{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_55201/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_55201","id":"gutenberg_55201","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/55201","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Classics of Literature","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Justice -- Early works to 1800","Political science -- Early works to 1800","Utopias -- Early works to 1800"],"text":"THE\nREPUBLIC OF PLATO\n\n_JOWETT_\n\nLondon\n\nHENRY FROWDE\n\nOXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE\nAMEN CORNER, E. C.\n\n\nTHE\nREPUBLIC OF PLATO\n\nTRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH\n\nWITH\n_INTRODUCTION, ANALYSIS\nMARGINAL ANALYSIS, AND INDEX_\n\nBY\n\nB. JOWETT, M.A.\n\nMASTER OF BALLIOL COLLEGE\nREGIUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD\nDOCTOR IN THEOLOGY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF LEYDEN\n\nTHE THIRD EDITION\n\n_REVISED AND CORRECTED THROUGHOUT_\n\nOxford\n\nAT THE CLARENDON PRESS\n\nM DCCC LXXXVIII\n\n[_All rights reserved_]\n\n\nTO MY FORMER PUPILS\nIN BALLIOL COLLEGE\nAND IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD,\nWHO DURING FORTY-SIX YEARS\nHAVE BEEN THE BEST OF FRIENDS TO ME,\nTHIS VOLUME IS INSCRIBED,\nIN GRATEFUL RECOGNITION\nOF THEIR NEVER FAILING ATTACHMENT.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n\nIN publishing a third edition of the Republic of Plato (originally\nincluded in my edition of Plato's works), I have to acknowledge the\nassistance of several friends, especially of my secretary, Mr. Matthew\nKnight, now residing for his health at Dav\u00f4s, and of Mr. Frank Fletcher,\nExhibitioner of Balliol College. To their accuracy and scholarship I am\nunder great obligations. The excellent index, in which are contained\nreferences to the other dialogues as well as to the Republic, is entirely\nthe work of Mr. Knight. I am also considerably indebted to Mr. J. W.\nMackail, Fellow of Balliol College, who read over the whole book in the\nprevious edition, and noted several inaccuracies.\n\nThe additions and alterations both in the introduction and in the text,\naffect at least a third of the work.\n\nHaving regard to the extent of these alterations, and to the annoyance\nwhich is felt by the owner of a book at the possession of it in an\ninferior form, and still more keenly by the writer himself, who must\nalways desire to be read as he is at his best, I have thought that some\npersons might like to exchange for the new edition the separate edition of\nthe Republic published in 1881, to which this present volume is the\nsuccessor. I have therefore arranged that those who desire to make this\nexchange, on depositing a perfect copy of the former separate edition with\nany agent of the Clarendon Press, shall be entitled to receive the new\nedition at half-price.\n\nIt is my hope to issue a revised edition of the remaining Dialogues in the\ncourse of a year.\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic._ Introduction.]\n\nTHE Republic of Plato is the longest of his works with the exception of\nthe Laws, and is certainly the greatest of them. There are nearer\napproaches to modern metaphysics in the Philebus and in the Sophist; the\nPoliticus or Statesman is more ideal; the form and institutions of the\nState are more clearly drawn out in the Laws; as works of art, the\nSymposium and the Protagoras are of higher excellence. But no other\nDialogue of Plato has the same largeness of view and the same perfection\nof style; no other shows an equal knowledge of the world, or contains more\nof those thoughts which are new as well as old, and not of one age only\nbut of all. Nowhere in Plato is there a deeper irony or a greater wealth\nof humour or imagery, or more dramatic power. Nor in any other of his\nwritings is the attempt made to interweave life and speculation, or to\nconnect politics with philosophy. The Republic is the centre around which\nthe other Dialogues may be grouped; here philosophy reaches the highest\npoint (cp. especially in Books V, VI, VII) to which ancient thinkers ever\nattained. Plato among the Greeks, like Bacon among the moderns, was the\nfirst who conceived a method of knowledge, although neither of them always\ndistinguished the bare outline or form from the substance of truth; and\nboth of them had to be content with an abstraction of science which was\nnot yet realized. He was the greatest metaphysical genius whom the world\nhas seen; and in him, more than in any other ancient thinker, the germs of\nfuture knowledge are contained. The sciences of logic and psychology,\nwhich have supplied so many instruments of thought to after-ages, are\nbased upon the analyses of Socrates and Plato. The principles of\ndefinition, the law of contradiction, the fallacy of arguing in a circle,\nthe distinction between the essence and accidents of a thing or notion,\nbetween means and ends, between causes and conditions; also the division\nof the mind into the rational, concupiscent, and irascible elements, or of\npleasures and desires into necessary and unnecessary--these {ii} and other\ngreat forms of thought are all of them to be found in the Republic, and\nwere probably first invented by Plato. The greatest of all logical truths,\nand the one of which writers on philosophy are most apt to lose sight, the\ndifference between words and things, has been most strenuously insisted on\nby him (cp. Rep. 454 A; Polit. 261 E; Cratyl. 435, 436 ff.), although he\nhas not always avoided the confusion of them in his own writings (e.g.\nRep. 463 E). But he does not bind up truth in logical formulae,--logic is\nstill veiled in metaphysics; and the science which he imagines to\n'contemplate all truth and all existence' is very unlike the doctrine of\nthe syllogism which Aristotle claims to have discovered (Soph. Elenchi 33.\n18).\n\nNeither must we forget that the Republic is but the third part of a still\nlarger design which was to have included an ideal history of Athens, as\nwell as a political and physical philosophy. The fragment of the Critias\nhas given birth to a world-famous fiction, second only in importance to\nthe tale of Troy and the legend of Arthur; and is said as a fact to have\ninspired some of the early navigators of the sixteenth century. This\nmythical tale, of which the subject was a history of the wars of the\nAthenians against the Island of Atlantis, is supposed to be founded upon\nan unfinished poem of Solon, to which it would have stood in the same\nrelation as the writings of the logographers to the poems of Homer. It\nwould have told of a struggle for Liberty (cp. Tim. 25 C), intended to\nrepresent the conflict of Persia and Hellas. We may judge from the noble\ncommencement of the Timaeus, from the fragment of the Critias itself, and\nfrom the third book of the Laws, in what manner Plato would have treated\nthis high argument. We can only guess why the great design was abandoned;\nperhaps because Plato became sensible of some incongruity in a fictitious\nhistory, or because he had lost his interest in it, or because advancing\nyears forbade the completion of it; and we may please ourselves with the\nfancy that had this imaginary narrative ever been finished, we should have\nfound Plato himself sympathising with the struggle for Hellenic\nindependence (cp. Laws iii. 698 ff.), singing a hymn of triumph over\nMarathon and Salamis, perhaps making the reflection of Herodotus where he\ncontemplates the growth of the Athenian empire--'How brave a thing is\nfreedom of speech, {iii} which has made the Athenians so far exceed every\nother state of Hellas in greatness!' or, more probably, attributing the\nvictory to the ancient good order of Athens and to the favour of Apollo\nand Athene (cp. Introd. to Critias).\n\nAgain, Plato may be regarded as the 'captain' ([Greek: a)rch\u00eago/s]) or\nleader of a goodly band of followers; for in the Republic is to be found\nthe original of Cicero's De Republica, of St. Augustine's City of God, of\nthe Utopia of Sir Thomas More, and of the numerous other imaginary States\nwhich are framed upon the same model. The extent to which Aristotle or the\nAristotelian school were indebted to him in the Politics has been little\nrecognised, and the recognition is the more necessary because it is not\nmade by Aristotle himself. The two philosophers had more in common than\nthey were conscious of; and probably some elements of Plato remain still\nundetected in Aristotle. In English philosophy too, many affinities may be\ntraced, not only in the works of the Cambridge Platonists, but in great\noriginal writers like Berkeley or Coleridge, to Plato and his ideas. That\nthere is a truth higher than experience, of which the mind bears witness\nto herself, is a conviction which in our own generation has been\nenthusiastically asserted, and is perhaps gaining ground. Of the Greek\nauthors who at the Renaissance brought a new life into the world Plato has\nhad the greatest influence. The Republic of Plato is also the first\ntreatise upon education, of which the writings of Milton and Locke,\nRousseau, Jean Paul, and Goethe are the legitimate descendants. Like Dante\nor Bunyan, he has a revelation of another life; like Bacon, he is\nprofoundly impressed with the unity of knowledge; in the early Church he\nexercised a real influence on theology, and at the Revival of Literature\non politics. Even the fragments of his words when 'repeated at\nsecond-hand' (Symp. 215 D) have in all ages ravished the hearts of men,\nwho have seen reflected in them their own higher nature. He is the father\nof idealism in philosophy, in politics, in literature. And many of the\nlatest conceptions of modern thinkers and statesmen, such as the unity of\nknowledge, the reign of law, and the equality of the sexes, have been\nanticipated in a dream by him.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe argument of the Republic is the search after Justice, the nature of\nwhich is first hinted at by Cephalus, the just and blameless {iv} old\nman--then discussed on the basis of proverbial morality by Socrates and\nPolemarchus--then caricatured by Thrasymachus and partially explained by\nSocrates--reduced to an abstraction by Glaucon and Adeimantus, and having\nbecome invisible in the individual reappears at length in the ideal State\nwhich is constructed by Socrates. The first care of the rulers is to be\neducation, of which an outline is drawn after the old Hellenic model,\nproviding only for an improved religion and morality, and more simplicity\nin music and gymnastic, a manlier strain of poetry, and greater harmony of\nthe individual and the State. We are thus led on to the conception of a\nhigher State, in which 'no man calls anything his own,' and in which there\nis neither 'marrying nor giving in marriage,' and 'kings are philosophers'\nand 'philosophers are kings;' and there is another and higher education,\nintellectual as well as moral and religious, of science as well as of art,\nand not of youth only but of the whole of life. Such a State is hardly to\nbe realized in this world and quickly degenerates. To the perfect ideal\nsucceeds the government of the soldier and the lover of honour, this again\ndeclining into democracy, and democracy into tyranny, in an imaginary but\nregular order having not much resemblance to the actual facts. When 'the\nwheel has come full circle' we do not begin again with a new period of\nhuman life; but we have passed from the best to the worst, and there we\nend. The subject is then changed and the old quarrel of poetry and\nphilosophy which had been more lightly treated in the earlier books of the\nRepublic is now resumed and fought out to a conclusion. Poetry is\ndiscovered to be an imitation thrice removed from the truth, and Homer, as\nwell as the dramatic poets, having been condemned as an imitator, is sent\ninto banishment along with them. And the idea of the State is supplemented\nby the revelation of a future life.\n\nThe division into books, like all similar divisions,[1] is probably later\nthan the age of Plato. The natural divisions are five in number;--(1) Book\nI and the first half of Book II down to the paragraph beginning, 'I had\nalways admired the genius of Glaucon and Adeimantus,' which is\nintroductory; the first book containing a refutation of the popular and\nsophistical notions of justice, and concluding, like some of the earlier\nDialogues, without arriving at any definite result. To this is appended a\nrestatement of the nature of justice {v} according to common opinion, and\nan answer is demanded to the question--What is justice, stripped of\nappearances? The second division (2) includes the remainder of the second\nand the whole of the third and fourth books, which are mainly occupied\nwith the construction of the first State and the first education. The\nthird division (3) consists of the fifth, sixth, and seventh books, in\nwhich philosophy rather than justice is the subject of enquiry, and the\nsecond State is constructed on principles of communism and ruled by\nphilosophers, and the contemplation of the idea of good takes the place of\nthe social and political virtues. In the eighth and ninth books (4) the\nperversions of States and of the individuals who correspond to them are\nreviewed in succession; and the nature of pleasure and the principle of\ntyranny are further analysed in the individual man. The tenth book (5) is\nthe conclusion of the whole, in which the relations of philosophy to\npoetry are finally determined, and the happiness of the citizens in this\nlife, which has now been assured, is crowned by the vision of another.\n\n[Footnote 1: Cp. Sir G. C. Lewis in the Classical Museum, vol. ii. p. 1.]\n\nOr a more general division into two parts may be adopted; the first (Books\nI-IV) containing the description of a State framed generally in accordance\nwith Hellenic notions of religion and morality, while in the second (Books\nV-X) the Hellenic State is transformed into an ideal kingdom of\nphilosophy, of which all other governments are the perversions. These two\npoints of view are really opposed, and the opposition is only veiled by\nthe genius of Plato. The Republic, like the Phaedrus (see Introduction to\nPhaedrus), is an imperfect whole; the higher light of philosophy breaks\nthrough the regularity of the Hellenic temple, which at last fades away\ninto the heavens (592 B). Whether this imperfection of structure arises\nfrom an enlargement of the plan; or from the imperfect reconcilement in\nthe writer's own mind of the struggling elements of thought which are now\nfirst brought together by him; or, perhaps, from the composition of the\nwork at different times--are questions, like the similar question about\nthe Iliad and the Odyssey, which are worth asking, but which cannot have a\ndistinct answer. In the age of Plato there was no regular mode of\npublication, and an author would have the less scruple in altering or\nadding to a work which was known only to a few of his friends. There is no\nabsurdity in supposing that he may have laid his labours aside for a time,\nor turned from one work to {vi} another; and such interruptions would be\nmore likely to occur in the case of a long than of a short writing. In all\nattempts to determine the chronological order of the Platonic writings on\ninternal evidence, this uncertainty about any single Dialogue being\ncomposed at one time is a disturbing element, which must be admitted to\naffect longer works, such as the Republic and the Laws, more than shorter\nones. But, on the other hand, the seeming discrepancies of the Republic\nmay only arise out of the discordant elements which the philosopher has\nattempted to unite in a single whole, perhaps without being himself able\nto recognise the inconsistency which is obvious to us. For there is a\njudgment of after ages which few great writers have ever been able to\nanticipate for themselves. They do not perceive the want of connexion in\ntheir own writings, or the gaps in their systems which are visible enough\nto those who come after them. In the beginnings of literature and\nphilosophy, amid the first efforts of thought and language, more\ninconsistencies occur than now, when the paths of speculation are well\nworn and the meaning of words precisely defined. For consistency, too, is\nthe growth of time; and some of the greatest creations of the human mind\nhave been wanting in unity. Tried by this test, several of the Platonic\nDialogues, according to our modern ideas, appear to be defective, but the\ndeficiency is no proof that they were composed at different times or by\ndifferent hands. And the supposition that the Republic was written\nuninterruptedly and by a continuous effort is in some degree confirmed by\nthe numerous references from one part of the work to another.\n\nThe second title, 'Concerning Justice,' is not the one by which the\nRepublic is quoted, either by Aristotle or generally in antiquity, and,\nlike the other second titles of the Platonic Dialogues, may therefore be\nassumed to be of later date. Morgenstern and others have asked whether the\ndefinition of justice, which is the professed aim, or the construction of\nthe State is the principal argument of the work. The answer is, that the\ntwo blend in one, and are two faces of the same truth; for justice is the\norder of the State, and the State is the visible embodiment of justice\nunder the conditions of human society. The one is the soul and the other\nis the body, and the Greek ideal of the State, as of the individual, is a\nfair mind in a fair body. In Hegelian phraseology the state is the reality\nof {vii} which justice is the idea. Or, described in Christian language,\nthe kingdom of God is within, and yet developes into a Church or external\nkingdom; 'the house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens,' is\nreduced to the proportions of an earthly building. Or, to use a Platonic\nimage, justice and the State are the warp and the woof which run through\nthe whole texture. And when the constitution of the State is completed,\nthe conception of justice is not dismissed, but reappears under the same\nor different names throughout the work, both as the inner law of the\nindividual soul, and finally as the principle of rewards and punishments\nin another life. The virtues are based on justice, of which common honesty\nin buying and selling is the shadow, and justice is based on the idea of\ngood, which is the harmony of the world, and is reflected both in the\ninstitutions of states and in motions of the heavenly bodies (cp. Tim.\n47). The Timaeus, which takes up the political rather than the ethical\nside of the Republic, and is chiefly occupied with hypotheses concerning\nthe outward world, yet contains many indications that the same law is\nsupposed to reign over the State, over nature, and over man.\n\nToo much, however, has been made of this question both in ancient and\nmodern times. There is a stage of criticism in which all works, whether of\nnature or of art, are referred to design. Now in ancient writings, and\nindeed in literature generally, there remains often a large element which\nwas not comprehended in the original design. For the plan grows under the\nauthor's hand; new thoughts occur to him in the act of writing; he has not\nworked out the argument to the end before he begins. The reader who seeks\nto find some one idea under which the whole may be conceived, must\nnecessarily seize on the vaguest and most general. Thus Stallbaum, who is\ndissatisfied with the ordinary explanations of the argument of the\nRepublic, imagines himself to have found the true argument 'in the\nrepresentation of human life in a State perfected by justice, and governed\naccording to the idea of good.' There may be some use in such general\ndescriptions, but they can hardly be said to express the design of the\nwriter. The truth is, that we may as well speak of many designs as of one;\nnor need anything be excluded from the plan of a great work to which the\nmind is naturally led by the association of ideas, and which does not\ninterfere with the general purpose. What kind or degree of {viii} unity is\nto be sought after in a building, in the plastic arts, in poetry, in\nprose, is a problem which has to be determined relatively to the\nsubject-matter. To Plato himself, the enquiry 'what was the intention of\nthe writer,' or 'what was the principal argument of the Republic' would\nhave been hardly intelligible, and therefore had better be at once\ndismissed (cp. the Introduction to the Phaedrus, vol. i.).\n\nIs not the Republic the vehicle of three or four great truths which, to\nPlato's own mind, are most naturally represented in the form of the State?\nJust as in the Jewish prophets the reign of Messiah, or 'the day of the\nLord,' or the suffering Servant or people of God, or the 'Sun of\nrighteousness with healing in his wings' only convey, to us at least,\ntheir great spiritual ideals, so through the Greek State Plato reveals to\nus his own thoughts about divine perfection, which is the idea of\ngood--like the sun in the visible world;--about human perfection, which is\njustice--about education beginning in youth and continuing in later\nyears--about poets and sophists and tyrants who are the false teachers and\nevil rulers of mankind--about 'the world' which is the embodiment of\nthem--about a kingdom which exists nowhere upon earth but is laid up in\nheaven to be the pattern and rule of human life. No such inspired creation\nis at unity with itself, any more than the clouds of heaven when the sun\npierces through them. Every shade of light and dark, of truth, and of\nfiction which is the veil of truth, is allowable in a work of\nphilosophical imagination. It is not all on the same plane; it easily\npasses from ideas to myths and fancies, from facts to figures of speech.\nIt is not prose but poetry, at least a great part of it, and ought not to\nbe judged by the rules of logic or the probabilities of history. The\nwriter is not fashioning his ideas into an artistic whole; they take\npossession of him and are too much for him. We have no need therefore to\ndiscuss whether a State such as Plato has conceived is practicable or not,\nor whether the outward form or the inward life came first into the mind of\nthe writer. For the practicability of his ideas has nothing to do with\ntheir truth (v. 472 D); and the highest thoughts to which he attains may\nbe truly said to bear the greatest 'marks of design'--justice more than\nthe external frame-work of the State, the idea of good more than justice.\nThe great science of dialectic or the organisation of ideas has no real\ncontent; but is only a type of the method or {ix} spirit in which the\nhigher knowledge is to be pursued by the spectator of all time and all\nexistence. It is in the fifth, sixth, and seventh books that Plato reaches\nthe 'summit of speculation,' and these, although they fail to satisfy the\nrequirements of a modern thinker, may therefore be regarded as the most\nimportant, as they are also the most original, portions of the work.\n\nIt is not necessary to discuss at length a minor question which has been\nraised by Boeckh, respecting the imaginary date at which the conversation\nwas held (the year 411 B.C. which is proposed by him will do as well as\nany other); for a writer of fiction, and especially a writer who, like\nPlato, is notoriously careless of chronology (cp. Rep. i. 336, Symp. 193\nA, etc.), only aims at general probability. Whether all the persons\nmentioned in the Republic could ever have met at any one time is not a\ndifficulty which would have occurred to an Athenian reading the work forty\nyears later, or to Plato himself at the time of writing (any more than to\nShakespeare respecting one of his own dramas); and need not greatly\ntrouble us now. Yet this may be a question having no answer 'which is\nstill worth asking,' because the investigation shows that we cannot argue\nhistorically from the dates in Plato; it would be useless therefore to\nwaste time in inventing far-fetched reconcilements of them in order to\navoid chronological difficulties, such, for example, as the conjecture of\nC. F. Hermann, that Glaucon and Adeimantus are not the brothers but the\nuncles of Plato (cp. Apol. 34 A), or the fancy of Stallbaum that Plato\nintentionally left anachronisms indicating the dates at which some of his\nDialogues were written.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe principal characters in the Republic are Cephalus, Polemarchus,\nThrasymachus, Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus. Cephalus appears in the\nintroduction only, Polemarchus drops at the end of the first argument, and\nThrasymachus is reduced to silence at the close of the first book. The\nmain discussion is carried on by Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus. Among\nthe company are Lysias (the orator) and Euthydemus, the sons of Cephalus\nand brothers of Polemarchus, an unknown Charmantides--these are mute\nauditors; also there is Cleitophon, who once interrupts (340 A), where, as\nin the Dialogue which bears his name, he appears as the friend and ally of\nThrasymachus.\n\n{x} Cephalus, the patriarch of the house, has been appropriately engaged\nin offering a sacrifice. He is the pattern of an old man who has almost\ndone with life, and is at peace with himself and with all mankind. He\nfeels that he is drawing nearer to the world below, and seems to linger\naround the memory of the past. He is eager that Socrates should come to\nvisit him, fond of the poetry of the last generation, happy in the\nconsciousness of a well-spent life, glad at having escaped from the\ntyranny of youthful lusts. His love of conversation, his affection, his\nindifference to riches, even his garrulity, are interesting traits of\ncharacter. He is not one of those who have nothing to say, because their\nwhole mind has been absorbed in making money. Yet he acknowledges that\nriches have the advantage of placing men above the temptation to\ndishonesty or falsehood. The respectful attention shown to him by\nSocrates, whose love of conversation, no less than the mission imposed\nupon him by the Oracle, leads him to ask questions of all men, young and\nold alike (cp. i. 328 A), should also be noted. Who better suited to raise\nthe question of justice than Cephalus, whose life might seem to be the\nexpression of it? The moderation with which old age is pictured by\nCephalus as a very tolerable portion of existence is characteristic, not\nonly of him, but of Greek feeling generally, and contrasts with the\nexaggeration of Cicero in the De Senectute. The evening of life is\ndescribed by Plato in the most expressive manner, yet with the fewest\npossible touches. As Cicero remarks (Ep. ad Attic. iv. 16), the aged\nCephalus would have been out of place in the discussion which follows, and\nwhich he could neither have understood nor taken part in without a\nviolation of dramatic propriety (cp. Lysimachus in the Laches, 89).\n\nHis 'son and heir' Polemarchus has the frankness and impetuousness of\nyouth; he is for detaining Socrates by force in the opening scene, and\nwill not 'let him off' (v. 449 B) on the subject of women and children.\nLike Cephalus, he is limited in his point of view, and represents the\nproverbial stage of morality which has rules of life rather than\nprinciples; and he quotes Simonides (cp. Aristoph. Clouds, 1355 ff.) as\nhis father had quoted Pindar. But after this he has no more to say; the\nanswers which he makes are only elicited from him by the dialectic of\nSocrates. He has not yet experienced the influence of the Sophists like\nGlaucon and {xi} Adeimantus, nor is he sensible of the necessity of\nrefuting them; he belongs to the pre-Socratic or pre-dialectical age. He\nis incapable of arguing, and is bewildered by Socrates to such a degree\nthat he does not know what he is saying. He is made to admit that justice\nis a thief, and that the virtues follow the analogy of the arts. From his\nbrother Lysias (contra Eratosth. p. 121) we learn that he fell a victim to\nthe Thirty Tyrants, but no allusion is here made to his fate, nor to the\ncircumstance that Cephalus and his family were of Syracusan origin, and\nhad migrated from Thurii to Athens.\n\nThe 'Chalcedonian giant,' Thrasymachus, of whom we have already heard in\nthe Phaedrus (267 D), is the personification of the Sophists, according to\nPlato's conception of them, in some of their worst characteristics. He is\nvain and blustering, refusing to discourse unless he is paid, fond of\nmaking an oration, and hoping thereby to escape the inevitable Socrates;\nbut a mere child in argument, and unable to foresee that the next 'move'\n(to use a Platonic expression) will 'shut him up' (vi. 487 B). He has\nreached the stage of framing general notions, and in this respect is in\nadvance of Cephalus and Polemarchus. But he is incapable of defending them\nin a discussion, and vainly tries to cover his confusion with banter and\ninsolence. Whether such doctrines as are attributed to him by Plato were\nreally held either by him or by any other Sophist is uncertain; in the\ninfancy of philosophy serious errors about morality might easily grow\nup--they are certainly put into the mouths of speakers in Thucydides; but\nwe are concerned at present with Plato's description of him, and not with\nthe historical reality. The inequality of the contest adds greatly to the\nhumour of the scene. The pompous and empty Sophist is utterly helpless in\nthe hands of the great master of dialectic, who knows how to touch all the\nsprings of vanity and weakness in him. He is greatly irritated by the\nirony of Socrates, but his noisy and imbecile rage only lays him more and\nmore open to the thrusts of his assailant. His determination to cram down\ntheir throats, or put 'bodily into their souls' his own words, elicits a\ncry of horror from Socrates. The state of his temper is quite as worthy of\nremark as the process of the argument. Nothing is more amusing than his\ncomplete submission when he has been once thoroughly beaten. At first he\nseems to continue {xii} the discussion with reluctance, but soon with\napparent good-will, and he even testifies his interest at a later stage by\none or two occasional remarks (v. 450 A, B). When attacked by Glaucon (vi.\n489 C, D) he is humorously protected by Socrates 'as one who has never\nbeen his enemy and is now his friend.' From Cicero and Quintilian and from\nAristotle's Rhetoric (iii. i. 7; ii. 23, 29) we learn that the Sophist\nwhom Plato has made so ridiculous was a man of note whose writings were\npreserved in later ages. The play on his name which was made by his\ncontemporary Herodicus (Aris. Rhet. ii. 23, 29), 'thou wast ever bold in\nbattle,' seems to show that the description of him is not devoid of\nverisimilitude.\n\nWhen Thrasymachus has been silenced, the two principal respondents,\nGlaucon and Adeimantus, appear on the scene: here, as in Greek tragedy\n(cp. Introd. to Phaedo), three actors are introduced. At first sight the\ntwo sons of Ariston may seem to wear a family likeness, like the two\nfriends Simmias and Cebes in the Phaedo. But on a nearer examination of\nthem the similarity vanishes, and they are seen to be distinct characters.\nGlaucon is the impetuous youth who can 'just never have enough of\nfetching' (cp. the character of him in Xen. Mem. iii. 6); the man of\npleasure who is acquainted with the mysteries of love (v. 474 D); the\n'juvenis qui gaudet canibus,' and who improves the breed of animals\n(v. 459 A); the lover of art and music (iii. 398 D, E) who has all the\nexperiences of youthful life. He is full of quickness and penetration,\npiercing easily below the clumsy platitudes of Thrasymachus to the real\ndifficulty; he turns out to the light the seamy side of human life, and\nyet does not lose faith in the just and true. It is Glaucon who seizes\nwhat may be termed the ludicrous relation of the philosopher to the world,\nto whom a state of simplicity is 'a city of pigs,' who is always prepared\nwith a jest (iii. 398 C, 407 A; v. 450, 451, 468 C; vi. 509 C; ix. 586)\nwhen the argument offers him an opportunity, and who is ever ready to\nsecond the humour of Socrates and to appreciate the ridiculous, whether in\nthe connoisseurs of music (vii. 531 A), or in the lovers of theatricals\n(v. 475 D), or in the fantastic behaviour of the citizens of democracy\n(viii. 557 foll.). His weaknesses are several times alluded to by Socrates\n(iii. 402 E; v. 474 D, 475 E), who, however, will not allow him to be\nattacked by his brother Adeimantus (viii. 548 D, E). He is a soldier, and,\nlike Adeimantus, has been {xiii} distinguished at the battle of Megara\n(368 A, anno 456?)... The character of Adeimantus is deeper and graver,\nand the profounder objections are commonly put into his mouth. Glaucon is\nmore demonstrative, and generally opens the game. Adeimantus pursues the\nargument further. Glaucon has more of the liveliness and quick sympathy of\nyouth; Adeimantus has the maturer judgment of a grown-up man of the world.\nIn the second book, when Glaucon insists that justice and injustice shall\nbe considered without regard to their consequences, Adeimantus remarks\nthat they are regarded by mankind in general only for the sake of their\nconsequences; and in a similar vein of reflection he urges at the\nbeginning of the fourth book that Socrates fails in making his citizens\nhappy, and is answered that happiness is not the first but the second\nthing, not the direct aim but the indirect consequence of the good\ngovernment of a State. In the discussion about religion and mythology,\nAdeimantus is the respondent (iii. 376-398), but Glaucon breaks in with a\nslight jest, and carries on the conversation in a lighter tone about music\nand gymnastic to the end of the book. It is Adeimantus again who\nvolunteers the criticism of common sense on the Socratic method of\nargument (vi. 487 B), and who refuses to let Socrates pass lightly over\nthe question of women and children (v. 449). It is Adeimantus who is the\nrespondent in the more argumentative, as Glaucon in the lighter and more\nimaginative portions of the Dialogue. For example, throughout the greater\npart of the sixth book, the causes of the corruption of philosophy and the\nconception of the idea of good are discussed with Adeimantus. At p. 506 C,\nGlaucon resumes his place of principal respondent; but he has a difficulty\nin apprehending the higher education of Socrates, and makes some false\nhits in the course of the discussion (526 D, 527 D). Once more Adeimantus\nreturns (viii. 548) with the allusion to his brother Glaucon whom he\ncompares to the contentious State; in the next book (ix. 576) he is again\nsuperseded, and Glaucon continues to the end (x. 621 B).\n\nThus in a succession of characters Plato represents the successive stages\nof morality, beginning with the Athenian gentleman of the olden time, who\nis followed by the practical man of that day regulating his life by\nproverbs and saws; to him succeeds the wild generalization of the\nSophists, and lastly come the young disciples of the great teacher, who\nknow the sophistical arguments {xiv} but will not be convinced by them,\nand desire to go deeper into the nature of things. These too, like\nCephalus, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, are clearly distinguished from one\nanother. Neither in the Republic, nor in any other Dialogue of Plato, is a\nsingle character repeated.\n\nThe delineation of Socrates in the Republic is not wholly consistent. In\nthe first book we have more of the real Socrates, such as he is depicted\nin the Memorabilia of Xenophon, in the earliest Dialogues of Plato, and in\nthe Apology. He is ironical, provoking, questioning, the old enemy of the\nSophists, ready to put on the mask of Silenus as well as to argue\nseriously. But in the sixth book his enmity towards the Sophists abates;\nhe acknowledges that they are the representatives rather than the\ncorrupters of the world (vi. 492 A). He also becomes more dogmatic and\nconstructive, passing beyond the range either of the political or the\nspeculative ideas of the real Socrates. In one passage (vi. 506 C) Plato\nhimself seems to intimate that the time had now come for Socrates, who had\npassed his whole life in philosophy, to give his own opinion and not to be\nalways repeating the notions of other men. There is no evidence that\neither the idea of good or the conception of a perfect state were\ncomprehended in the Socratic teaching, though he certainly dwelt on the\nnature of the universal and of final causes (cp. Xen. Mem. i. 4; Phaedo\n97); and a deep thinker like him, in his thirty or forty years of public\nteaching, could hardly have failed to touch on the nature of family\nrelations, for which there is also some positive evidence in the\nMemorabilia (Mem. i. 2, 51 foll.). The Socratic method is nominally\nretained; and every inference is either put into the mouth of the\nrespondent or represented as the common discovery of him and Socrates. But\nany one can see that this is a mere form, of which the affectation grows\nwearisome as the work advances. The method of enquiry has passed into a\nmethod of teaching in which by the help of interlocutors the same thesis\nis looked at from various points of view. The nature of the process is\ntruly characterized by Glaucon, when he describes himself as a companion\nwho is not good for much in an investigation, but can see what he is shown\n(iv. 432 C), and may, perhaps, give the answer to a question more fluently\nthan another (v. 474 A; cp. 389 A).\n\nNeither can we be absolutely certain that Socrates himself {xv} taught the\nimmortality of the soul, which is unknown to his disciple Glaucon in the\nRepublic (x. 608 D; cp. vi. 498 D, E; Apol. 40, 41); nor is there any\nreason to suppose that he used myths or revelations of another world as a\nvehicle of instruction, or that he would have banished poetry or have\ndenounced the Greek mythology. His favourite oath is retained, and a\nslight mention is made of the daemonium, or internal sign, which is\nalluded to by Socrates as a phenomenon peculiar to himself (vi. 496 C). A\nreal element of Socratic teaching, which is more prominent in the Republic\nthan in any of the other Dialogues of Plato, is the use of example and\nillustration ([Greek: ta\\ phortika\\ au)t\u00f4=| prosphe/rontes], iv. 442 E):\n'Let us apply the test of common instances.' 'You,' says Adeimantus,\nironically, in the sixth book, 'are so unaccustomed to speak in images.'\nAnd this use of examples or images, though truly Socratic in origin, is\nenlarged by the genius of Plato into the form of an allegory or parable,\nwhich embodies in the concrete what has been already described, or is\nabout to be described, in the abstract. Thus the figure of the cave in\nBook VII is a recapitulation of the divisions of knowledge in Book VI. The\ncomposite animal in Book IX is an allegory of the parts of the soul. The\nnoble captain and the ship and the true pilot in Book VI are a figure of\nthe relation of the people to the philosophers in the State which has been\ndescribed. Other figures, such as the dog (ii. 375 A, D; iii. 404 A, 416\nA; v. 451 D), or the marriage of the portionless maiden (vi. 495, 496), or\nthe drones and wasps in the eighth and ninth books, also form links of\nconnexion in long passages, or are used to recall previous discussions.\n\nPlato is most true to the character of his master when he describes him as\n'not of this world.' And with this representation of him the ideal state\nand the other paradoxes of the Republic are quite in accordance, though\nthey cannot be shown to have been speculations of Socrates. To him, as to\nother great teachers both philosophical and religious, when they looked\nupward, the world seemed to be the embodiment of error and evil. The\ncommon sense of mankind has revolted against this view, or has only\npartially admitted it. And even in Socrates himself the sterner judgement\nof the multitude at times passes into a sort of ironical pity or love. Men\nin general are incapable of philosophy, and are therefore at enmity with\nthe philosopher; but their misunderstanding of him {xvi} is unavoidable\n(vi. 494 foll.; ix. 589 D): for they have never seen him as he truly is in\nhis own image; they are only acquainted with artificial systems possessing\nno native force of truth--words which admit of many applications. Their\nleaders have nothing to measure with, and are therefore ignorant of their\nown stature. But they are to be pitied or laughed at, not to be quarrelled\nwith; they mean well with their nostrums, if they could only learn that\nthey are cutting off a Hydra's head (iv. 426 D, E). This moderation\ntowards those who are in error is one of the most characteristic features\nof Socrates in the Republic (vi. 499-502). In all the different\nrepresentations of Socrates, whether of Xenophon or Plato, and amid the\ndifferences of the earlier or later Dialogues, he always retains the\ncharacter of the unwearied and disinterested seeker after truth, without\nwhich he would have ceased to be Socrates.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nLeaving the characters we may now analyse the contents of the Republic,\nand then proceed to consider (1) The general aspects of this Hellenic\nideal of the State, (2) The modern lights in which the thoughts of Plato\nmay be read.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic I._ Analysis.]\n\nBOOK I. The Republic opens with a truly Greek scene--a festival in honour\nof the goddess Bendis which is held in the Piraeus; to this is added the\npromise of an equestrian torch-race in the evening. The whole work is\nsupposed to be recited by Socrates on the day after the festival to a\nsmall party, consisting of Critias, Timaeus, Hermocrates, and another;\nthis we learn from the first words of the Timaeus.\n\nWhen the rhetorical advantage of reciting the Dialogue has been gained,\nthe attention is not distracted by any reference to the audience; nor is\nthe reader further reminded of the extraordinary length of the narrative.\nOf the numerous company, three only take any serious part in the\ndiscussion; nor are we informed whether in the evening they went to the\ntorch-race, or talked, as in the Symposium, through the night. The manner\nin which the conversation has arisen is described *Stephanus 327* as\nfollows:--Socrates and his companion Glaucon are about to leave the\nfestival when they are detained by a message from Polemarchus, who\nspeedily appears accompanied by Adeimantus, the brother of Glaucon, and\nwith playful violence compels them to remain, promising them not only\n{xvii} the torch-race, *328* but the pleasure of conversation with the\nyoung, which to Socrates is a far greater attraction. They return to the\nhouse of Cephalus, Polemarchus' father, now in extreme old age, who is\nfound sitting upon a cushioned seat crowned for a sacrifice. 'You should\ncome to me oftener, Socrates, for I am too old to go to you; and at my\ntime of life, having lost other pleasures, I care the more for\nconversation.' *329* Socrates asks him what he thinks of age, to which the\nold man replies, that the sorrows and discontents of age are to be\nattributed to the tempers of men, and that age is a time of peace in which\nthe tyranny of the passions is no longer felt. Yes, replies Socrates, but\nthe world will say, Cephalus, that you are happy in old age because you\nare rich. 'And there is something in what they say, Socrates, but not so\nmuch as they imagine-- *330* as Themistocles replied to the Seriphian,\n\"Neither you, if you had been an Athenian, nor I, if I had been a\nSeriphian, would ever have been famous,\" I might in like manner reply to\nyou, Neither a good poor man can be happy in age, nor yet a bad rich man.'\nSocrates remarks that Cephalus appears not to care about riches, a quality\nwhich he ascribes to his having inherited, not acquired them, and would\nlike to know what he considers to be the chief advantage of them. Cephalus\nanswers that when you are old the belief in the world below grows upon\nyou, and then to have done justice and never to have been compelled to do\ninjustice through poverty, *331* and never to have deceived anyone, are\nfelt to be unspeakable blessings. Socrates, who is evidently preparing for\nan argument, next asks, What is the meaning of the word 'justice'? To tell\nthe truth and pay your debts? No more than this? Or must we admit\nexceptions? Ought I, for example, to put back into the hands of my friend,\nwho has gone mad, the sword which I borrowed of him when he was in his\nright mind? 'There must be exceptions.' 'And yet,' says Polemarchus, 'the\ndefinition which has been given has the authority of Simonides.' Here\nCephalus retires to look after the sacrifices, and bequeaths, as Socrates\nfacetiously remarks, the possession of the argument to his heir,\nPolemarchus....\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic I._ Introduction.]\n\nThe description of old age is finished, and Plato, as his manner is, has\ntouched the key-note of the whole work in asking for the definition of\njustice, first suggesting the question which Glaucon afterwards pursues\nrespecting external goods, and preparing for {xviii} the concluding mythus\nof the world below in the slight allusion of Cephalus. The portrait of the\njust man is a natural frontispiece or introduction to the long discourse\nwhich follows, and may perhaps imply that in all our perplexity about the\nnature of justice, there is no difficulty in discerning 'who is a just\nman.' The first explanation has been supported by a saying of Simonides;\nand now Socrates has a mind to show that the resolution of justice into\ntwo unconnected precepts, which have no common principle, fails to satisfy\nthe demands of dialectic.\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic I._ Analysis.]\n\n... *332* He proceeds: What did Simonides mean by this saying of his? Did\nhe mean that I was to give back arms to a madman? 'No, not in that case,\nnot if the parties are friends, and evil would result. He meant that you\nwere to do what was proper, good to friends and harm to enemies.' Every\nact does something to somebody; and following this analogy, Socrates asks,\nWhat is this due and proper thing which justice does, and to whom? He is\nanswered that justice does good to friends and harm to enemies. But in\nwhat way good or harm? 'In making alliances with the one, and going to war\nwith the other.' Then in time of peace what is the good of justice? *333*\nThe answer is that justice is of use in contracts, and contracts are money\npartnerships. Yes; but how in such partnerships is the just man of more\nuse than any other man? 'When you want to have money safely kept and not\nused.' Then justice will be useful when money is useless. And there is\nanother difficulty: justice, like the art of war or any other art, must be\nof opposites, *334* good at attack as well as at defence, at stealing as\nwell as at guarding. But then justice is a thief, though a hero\nnotwithstanding, like Autolycus, the Homeric hero, who was 'excellent\nabove all men in theft and perjury'--to such a pass have you and Homer and\nSimonides brought us; though I do not forget that the thieving must be for\nthe good of friends and the harm of enemies. And still there arises\nanother question: Are friends to be interpreted as real or seeming;\nenemies as real or seeming? *335* And are our friends to be only the good,\nand our enemies to be the evil? The answer is, that we must do good to our\nseeming and real good friends, and evil to our seeming and real evil\nenemies--good to the good, evil to the evil. But ought we to render evil\nfor evil at all, when to do so will only make men more evil? Can justice\nproduce injustice any more than the art of horsemanship {xix} can make bad\nhorsemen, or heat produce cold? The final conclusion is, that no sage or\npoet ever said that the just return evil for evil; this was a maxim of\nsome rich and mighty man, Periander, *336* Perdiccas, or Ismenias the\nTheban (about B.C. 398-381)....\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic I._ Introduction.]\n\nThus the first stage of aphoristic or unconscious morality is shown to be\ninadequate to the wants of the age; the authority of the poets is set\naside, and through the winding mazes of dialectic we make an approach to\nthe Christian precept of forgiveness of injuries. Similar words are\napplied by the Persian mystic poet to the Divine being when the\nquestioning spirit is stirred within him:--'If because I do evil, Thou\npunishest me by evil, what is the difference between Thee and me?' In this\nboth Plato and Kh\u00e8yam rise above the level of many Christian (?)\ntheologians. The first definition of justice easily passes into the\nsecond; for the simple words 'to speak the truth and pay your debts' is\nsubstituted the more abstract 'to do good to your friends and harm to your\nenemies.' Either of these explanations gives a sufficient rule of life for\nplain men, but they both fall short of the precision of philosophy. We may\nnote in passing the antiquity of casuistry, which not only arises out of\nthe conflict of established principles in particular cases, but also out\nof the effort to attain them, and is prior as well as posterior to our\nfundamental notions of morality. The 'interrogation' of moral ideas; the\nappeal to the authority of Homer; the conclusion that the maxim, 'Do good\nto your friends and harm to your enemies,' being erroneous, could not have\nbeen the word of any great man (cp. ii. 380 A, B), are all of them very\ncharacteristic of the Platonic Socrates.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic I._ Analysis.]\n\n... Here Thrasymachus, who has made several attempts to interrupt, but has\nhitherto been kept in order by the company, takes advantage of a pause and\nrushes into the arena, beginning, like a savage animal, with a roar.\n'Socrates,' he says, 'what folly is this?--Why do you agree to be\nvanquished by one another in a pretended argument?' He then prohibits all\nthe ordinary definitions of justice; *337* to which Socrates replies that\nhe cannot tell how many twelve is, if he is forbidden to say 2 x 6, or\n3 x 4, or 6 x 2, or 4 x 3. At first Thrasymachus is reluctant to argue; but\nat length, *338* with a promise of payment on the part of {xx} the company\nand of praise from Socrates, he is induced to open the game. 'Listen,' he\nsays, 'my answer is that might is right, justice the interest of the\nstronger: now praise me.' Let me understand you first. Do you mean that\nbecause Polydamas the wrestler, who is stronger than we are, finds the\neating of beef for his interest, the eating of beef is also for our\ninterest, who are not so strong? Thrasymachus is indignant at the\nillustration, and in pompous words, apparently intended to restore dignity\nto the argument, he explains his meaning to be that the rulers make laws\nfor their own interests. *339* But suppose, says Socrates, that the ruler\nor stronger makes a mistake--then the interest of the stronger is not his\ninterest. Thrasymachus is saved from this speedy downfall by his disciple\nCleitophon, who introduces the word 'thinks;' *340* --not the actual\ninterest of the ruler, but what he thinks or what seems to be his\ninterest, is justice. The contradiction is escaped by the unmeaning\nevasion: for though his real and apparent interests may differ, what the\nruler thinks to be his interest will always remain what he thinks to be\nhis interest.\n\nOf course this was not the original assertion, nor is the new\ninterpretation accepted by Thrasymachus himself. But Socrates is not\ndisposed to quarrel about words, if, as he significantly insinuates, his\nadversary has changed his mind. In what follows Thrasymachus does in fact\nwithdraw his admission that the ruler may make a mistake, for he affirms\nthat the ruler as a ruler is infallible. *341* Socrates is quite ready to\naccept the new position, which he equally turns against Thrasymachus by\nthe help of the analogy of the arts. *342* Every art or science has an\ninterest, but this interest is to be distinguished from the accidental\ninterest of the artist, and is only concerned with the good of the things\nor persons which come under the art. And justice has an interest which is\nthe interest not of the ruler or judge, but of those who come under his\nsway.\n\nThrasymachus is on the brink of the inevitable conclusion, when he makes a\nbold diversion. *343* 'Tell me, Socrates,' he says, 'have you a nurse?'\nWhat a question! Why do you ask? 'Because, if you have, she neglects you\nand lets you go about drivelling, and has not even taught you to know the\nshepherd from the sheep. For you fancy that shepherds and rulers never\nthink of their own interest, but only of their sheep or subjects, {xxi}\nwhereas the truth is that they fatten them for their use, sheep and\nsubjects alike. And experience proves that in every relation of life the\njust man is the loser and the unjust the gainer, *344* especially where\ninjustice is on the grand scale, which is quite another thing from the\npetty rogueries of swindlers and burglars and robbers of temples. The\nlanguage of men proves this--our 'gracious' and 'blessed' tyrant and the\nlike--all which tends to show (1) that justice is the interest of the\nstronger; and (2) that injustice is more profitable and also stronger than\njustice.'\n\nThrasymachus, who is better at a speech than at a close argument, having\ndeluged the company with words, has a mind to escape. *345* But the others\nwill not let him go, and Socrates adds a humble but earnest request that\nhe will not desert them at such a crisis of their fate. 'And what can I do\nmore for you?' he says; 'would you have me put the words bodily into your\nsouls?' God forbid! replies Socrates; but we want you to be consistent in\nthe use of terms, and not to employ 'physician' in an exact sense, and\nthen again 'shepherd' or 'ruler' in an inexact,--if the words are strictly\ntaken, the ruler and the shepherd look only to the good of their people or\nflocks and not to their own: whereas you insist that rulers are solely\nactuated by love of office. 'No doubt about it,' replies Thrasymachus.\n*346* Then why are they paid? Is not the reason, that their interest is\nnot comprehended in their art, and is therefore the concern of another\nart, the art of pay, which is common to the arts in general, and therefore\nnot identical with any one of them? *347* Nor would any man be a ruler\nunless he were induced by the hope of reward or the fear of\npunishment;--the reward is money or honour, the punishment is the\nnecessity of being ruled by a man worse than himself. And if a State (or\nChurch) were composed entirely of good men, they would be affected by the\nlast motive only; and there would be as much 'nolo episcopari' as there is\nat present of the opposite....\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic I._ Introduction.]\n\nThe satire on existing governments is heightened by the simple and\napparently incidental manner in which the last remark is introduced. There\nis a similar irony in the argument that the governors of mankind do not\nlike being in office, and that therefore they demand pay.\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic I._ Analysis.]\n\n... Enough of this: the other assertion of Thrasymachus is far {xxii} more\nimportant--that the unjust life is more gainful than the just. *348* Now,\nas you and I, Glaucon, are not convinced by him, we must reply to him; but\nif we try to compare their respective gains we shall want a judge to\ndecide for us; we had better therefore proceed by making mutual admissions\nof the truth to one another.\n\nThrasymachus had asserted that perfect injustice was more gainful than\nperfect justice, and after a little hesitation he is induced by Socrates\n*349* to admit the still greater paradox that injustice is virtue and\njustice vice. Socrates praises his frankness, and assumes the attitude of\none whose only wish is to understand the meaning of his opponents. At the\nsame time he is weaving a net in which Thrasymachus is finally enclosed.\nThe admission is elicited from him that the just man seeks to gain an\nadvantage over the unjust only, but not over the just, while the unjust\nwould gain an advantage over either. Socrates, in order to test this\nstatement, employs once more the favourite analogy of the arts. *350* The\nmusician, doctor, skilled artist of any sort, does not seek to gain more\nthan the skilled, but only more than the unskilled (that is to say, he\nworks up to a rule, standard, law, and does not exceed it), whereas the\nunskilled makes random efforts at excess. Thus the skilled falls on the\nside of the good, and the unskilled on the side of the evil, and the just\nis the skilled, and the unjust is the unskilled.\n\nThere was great difficulty in bringing Thrasymachus to the point; the day\nwas hot and he was streaming with perspiration, and for the first time in\nhis life he was seen to blush. But his other thesis that injustice was\nstronger than justice has not yet been refuted, and Socrates now proceeds\nto the consideration of this, which, with the assistance of Thrasymachus,\nhe hopes to clear up; the latter is at first churlish, but in the\njudicious hands of Socrates is soon restored to good humour: *351* Is\nthere not honour among thieves? Is not the strength of injustice only a\nremnant of justice? Is not absolute injustice absolute weakness also?\n*352* A house that is divided against itself cannot stand; two men who\nquarrel detract from one another's strength, and he who is at war with\nhimself is the enemy of himself and the gods. Not wickedness therefore,\nbut semi-wickedness flourishes in states,--a remnant of good is needed in\norder to make union in action possible,--there is no kingdom of evil in\nthis world.\n\n{xxiii} Another question has not been answered: Is the just or the unjust\nthe happier? To this we reply, that every art has an end and an excellence\nor virtue by which the end is accomplished. And is not the end of the soul\nhappiness, and justice the excellence of the soul by which happiness is\nattained? *354* Justice and happiness being thus shown to be inseparable,\nthe question whether the just or the unjust is the happier has\ndisappeared.\n\nThrasymachus replies: 'Let this be your entertainment, Socrates, at the\nfestival of Bendis.' Yes; and a very good entertainment with which your\nkindness has supplied me, now that you have left off scolding. And yet not\na good entertainment--but that was my own fault, for I tasted of too many\nthings. First of all the nature of justice was the subject of our enquiry,\nand then whether justice is virtue and wisdom, or evil and folly; and then\nthe comparative advantages of just and unjust: and the sum of all is that\nI know not what justice is; how then shall I know whether the just is\nhappy or not?...\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic I._ Introduction.]\n\nThus the sophistical fabric has been demolished, chiefly by appealing to\nthe analogy of the arts. 'Justice is like the arts (1) in having no\nexternal interest, and (2) in not aiming at excess, and (3) justice is to\nhappiness what the implement of the workman is to his work.' At this the\nmodern reader is apt to stumble, because he forgets that Plato is writing\nin an age when the arts and the virtues, like the moral and intellectual\nfaculties, were still undistinguished. Among early enquirers into the\nnature of human action the arts helped to fill up the void of speculation;\nand at first the comparison of the arts and the virtues was not perceived\nby them to be fallacious. They only saw the points of agreement in them\nand not the points of difference. Virtue, like art, must take means to an\nend; good manners are both an art and a virtue; character is naturally\ndescribed under the image of a statue (ii. 361 D; vii. 540 C); and there\nare many other figures of speech which are readily transferred from art to\nmorals. The next generation cleared up these perplexities; or at least\nsupplied after ages with a further analysis of them. The contemporaries of\nPlato were in a state of transition, and had not yet fully realized the\ncommon-sense distinction of Aristotle, that 'virtue is concerned with\naction, art with production' (Nic. Eth. vi. 4), or that 'virtue implies\nintention and constancy of purpose,' {xxiv} whereas 'art requires\nknowledge only' (Nic. Eth. vi. 3). And yet in the absurdities which follow\nfrom some uses of the analogy (cp. i. 333 E, 334 B), there seems to be an\nintimation conveyed that virtue is more than art. This is implied in the\n_reductio ad absurdum_ that 'justice is a thief,' and in the\ndissatisfaction which Socrates expresses at the final result.\n\nThe expression 'an art of pay' (i. 346 B) which is described as 'common to\nall the arts' is not in accordance with the ordinary use of language. Nor\nis it employed elsewhere either by Plato or by any other Greek writer. It\nis suggested by the argument, and seems to extend the conception of art to\ndoing as well as making. Another flaw or inaccuracy of language may be\nnoted in the words (i. 335 C) 'men who are injured are made more unjust.'\nFor those who are injured are not necessarily made worse, but only harmed\nor ill-treated.\n\nThe second of the three arguments, 'that the just does not aim at excess,'\nhas a real meaning, though wrapped up in an enigmatical form. That the\ngood is of the nature of the finite is a peculiarly Hellenic sentiment,\nwhich may be compared with the language of those modern writers who speak\nof virtue as fitness, and of freedom as obedience to law. The mathematical\nor logical notion of limit easily passes into an ethical one, and even\nfinds a mythological expression in the conception of envy ([Greek:\nphtho/nos]). Ideas of measure, equality, order, unity, proportion, still\nlinger in the writings of moralists; and the true spirit of the fine arts\nis better conveyed by such terms than by superlatives.\n\n  'When workmen strive to do better than well,\n  They do confound their skill in covetousness.'\n                        (King John, Act iv. Sc. 2.)\n\nThe harmony of the soul and body (iii. 402 D), and of the parts of the\nsoul with one another (iv. 442 C), a harmony 'fairer than that of musical\nnotes,' is the true Hellenic mode of conceiving the perfection of human\nnature.\n\nIn what may be called the epilogue of the discussion with Thrasymachus,\nPlato argues that evil is not a principle of strength, but of discord and\ndissolution, just touching the question which has been often treated in\nmodern times by theologians and philosophers, of the negative nature of\nevil (cp. on the other hand x. 610). In the last argument we trace the\ngerm of the {xxv} Aristotelian doctrine of an end and a virtue directed\ntowards the end, which again is suggested by the arts. The final\nreconcilement of justice and happiness and the identity of the individual\nand the State are also intimated. Socrates reassumes the character of a\n'know-nothing;' at the same time he appears to be not wholly satisfied\nwith the manner in which the argument has been conducted. Nothing is\nconcluded; but the tendency of the dialectical process, here as always, is\nto enlarge our conception of ideas, and to widen their application to\nhuman life.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic II._ Analysis.]\n\nBOOK II. Thrasymachus is pacified, *357* but the intrepid Glaucon insists\non continuing the argument. He is not satisfied with the indirect manner\nin which, at the end of the last book, Socrates had disposed of the\nquestion 'Whether the just or the unjust is the happier.' He begins by\ndividing goods into three classes:--first, goods desirable in themselves;\nsecondly, goods desirable in themselves and for their results; thirdly,\ngoods desirable for their results only. He then asks Socrates in which of\nthe three classes he would place justice. *358* In the second class,\nreplies Socrates, among goods desirable for themselves and also for their\nresults. 'Then the world in general are of another mind, for they say that\njustice belongs to the troublesome class of goods which are desirable for\ntheir results only.' Socrates answers that this is the doctrine of\nThrasymachus which he rejects. Glaucon thinks that Thrasymachus was too\nready to listen to the voice of the charmer, and proposes to consider the\nnature of justice and injustice in themselves and apart from the results\nand rewards of them which the world is always dinning in his ears. He will\nfirst of all speak of the nature and origin of justice; secondly, of the\nmanner in which men view justice as a necessity and not a good; and\nthirdly, he will prove the reasonableness of this view.\n\n'To do injustice is said to be a good; to suffer injustice an evil. As the\nevil is discovered by experience to be greater than the good, *359* the\nsufferers, who cannot also be doers, make a compact that they will have\nneither, and this compact or mean is called justice, but is really the\nimpossibility of doing injustice. No one would observe such a compact if\nhe were not obliged. Let us suppose that the just and unjust have two\nrings, like that of Gyges {xxvi} in the well-known story, which make them\ninvisible, *360* and then no difference will appear in them, for every one\nwill do evil if he can. And he who abstains will be regarded by the world\nas a fool for his pains. Men may praise him in public out of fear for\nthemselves, but they will laugh at him in their hearts. (Cp. Gorgias,\n483 B.)\n\n'And now let us frame an ideal of the just and unjust. Imagine the unjust\nman to be master of his craft, seldom making mistakes and easily\ncorrecting them; having gifts of money, speech, strength-- *361* the\ngreatest villain bearing the highest character: and at his side let us\nplace the just in his nobleness and simplicity--being, not\nseeming--without name or reward--clothed in his justice only--the best of\nmen who is thought to be the worst, and let him die as he has lived. I\nmight add (but I would rather put the rest into the mouth of the\npanegyrists of injustice--they will tell you) that the just man will be\nscourged, racked, bound, will have his eyes put out, and will at last be\ncrucified [literally _impaled_]--and all this because he ought to have\npreferred seeming to being. *362* How different is the case of the unjust\nwho clings to appearance as the true reality! His high character makes him\na ruler; he can marry where he likes, trade where he likes, help his\nfriends and hurt his enemies; having got rich by dishonesty he can worship\nthe gods better, and will therefore be more loved by them than the just.'\n\nI was thinking what to answer, when Adeimantus joined in the already\nunequal fray. He considered that the most important point of all had been\nomitted:--'Men are taught to be just for the sake of rewards; *363*\nparents and guardians make reputation the incentive to virtue. And other\nadvantages are promised by them of a more solid kind, such as wealthy\nmarriages and high offices. There are the pictures in Homer and Hesiod of\nfat sheep and heavy fleeces, rich corn-fields and trees toppling with\nfruit, which the gods provide in this life for the just. And the Orphic\npoets add a similar picture of another. The heroes of Musaeus and Eumolpus\nlie on couches at a festival, with garlands on their heads, enjoying as\nthe meed of virtue a paradise of immortal drunkenness. Some go further,\nand speak of a fair posterity in the third and fourth generation. But the\nwicked they bury in a slough and make them carry water in a sieve: and in\nthis life they {xxvii} attribute to them the infamy which Glaucon was\nassuming to be the lot of the just who are supposed to be unjust.\n\n*364* 'Take another kind of argument which is found both in poetry and\nprose:--\"Virtue,\" as Hesiod says, \"is honourable but difficult, vice is\neasy and profitable.\" You may often see the wicked in great prosperity and\nthe righteous afflicted by the will of heaven. And mendicant prophets\nknock at rich men's doors, promising to atone for the sins of themselves\nor their fathers in an easy fashion with sacrifices and festive games, or\nwith charms and invocations to get rid of an enemy good or bad by divine\nhelp and at a small charge;--they appeal to books professing to be written\nby Musaeus and Orpheus, and carry away the minds of whole cities, and\npromise to \"get souls out of purgatory;\" and if we refuse to listen to\nthem, *365* no one knows what will happen to us.\n\n'When a lively-minded ingenuous youth hears all this, what will be his\nconclusion? \"Will he,\" in the language of Pindar, \"make justice his high\ntower, or fortify himself with crooked deceit?\" Justice, he reflects,\nwithout the appearance of justice, is misery and ruin; injustice has the\npromise of a glorious life. Appearance is master of truth and lord of\nhappiness. To appearance then I will turn,--I will put on the show of\nvirtue and trail behind me the fox of Archilochus. I hear some one saying\nthat \"wickedness is not easily concealed,\" to which I reply that \"nothing\ngreat is easy.\" Union and force and rhetoric will do much; and if men say\nthat they cannot prevail over the gods, still how do we know that there\nare gods? Only from the poets, who acknowledge that they may be appeased\nby sacrifices. *366* Then why not sin and pay for indulgences out of your\nsin? For if the righteous are only unpunished, still they have no further\nreward, while the wicked may be unpunished and have the pleasure of\nsinning too. But what of the world below? Nay, says the argument, there\nare atoning powers who will set that matter right, as the poets, who are\nthe sons of the gods, tell us; and this is confirmed by the authority of\nthe State.\n\n'How can we resist such arguments in favour of injustice? Add good\nmanners, and, as the wise tell us, we shall make the best of both worlds.\nWho that is not a miserable caitiff will refrain from smiling at the\npraises of justice? Even if a man knows the better part he will not be\nangry with others; for he knows also that {xxviii} more than human virtue\nis needed to save a man, and that he only praises justice who is incapable\nof injustice.\n\n'The origin of the evil is that all men from the beginning, heroes, poets,\ninstructors of youth, have always asserted \"the temporal dispensation,\"\nthe honours and profits of justice. *367* Had we been taught in early\nyouth the power of justice and injustice inherent in the soul, and unseen\nby any human or divine eye, we should not have needed others to be our\nguardians, but every one would have been the guardian of himself. This is\nwhat I want you to show, Socrates;--other men use arguments which rather\ntend to strengthen the position of Thrasymachus that \"might is right;\" but\nfrom you I expect better things. And please, as Glaucon said, to exclude\nreputation; let the just be thought unjust and the unjust just, and do you\nstill prove to us the superiority of justice.'...\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic II._ Introduction.]\n\nThe thesis, which for the sake of argument has been maintained by Glaucon,\nis the converse of that of Thrasymachus--not right is the interest of the\nstronger, but right is the necessity of the weaker. Starting from the same\npremises he carries the analysis of society a step further back;--might is\nstill right, but the might is the weakness of the many combined against\nthe strength of the few.\n\nThere have been theories in modern as well as in ancient times which have\na family likeness to the speculations of Glaucon; e.g. that power is the\nfoundation of right; or that a monarch has a divine right to govern well\nor ill; or that virtue is self-love or the love of power; or that war is\nthe natural state of man; or that private vices are public benefits. All\nsuch theories have a kind of plausibility from their partial agreement\nwith experience. For human nature oscillates between good and evil, and\nthe motives of actions and the origin of institutions may be explained to\na certain extent on either hypothesis according to the character or point\nof view of a particular thinker. The obligation of maintaining authority\nunder all circumstances and sometimes by rather questionable means is felt\nstrongly and has become a sort of instinct among civilized men. The divine\nright of kings, or more generally of governments, is one of the forms\nunder which this natural feeling is expressed. Nor again is there any evil\nwhich has not some accompaniment of good or pleasure; nor any good {xxix}\nwhich is free from some alloy of evil; nor any noble or generous thought\nwhich may not be attended by a shadow or the ghost of a shadow of\nself-interest or of self-love. We know that all human actions are\nimperfect; but we do not therefore attribute them to the worse rather than\nto the better motive or principle. Such a philosophy is both foolish and\nfalse, like that opinion of the clever rogue who assumes all other men to\nbe like himself (iii. 409 C). And theories of this sort do not represent\nthe real nature of the State, which is based on a vague sense of right\ngradually corrected and enlarged by custom and law (although capable also\nof perversion), any more than they describe the origin of society, which\nis to be sought in the family and in the social and religious feelings of\nman. Nor do they represent the average character of individuals, which\ncannot be explained simply on a theory of evil, but has always a\ncounteracting element of good. And as men become better such theories\nappear more and more untruthful to them, because they are more conscious\nof their own disinterestedness. A little experience may make a man a\ncynic; a great deal will bring him back to a truer and kindlier view of\nthe mixed nature of himself and his fellow men.\n\nThe two brothers ask Socrates to prove to them that the just is happy when\nthey have taken from him all that in which happiness is ordinarily\nsupposed to consist. Not that there is (1) any absurdity in the attempt to\nframe a notion of justice apart from circumstances. For the ideal must\nalways be a paradox when compared with the ordinary conditions of human\nlife. Neither the Stoical ideal nor the Christian ideal is true as a fact,\nbut they may serve as a basis of education, and may exercise an ennobling\ninfluence. An ideal is none the worse because 'some one has made the\ndiscovery' that no such ideal was ever realized. (Cp. v. 472 D.) And in a\nfew exceptional individuals who are raised above the ordinary level of\nhumanity, the ideal of happiness may be realized in death and misery. This\nmay be the state which the reason deliberately approves, and which the\nutilitarian as well as every other moralist may be bound in certain cases\nto prefer.\n\nNor again, (2) must we forget that Plato, though he agrees generally with\nthe view implied in the argument of the two brothers, is not expressing\nhis own final conclusion, but rather {xxx} seeking to dramatize one of the\naspects of ethical truth. He is developing his idea gradually in a series\nof positions or situations. He is exhibiting Socrates for the first time\nundergoing the Socratic interrogation. Lastly, (3) the word 'happiness'\ninvolves some degree of confusion because associated in the language of\nmodern philosophy with conscious pleasure or satisfaction, which was not\nequally present to his mind.\n\nGlaucon has been drawing a picture of the misery of the just and the\nhappiness of the unjust, to which the misery of the tyrant in Book IX is\nthe answer and parallel. And still the unjust must appear just; that is\n'the homage which vice pays to virtue.' But now Adeimantus, taking up the\nhint which had been already given by Glaucon (ii. 358 C), proceeds to show\nthat in the opinion of mankind justice is regarded only for the sake of\nrewards and reputation, and points out the advantage which is given to\nsuch arguments as those of Thrasymachus and Glaucon by the conventional\nmorality of mankind. He seems to feel the difficulty of 'justifying the\nways of God to man.' Both the brothers touch upon the question, whether\nthe morality of actions is determined by their consequences (cp. iv. 420\nfoll.); and both of them go beyond the position of Socrates, that justice\nbelongs to the class of goods not desirable for themselves only, but\ndesirable for themselves and for their results, to which he recalls them.\nIn their attempt to view justice as an internal principle, and in their\ncondemnation of the poets, they anticipate him. The common life of Greece\nis not enough for them; they must penetrate deeper into the nature of\nthings.\n\nIt has been objected that justice is honesty in the sense of Glaucon and\nAdeimantus, but is taken by Socrates to mean all virtue. May we not more\ntruly say that the old-fashioned notion of justice is enlarged by\nSocrates, and becomes equivalent to universal order or well-being, first\nin the State, and secondly in the individual? He has found a new answer to\nhis old question (Protag. 329), 'whether the virtues are one or many,'\nviz. that one is the ordering principle of the three others. In seeking to\nestablish the purely internal nature of justice, he is met by the fact\nthat man is a social being, and he tries to harmonise the two opposite\ntheses as well as he can. There is no more inconsistency in this than was\ninevitable in his age and country; {xxxi} there is no use in turning upon\nhim the cross lights of modern philosophy, which, from some other point of\nview, would appear equally inconsistent. Plato does not give the final\nsolution of philosophical questions for us; nor can he be judged of by our\nstandard.\n\nThe remainder of the Republic is developed out of the question of the sons\nof Ariston. Three points are deserving of remark in what immediately\nfollows:--First, that the answer of Socrates is altogether indirect. He\ndoes not say that happiness consists in the contemplation of the idea of\njustice, and still less will he be tempted to affirm the Stoical paradox\nthat the just man can be happy on the rack. But first he dwells on the\ndifficulty of the problem and insists on restoring man to his natural\ncondition, before he will answer the question at all. He too will frame an\nideal, but his ideal comprehends not only abstract justice, but the whole\nrelations of man. Under the fanciful illustration of the large letters he\nimplies that he will only look for justice in society, and that from the\nState he will proceed to the individual. His answer in substance amounts\nto this,--that under favourable conditions, i.e. in the perfect State,\njustice and happiness will coincide, and that when justice has been once\nfound, happiness may be left to take care of itself. That he falls into\nsome degree of inconsistency, when in the tenth book (612 A) he claims to\nhave got rid of the rewards and honours of justice, may be admitted; for\nhe has left those which exist in the perfect State. And the philosopher\n'who retires under the shelter of a wall' (vi. 496) can hardly have been\nesteemed happy by him, at least not in this world. Still he maintains the\ntrue attitude of moral action. Let a man do his duty first, without asking\nwhether he will be happy or not, and happiness will be the inseparable\naccident which attends him. 'Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his\nrighteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you.'\n\nSecondly, it may be remarked that Plato preserves the genuine character of\nGreek thought in beginning with the State and in going on to the\nindividual. First ethics, then politics--this is the order of ideas to us;\nthe reverse is the order of history. Only after many struggles of thought\ndoes the individual assert his right as a moral being. In early ages he is\nnot _one_, but one of many, the citizen of a State which is prior to him;\nand he {xxxii} has no notion of good or evil apart from the law of his\ncountry or the creed of his church. And to this type he is constantly\ntending to revert, whenever the influence of custom, or of party spirit,\nor the recollection of the past becomes too strong for him.\n\nThirdly, we may observe the confusion or identification of the individual\nand the State, of ethics and politics, which pervades early Greek\nspeculation, and even in modern times retains a certain degree of\ninfluence. The subtle difference between the collective and individual\naction of mankind seems to have escaped early thinkers, and we too are\nsometimes in danger of forgetting the conditions of united human action,\nwhenever we either elevate politics into ethics, or lower ethics to the\nstandard of politics. The good man and the good citizen only coincide in\nthe perfect State; and this perfection cannot be attained by legislation\nacting upon them from without, but, if at all, by education fashioning\nthem from within.\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic II._ Analysis.]\n\n... Socrates praises the sons of Ariston, *368* 'inspired offspring of the\nrenowned hero,' as the elegiac poet terms them; but he does not understand\nhow they can argue so eloquently on behalf of injustice while their\ncharacter shows that they are uninfluenced by their own arguments. He\nknows not how to answer them, although he is afraid of deserting justice\nin the hour of need. He therefore makes a condition, that having weak eyes\nhe shall be allowed to read the large letters first and then go on to the\nsmaller, that is, he must look for justice in the State first, and will\nthen proceed to the individual. *369* Accordingly he begins to construct\nthe State.\n\nSociety arises out of the wants of man. His first want is food; his second\na house; his third a coat. The sense of these needs and the possibility of\nsatisfying them by exchange, draw individuals together on the same spot;\nand this is the beginning of a State, which we take the liberty to invent,\nalthough necessity is the real inventor. There must be first a husbandman,\nsecondly a builder, thirdly a weaver, to which may be added a cobbler.\nFour or five citizens at least are required to make a city. *370* Now men\nhave different natures, and one man will do one thing better than many;\nand business waits for no man. Hence there must be a division of labour\ninto different employments; into wholesale and retail trade; into workers,\nand makers of workmen's {xxxiii} tools; into shepherds and husbandmen.\nA city which includes all this will have far exceeded the limit of four or\nfive, and yet not be very large. *371* But then again imports will be\nrequired, and imports necessitate exports, and this implies variety of\nproduce in order to attract the taste of purchasers; also merchants and\nships. In the city too we must have a market and money and retail trades;\notherwise buyers and sellers will never meet, and the valuable time of the\nproducers will be wasted in vain efforts at exchange. If we add hired\nservants the State will be complete. And we may guess that *372* somewhere\nin the intercourse of the citizens with one another justice and injustice\nwill appear.\n\nHere follows a rustic picture of their way of life. They spend their days\nin houses which they have built for themselves; they make their own\nclothes and produce their own corn and wine. Their principal food is meal\nand flour, and they drink in moderation. They live on the best of terms\nwith each other, and take care not to have too many children. 'But,' said\nGlaucon, interposing, 'are they not to have a relish?' Certainly; they\nwill have salt and olives and cheese, vegetables and fruits, and chestnuts\nto roast at the fire. ''Tis a city of pigs, Socrates.' Why, I replied,\nwhat do you want more? 'Only the comforts of life,--sofas and tables, also\nsauces and sweets.' I see; you want not only a State, but a luxurious\nState; and possibly in the more complex frame we may sooner find justice\nand injustice. Then *373* the fine arts must go to work--every conceivable\ninstrument and ornament of luxury will be wanted. There will be dancers,\npainters, sculptors, musicians, cooks, barbers, tire-women, nurses,\nartists; swineherds and neatherds too for the animals, and physicians to\ncure the disorders of which luxury is the source. To feed all these\nsuperfluous mouths we shall need a part of our neighbour's land, and they\nwill want a part of ours. And this is the origin of war, which may be\ntraced to the same causes as other political evils. *374* Our city will\nnow require the slight addition of a camp, and the citizen will be\nconverted into a soldier. But then again our old doctrine of the division\nof labour must not be forgotten. The art of war cannot be learned in a\nday, and there must be a natural aptitude for military duties. There will\nbe some warlike natures *375* who have this aptitude--dogs keen of scent,\nswift of foot to pursue, and strong of limb to fight. And {xxxiv} as\nspirit is the foundation of courage, such natures, whether of men or\nanimals, will be full of spirit. But these spirited natures are apt to\nbite and devour one another; the union of gentleness to friends and\nfierceness against enemies appears to be an impossibility, and the\nguardian of a State requires both qualities. Who then can be a guardian?\nThe image of the dog suggests an answer. *376* For dogs are gentle to\nfriends and fierce to strangers. Your dog is a philosopher who judges by\nthe rule of knowing or not knowing; and philosophy, whether in man or\nbeast, is the parent of gentleness. The human watchdogs must be\nphilosophers or lovers of learning which will make them gentle. And how\nare they to be learned without education?\n\nBut what shall their education be? Is any better than the old-fashioned\nsort which is comprehended under the name of music and gymnastic? *377*\nMusic includes literature, and literature is of two kinds, true and false.\n'What do you mean?' he said. I mean that children hear stories before they\nlearn gymnastics, and that the stories are either untrue, or have at most\none or two grains of truth in a bushel of falsehood. Now early life is\nvery impressible, and children ought not to learn what they will have to\nunlearn when they grow up; we must therefore have a censorship of nursery\ntales, banishing some and keeping others. Some of them are very improper,\nas we may see in the great instances of Homer and Hesiod, who not only\ntell lies but bad lies; stories about Uranus and Saturn, *378* which are\nimmoral as well as false, and which should never be spoken of to young\npersons, or indeed at all; or, if at all, then in a mystery, after the\nsacrifice, not of an Eleusinian pig, but of some unprocurable animal.\nShall our youth be encouraged to beat their fathers by the example of\nZeus, or our citizens be incited to quarrel by hearing or seeing\nrepresentations of strife among the gods? Shall they listen to the\nnarrative of Hephaestus binding his mother, and of Zeus sending him flying\nfor helping her when she was beaten? Such tales may possibly have a\nmystical interpretation, but the young are incapable of understanding\nallegory. *379* If any one asks what tales are to be allowed, we will\nanswer that we are legislators and not book-makers; we only lay down the\nprinciples according to which books are to be written; to write them is\nthe duty of others.\n\n{xxxv} And our first principle is, that God must be represented as he is;\nnot as the author of all things, but of good only. We will not suffer the\npoets to say that he is the steward of good and evil, or that he has two\ncasks full of destinies;--or that Athene and Zeus incited Pandarus to\nbreak the treaty; or that *380* God caused the sufferings of Niobe, or of\nPelops, or the Trojan war; or that he makes men sin when he wishes to\ndestroy them. Either these were not the actions of the gods, or God was\njust, and men were the better for being punished. But that the deed was\nevil, and God the author, is a wicked, suicidal fiction which we will\nallow no one, old or young, to utter. This is our first and great\nprinciple--God is the author of good only.\n\nAnd the second principle is like unto it:--With God is no variableness or\nchange of form. Reason teaches us this; for if we suppose a change in God,\nhe must be changed either by another or by himself. By another?--but the\nbest works of nature and art *381* and the noblest qualities of mind are\nleast liable to be changed by any external force. By himself?--but he\ncannot change for the better; he will hardly change for the worse. He\nremains for ever fairest and best in his own image. Therefore we refuse to\nlisten to the poets who tell us of Here begging in the likeness of a\npriestess or of other deities who prowl about at night in strange\ndisguises; all that blasphemous nonsense with which mothers fool the\nmanhood out of their children must be suppressed. *382* But some one will\nsay that God, who is himself unchangeable, may take a form in relation to\nus. Why should he? For gods as well as men hate the lie in the soul, or\nprinciple of falsehood; and as for any other form of lying which is used\nfor a purpose and is regarded as innocent in certain exceptional\ncases--what need have the gods of this? For they are not ignorant of\nantiquity like the poets, nor are they afraid of their enemies, nor is any\nmadman a friend of theirs. *383* God then is true, he is absolutely true;\nhe changes not, he deceives not, by day or night, by word or sign. This is\nour second great principle--God is true. Away with the lying dream of\nAgamemnon in Homer, and the accusation of Thetis against Apollo in\nAeschylus....\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic II._ Introduction.]\n\nIn order to give clearness to his conception of the State, Plato proceeds\nto trace the first principles of mutual need and of {xxxvi} division of\nlabour in an imaginary community of four or five citizens. Gradually this\ncommunity increases; the division of labour extends to countries; imports\nnecessitate exports; a medium of exchange is required, and retailers sit\nin the market-place to save the time of the producers. These are the steps\nby which Plato constructs the first or primitive State, introducing the\nelements of political economy by the way. As he is going to frame a second\nor civilized State, the simple naturally comes before the complex. He\nindulges, like Rousseau, in a picture of primitive life--an idea which has\nindeed often had a powerful influence on the imagination of mankind, but\nhe does not seriously mean to say that one is better than the other (cp.\nPoliticus, p. 272); nor can any inference be drawn from the description of\nthe first state taken apart from the second, such as Aristotle appears to\ndraw in the Politics, iv. 4, 12 (cp. again Politicus, 272). We should not\ninterpret a Platonic dialogue any more than a poem or a parable in too\nliteral or matter-of-fact a style. On the other hand, when we compare the\nlively fancy of Plato with the dried-up abstractions of modern treatises\non philosophy, we are compelled to say with Protagoras, that the 'mythus\nis more interesting' (Protag. 320 D).\n\nSeveral interesting remarks which in modern times would have a place in a\ntreatise on Political Economy are scattered up and down the writings of\nPlato: cp. especially Laws, v. 740, Population; viii. 847, Free Trade;\nxi. 916-7, Adulteration; 923-4, Wills and Bequests; 930, Begging; Eryxias,\n(though not Plato's), Value and Demand; Republic, ii. 369 ff., Division of\nLabour. The last subject, and also the origin of Retail Trade, is treated\nwith admirable lucidity in the second book of the Republic. But Plato\nnever combined his economic ideas into a system, and never seems to have\nrecognized that Trade is one of the great motive powers of the State and\nof the world. He would make retail traders only of the inferior sort of\ncitizens (Rep. ii. 371; cp. Laws, viii. 847), though he remarks, quaintly\nenough (Laws, ix. 918 D), that 'if only the best men and the best women\neverywhere were compelled to keep taverns for a time or to carry on retail\ntrade, etc., then we should knew how pleasant and agreeable all these\nthings are.'\n\nThe disappointment of Glaucon at the 'city of pigs,' the ludicrous\ndescription of the ministers of luxury in the more refined {xxxvii} State,\nand the afterthought of the necessity of doctors, the illustration of the\nnature of the guardian taken from the dog, the desirableness of offering\nsome almost unprocurable victim when impure mysteries are to be\ncelebrated, the behaviour of Zeus to his father and of Hephaestus to his\nmother, are touches of humour which have also a serious meaning. In\nspeaking of education Plato rather startles us by affirming that a child\nmust be trained in falsehood first and in truth afterwards. Yet this is\nnot very different from saying that children must be taught through the\nmedium of imagination as well as reason; that their minds can only\ndevelope gradually, and that there is much which they must learn without\nunderstanding (cp. iii. 402 A). This is also the substance of Plato's\nview, though he must be acknowledged to have drawn the line somewhat\ndifferently from modern ethical writers, respecting truth and falsehood.\nTo us, economies or accommodations would not be allowable unless they were\nrequired by the human faculties or necessary for the communication of\nknowledge to the simple and ignorant. We should insist that the word was\ninseparable from the intention, and that we must not be 'falsely true,'\ni.e. speak or act falsely in support of what was right or true. But Plato\nwould limit the use of fictions only by requiring that they should have a\ngood moral effect, and that such a dangerous weapon as falsehood should be\nemployed by the rulers alone and for great objects.\n\nA Greek in the age of Plato attached no importance to the question whether\nhis religion was an historical fact. He was just beginning to be conscious\nthat the past had a history; but he could see nothing beyond Homer and\nHesiod. Whether their narratives were true or false did not seriously\naffect the political or social life of Hellas. Men only began to suspect\nthat they were fictions when they recognised them to be immoral. And so in\nall religions: the consideration of their morality comes first, afterwards\nthe truth of the documents in which they are recorded, or of the events\nnatural or supernatural which are told of them. But in modern times, and\nin Protestant countries perhaps more than in Catholic, we have been too\nmuch inclined to identify the historical with the moral; and some have\nrefused to believe in religion at all, unless a superhuman accuracy was\ndiscernible in every part of the record. The facts of an ancient {xxxviii}\nor religious history are amongst the most important of all facts; but they\nare frequently uncertain, and we only learn the true lesson which is to be\ngathered from them when we place ourselves above them. These reflections\ntend to show that the difference between Plato and ourselves, though not\nunimportant, is not so great as might at first sight appear. For we should\nagree with him in placing the moral before the historical truth of\nreligion; and, generally, in disregarding those errors or misstatements of\nfact which necessarily occur in the early stages of all religions. We know\nalso that changes in the traditions of a country cannot be made in a day;\nand are therefore tolerant of many things which science and criticism\nwould condemn.\n\nWe note in passing that the allegorical interpretation of mythology, said\nto have been first introduced as early as the sixth century before Christ\nby Theagenes of Rhegium, was well established in the age of Plato, and\nhere, as in the Phaedrus (229-30), though for a different reason, was\nrejected by him. That anachronisms whether of religion or law, when men\nhave reached another stage of civilization, should be got rid of by\nfictions is in accordance with universal experience. Great is the art of\ninterpretation; and by a natural process, which when once discovered was\nalways going on, what could not be altered was explained away. And so\nwithout any palpable inconsistency there existed side by side two forms of\nreligion, the tradition inherited or invented by the poets and the\ncustomary worship of the temple; on the other hand, there was the religion\nof the philosopher, who was dwelling in the heaven of ideas, but did not\ntherefore refuse to offer a cock to \u00c6sculapius, or to be seen saying his\nprayers at the rising of the sun. At length the antagonism between the\npopular and philosophical religion, never so great among the Greeks as in\nour own age, disappeared, and was only felt like the difference between\nthe religion of the educated and uneducated among ourselves. The Zeus of\nHomer and Hesiod easily passed into the 'royal mind' of Plato (Philebus,\n28); the giant Heracles became the knight-errant and benefactor of\nmankind. These and still more wonderful transformations were readily\neffected by the ingenuity of Stoics and neo-Platonists in the two or three\ncenturies before and after Christ. The Greek and Roman religions were\ngradually permeated by the spirit of philosophy; having lost their {xxxix}\nancient meaning, they were resolved into poetry and morality; and probably\nwere never purer than at the time of their decay, when their influence\nover the world was waning.\n\nA singular conception which occurs towards the end of the book is the lie\nin the soul; this is connected with the Platonic and Socratic doctrine\nthat involuntary ignorance is worse than voluntary. The lie in the soul is\na true lie, the corruption of the highest truth, the deception of the\nhighest part of the soul, from which he who is deceived has no power of\ndelivering himself. For example, to represent God as false or immoral, or,\naccording to Plato, as deluding men with appearances or as the author of\nevil; or again, to affirm with Protagoras that 'knowledge is sensation,'\nor that 'being is becoming,' or with Thrasymachus 'that might is right,'\nwould have been regarded by Plato as a lie of this hateful sort. The\ngreatest unconsciousness of the greatest untruth, e.g. if, in the language\nof the Gospels (John iv. 41), 'he who was blind' were to say 'I see,' is\nanother aspect of the state of mind which Plato is describing. The lie in\nthe soul may be further compared with the sin against the Holy Ghost (Luke\nxii. 10), allowing for the difference between Greek and Christian modes of\nspeaking. To this is opposed the lie in words, which is only such a\ndeception as may occur in a play or poem, or allegory or figure of speech,\nor in any sort of accommodation,--which though useless to the gods may be\nuseful to men in certain cases. Socrates is here answering the question\nwhich he had himself raised (i. 331 C) about the propriety of deceiving a\nmadman; and he is also contrasting the nature of God and man. For God is\nTruth, but mankind can only be true by appearing sometimes to be partial,\nor false. Reserving for another place the greater questions of religion or\neducation, we may note further, (1) the approval of the old traditional\neducation of Greece; (2) the preparation which Plato is making for the\nattack on Homer and the poets; (3) the preparation which he is also making\nfor the use of economies in the State; (4) the contemptuous and at the\nsame time euphemistic manner in which here as below (iii. 390) he alludes\nto the _Chronique Scandaleuse_ of the gods.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic III._ Analysis.]\n\nBOOK III. *386* There is another motive in purifying religion, which is to\nbanish fear; for no man can be courageous who is {xl} afraid of death, or\nwho believes the tales which are repeated by the poets concerning the\nworld below. They must be gently requested not to abuse hell; they may be\nreminded that their stories are both untrue and discouraging. Nor must\nthey be angry if we expunge obnoxious passages, such as the depressing\nwords of Achilles--'I would rather be a serving-man than rule over all the\ndead;' and the verses which tell of the squalid mansions, the senseless\nshadows, the flitting soul mourning over lost strength and youth, *387*\nthe soul with a gibber going beneath the earth like smoke, or the souls of\nthe suitors which flutter about like bats. The terrors and horrors of\nCocytus and Styx, ghosts and sapless shades, and the rest of their\nTartarean nomenclature, must vanish. Such tales may have their use; but\nthey are not the proper food for soldiers. As little can we admit the\nsorrows and sympathies of the Homeric heroes:--Achilles, the son of\nThetis, in tears, throwing ashes on his head, or pacing up and down the\nsea-shore in distraction; or Priam, the cousin of the gods, crying aloud,\nrolling in the mire. A good man is not prostrated at the loss of children\nor fortune. Neither is death terrible to him; and therefore lamentations\nover the dead should not be practised by men of note; *388* they should be\nthe concern of inferior persons only, whether women or men. Still worse is\nthe attribution of such weakness to the gods; as when the goddesses say,\n'Alas! my travail!' and worst of all, when the king of heaven himself\nlaments his inability to save Hector, or sorrows over the impending doom\nof his dear Sarpedon. Such a character of God, if not ridiculed by our\nyoung men, is likely to be imitated by them. Nor should our citizens be\ngiven to excess of laughter--'Such violent delights' are followed by a\nviolent re-action. The description in the Iliad of the gods shaking their\nsides at the clumsiness of Hephaestus will not be admitted by us.\n'Certainly not.'\n\nTruth should have a high place among the virtues, for falsehood, as we\nwere saying, is useless to the gods, and only useful to men as a medicine.\nBut this employment of falsehood must remain a privilege of state; the\ncommon man must not in return tell a lie to the ruler; any more than the\npatient would tell a lie to his physician, or the sailor to his captain.\n\nIn the next place our youth must be temperate, and temperance consists in\nself-control and obedience to authority. That is a {xli} lesson which\nHomer teaches in some places: 'The Achaeans marched on breathing prowess,\nin silent awe of their leaders;'--but a very different one in other\nplaces: 'O heavy with wine, who hast the eyes of a dog, but the heart of a\nstag.' *390* Language of the latter kind will not impress self-control on\nthe minds of youth. The same may be said about his praises of eating and\ndrinking and his dread of starvation; also about the verses in which he\ntells of the rapturous loves of Zeus and Here, or of how Hephaestus once\ndetained Ares and Aphrodite in a net on a similar occasion. There is a\nnobler strain heard in the words:--'Endure, my soul, thou hast endured\nworse.' Nor must we allow our citizens to receive bribes, or to say,\n'Gifts persuade the gods, gifts reverend kings;' or to applaud the ignoble\nadvice of Phoenix to Achilles that he should get money out of the Greeks\nbefore he assisted them; or the meanness of Achilles himself in taking\ngifts from Agamemnon; *391* or his requiring a ransom for the body of\nHector; or his cursing of Apollo; or his insolence to the river-god\nScamander; or his dedication to the dead Patroclus of his own hair which\nhad been already dedicated to the other river-god Spercheius; or his\ncruelty in dragging the body of Hector round the walls, and slaying the\ncaptives at the pyre: such a combination of meanness and cruelty in\nCheiron's pupil is inconceivable. The amatory exploits of Peirithous and\nTheseus are equally unworthy. Either these so-called sons of gods were not\nthe sons of gods, or they were not such as the poets imagine them, any\nmore than the gods themselves are the authors of evil. The youth who\nbelieves that such things are done by *392* those who have the blood of\nheaven flowing in their veins will be too ready to imitate their example.\n\nEnough of gods and heroes;--what shall we say about men? What the poets\nand story-tellers say--that the wicked prosper and the righteous are\nafflicted, or that justice is another's gain? Such misrepresentations\ncannot be allowed by us. But in this we are anticipating the definition of\njustice, and had therefore better defer the enquiry.\n\nThe subjects of poetry have been sufficiently treated; next follows style.\nNow all poetry is a narrative of events past, present, or to come; and\nnarrative is of three kinds, the simple, the imitative, and a composition\nof the two. An instance will {xlii} make my meaning clear. *393* The first\nscene in Homer is of the last or mixed kind, being partly description and\npartly dialogue. But if you throw the dialogue into the 'oratio obliqua,'\nthe passage will run thus: *394* The priest came and prayed Apollo that\nthe Achaeans might take Troy and have a safe return if Agamemnon would\nonly give him back his daughter; and the other Greeks assented, but\nAgamemnon was wroth, and so on--The whole then becomes descriptive, and\nthe poet is the only speaker left; or, if you omit the narrative, the\nwhole becomes dialogue. These are the three styles--which of them is to be\nadmitted into our State? 'Do you ask whether tragedy and comedy are to be\nadmitted?' Yes, but also something more--Is it not doubtful whether our\nguardians are to be imitators at all? Or rather, has not the question been\nalready answered, for we have decided that one man cannot in his life play\nmany parts, any more than *395* he can act both tragedy and comedy, or be\nrhapsodist and actor at once? Human nature is coined into very small\npieces, and as our guardians have their own business already, which is the\ncare of freedom, they will have enough to do without imitating. If they\nimitate they should imitate, not any meanness or baseness, but the good\nonly; for the mask which the actor wears is apt to become his face. We\ncannot allow men to play the parts of women, quarrelling, weeping,\nscolding, or boasting against the gods,--least of all when making love or\nin labour. They must not represent slaves, or bullies, or *396* cowards,\ndrunkards, or madmen, or blacksmiths, or neighing horses, or bellowing\nbulls, or sounding rivers, or a raging sea. A good or wise man will be\nwilling to perform good and wise actions, but he will be ashamed to play\nan inferior part which he has never practised; and he will prefer to\nemploy the descriptive style with as little imitation as possible. *397*\nThe man who has no self-respect, on the contrary, will imitate anybody and\nanything; sounds of nature and cries of animals alike; his whole\nperformance will be imitation of gesture and voice. Now in the descriptive\nstyle there are few changes, but in the dramatic there are a great many.\nPoets and musicians use either, or a compound of both, and this compound\nis very attractive to youth and their teachers as well as to the vulgar.\nBut our State in which one man plays one part only is not adapted for\ncomplexity. *398* And when one of these polyphonous pantomimic gentlemen\noffers to exhibit {xliii} himself and his poetry we will show him every\nobservance of respect, but at the same time tell him that there is no room\nfor his kind in our State; we prefer the rough, honest poet, and will not\ndepart from our original models (ii. 379 foll.; cp. Laws, vii. 817).\n\nNext as to the music. A song or ode has three parts,--the subject, the\nharmony, and the rhythm; of which the two last are dependent upon the\nfirst. As we banished strains of lamentation, so we may now banish the\nmixed Lydian harmonies, which are the harmonies of lamentation; and as our\ncitizens are to be temperate, we may also banish convivial harmonies, such\nas the Ionian and pure Lydian. *399* Two remain--the Dorian and Phrygian,\nthe first for war, the second for peace; the one expressive of courage,\nthe other of obedience or instruction or religious feeling. And as we\nreject varieties of harmony, we shall also reject the many-stringed,\nvariously-shaped instruments which give utterance to them, and in\nparticular the flute, which is more complex than any of them. The lyre and\nthe harp may be permitted in the town, and the Pan's-pipe in the fields.\nThus we have made a purgation of music, and will now make a purgation of\nmetres. *400* These should be like the harmonies, simple and suitable to\nthe occasion. There are four notes of the tetrachord, and there are three\nratios of metre, 3/2, 2/2, 2/1, which have all their characteristics, and\nthe feet have different characteristics as well as the rhythms. But about\nthis you and I must ask Damon, the great musician, who speaks, if I\nremember rightly, of a martial measure as well as of dactylic, trochaic,\nand iambic rhythms, which he arranges so as to equalize the syllables with\none another, assigning to each the proper quantity. We only venture to\naffirm the general principle that the style is to conform to the subject\nand the metre to the style; and that the simplicity and harmony of the\nsoul should be reflected in them all. This principle of simplicity has to\nbe learnt by every one in the days of his youth, *401* and may be gathered\nanywhere, from the creative and constructive arts, as well as from the\nforms of plants and animals.\n\nOther artists as well as poets should be warned against meanness or\nunseemliness. Sculpture and painting equally with music must conform to\nthe law of simplicity. He who violates it cannot be allowed to work in our\ncity, and to corrupt the taste of our citizens. For our guardians must\ngrow up, not amid images of {xliv} deformity which will gradually poison\nand corrupt their souls, but in a land of health and beauty where they\nwill drink in from every object sweet and harmonious influences. And of\nall these influences the greatest is the education given by music, which\nfinds a way into the innermost soul and *402* imparts to it the sense of\nbeauty and of deformity. At first the effect is unconscious; but when\nreason arrives, then he who has been thus trained welcomes her as the\nfriend whom he always knew. As in learning to read, first we acquire the\nelements or letters separately, and afterwards their combinations, and\ncannot recognize reflections of them until we know the letters\nthemselves;--in like manner we must first attain the elements or essential\nforms of the virtues, and then trace their combinations in life and\nexperience. There is a music of the soul which answers to the harmony of\nthe world; and the fairest object of a musical soul is the fair mind in\nthe fair body. Some defect in the latter may be excused, but not in the\nformer. *403* True love is the daughter of temperance, and temperance is\nutterly opposed to the madness of bodily pleasure. Enough has been said of\nmusic, which makes a fair ending with love.\n\nNext we pass on to gymnastics; about which I would remark, that the soul\nis related to the body as a cause to an effect, and therefore if we\neducate the mind we may leave the education of the body in her charge, and\nneed only give a general outline of the course to be pursued. In the first\nplace the guardians must abstain from strong drink, for they should be the\nlast persons to lose their wits. *404* Whether the habits of the palaestra\nare suitable to them is more doubtful, for the ordinary gymnastic is a\nsleepy sort of thing, and if left off suddenly is apt to endanger health.\nBut our warrior athletes must be wide-awake dogs, and must also be inured\nto all changes of food and climate. Hence they will require a simpler kind\nof gymnastic, akin to their simple music; and for their diet a rule may be\nfound in Homer, who feeds his heroes on roast meat only, and gives them no\nfish although they are living at the sea-side, nor boiled meats which\ninvolve an apparatus of pots and pans; and, if I am not mistaken, he\nnowhere mentions sweet sauces. Sicilian cookery and Attic confections and\nCorinthian courtezans, which are to gymnastic what Lydian and Ionian\nmelodies are to music, must be forbidden. *405* Where gluttony and\nintemperance prevail the town quickly fills {xlv} with doctors and\npleaders; and law and medicine give themselves airs as soon as the freemen\nof a State take an interest in them. But what can show a more disgraceful\nstate of education than to have to go abroad for justice because you have\nnone of your own at home? And yet there _is_ a worse stage of the same\ndisease--when men have learned to take a pleasure and pride in the twists\nand turns of the law; not considering how much better it would be for them\nso to order their lives as to have no need of a nodding justice. And there\nis a like disgrace in employing a physician, not for the cure of wounds or\nepidemic disorders, but because a man has by laziness and luxury\ncontracted diseases which were unknown in the days of Asclepius. How\nsimple is the Homeric practice of medicine. Eurypylus after he has been\nwounded *406* drinks a posset of Pramnian wine, which is of a heating\nnature; and yet the sons of Asclepius blame neither the damsel who gives\nhim the drink, nor Patroclus who is attending on him. The truth is that\nthis modern system of nursing diseases was introduced by Herodicus the\ntrainer; who, being of a sickly constitution, by a compound of training\nand medicine tortured first himself and then a good many other people, and\nlived a great deal longer than he had any right. But Asclepius would not\npractise this art, because he knew that the citizens of a well-ordered\nState have no leisure to be ill, and therefore he adopted the 'kill or\ncure' method, which artisans and labourers employ. 'They must be at their\nbusiness,' they say, 'and have no time for coddling: if they recover,\nwell; if they don't, there is an end of them.' *407* Whereas the rich man\nis supposed to be a gentleman who can afford to be ill. Do you know a\nmaxim of Phocylides--that 'when a man begins to be rich' (or, perhaps, a\nlittle sooner) 'he should practise virtue'? But how can excessive care of\nhealth be inconsistent with an ordinary occupation, and yet consistent\nwith that practice of virtue which Phocylides inculcates? When a student\nimagines that philosophy gives him a headache, he never does anything; he\nis always unwell. This was the reason why Asclepius and his sons practised\nno such art. They were acting in the interest of the public, and did not\nwish to preserve useless lives, or raise up a puny offspring to wretched\nsires. *408* Honest diseases they honestly cured; and if a man was\nwounded, they applied the proper remedies, and then let him eat and drink\nwhat he liked. But {xlvi} they declined to treat intemperate and worthless\nsubjects, even though they might have made large fortunes out of them.\nAs to the story of Pindar, that Asclepius was slain by a thunderbolt for\nrestoring a rich man to life, that is a lie--following our old rule we\nmust say either that he did not take bribes, or that he was not the son of\na god.\n\nGlaucon then asks Socrates whether the best physicians and the best judges\nwill not be those who have had severally the greatest experience of\ndiseases and of crimes. Socrates draws a distinction between the two\nprofessions. The physician should have had experience of disease in his\nown body, for he cures with his mind and not with his body. *409* But the\njudge controls mind by mind; and therefore his mind should not be\ncorrupted by crime. Where then is he to gain experience? How is he to be\nwise and also innocent? When young a good man is apt to be deceived by\nevil-doers, because he has no pattern of evil in himself; and therefore\nthe judge should be of a certain age; his youth should have been innocent,\nand he should have acquired insight into evil not by the practice of it,\nbut by the observation of it in others. This is the ideal of a judge; the\ncriminal turned detective is wonderfully suspicious, but when in company\nwith good men who have experience, he is at fault, for he foolishly\nimagines that every one is as bad as himself. Vice may be known of virtue,\nbut cannot know virtue. This is the sort of medicine and this the sort of\nlaw which will prevail in our State; *410* they will be healing arts to\nbetter natures; but the evil body will be left to die by the one, and the\nevil soul will be put to death by the other. And the need of either will\nbe greatly diminished by good music which will give harmony to the soul,\nand good gymnastic which will give health to the body. Not that this\ndivision of music and gymnastic really corresponds to soul and body; for\nthey are both equally concerned with the soul, which is tamed by the one\nand aroused and sustained by the other. The two together supply our\nguardians with their twofold nature. The passionate disposition when it\nhas too much gymnastic is hardened and brutalized, the gentle or\nphilosophic temper which has too much music becomes enervated. *411* While\na man is allowing music to pour like water through the funnel of his ears,\nthe edge of his soul gradually wears away, and the passionate or spirited\nelement is melted out of him. Too little {xlvii} spirit is easily\nexhausted; too much quickly passes into nervous irritability. So, again,\nthe athlete by feeding and training has his courage doubled, but he soon\ngrows stupid; he is like a wild beast, ready to do everything by blows and\nnothing by counsel or policy. There are two principles in man, reason and\npassion, and to these, *412* not to the soul and body, the two arts of\nmusic and gymnastic correspond. He who mingles them in harmonious concord\nis the true musician,--he shall be the presiding genius of our State.\n\nThe next question is, Who are to be our rulers? First, the elder must rule\nthe younger; and the best of the elders will be the best guardians. Now\nthey will be the best who love their subjects most, and think that they\nhave a common interest with them in the welfare of the state. These we\nmust select; but they must be watched at every epoch of life to see\nwhether they have retained the same opinions and held out against force\nand enchantment. *413* For time and persuasion and the love of pleasure\nmay enchant a man into a change of purpose, and the force of grief and\npain may compel him. And therefore our guardians must be men who have been\ntried by many tests, like gold in the refiner's fire, and have been passed\nfirst through danger, then through pleasure, and at every age have come\nout of such trials victorious and without stain, in full command of\nthemselves and their principles; having all their faculties in harmonious\nexercise for their country's good. These shall receive the highest honours\nboth in life and death. *414* (It would perhaps be better to confine the\nterm 'guardians' to this select class: the younger men may be called\n'auxiliaries.')\n\nAnd now for one magnificent lie, in the belief of which, Oh that we could\ntrain our rulers!--at any rate let us make the attempt with the rest of\nthe world. What I am going to tell is only another version of the legend\nof Cadmus; but our unbelieving generation will be slow to accept such a\nstory. The tale must be imparted, first to the rulers, then to the\nsoldiers, lastly to the people. We will inform them that their youth was a\ndream, and that during the time when they seemed to be undergoing their\neducation they were really being fashioned in the earth, who sent them up\nwhen they were ready; and that they must protect and cherish her whose\nchildren they are, and regard {xlviii} each other as brothers and sisters.\n'I do not wonder at your being ashamed to propound such a fiction.' There\nis more behind. *415* These brothers and sisters have different natures,\nand some of them God framed to rule, whom he fashioned of gold; others he\nmade of silver, to be auxiliaries; others again to be husbandmen and\ncraftsmen, and these were formed by him of brass and iron. But as they are\nall sprung from a common stock, a golden parent may have a silver son, or\na silver parent a golden son, and then there must be a change of rank; the\nson of the rich must descend, and the child of the artisan rise, in the\nsocial scale; for an oracle says 'that the State will come to an end if\ngoverned by a man of brass or iron.' Will our citizens ever believe all\nthis? 'Not in the present generation, but in the next, perhaps, Yes.'\n\nNow let the earthborn men go forth under the command of their rulers, and\nlook about and pitch their camp in a high place, which will be safe\nagainst enemies from without, and likewise against insurrections from\nwithin. There let them sacrifice and set up their tents; *416* for\nsoldiers they are to be and not shopkeepers, the watchdogs and guardians\nof the sheep; and luxury and avarice will turn them into wolves and\ntyrants. Their habits and their dwellings should correspond to their\neducation. They should have no property; their pay should only meet their\nexpenses; and they should have common meals. Gold and silver we will tell\nthem that they have from God, and this divine gift in their souls they\nmust not *417* alloy with that earthly dross which passes under the name\nof gold. They only of the citizens may not touch it, or be under the same\nroof with it, or drink from it; it is the accursed thing. Should they ever\nacquire houses or lands or money of their own, they will become\nhouseholders and tradesmen instead of guardians, enemies and tyrants\ninstead of helpers, and the hour of ruin, both to themselves and the rest\nof the State, will be at hand.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic III._ Introduction.]\n\nThe religious and ethical aspect of Plato's education will hereafter be\nconsidered under a separate head. Some lesser points may be more\nconveniently noticed in this place.\n\n1. The constant appeal to the authority of Homer, whom, with grave irony,\nPlato, after the manner of his age, summons as a {xlix} witness about\nethics and psychology, as well as about diet and medicine; attempting to\ndistinguish the better lesson from the worse (390), sometimes altering the\ntext from design (388, and, perhaps, 389); more than once quoting or\nalluding to Homer inaccurately (391, 406), after the manner of the early\nlogographers turning the Iliad into prose (393), and delighting to draw\nfar-fetched inferences from his words, or to make ludicrous applications\nof them. He does not, like Heracleitus, get into a rage with Homer and\nArchilochus (Heracl. Frag. 119, ed. Bywater), but uses their words and\nexpressions as vehicles of a higher truth; not on a system like Theagenes\nof Rhegium or Metrodorus, or in later times the Stoics, but as fancy may\ndictate. And the conclusions drawn from them are sound, although the\npremises are fictitious. These fanciful appeals to Homer add a charm to\nPlato's style, and at the same time they have the effect of a satire on\nthe follies of Homeric interpretation. To us (and probably to himself),\nalthough they take the form of arguments, they are really figures of\nspeech. They may be compared with modern citations from Scripture, which\nhave often a great rhetorical power even when the original meaning of the\nwords is entirely lost sight of. The real, like the Platonic Socrates, as\nwe gather from the Memorabilia of Xenophon, was fond of making similar\nadaptations (i. 2, 58; ii. 6, 11). Great in all ages and countries, in\nreligion as well as in law and literature, has been the art of\ninterpretation.\n\n2. 'The style is to conform to the subject and the metre to the style.'\nNotwithstanding the fascination which the word 'classical' exercises over\nus, we can hardly maintain that this rule is observed in all the Greek\npoetry which has come down to us. We cannot deny that the thought often\nexceeds the power of lucid expression in \u00c6schylus and Pindar; or that\nrhetoric gets the better of the thought in the Sophist-poet Euripides.\nOnly perhaps in Sophocles is there a perfect harmony of the two; in him\nalone do we find a grace of language like the beauty of a Greek statue, in\nwhich there is nothing to add or to take away; at least this is true of\nsingle plays or of large portions of them. The connection in the Tragic\nChoruses and in the Greek lyric poets is not unfrequently a tangled thread\nwhich in an age before logic the poet was unable to draw out. Many\nthoughts and feelings mingled in his mind, and he had no power of\ndisengaging or {l} arranging them. For there is a subtle influence of\nlogic which requires to be transferred from prose to poetry, just as the\nmusic and perfection of language are infused by poetry into prose. In all\nages the poet has been a bad judge of his own meaning (Apol. 22 B); for he\ndoes not see that the word which is full of associations to his own mind\nis difficult and unmeaning to that of another; or that the sequence which\nis clear to himself is puzzling to others. There are many passages in some\nof our greatest modern poets which are far too obscure; in which there is\nno proportion between style and subject, in which any half-expressed\nfigure, any harsh construction, any distorted collocation of words, any\nremote sequence of ideas is admitted; and there is no voice 'coming\nsweetly from nature,' or music adding the expression of feeling to\nthought. As if there could be poetry without beauty, or beauty without\nease and clearness. The obscurities of early Greek poets arose necessarily\nout of the state of language and logic which existed in their age. They\nare not examples to be followed by us; for the use of language ought in\nevery generation to become clearer and clearer. Like Shakespeare, they were\ngreat in spite, not in consequence, of their imperfections of expression.\nBut there is no reason for returning to the necessary obscurity which\nprevailed in the infancy of literature. The English poets of the last\ncentury were certainly not obscure; and we have no excuse for losing what\nthey had gained, or for going back to the earlier or transitional age\nwhich preceded them. The thought of our own times has not out-stripped\nlanguage; a want of Plato's 'art of measuring' is the real cause of the\ndisproportion between them.\n\n3. In the third book of the Republic a nearer approach is made to a theory\nof art than anywhere else in Plato. His views may be summed up as\nfollows:--True art is not fanciful and imitative, but simple and\nideal,--the expression of the highest moral energy, whether in action or\nrepose. To live among works of plastic art which are of this noble and\nsimple character, or to listen to such strains, is the best of\ninfluences,--the true Greek atmosphere, in which youth should be brought\nup. That is the way to create in them a natural good taste, which will\nhave a feeling of truth and beauty in all things. For though the poets are\nto be expelled, still art is recognized as another aspect of {li}\nreason--like love in the Symposium, extending over the same sphere, but\nconfined to the preliminary education, and acting through the power of\nhabit (vii. 522 A); and this conception of art is not limited to strains\nof music or the forms of plastic art, but pervades all nature and has a\nwide kindred in the world. The Republic of Plato, like the Athens of\nPericles, has an artistic as well as a political side.\n\nThere is hardly any mention in Plato of the creative arts; only in two or\nthree passages does he even allude to them (cp. Rep. iv. 420; Soph. 236\nA). He is not lost in rapture at the great works of Phidias, the\nParthenon, the Propylea, the statues of Zeus or Athene. He would probably\nhave regarded any abstract truth of number or figure (529 E) as higher\nthan the greatest of them. Yet it is hard to suppose that some influence,\nsuch as he hopes to inspire in youth, did not pass into his own mind from\nthe works of art which he saw around him. We are living upon the fragments\nof them, and find in a few broken stones the standard of truth and beauty.\nBut in Plato this feeling has no expression; he nowhere says that beauty\nis the object of art; he seems to deny that wisdom can take an external\nform (Phaedrus, 250 E); he does not distinguish the fine from the\nmechanical arts. Whether or no, like some writers, he felt more than he\nexpressed, it is at any rate remarkable that the greatest perfection of\nthe fine arts should coincide with an almost entire silence about them. In\none very striking passage he tells us that a work of art, like the State,\nis a whole; and this conception of a whole and the love of the newly-born\nmathematical sciences may be regarded, if not as the inspiring, at any\nrate as the regulating principles of Greek art (cp. Xen. Mem. iii. 10. 6;\nand Sophist, 235, 236).\n\n4. Plato makes the true and subtle remark that the physician had better\nnot be in robust health; and should have known what illness is in his own\nperson. But the judge ought to have had no similar experience of evil; he\nis to be a good man who, having passed his youth in innocence, became\nacquainted late in life with the vices of others. And therefore, according\nto Plato, a judge should not be young, just as a young man according to\nAristotle is not fit to be a hearer of moral philosophy. The bad, on the\nother hand, have a knowledge of vice, but no knowledge {lii} of virtue. It\nmay be doubted, however, whether this train of reflection is well founded.\nIn a remarkable passage of the Laws (xii. 950 B) it is acknowledged that\nthe evil may form a correct estimate of the good. The union of gentleness\nand courage in Book ii. at first seemed to be a paradox, yet was\nafterwards ascertained to be a truth. And Plato might also have found that\nthe intuition of evil may be consistent with the abhorrence of it (cp.\ninfra, ix. 582). There is a directness of aim in virtue which gives an\ninsight into vice. And the knowledge of character is in some degree a\nnatural sense independent of any special experience of good or evil.\n\n5. One of the most remarkable conceptions of Plato, because un-Greek and\nalso very different from anything which existed at all in his age of the\nworld, is the transposition of ranks. In the Spartan state there had been\nenfranchisement of Helots and degradation of citizens under special\ncircumstances. And in the ancient Greek aristocracies, merit was certainly\nrecognized as one of the elements on which government was based. The\nfounders of states were supposed to be their benefactors, who were raised\nby their great actions above the ordinary level of humanity; at a later\nperiod, the services of warriors and legislators were held to entitle them\nand their descendants to the privileges of citizenship and to the first\nrank in the state. And although the existence of an ideal aristocracy is\nslenderly proven from the remains of early Greek history, and we have a\ndifficulty in ascribing such a character, however the idea may be defined,\nto any actual Hellenic state--or indeed to any state which has ever\nexisted in the world--still the rule of the best was certainly the\naspiration of philosophers, who probably accommodated a good deal their\nviews of primitive history to their own notions of good government. Plato\nfurther insists on applying to the guardians of his state a series of\ntests by which all those who fell short of a fixed standard were either\nremoved from the governing body, or not admitted to it; and this\n'academic' discipline did to a certain extent prevail in Greek states,\nespecially in Sparta. He also indicates that the system of caste, which\nexisted in a great part of the ancient, and is by no means extinct in the\nmodern European world, should be set aside from time to time in favour of\nmerit. He is aware how deeply the greater part of {liii} mankind resent\nany interference with the order of society, and therefore he proposes his\nnovel idea in the form of what he himself calls a 'monstrous fiction.'\n(Compare the ceremony of preparation for the two 'great waves' in Book v.)\nTwo principles are indicated by him: first, that there is a distinction of\nranks dependent on circumstances prior to the individual: second, that\nthis distinction is and ought to be broken through by personal qualities.\nHe adapts mythology like the Homeric poems to the wants of the state,\nmaking 'the Phoenician tale' the vehicle of his ideas. Every Greek state\nhad a myth respecting its own origin; the Platonic republic may also have\na tale of earthborn men. The gravity and verisimilitude with which the\ntale is told, and the analogy of Greek tradition, are a sufficient\nverification of the 'monstrous falsehood.' Ancient poetry had spoken of a\ngold and silver and brass and iron age succeeding one another, but Plato\nsupposes these differences in the natures of men to exist together in a\nsingle state. Mythology supplies a figure under which the lesson may be\ntaught (as Protagoras says, 'the myth is more interesting'), and also\nenables Plato to touch lightly on new principles without going into\ndetails. In this passage he shadows forth a general truth, but he does not\ntell us by what steps the transposition of ranks is to be effected. Indeed\nthroughout the Republic he allows the lower ranks to fade into the\ndistance. We do not know whether they are to carry arms, and whether in\nthe fifth book they are or are not included in the communistic regulations\nrespecting property and marriage. Nor is there any use in arguing strictly\neither from a few chance words, or from the silence of Plato, or in\ndrawing inferences which were beyond his vision. Aristotle, in his\ncriticism on the position of the lower classes, does not perceive that the\npoetical creation is 'like the air, invulnerable,' and cannot be\npenetrated by the shafts of his logic (Pol. 2, 5, 18 foll.).\n\n6. Two paradoxes which strike the modern reader as in the highest degree\nfanciful and ideal, and which suggest to him many reflections, are to be\nfound in the third book of the Republic: first, the great power of music,\nso much beyond any influence which is experienced by us in modern times,\nwhen the art or science has been far more developed, and has found {liv}\nthe secret of harmony, as well as of melody; secondly, the indefinite and\nalmost absolute control which the soul is supposed to exercise over the\nbody.\n\nIn the first we suspect some degree of exaggeration, such as we may also\nobserve among certain masters of the art, not unknown to us, at the\npresent day. With this natural enthusiasm, which is felt by a few only,\nthere seems to mingle in Plato a sort of Pythagorean reverence for numbers\nand numerical proportion to which Aristotle is a stranger. Intervals of\nsound and number are to him sacred things which have a law of their own,\nnot dependent on the variations of sense. They rise above sense, and\nbecome a connecting link with the world of ideas. But it is evident that\nPlato is describing what to him appears to be also a fact. The power of a\nsimple and characteristic melody on the impressible mind of the Greek is\nmore than we can easily appreciate. The effect of national airs may bear\nsome comparison with it. And, besides all this, there is a confusion\nbetween the harmony of musical notes and the harmony of soul and body,\nwhich is so potently inspired by them.\n\nThe second paradox leads up to some curious and interesting questions--How\nfar can the mind control the body? Is the relation between them one of\nmutual antagonism or of mutual harmony? Are they two or one, and is either\nof them the cause of the other? May we not at times drop the opposition\nbetween them, and the mode of describing them, which is so familiar to us,\nand yet hardly conveys any precise meaning, and try to view this composite\ncreature, man, in a more simple manner? Must we not at any rate admit that\nthere is in human nature a higher and a lower principle, divided by no\ndistinct line, which at times break asunder and take up arms against one\nanother? Or again, they are reconciled and move together, either\nunconsciously in the ordinary work of life, or consciously in the pursuit\nof some noble aim, to be attained not without an effort, and for which\nevery thought and nerve are strained. And then the body becomes the good\nfriend or ally, or servant or instrument of the mind. And the mind has\noften a wonderful and almost superhuman power of banishing disease and\nweakness and calling out a hidden strength. Reason and the desires, the\nintellect and the senses are brought into harmony and obedience so as to\nform a {lv} single human being. They are ever parting, ever meeting; and\nthe identity or diversity of their tendencies or operations is for the\nmost part unnoticed by us. When the mind touches the body through the\nappetites, we acknowledge the responsibility of the one to the other.\nThere is a tendency in us which says 'Drink.' There is another which says,\n'Do not drink; it is not good for you.' And we all of us know which is the\nrightful superior. We are also responsible for our health, although into\nthis sphere there enter some elements of necessity which may be beyond our\ncontrol. Still even in the management of health, care and thought,\ncontinued over many years, may make us almost free agents, if we do not\nexact too much of ourselves, and if we acknowledge that all human freedom\nis limited by the laws of nature and of mind.\n\nWe are disappointed to find that Plato, in the general condemnation which\nhe passes on the practice of medicine prevailing in his own day,\ndepreciates the effects of diet. He would like to have diseases of a\ndefinite character and capable of receiving a definite treatment. He is\nafraid of invalidism interfering with the business of life. He does not\nrecognize that time is the great healer both of mental and bodily\ndisorders; and that remedies which are gradual and proceed little by\nlittle are safer than those which produce a sudden catastrophe. Neither\ndoes he see that there is no way in which the mind can more surely\ninfluence the body than by the control of eating and drinking; or any\nother action or occasion of human life on which the higher freedom of the\nwill can be more simple or truly asserted.\n\n7. Lesser matters of style may be remarked. (1) The affected ignorance of\nmusic, which is Plato's way of expressing that he is passing lightly over\nthe subject. (2) The tentative manner in which here, as in the second\nbook, he proceeds with the construction of the State. (3) The description\nof the State sometimes as a reality (389 D; 416 B), and then again as a\nwork of imagination only (cp. 534 C; 592 B); these are the arts by which\nhe sustains the reader's interest. (4) Connecting links (e.g. 408 C with\n379), or the preparation (394 D) for the entire expulsion of the poets in\nBook x. (5) The companion pictures of the lover of litigation and the\nvaletudinarian (405), the satirical jest about the maxim of Phocylides\n(407), the manner in which {lvi} the image of the gold and silver citizens\nis taken up into the subject (416 E), and the argument from the practice\nof Asclepius (407), should not escape notice.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic IV._ Analysis.]\n\nBOOK IV. *419* Adeimantus said: 'Suppose a person to argue, Socrates, that\nyou make your citizens miserable, and this by their own free-will; they\nare the lords of the city, and yet instead of having, like other men,\nlands and houses and money of their own, they live as mercenaries and are\nalways mounting guard.' *420* You may add, I replied, that they receive no\npay but only their food, and have no money to spend on a journey or a\nmistress. 'Well, and what answer do you give?' My answer is, that our\nguardians may or may not be the happiest of men,--I should not be\nsurprised to find in the long-run that they were,--but this is not the aim\nof our constitution, which was designed for the good of the whole and not\nof any one part. If I went to a sculptor and blamed him for having painted\nthe eye, which is the noblest feature of the face, not purple but black,\nhe would reply: 'The eye must be an eye, and you should look at the statue\nas a whole.' 'Now I can well imagine a fool's paradise, in which everybody\nis eating and drinking, clothed in purple and fine linen, and potters lie\non sofas and have their wheel at hand, that they may work a little when\nthey please; *421* and cobblers and all the other classes of a State lose\ntheir distinctive character. And a State may get on without cobblers; but\nwhen the guardians degenerate into boon companions, then the ruin is\ncomplete. Remember that we are not talking of peasants keeping holiday,\nbut of a State in which every man is expected to do his own work. The\nhappiness resides not in this or that class, but in the State as a whole.\nI have another remark to make:--A middle condition is best for artisans;\nthey should have money enough to buy tools, and not enough to be\nindependent of business. And will not the same condition be best for our\ncitizens? If they are poor, they will be mean; *422* if rich, luxurious\nand lazy; and in neither case contented. 'But then how will our poor city\nbe able to go to war against an enemy who has money?' There may be a\ndifficulty in fighting against one enemy; against two there will be none.\nIn the first place, the contest will be {lvii} carried on by trained\nwarriors against well-to-do citizens: and is not a regular athlete an easy\nmatch for two stout opponents at least? Suppose also, that before engaging\nwe send ambassadors to one of the two cities, saying, 'Silver and gold we\nhave not; do you help us and take our share of the spoil;'--who would\nfight against the lean, wiry dogs, when they might join with them in\npreying upon the fatted sheep? 'But if many states join their resources,\nshall we not be in danger?' I am amused to hear you use the word 'state'\nof any but our own State. *423* They are 'states,' but not 'a state'--many\nin one. For in every state there are two hostile nations, rich and poor,\nwhich you may set one against the other. But our State, while she remains\ntrue to her principles, will be in very deed the mightiest of Hellenic\nstates.\n\nTo the size of the state there is no limit but the necessity of unity; it\nmust be neither too large nor too small to be one. This is a matter of\nsecondary importance, like the principle of transposition which was\nintimated in the parable of the earthborn men. The meaning there implied\nwas that every man should do that for which he was fitted, and be at one\nwith himself, and then the whole city would be united. But all these\nthings are secondary, if education, which is the great matter, be duly\nregarded. *424* When the wheel has once been set in motion, the speed is\nalways increasing; and each generation improves upon the preceding, both\nin physical and moral qualities. The care of the governors should be\ndirected to preserve music and gymnastic from innovation; alter the songs\nof a country, Damon says, and you will soon end by altering its laws. The\nchange appears innocent at first, and begins in play; but the evil soon\nbecomes serious, working secretly upon the characters of individuals, then\nupon social and commercial relations, and lastly upon the institutions of\na state; and there is ruin and confusion everywhere. *425* But if\neducation remains in the established form, there will be no danger. A\nrestorative process will be always going on; the spirit of law and order\nwill raise up what has fallen down. Nor will any regulations be needed for\nthe lesser matters of life--rules of deportment or fashions of dress. Like\ninvites like for good or for evil. Education will correct deficiencies and\nsupply the power of self-government. Far be it from us to enter into the\n{lviii} particulars of legislation; let the guardians take care of\neducation, and education will take care of all other things.\n\nBut without education they may patch and mend as they please; they will\nmake no progress, any more than a patient who thinks to cure himself by\nsome favourite remedy and will not give up his luxurious mode of living.\n*426* If you tell such persons that they must first alter their habits,\nthen they grow angry; they are charming people. 'Charming,--nay, the very\nreverse.' Evidently these gentlemen are not in your good graces, nor the\nstate which is like them. And such states there are which first ordain\nunder penalty of death that no one shall alter the constitution, and then\nsuffer themselves to be flattered into and out of anything; and he who\nindulges them and fawns upon them, is their leader and saviour. 'Yes, the\nmen are as bad as the states.' But do you not admire their cleverness?\n'Nay, some of them are stupid enough to believe what the people tell\nthem.' And when all the world is telling a man that he is six feet high,\nand he has no measure, how can he believe anything else? But don't get\ninto a passion: to see our statesmen trying their nostrums, *427* and\nfancying that they can cut off at a blow the Hydra-like rogueries of\nmankind, is as good as a play. Minute enactments are superfluous in good\nstates, and are useless in bad ones.\n\nAnd now what remains of the work of legislation? Nothing for us; but to\nApollo the god of Delphi we leave the ordering of the greatest of all\nthings--that is to say, religion. Only our ancestral deity sitting upon\nthe centre and navel of the earth will be trusted by us if we have any\nsense, in an affair of such magnitude. No foreign god shall be supreme in\nour realms....\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic IV._ Introduction.]\n\nHere, as Socrates would say, let us 'reflect on' ([Greek: skop\u00f4=men]) what\nhas preceded: thus far we have spoken not of the happiness of the\ncitizens, but only of the well-being of the State. They may be the\nhappiest of men, but our principal aim in founding the State was not to\nmake them happy. They were to be guardians, not holiday-makers. In this\npleasant manner is presented to us the famous question both of ancient and\nmodern philosophy, touching the relation of duty to happiness, of right to\nutility.\n\nFirst duty, then happiness, is the natural order of our moral ideas. The\nutilitarian principle is valuable as a corrective of {lix} error, and\nshows to us a side of ethics which is apt to be neglected. It may be\nadmitted further that right and utility are co-extensive, and that he who\nmakes the happiness of mankind his object has one of the highest and\nnoblest motives of human action. But utility is not the historical basis\nof morality; nor the aspect in which moral and religious ideas commonly\noccur to the mind. The greatest happiness of all is, as we believe, the\nfar-off result of the divine government of the universe. The greatest\nhappiness of the individual is certainly to be found in a life of virtue\nand goodness. But we seem to be more assured of a law of right than we can\nbe of a divine purpose, that 'all mankind should be saved;' and we infer\nthe one from the other. And the greatest happiness of the individual may\nbe the reverse of the greatest happiness in the ordinary sense of the\nterm, and may be realised in a life of pain, or in a voluntary death.\nFurther, the word 'happiness' has several ambiguities; it may mean either\npleasure or an ideal life, happiness subjective or objective, in this\nworld or in another, of ourselves only or of our neighbours and of all men\neverywhere. By the modern founder of Utilitarianism the self-regarding and\ndisinterested motives of action are included under the same term, although\nthey are commonly opposed by us as benevolence and self-love. The word\nhappiness has not the definiteness or the sacredness of 'truth' and\n'right'; it does not equally appeal to our higher nature, and has not sunk\ninto the conscience of mankind. It is associated too much with the\ncomforts and conveniences of life; too little with 'the goods of the soul\nwhich we desire for their own sake.' In a great trial, or danger, or\ntemptation, or in any great and heroic action, it is scarcely thought of.\nFor these reasons 'the greatest happiness' principle is not the true\nfoundation of ethics. But though not the first principle, it is the\nsecond, which is like unto it, and is often of easier application. For the\nlarger part of human actions are neither right nor wrong, except in so far\nas they tend to the happiness of mankind (cp. Introd. to Gorgias and\nPhilebus).\n\nThe same question reappears in politics, where the useful or expedient\nseems to claim a larger sphere and to have a greater authority. For\nconcerning political measures, we chiefly ask: How will they affect the\nhappiness of mankind? Yet here too we may observe that what we term\nexpediency is merely the law of {lx} right limited by the conditions of\nhuman society. Right and truth are the highest aims of government as well\nas of individuals; and we ought not to lose sight of them because we\ncannot directly enforce them. They appeal to the better mind of nations;\nand sometimes they are too much for merely temporal interests to resist.\nThey are the watchwords which all men use in matters of public policy, as\nwell as in their private dealings; the peace of Europe may be said to\ndepend upon them. In the most commercial and utilitarian states of society\nthe power of ideas remains. And all the higher class of statesmen have in\nthem something of that idealism which Pericles is said to have gathered\nfrom the teaching of Anaxagoras. They recognise that the true leader of\nmen must be above the motives of ambition, and that national character is\nof greater value than material comfort and prosperity. And this is the\norder of thought in Plato; first, he expects his citizens to do their\nduty, and then under favourable circumstances, that is to say, in a\nwell-ordered State, their happiness is assured. That he was far from\nexcluding the modern principle of utility in politics is sufficiently\nevident from other passages; in which 'the most beneficial is affirmed to\nbe the most honourable' (v. 457 B), and also 'the most sacred' (v. 458 E).\n\nWe may note (1) The manner in which the objection of Adeimantus here, as\nin ii. 357 foll., 363; vi. ad init., etc., is designed to draw out and\ndeepen the argument of Socrates. (2) The conception of a whole as lying at\nthe foundation both of politics and of art, in the latter supplying the\nonly principle of criticism, which, under the various names of harmony,\nsymmetry, measure, proportion, unity, the Greek seems to have applied to\nworks of art. (3) The requirement that the State should be limited in\nsize, after the traditional model of a Greek state; as in the Politics of\nAristotle (vii. 4, etc.), the fact that the cities of Hellas were small is\nconverted into a principle. (4) The humorous pictures of the lean dogs and\nthe fatted sheep, of the light active boxer upsetting two stout gentlemen\nat least, of the 'charming' patients who are always making themselves\nworse; or again, the playful assumption that there is no State but our\nown; or the grave irony with which the statesman is excused who believes\nthat he is six feet high because he is told so, and having nothing to\nmeasure with is to be pardoned for his ignorance--he is too {lxi} amusing\nfor us to be seriously angry with him. (5) The light and superficial\nmanner in which religion is passed over when provision has been made for\ntwo great principles,--first, that religion shall be based on the highest\nconception of the gods (ii. 377 foll.), secondly, that the true national\nor Hellenic type shall be maintained....\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic IV._ Analysis.]\n\nSocrates proceeds: But where amid all this is justice? Son of Ariston,\ntell me where. Light a candle and search the city, and get your brother\nand the rest of our friends to help in seeking for her. 'That won't do,'\nreplied Glaucon, 'you yourself promised to make the search and talked\nabout the impiety of deserting justice.' Well, I said, I will lead the\nway, but do you follow. My notion is, that our State being perfect will\ncontain all the four virtues--wisdom, courage, temperance, justice. *428*\nIf we eliminate the three first, the unknown remainder will be justice.\n\nFirst then, of wisdom: the State which we have called into being will be\nwise because politic. And policy is one among many kinds of skill,--not\nthe skill of the carpenter, or of the worker in metal, or of the\nhusbandman, but the skill of him who advises about the interests of the\nwhole State. Of such a kind is the skill of the guardians, *429* who are a\nsmall class in number, far smaller than the blacksmiths; but in them is\nconcentrated the wisdom of the State. And if this small ruling class have\nwisdom, then the whole State will be wise.\n\nOur second virtue is courage, which we have no difficulty in finding in\nanother class--that of soldiers. Courage may be defined as a sort of\nsalvation--the never-failing salvation of the opinions which law and\neducation have prescribed concerning dangers. You know the way in which\ndyers first prepare the white ground and then lay on the dye of purple or\nof any other colour. Colours dyed in this way become fixed, and no soap or\nlye will ever wash them out. *430* Now the ground is education, and the\nlaws are the colours; and if the ground is properly laid, neither the soap\nof pleasure nor the lye of pain or fear will ever wash them out. This\npower which preserves right opinion about danger I would ask you to call\n'courage,' adding the epithet 'political' or 'civilized' in order to\ndistinguish it from mere animal courage and from a higher courage which\nmay hereafter be discussed.\n\n{lxii} Two virtues remain; temperance and justice. More than the preceding\nvirtues *431* temperance suggests the idea of harmony. Some light is\nthrown upon the nature of this virtue by the popular description of a man\nas 'master of himself'--which has an absurd sound, because the master is\nalso the servant. The expression really means that the better principle in\na man masters the worse. There are in cities whole classes--women, slaves\nand the like--who correspond to the worse, and a few only to the better;\nand in our State the former class are held under control by the latter.\nNow to which of these classes does temperance belong? 'To both of them.'\nAnd our State if any will be the abode of temperance; and we were right in\ndescribing this virtue as a harmony which is diffused through the whole,\n*432* making the dwellers in the city to be of one mind, and attuning the\nupper and middle and lower classes like the strings of an instrument,\nwhether you suppose them to differ in wisdom, strength or wealth.\n\nAnd now we are near the spot; let us draw in and surround the cover and\nwatch with all our eyes, lest justice should slip away and escape. Tell\nme, if you see the thicket move first. 'Nay, I would have you lead.' Well\nthen, offer up a prayer and follow. The way is dark and difficult; but we\nmust push on. I begin to see a track. 'Good news.' Why, Glaucon, our\ndulness of scent is quite ludicrous! While we are straining our eyes into\nthe distance, justice is tumbling out at our feet. We are as bad as people\nlooking for a thing which they have in their hands. Have you forgotten our\nold *433* principle of the division of labour, or of every man doing his\nown business, concerning which we spoke at the foundation of the\nState--what but this was justice? Is there any other virtue remaining\nwhich can compete with wisdom and temperance and courage in the scale of\npolitical virtue? For 'every one having his own' is the great object of\ngovernment; *434* and the great object of trade is that every man should\ndo his own business. Not that there is much harm in a carpenter trying to\nbe a cobbler, or a cobbler transforming himself into a carpenter; but\ngreat evil may arise from the cobbler leaving his last and turning into a\nguardian or legislator, or when a single individual is trainer, warrior,\nlegislator, all in one. And this evil is injustice, or every man doing\nanother's business. I do not say that as yet we are in a condition to\narrive at a final conclusion. For the {lxiii} definition which we believe\nto hold good in states has still to be tested by the individual. Having\nread the large letters we will now come back to the small. From the two\ntogether a brilliant light may be struck out....\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic IV._ Introduction.]\n\nSocrates proceeds to discover the nature of justice by a method of\nresidues. Each of the first three virtues corresponds to one of the three\nparts of the soul and one of the three classes in the State, although the\nthird, temperance, has more of the nature of a harmony than the first two.\nIf there be a fourth virtue, that can only be sought for in the relation\nof the three parts in the soul or classes in the State to one another. It\nis obvious and simple, and for that very reason has not been found out.\nThe modern logician will be inclined to object that ideas cannot be\nseparated like chemical substances, but that they run into one another and\nmay be only different aspects or names of the same thing, and such in this\ninstance appears to be the case. For the definition here given of justice\nis verbally the same as one of the definitions of temperance given by\nSocrates in the Charmides (162 A), which however is only provisional, and\nis afterwards rejected. And so far from justice remaining over when the\nother virtues are eliminated, the justice and temperance of the Republic\ncan with difficulty be distinguished. Temperance appears to be the virtue\nof a part only, and one of three, whereas justice is a universal virtue of\nthe whole soul. Yet on the other hand temperance is also described as a\nsort of harmony, and in this respect is akin to justice. Justice seems to\ndiffer from temperance in degree rather than in kind; whereas temperance\nis the harmony of discordant elements, justice is the perfect order by\nwhich all natures and classes do their own business, the right man in the\nright place, the division and co-operation of all the citizens. Justice,\nagain, is a more abstract notion than the other virtues, and therefore,\nfrom Plato's point of view, the foundation of them, to which they are\nreferred and which in idea precedes them. The proposal to omit temperance\nis a mere trick of style intended to avoid monotony (cp. vii. 528).\n\nThere is a famous question discussed in one of the earlier Dialogues of\nPlato (Protagoras, 329, 330; cp. Arist. Nic. Ethics, vi. 13. 6), 'Whether\nthe virtues are one or many?' This receives an answer which is to the\neffect that there are four cardinal virtues {lxiv} (now for the first time\nbrought together in ethical philosophy), and one supreme over the rest,\nwhich is not like Aristotle's conception of universal justice, virtue\nrelative to others, but the whole of virtue relative to the parts. To this\nuniversal conception of justice or order in the first education and in the\nmoral nature of man, the still more universal conception of the good in\nthe second education and in the sphere of speculative knowledge seems to\nsucceed. Both might be equally described by the terms 'law,' 'order,'\n'harmony;' but while the idea of good embraces 'all time and all\nexistence,' the conception of justice is not extended beyond man.\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic IV._ Analysis.]\n\n... Socrates is now going to identify the individual and the State. But\nfirst he must prove that there are three parts of the individual soul. His\nargument is as follows:--Quantity makes no difference in quality. The word\n'just,' whether applied to the individual or to the State, has the same\nmeaning. And the term 'justice' implied that the same three principles in\nthe State and in the individual were doing their own business. But are\nthey really three or one? The question is difficult, and one which can\nhardly be solved by the methods which we are now using; but the truer and\nlonger way would take up too much of our time. 'The shorter will satisfy\nme.' Well then, you would admit that the qualities of states mean the\nqualities of the individuals who compose them? The Scythians and Thracians\nare passionate, our own race intellectual, *436* and the Egyptians and\nPhoenicians covetous, because the individual members of each have such and\nsuch a character; the difficulty is to determine whether the several\nprinciples are one or three; whether, that is to say, we reason with one\npart of our nature, desire with another, are angry with another, or\nwhether the whole soul comes into play in each sort of action. This\nenquiry, however, requires a very exact definition of terms. The same\nthing in the same relation cannot be affected in two opposite ways. But\nthere is no impossibility in a man standing still, yet moving his arms, or\nin a top which is fixed on one spot going round upon its axis. There is no\nnecessity to mention all the possible exceptions; *437* let us\nprovisionally assume that opposites cannot do or be or suffer opposites in\nthe same relation. And to the class of opposites belong assent and\ndissent, desire and avoidance. And one form {lxv} of desire is thirst and\nhunger: and here arises a new point--thirst is thirst of drink, hunger is\nhunger of food; not of warm drink or of a particular kind of food, *438*\nwith the single exception of course that the very fact of our desiring\nanything implies that it is good. When relative terms have no attributes,\ntheir correlatives have no attributes; when they have attributes, their\ncorrelatives also have them. For example, the term 'greater' is simply\nrelative to 'less,' and knowledge refers to a subject of knowledge. But on\nthe other hand, a particular knowledge is of a particular subject. Again,\nevery science has a distinct character, which is defined by an object;\nmedicine, for example, is the science of health, although not to be\nconfounded with health. *439* Having cleared our ideas thus far, let us\nreturn to the original instance of thirst, which has a definite\nobject--drink. Now the thirsty soul may feel two distinct impulses; the\nanimal one saying 'Drink;' the rational one, which says 'Do not drink.'\nThe two impulses are contradictory; and therefore we may assume that they\nspring from distinct principles in the soul. But is passion a third\nprinciple, or akin to desire? There is a story of a certain Leontius which\nthrows some light on this question. He was coming up from the Piraeus\noutside the north wall, and he passed a spot where there were dead bodies\nlying by the executioner. He felt a longing desire to see them and also an\nabhorrence of them; at first he turned away and shut his eyes, then, *440*\nsuddenly tearing them open, he said,--'Take your fill, ye wretches, of the\nfair sight.' Now is there not here a third principle which is often found\nto come to the assistance of reason against desire, but never of desire\nagainst reason? This is passion or spirit, of the separate existence of\nwhich we may further convince ourselves by putting the following\ncase:--When a man suffers justly, if he be of a generous nature he is not\nindignant at the hardships which he undergoes: but when he suffers\nunjustly, his indignation is his great support; hunger and thirst cannot\ntame him; the spirit within him must do or die, until the voice of the\nshepherd, that is, of reason, bidding his dog bark no more, is heard\nwithin. This shows that passion is the ally of reason. *441* Is passion\nthen the same with reason? No, for the former exists in children and\nbrutes; and Homer affords a proof of the distinction between them when he\nsays, 'He smote his breast, and thus rebuked his soul.'\n\n{lxvi} And now, at last, we have reached firm ground, and are able to\ninfer that the virtues of the State and of the individual are the same.\nFor wisdom and courage and justice in the State are severally the wisdom\nand courage and justice in the individuals who form the State. Each of the\nthree classes will do the work of its own class in the State, and each\npart in the individual soul; reason, the superior, and passion, the\ninferior, *442* will be harmonized by the influence of music and\ngymnastic. The counsellor and the warrior, the head and the arm, will act\ntogether in the town of Mansoul, and keep the desires in proper\nsubjection. The courage of the warrior is that quality which preserves a\nright opinion about dangers in spite of pleasures and pains. The wisdom of\nthe counsellor is that small part of the soul which has authority and\nreason. The virtue of temperance is the friendship of the ruling and the\nsubject principles, both in the State and in the individual. Of justice we\nhave already spoken; and the notion already given of it may be confirmed\nby common instances. Will the just state or the just individual *443*\nsteal, lie, commit adultery, or be guilty of impiety to gods and men?\n'No.' And is not the reason of this that the several principles, whether\nin the state or in the individual, do their own business? And justice is\nthe quality which makes just men and just states. Moreover, our old\ndivision of labour, which required that there should be one man for one\nuse, was a dream or anticipation of what was to follow; and that dream has\nnow been realized in justice, which begins by binding together the three\nchords of the soul, and then acts harmoniously in every relation of life.\n*444* And injustice, which is the insubordination and disobedience of the\ninferior elements in the soul, is the opposite of justice, and is\ninharmonious and unnatural, being to the soul what disease is to the body;\nfor in the soul as well as in the body, good or bad actions produce good\nor bad habits. And virtue is the health and beauty and well-being of the\nsoul, and vice is the disease and weakness and deformity of the soul.\n\n*445* Again the old question returns upon us: Is justice or injustice the\nmore profitable? The question has become ridiculous. For injustice, like\nmortal disease, makes life not worth having. Come up with me to the hill\nwhich overhangs the city and look down upon the single form of virtue, and\nthe infinite forms of vice, {lxvii} among which are four special ones,\ncharacteristic both of states and of individuals. And the state which\ncorresponds to the single form of virtue is that which we have been\ndescribing, wherein reason rules under one of two names--monarchy and\naristocracy. Thus there are five forms in all, both of states and of\nsouls....\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic IV._ Introduction.]\n\nIn attempting to prove that the soul has three separate faculties, Plato\ntakes occasion to discuss what makes difference of faculties. And the\ncriterion which he proposes is difference in the working of the faculties.\nThe same faculty cannot produce contradictory effects. But the path of\nearly reasoners is beset by thorny entanglements, and he will not proceed\na step without first clearing the ground. This leads him into a tiresome\ndigression, which is intended to explain the nature of contradiction.\nFirst, the contradiction must be at the same time and in the same\nrelation. Secondly, no extraneous word must be introduced into either of\nthe terms in which the contradictory proposition is expressed: for\nexample, thirst is of drink, not of warm drink. He implies, what he does\nnot say, that if, by the advice of reason, or by the impulse of anger, a\nman is restrained from drinking, this proves that thirst, or desire under\nwhich thirst is included, is distinct from anger and reason. But suppose\nthat we allow the term 'thirst' or 'desire' to be modified, and say an\n'angry thirst,' or a 'revengeful desire,' then the two spheres of desire\nand anger overlap and become confused. This case therefore has to be\nexcluded. And still there remains an exception to the rule in the use of\nthe term 'good,' which is always implied in the object of desire. These\nare the discussions of an age before logic; and any one who is wearied by\nthem should remember that they are necessary to the clearing up of ideas\nin the first development of the human faculties.\n\nThe psychology of Plato extends no further than the division of the soul\ninto the rational, irascible, and concupiscent elements, which, as far as\nwe know, was first made by him, and has been retained by Aristotle and\nsucceeding ethical writers. The chief difficulty in this early analysis of\nthe mind is to define exactly the place of the irascible faculty ([Greek:\nthumo/s]), which may be variously described under the terms righteous\nindignation, spirit, passion. It is the foundation of courage, which\nincludes in Plato {lxviii} moral courage, the courage of enduring pain,\nand of surmounting intellectual difficulties, as well as of meeting\ndangers in war. Though irrational, it inclines to side with the rational:\nit cannot be aroused by punishment when justly inflicted: it sometimes\ntakes the form of an enthusiasm which sustains a man in the performance of\ngreat actions. It is the 'lion heart' with which the reason makes a treaty\n(ix. 589 B). On the other hand it is negative rather than positive; it is\nindignant at wrong or falsehood, but does not, like Love in the Symposium\nand Phaedrus, aspire to the vision of Truth or Good. It is the peremptory\nmilitary spirit which prevails in the government of honour. It differs\nfrom anger ([Greek: o)rg\u00ea/]), this latter term having no accessory notion\nof righteous indignation. Although Aristotle has retained the word, yet we\nmay observe that 'passion' ([Greek: thumo/s]) has with him lost its\naffinity to the rational and has become indistinguishable from 'anger'\n([Greek: o)rg\u00ea/]). And to this vernacular use Plato himself in the Laws\nseems to revert (ix. 836 B), though not always (v. 731 A). By modern\nphilosophy too, as well as in our ordinary conversation, the words anger\nor passion are employed almost exclusively in a bad sense; there is no\nconnotation of a just or reasonable cause by which they are aroused. The\nfeeling of 'righteous indignation' is too partial and accidental to admit\nof our regarding it as a separate virtue or habit. We are tempted also to\ndoubt whether Plato is right in supposing that an offender, however justly\ncondemned, could be expected to acknowledge the justice of his sentence;\nthis is the spirit of a philosopher or martyr rather than of a criminal.\n\nWe may observe (p. 444 D, E) how nearly Plato approaches Aristotle's\nfamous thesis, that 'good actions produce good habits.' The words 'as\nhealthy practices ([Greek: e)pit\u00eadeu/mata]) produce health, so do just\npractices produce justice,' have a sound very like the Nicomachean Ethics.\nBut we note also that an incidental remark in Plato has become a\nfar-reaching principle in Aristotle, and an inseparable part of a great\nEthical system.\n\nThere is a difficulty in understanding what Plato meant by 'the longer\nway' (435 D; cp. _infra_, vi. 504): he seems to intimate some metaphysic\nof the future which will not be satisfied with arguing from the principle\nof contradiction. In the sixth and seventh books (compare Sophist and\nParmenides) he has given {lxix} us a sketch of such a metaphysic; but when\nGlaucon asks for the final revelation of the idea of good, he is put off\nwith the declaration that he has not yet studied the preliminary sciences.\nHow he would have filled up the sketch, or argued about such questions\nfrom a higher point of view, we can only conjecture. Perhaps he hoped to\nfind some _a priori_ method of developing the parts out of the whole; or\nhe might have asked which of the ideas contains the other ideas, and\npossibly have stumbled on the Hegelian identity of the 'ego' and the\n'universal.' Or he may have imagined that ideas might be constructed in\nsome manner analogous to the construction of figures and numbers in the\nmathematical sciences. The most certain and necessary truth was to Plato\nthe universal; and to this he was always seeking to refer all knowledge or\nopinion, just as in modern times we seek to rest them on the opposite pole\nof induction and experience. The aspirations of metaphysicians have always\ntended to pass beyond the limits of human thought and language: they seem\nto have reached a height at which they are 'moving about in worlds\nunrealized,' and their conceptions, although profoundly affecting their\nown minds, become invisible or unintelligible to others. We are not\ntherefore surprized to find that Plato himself has nowhere clearly\nexplained his doctrine of ideas; or that his school in a later generation,\nlike his contemporaries Glaucon and Adeimantus, were unable to follow him\nin this region of speculation. In the Sophist, where he is refuting the\nscepticism which maintained either that there was no such thing as\npredication, or that all might be predicated of all, he arrives at the\nconclusion that some ideas combine with some, but not all with all. But he\nmakes only one or two steps forward on this path; he nowhere attains to\nany connected system of ideas, or even to a knowledge of the most\nelementary relations of the sciences to one another (see _infra_).\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic V._ Analysis.]\n\nBOOK V. *449* I was going to enumerate the four forms of vice or decline\nin states, when Polemarchus--he was sitting a little farther from me than\nAdeimantus--taking him by the coat and leaning towards him, said something\nin an undertone, of which I only caught the words, 'Shall we let him off?'\n'Certainly not,' said Adeimantus, raising his voice. Whom, I said, are you\n{lxx} not going to let off? 'You,' he said. Why? 'Because we think that\nyou are not dealing fairly with us in omitting women and children, of whom\nyou have slily disposed under the general formula that friends have all\nthings in common.' And was I not right? 'Yes,' he replied, 'but there are\nmany sorts of communism or community, and we want to know which of them is\nright. The company, as you have just heard, are resolved to have a further\nexplanation.' *450* Thrasymachus said, 'Do you think that we have come\nhither to dig for gold, or to hear you discourse?' Yes, I said; but the\ndiscourse should be of a reasonable length. Glaucon added, 'Yes, Socrates,\nand there is reason in spending the whole of life in such discussions; but\npray, without more ado, tell us how this community is to be carried out,\nand how the interval between birth and education is to be filled up.'\nWell, I said, the subject has several difficulties--What is possible? is\nthe first question. What is desirable? is the second. 'Fear not,' he\nreplied, 'for you are speaking among friends.' That, I replied, is a sorry\nconsolation; I shall destroy my friends as well as myself. *451* Not that\nI mind a little innocent laughter; but he who kills the truth is a\nmurderer. 'Then,' said Glaucon, laughing, 'in case you should murder us we\nwill acquit you beforehand, and you shall be held free from the guilt of\ndeceiving us.'\n\nSocrates proceeds:--The guardians of our state are to be watch-dogs, as we\nhave already said. Now dogs are not divided into hes and shes--we do not\ntake the masculine gender out to hunt and leave the females at home to\nlook after their puppies. They have the same employments--the only\ndifference between them is that the one sex is stronger and the other\nweaker. But if women are to have the same employments as men, they must\nhave the same education--they must be taught music and gymnastics, and the\nart of war. *452* I know that a great joke will be made of their riding on\nhorseback and carrying weapons; the sight of the naked old wrinkled women\nshowing their agility in the palaestra will certainly not be a vision of\nbeauty, and may be expected to become a famous jest. But we must not mind\nthe wits; there was a time when they might have laughed at our present\ngymnastics. All is habit: people have at last found out that the exposure\nis better than the concealment of the {lxxi} person, and now they laugh no\nmore. Evil only should be the subject of ridicule.\n\n*453* The first question is, whether women are able either wholly or\npartially to share in the employments of men. And here we may be charged\nwith inconsistency in making the proposal at all. For we started\noriginally with the division of labour; and the diversity of employments\nwas based on the difference of natures. But is there no difference between\nmen and women? Nay, are they not wholly different? _There_ was the\ndifficulty, Glaucon, which made me unwilling to speak of family relations.\nHowever, when a man is out of his depth, whether in a pool or in an ocean,\nhe can only swim for his life; and we must try to find a way of escape, if\nwe can.\n\n*454* The argument is, that different natures have different uses, and the\nnatures of men and women are said to differ. But this is only a verbal\nopposition. We do not consider that the difference may be purely nominal\nand accidental; for example, a bald man and a hairy man are opposed in a\nsingle point of view, but you cannot infer that because a bald man is a\ncobbler a hairy man ought not to be a cobbler. Now why is such an\ninference erroneous? Simply because the opposition between them is partial\nonly, like the difference between a male physician and a female physician,\nnot running through the whole nature, like the difference between a\nphysician and a carpenter. And if the difference of the sexes is only that\nthe one beget and the other bear children, this does not prove that they\nought to have distinct educations. *455* Admitting that women differ from\nmen in capacity, do not men equally differ from one another? Has not\nnature scattered all the qualities which our citizens require\nindifferently up and down among the two sexes? and even in their peculiar\npursuits, are not women often, though in some cases superior to men,\nridiculously enough surpassed by them? Women are the same in kind as men,\nand have the same aptitude or want of aptitude for medicine or gymnastic\nor war, *456* but in a less degree. One woman will be a good guardian,\nanother not; and the good must be chosen to be the colleagues of our\nguardians. If however their natures are the same, the inference is that\ntheir education must also be the same; there is no longer anything\nunnatural or impossible in a woman learning music {lxxii} and gymnastic.\nAnd the education which we give them will be the very best, far superior\nto that of cobblers, and will train up the very best women, and nothing\ncan be more advantageous to the State than this. *457* Therefore let them\nstrip, clothed in their chastity, and share in the toils of war and in the\ndefence of their country; he who laughs at them is a fool for his pains.\n\nThe first wave is past, and the argument is compelled to admit that men\nand women have common duties and pursuits. A second and greater wave is\nrolling in--community of wives and children; is this either expedient or\npossible? The expediency I do not doubt; I am not so sure of the\npossibility. 'Nay, I think that a considerable doubt will be entertained\non both points.' I meant to have escaped the trouble of proving the first,\nbut as you have detected the little stratagem I must even submit. *458*\nOnly allow me to feed my fancy like the solitary in his walks, with a\ndream of what might be, and then I will return to the question of what can\nbe.\n\nIn the first place our rulers will enforce the laws and make new ones\nwhere they are wanted, and their allies or ministers will obey. You, as\nlegislator, have already selected the men; and now you shall select the\nwomen. After the selection has been made, they will dwell in common houses\nand have their meals in common, and will be brought together by a\nnecessity more certain than that of mathematics. But they cannot be\nallowed to live in licentiousness; that is an unholy thing, which the\nrulers are determined to prevent. For the avoidance of this, *459* holy\nmarriage festivals will be instituted, and their holiness will be in\nproportion to their usefulness. And here, Glaucon, I should like to ask\n(as I know that you are a breeder of birds and animals), Do you not take\nthe greatest care in the mating? 'Certainly.' And there is no reason to\nsuppose that less care is required in the marriage of human beings. But\nthen our rulers must be skilful physicians of the State, for they will\noften need a strong dose of falsehood in order to bring about desirable\nunions between their subjects. The good must be paired with the good, and\nthe bad with the bad, and the offspring of the one must be reared, and of\nthe other destroyed; in this way the flock will be preserved in prime\ncondition. *460* Hymeneal festivals will be celebrated at times fixed with\nan eye to population, and the brides and bridegrooms will {lxxiii} meet at\nthem; and by an ingenious system of lots the rulers will contrive that the\nbrave and the fair come together, and that those of inferior breed are\npaired with inferiors--the latter will ascribe to chance what is really\nthe invention of the rulers. And when children are born, the offspring of\nthe brave and fair will be carried to an enclosure in a certain part of\nthe city, and there attended by suitable nurses; the rest will be hurried\naway to places unknown. The mothers will be brought to the fold and will\nsuckle the children; care however must be taken that none of them\nrecognise their own offspring; and if necessary other nurses may also be\nhired. The trouble of watching and getting up at night will be transferred\nto attendants. 'Then the wives of our guardians will have a fine easy time\nwhen they are having children.' And quite right too, I said, that they\nshould.\n\nThe parents ought to be in the prime of life, which for a man may be\nreckoned at thirty years--from twenty-five, *461* when he has 'passed the\npoint at which the speed of life is greatest,' to fifty-five; and at\ntwenty years for a woman--from twenty to forty. Any one above or below\nthose ages who partakes in the hymeneals shall be guilty of impiety; also\nevery one who forms a marriage connexion at other times without the\nconsent of the rulers. This latter regulation applies to those who are\nwithin the specified ages, after which they may range at will, provided\nthey avoid the prohibited degrees of parents and children, or of brothers\nand sisters, which last, however, are not absolutely prohibited, if a\ndispensation be procured. 'But how shall we know the degrees of affinity,\nwhen all things are common?' The answer is, that brothers and sisters are\nall such as are born seven or nine months after the espousals, and their\nparents those who are then espoused, *462* and every one will have many\nchildren and every child many parents.\n\nSocrates proceeds: I have now to prove that this scheme is advantageous\nand also consistent with our entire polity. The greatest good of a State\nis unity; the greatest evil, discord and distraction. And there will be\nunity where there are no private pleasures or pains or interests--where if\none member suffers all the members suffer, if one citizen is touched all\nare quickly sensitive; and the least hurt to the little finger of the\nState runs through the whole body and vibrates to the soul. For the true\n{lxxiv} State, like an individual, is injured as a whole when any part is\naffected. *463* Every State has subjects and rulers, who in a democracy\nare called rulers, and in other States masters: but in our State they are\ncalled saviours and allies; and the subjects who in other States are\ntermed slaves, are by us termed nurturers and paymasters, and those who\nare termed comrades and colleagues in other places, are by us called\nfathers and brothers. And whereas in other States members of the same\ngovernment regard one of their colleagues as a friend and another as an\nenemy, in our State no man is a stranger to another; for every citizen is\nconnected with every other by ties of blood, and these names and this way\nof speaking will have a corresponding reality--brother, father, sister,\nmother, repeated from infancy in the ears of children, will not be mere\nwords. *464* Then again the citizens will have all things in common, in\nhaving common property they will have common pleasures and pains.\n\nCan there be strife and contention among those who are of one mind; or\nlawsuits about property when men have nothing but their bodies which they\ncall their own; or suits about violence when every one is bound to defend\nhimself? *465* The permission to strike when insulted will be an\n'antidote' to the knife and will prevent disturbances in the State. But no\nyounger man will strike an elder; reverence will prevent him from laying\nhands on his kindred, and he will fear that the rest of the family may\nretaliate. Moreover, our citizens will be rid of the lesser evils of life;\nthere will be no flattery of the rich, no sordid household cares, no\nborrowing and not paying. Compared with the citizens of other States, ours\nwill be Olympic victors, and crowned with blessings greater still--they\nand their children having a better maintenance during life, and after\ndeath an honourable burial. *466* Nor has the happiness of the individual\nbeen sacrificed to the happiness of the State (cp. iv. 419 E); our Olympic\nvictor has not been turned into a cobbler, but he has a happiness beyond\nthat of any cobbler. At the same time, if any conceited youth begins to\ndream of appropriating the State to himself, he must be reminded that\n'half is better than the whole.' 'I should certainly advise him to stay\nwhere he is when he has the promise of such a brave life.'\n\nBut is such a community possible?--as among the animals, so {lxxv} also\namong men; and if possible, in what way possible? About war there is no\ndifficulty; the principle of communism is adapted to military service.\nParents will take their children to look on at a battle, *467* just as\npotters' boys are trained to the business by looking on at the wheel. And\nto the parents themselves, as to other animals, the sight of their young\nones will prove a great incentive to bravery. Young warriors must learn,\nbut they must not run into danger, although a certain degree of risk is\nworth incurring when the benefit is great. The young creatures should be\nplaced under the care of experienced veterans, and they should have\nwings--that is to say, swift and tractable steeds on which they may fly\naway and escape. *468* One of the first things to be done is to teach a\nyouth to ride.\n\nCowards and deserters shall be degraded to the class of husbandmen;\ngentlemen who allow themselves to be taken prisoners, may be presented to\nthe enemy. But what shall be done to the hero? First of all he shall be\ncrowned by all the youths in the army; secondly, he shall receive the\nright hand of fellowship; and thirdly, do you think that there is any harm\nin his being kissed? We have already determined that he shall have more\nwives than others, in order that he may have as many children as possible.\nAnd at a feast he shall have more to eat; we have the authority of Homer\nfor honouring brave men with 'long chines,' which is an appropriate\ncompliment, because meat is a very strengthening thing. Fill the bowl\nthen, and give the best seats and meats to the brave--may they do them\ngood! And he who dies in battle will be at once declared to be of the\ngolden race, and will, as we believe, become one of Hesiod's guardian\nangels. *469* He shall be worshipped after death in the manner prescribed\nby the oracle; and not only he, but all other benefactors of the State who\ndie in any other way, shall be admitted to the same honours.\n\nThe next question is, How shall we treat our enemies? Shall Hellenes be\nenslaved? No; for there is too great a risk of the whole race passing\nunder the yoke of the barbarians. Or shall the dead be despoiled?\nCertainly not; for that sort of thing is an excuse for skulking, and has\nbeen the ruin of many an army. There is meanness and feminine malice in\nmaking an enemy of the dead body, when the soul which was the owner has\nfled-- {lxxvi} like a dog who cannot reach his assailants, and quarrels\nwith the stones which are thrown at him instead. Again, the arms of\nHellenes should not be offered up in the temples of the Gods; *470* they\nare a pollution, for they are taken from brethren. And on similar grounds\nthere should be a limit to the devastation of Hellenic territory--the\nhouses should not be burnt, nor more than the annual produce carried off.\nFor war is of two kinds, civil and foreign; the first of which is properly\ntermed 'discord,' and only the second 'war;' and war between Hellenes is\nin reality civil war--a quarrel in a family, which is ever to be regarded\nas unpatriotic and unnatural, *471* and ought to be prosecuted with a view\nto reconciliation in a true phil-Hellenic spirit, as of those who would\nchasten but not utterly enslave. The war is not against a whole nation who\nare a friendly multitude of men, women, and children, but only against a\nfew guilty persons; when they are punished peace will be restored. That is\nthe way in which Hellenes should war against one another--and against\nbarbarians, as they war against one another now.\n\n'But, my dear Socrates, you are forgetting the main question: Is such a\nState possible? I grant all and more than you say about the blessedness of\nbeing one family--fathers, brothers, mothers, daughters, going out to war\ntogether; but I want to ascertain the possibility of this ideal State.'\nYou are too unmerciful. *472* The first wave and the second wave I have\nhardly escaped, and now you will certainly drown me with the third. When\nyou see the towering crest of the wave, I expect you to take pity. 'Not a\nwhit.'\n\nWell, then, we were led to form our ideal polity in the search after\njustice, and the just man answered to the just State. Is this ideal at all\nthe worse for being impracticable? Would the picture of a perfectly\nbeautiful man be any the worse because no such man ever lived? Can any\nreality come up to the idea? Nature will not allow words to be fully\nrealized; *473* but if I am to try and realize the ideal of the State in a\nmeasure, I think that an approach may be made to the perfection of which\nI dream by one or two, I do not say slight, but possible changes in the\npresent constitution of States. I would reduce them to a single one--the\ngreat wave, as I call it. _Until, then, kings are philosophers, or\nphilosophers are kings, cities will never cease from ill: no, nor the\n{lxxvii} human race; nor will our ideal polity ever come into being._\nI know that this is a hard saying, which few will be able to receive.\n'Socrates, all the world will take off his coat and rush upon you with\nsticks and stones, *474* and therefore I would advise you to prepare an\nanswer.' You got me into the scrape, I said. 'And I was right,' he\nreplied; 'however, I will stand by you as a sort of do-nothing,\nwell-meaning ally.' Having the help of such a champion, I will do my best\nto maintain my position. And first, I must explain of whom I speak and\nwhat sort of natures these are who are to be philosophers and rulers. As\nyou are a man of pleasure, you will not have forgotten how indiscriminate\nlovers are in their attachments; they love all, and turn blemishes into\nbeauties. The snub-nosed youth is said to have a winning grace; the beak\nof another has a royal look; the featureless are faultless; the dark are\nmanly, the fair angels; the sickly have a new term of endearment invented\nexpressly for them, which is 'honey-pale.' *475* Lovers of wine and lovers\nof ambition also desire the objects of their affection in every form. Now\nhere comes the point:--The philosopher too is a lover of knowledge in\nevery form; he has an insatiable curiosity. 'But will curiosity make a\nphilosopher? Are the lovers of sights and sounds, who let out their ears\nto every chorus at the Dionysiac festivals, to be called philosophers?'\nThey are not true philosophers, but only an imitation. 'Then how are we to\ndescribe the true?'\n\nYou would acknowledge the existence of abstract ideas, *476* such as\njustice, beauty, good, evil, which are severally one, yet in their various\ncombinations appear to be many. Those who recognize these realities are\nphilosophers; whereas the other class hear sounds and see colours, and\nunderstand their use in the arts, but cannot attain to the true or waking\nvision of absolute justice or beauty or truth; they have not the light of\nknowledge, but of opinion, and what they see is a dream only. Perhaps he\nof whom we say the last will be angry with us; can we pacify him without\nrevealing the disorder of his mind? Suppose we say that, if he has\nknowledge we rejoice to hear it, but knowledge must be of something which\nis, as ignorance is of something which is not; *477* and there is a third\nthing, which both is and is not, and is matter of opinion only. Opinion\nand knowledge, then, having distinct objects, must also be distinct\nfaculties. And {lxxviii} by faculties I mean powers unseen and\ndistinguishable only by the difference in their objects, as opinion and\nknowledge differ, since the one is liable to err, but the other is\nunerring and is the mightiest of all our faculties. If being is the object\nof knowledge, *478* and not-being of ignorance, and these are the\nextremes, opinion must lie between them, and may be called darker than the\none and brighter than the other. This intermediate or contingent matter is\nand is not at the same time, and partakes both of existence and of\nnon-existence. *479* Now I would ask my good friend, who denies abstract\nbeauty and justice, and affirms a many beautiful and a many just, whether\neverything he sees is not in some point of view different--the beautiful\nugly, the pious impious, the just unjust? Is not the double also the half,\nand are not heavy and light relative terms which pass into one another?\nEverything is and is not, as in the old riddle--'A man and not a man shot\nand did not shoot a bird and not a bird with a stone and not a stone.' The\nmind cannot be fixed on either alternative; and these ambiguous,\nintermediate, erring, half-lighted objects, which have a disorderly\nmovement in the region between being and not-being, are the proper matter\nof opinion, *480* as the immutable objects are the proper matter of\nknowledge. And he who grovels in the world of sense, and has only this\nuncertain perception of things, is not a philosopher, but a lover of\nopinion only....\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic V._ Introduction.]\n\nThe fifth book is the new beginning of the Republic, in which the\ncommunity of property and of family are first maintained, and the\ntransition is made to the kingdom of philosophers. For both of these\nPlato, after his manner, has been preparing in some chance words of Book\nIV (424 A), which fall unperceived on the reader's mind, as they are\nsupposed at first to have fallen on the ear of Glaucon and Adeimantus. The\n'paradoxes,' as Morgenstern terms them, of this book of the Republic will\nbe reserved for another place; a few remarks on the style, and some\nexplanations of difficulties, may be briefly added.\n\nFirst, there is the image of the waves, which serves for a sort of scheme\nor plan of the book. The first wave, the second wave, the third and\ngreatest wave come rolling in, and we hear the roar of them. All that can\nbe said of the extravagance of Plato's proposals is anticipated by\nhimself. Nothing is more admirable than the {lxxix} hesitation with which\nhe proposes the solemn text, 'Until kings are philosophers,' &c.; or the\nreaction from the sublime to the ridiculous, when Glaucon describes the\nmanner in which the new truth will be received by mankind.\n\nSome defects and difficulties may be noted in the execution of the\ncommunistic plan. Nothing is told us of the application of communism to\nthe lower classes; nor is the table of prohibited degrees capable of being\nmade out. It is quite possible that a child born at one hymeneal festival\nmay marry one of its own brothers or sisters, or even one of its parents,\nat another. Plato is afraid of incestuous unions, but at the same time he\ndoes not wish to bring before us the fact that the city would be divided\ninto families of those born seven and nine months after each hymeneal\nfestival. If it were worth while to argue seriously about such fancies, we\nmight remark that while all the old affinities are abolished, the newly\nprohibited affinity rests not on any natural or rational principle, but\nonly upon the accident of children having been born in the same month and\nyear. Nor does he explain how the lots could be so manipulated by the\nlegislature as to bring together the fairest and best. The singular\nexpression (460 E) which is employed to describe the age of\nfive-and-twenty may perhaps be taken from some poet.\n\nIn the delineation of the philosopher, the illustrations of the nature of\nphilosophy derived from love are more suited to the apprehension of\nGlaucon, the Athenian man of pleasure, than to modern tastes or feelings\n(cp. v. 474, 475). They are partly facetious, but also contain a germ of\ntruth. That science is a whole, remains a true principle of inductive as\nwell as of metaphysical philosophy; and the love of universal knowledge is\nstill the characteristic of the philosopher in modern as well as in\nancient times.\n\nAt the end of the fifth book Plato introduces the figment of contingent\nmatter, which has exercised so great an influence both on the Ethics and\nTheology of the modern world, and which occurs here for the first time in\nthe history of philosophy. He did not remark that the degrees of knowledge\nin the subject have nothing corresponding to them in the object. With him\na word must answer to an idea; and he could not conceive of an opinion\nwhich was an opinion about nothing. The influence of analogy led him to\ninvent 'parallels and conjugates' and to overlook facts. To us {lxxx} some\nof his difficulties are puzzling only from their simplicity: we do not\nperceive that the answer to them 'is tumbling out at our feet.' To the\nmind of early thinkers, the conception of not-being was dark and\nmysterious (Sophist, 254 A); they did not see that this terrible\napparition which threatened destruction to all knowledge was only a\nlogical determination. The common term under which, through the accidental\nuse of language, two entirely different ideas were included was another\nsource of confusion. Thus through the ambiguity of [Greek: dokei=n,\nphai/netai, e)/oiken, k.t.l.], Plato, attempting to introduce order into\nthe first chaos of human thought, seems to have confused perception and\nopinion, and to have failed to distinguish the contingent from the\nrelative. In the Theaetetus the first of these difficulties begins to\nclear up; in the Sophist the second; and for this, as well as for other\nreasons, both these dialogues are probably to be regarded as later than\nthe Republic.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic VI._ Analysis.]\n\nBOOK VI. *484* Having determined that the many have no knowledge of true\nbeing, and have no clear patterns in their minds of justice, beauty,\ntruth, and that philosophers have such patterns, we have now to ask\nwhether they or the many shall be rulers in our State. But who can doubt\nthat philosophers should be chosen, if they have the other qualities which\nare required in a ruler? *485* For they are lovers of the knowledge of the\neternal and of all truth; they are haters of falsehood; their meaner\ndesires are absorbed in the interests of knowledge; they are spectators of\nall time and all existence; *486* and in the magnificence of their\ncontemplation the life of man is as nothing to them, nor is death fearful.\nAlso they are of a social, gracious disposition, equally free from\ncowardice and arrogance. They learn and remember easily; they have\nharmonious, well-regulated minds; truth flows to them sweetly by nature.\nCan the god of Jealousy himself *487* find any fault with such an\nassemblage of good qualities?\n\nHere Adeimantus interposes:--'No man can answer you, Socrates; but every\nman feels that this is owing to his own deficiency in argument. He is\ndriven from one position to another, until he has nothing more to say,\njust as an unskilful player at draughts is reduced to his last move by a\nmore skilled opponent. And yet all the time he may be right. {lxxxi} He\nmay know, in this very instance, that those who make philosophy the\nbusiness of their lives, generally turn out rogues if they are bad men,\nand fools if they are good. What do you say?' I should say that he is\nquite right. 'Then how is such an admission reconcileable with the\ndoctrine that philosophers should be kings?'\n\n*488* I shall answer you in a parable which will also let you see how poor\na hand I am at the invention of allegories. The relation of good men to\ntheir governments is so peculiar, that in order to defend them I must take\nan illustration from the world of fiction. Conceive the captain of a ship,\ntaller by a head and shoulders than any of the crew, yet a little deaf, a\nlittle blind, and rather ignorant of the seaman's art. The sailors want to\nsteer, although they know nothing of the art; and they have a theory that\nit cannot be learned. If the helm is refused them, they drug the captain's\nposset, bind him hand and foot, and take possession of the ship. He who\njoins in the mutiny is termed a good pilot and what not; they have no\nconception that the true pilot must observe the winds and the stars, and\nmust be their master, whether they like it or not;--such an one would be\ncalled by them fool, prater, star-gazer. *489* This is my parable; which I\nwill beg you to interpret for me to those gentlemen who ask why the\nphilosopher has such an evil name, and to explain to them that not he, but\nthose who will not use him, are to blame for his uselessness. The\nphilosopher should not beg of mankind to be put in authority over them.\nThe wise man should not seek the rich, as the proverb bids, but every man,\nwhether rich or poor, must knock at the door of the physician when he has\nneed of him. Now the pilot is the philosopher--he whom in the parable they\ncall star-gazer, and the mutinous sailors are the mob of politicians by\nwhom he is rendered useless. Not that these are the worst enemies of\nphilosophy, who is far more dishonoured by her own professing sons when\nthey are corrupted by the world. *490* Need I recall the original image of\nthe philosopher? Did we not say of him just now, that he loved truth and\nhated falsehood, and that he could not rest in the multiplicity of\nphenomena, but was led by a sympathy in his own nature to the\ncontemplation of the absolute? All the virtues as well as truth, who is\nthe leader of them, took up their abode in his soul. But as you were\nobserving, if we turn aside to view the reality, we see {lxxxii} that the\npersons who were thus described, with the exception of a small and useless\nclass, are utter rogues.\n\nThe point which has to be considered, is the origin of this corruption in\nnature. *491* Every one will admit that the philosopher, in our\ndescription of him, is a rare being. But what numberless causes tend to\ndestroy these rare beings! There is no good thing which may not be a cause\nof evil--health, wealth, strength, rank, and the virtues themselves, when\nplaced under unfavourable circumstances. For as in the animal or vegetable\nworld the strongest seeds most need the accompaniment of good air and\nsoil, so the best of human characters turn out the worst when they fall\nupon an unsuitable soil; whereas weak natures hardly ever do any\nconsiderable good or harm; they are not the stuff out of which either\ngreat criminals or great heroes are made. *492* The philosopher follows\nthe same analogy: he is either the best or the worst of all men. Some\npersons say that the Sophists are the corrupters of youth; but is not\npublic opinion the real Sophist who is everywhere present--in those very\npersons, in the assembly, in the courts, in the camp, in the applauses and\nhisses of the theatre re-echoed by the surrounding hills? Will not a young\nman's heart leap amid these discordant sounds? and will any education save\nhim from being carried away by the torrent? Nor is this all. For if he\nwill not yield to opinion, there follows the gentle compulsion of exile or\ndeath. What principle of rival Sophists or anybody else can overcome in\nsuch an unequal contest? Characters there may be more than human, *493*\nwho are exceptions--God may save a man, but not his own strength. Further,\nI would have you consider that the hireling Sophist only gives back to the\nworld their own opinions; he is the keeper of the monster, who knows how\nto flatter or anger him, and observes the meaning of his inarticulate\ngrunts. Good is what pleases him, evil what he dislikes; truth and beauty\nare determined only by the taste of the brute. Such is the Sophist's\nwisdom, and such is the condition of those who make public opinion the\ntest of truth, whether in art or in morals. The curse is laid upon them of\nbeing and doing what it approves, and when they attempt first principles\nthe failure is ludicrous. Think of all this and ask yourself whether the\nworld is more likely to be a believer in the unity of the idea, or in the\nmultiplicity of phenomena. And the world if not a believer {lxxxiii} in\nthe idea cannot be a philosopher, *494* and must therefore be a persecutor\nof philosophers. There is another evil:--the world does not like to lose\nthe gifted nature, and so they flatter the young [Alcibiades] into a\nmagnificent opinion of his own capacity; the tall, proper youth begins to\nexpand, and is dreaming of kingdoms and empires. If at this instant a\nfriend whispers to him, 'Now the gods lighten thee; thou art a great fool'\nand must be educated--do you think that he will listen? Or suppose a\nbetter sort of man who is attracted towards philosophy, will they not make\nHerculean efforts to spoil and corrupt him? *495* Are we not right in\nsaying that the love of knowledge, no less than riches, may divert him?\nMen of this class [Critias] often become politicians--they are the authors\nof great mischief in states, and sometimes also of great good. And thus\nphilosophy is deserted by her natural protectors, and others enter in and\ndishonour her. Vulgar little minds see the land open and rush from the\nprisons of the arts into her temple. A clever mechanic having a soul\ncoarse as his body, thinks that he will gain caste by becoming her suitor.\nFor philosophy, even in her fallen estate, has a dignity of her own--and\nhe, like a bald little blacksmith's apprentice as he is, having made some\nmoney and got out of durance, washes and dresses himself as a bridegroom\nand marries his master's daughter. *496* What will be the issue of such\nmarriages? Will they not be vile and bastard, devoid of truth and nature?\n'They will.' Small, then, is the remnant of genuine philosophers; there\nmay be a few who are citizens of small states, in which politics are not\nworth thinking of, or who have been detained by Theages' bridle of ill\nhealth; for my own case of the oracular sign is almost unique, and too\nrare to be worth mentioning. And these few when they have tasted the\npleasures of philosophy, and have taken a look at that den of thieves and\nplace of wild beasts, which is human life, will stand aside from the storm\nunder the shelter of a wall, and try to preserve their own innocence and\nto depart in peace. 'A great work, too, will have been accomplished by\nthem.' Great, yes, but not the greatest; for man is a social being, and\ncan only attain his highest development in the society which is best\nsuited to him.\n\n*497* Enough, then, of the causes why philosophy has such an evil name.\nAnother question is, Which of existing states is suited to her? Not one of\nthem; at present she is like some exotic seed {lxxxiv} which degenerates\nin a strange soil; only in her proper state will she be shown to be of\nheavenly growth. 'And is her proper state ours or some other?' Ours in all\npoints but one, which was left undetermined. You may remember our saying\nthat some living mind or witness of the legislator was needed in states.\nBut we were afraid to enter upon a subject of such difficulty, and now the\nquestion recurs and has not grown easier:--How may philosophy be safely\nstudied? Let us bring her into the light of day, and make an end of the\ninquiry.\n\nIn the first place, I say boldly that nothing can be worse than the\npresent mode of study. *498* Persons usually pick up a little philosophy\nin early youth, and in the intervals of business, but they never master\nthe real difficulty, which is dialectic. Later, perhaps, they occasionally\ngo to a lecture on philosophy. Years advance, and the sun of philosophy,\nunlike that of Heracleitus, sets never to rise again. This order of\neducation should be reversed; it should begin with gymnastics in youth,\nand as the man strengthens, he should increase the gymnastics of his soul.\nThen, when active life is over, let him finally return to philosophy. 'You\nare in earnest, Socrates, but the world will be equally earnest in\nwithstanding you--no more than Thrasymachus.' Do not make a quarrel\nbetween Thrasymachus and me, who were never enemies and are now good\nfriends enough. And I shall do my best to convince him and all mankind of\nthe truth of my words, or at any rate to prepare for the future when, in\nanother life, we may again take part in similar discussions. 'That will be\na long time hence.' Not long in comparison with eternity. The many will\nprobably remain incredulous, for they have never seen the natural unity of\nideas, but only artificial juxtapositions; not free and generous thoughts,\nbut tricks of controversy and quips of law;-- *499* a perfect man ruling\nin a perfect state, even a single one they have not known. And we foresaw\nthat there was no chance of perfection either in states or individuals\nuntil a necessity was laid upon philosophers--not the rogues, but those\nwhom we called the useless class--of holding office; or until the sons of\nkings were inspired with a true love of philosophy. Whether in the\ninfinity of past time there has been, or is in some distant land, or ever\nwill be hereafter, an ideal such as we have described, we stoutly maintain\nthat there has been, is, and {lxxxv} will be such a state whenever the\nMuse of philosophy rules. *500* Will you say that the world is of another\nmind? O, my friend, do not revile the world! They will soon change their\nopinion if they are gently entreated, and are taught the true nature of\nthe philosopher. Who can hate a man who loves him? Or be jealous of one\nwho has no jealousy? Consider, again, that the many hate not the true but\nthe false philosophers--the pretenders who force their way in without\ninvitation, and are always speaking of persons and not of principles,\nwhich is unlike the spirit of philosophy. For the true philosopher\ndespises earthly strife; his eye is fixed on the eternal order in\naccordance with which he moulds himself into the Divine image (and not\nhimself only, but other men), and is the creator of the virtues private as\nwell as public. When mankind see that the happiness of states is only to\nbe found in that image, will they be angry with us for attempting to\ndelineate it? 'Certainly not. But what will be the process of\ndelineation?' *501* The artist will do nothing until he has made a _tabula\nrasa_; on this he will inscribe the constitution of a state, glancing\noften at the divine truth of nature, and from that deriving the godlike\namong men, mingling the two elements, rubbing out and painting in, until\nthere is a perfect harmony or fusion of the divine and human. But perhaps\nthe world will doubt the existence of such an artist. What will they\ndoubt? That the philosopher is a lover of truth, having a nature akin to\nthe best?--and if they admit this will they still quarrel with us for\nmaking philosophers our kings? 'They will be less disposed to quarrel.'\n*502* Let us assume then that they are pacified. Still, a person may\nhesitate about the probability of the son of a king being a philosopher.\nAnd we do not deny that they are very liable to be corrupted; but yet\nsurely in the course of ages there might be one exception--and one is\nenough. If one son of a king were a philosopher, and had obedient\ncitizens, he might bring the ideal polity into being. Hence we conclude\nthat our laws are not only the best, but that they are also possible,\nthough not free from difficulty.\n\nI gained nothing by evading the troublesome questions which arose\nconcerning women and children. I will be wiser now and acknowledge that we\nmust go to the bottom of another question: What is to be the education of\nour guardians? It was {lxxxvi} agreed that they were to be lovers of their\ncountry, *503* and were to be tested in the refiner's fire of pleasures\nand pains, and those who came forth pure and remained fixed in their\nprinciples were to have honours and rewards in life and after death. But\nat this point, the argument put on her veil and turned into another path.\nI hesitated to make the assertion which I now hazard,--that our guardians\nmust be philosophers. You remember all the contradictory elements, which\nmet in the philosopher--how difficult to find them all in a single person!\nIntelligence and spirit are not often combined with steadiness; the\nstolid, fearless, nature is averse to intellectual toil. And yet these\nopposite elements are all necessary, and therefore, as we were saying\nbefore, the aspirant must be tested in pleasures and dangers; and also, as\nwe must now further add, *504* in the highest branches of knowledge. You\nwill remember, that when we spoke of the virtues mention was made of a\nlonger road, which you were satisfied to leave unexplored. 'Enough seemed\nto have been said.' Enough, my friend; but what is enough while anything\nremains wanting? Of all men the guardian must not faint in the search\nafter truth; he must be prepared to take the longer road, or he will never\nreach that higher region which is above the four virtues; and of the\nvirtues too he must not only get an outline, but a clear and distinct\nvision. (Strange that we should be so precise about trifles, so careless\nabout the highest truths!) 'And what are the highest?' *505* You to\npretend unconsciousness, when you have so often heard me speak of the idea\nof good, about which we know so little, and without which though a man\ngain the world he has no profit of it! Some people imagine that the good\nis wisdom; but this involves a circle,--the good, they say, is wisdom,\nwisdom has to do with the good. According to others the good is pleasure;\nbut then comes the absurdity that good is bad, for there are bad pleasures\nas well as good. Again, the good must have reality; a man may desire the\nappearance of virtue, but he will not desire the appearance of good. Ought\nour guardians then to be ignorant of this supreme principle, *506* of\nwhich every man has a presentiment, and without which no man has any real\nknowledge of anything? 'But, Socrates, what is this supreme principle,\nknowledge or pleasure, or what? You may think me troublesome, but I say\nthat you have no business to be always {lxxxvii} repeating the doctrines\nof others instead of giving us your own.' Can I say what I do not know?\n'You may offer an opinion.' And will the blindness and crookedness of\nopinion content you when you might have the light and certainty of\nscience? 'I will only ask you to give such an explanation of the good as\nyou have given already of temperance and justice.' I wish that I could,\nbut in my present mood I cannot reach to the height of the knowledge of\nthe good. *507* To the parent or principal I cannot introduce you, but to\nthe child begotten in his image, which I may compare with the interest on\nthe principal, I will. (Audit the account, and do not let me give you a\nfalse statement of the debt.) You remember our old distinction of the many\nbeautiful and the one beautiful, the particular and the universal, the\nobjects of sight and the objects of thought? Did you ever consider that\nthe objects of sight imply a faculty of sight which is the most complex\nand costly of our senses, requiring not only objects of sense, but also a\nmedium, which is light; without which the sight will not distinguish\nbetween colours and all will be a blank? *508* For light is the noble bond\nbetween the perceiving faculty and the thing perceived, and the god who\ngives us light is the sun, who is the eye of the day, but is not to be\nconfounded with the eye of man. This eye of the day or sun is what I call\nthe child of the good, standing in the same relation to the visible world\nas the good to the intellectual. When the sun shines the eye sees, and in\nthe intellectual world where truth is, there is sight and light. Now that\nwhich is the sun of intelligent natures, is the idea of good, the cause of\nknowledge and truth, yet other and fairer than they are, *509* and\nstanding in the same relation to them in which the sun stands to light. O\ninconceivable height of beauty, which is above knowledge and above truth!\n('You cannot surely mean pleasure,' he said. Peace, I replied.) And this\nidea of good, like the sun, is also the cause of growth, and the author\nnot of knowledge only, but of being, yet greater far than either in\ndignity and power. 'That is a reach of thought more than human; but, pray,\ngo on with the image, for I suspect that there is more behind.' There is,\nI said; and bearing in mind our two suns or principles, imagine further\ntheir corresponding worlds--one of the visible, the other of the\nintelligible; you may assist your fancy by figuring the distinction under\nthe image {lxxxviii} of a line divided into two unequal parts, and may\nagain subdivide each part into two lesser segments representative of the\nstages of knowledge in either sphere. The lower portion of the lower or\nvisible sphere will consist of shadows and reflections, *510* and its\nupper and smaller portion will contain real objects in the world of nature\nor of art. The sphere of the intelligible will also have two\ndivisions,--one of mathematics, in which there is no ascent but all is\ndescent; no inquiring into premises, but only drawing of inferences. In\nthis division the mind works with figures and numbers, the images of which\nare taken not from the shadows, but from the objects, although the truth\nof them is seen only with the mind's eye; and they are used as hypotheses\nwithout being analysed. *511* Whereas in the other division reason uses\nthe hypotheses as stages or steps in the ascent to the idea of good, to\nwhich she fastens them, and then again descends, walking firmly in the\nregion of ideas, and of ideas only, in her ascent as well as descent, and\nfinally resting in them. 'I partly understand,' he replied; 'you mean that\nthe ideas of science are superior to the hypothetical, metaphorical\nconceptions of geometry and the other arts or sciences, whichever is to be\nthe name of them; and the latter conceptions you refuse to make subjects\nof pure intellect, because they have no first principle, although when\nresting on a first principle, they pass into the higher sphere.' You\nunderstand me very well, I said. And now to those four divisions of\nknowledge you may assign four corresponding faculties--pure intelligence\nto the highest sphere; active intelligence to the second; to the third,\nfaith; to the fourth, the perception of shadows--and the clearness of the\nseveral faculties will be in the same ratio as the truth of the objects to\nwhich they are related....\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic VI._ Introduction.]\n\nLike Socrates, we may recapitulate the virtues of the philosopher. In\nlanguage which seems to reach beyond the horizon of that age and country,\nhe is described as 'the spectator of all time and all existence.' He has\nthe noblest gifts of nature, and makes the highest use of them. All his\ndesires are absorbed in the love of wisdom, which is the love of truth.\nNone of the graces of a beautiful soul are wanting in him; neither can he\nfear death, or think much of human life. The ideal of modern {lxxxix}\ntimes hardly retains the simplicity of the antique; there is not the same\noriginality either in truth or error which characterized the Greeks. The\nphilosopher is no longer living in the unseen, nor is he sent by an oracle\nto convince mankind of ignorance; nor does he regard knowledge as a system\nof ideas leading upwards by regular stages to the idea of good. The\neagerness of the pursuit has abated; there is more division of labour and\nless of comprehensive reflection upon nature and human life as a whole;\nmore of exact observation and less of anticipation and inspiration. Still,\nin the altered conditions of knowledge, the parallel is not wholly lost;\nand there may be a use in translating the conception of Plato into the\nlanguage of our own age. The philosopher in modern times is one who fixes\nhis mind on the laws of nature in their sequence and connexion, not on\nfragments or pictures of nature; on history, not on controversy; on the\ntruths which are acknowledged by the few, not on the opinions of the many.\nHe is aware of the importance of 'classifying according to nature,' and\nwill try to 'separate the limbs of science without breaking them' (Phaedr.\n265 E). There is no part of truth, whether great or small, which he will\ndishonour; and in the least things he will discern the greatest (Parmen.\n130 C). Like the ancient philosopher he sees the world pervaded by\nanalogies, but he can also tell 'why in some cases a single instance is\nsufficient for an induction' (Mill's Logic, 3, 3, 3), while in other cases\na thousand examples would prove nothing. He inquires into a portion of\nknowledge only, because the whole has grown too vast to be embraced by a\nsingle mind or life. He has a clearer conception of the divisions of\nscience and of their relation to the mind of man than was possible to the\nancients. Like Plato, he has a vision of the unity of knowledge, not as\nthe beginning of philosophy to be attained by a study of elementary\nmathematics, but as the far-off result of the working of many minds in\nmany ages. He is aware that mathematical studies are preliminary to almost\nevery other; at the same time, he will not reduce all varieties of\nknowledge to the type of mathematics. He too must have a nobility of\ncharacter, without which genius loses the better half of greatness.\nRegarding the world as a point in immensity, and each individual as a link\nin a never-ending chain of existence, he will not think much of his own\nlife, or be greatly afraid of death.\n\n{xc} Adeimantus objects first of all to the form of the Socratic\nreasoning, thus showing that Plato is aware of the imperfection of his own\nmethod. He brings the accusation against himself which might be brought\nagainst him by a modern logician--that he extracts the answer because he\nknows how to put the question. In a long argument words are apt to change\ntheir meaning slightly, or premises may be assumed or conclusions inferred\nwith rather too much certainty or universality; the variation at each step\nmay be unobserved, and yet at last the divergence becomes considerable.\nHence the failure of attempts to apply arithmetical or algebraic formulae\nto logic. The imperfection, or rather the higher and more elastic nature\nof language, does not allow words to have the precision of numbers or of\nsymbols. And this quality in language impairs the force of an argument\nwhich has many steps.\n\nThe objection, though fairly met by Socrates in this particular instance,\nmay be regarded as implying a reflection upon the Socratic mode of\nreasoning. And here, as as at p. 506 B, Plato seems to intimate that the\ntime had come when the negative and interrogative method of Socrates must\nbe superseded by a positive and constructive one, of which examples are\ngiven in some of the later dialogues. Adeimantus further argues that the\nideal is wholly at variance with facts; for experience proves philosophers\nto be either useless or rogues. Contrary to all expectation (cp. p. 497\nfor a similar surprise) Socrates has no hesitation in admitting the truth\nof this, and explains the anomaly in an allegory, first characteristically\ndepreciating his own inventive powers. In this allegory the people are\ndistinguished from the professional politicians, and, as elsewhere, are\nspoken of in a tone of pity rather than of censure under the image of 'the\nnoble captain who is not very quick in his perceptions.'\n\nThe uselessness of philosophers is explained by the circumstance that\nmankind will not use them. The world in all ages has been divided between\ncontempt and fear of those who employ the power of ideas and know no other\nweapons. Concerning the false philosopher, Socrates argues that the best\nis most liable to corruption; and that the finer nature is more likely to\nsuffer from alien conditions. We too observe that there are some kinds\n{xci} of excellence which spring from a peculiar delicacy of constitution;\nas is evidently true of the poetical and imaginative temperament, which\noften seems to depend on impressions, and hence can only breathe or live\nin a certain atmosphere. The man of genius has greater pains and greater\npleasures, greater powers and greater weaknesses, and often a greater play\nof character than is to be found in ordinary men. He can assume the\ndisguise of virtue or disinterestedness without having them, or veil\npersonal enmity in the language of patriotism and philosophy,--he can say\nthe word which all men are thinking, he has an insight which is terrible\ninto the follies and weaknesses of his fellow-men. An Alcibiades, a\nMirabeau, or a Napoleon the First, are born either to be the authors of\ngreat evils in states, or 'of great good, when they are drawn in that\ndirection.'\n\nYet the thesis, 'corruptio optimi pessima,' cannot be maintained generally\nor without regard to the kind of excellence which is corrupted. The alien\nconditions which are corrupting to one nature, may be the elements of\nculture to another. In general a man can only receive his highest\ndevelopment in a congenial state or family, among friends or\nfellow-workers. But also he may sometimes be stirred by adverse\ncircumstances to such a degree that he rises up against them and reforms\nthem. And while weaker or coarser characters will extract good out of\nevil, say in a corrupt state of the church or of society, and live on\nhappily, allowing the evil to remain, the finer or stronger natures may be\ncrushed or spoiled by surrounding influences--may become misanthrope and\nphilanthrope by turns; or in a few instances, like the founders of the\nmonastic orders, or the Reformers, owing to some peculiarity in themselves\nor in their age, may break away entirely from the world and from the\nchurch, sometimes into great good, sometimes into great evil, sometimes\ninto both. And the same holds in the lesser sphere of a convent, a school,\na family.\n\nPlato would have us consider how easily the best natures are overpowered\nby public opinion, and what efforts the rest of mankind will make to get\npossession of them. The world, the church, their own profession, any\npolitical or party organization, are always carrying them off their legs\nand teaching them to apply high and holy names to their own prejudices and\ninterests. {xcii} The 'monster' corporation to which they belong judges\nright and truth to be the pleasure of the community. The individual\nbecomes one with his order; or, if he resists, the world is too much for\nhim, and will sooner or later be revenged on him. This is, perhaps, a\none-sided but not wholly untrue picture of the maxims and practice of\nmankind when they 'sit down together at an assembly,' either in ancient or\nmodern times.\n\nWhen the higher natures are corrupted by politics, the lower take\npossession of the vacant place of philosophy. This is described in one of\nthose continuous images in which the argument, to use a Platonic\nexpression, 'veils herself,' and which is dropped and reappears at\nintervals. The question is asked,--Why are the citizens of states so\nhostile to philosophy? The answer is, that they do not know her. And yet\nthere is also a better mind of the many; they would believe if they were\ntaught. But hitherto they have only known a conventional imitation of\nphilosophy, words without thoughts, systems which have no life in them; a\n[divine] person uttering the words of beauty and freedom, the friend of\nman holding communion with the Eternal, and seeking to frame the state in\nthat image, they have never known. The same double feeling respecting the\nmass of mankind has always existed among men. The first thought is that\nthe people are the enemies of truth and right; the second, that this only\narises out of an accidental error and confusion, and that they do not\nreally hate those who love them, if they could be educated to know them.\n\nIn the latter part of the sixth book, three questions have to be\nconsidered: 1st, the nature of the longer and more circuitous way, which\nis contrasted with the shorter and more imperfect method of Book IV; 2nd,\nthe heavenly pattern or idea of the state; 3rd, the relation of the\ndivisions of knowledge to one another and to the corresponding faculties\nof the soul.\n\n1. Of the higher method of knowledge in Plato we have only a glimpse.\nNeither here nor in the Phaedrus or Symposium, nor yet in the Philebus or\nSophist, does he give any clear explanation of his meaning. He would\nprobably have described his method as proceeding by regular steps to a\nsystem of universal knowledge, which inferred the parts from the whole\nrather than the whole from the parts. This ideal logic is not practised by\nhim {xciii} in the search after justice, or in the analysis of the parts\nof the soul; there, like Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, he argues\nfrom experience and the common use of language. But at the end of the\nsixth book he conceives another and more perfect method, in which all\nideas are only steps or grades or moments of thought, forming a connected\nwhole which is self-supporting, and in which consistency is the test of\ntruth. He does not explain to us in detail the nature of the process. Like\nmany other thinkers both in ancient and modern times his mind seems to be\nfilled with a vacant form which he is unable to realize. He supposes the\nsciences to have a natural order and connexion in an age when they can\nhardly be said to exist. He is hastening on to the 'end of the\nintellectual world' without even making a beginning of them.\n\nIn modern times we hardly need to be reminded that the process of\nacquiring knowledge is here confused with the contemplation of absolute\nknowledge. In all science _a priori_ and _a posteriori_ truths mingle in\nvarious proportions. The _a priori_ part is that which is derived from the\nmost universal experience of men, or is universally accepted by them; the\n_a posteriori_ is that which grows up around the more general principles\nand becomes imperceptibly one with them. But Plato erroneously imagines\nthat the synthesis is separable from the analysis, and that the method of\nscience can anticipate science. In entertaining such a vision of _a\npriori_ knowledge he is sufficiently justified, or at least his meaning\nmay be sufficiently explained by the similar attempts of Descartes, Kant,\nHegel, and even of Bacon himself, in modern philosophy. Anticipations or\ndivinations, or prophetic glimpses of truths whether concerning man or\nnature, seem to stand in the same relation to ancient philosophy which\nhypotheses bear to modern inductive science. These 'guesses at truth' were\nnot made at random; they arose from a superficial impression of\nuniformities and first principles in nature which the genius of the Greek,\ncontemplating the expanse of heaven and earth, seemed to recognize in the\ndistance. Nor can we deny that in ancient times knowledge must have stood\nstill, and the human mind been deprived of the very instruments of\nthought, if philosophy had been strictly confined to the results of\nexperience.\n\n{xciv} 2. Plato supposes that when the tablet has been made blank the\nartist will fill in the lineaments of the ideal state. Is this a pattern\nlaid up in heaven, or mere vacancy on which he is supposed to gaze with\nwondering eye? The answer is, that such ideals are framed partly by the\nomission of particulars, partly by imagination perfecting the form which\nexperience supplies (Phaedo, 74). Plato represents these ideals in a\nfigure as belonging to another world; and in modern times the idea will\nsometimes seem to precede, at other times to co-operate with the hand of\nthe artist. As in science, so also in creative art, there is a synthetical\nas well as an analytical method. One man will have the whole in his mind\nbefore he begins; to another the processes of mind and hand will be\nsimultaneous.\n\n3. There is no difficulty in seeing that Plato's divisions of knowledge\nare based, first, on the fundamental antithesis of sensible and\nintellectual which pervades the whole pre-Socratic philosophy; in which is\nimplied also the opposition of the permanent and transient, of the\nuniversal and particular. But the age of philosophy in which he lived\nseemed to require a further distinction;--numbers and figures were\nbeginning to separate from ideas. The world could no longer regard justice\nas a cube, and was learning to see, though imperfectly, that the\nabstractions of sense were distinct from the abstractions of mind. Between\nthe Eleatic being or essence and the shadows of phenomena, the Pythagorean\nprinciple of number found a place, and was, as Aristotle remarks, a\nconducting medium from one to the other. Hence Plato is led to introduce a\nthird term which had not hitherto entered into the scheme of his\nphilosophy. He had observed the use of mathematics in education; they were\nthe best preparation for higher studies. The subjective relation between\nthem further suggested an objective one; although the passage from one to\nthe other is really imaginary (Metaph. 1, 6, 4). For metaphysical and\nmoral philosophy has no connexion with mathematics; number and figure are\nthe abstractions of time and space, not the expressions of purely\nintellectual conceptions. When divested of metaphor, a straight line or a\nsquare has no more to do with right and justice than a crooked line with\nvice. The figurative association was mistaken for a real one; and thus the\nthree latter divisions of the Platonic proportion were constructed.\n\n{xcv} There is more difficulty in comprehending how he arrived at the\nfirst term of the series, which is nowhere else mentioned, and has no\nreference to any other part of his system. Nor indeed does the relation of\nshadows to objects correspond to the relation of numbers to ideas.\nProbably Plato has been led by the love of analogy (Timaeus, p. 32 B) to\nmake four terms instead of three, although the objects perceived in both\ndivisions of the lower sphere are equally objects of sense. He is also\npreparing the way, as his manner is, for the shadows of images at the\nbeginning of the seventh book, and the imitation of an imitation in the\ntenth. The line may be regarded as reaching from unity to infinity, and is\ndivided into two unequal parts, and subdivided into two more; each lower\nsphere is the multiplication of the preceding. Of the four faculties,\nfaith in the lower division has an intermediate position (cp. for the use\nof the word faith or belief, [Greek: pi/stis], Timaeus, 29 C, 37 B),\ncontrasting equally with the vagueness of the perception of shadows\n([Greek: ei)kasi/a]) and the higher certainty of understanding ([Greek:\ndia/noia]) and reason ([Greek: nou=s]).\n\nThe difference between understanding and mind or reason ([Greek: nou=s])\nis analogous to the difference between acquiring knowledge in the parts\nand the contemplation of the whole. True knowledge is a whole, and is at\nrest; consistency and universality are the tests of truth. To this\nself-evidencing knowledge of the whole the faculty of mind is supposed to\ncorrespond. But there is a knowledge of the understanding which is\nincomplete and in motion always, because unable to rest in the subordinate\nideas. Those ideas are called both images and hypotheses--images because\nthey are clothed in sense, hypotheses because they are assumptions only,\nuntil they are brought into connexion with the idea of good.\n\nThe general meaning of the passage 508-511, so far as the thought\ncontained in it admits of being translated into the terms of modern\nphilosophy, may be described or explained as follows:--There is a truth,\none and self-existent, to which by the help of a ladder let down from\nabove, the human intelligence may ascend. This unity is like the sun in\nthe heavens, the light by which all things are seen, the being by which\nthey are created and sustained. It is the _idea_ of good. And the steps of\nthe ladder leading up to this highest or universal existence are the\nmathematical {xcvi} sciences, which also contain in themselves an element\nof the universal. These, too, we see in a new manner when we connect them\nwith the idea of good. They then cease to be hypotheses or pictures, and\nbecome essential parts of a higher truth which is at once their first\nprinciple and their final cause.\n\nWe cannot give any more precise meaning to this remarkable passage, but we\nmay trace in it several rudiments or vestiges of thought which are common\nto us and to Plato: such as (1) the unity and correlation of the sciences,\nor rather of science, for in Plato's time they were not yet parted off or\ndistinguished; (2) the existence of a Divine Power, or life or idea or\ncause or reason, not yet conceived or no longer conceived as in the\nTimaeus and elsewhere under the form of a person; (3) the recognition of\nthe hypothetical and conditional character of the mathematical sciences,\nand in a measure of every science when isolated from the rest; (4) the\nconviction of a truth which is invisible, and of a law, though hardly a\nlaw of nature, which permeates the intellectual rather than the visible\nworld.\n\nThe method of Socrates is hesitating and tentative, awaiting the fuller\nexplanation of the idea of good, and of the nature of dialectic in the\nseventh book. The imperfect intelligence of Glaucon, and the reluctance of\nSocrates to make a beginning, mark the difficulty of the subject. The\nallusion to Theages' bridle, and to the internal oracle, or demonic sign,\nof Socrates, which here, as always in Plato, is only prohibitory; the\nremark that the salvation of any remnant of good in the present evil state\nof the world is due to God only; the reference to a future state of\nexistence, 498 D, which is unknown to Glaucon in the tenth book, 608 D,\nand in which the discussions of Socrates and his disciples would be\nresumed; the surprise in the answers at 487 E and 497 B; the fanciful\nirony of Socrates, where he pretends that he can only describe the strange\nposition of the philosopher in a figure of speech; the original\nobservation that the Sophists, after all, are only the representatives and\nnot the leaders of public opinion; the picture of the philosopher standing\naside in the shower of sleet under a wall; the figure of 'the great beast'\nfollowed by the expression of good-will towards the common people who\nwould not have rejected the philosopher if they had known him; the 'right\nnoble thought' that the highest {xcvii} truths demand the greatest\nexactness; the hesitation of Socrates in returning once more to his\nwell-worn theme of the idea of good; the ludicrous earnestness of Glaucon;\nthe comparison of philosophy to a deserted maiden who marries beneath\nher--are some of the most interesting characteristics of the sixth book.\n\nYet a few more words may be added, on the old theme, which was so oft\ndiscussed in the Socratic circle, of which we, like Glaucon and\nAdeimantus, would fain, if possible, have a clearer notion. Like them, we\nare dissatisfied when we are told that the idea of good can only be\nrevealed to a student of the mathematical sciences, and we are inclined to\nthink that neither we nor they could have been led along that path to any\nsatisfactory goal. For we have learned that differences of quantity cannot\npass into differences of quality, and that the mathematical sciences can\nnever rise above themselves into the sphere of our higher thoughts,\nalthough they may sometimes furnish symbols and expressions of them, and\nmay train the mind in habits of abstraction and self-concentration. The\nillusion which was natural to an ancient philosopher has ceased to be an\nillusion to us. But if the process by which we are supposed to arrive at\nthe idea of good be really imaginary, may not the idea itself be also a\nmere abstraction? We remark, first, that in all ages, and especially in\nprimitive philosophy, words such as being, essence, unity, good, have\nexerted an extraordinary influence over the minds of men. The meagreness\nor negativeness of their content has been in an inverse ratio to their\npower. They have become the forms under which all things were\ncomprehended. There was a need or instinct in the human soul which they\nsatisfied; they were not ideas, but gods, and to this new mythology the\nmen of a later generation began to attach the powers and associations of\nthe elder deities.\n\nThe idea of good is one of those sacred words or forms of thought, which\nwere beginning to take the place of the old mythology. It meant unity, in\nwhich all time and all existence were gathered up. It was the truth of all\nthings, and also the light in which they shone forth, and became evident\nto intelligences human and divine. It was the cause of all things, the\npower by which they were brought into being. It was the universal reason\ndivested of a human personality. It was the life as well as the {xcviii}\nlight of the world, all knowledge and all power were comprehended in it.\nThe way to it was through the mathematical sciences, and these too were\ndependent on it. To ask whether God was the maker of it, or made by it,\nwould be like asking whether God could be conceived apart from goodness,\nor goodness apart from God. The God of the Timaeus is not really at\nvariance with the idea of good; they are aspects of the same, differing\nonly as the personal from the impersonal, or the masculine from the\nneuter, the one being the expression or language of mythology, the other\nof philosophy.\n\nThis, or something like this, is the meaning of the idea of good as\nconceived by Plato. Ideas of number, order, harmony, development may also\nbe said to enter into it. The paraphrase which has just been given of it\ngoes beyond the actual words of Plato. We have perhaps arrived at the\nstage of philosophy which enables us to understand what he is aiming at,\nbetter than he did himself. We are beginning to realize what he saw darkly\nand at a distance. But if he could have been told that this, or some\nconception of the same kind, but higher than this, was the truth at which\nhe was aiming, and the need which he sought to supply, he would gladly\nhave recognized that more was contained in his own thoughts than he\nhimself knew. As his words are few and his manner reticent and tentative,\nso must the style of his interpreter be. We should not approach his\nmeaning more nearly by attempting to define it further. In translating him\ninto the language of modern thought, we might insensibly lose the spirit\nof ancient philosophy. It is remarkable that although Plato speaks of the\nidea of good as the first principle of truth and being, it is nowhere\nmentioned in his writings except in this passage. Nor did it retain any\nhold upon the minds of his disciples in a later generation; it was\nprobably unintelligible to them. Nor does the mention of it in Aristotle\nappear to have any reference to this or any other passage in his extant\nwritings.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic VII._ Analysis.]\n\nBOOK VII. *514* And now I will describe in a figure the enlightenment or\nunenlightenment of our nature:--Imagine human beings living in an\nunderground den which is open towards the light; they have been there from\nchildhood, having their necks and legs chained, and can only see into the\nden. {xcix} At a distance there is a fire, and between the fire and the\nprisoners a raised way, and a low wall is built along the way, like the\nscreen over which marionette players show their puppets. *515* Behind the\nwall appear moving figures, who hold in their hands various works of art,\nand among them images of men and animals, wood and stone, and some of the\npassers-by are talking and others silent. 'A strange parable,' he said,\n'and strange captives.' They are ourselves, I replied; and they see only\nthe shadows of the images which the fire throws on the wall of the den; to\nthese they give names, and if we add an echo which returns from the wall,\nthe voices of the passengers will seem to proceed from the shadows.\nSuppose now that you suddenly turn them round and make them look with pain\nand grief to themselves at the real images; will they believe them to be\nreal? Will not their eyes be dazzled, and will they not try to get away\nfrom the light to something which they are able to behold without\nblinking? *516* And suppose further, that they are dragged up a steep and\nrugged ascent into the presence of the sun himself, will not their sight\nbe darkened with the excess of light? Some time will pass before they get\nthe habit of perceiving at all; and at first they will be able to perceive\nonly shadows and reflections in the water; then they will recognize the\nmoon and the stars, and will at length behold the sun in his own proper\nplace as he is. Last of all they will conclude:--This is he who gives us\nthe year and the seasons, and is the author of all that we see. How will\nthey rejoice in passing from darkness to light! How worthless to them will\nseem the honours and glories of the den! But now imagine further, that\nthey descend into their old habitations;--in that underground dwelling\nthey will not see as well as their fellows, *517* and will not be able to\ncompete with them in the measurement of the shadows on the wall; there\nwill be many jokes about the man who went on a visit to the sun and lost\nhis eyes, and if they find anybody trying to set free and enlighten one of\ntheir number, they will put him to death, if they can catch him. Now the\ncave or den is the world of sight, the fire is the sun, the way upwards is\nthe way to knowledge, and in the world of knowledge the idea of good is\nlast seen and with difficulty, but when seen is inferred to be the author\nof good and right--parent of the lord of light in this world, and of truth\nand understanding in the other. {c} He who attains to the beatific vision\nis always going upwards; he is unwilling to descend into political\nassemblies and courts of law; for his eyes are apt to blink at the images\nor shadows of images which they behold in them--he cannot enter into the\nideas of those who have never in their lives understood the relation of\nthe shadow to the substance. *518* But blindness is of two kinds, and may\nbe caused either by passing out of darkness into light or out of light\ninto darkness, and a man of sense will distinguish between them, and will\nnot laugh equally at both of them, but the blindness which arises from\nfulness of light he will deem blessed, and pity the other; or if he laugh\nat the puzzled soul looking at the sun, he will have more reason to laugh\nthan the inhabitants of the den at those who descend from above. There is\na further lesson taught by this parable of ours. Some persons fancy that\ninstruction is like giving eyes to the blind, but we say that the faculty\nof sight was always there, and that the soul only requires to be turned\nround towards the light. And this is conversion; other virtues are almost\nlike bodily habits, and may be acquired in the same manner, but\nintelligence has a diviner life, and is indestructible, turning either to\ngood or evil according to the direction given. *519* Did you never observe\nhow the mind of a clever rogue peers out of his eyes, and the more clearly\nhe sees, the more evil he does? Now if you take such an one, and cut away\nfrom him those leaden weights of pleasure and desire which bind his soul\nto earth, his intelligence will be turned round, and he will behold the\ntruth as clearly as he now discerns his meaner ends. And have we not\ndecided that our rulers must neither be so uneducated as to have no fixed\nrule of life, nor so over-educated as to be unwilling to leave their\nparadise for the business of the world? We must choose out therefore the\nnatures who are most likely to ascend to the light and knowledge of the\ngood; but we must not allow them to remain in the region of light; they\nmust be forced down again among the captives in the den to partake of\ntheir labours and honours. 'Will they not think this a hardship?' You\nshould remember that our purpose in framing the State was not that our\ncitizens should do what they like, but that they should serve the State\nfor the common good of all. *520* May we not fairly say to our\nphilosopher,--Friend, we do you no wrong; for in other {ci} States\nphilosophy grows wild, and a wild plant owes nothing to the gardener, but\nyou have been trained by us to be the rulers and kings of our hive, and\ntherefore we must insist on your descending into the den. You must, each\nof you, take your turn, and become able to use your eyes in the dark, and\nwith a little practice you will see far better than those who quarrel\nabout the shadows, whose knowledge is a dream only, whilst yours is a\nwaking reality. It may be that the saint or philosopher who is best\nfitted, may also be the least inclined to rule, but necessity is laid upon\nhim, and he must no longer live in the heaven of ideas. *521* And this\nwill be the salvation of the State. For those who rule must not be those\nwho are desirous to rule; and, if you can offer to our citizens a better\nlife than that of rulers generally is, there will be a chance that the\nrich, not only in this world's goods, but in virtue and wisdom, may bear\nrule. And the only life which is better than the life of political\nambition is that of philosophy, which is also the best preparation for the\ngovernment of a State.\n\nThen now comes the question,--How shall we create our rulers; what way is\nthere from darkness to light? The change is effected by philosophy; it is\nnot the turning over of an oyster-shell, but the conversion of a soul from\nnight to day, from becoming to being. And what training will draw the soul\nupwards? Our former education had two branches, gymnastic, which was\noccupied with the body, and music, the sister art, which infused *522* a\nnatural harmony into mind and literature; but neither of these sciences\ngave any promise of doing what we want. Nothing remains to us but that\nuniversal or primary science of which all the arts and sciences are\npartakers, I mean number or calculation. 'Very true.' Including the art of\nwar? 'Yes, certainly.' Then there is something ludicrous about Palamedes\nin the tragedy, coming in and saying that he had invented number, and had\ncounted the ranks and set them in order. For if Agamemnon could not count\nhis feet (and without number how could he?) he must have been a pretty\nsort of general indeed. No man should be a soldier who cannot count, and\nindeed he is hardly to be called a man. But I am not speaking of these\npractical applications of arithmetic, *523* for number, in my view, is\nrather to be regarded as a conductor to thought and being. I will explain\n{cii} what I mean by the last expression:--Things sensible are of two\nkinds; the one class invite or stimulate the mind, while in the other the\nmind acquiesces. Now the stimulating class are the things which suggest\ncontrast and relation. For example, suppose that I hold up to the eyes\nthree fingers--a fore finger, a middle finger, a little finger--the sight\nequally recognizes all three fingers, but without number cannot further\ndistinguish them. Or again, suppose two objects to be relatively great and\nsmall, these ideas of greatness and smallness are supplied not by the\nsense, but by the mind. *524* And the perception of their contrast or\nrelation quickens and sets in motion the mind, which is puzzled by the\nconfused intimations of sense, and has recourse to number in order to find\nout whether the things indicated are one or more than one. Number replies\nthat they are two and not one, and are to be distinguished from one\nanother. Again, the sight beholds great and small, but only in a confused\nchaos, and not until they are distinguished does the question arise of\ntheir respective natures; we are thus led on to the distinction between\nthe visible and intelligible. That was what I meant when I spoke of\nstimulants to the intellect; I was thinking of the contradictions which\narise in perception. The idea of unity, for example, like that of a\nfinger, does not arouse thought unless involving some conception of\nplurality; *525* but when the one is also the opposite of one, the\ncontradiction gives rise to reflection; an example of this is afforded by\nany object of sight. All number has also an elevating effect; it raises\nthe mind out of the foam and flux of generation to the contemplation of\nbeing, having lesser military and retail uses also. The retail use is not\nrequired by us; but as our guardian is to be a soldier as well as a\nphilosopher, the military one may be retained. And to our higher purpose\nno science can be better adapted; but it must be pursued in the spirit of\na philosopher, not of a shopkeeper. It is concerned, not with visible\nobjects, but with abstract truth; for numbers are pure abstractions--the\ntrue arithmetician indignantly denies that his unit is capable of\ndivision. *526* When you divide, he insists that you are only multiplying;\nhis 'one' is not material or resolvable into fractions, but an unvarying\nand absolute equality; and this proves the purely intellectual character\nof his study. Note also the great power which arithmetic has of sharpening\nthe wits; no other discipline is equally {ciii} severe, or an equal test\nof general ability, or equally improving to a stupid person.\n\nLet our second branch of education be geometry. 'I can easily see,'\nreplied Glaucon, 'that the skill of the general will be doubled by his\nknowledge of geometry.' That is a small matter; the use of geometry, to\nwhich I refer, is the assistance given by it in the contemplation of the\nidea of good, and the compelling the mind to look at true being, and not\nat generation only. Yet the present mode of pursuing these studies, as any\none who is the least of a mathematician is aware, is mean and ridiculous;\nthey are made to look downwards to the arts, and not upwards to eternal\nexistence. *527* The geometer is always talking of squaring, subtending,\napposing, as if he had in view action; whereas knowledge is the real\nobject of the study. It should elevate the soul, and create the mind of\nphilosophy; it should raise up what has fallen down, not to speak of\nlesser uses in war and military tactics, and in the improvement of the\nfaculties.\n\nShall we propose, as a third branch of our education, astronomy? 'Very\ngood,' replied Glaucon; 'the knowledge of the heavens is necessary at once\nfor husbandry, navigation, military tactics.' I like your way of giving\nuseful reasons for everything in order to make friends of the world. And\nthere is a difficulty in proving to mankind that education is not only\nuseful information but a purification of the eye of the soul, which is\nbetter than the bodily eye, for by this alone is truth seen. *528* Now,\nwill you appeal to mankind in general or to the philosopher? or would you\nprefer to look to yourself only? 'Every man is his own best friend.' Then\ntake a step backward, for we are out of order, and insert the third\ndimension which is of solids, after the second which is of planes, and\nthen you may proceed to solids in motion. But solid geometry is not\npopular and has not the patronage of the State, nor is the use of it fully\nrecognized; the difficulty is great, and the votaries of the study are\nconceited and impatient. Still the charm of the pursuit wins upon men,\nand, if government would lend a little assistance, there might be great\nprogress made. 'Very true,' replied Glaucon; 'but do I understand you now\nto begin with plane geometry, and to place next geometry of solids, and\nthirdly, astronomy, or the motion of solids?' Yes, I said; my hastiness\nhas only hindered us.\n\n{civ} 'Very good, and now let us proceed to astronomy, about which I am\nwilling to speak in your lofty strain. *529* No one can fail to see that\nthe contemplation of the heavens draws the soul upwards.' I am an\nexception, then; astronomy as studied at present appears to me to draw the\nsoul not upwards, but downwards. Star-gazing is just looking up at the\nceiling--no better; a man may lie on his back on land or on water--he may\nlook up or look down, but there is no science in that. The vision of\nknowledge of which I speak is seen not with the eyes, but with the mind.\nAll the magnificence of the heavens is but the embroidery of a copy which\nfalls far short of the divine Original, and teaches nothing about the\nabsolute harmonies or motions of things. Their beauty is like the beauty\nof figures drawn by the hand of Daedalus or any other great artist, which\nmay be used for illustration, *530* but no mathematician would seek to\nobtain from them true conceptions of equality or numerical relations. How\nridiculous then to look for these in the map of the heavens, in which the\nimperfection of matter comes in everywhere as a disturbing element,\nmarring the symmetry of day and night, of months and years, of the sun and\nstars in their courses. Only by problems can we place astronomy on a truly\nscientific basis. Let the heavens alone, and exert the intellect.\n\nStill, mathematics admit of other applications, as the Pythagoreans say,\nand we agree. There is a sister science of harmonical motion, adapted to\nthe ear as astronomy is to the eye, and there may be other applications\nalso. Let us inquire of the Pythagoreans about them, not forgetting that\nwe have an aim higher than theirs, which is the relation of these sciences\nto the idea of good. The error which pervades astronomy also pervades\nharmonics. *531* The musicians put their ears in the place of their minds.\n'Yes,' replied Glaucon, 'I like to see them laying their ears alongside of\ntheir neighbours' faces--some saying, \"That's a new note,\" others\ndeclaring that the two notes are the same.' Yes, I said; but you mean the\nempirics who are always twisting and torturing the strings of the lyre,\nand quarrelling about the tempers of the strings; I am referring rather to\nthe Pythagorean harmonists, who are almost equally in error. For they\ninvestigate only the numbers of the consonances which are heard, and\nascend no higher,--of the true numerical harmony which is unheard, and is\nonly to be found in problems, they have not even a conception. {cv} 'That\nlast,' he said, 'must be a marvellous thing.' A thing, I replied, which is\nonly useful if pursued with a view to the good.\n\nAll these sciences are the prelude of the strain, and are profitable if\nthey are regarded in their natural relations to one another. 'I dare say,\nSocrates,' said Glaucon; 'but such a study will be an endless business.'\nWhat study do you mean--of the prelude, or what? For all these things are\nonly the prelude, and you surely do not suppose that a mere mathematician\nis also a dialectician? 'Certainly not. *532* I have hardly ever known a\nmathematician who could reason.' And yet, Glaucon, is not true reasoning\nthat hymn of dialectic which is the music of the intellectual world, and\nwhich was by us compared to the effort of sight, when from beholding the\nshadows on the wall we arrived at last at the images which gave the\nshadows? Even so the dialectical faculty withdrawing from sense arrives by\nthe pure intellect at the contemplation of the idea of good, and never\nrests but at the very end of the intellectual world. And the royal road\nout of the cave into the light, and the blinking of the eyes at the sun\nand turning to contemplate the shadows of reality, not the shadows of an\nimage only--this progress and gradual acquisition of a new faculty of\nsight by the help of the mathematical sciences, is the elevation of the\nsoul to the contemplation of the highest ideal of being.\n\n'So far, I agree with you. But now, leaving the prelude, let us proceed to\nthe hymn. What, then, is the nature of dialectic, and what are the paths\nwhich lead thither?' *533* Dear Glaucon, you cannot follow me here. There\ncan be no revelation of the absolute truth to one who has not been\ndisciplined in the previous sciences. But that there is a science of\nabsolute truth, which is attained in some way very different from those\nnow practised, I am confident. For all other arts or sciences are relative\nto human needs and opinions; and the mathematical sciences are but a dream\nor hypothesis of true being, and never analyse their own principles.\nDialectic alone rises to the principle which is above hypotheses,\nconverting and gently leading the eye of the soul out of the barbarous\nslough of ignorance into the light of the upper world, with the help of\nthe sciences which we have been describing--sciences, as they are often\ntermed, although they require some other name, implying greater clearness\nthan opinion and less clearness than science, and this in our previous\nsketch {cvi} was understanding. And so we get four names--two for\nintellect, and two for opinion,--reason or mind, understanding, faith,\nperception of shadows-- *534* which make a proportion--being : becoming ::\nintellect : opinion--and science : belief :: understanding: perception of\nshadows. Dialectic may be further described as that science which defines\nand explains the essence or being of each nature, which distinguishes and\nabstracts the good, and is ready to do battle against all opponents in the\ncause of good. To him who is not a dialectician life is but a sleepy dream;\nand many a man is in his grave before his is well waked up. And would you\nhave the future rulers of your ideal State intelligent beings, or stupid\nas posts? 'Certainly not the latter.' Then you must train them in\ndialectic, which will teach them to ask and answer questions, and is the\ncoping-stone of the sciences.\n\n*535* I dare say that you have not forgotten how our rulers were chosen;\nand the process of selection may be carried a step further:--As before,\nthey must be constant and valiant, good-looking, and of noble manners, but\nnow they must also have natural ability which education will improve; that\nis to say, they must be quick at learning, capable of mental toil,\nretentive, solid, diligent natures, who combine intellectual with moral\nvirtues; not lame and one-sided, diligent in bodily exercise and indolent\nin mind, or conversely; not a maimed soul, which hates falsehood and yet\n*536* unintentionally is always wallowing in the mire of ignorance; not a\nbastard or feeble person, but sound in wind and limb, and in perfect\ncondition for the great gymnastic trial of the mind. Justice herself can\nfind no fault with natures such as these; and they will be the saviours of\nour State; disciples of another sort would only make philosophy more\nridiculous than she is at present. Forgive my enthusiasm; I am becoming\nexcited; but when I see her trampled underfoot, I am angry at the authors\nof her disgrace. 'I did not notice that you were more excited than you\nought to have been.' But I felt that I was. Now do not let us forget\nanother point in the selection of our disciples--that they must be young\nand not old. For Solon is mistaken in saying that an old man can be always\nlearning; youth is the time of study, and here we must remember that the\nmind is free and dainty, and, unlike the body, must not be made to work\nagainst the grain. *537* Learning should be at first a sort of play, in\nwhich the natural bent is {cvii} detected. As in training them for war,\nthe young dogs should at first only taste blood; but when the necessary\ngymnastics are over which during two or three years divide life between\nsleep and bodily exercise, then the education of the soul will become a\nmore serious matter. At twenty years of age, a selection must be made of\nthe more promising disciples, with whom a new epoch of education will\nbegin. The sciences which they have hitherto learned in fragments will now\nbe brought into relation with each other and with true being; for the\npower of combining them is the test of speculative and dialectical\nability. And afterwards at thirty a further selection shall be made of\nthose who are able to withdraw from the world of sense into the\nabstraction of ideas. But at this point, judging from present experience,\nthere is a danger that dialectic may be the source of many evils. The\ndanger may be illustrated by a parallel case:--Imagine a person who has\nbeen brought up in wealth and luxury amid a crowd of flatterers, and who\nis suddenly informed that he is a supposititious son. *538* He has\nhitherto honoured his reputed parents and disregarded the flatterers, and\nnow he does the reverse. This is just what happens with a man's\nprinciples. There are certain doctrines which he learnt at home and which\nexercised a parental authority over him. Presently he finds that\nimputations are cast upon them; a troublesome querist comes and asks,\n'What is the just and good?' or proves that virtue is vice and vice\nvirtue, and his mind becomes unsettled, and he ceases to love, honour, and\nobey them as he has hitherto done. *539* He is seduced into the life of\npleasure, and becomes a lawless person and a rogue. The case of such\nspeculators is very pitiable, and, in order that our thirty years' old\npupils may not require this pity, let us take every possible care that\nyoung persons do not study philosophy too early. For a young man is a sort\nof puppy who only plays with an argument; and is reasoned into and out of\nhis opinions every day; he soon begins to believe nothing, and brings\nhimself and philosophy into discredit. A man of thirty does not run on in\nthis way; he will argue and not merely contradict, and adds new honour to\nphilosophy by the sobriety of his conduct. What time shall we allow for\nthis second gymnastic training of the soul?--say, twice the time required\nfor the gymnastics of the body; six, or perhaps five years, to commence at\nthirty, and then for fifteen {cviii} years let the student go down into\nthe den, and command armies, and gain experience of life. *540* At fifty\nlet him return to the end of all things, and have his eyes uplifted to the\nidea of good, and order his life after that pattern; if necessary, taking\nhis turn at the helm of State, and training up others to be his\nsuccessors. When his time comes he shall depart in peace to the islands of\nthe blest. He shall be honoured with sacrifices, and receive such worship\nas the Pythian oracle approves.\n\n'You are a statuary, Socrates, and have made a perfect image of our\ngovernors.' Yes, and of our governesses, for the women will share in all\nthings with the men. And you will admit that our State is not a mere\naspiration, but may really come into being when there shall arise\nphilosopher-kings, one or more, who will despise earthly vanities, and\nwill be the servants of justice only. 'And how will they begin their\nwork?' *541* Their first act will be to send away into the country all\nthose who are more than ten years of age, and to proceed with those who\nare left....\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic VII._ Introduction.]\n\nAt the commencement of the sixth book, Plato anticipated his explanation\nof the relation of the philosopher to the world in an allegory, in this,\nas in other passages, following the order which he prescribes in\neducation, and proceeding from the concrete to the abstract. At the\ncommencement of Book VII, under the figure of a cave having an opening\ntowards a fire and a way upwards to the true light, he returns to view the\ndivisions of knowledge, exhibiting familiarly, as in a picture, the result\nwhich had been hardly won by a great effort of thought in the previous\ndiscussion; at the same time casting a glance onward at the dialectical\nprocess, which is represented by the way leading from darkness to light.\nThe shadows, the images, the reflection of the sun and stars in the water,\nthe stars and sun themselves, severally correspond,--the first, to the\nrealm of fancy and poetry,--the second, to the world of sense,--the third,\nto the abstractions or universals of sense, of which the mathematical\nsciences furnish the type,--the fourth and last to the same abstractions,\nwhen seen in the unity of the idea, from which they derive a new meaning\nand power. The true dialectical process begins with the contemplation of\nthe real stars, and not mere reflections of them, {cix} and ends with the\nrecognition of the sun, or idea of good, as the parent not only of light\nbut of warmth and growth. To the divisions of knowledge the stages of\neducation partly answer:--first, there is the early education of childhood\nand youth in the fancies of the poets, and in the laws and customs of the\nState;--then there is the training of the body to be a warrior athlete,\nand a good servant of the mind;--and thirdly, after an interval follows\nthe education of later life, which begins with mathematics and proceeds to\nphilosophy in general.\n\nThere seem to be two great aims in the philosophy of Plato,--first, to\nrealize abstractions; secondly, to connect them. According to him, the\ntrue education is that which draws men from becoming to being, and to a\ncomprehensive survey of all being. He desires to develop in the human mind\nthe faculty of seeing the universal in all things; until at last the\nparticulars of sense drop away and the universal alone remains. He then\nseeks to combine the universals which he has disengaged from sense, not\nperceiving that the correlation of them has no other basis but the common\nuse of language. He never understands that abstractions, as Hegel says,\nare 'mere abstractions'--of use when employed in the arrangement of facts,\nbut adding nothing to the sum of knowledge when pursued apart from them,\nor with reference to an imaginary idea of good. Still the exercise of the\nfaculty of abstraction apart from facts has enlarged the mind, and played\na great part in the education of the human race. Plato appreciated the\nvalue of this faculty, and saw that it might be quickened by the study of\nnumber and relation. All things in which there is opposition or proportion\nare suggestive of reflection. The mere impression of sense evokes no power\nof thought or of mind, but when sensible objects ask to be compared and\ndistinguished, then philosophy begins. The science of arithmetic first\nsuggests such distinctions. There follow in order the other sciences of\nplain and solid geometry, and of solids in motion, one branch of which is\nastronomy or the harmony of the spheres,--to this is appended the sister\nscience of the harmony of sounds. Plato seems also to hint at the\npossibility of other applications of arithmetical or mathematical\nproportions, such as we employ in chemistry and natural philosophy, such\nas the Pythagoreans and even Aristotle make use of in Ethics {cx} and\nPolitics, e.g. his distinction between arithmetical and geometrical\nproportion in the Ethics (Book V), or between numerical and proportional\nequality in the Politics (iii. 8, iv. 12, &c.).\n\nThe modern mathematician will readily sympathise with Plato's delight in\nthe properties of pure mathematics. He will not be disinclined to say with\nhim:--Let alone the heavens, and study the beauties of number and figure\nin themselves. He too will be apt to depreciate their application to the\narts. He will observe that Plato has a conception of geometry, in which\nfigures are to be dispensed with; thus in a distant and shadowy way\nseeming to anticipate the possibility of working geometrical problems by a\nmore general mode of analysis. He will remark with interest on the\nbackward state of solid geometry, which, alas! was not encouraged by the\naid of the State in the age of Plato; and he will recognize the grasp of\nPlato's mind in his ability to conceive of one science of solids in motion\nincluding the earth as well as the heavens,--not forgetting to notice the\nintimation to which allusion has been already made, that besides astronomy\nand harmonics the science of solids in motion may have other applications.\nStill more will he be struck with the comprehensiveness of view which led\nPlato, at a time when these sciences hardly existed, to say that they must\nbe studied in relation to one another, and to the idea of good, or common\nprinciple of truth and being. But he will also see (and perhaps without\nsurprise) that in that stage of physical and mathematical knowledge, Plato\nhas fallen into the error of supposing that he can construct the heavens\n_a priori_ by mathematical problems, and determine the principles of\nharmony irrespective of the adaptation of sounds to the human ear. The\nillusion was a natural one in that age and country. The simplicity and\ncertainty of astronomy and harmonics seemed to contrast with the variation\nand complexity of the world of sense; hence the circumstance that there\nwas some elementary basis of fact, some measurement of distance or time or\nvibrations on which they must ultimately rest, was overlooked by him. The\nmodern predecessors of Newton fell into errors equally great; and Plato\ncan hardly be said to have been very far wrong, or may even claim a sort\nof prophetic insight into the subject, when we consider that the greater\npart of astronomy at the present day consists of abstract dynamics, {cxi}\nby the help of which most astronomical discoveries have been made.\n\nThe metaphysical philosopher from his point of view recognizes mathematics\nas an instrument of education,--which strengthens the power of attention,\ndevelopes the sense of order and the faculty of construction, and enables\nthe mind to grasp under simple formulae the quantitative differences of\nphysical phenomena. But while acknowledging their value in education, he\nsees also that they have no connexion with our higher moral and\nintellectual ideas. In the attempt which Plato makes to connect them, we\neasily trace the influences of ancient Pythagorean notions. There is no\nreason to suppose that he is speaking of the ideal numbers at p. 525 E;\nbut he is describing numbers which are pure abstractions, to which he\nassigns a real and separate existence, which, as 'the teachers of the art'\n(meaning probably the Pythagoreans) would have affirmed, repel all\nattempts at subdivision, and in which unity and every other number are\nconceived of as absolute. The truth and certainty of numbers, when thus\ndisengaged from phenomena, gave them a kind of sacredness in the eyes of\nan ancient philosopher. Nor is it easy to say how far ideas of order and\nfixedness may have had a moral and elevating influence on the minds of\nmen, 'who,' in the words of the Timaeus, 'might learn to regulate their\nerring lives according to them' (47 C). It is worthy of remark that the\nold Pythagorean ethical symbols still exist as figures of speech among\nourselves. And those who in modern times see the world pervaded by\nuniversal law, may also see an anticipation of this last word of modern\nphilosophy in the Platonic idea of good, which is the source and measure\nof all things, and yet only an abstraction. (Cp. Philebus sub fin.).\n\nTwo passages seem to require more particular explanations. First, that\nwhich relates to the analysis of vision. The difficulty in this passage\nmay be explained, like many others, from differences in the modes of\nconception prevailing among ancient and modern thinkers. To us, the\nperceptions of sense are inseparable from the act of the mind which\naccompanies them. The consciousness of form, colour, distance, is\nindistinguishable from the simple sensation, which is the medium of them.\nWhereas to Plato sense is the Heraclitean flux of sense, not {cxii} the\nvision of objects in the order in which they actually present themselves\nto the experienced sight, but as they may be imagined to appear confused\nand blurred to the half-awakened eye of the infant. The first action of\nthe mind is aroused by the attempt to set in order this chaos, and the\nreason is required to frame distinct conceptions under which the confused\nimpressions of sense may be arranged. Hence arises the question, 'What is\ngreat, what is small?' and thus begins the distinction of the visible and\nthe intelligible.\n\nThe second difficulty relates to Plato's conception of harmonics. Three\nclasses of harmonists are distinguished by him:--first, the Pythagoreans,\nwhom he proposes to consult as in the previous discussion on music he was\nto consult Damon--they are acknowledged to be masters in the art, but are\naltogether deficient in the knowledge of its higher import and relation to\nthe good; secondly, the mere empirics, whom Glaucon appears to confuse\nwith them, and whom both he and Socrates ludicrously describe as\nexperimenting by mere auscultation on the intervals of sounds. Both of\nthese fall short in different degrees of the Platonic idea of harmony,\nwhich must be studied in a purely abstract way, first by the method of\nproblems, and secondly as a part of universal knowledge in relation to the\nidea of good.\n\nThe allegory has a political as well as a philosophical meaning. The den\nor cave represents the narrow sphere of politics or law (cp. the\ndescription of the philosopher and lawyer in the Theaetetus, 172-176), and\nthe light of the eternal ideas is supposed to exercise a disturbing\ninfluence on the minds of those who return to this lower world. In other\nwords, their principles are too wide for practical application; they are\nlooking far away into the past and future, when their business is with the\npresent. The ideal is not easily reduced to the conditions of actual life,\nand may often be at variance with them. And at first, those who return are\nunable to compete with the inhabitants of the den in the measurement of\nthe shadows, and are derided and persecuted by them; but after a while\nthey see the things below in far truer proportions than those who have\nnever ascended into the upper world. The difference between the politician\nturned into a philosopher and the philosopher turned into a politician, is\nsymbolized by the two kinds of disordered eyesight, {cxiii} the one which\nis experienced by the captive who is transferred from darkness to day, the\nother, of the heavenly messenger who voluntarily for the good of his\nfellow-men descends into the den. In what way the brighter light is to\ndawn on the inhabitants of the lower world, or how the idea of good is to\nbecome the guiding principle of politics, is left unexplained by Plato.\nLike the nature and divisions of dialectic, of which Glaucon impatiently\ndemands to be informed, perhaps he would have said that the explanation\ncould not be given except to a disciple of the previous sciences. (Compare\nSymposium 210 A.)\n\nMany illustrations of this part of the Republic may be found in modern\nPolitics and in daily life. For among ourselves, too, there have been two\nsorts of Politicians or Statesmen, whose eyesight has become disordered in\ntwo different ways. First, there have been great men who, in the language\nof Burke, 'have been too much given to general maxims,' who, like J. S.\nMill or Burke himself, have been theorists or philosophers before they\nwere politicians, or who, having been students of history, have allowed\nsome great historical parallel, such as the English Revolution of 1688, or\npossibly Athenian democracy or Roman Imperialism, to be the medium through\nwhich they viewed contemporary events. Or perhaps the long projecting\nshadow of some existing institution may have darkened their vision. The\nChurch of the future, the Commonwealth of the future, the Society of the\nfuture, have so absorbed their minds, that they are unable to see in their\ntrue proportions the Politics of to-day. They have been intoxicated with\ngreat ideas, such as liberty, or equality, or the greatest happiness of\nthe greatest number, or the brotherhood of humanity, and they no longer\ncare to consider how these ideas must be limited in practice or harmonized\nwith the conditions of human life. They are full of light, but the light\nto them has become only a sort of luminous mist or blindness. Almost every\none has known some enthusiastic half-educated person, who sees everything\nat false distances, and in erroneous proportions.\n\nWith this disorder of eyesight may be contrasted another--of those who see\nnot far into the distance, but what is near only; who have been engaged\nall their lives in a trade or a profession; who are limited to a set or\nsect of their own. Men of this kind {cxiv} have no universal except their\nown interests or the interests of their class, no principle but the\nopinion of persons like themselves, no knowledge of affairs beyond what\nthey pick up in the streets or at their club. Suppose them to be sent into\na larger world, to undertake some higher calling, from being tradesmen to\nturn generals or politicians, from being schoolmasters to become\nphilosophers:--or imagine them on a sudden to receive an inward light\nwhich reveals to them for the first time in their lives a higher idea of\nGod and the existence of a spiritual world, by this sudden conversion or\nchange is not their daily life likely to be upset; and on the other hand\nwill not many of their old prejudices and narrownesses still adhere to\nthem long after they have begun to take a more comprehensive view of human\nthings? From familiar examples like these we may learn what Plato meant by\nthe eyesight which is liable to two kinds of disorders.\n\nNor have we any difficulty in drawing a parallel between the young\nAthenian in the fifth century before Christ who became unsettled by new\nideas, and the student of a modern University who has been the subject of\na similar 'aufkl\u00e4rung.' We too observe that when young men begin to\ncriticise customary beliefs, or to analyse the constitution of human\nnature, they are apt to lose hold of solid principle ([Greek: a(/pan to\\\nbe/baion au)t\u00f4=n e)xoi/chetai]). They are like trees which have been\nfrequently transplanted. The earth about them is loose, and they have no\nroots reaching far into the soil. They 'light upon every flower,'\nfollowing their own wayward wills, or because the wind blows them. They\ncatch opinions, as diseases are caught--when they are in the air. Borne\nhither and thither, 'they speedily fall into beliefs' the opposite of\nthose in which they were brought up. They hardly retain the distinction of\nright and wrong; they seem to think one thing as good as another. They\nsuppose themselves to be searching after truth when they are playing the\ngame of 'follow my leader.' They fall in love 'at first sight' with\nparadoxes respecting morality, some fancy about art, some novelty or\neccentricity in religion, and like lovers they are so absorbed for a time\nin their new notion that they can think of nothing else. The resolution of\nsome philosophical or theological question seems to them more interesting\nand important than any substantial knowledge of {cxv} literature or\nscience or even than a good life. Like the youth in the Philebus, they are\nready to discourse to any one about a new philosophy. They are generally\nthe disciples of some eminent professor or sophist, whom they rather\nimitate than understand. They may be counted happy if in later years they\nretain some of the simple truths which they acquired in early education,\nand which they may, perhaps, find to be worth all the rest. Such is the\npicture which Plato draws and which we only reproduce, partly in his own\nwords, of the dangers which beset youth in times of transition, when old\nopinions are fading away and the new are not yet firmly established. Their\ncondition is ingeniously compared by him to that of a supposititious son,\nwho has made the discovery that his reputed parents are not his real ones,\nand, in consequence, they have lost their authority over him.\n\nThe distinction between the mathematician and the dialectician is also\nnoticeable. Plato is very well aware that the faculty of the mathematician\nis quite distinct from the higher philosophical sense which recognizes and\ncombines first principles (531 E). The contempt which he expresses at p.\n533 for distinctions of words, the danger of involuntary falsehood, the\napology which Socrates makes for his earnestness of speech, are highly\ncharacteristic of the Platonic style and mode of thought. The quaint\nnotion that if Palamedes was the inventor of number Agamemnon could not\nhave counted his feet; the art by which we are made to believe that this\nState of ours is not a dream only; the gravity with which the first step\nis taken in the actual creation of the State, namely, the sending out of\nthe city all who had arrived at ten years of age, in order to expedite the\nbusiness of education by a generation, are also truly Platonic. (For the\nlast, compare the passage at the end of the third book (415 D), in which\nhe expects the lie about the earthborn men to be believed in the second\ngeneration.)\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic VIII._ Analysis.]\n\nBOOK VIII. *543* And so we have arrived at the conclusion, that in the\nperfect State wives and children are to be in common; and the education\nand pursuits of men and women, both in war and peace, are to be common,\nand kings are to be philosophers and warriors, and the soldiers of the\nState are to live together, {cxvi} having all things in common; and they\nare to be warrior athletes, receiving no pay but only their food, from the\nother citizens. Now let us return to the point at which we digressed.\n'That is easily done,' he replied: 'You were speaking of the State which\nyou had constructed, and of the individual who answered to this, both of\nwhom you affirmed to be good; *544* and you said that of inferior States\nthere were four forms and four individuals corresponding to them, which\nalthough deficient in various degrees, were all of them worth inspecting\nwith a view to determining the relative happiness or misery of the best or\nworst man. Then Polemarchus and Adeimantus interrupted you, and this led\nto another argument,--and so here we are.' Suppose that we put ourselves\nagain in the same position, and do you repeat your question. 'I should\nlike to know of what constitutions you were speaking?' Besides the perfect\nState there are only four of any note in Hellas:--first, the famous\nLacedaemonian or Cretan commonwealth; secondly, oligarchy, a State full of\nevils; thirdly, democracy, which follows next in order; fourthly, tyranny,\nwhich is the disease or death of all government. Now, States are not made\nof 'oak and rock,' but of flesh and blood; and therefore as there are five\nStates there must be five human natures in individuals, which correspond\nto them. And first, there is the ambitious nature, *545* which answers to\nthe Lacedaemonian State; secondly, the oligarchical nature; thirdly, the\ndemocratical; and fourthly, the tyrannical. This last will have to be\ncompared with the perfectly just, which is the fifth, that we may know\nwhich is the happier, and then we shall be able to determine whether the\nargument of Thrasymachus or our own is the more convincing. And as before\nwe began with the State and went on to the individual, so now, beginning\nwith timocracy, let us go on to the timocratical man, and then proceed to\nthe other forms of government, and the individuals who answer to them.\n\nBut how did timocracy arise out of the perfect State? Plainly, like all\nchanges of government, from division in the rulers. But whence came\ndivision? 'Sing, heavenly Muses,' as Homer says;--let them condescend to\nanswer us, as if we were children, to whom they put on a solemn face in\njest. 'And what will they say?' *546* They will say that human things are\nfated to decay, and even the perfect State will not escape from this law\nof destiny, {cxvii} when 'the wheel comes full circle' in a period short\nor long. Plants or animals have times of fertility and sterility, which\nthe intelligence of rulers because alloyed by sense will not enable them\nto ascertain, and children will be born out of season. For whereas divine\ncreations are in a perfect cycle or number, the human creation is in a\nnumber which declines from perfection, and has four terms and three\nintervals of numbers, increasing, waning, assimilating, dissimilating, and\nyet perfectly commensurate with each other. The base of the number with a\nfourth added (or which is 3 : 4), multiplied by five and cubed, gives two\nharmonies:--the first a square number, which is a hundred times the base\n(or a hundred times a hundred); the second, an oblong, being a hundred\nsquares of the rational diameter of a figure the side of which is five,\nsubtracting one from each square or two perfect squares from all, and\nadding a hundred cubes of three. This entire number is geometrical and\ncontains the rule or law of generation. When this law is neglected\nmarriages will be unpropitious; the inferior offspring who are then born\nwill in time become the rulers; the State will decline, and education fall\ninto decay; gymnastic will be preferred to music, and the gold and silver\nand brass and iron will form a chaotic mass-- *547* thus division will\narise. Such is the Muses' answer to our question. 'And a true answer, of\ncourse:--but what more have they to say?' They say that the two races, the\niron and brass, and the silver and gold, will draw the State different\nways;--the one will take to trade and moneymaking, and the others, having\nthe true riches and not caring for money, will resist them: the contest\nwill end in a compromise; they will agree to have private property, and\nwill enslave their fellow-citizens who were once their friends and\nnurturers. But they will retain their warlike character, and will be\nchiefly occupied in fighting and exercising rule. Thus arises timocracy,\nwhich is intermediate between aristocracy and oligarchy.\n\nThe new form of government resembles the ideal in obedience to rulers and\ncontempt for trade, and having common meals, and in devotion to warlike\nand gymnastic exercises. But corruption has crept into philosophy, and\nsimplicity of character, which was once her note, is now looked for only\nin the military class. *548* Arts of war begin to prevail over arts of\npeace; the ruler is no longer a {cxviii} philosopher; as in oligarchies,\nthere springs up among them an extravagant love of gain--get another man's\nand save your own, is their principle; and they have dark places in which\nthey hoard their gold and silver, for the use of their women and others;\nthey take their pleasures by stealth, like boys who are running away from\ntheir father--the law; and their education is not inspired by the Muse,\nbut imposed by the strong arm of power. The leading characteristic of this\nState is party spirit and ambition.\n\nAnd what manner of man answers to such a State? 'In love of contention,'\nreplied Adeimantus, 'he will be like our friend Glaucon.' In that respect,\nperhaps, but not in others. He is self-asserting and ill-educated, *549*\nyet fond of literature, although not himself a speaker,--fierce with\nslaves, but obedient to rulers, a lover of power and honour, which he\nhopes to gain by deeds of arms,--fond, too, of gymnastics and of hunting.\nAs he advances in years he grows avaricious, for he has lost philosophy,\nwhich is the only saviour and guardian of men. His origin is as\nfollows:--His father is a good man dwelling in an ill-ordered State, who\nhas retired from politics in order that he may lead a quiet life. His\nmother is angry at her loss of precedence among other women; she is\ndisgusted at her husband's selfishness, and she expatiates to her son on\nthe unmanliness and indolence of his father. The old family servant takes\nup the tale, and says to the youth:--'When you grow up you must be more of\na man than your father.' *550* All the world are agreed that he who minds\nhis own business is an idiot, while a busybody is highly honoured and\nesteemed. The young man compares this spirit with his father's words and\nways, and as he is naturally well disposed, although he has suffered from\nevil influences, he rests at a middle point and becomes ambitious and a\nlover of honour.\n\nAnd now let us set another city over against another man. The next form of\ngovernment is oligarchy, in which the rule is of the rich only; nor is it\ndifficult to see how such a State arises. The decline begins with the\npossession of gold and silver; illegal modes of expenditure are invented;\none draws another on, and the multitude are infected; riches outweigh\nvirtue; *551* lovers of money take the place of lovers of honour; misers\nof {cxix} politicians; and, in time, political privileges are confined by\nlaw to the rich, who do not shrink from violence in order to effect their\npurposes.\n\nThus much of the origin,--let us next consider the evils of oligarchy.\nWould a man who wanted to be safe on a voyage take a bad pilot because he\nwas rich, or refuse a good one because he was poor? And does not the\nanalogy apply still more to the State? And there are yet greater evils:\ntwo nations are struggling together in one--the rich and the poor; and the\nrich dare not put arms into the hands of the poor, and are unwilling to\npay for defenders out of their own money. And have we not already\ncondemned that State *552* in which the same persons are warriors as well\nas shopkeepers? The greatest evil of all is that a man may sell his\nproperty and have no place in the State; while there is one class which\nhas enormous wealth, the other is entirely destitute. But observe that\nthese destitutes had not really any more of the governing nature in them\nwhen they were rich than now that they are poor; they were miserable\nspendthrifts always. They are the drones of the hive; only whereas the\nactual drone is unprovided by nature with a sting, the two-legged things\nwhom we call drones are some of them without stings and some of them have\ndreadful stings; in other words, there are paupers and there are rogues.\nThese are never far apart; and in oligarchical cities, where nearly\neverybody is a pauper who is not a ruler, you will find abundance of both.\nAnd this evil state of society originates in bad education and bad\ngovernment.\n\n*553* Like State, like man,--the change in the latter begins with the\nrepresentative of timocracy; he walks at first in the ways of his father,\nwho may have been a statesman, or general, perhaps; and presently he sees\nhim 'fallen from his high estate,' the victim of informers, dying in\nprison or exile, or by the hand of the executioner. The lesson which he\nthus receives, makes him cautious; he leaves politics, represses his\npride, and saves pence. Avarice is enthroned as his bosom's lord, and\nassumes the style of the Great King; the rational and spirited elements\nsit humbly on the ground at either side, the one immersed in calculation,\nthe other absorbed in the admiration of wealth. The love of honour turns\nto love of money; the conversion is instantaneous. The {cxx} man is mean,\nsaving, toiling, *554* the slave of one passion which is the master of the\nrest: Is he not the very image of the State? He has had no education, or\nhe would never have allowed the blind god of riches to lead the dance\nwithin him. And being uneducated he will have many slavish desires, some\nbeggarly, some knavish, breeding in his soul. If he is the trustee of an\norphan, and has the power to defraud, he will soon prove that he is not\nwithout the will, and that his passions are only restrained by fear and\nnot by reason. Hence he leads a divided existence; in which the better\ndesires mostly prevail. *555* But when he is contending for prizes and\nother distinctions, he is afraid to incur a loss which is to be repaid\nonly by barren honour; in time of war he fights with a small part of his\nresources, and usually keeps his money and loses the victory.\n\nNext comes democracy and the democratic man, out of oligarchy and the\noligarchical man. Insatiable avarice is the ruling passion of an\noligarchy; and they encourage expensive habits in order that they may gain\nby the ruin of extravagant youth. Thus men of family often lose their\nproperty or rights of citizenship; but they remain in the city, full of\nhatred against the new owners of their estates and ripe for revolution.\nThe usurer with stooping walk pretends not to see them; he passes by, and\nleaves his sting--that is, his money--in some other victim; and many a man\nhas to pay the parent or principal sum multiplied into a family of\nchildren, *556* and is reduced into a state of dronage by him. The only\nway of diminishing the evil is either to limit a man in his use of his\nproperty, or to insist that he shall lend at his own risk. But the ruling\nclass do not want remedies; they care only for money, and are as careless\nof virtue as the poorest of the citizens. Now there are occasions on which\nthe governors and the governed meet together,--at festivals, on a journey,\nvoyaging or fighting. The sturdy pauper finds that in the hour of danger\nhe is not despised; he sees the rich man puffing and panting, and draws\nthe conclusion which he privately imparts to his companions,--'that our\npeople are not good for much;' and as a sickly frame is made ill by a mere\ntouch from without, or sometimes without external impulse is ready to fall\nto pieces of itself, so from the least cause, or with none at all, the\ncity falls ill and fights a battle for life or death. *557* And democracy\ncomes into {cxxi} power when the poor are the victors, killing some and\nexiling some, and giving equal shares in the government to all the rest.\n\nThe manner of life in such a State is that of democrats; there is freedom\nand plainness of speech, and every man does what is right in his own eyes,\nand has his own way of life. Hence arise the most various developments of\ncharacter; the State is like a piece of embroidery of which the colours\nand figures are the manners of men, and there are many who, like women and\nchildren, prefer this variety to real beauty and excellence. The State is\nnot one but many, like a bazaar at which you can buy anything. The great\ncharm is, that you may do as you like; you may govern if you like, let it\nalone if you like; go to war and make peace if you feel disposed, *558*\nand all quite irrespective of anybody else. When you condemn men to death\nthey remain alive all the same; a gentleman is desired to go into exile,\nand he stalks about the streets like a hero; and nobody sees him or cares\nfor him. Observe, too, how grandly Democracy sets her foot upon all our\nfine theories of education,--how little she cares for the training of her\nstatesmen! The only qualification which she demands is the profession of\npatriotism. Such is democracy;--a pleasing, lawless, various sort of\ngovernment, distributing equality to equals and unequals alike.\n\nLet us now inspect the individual democrat; and first, as in the case of\nthe State, we will trace his antecedents. He is the son of a miserly\noligarch, and has been taught by him to restrain the love of unnecessary\npleasures. Perhaps I ought to explain this latter term:-- *559* Necessary\npleasures are those which are good, and which we cannot do without;\nunnecessary pleasures are those which do no good, and of which the desire\nmight be eradicated by early training. For example, the pleasures of\neating and drinking are necessary and healthy, up to a certain point;\nbeyond that point they are alike hurtful to body and mind, and the excess\nmay be avoided. When in excess, they may be rightly called expensive\npleasures, in opposition to the useful ones. And the drone, as we called\nhim, is the slave of these unnecessary pleasures and desires, whereas the\nmiserly oligarch is subject only to the necessary.\n\nThe oligarch changes into the democrat in the following manner:--The youth\nwho has had a miserly bringing up, gets {cxxii} a taste of the drone's\nhoney; he meets with wild companions, who introduce him to every new\npleasure. As in the State, so in the individual, there are allies on both\nsides, temptations from without and passions from within; there is reason\nalso and external influences of parents and friends in alliance with the\noligarchical principle; *560* and the two factions are in violent conflict\nwith one another. Sometimes the party of order prevails, but then again\nnew desires and new disorders arise, and the whole mob of passions gets\npossession of the Acropolis, that is to say, the soul, which they find\nvoid and unguarded by true words and works. Falsehoods and illusions\nascend to take their place; the prodigal goes back into the country of the\nLotophagi or drones, and openly dwells there. And if any offer of alliance\nor parley of individual elders comes from home, the false spirits shut the\ngates of the castle and permit no one to enter,--there is a battle, and\nthey gain the victory; and straightway making alliance with the desires,\nthey banish modesty, which they call folly, and send temperance over the\nborder. When the house has been swept and garnished, they dress up the\nexiled vices, and, crowning them with garlands, bring them back under new\nnames. Insolence they call good breeding, anarchy freedom, waste\nmagnificence, impudence courage. *561* Such is the process by which the\nyouth passes from the necessary pleasures to the unnecessary. After a\nwhile he divides his time impartially between them; and perhaps, when he\ngets older and the violence of passion has abated, he restores some of the\nexiles and lives in a sort of equilibrium, indulging first one pleasure\nand then another; and if reason comes and tells him that some pleasures\nare good and honourable, and others bad and vile, he shakes his head and\nsays that he can make no distinction between them. Thus he lives in the\nfancy of the hour; sometimes he takes to drink, and then he turns\nabstainer; he practises in the gymnasium or he does nothing at all; then\nagain he would be a philosopher or a politician; or again, he would be a\nwarrior or a man of business; he is\n\n  'Every thing by starts and nothing long.'\n\n*562* There remains still the finest and fairest of all men and all\nStates--tyranny and the tyrant. Tyranny springs from democracy much as\ndemocracy springs from oligarchy. Both arise {cxxiii} from excess; the one\nfrom excess of wealth, the other from excess of freedom. 'The great\nnatural good of life,' says the democrat, 'is freedom.' And this exclusive\nlove of freedom and regardlessness of everything else, is the cause of the\nchange from democracy to tyranny. The State demands the strong wine of\nfreedom, and unless her rulers give her a plentiful draught, punishes and\ninsults them; equality and fraternity of governors and governed is the\napproved principle. Anarchy is the law, not of the State only, but of\nprivate houses, and extends even to the animals. *563* Father and son,\ncitizen and foreigner, teacher and pupil, old and young, are all on a\nlevel; fathers and teachers fear their sons and pupils, and the wisdom of\nthe young man is a match for the elder, and the old imitate the jaunty\nmanners of the young because they are afraid of being thought morose.\nSlaves are on a level with their masters and mistresses, and there is no\ndifference between men and women. Nay, the very animals in a democratic\nState have a freedom which is unknown in other places. The she-dogs are as\ngood as their she-mistresses, and horses and asses march along with\ndignity and run their noses against anybody who comes in their way. 'That\nhas often been my experience.' At last the citizens become so sensitive\nthat they cannot endure the yoke of laws, written or unwritten; they would\nhave no man call himself their master. Such is the glorious beginning of\nthings out of which tyranny springs. 'Glorious, indeed; but what is to\nfollow?' The ruin of oligarchy is the ruin of democracy; *564* for there\nis a law of contraries; the excess of freedom passes into the excess of\nslavery, and the greater the freedom the greater the slavery. You will\nremember that in the oligarchy were found two classes--rogues and paupers,\nwhom we compared to drones with and without stings. These two classes are\nto the State what phlegm and bile are to the human body; and the\nState-physician, or legislator, must get rid of them, just as the\nbee-master keeps the drones out of the hive. Now in a democracy, too,\nthere are drones, but they are more numerous and more dangerous than in\nthe oligarchy; there they are inert and unpractised, here they are full of\nlife and animation; and the keener sort speak and act, while the others\nbuzz about the bema and prevent their opponents from being heard. And\nthere is another class in democratic States, {cxxiv} of respectable,\nthriving individuals, who can be squeezed when the drones have need of\ntheir possessions; *565* there is moreover a third class, who are the\nlabourers and the artisans, and they make up the mass of the people. When\nthe people meet, they are omnipotent, but they cannot be brought together\nunless they are attracted by a little honey; and the rich are made to\nsupply the honey, of which the demagogues keep the greater part\nthemselves, giving a taste only to the mob. Their victims attempt to\nresist; they are driven mad by the stings of the drones, and so become\ndownright oligarchs in self-defence. Then follow informations and\nconvictions for treason. The people have some protector whom they nurse\ninto greatness, and from this root the tree of tyranny springs. The nature\nof the change is indicated in the old fable of the temple of Zeus Lycaeus,\nwhich tells how he who tastes human flesh mixed up with the flesh of other\nvictims will turn into a wolf. Even so the protector, who tastes human\nblood, and slays some and exiles others with or without law, who hints at\nabolition of debts and division of lands, *566* must either perish or\nbecome a wolf--that is, a tyrant. Perhaps he is driven out, but he soon\ncomes back from exile; and then if his enemies cannot get rid of him by\nlawful means, they plot his assassination. Thereupon the friend of the\npeople makes his well-known request to them for a body-guard, which they\nreadily grant, thinking only of his danger and not of their own. Now let\nthe rich man make to himself wings, for he will never run away again if he\ndoes not do so then. And the Great Protector, having crushed all his\nrivals, stands proudly erect in the chariot of State, a full-blown tyrant:\nLet us enquire into the nature of his happiness.\n\nIn the early days of his tyranny he smiles and beams upon everybody; he is\nnot a 'dominus,' no, not he: he has only come to put an end to debt and\nthe monopoly of land. Having got rid of foreign enemies, *567* he makes\nhimself necessary to the State by always going to war. He is thus enabled\nto depress the poor by heavy taxes, and so keep them at work; and he can\nget rid of bolder spirits by handing them over to the enemy. Then comes\nunpopularity; some of his old associates have the courage to oppose him.\nThe consequence is, that he has to make a purgation of the State; but,\nunlike the physician who purges {cxxv} away the bad, he must get rid of\nthe high-spirited, the wise and the wealthy; for he has no choice between\ndeath and a life of shame and dishonour. And the more hated he is, the\nmore he will require trusty guards; but how will he obtain them? 'They\nwill come flocking like birds--for pay.' Will he not rather obtain them on\nthe spot? He will take the slaves from their owners and make them his\nbody-guard; *568* these are his trusted friends, who admire and look up to\nhim. Are not the tragic poets wise who magnify and exalt the tyrant, and\nsay that he is wise by association with the wise? And are not their\npraises of tyranny alone a sufficient reason why we should exclude them\nfrom our State? They may go to other cities, and gather the mob about them\nwith fine words, and change commonwealths into tyrannies and democracies,\nreceiving honours and rewards for their services; but the higher they and\ntheir friends ascend constitution hill, the more their honour will fail\nand become 'too asthmatic to mount.' To return to the tyrant--How will he\nsupport that rare army of his? First, by robbing the temples of their\ntreasures, which will enable him to lighten the taxes; then he will take\nall his father's property, and spend it on his companions, male or female.\nNow his father is the demus, and if the demus gets angry, *569* and says\nthat a great hulking son ought not to be a burden on his parents, and bids\nhim and his riotous crew begone, then will the parent know what a monster\nhe has been nurturing, and that the son whom he would fain expel is too\nstrong for him. 'You do not mean to say that he will beat his father?'\nYes, he will, after having taken away his arms. 'Then he is a parricide\nand a cruel, unnatural son.' And the people have jumped from the fear of\nslavery into slavery, out of the smoke into the fire. Thus liberty, when\nout of all order and reason, passes into the worst form of servitude....\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic VIII._ Introduction.]\n\nIn the previous books Plato has described the ideal State; now he returns\nto the perverted or declining forms, on which he had lightly touched at\nthe end of Book iv. These he describes in a succession of parallels\nbetween the individuals and the States, tracing the origin of either in\nthe State or individual which has preceded them. He begins by asking the\npoint at which he digressed; and is thus led shortly to recapitulate the\nsubstance {cxxvi} of the three former books, which also contain a parallel\nof the philosopher and the State.\n\nOf the first decline he gives no intelligible account; he would not have\nliked to admit the most probable causes of the fall of his ideal State,\nwhich to us would appear to be the impracticability of communism or the\nnatural antagonism of the ruling and subject classes. He throws a veil of\nmystery over the origin of the decline, which he attributes to ignorance\nof the law of population. Of this law the famous geometrical figure or\nnumber is the expression. Like the ancients in general, he had no idea of\nthe gradual perfectibility of man or of the education of the human race.\nHis ideal was not to be attained in the course of ages, but was to spring\nin full armour from the head of the legislator. When good laws had been\ngiven, he thought only of the manner in which they were likely to be\ncorrupted, or of how they might be filled up in detail or restored in\naccordance with their original spirit. He appears not to have reflected\nupon the full meaning of his own words, 'In the brief space of human life,\nnothing great can be accomplished' (x. 608 B); or again, as he afterwards\nsays in the Laws (iii. 676), 'Infinite time is the maker of cities.' The\norder of constitutions which is adopted by him represents an order of\nthought rather than a succession of time, and may be considered as the\nfirst attempt to frame a philosophy of history.\n\nThe first of these declining States is timocracy, or the government of\nsoldiers and lovers of honour, which answers to the Spartan State; this is\na government of force, in which education is not inspired by the Muses,\nbut imposed by the law, and in which all the finer elements of\norganization have disappeared. The philosopher himself has lost the love\nof truth, and the soldier, who is of a simpler and honester nature, rules\nin his stead. The individual who answers to timocracy has some noticeable\nqualities. He is described as ill educated, but, like the Spartan, a lover\nof literature; and although he is a harsh master to his servants he has no\nnatural superiority over them. His character is based upon a reaction\nagainst the circumstances of his father, who in a troubled city has\nretired from politics; and his mother, who is dissatisfied at her own\nposition, is always urging him towards the life of political ambition.\nSuch a character may have had this origin, and indeed Livy attributes the\nLicinian laws to a {cxxvii} feminine jealousy of a similar kind (vii. 34).\nBut there is obviously no connection between the manner in which the\ntimocratic State springs out of the ideal, and the mere accident by which\nthe timocratic man is the son of a retired statesman.\n\nThe two next stages in the decline of constitutions have even less\nhistorical foundation. For there is no trace in Greek history of a polity\nlike the Spartan or Cretan passing into an oligarchy of wealth, or of the\noligarchy of wealth passing into a democracy. The order of history appears\nto be different; first, in the Homeric times there is the royal or\npatriarchal form of government, which a century or two later was succeeded\nby an oligarchy of birth rather than of wealth, and in which wealth was\nonly the accident of the hereditary possession of land and power.\nSometimes this oligarchical government gave way to a government based upon\na qualification of property, which, according to Aristotle's mode of using\nwords, would have been called a timocracy; and this in some cities, as at\nAthens, became the conducting medium to democracy. But such was not the\nnecessary order of succession in States; nor, indeed, can any order be\ndiscerned in the endless fluctuation of Greek history (like the tides in\nthe Euripus), except, perhaps, in the almost uniform tendency from\nmonarchy to aristocracy in the earliest times. At first sight there\nappears to be a similar inversion in the last step of the Platonic\nsuccession; for tyranny, instead of being the natural end of democracy, in\nearly Greek history appears rather as a stage leading to democracy; the\nreign of Peisistratus and his sons is an episode which comes between the\nlegislation of Solon and the constitution of Cleisthenes; and some secret\ncause common to them all seems to have led the greater part of Hellas at\nher first appearance in the dawn of history, e.g. Athens, Argos, Corinth,\nSicyon, and nearly every State with the exception of Sparta, through a\nsimilar stage of tyranny which ended either in oligarchy or democracy. But\nthen we must remember that Plato is describing rather the contemporary\ngovernments of the Sicilian States, which alternated between democracy and\ntyranny, than the ancient history of Athens or Corinth.\n\nThe portrait of the tyrant himself is just such as the later Greek\ndelighted to draw of Phalaris and Dionysius, in which, as in the lives of\nmediaeval saints or mythic heroes, the conduct and actions {cxxviii} of\none were attributed to another in order to fill up the outline. There was\nno enormity which the Greek was not today to believe of them; the tyrant\nwas the negation of government and law; his assassination was glorious;\nthere was no crime, however unnatural, which might not with probability be\nattributed to him. In this, Plato was only following the common thought of\nhis countrymen, which he embellished and exaggerated with all the power of\nhis genius. There is no need to suppose that he drew from life; or that\nhis knowledge of tyrants is derived from a personal acquaintance with\nDionysius. The manner in which he speaks of them would rather tend to\nrender doubtful his ever having 'consorted' with them, or entertained the\nschemes, which are attributed to him in the Epistles, of regenerating\nSicily by their help.\n\nPlato in a hyperbolical and serio-comic vein exaggerates the follies of\ndemocracy which he also sees reflected in social life. To him democracy is\na state of individualism or dissolution; in which every one is doing what\nis right in his own eyes. Of a people animated by a common spirit of\nliberty, rising as one man to repel the Persian host, which is the leading\nidea of democracy in Herodotus and Thucydides, he never seems to think.\nBut if he is not a believer in liberty, still less is he a lover of\ntyranny. His deeper and more serious condemnation is reserved for the\ntyrant, who is the ideal of wickedness and also of weakness, and who in\nhis utter helplessness and suspiciousness is leading an almost impossible\nexistence, without that remnant of good which, in Plato's opinion, was\nrequired to give power to evil (Book i. p. 352). This ideal of wickedness\nliving in helpless misery, is the reverse of that other portrait of\nperfect injustice ruling in happiness and splendour, which first of all\nThrasymachus, and afterwards the sons of Ariston had drawn, and is also\nthe reverse of the king whose rule of life is the good of his subjects.\n\nEach of these governments and individuals has a corresponding ethical\ngradation: the ideal State is under the rule of reason, not extinguishing\nbut harmonizing the passions, and training them in virtue; in the\ntimocracy and the timocratic man the constitution, whether of the State or\nof the individual, is based, first, upon courage, and secondly, upon the\nlove of honour; this latter virtue, {cxxix} which is hardly to be esteemed\na virtue, has superseded all the rest. In the second stage of decline the\nvirtues have altogether disappeared, and the love of gain has succeeded to\nthem; in the third stage, or democracy, the various passions are allowed\nto have free play, and the virtues and vices are impartially cultivated.\nBut this freedom, which leads to many curious extravagances of character,\nis in reality only a state of weakness and dissipation. At last, one\nmonster passion takes possession of the whole nature of man--this is\ntyranny. In all of them excess--the excess first of wealth and then of\nfreedom, is the element of decay.\n\nThe eighth book of the Republic abounds in pictures of life and fanciful\nallusions; the use of metaphorical language is carried to a greater extent\nthan anywhere else in Plato. We may remark, (1), the description of the\ntwo nations in one, which become more and more divided in the Greek\nRepublics, as in feudal times, and perhaps also in our own; (2), the\nnotion of democracy expressed in a sort of Pythagorean formula as equality\namong unequals; (3), the free and easy ways of men and animals, which are\ncharacteristic of liberty, as foreign mercenaries and universal mistrust\nare of the tyrant; (4), the proposal that mere debts should not be\nrecoverable by law is a speculation which has often been entertained by\nreformers of the law in modern times, and is in harmony with the\ntendencies of modern legislation. Debt and land were the two great\ndifficulties of the ancient lawgiver: in modern times we may be said to\nhave almost, if not quite, solved the first of these difficulties, but\nhardly the second.\n\nStill more remarkable are the corresponding portraits of individuals:\nthere is the family picture of the father and mother and the old servant\nof the timocratical man, and the outward respectability and inherent\nmeanness of the oligarchical; the uncontrolled licence and freedom of the\ndemocrat, in which the young Alcibiades seems to be depicted, doing right\nor wrong as he pleases, and who at last, like the prodigal, goes into a\nfar country (note here the play of language by which the democratic man is\nhimself represented under the image of a State having a citadel and\nreceiving embassies); and there is the wild-beast nature, which breaks\nloose in his successor. The hit about the tyrant being a parricide; the\nrepresentation of the tyrant's life as {cxxx} an obscene dream; the\nrhetorical surprise of a more miserable than the most miserable of men in\nBook ix; the hint to the poets that if they are the friends of tyrants\nthere is no place for them in a constitutional State, and that they are\ntoo clever not to see the propriety of their own expulsion; the continuous\nimage of the drones who are of two kinds, swelling at last into the\nmonster drone having wings (see infra, Book ix),--are among Plato's\nhappiest touches.\n\nThere remains to be considered the great difficulty of this book of the\nRepublic, the so-called number of the State. This is a puzzle almost as\ngreat as the Number of the Beast in the Book of Revelation, and though\napparently known to Aristotle, is referred to by Cicero as a proverb of\nobscurity (Ep. ad Att. vii. 13, 5). And some have imagined that there is\nno answer to the puzzle, and that Plato has been practising upon his\nreaders. But such a deception as this is inconsistent with the manner in\nwhich Aristotle speaks of the number (Pol. v. 12, \u00a7 7), and would have\nbeen ridiculous to any reader of the Republic who was acquainted with\nGreek mathematics. As little reason is there for supposing that Plato\nintentionally used obscure expressions; the obscurity arises from our want\nof familiarity with the subject. On the other hand, Plato himself\nindicates that he is not altogether serious, and in describing his number\nas a solemn jest of the Muses, he appears to imply some degree of satire\non the symbolical use of number. (Cp. Cratylus _passim_; Protag. 342 ff.)\n\nOur hope of understanding the passage depends principally on an accurate\nstudy of the words themselves; on which a faint light is thrown by the\nparallel passage in the ninth book. Another help is the allusion in\nAristotle, who makes the important remark that the latter part of the\npassage (from [Greek: \u00f4(=n e)pi/tritos puthm\u00ea\\n, k.t.l.]) describes a\nsolid figure. Some further clue may be gathered from the appearance of the\nPythagorean triangle, which is denoted by the numbers 3, 4, 5, and in\nwhich, as in every right-angled {cxxxi} triangle, the squares of the two\nlesser sides equal the square of the hypotenuse (3^2 + 4^2 = 5^2, or\n9 + 16 = 25).\n\n[Footnote 2: Pol. v. 12, \u00a7 8:--'He only says that nothing is abiding, but\nthat all things change in a certain cycle; and that the origin of the\nchange is a base of numbers which are in the ratio of 4 : 3; and this when\ncombined with a figure of five gives two harmonies; he means when the\nnumber of this figure becomes solid.']\n\nPlato begins by speaking of a perfect or cyclical number (cp. Tim. 39 D),\ni.e. a number in which the sum of the divisors equals the whole; this is\nthe divine or perfect number in which all lesser cycles or revolutions are\ncomplete. He also speaks of a human or imperfect number, having four terms\nand three intervals of numbers which are related to one another in certain\nproportions; these he converts into figures, and finds in them when they\nhave been raised to the third power certain elements of number, which give\ntwo 'harmonies,' the one square, the other oblong; but he does not say\nthat the square number answers to the divine, or the oblong number to the\nhuman cycle; nor is any intimation given that the first or divine number\nrepresents the period of the world, the second the period of the state, or\nof the human race as Zeller supposes; nor is the divine number afterwards\nmentioned (cp. Arist.). The second is the number of generations or births,\nand presides over them in the same mysterious manner in which the stars\npreside over them, or in which, according to the Pythagoreans,\nopportunity, justice, marriage, are represented by some number or figure.\nThis is probably the number 216.\n\nThe explanation given in the text supposes the two harmonies to make up\nthe number 8000. This explanation derives a certain plausibility from the\ncircumstance that 8000 is the ancient number of the Spartan citizens\n(Herod. vii. 34), and would be what Plato might have called 'a number\nwhich nearly concerns the population of a city' (588 A); the mysterious\ndisappearance of the Spartan population may possibly have suggested to him\nthe first cause of his decline of States. The lesser or square 'harmony,'\nof 400, might be a symbol of the guardians,--the larger or oblong\n'harmony,' of the people, and the numbers 3, 4, 5 might refer respectively\nto the three orders in the State or parts of the soul, the four virtues,\nthe five forms of government. The harmony of the musical scale, which is\nelsewhere used as a symbol of the harmony of the state (Rep. iv. 443 D),\nis also indicated. For the numbers 3, 4, 5, which represent the sides of\nthe Pythagorean triangle, also denote the intervals of the scale.\n\nThe terms used in the statement of the problem may be {cxxxii} explained\nas follows. A perfect number ([Greek: te/leios a)rithmo/s]), as already\nstated, is one which is equal to the sum of its divisors. Thus 6, which is\nthe first perfect or cyclical number, = 1 + 2 + 3. The words [Greek:\no)/roi], 'terms' or 'notes,' and [Greek: a)posta/seis], 'intervals,' are\napplicable to music as well as to number and figure. [Greek: Pr\u00f4/t\u00f4|] is\nthe 'base' on which the whole calculation depends, or the 'lowest term'\nfrom which it can be worked out. The words [Greek: duna/menai/ te kai\\\ndunasteuo/menoi] have been variously translated--'squared and cubed'\n(Donaldson), 'equalling and equalled in power' (Weber), 'by involution and\nevolution,' i.e. by raising the power and extracting the root (as in the\ntranslation). Numbers are called 'like and unlike' ([Greek: o(moiou=nte/s\nte kai\\ a)nomoiou=ntes]) when the factors or the sides of the planes and\ncubes which they represent are or are not in the same ratio: e.g. 8 and\n27 = 2^3 and 3^3; and conversely. 'Waxing' ([Greek: au)/xontes]) numbers,\ncalled also 'increasing' ([Greek: u(pertelei=s]) are those which are\nexceeded by the sum of their divisors: e.g. 12 and 18 are less than 16 and\n21. 'Waning' ([Greek: phthi/nontes]) numbers, called also 'decreasing'\n([Greek: e)llipei=s]) are those which succeed the sum of their divisors:\ne.g. 8 and 27 exceed 7 and 13. The words translated 'commensurable and\nagreeable to one another' ([Greek: pros\u00ea/gora kai\\ r(\u00eata/]) seem to be\ndifferent ways of describing the same relation, with more or less\nprecision. They are equivalent to 'expressible in terms having the same\nrelation to one another,' like the series 8, 12, 18, 27, each of which\nnumbers is in the relation of 1 and 1/2 to the preceding. The 'base,' or\n'fundamental number, which has 1/3 added to it' (1 and 1/3) = 4/3 or a\nmusical fourth. [Greek: A(rmoni/a] is a 'proportion' of numbers as of\nmusical notes, applied either to the parts or factors of a single number\nor to the relation of one number to another. The first harmony is a\n'square' number ([Greek: i)/s\u00ean i)sa/kis]); the second harmony is an\n'oblong' number ([Greek: prom\u00ea/k\u00ea]), i.e. a number representing a figure\nof which the opposite sides only are equal. [Greek: A)rithmoi\\ a)po\\\ndiame/tr\u00f4n] = 'numbers squared from' or 'upon diameters'; [Greek: r(\u00eat\u00f4=n]\n= 'rational,' i.e. omitting fractions, [Greek: a)r)r(\u00ea/t\u00f4n], 'irrational,'\ni.e. including fractions; e.g. 49 is a square of the rational diameter of\na figure the side of which = 5: 50, of an irrational diameter of the same.\nFor several of the explanations here given and for a good deal besides\nI am indebted to an excellent article on the Platonic Number by Dr.\nDonaldson (Proc. of the Philol. Society, vol. i. p. 81 ff.).\n\n{cxxxiii} The conclusions which he draws from these data are summed up by\nhim as follows. Having assumed that the number of the perfect or divine\ncycle is the number of the world, and the number of the imperfect cycle\nthe number of the state, he proceeds: 'The period of the world is defined\nby the perfect number 6, that of the state by the cube of that number or\n216, which is the product of the last pair of terms in the Platonic\nTetractys[3]; and if we take this as the basis of our computation, we\nshall have two cube numbers ([Greek: au)x\u00ea/seis duna/menai/ te kai\\\ndunasteuo/menai]), viz. 8 and 27; and the mean proportionals between\nthese, viz. 12 and 18, will furnish three intervals and four terms, and\nthese terms and intervals stand related to one another in the\n_sesqui-altera_ ratio, i.e. each term is to the preceding as 3/2. Now if\nwe remember that the number 216 = 8 x 27 = 3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3, and 3^2 + 4^2\n= 5^2, we must admit that this number implies the numbers 3, 4, 5, to\nwhich musicians attach so much importance. And if we combine the ratio 4/3\nwith the number 5, or multiply the ratios of the sides by the hypotenuse,\nwe shall by first squaring and then cubing obtain two expressions, which\ndenote the ratio of the two last pairs of terms in the Platonic Tetractys,\nthe former multiplied by the square, the latter by the cube of the number\n10, the sum of the first four digits which constitute the Platonic\nTetractys.' The two [Greek: a(rmoni/ai] he elsewhere explains as follows:\n'The first [Greek: a(rmoni/a] is [Greek: i)/s\u00ean i)sa/kis e(kato\\n\ntosauta/kis], in other words (4/3 x 5)^2 = 100 x 2^2/3^2. The second\n[Greek: a(rmoni/a], a cube of the same root, is described as 100\nmultiplied ([Greek: a]) by the rational diameter of 5 diminished by unity,\ni.e., as shown above, 48: ([Greek: b]) by two incommensurable diameters,\ni.e. the two first irrationals, or 2 and 3: and ([Greek: g]) by the cube\nof 3, or 27. Thus we have (48 + 5 + 27) 100 = 1000 x 2^3. This second\nharmony is to be the cube of the number of which the former harmony is the\nsquare, and therefore must be divided by the cube of 3. In other words,\nthe whole expression will be: (1), for the first harmony, 400/9: (2), for\nthe second harmony, 8000/27.'\n\n[Footnote 3: The Platonic Tetractys consisted of a series of seven terms,\n1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27.]\n\nThe reasons which have inclined me to agree with Dr. Donaldson and also\nwith Schleiermacher in supposing that 216 is the Platonic number of births\nare: (1) that it coincides with the description of the number given in the\nfirst part of the passage ([Greek: e)n \u00f4(=| pr\u00f4/t\u00f4| ... {cxxxiv}\na)pe/ph\u00easan]): (2) that the number 216 with its permutations would have\nbeen familiar to a Greek mathematician, though unfamiliar to us: (3) that\n216 is the cube of 6, and also the sum of 3^3, 4^3, 5^3, the numbers 3, 4,\n5 representing the Pythagorean triangle, of which the sides when squared\nequal the square of the hypotenuse (3^2 + 4^2 = 5^2): (4) that it is also\nthe period of the Pythagorean Metempsychosis: (5) the three ultimate terms\nor bases (3, 4, 5) of which 216 is composed answer to the third, fourth,\nfifth in the musical scale: (6) that the number 216 is the product of the\ncubes of 2 and 3, which are the two last terms in the Platonic Tetractys:\n(7) that the Pythagorean triangle is said by Plutarch (de Is. et Osir.,\n373 E), Proclus (super prima Eucl. iv. p. 111), and Quintilian (de Musica\niii. p. 152) to be contained in this passage, so that the tradition of the\nschool seems to point in the same direction: (8) that the Pythagorean\ntriangle is called also the figure of marriage ([Greek: gam\u00ea/lion\ndia/gramma]).\n\nBut though agreeing with Dr. Donaldson thus far, I see no reason for\nsupposing, as he does, that the first or perfect number is the world, the\nhuman or imperfect number the state; nor has he given any proof that the\nsecond harmony is a cube. Nor do I think that [Greek: a)r)r(\u00ea/t\u00f4n de\\\nduei=n] can mean 'two incommensurables,' which he arbitrarily assumes to\nbe 2 and 3, but rather, as the preceding clause implies, [Greek: duei=n\na)rithmoi=n a)po\\ a)r)r(\u00ea/t\u00f4n diame/tr\u00f4n pempa/dos], i.e. two square\nnumbers based upon irrational diameters of a figure the side of which is\n5 = 50 x 2.\n\nThe greatest objection to the translation is the sense given to the words\n[Greek: e)pi/tritos puthm\u00ea/n k.t.l.], 'a base of three with a third added\nto it, multiplied by 5.' In this somewhat forced manner Plato introduces\nonce more the numbers of the Pythagorean triangle. But the coincidences in\nthe numbers which follow are in favour of the explanation. The first\nharmony of 400, as has been already remarked, probably represents the\nrulers; the second and oblong harmony of 7600, the people.\n\nAnd here we take leave of the difficulty. The discovery of the riddle\nwould be useless, and would throw no light on ancient mathematics. The\npoint of interest is that Plato should have used such a symbol, and that\nso much of the Pythagorean spirit should have prevailed in him. His\ngeneral meaning is that divine creation is perfect, and is represented or\npresided {cxxxv} over by a perfect or cyclical number; human generation is\nimperfect, and represented or presided over by an imperfect number or\nseries of numbers. The number 5040, which is the number of the citizens in\nthe Laws, is expressly based by him on utilitarian grounds, namely, the\nconvenience of the number for division; it is also made up of the first\nseven digits multiplied by one another. The contrast of the perfect and\nimperfect number may have been easily suggested by the corrections of the\ncycle, which were made first by Meton and secondly by Callippus; (the\nlatter is said to have been a pupil of Plato). Of the degree of importance\nor of exactness to be attributed to the problem, the number of the tyrant\nin Book ix. (729 = 365 x 2), and the slight correction of the error in the\nnumber 5040/12 (Laws, 771 C), may furnish a criterion. There is nothing\nsurprising in the circumstance that those who were seeking for order in\nnature and had found order in number, should have imagined one to give law\nto the other. Plato believes in a power of number far beyond what he could\nsee realized in the world around him, and he knows the great influence\nwhich 'the little matter of 1, 2, 3' (vii. 522 C) exercises upon\neducation. He may even be thought to have a prophetic anticipation of the\ndiscoveries of Quetelet and others, that numbers depend upon numbers;\ne.g.--in population, the numbers of births and the respective numbers of\nchildren born of either sex, on the respective ages of parents, i.e. on\nother numbers.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic IX._ Analysis.]\n\nBOOK IX. *571* Last of all comes the tyrannical man, about whom we have to\nenquire, Whence is he, and how does he live--in happiness or in misery?\nThere is, however, a previous question of the nature and number of the\nappetites, which I should like to consider first. Some of them are\nunlawful, and yet admit of being chastened and weakened in various degrees\nby the power of reason and law. 'What appetites do you mean?' I mean those\nwhich are awake when the reasoning powers are asleep, which get up and\nwalk about naked without any self-respect or shame; and there is no\nconceivable folly or crime, however cruel or unnatural, of which, in\nimagination, they may not be guilty. 'True,' he said; 'very true.' But\nwhen a man's pulse beats temperately; and he has supped on a feast of\nreason and come to a knowledge of himself {cxxxvi} before going to rest,\n*572* and has satisfied his desires just enough to prevent their\nperturbing his reason, which remains clear and luminous, and when he is\nfree from quarrel and heat,--the visions which he has on his bed are least\nirregular and abnormal. Even in good men there is such an irregular\nwild-beast nature, which peers out in sleep.\n\nTo return:--You remember what was said of the democrat; that he was the\nson of a miserly father, who encouraged the saving desires and repressed\nthe ornamental and expensive ones; presently the youth got into fine\ncompany, and began to entertain a dislike to his father's narrow ways; and\nbeing a better man than the corrupters of his youth, he came to a mean,\nand led a life, not of lawless or slavish passion, but of regular and\nsuccessive indulgence. Now imagine that the youth has become a father, and\nhas a son who is exposed to the same temptations, and has companions who\nlead him into every sort of iniquity, and parents and friends who try to\nkeep him right. *573* The counsellors of evil find that their only chance\nof retaining him is to implant in his soul a monster drone, or love; while\nother desires buzz around him and mystify him with sweet sounds and\nscents, this monster love takes possession of him, and puts an end to\nevery true or modest thought or wish. Love, like drunkenness and madness,\nis a tyranny; and the tyrannical man, whether made by nature or habit, is\njust a drinking, lusting, furious sort of animal.\n\nAnd how does such an one live? 'Nay, that you must tell me.' Well then,\nI fancy that he will live amid revelries and harlotries, and love will be\nthe lord and master of the house. Many desires require much money, and so\nhe spends all that he has and borrows more; and when he has nothing the\nyoung ravens are still in the nest in which they were hatched, crying for\nfood. *574* Love urges them on; and they must be gratified by force or\nfraud, or if not, they become painful and troublesome; and as the new\npleasures succeed the old ones, so will the son take possession of the\ngoods of his parents; if they show signs of refusing, he will defraud and\ndeceive them; and if they openly resist, what then? 'I can only say, that\nI should not much like to be in their place.' But, O heavens, Adeimantus,\nto think that for some new-fangled and unnecessary love he will give up\nhis old father and mother, best and dearest of friends, or enslave them to\nthe fancies of the hour! {cxxxvii} Truly a tyrannical son is a blessing to\nhis father and mother! When there is no more to be got out of them, he\nturns burglar or pickpocket, or robs a temple. Love overmasters the\nthoughts of his youth, and he becomes in sober reality the monster that he\nwas sometimes in sleep. *575* He waxes strong in all violence and\nlawlessness; and is ready for any deed of daring that will supply the\nwants of his rabble-rout. In a well-ordered State there are only a few\nsuch, and these in time of war go out and become the mercenaries of a\ntyrant. But in time of peace they stay at home and do mischief; they are\nthe thieves, footpads, cut-purses, man-stealers of the community; or if\nthey are able to speak, they turn false-witnesses and informers. 'No small\ncatalogue of crimes truly, even if the perpetrators are few.' Yes, I said;\nbut small and great are relative terms, and no crimes which are committed\nby them approach those of the tyrant, whom this class, growing strong and\nnumerous, create out of themselves. If the people yield, well and good,\nbut, if they resist, then, as before he beat his father and mother, so now\nhe beats his fatherland and motherland, and places his mercenaries over\nthem. Such men in their early days live with flatterers, and they\nthemselves flatter others, in order to gain their ends; *576* but they\nsoon discard their followers when they have no longer any need of them;\nthey are always either masters or servants,--the joys of friendship are\nunknown to them. And they are utterly treacherous and unjust, if the\nnature of justice be at all understood by us. They realize our dream; and\nhe who is the most of a tyrant by nature, and leads the life of a tyrant\nfor the longest time, will be the worst of them, and being the worst of\nthem, will also be the most miserable.\n\nLike man, like State,--the tyrannical man will answer to tyranny, which is\nthe extreme opposite of the royal State; for one is the best and the other\nthe worst. But which is the happier? Great and terrible as the tyrant may\nappear enthroned amid his satellites, let us not be afraid to go in and\nask; and the answer is, that the monarchical is the happiest, and the\ntyrannical the most miserable of States. *577* And may we not ask the same\nquestion about the men themselves, requesting some one to look into them\nwho is able to penetrate the inner nature of man, and will not be\npanic-struck by the vain pomp of tyranny? I will suppose that he\n{cxxxviii} is one who has lived with him, and has seen him in family life,\nor perhaps in the hour of trouble and danger.\n\nAssuming that we ourselves are the impartial judge for whom we seek, let\nus begin by comparing the individual and State, and ask first of all,\nwhether the State is likely to be free or enslaved--Will there not be a\nlittle freedom and a great deal of slavery? And the freedom is of the bad,\nand the slavery of the good; and this applies to the man as well as to the\nState; for his soul is full of meanness and slavery, and the better part\nis enslaved to the worse. He cannot do what he would, and his mind is full\nof confusion; he is the very reverse of a freeman. *578* The State will be\npoor and full of misery and sorrow; and the man's soul will also be poor\nand full of sorrows, and he will be the most miserable of men. No, not the\nmost miserable, for there is yet a more miserable. 'Who is that?' The\ntyrannical man who has the misfortune also to become a public tyrant.\n'There I suspect that you are right.' Say rather, 'I am sure;' conjecture\nis out of place in an enquiry of this nature. He is like a wealthy owner\nof slaves, only he has more of them than any private individual. You will\nsay, 'The owners of slaves are not generally in any fear of them.' But\nwhy? Because the whole city is in a league which protects the individual.\nSuppose however that one of these owners and his household is carried off\nby a god into a wilderness, where there are no freemen to help him--will\nhe not be in an agony of terror?-- *579* will he not be compelled to\nflatter his slaves and to promise them many things sore against his will?\nAnd suppose the same god who carried him off were to surround him with\nneighbours who declare that no man ought to have slaves, and that the\nowners of them should be punished with death. 'Still worse and worse! He\nwill be in the midst of his enemies.' And is not our tyrant such a captive\nsoul, who is tormented by a swarm of passions which he cannot indulge;\nliving indoors always like a woman, and jealous of those who can go out\nand see the world?\n\nHaving so many evils, will not the most miserable of men be still more\nmiserable in a public station? Master of others when he is not master of\nhimself; like a sick man who is compelled to be an athlete; the meanest of\nslaves and the most abject of flatterers; wanting all things, and never\nable to satisfy his desires; always in fear and distraction, like the\nState of which he is the representative. *580* {cxxxix} His jealous,\nhateful, faithless temper grows worse with command; he is more and more\nfaithless, envious, unrighteous,--the most wretched of men, a misery to\nhimself and to others. And so let us have a final trial and proclamation;\nneed we hire a herald, or shall I proclaim the result? 'Make the\nproclamation yourself.' _The son of Ariston (the best) is of opinion that\nthe best and justest of men is also the happiest, and that this is he who\nis the most royal master of himself; and that the unjust man is he who is\nthe greatest tyrant of himself and of his State. And I add further--'seen\nor unseen by gods or men.'_\n\nThis is our first proof. The second is derived from the three kinds of\npleasure, which answer to the three elements of the soul--reason, passion,\ndesire; *581* under which last is comprehended avarice as well as sensual\nappetite, while passion includes ambition, party-feeling, love of\nreputation. Reason, again, is solely directed to the attainment of truth,\nand careless of money and reputation. In accordance with the difference of\nmen's natures, one of these three principles is in the ascendant, and they\nhave their several pleasures corresponding to them. Interrogate now the\nthree natures, and each one will be found praising his own pleasures and\ndepreciating those of others. The money-maker will contrast the vanity of\nknowledge with the solid advantages of wealth. The ambitious man will\ndespise knowledge which brings no honour; whereas the philosopher will\nregard only the fruition of truth, and will call other pleasures necessary\nrather than good. *582* Now, how shall we decide between them? Is there\nany better criterion than experience and knowledge? And which of the three\nhas the truest knowledge and the widest experience? The experience of\nyouth makes the philosopher acquainted with the two kinds of desire, but\nthe avaricious and the ambitious man never taste the pleasures of truth\nand wisdom. Honour he has equally with them; they are 'judged of him,' but\nhe is 'not judged of them,' for they never attain to the knowledge of true\nbeing. And his instrument is reason, whereas their standard is only wealth\nand honour; and if by reason we are to judge, his good will be the truest.\nAnd so we arrive at the result that the pleasure of the rational part of\nthe soul, and a life passed in such pleasure is the pleasantest. *583* He\nwho has a right to judge judges thus. Next comes the life of ambition,\nand, in the third place, that of money-making.\n\n{cxl} Twice has the just man overthrown the unjust--once more, as in an\nOlympian contest, first offering up a prayer to the saviour Zeus, let him\ntry a fall. A wise man whispers to me that the pleasures of the wise are\ntrue and pure; all others are a shadow only. Let us examine this: Is not\npleasure opposed to pain, and is there not a mean state which is neither?\nWhen a man is sick, nothing is more pleasant to him than health. But this\nhe never found out while he was well. In pain he desires only to cease\nfrom pain; on the other hand, when he is in an ecstasy of pleasure, rest\nis painful to him. Thus rest or cessation is both pleasure and pain. But\ncan that which is neither become both? Again, pleasure and pain are\nmotions, and the absence of them is rest; *584* but if so, how can the\nabsence of either of them be the other? Thus we are led to infer that the\ncontradiction is an appearance only, and witchery of the senses. And these\nare not the only pleasures, for there are others which have no preceding\npains. Pure pleasure then is not the absence of pain, nor pure pain the\nabsence of pleasure; although most of the pleasures which reach the mind\nthrough the body are reliefs of pain, and have not only their reactions\nwhen they depart, but their anticipations before they come. They can be\nbest described in a simile. There is in nature an upper, lower, and middle\nregion, and he who passes from the lower to the middle imagines that he is\ngoing up and is already in the upper world; and if he were taken back\nagain would think, and truly think, that he was descending. All this\narises out of his ignorance of the true upper, middle, and lower regions.\nAnd a like confusion happens with pleasure and pain, and with many other\nthings. *585* The man who compares grey with black, calls grey white; and\nthe man who compares absence of pain with pain, calls the absence of pain\npleasure. Again, hunger and thirst are inanitions of the body, ignorance\nand folly of the soul; and food is the satisfaction of the one, knowledge\nof the other. Now which is the purer satisfaction--that of eating and\ndrinking, or that of knowledge? Consider the matter thus: The satisfaction\nof that which has more existence is truer than of that which has less. The\ninvariable and immortal has a more real existence than the variable and\nmortal, and has a corresponding measure of knowledge and truth. The soul,\nagain, has more existence and truth and knowledge than the body, and is\ntherefore more really satisfied and has a more {cxli} natural pleasure.\n*586* Those who feast only on earthly food, are always going at random up\nto the middle and down again; but they never pass into the true upper\nworld, or have a taste of true pleasure. They are like fatted beasts, full\nof gluttony and sensuality, and ready to kill one another by reason of\ntheir insatiable lust; for they are not filled with true being, and their\nvessel is leaky (cp. Gorgias, 243 A, foll.). Their pleasures are mere\nshadows of pleasure, mixed with pain, coloured and intensified by\ncontrast, and therefore intensely desired; and men go fighting about them,\nas Stesichorus says that the Greeks fought about the shadow of Helen at\nTroy, because they know not the truth.\n\nThe same may be said of the passionate element:--the desires of the\nambitious soul, as well as of the covetous, have an inferior satisfaction.\nOnly when under the guidance of reason do either of the other principles\ndo their own business *587* or attain the pleasure which is natural to\nthem. When not attaining, they compel the other parts of the soul to\npursue a shadow of pleasure which is not theirs. And the more distant they\nare from philosophy and reason, the more distant they will be from law and\norder, and the more illusive will be their pleasures. The desires of love\nand tyranny are the farthest from law, and those of the king are nearest\nto it. There is one genuine pleasure, and two spurious ones: the tyrant\ngoes beyond even the latter; he has run away altogether from law and\nreason. Nor can the measure of his inferiority be told, except in a\nfigure. The tyrant is the third removed from the oligarch, and has\ntherefore, not a shadow of his pleasure, but the shadow of a shadow only.\nThe oligarch, again, is thrice removed from the king, and thus we get the\nformula 3 x 3, which is the number of a surface, representing the shadow\nwhich is the tyrant's pleasure, and if you like to cube this 'number of\nthe beast,' you will find that the measure of the difference amounts to\n729; the king is 729 times more happy than the tyrant. And this\nextraordinary number is _nearly_ equal to the number of days and nights in\na year (365 x 2 = 730); and is therefore concerned with human life. *588*\nThis is the interval between a good and bad man in happiness only: what\nmust be the difference between them in comeliness of life and virtue!\n\nPerhaps you may remember some one saying at the beginning of our\ndiscussion that the unjust man was profited if he had the {cxlii}\nreputation of justice. Now that we know the nature of justice and\ninjustice, let us make an image of the soul, which will personify his\nwords. First of all, fashion a multitudinous beast, having a ring of heads\nof all manner of animals, tame and wild, and able to produce and change\nthem at pleasure. Suppose now another form of a lion, and another of a\nman; the second smaller than the first, the third than the second; join\nthem together and cover them with a human skin, in which they are\ncompletely concealed. When this has been done, let us tell the supporter\nof injustice *589* that he is feeding up the beasts and starving the man.\nThe maintainer of justice, on the other hand, is trying to strengthen the\nman; he is nourishing the gentle principle within him, and making an\nalliance with the lion heart, in order that he may be able to keep down\nthe many-headed hydra, and bring all into unity with each other and with\nthemselves. Thus in every point of view, whether in relation to pleasure,\nhonour, or advantage, the just man is right, and the unjust wrong.\n\nBut now, let us reason with the unjust, who is not intentionally in error.\nIs not the noble that which subjects the beast to the man, or rather to\nthe God in man; the ignoble, that which subjects the man to the beast? And\nif so, who would receive gold on condition that he was to degrade the\nnoblest part of himself under the worst?--who would sell his son or\ndaughter into the hands of brutal and evil men, for any amount of money?\nAnd will he sell his own fairer and diviner part without any compunction\nto the most godless and foul? *590* Would he not be worse than Eriphyle,\nwho sold her husband's life for a necklace? And intemperance is the\nletting loose of the multiform monster, and pride and sullenness are the\ngrowth and increase of the lion and serpent element, while luxury and\neffeminacy are caused by a too great relaxation of spirit. Flattery and\nmeanness again arise when the spirited element is subjected to avarice,\nand the lion is habituated to become a monkey. The real disgrace of\nhandicraft arts is, that those who are engaged in them have to flatter,\ninstead of mastering their desires; therefore we say that they should be\nplaced under the control of the better principle in another because they\nhave none in themselves; not, as Thrasymachus imagined, to the injury of\nthe subjects, but for {cxliii} their good. And our intention in educating\nthe young, is to give them self-control; *591* the law desires to nurse up\nin them a higher principle, and when they have acquired this, they may go\ntheir ways.\n\n'What, then, shall a man profit, if he gain the whole world' and become\nmore and more wicked? Or what shall he profit by escaping discovery, if\nthe concealment of evil prevents the cure? If he had been punished, the\nbrute within him would have been silenced, and the gentler element\nliberated; and he would have united temperance, justice, and wisdom in his\nsoul--a union better far than any combination of bodily gifts. The man of\nunderstanding will honour knowledge above all; in the next place he will\nkeep under his body, not only for the sake of health and strength, but in\norder to attain the most perfect harmony of body and soul. In the\nacquisition of riches, too, he will aim at order and harmony; he will not\ndesire to heap up wealth without measure, but he will fear that the\nincrease of wealth will disturb the constitution of his own soul. For the\nsame reason *592* he will only accept such honours as will make him a\nbetter man; any others he will decline. 'In that case,' said he, 'he will\nnever be a politician.' Yes, but he will, in his own city; though probably\nnot in his native country, unless by some divine accident. 'You mean that\nhe will be a citizen of the ideal city, which has no place upon earth.'\nBut in heaven, I replied, there is a pattern of such a city, and he who\nwishes may order his life after that image. Whether such a state is or\never will be matters not; he will act according to that pattern and no\nother.....\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic IX._ Introduction.]\n\nThe most noticeable points in the 9th Book of the Republic are:--(1) the\naccount of pleasure; (2) the number of the interval which divides the king\nfrom the tyrant; (3) the pattern which is in heaven.\n\n1. Plato's account of pleasure is remarkable for moderation, and in this\nrespect contrasts with the later Platonists and the views which are\nattributed to them by Aristotle. He is not, like the Cynics, opposed to\nall pleasure, but rather desires that the several parts of the soul shall\nhave their natural satisfaction; he even agrees with the Epicureans in\ndescribing pleasure {cxliv} as something more than the absence of pain.\nThis is proved by the circumstance that there are pleasures which have no\nantecedent pains (as he also remarks in the Philebus), such as the\npleasures of smell, and also the pleasures of hope and anticipation. In\nthe previous book (pp. 558, 559) he had made the distinction between\nnecessary and unnecessary pleasure, which is repeated by Aristotle, and he\nnow observes that there are a further class of 'wild beast' pleasures,\ncorresponding to Aristotle's [Greek: th\u00eario/t\u00eas]. He dwells upon the\nrelative and unreal character of sensual pleasures and the illusion which\narises out of the contrast of pleasure and pain, pointing out the\nsuperiority of the pleasures of reason, which are at rest, over the\nfleeting pleasures of sense and emotion. The pre-eminence of royal\npleasure is shown by the fact that reason is able to form a judgment of\nthe lower pleasures, while the two lower parts of the soul are incapable\nof judging the pleasures of reason. Thus, in his treatment of pleasure, as\nin many other subjects, the philosophy of Plato is 'sawn up into\nquantities' by Aristotle; the analysis which was originally made by him\nbecame in the next generation the foundation of further technical\ndistinctions. Both in Plato and Aristotle we note the illusion under which\nthe ancients fell of regarding the transience of pleasure as a proof of\nits unreality, and of confounding the permanence of the intellectual\npleasures with the unchangeableness of the knowledge from which they are\nderived. Neither do we like to admit that the pleasures of knowledge,\nthough more elevating, are not more lasting than other pleasures, and are\nalmost equally dependent on the accidents of our bodily state (cp.\nIntroduction to Philebus).\n\n2. The number of the interval which separates the king from the tyrant,\nand royal from tyrannical pleasures, is 729, the cube of 9. Which Plato\ncharacteristically designates as a number concerned with human life,\nbecause _nearly_ equivalent to the number of days and nights in the year.\nHe is desirous of proclaiming that the interval between them is\nimmeasurable, and invents a formula to give expression to his idea. Those\nwho spoke of justice as a cube, of virtue as an art of measuring (Prot.\n357 A), saw no inappropriateness in conceiving the soul under the figure\nof a line, or the pleasure of the tyrant as separated from the {cxlv}\npleasure of the king by the numerical interval of 729. And in modern times\nwe sometimes use metaphorically what Plato employed as a philosophical\nformula. 'It is not easy to estimate the loss of the tyrant, except\nperhaps in this way,' says Plato. So we might say, that although the life\nof a good man is not to be compared to that of a bad man, yet you may\nmeasure the difference between them by valuing one minute of the one at an\nhour of the other ('One day in thy courts is better than a thousand'), or\nyou might say that 'there is an infinite difference.' But this is not so\nmuch as saying, in homely phrase, 'They are a thousand miles asunder.'\nAnd accordingly Plato finds the natural vehicle of his thoughts in a\nprogression of numbers; this arithmetical formula he draws out with the\nutmost seriousness, and both here and in the number of generation seems to\nfind an additional proof of the truth of his speculation in forming the\nnumber into a geometrical figure; just as persons in our own day are apt\nto fancy that a statement is verified when it has been only thrown into an\nabstract form. In speaking of the number 729 as proper to human life, he\nprobably intended to intimate that one year of the tyrannical = 12 hours\nof the royal life.\n\nThe simple observation that the comparison of two similar solids is\neffected by the comparison of the cubes of their sides, is the\nmathematical groundwork of this fanciful expression. There is some\ndifficulty in explaining the steps by which the number 729 is obtained;\nthe oligarch is removed in the third degree from the royal and\naristocratical, and the tyrant in the third degree from the oligarchical;\nbut we have to arrange the terms as the sides of a square and to count the\noligarch twice over, thus reckoning them not as = 5 but as = 9. The square\nof 9 is passed lightly over as only a step towards the cube.\n\n3. Towards the close of the Republic, Plato seems to be more and more\nconvinced of the ideal character of his own speculations. At the end of\nthe 9th Book the pattern which is in heaven takes the place of the city of\nphilosophers on earth. The vision which has received form and substance at\nhis hands, is now discovered to be at a distance. And yet this distant\nkingdom is also the rule of man's life (Bk. vii. 540 E). ('Say not lo!\nhere, or lo! there, for the kingdom of God is within you.') Thus a note is\nstruck which prepares for the revelation of a future {cxlvi} life in the\nfollowing Book. But the future life is present still; the ideal of\npolitics is to be realized in the individual.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic X._ Analysis.]\n\nBOOK X. *595* Many things pleased me in the order of our State, but there\nwas nothing which I liked better than the regulation about poetry. The\ndivision of the soul throws a new light on our exclusion of imitation. I\ndo not mind telling you in confidence that all poetry is an outrage on the\nunderstanding, unless the hearers have that balm of knowledge which heals\nerror. I have loved Homer ever since I was a boy, and even now he appears\nto me to be the great master of tragic poetry. But much as I love the man,\nI love truth more, and therefore I must speak out: and first of all, will\nyou explain what is imitation, for really I do not understand? 'How likely\nthen that I should understand!' *596* That might very well be, for the\nduller often sees better than the keener eye. 'True, but in your presence\nI can hardly venture to say what I think.' Then suppose that we begin in\nour old fashion, with the doctrine of universals. Let us assume the\nexistence of beds and tables. There is one idea of a bed, or of a table,\nwhich the maker of each had in his mind when making them; he did not make\nthe ideas of beds and tables, but he made beds and tables according to the\nideas. And is there not a maker of the works of all workmen, who makes not\nonly vessels but plants and animals, himself, the earth and heaven, and\nthings in heaven and under the earth? He makes the Gods also. 'He must be\na wizard indeed!' But do you not see that there is a sense in which you\ncould do the same? You have only to take a mirror, and catch the\nreflection of the sun, and the earth, or anything else--there now you have\nmade them. 'Yes, but only in appearance.' Exactly so; and the painter is\nsuch a creator as you are with the mirror, and he is even more unreal than\nthe carpenter; although neither the carpenter *597* nor any other artist\ncan be supposed to make the absolute bed. 'Not if philosophers may be\nbelieved.' Nor need we wonder that his bed has but an imperfect relation\nto the truth. Reflect:--Here are three beds; one in nature, which is made\nby God; another, which is made by the carpenter; and the third, by the\npainter. God only made one, nor could he have made more than one; for if\nthere had been two, there {cxlvii} would always have been a third--more\nabsolute and abstract than either, under which they would have been\nincluded. We may therefore conceive God to be the natural maker of the\nbed, and in a lower sense the carpenter is also the maker; but the painter\nis rather the imitator of what the other two make; he has to do with a\ncreation which is thrice removed from reality. And the tragic poet is an\nimitator, and, like every other imitator, is thrice removed from the king\nand from the truth. The painter imitates not the original bed, *598* but\nthe bed made by the carpenter. And this, without being really different,\nappears to be different, and has many points of view, of which only one is\ncaught by the painter, who represents everything because he represents a\npiece of everything, and that piece an image. And he can paint any other\nartist, although he knows nothing of their arts; and this with sufficient\nskill to deceive children or simple people. Suppose now that somebody came\nto us and told us, how he had met a man who knew all that everybody knows,\nand better than anybody:--should we not infer him to be a simpleton who,\nhaving no discernment of truth and falsehood, had met with a wizard or\nenchanter, whom he fancied to be all-wise? And when we hear persons saying\nthat Homer and the tragedians know all the arts and all the virtues, must\nwe not infer that they are under a similar delusion? *599* they do not see\nthat the poets are imitators, and that their creations are only\nimitations. 'Very true.' But if a person could create as well as imitate,\nhe would rather leave some permanent work and not an imitation only; he\nwould rather be the receiver than the giver of praise? 'Yes, for then he\nwould have more honour and advantage.'\n\nLet us now interrogate Homer and the poets. Friend Homer, say I to him,\nI am not going to ask you about medicine, or any art to which your poems\nincidentally refer, but about their main subjects--war, military tactics,\npolitics. If you are only twice and not thrice removed from the truth--not\nan imitator or an image-maker, please to inform us what good you have ever\ndone to mankind? Is there any city which professes to have received laws\nfrom you, as Sicily and Italy have from Charondas, *600* Sparta from\nLycurgus, Athens from Solon? Or was any war ever carried on by your\ncounsels? or is any invention attributed to you, as there is to Thales and\nAnacharsis? Or is there any {cxlviii} Homeric way of life, such as the\nPythagorean was, in which you instructed men, and which is called after\nyou? 'No, indeed; and Creophylus [Flesh-child] was even more unfortunate\nin his breeding than he was in his name, if, as tradition says, Homer in\nhis lifetime was allowed by him and his other friends to starve.' Yes, but\ncould this ever have happened if Homer had really been the educator of\nHellas? Would he not have had many devoted followers? If Protagoras and\nProdicus can persuade their contemporaries that no one can manage house or\nState without them, is it likely that Homer and Hesiod would have been\nallowed to go about as beggars--I mean if they had really been able to do\nthe world any good?--would not men have compelled them to stay where they\nwere, or have followed them about in order to get education? But they did\nnot; and therefore we may infer that Homer and all the poets are only\nimitators, who do but imitate the appearances of things. *601* For as a\npainter by a knowledge of figure and colour can paint a cobbler without\nany practice in cobbling, so the poet can delineate any art in the colours\nof language, and give harmony and rhythm to the cobbler and also to the\ngeneral; and you know how mere narration, when deprived of the ornaments\nof metre, is like a face which has lost the beauty of youth and never had\nany other. Once more, the imitator has no knowledge of reality, but only\nof appearance. The painter paints, and the artificer makes a bridle and\nreins, but neither understands the use of them--the knowledge of this is\nconfined to the horseman; and so of other things. Thus we have three arts:\none of use, another of invention, a third of imitation; and the user\nfurnishes the rule to the two others. The flute-player will know the good\nand bad flute, and the maker will put faith in him; but *602* the imitator\nwill neither know nor have faith--neither science nor true opinion can be\nascribed to him. Imitation, then, is devoid of knowledge, being only a\nkind of play or sport, and the tragic and epic poets are imitators in the\nhighest degree.\n\nAnd now let us enquire, what is the faculty in man which answers to\nimitation. Allow me to explain my meaning: Objects are differently seen\nwhen in the water and when out of the water, when near and when at a\ndistance; and the painter or juggler makes use of this variation to impose\nupon us. And {cxlix} the art of measuring and weighing and calculating\ncomes in to save our bewildered minds from the power of appearance; for,\nas we were saying, *603* two contrary opinions of the same about the same\nand at the same time, cannot both of them be true. But which of them is\ntrue is determined by the art of calculation; and this is allied to the\nbetter faculty in the soul, as the arts of imitation are to the worse. And\nthe same holds of the ear as well as of the eye, of poetry as well as\npainting. The imitation is of actions voluntary or involuntary, in which\nthere is an expectation of a good or bad result, and present experience of\npleasure and pain. But is a man in harmony with himself when he is the\nsubject of these conflicting influences? Is there not rather a\ncontradiction in him? Let me further ask, whether *604* he is more likely\nto control sorrow when he is alone or when he is in company. 'In the\nlatter case.' Feeling would lead him to indulge his sorrow, but reason and\nlaw control him and enjoin patience; since he cannot know whether his\naffliction is good or evil, and no human thing is of any great\nconsequence, while sorrow is certainly a hindrance to good counsel. For\nwhen we stumble, we should not, like children, make an uproar; we should\ntake the measures which reason prescribes, not raising a lament, but\nfinding a cure. And the better part of us is ready to follow reason, while\nthe irrational principle is full of sorrow and distraction at the\nrecollection of our troubles. Unfortunately, however, this latter\nfurnishes the chief materials of the imitative arts. Whereas reason is\never in repose and cannot easily be displayed, especially to a mixed\nmultitude who have no experience of her. *605* Thus the poet is like the\npainter in two ways: first he paints an inferior degree of truth, and\nsecondly, he is concerned with an inferior part of the soul. He indulges\nthe feelings, while he enfeebles the reason; and we refuse to allow him to\nhave authority over the mind of man; for he has no measure of greater and\nless, and is a maker of images and very far gone from truth.\n\nBut we have not yet mentioned the heaviest count in the indictment--the\npower which poetry has of injuriously exciting the feelings. When we hear\nsome passage in which a hero laments his sufferings at tedious length, you\nknow that we sympathize with him and praise the poet; and yet in our own\n{cl} sorrows such an exhibition of feeling is regarded as effeminate and\nunmanly (cp. Ion, 535 E). Now, ought a man to feel pleasure in seeing\nanother do what he hates and abominates in himself? *606* Is he not giving\nway to a sentiment which in his own case he would control?--he is off his\nguard because the sorrow is another's; and he thinks that he may indulge\nhis feelings without disgrace, and will be the gainer by the pleasure. But\nthe inevitable consequence is that he who begins by weeping at the sorrows\nof others, will end by weeping at his own. The same is true of\ncomedy,--you may often laugh at buffoonery which you would be ashamed to\nutter, and the love of coarse merriment on the stage will at last turn you\ninto a buffoon at home. Poetry feeds and waters the passions and desires;\nshe lets them rule instead of ruling them. And therefore, when we hear the\nencomiasts of Homer affirming that he is the educator of Hellas, *607* and\nthat all life should be regulated by his precepts, we may allow the\nexcellence of their intentions, and agree with them in thinking Homer a\ngreat poet and tragedian. But we shall continue to prohibit all poetry\nwhich goes beyond hymns to the Gods and praises of famous men. Not\npleasure and pain, but law and reason shall rule in our State.\n\nThese are our grounds for expelling poetry; but lest she should charge us\nwith discourtesy, let us also make an apology to her. We will remind her\nthat there is an ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy, of which\nthere are many traces in the writings of the poets, such as the saying of\n'the she-dog, yelping at her mistress,' and 'the philosophers who are\nready to circumvent Zeus,' and 'the philosophers who are paupers.'\nNevertheless we bear her no ill-will, and will gladly allow her to return\nupon condition that she makes a defence of herself in verse; and her\nsupporters who are not poets may speak in prose. We confess her charms;\nbut if she cannot show that she is useful as well as delightful, like\nrational lovers, we must renounce our love, though endeared to us by early\nassociations. *608* Having come to years of discretion, we know that\npoetry is not truth, and that a man should be careful how he introduces\nher to that state or constitution which he himself is; for there is a\nmighty issue at stake--no less than the good or evil of a human soul. And\nit is not worth while to forsake justice and virtue {cli} for the\nattractions of poetry, any more than for the sake of honour or wealth.\n'I agree with you.'\n\nAnd yet the rewards of virtue are greater far than I have described. 'And\ncan we conceive things greater still?' Not, perhaps, in this brief span of\nlife: but should an immortal being care about anything short of eternity?\n'I do not understand what you mean?' Do you not know that the soul is\nimmortal? 'Surely you are not prepared to prove that?' Indeed I am. 'Then\nlet me hear this argument, of which you make so light.'\n\n*609* You would admit that everything has an element of good and of evil.\nIn all things there is an inherent corruption; and if this cannot destroy\nthem, nothing else will. The soul too has her own corrupting principles,\nwhich are injustice, intemperance, cowardice, and the like. But none of\nthese destroy the soul in the same sense that disease destroys the body.\nThe soul may be full of all iniquities, but is not, by reason of them,\nbrought any nearer to death. Nothing which was not destroyed from within\never perished by external affection of evil. The body, which is one thing,\n*610* cannot be destroyed by food, which is another, unless the badness of\nthe food is communicated to the body. Neither can the soul, which is one\nthing, be corrupted by the body, which is another, unless she herself is\ninfected. And as no bodily evil can infect the soul, neither can any\nbodily evil, whether disease or violence, or any other destroy the soul,\nunless it can be shown to render her unholy and unjust. But no one will\never prove that the souls of men become more unjust when they die. If a\nperson has the audacity to say the contrary, the answer is--Then why do\ncriminals require the hand of the executioner, and not die of themselves?\n'Truly,' he said, 'injustice would not be very terrible if it brought a\ncessation of evil; but I rather believe that the injustice which murders\nothers may tend to quicken and stimulate the life of the unjust.' You are\nquite right. If sin which is her own natural and inherent evil cannot\ndestroy the soul, hardly will anything else destroy her. *611* But the\nsoul which cannot be destroyed either by internal or external evil must be\nimmortal and everlasting. And if this be true, souls will always exist in\nthe same number. They cannot diminish, because they cannot be destroyed;\nnor yet increase, for the increase of the immortal must come from\nsomething {clii} mortal, and so all would end in immortality. Neither is\nthe soul variable and diverse; for that which is immortal must be of the\nfairest and simplest composition. If we would conceive her truly, and so\nbehold justice and injustice in their own nature, she must be viewed by\nthe light of reason pure as at birth, or as she is reflected in philosophy\nwhen holding converse with the divine and immortal and eternal. In her\npresent condition we see her only like the sea-god Glaucus, bruised and\nmaimed in the sea which is the world, *612* and covered with shells and\nstones which are incrusted upon her from the entertainments of earth.\n\nThus far, as the argument required, we have said nothing of the rewards\nand honours which the poets attribute to justice; we have contented\nourselves with showing that justice in herself is best for the soul in\nherself, even if a man should put on a Gyges' ring and have the helmet of\nHades too. And now you shall repay me what you borrowed; and I will\nenumerate the rewards of justice in life and after death. I granted, for\nthe sake of argument, as you will remember, that evil might perhaps escape\nthe knowledge of Gods and men, although this was really impossible. And\nsince I have shown that justice has reality, you must grant me also that\nshe has the palm of appearance. In the first place, the just man is known\nto the Gods, *613* and he is therefore the friend of the Gods, and he will\nreceive at their hands every good, always excepting such evil as is the\nnecessary consequence of former sins. All things end in good to him,\neither in life or after death, even what appears to be evil; for the Gods\nhave a care of him who desires to be in their likeness. And what shall we\nsay of men? Is not honesty the best policy? The clever rogue makes a great\nstart at first, but breaks down before he reaches the goal, and slinks\naway in dishonour; whereas the true runner perseveres to the end, and\nreceives the prize. And you must allow me to repeat all the blessings\nwhich you attributed to the fortunate unjust--they bear rule in the city,\nthey marry and give in marriage to whom they will; and the evils which you\nattributed to the unfortunate just, do really fall in the end on the\nunjust, although, as you implied, their sufferings are better veiled in\nsilence.\n\n*614* But all the blessings of this present life are as nothing when\n{cliii} compared with those which await good men after death. 'I should\nlike to hear about them.' Come, then, and I will tell you the story of Er,\nthe son of Armenius, a valiant man. He was supposed to have died in\nbattle, but ten days afterwards his body was found untouched by corruption\nand sent home for burial. On the twelfth day he was placed on the funeral\npyre and there he came to life again, and told what he had seen in the\nworld below. He said that his soul went with a great company to a place,\nin which there were two chasms near together in the earth beneath, and two\ncorresponding chasms in the heaven above. And there were judges sitting in\nthe intermediate space, bidding the just ascend by the heavenly way on the\nright hand, having the seal of their judgment set upon them before, while\nthe unjust, having the seal behind, were bidden to descend by the way on\nthe left hand. Him they told to look and listen, as he was to be their\nmessenger to men from the world below. And he beheld and saw the souls\ndeparting after judgment at either chasm; some who came from earth, were\nworn and travel-stained; others, who came from heaven, were clean and\nbright. They seemed glad to meet and rest awhile in the meadow; here they\ndiscoursed with one another of what they had seen in the other world.\n*615* Those who came from earth wept at the remembrance of their sorrows,\nbut the spirits from above spoke of glorious sights and heavenly bliss. He\nsaid that for every evil deed they were punished tenfold--now the journey\nwas of a thousand years' duration, because the life of man was reckoned as\na hundred years--and the rewards of virtue were in the same proportion. He\nadded something hardly worth repeating about infants dying almost as soon\nas they were born. Of parricides and other murderers he had tortures still\nmore terrible to narrate. He was present when one of the spirits\nasked--Where is Ardiaeus the Great? (This Ardiaeus was a cruel tyrant, who\nhad murdered his father, and his elder brother, a thousand years before.)\nAnother spirit answered, 'He comes not hither, and will never come. And I\nmyself,' he added, 'actually saw this terrible sight. At the entrance of\nthe chasm, as we were about to reascend, Ardiaeus appeared, and some other\nsinners--most of whom had been tyrants, but not all--and just as they\nfancied that they were returning to life, the chasm gave a roar, *616* and\nthen wild, fiery-looking men who knew the {cliv} meaning of the sound,\nseized him and several others, and bound them hand and foot and threw them\ndown, and dragged them along at the side of the road, lacerating them and\ncarding them like wool, and explaining to the passers-by, that they were\ngoing to be cast into hell.' The greatest terror of the pilgrims ascending\nwas lest they should hear the voice, and when there was silence one by one\nthey passed up with joy. To these sufferings there were corresponding\ndelights.\n\nOn the eighth day the souls of the pilgrims resumed their journey, and in\nfour days came to a spot whence they looked down upon a line of light, in\ncolour like a rainbow, only brighter and clearer. One day more brought\nthem to the place, and they saw that this was the column of light which\nbinds together the whole universe. The ends of the column were fastened to\nheaven, and from them hung the distaff of Necessity, on which all the\nheavenly bodies turned--the hook and spindle were of adamant, and the\nwhorl of a mixed substance. The whorl was in form like a number of boxes\nfitting into one another with their edges turned upwards, making together\na single whorl which was pierced by the spindle. The outermost had the rim\nbroadest, and the inner whorls were smaller and smaller, and had their\nrims narrower. The largest (the fixed stars) was spangled--the seventh\n(the sun) was brightest--the eighth (the moon) shone by the light of the\nseventh-- *617* the second and fifth (Saturn and Mercury) were most like\none another and yellower than the eighth--the third (Jupiter) had the\nwhitest light--the fourth (Mars) was red--the sixth (Venus) was in\nwhiteness second. The whole had one motion, but while this was revolving\nin one direction the seven inner circles were moving in the opposite, with\nvarious degrees of swiftness and slowness. The spindle turned on the knees\nof Necessity, and a Siren stood hymning upon each circle, while Lachesis,\nClotho, and Atropos, the daughters of Necessity, sat on thrones at equal\nintervals, singing of past, present, and future, responsive to the music\nof the Sirens; Clotho from time to time guiding the outer circle with a\ntouch of her right hand; Atropos with her left hand touching and guiding\nthe inner circles; Lachesis in turn putting forth her hand from time to\ntime to guide both of them. On their arrival the pilgrims went to\nLachesis, and there was an interpreter who arranged them, and taking from\nher {clv} knees lots, and samples of lives, got up into a pulpit and said:\n'Mortal souls, hear the words of Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity. A\nnew period of mortal life has begun, and you may choose what divinity you\nplease; the responsibility of choosing is with you--God is blameless.'\n*618* After speaking thus, he cast the lots among them and each one took\nup the lot which fell near him. He then placed on the ground before them\nthe samples of lives, many more than the souls present; and there were all\nsorts of lives, of men and of animals. There were tyrannies ending in\nmisery and exile, and lives of men and women famous for their different\nqualities; and also mixed lives, made up of wealth and poverty, sickness\nand health. Here, Glaucon, is the great risk of human life, and therefore\nthe whole of education should be directed to the acquisition of such a\nknowledge as will teach a man to refuse the evil and choose the good. He\nshould know all the combinations which occur in life--of beauty with\npoverty or with wealth,--of knowledge with external goods,--and at last\nchoose with reference to the nature of the soul, regarding that only as\nthe better life which makes men better, and leaving the rest. And *619* a\nman must take with him an iron sense of truth and right into the world\nbelow, that there too he may remain undazzled by wealth or the allurements\nof evil, and be determined to avoid the extremes and choose the mean. For\nthis, as the messenger reported the interpreter to have said, is the true\nhappiness of man; and any one, as he proclaimed, may, if he choose with\nunderstanding, have a good lot, even though he come last. 'Let not the\nfirst be careless in his choice, nor the last despair.' He spoke; and when\nhe had spoken, he who had drawn the first lot chose a tyranny: he did not\nsee that he was fated to devour his own children--and when he discovered\nhis mistake, he wept and beat his breast, blaming chance and the Gods and\nanybody rather than himself. He was one of those who had come from heaven,\nand in his previous life had been a citizen of a well-ordered State, but\nhe had only habit and no philosophy. Like many another, he made a bad\nchoice, because he had no experience of life; whereas those who came from\nearth and had seen trouble were not in such a hurry to choose. But if a\nman had followed philosophy while upon earth, and had been moderately\nfortunate in his lot, he might not only be happy here, but his pilgrimage\nboth from and {clvi} to this world would be smooth and heavenly. Nothing\nwas more curious than the spectacle of the choice, at once sad and\nlaughable and wonderful; most of the souls only seeking to avoid their own\ncondition in a previous life. *620* He saw the soul of Orpheus changing\ninto a swan because he would not be born of a woman; there was Thamyras\nbecoming a nightingale; musical birds, like the swan, choosing to be men;\nthe twentieth soul, which was that of Ajax, preferring the life of a lion\nto that of a man, in remembrance of the injustice which was done to him in\nthe judgment of the arms; and Agamemnon, from a like enmity to human\nnature, passing into an eagle. About the middle was the soul of Atalanta\nchoosing the honours of an athlete, and next to her Epeus taking the\nnature of a workwoman; among the last was Thersites, who was changing\nhimself into a monkey. Thither, the last of all, came Odysseus, and sought\nthe lot of a private man, which lay neglected and despised, and when he\nfound it he went away rejoicing, and said that if he had been first\ninstead of last, his choice would have been the same. Men, too, were seen\npassing into animals, and wild and tame animals changing into one another.\n\nWhen all the souls had chosen they went to Lachesis, who sent with each of\nthem their genius or attendant to fulfil their lot. He first of all\nbrought them under the hand of Clotho, and drew them within the revolution\nof the spindle impelled by her hand; from her they were carried to\nAtropos, who made the threads irreversible; *621* whence, without turning\nround, they passed beneath the throne of Necessity; and when they had all\npassed, they moved on in scorching heat to the plain of Forgetfulness and\nrested at evening by the river Unmindful, whose water could not be\nretained in any vessel; of this they had all to drink a certain\nquantity--some of them drank more than was required, and he who drank\nforgot all things. Er himself was prevented from drinking. When they had\ngone to rest, about the middle of the night there were thunderstorms and\nearthquakes, and suddenly they were all driven divers ways, shooting like\nstars to their birth. Concerning his return to the body, he only knew that\nawaking suddenly in the morning he found himself lying on the pyre.\n\nThus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved, and will be our salvation, if we\nbelieve that the soul is immortal, and hold fast to the {clvii} heavenly\nway of Justice and Knowledge. So shall we pass undefiled over the river of\nForgetfulness, and be dear to ourselves and to the Gods, and have a crown\nof reward and happiness both in this world and also in the millennial\npilgrimage of the other.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic X._ Introduction.]\n\nThe Tenth Book of the Republic of Plato falls into two divisions: first,\nresuming an old thread which has been interrupted, Socrates assails the\npoets, who, now that the nature of the soul has been analyzed, are seen to\nbe very far gone from the truth; and secondly, having shown the reality of\nthe happiness of the just, he demands that appearance shall be restored to\nhim, and then proceeds to prove the immortality of the soul. The argument,\nas in the Phaedo and Gorgias, is supplemented by the vision of a future\nlife.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWhy Plato, who was himself a poet, and whose dialogues are poems and\ndramas, should have been hostile to the poets as a class, and especially\nto the dramatic poets; why he should not have seen that truth may be\nembodied in verse as well as in prose, and that there are some indefinable\nlights and shadows of human life which can only be expressed in\npoetry--some elements of imagination which always entwine with reason; why\nhe should have supposed epic verse to be inseparably associated with the\nimpurities of the old Hellenic mythology; why he should try Homer and\nHesiod by the unfair and prosaic test of utility,--are questions which\nhave always been debated amongst students of Plato. Though unable to give\na complete answer to them, we may show--first, that his views arose\nnaturally out of the circumstances of his age; and secondly, we may elicit\nthe truth as well as the error which is contained in them.\n\nHe is the enemy of the poets because poetry was declining in his own\nlifetime, and a theatrocracy, as he says in the Laws (iii. 701 A), had\ntaken the place of an intellectual aristocracy. Euripides exhibited the\nlast phase of the tragic drama, and in him Plato saw the friend and\napologist of tyrants, and the Sophist of tragedy. The old comedy was\nalmost extinct; the new had not yet arisen. Dramatic and lyric poetry,\nlike every other branch of Greek literature, was falling under the power\nof rhetoric. There was no 'second or third' to \u00c6schylus and {clviii}\nSophocles in the generation which followed them. Aristophanes, in one of\nhis later comedies (Frogs, 89 foll.), speaks of 'thousands of\ntragedy-making prattlers,' whose attempts at poetry he compares to the\nchirping of swallows; 'their garrulity went far beyond Euripides,'--'they\nappeared once upon the stage, and there was an end of them.' To a man of\ngenius who had a real appreciation of the godlike \u00c6schylus and the noble\nand gentle Sophocles, though disagreeing with some parts of their\n'theology' (Rep. ii. 380), these 'minor poets' must have been contemptible\nand intolerable. There is no feeling stronger in the dialogues of Plato\nthan a sense of the decline and decay both in literature and in politics\nwhich marked his own age. Nor can he have been expected to look with\nfavour on the licence of Aristophanes, now at the end of his career, who\nhad begun by satirizing Socrates in the Clouds, and in a similar spirit\nforty years afterwards had satirized the founders of ideal commonwealths\nin his Eccleziazusae, or Female Parliament (cp. x. 606 C, and Laws ii. 658\nff.; 817).\n\nThere were other reasons for the antagonism of Plato to poetry. The\nprofession of an actor was regarded by him as a degradation of human\nnature, for 'one man in his life' cannot 'play many parts;' the characters\nwhich the actor performs seem to destroy his own character, and to leave\nnothing which can be truly called himself. Neither can any man live his\nlife and act it. The actor is the slave of his art, not the master of it.\nTaking this view Plato is more decided in his expulsion of the dramatic\nthan of the epic poets, though he must have known that the Greek\ntragedians afforded noble lessons and examples of virtue and patriotism,\nto which nothing in Homer can be compared. But great dramatic or even\ngreat rhetorical power is hardly consistent with firmness or strength of\nmind, and dramatic talent is often incidentally associated with a weak or\ndissolute character.\n\nIn the Tenth Book Plato introduces a new series of objections. First, he\nsays that the poet or painter is an imitator, and in the third degree\nremoved from the truth. His creations are not tested by rule and measure;\nthey are only appearances. In modern times we should say that art is not\nmerely imitation, but rather the expression of the ideal in forms of\nsense. Even adopting the humble image of Plato, from which his argument\nderives a colour, we should maintain that the artist {clix} may ennoble\nthe bed which he paints by the folds of the drapery, or by the feeling of\nhome which he introduces; and there have been modern painters who have\nimparted such an ideal interest to a blacksmith's or a carpenter's shop.\nThe eye or mind which feels as well as sees can give dignity and pathos to\na ruined mill, or a straw-built shed [Rembrandt], to the hull of a vessel\n'going to its last home' [Turner]. Still more would this apply to the\ngreatest works of art, which seem to be the visible embodiment of the\ndivine. Had Plato been asked whether the Zeus or Athene of Pheidias was\nthe imitation of an imitation only, would he not have been compelled to\nadmit that something more was to be found in them than in the form of any\nmortal; and that the rule of proportion to which they conformed was\n'higher far than any geometry or arithmetic could express?' (Statesman,\n257 A.)\n\nAgain, Plato objects to the imitative arts that they express the emotional\nrather than the rational part of human nature. He does not admit\nAristotle's theory, that tragedy or other serious imitations are a\npurgation of the passions by pity and fear; to him they appear only to\nafford the opportunity of indulging them. Yet we must acknowledge that we\nmay sometimes cure disordered emotions by giving expression to them; and\nthat they often gain strength when pent up within our own breast. It is\nnot every indulgence of the feelings which is to be condemned. For there\nmay be a gratification of the higher as well as of the lower--thoughts\nwhich are too deep or too sad to be expressed by ourselves, may find an\nutterance in the words of poets. Every one would acknowledge that there\nhave been times when they were consoled and elevated by beautiful music or\nby the sublimity of architecture or by the peacefulness of nature. Plato\nhas himself admitted, in the earlier part of the Republic, that the arts\nmight have the effect of harmonizing as well as of enervating the mind;\nbut in the Tenth Book he regards them through a Stoic or Puritan medium.\nHe asks only 'What good have they done?' and is not satisfied with the\nreply, that 'They have given innocent pleasure to mankind.'\n\nHe tells us that he rejoices in the banishment of the poets, since he has\nfound by the analysis of the soul that they are concerned with the\ninferior faculties. He means to say that {clx} the higher faculties have\nto do with universals, the lower with particulars of sense. The poets are\non a level with their own age, but not on a level with Socrates and Plato;\nand he was well aware that Homer and Hesiod could not be made a rule of\nlife by any process of legitimate interpretation; his ironical use of them\nis in fact a denial of their authority; he saw, too, that the poets were\nnot critics--as he says in the Apology, 'Any one was a better interpreter\nof their writings than they were themselves' (22 C). He himself ceased to\nbe a poet when he became a disciple of Socrates; though, as he tells us of\nSolon, 'he might have been one of the greatest of them, if he had not been\ndeterred by other pursuits' (Tim. 21 C) Thus from many points of view\nthere is an antagonism between Plato and the poets, which was foreshadowed\nto him in the old quarrel between philosophy and poetry. The poets, as he\nsays in the Protagoras (316 E), were the Sophists of their day; and his\ndislike of the one class is reflected on the other. He regards them both\nas the enemies of reasoning and abstraction, though in the case of\nEuripides more with reference to his immoral sentiments about tyrants and\nthe like. For Plato is the prophet who 'came into the world to convince\nmen'--first of the fallibility of sense and opinion, and secondly of the\nreality of abstract ideas. Whatever strangeness there may be in modern\ntimes in opposing philosophy to poetry, which to us seem to have so many\nelements in common, the strangeness will disappear if we conceive of\npoetry as allied to sense, and of philosophy as equivalent to thought and\nabstraction. Unfortunately the very word 'idea,' which to Plato is\nexpressive of the most real of all things, is associated in our minds with\nan element of subjectiveness and unreality. We may note also how he\ndiffers from Aristotle who declares poetry to be truer than history, for\nthe opposite reason, because it is concerned with universals, not like\nhistory, with particulars (Poet. c. 9, 3).\n\nThe things which are seen are opposed in Scripture to the things which are\nunseen--they are equally opposed in Plato to universals and ideas. To him\nall particulars appear to be floating about in a world of sense; they have\na taint of error or even of evil. There is no difficulty in seeing that\nthis is an illusion; for there is no more error or variation in an\nindividual man, horse, {clxi} bed, etc., than in the class man, horse,\nbed, etc.; nor is the truth which is displayed in individual instances\nless certain than that which is conveyed through the medium of ideas. But\nPlato, who is deeply impressed with the real importance of universals as\ninstruments of thought, attributes to them an essential truth which is\nimaginary and unreal; for universals may be often false and particulars\ntrue. Had he attained to any clear conception of the individual, which is\nthe synthesis of the universal and the particular; or had he been able to\ndistinguish between opinion and sensation, which the ambiguity of the\nwords [Greek: do/xa, phai/nesthai, ei)ko\\s] and the like, tended to\nconfuse, he would not have denied truth to the particulars of sense.\n\nBut the poets are also the representatives of falsehood and feigning in\nall departments of life and knowledge, like the sophists and rhetoricians\nof the Gorgias and Phaedrus; they are the false priests, false prophets,\nlying spirits, enchanters of the world. There is another count put into\nthe indictment against them by Plato, that they are the friends of the\ntyrant, and bask in the sunshine of his patronage. Despotism in all ages\nhas had an apparatus of false ideas and false teachers at its service--in\nthe history of Modern Europe as well as of Greece and Rome. For no\ngovernment of men depends solely upon force; without some corruption of\nliterature and morals--some appeal to the imagination of the masses--some\npretence to the favour of heaven--some element of good giving power to\nevil (cp. i. 352), tyranny, even for a short time, cannot be maintained.\nThe Greek tyrants were not insensible to the importance of awakening in\ntheir cause a Pseudo-Hellenic feeling; they were proud of successes at the\nOlympic games; they were not devoid of the love of literature and art.\nPlato is thinking in the first instance of Greek poets who had graced the\ncourts of Dionysius or Archelaus: and the old spirit of freedom is roused\nwithin him at their prostitution of the Tragic Muse in the praises of\ntyranny. But his prophetic eye extends beyond them to the false teachers\nof other ages who are the creatures of the government under which they\nlive. He compares the corruption of his contemporaries with the idea of a\nperfect society, and gathers up into one mass of evil the evils and errors\nof mankind; to him they are personified in the {clxii} rhetoricians,\nsophists, poets, rulers who deceive and govern the world.\n\nA further objection which Plato makes to poetry and the imitative arts is\nthat they excite the emotions. Here the modern reader will be disposed to\nintroduce a distinction which appears to have escaped him. For the\nemotions are neither bad nor good in themselves, and are not most likely\nto be controlled by the attempt to eradicate them, but by the moderate\nindulgence of them. And the vocation of art is to present thought in the\nform of feeling, to enlist the feelings on the side of reason, to inspire\neven for a moment courage or resignation; perhaps to suggest a sense of\ninfinity and eternity in a way which mere language is incapable of\nattaining. True, the same power which in the purer age of art embodies\ngods and heroes only, may be made to express the voluptuous image of a\nCorinthian courtezan. But this only shows that art, like other outward\nthings, may be turned to good and also to evil, and is not more closely\nconnected with the higher than with the lower part of the soul. All\nimitative art is subject to certain limitations, and therefore necessarily\npartakes of the nature of a compromise. Something of ideal truth is\nsacrificed for the sake of the representation, and something in the\nexactness of the representation is sacrificed to the ideal. Still, works\nof art have a permanent element; they idealize and detain the passing\nthought, and are the intermediates between sense and ideas.\n\nIn the present stage of the human mind, poetry and other forms of fiction\nmay certainly be regarded as a good. But we can also imagine the existence\nof an age in which a severer conception of truth has either banished or\ntransformed them. At any rate we must admit that they hold a different\nplace at different periods of the world's history. In the infancy of\nmankind, poetry, with the exception of proverbs, is the whole of\nliterature, and the only instrument of intellectual culture; in modern\ntimes she is the shadow or echo of her former self, and appears to have a\nprecarious existence. Milton in his day doubted whether an epic poem was\nany longer possible. At the same time we must remember, that what Plato\nwould have called the charms of poetry have been partly transferred\n{clxiii} to prose; he himself (Statesman 304) admits rhetoric to be the\nhandmaiden of Politics, and proposes to find in the strain of law (Laws\nvii. 811) a substitute for the old poets. Among ourselves the creative\npower seems often to be growing weaker, and scientific fact to be more\nengrossing and overpowering to the mind than formerly. The illusion of the\nfeelings commonly called love, has hitherto been the inspiring influence\nof modern poetry and romance, and has exercised a humanizing if not a\nstrengthening influence on the world. But may not the stimulus which love\nhas given to fancy be some day exhausted? The modern English novel which\nis the most popular of all forms of reading is not more than a century or\ntwo old: will the tale of love a hundred years hence, after so many\nthousand variations of the same theme, be still received with unabated\ninterest?\n\nArt cannot claim to be on a level with philosophy or religion, and may\noften corrupt them. It is possible to conceive a mental state in which all\nartistic representations are regarded as a false and imperfect expression,\neither of the religious ideal or of the philosophical ideal. The fairest\nforms may be revolting in certain moods of mind, as is proved by the fact\nthat the Mahometans, and many sects of Christians, have renounced the use\nof pictures and images. The beginning of a great religion, whether\nChristian or Gentile, has not been 'wood or stone,' but a spirit moving in\nthe hearts of men. The disciples have met in a large upper room or in\n'holes and caves of the earth'; in the second or third generation, they\nhave had mosques, temples, churches, monasteries. And the revival or\nreform of religions, like the first revelation of them, has come from\nwithin and has generally disregarded external ceremonies and\naccompaniments.\n\nBut poetry and art may also be the expression of the highest truth and the\npurest sentiment. Plato himself seems to waver between two opposite\nviews--when, as in the third Book, he insists that youth should be brought\nup amid wholesome imagery; and again in Book x, when he banishes the poets\nfrom his Republic. Admitting that the arts, which some of us almost deify,\nhave fallen short of their higher aim, we must admit on the other hand\nthat to banish imagination wholly would be suicidal {clxiv} as well as\nimpossible. For nature too is a form of art; and a breath of the fresh air\nor a single glance at the varying landscape would in an instant revive and\nreillumine the extinguished spark of poetry in the human breast. In the\nlower stages of civilization imagination more than reason distinguishes\nman from the animals; and to banish art would be to banish thought, to\nbanish language, to banish the expression of all truth. No religion is\nwholly devoid of external forms; even the Mahometan who renounces the use\nof pictures and images has a temple in which he worships the Most High, as\nsolemn and beautiful as any Greek or Christian building. Feeling too and\nthought are not really opposed; for he who thinks must feel before he can\nexecute. And the highest thoughts, when they become familiarized to us,\nare always tending to pass into the form of feeling.\n\nPlato does not seriously intend to expel poets from life and society. But\nhe feels strongly the unreality of their writings; he is protesting\nagainst the degeneracy of poetry in his own day as we might protest\nagainst the want of serious purpose in modern fiction, against the\nunseemliness or extravagance of some of our poets or novelists, against\nthe time-serving of preachers or public writers, against the\nregardlessness of truth which to the eye of the philosopher seems to\ncharacterize the greater part of the world. For we too have reason to\ncomplain that our poets and novelists 'paint inferior truth' and 'are\nconcerned with the inferior part of the soul'; that the readers of them\nbecome what they read and are injuriously affected by them. And we look in\nvain for that healthy atmosphere of which Plato speaks,--'the beauty which\nmeets the sense like a breeze and imperceptibly draws the soul, even in\nchildhood, into harmony with the beauty of reason.'\n\nFor there might be a poetry which would be the hymn of divine perfection,\nthe harmony of goodness and truth among men: a strain which should renew\nthe youth of the world, and bring back the ages in which the poet was\nman's only teacher and best friend,--which would find materials in the\nliving present as well as in the romance of the past, and might subdue to\nthe fairest forms of speech and verse the intractable materials of modern\ncivilisation,--which might elicit the simple principles, or, as Plato\n{clxv} would have called them, the essential forms, of truth and justice\nout of the variety of opinion and the complexity of modern society,--which\nwould preserve all the good of each generation and leave the bad\nunsung,--which should be based not on vain longings or faint imaginings,\nbut on a clear insight into the nature of man. Then the tale of love might\nbegin again in poetry or prose, two in one, united in the pursuit of\nknowledge, or the service of God and man; and feelings of love might still\nbe the incentive to great thoughts and heroic deeds as in the days of\nDante or Petrarch; and many types of manly and womanly beauty might appear\namong us, rising above the ordinary level of humanity, and many lives\nwhich were like poems (Laws vii. 817 B), be not only written, but lived by\nus. A few such strains have been heard among men in the tragedies of\n\u00c6eschylus and Sophocles, whom Plato quotes, not, as Homer is quoted by\nhim, in irony, but with deep and serious approval,--in the poetry of\nMilton and Wordsworth, and in passages of other English poets,--first and\nabove all in the Hebrew prophets and psalmists. Shakespeare has taught us\nhow great men should speak and act; he has drawn characters of a wonderful\npurity and depth; he has ennobled the human mind, but, like Homer (Rep. x.\n599 foll.), he 'has left no way of life.' The next greatest poet of modern\ntimes, Goethe, is concerned with 'a lower degree of truth'; he paints the\nworld as a stage on which 'all the men and women are merely players'; he\ncultivates life as an art, but he furnishes no ideals of truth and action.\nThe poet may rebel against any attempt to set limits to his fancy; and he\nmay argue truly that moralizing in verse is not poetry. Possibly, like\nMephistopheles in Faust, he may retaliate on his adversaries. But the\nphilosopher will still be justified in asking, 'How may the heavenly gift\nof poesy be devoted to the good of mankind?'\n\nReturning to Plato, we may observe that a similar mixture of truth and\nerror appears in other parts of the argument. He is aware of the absurdity\nof mankind framing their whole lives according to Homer; just as in the\nPhaedrus he intimates the absurdity of interpreting mythology upon\nrational principles; both these were the modern tendencies of his own age,\nwhich he deservedly ridicules. On the other hand, his argument that\n{clxvi} Homer, if he had been able to teach mankind anything worth\nknowing, would not have been allowed by them to go about begging as a\nrhapsodist, is both false and contrary to the spirit of Plato (cp. Rep.\nvi. 489 A foll.). It may be compared with those other paradoxes of the\nGorgias, that 'No statesman was ever unjustly put to death by the city of\nwhich he was the head'; and that 'No Sophist was ever defrauded by his\npupils' (Gorg. 519 foll.)......\n\nThe argument for immortality seems to rest on the absolute dualism of soul\nand body. Admitting the existence of the soul, we know of no force which\nis able to put an end to her. Vice is her own proper evil; and if she\ncannot be destroyed by that, she cannot be destroyed by any other. Yet\nPlato has acknowledged that the soul may be so overgrown by the\nincrustations of earth as to lose her original form; and in the Timaeus he\nrecognizes more strongly than in the Republic the influence which the body\nhas over the mind, denying even the voluntariness of human actions, on the\nground that they proceed from physical states (Tim. 86, 87). In the\nRepublic, as elsewhere, he wavers between the original soul which has to\nbe restored, and the character which is developed by training and\neducation......\n\nThe vision of another world is ascribed to Er, the son of Armenius, who is\nsaid by Clement of Alexandria to have been Zoroaster. The tale has\ncertainly an oriental character, and may be compared with the pilgrimages\nof the soul in the Zend Avesta (cp. Haug, Avesta, p. 197). But no trace of\nacquaintance with Zoroaster is found elsewhere in Plato's writings, and\nthere is no reason for giving him the name of Er the Pamphylian. The\nphilosophy of Heracleitus cannot be shown to be borrowed from Zoroaster,\nand still less the myths of Plato.\n\nThe local arrangement of the vision is less distinct than that of the\nPhaedrus and Phaedo. Astronomy is mingled with symbolism and mythology;\nthe great sphere of heaven is represented under the symbol of a cylinder\nor box, containing the seven orbits of the planets and the fixed stars;\nthis is suspended from an axis or spindle which turns on the knees of\nNecessity; the revolutions of the seven orbits contained in the cylinder\nare guided by the fates, and their harmonious motion produces {clxvii} the\nmusic of the spheres. Through the innermost or eighth of these, which is\nthe moon, is passed the spindle; but it is doubtful whether this is the\ncontinuation of the column of light, from which the pilgrims contemplate\nthe heavens; the words of Plato imply that they are connected, but not the\nsame. The column itself is clearly not of adamant. The spindle (which is\nof adamant) is fastened to the ends of the chains which extend to the\nmiddle of the column of light--this column is said to hold together the\nheaven; but whether it hangs from the spindle, or is at right angles to\nit, is not explained. The cylinder containing the orbits of the stars is\nalmost as much a symbol as the figure of Necessity turning the\nspindle;--for the outermost rim is the sphere of the fixed stars, and\nnothing is said about the intervals of space which divide the paths of the\nstars in the heavens. The description is both a picture and an orrery, and\ntherefore is necessarily inconsistent with itself. The column of light is\nnot the Milky Way--which is neither straight, nor like a rainbow--but the\nimaginary axis of the earth. This is compared to the rainbow in respect\nnot of form but of colour, and not to the undergirders of a trireme, but\nto the straight rope running from prow to stern in which the undergirders\nmeet.\n\nThe orrery or picture of the heavens given in the Republic differs in its\nmode of representation from the circles of the same and of the other in\nthe Timaeus. In both the fixed stars are distinguished from the planets,\nand they move in orbits without them, although in an opposite direction:\nin the Republic as in the Timaeus (40 B) they are all moving round the\naxis of the world. But we are not certain that in the former they are\nmoving round the earth. No distinct mention is made in the Republic of the\ncircles of the same and other; although both in the Timaeus and in the\nRepublic the motion of the fixed stars is supposed to coincide with the\nmotion of the whole. The relative thickness of the rims is perhaps\ndesigned to express the relative distances of the planets. Plato probably\nintended to represent the earth, from which Er and his companions are\nviewing the heavens, as stationary in place; but whether or not herself\nrevolving, unless this is implied in the revolution of the axis, is\nuncertain (cp. Timaeus). The spectator {clxviii} may be supposed to look\nat the heavenly bodies, either from above or below. The earth is a sort of\nearth and heaven in one, like the heaven of the Phaedrus, on the back of\nwhich the spectator goes out to take a peep at the stars and is borne\nround in the revolution. There is no distinction between the equator and\nthe ecliptic. But Plato is no doubt led to imagine that the planets have\nan opposite motion to that of the fixed stars, in order to account for\ntheir appearances in the heavens. In the description of the meadow, and\nthe retribution of the good and evil after death, there are traces of\nHomer.\n\nThe description of the axis as a spindle, and of the heavenly bodies as\nforming a whole, partly arises out of the attempt to connect the motions\nof the heavenly bodies with the mythological image of the web, or weaving\nof the Fates. The giving of the lots, the weaving of them, and the making\nof them irreversible, which are ascribed to the three Fates--Lachesis,\nClotho, Atropos, are obviously derived from their names. The element of\nchance in human life is indicated by the order of the lots. But chance,\nhowever adverse, may be overcome by the wisdom of man, if he knows how to\nchoose aright; there is a worse enemy to man than chance; this enemy is\nhimself. He who was moderately fortunate in the number of the lot--even\nthe very last comer--might have a good life if he chose with wisdom. And\nas Plato does not like to make an assertion which is unproven, he more\nthan confirms this statement a few sentences afterwards by the example of\nOdysseus, who chose last. But the virtue which is founded on habit is not\nsufficient to enable a man to choose; he must add to virtue knowledge, if\nhe is to act rightly when placed in new circumstances. The routine of good\nactions and good habits is an inferior sort of goodness; and, as Coleridge\nsays, 'Common sense is intolerable which is not based on metaphysics,' so\nPlato would have said, 'Habit is worthless which is not based upon\nphilosophy.'\n\nThe freedom of the will to refuse the evil and to choose the good is\ndistinctly asserted. 'Virtue is free, and as a man honours or dishonours\nher he will have more or less of her.' The life of man is 'rounded' by\nnecessity; there are circumstances prior to birth which affect him (cp.\nPol. 273 B). But within the walls of necessity there is an open space in\nwhich he is his own master, {clxix} and can study for himself the effects\nwhich the variously compounded gifts of nature or fortune have upon the\nsoul, and act accordingly. All men cannot have the first choice in\neverything. But the lot of all men is good enough, if they choose wisely\nand will live diligently.\n\nThe verisimilitude which is given to the pilgrimage of a thousand years,\nby the intimation that Ardiaeus had lived a thousand years before; the\ncoincidence of Er coming to life on the twelfth day after he was supposed\nto have been dead with the seven days which the pilgrims passed in the\nmeadow, and the four days during which they journeyed to the column of\nlight; the precision with which the soul is mentioned who chose the\ntwentieth lot; the passing remarks that there was no definite character\namong the souls, and that the souls which had chosen ill blamed any one\nrather than themselves; or that some of the souls drank more than was\nnecessary of the waters of Forgetfulness, while Er himself was hindered\nfrom drinking; the desire of Odysseus to rest at last, unlike the\nconception of him in Dante and Tennyson; the feigned ignorance of how Er\nreturned to the body, when the other souls went shooting like stars to\ntheir birth,--add greatly to the probability of the narrative. They are\nsuch touches of nature as the art of Defoe might have introduced when he\nwished to win credibility for marvels and apparitions.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic._ Introduction.]\n\nThere still remain to be considered some points which have been\nintentionally reserved to the end: (I) the Janus-like character of the\nRepublic, which presents two faces--one an Hellenic state, the other a\nkingdom of philosophers. Connected with the latter of the two aspects are\n(II) the paradoxes of the Republic, as they have been termed by\nMorgenstern: ([Greek: a]) the community of property; ([Greek: b]) of\nfamilies; ([Greek: g]) the rule of philosophers; ([Greek: d]) the analogy\nof the individual and the State, which, like some other analogies in the\nRepublic, is carried too far. We may then proceed to consider (III) the\nsubject of education as conceived by Plato, bringing together in a general\nview the education of youth and the education of after-life; (IV) we may\nnote further some essential differences between ancient and modern\npolitics which are suggested by the Republic; {clxx} (V) we may compare\nthe Politicus and the Laws; (VI) we may observe the influence exercised by\nPlato on his imitators; and (VII) take occasion to consider the nature and\nvalue of political, and (VIII) of religious ideals.\n\nI. Plato expressly says that he is intending to found an Hellenic State\n(Book v. 470 E). Many of his regulations are characteristically Spartan;\nsuch as the prohibition of gold and silver, the common meals of the men,\nthe military training of the youth, the gymnastic exercises of the women.\nThe life of Sparta was the life of a camp (Laws ii. 666 E), enforced even\nmore rigidly in time of peace than in war; the citizens of Sparta, like\nPlato's, were forbidden to trade--they were to be soldiers and not\nshopkeepers. Nowhere else in Greece was the individual so completely\nsubjected to the State; the time when he was to marry, the education of\nhis children, the clothes which he was to wear, the food which he was to\neat, were all prescribed by law. Some of the best enactments in the\nRepublic, such as the reverence to be paid to parents and elders, and some\nof the worst, such as the exposure of deformed children, are borrowed from\nthe practice of Sparta. The encouragement of friendships between men and\nyouths, or of men with one another, as affording incentives to bravery, is\nalso Spartan; in Sparta too a nearer approach was made than in any other\nGreek State to equality of the sexes, and to community of property; and\nwhile there was probably less of licentiousness in the sense of\nimmorality, the tie of marriage was regarded more lightly than in the rest\nof Greece. The 'suprema lex' was the preservation of the family, and the\ninterest of the State. The coarse strength of a military government was\nnot favourable to purity and refinement; and the excessive strictness of\nsome regulations seems to have produced a reaction. Of all Hellenes the\nSpartans were most accessible to bribery; several of the greatest of them\nmight be described in the words of Plato as having a 'fierce secret\nlonging after gold and silver.' Though not in the strict sense communists,\nthe principle of communism was maintained among them in their division of\nlands, in their common meals, in their slaves, and in the free use of one\nanother's goods. Marriage was a public institution: and the women were\neducated by the State, and sang and danced in public with the men.\n\n{clxxi} Many traditions were preserved at Sparta of the severity with\nwhich the magistrates had maintained the primitive rule of music and\npoetry; as in the Republic of Plato, the new-fangled poet was to be\nexpelled. Hymns to the Gods, which are the only kind of music admitted\ninto the ideal State, were the only kind which was permitted at Sparta.\nThe Spartans, though an unpoetical race, were nevertheless lovers of\npoetry; they had been stirred by the Elegiac strains of Tyrtaeus, they had\ncrowded around Hippias to hear his recitals of Homer; but in this they\nresembled the citizens of the timocratic rather than of the ideal State\n(548 E). The council of elder men also corresponds to the Spartan\n_gerousia_; and the freedom with which they are permitted to judge about\nmatters of detail agrees with what we are told of that institution. Once\nmore, the military rule of not spoiling the dead or offering arms at the\ntemples; the moderation in the pursuit of enemies; the importance attached\nto the physical well-being of the citizens; the use of warfare for the\nsake of defence rather than of aggression--are features probably suggested\nby the spirit and practice of Sparta.\n\nTo the Spartan type the ideal State reverts in the first decline; and the\ncharacter of the individual timocrat is borrowed from the Spartan citizen.\nThe love of Lacedaemon not only affected Plato and Xenophon, but was\nshared by many undistinguished Athenians; there they seemed to find a\nprinciple which was wanting in their own democracy. The [Greek:\neu)kosmi/a] of the Spartans attracted them, that is to say, not the\ngoodness of their laws, but the spirit of order and loyalty which\nprevailed. Fascinated by the idea, citizens of Athens would imitate the\nLacedaemonians in their dress and manners; they were known to the\ncontemporaries of Plato as 'the persons who had their ears bruised,' like\nthe Roundheads of the Commonwealth. The love of another church or country\nwhen seen at a distance only, the longing for an imaginary simplicity in\ncivilized times, the fond desire of a past which never has been, or of a\nfuture which never will be,--these are aspirations of the human mind which\nare often felt among ourselves. Such feelings meet with a response in the\nRepublic of Plato.\n\nBut there are other features of the Platonic Republic, as, for example,\nthe literary and philosophical education, and the grace {clxxii} and\nbeauty of life, which are the reverse of Spartan. Plato wishes to give his\ncitizens a taste of Athenian freedom as well as of Lacedaemonian\ndiscipline. His individual genius is purely Athenian, although in theory\nhe is a lover of Sparta; and he is something more than either--he has also\na true Hellenic feeling. He is desirous of humanizing the wars of Hellenes\nagainst one another; he acknowledges that the Delphian God is the grand\nhereditary interpreter of all Hellas. The spirit of harmony and the Dorian\nmode are to prevail, and the whole State is to have an external beauty\nwhich is the reflex of the harmony within. But he has not yet found out\nthe truth which he afterwards enunciated in the Laws (i. 628 D)--that he\nwas a better legislator who made men to be of one mind, than he who\ntrained them for war. The citizens, as in other Hellenic States,\ndemocratic as well as aristocratic, are really an upper class; for,\nalthough no mention is made of slaves, the lower classes are allowed to\nfade away into the distance, and are represented in the individual by the\npassions. Plato has no idea either of a social State in which all classes\nare harmonized, or of a federation of Hellas or the world in which\ndifferent nations or States have a place. His city is equipped for war\nrather than for peace, and this would seem to be justified by the ordinary\ncondition of Hellenic States. The myth of the earth-born men is an\nembodiment of the orthodox tradition of Hellas, and the allusion to the\nfour ages of the world is also sanctioned by the authority of Hesiod and\nthe poets. Thus we see that the Republic is partly founded on the ideal of\nthe old Greek _polis_, partly on the actual circumstances of Hellas in\nthat age. Plato, like the old painters, retains the traditional form, and\nlike them he has also a vision of a city in the clouds.\n\nThere is yet another thread which is interwoven in the texture of the\nwork; for the Republic is not only a Dorian State, but a Pythagorean\nleague. The 'way of life' which was connected with the name of Pythagoras,\nlike the Catholic monastic orders, showed the power which the mind of an\nindividual might exercise over his contemporaries, and may have naturally\nsuggested to Plato the possibility of reviving such 'mediaeval\ninstitutions.' The Pythagoreans, like Plato, enforced a rule of life and a\nmoral and intellectual training. The influence ascribed to music, which to\n{clxxiii} us seems exaggerated, is also a Pythagorean feature; it is not\nto be regarded as representing the real influence of music in the Greek\nworld. More nearly than any other government of Hellas, the Pythagorean\nleague of three hundred was an aristocracy of virtue. For once in the\nhistory of mankind the philosophy of order or [Greek: ko/smos], expressing\nand consequently enlisting on its side the combined endeavours of the\nbetter part of the people, obtained the management of public affairs and\nheld possession of it for a considerable time (until about B.C. 500).\nProbably only in States prepared by Dorian institutions would such a\nleague have been possible. The rulers, like Plato's [Greek: phu/lakes],\nwere required to submit to a severe training in order to prepare the way\nfor the education of the other members of the community. Long after the\ndissolution of the Order, eminent Pythagoreans, such as Archytas of\nTarentum, retained their political influence over the cities of Magna\nGraecia. There was much here that was suggestive to the kindred spirit of\nPlato, who had doubtless meditated deeply on the 'way of life of\nPythagoras' (Rep. x. 600 B) and his followers. Slight traces of\nPythagoreanism are to be found in the mystical number of the State, in the\nnumber which expresses the interval between the king and the tyrant, in\nthe doctrine of transmigration, in the music of the spheres, as well as in\nthe great though secondary importance ascribed to mathematics in\neducation.\n\nBut as in his philosophy, so also in the form of his State, he goes far\nbeyond the old Pythagoreans. He attempts a task really impossible, which\nis to unite the past of Greek history with the future of philosophy,\nanalogous to that other impossibility, which has often been the dream of\nChristendom, the attempt to unite the past history of Europe with the\nkingdom of Christ. Nothing actually existing in the world at all resembles\nPlato's ideal State; nor does he himself imagine that such a State is\npossible. This he repeats again and again; e.g. in the Republic (ix. _sub\nfin._), or in the Laws (Book v. 739), where, casting a glance back on the\nRepublic, he admits that the perfect state of communism and philosophy was\nimpossible in his own age, though still to be retained as a pattern. The\nsame doubt is implied in the earnestness with which he argues in the\nRepublic (v. 472 D) that ideals are none the worse because they cannot be\nrealized in fact, and {clxxiv} in the chorus of laughter, which like a\nbreaking wave will, as he anticipates, greet the mention of his proposals;\nthough like other writers of fiction, he uses all his art to give reality\nto his inventions. When asked how the ideal polity can come into being, he\nanswers ironically, 'When one son of a king becomes a philosopher'; he\ndesignates the fiction of the earth-born men as 'a noble lie'; and when\nthe structure is finally complete, he fairly tells you that his Republic\nis a vision only, which in some sense may have reality, but not in the\nvulgar one of a reign of philosophers upon earth. It has been said that\nPlato flies as well as walks, but this falls short of the truth; for he\nflies and walks at the same time, and is in the air and on firm ground in\nsuccessive instants.\n\nNiebuhr has asked a trifling question, which may be briefly noticed in\nthis place--Was Plato a good citizen? If by this is meant, Was he loyal to\nAthenian institutions?--he can hardly be said to be the friend of\ndemocracy: but neither is he the friend of any other existing form of\ngovernment; all of them he regarded as 'states of faction' (Laws viii.\n832 C); none attained to his ideal of a voluntary rule over voluntary\nsubjects, which seems indeed more nearly to describe democracy than any\nother; and the worst of them is tyranny. The truth is, that the question\nhas hardly any meaning when applied to a great philosopher whose writings\nare not meant for a particular age and country, but for all time and all\nmankind. The decline of Athenian politics was probably the motive which\nled Plato to frame an ideal State, and the Republic may be regarded as\nreflecting the departing glory of Hellas. As well might we complain of St.\nAugustine, whose great work 'The City of God' originated in a similar\nmotive, for not being loyal to the Roman Empire. Even a nearer parallel\nmight be afforded by the first Christians, who cannot fairly be charged\nwith being bad citizens because, though 'subject to the higher powers,'\nthey were looking forward to a city which is in heaven.\n\nII. The idea of the perfect State is full of paradox when judged of\naccording to the ordinary notions of mankind. The paradoxes of one age\nhave been said to become the commonplaces of the next; but the paradoxes\nof Plato are at least as paradoxical to us as they were to his\ncontemporaries. The {clxxv} modern world has either sneered at them as\nabsurd, or denounced them as unnatural and immoral; men have been pleased\nto find in Aristotle's criticisms of them the anticipation of their own\ngood sense. The wealthy and cultivated classes have disliked and also\ndreaded them; they have pointed with satisfaction to the failure of\nefforts to realize them in practice. Yet since they are the thoughts of\none of the greatest of human intelligences, and of one who had done most\nto elevate morality and religion, they seem to deserve a better treatment\nat our hands. We may have to address the public, as Plato does poetry, and\nassure them that we mean no harm to existing institutions. There are\nserious errors which have a side of truth and which therefore may fairly\ndemand a careful consideration: there are truths mixed with error of which\nwe may indeed say, 'The half is better than the whole.' Yet 'the half' may\nbe an important contribution to the study of human nature.\n\n([Greek: a]) The first paradox is the community of goods, which is\nmentioned slightly at the end of the third Book, and seemingly, as\nAristotle observes, is confined to the guardians; at least no mention is\nmade of the other classes. But the omission is not of any real\nsignificance, and probably arises out of the plan of the work, which\nprevents the writer from entering into details.\n\nAristotle censures the community of property much in the spirit of modern\npolitical economy, as tending to repress industry, and as doing away with\nthe spirit of benevolence. Modern writers almost refuse to consider the\nsubject, which is supposed to have been long ago settled by the common\nopinion of mankind. But it must be remembered that the sacredness of\nproperty is a notion far more fixed in modern than in ancient times. The\nworld has grown older, and is therefore more conservative. Primitive\nsociety offered many examples of land held in common, either by a tribe or\nby a township, and such may probably have been the original form of landed\ntenure. Ancient legislators had invented various modes of dividing and\npreserving the divisions of land among the citizens; according to\nAristotle there were nations who held the land in common and divided the\nproduce, and there were others who divided the land and stored the produce\nin common. The evils of debt and the inequality of property were far\ngreater in ancient than in modern {clxxvi} times, and the accidents to\nwhich property was subject from war, or revolution, or taxation, or other\nlegislative interference, were also greater. All these circumstances gave\nproperty a less fixed and sacred character. The early Christians are\nbelieved to have held their property in common, and the principle is\nsanctioned by the words of Christ himself, and has been maintained as a\ncounsel of perfection in almost all ages of the Church. Nor have there\nbeen wanting instances of modern enthusiasts who have made a religion of\ncommunism; in every age of religious excitement notions like Wycliffe's\n'inheritance of grace' have tended to prevail. A like spirit, but fiercer\nand more violent, has appeared in politics. 'The preparation of the Gospel\nof peace' soon becomes the red flag of Republicanism.\n\nWe can hardly judge what effect Plato's views would have upon his own\ncontemporaries; they would perhaps have seemed to them only an\nexaggeration of the Spartan commonwealth. Even modern writers would\nacknowledge that the right of private property is based on expediency, and\nmay be interfered with in a variety of ways for the public good. Any other\nmode of vesting property which was found to be more advantageous, would in\ntime acquire the same basis of right; 'the most useful,' in Plato's words,\n'would be the most sacred.' The lawyers and ecclesiastics of former ages\nwould have spoken of property as a sacred institution. But they only meant\nby such language to oppose the greatest amount of resistance to any\ninvasion of the rights of individuals and of the Church.\n\nWhen we consider the question, without any fear of immediate application\nto practice, in the spirit of Plato's Republic, are we quite sure that the\nreceived notions of property are the best? Is the distribution of wealth\nwhich is customary in civilized countries the most favourable that can be\nconceived for the education and development of the mass of mankind? Can\n'the spectator of all time and all existence' be quite convinced that one\nor two thousand years hence, great changes will not have taken place in\nthe rights of property, or even that the very notion of property, beyond\nwhat is necessary for personal maintenance, may not have disappeared? This\nwas a distinction familiar to Aristotle, though likely to be laughed at\namong ourselves. Such a change would not be greater than some other\nchanges through {clxxvii} which the world has passed in the transition\nfrom ancient to modern society, for example, the emancipation of the serfs\nin Russia, or the abolition of slavery in America and the West Indies; and\nnot so great as the difference which separates the Eastern village\ncommunity from the Western world. To accomplish such a revolution in the\ncourse of a few centuries, would imply a rate of progress not more rapid\nthan has actually taken place during the last fifty or sixty years. The\nkingdom of Japan underwent more change in five or six years than Europe in\nfive or six hundred. Many opinions and beliefs which have been cherished\namong ourselves quite as strongly as the sacredness of property have\npassed away; and the most untenable propositions respecting the right of\nbequests or entail have been maintained with as much fervour as the most\nmoderate. Some one will be heard to ask whether a state of society can be\nfinal in which the interests of thousands are perilled on the life or\ncharacter of a single person. And many will indulge the hope that our\npresent condition may, after all, be only transitional, and may conduct to\na higher, in which property, besides ministering to the enjoyment of the\nfew, may also furnish the means of the highest culture to all, and will be\na greater benefit to the public generally, and also more under the control\nof public authority. There may come a time when the saying, 'Have I not a\nright to do what I will with my own?' will appear to be a barbarous relic\nof individualism;--when the possession of a part may be a greater blessing\nto each and all than the possession of the whole is now to any one.\n\nSuch reflections appear visionary to the eye of the practical statesman,\nbut they are within the range of possibility to the philosopher. He can\nimagine that in some distant age or clime, and through the influence of\nsome individual, the notion of common property may or might have sunk as\ndeep into the heart of a race, and have become as fixed to them, as\nprivate property is to ourselves. He knows that this latter institution is\nnot more than four or five thousand years old: may not the end revert to\nthe beginning? In our own age even Utopias affect the spirit of\nlegislation, and an abstract idea may exercise a great influence on\npractical politics.\n\nThe objections that would be generally urged against Plato's community of\nproperty, are the old ones of Aristotle, that motives {clxxviii} for\nexertion would be taken away, and that disputes would arise when each was\ndependent upon all. Every man would produce as little and consume as much\nas he liked. The experience of civilized nations has hitherto been adverse\nto Socialism. The effort is too great for human nature; men try to live in\ncommon, but the personal feeling is always breaking in. On the other hand\nit may be doubted whether our present notions of property are not\nconventional, for they differ in different countries and in different\nstates of society. We boast of an individualism which is not freedom, but\nrather an artificial result of the industrial state of modern Europe. The\nindividual is nominally free, but he is also powerless in a world bound\nhand and foot in the chains of economic necessity. Even if we cannot\nexpect the mass of mankind to become disinterested, at any rate we observe\nin them a power of organization which fifty years ago would never have\nbeen suspected. The same forces which have revolutionized the political\nsystem of Europe, may effect a similar change in the social and industrial\nrelations of mankind. And if we suppose the influence of some good as well\nas neutral motives working in the community, there will be no absurdity in\nexpecting that the mass of mankind having power, and becoming enlightened\nabout the higher possibilities of human life, when they learn how much\nmore is attainable for all than is at present the possession of a favoured\nfew, may pursue the common interest with an intelligence and persistency\nwhich mankind have hitherto never seen.\n\nNow that the world has once been set in motion, and is no longer held fast\nunder the tyranny of custom and ignorance; now that criticism has pierced\nthe veil of tradition and the past no longer overpowers the present,--the\nprogress of civilization may be expected to be far greater and swifter\nthan heretofore. Even at our present rate of speed the point at which we\nmay arrive in two or three generations is beyond the power of imagination\nto foresee. There are forces in the world which work, not in an\narithmetical, but in a geometrical ratio of increase. Education, to use\nthe expression of Plato, moves like a wheel with an ever-multiplying\nrapidity. Nor can we say how great may be its influence, when it becomes\nuniversal,--when it has been inherited by many generations,--when it is\nfreed from the trammels {clxxix} of superstition and rightly adapted to\nthe wants and capacities of different classes of men and women. Neither do\nwe know how much more the co-operation of minds or of hands may be capable\nof accomplishing, whether in labour or in study. The resources of the\nnatural sciences are not half-developed as yet; the soil of the earth,\ninstead of growing more barren, may become many times more fertile than\nhitherto; the uses of machinery far greater, and also more minute than at\npresent. New secrets of physiology may be revealed, deeply affecting human\nnature in its innermost recesses. The standard of health may be raised and\nthe lives of men prolonged by sanitary and medical knowledge. There may be\npeace, there may be leisure, there may be innocent refreshments of many\nkinds. The ever-increasing power of locomotion may join the extremes of\nearth. There may be mysterious workings of the human mind, such as occur\nonly at great crises of history. The East and the West may meet together,\nand all nations may contribute their thoughts and their experience to the\ncommon stock of humanity. Many other elements enter into a speculation of\nthis kind. But it is better to make an end of them. For such reflections\nappear to the majority far-fetched, and to men of science, commonplace.\n\n([Greek: b]) Neither to the mind of Plato nor of Aristotle did the\ndoctrine of community of property present at all the same difficulty, or\nappear to be the same violation of the common Hellenic sentiment, as the\ncommunity of wives and children. This paradox he prefaces by another\nproposal, that the occupations of men and women shall be the same, and\nthat to this end they shall have a common training and education. Male and\nfemale animals have the same pursuits--why not also the two sexes of man?\n\nBut have we not here fallen into a contradiction? for we were saying that\ndifferent natures should have different pursuits. How then can men and\nwomen have the same? And is not the proposal inconsistent with our notion\nof the division of labour?--These objections are no sooner raised than\nanswered; for, according to Plato, there is no organic difference between\nmen and women, but only the accidental one that men beget and women bear\nchildren. Following the analogy of the other animals, he contends that all\nnatural gifts are scattered about indifferently among both sexes, though\nthere may be a superiority of degree {clxxx} on the part of the men. The\nobjection on the score of decency to their taking part in the same\ngymnastic exercises, is met by Plato's assertion that the existing feeling\nis a matter of habit.\n\nThat Plato should have emancipated himself from the ideas of his own\ncountry and from the example of the East, shows a wonderful independence\nof mind. He is conscious that women are half the human race, in some\nrespects the more important half (Laws vi. 781 B); and for the sake both\nof men and women he desires to raise the woman to a higher level of\nexistence. He brings, not sentiment, but philosophy to bear upon a\nquestion which both in ancient and modern times has been chiefly regarded\nin the light of custom or feeling. The Greeks had noble conceptions of\nwomanhood in the goddesses Athene and Artemis, and in the heroines\nAntigone and Andromache. But these ideals had no counterpart in actual\nlife. The Athenian woman was in no way the equal of her husband; she was\nnot the entertainer of his guests or the mistress of his house, but only\nhis housekeeper and the mother of his children. She took no part in\nmilitary or political matters; nor is there any instance in the later ages\nof Greece of a woman becoming famous in literature. 'Hers is the greatest\nglory who has the least renown among men,' is the historian's conception\nof feminine excellence. A very different ideal of womanhood is held up by\nPlato to the world; she is to be the companion of the man, and to share\nwith him in the toils of war and in the cares of government. She is to be\nsimilarly trained both in bodily and mental exercises. She is to lose as\nfar as possible the incidents of maternity and the characteristics of the\nfemale sex.\n\nThe modern antagonist of the equality of the sexes would argue that the\ndifferences between men and women are not confined to the single point\nurged by Plato; that sensibility, gentleness, grace, are the qualities of\nwomen, while energy, strength, higher intelligence, are to be looked for\nin men. And the criticism is just: the differences affect the whole\nnature, and are not, as Plato supposes, confined to a single point. But\nneither can we say how far these differences are due to education and the\nopinions of mankind, or physically inherited from the habits and opinions\nof former generations. Women have been always taught, not exactly that\nthey are slaves, but that they are in an inferior {clxxxi} position, which\nis also supposed to have compensating advantages; and to this position\nthey have conformed. It is also true that the physical form may easily\nchange in the course of generations through the mode of life; and the\nweakness or delicacy, which was once a matter of opinion, may become a\nphysical fact. The characteristics of sex vary greatly in different\ncountries and ranks of society, and at different ages in the same\nindividuals. Plato may have been right in denying that there was any\nultimate difference in the sexes of man other than that which exists in\nanimals, because all other differences may be conceived to disappear in\nother states of society, or under different circumstances of life and\ntraining.\n\nThe first wave having been passed, we proceed to the second--community of\nwives and children. 'Is it possible? Is it desirable?' For as Glaucon\nintimates, and as we far more strongly insist, 'Great doubts may be\nentertained about both these points.' Any free discussion of the question\nis impossible, and mankind are perhaps right in not allowing the ultimate\nbases of social life to be examined. Few of us can safely enquire into the\nthings which nature hides, any more than we can dissect our own bodies.\nStill, the manner in which Plato arrived at his conclusions should be\nconsidered. For here, as Mr. Grote has remarked, is a wonderful thing,\nthat one of the wisest and best of men should have entertained ideas of\nmorality which are wholly at variance with our own. And if we would do\nPlato justice, we must examine carefully the character of his proposals.\nFirst, we may observe that the relations of the sexes supposed by him are\nthe reverse of licentious: he seems rather to aim at an impossible\nstrictness. Secondly, he conceives the family to be the natural enemy of\nthe state; and he entertains the serious hope that an universal\nbrotherhood may take the place of private interests--an aspiration which,\nalthough not justified by experience, has possessed many noble minds. On\nthe other hand, there is no sentiment or imagination in the connections\nwhich men and women are supposed by him to form; human beings return to\nthe level of the animals, neither exalting to heaven, nor yet abusing the\nnatural instincts. All that world of poetry and fancy which the passion of\nlove has called forth in modern literature and romance would have been\nbanished by Plato. The arrangements {clxxxii} of marriage in the Republic\nare directed to one object--the improvement of the race. In successive\ngenerations a great development both of bodily and mental qualities might\nbe possible. The analogy of animals tends to show that mankind can within\ncertain limits receive a change of nature. And as in animals we should\ncommonly choose the best for breeding, and destroy the others, so there\nmust be a selection made of the human beings whose lives are worthy to be\npreserved.\n\nWe start back horrified from this Platonic ideal, in the belief, first,\nthat the higher feelings of humanity are far too strong to be crushed out;\nsecondly, that if the plan could be carried into execution we should be\npoorly recompensed by improvements in the breed for the loss of the best\nthings in life. The greatest regard for the weakest and meanest of human\nbeings--the infant, the criminal, the insane, the idiot, truly seems to us\none of the noblest results of Christianity. We have learned, though as yet\nimperfectly, that the individual man has an endless value in the sight of\nGod, and that we honour Him when we honour the darkened and disfigured\nimage of Him (cp. Laws xi. 931 A). This is the lesson which Christ taught\nin a parable when He said, 'Their angels do always behold the face of My\nFather which is in heaven.' Such lessons are only partially realized in\nany age; they were foreign to the age of Plato, as they have very\ndifferent degrees of strength in different countries or ages of the\nChristian world. To the Greek the family was a religious and customary\ninstitution binding the members together by a tie inferior in strength to\nthat of friendship, and having a less solemn and sacred sound than that of\ncountry. The relationship which existed on the lower level of custom,\nPlato imagined that he was raising to the higher level of nature and\nreason; while from the modern and Christian point of view we regard him as\nsanctioning murder and destroying the first principles of morality.\n\nThe great error in these and similar speculations is that the difference\nbetween man and the animals is forgotten in them. The human being is\nregarded with the eye of a dog- or bird-fancier (v. 459 A), or at best of\na slave-owner; the higher or human qualities are left out. The breeder of\nanimals aims chiefly at size or speed or strength; in a few cases at\ncourage or temper; most often the fitness of the animal for food is the\ngreat desideratum. {clxxxiii} But mankind are not bred to be eaten, nor\nyet for their superiority in fighting or in running or in drawing carts.\nNeither does the improvement of the human race consist merely in the\nincrease of the bones and flesh, but in the growth and enlightenment of\nthe mind. Hence there must be 'a marriage of true minds' as well as of\nbodies, of imagination and reason as well as of lusts and instincts. Men\nand women without feeling or imagination are justly called brutes; yet\nPlato takes away these qualities and puts nothing in their place, not even\nthe desire of a noble offspring, since parents are not to know their own\nchildren. The most important transaction of social life, he who is the\nidealist philosopher converts into the most brutal. For the pair are to\nhave no relation to one another, except at the hymeneal festival; their\nchildren are not theirs, but the state's; nor is any tie of affection to\nunite them. Yet here the analogy of the animals might have saved Plato\nfrom a gigantic error, if he had 'not lost sight of his own illustration'\n(ii. 375 D). For the 'nobler sort of birds and beasts' (v. 459 A) nourish\nand protect their offspring and are faithful to one another.\n\nAn eminent physiologist thinks it worth while 'to try and place life on a\nphysical basis.' But should not life rest on the moral rather than upon\nthe physical? The higher comes first, then the lower, first the human and\nrational, afterwards the animal. Yet they are not absolutely divided; and\nin times of sickness or moments of self-indulgence they seem to be only\ndifferent aspects of a common human nature which includes them both.\nNeither is the moral the limit of the physical, but the expansion and\nenlargement of it,--the highest form which the physical is capable of\nreceiving. As Plato would say, the body does not take care of the body,\nand still less of the mind, but the mind takes care of both. In all human\naction not that which is common to man and the animals is the\ncharacteristic element, but that which distinguishes him from them. Even\nif we admit the physical basis, and resolve all virtue into health of body\n'_la fa\u00e7on que notre sang circule_,' still on merely physical grounds we\nmust come back to ideas. Mind and reason and duty and conscience, under\nthese or other names, are always reappearing. There cannot be health of\nbody without health of mind; nor health of mind without the sense of duty\nand the love of truth (cp. Charm. 156 D, E).\n\nThat the greatest of ancient philosophers should in his regulations\n{clxxxiv} about marriage have fallen into the error of separating body and\nmind, does indeed appear surprising. Yet the wonder is not so much that\nPlato should have entertained ideas of morality which to our own age are\nrevolting, but that he should have contradicted himself to an extent which\nis hardly credible, falling in an instant from the heaven of idealism into\nthe crudest animalism. Rejoicing in the newly found gift of reflection, he\nappears to have thought out a subject about which he had better have\nfollowed the enlightened feeling of his own age. The general sentiment of\nHellas was opposed to his monstrous fancy. The old poets, and in later\ntime the tragedians, showed no want of respect for the family, on which\nmuch of their religion was based. But the example of Sparta, and perhaps\nin some degree the tendency to defy public opinion, seems to have misled\nhim. He will make one family out of all the families of the state. He will\nselect the finest specimens of men and women and breed from these only.\n\nYet because the illusion is always returning (for the animal part of human\nnature will from time to time assert itself in the disguise of philosophy\nas well as of poetry), and also because any departure from established\nmorality, even where this is not intended, is apt to be unsettling, it may\nbe worth while to draw out a little more at length the objections to the\nPlatonic marriage. In the first place, history shows that wherever\npolygamy has been largely allowed the race has deteriorated. One man to\none woman is the law of God and nature. Nearly all the civilized peoples\nof the world at some period before the age of written records, have become\nmonogamists; and the step when once taken has never been retraced. The\nexceptions occurring among Brahmins or Mahometans or the ancient Persians,\nare of that sort which may be said to prove the rule. The connexions\nformed between superior and inferior races hardly ever produce a noble\noffspring, because they are licentious; and because the children in such\ncases usually despise the mother and are neglected by the father who is\nashamed of them. Barbarous nations when they are introduced by Europeans\nto vice die out; polygamist peoples either import and adopt children from\nother countries, or dwindle in numbers, or both. Dynasties and\naristocracies which have disregarded the laws of nature have decreased in\nnumbers and degenerated in {clxxxv} stature; 'mariages de convenance'\nleave their enfeebling stamp on the offspring of them ((cp. King Lear, Act\ni. Sc. 2). The marriage of near relations, or the marrying in and in of\nthe same family tends constantly to weakness or idiocy in the children,\nsometimes assuming the form as they grow older of passionate\nlicentiousness. The common prostitute rarely has any offspring. By such\nunmistakable evidence is the authority of morality asserted in the\nrelations of the sexes: and so many more elements enter into this\n'mystery' than are dreamed of by Plato and some other philosophers.\n\nRecent enquirers have indeed arrived at the conclusion that among\nprimitive tribes there existed a community of wives as of property, and\nthat the captive taken by the spear was the only wife or slave whom any\nman was permitted to call his own. The partial existence of such customs\namong some of the lower races of man, and the survival of peculiar\nceremonies in the marriages of some civilized nations, are thought to\nfurnish a proof of similar institutions having been once universal. There\ncan be no question that the study of anthropology has considerably changed\nour views respecting the first appearance of man upon the earth. We know\nmore about the aborigines of the world than formerly, but our increasing\nknowledge shows above all things how little we know. With all the helps\nwhich written monuments afford, we do but faintly realize the condition of\nman two thousand or three thousand years ago. Of what his condition was\nwhen removed to a distance 200,000 or 300,000 years, when the majority of\nmankind were lower and nearer the animals than any tribe now existing upon\nthe earth, we cannot even entertain conjecture. Plato (Laws iii. 676\nfoll.) and Aristotle (Metaph. xi. 8, \u00a7\u00a7 19, 20) may have been more right\nthan we imagine in supposing that some forms of civilisation were\ndiscovered and lost several times over. If we cannot argue that all\nbarbarism is a degraded civilization, neither can we set any limits to the\ndepth of degradation to which the human race may sink through war,\ndisease, or isolation. And if we are to draw inferences about the origin\nof marriage from the practice of barbarous nations, we should also\nconsider the remoter analogy of the animals. Many birds and animals,\nespecially the carnivorous, have only one mate, and the love and care of\noffspring which seems to be natural is inconsistent {clxxxvi} with the\nprimitive theory of marriage. If we go back to an imaginary state in which\nmen were almost animals and the companions of them, we have as much right\nto argue from what is animal to what is human as from the barbarous to the\ncivilized man. The record of animal life on the globe is fragmentary,--the\nconnecting links are wanting and cannot be supplied; the record of social\nlife is still more fragmentary and precarious. Even if we admit that our\nfirst ancestors had no such institution as marriage, still the stages by\nwhich men passed from outer barbarism to the comparative civilization of\nChina, Assyria, and Greece, or even of the ancient Germans, are wholly\nunknown to us.\n\nSuch speculations are apt to be unsettling, because they seem to show that\nan institution which was thought to be a revelation from heaven, is only\nthe growth of history and experience. We ask what is the origin of\nmarriage, and we are told that like the right of property, after many wars\nand contests, it has gradually arisen out of the selfishness of\nbarbarians. We stand face to face with human nature in its primitive\nnakedness. We are compelled to accept, not the highest, but the lowest\naccount of the origin of human society. But on the other hand we may truly\nsay that every step in human progress has been in the same direction, and\nthat in the course of ages the idea of marriage and of the family has been\nmore and more defined and consecrated. The civilized East is immeasurably\nin advance of any savage tribes; the Greeks and Romans have improved upon\nthe East; the Christian nations have been stricter in their views of the\nmarriage relation than any of the ancients. In this as in so many other\nthings, instead of looking back with regret to the past, we should look\nforward with hope to the future. We must consecrate that which we believe\nto be the most holy, and that 'which is the most holy will be the most\nuseful.' There is more reason for maintaining the sacredness of the\nmarriage tie, when we see the benefit of it, than when we only felt a\nvague religious horror about the violation of it. But in all times of\ntransition, when established beliefs are being undermined, there is a\ndanger that in the passage from the old to the new we may insensibly let\ngo the moral principle, finding an excuse for listening to the voice of\npassion in the uncertainty of knowledge, or the {clxxxvii} fluctuations of\nopinion. And there are many persons in our own day who, enlightened by the\nstudy of anthropology, and fascinated by what is new and strange, some\nusing the language of fear, others of hope, are inclined to believe that a\ntime will come when through the self-assertion of women, or the rebellious\nspirit of children, by the analysis of human relations, or by the force of\noutward circumstances, the ties of family life may be broken or greatly\nrelaxed. They point to societies in America and elsewhere which tend to\nshow that the destruction of the family need not necessarily involve the\noverthrow of all morality. Wherever we may think of such speculations, we\ncan hardly deny that they have been more rife in this generation than in\nany other; and whither they are tending, who can predict?\n\nTo the doubts and queries raised by these 'social reformers' respecting\nthe relation of the sexes and the moral nature of man, there is a\nsufficient answer, if any is needed. The difference about them and us is\nreally one of fact. They are speaking of man as they wish or fancy him to\nbe, but we are speaking of him as he is. They isolate the animal part of\nhis nature; we regard him as a creature having many sides, or aspects,\nmoving between good and evil, striving to rise above himself and to become\n'a little lower than the angels.' We also, to use a Platonic formula, are\nnot ignorant of the dissatisfactions and incompatibilities of family life,\nof the meannesses of trade, of the flatteries of one class of society by\nanother, of the impediments which the family throws in the way of lofty\naims and aspirations. But we are conscious that there are evils and\ndangers in the background greater still, which are not appreciated,\nbecause they are either concealed or suppressed. What a condition of man\nwould that be, in which human passions were controlled by no authority,\ndivine or human, in which there was no shame or decency, no higher\naffection overcoming or sanctifying the natural instincts, but simply a\nrule of health! Is it for this that we are asked to throw away the\ncivilization which is the growth of ages?\n\nFor strength and health are not the only qualities to be desired; there\nare the more important considerations of mind and character and soul. We\nknow how human nature may be degraded; we do not know how by artificial\nmeans any improvement in the breed can be effected. The problem is a\ncomplex one, for if we {clxxxviii} go back only four steps (and these at\nleast enter into the composition of a child), there are commonly thirty\nprogenitors to be taken into account. Many curious facts, rarely admitting\nof proof, are told us respecting the inheritance of disease or character\nfrom a remote ancestor. We can trace the physical resemblances of parents\nand children in the same family--\n\n  'Sic oculos, sic ille manus, sic ora ferebat';\n\nbut scarcely less often the differences which distinguish children both\nfrom their parents and from one another. We are told of similar mental\npeculiarities running in families, and again of a tendency, as in the\nanimals, to revert to a common or original stock. But we have a difficulty\nin distinguishing what is a true inheritance of genius or other qualities,\nand what is mere imitation or the result of similar circumstances. Great\nmen and great women have rarely had great fathers and mothers. Nothing\nthat we know of in the circumstances of their birth or lineage will\nexplain their appearance. Of the English poets of the last and two\npreceding centuries scarcely a descendant remains,--none have ever been\ndistinguished. So deeply has nature hidden her secret, and so ridiculous\nis the fancy which has been entertained by some that we might in time by\nsuitable marriage arrangements or, as Plato would have said, 'by an\ningenious system of lots,' produce a Shakespeare or a Milton. Even\nsupposing that we could breed men having the tenacity of bulldogs, or,\nlike the Spartans, 'lacking the wit to run away in battle,' would the\nworld be any the better? Many of the noblest specimens of the human race\nhave been among the weakest physically. Tyrtaeus or Aesop, or our own\nNewton, would have been exposed at Sparta; and some of the fairest and\nstrongest men and women have been among the wickedest and worst. Not by\nthe Platonic device of uniting the strong and fair with the strong and\nfair, regardless of sentiment and morality, nor yet by his other device of\ncombining dissimilar natures (Statesman 310 A), have mankind gradually\npassed from the brutality and licentiousness of primitive marriage to\nmarriage Christian and civilized.\n\nFew persons would deny that we bring into the world an inheritance of\nmental and physical qualities derived first from our parents, or through\nthem from some remoter ancestor, {clxxxix} secondly from our race, thirdly\nfrom the general condition of mankind into which we are born. Nothing is\ncommoner than the remark, that 'So and so is like his father or his\nuncle'; and an aged person may not unfrequently note a resemblance in a\nyouth to a long-forgotten ancestor, observing that 'Nature sometimes skips\na generation.' It may be true also, that if we knew more about our\nancestors, these similarities would be even more striking to us. Admitting\nthe facts which are thus described in a popular way, we may however remark\nthat there is no method of difference by which they can be defined or\nestimated, and that they constitute only a small part of each individual.\nThe doctrine of heredity may seem to take out of our hands the conduct of\nour own lives, but it is the idea, not the fact, which is really terrible\nto us. For what we have received from our ancestors is only a fraction of\nwhat we are, or may become. The knowledge that drunkenness or insanity has\nbeen prevalent in a family may be the best safeguard against their\nrecurrence in a future generation. The parent will be most awake to the\nvices or diseases in his child of which he is most sensible within\nhimself. The whole of life may be directed to their prevention or cure.\nThe traces of consumption may become fainter, or be wholly effaced: the\ninherent tendency to vice or crime may be eradicated. And so heredity,\nfrom being a curse, may become a blessing. We acknowledge that in the\nmatter of our birth, as in our nature generally, there are previous\ncircumstances which affect us. But upon this platform of circumstances or\nwithin this wall of necessity, we have still the power of creating a life\nfor ourselves by the informing energy of the human will.\n\nThere is another aspect of the marriage question to which Plato is a\nstranger. All the children born in his state are foundlings. It never\noccurred to him that the greater part of them, according to universal\nexperience, would have perished. For children can only be brought up in\nfamilies. There is a subtle sympathy between the mother and the child\nwhich cannot be supplied by other mothers, or by 'strong nurses one or\nmore' (Laws vii. 789 E). If Plato's 'pen' was as fatal as the Cr\u00e8ches of\nParis, or the foundling hospital of Dublin, more than nine-tenths of his\nchildren would have perished. There would have been no need to expose or\nput out of the way the weaklier children, for they would have {cxc} died\nof themselves. So emphatically does nature protest against the destruction\nof the family.\n\nWhat Plato had heard or seen of Sparta was applied by him in a mistaken\nway to his ideal commonwealth. He probably observed that both the Spartan\nmen and women were superior in form and strength to the other Greeks; and\nthis superiority he was disposed to attribute to the laws and customs\nrelating to marriage. He did not consider that the desire of a noble\noffspring was a passion among the Spartans, or that their physical\nsuperiority was to be attributed chiefly, not to their marriage customs,\nbut to their temperance and training. He did not reflect that Sparta was\ngreat, not in consequence of the relaxation of morality, but in spite of\nit, by virtue of a political principle stronger far than existed in any\nother Grecian state. Least of all did he observe that Sparta did not\nreally produce the finest specimens of the Greek race. The genius, the\npolitical inspiration of Athens, the love of liberty--all that has made\nGreece famous with posterity, were wanting among the Spartans. They had no\nThemistocles, or Pericles, or Aeschylus, or Sophocles, or Socrates, or\nPlato. The individual was not allowed to appear above the state; the laws\nwere fixed, and he had no business to alter or reform them. Yet whence has\nthe progress of cities and nations arisen, if not from remarkable\nindividuals, coming into the world we know not how, and from causes over\nwhich we have no control? Something too much may have been said in modern\ntimes of the value of individuality. But we can hardly condemn too\nstrongly a system which, instead of fostering the scattered seeds or\nsparks of genius and character, tends to smother and extinguish them.\n\nStill, while condemning Plato, we must acknowledge that neither\nChristianity, nor any other form of religion and society, has hitherto\nbeen able to cope with this most difficult of social problems, and that\nthe side from which Plato regarded it is that from which we turn away.\nPopulation is the most untameable force in the political and social world.\nDo we not find, especially in large cities, that the greatest hindrance to\nthe amelioration of the poor is their improvidence in marriage?--a small\nfault truly, if not involving endless consequences. There are whole\ncountries too, such as India, or, nearer home, Ireland, in which a {cxci}\nright solution of the marriage question seems to lie at the foundation of\nthe happiness of the community. There are too many people on a given\nspace, or they marry too early and bring into the world a sickly and\nhalf-developed offspring; or owing to the very conditions of their\nexistence, they become emaciated and hand on a similar life to their\ndescendants. But who can oppose the voice of prudence to the 'mightiest\npassions of mankind' (Laws viii. 835 C), especially when they have been\nlicensed by custom and religion? In addition to the influences of\neducation, we seem to require some new principles of right and wrong in\nthese matters, some force of opinion, which may indeed be already heard\nwhispering in private, but has never affected the moral sentiments of\nmankind in general. We unavoidably lose sight of the principle of utility,\njust in that action of our lives in which we have the most need of it. The\ninfluences which we can bring to bear upon this question are chiefly\nindirect. In a generation or two, education, emigration, improvements in\nagriculture and manufactures, may have provided the solution. The state\nphysician hardly likes to probe the wound: it is beyond his art; a matter\nwhich he cannot safely let alone, but which he dare not touch:\n\n  'We do but skin and film the ulcerous place.'\n\nWhen again in private life we see a whole family one by one dropping into\nthe grave under the Ate of some inherited malady, and the parents perhaps\nsurviving them, do our minds ever go back silently to that day twenty-five\nor thirty years before on which under the fairest auspices, amid the\nrejoicings of friends and acquaintances, a bride and bridegroom joined\nhands with one another? In making such a reflection we are not opposing\nphysical considerations to moral, but moral to physical; we are seeking to\nmake the voice of reason heard, which drives us back from the extravagance\nof sentimentalism on common sense. The late Dr. Combe is said by his\nbiographer to have resisted the temptation to marriage, because he knew\nthat he was subject to hereditary consumption. One who deserved to be\ncalled a man of genius, a friend of my youth, was in the habit of wearing\na black ribbon on his wrist, in order to remind him that, being liable to\noutbreaks of insanity, he must not give way to the natural impulses of\naffection: he died unmarried in a {cxcii} lunatic asylum. These two little\nfacts suggest the reflection that a very few persons have done from a\nsense of duty what the rest of mankind ought to have done under like\ncircumstances, if they had allowed themselves to think of all the misery\nwhich they were about to bring into the world. If we could prevent such\nmarriages without any violation of feeling or propriety, we clearly ought;\nand the prohibition in the course of time would be protected by a 'horror\nnaturalis' similar to that which, in all civilized ages and countries, has\nprevented the marriage of near relations by blood. Mankind would have been\nthe happier, if some things which are now allowed had from the beginning\nbeen denied to them; if the sanction of religion could have prohibited\npractices inimical to health; if sanitary principles could in early ages\nhave been invested with a superstitious awe. But, living as we do far on\nin the world's history, we are no longer able to stamp at once with the\nimpress of religion a new prohibition. A free agent cannot have his\nfancies regulated by law; and the execution of the law would be rendered\nimpossible, owing to the uncertainty of the cases in which marriage was to\nbe forbidden. Who can weigh virtue, or even fortune against health, or\nmoral and mental qualities against bodily? Who can measure probabilities\nagainst certainties? There has been some good as well as evil in the\ndiscipline of suffering; and there are diseases, such as consumption,\nwhich have exercised a refining and softening influence on the character.\nYouth is too inexperienced to balance such nice considerations; parents do\nnot often think of them, or think of them too late. They are at a distance\nand may probably be averted; change of place, a new state of life, the\ninterests of a home may be the cure of them. So persons vainly reason when\ntheir minds are already made up and their fortunes irrevocably linked\ntogether. Nor is there any ground for supposing that marriages are to any\ngreat extent influenced by reflections of this sort, which seem unable to\nmake any head against the irresistible impulse of individual attachment.\n\nLastly, no one can have observed the first rising flood of the passions in\nyouth, the difficulty of regulating them, and the effects on the whole\nmind and nature which follow from them, the stimulus which is given to\nthem by the imagination, without feeling that there is something\nunsatisfactory in our method of {cxciii} treating them. That the most\nimportant influence on human life should be wholly left to chance or\nshrouded in mystery, and instead of being disciplined or understood,\nshould be required to conform only to an external standard of\npropriety--cannot be regarded by the philosopher as a safe or satisfactory\ncondition of human things. And still those who have the charge of youth\nmay find a way by watchfulness, by affection, by the manliness and\ninnocence of their own lives, by occasional hints, by general admonitions\nwhich every one can apply for himself, to mitigate this terrible evil\nwhich eats out the heart of individuals and corrupts the moral sentiments\nof nations. In no duty towards others is there more need of reticence and\nself-restraint. So great is the danger lest he who would be the counsellor\nof another should reveal the secret prematurely, lest he should get\nanother too much into his power; or fix the passing impression of evil by\ndemanding the confession of it.\n\nNor is Plato wrong in asserting that family attachments may interfere with\nhigher aims. If there have been some who 'to party gave up what was meant\nfor mankind,' there have certainly been others who to family gave up what\nwas meant for mankind or for their country. The cares of children, the\nnecessity of procuring money for their support, the flatteries of the rich\nby the poor, the exclusiveness of caste, the pride of birth or wealth, the\ntendency of family life to divert men from the pursuit of the ideal or the\nheroic, are as lowering in our own age as in that of Plato. And if we\nprefer to look at the gentle influences of home, the development of the\naffections, the amenities of society, the devotion of one member of a\nfamily for the good of the others, which form one side of the picture, we\nmust not quarrel with him, or perhaps ought rather to be grateful to him,\nfor having presented to us the reverse. Without attempting to defend Plato\non grounds of morality, we may allow that there is an aspect of the world\nwhich has not unnaturally led him into error.\n\nWe hardly appreciate the power which the idea of the State, like all other\nabstract ideas, exercised over the mind of Plato. To us the State seems to\nbe built up out of the family, or sometimes to be the framework in which\nfamily and social life is contained. But to Plato in his present mood of\nmind the family {cxciv} is only a disturbing influence which, instead of\nfilling up, tends to disarrange the higher unity of the State. No\norganization is needed except a political, which, regarded from another\npoint of view, is a military one. The State is all-sufficing for the wants\nof man, and, like the idea of the Church in later ages, absorbs all other\ndesires and affections. In time of war the thousand citizens are to stand\nlike a rampart impregnable against the world or the Persian host; in time\nof peace the preparation for war and their duties to the State, which are\nalso their duties to one another, take up their whole life and time. The\nonly other interest which is allowed to them besides that of war, is the\ninterest of philosophy. When they are too old to be soldiers they are to\nretire from active life and to have a second novitiate of study and\ncontemplation. There is an element of monasticism even in Plato's\ncommunism. If he could have done without children, he might have converted\nhis Republic into a religious order. Neither in the Laws (v. 739 B), when\nthe daylight of common sense breaks in upon him, does he retract his\nerror. In the state of which he would be the founder, there is no marrying\nor giving in marriage: but because of the infirmity of mankind, he\ncondescends to allow the law of nature to prevail.\n\n([Greek: g]) But Plato has an equal, or, in his own estimation, even\ngreater paradox in reserve, which is summed up in the famous text, 'Until\nkings are philosophers or philosophers are kings, cities will never cease\nfrom ill.' And by philosophers he explains himself to mean those who are\ncapable of apprehending ideas, especially the idea of good. To the\nattainment of this higher knowledge the second education is directed.\nThrough a process of training which has already made them good citizens\nthey are now to be made good legislators. We find with some surprise (not\nunlike the feeling which Aristotle in a well-known passage describes the\nhearers of Plato's lectures as experiencing, when they went to a discourse\non the idea of good, expecting to be instructed in moral truths, and\nreceived instead of them arithmetical and mathematical formulae) that\nPlato does not propose for his future legislators any study of finance or\nlaw or military tactics, but only of abstract mathematics, as a\npreparation for the still more abstract conception of good. We ask, with\nAristotle, What is the use of a man knowing the idea of {cxcv} good, if he\ndoes not know what is good for this individual, this state, this condition\nof society? We cannot understand how Plato's legislators or guardians are\nto be fitted for their work of statesmen by the study of the five\nmathematical sciences. We vainly search in Plato's own writings for any\nexplanation of this seeming absurdity.\n\nThe discovery of a great metaphysical conception seems to ravish the mind\nwith a prophetic consciousness which takes away the power of estimating\nits value. No metaphysical enquirer has ever fairly criticised his own\nspeculations; in his own judgment they have been above criticism; nor has\nhe understood that what to him seemed to be absolute truth may reappear in\nthe next generation as a form of logic or an instrument of thought. And\nposterity have also sometimes equally misapprehended the real value of his\nspeculations. They appear to them to have contributed nothing to the stock\nof human knowledge. The _idea_ of good is apt to be regarded by the modern\nthinker as an unmeaning abstraction; but he forgets that this abstraction\nis waiting ready for use, and will hereafter be filled up by the divisions\nof knowledge. When mankind do not as yet know that the world is subject to\nlaw, the introduction of the mere conception of law or design or final\ncause, and the far-off anticipation of the harmony of knowledge, are great\nsteps onward. Even the crude generalization of the unity of all things\nleads men to view the world with different eyes, and may easily affect\ntheir conception of human life and of politics, and also their own conduct\nand character (Tim. 90 A). We can imagine how a great mind like that of\nPericles might derive elevation from his intercourse with Anaxagoras\n(Phaedr. 270 A). To be struggling towards a higher but unattainable\nconception is a more favourable intellectual condition than to rest\nsatisfied in a narrow portion of ascertained fact. And the earlier, which\nhave sometimes been the greater ideas of science, are often lost sight of\nat a later period. How rarely can we say of any modern enquirer in the\nmagnificent language of Plato, that 'He is the spectator of all time and\nof all existence!'\n\nNor is there anything unnatural in the hasty application of these vast\nmetaphysical conceptions to practical and political life. In the first\nenthusiasm of ideas men are apt to see them {cxcvi} everywhere, and to\napply them in the most remote sphere. They do not understand that the\nexperience of ages is required to enable them to fill up 'the intermediate\naxioms.' Plato himself seems to have imagined that the truths of\npsychology, like those of astronomy and harmonics, would be arrived at by\na process of deduction, and that the method which he has pursued in the\nFourth Book, of inferring them from experience and the use of language,\nwas imperfect and only provisional. But when, after having arrived at the\nidea of good, which is the end of the science of dialectic, he is asked,\nWhat is the nature, and what are the divisions of the science? He refuses\nto answer, as if intending by the refusal to intimate that the state of\nknowledge which then existed was not such as would allow the philosopher\nto enter into his final rest. The previous sciences must first be studied,\nand will, we may add, continue to be studied till the end of time,\nalthough in a sense different from any which Plato could have conceived.\nBut we may observe, that while he is aware of the vacancy of his own\nideal, he is full of enthusiasm in the contemplation of it. Looking into\nthe orb of light, he sees nothing, but he is warmed and elevated. The\nHebrew prophet believed that faith in God would enable him to govern the\nworld; the Greek philosopher imagined that contemplation of the good would\nmake a legislator. There is as much to be filled up in the one case as in\nthe other, and the one mode of conception is to the Israelite what the\nother is to the Greek. Both find a repose in a divine perfection, which,\nwhether in a more personal or impersonal form, exists without them and\nindependently of them, as well as within them.\n\nThere is no mention of the idea of good in the Timaeus, nor of the divine\nCreator of the world in the Republic; and we are naturally led to ask in\nwhat relation they stand to one another. Is God above or below the idea of\ngood? Or is the Idea of Good another mode of conceiving God? The latter\nappears to be the truer answer. To the Greek philosopher the perfection\nand unity of God was a far higher conception than his personality, which\nhe hardly found a word to express, and which to him would have seemed to\nbe borrowed from mythology. To the Christian, on the other hand, or to the\nmodern thinker in {cxcvii} general, it is difficult, if not impossible, to\nattach reality to what he terms mere abstraction; while to Plato this very\nabstraction is the truest and most real of all things. Hence, from a\ndifference in forms of thought, Plato appears to be resting on a creation\nof his own mind only. But if we may be allowed to paraphrase the idea of\ngood by the words 'intelligent principle of law and order in the universe,\nembracing equally man and nature,' we begin to find a meeting-point\nbetween him and ourselves.\n\nThe question whether the ruler or statesman should be a philosopher is one\nthat has not lost interest in modern times. In most countries of Europe\nand Asia there has been some one in the course of ages who has truly\nunited the power of command with the power of thought and reflection, as\nthere have been also many false combinations of these qualities. Some kind\nof speculative power is necessary both in practical and political life;\nlike the rhetorician in the Phaedrus, men require to have a conception of\nthe varieties of human character, and to be raised on great occasions\nabove the commonplaces of ordinary life. Yet the idea of the\nphilosopher-statesman has never been popular with the mass of mankind;\npartly because he cannot take the world into his confidence or make them\nunderstand the motives from which he acts; and also because they are\njealous of a power which they do not understand. The revolution which\nhuman nature desires to effect step by step in many ages is likely to be\nprecipitated by him in a single year or life. They are afraid that in the\npursuit of his greater aims he may disregard the common feelings of\nhumanity, he is too apt to be looking into the distant future or back into\nthe remote past, and unable to see actions or events which, to use an\nexpression of Plato's 'are tumbling out at his feet.' Besides, as Plato\nwould say, there are other corruptions of these philosophical statesmen.\nEither 'the native hue of resolution is sicklied o'er with the pale cast\nof thought,' and at the moment when action above all things is required he\nis undecided, or general principles are enunciated by him in order to\ncover some change of policy; or his ignorance of the world has made him\nmore easily fall a prey to the arts of others; or in some cases he has\nbeen converted into a courtier, who enjoys {cxcviii} the luxury of holding\nliberal opinions, but was never known to perform a liberal action. No\nwonder that mankind have been in the habit of calling statesmen of this\nclass pedants, sophisters, doctrinaires, visionaries. For, as we may be\nallowed to say, a little parodying the words of Plato, 'they have seen bad\nimitations of the philosopher-statesman.' But a man in whom the power of\nthought and action are perfectly balanced, equal to the present, reaching\nforward to the future, 'such a one,' ruling in a constitutional state,\n'they have never seen.'\n\nBut as the philosopher is apt to fail in the routine of political life, so\nthe ordinary statesman is also apt to fail in extraordinary crises. When\nthe face of the world is beginning to alter, and thunder is heard in the\ndistance, he is still guided by his old maxims, and is the slave of his\ninveterate party prejudices; he cannot perceive the signs of the times;\ninstead of looking forward he looks back; he learns nothing and forgets\nnothing; with 'wise saws and modern instances' he would stem the rising\ntide of revolution. He lives more and more within the circle of his own\nparty, as the world without him becomes stronger. This seems to be the\nreason why the old order of things makes so poor a figure when confronted\nwith the new, why churches can never reform, why most political changes\nare made blindly and convulsively. The great crises in the history of\nnations have often been met by an ecclesiastical positiveness, and a more\nobstinate reassertion of principles which have lost their hold upon a\nnation. The fixed ideas of a reactionary statesman may be compared to\nmadness; they grow upon him, and he becomes possessed by them; no\njudgement of others is ever admitted by him to be weighed in the balance\nagainst his own.\n\n([Greek: d]) Plato, labouring under what, to modern readers, appears to\nhave been a confusion of ideas, assimilates the state to the individual,\nand fails to distinguish Ethics from Politics. He thinks that to be most\nof a state which is most like one man, and in which the citizens have the\ngreatest uniformity of character. He does not see that the analogy is\npartly fallacious, and that the will or character of a state or nation is\nreally the balance or rather the surplus of individual wills, which are\nlimited by the condition of having to act in common. {cxcix} The movement\nof a body of men can never have the pliancy or facility of a single man;\nthe freedom of the individual, which is always limited, becomes still more\nstraitened when transferred to a nation. The powers of action and feeling\nare necessarily weaker and more balanced when they are diffused through a\ncommunity; whence arises the often discussed question, 'Can a nation, like\nan individual, have a conscience?' We hesitate to say that the characters\nof nations are nothing more than the sum of the characters of the\nindividuals who compose them; because there may be tendencies in\nindividuals which react upon one another. A whole nation may be wiser than\nany one man in it; or may be animated by some common opinion or feeling\nwhich could not equally have affected the mind of a single person, or may\nhave been inspired by a leader of genius to perform acts more than human.\nPlato does not appear to have analysed the complications which arise out\nof the collective action of mankind. Neither is he capable of seeing that\nanalogies, though specious as arguments, may often have no foundation in\nfact, or of distinguishing between what is intelligible or vividly present\nto the mind, and what is true. In this respect he is far below Aristotle,\nwho is comparatively seldom imposed upon by false analogies. He cannot\ndisentangle the arts from the virtues--at least he is always arguing from\none to the other. His notion of music is transferred from harmony of\nsounds to harmony of life: in this he is assisted by the ambiguities of\nlanguage as well as by the prevalence of Pythagorean notions. And having\nonce assimilated the state to the individual, he imagines that he will\nfind the succession of states paralleled in the lives of individuals.\n\nStill, through this fallacious medium, a real enlargement of ideas is\nattained. When the virtues as yet presented no distinct conception to the\nmind, a great advance was made by the comparison of them with the arts;\nfor virtue is partly art, and has an outward form as well as an inward\nprinciple. The harmony of music affords a lively image of the harmonies of\nthe world and of human life, and may be regarded as a splendid\nillustration which was naturally mistaken for a real analogy. In the same\nway the identification of ethics with politics has a tendency to give\ndefiniteness to ethics, and also to elevate and ennoble men's {cc} notions\nof the aims of government and of the duties of citizens; for ethics from\none point of view may be conceived as an idealized law and politics; and\npolitics, as ethics reduced to the conditions of human society. There have\nbeen evils which have arisen out of the attempt to identify them, and this\nhas led to the separation or antagonism of them, which has been introduced\nby modern political writers. But we may likewise feel that something has\nbeen lost in their separation, and that the ancient philosophers who\nestimated the moral and intellectual wellbeing of mankind first, and the\nwealth of nations and individuals second, may have a salutary influence on\nthe speculations of modern times. Many political maxims originate in a\nreaction against an opposite error; and when the errors against which they\nwere directed have passed away, they in turn become errors.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIII. Plato's views of education are in several respects remarkable; like\nthe rest of the Republic they are partly Greek and partly ideal, beginning\nwith the ordinary curriculum of the Greek youth, and extending to\nafter-life. Plato is the first writer who distinctly says that education\nis to comprehend the whole of life, and to be a preparation for another in\nwhich education begins again (vi. 498 D). This is the continuous thread\nwhich runs through the Republic, and which more than any other of his\nideas admits of an application to modern life.\n\nHe has long given up the notion that virtue cannot be taught; and he is\ndisposed to modify the thesis of the Protagoras, that the virtues are one\nand not many. He is not unwilling to admit the sensible world into his\nscheme of truth. Nor does he assert in the Republic the involuntariness of\nvice, which is maintained by him in the Timaeus, Sophist, and Laws (cp.\nProtag. 345 foll., 352, 355; Apol. 25 E; Gorg. 468, 509 E). Nor do the\nso-called Platonic ideas recovered from a former state of existence affect\nhis theory of mental improvement. Still we observe in him the remains of\nthe old Socratic doctrine, that true knowledge must be elicited from\nwithin, and is to be sought for in ideas, not in particulars of sense.\nEducation, as he says, will implant a principle of intelligence which is\nbetter than ten {cci} thousand eyes. The paradox that the virtues are one,\nand the kindred notion that all virtue is knowledge, are not entirely\nrenounced; the first is seen in the supremacy given to justice over the\nrest; the second in the tendency to absorb the moral virtues in the\nintellectual, and to centre all goodness in the contemplation of the idea\nof good. The world of sense is still depreciated and identified with\nopinion, though admitted to be a shadow of the true. In the Republic he is\nevidently impressed with the conviction that vice arises chiefly from\nignorance and may be cured by education; the multitude are hardly to be\ndeemed responsible for what they do (v. 499 E). A faint allusion to the\ndoctrine of reminiscence occurs in the Tenth Book (621 A); but Plato's\nviews of education have no more real connection with a previous state of\nexistence than our own; he only proposes to elicit from the mind that\nwhich is there already. Education is represented by him, not as the\nfilling of a vessel, but as the turning the eye of the soul towards the\nlight.\n\nHe treats first of music or literature, which he divides into true and\nfalse, and then goes on to gymnastics; of infancy in the Republic he takes\nno notice, though in the Laws he gives sage counsels about the nursing of\nchildren and the management of the mothers, and would have an education\nwhich is even prior to birth. But in the Republic he begins with the age\nat which the child is capable of receiving ideas, and boldly asserts, in\nlanguage which sounds paradoxical to modern ears, that he must be taught\nthe false before he can learn the true. The modern and ancient\nphilosophical world are not agreed about truth and falsehood; the one\nidentifies truth almost exclusively with fact, the other with ideas. This\nis the difference between ourselves and Plato, which is, however, partly a\ndifference of words (cp. supra, p. xxxviii). For we too should admit that\na child must receive many lessons which he imperfectly understands; he\nmust be taught some things in a figure only, some too which he can hardly\nbe expected to believe when he grows older; but we should limit the use of\nfiction by the necessity of the case. Plato would draw the line\ndifferently; according to him the aim of early education is not truth as a\nmatter of fact, but truth as a matter of principle; the child is to be\ntaught first simple religious truths, and then simple moral truths, and\ninsensibly to learn the lesson of good manners and good taste. He {ccii}\nwould make an entire reformation of the old mythology; like Xenophanes and\nHeracleitus he is sensible of the deep chasm which separates his own age\nfrom Homer and Hesiod, whom he quotes and invests with an imaginary\nauthority, but only for his own purposes. The lusts and treacheries of the\ngods are to be banished; the terrors of the world below are to be\ndispelled; the misbehaviour of the Homeric heroes is not to be a model for\nyouth. But there is another strain heard in Homer which may teach our\nyouth endurance; and something may be learnt in medicine from the simple\npractice of the Homeric age. The principles on which religion is to be\nbased are two only: first, that God is true; secondly, that he is good.\nModern and Christian writers have often fallen short of these; they can\nhardly be said to have gone beyond them.\n\nThe young are to be brought up in happy surroundings, out of the way of\nsights or sounds which may hurt the character or vitiate the taste. They\nare to live in an atmosphere of health; the breeze is always to be wafting\nto them the impressions of truth and goodness. Could such an education be\nrealized, or if our modern religious education could be bound up with\ntruth and virtue and good manners and good taste, that would be the best\nhope of human improvement. Plato, like ourselves, is looking forward to\nchanges in the moral and religious world, and is preparing for them. He\nrecognizes the danger of unsettling young men's minds by sudden changes of\nlaws and principles, by destroying the sacredness of one set of ideas when\nthere is nothing else to take their place. He is afraid too of the\ninfluence of the drama, on the ground that it encourages false sentiment,\nand therefore he would not have his children taken to the theatre; he\nthinks that the effect on the spectators is bad, and on the actors still\nworse. His idea of education is that of harmonious growth, in which are\ninsensibly learnt the lessons of temperance and endurance, and the body\nand mind develope in equal proportions. The first principle which runs\nthrough all art and nature is simplicity; this also is to be the rule of\nhuman life.\n\nThe second stage of education is gymnastic, which answers to the period of\nmuscular growth and development. The simplicity which is enforced in music\nis extended to gymnastic; Plato is aware that the training of the body may\nbe inconsistent with the {cciii} training of the mind, and that bodily\nexercise may be easily overdone. Excessive training of the body is apt to\ngive men a headache or to render them sleepy at a lecture on philosophy,\nand this they attribute not to the true cause, but to the nature of the\nsubject. Two points are noticeable in Plato's treatment of\ngymnastic:--First, that the time of training is entirely separated from\nthe time of literary education. He seems to have thought that two things\nof an opposite and different nature could not be learnt at the same time.\nHere we can hardly agree with him; and, if we may judge by experience, the\neffect of spending three years between the ages of fourteen and seventeen\nin mere bodily exercise would be far from improving to the intellect.\nSecondly, he affirms that music and gymnastic are not, as common opinion\nis apt to imagine, intended, the one for the cultivation of the mind and\nthe other of the body, but that they are both equally designed for the\nimprovement of the mind. The body, in his view, is the servant of the\nmind; the subjection of the lower to the higher is for the advantage of\nboth. And doubtless the mind may exercise a very great and paramount\ninfluence over the body, if exerted not at particular moments and by fits\nand starts, but continuously, in making preparation for the whole of life.\nOther Greek writers saw the mischievous tendency of Spartan discipline\n(Arist. Pol. viii. 4, \u00a7 1 foll.; Thuc. ii. 37, 39). But only Plato\nrecognized the fundamental error on which the practice was based.\n\nThe subject of gymnastic leads Plato to the sister subject of medicine,\nwhich he further illustrates by the parallel of law. The modern disbelief\nin medicine has led in this, as in some other departments of knowledge, to\na demand for greater simplicity; physicians are becoming aware that they\noften make diseases 'greater and more complicated' by their treatment of\nthem (Rep. iv. 426 A). In two thousand years their art has made but\nslender progress; what they have gained in the analysis of the parts is in\na great degree lost by their feebler conception of the human frame as a\nwhole. They have attended more to the cure of diseases than to the\nconditions of health; and the improvements in medicine have been more than\ncounterbalanced by the disuse of regular training. Until lately they have\nhardly thought of air and water, the importance of which was well\nunderstood by the ancients; as Aristotle remarks, 'Air and water, being\nthe elements {cciv} which we most use, have the greatest effect upon\nhealth' (Polit. vii. 11, \u00a7 4.). For ages physicians have been under the\ndominion of prejudices which have only recently given way; and now there\nare as many opinions in medicine as in theology, and an equal degree of\nscepticism and some want of toleration about both. Plato has several good\nnotions about medicine; according to him, 'the eye cannot be cured without\nthe rest of the body, nor the body without the mind' (Charm. 156 E). No\nman of sense, he says in the Timaeus, would take physic; and we heartily\nsympathize with him in the Laws when he declares that 'the limbs of the\nrustic worn with toil will derive more benefit from warm baths than from\nthe prescriptions of a not over wise doctor' (vi. 761 C). But we can\nhardly praise him when, in obedience to the authority of Homer, he\ndepreciates diet, or approve of the inhuman spirit in which he would get\nrid of invalid and useless lives by leaving them to die. He does not seem\nto have considered that the 'bridle of Theages' might be accompanied by\nqualities which were of far more value to the State than the health or\nstrength of the citizens; or that the duty of taking care of the helpless\nmight be an important element of education in a State. The physician\nhimself (this is a delicate and subtle observation) should not be a man in\nrobust health; he should have, in modern phraseology, a nervous\ntemperament; he should have experience of disease in his own person, in\norder that his powers of observation may be quickened in the case of\nothers.\n\nThe perplexity of medicine is paralleled by the perplexity of law; in\nwhich, again, Plato would have men follow the golden rule of simplicity.\nGreater matters are to be determined by the legislator or by the oracle of\nDelphi, lesser matters are to be left to the temporary regulation of the\ncitizens themselves. Plato is aware that _laissez faire_ is an important\nelement of government. The diseases of a State are like the heads of a\nhydra; they multiply when they are cut off. The true remedy for them is\nnot extirpation but prevention. And the way to prevent them is to take\ncare of education, and education will take care of all the rest. So in\nmodern times men have often felt that the only political measure worth\nhaving--the only one which would produce any certain or lasting effect,\nwas a measure of national education. And in our own more than in any\nprevious age the necessity has been {ccv} recognized of restoring the\never-increasing confusion of law to simplicity and common sense.\n\nWhen the training in music and gymnastic is completed, there follows the\nfirst stage of active and public life. But soon education is to begin\nagain from a new point of view. In the interval between the Fourth and\nSeventh Books we have discussed the nature of knowledge, and have thence\nbeen led to form a higher conception of what was required of us. For true\nknowledge, according to Plato, is of abstractions, and has to do, not with\nparticulars or individuals, but with universals only; not with the\nbeauties of poetry, but with the ideas of philosophy. And the great aim of\neducation is the cultivation of the habit of abstraction. This is to be\nacquired through the study of the mathematical sciences. They alone are\ncapable of giving ideas of relation, and of arousing the dormant energies\nof thought.\n\nMathematics in the age of Plato comprehended a very small part of that\nwhich is now included in them; but they bore a much larger proportion to\nthe sum of human knowledge. They were the only organon of thought which\nthe human mind at that time possessed, and the only measure by which the\nchaos of particulars could be reduced to rule and order. The faculty which\nthey trained was naturally at war with the poetical or imaginative; and\nhence to Plato, who is everywhere seeking for abstractions and trying to\nget rid of the illusions of sense, nearly the whole of education is\ncontained in them. They seemed to have an inexhaustible application,\npartly because their true limits were not yet understood. These Plato\nhimself is beginning to investigate; though not aware that number and\nfigure are mere abstractions of sense, he recognizes that the forms used\nby geometry are borrowed from the sensible world (vi. 510, 511). He seeks\nto find the ultimate ground of mathematical ideas in the idea of good,\nthough he does not satisfactorily explain the connexion between them; and\nin his conception of the relation of ideas to numbers, he falls very far\nshort of the definiteness attributed to him by Aristotle (Met. i. 8, \u00a7 24;\nix. 17). But if he fails to recognize the true limits of mathematics, he\nalso reaches a point beyond them; in his view, ideas of number become\nsecondary to a higher conception of knowledge. The dialectician is as much\nabove the mathematician as the mathematician is above the ordinary man\n(cp. vii. 526 D, {ccvi} 531 E). The one, the self-proving, the good which\nis the higher sphere of dialectic, is the perfect truth to which all\nthings ascend, and in which they finally repose.\n\nThis self-proving unity or idea of good is a mere vision of which no\ndistinct explanation can be given, relative only to a particular stage in\nGreek philosophy. It is an abstraction under which no individuals are\ncomprehended, a whole which has no parts (cf. Arist., Nic. Eth., i. 4).\nThe vacancy of such a form was perceived by Aristotle, but not by Plato.\nNor did he recognize that in the dialectical process are included two or\nmore methods of investigation which are at variance with each other. He\ndid not see that whether he took the longer or the shorter road, no\nadvance could be made in this way. And yet such visions often have an\nimmense effect; for although the method of science cannot anticipate\nscience, the idea of science, not as it is, but as it will be in the\nfuture, is a great and inspiring principle. In the pursuit of knowledge we\nare always pressing forward to something beyond us; and as a false\nconception of knowledge, for example the scholastic philosophy, may lead\nmen astray during many ages, so the true ideal, though vacant, may draw\nall their thoughts in a right direction. It makes a great difference\nwhether the general expectation of knowledge, as this indefinite feeling\nmay be termed, is based upon a sound judgment. For mankind may often\nentertain a true conception of what knowledge ought to be when they have\nbut a slender experience of facts. The correlation of the sciences, the\nconsciousness of the unity of nature, the idea of classification, the\nsense of proportion, the unwillingness to stop short of certainty or to\nconfound probability with truth, are important principles of the higher\neducation. Although Plato could tell us nothing, and perhaps knew that he\ncould tell us nothing, of the absolute truth, he has exercised an\ninfluence on the human mind which even at the present day is not\nexhausted; and political and social questions may yet arise in which the\nthoughts of Plato may be read anew and receive a fresh meaning.\n\nThe Idea of good is so called only in the Republic, but there are traces\nof it in other dialogues of Plato. It is a cause as well as an idea, and\nfrom this point of view may be compared with the creator of the Timaeus,\nwho out of his goodness created {ccvii} all things. It corresponds to a\ncertain extent with the modern conception of a law of nature, or of a\nfinal cause, or of both in one, and in this regard may be connected with\nthe measure and symmetry of the Philebus. It is represented in the\nSymposium under the aspect of beauty, and is supposed to be attained there\nby stages of initiation, as here by regular gradations of knowledge.\nViewed subjectively, it is the process or science of dialectic. This is\nthe science which, according to the Phaedrus, is the true basis of\nrhetoric, which alone is able to distinguish the natures and classes of\nmen and things; which divides a whole into the natural parts, and reunites\nthe scattered parts into a natural or organized whole; which defines the\nabstract essences or universal ideas of all things, and connects them;\nwhich pierces the veil of hypotheses and reaches the final cause or first\nprinciple of all; which regards the sciences in relation to the idea of\ngood. This ideal science is the highest process of thought, and may be\ndescribed as the soul conversing with herself or holding communion with\neternal truth and beauty, and in another form is the everlasting question\nand answer--the ceaseless interrogative of Socrates. The dialogues of\nPlato are themselves examples of the nature and method of dialectic.\nViewed objectively, the idea of good is a power or cause which makes the\nworld without us correspond with the world within. Yet this world without\nus is still a world of ideas. With Plato the investigation of nature is\nanother department of knowledge, and in this he seeks to attain only\nprobable conclusions (cp. Timaeus, 44 D).\n\nIf we ask whether this science of dialectic which Plato only half explains\nto us is more akin to logic or to metaphysics, the answer is that in his\nmind the two sciences are not as yet distinguished, any more than the\nsubjective and objective aspects of the world and of man, which German\nphilosophy has revealed to us. Nor has he determined whether his science\nof dialectic is at rest or in motion, concerned with the contemplation of\nabsolute being, or with a process of development and evolution. Modern\nmetaphysics may be described as the science of abstractions, or as the\nscience of the evolution of thought; modern logic, when passing beyond the\nbounds of mere Aristotelian forms, may be defined as the science of\nmethod. The germ of {ccviii} both of them is contained in the Platonic\ndialectic; all metaphysicians have something in common with the ideas of\nPlato; all logicians have derived something from the method of Plato. The\nnearest approach in modern philosophy to the universal science of Plato,\nis to be found in the Hegelian 'succession of moments in the unity of the\nidea.' Plato and Hegel alike seem to have conceived the world as the\ncorrelation of abstractions; and not impossibly they would have understood\none another better than any of their commentators understand them (Swift's\nVoyage to Laputa, c. 8[4]). There is, however, a difference between them:\nfor whereas Hegel is thinking of all the minds of men as one mind, which\ndevelopes the stages of the idea in different countries or at different\ntimes in the same country, with Plato these gradations are regarded only\nas an order of thought or ideas; the history of the human mind had not yet\ndawned upon him.\n\n[Footnote 4: 'Having a desire to see those ancients who were most renowned\nfor wit and learning, I set apart one day on purpose. I proposed that\nHomer and Aristotle might appear at the head of all their commentators;\nbut these were so numerous that some hundreds were forced to attend in the\ncourt and outward rooms of the palace. I knew, and could distinguish these\ntwo heroes, at first sight, not only from the crowd, but from each other.\nHomer was the taller and comelier person of the two, walked very erect for\none of his age, and his eyes were the most quick and piercing I ever\nbeheld. Aristotle stooped much, and made use of a staff. His visage was\nmeagre, his hair lank and thin, and his voice hollow. I soon discovered\nthat both of them were perfect strangers to the rest of the company, and\nhad never seen or heard of them before. And I had a whisper from a ghost,\nwho shall be nameless, \"That these commentators always kept in the most\ndistant quarters from their principals, in the lower world, through a\nconsciousness of shame and guilt, because they had so horribly\nmisrepresented the meaning of these authors to posterity.\" I introduced\nDidymus and Eustathius to Homer, and prevailed on him to treat them better\nthan perhaps they deserved, for he soon found they wanted a genius to\nenter into the spirit of a poet. But Aristotle was out of all patience\nwith the account I gave him of Scotus and Ramus, as I presented them to\nhim; and he asked them \"whether the rest of the tribe were as great dunces\nas themselves?\"']\n\nMany criticisms may be made on Plato's theory of education. While in some\nrespects he unavoidably falls short of modern thinkers, in others he is in\nadvance of them. He is opposed to the modes of education which prevailed\nin his own time; but he can hardly be said to have discovered new ones. He\ndoes {ccix} not see that education is relative to the characters of\nindividuals; he only desires to impress the same form of the state on the\nminds of all. He has no sufficient idea of the effect of literature on the\nformation of the mind, and greatly exaggerates that of mathematics. His\naim is above all things to train the reasoning faculties; to implant in\nthe mind the spirit and power of abstraction; to explain and define\ngeneral notions, and, if possible, to connect them. No wonder that in the\nvacancy of actual knowledge his followers, and at times even he himself,\nshould have fallen away from the doctrine of ideas, and have returned to\nthat branch of knowledge in which alone the relation of the one and many\ncan be truly seen--the science of number. In his views both of teaching\nand training he might be styled, in modern language, a doctrinaire; after\nthe Spartan fashion he would have his citizens cast in one mould; he does\nnot seem to consider that some degree of freedom, 'a little wholesome\nneglect,' is necessary to strengthen and develope the character and to\ngive play to the individual nature. His citizens would not have acquired\nthat knowledge which in the vision of Er is supposed to be gained by the\npilgrims from their experience of evil.\n\nOn the other hand, Plato is far in advance of modern philosophers and\ntheologians when he teaches that education is to be continued through life\nand will begin again in another. He would never allow education of some\nkind to cease; although he was aware that the proverbial saying of Solon,\n'I grow old learning many things,' cannot be applied literally. Himself\nravished with the contemplation of the idea of good, and delighting in\nsolid geometry (Rep. vii. 528), he has no difficulty in imagining that a\nlifetime might be passed happily in such pursuits. We who know how many\nmore men of business there are in the world than real students or\nthinkers, are not equally sanguine. The education which he proposes for\nhis citizens is really the ideal life of the philosopher or man of genius,\ninterrupted, but only for a time, by practical duties,--a life not for the\nmany, but for the few.\n\nYet the thought of Plato may not be wholly incapable of application to our\nown times. Even if regarded as an ideal which can never be realized, it\nmay have a great effect in elevating the characters of mankind, and\nraising them above the routine {ccx} of their ordinary occupation or\nprofession. It is the best form under which we can conceive the whole of\nlife. Nevertheless the idea of Plato is not easily put into practice. For\nthe education of after life is necessarily the education which each one\ngives himself. Men and women cannot be brought together in schools or\ncolleges at forty or fifty years of age; and if they could the result\nwould be disappointing. The destination of most men is what Plato would\ncall 'the Den' for the whole of life, and with that they are content.\nNeither have they teachers or advisers with whom they can take counsel in\nriper years. There is no 'schoolmaster abroad' who will tell them of their\nfaults, or inspire them with the higher sense of duty, or with the\nambition of a true success in life; no Socrates who will convict them of\nignorance; no Christ, or follower of Christ, who will reprove them of sin.\nHence they have a difficulty in receiving the first element of\nimprovement, which is self-knowledge. The hopes of youth no longer stir\nthem; they rather wish to rest than to pursue high objects. A few only who\nhave come across great men and women, or eminent teachers of religion and\nmorality, have received a second life from them, and have lighted a candle\nfrom the fire of their genius.\n\nThe want of energy is one of the main reasons why so few persons continue\nto improve in later years. They have not the will, and do not know the\nway. They 'never try an experiment,' or look up a point of interest for\nthemselves; they make no sacrifices for the sake of knowledge; their\nminds, like their bodies, at a certain age become fixed. Genius has been\ndefined as 'the power of taking pains'; but hardly any one keeps up his\ninterest in knowledge throughout a whole life. The troubles of a family,\nthe business of making money, the demands of a profession destroy the\nelasticity of the mind. The waxen tablet of the memory which was once\ncapable of receiving 'true thoughts and clear impressions' becomes hard\nand crowded; there is not room for the accumulations of a long life\n(Theaet. 194 ff.). The student, as years advance, rather makes an exchange\nof knowledge than adds to his stores. There is no pressing necessity to\nlearn; the stock of Classics or History or Natural Science which was\nenough for a man at twenty-five is enough for him at fifty. Neither is it\neasy to give a definite answer to any one who asks how he is to improve.\nFor self-education consists in a {ccxi} thousand things, commonplace in\nthemselves,--in adding to what we are by nature something of what we are\nnot; in learning to see ourselves as others see us; in judging, not by\nopinion, but by the evidence of facts; in seeking out the society of\nsuperior minds; in a study of lives and writings of great men; in\nobservation of the world and character; in receiving kindly the natural\ninfluence of different times of life; in any act or thought which is\nraised above the practice or opinions of mankind; in the pursuit of some\nnew or original enquiry; in any effort of mind which calls forth some\nlatent power.\n\nIf any one is desirous of carrying out in detail the Platonic education of\nafter-life, some such counsels as the following may be offered to\nhim:--That he shall choose the branch of knowledge to which his own mind\nmost distinctly inclines, and in which he takes the greatest delight,\neither one which seems to connect with his own daily employment, or,\nperhaps, furnishes the greatest contrast to it. He may study from the\nspeculative side the profession or business in which he is practically\nengaged. He may make Homer, Dante, Shakespeare, Plato, Bacon the friends\nand companions of his life. He may find opportunities of hearing the\nliving voice of a great teacher. He may select for enquiry some point of\nhistory or some unexplained phenomenon of nature. An hour a day passed in\nsuch scientific or literary pursuits will furnish as many facts as the\nmemory can retain, and will give him 'a pleasure not to be repented of'\n(Timaeus, 59 D). Only let him beware of being the slave of crotchets, or\nof running after a Will o' the Wisp in his ignorance, or in his vanity of\nattributing to himself the gifts of a poet or assuming the air of a\nphilosopher. He should know the limits of his own powers. Better to build\nup the mind by slow additions, to creep on quietly from one thing to\nanother, to gain insensibly new powers and new interests in knowledge,\nthan to form vast schemes which are never destined to be realized. But\nperhaps, as Plato would say, 'This is part of another subject' (Tim. 87\nB); though we may also defend our digression by his example (Theaet. 72,\n77).\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIV. We remark with surprise that the progress of nations or {ccxii} the\nnatural growth of institutions which fill modern treatises on political\nphilosophy seem hardly ever to have attracted the attention of Plato and\nAristotle. The ancients were familiar with the mutability of human\naffairs; they could moralize over the ruins of cities and the fall of\nempires (cp. Plato, Statesman 301, 302, and Sulpicius' Letter to Cicero,\nAd Fam. iv. 5); by them fate and chance were deemed to be real powers,\nalmost persons, and to have had a great share in political events. The\nwiser of them like Thucydides believed that 'what had been would be\nagain,' and that a tolerable idea of the future could be gathered from the\npast. Also they had dreams of a Golden Age which existed once upon a time\nand might still exist in some unknown land, or might return again in the\nremote future. But the regular growth of a state enlightened by\nexperience, progressing in knowledge, improving in the arts, of which the\ncitizens were educated by the fulfilment of political duties, appears\nnever to have come within the range of their hopes and aspirations. Such a\nstate had never been seen, and therefore could not be conceived by them.\nTheir experience (cp. Aristot. Metaph. xi. 21; Plato, Laws iii. 676-9) led\nthem to conclude that there had been cycles of civilization in which the\narts had been discovered and lost many times over, and cities had been\noverthrown and rebuilt again and again, and deluges and volcanoes and\nother natural convulsions had altered the face of the earth. Tradition\ntold them of many destructions of mankind and of the preservation of a\nremnant. The world began again after a deluge and was reconstructed out of\nthe fragments of itself. Also they were acquainted with empires of unknown\nantiquity, like the Egyptian or Assyrian; but they had never seen them\ngrow, and could not imagine, any more than we can, the state of man which\npreceded them. They were puzzled and awestricken by the Egyptian\nmonuments, of which the forms, as Plato says, not in a figure, but\nliterally, were ten thousand years old (Laws ii. 656 E), and they\ncontrasted the antiquity of Egypt with their own short memories.\n\nThe early legends of Hellas have no real connection with the later\nhistory: they are at a distance, and the intermediate region is concealed\nfrom view; there is no road or path which leads from one to the other. At\nthe beginning of Greek history, in the vestibule of the temple, is seen\nstanding first of all the figure of {ccxiii} the legislator, himself the\ninterpreter and servant of the God. The fundamental laws which he gives\nare not supposed to change with time and circumstances. The salvation of\nthe state is held rather to depend on the inviolable maintenance of them.\nThey were sanctioned by the authority of heaven, and it was deemed impiety\nto alter them. The desire to maintain them unaltered seems to be the\norigin of what at first sight is very surprising to us--the intolerant\nzeal of Plato against innovators in religion or politics (cp. Laws x.\n907-9); although with a happy inconsistency he is also willing that the\nlaws of other countries should be studied and improvements in legislation\nprivately communicated to the Nocturnal Council (Laws xii. 951, 2). The\nadditions which were made to them in later ages in order to meet the\nincreasing complexity of affairs were still ascribed by a fiction to the\noriginal legislator; and the words of such enactments at Athens were\ndisputed over as if they had been the words of Solon himself. Plato hopes\nto preserve in a later generation the mind of the legislator; he would\nhave his citizens remain within the lines which he has laid down for them.\nHe would not harass them with minute regulations, he would have allowed\nsome changes in the laws: but not changes which would affect the\nfundamental institutions of the state, such for example as would convert\nan aristocracy into a timocracy, or a timocracy into a popular form of\ngovernment.\n\nPassing from speculations to facts, we observe that progress has been the\nexception rather than the law of human history. And therefore we are not\nsurprised to find that the idea of progress is of modern rather than of\nancient date; and, like the idea of a philosophy of history, is not more\nthan a century or two old. It seems to have arisen out of the impression\nleft on the human mind by the growth of the Roman Empire and of the\nChristian Church, and to be due to the political and social improvements\nwhich they introduced into the world; and still more in our own century to\nthe idealism of the first French Revolution and the triumph of American\nIndependence; and in a yet greater degree to the vast material prosperity\nand growth of population in England and her colonies and in America. It is\nalso to be ascribed in a measure to the greater study of the philosophy of\nhistory. The optimist temperament of some great writers has {ccxiv}\nassisted the creation of it, while the opposite character has led a few to\nregard the future of the world as dark. The 'spectator of all time and of\nall existence' sees more of 'the increasing purpose which through the ages\nran' than formerly: but to the inhabitant of a small state of Hellas the\nvision was necessarily limited like the valley in which he dwelt. There\nwas no remote past on which his eye could rest, nor any future from which\nthe veil was partly lifted up by the analogy of history. The narrowness of\nview, which to ourselves appears so singular, was to him natural, if not\nunavoidable.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nV. For the relation of the Republic to the Statesman and the Laws, and the\ntwo other works of Plato which directly treat of politics, see the\nIntroductions to the two latter; a few general points of comparison may be\ntouched upon in this place.\n\nAnd first of the Laws. (1) The Republic, though probably written at\nintervals, yet speaking generally and judging by the indications of\nthought and style, may be reasonably ascribed to the middle period of\nPlato's life: the Laws are certainly the work of his declining years, and\nsome portions of them at any rate seem to have been written in extreme old\nage. (2) The Republic is full of hope and aspiration: the Laws bear the\nstamp of failure and disappointment. The one is a finished work which\nreceived the last touches of the author: the other is imperfectly\nexecuted, and apparently unfinished. The one has the grace and beauty of\nyouth: the other has lost the poetical form, but has more of the severity\nand knowledge of life which is characteristic of old age. (3) The most\nconspicuous defect of the Laws is the failure of dramatic power, whereas\nthe Republic is full of striking contrasts of ideas and oppositions of\ncharacter. (4) The Laws may be said to have more the nature of a sermon,\nthe Republic of a poem; the one is more religious, the other more\nintellectual. (5) Many theories of Plato, such as the doctrine of ideas,\nthe government of the world by philosophers, are not found in the Laws;\nthe immortality of the soul is first mentioned in xii. 959, 967; the\nperson of Socrates has altogether disappeared. The community of women and\nchildren is renounced; the institution of common or public meals for women\n(Laws vi. 781) is for the first time introduced {ccxv} (Ar. Pol. ii. 6,\n\u00a7 5). (6) There remains in the Laws the old enmity to the poets (vii. 817),\nwho are ironically saluted in high-flown terms, and, at the same time, are\nperemptorily ordered out of the city, if they are not willing to submit\ntheir poems to the censorship of the magistrates (cp. Rep. iii. 398).\n(7) Though the work is in most respects inferior, there are a few passages\nin the Laws, such as v. 727 ff. (the honour due to the soul), viii. 835\nff. (the evils of licentious or unnatural love), the whole of Book x.\n(religion), xi. 918 ff. (the dishonesty of retail trade), and 923 ff.\n(bequests), which come more home to us, and contain more of what may be\ntermed the modern element in Plato than almost anything in the Republic.\n\nThe relation of the two works to one another is very well given:\n\n(i) by Aristotle in the Politics (ii. 6, \u00a7\u00a7 1-5) from the side of the\nLaws:--\n\n'The same, or nearly the same, objections apply to Plato's later work, the\nLaws, and therefore we had better examine briefly the constitution which\nis therein described. In the Republic, Socrates has definitely settled in\nall a few questions only; such as the community of women and children, the\ncommunity of property, and the constitution of the state. The population\nis divided into two classes--one of husbandmen, and the other of warriors;\nfrom this latter is taken a third class of counsellors and rulers of the\nstate. But Socrates has not determined whether the husbandmen and artists\nare to have a share in the government, and whether they too are to carry\narms and share in military service or not. He certainly thinks that the\nwomen ought to share in the education of the guardians, and to fight by\ntheir side. The remainder of the work is filled up with digressions\nforeign to the main subject, and with discussions about the education of\nthe guardians. In the Laws there is hardly anything but laws; not much is\nsaid about the constitution. This, which he had intended to make more of\nthe ordinary type, he gradually brings round to the other or ideal form.\nFor with the exception of the community of women and property, he supposes\neverything to be the same in both states; there is to be the same\neducation; the citizens of both are to live free from servile occupations,\nand there are to be common meals in both. The only difference is that in\nthe Laws the common meals are {ccxvi} extended to women, and the warriors\nnumber about 5000, but in the Republic only 1000.'\n\n(ii) by Plato in the Laws (Book v. 739 B-E), from the side of the\nRepublic:--\n\n'The first and highest form of the state and of the government and of the\nlaw is that in which there prevails most widely the ancient saying that\n\"Friends have all things in common.\" Whether there is now, or ever will\nbe, this communion of women and children and of property, in which the\nprivate and individual is altogether banished from life, and things which\nare by nature private, such as eyes and ears and hands, have become\ncommon, and all men express praise and blame, and feel joy and sorrow, on\nthe same occasions, and the laws unite the city to the utmost,--whether\nall this is possible or not, I say that no man, acting upon any other\nprinciple, will ever constitute a state more exalted in virtue, or truer\nor better than this. Such a state, whether inhabited by Gods or sons of\nGods, will make them blessed who dwell therein; and therefore to this we\nare to look for the pattern of the state, and to cling to this, and, as\nfar as possible, to seek for one which is like this. The state which we\nhave now in hand, when created, will be nearest to immortality and unity\nin the next degree; and after that, by the grace of God, we will complete\nthe third one. And we will begin by speaking of the nature and origin of\nthe second.'\n\nThe comparatively short work called the Statesman or Politicus in its\nstyle and manner is more akin to the Laws, while in its idealism it rather\nresembles the Republic. As far as we can judge by various indications of\nlanguage and thought, it must be later than the one and of course earlier\nthan the other. In both the Republic and Statesman a close connection is\nmaintained between Politics and Dialectic. In the Statesman, enquiries\ninto the principles of Method are interspersed with discussions about\nPolitics. The comparative advantages of the rule of law and of a person\nare considered, and the decision given in favour of a person (Arist. Pol.\niii. 15, 16). But much may be said on the other side, nor is the\nopposition necessary; for a person may rule by law, and law may be so\napplied as to be the living voice of the legislator. As in the Republic,\nthere is a myth, describing, however, not a future, but a former existence\nof mankind. The question is {ccxvii} asked, 'Whether the state of\ninnocence which is described in the myth, or a state like our own which\npossesses art and science and distinguishes good from evil, is the\npreferable condition of man.' To this question of the comparative\nhappiness of civilized and primitive life, which was so often discussed in\nthe last century and in our own, no answer is given. The Statesman, though\nless perfect in style than the Republic and of far less range, may justly\nbe regarded as one of the greatest of Plato's dialogues.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nVI. Others as well as Plato have chosen an ideal Republic to be the\nvehicle of thoughts which they could not definitely express, or which went\nbeyond their own age. The classical writing which approaches most nearly\nto the Republic of Plato is the 'De Republica' of Cicero; but neither in\nthis nor in any other of his dialogues does he rival the art of Plato. The\nmanners are clumsy and inferior; the hand of the rhetorician is apparent\nat every turn. Yet noble sentiments are constantly recurring: the true\nnote of Roman patriotism--'We Romans are a great people'--resounds through\nthe whole work. Like Socrates, Cicero turns away from the phenomena of the\nheavens to civil and political life. He would rather not discuss the 'two\nSuns' of which all Rome was talking, when he can converse about 'the two\nnations in one' which had divided Rome ever since the days of the Gracchi.\nLike Socrates again, speaking in the person of Scipio, he is afraid lest\nhe should assume too much the character of a teacher, rather than of an\nequal who is discussing among friends the two sides of a question. He\nwould confine the terms King or State to the rule of reason and justice,\nand he will not concede that title either to a democracy or to a monarchy.\nBut under the rule of reason and justice he is willing to include the\nnatural superior ruling over the natural inferior, which he compares to\nthe soul ruling over the body. He prefers a mixture of forms of government\nto any single one. The two portraits of the just and the unjust, which\noccur in the second book of the Republic, are transferred to the\nstate--Philus, one of the interlocutors, maintaining against his will the\nnecessity of injustice as a principle of government, while the other,\nLaelius, supports the opposite thesis. His views of language and number\nare derived {ccxviii} from Plato; like him he denounces the drama. He also\ndeclares that if his life were to be twice as long he would have no time\nto read the lyric poets. The picture of democracy is translated by him\nword for word, though he had hardly shown himself able to 'carry the jest'\nof Plato. He converts into a stately sentence the humorous fancy about the\nanimals, who 'are so imbued with the spirit of democracy that they make\nthe passers-by get out of their way' (i. 42). His description of the\ntyrant is imitated from Plato, but is far inferior. The second book is\nhistorical, and claims for the Roman constitution (which is to him the\nideal) a foundation of fact such as Plato probably intended to have given\nto the Republic in the Critias. His most remarkable imitation of Plato is\nthe adaptation of the vision of Er, which is converted by Cicero into the\n'Somnium Scipionis'; he has 'romanized' the myth of the Republic, adding\nan argument for the immortality of the soul taken from the Phaedrus, and\nsome other touches derived from the Phaedo and the Timaeus. Though a\nbeautiful tale and containing splendid passages, the 'Somnium Scipionis'\nis very inferior to the vision of Er; it is only a dream, and hardly\nallows the reader to suppose that the writer believes in his own creation.\nWhether his dialogues were framed on the model of the lost dialogues of\nAristotle, as he himself tells us, or of Plato, to which they bear many\nsuperficial resemblances, he is still the Roman orator; he is not\nconversing, but making speeches, and is never able to mould the\nintractable Latin to the grace and ease of the Greek Platonic dialogue.\nBut if he is defective in form, much more is he inferior to the Greek in\nmatter; he nowhere in his philosophical writings leaves upon our minds the\nimpression of an original thinker.\n\nPlato's Republic has been said to be a church and not a state; and such an\nideal of a city in the heavens has always hovered over the Christian\nworld, and is embodied in St. Augustine's 'De Civitate Dei,' which is\nsuggested by the decay and fall of the Roman Empire, much in the same\nmanner in which we may imagine the Republic of Plato to have been\ninfluenced by the decline of Greek politics in the writer's own age. The\ndifference is that in the time of Plato the degeneracy, though certain,\nwas gradual and insensible: whereas the taking of Rome by the Goths\nstirred like an earthquake the age of St. Augustine. Men {ccxix} were\ninclined to believe that the overthrow of the city was to be ascribed to\nthe anger felt by the old Roman deities at the neglect of their worship.\nSt. Augustine maintains the opposite thesis; he argues that the\ndestruction of the Roman Empire is due, not to the rise of Christianity,\nbut to the vices of Paganism. He wanders over Roman history, and over\nGreek philosophy and mythology, and finds everywhere crime, impiety and\nfalsehood. He compares the worst parts of the Gentile religions with the\nbest elements of the faith of Christ. He shows nothing of the spirit which\nled others of the early Christian Fathers to recognize in the writings of\nthe Greek philosophers the power of the divine truth. He traces the\nparallel of the kingdom of God, that is, the history of the Jews,\ncontained in their scriptures, and of the kingdoms of the world, which are\nfound in gentile writers, and pursues them both into an ideal future. It\nneed hardly be remarked that his use both of Greek and of Roman historians\nand of the sacred writings of the Jews is wholly uncritical. The heathen\nmythology, the Sybilline oracles, the myths of Plato, the dreams of\nNeo-Platonists are equally regarded by him as matter of fact. He must be\nacknowledged to be a strictly polemical or controversial writer who makes\nthe best of everything on one side and the worst of everything on the\nother. He has no sympathy with the old Roman life as Plato has with Greek\nlife, nor has he any idea of the ecclesiastical kingdom which was to arise\nout of the ruins of the Roman empire. He is not blind to the defects of\nthe Christian Church, and looks forward to a time when Christian and Pagan\nshall be alike brought before the judgment-seat, and the true City of God\nshall appear.... The work of St. Augustine is a curious repertory of\nantiquarian learning and quotations, deeply penetrated with Christian\nethics, but showing little power of reasoning, and a slender knowledge of\nthe Greek literature and language. He was a great genius, and a noble\ncharacter, yet hardly capable of feeling or understanding anything\nexternal to his own theology. Of all the ancient philosophers he is most\nattracted by Plato, though he is very slightly acquainted with his\nwritings. He is inclined to believe that the idea of creation in the\nTimaeus is derived from the narrative in Genesis; and he is strangely\ntaken with the coincidence (?) of Plato's saying that 'the philosopher\n{ccxx} is the lover of God,' and the words of the Book of Exodus in which\nGod reveals himself to Moses (Exod. iii. 14) He dwells at length on\nmiracles performed in his own day, of which the evidence is regarded by\nhim as irresistible. He speaks in a very interesting manner of the beauty\nand utility of nature and of the human frame, which he conceives to afford\na foretaste of the heavenly state and of the resurrection of the body. The\nbook is not really what to most persons the title of it would imply, and\nbelongs to an age which has passed away. But it contains many fine\npassages and thoughts which are for all time.\n\nThe short treatise de Monarchia of Dante is by far the most remarkable of\nmedi\u00e6val ideals, and bears the impress of the great genius in whom Italy\nand the Middle Ages are so vividly reflected. It is the vision of an\nUniversal Empire, which is supposed to be the natural and necessary\ngovernment of the world, having a divine authority distinct from the\nPapacy, yet coextensive with it. It is not 'the ghost of the dead Roman\nEmpire sitting crowned upon the grave thereof,' but the legitimate heir\nand successor of it, justified by the ancient virtues of the Romans and\nthe beneficence of their rule. Their right to be the governors of the\nworld is also confirmed by the testimony of miracles, and acknowledged by\nSt. Paul when he appealed to C\u00e6sar, and even more emphatically by Christ\nHimself, Who could not have made atonement for the sins of men if He had\nnot been condemned by a divinely authorized tribunal. The necessity for\nthe establishment of an Universal Empire is proved partly by a priori\narguments such as the unity of God and the unity of the family or nation;\npartly by perversions of Scripture and history, by false analogies of\nnature, by misapplied quotations from the classics, and by odd scraps and\ncommonplaces of logic, showing a familiar but by no means exact knowledge\nof Aristotle (of Plato there is none). But a more convincing argument\nstill is the miserable state of the world, which he touchingly describes.\nHe sees no hope of happiness or peace for mankind until all nations of the\nearth are comprehended in a single empire. The whole treatise shows how\ndeeply the idea of the Roman Empire was fixed in the minds of his\ncontemporaries. Not much argument was needed to maintain the truth of a\ntheory which to his own {ccxxi} contemporaries seemed so natural and\ncongenial. He speaks, or rather preaches, from the point of view, not of\nthe ecclesiastic, but of the layman, although, as a good Catholic, he is\nwilling to acknowledge that in certain respects the Empire must submit to\nthe Church. The beginning and end of all his noble reflections and of his\narguments, good and bad, is the aspiration 'that in this little plot of\nearth belonging to mortal man life may pass in freedom and peace.' So\ninextricably is his vision of the future bound up with the beliefs and\ncircumstances of his own age.\n\nThe 'Utopia' of Sir Thomas More is a surprising monument of his genius,\nand shows a reach of thought far beyond his contemporaries. The book was\nwritten by him at the age of about 34 or 35, and is full of the generous\nsentiments of youth. He brings the light of Plato to bear upon the\nmiserable state of his own country. Living not long after the Wars of the\nRoses, and in the dregs of the Catholic Church in England, he is indignant\nat the corruption of the clergy, at the luxury of the nobility and gentry,\nat the sufferings of the poor, at the calamities caused by war. To the eye\nof More the whole world was in dissolution and decay; and side by side\nwith the misery and oppression which he has described in the First Book of\nthe Utopia, he places in the Second Book the ideal state which by the help\nof Plato he had constructed. The times were full of stir and intellectual\ninterest. The distant murmur of the Reformation was beginning to be heard.\nTo minds like More's, Greek literature was a revelation: there had arisen\nan art of interpretation, and the New Testament was beginning to be\nunderstood as it had never been before, and has not often been since, in\nits natural sense. The life there depicted appeared to him wholly unlike\nthat of Christian commonwealths, in which 'he saw nothing but a certain\nconspiracy of rich men procuring their own commodities under the name and\ntitle of the Commonwealth.' He thought that Christ, like Plato,\n'instituted all things common,' for which reason, he tells us, the\ncitizens of Utopia were the more willing to receive his doctrines[5]. The\ncommunity of {ccxxii} property is a fixed idea with him, though he is\naware of the arguments which may be urged on the other side[6]. We wonder\nhow in the reign of Henry VIII, though veiled in another language and\npublished in a foreign country, such speculations could have been endured.\n\n[Footnote 5: 'Howbeit, I think this was no small help and furtherance in\nthe matter, that they heard us say that Christ instituted among his, all\nthings common, and that the same community doth yet remain in the rightest\nChristian communities' (Utopia, English Reprints, p. 144).]\n\n[Footnote 6: 'These things (I say), when I consider with myself, I hold\nwell with Plato, and do nothing marvel that he would make no laws for them\nthat refused those laws, whereby all men should have and enjoy equal\nportions of riches and commodities. For the wise men did easily foresee\nthis to be the one and only way to the wealth of a community, if equality\nof all things should be brought in and established' (Utopia, English\nReprints, p. 67, 68).]\n\nHe is gifted with far greater dramatic invention than any one who\nsucceeded him, with the exception of Swift. In the art of feigning he is a\nworthy disciple of Plato. Like him, starting from a small portion of fact,\nhe founds his tale with admirable skill on a few lines in the Latin\nnarrative of the voyages of Amerigo Vespucci. He is very precise about\ndates and facts, and has the power of making us believe that the narrator\nof the tale must have been an eyewitness. We are fairly puzzled by his\nmanner of mixing up real and imaginary persons; his boy John Clement and\nPeter Giles, citizen of Antwerp, with whom he disputes about the precise\nwords which are supposed to have been used by the (imaginary) Portuguese\ntraveller, Raphael Hythloday. 'I have the more cause,' says Hythloday, 'to\nfear that my words shall not be believed, for that I know how difficultly\nand hardly I myself would have believed another man telling the same, if\nI had not myself seen it with mine own eyes.' Or again: 'If you had been\nwith me in Utopia, and had presently seen their fashions and laws as I did\nwhich lived there five years and more, and would never have come thence,\nbut only to make the new land known here,' etc. More greatly regrets that\nhe forgot to ask Hythloday in what part of the world Utopia is situated;\nhe 'would have spent no small sum of money rather than it should have\nescaped him,' and he begs Peter Giles to see Hythloday or write to him and\nobtain an answer to the question. After this we are not surprised to hear\nthat a Professor of Divinity (perhaps 'a late famous vicar of Croydon in\nSurrey,' as the translator thinks) is desirous of being sent thither as a\nmissionary by the High Bishop, 'yea, and that he may himself be made\nBishop of Utopia, nothing doubting that he must obtain this Bishopric with\nsuit; and he counteth that a godly {ccxxiii} suit which proceedeth not of\nthe desire of honour or lucre, but only of a godly zeal.' The design may\nhave failed through the disappearance of Hythloday, concerning whom we\nhave 'very uncertain news' after his departure. There is no doubt,\nhowever, that he had told More and Giles the exact situation of the\nisland, but unfortunately at the same moment More's attention, as he is\nreminded in a letter from Giles, was drawn off by a servant, and one of\nthe company from a cold caught on shipboard coughed so loud as to prevent\nGiles from hearing. And 'the secret has perished' with him; to this day\nthe place of Utopia remains unknown.\n\nThe words of Phaedrus (275 B), 'O Socrates, you can easily invent\nEgyptians or anything,' are recalled to our mind as we read this lifelike\nfiction. Yet the greater merit of the work is not the admirable art, but\nthe originality of thought. More is as free as Plato from the prejudices\nof his age, and far more tolerant. The Utopians do not allow him who\nbelieves not in the immortality of the soul to share in the administration\nof the state (cp. Laws x. 908 foll.), 'howbeit they put him to no\npunishment, because they be persuaded that it is in no man's power to\nbelieve what he list'; and 'no man is to be blamed for reasoning in\nsupport of his own religion[7].' In the public services 'no prayers be\nused, but such as every man may boldly pronounce without giving offence to\nany sect.' He says significantly, 'There be that give worship to a man\nthat was once of excellent virtue or of famous glory, not only as God, but\nalso the chiefest and highest God. But the most and the wisest part,\nrejecting all these, believe that there is a certain godly power unknown,\nfar above the capacity and reach of man's wit, dispersed throughout all\nthe world, not in bigness, but in virtue and power. Him they call the\nFather of all. To Him alone they attribute the beginnings, the\nincreasings, the proceedings, {ccxxiv} the changes, and the ends of all\nthings. Neither give they any divine honours to any other than him.' So\nfar was More from sharing the popular beliefs of his time. Yet at the end\nhe reminds us that he does not in all respects agree with the customs and\nopinions of the Utopians which he describes. And we should let him have\nthe benefit of this saving clause, and not rudely withdraw the veil behind\nwhich he has been pleased to conceal himself.\n\n[Footnote 7: 'One of our company in my presence was sharply punished. He,\nas soon as he was baptised, began, against our wills, with more earnest\naffection than wisdom, to reason of Christ's religion, and began to wax so\nhot in his matter, that he did not only prefer our religion before all\nother, but also did despise and condemn all other, calling them profane,\nand the followers of them wicked and devilish, and the children of\neverlasting damnation. When he had thus long reasoned the matter, they\nlaid hold on him, accused him, and condemned him into exile, not as a\ndespiser of religion, but as a seditious person and a raiser up of\ndissension among the people' (p. 145).]\n\nNor is he less in advance of popular opinion in his political and moral\nspeculations. He would like to bring military glory into contempt; he\nwould set all sorts of idle people to profitable occupation, including in\nthe same class, priests, women, noblemen, gentlemen, and 'sturdy and\nvaliant beggars,' that the labour of all may be reduced to six hours a\nday. His dislike of capital punishment, and plans for the reformation of\noffenders; his detestation of priests and lawyers[8]; his remark that\n'although every one may hear of ravenous dogs and wolves and cruel\nman-eaters, it is not easy to find states that are well and wisely\ngoverned,' are curiously at variance with the notions of his age and\nindeed with his own life. There are many points in which he shows a modern\nfeeling and a prophetic insight like Plato. He is a sanitary reformer; he\nmaintains that civilized states have a right to the soil of waste\ncountries; he is inclined to the opinion which places happiness in\nvirtuous pleasures, but herein, as he thinks, not disagreeing from those\nother philosophers who define virtue to be a life according to nature. He\nextends the idea of happiness so as to include the happiness of others;\nand he argues ingeniously, 'All men agree that we ought to make others\nhappy; but if others, how much more ourselves!' And still he thinks that\nthere may be a more excellent way, but to this no man's reason can attain\nunless heaven should inspire him with a higher truth. His ceremonies\nbefore marriage; his _humane_ proposal that war should be carried on by\nassassinating the leaders of the enemy, may be compared to some of the\nparadoxes of Plato. He has a charming fancy, like the affinities of Greeks\nand barbarians in the Timaeus, that the Utopians learnt the language of\nthe Greeks with the more readiness because they were originally of the\nsame race with them. He is penetrated with the spirit of Plato, and quotes\nor adapts many {ccxxv} thoughts both from the Republic and from the\nTimaeus. He prefers public duties to private, and is somewhat impatient of\nthe importunity of relations. His citizens have no silver or gold of their\nown, but are ready enough to pay them to their mercenaries (cp. Rep. iv.\n422, 423). There is nothing of which he is more contemptuous than the love\nof money. Gold is used for fetters of criminals, and diamonds and pearls\nfor children's necklaces[9].\n\n[Footnote 8: Compare his satirical observation: 'They (the Utopians) have\npriests of exceeding holiness, and therefore very few' (p. 150).]\n\n[Footnote 9: When the ambassadors came arrayed in gold and peacocks'\nfeathers 'to the eyes of all the Utopians except very few, which had been\nin other countries for some reasonable cause, all that gorgeousness of\napparel seemed shameful and reproachful. In so much that they most\nreverently saluted the vilest and most abject of them for lords--passing\nover the ambassadors themselves without any honour, judging them by their\nwearing of golden chains to be bondmen. You should have seen children\nalso, that had cast away their pearls and precious stones, when they saw\nthe like sticking upon the ambassadors' caps, dig and push their mothers\nunder the sides, saying thus to them--\"Look, mother, how great a lubber\ndoth yet wear pearls and precious stones, as though he were a little child\nstill.\" But the mother; yea and that also in good earnest: \"Peace, son,\"\nsaith she, \"I think he be some of the ambassadors' fools\"' (p. 102).]\n\nLike Plato he is full of satirical reflections on governments and princes;\non the state of the world and of knowledge. The hero of his discourse\n(Hythloday) is very unwilling to become a minister of state, considering\nthat he would lose his independence and his advice would never be\nheeded[10]. He ridicules the new logic of his time; the Utopians could\nnever be made to understand the doctrine of Second Intentions[11]. He is\nvery severe on the sports of the gentry; the Utopians count 'hunting the\nlowest, the vilest, and the most abject part of butchery.' He quotes the\nwords of the Republic in which the philosopher is described 'standing out\nof the way under a wall until the driving storm of sleet and rain be\noverpast,' which admit of a singular application to More's own fate;\nalthough, writing twenty years before (about the year 1514), {ccxxvi} he\ncan hardly be supposed to have foreseen this. There is no touch of satire\nwhich strikes deeper than his quiet remark that the greater part of the\nprecepts of Christ are more at variance with the lives of ordinary\nChristians than the discourse of Utopia[12].\n\n[Footnote 10: Cp. an exquisite passage at p. 35, of which the conclusion\nis as follows: 'And verily it is naturally given ... suppressed and\nended.']\n\n[Footnote 11: 'For they have not devised one of all those rules of\nrestrictions, amplifications, and suppositions, very wittily invented in\nthe small Logicals, which here our children in every place do learn.\nFurthermore, they were never yet able to find out the second intentions;\ninsomuch that none of them all could ever see man himself in common, as\nthey call him, though he be (as you know) bigger than was ever any giant,\nyea, and pointed to of us even with our finger.']\n\n[Footnote 12: 'And yet the most part of them is more dissident from the\nmanners of the world now a days, than my communication was. But preachers,\nsly and wily men, following your counsel (as I suppose) because they saw\nmen evil-willing to frame their manners to Christ's rule, they have\nwrested and wried his doctrine, and, like a rule of lead, have applied it\nto men's manners, that by some means at the least way, they might agree\ntogether.']\n\nThe 'New Atlantis' is only a fragment, and far inferior in merit to the\n'Utopia.' The work is full of ingenuity, but wanting in creative fancy,\nand by no means impresses the reader with a sense of credibility. In some\nplaces Lord Bacon is characteristically different from Sir Thomas More,\nas, for example, in the external state which he attributes to the governor\nof Solomon's House, whose dress he minutely describes, while to Sir Thomas\nMore such trappings appear simple ridiculous. Yet, after this programme of\ndress, Bacon adds the beautiful trait, 'that he had a look as though he\npitied men.' Several things are borrowed by him from the Timaeus; but he\nhas injured the unity of style by adding thoughts and passages which are\ntaken from the Hebrew Scriptures.\n\nThe 'City of the Sun' written by Campanella (1568-1639), a Dominican\nfriar, several years after the 'New Atlantis' of Bacon, has many\nresemblances to the Republic of Plato. The citizens have wives and\nchildren in common; their marriages are of the same temporary sort, and\nare arranged by the magistrates from time to time. They do not, however,\nadopt his system of lots, but bring together the best natures, male and\nfemale, 'according to philosophical rules.' The infants until two years of\nage are brought up by their mothers in public temples; and since\nindividuals for the most part educate their children badly, at the\nbeginning of their third year they are committed to the care of the State,\nand are taught at first, not out of books, but from paintings of all\nkinds, which are emblazoned on the walls of the city. The city has six\ninterior circuits of walls, and an outer wall which is the seventh. On\nthis outer wall are painted the figures of legislators and philosophers,\nand {ccxxvii} on each of the interior walls the symbols or forms of some\none of the sciences are delineated. The women are, for the most part,\ntrained, like the men, in warlike and other exercises; but they have two\nspecial occupations of their own. After a battle, they and the boys soothe\nand relieve the wounded warriors; also they encourage them with embraces\nand pleasant words (cp. Plato, Rep. v. 468). Some elements of the\nChristian or Catholic religion are preserved among them. The life of the\nApostles is greatly admired by this people because they had all things in\ncommon; and the short prayer which Jesus Christ taught men is used in\ntheir worship. It is a duty of the chief magistrates to pardon sins, and\ntherefore the whole people make secret confession of them to the\nmagistrates, and they to their chief, who is a sort of Rector\nMetaphysicus; and by this means he is well informed of all that is going\non in the minds of men. After confession, absolution is granted to the\ncitizens collectively, but no one is mentioned by name. There also exists\namong them a practice of perpetual prayer, performed by a succession of\npriests, who change every hour. Their religion is a worship of God in\nTrinity, that is of Wisdom, Love and Power, but without any distinction of\npersons. They behold in the sun the reflection of His glory; mere graven\nimages they reject, refusing to fall under the 'tyranny' of idolatry.\n\nMany details are given about their customs of eating and drinking, about\ntheir mode of dressing, their employments, their wars. Campanella looks\nforward to a new mode of education, which is to be a study of nature, and\nnot of Aristotle. He would not have his citizens waste their time in the\nconsideration of what he calls 'the dead signs of things.' He remarks that\nhe who knows one science only, does not really know that one any more than\nthe rest, and insists strongly on the necessity of a variety of knowledge.\nMore scholars are turned out in the City of the Sun in one year than by\ncontemporary methods in ten or fifteen. He evidently believes, like Bacon,\nthat henceforward natural science will play a great part in education, a\nhope which seems hardly to have been realized, either in our own or in any\nformer age; at any rate the fulfilment of it has been long deferred.\n\nThere is a good deal of ingenuity and even originality in this {ccxxviii}\nwork, and a most enlightened spirit pervades it. But it has little or no\ncharm of style, and falls very far short of the 'New Atlantis' of Bacon,\nand still more of the 'Utopia' of Sir Thomas More. It is full of\ninconsistencies, and though borrowed from Plato, shows but a superficial\nacquaintance with his writings. It is a work such as one might expect to\nhave been written by a philosopher and man of genius who was also a friar,\nand who had spent twenty-seven years of his life in a prison of the\nInquisition. The most interesting feature of the book, common to Plato and\nSir Thomas More, is the deep feeling which is shown by the writer, of the\nmisery and ignorance prevailing among the lower classes in his own time.\nCampanella takes note of Aristotle's answer to Plato's community of\nproperty, that in a society where all things are common, no individual\nwould have any motive to work (Arist. Pol. ii. 5, \u00a7 6): he replies, that\nhis citizens being happy and contented in themselves (they are required to\nwork only four hours a day), will have greater regard for their fellows\nthan exists among men at present. He thinks, like Plato, that if he\nabolishes private feelings and interests, a great public feeling will take\ntheir place.\n\nOther writings on ideal states, such as the 'Oceana' of Harrington, in\nwhich the Lord Archon, meaning Cromwell, is described, not as he was, but\nas he ought to have been; or the 'Argenis' of Barclay, which is an\nhistorical allegory of his own time, are too unlike Plato to be worth\nmentioning. More interesting than either of these, and far more Platonic\nin style and thought, is Sir John Eliot's 'Monarchy of Man,' in which the\nprisoner of the Tower, no longer able 'to be a politician in the land of\nhis birth,' turns away from politics to view 'that other city which is\nwithin him,' and finds on the very threshold of the grave that the secret\nof human happiness is the mastery of self. The change of government in the\ntime of the English Commonwealth set men thinking about first principles,\nand gave rise to many works of this class.... The great original genius of\nSwift owes nothing to Plato; nor is there any trace in the conversation or\nin the works of Dr. Johnson of any acquaintance with his writings. He\nprobably would have refuted Plato without reading him, in the same fashion\nin which he supposed himself to have refuted Bishop Berkeley's theory of\nthe non-existence of matter. If we {ccxxix} except the so-called English\nPlatonists, or rather Neo-Platonists, who never understood their master,\nand the writings of Coleridge, who was to some extent a kindred spirit,\nPlato has left no permanent impression on English literature.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nVII. Human life and conduct are affected by ideals in the same way that\nthey are affected by the examples of eminent men. Neither the one nor the\nother are immediately applicable to practice, but there is a virtue\nflowing from them which tends to raise individuals above the common\nroutine of society or trade, and to elevate States above the mere\ninterests of commerce or the necessities of self-defence. Like the ideals\nof art they are partly framed by the omission of particulars; they require\nto be viewed at a certain distance, and are apt to fade away if we attempt\nto approach them. They gain an imaginary distinctness when embodied in a\nState or in a system of philosophy, but they still remain the visions of\n'a world unrealized.' More striking and obvious to the ordinary mind are\nthe examples of great men, who have served their own generation and are\nremembered in another. Even in our own family circle there may have been\nsome one, a woman, or even a child, in whose face has shone forth a\ngoodness more than human. The ideal then approaches nearer to us, and we\nfondly cling to it. The ideal of the past, whether of our own past lives\nor of former states of society, has a singular fascination for the minds\nof many. Too late we learn that such ideals cannot be recalled, though the\nrecollection of them may have a humanizing influence on other times. But\nthe abstractions of philosophy are to most persons cold and vacant; they\ngive light without warmth; they are like the full moon in the heavens when\nthere are no stars appearing. Men cannot live by thought alone; the world\nof sense is always breaking in upon them. They are for the most part\nconfined to a corner of earth, and see but a little way beyond their own\nhome or place of abode; they 'do not lift up their eyes to the hills';\nthey are not awake when the dawn appears. But in Plato we have reached a\nheight from which a man may look into the distance (Rep. iv. 445 C) and\nbehold the future of the world and of philosophy. The ideal of the State\nand of the life of the philosopher; the ideal of an education {ccxxx}\ncontinuing through life and extending equally to both sexes; the ideal of\nthe unity and correlation of knowledge; the faith in good and\nimmortality--are the vacant forms of light on which Plato is seeking to\nfix the eye of mankind.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nVIII. Two other ideals, which never appeared above the horizon in Greek\nPhilosophy, float before the minds of men in our own day: one seen more\nclearly than formerly, as though each year and each generation brought us\nnearer to some great change; the other almost in the same degree retiring\nfrom view behind the laws of nature, as if oppressed by them, but still\nremaining a silent hope of we know not what hidden in the heart of man.\nThe first ideal is the future of the human race in this world; the second\nthe future of the individual in another. The first is the more perfect\nrealization of our own present life; the second, the abnegation of it: the\none, limited by experience, the other, transcending it. Both of them have\nbeen and are powerful motives of action; there are a few in whom they have\ntaken the place of all earthly interests. The hope of a future for the\nhuman race at first sight seems to be the more disinterested, the hope of\nindividual existence the more egotistical, of the two motives. But when\nmen have learned to resolve their hope of a future either for themselves\nor for the world into the will of God--'not my will but Thine,' the\ndifference between them falls away; and they may be allowed to make either\nof them the basis of their lives, according to their own individual\ncharacter or temperament. There is as much faith in the willingness to\nwork for an unseen future in this world as in another. Neither is it\ninconceivable that some rare nature may feel his duty to another\ngeneration, or to another century, almost as strongly as to his own, or\nthat living always in the presence of God, he may realize another world as\nvividly as he does this.\n\nThe greatest of all ideals may, or rather must be conceived by us under\nsimilitudes derived from human qualities; although sometimes, like the\nJewish prophets, we may dash away these figures of speech and describe the\nnature of God only in negatives. These again by degrees acquire a positive\nmeaning. It would be well, if when meditating on the higher truths either\nof ccxxxi} philosophy or religion, we sometimes substituted one form of\nexpression for another, lest through the necessities of language we should\nbecome the slaves of mere words.\n\nThere is a third ideal, not the same, but akin to these, which has a place\nin the home and heart of every believer in the religion of Christ, and in\nwhich men seem to find a nearer and more familiar truth, the Divine man,\nthe Son of Man, the Saviour of mankind, Who is the first-born and head of\nthe whole family in heaven and earth, in Whom the Divine and human, that\nwhich is without and that which is within the range of our earthly\nfaculties, are indissolubly united. Neither is this divine form of\ngoodness wholly separable from the ideal of the Christian Church, which is\nsaid in the New Testament to be 'His body,' or at variance with those\nother images of good which Plato sets before us. We see Him in a figure\nonly, and of figures of speech we select but a few, and those the\nsimplest, to be the expression of Him. We behold Him in a picture, but He\nis not there. We gather up the fragments of His discourses, but neither do\nthey represent Him as He truly was. His dwelling is neither in heaven nor\nearth, but in the heart of man. This is that image which Plato saw dimly\nin the distance, which, when existing among men, he called, in the\nlanguage of Homer, 'the likeness of God' (Rep. vi. 501 B), the likeness of\na nature which in all ages men have felt to be greater and better than\nthemselves, and which in endless forms, whether derived from Scripture or\nnature, from the witness of history or from the human heart, regarded as a\nperson or not as a person, with or without parts or passions, existing in\nspace or not in space, is and will always continue to be to mankind the\nIdea of Good.\n\n\n\n\nTHE REPUBLIC.\n\nBOOK I\n\n                      _PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE._\n\n     Socrates, _who is the narrator_.     Cephalus.\n     Glaucon.                             Thrasymachus.\n     Adeimantus.                          Cleitophon.\n     Polemarchus.\n\n                      _And others who are mute auditors._\n\nThe scene is laid in the house of Cephalus at the Piraeus; and the whole\ndialogue is narrated by Socrates the day after it actually took place to\nTimaeus, Hermocrates, Critias, and a nameless person, who are introduced\nin the Timaeus.\n\n\n*Ed. Steph. 327* [Sidenote: _Republic I_. Socrates, Glaucon. Meeting of\nSocrates and Glaucon with Polemarchus at the Bendidean festival.]\n\nI went down yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon the son of Ariston, that\nI might offer up my prayers to the goddess[1]; and also because I wanted\nto see in what manner they would celebrate the festival, which was a new\nthing. I was delighted with the procession of the inhabitants; but that of\nthe Thracians was equally, if not more, beautiful. *327B* When we had\nfinished our prayers and viewed the spectacle, we turned in the direction\nof the city; and at that instant Polemarchus the son of Cephalus chanced\nto catch sight of us from a distance as we were starting on our way home,\nand told his servant to run and bid us wait for him. The servant took hold\nof me by the cloak behind, and said: Polemarchus desires you to wait.\n\n[Footnote 1: Bendis, the Thracian Artemis.]\n\nI turned round, and asked him where his master was.\n\nThere he is, said the youth, coming after you, if you will only wait.\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates, Polemarchus, Glaucon, Adeimantus, Cephalus.]\n\n{2} *327C* Certainly we will, said Glaucon; and in a few minutes\nPolemarchus appeared, and with him Adeimantus, Glaucon's brother, Niceratus\nthe son of Nicias, and several others who had been at the procession.\n\nPolemarchus said to me: I perceive, Socrates, that you and your companion\nare already on your way to the city.\n\nYou are not far wrong, I said.\n\nBut do you see, he rejoined, how many we are?\n\nOf course.\n\nAnd are you stronger than all these? for if not, you will have to remain\nwhere you are.\n\nMay there not be the alternative, I said, that we may persuade you to let\nus go?\n\nBut can you persuade us, if we refuse to listen to you? he said.\n\nCertainly not, replied Glaucon.\n\nThen we are not going to listen; of that you may be assured.\n\n*328A* [Sidenote: The equestrian torch-race.]\n\nAdeimantus added: Has no one told you of the torch-race on horseback in\nhonour of the goddess which will take place in the evening?\n\nWith horses! I replied: That is a novelty. Will horsemen carry torches and\npass them one to another during the race?\n\nYes, said Polemarchus, and not only so, but a festival will be celebrated\nat night, which you certainly ought to see. Let us rise soon after supper\nand see this festival; there will be a gathering of young men, and we will\nhave a good talk. *328B* Stay then, and do not be perverse.\n\nGlaucon said: I suppose, since you insist, that we must.\n\nVery good, I replied.\n\n[Sidenote: The gathering of friends at the house of Cephalus.]\n\nAccordingly we went with Polemarchus to his house; and there we found his\nbrothers Lysias and Euthydemus, and with them Thrasymachus the\nChalcedonian, Charmantides the Paeanian, and Cleitophon the son of\nAristonymus. There too was Cephalus the father of Polemarchus, whom I had\nnot seen for a long time, and I thought him very much aged. *328C* He was\nseated on a cushioned chair, and had a garland on his head, for he had\nbeen sacrificing in the court; and there were some other chairs in the\nroom arranged in a semicircle, {3} upon which we sat down by him. He\nsaluted me eagerly, and then he said:--\n\n[Sidenote: Cephalus, Socrates.]\n\nYou don't come to see me, Socrates, as often as you ought: If I were still\nable to go and see you I would not ask you to come to me. But at my age\nI can hardly get to the city, and therefore you should come oftener to the\nPiraeus. *328D* For let me tell you, that the more the pleasures of the\nbody fade away, the greater to me is the pleasure and charm of\nconversation. Do not then deny my request, but make our house your resort\nand keep company with these young men; we are old friends, and you will be\nquite at home with us.\n\nI replied: There is nothing which for my part I like better, Cephalus,\nthan conversing with aged men; *328E* for I regard them as travellers who\nhave gone a journey which I too may have to go, and of whom I ought to\nenquire, whether the way is smooth and easy, or rugged and difficult. And\nthis is a question which I should like to ask of you who have arrived at\nthat time which the poets call the 'threshold of old age'--Is life harder\ntowards the end, or what report do you give of it?\n\n*329A* [Sidenote: Old age is not to blame for the troubles of old men.]\n\n[Sidenote: The excellent saying of Sophocles.]\n\nI will tell you, Socrates, he said, what my own feeling is. Men of my age\nflock together; we are birds of a feather, as the old proverb says; and at\nour meetings the tale of my acquaintance commonly is--I cannot eat,\nI cannot drink; the pleasures of youth and love are fled away: there was a\ngood time once, but now that is gone, and life is no longer life. *329B*\nSome complain of the slights which are put upon them by relations, and\nthey will tell you sadly of how many evils their old age is the cause. But\nto me, Socrates, these complainers seem to blame that which is not really\nin fault. For if old age were the cause, I too being old, and every other\nold man, would have felt as they do. But this is not my own experience,\nnor that of others whom I have known. How well I remember the aged poet\nSophocles, when in answer to the question, *329C* How does love suit with\nage, Sophocles,--are you still the man you were? Peace, he replied; most\ngladly have I escaped the thing of which you speak; I feel as if I had\nescaped from a mad and furious master. His words have often occurred to my\nmind since, and they seem as good to me now as at the time when he uttered\nthem. {4} For certainly old age has a great sense of calm and freedom;\nwhen the passions relax their hold, then, as Sophocles says, *329D* we are\nfreed from the grasp not of one mad master only, but of many. The truth\nis, Socrates, that these regrets, and also the complaints about relations,\nare to be attributed to the same cause, which is not old age, but men's\ncharacters and tempers; for he who is of a calm and happy nature will\nhardly feel the pressure of age, but to him who is of an opposite\ndisposition youth and age are equally a burden.\n\n[Sidenote: It is admitted that the old, if they are to be comfortable,\nmust have a fair share of external goods; neither virtue alone nor riches\nalone can make an old man happy.]\n\nI listened in admiration, and wanting to draw him out, that he might go\non-- *329E* Yes, Cephalus, I said: but I rather suspect that people in\ngeneral are not convinced by you when you speak thus; they think that old\nage sits lightly upon you, not because of your happy disposition, but\nbecause you are rich, and wealth is well known to be a great comforter.\n\nYou are right, he replied; they are not convinced: and there is something\nin what they say; not, however, so much as they imagine. I might answer\nthem as Themistocles answered the Seriphian who was abusing him and saying\nthat he was famous, not for his own merits but because he *330A* was an\nAthenian: 'If you had been a native of my country or I of yours, neither\nof us would have been famous.' And to those who are not rich and are\nimpatient of old age, the same reply may be made; for to the good poor man\nold age cannot be a light burden, nor can a bad rich man ever have peace\nwith himself.\n\nMay I ask, Cephalus, whether your fortune was for the most part inherited\nor acquired by you?\n\n[Sidenote: Cephalus has inherited rather than made a fortune; he is\ntherefore indifferent to money.]\n\nAcquired! *330B* Socrates; do you want to know how much I acquired? In the\nart of making money I have been midway between my father and grandfather:\nfor my grandfather, whose name I bear, doubled and trebled the value of\nhis patrimony, that which he inherited being much what I possess now; but\nmy father Lysanias reduced the property below what it is at present: and\nI shall be satisfied if I leave to these my sons not less but a little more\nthan I received.\n\nThat was why I asked you the question, I replied, because I see that you\nare indifferent about money, *330C* which is a characteristic rather of\nthose who have inherited their fortunes than of those who have acquired\nthem; the makers {5} of fortunes have a second love of money as a creation\nof their own, resembling the affection of authors for their own poems, or\nof parents for their children, besides that natural love of it for the\nsake of use and profit which is common to them and all men. And hence they\nare very bad company, for they can talk about nothing but the praises of\nwealth.\n\nThat is true, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: The advantages of wealth.]\n\n*330D* Yes, that is very true, but may I ask another question?--What do\nyou consider to be the greatest blessing which you have reaped from your\nwealth?\n\n[Sidenote: The fear of death and the consciousness of sin become more\nvivid in old age; and to be rich frees a man from many temptations.]\n\nOne, he said, of which I could not expect easily to convince others. For\nlet me tell you, Socrates, that when a man thinks himself to be near\ndeath, fears and cares enter into his mind which he never had before; the\ntales of a world below and the punishment which is exacted there of deeds\ndone here were once a laughing matter to him, *330E* but now he is\ntormented with the thought that they may be true: either from the weakness\nof age, or because he is now drawing nearer to that other place, he has a\nclearer view of these things; suspicions and alarms crowd thickly upon\nhim, and he begins to reflect and consider what wrongs he has done to\nothers. And when he finds that the sum of his transgressions is great he\nwill many a time like a child start up in his sleep for fear, and he is\nfilled with dark forebodings. But *331A* to him who is conscious of no\nsin, sweet hope, as Pindar charmingly says, is the kind nurse of his age:\n\n[Sidenote: The admirable strain of Pindar.]\n\n'Hope,' he says, 'cherishes the soul of him who lives in justice and\nholiness, and is the nurse of his age and the companion of his\njourney;--hope which is mightiest to sway the restless soul of man.'\n\nHow admirable are his words! And the great blessing of riches, *331B* I do\nnot say to every man, but to a good man, is, that he has had no occasion\nto deceive or to defraud others, either intentionally or unintentionally;\nand when he departs to the world below he is not in any apprehension about\nofferings due to the gods or debts which he owes to men. Now to this peace\nof mind the possession of wealth greatly contributes; and therefore I say,\nthat, setting one thing against another, of the many advantages which\nwealth has to give, to a man of sense this is in my opinion the greatest.\n{6}\n\n[Sidenote: Cephalus, Socrates, Polemarchus.]\n\n[Sidenote: Justice to speak truth and pay your debts.]\n\n*331C* Well said, Cephalus, I replied; but as concerning justice, what is\nit?--to speak the truth and to pay your debts--no more than this? And even\nto this are there not exceptions? Suppose that a friend when in his right\nmind has deposited arms with me and he asks for them when he is not in his\nright mind, ought I to give them back to him? No one would say that I\nought or that I should be right in doing so, any more than they would say\nthat I ought always to speak the truth to one who is in his condition.\n\n*331D* You are quite right, he replied.\n\nBut then, I said, speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a\ncorrect definition of justice.\n\n[Sidenote: This is the definition of Simonides. But you ought not on all\noccasions to do either. What then was his meaning?]\n\nQuite correct, Socrates, if Simonides is to be believed, said Polemarchus\ninterposing.\n\nI fear, said Cephalus, that I must go now, for I have to look after the\nsacrifices, and I hand over the argument to Polemarchus and the company.\n\nIs not Polemarchus your heir? I said.\n\nTo be sure, he answered, and went away laughing to the sacrifices.\n\n*331E* Tell me then, O thou heir of the argument, what did Simonides say,\nand according to you truly say, about justice?\n\nHe said that the repayment of a debt is just, and in saying so he appears\nto me to be right.\n\nI should be sorry to doubt the word of such a wise and inspired man, but\nhis meaning, though probably clear to you, is the reverse of clear to me.\nFor he certainly does not mean, as we were just now saying, that I ought\nto return a deposit of arms or of anything else to one who asks for it\n*332A* when he is not in his right senses; and yet a deposit cannot be\ndenied to be a debt.\n\nTrue.\n\nThen when the person who asks me is not in his right mind I am by no means\nto make the return?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nWhen Simonides said that the repayment of a debt was justice, he did not\nmean to include that case?\n\nCertainly not; for he thinks that a friend ought always to do good to a\nfriend and never evil.\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates, Polemarchus.]\n\n*332B* You mean that the return of a deposit of gold which is to the\ninjury of the receiver, if the two parties are friends, is not the\nrepayment of a debt,--that is what you would imagine him to say?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd are enemies also to receive what we owe to them?\n\nTo be sure, he said, they are to receive what we owe them, and an enemy,\nas I take it, owes to an enemy that which is due or proper to him--that is\nto say, evil. {7}\n\nSimonides, then, after the manner of poets, would seem to have spoken\ndarkly of the nature of justice; *332C* for he really meant to say that\njustice is the giving to each man what is proper to him, and this he\ntermed a debt.\n\nThat must have been his meaning, he said.\n\nBy heaven! I replied; and if we asked him what due or proper thing is\ngiven by medicine, and to whom, what answer do you think that he would\nmake to us?\n\nHe would surely reply that medicine gives drugs and meat and drink to\nhuman bodies.\n\nAnd what due or proper thing is given by cookery, and to what?\n\n*332D* Seasoning to food.\n\nAnd what is that which justice gives, and to whom?\n\nIf, Socrates, we are to be guided at all by the analogy of the preceding\ninstances, then justice is the art which gives good to friends and evil to\nenemies.\n\nThat is his meaning then?\n\nI think so.\n\n[Sidenote: Illustrations.]\n\nAnd who is best able to do good to his friends and evil to his enemies in\ntime of sickness?\n\nThe physician.\n\n*332E* Or when they are on a voyage, amid the perils of the sea?\n\nThe pilot.\n\nAnd in what sort of actions or with a view to what result is the just man\nmost able to do harm to his enemy and good to his friend?\n\nIn going to war against the one and in making alliances with the other.\n\nBut when a man is well, my dear Polemarchus, there is no need of a\nphysician? {8}\n\nNo.\n\nAnd he who is not on a voyage has no need of a pilot?\n\nNo.\n\nThen in time of peace justice will be of no use?\n\nI am very far from thinking so.\n\n*333A* You think that justice may be of use in peace as well as in war?\n\nYes.\n\nLike husbandry for the acquisition of corn?\n\nYes.\n\nOr like shoemaking for the acquisition of shoes,--that is what you mean?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd what similar use or power of acquisition has justice in time of peace?\n\n[Sidenote: Justice is useful in contracts,]\n\nIn contracts, Socrates, justice is of use.\n\nAnd by contracts you mean partnerships?\n\nExactly.\n\n*333B* But is the just man or the skilful player a more useful and better\npartner at a game of draughts?\n\nThe skilful player.\n\nAnd in the laying of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful or\nbetter partner than the builder?\n\nQuite the reverse.\n\nThen in what sort of partnership is the just man a better partner than the\nharp-player, as in playing the harp the harp-player is certainly a better\npartner than the just man?\n\nIn a money partnership.\n\nYes, Polemarchus, but surely not in the use of money; for you do not want\na just man to be your counsellor in the purchase or sale of a horse; a man\nwho is knowing about *333C* horses would be better for that, would he not?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd when you want to buy a ship, the shipwright or the pilot would be\nbetter?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen what is that joint use of silver or gold in which the just man is to\nbe preferred?\n\n[Sidenote: especially in the safe-keeping of deposits.]\n\nWhen you want a deposit to be kept safely.\n\nYou mean when money is not wanted, but allowed to lie? {9}\n\nPrecisely.\n\n[Sidenote: But not in the use of money: and if so, justice is only useful\nwhen money or anything else is useless.]\n\nThat is to say, justice is useful when money is useless?\n\n*333D* That is the inference.\n\nAnd when you want to keep a pruning-hook safe, then justice is useful to\nthe individual and to the state; but when you want to use it, then the art\nof the vine-dresser?\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd when you want to keep a shield or a lyre, and not to use them, you\nwould say that justice is useful; but when you want to use them, then the\nart of the soldier or of the musician?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd so of all other things;--justice is useful when they are useless, and\nuseless when they are useful?\n\nThat is the inference.\n\n*333E* Then justice is not good for much. But let us consider this further\npoint: Is not he who can best strike a blow in a boxing match or in any\nkind of fighting best able to ward off a blow?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd he who is most skilful in preventing or escaping[2] from a disease is\nbest able to create one?\n\n[Footnote 2: Reading [Greek: phula/xasthai kai\\ lathei=n, (ou=tos, ktl].]\n\nTrue.\n\n[Sidenote: A new point of view: Is not he who is best able to do good best\nable to do evil?]\n\nAnd he is the best guard of a camp who is best able to *334A* steal a\nmarch upon the enemy?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen he who is a good keeper of anything is also a good thief?\n\nThat, I suppose, is to be inferred.\n\nThen if the just man is good at keeping money, he is good at stealing it.\n\nThat is implied in the argument.\n\nThen after all the just man has turned out to be a thief. And this is a\nlesson which I suspect you must have learnt out of Homer; *334B* for he,\nspeaking of Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, who is a\nfavourite of his, affirms that\n\n  'He was excellent above all men in theft and perjury.'\n\nAnd so, you and Homer and Simonides are agreed that {10} justice is an art\nof theft; to be practised however 'for the good of friends and for the\nharm of enemies,'--that was what you were saying?\n\nNo, certainly not that, though I do not now know what I did say; but I\nstill stand by the latter words.\n\n*334C* Well, there is another question: By friends and enemies do we mean\nthose who are so really, or only in seeming?\n\n[Sidenote: Justice an art of theft to be practised for the good of friends\nand the harm of enemies. But who are friends and enemies?]\n\nSurely, he said, a man may be expected to love those whom he thinks good,\nand to hate those whom he thinks evil.\n\nYes, but do not persons often err about good and evil: many who are not\ngood seem to be so, and conversely?\n\nThat is true.\n\nThen to them the good will be enemies and the evil will be their friends?\nTrue.\n\nAnd in that case they will be right in doing good to the evil and *334D*\nevil to the good?\n\nClearly.\n\nBut the good are just and would not do an injustice?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen according to your argument it is just to injure those who do no\nwrong?\n\nNay, Socrates; the doctrine is immoral.\n\nThen I suppose that we ought to do good to the just and harm to the\nunjust?\n\nI like that better.\n\n[Sidenote: Mistakes will sometimes happen.]\n\nBut see the consequence:--Many a man who is ignorant of human nature has\nfriends who are bad friends, *334E* and in that case he ought to do harm\nto them; and he has good enemies whom he ought to benefit; but, if so, we\nshall be saying the very opposite of that which we affirmed to be the\nmeaning of Simonides.\n\nVery true, he said: and I think that we had better correct an error into\nwhich we seem to have fallen in the use of the words 'friend' and 'enemy.'\n\nWhat was the error, Polemarchus? I asked.\n\nWe assumed that he is a friend who seems to be or who is thought good.\n\n[Sidenote: Correction of the definition.]\n\nAnd how is the error to be corrected?\n\n[Sidenote: To appearance we must add reality. He is a friend who 'is' as\nwell as 'seems' good, And we should do good to our good friends and harm\nto our bad enemies.]\n\nWe should rather say that he is a friend who is, as well as {11} seems,\ngood; *335A* and that he who seems only, and is not good, only seems to be\nand is not a friend; and of an enemy the same may be said.\n\nYou would argue that the good are our friends and the bad our enemies?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd instead of saying simply as we did at first, that it is just to do\ngood to our friends and harm to our enemies, we should further say: It is\njust to do good to our friends when they are good and harm to our enemies\nwhen they are evil?\n\n*335B* Yes, that appears to me to be the truth.\n\nBut ought the just to injure any one at all?\n\nUndoubtedly he ought to injure those who are both wicked and his enemies.\n\n[Sidenote: To harm men is to injure them; and to injure them is to make\nthem unjust. But justice cannot produce injustice.]\n\nWhen horses are injured, are they improved or deteriorated?\n\nThe latter.\n\nDeteriorated, that is to say, in the good qualities of horses, not of\ndogs?\n\nYes, of horses.\n\nAnd dogs are deteriorated in the good qualities of dogs, and not of\nhorses?\n\nOf course.\n\n*335C* And will not men who are injured be deteriorated in that which is\nthe proper virtue of man?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd that human virtue is justice?\n\nTo be sure.\n\nThen men who are injured are of necessity made unjust?\n\nThat is the result.\n\n[Sidenote: Illustrations.]\n\nBut can the musician by his art make men unmusical?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nOr the horseman by his art make them bad horsemen?\n\nImpossible.\n\nAnd can the just by justice make men unjust, or speaking *335D* generally,\ncan the good by virtue make them bad?\n\nAssuredly not.\n\nAny more than heat can produce cold?\n\nIt cannot.\n\nOr drought moisture? {12}\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus.]\n\nClearly not.\n\nNor can the good harm any one?\n\nImpossible.\n\nAnd the just is the good?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen to injure a friend or any one else is not the act of a just man, but\nof the opposite, who is the unjust?\n\nI think that what you say is quite true, Socrates.\n\n*335E* Then if a man says that justice consists in the repayment of debts,\nand that good is the debt which a just man owes to his friends, and evil\nthe debt which he owes to his enemies,--to say this is not wise; for it is\nnot true, if, as has been clearly shown, the injuring of another can be in\nno case just.\n\nI agree with you, said Polemarchus.\n\n[Sidenote: The saying however explained is not to be attributed to any\ngood or wise man.]\n\nThen you and I are prepared to take up arms against any one who attributes\nsuch a saying to Simonides or Bias or Pittacus, or any other wise man or\nseer?\n\nI am quite ready to do battle at your side, he said.\n\n*336A* Shall I tell you whose I believe the saying to be?\n\nWhose?\n\nI believe that Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias the Theban, or\nsome other rich and mighty man, who had a great opinion of his own power,\nwas the first to say that justice is 'doing good to your friends and harm\nto your enemies.'\n\nMost true, he said.\n\nYes, I said; but if this definition of justice also breaks down, what\nother can be offered?\n\n[Sidenote: The brutality of Thrasymachus.]\n\n*336B* Several times in the course of the discussion Thrasymachus had made\nan attempt to get the argument into his own hands, and had been put down\nby the rest of the company, who wanted to hear the end. But when\nPolemarchus and I had done speaking and there was a pause, he could no\nlonger hold his peace; and, gathering himself up, he came at us like a\nwild beast, seeking to devour us. We were quite panic-stricken at the\nsight of him.\n\nHe roared out to the whole company: What folly, Socrates, has taken\npossession of you all? *336C* And why, sillybillies, do you knock under to\none another? I say that if you want really to know what justice is, you\nshould not only ask but {13} answer, and you should not seek honour to\nyourself from the refutation of an opponent, but have your own answer; for\nthere is many a one who can ask and cannot answer. *336D* And now I will\nnot have you say that justice is duty or advantage or profit or gain or\ninterest, for this sort of nonsense will not do for me; I must have\nclearness and accuracy.\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates, Thrasymachus.]\n\nI was panic-stricken at his words, and could not look at him without\ntrembling. Indeed I believe that if I had not fixed my eye upon him,\nI should have been struck dumb: but when I saw his fury rising, I looked\nat him first, and was *336E* therefore able to reply to him.\n\nThrasymachus, I said, with a quiver, don't be hard upon us. Polemarchus\nand I may have been guilty of a little mistake in the argument, but I can\nassure you that the error was not intentional. If we were seeking for a\npiece of gold, you would not imagine that we were 'knocking under to one\nanother,' and so losing our chance of finding it. And why, when we are\nseeking for justice, a thing more precious than many pieces of gold, do\nyou say that we are weakly yielding to one another and not doing our\nutmost to get at the truth? Nay, my good friend, we are most willing and\nanxious to do so, but the fact is that we cannot. And if so, you people\nwho know all things should pity us and not be angry with us.\n\n*337A* How characteristic of Socrates! he replied, with a bitter laugh;\n--that's your ironical style! Did I not foresee--have I not already told\nyou, that whatever he was asked he would refuse to answer, and try irony\nor any other shuffle, in order that he might avoid answering?\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates cannot give any answer if all true answers are\nexcluded.]\n\n[Sidenote: Thrasymachus is assailed with his own weapons.]\n\nYou are a philosopher, Thrasymachus, I replied, and well know that if you\nask a person what numbers make up twelve, *337B* taking care to prohibit\nhim whom you ask from answering twice six, or three times four, or six\ntimes two, or four times three, 'for this sort of nonsense will not do for\nme,'--then obviously, if that is your way of putting the question, no one\ncan answer you. But suppose that he were to retort, 'Thrasymachus, what do\nyou mean? If one of these numbers which you interdict be the true answer\nto the question, am I falsely to say some other number which is not the\nright one?--is *337C* that your meaning?'--How would you answer him?\n\nJust as if the two cases were at all alike! he said. {14}\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates, Thrasymachus, Glaucon.]\n\nWhy should they not be? I replied; and even if they are not, but only\nappear to be so to the person who is asked, ought he not to say what he\nthinks, whether you and I forbid him or not?\n\nI presume then that you are going to make one of the interdicted answers?\n\nI dare say that I may, notwithstanding the danger, if upon reflection\nI approve of any of them.\n\n*337D* But what if I give you an answer about justice other and better, he\nsaid, than any of these? What do you deserve to have done to you?\n\nDone to me!--as becomes the ignorant, I must learn from the wise--that is\nwhat I deserve to have done to me.\n\n[Sidenote: The Sophist demands payment for his instructions. The company\nare very willing to contribute.]\n\nWhat, and no payment! a pleasant notion!\n\nI will pay when I have the money, I replied.\n\nBut you have, Socrates, said Glaucon: and you, Thrasymachus, need be under\nno anxiety about money, for we will all make a contribution for Socrates.\n\n*337E* Yes, he replied, and then Socrates will do as he always does\n--refuse to answer himself, but take and pull to pieces the answer of some\none else.\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates knows little or nothing: how can he answer? And he is\ndeterred by the interdict of Thrasymachus.]\n\nWhy, my good friend, I said, how can any one answer who knows, and says\nthat he knows, just nothing; and who, even if he has some faint notions of\nhis own, is told by a man of authority not to utter them? The natural\nthing is, that *338A* the speaker should be some one like yourself who\nprofesses to know and can tell what he knows. Will you then kindly answer,\nfor the edification of the company and of myself?\n\nGlaucon and the rest of the company joined in my request, and\nThrasymachus, as any one might see, was in reality eager to speak; for he\nthought that he had an excellent answer, and would distinguish himself.\nBut at first he affected to insist on my answering; at length he consented\nto begin. *338B* Behold, he said, the wisdom of Socrates; he refuses to\nteach himself, and goes about learning of others, to whom he never even\nsays Thank you.\n\nThat I learn of others, I replied, is quite true; but that I am ungrateful\nI wholly deny. Money I have none, and therefore I pay in praise, which is\nall I have; and how ready {15} I am to praise any one who appears to me to\nspeak well you will very soon find out when you answer; for I expect that\nyou will answer well.\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates, Thrasymachus.]\n\n[Sidenote: The definition of Thrasymachus: 'Justice is the interest of the\nstronger or ruler.']\n\n*338C* Listen, then, he said; I proclaim that justice is nothing else than\nthe interest of the stronger. And now why do you not praise me? But of\ncourse you won't.\n\nLet me first understand you, I replied. Justice, as you say, is the\ninterest of the stronger. What, Thrasymachus, is the meaning of this? You\ncannot mean to say that because Polydamas, the pancratiast, is stronger\nthan we are, and finds the eating of beef conducive to his bodily\nstrength, that to *338D* eat beef is therefore equally for our good who\nare weaker than he is, and right and just for us?\n\nThat's abominable of you, Socrates; you take the words in the sense which\nis most damaging to the argument.\n\nNot at all, my good sir, I said; I am trying to understand them; and\nI wish that you would be a little clearer.\n\nWell, he said, have you never heard that forms of government differ; there\nare tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies?\n\nYes, I know.\n\nAnd the government is the ruling power in each state?\n\nCertainly.\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates compels Thrasymachus to explain his meaning.]\n\n*338E* And the different forms of government make laws democratical,\naristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests; and\nthese laws, which are made by them for their own interests, are the\njustice which they deliver to their subjects, and him who transgresses\nthem they punish as a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what\nI mean when I say that in all states there is the same principle of\njustice, which is the interest of the government; and *339A* as the\ngovernment must be supposed to have power, the only reasonable conclusion\nis, that everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the\ninterest of the stronger.\n\nNow I understand you, I said; and whether you are right or not I will try\nto discover. But let me remark, that in defining justice you have yourself\nused the word 'interest' which you forbade me to use. It is true, however,\nthat in your definition the words 'of the stronger' are added.\n\n*339B* A small addition, you must allow, he said. {16}\n\nGreat or small, never mind about that: we must first enquire whether what\nyou are saying is the truth. Now we are both agreed that justice is\ninterest of some sort, but you go on to say 'of the stronger'; about this\naddition I am not so sure, and must therefore consider further.\n\nProceed.\n\n[Sidenote: He is dissatisfied with the explanation; for rulers may err.]\n\nI will; and first tell me, Do you admit that it is just for subjects to\nobey their rulers?\n\nI do.\n\n*339C* But are the rulers of states absolutely infallible, or are they\nsometimes liable to err?\n\nTo be sure, he replied, they are liable to err.\n\nThen in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and\nsometimes not?\n\nTrue.\n\nWhen they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their interest;\nwhen they are mistaken, contrary to their interest; you admit that?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the laws which they make must be obeyed by their subjects,--and that\nis what you call justice?\n\nDoubtless.\n\n[Sidenote: And then the justice which makes a mistake will turn out to be\nthe reverse of the interest of the stronger.]\n\n*339D* Then justice, according to your argument, is not only obedience to\nthe interest of the stronger but the reverse?\n\nWhat is that you are saying? he asked.\n\nI am only repeating what you are saying, I believe. But let us consider:\nHave we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about their own\ninterest in what they command, and also that to obey them is justice? Has\nnot that been admitted?\n\nYes.\n\n*339E* Then you must also have acknowledged justice not to be for the\ninterest of the stronger, when the rulers unintentionally command things\nto be done which are to their own injury. For if, as you say, justice is\nthe obedience which the subject renders to their commands, in that case, O\nwisest of men, is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker are\ncommanded to do, not what is for the interest, but what is for the injury\nof the stronger?\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates, Cleitophon, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus.]\n\nNothing can be clearer, Socrates, said Polemarchus. {17}\n\n*340A* Yes, said Cleitophon, interposing, if you are allowed to be his\nwitness.\n\nBut there is no need of any witness, said Polemarchus, for Thrasymachus\nhimself acknowledges that rulers may sometimes command what is not for\ntheir own interest, and that for subjects to obey them is justice.\n\n[Sidenote: Cleitophon tries to make a way of escape for Thrasymachus by\ninserting the words 'thought to be.']\n\nYes, Polemarchus,--Thrasymachus said that for subjects to do what was\ncommanded by their rulers is just.\n\nYes, Cleitophon, but he also said that justice is the interest *340B* of\nthe stronger, and, while admitting both these propositions, he further\nacknowledged that the stronger may command the weaker who are his subjects\nto do what is not for his own interest; whence follows that justice is the\ninjury quite as much as the interest of the stronger.\n\nBut, said Cleitophon, he meant by the interest of the stronger what the\nstronger thought to be his interest,--this was what the weaker had to do;\nand this was affirmed by him to be justice.\n\nThose were not his words, rejoined Polemarchus.\n\n*340C* Never mind, I replied, if he now says that they are, let us accept\nhis statement. Tell me, Thrasymachus, I said, did you mean by justice what\nthe stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not?\n\n[Sidenote: This evasion is repudiated by Thrasymachus;]\n\nCertainly not, he said. Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken the\nstronger at the time when he is mistaken?\n\nYes, I said, my impression was that you did so, when you admitted that the\nruler was not infallible but might be sometimes mistaken.\n\n[Sidenote: who adopts another line of defence: 'No artist or ruler is ever\nmistaken _qua_ artist or ruler.']\n\n*340D* You argue like an informer, Socrates. Do you mean, for example,\nthat he who is mistaken about the sick is a physician in that he is\nmistaken? or that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician\nor grammarian at the time when he is making the mistake, in respect of the\nmistake? True, we say that the physician or arithmetician or grammarian\nhas made a mistake, but this is only a way of speaking; for the fact is\nthat neither the grammarian nor any other person of skill ever makes a\nmistake in so far as he is what his name implies; they none of them err\nunless their skill fails them, and then they cease to be skilled artists.\n{18} No artist or sage or ruler errs at the time when he is what his name\nimplies; though he is commonly said to err, and *340E* I adopted the\ncommon mode of speaking. But to be perfectly accurate, since you are such\na lover of accuracy, we should say that the ruler, in so far as he is a\nruler, is unerring, and, *341A* being unerring, always commands that which\nis for his own interest; and the subject is required to execute his\ncommands; and therefore, as I said at first and now repeat, justice is the\ninterest of the stronger.\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates, Thrasymachus.]\n\nIndeed, Thrasymachus, and do I really appear to you to argue like an\ninformer?\n\nCertainly, he replied.\n\nAnd do you suppose that I ask these questions with any design of injuring\nyou in the argument?\n\nNay, he replied, 'suppose' is not the word--I know it; *341B* but you will\nbe found out, and by sheer force of argument you will never prevail.\n\nI shall not make the attempt, my dear man; but to avoid any\nmisunderstanding occurring between us in future, let me ask, in what sense\ndo you speak of a ruler or stronger whose interest, as you were saying, he\nbeing the superior, it is just that the inferior should execute--is he a\nruler in the popular or in the strict sense of the term?\n\nIn the strictest of all senses, he said. And now cheat and play the\ninformer if you can; I ask no quarter at your hands. But you never will be\nable, never.\n\n[Sidenote: The essential meaning of words distinguished from their\nattributes.]\n\n*341C* And do you imagine, I said, that I am such a madman as to try and\ncheat, Thrasymachus? I might as well shave a lion.\n\nWhy, he said, you made the attempt a minute ago, and you failed.\n\nEnough, I said, of these civilities. It will be better that I should ask\nyou a question: Is the physician, taken in that strict sense of which you\nare speaking, a healer of the sick or a maker of money? And remember that\nI am now speaking of the true physician.\n\nA healer of the sick, he replied.\n\nAnd the pilot--that is to say, the true pilot--is he a captain of sailors\nor a mere sailor?\n\nA captain of sailors. {19}\n\n*341D* The circumstance that he sails in the ship is not to be taken into\naccount; neither is he to be called a sailor; the name pilot by which he\nis distinguished has nothing to do with sailing, but is significant of his\nskill and of his authority over the sailors.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nNow, I said, every art has an interest?\n\nCertainly.\n\nFor which the art has to consider and provide?\n\nYes, that is the aim of art.\n\nAnd the interest of any art is the perfection of it--this and nothing\nelse?\n\n*341E* What do you mean?\n\nI mean what I may illustrate negatively by the example of the body.\nSuppose you were to ask me whether the body is self-sufficing or has\nwants, I should reply: Certainly the body has wants; for the body may be\nill and require to be cured, and has therefore interests to which the art\nof medicine ministers; and this is the origin and intention of medicine,\nas you will acknowledge. Am I not right?\n\n*342A* Quite right, he replied.\n\n[Sidenote: Art has no imperfection to be corrected, and therefore no\nextraneous interest.]\n\nBut is the art of medicine or any other art faulty or deficient in any\nquality in the same way that the eye may be deficient in sight or the ear\nfail of hearing, and therefore requires another art to provide for the\ninterests of seeing and hearing--has art in itself, I say, any similar\nliability to fault or defect, and does every art require another\nsupplementary art to provide for its interests, and that another and\nanother without end? Or have the arts to look only *342B* after their own\ninterests? Or have they no need either of themselves or of\nanother?--having no faults or defects, they have no need to correct them,\neither by the exercise of their own art or of any other; they have only to\nconsider the interest of their subject-matter. For every art remains pure\nand faultless while remaining true--that is to say, while perfect and\nunimpaired. Take the words in your precise sense, and tell me whether I am\nnot right.\n\nYes, clearly.\n\n[Sidenote: Illustrations.]\n\n*342C* Then medicine does not consider the interest of medicine, but the\ninterest of the body? {20}\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nNor does the art of horsemanship consider the interests of the art of\nhorsemanship, but the interests of the horse; neither do any other arts\ncare for themselves, for they have no needs; they care only for that which\nis the subject of their art?\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nBut surely, Thrasymachus, the arts are the superiors and rulers of their\nown subjects?\n\nTo this he assented with a good deal of reluctance.\n\nThen, I said, no science or art considers or enjoins the interest of the\nstronger or superior, but only the interest *342D* of the subject and\nweaker?\n\nHe made an attempt to contest this proposition also, but finally\nacquiesced.\n\nThen, I continued, no physician, in so far as he is a physician, considers\nhis own good in what he prescribes, but the good of his patient; for the\ntrue physician is also a ruler having the human body as a subject, and is\nnot a mere money-maker; that has been admitted?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the pilot likewise, in the strict sense of the term, is a ruler of\nsailors and not a mere sailor?\n\n*342E* That has been admitted.\n\nAnd such a pilot and ruler will provide and prescribe for the interest of\nthe sailor who is under him, and not for his own or the ruler's interest?\n\nHe gave a reluctant 'Yes.'\n\n[Sidenote: The disinterestedness of rulers.]\n\nThen, I said, Thrasymachus, there is no one in any rule who, in so far as\nhe is a ruler, considers or enjoins what is for his own interest, but\nalways what is for the interest of his subject or suitable to his art; to\nthat he looks, and that alone he considers in everything which he says and\ndoes.\n\n*343A* When we had got to this point in the argument, and every one saw\nthat the definition of justice had been completely upset, Thrasymachus,\ninstead of replying to me, said: Tell me, Socrates, have you got a nurse?\n\n[Sidenote: The impudence of Thrasymachus.]\n\nWhy do you ask such a question, I said, when you ought rather to be\nanswering?\n\nBecause she leaves you to snivel, and never wipes your {21} nose: she has\nnot even taught you to know the shepherd from the sheep.\n\nWhat makes you say that? I replied.\n\n[Sidenote: Thrasymachus dilates upon the advantages of injustice,]\n\n[Sidenote: especially when pursued on a great scale.]\\\n\n[Sidenote: Tyranny.]\n\n*343B* Because you fancy that the shepherd or neatherd fattens or tends\nthe sheep or oxen with a view to their own good and not to the good of\nhimself or his master; and you further imagine that the rulers of states,\nif they are true rulers, never think of their subjects as sheep, and that\nthey are not studying their own advantage day and night. Oh, no; *343C*\nand so entirely astray are you in your ideas about the just and unjust as\nnot even to know that justice and the just are in reality another's good;\nthat is to say, the interest of the ruler and stronger, and the loss of\nthe subject and servant; and injustice the opposite; for the unjust is\nlord over the truly simple and just: he is the stronger, and his subjects\ndo what is for his interest, and minister to his *343D* happiness, which\nis very far from being their own. Consider further, most foolish Socrates,\nthat the just is always a loser in comparison with the unjust. First of\nall, in private contracts: wherever the unjust is the partner of the just\nyou will find that, when the partnership is dissolved, the unjust man has\nalways more and the just less. Secondly, in their dealings with the State:\nwhen there is an income-tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust\nless on the same amount of income; and when there is anything to be *343E*\nreceived the one gains nothing and the other much. Observe also what\nhappens when they take an office; there is the just man neglecting his\naffairs and perhaps suffering other losses, and getting nothing out of the\npublic, because he is just; moreover he is hated by his friends and\nacquaintance for refusing to serve them in unlawful ways. But all this is\nreversed in the case of the unjust man. I am speaking, as before, *344A*\nof injustice on a large scale in which the advantage of the unjust is most\napparent; and my meaning will be most clearly seen if we turn to that\nhighest form of injustice in which the criminal is the happiest of men,\nand the sufferers or those who refuse to do injustice are the most\nmiserable--that is to say tyranny, which by fraud and force takes away the\nproperty of others, not little by little but wholesale; comprehending in\none, things sacred as well as profane, *344B* private {22} and public; for\nwhich acts of wrong, if he were detected perpetrating any one of them\nsingly, he would be punished and incur great disgrace--they who do such\nwrong in particular cases are called robbers of temples, and man-stealers\nand burglars and swindlers and thieves. But when a man besides taking away\nthe money of the citizens has made slaves of them, then, instead of these\nnames of reproach, he is *344C* termed happy and blessed, not only by the\ncitizens but by all who hear of his having achieved the consummation of\ninjustice. For mankind censure injustice, fearing that they may be the\nvictims of it and not because they shrink from committing it. And thus, as\nI have shown, Socrates, injustice, when on a sufficient scale, has more\nstrength and freedom and mastery than justice; and, as I said at first,\njustice is the interest of the stronger, whereas injustice is a man's own\nprofit and interest.\n\n[Sidenote: Thrasymachus having made his speech wants to run away, but is\ndetained by the company.]\n\n*344D* Thrasymachus, when he had thus spoken, having, like a bath-man,\ndeluged our ears with his words, had a mind to go away. But the company\nwould not let him; they insisted that he should remain and defend his\nposition; and I myself added my own humble request that he would not leave\nus. Thrasymachus, I said to him, excellent man, how suggestive are your\nremarks! And are you going to run away before you have fairly taught or\nlearned whether they are true or not? *344E* Is the attempt to determine\nthe way of man's life so small a matter in your eyes--to determine how\nlife may be passed by each one of us to the greatest advantage?\n\nAnd do I differ from you, he said, as to the importance of the enquiry?\n\nYou appear rather, I replied, to have no care or thought about us,\nThrasymachus--whether we live better or worse from not knowing what you\nsay you know, is to you a matter of indifference. *345A* Prithee, friend,\ndo not keep your knowledge to yourself; we are a large party; and any\nbenefit which you confer upon us will be amply rewarded. For my own part\nI openly declare that I am not convinced, and that I do not believe\ninjustice to be more gainful than justice, even if uncontrolled and\nallowed to have free play. For, granting that there may be an unjust man\nwho is able to commit injustice either by fraud or force, still this does\nnot convince me of the {23} superior advantage of injustice, and there may\nbe others who are in the same predicament with myself. Perhaps we may be\nwrong; *345B* if so, you in your wisdom should convince us that we are\nmistaken in preferring justice to injustice.\n\n[Sidenote: The swagger of Thrasymachus.]\n\nAnd how am I to convince you, he said, if you are not already convinced by\nwhat I have just said; what more can I do for you? Would you have me put\nthe proof bodily into your souls?\n\nHeaven forbid! I said; I would only ask you to be consistent; or, if you\nchange, change openly and let there be no deception. For I must remark,\nThrasymachus, if you will *345C* recall what was previously said, that\nalthough you began by defining the true physician in an exact sense, you\ndid not observe a like exactness when speaking of the shepherd; you\nthought that the shepherd as a shepherd tends the sheep not with a view to\ntheir own good, but like a mere diner or banquetter with a view to the\npleasures of the table; or, again, as a trader for sale in the market, and\nnot as a shepherd. *345D* Yet surely the art of the shepherd is concerned\nonly with the good of his subjects; he has only to provide the best for\nthem, since the perfection of the art is already ensured whenever all the\nrequirements of it are satisfied. And that was what I was saying just now\nabout the ruler. I conceived that the art of the ruler, considered as\nruler, whether in a *345E* state or in private life, could only regard the\ngood of his flock or subjects; whereas you seem to think that the rulers\nin states, that is to say, the true rulers, like being in authority.\n\nThink! Nay, I am sure of it.\n\n[Sidenote: The arts have different functions and are not to be confounded\nwith the art of payment which is common to them all.]\n\nThen why in the case of lesser offices do men never take them willingly\nwithout payment, unless under the idea that *346A* they govern for the\nadvantage not of themselves but of others? Let me ask you a question: Are\nnot the several arts different, by reason of their each having a separate\nfunction? And, my dear illustrious friend, do say what you think, that we\nmay make a little progress.\n\nYes, that is the difference, he replied.\n\nAnd each art gives us a particular good and not merely a general\none--medicine, for example, gives us health; navigation, safety at sea,\nand so on?\n\nYes, he said. {24}\n\n*346B* And the art of payment has the special function of giving pay: but\nwe do not confuse this with other arts, any more than the art of the pilot\nis to be confused with the art of medicine, because the health of the\npilot may be improved by a sea voyage. You would not be inclined to say,\nwould you, that navigation is the art of medicine, at least if we are to\nadopt your exact use of language?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nOr because a man is in good health when he receives pay you would not say\nthat the art of payment is medicine?\n\nI should not.\n\nNor would you say that medicine is the art of receiving pay because a man\ntakes fees when he is engaged in healing?\n\n*346C* Certainly not.\n\nAnd we have admitted, I said, that the good of each art is specially\nconfined to the art?\n\nYes.\n\nThen, if there be any good which all artists have in common, that is to be\nattributed to something of which they all have the common use?\n\nTrue, he replied.\n\nAnd when the artist is benefited by receiving pay the advantage is gained\nby an additional use of the art of pay, which is not the art professed by\nhim?\n\nHe gave a reluctant assent to this.\n\n*346D* Then the pay is not derived by the several artists from their\nrespective arts. But the truth is, that while the art of medicine gives\nhealth, and the art of the builder builds a house, another art attends\nthem which is the art of pay. The various arts may be doing their own\nbusiness and benefiting that over which they preside, but would the artist\nreceive any benefit from his art unless he were paid as well?\n\nI suppose not.\n\n*346E* But does he therefore confer no benefit when he works for nothing?\n\nCertainly, he confers a benefit.\n\n[Sidenote: The true ruler or artist seeks, not his own advantage, but the\nperfection of his art; and therefore he must be paid.]\n\nThen now, Thrasymachus, there is no longer any doubt that neither arts nor\ngovernments provide for their own interests; but, as we were before\nsaying, they rule and provide for the interests of their subjects who are\nthe weaker {25} and not the stronger--to their good they attend and not to\nthe good of the superior. And this is the reason, my dear Thrasymachus,\nwhy, as I was just now saying, no one is willing to govern; because no one\nlikes to take in hand the reformation of evils which are not his concern\nwithout remuneration. *347A* For, in the execution of his work, and in\ngiving his orders to another, the true artist does not regard his own\ninterest, but always that of his subjects; and therefore in order that\nrulers may be willing to rule, they must be paid in one of three modes of\npayment, money, or honour, or a penalty for refusing.\n\n[Sidenote: Three modes of paying rulers, money, honour, and a penalty for\nrefusing to rule.]\n\nWhat do you mean, Socrates? said Glaucon. The first two modes of payment\nare intelligible enough, but what the penalty is I do not understand, or\nhow a penalty can be a payment.\n\nYou mean that you do not understand the nature of this *347B* payment\nwhich to the best men is the great inducement to rule? Of course you know\nthat ambition and avarice are held to be, as indeed they are, a disgrace?\n\nVery true.\n\n[Sidenote: The penalty is the evil of being ruled by an inferior.]\n\n[Sidenote: In a city composed wholly of good men there would be a great\nunwillingness to rule.]\n\n[Sidenote: Thrasymachus maintains that the life of the unjust is better\nthan the life of the just.]\n\nAnd for this reason, I said, money and honour have no attraction for them;\ngood men do not wish to be openly demanding payment for governing and so\nto get the name of hirelings, nor by secretly helping themselves out of\nthe public revenues to get the name of thieves. And not being ambitious\nthey do not care about honour. Wherefore necessity *347C* must be laid\nupon them, and they must be induced to serve from the fear of punishment.\nAnd this, as I imagine, is the reason why the forwardness to take office,\ninstead of waiting to be compelled, has been deemed dishonourable. Now the\nworst part of the punishment is that he who refuses to rule is liable to\nbe ruled by one who is worse than himself. And the fear of this, as I\nconceive, induces the good to take *347D* office, not because they would,\nbut because they cannot help--not under the idea that they are going to\nhave any benefit or enjoyment themselves, but as a necessity, and because\nthey are not able to commit the task of ruling to any one who is better\nthan themselves, or indeed as good. For there is reason to think that if a\ncity were composed entirely of good men, then to avoid office would be as\nmuch an object of contention as to obtain office is at present; then we\nshould {26} have plain proof that the true ruler is not meant by nature to\nregard his own interest, but that of his subjects; and every one who knew\nthis would choose rather to receive a benefit from another than to have\nthe trouble of conferring one. *347E* So far am I from agreeing with\nThrasymachus that justice is the interest of the stronger. This latter\nquestion need not be further discussed at present; but when Thrasymachus\nsays that the life of the unjust is more advantageous than that of the\njust, his new statement appears to me to be of a far more serious\ncharacter. Which of us has spoken truly? And which sort of life, Glaucon,\ndo you prefer?\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates, Glaucon, Thrasymachus.]\n\nI for my part deem the life of the just to be the more advantageous, he\nanswered.\n\n*348A* Did you hear all the advantages of the unjust which Thrasymachus\nwas rehearsing?\n\nYes, I heard him, he replied, but he has not convinced me.\n\nThen shall we try to find some way of convincing him, if we can, that he\nis saying what is not true?\n\nMost certainly, he replied.\n\nIf, I said, he makes a set speech and we make another recounting all the\nadvantages of being just, and he answers and we rejoin, there must be a\nnumbering and measuring *348B* of the goods which are claimed on either\nside, and in the end we shall want judges to decide; but if we proceed in\nour enquiry as we lately did, by making admissions to one another, we\nshall unite the offices of judge and advocate in our own persons.\n\nVery good, he said.\n\nAnd which method do I understand you to prefer? I said.\n\nThat which you propose.\n\nWell, then, Thrasymachus, I said, suppose you begin at the beginning and\nanswer me. You say that perfect injustice is more gainful than perfect\njustice?\n\n*348C* Yes, that is what I say, and I have given you my reasons.\n\nAnd what is your view about them? Would you call one of them virtue and\nthe other vice?\n\nCertainly.\n\nI suppose that you would call justice virtue and injustice vice?\n\n[Sidenote: A paradox still more extreme, that injustice is virtue,]\n\nWhat a charming notion! So likely too, seeing that I affirm injustice to\nbe profitable and justice not. {27}\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates, Thrasymachus.]\n\nWhat else then would you say?\n\nThe opposite, he replied.\n\nAnd would you call justice vice?\n\nNo, I would rather say sublime simplicity.\n\n*348D* Then would you call injustice malignity?\n\nNo; I would rather say discretion.\n\nAnd do the unjust appear to you to be wise and good?\n\nYes, he said; at any rate those of them who are able to be perfectly\nunjust, and who have the power of subduing states and nations; but perhaps\nyou imagine me to be talking of cutpurses. Even this profession if\nundetected has advantages, though they are not to be compared with those\nof which I was just now speaking.\n\n*348E* I do not think that I misapprehend your meaning, Thrasymachus,\nI replied; but still I cannot hear without amazement that you class\ninjustice with wisdom and virtue, and justice with the opposite.\n\nCertainly I do so class them.\n\nNow, I said, you are on more substantial and almost unanswerable ground;\nfor if the injustice which you were maintaining to be profitable had been\nadmitted by you as by others to be vice and deformity, an answer might\nhave been given to you on received principles; but now I perceive that\n*349A* you will call injustice honourable and strong, and to the unjust\nyou will attribute all the qualities which were attributed by us before to\nthe just, seeing that you do not hesitate to rank injustice with wisdom\nand virtue.\n\nYou have guessed most infallibly, he replied.\n\nThen I certainly ought not to shrink from going through with the argument\nso long as I have reason to think that you, Thrasymachus, are speaking\nyour real mind; for I do believe that you are now in earnest and are not\namusing yourself at our expense.\n\nI may be in earnest or not, but what is that to you?--to refute the\nargument is your business.\n\n[Sidenote: refuted by the analogy of the arts.]\n\n*349B* Very true, I said; that is what I have to do: But will you be so\ngood as answer yet one more question? Does the just man try to gain any\nadvantage over the just?\n\nFar otherwise; if he did he would not be the simple amusing creature which\nhe is. {28}\n\nAnd would he try to go beyond just action?\n\nHe would not.\n\nAnd how would he regard the attempt to gain an advantage over the unjust;\nwould that be considered by him as just or unjust?\n\n[Sidenote: The just tries to obtain an advantage over the unjust, but not\nover the just; the unjust over both just and unjust.]\n\nHe would think it just, and would try to gain the advantage; but he would\nnot be able.\n\nWhether he would or would not be able, I said, is not to the point. *349C*\nMy question is only whether the just man, while refusing to have more than\nanother just man, would wish and claim to have more than the unjust?\n\nYes, he would.\n\nAnd what of the unjust--does he claim to have more than the just man and\nto do more than is just?\n\nOf course, he said, for he claims to have more than all men.\n\nAnd the unjust man will strive and struggle to obtain more than the unjust\nman or action, in order that he may have more than all?\n\nTrue.\n\nWe may put the matter thus, I said--the just does not desire more than his\nlike but more than his unlike, whereas the unjust desires more than both\nhis like and his unlike?\n\n*349D* Nothing, he said, can be better than that statement.\n\nAnd the unjust is good and wise, and the just is neither?\n\nGood again, he said.\n\nAnd is not the unjust like the wise and good and the just unlike them?\n\nOf course, he said, he who is of a certain nature, is like those who are\nof a certain nature; he who is not, not.\n\nEach of them, I said, is such as his like is?\n\nCertainly, he replied.\n\n[Sidenote: Illustrations.]\n\nVery good, Thrasymachus, I said; and now to take the case of the arts: you\nwould admit that one man is a musician and *349E* another not a musician?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd which is wise and which is foolish?\n\nClearly the musician is wise, and he who is not a musician is foolish.\n\nAnd he is good in as far as he is wise, and bad in as far as he is\nfoolish? {29}\n\nYes.\n\nAnd you would say the same sort of thing of the physician?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd do you think, my excellent friend, that a musician when he adjusts the\nlyre would desire or claim to exceed or go beyond a musician in the\ntightening and loosening the strings?\n\nI do not think that he would.\n\nBut he would claim to exceed the non-musician?\n\nOf course.\n\n*350A* And what would you say of the physician? In prescribing meats and\ndrinks would he wish to go beyond another physician or beyond the practice\nof medicine?\n\nHe would not.\n\nBut he would wish to go beyond the non-physician?\n\nYes.\n\n[Sidenote: The artist remains within the limits of his art:]\n\nAnd about knowledge and ignorance in general; see whether you think that\nany man who has knowledge ever would wish to have the choice of saying or\ndoing more than another man who has knowledge. Would he not rather say or\ndo the same as his like in the same case?\n\nThat, I suppose, can hardly be denied.\n\nAnd what of the ignorant? would he not desire to have *350B* more than\neither the knowing or the ignorant?\n\nI dare say.\n\nAnd the knowing is wise?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the wise is good?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen the wise and good will not desire to gain more than his like, but\nmore than his unlike and opposite?\n\nI suppose so.\n\nWhereas the bad and ignorant will desire to gain more than both?\n\nYes.\n\nBut did we not say, Thrasymachus, that the unjust goes beyond both his\nlike and unlike? Were not these your words?\n\nThey were.\n\n[Sidenote: and similarly the just man does not exceed the limits of other\njust men.]\n\n*350C* And you also said that the just will not go beyond his like but his\nunlike? {30}\n\nYes.\n\nThen the just is like the wise and good, and the unjust like the evil and\nignorant?\n\nThat is the inference.\n\nAnd each of them is such as his like is?\n\nThat was admitted.\n\nThen the just has turned out to be wise and good and the unjust evil and\nignorant.\n\n[Sidenote: Thrasymachus perspiring and even blushing.]\n\nThrasymachus made all these admissions, not fluently, as *350D* I repeat\nthem, but with extreme reluctance; it was a hot summer's day, and the\nperspiration poured from him in torrents; and then I saw what I had never\nseen before, Thrasymachus blushing. As we were now agreed that justice was\nvirtue and wisdom, and injustice vice and ignorance, I proceeded to\nanother point:\n\nWell, I said, Thrasymachus, that matter is now settled; but were we not\nalso saying that injustice had strength; do you remember?\n\nYes, I remember, he said, but do not suppose that I approve of what you\nare saying or have no answer; if however I were to answer, you would be\nquite certain to accuse me of haranguing; *350E* therefore either permit\nme to have my say out, or if you would rather ask, do so, and I will\nanswer 'Very good,' as they say to story-telling old women, and will nod\n'Yes' and 'No.'\n\nCertainly not, I said, if contrary to your real opinion.\n\nYes, he said, I will, to please you, since you will not let me speak. What\nelse would you have?\n\nNothing in the world, I said; and if you are so disposed I will ask and\nyou shall answer.\n\nProceed.\n\nThen I will repeat the question which I asked before, in *351A* order that\nour examination of the relative nature of justice and injustice may be\ncarried on regularly. A statement was made that injustice is stronger and\nmore powerful than justice, but now justice, having been identified with\nwisdom and virtue, is easily shown to be stronger than injustice, if\ninjustice is ignorance; this can no longer be questioned by any one. But\nI want to view the matter, Thrasymachus, in a different way: *351B* You\nwould not deny that a state may be {31} unjust and may be unjustly\nattempting to enslave other states, or may have already enslaved them, and\nmay be holding many of them in subjection?\n\nTrue, he replied; and I will add that the best and most perfectly unjust\nstate will be most likely to do so.\n\nI know, I said, that such was your position; but what I would further\nconsider is, whether this power which is possessed by the superior state\ncan exist or be exercised without justice or only with justice.\n\n[Sidenote: At this point the temper of Thrasymachus begins to improve. Cp.\n5. 450 A, 6. 498 C.]\n\n*351C* If you are right in your view, and justice is wisdom, then only\nwith justice; but if I am right, then without justice.\n\nI am delighted, Thrasymachus, to see you not only nodding assent and\ndissent, but making answers which are quite excellent.\n\nThat is out of civility to you, he replied.\n\nYou are very kind, I said; and would you have the goodness also to inform\nme, whether you think that a state, or an army, or a band of robbers and\nthieves, or any other gang of evil-doers could act at all if they injured\none another?\n\n*351D* No indeed, he said, they could not.\n\nBut if they abstained from injuring one another, then they might act\ntogether better?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd this is because injustice creates divisions and hatreds and fighting,\nand justice imparts harmony and friendship; is not that true,\nThrasymachus?\n\n[Sidenote: Perfect injustice, whether in state or individuals, is\ndestructive to them.]\n\nI agree, he said, because I do not wish to quarrel with you.\n\nHow good of you, I said; but I should like to know also whether injustice,\nhaving this tendency to arouse hatred, wherever existing, among slaves or\namong freemen, will not make them hate one another and set them at\nvariance and render them incapable of common action?\n\nCertainly.\n\n*351E* And even if injustice be found in two only, will they not quarrel\nand fight, and become enemies to one another and to the just?\n\nThey will.\n\nAnd suppose injustice abiding in a single person, would your wisdom say\nthat she loses or that she retains her natural power? {32}\n\nLet us assume that she retains her power.\n\nYet is not the power which injustice exercises of such a nature that\nwherever she takes up her abode, whether in a city, in an army, in a\nfamily, or in any other body, that body is, *352A* to begin with, rendered\nincapable of united action by reason of sedition and distraction; and does\nit not become its own enemy and at variance with all that opposes it, and\nwith the just? Is not this the case?\n\nYes, certainly.\n\nAnd is not injustice equally fatal when existing in a single person; in\nthe first place rendering him incapable of action because he is not at\nunity with himself, and in the second place making him an enemy to himself\nand the just? Is not that true, Thrasymachus?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd O my friend, I said, surely the gods are just?\n\nGranted that they are.\n\n*352B* But if so, the unjust will be the enemy of the gods, and the just\nwill be their friend?\n\nFeast away in triumph, and take your fill of the argument; I will not\noppose you, lest I should displease the company.\n\n[Sidenote: Recapitulation.]\n\nWell then, proceed with your answers, and let me have the remainder of my\nrepast. For we have already shown that the just are clearly wiser and\nbetter and abler than the unjust, and that the unjust are incapable of\ncommon action; *352C* nay more, that to speak as we did of men who are\nevil acting at any time vigorously together, is not strictly true, for if\nthey had been perfectly evil, they would have laid hands upon one another;\nbut it is evident that there must have been some remnant of justice in\nthem, which enabled them to combine; if there had not been they would have\ninjured one another as well as their victims; they were but half-villains\nin their enterprises; for had they been whole villains, and utterly\nunjust, they would have been utterly incapable of action. *352D* That, as\nI believe, is the truth of the matter, and not what you said at first. But\nwhether the just have a better and happier life than the unjust is a\nfurther question which we also proposed to consider. I think that they\nhave, and for the reasons which I have given; but still {33} I should like\nto examine further, for no light matter is at stake, nothing less than the\nrule of human life.\n\nProceed.\n\n[Sidenote: Illustrations of ends and excellences preparatory to the\nenquiry into the end and excellence of the soul.]\n\nI will proceed by asking a question: Would you not say that a horse has\nsome end?\n\n*352E* I should.\n\nAnd the end or use of a horse or of anything would be that which could not\nbe accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other thing?\n\nI do not understand, he said.\n\nLet me explain: Can you see, except with the eye?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nOr hear, except with the ear?\n\nNo.\n\nThese then may be truly said to be the ends of these organs?\n\nThey may.\n\n*353A* But you can cut off a vine-branch with a dagger or with a chisel,\nand in many other ways?\n\nOf course.\n\nAnd yet not so well as with a pruning-hook made for the purpose?\n\nTrue.\n\nMay we not say that this is the end of a pruning-hook?\n\nWe may.\n\nThen now I think you will have no difficulty in understanding my meaning\nwhen I asked the question whether the end of anything would be that which\ncould not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other\nthing?\n\n*353B* I understand your meaning, he said, and assent.\n\n[Sidenote: All things which have ends have also virtues and excellences by\nwhich they fulfil those ends.]\n\nAnd that to which an end is appointed has also an excellence? Need I ask\nagain whether the eye has an end?\n\nIt has.\n\nAnd has not the eye an excellence?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the ear has an end and an excellence also?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd the same is true of all other things; they have each of them an end\nand a special excellence?\n\nThat is so.\n\nWell, and can the eyes fulfil their end if they are {34} wanting *353C* in\ntheir own proper excellence and have a defect instead?\n\nHow can they, he said, if they are blind and cannot see?\n\nYou mean to say, if they have lost their proper excellence, which is\nsight; but I have not arrived at that point yet. I would rather ask the\nquestion more generally, and only enquire whether the things which fulfil\ntheir ends fulfil them by their own proper excellence, and fail of\nfulfilling them by their own defect?\n\nCertainly, he replied.\n\nI might say the same of the ears; when deprived of their own proper\nexcellence they cannot fulfil their end?\n\nTrue.\n\n*353D* And the same observation will apply to all other things?\n\nI agree.\n\n[Sidenote: And the soul has a virtue and an end--the virtue justice, the\nend happiness.]\n\nWell; and has not the soul an end which nothing else can fulfil? for\nexample, to superintend and command and deliberate and the like. Are not\nthese functions proper to the soul, and can they rightly be assigned to\nany other?\n\nTo no other.\n\nAnd is not life to be reckoned among the ends of the soul?\n\nAssuredly, he said.\n\nAnd has not the soul an excellence also?\n\nYes.\n\n*353E* And can she or can she not fulfil her own ends when deprived of\nthat excellence?\n\nShe cannot.\n\nThen an evil soul must necessarily be an evil ruler and superintendent,\nand the good soul a good ruler?\n\nYes, necessarily.\n\n[Sidenote: Hence justice and happiness are necessarily connected.]\n\nAnd we have admitted that justice is the excellence of the soul, and\ninjustice the defect of the soul?\n\nThat has been admitted.\n\nThen the just soul and the just man will live well, and the unjust man\nwill live ill?\n\nThat is what your argument proves.\n\n*354A* And he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who lives ill\nthe reverse of happy?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen the just is happy, and the unjust miserable? {35}\n\nSo be it.\n\nBut happiness and not misery is profitable.\n\nOf course.\n\nThen, my blessed Thrasymachus, injustice can never be more profitable than\njustice.\n\nLet this, Socrates, he said, be your entertainment at the Bendidea.\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates is displeased with himself and with the argument.]\n\nFor which I am indebted to you, I said, now that you have grown gentle\ntowards me and have left off scolding. Nevertheless, *354B* I have not\nbeen well entertained; but that was my own fault and not yours. As an\nepicure snatches a taste of every dish which is successively brought to\ntable, he not having allowed himself time to enjoy the one before, so have\nI gone from one subject to another without having discovered what I sought\nat first, the nature of justice. I left that enquiry and turned away to\nconsider whether justice is virtue and wisdom or evil and folly; and when\nthere arose a further question about the comparative advantages of justice\nand injustice, I could not refrain from passing on to that. And the result\nof the whole discussion has been that I know nothing at all. *354C* For\nI know not what justice is, and therefore I am not likely to know whether\nit is or is not a virtue, nor can I say whether the just man is happy or\nunhappy.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK II.\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic II._ Socrates, Glaucon.]\n\n*357A* With these words I was thinking that I had made an end of the\ndiscussion; but the end, in truth, proved to be only a beginning. For\nGlaucon, who is always the most pugnacious of men, was dissatisfied at\nThrasymachus' retirement; he wanted to have the battle out. So he said to\nme: Socrates, do you wish really to persuade us, or only to seem to *357B*\nhave persuaded us, that to be just is always better than to be unjust?\n\nI should wish really to persuade you, I replied, if I could.\n\n[Sidenote: The threefold division of goods.]\n\nThen you certainly have not succeeded. Let me ask you now:--How would you\narrange goods--are there not some which we welcome for their own sakes,\nand independently of their consequences, as, for example, harmless\npleasures and enjoyments, which delight us at the time, although nothing\nfollows from them?\n\nI agree in thinking that there is such a class, I replied.\n\n*357C* Is there not also a second class of goods, such as knowledge,\nsight, health, which are desirable not only in themselves, but also for\ntheir results?\n\nCertainly, I said.\n\nAnd would you not recognize a third class, such as gymnastic, and the care\nof the sick, and the physician's art; also the various ways of\nmoney-making--these do us good but we regard them as disagreeable; and no\none would choose them *357D* for their own sakes, but only for the sake of\nsome reward or result which flows from them?\n\nThere is, I said, this third class also. But why do you ask?\n\nBecause I want to know in which of the three classes you would place\njustice?\n\n*358A* In the highest class, I replied,--among those goods which {37} he\nwho would be happy desires both for their own sake and for the sake of\ntheir results.\n\nThen the many are of another mind; they think that justice is to be\nreckoned in the troublesome class, among goods which are to be pursued for\nthe sake of rewards and of reputation, but in themselves are disagreeable\nand rather to be avoided.\n\nI know, I said, that this is their manner of thinking, and that this was\nthe thesis which Thrasymachus was maintaining just now, when he censured\njustice and praised injustice. But I am too stupid to be convinced by him.\n\n[Sidenote: Three heads of the argument:--1. The nature of justice: 2.\nJustice a necessity, but not a good: 3. The reasonableness of this\nnotion.]\n\n*358B* I wish, he said, that you would hear me as well as him, and then\nI shall see whether you and I agree. For Thrasymachus seems to me, like a\nsnake, to have been charmed by your voice sooner than he ought to have\nbeen; but to my mind the nature of justice and injustice have not yet been\nmade clear. Setting aside their rewards and results, I want to know what\nthey are in themselves, and how they inwardly work in the soul. If you\nplease, then, I will revive the argument of Thrasymachus. *358C* And first\nI will speak of the nature and origin of justice according to the common\nview of them. Secondly, I will show that all men who practise justice do\nso against their will, of necessity, but not as a good. And thirdly,\nI will argue that there is reason in this view, for the life of the unjust\nis after all better far than the life of the just--if what they say is\ntrue, Socrates, since I myself am not of their opinion. But still\nI acknowledge that I am perplexed when I hear the voices of Thrasymachus\nand myriads of others dinning in my ears; and, on the other hand, I have\n*358D* never yet heard the superiority of justice to injustice maintained\nby any one in a satisfactory way. I want to hear justice praised in\nrespect of itself; then I shall be satisfied, and you are the person from\nwhom I think that I am most likely to hear this; and therefore I will\npraise the unjust life to the utmost of my power, and my manner of\nspeaking will indicate the manner in which I desire to hear you too\npraising justice and censuring injustice. Will you say whether you approve\nof my proposal?\n\nIndeed I do; nor can I imagine any theme about which a man of sense would\noftener wish to converse. {38}\n\n[Sidenote: Glaucon.]\n\n*358E* I am delighted, he replied, to hear you say so, and shall begin by\nspeaking, as I proposed, of the nature and origin of justice.\n\n[Sidenote: Justice a compromise between doing and suffering evil.]\n\nThey say that to do injustice is, by nature, good; to suffer injustice,\nevil; but that the evil is greater than the good. And so when men have\nboth done and suffered injustice and *359A* have had experience of both,\nnot being able to avoid the one and obtain the other, they think that they\nhad better agree among themselves to have neither; hence there arise laws\nand mutual covenants; and that which is ordained by law is termed by them\nlawful and just. This they affirm to be the origin and nature of\njustice;--it is a mean or compromise, between the best of all, which is to\ndo injustice and not be punished, and the worst of all, which is to suffer\ninjustice without the power of retaliation; and justice, being at a middle\npoint between the two, is tolerated not as a good, but as the lesser evil,\nand honoured by reason of the inability of men to do injustice. *359B* For\nno man who is worthy to be called a man would ever submit to such an\nagreement if he were able to resist; he would be mad if he did. Such is\nthe received account, Socrates, of the nature and origin of justice.\n\n[Sidenote: The story of Gyges.]\n\n[Sidenote: The application of the story of Gyges.]\n\nNow that those who practise justice do so involuntarily and because they\nhave not the power to be unjust will best appear *359C* if we imagine\nsomething of this kind: having given both to the just and the unjust power\nto do what they will, let us watch and see whither desire will lead them;\nthen we shall discover in the very act the just and unjust man to be\nproceeding along the same road, following their interest, which all\nnatures deem to be their good, and are only diverted into the path of\njustice by the force of law. The liberty which we are supposing may be\nmost completely given to them in the form of such a power as is said to\nhave been *359D* possessed by Gyges, the ancestor of Croesus the\nLydian[1]. According to the tradition, Gyges was a shepherd in the service\nof the king of Lydia; there was a great storm, and an earthquake made an\nopening in the earth at the place where he was feeding his flock. Amazed\nat the sight, he {39} descended into the opening, where, among other\nmarvels, he beheld a hollow brazen horse, having doors, at which he\nstooping and looking in saw a dead body of stature, as appeared to him,\nmore than human, and having nothing on but a gold ring; *359E* this he\ntook from the finger of the dead and reascended. Now the shepherds met\ntogether, according to custom, that they might send their monthly report\nabout the flocks to the king; into their assembly he came having the ring\non his finger, and as he was sitting among them he chanced to turn the\ncollet of the ring inside his hand, when instantly he became invisible to\nthe rest of the company and they began to speak of him as if he were no\nlonger present. *360A* He was astonished at this, and again touching the\nring he turned the collet outwards and reappeared; he made several trials\nof the ring, and always with the same result--when he turned the collet\ninwards he became invisible, when outwards he reappeared. Whereupon he\ncontrived to be chosen one of the messengers who were sent to the court;\nwhere as soon as he arrived *360B* he seduced the queen, and with her help\nconspired against the king and slew him, and took the kingdom. Suppose now\nthat there were two such magic rings, and the just put on one of them and\nthe unjust the other; no man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature\nthat he would stand fast in justice. No man would keep his hands off what\nwas not his own when he could safely take what he *360C* liked out of the\nmarket, or go into houses and lie with any one at his pleasure, or kill or\nrelease from prison whom he would, and in all respects be like a God among\nmen. Then the actions of the just would be as the actions of the unjust;\nthey would both come at last to the same point. And this we may truly\naffirm to be a great proof that a man is just, not willingly or because he\nthinks that justice is any good to him individually, but of necessity, for\nwherever any one thinks that he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust.\nFor *360D* all men believe in their hearts that injustice is far more\nprofitable to the individual than justice, and he who argues as I have\nbeen supposing, will say that they are right. If you could imagine any one\nobtaining this power of becoming invisible, and never doing any wrong or\ntouching what was another's, he would be thought by the lookers-on to be a\n{40} most wretched idiot, although they would praise him to one another's\nfaces, and keep up appearances with one another from a fear that they too\nmight suffer injustice. Enough of this.\n\n[Footnote 1: Reading [Greek: Gu/n\u00ea| t\u00f4=| Kroi/sou tou= Ludou= progo/n\u00f4|.]\n\n[Sidenote: The unjust to be clothed with power and reputation.]\n\n[Sidenote: The just to be unclothed of all but his virtue.]\n\n*360E* Now, if we are to form a real judgment of the life of the just and\nunjust, we must isolate them; there is no other way; and how is the\nisolation to be effected? I answer: Let the unjust man be entirely unjust,\nand the just man entirely just; nothing is to be taken away from either of\nthem, and both are to be perfectly furnished for the work of their\nrespective lives. First, let the unjust be like other distinguished\nmasters of craft; like the skilful pilot or *361A* physician, who knows\nintuitively his own powers and keeps within their limits, and who, if he\nfails at any point, is able to recover himself. So let the unjust make his\nunjust attempts in the right way, and lie hidden if he means to be great\nin his injustice: (he who is found out is nobody:) for the highest reach\nof injustice is, to be deemed just when you are not. Therefore I say that\nin the perfectly unjust man we must assume the most perfect injustice;\nthere is to be no deduction, but we must allow him, while doing the most\nunjust acts, *361B* to have acquired the greatest reputation for justice.\nIf he have taken a false step he must be able to recover himself; he must\nbe one who can speak with effect, if any of his deeds come to light, and\nwho can force his way where force is required by his courage and strength,\nand command of money and friends. And at his side let us place the just\nman in his nobleness and simplicity, wishing, as Aeschylus says, to be and\nnot to seem good. There must be no seeming, *361C* for if he seem to be\njust he will be honoured and rewarded, and then we shall not know whether\nhe is just for the sake of justice or for the sake of honours and rewards;\ntherefore, let him be clothed in justice only, and have no other covering;\nand he must be imagined in a state of life the opposite of the former. Let\nhim be the best of men, and let him be thought the worst; then he will\nhave been put to the proof; and we shall see whether he will be affected\nby the fear of infamy and its consequences. And let him continue *361D*\nthus to the hour of death; being just and seeming to be unjust. When both\nhave reached the uttermost extreme, {41} the one of justice and the other\nof injustice, let judgment be given which of them is the happier of the\ntwo.\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates, Glaucon.]\n\nHeavens! my dear Glaucon, I said, how energetically you polish them up for\nthe decision, first one and then the other, as if they were two statues.\n\n[Sidenote: The just man will learn by each experience that he ought to\nseem and not to be just.]\n\n[Sidenote: The unjust who appears just will attain every sort of\nprosperity.]\n\nI do my best, he said. And now that we know what they are like there is no\ndifficulty in tracing out the sort of life *361E* which awaits either of\nthem. This I will proceed to describe; but as you may think the\ndescription a little too coarse, I ask you to suppose, Socrates, that the\nwords which follow are not mine.--Let me put them into the mouths of the\neulogists of injustice: They will tell you that the just man who is\nthought unjust will be scourged, racked, bound--will have his eyes burnt\nout; and, at last, after suffering every kind of evil, he will be impaled:\nThen he will understand that he *362A* ought to seem only, and not to be,\njust; the words of Aeschylus may be more truly spoken of the unjust than\nof the just. For the unjust is pursuing a reality; he does not live with a\nview to appearances--he wants to be really unjust and not to seem only:--\n\n  'His mind has a soil deep and fertile, *362B*\n  Out of which spring his prudent counsels.'[2]\n\nIn the first place, he is thought just, and therefore bears rule in the\ncity; he can marry whom he will, and give in marriage to whom he will;\nalso he can trade and deal where he likes, and always to his own\nadvantage, because he has no misgivings about injustice; and at every\ncontest, whether in public or private, he gets the better of his\nantagonists, and gains at their expense, and is rich, and out of his gains\nhe *362C* can benefit his friends, and harm his enemies; moreover, he can\noffer sacrifices, and dedicate gifts to the gods abundantly and\nmagnificently, and can honour the gods or any man whom he wants to honour\nin a far better style than the just, and therefore he is likely to be\ndearer than they are to the gods. And thus, Socrates, gods and men are\nsaid to unite in making the life of the unjust better than the life of the\njust.\n\n[Footnote 2: Seven against Thebes, 574.]\n\n[Sidenote: Adeimantus, Socrates.]\n\n*362D* I was going to say something in answer to Glaucon, when {42}\nAdeimantus, his brother, interposed: Socrates, he said, you do not suppose\nthat there is nothing more to be urged?\n\nWhy, what else is there? I answered.\n\nThe strongest point of all has not been even mentioned, he replied.\n\nWell, then, according to the proverb, 'Let brother help brother'--if he\nfails in any part do you assist him; although I must confess that Glaucon\nhas already said quite enough to lay me in the dust, and take from me the\npower of helping justice.\n\n[Sidenote: Adeimantus.]\n\n[Sidenote: Adeimantus takes up the argument. Justice is praised and\ninjustice blamed, but only out of regard to their consequences.]\n\n[Sidenote: The rewards and punishments of another life.]\n\n*362E* Nonsense, he replied. But let me add something more: There is\nanother side to Glaucon's argument about the praise and censure of justice\nand injustice, which is equally required in order to bring out what\nI believe to be his meaning. Parents and tutors are always telling their\nsons and their *363A* wards that they are to be just; but why? not for the\nsake of justice, but for the sake of character and reputation; in the hope\nof obtaining for him who is reputed just some of those offices, marriages,\nand the like which Glaucon has enumerated among the advantages accruing to\nthe unjust from the reputation of justice. More, however, is made of\nappearances by this class of persons than by the others; for they throw in\nthe good opinion of the gods, and will tell you of a shower of benefits\nwhich the heavens, as they say, rain upon the pious; and this accords with\nthe testimony of the noble Hesiod and Homer, the first of whom says, that\nthe gods *363B* make the oaks of the just--\n\n  'To bear acorns at their summit, and bees in the middle;\n  And the sheep are bowed down with the weight of their fleeces[3],'\n\nand many other blessings of a like kind are provided for them. And Homer\nhas a very similar strain; for he speaks of one whose fame is--\n\n  'As the fame of some blameless king who, like a god,\n  Maintains justice; to whom the black earth brings forth *363C*\n  Wheat and barley, whose trees are bowed with fruit,\n  And his sheep never fail to bear, and the sea gives him fish[4].'\n\nStill grander are the gifts of heaven which Musaeus and his son[5]\nvouchsafe to the just; they take them down into the {43} world below,\nwhere they have the saints lying on couches at a feast, everlastingly\ndrunk, crowned with garlands; *363D* their idea seems to be that an\nimmortality of drunkenness is the highest meed of virtue. Some extend\ntheir rewards yet further; the posterity, as they say, of the faithful and\njust shall survive to the third and fourth generation. This is the style\nin which they praise justice. But about the wicked there is another\nstrain; they bury them in a slough in Hades, and make them carry water in\na sieve; also while they are yet living they bring them to infamy, and\ninflict *363E* upon them the punishments which Glaucon described as the\nportion of the just who are reputed to be unjust; nothing else does their\ninvention supply. Such is their manner of praising the one and censuring\nthe other.\n\n[Footnote 3: Hesiod, Works and Days, 230.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Homer, Od. xix. 109.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Eumolpus.]\n\n[Sidenote: Men are always repeating that virtue is painful and vice\npleasant.]\n\n[Sidenote: They are taught that sins may be easily expiated.]\n\nOnce more, Socrates, I will ask you to consider another way of speaking\nabout justice and injustice, which is not confined to the poets, *364A*\nbut is found in prose writers. The universal voice of mankind is always\ndeclaring that justice and virtue are honourable, but grievous and\ntoilsome; and that the pleasures of vice and injustice are easy of\nattainment, and are only censured by law and opinion. They say also that\nhonesty is for the most part less profitable than dishonesty; and they are\nquite ready to call wicked men happy, and to honour them both in public\nand private when they are rich or in any other way influential, while they\ndespise and overlook *364B* those who may be weak and poor, even though\nacknowledging them to be better than the others. But most extraordinary of\nall is their mode of speaking about virtue and the gods: they say that the\ngods apportion calamity and misery to many good men, and good and\nhappiness to the wicked. And mendicant prophets go to rich men's doors and\npersuade them that they have a power committed to them by the gods of\nmaking an atonement for a man's own or his ancestor's *364C* sins by\nsacrifices or charms, with rejoicings and feasts; and they promise to harm\nan enemy, whether just or unjust, at a small cost; with magic arts and\nincantations binding heaven, as they say, to execute their will. And the\npoets are the authorities to whom they appeal, now smoothing the path of\nvice with the words of Hesiod;-- {44}\n\n  'Vice may be had in abundance without trouble; *364D* the way is smooth\n  and her dwelling-place is near. But before virtue the gods have set\n  toil[6],'\n\nand a tedious and uphill road: then citing Homer as a witness that the\ngods may be influenced by men; for he also says:--\n\n  'The gods, too, may be turned from their purpose; and men pray to them\n  and avert their wrath by sacrifices and *364E* soothing entreaties, and\n  by libations and the odour of fat, when they have sinned and\n  transgressed[7].'\n\nAnd they produce a host of books written by Musaeus and Orpheus, who were\nchildren of the Moon and the Muses--that is what they say--according to\nwhich they perform their ritual, and persuade not only individuals, but\nwhole cities, that expiations and atonements for sin may be made by\nsacrifices and amusements which fill a vacant hour, and are equally at the\nservice of the living and the dead; the latter *365A* sort they call\nmysteries, and they redeem us from the pains of hell, but if we neglect\nthem no one knows what awaits us.\n\n[Footnote 6: Hesiod, Works and Days, 287.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Homer, Iliad, ix. 493.]\n\n[Sidenote: The effects of all this upon the youthful mind.]\n\nHe proceeded: And now when the young hear all this said about virtue and\nvice, and the way in which gods and men regard them, how are their minds\nlikely to be affected, my dear Socrates,--those of them, I mean, who are\nquickwitted, and, like bees on the wing, light on every flower, and from\nall that they hear are prone to draw conclusions as to what manner of\npersons they should be and in what way they *365B* should walk if they\nwould make the best of life? Probably the youth will say to himself in the\nwords of Pindar--\n\n  'Can I by justice or by crooked ways of deceit ascend a loftier tower\n  which may be a fortress to me all my days?'\n\n[Sidenote: The existence of the gods is only known to us through the\npoets, who likewise assure us that they may be bribed and that they are\nvery ready to forgive.]\n\nFor what men say is that, if I am really just and am not also thought just\nprofit there is none, but the pain and loss on the other hand are\nunmistakeable. But if, though unjust, I acquire the reputation of justice,\na heavenly life is promised to me. *365C* Since then, as philosophers\nprove, appearance tyrannizes over truth and is lord of happiness, to\nappearance I must devote myself. I will describe around me a picture and\nshadow of virtue to be the vestibule and exterior of my {45} house; behind\nI will trail the subtle and crafty fox, as Archilochus, greatest of sages,\nrecommends. But I hear some one exclaiming that the concealment of\nwickedness is often difficult; *365D* to which I answer, Nothing great is\neasy. Nevertheless, the argument indicates this, if we would be happy, to\nbe the path along which we should proceed. With a view to concealment we\nwill establish secret brotherhoods and political clubs. And there are\nprofessors of rhetoric who teach the art of persuading courts and\nassemblies; and so, partly by persuasion and partly by force, I shall make\nunlawful gains and not be punished. Still I hear a voice saying that the\ngods cannot be deceived, neither can they be compelled. But what if there\nare no gods? or, suppose them to have no care of human things--why in\neither case *365E* should we mind about concealment? And even if there are\ngods, and they do care about us, yet we know of them only from tradition\nand the genealogies of the poets; and these are the very persons who say\nthat they may be influenced and turned by 'sacrifices and soothing\nentreaties and by offerings.' Let us be consistent then, and believe both\nor neither. If the poets speak truly, why then we had better *366A* be\nunjust, and offer of the fruits of injustice; for if we are just, although\nwe may escape the vengeance of heaven, we shall lose the gains of\ninjustice; but, if we are unjust, we shall keep the gains, and by our\nsinning and praying, and praying and sinning, the gods will be\npropitiated, and we shall not be punished. 'But there is a world below in\nwhich either we or our posterity will suffer for our unjust deeds.' Yes,\nmy friend, will be the reflection, but there are mysteries and atoning\ndeities, and these have great power. That is *366B* what mighty cities\ndeclare; and the children of the gods, who were their poets and prophets,\nbear a like testimony.\n\n[Sidenote: All this, even if not absolutely true, affords great excuse for\ndoing wrong.]\n\nOn what principle, then, shall we any longer choose justice rather than\nthe worst injustice? when, if we only unite the latter with a deceitful\nregard to appearances, we shall fare to our mind both with gods and men,\nin life and after death, as the most numerous and the highest authorities\ntell us. *366C* Knowing all this, Socrates, how can a man who has any\nsuperiority of mind or person or rank or wealth, be willing to honour\njustice; or indeed to refrain from laughing when he hears {46} justice\npraised? And even if there should be some one who is able to disprove the\ntruth of my words, and who is satisfied that justice is best, still he is\nnot angry with the unjust, but is very ready to forgive them, because he\nalso *366D* knows that men are not just of their own free will; unless,\nperadventure, there be some one whom the divinity within him may have\ninspired with a hatred of injustice, or who has attained knowledge of the\ntruth--but no other man. He only blames injustice who, owing to cowardice\nor age or some weakness, has not the power of being unjust. And this is\nproved by the fact that when he obtains the power, he immediately becomes\nunjust as far as he can be.\n\n[Sidenote: Men should be taught that justice is in itself the greatest\ngood and injustice the greatest evil.]\n\nThe cause of all this, Socrates, was indicated by us at the beginning of\nthe argument, when my brother and I told you how astonished we were to\nfind that of all the professing *366E* panegyrists of justice--beginning\nwith the ancient heroes of whom any memorial has been preserved to us, and\nending with the men of our own time--no one has ever blamed injustice or\npraised justice except with a view to the glories, honours, and benefits\nwhich flow from them. No one has ever adequately described either in verse\nor prose the true essential nature of either of them abiding in the soul,\nand invisible to any human or divine eye; or shown that of all the things\nof a man's soul which he has within him, justice is *367A* the greatest\ngood, and injustice the greatest evil. Had this been the universal strain,\nhad you sought to persuade us of this from our youth upwards, we should\nnot have been on the watch to keep one another from doing wrong, but every\none would have been his own watchman, because afraid, if he did wrong, of\nharbouring in himself the greatest of evils. I dare say that Thrasymachus\nand others would seriously hold the language which I have been merely\nrepeating, and words even stronger than these about justice and injustice,\ngrossly, as I conceive, perverting their true nature. But I speak in this\n*367B* vehement manner, as I must frankly confess to you, because I want\nto hear from you the opposite side; and I would ask you to show not only\nthe superiority which justice has over injustice, but what effect they\nhave on the possessor of them which makes the one to be a good and the\nother an evil to him. And please, as Glaucon requested of you, to {47}\nexclude reputations; for unless you take away from each of them his true\nreputation and add on the false, we shall say that you do not praise\njustice, but the appearance of it; *367C* we shall think that you are only\nexhorting us to keep injustice dark, and that you really agree with\nThrasymachus in thinking that justice is another's good and the interest\nof the stronger, and that injustice is a man's own profit and interest,\nthough injurious to the weaker. Now as you have admitted that justice is\none of that highest class of goods which are desired indeed for their\nresults, but in a far greater *367D* degree for their own sakes--like\nsight or hearing or knowledge or health, or any other real and natural and\nnot merely conventional good--I would ask you in your praise of justice to\nregard one point only: I mean the essential good and evil which justice\nand injustice work in the possessors of them. Let others praise justice\nand censure injustice, magnifying the rewards and honours of the one and\nabusing the other; that is a manner of arguing which, coming from them,\nI am ready to tolerate, but from you who have spent your whole life in the\nconsideration of this question, unless I hear *367E* the contrary from\nyour own lips, I expect something better. And therefore, I say, not only\nprove to us that justice is better than injustice, but show what they\neither of them do to the possessor of them, which makes the one to be a\ngood and the other an evil, whether seen or unseen by gods and men.\n\n[Sidenote: Adeimantus, Socrates.]\n\n[Sidenote: Glaucon and Adeimantus able to argue so well, but unconvinced\nby their own arguments.]\n\nI had always admired the genius of Glaucon and Adeimantus, but on hearing\nthese words I was quite delighted, and said: *368A* Sons of an illustrious\nfather, that was not a bad beginning of the Elegiac verses which the\nadmirer of Glaucon made in honour of you after you had distinguished\nyourselves at the battle of Megara:--\n\n  'Sons of Ariston,' he sang, 'divine offspring of an illustrious hero.'\n\nThe epithet is very appropriate, for there is something truly divine in\nbeing able to argue as you have done for the superiority of injustice, and\nremaining unconvinced by your own arguments. *368B* And I do believe that\nyou are not convinced--this I infer from your general character, for had\nI judged only from your speeches I should have mistrusted you. But now,\nthe greater my confidence in you, the greater is my {48} difficulty in\nknowing what to say. For I am in a strait between two; on the one hand\nI feel that I am unequal to the task; and my inability is brought home to\nme by the fact that you were not satisfied with the answer which I made to\nThrasymachus, proving, as I thought, the superiority which justice has\nover injustice. And yet I cannot refuse to help, while breath and speech\nremain to me; I am afraid that there would be an impiety in being present\nwhen justice *368C* is evil spoken of and not lifting up a hand in her\ndefence. And therefore I had best give such help as I can.\n\n[Sidenote: The large letters.]\n\nGlaucon and the rest entreated me by all means not to let the question\ndrop, but to proceed in the investigation. They wanted to arrive at the\ntruth, first, about the nature of justice and injustice, and secondly,\nabout their relative advantages. I told them, what I really thought, that\nthe enquiry would be of a serious nature, and would require very good\neyes. *368D* Seeing then, I said, that we are no great wits, I think that\nwe had better adopt a method which I may illustrate thus; suppose that a\nshort-sighted person had been asked by some one to read small letters from\na distance; and it occurred to some one else that they might be found in\nanother place which was larger and in which the letters were larger--if\nthey were the same and he could read the larger letters first, and then\nproceed to the lesser--this would have been thought a rare piece of good\nfortune.\n\nVery true, said Adeimantus; but how does the illustration *368E* apply to\nour enquiry?\n\nI will tell you, I replied; justice, which is the subject of our enquiry,\nis, as you know, sometimes spoken of as the virtue of an individual, and\nsometimes as the virtue of a State.\n\nTrue, he replied.\n\nAnd is not a State larger than an individual?\n\nIt is.\n\n[Sidenote: Justice to be seen in the State more easily than in the\nindividual.]\n\nThen in the larger the quantity of justice is likely to be larger and more\neasily discernible. I propose therefore that we enquire into the nature of\njustice and injustice, first as *369A* they appear in the State, and\nsecondly in the individual, proceeding from the greater to the lesser and\ncomparing them. {49}\n\nThat, he said, is an excellent proposal.\n\nAnd if we imagine the State in process of creation, we shall see the\njustice and injustice of the State in process of creation also.\n\nI dare say.\n\nWhen the State is completed there may be a hope that the object of our\nsearch will be more easily discovered.\n\n*369B* Yes, far more easily.\n\nBut ought we to attempt to construct one? I said; for to do so, as I am\ninclined to think, will be a very serious task. Reflect therefore.\n\nI have reflected, said Adeimantus, and am anxious that you should proceed.\n\n[Sidenote: The State arises out of the wants of men.]\n\nA State, I said, arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind; no\none is self-sufficing, but all of us have many wants. Can any other origin\nof a State be imagined?\n\nThere can be no other.\n\n*369C* Then, as we have many wants, and many persons are needed to supply\nthem, one takes a helper for one purpose and another for another; and when\nthese partners and helpers are gathered together in one habitation the\nbody of inhabitants is termed a State.\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nAnd they exchange with one another, and one gives, and another receives,\nunder the idea that the exchange will be for their good.\n\nVery true.\n\nThen, I said, let us begin and create in idea a State; and yet the true\ncreator is necessity, who is the mother of our invention.\n\nOf course, he replied.\n\n[Sidenote: The four or five greater needs of life, and the four or five\nkinds of citizens who correspond to them.]\n\n*369D* Now the first and greatest of necessities is food, which is the\ncondition of life and existence.\n\nCertainly.\n\nThe second is a dwelling, and the third clothing and the like.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd now let us see how our city will be able to supply this great demand:\nWe may suppose that one man is a husbandman, another a builder, some one\nelse a weaver-- {50} shall we add to them a shoemaker, or perhaps some\nother purveyor to our bodily wants?\n\nQuite right.\n\nThe barest notion of a State must include four or five men.\n\n*369E* Clearly.\n\n[Sidenote: The division of labour.]\n\nAnd how will they proceed? Will each bring the result of his labours into\na common stock?--the individual husbandman, for example, producing for\nfour, and labouring four times as long and as much as he need in the\nprovision of food with which he supplies others as well as himself; or\nwill he have nothing to do with others and not be at the trouble of\nproducing for them, but provide for himself alone *370A* a fourth of the\nfood in a fourth of the time, and in the remaining three fourths of his\ntime be employed in making a house or a coat or a pair of shoes, having no\npartnership with others, but supplying himself all his own wants?\n\nAdeimantus thought that he should aim at producing food only and not at\nproducing everything.\n\nProbably, I replied, that would be the better way; and when I hear you say\nthis, I am myself reminded that we are *370B* not all alike; there are\ndiversities of natures among us which are adapted to different\noccupations.\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd will you have a work better done when the workman has many\noccupations, or when he has only one?\n\nWhen he has only one.\n\nFurther, there can be no doubt that a work is spoilt when not done at the\nright time?\n\nNo doubt.\n\nFor business is not disposed to wait until the doer of the business is at\nleisure; but the doer must follow up what he *370C* is doing, and make the\nbusiness his first object.\n\nHe must.\n\nAnd if so, we must infer that all things are produced more plentifully and\neasily and of a better quality when one man does one thing which is\nnatural to him and does it at the right time, and leaves other things.\n\nUndoubtedly.\n\n[Sidenote: The first citizens are:--1. a husbandman, 2. a builder. 3. a\nweaver, 4. a shoemaker. To these must be added:--5. a carpenter, 6. a\nsmith, etc., 7. merchants, 8. retailers.]\n\nThen more than four citizens will be required; for the husbandman will not\nmake his own plough or mattock, or {51} *370D* other implements of\nagriculture, if they are to be good for anything. Neither will the builder\nmake his tools--and he too needs many; and in like manner the weaver and\nshoemaker.\n\nTrue.\n\nThen carpenters, and smiths, and many other artisans, will be sharers in\nour little State, which is already beginning to grow?\n\nTrue.\n\nYet even if we add neatherds, shepherds, and other herdsmen, *370E* in\norder that our husbandmen may have oxen to plough with, and builders as\nwell as husbandmen may have draught cattle, and curriers and weavers\nfleeces and hides,--still our State will not be very large.\n\nThat is true; yet neither will it be a very small State which contains all\nthese.\n\nThen, again, there is the situation of the city--to find a place where\nnothing need be imported is wellnigh impossible.\n\nImpossible.\n\nThen there must be another class of citizens who will bring the required\nsupply from another city?\n\nThere must.\n\n*371A* But if the trader goes empty-handed, having nothing which they\nrequire who would supply his need, he will come back empty-handed.\n\nThat is certain.\n\nAnd therefore what they produce at home must be not only enough for\nthemselves, but such both in quantity and quality as to accommodate those\nfrom whom their wants are supplied.\n\nVery true.\n\nThen more husbandmen and more artisans will be required?\n\nThey will.\n\nNot to mention the importers and exporters, who are called merchants?\n\nYes.\n\nThen we shall want merchants?\n\nWe shall.\n\nAnd if merchandise is to be carried over the sea, skilful *371B* sailors\nwill also be needed, and in considerable numbers?\n\nYes, in considerable numbers.\n\nThen, again, within the city, how will they exchange their {52}\nproductions? To secure such an exchange was, as you will remember, one of\nour principal objects when we formed them into a society and constituted a\nState.\n\nClearly they will buy and sell.\n\nThen they will need a market-place, and a money-token for purposes of\nexchange.\n\nCertainly.\n\n[Sidenote: The origin of retail trade.]\n\n*371C* Suppose now that a husbandman, or an artisan, brings some\nproduction to market, and he comes at a time when there is no one to\nexchange with him,--is he to leave his calling and sit idle in the\nmarket-place?\n\nNot at all; he will find people there who, seeing the want, undertake the\noffice of salesmen. In well-ordered states they are commonly those who are\nthe weakest in bodily strength, and therefore of little use for any other\npurpose; their duty is *371D* to be in the market, and to give money in\nexchange for goods to those who desire to sell and to take money from\nthose who desire to buy.\n\nThis want, then, creates a class of retail-traders in our State. Is not\n'retailer' the term which is applied to those who sit in the market-place\nengaged in buying and selling, while those who wander from one city to\nanother are called merchants?\n\nYes, he said.\n\n*371E* And there is another class of servants, who are intellectually\nhardly on the level of companionship; still they have plenty of bodily\nstrength for labour, which accordingly they sell, and are called, if I do\nnot mistake, hirelings, hire being the name which is given to the price of\ntheir labour.\n\nTrue.\n\nThen hirelings will help to make up our population?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd now, Adeimantus, is our State matured and perfected?\n\nI think so.\n\nWhere, then, is justice, and where is injustice, and in what part of the\nState did they spring up?\n\n*372A* Probably in the dealings of these citizens with one another. I\ncannot imagine that they are more likely to be found any where else.\n\nI dare say that you are right in your suggestion, I said; {53} we had\nbetter think the matter out, and not shrink from the enquiry.\n\n[Sidenote: A picture of primitive life.]\n\nLet us then consider, first of all, what will be their way of life, now\nthat we have thus established them. Will they not produce corn, and wine,\nand clothes, and shoes, and build houses for themselves? And when they are\nhoused, they will work, in summer, commonly, stripped and barefoot, but\n*372B* in winter substantially clothed and shod. They will feed on\nbarley-meal and flour of wheat, baking and kneading them, making noble\ncakes and loaves; these they will serve up on a mat of reeds or on clean\nleaves, themselves reclining the while upon beds strewn with yew or\nmyrtle. And they and their children will feast, drinking of the wine which\nthey have made, wearing garlands on their heads, and hymning the praises\nof the gods, in happy converse with one another. *372C* And they will take\ncare that their families do not exceed their means; having an eye to\npoverty or war.\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates, Glaucon.]\n\nBut, said Glaucon, interposing, you have not given them a relish to their\nmeal.\n\nTrue, I replied, I had forgotten; of course they must have a relish--salt,\nand olives, and cheese, and they will boil roots and herbs such as country\npeople prepare; for a dessert we shall give them figs, and peas, and\nbeans; and they will roast myrtle-berries and acorns at the fire, drinking\nin moderation. *372D* And with such a diet they may be expected to live in\npeace and health to a good old age, and bequeath a similar life to their\nchildren after them.\n\nYes, Socrates, he said, and if you were providing for a city of pigs, how\nelse would you feed the beasts?\n\nBut what would you have, Glaucon? I replied.\n\nWhy, he said, you should give them the ordinary conveniences of life.\nPeople who are to be comfortable are accustomed to lie on sofas, and dine\noff tables, and they should *372E* have sauces and sweets in the modern\nstyle.\n\n[Sidenote: A luxurious State must be called into existence,]\n\nYes, I said, now I understand: the question which you would have me\nconsider is, not only how a State, but how a luxurious State is created;\nand possibly there is no harm in this, for in such a State we shall be\nmore likely to see how justice and injustice originate. In my opinion the\ntrue and healthy constitution of the State is the one which I have {54}\ndescribed. But if you wish also to see a State at fever-heat, I have no\nobjection. For I suspect that many will not be *373A* satisfied with the\nsimpler way of life. They will be for adding sofas, and tables, and other\nfurniture; also dainties, and perfumes, and incense, and courtesans, and\ncakes, all these not of one sort only, but in every variety; we must go\nbeyond the necessaries of which I was at first speaking, such as houses,\nand clothes, and shoes: the arts of the painter and the embroiderer will\nhave to be set in motion, and gold and ivory and all sorts of materials\nmust be procured.\n\n*373B* True, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: and in this many new callings will be required.]\n\nThen we must enlarge our borders; for the original healthy State is no\nlonger sufficient. Now will the city have to fill and swell with a\nmultitude of callings which are not required by any natural want; such as\nthe whole tribe of hunters and actors, of whom one large class have to do\nwith forms and colours; another will be the votaries of music--poets and\ntheir attendant train of rhapsodists, players, dancers, contractors; also\nmakers of divers kinds of articles, *373C* including women's dresses. And\nwe shall want more servants. Will not tutors be also in request, and\nnurses wet and dry, tirewomen and barbers, as well as confectioners and\ncooks; and swineherds, too, who were not needed and therefore had no place\nin the former edition of our State, but are needed now? They must not be\nforgotten: and there will be animals of many other kinds, if people eat\nthem.\n\nCertainly.\n\n*373D* And living in this way we shall have much greater need of\nphysicians than before?\n\nMuch greater.\n\nAnd the country which was enough to support the original inhabitants will\nbe too small now, and not enough?\n\nQuite true.\n\n[Sidenote: The territory of our State must be enlarged; and hence will\narise war between us and our neighbours.]\n\nThen a slice of our neighbours' land will be wanted by us for pasture and\ntillage, and they will want a slice of ours, if, like ourselves, they\nexceed the limit of necessity, and give themselves up to the unlimited\naccumulation of wealth?\n\n*373E* That, Socrates, will be inevitable.\n\nAnd so we shall go to war, Glaucon. Shall we not?\n\nMost certainly, he replied. {55}\n\nThen without determining as yet whether war does good or harm, thus much\nwe may affirm, that now we have discovered war to be derived from causes\nwhich are also the causes of almost all the evils in States, private as\nwell as public.\n\nUndoubtedly.\n\nAnd our State must once more enlarge; and this time the enlargement will\nbe nothing short of a whole army, which *374A* will have to go out and\nfight with the invaders for all that we have, as well as for the things\nand persons whom we were describing above.\n\nWhy? he said; are they not capable of defending themselves?\n\n[Sidenote: War is an art, and as no art can be pursued with success unless\na man's whole attention is devoted to it, a soldier cannot be allowed to\nexercise any calling but his own.]\n\nNo, I said; not if we were right in the principle which was acknowledged\nby all of us when we were framing the State: the principle, as you will\nremember, was that one man cannot practise many arts with success.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\n*374B* But is not war an art?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd an art requiring as much attention as shoemaking?\n\nQuite true.\n\n[Sidenote: The warrior's art requires a long apprenticeship and many\nnatural gifts.]\n\nAnd the shoemaker was not allowed by us to be a husbandman, or a weaver,\nor a builder--in order that we might have our shoes well made; but to him\nand to every other worker was assigned one work for which he was by nature\nfitted, and *374C* at that he was to continue working all his life long\nand at no other; he was not to let opportunities slip, and then he would\nbecome a good workman. Now nothing can be more important than that the\nwork of a soldier should be well done. But is war an art so easily\nacquired that a man may be a warrior who is also a husbandman, or\nshoemaker, or other artisan; although no one in the world would be a good\ndice or draught player who merely took up the game as a recreation, and\nhad not from his earliest years devoted himself to this and nothing else?\nNo tools will make a man a skilled workman, or master of defence, nor be\nof any use to him who has not learned how to handle them, and has never\n*374D* bestowed any attention upon them. How then will he who takes up a\nshield or other implement of war become a good {56} fighter all in a day,\nwhether with heavy-armed or any other kind of troops?\n\nYes, he said, the tools which would teach men their own use would be\nbeyond price.\n\nAnd the higher the duties of the guardian, I said, the more *374E* time,\nand skill, and art, and application will be needed by him?\n\nNo doubt, he replied.\n\nWill he not also require natural aptitude for his calling?\n\nCertainly.\n\n[Sidenote: The selection of guardians.]\n\nThen it will be our duty to select, if we can, natures which are fitted\nfor the task of guarding the city?\n\nIt will.\n\nAnd the selection will be no easy matter, I said; but we must be brave and\ndo our best.\n\n*375A* We must.\n\nIs not the noble youth very like a well-bred dog in respect of guarding\nand watching?\n\nWhat do you mean?\n\nI mean that both of them ought to be quick to see, and swift to overtake\nthe enemy when they see him; and strong too if, when they have caught him,\nthey have to fight with him.\n\nAll these qualities, he replied, will certainly be required by them.\n\nWell, and your guardian must be brave if he is to fight well?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd is he likely to be brave who has no spirit, whether horse or dog or\nany other animal? Have you never observed *375B* how invincible and\nunconquerable is spirit and how the presence of it makes the soul of any\ncreature to be absolutely fearless and indomitable?\n\nI have.\n\nThen now we have a clear notion of the bodily qualities which are required\nin the guardian.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd also of the mental ones; his soul is to be full of spirit?\n\nYes.\n\nBut are not these spirited natures apt to be savage with one another, and\nwith everybody else? {57}\n\nA difficulty by no means easy to overcome, he replied.\n\n*375C* Whereas, I said, they ought to be dangerous to their enemies, and\ngentle to their friends; if not, they will destroy themselves without\nwaiting for their enemies to destroy them.\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nWhat is to be done then? I said; how shall we find a gentle nature which\nhas also a great spirit, for the one is the contradiction of the other?\n\nTrue.\n\n[Sidenote: The guardian must unite the opposite qualities of gentleness\nand spirit.]\n\nHe will not be a good guardian who is wanting in either of these two\nqualities; and yet the combination of them *375D* appears to be\nimpossible; and hence we must infer that to be a good guardian is\nimpossible.\n\nI am afraid that what you say is true, he replied.\n\nHere feeling perplexed I began to think over what had preceded.--My\nfriend, I said, no wonder that we are in a perplexity; for we have lost\nsight of the image which we had before us.\n\nWhat do you mean? he said.\n\nI mean to say that there do exist natures gifted with those opposite\nqualities.\n\nAnd where do you find them?\n\n[Sidenote: Such a combination may be observed in the dog.]\n\nMany animals, I replied, furnish examples of them; our *375E* friend the\ndog is a very good one: you know that well-bred dogs are perfectly gentle\nto their familiars and acquaintances, and the reverse to strangers.\n\nYes, I know.\n\nThen there is nothing impossible or out of the order of nature in our\nfinding a guardian who has a similar combination of qualities?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nWould not he who is fitted to be a guardian, besides the spirited nature,\nneed to have the qualities of a philosopher?\n\nI do not apprehend your meaning.\n\n*376A* The trait of which I am speaking, I replied, may be also seen in\nthe dog, and is remarkable in the animal.\n\nWhat trait?\n\n[Sidenote: The dog distinguishes friend and enemy by the criterion of\nknowing and not knowing:]\n\nWhy, a dog, whenever he sees a stranger, is angry; when an acquaintance,\nhe welcomes him, although the one has {58} never done him any harm, nor\nthe other any good. Did this never strike you as curious?\n\nThe matter never struck me before; but I quite recognise the truth of your\nremark.\n\nAnd surely this instinct of the dog is very charming;-- *376B* your dog is\na true philosopher.\n\nWhy?\n\nWhy, because he distinguishes the face of a friend and of an enemy only by\nthe criterion of knowing and not knowing. And must not an animal be a\nlover of learning who determines what he likes and dislikes by the test of\nknowledge and ignorance?\n\nMost assuredly.\n\n[Sidenote: whereby he is shown to be a philosopher.]\n\nAnd is not the love of learning the love of wisdom, which is philosophy?\n\nThey are the same, he replied.\n\nAnd may we not say confidently of man also, that he who *376C* is likely\nto be gentle to his friends and acquaintances, must by nature be a lover\nof wisdom and knowledge?\n\nThat we may safely affirm.\n\nThen he who is to be a really good and noble guardian of the State will\nrequire to unite in himself philosophy and spirit and swiftness and\nstrength?\n\nUndoubtedly.\n\n[Sidenote: How are our citizens to be reared and educated?]\n\nThen we have found the desired natures; and now that we have found them,\nhow are they to be reared and educated? Is not this an enquiry which may\nbe expected to throw light *376D* on the greater enquiry which is our\nfinal end--How do justice and injustice grow up in States? for we do not\nwant either to omit what is to the point or to draw out the argument to an\ninconvenient length.\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates, Adeimantus.]\n\nAdeimantus thought that the enquiry would be of great service to us.\n\nThen, I said, my dear friend, the task must not be given up, even if\nsomewhat long.\n\nCertainly not.\n\nCome then, and let us pass a leisure hour in story-telling, and our story\nshall be the education of our heroes.\n\n*376E* By all means.\n\nAnd what shall be their education? Can we find a better {59} than the\ntraditional sort?--and this has two divisions, gymnastic for the body, and\nmusic for the soul.\n\nTrue.\n\n[Sidenote: Education divided into gymnastic for the body and music for the\nsoul. Music includes literature, which may be true or false.]\n\nShall we begin education with music, and go on to gymnastic afterwards?\n\nBy all means.\n\nAnd when you speak of music, do you include literature or not?\n\nI do.\n\nAnd literature may be either true or false?\n\nYes.\n\n*377A* And the young should be trained in both kinds, and we begin with\nthe false?\n\nI do not understand your meaning, he said.\n\nYou know, I said, that we begin by telling children stories which, though\nnot wholly destitute of truth, are in the main fictitious; and these\nstories are told them when they are not of an age to learn gymnastics.\n\nVery true.\n\nThat was my meaning when I said that we must teach music before\ngymnastics.\n\nQuite right, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: The beginning the most important part of education.]\n\nYou know also that the beginning is the most important *377B* part of any\nwork, especially in the case of a young and tender thing; for that is the\ntime at which the character is being formed and the desired impression is\nmore readily taken.\n\nQuite true.\n\nAnd shall we just carelessly allow children to hear any casual tales which\nmay be devised by casual persons, and to receive into their minds ideas\nfor the most part the very opposite of those which we should wish them to\nhave when they are grown up?\n\nWe cannot.\n\n[Sidenote: Works of fiction to be placed under a censorship.]\n\nThen the first thing will be to establish a censorship of *377C* the\nwriters of fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which\nis good, and reject the bad; and we will desire mothers and nurses to tell\ntheir children the authorised ones only. Let them fashion the mind with\nsuch tales, even more fondly than they mould the body with their hands;\nbut most of those which are now in use must be discarded. {60}\n\nOf what tales are you speaking? he said.\n\nYou may find a model of the lesser in the greater, I said; *377D* for they\nare necessarily of the same type, and there is the same spirit in both of\nthem.\n\nVery likely, he replied; but I do not as yet know what you would term the\ngreater.\n\n[Sidenote: Homer and Hesiod are tellers of bad lies, that is to say, they\ngive false representations of the gods,]\n\nThose, I said, which are narrated by Homer and Hesiod, and the rest of the\npoets, who have ever been the great story-tellers of mankind.\n\nBut which stories do you mean, he said; and what fault do you find with\nthem?\n\nA fault which is most serious, I said; the fault of telling a lie, and,\nwhat is more, a bad lie.\n\nBut when is this fault committed?\n\n*377E* Whenever an erroneous representation is made of the nature of gods\nand heroes,--as when a painter paints a portrait not having the shadow of\na likeness to the original.\n\nYes, he said, that sort of thing is certainly very blameable; but what are\nthe stories which you mean?\n\nFirst of all, I said, there was that greatest of all lies in high places,\nwhich the poet told about Uranus, and which was a bad lie too,--I mean\nwhat Hesiod says that Uranus did, *378A* and how Cronus retaliated on\nhim[8]. The doings of Cronus, and the sufferings which in turn his son\ninflicted upon him, even if they were true, ought certainly not to be\nlightly told to young and thoughtless persons; if possible, they had\nbetter be buried in silence. But if there is an absolute necessity for\ntheir mention, a chosen few might hear them in a mystery, and they should\nsacrifice not a common [Eleusinian] pig, but some huge and unprocurable\nvictim; and then the number of the hearers will be very few indeed.\n\n[Footnote 8: Hesiod, Theogony, 154, 459.]\n\nWhy, yes, said he, those stories are extremely objectionable.\n\n[Sidenote: which have a bad effect on the minds of youth.]\n\n*378B* Yes, Adeimantus, they are stories not to be repeated in our State;\nthe young man should not be told that in committing the worst of crimes he\nis far from doing anything outrageous; and that even if he chastises his\nfather when he does wrong, in whatever manner, he will only be following\nthe example of the first and greatest among the gods. {61}\n\nI entirely agree with you, he said; in my opinion those stories are quite\nunfit to be repeated.\n\n[Sidenote: The stories about the quarrels of the gods and their evil\nbehaviour to one another are untrue.]\n\n[Sidenote: And allegorical interpretations of them are not understood by\nthe young.]\n\nNeither, if we mean our future guardians to regard the habit of\nquarrelling among themselves as of all things the basest, should any word\nbe said to them of the wars in heaven, *378C* and of the plots and\nfightings of the gods against one another, for they are not true. No, we\nshall never mention the battles of the giants, or let them be embroidered\non garments; and we shall be silent about the innumerable other quarrels\nof gods and heroes with their friends and relatives. If they would only\nbelieve us we would tell them that quarrelling is unholy, and that never\nup to this time *378D* has there been any quarrel between citizens; this\nis what old men and old women should begin by telling children; and when\nthey grow up, the poets also should be told to compose for them in a\nsimilar spirit[9]. But the narrative of Hephaestus binding Here his\nmother, or how on another occasion Zeus sent him flying for taking her\npart when she was being beaten, and all the battles of the gods in\nHomer--these tales must not be admitted into our State, whether they are\nsupposed to have an allegorical meaning or not. For a young person cannot\njudge what is allegorical and *378E* what is literal; anything that he\nreceives into his mind at that age is likely to become indelible and\nunalterable; and therefore it is most important that the tales which the\nyoung first hear should be models of virtuous thoughts.\n\n[Footnote 9: Placing the comma after [Greek: grausi/], and not after\n[Greek: gignome/nois].]\n\nThere you are right, he replied; but if any one asks where are such models\nto be found and of what tales are you speaking--how shall we answer him?\n\n*379A* I said to him, You and I, Adeimantus, at this moment are not poets,\nbut founders of a State: now the founders of a State ought to know the\ngeneral forms in which poets should cast their tales, and the limits which\nmust be observed by them, but to make the tales is not their business.\n\nVery true, he said; but what are these forms of theology which you mean?\n\n[Sidenote: God is to be represented as he truly is.]\n\nSomething of this kind, I replied:--God is always to be represented as he\ntruly is, whatever be the sort of poetry, epic, lyric or tragic, in which\nthe representation is given.\n\nRight. {62}\n\n*379B* And is he not truly good? and must he not be represented as such?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd no good thing is hurtful?\n\nNo, indeed.\n\nAnd that which is not hurtful hurts not?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nAnd that which hurts not does no evil?\n\nNo.\n\nAnd can that which does no evil be a cause of evil?\n\nImpossible.\n\nAnd the good is advantageous?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd therefore the cause of well-being?\n\nYes.\n\nIt follows therefore that the good is not the cause of all things, but of\nthe good only?\n\n*379C* Assuredly.\n\n[Sidenote: God, if he be good, is the author of good only.]\n\nThen God, if he be good, is not the author of all things, as the many\nassert, but he is the cause of a few things only, and not of most things\nthat occur to men. For few are the goods of human life, and many are the\nevils, and the good is to be attributed to God alone; of the evils the\ncauses are to be sought elsewhere, and not in him.\n\nThat appears to me to be most true, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: The fictions of the poets.]\n\n[Sidenote: Only that evil which is of the nature of punishment to be\nattributed to God.]\n\nThen we must not listen to Homer or to any other poet *379D* who is guilty\nof the folly of saying that two casks\n\n  'Lie at the threshold of Zeus, full of lots, one of good, the other of\n  evil lots[10],'\n\nand that he to whom Zeus gives a mixture of the two\n\n  'Sometimes meets with evil fortune, at other times with good;'\n\nbut that he to whom is given the cup of unmingled ill,\n\n  'Him wild hunger drives o'er the beauteous earth.'\n\n*379E* And again--\n\n  'Zeus, who is the dispenser of good and evil to us.'\n\nAnd if any one asserts that the violation of oaths and treaties, {63}\nwhich was really the work of Pandarus[11], was brought about by Athene and\nZeus, or that the strife and contention of the gods was instigated by\nThemis and Zeus[12], he shall not have our approval; neither will we allow\nour young men to hear the words of Aeschylus, that\n\n  *380A* 'God plants guilt among men when he desires utterly to destroy a\n  house.'\n\nAnd if a poet writes of the sufferings of Niobe--the subject of the\ntragedy in which these iambic verses occur--or of the house of Pelops, or\nof the Trojan war or on any similar theme, either we must not permit him\nto say that these are the works of God, or if they are of God, he must\ndevise some explanation of them such as we are seeking; he must say that\n*380B* God did what was just and right, and they were the better for being\npunished; but that those who are punished are miserable, and that God is\nthe author of their misery--the poet is not to be permitted to say; though\nhe may say that the wicked are miserable because they require to be\npunished, and are benefited by receiving punishment from God; but that God\nbeing good is the author of evil to any one is to be *380C* strenuously\ndenied, and not to be said or sung or heard in verse or prose by any one\nwhether old or young in any well-ordered commonwealth. Such a fiction is\nsuicidal, ruinous, impious.\n\n[Footnote 10: Iliad, xxiv. 527.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Iliad, ii. 69.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Ib. xx.]\n\nI agree with you, he replied, and am ready to give my assent to the law.\n\nLet this then be one of our rules and principles concerning the gods, to\nwhich our poets and reciters will be expected to conform,--that God is not\nthe author of all things, but of good only.\n\nThat will do, he said.\n\n*380D* And what do you think of a second principle? Shall I ask you\nwhether God is a magician, and of a nature to appear insidiously now in\none shape, and now in another--sometimes himself changing and passing into\nmany forms, sometimes deceiving us with the semblance of such\ntransformations; or is he one and the same immutably fixed in his own\nproper image? {64}\n\nI cannot answer you, he said, without more thought.\n\n[Sidenote: Things must be changed either by another or by themselves.]\n\nWell, I said; but if we suppose a change in anything, that *380E* change\nmust be effected either by the thing itself, or by some other thing?\n\nMost certainly.\n\nAnd things which are at their best are also least liable to be altered or\ndiscomposed; for example, when healthiest and strongest, the human frame\nis least liable to be affected by meats and drinks, and the plant which is\nin the fullest vigour also suffers least from winds or the heat of the sun\nor any similar causes.\n\nOf course.\n\n*381A* And will not the bravest and wisest soul be least confused or\nderanged by any external influence?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd the same principle, as I should suppose, applies to all composite\nthings--furniture, houses, garments: when good and well made, they are\nleast altered by time and circumstances.\n\nVery true.\n\n*381B* Then everything which is good, whether made by art or nature, or\nboth, is least liable to suffer change from without?\n\nTrue.\n\nBut surely God and the things of God are in every way perfect?\n\nOf course they are.\n\n[Sidenote: But God cannot be changed by other; and will not be changed by\nhimself.]\n\nThen he can hardly be compelled by external influence to take many shapes?\n\nHe cannot.\n\nBut may he not change and transform himself?\n\nClearly, he said, that must be the case if he is changed at all.\n\nAnd will he then change himself for the better and fairer, or for the\nworse and more unsightly?\n\n*381C* If he change at all he can only change for the worse, for we cannot\nsuppose him to be deficient either in virtue or beauty.\n\nVery true, Adeimantus; but then, would any one, whether God or man, desire\nto make himself worse?\n\nImpossible.\n\nThen it is impossible that God should ever be willing to {65} change;\nbeing, as is supposed, the fairest and best that is conceivable, every God\nremains absolutely and for ever in his own form.\n\nThat necessarily follows, he said, in my judgment.\n\n*381D* Then, I said, my dear friend, let none of the poets tell us that\n\n  'The gods, taking the disguise of strangers from other lands, walk up and\n  down cities in all sorts of forms[13];'\n\nand let no one slander Proteus and Thetis, neither let any one, either in\ntragedy or in any other kind of poetry, introduce Here disguised in the\nlikeness of a priestess asking an alms\n\n  'For the life-giving daughters of Inachus the river of Argos;'\n\n*381E* --let us have no more lies of that sort. Neither must we have\nmothers under the influence of the poets scaring their children with a bad\nversion of these myths--telling how certain gods, as they say, 'Go about\nby night in the likeness of so many strangers and in divers forms;' but\nlet them take heed lest they make cowards of their children, and at the\nsame time speak blasphemy against the gods.\n\n[Footnote 13: Hom. Od. xvii. 485.]\n\nHeaven forbid, he said.\n\nBut although the gods are themselves unchangeable, still by witchcraft and\ndeception they may make us think that they appear in various forms?\n\nPerhaps, he replied.\n\n[Sidenote: Nor will he make any false representation of himself.]\n\nWell, but can you imagine that God will be willing to lie, whether in word\nor deed, or to put forth a phantom of himself?\n\n*382A* I cannot say, he replied.\n\nDo you not know, I said, that the true lie, if such an expression may be\nallowed, is hated of gods and men?\n\nWhat do you mean? he said.\n\nI mean that no one is willingly deceived in that which is the truest and\nhighest part of himself, or about the truest and highest matters; there,\nabove all, he is most afraid of a lie having possession of him. {66}\n\nStill, he said, I do not comprehend you.\n\n*382B* The reason is, I replied, that you attribute some profound meaning\nto my words; but I am only saying that deception, or being deceived or\nuninformed about the highest realities in the highest part of themselves,\nwhich is the soul, and in that part of them to have and to hold the lie,\nis what mankind least like;--that, I say, is what they utterly detest.\n\nThere is nothing more hateful to them.\n\nAnd, as I was just now remarking, this ignorance in the soul of him who is\ndeceived may be called the true lie; for the lie in words is only a kind\nof imitation and shadowy image of a previous affection of the soul, not\npure unadulterated *382C* falsehood. Am I not right?\n\nPerfectly right.\n\n[Sidenote: The true lie is equally hated both by gods and men; the\nremedial or preventive lie is comparatively innocent, but God can have no\nneed of it.]\n\nThe true lie is hated not only by the gods, but also by men?\n\nYes.\n\nWhereas the lie in words is in certain cases useful and not hateful; in\ndealing with enemies--that would be an instance; or again, when those whom\nwe call our friends in a fit of madness or illusion are going to do some\nharm, then it is useful and is a sort of medicine or preventive; also in\nthe *382D* tales of mythology, of which we were just now speaking--because\nwe do not know the truth about ancient times, we make falsehood as much\nlike truth as we can, and so turn it to account.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nBut can any of these reasons apply to God? Can we suppose that he is\nignorant of antiquity, and therefore has recourse to invention?\n\nThat would be ridiculous, he said.\n\nThen the lying poet has no place in our idea of God?\n\nI should say not.\n\nOr perhaps he may tell a lie because he is afraid of enemies?\n\n*382E* That is inconceivable.\n\nBut he may have friends who are senseless or mad?\n\nBut no mad or senseless person can be a friend of God.\n\nThen no motive can be imagined why God should lie?\n\nNone whatever. {67}\n\nThen the superhuman and divine is absolutely incapable of falsehood?\n\nYes.\n\nThen is God perfectly simple and true both in word and deed[14]; he\nchanges not; he deceives not, either by sign or word, by dream or waking\nvision.\n\n[Footnote 14: Omitting [Greek: kata\\ phantasi/as].]\n\n*383A* Your thoughts, he said, are the reflection of my own.\n\nYou agree with me then, I said, that this is the second type or form in\nwhich we should write and speak about divine things. The gods are not\nmagicians who transform themselves, neither do they deceive mankind in any\nway.\n\nI grant that.\n\n[Sidenote: Away then with the falsehoods of the poets!]\n\nThen, although we are admirers of Homer, we do not admire the lying dream\nwhich Zeus sends to Agamemnon; neither will we praise the verses of\nAeschylus in which Thetis *383B* says that Apollo at her nuptials\n\n  'Was celebrating in song her fair progeny whose days were to be long, and\n  to know no sickness. And when he had spoken of my lot as in all things\n  blessed of heaven he raised a note of triumph and cheered my soul. And\n  I thought that the word of Phoebus, being divine and full of prophecy,\n  would not fail. And now he himself who uttered the strain, he who was\n  present at the banquet, and who said this--he it is who has slain my\n  son[15].'\n\n[Footnote 15: From a lost play.]\n\n*383C* These are the kind of sentiments about the gods which will arouse\nour anger; and he who utters them shall be refused a chorus; neither shall\nwe allow teachers to make use of them in the instruction of the young,\nmeaning, as we do, that our guardians, as far as men can be, should be\ntrue worshippers of the gods and like them.\n\nI entirely agree, he said, in these principles, and promise to make them\nmy laws.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK III.\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic III._ Socrates, Adeimantus.]\n\n[Sidenote: The discouraging lessons of mythology.]\n\n*386A* Such then, I said, are our principles of theology--some tales are\nto be told, and others are not to be told to our disciples from their\nyouth upwards, if we mean them to honour the gods and their parents, and\nto value friendship with one another.\n\nYes; and I think that our principles are right, he said.\n\nBut if they are to be courageous, must they not learn other lessons\nbesides these, and lessons of such a kind as will take *386B* away the\nfear of death? Can any man be courageous who has the fear of death in him?\n\nCertainly not, he said.\n\nAnd can he be fearless of death, or will he choose death in battle rather\nthan defeat and slavery, who believes the world below to be real and\nterrible?\n\nImpossible.\n\n[Sidenote: The description of the world below in Homer.]\n\nThen we must assume a control over the narrators of this class of tales as\nwell as over the others, and beg them not simply to revile but rather to\ncommend the world below, *386C* intimating to them that their descriptions\nare untrue, and will do harm to our future warriors.\n\nThat will be our duty, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: Such tales to be rejected.]\n\nThen, I said, we shall have to obliterate many obnoxious passages,\nbeginning with the verses,\n\n  'I would rather be a serf on the land of a poor and portionless man than\n  rule over all the dead who have come to nought[1].'\n\nWe must also expunge the verse, which tells us how Pluto feared,\n\n  *386D* 'Lest the mansions grim and squalid which the gods abhor should\n  be seen both of mortals and immortals[2].' {69}\n\nAnd again:--\n\n  'O heavens! verily in the house of Hades there is soul and ghostly form\n  but no mind at all[3]!'\n\nAgain of Tiresias:--\n\n  '[To him even after death did Persephone grant mind,] that he alone\n  should be wise; but the other souls are flitting shades[4].'\n\nAgain:--\n\n  'The soul flying from the limbs had gone to Hades, lamenting her fate,\n  leaving manhood and youth[5].'\n\nAgain:--\n\n  *387A* 'And the soul, with shrilling cry, passed like smoke beneath the\n  earth[6].'\n\nAnd,--\n\n  'As bats in hollow of mystic cavern, whenever any of them has dropped\n  out of the string and falls from the rock, fly shrilling and cling to\n  one another, so did they with shrilling cry hold together as they\n  moved[7].'\n\n*387B* And we must beg Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we\nstrike out these and similar passages, not because they are unpoetical, or\nunattractive to the popular ear, but because the greater the poetical\ncharm of them, the less are they meet for the ears of boys and men who are\nmeant to be free, and who should fear slavery more than death.\n\n[Footnote 1: Od. xi. 489.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Il. xx. 64.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Il. xxiii. 103.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Od. x. 495.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Il. xvi. 856.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Ib. xxiii. 100.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Od. xxiv. 6.]\n\nUndoubtedly.\n\nAlso we shall have to reject all the terrible and appalling names which\ndescribe the world below--Cocytus and Styx, *387C* ghosts under the earth,\nand sapless shades, and any similar words of which the very mention causes\na shudder to pass through the inmost soul of him who hears them. I do not\nsay that these horrible stories may not have a use of some kind; but there\nis a danger that the nerves of our guardians may be rendered too excitable\nand effeminate by them.\n\nThere is a real danger, he said.\n\nThen we must have no more of them.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnother and a nobler strain must be composed and sung by us. {70}\n\nClearly.\n\n*387D* And shall we proceed to get rid of the weepings and wailings of\nfamous men?\n\nThey will go with the rest.\n\n[Sidenote: The effeminate and pitiful strains of famous men, and yet more\nof the gods, must also be banished.]\n\nBut shall we be right in getting rid of them? Reflect: our principle is\nthat the good man will not consider death terrible to any other good man\nwho is his comrade.\n\nYes; that is our principle.\n\nAnd therefore he will not sorrow for his departed friend as though he had\nsuffered anything terrible?\n\nHe will not.\n\nSuch an one, as we further maintain, is sufficient for himself *387E* and\nhis own happiness, and therefore is least in need of other men.\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nAnd for this reason the loss of a son or brother, or the deprivation of\nfortune, is to him of all men least terrible.\n\nAssuredly.\n\nAnd therefore he will be least likely to lament, and will bear with the\ngreatest equanimity any misfortune of this sort which may befall him.\n\nYes, he will feel such a misfortune far less than another.\n\nThen we shall be right in getting rid of the lamentations of famous men,\nand making them over to women (and not *388A* even to women who are good\nfor anything), or to men of a baser sort, that those who are being\neducated by us to be the defenders of their country may scorn to do the\nlike.\n\nThat will be very right.\n\n[Sidenote: Such are the laments of Achilles, and Priam, and of Zeus when\nhe beholds the fate of Hector or Sarpedon.]\n\nThen we will once more entreat Homer and the other poets not to depict\nAchilles[8], who is the son of a goddess, first lying on his side, then on\nhis back, and then on his face; then starting up and sailing in a frenzy\nalong the shores of *388B* the barren sea; now taking the sooty ashes in\nboth his hands[9] and pouring them over his head, or weeping and wailing\nin the various modes which Homer has delineated. Nor should he describe\nPriam the kinsman of the gods as praying and beseeching,\n\n  'Rolling in the dirt, calling each man loudly by his name[10].' {71}\n\nStill more earnestly will we beg of him at all events not to introduce the\ngods lamenting and saying,\n\n  *388C* 'Alas! my misery! Alas! that I bore the bravest to my\n  sorrow[11].'\n\nBut if he must introduce the gods, at any rate let him not dare so\ncompletely to misrepresent the greatest of the gods, as to make him say--\n\n  'O heavens! with my eyes verily I behold a dear friend of mine chased\n  round and round the city, and my heart is sorrowful[12].'\n\nOr again:--\n\n  'Woe is me that I am fated to have Sarpedon, dearest of *388D* men to\n  me, subdued at the hands of Patroclus the son of Menoetius[13].'\n\nFor if, my sweet Adeimantus, our youth seriously listen to such unworthy\nrepresentations of the gods, instead of laughing at them as they ought,\nhardly will any of them deem that he himself, being but a man, can be\ndishonoured by similar actions; neither will he rebuke any inclination\nwhich may arise in his mind to say and do the like. And instead of having\nany shame or self-control, he will be always whining and lamenting on\nslight occasions.\n\n[Footnote 8: Il. xxiv. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Ib. xviii. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Ib. xxii. 414.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Il. xviii. 54.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Ib. xxii. 168.]\n\n[Footnote 13: Ib. xvi. 433.]\n\n*388E* Yes, he said, that is most true.\n\nYes, I replied; but that surely is what ought not to be, as the argument\nhas just proved to us; and by that proof we must abide until it is\ndisproved by a better.\n\nIt ought not to be.\n\n[Sidenote: Neither are the guardians to be encouraged to laugh by the\nexample of the gods.]\n\nNeither ought our guardians to be given to laughter. For a fit of laughter\nwhich has been indulged to excess almost always produces a violent\nreaction.\n\nSo I believe.\n\nThen persons of worth, even if only mortal men, must not be represented as\novercome by laughter, and still less must such a representation of the\ngods be allowed.\n\n*389A* Still less of the gods, as you say, he replied.\n\nThen we shall not suffer such an expression to be used about the gods as\nthat of Homer when he describes how\n\n  'Inextinguishable laughter arose among the blessed gods, when they saw\n  Hephaestus bustling about the mansion[14].'\n\nOn your views, we must not admit them. {72}\n\n[Footnote 14: Ib. i. 599.]\n\nOn my views, if you like to father them on me; that we *389B* must not\nadmit them is certain.\n\n[Sidenote: Our youth must be truthful,]\n\nAgain, truth should be highly valued; if, as we were saying, a lie is\nuseless to the gods, and useful only as a medicine to men, then the use of\nsuch medicines should be restricted to physicians; private individuals\nhave no business with them.\n\nClearly not, he said.\n\nThen if any one at all is to have the privilege of lying, the rulers of\nthe State should be the persons; and they, in their dealings either with\nenemies or with their own citizens, may be allowed to lie for the public\ngood. But nobody else should *389C* meddle with anything of the kind; and\nalthough the rulers have this privilege, for a private man to lie to them\nin return is to be deemed a more heinous fault than for the patient or the\npupil of a gymnasium not to speak the truth about his own bodily illnesses\nto the physician or to the trainer, or for a sailor not to tell the\ncaptain what is happening about the ship and the rest of the crew, and how\nthings are going with himself or his fellow sailors.\n\nMost true, he said.\n\n*389D* If, then, the ruler catches anybody beside himself lying in the\nState,\n\n  'Any of the craftsmen, whether he be priest or physician or\n  carpenter[15],'\n\nhe will punish him for introducing a practice which is equally subversive\nand destructive of ship or State.\n\n[Footnote 15: Od. xvii. 383 sq.]\n\nMost certainly, he said, if our idea of the State is ever carried out[16].\n\n[Footnote 16: Or, 'if his words are accompanied by actions.']\n\n[Sidenote: and also temperate.]\n\nIn the next place our youth must be temperate?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAre not the chief elements of temperance, speaking *389E* generally,\nobedience to commanders and self-control in sensual pleasures?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen we shall approve such language as that of Diomede in Homer,\n\n  'Friend, sit still and obey my word[17],' {73}\n\nand the verses which follow,\n\n  'The Greeks marched breathing prowess[18], .... in silent awe of their\n  leaders[19],'\n\nand other sentiments of the same kind.\n\n[Footnote 17: Il. iv. 412.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Od. iii. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Ib. iv. 431.]\n\nWe shall.\n\nWhat of this line,\n\n  'O heavy with wine, who hast the eyes of a dog and the heart of a\n  stag[20],'\n\n*390A* and of the words which follow? Would you say that these, or any\nsimilar impertinences which private individuals are supposed to address to\ntheir rulers, whether in verse or prose, are well or ill spoken?\n\n[Footnote 20: Ib. i. 225.]\n\nThey are ill spoken.\n\nThey may very possibly afford some amusement, but they do not conduce to\ntemperance. And therefore they are likely to do harm to our young men--you\nwould agree with me there?\n\nYes.\n\n[Sidenote: The praises of eating and drinking, and the tale of the\nimproper behaviour of Zeus and Here, are not to be repeated to the young.]\n\n[Sidenote: The indecent tale of Ares and Aphrodite.]\n\nAnd then, again, to make the wisest of men say that nothing in his opinion\nis more glorious than\n\n  *390B* 'When the tables are full of bread and meat, and the cup-bearer\n  carries round wine which he draws from the bowl and pours into the\n  cups,[21]'\n\nis it fit or conducive to temperance for a young man to hear such words?\nOr the verse\n\n  'The saddest of fates is to die and meet destiny from hunger[22]'?\n\nWhat would you say again to the tale of Zeus, who, while other gods and\nmen were asleep and he the only person *390C* awake, lay devising plans,\nbut forgot them all in a moment through his lust, and was so completely\novercome at the sight of Here that he would not even go into the hut, but\nwanted to lie with her on the ground, declaring that he had never been in\nsuch a state of rapture before, even when they first met one another\n\n  'Without the knowledge of their parents[23];' {74}\n\nor that other tale of how Hephaestus, because of similar goings on, cast a\nchain around Ares and Aphrodite[24]?\n\n[Footnote 21: Ib. ix. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Ib. xii. 342.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Il. xiv. 281.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Od. viii. 266.]\n\nIndeed, he said, I am strongly of opinion that they ought not to hear that\nsort of thing.\n\n[Sidenote: The opposite strain of endurance.]\n\n*390D* But any deeds of endurance which are done or told by famous men,\nthese they ought to see and hear; as, for example, what is said in the\nverses,\n\n  'He smote his breast, and thus reproached his heart, Endure, my heart;\n  far worse hast thou endured[25]!'\n\n[Footnote 25: Ib. xx. 17.]\n\nCertainly, he said.\n\nIn the next place, we must not let them be receivers of gifts or lovers of\nmoney.\n\n*390E* Certainly not.\n\n[Sidenote: Condemnation of Achilles and Phoenix.]\n\nNeither must we sing to them of\n\n  'Gifts persuading gods, and persuading reverend kings[26].'\n\nNeither is Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, to be approved or deemed to\nhave given his pupil good counsel when he told him that he should take the\ngifts of the Greeks and assist them[27]; but that without a gift he should\nnot lay aside his anger. Neither will we believe or acknowledge Achilles\nhimself to have been such a lover of money that he took Agamemnon's gifts,\nor that when he had received payment he restored the dead body of Hector,\nbut that without payment he was unwilling to do so[28].\n\n[Footnote 26: Quoted by Suidas as attributed to Hesiod.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Il. ix. 515.]\n\n[Footnote 28: Ib. xxiv. 175.]\n\n*391A* Undoubtedly, he said, these are not sentiments which can be\napproved.\n\n[Sidenote: The impious behaviour of Achilles to Apollo and the river-gods;\nhis cruelty.]\n\nLoving Homer as I do[29], I hardly like to say that in attributing these\nfeelings to Achilles, or in believing that they are truly attributed to\nhim, he is guilty of downright impiety. As little can I believe the\nnarrative of his insolence to Apollo, where he says,\n\n  'Thou hast wronged me, O far-darter, most abominable of deities. Verily\n  I would be even with thee, if I had only the power[30];'\n\n*391B* or his insubordination to the river-god[31], on whose divinity he\nis ready to lay hands; or his offering to the dead Patroclus {75} of his\nown hair[32], which had been previously dedicated to the other river-god\nSpercheius, and that he actually performed this vow; or that he dragged\nHector round the tomb of Patroclus[33], and slaughtered the captives at\nthe pyre[34]; of all this I cannot believe that he was guilty, any more\nthan I can *391C* allow our citizens to believe that he, the wise\nCheiron's pupil, the son of a goddess and of Peleus who was the gentlest\nof men and third in descent from Zeus, was so disordered in his wits as to\nbe at one time the slave of two seemingly inconsistent passions, meanness,\nnot untainted by avarice, combined with overweening contempt of gods and\nmen.\n\n[Footnote 29: Cf. _infra_, x. 595.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Il. xxii. 15 sq.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Ib. xxi. 130, 223 sq.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Il. xxiii. 151.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Ib. xxii. 394.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Ib. xxiii. 175.]\n\nYou are quite right, he replied.\n\n[Sidenote: The tale of Theseus and Peirithous.]\n\nAnd let us equally refuse to believe, or allow to be repeated, the tale of\nTheseus son of Poseidon, or of Peirithous *391D* son of Zeus, going forth\nas they did to perpetrate a horrid rape; or of any other hero or son of a\ngod daring to do such impious and dreadful things as they falsely ascribe\nto them in our day: and let us further compel the poets to declare either\nthat these acts were not done by them, or that they were not the sons of\ngods;--both in the same breath they shall not be permitted to affirm. We\nwill not have them trying to persuade our youth that the gods are the\nauthors of evil, and that heroes are no better than men--sentiments *391E*\nwhich, as we were saying, are neither pious nor true, for we have already\nproved that evil cannot come from the gods.\n\nAssuredly not.\n\n[Sidenote: The bad effect of these mythological tales upon the young.]\n\nAnd further they are likely to have a bad effect on those who hear them;\nfor everybody will begin to excuse his own vices when he is convinced that\nsimilar wickednesses are always being perpetrated by--\n\n  'The kindred of the gods, the relatives of Zeus, whose ancestral altar,\n  the altar of Zeus, is aloft in air on the peak of Ida,'\n\nand who have\n\n  'the blood of deities yet flowing in their veins[35].'\n\nAnd therefore let us put an end to such tales, lest they *392A* engender\nlaxity of morals among the young. {76}\n\n[Footnote 35: From the Niobe of Aeschylus.]\n\nBy all means, he replied.\n\nBut now that we are determining what classes of subjects are or are not to\nbe spoken of, let us see whether any have been omitted by us. The manner\nin which gods and demigods and heroes and the world below should be\ntreated has been already laid down.\n\nVery true.\n\n[Sidenote: Misstatements of the poets about men.]\n\nAnd what shall we say about men? That is clearly the remaining portion of\nour subject.\n\nClearly so.\n\nBut we are not in a condition to answer this question at present, my\nfriend.\n\nWhy not?\n\nBecause, if I am not mistaken, we shall have to say that *392B* about men\npoets and story-tellers are guilty of making the gravest misstatements\nwhen they tell us that wicked men are often happy, and the good miserable;\nand that injustice is profitable when undetected, but that justice is a\nman's own loss and another's gain--these things we shall forbid them to\nutter, and command them to sing and say the opposite.\n\nTo be sure we shall, he replied.\n\nBut if you admit that I am right in this, then I shall maintain that you\nhave implied the principle for which we have been all along contending.\n\nI grant the truth of your inference.\n\n*392C* That such things are or are not to be said about men is a question\nwhich we cannot determine until we have discovered what justice is, and\nhow naturally advantageous to the possessor, whether he seem to be just or\nnot.\n\nMost true, he said.\n\nEnough of the subjects of poetry: let us now speak of the style; and when\nthis has been considered, both matter and manner will have been completely\ntreated.\n\nI do not understand what you mean, said Adeimantus.\n\n*392D* Then I must make you understand; and perhaps I may be more\nintelligible if I put the matter in this way. You are aware, I suppose,\nthat all mythology and poetry is a narration of events, either past,\npresent, or to come?\n\nCertainly, he replied. {77}\n\nAnd narration may be either simple narration, or imitation, or a union of\nthe two?\n\nThat again, he said, I do not quite understand.\n\n[Sidenote: Analysis of the dramatic element in Epic poetry.]\n\nI fear that I must be a ridiculous teacher when I have so much difficulty\nin making myself apprehended. Like a bad speaker, therefore, I will not\ntake the whole of the subject, *392E* but will break a piece off in\nillustration of my meaning. You know the first lines of the Iliad, in\nwhich the poet says that *393A* Chryses prayed Agamemnon to release his\ndaughter, and that Agamemnon flew into a passion with him; whereupon\nChryses, failing of his object, invoked the anger of the God against the\nAchaeans. Now as far as these lines,\n\n  'And he prayed all the Greeks, but especially the two sons of Atreus,\n  the chiefs of the people,'\n\nthe poet is speaking in his own person; he never leads us to suppose that\nhe is any one else. But in what follows he takes the person of Chryses,\nand then he does all that he can *393B* to make us believe that the\nspeaker is not Homer, but the aged priest himself. And in this double form\nhe has cast the entire narrative of the events which occurred at Troy and\nin Ithaca and throughout the Odyssey.\n\nYes.\n\nAnd a narrative it remains both in the speeches which the poet recites\nfrom time to time and in the intermediate passages?\n\nQuite true.\n\n[Sidenote: Epic poetry has an element of imitation in the speeches; the\nrest is simple narrative.]\n\n*393C* But when the poet speaks in the person of another, may we not say\nthat he assimilates his style to that of the person who, as he informs\nyou, is going to speak?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd this assimilation of himself to another, either by the use of voice or\ngesture, is the imitation of the person whose character he assumes?\n\nOf course.\n\nThen in this case the narrative of the poet may be said to proceed by way\nof imitation?\n\nVery true.\n\n[Sidenote: Illustrations from the beginning of the Iliad.]\n\nOr, if the poet everywhere appears and never conceals *393D* himself, then\nagain the imitation is dropped, and his poetry becomes simple narration.\nHowever, in order that I may {78} make my meaning quite clear, and that\nyou may no more say, 'I don't understand,' I will show how the change\nmight be effected. If Homer had said, 'The priest came, having his\ndaughter's ransom in his hands, supplicating the Achaeans, and above all\nthe kings;' and then if, instead of speaking in the person of Chryses, he\nhad continued in his own person, the words would have been, not imitation,\nbut simple narration. The passage would have run as follows (I am no poet,\n*393E* and therefore I drop the metre), 'The priest came and prayed the\ngods on behalf of the Greeks that they might capture Troy and return\nsafely home, but begged that they would give him back his daughter, and\ntake the ransom which he brought, and respect the God. Thus he spoke, and\nthe other Greeks revered the priest and assented. But Agamemnon was wroth,\nand bade him depart and not come again, lest the staff and chaplets of the\nGod should be of no avail to him--the daughter of Chryses should not be\nreleased, he said--she should grow old with him in Argos. And then he told\nhim to go away and not to provoke him, if he intended to get home\nunscathed. And the old man went away in fear and *394A* silence, and, when\nhe had left the camp, he called upon Apollo by his many names, reminding\nhim of everything which he had done pleasing to him, whether in building\nhis temples, or in offering sacrifice, and praying that his good deeds\nmight be returned to him, and that the Achaeans might expiate his tears by\nthe arrows of the god,'--and so on. *394B* In this way the whole becomes\nsimple narrative.\n\nI understand, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: Tragedy and Comedy are wholly imitative; dithyrambic and some\nother kinds of poetry are devoid of imitation. Epic poetry is a\ncombination of the two.]\n\nOr you may suppose the opposite case--that the intermediate passages are\nomitted, and the dialogue only left.\n\nThat also, he said, I understand; you mean, for example, as in tragedy.\n\nYou have conceived my meaning perfectly; and if I mistake not, what you\nfailed to apprehend before is now made *394C* clear to you, that poetry\nand mythology are, in some cases, wholly imitative--instances of this are\nsupplied by tragedy and comedy; there is likewise the opposite style, in\nwhich the poet is the only speaker--of this the dithyramb affords the best\nexample; and the combination of both is found in epic, and in several\nother styles of poetry. Do I take you with me? {79}\n\nYes, he said; I see now what you meant.\n\nI will ask you to remember also what I began by saying, that we had done\nwith the subject and might proceed to the style.\n\nYes, I remember.\n\n*394D* In saying this, I intended to imply that we must come to an\nunderstanding about the mimetic art,--whether the poets, in narrating\ntheir stories, are to be allowed by us to imitate, and if so, whether in\nwhole or in part, and if the latter, in what parts; or should all\nimitation be prohibited?\n\nYou mean, I suspect, to ask whether tragedy and comedy shall be admitted\ninto our State?\n\n[Sidenote: A hint about Homer (cp. _infra_, bk. x.)]\n\nYes, I said; but there may be more than this in question: I really do not\nknow as yet, but whither the argument may blow, thither we go.\n\nAnd go we will, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: Our guardians ought not to be imitators, for one man can only\ndo one thing well;]\n\n*394E* Then, Adeimantus, let me ask you whether our guardians ought to be\nimitators; or rather, has not this question been decided by the rule\nalready laid down that one man can only do one thing well, and not many;\nand that if he attempt many, he will altogether fail of gaining much\nreputation in any?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd this is equally true of imitation; no one man can imitate many things\nas well as he would imitate a single one?\n\nHe cannot.\n\n*395A* Then the same person will hardly be able to play a serious part in\nlife, and at the same time to be an imitator and imitate many other parts\nas well; for even when two species of imitation are nearly allied, the\nsame persons cannot succeed in both, as, for example, the writers of\ntragedy and comedy--did you not just now call them imitations?\n\nYes, I did; and you are right in thinking that the same persons cannot\nsucceed in both.\n\nAny more than they can be rhapsodists and actors at once?\n\nTrue.\n\n*395B* Neither are comic and tragic actors the same; yet all these things\nare but imitations.\n\nThey are so.\n\n[Sidenote: he cannot even imitate many things.]\n\nAnd human nature, Adeimantus, appears to have been {80} coined into yet\nsmaller pieces, and to be as incapable of imitating many things well, as\nof performing well the actions of which the imitations are copies.\n\nQuite true, he replied.\n\nIf then we adhere to our original notion and bear in mind that our\nguardians, setting aside every other business, are to *395C* dedicate\nthemselves wholly to the maintenance of freedom in the State, making this\ntheir craft, and engaging in no work which does not bear on this end, they\nought not to practise or imitate anything else; if they imitate at all,\nthey should imitate from youth upward only those characters which are\nsuitable to their profession--the courageous, temperate, holy, free, and\nthe like; but they should not depict or be skilful at imitating any kind\nof illiberality or baseness, lest from imitation they should come to be\nwhat they imitate. Did *395D* you never observe how imitations, beginning\nin early youth and continuing far into life, at length grow into habits\nand become a second nature, affecting body, voice, and mind?\n\nYes, certainly, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: Imitations which are of the degrading sort.]\n\nThen, I said, we will not allow those for whom we profess a care and of\nwhom we say that they ought to be good men, to imitate a woman, whether\nyoung or old, quarrelling with her husband, or striving and vaunting\nagainst the gods in *395E* conceit of her happiness, or when she is in\naffliction, or sorrow, or weeping; and certainly not one who is in\nsickness, love, or labour.\n\nVery right, he said.\n\nNeither must they represent slaves, male or female, performing the offices\nof slaves?\n\nThey must not.\n\nAnd surely not bad men, whether cowards or any others, who do the reverse\nof what we have just been prescribing, who scold or mock or revile one\nanother in drink or out of drink, or who in any other manner sin against\nthemselves and their neighbours in word or deed, as the manner of such is.\n*396A* Neither should they be trained to imitate the action or speech of\nmen or women who are mad or bad; for madness, like vice, is to be known\nbut not to be practised or imitated.\n\nVery true, he replied. {81}\n\nNeither may they imitate smiths or other artificers, or *396B* oarsmen, or\nboatswains, or the like?\n\nHow can they, he said, when they are not allowed to apply their minds to\nthe callings of any of these?\n\nNor may they imitate the neighing of horses, the bellowing of bulls, the\nmurmur of rivers and roll of the ocean, thunder, and all that sort of\nthing?\n\nNay, he said, if madness be forbidden, neither may they copy the behaviour\nof madmen.\n\nYou mean, I said, if I understand you aright, that there is one sort of\nnarrative style which may be employed by a truly *396C* good man when he\nhas anything to say, and that another sort will be used by a man of an\nopposite character and education.\n\nAnd which are these two sorts? he asked.\n\n[Sidenote: Imitations which may be encouraged.]\n\nSuppose, I answered, that a just and good man in the course of a narration\ncomes on some saying or action of another good man,--I should imagine that\nhe will like to personate him, and will not be ashamed of this sort of\nimitation: he will be most ready to play the part of the good *396D* man\nwhen he is acting firmly and wisely; in a less degree when he is overtaken\nby illness or love or drink, or has met with any other disaster. But when\nhe comes to a character which is unworthy of him, he will not make a study\nof that; he will disdain such a person, and will assume his likeness, if\nat all, for a moment only when he is performing some good action; at other\ntimes he will be ashamed to play a part which he has never practised, nor\nwill he like to fashion and frame himself after the baser models; he feels\nthe *396E* employment of such an art, unless in jest, to be beneath him,\nand his mind revolts at it.\n\nSo I should expect, he replied.\n\nThen he will adopt a mode of narration such as we have illustrated out of\nHomer, that is to say, his style will be both imitative and narrative; but\nthere will be very little of the former, and a great deal of the latter.\nDo you agree?\n\nCertainly, he said; that is the model which such a speaker *397A* must\nnecessarily take.\n\n[Sidenote: Imitations which are to be prohibited.]\n\nBut there is another sort of character who will narrate anything, and, the\nworse he is, the more unscrupulous he will be; nothing will be too bad for\nhim: and he will be ready to {82} imitate anything, not as a joke, but in\nright good earnest, and before a large company. As I was just now saying,\nhe will attempt to represent the roll of thunder, the noise of wind and\nhail, or the creaking of wheels, and pulleys, and the various sounds of\nflutes, pipes, trumpets, and all sorts of instruments: he will bark like a\ndog, bleat like *397B* a sheep, or crow like a cock; his entire art will\nconsist in imitation of voice and gesture, and there will be very little\nnarration.\n\nThat, he said, will be his mode of speaking.\n\nThese, then, are the two kinds of style?\n\nYes.\n\n[Sidenote: Two kinds of style--the one simple, the other multiplex. There\nis also a third which is a combination of the two.]\n\nAnd you would agree with me in saying that one of them is simple and has\nbut slight changes; and if the harmony and rhythm are also chosen for\ntheir simplicity, the result is that the speaker, if he speaks correctly,\nis always pretty much the same in style, and he will keep within the\nlimits of a single harmony (for the changes are not great), and in *397C*\nlike manner he will make use of nearly the same rhythm?\n\nThat is quite true, he said.\n\nWhereas the other requires all sorts of harmonies and all sorts of\nrhythms, if the music and the style are to correspond, because the style\nhas all sorts of changes.\n\nThat is also perfectly true, he replied.\n\nAnd do not the two styles, or the mixture of the two, comprehend all\npoetry, and every form of expression in words? No one can say anything\nexcept in one or other of them or in both together.\n\nThey include all, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: The simple style alone is to be admitted in the State; the\nattractions of the mixed style are acknowledged, but it appears to be\nexcluded.]\n\n*397D* And shall we receive into our State all the three styles, or one\nonly of the two unmixed styles? or would you include the mixed?\n\nI should prefer only to admit the pure imitator of virtue.\n\nYes, I said, Adeimantus, but the mixed style is also very charming: and\nindeed the pantomimic, which is the opposite of the one chosen by you, is\nthe most popular style with children and their attendants, and with the\nworld in general.\n\nI do not deny it.\n\nBut I suppose you would argue that such a style is unsuitable *397E* to\nour State, in which human nature is not twofold or manifold, for one man\nplays one part only? {83}\n\nYes; quite unsuitable.\n\nAnd this is the reason why in our State, and in our State only, we shall\nfind a shoemaker to be a shoemaker and not a pilot also, and a husbandman\nto be a husbandman and not a dicast also, and a soldier a soldier and not\na trader also, and the same throughout?\n\nTrue, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: The pantomimic artist is to receive great honours, but he is to\nbe sent out of the country.]\n\n*398A* And therefore when any one of these pantomimic gentlemen, who are\nso clever that they can imitate anything, comes to us, and makes a\nproposal to exhibit himself and his poetry, we will fall down and worship\nhim as a sweet and holy and wonderful being; but we must also inform him\nthat in our State such as he are not permitted to exist; the law will not\nallow them. And so when we have anointed him with myrrh, and set a garland\nof wool upon his head, we shall send him away to another city. For we mean\nto employ for *398B* our souls' health the rougher and severer poet or\nstory-teller, who will imitate the style of the virtuous only, and will\nfollow those models which we prescribed at first when we began the\neducation of our soldiers.\n\nWe certainly will, he said, if we have the power.\n\nThen now, my friend, I said, that part of music or literary education\nwhich relates to the story or myth may be considered to be finished; for\nthe matter and manner have both been discussed.\n\nI think so too, he said.\n\n*398C* Next in order will follow melody and song.\n\nThat is obvious.\n\nEvery one can see already what we ought to say about them, if we are to be\nconsistent with ourselves.\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates, Glaucon.]\n\nI fear, said Glaucon, laughing, that the word 'every one' hardly includes\nme, for I cannot at the moment say what they should be; though I may\nguess.\n\nAt any rate you can tell that a song or ode has three *398D* parts--the\nwords, the melody, and the rhythm; that degree of knowledge I may\npresuppose?\n\nYes, he said; so much as that you may.\n\nAnd as for the words, there will surely be no difference between words\nwhich are and which are not set to music; {84} both will conform to the\nsame laws, and these have been already determined by us?\n\nYes.\n\n[Sidenote: Melody and rhythm.]\n\nAnd the melody and rhythm will depend upon the words?\n\nCertainly.\n\nWe were saying, when we spoke of the subject-matter, that we had no need\nof lamentation and strains of sorrow?\n\nTrue.\n\n*398E* And which are the harmonies expressive of sorrow? You are musical,\nand can tell me.\n\nThe harmonies which you mean are the mixed or tenor Lydian, and the\nfull-toned or bass Lydian, and such like.\n\nThese then, I said, must be banished; even to women who have a character\nto maintain they are of no use, and much less to men.\n\nCertainly.\n\nIn the next place, drunkenness and softness and indolence are utterly\nunbecoming the character of our guardians.\n\nUtterly unbecoming.\n\n[Sidenote: The relaxed melodies or harmonies are the Ionian and the\nLydian. These are to be banished.]\n\nAnd which are the soft or drinking harmonies?\n\n*399A* The Ionian, he replied, and the Lydian; they are termed 'relaxed.'\n\nWell, and are these of any military use?\n\nQuite the reverse, he replied; and if so the Dorian and the Phrygian are\nthe only ones which you have left.\n\nI answered: Of the harmonies I know nothing, but I want to have one\nwarlike, to sound the note or accent which a brave man utters in the hour\nof danger and stern resolve, or when his cause is failing, and he is going\nto wounds or *399B* death or is overtaken by some other evil, and at every\nsuch crisis meets the blows of fortune with firm step and a determination\nto endure; and another to be used by him in times of peace and freedom of\naction, when there is no pressure of necessity, and he is seeking to\npersuade God by prayer, or man by instruction and admonition, or on the\nother hand, when he is expressing his willingness to yield to persuasion\nor entreaty or admonition, and which represents him when by prudent\nconduct he has attained his end, not carried away by his success, but\nacting moderately and wisely *399C* under the circumstances, and\nacquiescing in the event. These {85} two harmonies I ask you to leave; the\nstrain of necessity and the strain of freedom, the strain of the\nunfortunate and the strain of the fortunate, the strain of courage, and\nthe strain of temperance; these, I say, leave.\n\nAnd these, he replied, are the Dorian and Phrygian harmonies of which\nI was just now speaking.\n\n[Sidenote: The Dorian and Phrygian are to be retained.]\n\nThen, I said, if these and these only are to be used in our songs and\nmelodies, we shall not want multiplicity of notes or a panharmonic scale?\n\nI suppose not.\n\nThen we shall not maintain the artificers of lyres with three corners and\ncomplex scales, or the makers of any other *399D* many-stringed\ncuriously-harmonised instruments?\n\nCertainly not.\n\n[Sidenote: Musical instruments--which are to be rejected and which\nallowed?]\n\nBut what do you say to flute-makers and flute-players? Would you admit\nthem into our State when you reflect that in this composite use of harmony\nthe flute is worse than all the stringed instruments put together; even\nthe panharmonic music is only an imitation of the flute?\n\nClearly not.\n\nThere remain then only the lyre and the harp for use in the city, and the\nshepherds may have a pipe in the country.\n\nThat is surely the conclusion to be drawn from the argument.\n\n*399E* The preferring of Apollo and his instruments to Marsyas and his\ninstruments is not at all strange, I said.\n\nNot at all, he replied.\n\nAnd so, by the dog of Egypt, we have been unconsciously purging the State,\nwhich not long ago we termed luxurious.\n\nAnd we have done wisely, he replied.\n\nThen let us now finish the purgation, I said. Next in order to harmonies,\nrhythms will naturally follow, and they should be subject to the same\nrules, for we ought not to seek out complex systems of metre, or metres of\nevery kind, but rather to discover what rhythms are the expressions of\n*400A* a courageous and harmonious life; and when we have found them, we\nshall adapt the foot and the melody to words having a like spirit, not the\nwords to the foot and melody. To say what these rhythms are will be your\nduty--you must teach me them, as you have already taught me the harmonies.\n{86}\n\n[Sidenote: Three kinds of rhythm as there are four notes of the\ntetrachord.]\n\nBut, indeed, he replied, I cannot tell you. I only know that there are\nsome three principles of rhythm out of which metrical systems are framed,\njust as in sounds there are four notes[36] out of which all the harmonies\nare composed; that is an observation which I have made. But of what sort\nof lives they are severally the imitations I am unable to say.\n\n[Footnote 36: i.e. the four notes of the tetrachord.]\n\n*400B* Then, I said, we must take Damon into our counsels; and he will\ntell us what rhythms are expressive of meanness, or insolence, or fury, or\nother unworthiness, and what are to be reserved for the expression of\nopposite feelings. And I think that I have an indistinct recollection of\nhis mentioning a complex Cretic rhythm; also a dactylic or heroic, and he\narranged them in some manner which I do not quite understand, making the\nrhythms equal in the rise and fall of the foot, long and short\nalternating; and, unless I am mistaken, he spoke of an iambic as well as\nof a trochaic rhythm, *400C* and assigned to them short and long\nquantities.[37] Also in some cases he appeared to praise or censure the\nmovement of the foot quite as much as the rhythm; or perhaps a combination\nof the two; for I am not certain what he meant. These matters, however, as\nI was saying, had better be referred to Damon himself, for the analysis of\nthe subject would be difficult, you know?\n\n[Footnote 37: Socrates expresses himself carelessly in accordance with his\nassumed ignorance of the details of the subject. In the first part of the\nsentence he appears to be speaking of paeonic rhythms which are in the\nratio of 3/2; in the second part, of dactylic and anapaestic rhythms,\nwhich are in the ratio of 1/1; in the last clause, of iambic and trochaic\nrhythms, which are in the ratio of 1/2 or 2/1.]\n\nRather so, I should say.\n\nBut there is no difficulty in seeing that grace or the absence of grace is\nan effect of good or bad rhythm.\n\nNone at all.\n\n[Sidenote: Rhythm and harmony follow style, and style is the expression of\nthe soul.]\n\n*400D* And also that good and bad rhythm naturally assimilate to a good\nand bad style; and that harmony and discord in like manner follow style;\nfor our principle is that rhythm and harmony are regulated by the words,\nand not the words by them.\n\nJust so, he said, they should follow the words.\n\nAnd will not the words and the character of the style depend on the temper\nof the soul? {87}\n\nYes.\n\nAnd everything else on the style?\n\nYes.\n\n[Sidenote: Simplicity the great first principle;]\n\nThen beauty of style and harmony and grace and good *400E* rhythm depend\non simplicity,--I mean the true simplicity of a rightly and nobly ordered\nmind and character, not that other simplicity which is only an euphemism\nfor folly?\n\nVery true, he replied.\n\nAnd if our youth are to do their work in life, must they not make these\ngraces and harmonies their perpetual aim?\n\nThey must.\n\n[Sidenote: and a principle which is widely spread in nature and art.]\n\n*401A* And surely the art of the painter and every other creative and\nconstructive art are full of them,--weaving, embroidery, architecture, and\nevery kind of manufacture; also nature, animal and vegetable,--in all of\nthem there is grace or the absence of grace. And ugliness and discord and\ninharmonious motion are nearly allied to ill words and ill nature, as\ngrace and harmony are the twin sisters of goodness and virtue and bear\ntheir likeness.\n\nThat is quite true, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: Our citizens must grow up to manhood amidst impressions of\ngrace and beauty only; all ugliness and vice must be excluded.]\n\n*401B* But shall our superintendence go no further, and are the poets only\nto be required by us to express the image of the good in their works, on\npain, if they do anything else, of expulsion from our State? Or is the\nsame control to be extended to other artists, and are they also to be\nprohibited from exhibiting the opposite forms of vice and intemperance and\nmeanness and indecency in sculpture and building and the other creative\narts; and is he who cannot conform to this rule of ours to be prevented\nfrom practising his art in our State, lest the taste of our citizens be\ncorrupted by him? We would not have our guardians grow up amid images of\nmoral deformity, as in some noxious pasture, and there *401C* browse and\nfeed upon many a baneful herb and flower day by day, little by little,\nuntil they silently gather a festering mass of corruption in their own\nsoul. Let our artists rather be those who are gifted to discern the true\nnature of the beautiful and graceful; then will our youth dwell in a land\nof health, amid fair sights and sounds, and receive the good in\neverything; and beauty, the effluence of fair works, shall *401D* flow\ninto the eye and ear, like a health-giving breeze from a purer region, and\n{88} insensibly draw the soul from earliest years into likeness and\nsympathy with the beauty of reason.\n\nThere can be no nobler training than that, he replied.\n\n[Sidenote: The power of imparting grace is possessed by harmony.]\n\nAnd therefore, I said, Glaucon, musical training is a more potent\ninstrument than any other, because rhythm and harmony find their way into\nthe inward places of the soul, on which they mightily fasten, imparting\ngrace, and making the soul of him who is rightly educated graceful, or of\nhim who *401E* is ill-educated ungraceful; and also because he who has\nreceived this true education of the inner being will most shrewdly\nperceive omissions or faults in art and nature, and *402A* with a true\ntaste, while he praises and rejoices over and receives into his soul the\ngood, and becomes noble and good, he will justly blame and hate the bad,\nnow in the days of his youth, even before he is able to know the reason\nwhy; and when reason comes he will recognise and salute the friend with\nwhom his education has made him long familiar.\n\nYes, he said, I quite agree with you in thinking that our youth should be\ntrained in music and on the grounds which you mention.\n\nJust as in learning to read, I said, we were satisfied when we knew the\nletters of the alphabet, which are very few, in all their recurring sizes\nand combinations; not slighting them *402B* as unimportant whether they\noccupy a space large or small, but everywhere eager to make them out; and\nnot thinking ourselves perfect in the art of reading until we recognise\nthem wherever they are found[38]:\n\n[Footnote 38: Cp. _supra_, II. 368 D.]\n\nTrue--\n\nOr, as we recognise the reflection of letters in the water, or in a\nmirror, only when we know the letters themselves; the same art and study\ngiving us the knowledge of both:\n\nExactly--\n\n[Sidenote: The true musician must know the essential forms of virtue and\nvice.]\n\nEven so, as I maintain, neither we nor our guardians, whom *402C* we have\nto educate, can ever become musical until we and they know the essential\nforms of temperance, courage, liberality, magnificence, and their kindred,\nas well as the contrary forms, in all their combinations, and can\nrecognise them and their images wherever they are found, not slighting\n{89} them either in small things or great, but believing them all to be\nwithin the sphere of one art and study.\n\nMost assuredly.\n\n[Sidenote: The harmony of soul and body the fairest of sights.]\n\n*402D* And when a beautiful soul harmonizes with a beautiful form, and the\ntwo are cast in one mould, that will be the fairest of sights to him who\nhas an eye to see it?\n\nThe fairest indeed.\n\nAnd the fairest is also the loveliest?\n\nThat may be assumed.\n\nAnd the man who has the spirit of harmony will be most in love with the\nloveliest; but he will not love him who is of an inharmonious soul?\n\n[Sidenote: The true lover will not mind defects of the person.]\n\nThat is true, he replied, if the deficiency be in his soul; but if there\nbe any merely bodily defect in another he will *402E* be patient of it,\nand will love all the same.\n\nI perceive, I said, that you have or have had experiences of this sort,\nand I agree. But let me ask you another question: Has excess of pleasure\nany affinity to temperance?\n\nHow can that be? he replied; pleasure deprives a man of the use of his\nfaculties quite as much as pain.\n\nOr any affinity to virtue in general?\n\n*403A* None whatever.\n\nAny affinity to wantonness and intemperance?\n\nYes, the greatest.\n\nAnd is there any greater or keener pleasure than that of sensual love?\n\nNo, nor a madder.\n\n[Sidenote: True love is temperate and harmonious.]\n\nWhereas true love is a love of beauty and order--temperate and harmonious?\n\nQuite true, he said.\n\nThen no intemperance or madness should be allowed to approach true love?\n\nCertainly not.\n\n[Sidenote: True love is free from sensuality and coarseness.]\n\n*403B* Then mad or intemperate pleasure must never be allowed to come near\nthe lover and his beloved; neither of them can have any part in it if\ntheir love is of the right sort?\n\nNo, indeed, Socrates, it must never come near them.\n\nThen I suppose that in the city which we are founding you would make a law\nto the effect that a friend should use no other familiarity to his love\nthan a father would use to his {90} son, and then only for a noble\npurpose, and he must first have the other's consent; and this rule is to\nlimit him in *403C* all his intercourse, and he is never to be seen going\nfurther, or, if he exceeds, he is to be deemed guilty of coarseness and\nbad taste.\n\nI quite agree, he said.\n\nThus much of music, which makes a fair ending; for what should be the end\nof music if not the love of beauty?\n\nI agree, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: Gymnastic.]\n\nAfter music comes gymnastic, in which our youth are next to be trained.\n\nCertainly.\n\nGymnastic as well as music should begin in early years; the training in it\nshould be careful and should continue through life. *403D* Now my belief\nis,--and this is a matter upon which I should like to have your opinion in\nconfirmation of my own, but my own belief is,--not that the good body by\nany bodily excellence improves the soul, but, on the contrary, that the\ngood soul, by her own excellence, improves the body as far as this may be\npossible. What do you say?\n\nYes, I agree.\n\n[Sidenote: The body to be entrusted to the mind.]\n\nThen, to the mind when adequately trained, we shall be right in handing\nover the more particular care of the body; *403E* and in order to avoid\nprolixity we will now only give the general outlines of the subject.\n\nVery good.\n\nThat they must abstain from intoxication has been already remarked by us;\nfor of all persons a guardian should be the last to get drunk and not know\nwhere in the world he is.\n\nYes, he said; that a guardian should require another guardian to take care\nof him is ridiculous indeed.\n\nBut next, what shall we say of their food; for the men are in training for\nthe great contest of all--are they not?\n\nYes, he said.\n\n*404A* And will the habit of body of our ordinary athletes be suited to\nthem?\n\nWhy not?\n\n[Sidenote: The usual training of athletes too gross and sleepy.]\n\nI am afraid, I said, that a habit of body such as they have is but a\nsleepy sort of thing, and rather perilous to health. Do you not observe\nthat these athletes sleep away their {91} lives, and are liable to most\ndangerous illnesses if they depart, in ever so slight a degree, from their\ncustomary regimen?\n\nYes, I do.\n\nThen, I said, a finer sort of training will be required for our warrior\nathletes, who are to be like wakeful dogs, and to see and hear with the\nutmost keenness; amid the many changes of water and also of food, of\nsummer heat and winter *404B* cold, which they will have to endure when on\na campaign, they must not be liable to break down in health.\n\nThat is my view.\n\nThe really excellent gymnastic is twin sister of that simple music which\nwe were just now describing.\n\nHow so?\n\n[Sidenote: Military gymnastic.]\n\nWhy, I conceive that there is a gymnastic which, like our music, is simple\nand good; and especially the military gymnastic.\n\nWhat do you mean?\n\nMy meaning may be learned from Homer; he, you know, feeds his heroes at\ntheir feasts, when they are campaigning, on soldiers' fare; they have no\nfish, although they are on *404C* the shores of the Hellespont, and they\nare not allowed boiled meats but only roast, which is the food most\nconvenient for soldiers, requiring only that they should light a fire, and\nnot involving the trouble of carrying about pots and pans.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd I can hardly be mistaken in saying that sweet sauces are nowhere\nmentioned in Homer. In proscribing them, however, he is not singular; all\nprofessional athletes are well aware that a man who is to be in good\ncondition should take nothing of the kind.\n\nYes, he said; and knowing this, they are quite right in not taking them.\n\n[Sidenote: Syracusan dinners and Corinthian courtezans are prohibited.]\n\n*404D* Then you would not approve of Syracusan dinners, and the\nrefinements of Sicilian cookery?\n\nI think not.\n\nNor, if a man is to be in condition, would you allow him to have a\nCorinthian girl as his fair friend?\n\nCertainly not. {92}\n\nNeither would you approve of the delicacies, as they are thought, of\nAthenian confectionary?\n\nCertainly not.\n\n[Sidenote: The luxurious style of living may be justly compared to the\npanharmonic strain of music.]\n\nAll such feeding and living may be rightly compared by us *404E* to melody\nand song composed in the panharmonic style, and in all the rhythms.\n\nExactly.\n\nThere complexity engendered licence, and here disease; whereas simplicity\nin music was the parent of temperance in the soul; and simplicity in\ngymnastic of health in the body.\n\nMost true, he said.\n\n*405A* But when intemperance and diseases multiply in a State, halls of\njustice and medicine are always being opened; and the arts of the doctor\nand the lawyer give themselves airs, finding how keen is the interest\nwhich not only the slaves but the freemen of a city take about them.\n\nOf course.\n\n[Sidenote: Every man should be his own doctor and lawyer.]\n\nAnd yet what greater proof can there be of a bad and disgraceful state of\neducation than this, that not only artisans and the meaner sort of people\nneed the skill of first-rate physicians and judges, but also those who\nwould profess to *405B* have had a liberal education? Is it not\ndisgraceful, and a great sign of want of good-breeding, that a man should\nhave to go abroad for his law and physic because he has none of his own at\nhome, and must therefore surrender himself into the hands of other men\nwhom he makes lords and judges over him?\n\nOf all things, he said, the most disgraceful.\n\n[Sidenote: Bad as it is to go to law, it is still worse to be a lover of\nlitigation.]\n\nWould you say 'most,' I replied, when you consider that there is a further\nstage of the evil in which a man is not only a life-long litigant, passing\nall his days in the courts, either as plaintiff or defendant, but is\nactually led by his bad taste to pride himself on his litigiousness; he\nimagines that he is *405C* a master in dishonesty; able to take every\ncrooked turn, and wriggle into and out of every hole, bending like a withy\nand getting out of the way of justice: and all for what?--in order to gain\nsmall points not worth mentioning, he not knowing that so to order his\nlife as to be able to do without a napping judge is a far higher and\nnobler sort of thing. Is not that still more disgraceful? {93}\n\nYes, he said, that is still more disgraceful.\n\n[Sidenote: Bad also to require the help of medicine.]\n\nWell, I said, and to require the help of medicine, not when a wound has to\nbe cured, or on occasion of an epidemic, but *405D* just because, by\nindolence and a habit of life such as we have been describing, men fill\nthemselves with waters and winds, as if their bodies were a marsh,\ncompelling the ingenious sons of Asclepius to find more names for\ndiseases, such as flatulence and catarrh; is not this, too, a disgrace?\n\nYes, he said, they do certainly give very strange and newfangled names to\ndiseases.\n\n[Sidenote: In the time of Asclepius and of Homer the practice of medicine\nwas very simple.]\n\nYes, I said, and I do not believe that there were any such *405E* diseases\nin the days of Asclepius; and this I infer from the circumstance that the\nhero Eurypylus, after he has been wounded in Homer, drinks a posset of\nPramnian wine well *406A* besprinkled with barley-meal and grated cheese,\nwhich are certainly inflammatory, and yet the sons of Asclepius who were\nat the Trojan war do not blame the damsel who gives him the drink, or\nrebuke Patroclus, who is treating his case.\n\nWell, he said, that was surely an extraordinary drink to be given to a\nperson in his condition.\n\n[Sidenote: The nursing of disease began with Herodicus.]\n\nNot so extraordinary, I replied, if you bear in mind that in former days,\nas is commonly said, before the time of Herodicus, the guild of Asclepius\ndid not practise our present system of medicine, which may be said to\neducate diseases. But Herodicus, being a trainer, and himself of a sickly\nconstitution, by a combination of training and doctoring found *406B* out\na way of torturing first and chiefly himself, and secondly the rest of the\nworld.\n\nHow was that? he said.\n\nBy the invention of lingering death; for he had a mortal disease which he\nperpetually tended, and as recovery was out of the question, he passed his\nentire life as a valetudinarian; he could do nothing but attend upon\nhimself, and he was in constant torment whenever he departed in anything\nfrom his usual regimen, and so dying hard, by the help of science he\nstruggled on to old age.\n\nA rare reward of his skill!\n\n*406C* Yes, I said; a reward which a man might fairly expect who never\nunderstood that, if Asclepius did not instruct his descendants in\nvaletudinarian arts, the omission arose, not {94} from ignorance or\ninexperience of such a branch of medicine, but because he knew that in all\nwell-ordered states every individual has an occupation to which he must\nattend, and has therefore no leisure to spend in continually being ill.\nThis we remark in the case of the artisan, but, ludicrously enough, do not\napply the same rule to people of the richer sort.\n\nHow do you mean? he said.\n\n[Sidenote: The working-man has no time for tedious remedies.]\n\n*406D* I mean this: When a carpenter is ill he asks the physician for a\nrough and ready cure; an emetic or a purge or a cautery or the knife,\n--these are his remedies. And if some one prescribes for him a course of\ndietetics, and tells him that he must swathe and swaddle his head, and all\nthat sort of thing, he replies at once that he has no time to be ill, and\nthat he sees no good in a life which is spent in nursing his disease to\nthe neglect of his customary employment; and therefore *406E* bidding\ngood-bye to this sort of physician, he resumes his ordinary habits, and\neither gets well and lives and does his business, or, if his constitution\nfails, he dies and has no more trouble.\n\nYes, he said, and a man in his condition of life ought to use the art of\nmedicine thus far only.\n\n*407A* Has he not, I said, an occupation; and what profit would there be\nin his life if he were deprived of his occupation?\n\nQuite true, he said.\n\nBut with the rich man this is otherwise; of him we do not say that he has\nany specially appointed work which he must perform, if he would live.\n\nHe is generally supposed to have nothing to do.\n\nThen you never heard of the saying of Phocylides, that as soon as a man\nhas a livelihood he should practise virtue?\n\nNay, he said, I think that he had better begin somewhat sooner.\n\n[Sidenote: The slow cure equally an impediment to the mechanical arts, to\nthe practice of virtue]\n\nLet us not have a dispute with him about this, I said; but rather ask\nourselves: Is the practice of virtue obligatory on *407B* the rich man, or\ncan he live without it? And if obligatory on him, then let us raise a\nfurther question, whether this dieting of disorders, which is an\nimpediment to the application of the mind in carpentering and the\nmechanical arts, does not equally stand in the way of the sentiment of\nPhocylides? {95}\n\nOf that, he replied, there can be no doubt; such excessive care of the\nbody, when carried beyond the rules of gymnastic, is most inimical to the\npractice of virtue.\n\n[Sidenote: and to any kind of study or thought.]\n\n[38]Yes, indeed, I replied, and equally incompatible with the management\nof a house, an army, or an office of state; and, what is most important of\nall, irreconcileable with any kind *407C* of study or thought or\nself-reflection--there is a constant suspicion that headache and giddiness\nare to be ascribed to philosophy, and hence all practising or making trial\nof virtue in the higher sense is absolutely stopped; for a man is always\nfancying that he is being made ill, and is in constant anxiety about the\nstate of his body.\n\n[Footnote 38: Making the answer of Socrates begin at [Greek: kai\\ ga\\r\npro\\s k.t.l.]]\n\nYes, likely enough.\n\n[Sidenote: Asclepius would not cure diseased constitutions because they\nwere of no use to the State.]\n\nAnd therefore our politic Asclepius may be supposed to have exhibited the\npower of his art only to persons who, being generally of healthy\nconstitution and habits of life, had *407D* a definite ailment; such as\nthese he cured by purges and operations, and bade them live as usual,\nherein consulting the interests of the State; but bodies which disease had\npenetrated through and through he would not have attempted to cure by\ngradual processes of evacuation and infusion: he did not want to lengthen\nout good-for-nothing lives, or to have weak fathers begetting weaker\nsons;--if a man was not able to live in the ordinary way he had no\nbusiness to cure him; *407E* for such a cure would have been of no use\neither to himself, or to the State.\n\nThen, he said, you regard Asclepius as a statesman.\n\n[Sidenote: The case of Menelaus, who was attended by the sons of\nAsclepius.]\n\nClearly; and his character is further illustrated by his sons. *408A* Note\nthat they were heroes in the days of old and practised the medicines of\nwhich I am speaking at the siege of Troy: You will remember how, when\nPandarus wounded Menelaus, they\n\n  'Sucked the blood out of the wound, and sprinkled soothing\n  remedies[39],'\n\nbut they never prescribed what the patient was afterwards to eat or drink\nin the case of Menelaus, any more than in the case of Eurypylus; the\nremedies, as they conceived, were enough to heal any man who before he was\nwounded was {96} *408B* healthy and regular in his habits; and even though\nhe did happen to drink a posset of Pramnian wine, he might get well all\nthe same. But they would have nothing to do with unhealthy and intemperate\nsubjects, whose lives were of no use either to themselves or others; the\nart of medicine was not designed for their good, and though they were as\nrich as Midas, the sons of Asclepius would have declined to attend them.\n\n[Footnote 39: Iliad iv. 218.]\n\nThey were very acute persons, those sons of Asclepius.\n\n[Sidenote: The offence of Asclepius.]\n\nNaturally so, I replied. Nevertheless, the tragedians and Pindar\ndisobeying our behests, although they acknowledge that Asclepius was the\nson of Apollo, say also that he was bribed into healing a rich man who was\nat the point of *408C* death, and for this reason he was struck by\nlightning. But we, in accordance with the principle already affirmed by\nus, will not believe them when they tell us both;--if he was the son of a\ngod, we maintain that he was not avaricious; or, if he was avaricious, he\nwas not the son of a god.\n\nAll that, Socrates, is excellent; but I should like to put a question to\nyou: Ought there not to be good physicians in a State, and are not the\nbest those who have treated the *408D* greatest number of constitutions\ngood and bad? and are not the best judges in like manner those who are\nacquainted with all sorts of moral natures?\n\nYes, I said, I too would have good judges and good physicians. But do you\nknow whom I think good?\n\nWill you tell me?\n\nI will, if I can. Let me however note that in the same question you join\ntwo things which are not the same.\n\nHow so? he asked.\n\n[Sidenote: The physician should have experience of illness in his own\nperson;]\n\nWhy, I said, you join physicians and judges. Now the most skilful\nphysicians are those who, from their youth upwards, have combined with the\nknowledge of their art *408E* the greatest experience of disease; they had\nbetter not be robust in health, and should have had all manner of diseases\nin their own persons. For the body, as I conceive, is not the instrument\nwith which they cure the body; in that case we could not allow them ever\nto be or to have been sickly; but they cure the body with the mind, and\nthe mind which has become and is sick can cure nothing. {97}\n\nThat is very true, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: on the other hand, the judge should not learn to know evil by\nthe practice of it, but by long observation of evil in others.]\n\n*409A* But with the judge it is otherwise; since he governs mind by mind;\nhe ought not therefore to have been trained among vicious minds, and to\nhave associated with them from youth upwards, and to have gone through the\nwhole calendar of crime, only in order that he may quickly infer the\ncrimes of others as he might their bodily diseases from his own\nself-consciousness; the honourable mind which is to form a healthy\njudgment should have had no experience or contamination of evil habits\nwhen young. And this is the reason why in youth good men often appear to\nbe simple, and are *409B* easily practised upon by the dishonest, because\nthey have no examples of what evil is in their own souls.\n\nYes, he said, they are far too apt to be deceived.\n\nTherefore, I said, the judge should not be young; he should have learned\nto know evil, not from his own soul, but from late and long observation of\nthe nature of evil in others: *409C* knowledge should be his guide, not\npersonal experience.\n\nYes, he said, that is the ideal of a judge.\n\n[Sidenote: Such a knowledge of human nature far better and truer than that\nof the adept in crime.]\n\nYes, I replied, and he will be a good man (which is my answer to your\nquestion); for he is good who has a good soul. But the cunning and\nsuspicious nature of which we spoke,--he who has committed many crimes,\nand fancies himself to be a master in wickedness, when he is amongst his\nfellows, is wonderful in the precautions which he takes, because he judges\nof them by himself: but when he gets into the company of men of virtue,\nwho have the experience of age, he appears to be a fool again, owing to\nhis unseasonable suspicions; *409D* he cannot recognise an honest man,\nbecause he has no pattern of honesty in himself; at the same time, as the\nbad are more numerous than the good, and he meets with them oftener, he\nthinks himself, and is by others thought to be, rather wise than foolish.\n\nMost true, he said.\n\nThen the good and wise judge whom we are seeking is not this man, but the\nother; for vice cannot know virtue too, but a virtuous nature, educated by\ntime, will acquire a knowledge *409E* both of virtue and vice: the\nvirtuous, and not the vicious, man has wisdom--in my opinion.\n\nAnd in mine also. {98}\n\nThis is the sort of medicine, and this is the sort of law, which you will\nsanction in your state. They will minister to *410A* better natures,\ngiving health both of soul and of body; but those who are diseased in\ntheir bodies they will leave to die, and the corrupt and incurable souls\nthey will put an end to themselves.\n\nThat is clearly the best thing both for the patients and for the State.\n\nAnd thus our youth, having been educated only in that simple music which,\nas we said, inspires temperance, will be reluctant to go to law.\n\nClearly.\n\n*410B* And the musician, who, keeping to the same track, is content to\npractise the simple gymnastic, will have nothing to do with medicine\nunless in some extreme case.\n\nThat I quite believe.\n\nThe very exercises and tolls which he undergoes are intended to stimulate\nthe spirited element of his nature, and not to increase his strength; he\nwill not, like common athletes, use exercise and regimen to develope his\nmuscles.\n\nVery right, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: Music and gymnastic are equally designed for the improvement of\nthe mind.]\n\n*410C* Neither are the two arts of music and gymnastic really designed, as\nis often supposed, the one for the training of the soul, the other for the\ntraining of the body.\n\nWhat then is the real object of them?\n\nI believe, I said, that the teachers of both have in view chiefly the\nimprovement of the soul.\n\nHow can that be? he asked.\n\nDid you never observe, I said, the effect on the mind itself of exclusive\ndevotion to gymnastic, or the opposite effect of an exclusive devotion to\nmusic?\n\nIn what way shown? he said.\n\n[Sidenote: The mere athlete must be softened, and the philosophic nature\nprevented from becoming too soft]\n\n*410D* The one producing a temper of hardness and ferocity, the other of\nsoftness and effeminacy, I replied.\n\nYes, he said, I am quite aware that the mere athlete becomes too much of a\nsavage, and that the mere musician is melted and softened beyond what is\ngood for him.\n\nYet surely, I said, this ferocity only comes from spirit, which, if\nrightly educated, would give courage, but, if too much intensified, is\nliable to become hard and brutal. {99}\n\nThat I quite think.\n\n*410E* On the other hand the philosopher will have the quality of\ngentleness. And this also, when too much indulged, will turn to softness,\nbut, if educated rightly, will be gentle and moderate.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd in our opinion the guardians ought to have both these qualities?\n\nAssuredly.\n\nAnd both should be in harmony?\n\nBeyond question.\n\n*411A* And the harmonious soul is both temperate and courageous?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the inharmonious is cowardly and boorish?\n\nVery true.\n\n[Sidenote: Music, if carried too far, renders the weaker nature\neffeminate, the stronger irritable.]\n\nAnd, when a man allows music to play upon him and to pour into his soul\nthrough the funnel of his ears those sweet and soft and melancholy airs of\nwhich we were just now speaking, and his whole life is passed in warbling\nand the delights of song; in the first stage of the process the passion or\nspirit which is in him is tempered like iron, and made *411B* useful,\ninstead of brittle and useless. But, if he carries on the softening and\nsoothing process, in the next stage he begins to melt and waste, until he\nhas wasted away his spirit and cut out the sinews of his soul; and he\nbecomes a feeble warrior.\n\nVery true.\n\nIf the element of spirit is naturally weak in him the change is speedily\naccomplished, but if he have a good deal, then the power of music\nweakening the spirit renders him excitable;--on the least provocation he\nflames up at once, and is *411C* speedily extinguished; instead of having\nspirit he grows irritable and passionate and is quite impracticable.\n\nExactly.\n\n[Sidenote: And in like manner the well-fed athlete, if he have no\neducation,]\n\nAnd so in gymnastics, if a man takes violent exercise and is a great\nfeeder, and the reverse of a great student of music and philosophy, at\nfirst the high condition of his body fills him with pride and spirit, and\nhe becomes twice the man that he was. {100}\n\nCertainly.\n\n[Sidenote: degenerates into a wild beast.]\n\nAnd what happens? if he do nothing else, and holds no *411D* converse with\nthe Muses, does not even that intelligence which there may be in him,\nhaving no taste of any sort of learning or enquiry or thought or culture,\ngrow feeble and dull and blind, his mind never waking up or receiving\nnourishment, and his senses not being purged of their mists?\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nAnd he ends by becoming a hater of philosophy, uncivilized, never using\nthe weapon of persuasion,--he is like a wild *411E* beast, all violence\nand fierceness, and knows no other way of dealing; and he lives in all\nignorance and evil conditions, and has no sense of propriety and grace.\n\nThat is quite true, he said.\n\nAnd as there are two principles of human nature, one the spirited and the\nother the philosophical, some God, as I should say, has given mankind two\narts answering to them (and only indirectly to the soul and body), in\norder that these *412A* two principles (like the strings of an instrument)\nmay be relaxed or drawn tighter until they are duly harmonized.\n\nThat appears to be the intention.\n\n[Sidenote: Music to be mingled with gymnastic, and both attempered to the\nindividual soul.]\n\nAnd he who mingles music with gymnastic in the fairest proportions, and\nbest attempers them to the soul, may be rightly called the true musician\nand harmonist in a far higher sense than the tuner of the strings.\n\nYou are quite right, Socrates.\n\nAnd such a presiding genius will be always required in our State if the\ngovernment is to last.\n\n*412B* Yes, he will be absolutely necessary.\n\n[Sidenote: Enough of principles of education: who are to be our rulers?]\n\nSuch, then, are our principles of nurture and education: Where would be\nthe use of going into further details about the dances of our citizens, or\nabout their hunting and coursing, their gymnastic and equestrian contests?\nFor these all follow the general principle, and having found that, we\nshall have no difficulty in discovering them.\n\nI dare say that there will be no difficulty.\n\nVery good, I said; then what is the next question? Must we not ask who are\nto be rulers and who subjects?\n\n*412C* Certainly.\n\n[Sidenote: The elder must rule and the younger serve.]\n\nThere can be no doubt that the elder must rule the younger. {101}\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd that the best of these must rule.\n\nThat is also clear.\n\nNow, are not the best husbandmen those who are most devoted to husbandry?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd as we are to have the best of guardians for our city, must they not be\nthose who have most the character of guardians?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd to this end they ought to be wise and efficient, and to have a special\ncare of the State?\n\n*412D* True.\n\n[Sidenote: Those are to be appointed rulers who have been tested in all\nthe stages of their life;]\n\nAnd a man will be most likely to care about that which he loves?\n\nTo be sure.\n\nAnd he will be most likely to love that which he regards as having the\nsame interests with himself, and that of which the good or evil fortune is\nsupposed by him at any time most to affect his own?\n\nVery true, he replied.\n\nThen there must be a selection. Let us note among the guardians those who\nin their whole life show the greatest *412E* eagerness to do what is for\nthe good of their country, and the greatest repugnance to do what is\nagainst her interests.\n\nThose are the right men.\n\nAnd they will have to be watched at every age, in order that we may see\nwhether they preserve their resolution, and never, under the influence\neither of force or enchantment, forget or cast off their sense of duty to\nthe State.\n\nHow cast off? he said.\n\nI will explain to you, I replied. A resolution may go out of a man's mind\neither with his will or against his will; with *413A* his will when he\ngets rid of a falsehood and learns better, against his will whenever he is\ndeprived of a truth.\n\nI understand, he said, the willing loss of a resolution; the meaning of\nthe unwilling I have yet to learn.\n\nWhy, I said, do you not see that men are unwillingly deprived of good, and\nwillingly of evil? Is not to have lost the truth an evil, and to possess\nthe truth a good? and you {102} would agree that to conceive things as\nthey are is to possess the truth?\n\nYes, he replied; I agree with you in thinking that mankind are deprived of\ntruth against their will.\n\n*413B* And is not this involuntary deprivation caused either by theft, or\nforce, or enchantment?\n\nStill, he replied, I do not understand you.\n\n[Sidenote: and who are unchanged by the influence either of pleasure, or\nof fear,]\n\nI fear that I must have been talking darkly, like the tragedians. I only\nmean that some men are changed by persuasion and that others forget;\nargument steals away the hearts of one class, and time of the other; and\nthis I call theft. Now you understand me?\n\nYes.\n\nThose again who are forced, are those whom the violence of some pain or\ngrief compels to change their opinion.\n\nI understand, he said, and you are quite right.\n\n[Sidenote: or of enchantments.]\n\n*413C* And you would also acknowledge that the enchanted are those who\nchange their minds either under the softer influence of pleasure, or the\nsterner influence of fear?\n\nYes, he said; everything that deceives may be said to enchant.\n\nTherefore, as I was just now saying, we must enquire who are the best\nguardians of their own conviction that what they think the interest of the\nState is to be the rule of their lives. We must watch them from their\nyouth upwards, and make them perform actions in which they are most likely\nto forget or to be deceived, and he who remembers and is not deceived\n*413D* is to be selected, and he who fails in the trial is to be rejected.\nThat will be the way?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd there should also be toils and pains and conflicts prescribed for\nthem, in which they will be made to give further proof of the same\nqualities.\n\nVery right, he replied.\n\n[Sidenote: If they stand the test they are to be honoured in life and\nafter death.]\n\nAnd then, I said, we must try them with enchantments--that is the third\nsort of test--and see what will be their behaviour: like those who take\ncolts amid noise and tumult to see if they are of a timid nature, so must\nwe take our youth amid terrors of some kind, and again pass them into\npleasures, *413E* and prove them more thoroughly than gold is {103} proved\nin the furnace, that we may discover whether they are armed against all\nenchantments, and of a noble bearing always, good guardians of themselves\nand of the music which they have learned, and retaining under all\ncircumstances a rhythmical and harmonious nature, such as will be most\nserviceable to the individual and to the State. And he who at every age,\nas boy and youth and in mature life, has come out of the trial victorious\nand pure, shall be appointed *414A* a ruler and guardian of the State; he\nshall be honoured in life and death, and shall receive sepulture and other\nmemorials of honour, the greatest that we have to give. But him who fails,\nwe must reject. I am inclined to think that this is the sort of way in\nwhich our rulers and guardians should be chosen and appointed. I speak\ngenerally, and not with any pretension to exactness.\n\nAnd, speaking generally, I agree with you, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: The title of guardians to be reserved for the elders, the young\nmen to be called auxiliaries.]\n\n*414B* And perhaps the word 'guardian' in the fullest sense ought to be\napplied to this higher class only who preserve us against foreign enemies\nand maintain peace among our citizens at home, that the one may not have\nthe will, or the others the power, to harm us. The young men whom we\nbefore called guardians may be more properly designated auxiliaries and\nsupporters of the principles of the rulers.\n\nI agree with you, he said.\n\nHow then may we devise one of those needful falsehoods of which we lately\nspoke--just one royal lie which may *414C* deceive the rulers, if that be\npossible, and at any rate the rest of the city?\n\nWhat sort of lie? he said.\n\n[Sidenote: The Phoenician tale.]\n\nNothing new, I replied; only an old Phoenician[40] tale of what has often\noccurred before now in other places, (as the poets say, and have made the\nworld believe) though not in our time, and I do not know whether such an\nevent could ever happen again, or could now even be made probable, if it\ndid.\n\n[Footnote 40: Cp. Laws, 663 E.]\n\nHow your words seem to hesitate on your lips!\n\nYou will not wonder, I replied, at my hesitation when you have heard.\n\nSpeak, he said, and fear not. {104}\n\n[Sidenote: The citizens to be told that they are really autochthonous,\nsent up out of the earth,]\n\n*414D* Well then, I will speak, although I really know not how to look you\nin the face, or in what words to utter the audacious fiction, which\nI propose to communicate gradually, first to the rulers, then to the\nsoldiers, and lastly to the people. They are to be told that their youth\nwas a dream, and the education and training which they received from us,\nan appearance only; in reality during all that time they were being formed\nand fed in the womb of the earth, where they *414E* themselves and their\narms and appurtenances were manufactured; when they were completed, the\nearth, their mother, sent them up; and so, their country being their\nmother and also their nurse, they are bound to advise for her good, and to\ndefend her against attacks, and her citizens they are to regard as\nchildren of the earth and their own brothers.\n\nYou had good reason, he said, to be ashamed of the lie which you were\ngoing to tell.\n\n[Sidenote: and composed of metals of various quality.]\n\n[Sidenote: The noble quality to rise in the State, the ignoble to\ndescend.]\n\n*415A* True, I replied, but there is more coming; I have only told you\nhalf. Citizens, we shall say to them in our tale, you are brothers, yet\nGod has framed you differently. Some of you have the power of command, and\nin the composition of these he has mingled gold, wherefore also they have\nthe greatest honour; others he has made of silver, to be auxiliaries;\nothers again who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen he has composed of\nbrass and iron; and the species will generally be preserved in the\nchildren. But as all are of the same original stock, a golden parent will\nsometimes have a *415B* silver son, or a silver parent a golden son. And\nGod proclaims as a first principle to the rulers, and above all else, that\nthere is nothing which they should so anxiously guard, or of which they\nare to be such good guardians, as of the purity of the race. They should\nobserve what elements mingle in their offspring; for if the son of a\ngolden or silver parent has an admixture of brass and iron, then nature\norders *415C* a transposition of ranks, and the eye of the ruler must not\nbe pitiful towards the child because he has to descend in the scale and\nbecome a husbandman or artisan, just as there may be sons of artisans who\nhaving an admixture of gold or silver in them are raised to honour, and\nbecome guardians or auxiliaries. For an oracle says that when a man of\nbrass or iron guards the State, it will be destroyed. Such is the {105}\ntale; is there any possibility of making our citizens believe in it?\n\n[Sidenote: Is such a fiction credible?--Yes, in a future generation; not\nin the present.]\n\n*415D* Not in the present generation, he replied; there is no way of\naccomplishing this; but their sons may be made to believe in the tale, and\ntheir sons' sons, and posterity after them.\n\n[Sidenote: The selection of a site for the warriors' camp.]\n\nI see the difficulty, I replied; yet the fostering of such a belief will\nmake them care more for the city and for one another. Enough, however, of\nthe fiction, which may now fly abroad upon the wings of rumour, while we\narm our earth-born heroes, and lead them forth under the command of their\nrulers. Let them look round and select a spot whence they can best\nsuppress insurrection, if any prove refractory *415E* within, and also\ndefend themselves against enemies, who like wolves may come down on the\nfold from without; there let them encamp, and when they have encamped, let\nthem sacrifice to the proper Gods and prepare their dwellings.\n\nJust so, he said.\n\nAnd their dwellings must be such as will shield them against the cold of\nwinter and the heat of summer.\n\nI suppose that you mean houses, he replied.\n\nYes, I said; but they must be the houses of soldiers, and not of\nshop-keepers.\n\nWhat is the difference? he said.\n\n[Sidenote: The warriors must be humanized by education.]\n\n*416A* That I will endeavour to explain, I replied. To keep watch-dogs,\nwho, from want of discipline or hunger, or some evil habit or other, would\nturn upon the sheep and worry them, and behave not like dogs but wolves,\nwould be a foul and monstrous thing in a shepherd?\n\nTruly monstrous, he said.\n\n*416B* And therefore every care must be taken that our auxiliaries, being\nstronger than our citizens, may not grow to be too much for them and\nbecome savage tyrants instead of friends and allies?\n\nYes, great care should be taken.\n\nAnd would not a really good education furnish the best safeguard?\n\nBut they are well-educated already, he replied.\n\nI cannot be so confident, my dear Glaucon, I said; I am much more certain\nthat they ought to be, and that true *416C* education, whatever that may\nbe, will have the greatest {106} tendency to civilize and humanize them in\ntheir relations to one another, and to those who are under their\nprotection.\n\nVery true, he replied.\n\nAnd not only their education, but their habitations, and all that belongs\nto them, should be such as will neither impair their virtue as guardians,\nnor tempt them to prey upon the other citizens. *416D* Any man of sense\nmust acknowledge that.\n\nHe must.\n\n[Sidenote: Their way of life will be that of a camp]\n\n[Sidenote: They must have no homes or property of their own.]\n\nThen now let us consider what will be their way of life, if they are to\nrealize our idea of them. In the first place, none of them should have any\nproperty of his own beyond what is absolutely necessary; neither should\nthey have a private house or store closed against any one who has a mind\nto enter; their provisions should be only such as are required by trained\nwarriors, who are men of temperance and courage; *416E* they should agree\nto receive from the citizens a fixed rate of pay, enough to meet the\nexpenses of the year and no more; and they will go to mess and live\ntogether like soldiers in a camp. Gold and silver we will tell them that\nthey have from God; the diviner metal is within them, and they have\ntherefore no need of the dross which is current among men, and ought not\nto pollute the divine by any *417A* such earthly admixture; for that\ncommoner metal has been the source of many unholy deeds, but their own is\nundefiled. And they alone of all the citizens may not touch or handle\nsilver or gold, or be under the same roof with them, or wear them, or\ndrink from them. And this will be their salvation, and they will be the\nsaviours of the State. But should they ever acquire homes or lands or\nmoneys of their own, they will become housekeepers and husbandmen instead\nof guardians, *417B* enemies and tyrants instead of allies of the other\ncitizens; hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against, they\nwill pass their whole life in much greater terror of internal than of\nexternal enemies, and the hour of ruin, both to themselves and to the rest\nof the State, will be at hand. For all which reasons may we not say that\nthus shall our State be ordered, and that these shall be the regulations\nappointed by us for guardians concerning their houses and all other\nmatters?\n\nYes, said Glaucon.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK IV.\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic IV._ Adeimantus, Socrates.]\n\n[Sidenote: An objection that Socrates has made his citizens poor and\nmiserable:]\n\n*419A* Here Adeimantus interposed a question: How would you answer,\nSocrates, said he, if a person were to say that you are making[1] these\npeople miserable, and that they are the cause of their own unhappiness;\nthe city in fact belongs to them, but they are none the better for it;\nwhereas other men acquire lands, and build large and handsome houses, and\nhave everything handsome about them, offering sacrifices to the gods on\ntheir own account, and practising hospitality; moreover, as you were\nsaying just now, they have gold and silver, and all that is usual among\nthe favourites of fortune; but our poor citizens are no better than\nmercenaries who are quartered in the city and are always mounting guard?\n\n[Footnote 1: Or, 'that for their own good you are making these people\nmiserable.']\n\n[Sidenote: and worst of all, adds Socrates, they have no money.]\n\n*420A* Yes, I said; and you may add that they are only fed, and not paid\nin addition to their food, like other men; and therefore they cannot, if\nthey would, take a journey of pleasure; they have no money to spend on a\nmistress or any other luxurious fancy, which, as the world goes, is\nthought to be happiness; and many other accusations of the same nature\nmight be added.\n\nBut, said he, let us suppose all this to be included in the charge.\n\n*420B* You mean to ask, I said, what will be our answer?\n\nYes.\n\n[Sidenote: Yet very likely they may be the happiest of mankind.]\n\n[Sidenote: The State, like a statue, must be judged of as a whole.]\n\n[Sidenote: The guardians must be guardians, not boon companions.]\n\nIf we proceed along the old path, my belief, I said, is that we shall find\nthe answer. And our answer will be that, even as they are, our guardians\nmay very likely be the happiest of men; but that our aim in founding the\nState was not the disproportionate happiness of any one class, but the\ngreatest happiness of the whole; we thought that in a State {108} which is\nordered with a view to the good of the whole we should be most likely to\nfind justice, and in the ill-ordered *420C* State injustice: and, having\nfound them, we might then decide which of the two is the happier. At\npresent, I take it, we are fashioning the happy State, not piecemeal, or\nwith a view of making a few happy citizens, but as a whole; and by-and-by\nwe will proceed to view the opposite kind of State. Suppose that we were\npainting a statue, and some one came up to us and said, Why do you not put\nthe most beautiful colours on the most beautiful parts of the body--the\neyes ought to be purple, but you have made them black--to him *420D* we\nmight fairly answer, Sir, you would not surely have us beautify the eyes\nto such a degree that they are no longer eyes; consider rather whether, by\ngiving this and the other features their due proportion, we make the whole\nbeautiful. And so I say to you, do not compel us to assign to the\nguardians a sort of happiness which will make them anything but guardians;\n*420E* for we too can clothe our husbandmen in royal apparel, and set\ncrowns of gold on their heads, and bid them till the ground as much as\nthey like, and no more. Our potters also might be allowed to repose on\ncouches, and feast by the fireside, passing round the winecup, while their\nwheel is conveniently at hand, and working at pottery only as much as they\nlike; in this way we might make every class happy--and then, as you\nimagine, the whole State would be happy. But do not put this idea into our\nheads; for, *421A* if we listen to you, the husbandman will be no longer a\nhusbandman, the potter will cease to be a potter, and no one will have the\ncharacter of any distinct class in the State. Now this is not of much\nconsequence where the corruption of society, and pretension to be what you\nare not, is confined to cobblers; but when the guardians of the laws and\nof the government are only seeming and not real guardians, then see how\nthey turn the State upside down; and on the other hand they alone have the\npower of giving order and happiness to the State. We mean our guardians to\nbe true *421B* saviours and not the destroyers of the State, whereas our\nopponent is thinking of peasants at a festival, who are enjoying a life of\nrevelry, not of citizens who are doing their duty to the State. But, if\nso, we mean different things, and he is {109} speaking of something which\nis not a State. And therefore we must consider whether in appointing our\nguardians we would look to their greatest happiness individually, or\nwhether this principle of happiness does not rather reside in the State as\na whole. But if the latter be the truth, then the guardians *421C* and\nauxiliaries, and all others equally with them, must be compelled or\ninduced to do their own work in the best way. And thus the whole State\nwill grow up in a noble order, and the several classes will receive the\nproportion of happiness which nature assigns to them.\n\nI think that you are quite right.\n\nI wonder whether you will agree with another remark which occurs to me.\n\nWhat may that be?\n\n*421D* There seem to be two causes of the deterioration of the arts.\n\nWhat are they?\n\nWealth, I said, and poverty.\n\nHow do they act?\n\n[Sidenote: When an artisan grows rich, he becomes careless: if he is very\npoor, he has no money to buy tools with. The city should be neither poor\nnor rich.]\n\nThe process is as follows: When a potter becomes rich, will he, think you,\nany longer take the same pains with his art?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nHe will grow more and more indolent and careless?\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd the result will be that he becomes a worse potter?\n\nYes; he greatly deteriorates.\n\nBut, on the other hand, if he has no money, and cannot provide himself\nwith tools or instruments, he will not work *421E* equally well himself,\nnor will he teach his sons or apprentices to work equally well.\n\nCertainly not.\n\nThen, under the influence either of poverty or of wealth, workmen and\ntheir work are equally liable to degenerate?\n\nThat is evident.\n\nHere, then, is a discovery of new evils, I said, against which the\nguardians will have to watch, or they will creep into the city unobserved.\n\nWhat evils?\n\n*422A* Wealth, I said, and poverty; the one is the parent of {110} luxury\nand indolence, and the other of meanness and viciousness, and both of\ndiscontent.\n\n[Sidenote: But how, being poor, can she contend against a wealthy enemy?]\n\nThat is very true, he replied; but still I should like to know, Socrates,\nhow our city will be able to go to war, especially against an enemy who is\nrich and powerful, if deprived of the sinews of war.\n\nThere would certainly be a difficulty, I replied, in going *422B* to war\nwith one such enemy; but there is no difficulty where there are two of\nthem.\n\nHow so? he asked.\n\n[Sidenote: Our wiry soldiers will be more than a match for their fat\nneighbours.]\n\nIn the first place, I said, if we have to fight, our side will be trained\nwarriors fighting against an army of rich men.\n\nThat is true, he said.\n\nAnd do you not suppose, Adeimantus, that a single boxer who was perfect in\nhis art would easily be a match for two stout and well-to-do gentlemen who\nwere not boxers?\n\nHardly, if they came upon him at once.\n\nWhat, now, I said, if he were able to run away and then *422C* turn and\nstrike at the one who first came up? And supposing he were to do this\nseveral times under the heat of a scorching sun, might he not, being an\nexpert, overturn more than one stout personage?\n\nCertainly, he said, there would be nothing wonderful in that.\n\nAnd yet rich men probably have a greater superiority in the science and\npractise of boxing than they have in military qualities.\n\nLikely enough.\n\nThen we may assume that our athletes will be able to fight with two or\nthree times their own number?\n\nI agree with you, for I think you right.\n\n[Sidenote: And they will have allies who will readily join on condition of\nreceiving the spoil.]\n\n*422D* And suppose that, before engaging, our citizens send an embassy to\none of the two cities, telling them what is the truth: Silver and gold we\nneither have nor are permitted to have, but you may; do you therefore come\nand help us in war, and take the spoils of the other city: Who, on hearing\nthese words, would choose to fight against lean wiry dogs, rather than,\nwith the dogs on their side, against fat and tender sheep?\n\nThat is not likely; and yet there might be a danger to the {111} *422E*\npoor State if the wealth of many States were to be gathered into one.\n\nBut how simple of you to use the term State at all of any but our own!\n\nWhy so?\n\n[Sidenote: But many cities will conspire? No: they are divided in\nthemselves.]\n\n[Sidenote: Many states are contained in one]\n\nYou ought to speak of other States in the plural number; not one of them\nis a city, but many cities, as they say in the game. For indeed any city,\nhowever small, is in fact divided into two, one the city of the poor, the\nother of the rich; *423A* these are at war with one another; and in either\nthere are many smaller divisions, and you would be altogether beside the\nmark if you treated them all as a single State. But if you deal with them\nas many, and give the wealth or power or persons of the one to the others,\nyou will always have a great many friends and not many enemies. And your\nState, while the wise order which has now been prescribed continues to\nprevail in her, will be the greatest of States, I do not mean to say in\nreputation or appearance, but in deed and truth, though she number not\nmore than a thousand defenders. A single State which is her equal you will\nhardly find, either *423B* among Hellenes or barbarians, though many that\nappear to be as great and many times greater.\n\nThat is most true, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: The limit to the size of the State the possibility of unity.]\n\nAnd what, I said, will be the best limit for our rulers to fix when they\nare considering the size of the State and the amount of territory which\nthey are to include, and beyond which they will not go?\n\nWhat limit would you propose?\n\nI would allow the State to increase so far as is consistent with unity;\nthat, I think, is the proper limit.\n\n*423C* Very good, he said.\n\nHere then, I said, is another order which will have to be conveyed to our\nguardians: Let our city be accounted neither large nor small, but one and\nself-sufficing.\n\nAnd surely, said he, this is not a very severe order which we impose upon\nthem.\n\n[Sidenote: The duty of adjusting the citizens to the rank for which nature\nintended them.]\n\nAnd the other, said I, of which we were speaking before is lighter\nstill,--I mean the duty of degrading the offspring of the guardians when\ninferior, and of elevating into the rank *423D* of guardians the offspring\nof the lower classes, when naturally {112} superior. The intention was,\nthat, in the case of the citizens generally, each individual should be put\nto the use for which nature intended him, one to one work, and then every\nman would do his own business, and be one and not many; and so the whole\ncity would be one and not many.\n\nYes, he said; that is not so difficult.\n\nThe regulations which we are prescribing, my good Adeimantus, are not, as\nmight be supposed, a number of great principles, but trifles all, if care\nbe taken, as the saying is, *423E* of the one great thing,--a thing,\nhowever, which I would rather call, not great, but sufficient for our\npurpose.\n\nWhat may that be? he asked.\n\nEducation, I said, and nurture: If our citizens are well educated, and\ngrow into sensible men, they will easily see their way through all these,\nas well as other matters which I omit; such, for example, as marriage, the\npossession of *424A* women and the procreation of children, which will all\nfollow the general principle that friends have all things in common, as\nthe proverb says.\n\nThat will be the best way of settling them.\n\n[Sidenote: Good education has a cumulative force and affects the breed.]\n\nAlso, I said, the State, if once started well, moves with accumulating\nforce like a wheel. For good nurture and education implant good\nconstitutions, and these good constitutions taking root in a good\neducation improve more and more, *424B* and this improvement affects the\nbreed in man as in other animals.\n\nVery possibly, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: No innovations to be made either in music or gymnastic.]\n\n[Sidenote: Damon.]\n\nThen to sum up: This is the point to which, above all, the attention of\nour rulers should be directed,--that music and gymnastic be preserved in\ntheir original form, and no innovation made. They must do their utmost to\nmaintain them intact. And when any one says that mankind most regard\n\n  'The newest song which the singers have[2],'\n\n*424C* they will be afraid that he may be praising, not new songs, but a\nnew kind of song; and this ought not to be praised, or conceived to be the\nmeaning of the poet; for any musical innovation is full of danger to the\nwhole State, and ought to be prohibited. So Damon tells me, and I can\nquite believe {113} him;--he says that when modes of music change, the\nfundamental laws of the State always change with them.\n\n[Footnote 2: Od. i. 352.]\n\nYes, said Adeimantus; and you may add my suffrage to Damon's and your own.\n\n*424D* Then, I said, our guardians must lay the foundations of their\nfortress in music?\n\nYes, he said; the lawlessness of which you speak too easily steals in.\n\nYes, I replied, in the form of amusement; and at first sight it appears\nharmless.\n\n[Sidenote: The spirit of lawlessness, beginning in music, gradually\npervades the whole of life.]\n\nWhy, yes, he said, and there is no harm; were it not that little by little\nthis spirit of licence, finding a home, imperceptibly penetrates into\nmanners and customs; whence, issuing with greater force, it invades\ncontracts between man and *424E* man, and from contracts goes on to laws\nand constitutions, in utter recklessness, ending at last, Socrates, by an\noverthrow of all rights, private as well as public.\n\nIs that true? I said.\n\nThat is my belief, he replied.\n\nThen, as I was saying, our youth should be trained from the first in a\nstricter system, for if amusements become *425A* lawless, and the youths\nthemselves become lawless, they can never grow up into well-conducted and\nvirtuous citizens.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: The habit of order the basis of education.]\n\nAnd when they have made a good beginning in play, and by the help of music\nhave gained the habit of good order, then this habit of order, in a manner\nhow unlike the lawless play of the others! will accompany them in all\ntheir actions and be a principle of growth to them, and if there be any\nfallen places in the State will raise them up again.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: If the citizens have the root of the matter in them, they will\nsupply the details for themselves.]\n\nThus educated, they will invent for themselves any lesser rules which\ntheir predecessors have altogether neglected.\n\nWhat do you mean?\n\n*425B* I mean such things as these:--when the young are to be silent\nbefore their elders; how they are to show respect to them by standing and\nmaking them sit; what honour is due to parents; what garments or shoes are\nto be worn; the mode of dressing the hair; deportment and manners in\ngeneral. You would agree with me? {114}\n\nYes.\n\nBut there is, I think, small wisdom in legislating about such\nmatters,--I doubt if it is ever done; nor are any precise written\nenactments about them likely to be lasting.\n\nImpossible.\n\nIt would seem, Adeimantus, that the direction in which *425C* education\nstarts a man, will determine his future life. Does not like always attract\nlike?\n\nTo be sure.\n\nUntil some one rare and grand result is reached which may be good, and may\nbe the reverse of good?\n\nThat is not to be denied.\n\nAnd for this reason, I said, I shall not attempt to legislate further\nabout them.\n\nNaturally enough, he replied.\n\n[Sidenote: The mere routine of administration may be omitted by us.]\n\nWell, and about the business of the agora, and the ordinary dealings\nbetween man and man, or again about agreements *425D* with artisans; about\ninsult and injury, or the commencement of actions, and the appointment of\njuries, what would you say? there may also arise questions about any\nimpositions and exactions of market and harbour dues which may be\nrequired, and in general about the regulations of markets, police,\nharbours, and the like. But, oh heavens! shall we condescend to legislate\non any of these particulars?\n\nI think, he said, that there is no need to impose laws about *425E* them\non good men; what regulations are necessary they will find out soon enough\nfor themselves.\n\nYes, I said, my friend, if God will only preserve to them the laws which\nwe have given them.\n\nAnd without divine help, said Adeimantus, they will go on for ever making\nand mending their laws and their lives in the hope of attaining\nperfection.\n\n[Sidenote: Illustration of reformers of the law taken from invalids who\nare always doctoring themselves, but will never listen to the truth.]\n\nYou would compare them, I said, to those invalids who, having no\nself-restraint, will not leave off their habits of intemperance?\n\nExactly.\n\n*426A* Yes, I said; and what a delightful life they lead! they are always\ndoctoring and increasing and complicating their disorders, and always\nfancying that they will be cured by any nostrum which anybody advises them\nto try. {115}\n\nSuch cases are very common, he said, with invalids of this sort.\n\nYes, I replied; and the charming thing is that they deem him their worst\nenemy who tells them the truth, which is simply that, unless they give up\neating and drinking and *426B* wenching and idling, neither drug nor\ncautery nor spell nor amulet nor any other remedy will avail.\n\nCharming! he replied. I see nothing charming in going into a passion with\na man who tells you what is right.\n\nThese gentlemen, I said, do not seem to be in your good graces.\n\nAssuredly not.\n\nNor would you praise the behaviour of States which act like the men whom\nI was just now describing. For are there not ill-ordered States in which\nthe citizens are forbidden *426C* under pain of death to alter the\nconstitution; and yet he who most sweetly courts those who live under this\nregime and indulges them and fawns upon them and is skilful in\nanticipating and gratifying their humours is held to be a great and good\nstatesman--do not these States resemble the persons whom I was describing?\n\nYes, he said; the States are as bad as the men; and I am very far from\npraising them.\n\n*426D* But do you not admire, I said, the coolness and dexterity of these\nready ministers of political corruption?\n\n[Sidenote: Demagogues trying their hands at legislation may be excused for\ntheir ignorance of the world.]\n\nYes, he said, I do; but not of all of them, for there are some whom the\napplause of the multitude has deluded into the belief that they are really\nstatesmen, and these are not much to be admired.\n\nWhat do you mean? I said; you should have more feeling for them. When a\nman cannot measure, and a great many *426E* others who cannot measure\ndeclare that he is four cubits high, can he help believing what they say?\n\nNay, he said, certainly not in that case.\n\nWell, then, do not be angry with them; for are they not as good as a play,\ntrying their hand at paltry reforms such as I was describing; they are\nalways fancying that by legislation they will make an end of frauds in\ncontracts, and the other rascalities which I was mentioning, not knowing\nthat they are in reality cutting off the heads of a hydra? {116}\n\n*427A* Yes, he said; that is just what they are doing.\n\nI conceive, I said, that the true legislator will not trouble himself with\nthis class of enactments whether concerning laws or the constitution\neither in an ill-ordered or in a well-ordered State; for in the former\nthey are quite useless, and in the latter there will be no difficulty in\ndevising them; and many of them will naturally flow out of our previous\nregulations.\n\n*427B* What, then, he said, is still remaining to us of the work of\nlegislation?\n\nNothing to us, I replied; but to Apollo, the God of Delphi, there remains\nthe ordering of the greatest and noblest and chiefest things of all.\n\nWhich are they? he said.\n\n[Sidenote: Religion to be left to the God of Delphi.]\n\nThe institution of temples and sacrifices, and the entire service of gods,\ndemigods, and heroes; also the ordering of the repositories of the dead,\nand the rites which have to be observed by him who would propitiate the\ninhabitants of the world below. These are matters of which we are ignorant\nourselves, and as founders of a city we should be *427C* unwise in\ntrusting them to any interpreter but our ancestral deity. He is the god\nwho sits in the centre, on the navel of the earth, and he is the\ninterpreter of religion to all mankind.\n\nYou are right, and we will do as you propose.\n\nBut where, amid all this, is justice? son of Ariston, tell me where.\n*427D* Now that our city has been made habitable, light a candle and\nsearch, and get your brother and Polemarchus and the rest of our friends\nto help, and let us see where in it we can discover justice and where\ninjustice, and in what they differ from one another, and which of them the\nman who would be happy should have for his portion, whether seen or unseen\nby gods and men.\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates, Glaucon.]\n\nNonsense, said Glaucon: did you not promise to search *427E* yourself,\nsaying that for you not to help justice in her need would be an impiety?\n\nI do not deny that I said so, and as you remind me, I will be as good as\nmy word; but you must join.\n\nWe will, he replied.\n\nWell, then, I hope to make the discovery in this way: {117} I mean to\nbegin with the assumption that our State, if rightly ordered, is perfect.\n\nThat is most certain.\n\nAnd being perfect, is therefore wise and valiant and temperate and just.\n\nThat is likewise clear.\n\nAnd whichever of these qualities we find in the State, the one which is\nnot found will be the residue?\n\n*428A* Very good.\n\nIf there were four things, and we were searching for one of them, wherever\nit might be, the one sought for might be known to us from the first, and\nthere would be no further trouble; or we might know the other three first,\nand then the fourth would clearly be the one left.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nAnd is not a similar method to be pursued about the virtues, which are\nalso four in number?\n\nClearly.\n\n[Sidenote: The place of the virtues in the State: (1) The wisdom of the\nstatesman advises, not about particular arts or pursuits,]\n\nFirst among the virtues found in the State, wisdom comes *428B* into view,\nand in this I detect a certain peculiarity.\n\nWhat is that?\n\nThe State which we have been describing is said to be wise as being good\nin counsel?\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd good counsel is clearly a kind of knowledge, for not by ignorance, but\nby knowledge, do men counsel well?\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd the kinds of knowledge in a State are many and diverse?\n\nOf course.\n\nThere is the knowledge of the carpenter; but is that the sort of knowledge\nwhich gives a city the title of wise and good in counsel?\n\n*428C* Certainly not; that would only give a city the reputation of skill\nin carpentering.\n\nThen a city is not to be called wise because possessing a knowledge which\ncounsels for the best about wooden implements?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nNor by reason of a knowledge which advises about brazen {118} pots,\nI said, nor as possessing any other similar knowledge?\n\nNot by reason of any of them, he said.\n\nNor yet by reason of a knowledge which cultivates the earth; that would\ngive the city the name of agricultural?\n\nYes.\n\n[Sidenote: but about the whole State.]\n\nWell, I said, and is there any knowledge in our recently-founded State\namong any of the citizens which advises, *428D* not about any particular\nthing in the State, but about the whole, and considers how a State can\nbest deal with itself and with other States?\n\nThere certainly is.\n\nAnd what is this knowledge, and among whom is it found? I asked.\n\nIt is the knowledge of the guardians, he replied, and is found among those\nwhom we were just now describing as perfect guardians.\n\nAnd what is the name which the city derives from the possession of this\nsort of knowledge?\n\nThe name of good in counsel and truly wise.\n\n[Sidenote: The statesmen or guardians are the smallest of all classes in\nthe State.]\n\n*428E* And will there be in our city more of these true guardians or more\nsmiths?\n\nThe smiths, he replied, will be far more numerous.\n\nWill not the guardians be the smallest of all the classes who receive a\nname from the profession of some kind of knowledge?\n\nMuch the smallest.\n\nAnd so by reason of the smallest part or class, and of the knowledge which\nresides in this presiding and ruling part of itself, the whole State,\nbeing thus constituted according to *429A* nature, will be wise; and this,\nwhich has the only knowledge worthy to be called wisdom, has been ordained\nby nature to be of all classes the least.\n\nMost true.\n\nThus, then, I said, the nature and place in the State of one of the four\nvirtues has somehow or other been discovered.\n\nAnd, in my humble opinion, very satisfactorily discovered, he replied.\n\nAgain, I said, there is no difficulty in seeing the nature of {119}\ncourage, and in what part that quality resides which gives the name of\ncourageous to the State.\n\nHow do you mean?\n\n[Sidenote: (2) The courage which makes the city courageous is found\nchiefly in the soldier.]\n\n*429B* Why, I said, every one who calls any State courageous or cowardly,\nwill be thinking of the part which fights and goes out to war on the\nState's behalf.\n\nNo one, he replied, would ever think of any other.\n\nThe rest of the citizens may be courageous or may be cowardly, but their\ncourage or cowardice will not, as I conceive, have the effect of making\nthe city either the one or the other.\n\nCertainly not.\n\n[Sidenote: It is the quality which preserves right opinion about things to\nbe feared and not to be feared.]\n\nThe city will be courageous in virtue of a portion of herself which\npreserves under all circumstances that opinion *429C* about the nature of\nthings to be feared and not to be feared in which our legislator educated\nthem; and this is what you term courage.\n\nI should like to hear what you are saying once more, for I do not think\nthat I perfectly understand you.\n\nI mean that courage is a kind of salvation.\n\nSalvation of what?\n\nOf the opinion respecting things to be feared, what they are and of what\nnature, which the law implants through education; and I mean by the words\n'under all circumstances' *429D* to intimate that in pleasure or in pain,\nor under the influence of desire or fear, a man preserves, and does not\nlose this opinion. Shall I give you an illustration?\n\nIf you please.\n\n[Sidenote: Illustration from the art of dyeing.]\n\nYou know, I said, that dyers, when they want to dye wool for making the\ntrue sea-purple, begin by selecting their white colour first; this they\nprepare and dress with much care and pains, in order that the white ground\nmay take the purple hue in full perfection. The dyeing then proceeds; and\n*429E* whatever is dyed in this manner becomes a fast colour, and no\nwashing either with lyes or without them can take away the bloom. But,\nwhen the ground has not been duly prepared, you will have noticed how poor\nis the look either of purple or of any other colour.\n\nYes, he said; I know that they have a washed-out and ridiculous\nappearance. {120}\n\n[Sidenote: Our soldiers must take the dye of the laws.]\n\nThen now, I said, you will understand what our object was *430A* in\nselecting our soldiers, and educating them in music and gymnastic; we were\ncontriving influences which would prepare them to take the dye of the laws\nin perfection, and the colour of their opinion about dangers and of every\nother opinion was to be indelibly fixed by their nurture and training, not\nto be washed away by such potent lyes as pleasure--mightier agent far in\nwashing the soul than any soda or lye; *430B* or by sorrow, fear, and\ndesire, the mightiest of all other solvents. And this sort of universal\nsaving power of true opinion in conformity with law about real and false\ndangers I call and maintain to be courage, unless you disagree.\n\nBut I agree, he replied; for I suppose that you mean to exclude mere\nuninstructed courage, such as that of a wild beast or of a slave--this, in\nyour opinion, is not the courage which the law ordains, and ought to have\nanother name.\n\n*430C* Most certainly.\n\nThen I may infer courage to be such as you describe?\n\nWhy, yes, said I, you may, and if you add the words 'of a citizen,' you\nwill not be far wrong;--hereafter, if you like, we will carry the\nexamination further, but at present we are seeking not for courage but\njustice; and for the purpose of our enquiry we have said enough.\n\nYou are right, he replied.\n\n[Sidenote: Two other virtues, temperance and justice, which must be\nconsidered in their proper order.]\n\nTwo virtues remain to be discovered in the State--first, *430D*\ntemperance, and then justice which is the end of our search.\n\nVery true.\n\nNow, can we find justice without troubling ourselves about temperance?\n\nI do not know how that can be accomplished, he said, nor do I desire that\njustice should be brought to light and temperance lost sight of; and\ntherefore I wish that you would do me the favour of considering temperance\nfirst.\n\n*430E* Certainly, I replied, I should not be justified in refusing your\nrequest.\n\nThen consider, he said.\n\nYes, I replied; I will; and as far as I can at present see, the virtue of\ntemperance has more of the nature of harmony and symphony than the\npreceding.\n\nHow so? he asked. {121}\n\nTemperance, I replied, is the ordering or controlling of certain pleasures\nand desires; this is curiously enough implied in the saying of 'a man\nbeing his own master;' and other traces of the same notion may be found in\nlanguage.\n\nNo doubt, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: The temperate is master of himself, but the same person, when\nintemperate, is also the slave of himself.]\n\nThere is something ridiculous in the expression 'master of himself;'\n*431A* for the master is also the servant and the servant the master; and\nin all these modes of speaking the same person is denoted.\n\nCertainly.\n\nThe meaning is, I believe, that in the human soul there is a better and\nalso a worse principle; and when the better has the worse under control,\nthen a man is said to be master of himself; and this is a term of praise:\nbut when, owing to evil education or association, the better principle,\nwhich is also the smaller, is overwhelmed by the greater mass of the\n*431B* worse--in this case he is blamed and is called the slave of self\nand unprincipled.\n\nYes, there is reason in that.\n\nAnd now, I said, look at our newly-created State, and there you will find\none of these two conditions realized; for the State, as you will\nacknowledge, may be justly called master of itself, if the words\n'temperance' and 'self-mastery' truly express the rule of the better part\nover the worse.\n\nYes, he said, I see that what you say is true.\n\nLet me further note that the manifold and complex pleasures *431C* and\ndesires and pains are generally found in children and women and servants,\nand in the freemen so called who are of the lowest and more numerous\nclass.\n\nCertainly, he said.\n\nWhereas the simple and moderate desires which follow reason, and are under\nthe guidance of mind and true opinion, are to be found only in a few, and\nthose the best born and best educated.\n\nVery true.\n\n[Sidenote: The State which has the passions and desires of the many\ncontrolled by the few may be rightly called temperate.]\n\nThese two, as you may perceive, have a place in our State; *431D* and the\nmeaner desires of the many are held down by the virtuous desires and\nwisdom of the few.\n\nThat I perceive, he said.\n\nThen if there be any city which may be described as {122} master of its\nown pleasures and desires, and master of itself, ours may claim such a\ndesignation?\n\nCertainly, he replied.\n\nIt may also be called temperate, and for the same reasons?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd if there be any State in which rulers and subjects *431E* will be\nagreed as to the question who are to rule, that again will be our State?\n\nUndoubtedly.\n\nAnd the citizens being thus agreed among themselves, in which class will\ntemperance be found--in the rulers or in the subjects?\n\nIn both, as I should imagine, he replied.\n\nDo you observe that we were not far wrong in our guess that temperance was\na sort of harmony?\n\nWhy so?\n\n[Sidenote: Temperance resides in the whole State.]\n\nWhy, because temperance is unlike courage and wisdom, each of which\nresides in a part only, the one making the *432A* State wise and the other\nvaliant; not so temperance, which extends to the whole, and runs through\nall the notes of the scale, and produces a harmony of the weaker and the\nstronger and the middle class, whether you suppose them to be stronger or\nweaker in wisdom or power or numbers or wealth, or anything else. Most\ntruly then may we deem temperance to be the agreement of the naturally\nsuperior and inferior, as to the right to rule of either, both in states\nand individuals.\n\n*432B* I entirely agree with you.\n\nAnd so, I said, we may consider three out of the four virtues to have been\ndiscovered in our State. The last of those qualities which make a state\nvirtuous must be justice, if we only knew what that was.\n\nThe inference is obvious.\n\n[Sidenote: Justice is not far off.]\n\nThe time then has arrived, Glaucon, when, like huntsmen, we should\nsurround the cover, and look sharp that justice does not steal away, and\npass out of sight and escape us; for *432C* beyond a doubt she is\nsomewhere in this country: watch therefore and strive to catch a sight of\nher, and if you see her first, let me know.\n\nWould that I could! but you should regard me rather as {123} a follower\nwho has just eyes enough to see what you show him--that is about as much\nas I am good for.\n\nOffer up a prayer with me and follow.\n\nI will, but you must show me the way.\n\nHere is no path, I said, and the wood is dark and perplexing; still we\nmust push on.\n\n*432D* Let us push on.\n\nHere I saw something: Halloo! I said, I begin to perceive a track, and I\nbelieve that the quarry will not escape.\n\nGood news, he said.\n\nTruly, I said, we are stupid fellows.\n\nWhy so?\n\nWhy, my good sir, at the beginning of our enquiry, ages ago, there was\njustice tumbling out at our feet, and we never saw her; nothing could be\nmore ridiculous. Like people who go about looking for what they have in\ntheir hands--that *432E* was the way with us--we looked not at what we\nwere seeking, but at what was far off in the distance; and therefore,\nI suppose, we missed her.\n\nWhat do you mean?\n\nI mean to say that in reality for a long time past we have been talking of\njustice, and have failed to recognise her.\n\nI grow impatient at the length of your exordium.\n\n[Sidenote: We had already found her when we spoke of one man doing one\nthing only.]\n\n*433A* Well then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not: You remember\nthe original principle which we were always laying down at the foundation\nof the State, that one man should practise one thing only, the thing to\nwhich his nature was best adapted;--now justice is this principle or a\npart of it.\n\nYes, we often said that one man should do one thing only.\n\nFurther, we affirmed that justice was doing one's own business, and not\nbeing a busybody; we said so again and again, *433B* and many others have\nsaid the same to us.\n\nYes, we said so.\n\nThen to do one's own business in a certain way may be assumed to be\njustice. Can you tell me whence I derive this inference?\n\nI cannot, but I should like to be told.\n\n[Sidenote: From another point of view Justice is the residue of the three\nothers.]\n\nBecause I think that this is the only virtue which remains in the State\nwhen the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are\nabstracted; and, that this is the ultimate {124} cause and condition of\nthe existence of all of them, and while remaining in them is also their\npreservative; *433C* and we were saying that if the three were discovered\nby us, justice would be the fourth or remaining one.\n\nThat follows of necessity.\n\nIf we are asked to determine which of these four qualities by its presence\ncontributes most to the excellence of the State, whether the agreement of\nrulers and subjects, or the preservation in the soldiers of the opinion\nwhich the law ordains about the true nature of dangers, or wisdom and\n*433D* watchfulness in the rulers, or whether this other which I am\nmentioning, and which is found in children and women, slave and freeman,\nartisan, ruler, subject,--the quality, I mean, of every one doing his own\nwork, and not being a busybody, would claim the palm--the question is not\nso easily answered.\n\nCertainly, he replied, there would be a difficulty in saying which.\n\nThen the power of each individual in the State to do his own work appears\nto compete with the other political virtues, wisdom, temperance, courage.\n\nYes, he said.\n\nAnd the virtue which enters into this competition is *433E* justice?\n\nExactly.\n\n[Sidenote: Our idea is confirmed by the administration of justice in\nlawsuits. No man is to have what is not his own.]\n\nLet us look at the question from another point of view: Are not the rulers\nin a State those to whom you would entrust the office of determining suits\nat law?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd are suits decided on any other ground but that a man may neither take\nwhat is another's, nor be deprived of what is his own?\n\nYes; that is their principle.\n\nWhich is a just principle?\n\nYes.\n\nThen on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and doing\nwhat is a man's own, and belongs to him?\n\n*434A* Very true.\n\n[Sidenote: Illustration: Classes, like individuals, should not meddle with\none another's occupations.]\n\nThink, now, and say whether you agree with me or not. Suppose a carpenter\nto be doing the business of a cobbler, {125} or a cobbler of a carpenter;\nand suppose them to exchange their implements or their duties, or the same\nperson to be doing the work of both, or whatever be the change; do you\nthink that any great harm would result to the State?\n\nNot much.\n\nBut when the cobbler or any other man whom nature *434B* designed to be a\ntrader, having his heart lifted up by wealth or strength or the number of\nhis followers, or any like advantage, attempts to force his way into the\nclass of warriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and guardians,\nfor which he is unfitted, and either to take the implements or the duties\nof the other; or when one man is trader, legislator, and warrior all in\none, then I think you will agree with me in saying that this interchange\nand this meddling of one with another is the ruin of the State.\n\nMost true.\n\nSeeing then, I said, that there are three distinct classes, any meddling\nof one with another, or the change of one into *434C* another, is the\ngreatest harm to the State, and may be most justly termed evil-doing?\n\nPrecisely.\n\nAnd the greatest degree of evil-doing to one's own city would be termed by\nyou injustice?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThis then is injustice; and on the other hand when the trader, the\nauxiliary, and the guardian each do their own business, that is justice,\nand will make the city just.\n\n*434D* I agree with you.\n\n[Sidenote: From the larger example of the State we will now return to the\nindividual.]\n\nWe will not, I said, be over-positive as yet; but if, on trial, this\nconception of justice be verified in the individual as well as in the\nState, there will be no longer any room for doubt; if it be not verified,\nwe must have a fresh enquiry. First let us complete the old investigation,\nwhich we began, as you remember, under the impression that, if we could\npreviously examine justice on the larger scale, there would be less\ndifficulty in discerning her in the individual. That larger *434E* example\nappeared to be the State, and accordingly we constructed as good a one as\nwe could, knowing well that in the good State justice would be found. Let\nthe discovery which we made be now applied to the individual--if they\nagree, {126} we shall be satisfied; or, if there be a difference in the\nindividual, we will come back to the State and have another *435A* trial\nof the theory. The friction of the two when rubbed together may possibly\nstrike a light in which justice will shine forth, and the vision which is\nthen revealed we will fix in our souls.\n\nThat will be in regular course; let us do as you say.\n\nI proceeded to ask: When two things, a greater and less, are called by the\nsame name, are they like or unlike in so far as they are called the same?\n\nLike, he replied.\n\n*435B* The just man then, if we regard the idea of justice only, will be\nlike the just State?\n\nHe will.\n\nAnd a State was thought by us to be just when the three classes in the\nState severally did their own business; and also thought to be temperate\nand valiant and wise by reason of certain other affections and qualities\nof these same classes?\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nAnd so of the individual; we may assume that he has the *435C* same three\nprinciples in his own soul which are found in the State; and he may be\nrightly described in the same terms, because he is affected in the same\nmanner?\n\nCertainly, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: How can we decide whether or no the soul has three distinct\nprinciples?]\n\nOnce more then, O my friend, we have alighted upon an easy\nquestion--whether the soul has these three principles or not?\n\nAn easy question! Nay, rather, Socrates, the proverb holds that hard is\nthe good.\n\n[Sidenote: Our method is inadequate, and for a better and longer one we\nhave not at present time.]\n\nVery true, I said; and I do not think that the method *435D* which we are\nemploying is at all adequate to the accurate solution of this question;\nthe true method is another and a longer one. Still we may arrive at a\nsolution not below the level of the previous enquiry.\n\nMay we not be satisfied with that? he said;--under the circumstances, I am\nquite content.\n\nI too, I replied, shall be extremely well satisfied.\n\nThen faint not in pursuing the speculation, he said.\n\n*435E* Must we not acknowledge, I said, that in each of us there {127} are\nthe same principles and habits which there are in the State; and that from\nthe individual they pass into the State?--how else can they come there?\nTake the quality of passion or spirit;--it would be ridiculous to imagine\nthat this quality, when found in States, is not derived from the\nindividuals who are supposed to possess it, e.g. the Thracians, Scythians,\nand in general the northern nations; and the same may be said of the love\nof knowledge, which is the special characteristic of our part of the\nworld, or of the *436A* love of money, which may, with equal truth, be\nattributed to the Phoenicians and Egyptians.\n\nExactly so, he said.\n\nThere is no difficulty in understanding this.\n\nNone whatever.\n\n[Sidenote: A digression in which an attempt is made to attain logical\nclearness.]\n\nBut the question is not quite so easy when we proceed to ask whether these\nprinciples are three or one; whether, that is to say, we learn with one\npart of our nature, are angry with another, and with a third part desire\nthe satisfaction *436B* of our natural appetites; or whether the whole\nsoul comes into play in each sort of action--to determine that is the\ndifficulty.\n\nYes, he said; there lies the difficulty.\n\nThen let us now try and determine whether they are the same or different.\n\nHow can we? he asked.\n\n[Sidenote: The criterion of truth: Nothing can be and not be at the same\ntime in the same relation.]\n\nI replied as follows: The same thing clearly cannot act or be acted upon\nin the same part or in relation to the same thing at the same time, in\ncontrary ways; and therefore whenever this contradiction occurs in things\napparently the same, we know that they are really not the same, but *436C*\ndifferent.\n\nGood.\n\nFor example, I said, can the same thing be at rest and in motion at the\nsame time in the same part?\n\nImpossible.\n\nStill, I said, let us have a more precise statement of terms, lest we\nshould hereafter fall out by the way. Imagine the case of a man who is\nstanding and also moving his hands and his head, and suppose a person to\nsay that one and the same person is in motion and at rest at the same\nmoment {128} --to such a mode of speech we should object, and should\n*436D* rather say that one part of him is in motion while another is at\nrest.\n\nVery true.\n\n[Sidenote: Anticipation of objections to this 'law of thought.']\n\nAnd suppose the objector to refine still further, and to draw the nice\ndistinction that not only parts of tops, but whole tops, when they spin\nround with their pegs fixed on the spot, are at rest and in motion at the\nsame time (and he may say the same of anything which revolves in the same\nspot), his objection would not be admitted by us, because *436E* in such\ncases things are not at rest and in motion in the same parts of\nthemselves; we should rather say that they have both an axis and a\ncircumference, and that the axis stands still, for there is no deviation\nfrom the perpendicular; and that the circumference goes round. But if,\nwhile revolving, the axis inclines either to the right or left, forwards\nor backwards, then in no point of view can they be at rest.\n\nThat is the correct mode of describing them, he replied.\n\nThen none of these objections will confuse us, or incline us to believe\nthat the same thing at the same time, in the *437A* same part or in\nrelation to the same thing, can act or be acted upon in contrary ways.\n\nCertainly not, according to my way of thinking.\n\nYet, I said, that we may not be compelled to examine all such objections,\nand prove at length that they are untrue, let us assume their absurdity,\nand go forward on the understanding that hereafter, if this assumption\nturn out to be untrue, all the consequences which follow shall be\nwithdrawn.\n\nYes, he said, that will be the best way.\n\n[Sidenote: Likes and dislikes exist in many forms.]\n\n*437B* Well, I said, would you not allow that assent and dissent, desire\nand aversion, attraction and repulsion, are all of them opposites, whether\nthey are regarded as active or passive (for that makes no difference in\nthe fact of their opposition)?\n\nYes, he said, they are opposites.\n\nWell, I said, and hunger and thirst, and the desires in general, and again\nwilling and wishing,--all these you would *437C* refer to the classes\nalready mentioned. You would say--would you not?--that the soul of him who\ndesires is seeking {129} after the object of his desire; or that he is\ndrawing to himself the thing which he wishes to possess: or again, when a\nperson wants anything to be given him, his mind, longing for the\nrealization of his desire, intimates his wish to have it by a nod of\nassent, as if he had been asked a question?\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd what would you say of unwillingness and dislike and the absence of\ndesire; should not these be referred to the opposite class of repulsion\nand rejection?\n\n*437D* Certainly.\n\nAdmitting this to be true of desire generally, let us suppose a particular\nclass of desires, and out of these we will select hunger and thirst, as\nthey are termed, which are the most obvious of them?\n\nLet us take that class, he said.\n\nThe object of one is food, and of the other drink?\n\nYes.\n\n[Sidenote: There may be simple thirst or qualified thirst, having\nrespectively a simple or a qualified object.]\n\nAnd here comes the point: is not thirst the desire which the soul has of\ndrink, and of drink only; not of drink qualified by anything else; for\nexample, warm or cold, or much or little, or, in a word, drink of any\nparticular sort: but if *437E* the thirst be accompanied by heat, then the\ndesire is of cold drink; or, if accompanied by cold, then of warm drink;\nor, if the thirst be excessive, then the drink which is desired will be\nexcessive; or, if not great, the quantity of drink will also be small: but\nthirst pure and simple will desire drink pure and simple, which is the\nnatural satisfaction of thirst, as food is of hunger?\n\nYes, he said; the simple desire is, as you say, in every case of the\nsimple object, and the qualified desire of the qualified object.\n\n[Sidenote: Exception: The term good expresses, not a particular, but an\nuniversal relation.]\n\n*438A* But here a confusion may arise; and I should wish to guard against\nan opponent starting up and saying that no man desires drink only, but\ngood drink, or food only, but good food; for good is the universal object\nof desire, and thirst being a desire, will necessarily be thirst after\ngood drink; and the same is true of every other desire.\n\nYes, he replied, the opponent might have something to say.\n\nNevertheless I should still maintain, that of relatives some {130} *438B*\nhave a quality attached to either term of the relation; others are simple\nand have their correlatives simple.\n\nI do not know what you mean.\n\n[Sidenote: Illustration of the argument from the use of language about\ncorrelative terms.]\n\nWell, you know of course that the greater is relative to the less?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd the much greater to the much less?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the sometime greater to the sometime less, and the greater that is to\nbe to the less that is to be?\n\nCertainly, he said.\n\n*438C* And so of more and less, and of other correlative terms, such as\nthe double and the half, or again, the heavier and the lighter, the\nswifter and the slower; and of hot and cold, and of any other\nrelatives;--is not this true of all of them?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd does not the same principle hold in the sciences? The object of\nscience is knowledge (assuming that to be the true definition), but the\nobject of a particular science is a *438D* particular kind of knowledge;\nI mean, for example, that the science of house-building is a kind of\nknowledge which is defined and distinguished from other kinds and is\ntherefore termed architecture.\n\nCertainly.\n\nBecause it has a particular quality which no other has?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd it has this particular quality because it has an object of a\nparticular kind; and this is true of the other arts and sciences?\n\nYes.\n\n[Sidenote: Recapitulation]\n\n[Sidenote: Anticipation of a possible confusion.]\n\nNow, then, if I have made myself clear, you will understand my original\nmeaning in what I said about relatives. My meaning was, that if one term\nof a relation is taken alone, the other is taken alone; if one term is\nqualified, the other is also qualified. *438E* I do not mean to say that\nrelatives may not be disparate, or that the science of health is healthy,\nor of disease necessarily diseased, or that the sciences of good and evil\nare therefore good and evil; but only that, when the term science is no\nlonger used absolutely, but has a qualified object which in this case is\nthe nature of health and disease, {131} it becomes defined, and is hence\ncalled not merely science, but the science of medicine.\n\nI quite understand, and I think as you do.\n\n*439A* Would you not say that thirst is one of these essentially relative\nterms, having clearly a relation--\n\nYes, thirst is relative to drink.\n\nAnd a certain kind of thirst is relative to a certain kind of drink; but\nthirst taken alone is neither of much nor little, nor of good nor bad, nor\nof any particular kind of drink, but of drink only?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen the soul of the thirsty one, in so far as he is thirsty, *439B*\ndesires only drink; for this he yearns and tries to obtain it?\n\nThat is plain.\n\n[Sidenote: The law of contradiction.]\n\nAnd if you suppose something which pulls a thirsty soul away from drink,\nthat must be different from the thirsty principle which draws him like a\nbeast to drink; for, as we were saying, the same thing cannot at the same\ntime with the same part of itself act in contrary ways about the same.\n\nImpossible.\n\nNo more than you can say that the hands of the archer push and pull the\nbow at the same time, but what you say is that one hand pushes and the\nother pulls.\n\n*439C* Exactly so, he replied.\n\nAnd might a man be thirsty, and yet unwilling to drink?\n\nYes, he said, it constantly happens.\n\nAnd in such a case what is one to say? Would you not say that there was\nsomething in the soul bidding a man to drink, and something else\nforbidding him, which is other and stronger than the principle which bids\nhim?\n\nI should say so.\n\n[Sidenote: The opposition of desire and reason.]\n\n*439D* And the forbidding principle is derived from reason, and that which\nbids and attracts proceeds from passion and disease?\n\nClearly.\n\nThen we may fairly assume that they are two, and that they differ from one\nanother; the one with which a man reasons, we may call the rational\nprinciple of the soul, the other, with which he loves and hungers and\nthirsts and feels the {132} flutterings of any other desire, may be termed\nthe irrational or appetitive, the ally of sundry pleasures and\nsatisfactions?\n\n*439E* Yes, he said, we may fairly assume them to be different.\n\nThen let us finally determine that there are two principles existing in\nthe soul. And what of passion, or spirit? Is it a third, or akin to one of\nthe preceding?\n\nI should be inclined to say--akin to desire.\n\n[Sidenote: The third principle of spirit or passion illustrated by an\nexample.]\n\nWell, I said, there is a story which I remember to have heard, and in\nwhich I put faith. The story is, that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, coming\nup one day from the Piraeus, under the north wall on the outside, observed\nsome dead bodies lying on the ground at the place of execution. He felt a\ndesire to see them, and also a dread and abhorrence of them; *440A* for a\ntime he struggled and covered his eyes, but at length the desire got the\nbetter of him; and forcing them open, he ran up to the dead bodies,\nsaying, Look, ye wretches, take your fill of the fair sight.\n\nI have heard the story myself, he said.\n\nThe moral of the tale is, that anger at times goes to war with desire, as\nthough they were two distinct things.\n\nYes; that is the meaning, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: Passion never takes part with desire against reason.]\n\nAnd are there not many other cases in which we observe *440B* that when a\nman's desires violently prevail over his reason, he reviles himself, and\nis angry at the violence within him, and that in this struggle, which is\nlike the struggle of factions in a State, his spirit is on the side of his\nreason;--but for the passionate or spirited element to take part with the\ndesires when reason decides that she should not be opposed[3], is a sort\nof thing which I believe that you never observed occurring in yourself,\nnor, as I should imagine, in any one else?\n\n[Footnote 3: Reading [Greek: m\u00ea\\ dei=n a)ntipra/tein], without a comma\nafter [Greek: dei=n].]\n\nCertainly not.\n\n[Sidenote: Righteous indignation never felt by a person of noble character\nwhen he deservedly suffers.]\n\n*440C* Suppose that a man thinks he has done a wrong to another, the\nnobler he is the less able is he to feel indignant at any suffering, such\nas hunger, or cold, or any other pain which the injured person may inflict\nupon him--these he deems to be just, and, as I say, his anger refuses to\nbe excited by them.\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nBut when he thinks that he is the sufferer of the wrong, {133} then he\nboils and chafes, and is on the side of what he believes to be justice;\nand because he suffers hunger *440D* or cold or other pain he is only the\nmore determined to persevere and conquer. His noble spirit will not be\nquelled until he either slays or is slain; or until he hears the voice of\nthe shepherd, that is, reason, bidding his dog bark no more.\n\nThe illustration is perfect, he replied; and in our State, as we were\nsaying, the auxiliaries were to be dogs, and to hear the voice of the\nrulers, who are their shepherds.\n\nI perceive, I said, that you quite understand me; there is, however, a\nfurther point which I wish you to consider.\n\n*440E* What point?\n\nYou remember that passion or spirit appeared at first sight to be a kind\nof desire, but now we should say quite the contrary; for in the conflict\nof the soul spirit is arrayed on the side of the rational principle.\n\nMost assuredly.\n\n[Sidenote: Not two, but three principles in the soul, as in the State.]\n\nBut a further question arises: Is passion different from reason also, or\nonly a kind of reason; in which latter case, instead of three principles\nin the soul, there will only be two, *441A* the rational and the\nconcupiscent; or rather, as the State was composed of three classes,\ntraders, auxiliaries, counsellors, so may there not be in the individual\nsoul a third element which is passion or spirit, and when not corrupted by\nbad education is the natural auxiliary of reason?\n\nYes, he said, there must be a third.\n\nYes, I replied, if passion, which has already been shown to be different\nfrom desire, turn out also to be different from reason.\n\nBut that is easily proved:--We may observe even in young children that\nthey are full of spirit almost as soon as they are born, whereas some of\nthem never seem to attain to *441B* the use of reason, and most of them\nlate enough.\n\n[Sidenote: Appeal to Homer.]\n\nExcellent, I said, and you may see passion equally in brute animals, which\nis a further proof of the truth of what you are saying. And we may once\nmore appeal to the words of Homer, which have been already quoted by us,\n\n  'He smote his breast, and thus rebuked his soul[4],' {134}\n\n*441C* for in this verse Homer has clearly supposed the power which\nreasons about the better and worse to be different from the unreasoning\nanger which is rebuked by it.\n\n[Footnote 4: Od. xx. 17, quoted supra, III. 390 D.]\n\nVery true, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: The conclusion that the same three principles exist both in the\nState and in the individual applied to each of them.]\n\nAnd so, after much tossing, we have reached land, and are fairly agreed\nthat the same principles which exist in the State exist also in the\nindividual, and that they are three in number.\n\nExactly.\n\nMust we not then infer that the individual is wise in the same way, and in\nvirtue of the same quality which makes the State wise?\n\nCertainly.\n\n*441D* Also that the same quality which constitutes courage in the State\nconstitutes courage in the individual, and that both the State and the\nindividual bear the same relation to all the other virtues?\n\nAssuredly.\n\nAnd the individual will be acknowledged by us to be just in the same way\nin which the State is just?\n\nThat follows, of course.\n\nWe cannot but remember that the justice of the State *441E* consisted in\neach of the three classes doing the work of its own class?\n\nWe are not very likely to have forgotten, he said.\n\nWe must recollect that the individual in whom the several qualities of his\nnature do their own work will be just, and will do his own work?\n\nYes, he said, we must remember that too.\n\nAnd ought not the rational principle, which is wise, and has the care of\nthe whole soul, to rule, and the passionate or spirited principle to be\nthe subject and ally?\n\nCertainly.\n\n[Sidenote: Music and gymnastic will harmonize passion and reason. These\ntwo combined will control desire,]\n\nAnd, as we were saying, the united influence of music and gymnastic will\nbring them into accord, nerving and sustaining the reason with noble words\nand lessons, and moderating and *442A* soothing and civilizing the\nwildness of passion by harmony and rhythm?\n\nQuite true, he said.\n\nAnd these two, thus nurtured and educated, and having {135} learned truly\nto know their own functions, will rule[5] over the concupiscent, which in\neach of us is the largest part of the soul and by nature most insatiable\nof gain; over this they will keep guard, lest, waxing great and strong\nwith the fulness of bodily pleasures, as they are termed, the *442B*\nconcupiscent soul, no longer confined to her own sphere, should attempt to\nenslave and rule those who are not her natural-born subjects, and overturn\nthe whole life of man?\n\n[Footnote 5: Reading [Greek: prostat\u00ea/seton] with Bekker; or, if the\nreading [Greek: prost\u00ea/seton], which is found in the MSS., be adopted,\nthen the nominative must be supplied from the previous sentence: 'Music\nand gymnastic will place in authority over ...' This is very awkward, and\nthe awkwardness is increased by the necessity of changing the subject at\n[Greek: t\u00ear\u00ea/seton].]\n\nVery true, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: and will be the best defenders both of body and soul.]\n\nBoth together will they not be the best defenders of the whole soul and\nthe whole body against attacks from without; the one counselling, and the\nother fighting under his leader, and courageously executing his commands\nand counsels?\n\nTrue.\n\n[Sidenote: The courageous.]\n\nAnd he is to be deemed courageous whose spirit retains in *442C* pleasure\nand in pain the commands of reason about what he ought or ought not to\nfear?\n\nRight, he replied.\n\n[Sidenote: The wise.]\n\nAnd him we call wise who has in him that little part which rules, and\nwhich proclaims these commands; that part too being supposed to have a\nknowledge of what is for the interest of each of the three parts and of\nthe whole?\n\nAssuredly.\n\n[Sidenote: The temperate.]\n\nAnd would you not say that he is temperate who has these same elements in\nfriendly harmony, in whom the one ruling principle of reason, and the two\nsubject ones of spirit and *442D* desire are equally agreed that reason\nought to rule, and do not rebel?\n\nCertainly, he said, that is the true account of temperance whether in the\nState or individual.\n\n[Sidenote: The just.]\n\nAnd surely, I said, we have explained again and again how and by virtue of\nwhat quality a man will be just.\n\nThat is very certain.\n\nAnd is justice dimmer in the individual, and is her form different, or is\nshe the same which we found her to be in the State? {136}\n\nThere is no difference in my opinion, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: The nature of justice illustrated by commonplace instances.]\n\nBecause, if any doubt is still lingering in our minds, a few *442E*\ncommonplace instances will satisfy us of the truth of what I am saying.\n\nWhat sort of instances do you mean?\n\nIf the case is put to us, must we not admit that the just *443A* State, or\nthe man who is trained in the principles of such a State, will be less\nlikely than the unjust to make away with a deposit of gold or silver?\nWould any one deny this?\n\nNo one, he replied.\n\nWill the just man or citizen ever be guilty of sacrilege or theft, or\ntreachery either to his friends or to his country?\n\nNever.\n\nNeither will he ever break faith where there have been oaths or\nagreements?\n\nImpossible.\n\nNo one will be less likely to commit adultery, or to dishonour his father\nand mother, or to fail in his religious duties?\n\nNo one.\n\n*443B* And the reason is that each part of him is doing its own business,\nwhether in ruling or being ruled?\n\nExactly so.\n\nAre you satisfied then that the quality which makes such men and such\nstates is justice, or do you hope to discover some other?\n\nNot I, indeed.\n\n[Sidenote: We have realized the hope entertained in the first construction\nof the State.]\n\nThen our dream has been realized; and the suspicion which we entertained\nat the beginning of our work of construction, *443C* that some divine\npower must have conducted us to a primary form of justice, has now been\nverified?\n\nYes, certainly.\n\nAnd the division of labour which required the carpenter and the shoemaker\nand the rest of the citizens to be doing each his own business, and not\nanother's, was a shadow of justice, and for that reason it was of use?\n\nClearly.\n\n[Sidenote: The three principles harmonize in one.]\n\n[Sidenote: The harmony of human life.]\n\nBut in reality justice was such as we were describing, being concerned\nhowever, not with the outward man, but *443D* with the inward, which is\nthe true self and concernment of {137} man: for the just man does not\npermit the several elements within him to interfere with one another, or\nany of them to do the work of others,--he sets in order his own inner\nlife, and is his own master and his own law, and at peace with himself;\nand when he has bound together the three principles within him, which may\nbe compared to the higher, lower, and middle notes of the scale, and the\nintermediate intervals--when he has bound all these together, and is no\nlonger *443E* many, but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly\nadjusted nature, then he proceeds to act, if he has to act, whether in a\nmatter of property, or in the treatment of the body, or in some affair of\npolitics or private business; always thinking and calling that which\npreserves and co-operates with this harmonious condition, just and good\naction, and the knowledge which presides over it, wisdom, *444A* and that\nwhich at any time impairs this condition, he will call unjust action, and\nthe opinion which presides over it ignorance.\n\nYou have said the exact truth, Socrates.\n\nVery good; and if we were to affirm that we had discovered the just man\nand the just State, and the nature of justice in each of them, we should\nnot be telling a falsehood?\n\nMost certainly not.\n\nMay we say so, then?\n\nLet us say so.\n\nAnd now, I said, injustice has to be considered.\n\nClearly.\n\n[Sidenote: Injustice the opposite of justice.]\n\n*444B* Must not injustice be a strife which arises among the three\nprinciples--a meddlesomeness, and interference, and rising up of a part of\nthe soul against the whole, an assertion of unlawful authority, which is\nmade by a rebellious subject against a true prince, of whom he is the\nnatural vassal,--what is all this confusion and delusion but injustice,\nand intemperance and cowardice and ignorance, and every form of vice?\n\nExactly so.\n\n*444C* And if the nature of justice and injustice be known, then the\nmeaning of acting unjustly and being unjust, or, again, of acting justly,\nwill also be perfectly clear?\n\nWhat do you mean? he said.\n\nWhy, I said, they are like disease and health; being in the soul just what\ndisease and health are in the body. {138}\n\nHow so? he said.\n\n[Sidenote: Analogy of body and soul.]\n\nWhy, I said, that which is healthy causes health, and that which is\nunhealthy causes disease.\n\nYes.\n\n*444D* And just actions cause justice, and unjust actions cause injustice?\n\nThat is certain.\n\n[Sidenote: Health : disease :: justice : injustice.]\n\nAnd the creation of health is the institution of a natural order and\ngovernment of one by another in the parts of the body; and the creation of\ndisease is the production of a state of things at variance with this\nnatural order?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd is not the creation of justice the institution of a natural order and\ngovernment of one by another in the parts of the soul, and the creation of\ninjustice the production of a state of things at variance with the natural\norder?\n\nExactly so, he said.\n\nThen virtue is the health and beauty and well-being of the *444E* soul,\nand vice the disease and weakness and deformity of the same?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd do not good practices lead to virtue, and evil practices to vice?\n\nAssuredly.\n\n[Sidenote: The old question, whether the just or the unjust is the\nhappier, has become ridiculous.]\n\n*445A* Still our old question of the comparative advantage of justice and\ninjustice has not been answered: Which is the more profitable, to be just\nand act justly and practise virtue, whether seen or unseen of gods and\nmen, or to be unjust and act unjustly, if only unpunished and unreformed?\n\nIn my judgment, Socrates, the question has now become ridiculous. We know\nthat, when the bodily constitution is gone, life is no longer endurable,\nthough pampered with all kinds of meats and drinks, and having all wealth\nand all power; and shall we be told that when the very essence of the\nvital principle is undermined and corrupted, life is *445B* still worth\nhaving to a man, if only he be allowed to do whatever he likes with the\nsingle exception that he is not to acquire justice and virtue, or to\nescape from injustice and vice; assuming them both to be such as we have\ndescribed?\n\nYes, I said, the question is, as you say, ridiculous. Still, {139} as we\nare near the spot at which we may see the truth in the clearest manner\nwith our own eyes, let us not faint by the way.\n\nCertainly not, he replied.\n\n*445C* Come up hither, I said, and behold the various forms of vice, those\nof them, I mean, which are worth looking at.\n\nI am following you, he replied: proceed.\n\nI said, The argument seems to have reached a height from which, as from\nsome tower of speculation, a man may look down and see that virtue is one,\nbut that the forms of vice are innumerable; there being four special ones\nwhich are deserving of note.\n\nWhat do you mean? he said.\n\n[Sidenote: As many forms of the soul as of the State.]\n\nI mean, I replied, that there appear to be as many forms of the soul as\nthere are distinct forms of the State.\n\nHow many?\n\n*445D* There are five of the State, and five of the soul, I said.\n\nWhat are they?\n\nThe first, I said, is that which we have been describing, and which may be\nsaid to have two names, monarchy and aristocracy, accordingly as rule is\nexercised by one distinguished man or by many.\n\nTrue, he replied.\n\nBut I regard the two names as describing one form only; *445E* for whether\nthe government is in the hands of one or many, if the governors have been\ntrained in the manner which we have supposed, the fundamental laws of the\nState will be maintained.\n\nThat is true, he replied.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK V.\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic V._ SOCRATES, GLAUCON, ADEIMANTUS.]\n\n[Sidenote: The community of women and children.]\n\n*449A* Such is the good and true City or State, and the good and true man\nis of the same pattern; and if this is right every other is wrong; and the\nevil is one which affects not only the ordering of the State, but also the\nregulation of the individual soul, and is exhibited in four forms.\n\nWhat are they? he said.\n\nI was proceeding to tell the order in which the four evil *449B* forms\nappeared to me to succeed one another, when Polemarchus, who was sitting a\nlittle way off, just beyond Adeimantus, began to whisper to him:\nstretching forth his hand, he took hold of the upper part of his coat by\nthe shoulder, and drew him towards him, leaning forward himself so as to\nbe quite close and saying something in his ear, of which I only caught the\nwords, 'Shall we let him off, or what shall we do?'\n\nCertainly not, said Adeimantus, raising his voice.\n\nWho is it, I said, whom you are refusing to let off?\n\nYou, he said.\n\n*449C* I repeated[1], Why am I especially not to be let off?\n\n[Footnote 1: Reading [Greek: e)/ti e)g\u00f4\\ ei)=pon].]\n\n[Sidenote: The saying 'Friends have all things in common' is an\ninsufficient solution of the problem.]\n\nWhy, he said, we think that you are lazy, and mean to cheat us out of a\nwhole chapter which is a very important part of the story; and you fancy\nthat we shall not notice your airy way of proceeding; as if it were\nself-evident to everybody, that in the matter of women and children\n'friends have all things in common.'\n\nAnd was I not right, Adeimantus?\n\nYes, he said; but what is right in this particular case, like everything\nelse, requires to be explained; for community may be of many kinds.\nPlease, therefore, to say what sort *449D* of community you mean. We have\nbeen long {141} expecting that you would tell us something about the\nfamily life of your citizens--how they will bring children into the world,\nand rear them when they have arrived, and, in general, what is the nature\nof this community of women and children--for we are of opinion that the\nright or wrong management of such matters will have a great and paramount\ninfluence on the State for good or for evil. And now, since the question\nis still undetermined, and you are taking in hand another *450A* State, we\nhave resolved, as you heard, not to let you go until you give an account\nof all this.\n\nTo that resolution, said Glaucon, you may regard me as saying Agreed.\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates, Thrasymachus.]\n\nAnd without more ado, said Thrasymachus, you may consider us all to be\nequally agreed.\n\n[Sidenote: The feigned surprise of Socrates.]\n\nI said, You know not what you are doing in thus assailing me: What an\nargument are you raising about the State! Just as I thought that I had\nfinished, and was only too glad that I had laid this question to sleep,\nand was reflecting how fortunate I was in your acceptance of what I then\nsaid, you ask me to begin again at the very foundation, ignorant of *450B*\nwhat a hornet's nest of words you are stirring. Now I foresaw this\ngathering trouble, and avoided it.\n\n[Sidenote: The good-humour of Thrasymachus.]\n\nFor what purpose do you conceive that we have come here, said\nThrasymachus,--to look for gold, or to hear discourse?\n\nYes, but discourse should have a limit.\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates, Glaucon.]\n\nYes, Socrates, said Glaucon, and the whole of life is the only limit which\nwise men assign to the hearing of such discourses. But never mind about\nus; take heart yourself *450C* and answer the question in your own way:\nWhat sort of community of women and children is this which is to prevail\namong our guardians? and how shall we manage the period between birth and\neducation, which seems to require the greatest care? Tell us how these\nthings will be.\n\nYes, my simple friend, but the answer is the reverse of easy; many more\ndoubts arise about this than about our previous conclusions. For the\npracticability of what is said may be doubted; and looked at in another\npoint of view, whether the scheme, if ever so practicable, would be for\nthe best, is also doubtful. Hence I feel a reluctance to approach {142}\nthe *450D* subject, lest our aspiration, my dear friend, should turn out\nto be a dream only.\n\nFear not, he replied, for your audience will not be hard upon you; they\nare not sceptical or hostile.\n\nI said: My good friend, I suppose that you mean to encourage me by these\nwords.\n\nYes, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: A friendly audience is more dangerous than a hostile one.]\n\nThen let me tell you that you are doing just the reverse; the\nencouragement which you offer would have been all very well had I myself\nbelieved that I knew what I was talking about: to declare the truth about\nmatters of high *450E* interest which a man honours and loves among wise\nmen who love him need occasion no fear or faltering in his mind; but to\ncarry on an argument when you are yourself only *451A* a hesitating\nenquirer, which is my condition, is a dangerous and slippery thing; and\nthe danger is not that I shall be laughed at (of which the fear would be\nchildish), but that I shall miss the truth where I have most need to be\nsure of my footing, and drag my friends after me in my fall. And I pray\nNemesis not to visit upon me the words which I am going to utter. For I do\nindeed believe that to be an involuntary homicide is a less crime than to\nbe a deceiver about beauty or goodness or justice in the matter of\nlaws[2]. And that is a risk which I would rather run among enemies than\namong friends, and therefore you do well to encourage *451B* me[3].\n\n[Footnote 2: Or inserting [Greek: kai\\] before [Greek: nomi/m\u00f4n]: 'a\ndeceiver about beauty or goodness or principles of justice or law.']\n\n[Footnote 3: Reading [Greek: \u00f4(/ste eu)= me paramuthei=].]\n\nGlaucon laughed and said: Well then, Socrates, in case you and your\nargument do us any serious injury you shall be acquitted beforehand of the\nhomicide, and shall not be held to be a deceiver; take courage then and\nspeak.\n\nWell, I said, the law says that when a man is acquitted he is free from\nguilt, and what holds at law may hold in argument.\n\nThen why should you mind?\n\nWell, I replied, I suppose that I must retrace my steps *451C* and say\nwhat I perhaps ought to have said before in the proper place. The part of\nthe men has been played out, and now properly enough comes the turn of the\nwomen. Of them I will proceed to speak, and the more readily since I am\ninvited by you. {143}\n\nFor men born and educated like our citizens, the only way, in my opinion,\nof arriving at a right conclusion about the possession and use of women\nand children is to follow the path on which we originally started, when we\nsaid that the men were to be the guardians and watchdogs of the herd.\n\nTrue.\n\n*451D* Let us further suppose the birth and education of our women to be\nsubject to similar or nearly similar regulations; then we shall see\nwhether the result accords with our design.\n\nWhat do you mean?\n\n[Sidenote: No distinction among the animals such as is made between men\nand women.]\n\nWhat I mean may be put into the form of a question, I said: Are dogs\ndivided into hes and shes, or do they both share equally in hunting and in\nkeeping watch and in the other duties of dogs? or do we entrust to the\nmales the entire and exclusive care of the flocks, while we leave the\nfemales at home, under the idea that the bearing and suckling their\npuppies is labour enough for them?\n\n*451E* No, he said, they share alike; the only difference between them is\nthat the males are stronger and the females weaker.\n\nBut can you use different animals for the same purpose, unless they are\nbred and fed in the same way?\n\nYou cannot.\n\nThen, if women are to have the same duties as men, they *452A* must have\nthe same nurture and education?\n\nYes.\n\nThe education which was assigned to the men was music and gymnastic.\n\nYes.\n\n[Sidenote: Women must be taught music, gymnastic, and military exercises\nequally with men.]\n\nThen women must be taught music and gymnastic and also the art of war,\nwhich they must practise like the men?\n\nThat is the inference, I suppose.\n\nI should rather expect, I said, that several of our proposals, if they are\ncarried out, being unusual, may appear ridiculous.\n\nNo doubt of it.\n\nYes, and the most ridiculous thing of all will be the sight of women naked\nin the palaestra, exercising with the men, *452B* especially when they are\nno longer young; they certainly will not be a vision of beauty, any more\nthan the enthusiastic {144} old men who in spite of wrinkles and ugliness\ncontinue to frequent the gymnasia.\n\nYes, indeed, he said: according to present notions the proposal would be\nthought ridiculous.\n\nBut then, I said, as we have determined to speak our minds, we must not\nfear the jests of the wits which will be directed against this sort of\ninnovation; how they will talk of women's *452C* attainments both in music\nand gymnastic, and above all about their wearing armour and riding upon\nhorseback!\n\nVery true, he replied.\n\n[Sidenote: Convention should not be permitted to stand in the way of a\nhigher good.]\n\nYet having begun we must go forward to the rough places of the law; at the\nsame time begging of these gentlemen for once in their life to be serious.\nNot long ago, as we shall remind them, the Hellenes were of the opinion,\nwhich is still generally received among the barbarians, that the sight of\na naked man was ridiculous and improper; and when first the Cretans and\nthen the Lacedaemonians introduced the *452D* custom, the wits of that day\nmight equally have ridiculed the innovation.\n\nNo doubt.\n\nBut when experience showed that to let all things be uncovered was far\nbetter than to cover them up, and the ludicrous effect to the outward eye\nvanished before the better principle which reason asserted, then the man\nwas perceived to be a fool who directs the shafts of his ridicule at any\nother *452E* sight but that of folly and vice, or seriously inclines to\nweigh the beautiful by any other standard but that of the good[4].\n\n[Footnote 4: Reading with Paris A. [Greek: kai\\ kalou= ...]]\n\nVery true, he replied.\n\nFirst, then, whether the question is to be put in jest or in *453A*\nearnest, let us come to an understanding about the nature of woman: Is she\ncapable of sharing either wholly or partially in the actions of men, or\nnot at all? And is the art of war one of those arts in which she can or\ncan not share? That will be the best way of commencing the enquiry, and\nwill probably lead to the fairest conclusion.\n\nThat will be much the best way.\n\nShall we take the other side first and begin by arguing against ourselves;\nin this manner the adversary's position will not be undefended. {145}\n\n*453B* Why not? he said.\n\n[Sidenote: Objection: We were saying that every one should do his own\nwork: Have not women and men severally a work of their own?]\n\nThen let us put a speech into the mouths of our opponents. They will say:\n'Socrates and Glaucon, no adversary need convict you, for you yourselves,\nat the first foundation of the State, admitted the principle that\neverybody was to do the one work suited to his own nature.' And certainly,\nif I am not mistaken, such an admission was made by us. 'And do not the\nnatures of men and women differ very much indeed?' And we shall reply: Of\ncourse they do. Then we shall be asked, 'Whether the tasks assigned to men\nand to women should not be different, and such as are agreeable to their\n*453C* different natures?' Certainly they should. 'But if so, have you not\nfallen into a serious inconsistency in saying that men and women, whose\nnatures are so entirely different, ought to perform the same\nactions?'--What defence will you make for us, my good Sir, against any one\nwho offers these objections?\n\nThat is not an easy question to answer when asked suddenly; and I shall\nand I do beg of you to draw out the case on our side.\n\nThese are the objections, Glaucon, and there are many *453D* others of a\nlike kind, which I foresaw long ago; they made me afraid and reluctant to\ntake in hand any law about the possession and nurture of women and\nchildren.\n\nBy Zeus, he said, the problem to be solved is anything but easy.\n\nWhy yes, I said, but the fact is that when a man is out of his depth,\nwhether he has fallen into a little swimming bath or into mid ocean, he\nhas to swim all the same.\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd must not we swim and try to reach the shore: we will hope that Arion's\ndolphin or some other miraculous help may save us?\n\n*453E* I suppose so, he said.\n\nWell then, let us see if any way of escape can be found. We\nacknowledged--did we not? that different natures ought to have different\npursuits, and that men's and women's natures are different. And now what\nare we saying?--that different natures ought to have the same\npursuits,--this is the inconsistency which is charged upon us. {146}\n\nPrecisely.\n\n*454A* Verily, Glaucon, I said, glorious is the power of the art of\ncontradiction!\n\nWhy do you say so?\n\n[Sidenote: The seeming inconsistency arises out of a verbal opposition.]\n\nBecause I think that many a man falls into the practice against his will.\nWhen he thinks that he is reasoning he is really disputing, just because\nhe cannot define and divide, and so know that of which he is speaking; and\nhe will pursue a merely verbal opposition in the spirit of contention and\nnot of fair discussion.\n\nYes, he replied, such is very often the case; but what has that to do with\nus and our argument?\n\n*454B* A great deal; for there is certainly a danger of our getting\nunintentionally into a verbal opposition.\n\nIn what way?\n\n[Sidenote: When we assigned to different natures different pursuits, we\nmeant only those differences of nature which affected the pursuits.]\n\nWhy we valiantly and pugnaciously insist upon the verbal truth, that\ndifferent natures ought to have different pursuits, but we never\nconsidered at all what was the meaning of sameness or difference of\nnature, or why we distinguished them when we assigned different pursuits\nto different natures and the same to the same natures.\n\nWhy, no, he said, that was never considered by us.\n\n*454C* I said: Suppose that by way of illustration we were to ask the\nquestion whether there is not an opposition in nature between bald men and\nhairy men; and if this is admitted by us, then, if bald men are cobblers,\nwe should forbid the hairy men to be cobblers, and conversely?\n\nThat would be a jest, he said.\n\nYes, I said, a jest; and why? because we never meant when we constructed\nthe State, that the opposition of natures should extend to every\ndifference, but only to those *454D* differences which affected the\npursuit in which the individual is engaged; we should have argued, for\nexample, that a physician and one who is in mind a physician[5] may be\nsaid to have the same nature.\n\n[Footnote 5: Reading [Greek: i)atro\\n me\\n kai\\ i)atriko\\n t\u00ea\\n psuch\u00ea\\n\no)/nta].]\n\nTrue.\n\nWhereas the physician and the carpenter have different natures?\n\nCertainly. {147}\n\nAnd if, I said, the male and female sex appear to differ in their fitness\nfor any art or pursuit, we should say that such pursuit or art ought to be\nassigned to one or the other of them; but if the difference consists only\nin women bearing *454E* and men begetting children, this does not amount\nto a proof that a woman differs from a man in respect of the sort of\neducation she should receive; and we shall therefore continue to maintain\nthat our guardians and their wives ought to have the same pursuits.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nNext, we shall ask our opponent how, in reference to any *455A* of the\npursuits or arts of civic life, the nature of a woman differs from that of\na man?\n\nThat will be quite fair.\n\nAnd perhaps he, like yourself, will reply that to give a sufficient answer\non the instant is not easy; but after a little reflection there is no\ndifficulty.\n\nYes, perhaps.\n\nSuppose then that we invite him to accompany us in the *455B* argument,\nand then we may hope to show him that there is nothing peculiar in the\nconstitution of women which would affect them in the administration of the\nState.\n\nBy all means.\n\n[Sidenote: The same natural gifts are found in both sexes, but they are\npossessed in a higher degree by men than women.]\n\nLet us say to him: Come now, and we will ask you a question:--when you\nspoke of a nature gifted or not gifted in any respect, did you mean to say\nthat one man will acquire a thing easily, another with difficulty; a\nlittle learning will lead the one to discover a great deal; whereas the\nother, after much study and application, no sooner learns than he forgets;\nor again, did you mean, that the one has a body which is a good servant to\nhis mind, while the body of the other is a hindrance to him?--would not\nthese be the sort *455C* of differences which distinguish the man gifted\nby nature from the one who is ungifted?\n\nNo one will deny that.\n\nAnd can you mention any pursuit of mankind in which the male sex has not\nall these gifts and qualities in a higher degree than the female? Need\nI waste time in speaking of the art of weaving, and the management of\npancakes and preserves, in which womankind does really appear to be {148}\ngreat, and in which for her to be beaten by a man is of all *455D* things\nthe most absurd?\n\nYou are quite right, he replied, in maintaining the general inferiority of\nthe female sex: although many women are in many things superior to many\nmen, yet on the whole what you say is true.\n\nAnd if so, my friend, I said, there is no special faculty of\nadministration in a state which a woman has because she is a woman, or\nwhich a man has by virtue of his sex, but the gifts of nature are alike\ndiffused in both; all the pursuits of *455E* men are the pursuits of women\nalso, but in all of them a woman is inferior to a man.\n\nVery true.\n\n[Sidenote: Men and women are to be governed by the same laws and to have\nthe same pursuits.]\n\nThen are we to impose all our enactments on men and none of them on women?\n\nThat will never do.\n\n*456A* One woman has a gift of healing, another not; one is a musician,\nand another has no music in her nature?\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd one woman has a turn for gymnastic and military exercises, and another\nis unwarlike and hates gymnastics?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd one woman is a philosopher, and another is an enemy of philosophy; one\nhas spirit, and another is without spirit?\n\nThat is also true.\n\nThen one woman will have the temper of a guardian, and another not. Was\nnot the selection of the male guardians determined by differences of this\nsort?\n\nYes.\n\nMen and women alike possess the qualities which make a guardian; they\ndiffer only in their comparative strength or weakness.\n\nObviously.\n\n*456B* And those women who have such qualities are to be selected as the\ncompanions and colleagues of men who have similar qualities and whom they\nresemble in capacity and in character?\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd ought not the same natures to have the same pursuits?\n\nThey ought.\n\nThen, as we were saying before, there is nothing unnatural {149} in\nassigning music and gymnastic to the wives of the guardians--to that point\nwe come round again.\n\nCertainly not.\n\nThe law which we then enacted was agreeable to nature, *456C* and\ntherefore not an impossibility or mere aspiration; and the contrary\npractice, which prevails at present, is in reality a violation of nature.\n\nThat appears to be true.\n\nWe had to consider, first, whether our proposals were possible, and\nsecondly whether they were the most beneficial?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the possibility has been acknowledged?\n\nYes.\n\nThe very great benefit has next to be established?\n\nQuite so.\n\n[Sidenote: There are different degrees of goodness both in women and in\nmen.]\n\nYou will admit that the same education which makes a man a good guardian\nwill make a woman a good guardian; for *456D* their original nature is the\nsame?\n\nYes.\n\nI should like to ask you a question.\n\nWhat is it?\n\nWould you say that all men are equal in excellence, or is one man better\nthan another?\n\nThe latter.\n\nAnd in the commonwealth which we were founding do you conceive the\nguardians who have been brought up on our model system to be more perfect\nmen, or the cobblers whose education has been cobbling?\n\nWhat a ridiculous question!\n\nYou have answered me, I replied: Well, and may we not *456E* further say\nthat our guardians are the best of our citizens?\n\nBy far the best.\n\nAnd will not their wives be the best women?\n\nYes, by far the best.\n\nAnd can there be anything better for the interests of the State than that\nthe men and women of a State should be as good as possible?\n\nThere can be nothing better.\n\n*457A* And this is what the arts of music and gymnastic, when present in\nsuch manner as we have described, will accomplish? {150}\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen we have made an enactment not only possible but in the highest degree\nbeneficial to the State?\n\nTrue.\n\n[Sidenote: The noble saying.]\n\nThen let the wives of our guardians strip, for their virtue will be their\nrobe, and let them share in the toils of war and the defence of their\ncountry; only in the distribution of labours the lighter are to be\nassigned to the women, who are the weaker natures, but in other respects\ntheir duties are to be the same. *457B* And as for the man who laughs at\nnaked women exercising their bodies from the best of motives, in his\nlaughter he is plucking\n\n  'A fruit of unripe wisdom,'\n\nand he himself is ignorant of what he is laughing at, or what he is\nabout;--for that is, and ever will be, the best of sayings, _That the\nuseful is the noble and the hurtful is the base._\n\nVery true.\n\nHere, then, is one difficulty in our law about women, which we may say\nthat we have now escaped; the wave has not swallowed us up alive for\nenacting that the guardians of either sex should have all their pursuits\nin common; to the utility *457C* and also to the possibility of this\narrangement the consistency of the argument with itself bears witness.\n\nYes, that was a mighty wave which you have escaped.\n\n[Sidenote: The second and greater wave.]\n\nYes, I said, but a greater is coming; you will not think much of this when\nyou see the next.\n\nGo on; let me see.\n\nThe law, I said, which is the sequel of this and of all that has preceded,\nis to the following effect,--'that the wives of *457D* our guardians are\nto be common, and their children are to be common, and no parent is to\nknow his own child, nor any child his parent.'\n\nYes, he said, that is a much greater wave than the other; and the\npossibility as well as the utility of such a law are far more\nquestionable.\n\nI do not think, I said, that there can be any dispute about the very great\nutility of having wives and children in common; the possibility is quite\nanother matter, and will be very much disputed. {151}\n\n*457E* I think that a good many doubts may be raised about both.\n\n[Sidenote: The utility and possibility of a community of wives and\nchildren.]\n\nYou imply that the two questions must be combined, I replied. Now I meant\nthat you should admit the utility; and in this way, as I thought, I should\nescape from one of them, and then there would remain only the possibility.\n\nBut that little attempt is detected, and therefore you will please to give\na defence of both.\n\n[Sidenote: The utility to be considered first, the possibility\nafterwards.]\n\nWell, I said, I submit to my fate. Yet grant me a little *458A* favour:\nlet me feast my mind with the dream as day dreamers are in the habit of\nfeasting themselves when they are walking alone; for before they have\ndiscovered any means of effecting their wishes--that is a matter which\nnever troubles them--they would rather not tire themselves by thinking\nabout possibilities; but assuming that what they desire is already granted\nto them, they proceed with their plan, and delight in detailing what they\nmean to do when their wish has come true--that is a way which they have of\nnot doing much good *458B* to a capacity which was never good for much.\nNow I myself am beginning to lose heart, and I should like, with your\npermission, to pass over the question of possibility at present. Assuming\ntherefore the possibility of the proposal, I shall now proceed to enquire\nhow the rulers will carry out these arrangements, and I shall demonstrate\nthat our plan, if executed, will be of the greatest benefit to the State\nand to the guardians. First of all, then, if you have no objection, I will\nendeavour with your help to consider the advantages of the measure; and\nhereafter the question of possibility.\n\nI have no objection; proceed.\n\nFirst, I think that if our rulers and their auxiliaries are to *458C* be\nworthy of the name which they bear, there must be willingness to obey in\nthe one and the power of command in the other; the guardians must\nthemselves obey the laws, and they must also imitate the spirit of them in\nany details which are entrusted to their care.\n\nThat is right, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: The legislator will select guardians male and female, who will\nmeet at common meals and exercises, and will be drawn to one another by an\nirresistible necessity.]\n\nYou, I said, who are their legislator, having selected the men, will now\nselect the women and give them to them;--they must be as far as possible\nof like natures with them; and they must live in common houses and meet at\ncommon meals. None of them will have anything specially his or her own;\n{152} *458D* they will be together, and will be brought up together, and\nwill associate at gymnastic exercises. And so they will be drawn by a\nnecessity of their natures to have intercourse with each other--necessity\nis not too strong a word, I think?\n\nYes, he said;--necessity, not geometrical, but another sort of necessity\nwhich lovers know, and which is far more convincing and constraining to\nthe mass of mankind.\n\nTrue, I said; and this, Glaucon, like all the rest, must proceed after an\norderly fashion; in a city of the blessed, *458E* licentiousness is an\nunholy thing which the rulers will forbid.\n\nYes, he said, and it ought not to be permitted.\n\nThen clearly the next thing will be to make matrimony sacred in the\nhighest degree, and what is most beneficial will be deemed sacred?\n\n*459A* Exactly.\n\n[Sidenote: The breeding of human beings, as of animals, to be from the\nbest and from those who are of a ripe age.]\n\nAnd how can marriages be made most beneficial?--that is a question which\nI put to you, because I see in your house dogs for hunting, and of the\nnobler sort of birds not a few. Now, I beseech you, do tell me, have you\never attended to their pairing and breeding?\n\nIn what particulars?\n\nWhy, in the first place, although they are all of a good sort, are not\nsome better than others?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd do you breed from them all indifferently, or do you take care to breed\nfrom the best only?\n\nFrom the best.\n\n*459B* And do you take the oldest or the youngest, or only those of ripe\nage?\n\nI choose only those of ripe age.\n\nAnd if care was not taken in the breeding, your dogs and birds would\ngreatly deteriorate?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd the same of horses and animals in general?\n\nUndoubtedly.\n\nGood heavens! my dear friend, I said, what consummate skill will our\nrulers need if the same principle holds of the human species!\n\n*459C* Certainly, the same principle holds; but why does this involve any\nparticular skill? {153}\n\n[Sidenote: Useful lies 'very honest knaveries.']\n\nBecause, I said, our rulers will often have to practise upon the body\ncorporate with medicines. Now you know that when patients do not require\nmedicines, but have only to be put under a regimen, the inferior sort of\npractitioner is deemed to be good enough; but when medicine has to be\ngiven, then the doctor should be more of a man.\n\nThat is quite true, he said; but to what are you alluding?\n\nI mean, I replied, that our rulers will find a considerable dose of\nfalsehood and deceit necessary for the good of their subjects: *459D* we\nwere saying that the use of all these things regarded as medicines might\nbe of advantage.\n\nAnd we were very right.\n\nAnd this lawful use of them seems likely to be often needed in the\nregulations of marriages and births.\n\nHow so?\n\n[Sidenote: Arrangements for the improvement of the breed;]\n\nWhy, I said, the principle has been already laid down that the best of\neither sex should be united with the best as often, and the inferior with\nthe inferior, as seldom as possible; and that they should rear the\noffspring of the one sort of union, *459E* but not of the other, if the\nflock is to be maintained in first-rate condition. Now these goings on\nmust be a secret which the rulers only know, or there will be a further\ndanger of our herd, as the guardians may be termed, breaking out into\nrebellion.\n\nVery true.\n\n[Sidenote: and for the regulation of population.]\n\nHad we not better appoint certain festivals at which we will bring\ntogether the brides and bridegrooms, and sacrifices *460A* will be offered\nand suitable hymeneal songs composed by our poets: the number of weddings\nis a matter which must be left to the discretion of the rulers, whose aim\nwill be to preserve the average of population? There are many other things\nwhich they will have to consider, such as the effects of wars and diseases\nand any similar agencies, in order as far as this is possible to prevent\nthe State from becoming either too large or too small.\n\nCertainly, he replied.\n\n[Sidenote: Pairing by lot.]\n\nWe shall have to invent some ingenious kind of lots which the less worthy\nmay draw on each occasion of our bringing them together, and then they\nwill accuse their own ill-luck and not the rulers. {154}\n\nTo be sure, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: The brave deserve the fair.]\n\n*460B* And I think that our braver and better youth, besides their other\nhonours and rewards, might have greater facilities of intercourse with\nwomen given them; their bravery will be a reason, and such fathers ought\nto have as many sons as possible.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd the proper officers, whether male or female or both, for offices are\nto be held by women as well as by men--\n\nYes--\n\n[Sidenote: What is to be done with the children?]\n\n*460C* The proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents to\nthe pen or fold, and there they will deposit them with certain nurses who\ndwell in a separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the\nbetter when they chance to be deformed, will be put away in some\nmysterious, unknown place, as they should be.\n\nYes, he said, that must be done if the breed of the guardians is to be\nkept pure.\n\nThey will provide for their nurture, and will bring the mothers to the\nfold when they are full of milk, taking the *460D* greatest possible care\nthat no mother recognises her own child; and other wet-nurses may be\nengaged if more are required. Care will also be taken that the process of\nsuckling shall not be protracted too long; and the mothers will have no\ngetting up at night or other trouble, but will hand over all this sort of\nthing to the nurses and attendants.\n\nYou suppose the wives of our guardians to have a fine easy time of it when\nthey are having children.\n\nWhy, said I, and so they ought. Let us, however, proceed with our scheme.\nWe were saying that the parents should be in the prime of life?\n\nVery true.\n\n*460E* And what is the prime of life? May it not be defined as a period of\nabout twenty years in a woman's life, and thirty in a man's?\n\nWhich years do you mean to include?\n\n[Sidenote: A woman to bear children from twenty to forty; a man to beget\nthem from twenty-five to fifty-five.]\n\nA woman, I said, at twenty years of age may begin to bear children to the\nState, and continue to bear them until forty; a man may begin at\nfive-and-twenty, when he has passed the {155} point at which the pulse of\nlife beats quickest, and continue to beget children until he be\nfifty-five.\n\n*461A* Certainly, he said, both in men and women those years are the prime\nof physical as well as of intellectual vigour.\n\nAny one above or below the prescribed ages who takes part in the public\nhymeneals shall be said to have done an unholy and unrighteous thing; the\nchild of which he is the father, if it steals into life, will have been\nconceived under auspices very unlike the sacrifices and prayers, which at\neach hymeneal priestesses and priest and the whole city will offer, that\nthe new generation may be better and more useful than their *461B* good\nand useful parents, whereas his child will be the offspring of darkness\nand strange lust.\n\nVery true, he replied.\n\nAnd the same law will apply to any one of those within the prescribed age\nwho forms a connection with any woman in the prime of life without the\nsanction of the rulers; for we shall say that he is raising up a bastard\nto the State, uncertified and unconsecrated.\n\nVery true, he replied.\n\n[Sidenote: After the prescribed age has been passed, more licence is\nallowed: but all who were born after certain hymeneal festivals at which\ntheir parents or grandparents came together must be kept separate.]\n\nThis applies, however, only to those who are within the specified age:\nafter that we allow them to range at will, *461C* except that a man may\nnot marry his daughter or his daughter's daughter, or his mother or his\nmother's mother; and women, on the other hand, are prohibited from\nmarrying their sons or fathers, or son's son or father's father, and so on\nin either direction. And we grant all this, accompanying the permission\nwith strict orders to prevent any embryo which may come into being from\nseeing the light; and if any force a way to the birth, the parents must\nunderstand that the offspring of such an union cannot be maintained, and\narrange accordingly.\n\nThat also, he said, is a reasonable proposition. But how *461D* will they\nknow who are fathers and daughters, and so on?\n\nThey will never know. The way will be this:--dating from the day of the\nhymeneal, the bridegroom who was then married will call all the male\nchildren who are born in the seventh and tenth month afterwards his sons,\nand the female children his daughters, and they will call him father, and\nhe will call their children his grandchildren, and they {156} will call\nthe elder generation grandfathers and grandmothers. All who were begotten\nat the time when their fathers and mothers came together will be called\ntheir brothers and *461E* sisters, and these, as I was saying, will be\nforbidden to inter-marry. This, however, is not to be understood as an\nabsolute prohibition of the marriage of brothers and sisters; if the lot\nfavours them, and they receive the sanction of the Pythian oracle, the law\nwill allow them.\n\nQuite right, he replied.\n\nSuch is the scheme, Glaucon, according to which the guardians of our State\nare to have their wives and families in common. And now you would have the\nargument show that this community is consistent with the rest of our\npolity, and also that nothing can be better--would you not?\n\n*462A* Yes, certainly.\n\nShall we try to find a common basis by asking of ourselves what ought to\nbe the chief aim of the legislator in making laws and in the organization\nof a State,--what is the greatest good, and what is the greatest evil, and\nthen consider whether our previous description has the stamp of the good\nor of the evil?\n\nBy all means.\n\n[Sidenote: The greatest good of States, unity; the greatest evil, discord.\nThe one the result of public, the other of private feelings.]\n\nCan there be any greater evil than discord and distraction *462B* and\nplurality where unity ought to reign? or any greater good than the bond of\nunity?\n\nThere cannot.\n\nAnd there is unity where there is community of pleasures and pains--where\nall the citizens are glad or grieved on the same occasions of joy and\nsorrow?\n\nNo doubt.\n\nYes; and where there is no common but only private feeling a State is\ndisorganized--when you have one half of the world triumphing and the other\nplunged in grief at *462C* the same events happening to the city or the\ncitizens?\n\nCertainly.\n\nSuch differences commonly originate in a disagreement about the use of the\nterms 'mine' and 'not mine,' 'his' and 'not his.'\n\nExactly so.\n\nAnd is not that the best-ordered State in which the greatest {157} number\nof persons apply the terms 'mine' and 'not mine' in the same way to the\nsame thing?\n\nQuite true.\n\n[Sidenote: The State like a living being which feels altogether when hurt\nin any part.]\n\nOr that again which most nearly approaches to the condition of the\nindividual--as in the body, when but a finger of one of us is hurt, the\nwhole frame, drawn towards the soul as a centre and forming one kingdom\nunder the ruling power *462D* therein, feels the hurt and sympathizes all\ntogether with the part affected, and we say that the man has a pain in his\nfinger; and the same expression is used about any other part of the body,\nwhich has a sensation of pain at suffering or of pleasure at the\nalleviation of suffering.\n\nVery true, he replied; and I agree with you that in the best-ordered State\nthere is the nearest approach to this common feeling which you describe.\n\nThen when any one of the citizens experiences any good *462E* or evil, the\nwhole State will make his case their own, and will either rejoice or\nsorrow with him?\n\nYes, he said, that is what will happen in a well-ordered State.\n\n[Sidenote: How different are the terms which are applied to the rulers in\nother States and in our own!]\n\nIt will now be time, I said, for us to return to our State and see whether\nthis or some other form is most in accordance with these fundamental\nprinciples.\n\nVery good.\n\n*463A* Our State like every other has rulers and subjects?\n\nTrue.\n\nAll of whom will call one another citizens?\n\nOf course.\n\nBut is there not another name which people give to their rulers in other\nStates?\n\nGenerally they call them masters, but in democratic States they simply\ncall them rulers.\n\nAnd in our State what other name besides that of citizens do the people\ngive the rulers?\n\n*463B* They are called saviours and helpers, he replied.\n\nAnd what do the rulers call the people?\n\nTheir maintainers and foster-fathers.\n\nAnd what do they call them in other States?\n\nSlaves.\n\nAnd what do the rulers call one another in other States? {158}\n\nFellow-rulers.\n\nAnd what in ours?\n\nFellow-guardians.\n\nDid you ever know an example in any other State of a ruler who would speak\nof one of his colleagues as his friend and of another as not being his\nfriend?\n\nYes, very often.\n\nAnd the friend he regards and describes as one in whom *463C* he has an\ninterest, and the other as a stranger in whom he has no interest?\n\nExactly.\n\nBut would any of your guardians think or speak of any other guardian as a\nstranger?\n\nCertainly he would not; for every one whom they meet will be regarded by\nthem either as a brother or sister, or father or mother, or son or\ndaughter, or as the child or parent of those who are thus connected with\nhim.\n\n[Sidenote: The State one family.]\n\nCapital, I said; but let me ask you once more: Shall they *463D* be a\nfamily in name only; or shall they in all their actions be true to the\nname? For example, in the use of the word 'father,' would the care of a\nfather be implied and the filial reverence and duty and obedience to him\nwhich the law commands; and is the violator of these duties to be regarded\nas an impious and unrighteous person who is not likely to receive much\ngood either at the hands of God or of man? Are these to be or not to be\nthe strains which the children will hear repeated in their ears by all the\ncitizens about those who are intimated to them to be their parents and the\nrest of their kinsfolk?\n\n[Sidenote: Using the same terms, they will have the same modes of thinking\nand acting, and this is to be attributed mainly to the community of women\nand children.]\n\n*463E* These, he said, and none other; for what can be more ridiculous\nthan for them to utter the names of family ties with the lips only and not\nto act in the spirit of them?\n\nThen in our city the language of harmony and concord will be more often\nheard than in any other. As I was describing before, when any one is well\nor ill, the universal word will be 'with me it is well' or 'it is ill.'\n\n*464A* Most true.\n\nAnd agreeably to this mode of thinking and speaking, were we not saying\nthat they will have their pleasures and pains in common? {159}\n\nYes, and so they will.\n\nAnd they will have a common interest in the same thing which they will\nalike call 'my own,' and having this common interest they will have a\ncommon feeling of pleasure and pain?\n\nYes, far more so than in other States.\n\nAnd the reason of this, over and above the general constitution of the\nState, will be that the guardians will have a community of women and\nchildren?\n\nThat will be the chief reason.\n\n*464B* And this unity of feeling we admitted to be the greatest good, as\nwas implied in our own comparison of a well-ordered State to the relation\nof the body and the members, when affected by pleasure or pain?\n\nThat we acknowledged, and very rightly.\n\nThen the community of wives and children among our citizens is clearly the\nsource of the greatest good to the State?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd this agrees with the other principle which we were affirming,--that\nthe guardians were not to have houses or *464C* lands or any other\nproperty; their pay was to be their food, which they were to receive from\nthe other citizens, and they were to have no private expenses; for we\nintended them to preserve their true character of guardians.\n\nRight, he replied.\n\n[Sidenote: There will be no private interests among them, and therefore no\nlawsuits or trials for assault or violence to elders.]\n\nBoth the community of property and the community of families, as I am\nsaying, tend to make them more truly guardians; they will not tear the\ncity in pieces by differing about 'mine' and 'not mine;' each man dragging\nany *464D* acquisition which he has made into a separate house of his own,\nwhere he has a separate wife and children and private pleasures and pains;\nbut all will be affected as far as may be by the same pleasures and pains\nbecause they are all of one opinion about what is near and dear to them,\nand therefore they all tend towards a common end.\n\nCertainly, he replied.\n\nAnd as they have nothing but their persons which they can call their own,\nsuits and complaints will have no existence *464E* among them; they will\nbe delivered from all those quarrels of which money or children or\nrelations are the occasion. {160}\n\nOf course they will.\n\nNeither will trials for assault or insult ever be likely to occur among\nthem. For that equals should defend themselves against equals we shall\nmaintain to be honourable and right; *465A* we shall make the protection\nof the person a matter of necessity.\n\nThat is good, he said.\n\nYes; and there is a further good in the law; viz. that if a man has a\nquarrel with another he will satisfy his resentment then and there, and\nnot proceed to more dangerous lengths.\n\nCertainly.\n\nTo the elder shall be assigned the duty of ruling and chastising the\nyounger.\n\nClearly.\n\nNor can there be a doubt that the younger will not strike or do any other\nviolence to an elder, unless the magistrates command him; nor will he\nslight him in any way. For there are two guardians, shame and fear, mighty\nto prevent him: shame, which makes men refrain from laying hands on *465B*\nthose who are to them in the relation of parents; fear, that the injured\none will be succoured by the others who are his brothers, sons, fathers.\n\nThat is true, he replied.\n\nThen in every way the laws will help the citizens to keep the peace with\none another?\n\nYes, there will be no want of peace.\n\n[Sidenote: From how many other evils will our citizens be delivered!]\n\nAnd as the guardians will never quarrel among themselves there will be no\ndanger of the rest of the city being divided either against them or\nagainst one another.\n\nNone whatever.\n\nI hardly like even to mention the little meannesses of *465C* which they\nwill be rid, for they are beneath notice: such, for example, as the\nflattery of the rich by the poor, and all the pains and pangs which men\nexperience in bringing up a family, and in finding money to buy\nnecessaries for their household, borrowing and then repudiating, getting\nhow they can, and giving the money into the hands of women and slaves to\nkeep--the many evils of so many kinds which people suffer in this way are\nmean enough and obvious enough, and not worth speaking of. {161}\n\n*465D* Yes, he said, a man has no need of eyes in order to perceive that.\n\nAnd from all these evils they will be delivered, and their life will be\nblessed as the life of Olympic victors and yet more blessed.\n\nHow so?\n\nThe Olympic victor, I said, is deemed happy in receiving a part only of\nthe blessedness which is secured to our citizens, who have won a more\nglorious victory and have a more complete maintenance at the public cost.\nFor the victory which they have won is the salvation of the whole State;\nand the crown with which they and their children are crowned is the\nfulness of all that life needs; they receive *465E* rewards from the hands\nof their country while living, and after death have an honourable burial.\n\nYes, he said, and glorious rewards they are.\n\n[Sidenote: Answer to the charge of Adeimantus that we made our citizens\nunhappy for their own good.]\n\nDo you remember, I said, how in the course of the previous *466A*\ndiscussion[6] some one who shall be nameless accused us of making our\nguardians unhappy--they had nothing and might have possessed all\nthings--to whom we replied that, if an occasion offered, we might perhaps\nhereafter consider this question, but that, as at present advised, we\nwould make our guardians truly guardians, and that we were fashioning the\nState with a view to the greatest happiness, not of any particular class,\nbut of the whole?\n\n[Footnote 6: Pages 419, 420 ff.]\n\nYes, I remember.\n\n[Sidenote: Their life not to be compared with that of citizens in ordinary\nStates.]\n\nAnd what do you say, now that the life of our protectors is made out to be\nfar better and nobler than that of Olympic *466B* victors--is the life of\nshoemakers, or any other artisans, or of husbandmen, to be compared with\nit?\n\nCertainly not.\n\n[Sidenote: He who seeks to be more than a guardian is naught.]\n\nAt the same time I ought here to repeat what I have said elsewhere, that\nif any of our guardians shall try to be happy in such a manner that he\nwill cease to be a guardian, and is not content with this safe and\nharmonious life, which, in our judgment, is of all lives the best, but\ninfatuated by some youthful conceit of happiness which gets up into his\nhead *466C* shall seek to appropriate the whole state to himself, then he\n{162} will have to learn how wisely Hesiod spoke, when he said, 'half is\nmore than the whole.'\n\nIf he were to consult me, I should say to him: Stay where you are, when\nyou have the offer of such a life.\n\n[Sidenote: The common way of life includes common education, common\nchildren, common services and duties of men and women.]\n\nYou agree then, I said, that men and women are to have a common way of\nlife such as we have described--common education, common children; and\nthey are to watch over the citizens in common whether abiding in the city\nor going out to war; they are to keep watch together, and to hunt *466D*\ntogether like dogs; and always and in all things, as far as they are able,\nwomen are to share with the men? And in so doing they will do what is\nbest, and will not violate, but preserve the natural relation of the\nsexes.\n\nI agree with you, he replied.\n\nThe enquiry, I said, has yet to be made, whether such a community be found\npossible--as among other animals, so also among men--and if possible, in\nwhat way possible?\n\nYou have anticipated the question which I was about to suggest.\n\n*466E* There is no difficulty, I said, in seeing how war will be carried\non by them.\n\nHow?\n\n[Sidenote: The children to accompany their parents on military\nexpeditions;]\n\nWhy, of course they will go on expeditions together; and will take with\nthem any of their children who are strong enough, that, after the manner\nof the artisan's child, they may look on at the work which they will have\nto do when they are grown up; *467A* and besides looking on they will have\nto help and be of use in war, and to wait upon their fathers and mothers.\nDid you never observe in the arts how the potters' boys look on and help,\nlong before they touch the wheel?\n\nYes, I have.\n\nAnd shall potters be more careful in educating their children and in\ngiving them the opportunity of seeing and practising their duties than our\nguardians will be?\n\nThe idea is ridiculous, he said.\n\nThere is also the effect on the parents, with whom, as with *467B* other\nanimals, the presence of their young ones will be the greatest incentive\nto valour.\n\nThat is quite true, Socrates; and yet if they are defeated, which may\noften happen in war, how great the danger is! {163} the children will be\nlost as well as their parents, and the State will never recover.\n\nTrue, I said; but would you never allow them to run any risk?\n\nI am far from saying that.\n\nWell, but if they are ever to run a risk should they not do so on some\noccasion when, if they escape disaster, they will be the better for it?\n\nClearly.\n\n[Sidenote: but care must be taken that they do not run any serious risk.]\n\n*467C* Whether the future soldiers do or do not see war in the days of\ntheir youth is a very important matter, for the sake of which some risk\nmay fairly be incurred.\n\nYes, very important.\n\nThis then must be our first step,--to make our children spectators of war;\nbut we must also contrive that they shall be secured against danger; then\nall will be well.\n\nTrue.\n\nTheir parents may be supposed not to be blind to the risks of war, but to\nknow, as far as human foresight can, what *467D* expeditions are safe and\nwhat dangerous?\n\nThat may be assumed.\n\nAnd they will take them on the safe expeditions and be cautious about the\ndangerous ones?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd they will place them under the command of experienced veterans who\nwill be their leaders and teachers?\n\nVery properly.\n\nStill, the dangers of war cannot be always foreseen; there is a good deal\nof chance about them?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen against such chances the children must be at once furnished with\nwings, in order that in the hour of need they may fly away and escape.\n\n*467E* What do you mean? he said.\n\nI mean that we must mount them on horses in their earliest youth, and when\nthey have learnt to ride, take them on horseback to see war: the horses\nmust not be spirited and warlike, but the most tractable and yet the\nswiftest that can be had. In this way they will get an excellent view of\nwhat is *468A* hereafter to be their own business; and if there is danger\nthey have only to follow their elder leaders and escape. {164}\n\nI believe that you are right, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: The coward is to be degraded into a lower rank.]\n\nNext, as to war; what are to be the relations of your soldiers to one\nanother and to their enemies? I should be inclined to propose that the\nsoldier who leaves his rank or throws away his arms, or is guilty of any\nother act of cowardice, should be degraded into the rank of a husbandman\nor artisan. What do you think?\n\nBy all means, I should say.\n\nAnd he who allows himself to be taken prisoner may as well be made a\npresent of to his enemies; he is their lawful prey, and let them do what\nthey like with him.\n\n*468B* Certainly.\n\n[Sidenote: The hero to receive honour from his comrades and favour from\nhis beloved,]\n\nBut the hero who has distinguished himself, what shall be done to him? In\nthe first place, he shall receive honour in the army from his youthful\ncomrades; every one of them in succession shall crown him. What do you\nsay?\n\nI approve.\n\nAnd what do you say to his receiving the right hand of fellowship?\n\nTo that too, I agree.\n\nBut you will hardly agree to my next proposal.\n\nWhat is your proposal?\n\nThat he should kiss and be kissed by them.\n\nMost certainly, and I should be disposed to go further, and say: *468C*\nLet no one whom he has a mind to kiss refuse to be kissed by him while the\nexpedition lasts. So that if there be a lover in the army, whether his\nlove be youth or maiden, he may be more eager to win the prize of valour.\n\nCapital, I said. That the brave man is to have more wives than others has\nbeen already determined: and he is to have first choices in such matters\nmore than others, in order that he may have as many children as possible?\n\nAgreed.\n\n[Sidenote: and to have precedence, and a larger share of meats and\ndrinks;]\n\nAgain, there is another manner in which, according to *468D* Homer, brave\nyouths should be honoured; for he tells how Ajax[7], after he had\ndistinguished himself in battle, was rewarded with long chines, which\nseems to be a compliment appropriate to a hero in the flower of his age,\nbeing not only a tribute of honour but also a very strengthening thing.\n\n[Footnote 7: Iliad, vii. 321.]\n\n{165} Most true, he said.\n\nThen in this, I said, Homer shall be our teacher; and we too, at\nsacrifices and on the like occasions, will honour the brave according to\nthe measure of their valour, whether men or women, with hymns and those\nother distinctions which we were mentioning; also with\n\n  *468E* 'seats of precedence, and meats and full cups[8];'\n\nand in honouring them, we shall be at the same time training them.\n\n[Footnote 8: Iliad, viii. 161.]\n\nThat, he replied, is excellent.\n\nYes, I said; and when a man dies gloriously in war shall we not say, in\nthe first place, that he is of the golden race?\n\nTo be sure.\n\n[Sidenote: also to be worshipped after death.]\n\nNay, have we not the authority of Hesiod for affirming that when they are\ndead\n\n  *469A* 'They are holy angels upon the earth, authors of good, averters\n  of evil, the guardians of speech-gifted men'?[9]\n\n[Footnote 9: Probably Works and Days, 121 foll.]\n\nYes; and we accept his authority.\n\nWe must learn of the god how we are to order the sepulture of divine and\nheroic personages, and what is to be their special distinction; and we\nmust do as he bids?\n\nBy all means.\n\nAnd in ages to come we will reverence them and kneel *469B* before their\nsepulchres as at the graves of heroes. And not only they but any who are\ndeemed pre-eminently good, whether they die from age, or in any other way,\nshall be admitted to the same honours.\n\nThat is very right, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: Behaviour to enemies.]\n\nNext, how shall our soldiers treat their enemies? What about this?\n\nIn what respect do you mean?\n\nFirst of all, in regard to slavery? Do you think it right that Hellenes\nshould enslave Hellenic States, or allow others to enslave them, if they\ncan help? Should not their custom be to spare them, considering the danger\nwhich there is *469C* that the whole race may one day fall under the yoke\nof the barbarians?\n\nTo spare them is infinitely better. {166}\n\n[Sidenote: No Hellene shall be made a slave.]\n\nThen no Hellene should be owned by them as a slave; that is a rule which\nthey will observe and advise the other Hellenes to observe.\n\nCertainly, he said; they will in this way be united against the barbarians\nand will keep their hands off one another.\n\nNext as to the slain; ought the conquerors, I said, to take anything but\ntheir armour? Does not the practice of *469D* despoiling an enemy afford\nan excuse for not facing the battle? Cowards skulk about the dead,\npretending that they are fulfilling a duty, and many an army before now\nhas been lost from this love of plunder.\n\nVery true.\n\n[Sidenote: Those who fall in battle are not to be despoiled.]\n\nAnd is there not illiberality and avarice in robbing a corpse, and also a\ndegree of meanness and womanishness in making an enemy of the dead body\nwhen the real enemy has flown away and left only his fighting gear behind\nhim,--is not this *469E* rather like a dog who cannot get at his\nassailant, quarrelling with the stones which strike him instead?\n\nVery like a dog, he said.\n\nThen we must abstain from spoiling the dead or hindering their burial?\n\nYes, he replied, we most certainly must.\n\n[Sidenote: The arms of Hellenes are not to be offered at temples;]\n\nNeither shall we offer up arms at the temples of the gods, *470A* least of\nall the arms of Hellenes, if we care to maintain good feeling with other\nHellenes; and, indeed, we have reason to fear that the offering of spoils\ntaken from kinsmen may be a pollution unless commanded by the god himself?\n\nVery true.\n\nAgain, as to the devastation of Hellenic territory or the burning of\nhouses, what is to be the practice?\n\nMay I have the pleasure, he said, of hearing your opinion?\n\nBoth should be forbidden, in my judgment; I would take *470B* the annual\nproduce and no more. Shall I tell you why?\n\nPray do.\n\n[Sidenote: nor Hellenic territory devastated.]\n\nWhy, you see, there is a difference in the names 'discord' and 'war,' and\nI imagine that there is also a difference in their natures; the one is\nexpressive of what is internal and domestic, the other of what is external\nand foreign; and the first of the two is termed discord, and only the\nsecond, war. {167}\n\nThat is a very proper distinction, he replied.\n\n*470C* And may I not observe with equal propriety that the Hellenic race\nis all united together by ties of blood and friendship, and alien and\nstrange to the barbarians?\n\nVery good, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: Hellenic warfare is only a kind of discord not intended to be\nlasting.]\n\nAnd therefore when Hellenes fight with barbarians and barbarians with\nHellenes, they will be described by us as being at war when they fight,\nand by nature enemies, and this kind of antagonism should be called war;\nbut when Hellenes fight with one another we shall say that Hellas is then\nin a state of disorder and discord, they being by nature friends; *470D*\nand such enmity is to be called discord.\n\nI agree.\n\nConsider then, I said, when that which we have acknowledged to be discord\noccurs, and a city is divided, if both parties destroy the lands and burn\nthe houses of one another, how wicked does the strife appear! No true\nlover of his country would bring himself to tear in pieces his own nurse\nand mother: There might be reason in the conqueror depriving the conquered\nof their harvest, but still they would *470E* have the idea of peace in\ntheir hearts and would not mean to go on fighting for ever.\n\nYes, he said, that is a better temper than the other.\n\nAnd will not the city, which you are founding, be an Hellenic city?\n\nIt ought to be, he replied.\n\nThen will not the citizens be good and civilized?\n\nYes, very civilized.\n\n[Sidenote: The lover of his own city will also be a lover of Hellas.]\n\nAnd will they not be lovers of Hellas, and think of Hellas as their own\nland, and share in the common temples?\n\nMost certainly.\n\nAnd any difference which arises among them will be *471A* regarded by them\nas discord only--a quarrel among friends, which is not to be called a war?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nThen they will quarrel as those who intend some day to be reconciled?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThey will use friendly correction, but will not enslave or destroy their\nopponents; they will be correctors, not enemies? {168}\n\nJust so.\n\n[Sidenote: Hellenes should deal mildly with Hellenes; and with barbarians\nas Hellenes now deal with one another.]\n\nAnd as they are Hellenes themselves they will not devastate Hellas, nor\nwill they burn houses, nor ever suppose that the whole population of a\ncity--men, women, and children--are equally their enemies, for they know\nthat the guilt of war is always confined to a few persons and that the\nmany are their friends. *471B* And for all these reasons they will be\nunwilling to waste their lands and rase their houses; their enmity to them\nwill only last until the many innocent sufferers have compelled the guilty\nfew to give satisfaction?\n\nI agree, he said, that our citizens should thus deal with their Hellenic\nenemies; and with barbarians as the Hellenes now deal with one another.\n\nThen let us enact this law also for our guardians:--that they are neither\nto devastate the lands of Hellenes nor to *471C* burn their houses.\n\nAgreed; and we may agree also in thinking that these, like all our\nprevious enactments, are very good.\n\n[Sidenote: The complaint of Glaucon respecting the hesitation of\nSocrates.]\n\nBut still I must say, Socrates, that if you are allowed to go on in this\nway you will entirely forget the other question which at the commencement\nof this discussion you thrust aside:--Is such an order of things possible,\nand how, if at all? For I am quite ready to acknowledge that the plan\nwhich you propose, if only feasible, would do all sorts of good to the\nState. I will add, what you have omitted, that your *471D* citizens will\nbe the bravest of warriors, and will never leave their ranks, for they\nwill all know one another, and each will call the other father, brother,\nson; and if you suppose the women to join their armies, whether in the\nsame rank or in the rear, either as a terror to the enemy, or as\nauxiliaries in case of need, I know that they will then be absolutely\ninvincible; and there are many domestic advantages which might also be\nmentioned and which I also fully acknowledge: *471E* but, as I admit all\nthese advantages and as many more as you please, if only this State of\nyours were to come into existence, we need say no more about them;\nassuming then the existence of the State, let us now turn to the question\nof possibility and ways and means--the rest may be left. {169}\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates excuses himself and makes one or two remarks\npreparatory to a final effort.]\n\n*472A* If I loiter[10] for a moment, you instantly make a raid upon me,\nI said, and have no mercy; I have hardly escaped the first and second\nwaves, and you seem not to be aware that you are now bringing upon me the\nthird, which is the greatest and heaviest. When you have seen and heard the\nthird wave, I think you will be more considerate and will acknowledge that\nsome fear and hesitation was natural respecting a proposal so extraordinary\nas that which I have now to state and investigate.\n\n[Footnote 10: Reading [Greek: straggeuome/n\u00f4|].]\n\nThe more appeals of this sort which you make, he said, the *472B* more\ndetermined are we that you shall tell us how such a State is possible:\nspeak out and at once.\n\nLet me begin by reminding you that we found our way hither in the search\nafter justice and injustice.\n\nTrue, he replied; but what of that?\n\nI was only going to ask whether, if we have discovered them, we are to\nrequire that the just man should in nothing fail of absolute justice; or\nmay we be satisfied with an approximation, *472C* and the attainment in\nhim of a higher degree of justice than is to be found in other men?\n\nThe approximation will be enough.\n\n[Sidenote: (1) The ideal is a standard only which can never be perfectly\nrealized;]\n\nWe were enquiring into the nature of absolute justice and into the\ncharacter of the perfectly just, and into injustice and the perfectly\nunjust, that we might have an ideal. We were to look at these in order\nthat we might judge of our own happiness and unhappiness according to the\nstandard *472D* which they exhibited and the degree in which we resembled\nthem, but not with any view of showing that they could exist in fact.\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nWould a painter be any the worse because, after having delineated with\nconsummate art an ideal of a perfectly beautiful man, he was unable to\nshow that any such man could ever have existed?\n\nHe would be none the worse.\n\n*472E* Well, and were we not creating an ideal of a perfect State?\n\nTo be sure.\n\n[Sidenote: (2) but is none the worse for this.]\n\nAnd is our theory a worse theory because we are unable to {170} prove the\npossibility of a city being ordered in the manner described?\n\nSurely not, he replied.\n\nThat is the truth, I said. But if, at your request, I am to try and show\nhow and under what conditions the possibility is highest, I must ask you,\nhaving this in view, to repeat your former admissions.\n\nWhat admissions?\n\n*473A* I want to know whether ideals are ever fully realized in language?\nDoes not the word express more than the fact, and must not the actual,\nwhatever a man may think, always, in the nature of things, fall short of\nthe truth? What do you say?\n\nI agree.\n\nThen you must not insist on my proving that the actual State will in every\nrespect coincide with the ideal: if we are only able to discover how a\ncity may be governed nearly as we proposed, you will admit that we have\ndiscovered the possibility which you demand; and will be contented. *473B*\nI am sure that I should be contented--will not you?\n\nYes, I will.\n\n[Sidenote: (3) Although the ideal cannot be realized, one or two changes,\nor rather a single change, might revolutionize a State.]\n\nLet me next endeavour to show what is that fault in States which is the\ncause of their present maladministration, and what is the least change\nwhich will enable a State to pass into the truer form; and let the change,\nif possible, be of one thing only, or, if not, of two; at any rate, let\nthe changes be as few and slight as possible.\n\n*473C* Certainly, he replied.\n\nI think, I said, that there might be a reform of the State if only one\nchange were made, which is not a slight or easy though still a possible\none.\n\nWhat is it? he said.\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates goes forth to meet the wave.]\n\nNow then, I said, I go to meet that which I liken to the greatest of the\nwaves; yet shall the word be spoken, even though the wave break and drown\nme in laughter and dishonour; and do you mark my words.\n\nProceed.\n\n[Sidenote: 'Cities will never cease from ill until they are governed by\nphilosophers.']\n\nI said: _Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this\nworld have the spirit and power of philosophy, and *473D* political\ngreatness and wisdom meet in one, and those {171} commoner natures who\npursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside,\ncities will never have rest from their evils,--nor the human race, as\nI believe,--and then only will this *473E* our State have a possibility of\nlife and behold the light of day._ Such was the thought, my dear Glaucon,\nwhich I would fain have uttered if it had not seemed too extravagant; for\nto be convinced that in no other State can there be happiness private or\npublic is indeed a hard thing.\n\n[Sidenote: What will the world say to this?]\n\nSocrates, what do you mean? I would have you consider that the word which\nyou have uttered is one at which numerous persons, and very respectable\npersons too, in *474A* a figure pulling off their coats all in a moment,\nand seizing any weapon that comes to hand, will run at you might and main,\nbefore you know where you are, intending to do heaven knows what; and if\nyou don't prepare an answer, and put yourself in motion, you will be\n'pared by their fine wits,' and no mistake.\n\nYou got me into the scrape, I said.\n\nAnd I was quite right; however, I will do all I can to get you out of it;\nbut I can only give you good-will and good advice, and, perhaps, I may be\nable to fit answers to your questions better than another--that is all.\nAnd now, having *474B* such an auxiliary, you must do your best to show\nthe unbelievers that you are right.\n\n[Sidenote: But who is a philosopher?]\n\nI ought to try, I said, since you offer me such invaluable assistance. And\nI think that, if there is to be a chance of our escaping, we must explain\nto them whom we mean when we say that philosophers are to rule in the\nState; then we shall be able to defend ourselves: There will be discovered\nto be some natures who ought to study philosophy and to be *474C* leaders\nin the State; and others who are not born to be philosophers, and are\nmeant to be followers rather than leaders.\n\nThen now for a definition, he said.\n\nFollow me, I said, and I hope that I may in some way or other be able to\ngive you a satisfactory explanation.\n\nProceed.\n\n[Sidenote: Parallel of the lover.]\n\nI dare say that you remember, and therefore I need not remind you, that a\nlover, if he is worthy of the name, ought to show his love, not to some\none part of that which he loves, but to the whole. {172}\n\n*474D* I really do not understand, and therefore beg of you to assist my\nmemory.\n\n[Sidenote: The lover of the fair loves them all;]\n\nAnother person, I said, might fairly reply as you do; but a man of\npleasure like yourself ought to know that all who are in the flower of\nyouth do somehow or other raise a pang or emotion in a lover's breast, and\nare thought by him to be worthy of his affectionate regards. Is not this a\nway which you have with the fair: one has a snub nose, and you praise his\ncharming face; the hook-nose of another has, you say, a royal look; while\nhe who is neither snub nor hooked has *474E* the grace of regularity: the\ndark visage is manly, the fair are children of the gods; and as to the\nsweet 'honey pale,' as they are called, what is the very name but the\ninvention of a lover who talks in diminutives, and is not averse to\npaleness if appearing on the cheek of youth? In a word, there is no *475A*\nexcuse which you will not make, and nothing which you will not say, in\norder not to lose a single flower that blooms in the spring-time of youth.\n\nIf you make me an authority in matters of love, for the sake of the\nargument, I assent.\n\n[Sidenote: the lover of wines all wines;]\n\nAnd what do you say of lovers of wine? Do you not see them doing the same?\nThey are glad of any pretext of drinking any wine.\n\nVery good.\n\n[Sidenote: the lover of honour all honour;]\n\nAnd the same is true of ambitious men; if they cannot command an army,\nthey are willing to command a file; and *475B* if they cannot be honoured\nby really great and important persons, they are glad to be honoured by\nlesser and meaner people,--but honour of some kind they must have.\n\nExactly.\n\nOnce more let me ask: Does he who desires any class of goods, desire the\nwhole class or a part only?\n\nThe whole.\n\n[Sidenote: the philosopher, or lover of wisdom, all knowledge.]\n\nAnd may we not say of the philosopher that he is a lover, not of a part of\nwisdom only, but of the whole?\n\nYes, of the whole.\n\nAnd he who dislikes learning, especially in youth, when *475C* he has no\npower of judging what is good and what is not, such an one we maintain not\nto be a philosopher or a lover of knowledge, just as he who refuses his\nfood is not hungry, {173} and may be said to have a bad appetite and not a\ngood one?\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nWhereas he who has a taste for every sort of knowledge and who is curious\nto learn and is never satisfied, may be justly termed a philosopher?\nAm I not right?\n\n[Sidenote: Under knowledge, however, are not to be included sights and\nsounds, or under the lovers of knowledge, musical amateurs and the like.]\n\n*475D* Glaucon said: If curiosity makes a philosopher, you will find many\na strange being will have a title to the name. All the lovers of sights\nhave a delight in learning, and must therefore be included. Musical\namateurs, too, are a folk strangely out of place among philosophers, for\nthey are the last persons in the world who would come to anything like a\nphilosophical discussion, if they could help, while they run about at the\nDionysiac festivals as if they had let out their ears to hear every\nchorus; whether the performance is in town or country--that makes no\ndifference--they are there. Now are we *475E* to maintain that all these\nand any who have similar tastes, as well as the professors of quite minor\narts, are philosophers?\n\nCertainly not, I replied; they are only an imitation.\n\nHe said: Who then are the true philosophers?\n\nThose, I said, who are lovers of the vision of truth.\n\nThat is also good, he said; but I should like to know what you mean?\n\nTo another, I replied, I might have a difficulty in explaining; but I am\nsure that you will admit a proposition which I am about to make.\n\nWhat is the proposition?\n\nThat since beauty is the opposite of ugliness, they are two?\n\nCertainly.\n\n*476A* And inasmuch as they are two, each of them is one?\n\nTrue again.\n\nAnd of just and unjust, good and evil, and of every other class, the same\nremark holds: taken singly, each of them is one; but from the various\ncombinations of them with actions and things and with one another, they\nare seen in all sorts of lights and appear many?\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd this is the distinction which I draw between the sight- {174} loving,\nart-loving, practical class and those of whom I am speaking, *476B* and\nwho are alone worthy of the name of philosophers.\n\nHow do you distinguish them? he said.\n\nThe lovers of sounds and sights, I replied, are, as I conceive, fond of\nfine tones and colours and forms and all the artificial products that are\nmade out of them, but their mind is incapable of seeing or loving absolute\nbeauty.\n\nTrue, he replied.\n\nFew are they who are able to attain to the sight of this.\n\n*476C* Very true.\n\nAnd he who, having a sense of beautiful things has no sense of absolute\nbeauty, or who, if another lead him to a knowledge of that beauty is\nunable to follow--of such an one I ask, Is he awake or in a dream only?\nReflect: is not the dreamer, sleeping or waking, one who likens dissimilar\nthings, who puts the copy in the place of the real object?\n\nI should certainly say that such an one was dreaming.\n\n[Sidenote: True knowledge is the ability to distinguish between the one\nand many, between the idea and the objects which partake of the idea.]\n\nBut take the case of the other, who recognises the existence *476D* of\nabsolute beauty and is able to distinguish the idea from the objects which\nparticipate in the idea, neither putting the objects in the place of the\nidea nor the idea in the place of the objects--is he a dreamer, or is he\nawake?\n\nHe is wide awake.\n\nAnd may we not say that the mind of the one who knows has knowledge, and\nthat the mind of the other, who opines only, has opinion?\n\nCertainly.\n\nBut suppose that the latter should quarrel with us and dispute our\nstatement, can we administer any soothing *476E* cordial or advice to him,\nwithout revealing to him that there is sad disorder in his wits?\n\nWe must certainly offer him some good advice, he replied.\n\nCome, then, and let us think of something to say to him. Shall we begin by\nassuring him that he is welcome to any knowledge which he may have, and\nthat we are rejoiced at his having it? But we should like to ask him a\nquestion: Does he who has knowledge know something or nothing? (You must\nanswer for him.)\n\nI answer that he knows something. {175}\n\nSomething that is or is not?\n\nSomething that is; for how can that which is not ever be known?\n\n[Sidenote: There is an intermediate between being and not being, and a\ncorresponding intermediate between ignorance and knowledge. This\nintermediate is a faculty termed opinion.]\n\n*477A* And are we assured, after looking at the matter from many points of\nview, that absolute being is or may be absolutely known, but that the\nutterly non-existent is utterly unknown?\n\nNothing can be more certain.\n\nGood. But if there be anything which is of such a nature as to be and not\nto be, that will have a place intermediate between pure being and the\nabsolute negation of being?\n\nYes, between them.\n\nAnd, as knowledge corresponded to being and ignorance of necessity to\nnot-being, for that intermediate between being and not-being there has to\nbe discovered a corresponding *477B* intermediate between ignorance and\nknowledge, if there be such?\n\nCertainly.\n\nDo we admit the existence of opinion?\n\nUndoubtedly.\n\nAs being the same with knowledge, or another faculty?\n\nAnother faculty.\n\nThen opinion and knowledge have to do with different kinds of matter\ncorresponding to this difference of faculties?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd knowledge is relative to being and knows being. But before I proceed\nfurther I will make a division.\n\nWhat division?\n\n*477C* I will begin by placing faculties in a class by themselves: they\nare powers in us, and in all other things, by which we do as we do. Sight\nand hearing, for example, I should call faculties. Have I clearly\nexplained the class which I mean?\n\nYes, I quite understand.\n\nThen let me tell you my view about them. I do not see them, and therefore\nthe distinctions of figure, colour, and the like, which enable me to\ndiscern the differences of some things, do not apply to them. In speaking\nof a faculty I think *477D* only of its sphere and its result; and that\nwhich has the same sphere and the same result I call the same faculty, but\nthat which has another sphere and another result I call different. Would\nthat be your way of speaking? {176}\n\nYes.\n\nAnd will you be so very good as to answer one more question? Would you say\nthat knowledge is a faculty, or in what class would you place it?\n\nCertainly knowledge is a faculty, and the mightiest of all faculties.\n\n*477E* And is opinion also a faculty?\n\nCertainly, he said; for opinion is that with which we are able to form an\nopinion.\n\nAnd yet you were acknowledging a little while ago that knowledge is not\nthe same as opinion?\n\n[Sidenote: Opinion differs from knowledge because the one errs and the\nother is unerring.]\n\nWhy, yes, he said: how can any reasonable being ever identify that which\nis infallible with that which errs?\n\n*478A* An excellent answer, proving, I said, that we are quite conscious\nof a distinction between them.\n\nYes.\n\nThen knowledge and opinion having distinct powers have also distinct\nspheres or subject-matters?\n\nThat is certain.\n\nBeing is the sphere or subject-matter of knowledge, and knowledge is to\nknow the nature of being?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd opinion is to have an opinion?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd do we know what we opine? or is the subject-matter of opinion the same\nas the subject-matter of knowledge?\n\nNay, he replied, that has been already disproven; if difference in faculty\nimplies difference in the sphere or *478B* subject-matter, and if, as we\nwere saying, opinion and knowledge are distinct faculties, then the sphere\nof knowledge and of opinion cannot be the same.\n\nThen if being is the subject-matter of knowledge, something else must be\nthe subject-matter of opinion?\n\nYes, something else.\n\n[Sidenote: It also differs from ignorance, which is concerned with\nnothing.]\n\nWell then, is not-being the subject-matter of opinion? or, rather, how can\nthere be an opinion at all about not-being? Reflect: when a man has an\nopinion, has he not an opinion about something? Can he have an opinion\nwhich is an opinion about nothing?\n\nImpossible. {177}\n\nHe who has an opinion has an opinion about some one thing?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd not-being is not one thing but, properly speaking, *478C* nothing?\n\nTrue.\n\nOf not-being, ignorance was assumed to be the necessary correlative; of\nbeing, knowledge?\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nThen opinion is not concerned either with being or with not-being?\n\nNot with either.\n\nAnd can therefore neither be ignorance nor knowledge?\n\nThat seems to be true.\n\n[Sidenote: Its place is not to be sought without or beyond knowledge or\nignorance, but between them.]\n\nBut is opinion to be sought without and beyond either of them, in a\ngreater clearness than knowledge, or in a greater darkness than ignorance?\n\nIn neither.\n\nThen I suppose that opinion appears to you to be darker than knowledge,\nbut lighter than ignorance?\n\nBoth; and in no small degree.\n\n*478D* And also to be within and between them?\n\nYes.\n\nThen you would infer that opinion is intermediate?\n\nNo question.\n\nBut were we not saying before, that if anything appeared to be of a sort\nwhich is and is not at the same time, that sort of thing would appear also\nto lie in the interval between pure being and absolute not-being; and that\nthe corresponding faculty is neither knowledge nor ignorance, but will be\nfound in the interval between them?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd in that interval there has now been discovered something which we call\nopinion?\n\nThere has.\n\n*478E* Then what remains to be discovered is the object which partakes\nequally of the nature of being and not-being, and cannot rightly be termed\neither, pure and simple; this unknown term, when discovered, we may truly\ncall the subject of opinion, and assign each to their proper faculty,--\n{178} the extremes to the faculties of the extremes and the mean to the\nfaculty of the mean.\n\nTrue.\n\n[Sidenote: The absoluteness of the one and the relativeness of the many.]\n\n*479A* This being premised, I would ask the gentleman who is of opinion\nthat there is no absolute or unchangeable idea of beauty--in whose opinion\nthe beautiful is the manifold--he, I say, your lover of beautiful sights,\nwho cannot bear to be told that the beautiful is one, and the just is one,\nor that anything is one--to him I would appeal, saying, Will you be so\nvery kind, sir, as to tell us whether, of all these beautiful things,\nthere is one which will not be found ugly; or of the just, which will not\nbe found unjust; or of the holy, which will not also be unholy?\n\n*479B* No, he replied; the beautiful will in some point of view be found\nugly; and the same is true of the rest.\n\nAnd may not the many which are doubles be also halves?--doubles, that is,\nof one thing, and halves of another?\n\nQuite true.\n\nAnd things great and small, heavy and light, as they are termed, will not\nbe denoted by these any more than by the opposite names?\n\nTrue; both these and the opposite names will always attach to all of them.\n\nAnd can any one of those many things which are called by particular names\nbe said to be this rather than not to be this?\n\nHe replied: They are like the punning riddles which are *479C* asked at\nfeasts or the children's puzzle about the eunuch aiming at the bat, with\nwhat he hit him, as they say in the puzzle, and upon what the bat was\nsitting. The individual objects of which I am speaking are also a riddle,\nand have a double sense: nor can you fix them in your mind, either as\nbeing or not-being, or both, or neither.\n\nThen what will you do with them? I said. Can they have a better place than\nbetween being and not-being? For they are clearly not in greater darkness\nor negation than not-being, *479D* or more full of light and existence\nthan being.\n\nThat is quite true, he said.\n\nThus then we seem to have discovered that the many ideas which the\nmultitude entertain about the beautiful and about {179} all other things\nare tossing about in some region which is half-way between pure being and\npure not-being?\n\nWe have.\n\nYes; and we had before agreed that anything of this kind which we might\nfind was to be described as matter of opinion, and not as matter of\nknowledge; being the intermediate flux which is caught and detained by the\nintermediate faculty.\n\nQuite true.\n\n[Sidenote: Opinion is the knowledge, not of the absolute, but of the\nmany.]\n\n*479E* Then those who see the many beautiful, and who yet neither see\nabsolute beauty, nor can follow any guide who points the way thither; who\nsee the many just, and not absolute justice, and the like,--such persons\nmay be said to have opinion but not knowledge?\n\nThat is certain.\n\nBut those who see the absolute and eternal and immutable may be said to\nknow, and not to have opinion only?\n\nNeither can that be denied.\n\nThe one love and embrace the subjects of knowledge, the other those of\nopinion? The latter are the same, as I dare say *480A* you will remember,\nwho listened to sweet sounds and gazed upon fair colours, but would not\ntolerate the existence of absolute beauty.\n\nYes, I remember.\n\nShall we then be guilty of any impropriety in calling them lovers of\nopinion rather than lovers of wisdom, and will they be very angry with us\nfor thus describing them?\n\nI shall tell them not to be angry; no man should be angry at what is true.\n\nBut those who love the truth in each thing are to be called lovers of\nwisdom and not lovers of opinion.\n\nAssuredly.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK VI.\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic VI._ Socrates, Glaucon.]\n\n*484A* And thus, Glaucon, after the argument has gone a weary way, the\ntrue and the false philosophers have at length appeared in view.\n\nI do not think, he said, that the way could have been shortened.\n\n[Sidenote: If we had time, we might have a nearer view of the true and\nfalse philosopher.]\n\nI suppose not, I said; and yet I believe that we might have had a better\nview of both of them if the discussion could have been confined to this\none subject and if there were not many other questions awaiting us, which\nhe who desires to see in what respect the life of the just differs from\n*484B* that of the unjust must consider.\n\nAnd what is the next question? he asked.\n\nSurely, I said, the one which follows next in order. Inasmuch as\nphilosophers only are able to grasp the eternal and unchangeable, and\nthose who wander in the region of the many and variable are not\nphilosophers, I must ask you which of the two classes should be the rulers\nof our State?\n\nAnd how can we rightly answer that question?\n\n[Sidenote: Which of them shall be our guardians?]\n\nWhichever of the two are best able to guard the laws and *484C*\ninstitutions of our State--let them be our guardians.\n\nVery good.\n\n[Sidenote: A question hardly to be asked.]\n\nNeither, I said, can there be any question that the guardian who is to\nkeep anything should have eyes rather than no eyes?\n\nThere can be no question of that.\n\nAnd are not those who are verily and indeed wanting in the knowledge of\nthe true being of each thing, and who have in their souls no clear\npattern, and are unable as with a painter's eye to look at the absolute\ntruth and to that original *484D* to repair, and having perfect vision of\nthe other world to order the laws about beauty, goodness, justice in this,\nif not {181} already ordered, and to guard and preserve the order of\nthem--are not such persons, I ask, simply blind?\n\nTruly, he replied, they are much in that condition.\n\nAnd shall they be our guardians when there are others who, besides being\ntheir equals in experience and falling short of them in no particular of\nvirtue, also know the very truth of each thing?\n\nThere can be no reason, he said, for rejecting those who have this\ngreatest of all great qualities; they must always have the first place\nunless they fail in some other respect.\n\n*485A* Suppose then, I said, that we determine how far they can unite this\nand the other excellences.\n\nBy all means.\n\n[Sidenote: The philosopher is a lover of truth and of all true being.]\n\nIn the first place, as we began by observing, the nature of the\nphilosopher has to be ascertained. We must come to an understanding about\nhim, and, when we have done so, then, if I am not mistaken, we shall also\nacknowledge that such an union of qualities is possible, and that those in\nwhom they are united, and those only, should be rulers in the State.\n\nWhat do you mean?\n\nLet us suppose that philosophical minds always love knowledge *485B* of a\nsort which shows them the eternal nature not varying from generation and\ncorruption.\n\nAgreed.\n\nAnd further, I said, let us agree that they are lovers of all true being;\nthere is no part whether greater or less, or more or less honourable,\nwhich they are willing to renounce; as we said before of the lover and the\nman of ambition.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd if they are to be what we were describing, is there *485C* not another\nquality which they should also possess?\n\nWhat quality?\n\nTruthfulness: they will never intentionally receive into their mind\nfalsehood, which is their detestation, and they will love the truth.\n\nYes, that may be safely affirmed of them.\n\n'May be,' my friend, I replied, is not the word; say rather 'must be\naffirmed:' for he whose nature is amorous of anything cannot help loving\nall that belongs or is akin to the object of his affections. {182}\n\nRight, he said.\n\nAnd is there anything more akin to wisdom than truth?\n\nHow can there be?\n\nCan the same nature be a lover of wisdom and a lover of *485D* falsehood?\n\nNever.\n\nThe true lover of learning then must from his earliest youth, as far as in\nhim lies, desire all truth?\n\nAssuredly.\n\nBut then again, as we know by experience, he whose desires are strong in\none direction will have them weaker in others; they will be like a stream\nwhich has been drawn off into another channel.\n\nTrue.\n\n[Sidenote: He will be absorbed in the pleasures of the soul, and therefore\ntemperate and the reverse of covetous or mean.]\n\nHe whose desires are drawn towards knowledge in every form will be\nabsorbed in the pleasures of the soul, and will hardly feel bodily\npleasure--I mean, if he be a true philosopher and not a sham one.\n\n*485E* That is most certain.\n\nSuch an one is sure to be temperate and the reverse of covetous; for the\nmotives which make another man desirous of having and spending, have no\nplace in his character.\n\nVery true.\n\n*486A* Another criterion of the philosophical nature has also to be\nconsidered.\n\nWhat is that?\n\nThere should be no secret corner of illiberality; nothing can be more\nantagonistic than meanness to a soul which is ever longing after the whole\nof things both divine and human.\n\nMost true, he replied.\n\n[Sidenote: In the magnificence of his contemplations he will not think\nmuch of human life.]\n\nThen how can he who has magnificence of mind and is the spectator of all\ntime and all existence, think much of human life?\n\nHe cannot.\n\n*486B* Or can such an one account death fearful?\n\nNo indeed.\n\nThen the cowardly and mean nature has no part in true philosophy? {183}\n\nCertainly not.\n\nOr again: can he who is harmoniously constituted, who is not covetous or\nmean, or a boaster, or a coward--can he, I say, ever be unjust or hard in\nhis dealings?\n\nImpossible.\n\n[Sidenote: He will be of a gentle, sociable, harmonious nature; a lover of\nlearning, having a good memory and moving spontaneously in the world of\nbeing.]\n\nThen you will soon observe whether a man is just and gentle, or rude and\nunsociable; these are the signs which distinguish even in youth the\nphilosophical nature from the unphilosophical.\n\nTrue.\n\n*486C* There is another point which should be remarked.\n\nWhat point?\n\nWhether he has or has not a pleasure in learning; for no one will love\nthat which gives him pain, and in which after much toil he makes little\nprogress.\n\nCertainly not.\n\nAnd again, if he is forgetful and retains nothing of what he learns, will\nhe not be an empty vessel?\n\nThat is certain.\n\nLabouring in vain, he must end in hating himself and his fruitless\noccupation? Yes.\n\n*486D* Then a soul which forgets cannot be ranked among genuine\nphilosophic natures; we must insist that the philosopher should have a\ngood memory?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd once more, the inharmonious and unseemly nature can only tend to\ndisproportion?\n\nUndoubtedly.\n\nAnd do you consider truth to be akin to proportion or to disproportion?\n\nTo proportion.\n\nThen, besides other qualities, we must try to find a naturally\nwell-proportioned and gracious mind, which will move spontaneously towards\nthe true being of everything.\n\nCertainly.\n\n*486E* Well, and do not all these qualities, which we have been\nenumerating, go together, and are they not, in a manner, necessary to a\nsoul, which is to have a full and perfect participation of being? {184}\n\n*487A* They are absolutely necessary, he replied.\n\n[Sidenote: Conclusion: What a blameless study then is philosophy!]\n\nAnd must not that be a blameless study which he only can pursue who has\nthe gift of a good memory, and is quick to learn,--noble, gracious, the\nfriend of truth, justice, courage, temperance, who are his kindred?\n\nThe god of jealousy himself, he said, could find no fault with such a\nstudy.\n\nAnd to men like him, I said, when perfected by years and education, and to\nthese only you will entrust the State.\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates, Adeimantus.]\n\n[Sidenote: Nay, says Adeimantus, you can prove anything, but your hearers\nare unconvinced all the same.]\n\n[Sidenote: Common opinion declares philosophers to be either rogues or\nuseless.]\n\n*487B* Here Adeimantus interposed and said: To these statements, Socrates,\nno one can offer a reply; but when you talk in this way, a strange feeling\npasses over the minds of your hearers: They fancy that they are led astray\na little at each step in the argument, owing to their own want of skill in\nasking and answering questions; these littles accumulate, and at the end\nof the discussion they are found to have sustained a mighty overthrow and\nall their former notions appear to be turned upside down. And as unskilful\nplayers of draughts are at last shut up by their more skilful adversaries\n*487C* and have no piece to move, so they too find themselves shut up at\nlast; for they have nothing to say in this new game of which words are the\ncounters; and yet all the time they are in the right. The observation is\nsuggested to me by what is now occurring. For any one of us might say,\nthat although in words he is not able to meet you at each step of the\nargument, he sees as a fact that the votaries of philosophy, when they\ncarry on the study, not only in youth as a part of *487D* education, but\nas the pursuit of their maturer years, most of them become strange\nmonsters, not to say utter rogues, and that those who may be considered\nthe best of them are made useless to the world by the very study which you\nextol.\n\nWell, and do you think that those who say so are wrong?\n\nI cannot tell, he replied; but I should like to know what is your opinion.\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates, instead of denying this statement, admits the truth\nof it.]\n\nHear my answer; I am of opinion that they are quite right.\n\n*487E* Then how can you be justified in saying that cities will not cease\nfrom evil until philosophers rule in them, when philosophers are\nacknowledged by us to be of no use to them?\n\nYou ask a question, I said, to which a reply can only be given in a\nparable. {185}\n\nYes, Socrates; and that is a way of speaking to which you are not at all\naccustomed, I suppose.\n\n[Sidenote: A parable.]\n\n[Sidenote: The noble captain whose senses are rather dull (the people in\ntheir better mind); the mutinous crew (the mob of politicians); and the\npilot (the true philosopher).]\n\nI perceive, I said, that you are vastly amused at having plunged me into\nsuch a hopeless discussion; but now hear *488A* the parable, and then you\nwill be still more amused at the meagreness of my imagination: for the\nmanner in which the best men are treated in their own States is so\ngrievous that no single thing on earth is comparable to it; and therefore,\nif I am to plead their cause, I must have recourse to fiction, and put\ntogether a figure made up of many things, like the fabulous unions of\ngoats and stags which are found in pictures. Imagine then a fleet or a\nship in which there is *488B* a captain who is taller and stronger than\nany of the crew, but he is a little deaf and has a similar infirmity in\nsight, and his knowledge of navigation is not much better. The sailors are\nquarrelling with one another about the steering--every one is of opinion\nthat he has a right to steer, though he has never learned the art of\nnavigation and cannot tell who taught him or when he learned, and will\nfurther assert that it cannot be taught, and they are ready to cut in\npieces any *488C* one who says the contrary. They throng about the\ncaptain, begging and praying him to commit the helm to them; and if at any\ntime they do not prevail, but others are preferred to them, they kill the\nothers or throw them overboard, and having first chained up the noble\ncaptain's senses with drink or some narcotic drug, they mutiny and take\npossession of the ship and make free with the stores; thus, eating and\ndrinking, they proceed on their voyage in such manner as *488D* might be\nexpected of them. Him who is their partisan and cleverly aids them in\ntheir plot for getting the ship out of the captain's hands into their own\nwhether by force or persuasion, they compliment with the name of sailor,\npilot, able seaman, and abuse the other sort of man, whom they call a\ngood-for-nothing; but that the true pilot must pay attention to the year\nand seasons and sky and stars and winds, and whatever else belongs to his\nart, if he intends to be really qualified for the command of a ship, and\nthat he must and *488E* will be the steerer, whether other people like or\nnot--the possibility of this union of authority with the steerer's art has\nnever seriously entered into their thoughts or been made *489A* part {186}\nof their calling[1]. Now in vessels which are in a state of mutiny and by\nsailors who are mutineers, how will the true pilot be regarded? Will he\nnot be called by them a prater, a star-gazer, a good-for-nothing?\n\n[Footnote 1: Or, applying [Greek: o(/p\u00f4s de\\ kubern\u00ea/sei] to the\nmutineers, 'But only understanding ([Greek: e)pai+/ontas]) that he (the\nmutinous pilot) must rule in spite of other people, never considering that\nthere is an art of command which may be practised in combination with the\npilot's art.']\n\nOf course, said Adeimantus.\n\n[Sidenote: The interpretation.]\n\nThen you will hardly need, I said, to hear the interpretation of the\nfigure, which describes the true philosopher in his relation to the State;\nfor you understand already.\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen suppose you now take this parable to the gentleman who is surprised\nat finding that philosophers have no honour in their cities; explain it to\nhim and try to convince him that *489B* their having honour would be far\nmore extraordinary.\n\nI will.\n\n[Sidenote: The uselessness of philosophers arises out of the unwillingness\nof mankind to make use of them.]\n\nSay to him, that, in deeming the best votaries of philosophy to be useless\nto the rest of the world, he is right; but also tell him to attribute\ntheir uselessness to the fault of those who will not use them, and not to\nthemselves. The pilot should not humbly beg the sailors to be commanded by\nhim--that is not the order of nature; neither are 'the wise to go to the\ndoors of the rich'--the ingenious author of this saying told a lie--but\nthe truth is, that, when a man is ill, *489C* whether he be rich or poor,\nto the physician he must go, and he who wants to be governed, to him who\nis able to govern. The ruler who is good for anything ought not to beg his\nsubjects to be ruled by him; although the present governors of mankind are\nof a different stamp; they may be justly compared to the mutinous sailors,\nand the true helmsmen to those who are called by them good-for-nothings\nand star-gazers.\n\nPrecisely so, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: The real enemies of philosophy her professing followers.]\n\nFor these reasons, and among men like these, philosophy, the noblest\npursuit of all, is not likely to be much esteemed *489D* by those of the\nopposite faction; not that the greatest and most lasting injury is done to\nher by her opponents, but by her own professing followers, the same of\nwhom you {187} suppose the accuser to say, that the greater number of them\nare arrant rogues, and the best are useless; in which opinion I agreed.\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the reason why the good are useless has now been explained?\n\nTrue.\n\n[Sidenote: The corruption of philosophy due to many causes.]\n\nThen shall we proceed to show that the corruption of the majority is also\nunavoidable, and that this is not to be laid to *489E* the charge of\nphilosophy any more than the other?\n\nBy all means.\n\nAnd let us ask and answer in turn, first going back to the *490A*\ndescription of the gentle and noble nature. Truth, as you will remember,\nwas his leader, whom he followed always and in all things; failing in\nthis, he was an impostor, and had no part or lot in true philosophy.\n\nYes, that was said.\n\nWell, and is not this one quality, to mention no others, greatly at\nvariance with present notions of him?\n\nCertainly, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: But before considering this, let us re-enumerate the qualities\nof the philosopher:]\n\nAnd have we not a right to say in his defence, that the true lover of\nknowledge is always striving after being--that is his nature; he will not\nrest in the multiplicity of individuals *490B* which is an appearance\nonly, but will go on--the keen edge will not be blunted, nor the force of\nhis desire abate until he have attained the knowledge of the true nature\nof every essence by a sympathetic and kindred power in the soul, and by\nthat power drawing near and mingling and becoming incorporate with very\nbeing, having begotten mind and truth, he will have knowledge and will\nlive and grow truly, and then, and not till then, will he cease from his\ntravail.\n\nNothing, he said, can be more just than such a description of him.\n\n[Sidenote: his love of essence, of truth, of justice, besides his other\nvirtues and natural gifts.]\n\nAnd will the love of a lie be any part of a philosopher's nature? Will he\nnot utterly hate a lie?\n\n*490C* He will.\n\nAnd when truth is the captain, we cannot suspect any evil of the band\nwhich he leads?\n\nImpossible. {188}\n\nJustice and health of mind will be of the company, and temperance will\nfollow after?\n\nTrue, he replied.\n\nNeither is there any reason why I should again set in array the\nphilosopher's virtues, as you will doubtless remember that courage,\nmagnificence, apprehension, memory, were his natural gifts. And you\nobjected that, although no one could *490D* deny what I then said, still,\nif you leave words and look at facts, the persons who are thus described\nare some of them manifestly useless, and the greater number utterly\ndepraved; we were then led to enquire into the grounds of these\naccusations, and have now arrived at the point of asking why are the\nmajority bad, which question of necessity brought us back to the\nexamination and definition of the true philosopher.\n\n*490E* Exactly.\n\n[Sidenote: The reasons why philosophical natures so easily deteriorate.]\n\nAnd we have next to consider the corruptions of the philosophic nature,\nwhy so many are spoiled and so few escape spoiling--I am speaking of those\nwho were said to be *491A* useless but not wicked--and, when we have done\nwith them, we will speak of the imitators of philosophy, what manner of\nmen are they who aspire after a profession which is above them and of\nwhich they are unworthy, and then, by their manifold inconsistencies,\nbring upon philosophy, and upon all philosophers, that universal\nreprobation of which we speak.\n\nWhat are these corruptions? he said.\n\n[Sidenote: (1) There are but a few of them;]\n\nI will see if I can explain them to you. Every one will admit that a\nnature having in perfection all the qualities *491B* which we required in\na philosopher, is a rare plant which is seldom seen among men.\n\nRare indeed.\n\nAnd what numberless and powerful causes tend to destroy these rare\nnatures!\n\nWhat causes?\n\n[Sidenote: (2) and they may be distracted from philosophy by their own\nvirtues;]\n\nIn the first place there are their own virtues, their courage, temperance,\nand the rest of them, every one of which praiseworthy qualities (and this\nis a most singular circumstance) destroys and distracts from philosophy\nthe soul which is the possessor of them.\n\nThat is very singular, he replied. {189}\n\n[Sidenote: and also, (3), by the ordinary goods of life.]\n\n*491C* Then there are all the ordinary goods of life--beauty, wealth,\nstrength, rank, and great connections in the State--you understand the\nsort of things--these also have a corrupting and distracting effect.\n\nI understand; but I should like to know more precisely what you mean about\nthem.\n\nGrasp the truth as a whole, I said, and in the right way; you will then\nhave no difficulty in apprehending the preceding remarks, and they will no\nlonger appear strange to you.\n\nAnd how am I to do so? he asked.\n\n*491D* Why, I said, we know that all germs or seeds, whether vegetable or\nanimal, when they fail to meet with proper nutriment or climate or soil,\nin proportion to their vigour, are all the more sensitive to the want of a\nsuitable environment, for evil is a greater enemy to what is good than to\nwhat is not.\n\nVery true.\n\n[Sidenote: (4) The finer natures more liable to injury than the inferior.]\n\nThere is reason in supposing that the finest natures, when under alien\nconditions, receive more injury than the inferior, because the contrast is\ngreater.\n\nCertainly.\n\n*491E* And may we not say, Adeimantus, that the most gifted minds, when\nthey are ill-educated, become pre-eminently bad? Do not great crimes and\nthe spirit of pure evil spring out of a fulness of nature ruined by\neducation rather than from any inferiority, whereas weak natures are\nscarcely capable of any very great good or very great evil?\n\nThere I think that you are right.\n\n[Sidenote: (5) They are not corrupted by private sophists, but compelled\nby the opinion of the world meeting in the assembly or in some other place\nof resort.]\n\n*492A* And our philosopher follows the same analogy--he is like a plant\nwhich, having proper nurture, must necessarily grow and mature into all\nvirtue, but, if sown and planted in an alien soil, becomes the most\nnoxious of all weeds, unless he be preserved by some divine power. Do you\nreally think, as people so often say, that our youth are corrupted by\nSophists, or that private teachers of the art corrupt them in any degree\nworth speaking of? Are not the public who say these things *492B* the\ngreatest of all Sophists? And do they not educate to perfection young and\nold, men and women alike, and fashion them after their own hearts?\n\nWhen is this accomplished? he said. {190}\n\nWhen they meet together, and the world sits down at an assembly, or in a\ncourt of law, or a theatre, or a camp, or in any other popular resort, and\nthere is a great uproar, and they praise some things which are being said\nor done, and blame other things, equally exaggerating both, shouting and\n*492C* clapping their hands, and the echo of the rocks and the place in\nwhich they are assembled redoubles the sound of the praise or blame--at\nsuch a time will not a young man's heart, as they say, leap within him?\nWill any private training enable him to stand firm against the\noverwhelming flood of popular opinion? or will he be carried away by the\nstream? Will he not have the notions of good and evil which the public in\ngeneral have--he will do as they do, and as they are, such will he be?\n\n*492D* Yes, Socrates; necessity will compel him.\n\n[Sidenote: (6) The other compulsion of violence and death.]\n\nAnd yet, I said, there is a still greater necessity, which has not been\nmentioned.\n\nWhat is that?\n\nThe gentle force of attainder or confiscation or death, which, as you are\naware, these new Sophists and educators, who are the public, apply when\ntheir words are powerless.\n\nIndeed they do; and in right good earnest.\n\nNow what opinion of any other Sophist, or of any private person, can be\nexpected to overcome in such an unequal contest?\n\n*492E* None, he replied.\n\n[Sidenote: They must be saved, if at all, by the power of God.]\n\nNo, indeed, I said, even to make the attempt is a great piece of folly;\nthere neither is, nor has been, nor is ever likely to be, any different\ntype of character which has had no other training in virtue but that which\nis supplied by public opinion[2]--I speak, my friend, of human virtue\nonly; what is more than human, as the proverb says, is not included:\nfor I would not have you ignorant that, in the present evil state of\ngovernments, whatever is saved and comes to good is *493A* saved by the\npower of God, as we may truly say.\n\n[Footnote 2: Or, taking [Greek: para\\] in another sense, 'trained to\nvirtue on their principles.']\n\nI quite assent, he replied.\n\nThen let me crave your assent also to a further observation.\n\nWhat are you going to say?\n\n[Sidenote: The great brute; his behaviour and temper (the people looked at\nfrom their worse side).]\n\nWhy, that all those mercenary individuals, whom the many {191} call\nSophists and whom they deem to be their adversaries, do, in fact, teach\nnothing but the opinion of the many, that is to say, the opinions of their\nassemblies; and this is their wisdom. I might compare them to a man who\nshould study the tempers and desires of a mighty strong beast who is fed\n*493B* by him--he would learn how to approach and handle him, also at what\ntimes and from what causes he is dangerous or the reverse, and what is the\nmeaning of his several cries, and by what sounds, when another utters\nthem, he is soothed or infuriated; and you may suppose further, that when,\nby continually attending upon him, he has become perfect in all this, he\ncalls his knowledge wisdom, and makes of it a system or art, which he\nproceeds to teach, although he has no real notion of what he means by the\nprinciples or passions of which he is speaking, but calls this honourable\nand that dishonourable, or good or evil, or just or unjust, all in\naccordance *493C* with the tastes and tempers of the great brute. Good he\npronounces to be that in which the beast delights and evil to be that\nwhich he dislikes; and he can give no other account of them except that\nthe just and noble are the necessary, having never himself seen, and\nhaving no power of explaining to others the nature of either, or the\ndifference between them, which is immense. By heaven, would not such an\none be a rare educator?\n\nIndeed he would.\n\n[Sidenote: He who associates with the people will conform to their tastes\nand will produce only what pleases them.]\n\nAnd in what way does he who thinks that wisdom is *493D* the discernment\nof the tempers and tastes of the motley multitude, whether in painting or\nmusic, or, finally, in politics, differ from him whom I have been\ndescribing? For when a man consorts with the many, and exhibits to them\nhis poem or other work of art or the service which he has done the State,\nmaking them his judges[3] when he is not obliged, the so-called necessity\nof Diomede will oblige him to produce whatever they praise. And yet the\nreasons are utterly ludicrous which they give in confirmation of their own\nnotions about the honourable and good. Did you ever hear any of them which\nwere not?\n\n[Footnote 3: Putting a comma after [Greek: t\u00f4=n a)nangkai/\u00f4n].]\n\n*493E* No, nor am I likely to hear.\n\nYou recognise the truth of what I have been saying? Then {192} let me ask\nyou to consider further whether the world will ever be induced to believe\nin the existence of absolute *494A* beauty rather than of the many\nbeautiful, or of the absolute in each kind rather than of the many in each\nkind?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nThen the world cannot possibly be a philosopher?\n\nImpossible.\n\nAnd therefore philosophers must inevitably fall under the censure of the\nworld?\n\nThey must.\n\nAnd of individuals who consort with the mob and seek to please them?\n\nThat is evident.\n\nThen, do you see any way in which the philosopher can *494B* be preserved\nin his calling to the end? and remember what we were saying of him, that\nhe was to have quickness and memory and courage and magnificence--these\nwere admitted by us to be the true philosopher's gifts.\n\nYes.\n\n[Sidenote: The youth who has great bodily and mental gifts will be\nflattered from his childhood,]\n\nWill not such an one from his early childhood be in all things first among\nall, especially if his bodily endowments are like his mental ones?\n\nCertainly, he said.\n\nAnd his friends and fellow-citizens will want to use him as he gets older\nfor their own purposes?\n\nNo question.\n\n*494C* Falling at his feet, they will make requests to him and do him\nhonour and flatter him, because they want to get into their hands now, the\npower which he will one day possess.\n\nThat often happens, he said.\n\nAnd what will a man such as he is be likely to do under such\ncircumstances, especially if he be a citizen of a great city, rich and\nnoble, and a tall proper youth? Will he not be full of boundless\naspirations, and fancy himself able to manage the affairs of Hellenes and\nof barbarians, and having got such *494D* notions into his head will he\nnot dilate and elevate himself in the fulness of vain pomp and senseless\npride?\n\nTo be sure he will.\n\n[Sidenote: and being incapable of having reason, will be easily drawn away\nfrom philosophy.]\n\nNow, when he is in this state of mind, if some one gently comes to him and\ntells him that he is a fool and must get {193} understanding, which can\nonly be got by slaving for it, do you think that, under such adverse\ncircumstances, he will be easily induced to listen?\n\nFar otherwise.\n\nAnd even if there be some one who through inherent *494E* goodness or\nnatural reasonableness has had his eyes opened a little and is humbled and\ntaken captive by philosophy, how will his friends behave when they think\nthat they are likely to lose the advantage which they were hoping to reap\nfrom his companionship? Will they not do and say anything to prevent him\nfrom yielding to his better nature and to render his teacher powerless,\nusing to this end private intrigues as well as public prosecutions?\n\n*495A* There can be no doubt of it.\n\nAnd how can one who is thus circumstanced ever become a philosopher?\n\nImpossible.\n\n[Sidenote: The very qualities which make a man a philosopher may also\ndivert him from philosophy.]\n\nThen were we not right in saying that even the very qualities which make a\nman a philosopher may, if he be ill-educated, divert him from philosophy,\nno less than riches and their accompaniments and the other so-called goods\nof life?\n\nWe were quite right.\n\n[Sidenote: Great natures alone are capable, either of great good, or great\nevil.]\n\nThus, my excellent friend, is brought about all that ruin and *495B*\nfailure which I have been describing of the natures best adapted to the\nbest of all pursuits; they are natures which we maintain to be rare at any\ntime; this being the class out of which come the men who are the authors\nof the greatest evil to States and individuals; and also of the greatest\ngood when the tide carries them in that direction; but a small man never\nwas the doer of any great thing either to individuals or to States.\n\nThat is most true, he said.\n\nAnd so philosophy is left desolate, with her marriage rite *495C*\nincomplete: for her own have fallen away and forsaken her, and while they\nare leading a false and unbecoming life, other unworthy persons, seeing\nthat she has no kinsmen to be her protectors, enter in and dishonour her;\nand fasten upon her the reproaches which, as you say, her reprovers utter,\nwho affirm of her votaries that some are good for nothing, and that the\ngreater number deserve the severest punishment. {194}\n\nThat is certainly what people say.\n\n[Sidenote: The attractiveness of philosophy to the vulgar.]\n\nYes; and what else would you expect, I said, when you think of the puny\ncreatures who, seeing this land open to *495D* them--a land well stocked\nwith fair names and showy titles--like prisoners running out of prison\ninto a sanctuary, take a leap out of their trades into philosophy; those\nwho do so being probably the cleverest hands at their own miserable\ncrafts? For, although philosophy be in this evil case, still there remains\na dignity about her which is not to be found in the arts. And many are\nthus attracted by her whose *495E* natures are imperfect and whose souls\nare maimed and disfigured by their meannesses, as their bodies are by\ntheir trades and crafts. Is not this unavoidable?\n\nYes.\n\nAre they not exactly like a bald little tinker who has just got out of\ndurance and come into a fortune; he takes a bath and puts on a new coat,\nand is decked out as a bridegroom going to marry his master's daughter,\nwho is left poor and desolate?\n\n*496A* A most exact parallel.\n\nWhat will be the issue of such marriages? Will they not be vile and\nbastard?\n\nThere can be no question of it.\n\n[Sidenote: The _m\u00e9salliance_ of philosophy.]\n\nAnd when persons who are unworthy of education approach philosophy and\nmake an alliance with her who is in a rank above them what sort of ideas\nand opinions are likely to be generated? [4]Will they not be sophisms\ncaptivating to the ear, having nothing in them genuine, or worthy of or\nakin to true wisdom?\n\n[Footnote 4: Or, 'will they not deserve to be called sophisms,' ....]\n\nNo doubt, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: Few are the worthy disciples:]\n\n[Sidenote: and these are unable to resist the madness of the world;]\n\n[Sidenote: they therefore in order to escape the storm take shelter behind\na wall and live their own life.]\n\nThen, Adeimantus, I said, the worthy disciples of philosophy *496B* will\nbe but a small remnant: perchance some noble and well-educated person,\ndetained by exile in her service, who in the absence of corrupting\ninfluences remains devoted to her; or some lofty soul born in a mean city,\nthe politics of which he contemns and neglects; and there may be a gifted\nfew who leave the arts, which they justly despise, and come to her;--or\nperadventure there are some who are restrained *496C* by our friend\nTheages' bridle; for everything in the life of Theages {195} conspired to\ndivert him from philosophy; but ill-health kept him away from politics. My\nown case of the internal sign is hardly worth mentioning, for rarely, if\never, has such a monitor been given to any other man. Those who belong to\nthis small class have tasted how sweet and blessed a possession philosophy\nis, and have also seen enough of the madness of the multitude; and they\nknow *496D* that no politician is honest, nor is there any champion of\njustice at whose side they may fight and be saved. Such an one may be\ncompared to a man who has fallen among wild beasts--he will not join in\nthe wickedness of his fellows, but neither is he able singly to resist all\ntheir fierce natures, and therefore seeing that he would be of no use to\nthe State or to his friends, and reflecting that he would have to throw\naway his life without doing any good either to himself or others, he holds\nhis peace, and goes his own way. He is like one who, in the storm of dust\nand sleet which the driving wind hurries along, retires under the shelter\nof a wall; and seeing the rest of mankind full of wickedness, he is\ncontent, *496E* if only he can live his own life and be pure from evil or\nunrighteousness, and depart in peace and good-will, with bright hopes.\n\nYes, he said, and he will have done a great work before he departs.\n\nA great work--yes; but not the greatest, unless he find *497A* a State\nsuitable to him; for in a State which is suitable to him, he will have a\nlarger growth and be the saviour of his country, as well as of himself.\n\nThe causes why philosophy is in such an evil name have now been\nsufficiently explained: the injustice of the charges against her has been\nshown--is there anything more which you wish to say?\n\nNothing more on that subject, he replied; but I should like to know which\nof the governments now existing is in your opinion the one adapted to her.\n\n[Sidenote: No existing State suited to philosophy.]\n\n*497B* Not any of them, I said; and that is precisely the accusation which\nI bring against them--not one of them is worthy of the philosophic nature,\nand hence that nature is warped and estranged;--as the exotic seed which\nis sown in a foreign land becomes denaturalized, and is wont to be\noverpowered and to lose itself in the new soil, even so this growth {196}\nof philosophy, instead of persisting, degenerates and receives another\ncharacter. But if philosophy ever finds in the State *497C* that\nperfection which she herself is, then will be seen that she is in truth\ndivine, and that all other things, whether natures of men or institutions,\nare but human;--and now, I know, that you are going to ask, What that\nState is:\n\nNo, he said; there you are wrong, for I was going to ask another\nquestion--whether it is the State of which we are the founders and\ninventors, or some other?\n\n[Sidenote: Even our own State requires the addition of the living\nauthority.]\n\nYes, I replied, ours in most respects; but you may remember my saying\nbefore, that some living authority would always be required in the State\nhaving the same idea of *497D* the constitution which guided you when as\nlegislator you were laying down the laws.\n\nThat was said, he replied.\n\nYes, but not in a satisfactory manner; you frightened us by interposing\nobjections, which certainly showed that the discussion would be long and\ndifficult; and what still remains is the reverse of easy.\n\nWhat is there remaining?\n\nThe question how the study of philosophy may be so ordered as not to be\nthe ruin of the State: All great attempts are attended with risk; 'hard is\nthe good,' as men say.\n\n*497E* Still, he said, let the point be cleared up, and the enquiry will\nthen be complete.\n\nI shall not be hindered, I said, by any want of will, but, if at all, by a\nwant of power: my zeal you may see for yourselves; and please to remark in\nwhat I am about to say how boldly and unhesitatingly I declare that States\nshould pursue philosophy, not as they do now, but in a different spirit.\n\nIn what manner?\n\n[Sidenote: The superficial study of philosophy which exists in the present\nday.]\n\n*498A* At present, I said, the students of philosophy are quite young;\nbeginning when they are hardly past childhood, they devote only the time\nsaved from moneymaking and housekeeping to such pursuits; and even those\nof them who are reputed to have most of the philosophic spirit, when they\ncome within sight of the great difficulty of the subject, I mean\ndialectic, take themselves off. In after life when invited by some one\nelse, they may, perhaps, go and hear a lecture, and about this they make\nmuch ado, for philosophy is not considered {197} by them to be their\nproper business: at last, when they grow old, in most cases they are\nextinguished more *498B* truly than Heracleitus' sun, inasmuch as they\nnever light up again[5].\n\n[Footnote 5: Heraclitus said that the sun was extinguished every evening\nand relighted every morning.]\n\nBut what ought to be their course?\n\nJust the opposite. In childhood and youth their study, and what philosophy\nthey learn, should be suited to their tender years: during this period\nwhile they are growing up towards manhood, the chief and special care\nshould be given to their bodies that they may have them to use in the\nservice of philosophy; as life advances and the intellect begins to\nmature, let them increase the gymnastics of the soul; but when the\nstrength of our citizens fails and is past civil and *498C* military\nduties, then let them range at will and engage in no serious labour, as we\nintend them to live happily here, and to crown this life with a similar\nhappiness in another.\n\n[Sidenote: Thrasymachus once more.]\n\nHow truly in earnest you are, Socrates! he said; I am sure of that; and\nyet most of your hearers, if I am not mistaken, are likely to be still\nmore earnest in their opposition to you, and will never be convinced;\nThrasymachus least of all.\n\nDo not make a quarrel, I said, between Thrasymachus and *498D* me, who\nhave recently become friends, although, indeed, we were never enemies; for\nI shall go on striving to the utmost until I either convert him and other\nmen, or do something which may profit them against the day when they live\nagain, and hold the like discourse in another state of existence.\n\nYou are speaking of a time which is not very near.\n\n[Sidenote: The people hate philosophy because they have only known bad and\nconventional imitations of it.]\n\nRather, I replied, of a time which is as nothing in comparison with\neternity. Nevertheless, I do not wonder that the many refuse to believe;\nfor they have never seen that of which we are now speaking realized; they\nhave seen only *498E* a conventional imitation of philosophy, consisting\nof words artificially brought together, not like these of ours having a\nnatural unity. But a human being who in word and work is perfectly\nmoulded, as far as he can be, into the proportion and likeness of\nvirtue--such a man ruling in a city which *499A* bears the same image,\nthey have never yet seen, neither one nor many of them--do you think that\nthey ever did? {198}\n\nNo indeed.\n\nNo, my friend, and they have seldom, if ever, heard free and noble\nsentiments; such as men utter when they are earnestly and by every means\nin their power seeking after truth for the sake of knowledge, while they\nlook coldly on the subtleties of controversy, of which the end is opinion\nand strife, whether they meet with them in the courts of law or in\nsociety.\n\nThey are strangers, he said, to the words of which you speak.\n\nAnd this was what we foresaw, and this was the reason *499B* why truth\nforced us to admit, not without fear and hesitation, that neither cities\nnor States nor individuals will ever attain perfection until the small\nclass of philosophers whom we termed useless but not corrupt are\nprovidentially compelled, whether they will or not, to take care of the\nState, and until a like necessity be laid on the State to obey them[6]; or\nuntil kings, or if not kings, the sons of kings or princes, are divinely\n*499C* inspired with a true love of true philosophy. That either or both\nof these alternatives are impossible, I see no reason to affirm: if they\nwere so, we might indeed be justly ridiculed as dreamers and visionaries.\nAm I not right?\n\n[Footnote 6: Reading [Greek: kat\u00eako/\u00f4|] or [Greek: kat\u00eako/ois].]\n\nQuite right.\n\n[Sidenote: Somewhere, at some time, there may have been or may be a\nphilosopher who is also the ruler of a State.]\n\nIf then, in the countless ages of the past, or at the present hour in some\nforeign clime which is far away and beyond *499D* our ken, the perfected\nphilosopher is or has been or hereafter shall be compelled by a superior\npower to have the charge of the State, we are ready to assert to the\ndeath, that this our constitution has been, and is--yea, and will be\nwhenever the Muse of Philosophy is queen. There is no impossibility in all\nthis; that there is a difficulty, we acknowledge ourselves.\n\nMy opinion agrees with yours, he said.\n\nBut do you mean to say that this is not the opinion of the multitude?\n\nI should imagine not, he replied.\n\nO my friend, I said, do not attack the multitude: they will *499E* change\ntheir minds, if, not in an aggressive spirit, but gently {199} and with\nthe view of soothing them and removing their dislike of over-education,\nyou show them your philosophers as they really are and describe as you\nwere just now doing *500A* their character and profession, and then\nmankind will see that he of whom you are speaking is not such as they\nsupposed--if they view him in this new light, they will surely change\ntheir notion of him, and answer in another strain[7]. Who can be at enmity\nwith one who loves them, who that is himself gentle and free from envy\nwill be jealous of one in whom there is no jealousy? Nay, let me answer\nfor you, that in a few this harsh temper may be found but not in the\nmajority of mankind.\n\n[Footnote 7: Reading [Greek: \u00ea)= kai\\ e)a\\n ou(/t\u00f4 the\u00f4=ntai] without a\nquestion, and [Greek: a)lloi/an toi]: or, retaining the question and\ntaking [Greek: a)lloi/an do/xan] in a new sense: 'Do you mean to say\nreally that, viewing him in this light, they will be of another mind from\nyours, and answer in another strain?']\n\nI quite agree with you, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: The feeling against philosophy is really a feeling against\npretended philosophers who are always talking about persons.]\n\n*500B* And do you not also think, as I do, that the harsh feeling which\nthe many entertain towards philosophy originates in the pretenders, who\nrush in uninvited, and are always abusing them, and finding fault with\nthem, who make persons instead of things the theme of their conversation?\nand nothing can be more unbecoming in philosophers than this.\n\nIt is most unbecoming.\n\n[Sidenote: The true philosopher, who has his eye fixed upon immutable\nprinciples, will fashion States after the heavenly image.]\n\nFor he, Adeimantus, whose mind is fixed upon true being, has surely no\ntime to look down upon the affairs of earth, or *500C* to be filled with\nmalice and envy, contending against men; his eye is ever directed towards\nthings fixed and immutable, which he sees neither injuring nor injured by\none another, but all in order moving according to reason; these he\nimitates, and to these he will, as far as he can, conform himself. Can a\nman help imitating that with which he holds reverential converse?\n\nImpossible.\n\nAnd the philosopher holding converse with the divine order, becomes\norderly and divine, as far as the nature of *500D* man allows; but like\nevery one else, he will suffer from detraction.\n\nOf course. {200}\n\nAnd if a necessity be laid upon him of fashioning, not only himself, but\nhuman nature generally, whether in States or individuals, into that which\nhe beholds elsewhere, will he, think you, be an unskilful artificer of\njustice, temperance, and every civil virtue?\n\nAnything but unskilful.\n\nAnd if the world perceives that what we are saying about *500E* him is the\ntruth, will they be angry with philosophy? Will they disbelieve us, when\nwe tell them that no State can be happy which is not designed by artists\nwho imitate the heavenly pattern?\n\nThey will not be angry if they understand, he said. But *501A* how will\nthey draw out the plan of which you are speaking?\n\n[Sidenote: He will begin with a 'tabula rasa' and there inscribe his\nlaws.]\n\nThey will begin by taking the State and the manners of men, from which, as\nfrom a tablet, they will rub out the picture, and leave a clean surface.\nThis is no easy task. But whether easy or not, herein will lie the\ndifference between them and every other legislator,--they will have\nnothing to do either with individual or State, and will inscribe no laws,\nuntil they have either found, or themselves made, a clean surface.\n\nThey will be very right, he said.\n\nHaving effected this, they will proceed to trace an outline of the\nconstitution?\n\nNo doubt.\n\n*501B* And when they are filling in the work, as I conceive, they will\noften turn their eyes upwards and downwards: I mean that they will first\nlook at absolute justice and beauty and temperance, and again at the human\ncopy; and will mingle and temper the various elements of life into the\nimage of a man; and this they will conceive according to that other image,\nwhich, when existing among men, Homer calls the form and likeness of God.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nAnd one feature they will erase, and another they will put *501C* in,\nuntil they have made the ways of men, as far as possible, agreeable to the\nways of God?\n\nIndeed, he said, in no way could they make a fairer picture.\n\n[Sidenote: The enemies of philosophy, when they hear the truth, are\ngradually propitiated,]\n\nAnd now, I said, are we beginning to persuade those whom {201} you\ndescribed as rushing at us with might and main, that the painter of\nconstitutions is such an one as we are praising; at whom they were so very\nindignant because to his hands we committed the State; and are they\ngrowing a little calmer at what they have just heard?\n\nMuch calmer, if there is any sense in them.\n\n*501D* Why, where can they still find any ground for objection? Will they\ndoubt that the philosopher is a lover of truth and being?\n\nThey would not be so unreasonable.\n\nOr that his nature, being such as we have delineated, is akin to the\nhighest good?\n\nNeither can they doubt this.\n\nBut again, will they tell us that such a nature, placed under favourable\ncircumstances, will not be perfectly good and wise if any ever was? Or\nwill they prefer those whom we have rejected?\n\n*501E* Surely not.\n\nThen will they still be angry at our saying, that, until philosophers bear\nrule, States and individuals will have no rest from evil, nor will this\nour imaginary State ever be realized?\n\nI think that they will be less angry.\n\n[Sidenote: and at length become quite gentle.]\n\nShall we assume that they are not only less angry but *502A* quite gentle,\nand that they have been converted and for very shame, if for no other\nreason, cannot refuse to come to terms?\n\nBy all means, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: There may have been one son of a king a philosopher who has\nremained uncorrupted and has a State obedient to his will.]\n\nThen let us suppose that the reconciliation has been effected. Will any\none deny the other point, that there may be sons of kings or princes who\nare by nature philosophers?\n\nSurely no man, he said.\n\nAnd when they have come into being will any one say that they must of\nnecessity be destroyed; that they can hardly *502B* be saved is not denied\neven by us; but that in the whole course of ages no single one of them can\nescape--who will venture to affirm this?\n\nWho indeed!\n\nBut, said I, one is enough; let there be one man who has a city obedient\nto his will, and he might bring into existence the ideal polity about\nwhich the world is so incredulous.\n\nYes, one is enough. {202}\n\nThe ruler may impose the laws and institutions which we have been\ndescribing, and the citizens may possibly be willing to obey them?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd that others should approve, of what we approve, is no miracle or\nimpossibility?\n\n*502C* I think not.\n\nBut we have sufficiently shown, in what has preceded, that all this, if\nonly possible, is assuredly for the best.\n\nWe have.\n\n[Sidenote: Our constitution then is not unattainable.]\n\nAnd now we say not only that our laws, if they could be enacted, would be\nfor the best, but also that the enactment of them, though difficult, is\nnot impossible.\n\nVery good.\n\nAnd so with pain and toil we have reached the end of one subject, but more\nremains to be discussed;--how and by *502D* what studies and pursuits will\nthe saviours of the constitution be created, and at what ages are they to\napply themselves to their several studies?\n\nCertainly.\n\n[Sidenote: Recapitulation.]\n\nI omitted the troublesome business of the possession of women, and the\nprocreation of children, and the appointment of the rulers, because I knew\nthat the perfect State would be eyed with jealousy and was difficult of\nattainment; but that piece of cleverness was not of much service to me,\n*502E* for I had to discuss them all the same. The women and children are\nnow disposed of, but the other question of the rulers must be investigated\nfrom the very beginning. We were saying, as you will remember, that they\nwere to be lovers *503A* of their country, tried by the test of pleasures\nand pains, and neither in hardships, nor in dangers, nor at any other\ncritical moment were to lose their patriotism--he was to be rejected who\nfailed, but he who always came forth pure, like gold tried in the\nrefiner's fire, was to be made a ruler, and to receive honours and rewards\nin life and after death. This was the sort of thing which was being said,\nand then the argument turned aside and veiled her face; not liking to\n*503B* stir the question which has now arisen.\n\nI perfectly remember, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: The guardian must be a philosopher, and a philosopher must be a\nperson of rare gifts]\n\nYes, my friend, I said, and I then shrank from hazarding {203} the bold\nword; but now let me dare to say--that the perfect guardian must be a\nphilosopher.\n\nYes, he said, let that be affirmed.\n\nAnd do not suppose that there will be many of them; for the gifts which\nwere deemed by us to be essential rarely grow together; they are mostly\nfound in shreds and patches.\n\n*503C* What do you mean? he said.\n\n[Sidenote: The contrast of the quick and solid temperaments.]\n\nYou are aware, I replied, that quick intelligence, memory, sagacity,\ncleverness, and similar qualities, do not often grow together, and that\npersons who possess them and are at the same time high-spirited and\nmagnanimous are not so constituted by nature as to live orderly and in a\npeaceful and settled manner; they are driven any way by their impulses,\nand all solid principle goes out of them.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nOn the other hand, those steadfast natures which can *503D* better be\ndepended upon, which in a battle are impregnable to fear and immovable,\nare equally immovable when there is anything to be learned; they are\nalways in a torpid state, and are apt to yawn and go to sleep over any\nintellectual toil.\n\nQuite true.\n\n[Sidenote: They must be united.]\n\nAnd yet we were saying that both qualities were necessary in those to whom\nthe higher education is to be imparted, and who are to share in any office\nor command.\n\nCertainly, he said.\n\nAnd will they be a class which is rarely found?\n\nYes, indeed.\n\n[Sidenote: He who is to hold command must be tested in many kinds of\nknowledge.]\n\n*503E* Then the aspirant must not only be tested in those labours and\ndangers and pleasures which we mentioned before, but there is another kind\nof probation which we did not mention--he must be exercised also in many\nkinds of knowledge, to see whether the soul will be able to endure the\nhighest of all, *504A* or will faint under them, as in any other studies\nand exercises.\n\nYes, he said, you are quite right in testing him. But what do you mean by\nthe highest of all knowledge?\n\nYou may remember, I said, that we divided the soul into three parts; and\ndistinguished the several natures of justice, temperance, courage, and\nwisdom?\n\nIndeed, he said, if I had forgotten, I should not deserve to hear more.\n{204}\n\nAnd do you remember the word of caution which preceded the discussion of\nthem[8]?\n\n[Footnote 8: Cp. IV. 435 D.]\n\nTo what do you refer?\n\n[Sidenote: The shorter exposition of education, which has been already\ngiven, inadequate.]\n\n*504B* We were saying, if I am not mistaken, that he who wanted to see\nthem in their perfect beauty must take a longer and more circuitous way,\nat the end of which they would appear; but that we could add on a popular\nexposition of them on a level with the discussion which had preceded. And\nyou replied that such an exposition would be enough for you, and so the\nenquiry was continued in what to me seemed to be a very inaccurate manner;\nwhether you were satisfied or not, it is for you to say.\n\nYes, he said, I thought and the others thought that you gave us a fair\nmeasure of truth.\n\n*504C* But, my friend, I said, a measure of such things which in any\ndegree falls short of the whole truth is not fair measure; for nothing\nimperfect is the measure of anything, although persons are too apt to be\ncontented and think that they need search no further.\n\nNot an uncommon case when people are indolent.\n\nYes, I said; and there cannot be any worse fault in a guardian of the\nState and of the laws.\n\nTrue.\n\n[Sidenote: The guardian must take the longer road of the higher learning,]\n\nThe guardian then, I said, must be required to take the *504D* longer\ncircuit, and toil at learning as well as at gymnastics, or he will never\nreach the highest knowledge of all which, as we were just now saying, is\nhis proper calling.\n\nWhat, he said, is there a knowledge still higher than this--higher than\njustice and the other virtues?\n\nYes, I said, there is. And of the virtues too we must behold not the\noutline merely, as at present--nothing short of the most finished picture\nshould satisfy us. When little *504E* things are elaborated with an\ninfinity of pains, in order that they may appear in their full beauty and\nutmost clearness, how ridiculous that we should not think the highest\ntruths worthy of attaining the highest accuracy!\n\nA right noble thought[9]; but do you suppose that we {205} shall refrain\nfrom asking you what is this highest knowledge?\n\n[Footnote 9: Or, separating [Greek: kai\\ ma/la] from [Greek: a)/xion],\n'True, he said, and a noble thought': or [Greek: a)/xion to\\ diano/\u00eama]\nmay be a gloss.]\n\n[Sidenote: which leads upwards at last to the idea of good.]\n\nNay, I said, ask if you will; but I am certain that you have heard the\nanswer many times, and now you either do not understand me or, as I rather\nthink, you are disposed to be *505A* troublesome; for you have often been\ntold that the idea of good is the highest knowledge, and that all other\nthings become useful and advantageous only by their use of this. You can\nhardly be ignorant that of this I was about to speak, concerning which, as\nyou have often heard me say, we know so little; and, without which, any\nother knowledge *505B* or possession of any kind will profit us nothing.\nDo you think that the possession of all other things is of any value if we\ndo not possess the good? or the knowledge of all other things if we have\nno knowledge of beauty and goodness?\n\nAssuredly not.\n\n[Sidenote: But what is the good? Some say pleasure, others knowledge,\nwhich they absurdly explain to mean knowledge of the good.]\n\nYou are further aware that most people affirm pleasure to be the good, but\nthe finer sort of wits say it is knowledge?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd you are aware too that the latter cannot explain what they mean by\nknowledge, but are obliged after all to say knowledge of the good?\n\nHow ridiculous!\n\n*505C* Yes, I said, that they should begin by reproaching us with our\nignorance of the good, and then presume our knowledge of it--for the good\nthey define to be knowledge of the good, just as if we understood them\nwhen they use the term 'good'--this is of course ridiculous.\n\nMost true, he said.\n\nAnd those who make pleasure their good are in equal perplexity; for they\nare compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures as well as good.\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd therefore to acknowledge that bad and good are the same?\n\n*505D* True.\n\nThere can be no doubt about the numerous difficulties in which this\nquestion is involved.\n\nThere can be none.\n\nFurther, do we not see that many are willing to do or to {206} have or to\nseem to be what is just and honourable without the reality; but no one is\nsatisfied with the appearance of good--the reality is what they seek; in\nthe case of the good, appearance is despised by every one.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: Every man pursues the good, but without knowing the nature of\nit.]\n\nOf this then, which every soul of man pursues and makes *505E* the end of\nall his actions, having a presentiment that there is such an end, and yet\nhesitating because neither knowing *506A* the nature nor having the same\nassurance of this as of other things, and therefore losing whatever good\nthere is in other things,--of a principle such and so great as this ought\nthe best men in our State, to whom everything is entrusted, to be in the\ndarkness of ignorance?\n\nCertainly not, he said.\n\nI am sure, I said, that he who does not know how the beautiful and the\njust are likewise good will be but a sorry guardian of them; and I suspect\nthat no one who is ignorant of the good will have a true knowledge of\nthem.\n\nThat, he said, is a shrewd suspicion of yours.\n\n*506B* And if we only have a guardian who has this knowledge our State\nwill be perfectly ordered?\n\n[Sidenote: The guardian ought to know these things.]\n\nOf course, he replied; but I wish that you would tell me whether you\nconceive this supreme principle of the good to be knowledge or pleasure,\nor different from either?\n\nAye, I said, I knew all along that a fastidious gentleman[10] like you\nwould not be contented with the thoughts of other people about these\nmatters.\n\n[Footnote 10: Reading [Greek: a)n\u00ea\\r kalo/s]: or reading [Greek: a)n\u00ea\\r\nkal\u00f4=s], 'I quite well knew from the very first, that you, &c.']\n\nTrue, Socrates; but I must say that one who like you has passed a lifetime\nin the study of philosophy should not be *506C* always repeating the\nopinions of others, and never telling his own.\n\nWell, but has any one a right to say positively what he does not know?\n\nNot, he said, with the assurance of positive certainty; he has no right to\ndo that: but he may say what he thinks, as a matter of opinion.\n\nAnd do you not know, I said, that all mere opinions are bad, and the best\nof them blind? You would not deny that {207} those who have any true\nnotion without intelligence are only like blind men who feel their way\nalong the road?\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd do you wish to behold what is blind and crooked and *506D* base, when\nothers will tell you of brightness and beauty?\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates, Glaucon.]\n\nStill, I must implore you, Socrates, said Glaucon, not to turn away just\nas you are reaching the goal; if you will only give such an explanation of\nthe good as you have already given of justice and temperance and the other\nvirtues, we shall be satisfied.\n\n[Sidenote: We can only attain to the things of mind through the things of\nsense. The 'child' of the good.]\n\nYes, my friend, and I shall be at least equally satisfied, but I cannot\nhelp fearing that I shall fail, and that my indiscreet zeal will bring\nridicule upon me. No, sweet sirs, let us not *506E* at present ask what is\nthe actual nature of the good, for to reach what is now in my thoughts\nwould be an effort too great for me. But of the child of the good who is\nlikest him, I would fain speak, if I could be sure that you wished to\nhear--otherwise, not.\n\nBy all means, he said, tell us about the child, and you shall remain in\nour debt for the account of the parent.\n\n*507A* I do indeed wish, I replied, that I could pay, and you receive, the\naccount of the parent, and not, as now, of the offspring only; take,\nhowever, this latter by way of interest[11], and at the same time have a\ncare that I do not render a false account, although I have no intention of\ndeceiving you.\n\n[Footnote: 11: A play upon [Greek: to/kos], which means both 'offspring'\nand 'interest.']\n\nYes, we will take all the care that we can: proceed.\n\nYes, I said, but I must first come to an understanding with you, and\nremind you of what I have mentioned in the course of this discussion, and\nat many other times.\n\n*507B* What?\n\nThe old story, that there is a many beautiful and a many good, and so of\nother things which we describe and define; to all of them the term 'many'\nis applied.\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nAnd there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and of other things\nto which the term 'many' is applied there is an absolute; for they may be\nbrought under a single idea, which is called the essence of each.\n\nVery true. {208}\n\nThe many, as we say, are seen but not known, and the ideas are known but\nnot seen.\n\nExactly.\n\n*507C* And what is the organ with which we see the visible things?\n\nThe sight, he said.\n\nAnd with the hearing, I said, we hear, and with the other senses perceive\nthe other objects of sense?\n\nTrue.\n\n[Sidenote: Sight the most complex of the senses,]\n\nBut have you remarked that sight is by far the most costly and complex\npiece of workmanship which the artificer of the senses ever contrived?\n\nNo, I never have, he said.\n\nThen reflect; has the ear or voice need of any third or *507D* additional\nnature in order that the one may be able to hear and the other to be\nheard?\n\nNothing of the sort.\n\nNo, indeed, I replied; and the same is true of most, if not all, the other\nsenses--you would not say that any of them requires such an addition?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nBut you see that without the addition of some other nature there is no\nseeing or being seen?\n\nHow do you mean?\n\n[Sidenote: and, unlike the other senses, requires the addition of a third\nnature before it can be used. This third nature is light.]\n\nSight being, as I conceive, in the eyes, and he who has eyes wanting to\nsee; colour being also present in them, still *507E* unless there be a\nthird nature specially adapted to the purpose, the owner of the eyes will\nsee nothing and the colours will be invisible.\n\nOf what nature are you speaking?\n\nOf that which you term light, I replied.\n\nTrue, he said.\n\n*508A* Noble, then, is the bond which links together sight and visibility,\nand great beyond other bonds by no small difference of nature; for light\nis their bond, and light is no ignoble thing?\n\nNay, he said, the reverse of ignoble.\n\nAnd which, I said, of the gods in heaven would you say was the lord of\nthis element? Whose is that light which makes the eye to see perfectly and\nthe visible to appear? {209}\n\nYou mean the sun, as you and all mankind say.\n\nMay not the relation of sight to this deity be described as follows?\n\nHow?\n\n*508B* Neither sight nor the eye in which sight resides is the sun?\n\nNo.\n\n[Sidenote: The eye like the sun, but not the same with it.]\n\nYet of all the organs of sense the eye is the most like the sun?\n\nBy far the most like.\n\nAnd the power which the eye possesses is a sort of effluence which is\ndispensed from the sun?\n\nExactly.\n\nThen the sun is not sight, but the author of sight who is recognised by\nsight?\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nAnd this is he whom I call the child of the good, whom the good begat in\nhis own likeness, to be in the visible world, in *508C* relation to sight\nand the things of sight, what the good is in the intellectual world in\nrelation to mind and the things of mind:\n\nWill you be a little more explicit? he said.\n\nWhy, you know, I said, that the eyes, when a person directs them towards\nobjects on which the light of day is no longer shining, but the moon and\nstars only, see dimly, and are nearly blind; they seem to have no\nclearness of vision in them?\n\nVery true.\n\n[Sidenote: Visible objects are to be seen only when the sun shines upon\nthem; truth is only known when illuminated by the idea of good.]\n\n*508D* But when they are directed towards objects on which the sun shines,\nthey see clearly and there is sight in them?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd the soul is like the eye: when resting upon that on which truth and\nbeing shine, the soul perceives and understands, and is radiant with\nintelligence; but when turned towards the twilight of becoming and\nperishing, then she has opinion only, and goes blinking about, and is\nfirst of one opinion and then of another, and seems to have no\nintelligence?\n\nJust so.\n\n[Sidenote: The idea of good higher than science or truth (the objective\nthan the subjective).]\n\n*508E* Now, that which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing\nto the knower is what I would have you term the {210} idea of good, and\nthis you will deem to be the cause of science[12], and of truth in so far\nas the latter becomes the subject of knowledge; beautiful too, as are both\ntruth and knowledge, you will be right in esteeming this other nature\n*509A* as more beautiful than either; and, as in the previous instance,\nlight and sight may be truly said to be like the sun, and yet not to be\nthe sun, so in this other sphere, science and truth may be deemed to be\nlike the good, but not the good; the good has a place of honour yet\nhigher.\n\n[Footnote 12: Reading [Greek: dianoou=].]\n\nWhat a wonder of beauty that must be, he said, which is the author of\nscience and truth, and yet surpasses them in beauty; for you surely cannot\nmean to say that pleasure is the good?\n\nGod forbid, I replied; but may I ask you to consider the image in another\npoint of view?\n\n*509B* In what point of view?\n\nYou would say, would you not, that the sun is not only the author of\nvisibility in all visible things, but of generation and nourishment and\ngrowth, though he himself is not generation?\n\nCertainly.\n\n[Sidenote: As the sun is the cause of generation, so the good is the cause\nof being and essence.]\n\nIn like manner the good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge\nto all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the good is\nnot essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power.\n\n*509C* Glaucon said, with a ludicrous earnestness: By the light of heaven,\nhow amazing!\n\nYes, I said, and the exaggeration may be set down to you; for you made me\nutter my fancies.\n\nAnd pray continue to utter them; at any rate let us hear if there is\nanything more to be said about the similitude of the sun.\n\nYes, I said, there is a great deal more.\n\nThen omit nothing, however slight.\n\nI will do my best, I said; but I should think that a great deal will have\nto be omitted.\n\nI hope not, he said.\n\n*509D* You have to imagine, then, that there are two ruling {211} powers,\nand that one of them is set over the intellectual world, the other over\nthe visible. I do not say heaven, lest you should fancy that I am playing\nupon the name ([Greek: ou)rano/s, o(rato/s]). May I suppose that you have\nthis distinction of the visible and intelligible fixed in your mind?\n\nI have.\n\n[Sidenote: The two spheres of sight and knowledge are represented by a\nline which is divided into two unequal parts.]\n\nNow take a line which has been cut into two unequal[13] parts, and divide\neach of them again in the same proportion, and suppose the two main\ndivisions to answer, one to the visible and the other to the intelligible,\nand then compare the subdivisions in respect of their clearness and want\nof *509E* clearness, and you will find that the first section in the\n*510A* sphere of the visible consists of images. And by images I mean, in\nthe first place, shadows, and in the second place, reflections in water\nand in solid, smooth and polished bodies and the like: Do you understand?\n\n[Footnote 13: Reading: [Greek: a)/nisa].]\n\nYes, I understand.\n\nImagine, now, the other section, of which this is only the resemblance, to\ninclude the animals which we see, and everything that grows or is made.\n\nVery good.\n\nWould you not admit that both the sections of this division have different\ndegrees of truth, and that the copy is to the original as the sphere of\nopinion is to the sphere of knowledge?\n\n*510B* Most undoubtedly.\n\nNext proceed to consider the manner in which the sphere of the\nintellectual is to be divided.\n\nIn what manner?\n\n[Sidenote: Images and hypotheses.]\n\nThus:--There are two subdivisions, in the lower of which the soul uses the\nfigures given by the former division as images; the enquiry can only be\nhypothetical, and instead of going upwards to a principle descends to the\nother end; in the higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses,\nand goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses, making no use of\nimages[14] as in the former case, but proceeding only in and through the\nideas themselves.\n\n[Footnote 14: Reading [Greek: \u00f4(=nper e)kei=no ei)ko/n\u00f4n].]\n\nI do not quite understand your meaning, he said. {212}\n\n[Sidenote: The hypotheses of mathematics.]\n\n*510C* Then I will try again; you will understand me better when I have\nmade some preliminary remarks. You are aware that students of geometry,\narithmetic, and the kindred sciences assume the odd and the even and the\nfigures and three kinds of angles and the like in their several branches\nof science; these are their hypotheses, which they and every body are\nsupposed to know, and therefore they do not deign to give any account of\nthem either to themselves or others; *510D* but they begin with them, and\ngo on until they arrive at last, and in a consistent manner, at their\nconclusion?\n\nYes, he said, I know.\n\n[Sidenote: In both spheres hypotheses are used, in the lower taking the\nform of images, but in the higher the soul ascends above hypotheses to the\nidea of good.]\n\nAnd do you not know also that although they make use of the visible forms\nand reason about them, they are thinking not of these, but of the ideals\nwhich they resemble; not of the *510E* figures which they draw, but of the\nabsolute square and the absolute diameter, and so on--the forms which they\ndraw or make, and which have shadows and reflections in water of their\nown, are converted by them into images, but they are really seeking to\nbehold the things themselves, which can only be seen with the eye of the\nmind?\n\n*511A* That is true.\n\nAnd of this kind I spoke as the intelligible, although in the search after\nit the soul is compelled to use hypotheses; not ascending to a first\nprinciple, because she is unable to rise above the region of hypothesis,\nbut employing the objects of which the shadows below are resemblances in\ntheir turn as images, they having in relation to the shadows and\nreflections of them a greater distinctness, and therefore a higher value.\n\n*511B* I understand, he said, that you are speaking of the province of\ngeometry and the sister arts.\n\n[Sidenote: Dialectic by the help of hypotheses rises above hypotheses.]\n\nAnd when I speak of the other division of the intelligible, you will\nunderstand me to speak of that other sort of knowledge which reason\nherself attains by the power of dialectic, using the hypotheses not as\nfirst principles, but only as hypotheses--that is to say, as steps and\npoints of departure into a world which is above hypotheses, in order that\nshe may soar beyond them to the first principle of the whole; and clinging\nto this and then to that which depends on this, by successive steps she\ndescends again without the aid of {213} *511C* any sensible object, from\nideas, through ideas, and in ideas she ends.\n\n[Sidenote: Return to psychology.]\n\nI understand you, he replied; not perfectly, for you seem to me to be\ndescribing a task which is really tremendous; but, at any rate,\nI understand you to say that knowledge and being, which the science of\ndialectic contemplates, are clearer than the notions of the arts, as they\nare termed, which proceed from hypotheses only: these are also\ncontemplated by the understanding, and not by the senses: yet, because\n*511D* they start from hypotheses and do not ascend to a principle, those\nwho contemplate them appear to you not to exercise the higher reason upon\nthem, although when a first principle is added to them they are cognizable\nby the higher reason. And the habit which is concerned with geometry and\nthe cognate sciences I suppose that you would term understanding and not\nreason, as being intermediate between opinion and reason.\n\n[Sidenote: Four faculties: Reason, understanding, faith, perception of\nshadows.]\n\nYou have quite conceived my meaning, I said; and now, corresponding to\nthese four divisions, let there be four faculties in the soul--reason\nanswering to the highest, *511E* understanding to the second, faith (or\nconviction) to the third, and perception of shadows to the last--and let\nthere be a scale of them, and let us suppose that the several faculties\nhave clearness in the same degree that their objects have truth.\n\nI understand, he replied, and give my assent, and accept your arrangement.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK VII.\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic VII._ Socrates, Glaucon.]\n\n[Sidenote: The den, the prisoners; the light at a distance;]\n\n*514A* And now, I said, let me show in a figure how far our nature is\nenlightened or unenlightened:--Behold! human beings living in a\nunderground den, which has a mouth open towards the light and reaching all\nalong the den; here they have been from their childhood, and have their\nlegs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and *514B* can only see\nbefore them, being prevented by the chains from turning round their heads.\nAbove and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the\nfire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you will see, if you\nlook, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which marionette\nplayers have in front of them, over which they show the puppets.\n\nI see.\n\n[Sidenote: the low wall, and the moving figures of which the shadows are\nseen on the opposite wall of the den.]\n\nAnd do you see, I said, men passing along the wall carrying *514C* all\nsorts of vessels, and statues and figures of animals *515A* made of wood\nand stone and various materials, which appear over the wall? Some of them\nare talking, others silent.\n\nYou have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners.\n\nLike ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own shadows, or the\nshadows of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the\ncave?\n\nTrue, he said; how could they see anything but the *515B* shadows if they\nwere never allowed to move their heads?\n\nAnd of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would only\nsee the shadows?\n\nYes, he said.\n\nAnd if they were able to converse with one another, would they not suppose\nthat they were naming what was actually before them[1]? {215}\n\n[Footnote 1: Reading [Greek: paro/nta].]\n\nVery true.\n\n[Sidenote: The prisoners would mistake the shadows for realities.]\n\nAnd suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the other\nside, would they not be sure to fancy when one of the passers-by spoke\nthat the voice which they heard came from the passing shadow?\n\nNo question, he replied.\n\n*515C* To them, I said, the truth would be literally nothing but the\nshadows of the images.\n\nThat is certain.\n\n[Sidenote: And when released, they would still persist in maintaining the\nsuperior truth of the shadows.]\n\nAnd now look again, and see what will naturally follow if the prisoners\nare released and disabused of their error. At first, when any of them is\nliberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round and\nwalk and look towards the light, he will suffer sharp pains; the glare\nwill distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of *515D*\nwhich in his former state he had seen the shadows; and then conceive some\none saying to him, that what he saw before was an illusion, but that now,\nwhen he is approaching nearer to being and his eye is turned towards more\nreal existence, he has a clearer vision,--what will be his reply? And you\nmay further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they\npass and requiring him to name them,--will he not be perplexed? Will he\nnot fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the\nobjects which are now shown to him?\n\nFar truer.\n\n*515E* And if he is compelled to look straight at the light, will he not\nhave a pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take refuge in\nthe objects of vision which he can see, and which he will conceive to be\nin reality clearer than the things which are now being shown to him?\n\nTrue, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: When dragged upwards, they would be dazzled by excess of\nlight.]\n\nAnd suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and\nrugged ascent, and held fast until he is forced into the presence of the\nsun himself, is he not likely to be *516A* pained and irritated? When he\napproaches the light his eyes will be dazzled, and he will not be able to\nsee anything at all of what are now called realities.\n\nNot all in a moment, he said.\n\nHe will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the {216} upper world.\nAnd first he will see the shadows best, next the reflections of men and\nother objects in the water, and then the objects themselves; then he will\ngaze upon the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled heaven;\n*516B* and he will see the sky and the stars by night better than the sun\nor the light of the sun by day?\n\nCertainly.\n\n[Sidenote: At length they will see the sun and understand his nature.]\n\nLast of all he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections of\nhim in the water, but he will see him in his own proper place, and not in\nanother; and he will contemplate him as he is.\n\nCertainly.\n\nHe will then proceed to argue that this is he who gives the season and the\nyears, and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world, and in a\ncertain way the cause of all *516C* things which he and his fellows have\nbeen accustomed to behold?\n\nClearly, he said, he would first see the sun and then reason about him.\n\n[Sidenote: They would then pity their old companions of the den.]\n\nAnd when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom of the den and\nhis fellow-prisoners, do you not suppose that he would felicitate himself\non the change, and pity them?\n\nCertainly, he would.\n\nAnd if they were in the habit of conferring honours among themselves on\nthose who were quickest to observe the passing shadows and to remark which\nof them went before, and *516D* which followed after, and which were\ntogether; and who were therefore best able to draw conclusions as to the\nfuture, do you think that he would care for such honours and glories, or\nenvy the possessors of them? Would he not say with Homer,\n\n  'Better to be the poor servant of a poor master,'\n\nand to endure anything, rather than think as they do and live after their\nmanner?\n\n*516E* Yes, he said, I think that he would rather suffer anything than\nentertain these false notions and live in this miserable manner.\n\n[Sidenote: But when they returned to the den they would see much worse\nthan those who had never left it.]\n\nImagine once more, I said, such an one coming suddenly {217} out of the\nsun to be replaced in his old situation; would he not be certain to have\nhis eyes full of darkness?\n\nTo be sure, he said.\n\nAnd if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the\nshadows with the prisoners who had never *517A* moved out of the den,\nwhile his sight was still weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and\nthe time which would be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be\nvery considerable), would he not be ridiculous? Men would say of him that\nup he went and down he came without his eyes; and that it was better not\neven to think of ascending; and if any one tried to loose another and lead\nhim up to the light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put\nhim to death.\n\nNo question, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: The prison is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the\nsun.]\n\nThis entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear *517B* Glaucon, to\nthe previous argument; the prison-house is the world of sight, the light\nof the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret\nthe journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual\nworld according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have\nexpressed--whether rightly or wrongly God knows. But, whether true or\nfalse, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good\nappears last of all, and is seen *517C* only with an effort; and, when\nseen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful\nand right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world,\nand the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that\nthis is the power upon which he who would act rationally either in public\nor private life must have his eye fixed.\n\nI agree, he said, as far as I am able to understand you.\n\nMoreover, I said, you must not wonder that those who attain to this\nbeatific vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs; for their souls\nare ever hastening into the *517D* upper world where they desire to dwell;\nwhich desire of theirs is very natural, if our allegory may be trusted.\n\nYes, very natural.\n\n[Sidenote: Nothing extraordinary in the philosopher being unable to see in\nthe dark.]\n\nAnd is there anything surprising in one who passes from divine\ncontemplations to the evil state of man, misbehaving {218} himself in a\nridiculous manner; if, while his eyes are blinking and before he has\nbecome accustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled to fight in\ncourts of law, or in other places, about the images or the shadows of\nimages of *517E* justice, and is endeavouring to meet the conceptions of\nthose who have never yet seen absolute justice?\n\nAnything but surprising, he replied.\n\n[Sidenote: The eyes may be blinded in two ways, by excess or by defect of\nlight.]\n\n*518A* Any one who has common sense will remember that the bewilderments\nof the eyes are of two kinds, and arise from two causes, either from\ncoming out of the light or from going into the light, which is true of the\nmind's eye, quite as much as of the bodily eye; and he who remembers this\nwhen he sees any one whose vision is perplexed and weak, will not be too\nready to laugh; he will first ask whether that soul of man has come out of\nthe brighter life, and is unable to see because unaccustomed to the dark,\nor having turned from darkness to the day is dazzled by excess of light.\n*518B* And he will count the one happy in his condition and state of\nbeing, and he will pity the other; or, if he have a mind to laugh at the\nsoul which comes from below into the light, there will be more reason in\nthis than in the laugh which greets him who returns from above out of the\nlight into the den.\n\nThat, he said, is a very just distinction.\n\n[Sidenote: The conversion of the soul is the turning round the eye from\ndarkness to light.]\n\nBut then, if I am right, certain professors of education must be wrong\nwhen they say that they can put a knowledge *518C* into the soul which was\nnot there before, like sight into blind eyes.\n\nThey undoubtedly say this, he replied.\n\nWhereas, our argument shows that the power and capacity of learning exists\nin the soul already; and that just as the eye was unable to turn from\ndarkness to light without the whole body, so too the instrument of\nknowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be turned from the\nworld of becoming into that of being, and learn by degrees to endure the\nsight of being, and of the brightest and best of being, or *518D* in other\nwords, of the good.\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd must there not be some art which will effect conversion in the easiest\nand quickest manner; not implanting {219} the faculty of sight, for that\nexists already, but has been turned in the wrong direction, and is looking\naway from the truth?\n\nYes, he said, such an art may be presumed.\n\n[Sidenote: The virtue of wisdom has a divine power which may be turned\neither towards good or towards evil.]\n\nAnd whereas the other so-called virtues of the soul seem to be akin to\nbodily qualities, for even when they are not *518E* originally innate they\ncan be implanted later by habit and exercise, the virtue of wisdom more\nthan anything else contains a divine element which always remains, and by\nthis conversion is rendered useful and profitable; or, on the other hand,\nhurtful and useless. Did you never observe the narrow *519A* intelligence\nflashing from the keen eye of a clever rogue--how eager he is, how clearly\nhis paltry soul sees the way to his end; he is the reverse of blind, but\nhis keen eye-sight is forced into the service of evil, and he is\nmischievous in proportion to his cleverness?\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nBut what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days of\ntheir youth; and they had been severed from those sensual pleasures, such\nas eating and drinking, which, *519B* like leaden weights, were attached\nto them at their birth, and which drag them down and turn the vision of\ntheir souls upon the things that are below--if, I say, they had been\nreleased from these impediments and turned in the opposite direction, the\nvery same faculty in them would have seen the truth as keenly as they see\nwhat their eyes are turned to now.\n\nVery likely.\n\n[Sidenote: Neither the uneducated nor the overeducated will be good\nservants of the State.]\n\nYes, I said; and there is another thing which is likely, or rather a\nnecessary inference from what has preceded, that neither the uneducated\nand uninformed of the truth, nor *519C* yet those who never make an end of\ntheir education, will be able ministers of State; not the former, because\nthey have no single aim of duty which is the rule of all their actions,\nprivate as well as public; nor the latter, because they will not act at\nall except upon compulsion, fancying that they are already dwelling apart\nin the islands of the blest.\n\nVery true, he replied.\n\nThen, I said, the business of us who are the founders of the State will be\nto compel the best minds to attain that {220} knowledge which we have\nalready shown to be the greatest of all--they must continue to ascend\nuntil they arrive at the good; *519D* but when they have ascended and seen\nenough we must not allow them to do as they do now.\n\nWhat do you mean?\n\n[Sidenote: Men should ascend to the upper world, but they should also\nreturn to the lower.]\n\nI mean that they remain in the upper world: but this must not be allowed;\nthey must be made to descend again among the prisoners in the den, and\npartake of their labours and honours, whether they are worth having or\nnot.\n\nBut is not this unjust? he said; ought we to give them a worse life, when\nthey might have a better?\n\n*519E* You have again forgotten, my friend, I said, the intention of the\nlegislator, who did not aim at making any one class in the State happy\nabove the rest; the happiness was to be in the whole State, and he held\nthe citizens together by persuasion and necessity, making them benefactors\nof the State, *520A* and therefore benefactors of one another; to this end\nhe created them, not to please themselves, but to be his instruments in\nbinding up the State.\n\nTrue, he said, I had forgotten.\n\n[Sidenote: The duties of philosophers.]\n\n[Sidenote: Their obligations to their country will induce them to take\npart in her government.]\n\nObserve, Glaucon, that there will be no injustice in compelling our\nphilosophers to have a care and providence of others; we shall explain to\nthem that in other States, men *520B* of their class are not obliged to\nshare in the toils of politics: and this is reasonable, for they grow up\nat their own sweet will, and the government would rather not have them.\nBeing self-taught, they cannot be expected to show any gratitude for a\nculture which they have never received. But we have brought you into the\nworld to be rulers of the hive, kings of yourselves and of the other\ncitizens, and have educated you far better and more perfectly than they\nhave been educated, and you are better able to share in the double duty.\n*520C* Wherefore each of you, when his turn comes, must go down to the\ngeneral underground abode, and get the habit of seeing in the dark. When\nyou have acquired the habit, you will see ten thousand times better than\nthe inhabitants of the den, and you will know what the several images are,\nand what they represent, because you have seen the beautiful and just and\ngood in their truth. And thus our State, which is also yours, will be a\nreality, and not a dream {221} only, and will be administered in a spirit\nunlike that of other States, in which men fight with one another about\nshadows only and are distracted in the struggle for power, *520D* which in\ntheir eyes is a great good. Whereas the truth is that the State in which\nthe rulers are most reluctant to govern is always the best and most\nquietly governed, and the State in which they are most eager, the worst.\n\nQuite true, he replied.\n\nAnd will our pupils, when they hear this, refuse to take their turn at the\ntoils of State, when they are allowed to spend the greater part of their\ntime with one another in the heavenly light?\n\n[Sidenote: They will be willing but not anxious to rule.]\n\n*520E* Impossible, he answered; for they are just men, and the commands\nwhich we impose upon them are just; there can be no doubt that every one\nof them will take office as a stern necessity, and not after the fashion\nof our present rulers of State.\n\n[Sidenote: The statesman must be provided with a better life than that of\na ruler; and then he will not covet office.]\n\nYes, my friend, I said; and there lies the point. You *521A* must contrive\nfor your future rulers another and a better life than that of a ruler, and\nthen you may have a well-ordered State; for only in the State which offers\nthis, will they rule who are truly rich, not in silver and gold, but in\nvirtue and wisdom, which are the true blessings of life. Whereas if they\ngo to the administration of public affairs, poor and hungering after their\nown private advantage, thinking that hence they are to snatch the chief\ngood, order there can never be; for they will be fighting about office,\nand the civil and domestic broils which thus arise will be the ruin of the\nrulers themselves and of the whole State.\n\nMost true, he replied.\n\n*521B* And the only life which looks down upon the life of political\nambition is that of true philosophy. Do you know of any other?\n\nIndeed, I do not, he said.\n\nAnd those who govern ought not to be lovers of the task? For, if they are,\nthere will be rival lovers, and they will fight.\n\nNo question.\n\nWho then are those whom we shall compel to be guardians? Surely they will\nbe the men who are wisest about affairs of {222} State, and by whom the\nState is best administered, and who at the same time have other honours\nand another and a better life than that of politics?\n\nThey are the men, and I will choose them, he replied.\n\n*521C* And now shall we consider in what way such guardians will be\nproduced, and how they are to be brought from darkness to light,--as some\nare said to have ascended from the world below to the gods?\n\nBy all means, he replied.\n\n[Sidenote: The training of the guardians.]\n\nThe process, I said, is not the turning over of an oyster-shell[2], but\nthe turning round of a soul passing from a day which is little better than\nnight to the true day of being, that is, the ascent from below[3], which\nwe affirm to be true philosophy?\n\n[Footnote 2: In allusion to a game in which two parties fled or pursued\naccording as an oyster-shell which was thrown into the air fell with the\ndark or light side uppermost.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Reading [Greek: ou)=san e)pa/nodon].]\n\nQuite so.\n\nAnd should we not enquire what sort of knowledge has the *521D* power of\neffecting such a change?\n\nCertainly.\n\n[Sidenote: What knowledge will draw the soul upwards?]\n\nWhat sort of knowledge is there which would draw the soul from becoming to\nbeing? And another consideration has just occurred to me: You will\nremember that our young men are to be warrior athletes?\n\nYes, that was said.\n\nThen this new kind of knowledge must have an additional quality?\n\nWhat quality?\n\nUsefulness in war.\n\nYes, if possible.\n\n[Sidenote: Recapitulation.]\n\nThere were two parts in our former scheme of education, *521E* were there\nnot?\n\n[Sidenote: There were two parts in our former scheme of education, were\nthere not?]\n\nJust so.\n\nThere was gymnastic which presided over the growth and decay of the body,\nand may therefore be regarded as having to do with generation and\ncorruption?\n\nTrue.\n\n*522A* Then that is not the knowledge which we are seeking to discover?\n{223}\n\nNo.\n\nBut what do you say of music, which also entered to a certain extent into\nour former scheme?\n\nMusic, he said, as you will remember, was the counterpart of gymnastic,\nand trained the guardians by the influences of habit, by harmony making\nthem harmonious, by rhythm rhythmical, but not giving them science; and\nthe words, whether fabulous or possibly true, had kindred elements of\nrhythm and harmony in them. But in music there was *522B* nothing which\ntended to that good which you are now seeking.\n\nYou are most accurate, I said, in your recollection; in music there\ncertainly was nothing of the kind. But what branch of knowledge is there,\nmy dear Glaucon, which is of the desired nature; since all the useful arts\nwere reckoned mean by us?\n\nUndoubtedly; and yet if music and gymnastic are excluded, and the arts are\nalso excluded, what remains?\n\nWell, I said, there may be nothing left of our special subjects; and then\nwe shall have to take something which is not special, but of universal\napplication.\n\nWhat may that be?\n\n[Sidenote: There remains for the second education, arithmetic;]\n\n*522C* A something which all arts and sciences and intelligences use in\ncommon, and which every one first has to learn among the elements of\neducation.\n\nWhat is that?\n\nThe little matter of distinguishing one, two, and three--in a word, number\nand calculation:--do not all arts and sciences necessarily partake of\nthem?\n\nYes.\n\nThen the art of war partakes of them?\n\nTo be sure.\n\n*522D* Then Palamedes, whenever he appears in tragedy, proves Agamemnon\nridiculously unfit to be a general. Did you never remark how he declares\nthat he had invented number, and had numbered the ships and set in array\nthe ranks of the army at Troy; which implies that they had never been\nnumbered before, and Agamemnon must be supposed literally to have been\nincapable of counting his own feet--how could he if he was ignorant of\nnumber? And if that is true, what sort of general must he have been? {224}\n\nI should say a very strange one, if this was as you say.\n\n*522E* Can we deny that a warrior should have a knowledge of arithmetic?\n\nCertainly he should, if he is to have the smallest understanding of\nmilitary tactics, or indeed, I should rather say, if he is to be a man at\nall.\n\nI should like to know whether you have the same notion which I have of\nthis study?\n\nWhat is your notion?\n\n[Sidenote: that being a study which leads naturally to reflection, for]\n\nIt appears to me to be a study of the kind which we are *523A* seeking,\nand which leads naturally to reflection, but never to have been rightly\nused; for the true use of it is simply to draw the soul towards being.\n\nWill you explain your meaning? he said.\n\nI will try, I said; and I wish you would share the enquiry with me, and\nsay 'yes' or 'no' when I attempt to distinguish in my own mind what\nbranches of knowledge have this attracting power, in order that we may\nhave clearer proof that arithmetic is, as I suspect, one of them.\n\nExplain, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: reflection is aroused by contradictory impressions of sense.]\n\nI mean to say that objects of sense are of two kinds; some *523B* of them\ndo not invite thought because the sense is an adequate judge of them;\nwhile in the case of other objects sense is so untrustworthy that further\nenquiry is imperatively demanded.\n\nYou are clearly referring, he said, to the manner in which the senses are\nimposed upon by distance, and by painting in light and shade.\n\nNo, I said, that is not at all my meaning.\n\nThen what is your meaning?\n\nWhen speaking of uninviting objects, I mean those which *523C* do not pass\nfrom one sensation to the opposite; inviting objects are those which do;\nin this latter case the sense coming upon the object, whether at a\ndistance or near, gives no more vivid idea of anything in particular than\nof its opposite. An illustration will make my meaning clearer:--here are\nthree fingers--a little finger, a second finger, and a middle finger.\n\nVery good. {225}\n\nYou may suppose that they are seen quite close: And here comes the point.\n\nWhat is it?\n\n[Sidenote: No difficulty in simple perception.]\n\nEach of them equally appears a finger, whether seen in the *523D* middle\nor at the extremity, whether white or black, or thick or thin--it makes no\ndifference; a finger is a finger all the same. In these cases a man is not\ncompelled to ask of thought the question what is a finger? for the sight\nnever intimates to the mind that a finger is other than a finger.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd therefore, I said, as we might expect, there is nothing *523E* here\nwhich invites or excites intelligence.\n\nThere is not, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: But the same senses at the same time give different impressions\nwhich are at first indistinct and have to be distinguished by the mind.]\n\nBut is this equally true of the greatness and smallness of the fingers?\nCan sight adequately perceive them? and is no difference made by the\ncircumstance that one of the fingers is in the middle and another at the\nextremity? And in like manner does the touch adequately perceive the\nqualities of thickness or thinness, of softness or hardness? And so of the\nother senses; do they give perfect intimations of such matters? *524A* Is\nnot their mode of operation on this wise--the sense which is concerned\nwith the quality of hardness is necessarily concerned also with the\nquality of softness, and only intimates to the soul that the same thing is\nfelt to be both hard and soft?\n\nYou are quite right, he said.\n\nAnd must not the soul be perplexed at this intimation which the sense\ngives of a hard which is also soft? What, again, is the meaning of light\nand heavy, if that which is light is also heavy, and that which is heavy,\nlight?\n\n*524B* Yes, he said, these intimations which the soul receives are very\ncurious and require to be explained.\n\n[Sidenote: The aid of numbers is invoked in order to remove the\nconfusion.]\n\nYes, I said, and in these perplexities the soul naturally summons to her\naid calculation and intelligence, that she may see whether the several\nobjects announced to her are one or two.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd if they turn out to be two, is not each of them one and different?\n\nCertainly. {226}\n\nAnd if each is one, and both are two, she will conceive the *524C* two as\nin a state of division, for if there were undivided they could only be\nconceived of as one?\n\nTrue.\n\nThe eye certainly did see both small and great, but only in a confused\nmanner; they were not distinguished.\n\nYes.\n\n[Sidenote: The chaos then begins to be defined.]\n\nWhereas the thinking mind, intending to light up the chaos, was compelled\nto reverse the process, and look at small and great as separate and not\nconfused.\n\nVery true.\n\nWas not this the beginning of the enquiry 'What is great?' and 'What is\nsmall?'\n\nExactly so.\n\n[Sidenote: The parting of the visible and intelligible.]\n\nAnd thus arose the distinction of the visible and the intelligible.\n\n*524D* Most true.\n\nThis was what I meant when I spoke of impressions which invited the\nintellect, or the reverse--those which are simultaneous with opposite\nimpressions, invite thought; those which are not simultaneous do not.\n\nI understand, he said, and agree with you.\n\nAnd to which class do unity and number belong?\n\nI do not know, he replied.\n\n[Sidenote: Thought is aroused by the contradiction of the one and many.]\n\nThink a little and you will see that what has preceded will supply the\nanswer; for if simple unity could be adequately perceived by the sight or\nby any other sense, then, *524E* as we were saying in the case of the\nfinger, there would be nothing to attract towards being; but when there is\nsome contradiction always present, and one is the reverse of one and\ninvolves the conception of plurality, then thought begins to be aroused\nwithin us, and the soul perplexed and wanting to arrive at a decision asks\n'What is absolute unity?' This *525A* is the way in which the study of the\none has a power of drawing and converting the mind to the contemplation of\ntrue being.\n\nAnd surely, he said, this occurs notably in the case of one; for we see\nthe same thing to be both one and infinite in multitude?\n\nYes, I said; and this being true of one must be equally true of all\nnumber? {227}\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd all arithmetic and calculation have to do with number?\n\nYes.\n\n*525B* And they appear to lead the mind towards truth?\n\nYes, in a very remarkable manner.\n\n[Sidenote: Arithmetic has a practical and also a philosophical use, the\nlatter the higher.]\n\nThen this is knowledge of the kind for which we are seeking, having a\ndouble use, military and philosophical; for the man of war must learn the\nart of number or he will not know how to array his troops, and the\nphilosopher also, because he has to rise out of the sea of change and lay\nhold of true being, and therefore he must be an arithmetician.\n\nThat is true.\n\nAnd our guardian is both warrior and philosopher?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen this is a kind of knowledge which legislation may fitly prescribe;\nand we must endeavour to persuade those *525C* who are to be the principal\nmen of our State to go and learn arithmetic, not as amateurs, but they\nmust carry on the study until they see the nature of numbers with the mind\nonly; nor again, like merchants or retail-traders, with a view to buying\nor selling, but for the sake of their military use, and of the soul\nherself; and because this will be the easiest way for her to pass from\nbecoming to truth and being.\n\nThat is excellent, he said.\n\nYes, I said, and now having spoken of it, I must add *525D* how charming\nthe science is! and in how many ways it conduces to our desired end, if\npursued in the spirit of a philosopher, and not of a shopkeeper!\n\nHow do you mean?\n\n[Sidenote: The higher arithmetic is concerned, not with visible or\ntangible objects, but with abstract numbers.]\n\nI mean, as I was saying, that arithmetic has a very great and elevating\neffect, compelling the soul to reason about abstract number, and rebelling\nagainst the introduction of visible or tangible objects into the argument.\nYou know *525E* how steadily the masters of the art repel and ridicule any\none who attempts to divide absolute unity when he is calculating, and if\nyou divide, they multiply[4], taking care that one shall continue one and\nnot become lost in fractions. {228}\n\n[Footnote 4: Meaning either (1) that they integrate the number because\nthey deny the possibility of fractions; or (2) that division is regarded\nby them as a process of multiplication, for the fractions of one continue\nto be units.]\n\nThat is very true.\n\n*526A* Now, suppose a person were to say to them: O my friends, what are\nthese wonderful numbers about which you are reasoning, in which, as you\nsay, there is a unity such as you demand, and each unit is equal,\ninvariable, indivisible,--what would they answer?\n\nThey would answer, as I should conceive, that they were speaking of those\nnumbers which can only be realized in thought.\n\nThen you see that this knowledge may be truly called *526B* necessary,\nnecessitating as it clearly does the use of the pure intelligence in the\nattainment of pure truth?\n\nYes; that is a marked characteristic of it.\n\n[Sidenote: The arithmetician is naturally quick, and the study of\narithmetic gives him still greater quickness.]\n\nAnd have you further observed, that those who have a natural talent for\ncalculation are generally quick at every other kind of knowledge; and even\nthe dull, if they have had an arithmetical training, although they may\nderive no other advantage from it, always become much quicker than they\nwould otherwise have been.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\n*526C* And indeed, you will not easily find a more difficult study, and\nnot many as difficult.\n\nYou will not.\n\nAnd, for all these reasons, arithmetic is a kind of knowledge in which the\nbest natures should be trained, and which must not be given up.\n\nI agree.\n\nLet this then be made one of our subjects of education. And next, shall we\nenquire whether the kindred science also concerns us?\n\nYou mean geometry?\n\nExactly so.\n\n[Sidenote: Geometry has practical applications;]\n\n*526D* Clearly, he said, we are concerned with that part of geometry which\nrelates to war; for in pitching a camp, or taking up a position, or\nclosing or extending the lines of an army, or any other military\nmanoeuvre, whether in actual battle or on a march, it will make all the\ndifference whether a general is or is not a geometrician.\n\n[Sidenote: these however are trifling in comparison with that greater part\nof the science which tends towards the good,]\n\nYes, I said, but for that purpose a very little of either geometry or\ncalculation will be enough; the question relates {229} rather to the\ngreater and more advanced part of geometry-- *526E* whether that tends in\nany degree to make more easy the vision of the idea of good; and thither,\nas I was saying, all things tend which compel the soul to turn her gaze\ntowards that place, where is the full perfection of being, which she\nought, by all means, to behold.\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nThen if geometry compels us to view being, it concerns us; if becoming\nonly, it does not concern us?\n\n*527A* Yes, that is what we assert.\n\nYet anybody who has the least acquaintance with geometry will not deny\nthat such a conception of the science is in flat contradiction to the\nordinary language of geometricians.\n\nHow so?\n\nThey have in view practice only, and are always speaking, in a narrow and\nridiculous manner, of squaring and extending and applying and the\nlike--they confuse the necessities of geometry with those of daily life;\nwhereas knowledge is the *527B* real object of the whole science.\n\nCertainly, he said.\n\nThen must not a further admission be made?\n\nWhat admission?\n\n[Sidenote: and is concerned with the eternal.]\n\nThat the knowledge at which geometry aims is knowledge of the eternal, and\nnot of aught perishing and transient.\n\nThat, he replied, may be readily allowed, and is true.\n\nThen, my noble friend, geometry will draw the soul towards truth, and\ncreate the spirit of philosophy, and raise up that which is now unhappily\nallowed to fall down.\n\nNothing will be more likely to have such an effect.\n\n*527C* Then nothing should be more sternly laid down than that the\ninhabitants of your fair city should by all means learn geometry. Moreover\nthe science has indirect effects, which are not small.\n\nOf what kind? he said.\n\nThere are the military advantages of which you spoke, I said; and in all\ndepartments of knowledge, as experience proves, any one who has studied\ngeometry is infinitely quicker of apprehension than one who has not.\n\nYes indeed, he said, there is an infinite difference between them. {230}\n\nThen shall we propose this as a second branch of knowledge which our youth\nwill study?\n\nLet us do so, he replied.\n\n*527D* And suppose we make astronomy the third--what do you say?\n\n[Sidenote: Astronomy, like the previous sciences, is at first praised by\nGlaucon for its practical uses.]\n\nI am strongly inclined to it, he said; the observation of the seasons and\nof months and years is as essential to the general as it is to the farmer\nor sailor.\n\nI am amused, I said, at your fear of the world, which makes you guard\nagainst the appearance of insisting upon useless studies; and I quite\nadmit the difficulty of believing that in every man there is an eye of the\nsoul which, when by *527E* other pursuits lost and dimmed, is by these\npurified and re-illumined; and is more precious far than ten thousand\nbodily eyes, for by it alone is truth seen. Now there are two classes of\npersons: one class of those who will agree with you and will take your\nwords as a revelation; another class *528A* to whom they will be utterly\nunmeaning, and who will naturally deem them to be idle tales, for they see\nno sort of profit which is to be obtained from them. And therefore you had\nbetter decide at once with which of the two you are proposing to argue.\nYou will very likely say with neither, and that your chief aim in carrying\non the argument is your own improvement; at the same time you do not\ngrudge to others any benefit which they may receive.\n\nI think that I should prefer to carry on the argument mainly on my own\nbehalf.\n\n[Sidenote: Correction of the order.]\n\nThen take a step backward, for we have gone wrong in the order of the\nsciences.\n\nWhat was the mistake? he said.\n\nAfter plane geometry, I said, we proceeded at once to *528B* solids in\nrevolution, instead of taking solids in themselves; whereas after the\nsecond dimension the third, which is concerned with cubes and dimensions\nof depth, ought to have followed.\n\nThat is true, Socrates; but so little seems to be known as yet about these\nsubjects.\n\n[Sidenote: The pitiable condition of solid geometry.]\n\nWhy, yes, I said, and for two reasons:--in the first place, no government\npatronises them; this leads to a want of energy in the pursuit of them,\nand they are difficult; in the {231} second place, students cannot learn\nthem unless they have a director. But then a director can hardly be found,\nand even *528C* if he could, as matters now stand, the students, who are\nvery conceited, would not attend to him. That, however, would be otherwise\nif the whole State became the director of these studies and gave honour to\nthem; then disciples would want to come, and there would be continuous and\nearnest search, and discoveries would be made; since even now, disregarded\nas they are by the world, and maimed of their fair proportions, and\nalthough none of their votaries can tell the use of them, still these\nstudies force their way by their natural charm, and very likely, if they\nhad the help of the State, they would some day emerge into light.\n\n*528D* Yes, he said, there is a remarkable charm in them. But I do not\nclearly understand the change in the order. First you began with a\ngeometry of plane surfaces?\n\nYes, I said.\n\nAnd you placed astronomy next, and then you made a step backward?\n\n[Sidenote: The motion of solids.]\n\nYes, and I have delayed you by my hurry; the ludicrous state of solid\ngeometry, which, in natural order, should have followed, made me pass over\nthis branch and go on to *528E* astronomy, or motion of solids.\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nThen assuming that the science now omitted would come into existence if\nencouraged by the State, let us go on to astronomy, which will be fourth.\n\n[Sidenote: Glaucon grows sentimental about astronomy.]\n\nThe right order, he replied. And now, Socrates, as you rebuked the vulgar\nmanner in which I praised astronomy *529A* before, my praise shall be\ngiven in your own spirit. For every one, as I think, must see that\nastronomy compels the soul to look upwards and leads us from this world to\nanother.\n\nEvery one but myself, I said; to every one else this may be clear, but not\nto me.\n\nAnd what then would you say?\n\nI should rather say that those who elevate astronomy into philosophy\nappear to me to make us look downwards and not upwards.\n\nWhat do you mean? he asked. {232}\n\n[Sidenote: He is rebuked by Socrates,]\n\nYou, I replied, have in your mind a truly sublime conception of our\nknowledge of the things above. And I dare *529B* say that if a person were\nto throw his head back and study the fretted ceiling, you would still\nthink that his mind was the percipient, and not his eyes. And you are very\nlikely right, and I may be a simpleton: but, in my opinion, that knowledge\nonly which is of being and of the unseen can make the soul look upwards,\nand whether a man gapes at the heavens or blinks on the ground, seeking to\nlearn some particular of sense, I would deny that he can learn, for *529C*\nnothing of that sort is matter of science; his soul is looking downwards,\nnot upwards, whether his way to knowledge is by water or by land, whether\nhe floats, or only lies on his back.\n\n[Sidenote: who explains that the higher astronomy is an abstract science.]\n\nI acknowledge, he said, the justice of your rebuke. Still, I should like\nto ascertain how astronomy can be learned in any manner more conducive to\nthat knowledge of which we are speaking?\n\nI will tell you, I said: The starry heaven which we behold is wrought upon\na visible ground, and therefore, *529D* although the fairest and most\nperfect of visible things, must necessarily be deemed inferior far to the\ntrue motions of absolute swiftness and absolute slowness, which are\nrelative to each other, and carry with them that which is contained in\nthem, in the true number and in every true figure. Now, these are to be\napprehended by reason and intelligence, but not by sight.\n\nTrue, he replied.\n\nThe spangled heavens should be used as a pattern and with a view to that\nhigher knowledge; their beauty is like *529E* the beauty of figures or\npictures excellently wrought by the hand of Daedalus, or some other great\nartist, which we may chance to behold; any geometrician who saw them would\nappreciate the exquisiteness of their workmanship, but he would never\ndream of thinking that in them he could find the true equal or the true\ndouble, or the truth of any *530A* other proportion.\n\nNo, he replied, such an idea would be ridiculous.\n\nAnd will not a true astronomer have the same feeling when he looks at the\nmovements of the stars? Will he not think that heaven and the things in\nheaven are framed by the {233} Creator of them in the most perfect manner?\nBut he will never imagine that the proportions of night and day, or of\nboth to the month, or of the month to the year, or of the *530B* stars to\nthese and to one another, and any other things that are material and\nvisible can also be eternal and subject to no deviation--that would be\nabsurd; and it is equally absurd to take so much pains in investigating\ntheir exact truth.\n\nI quite agree, though I never thought of this before.\n\n[Sidenote: The real knowledge of astronomy or geometry is to be attained\nby the use of abstractions.]\n\nThen, I said, in astronomy, as in geometry, we should employ problems, and\nlet the heavens alone if we would approach the subject in the right way\nand so make the *530C* natural gift of reason to be of any real use.\n\nThat, he said, is a work infinitely beyond our present astronomers.\n\nYes, I said; and there are many other things which must also have a\nsimilar extension given to them, if our legislation is to be of any value.\nBut can you tell me of any other suitable study?\n\nNo, he said, not without thinking.\n\nMotion, I said, has many forms, and not one only; two of *530D* them are\nobvious enough even to wits no better than ours; and there are others, as\nI imagine, which may be left to wiser persons.\n\nBut where are the two?\n\nThere is a second, I said, which is the counterpart of the one already\nnamed.\n\nAnd what may that be?\n\n[Sidenote: What astronomy is to the eye, harmonics are to the ear.]\n\nThe second, I said, would seem relatively to the ears to be what the first\nis to the eyes; for I conceive that as the eyes are designed to look up at\nthe stars, so are the ears to hear harmonious motions; and these are\nsister sciences--as the Pythagoreans say, and we, Glaucon, agree with\nthem?\n\nYes, he replied.\n\n*530E* But this, I said, is a laborious study, and therefore we had better\ngo and learn of them; and they will tell us whether there are any other\napplications of these sciences. At the same time, we must not lose sight\nof our own higher object.\n\nWhat is that?\n\n[Sidenote: They must be studied with a view to the good and not after the\nfashion of the empirics or even of the Pythagoreans.]\n\nThere is a perfection which all knowledge ought to reach, {234} and which\nour pupils ought also to attain, and not to fall short of, as I was saying\nthat they did in astronomy. *531A* For in the science of harmony, as you\nprobably know, the same thing happens. The teachers of harmony compare the\nsounds and consonances which are heard only, and their labour, like that\nof the astronomers, is in vain.\n\nYes, by heaven! he said; and 'tis as good as a play to hear them talking\nabout their condensed notes, as they call them; they put their ears close\nalongside of the strings like persons catching a sound from their\nneighbour's wall[5]--one set of them declaring that they distinguish an\nintermediate note and have found the least interval which should be the\nunit of measurement; the others insisting that the two sounds have passed\ninto the same--either party setting *531B* their ears before their\nunderstanding.\n\n[Footnote 5: Or, 'close alongside of their neighbour's instruments, as if\nto catch a sound from them.']\n\nYou mean, I said, those gentlemen who tease and torture the strings and\nrack them on the pegs of the instrument: I might carry on the metaphor and\nspeak after their manner of the blows which the plectrum gives, and make\naccusations against the strings, both of backwardness and forwardness to\nsound; but this would be tedious, and therefore I will only say that these\nare not the men, and that I am referring to the Pythagoreans, of whom\nI was just now proposing to enquire about harmony. For they too are in\nerror, like the *531C* astronomers; they investigate the numbers of the\nharmonies which are heard, but they never attain to problems--that is to\nsay, they never reach the natural harmonies of number, or reflect why some\nnumbers are harmonious and others not.\n\nThat, he said, is a thing of more than mortal knowledge.\n\nA thing, I replied, which I would rather call useful; that is, if sought\nafter with a view to the beautiful and good; but if pursued in any other\nspirit, useless.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: All these studies must be correlated with one another.]\n\nNow, when all these studies reach the point of inter-communion *531D* and\nconnection with one another, and come to be considered in their mutual\naffinities, then, I think, but not till then, will the pursuit of them\nhave a value for our objects; otherwise there is no profit in them. {235}\n\nI suspect so; but you are speaking, Socrates, of a vast work.\n\nWhat do you mean? I said; the prelude or what? Do you not know that all\nthis is but the prelude to the actual strain which we have to learn? For\nyou surely would not *531E* regard the skilled mathematician as a\ndialectician?\n\n[Sidenote: Want of reasoning power in mathematicians.]\n\nAssuredly not, he said; I have hardly ever known a mathematician who was\ncapable of reasoning.\n\nBut do you imagine that men who are unable to give and take a reason will\nhave the knowledge which we require of them?\n\nNeither can this be supposed.\n\n[Sidenote: Dialectic proceeds by reason only, without any help of sense.]\n\n*532A* And so, Glaucon, I said, we have at last arrived at the hymn of\ndialectic. This is that strain which is of the intellect only, but which\nthe faculty of sight will nevertheless be found to imitate; for sight, as\nyou may remember, was imagined by us after a while to behold the real\nanimals and stars, and last of all the sun himself. And so with dialectic;\nwhen a person starts on the discovery of the absolute by the light of\nreason only, and without any assistance of sense, and perseveres *532B*\nuntil by pure intelligence he arrives at the perception of the absolute\ngood, he at last finds himself at the end of the intellectual world, as in\nthe case of sight at the end of the visible.\n\nExactly, he said.\n\nThen this is the progress which you call dialectic?\n\nTrue.\n\n[Sidenote: The gradual acquirement of dialectic by the pursuit of the arts\nanticipated in the allegory of the den.]\n\nBut the release of the prisoners from chains, and their translation from\nthe shadows to the images and to the light, and the ascent from the\nunderground den to the sun, while in his presence they are vainly trying\nto look on animals and plants and the light of the sun, but are able to\nperceive *532C* even with their weak eyes the images[6] in the water\n(which are divine), and are the shadows of true existence (not shadows of\nimages cast by a light of fire, which compared with the sun is only an\nimage)--this power of elevating the highest principle in the soul to the\ncontemplation of that which is best in existence, with which we may\ncompare the raising of that {236} faculty which is the very light of the\nbody to the sight of that which is brightest in the material and visible\nworld--this power is given, as I was saying, by all that study and pursuit\n*532D* of the arts which has been described.\n\n[Footnote 6: Omitting [Greek: e)ntau=tha de\\ pro\\s phanta/smata]. The word\n[Greek: thei=a] is bracketed by Stallbaum.]\n\nI agree in what you are saying, he replied, which may be hard to believe,\nyet, from another point of view, is harder still to deny. This, however,\nis not a theme to be treated of in passing only, but will have to be\ndiscussed again and again. And so, whether our conclusion be true or\nfalse, let us assume all this, and proceed at once from the prelude or\npreamble to the chief strain[7], and describe that in like manner. Say,\nthen, what is the nature and what are the divisions of *532E* dialectic,\nand what are the paths which lead thither; for these paths will also lead\nto our final rest.\n\n[Footnote 7: A play upon the word [Greek: no/mos], which means both 'law'\nand 'strain.']\n\n[Sidenote: The nature of dialectic can only be revealed to those who have\nbeen students of the preliminary sciences,]\n\n*533A* Dear Glaucon, I said, you will not be able to follow me here,\nthough I would do my best, and you should behold not an image only but the\nabsolute truth, according to my notion. Whether what I told you would or\nwould not have been a reality I cannot venture to say; but you would have\nseen something like reality; of that I am confident.\n\nDoubtless, he replied.\n\nBut I must also remind you, that the power of dialectic alone can reveal\nthis, and only to one who is a disciple of the previous sciences.\n\nOf that assertion you may be as confident as of the last.\n\n*533B* And assuredly no one will argue that there is any other method of\ncomprehending by any regular process all true existence or of ascertaining\nwhat each thing is in its own nature; for the arts in general are\nconcerned with the desires or opinions of men, or are cultivated with a\nview to production and construction, or for the preservation of such\nproductions and constructions; and as to the mathematical sciences which,\nas we were saying, have some apprehension of true being--geometry and the\nlike--they only dream about *533C* being, but never can they behold the\nwaking reality so long as they leave the hypotheses which they use\nunexamined, and are unable to give an account of them. For when a man\nknows not his own first principle, and when the conclusion {237} and\nintermediate steps are also constructed out of he knows not what, how can\nhe imagine that such a fabric of convention can ever become science?\n\nImpossible, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: which are her handmaids.]\n\nThen dialectic, and dialectic alone, goes directly to the first principle\nand is the only science which does away with hypotheses in order to make\nher ground secure; the eye of *533D* the soul, which is literally buried\nin an outlandish slough, is by her gentle aid lifted upwards; and she uses\nas handmaids and helpers in the work of conversion, the sciences which we\nhave been discussing. Custom terms them sciences, but they ought to have\nsome other name, implying greater clearness than opinion and less\nclearness than science: and this, in our previous sketch, was called\nunderstanding. But why *533E* should we dispute about names when we have\nrealities of such importance to consider?\n\nWhy indeed, he said, when any name will do which expresses the thought of\nthe mind with clearness?\n\n[Sidenote: Two divisions of the mind, intellect and opinion, each having\ntwo subdivisions.]\n\nAt any rate, we are satisfied, as before, to have four divisions; two for\nintellect and two for opinion, and to call the first division science, the\nsecond understanding, the third belief, and the fourth perception of\nshadows, opinion *534A* being concerned with becoming, and intellect with\nbeing; and so to make a proportion:--\n\n  As being is to becoming, so is pure intellect to opinion.\n  And as intellect is to opinion, so is science to belief, and\n  understanding to the perception of shadows.\n\nBut let us defer the further correlation and subdivision of the subjects\nof opinion and of intellect, for it will be a long enquiry, many times\nlonger than this has been.\n\n*534B* As far as I understand, he said, I agree.\n\nAnd do you also agree, I said, in describing the dialectician as one who\nattains a conception of the essence of each thing? And he who does not\npossess and is therefore unable to impart this conception, in whatever\ndegree he fails, may in that degree also be said to fail in intelligence?\nWill you admit so much?\n\nYes, he said; how can I deny it?\n\n[Sidenote: No truth which does not rest on the idea of good]\n\nAnd you would say the same of the conception of the good? Until the person\nis able to abstract and define rationally the {238} *534C* idea of good,\nand unless he can run the gauntlet of all objections, and is ready to\ndisprove them, not by appeals to opinion, but to absolute truth, never\nfaltering at any step of the argument--unless he can do all this, you\nwould say that he knows neither the idea of good nor any other good; he\napprehends only a shadow, if anything at all, which is given by opinion\nand not by science;--dreaming and slumbering in this life, before he is\nwell awake here, he *534D* arrives at the world below, and has his final\nquietus.\n\nIn all that I should most certainly agree with you.\n\nAnd surely you would not have the children of your ideal State, whom you\nare nurturing and educating--if the ideal ever becomes a reality--you\nwould not allow the future rulers to be like posts[8], having no reason in\nthem, and yet to be set in authority over the highest matters?\n\n[Footnote 8: [Greek: gramma/s]. literally 'lines,' probably the\nstarting-point of a race-course.]\n\nCertainly not.\n\nThen you will make a law that they shall have such an education as will\nenable them to attain the greatest skill in asking and answering\nquestions?\n\n*534E* Yes, he said, you and I together will make it.\n\n[Sidenote: ought to have a high place.]\n\nDialectic, then, as you will agree, is the coping-stone of the sciences,\nand is set over them; no other science can be *535A* placed higher--the\nnature of knowledge can no further go?\n\nI agree, he said.\n\nBut to whom we are to assign these studies, and in what way they are to be\nassigned, are questions which remain to be considered.\n\nYes, clearly.\n\nYou remember, I said, how the rulers were chosen before?\n\nCertainly, he said.\n\nThe same natures must still be chosen, and the preference again given to\nthe surest and the bravest, and, if possible, *535B* to the fairest; and,\nhaving noble and generous tempers, they should also have the natural gifts\nwhich will facilitate their education.\n\nAnd what are these?\n\n[Sidenote: The natural gifts which are required in the dialectician: a\ntowardly understanding; a good memory; strength of character;]\n\nSuch gifts as keenness and ready powers of acquisition; for the mind more\noften faints from the severity of study {239} than from the severity of\ngymnastics: the toil is more entirely the mind's own, and is not shared\nwith the body.\n\nVery true, he replied.\n\n*535C* Further, he of whom we are in search should have a good memory, and\nbe an unwearied solid man who is a lover of labour in any line; or he will\nnever be able to endure the great amount of bodily exercise and to go\nthrough all the intellectual discipline and study which we require of him.\n\nCertainly, he said; he must have natural gifts.\n\nThe mistake at present is, that those who study philosophy have no\nvocation, and this, as I was before saying, is the reason why she has\nfallen into disrepute: her true sons should take her by the hand and not\nbastards.\n\nWhat do you mean?\n\n[Sidenote: industry;]\n\n*535D* In the first place, her votary should not have a lame or halting\nindustry--I mean, that he should not be half industrious and half idle:\nas, for example, when a man is a lover of gymnastic and hunting, and all\nother bodily exercises, but a hater rather than a lover of the labour of\nlearning or listening or enquiring. Or the occupation to which he devotes\nhimself may be of an opposite kind, and he may have the other sort of\nlameness.\n\nCertainly, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: love of truth;]\n\nAnd as to truth, I said, is not a soul equally to be deemed *535E* halt\nand lame which hates voluntary falsehood and is extremely indignant at\nherself and others when they tell lies, but is patient of involuntary\nfalsehood, and does not mind wallowing like a swinish beast in the mire of\nignorance, and has no shame at being detected?\n\nTo be sure.\n\n[Sidenote: the moral virtues.]\n\n*536A* And, again, in respect of temperance, courage, magnificence, and\nevery other virtue, should we not carefully distinguish between the true\nson and the bastard? for where there is no discernment of such qualities\nstates and individuals unconsciously err; and the state makes a ruler, and\nthe individual a friend, of one who, being defective in some part of\nvirtue, is in a figure lame or a bastard.\n\nThat is very true, he said.\n\nAll these things, then, will have to be carefully considered *536B* by us;\nand if only those whom we introduce to this vast {240} system of education\nand training are sound in body and mind, justice herself will have nothing\nto say against us, and we shall be the saviours of the constitution and of\nthe State; but, if our pupils are men of another stamp, the reverse will\nhappen, and we shall pour a still greater flood of ridicule on philosophy\nthan she has to endure at present.\n\nThat would not be creditable.\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates plays a little with himself and his subject.]\n\nCertainly not, I said; and yet perhaps, in thus turning jest into earnest\nI am equally ridiculous.\n\nIn what respect?\n\n*536C* I had forgotten, I said, that we were not serious, and spoke with\ntoo much excitement. For when I saw philosophy so undeservedly trampled\nunder foot of men I could not help feeling a sort of indignation at the\nauthors of her disgrace: and my anger made me too vehement.\n\nIndeed! I was listening, and did not think so.\n\n[Sidenote: For the study of dialectic the young must be selected.]\n\nBut I, who am the speaker, felt that I was. And now let me remind you\nthat, although in our former selection we *536D* chose old men, we must\nnot do so in this. Solon was under a delusion when he said that a man when\nhe grows old may learn many things--for he can no more learn much than he\ncan run much; youth is the time for any extraordinary toil.\n\nOf course.\n\n[Sidenote: The preliminary studies should be commenced in childhood, but\nnever forced.]\n\nAnd, therefore, calculation and geometry and all the other elements of\ninstruction, which are a preparation for dialectic, should be presented to\nthe mind in childhood; not, however, under any notion of forcing our\nsystem of education.\n\nWhy not?\n\n*536E* Because a freeman ought not to be a slave in the acquisition of\nknowledge of any kind. Bodily exercise, when compulsory, does no harm to\nthe body; but knowledge which is acquired under compulsion obtains no hold\non the mind.\n\nVery true.\n\nThen, my good friend, I said, do not use compulsion, but *537A* let early\neducation be a sort of amusement; you will then be better able to find out\nthe natural bent.\n\nThat is a very rational notion, he said.\n\nDo you remember that the children, too, were to be taken {241} to see the\nbattle on horseback; and that if there were no danger they were to be\nbrought close up and, like young hounds, have a taste of blood given them?\n\nYes, I remember.\n\nThe same practice may be followed, I said, in all these things--labours,\nlessons, dangers--and he who is most at home in all of them ought to be\nenrolled in a select number.\n\n*537B* At what age?\n\n[Sidenote: The necessary gymnastics must be completed first.]\n\nAt the age when the necessary gymnastics are over: the period whether of\ntwo or three years which passes in this sort of training is useless for\nany other purpose; for sleep and exercise are unpropitious to learning;\nand the trial of who is first in gymnastic exercises is one of the most\nimportant tests to which our youth are subjected.\n\nCertainly, he replied.\n\n[Sidenote; At twenty years of age the disciples will begin to be taught\nthe correlation of the sciences.]\n\nAfter that time those who are selected from the class of twenty years old\nwill be promoted to higher honour, and the *537C* sciences which they\nlearned without any order in their early education will now be brought\ntogether, and they will be able to see the natural relationship of them to\none another and to true being.\n\nYes, he said, that is the only kind of knowledge which takes lasting root.\n\nYes, I said; and the capacity for such knowledge is the great criterion of\ndialectical talent: the comprehensive mind is always the dialectical.\n\nI agree with you, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: At thirty the most promising will be placed in a select class.]\n\nThese, I said, are the points which you must consider; *537D* and those\nwho have most of this comprehension, and who are most steadfast in their\nlearning, and in their military and other appointed duties, when they have\narrived at the age of thirty have to be chosen by you out of the select\nclass, and elevated to higher honour; and you will have to prove them by\nthe help of dialectic, in order to learn which of them is able to give up\nthe use of sight and the other senses, and in company with truth to attain\nabsolute being: And here, my friend, great caution is required.\n\nWhy great caution?\n\n[Sidenote: The growth of scepticism]\n\n*537E* Do you not remark, I said, how great is the evil which dialectic\nhas introduced? {242}\n\nWhat evil? he said.\n\nThe students of the art are filled with lawlessness.\n\nQuite true, he said.\n\nDo you think that there is anything so very unnatural or inexcusable in\ntheir case? or will you make allowance for them?\n\nIn what way make allowance?\n\n[Sidenote: in the minds of the young illustrated by the case of a\nsupposititious son,]\n\nI want you, I said, by way of parallel, to imagine a supposititious son\nwho is brought up in great wealth; he *538A* is one of a great and\nnumerous family, and has many flatterers. When he grows up to manhood, he\nlearns that his alleged are not his real parents; but who the real are he\nis unable to discover. Can you guess how he will be likely to behave\ntowards his flatterers and his supposed parents, first of all during the\nperiod when he is ignorant of the false relation, and then again when he\nknows? Or shall I guess for you?\n\nIf you please.\n\n[Sidenote: who ceases to honour his father when he discovers that he is\nnot his father.]\n\nThen I should say, that while he is ignorant of the truth *538B* he will\nbe likely to honour his father and his mother and his supposed relations\nmore than the flatterers; he will be less inclined to neglect them when in\nneed, or to do or say anything against them; and he will be less willing\nto disobey them in any important matter.\n\nHe will.\n\nBut when he has made the discovery, I should imagine that he would\ndiminish his honour and regard for them, and would become more devoted to\nthe flatterers; their influence over him would greatly increase; he would\nnow live after *538C* their ways, and openly associate with them, and,\nunless he were of an unusually good disposition, he would trouble himself\nno more about his supposed parents or other relations.\n\nWell, all that is very probable. But how is the image applicable to the\ndisciples of philosophy?\n\nIn this way: you know that there are certain principles about justice and\nhonour, which were taught us in childhood, and under their parental\nauthority we have been brought up, obeying and honouring them.\n\nThat is true.\n\n*538D* There are also opposite maxims and habits of pleasure {243} which\nflatter and attract the soul, but do not influence those of us who have\nany sense of right, and they continue to obey and honour the maxims of\ntheir fathers.\n\nTrue.\n\n[Sidenote: So men who begin to analyse the first principles of morality\ncease to respect them.]\n\nNow, when a man is in this state, and the questioning spirit asks what is\nfair or honourable, and he answers as the legislator has taught him, and\nthen arguments many and diverse refute his words, until he is driven into\nbelieving that nothing is honourable any more than dishonourable, or\n*538E* just and good any more than the reverse, and so of all the notions\nwhich he most valued, do you think that he will still honour and obey them\nas before?\n\nImpossible.\n\nAnd when he ceases to think them honourable and natural *539A* as\nheretofore, and he fails to discover the true, can he be expected to\npursue any life other than that which flatters his desires?\n\nHe cannot.\n\nAnd from being a keeper of the law he is converted into a breaker of it?\n\nUnquestionably.\n\nNow all this is very natural in students of philosophy such as I have\ndescribed, and also, as I was just now saying, most excusable.\n\nYes, he said; and, I may add, pitiable.\n\nTherefore, that your feelings may not be moved to pity about our citizens\nwho are now thirty years of age, every care must be taken in introducing\nthem to dialectic.\n\nCertainly.\n\n[Sidenote: Young men are fond of pulling truth to pieces and thus bring\ndisgrace upon themselves and upon philosophy.]\n\n*539B* There is a danger lest they should taste the dear delight too\nearly; for youngsters, as you may have observed, when they first get the\ntaste in their mouths, argue for amusement, and are always contradicting\nand refuting others in imitation of those who refute them; like\npuppy-dogs, they rejoice in pulling and tearing at all who come near them.\n\nYes, he said, there is nothing which they like better.\n\nAnd when they have made many conquests and received *539C* defeats at the\nhands of many, they violently and speedily get into a way of not believing\nanything which they believed before, and hence, not only they, but\nphilosophy and all that {244} relates to it is apt to have a bad name with\nthe rest of the world.\n\nToo true, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: The dialectician and the eristic.]\n\nBut when a man begins to get older, he will no longer be guilty of such\ninsanity; he will imitate the dialectician who is seeking for truth, and\nnot the eristic, who is contradicting for the sake of amusement; and the\ngreater moderation of his *539D* character will increase instead of\ndiminishing the honour of the pursuit.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nAnd did we not make special provision for this, when we said that the\ndisciples of philosophy were to be orderly and steadfast, not, as now, any\nchance aspirant or intruder?\n\nVery true.\n\nSuppose, I said, the study of philosophy to take the place of gymnastics\nand to be continued diligently and earnestly and exclusively for twice the\nnumber of years which were passed in bodily exercise--will that be enough?\n\n*539E* Would you say six or four years? he asked.\n\n[Sidenote: The study of philosophy to continue for five years; 30-35.]\n\nSay five years, I replied; at the end of the time they must be sent down\nagain into the den and compelled to hold any military or other office\nwhich young men are qualified to hold: in this way they will get their\nexperience of life, and there will be an opportunity of trying whether,\nwhen they are drawn all manner of ways by temptation, they will stand firm\nor flinch.\n\n*540A* And how long is this stage of their lives to last?\n\n[Sidenote: During fifteen years, 35-50, they are to hold office.]\n\n[Sidenote: At the end of that time they are to live chiefly in the\ncontemplation of the good, but occasionally to return to politics.]\n\nFifteen years, I answered; and when they have reached fifty years of age,\nthen let those who still survive and have distinguished themselves in\nevery action of their lives and in every branch of knowledge come at last\nto their consummation: the time has now arrived at which they must raise\nthe eye of the soul to the universal light which lightens all things, and\nbehold the absolute good; for that is the pattern according to which they\nare to order the State and the *540B* lives of individuals, and the\nremainder of their own lives also; making philosophy their chief pursuit,\nbut, when their turn comes, toiling also at politics and ruling for the\npublic good, not as though they were performing some heroic {245} action,\nbut simply as a matter of duty; and when they have brought up in each\ngeneration others like themselves and left them in their place to be\ngovernors of the State, then they will depart to the Islands of the Blest\nand dwell there; and the city will give them public memorials and\nsacrifices *540C* and honour them, if the Pythian oracle consent, as\ndemigods, but if not, as in any case blessed and divine.\n\nYou are a sculptor, Socrates, and have made statues of our governors\nfaultless in beauty.\n\nYes, I said, Glaucon, and of our governesses too; for you must not suppose\nthat what I have been saying applies to men only and not to women as far\nas their natures can go.\n\nThere you are right, he said, since we have made them to share in all\nthings like the men.\n\n*540D* Well, I said, and you would agree (would you not?) that what has\nbeen said about the State and the government is not a mere dream, and\nalthough difficult not impossible, but only possible in the way which has\nbeen supposed; that is to say, when the true philosopher kings are born in\na State, one or more of them, despising the honours of this present world\nwhich they deem mean and worthless, esteeming above all things right and\nthe honour *540E* that springs from right, and regarding justice as the\ngreatest and most necessary of all things, whose ministers they are, and\nwhose principles will be exalted by them when they set in order their own\ncity?\n\nHow will they proceed?\n\n[Sidenote: Practical measures for the speedy foundation of the State.]\n\nThey will begin by sending out into the country all the *541A* inhabitants\nof the city who are more than ten years old, and will take possession of\ntheir children, who will be unaffected by the habits of their parents;\nthese they will train in their own habits and laws, I mean in the laws\nwhich we have given them: and in this way the State and constitution of\nwhich we were speaking will soonest and most easily attain happiness, and\nthe nation which has such a constitution will gain most.\n\nYes, that will be the best way. And I think, Socrates, *541B* that you\nhave very well described how, if ever, such a constitution might come into\nbeing. {246}\n\nEnough then of the perfect State, and of the man who bears its\nimage--there is no difficulty in seeing how we shall describe him.\n\nThere is no difficulty, he replied; and I agree with you in thinking that\nnothing more need be said.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK VIII.\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic VIII._ Socrates, Glaucon.]\n\n[Sidenote: Recapitulation of Book V.]\n\n*543A* And so, Glaucon, we have arrived at the conclusion that in the\nperfect State wives and children are to be in common; and that all\neducation and the pursuits of war and peace are also to be common, and the\nbest philosophers and the bravest warriors are to be their kings?\n\nThat, replied Glaucon, has been acknowledged.\n\n*543B* Yes, I said; and we have further acknowledged that the governors,\nwhen appointed themselves, will take their soldiers and place them in\nhouses such as we were describing, which are common to all, and contain\nnothing private, or individual; and about their property, you remember\nwhat we agreed?\n\nYes, I remember that no one was to have any of the ordinary possessions of\nmankind; they were to be warrior *543C* athletes and guardians, receiving\nfrom the other citizens, in lieu of annual payment, only their\nmaintenance, and they were to take care of themselves and of the whole\nState.\n\nTrue, I said; and now that this division of our task is concluded, let us\nfind the point at which we digressed, that we may return into the old\npath.\n\n[Sidenote: Return to the end of Book IV.]\n\nThere is no difficulty in returning; you implied, then as now, that you\nhad finished the description of the State: you said that such a State was\ngood, and that the man was good *543D* who answered to it, although, as\nnow appears, you had more *544A* excellent things to relate both of State\nand man. And you said further, that if this was the true form, then the\nothers were false; and of the false forms, you said, as I remember, that\nthere were four principal ones, and that their defects, and the defects of\nthe individuals corresponding to them, were worth examining. When we had\nseen all the individuals, and finally agreed as to who was the best and\nwho was the worst {248} of them, we were to consider whether the best was\nnot also the happiest, and the worst the most miserable. I asked you what\nwere the four forms of government of which *544B* you spoke, and then\nPolemarchus and Adeimantus put in their word; and you began again, and\nhave found your way to the point at which we have now arrived.\n\nYour recollection, I said, is most exact.\n\nThen, like a wrestler, he replied, you must put yourself again in the same\nposition; and let me ask the same questions, and do you give me the same\nanswer which you were about to give me then.\n\nYes, if I can, I will, I said.\n\nI shall particularly wish to hear what were the four constitutions of\nwhich you were speaking.\n\n[Sidenote: Four imperfect constitutions, the Cretan or Spartan, Oligarchy,\nDemocracy, Tyranny.]\n\n*544C* That question, I said, is easily answered: the four governments of\nwhich I spoke, so far as they have distinct names, are, first, those of\nCrete and Sparta, which are generally applauded; what is termed oligarchy\ncomes next; this is not equally approved, and is a form of government\nwhich teems with evils: thirdly, democracy, which naturally follows\noligarchy, although very different: and lastly comes tyranny, great and\nfamous, which differs from them all, and is the fourth and worst disorder\nof a State. I do not know, do you? of any other constitution which can be\nsaid to have a distinct character. *544D* There are lordships and\nprincipalities which are bought and sold, and some other intermediate\nforms of government. But these are nondescripts and may be found equally\namong Hellenes and among barbarians.\n\nYes, he replied, we certainly hear of many curious forms of government\nwhich exist among them.\n\n[Sidenote: States are like men, because they are made up of men.]\n\nDo you know, I said, that governments vary as the dispositions of men\nvary, and that there must be as many of the one as there are of the other?\nFor we cannot suppose that States are made of 'oak and rock,' and not out\nof the human natures which are in them, and which in a figure *544E* turn\nthe scale and draw other things after them?\n\nYes, he said, the States are as the men are; they grow out of human\ncharacters.\n\nThen if the constitutions of States are five, the dispositions of\nindividual minds will also be five? {249}\n\nCertainly.\n\nHim who answers to aristocracy, and whom we rightly *545A* call just and\ngood, we have already described.\n\nWe have.\n\nThen let us now proceed to describe the inferior sort of natures, being\nthe contentious and ambitious, who answer to the Spartan polity; also the\noligarchical, democratical, and tyrannical. Let us place the most just by\nthe side of the most unjust, and when we see them we shall be able to\ncompare the relative happiness or unhappiness of him who leads a life of\npure justice or pure injustice. The enquiry will then be completed. And we\nshall know whether we ought to pursue injustice, as Thrasymachus advises,\nor *545B* in accordance with the conclusions of the argument to prefer\njustice.\n\nCertainly, he replied, we must do as you say.\n\n[Sidenote: The State and the individual.]\n\nShall we follow our old plan, which we adopted with a view to clearness,\nof taking the State first and then proceeding to the individual, and begin\nwith the government of honour?--I know of no name for such a government\nother than timocracy, or perhaps timarchy. We will compare with this the\nlike character in the individual; and, after that, *545C* consider\noligarchy and the oligarchical man; and then again we will turn our\nattention to democracy and the democratical man; and lastly, we will go\nand view the city of tyranny, and once more take a look into the tyrant's\nsoul, and try to arrive at a satisfactory decision.\n\nThat way of viewing and judging of the matter will be very suitable.\n\n[Sidenote: How timocracy arises out of aristocracy.]\n\nFirst, then, I said, let us enquire how timocracy (the government of\nhonour) arises out of aristocracy (the government *545D* of the best).\nClearly, all political changes originate in divisions of the actual\ngoverning power; a government which is united, however small, cannot be\nmoved.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nIn what way, then, will our city be moved, and in what manner will the two\nclasses of auxiliaries and rulers disagree among themselves or with one\nanother? Shall we, after the manner of Homer, pray the Muses to tell us\n'how discord *545E* first arose'? Shall we imagine them in solemn {250}\nmockery, to play and jest with us as if we were children, and to address\nus in a lofty tragic vein, making believe to be in earnest?\n\nHow would they address us?\n\n[Sidenote: The intelligence which is alloyed with sense will not know how\nto regulate births and deaths in accordance with the number which controls\nthem.]\n\n*546A* After this manner:--A city which is thus constituted can hardly be\nshaken; but, seeing that everything which has a beginning has also an end,\neven a constitution such as yours will not last for ever, but will in time\nbe dissolved. And this is the dissolution:--In plants that grow in the\nearth, as well as in animals that move on the earth's surface, fertility\nand sterility of soul and body occur when the circumferences of the\ncircles of each are completed, which in short-lived existences pass over a\nshort space, and in long-lived ones over a long space. But to the\nknowledge of human fecundity and sterility all the wisdom and education of\nyour rulers will not attain; *546B* the laws which regulate them will not\nbe discovered by an intelligence which is alloyed with sense, but will\nescape them, and they will bring children into the world when they ought\nnot. Now that which is of divine birth has a period which is contained in\na perfect number,[1] but the period of human birth is comprehended in a\nnumber in which first increments by involution and evolution [_or_ squared\nand cubed] obtaining three intervals and four terms of like and unlike,\nwaxing and waning numbers, make all the terms *546C* commensurable and\nagreeable to one another.[2] The base of these (3) with a third added (4)\nwhen combined with five (20) and raised to the third power furnishes two\nharmonies; the first a square which is a hundred times as great (400 =\n4 x 100),[3] and the other a figure having one side equal to the former,\nbut oblong,[4] consisting of a hundred numbers squared upon rational\ndiameters of a square (i.e. omitting fractions), the side of which is five\n(7 x 7 = 49 x 100 = 4900), each of them {251} being less by one (than the\nperfect square which includes the fractions, sc. 50) or less by[5] two\nperfect squares of irrational diameters (of a square the side of which is\nfive = 50 + 50 = 100); and a hundred cubes of three (27 x 100 = 2700 + 4900\n+ 400 = 8000). Now this number represents a geometrical figure which has\ncontrol over *546D* the good and evil of births. For when your guardians\nare ignorant of the law of births, and unite bride and bridegroom out of\nseason, the children will not be goodly or fortunate. And though only the\nbest of them will be appointed by their predecessors, still they will be\nunworthy to hold their fathers' places, and when they come into power as\nguardians, they will soon be found to fail in taking care of us, the\nMuses, first by under-valuing music; which neglect will soon extend to\ngymnastic; and hence the young men of your State will be less cultivated.\nIn the succeeding generation rulers will be appointed who have lost the\nguardian power of testing the metal of your *546E* different races, which,\nlike Hesiod's, are of gold and silver and brass and iron. And so iron will\nbe mingled with silver, *547A* and brass with gold, and hence there will\narise dissimilarity and inequality and irregularity, which always and in\nall places are causes of hatred and war. This the Muses affirm to be the\nstock from which discord has sprung, wherever arising; and this is their\nanswer to us.\n\n[Footnote 1: i.e. a cyclical number, such as 6, which is equal to the sum\nof its divisors 1, 2, 3, so that when the circle or time represented by 6\nis completed, the lesser times or rotations represented by 1, 2, 3 are\nalso completed.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Probably the numbers 3, 4, 5, 6 of which the three first =\nthe sides of the Pythagorean triangle. The terms will then be 3^3, 4^3,\n5^3, which together = 6^3 = 216.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Or the first a square which is 100 x 100 = 10,000. The whole\nnumber will then be 17,500 = a square of 100, and an oblong of 100 by 75.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Reading [Greek: prom\u00ea/k\u00ea de/].]\n\n[Footnote 5: Or, 'consisting of two numbers squared upon irrational\ndiameters,' &c. = 100. For other explanations of the passage see\nIntroduction.]\n\nYes, and we may assume that they answer truly.\n\nWhy, yes, I said, of course they answer truly; how can the Muses speak\nfalsely?\n\n*547B* And what do the Muses say next?\n\n[Sidenote: Then discord arose and individual took the place of common\nproperty.]\n\nWhen discord arose, then the two races were drawn different ways: the iron\nand brass fell to acquiring money and land and houses and gold and silver;\nbut the gold and silver races, not wanting money but having the true\nriches in their own nature, inclined towards virtue and the ancient order\nof things. There was a battle between them, and at last they agreed to\ndistribute their land and houses among *547C* individual owners; and they\nenslaved their friends and maintainers, whom they had formerly protected\nin the condition of freemen, and made of them subjects and servants; and\n{252} they themselves were engaged in war and in keeping a watch against\nthem.\n\nI believe that you have rightly conceived the origin of the change.\n\nAnd the new government which thus arises will be of a form intermediate\nbetween oligarchy and aristocracy?\n\nVery true.\n\nSuch will be the change, and after the change has been made, *547D* how\nwill they proceed? Clearly, the new State, being in a mean between\noligarchy and the perfect State, will partly follow one and partly the\nother, and will also have some peculiarities.\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nIn the honour given to rulers, in the abstinence of the warrior class from\nagriculture, handicrafts, and trade in general, in the institution of\ncommon meals, and in the attention paid to gymnastics and military\ntraining--in all these respects this State will resemble the former.\n\nTrue.\n\n[Sidenote: Timocracy will retain the military and reject the philosophical\ncharacter of the perfect State.]\n\n*547E* But in the fear of admitting philosophers to power, because they\nare no longer to be had simple and earnest, but are made up of mixed\nelements; and in turning from them to passionate and less complex\ncharacters, who are by nature *548A* fitted for war rather than peace; and\nin the value set by them upon military stratagems and contrivances, and in\nthe waging of everlasting wars--this State will be for the most part\npeculiar.\n\nYes.\n\n[Sidenote: The soldier class miserly and covetous.]\n\nYes, I said; and men of this stamp will be covetous of money, like those\nwho live in oligarchies; they will have, a fierce secret longing after\ngold and silver, which they will hoard in dark places, having magazines\nand treasuries of their own for the deposit and concealment of them; also\ncastles which are just nests for their eggs, and in which they *548B* will\nspend large sums on their wives, or on any others whom they please.\n\nThat is most true, he said.\n\nAnd they are miserly because they have no means of openly acquiring the\nmoney which they prize; they will spend that which is another man's on the\ngratification of {253} their desires, stealing their pleasures and running\naway like children from the law, their father: they have been schooled not\nby gentle influences but by force, for they have neglected her who is the\ntrue Muse, the companion of reason and *548C* philosophy, and have\nhonoured gymnastic more than music.\n\nUndoubtedly, he said, the form of government which you describe is a\nmixture of good and evil.\n\n[Sidenote: The spirit of ambition predominates in such States.]\n\nWhy, there is a mixture, I said; but one thing, and one thing only, is\npredominantly seen,--the spirit of contention and ambition; and these are\ndue to the prevalence of the passionate or spirited element.\n\nAssuredly, he said.\n\nSuch is the origin and such the character of this State, which has been\ndescribed in outline only; the more perfect *548D* execution was not\nrequired, for a sketch is enough to show the type of the most perfectly\njust and most perfectly unjust; and to go through all the States and all\nthe characters of men, omitting none of them, would be an interminable\nlabour.\n\nVery true, he replied.\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates, Adeimantus.]\n\n[Sidenote: The timocratic man, uncultured, but fond of culture, ambitious,\ncontentious, rough with slaves, and courteous to freemen; a soldier,\nathlete, hunter; a despiser of riches while young, fond of them when he\ngrows old.]\n\nNow what man answers to this form of government--how did he come into\nbeing, and what is he like?\n\nI think, said Adeimantus, that in the spirit of contention which\ncharacterises him, he is not unlike our friend Glaucon.\n\n*548E* Perhaps, I said, he may be like him in that one point; but there\nare other respects in which he is very different.\n\nIn what respects?\n\nHe should have more of self-assertion and be less cultivated, and yet a\nfriend of culture; and he should be a good *549A* listener, but no\nspeaker. Such a person is apt to be rough with slaves, unlike the educated\nman, who is too proud for that; and he will also be courteous to freemen,\nand remarkably obedient to authority; he is a lover of power and a lover\nof honour; claiming to be a ruler, not because he is eloquent, or on any\nground of that sort, but because he is a soldier and has performed feats\nof arms; he is also a lover of gymnastic exercises and of the chase.\n\nYes, that is the type of character which answers to timocracy.\n\nSuch an one will despise riches only when he is young; {254} *549B* but as\nhe gets older he will be more and more attracted to them, because he has a\npiece of the avaricious nature in him, and is not single-minded towards\nvirtue, having lost his best guardian.\n\nWho was that? said Adeimantus.\n\nPhilosophy, I said, tempered with music, who comes and takes up her abode\nin a man, and is the only saviour of his virtue throughout life.\n\nGood, he said.\n\nSuch, I said, is the timocratical youth, and he is like the timocratical\nState.\n\n*549C* Exactly.\n\nHis origin is as follows:--He is often the young son of a brave father,\nwho dwells in an ill-governed city, of which he declines the honours and\noffices, and will not go to law, or exert himself in any way, but is ready\nto waive his rights in order that he may escape trouble.\n\nAnd how does the son come into being?\n\n[Sidenote: The timocratic man often originates in a reaction against his\nfather's character, which is encouraged by his mother,]\n\nThe character of the son begins to develope when he hears his mother\ncomplaining that her husband has no place in the government, of which the\nconsequence is that she has *549D* no precedence among other women.\nFurther, when she sees her husband not very eager about money, and instead\nof battling and railing in the law courts or assembly, taking whatever\nhappens to him quietly; and when she observes that his thoughts always\ncentre in himself, while he treats her with very considerable\nindifference, she is annoyed, and says to her son that his father is only\nhalf a man and far too easy-going: adding all the other complaints about\nher own *549E* ill-treatment which women are so fond of rehearsing.\n\nYes, said Adeimantus, they give us plenty of them, and their complaints\nare so like themselves.\n\n[Sidenote: and by the old servants of the household.]\n\nAnd you know, I said, that the old servants also, who are supposed to be\nattached to the family, from time to time talk privately in the same\nstrain to the son; and if they see any one who owes money to his father,\nor is wronging him in any way, and he fails to prosecute them, they tell\nthe youth that *550A* when he grows up he must retaliate upon people of\nthis sort, and be more of a man than his father. He has only to walk\nabroad and he hears and sees the same sort of thing: those {255} who do\ntheir own business in the city are called simpletons, and held in no\nesteem, while the busy-bodies are honoured and applauded. The result is\nthat the young man, hearing and seeing all these things--hearing, too, the\nwords of his father, and having a nearer view of his way of life, and\nmaking comparisons of him and others--is drawn opposite ways: *550B* while\nhis father is watering and nourishing the rational principle in his soul,\nthe others are encouraging the passionate and appetitive; and he being not\noriginally of a bad nature, but having kept bad company, is at last\nbrought by their joint influence to a middle point, and gives up the\nkingdom which is within him to the middle principle of contentiousness and\npassion, and becomes arrogant and ambitious.\n\nYou seem to me to have described his origin perfectly.\n\n*550C* Then we have now, I said, the second form of government and the\nsecond type of character?\n\nWe have.\n\nNext, let us look at another man who, as Aeschylus says,\n\n  'Is set over against another State;'\n\nor rather, as our plan requires, begin with the State.\n\nBy all means.\n\n[Sidenote: Oligarchy]\n\nI believe that oligarchy follows next in order.\n\nAnd what manner of government do you term oligarchy?\n\nA government resting on a valuation of property, in which *550D* the rich\nhave power and the poor man is deprived of it.\n\nI understand, he replied.\n\nOught I not to begin by describing how the change from timocracy to\noligarchy arises?\n\nYes.\n\nWell, I said, no eyes are required in order to see how the one passes into\nthe other.\n\nHow?\n\n[Sidenote: arises out of increased accumulation and increased expenditure\namong the citizens.]\n\nThe accumulation of gold in the treasury of private individuals is the\nruin of timocracy; they invent illegal modes of expenditure; for what do\nthey or their wives care about the law?\n\nYes, indeed.\n\n*550E* And then one, seeing another grow rich, seeks to rival {256} him,\nand thus the great mass of the citizens become lovers of money.\n\nLikely enough.\n\n[Sidenote: As riches increase, virtue decreases: the one is honoured, the\nother despised; the one cultivated, the other neglected.]\n\nAnd so they grow richer and richer, and the more they think of making a\nfortune the less they think of virtue; for when riches and virtue are\nplaced together in the scales of the balance, the one always rises as the\nother falls.\n\nTrue.\n\n*551A* And in proportion as riches and rich men are honoured in the State,\nvirtue and the virtuous are dishonoured.\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd what is honoured is cultivated, and that which has no honour is\nneglected.\n\nThat is obvious.\n\nAnd so at last, instead of loving contention and glory, men become lovers\nof trade and money; they honour and look up to the rich man, and make a\nruler of him, and dishonour the poor man.\n\nThey do so.\n\n[Sidenote: In an oligarchy a money qualification is established.]\n\nThey next proceed to make a law which fixes a sum *551B* of money as the\nqualification of citizenship; the sum is higher in one place and lower in\nanother, as the oligarchy is more or less exclusive; and they allow no one\nwhose property falls below the amount fixed to have any share in the\ngovernment. These changes in the constitution they effect by force of\narms, if intimidation has not already done their work.\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd this, speaking generally, is the way in which oligarchy is\nestablished.\n\nYes, he said; but what are the characteristics of this form *551C* of\ngovernment, and what are the defects of which we were speaking[6]?\n\n[Footnote 6: Cp. supra, 544 C.]\n\n[Sidenote: A ruler is elected because he is rich: Who would elect a pilot\non this principle?]\n\nFirst of all, I said, consider the nature of the qualification. Just think\nwhat would happen if pilots were to be chosen according to their property,\nand a poor man were refused permission to steer, even though he were a\nbetter pilot?\n\nYou mean that they would shipwreck?\n\nYes; and is not this true of the government of anything[7]? {257}\n\n[Footnote 7: Omitting [Greek: \u00ea)/ tinos].]\n\nI should imagine so.\n\nExcept a city?--or would you include a city?\n\nNay, he said, the case of a city is the strongest of all, inasmuch as the\nrule of a city is the greatest and most difficult of all.\n\n*551D* This, then, will be the first great defect of oligarchy?\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd here is another defect which is quite as bad.\n\nWhat defect?\n\n[Sidenote: The extreme division of classes in such a State.]\n\nThe inevitable division: such a State is not one, but two States, the one\nof poor, the other of rich men; and they are living on the same spot and\nalways conspiring against one another.\n\nThat, surely, is at least as bad.\n\n[Sidenote: They dare not go to war.]\n\nAnother discreditable feature is, that, for a like reason, they are\nincapable of carrying on any war. Either they arm *551E* the multitude,\nand then they are more afraid of them than of the enemy; or, if they do\nnot call them out in the hour of battle, they are oligarchs indeed, few to\nfight as they are few to rule. And at the same time their fondness for\nmoney makes them unwilling to pay taxes.\n\nHow discreditable!\n\nAnd, as we said before, under such a constitution the *552A* same persons\nhave too many callings--they are husbandmen, tradesmen, warriors, all in\none. Does that look well?\n\nAnything but well.\n\nThere is another evil which is, perhaps, the greatest of all, and to which\nthis State first begins to be liable.\n\nWhat evil?\n\n[Sidenote: The ruined man, who has no occupation, once a spendthrift, now\na pauper, still exists in the State.]\n\nA man may sell all that he has, and another may acquire his property; yet\nafter the sale he may dwell in the city of which he is no longer a part,\nbeing neither trader, nor artisan, nor horseman, nor hoplite, but only a\npoor, helpless creature.\n\n*552B* Yes, that is an evil which also first begins in this State.\n\nThe evil is certainly not prevented there; for oligarchies have both the\nextremes of great wealth and utter poverty.\n\nTrue.\n\nBut think again: In his wealthy days, while he was spending his money, was\na man of this sort a whit more good to the State for the purposes of\ncitizenship? Or {258} did he only seem to be a member of the ruling body,\nalthough in truth he was neither ruler nor subject, but just a\nspendthrift?\n\n*552C* As you say, he seemed to be a ruler, but was only a spendthrift.\n\nMay we not say that this is the drone in the house who is like the drone\nin the honeycomb, and that the one is the plague of the city as the other\nis of the hive?\n\nJust so, Socrates.\n\nAnd God has made the flying drones, Adeimantus, all without stings,\nwhereas of the walking drones he has made some without stings but others\nhave dreadful stings; of the stingless class are those who in their old\nage end as paupers; *552D* of the stingers come all the criminal class, as\nthey are termed.\n\nMost true, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: Where there are paupers, there are thieves]\n\nClearly then, whenever you see paupers in a State, somewhere in that\nneighbourhood there are hidden away thieves, and cut-purses and robbers of\ntemples, and all sorts of malefactors.\n\nClearly.\n\nWell, I said, and in oligarchical States do you not find paupers?\n\nYes, he said; nearly everybody is a pauper who is not a ruler.\n\n[Sidenote: and other criminals.]\n\n*552E* And may we be so bold as to affirm that there are also many\ncriminals to be found in them, rogues who have stings, and whom the\nauthorities are careful to restrain by force?\n\nCertainly, we may be so bold.\n\nThe existence of such persons is to be attributed to want of education,\nill-training, and an evil constitution of the State?\n\nTrue.\n\nSuch, then, is the form and such are the evils of oligarchy; and there may\nbe many other evils.\n\nVery likely.\n\n*553A* Then oligarchy, or the form of government in which the rulers are\nelected for their wealth, may now be dismissed. Let us next proceed to\nconsider the nature and origin of the individual who answers to this\nState. {259}\n\nBy all means.\n\nDoes not the timocratical man change into the oligarchical on this wise?\n\nHow?\n\n[Sidenote: The ruin of the timocratical man gives birth to the\noligarchical.]\n\nA time arrives when the representative of timocracy has a son: at first he\nbegins by emulating his father and walking in his footsteps, but presently\nhe sees him of a sudden *553B* foundering against the State as upon a\nsunken reef, and he and all that he has is lost; he may have been a\ngeneral or some other high officer who is brought to trial under a\nprejudice raised by informers, and either put to death, or exiled, or\ndeprived of the privileges of a citizen, and all his property taken from\nhim.\n\nNothing more likely.\n\n[Sidenote: His son begins life a ruined man and takes to money-making.]\n\nAnd the son has seen and known all this--he is a ruined man, and his fear\nhas taught him to knock ambition and *553C* passion headforemost from his\nbosom's throne; humbled by poverty he takes to money-making and by mean\nand miserly savings and hard work gets a fortune together. Is not such an\none likely to seat the concupiscent and covetous element on the vacant\nthrone and to suffer it to play the great king within him, girt with tiara\nand chain and scimitar?\n\nMost true, he replied.\n\n*553D* And when he has made reason and spirit sit down on the ground\nobediently on either side of their sovereign, and taught them to know\ntheir place, he compels the one to think only of how lesser sums may be\nturned into larger ones, and will not allow the other to worship and\nadmire anything but riches and rich men, or to be ambitious of anything so\nmuch as the acquisition of wealth and the means of acquiring it.\n\nOf all changes, he said, there is none so speedy or so sure as the\nconversion of the ambitious youth into the avaricious one.\n\n*553E* And the avaricious, I said, is the oligarchical youth?\n\n[Sidenote: The oligarchical man and State resemble one another in their\nestimation of wealth: In their toiling and saving ways, in their want of\ncultivation.]\n\nYes, he said; at any rate the individual out of whom he came is like the\nState out of which oligarchy came.\n\nLet us then consider whether there is any likeness between them.\n\n*554A* Very good.\n\nFirst, then, they resemble one another in the value which they set upon\nwealth? {260}\n\nCertainly.\n\nAlso in their penurious, laborious character; the individual only\nsatisfies his necessary appetites, and confines his expenditure to them;\nhis other desires he subdues, under the idea that they are unprofitable.\n\nTrue.\n\nHe is a shabby fellow, who saves something out of everything and makes a\npurse for himself; and this is the sort of *554B* man whom the vulgar\napplaud. Is he not a true image of the State which he represents?\n\nHe appears to me to be so; at any rate money is highly valued by him as\nwell as by the State.\n\nYou see that he is not a man of cultivation, I said.\n\nI imagine not, he said; had he been educated he would never have made a\nblind god director of his chorus, or given him chief honour[8].\n\n[Footnote 8: Reading [Greek: kai\\ e)ti/ma ma/lista. Eu)=, \u00ea)= d' e)g\u00f4/],\naccording to Schneider's excellent emendation.]\n\nExcellent! I said. Yet consider: Must we not further admit that owing to\nthis want of cultivation there will be *554C* found in him dronelike\ndesires as of pauper and rogue, which are forcibly kept down by his\ngeneral habit of life?\n\nTrue.\n\nDo you know where you will have to look if you want to discover his\nrogueries?\n\nWhere must I look?\n\n[Sidenote: The oligarchical man keeps up a fair outside, but he has only\nan enforced virtue and will cheat when he can.]\n\nYou should see him where he has some great opportunity of acting\ndishonestly, as in the guardianship of an orphan.\n\nAye.\n\nIt will be clear enough then that in his ordinary dealings which give him\na reputation for honesty he coerces his bad *554D* passions by an enforced\nvirtue; not making them see that they are wrong, or taming them by reason,\nbut by necessity and fear constraining them, and because he trembles for\nhis possessions.\n\nTo be sure.\n\nYes, indeed, my dear friend, but you will find that the natural desires of\nthe drone commonly exist in him all the same whenever he has to spend what\nis not his own. {261}\n\nYes, and they will be strong in him too.\n\nThe man, then, will be at war with himself; he will be two men, and not\none; but, in general, his better desires *554E* will be found to prevail\nover his inferior ones.\n\nTrue.\n\nFor these reasons such an one will be more respectable than most people;\nyet the true virtue of a unanimous and harmonious soul will flee far away\nand never come near him.\n\nI should expect so.\n\n[Sidenote: His meanness in a contest; he saves his money and loses the\nprize.]\n\n*555A* And surely, the miser individually will be an ignoble competitor in\na State for any prize of victory, or other object of honourable ambition;\nhe will not spend his money in the contest for glory; so afraid is he of\nawakening his expensive appetites and inviting them to help and join in\nthe struggle; in true oligarchical fashion he fights with a small part\nonly of his resources, and the result commonly is that he loses the prize\nand saves his money.\n\nVery true.\n\nCan we any longer doubt, then, that the miser and money-maker *555B*\nanswers to the oligarchical State?\n\nThere can be no doubt.\n\n[Sidenote: Democracy arises out of the extravagance and indebtedness of\nmen of family and position,]\n\nNext comes democracy; of this the origin and nature have still to be\nconsidered by us; and then we will enquire into the ways of the democratic\nman, and bring him up for judgment.\n\nThat, he said, is our method.\n\nWell, I said, and how does the change from oligarchy into democracy arise?\nIs it not on this wise?--The good at which such a State aims is to become\nas rich as possible, a desire which is insatiable?\n\nWhat then?\n\n*555C* The rulers, being aware that their power rests upon their wealth,\nrefuse to curtail by law the extravagance of the spendthrift youth because\nthey gain by their ruin; they take interest from them and buy up their\nestates and thus increase their own wealth and importance?\n\nTo be sure.\n\nThere can be no doubt that the love of wealth and the spirit of moderation\ncannot exist together in citizens of the same state to any considerable\nextent; one or the other will *555D* be disregarded. {262}\n\nThat is tolerably clear.\n\nAnd in oligarchical States, from the general spread of carelessness and\nextravagance, men of good family have often been reduced to beggary?\n\nYes, often.\n\n[Sidenote: who remain in the city, and form a dangerous class ready to\nhead a revolution.]\n\nAnd still they remain in the city; there they are, ready to sting and\nfully armed, and some of them owe money, some have forfeited their\ncitizenship; a third class are in both predicaments; and they hate and\nconspire against those who have got their property, and against everybody\nelse, and are *555E* eager for revolution.\n\nThat is true.\n\nOn the other hand, the men of business, stooping as they walk, and\npretending not even to see those whom they have already ruined, insert\ntheir sting--that is, their money--into some one else who is not on his\nguard against them, and recover the parent sum many times over multiplied\ninto a family of children: and so they make drone and pauper to abound in\nthe State.\n\n*556A* Yes, he said, there are plenty of them--that is certain.\n\n[Sidenote: Two remedies: (1) restrictions on the free use of property;]\n\nThe evil blazes up like a fire; and they will not extinguish it, either by\nrestricting a man's use of his own property, or by another remedy:\n\nWhat other?\n\n[Sidenote: (2) contracts to be made at a man's own risk.]\n\nOne which is the next best, and has the advantage of compelling the\ncitizens to look to their characters:--Let *556B* there be a general rule\nthat every one shall enter into voluntary contracts at his own risk, and\nthere will be less of this scandalous money-making, and the evils of which\nwe were speaking will be greatly lessened in the State.\n\nYes, they will be greatly lessened.\n\nAt present the governors, induced by the motives which I have named, treat\ntheir subjects badly; while they and their adherents, especially the young\nmen of the governing class, are habituated to lead a life of luxury and\nidleness *556C* both of body and mind; they do nothing, and are incapable\nof resisting either pleasure or pain.\n\nVery true.\n\nThey themselves care only for making money, and are as indifferent as the\npauper to the cultivation of virtue. {263}\n\nYes, quite as indifferent.\n\n[Sidenote: The subjects discover the weakness of their rulers.]\n\nSuch is the state of affairs which prevails among them. And often rulers\nand their subjects may come in one another's way, whether on a journey or\non some other occasion of meeting, on a pilgrimage or a march, as\nfellow-soldiers or *556D* fellow-sailors; aye, and they may observe the\nbehaviour of each other in the very moment of danger--for where danger is,\nthere is no fear that the poor will be despised by the rich--and very\nlikely the wiry sunburnt poor man may be placed in battle at the side of a\nwealthy one who has never spoilt his complexion and has plenty of\nsuperfluous flesh--when he sees such an one puffing and at his wits' end,\nhow can he avoid drawing the conclusion that men like him are only rich\nbecause no one has the courage to despoil them? And when they meet in\nprivate will not people be *556E* saying to one another 'Our warriors are\nnot good for much'?\n\nYes, he said, I am quite aware that this is their way of talking.\n\n[Sidenote: A slight cause, internal or external, may produce revolution.]\n\nAnd, as in a body which is diseased the addition of a touch from without\nmay bring on illness, and sometimes even when there is no external\nprovocation a commotion may arise within--in the same way wherever there\nis weakness in the State there is also likely to be illness, of which the\noccasion may be very slight, the one party introducing from without their\noligarchical, the other their democratical allies, and then the State\nfalls sick, and is at war with herself; and *557A* may be at times\ndistracted, even when there is no external cause.\n\nYes, surely.\n\n[Sidenote: Such is the origin and nature of democracy.]\n\nAnd then democracy comes into being after the poor have conquered their\nopponents, slaughtering some and banishing some, while to the remainder\nthey give an equal share of freedom and power; and this is the form of\ngovernment in which the magistrates are commonly elected by lot.\n\nYes, he said, that is the nature of democracy, whether the revolution has\nbeen effected by arms, or whether fear has caused the opposite party to\nwithdraw.\n\nAnd now what is their manner of life, and what sort of *557B* a government\nhave they? for as the government is, such will be the man.\n\nClearly, he said. {264}\n\n[Sidenote: Democracy allows a man to do as he likes, and therefore\ncontains the greatest variety of characters and constitutions.]\n\nIn the first place, are they not free; and is not the city full of freedom\nand frankness--a man may say and do what he likes?\n\n'Tis said so, he replied.\n\nAnd where freedom is, the individual is clearly able to order for himself\nhis own life as he pleases?\n\nClearly.\n\n*557C* Then in this kind of State there will be the greatest variety of\nhuman natures?\n\nThere will.\n\nThis, then, seems likely to be the fairest of States, being like an\nembroidered robe which is spangled with every sort of flower[9]. And just\nas women and children think a variety of colours to be of all things most\ncharming, so there are many men to whom this State, which is spangled with\nthe manners and characters of mankind, will appear to be the fairest of\nStates.\n\n[Footnote 9: Omitting [Greek: ti/ m\u00ea/n; e)/ph\u00ea].]\n\nYes.\n\n*557D* Yes, my good Sir, and there will be no better in which to look for\na government.\n\nWhy?\n\nBecause of the liberty which reigns there--they have a complete assortment\nof constitutions; and he who has a mind to establish a State, as we have\nbeen doing, must go to a democracy as he would to a bazaar at which they\nsell them, and pick out the one that suits him; then, when he has made his\nchoice, he may found his State.\n\n*557E* He will be sure to have patterns enough.\n\n[Sidenote: The law falls into abeyance.]\n\nAnd there being no necessity, I said, for you to govern in this State,\neven if you have the capacity, or to be governed, unless you like, or go\nto war when the rest go to war, or to be at peace when others are at\npeace, unless you are so disposed--there being no necessity also, because\nsome law forbids you to hold office or be a dicast, that you should not\nhold office or be a dicast, if you have a fancy--is not *558A* this a way\nof life which for the moment is supremely delightful?\n\nFor the moment, yes. {265}\n\nAnd is not their humanity to the condemned[10] in some cases quite\ncharming? Have you not observed how, in a democracy, many persons,\nalthough they have been sentenced to death or exile, just stay where they\nare and walk about the world--the gentleman parades like a hero, and\nnobody sees or cares?\n\n[Footnote 10: Or, 'the philosophical temper of the condemned.']\n\nYes, he replied, many and many a one.\n\n[Sidenote: All principles of order and good taste are trampled under foot\nby democracy.]\n\n*558B* See too, I said, the forgiving spirit of democracy, and the 'don't\ncare' about trifles, and the disregard which she shows of all the fine\nprinciples which we solemnly laid down at the foundation of the city--as\nwhen we said that, except in the case of some rarely gifted nature, there\nnever will be a good man who has not from his childhood been used to play\namid things of beauty and make of them a joy and a study--how grandly does\nshe trample all these fine notions of ours under her feet, never giving a\nthought to the pursuits which make a statesman, and promoting to honour\nany one who professes *558C* to be the people's friend.\n\nYes, she is of a noble spirit.\n\nThese and other kindred characteristics are proper to democracy, which is\na charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and\ndispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike.\n\nWe know her well.\n\nConsider now, I said, what manner of man the individual is, or rather\nconsider, as in the case of the State, how he comes into being.\n\nVery good, he said.\n\nIs not this the way--he is the son of the miserly and oligarchical *558D*\nfather who has trained him in his own habits?\n\nExactly.\n\n[Sidenote: Which are the necessary and which the unnecessary pleasures?]\n\nAnd, like his father, he keeps under by force the pleasures which are of\nthe spending and not of the getting sort, being those which are called\nunnecessary?\n\nObviously.\n\nWould you like, for the sake of clearness, to distinguish which are the\nnecessary and which are the unnecessary pleasures?\n\nI should. {266}\n\n[Sidenote: Necessary desires cannot be got rid of,]\n\nAre not necessary pleasures those of which we cannot get *558E* rid, and\nof which the satisfaction is a benefit to us? And they are rightly called\nso, because we are framed by nature to desire both what is beneficial and\nwhat is necessary, and cannot help it.\n\nTrue.\n\n*559A* We are not wrong therefore in calling them necessary?\n\nWe are not.\n\nAnd the desires of which a man may get rid, if he takes pains from his\nyouth upwards--of which the presence, moreover, does no good, and in some\ncases the reverse of good--shall we not be right in saying that all these\nare unnecessary?\n\nYes, certainly.\n\nSuppose we select an example of either kind, in order that we may have a\ngeneral notion of them?\n\nVery good.\n\nWill not the desire of eating, that is, of simple food and condiments, in\nso far as they are required for health and *559B* strength, be of the\nnecessary class?\n\nThat is what I should suppose.\n\nThe pleasure of eating is necessary in two ways; it does us good and it is\nessential to the continuance of life?\n\nYes.\n\n[Sidenote: but may be indulged to excess.]\n\nBut the condiments are only necessary in so far as they are good for\nhealth?\n\nCertainly.\n\n[Sidenote: Illustration taken from eating and drinking.]\n\nAnd the desire which goes beyond this, of more delicate food, or other\nluxuries, which might generally be got rid of, if controlled and trained\nin youth, and is hurtful to the body, and hurtful to the soul in the\npursuit of wisdom and virtue, may be *559C* rightly called unnecessary?\n\nVery true.\n\nMay we not say that these desires spend, and that the others make money\nbecause they conduce to production?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd of the pleasures of love, and all other pleasures, the same holds\ngood?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd the drone of whom we spoke was he who was surfeited in pleasures and\ndesires of this sort, and was the slave {267} *559D* of the unnecessary\ndesires, whereas he who was subject to the necessary only was miserly and\noligarchical?\n\nVery true.\n\nAgain, let us see how the democratical man grows out of the oligarchical:\nthe following, as I suspect, is commonly the process.\n\nWhat is the process?\n\n[Sidenote: The young oligarch is led away by his wild associates.]\n\nWhen a young man who has been brought up as we were just now describing,\nin a vulgar and miserly way, has tasted drones' honey and has come to\nassociate with fierce and crafty natures who are able to provide for him\nall sorts of refinements and varieties of pleasure--then, as you may\n*559E* imagine, the change will begin of the oligarchical principle within\nhim into the democratical?\n\nInevitably.\n\n[Sidenote: There are allies to either part of his nature.]\n\nAnd as in the city like was helping like, and the change was effected by\nan alliance from without assisting one division of the citizens, so too\nthe young man is changed by a class of desires coming from without to\nassist the desires within him, that which is akin and alike again helping\nthat which is akin and alike?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd if there be any ally which aids the oligarchical principle within him,\nwhether the influence of a father or of kindred, *560A* advising or\nrebuking him, then there arises in his soul a faction and an opposite\nfaction, and he goes to war with himself.\n\nIt must be so.\n\nAnd there are times when the democratical principle gives way to the\noligarchical, and some of his desires die, and others are banished; a\nspirit of reverence enters into the young man's soul and order is\nrestored.\n\nYes, he said, that sometimes happens.\n\nAnd then, again, after the old desires have been driven out, *560B* fresh\nones spring up, which are akin to them, and because he their father does\nnot know how to educate them, wax fierce and numerous.\n\nYes, he said, that is apt to be the way.\n\nThey draw him to his old associates, and holding secret intercourse with\nthem, breed and multiply in him. {268}\n\nVery true.\n\nAt length they seize upon the citadel of the young man's soul, which they\nperceive to be void of all accomplishments and fair pursuits and true\nwords, which make their abode in the minds of men who are dear to the\ngods, and are their best guardians and sentinels.\n\n*560C* None better.\n\nFalse and boastful conceits and phrases mount upwards and take their\nplace.\n\nThey are certain to do so.\n\n[Sidenote: The progress of the oligarchic young man told in an allegory.]\n\nAnd so the young man returns into the country of the lotus-eaters, and\ntakes up his dwelling there in the face of all men; and if any help be\nsent by his friends to the oligarchical part of him, the aforesaid vain\nconceits shut the gate of the king's fastness; and they will neither allow\nthe embassy itself to enter, nor if private advisers offer the fatherly\ncounsel of the aged will they listen to them or receive them. *560D* There\nis a battle and they gain the day, and then modesty, which they call\nsilliness, is ignominiously thrust into exile by them, and temperance,\nwhich they nickname unmanliness, is trampled in the mire and cast forth;\nthey persuade men that moderation and orderly expenditure are vulgarity\nand meanness, and so, by the help of a rabble of evil appetites, they\ndrive them beyond the border.\n\nYes, with a will.\n\nAnd when they have emptied and swept clean the soul of *560E* him who is\nnow in their power and who is being initiated by them in great mysteries,\nthe next thing is to bring back to their house insolence and anarchy and\nwaste and impudence in bright array having garlands on their heads, and a\ngreat company with them, hymning their praises and calling *561A* them by\nsweet names; insolence they term breeding, and anarchy liberty, and waste\nmagnificence, and impudence courage. And so the young man passes out of\nhis original nature, which was trained in the school of necessity, into\nthe freedom and libertinism of useless and unnecessary pleasures.\n\nYes, he said, the change in him is visible enough.\n\n[Sidenote: He becomes a rake; but he also sometimes stops short in his\ncareer and gives way to pleasures good and bad indifferently.]\n\nAfter this he lives on, spending his money and labour and time on\nunnecessary pleasures quite as much as on necessary {269} ones; but if he\nbe fortunate, and is not too much disordered in his wits, when years have\nelapsed, and the heyday of *561B* passion is over--supposing that he then\nre-admits into the city some part of the exiled virtues, and does not\nwholly give himself up to their successors--in that case he balances his\npleasures and lives in a sort of equilibrium, putting the government of\nhimself into the hands of the one which comes first and wins the turn; and\nwhen he has had enough of that, then into the hands of another; he\ndespises none of them but encourages them all equally.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: He rejects all advice,]\n\nNeither does he receive or let pass into the fortress any true word of\nadvice; if any one says to him that some *561C* pleasures are the\nsatisfactions of good and noble desires, and others of evil desires, and\nthat he ought to use and honour some and chastise and master the others\n--whenever this is repeated to him he shakes his head and says that they\nare all alike, and that one is as good as another.\n\nYes, he said; that is the way with him.\n\n[Sidenote: passing his life in the alternation from one extreme to\nanother.]\n\nYes, I said, he lives from day to day indulging the appetite of the hour;\nand sometimes he is lapped in drink and strains of the flute; then he\nbecomes a water-drinker, and tries to get thin; *561D* then he takes a\nturn at gymnastics; sometimes idling and neglecting everything, then once\nmore living the life of a philosopher; often he is busy with politics, and\nstarts to his feet and says and does whatever comes into his head; and, if\nhe is emulous of any one who is a warrior, off he is in that direction, or\nof men of business, once more in that. His life has neither law nor order;\nand this distracted existence he terms joy and bliss and freedom; and so\nhe goes on.\n\n*561E* Yes, he replied, he is all liberty and equality.\n\n[Sidenote: He is 'not one, but all mankind's epitome.']\n\nYes, I said; his life is motley and manifold and an epitome of the lives\nof many;--he answers to the State which we described as fair and spangled.\nAnd many a man and many a woman will take him for their pattern, and many\na constitution and many an example of manners is contained in him.\n\nJust so.\n\n*561A* Let him then be set over against democracy; he may truly be called\nthe democratic man. {270}\n\nLet that be his place, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: Tyranny and the tyrant.]\n\nLast of all comes the most beautiful of all, man and State alike, tyranny\nand the tyrant; these we have now to consider.\n\nQuite true, he said.\n\nSay then, my friend, In what manner does tyranny arise?--that it has a\ndemocratic origin is evident.\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd does not tyranny spring from democracy in the *562B* same manner as\ndemocracy from oligarchy--I mean, after a sort?\n\nHow?\n\n[Sidenote: The insatiable desire of wealth creates a demand for democracy,\nthe insatiable desire of freedom creates a demand for tyranny.]\n\nThe good which oligarchy proposed to itself and the means by which it was\nmaintained was excess of wealth--am I not right?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the insatiable desire of wealth and the neglect of all other things\nfor the sake of money-getting was also the ruin of oligarchy?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd democracy has her own good, of which the insatiable desire brings her\nto dissolution?\n\nWhat good?\n\nFreedom, I replied; which, as they tell you in a democracy, *562C* is the\nglory of the State--and that therefore in a democracy alone will the\nfreeman of nature deign to dwell.\n\nYes; the saying is in every body's mouth.\n\nI was going to observe, that the insatiable desire of this and the neglect\nof other things introduces the change in democracy, which occasions a\ndemand for tyranny.\n\nHow so?\n\nWhen a democracy which is thirsting for freedom has evil *562D*\ncup-bearers presiding over the feast, and has drunk too deeply of the\nstrong wine of freedom, then, unless her rulers are very amenable and give\na plentiful draught, she calls them to account and punishes them, and says\nthat they are cursed oligarchs.\n\nYes, he replied, a very common occurrence.\n\n[Sidenote: Freedom in the end means anarchy.]\n\nYes, I said; and loyal citizens are insultingly termed by her slaves who\nhug their chains and men of naught; she would have subjects who are like\nrulers, and rulers who are {271} like subjects: these are men after her\nown heart, whom she praises and honours both in private and public. Now,\nin *562E* such a State, can liberty have any limit?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nBy degrees the anarchy finds a way into private houses, and ends by\ngetting among the animals and infecting them.\n\nHow do you mean?\n\nI mean that the father grows accustomed to descend to the level of his\nsons and to fear them, and the son is on a level with his father, he\nhaving no respect or reverence for either of his parents; and this is his\nfreedom, and the metic is equal with the citizen and the citizen with the\nmetic, and the *563A* stranger is quite as good as either.\n\nYes, he said, that is the way.\n\n[Sidenote: The inversion of all social relations.]\n\nAnd these are not the only evils, I said--there are several lesser ones:\nIn such a state of society the master fears and flatters his scholars, and\nthe scholars despise their masters and tutors; young and old are all\nalike; and the young man is on a level with the old, and is ready to\ncompete with him in word or deed; and old men condescend to the young and\nare full of pleasantry and gaiety; they are loth to be *563B* thought\nmorose and authoritative, and therefore they adopt the manners of the\nyoung.\n\nQuite true, he said.\n\nThe last extreme of popular liberty is when the slave bought with money,\nwhether male or female, is just as free as his or her purchaser; nor must\nI forget to tell of the liberty and equality of the two sexes in relation\nto each other.\n\n*563C* Why not, as Aeschylus says, utter the word which rises to our lips?\n\n[Sidenote: Freedom among the animals.]\n\nThat is what I am doing, I replied; and I must add that no one who does\nnot know would believe, how much greater is the liberty which the animals\nwho are under the dominion of man have in a democracy than in any other\nState: for truly, the she-dogs, as the proverb says, are as good as their\nshe-mistresses, and the horses and asses have a way of marching along with\nall the rights and dignities of freemen; and they will run at any body who\ncomes in their way if he does not leave the road clear for them: and all\nthings are *563D* just ready to burst with liberty. {272}\n\nWhen I take a country walk, he said, I often experience what you describe.\nYou and I have dreamed the same thing.\n\n[Sidenote: No law, no authority.]\n\nAnd above all, I said, and as the result of all, see how sensitive the\ncitizens become; they chafe impatiently at the least touch of authority,\nand at length, as you know, they cease to care even for the laws, written\nor unwritten; they will have *563E* no one over them.\n\nYes, he said, I know it too well.\n\nSuch, my friend, I said, is the fair and glorious beginning out of which\nsprings tyranny.\n\nGlorious indeed, he said. But what is the next step?\n\nThe ruin of oligarchy is the ruin of democracy; the same disease magnified\nand intensified by liberty overmasters democracy--the truth being that the\nexcessive *564A* increase of anything often causes a reaction in the\nopposite direction; and this is the case not only in the seasons and in\nvegetable and animal life, but above all in forms of government.\n\nTrue.\n\nThe excess of liberty, whether in States or individuals, seems only to\npass into excess of slavery.\n\nYes, the natural order.\n\nAnd so tyranny naturally arises out of democracy, and the most aggravated\nform of tyranny and slavery out of the most extreme form of liberty?\n\nAs we might expect.\n\n[Sidenote: The common evil of oligarchy and democracy is the class of idle\nspend-thrifts.]\n\nThat, however, was not, as I believe, your question--you rather desired to\nknow what is that disorder which is *564B* generated alike in oligarchy\nand democracy, and is the ruin of both?\n\nJust so, he replied.\n\nWell, I said, I meant to refer to the class of idle spendthrifts, of whom\nthe more courageous are the leaders and the more timid the followers, the\nsame whom we were comparing to drones, some stingless, and others having\nstings.\n\nA very just comparison.\n\n[Sidenote: Illustration.]\n\nThese two classes are the plagues of every city in which they are\ngenerated, being what phlegm and bile are to the body. *564C* And the good\nphysician and lawgiver of the State {273} ought, like the wise bee-master,\nto keep them at a distance and prevent, if possible, their ever coming in;\nand if they have anyhow found a way in, then he should have them and their\ncells cut out as speedily as possible.\n\nYes, by all means, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: Altogether three classes in a democracy.]\n\nThen, in order that we may see clearly what we are doing, let us imagine\ndemocracy to be divided, as indeed it is, into *564D* three classes; for\nin the first place freedom creates rather more drones in the democratic\nthan there were in the oligarchical State.\n\nThat is true.\n\nAnd in the democracy they are certainly more intensified.\n\nHow so?\n\n[Sidenote: (1) The drones or spend-thrifts who are more numerous and\nactive than in the oligarchy.]\n\nBecause in the oligarchical State they are disqualified and driven from\noffice, and therefore they cannot train or gather strength; whereas in a\ndemocracy they are almost the entire ruling power, and while the keener\nsort speak and act, the rest keep buzzing about the bema and do *564E* not\nsuffer a word to be said on the other side; hence in democracies almost\neverything is managed by the drones.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nThen there is another class which is always being severed from the mass.\n\nWhat is that?\n\n[Sidenote: (2) The orderly or wealthy class who are fed upon by the\ndrones.]\n\nThey are the orderly class, which in a nation of traders is sure to be the\nrichest.\n\nNaturally so.\n\nThey are the most squeezable persons and yield the largest amount of honey\nto the drones.\n\nWhy, he said, there is little to be squeezed out of people who have\nlittle.\n\nAnd this is called the wealthy class, and the drones feed upon them.\n\n*565A* That is pretty much the case, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: (3) The working class who also get a share.]\n\nThe people are a third class, consisting of those who work with their own\nhands; they are not politicians, and have not much to live upon. This,\nwhen assembled, is the largest and most powerful class in a democracy.\n\nTrue, he said; but then the multitude is seldom willing to congregate\nunless they get a little honey. {274}\n\nAnd do they not share? I said. Do not their leaders deprive the rich of\ntheir estates and distribute them among the people; at the same time\ntaking care to reserve the larger part for themselves?\n\n*565B* Why, yes, he said, to that extent the people do share.\n\n[Sidenote: The well-to-do have to defend themselves against the people.]\n\nAnd the persons whose property is taken from them are compelled to defend\nthemselves before the people as they best can?\n\nWhat else can they do?\n\nAnd then, although they may have no desire of change, the others charge\nthem with plotting against the people and being friends of oligarchy?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd the end is that when they see the people, not of their own accord, but\nthrough ignorance, and because they are *565C* deceived by informers,\nseeking to do them wrong, then at last they are forced to become oligarchs\nin reality; they do not wish to be, but the sting of the drones torments\nthem and breeds revolution in them.\n\nThat is exactly the truth.\n\nThen come impeachments and judgments and trials of one another.\n\nTrue.\n\n[Sidenote: The people have a protector who, when once he tastes blood, is\nconverted into a tyrant.]\n\nThe people have always some champion whom they set over them and nurse\ninto greatness.\n\nYes, that is their way.\n\n*565D* This and no other is the root from which a tyrant springs; when he\nfirst appears above ground he is a protector.\n\nYes, that is quite clear.\n\nHow then does a protector begin to change into a tyrant? Clearly when he\ndoes what the man is said to do in the tale of the Arcadian temple of\nLycaean Zeus.\n\nWhat tale?\n\nThe tale is that he who has tasted the entrails of a single human victim\nminced up with the entrails of other victims is *565E* destined to become\na wolf. Did you never hear it?\n\nOh, yes.\n\nAnd the protector of the people is like him; having a mob entirely at his\ndisposal, he is not restrained from shedding the blood of kinsmen; by the\nfavourite method of false accusation he brings them into court and murders\nthem, {275} making the life of man to disappear, and with unholy tongue\nand lips tasting the blood of his fellow citizens; some he kills and\nothers he banishes, at the same time hinting at the abolition of debts and\npartition of lands: and after this, what *566A* will be his destiny? Must\nhe not either perish at the hands of his enemies, or from being a man\nbecome a wolf--that is, a tyrant?\n\nInevitably.\n\nThis, I said, is he who begins to make a party against the rich?\n\nThe same.\n\n[Sidenote: After a time he is driven out, but comes back a full-blown\ntyrant.]\n\nAfter a while he is driven out, but comes back, in spite of his enemies, a\ntyrant full grown.\n\nThat is clear.\n\n*566B* And if they are unable to expel him, or to get him condemned to\ndeath by a public accusation, they conspire to assassinate him.\n\nYes, he said, that is their usual way.\n\n[Sidenote: The body-guard.]\n\nThen comes the famous request for a body-guard, which is the device of all\nthose who have got thus far in their tyrannical career--'Let not the\npeople's friend,' as they say, 'be lost to them.'\n\nExactly.\n\nThe people readily assent; all their fears are for him--they have none for\nthemselves.\n\n*566C* Very true.\n\nAnd when a man who is wealthy and is also accused of being an enemy of the\npeople sees this, then, my friend, as the oracle said to Croesus,\n\n  'By pebbly Hermus' shore he flees and rests not, and is not ashamed to\n  be a coward[11].'\n\n[Footnote 11: Herod. i. 55.]\n\nAnd quite right too, said he, for if he were, he would never be ashamed\nagain.\n\nBut if he is caught he dies.\n\nOf course.\n\n[Sidenote: The protector standing up in the chariot of State.]\n\n*566D* And he, the protector of whom we spoke, is to be seen, not 'larding\nthe plain' with his bulk, but himself the overthrower of many, standing up\nin the chariot of State with the reins in his hand, no longer protector,\nbut tyrant absolute. {276}\n\nNo doubt, he said.\n\nAnd now let us consider the happiness of the man, and also of the State in\nwhich a creature like him is generated.\n\nYes, he said, let us consider that.\n\nAt first, in the early days of his power, he is full of smiles, and he\nsalutes every one whom he meets;--he to be called *566E* a tyrant, who is\nmaking promises in public and also in private! liberating debtors, and\ndistributing land to the people and his followers, and wanting to be so\nkind and good to every one!\n\nOf course, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: He stirs up wars, and impoverishes his subjects by the\nimposition of taxes.]\n\nBut when he has disposed of foreign enemies by conquest or treaty, and\nthere is nothing to fear from them, then he is always stirring up some war\nor other, in order that the people may require a leader.\n\nTo be sure.\n\n*567A* Has he not also another object, which is that they may be\nimpoverished by payment of taxes, and thus compelled to devote themselves\nto their daily wants and therefore less likely to conspire against him?\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd if any of them are suspected by him of having notions of freedom, and\nof resistance to his authority, he will have a good pretext for destroying\nthem by placing them at the mercy of the enemy; and for all these reasons\nthe tyrant must be always getting up a war.\n\nHe must.\n\n*567B* Now he begins to grow unpopular.\n\nA necessary result.\n\nThen some of those who joined in setting him up, and who are in power,\nspeak their minds to him and to one another, and the more courageous of\nthem cast in his teeth what is being done.\n\nYes, that may be expected.\n\n[Sidenote: He gets rid of his bravest and boldest followers.]\n\nAnd the tyrant, if he means to rule, must get rid of them; he cannot stop\nwhile he has a friend or an enemy who is good for anything.\n\nHe cannot.\n\nAnd therefore he must look about him and see who is *567C* valiant, who is\nhigh-minded, who is wise, who is wealthy; {277} happy man, he is the enemy\nof them all, and must seek occasion against them whether he will or no,\nuntil he has made a purgation of the State.\n\nYes, he said, and a rare purgation.\n\n[Sidenote: His purgation of the State.]\n\nYes, I said, not the sort of purgation which the physicians make of the\nbody; for they take away the worse and leave the better part, but he does\nthe reverse.\n\nIf he is to rule, I suppose that he cannot help himself.\n\n*567D* What a blessed alternative, I said:--to be compelled to dwell only\nwith the many bad, and to be by them hated, or not to live at all!\n\nYes, that is the alternative.\n\nAnd the more detestable his actions are to the citizens the more\nsatellites and the greater devotion in them will he require?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd who are the devoted band, and where will he procure them?\n\nThey will flock to him, he said, of their own accord, if he pays them.\n\n[Sidenote: More drones.]\n\nBy the dog! I said, here are more drones, of every sort *567E* and from\nevery land.\n\nYes, he said, there are.\n\nBut will he not desire to get them on the spot?\n\nHow do you mean?\n\nHe will rob the citizens of their slaves; he will then set them free and\nenrol them in his body-guard.\n\nTo be sure, he said; and he will be able to trust them best of all.\n\n[Sidenote: He puts to death his friends and lives with the slaves whom he\nhas enfranchised.]\n\nWhat a blessed creature, I said, must this tyrant be; he *568A* has put to\ndeath the others and has these for his trusted friends.\n\nYes, he said; they are quite of his sort.\n\nYes, I said, and these are the new citizens whom he has called into\nexistence, who admire him and are his companions, while the good hate and\navoid him.\n\nOf course.\n\n[Sidenote: Euripides and the tragedians praise tyranny, which is an\nexcellent reason for expelling them from our State.]\n\nVerily, then, tragedy is a wise thing and Euripides a great tragedian.\n\nWhy so? {278}\n\nWhy, because he is the author of the pregnant saying,\n\n  *568B* 'Tyrants are wise by living with the wise;'\n\nand he clearly meant to say that they are the wise whom the tyrant makes\nhis companions.\n\nYes, he said, and he also praises tyranny as godlike; and many other\nthings of the same kind are said by him and by the other poets.\n\nAnd therefore, I said, the tragic poets being wise men will forgive us and\nany others who live after our manner if we do not receive them into our\nState, because they are the eulogists of tyranny.\n\n*568C* Yes, he said, those who have the wit will doubtless forgive us.\n\nBut they will continue to go to other cities and attract mobs, and hire\nvoices fair and loud and persuasive, and draw the cities over to tyrannies\nand democracies.\n\nVery true.\n\nMoreover, they are paid for this and receive honour--the greatest honour,\nas might be expected, from tyrants, and the next greatest from\ndemocracies; but the higher they ascend *568D* our constitution hill, the\nmore their reputation fails, and seems unable from shortness of breath to\nproceed further.\n\nTrue.\n\nBut we are wandering from the subject: Let us therefore return and enquire\nhow the tyrant will maintain that fair and numerous and various and\never-changing army of his.\n\n[Sidenote: The tyrant seizes the treasures in the temples, and when these\nfail feeds upon the people.]\n\nIf, he said, there are sacred treasures in the city, he will confiscate\nand spend them; and in so far as the fortunes of attainted persons may\nsuffice, he will be able to diminish the taxes which he would otherwise\nhave to impose upon the people.\n\n*568E* And when these fail?\n\nWhy, clearly, he said, then he and his boon companions, whether male or\nfemale, will be maintained out of his father's estate.\n\nYou mean to say that the people, from whom he has derived his being, will\nmaintain him and his companions?\n\nYes, he said; they cannot help themselves.\n\n[Sidenote: They rebel, and then he beats his own parent, i.e. the people.]\n\nBut what if the people fly into a passion, and aver that a {279} grown-up\nson ought not to be supported by his father, but *569A* that the father\nshould be supported by the son? The father did not bring him into being,\nor settle him in life, in order that when his son became a man he should\nhimself be the servant of his own servants and should support him and his\nrabble of slaves and companions; but that his son should protect him, and\nthat by his help he might be emancipated from the government of the rich\nand aristocratic, as they are termed. And so he bids him and his\ncompanions depart, just as any other father might drive out of the house a\nriotous son and his undesirable associates.\n\nBy heaven, he said, then the parent will discover what *569B* a monster he\nhas been fostering in his bosom; and, when he wants to drive him out, he\nwill find that he is weak and his son strong.\n\nWhy, you do not mean to say that the tyrant will use violence? What! beat\nhis father if he opposes him?\n\nYes, he will, having first disarmed him.\n\nThen he is a parricide, and a cruel guardian of an aged parent; and this\nis real tyranny, about which there can be no longer a mistake: as the\nsaying is, the people who would escape the smoke which is the slavery of\nfreemen, has fallen *569C* into the fire which is the tyranny of slaves.\nThus liberty, getting out of all order and reason, passes into the\nharshest and bitterest form of slavery.\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nVery well; and may we not rightly say that we have sufficiently discussed\nthe nature of tyranny, and the manner of the transition from democracy to\ntyranny?\n\nYes, quite enough, he said.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK IX.\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic IX._ Socrates, Adeimantus.]\n\n*571A* Last of all comes the tyrannical man; about whom we have once more\nto ask, how is he formed out of the democratical? and how does he live, in\nhappiness or in misery?\n\nYes, he said, he is the only one remaining.\n\nThere is, however, I said, a previous question which remains unanswered.\n\nWhat question?\n\n[Sidenote: A digression having a purpose.]\n\nI do not think that we have adequately determined the nature and number of\nthe appetites, and until this is accomplished *571B* the enquiry will\nalways be confused.\n\nWell, he said, it is not too late to supply the omission.\n\n[Sidenote: The wild beast latent in man peers forth in sleep.]\n\nVery true, I said; and observe the point which I want to understand:\nCertain of the unnecessary pleasures and appetites I conceive to be\nunlawful; every one appears to have them, but in some persons they are\ncontrolled by the laws and by reason, and the better desires prevail over\nthem--either they are wholly banished or they become few and weak; while\nin the case of others they are stronger, and *571C* there are more of\nthem.\n\nWhich appetites do you mean?\n\nI mean those which are awake when the reasoning and human and ruling power\nis asleep; then the wild beast within us, gorged with meat or drink,\nstarts up and having shaken off sleep, goes forth to satisfy his desires;\nand there *571D* is no conceivable folly or crime--not excepting incest or\nany other unnatural union, or parricide, or the eating of forbidden\nfood--which at such a time, when he has parted company with all shame and\nsense, a man may not be ready to commit.\n\nMost true, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: The contrast of the temperate man whose passions are under the\ncontrol of reason.]\n\nBut when a man's pulse is healthy and temperate, and when before going to\nsleep he has awakened his rational {281} powers, and fed them on noble\nthoughts and enquiries, *571E* collecting himself in meditation; after\nhaving first indulged his appetites neither too much nor too little, but\njust enough to lay them to sleep, and prevent them and their enjoyments\n*572A* and pains from interfering with the higher principle--which he\nleaves in the solitude of pure abstraction, free to contemplate and aspire\nto the knowledge of the unknown, whether in past, present, or future: when\nagain he has allayed the passionate element, if he has a quarrel against\nany one--I say, when, after pacifying the two irrational principles, he\nrouses up the third, which is reason, before he takes his rest, then, as\nyou know, he attains truth most nearly, and is least *572B* likely to be\nthe sport of fantastic and lawless visions.\n\nI quite agree.\n\nIn saying this I have been running into a digression; but the point which\nI desire to note is that in all of us, even in good men, there is a\nlawless wild-beast nature, which peers out in sleep. Pray, consider\nwhether I am right, and you agree with me.\n\nYes, I agree.\n\n[Sidenote: Recapitulation.]\n\nAnd now remember the character which we attributed *572C* to the\ndemocratic man. He was supposed from his youth upwards to have been\ntrained under a miserly parent, who encouraged the saving appetites in\nhim, but discountenanced the unnecessary, which aim only at amusement and\nornament?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd then he got into the company of a more refined, licentious sort of\npeople, and taking to all their wanton ways rushed into the opposite\nextreme from an abhorrence of his father's meanness. At last, being a\nbetter man than his corruptors, he was drawn in both directions until he\nhalted *572D* midway and led a life, not of vulgar and slavish passion,\nbut of what he deemed moderate indulgence in various pleasures. After this\nmanner the democrat was generated out of the oligarch?\n\nYes, he said; that was our view of him, and is so still.\n\nAnd now, I said, years will have passed away, and you must conceive this\nman, such as he is, to have a son, who is brought up in his father's\nprinciples.\n\nI can imagine him. {282}\n\nThen you must further imagine the same thing to happen to the son which\nhas already happened to the father:--he is *572E* drawn into a perfectly\nlawless life, which by his seducers is termed perfect liberty; and his\nfather and friends take part with his moderate desires, and the opposite\nparty assist the opposite ones. As soon as these dire magicians and *573A*\ntyrant-makers find that they are losing their hold on him, they contrive\nto implant in him a master passion, to be lord over his idle and\nspendthrift lusts--a sort of monstrous winged drone--that is the only\nimage which will adequately describe him.\n\nYes, he said, that is the only adequate image of him.\n\nAnd when his other lusts, amid clouds of incense and perfumes and garlands\nand wines, and all the pleasures of a dissolute life, now let loose, come\nbuzzing around him, nourishing to the utmost the sting of desire which\nthey implant in his drone-like nature, then at last this lord of *573B*\nthe soul, having Madness for the captain of his guard, breaks out into a\nfrenzy: and if he finds in himself any good opinions or appetites in\nprocess of formation[1], and there is in him any sense of shame remaining,\nto these better principles he puts an end, and casts them forth until he\nhas purged away temperance and brought in madness to the full.\n\n[Footnote 1: Or, 'opinions or appetites such as are deemed to be good.']\n\n[Sidenote: The tyrannical man is made up of lusts and appetites. Love,\ndrink, madness are but different forms of tyranny.]\n\nYes, he said, that is the way in which the tyrannical man is generated.\n\nAnd is not this the reason why of old love has been called a tyrant?\n\nI should not wonder.\n\nFurther, I said, has not a drunken man also the spirit of *573C* a tyrant?\n\nHe has.\n\nAnd you know that a man who is deranged and not right in his mind, will\nfancy that he is able to rule, not only over men, but also over the gods?\n\nThat he will.\n\nAnd the tyrannical man in the true sense of the word comes into being\nwhen, either under the influence of nature, or habit, or both, he becomes\ndrunken, lustful, passionate? O my friend, is not that so? {283}\n\nAssuredly.\n\nSuch is the man and such is his origin. And next, how does he live?\n\n*573D* Suppose, as people facetiously say, you were to tell me.\n\nI imagine, I said, at the next step in his progress, that there will be\nfeasts and carousals and revellings and courtezans, and all that sort of\nthing; Love is the lord of the house within him, and orders all the\nconcerns of his soul.\n\nThat is certain.\n\nYes; and every day and every night desires grow up many and formidable,\nand their demands are many.\n\nThey are indeed, he said.\n\nHis revenues, if he has any, are soon spent.\n\nTrue.\n\n*573E* Then comes debt and the cutting down of his property.\n\nOf course.\n\n[Sidenote: His desires become greater and his means less.]\n\nWhen he has nothing left, must not his desires, crowding in the nest like\nyoung ravens, be crying aloud for food; and *574A* he, goaded on by them,\nand especially by love himself, who is in a manner the captain of them, is\nin a frenzy, and would fain discover whom he can defraud or despoil of his\nproperty, in order that he may gratify them?\n\nYes, that is sure to be the case.\n\nHe must have money, no matter how, if he is to escape horrid pains and\npangs.\n\nHe must.\n\n[Sidenote: He will rob his father and mother.]\n\nAnd as in himself there was a succession of pleasures, and the new got the\nbetter of the old and took away their rights, so he being younger will\nclaim to have more than his father and his mother, and if he has spent his\nown share of the property, he will take a slice of theirs.\n\nNo doubt he will.\n\n*574B* And if his parents will not give way, then he will try first of all\nto cheat and deceive them.\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd if he fails, then he will use force and plunder them.\n\nYes, probably.\n\nAnd if the old man and woman fight for their own, what then, my friend?\nWill the creature feel any compunction at tyrannizing over them? {284}\n\nNay, he said, I should not feel at all comfortable about his parents.\n\n[Sidenote: He will prefer the love of a girl or a youth to his aged\nparents, and may even be induced to strike them.]\n\nBut, O heavens! Adeimantus, on account of some new-fangled love of a\nharlot, who is anything but a necessary *574C* connection, can you believe\nthat he would strike the mother who is his ancient friend and necessary to\nhis very existence, and would place her under the authority of the other,\nwhen she is brought under the same roof with her; or that, under like\ncircumstances, he would do the same to his withered old father, first and\nmost indispensable of friends, for the sake of some newly-found blooming\nyouth who is the reverse of indispensable?\n\nYes, indeed, he said; I believe that he would.\n\nTruly, then, I said, a tyrannical son is a blessing to his father and\nmother.\n\nHe is indeed, he replied.\n\n[Sidenote: He turns highwayman, robs temples, loses all his early\nprinciples, and becomes in waking reality the evil dream which he had in\nsleep.]\n\n[Sidenote: He gathers followers about him.]\n\n*574D* He first takes their property, and when that fails, and pleasures\nare beginning to swarm in the hive of his soul, then he breaks into a\nhouse, or steals the garments of some nightly wayfarer; next he proceeds\nto clear a temple. Meanwhile the old opinions which he had when a child,\nand which gave judgment about good and evil, are overthrown by those\nothers which have just been emancipated, and are now the body-guard of\nlove and share his empire. These in his democratic days, when he was still\nsubject to the laws *574E* and to his father, were only let loose in the\ndreams of sleep. But now that he is under the dominion of love, he becomes\nalways and in waking reality what he was then very rarely and in a dream\nonly; he will commit the foulest murder, or eat forbidden food, or be\nguilty of any other horrid act. *575A* Love is his tyrant, and lives\nlordly in him and lawlessly, and being himself a king, leads him on, as a\ntyrant leads a State, to the performance of any reckless deed by which he\ncan maintain himself and the rabble of his associates, whether those whom\nevil communications have brought in from without, or those whom he himself\nhas allowed to break loose within him by reason of a similar evil nature\nin himself. Have we not here a picture of his way of life?\n\nYes, indeed, he said.\n\nAnd if there are only a few of them in the State, and the {285} *575B*\nrest of the people are well disposed, they go away and become the\nbody-guard or mercenary soldiers of some other tyrant who may probably\nwant them for a war; and if there is no war, they stay at home and do many\nlittle pieces of mischief in the city.\n\nWhat sort of mischief?\n\nFor example, they are the thieves, burglars, cut-purses, foot-pads,\nrobbers of temples, man-stealers of the community; or if they are able to\nspeak they turn informers, and bear false witness, and take bribes.\n\n*575C* A small catalogue of evils, even if the perpetrators of them are\nfew in number.\n\n[Sidenote: A private person can do but little harm in comparison of the\ntyrant.]\n\nYes, I said; but small and great are comparative terms, and all these\nthings, in the misery and evil which they inflict upon a State, do not\ncome within a thousand miles of the tyrant; when this noxious class and\ntheir followers grow numerous and become conscious of their strength,\nassisted by the infatuation of the people, they choose from among\nthemselves the one who has most of the tyrant in his own soul, *575D* and\nhim they create their tyrant.\n\nYes, he said, and he will be the most fit to be a tyrant.\n\nIf the people yield, well and good; but if they resist him, as he began by\nbeating his own father and mother, so now, if he has the power, he beats\nthem, and will keep his dear old fatherland or motherland, as the Cretans\nsay, in subjection to his young retainers whom he has introduced to be\ntheir rulers and masters. This is the end of his passions and desires.\n\n*575E* Exactly.\n\n[Sidenote: The behaviour of the tyrant to his early supporters.]\n\nWhen such men are only private individuals and before they get power, this\nis their character; they associate entirely with their own flatterers or\nready tools; or if they want anything from anybody, they in their turn are\nequally ready to bow down before them: they profess every sort of *576A*\naffection for them; but when they have gained their point they know them\nno more.\n\nYes, truly.\n\n[Sidenote: He is always either master or servant, always treacherous,\nunjust, the waking reality of our dream, a tyrant by nature, a tyrant in\nfact.]\n\nThey are always either the masters or servants and never the friends of\nanybody; the tyrant never tastes of true freedom or friendship. {286}\n\nCertainly not.\n\nAnd may we not rightly call such men treacherous?\n\nNo question.\n\n*576B* Also they are utterly unjust, if we were right in our notion of\njustice?\n\nYes, he said, and we were perfectly right.\n\nLet us then sum up in a word, I said, the character of the worst man:\nhe is the waking reality of what we dreamed.\n\nMost true.\n\nAnd this is he who being by nature most of a tyrant bears rule, and the\nlonger he lives the more of a tyrant he becomes.\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates, Glaucon.]\n\nThat is certain, said Glaucon, taking his turn to answer.\n\n[Sidenote: The wicked are also the most miserable.]\n\nAnd will not he who has been shown to be the wickedest, *576C* be also the\nmost miserable? and he who has tyrannized longest and most, most\ncontinually and truly miserable; although this may not be the opinion of\nmen in general?\n\nYes, he said, inevitably.\n\n[Sidenote: Like man, like State.]\n\nAnd must not the tyrannical man be like the tyrannical State, and the\ndemocratical man like the democratical State; and the same of the others?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd as State is to State in virtue and happiness, so is man in relation to\nman?\n\n*576D* To be sure.\n\n[Sidenote: The opposite of the king.]\n\nThen comparing our original city, which was under a king, and the city\nwhich is under a tyrant, how do they stand as to virtue?\n\nThey are the opposite extremes, he said, for one is the very best and the\nother is the very worst.\n\nThere can be no mistake, I said, as to which is which, and therefore I\nwill at once enquire whether you would arrive at a similar decision about\ntheir relative happiness and misery. And here we must not allow ourselves\nto be panic-stricken at the apparition of the tyrant, who is only a unit\nand may perhaps have a few retainers about him; but let us go as we *576E*\nought into every corner of the city and look all about, and then we will\ngive our opinion.\n\nA fair invitation, he replied; and I see, as every one must, that a\ntyranny is the wretchedest form of government, and the rule of a king the\nhappiest. {287}\n\nAnd in estimating the men too, may I not fairly make *577A* a like\nrequest, that I should have a judge whose mind can enter into and see\nthrough human nature? he must not be like a child who looks at the outside\nand is dazzled at the pompous aspect which the tyrannical nature assumes\nto the beholder, but let him be one who has a clear insight. May I suppose\nthat the judgment is given in the hearing of us all by one who is able to\njudge, and has dwelt in the same place with him, and been present at his\ndally life and known *577B* him in his family relations, where he may be\nseen stripped of his tragedy attire, and again in the hour of public\ndanger--he shall tell us about the happiness and misery of the tyrant when\ncompared with other men?\n\nThat again, he said, is a very fair proposal.\n\nShall I assume that we ourselves are able and experienced judges and have\nbefore now met with such a person? We shall then have some one who will\nanswer our enquiries.\n\nBy all means.\n\n*577C* Let me ask you not to forget the parallel of the individual and the\nState; bearing this in mind, and glancing in turn from one to the other of\nthem, will you tell me their respective conditions?\n\nWhat do you mean? he asked.\n\n[Sidenote: The State is not free, but enslaved.]\n\nBeginning with the State, I replied, would you say that a city which is\ngoverned by a tyrant is free or enslaved?\n\nNo city, he said, can be more completely enslaved.\n\nAnd yet, as you see, there are freemen as well as masters in such a State?\n\nYes, he said, I see that there are--a few; but the people, speaking\ngenerally, and the best of them are miserably degraded and enslaved.\n\n[Sidenote: Like a slave, the tyrant is full of meanness, and the ruling\npart of him is madness.]\n\n*577D* Then if the man is like the State, I said, must not the same rule\nprevail? his soul is full of meanness and vulgarity--the best elements in\nhim are enslaved; and there is a small ruling part, which is also the\nworst and maddest.\n\nInevitably.\n\nAnd would you say that the soul of such an one is the soul of a freeman,\nor of a slave?\n\nHe has the soul of a slave, in my opinion. {288}\n\nAnd the State which is enslaved under a tyrant is utterly incapable of\nacting voluntarily?\n\nUtterly incapable.\n\n[Sidenote: The city which is subject to him is goaded by a gadfly;]\n\n*577E* And also the soul which is under a tyrant (I am speaking of the\nsoul taken as a whole) is least capable of doing what she desires; there\nis a gadfly which goads her, and she is full of trouble and remorse?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd is the city which is under a tyrant rich or poor?\n\nPoor.\n\n[Sidenote: poor;]\n\n*578A* And the tyrannical soul must be always poor and insatiable?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd must not such a State and such a man be always full of fear?\n\nYes, indeed.\n\n[Sidenote: full of misery.]\n\nIs there any State in which you will find more of lamentation and sorrow\nand groaning and pain?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nAnd is there any man in whom you will find more of this sort of misery\nthan in the tyrannical man, who is in a fury of passions and desires?\n\nImpossible.\n\n*578B* Reflecting upon these and similar evils, you held the tyrannical\nState to be the most miserable of States?\n\nAnd I was right, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: Also the tyrannical man is most miserable.]\n\nCertainly, I said. And when you see the same evils in the tyrannical man,\nwhat do you say of him?\n\nI say that he is by far the most miserable of all men.\n\n[Sidenote: Yet there is a still more miserable being, the tyrannical man\nwho is a public tyrant.]\n\nThere, I said, I think that you are beginning to go wrong.\n\nWhat do you mean?\n\nI do not think that he has as yet reached the utmost extreme of misery.\n\nThen who is more miserable?\n\nOne of whom I am about to speak.\n\nWho is that?\n\n*578C* He who is of a tyrannical nature, and instead of leading a private\nlife has been cursed with the further misfortune of being a public tyrant.\n\nFrom what has been said, I gather that you are right. {289}\n\nYes, I replied, but in this high argument you should be a little more\ncertain, and should not conjecture only; for of all questions, this\nrespecting good and evil is the greatest.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nLet me then offer you an illustration, which may, I think, *578D* throw a\nlight upon this subject.\n\nWhat is your illustration?\n\n[Sidenote: In cities there are many great slaveowners, and they help to\nprotect one another.]\n\nThe case of rich individuals in cities who possess many slaves: from them\nyou may form an idea of the tyrant's condition, for they both have slaves;\nthe only difference is that he has more slaves.\n\nYes, that is the difference.\n\nYou know that they live securely and have nothing to apprehend from their\nservants?\n\nWhat should they fear?\n\nNothing. But do you observe the reason of this?\n\nYes; the reason is, that the whole city is leagued together for the\nprotection of each individual.\n\n[Sidenote: But suppose a slaveowner and his slaves carried off into the\nwilderness, what will happen then? Such is the condition of the tyrant.]\n\n*578E* Very true, I said. But imagine one of these owners, the master say\nof some fifty slaves, together with his family and property and slaves,\ncarried off by a god into the wilderness, where there are no freemen to\nhelp him--will he not be in an agony of fear lest he and his wife and\nchildren should be put to death by his slaves?\n\nYes, he said, he will be in the utmost fear.\n\n*579A* The time has arrived when he will be compelled to flatter divers of\nhis slaves, and make many promises to them of freedom and other things,\nmuch against his will--he will have to cajole his own servants.\n\nYes, he said, that will be the only way of saving himself.\n\nAnd suppose the same god, who carried him away, to surround him with\nneighbours who will not suffer one man to be the master of another, and\nwho, if they could catch the offender, would take his life?\n\n*579B* His case will be still worse, if you suppose him to be everywhere\nsurrounded and watched by enemies.\n\n[Sidenote: He is the daintiest of all men and has to endure the hardships\nof a prison;]\n\nAnd is not this the sort of prison in which the tyrant will be bound--he\nwho being by nature such as we have described, is full of all sorts of\nfears and lusts? His soul is dainty and greedy, and yet alone, of all men\nin the city, he is never {290} allowed to go on a journey, or to see the\nthings which other freemen desire to see, but he lives in his hole like a\nwoman *579C* hidden in the house, and is jealous of any other citizen who\ngoes into foreign parts and sees anything of interest.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: Miserable in himself, he is still more miserable if he be in a\npublic station.]\n\nAnd amid evils such as these will not he who is ill-governed in his own\nperson--the tyrannical man, I mean--whom you just now decided to be the\nmost miserable of all--will not he be yet more miserable when, instead of\nleading a private life, he is constrained by fortune to be a public\ntyrant? He has to be master of others when he is not master of himself: he\nis like a diseased or paralytic man who is compelled to pass his *579D*\nlife, not in retirement, but fighting and combating with other men.\n\nYes, he said, the similitude is most exact.\n\n[Sidenote: He then leads a life worse than the worst,]\n\nIs not his case utterly miserable? and does not the actual tyrant lead a\nworse life than he whose life you determined to be the worst?\n\nCertainly.\n\n[Sidenote: in unhappiness,]\n\nHe who is the real tyrant, whatever men may think, is the real slave, and\nis obliged to practise the greatest adulation *579E* and servility, and to\nbe the flatterer of the vilest of mankind. He has desires which he is\nutterly unable to satisfy, and has more wants than any one, and is truly\npoor, if you know how to inspect the whole soul of him: all his life long\nhe is beset with fear and is full of convulsions and distractions, even as\nthe State which he resembles: and surely the resemblance holds?\n\nVery true, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: and in wickedness.]\n\n*580A* Moreover, as we were saying before, he grows worse from having\npower: he becomes and is of necessity more jealous, more faithless, more\nunjust, more friendless, more impious, than he was at first; he is the\npurveyor and cherisher of every sort of vice, and the consequence is that\nhe is supremely miserable, and that he makes everybody else as miserable\nas himself.\n\nNo man of any sense will dispute your words.\n\n[Sidenote: The umpire decides that]\n\nCome then, I said, and as the general umpire in theatrical *580B* contests\nproclaims the result, do you also decide who in your opinion is first in\nthe scale of happiness, and who second, {291} and in what order the others\nfollow: there are five of them in all--they are the royal, timocratical,\noligarchical, democratical, tyrannical.\n\nThe decision will be easily given, he replied; they shall be choruses\ncoming on the stage, and I must judge them in the order in which they\nenter, by the criterion of virtue and vice, happiness and misery.\n\n[Sidenote: the best is the happiest and the worst is the most miserable.\nThis is the proclamation of the son of Ariston.]\n\nNeed we hire a herald, or shall I announce, that the son of Ariston [the\nbest] has decided that the best and justest *580C* is also the happiest,\nand that this is he who is the most royal man and king over himself; and\nthat the worst and most unjust man is also the most miserable, and that\nthis is he who being the greatest tyrant of himself is also the greatest\ntyrant of his State?\n\nMake the proclamation yourself, he said.\n\nAnd shall I add, 'whether seen or unseen by gods and men'?\n\nLet the words be added.\n\nThen this, I said, will be our first proof; and there is *580D* another,\nwhich may also have some weight.\n\nWhat is that?\n\n[Sidenote: Proof, derived from the three principles of the soul.]\n\nThe second proof is derived from the nature of the soul: seeing that the\nindividual soul, like the State, has been divided by us into three\nprinciples, the division may, I think, furnish a new demonstration.\n\nOf what nature?\n\nIt seems to me that to these three principles three pleasures correspond;\nalso three desires and governing powers.\n\nHow do you mean? he said.\n\nThere is one principle with which, as we were saying, a man learns,\nanother with which he is angry; the third, *580E* having many forms, has\nno special name, but is denoted by the general term appetitive, from the\nextraordinary strength and vehemence of the desires of eating and drinking\nand the other sensual appetites which are the main elements of it; *581A*\nalso money-loving, because such desires are generally satisfied by the\nhelp of money.\n\nThat is true, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: (1) The appetitive:]\n\nIf we were to say that the loves and pleasures of this third part were\nconcerned with gain, we should then be {292} able to fall back on a single\nnotion; and might truly and intelligibly describe this part of the soul as\nloving gain or money.\n\nI agree with you.\n\nAgain, is not the passionate element wholly set on ruling and conquering\nand getting fame?\n\n*581B* True.\n\n[Sidenote: (2) The ambitious;]\n\nSuppose we call it the contentious or ambitious--would the term be\nsuitable?\n\nExtremely suitable.\n\n[Sidenote: (3) The principle of knowledge and truth.]\n\nOn the other hand, every one sees that the principle of knowledge is\nwholly directed to the truth, and cares less than either of the others for\ngain or fame.\n\nFar less.\n\n'Lover of wisdom,' 'lover of knowledge,' are titles which we may fitly\napply to that part of the soul?\n\nCertainly.\n\nOne principle prevails in the souls of one class of men, *581C* another in\nothers, as may happen?\n\nYes.\n\nThen we may begin by assuming that there are three classes of men--lovers\nof wisdom, lovers of honour, lovers of gain?\n\nExactly.\n\nAnd there are three kinds of pleasure, which are their several objects?\n\nVery true.\n\n[Sidenote: Each will depreciate the others, but only the philosopher has\nthe power to judge,]\n\nNow, if you examine the three classes of men, and ask of them in turn\nwhich of their lives is pleasantest, each will be found praising his own\nand depreciating that of others: *581D* the money-maker will contrast the\nvanity of honour or of learning if they bring no money with the solid\nadvantages of gold and silver?\n\nTrue, he said.\n\nAnd the lover of honour--what will be his opinion? Will he not think that\nthe pleasure of riches is vulgar, while the pleasure of learning, if it\nbrings no distinction, is all smoke and nonsense to him?\n\nVery true. {293}\n\n[Sidenote: because he alone has experience of the highest pleasures and is\nalso acquainted with the lower.]\n\nAnd are we to suppose[2], I said, that the philosopher sets *581E* any\nvalue on other pleasures in comparison with the pleasure of knowing the\ntruth, and in that pursuit abiding, ever learning, not so far indeed from\nthe heaven of pleasure? Does he not call the other pleasures necessary,\nunder the idea that if there were no necessity for them, he would rather\nnot have them?\n\n[Footnote 2: Reading with Grasere and Hermann [Greek: ti/ oi)\u00f4/metha], and\nomitting [Greek: ou)de\\n], which is not found in the best MSS.]\n\nThere can be no doubt of that, he replied.\n\nSince, then, the pleasures of each class and the life of each are in\ndispute, and the question is not which life is more or *582A* less\nhonourable, or better or worse, but which is the more pleasant or\npainless--how shall we know who speaks truly?\n\nI cannot myself tell, he said.\n\nWell, but what ought to be the criterion? Is any better than experience\nand wisdom and reason?\n\nThere cannot be a better, he said.\n\nThen, I said, reflect. Of the three individuals, which has the greatest\nexperience of all the pleasures which we enumerated? Has the lover of\ngain, in learning the nature of essential truth, greater experience of the\npleasure of *582B* knowledge than the philosopher has of the pleasure of\ngain?\n\nThe philosopher, he replied, has greatly the advantage; for he has of\nnecessity always known the taste of the other pleasures from his childhood\nupwards: but the lover of gain in all his experience has not of necessity\ntasted--or, I should rather say, even had he desired, could hardly have\ntasted--the sweetness of learning and knowing truth.\n\nThen the lover of wisdom has a great advantage over the lover of gain, for\nhe has a double experience?\n\n*582C* Yes, very great.\n\nAgain, has he greater experience of the pleasures of honour, or the lover\nof honour of the pleasures of wisdom?\n\nNay, he said, all three are honoured in proportion as they attain their\nobject; for the rich man and the brave man and the wise man alike have\ntheir crowd of admirers, and as they all receive honour they all have\nexperience of the pleasures of honour; but the delight which is to be\nfound {294} in the knowledge of true being is known to the philosopher\nonly.\n\n*582D* His experience, then, will enable him to judge better than any one?\n\nFar better.\n\n[Sidenote: The philosopher alone having both judgment and experience,]\n\nAnd he is the only one who has wisdom as well as experience?\n\nCertainly.\n\nFurther, the very faculty which is the instrument of judgment is not\npossessed by the covetous or ambitious man, but only by the philosopher?\n\nWhat faculty?\n\nReason, with whom, as we were saying, the decision ought to rest.\n\nYes.\n\nAnd reasoning is peculiarly his instrument?\n\nCertainly.\n\nIf wealth and gain were the criterion, then the praise or *582E* blame of\nthe lover of gain would surely be the most trustworthy?\n\nAssuredly.\n\nOr if honour or victory or courage, in that case the judgment of the\nambitious or pugnacious would be the truest?\n\nClearly.\n\n[Sidenote: the pleasures which he approves are the true pleasures: he\nplaces (1) the love of wisdom, (2) the love of honour, (3) and lowest the\nlove of gain.]\n\nBut since experience and wisdom and reason are the judges--\n\nThe only inference possible, he replied, is that pleasures which are\napproved by the lover of wisdom and reason are the truest.\n\nAnd so we arrive at the result, that the pleasure of the *583A*\nintelligent part of the soul is the pleasantest of the three, and that he\nof us in whom this is the ruling principle has the pleasantest life.\n\nUnquestionably, he said, the wise man speaks with authority when he\napproves of his own life.\n\nAnd what does the judge affirm to be the life which is next, and the\npleasure which is next?\n\nClearly that of the soldier and lover of honour; who is nearer to himself\nthan the money-maker.\n\nLast comes the lover of gain? {295}\n\nVery true, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: True pleasure is not relative but absolute.]\n\n*583B* Twice in succession, then, has the just man overthrown the unjust\nin this conflict; and now comes the third trial, which is dedicated to\nOlympian Zeus the saviour: a sage whispers in my ear that no pleasure\nexcept that of the wise is quite true and pure--all others are a shadow\nonly; and surely this will prove the greatest and most decisive of falls?\n\nYes, the greatest; but will you explain yourself?\n\n*583C* I will work out the subject and you shall answer my questions.\n\nProceed.\n\nSay, then, is not pleasure opposed to pain?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd there is a neutral state which is neither pleasure nor pain?\n\nThere is.\n\nA state which is intermediate, and a sort of repose of the soul about\neither--that is what you mean?\n\nYes.\n\nYou remember what people say when they are sick?\n\nWhat do they say?\n\nThat after all nothing is pleasanter than health. But then they never knew\nthis to be the greatest of pleasures until *583D* they were ill.\n\nYes, I know, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: The states intermediate between pleasure and pain are termed\npleasures or pains only in relation to their opposites.]\n\nAnd when persons are suffering from acute pain, you must have heard them\nsay that there is nothing pleasanter than to get rid of their pain?\n\nI have.\n\nAnd there are many other cases of suffering in which the mere rest and\ncessation of pain, and not any positive enjoyment, is extolled by them as\nthe greatest pleasure?\n\nYes, he said; at the time they are pleased and well content to be at rest.\n\n*583E* Again, when pleasure ceases, that sort of rest or cessation will be\npainful?\n\nDoubtless, he said.\n\nThen the intermediate state of rest will be pleasure and will also be\npain?\n\nSo it would seem. {296}\n\nBut can that which is neither become both?\n\nI should say not.\n\nAnd both pleasure and pain are motions of the soul, are they not?\n\nYes.\n\n[Sidenote: Pleasure and pain are said to be states of rest, but they are\nreally motions.]\n\n*584A* But that which is neither was just now shown to be rest and not\nmotion, and in a mean between them?\n\nYes.\n\nHow, then, can we be right in supposing that the absence of pain is\npleasure, or that the absence of pleasure is pain?\n\nImpossible.\n\nThis then is an appearance only and not a reality; that is to say, the\nrest is pleasure at the moment and in comparison of what is painful, and\npainful in comparison of what is pleasant; but all these representations,\nwhen tried by the test of true pleasure, are not real but a sort of\nimposition?\n\nThat is the inference.\n\n[Sidenote: All pleasures are not merely cessations of pains, or pains of\npleasures; e.g. the pleasures of smell are not.]\n\n*584B* Look at the other class of pleasures which have no antecedent pains\nand you will no longer suppose, as you perhaps may at present, that\npleasure is only the cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure.\n\nWhat are they, he said, and where shall I find them?\n\nThere are many of them: take as an example the pleasures of smell, which\nare very great and have no antecedent pains; they come in a moment, and\nwhen they depart leave no pain behind them.\n\nMost true, he said.\n\n*584C* Let us not, then, be induced to believe that pure pleasure is the\ncessation of pain, or pain of pleasure.\n\nNo.\n\nStill, the more numerous and violent pleasures which reach the soul\nthrough the body are generally of this sort--they are reliefs of pain.\n\nThat is true.\n\nAnd the anticipations of future pleasures and pains are of a like nature?\n\nYes.\n\n*584D* Shall I give you an illustration of them?\n\nLet me hear. {297}\n\nYou would allow, I said, that there is in nature an upper and lower and\nmiddle region?\n\nI should.\n\n[Sidenote: Illustrations of the unreality of certain pleasures.]\n\nAnd if a person were to go from the lower to the middle region, would he\nnot imagine that he is going up; and he who is standing in the middle and\nsees whence he has come, would imagine that he is already in the upper\nregion, if he has never seen the true upper world?\n\nTo be sure, he said; how can he think otherwise?\n\n*584E* But if he were taken back again he would imagine, and truly\nimagine, that he was descending?\n\nNo doubt.\n\nAll that would arise out of his ignorance of the true upper and middle and\nlower regions?\n\nYes.\n\nThen can you wonder that persons who are inexperienced in the truth, as\nthey have wrong ideas about many other things, should also have wrong\nideas about pleasure and pain and the intermediate state; so that when\nthey are only being *585A* drawn towards the painful they feel pain and\nthink the pain which they experience to be real, and in like manner, when\ndrawn away from pain to the neutral or intermediate state, they firmly\nbelieve that they have reached the goal of satiety and pleasure; they, not\nknowing pleasure, err in contrasting pain with the absence of pain, which\nis like contrasting black with grey instead of white--can you wonder, I\nsay, at this?\n\nNo, indeed; I should be much more disposed to wonder at the opposite.\n\nLook at the matter thus:--Hunger, thirst, and the like, *585B* are\ninanitions of the bodily state?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd ignorance and folly are inanitions of the soul?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd food and wisdom are the corresponding satisfactions of either?\n\nCertainly.\n\n[Sidenote: The intellectual more real than the sensual.]\n\nAnd is the satisfaction derived from that which has less or from that\nwhich has more existence the truer?\n\nClearly, from that which has more.\n\nWhat classes of things have a greater share of pure {298} existence in\nyour judgment--those of which food and drink and condiments and all kinds\nof sustenance are examples, or the class which contains true opinion and\nknowledge and *585C* mind and all the different kinds of virtue? Put the\nquestion in this way:--Which has a more pure being--that which is\nconcerned with the invariable, the immortal, and the true, and is of such\na nature, and is found in such natures; or that which is concerned with\nand found in the variable and mortal, and is itself variable and mortal?\n\nFar purer, he replied, is the being of that which is concerned with the\ninvariable.\n\nAnd does the essence of the invariable partake of knowledge in the same\ndegree as of essence?\n\nYes, of knowledge in the same degree.\n\nAnd of truth in the same degree?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd, conversely, that which has less of truth will also have less of\nessence?\n\nNecessarily.\n\n*585D* Then, in general, those kinds of things which are in the service of\nthe body have less of truth and essence than those which are in the\nservice of the soul?\n\nFar less.\n\nAnd has not the body itself less of truth and essence than the soul?\n\nYes.\n\nWhat is filled with more real existence, and actually has a more real\nexistence, is more really filled than that which is filled with less real\nexistence and is less real?\n\nOf course.\n\n[Sidenote: The pleasures of the sensual and also of the passionate element\nare unreal and mixed.]\n\nAnd if there be a pleasure in being filled with that which is according to\nnature, that which is more really filled with *585E* more real being will\nmore really and truly enjoy true pleasure; whereas that which participates\nin less real being will be less truly and surely satisfied, and will\nparticipate in an illusory and less real pleasure?\n\nUnquestionably.\n\n*586A* Those then who know not wisdom and virtue, and are always busy with\ngluttony and sensuality, go down and up again as far as the mean; and in\nthis region they move at {299} random throughout life, but they never pass\ninto the true upper world; thither they neither look, nor do they ever\nfind their way, neither are they truly filled with true being, nor do they\ntaste of pure and abiding pleasure. Like cattle, with their eyes always\nlooking down and their heads stooping to the earth, that is, to the\ndining-table, they fatten and feed *586B* and breed, and, in their\nexcessive love of these delights, they kick and butt at one another with\nhorns and hoofs which are made of iron; and they kill one another by\nreason of their insatiable lust. For they fill themselves with that which\nis not substantial, and the part of themselves which they fill is also\nunsubstantial and incontinent.\n\nVerily, Socrates, said Glaucon, you describe the life of the many like an\noracle.\n\nTheir pleasures are mixed with pains--how can they be otherwise? For they\nare mere shadows and pictures of *586C* the true, and are coloured by\ncontrast, which exaggerates both light and shade, and so they implant in\nthe minds of fools insane desires of themselves; and they are fought about\nas Stesichorus says that the Greeks fought about the shadow of Helen at\nTroy in ignorance of the truth.\n\nSomething of that sort must inevitably happen.\n\nAnd must not the like happen with the spirited or passionate element of\nthe soul? Will not the passionate man who carries his passion into action,\nbe in the like case, whether he is envious and ambitious, or violent and\ncontentious, or angry and discontented, if he be seeking to attain *586D*\nhonour and victory and the satisfaction of his anger without reason or\nsense?\n\nYes, he said, the same will happen with the spirited element also.\n\n[Sidenote: Both kinds of pleasures are attained in the highest degree when\nthe desires which seek them are under the guidance of reason.]\n\nThen may we not confidently assert that the lovers of money and honour,\nwhen they seek their pleasures under the guidance and in the company of\nreason and knowledge, and pursue after and win the pleasures which wisdom\nshows them, will also have the truest pleasures in the highest degree\nwhich is attainable to them, inasmuch as they follow truth; *586E* and\nthey will have the pleasures which are natural to them, if that which is\nbest for each one is also most natural to him?\n\nYes, certainly; the best is the most natural. {300}\n\nAnd when the whole soul follows the philosophical principle, and there is\nno division, the several parts are just, *587A* and do each of them their\nown business, and enjoy severally the best and truest pleasures of which\nthey are capable?\n\nExactly.\n\nBut when either of the two other principles prevails, it fails in\nattaining its own pleasure, and compels the rest to pursue after a\npleasure which is a shadow only and which is not their own?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd the greater the interval which separates them from philosophy and\nreason, the more strange and illusive will be the pleasure?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd is not that farthest from reason which is at the greatest distance\nfrom law and order?\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd the lustful and tyrannical desires are, as we saw, at the *587B*\ngreatest distance?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the royal and orderly desires are nearest?\n\nYes.\n\nThen the tyrant will live at the greatest distance from true or natural\npleasure, and the king at the least?\n\nCertainly.\n\nBut if so, the tyrant will live most unpleasantly, and the king most\npleasantly?\n\nInevitably.\n\n[Sidenote: The measure of the interval which separates the king from the\ntyrant,]\n\nWould you know the measure of the interval which separates them?\n\nWill you tell me?\n\nThere appear to be three pleasures, one genuine and two *587C* spurious:\nnow the transgression of the tyrant reaches a point beyond the spurious;\nhe has run away from the region of law and reason, and taken up his abode\nwith certain slave pleasures which are his satellites, and the measure of\nhis inferiority can only be expressed in a figure.\n\nHow do you mean?\n\nI assume, I said, that the tyrant is in the third place from the oligarch;\nthe democrat was in the middle? {301}\n\nYes.\n\nAnd if there is truth in what has preceded, he will be wedded to an image\nof pleasure which is thrice removed as to truth from the pleasure of the\noligarch?\n\nHe will.\n\nAnd the oligarch is third from the royal; since we count *587D* as one\nroyal and aristocratical?\n\nYes, he is third.\n\nThen the tyrant is removed from true pleasure by the space of a number\nwhich is three times three?\n\nManifestly.\n\n[Sidenote: expressed under the symbol of a cube corresponding to the\nnumber 729.]\n\nThe shadow then of tyrannical pleasure determined by the number of length\nwill be a plane figure.\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd if you raise the power and make the plane a solid, there is no\ndifficulty in seeing how vast is the interval by which the tyrant is\nparted from the king.\n\nYes; the arithmetician will easily do the sum.\n\nOr if some person begins at the other end and measures *587E* the interval\nby which the king is parted from the tyrant in truth of pleasure, he will\nfind him, when the multiplication is completed, living 729 times more\npleasantly, and the tyrant more painfully by this same interval.\n\nWhat a wonderful calculation! And how enormous is the *588A* distance\nwhich separates the just from the unjust in regard to pleasure and pain!\n\n[Sidenote: which is _nearly_ the number of days and nights in a year.]\n\nYet a true calculation, I said, and a number which nearly concerns human\nlife, if human beings are concerned with days and nights and months and\nyears[3].\n\n[Footnote 3: 729 _nearly_ equals the number of days and nights in the\nyear.]\n\nYes, he said, human life is certainly concerned with them.\n\nThen if the good and just man be thus superior in pleasure to the evil and\nunjust, his superiority will be infinitely greater in propriety of life\nand in beauty and virtue?\n\nImmeasurably greater.\n\n[Sidenote: Refutation of Thrasymachus.]\n\n*588B* Well, I said, and now having arrived at this stage of the argument,\nwe may revert to the words which brought us hither: Was not some one\nsaying that injustice was a gain to the perfectly unjust who was reputed\nto be just?\n\nYes, that was said. {302}\n\nNow then, having determined the power and quality of justice and\ninjustice, let us have a little conversation with him.\n\nWhat shall we say to him?\n\nLet us make an image of the soul, that he may have his own words presented\nbefore his eyes.\n\n*588C* Of what sort?\n\n[Sidenote: The triple animal who has outwardly the image of a man.]\n\nAn ideal image of the soul, like the composite creations of ancient\nmythology, such as the Chimera or Scylla or Cerberus, and there are many\nothers in which two or more different natures are said to grow into one.\n\nThere are said of have been such unions.\n\nThen do you now model the form of a multitudinous, many-headed monster,\nhaving a ring of heads of all manner of beasts, tame and wild, which he is\nable to generate and metamorphose at will.\n\n*588D* You suppose marvellous powers in the artist; but, as language is\nmore pliable than wax or any similar substance, let there be such a model\nas you propose.\n\nSuppose now that you make a second form as of a lion, and a third of a\nman, the second smaller than the first, and the third smaller than the\nsecond.\n\nThat, he said, is an easier task; and I have made them as you say.\n\nAnd now join them, and let the three grow into one.\n\nThat has been accomplished.\n\nNext fashion the outside of them into a single image, as of a man, so that\nhe who is not able to look within, and sees *588E* only the outer hull,\nmay believe the beast to be a single human creature.\n\nI have done so, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: Will any one say that we should strengthen the monster and the\nlion at the expense of the man?]\n\nAnd now, to him who maintains that it is profitable for the human creature\nto be unjust, and unprofitable to be just, let us reply that, if he be\nright, it is profitable for this creature to feast the multitudinous\nmonster and strengthen the lion and *589A* the lion-like qualities, but to\nstarve and weaken the man, who is consequently liable to be dragged about\nat the mercy of either of the other two; and he is not to attempt to\nfamiliarize or harmonize them with one another--he ought rather to suffer\nthem to fight and bite and devour one another. {303}\n\nCertainly, he said; that is what the approver of injustice says.\n\nTo him the supporter of justice makes answer that he should ever so speak\nand act as to give the man within him in some way or other the most\ncomplete mastery over the *589B* entire human creature. He should watch\nover the many-headed monster like a good husbandman, fostering and\ncultivating the gentle qualities, and preventing the wild ones from\ngrowing; he should be making the lion-heart his ally, and in common care\nof them all should be uniting the several parts with one another and with\nhimself.\n\nYes, he said, that is quite what the maintainer of justice say.\n\nAnd so from every point of view, whether of pleasure, *589C* honour, or\nadvantage, the approver of justice is right and speaks the truth, and the\ndisapprover is wrong and false and ignorant?\n\nYes, from every point of view.\n\n[Sidenote: For the noble principle subjects the beast to the man, the\nignoble the man to the beast.]\n\nCome, now, and let us gently reason with the unjust, who is not\nintentionally in error. 'Sweet Sir,' we will say to him, 'what think you\nof things esteemed noble and ignoble? *589D* Is not the noble that which\nsubjects the beast to the man, or rather to the god in man; and the\nignoble that which subjects the man to the beast?' He can hardly avoid\nsaying Yes--can he now?\n\nNot if he has any regard for my opinion.\n\n[Sidenote: A man would not be the gainer if he sold his child: how much\nworse to sell his soul!]\n\nBut, if he agree so far, we may ask him to answer another question: 'Then\nhow would a man profit if he received gold and silver on the condition\nthat he was to enslave the noblest part of him to the worst? Who can\nimagine that a man who *589E* sold his son or daughter into slavery for\nmoney, especially if he sold them into the hands of fierce and evil men,\nwould be the gainer, however large might be the sum which he received? And\nwill any one say that he is not a miserable *590A* caitiff who\nremorselessly sells his own divine being to that which is most godless and\ndetestable? Eriphyle took the necklace as the price of her husband's life,\nbut he is taking a bribe in order to compass a worse ruin.'\n\nYes, said Glaucon, far worse--I will answer for him.\n\nHas not the intemperate been censured of old, because in {304} him the\nhuge multiform monster is allowed to be too much at large?\n\nClearly.\n\n[Sidenote: Proofs:--(1) Men are blamed for the predominance of the lower\nnature,]\n\nAnd men are blamed for pride and bad temper when the *590B* lion and\nserpent element in them disproportionately grows and gains strength?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd luxury and softness are blamed, because they relax and weaken this\nsame creature, and make a coward of him?\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd is not a man reproached for flattery and meanness who subordinates the\nspirited animal to the unruly monster, and, for the sake of money, of\nwhich he can never have enough, habituates him in the days of his youth to\nbe trampled in the mire, and from being a lion to become a monkey?\n\n*590C* True, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: as well as for the meanness of their employments and\ncharacter:]\n\nAnd why are mean employments and manual arts a reproach? Only because they\nimply a natural weakness of the higher principle; the individual is unable\nto control the creatures within him, but has to court them, and his great\nstudy is how to flatter them.\n\nSuch appears to be the reason.\n\n[Sidenote: (2) It is admitted that every one should be the servant of a\ndivine rule, or at any rate be kept under control by an external\nauthority:]\n\nAnd therefore, being desirous of placing him under a rule like that of the\nbest, we say that he ought to be the servant *590D* of the best, in whom\nthe Divine rules; not, as Thrasymachus supposed, to the injury of the\nservant, but because every one had better be ruled by divine wisdom\ndwelling within him; or, if this be impossible, then by an external\nauthority, in order that we may be all, as far as possible, under the same\ngovernment, friends and equals.\n\nTrue, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: (3) The care taken of children shows that we seek to establish\nin them a higher principle.]\n\n*590E* And this is clearly seen to be the intention of the law, which is\nthe ally of the whole city; and is seen also in the authority which we\nexercise over children, and the refusal to let them be free until we have\nestablished in them a principle analogous to the constitution of a state,\nand by *591A* cultivation of this higher element have set up in their\nhearts a guardian and ruler like our own, and when this is done they may\ngo their ways.\n\nYes, he said, the purpose of the law is manifest. {305}\n\nFrom what point of view, then, and on what ground can we say that a man is\nprofited by injustice or intemperance or other baseness, which will make\nhim a worse man, even though he acquire money or power by his wickedness?\n\nFrom no point of view at all.\n\n[Sidenote: The wise man will employ his energies in freeing and\nharmonizing the nobler elements of his nature and in regulating his bodily\nhabits.]\n\nWhat shall he profit, if his injustice be undetected and unpunished?\n*591B* He who is undetected only gets worse, whereas he who is detected\nand punished has the brutal part of his nature silenced and humanized; the\ngentler element in him is liberated, and his whole soul is perfected and\nennobled by the acquirement of justice and temperance and wisdom, more\nthan the body ever is by receiving gifts of beauty, strength and health,\nin proportion as the soul is more honourable than the body.\n\nCertainly, he said.\n\n*591C* To this nobler purpose the man of understanding will devote the\nenergies of his life. And in the first place, he will honour studies which\nimpress these qualities on his soul and will disregard others?\n\nClearly, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: His first aim not health but harmony of soul.]\n\nIn the next place, he will regulate his bodily habit and training, and so\nfar will he be from yielding to brutal and irrational pleasures, that he\nwill regard even health as quite a secondary matter; his first object will\nbe not that he may *591D* be fair or strong or well, unless he is likely\nthereby to gain temperance, but he will always desire so to attemper the\nbody as to preserve the harmony of the soul?\n\nCertainly he will, if he has true music in him.\n\nAnd in the acquisition of wealth there is a principle of order and harmony\nwhich he will also observe; he will not allow himself to be dazzled by the\nfoolish applause of the world, and heap up riches to his own infinite\nharm?\n\nCertainly not, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: He will not heap up riches,]\n\n*591E* He will look at the city which is within him, and take heed that no\ndisorder occur in it, such as might arise either from superfluity or from\nwant; and upon this principle he will regulate his property and gain or\nspend according to his means.\n\nVery true.\n\n[Sidenote: and he will only accept such political honours as will not\ndeteriorate his character.]\n\nAnd, for the same reason, he will gladly accept and enjoy {306} *592A*\nsuch honours as he deems likely to make him a better man; but those,\nwhether private or public, which are likely to disorder his life, he will\navoid?\n\nThen, if that is his motive, he will not be a statesman.\n\nBy the dog of Egypt, he will! in the city which is his own he certainly\nwill, though in the land of his birth perhaps not, unless he have a divine\ncall.\n\n[Sidenote: He has a city of his own, and the ideal pattern of this will be\nthe law of his life.]\n\nI understand; you mean that he will be a ruler in the city of which we are\nthe founders, and which exists in idea only; *592B* for I do not believe\nthat there is such an one anywhere on earth?\n\nIn heaven, I replied, there is laid up a pattern of it, methinks, which he\nwho desires may behold, and beholding, may set his own house in order[4].\nBut whether such an one exists, or ever will exist in fact, is no matter;\nfor he will live after the manner of that city, having nothing to do with\nany other.\n\n[Footnote 4: Or 'take up his abode there.']\n\nI think so, he said.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK X.\n\n\n[Sidenote: _Republic X._ Socrates, Glaucon.]\n\n*595A* Of the many excellences which I perceive in the order of our State,\nthere is none which upon reflection pleases me better than the rule about\npoetry.\n\nTo what do you refer?\n\nTo the rejection of imitative poetry, which certainly ought not to be\nreceived; as I see far more clearly now that *595B* the parts of the soul\nhave been distinguished.\n\nWhat do you mean?\n\n[Sidenote: Poetical imitations are ruinous to the mind of the hearer.]\n\nSpeaking in confidence, for I should not like to have my words repeated to\nthe tragedians and the rest of the imitative tribe--but I do not mind\nsaying to you, that all poetical imitations are ruinous to the\nunderstanding of the hearers, and that the knowledge of their true nature\nis the only antidote to them.\n\nExplain the purport of your remark.\n\nWell, I will tell you, although I have always from my earliest youth had\nan awe and love of Homer, which even now makes the words falter on my\nlips, for he is the great *595C* captain and teacher of the whole of that\ncharming tragic company; but a man is not to be reverenced more than the\ntruth, and therefore I will speak out.\n\nVery good, he said.\n\nListen to me then, or rather, answer me.\n\nPut your question.\n\n[Sidenote: The nature of imitation.]\n\nCan you tell me what imitation is? for I really do not know.\n\nA likely thing, then, that I should know.\n\n*596A* Why not? for the duller eye may often see a thing sooner than the\nkeener.\n\nVery true, he said; but in your presence, even if I had any (308} faint\nnotion, I could not muster courage to utter it. Will you enquire yourself?\n\nWell then, shall we begin the enquiry in our usual manner: Whenever a\nnumber of individuals have a common name, we assume them to have also a\ncorresponding idea or form:--do you understand me?\n\nI do.\n\n[Sidenote: The idea is one, but the objects comprehended under it are\nmany.]\n\nLet us take any common instance; there are beds and *596B* tables in the\nworld--plenty of them, are there not?\n\nYes.\n\nBut there are only two ideas or forms of them--one the idea of a bed, the\nother of a table.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd the maker of either of them makes a bed or he makes a table for our\nuse, in accordance with the idea--that is our way of speaking in this and\nsimilar instances--but no artificer makes the ideas themselves: how could\nhe?\n\nImpossible.\n\nAnd there is another artist,--I should like to know what you would say of\nhim.\n\n*596C* Who is he?\n\n[Sidenote: The universal creator an extraordinary person. But note also\nthat everybody is a creator in a sense. For all things may be made by the\nreflection of them in a mirror.]\n\nOne who is the maker of all the works of all other workmen.\n\nWhat an extraordinary man!\n\nWait a little, and there will be more reason for your saying so. For this\nis he who is able to make not only vessels of every kind, but plants and\nanimals, himself and all other things--the earth and heaven, and the\nthings which are in heaven or under the earth; he makes the gods also.\n\n*596D* He must be a wizard and no mistake.\n\nOh! you are incredulous, are you? Do you mean that there is no such maker\nor creator, or that in one sense there might be a maker of all these\nthings but in another not? Do you see that there is a way in which you\ncould make them all yourself?\n\nWhat way?\n\nAn easy way enough; or rather, there are many ways in which the feat might\nbe quickly and easily accomplished, none quicker than that of turning a\nmirror round and round--you *596E* would soon enough make the sun and the\nheavens, and the earth and yourself, and other animals and plants, and\n{309} all the other things of which we were just now speaking, in the\nmirror.\n\nYes, he said; but they would be appearances only.\n\n[Sidenote: But this is an appearance only: and the painter too is a maker\nof appearances.]\n\nVery good, I said, you are coming to the point now. And the painter too\nis, as I conceive, just such another--a creator of appearances, is he not?\n\nOf course.\n\nBut then I suppose you will say that what he creates is untrue. And yet\nthere is a sense in which the painter also creates a bed?\n\nYes, he said, but not a real bed.\n\n*597A* And what of the maker of the bed? were you not saying that he too\nmakes, not the idea which, according to our view, is the essence of the\nbed, but only a particular bed?\n\nYes, I did.\n\nThen if he does not make that which exists he cannot make true existence,\nbut only some semblance of existence; and if any one were to say that the\nwork of the maker of the bed, or of any other workman, has real existence,\nhe could hardly be supposed to be speaking the truth.\n\nAt any rate, he replied, philosophers would say that he was not speaking\nthe truth.\n\nNo wonder, then, that his work too is an indistinct expression of truth.\n\n*597B* No wonder.\n\nSuppose now that by the light of the examples just offered we enquire who\nthis imitator is?\n\nIf you please.\n\n[Sidenote: Three beds and three makers of beds.]\n\nWell then, here are three beds: one existing in nature, which is made by\nGod, as I think that we may say--for no one else can be the maker?\n\nNo.\n\nThere is another which is the work of the carpenter?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the work of the painter is a third?\n\nYes.\n\nBeds, then, are of three kinds, and there are three artists who\nsuperintend them: God, the maker of the bed, and the painter?\n\nYes, there are three of them. {310}\n\n*597C* God, whether from choice or from necessity, made one bed in nature\nand one only; two or more such ideal beds neither ever have been nor ever\nwill be made by God.\n\nWhy is that?\n\n[Sidenote: (1) The creator. God could only make one bed; if he made two, a\nthird would still appear behind them.]\n\nBecause even if He had made but two, a third would still appear behind\nthem which both of them would have for their idea, and that would be the\nideal bed and not the two others.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\n*597D* God knew this, and He desired to be the real maker of a real bed,\nnot a particular maker of a particular bed, and therefore He created a bed\nwhich is essentially and by nature one only.\n\nSo we believe.\n\nShall we, then, speak of Him as the natural author or maker of the bed?\n\nYes, he replied; inasmuch as by the natural process of creation He is the\nauthor of this and of all other things.\n\n[Sidenote: (2) The human maker.]\n\nAnd what shall we say of the carpenter--is not he also the maker of the\nbed?\n\nYes.\n\nBut would you call the painter a creator and maker?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nYet if he is not the maker, what is he in relation to the bed?\n\n[Sidenote: (3) The imitator, i.e. the painter or poet,]\n\n*597E* I think, he said, that we may fairly designate him as the imitator\nof that which the others make.\n\nGood, I said; then you call him who is third in the descent from nature an\nimitator?\n\nCertainly, he said.\n\nAnd the tragic poet is an imitator, and therefore, like all other\nimitators, he is thrice removed from the king and from the truth?\n\nThat appears to be so.\n\nThen about the imitator we are agreed. And what about *598A* the painter?\n--I would like to know whether he may be thought to imitate that which\noriginally exists in nature, or only the creations of artists?\n\nThe latter.\n\nAs they are or as they appear? you have still to determine this. {311}\n\nWhat do you mean?\n\n[Sidenote: whose art is one of imitation or appearance and a long way\nremoved from the truth.]\n\nI mean, that you may look at a bed from different points of view,\nobliquely or directly or from any other point of view, and the bed will\nappear different, but there is no difference in reality. And the same of\nall things.\n\nYes, he said, the difference is only apparent.\n\n*598B* Now let me ask you another question: Which is the art of painting\ndesigned to be--an imitation of things as they are, or as they appear--of\nappearance or of reality?\n\nOf appearance.\n\n[Sidenote: Any one who does all things does only a very small part of\nthem.]\n\nThen the imitator, I said, is a long way off the truth, and can do all\nthings because he lightly touches on a small part of them, and that part\nan image. For example: A painter will paint a cobbler, carpenter, or any\nother artist, though he *598C* knows nothing of their arts; and, if he is\na good artist, he may deceive children or simple persons, when he shows\nthem his picture of a carpenter from a distance, and they will fancy that\nthey are looking at a real carpenter.\n\nCertainly.\n\n[Sidenote: Any one who pretends to know all things is ignorant of the very\nnature of knowledge.]\n\nAnd whenever any one informs us that he has found a man who knows all the\narts, and all things else that anybody knows, and every single thing with\na higher degree of accuracy *598D* than any other man--whoever tells us\nthis, I think that we can only imagine him to be a simple creature who is\nlikely to have been deceived by some wizard or actor whom he met, and whom\nhe thought all-knowing, because he himself was unable to analyse the\nnature of knowledge and ignorance and imitation.\n\nMost true.\n\n[Sidenote: And he who attributes such universal knowledge to the poets is\nsimilarly deceived.]\n\nAnd so, when we hear persons saying that the tragedians, and Homer, who is\nat their head, know all the arts and all *598E* things human, virtue as\nwell as vice, and divine things too, for that the good poet cannot compose\nwell unless he knows his subject, and that he who has not this knowledge\ncan never be a poet, we ought to consider whether here also there may not\nbe a similar illusion. Perhaps they may have come across imitators and\nbeen deceived by them; they may not have remembered when they saw their\nworks that *599A* these were but imitations thrice removed from the truth,\nand could easily be made without any knowledge of the truth, {312} because\nthey are appearances only and not realities? Or, after all, they may be in\nthe right, and poets do really know the things about which they seem to\nthe many to speak so well?\n\nThe question, he said, should by all means be considered.\n\n[Sidenote: He who could make the original would not make the image.]\n\nNow do you suppose that if a person were able to make the original as well\nas the image, he would seriously devote himself to the image-making\nbranch? Would he allow imitation to be the ruling principle of his life,\nas if he had *599B* nothing higher in him?\n\nI should say not.\n\nThe real artist, who knew what he was imitating, would be interested in\nrealities and not in imitations; and would desire to leave as memorials of\nhimself works many and fair; and, instead of being the author of\nencomiums, he would prefer to be the theme of them.\n\nYes, he said, that would be to him a source of much greater honour and\nprofit.\n\n[Sidenote: If Homer had been a legislator, or general, or inventor,]\n\nThen, I said, we must put a question to Homer; not about *599C* medicine,\nor any of the arts to which his poems only incidentally refer: we are not\ngoing to ask him, or any other poet, whether he has cured patients like\nAsclepius, or left behind him a school of medicine such as the Asclepiads\nwere, or whether he only talks about medicine and other arts at\nsecond-hand; but we have a right to know respecting military tactics,\npolitics, education, which are the chiefest *599D* and noblest subjects of\nhis poems, and we may fairly ask him about them. 'Friend Homer,' then we\nsay to him, 'if you are only in the second remove from truth in what you\nsay of virtue, and not in the third--not an image maker or imitator--and\nif you are able to discern what pursuits make men better or worse in\nprivate or public life, tell us what State was ever better governed by\nyour help? The good *599E* order of Lacedaemon is due to Lycurgus, and\nmany other cities great and small have been similarly benefited by others;\nbut who says that you have been a good legislator to them and have done\nthem any good? Italy and Sicily boast of Charondas, and there is Solon who\nis renowned among us; but what city has anything to say about you?' Is\nthere any city which he might name?\n\nI think not, said Glaucon; not even the Homerids themselves pretend that\nhe was a legislator. {313}\n\n*600A* Well, but is there any war on record which was carried on\nsuccessfully by him, or aided by his counsels, when he was alive?\n\nThere is not.\n\nOr is there any invention[1] of his, applicable to the arts or to human\nlife, such as Thales the Milesian or Anacharsis the Scythian, and other\ningenious men have conceived, which is attributed to him?\n\n[Footnote: Omitting [Greek: ei)s].]\n\nThere is absolutely nothing of the kind.\n\nBut, if Homer never did any public service, was he privately a guide or\nteacher of any? Had he in his lifetime friends *600B* who loved to\nassociate with him, and who handed down to posterity an Homeric way of\nlife, such as was established by Pythagoras who was so greatly beloved for\nhis wisdom, and whose followers are to this day quite celebrated for the\norder which was named after him?\n\nNothing of the kind is recorded of him. For surely, Socrates, Creophylus,\nthe companion of Homer, that child of flesh, whose name always makes us\nlaugh, might be more justly ridiculed for his stupidity, if, as is said,\nHomer was *600C* greatly neglected by him and others in his own day when\nhe was alive?\n\n[Sidenote: or had done anything else for the improvement of mankind, he\nwould not have been allowed to starve.]\n\nYes, I replied, that is the tradition. But can you imagine, Glaucon, that\nif Homer had really been able to educate and improve mankind--if he had\npossessed knowledge and not been a mere imitator--can you imagine, I say,\nthat he would not have had many followers, and been honoured and loved by\nthem? Protagoras of Abdera, and Prodicus of Ceos, and a host of others,\nhave only to whisper to their contemporaries: *600D* 'You will never be\nable to manage either your own house or your own State until you appoint\nus to be your ministers of education'--and this ingenious device of theirs\nhas such an effect in making men love them that their companions all but\ncarry them about on their shoulders. And is it conceivable that the\ncontemporaries of Homer, or again of Hesiod, would have allowed either of\nthem to go about as rhapsodists, if they had really been able to make\nmankind virtuous? Would they not have been as unwilling to part with them\nas with gold, and have compelled them to stay {314} *600E* at home with\nthem? Or, if the master would not stay, then the disciples would have\nfollowed him about everywhere, until they had got education enough?\n\nYes, Socrates, that, I think, is quite true.\n\n[Sidenote: The poets, like the painters, are but imitators;]\n\nThen must we not infer that all these poetical individuals, beginning with\nHomer, are only imitators; they copy images *601A* of virtue and the like,\nbut the truth they never reach? The poet is like a painter who, as we have\nalready observed, will make a likeness of a cobbler though he understands\nnothing of cobbling; and his picture is good enough for those who know no\nmore than he does, and judge only by colours and figures.\n\nQuite so.\n\nIn like manner the poet with his words and phrases[2] may be said to lay\non the colours of the several arts, himself understanding their nature\nonly enough to imitate them; and other people, who are as ignorant as he\nis, and judge only from his words, imagine that if he speaks of cobbling,\nor of military tactics, or of anything else, in metre and harmony *601B*\nand rhythm, he speaks very well--such is the sweet influence which melody\nand rhythm by nature have. And I think that you must have observed again\nand again what a poor appearance the tales of poets make when stripped of\nthe colours which music puts upon them, and recited in simple prose.\n\n[Footnote 2: Or, 'with his nouns and verbs.']\n\nYes, he said.\n\nThey are like faces which were never really beautiful, but only blooming;\nand now the bloom of youth has passed away from them?\n\nExactly.\n\n[Sidenote: they know nothing of true existence.]\n\nHere is another point: The imitator or maker of the image knows nothing of\ntrue existence; he knows appearances only. *601C* Am I not right?\n\nYes.\n\nThen let us have a clear understanding, and not be satisfied with half an\nexplanation.\n\nProceed.\n\nOf the painter we say that he will paint reins, and he will paint a bit?\n\nYes. {315}\n\nAnd the worker in leather and brass will make them?\n\nCertainly.\n\n[Sidenote: The maker has more knowledge than the imitator, but less than\nthe user. Three arts, using, making, imitating.]\n\nBut does the painter know the right form of the bit and reins? Nay, hardly\neven the workers in brass and leather who make them; only the horseman who\nknows how to use them--he knows their right form.\n\nMost true.\n\nAnd may we not say the same of all things?\n\nWhat?\n\n*601D* That there are three arts which are concerned with all things: one\nwhich uses, another which makes, a third which imitates them?\n\nYes.\n\n[Sidenote: Goodness of things relative to use; hence the maker of them is\ninstructed by the user.]\n\nAnd the excellence or beauty or truth of every structure, animate or\ninanimate, and of every action of man, is relative to the use for which\nnature or the artist has intended them.\n\nTrue.\n\nThen the user of them must have the greatest experience of them, and he\nmust indicate to the maker the good or bad qualities which develop\nthemselves in use; for example, the flute-player will tell the flute-maker\nwhich of his flutes is satisfactory to the performer; he will tell him how\nhe ought *601E* to make them, and the other will attend to his\ninstructions?\n\nOf course.\n\nThe one knows and therefore speaks with authority about the goodness and\nbadness of flutes, while the other, confiding in him, will do what he is\ntold by him?\n\nTrue.\n\n[Sidenote: The maker has belief and not knowledge, the imitator neither.]\n\nThe instrument is the same, but about the excellence or badness of it the\nmaker will only attain to a correct belief; and this he will gain from him\nwho knows, by talking to him *602A* and being compelled to hear what he\nhas to say, whereas the user will have knowledge?\n\nTrue.\n\nBut will the imitator have either? Will he know from use whether or no his\ndrawing is correct or beautiful? or will he have right opinion from being\ncompelled to associate with another who knows and gives him instructions\nabout what he should draw? {316}\n\nNeither.\n\nThen he will no more have true opinion than he will have knowledge about\nthe goodness or badness of his imitations?\n\nI suppose not.\n\nThe imitative artist will be in a brilliant state of intelligence about\nhis own creations?\n\nNay, very much the reverse.\n\n*602B* And still he will go on imitating without knowing what makes a\nthing good or bad, and may be expected therefore to imitate only that\nwhich appears to be good to the ignorant multitude?\n\nJust so.\n\nThus far then we are pretty well agreed that the imitator has no knowledge\nworth mentioning of what he imitates. Imitation is only a kind of play or\nsport, and the tragic poets, whether they write in Iambic or in Heroic\nverse, are imitators in the highest degree?\n\nVery true.\n\n[Sidenote: Imitation has been proved to be thrice removed from the truth.]\n\n*602C* And now tell me, I conjure you, has not imitation been shown by us\nto be concerned with that which is thrice removed from the truth?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd what is the faculty in man to which imitation is addressed?\n\nWhat do you mean?\n\nI will explain: The body which is large when seen near, appears small when\nseen at a distance?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd the same object appears straight when looked at out of the water, and\ncrooked when in the water; and the concave becomes convex, owing to the\nillusion about colours to which the sight is liable. Thus every sort of\nconfusion is revealed within us; *602D* and this is that weakness of the\nhuman mind on which the art of conjuring and of deceiving by light and\nshadow and other ingenious devices imposes, having an effect upon us like\nmagic.\n\nTrue.\n\n[Sidenote: The art of measuring given to man that he may correct the\nvariety of appearances.]\n\nAnd the arts of measuring and numbering and weighing come to the rescue of\nthe human understanding--there {317} is the beauty of them--and the\napparent greater or less, or more or heavier, no longer have the mastery\nover us, but give way before calculation and measure and weight?\n\nMost true.\n\n*602E* And this, surely, must be the work of the calculating and rational\nprinciple in the soul?\n\nTo be sure.\n\nAnd when this principle measures and certifies that some things are equal,\nor that some are greater or less than others, there occurs an apparent\ncontradiction?\n\nTrue.\n\nBut were we not saying that such a contradiction is impossible--the same\nfaculty cannot have contrary opinions at the same time about the same\nthing?\n\nVery true.\n\n*603A* Then that part of the soul which has an opinion contrary to measure\nis not the same with that which has an opinion in accordance with measure?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd the better part of the soul is likely to be that which trusts to\nmeasure and calculation?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd that which is opposed to them is one of the inferior principles of the\nsoul?\n\nNo doubt.\n\nThis was the conclusion at which I was seeking to arrive when I said that\npainting or drawing, and imitation in general, when doing their own proper\nwork, are far removed from truth, and the companions and friends and\nassociates of *603B* a principle within us which is equally removed from\nreason, and that they have no true or healthy aim.\n\nExactly.\n\n[Sidenote: The productions of the imitative arts are bastard and\nillegitimate.]\n\nThe imitative art is an inferior who marries an inferior, and has inferior\noffspring.\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd is this confined to the sight only, or does it extend to the hearing\nalso, relating in fact to what we term poetry?\n\nProbably the same would be true of poetry.\n\nDo not rely, I said, on a probability derived from the analogy of\npainting; but let us examine further and see {318} *603C* whether the\nfaculty with which poetical imitation is concerned is good or bad.\n\nBy all means.\n\nWe may state the question thus:--Imitation imitates the actions of men,\nwhether voluntary or involuntary, on which, as they imagine, a good or bad\nresult has ensued, and they rejoice or sorrow accordingly. Is there\nanything more?\n\nNo, there is nothing else.\n\n[Sidenote: They imitate opposites;]\n\nBut in all this variety of circumstances is the man at unity *603D* with\nhimself--or rather, as in the instance of sight there was confusion and\nopposition in his opinions about the same things, so here also is there\nnot strife and inconsistency in his life? Though I need hardly raise the\nquestion again, for I remember that all this has been already admitted;\nand the soul has been acknowledged by us to be full of these and ten\nthousand similar oppositions occurring at the same moment?\n\nAnd we were right, he said.\n\nYes, I said, thus far we were right; but there was an *603E* omission\nwhich must now be supplied.\n\nWhat was the omission?\n\nWere we not saying that a good man, who has the misfortune to lose his son\nor anything else which is most dear to him, will bear the loss with more\nequanimity than another?\n\nYes.\n\n[Sidenote: they encourage weakness;]\n\nBut will he have no sorrow, or shall we say that although he cannot help\nsorrowing, he will moderate his sorrow?\n\nThe latter, he said, is the truer statement.\n\n*604A* Tell me: will he be more likely to struggle and hold out against\nhis sorrow when he is seen by his equals, or when he is alone?\n\nIt will make a great difference whether he is seen or not.\n\nWhen he is by himself he will not mind saying or doing many things which\nhe would be ashamed of any one hearing or seeing him do?\n\nTrue.\n\nThere is a principle of law and reason in him which bids him resist, as\nwell as a feeling of his misfortune which is *604B* forcing him to indulge\nhis sorrow? {319}\n\nTrue.\n\nBut when a man is drawn in two opposite directions, to and from the same\nobject, this, as we affirm, necessarily implies two distinct principles in\nhim?\n\nCertainly.\n\nOne of them is ready to follow the guidance of the law?\n\nHow do you mean?\n\n[Sidenote: they are at variance with the exhortations of philosophy;]\n\nThe law would say that to be patient under suffering is best, and that we\nshould not give way to impatience, as there is no knowing whether such\nthings are good or evil; and nothing is gained by impatience; also,\nbecause no human *604C* thing is of serious importance, and grief stands\nin the way of that which at the moment is most required.\n\nWhat is most required? he asked.\n\nThat we should take counsel about what has happened, and when the dice\nhave been thrown order our affairs in the way which reason deems best;\nnot, like children who have had a fall, keeping hold of the part struck\nand wasting time in setting up a howl, but always accustoming the soul\nforthwith *604D* to apply a remedy, raising up that which is sickly and\nfallen, banishing the cry of sorrow by the healing art.\n\nYes, he said, that is the true way of meeting the attacks of fortune.\n\nYes, I said; and the higher principle is ready to follow this suggestion\nof reason?\n\nClearly.\n\n[Sidenote: they recall trouble and sorrow;]\n\nAnd the other principle, which inclines us to recollection of our troubles\nand to lamentation, and can never have enough of them, we may call\nirrational, useless, and cowardly?\n\nIndeed, we may.\n\n*604E* And does not the latter--I mean the rebellious principle--furnish a\ngreat variety of materials for imitation? Whereas the wise and calm\ntemperament, being always nearly equable, is not easy to imitate or to\nappreciate when imitated, especially at a public festival when a\npromiscuous crowd is assembled in a theatre. For the feeling represented\nis one to which they are strangers.\n\n*605A* Certainly.\n\nThen the imitative poet who aims at being popular is not {320} by nature\nmade, nor is his art intended, to please or to affect the rational\nprinciple in the soul; but he will prefer the passionate and fitful\ntemper, which is easily imitated?\n\nClearly.\n\n[Sidenote: they minister in an inferior manner to an inferior principle in\nthe soul.]\n\nAnd now we may fairly take him and place him by the side of the painter,\nfor he is like him in two ways: first, inasmuch as his creations have an\ninferior degree of truth--in this, *605B* I say, he is like him; and he is\nalso like him in being concerned with an inferior part of the soul; and\ntherefore we shall be right in refusing to admit him into a well-ordered\nState, because he awakens and nourishes and strengthens the feelings and\nimpairs the reason. As in a city when the evil are permitted to have\nauthority and the good are put out of the way, so in the soul of man, as\nwe maintain, the imitative poet implants an evil constitution, for he\nindulges the *605C* irrational nature which has no discernment of greater\nand less, but thinks the same thing at one time great and at another\nsmall--he is a manufacturer of images and is very far removed from the\ntruth[3].\n\n[Footnote 3: Reading [Greek: ei)d\u00f4lopoiou=nta ... a)phest\u00f4=ta].]\n\nExactly.\n\nBut we have not yet brought forward the heaviest count in our\naccusation:--the power which poetry has of harming even the good (and\nthere are very few who are not harmed), is surely an awful thing?\n\nYes, certainly, if the effect is what you say.\n\n[Sidenote: How can we be right in sympathizing with the sorrows of poetry\nwhen we would fain restrain those of real life?]\n\nHear and judge: The best of us, as I conceive, when we listen to a passage\nof Homer, or one of the tragedians, in *605D* which he represents some\npitiful hero who is drawling out his sorrows in a long oration, or\nweeping, and smiting his breast--the best of us, you know, delight in\ngiving way to sympathy, and are in raptures at the excellence of the poet\nwho stirs our feelings most.\n\nYes, of course I know.\n\nBut when any sorrow of our own happens to us, then you may observe that we\npride ourselves on the opposite quality--we would fain be quiet and\npatient; this is the manly part, *605E* and the other which delighted us\nin the recitation is now deemed to be the part of a woman.\n\nVery true, he said. {321}\n\nNow can we be right in praising and admiring another who is doing that\nwhich any one of us would abominate and be ashamed of in his own person?\n\nNo, he said, that is certainly not reasonable.\n\n*606A* Nay, I said, quite reasonable from one point of view.\n\nWhat point of view?\n\n[Sidenote: We fail to observe that a sentimental pity soon creates a real\nweakness.]\n\nIf you consider, I said, that when in misfortune we feel a natural hunger\nand desire to relieve our sorrow by weeping and lamentation, and that this\nfeeling which is kept under control in our own calamities is satisfied and\ndelighted by the poets;--the better nature in each of us, not having been\nsufficiently trained by reason or habit, allows the sympathetic *606B*\nelement to break loose because the sorrow is another's; and the spectator\nfancies that there can be no disgrace to himself in praising and pitying\nany one who comes telling him what a good man he is, and making a fuss\nabout his troubles; he thinks that the pleasure is a gain, and why should\nhe be supercilious and lose this and the poem too? Few persons ever\nreflect, as I should imagine, that from the evil of other men something of\nevil is communicated to themselves. And so the feeling of sorrow which has\ngathered strength at the sight of the misfortunes of others is with\ndifficulty repressed in our own.\n\n*606C* How very true!\n\n[Sidenote: In like manner the love of comedy may turn a man into a\nbuffoon.]\n\nAnd does not the same hold also of the ridiculous? There are jests which\nyou would be ashamed to make yourself, and yet on the comic stage, or\nindeed in private, when you hear them, you are greatly amused by them, and\nare not at all disgusted at their unseemliness;--the case of pity is\nrepeated;--there is a principle in human nature which is disposed to raise\na laugh, and this which you once restrained by reason, because you were\nafraid of being thought a buffoon, is now let out again; and having\nstimulated the risible faculty at the theatre, you are betrayed\nunconsciously to yourself into playing the comic poet at home.\n\nQuite true, he said.\n\n*606D* And the same may be said of lust and anger and all the other\naffections, of desire and pain and pleasure, which are held to be\ninseparable from every action--in all of them {322} poetry feeds and\nwaters the passions instead of drying them up; she lets them rule,\nalthough they ought to be controlled, if mankind are ever to increase in\nhappiness and virtue.\n\nI cannot deny it.\n\n[Sidenote: We are lovers of Homer, but we must expel him from our State.]\n\n*606E* Therefore, Glaucon, I said, whenever you meet with any of the\neulogists of Homer declaring that he has been the educator of Hellas, and\nthat he is profitable for education and for the ordering of human things,\nand that you should *607A* take him up again and again and get to know him\nand regulate your whole life according to him, we may love and honour\nthose who say these things--they are excellent people, as far as their\nlights extend; and we are ready to acknowledge that Homer is the greatest\nof poets and first of tragedy writers; but we must remain firm in our\nconviction that hymns to the gods and praises of famous men are the only\npoetry which ought to be admitted into our State. For if you go beyond\nthis and allow the honeyed muse to enter, either in epic or lyric verse,\nnot law and the reason of mankind, which by common consent have ever been\ndeemed best, but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our State.\n\nThat is most true, he said.\n\n[Sidenote: Apology to the poets.]\n\n*607B* And now since we have reverted to the subject of poetry, let this\nour defence serve to show the reasonableness of our former judgment in\nsending away out of our State an art having the tendencies which we have\ndescribed; for reason constrained us. But that she may not impute to us\nany harshness or want of politeness, let us tell her that there is an\nancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry; of which there are many\nproofs, such as the saying of 'the yelping hound howling at her lord,' or\nof one 'mighty in *607C* the vain talk of fools,' and 'the mob of sages\ncircumventing Zeus,' and the 'subtle thinkers who are beggars after all';\nand there are innumerable other signs of ancient enmity between them.\nNotwithstanding this, let us assure our sweet friend and the sister arts\nof imitation, that if she will only prove her title to exist in a\nwell-ordered State we shall be delighted to receive her--we are very\nconscious of her charms; but we may not on that account betray the truth.\n{323} I dare say, Glaucon, that you are as much charmed by her *607D* as\nI am, especially when she appears in Homer?\n\nYes, indeed, I am greatly charmed.\n\nShall I propose, then, that she be allowed to return from exile, but upon\nthis condition only--that she make a defence of herself in lyrical or some\nother metre?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd we may further grant to those of her defenders who are lovers of\npoetry and yet not poets the permission to speak in prose on her behalf:\nlet them show not only that she is pleasant but also useful to States and\nto human life, and we will listen in a kindly spirit; for if this can be\nproved *607E* we shall surely be the gainers--I mean, if there is a use in\npoetry as well as a delight?\n\nCertainly, he said, we shall be the gainers.\n\n[Sidenote: Poetry is attractive but not true.]\n\nIf her defence fails, then, my dear friend, like other persons who are\nenamoured of something, but put a restraint upon themselves when they\nthink their desires are opposed to their interests, so too must we after\nthe manner of lovers give her up, though not without a struggle. We too\nare inspired by that love of poetry which the education *608A* of noble\nStates has implanted in us, and therefore we would have her appear at her\nbest and truest; but so long as she is unable to make good her defence,\nthis argument of ours shall be a charm to us, which we will repeat to\nourselves while we listen to her strains; that we may not fall away into\nthe childish love of her which captivates the many. At all events we are\nwell aware[4] that poetry being such as we have described is not to be\nregarded seriously as attaining to the truth; and he who listens to her,\nfearing for the safety of the *608B* city which is within him, should be\non his guard against her seductions and make our words his law.\n\n[Footnote 4: Or, if we accept Madvig's ingenious but unnecessary\nemendation [Greek: a)|so/metha], 'At all events we will sing, that' &c.]\n\nYes, he said, I quite agree with you.\n\nYes, I said, my dear Glaucon, for great is the issue at stake, greater\nthan appears, whether a man is to be good or bad. And what will any one be\nprofited if under the influence of honour or money or power, aye, or under\nthe excitement of poetry, he neglect justice and virtue? {324}\n\nYes, he said; I have been convinced by the argument, as I believe that any\none else would have been.\n\n*608C* And yet no mention has been made of the greatest prizes and rewards\nwhich await virtue.\n\nWhat, are there any greater still? If there are, they must be of an\ninconceivable greatness.\n\n[Sidenote: The rewards of virtue extend not only to this little space of\nhuman life but to the whole of existence.]\n\nWhy, I said, what was ever great in a short time? The whole period of\nthree score years and ten is surely but a little thing in comparison with\neternity?\n\nSay rather 'nothing,' he replied.\n\nAnd should an immortal being seriously think of this little *608D* space\nrather than of the whole?\n\nOf the whole, certainly. But why do you ask?\n\nAre you not aware, I said, that the soul of man is immortal and\nimperishable?\n\nHe looked at me in astonishment, and said: No, by heaven: And are you\nreally prepared to maintain this?\n\nYes, I said, I ought to be, and you too--there is no difficulty in proving\nit.\n\nI see a great difficulty; but I should like to hear you state this\nargument of which you make so light.\n\nListen then.\n\nI am attending.\n\nThere is a thing which you call good and another which you call evil?\n\nYes, he replied.\n\n*608E* Would you agree with me in thinking that the corrupting and\ndestroying element is the evil, and the saving and improving element the\ngood?\n\nYes.\n\n[Sidenote: Everything has a good and an evil, and if not destroyed by its\nown evil, will not be destroyed by that of another.]\n\nAnd you admit that every thing has a good and also an evil; *609A* as\nophthalmia is the evil of the eyes and disease of the whole body; as\nmildew is of corn, and rot of timber, or rust of copper and iron: in\neverything, or in almost everything, there is an inherent evil and\ndisease?\n\nYes, he said.\n\nAnd anything which is infected by any of these evils is made evil, and at\nlast wholly dissolves and dies?\n\nTrue.\n\nThe vice and evil which is inherent in each is the destruction {325} of\neach; and if this does not destroy them there is nothing else that will;\n*609B* for good certainly will not destroy them, nor again, that which is\nneither good nor evil.\n\nCertainly not.\n\nIf, then, we find any nature which having this inherent corruption cannot\nbe dissolved or destroyed, we may be certain that of such a nature there\nis no destruction?\n\nThat may be assumed.\n\nWell, I said, and is there no evil which corrupts the soul?\n\nYes, he said, there are all the evils which we were just now *609C*\npassing in review: unrighteousness, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance.\n\n[Sidenote: Therefore, if the soul cannot be destroyed by moral evil, she\ncertainly will not be destroyed by physical evil.]\n\nBut does any of these dissolve or destroy her?--and here do not let us\nfall into the error of supposing that the unjust and foolish man, when he\nis detected, perishes through his own injustice, which is an evil of the\nsoul. Take the analogy of the body: The evil of the body is a disease\nwhich wastes and reduces and annihilates the body; and all the things of\nwhich we were just now speaking come to annihilation *609D* through their\nown corruption attaching to them and inhering in them and so destroying\nthem. Is not this true?\n\nYes.\n\nConsider the soul in like manner. Does the injustice or other evil which\nexists in the soul waste and consume her? Do they by attaching to the soul\nand inhering in her at last bring her to death, and so separate her from\nthe body?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nAnd yet, I said, it is unreasonable to suppose that anything can perish\nfrom without through affection of external evil which could not be\ndestroyed from within by a corruption of its own?\n\nIt is, he replied.\n\n*609E* Consider, I said, Glaucon, that even the badness of food, whether\nstaleness, decomposition, or any other bad quality, when confined to the\nactual food, is not supposed to destroy the body; although, if the badness\nof food communicates corruption to the body, then we should say that the\nbody *610A* has been destroyed by a corruption of itself, which is\ndisease, brought on by this; but that the body, being one thing, can be\ndestroyed by the badness of food, which {326} is another, and which does\nnot engender any natural infection--this we shall absolutely deny?\n\nVery true.\n\n[Sidenote: Evil means the contagion of evil, and the evil of the body does\nnot infect the soul.]\n\nAnd, on the same principle, unless some bodily evil can produce an evil of\nthe soul, we must not suppose that the soul, which is one thing, can be\ndissolved by any merely external evil which belongs to another?\n\nYes, he said, there is reason in that.\n\nEither, then, let us refute this conclusion, or, while it *610B* remains\nunrefuted, let us never say that fever, or any other disease, or the knife\nput to the throat, or even the cutting up of the whole body into the\nminutest pieces, can destroy the soul, until she herself is proved to\nbecome more unholy or unrighteous in consequence of these things being\ndone to the body; but that the soul, or anything else if not destroyed\n*610C* by an internal evil, can be destroyed by an external one, is not to\nbe affirmed by any man.\n\nAnd surely, he replied, no one will ever prove that the souls of men\nbecome more unjust in consequence of death.\n\nBut if some one who would rather not admit the immortality of the soul\nboldly denies this, and says that the dying do really become more evil and\nunrighteous, then, if the speaker is right, I suppose that injustice, like\ndisease, must be assumed to be fatal to the unjust, and that those who\ntake *610D* this disorder die by the natural inherent power of destruction\nwhich evil has, and which kills them sooner or later, but in quite another\nway from that in which, at present, the wicked receive death at the hands\nof others as the penalty of their deeds?\n\nNay, he said, in that case injustice, if fatal to the unjust, will not be\nso very terrible to him, for he will be delivered from evil. But I rather\nsuspect the opposite to be the truth, *610E* and that injustice which, if\nit have the power, will murder others, keeps the murderer alive--aye, and\nwell awake too; so far removed is her dwelling-place from being a house of\ndeath.\n\nTrue, I said; if the inherent natural vice or evil of the soul is unable\nto kill or destroy her, hardly will that which is appointed to be the\ndestruction of some other body, destroy a soul or anything else except\nthat of which it was appointed to be the destruction. {327}\n\nYes, that can hardly be.\n\nBut the soul which cannot be destroyed by an evil, whether *611A* inherent\nor external, must exist for ever, and if existing for ever, must be\nimmortal?\n\nCertainly.\n\n[Sidenote: If the soul is indestructible, the number of souls can never\nincrease or diminish.]\n\nThat is the conclusion, I said; and, if a true conclusion, then the souls\nmust always be the same, for if none be destroyed they will not diminish\nin number. Neither will they increase, for the increase of the immortal\nnatures must come from something mortal, and all things would thus end in\nimmortality.\n\nVery true.\n\n*611B* But this we cannot believe--reason will not allow us--any more than\nwe can believe the soul, in her truest nature, to be full of variety and\ndifference and dissimilarity.\n\nWhat do you mean? he said.\n\nThe soul, I said, being, as is now proven, immortal, must be the fairest\nof compositions and cannot be compounded of many elements?\n\nCertainly not.\n\n[Sidenote: The soul, if she is to be seen truly, should be stripped of the\naccidents of earth.]\n\nHer immortality is demonstrated by the previous argument, and there are\nmany other proofs; but to see her as she *611C* really is, not as we now\nbehold her, marred by communion with the body and other miseries, you must\ncontemplate her with the eye of reason, in her original purity; and then\nher beauty will be revealed, and justice and injustice and all the things\nwhich we have described will be manifested more clearly. Thus far, we have\nspoken the truth concerning her as she appears at present, but we must\nremember also that we have seen her only in a condition which may be\ncompared *611D* to that of the sea-god Glaucus, whose original image can\nhardly be discerned because his natural members are broken off and crushed\nand damaged by the waves in all sorts of ways, and incrustations have\ngrown over them of seaweed and shells and stones, so that he is more like\nsome monster than he is to his own natural form. And the soul which we\nbehold is in a similar condition, disfigured by ten thousand ills. But not\nthere, Glaucon, not there must we look.\n\nWhere then?\n\n[Sidenote: Her true conversation is with the eternal.]\n\n*611E* At her love of wisdom. Let us see whom she affects, and {328} what\nsociety and converse she seeks in virtue of her near kindred with the\nimmortal and eternal and divine; also how different she would become if\nwholly following this superior principle, and borne by a divine impulse\nout of the ocean in which she now is, and disengaged from the stones and\nshells and things of earth and rock which in wild variety spring up *612A*\naround her because she feeds upon earth, and is overgrown by the good\nthings of this life as they are termed: then you would see her as she is,\nand know whether she have one shape only or many, or what her nature is.\nOf her affections and of the forms which she takes in this present life I\nthink that we have now said enough.\n\nTrue, he replied.\n\n[Sidenote: Having put aside for argument's sake the rewards of virtue, we\nmay now claim to have them restored.]\n\nAnd thus, I said, we have fulfilled the conditions of the argument[5];\n*612B* we have not introduced the rewards and glories of justice, which,\nas you were saying, are to be found in Homer and Hesiod; but justice in\nher own nature has been shown to be best for the soul in her own nature.\nLet a man do what is just, whether he have the ring of Gyges or not, and\neven if in addition to the ring of Gyges he put on the helmet of Hades.\n\n[Footnote 5: Reading [Greek: a)pelusa/metha].]\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd now, Glaucon, there will be no harm in further enumerating how many\nand how great are the rewards which *612C* justice and the other virtues\nprocure to the soul from gods and men, both in life and after death.\n\nCertainly not, he said.\n\nWill you repay me, then, what you borrowed in the argument?\n\nWhat did I borrow?\n\nThe assumption that the just man should appear unjust and the unjust just:\nfor you were of opinion that even if the true state of the case could not\npossibly escape the eyes of gods and men, still this admission ought to be\nmade for the sake of the argument, in order that pure justice might be\n*612D* weighed against pure injustice. Do you remember?\n\nI should be much to blame if I had forgotten.\n\nThen, as the cause is decided, I demand on behalf of justice that the\nestimation in which she is held by gods and {329} men and which we\nacknowledge to be her due should now be restored to her by us[6]; since\nshe has been shown to confer reality, and not to deceive those who truly\npossess her, let what has been taken from her be given back, that so she\nmay win that palm of appearance which is hers also, and which she gives to\nher own.\n\n[Footnote 6: Reading [Greek: \u00ea(m\u00f4=n].]\n\n*612E* The demand, he said, is just.\n\nIn the first place, I said--and this is the first thing which you will\nhave to give back--the nature both of the just and unjust is truly known\nto the gods.\n\nGranted.\n\n[Sidenote: The just man is the friend of the gods, and all things work\ntogether for his good.]\n\nAnd if they are both known to them, one must be the friend and the other\nthe enemy of the gods, as we admitted from the beginning?\n\nTrue.\n\n*613A* And the friend of the gods may be supposed to receive from them all\nthings at their best, excepting only such evil as is the necessary\nconsequence of former sins?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen this must be our notion of the just man, that even when he is in\npoverty or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will in\nthe end work together for good to him in life and death: for the gods have\na care of any one whose desire is to become just and to be like God, as\nfar as *613B* man can attain the divine likeness, by the pursuit of\nvirtue?\n\nYes, he said; if he is like God he will surely not be neglected by him.\n\n[Sidenote: The unjust is the opposite.]\n\nAnd of the unjust may not the opposite be supposed?\n\nCertainly.\n\nSuch, then, are the palms of victory which the gods give the just?\n\nThat is my conviction.\n\n[Sidenote: He may be compared to a runner who is only good at the start.]\n\nAnd what do they receive of men? Look at things as they really are, and\nyou will see that the clever unjust are in the case of runners, who run\nwell from the starting-place to the goal but not back again from the goal:\nthey go off at a great pace, *613C* but in the end only look foolish,\nslinking away with their ears draggling on their shoulders, and without a\ncrown; but the true runner comes to the finish and receives the {330}\nprize and is crowned. And this is the way with the just; he who endures to\nthe end of every action and occasion of his entire life has a good report\nand carries off the prize which men have to bestow.\n\nTrue.\n\n[Sidenote: [Sidenote: Recapitulation of things unfit for ears polite which\nhad been described by Glaucon in Book II.]]\n\nAnd now you must allow me to repeat of the just the blessings which you\nwere attributing to the fortunate unjust. *613D* I shall say of them, what\nyou were saying of the others, that as they grow older, they become rulers\nin their own city if they care to be; they marry whom they like and give\nin marriage to whom they will; all that you said of the others I now say\nof these. And, on the other hand, of the unjust I say that the greater\nnumber, even though they escape in their youth, are found out at last and\nlook foolish at the end of their course, and when they come to be old and\nmiserable are flouted alike by stranger and citizen; they are beaten and\n*613E* then come those things unfit for ears polite, as you truly term\nthem; they will be racked and have their eyes burned out, as you were\nsaying. And you may suppose that I have repeated the remainder of your\ntale of horrors. But will you let me assume, without reciting them, that\nthese things are true?\n\nCertainly, he said, what you say is true.\n\n*614A* These, then, are the prizes and rewards and gifts which are\nbestowed upon the just by gods and men in this present life, in addition\nto the other good things which justice of herself provides.\n\nYes, he said; and they are fair and lasting.\n\nAnd yet, I said, all these are as nothing either in number or greatness in\ncomparison with those other recompenses which await both just and unjust\nafter death. And you ought to hear them, and then both just and unjust\nwill have received from us a full payment of the debt which the argument\nowes to them.\n\n*614B* Speak, he said; there are few things which I would more gladly\nhear.\n\n[Sidenote: Socrates.]\n\n[Sidenote: The vision of Er.]\n\n[Sidenote: The judgement.]\n\n[Sidenote: The two openings in heaven and the two in earth through which\npassed those who were beginning and those who had completed their\npilgrimage.]\n\n[Sidenote: The meeting in the meadow.]\n\n[Sidenote: The punishment tenfold the sin.]\n\n[Sidenote: 'Unbaptized infants.']\n\n[Sidenote: Ardiaeus the tyrant.]\n\n[Sidenote: Incurable sinners.]\n\nWell, I said, I will tell you a tale; not one of the tales which Odysseus\ntells to the hero Alcinous, yet this too is a tale of a hero, Er the son\nof Armenius, a Pamphylian by birth. He was slain in battle, and ten days\nafterwards, when the bodies of the dead were taken up already in a state\nof corruption, his body was found unaffected by decay, and {331} carried\naway home to be buried. And on the twelfth day, as he was lying on the\nfuneral pile, he returned to life and told them what he had seen in the\nother world. He said that when his soul left the body he went on a journey\nwith a great company, *614C* and that they came to a mysterious place at\nwhich there were two openings in the earth; they were near together, and\nover against them were two other openings in the heaven above. In the\nintermediate space there were judges seated, who commanded the just, after\nthey had given judgment on them and had bound their sentences in front of\nthem, to ascend by the heavenly way on the right hand; and in like manner\nthe unjust were bidden by them to descend by the lower way on the left\nhand; these also bore the symbols of their deeds, but fastened on their\nbacks. He drew near, *614D* and they told him that he was to be the\nmessenger who would carry the report of the other world to men, and they\nbade him hear and see all that was to be heard and seen in that place.\nThen he beheld and saw on one side the souls departing at either opening\nof heaven and earth when sentence had been given on them; and at the two\nother openings other souls, some ascending out of the earth dusty and worn\nwith travel, some descending out of heaven clean and bright. And *614E*\narriving ever and anon they seemed to have come from a long journey, and\nthey went forth with gladness into the meadow, where they encamped as at a\nfestival; and those who knew one another embraced and conversed, the souls\nwhich came from earth curiously enquiring about the things above, and the\nsouls which came from heaven about the things beneath. And they told one\nanother of what had happened by the way, those from below weeping and\nsorrowing *615A* at the remembrance of the things which they had endured\nand seen in their journey beneath the earth (now the journey lasted a\nthousand years), while those from above were describing heavenly delights\nand visions of inconceivable beauty. The story, Glaucon, would take too\nlong to tell; but the sum was this:--He said that for every wrong which\nthey had done to any one they suffered tenfold; or once in a hundred\nyears--such being reckoned to be the length *615B* of man's life, and the\npenalty being thus paid ten times in a thousand years. If, for example,\nthere were any who had been {332} the cause of many deaths, or had\nbetrayed or enslaved cities or armies, or been guilty of any other evil\nbehaviour, for each and all of their offences they received punishment ten\ntimes over, and the rewards of beneficence and justice and *615C* holiness\nwere in the same proportion. I need hardly repeat what he said concerning\nyoung children dying almost as soon as they were born. Of piety and\nimpiety to gods and parents, and of murderers[7], there were retributions\nother and greater far which he described. He mentioned that he was present\nwhen one of the spirits asked another, 'Where is Ardiaeus the Great?' (Now\nthis Ardiaeus lived a thousand years before the time of Er: he had been\nthe tyrant of some city of Pamphylia, and had murdered his aged father and\nhis elder brother, *615D* and was said to have committed many other\nabominable crimes.) The answer of the other spirit was: 'He comes not\nhither and will never come. And this,' said he, 'was one of the dreadful\nsights which we ourselves witnessed. We were at the mouth of the cavern,\nand, having completed all our experiences, were about to reascend, when of\na sudden Ardiaeus appeared and several others, most of whom were tyrants;\nand there were also besides the tyrants private individuals *615E* who had\nbeen great criminals: they were just, as they fancied, about to return\ninto the upper world, but the mouth, instead of admitting them, gave a\nroar, whenever any of these incurable sinners or some one who had not been\nsufficiently punished tried to ascend; and then wild men of fiery aspect,\nwho were standing by and heard the sound, *616A* seized and carried them\noff; and Ardiaeus and others they bound head and foot and hand, and threw\nthem down and flayed them with scourges, and dragged them along the road\nat the side, carding them on thorns like wool, and declaring to the\npassers-by what were their crimes, and that[8] they were being taken away\nto be cast into hell.' And of all the many terrors which they had endured,\nhe said that there was none like the terror which each of them felt at\nthat moment, lest they should hear the voice; and when there was silence,\none by one they ascended with exceeding joy. These, said Er, were the\npenalties and retributions, and there were blessings as great. {333}\n\n[Footnote 7: Reading [Greek: au)to/cheiras].]\n\n[Footnote 8: Reading [Greek: kai\\ o(/ti].]\n\n[Sidenote: The whorls representing the spheres of the heavenly bodies.]\n\n*616B* Now when the spirits which were in the meadow had tarried seven\ndays, on the eighth they were obliged to proceed on their journey, and, on\nthe fourth day after, he said that they came to a place where they could\nsee from above a line of light, straight as a column, extending right\nthrough the whole heaven and through the earth, in colour resembling the\nrainbow, only brighter and purer; another day's journey brought them to\nthe place, and there, in the *616C* midst of the light, they saw the ends\nof the chains of heaven let down from above: for this light is the belt of\nheaven, and holds together the circle of the universe, like the\nunder-girders of a trireme. From these ends is extended the spindle of\nNecessity, on which all the revolutions turn. The shaft and hook of this\nspindle are made of steel, and the whorl is made partly of steel and also\npartly of other materials. *616D* Now the whorl is in form like the whorl\nused on earth; and the description of it implied that there is one large\nhollow whorl which is quite scooped out, and into this is fitted another\nlesser one, and another, and another, and four others, making eight in\nall, like vessels which fit into one another; the whorls show their edges\non the upper side, and on their *616E* lower side all together form one\ncontinuous whorl. This is pierced by the spindle, which is driven home\nthrough the centre of the eighth. The first and outermost whorl has the\nrim broadest, and the seven inner whorls are narrower, in the following\nproportions--the sixth is next to the first in size, the fourth next to\nthe sixth; then comes the eighth; the seventh is fifth, the fifth is\nsixth, the third is seventh, last and eighth comes the second. The largest\n[or fixed stars] is spangled, and the seventh [or sun] is brightest; the\neighth [or moon] *617A* coloured by the reflected light of the seventh;\nthe second and fifth [Saturn and Mercury] are in colour like one another,\nand yellower than the preceding; the third [Venus] has the whitest light;\nthe fourth [Mars] is reddish; the sixth [Jupiter] is in whiteness second.\nNow the whole spindle has the same motion; but, as the whole revolves in\none direction, the seven inner circles move slowly in the other, and of\nthese the swiftest is the eighth; next in swiftness are the *617B*\nseventh, sixth, and fifth, which move together; third in swiftness\nappeared to move according to the law of this {334} reversed motion the\nfourth; the third appeared fourth and the second fifth. The spindle turns\non the knees of Necessity; and on the upper surface of each circle is a\nsiren, who goes round with them, hymning a single tone or note. The eight\ntogether form one harmony; and round about, at equal intervals, *617C*\nthere is another band, three in number, each sitting upon her throne:\nthese are the Fates, daughters of Necessity, who are clothed in white\nrobes and have chaplets upon their heads, Lachesis and Clotho and Atropos,\nwho accompany with their voices the harmony of the sirens--Lachesis\nsinging of the past, Clotho of the present, Atropos of the future; Clotho\nfrom time to time assisting with a touch of her right hand the revolution\nof the outer circle of the whorl or spindle, and Atropos with her left\nhand touching and guiding the inner ones, and Lachesis laying *617D* hold\nof either in turn, first with one hand and then with the other.\n\n[Sidenote: The proclamation of the free choice.]\n\n[Sidenote: The complexity of circumstances,]\n\n[Sidenote: and their relation to the human soul.]\n\nWhen Er and the spirits arrived, their duty was to go at once to Lachesis;\nbut first of all there came a prophet who arranged them in order; then he\ntook from the knees of Lachesis lots and samples of lives, and having\nmounted a high pulpit, spoke as follows: 'Hear the word of Lachesis, the\ndaughter of Necessity. Mortal souls, behold a new cycle of life and\nmortality. Your genius will not be allotted to you, *617E* but you will\nchoose your genius; and let him who draws the first lot have the first\nchoice, and the life which he chooses shall be his destiny. Virtue is\nfree, and as a man honours or dishonours her he will have more or less of\nher; the responsibility is with the chooser--God is justified.' When the\nInterpreter had thus spoken he scattered lots indifferently among them\nall, and each of them took up the lot which fell near him, all but Er\nhimself (he was not allowed), and each as he took his lot perceived the\nnumber which he had obtained. *618A* Then the Interpreter placed on the\nground before them the samples of lives; and there were many more lives\nthan the souls present, and they were of all sorts. There were lives of\nevery animal and of man in every condition. And there were tyrannies among\nthem, some lasting out the tyrant's life, others which broke off in the\nmiddle and came to an end in poverty and exile and beggary; and there were\n{335} lives of famous men, some who were famous for their form and beauty\nas well as for their strength and success in games, *618B* or, again, for\ntheir birth and the qualities of their ancestors; and some who were the\nreverse of famous for the opposite qualities. And of women likewise; there\nwas not, however, any definite character in them, because the soul, when\nchoosing a new life, must of necessity become different. But there was\nevery other quality, and the all mingled with one another, and also with\nelements of wealth and poverty, and disease and health; and there were\nmean states also. And here, my dear Glaucon, is the supreme peril of our\nhuman state; and therefore the utmost care should be taken. *618C* Let\neach one of us leave every other kind of knowledge and seek and follow one\nthing only, if peradventure he may be able to learn and may find some one\nwho will make him able to learn and discern between good and evil, and so\nto choose always and everywhere the better life as he has opportunity. He\nshould consider the bearing of all these things which have been mentioned\nseverally and collectively upon virtue; he should know what the effect of\nbeauty is when combined with poverty or wealth in a *618D* particular\nsoul, and what are the good and evil consequences of noble and humble\nbirth, of private and public station, of strength and weakness, of\ncleverness and dullness, and of all the natural and acquired gifts of the\nsoul, and the operation of them when conjoined; he will then look at the\nnature of the soul, and from the consideration of all these qualities he\nwill be able to determine which is the better and which is the worse; and\nso he will choose, giving the name *618E* of evil to the life which will\nmake his soul more unjust, and good to the life which will make his soul\nmore just; all else he will disregard. For we have seen and know that this\nis *619A* the best choice both in life and after death. A man must take\nwith him into the world below an adamantine faith in truth and right, that\nthere too he may be undazzled by the desire of wealth or the other\nallurements of evil, lest, coming upon tyrannies and similar villainies,\nhe do irremediable wrongs to others and suffer yet worse himself; but let\nhim know how to choose the mean and avoid the extremes on either side, as\nfar as possible, not only in this life but {336} in all *619B* that which\nis to come. For this is the way of happiness.\n\n[Sidenote: Habit not enough without philosophy when circumstances change.]\n\n[Sidenote: The spectacle of the election.]\n\nAnd according to the report of the messenger from the other world this was\nwhat the prophet said at the time: 'Even for the last comer, if he chooses\nwisely and will live diligently, there is appointed a happy and not\nundesirable existence. Let not him who chooses first be careless, and let\nnot the last despair.' And when he had spoken, he who had the first choice\ncame forward and in a moment chose the greatest tyranny; his mind having\nbeen darkened by folly and sensuality, he had not thought out the whole\nmatter before he chose, and did not at first sight perceive that he *619C*\nwas fated, among other evils, to devour his own children. But when he had\ntime to reflect, and saw what was in the lot, he began to beat his breast\nand lament over his choice, forgetting the proclamation of the prophet;\nfor, instead of throwing the blame of his misfortune on himself, he\naccused chance and the gods, and everything rather than himself. Now he\nwas one of those who came from heaven, and in a former life had dwelt in a\nwell-ordered State, but his virtue *619D* was a matter of habit only, and\nhe had no philosophy. And it was true of others who were similarly\novertaken, that the greater number of them came from heaven and therefore\nthey had never been schooled by trial, whereas the pilgrims who came from\nearth having themselves suffered and seen others suffer, were not in a\nhurry to choose. And owing to this inexperience of theirs, and also\nbecause the lot was a chance, many of the souls exchanged a good destiny\nfor an evil or an evil for a good. For if a man had always on his arrival\nin this world dedicated himself from the first to sound philosophy, *619E*\nand had been moderately fortunate in the number of the lot, he might, as\nthe messenger reported, be happy here, and also his journey to another\nlife and return to this, instead of being rough and underground, would be\nsmooth and heavenly. Most curious, he said, was the spectacle--sad and\nlaughable and strange; for the choice of the souls *620A* was in most\ncases based on their experience of a previous life. There he saw the soul\nwhich had once been Orpheus choosing the life of a swan out of enmity to\nthe race of women, hating to be born of a woman because they had {337}\nbeen his murderers; he beheld also the soul of Thamyras choosing the life\nof a nightingale; birds, on the other hand, like the swan and other\nmusicians, wanting to be men. The *620B* soul which obtained the\ntwentieth[9] lot chose the life of a lion, and this was the soul of Ajax\nthe son of Telamon, who would not be a man, remembering the injustice\nwhich was done him in the judgment about the arms. The next was Agamemnon,\nwho took the life of an eagle, because, like Ajax, he hated human nature\nby reason of his sufferings. About the middle came the lot of Atalanta;\nshe, seeing the great fame of an athlete, was unable to resist the\ntemptation: and after her *620C* there followed the soul of Epeus the son\nof Panopeus passing into the nature of a woman cunning in the arts; and\nfar away among the last who chose, the soul of the jester Thersites was\nputting on the form of a monkey. There came also the soul of Odysseus\nhaving yet to make a choice, and his lot happened to be the last of them\nall. Now the recollection of former toils had disenchanted him of\nambition, and he went about for a considerable time in search of the life\nof a private man who had no cares; he had some difficulty in finding this,\nwhich was lying about and had been neglected by everybody else; *620D* and\nwhen he saw it, he said that he would have done the same had his lot been\nfirst instead of last, and that he was delighted to have it. And not only\ndid men pass into animals, but I must also mention that there were animals\ntame and wild who changed into one another and into corresponding human\nnatures--the good into the gentle and the evil into the savage, in all\nsorts of combinations.\n\n[Footnote 9: Reading [Greek: ei)kost\u00ea/n].]\n\nAll the souls had now chosen their lives, and they went in the order of\ntheir choice to Lachesis, who sent with them the genius whom they had\nseverally chosen, to be the guardian *620E* of their lives and the\nfulfiller of the choice: this genius led the souls first to Clotho, and\ndrew them within the revolution of the spindle impelled by her hand, thus\nratifying the destiny of each; and then, when they were fastened to this,\ncarried them to Atropos, who spun the threads and made *621A* them\nirreversible, whence without turning round they passed beneath the throne\nof Necessity; and when they had all passed, they marched on in a scorching\nheat to the plain of {338} Forgetfulness, which was a barren waste\ndestitute of trees and verdure; and then towards evening they encamped by\nthe river of Unmindfulness, whose water no vessel can hold; of this they\nwere all obliged to drink a certain quantity, and those who were not saved\nby wisdom drank more than was necessary; and each one as he drank forgot\nall things. *621B* Now after they had gone to rest, about the middle of\nthe night there was a thunderstorm and earthquake, and then in an instant\nthey were driven upwards in all manner of ways to their birth, like stars\nshooting. He himself was hindered from drinking the water. But in what\nmanner or by what means he returned to the body he could not say; only, in\nthe morning, awaking suddenly, he found himself lying on the pyre.\n\nAnd thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved and has not perished, *621C*\nand will save us if we are obedient to the word spoken; and we shall pass\nsafely over the river of Forgetfulness and our soul will not be defiled.\nWherefore my counsel is, that we hold fast ever to the heavenly way and\nfollow after justice and virtue always, considering that the soul is\nimmortal and able to endure every sort of good and every sort of evil.\nThus shall we live dear to one another and to the gods, both while\nremaining here and when, like *621D* conquerors in the games who go round\nto gather gifts, we receive our reward. And it shall be well with us both\nin this life and in the pilgrimage of a thousand years which we have been\ndescribing.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX.\n\n\nA.\n\nABDERA, Protagoras of, 10. 600 C.\n\nAbortion, allowed in certain cases, 5. 461 C.\n\nAbsolute beauty, 5. 476, 479; 6. 494 A, 501 B, 507 B;--absolute good, 6.\n507 B; 7. 540 A;--absolute justice, 5. 479; 6. 501 B; 7. 517 E;--absolute\nswiftness and slowness, 7. 529 D;--absolute temperance, 6. 501 B;\n--absolute unity, 7. 524 E, 525 E;--the absolute and the many, 6. 507.\n\nAbstract ideas, origin of, 7. 523. Cp. Idea.\n\nAchaeans, 3. 389 E, 390 E, 393 A, D, 394 A.\n\nAchilles, the son of Peleus, third in descent from Zeus, 3. 391 C; his\ngrief, _ib._ 388 A; his avarice, cruelty, and insolence, _ib._ 390 E,\n391 A, B; his master Phoenix, _ib._ 390 E.\n\nActive life, age for, 7. 539, 540.\n\nActors, cannot perform both tragic and comic parts, 3. 395 A.\n\nAdeimantus, son of Ariston, a person in the dialogue, 1. 327 C; his\ngenius, 2. 368 A; distinguished at the battle of Megara, _ibid._; takes up\nthe discourse, _ib._ 362 D, 368 E, 376 D; 4. 419 A; 6. 487 A; 8. 548 E;\nurges Socrates to speak in detail about the community of women and\nchildren, 5. 449.\n\nAdrasteia, prayed to, 5. 451 A.\n\nAdultery, 5. 461 A.\n\nAeschylus, quoted:--\nS. c. T. 451, 8. 550 C;\n\"     592, 2. 361 B, E;\n\"     593 _ib._ 362 A;\nNiobe, fr. 146, 3. 391 E;\n\"    fr. 151, 2. 380 A;\nXanthians, fr. 159, _ib._ 381 D;\nFab. incert. 266, _ib._ 383 B;\n\"     \"     326, 8. 563 C.\n\nAesculapius, _see_ Asclepius.\n\nAffinity, degrees of, 5. 461.\n\nAgamemnon, his dream, 2. 383 A; his gifts to Achilles, 3. 390 E; his anger\nagainst Chryses, _ib._ 392 E foll.; shown by Palamedes in the play to be a\nridiculous general, 7. 522 D; his soul becomes an eagle, 10. 620 B.\n\nAge, for active life, 7. 539, 540;--for marriage, 5. 460;--for philosophy,\n7. 539.\n\nAgent and patient have the same qualities, 4. 437.\n\nAglaion, father of Leontius, 4. 439 E.\n\nAgriculture, tools required for, 2. 370 C.\n\nAjax, the son of Telamon, 10. 620 B; the reward of his bravery, 5. 468 D;\nhis soul turns into a lion, 10. 620 B.\n\nAlcinous, 'tales of,' 10. 614 B.\n\nAllegory, cannot be understood by the young, 2. 378 E.\n\nAmbition, disgraceful, 1. 347 B (_cp._ 7. 520 D); characteristic of the\ntimocratic state and man, 8. 545, 548, 550 B, 553 E; easily passes into\navarice, _ib._ 553 E; assigned {340} to the passionate element of the\nsoul, 9. 581 A;--ambitious men, 5. 475 A; 6. 485 B.\n\nAmeles, the river ( = Lethe), 10. 621 A, C.\n\nAmusement, a means of education, 4. 425 A; 7. 537 A.\n\nAnacharsis, the Scythian, his inventions, 10. 600 A.\n\nAnalogy of the arts applied to rulers, 1. 341; of the arts and justice,\n_ib._ 349; of men and animals, 2. 375; 5. 459.\n\nAnapaestic rhythms, 3. 400 B.\n\nAnarchy, begins in music, 4. 424 E [_cp._ Laws 3. 701 B]; in democracies,\n8. 562 D.\n\nAnger, stirred by injustice, 4. 440.\n\nAnimals, liberty enjoyed by, in a democracy, 8. 562 E, 563 C; choose their\ndestiny in the next world, 10. 620 D [_cp._ Phaedr. 249 B].\n\nAnticipations of pleasure and pain, 9. 584 D.\n\nAphrodit\u00e8, bound by Hephaestus, 3. 390 C.\n\nApollo, song of, at the nuptials of Thetis, 2. 383 A; Apollo and Achilles,\n3. 391 A; Chryses' prayer to, _ib._ 394 A; lord of the lyre, _ib._ 399 E;\nfather of Asclepius, _ib._ 408 C; the God of Delphi, 4. 427 A.\n\nAppearance, power of, 2. 365 B, 366 C.\n\nAppetite, good and bad, 5. 475 C.\n\nAppetites, the, 8. 559; 9. 571 (_cp._ 4. 439).\n\nAppetitive element of the soul, 4. 439 [_cp._ Tim. 70 E]; must be\nsubordinate to reason and passion, 4. 442 A; 9. 571 D; may be described as\nthe love of gain, 9. 581 A.\n\nArcadia, temple of Lycaean Zeus in, 8. 565 D.\n\nArchilochus, quoted, 2. 365 C.\n\nArchitecture, 4. 438 C; necessity of pure taste in, 3. 401.\n\nArdiaeus, tyrant of Pamphylia, his eternal punishment, 10. 615 C, E.\n\nAres and Aphrodit\u00e8, 3. 390 C.\n\nArgos, Agamemnon, king of, 3. 393 E.\n\nArgument, the longer and the shorter method of, 4. 435; 6. 504; misleading\nnature of (Adeimantus), 6. 487; youthful love of, 7. 539 [_cp._ Phil.\n15 E]. For the personification of the argument, _see_ Personification.\n\nArion, 5. 453 E.\n\nAristocracy (i.e. the ideal state or government of the best), 4. 445 C\n(_cp._ 8. 544 E, 545 D, _and see_ State); mode of its decline, 8. 546;\n--the aristocratical man, 7. 541 B; 8. 544 E (_see_ Guardians,\nPhilosopher, Ruler):--(in the ordinary sense of the word), 1. 338 D. Cp.\nConstitution.\n\nAriston, father of Glaucon, 1. 327 A (_cp._ 2. 368 A).\n\nAristonymus, father of Cleitophon, 1. 328 B.\n\nArithmetic, must be learnt by the rulers, 7. 522-526; use of, in forming\nideas, _ib._ 524 foll. (_cp._ 10. 602); spirit in which it should be\npursued, 7. 525 D; common notions about, mistaken, _ib._ E; an excellent\ninstrument of education, _ib._ 526 [_cp._ Laws 5. 747]; employed in order\nto express the interval between the king and the tyrant, 9. 587. Cp.\nMathematics.\n\nArmenius, father of Er, the Pamphylian, 10. 614 B.\n\nArms, throwing away of, disgraceful, 5. 468 A; arms of Hellenes not to be\noffered as trophies in the temples, _ib._ 470 A.\n\nArmy needed in a state, 2. 374.\n\nArt, influence of, on character, 3. 400 foll.;--art of building, _ib._\n401 A; 4. 438 C; carpentry, 4. 428 C; calculation, 7. 524, 526 B; 10. {341}\n602; cookery, 1. 332 C; dyeing, 4. 429 D; embroidery, 3. 401 A; exchange,\n2. 369 C; measurement, 10. 602; money-making, 1. 330; 8. 556; payment, 1.\n346; tactics, 7. 522 E, 525 B; weaving, 3. 401 A; 5. 455 D; weighing, 10.\n602 D;--the arts exercised for the good of their subject, 1. 342, 345-347\n[_cp._ Euthyph. 13]; interested in their own perfection, 1. 342; differ\naccording to their functions, _ib._ 346; full of grace, 3. 401 A; must be\nsubject to a censorship, _ib._ B; causes of the deterioration of, 4. 421;\nemployment of children in, 5. 467 A; ideals in, _ib._ 472 D; chiefly\nuseful for practical purposes, 7. 533 A;--the arts and philosophy, 6.\n495 E, 496 C (cp. _supra_ 5. 475 D, 476 A);--the handicraft arts a\nreproach, 9. 590 C;--the lesser arts ([Greek: technu/dria]), 5. 475 D;\n([Greek: te/chnia]), 6. 495 D;--three arts concerned with all things,\n10. 601.\n\nArt. [_Art, according to the conception of Plato, is not a collection of\ncanons of criticism, but a subtle influence which pervades all things\nanimate as well as inanimate_ (3. 400, 401). _He knows nothing of\n'schools' or of the history of art, nor does he select any building or\nstatue for condemnation or admiration._ [_Cp._ Protag. 311 C, _where\nPheidias is casually mentioned as the typical sculptor, and_ Meno 91 D,\n_where Socrates says that Pheidias, 'although he wrought such exceedingly\nnoble works,' did not make nearly so much money by them as Protagoras did\nby his wisdom._] _Plato judges art by one test, 'simplicity,' but under\nthis he includes moderation, purity, and harmony of proportion; and he\nwould extend to sculpture and architecture the same rigid censorship which\nhe has already applied to poetry and music_ (3. 401 A). _He dislikes the\n'illusions' of painting_ (10. 602) _and the 'false proportions' given by\nsculptors to their subjects_ (Soph. 234 E), _both of which he classes as a\nspecies of magic. With more justice he points out the danger of an\nexcessive devotion to art;_ (cp. _the ludicrous pictures of the unmanly\nmusician_ (3. 411), _and of the dilettanti who run about to every chorus_\n(5. 475)). _But he hopes to save his guardians from effeminacy by the\nsevere discipline and training of their early years. Sparta and Athens are\nto be combined_ [_cp._ Introduction, p. clxx]: _the citizens will live, as\nAdeimantus complains, 'like a garrison of mercenaries'_ (4. 419); _but\nthey will be surrounded by an atmosphere of grace and beauty, which will\ninsensibly instil noble and true ideas into their minds._]\n\nArtisans, necessary in the state, 2. 370; have no time to be ill,\n3. 406 D.\n\nArtist, the Great, 10. 596 [_cp._ Laws 10. 902 E];--the true artist does\nnot work for his own benefit, 1. 346, 347;--artists must imitate the good\nonly, 3. 401 C.\n\nAsclepiadae, 3. 405 D, 408 B; 10. 599 C.\n\nAsclepius, son of Apollo, 3. 408 C; not ignorant of the lingering\ntreatment, _ib._ 406 D; a statesman, _ib._ 407 E; said by the poets to\nhave been bribed to restore a rich man to life, _ib._ 408 B; left\ndisciples, 10. 599 C;--descendants of, 3. 406 A;--his sons at Troy,\n_ibid._\n\nAssaults, trials for, will be unknown in the best state, 5. 464 E.\n\nAstronomy, must be studied by the rulers, 7. 527-530; spirit in which it\nshould be pursued, _ib._ 529, 530. {342}\n\nAtalanta, chose the life of an athlete, 10. 620 B.\n\nAthen\u00e9, not to be considered author of the strife between Trojans and\nAchaeans, 2. 379 E.\n\nAthenian confectionery, 3. 404 E.\n\nAthens, corpses exposed outside the northern wall of, 4. 439 E.\n\nAthlete, Atalanta chooses the soul of an, 10. 620 B; athletes, obliged to\npay excessive attention to diet, 3. 404 A; sleep away their lives,\n_ibid._; are apt to become brutalized, _ib._ 410, 411 (cp. 7. 535 D);--the\nguardians athletes of war, 3. 403 E, 404 B; 4. 422; 7. 521 E; 8. 543\n[_cp._ Laws 8. 830].\n\nAtridae, 3. 393 A.\n\nAtropos (one of the Fates), her song, 10. 617 C; spins the threads of\ndestiny, and makes them irreversible, _ib._ 620 E.\n\nAttic confections, 3. 404 E.\n\nAudience, _see_ Spectator.\n\nAutolycus, praised by Homer, 1. 334 A.\n\nAuxiliaries, the young warriors of the state, 3. 414; compared to dogs,\n2. 376; 4. 440 D; 5. 451 D; have silver mingled in their veins, 3. 415 A.\nCp. Guardians.\n\nAvarice, disgraceful, 1. 347 B; forbidden in the guardians, 3. 390 E;\nfalsely imputed to Achilles and Asclepius by the poets, _ib._ 391 B,\n408 C; characteristic of timocracy and oligarchy, 8. 548 A, 553.\n\n\nB.\n\n\nBarbarians, regard nakedness as improper, 5. 452; the natural enemies of\nthe Hellenes, _ib._ 469 D, 470 C [_cp._ Pol. 262 D]; peculiar forms of\ngovernment among, 8. 544 D.\n\nBeast, the great, 6. 493; the many-headed, 9. 588, 589; 'the wild beast\nwithin us,' _ib._ 571, 572.\n\nBeautiful, the, and the good are one, 5. 452;--the many beautiful\ncontrasted with absolute beauty, 6. 507 B.\n\nBeauty as a means of education, 3. 401 foll.; absolute beauty, 5. 476,\n479; 6. 494 A, 501 B, 507 B [_cp._ Laws 2. 655 C].\n\nBecoming, the passage from, to being, 7. 518 D, 521 D, 525 D.\n\nBeds, the figure of the three, 10. 596.\n\nBee-masters, 8. 564 C.\n\nBeing and not being, 5. 477; true being the object of the philosopher's\ndesire, 6. 484, 485, 486 E, 490, 500 C; 7. 521, 537 D; 9. 581, 582 C (cp.\n5. 475 E; 7. 520 B, 525; _and_ Phaedo 82; Phaedr. 249; Theaet. 173 E;\nSoph. 249 D, 254); concerned with the invariable, 9. 585 C.\n\nBelief, _see_ Faith.\n\nBendidea, a feast of Artemis, 1. 354 A (cp. 327 A, B).\n\nBendis, a title of Artemis, 1. 327 A.\n\nBias of Priene, 1. 335 E.\n\nBirds, breeding of, at Athens, 5. 459.\n\nBlest, Islands of the, 7. 519 C, 540 B.\n\nBody, the, not self-sufficing, 1. 341 E; excessive care of, inimical to\nvirtue, 3. 407 (cp. 9. 591 D); has less truth and essence than the soul,\n9. 585 D;--harmony of body and soul, 3. 402 D.\n\nBody, the, and the members, comparison of the state to, 5. 462 D, 464 B.\n\nBoxing, 4. 422.\n\nBrass (and iron) mingled by the God in the husbandmen and craftsmen,\n3. 415 A (cp. 8. 547 A).\n\nBreeding of animals, 5. 459.\n\nBuilding, art of, 3. 401 A; 4. 438 C.\n\nBurial of the guardians, 3. 414 A; 5. 465 E, 469 A; 7. 540 B [_cp._ Laws\n12. 947]. {343}\n\n\nC.\n\n\nCalculation, art of, corrects the illusions of sight, 10. 602 (cp.\n7. 524); the talent for, accompanied by general quickness, 7. 526 B.\nCp. Arithmetic.\n\nCaptain, parable of the deaf, 6. 488.\n\nCarpentry, 4. 428 C.\n\nCauses, final, argument from, applied to justice, 1. 352: 6. 491 E,\n495 B;--of crimes, 8. 552 D; 9. 575 A.\n\nCave, the image of the, 7. 514 foll., 532 (cp. 539 E).\n\nCensorship of fiction, 2. 377; 3. 386-391, 401 A, 408 C; 10. 595 foll.\n[_cp._ Laws 7. 801, 811]; of the arts, 3. 401.\n\nCeos, Prodicus of, 10. 600 C.\n\nCephalus, father of Polemarchus, 1. 327 B; offers sacrifice, _ib._ 328 B,\n331 D; his views on old age, _ib._ 328 E; his views on wealth, _ib._ 330 A\nfoll.\n\nCephalus [of Clazomenae], 1. 330 B.\n\nCerberus, two natures in one, 9. 588 C.\n\nChance in war, 5. 467 E; blamed by men for their misfortunes, 10. 619 C.\n\nChange in music, not to be allowed, 4. 424 [_cp._ Laws 7. 799].\n\nCharacter, differences of, in men, 1. 329 D [_cp._ Pol. 307]; in women,\n5. 456;--affected by the imitation of unworthy objects, 3. 395;--national\ncharacter, 4. 435 [_cp._ Laws 5. 747]:--great characters may be ruined by\nbad education, 6. 491 E, 495 B; 7. 519:--faults of character, 6. 503\n[_cp._ Theaet. 144 B].\n\nCharmantides, the Paeanian, present at the dialogue, 1. 328 B.\n\nCharondas, lawgiver of Italy and Sicily, 10. 599 E.\n\nCheese, 2. 372 C; 3. 405 E.\n\nCheiron, teacher of Achilles, 3. 391 C.\n\nChildren have spirit, but not reason, 4. 441 A; why under authority, 9.\n590 E;--in the state, 3. 415; 5. 450 E, 457 foll.; 8. 543; must not hear\nimproper stories, 2. 377; 3. 391 C; must be reared amid fair sights and\nsounds, 3. 401; must receive education even in their plays, 4. 425 A; 7.\n537 A [_cp._ Laws 1. 643 B]; must learn to ride, 5. 467 [_cp._ Laws 7.\n804 C]; must go with their fathers and mothers into war, 5. 467; 7.\n537 A:--transfer of children from one class to another, 3. 415;\n4. 423 D:--exposure of children allowed, 5. 460 C, 461 C:--illegitimate\nchildren, _ib._ 461 A.\n\nChimaera, two natures in one, 9. 588 C.\n\nChines, presented to the brave warrior, 5. 468 D.\n\nChryses, the priest of Apollo (Iliad i. 11 foll.), 3. 392 E foll.\n\nCithara, _see_ Harp.\n\nCitizens, the, of the best state, compared to a garrison of mercenaries\n(Adeimantus), 4. 419 (cp. 8. 543); will form one family, 5. 462 foll.\n_See_ Guardians.\n\nCity, situation of the, 3. 415:--the 'city of pigs,' 2. 372:--the heavenly\ncity, 9. 592:--Cities, most, divided between rich and poor, 4. 422 E; 8.\n551 E [_cp._ Laws 12. 945 E]:--the game of cities, 4. 422 E. Cp.\nConstitution, State.\n\nClasses, in the state, should be kept distinct, 2. 374; 3. 397 E, 415 A;\n4. 421, 433 A, 434, 441 E, 443; 5. 453 (cp. 8. 552 A, _and_ Laws\n8. 846 E).\n\nCleitophon, the son of Aristonymus, present at the dialogue, 1. 328 B;\ninterposes on behalf of Thrasymachus, _ib._ 340 A.\n\nCleverness, no match for honesty, 3. 409 C (cp. 10. 613 C); not often\nunited with a steady character, 6. {344} 503 [_cp._ Theaet. 144 B]; needs\nan ideal direction, 7. 519 [_cp._ Laws 7. 819 A].\n\nClotho, second of the fates, 10. 617 C, 620 E; sings of the present, _ib._\n617 C; the souls brought to her, _ib._ 620 E.\n\nColours, comparison of, 9. 585 A; contrast of, _ib._ 586 C;--indelible\ncolours, 4. 429:--'colours' of poetry, 10. 601 A.\n\nComedy, cannot be allowed in the state, 3. 394 [_cp._ Laws 7. 816 D];\naccustoms the mind to vulgarity, 10. 606;--same actors cannot act both\ntragedy and comedy, 3. 395.\n\nCommon life in the state, 5. 458, 464 foll.;--common meals of the\nguardians, 3. 416; common meals for women, 5. 458 D [_cp._ Laws 6. 781; 7.\n806 E; 8. 839 D];--common property among the guardians, 3. 416 E;\n4. 420 A, 422 D; 5. 464; 8. 543.\n\nCommunity of women and children, 3. 416; 5. 450 E, 457 foll., 462, 464;\n8. 543 A [_cp._ Laws 5. 739 C];--of property, 3. 416 E; 4. 420 A, 422 D;\n5. 464; 8. 543;--of feeling, 5. 464.\n\nCommunity. [_The communism of the Republic seems to have been suggested by\nPlato's desire for the unity of the state_ (cp. 5. 462 foll.). _If those\n'two small pestilent words, \"meum\" and \"tuum,\" which have engendered so\nmuch strife among men and created so much mischief in the world,' could be\nbanished from the lips and thoughts of mankind, the ideal state would soon\nbe realized. The citizens would have parents, wives, children, and\nproperty in common; they would rejoice in each other's prosperity, and\nsorrow at each other's misfortune; they would call their rulers not\n'lords' and 'masters,' but 'friends' and 'saviours.' Plato is aware that\nsuch a conception could hardly be carried out in this world; and he evades\nor adjourns, rather than solves, the difficulty by the famous assertion\nthat only when the philosopher rules in the city will the ills of human\nlife find an end_ [_cp._ Introduction, p. clxxiii]. _In the Critias, where\nthe ideal state, as Plato himself hints to us_ (110 D), _is to some extent\nreproduced in an imaginary description of ancient Attica, property is\ncommon, but there is no mention of a community of wives and children.\nFinally in the Laws_ (5. 739), _Plato while still maintaining the\nblessings of communism, recognizes the impossibility of its realization,\nand sets about the construction of a 'second-best state' in which the\nrights of property are conceded; although, according to Aristotle_ (Pol.\nii. 6, \u00a7 4), _he gradually reverts to the ideal polity in all except a few\nunimportant particulars._]\n\nConception, the, of truth by the philosopher, 6. 490 A.\n\nConfidence and courage, 4. 430 B.\n\nConfiscation of the property of the rich in democracies, 8. 565.\n\nConstitution, the aristocratic, is the ideal state sketched in bk. iv (cp.\n8. 544 E, 545 D);--defective forms of constitution, 4. 445 B; 8. 544\n[_cp._ Pol. 291 E foll.]; aristocracy (in the ordinary sense), 1. 338 D;\ntimocracy or 'Spartan polity,' 8. 545 foll.; oligarchy, _ib._ 550 foll.,\n554 E; democracy, _ib._ 555 foll., 557 D; tyranny, _ib._ 544 C, 562. Cp.\nGovernment, State.\n\nContentiousness, a characteristic of timocracy, 8. 548.\n\nContracts, in some states not protected by law, 8. 556 A.\n\nContradiction, nature of, 4. 436; 10. 602 E; power of, 5. 454 A. {345}\n\nConvention, justice a matter of, 2. 359 A.\n\nConversation, should not be personal, 6. 500 B.\n\nConversion of the soul, 7. 518, 521, 525 [_cp._ Laws 12. 957 E].\n\nCookery, art of, employed in the definition of justice, 1. 332 C.\n\nCorinthian courtesans, 3. 404 D.\n\nCorpses, not to be spoiled, 5. 469.\n\nCorrelative and relative, qualifications of, 4. 437 foll. [_cp._ Gorg.\n476]; how corrected, 7. 524.\n\n_Corruptio optimi pessima_, 6. 491.\n\nCorruption, the, of youth, not to be attributed to the Sophists, but to\npublic opinion, 6. 492 A.\n\nCourage, required in the guardians, 2. 375; 3. 386, 413 E, 416 E; 4. 429;\n6. 503 E; inconsistent with the fear of death, 3. 386; 6. 486 A; = the\npreservation of a right opinion about objects of fear, 4. 429, 442 B (cp.\n2. 376, _and_ Laches 193, 195); distinguished from fearlessness, 4. 430 B;\none of the philosopher's virtues, 6. 486 A, 490 E, 494 A:--the courageous\ntemper averse to intellectual toil, _ib._ 503 D [_cp._ Pol. 306, 307].\n\nCourtesans, 3. 404 D.\n\nCovetousness, not found in the philosopher, 6. 485 E; characteristic of\ntimocracy and oligarchy, 8. 548, 553; = the appetitive element of the\nsoul, 9. 581 A.\n\nCowardice in war, to be punished, 5. 468 A; not found in the philosopher,\n6. 486 B.\n\nCreophylus, 'the child of flesh,' companion of Homer, 10. 600 B.\n\nCrete, government of, generally applauded, 8. 544 C; a timocracy, _ib._\n545 B;--Cretans, naked exercises among, 5. 452 C; call their country\n'mother-land,' 9. 575 E;--Cretic rhythm, 3. 400 B.\n\nCrimes, great and small, differently estimated by mankind, 1. 344\n(cp. 348 D); causes of, 6. 491 E, 495 B; 8. 552 D; 9. 575 A.\n\nCriminals, are usually men of great character spoiled by bad education,\n6. 491 E, 495 B; numerous in oligarchies, 8. 552 D.\n\nCroesus, 2. 359 C; 'as the oracle said to Croesus,' 8. 566 C.\n\nCronos, ill treated by Zeus, 2. 377 E; his behaviour to Uranus, _ibid._\n\nCunning man, the, no match for the virtuous, 3. 409 D.\n\nCycles, recurrence of, in nature, 8. 546 A [_cp._ Tim. 22 C; Crit. 109 D;\nPol. 269 foll.; Laws 3. 677].\n\n\nD.\n\n\nDactylic metre, 3. 400 C.\n\nDaedalus, beauty of his works, 7. 529 E.\n\nDamon, an authority on rhythm, 3. 400 B (cp. 4. 424 C).\n\nDancing (in education), 3. 412 B.\n\nDay-dreams, 5. 458 A, 476 C.\n\nDead (in battle) not to be stripped, 5. 469; judgment of the dead,\n10. 615.\n\nDeath, the approach of, brings no terror to the aged, 1. 330 E; the\nguardians must have no fear of, 3. 386, 387 (cp. 6. 486 C); preferable to\nslavery, 3. 387 A.\n\nDebts, abolition of, proclaimed by demagogues, 8. 565 E, 566 E.\n\nDelphi, religion left to the god at, 4. 427 A (cp. 5. 461 E, 469 A;\n7. 540 B).\n\nDemagogues, 8. 564, 565.\n\nDemocracy, 1. 338 D; spoken of under the parable of the captain and the\nmutinous crew, 6. 488; democracy and philosophy, _ib._ 494, 500; the third\nform of imperfect state, 8. 544 [_cp._ Pol. 291, 292]; detailed account\nof, _ib._ 555 foll.; characterised by freedom, _ib._ 557 B, 561-563; a\n'bazaar of constitutions,' _ib._ 557 D; the {346} humours of democracy,\n_ib._ E, 561; elements contained in, _ib._ 564.--democracy in animals,\n_ib._ 563:--the democratical man, _ib._ 558, 559 foll., 561, 562; 9. 572;\nhis place in regard to pleasure, 9. 587.\n\nDesire, has a relaxing effect on the soul, 4. 430 A; the conflict of\ndesire and reason, 4. 440 [_cp._ Phaedr. 253 foll.; Tim. 70 A];--the\ndesires divided into simple and qualified, 4. 437 foll.; into necessary\nand unnecessary, 8. 559.\n\nDespots (masters), 5. 463 A. _See_ Tyrant.\n\nDestiny, the, of man in his own power, 10. 617 E.\n\nDialectic, the most difficult branch of philosophy, 6. 498; objects of,\n_ib._ 511; 7. 537 D; proceeds by a double method, 6. 511; compared to\nsight, 7. 532 A; capable of attaining to the idea of good, _ibid._; gives\nfirmness to hypotheses, _ib._ 533; the coping stone of the sciences, _ib._\n534 [_cp._ Phil. 57]; must be studied by the rulers, _ib._ 537; dangers of\nthe study, _ibid._; years to be spent in, _ib._ 539; distinguished from\neristic, _ib._ D (cp. 5. 454 A; 6. 499 A):--the dialectician has a\nconception of essence, 7. 534 [_cp._ Phaedo 75 D].\n\nDialectic. [_Dialectic, the 'coping stone of knowledge,' is everywhere\ndistinguished by Plato from eristic, i.e., argument for argument's sake_\n[_cp._ Euthyd. 275 foll., 293; Meno 75 D; Phaedo 101; Phil. 17; Theaet.\n167 E]. _It is that 'gift of heaven'_ (Phil. 16) _which teaches men to\nemploy the hypotheses of science, not as final results, but as points from\nwhich the mind may rise into the higher heaven of ideas and behold truth\nand being. This vague and magnificent conception was probably hardly\nclearer to Plato himself when he wrote the Republic than it is to us_\n[_cp._ Introduction, p. xcii]; _but in the Sophist and Statesman it\nappears in a more definite form as a combination of analysis and synthesis\nby which we arrive at a true notion of things._ [_Cp. the_ [Greek:\nu(ph\u00eag\u00eame/n\u00ea metho/dos] _of Aristotle_ (Pol. i. 1, \u00a7 3; 8, \u00a7 1), _which is\nan analogous mode of proceeding from the parts to the whole.] In the Laws\ndialectic no longer occupies a prominent place; it is the 'old man's\nharmless amusement'_ (7. 820 C), _or, regarded more seriously, the method\nof discussion by question and answer, which is abused by the natural\nphilosophers to disprove the existence of the Gods_ (10. 891).]\n\nDice ([Greek: ku/boi]), 10. 604 C; skill required in dice-playing,\n2. 374 C.\n\nDiet, 3. 404; 8. 559 C [_cp._ Tim. 89].\n\nDifferences, accidental and essential, 5. 454.\n\nDiomede, his command to the Greeks (Iliad iv. 412), 3. 389 E; 'necessity\nof,' (proverb), 6. 493 D.\n\nDionysiac festival (at Athens), 5. 475 D.\n\nDiscord, causes of, 5. 462; 8. 547 A, 556 E; the ruin of states, 5. 462;\ndistinguished from war, _ib._ 470 [_cp._ Laws 1. 628, 629].\n\nDiscourse, love of, 1. 328 A; 5. 450 B; increases in old age, 1. 328 D;\npleasure of, in the other world, 6. 498 D [_cp._ Apol. 41].\n\nDisease, origin of, 3. 404; the right treatment of, _ib._ 405 foll.; the\nphysician must have experience of, in his own person, _ib._ 408; disease\nand vice compared, 4. 444; 10. 609 foll. [_cp._ Soph. 228; Pol. 296; Laws\n10. {347} 906]; inherent in everything, 10. 609.\n\nDishonesty, thought by men to be more profitable than honesty, 2. 364 A.\n\nDithyrambic poetry, nature of, 3. 394 B.\n\nDiversities of natural gifts, 2. 370; 5. 455; 7. 535 A.\n\nDivision of labour, 2. 370, 374 A; 3. 394 E, 395 B, 397 E; 4. 423 E, 433 A,\n435 A, 441 E, 443, 453 B; a part of justice, 4. 433, 435 A, 441 E (cp.\n_supra_ 1. 332, 349, 350, _and_ Laws 8. 846 C);--of lands, proclaimed by\nthe would-be tyrant, 8. 565 E, 566 E.\n\nDoctors, flourish when luxury increases in the state, 2. 373 C; 3. 405 A;\ntwo kinds of, 5. 459 C [_cp._ Laws 4. 720; 9. 857 D]. Cp. Physician.\n\nDog, Socrates' oath by the, 3. 399 E; 8. 567 E; 9. 592;--dogs are\nphilosophers, 2. 376; the guardians the watch-dogs of the state, _ibid._;\n4. 440 D; 5. 451 D; breeding of dogs, 5. 459.\n\nDolphin, Arion's, 5. 453 E.\n\nDorian harmony, allowed, with the Phrygian, in the state, 3. 399 A.\n\nDraughts, 1. 333 A; skill required in, 2. 374 C;--comparison of an\nargument to a game of draughts, 6. 487 C.\n\nDreams, an indication of the bestial element in human nature, 9. 571, 572,\n574 E.\n\nDrones, the, 8. 552, 554 C, 555 E, 559 C, 564 B, 567 E; 9. 573 A [_cp._\nLaws 10. 901 A].\n\nDrunkenness, in heaven, 2. 363 D; forbidden in the guardians, 3. 398 E,\n403 E;--the drunken man apt to be tyrannical, 8. 573 C. Cp. Intoxication.\n\nDyeing, 4. 429 D.\n\n\nE.\n\n\nEarly society, 2. 359.\n\nEating, pleasure accompanying, 8. 559.\n\nEducation, commonly divided into gymnastic for the body and music for the\nsoul, 2. 376 E, 403 (_see_ Gymnastic, Music, _and_ _cp._ Laws 7. 795 E);\nboth music and gymnastic really designed for the soul, 3. 410:--use of\nfiction in, 2. 377 foll.; 3. 391; the poets bad educators, 2. 377; 3. 391,\n392, 408 B; 10. 600, 606 E, 607 B [_cp._ Laws 10. 886 C, 890 A]; must be\nsimple, 3. 397, 404 E; melody in, _ib._ 398 foll.; mimetic art in, _ib._\n399; importance of good surroundings, _ib._ 401; influence of, on manners,\n4. 424, 425; innovation in, dangerous, _ibid._; early, should be given\nthrough amusement, _ib._ 425 A; 7. 536 E [_cp._ Laws 1. 643 B]; ought to\nbe the same for men and women, 5. 451 foll., 466; dangerous when\nill-directed, 6. 491; not a process of acquisition, but the use of powers\nalready existing in us, 7. 518; not to be compulsory, _ib._ 537\nA;--education of the guardians, 2. 376 foll.; 4. 429, 430; 7. 521 (cp.\nGuardians, Ruler);--the higher or philosophic education, 6. 498, 503 E,\n504; 7. 514-537; age at which it should commence, 6. 498; 7. 537; 'the\nlonger way,' 6. 504 (cp. 4. 435); 'the prelude or preamble,' 7. 532 E.\n\nEducation. [_Education in the Republic is divided into two parts,_ (i)\n_the common education of the citizens;_ (ii) _the special education of the\nrulers._ (i) _The first, beginning with childhood in the plays of the\nchildren_ [_cp._ Laws 1. 643 B], _is the old Hellenic education,_ [_the_\n[Greek: katabebl\u00eame/na paideu/mata] _of Aristotle_, Pol. viii. 2, \u00a7 6],\n{348}--_'music for the mind and gymnastic for the body'_ [_cp._ Laws 7.\n795 E]. _But Plato soon discovers that both are really intended for the\nbenefit of the soul_ [_cp._ Laws 5. 743 D]; _and under 'music' he includes\nliterature_ ([Greek: lo/goi]), _i.e. humane culture as distinguished from\nscientific knowledge. Music precedes gymnastic; both are not to be learned\ntogether; only the simpler kinds of either are tolerated_ [_cp._ Laws Book\nVII, _passim_]. _Boys and girls share equally in both_ [_cp._ Laws 7.\n794 D]. _The greatest attention must be paid to good surroundings; nothing\nmean or vile must meet the eye or strike the ear of the young scholar. The\nfairy tales of childhood and the fictions of the poets are alike placed\nunder censorship_ [_cp._ Laws Book X, _and see s. v._ Poetry]. _Gentleness\nis to be united with manliness; beauty of form and activity of mind are to\nmingle in perfect and harmonious accord._--(ii) _The special education\ncommences at twenty by the selection of the most promising students. These\nspend ten years in the acquisition of the higher branches of arithmetic,\ngeometry, astronomy, harmony_ [_cp._ Laws 7. 817 E], _which are not to be\npursued in a scientific spirit or for utility only, but rather with a view\nto their combination by means of dialectic into an ideal of all knowledge_\n(_see s. v._ Dialectic). _At thirty a further selection is made: those\nselected spend five years in the study of philosophy, are then sent into\nactive life for fifteen years, and finally after fifty return to\nphilosophy, which for the remainder of their days is to form their chief\noccupation_ (_see s. v._ Rulers).]\n\nEgyptians, characterised by love of money, 4. 435 E.\n\nElder, the, to bear rule in the state, 3. 412 B [_cp._ Laws 3. 690 A;\n4. 714 E]; to be over the younger, 5. 465 A [_cp._ Laws 4. 721 D; 9. 879 C;\n11. 917 A].\n\nEmbroidery, art of, 3. 401 A.\n\nEnchantments, used by mendicant prophets, 2. 364 B;--enchantments, i.e.\ntests to which the guardians are to be subjected, 3. 413 (cp. 6. 503 A;\n7. 539 E).\n\nEnd, the, and use of the soul, 1. 353:--ends and excellencies ([Greek:\na)retai\\]) of things, _ibid._; things distinguished by their ends, 5. 478.\n\nEndurance, must be inculcated on the young, 3. 390 C (cp. 10. 605 E).\n\nEnemies, treatment of, 5. 469.\n\nEnquiry, roused by some objects of sense, 7. 523.\n\nEpeus, soul of, turns into a woman, 10. 620 C.\n\nEpic poetry, a combination of imitation and narration, 3. 394 B,\n396 E;--epic poets, imitators in the highest degree, 10. 602 C.\n\nEr, myth of, 10. 614 B foll.\n\nEriphyle, 9. 590 A.\n\nEristic, distinguished from dialectic, 5. 454 A; 6. 499 A; 7. 539 D.\n\nError, not possible in the skilled person (Thrasymachus), 1. 340 D.\n\nEssence and the good, 6. 509; essence of the invariable, 9. 585;--essence\nof things, 6. 507 B; apprehended by the dialectician, 7. 534 B.\n\nEternity, contrasted with human life, 10. 608 D.\n\nEumolpus, son of Musaeus, 2. 363 D.\n\nEunuch, the riddle of the, 5. 479.\n\nEuripides, a great tragedian, 8. 568 A; his maxims about tyrants,\n_ibid._:--quoted, Troades, l. 1169, _ibid._ {349}\n\nEurypylus, treatment of the wounded, 3. 405 E, 408 A.\n\nEuthydemus, brother of Polemarchus, 1. 328 B.\n\nEvil, God not the author of, 2. 364, 379, 380 A; 3. 391 E [_cp._ Laws 2.\n672 B]; the destructive element in the soul, 10. 609 foll. (cp. 4.\n444):--justice must exist even among the evil, 1. 351 foll.; their\nsupposed prosperity, 2. 364 [_cp._ Gorg. 470 foll.; Laws 2. 66 1; 10. 899,\n905]; more numerous than the good, 3. 409 D. Cp. Injustice.\n\nExcellence relative to use, 10. 601; excellences ([Greek: a)retai\\]) and\nends of things, 1. 353.\n\nExchange, the art of, necessary in the formation of the state, 2. 369 C.\n\nExercises, naked, in Greece, 5. 452.\n\nExistence, a participation in essence, 9. 585 [_cp._ Phaedo 101].\n\nExperience, the criterion of true and false pleasures, 9. 582.\n\nExpiation of guilt, 2. 364.\n\nEye of the soul, 7. 518 D, 527 E, 533 D, 540 A;--the soul like the eye,\n6. 508; 7. 518:--Eyes, the, in relation to sight, 6. 507 (cp. Sight).\n\n\nF.\n\n\nFact and ideal, 5. 472, 473.\n\nFaculties, how different, 5. 477;--faculties of the soul, 6. 511 E;\n7. 533 E.\n\nFaith [or Persuasion], one of the faculties of the soul, 6. 511 D;\n7. 533 E.\n\nFalsehood, alien to the nature of God, 2. 382 [_cp._ Laws 11. 917 A]; a\nmedicine, only to be used by the state, _ibid._; 3. 389 A, 414 C; 5. 459 D\n[_cp._ Laws 2. 663]; hateful to the philosopher, 6. 486, 490.\n\nFamily life in the state, 5. 449;--families in the state, _ib._\n461;--family and state, _ib._ 463;--cares of family life, _ib._ 465 C.\n\nFates, the, 10. 617, 620 E.\n\nFear, a solvent of the soul, 4. 430 A; fear and shame, 5. 465 A.\n\nFearlessness, distinguished from courage, 4. 430 B [_cp._ Laches 197 B;\nProtag. 349 C, 359 foll.].\n\nFeeling, community of, in the state, 5. 464.\n\nFestival of the Bendidea (at the Piraeus), 1. 327 A, 354 A; of Dionysus\n(at Athens), 5. 475 D.\n\nFiction in education, 2. 377 foll.; 3. 391; censorship of, necessary,\n2. 377 foll.; 3. 386-391, 401 A, 408 C; 10. 595 foll.; not to represent\nsorrow, 3. 387 foll. (cp. 10. 604); representing intemperance to be\ndiscarded, 3. 390;--stories about the gods, not to be received, 2. 378\nfoll.; 3. 388 foll., 408 C [_cp._ Euthyph. 6, 8; Crit. 109 B; Laws\n2. 672 B; 10. 886 C; 12. 941];--stories of the world below, objectionable,\n3. 386 foll. (cp. Hades, World below).\n\nFinal causes, argument from, applied to justice, 1. 352.\n\nFire, obtained by friction, 4. 434 E.\n\nFlattery, of the multitude by their leaders, in ill-ordered states, 4. 426\n(cp. 9. 590 B).\n\nFlute, the, to be rejected, 3. 399;--flute players and flute makers,\n_ib._ D; 10. 601.\n\nFolly, an inanition ([Greek: ke/n\u00f4sis]) of the soul, 9. 585 A.\n\nFood, the condition of life and existence, 2. 369 C.\n\nForgetfulness, a mark of an unphilosophical nature, 6. 486 D, 490 E:--the\nplain of Forgetfulness (Lethe), 10. 621 A.\n\nFox, the emblem of subtlety, 2. 365 C.\n\nFractions, 7. 525 E.\n\nFreedom, the characteristic of democracy, 8. 557 B, 561-563.\n\nFriend, the, must be as well as seem {350} good, 1. 334, 335;--the friends\nof the tyrant, 8. 567 E; 9. 576.\n\nFriendship, implies justice, 1. 351 foll.; in the state, 5. 462, 463.\n\nFuneral of the guardians, 5. 465 E, 468 E; 7. 540 B;--corpses placed on\nthe pyre on the twelfth day, 10. 614.\n\nFuture life, 3. 387; 10. 614 foll.; punishment of the wicked in, 2. 363;\n10. 615 [_cp._ Phaedo 108; Gorg. 523 E, 525; Laws 9. 870 E, 881 B;\n10. 904 C]. _See_ Hades, World below.\n\n\nG.\n\n\nGames, as a means of education, 4. 425 A (cp. 7. 537 A);--dice ([Greek:\nku/boi]), 10. 604 C;--draughts ([Greek: pettei/a]), 1. 333 A; 2. 374 C;\n6. 487 C;--city ([Greek: po/lis]), 4. 422 E:--[the Olympic, &c.] glory\ngained by success in, 5. 465 D, 466 A; 10. 618 A (cp. 620 B).\n\nGeneral, the, ought to know arithmetic and geometry, 7. 522 D, 525 B,\n526 D, 527 C.\n\nGentleness, characteristic of the philosopher, 2. 375, 376; 3. 410;\n6. 486 C; usually inconsistent with spirit, 2. 375.\n\nGeometry, must be learnt by the rulers, 7. 526 foll.; erroneously thought\nto serve for practical purposes only, _ib._ 527;--geometry of solids,\n_ib._ 528;--geometrical necessity, 5. 458 D;--geometrical notions\napprehended by a faculty of the soul, 6. 511 C.\n\nGiants, battles of the, 2. 378 B.\n\nGifts, given to victors, 3. 414; 5. 460, 468;--gifts of nature, 2. 370 A;\n5. 455; 7. 535 A; may be perverted, 6. 491 E, 495 A; 7. 519 [_cp._ Laws 7.\n819 A; 10. 908 C].\n\nGlaucon, son of Ariston, 1. 327 A; 2. 368 A; takes up the discourse, 1.\n347 A; 2. 372 C; 3. 398 B; 4. 427 D; 5. 450 A; 6. 506 D; 9. 576 B; anxious\nto contribute money for Socrates, 1. 337 E; the boldest of men, 2. 357 A;\nhis genius, _ib._ 368 A; distinguished at the battle of Megara, _ibid._; a\nmusician, 3. 398 D; 7. 531 A; desirous that Socrates should discuss the\nsubject of women and children, 5. 450 A; breeds dogs and birds, _ib._\n459 A; a lover, _ib._ 474 D (cp. 3. 402 E; 5. 458 E); not a dialectician,\n7. 533; his contentiousness, 8. 548 E; not acquainted with the doctrine\nof the immortality of the soul, 10. 608.\n\nGlaucus, the sea-god, 10. 611 C.\n\nGluttony, 9. 586 A.\n\nGod, not the author of evil, 2. 364, 379, 380 A; 3. 391 E [_cp._ Laws 2.\n672 B]; never changes, 2. 380; will not lie, _ib._ 382; the maker of all\nthings, 10. 598:--Gods, the, thought to favour the unjust, 2. 362 B, 364;\nsupposed to accept the gifts of the wicked, _ib._ 365 [_cp._ Laws 4. 716 E;\n10. 905 foll.; 12. 948]; believed to take no heed of human affairs, 2. 365\n[_cp._ Laws 10. 889 foll.; 12. 948]; human ignorance of, 2. 365 [_cp._\nCrat 400 E; Crit. 107; Parm. 134 E]; disbelief in, 2. 365 [_cp._ Laws 10.\n885 foll., 909; 12. 948]; stories of, not to be repeated, 2. 378 foll.;\n3. 388 foll., 408 C [_cp._ Euthyph. 6, 8; Crit. 109 B; Laws 2. 672 B; 10.\n886 C; 12. 941]; not to be represented grieving or laughing, 3. 388;--'gods\nwho wander about at night in the disguise of strangers,' 2. 381 D;--the\nwar of the gods and the giants, _ib._ 378 B.\n\nGod. [_The theology of Plato is summed up by himself in the second book of\nthe Republic under two heads, 'God is perfect and unchangeable,' and 'God\nis true and_ {351} _the author of truth.' These canons are also the test\nby which he tries poetry and the poets_ (_see s. v._ Poetry):--_Homer and\nthe tragedians represent the Gods as changing their forms or as deceiving\nmen by lying dreams, and therefore they must be expelled from the state.\nBut Plato has not yet acquired the austere temper of his later years. He\ndoes not threaten the impenitent unbeliever with bonds and death_ (Laws\n10. 908, 910), _but is content to show by argument the superiority of\njustice over injustice. In other respects the theology of the Republic is\nrepeated and amplified in the Laws; the theses that God is not the author\nof evil and will not accept the gifts of the wicked or favour the unjust,\nare maintained with equal earnestness in both. The Republic is less\npessimistic in tone than the Laws; but the thought of the insignificance\nof man and the briefness of human life is already familiar to Plato's\nmind_ [_cp._ 6. 486 A; 10. 604; _and see s. v._ Man]. _The conception of\nGod as the Demiurgus or Creator of the universe, which is prominent in the\nTimaeus, Sophist, and Statesman, hardly appears either in the Republic or\nthe Laws_ (_cp._ Rep. 10. 596 foll.; Laws 10. 886 foll.).]\n\nGold, mingled by the God in the auxiliaries, 3. 415 A (cp. 416 E;\n8. 547 A);--[and silver] not allowed to the guardians, 3. 416 E; 4. 419,\n422 D; 5. 464 D (cp. 8. 543).\n\nGood, the saving element, 10. 609:--the good = the beautiful, 5. 452\n[_cp._ Lys. 216; Symp. 201 B, 204 E foll.]; the good and pleasure, 6. 505,\n509 A [_cp._ Gorg. 497; Phil. 11, 60 A]; the good superior to essence,\n_ib._ 509; the brightest and best of being, 7. 518 D;--absolute good,\n6. 507 B; 7. 540 A;--the idea of good, 6. 505, 508; 7. 517, 534; is the\nhighest knowledge, 6. 505; 7. 526 E; nature of, 6. 505, 506;--the child of\nthe good, _ib._ 506 E, 508:--good things least liable to change, 2.\n381;--goods classified, _ib._ 357, 367 D [_cp._ Protag. 334; Gorg. 451 E;\nPhil. 66; Laws 1. 631; 3. 697];--the goods of life often a temptation, 6.\n491 E, 495 A.\n\nGood man, the, will disdain to imitate ignoble actions, 3. 396:--Good men,\nwhy they take office, 1. 347; = the wise, _ib._ 350 [_cp._ 1 Alcib. 124,\n125]; unfortunate (Adeimantus), 2. 364; self-sufficient, 3. 387 [_cp._\nLys. 215 A]; will not give way to sorrow, _ibid._; 10. 603 E [_cp._ Laws\n5. 732; 7. 792 B, 800 D]; appear simple from their inexperience of evil,\n3. 409 A; hate the tyrant, 8. 568 A; the friends of God and like Him, 10.\n613 [_cp._ Phil. 39 E; Laws 4. 716].\n\nGoods, community of, 3. 416; 5. 464; 8. 543. _See_ Community.\n\nGovernment, forms of, are they administered in the interest of the rulers?\n1. 338 D, 343, 346; are all based on a principle of justice, _ib._ 338 E\n[_cp._ Laws 12. 945]; present forms in an evil condition, 6. 492 E, 496;\nnone of the existing forms adapted to philosophy, _ib._ 497;--the four\nimperfect forms, 4. 445 B; 8. 544 [_cp._ Pol. 291 foll., 301 foll.];\nsuccession of changes in states, 8. 545 foll.;--peculiar barbarian forms,\n_ib._ 544 D. Cp. Constitution, State.\n\nGovernment, forms of. [_The classification of forms of government which\nPlato adopts in the Republic is not exactly the same with that given in\nthe Statesman or the Laws. Both in the Republic_ {352} _and the Statesman\nthe series commences with the perfect state, which may be either monarchy\nor aristocracy, accordingly as the 'one best man' bears rule or many who\nare all 'perfect in virtue'_ [_cp._ Arist. Pol. iv. 2, \u00a7 1]. _But in the\nRepublic the further succession is somewhat fancifully connected with the\ndivisions of the soul. The rule of reason_ [_i.e. the perfect state_]\n_passes into timocracy, in which the 'spirited element' is predominant_\n(8. 548), _timocracy into three governments in turn, which represent the\n'appetitive principle,'--first, oligarchy, in which the desire of wealth\nis supreme_ (8. 533 D; 9. 581); _secondly, democracy, characterised by an\nunbounded lust for freedom_ (9. 561); _thirdly, tyranny, in which all evil\ndesires grow unchecked, and the tyrant becomes 'the waking reality of what\nhe once was in his dreams only'_ (9. 574 E). _Each of these inferior forms\nis illustrated in the individual who corresponds to the state and 'is set\nover against it'_ (8. 550 C). _In the Statesman, after the government of\nthe one or many good has been separated, the remaining forms are\nclassified accordingly as the government has or has not regard to law, and\ndemocracy is said to be_ (303 A) _'the worst of lawful and the best of\nlawless governments'_ (_an expression criticised by Aristotle,_ Pol. iv.\n2, \u00a7 3). _In the Laws again the subject is differently treated: monarchy\nand democracy are described as 'the two mother forms,' which must be\ncombined in order to produce a good state_ (3. 693), _and the Spartan and\nCretan constitutions are therefore praised as polities in which every form\nof government is represented_ (4. 712). _But the majority of existing\nstates are mere class governments and have no regard to virtue_ (12.\n962 E). _These various ideas are nearly all reproduced or criticised in the\nPolitics of Aristotle, who, however, does not employ the term 'timocracy,'\nand adds one great original conception,--the_ [Greek: mes\u00ea\\ politei/a],\n_or government of the middle class._]\n\nGovernments, sometimes bought and sold, 8. 544 D.\n\nGrace ([Greek: eu)sch\u00eamosu/n\u00ea]), the effect of good rhythm accompanying\ngood style, 3. 400 D; all life and every art full of grace, _ib._ 401 A.\n\nGreatness and smallness, 4. 438 B; 5. 479 B; 7. 523, 524; 9. 575 C;\n10. 602 D, 605 C.\n\nGrief, not to be indulged, 3. 387; 10. 603-606. Cp. Sorrow.\n\nGuard, the tyrant's request for a, 8. 566 B, 567 E.\n\nGuardians of the state, must be philosophers, 2. 376; 6. 484, 498, 501,\n503 B; 7. 520, 521, 525 B, 540; 8. 543; must be both spirited and gentle,\n2. 375; 3. 410; 6. 503 [_cp._ Laws 5. 731 B]; must be tested by pleasures\nand pains, 3. 413 (cp. 6. 503 A; 7. 539 E); have gold and silver mingled\nin their veins, 3. 415 A (cp. 416 E; 8. 547 A); their happiness, 4. 419\nfoll.; 5. 465 E foll.; 6. 498 C; 7. 519 E; will be the class in the state\nwhich possesses wisdom, 4. 428 [_cp._ Laws 12. 965 A]; will form one\nfamily with the citizens, 5. 462-466; must preserve moderation, _ib._\n466 B; divided into auxiliaries and guardians proper, 3. 414 (cp. 8. 545 E;\n_and see_ Auxiliaries, Rulers):--the guardians [i.e. the auxiliaries] must\nbe courageous, 2. 375; 3. 386, 413 E, 416 E; 4. 429; 6. 503 E; must have\nno fear of death, 3. 386 (cp. {353} 6. 486 C); not to weep, 3. 387 (cp.\n10. 603 E); nor to be given to laughter, 3. 388 [_cp._ Laws 5. 732; 11.\n935]; must be temperate, _ib._ 389 D; must not be avaricious, _ib._ 390 E;\nmust only imitate noble characters and actions, _ib._ 395 foll., 402 E;\nmust only learn the Dorian and Phrygian harmonies, and play on the lyre\nand harp, _ib._ 398, 399; must be sober, _ib._ 398 E, 403 E; must be\nreared amid fair surroundings, _ib._ 401; athletes of war, _ib._ 403,\n404 B; 4. 422; 7. 521 E; 8. 543 [_cp._ Laws 8. 830]; must live according to\nrule, 3. 404; will not go to law or have resort to medicine, _ib._ 410 A;\nmust have common meals and live a soldier's life, _ib._ 416; will not\nrequire gold or silver or property of any kind, _ib._ 417; 4. 419, 420 A,\n422 D; 5. 464 C; compared to a garrison of mercenaries (Adeimantus), 4.\n419 (cp. 8. 543); must go to war on horseback in their childhood, 5. 467;\n7. 537 A; regulations for their conduct in war, 5. 467-471:--female\nguardians, _ib._, 456, 458, 468; 7. 540 C (cp. Women).\n\nGyges, 2. 359 C; 10. 612 B.\n\nGymnastic, supposed to be intended only for the body, 2. 376 E; 3. 403;\n7. 521 [_cp._ Laws 7. 795 E]; really designed for the improvement of the\nsoul, 3. 410; like music, should be continued throughout life, _ib._ 403 C;\neffect of excessive, _ib._ 404, 410; 7. 537 B; should be of a simple\ncharacter, 3. 404, 410 A; the ancient forms of, to be retained, 4. 424;\nmust co-operate with music in creating a harmony of the soul, _ib._ 441 E;\nsuitable to women, 5. 452-457 [_cp._ Laws 7. 804, 813, 833]; ought to be\ncombined with intellectual pursuits, 7. 535 D [_cp._ Tim. 88]; time to be\nspent in, _ib._ 537.\n\n\nH.\n\n\nHabit and virtue, 7. 518 E; 10. 619 D.\n\nHades, tales about the terrors of, 1. 330 D; 2. 366 A; such tales not to\nbe heeded, 3. 386 B [_cp._ Crat. 403];--the place of punishment, 2. 363;\n10. 614 foll.; Musaeus' account of the good and bad in, 2. 363;--the\njourney to, 10. 614 [_cp._ Phaedo 108 A]:--(Pluto) helmet of, 10. 612 B.\nCp. World below.\n\nHalf, the, better than the whole, 5. 466 B.\n\nHandicraft arts, a reproach, 9. 590 [_cp._ Gorg. 512].\n\nHappiness of the unjust, 1. 354; 2. 364; 3. 392 B (cp. 8. 545 A, _and_\nGorg. 470 foll.; Laws 2. 661; 10. 899 E, 905 A);--of the guardians, 4. 419\nfoll.; 5. 465 E foll.; 6. 498 C; 7. 519 E;--of Olympic victors, 5. 465 D,\n466 A; 10. 618 A;--of the tyrant, 9. 576 foll., 587;--the greatest\nhappiness awarded to the most just, _ib._ 580 foll.\n\nHarmonies, the more complex to be rejected, 3. 397 foll.;--the Lydian\nharmony, _ib._ 398; the Ionian, _ib._ E; the Dorian and Phrygian alone to\nbe accepted, _ib._ 399.\n\nHarmony, akin to virtue, 3. 401 A (cp. 7. 522 A);--science of, must be\nacquired by the rulers, 7. 531 (cp. Music);--harmony of soul and body, 3.\n402 D;--harmony of the soul, effected by temperance, 4. 430, 441 E, 442 D,\n443 (cp. 9. 591 D, _and_ Laws 2. 653 B);--harmony in the acquisition of\nwealth, 9. 591 E.\n\nHarp, the, ([Greek: kitha/ra]), allowed in the best state, 3. 399. {354}\n\nHatred, between the despot and his subjects, 8. 567 E; 9. 576 A.\n\nHealth and justice compared, 4. 444; pleasure of health, 9. 583 C;\nsecondary to virtue, _ib._ 591 D.\n\nHearing, classed among faculties, 5. 477 E; composed of two elements,\nspeech and hearing, and not requiring, like sight, a third intermediate\nnature, 6. 507 C.\n\nHeaven, the starry, the fairest of visible things, 7. 529 D; the motions\nof, not eternal, _ib._ 530 A.\n\nHeaviness, 5. 479; 7. 524 A.\n\nHector, dragged by Achilles round the tomb of Patroclus, 3. 391 B.\n\nHelen, never went to Troy, 9. 586 C.\n\nHellas, not to be devastated in civil war, 5. 470 A foll., 471 A:\n--Hellenes characterised by the love of knowledge, 4. 435 E; did not\noriginally strip in the gymnasia, 5. 452 D; not to be enslaved by\nHellenes, _ib._ 469 B, C; united by ties of blood, _ib._ 470 C; not to\ndevastate Hellas, _ib._ 471 A foll.; Hellenes and barbarians are\nstrangers, _ib._ 469 D, 470 C [_cp._ Pol. 262 D].\n\nHellespont, 3. 404 C.\n\nHephaestus, binds Her\u00e8, 2. 378 D; thrown from heaven by Zeus, _ibid._;\nimproperly delineated by Homer, 3. 389 A; chains Ares and Aphrodit\u00e8, _ib._\n390 C.\n\nHeracleitus, the 'sun of,' 6. 498 B.\n\nHer\u00e8, bound by Hephaestus, 2. 378 D; Her\u00e8 and Zeus, _ibid._; 3. 390 B;\nbegged alms for the daughters of Inachus, 2. 381 D.\n\nHermes, the star sacred to (Mercury), 10. 617 A.\n\nHermus, 8. 566 C.\n\nHerodicus of Selymbria, the inventor of valetudinarianism, 3. 406 A foll.\n\nHeroes, not to lament, 3. 387, 388; 10. 603-606; to be rewarded, 5. 468;\nafter death, _ibid._\n\nHeroic rhythm, 3. 400 C.\n\nHesiod, his rewards of justice, 2. 363 B; 10. 612 A; his stories improper\nfor youth, 2. 377 D; his classification of the races, 8. 547 A; a wandering\nrhapsode, 10. 600 D:--\nQuoted:--\n Theogony,\n  l. 154, 459, 2. 377 E.\n Works and Days,\n  l. 40, 5. 466 B.\n  l. 109, 8. 546 E.\n  l. 122, 5. 468 E.\n  l. 233, 2. 363 B.\n  l. 287, _ib._ 364 D.\n Fragm. 117, 3. 390 E.\n\nHirelings, required in the state, 2. 371 E.\n\nHoliness of marriage, 5. 458 E, 459 [_cp._ Laws 6. 776]. _See_ Marriage.\n\nHomer, supports the theory that justice is a thief, 1. 334 B; his\nrewards of justice, 2. 363 B; 10. 612 A; his stories not approved for\nyouth, 2. 377 D foll. (cp. 10. 595); his mode of narration, 3. 393 A\nfoll.; feeds his heroes on campaigners' fare, _ib._ 404 C; Socrates'\nfeeling of reverence for him, 10. 595 C, 607 (cp. 3. 391 A); the\ncaptain and teacher of the tragic poets, 10. 595 B, 598 D, E; not a\nlegislator, _ib._ 599 E; or a general, _ib._ 600 A [_cp._ Ion 537\nfoll.]; or inventor, _ibid._; or teacher, _ibid._; no educator, _ib._\n600, 606 E, 607 B; not much esteemed in his lifetime, _ib._ 600 B foll.;\nwent about as a rhapsode, _ibid._ Passages quoted or referred to:--\n Iliad i.\n  l. 11 foll., 3. 392 E foll.\n  l. 131, 6. 501 B.\n  l. 225, 3. 389 E.\n  l. 590 foll., 2. 378 D.\n  l. 599 foll., 3. 389 A.\n Iliad ii.\n  l. 623, 6. 501 C.\n Iliad iii.\n  l. 8, 3. 389 E. {355}\n Iliad iv.\n  l. 69 foll., 2. 379 E.\n  l. 218, 3. 408 A.\n  l. 412, _ib._ 389 E.\n  l. 431, _ibid._\n Iliad v.\n  l. 845, 10. 612 B.\n Iliad vii.\n  l. 321, 5. 468 D.\n Iliad viii.\n  l. 162, _ibid._\n Iliad ix.\n  l. 497 foll., 2. 364 D.\n  l. 513 foll., 3. 390 E.\n Iliad xi.\n  l. 576, _ib._ 405 E.\n  l. 624, _ibid._\n  l. 844, _ib._ 408 A.\n Iliad xii.\n  l. 311, 5. 468 E.\n Iliad xiv.\n  l. 294 foll., 3. 390 C.\n Iliad xvi.\n  l. 433, _ib._ 388 C.\n  l. 776, 8. 566 D.\n  l. 856 foll., 3. 386 E.\n Iliad xviii.\n  l. 23 foll., _ib._ 388 A.\n  l. 54, _ib._ B.\n Iliad xix.\n  l. 278 foll., _ib._ 390 E.\n Iliad xx.\n  l. 4 foll., 2. 379 E.\n  l. 64 foll., 3. 386 C.\n Iliad xxi.\n  l. 222 foll., _ib._ 391 B.\n Iliad xxii.\n  ll. 15, 20, _ib._ A.\n  l. 168 foll., _ib._ 388 C.\n  l. 362 foll., _ib._ 386 E.\n  l. 414, _ib._ 388 B.\n Iliad xxiii.\n  l. 100 foll., _ib._ 387 A.\n  l. 103 foll., _ib._ 386 D.\n  l. 151 _ib._ 391 B.\n  l. 175 _ibid._\n Iliad xxiv.\n  l. 10 foll., _ib._ 388 A.\n  l. 527, 2. 379 D.\n Odyssey i.\n  l. 351 foll., 4. 424 D.\n Odyssey viii.\n  l. 266 foll., 3. 390 D.\n Odyssey ix.\n  l. 9. foll., _ib._ B.\n  l. 91 foll., 8. 560 C.\n Odyssey x.\n  l. 495, 3. 386 E.\n Odyssey xi.\n  l. 489 foll., _ib._ C; 7. 516 D.\n Odyssey xii.\n  l. 342, 3. 390 B.\n Odyssey xvii.\n  l. 383 foll., _ib._ 389 D.\n  l. 485 foll., 2. 381 D.\n Odyssey xix.\n  l. 109 foll., _ib._ 363 B.\n  l. 395, 1. 334 B.\n Odyssey xx.\n  l. 17, 3. 390 D; 4. 441 B.\n\nHomer, allusions to, 1. 328 E; 2. 381 D; 3. 390 E; 8. 544 D.\n\nHomeridae, 10. 599 E.\n\nHonest man, the, a match for the rogue, 3. 409 C (cp. 10. 613 C).\n\nHonesty, fostered by the possession of wealth, 1. 331 A; thought by\nmankind to be unprofitable, 2. 364 A; 3. 392 B.\n\nHonour, pleasures enjoyed by the lover of, 9. 581 C, 586 E:--the\n'government of honour,' _see_ Timocracy.\n\nHope, the comfort of the righteous in old age (Pindar), 1. 331 A.\n\nHousehold cares, 5. 465 C.\n\nHuman interests, unimportance of, 10. 604 B (cp. 6. 486 A, _and_ Theaet.\n173; Laws 1. 644 E; 7. 803);--life, full of evils, 2. 379 C; shortness of,\n10. 608 D;--nature, incapable of doing many things well, 3. 395 B;\n--sacrifices, 8. 565 D. {356}\n\nHunger, 4. 437 E, 439; an inanition ([Greek: ke/n\u00f4sis]) of the body,\n9. 585 A.\n\nHymns, to the gods, may be allowed in the State, 10: 607 A [_cp._ Laws\n3. 700 A; 7. 801 E];--marriage hymns, 5. 459 E.\n\nHypothesis, in mathematics and in the intellectual world, 6. 510; in the\nsciences, 7. 533.\n\n\nI.\n\n\nIambic measure, 3. 400 C.\n\nIda, altar of the gods on, 3. 391 E.\n\nIdea of good, the source of truth, 6. 508 (cp. 505); a cause like the sun,\n_ib._ 508; 7. 516, 517; must be apprehended by the lover of knowledge,\n7. 534;--ideas and phenomena, 5. 476; 6. 507;--ideas and hypotheses,\n6. 510;--absolute ideas, 5. 476 [_cp._ Phaedo 65, 74; Parm. 133]; origin of\nabstract ideas, 7. 523; nature of, 10. 596; singleness of, _ib._ 597\n[_cp._ Tim. 28, 51].\n\nIdea. [_The Idea of Good is an abstraction, which, under that name at\nleast, does not elsewhere occur in Plato's writings. But it is probably\nnot essentially different from another abstraction, 'the true being of\nthings,' which is mentioned in many of his Dialogues_ [_cp. passages cited\ns. v. Being_]. _He has nowhere given an explanation of his meaning, not\nbecause he was 'regardless whether we understood him or not,' but rather,\nperhaps, because he was himself unable to state in precise terms the ideal\nwhich floated before his mind. He belonged to an age in which men felt too\nstrongly the first pleasure of metaphysical speculation to be able to\nestimate the true value of the ideas which they conceived_ (_cp. his own\npicture of the effect of dialectic on the youthful mind,_ 7. 539). _To\nhim, as to the Schoolmen of the Middle Ages, an abstraction seemed truer\nthan a fact: he was impatient to shake off the shackles of sense and rise\ninto the purer atmosphere of ideas. Yet in the allegory of the cave_\n(_Book VII_), _whose inhabitants must go up to the light of perfect\nknowledge but descend again into the obscurity of opinion, he has shown\nthat he was not unaware of the necessity of finding a firm starting-point\nfor these flights of metaphysical imagination_ (_cp._ 6. 510). _A passage\nin the Philebus_ (65 A) _gives perhaps the best insight into his meaning:\n'If we are not able to hunt the good with one idea only, with three we may\ntake our prey,--Beauty, Symmetry, Truth.' The three were inseparable to\nthe Greek mind, and no conception of perfection could be formed in which\nthey did not unite._ (Cp. Introduction, pp. lxix, xcvii).]\n\nIdeal state, is it possible? 5. 471, 473; 6. 499; 7. 540 (cp. 7. 520,\n_and_ Laws 4. 711 E; 5. 739); how to be commenced, 6. 501; 7. 540:\n--ideals, value of, 5. 472. For the ideal state, _see_ City,\nConstitution, Education, Guardians, Rulers, etc.\n\nIgnorance, nature of, 5. 477, 478; an inanition ([Greek: ke/n\u00f4sis]) of the\nsoul, 9. 585.\n\nIliad, the style of, illustrated, 3. 392 E foll.; mentioned, _ib._ 393 A.\nCp. Homer, Odyssey.\n\nIlion, _see_ Troy.\n\nIllegitimate children, 5. 461 A.\n\nIllusions of sight, 7. 523; 10. 602 [_cp._ Phaedo 65 A; Phil. 380, 42 D;\nTheaet. 157 E].\n\nImages, (i.e. reflections of visible objects), 6. 510; 10. 596 (_cp._ Tim.\n52 D). {357}\n\nImitation in style, 3. 393, 394; 10. 596 foll., 600 foll.; affects the\ncharacter, 3. 395; thrice removed from the truth, 10. 596, 597, 598,\n602 B; concerned with the weaker part of the soul, _ib._ 604.\n\nImitative poetry, 10. 595; arts, inferior, _ib._ 605.\n\nImitators, ignorant, 10. 602.\n\nImmortality, proof of, 10. 608 foll., (cp. 6. 498 C, _and see_ Soul).\n\nImpatience, uselessness of, 10. 604 C.\n\nImpetuosity, 6. 503 E.\n\nInachus, Her\u00e8 asks alms for the daughters of, 2. 381 D.\n\nInanitions ([Greek: ke/n\u00f4seis]) of body and soul, 9. 585 A.\n\nIncantations used by mendicant prophets, 2. 364 B; in medicine, 4. 426 A.\n\nIncome Tax, 1. 343 D.\n\nIndifference to money, characteristic of those who inherit a fortune,\n1. 330 B.\n\nIndividual, inferior types of the, 8. 545; individual and state, 2. 368;\n4. 434, 441; 5. 462; 8. 544; 9. 577 B [_cp._ Laws 3. 689; 5. 739; 9. 875,\n877 C; 11. 923].\n\nInfants have spirit, but not reason, 4. 441 [_cp._ Laws 12. 963 E].\n\nInformers, 9. 575 B.\n\nInjustice, advantage of, 1. 343; defined by Thrasymachus as discretion,\n_ib._ 348 D; injustice and vice, _ibid._; suicidal to states and\nindividuals, _ib._ 351 E [_cp._ Laws 10. 906 A]; in perfection, 2. 360;\neulogists of, _ib._ 361, 366, 367; 3. 392 B (_cp._ 8. 545 A; 9. 588); only\nblamed by those who have not the power to be unjust, 2. 366 C; in the\nstate, 4. 434; = anarchy in the soul, _ib._ 444 B [_cp._ Soph. 228];\nbrings no profit, 9. 589, 590; 10. 613.\n\nInnovation in education dangerous, 4. 424 [_cp._ Laws 2. 656, 660 A]. See\nGymnastic, Music.\n\nIntellect, objects of, classified, 7. 534 (cp. 5. 476); relation of the\nintellect and the good, 6. 508.\n\nIntellectual world, divisions of, 6. 510 foll.; 7. 517; compared to the\nvisible, 6. 508, 509; 7. 532 A.\n\nIntercourse between the sexes, 5. 458 foll. [_cp._ Laws 8. 839 foll.]; in\na democracy, 8. 563 B.\n\nInterest, sometimes irrecoverable by law, 8. 556 A [_cp._ Laws 5. 742 C].\n\nIntermediates, 9. 583.\n\nIntimations, the, given by the senses imperfect, 7. 523 foll.; 10. 602.\n\nIntoxication, not allowed in the state, 3. 398 E, 403 E. Cp. Drinking.\n\nInvalids, 3. 406, 407; 4. 425, 426.\n\nIonian harmony, must be rejected, 3. 399 A.\n\nIron (and brass) mingled by the God in the husbandmen and craftsmen,\n3. 415 A (cp. 8. 547 A).\n\nIsmenias, the Theban, 'a rich and mighty man,' 1. 336 A.\n\nItaly, 'can tell of Charondas as a lawgiver,' 10. 599 E.\n\n\nJ.\n\n\nJudge, the good, must himself be virtuous, 3. 409 [_cp._ Pol. 305].\n\nJudgement, the final, 10. 614 foll. Cp. Hades.\n\nJuggling, 10. 602 D.\n\nJust man, the, is at a disadvantage compared with the unjust\n(Thrasymachus), 1. 343; is happy, _ib._ 354 [_cp._ Laws 1. 660 E]; attains\nharmony in his soul, 4. 443 E; proclaimed the happiest, 9. 580\nfoll.;--just men the friends of the gods, 10. 613 [_cp._ Phil. 39 E; Laws\n4. 716 D];--just and unjust are at heart the same (Glaucon), 3. 360.\n\nJustice, = to speak the truth and pay one's debts, 1. 331 foll.; {358} =\nthe interest of the stronger, _ib._ 338; 2. 367 [_cp._ Gorg. 489; Laws 4.\n714 A]; = honour among thieves, 1. 352; = the excellence of the soul,\n_ib._ 353:--the art which gives good and evil to friends and enemies,\n_ib._ 332 foll., 336; is a thief, _ib._ 334; the proper virtue of man,\n_ib._ 335; 'sublime simplicity,' _ib._ 348; does not aim at excess, _ib._\n349; identical with wisdom and virtue, _ib._ 351; a principle of harmony,\n_ibid._ (cp. 9. 591 D); in the highest class of goods, 2. 357, 367 D\n[_cp._ Laws 1. 631 C]; the union of wisdom, temperance, and courage, 4.\n433 [_cp._ Laws 1. 631 C]; a division of labour, _ibid._ foll. (cp.\n_supra_, 1. 332, 349, 350, _and_ 1 Alcib. 127):--nature and origin of\n(Glaucon), 2. 358, 359; conventional, _ib._ 359 A [_cp._ Theaet. 172 A,\n177 C; Laws 10. 889, 890]; praised for its consequences only (Adeimantus),\n_ib._ 362 E, 366; a matter of appearance, _ib._ 365:--useful alike in war\nand peace, 1. 333; can do no harm, _ib._ 335; more precious than gold,\n_ib._ 336; toilsome, 2. 364:--compared to health, 4. 444:--the poets on,\n2. 363, 364, 365 E:--in perfection, _ib._ 361:--more profitable than\ninjustice, 4. 445; 9. 589 foll.; superior to injustice, 9. 589; final\ntriumph of, _ib._ 580; 10. 612, 613:--in the state, 2. 369; 4. 431; the\nsame in the individual and the state, 4. 435 foll., 441 foll.:--absolute\njustice, 5. 479 E; 6. 501 B; 7. 517 E.\n\nJustice. [_The search for justice is the groundwork or foundation of the\nRepublic, which commences with an enquiry into its nature and ends with a\ntriumphant demonstration of the superior happiness enjoyed by the just\nman. In the First Book several definitions of justice are attempted, all\nof which prove inadequate. Glaucon and Adeimantus then intervene:--mankind\nregard justice as a necessity, not as a good in itself, or at best as only\nto be practised because of the temporal benefits which flow from it: can\nSocrates prove that it belongs to a higher class of goods? Socrates in\nreply proposes to construct an ideal state in which justice will be more\neasily recognised than in the individual. Justice is thus discovered to be\nthe essential virtue of the state,_ (_a thesis afterwards enlarged upon by\nAristotle_ [Pol. i. 2, \u00a7 16; iii. 13, \u00a7 3]), _the bond of the social\norganization, and, like temperance in the Laws_ [3. 696, 697; 4. 709 E],\n_rather the accompaniment or condition of the virtues than a virtue in\nitself_ [_cp._ Introduction, p. lxiii]. _Expressed in an outward or\npolitical form it becomes the great principle which has been already\nenunciated_ (i. 322), _'that every man shall do his own work;' on this\nPlato bases the necessity of the division into classes which underlies the\nwhole fabric of the ideal state_ (4. 433 foll.; Tim. 17 C). _Thus we are\nled to acknowledge the happiness of the just; for he alone reflects in\nhimself this vital principle of the state_ (4. 445). _The final proof is\nsupplied by a comparison of the perfect state with actual forms of\ngovernment. These, like the individuals who correspond to them, become\nmore and more miserable as they recede further from the ideal, and the\nclimax is reached_ (9. 587) _when the tyrant is shown by the aid of\narithmetic to have '729 times less pleasure than the king'_ [_i.e. the\nperfectly just ruler_]. _Lastly, the happiness of the just is proved to_\n{359} _extend also into the next world, where men appear before the\njudgment seat of heaven and receive the due reward of their deeds in this\nlife._]\n\n\nK.\n\n\nKing, the Great, 8. 553 D:--pleasure of the king and the tyrant compared,\n9. 587 foll.;--kings and philosophers, 5. 473 (cp. 6. 487 E, 498 foll.,\n501 E foll.; 7. 540; 8. 543; 9. 592).\n\nKisses, the reward of the brave warrior, 5. 468 C.\n\nKnowledge ([Greek: e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea, gign\u00f4/skein]), = knowledge of ideas, 6. 484;\n--nature of, 5. 477, 478; classed among faculties, _ib._ 477; 6. 511 E;\n7. 533 E;--previous, to birth, 7. 518 C;--how far given by sense, _ib._\n529 [_cp._ Phaedo 75];--should not be acquired under compulsion, _ib._\n536 E;--the foundation of courage, 4. 429 [_cp._ Laches 193, 197; Protag.\n350, 360];--knowledge and opinion, 5. 476-478; 6. 508, 510 A; 7. 534;\nknowledge and pleasure, 6. 505; knowledge and wisdom, 4. 428;--the highest\nknowledge, 6. 504; 7. 514 foll.;--unity of knowledge, 5. 479 [_cp._ Phaedo\n101];--the best knowledge, 10. 618;--knowledge of shadows, 6. 511 D; 7.\n534 A:--love of knowledge characteristic of the Hellenes, 4. 435 E;\npeculiar to the rational element of the soul, 9. 581 B.\n\n\nL.\n\n\nLabour, division of, 2. 370, 374 A; 3. 394 E, 395 B, 397 E; 4. 423 E,\n433 A, 435 A, 441 E, 443, 453 B [_cp._ Laws 8. 846, 847].\n\nLacedaemon, owes its good order to Lycurgus, 10. 599 E;--constitution of,\ncommonly extolled, 8. 544 D; a timocracy, _ib._ 545 B:--Lacedaemonians\nfirst after the Cretans to strip in the gymnasia, 5. 452 D.\n\nLachesis, turns the spindle of Necessity together with Clotho and Atropos,\n10. 617 C; her speech, _ib._ D; apportions a genius to each soul, _ib._\n620 D.\n\nLamentation over the dead, to be checked, 3. 387.\n\nLands, partition of, proclaimed by the would-be tyrant, 8. 565 E, 566 E.\n\nLanguage, pliability of, 9. 588 D [_cp._ Soph. 277 B].\n\nLaughter not to be allowed in the guardians, 3. 388 [_cp._ Laws 5. 732;\n11. 935]; nor represented in the gods, _ib._ 389.\n\nLaws, may be given in error, 1. 339 E; supposed to arise from a convention\namong mankind, 2. 359 A; cause of, 3. 405; on special subjects of little\nuse, 4. 425, 426 [_cp._ Laws 7. 788]; treated with contempt in\ndemocracies, 8. 563 E; bring help to all in the state, 9. 590.\n\nLawyers, increase when wealth abounds, 4. 405 A.\n\nLearning, pleasure of, 6. 486 C (cp. 9. 581, 586).\n\nLegislation, cannot reach the minutiae of life, 4. 425, 426; requires the\nhelp of God, _ib._ 425 E. Cp. Laws.\n\nLeontius, story of, 4. 439 E.\n\nLethe, 10. 621.\n\nLetters, image of the large and small, 2. 368; 3. 402 A.\n\nLiberality, one of the virtues of the philosopher, 6. 485 E.\n\nLiberty, characteristic of democracy, 8. 557 B, 561-563.\n\nLicence, begins in music, 4. 424 E [_cp._ Laws 3. 701 B]; in democracies,\n8. 562 D.\n\nLicentiousness forbidden, 5. 458. {360}\n\nLie, a, hateful to the philosopher, 6. 490 C (cp. _supra_ 486 E);--the\ntrue lie and the lie in words, 2. 382;--the royal lie ([Greek: gennai/on\npseu=dos]), 3. 414;--rulers of the state may lie, 2. 382; 3. 389 A, 414 C;\n5. 459 D;--the Gods not to be represented as lying, 2. 382;--lies of the\npoets, _ib._ 377 foll.; 3. 386, 408 B (cp. 10. 597 foll.).\n\nLife in the early state, 2. 372;--loses its zest in old age, 1. 329 A;\nfull of evils, 2. 379 C; intolerable without virtue, 4. 445; shortness of,\ncompared to eternity, 10. 608 D;--the life of virtue toilsome, 2. 364 D;\n--the just or the unjust, which is the more advantageous? _ib._ 347\nfoll.;--three kinds of lives among men, 9. 581;--life of women ought to\nresemble that of men, 5. 451 foll. [_cp._ Laws 7. 804 E];--the necessities\nof life, 2. 369, 373 A;--the prime of life, 5. 460 E.\n\nLight, 6. 507 E. Cp. Sight, Vision.\n\nLight and heavy, 5. 479; 7. 524.\n\nLike to like, 4. 425 C.\n\nLiterature ([Greek: lo/goi]), included under 'music' in education,\n2. 376 E.\n\nLitigation, the love of, ignoble, 3. 405.\n\nLogic; method of residues, 4. 427;--accidents and essence distinguished,\n5. 454;--nature of opposition, 4. 436;--categories, [Greek: pro/s ti], 4.\n437; quality and relation, _ibid._;--fallacies, 6. 487. For Plato's method\nof definitions, _see_ Knowledge, Temperance; and cp. Dialectic,\nMetaphysic.\n\nLotophagi, 8. 560 C.\n\nLots, use of, 5. 460 A, 462 E; election by, characteristic of democracy,\n8. 557 A.\n\nLove of the beautiful, 3. 402, 403 [_cp._ 1 Alcib. 131]; bodily love and\ntrue love, _ib._ 403; love and the love of knowledge, 5. 474 foll.; is of\nthe whole, not of the part, _ib._ C, 475 B; 6. 485 B; a tyrant, 9. 573 B,\n574 E (cp. 1. 329 B):--familiarities which may be allowed between the\nlover and the beloved, 3. 403 B:--lovers' names, 5. 474:--lovers of wine,\n_ib._ 475 A:--lovers of beautiful sights and sounds, _ib._ 476 B, 479 A,\n480.\n\nLuxury in the state, 2. 372, 373; a cause of disease, 3. 405 E; would not\ngive happiness to the citizens, 4. 420, 421; makes men cowards, 9. 590 B.\n\nLycaean Zeus, temple of, 8. 565 D.\n\nLycurgus, the author of the greatness of Lacedaemon, 10. 599 E.\n\nLydia, kingdom of, obtained by Gyges, 2. 359 C:--Lydian harmonies, to be\nrejected, 3. 398 E foll.\n\nLying, a privilege of the state, 3. 389 A, 414 C; 5. 459 D.\n\nLyre, the instrument of Apollo, and allowed in the best state, 3. 399 D.\n\nLysanias, father of Cephalus, 1. 330 B.\n\nLysias, the brother of Polemarchus, 1. 328 B.\n\n\nM.\n\n\nMadman, arms not to be returned to a, 1. 331; fancies of madmen, 8. 573 C.\n\nMagic, 10. 602 D.\n\nMagistrates, elected by lot in democracy, 8. 557 A.\n\nMagnanimity, ([Greek: megalo/prepeia]), one of the philosopher's virtues,\n6. 486 A, 490 E, 494 A.\n\nMaker, the, not so good a judge as the user, 10. 601 C [_cp._ Crat. 390].\n\nMan, 'the master of himself,' 4. 430 E [_cp._ Laws 1. 626 E foll.]; 'the\nform and likeness of God,' 6. 501 B [_cp._ Phaedr. 248 A; Theaet. 176 C;\nLaws 4. 716 D]; his unimportance, 10. 604 B (cp. 6. 486 A, {361} _and_\nLaws 1. 644 E; 7. 803); has the power to choose his own destiny, 10. 617 E;\n--the one best man, 6. 502 [_cp._ Pol. 301]:--Men are not just of their\nown will, 2. 366 C; unite in the state in order to supply each other's\nwants, _ib._ 369;--the nature of men and women, 5. 453-455;--analogy of\nmen and animals, _ib._ 459;--three classes of, 9. 581.\n\nManners, influenced by education, 4. 424, 425; cannot be made the subject\nof legislation, _ibid._; freedom of, in democracies, 8. 563 A.\n\n'Many,' the term, as applied to the beautiful, the good, &c., 6. 507.\n\nMany, the, flatter their leaders into thinking themselves statesmen, 4.\n426; wrong in their notions about the honourable and the good, 6. 493 E;\nwould lose their harsh feeling towards philosophy if they could see the\ntrue philosopher, _ib._ 500; their pleasures and pains, 9. 586;--'the\ngreat beast,' 6. 493. Cp. Multitude.\n\nMarionette players, 7. 514 B.\n\nMarriage, holiness of, 5. 458 E, 459; age for, _ib._ 460; prayers and\nsacrifices at, _ibid._;--marriage festivals, _ib._ 459, 460.\n\nMarsyas, Apollo to be preferred to, 3. 399 E.\n\nMathematics, 7. 522-532; use of hypotheses in, 6. 510;--mathematical\nnotions perceived by a faculty of the soul, 6. 511 C:--the mathematician\nnot usually a dialectician, 7. 531 E.\n\nMean, happiness of the, 10. 619 A [_cp._ Laws 3. 679 A; 5. 728 E;\n7. 792 D].\n\nMeanness, unknown to the philosopher, 6. 486 A; characteristic of the\noligarchs, 8. 554.\n\nMeasurement, art of, corrects the illusions of sight, 10. 602 D.\n\nMeat, roast, the best diet for soldiers, 3. 404 D.\n\nMedicine, cause of, 3. 405; not intended to preserve unhealthy and\nintemperate subjects, _ib._ 406 foll., 408 A; 4. 426 A [_cp._ Tim. 89 B];\nthe two kinds of, 5. 459 [_cp._ Laws 4. 720]; use of incantations in, 4.\n426 A;--analogy of, employed in the definition of justice, 1. 332 C.\n\nMegara, battle of, 2. 368 A.\n\nMelody, in education, 3. 398 foll.; its influence, 10. 601 B.\n\nMemory, the philosopher should have a good, 6. 486 D, 490 E, 494 A;\n7. 535 B.\n\nMendicant prophets, 2. 364 C.\n\nMenelaus, treatment of, when wounded, 3. 408 A.\n\nMenoetius, father of Patroclus, 3. 388 C.\n\nMental blindness, causes of, 7. 518.\n\nMerchants, necessary in the state, 2. 371.\n\nMetaphysics; absolute ideas, 5. 476;--abstract and relative ideas,\n7. 524;--analysis of knowledge, 6. 510;--qualifications of relative and\ncorrelative, 4. 437 foll.; 7. 524. Cp. Idea, Logic.\n\nMetempsychosis, 10. 617. Cp. Soul.\n\nMidas, wealth of, 3. 408 B.\n\nMight and right, 1. 338 foll. [_cp._ Gorg. 483, 489; Laws 1. 627; 3. 690;\n10. 890].\n\nMiletus, Thales of, 10. 600 A.\n\nMilitary profession, the, 2. 374.\n\nMimetic art, in education, 3. 394 foll.; the same person cannot succeed in\ntragedy and comedy, _ib._ 395 A; imitations lead to habit, ib. D; men\nacting women's part, _ib._ E; influence on character, _ibid._ foll. Cp.\nImitation.\n\n'Mine and thine,' a common cause of dispute, 5. 462.\n\nMinisters of the state must be educated, 7. 519. See Ruler. {362}\n\nMiser, the, typical of the oligarchical state, 8. 555 A (cp. 559 D).\n\nMisfortune, to be borne with patience, 3. 387; 10. 603-606.\n\nModels (or types), by which the poets are to be guided in their\ncompositions, 2. 379 A.\n\nModeration, necessity of, 5. 466 B [_cp._ Laws 3. 690 E; 5. 732, 736 E].\n\nMomus (god of jealousy), 6. 487 A.\n\nMonarchy, distinguished from aristocracy as that form of the perfect state\nin which one rules, 4. 445 C (cp. 9. 576 D, _and_ Pol. 301); the happiest\nform of government, 9. 576 E (cp. 580 C, 587 B).\n\nMoney, needed in the state, 2. 371 B [_cp._ Laws 11. 918]; not necessary\nin order to carry on war, 4. 423;--love of, among the Egyptians and\nPhoenicians, _ib._ 435 E; characteristic of timocracy and oligarchy, 8.\n548 A, 553, 562 A; referred to the appetitive element of the soul,\n9. 580 E; despicable, _ib._ 589 E, 590 C (cp. 3. 390 E).\n\nMoney-lending, in oligarchies, 8. 555, 556.\n\nMoney-making, art of, in Cephalus' family, 1. 330 B; evil of, 8. 556;\npleasure of, 9. 581 C, 586 E.\n\nMoney-qualifications in oligarchies, 8. 550, 551.\n\nMoon, reputed mother of Orpheus, 2. 364 E.\n\nMotherland, a Cretan word, 9. 575 E [_cp._ Menex. 237].\n\nMothers in the state, 5. 460.\n\nMotion and rest, 4. 436;--motion of the stars, 7. 529, 530; 10. 616 E.\n\nMultitude, the, the great Sophist, 6. 492; their madness, _ib._ 496 C. Cp.\nMany.\n\nMusaeus, his pictures of a future life, 2. 363 D, E, 364 E.\n\nMuses, the, Musaeus and Orpheus the children of, 2. 364 E.\n\nMusic, to be taught before gymnastic, 2. 376 E (cp. 3. 403 C); includes\nliterature ([Greek: lo/goi]), 2. 376 E;--in education, _ib._ 377 foll.; 3.\n398 foll.; 7. 522 A (_see_ Poetry, Poets, _and cp._ Protag. 326; Laws 2.\n654, 660); complexity in, to be rejected, 3. 397 [_cp._ Laws 7. 812]; the\nsevere and the vulgar kind, _ibid._ [_cp._ Laws 7. 802]; the end of, the\nlove of beauty, _ib._ 403 C; like gymnastic, should be studied throughout\nlife, _ibid._; the simpler kinds of, foster temperance in the soul, _ib._\n404 A, 410 A; effect of excessive, _ib._ 410, 411; ancient forms of, not\nto be altered, 4. 424 [_cp._ Laws 2. 657; 7. 799, 801]; must be taught to\nwomen, 5. 452.\n\nMusic. [_Music to the ancients had a far wider significance than to us. It\nwas opposed to gymnastic as 'mental' to 'bodily' training, and included\nequally reading and writing, mathematics, harmony, poetry, and music\nstrictly speaking: drawing, as Aristotle tells us_ (Pol. viii. 3, \u00a7 1),\n_was sometimes made a separate division._ I. _Music_ (_in this wider\nsense_), _Plato says, should precede gymnastic; and, according to a\nremarkable passage in the Protagoras_ (325 C), _the pupils in a Greek\nschool were actually instructed in reading and writing, made to learn\npoetry by heart, and taught to play on the lyre, before they went to the\ngymnasium. The ages at which children should commence these various studies\nare not stated in the Republic; but in the VIIth Book of the Laws, where\nthe subject is treated more in detail, the children begin going to school\nat ten, and spend three years in learning to read and write, and another\nthree years in music_ (Laws 7. 810). _This agrees very fairly with the\nselection of the_ {363} _most promising youth at the age of twenty_ (Rep.\n7. 537), _as it would allow a corresponding period of three years for\ngymnastic training._ II. _Music, strictly so called, plays a great part in\nPlato's scheme of education. He hopes by its aid to make the lives of his\nyouthful scholars harmonious and gracious, and to implant in their souls\ntrue conceptions of good and evil. Music is a gift of the Gods to men, and\nwas never intended, 'as the many foolishly and blasphemously suppose,'\nmerely to give us an idle pleasure_ (Tim. 47 E; Laws 2. 654, 658 E; 7.\n802 D). _Neither should a freeman aim at attaining perfect execution_\n[_cp._ Arist. Pol. viii. 6, \u00a7\u00a7 7, 15]: _in the Laws_ (7. 810) _we are told\nthat every one must go through the three years course of music, 'neither\nmore nor less, whether he like or whether he dislike the study.' Both\ninstruments and music are to be of a simple character: in the Republic\nonly the lyre, the pipe, and the flute are tolerated, and the Dorian and\nPhrygian harmonies. No change in the fashions of music is permitted; for\nwhere there is licence in music there will be anarchy in the state. In\nthis desire for simplicity and fixity in music Plato was probably opposed\nto the tendencies of his own age. The severe harmony which had once\ncharacterized Hellenic art was passing out of favour: alike in\narchitecture, sculpture, painting, literature, and music, richer and more\nornate styles prevailed. We regard the change as inevitable, and not\nperhaps wholly to be regretted: to Plato it was a cause rather than a sign\nof the decline of Hellas._]\n\nMusical amateurs, 5. 475;--education, 2. 377; 3. 398 foll.; 7. 522 A;\n--instruments, the more complex kinds of, rejected, 3. 399 [_cp._ Laws\n7. 812 D];--modes, _ib._ 397-399; changes in, involve changes in the laws,\n4. 424 C.\n\nMysteries, 2. 365 A, 366 A, 378 A; 8. 560 E.\n\nMythology, misrepresentations of the gods in, 2. 378 foll.; 3. 388 foll.,\n408 C (cp. Gods); like poetry, has an imitative character, 3. 392 D foll.\n\n\nN.\n\n\nNarration, styles of, 3. 392, 393, 396.\n\nNational qualities, 4. 435.\n\nNatural gifts, 2. 370 A; 5. 455; 6. 491 E, 495 A; 7. 519, 535.\n\nNature, recurrent cycles in, 8. 546 A (cp. Cycles); divisions of, 9. 584\n[_cp._ Phil. 23].\n\nNecessities, the, of life, 2. 368, 373 A.\n\nNecessity, the mother of the Fates, 10. 616, 617, 621 A.\n\nNecessity, the, 'which lovers know,' 5. 458 E;--the 'necessity of\nDiomede,' 6. 493 D.\n\nNemesis, 5. 451 A.\n\nNiceratus, son of Nicias, 1. 327 C.\n\nNicias, 1. 327 C.\n\nNightingale, Thamyras changed into a, 10. 620.\n\nNiobe, sufferings of, in tragic poetry, 2. 380 A.\n\n[Greek: no/mos], strain and law, 7. 532 E [_cp._ Laws 7. 800 A].\n\nNot-being, 5. 477.\n\nNovelties in music and gymnastic to be discouraged, 4. 424.\n\nNumber, said to have been invented by Palamedes, 7. 522 D;--the number of\nthe State, 8. 546.\n\n\nO.\n\n\nObjects and ideas to be distinguished, 5. 476; 6. 507. {364}\n\nOdysseus and Alcinous, 10. 614 B; chooses the lot of a private man, _ib._\n620 D.\n\nOdyssey, 3. 393 A. Cp. Iliad.\n\nOffice, not desired by the good ruler, 7. 520 A.\n\nOld age, complaints against, 1. 329; Sophocles quoted in regard to,\n_ibid._; wealth a comforter of age, _ibid._;--old men think more of the\nfuture life, _ib._ 330; not students, 7. 536 [_cp._ Laches 189];--the\nolder to bear rule in the state, 3. 412 [_cp._ Laws 3. 690 A; 4. 714 E];\nto be over the younger, 5. 465 A [_cp._ Laws 4. 721 D; 9. 879 C;\n11. 917 A].\n\nOligarchy, a form of government which has many evils, 8. 544, 551, 552;\norigin of, _ib._ 550; nature of, _ibid._; always divided against itself,\n_ib._ 551 D, 554 E--the oligarchical man, 8. 553; a miser, _ib._ 555; his\nplace in regard to pleasure, 9. 587.\n\nOlympian Zeus, the Saviour, 9. 583 B.\n\nOlympic victors, happiness and glory of, 5. 465 D, 466 A (_cp._\n10. 618 A).\n\nOne, the, study of, draws the mind to the contemplation of true being,\n7. 525 A.\n\nOpinion and knowledge, 5. 476-478; 6. 508 D, 510 A; 7. 534; the lovers of\nopinion, 5. 479, 480; a blind guide, 6. 506; objects of opinion and\nintellect classified, 7. 534 (cp. 5. 476);--true opinion and courage,\n4. 429, 430 (cp. Courage).\n\nOpposites, qualification of, 4. 436; in nature, 5. 454, 475 E. Cp.\nContradiction.\n\nOppositions in the soul, 10. 603 D.\n\nOrpheus, child of the Moon and the Muses, 2. 364 E; soul of, chooses a\nswan's life, 10. 620 A;--quoted, 2. 364 E.\n\n\nP.\n\n\nPaeanian, Charmantides the, 1. 328 B.\n\nPain, cessation of, causes pleasure, 9. 583 D [_cp._ Phaedo 60 A;\nPhil. 51 A]; a motion of the soul, _ib._ E.\n\nPainters, 10. 596, 597; are imitators, ib. 597 [_cp._ Soph. 234]; painters\nand poets, _ib._ 597, 603, 605:--'the painter of constitutions,' 6. 501.\n\nPainting, in light and shade, 10. 602 C.\n\nPalamedes and Agamemnon in the play, 7. 522 D.\n\nPamphylia, Ardiaeus a tyrant of some city in, 10. 615 C.\n\nPandarus, author of the violation of the oaths, 2. 379 E; wounded\nMenelaus, 3. 408 A.\n\nPanharmonic scale, the, 3. 399.\n\nPanopeus, father of Epeus, 10. 620 B.\n\nPantomimic representations, not to be allowed, 3. 397.\n\nParadox about justice and injustice, the, 1. 348.\n\nParental anxieties, 5. 465 C [_cp._ Euthyd. 306 E].\n\nParents, the oldest and most indispensable of friends, 8. 574 C; parents\nand children in the state, 5. 461.\n\nPart and whole, in regard to the happiness of the state, 4. 420 D; 5. 466;\n7. 519 E; in love, 5. 474 C, 475 B; 6. 485 B.\n\nPassionate element of the soul, 4. 440; 6. 504 A; 8. 548 D; 9. 571 E,\n580 A. _See_ Spirit.\n\nPassions, the, tyranny of, 1. 329 C; fostered by poetry, 10. 606.\n\nPatient and agent equally qualified, 4. 436 [_cp._ Gorg. 476; Phil. 27 A].\n\nPatroclus, cruel vengeance taken by Achilles for, 3. 391 B; his treatment\nof the wounded Eurypylus, _ib._ 406 A. {365}\n\nPattern, the heavenly, 6. 500 E; 7. 540 A; 9. 592 [_cp._ Laws 5. 739 D].\n\nPaupers. _See_ Poor.\n\nPayment, art of, 1. 346.\n\nPeirithous, son of Zeus, the tale of, not to be repeated, 3. 391 D.\n\nPeleus, the gentlest of men, 3. 391 C.\n\nPerception, in the eye and in the soul, 6. 508 foll.\n\nPerdiccas [King of Macedonia], 1. 336 A.\n\nPerfect state, difficulty of, 5. 472; 6. 502 E [_cp._ Laws 4. 711];\npossible, 5. 471, 473; 6. 499; 7. 540 [_cp._ Laws 5. 739]; manner of its\ndecline, 8. 546 [_cp._ Crit. 120].\n\nPeriander, the tyrant, 1. 336 A.\n\nPersonalities, avoided by the philosopher, 6. 500 B [_cp._ Theaet. 174 C].\n\nPersonification; the argument compared to a search or chase, 2. 368 C; 4.\n427 C, 432; to a stormy sea, 4. 441 B; to an ocean, 5. 453 D; to a game of\ndraughts, 6. 487 B; to a journey, 7. 532 E; to a charm, 10. 608 A;--'has\ntravelled a long way,' 6. 484 A;--'veils her face,' _ib._ 503 A;\n--'following in the footsteps of the argument,' 2. 365 C;--'whither the\nargument may blow, thither we go,' 3. 394 D;--'a swarm of words,'\n5. 450 B;--the three waves, _ib._ 457 C, 472 A, 473 C.\n\nPersuasion [or Faith], one of the faculties of the soul, 6. 511 D;\n7. 533 E.\n\nPhilosopher, the, has the quality of gentleness, 2. 375, 376; 3. 410; 6.\n486 C; 'the spectator of all time and all existence,' 6. 486 A [_cp._\nTheaet. 173 E]; should have a good memory, _ib._ D, 490 E, 494 A; 7. 535;\nhas his mind fixed upon true being, 6. 484, 485, 486 E, 490, 500 C, 501 D;\n7. 521, 537 D; 9. 581, 582 C (cp. 5. 475 E; 7. 520 B, 525, _and_ Phaedo\n82; Phaedr. 249; Theaet. 173 E; Soph. 249 D, 254); his qualifications and\nexcellences, 6. 485 foll., 490 D, 491 B, 494 B [_cp._ Phaedo 68];\ncorruption of the philosopher, _ib._ 491 foll.; is apt to retire from the\nworld, _ib._ 496 [_cp._ Theaet. 173]; does not delight in personal\nconversation, _ib._ 500 B [_cp._ Theaet. 174 C]; must be an arithmetician,\n7. 525 B; pleasures of the philosopher, 9. 581 E:--Philosophers are to be\nkings, 5. 473 (cp. 6. 487 E, 498 foll., 501 E foll.; 7. 540; 8. 543; 9.\n592); are lovers of all knowledge, 5. 475; 6. 486 A, 490; true and false,\n5. 475 foll.; 6. 484, 491, 494, 496 A, 500; 7. 535; to be guardians, 2.\n375 (_see_ Guardians); why they are useless, 6. 487 foll.; few in number,\n_ib._ E, 496, 499 B, 503 B [_cp._ Phaedo 69 C]; will frame the state after\nthe heavenly pattern, _ib._ 501; 7. 540 A; 9. 592; education of, 6. 503;\nphilosophers and poets, 10. 607 [_cp._ Laws 12. 967].\n\nPhilosophic nature, the, rarity of, 6. 491; causes of the ruin of, _ibid._\n\nPhilosophy, every headache ascribed to, 3. 407 C; = love of real\nknowledge, 6. 485 (cp. _supra_ 5. 475 E); the corruption of, 6. 491;\nphilosophy and the world, _ib._ 494; the desolation of, _ib._ 495;\nphilosophy and the arts, _ib._ E, 496 C (cp. _supra_ 5. 475 D, 476 A);\ntrue and false philosophy, 6. 496 E, 498 E; philosophy and governments,\n_ib._ 497; time set apart for, _ib._ 498; 7. 539; commonly neglected in\nafter life, 6. 498; prejudice against, _ib._ 500, 501; why it is useless,\n7. 517, 535, 539; the guardian and saviour of virtue, 8. 549 B; philosophy\nand poetry, 10. 607; aids a man to make a wise choice in the next world,\n_ib._ 618. {366}\n\nPhocylides, his saying, 'that as soon as a man has a livelihood he should\npractise virtue,' 3. 407 B.\n\nPhoenician tale, the, 3. 414 C foll.\n\nPhoenicians, their love of money, 4. 436 A.\n\nPhoenix, tutor of Achilles, 3. 390 E.\n\nPhrygian harmony, the, 3. 399.\n\nPhysician, the, not a mere money maker, 1. 341 C, 342 D; the good\nphysician, 3. 408; physicians find employment when luxury increases, 2.\n373 C; 3. 405 A. Cp. Medicine.\n\nPigs, sacrificed at the Mysteries, 2. 378 A.\n\nPilot, the, and the just man, 1. 332 (cp. 341); the true pilot, 6. 488 E.\n\nPindar, on the hope of the righteous, 1. 331 A; on Asclepius, 3. 408 B;\n--quoted, 2. 365 B.\n\nPipe, the, ([Greek: su/rigx]), one of the musical instruments permitted to\nbe used, 3. 399 D.\n\nPiraeus, 1. 327 A; 4. 439 E; Socrates seldom goes there, 1. 328 C.\n\nPittacus of Mitylene, a sage, 1. 335 E.\n\nPlays of children should be made a means of instruction, 4. 425 A;\n7. 537 A [_cp._ Laws 1. 643 B].\n\nPleasure, not akin to virtue, 3. 402, 403; pleasure and love, _ibid._;\ndefined as knowledge or good, 6. 505 B, 509 B; the highest, 9. 583; caused\nby the cessation of pain, _ib._ D [_cp._ Phaedo 60 A; Phil. 51]; a motion\nof the soul, _ib._ E;--real pleasure unknown to the tyrant, _ib._ 587;\n--pleasure of learning, 6. 486 C (cp. 9. 581, 586, _and_ Laws 2. 667);\n--sensual pleasure, 7. 519; 9. 586; a solvent of the soul, 4. 430 A\n[_cp._ Laws 1. 633 E]; not desired by the philosopher, 6. 485\nE:--Pleasures, division of, into necessary and unnecessary, 8. 558, 559,\n561 A; 9. 572, 581 E; honourable and dishonourable, 8. 561 C; three\nclasses of, 9. 581; criterion of, _ib._ 582; classification of, _ib._\n583;--pleasures of smell, _ib._ 584 B;--pleasures of the many, 585; of the\npassionate, _ib._ 586; of the philosopher, _ib._ 586, 587.\n\nPluto, 8. 554 B.\n\nPoetry, styles of, 3. 392-394, 398; in the state, _ib._ 392-394, 398; 8.\n568 B; 10. 595 foll., 605 A, 607 A [_cp._ Laws 7. 817]; effect of, 10.\n605; feeds the passions, _ib._ 606; poetry and philosophy, _ib._ 607\n[_cp._ Laws 12. 967]:--'colours' of poetry, _ib._ 601 A.\n\nPoetry. [_The Republic is the first of Plato's works in which he seriously\nexamines the value of poetry in education, and the place of the poets in\nthe state. The question could hardly be neglected by the philosopher who\nproposed to construct an ideal polity or government of the best. For\npoetry played a great part in Hellenic life: the children learned whole\npoems by heart in their schools_ (Protag. 326 A; Laws 7. 810 C); _the\nrhapsode delighted the crowds at the festivals_ (Ion 535); _the theatres\nwere free, or almost free, to all, 'costing but a drachma at the most'_\n(Apol. 26 D); _the intervals of a banquet were filled up by conversation\nabout the poets_ (Protag. 347 C). _The quarrel between philosophy and\npoetry was an ancient one, which had found its first expression in the\nattacks of Xenophanes_ (538 B.C.) _and Heracleitus_ (508 B.C.) _upon the\npopular mythology. In the earlier dialogues of Plato the poets are treated\nwith an ironical courtesy, through which an antagonistic spirit is allowed\nhere and there to appear: they are 'winged and holy beings'_ (Ion 534)\n_who sing by inspiration,_ {367} _but at the same time are the worst\npossible critics of their own writings and the most self-conceited of\nmortals_ (Apol. 22 D). _In the Republic_ (_II and III_), _Plato begins the\ntrial of poetry by the enquiry whether the tales and legends related by\nthe epic and tragic poets are true in themselves or likely to furnish good\nexamples to his future citizens. They cannot be true, for they are\ncontrary to the nature of God_ (_see s. v._ God), _and they are certainly\nnot proper lessons for youth. There must be a censorship of poetry, and\nall objectionable passages expunged; suitable rules and regulations will\nbe laid down, and to these the poets must conform. In the Xth Book the\nargument takes a deeper tone. The Poet is proved to be an impostor thrice\nremoved from the truth, a wizard who steals the hearts of the unwary by\nhis spells and enchantments. Men easily fall into the habit of imitating\nwhat they admire; and the lamentations and woes of the tragic hero and the\nunseemly buffoonery of the comedian are equally bad models for the\ncitizens of a free and noble state. The poets must therefore be banished,\nunless, Plato adds, the lovers of poetry can persuade us of her innocence\nof the charges laid against her. In the Laws a similar conclusion is\nreached:--'The state is an imitation of the best life, and the noblest\nform of tragedy. The legislator and the poet are rivals, and the latter\ncan only be tolerated if his words are in harmony with the laws of the\nstate'_ (vii. 817)].\n\nPoets, the, love their poems as their own creation, 1. 330 C [_cp._ Symp.\n209]; speak in parables, _ib._ 332 B (cp. 3. 413 B); on justice, 2. 363,\n364, 365 E; bad teachers of youth, _ib._ 377; 3. 391, 392, 408 C [_cp._\nLaws 10. 866 C, 890 A]; must be restrained by certain rules, 2. 379 foll.;\n3. 398 A [_cp._ Laws 2. 656, 660 A; 4. 719]; banished from the state, 3.\n398 A; 8. 568 B; 10. 595 foll., 605 A, 607 A [_cp._ Laws 7. 817]; poets\nand tyrants, 8. 568; thrice removed from the truth, 10. 596, 597, 598 E,\n602 B, 605 C; imitators only, _ib._ 600, 601 (cp. 3. 393, _and_ Laws 4.\n719 C); poets and painters, 10. 601, 603, 605;--'the poets who were\nchildren and prophets of the gods' (? Orpheus and Musaeus; cp. _supra_\n364 E), 2. 366 A.\n\nPolemarchus, the son of Cephalus, 1. 327 B; 'the heir of the argument,'\n_ib._ 331; intervenes in the discussion, _ib._ 340; wishes Socrates to\nspeak in detail about the community of women and children, 5. 449.\n\nPoliticians, in democracies, 8. 564.\n\nPolydamas, the pancratiast, 1. 338 C.\n\nPoor, the, have no time to be ill, 3. 406 E; everywhere hostile to the\nrich, 4. 423 A; 8. 551 E [_cp._ Laws 5. 736 A]; very numerous in\noligarchies, 8. 552 D; not despised by the rich in time of danger, _ib._\n556 C.\n\nPopulation, to be regulated, 5. 460.\n\nPoverty, prejudicial to the arts, 4. 421; poverty and crime, 8. 552.\n\nPower, the struggle for, 7. 520 C [_cp._ Laws 4. 715 A].\n\nPramnian wine, 3. 405 E, 408 A.\n\nPriam, Homer's delineation of, condemned, 3. 388 B.\n\nPrisoners in war, 5. 468-470.\n\nPrivate property, not allowed to the guardians, 3. 416 E; 4. 420 A, 422 D;\n5. 464 C; 8. 543.\n\nPrizes of valour, 5. 468.\n\nProdicus, a popular teacher, 10. 600 C. {368}\n\nProperty, to be common, 3. 416 E; 4. 420 A, 422 D; 5. 464 C; 8. 543;\nrestrictions on the disposition of, 8. 556 A [_cp._ Laws 11. 923]:\n--property qualifications in oligarchies, _ib._ 550, 551.\n\nProphets, mendicant, 2. 364 C.\n\nProportion, akin to truth, 6. 486 E.\n\nProse writers on justice, 2. 364 A.\n\nProtagoras, his popularity as a teacher, 10. 600 C.\n\nProteus, not to be slandered, 2. 381 D.\n\nProverbs: 'birds of a feather,' 1. 329 A; 'shave a lion,' _ib._ 341 C;\n'let brother help brother,' 2. 362 D; 'wolf and flock,' 3. 415 D; 'one\ngreat thing,'4. 423 E; 'hard is the good,' _ib._ 435 C; 'friends have all\nthings in common,' 5. 449 C; 'the useful is the noble,' _ib._ 457 B; 'the\nwise must go to the doors of the rich,' 6. 489 B (cp. 2. 364 B); 'what is\nmore than human,' 6. 492 E; 'the necessity of Diomede,' _ib._ 493 D; 'the\nshe-dog as good as her mistress,' 8. 563 D; 'out of the smoke into the\nfire,' _ib._ 569 B; 'does not come within a thousand miles' ([Greek: ou)d'\ni)/ktar ba/llei]), 9. 575 D.\n\nPublic, the, the great Sophist, 6. 492; compared to a many-headed beast,\n_ib._ 493; cannot be philosophic, _ib._ 494 A [_cp._ Pol. 292 D]. _See_\nMany, Multitude.\n\nPunishment, of the wicked, in the world below, 2. 363; 10. 614. Cp. Hades,\nWorld below.\n\nPurgation of the luxurious state, 3. 399 E;--of the city by the tyrant,\n8. 567 D;--of the soul, by the tyrannical man, _ib._ 573 A.\n\nPythagoreans, the, authorities on the science of harmony, 7. 529, 530,\n531; never reach the natural harmonies of number, _ib._ 531 C;--the\nPythagorean way of life, 10. 600 A.\n\nPythian Oracle, the, 5. 461 E; 7. 540 C.\n\n\nQ.\n\n\nQuacks, 5. 459.\n\nQuarrels, dishonourable, 2. 378; 3. 395 E; will be unknown in the best\nstate, 2. 378 B; 5. 464 E [_cp._ Laws 5. 739];--quarrels of the Gods and\nheroes, 2. 378.\n\n\nR.\n\n\nRational element of the soul, 4. 435-442; 6. 504 A; 8. 550 A; 9. 571,\n580 E, 581 [_cp._ Tim. 69 E-72]; ought to bear rule, and be assisted by the\nspirited element against the passions, 4. 441 E, 442; characterized by the\nlove of knowledge, 9. 581 B; the pleasures of, the truest, _ib._ 582;\npreserves the mind from the illusions of sense, 10. 602.\n\nRationalism among youth, 7. 538 [_cp._ Laws 10. 886].\n\nReaction, 8. 564 A.\n\nRead, learning to, 3. 402 A.\n\nReason, a faculty of the soul, 6. 511 D (cp. 7. 533 E); reason and\nappetite, 9. 571 (cp. 4. 439-442, _and_ Tim. 69 E foll.); reason should be\nthe guide of pleasure, 9. 585-587.\n\nReflections, 6. 510 A.\n\nRelations, slights inflicted by, in old age, 1. 329.\n\nRelative and correlative, qualifications of, 4. 437 foll. [_cp._ Gorg.\n476]; how corrected, 7. 524.\n\nRelativity of things and individuals, 5. 479; fallacies caused by, 9. 584,\n585; 10. 602, 605 C.\n\nReligion, matters of, left to the god at Delphi, 4. 427 A (cp. 5. 461 E,\n469 A; 7. 540 B).\n\nResidues, method of, 4. 427 E.\n\nRest and motion, 4. 436.\n\nRetail traders, necessary in the state, 2. 371 [_cp._ Laws 11. 918].\n\nReverence in the young, 5. 465 A {369} [_cp._ Laws 5, 729; 9. 879;\n11. 917 A].\n\nRhetoric, professors of, 2. 365 D.\n\nRhythm, 3. 400; goes with the subject, _ib._ 398 D, 400 B; its persuasive\ninfluence, _ib._ 401 E; 10. 601 B.\n\nRiches. _See_ Wealth.\n\nRiddle, the, of the eunuch and the bat, 5. 479 C.\n\nRidicule, only to be directed against folly and vice, 5. 452 E; danger of\nunrestrained ridicule, 10. 606 C [_cp._ Laws 11. 935 A].\n\nRiding, the children of the guardians to be taught, 5. 467; 7. 537 A\n[_cp._ Laws 7. 794 D].\n\nRight and might, 1. 338 foll.\n\nRuler, the, in the strict and in the popular sense, 1. 341 B; the true\nruler does not ask, but claim obedience, 6. 489 C [_cp._ Pol. 300, 301];\nthe ideal ruler, _ib._ 502:--Rulers of states; do they study their own\ninterests? 1. 338 D, 343, 346 (cp. 7. 520 C); are not infallible, 1. 339;\nhow they are paid, _ib._ 347; good men do not desire office, _ibid._; 7.\n520 D; why they become rulers, 1. 347; present rulers dishonest, 6. 496 D:\n--[in the best state] must be tested by pleasures and pains, 3. 413 (cp.\n6. 503 A; 7. 539 E); have the sole privilege of lying, 2. 382; 3. 389 A,\n414 C; 5. 459 D [_cp._ Laws 2. 663]; must be taken from the older\ncitizens, 3. 412 (cp. 6. 498 C); will be called friends and saviours, 5.\n463; 6. 502 E; must be philosophers, 2. 376; 5. 473; 6. 484, 497 foll.,\n501, 503 B; 7. 520, 521, 525 B, 540; 8. 543; the qualities which must be\nfound in them, 6. 503 A; 7. 535; must attain to the knowledge of the good,\n6, 506; 7. 519; will accept office as a necessity, 7. 520 E, 540 A; will\nbe selected at twenty, and again at thirty, from the guardians, _ib._ 537;\nmust learn arithmetic, _ib._ 522-526; geometry, _ib._ 526, 527; astronomy,\n_ib._ 527-530; harmony, _ib._ 531; at thirty must be initiated into\nphilosophy, _ib._ 537-539; at thirty-five must enter on active life, _ib._\n539 E; after fifty may return to philosophy, _ib._ 540; when they die,\nwill be buried by the state and paid divine honours, 3. 414 A; 5. 465 E,\n469 A; 7. 540 B. Cp. Guardians.\n\n\nS.\n\n\nSacrifices, private, 1. 328 B, 331 D;--in atonement, 2. 364;--human, in\nArcadia, 8. 565 D.\n\nSailors, necessary in the state, 2. 371 B.\n\nSarpedon, 3. 388 C.\n\nSauces, not mentioned in Homer, 3. 404 D.\n\nScamander, beleaguered by Achilles, 3. 391 B.\n\nScepticism, danger of, 7. 538, 539.\n\nScience ([Greek: e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea]), a division of the intellectual world, 7.\n533 E (cp. 6. 511);--the sciences distinguished by their object, 4. 438\n[_cp._ Charm. 171]; not to be studied with a view to utility only, 7.\n527 A, 529, 530; their unity, _ib._ 531; use hypotheses, _ib._ 533;\ncorrelation of, _ib._ 537.\n\nSculpture, must only express the image of the good, 3. 401 B; painting of,\n4. 420 D [_cp._ Laws 2. 668 E].\n\nScylla, 9. 588 C.\n\nScythian, Anacharsis the, 10. 600 A;--Scythians, the, characterized by\nspirit or passion, 4. 435 E.\n\nSelf-indulgence in men and states, 4. 425 E, 426;--self-interest the\nnatural guide of men, 2. 359 B;--self-made men bad company, 1. 330 C;\n--self-mastery, 4. 430, 431. {370}\n\nSense, objects of, twofold, 7. 523; knowledge given by, imperfect,\n_ibid._; 10. 602; sense and intellect, 7. 524:--Senses, the, classed among\nfaculties, 5. 477 C.\n\nSeriphian, story of Themistocles and the, 1. 329 E.\n\nServants, old family, 8. 549 E.\n\nSex in the world below, 10. 618 B;--sexes to follow the same training, 5.\n451, 466 [_cp._ Laws 7. 805]; equality of, advantageous, _ib._ 456, 457;\nrelation between, _ib._ 458 foll. [_cp._ Laws 8. 835 E]; freedom of\nintercourse between, in a democracy, 8. 563 B. Cp. Women.\n\nSexual desires, 5. 458 E [_cp._ Laws 6. 783 A; 8. 835 E].\n\nShadows, 6. 510 A;--knowledge of shadows ([Greek: ei)kasi/a]), one of the\nfaculties of the soul, 6. 511 E; 7. 533 E.\n\nShepherd, the analogy of, with the ruler, 1. 343, 345 [_cp._ Pol. 275].\n\nShopkeepers, necessary in the state, 2. 371 [_cp._ Laws 11. 918].\n\nShort sight, 2. 368 D.\n\nSicily, 'can tell of Charondas,' 10. 599 E;--Sicilian cookery, 3. 404 D.\n\nSight, placed in the class of faculties, 5. 477 C; requires in addition to\nvision and colour, a third element, light, 6. 507; the most wonderful of\nthe senses, _ibid._; compared to mind, _ib._ 508; 7. 532 A; illusions of,\n7. 523; 10. 602, 603 D:--the world of sight, 7. 517.\n\nSign, the, of Socrates, 6. 496 C.\n\nSilver, mingled by the God in the auxiliaries, 3. 415 A (cp. 416 E;\n8. 547 A);--[and gold] not allowed to the guardians, 3. 416 E; 4. 419,\n422 D; 5. 464 D (cp. 8. 543).\n\nSimonides, his definition of justice discussed, 1. 331 D--335 E; a sage,\n_ib._ 335 E.\n\nSimplicity, the first principle of education, 3. 397 foll., 400 E, 404;\nthe two kinds of, _ib._ 400 E; of the good man, _ib._ 409 A; in diet,\n8. 559 C (cp. 3. 404 D).\n\nSin, punishment of, 2. 363; 10. 614 foll. Cp. Hades, World below.\n\nSirens, harmony of the, 10. 617 B.\n\nSkilled person, the, cannot err (Thrasymachus), 1. 340 D.\n\nSlavery, more to be feared than death, 3. 387 A; of Hellenes condemned,\n5. 469 B.\n\nSlaves, the uneducated man harsh towards, 8. 549 A; enjoy great freedom in\na democracy, _ib._ 563 B; always inclined to rise against their masters,\n9. 578 [_cp._ Laws 6. 776, 777].\n\nSmallness and greatness, 4. 438 B; 5. 479 B; 7. 523, 524; 9. 575 C;\n10. 602 D, 605 C.\n\nSmell, pleasures of, 9. 584 B.\n\nSnake-charming, 1. 358 B.\n\nSocrates, goes down to the Peiraeus to see the feast of Bendis, 1. 327;\ndetained by Polemarchus and Glaucon, _ibid._; converses with Cephalus,\n_ib._ 328-332; trembles before Thrasymachus, _ib._ 336 D; his irony, _ib._\n337 A; his poverty, _ib._ D; a sharper in argument, _ib._ 340 D; ignorant\nof what justice is, _ib._ 354 C; his powers of fascination, 2. 358 A;\nrequested by Glaucon and Adeimantus to praise justice _per se_, _ib._\n367 B; cannot refuse to help justice, _ib._ 368 C; 4. 427 D; his oath 'by\nthe dog,' 3. 399 E; 8. 567 E; 9. 592 A; hoped to have evaded discussing the\nsubject of women and children, 5. 449, 472, 473 (cp. 6. 502 E); his love\nof truth, 5. 451 A; 6. 504; his power in argument, 6. 487 B; not\nunaccustomed to speak in parables, _ib._ E; his sign, _ib._ 496 C; his\nearnestness in behalf of philosophy, 7. 536 B; his reverence for Homer,\n10. 595 C, 607 (cp. 3. 391 A). {371}\n\nSoldiers, must form a separate class, 2. 374; the diet suited for, 3. 404 D\n(cp. Guardians);--women to be soldiers, 5. 452, 466, 471 E;--punishment\nof soldiers for cowardice, _ib._ 468 A. Cp. Warrior.\n\nSolon, famous at Athens, 10. 599 E;--quoted, 7. 536 D.\n\nSon, the supposititious, parable of, 7. 537 E.\n\nSong, parts of, 3. 398 D.\n\nSophists, the, their view of justice, 1. 338 foll.; verbal quibbles of,\n_ib._ 340; the public the great Sophist, 6. 492; the Sophists compared to\nfeeders of a beast, _ib._ 493.\n\nSophocles, a remark of, quoted, 1. 329 B.\n\nSorrow, not to be indulged, 3. 387; 10. 603-606; has a relaxing effect on\nthe soul, 4. 430 A; 10. 606.\n\nSoul, the, has ends and excellences, 1. 353 D; beauty in the soul, 3. 401;\nthe fair soul in the fair body, _ib._ 402 D; sympathy of soul and body, 5.\n462 D, 464 B; conversion of the soul from darkness to light, 7. 518, 521,\n525 [_cp._ Laws 12. 957 E]; requires the aid of calculation and\nintelligence in order to interpret the intimations of sense, _ib._ 523,\n524; 10. 602; has more truth and essence than the body, 9. 585 D;--better\nand worse principles in the soul, 4. 431; the soul divided into reason,\nspirit, appetite, _ib._ 435-442; 6. 504 A; 8. 550 A; 9. 571, 580 E, 581\n[_cp._ Tim. 69 E-72, 89 E; Laws 9. 863]; faculties of the soul, 6. 511 E;\n7. 533 E; oppositions in the soul, 10. 603 D [_cp._ Soph. 228 A; Laws 10.\n896 D];--the lame soul, 3. 401; 7. 535 [_cp._ Tim. 44; Soph. 228];--the\nsoul marred by meanness, 6. 495 E [_cp._ Gorg. 524 E];--immortality of the\nsoul, 10. 608 foll., (cp. 6. 498 C);--number of souls does not increase,\n10. 611 A;--the soul after death, _ib._ 614 foll.;--transmigration of\nsouls, _ib._ 617 [_cp._ Phaedr. 249; Tim. 90 E foll.];--the soul impure\nand disfigured while in the body, _ib._ 611 [_cp._ Phaedo 81];--compared\nto a many-headed monster, 9. 588; to the images of the sea-god Glaucus,\n10. 611;--like the eye, 6. 508; 7. 518;--harmony of the soul, produced by\ntemperance, 4. 430, 442, 443 (cp. 9. 591 D, _and_ Laws 2. 653 B);--eye of\nthe soul, 7. 518 D, 527 E, 533 D, 540 A;--five forms of the state and\nsoul, 4. 445; 5. 449; 9. 577.\n\nSoul. [_The psychology of the Republic, while agreeing generally with that\nof the other Dialogues, is in some respects a modification or developement\nof their conclusions.--The division of the soul into three elements,\nreason, spirit, appetite, here first assumes a precise form, and\nhenceforward has a permanent place in the language of philosophy_ (_cp._\nIntrod. p. lxvii). _On this division the distinction between forms of\ngovernment is based_ (_see s. v._ Government). _Virtue, again, is the\nharmony or accord of the different elements, when the dictates of reason\nare enforced by passion against the appetites, while vice is the anarchy\nor discord of the soul when passion and appetite join in rebellion against\nreason_ (_cp._ 4. 444; 10. 609 foll.; Soph. 228; Pol. 296 D; Laws 10. 906\nC].--_Regarded from the intellectual side the soul is analysed into four\nfaculties, reason, understanding, faith, knowledge of shadows. These\nseverally correspond to the four divisions of knowledge_ (6. 511 E), _two\nfor intellect and two for opinion; and thus arises the Platonic\n'proportion,'_--_being_ : _becoming_ :: _intellect_ : _opinion, and\nscience_ : _belief_ {372} :: _understanding_ : _knowledge of shadows.\nThese divisions are partly real, partly formed by a logical process,\nwhich, as in so many distinctions of ancient philosophers, has outrun\nfact, and are further illustrated and explained by the allegory of the\ncave in Book VII_ (_see_ Introduction, p. xciv).--_The pre-existence and\nthe immortality of the soul are assumed. The doctrine of [Greek:\na)na/mn\u00easis] or 'remembrance of a previous birth' is not so much dwelt\nupon as in the Meno, Phaedo, or Phaedrus, neither is it made a proof of\nimmortality_ (Meno 86; Phaedo 73). _It is apparently alluded to in the\nstory of Er, where we are told that 'the pilgrims drank the waters of\nUnmindfulness; the foolish took too deep a draught, but the wise were more\nmoderate'_ (10. 621 A). _In the Xth Book Glaucon is supposed to receive\nwith amazement Socrates' confident assertion of immortality, although a\nprevious allusion to another state of existence has passed unheeded_ (6.\n498 D); _and in earlier parts of the discussion_ (_e.g._ 2. 362; 3. 386),\n_the censure which is passed on the common representations of Hades\nimplies in itself some belief in a future life_ [_cp._ Introduction to\nPhaedo, Vol. I]. _The argument for the immortality of the soul is not\ndrawn out at great length or with the emphasis of the Phaedo. It is\nchiefly of a verbal character:--All things which perish are destroyed by\nsome inherent evil; but the soul is not destroyed by sin, which is the\nevil proper to her, and must therefore be immortal_ (_cp._ Introd. p.\nclxvi).--_The condition of the soul after death is represented by Plato in\nhis favourite form of a myth_ [_cp._ Meno 81; Phaedo 88; Gorg. 522]. _The\nPamphylian warrior Er, who is supposed to have died in battle, revives\nwhen placed on the funeral pyre and relates his experiences in the other\nworld. He tells how the just are rewarded and the wicked punished, and is\nprivileged to describe the spectacle which he had witnessed of the choice\nof a new life by the pilgrim souls. The reward of release from bodily\nexistence is not held out to the philosopher_ (Phaedo 114 C), _but his\nwisdom, which has a deeper root than habit_ (10. 619), _preserves him from\noverhaste in his choice and ensures him a happy destiny.--The\ntransmigration of souls is represented in the myth much as in the Phaedrus\nand Timaeus. Plato in all likelihood derived the doctrine from an Oriental\nsource, but through Pythagorean channels. It probably had a real hold on\nhis mind, as it agreed, or could be made to agree, with the conviction,\nwhich he elsewhere expresses, of the remedial nature of punishment_ [_cp._\nProtag. 323; Gorg. 523-525].\n\nSounds in music, 7. 531 A.\n\nSparta. _See_ Lacedaemon.\n\nSpectator, the, unconsciously influenced by what he sees and hears, 10.\n605, 606 [_cp._ Laws 2. 656 A, 659 C];--the philosopher the spectator of\nall time and all existence, 6. 486 A [_cp._ Theaet. 173 E].\n\nSpendthrifts, in Greek states, 8. 564.\n\nSpercheius, the river-god, 3. 391 B.\n\nSpirit, must be combined with gentleness in the guardians, 2. 375; 3. 410;\n6. 503 [_cp._ Laws 5. 731 B]; characteristic of northern nations, 4. 435\nE; found in quite young children, _ib._ 441 A [_cp._ Laws; 12. {373}\n963]:--the spirited (or passionate) element in the soul, _ib._ 440 foll.;\n6. 504 A; 8. 550 A; 9. 572 A, 580 E; must be subject to the rational part,\n4. 441 E [_cp._ Tim. 30 C, 70, 89 D]; predominant in the timocratic state\nand man, 8. 548, 550 B; characterised by ambition, 9. 581 B; its\npleasures, _ib._ 586 D; the favourite object of the poet's imitation, 10.\n604, 605.\n\nStars, motion of the, 7. 529, 530; 10. 616 E.\n\nState, relation of, to the individual, 2. 368; 4. 434, 441; 5. 462; 8.\n544; 9. 577 B [_cp._ Laws 3. 689; 5. 739; 9. 875, 877 C; 11. 923]; origin\nof, 2. 369 foll. [_cp._ Laws 3. 678 foll.]; should be in unity, 4. 422; 5.\n463 [_cp._ Laws 5. 739]; place of the virtues in, 4. 428 foll.; virtue of\nstate and individual, _ib._ 441; 6. 498 E; family life in, 5. 449 [_cp._\nLaws 5. 740]:--the luxurious state, 2. 372 D foll.:--[the best state];\nclasses must be kept distinct, _ib._ 374; 3. 379 E, 415 A; 4. 421, 433 A,\n434, 441 E, 443; 5. 453 (cp. 8. 552 A, _and_ Laws 8. 846 E); the rulers\nmust be philosophers, 2. 376; 5. 473; 6. 484, 497 foll., 501, 503 B; 7.\n520, 521, 525 B, 540; 8. 543 (cp. Rulers); the government must have the\nmonopoly of lying, 2. 382; 3. 389 A, 414 C; 5. 459 D [_cp._ Laws 2. 663 E];\nthe poets to be banished, 3. 398 A; 8. 568 B; 10. 595 foll., 605 A,\n607 A [_cp._ Laws 7. 817]; the older must bear rule, the younger obey,\n3. 412 [_cp._ Laws 3. 690 A; 4. 714 E]; women, children, and goods to be\ncommon, _ib._ 416; 5. 450 E, 457 foll., 462, 464; 8. 543 A [_cp._ Laws 5.\n739; 7. 807 B]; must be happy as a whole, 4. 420 D; 5. 466 A; 7. 519 E;\nwill easily master other states in war, 4. 422; must be of a size which is\nnot inconsistent with unity, _ib._ 423 [_cp._ Laws 5. 737]; composed of\nthree classes, traders, auxiliaries, counsellors, _ib._ 441 A; may be\neither a monarchy or an aristocracy, _ib._ 445 C (cp. 9. 576 D); will form\none family, 5. 463 [_cp._ Pol. 259]; will be free from quarrels and\nlaw-suits, 2. 378; 5. 464, 465;--is it possible? 5. 471, 473; 6. 499; 7.\n540 [_cp._ 7. 520 _and_ Laws 4. 711 E; 5. 739]; framed after the heavenly\npattern, 6. 500 E; 7. 540 A; 9. 592; how to be commenced, 6. 501; 7. 540;\nmanner of its decline, 8. 546 [_cp._ Crit. 120];--the best state that in\nwhich the rulers least desire office, 7. 520, 521:--the four imperfect\nforms of states, 4. 445 B; 8. 544 [_cp._ Pol. 291 foll., 391 foll.];\nsuccession of states, 8. 545 foll. (cp. Government, forms of):--existing\nstates not one but many, 4. 423 A; nearly all corrupt, 6. 496; 7. 519,\n520; 9. 592.\n\nState. [_The polity of which Plato 'sketches the outline' in the Republic\nmay be analysed into two principal elements,_ I, _an Hellenic state of the\nolder or Spartan type, with some traits borrowed from Athens,_ II, _an\nideal city in which the citizens have all things in common, and the\ngovernment is carried on by a class of philosopher rulers who are selected\nby merit. These two elements are not perfectly combined; and, as Aristotle\ncomplains_ (Pol. ii. 5, \u00a7 18), _very much is left ill-defined and\nuncertain._--I. _Like Hellenic cities in general, the number of the\ncitizens is not to be great. The size of the state is limited by the\nrequirement that 'it shall not be larger or smaller than is consistent\nwith unity.'_ [_The 'convenient number' 5040, which is_ {374} _suggested\nin the Laws_ (v. 737), _is regarded by Aristotle_ (Pol. ii. 6, \u00a7 6) _as an\n'enormous multitude.'_] _Again, the individual is subordinate to the\nstate. When Adeimantus complains of the hard life which the citizens will\nlead, 'like mercenaries in a garrison'_ (4. 419), _he is answered by\nSocrates that if the happiness of the whole is secured, the happiness of\nthe parts will inevitably follow. Once more, war is supposed to be the\nnormal condition of the state, and military service is imposed upon all.\nThe profession of arms is the only one in which the citizen may properly\nengage. Trade is regarded as dishonourable:--'those who are good for\nnothing else sit in the Agora buying and selling'_ (2. 371 D); _the\nwarrior can spare no time for such an employment_ (_ib._ 374 C). [_In the\nLaws Plato's ideas enlarge; he thinks that peace is to be preferred to\nwar_ (1. 628); _and he speculates on the possibility of redeeming trade\nfrom reproach by compelling some of the best citizens to open a shop or\nkeep a tavern_ (11. 918).]--_In these respects, as well as in the\nintroduction of common meals, Plato was probably influenced by the\ntraditional ideal of Sparta_ [_cp._ Introd. p. clxx]. _The Athenian\nelement appears in the intellectual training of the citizens, and\ngenerally in the atmosphere of grace and refinement which they are to\nbreathe_ (_see s. v._ Art). _The restless energy of the Athenian character\nis perhaps reflected in the discipline imposed upon the ruling class_\n(7. 540), _who when they have reached fifty are dispensed from continuous\npublic service, but must then devote themselves to abstract study, and\nalso be willing to take their turn when necessary at the helm of state_\n[_cp._ Laws 7. 807; Thucyd. i. 70; ii. 40].--II. _The most peculiar\nfeatures of Plato's state are_ (1) _the community of property,_ (2) _the\nposition of women,_ (3) _the government of philosophers._ (1) _The first_\n(_see s. v._), _though suggested in some measure by the example of Sparta\nor Crete_ [_cp._ Arist. Pol. ii. 5, \u00a7 6], _is not known to have been\nactually practised anywhere in Hellas, unless possibly among such a body\nas the Pythagorean brotherhood._ (2) _Nothing in all the Republic was\nprobably stranger to his contemporaries than the place which Plato assigns\nto women in the state. The community of wives and children, though\ncarefully guarded by him from the charge of licentiousness_ (5. 458 E),\n_would appear worse in Athenian eyes than the traditional 'licence' of the\nSpartan women_ [Arist. Pol. ii. 9, \u00a7 5), _which, so far as it really\nexisted, no doubt arose out of an excessive regard to physical\nconsiderations in marriage. Again, the equal share in education, in war,\nand in administration which the women are supposed to enjoy in Plato's\nstate, was, if not so revolting, quite as contrary to common Hellenic\nsentiment_ [_cp._ Thucyd. ii. 45]. _The Spartan women exercised a great\ninfluence on public affairs, but this was mainly indirect_ [_cp._ Laws 7.\n806; Arist. Pol. ii. 9, \u00a7 8]; _they did not hold office or learn the use\nof arms. At Athens, as is well known, the women, of the upper classes at\nleast, lived in an almost Oriental seclusion, and were wholly absorbed in\nhousehold duties_ (Laws 7. 805 E). (3) _Finally, the government of\nphilosophers had no analogy in the Hellenic world of_ {375} _Plato's time.\nHe may have taken the suggestion from the stories of the Pythagorean rule\nin Magna Graecia. But it is also possible that these accounts of the\nbrotherhood of Pythagoras, some of which have reached us on very doubtful\nauthority, may be themselves to a considerable extent coloured and\ndistorted by features adapted from the Republic. Whether this is the case\nor not, we can hardly doubt that Plato was chiefly indebted to his own\nimagination for his kingdom of philosophers, or that it remained to\nhimself an ideal, rather than a state which would ever 'play her part in\nactual life'_ (Tim. 19, 20). _It is at least significant that he never\nfinished the Critias, as though he were unable to embody, even in a\nmythical form, the 'city of which the pattern is laid up in heaven.'_]\n\nStatesmen in their own imagination, 4. 426.\n\nStatues, polished for a decision, 2. 361 D; painted, 4. 420 D.\n\nSteadiness of character, apt to be accompanied by stupidity, 6. 503 [_cp._\nTheaet. 144 B].\n\nStesichorus, says that Helen was never at Troy, 9. 586 C.\n\nStories, improper, not to be told to children, 2. 377; 3. 391. Cp.\nChildren, Education.\n\nStrength, rule of, 1. 338.\n\nStyle of poetry, 3. 392;--styles, various, _ib._ 397.\n\nStyx, 3. 387 B.\n\nSuits, will be unknown in the best state, 5. 464 E.\n\nSumptuary laws, 4. 423, 425.\n\nSun, the, compared with the idea of good, 6. 508; not sight, but the\nauthor of sight, _ib._ 509;--'the sun of Heracleitus,' _ib._ 498 A.\n\nSupposititious son, parable of the, 7. 538.\n\nSympathy, of soul and body, 5. 462 D, 464 B; aroused by poetry, 10. 605 B.\n\nSyracusan dinners, 3. 404 D.\n\n\nT.\n\n\nTactics, use of arithmetic in, 7. 522 E, 525 B.\n\nTartarus (= hell), 10. 616 A.\n\nTaste, good, importance of, 3. 401, 402.\n\nTaxes, heavy, imposed by the tyrant, 8. 567 A, 568 E.\n\nTeiresias, alone has understanding among the dead, 3. 386 E.\n\nTelamon, 10. 620 B.\n\nTemperance ([Greek: s\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ea]), in the state, 3. 389; 4. 430 foll.\n[_cp._ Laws 3. 696]; temperance and love, 3. 403 A; fostered in the soul\nby the simple kind of music, _ib._ 404 E, 410 A; a harmony of the soul,\n4. 430, 441 E, 442 D, 443 (cp. 9. 591 D, _and_ Laws 2. 653 B); one of the\nphilosopher's virtues, 6. 485 E, 490 E, 491 B, 494 B [_cp._ Phaedo 68].\n\nTemple-robbing, 9. 574 D, 575 B.\n\nTerritory, devastation of Hellenic, not to be allowed, 5. 470;--unlimited,\nnot required by the good state, 4. 423 [_cp._ Laws 5. 737].\n\nThales, inventions of, 10. 600 A.\n\nThamyras, soul of, chooses the life of a nightingale, 10. 620 A.\n\nTheages, the bridle of, 6. 496 B.\n\nThemis, did not instigate the strife with the gods, 2. 379 E.\n\nThemistocles, answer of, to the Seriphian, 1. 330 A.\n\nTheology of Plato, 2. 379 foll. Cp. God.\n\nThersites, puts on the form of a monkey, 10. 620 C.\n\nTheseus, the tale of, and Peirithous not permitted, 3. 391 C.\n\nThetis, not to be slandered, 2. 381 D; {376} her accusation of Apollo,\n_ib._ 383 A.\n\nThirst, 4. 437 E, 439; an inanition ([Greek: ke/n\u00f4sis]) of the body, 9.\n585 A.\n\nThracians, procession of, in honour of Bendis, 1. 327 A; characterised by\nspirit or passion, 4. 435 E.\n\nThrasymachus, the Chalcedonian, a person in the dialogue, 1. 328 B;\ndescribed, _ib._ 336 B; will be paid, _ib._ 337 D; defines justice, _ib._\n338 C foll.; his rudeness, _ib._ 343 A; his views of government, _ibid._\n(cp. 9. 590 D); his encomium on injustice, 1. 343 A; his manner of speech,\n_ib._ 345 B; his paradox about justice and injustice, _ib._ 348 B foll.;\nhe blushes, _ib._ 350 D; is pacified, and retires from the argument, _ib._\n354 (cp. 6. 498 C); would have Socrates discuss the subject of women and\nchildren, 5. 450.\n\nTimocracy, 8. 545 foll.; origin of, ib. 547:--the timocratical man,\ndescribed, 8. 549; his origin, _ibid._\n\nTinker, the prosperous, 6. 495, 496.\n\nTops, 4. 436.\n\nTorch race, an equestrian, 1. 328 A.\n\nTouch, 7. 523 E.\n\nTraders, necessary in the state, 2. 371.\n\nTraditions of ancient times, their truth not certainly known to us, 2. 382\nC (cp. 3. 414 C, _and_ Tim. 40 D; Crit. 107; Pol. 271 A; Laws 4. 713 E;\n6. 782 D).\n\nTragedy and comedy in the state, 3. 394 [_cp._ Laws 7. 817].\n\nTragic poets, the, eulogizers of tyranny, 8. 568 A; imitators, 10. 597,\n598.\n\nTraining, dangers of, 3. 404 A; severity of, 6. 504 A (cp. 7. 535 B).\n\nTransfer of children from one class to another, 3. 415; 4. 423 D.\n\nTransmigration of souls, 10. 617. See Soul.\n\nTrochaic rhythms, 3. 400 B.\n\nTroy, 3. 393 E; Helen never at, 9. 586 C:--Trojan War, 2. 380 A: treatment\nof the wounded in, 3. 405 E, 408 A; the army numbered by Palamedes,\n7. 522 D.\n\nTruth, is not lost by men of their own will, 3. 413 A; the aim of the\nphilosopher, 6. 484, 485, 486 E, 490, 500 C, 501 D; 7. 521, 537 D; 9. 581,\n582 C (cp. _supra_ 5. 475 E; 7. 520, 525; _and_ Phaedo 82; Phaedr. 249;\nTheaet. 173 E; Soph. 249 D, 254 A); akin to wisdom, 6. 485 D; to\nproportion, _ib._ 486 E; no partial measure of, sufficient, _ib._ 504;\nlove of, essential in this world and the next, 10. 618;--truth and\nessence, 9. 585 D.\n\nTyranny, 1. 338 D; = injustice on the grand scale, _ib._ 344 [_cp._ Gorg.\n469]; the wretchedest form of government, 8. 544 C; 9. 576 [_cp._ Pol.\n302 E]; origin of, 8. 562, 564:--the tyrannical man, 9. 571 foll.; life\nof, _ib._ 573; his treatment of his parents, _ib._ 574; most miserable,\n_ib._ 576, 578; has the soul of a slave, _ib._ 577.\n\nTyrant, the, origin of, 8. 565; happiness of, _ib._ 566 foll.; 9. 576\nfoll. [_cp._ Laws 2. 661 B]; his rise to power, 8. 566; his taxes, _ib._\n567 A, 568 E; his army, _ib._ 567 A, 569; his purgation of the city, _ib._\n567 B; misery of, 9. 579; has no real pleasure, _ib._ 587; how far distant\nfrom pleasure, _ibid._:--Tyrants and poets, 8. 568; have no friends,\n_ibid._; 9. 576 [_cp._ Gorg. 510 C]; punishment of, in the world below,\n10. 615 [_cp._ Gorg. 525].\n\n\nU.\n\n\nUnderstanding, a faculty of the soul, 6. 511 D; = science, 7. 533 E.\n\nUnion impossible among the bad, 1. 352 A [_cp._ Lysis 214]. {377}\n\nUnity of the state, 4. 422, 423; 5. 462, 463 [_cp._ Laws 5. 739];\n--absolute unity, 7. 524 E, 525 E; unity and plurality, _ibid._\n\nUnjust man, the, happy (Thrasymachus), 1. 343, 344 [_cp._ Gorg. 470\nfoll.]; his unhappiness finally proved, 9. 580; 10. 613:--injustice =\nprivate profit, 1. 344 (_see_ Injustice).\n\nUranus, immoral stories about, 2. 377 E.\n\nUser, the, a better judge than the maker, 10. 601 C [_cp._ Crat. 390].\n\nUsury, sometimes not protected by law, 8. 556 A [_cp._ Laws 5. 742 C].\n\n\nV.\n\n\nValetudinarianism, 3. 406; 4. 426 A.\n\nValour, prizes of, 5. 468.\n\nVice, the disease of the soul, 4. 444; 10. 609 foll. [_cp._ Soph. 228;\nPol. 296 D; Laws 10. 906 C]; is many, 4. 445; the proper object of\nridicule, 5. 452 E;--fine names for the vices, 8. 560 E. Cp. Injustice.\n\nVirtue and justice, 1. 350 [_cp._ Meno 73 E, 79]; thought by mankind to be\ntoilsome, 2. 364 A [_cp._ Laws 807 D]; virtue and harmony, 3. 401 A (_cp._\n7. 522 A); virtue and pleasure, 3. 402 E (cp. Pleasure); not promoted by\nexcessive care of the body, _ib._ 407 (_cp._ 9. 591 D); makes men wise, 3.\n409 E; divided into parts, 4. 428 foll., 433; in the individual and the\nstate, _ib._ 435 foll., 441 (cp. Justice); the health of the soul, _ib._\n444 (cp. 10. 609 foll., _and_ Soph. 228; Pol. 296 D); is one, _ib._ 445;\nmay be a matter of habit, 7. 518 E; 10. 619 D; impeded by wealth, 8. 550 E\n[_cp._ Laws 5. 728 A, 742; 8. 831, 836 A];--virtues of the philosopher, 6.\n485 foll., 490 D, 491 B, 494 B (cp. Philosopher); place of the several\nvirtues in the state, 4. 427 foll.\n\nVisible world, divisions of, 6. 510 foll.; 7. 517; compared to the\nintellectual, 6. 508, 509; 7. 532 A.\n\nVision, 5. 477; 6. 508; 7. 517. _See_ Sight.\n\n\nW.\n\n\nWar, causes of, 2. 373; 4. 422 foll.; 8. 547 A; an art, 2. 374 A (cp.\n4. 422, _and_ Laws 11. 921 E); men, women, and children to go to, 5. 452\nfoll., 467, 471 E; 7. 537 A; regulations concerning, 5. 467-471; a matter\nof chance, _ib._ 467 E [_cp._ Laws 1. 638 A]; distinction between internal\nand external, _ib._ 470 A [_cp._ Laws 1. 628, 629]; the guilt of, always\nconfined to a few persons, _ib._ 471 B; love of, especially characteristic\nof timocracy, 8. 547 E; cannot be easily waged by an oligarchy, _ib._ 551\nE; the rich and the poor in war, _ib._ 556 C; a favourite resource of the\ntyrant, _ib._ 567 A.\n\nWarrior, the brave, rewards of, 5. 468; his burial, _ib._ E; the warrior\nmust know how to count, 7. 522 E, 525; must be a geometrician, _ib._ 526.\n\nWaves, the three, 5. 457 C, 472 A, 473 C.\n\nWeak, the, by nature subject to the strong, 1. 338 [_cp._ Gorg. 489; Laws\n3. 690 B]; not capable of much, either for good or evil, 6. 491 E, 495 B.\n\nWealth, the advantage of, in old age, 1. 329, 330; the greatest blessing\nof, _ib._ 330, 331; the destruction of the arts, 4. 421; influence of, on\nthe state, _ib._ 422 A [_cp._ Laws 4. 705; 5. 729 A]; the 'sinews of war,'\n_ibid._; all-powerful in oligarchies and timocracies, 8. 548 A, 551 B, 553,\n562 A; an impediment to virtue, {378} _ib._ 550 E [_cp._ Laws 5. 728 A;\n742 E; 8. 831, 836 A]; should only be acquired to a moderate amount, 9.\n591 E [_cp._ Laws 7. 801 B]:--the blind god of wealth (Pluto), 8. 554 B:\n--Wealthy, the, everywhere hostile to the poor, 4. 423 A; 8. 551 E\n[_cp._ Laws 5. 736 A]; flattered by them, 5. 465 C; the wealthy and the\nwise, 6. 489 B; plundered by the multitude in democracies, 8. 564, 565.\n\nWeaving, the art of, 3. 401 A; 5. 455 D.\n\nWeep, the guardians not to, 3. 387 C (cp. 10. 603 E).\n\nWeighing, art of, corrects the illusions of sight, 10. 602 D.\n\nWhole, the, in regard to the happiness of the state, 4. 420 D; 5. 466 A;\n7. 519 E; in love, 5. 474 C, 475 B; 6. 485 B.\n\nWhorl, the great, 10. 616.\n\nWicked, the, punishment of, in the world below, 2. 363; 10. 614; thought\nby men to be happy, 1. 354; 2. 364 A; 3. 392 B (cp. 8. 545 A, _and_ Gorg.\n470 foll.; Laws 2. 66 1; 10. 899 E, 905 A).\n\nWine, lovers of, 5. 475 A.\n\nWisdom ([Greek: sophi/a, phro/n\u00easis]) and injustice, 1. 349, 350; in the\nstate, 4. 428; akin to truth, 6. 485 D; the power of, 7. 518, 519; the\nonly virtue which is innate in us, _ib._ 518 E.\n\nWise man, the, = the good, 1. 350 [_cp._ 1 Alcib. 124, 125]; definition\nof, 4. 442 C; alone has true pleasure, 9. 583 B; life of, _ib._ 591;--'the\nwise to go to the doors of the rich,' 6. 489 B;--wise men said to be the\nfriends of the tyrant, 8. 568.\n\nWives to be common in the state, 5. 457 foll.; 8. 543.\n\nWolves, men changed into, 8. 565 D; 'wolf and flock' (proverb), 3. 415 D.\n\nWomen, employments of, 5. 455; differences of taste in, _ib._ 456; fond of\ncomplaining, 8. 549 D; supposed to differ in nature from men, 5. 453;\ninferior to men, _ib._ 455 [_cp._ Tim. 42; Laws 6. 781]; ought to be\ntrained like men, _ib._ 451, 466 [_cp._ Laws 7. 805; 8. 829 E]; in the\ngymnasia, _ib._ 452, 457 [_cp._ Laws 7. 813, 814; 8. 833]; in war, _ib._\n453 foll., 466 E, 471 E [_cp._ Laws 6. 785; 7. 806, 814 A]; to be\nguardians, _ib._ 456, 458, 468; 7. 540 C; (and children) to be common, 5.\n450 E, 457 foll., 462, 464; 8. 543 [_cp._ Laws 5. 739]. _See supra s. v._\nState, p. 374.\n\nWorld, the, cannot be a philosopher, 6. 494 A.\n\nWorld below, the, seems very near to the aged, 1. 330 E; not to be\nreviled, 3. 386 foll. [_cp._ Crat. 403; Laws 5. 727 E; 8. 828 D]; pleasure\nof discourse in, 6. 498 D [_cp._ Apol. 41]; punishment of the wicked in,\n2. 363; 10. 614 foll.; sex in, 10. 618 B;--[heroes] who have ascended from\nthe world below to the gods, 7. 521 C.\n\n\nX.\n\n\nXerxes, perhaps author of the maxim that justice = paying one's debts,\n1. 336 A.\n\n\nY.\n\n\nYoung, the, how affected by the common praises of injustice, 2. 365;\ncannot understand allegory, _ib._ 378 E; must be subject in the state,\n3. 412 B [_cp._ Laws 3. 690 A; 4. 714 E]; must submit to their elders,\n5. 465 A [_cp._ Laws 4. 721 D; 9. 879 C; 11. 917 A]. Cp. Children,\nEducation.\n\nYouth, the corruption of, not to be attributed to the Sophists, but to\n{379} public opinion, 6. 492 A;--youthful enthusiasm for metaphysics, 7.\n539 B [_cp._ Phil. 15 E];--youthful scepticism, not of long continuance,\n_ib._ D [_cp._ Soph. 234 E; Laws 10. 888 B].\n\n\nZ.\n\n\nZeus, his treatment of his father, 2. 377 E; throws Hephaestus from\nheaven, _ib._ 378 D;--Achilles descended from, 3. 391 C;--did not cause\nthe violation of the treaty in the Trojan War, or the strife of the gods,\n2. 379 E; or send the lying dream to Agamemnon, _ib._ 383 A; or lust for\nHer\u00e8, 3. 390 B; ought not to have been described by Homer as lamenting for\nAchilles and Sarpedon, _ib._ 388 C;--Lycaean Zeus, 8. 565 D;--Olympian\nZeus, 9. 583 B.\n\n\n\n\nTHE END.\n\n\nOxford\n\nPRINTED AT THE CLARENDON PRESS\n\nBY HORACE HART\n\nPRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY\n\n\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTranscriber's Note\n\n\nThe reference text was kindly provided by the Internet Archive,\nhttps://archive.org/download/a604578400platuoft/a604578400platuoft.pdf.\n\n\nCorrections and Emendations\n\nIn the Introduction page xxv, a final quotation mark has been restored that\ndropped out after the first edition. On page l, Shakespere has been changed\nto Shakespeare.\n\nIn section 414 C, the third edition closes a parenthesis with a comma, thus\n,); the comma has been deleted as in earlier editions.\n\nIn the Index, s.v. Aglaion, the name has been made consistent with the\ntext; it reads Aglaon in the 3rd edition. S.v. Athen\u00e9, Acheans has been\nchanged to Achaeans to maintain consistency, s.v. Festival, Bendidaea\nhas been changed to Bendidea, and s.v. Luxury, Lycean has been changed to\nLycaean, for the same reason. Various other inconsistencies have been left\nuntouched (e.g. [Arist. Pol. ii. 9, \u00a7 5) in the Index in the article on\nState; italicising of supra, etc.).\n\nIn the Index also, a reference, s.v. Intoxication, to Drinking fails to\nrefer; it should be to Drunkenness.\n\n\nConventions in this text\n\nSidenotes in the Introduction and material in the left margin of the\ntranslated part of the book have been labelled [Sidenote: and placed above\nthe paragraph beside which they are placed.\n\nPage numbers have been placed in the body of the text within {}.\n\nMaterial in the right margin, the Stephanus numbering, has been placed in\nthe body of the text within ** - in the translated text the section\nletters (A-E) have been taken from a two-volume edition published in 1908\nand all Stephanus numbers in the translation have been given in full (so\n565A instead of 565, and note that the space between number and letter has\nbeen omitted). Page numbers and the Stephanus numbering have been given a\nspace on either side, even when this goes against Project Gutenberg\nconventions.\n\nFootnotes have been labelled [Footnote and have been placed below the\nparagraph in which they occur. They are numbered consecutively within the\nIntroduction and each Book of the translation.\n\nGreek has been transliterated in full: ) is used for smooth breathing; (\nfor hard; + for diaeresis; / for acute accent; \\ for grave; = for\ncircumflex; | for iota subscript; ch is used for chi, ph for phi, ps for\npsi, th for theta; \u00ea for eta and \u00f4 for omega; u is used for upsilon in all\ncases.","title":"The Republic of Plato","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":252707}