation between philosophy\nand common sense as premised in my system.\n\n'For what good, then, is the speculative standpoint and the whole of\nphilosophy therewith, if it be not for life? Had humanity not tasted\nof this forbidden fruit, it might dispense with all philosophy. But in\nhumanity there is a wish implanted to behold that region lying beyond\nthe individual; and to behold it not merely in a reflected light but\nface to face. The first who raised a question about God's existence\nbroke through the barriers, he shook humanity in its main foundation\npillars, and threw it out of joint into an intestine strife which is\nnot yet settled, and which can only be settled by advancing boldly\nto that supreme point from which the speculative and the practical\nappear to be at one. We began to philosophise from pride of heart, and\nthus lost our innocence: we beheld our nakedness, and ever since we\nphilosophise from the need of our redemption.'\n\nP. 50. Physics and Philosophy of Nature: cf. _Werke,_ vii. i, p. 18:\n'The Philosophy of Nature takes up the material, prepared for it by\nphysics out of experience, at the point to which physics has brought\nit, and again transforms it, without basing it ultimately on the\nauthority of experience. Physics therefore must work into the hands of\nphilosophy, so that the latter may translate into a true comprehension\n(Begriff) the abstract universal transmitted to it, showing how it\nissues from that comprehension as an intrinsically necessary whole. The\nphilosophic way of putting the facts is no mere whim once in a way,\nby way of change, to walk on the head, after walking a long while on\nthe legs, or once in a way to see our every-day face besmeared with\npaint. No; it is because the method of physics does not satisfy the\ncomprehension, that we have to go on further.'\n\nP. 51, \u00a7 24. The distinction of ordinary and speculative Logic\nis partly like that made by Fichte (i. 68) between Logic and\nWissenschaftslehre. 'The former,' says Fichte, 'is conditioned and\ndetermined by the latter.' Logic deals only with form; epistomology\nwith import as well.\n\nP. 54, \u00a7 24. The Mosaic legend of the Fall; cf. similar interpretations\nin Kant: _Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft_,\n1ster St\u00fcck; and Schelling, _Werke,_ i. (1. Abth.) 34.\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nP. 61, \u00a7 28. Fichte--to emphasise the experiential truth of his\nsystem--says (_Werke,_ ii. 331): 'There was a philosophy which\nprofessed to be able to expand by mere _inference_ the range thus\nindicated for philosophy. According to it, thinking was--not, as we\nhave described it, the analysis of what was given and the recombining\nof it in other forms, but at the same time--a production and creation\nof something quite new. In this system the philosopher found himself\nin the exclusive possession of certain pieces of knowledge which the\nvulgar understanding had to do without. In it the philosopher could\nreason out for himself a God and an immortality and talk himself into\nthe conclusion that he was wise and good.'\n\nWolfs definition of philosophy is 'the Science of the possible in so\nfar as it can be'; and the possible = the non-contradictory.\n\nP. 64, \u00a7 29. The oriental sage corresponds (cf. Hegel, _Werke,_ xii.\n229) to the writer known as Dionysius the Areopagite (_De Mystica\nTheologia,_ and _De Divitus Nominibus._)--The same problem as to the\nrelation of the Infinite (God) to the Finite (world) is discussed in\nJewish speculation (by Saadia, Mamuni, _&c._) as the question of the\ndivine names,--a dogma founded on the thirteen names (or attributes)\napplied to God in Exodus xxxiv. 6. (Cf. D. Kaufmann, _Geschichte der\nAttributenlehre._) The same spirit has led to the list of ninety-nine\n'excellent names' of Allah in Islam, a list which tradition derives\nfrom Mohammed.\n\nP. 65, \u00a7 31. Cf. _Werke,_ ii. 47 _seqq.:_ 'The nature of the judgment\nor proposition--involving as it does a distinction of subject and\npredicate--is destroyed by the \"speculative\" proposition. This conflict\nof the propositional form with the unity of comprehension which\ndestroys it is like the antagonism in rhythm between metre and accent.\nThe rhythm results from the floating \"mean\" and unification of the two.\nHence even in the \"philosophical\" proposition the identity of subject\nand predicate is not meant to annihilate their difference (expressed by\nthe propositional form): their unity is meant to issue as a _harmony._\nThe propositional form lets appear the definite shade or accent\npointing to a distinction in its fulfilment: whereas in the predicate\ngiving expression to the substance, and the subject itself falling\ninto the universal, we have the unity in which that accent is heard no\nmore. Thus in the proposition \"God is Being\" the predicate is Being; it\nrepresents the substance in which the subject is dissolved away. Being\nis here meant not to be predicate but essence: and in that way God\nseems to cease to be what he is--by his place in the proposition--viz.\nthe permanent subject. The mind--far from getting further forward in\nthe passage from subject to predicate--feels itself rather checked,\nthrough the loss of the subject, and thrown back, from a sense of its\nloss, to the thought of the subject. Or,--since the predicate itself\nis enunciated as a subject (as Being or as Essence) which exhausts the\nnature of the subject, it again comes face to face with the subject\neven in the predicate.--Thought thus loses its solid objective ground\nwhich it had on the subject: yet at the same time in the predicate it\nis thrown back upon it, and instead of getting to rest in itself it\nreturns upon the subject of the content.--To this unusual check and\narrest are in the main due the complaints as to the unintelligibility\nof philosophical works,--supposing the individual to possess any other\nconditions of education needed for understanding them.'\n\nP. 66, \u00a7 32. On the relation of dogmatism and scepticism see the\nintroduction to Kant's _Criticism of Pure Reason,_ and compare Caird's\n_Critical Philosophy of I. Kant,_ vol. i. chap. i.\n\nP. 67, \u00a7 33. The subdivision of 'theoretical' philosophy or metaphysics\ninto the four branches, Ontology, Cosmology, Psychology (rational and\nempirical), and Natural Theology, is more or less common to the whole\nWolfian School. Wolf's special addition to the preceding scholastic\nsystems is found in the conception of a general Cosmology. Metaphysics\nprecedes physics, and the departments of practical philosophy. In\nfront of all stands logic or rational philosophy. Empirical psychology\nbelongs properly to physics, but reasons of practical convenience put\nit elsewhere.\n\nP. 69, \u00a7 34. The question of the 'Seat of the Soul' is well known in\nthe writings of Lotze (_e.g. Metaphysic,_ \u00a7 291).\n\nAbsolute actuosity. The _Notio Dei_ according to Thomas Aquinas, as\nwell as the dogmatics of post-Reformation times, is _actus purus_\n(or _actus purissimus_). For God _nihil potentialitatis habet._ Cf.\n_Werke, xii._228: 'Aristotle especially has conceived God under the\nabstract category of activity. Pure activity is knowledge (Wissen)--in\nthe scholastic age, _actus purus_--: but in order to be put as\nactivity, it must be put in its \"moments.\" For knowledge we require\nanother thing which is known: and which, when knowledge knows it, is\nthereby appropriated. It is implied in this that God--the eternal and\nself-subsistent--eternally begets himself as his Son,--distinguishes\nhimself from himself. But what he thus distinguishes from himself,\nhas not the shape of an otherness: but what is distinguished is\n_ipso facto_ identical with what it is parted from. God is spirit:\nno darkness, no colouring or mixture enters this pure light. The\nrelationship of father and son is taken from organic life and used\nmetaphorically--the natural relation is only pictorial and hence does\nnot quite correspond to what is to be expressed. We say, God eternally\nbegets his Son, God distinguishes himself from himself: and thus we\nbegin from God, saying he does this, and in the other he creates is\nutterly with himself (the form of Love): but we must be well aware\nthat God is this _whole action itself_ God is the beginning; he does\nthis: but equally is he only the end, the totality: and as such\ntotality he is spirit. God as merely the Father is not yet the true\n(it is the Jewish religion where he is thus without the Son): He is\nrather beginning and end: He is his presupposition, makes himself a\npresupposition (this is only another form of distinguishing): He is the\neternal process.'\n\nNicolaus Cusanus speaks of God (_De docta Ignorantia,_ ii. I) as\n_infinita actualitas quae est actu omnis essendi possibilitas._ The\nterm 'actuosity' seems doubtful.\n\nP. 73, \u00a7 36. _Sensus eminentior._ Theology distinguishes three modes in\nwhich the human intelligence can attain a knowledge of God. By the _via\ncausalitatis_ it argues that God is; by the _via negationis,_ what he\nis not; by the _via eminentiae,_ it gets a glimpse of the relation in\nwhich he stands to us. It regards God _i.e._ as the cause of the finite\nuniverse; but as God is infinite, all that is predicated of him must be\ntaken as merely approximative (_sensu eminentiori_) and there is left\na vast remainder which can only be filled up with negations [Durandus\nde S. Porciano on the Sentent, i. 3. I]. The _sensus eminentior_ is\nthe subject of Spinoza's strictures, Ep. 6 (56 in Opp. ii. 202): while\nLeibniz adopts it in the preface to _Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e,_ 'Les perfections de\nDieu sont celles de nos \u00e2mes, mais il les poss\u00e8de sans bornes: il est\nun oc\u00e9an, dont nous n'avons re\u00e7u que les gouttes; il y a en nous\nquelque puissance, quelque connaissance, quelque bont\u00e9; mais elles sont\ntoutes enti\u00e8res en Dieu.'\n\nThe _via causalitatis_ infers _e.g.,_ from the existence of morality\nand intelligence here, a Being whose will finds expression therein: the\n_via eminentiae_ infers that that will is good, and that intelligence\nwise in the highest measure, and the _via negationis_ sets aside in the\nconception of God all the limitations and conditions to which human\nintelligence and will are subject.\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nP. 80, \u00a7 38. The verses (forming part of the advice which\nMephistopheles, personating Faust, gives to the recently-arrived\npupil) stand in the original in a different order: beginning \"Dann hat\ner die Theile in seiner Hand,\" &c. The meaning of these and the two\npreceding lines is somewhat as follows, in versification even laxer\nthan Goethe's:--\n\n    If you want to describe life and gather its meaning,\n    To drive out its spirit most be your beginning,\n    Then though fast in your hand lie the parts one by one\n    The spirit that linked them, alas! is gone.\n    And 'Nature's Laboratory' is only a name\n    That the chemist bestows on't to hide his own shame.\n\nOne may compare _Wilhelm Meister's Wanderjahre,_ iii. 3, where it is\nremarked, in reference to some anatomical exercises: 'You will learn\nere long that building-up is more instructive than tearing-down,\ncombining more than separating, animating the dead more than killing\nagain what was killed already.... Combining means more than separating:\nreconstructing more than onlooking.' The first part of _Faust_ appeared\n1808: the _Wanderjahre,_ 1828-9.\n\nP. 82, \u00a7 39. The article on the 'Relation of scepticism to philosophy,\nan exposition of its various modifications, and comparison of the\nlatest with the ancient'--in form a review of G. E. Schulze's\n_Criticism of Theoretical Philosophy_'--was republished in vol. xvi. of\nHegel's _Werke_ (vol. i. of the _Vermischte Schriften_).\n\nP. 87, \u00a7 42. In an earlier review of Kant's work (_Werke,_ i. 83) on\nGlauben und Wissen (an article in Sendling and Hegel's _Journal_)\nHegel attaches more weight to a factor in the critical theory of\nknowledge, here neglected. Kant, he says, has--within the limits\nallowed by his psychological terms of thought--'put (in an excellent\nway) the _\u00e0 priori_ of sensibility into the original identity and\nmultiplicity, and that as transcendental imagination in the \"higher\npower\" of an immersion of unity in multiplicity: whilst Understanding\n(Verstand) he makes to consist in the elevation to universality of this\n_\u00e0 priori_ synthetic unity of sensibility,--whereby this identity is\ninvested with a comparative antithesis to the sensibility: and Reason\n(Vernunft) is presented as a still higher power over the preceding\ncomparative antithesis, without however this universality and infinity\nbeing allowed to go beyond the stereotyped formal pure infinity.\nThis genuinely rational construction by which, though the bad name\n\"faculties\" is left, there is in truth presented a single identity\nof them all, is transformed by Jacobi into a series of faculties,\n_resting_ one upon another.'\n\nP. 87, \u00a7 42. Fichte: cf. _Werke,_ i. 420: 'I have said before, and\nsay it here again, that my system is no other than the Kantian. That\nmeans: it contains the same view of facts, but in its method is quite\nindependent of the Kantian exposition.' 'Kant, up to now, is a closed\nbook.'--i. 442. There are two ways of critical idealism. 'Either' (as\nFichte) 'it actually deduces from the fundamental laws of intelligence,\nthat system of necessary modes of action, and with it, at the same\ntime, the objective conceptions thus arising, and thus lets the whole\ncompass of our conceptions gradually arise under the eyes of the reader\nor hearer; or' (like Kant and his unprogressive disciples) 'it gets\nhold of these laws from anywhere and anyhow, as they are immediately\napplied to objects, therefore on their lowest grade (--on this grade\nthey are called _categories),_ and then asseverates that it is by\nthese that objects are determined and arranged.' And i. 478: 'I know\nthat the categories which Kant laid down are in no way _proved_ by\nhim to be conditions of self-consciousness, but only said to be so:\nI know that space and time and what in the original consciousness is\ninseparable from them and fills them both, are still less deduced as\nsuch conditions, for of them it is not even said expressly--as of the\ncategories--that they are so, but only inferentially. But I believe\nquite as surely that I know that Kant had the thought of such a system:\nthat everything he actually propounds are fragments and results of this\nsystem; and that his statements have meaning and coherence only on this\npresupposition.' Cf. viii. 362.\n\nP. 89, \u00a7 42. Transcendental unity of self-consciousness. Kant's _Kritik\nder reinen Vernunft,_ \u00a7 16: 'The _I think_ must be able to accompany\nall my ideas.... This idea is an act of spontaneity. ... I name it\npure apperception ... or original apperception ... because it is that\nself-consciousness which can be accompanied by none further. The unity\nof it I also call the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in\norder to denote the possibility of cognition _\u00e0 priori_ from it.'\n\nP. 92, \u00a7 44. _Caput mortuum:_ a term of the Alchemists to denote the\nnon-volatile precipitate left in the retort after the spirit had been\nextracted: the fixed or dead remains, 'quando spiritus animam sursum\nvexit.'\n\nP. 92, \u00a7 45. Reason and Understanding. In the Wolfian School (_e.g._\nin Baumgarten's _Metaphysik,_ \u00a7 468) the term intellect (Verstand)\nis used of the general faculty of higher cognition, while _ratio_\n(Vernunft) specially denotes the power of seeing distinctly the\nconnexions of things. So Wolff (_Vern\u00fcnftige Gedanken von Gott, &c._ \u00a7\n277) defines Verstand as 'the faculty of distinctly representing the\npossible,' and Vernunft (\u00a7 368) as 'the faculty of seeing into the\nconnexion of truths.' It is on this use of _Reason_ as the faculty of\ninference that Kant's use of the term is founded: though it soon widely\ndeparts from its origin. For upon the 'formal' use of reason as the\nfaculty of syllogising, Kant superinduces a transcendental use as a\n'faculty of _principles_,' while the understanding is only 'a faculty\nof _rules.'_ 'Reason,' in other words, 'itself begets conceptions,'\nand 'maxims, which it borrows neither from the senses nor from the\nunderstanding.' (_Kritik d. r. Vern., Dialektik,_ Einleit. ii. A.) And\nthe essential aim of Reason is to give unity to the various cognitions\nof understanding. While the unity given by understanding is 'unity of\na possible experience,' that sought by reason is the discovery of an\nunconditioned which will complete the unity of the former (_Dial._\nEinleit. iv), or of 'the totality of the conditions to a given\nconditioned.' (_Dial,_ vii.)\n\nIt is this distinction of the terms which is dominant in Fichte and\nHegel, where Verstand is the more practical intellect which seeks\ndefinite and restricted results and knowledges, while Vernunft is\na deeper and higher power which aims at completeness. In Goethe's\nmore reflective prose we see illustrations of this usage: _e.g.\nWilh. Meister's Wanderjahre,_ i. it is said to be the object of\nthe 'reasonable' man 'das entgegengesetzte zu \u00fcberschauen und in\nUebereinstimmung zu bringen': or Bk. ii. Reasonable men when they have\ndevised something verst\u00e4ndig to get this or that difficulty out of the\nway, &c. Goethe, in his _Spr\u00fcche in Prosa_ (896), _Werke,_ iii. 281,\nsays 'Reason has for its province the thing in process (das Werdende),\nunderstanding the thing completed (das Gewordene): the former does not\ntrouble itself about the purpose, the latter asks not whence. Reason\ntakes delight in developing; understanding wishes to keep everything as\nit is, so as to use it.' (Similarly in Eckermann's Convers. Feb. 13,\n1829.) Cf. Oken, Naturphilosophie, \u00a7 2914. Verstand ist Microcosmus,\nVernunft Macrocosmus.\n\nKant's use of the term Reason, coupled with his special view of\nPractical Reason and his use of the term Faith (Glaube), leads on to\nthe terminology of Jacobi. In earlier writings Jacobi had insisted on\nthe contrast between the superior authority of feeling and faith (which\nare in touch with truth) and the mechanical method of intelligence and\nreasoning (Verstand and Vernunft). At a later period however he changed\nand fixed the nomenclature of his distinction. What he had first called\nGlaube he latterly called Vernunft,--which is in brief a 'sense for\nthe supersensible'--an intuition giving higher and complete or total\nknowledge--an immediate apprehension of the real and the true. As\ncontrasted with this reasonable faith or feeling, he regards Verstand\nas a mere faculty of inference or derivative knowledge, referring one\nthing to another by the rule of identity.\n\nThis distinction which is substantially reproduced by Coleridge\n(though with certain clauses that show traces of Schellingian\ninfluence) has connexions--like so much else in Jacobi--with the\nusage of Schopenhauer, 'Nobody,' says Jacobi, 'has ever spoken of an\nanimal Vernunft: a mere animal Verstand however we all know and speak\nof.' (Jacobi's _Werke,_ iii. 8.) Schopenhauer repeats and enforces\nthe remark. All animals possess, says Schopenhauer, the power of\napprehending causality, of cognising objects: a power of immediate and\nintuitive knowledge of real things: this is Verstand. But Vernunft,\nwhich is peculiar to man, is the cognition of _truth_ (not of reality):\nit is an abstract judgment with a sufficient reason (_Welt als W._ i. \u00a7\n6).\n\nOne is tempted to connect the modern distinction with an older one\nwhich goes back in its origin to Plato and Aristotle, but takes form in\nthe Neo-Platonist School, and enters the Latin world through Bo\u00ebthius.\n_Consol. Phil._ iv. 6: _Igitur uti est ad intellectum ratiocinatio,\nad id quod est id quod gignitur, ad aeternitatem tempus,_ and in v.\n4 there is a full distinction of _sensus, imaginatio, ratio_ and\n_intelligentia_ in ascending order. _Ratio_ is the discursive knowledge\nof the idea (_universali consideratione perpendit): intelligentia_\napprehends it at once, and as a simple _forma (pura mentis acie\ncontuetur)_: [cf. Stob. _Ed._ i. 826-832: Porphyr. _Sentent._15].\nReasoning belongs to the human species, just as intelligence to the\ndivine alone. Yet it is assumed--in an attempt to explain divine\nforeknowledge and defend freedom--that man may in some measure place\nhimself on the divine standpoint (v. 5).\n\nThis contrast between a higher mental faculty (_mens_) and a lower\n(_ratio_) which even Aquinas adopts from the interpretation of\nAristotle (_Summa Theol._ i. 79, 9) is the favourite weapon in the\nhands of mysticism. After the example of Dionysius Areop., Nicolaus of\nCusa, Reuchlin, and other thinkers of the Renaissance depreciate mere\ndiscursive thought and logical reasoning. It is the inner _mens_--like\na simple ray of light--penetrating by an immediate and indivisible\nact to the divine--which gives us access to the supreme science. This\n_simplex intelligentia,--_ superior to imagination or reasoning--as\nGerson says, _Consid. de Th._ 10, is sometimes named _mens,_ sometimes\n_Spiritus,_ the light of intelligence, the shadow of the angelical\nintellect, the divine light. From Scotus Erigena to Nicolas of Cusa\none tradition is handed down: it is taken up by men like Everard Digby\n(in his _Theoria Analytica_) and the group of Cambridge Platonists and\nby Spinoza in the seventeenth century, and it reappears, profoundly\nmodified, in the German idealism between 1790 and 1820.\n\nP. 99, \u00a7 48. 'Science of Logic'; Hegel's large work on the subject,\npublished between 1812-16. The discussions on the Antinomies belong\nchiefly to the first part of it.\n\nP. 102, \u00a7 50. 'Natural Theology,' here to be taken in a narrower sense\nthan in p. 73, where it is equivalent to Rational Theology in general.\nHere it means 'Physico-theology'--the argument from design in nature.\n\nP. 103, \u00a7 50. Spinoza--defining God as 'the union of thought with\nextension.' This is not verbally accurate; for according to _Ethica,_\ni. pr. 11, God, or the substance, consists of infinite attributes,\neach of which expresses the eternal and infinite essence. But Spinoza\nmentions of 'attributes' only two: _Ethica,_ ii. pr. 1. I Thought is\nan attribute of God: pr. 2, Extension is an attribute of God. And he\nadds, _Ethica,_ i. pr. 10, Schol. 'All the attributes substance has\nwere always in it together, nor can one be produced by another.' And\nin _Ethica,_ ii. 7. Sch. it is said: 'Thinking substance and extended\nsubstance is one and the same substance which is comprehended now under\nthis, now under that attribute.'\n\nP. 110, \u00a7 54. 'Practical in the true sense of the word.' Cf. Kant,\n_Werke,_ Ros. and Sch. i. 581: 'A great misunderstanding, exerting an\ninjurious influence on scientific methods, prevails with regard to what\nshould be considered \"practical\" in such sense as to justify its place\nin practical philosophy. Diplomacy and finance, rules of economy no\nless than rules of social intercourse, precepts of health and dietetic\nof the soul no less than the body, have been classed as practical\nphilosophy on the mere ground that they all contain a collection of\npractical propositions. Hut although such practical propositions\ndiffer in mode of statement from the theoretical propositions which\nhave for import the possibility of things and the exposition of their\nnature, they have the same content. \"Practical,\" properly so called,\nare only those propositions which relate to _Liberty_ under laws. All\nothers whatever are nothing but the theory of what pertains to the\n_nature_ of things--only that theory is brought to bear on the way in\nwhich the things may be produced by us in conformity with a principle;\n_i.e._ the possibility of the things is presented as the result of\na voluntary action which itself too may be counted among physical\ncauses.' And Kant, _Werke,_ iv. 10. 'Hence a sum of practical precepts\ngiven by philosophy does not form a special part of it (co-ordinate\nwith the theoretical) merely because they are practical. Practical\nthey might be, even though their principle were wholly derived from\nthe theoretical knowledge of nature,--as _technico-practical_ rules.\nThey are practical in the true sense, when and because their principle\nis not borrowed from the nature-conception (which is always sensuously\nconditioned) and rests therefore on the supersensible, which the\nconception of liberty alone makes knowable by formal laws. They are\ntherefore ethico-practical, _i.e._ not merely _precepts and rules_ with\nthis or that intention, but laws without antecedent reference to ends\nand intentions.'\n\nP. 111, \u00a7 54. Eudaemonism. But there is Eudaemonism and Eudaemonism;\nas Cf. Hegel, _Werke,_ i. 8. 4 The time had come when the infinite\nlonging away beyond the body and the world had reconciled itself\nwith the reality of existence. Yet the reality which the soul was\nreconciled to--the objective which the subjectivity recognised--was\nactually only empirical existence, common world and actuality.... And\nthough the reconciliation was in its heart and ground sure and fast,\nit still needed an objective form for this ground: the very necessity\nof nature made the blind certitude of immersion in the reality of\nempirical existence seek to provide itself with a justification and a\ngood conscience. This reconciliation for consciousness was found in the\nHappiness-doctrine: the fixed point it started from being the empirical\nsubject, and what it was reconciled to, the vulgar actuality, whereon\nit might now confide, and to which it might surrender itself without\nsin. The profound coarseness and utter vulgarity, which is at the basis\nof this happiness-doctrine, has its only elevation in its striving\nafter justification and a good conscience, which however can get no\nfurther than the objectivity of mere intellectualism.\n\n'The dogmatism of eudaemonism and of popular philosophy (Aufkl\u00e4rung)\ntherefore did not consist in the fact that it made happiness and\nenjoyment the supreme good. For if Happiness be comprehended as an\n_Idea,_ it ceases to be something empirical and casual--as also to be\nanything sensuous. In the supreme existence, reasonable act (Thun) and\nsupreme enjoyment are one. So long as supreme blessedness is supreme\n_Idea_ it matters not whether we try to apprehend the supreme existence\non the side of its ideality,--which, as isolated may be first called\nreasonable act--or on the side of its reality--which as isolated may\nbe first called enjoyment and feeling. For reasonable act and supreme\nenjoyment, ideality and reality are both alike in it and identical.\nEvery philosophy has only one problem--to construe supreme blessedness\nas supreme Idea. So long as it is by reason that supreme enjoyment is\nascertained, the distinguishability of the two at once disappears:\nfor this comprehension and the infinity which is dominant in act, and\nthe reality and finitude which is dominant in enjoyment, are taken up\ninto one another. The controversy with happiness becomes a meaningless\nchatter, when happiness is known as the blessed enjoyment of the\neternal intuition. But what was called eudaemonism meant--it must\nbe said--an empirical happiness, an enjoyment of sensation, not the\neternal intuition and blessedness.'\n\nP. 112, \u00a7 55. Schiller. _Ueber die aesthetische Erziehung des\nMenschen_(1795), 18th letter. 'Through beauty the sensuous man is led\nto form and to thought; through beauty the intellectual man is led back\nto matter and restored to the sense-world. Beauty combines two states\nwhich are opposed to one another.' Letter 25. 'We need not then have\nany difficulty about finding a way from sensuous dependence to moral\nliberty, after beauty has given a case where liberty can completely\nco-exist with dependence, and where man in order to show himself an\nintelligence need not make his escape from matter. If--as the fact\nof beauty teaches--man is free even in association with the senses,\nand if--as the conception necessarily involves--liberty is something\nabsolute and supersensible, there can no longer be any question how\nhe comes to elevate himself from limitations to the absolute: for\nin beauty this has already come to pass.' Cf. _Ueber Anmuth und\nW\u00fcrde_(1793). 'It is in a beautiful soul, then, that sense and reason,\nduty and inclination harmonize; and grace is their expression in the\nappearance. Only in the service of a beautiful soul can nature at the\nsame time possess liberty.' (See Bosanquet's _History of Aesthetic._)\n\nP. 115, \u00a7 60. The quotation in the note comes from \u00a7 87 of the _Kritik\nder Urtheilskraft_ (_Werke,_ ed. Ros. and Sch. iv. 357).\n\nP. 120, \u00a7 60. Fichte, _Werke,_ i. 279. 'The principle of life and\nconsciousness, the ground of its possibility, is (as has been shown)\ncertainly contained in the Ego: yet by this means there arises no\nactual life, no empirical life in time--and another life is for us\nutterly unthinkable. If such an actual life is to be possible, there\nis still needed for that a special impulse (Aufstoss) striking the\nEgo from the Non-ego. According to my system, therefore, the ultimate\nground of all actuality for the Ego is an original action and re-action\nbetween the Ego and something outside it, of which all that can be said\nis that it must be completely opposed to the Ego. In this reciprocal\naction nothing is brought into the Ego, nothing foreign imported;\neverything that is developed from it _ad infinitum_ is developed from\nit solely according to its own laws. The Ego is merely put in motion by\nthat opposite, so as to act; and without such a first mover it would\nnever have acted; and, as its existence consists merely in action, it\nwould not even have existed. But the source of motion has no further\nattributes than to set in motion, to be an opposing force which as such\nis only felt.\n\n'My philosophy therefore is realistic. It shows that the consciousness\nof finite natures cannot at all be explained, unless we assume a force\nexisting independently of them, and completely opposed to them;--on\nwhich as regards their empirical existence they are dependent. But\nit asserts nothing further than such an opposed force, which is\nmerely _felt,_ but not _cognised,_ by finite beings. All possible\nspecifications of this force or non-ego, which may present themselves\n_ad infinitum_ in our consciousness, my system engages to deduce from\nthe specifying faculty of the Ego....\n\n'That the finite mind must necessarily assume outside it something\nabsolute (a Ding:an:sich), and yet must on the other hand acknowledge\nthat this something only exists for the mind (is a necessary no\u00fcmenon):\nthis is the circle which may be infinitely expanded, but from which the\nfinite mind can never issue.' Cf. Fichte's _Werke,_ i. 248, ii. 478.\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nP. 121, \u00a7 62. F. H. Jacobi (_Werke,_ v. 82) in his _Woldemar_ (a\nromance contained in a series of letters, first published _as a whole_\nin 1781) writes: 'The philosophical understanding (Verstand) is jealous\nof everything unique, everything immediately certain which makes itself\ntrue, without proofs, solely by its existence. It persecutes this\nfaith of reason even into our inmost consciousness, where it tries to\nmake us distrust the feeling of our identity and personality.' 'What\nis absolutely and intrinsically true,' he adds (v. 122), 'is not got\nby way of reasoning and comparison: both our immediate consciousness\n(Wissen)--I am--and our conscience (Gewissen) are the work of a secret\nsomething in which heart, understanding, and sense combine.' 'Notions\n(Begriffe), far from embalming the living, really turn it into a\ncorpse' (v. 380).\n\nCf. Fichte's words (_Werke,_ ii. 255), Aus dem Gewissen allein stammt\ndie Wahrheit, &c.\n\nP. 122, \u00a7 62. The Letters on the doctrine of Spinoza, published in\n1785, were re-issued in 1789 with eight supplements.\n\n'A science,' says Jacobi in his latest utterance (_Werke,_ iv. pref.\nxxx.) 'is only a systematic register of cognitions mutually referring\nto one another--the first and last point in the series is wanting.'\n\nP. 123, \u00a7 62. Lalande's dictum is referred to by Fries (_Popul\u00e4re\nVorlesungen \u00fcber Sternkunde,_ 1813) quoted by Jacobi in his _Werke,_\nii. 55. What Lalande has actually written in the preface to his work on\nastronomy is that the science as he understands it has no relation to\nnatural theology--in other words, that he is not writing a Bridgewater\ntreatise.\n\nP. 123, \u00a7 63. Jacobi, _Werke,_ ii. 222. 'For my part, I regard the\nprinciple of reason as all one with the principle of life.' And ii.\n343: 'Evidently reason is the true and proper life of our nature.'\nIt is in virtue of our inner tendency and instinct towards the\neternal (Richtung und Trieb auf das Ewige),--of our sense for the\nsupersensible--that we, human beings, really subsist (iv. 6. 152). And\nthis Organ der Vernehmung des Uebersinnlichen is Reason (iii. 203, &c).\n\nThe language of Jacobi fluctuates, not merely in words, but in the\nintensity of his intuitionalism. Thus, _e.g._ iii. 32: 'The reason man\nhas is no faculty giving the science of the true, but only a presage'\n(Ahndung des Wahren). 'The belief in a God,' he says, at one time (iii.\n206) 'is as natural to man as his upright position': but that belief\nis, he says elsewhere, only 'an inborn devotion (Andacht) before an\nunknown God.' Thus, if we have an immediate awareness (Wissen) of\nGod, this is not knowledge or science (Wissenschaft). Such intuition\nof reason is described (ii. 9) as 'the faculty of _presupposing_ the\nintrinsically (an sich) true, good, and beautiful, with full confidence\nin the objective validity of the presupposition.' But that object we\nare let see only in feeling (ii. 61). 'Our philosophy,' he says (iii.\n6) 'starts from feeling--of course an objective and pure feeling.'\n\nP. 124, \u00a7 63. Jacobi (_Werke,_ iv. a, p. 211): 'Through faith (Glaube)\nwe know that we have a body.' Such immediate knowledge of our own\nactivity--'the feeling of I am, I act' (iii. 411)--the sense of\n'absolute self-activity' or freedom (of which the 'possibility cannot\nbe cognised,' because logically a contradiction) is what Jacobi calls\nAnschauung (Intuition). He distinguishes a sensuous, and a rational\nintuition (iii. 59).\n\nP. 125, \u00a7 63. Jacobi expressly disclaims identification of his Glaube\nwith the faith of Christian doctrine (_Werke,_ iv. a, p. 210). In\ndefence he quotes from Hume, Inquiry V, and from Reid, passages to\nillustrate his usage of the term 'belief--by the distinction between\nwhich and faith certain ambiguities are no doubt avoided.\n\nP. 129, \u00a7 66. Kant had said _'Concepts without intuitions are empty'_\nIt is an exaggeration of this half-truth (the other half is _Intuitions\nwithout concepts are blind_) that is the basis of these statements of\nJacobi (and of Schopenhauer)--a view of which the following passage\nfrom Schelling (_Werke,_ ii. 125) is representative. 'Concepts\n(Begriffe) are only silhouettes of reality. They are projected by\na serviceable faculty, the understanding, which only comes into\naction when reality is already on the scene,--which only comprehends,\nconceives, retains what it required a creative faculty to produce....\nThe mere concept is a word without meaning.... All reality that can\nattach to it is lent to it merely by the intuition (Anschauung) which\npreceded it. ... Nothing is real for us except what is _immediately\ngiven_ us, without any mediation by concepts, without our feeling at\nliberty. But nothing reaches us immediately except through intuition.'\nHe adds, however, 'Intuition is due to the activity of mind (Sein):\nit demands a disengaged sense (freier Sinn) and an intellectual organ\n(geistiges Organ).'\n\nP. 134. Cicero: _De Natura Deorum,_ i. 16; ii. 4, _De quo autem omnium\nnatura consentit, id verum esse necesse est_; cf. Seneca, Epist. cxvii.\n6. The principle is common to Stoics and Epicureans: it is the maxim\nof Catholic truth _Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creditum\nest_--equivalent to Aristotle's \u1f44 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6, \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4' \u03b5\u1f37\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c6\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd--But as\nAristotle remarks (_An. Post._ i. 31) \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03b4\u03af\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9.\n\nJacobi: _Werke,_ vi. 145. 'The general opinion about what is true and\ngood must have an authority equal to reason.'\n\nP. 136, \u00a7 72. Cf. _Encyclop._ \u00a7 400: 'That the heart and the feeling\nis not the form by which anything is justified as religious, moral,\ntrue, and just, and that an appeal to heart and feeling either means\nnothing or means something bad, should hardly need enforcing. Can any\nexperience be more trite than that hearts and feelings are also bad,\nevil, godless, mean, &c.? Ay, that the heart is the source of such\nfeelings only, is directly said in the words: Out of the heart proceed\nevil thoughts, &c. In times when the heart and the sentiment are, by\nscientific theology and philosophy, made the criterion of goodness,\nreligion, and morality, it is necessary to recall these trivial\nexperiences.'\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nP. 145, \u00a7 80. Goethe; the reference is to _Werke,_ ii. 268 (Natur und\nKunst):\n\n    Wer Groszes will, mu\u00df sich zusammenraffen:\n    In der Beschr\u00e4nkung zeigt sich erst der Meister,\n    Und das Gesetz nur kann uns Freiheit geben.\n\nSuch 'limitation' of aim and work is a frequent lesson in _Wilhelm\nMeister's Wanderjahre, e.g._ i. ch. 4. 'Many-sidedness prepares,\nproperly speaking, only the element in which the one-sided can act....\nThe best thing is to restrict oneself to a handi-work.' And i. ch. 12:\n'To be acquainted with and to exercise one thing rightly gives higher\ntraining than mere tolerableness (halfness) in a hundred sorts of\nthings.' And ii. ch. 12: 'Your general training and all establishments\nfor the purpose are fool's farces.'\n\nP. 147, \u00a7 81. Cf. Fichte, _Werke,_ ii. 37. 'Yet it is not _we_ who\nanalyse: but knowledge analyses itself, and can do so, because in all\nits being it is a _for-self_ (F\u00fcr:sich),' &c.\n\nP. 149, \u00a7 81. Plato, the inventor of Dialectic. Sometimes on the\nauthority of Aristotle, as reported by _Diog. Laert._ ix. 25, Zeno of\nElea gets this title; but Hegel refers to such statements as _Diog.\nLaer,',_ ii. 34 \u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03a0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03ad\u03b8\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f10\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b5 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1\u03bd.\n\nProtagoras. But it is rather in the dialogue _Meno,_ pp. 81-97,\nthat Plato exhibits this view of knowledge. Cf. _Phaedo,_72 E, and\n_Phaedrus,_ 245.\n\nParmenides; especially see Plat. _Parmen._ pp. 142, 166; cf. Hegel,\n_Werke,_ xi v. 204.\n\nWith Aristotle dialectic is set in contrast to apodictic, and treated\nas (in the modern sense) a quasi-inductive process (Ar. _Top._ Lib.\nviii.): with the Stoics, dialectic is the name of the half-rhetorical\nlogic which they, rather than Aristotle, handed on to the schoolmen of\nthe Middle Ages.\n\nP. 150, \u00a7 81. The physical elements are fire, air, earth, and water.\nEarthquakes, storms, &c, are examples of the 'meteorological process.'\nCf. _Encyclop._ \u00a7\u00a7 281-289.\n\nP. 152, \u00a7 82. Dialectic; cf: _Werke,_ v. 326 seqq.\n\nP. 154, \u00a7 82. Mysticism; cf. Mill's _Logic,_ bk. v, ch. 3, \u00a7 4:\n'Mysticism is neither more nor less than ascribing objective existence\nto the subjective creations of the mind's own faculties, to mere ideas\nof the intellect; and believing that by watching and contemplating\nthese ideas of its own making, it can read in them what takes place in\nthe world without.' Mill thus takes it as equivalent to an ontological\nmythology--probably a rare use of the term.\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nP. 156, \u00a7 85. The Absolute. The term, in something like its modern\nusage, is at least as old as Nicolaus Cusanus. God, according to him,\nis the _absoluta omnium quidditas (Apol._406), the _esse absolutum,_ or\n_ipsum esse in existentibus_ (_De ludo Globi,_ ii. 161 a), the _unum\nabsolutum,_ the _vis absoluta,_ or _possibilitas absoluta,_ or _valor\nabsolutus: absoluta vita, absoluta ratio: absoluta essendi forma._ On\nthis term and its companion _infinities_ he rings perpetual changes.\nBut its distinct employment to denote the 'metaphysical God' is much\nmore modern. In Kant, _e.g._ the 'Unconditioned' (Das Unbedingte)\nis the metaphysical, corresponding to the religious, conception of\ndeity; and the same is the case with Fichte, who however often makes\nuse of the adjective 'absolute.' It is with Schelling that the term\nis naturalised in philosophy: it already appears in his works of 1793\nand 1795: and from him apparently it finds its way into Fichte's\n_Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre_ of 1801 (_Werke,_ ii. 13) 'The\nabsolute is neither knowing nor being; nor is it identity, nor is it\nindifference of the two; but it is throughout merely and solely the\nabsolute.'\n\nThe term comes into English philosophical language through Coleridge\nand later borrowers from the German. See Ferrier's _Institutes of\nMetaphysic,_ Prop. xx, and Mill's _Examination of Hamilton,_ chap. iv.\n\nP. 158, \u00a7 86. Cf. Schelling, iii. 372: I = I expresses the identity\nbetween the 'I,' in so far as it is the producing, and the 'I' as the\nproduced; the original synthetical and yet identical proposition: the\n_cogito=sum_ of Schelling.\n\nP. 159. Definition of God as _Ens realissimum, e.g._ Meier's\n_Baumgarten's Metaphysic,_ \u00a7 605.\n\nJacobi, _Werke,_ iv. 6, thus describes Spinoza's God.\n\nAs to the beginning cf. Fichte, _Werke,_ ii. 14 (speaking of 'absolute\nknowing'): 'It is not a knowing of something, nor is it a knowing of\nnothing (so that it would be a knowing of somewhat, but this somewhat\nbe nothing): it is not even a knowing of itself, for it is no knowledge\nat all _of_;--nor is it _a_ knowing (quantitatively and in relation),\nbut it is (the) knowing (absolutely qualitatively). It is no act, no\nevent, or that somewhat is in knowing; but it is just the knowing, in\nwhich alone all acts and all events, which are there set down, can be\nset down.'\n\nHistory of Philosophy; cf. Hegel, _Werke,_ i. 165. 'If the Absolute,\nlike its phenomenon Reason, be (as it is) eternally one and the same,\nthen each reason, which has turned itself upon and cognised itself,\nhas produced a true philosophy and solved the problem which, like its\nsolution, is at all times the same. The reason, which cognises itself,\nhas in philosophy to do only with itself: hence in itself too lies\nits whole work and its activity; and as regards the inward essence of\nphilosophy there are neither predecessors nor successors.\n\n'Just as little, as of constant improvements, can there be talk of\n\"peculiar views\" of philosophy.... The true peculiarity of a philosophy\nis the interesting individuality, in which reason has organised itself\na form from the materials of a particular age; in it the particular\nspeculative reason finds spirit of its spirit, flesh of its flesh; it\nbeholds itself in it as one and the same, as another living being.\nEach philosophy is perfect in itself, and possesses totality, like a\nwork of genuine art. As little as the works of Apelles and Sophocles,\nif Raphael and Shakespeare had known them, could have seemed to them\nmere preliminary exercises for themselves--but as cognate spiritual\npowers;--so little can reason in its own earlier formations perceive\nonly useful preparatory exercises.' Cf. Schelling, iv. 401.\n\nP. 160, \u00a7 86. Parmenides (ap. Simplic. _Phys._): of the two ways of\ninvestigation the first is that _it is,_ and that not-to-be is not.\n\n    \u1f21 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f45\u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f13\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f61\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f13\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\n\nP. 161, \u00a7 87. The Buddhists. Cf. Hegel, _Werke,_ xi. 387. Modern\nhistories of Buddhism insist upon the purely ethico-religious character\nof the teaching. Writers like von Hartmann (_Religionsphilosophie,_ p.\n320) on the contrary hold that Buddhism carried out the esoteric theory\nof Brahmanism to the consequence that the abstract one is nothing.\nAccording to Vassilief, _Le Bouddhisme,_ p. 318 seqq., one of the\nBuddhist metaphysical schools, the Madhyamikas, founded by N\u00e2g\u00e2rdjuna\n400 years after Buddha, taught that All is Void.--Such metaphysics were\nprobably reactions of the underlying Brahmanist idea.\n\nBut generally Buddhism (as was not unnatural 60 years ago) is hardly\ntaken here in its characteristic historical features.\n\nP. 167, \u00a7 88. Aristotle, _Phys,_ i. 8 (191 a. 26): 'Those philosophers\nwho first sought the truth and the real substance of things got on a\nfalse track, like inexperienced travellers who fail to discover the\nway, and declared that nothing can either come into being or disappear,\nbecause it is necessary that what comes into being should come into\nbeing either from what is or from what is not, and that it is from both\nof these impossible: for what is does not become (it already is), and\nnothing would become from what is not.'\n\n(5) is an addition of ed. 3 (1830); cf. _Werke,_ xvii. 181.\n\nP. 168, \u00a7 88. The view of Heraclitus here taken is founded on the\ninterpretation given by Plato (in the _Theaetetus,_152; _Cratylus,_\n401) and by Aristotle, of a fundamental doctrine of the Ephesian--which\nhowever is expressed in the fragments by the name of the everliving\nfire. The other phrase (Ar. _Met._ i. 4) is used by Aristotle to\ndescribe the position, not of Heraclitus, but of Leucippus and\nDemocritus. Cf. Plutarch, _adv. Colotem,_ 4. 2 \u0394\u03b7\u03bc\u03cc\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f74\n\u03bc\u1fb1\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f25 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9; cf. Simplic. in Ar. _Phys._ fol. 7.\n\nP. 169, \u00a7 89. Daseyn: Determinate being. Cf. Schelling, i. 209.\n'Being (Seyn) expresses the absolute, Determinate being (Daseyn) a\nconditional, 'positing': Actuality, one conditioned in a definite sort\nby a definite condition. The single phenomenon in the whole system\nof the world has _actuality;_ the world of phenomena in general has\nDaseyn; but the absolutely-posited, the Ego, _is. I am_ is all the Ego\ncan say of itself.'\n\nP. 171, \u00a7 91. Being-by-self: An:sich:seyn.\n\nSpinoza, _Epist._ 50, _figura non aliud quam determinatio et\ndeterminatio negatio est._\n\nP. 172, \u00a7 92. Grenze (limit or boundary), and Schranke (barrier or\ncheck) are distinguished in _Werke,_ iii. 128-139 (see Stirling's\n_Secret of Hegel,_ i. 377 seqq.). Cf. Kant's remark, _Krit. d. r.\nVernunft,_ p. 795, that Hume only erschr\u00e4nkt our intellect, ohne ihn zu\nbegrenzen.\n\nP. 173, \u00a7 92. Plato, _Timaeus,_ c. 35 (formation of the world-soul):\n'From the individual and ever-identical essence (\u1f40\u03c5\u03c3\u03af\u03b1) and the\ndivisible which is corporeal, he compounded a third intermediate\nspecies of essence.... And taking these, being three, he compounded\nthem all into one form (\u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1), adjusting perforce the unmixable nature\nof the other and the same, and mingling them all with the essence, and\nmaking of three one again, he again distributed this total into as many\nportions as were fitting, but each of them mingled out of the same and\nthe other and the essence.'\n\nP. 175, \u00a7 94. Philosophy. Cf. Schelling, _Werke,_ ii. 377. 'A various\nexperience has taught me that for most men the greatest obstacle to the\nunderstanding and vital apprehension of philosophy is their invincible\nopinion that its object is to be sought at an infinite distance.\nThe consequence is, that while they should fix their eye on what is\npresent (das Gegenw\u00e4rtige), every effort of their mind is called out\nto get hold of an object which is not in question through the whole\ninquiry.' ... 'The aim of the sublimest science can only be to show the\nactuality,--in the strictest sense the actuality, the presence, the\nvital existence (Daseyn)--of a God in the whole of things and in each\none.... Here we deal no longer with an extra-natural or supernatural\nthing, but with the immediately near, the alone-actual to which we\nourselves also belong, and in which we are.'\n\nP. 177, \u00a7 95. Plato's _Philebus,_ ch. xii-xxiii (pp. 23-38): cf.\n_Werke,_ xiv. 214 seqq.: 'The absolute is therefore what in one unity\nis finite and infinite.'\n\nP. 178. Idealism of Philosophy: cf. Schelling, ii. 67. 'Every\nphilosophy therefore is and remains Idealism; and it is only under\nitself that it embraces realism and idealism; only that the former\nIdealism should not be confused with the latter, which is of a merely\nrelative kind.'\n\nHegel, _Werke,_ iii. 163. 'The proposition that the finite is \"ideal\"\nconstitutes Idealism. In nothing else consists the Idealism of\nphilosophy than in recognising that the finite has no genuine being....\nThe contrast of idealistic and realistic philosophy is therefore of\nno importance. A philosophy that attributed to finite existences as\nsuch a genuine ultimate absolute being would not deserve the name\nphilosophy.... By \"ideal\" is meant existing as a representation in\nconsciousness: whatever is in a mental concept, idea or imagination is\n\"ideal\": \"ideal\" is just another word for \"in imagination,\"--something\nnot merely distinct from the real, but essentially not real. The mind\nindeed is the great idealist: in the sensation, representation, thought\nof the mind the fact has not what is called _real_ existence; in the\nsimplicity of the Ego such external being is only suppressed, existing\n_for me,_ and \"ideally\" in me. This subjective idealism refers only to\nthe representational form, by which an import is mine.'\n\nP. 180, \u00a7 96. The distinction of nature and mind as real and ideal is\nespecially Schelling's: See _e.g._ his _Einleitung,_ &c. iii. 272. 'If\nit is the problem of Transcendental Philosophy to subordinate the real\nto the ideal, it is on the contrary the problem of the philosophy of\nnature to explain the ideal from the real.'\n\nP. 183, \u00a7 98. Newton: see _Scholium_ at the end of the _Principia,_ and\ncf. _Optics,_ iii. qu. 28.\n\nModern Atomism, besides the conception of particles or molecules, has\nthat of mathematical centres of force.\n\nKant, _Werke,_ v. 379 (ed. Rosenk.). 'The general principle of the\n_dynamic_ of material nature is that all reality in the objects of the\nexternal senses must be regarded as moving force: whereby accordingly\nso-called solid or absolute impenetrability is banished from natural\nscience as a meaningless concept, and repellent force put in its\nstead; whereas true and immediate attraction is defended against all\nthe subtleties of a self-misconceiving metaphysic and declared to be a\nfundamental force necessary for the very possibility of the concept of\nmatter.'\n\nP. 184, \u00a7 98. Abraham Gottheit K\u00e4stner (1719-1800), professor\nforty-four years at G\u00f6ttingen, enjoyed in the latter half of the\neighteenth century a considerable repute, both in literature and in\nmathematical science. Some of, his epigrams are still quoted.\n\nP. 190, \u00a7 102. The two 'moments' of number Unity, and Sum (Anzahl),\nmay be compared with the Greek distinction between one and \u1f00\u03c1\u03b9\u03b8\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2\n(cf. Arist. _Phys._ iv. 12 \u1f10\u03bb\u03ac\u03c7\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b9\u03b8\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2 \u1f21 \u03b4\u03c5\u03ac\u03c2). According\nto Rosenkranz (_Leben Hegels_) the classification of arithmetical\noperations often engaged Hegel's research. Note the relation in Greek\nbetween \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd and \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd. Cf. Kant's view of the 'synthesis' in\narithmetic.\n\nP. 193, \u00a7 103. Intensive magnitude. Cf. Kant, _Kritik der reinen\nVernunft,_ p. 207, on Anticipation of Perception (Wahrnehmung), and p.\n414, in application to the question of the soul's persistence.\n\nP. 195, \u00a7 104. Not Aristotle, but rather Simplicius on the _Physics_\nof Aristotle, fol. 306: giving Zeno's argument against the alleged\ncomposition of the line from a series of points. What you can say of\none supposed small real unit, you can say of a smaller, and so on _ad\ninfinitum._ (Cf. Burnet's _Early Greek Philosophy,_ p. 329.)\n\nP. 196, \u00a7 104. The distinction between imagination and intellect made\nby Spinoza in _Ep._ xii. (olim xxix.) in _Opp._ ed. Land vol. ii. 40\nseqq. is analogous to that already noted (p. 402) between _ratio_ and\n_intellegentia,_ and is connected, as by Bo\u00ebthius, with the distinction\nwhich Plato, _Timaeus,_ 37, draws between eternity (\u03b1\u1f30\u03ce\u03bd) and time.\n\nThe infinite (_Eth._ i. prop. 8. Schol. I) is the 'absolute affirmation\nof a certain nature's existence,' as opposed to finitude which is\nreally _ex parte negatio._ 'The problem has always been held extremely\ndifficult, if not inextricable, because people did not distinguish\nbetween what is concluded to be infinite by its own nature and the\nforce of its definition, and what has no ends, not in virtue of its\nessence, but in virtue of its cause. It was difficult also because\nthey did not distinguish between what is called infinite because it\nhas no ends, and that whose parts (though we may have a maximum and\nminimum of it) we cannot equate or explicate by any number. Lastly\nbecause they lid not distinguish between what we can only understand\n(_intelligere,_) but not imagine, and what we can also imagine.'\n\nTo illustrate his meaning, Spinoza calls attention to the distinction\nof substance from mode, of eternity from duration. We can 'explicate'\nthe existence only of modes by duration: that of substance, 'by\neternity, _i.e._ by an infinite fruition of existence or being' (_per\naeternitatem, hoc est, infinitam existendi, sive, invita latinitate,\nessendi fruitionem._) The attempt therefore to show that extended\n_substance_ is composed of parts is an illusion,--which arises because\nwe look at quantity 'abstractly or superficially, as we have it in\nimagination by means of the senses.' So looking at it, as we are liable\nto do, a quantity will be found divisible, finite, composed of parts\nand manifold. But if we look at it as it really is,--as a Substance\n--as it is in the intellect alone--(which is a work of difficulty), it\nwill be found infinite, indivisible, and unique. 'It is only therefore\nwhen we abstract duration and quantity from substance, that we use\ntime to determine duration and measure to determine quantity, so as to\nbe able to imagine them. Eternity and substance, on the other hand,\nare no objects of imagination but only of intellect; and to try to\nexplicate them by such notions as measure, time, and number--which are\nonly modes of thinking or rather of imagining--is no better than to\nfall into imaginative raving.' 'Nor will even the modes of Substance\never be rightly understood, should they be confounded with this sort\nof _entia rationis_' (_i.e. modi cogitandi_ subserving the easier\nretention, explication and _imagination_ of things _understood_)'\nor aids to imagination. For when we do so, we separate them from\nsubstance, and from the mode in which they flow from eternity, without\nwhich they cannot be properly understood.' (Cf. Hegel's _Werke,_ i. 63.)\n\nThe verses from Albr. von Haller come from his poem on Eternity (1736).\nHegel seems to quote from an edition before 1776, when the fourth line\nwas added in the stanza as it thus finally stood:--\n\n    Ich h\u00e4ufe ungeheure Zahlen,\n    Geb\u00fcrge Millionen auf,\n    Ich welze Zeit auf Zeit und Welt auf Welten hin,\n    Und wenn ich auf der March des endlichen nun bin,\n    Und von der f\u00fcrchterlichen H\u00f6he\n    Mit Schwindeln wieder nach dir sehe,\n    Ist alle Macht der Zahl, vermehrt mit tausend Malen,\n    Noch nicht ein Theil von dir.\n    Ich tilge sie, und du liegst ganz vor mir.\n\nKant, _Kritik d. r. Vernunft,_ p. 641. 'Even Eternity, however _eerily_\nsublime may be its description by Haller,' &c.\n\nP. 197, \u00a7 104. Pythagoras in order of time probably comes between\nAnaximenes (of Ionia) and Xenophanes (of Elea). But the mathematical\nand metaphysical doctrines attributed to the Pythagorean are known\nto us only in the form in which they are represented in Plato and\nAristotle, _i.e._ in a later stage of development. The Platonists (cf.\nArist. _Met._ i. 6; xi. 1. 12; xii. 1. 7; cf. Plat. _Rep._ p. 510)\ntreated mathematical fact as mid-way between 'sensibles' and 'ideas';\nand Aristotle himself places mathematics as a science between physical\nand metaphysical (theological) philosophy.\n\nThe tradition (referred to p. 198) about Pythagoras is given by\nIamblichus, _Vita Pyth._ \u00a7115 seqq.: it forms part of the later\nNeo-Pythagorean legend, which entered literature in the first centuries\nof the Christian era.\n\nP. 201, \u00a7 107. Hebrew hymns: _e.g. Psalms_ lxxiv. and civ.; Proverbs\nviii. and Job xxxviii. _Vetus verbum est,_ says Leibniz (ed. Erdmann,\np. 162), _Deum omnia pondere, mensura, numero, fecisse._\n\nP. 202, \u00a7 108. The antinomy of measure. These logical puzzles\nare the so-called fallacy of Sorites (a different thing from the\nchain-syllogism of the logic-books); cf. Cic. _Acad._ ii. 28, 29; _De\nDivin._ ii. 4--and the \u03c6\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03ba\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 cf. Horace, _Epist._ ii. 1-45.\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nP. 211, \u00a7 113. Self-relation--(sich) auf sich beziehen.\n\nP. 213, \u00a7 115. The 'laws of thought' is the magniloquent title given\nin the Formal Logic since Kant's day to the principles or maxims\n(_principia_, Grunds\u00e4tze) which Kant himself described as 'general and\nformal criteria of truth.' They include the so-called principle of\ncontradiction, with its developments, the principle of identity and\nexcluded middle: to which, with a desire for completeness, eclectic\nlogicians have added the Leibnizian principle of the reason. Hegel\nhas probably an eye to Krug and Fries in some of his remarks. The\nthree laws may be compared and contrasted with the three principles,\n--homogeneity, specification, and continuity of forms, in Kant's\n_Kritik d. r. Vern._ p. 686.\n\nP. 217, \u00a7 117. Leibniz, _Nouveaux Essais,_ Liv. ii. ch. 27, \u00a7 3 (ed.\nErdmann, p. 273: cf. fourth Letter to Clarke). _Il n'y a point deux\nindividus indiscernables. Un gentilhomme d'esprit de mes amis, en\nparlant avec moi en pr\u00e9sence de Madame l'Electrice dans le jardin de\nHerrenhausen, crut qu'il trouverait bien deux feuilles enti\u00e8rement\nsemblables. Madame l'Electrice l'en d\u00e9fia, et il courut longtems en\nvain pour en chercher._\n\nThe principle of individuation or indiscernibility is: 'If two\nindividuals were perfectly alike and equal and, in a word,\nindistinguishable by themselves, there would be no principle of\nindividuation: (Leibniz, ed. Erdm. p. 277) _Poser deux choses\nindiscernables est poser la m\u00eame chose sous deux noms_ (p. 756).\n_Principium individuationis idem est quod absolutae specificationis qu\u00e2\nres ita sit determinata, ut ab aliis omnibus distingui possit._\n\nP. 221, \u00a7 119. Polarity. Schelling, ii. 489. 'The law of Polarity is a\nuniversal law of nature'; cf. ii. 459: 'It is a first principle of a\nphilosophic theory of nature to have a view (in the whole of nature),\non polarity and dualism.' But he adds (476), 'It is time to define\nmore accurately the concept of polarity.' So Oken, _Naturphilosophie_:\n\u00a776: 'A force consisting of two principles is called Polarity.' \u00a7 77:\n'Polarity is the first force which makes its appearance in the world.'\n\u00a7 81: 'The original movement is a result of the original polarity.'\n\nP. 223, \u00a7 119. Cf. Fichte, ii. 53. 'To everything but this the\nlogically trained thinker can rise. He is on his guard against\ncontradiction. But, in that case, how about the possibility of the\nmaxim of his own logic that we can think no contradiction. In some way\nhe must have got hold of contradiction and thought it, or he could\nmake no communications about it. Had such people only once regularly\nasked themselves how they came to think the _merely_ possible or\ncontingent (the not-necessary), and how they actually do so! Evidently\nthey here leap through a not-being, not-thinking, &c, into the utterly\nunmediated, self-initiating, free,--into be\u00ebnt non-being,--in short,\nthe above contradiction, as it was laid down. With consistent thinkers\nthe result of this incapacity is nothing but the utter abolition of\nfreedom,--the most absolute fatalism and Spinozism.\n\nP. 227, \u00a7121. Leibniz (ed. Erdmann, p. 515). 'The principle of _la\nraison d\u00e9terminante_ is that nothing ever occurs without there being a\ncause for it, or at least a determinant reason, _i.e._ something which\nmay serve to render a reason _\u00e0 priori_ why that is existent rather\nthan in any other way. This great principle holds good in all events.'\nCf. p. 707. 'The principle of \"sufficient reason\" is that in virtue\nof which we consider that no fact could be found true or consistent,\nno enunciation truthful, without there being a sufficient reason why\nit is so and not otherwise.... When a truth is necessary, we can find\nthe reason of it by analysis, resolving it into simpler ideas and\ntruths, until we come to primitive ideas.... But the sufficient reason\nought also to be found in contingent truths or truths of fact, _i.e._\nin the series of things spread through the universe of creatures,\nor the resolution into particular reasons might go into a limitless\ndetail: ... and as all this detail embraces only other antecedent, or\nmore detailed contingencies, ... the sufficient or final (_derni\u00e8re_)\nreason must be outside the succession or series of this detail of\ncontingencies, however infinite it might be. And it is thus that the\nfinal reason of things must be in a \"necessary substance,\" in which the\ndetail of the changes exists only _eminenter,_ as in the source,--and\nit is what we call God.' _(Monadology_ \u00a7\u00a7 32-38.)\n\nHence the supremacy of final causes. Thus _Opp._ ed. Erdmann, p. 678:\n_Ita fit ut efficientes causae pendeant a finalibus, et spiritualia\nsint natura priora materialibus._ Accordingly he urges, p. 155, that\nfinal cause has not merely a moral and religious value in ethics and\ntheology, but is useful even in physics for the detection of deep-laid\ntruths. Cf. p. 106: _C'est sanctifier la Philosophie que de faire\ncouler ses ruisseaux de la fontaine des attributs de Dieu. Bien loin\nd'exclure les causes finales et la consid\u00e9ration d'un \u00eatre agissant\navec sagesse, c'est de l\u00e0 qu'il faut tout d\u00e9duire en Physique._ Cf.\nalso _Principes de la Nature_ (Leibn. ed. Erdm. p. 716): 'It is\nsurprising that by the sole consideration of efficient causes or\nof matter, we could not render a reason for those laws of movement\ndiscovered in our time. _Il y faut recourir aux causes finales_.'\n\nP. 228, \u00a7 121 Socrates. The antitheses between Socrates and the\nSophists belongs in the main to the Platonic dialogues,--not co the\nhistorical Socrates. It is the literary form in which the philosophy of\nPlato works out its development through the criticism of contemporary\nopinions and doctrines. And even in Plato's writings the antagonism is\nvery unlike what later interpretations have made out of it.\n\nP. 231, \u00a7 124. Thing by itself (thing in itself) the Ding:an:sich.\n\nP. 235, \u00a7 126. Cf. _Encycl._ \u00a7 334 (_Werke,_ viii. 1. p. 411). 'In\nempirical chemistry the chief object is the _particularity_ of the\nmatters and products, which are grouped by superficial abstract\nfeatures which make impossible any system in the special detail. In\nthese lists, metals, oxygen, hydrogen, &c.--metalloids, sulphur,\nphosphorus appear side by side as _simple_ chemical bodies on the same\nlevel. The great physical variety of these bodies must of itself create\na prepossession against such coordination; and their chemical origin,\nthe process from which they issue, is clearly no less various. But\nin an equally chaotic way, more abstract and more real processes are\nput on the same level. If all this is to get scientific form, every\nproduct ought to be determined according to the grade of the concrete\nand completely developed process from which it essentially issues, and\nwhich gives it its peculiar significance; and for that purpose it is\nnot less essential to distinguish grades in abstractness or reality\nof the process. Animal and vegetable substances in any case belong\nto a quite other order: so little can their nature be understood from\nthe chemical process, that they are rather destroyed in it, and only\nthe way of their death is apprehended. These substances, however,\nought above all to serve to counter-act the metaphysic predominant\nin chemistry as in physics,--the ideas or rather wild fancies of the\n_unalterability of matters_ under all circumstances, as well as the\ncategories of the _composition_ and the _consistence_ of bodies from\nsuch matters. We see it generally admitted that chemical matters lose\nin combination the _properties_ which they show in separation: and yet\nwe find the idea prevailing that they are the same things _without_ the\nproperties as they are _with_ them,--so that as things _with_ these\nproperties they are not results of the process.'--Cf. _Werke,_ vii. a.\n372: 'Air does not consist of oxygen and nitrogen: but these are the\nforms under which air is put,' cf. _ib._403.\n\nP. 241, \u00a7 131. Fichte's _Sonnenklarer Bericht_ appeared in 1801.\n\nP. 247, \u00a7 136. Herder's _Gott: Gespr\u00e4che \u00fcber Spinoza's System,_ 1787,\n2nd ed. 1800. 'God is, in the highest and unique sense of the word,\nForce, _i.e._ the primal force of all forces, the soul of all souls'\n(p. 63), 'All that we call matter, therefore, is more or less animate:\nit is a realm of efficient forces. One force predominates: otherwise\nthere were no _one,_ no whole' (p. 207). 'The supreme being (Daseyn)\ncould give its creatures nothing higher than being. (_Theophron._) But,\nmy friend, being and being, however simple in the concept, are in their\nestate very different; and what do you suppose, Philolaus, marks its\ngrades and differences? (_Phil._) Nothing but forces. In God himself\nwe found no higher conception; but all his forces were only one. The\nsupreme force could not be other than supreme goodness and wisdom,\never-living, ever-active. (_Theoph._) Now you yourself see, Philolaus,\nthat the supreme, or rather the All (for God is not a supreme unit in\na scale of beings like himself), could not reveal himself otherwise\nthan in the universe as active. In him nothing could slumber, and what\nhe expressed was himself. He is before everything, and everything\nsubsists in him: the whole world an expression, an appearance of his\never-living, ever-acting forces' (p. 200).\n\n'It was the mistake of Spinoza,' says Herder, 'to be unduly influenced\nby the Cartesian phraseology. Had he chosen the conception of force and\neffect, everything would have gone easier, and his system become much\nmore distinct and coherent. 'Had he developed the conception of power,\nand the conception of matter, he must in conformity with his system\nnecessarily have come to the conception of forces, which work as well\nin matter as in organs of thinking: he would in that case have regarded\npower and thought as forces, _e.g._ as one.' (Cf. H. Spencer, 'Force,\nthe Ultimate of Ultimates.' First Princ. p 169)\n\nAccording to Rosenkranz (_Leben Hegels,_ p. 223) there exists in\nmanuscript a criticism by Hegel on the second edition of Herder's\n_God._ Herder's Dialogue belongs to the controversy aroused by Jacobi's\nletters on Spinoza.\n\nP. 250, \u00a7 136. Newton. Leibniz charges him with the view that God needs\nfrom time to time _remonter sa montre,_ otherwise it would cease going:\nthat his machine requires to be cleaned (_d\u00e9crasser_) by extraordinary\naid' (ed. Erdm. p. 746).\n\nP. 252, \u00a7 140. The verses quoted occur in Goethe's _Werke_ ii. 376,\nunder the heading Allerdings. Originally the first four lines appeared\nin Haller's poem _Die menschlichen Tugenden_ thus--\n\n    Ins Innre der Natur bringt sein erschaffner Geist:\n    Zu gl\u00fccklich, wenn sie noch die \u00e4u\u00dfre Schale weist!\n\n    (To nature's heart there penetrates no mere created mind:\n    Too happy if she but display the outside of her rind.)\n\nHegel--reading weizt for weist--takes the second line as\n\n    Too happy, if he can but know the outside of her rind.\n\nGoethe's attack upon a vulgar misuse of the lines belongs to his\ndispute with the scientists. His verses appeared in 1820 as _Heiteres\nReimst\u00fcck_ at the end of Heft 3 _zur Morphologie,_--of which the\nclosing section is entitled _Freundlicher Zuruf_ (_Werke_ xxvii. 161),\nas follows:--\n\n    \"Ins Innre der Natur,\"\n    O du Philister!--\n    \"Dringt kein erschaffner Geist.\"\n    .    .    .    .    .    .\n    \"Gl\u00fcckselig! wem sie nur\n    Die \u00e4u\u00dfre Schale weis't.\"\n    Das h\u00f6r' ich sechzig Jahre wiederholen,\n    Ich fluche drauf, aber verstohlen:\n    Sage mir taufend tausendmale:\n    Alles giebt sie reichlich und gern;\n    Natur hat weder Stern\n    Noch Schale,\n    Alles ist sie mit einem Male.\n\n[The last seven lines may be thus paraphrased in continuation:\n\n    I swear--of course but to myself--as rings within my ears\n    That same old warning o'er and o'er again for sixty years,\n    And thus a thousand thousand times I answer in my mind:\n    --With gladsome and ungrudging hand metes nature from her store:\n    She keeps not back the core,\n    Nor separates the rind,\n    But all in each both rind and core has evermore combined.]\n\nP. 254, \u00a7 140. Plato and Aristotle: cf. Plato, _Phaedrus,_ 247 A\n(\u03c6\u03b8\u03cc\u03bdo\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03be\u03c9 \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03bd \u03c7\u03cc\u03c1o\u03c5 \u1f34\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9); _Timaeus,_ 29 E; and Aristotle,\n_Metaph._ i. 2. 22.\n\nP. 256, \u00a7 140. Goethe: _S\u00e4mmtl. Werke,_ iii. 203 (_Maxime und\nReflexionen_). Gegen gro\u00dfe Vorz\u00fcge eines Andern giebt es kein\nRettungsmittel als die Liebe. Cf. Schiller to Goethe, 2 July, 1796.\n'How vividly I have felt on this occasion ... that against surpassing\nmerit nothing but Love gives liberty' (da\u00df es dem Vortrefflichen\ngegen\u00fcber seine Freiheit giebt als die Liebe).\n\n'Pragmatic.' This word, denoting a meddlesome busybody in older English\nand sometimes made a vague term of abuse, has been in the present\ncentury used in English as it is here employed in German.\n\nAccording to Polybius, ix. I. 2, the \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f31\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\nis that which has a directly utilitarian aim. So Kant, _Foundation of\nMetaph. of Ethic (Werke,_ viii. 41, note): 'A history is pragmatically\ncomposed when it renders prudent, _i.e._ instructs the world how it may\nsecure its advantage better or at least as well as the ages preceding.'\nSchelling (v. 308) quotes in illustration of pragmatic history-writing\nthe words of Faust to Wagner (Goethe, xi. 26):\n\n    Was ihr den Geist der Zeiten heisst,\n    Das ist im Grund der herren eigner Geist,,\n    In dem die Zeiten sich bespiegeln.\n\nCf. also Hegel, _Werke,_ ix. 8. 'A second kind of reflectional history\nis the pragmatic. When we have to do with the past and are engaged\nwith a distant world, the mind sees rising before it a present, which\nit has from its own action as a reward for its trouble. The events are\ndifferent; but their central and universal fact, their structural\nplan is identical. This abolishes the past and makes the event\npresent. Pragmatic reflections, however abstract they be, are thus in\nreality the present, and vivify the tales of the past with the life of\nto-day.--Here too a word should specially be given to the moralising\nand the moral instructions to be gained through history,--for which it\nwas often studied.... Rulers, statesmen, nations, are especially bidden\nlearn from the experience of history. But what experience and history\nteach is that nations and governments never have learned anything from\nhistory, or acted upon teaching which could have been drawn from it.'\n\nCf. Froude: _Divorce of Catherine,_ p. 2. 'The student (of history)\nlooks for an explanation (of political conduct) in elements which he\nthinks he understands--in pride, ambition, fear, avarice, jealousy, or\nsensuality.'\n\nP. 257, \u00a7 141. Cf. Goethe, xxiii, 298. 'What is the outside of an\norganic nature but the ever-varied phenomenon of the inside? This\noutside, this surface is so exactly adapted to a varied, complex,\ndelicate, inward structure that it thus itself becomes an inside:\nboth aspects, the outside and the inside, standing in most direct\ncorrelation alike in the quietest existence and in the most violent\nmovement.'\n\nP. 260, \u00a7 143. Kant, _Kritik der reinen Vernunft,_ 2nd ed. p. 266.\n\nP. 269, \u00a7 147. Cf. Schelling, _Werke,_ v. 290 (cf. iii. 603). 'There\nare three periods of history, that of nature, of destiny, and of\nprovidence. These three ideas express the same identity, but in a\ndifferent way. Destiny too is providence, but recognised in the real,\nas providence, is also destiny, but beheld (angeschaut) in the ideal.'\n\nP. 275, \u00a7 151. On the relation between Spinoza and Leibniz cf. Hegel,\n_Werke,_ iv. 187-193. It would be a mistake, however, to represent\nLeibniz as mainly engaged in a work of conscious antagonism to Spinoza.\n\nP. 277, \u00a7 153. Jacobi.--Jacobi (like Schopenhauer) insists specially on\nthe distinction between grounds (Gr\u00fcnde)--which are formal, logical,\nand verbal, and causes (Ursachen)--which carry us into reality and\nlife and nature. To transform the mere _Because_ into the _cause_\nwe must (he says) pass from logic and the analytical understanding\nto experience and the inner life. Instead of the timelessness of\nsimultaneity which characterises the logical relation cf ground and\nconsequent, the nexus of cause and effect introduces the element\nof time,--thereby acquiring reality (Jacobi, _Werke,_ iii. 452).\nThe conception of Cause--meaningless as a mere category of abstract\nthought--gets reality as a factor in experience, ein Erfahrungsbegriff,\nand is immediately given to us in the consciousness of our own\ncausality (Jacobi, _Werke,_ iv. 145-158). Cf. Kant, _Kritik der reinen\nVern._ p. 116.\n\nP. 283, \u00a7 158. The _Amor intellectualis Dei_ (Spinoza, _Eth._ v. 32)\nis described as a consequence of the third grade of cognition, viz.\nthe _scientia intuitiva_ which 'proceeds from an adequate idea of the\nformal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate cognition\nof the essence of things (ii. 40, Schol. 2). From it arises (v.\n27), the highest possible _acquiescentia mentis,_ in which the mind\ncontemplates all things _sub specie aeternitatis_ (v. 29), knows itself\nto be in God and sees itself and all things in their divine essence.\nBut this intellectual love of mind towards God is part of the infinite\nlove wherewith God loves himself (v. 36) 'From these things we clearly\nunderstand in what our salvation or blessedness or liberty consists: to\nwit, in the constant and eternal love towards God, or in the love of\nGod towards men' (Schol. to v. 36).\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\nPage 289, \u00a7 161. Evolution and development in the stricter sense\nin which these terms were originally used in the seventeenth and\neighteenth centuries imply a theory of preformation, according\nto which the growth of an organic being is simply a process of\nenlarging and filling out a miniature organism, actual but invisible,\nbecause too inconspicuous. Such was the doctrine adopted by Leibniz\n(_Consid\u00e9rations sur le principe de vie; Syst\u00e8me nouveau de la Nature_,\n&c). According to it development is no real generation of new parts,\nbut only an augmentation into bulk and visibility of parts already\noutlined. This doctrine of preformation (as opposed to epigenesis)\nis carried out by Charles Bonnet, who in his _Consid\u00e9rations sur les\ncorps organis\u00e9s_ (1762) propounds the further hypothesis that the\n'germs' from which living beings proceed contain, enclosed one within\nanother, the germs of all creatures yet to be. This is the hypothesis\nof '_Embo\u00eetement._' 'The system which regards generations as mere\neducts' says Kant (_Kritik der Urteilskraft,_ \u00a7 80; _Werke,_ iv. 318)\n'is called that of _individual_ preformation or the evolution theory:\nthe system which regards them as products is called Epigenesis.--which\nmight also be called the theory of _generic_ preformation, considering\nthat the productive powers of the g\u00e9n\u00e9rants follow the inherent\ntendencies belonging to the family characteristics, and that the\nspecific form is therefore a 'virtual' preformation, in this way the\nopposing theory of individual preformation might be better called\nthe involution theory, or theory of Einschachtelung (_Embo\u00eetement._)\nCf. Leibniz (_Werke,_ Erdmann, 715). 'As animals generally are not\nentirely born at conception or _generation,_ no more do they entirely\nperish at what we call _death_; for it is reasonable that what does\nnot commence naturally, does not finish either in the order of nature.\nThus quitting their mask or their rags, they only return to a subtler\ntheatre, where however they can be as sensible and well regulated as\nin the greater.... Thus not only the souls, but even the animals are\nneither generable nor perishable: they are only developed, enveloped,\nre-clothed, unclothed,--transformed. The souls never altogether quit\ntheir body, and do not pass from one body into another body which is\nentirely new to them. There is therefore no metempsychosis, but there\nis metamorphosis. The animals change, take and quit only parts: which\ntakes place little by little and by small imperceptible parcels, but\ncontinually, in nutrition: and takes place suddenly notably but rarely,\nat conception, or at death, which make them gain or lose much all at\nonce.'\n\nThe theory of _Embo\u00eetement_ or _Envelopment,_ according to Bonnet\n(_Consid\u00e9rations,_ &c. ch. I) is that 'the germs of all the organised\nbodies of one species were inclosed (_renferm\u00e9s_) one in another,\nand have been developed successively.' So according to Haller\n(_Physiology,_ Tome vii. \u00a7 2) 'it is evident that in plants the\nmother-plant contains the germs of several generations; and there is\ntherefore no inherent improbability in the view that _tous les enfans,\nexcept\u00e9 un, fussent renferm\u00e9s dans l'ovaire de la premi\u00e8re Fille\nd'Eve.'_ Cf. Weismann's _Continuity of the Germ-plasma._ Yet Bonnet\n(_Contemplation de la Nature,_ part vii. ch. 9, note 2), says, 'The\ngerms are not enclosed like boxes or cases one in another, but a germ\nforms part of another germ, as a grain forms part of the plant in which\nit is developed.'\n\nP. 293, \u00a7 163. Rousseau, _Contrat Social,_ liv. ii. ch. 3.\n\nP. 296, \u00a7 165. The 'adequate' idea is a sub-species of the 'distinct.'\nWhen an idea does not merely distinguish a thing from others (when\nit is _clear),_ or in addition represent the characteristic marks\nbelonging to the object so distinguished (when it is _distinct),_ but\nalso brings out the farther characteristics of these characteristics,\nthe idea is _adequate._ Thus adequate is a sort of second power of\ndistinct. (Cf. Baumeister's _Instit. Philos. Ration._ 1765, \u00a7\u00a7 64-94.)\nHegel's description rather agrees with the 'complete idea' 'by which\nI put before my mind singly marks sufficient to discern the thing\nrepresented from all other things in every case, state, and time'\n(Baumeister, _ib._ \u00a7 88). But cf. Leibniz, ed. Erdm. p. 79: _notitia\nadaequata._\n\nP. 298, \u00a7 166. Cf. Baumeister, _Instit. Phil. Rat._ \u00a7 185: _Judicium\nest idearum conjunctio vel separatio._\n\nP. 299, \u00a7 166. _Punctum saliens:_ the _punctum sanguineum saliens_ of\nHarvey (_de Generat. Animal, exercit._ 17), or first appearance of the\nheart: the _\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03b3\u03bc\u1f74 \u03b1\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03af\u03bd\u03b7_ in the egg, of which Aristotle (_Hist.\nAnim._ vi. 3) says \u03c4o\u1fe1\u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03b7\u03b4\u1fb7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f65\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f13\u03bc\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd.\n\nP. 301, \u00a7 169. Cf. Whately, _Logic_ (Bk. ii. ch. I, \u00a7 2), 'Of these\nterms that which is spoken of is called the _subject;_ that which is\nsaid of it, the _predicate._'\n\nP. 303, \u00a7 171. Kant, _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_ (p. 95, 2nd ed.) \u00a7 9.\n\nP. 304, \u00a7 172. Cf. Jevons, _Principles of Science,_ ch. 3, 'on limited\nidentities' and 'negative propositions.'\n\nP. 309. Ear-lobes. The remark is due to Blumenbach: cf. Hegel's\n_Werke,_ v. 285.\n\nP. 312. Colours, _i.e._ painters' colours; cf. _Werke,_ vii. 1. 314\n(lecture-note). 'Painters are not such fools as to be Newtonians: they\nhave red, yellow, and blue, and out of these they make their other\ncolours.'\n\nP. 315, \u00a7 181. For the genetic classification of judgments and\nsyllogisms and the passage from the former to the latter compare\nespecially Lotze's _Logic,_ Book i. And for the comprehensive\nexhibition of the systematic process of judgment and inference see B.\nBosanquet's _Logic, or the Morphology of Knowledge._ The passage from\nHegel's _Werke,_ v. 139, quoted at the head of that work is parallel to\nthe sentence in p. 318, 'The interest, therefore,' &c.\n\nP. 320, \u00a7 186. The letters I-P-U, of course, stand for Individual,\nParticular, and Universal.\n\nP. 321, \u00a7 187. Fourth figure. This so-called Galenian figure was\ndifferentiated from the first figure by the separation of the five\nmoods, which (after Arist. _An._ pr. i. 7 and ii. I) Theophrastus and\nthe later pupils, down at least to Bo\u00ebthius, had subjoined to the four\nrecognised types of perfect syllogism. But its Galenian origin is more\nthan doubtful.\n\nP. 325, \u00a7 190. Cf. Mill's _Logic,_ Bk. ii. ch. 3. 'In every syllogism\nconsidered as an argument to prove the conclusion there is a _petitio\nprincipii._'\n\nHegel's Induction is that strictly so called or complete induction, the\nargument from the sum of actual experiences--that _per enumerationem\nsimplicem,_ and _\u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd._ Of course except by accident or by\nartificial arrangement such completeness is impossible _in rerum\nnatura._\n\nP. 326, \u00a7 190. The 'philosophy of Nature' referred to here is probably\nthat of Oken and the Schellingians; but later critics (_e.g._ Riehl,\n_Philosoph. Criticismus,_ iii. 120) have accused Hegel himself of even\ngreater enormities in this department.\n\nP. 328, \u00a7 192. _Elementarlehre:_ Theory of the Elements, called by\nHamilton (_Lectures on Logic,_ i. 65) Stoicheiology as opposed to\nmethodology. Cf. the Port Royal Logic. Kant's _Kritik_ observes the\nsame division of the subject.\n\nP. 332, \u00a7 193. Anselm, _Proslogium,_ c. 2. In the _Monologium_ Anselm\nexpounds the usual argument from conditioned to unconditioned (_Est\nigitur unum aliquid, quod solum maxime et summe omnium est; per quod\nest quidquid est bonum vel magnum, el omnino quidquid aliquid est.\nMonol._ c. 3). But in the Proslogium he seeks an argument _quod nullo\nad se probandum quam se solo indigeret--i.e._ from the conception of\n(God as) the highest and greatest that can be (_aliquid quo nihil majus\ncogitari potest_) he infers its being (_sic ergo vere_ EST _aliquid\nquo majus cogitari non potest, ut nec cogitari possit non esse._) The\nabsolute would not be absolute if the idea of it did not _ipso facto_\nimply existence.\n\nGaunilo of Marmoutier in the _Liber pro insipiente_ made the objection\nthat the fact of such argument being needed showed that idea and\nreality were _prima facie_ different. And in fact the argument of\nAnselm deals with an Absolute which is object rather than subject,\nthought rather than thinker; in human consciousness realised, but\nnot essentially self-affirming--implicit (an:sich) only, as said in\npp. 331, 333. And Anselm admits c. 15 _Domine, non solum es, quo\nmajus cogitari nequit, sed es quiddam majus quam cogitari potest_\n(transcending our thought).\n\nP. 333, line 2. This sentence has been transposed in the translation.\nIn the original it occurs after the quotation from the Latin in p. 332.\n\nP. 334, \u00a7 194. Leibniz: for a brief account of the Monads see Caird's\n_Crit. Philosophy of J. Kant,_ i. 86-95.\n\nA monad is the simple substance or indivisible unity corresponding\nto a body. It is as simple what the world is as a multiplicity: it\n'represents,' _i.e._ concentrates into unity, the variety of phenomena:\nis the expression of the material in the immaterial, of the compound in\nthe simple, of the extended outward in the inward. Its unity and its\nrepresentative capacity go together (cf. Lotze, _Mikrokosmus._) It is\nthe 'present which is full of the future and laden with the past' (ed.\nErdm. p. 197); the point which is all-embracing, the totality of the\nuniverse. And yet there are monads--in the plural.\n\nP. 334, \u00a7 194. Fichte, _Werke,_ i. 430. 'Every thorough-going dogmatic\nphilosopher is necessarily a fatalist.'\n\nP. 338, \u00a7 195. Cf. _Encyclop._ \u00a7 463. 'This supreme inwardising of\nideation (Vorstellung) is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence,\nreducing itself to the mere being, the general space of mere names and\nmeaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because\nsubjectivity, at the same time the power over the different names, the\nempty link which fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in fixed\norder.'\n\nContemporaneously with Hegel, Herbart turned psychology in the line of\na 'statics and dynamics of the mind.' See (besides earlier suggestions)\nhis _De Attentionis mensura causisque primariis_ (1822) and his\n_Ueber die M\u00f6glichkeit und Notwendigkeit, Mathematik auf Psychologie\nanzuwenden_ (1822).\n\nP. 340, \u00a7 198. _Civil_ society: distinguished as the social\nand economical organisation of the _bourgeoisie,_ with their\nparticularist-universal aims, from the true universal unity of\n_citoyens_ in the state or ethico-political organism.\n\nP. 345, \u00a7 204. Inner design: see Kant's _Kritik der Urtheilskraft,_ \u00a7\n62.\n\nAristotle, _De Anima,_ ii. 4 (415. b. 7) \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4' \u1f60\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f57 \u1f15\u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03b1 \u1f21\n\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74 \u03b1\u03c4\u03af\u03b1: ii. 2 \u03b6\u03c9\u1f74\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9' \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c6\u03ae\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f54\u03be\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c6\u03b8\u03af\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd.\n\nP. 347, \u00a7 206. Neutral first water, cf. _Encyclop._\u00a7 284, 'without\nindependent individuality, without rigidity and intrinsic\ndetermination, a thorough-going equilibrium.' Cf. _Werke,_ vii. 6.\n168. 'Water is absolute neutrality, not like salt, an individualised\nneutrality; and hence it was at an early date called the mother of\neverything particular.' 'As the neutral it is the solvent of acids and\nalkalis.' Cf. Oken's _Lehrbuch der Naturphilosophie,_ \u00a7\u00a7 294 and 432.\n\nP. 348, \u00a7 206. Conclude = beschliessen: Resolve = entschliessen. Cf.\nChr. Sigwart, _Kleine Schriften,_ ii. 115, _seqq._\n\nP. 359, \u00a7 216. Aristotle, _De Anim. Generat._ i. (726. b. 24) \u1f21 \u03c7\u03b5\u1f76\u03c1\n\u1f04\u03bd\u03b5\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c7\u03b5\u1f76\u03c1 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03ce\u03bd\u03c5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd.\n\nArist. _Metaph._ viii. 6 (1045. b. 11) \u03bf \u03b4\u1f72 (\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3o\u03c5\u03c3i) \u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f25\n\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b4\u03b5\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b6\u1fc6\u03bd.\n\nP. 360, \u00a7 218. Sensibility, &c. This triplicity (as partly\ndistinguished by Haller after Glisson) of the functions of organic life\nis largely worked out in Schelling, ii. 491.\n\nP. 361, \u00a7 219. Cf. Schelling, ii. 540. As walking is a constantly\nprevented falling, so life is a constantly prevented extinction of the\nvital process.\n\nP. 367, \u00a7 229. Spinoza (_Eth._ i. def. I) defines _causa sui_ as\n_id cujus essentia involvit existentiam,_ and (in def. 3) defines\n_substantia_ as _id quod in se est et per se concipitur._\n\nSchelling: _e.g. Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie_ (1801),\n(_Werke,_ iv. 114): 'I call reason the absolute reason, or reason,\nin so far as it is thought as total indifference of subjective and\nobjective.'\n\nP. 367, \u00a7 230. 'Mammals distinguish themselves': unter; unter:scheiden,\ninstead of scheiden: cf. _Werke,_ ii. 181. 'The distinctive marks of\nanimals, _e.g._ are taken from the claws and teeth: for in fact it\nis not merely cognition which by this means distinguishes one animal\nfrom another: but the animal thereby separates itself off: by these\nweapons it keeps itself to itself and separate from the universal.'\nCf. _Werke,_ vii. a. 651 _seqq._ (_Encycl._ \u00a7 370) where reference is\nmade to Cuvier, _Recherches sur les ossements fossiles des quadrup\u00e8des_\n(1812), &c.\n\nP. 368, \u00a7 230. Kant, _Kritik der Urtheilskraft:_ Einleitung, \u00a7 9\n(note), (_Werke,_ ed. Ros. iv. 39); see Caird's _Critical Philosophy of\nI. Kant,_ Book i. ch. 5; also Hegel's _Werke,_ ii. 3.\n\nP. 369, \u00a7 231. An example of Wolfs pedantry is given in Hegel, _Werke,_\nv. 307, from Wolfs _Rudiments of Architecture,_ Theorem viii. 'A window\nmust be broad enough for two persons to recline comfortably in it, side\nby side. _Proof._ It is customary to recline with another person on the\nwindow to look about. But as the architect ought to satisfy the main\nviews of the owner (\u00a7 I) he must make the window broad enough for two\npersons to recline comfortably side by side.'\n\n'Construction': cf. _Werke,_ ii. 38. 'Instead of its own internal life\nand spontaneous movement, such a simple mode (as subject, object,\ncause, substance, &c.) has expression given to it by perception (here\n= sense-consciousness) on some superficial analogy: and this external\nand empty application of the formula is called \"Construction.\" The\nprocedure shares the qualities of all such formalism. How stupid-headed\nmust be the man, who could not in a quarter of an hour master the\ntheory of asthenic, sthenic and indirectly asthenic diseases' (this is\npointed at Schelling's _Werke,_ iii. 236) 'and the three corresponding\ncurative methods, and who, when, no long time since, such instruction\nwas sufficient, could not in this short period be transformed from\na mere practitioner into a \"scientific\" physician? The formalism of\n_Naturphilosophie_ may teach _e.g._ that understanding is electricity,\nor that the animal is nitrogen, or even that it is _like_ the South or\nthe North, or that it represents it,--as baldly as is here expressed\nor with greater elaboration in terminology. At such teachings the\ninexperienced may fall into a rapture of admiration, may reverence the\nprofound genius it implies,--may take delight in the sprightliness\nof language which instead of the abstract _concept_ gives the more\npleasing _perceptual_ image, and may congratulate itself on feeling its\nsoul akin to such splendid achievement. The trick of such a wisdom is\nas soon learnt as it is easy to practice; its repetition, when it grows\nfamiliar, becomes as intolerable as the repetition of juggling once\ndetected. The instrument of this monotonous formalism is not harder to\nmanipulate than a painter's palette with two colours on it, say red and\ngreen, the former to dye the surface if a historic piece, the latter if\na landscape is asked for.'\n\nKant (_Werke,_ iii. 36) in the 'Prolegomena to every future\nMetaphysic,' \u00a7 7, says: 'We find, however, it is the peculiarity\nof mathematical science that it must first exhibit its concept in\na percept, and do so _\u00e0 priori_,--hence in a pure percept. This\nobservation with regard to the nature of mathematics gives a hint as to\nthe first and supreme condition of its possibility: it must be based\non some pure percept in which it can exhibit all its concepts _in\nconcreto_ and yet _\u00e0 priori,_ or, as it is called, _construe_ them.'\n\nThe phrase, and the emphasis on the doctrine, that perception must be\ntaken as an auxiliary in mathematics,' belong specially to the second\nedition of the _Kritik, e.g._ Pref. xii. To learn the properties of\nthe isosceles triangle the mathematical student must 'produce (by\n'construction') what he himself thought into it and exhibited _\u00e0\npriori_ according to concepts.'\n\n'Construction, in general,' says Schelling (_Werke,_ v. 252:\ncf. iv. 407) 'is the exhibition of the universal and particular\nin unity':--'absolute unity of the ideal and the real.' v. 225.\nDarstellung in intellektueller Anschauung ist philosophische\nKonstruktion.\n\nP. 372. 'Recollection' = Erinnerung: _e.g._ the return from\ndifferentiation and externality to simplicity and inwardness:\ndistinguished from Ged\u00e4chtniss = memory (specially of words).\n\nP. 373, \u00a7 236. Cf. Schelling, _Werke,_ iv. 405. 'Every particular\nobject is in its absoluteness the Idea; and accordingly the Idea is\nalso the absolute object (Gegenstand) itself,--as the absolutely ideal\nalso the absolutely real.'\n\nP. 374, \u00a7 236. Aristotle, _Metaphys._ xi. 9 (1074. 6. 34) \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f05\u03c1\u03b1\n\u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u1fd6 (\u1f41 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 = \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03c2), \u03b5\u1f35\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f21 \u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03bd\u03bf\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2. Cf. Arist. _Metaph._ xii. 7.\n\nP. 377, \u00a7239. 'Supposes a correlative' = ist f\u00fcr Eines. On Seyn: f\u00fcr\nEines, cf. _Werke,_ iii. 168. Das Ide\u00eblle ist notwendig f\u00fcr:Eines, aber\nes ist nicht f\u00fcr ein Anderes: das Eine f\u00fcr welches es ist, ist nur es\nselbst.... God is therefore for-self (to himself) in so far as he\nhimself is that which is for him.\n\nP. 379, \u00a7 244. The percipient idea (anschauende Idee), of course both\nobject and subject of intuition, is opposed to the Idea (as logical)\nin the element of _Thought_: but still _as Idea_ and not--to use\nKant's phrase (_Kritik der r. Vern._ \u00a7 26)--as _natura materialiter\nspectata._\n\n\n\nTHE END.","title":"The Logic of Hegel","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":151199}