{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_55531/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_55531","id":"gutenberg_55531","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/55531","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Religion -- Philosophy"],"text":"Transcriber's Note.\n\nApparent typographical errors have been corrected; inconsistencies in\nthe use of hyphens have been retained.\n\nOne \"oe\" ligature has been removed.\n\n\n\n\n COMMON SENSE APPLIED TO RELIGION;\n OR,\n THE BIBLE AND THE PEOPLE.\n\n BY CATHARINE E. BEECHER.\n\n AUTHOR OF \"LETTERS TO THE PEOPLE ON HEALTH AND HAPPINESS,\"\n \"PHYSIOLOGY AND CALISTHENICS,\" \"DOMESTIC ECONOMY,\"\n \"DOMESTIC RECEIPT-BOOK,\" &c., &c.\n\n\n NEW YORK:\n HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,\n FRANKLIN SQUARE.\n\n MONTREAL: BENJAMIN DAWSON.\n 1857.\n\n\nEntered, according to Act of Congress, in the year one thousand eight\nhundred and fifty-seven, by\n\nHARPER & BROTHERS,\n\nin the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Southern District of\nNew York.\n\n\n TO THE PEOPLE,\n AS THE SAFEST AND TRUEST INTERPRETERS OF\n THE BIBLE, AND\n TO WOMAN, AS\n THE HEAVEN-APPOINTED EDUCATOR OF MIND,\n THIS WORK\n Is respectfully Dedicated.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX.\n\n\n                                                                    Page\n\n Introduction                                                         ix\n\n CHAP. I. The Grand Questions of Life                                  9\n\n CHAP. II. The Principles of Reason, or Intuitive Truths              14\n\n CHAP. III. Sources of Human Knowledge                                29\n\n CHAP. IV. Of the Knowledge gained by Human Experience in regard\n to the Nature of Mind and of the System of which it is a Part        32\n\n CHAP. V. Knowledge gained by Reason and Experience alone as to a\n Future State                                                         42\n\n CHAP. VI. Knowledge gained by Reason and Experience alone\n concerning the Existence, Character, and Designs of the Creator      47\n\n CHAP. VII. Diversities in Systems of Mental Philosophy               52\n\n CHAP. VIII. Classification and Description of the Mental Powers      59\n\n CHAP. IX. Sensation and Perception                                   64\n\n CHAP. X. Conception and Memory                                       79\n\n CHAP. XI. Attention and Abstraction                                  83\n\n CHAP. XII. Association                                               93\n\n CHAP. XIII. Imagination                                             102\n\n CHAP. XIV. Judgment                                                 106\n\n CHAP. XV. The Susceptibilities                                      109\n\n CHAP. XVI. The Susceptibilities. Emotions of Taste                  120\n\n CHAP. XVII. The Moral Susceptibilities                              139\n\n CHAP. XVIII. The Will                                               149\n\n CHAP. XIX. Faith or Belief                                          165\n\n CHAP. XX. Constitutional Varieties of the Human Mind                175\n\n CHAP. XXI. Habit                                                    178\n\n CHAP. XXII. Mind as Proof of its Creator's Designs                  190\n\n CHAP. XXIII. Social and Material Proofs of the Creator's\n Designs                                                             207\n\n CHAP. XXIV. Right Mode of securing the Object for which\n Mind was created                                                    212\n\n CHAP. XXV. Wrong Action of Mind and its Causes                      220\n\n CHAP. XXVI. Wrong Action of Mind and its Results in this\n Life                                                                224\n\n CHAP. XXVII. Wrong Action of Mind and its Results in a Future\n State                                                               233\n\n CHAP. XXVIII. Character of the Creator                              245\n\n CHAP. XXIX. On Perfect and Imperfect Minds                          250\n\n CHAP. XXX. On the probable Existence and Character of\n Disembodied Spirits                                                 258\n\n CHAP. XXXI. Probabilities in regard to a Revelation from the\n Creator                                                             261\n\n CHAP. XXXII. Interpretation of Language                             265\n\n Addenda to Vol. I.                                                  281\n\n Notes                                                               337\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\n\nThis work is the result of thirty years of devotion to the training of\nthe human mind for the great end for which it was created. Early in that\nperiod it was felt that at the very foundation of such efforts were\nopposing _theological theories_, that seemed at war with both the common\nsense and the moral sense of mankind.\n\nIn the progress of such duties, a work was prepared on _Mental and Moral\nScience_, as a text-book for the institution under the care of the\nwriter, which was printed, but never published. After submitting this\nwork to the criticism of a number of the leading minds of various\nschools and sects, it was found to contain so much that might result in\ntheological controversy, that it was deemed modest and wise to wait\nuntil age, experience, and farther examination had lent their maturing\ninfluence.\n\nAfter a delay of over a quarter of a century, the conviction above\nstated not only remains, but has been strengthened by the discussions\nand developments that have intervened in that period.\n\nWhile the great practical truths both of natural and revealed religion\nhave seemed constantly to be gaining a more controlling influence over\nthe intellect and feelings of mankind, the theological dogmas referred\nto have been more and more evaded or rejected, even by those who receive\nand respect the Bible as containing authentic and authoritative\nrevelations from God.\n\nAt the same time, there is apparent a manifest and strong tendency,\nespecially among the young and most highly-educated of both sexes, to\n_infidelity_; not to that species of a former age which involved a\nhatred and contempt for the Bible, nor to the entire rejection of it as\na very respectable and useful collection of most interesting writings,\nbut to a rejection of it as a _sure and authoritative guide in faith and\nmorals_.\n\nThough there may be other assignable causes for this, it is certain that\nnot the least powerful is the repellency of dogmas claimed to be\ncontained in the Bible, which are revolting both to the intellect and to\nthe moral nature of man.\n\nInstead of being able to meet their religious teachers with the\nassumption that all which they have felt to be contrary to reason, to\ncommon sense, and to common honesty is not contained in the Sacred\nWritings, many have gradually drawn off to the religion of reason and\nnature, and left the Bible to theologians and the Church.\n\nAt the same time, there has been a new development of philanthropy, in\nwhich those who either repudiate the Bible as of any binding authority,\nor disallow its commonly-accepted teachings, are as prominent and\nearnest in works of benevolence as the most orthodox of any sect. To\nthese are added religious teachers, who set forth the morality and\nbenevolence demanded in the Bible as obligatory, and as satisfactorily\ndeducible from the light of nature, so that no revelation is needful to\nmake them more so. Meantime, in popular forms and by popular writers,\nall the most plausible and startling difficulties that oppose the claims\nof the Bible are widely disseminated, while little is done to counteract\nthese influences.\n\nAnother class of religionists has also arisen, that numbers probably its\nhundreds of thousands, the _Spiritualists_, who rest their faith on a\nnew species of so-called revelations, which ordinarily clash with the\naccepted teachings of the Bible, and by vast numbers are received as of\nsuperior authority.\n\nMeantime the press and public lectures are extensively supplanting the\npulpit as organs of moral and religious influence over large portions of\nthe community, while a large part of the most popular speakers and\nwriters avowedly reject the Bible as of any binding authority in\ndeciding moral and religious questions.\n\nAt the same time, there has arisen a freedom of investigation, and an\naversion to all traditional or conservative bonds, such as probably\nnever before was so universal and dominant in this nation, especially\namong those religiously educated.\n\nAll these influences have combined to place the Bible, and the systems\nof theology that claim to be educed from it, in entirely new relations.\nNothing now is safe on the ground of tradition, or of authority, or of\nthe reverence that belongs to age, learning, genius, or experience.\nEvery thing in religion, as well as other matters, is to stand on its\nown claims, and not by any factitious supports.\n\nIn this state of the public mind, the following considerations have had\ninfluence in leading to the presentation of the views contained in this\nvolume.\n\nIt is the distinctive maxim of Protestant Christianity that \"every\nperson is to be his own interpreter of the revelations of God contained\nin the Bible, responsible only to his Maker.\" This, of course, implies\nthe practicability of a proper qualification for this duty in every\nindividual, so that no person shall necessarily be dependent on other\nminds for a correct knowledge of all that relates to his own duty and\ndangers.\n\nIt is manifest that the Creator designed that _woman_ should have the\nleading position as the _educator of mind_, especially at that period\nwhen the habits and principles of life are formed. This being so, it is\nclear that it was designed that _she_ should be qualified to gain by her\nown independent powers all that is revealed by God that will aid her in\nthis great work.\n\nThe theological theories referred to, as seemingly opposing the moral\nsense and common sense of mankind, are those that relate to the\nfoundation principle on which the training of mind is to start. They\ninvolve the most practical questions of every-day life, both as to\nindividual responsibility and to the education of the young.\n\nThese theories, then, are to be examined and tested by _the laity_ as\nmuch as by theologians, and especially are they to be examined and\ndecided on by _woman_, as the heaven-appointed educator of infancy and\nchildhood.\n\nIn this examination, these theories are to be tested, not by the\ndecisions of ecclesiastical bodies, nor by the writings of theologians,\nbut by those principles of _reason and common sense, and those laws of\nlanguage_, which guide mankind in all other practical and personal\nduties. In order to this, these principles must be evolved and stated in\nsimple and popular form, for particular application on these questions;\nfor no man or woman can decide whether a thing agrees with, or is\ncontrary to the moral sense, or to the principles of reason and common\nsense, till they clearly perceive what those principles are, and have\nlearned to apply them appropriately.\n\nThe leading object of this volume is, then, to present these principles\nin a popular form, and to make it apparent that they can be practically\nemployed by the laity in deciding what is truth, both as to the claims\nof the Bible as containing authoritative revelations from the Creator,\nand also as to the true interpretation of it.\n\nIn asking the attention of the laity, including her own sex, to the\ndiscussion of topics which have heretofore been deemed the most\ndifficult, recondite, and profound, it is with the full conviction that\nmost of the difficulties that heretofore have opposed such\ninvestigations have belonged, not to the topics themselves, but to the\nmethods of discussion.\n\nIt is believed that, though this small volume embraces most of those\npoints in metaphysics which have been considered the most difficult,\nthere is not a page that can not be perfectly comprehended by any man or\nwoman of only an ordinarily good education, and with less intellectual\neffort than is demanded of little girls in acquiring an ability to parse\nthe English language.\n\nIt is true that _close thought and attention_ are requisite for a full\nappreciation of all in this volume; but not more of these are required\nthan the dignity and importance of the great topics involved properly\ndemand.\n\nIn attempting what is here proposed, it can be seen that there are great\ndifficulties to be met. As a general fact, these subjects have not been\npresented in popular forms, but have been confined to works of\nmetaphysics and theology, and there enveloped in scientific techniques\nand formulas not interesting or intelligible to the common mind. For\nthis reason, it has been suggested that, before presenting the abstract\nportion, a _practical illustration_ of the subject, embodied in the\nhistory of the opinions of the author, as they have been formed or\nmodified by these principles, would have far more effect on the class of\nreaders for whom the work is written than the bare statement of\nprinciples and argument, while it would certainly be more likely to be\nread.\n\nIt has been still farther urged that, in attempting to controvert\nlong-established theories, embodied as a part of religious truth in the\npopular mind, there will be an opposition of _feeling_ to be overcome,\nwhich needs a counterbalancing appeal to the feelings such as an\nindividual history can best offer.\n\nAs to the propriety of such a measure, it is now so common to offer\nautobiographies, and histories of life and opinions by living authors,\nthat this will be no innovation on the customs of the literary world.\n\nTo this, a more weighty consideration should be added, and that is, that\nall questions of propriety and of duty are regulated by circumstances of\nrisk and danger. A woman, suddenly roused from sleep to save her\nchildren from the flames, has a very different rule of propriety in\nappearing before the public from that demanded on ordinary occasions. In\nthis view, a believer in the risks of the _eternal loss of the soul_\nmust withhold nothing, however sacred and cherished, if there is the\nshadow of a probability that it will avail aught in aiding, it may be,\nbut one struggling, darkened mind in the death-agony of the soul.\n\nFrom these considerations, the writer has been led to prefix to the\nexhibition of principles and arguments of this work, a mental history\nthat shall particularly illustrate the subjects discussed. The article\nwas prepared for certain personal and family friends, and is inserted\nvery nearly in its original form.\n\n\nILLUSTRATIVE MENTAL HISTORY.\n\nI wish, before publishing my forthcoming work, to obtain the views of\nsome of my theological friends as to certain phases of experience of my\nown mind, and, to a certain extent, of other minds known to me.\n\nMy _intellectual_ character was a singular compound of the practical and\nthe imaginative. In youth I had no love for study or for reading even,\nexcepting works of imagination. Don Quixote, the novel to which I first\nhad access, was nearly committed to memory, as were a few other novels\nfound at my grandmother's. The poets, both ancient and modern, were\nalways in reach, and with these materials I early formed a habit of\nreverie and castle-building as my chief internal source of enjoyment.\nWith this was combined incessant activity in practical matters, such as,\nat first, doll-dressing and baby-house building; afterward drawing,\npainting, exploits of merriment, practical jokes, snow castles and\nforts, summer excursions, school and family drama-acting, and the like.\nTill eighteen, I never wrote any thing but a few letters and scraps of\nrhyme, and the transforming of some stories into dramas for acting. A\nkind teacher, who sympathized in my strong love of the comic, described\nme as \"the busiest of all creatures in doing nothing.\"\n\n_Socially_, I was good-natured and sympathizing, so that my jokes and\ntricks were never such as to tease or annoy others.\n\n_Morally_, I had a strong sense of justice, but was not naturally so\nconscientious as some of the other children. Add to these, persevering\nenergy, great self-reliance, and such cheerful hopefulness that the idea\nof danger or failure never entered my head. Even to this day, perfect\nsuccess and no mischances are always anticipated till reason corrects\nthe calculation.\n\nThus constituted, my strict religious training made little impression,\nfor I rarely heard any thing of that which seemed so dull and\nunintelligible. Up to the age of sixteen my conceptions on this subject\nwere about these: that God made me and all things, and was very great,\nand wise, and good; that he knew all I thought and did; that because\nAdam and Eve disobeyed him _once_ only, he drove them out of Eden, and\nthen so arranged it that all their descendants would be born with wicked\nhearts, and that, though this did not seem either just or good, it was\nso; that I had such a wicked heart that I could not feel or act right in\nany thing till I had a new one; that God only could give me a new heart;\nthat, if I died without it, I should go to a lake of fire and brimstone,\nand be burned alive in it forever; that Jesus Christ was very good, and\nvery sorry for us, and came to earth, and suffered and died to save us\nfrom this dreadful doom; that _revivals_ were times when God, the Holy\nSpirit, gave people new hearts; that, when revivals came, it was best to\nread the Bible, and pray, and go to meetings, but that at other times it\nwas of little use. This last was not taught, but was my own inference.\n\nMy mind turned from all this as very disagreeable. When led by my\nparents and Christian friends to it, I tried to do as they told me,\nbecause I saw they were anxious and troubled, and I wished to relieve\nthem. Two or three times, when I saw my father so troubled, I took\n_Doddridge's Rise and Progress of Religion_, and tried to go through the\nprocess there laid down, but with utter failure. Meantime, I rarely\nheard any prayers or sermons, and at fifteen I doubt if the whole of my\nreally serious thoughts and efforts would, except the above, have\noccupied a whole hour.\n\nIn the earlier periods of my religious training, my parents, in their\ninstructions, and also my little hymns and catechisms, made the\nimpression that God loved little children, and, though he was angry when\nthey did wrong, he was pleased when they did right; and, as parental\ngovernment was tender and loving, my impression of the feelings of the\nheavenly Parent were conformed to this, my past experience.\n\nBut when, in more mature years, I came under the influence of \"revival\npreaching,\" all this impression seemed to be reversed. I was taught to\nlook at God as a great \"moral governor,\" whose chief interest was \"to\nsustain his law.\" Then there seemed to be two kinds of right and wrong,\nthe \"common\" and the \"evangelical.\" According to this distinction, I\ncould not feel or do any thing that was right or acceptable _to God_\ntill my birth-gift of a depraved heart was renewed by a special divine\ninterposition.\n\nMeantime, there did not seem to be any direct and practical way of\nsecuring this supernatural interference; for it was to be the result,\nnot of any efforts of mine, nor were any divine promises or\nencouragements offered to secure my efforts. On the contrary, the\nselection of the recipients of this favor was regulated by a divine\ndecree of \"election,\" without reference to any acts of a being who did\nnothing but evil, and only evil, till this favor was bestowed. Moreover,\nall the exhortations to effort were based simply on the fact that,\nordinarily, those who took a certain course were selected, though I\nperceived that sometimes those who did the least were chosen, while\nthose who did the most were passed by.\n\nIt was this view of the case that had the chief influence in leading to\nan entire neglect of all religious concerns. It was so nearly like a\nmatter of mere chance, and there seemed so little adaptation of means to\nends, that, to one so hopeful, and, at the same time, so practical,\nthere was very little motive of any kind to lead to a religious life.\n\nThe first real earnest feeling I ever had on this subject was when my\ntender mother died--such a mother as earth has seldom seen; as strong in\nintellect as she was modest and gentle in manners, and loving and\nsympathizing in heart. She left seven children younger than myself, one\nof them a babe, and I only sixteen. I really tried, for some time, to\nbecome a Christian, till the load of grief was alleviated by time, and\nthen such efforts ceased; but these new responsibilities turned my\npractical habits into useful channels.\n\nOnce after this, when \"a revival\" seemed closing, and my father\nexpressed his distress for my indifference, I told him I was so happy I\ncould not do any thing but enjoy life, and that _nothing but trials and\nsorrow_ would do me any good. Tears came into his eyes as he said, \"Dear\nchild, must I die too?\" The responsive tears came to my eyes, but soon\nall was forgotten.\n\nAt this time my theory of morals was, that to lie, steal, swear,\nquarrel, disobey parents, and break the Sabbath, were sins for which I\nshould feel guilty; but for not becoming a Christian, when I could not\nunderstand how to do it, never rested on my conscience as a sin, but was\nfelt to be simply a misfortune. And I wondered, if God desired that I\nshould have a new heart, and he only could give it, why he did not do\nso. This was the amount of my \"reasoning\" so far. Till nearly twenty, I\ngained little knowledge except by intercourse with intelligent people,\nfor still I had no love for solid reading or study. At about that age, I\nremember turning over Reid's work on Mental Science, in which my mother\nhad been deeply interested, and wondering how people could read such\nstuff.\n\nAt twenty that betrothal took place, so soon and so tragically ended! It\nwas the realization of all my favorite dreams of earthly bliss.\nAffection, taste, ambition, every thing most desirable to me and to\nfamily friends, seemed secured. In a few months all was ended, and in\nthe most terrible and heart-rending manner.\n\nAfter the first stunning effect was over, the next feeling was, \"This is\nthat indispensable sorrow! this is to save me from _eternal death_!\" And\nso, as soon as I could do any thing, I began a course of religious\nreading, prayer, and mental conflict. I tried to remedy that pernicious\nmental habit of reverie and castle-building; I tried to do I knew not\nwhat in \"becoming a Christian.\"\n\nShut up in entire seclusion, all my dearest hopes forever crushed,\nwithout hope or object in life, overwhelmed with grief, horrified less\nat his dreadful death than at the awful apprehensions he himself had\nimparted that he was unprepared to die, I spent week after week in\nreading the stern and powerful writings of President Edwards, Dwight's\nSystem of Theology, and other similar works. I hoped for nothing, cared\nfor nothing but to become a Christian. Yet no one could tell me\nintelligibly how to do it, while it was clear that all expected nothing\nfrom my efforts, and that all was dependent on a divine efflatus that\nwas to change the birth-gift of a depraved heart.\n\nAnd yet I was told that the fault was all my own; that it was my\nobstinate _unwillingness_ to do what was required that alone made it\nneedful for God to interfere. This was urged as a doctrine from God, and\nso, though it seemed as if I was not only willing, but that I longed for\nthis change, I submitted my humble intellect to His, and owned that it\nmust be so. So passed several dark and weary months.\n\nNext, I went to visit the parents of the friend I had lost. Here I read\nhis private records of _years_ of almost superhuman effort to govern his\nmind, and to achieve the very thing I was laboring for, and yet, to his\nmind, all ended in entire failure; and this, too, without any murmuring,\nor any accusation of any one but himself. It was, as he maintained,\nbecause he was so ungrateful, so hardened, so obstinately \"unwilling,\"\nso averse from God and his service. And yet he was the model of every\ndomestic, social, and official virtue; so reverent to God, so tender as\na son and brother, so conscientious and faithful as an instructor! In\nnot a single duty did he fail that the closest intimacy could discover;\nand yet, by his own showing, he had no love to God, and was entirely\n\"unwilling\" to love and serve him.\n\nAt the same time, I found his intelligent, tender, heart-broken mother\nhad for years been living just such a conscientious life, without any\nhope that she was a Christian, while now her pride and darling son was\nlost to her forever on earth, and oh! where was he? and where should she\nmeet him at last? And thus she died. The only brother, too, so\nconscientious and exemplary, was and long continued in the same same\nposition of mind.\n\nThese revelations took away all hope of any good from any farther\nefforts of mine. At this period I almost lost my reason. For some days I\nthought I should go distracted. The first decided \"change of mind\" I now\nrecall was an outburst of indignation and abhorrence. I remember once\nrising, as I was about to offer my usual, now hopeless prayer, with a\nfeeling very like this: that such a God did not deserve to be loved;\nthat I would not love him if I could, and I was glad I did not! It was\nbut momentary, and the long training of years resumed its sway.\n\nIt was at this period that I framed my first attempt at serious argument\nin a letter to my father. I took this position, that our own\n_experience_ and _consciousness_ were the highest kind of evidence of\nour mental power, and that I had this evidence of my mental inability to\nlove God as required. My father's reply was published in the _Christian\nSpectator_, and was regarded as masterly and unanswerable. Its chief aim\nwas to lessen confidence in my own consciousness, and to show that, as\nGod was just and good, and certainly did require supreme love to him, we\nhad the power to obey. I was unable to meet the argument, and so allowed\nthat it must be so, and that all that was in my way was my own obstinate\n\"unwillingness.\"\n\nBut there was another point about which I attempted to reason that I did\nnot give up so easily. According to the theory of \"obstinate\nunwillingness,\" there was nothing in the Bible by way of promise, or\neven encouragement, for any like me. For how could God feel sympathy for\nobstinate rebels, or how make promises of hope and encouragement to\nthose whose only difficulty was an unreasonable dislike to God and his\nservice? Such texts as I quoted to the contrary (as Prov. 2:1-6; Matth.\n7:7; John 4:10) were not for such as I, but for those already converted;\nand no prayers, even, were acceptable till offered by a renewed heart.\nSo it seemed impossible, in any case, to pray acceptably to God for the\ngreatest of all boons, redemption from the awful doom of eternal death;\nfor at regeneration the blessing was already given, and before that act\nno prayer was acceptable. So there was no place for such a prayer. This\nI never accepted, though I did not quite venture to oppose it.\n\nAt one time my mind turned with longing and tender emotions toward Jesus\nChrist. All he said and did appeared so reasonable and so kind that it\nseemed to me he would hear my prayers. I brought, to sustain this idea,\nthe case of the young man whom \"Jesus loved\" when he had no religion.\nHere I was met by a theory that, till now, had not attracted my notice,\nwhich was, that there was a human soul in Christ joined to the Divine\nmind, and that it was this human soul that felt this \"human sympathy\"\nfor sinners, and _bore all the suffering_, while the Deity had nothing\nbut calm, unmingled bliss. This made me feel that I could love the human\nsoul, but could not love God. Indeed, the sufferings of this innocent\nSavior, _unshared by God_, was the most revolting of all.\n\nAt the close of a long year of such darkness and suffering, I went to my\nfriends in Boston, where \"a _revival_\" was in progress, and where I met\nmy father. Here I received the most tender sympathy, was taken to\nprayer-meetings, and every thing was said and done that piety and love\ncould devise for my relief, but all in vain.\n\nFinally, I came to this attitude of mind: \"I will not try any more to\nunderstand any thing about these doctrines. I will not try any more to\n'be convinced of sin' in this inability to love God. Something is the\nmatter: it does not seem like obstinate 'unwillingness;' but if God says\nso, I will take his word for it. I will assume that He is just, and\nwise, and good, in spite of all that seems to contrary. I will try to do\nall He commands the best I can. _There must be a dreadful mistake\nsomewhere_, but I will trust and obey, and wait quietly for light.\" At\nthis time my father gave me some little hope. I knew not why, for I did\nnot \"love God\" according to any of the ordinary tests. But I was\nencouraged to hope that my heart was \"renewed,\" and I shortly after made\na public profession of religion in my father's church.\n\nDuring my residence with the friends referred to, I attempted the duties\nof a teacher to two young daughters of the family, and, to prepare\nmyself, for the first time set my mind to real hard study. In five weeks\nI went through a large Arithmetic, of which I knew almost nothing; in\nseven weeks I completed Day's Algebra. Two schoolbooks on Chemistry and\nNatural Philosophy were also mastered that gloomy winter. I had no other\nresource within or without for so active a mind. Then my father urged\nme, for the sake of a sister, as my own pecuniary wants had been\nprovided for, to commence a school in Hartford. As I taught only half a\nday, and \"the higher branches\" were but just entering female schools, I\nfound no difficulty in keeping sufficiently ahead of my pupils. Thus\ncommenced my career as a teacher.\n\nI went on several years with no other evidence of \"love to God,\" which\nwas the main test of \"regeneration,\" but perseverance in the\ndetermination to assume that He was wise, just, and good, and to do all\nI could to obey him. My great aim in life was to find out what He\nrequired from the Bible, and then to try to do it as well as I could.\nBesides this, I imitated the methods of Christian worthies. I kept a\nreligious diary--read religious books--went to religious meetings--prayed\nin my school, and taught religion to my pupils as it had been taught to\nme. Often, when I found suffering young minds embarrassed by my own\ndifficulties, willing and anxious to do all in their power, and yet\nunable to feel as required, I almost lived over past anguish of spirit,\nand could scarcely nerve myself to instruct them that all the wrong was\ntheir own \"obstinate unwillingness.\" There was a constant conflict\nbetween the theories to which I had bowed my intellect, and thought I\nreally believed, and the impulses of my moral nature and common sense.\n\nSometimes these questions were intolerably imperative. What evidence is\nthere that what God says is _true_, when He claims to be wise, and just,\nand good, when He has done such contradictory things? For a single act,\ndone six thousand years ago, the _first_ act of disobedience too, He has\nso constituted things that all the human minds that might be made right\nare formed so \"_depraved_\" as that not one of them will ever be\n\"willing\" to love and obey the Creator till He \"_renews_\" their minds.\nIf I were to act thus, I should think it right for every one to believe\nI was cruel and unjust until I showed good reasons for it. And if I saw\nany one ruining the minds of young children, or permitting Adam or any\none else to do it, when I had power to prevent it, I should say it was\nright to consider him an abominable and hateful being till he showed\ngood reasons for such a course.\n\nSuch thoughts were banished by the force of a strong will, and I\ncontinued to hold on to the Bible as a revelation from God, and to His\nclaims as being wise, and just, and good. My renewed decision was,\n\"There is some _dreadful mistake somewhere_; but I will take God's word\nand trust it, do the best I can, and wait till all is made clear.\"\n\nIn the later periods of life, a mode of religious training has come\nrepeatedly under my observation, to which a brief reference will here be\nmade. I have known children, no more favorably endowed than myself, and\nsome of them less so, whose parents were no more earnest and faithful\nthan mine, though on a different theory.\n\nThese children were first trained to prompt, unquestioning, and\nuniversal obedience to their parents' commands, almost such as is\nrequired by their Creator to his fixed and unalterable laws. At the same\ntime they were treated with the greatest tenderness and sympathy, and as\nsoon as they could understand the reasons for parental requirements,\nthese reasons were given, but always with the understanding that\nimplicit obedience must often be rendered without understanding the\nreasons. When these habits of confiding and affectionate obedience were\nformed, then they were taught that Jesus Christ was the Maker, Friend,\nand Father of all, who loved all his children as these parents loved\ntheir little ones, only more and better; that He created them to be\nhappy, rejoiced to see them so, and was always sorry for them in every\ntrouble.\n\nThey were taught that there are _right_ ways and _wrong_ ways of seeking\nto be happy; that Jesus Christ came into this world to teach us what are\nthese right and wrong ways, and that His instructions are written in the\nBible; that it is very difficult to feel and act right in all things;\nthat, when children _try_ to do so, the Savior is pleased with them,\nand, though they see him not, is present with them to help them; that,\nwhen they fail, and feel or act wrong, he is grieved, as their parents\nare, and as ready to forgive and help them, when they too are sorry, and\ncontinue to try to do right in all things; that _they are Christians\njust so far as they succeed in obeying Christ_, and that, the more they\ntry, the more help they will have, and the better they will succeed.\n\nThus these children grew up with the feeling that whenever they did any\nthing that was kind, honest, honorable, just, and self-denying, they\nwere pleasing, not only their parents, but their best and ever-present\nFriend. Under such a course, the varied duties of religion and of social\nand domestic life were gradually not only explained, but _enforced_,\nboth by parental authority and example, till a character and habits were\nformed that were far more consistent with the New Testament exhibitions\nof Christian life than is often seen among mature Christians.\n\nWithout at present expressing any other opinion in regard to this\nmethod, I am strong in the belief that if this course had been pursued\nwith me in childhood, very different mental habits would have been the\nresult, and that the Christian life would have begun and progressed\nprobably before the severe discipline of sorrow came, and certainly\nafter it had been experienced.\n\nAt the same time, there is a deep conviction that many of my young\npupils, who turned away from religion as uninviting, severe, and\nunintelligible, would, by another method, have been easily led into the\ntrue paths of pleasantness and peace.\n\nI wish now to exhibit the influence of one doctrine (which I claim to be\nthat of reason as truly as of revelation) on a mind like mine. I have\nstated something of that hopeful, elastic, and happy temperament that\nseemed to make sorrow so indispensable to the development of my noblest\npowers. But the earthly sorrow, time and new interests would have\nremedied ere youth had passed. But that awful doctrine of THE ETERNAL,\nIRREMEDIABLE LOSS OF THE SOUL, so ground into my spirit by years of\neffort, of which this was the mainspring, has been the grand motive\npower of my whole life ever since. If I could in any way have satisfied\nmyself that a time would come, however distant, when all sufferers would\nbe repaid by eternal ages of bliss, and all the guilty, however long\ntheir period of purgation, would at last be pure and happy _forever_, I\nshould have returned to life and its enjoyments with fresh zest after\nsuch a period of privation. But I could not gain any such assurance\nwithout the Bible, but rather the reverse; while all the life and\nteachings of Christ and the Apostles seemed entirely based on the\nassumption that our whole race were in awful danger, that some were to\nbe saved and some were to be _lost_ _forever_, and that the great end\nfor which Christ lived, and for which his followers are to live, is to\nSAVE AS MANY AS POSSIBLE from this awful doom.\n\nIndeed, I could not see how any one could feel any respect for the\nteachings of Christ when such terrible things were uttered by him, if\nthere was no just reason thus to terrify and alarm mankind. Times\nwithout number, I went over the New Testament to see if I could find any\n_honest_ way of escaping that doctrine, and always ending with a deeper\nand more awful conviction of its reality. The result was, that while,\nfor the first year, I was driven to such mental effort and suffering to\nsave myself, as soon as the least hope dawned that I was safe, all that\nwas kindly and sympathizing in my nature led me to renewed efforts to\nsave others.\n\nAfter such a lesson of inability, both in my own case and that of such\ndear friends, no words can express the ineffable pity, sympathy, and\nalmost horror with which I looked on the world around me. And when young\nand happy minds, such as once was my own, came under my training, I\nnever felt any need of being \"waked up,\" as some Christian people seemed\nto do. It only seemed to me I could never sleep. There never has been an\nhour for thirty years when a moment's consideration of this awful\ndoctrine would not drive away every temptation to earthly ambition, or\nany longings for earthly good of any sort for myself. Many times, when,\nby the presentation of such an awful theme, I have brought the young to\nme with tears and willing docility, and when, to the question \"What can\nwe do to be saved?\" my shut-up heart was ready to exclaim \"Nothing,\" I\nhave been so burdened and worn as to be obliged to pray to forget, and\nto take every lawful mode to turn my thoughts to other less exciting\nthemes. It was at such times I understood for what the love of the comic\nwas implanted, and if all Christians should feel as I do, what might be\nthe legitimate use of works of fiction, the drama, and the dance. In\nsuch a case, and properly regulated, they would be needful and only\nbeneficial alteratives.\n\nI wish now to ask my theological friends to consider the character of my\ninner life. In all outward manifestations I took the theory of religion\ntrained into me, and did my best to believe it, and talked, and wrote,\nand prayed, and acted before others on the assumption of its truth. But\nmy inner life was after this fashion: as to prayer in private, I found\ngreat comfort in the preface to the Lord's prayer, \"_After this manner_\npray ye.\" It was a short, comprehensive prayer, which amounted to this,\nthat God's will might be done on earth as in heaven; that our temporal\nwants might be supplied; that we might do right and escape evil. This I\ncould sincerely feel and pray when all _details_ distressed me. But,\nstill better, this prayer began, \"Our _Father_.\" Now to me, through my\nwhole life, this word \"father\" had been associated with unparalleled\ntenderness, sympathy, and love; with truth, justice, and all that was\nlovable. I could not apply it to God without such associations, and so\nit comforted me--and that was all. But the prayers, hymns, and sermons\nconformed to the _theory_ of religion were occasions when I had to\nstruggle with feelings of disgust and abhorrence. Especially, at times,\nwas this so in reference to the _atoning_ _sacrifice of Jesus Christ_,\nuntil I formed a curious mental habit of letting these things pass\nthrough my mind as something I did not understand, and then there seemed\nto flow in a vague impression of something better, I knew not what.\n\nIn the progress of years I came to instruct some of the most vigorous\nand active minds I ever saw, both in mental science and in the\ninterpretation of the Bible, and thus gradually evolved and applied \"the\nprinciples of reason and rules of interpretation\" in this work. The\nresults will mainly appear in what follows.\n\nUp to this time, my feelings toward God (except sometimes when praying,\nas above described) were that, as He has said he was wise, and just, and\ngood, I would take his word for it, in spite of all the evidence to the\ncontrary, and feel and act as he required as far as I had power. My\nservice, however, was much like that of a slave to a hard master. If\n\"the _fear_ of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom,\" I certainly began\naright.\n\nBut the whole force of my being was turned, not toward Him, but toward\nmy lost, and suffering, and darkened fellow-beings. And when all my\ndarkness was removed, and by a simple intellectual process of\nargumentation I drew from His Holy Word all my soul had longed for, my\nchief joy was, not that I was safe, not that I could feel emotions of\nlove to Him, but that _He felt as I did_ for this all-absorbing purpose\nand end of my existence--to save my fellow-men.\n\nSome minds seem to begin religious life with such emotions of love to\nthe Creator as makes it easy to carry out the purpose to obey him. In my\ncase, I began with the cool intellectual purpose to obey him, while it\nwas _love_, not to Him, but to my fellow-men, that made it easy to carry\nout this purpose of obedience. But, in both cases, was it not the\n_spirit of obedience_ that was the grand requisite? The _all-controlling\npurpose of acting right_, by obeying all the laws of the Creator as\ndiscovered by the light of Nature, or by His revealed Word--is not\n_this_ the distinctive feature that marks the \"_regenerated_\" soul?\n\nIt is theological _theories_, forced on mankind through popes, emperors,\nand church councils, by pains and penalties, which has mystified that\ngrand question of life, \"What must we do to be saved?\" so that the\nanswer to almost every other practical question is more clear than this.\nWhat do the great masses of men suppose that _they themselves_ are to do\nif ever they become \"regenerated?\" Multitudes imagine that, by going to\ncamp-meetings, or conference meetings, or in \"revivals,\" some Divine\nefflux will come over them, of which the chief evidence is that the mind\nis filled with joy, or other delightful emotions. Others deem it a\nmysterious change, that takes place sometimes in sleep, without any\nvoluntary act of the individual. Others suppose it to consist in certain\nemotions or mental acts, in reference to Jesus Christ, that come by\ndivine influence. Others consider it an act of the intellect and will,\nof which emotions may be the preceding state, or may follow as a result.\nProbably the vast majority regard it as a mysterious indescribable\nevent, that no one can understand till it is experienced, and which can\nnot be made intelligible to an \"unrenewed mind.\"\n\nThousands of excellent, conscientious persons are moving about with dark\nminds and heavy hearts, who would instantly become happy and consistent\nfollowers of Christ if these theories could be removed from their minds,\nand they were sure that an earnest spirit of obedience to Jesus Christ\nis what is required; to which the promises of hope and encouragement are\nmade; which is the highest evidence of regeneration, and the chief\nfeature of that \"love to God\" required; while all emotions, frames, and\nfeelings are nothing without it. Thousands of children and young\npersons, religiously trained, are held back from a religious life\nbecause it is conceived of as so mysterious, uninviting, and painful\nthat they can neither understand or desire it. At the same time, it is\ntrue that, _after children have been trained wrong_, so that bad habits\nof mind are dominant, the clear understanding of this subject will not,\nin many cases, make it easy for them to commence a religious life, or\nmake it look desirable.\n\nThe fearful sanctions of eternity can not very directly be brought to\nbear on the minds of young children without great risk of entirely false\nimpressions. We see, in the Old Testament, that when God was training _a\nrace_, in the infancy of its development He made visible appearances,\nused temporal motives, and made no appeals to the sanctions of the\ninvisible world. Like the parents just referred to, his first aim seemed\nto be to teach _habits of obedience_ to God's temporal laws, while, at\nthe same time, He displayed his sympathy, mercy, and love. And among his\nancient people men became his obedient children by just such training as\nis now best fitted to young children.\n\nBut when the race was farther advanced, so as to be able to act more by\nreason and on _general principles_, and when His religion, by new\nmotives and forces, was to be extended from one nation to all the world,\n_then the Creator came himself_; and while disclosing those most\nterrific sanctions of the invisible world, at the same time exhibited\nsuch a manifestation of His pity, sympathy, and _self-sacrificing love_\nas renders these terrors safe and effective in such a conjuncture, as\nthey would not be without.\n\nWith these two classes of motives thus intensified, such a moral power\nhas been generated, leading to self-denying efforts to educate and save\nmankind, as never existed before. In the case of the writer, the power\nof these terrible sanctions _alone_ has been illustrated. In other\ncases, the power of Christ's love and example have been the leading\nmotives. It is the _union of both_, clearly appreciated, and especially\nbrought to bear on those who form the character of childhood and youth,\nthat eventually is to renew the whole race, and bring every human being\nto perfect obedience to _all_ the laws of the Creator.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn the investigation which originated at the time the writer commenced\nteaching mental philosophy in connection with the Bible, this was the\nfirst point to which attention was led, \"What is that '_reason_' or\n'_common sense_' which is so often appealed to as the umpire in\nreligion, morals, and interpretation?\" All the works of mental science\nwithin reach were examined, but it was long before any clear conceptions\non this question were gained, and still longer before any _test_ was\nevolved that seemed a _practical_ one, as it is presented in this work.\nNot that these principles and the test are not indicated by\nmetaphysicians in various forms of language, but that there is such a\nconfusing variety of expression, and all is so presented as a\n_speculative_ instead of a _practical_ question, that years elapsed\nbefore that use of these principles which this work illustrates was\nattained.\n\nThis is here referred to in explanation of future passages that\notherwise might seem to imply that the author assumes to have discovered\nsomething not before known or recognized by metaphysicians. The very\nwritings of Dr. Reid, which, in early life, were turned over with wonder\nthat any one could be interested in them, probably contain the most\ncomplete and clear exhibition of these principles, and also recognize\nthe _test_ by which they are to be established. The writings of Sir\nWilliam Hamilton exhibit other, but less practical tests of these\nprinciples.\n\nUntil the printing of this volume was nearly complete, it was the plan\nof the author to have the whole work issued at once; and, with reference\nto this whole, its title was THE BIBLE AND THE PEOPLE, OR COMMON SENSE\nAPPLIED TO RELIGION. But, after submitting this portion of the work to\ncriticism, it was concluded to issue only one volume, and to wait until\nit was seen what reception the _principles_ it offered would meet. In\nconsequence of this, it seemed proper to transpose the title, as the\nlatter portion of it best describes the contents of the first volume.\nThis accounts for what is unusual in paging and in the running title on\nthe left-hand pages.\n\n\n\n\nTHE\n\nBIBLE AND THE PEOPLE.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nTHE GRAND QUESTIONS OF LIFE.\n\n\nWe are now living through the period of demolition. In morals, in social\nlife, in politics, in medicine, and in religion, there is a universal\nupturning of foundations.\n\nBut the day of reconstruction seems to be looming in the orient, and now\nthe grand question is, Are there any sure and universal principles that\nwill evolve a harmonious system in which all shall agree? Or, is the\nonly unity to be anticipated that which results from the unsatisfactory\nconclusion that all must \"agree to disagree?\"\n\nThe first alternative is believed to be in our future; and it is hoped\nthat this volume will contribute something toward evolving such\nprinciples of reconstruction.\n\nIn some happily constituted minds and singularly favorable\ncircumstances, the passages of this life are almost uniformly happy, and\nno clouds ever shut out the sunshine of a cheerful existence.\n\nBut, as a general rule, the farther we advance in life, the more solemn\nbecome our convictions that its experiences are stormy, sad,\ndisappointing, and unsatisfactory. And the nobler the mind and the more\nexalted its aspirations, the more surely are these lessons read and\nunderstood.\n\nIf we turn aside from the lower haunts of poverty, vice, and crime, and\nlook only at the more favored classes, we find men toiling for years and\nyears to build up schemes which, in some sudden shock, crumble and pass\naway; or, are their high hopes accomplished, some bitter ingredient\nmingles with the cup of success, that turns it to gall.\n\nAnd so, in heart-histories, the tenderest ties are formed, as it would\nseem, only to be wrenched and torn. The young heart gives its fresh\nimpassioned love to its appropriate object, and, just at the happy\nconsummation, death or desertion forever ends life's brightest\nexperience.\n\nThe young parents receive their first-born with untold rapture, and then\nsome disease or accident turns it to a hopeless idiot or ceaseless\nsufferer.\n\nThe young husband lays at once his first love and his first born in the\nsame grave. The tender parents spend years and years of care and effort\nto rear a darling child, and at the culmination of their hopes the\nflower is cut down.\n\nBusiness or misfortune severs those whose chief happiness would be to\nlive together. The long-tried friends of early life are thrown into\npainful antagonisms that end their friendship. The conflicts of interest\nand party develop conduct and character that shatter confidence in men\nand tempt to misanthropy.\n\nIn short, there are seasons when a thoughtful and tender spirit is\ntempted to feel as if some malignant power were commissioned to seek out\nall that is most beautiful, harmonious, and delightful in the experience\nof our race, only to imbitter, confound, and destroy.\n\nAnd even where the experience of life has been the most favorable, as\nits closing years come on early friends pass away, the capacities and\nresources of enjoyment diminish, and the dim cloud that shrouds the\nclosing vista awakens solemn and anxious meditations on the untried and\nsilent future. Such experiences bring forth the heart-yearning questions\nthat come, as it were, from the united voice of sad and suffering\nhumanity:\n\n\"Is there a God that controls the destinies of man? If so, what are his\ncharacter and designs? Is this sad life our only portion, or shall we\nlive beyond the grave? If there is another life before us, what\ninfluence has our conduct and character here on its solemn destinies?\n\nAre we left to our own unaided faculties to reason out from the nature\nof things around us the replies to these momentous questions, or has the\nAuthor of our being given some direct revelation to guide us?\n\nIf such a revelation exists, is it made accessible to all, or must one\nportion of our race necessarily depend on fallible and interested\ninterpreters?\n\nDoes this revelation agree with reason and experience, and does it\ncontain all that we need both for safe guidance and for peace of mind?\"\n\nIt is believed that, in the following pages, it will be seen that every\nmind, of even only ordinary capacity, is furnished with the means of\nanswering all these questions, and with as much certainty as appertains\nto the ordinary practical questions of this life.\n\nAt the same time, it will appear that most of the difficulties and\ndiversities of opinions in religious matters have mainly resulted from\nneglecting these means of obtaining truth and peace, and that the \"good\ntimes coming\" are all depending on the proper use of these means.\n\nAs introductory to the first main topic, it is important to refer to the\nfact that, in all languages, man is recognized as possessing what is\ncalled _reason_. He is called a _reasonable_ being and a _reasoning_\nbeing, and it is claimed that it is his reason that places him at the\nhead of creation in this world.\n\nAgain, in discussions on truth and duty, all men seem to agree that\nthere is such a thing as _reason_, and that it is, more or less, to be\nmade the umpire in settling all disputed points. It is true that very\nfew seem to have a clear and definite idea of what this reason is, or\nhow it is to be made an umpire. But all allow that there is such a\nthing, and that it has a very important office in deciding questions of\ntruth and duty.\n\nThen, again, among more scientific men, we hear constant reference made\nto our \"intuitions\" and our \"intuitive knowledge,\" as if there were some\nfixed truths which are superior to all others. It is true, that when we\ncome to inquire specifically as to what are these intuitions, we often\nfind them to be acquired notions, and sometimes such as are unsupported\nby any evidence, or even contrary to the best kind of evidence.\nNevertheless, those who use these terms all agree in the fact that there\nare \"intuitions\" and \"intuitive knowledge,\" which are superior to any\nother kinds of knowledge, and involve a certainty of conviction which no\nreasoning can overthrow.\n\nThen, as we advance still higher in the world of letters, we find\nmetaphysicians and philosophers assuming that a belief in certain truths\nis implanted in all rational minds by the Creator as a necessary part of\ntheir constitution, and that these truths are the foundation of most of\nour acquired knowledge. The truths or principles of mind thus recognized\nare called by various names, such as _reason_, the _principles of\nreason_, the _primary truths_, the _intuitions_, the _intuitive truths_,\nthe _fundamental truths_, the _principles of common sense_, the\n_categories_, etc.\n\nThe grand difficulty on this subject has been, that while all agree in\nthe existence of such implanted truths, there has never been any _test_\nfor deciding which are these truths, in distinction from our acquired\nnotions.\n\nIt is the object of the succeeding chapter to present the most important\nof these truths, and also to set forth an infallible test by which they\nmay be distinguished from every other kind of knowledge.\n\nAnd this attempt is made with a full conviction that success in such an\neffort is to be the foundation of that harmony of reconstruction which\nhas been indicated as provided for the future.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nPRINCIPLES OF REASON, OR INTUITIVE TRUTHS.\n\n\nIt is maintained that the Author of mind has implanted, as a part of its\nconstitution, the belief in certain truths, so that it is impossible to\ndisbelieve them without losing that which distinguishes man as a\nrational being.\n\nIt is also assumed that there is an _infallible test_, by which we can\ndistinguish these truths from all those acquired notions which men often\nfalsely call intuitions, or principles of reason, etc.\n\nBefore proceeding, it will be premised that the attempt will not be to\nset forth _all_ those truths that may properly be called intuitive, but\nit will be limited to those which are immediately connected with the\nsubjects to be discussed.\n\nTo proceed, then, the first principle of reason, or intuitive truth, is\nthat by which we arrive at the idea of a great _First Cause, who was\nwithout a beginning_. In briefest form, this truth is usually thus\nexpressed:\n\nEVERY CHANGE HAS A CAUSE.\n\nThe position here maintained is that the human mind is so made that,\nwhenever any kind of change (or effect) takes place, there inevitably\nfollows a belief that there is some antecedent which is _the cause_ of\nthis change, or, in other words, that there is _something that produced\nthis change_.\n\nNow the question is not how this conviction first finds entrance to the\nmind, nor whether it is consequent on experience.\n\nIt is simply a question of fact. Men always do, whenever they see any\nnew form of existence, or any change take place, believe that there is\nsome antecedent cause that produced this change.\n\nMoreover, if a man should be found who was destitute of this belief, so\nthat in his daily pursuits he assumed that things would spring into\nexistence without any cause, and that there were no causes of any kind\nthat produced the changes around him, he would be pronounced insane--a\nman who had \"lost his reason.\"\n\nHere, then, we have an example of an intuitive truth, and also an\nillustration of the _test_ by which we are to distinguish such truths\nfrom all others, viz.:\n\n_Any truth is a principle of reason, or an intuitive truth, when all men\ntalk and act as if they believed it in the practical affairs of life,\nand when talking and acting as if it were not believed, would\nuniversally be regarded as evidence that a man had \"lost his reason.\"_\n\nIt will now be shown how a belief in this truth involves a belief in\nsome great First Cause who himself had no beginning.\n\nThe atheist says thus: Somewhere, far back in other ages, there were no\nexistences at all, either of matter or mind; but at a given period,\nwithout any cause at all, the vast and wonderful contrivances of matter\nand mind began to exist.\n\nThe first reply to this is, that it is an assertion without evidence,\neither intuitive or otherwise. No being ever was known to testify of\nsuch an event, and there is no proof of it of any kind.\n\nNext, it is replied that placing such an event at distant ages does not\nrender it any more credible than the assertion that worlds and\nintelligent beings are coming into existence at the present time without\nany cause. God has so constituted our minds that we can not believe that\nany curious and wonderful contrivance springs into being without a\ncause, either now or at any past period of time.\n\nIf the atheist, in the common affairs of life, should talk and act as if\nhe believed there were no causes for all the existences and changes\naround him, he would be regarded as having \"lost his reason.\" And thus\nHoly Writ sanctions the decision: \"The fool hath said in his heart,\nThere is no God.\"\n\nWe find, then, that our minds are made so that we can not help believing\nthat whatever begins to be has an antecedent cause that produces it, and\nevery change in any kind of existence has a cause. We find, also, the\nuniverse around us to be a succession of changes, and these we trace\nback and back again to antecedent causes.\n\nBut at last we come to the grand question, \"Who first started this vast\nsystem of endless and wonderful contrivances?\"\n\nOnly two replies are possible. The first is that of the atheist, that\nthe whole started into existence without a cause, which we have shown\nthat no sane mind can really believe.\n\nThe only remaining reply is, there is _some great_ _self-existent Cause,\nwho never began to be, and who is the author of the universe of matter\nand mind_.[1]\n\nIt must, however, be conceded that this intuitive truth does not aid us\nin deciding what is the nature and character of this First Cause. We are\nobliged to resort to other intuitive truths to settle this question.\n\nNeither does this principle aid us in deciding whether there may not be\n_more than one_ self-existent cause; for several minds can be supposed\nto have united in will and action to bring forth this \"universal frame,\"\neach one of which might have existed without beginning.\n\nThe second intuitive truth is this:\n\nTWO CLASSES OF CAUSES EXIST, VIZ., MATERIAL THINGS, WHICH ACT ON MIND,\nAND IMMATERIAL OR SPIRITUAL THINGS, WHICH ACT ON MATTER.\n\nSome metaphysicians maintain that every thing is matter, and that mind\nor spirit is only one particular species of matter. Others teach that\nevery thing is mind, and that all which we suppose to be material things\nare merely ideas in the mind of what really has no existence.\n\nNow we have no mode of proving that we have a soul or that we have a\nbody, or that there are any real things existing around us. But God has\nso formed our minds that we can not help believing that our minds are\ndistinct from matter, and that they are causes of changes in our body\nand in the things around us. Nor can we help believing that we have\nbodies, and that the things around us are realities. And no man could\ntalk or act, in practical matters, with a contrary belief, without being\nregarded as having \"lost his reason.\"\n\nThe third intuitive truth is, that THE MIND OF MAN IS A FREE AGENT.\n\nBy this is signified that mind is an independent cause of its own\nvolitions, and capable, in appropriate circumstances, of choosing in\n_either_ of two or more ways, not being, like matter, forced to a fixed\nand necessary mode of action.\n\nSome changes in mind are necessary effects produced by causes out of the\nmind. And some mental action is the necessary result of its\nconstitution, and can not be otherwise. But _choice_ or _volition_ is an\nact of the mind itself, when it has power to choose in either of two or\nmore ways without any change of circumstances.\n\nThe fatalist denies this, and maintains that choice is a necessary act,\nthe same as the changes in matter, and that at each act of choice the\nmind had no power to choose otherwise than as it does choose.\n\nIn reply to this, nothing is needed but to show that all men believe,\nand show it by their words and actions, that they always have power to\nchoose more ways than one. And after they have chosen a particular way,\nthey still believe that they had the power to have chosen another way.\nAnd though metaphysicians may deny this in words, if any one of them, in\npractical every-day life, should talk and act as if he believed that he\nhad no power to choose otherwise than as he does, he would be regarded\nas having \"lost his reason.\"\n\nThis subject has often been so treated as to embarrass some of the most\nacute minds. Yet the ordinary mind is as perfectly qualified to settle\nthis question as the most astute philosopher. Do men believe that they\nhave no power to choose any other way than as they do choose? Do they\ntalk and act in common life as if they believed it? Would not a man who\ntalked and acted on the assumption that he had no power to choose\notherwise than as he does choose be regarded as having \"lost his\nreason?\"\n\nAll men of common sense must answer these questions alike, and thus\ndecide that this is one of the intuitive truths.\n\nThe fourth intuitive truth is, that DESIGN IS EVIDENCE OF AN INTELLIGENT\nCAUSE, AND THE NATURE OF A DESIGN PROVES THE INTENTION AND CHARACTER OF\nTHE AUTHOR.\n\nIt is by the aid of this principle of reason that we gain a knowledge of\nthe character and designs of our Creator. All minds are so constituted\nthat when they find a contrivance fitted to accomplish some end, they\ncan not help believing that the author of it is an _intelligent_ cause,\nand that he _intended_ to secure that end.\n\nThis position is finely illustrated by Paley. He describes a savage\nfinding a watch in a desert, who is made to comprehend all its curious\ncontrivances for marking time. This savage, he claims, would inevitably\nconclude that some intelligent person made the watch, and that it was\nhis design to have it keep time.\n\nIn like manner, should the residence of a person be inspected, and be\nfound filled with contrivances for producing mischief and for torturing\nmen and animals, the result would be a belief that the author of these\nthings was cruel and malignant. On the other hand, were these\ncontrivances calculated to produce only comfort and happiness, the\ninevitable belief would follow that the contriver was benevolent.\n\nAgain, if these designs were found to involve powerful and magnificent\nresults, the immediate belief would follow that the author was wise and\npowerful as well as benevolent.\n\nThis illustrates the method by which this implanted principle of reason\nenables us to learn the design and character of the Author of the\nuniverse by the works of creation.\n\nThe fifth intuitive truth is, that NO RATIONAL MIND WILL CHOOSE EVIL\nWITHOUT ANY HOPE OF COMPENSATING GOOD.\n\nThe fact that any person was seeking pain and evil without hope of\ncompensating good would prove to all that \"reason was lost.\" No sane\nmind ever acts thus.\n\nIt is by the aid of this intuitive truth that we rely on human\ntestimony. The surest mode of establishing the reliability of a witness\nis to show that by false testimony he would knowingly incur evil and\ngain no good. In such circumstances no one would believe that a witness\nwould be false.\n\nThe sixth intuitive truth is, that THINGS WILL CONTINUE AS THEY ARE AND\nHAVE BEEN TILL THERE IS EVIDENCE OF A CHANGE OR OF A CAUSE FOR A CHANGE.\n\nAll the business of this life rests on a belief in this implanted truth,\nand equally so do our inferences in regard to the immortality of the\nsoul and a future state.\n\nThe belief that the sun will continue to rise, or that the seasons will\nreturn, rests solely on the fact that these events have been uniform in\npast time, and that we know of no cause for a change from this\nuniformity. And were any person to talk and act as if destitute of this\nbelief, he would be deemed insane.\n\nBishop Butler's celebrated argument on the immortality of the soul is\nfounded entirely on this principle. It is briefly this:\n\nThings will continue as they are and have been unless there is some\nevidence of some change or cause for a change. At death the soul exists.\nThe dissolution of the body is no evidence of the destruction of the\nsoul, and there is no kind of evidence that it is destroyed. Therefore\nwe infer that the soul continues to exist after the dissolution of the\nbody.\n\nThe main point in this argument is to show that there is no evidence\nthat the act of death involves the destruction of the soul. If this can\nbe established, then the belief must follow that the soul exists after\ndeath. By the same method Butler establishes several other doctrines of\nthe Bible.\n\nIt is by the aid of this principle that what are called the laws of\nnature are established. By means of human testimony we learn what has\nbeen the uniform course of nature. And then men conclude that what has\nbeen will continue to be until some new cause intervenes to change this\nuniformity.\n\nThe seventh intuitive truth is, that the NEEDLESS DESTRUCTION OF\nHAPPINESS OR INFLICTION OF PAIN IS WRONG, and THAT WHATEVER TENDS TO\nPRODUCE THE MOST HAPPINESS IS RIGHT.\n\nThe terms right and wrong, as used by mankind, always have reference to\nsome _plan_ or _design_. Any thing is called right when it fulfills the\ndesign for which it is made, and it is called wrong when it does not.\nThus a watch is right when it fulfills its design in keeping time. A\ncompass is right when it points to the north. And so of all\ncontrivances.\n\nOf course, then, the question as to the right and wrong action of mind\ninvolves a reference to the _object_ or _design_ of the Author of mind.\nAt this time it will be assumed (the proof being reserved for future\npages) that the design or object for which God made mind was _to produce\nthe greatest possible happiness with the least possible evil_.\n\nIt is also assumed, without here exhibiting the proof, that the\nimpression of this design is so inwrought into the mental constitution\nthat whatever is perceived to be destructive to happiness is felt to be\n_wrong_--that is, _unfitted_ to the design of the Author of all things,\nwhich the mind _feels_ often when it can not logically set forth the\nreason. So, also, whatever is seen to promote the greatest amount of\nhappiness is felt to be right.\n\nThe mind is so constituted that, without any act of reasoning as to the\ntendencies of things, there are certain feelings and actions that the\nmind turns from as _unfit_ and to be abhorred.\n\nThus, when plighted faith is violated, or a great benefactor treated\nwith cruelty and indignity by those he has benefited, a feeling of\nunfitness and abhorrence is awakened, independent of all considerations\nof the tendency of such conduct to destroy happiness.\n\nIn like manner, there are certain acts of gratitude and benevolence that\nalways awaken approval and admiration as suitable and right, without any\nreference to future tendencies or results.\n\nAt the same time, it is true that when, by a process of reasoning, it is\nseen that the _tendency_ of any course of conduct is to diminish\nhappiness or inflict evil without compensating good, there arises the\nsame feeling of disapproval of it as wrong, and unfitted to the end for\nwhich all things are made. This is often the case when there is no\ndefinite, distinct idea of what the great design of the Creator may be.\n\nThis belief and feeling of unfitness and wrongfulness is common to all\nsane minds. It is true that there are different views of what actions\nare destructive to happiness, but when there is a clear perception that\na given act will do great harm and no good, every mind will feel that it\nis wrong; and when it is seen that any act will do good without any\nevil, it is felt to be right. And this is so universal, that if any one\nshould be found to talk and act with a contrary belief, he would be\nregarded as having lost a part of that which constitutes him a rational\nbeing.\n\nThe eighth intuitive truth is, that THE EVIDENCE OF OUR SENSES IS\nRELIABLE.\n\nThis statement needs some qualification. It often requires time to learn\naccurately what our senses do testify, and sometimes the apparent\nexperience of the senses proves incorrect. For example, to one just\nrestored to sight, every object seems to touch the eye, and distances\nare learned only by experience. So the sun and stars seem to move, when\nit is the earth that is turning. So, also, the senses are sometimes\ndiseased or disordered, and make false reports.\n\nThe true meaning, then, of the above intuitive truth is, that when men\nknow that they have had all requisite experience, and understand\nproperly all the circumstances of the case, they can not help believing\nthe evidence of their senses, and when this belief is lost, a person is\nregarded as insane.\n\nThe ninth intuitive truth is, that WHENEVER THERE IS A CHANGE IN THE\nESTABLISHED ORDER OF NATURE SURPASSING HUMAN POWER, IT IS EVIDENCE OF A\nSUPERNATURAL AGENCY THAT IS SANCTIONED BY THE AUTHOR OF THE LAWS OF\nNATURE.\n\nThe conviction of the wisdom and power of the Author of this vast and\nwonderful frame around us is such that whatever changes may occur in its\nestablished order must be felt to be by his permission.\n\nTo illustrate this, suppose a man appeared claiming to be a teacher sent\nfrom God. In proof of this, he commands a mountain to be uptorn and\nthrown into the sea. Now, if this phenomenon should follow his command,\nit would be impossible for any who witnessed it to refrain from\nbelieving that the Author of Nature performed this miracle to attest the\nauthority of his messenger.\n\nIn order to insure this belief in the interference of Deity, there must\nbe full evidence that there can be no deception, and that the miraculous\nperformance is entirely beyond human power and skill. Men always talk\nand act on the assumption that _such_ miracles are from God, and that\nall rational minds so regard them.\n\nThe tenth intuitive truth is, that IN ALL PRACTICAL CONCERNS WE ARE TO\nCONSIDER THAT COURSE RIGHT WHICH HAS THE BALANCE OF EVIDENCE IN ITS\nFAVOR.\n\nThere are few practical questions where we can have perfect certainty as\nto the right course. In almost all the concerns of life men are guided\nby _probabilities_. It is not certain that seed will spring up, or that\na ship will return, or that a given medicine will cure, or that any\nfuture project will succeed; but men go forward in their pursuits with\nexactly the same decision as if the probabilities that guide them were\ncertainties. They find which course has _the most_ evidence in its\nfavor, and then act as if it was certain that this was the right course\nto attain their designs.\n\nAnd if any person should habitually act as if he believed the reverse,\nhe would be regarded as having lost his reason.\n\nThe eleventh intuitive truth is, that NOTHING IS TO BE ASSUMED AS TRUE\nUNLESS THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT IT IS SO.\n\nThis principle is always assumed in all practical affairs. If a man were\nto send a cargo abroad without _any_ evidence that it was wanted, he\nwould be called a fool; and so in all other concerns, every sane man\ntakes this for his rule of conduct.\n\nThe preceding include the principles which it is believed are the grand\nfoundation on which rest most of the practical knowledge of life, as\nwell as the doctrines and duties both of natural and revealed religion.\n\nThere are some other intuitive truths which are not introduced here, and\nthere are some principles that others have placed in this honorable\nposition which could not stand the _test_ here introduced, and claimed\nto be the only true and reliable one.\n\nThe intuitive truths have been called \"fundamental truths,\" because they\nare the ultimate basis of all knowledge secured or established by the\nprocess of _reasoning_.\n\nThis process consists in assuming a certain proposition to be true as\nthe _basis_ of an argument. If this proposition is granted, or supposed\nto be granted, then the reasoner proceeds to show that the point in\ndispute is in reality _included_ in the truth already granted, so that\nbelieving the first proposition, or basis, necessarily involves a belief\nin the one to be proved.\n\nFor example, if a man wishes to prove that a certain person is a\nbenevolent man, he proceeds thus:\n\nLet it be granted that all persons who are habitually contriving and\nlaboring to promote the happiness of all around them are benevolent\npersons. This basis proposition being conceded to be true, the reasoner\nproceeds to present evidence that the person in question habitually is\nlaboring for the good of others. This being done, he draws the\nconclusion that this person is _included_ in the class which have been\ngranted to be benevolent.\n\n_Reasoning_, then, is a process for exhibiting evidence that a point\nwhich is disputed is included in a proposition already believed and\nallowed.\n\nBut suppose the disputant denies the truth of the basis or foundation\nproposition, then it becomes necessary to establish that proposition by\nanother act of reasoning. In order to do this, still another proposition\nis assumed which is allowed to be true, and which the reasoner then\nattempts to show includes his former basis proposition.\n\nThis process may thus be continued till, finally, it comes to pass that\nthe basis proposition assumed is an intuitive truth. In this case the\nvictory is secure; for whatever can be shown to be embraced in an\nintuitive truth must be conceded to be true, and whatever is\ncontradictory to an intuitive truth must be allowed to be false.\n\nNow it can be shown that all the reliable practical knowledge of this\nlife can be thus traced back till it is seen to rest on some intuitive\ntruth as its basis.\n\nSo, also, all the doctrines and duties, both of natural and revealed\nreligion, can be shown to rest on these intuitive truths. This indicates\nthe propriety of the name given to these first principles as _principles\nof reason_ and _fundamental truths_.\n\nHere, then, is presented the foundation of the hope so confidently\nexpressed, that a time is coming when, in all the great questions which\nnow agitate humanity with doubts, discussions, and conflict, there shall\nresult universal harmony and unity of opinion. If such intuitive\nprinciples are implanted in all human minds; if there is a _certain\ntest_ by which these principles can be eliminated and established; and\nif, by a sure process of reasoning, every correct practical and\nreligious opinion can be shown to rest on these principles, and every\nfalse one to contradict them, then we can plainly perceive the true path\nto this golden age.\n\nIt is to cultivate the powers of the human intellect, to train every\nmind, from early life, to detect the true laws of reason, and to\npractice accurately the process of reasoning. Not that this alone will\nsuffice without the attending cultivation of the moral powers, and the\npromised blessing of heavenly aid. But the first would powerfully tend\nto secure the second, and then the third would inevitably be bestowed.\n\nBefore proceeding farther, it is desirable to recognize the fact that\nthe word _reason_ is used in several ways. Sometimes it signifies simply\nthe intuitive truths. Sometimes it includes all those principles and\npowers of mind which are employed in the act of reasoning. Sometimes it\nrefers to the intellect in distinction from the feelings. In all cases,\nhowever, the connection will determine in which of these uses it is\nemployed.\n\n[1] Note A.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nSOURCES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.\n\n\nWe have seen that there are certain intuitive truths, the belief of\nwhich is implanted as a part of our mental constitution, and that there\nis a _test_ by which we can distinguish them from all other kinds of\nknowledge.\n\nWe have seen, also, that we are dependent on these truths for a large\nportion of our acquired knowledge, inasmuch as they are the basis of\n_reasoning_, which is that process by which we gain new truths by the\naid of those already believed.\n\nIt has been intimated, also, that it is chiefly by the aid of these\nprinciples that a harmonious system of truth is to be anticipated, in\nwhich all minds will eventually agree, at least in all great questions\ninvolving the eternal interests of our race.\n\nWe will now proceed in an inquiry as to what are _the sources of human\nknowledge_ in addition to these first implanted truths.\n\nIn the first place, then, we have our own personal experience of the\nnature and action of our own minds, and of the qualities and powers of\nthe persons and things around us. Next we have the experience of other\nminds as to their own mental history and the properties and powers of\nall that has surrounded them. This knowledge is communicated by them to\nus either directly by word of mouth, or indirectly by writings and\nbooks.\n\nThe experience of a single mind is very limited both as to space and\ntime, and it is only by the united experience of many persons, in\ndifferent periods and places, that we arrive at what are called the laws\nof nature and experience. The laws of day and night, summer and winter,\nthe tides, and all the other phenomena of nature, are simply a uniform\nsuccession and regularity of events, from which men infer a future\nregularity of the same experience. Much of this knowledge of past\nuniformity is transmitted from others to us, and rests on our confidence\nin human testimony, and it has been shown that this confidence is based\non one of the intuitive truths.\n\nNext, we have the knowledge gained by the process of reasoning, and for\nthis we are dependent on the intuitive truths which are the foundation\nof all reliable deductions.\n\nLastly, we have the resource of _revelations_ from the Creator of all,\nwho can communicate to us knowledge that we can not gain either by\nintuition, or experience, or reasoning.\n\nIn regard to the kinds of knowledge to be gained from each of these\nsources, it is clear that the experience of ourselves and others\nfurnishes us with nothing but facts, as it regards matter and mind, as\nthey are developed in _this_ world only. As it respects the Creator, his\ncharacter and designs, the immortality of the soul, and the future\ndestiny of our race, we gain nothing by our own personal observation or\nexperience. \"No man hath seen God at any time.\" No one has gone to \"the\nsilent land\" to learn by inspection the secrets of that dim shore, or\nthe destiny of the soul when it passes from earth.\n\nNeither have we any resource in the experience of others who can go to\nthe invisible world and transmit to us the knowledge there gained. There\nis not a man upon earth that can furnish any reliable information on\nthese subjects from any personal knowledge.\n\nIt becomes, then, a most interesting inquiry as to the amount and kind\nof knowledge to be gained by means of the intuitive truths, experience,\nand reasoning, independently of revelation. In what follows this inquiry\nwill be pursued.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\n OF THE KNOWLEDGE GAINED BY HUMAN EXPERIENCE\n IN REGARD TO THE NATURE OF MIND AND THE LAWS\n OF THE SYSTEM OF WHICH IT IS A PART.\n\n\nWe have seen that there are only these sources of human knowledge, viz.,\nthe _intuitive truths_, _human experience_, _reasoning_, and\n_revelation_. We have alluded to the nature of intuitive knowledge; we\nwill now inquire as to the nature of the knowledge gained by human\nexperience, firstly, in regard to the _constitution of mind and the laws\nof that system in which it is placed_. We restrict our inquiries to\nthose points which have the most direct bearing on the great questions\nto be discussed.\n\nAs it respects the nature of mind, then, as exhibited by experience, we\nlearn, in the first place, that it is constituted with desires and\npropensities for various kinds of enjoyment. These are the\ngratifications secured by the senses, the pleasures of taste, the\nhappiness of giving and receiving affection, the various intellectual\npleasures, and the still higher enjoyment resulting from our moral\nnature. All these are common to the race, though in varied degrees and\ncombinations. The mind is also constituted with susceptibilities to pain\nand suffering from all the sources from which enjoyment may spring.\n\nWith these susceptibilities are combined an all-pervading and constant\n_desire_ to gain enjoyment and to escape suffering. This desire is the\ngrand _motive_ power to the mind, as the main-spring is to a watch. For\nthis reason, awakened desires to gain any particular enjoyment or escape\nany pain are called _motives_. And so, also, all those things that cause\nthese desires are called motives.\n\nNext, it is seen that the mind is endowed with intellect, or the\nintellectual powers, by which it can perceive the nature and relative\nvalue of various kinds of enjoyment, compare the present with the\nfuture, and judge both of what is most valuable and of the proper modes\nof securing it.\n\nTo this add the power of choice or volition, by which, in view of any\ntwo or more kinds of enjoyment, the mind decides which shall be secured\nand which be denied.\n\nThus constituted, the mind comes into action in a _system of law_.\n\nBy this is signified that in every direction in which man can seek\nenjoyment there is a right course, or one that secures the good sought\nin such proper degrees and at such times as that the enjoyment designed\nis the result. At the same time there is a wrong course, or one in which\nthe enjoyment sought is not secured, or, if gained, is combined with\npain and disappointment.\n\nThus there are right and wrong modes of seeking all the multiplied kinds\nof enjoyment, while to the right course is attached the reward of\npleasure, and with the wrong course is connected the penalty of pain,\neither immediate or remote.\n\nAgain, our minds come into existence in a _social_ _system_ so\nconstituted that the rewards and penalties of law extend, not merely to\nthe good and evil doer, but to those connected with him. Thus each mind\nis made dependent for happiness on the well-doing of those around almost\nas much as on its own obedience to law. The penalties for the sins of\nparents fall on their children, and the sins of children are visited on\ntheir parents, and thus in all the other relations of life. Equally so\nare the rewards of obedience shared by all who are connected with the\nwell-doer.\n\nThus it appears that in this life _happiness_ is the joint product of\nthe obedience of each individual and the obedience of all connected with\nhim to the laws of the vast system in which we are placed.\n\nAgain, each mind comes into this system of law in perfect ignorance of\nthe right and wrong courses to be pursued. At the commencement of being\nthere has been no knowledge of good or of evil to call forth desire or\nfear, while the only conceivable way in which such a being can be taught\nlaw, and its penalties and rewards, is by _experience_. Good must be\ntasted before the desire for it can come, and evil must be felt before\nthe fear of it can arise.\n\nAfter there has been some experience of pleasure and pain, and such\nadvance in knowledge as that others around can teach the new-comer what\nare the right and wrong courses, then _faith_ or _belief_ becomes the\nleading mode of safety. From this time happiness or suffering will be\nproportioned to the _truth_ of the instructions given, to the _faith_\naccorded, and to the _obedience_ rendered.\n\nIn this complicated system of law, it is found that the great Author of\nall is never moved to modify or suspend the penalties of wrong-doing by\ncommiseration for the inevitable ignorance of inexperienced beings, nor\nby pity when wrong instructions are given, nor by sympathy for the pain\ninflicted. _Obedience_, exact, constant, persevering--this is the only\nmode of securing the enjoyment and escaping the pain that are the\nsanctions of law.\n\nAnd not only so, but it is often the case that disobedience to some law\nin only one instance will destroy the comfort and usefulness of a whole\nlife. Nay, more, the neglect or the mistake of a parent sometimes will\nbring the penalty of violated law on some innocent child, whose whole\nlife will thus be made miserable.\n\nAgain, it is found that the sources of enjoyment are of different\nrelative value.\n\nIn the commencement of existence pleasure is secured mainly through the\nsenses. Next come the higher social and domestic pleasures; then follow\nthe intellectual enjoyments, the various gratifications of taste, and\nall the multitudinous resources open to a highly-cultivated, virtuous,\nand religious man.\n\nThe greater the number of these sources, and the more elevated the\nnature of each, the greater the degree of happiness gained.\n\nSuch, also, is the nature of things, that the lower kinds of happiness\nare placed first within our reach, and then, as the higher modes of\nenjoyment come, we often find them incompatible with the others, so that\nto obtain these we must, to some extent, relinquish the humbler classes.\nThus, when a child begins to find the value of intellectual attainments,\nhe sees they can not be gained without a sacrifice of many indulgences\nthat are of an inferior value.\n\nWe now come to the _grand law_ of the system in which we are placed, as\nit has been developed by the experience of our race, and that, in one\nword, is\n\nSACRIFICE!\n\nEach mind finds that it has conflicting desires, so that one class must\nconstantly be sacrificed to another of superior value. And the rule in\nreference to individual enjoyment is \"_always to sacrifice the lesser\nfor the greater good, having reference to the future as much as to the\npresent_.\"\n\nThis is the lesson of self-denial and self-control first taught to\ninfancy and childhood, and just as fast as the reasoning powers are\ndeveloped, the extent of this far-reaching rule is impressed on the\nmind. At first this rule is applied to the young child himself, and he\nis trained chiefly to understand what will injure or benefit himself.\n\nBut gradually a new and higher law begins to appear. As soon as the\nchild can be made to understand that he is surrounded by other minds,\nwho can suffer and enjoy by the same rules that regulate his happiness,\nhe begins to learn the other and still higher law of _sacrifice_; and\nthat is, that \"_the lesser good of the individual is always to be\nsacrificed to the greater good of the many, having reference always to\nthe future as much as to the present_.\"\n\nThus life commences with desires that are to be _controlled_ and\n_denied_, first by parental power and influence, and next by the\nintellect and will of the child. And the farther life advances, the more\nnumerous and complicated are the occasions where intellect must judge\nwhat is best for self, and what is best for the commonwealth, whose\ninterests must have precedence.\n\nAnd as self-denial always involves more or less pain, it becomes a fact\nthat happiness is to be gained only by more or less _suffering_.\n\nMoreover, the greater the good to be gained, the greater is the\nself-denial and suffering involved in its attainment. Though there are\nexceptions, this certainly is the general rule.\n\nThe history of an individual is a history of self-conquest. It is a\nhistory of the self-denial and suffering involved in subjecting the\nphysical to the intellectual, and both to the moral nature.\n\nIn like manner, the history of the race, from infancy through its stages\nof barbarism, heathenism, civilization, and Christianity, is a process\nof _suffering_, as the lower principles of humanity are gradually\nsubjected to the higher, while men learn to give up lower gratifications\nfor the more elevated, and to sacrifice the lesser good of the minority\nto the well-being of the majority.\n\nBut the cheering aspect of the case is that the effects of suffering are\nsalutary and tonic. The child who is trained to bear cold bravely, to\nundergo toil, and to meet crosses, becomes strong in body, and\nenterprising and energetic in spirit; while a course of ease and\nindulgence debilitates both mind and body. This is true most decidedly\nwhen such a course is cheerfully and voluntarily assumed, and is not\nforced merely by fear of penalties.\n\nThe same is true of communities. Those people who live in a cold climate\nand on a hard soil become vigorous, industrious, and enterprising; while\na soft climate, and such abundance as requires no self-denial and toil,\ntend to national debility and decay.\n\nAnother fact is still more cheering, and that is, that the more a habit\nof self-control and self-denial is formed, the easier they become, so\nthat what at first was severe and painful may become a pleasure. Such\nmay be the progress of a virtuous mind, that, ultimately, acting right,\nor conscious rectitude, may become more desirable and agreeable than any\nother mode of enjoyment.\n\nThe history of mankind thus far shows that as a race we are progressing\nto higher and higher happiness. As we take the history of each nation\nfrom its origin, we find it a development of progress from lower to\nhigher degrees of enjoyment. Then we find periods of retrocession and\ndecay. Still, the experience of one age is transmitted more or less to\nanother, so that, on the whole, the race has been gaining, both as to\nthe number of sources of enjoyment received and as to the relative value\nof the enjoyments sought. The proportion of persons who secure the\nhigher class of enjoyments is certainly greater now than at any former\nperiod of the world's history.\n\nAgain, the history of the world teaches us that while the race gains in\nknowledge of the laws of the system and in obedience to them, there are\nvast multitudes to whom, as individuals, this life is a _total failure_.\nTheir career has involved such frequent and fatal violations of the laws\nof the system, that their progress is constantly downward; and, so far\nas past experience gives any data, we must infer that continued\nexistence would prove a continued downward progress. The glutton, the\ndrunkard, the miser, the sluggard, the licentious, the selfish,\nmalignant, and cruel--all these are binding their spirits with the\n_chains of habit_, rendering obedience to the laws they are violating\nmore difficult and improbable.\n\nBut then, as a counterbalancing result, it is seen that these losses to\nindividuals are made available to the protection and improvement of the\nrace, and seem indispensable to it; for it is the example of the evils\nsuffered by wrong-doers that is constantly exercising a preservative\ninfluence to deter others from similar courses. Thus good is constantly\neduced from ill, even in the most melancholy cases.\n\nWe have seen that it is the desire of good and fear of evil that is the\nmotive power in causing all mental action, and we have the history of\nman to teach us also what kinds of motives prove the most effective in\nsecuring that obedience to law which is the only way to true and perfect\nhappiness.\n\nOur only mode of learning the nature of a thing is to observe how it\nacts and is acted upon. This is as true of mind as it is of material\nthings. What, then, has the experience of our race taught as to the\nnature of mind in reference to the kinds and relative influence of\nmotive that secure obedience to law?\n\nIn the first place, then, we learn that _fear of evil is indispensable_.\nAs soon as children in the family, or adults in society, find that no\nharm comes from gratifying their desires, all restraint is removed. So\nstrong is this necessity, that when natural penalties seem uncertain or\nfar off, parents and civil rulers find it imperative to add those which\nare more immediate and discernible.\n\nBut with this we learn that fear alone is not a healthful stimulus.\nChildren and slaves who have no motives to action but fear of penalties\nare never so successfully led to obedience as when other more agreeable\ninfluences are combined. A mind that is constantly goaded to action by\nfear of evil becomes torpid, or irritable, or despairing, or all\ntogether. The hope of good, or rewards, then, are as indispensable to\nsecure obedience to law as penalties. The proper balancing of the\nmotives of fear of evil and hope of good is the grand art of controlling\nmind, both as it respects individuals and communities.\n\nIn reference to those motives that are pleasurable, there are two\nclasses which it is very important to recognize. The first class are\nthose sources of enjoyment which are sought for the gratification of\nself without any reference to another. Of this class are the pleasures\nof the senses, the enjoyment of acquiring knowledge, the exercise of\npower, the pleasures of taste, and others that need not here be\nspecified.\n\nThe second class are those in which the enjoyment is secured by\nproducing happiness for others, and is sought solely in reference to the\nenjoyment of another. The most decided illustration of this kind is that\nof a mother who is providing for her offspring. This and all true love\nhas, as its distinctive feature, the pleasure found in conferring\nhappiness on the beloved object. Gratitude, also, has for its main\nelement the desire to make some returns of enjoyment to one who has\nconferred a favor.\n\nExperience has shown that the most powerful of all motives in securing\nobedience to law is that of _love_.\n\nWhen love is awakened toward a superior mind--when this superior mind\nknows what are the true rules of right and wrong, and is deeply\ninterested to guide and aid the inferior mind--when this interest is\nexpressed by all winning and attractive methods, nothing has ever yet\nbeen found so successful in securing obedience to the rules of right and\nwrong.\n\nThe power of this principle is greatly enhanced when the superior mind\nis a benefactor. The bestowal of kindness excites a desire to make some\nreturns of good, and when it is seen that such a benefactor is gratified\nby leading a dependent mind to right action, it proves a most powerful\nmotive to obedience.\n\nStill more is the power of this principle increased when the favors\nbestowed are purchased by self-denial and suffering on the part of the\nbenefactor. The more noble the benefactor, and the greater the good thus\npurchased or the evils thus averted, the stronger is the principle of\ngratitude leading to such returns of obedience.\n\nAgain, experience has shown that the advance of the race has been by the\nagency of teachers and confessors who secured light and elevation to\ntheir fellows at the expense of labor, toil, and self-denial of the\nseverest kind.\n\nThese are the leading points in the results of human experience as to\nthe nature of mind and the laws of the system of which it is a part.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nKNOWLEDGE GAINED BY REASON AND EXPERIENCE AS TO A FUTURE STATE.\n\n\nWe have shown that, independently of a revelation, we have no sources of\nknowledge except the intuitions reasoning and experience. Hereafter we\nwill, as is often done, include the two first in the term reason.\n\nWe have seen what knowledge has been furnished by human experience as to\nthe nature of mind and the laws of the present system in which it is\nplaced. We will now inquire as to the teachings of reason and experience\nin regard to the future.\n\nAs to the question of the existence of the soul after the dissolution of\nthe body, we have only one of the intuitive truths for our guide, viz.,\n\"things will continue as they are and have been till there is evidence\nof a cause for change,\" or, in other words, things will continue\naccording to past experience till there is some evidence to the\ncontrary.\n\nIt has been the uniform experience of mankind that the human mind passes\nthrough various states of existence extremely different in nature and\ncontinuance. The first state is that in which the mind seems to have no\nsusceptibilities but of sensation, and to be utterly destitute of all\nthe properties of a rational intellect. By a slow and gradual process,\nnew and successive powers seem to be called into existence, and what\nseemed among the lowest grades of animal existence becomes the glory and\nlord of this lower world. Yet, in the full exercise of all the faculties\nof a rational and moral nature, there is a perpetual recurrence of\nperiods in which all evidences of the existence of such faculties cease.\nIn a profound sleep, or in a deep swoon, no proof of rational existence\nremains either to the being thus affected or to the observers of this\nphenomenon. As the extreme of old age approaches, the glories of the\nmind begin to fade away, until man sometimes passes into a state of\nsecond childhood. There are times, also, when changes in the material\nsystem derange all the power of intellect, and sometimes reduce what was\nonce a rational mind to a state of entire fatuity, and then, again, the\nmental powers are restored.\n\nThe experience of mankind, then, on this subject is this: that the mind\nis an existence which passes through multiplied and very great changes\nwithout being destroyed. The soul continues to exist after changes as\ngreat as death, and in many respects similar to it, such, for example,\nas the event of birth, and of sleep, and we have never known a mind\ndestroyed by such changes. The argument, then, is, that as things will\nbe in agreement with past experience, the soul will continue to go\nthrough other changes without being destroyed, unless there is some\nreason to the contrary.\n\nThere can be no reason found to the contrary, for there is no evidence\nthat the event called death is any thing more than a separation of the\nspirit from its material envelope, nor is there any evidence against the\nsupposition that it may be an event which introduces the mind into a\nmore perfect state of existence.\n\nIt appears that losing various parts of the body does not at all affect\nthe operations of mind; that by the perpetual changes that are taking\nplace in the body, every particle of it, after a course of years, is\ndissevered from its connection with the spirit, and is supplied by other\nmatter. The soul is thus proved to be so connected with a material body\nthat it may lose the whole of it by a slow process without being the\nleast injured, and therefore we have the evidence of experience that it\nmay be _separated_ from the body without any detriment to its powers and\nfaculties.\n\nAnalogy also leads to the supposition that death is only a change which\nintroduces the intellectual being into a more perfect mode of existence;\nfor, in past experience, those changes most resembling death, which are\nnot accidental, but according to the ordinary course of nature, are\nmeans of renewing and invigorating mental powers. Thus sleep, the emblem\nof death, is succeeded by renewed powers of activity and consciousness.\n\nThe changes of other animals which most resemble death furnish another\nanalogy. The humble worm rolls itself up in its temporary tomb, and,\nafter a short slumber, bursts forth to new life, clothed in more\nbrilliant dyes, endued with more active capacities, and prepared to\nsecure enjoyments before unknown. Reasoning from past experience, then,\nwe should infer the continued existence of the mind after death.\n\nBy the same method we arrive at the doctrine of the immortality of the\nsoul. We know that the soul does now exist. We know of no cause that\nwill destroy it. Therefore we infer that it will _forever_ continue to\nexist.\n\nWhether this argument is satisfactory or not, without a revelation this\nis _all_ the evidence we have of the soul's continued existence after\ndeath, and of the immortality of the soul.\n\nIt is the same intuitive truth which (without a revelation) alone\nfurnishes aid in regard to the future destiny of man.\n\nWe assume that things are to be in agreement with past experience unless\nthere is evidence to the contrary. No such evidence can be found. What,\nthen, does the past history of our race teach us to expect from the\nfuture? These are the most important deductions:\n\nWe are to continue under the same laws of the system already\nestablished. We are to have the same susceptibilities to pleasure and\npain, the same intellect to guide us, the same power of volition to\ndecide our own courses.\n\nWe are to be parts of a social system in which every member suffers not\nonly for his own violations of law, but for the sins of others.\n\nThe great law of this system is to be forever sustained--the _law of_\nSACRIFICE. Every being is to sacrifice the lesser for the greater good\nin all his individual concerns, and, in regard to the commonwealth, the\nlesser good of the individual is to be sacrificed to the greater good of\nthe many. In all this, also, reference is to be had to the interests of\nthe future as much as to those of the present, and all violations of\nthis great law are to involve the established penalties.\n\nThis system of law is to be administered as it has been in the past. No\npity for ignorance, no sympathy for the suffering, will ever suspend the\nnatural penalties for wrong-doing. _Obedience_, exact, constant, and\npersevering, is to be the only mode of securing the rewards and escaping\nthe penalties of this system.\n\nAgain, mankind, as a race, are to continue to progress, until at some\nperiod a certain portion will arrive at the entire and perfect obedience\nto law which, at the present stage of being, no one has ever yet\nattained.\n\nBut, on the other hand, this progress will be attended with the hopeless\nand perpetual ruin of multitudes who, as individuals, take a retrograde\ncourse, and grow more and more guilty and miserable, while continued\nexistence will serve only to render obedience to law more improbable.\n\nBut from this loss to individuals will result protective and purifying\ninfluences to the commonwealth, so that thus good will constantly be\neduced from evil.\n\nAgain, the influences that are to secure the advance of the race to\nperfect obedience are to be, knowledge of laws, fear of penalties, hope\nof rewards, and love and gratitude toward those who may prove teachers,\nbenefactors, and self-sacrificing friends. These have been the modes in\npast experience in this world, and therefore we infer them for the\nfuture.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\n KNOWLEDGE GAINED BY REASON AND EXPERIENCE\n ALONE CONCERNING THE EXISTENCE, CHARACTER,\n AND DESIGNS OF THE CREATOR.\n\n\nWe have shown that, in regard to our Creator, his character and designs,\nwithout a revelation, we have nothing to guide us but the intuitive\ntruths, and the deductions obtained by their aid from human experience.\n\nWe will now inquire as to the amount of knowledge to be secured from\nthese sources.\n\nBy the aid of the first intuitive truth, we arrive at the knowledge of\nsome great First Cause or causes, existing without beginning, who\ncreated the universe of matter and mind; yet, as has been shown, we are\nnot, by this first principle, enabled to infer any thing as to the\n_unity_ or _plurality_ of such cause or causes. For aught that this\nintuitive truth indicates, there may have been a plurality of eternal\nand self-existent minds, who acted in unity at the creation of all\nthings. Neither can we, by the aid of this truth, arrive at any\nconclusion as to the character and designs of the author or authors of\nall created things.\n\nIt is by the aid of the fourth intuitive truth that we deduce whatever\ncan be known of the character and designs of the Creator.\n\nThis truth teaches us that \"design is evidence of an intelligent cause,\nand that the nature of a design proves the intention and character of\nthe author.\"\n\nThe works of Nature, both of mind and matter, are full of evidence of\ndesign, and from this we infer that the Creator is an _intelligent_\ncause.\n\nThe infinite variety and extent of creation are evidences of the\nwonderful _power_ of their Author. The fact that all the contrivances of\nmatter and mind are clearly designed to produce enjoyment, while pain is\nmerely the result of a violation of laws which, if obeyed, would secure\nonly happiness--this is evidence of the _benevolence_ of the Creator.\n\nThe skill with which all things are formed and combined to secure the\nends designed are proofs of the _wisdom_ of the Creator.\n\nThus, by aid of the fourth intuitive truth, and the world of mind and\nmatter around us, we obtain the result that the Author of Nature is\n_powerful, benevolent, and wise_.\n\nBut in regard to the use of the word _power_, as applied to the Creator,\none distinction is important. There are things which are contradictory\nand impossible in the nature of things, so that no one can conceive of\nthem as possible. Thus, to create and not to create at the same time, or\nto make a mind that is a free agent and at the same time not a free\nagent, but controlled in volitions by fixed causation as matter\nis--these and many other things are contradictions or impossibilities.\n\nNow when we say that the Creator can not do these things, we do not\nlimit his power, for almighty power signifies simply and only a power to\ndo all things that are not contradictions and thus absurdities.\n\nThis being premised, we are obliged to infer from the history of our\nrace that the Creator, in regard to the existence of evil, is limited\neither in power, or in benevolence, or in the nature of things.\n\nWe arrive at this conclusion thus: We see that evils and suffering,\nmultitudinous and terrific, do exist, and have existed in all ages. In\nreference to this, only these suppositions are conceivable: the first\nis, that the Creator is perfectly benevolent, and that a better system,\nwith all the existing good and none of the evil, is conceivable and\npossible in the nature of things, yet that he _had not the power_ to\nproduce and sustain it.\n\nThe second supposition is, that the Creator has the power to produce and\nsustain a wiser and better system, in which there shall be all the good\nand none of the evil in the existing one, and yet that he _would not_ do\nit. This either involves the supposition of a purely malignant being,\nwho enjoys witnessing needless and awful suffering, and prefers it to\nhappiness, or of one who is, like human beings, of a mixed character,\nand allows evil to exist when self-denying efforts might prevent it.\n\nAll the minds of whom we have had any knowledge, although, where their\nown ease and pleasure are not to be sacrificed, they prefer to make\nothers around them happy, yet ever exhibit a selfish spirit. They all\nshow that they think and plan more for their own private enjoyment than\nfor the general happiness, and thus, to a greater or less extent, are\nselfish. Reasoning from experience, then, we should infer that the\nCreator might be of the same character.\n\nThe third supposition is, that the Creator has instituted the _best\nsystem possible in the nature of things_, so that there is and will be\nthe MOST POSSIBLE GOOD WITH THE LEAST POSSIBLE EVIL.\n\nWe come, then, to the inquiry as to the _end_ or _design_ of the Creator\nin forming the universe of mind and matter.\n\nTo answer this, we must again refer to the fourth intuitive truth, viz.,\n\"the nature of a contrivance is proof of the intention or design of the\nauthor.\"\n\nThis position is illustrated in many cases in common life. If we find a\ncontrivance which moves the air toward a fire and thus increases the\nflame, we infer that the author intended to produce this result. If we\nfind a contrivance to show the time of day, such as a sun-dial or clock,\nwe can not help believing that the author intended to secure this end.\n\nMoreover, when we find a curious machine, where every part is arranged\non a given design, we naturally inquire _how it must be worked_ to\nproduce the intended result. It may have wheels that, if turned one way,\nproduce the end designed, but, if turned another way, produce exactly\nthe opposite effect.\n\nFor example, if the wheels of a mill are arranged aright, or as the\nauthor designed, they will grind flour or weave cotton; but if arranged\nand worked contrary to the design of the author, they will break\nthemselves to pieces and destroy all things around them.\n\nTwo inquiries, then, are to be made in reference to the design of the\nCreator. The first is, What was the end or design for which he made all\nthings? and the second is, What is the right and true method by which\nthis design can be secured?\n\nWe shall assume, and attempt to prove in what follows, that the design\nand ultimate end of the Creator in all his works is _to produce the\ngreatest possible happiness with the least possible evil_.\n\nAfterward will be exhibited the _true and right method_ for securing\nthis end, so far as we can learn it by reason and experience _without a\nrevelation_.\n\nIn pursuing this plan, the first step will be to exhibit the\nconstitution and laws of mind, as the chief and most wonderful\nexhibition of the grand design of its Author.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nDIVERSITIES IN SYSTEMS OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.\n\n\nWe are now to commence an examination of the various powers and\noperations of the human mind, for the purpose of illustrating the grand\naim of the Author in the creation of all things.\n\nIn pursuing this course, it is needful, first, to refer to the apparent\ndiversities in systems of mental philosophy, for the purpose of\njustifying the classification and the terms to be employed hereafter.\n\nThere is nothing more hackneyed than the complaints against metaphysics\nas abstruse, difficult of comprehension, and unpractical, while the\nvarious writers on this science seem more or less divided into opposing\nschools. Notwithstanding this, there are reasons for maintaining a real\nagreement in all systems of mental philosophy, at least in essentials,\nand the following considerations lead to such a conclusion:\n\nIn the first place, the nature of the subject investigated would\nnecessarily tend to such a result; for that subject is the human mind,\nnot in its specific peculiarities, but in those generic phenomena which\nare common to all minds; just as the natural philosopher investigates\nthose properties of matter which are common to a class, and not the\nspecific peculiarities that distinguish individual masses or particles.\nNow, as those who direct their investigations to mental phenomena are\nall drawing a picture from the same pattern, it is properly inferred\nthat in the main outlines there must be a general resemblance.\n\nAnother reason for this conclusion is the mode of investigation pursued.\nIt is simply observing, first, the phenomena of our own minds, and then\ncomparing them with those of other minds as exhibited in looks, words,\nand actions, and thus educing generic resemblances and specific\ndifferences. It is the generic resemblances only that constitute the\nfaculties and laws of mind which are to be described, classified, and\nnamed.\n\nAnother reason for inferring such an agreement of systems is the fact,\nnot only that all human minds have common phenomena, but that they have\nprovided themselves with terms to express them, so that they succeed in\nso far understanding each other as to make comparisons of their mental\nexperience.\n\nThe same agreement may be inferred, also, when we consider that mental\nphilosophy treats, not of new ideas, or new combinations of ideas, but\nof knowledge which is already in the mind. The process to be pursued,\nthen, involves a reference to what we have ourselves experienced; it is\nan examination of our own feelings, thoughts, and volitions. These are\nsubjects of which we are competent judges, and in regard to which we can\nbe certain as to what is correct or incorrect, more than we can be in\nreference to any other kind of knowledge.\n\nFrom these considerations, it is inferred that all systems of mental\nphilosophy will resemble each other just so far as they are true, and\nthat the difference must be mainly in modes of presenting the subject.\nInasmuch as writers on mental science are drawing a picture of those\nexperiences of their own minds which are common to the whole race, they\nmust in the main resemble each other, though some may be more imperfect,\nvague, and disconnected than others.\n\nIt may be useful to indicate the causes which have combined to produce\nperplexity and apparent diversities among writers on mental science.\n\nThe first cause is the want of an accurate medium of communication by\nwhich one mind can compare its experience with the experience of other\nminds. In natural science, when the philosopher instructs in reference\nto the properties of matter, all the terms employed can be made definite\nby appeals to the senses. For example, if it is not understood what is\nmeant by a _pungent_ smell, such a smell can be produced, and then there\nis a perfectly clear idea of what is meant by the term. But in mental\nscience, when the term _reason_ or the term _understanding_ is employed,\nno such perfect and definite mode is at command to illustrate the\nmeaning.\n\nOn the contrary, in this science, a single term is often used with\nvarious meanings, each use, however, including some common idea, while\nthe extent or limitation in every case is to be determined by the\nconnection. For example, the term _heart_ is used sometimes to signify\nthe chief organ of physical life, sometimes it signifies the mind\nitself. In a more limited use it denotes the feelings, and in a still\nmore restricted sense it expresses the leading interest of the mind.\nThis involves a constant process of reasoning to decide the meaning of\nthe term.\n\nAnother perplexity in mental science has arisen from an unwarrantable\nuse of terms by writers. In some instances new distinctions in mental\nanalysis have been originated, and then terms have been used to express\nthese distinctions which never before were employed in this limited\nsense. Of course, in reading their works, the mind is confused by\nmeeting terms that in common use recall one signification, when the\nwriter employs them in another.\n\nIn other cases, such writers have formed new classifications of mental\nphenomena, and employed new terms to express them, and thus an\nimpression is made that something new has been discovered, or a new\nsystem evolved. For example, Brown arranges the intellectual operations\nof mind in but two general classes, and calls them _simple suggestion_\nand _relative suggestion_. But his work, in this respect, presents only\na new classification and new terms, but no new ideas.\n\nAnother difficulty in mental science has arisen from the fact that many\nwriters on this subject have failed in accurate analysis of the\nphenomena of mind, and, of course, have not succeeded in conveying clear\nand distinct ideas to their readers. For example, some metaphysicians\nhave never discriminated between _desire_ and _choice_, but have written\nas if they were the same thing. Thus they have affirmed things which\nwere true in reference to one of these mental acts, and false in regard\nto the other. This has produced mistiness of apprehension or false\nconceptions in their readers. Some understand the writer one way and\ndispute his positions, others understand him another way and defend\nthem, because what he says is true of one act and false of the other,\nwhile both acts are spoken of as one and the same.\n\nMeantime the great mass of readers have never been accustomed to any\naccurate analysis, or even to any fixed observation of their own mental\nstates. They are, therefore, unprepared to detect these defects in the\nwriters on mental science, and are easily confused and perplexed.\n\nAnother difficulty has arisen from false ideas as to the origin and\nproper use of words. In most minds an impression has been generated that\nthere is an inherent meaning belonging to the words of a language. They\ndo not consider that in the formation of language the ideas come first,\nand that the words are only conventional signs which men agree in using\nto express these ideas. Writers often speak of words which by long usage\nhave been connected with certain ideas, as if they ought not to be so\nemployed. They do not consider that the fact that men have used a word\nfor a given idea, and understand each other, is the very thing which\nestablishes its proper use and meaning.\n\nIf, then, in all time and in all nations, mankind have classified and\ngiven names to their mental states, the classification and the names are\ntrue and proper, and no philosopher should claim that these are\nincorrect. The object of language is to enable men to communicate their\nideas, and that language is best which enables them to do it the most\nextensively and the most accurately.\n\nIt is maintained, then, that there is a _system_ of mental philosophy\nwhich is understood by all mankind; that there are words in common use\nby which it can be clearly and definitely described and expressed,\neither by single terms or by circumlocution; that it is recognized in\nthe Bible; and that, substantially, it is the system taught by all\nwriters on mental science, some teaching one portion and some another.\nIt is maintained, also, that no such writer has taught any thing of any\nimportance _that is true_ which can not be translated into the language\nof common life, so as to be readily comprehended even by persons of\nordinary capacity and education.\n\nThere is no difficulty in leading any mind of ordinary capacity to\nnotice the several classes of mental operations introduced in this work,\nand in all nations and languages these facts are recognized and terms\nare provided to express them.\n\nSome persons object to speaking of any mental phenomena as _states_ of\nmind, because it is claimed that the mind is _active_ in all. Thus\nsensations are claimed to be acts of mind instead of passive states\ncaused by material objects. In regard to this and various other\nobjections urged against this mode of classification and nomenclature,\nit may be remarked that the thing aimed at is simply, by means of a\ndescription, to point out what is meant. When this is understood, it\ndoes not change our idea to give it a name. We know by our own\nexperience what it is to have a sensation, and calling it a _state_ or\nan _act_ does not alter our idea of the fact.\n\nIn using words, all we have to do is to _convey our meaning_, either by\ndescription or illustration, and when we have done this, to select a\nword to express it; and that word is best for this purpose which would\nrecall this meaning to the greatest number of persons who have\npreviously used it in this sense.\n\nFor this reason, it is most proper to use terms employed in common life\nto express the phenomena treated of in mental science, instead of\ninstituting new terms, which, to most persons, have never had the\nintended ideas connected with them.\n\nThis method is adopted in the following pages; but it is important to\nremember that, while these words are used both in common life and by\nmetaphysical writers with the meaning here indicated, they are often\nused with other significations. Thus the word _to perceive_ is used not\nonly to signify the act of gaining ideas by the senses, but any act of\nmind in noticing truths of any kind, either mental or external. So _to\nconceive_ and _to perceive_ are often used interchangeably as meaning\nthe same thing.\n\nBut this does not render it necessary to seek any new terms to express\nthese ideas. All that is needful is to indicate that in classing and\ndescribing mental phenomena we restrict ourselves to one exact and\nuniform use of these terms, and this use is indicated in the description\nor definition given.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nCLASSIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION OF THE MENTAL POWERS.\n\n\nWe now proceed to the classification and description of the mental\npowers.\n\nNot only all writers on mental science, but the most common writers and\nspeakers, recognize a general division of mental operations, which is\nexpressed by the terms _intellect_, _feeling_, and _choice_. We _think_,\nwe _feel_, and we _choose_. Even the young child learns to comprehend\nthese three grand divisions of the mental phenomena.\n\nTo this most general division, in this work, are applied the terms _the\nintellectual powers, the susceptibilities_, and _the will_. These terms\nare selected because they are the most common ones.\n\n\nTHE INTELLECTUAL POWERS.\n\nUnder the general class of intellectual powers are arranged the\nfollowing specific powers of mind:\n\nSensation, Perception, Conception, Memory, Imagination, Judgment,\nAbstraction, Attention, and Association.\n\n_Sensation_ is a state of mind produced by material objects acting on\nthe senses.\n\nThus, when light, which is considered as one kind of matter, affects the\neye, the sensation of _sight_ is produced. When the perfume of a rose,\nwhich is another species of matter, affects the nostrils, the sensation\nof _smell_ is produced. When a bell or some musical instrument causes\nthe air to vibrate on the drum of the ear, it causes the sensation of\n_sound_. When any sapid body is applied to the tongue, the sensation of\n_taste_ is caused. When the hand, or any part of the body, comes in\ncontact with another body, the sensation of _touch_ is produced.\n\nThus it appears that the five senses are the organs of sensation, and\nthat through their instrumentality material things operate upon the\nmind.\n\n_Perception_ is a _sensation_ attended by the _belief of a cause_, and\nit is this additional circumstance alone which distinguishes perception\nfrom sensation.\n\nIf a person were asleep, and should suffer from the prick of a pin, or\nbe disturbed by an unpleasant sound, these would be mere sensations,\nbecause the mind would not ascribe them to any cause. But if the person\nshould waken, these sensations would immediately become perceptions,\nbecause they would be attended by the belief of some cause.\n\n_Conception_ is a state of mind similar to perception, and differs from\nit in being less vivid, and in not being produced through the medium of\nthe senses.\n\nWhen we look at a tree, we have a _perception_ of this object. But the\nmind can also have an idea of this tree when removed from the sight,\nthough the idea is not so vivid and distinct, nor have the senses any\nagency in producing it. The perfume of a rose, also, occasions another\nsensation; but when the rose is removed, so as not to affect the senses,\nwe can still have a _conception_ of its perfume. The conception differs\nfrom the perception only in being less vivid, and in not being caused by\na material object acting on the senses.\n\n_Memory_ is either a conception or a perception, which is attended with\na feeling of its resemblance to a past state of mind. It is this feeling\nof resemblance that is the only circumstance which distinguishes memory\nfrom conception.\n\nThus we may conceive of a tree without recognizing it as the particular\nidea of any tree we may have seen before; but if this is accompanied by\na feeling of the resemblance of this idea to the one we always have when\nwe see the tree that shadows the paternal roof, this conception becomes\n_memory_. If we conceive the form of a man without recognizing the\nresemblance of this idea to the perceptions we have when we see any\nparticular man, this is a simple act of conception; but if we recognize\nin this object of conception the features of a dear friend, this act\nthen becomes memory. Again, if we conceive of certain events and\ncircumstances attending them without recognizing this combination as\never having existed in past experience, they are mere conceptions; but\nif we recognize in them the events and circumstances of past experience,\nconception becomes memory.\n\n_Imagination_ is the power which the mind possesses of arranging our\nconceptions in new combinations. We can conceive objects as united\ntogether of which we never conceived before as thus united.\n\nThus, when we read the description of some picturesque scene in nature,\nthe mind immediately groups together mountains, trees, brooks, cottages,\nand glens, forming a new combination of conceptions different from any\nscene we ever witnessed or conceived before. All the objects thus\ncombined are conceptions; the act of arranging them is an act of the\nimagination.\n\n_Judgment_ is the power which the mind possesses of _noticing\nrelations_. A _relation_ is an idea obtained by observing one thing in\nconnection with another. Thus, when we perceive one thing to be _longer_\nthan another, one thing to be _on_ another, or one thing to _belong_ to\nanother--in all these cases the mind _notices relations_, or exercises\nthe faculty of judgment. Thus, also, when we compare any action with the\nrule of duty in order to decide whether it is right or wrong, we\nexercise the same faculty. This act always is necessarily preceded by\nthe comparison of one thing with another, in order to notice the\nrelations.\n\n_Abstraction_ is the power of noticing certain parts or qualities of any\nobject, as distinct from other parts or qualities. Thus, when we notice\nthe length of a bridge without attending to the breadth or color, or\nwhen we notice the height of a man without thinking of his character, we\nexercise the faculty of abstraction.\n\n_Attention_ is the direction of the mind to any particular object or\nquality, from the interest which is felt in it, or in something\nconnected with it. The degree of attention is always proportioned to the\ndegree of interest felt in the object.\n\n_Association_ is the power possessed by the mind of recalling ideas in\nthe connections and relations in which they have existed in past\nexperience. For example, when any two objects, such as a house and a\ntree, have often been observed together, the idea of one will ordinarily\nbe attended by that of the other. If two events have often been united\ntogether in regard to the _time_ of their occurrence, such, for example,\nas thunder and lightning, the idea of one will usually be attended by\nthe other.\n\nIn this work, the aim is to introduce no more of mental analysis than is\nneeded for its main object. What is here introduced is not claimed as a\ncomplete presentation of all the mental phenomena.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\nSENSATION AND PERCEPTION.\n\n\nAs there is no distinction between sensation and perception except in\nthe fact that one is attended with the belief of a cause and the other\nis not, they will be treated of together.\n\nThe mind of man is an immaterial existence, confined in its operations\nby the body it inhabits, and depending upon the construction and\nmodifications of this envelope for much of its happiness or suffering.\n\nThe exercise of the imagination, when the eyes are closed and the body\nat rest, will probably give us the best idea of what is the nature of\nspiritual existence when disconnected with matter. It is one of the\noffices of our bodily system to retain the spirit in its operations in\none particular place, so that ordinarily it can have direct communion\nwith no other mind which is not in the same place. Whether this is the\ncase with mere spiritual existence is a question for conjecture, and not\nfor any rational decision.\n\nWhile the spirit of man is resident in its material frame, it is\nfurnished with facilities of communication with other minds, and with\norgans which fit it to receive suffering or enjoyment from the material\nobjects by which it is surrounded. These organs of communication are the\nseveral senses. They consist of expansions of the substance of which the\nbrain is formed, which, descending to the body through the spinal bone\nof the back, are thence sent out in thousands of ramifications over the\nwhole system. Those branches which enter the eyes, and are spread over\nthe interior back part of this organ, are called the _optic nerve_.\nWhenever the particles of light enter the eye, they strike the optic\nnerve, and produce the sensation which is called _sight_. Those branches\nwhich are spread over the tongue are the organ of _taste_. Those that\nare extended through the cavities of the nostrils are called the\n_olfactory_ nerves. When the small particles of matter that escape from\nodoriferous bodies come in contact with these nerves, they produce the\nsensation of _smell_.\n\nThe nerves that constitute the organ of _hearing_ are extended over the\ncavity of the ear behind the _tympanum_, or _ear-drum_. This cavity is\nfilled with a liquid, and when the drum of the ear is caused to vibrate\nby the air which is set in motion by sonorous bodies, it produces\nundulations of this liquid upon these nerves, and thus the sensation of\n_sound_ is produced. By the expansion of other nerves, the sense of\n_feeling_ is extended all over the body, excepting the nails and the\nhair. It is by the action of matter, in its different forms, on these\nseveral senses, that the mind obtains ideas, and that ideas are imparted\nfrom one mind to another.\n\n_Perception_ never takes place unless some material object makes an\nimpression upon one of the senses. In the case of the eye, the ear, and\nthe nostrils, the object which is regarded as the cause of the sensation\ndoes not come immediately in contact with the organs of sense. When we\nsee a body, we consider it as the cause of that perception; but it is\nnot the body that comes in contact with the organ of sight, but merely\nthe particles of light reflected from that body. In the case of smell,\nthe fragrant body is regarded as the cause of the sensation; but that\nwhich acts on the sense is the material particles of perfume which flow\nfrom that body.\n\nThus, also, with hearing. We consider the sonorous body as the cause;\nbut the sensation is produced through the medium of the air, which\naffects the drum of the ear. But in the case of taste and touch, the\nbody which is regarded by the mind as the cause must come in contact\nwith the nerves of the tongue or the body to produce the sensation.\n\n\n_Smell._\n\nThe sense of smell is one which greatly conduces to the preservation,\nthe comfort, and the happiness of man. It is a continual aid to him in\ndetecting polluted atmosphere or unhealthy food. The direct enjoyment it\naffords is probably less in amount than that derived from any of the\nother senses; yet, were we deprived of all the enjoyment gained through\nthis source, we should probably find the privation much greater than we\nat first might imagine. When we walk forth among the beauties of nature,\nthe fresh perfumes that send forth their incense are sources both of\nimmediate and succeeding gratification. The beautiful images of nature\nwhich rise to the mind in our imaginative hours, would lose many of\ntheir obscure but charming associations were the fields stripped of the\nfragrance of their greens and the flowers of their sweet perfumes.\nNature would appear to have lost that moving spirit of life which now\never rides upon the evening zephyrs and the summer breeze. As it is, as\nwe walk abroad, all nature seems to send forth its welcome, while to its\nMaker's praise\n\n                      \"Each odorous leaf,\n  Each opening blossom, freely breathes abroad\n  Its gratitude, and thanks Him with its sweets.\"\n\n_Taste._\n\nWhen a sapid body is applied to the organ of taste, two sensations are\nproduced, one of _touch_ and one of _taste_. We are conscious of the\ndifference of these sensations when we apply a body to the tongue which\nhas taste, and then immediately one which has not. It is probable,\nhowever, that the same set of nerves serve both purposes.\n\nIt is one of the numberless evidences of the benevolence of our Creator\nthat the process which is necessary for the preservation of life, and\nwhich depends upon the voluntary activity of every human being, should\nbe connected with a sense which affords such gratification that the duty\nis sought as a pleasure. Were mankind led to seek food merely in the\nexercise of reason for the purpose of preserving life, multitudes,\nthrough carelessness and forgetfulness, would be perpetually neglecting\nthat regular supply without which the animal system would become\nderanged and enfeebled. By the present constitution of the body, the\ngratification of this sense is an object of desire, and thus we are\ncontinually reminded of our duty, and led to it as a source of\nenjoyment.\n\nNor is it the gratification of this sense which is the only source of\nenjoyment connected with it. The regular periods for repast bring around\nthe social board those united to each other by the tenderest ties of\nkindred and affection. These become seasons of cheerful hilarity and\nrelaxation, seasons of cessation from daily cares, seasons for the\ninterchange of kind feelings and intellectual stores; and while the mere\ngratification of sense is one source of pleasure, to this is often added\nthe \"feast of reason and the flow of soul.\"\n\nThe effect on the best feelings in thus assembling to participate in\ncommon blessings is scarcely ever appreciated. Did every individual of\nour race retire to secrecy and solitude to satisfy the cravings of\nnature, how much would the sum of human happiness be diminished! But\nthus has our benevolent Creator contrived that one source of enjoyment\nshould serve as an occasion for introducing many more.\n\n\n_Hearing._\n\nThe sense of hearing is one more connected with the intellectual and\nmoral powers of man than either taste or smell, as it is through the\nmedium of this organ that both music and speech operate on the human\nmind. We can form some imperfect estimate of the amount of happiness\nderived from this sense by imagining the condition of mankind were they\nat once and forever deprived of this source of improvement and\nenjoyment. The voice of sympathy, friendship, and love would be hushed.\nThe eloquence of the forum, the debates of the Legislature, the\ninstructions of the pulpit, would cease. The music of nature--its\nsighing winds and dashing waters--would be stilled, and the warbling of\nthe groves would charm no more. The sound of pipe, and harp, and solemn\nharmonies of voice would never again waken the soul to thrilling and\nnameless emotions. Where now ten thousand sounds of active life, or\ncheerful hum of business, or music of language and song charm and\nanimate the soul, man would walk forth in silence and solitude.\n\nThe operation of mere sound, disconnected with the ideas which are often\nconveyed by it, is a subject of curious speculation. Sounds differ from\neach other in _quality_, _pitch_, _force_, and in _length_. The\ndifference in _tone_ may be illustrated by the sounds of a clarionet\ncompared with the sound of a bell or of the human voice. Every\ninstrument and every human voice has each a peculiar tone by which it is\ndistinguished from all others. The difference in _pitch_ is shown by\nsounding a low and a high note in succession on an instrument. The\ndifference in _force_ is exhibited by singing or speaking loud or soft.\n\nThere are certain sounds that in themselves are either agreeable or\ndisagreeable from their tone alone. Thus the sound of a flute is\nagreeable, and that of the filing of a saw is disagreeable. Sounds also\nare agreeable according as they succeed each other.\n\n_Melody_ is a succession of agreeable tones arranged in some regular\norder as it respects their duration and succession. Some melodies are\nmuch more agreeable to the ear than others. Some melodies produce a\nplaintive state of mind, others exhilarate, and this without regard to\nany thing except the nature of the sounds and their succession. Thus a\nvery young infant, by a certain succession of musical tones, can be made\neither to weep in sorrow or smile with joy.\n\n_Harmony_ is a certain _combination_ of sounds which are agreeable to\nthe ear; and it is found that the mind can be much more powerfully\naffected by a combination of harmonious sounds than by any melody. The\neffect of music on certain minds is very powerful, often awakening\nstrange and indescribable emotions. It has been, therefore, much\nemployed both to heighten social, patriotic, and devotional feeling.\n\nThere is probably nothing which produces stronger and more abiding\nassociations in the mind than musical sounds. As an example of this may\nbe mentioned the national air which is sung by the Swiss in their native\nvalleys. It is said that when they become wanderers in foreign lands, so\nstrongly will this wild music recall the scenes of their childhood and\nyouth, their native skies, their towering mountains and romantic glens,\nwith all the strong local attachments that gather around such objects,\nthat their heart sickens with longing desires to return. And so much was\nthis the case with the Swiss of the French armies, that Bonaparte\nforbade this air being played among his troops. The Marseilles Hymn,\nwhich was chanted in the scenes of the French Revolution, was said to\nhave been perfectly electrifying, and to have produced more effect than\nall the eloquence of orators or machinations of statesmen.\n\nThe mind seems to acquire by experience only the power of determining\nthe place whence sounds originate. It is probable that, at first, sounds\nseem to originate within the ear of the person who hears; and, even\nafter long experience, cases have been known, when a person suddenly\nwaked from sleep imagined the throbbing of his own heart was a knocking\nat the door. But observation and experience soon teach us the direction\nand the distance of sounds. The art of the ventriloquist consists in\nnothing but the power which a nice and accurate ear gives him of\ndistinguishing the difference between sounds when near or far off, and\nof imitating them.\n\n\n_Touch._\n\nThe sense of touch is not confined to one particular organ, but is\nextended over the whole system, both externally and internally. It is in\nthe hands, however, especially at the ends of the fingers, that this\nsense is most acute and most employed. We acquire many more ideas by the\naid of this sense than by either hearing, smell, or taste. By these last\nwe become acquainted with only one particular quality in a body, either\nof taste, smell, or sound; but by means of the touch we learn such\nqualities as heat and cold, roughness and smoothness, hardness and\nsoftness, figure, solidity, and extension.\n\nIt is supposed that it is by this sense that we gain the idea of\nsomething _external_, or without ourselves. The sensation of smell would\nseem to be within, as an act or emotion of the soul itself. Thus also\nwith hearing, which, being produced within the ear by the undulating\nair, would seem to originate within. Thus also with sensations within\nthe eye. But when the limbs begin to move and to come in contact with\noutward objects, and also in contact with various parts of the body, the\nmind gains an idea of the existence of some outward object. This is\nprobably the first sense by which any idea of existence is wakened in\nthe mind. As one sense after another is called into action, the mind\ncontinually gains new ideas, and then begins its operations of\ncomparing, abstracting, reasoning, and willing.\n\nIt is by the sense of touch that we gain our ideas of _resistance_ and\n_extension_. In the class of ideas included under the head of ideas of\nresistance may be placed those of solidity, liquidity, hardness,\nsoftness, viscidity, roughness, and smoothness; these all being\ndifferent names for different modes of resistance to the muscles of the\nhands, arms, or fingers, when applied to the bodies which have these\nqualities. These ideas are not gained by simple contact; their existence\ndepends upon the contraction or expansion of the muscles, which are the\norgans of motion and resistance in the human body.\n\nWe may suppose the infant to gain these ideas by a process somewhat\nsimilar to this: He first moves his arms by instinct, without any\nknowledge of the effects to follow. By this movement he gains certain\nideas of the simple contractions and extension of his muscles, and\nlearns also that by his own will he can exercise his muscles in this\nmanner. At length he attempts to move his arm in a manner to which he\nhas become familiar, and some object intervenes, and motion is\nprevented, while all his wonted muscular efforts are vain. Thus arises\nin his mind a new idea, of resistance, in addition to the sensations of\ntouch and of motion, which had before been experienced.\n\nThe ideas of _different degrees_ of this resistance are gained by\nrepeated experience, and when age furnishes the ability to understand\nlanguage, the names of hardness, softness, roughness, and the like, are\ngiven to these ideas. In the use of his muscles, also, the infant must\nfirst acquire its ideas of _extension_ and _figure_; for it must be\nwhere resistance to muscular effort ceases that he must feel that the\ncause ceases to exist. The little being extends his hand--an object\nintervenes which interrupts his muscular motions; he grasps this object,\nand wherever this feeling of resistance exists, there he feels that the\ncause of it exists, and that after he has passed certain limits it does\nnot exist.\n\n_Figure_ is defined as the _limits of extension_, and, of course, it can\nbe seen that ideas of figure can only be gained by thus finding the\nlimits of extension. It has formerly been supposed that ideas of\n_extension_ and _figure_ were gained by the eye, but later experiments\nand discussions show that the sense of feeling, including muscular\nmotion, is the medium by which these ideas are first gained, and that\nafterward the eye, by the principle of association, acquires the power\nof distinguishing figure and distance.\n\nThere is much enjoyment resulting from the sense of touch in many ways,\na large portion of which is almost unnoticed. Much also included under\nthe term _comfort_ results from this sense. Much of that which is\nagreeable in clothing and in objects around us is of this nature.\nBesides this, there are many endearments of friendship and affection\nthat gain expression only through this medium.\n\n\n_Vision._\n\nThe organ of vision is the eye, which is one of the most curious and\nwonderful parts of the human frame, and displays in astonishing variety\nthe wisdom and skill of its Designer.\n\nThe eye consists of a round ball, formed externally of various\ncoverings, and within of humors of different degrees of consistency. The\nfront part of the eye, which is exposed to view, has a small opening in\nit, which admits the rays of light within this ball, while it is by the\noperation of light on the nerves, which are spread in fine net-work over\nthe interior, that _sight_ is produced.\n\nIn examining the mechanism of the eye, a great variety of contrivances\nappear, all aiding in accomplishing the object of vision. In the first\nplace, we may observe its modes of protection and defense. The lid is a\nsoft, moist wiper, which, with a motion quick as lightning, protects the\neye from outward violence, cleanses it from dust, veils it from\noverpowering radiance, and in hours of repose entirely excludes the\nlight. On its edge is the fringing lash, which intercepts floating\nmatter that might otherwise intrude, while above is spread the eyebrow,\nwhich, like a thatch, obstructs the drops that heat or toil accumulate\non the brow.\n\nWe next observe the organs of motion with which the eye is furnished,\nand which, with complicated strings and pulleys, can turn it every way\nat the will of the intelligent agent. The _pupil_ or _opening_ of the\neye, also, is so constructed, with its minute and multiplied circular\nand crossing muscles, that it can contract or expand in size just in\nproportion as the light varies in intensity.\n\nThe ball of the eye is filled with three substances of different degrees\nof density. One is a watery humor, near the front of the eye; back of\nthis, and suspended by two muscles, is the solid lens of the eye, or the\n_crystalline humor_; and the remainder of the eye, in which this lens is\nimbedded, consists of the _vitreous humor_, which is of the consistence\nof jelly. These all have different degrees of transparency, and are so\nnicely adjusted that the rays of light, which start from every point in\nall bodies in _diverging_ lines, are by these humors made to _converge_\nand meet in points on the _retina_, or the nerve of the eye, forming\nthere a small picture, exactly of the same proportions, though not the\nsame size, as the scene which is spread before the eye.\n\nWhen the outer covering of the back part of the eye is removed, the\nobjects which are in front of the eye may be discerned, delicately\nportrayed in all their perfect colors and proportions, on the retina\nwhich lines the interior. It is this impression of light on the optic\nnerve which gives our ideas of light and colors.\n\nThe eye is also formed in such a way that it can alter its shape and\nbecome somewhat oblong, while at the same time its lens is projected\nforward or drawn back. The object of this contrivance is to obtain an\nequally perfect picture of distant and of near objects.\n\nOur ideas of _shape_ and _size_ at first are not gained by the eye, but\nby the sense of touch. After considerable experience we learn to\ndetermine shape and size by the eye. Experiments made upon persons born\nblind and restored to sight furnish many curious facts to support this\nassertion.\n\nWhen the eye first admits the light, all objects appear to _touch_ the\neye, and are all a confused mass of different colors. But by continual\nobservation, and by the aid of the sense of touch, objects gradually are\nseparated from each other, and are then regarded as separate and\ndistinct existences.\n\nThe eye is so formed that the picture of any object on the retina varies\nin size according to its _distance_. Two objects of equal size will make\na different picture on the back of the eye, according to the distance at\nwhich they are held. The ideas of size at first are regulated by the\nproportions of this picture in the eye, until by experience it is found\nthat this is an incorrect mode, and that it is necessary to judge of the\n_distance_ of a body before we can determine its _size_. This accounts\nfor the fact that objects appear to us so different according as we\nconceive of their distance, and that we are often deceived in the size\nof bodies because we have no mode of determining their distance.\n\nBut it appears also that our ideas of distance are gained, not by the\neye alone, but by the eye and the sense of feeling united. A child by\nthe sense of feeling learns the size of his cup or his playthings. He\nsees them removed, and that their apparent size diminishes. They are\nreturned to him, and he finds them unaltered in size. When attempting to\nrecover them, he finds that when they look very small he is obliged to\npass over a much greater distance to gain them than when they appear\nlarge, and that the distance is always in exact proportion to their\napparent size. In this way, by oft-repeated experiments, the infant\nreasoner learns to judge both of the size and distance of objects. From\nthis it appears that, in determining the size of an object, we\npreviously form some judgment of its distance, and likewise that, in\nfinding the distance, we first determine the size.\n\nThe _shape_ of objects is learned altogether by the sense of _feeling_.\nIt has before been stated that at the first exercise of vision every\nthing is a confused mass of different colors, and all appearing to touch\nthe eye. By the aid of the hands the separate existence of different\nbodies is detected, and the feeling of touch, which once was the sole\nmode of determining shape, is now associated with a certain form or\npicture on the eye, so that, in process of time, the eye becomes the\nprincipal judge of shape.\n\nBut, in determining the shape of a thing, an act of judgment is\nnecessary. This may be illustrated by the example of a hoop, which in\none position will make a picture in the eye which is circular, in\nanother position the picture of it will be oval, and in another only a\nstraight line. If a person will observe a hoop in these different\npositions, and then attempt to draw a picture of it, he will be\nconscious of this varying picture in the eye. Of course, in order to\ndecide the shape of a thing, we must decide its distance, its relative\nposition, and various circumstances which would alter the form of the\npicture in the eye. It is only by long experience that the infant child\ngradually acquires the power of determining the shape, size, and\ndistance of objects.\n\nThe painter's art consists in laying on to canvas an enlarged picture of\nthe scene which is painted in the interior of his own eye. In this\nminute picture of the eye, the more distant an object the smaller its\nsize, the more indistinct its outline, and the fainter its colors. These\nsame are transferred to canvas in an enlarged form; the distant objects\nare made small in size, faint in colors, and indistinct in outline, just\nin proportion to their distance.\n\nThe organ of vision is the inlet of more enjoyment to the mind than any\nof the other senses. Through this small loop-hole the spirit looks forth\non the rich landscape of nature, and the charms both of the natural and\nmoral world. The fresh colors, the beauty of motion, the grace of\nfigures, the fitness of proportion, and all the charms of taste, are\ndiscovered through this medium. By the eye, also, we learn to read the\nspeaking face of man, we greet the smile of friendship and love, and all\nthose varying charms that glance across the human face divine. By the\naid of this little organ, too, we climb not only the summits of earth's\ndomains, but wander forth to planets, stars, and suns, traverse the vast\nethereal expanse, and gather faint images and flitting visions of the\nspirit's future home.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X.\n\nCONCEPTION AND MEMORY.\n\n\nThere has been much speculation on the question as to whether the mind\npossesses any ideas entirely independent of the senses, which were\ngained without any aid or influence from them. Many have maintained the\nexistence of some ideas, which they denominate _innate ideas_, which\nthey suppose were originally implanted in the mind, and not at all\ndependent on sensation.\n\nOn this subject it may be sufficient to remark that there is no _proof_\nof the existence of any such ideas. All ideas, so far as we can trace\nthem, seem to have been originally gained by the senses, though the mind\nhas the power of making new arrangements and combinations of such\nmaterials as are thus furnished.\n\nThe intuitive truths seem to exist as a part of the original\nconstitution of the mind, but there is no evidence that they would ever\nhave been called into exercise except through the instrumentality of the\nsenses.\n\nThere is nothing to prove that the positive exercise of thought,\nfeeling, and volition is necessary to the existence of mind, and no\nproof that the mind might not have existed forever without thought or\nfeeling of any kind, were it not for the aid of the senses. We know that\nthere are periods of sleep and of swooning, when the mind is in\nexistence, and yet when there is no evidence that either thoughts,\nfeelings, or volitions are in exercise.\n\nSpeculations on this subject seem to be profitless, because there are no\ndata for determining them. The _facts_ in the case are not of a\ncharacter to enable us to pronounce positively either that these\noperations are or are not essential to its existence. It may be that in\nsleep and in a swoon these phenomena exist, and no memory is retained of\nthem, and it is equally probable that at such intervals all mental\noperations entirely cease.\n\nBut, now that the mind has been furnished by the senses with its\nsplendid acquisitions, upon which its reflective powers can act, it is\neasy to believe that it might continue to exist and to be in active\nexercise if all its bodily senses, and even its material envelope, were\ndestroyed. Should we never again behold the light of heaven, nor be\ncharmed with the profusion of varied color and form, still the mind\ncould busy itself with pleasing visions of brilliant dyes, of graceful\noutline, and fair proportion, as bright and as beautiful as any objects\nof sense could awaken. Should we never again inhale the freshness of\nmorning or the perfumes of spring, the mind itself could furnish from\nits stores some treasured incense, never to be entirely exhaled. Should\nthe palate never again be cooled by the freshening water of spring, or\nbe refreshed by the viands of the luxuriant year, yet fancy could spread\nforth her golden fruits and sparkling juices in banquets as varied and\nprofuse as ever greeted the most fastidious taste. Should the melodies\nof speech and of music be heard no more, and the sweet harmonies of\nnature and of art forever be hushed, yet the exulting spirit could\nwarble its own songs, and melt in ecstasies with imagined harmonies. And\nshould the grasp of friendship rejoice us no more, nor the embrace of\naffection send joy to the heart, yet still the spirit would not be\ndesolate, for it could gather around it the beings most loved, and still\nfeel the embraces of affection.\n\nConceptions are distinguished into two classes with reference to this\none fact, that some of our conceptions are attended with a consciousness\nthat they have existed before, and others are not. Those conceptions\nwhich are thus attended with the feeling of their resemblance to past\nperceptions or conceptions are called ideas of _memory_; those of our\n_perceptions_ also which are attended with this recognition are called\nmemory.\n\nHow important to our happiness and improvement is this recognition of\npast ideas, few are wont to imagine. If all our knowledge of external\nthings were forever lost to us after sensation is past, our existence\nwould be one of mere sensitive enjoyment, and all the honor and dignity\nof mind would be destroyed. No past experience could be of any avail,\nnor could any act of judgment or of reasoning be performed. Even the\nmost common wants of animal nature could not be supplied; for, were the\ncooling water and sustaining food presented to the sight, no memory of\nthe past comfort secured by them would lead the mind to seek it again.\nOr, had nature, by some implanted instinct, provided for these\nnecessities, yet life in this case would have consisted of a mere\nsuccession of sensations, without even the amount of intellect of which\nthe lower animals give proof.\n\nIt is the capacity of retrospection, too, which gives us the power of\nforeseeing the future, and thus of looking both before and behind for\nsources of enjoyment in delightful reminiscences and joyful\nanticipations. It is this power of remembrance and foresight which\nraises man to be the image of his Creator, the miniature of Him who sees\nthe end from the beginning, who looks back on never commencing ages, and\nforward through eternal years.\n\nIt is true the mind of man can foresee only by the process of reasoning,\nby which it is inferred that the future will, in given circumstances,\nresemble the past. And how the Eternal Mind can foresee by intuition all\nthe events which hang upon the volitions of the myriads of acting minds\nwhich he has formed is what no human intellect can grasp. The _foresight\nof intuition_ has not been bestowed upon man, but is reserved as one\ndistinctive prerogative of Deity.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI.\n\nATTENTION AND ABSTRACTION.\n\n\nTo understand clearly the nature of the mental phenomena called\n_attention_ and _abstraction_, two facts in our mental history need\ndefinitely to be understood--facts which have a decided bearing on the\nnature and character of almost all the operations of mind.\n\nThe first is, that the objects of our conceptions are seldom, if ever,\nisolated, disconnected objects. On the contrary, there is an extended\nand complex picture before the mind, including often a great variety of\nobjects, with their several qualities, relations, and changes. In this\nmental picture some objects are clear and distinct, while others seem to\nfloat along in shadowy vagueness.\n\nThis fact must be evident to any mind that will closely examine its own\nmental operations. It is also equally evident when we consider the mode\nin which our ideas are gained by perception. We never acquire our ideas\nin single disconnected lineaments. We are continually viewing complex\nobjects with numerous qualities and surrounded by a great variety of\ncircumstances, which unitedly form a _whole_ in one act of perception.\n\nIndeed, there are few objects, either of perception or conception,\nwhich, however close the process of abstraction, do not remain complex\nin their nature. The simplest forms of matter are _combined_ ideas of\nextension, figure, color, and relation. These different ideas we gain by\nthe aid of the different senses. Of course, our conceptions are\ncombinations of different qualities in an object which the mind\nconsiders as _one_, and as distinct from other objects.\n\nEach item, then, in any mental picture is itself a complex object, and\neach mental picture is formed by a combination of such complex objects.\nIt will be found very difficult, if not impossible, to mention a name\nwhich recalls any object of sense in which the conception recalled by\nthe word is a single disconnected thing, without any idea of place or\nany attendant circumstances, and, as before remarked, almost all objects\nof sense are complex objects, combining several ideas, which were gained\nthrough the instrumentality of different senses. The idea of color is\ngained by one sense, of position, shape, and consistency by another, and\nother qualities and powers which the mind associates with it by other\nsenses.\n\nThe other fact necessary to the correct understanding of the subject is\nthe influence which the _desires_ and _emotions_ have upon the character\nboth of the perceptions and conceptions with which they coexist.\n\nIt will be found that our _sensations_ vary in vividness and\ndistinctness according to the strength and permanency of certain\nfeelings of desire which coexist with them. For example, we are\ncontinually hearing a multitude of sounds, but in respect to many of\nthem, as we feel no desire to know the cause or nature of them, these\nsensations are so feeble and indistinct as scarcely ever to be recalled\nto the mind or recognized by any act of memory; but should we hear some\nstrange wailing sound, immediately the desire would arise to ascertain\nits nature and cause. It would immediately become an object of distinct\nand vivid perception, and continue so as long as the desire lasted.\n\nWhile one sensation becomes thus clear and prominent, it will be found\nthat other sensations which were coexisting with it will become feebler\nand seem to die away. The same impressions may still be made upon the\neye as before, the same sounds that had previously been regarded may\nstill strike upon the ear, but while the desire continues to learn the\ncause of that strange wailing sound, the other sensations would all be\nfaint and indistinct. When this desire is gratified, then other\nsensations would resume their former distinctness and prominency.\n\nOur _conceptions_, in like manner, are affected by the coexistence of\nemotion or desire. If, for example, we are employing ourselves in study\nor mental speculations, the vividness of our conceptions will vary in\nexact proportion to the interest we feel in securing the object about\nwhich our conceptions are employed. If we feel but little interest in\nthe subject of our speculations, every conception connected with them\nwill be undefined and indistinct; but if the desire of approbation, or\nthe admonitions of conscience, or the hope of securing some future good\nstimulate desire, immediately our conceptions grow more vivid and clear,\nand the object at which we aim is more readily and speedily secured. The\ngreat art, then, of quickening mental vigor and activity, and of gaining\nclear and quick conceptions, is to awaken interest and excite desire.\nWhen this is secured, conceptions will immediately become bright and\nclear, and all mental operations will be carried forward with facility\nand speed.\n\nThe distinction between _attention_ and _abstraction_ is not great, but,\nas it is recognized in language, it needs to be definitely understood.\n_Attention_ has been defined as \"the direction of the mind to some\nparticular object, from the interest which is felt in that object.\" It\nconsists simply in a feeling of desire coexisting with our sensations\nand conceptions, and thus rendering them vivid and distinct; while, in\nconsequence of this fact, all other sensations and conceptions seem to\nfade and grow indistinct.\n\nAttention seems to be the generic exercise, and abstraction one species\nof the same thing. Attention is used to express the interest which\nattends our perceptions or conceptions as _whole objects_, thus\nrendering them clear and distinct from other surrounding objects.\nAbstraction is that particular act of attention which makes _one part_\nor _one quality_ of a complex object become vivid and distinct, while\nother parts and qualities grow faint and indistinct. Thus, in viewing a\nlandscape, we should be said to exercise the power of attention if we\nnoticed some object, such as a stream or a bridge, while other objects\nwere more slightly regarded; and we should exercise the power of\nabstraction if we noticed the _color_ of the bridge or the _width_ of\nthe stream, while their other qualities were not equally regarded.\n\nIt is the power of abstraction which is the foundation of _language_ in\nits present use. Were it not for the power which the mind has of\nabstracting certain qualities and circumstances of things, and\nconsidering them as separate and distinct from all other parts and\nqualities, no words could be used except such as specify particular\nindividuals. Every object that meets our eye would demand a separate and\npeculiar name, thus making the acquisition of language the labor of a\nlife.\n\nBut now the mind possesses the power of abstracting a greater or fewer\nnumber of qualities, and to these _qualities_ a name is given, and\nwhenever these qualities are found combined in any object, this name can\nbe applied. Thus the name _animal_ is given to any thing which has the\nqualities of existence and animal life, and the name _quadruped_ is\ngiven to any object which has the qualities of animal life and of four\nlegs.\n\nEvery thing which is regarded by the mind as a separate existence must\nhave some peculiar quality, or action, or circumstance of time or place,\nto distinguish it from every other existence. Were there not something,\neither in the qualities or circumstances, which made each object in some\nrespects peculiar, there would be no way to distinguish one thing from\nanother.\n\nA _proper name_ is one which is used to recall the properties and\ncircumstances which distinguish one individual existence from every\nother. Such is the word Mount Blanc, which recalls certain qualities and\ncircumstances that distinguish one particular thing from all others, and\nthe name Julius C\u00e6sar, which recalls the character, qualities, and\ncircumstances which distinguish one being from every other.\n\nSome words, then, are used to recall the peculiar qualities and\ncircumstances of individual existences, and are called _proper names_;\nother words are used to recall a combination of certain qualities and\ncircumstances, which unitedly are an object of conception, but are not\nconsidered by the mind as belonging to any real particular existence.\nThese last words are called _general terms_ or _common names_.\n\nA great variety of names may be applied to the same object of conception\nor perception, according to the number of qualities and circumstances\nwhich are abstracted by the mind. Thus an object may be called a\n_thing_, and, in this case, the simple circumstance of existence is what\nis recalled by the word. The same object may be called an _animal_, and\nthen the qualities of existence and animal life are made the objects of\nconception. It can also be called a _man_, and then, in addition to the\nqualities recalled by the word animal, are recalled those qualities\nwhich distinguish man from all other animals. It can also be called a\n_father_, and then to the qualities recalled by the term man is added\nthe circumstance of his relation to some other being. The same object\ncan be called _La Fayette_, and then, to all the preceding qualities,\nwould be added in our conceptions all those peculiar qualities and\ncircumstances which distinguish the hero of France from all other\nexistences.\n\nThe following will probably illustrate the mode by which the human mind\nfirst acquires the proper use of these general terms. The infant child\nlearns to distinguish one existence from another probably long before he\nacquires the use of any names by which to designate them. We may suppose\nthat a little dog is an inmate of his nursery, and that with the _sight_\nof this animal has often been associated the _sound_ of the word _dog_.\nThis is so often repeated, that, by the principle of association, the\nsight of the object and the sound of the word invariably recur together.\nHe observes that this sound is used by those around him in order to\ndirect his attention to the animal, and he himself soon uses the word to\ndirect the attention of others in the same way.\n\nBut soon it happens that another animal is introduced into his\napartment, which in many respects resembles the object he has learned to\ncall a dog. To this new object he would apply the same term, but he\nfinds that others use the sound _cat_ in connection with the sight of\nthis new animal. He soon learns the difference between the two objects,\nthe particulars in which they agree, and those in which they differ. He\nafterward notices other animals of these species, and observes that some\nhave the qualities to which the term _dog_ is applied, and others those\nto which the term _cat_ is applied.\n\nHe continues to notice animals of other kinds, and, after long\nexperience in this way, he learns to apply names to designate a\nparticular _combination of qualities_, and, whenever these qualities are\nfound combined, he has a term ready to apply to them. He learns that\nsome words are used to point out the peculiar qualities which\ndistinguish one thing from all others, and, at the same time, other\nwords are used which simply recall _qualities_, but do not designate any\nparticular existence to which they belong. Thus the term _boy_ he uses\nfor the purpose of designating qualities without conceiving of any\nparticular existence in which they are found, while the term _Mary_ is\nused to designate the qualities and circumstances of the particular\nexistence he finds as the companion of his sports.\n\nAll objects of our perceptions are arranged into classes, according to\nthe peculiar combination of qualities which are recalled by the names\nemployed to designate them. For example, all objects that have the\nqualities of existence and of animal life are arranged in one class, and\nare called _animals_. All those which have the qualities recalled by the\nterm animal, and the additional qualities of wings and feathers, are\narranged in another class called _birds_. All those objects which have\nthe qualities included in the term _bird_, together with several\nadditional qualities, are arranged in another class, and called\n_eagles_.\n\nTo these various classes the terms _genera_ and _species_ are applied.\nThese terms imply a _relation_, or the comparison of one class with\nanother, in reference to the _number of qualities_ to be recalled by the\nterms employed. Thus the class _bird_ is called a _species_ of the class\n_animal_, because it includes all the qualities that are combined in the\nconception recalled by the word animal, and others in addition; but the\nclass _bird_ is called a _genus_ in relation to the class _eagle_,\nbecause it contains only a part of the qualities which are recalled by\nthe term eagle.\n\nA _genus_ may be defined as a class of things the name of which recalls\n_fewer_ particulars than the name of another class or species with which\nit is compared. _Bird_ is a _genus_ when compared with the class\n_eagle_.\n\nA _species_ is a class of things the name of which recalls more\nparticulars than the name of another class or genus with which it is\ncompared. _Bird_ is a _species_ when compared with the class _animal_.\n\nIn examining language, it will be found that the larger portion of words\nin common use are names of _genera_ and _species_--that is, they are\nwords employed to recall ideas as they are arranged in genera and\nspecies. It is only those words that are _proper names_ which recall\nconceptions of the particular existences by which we are surrounded.\nSome of these surrounding existences are furnished with these particular\nnames, and others can be designated and distinguished from each other\nonly by a description. Thus we see some hills around our horizon, some\nof which have a peculiar name, and others can be designated only by\ndescribing the circumstances which distinguish them from all other\nhills.\n\nA _definition_ of a word is an enumeration of the several qualities or\ncircumstances which distinguish certain things from all others, and\nwhich are recalled to the mind when the word is used. Thus, if the word\nanimal is to be defined, we do it by mentioning the circumstances of its\n_existence_ and _animal life_, as the ideas recalled by the word.\nGenerally, a word is defined by mentioning the name of some _genus_ of\nwhich the thing intended is a _species_, and then adding those\nparticular qualities which the species has, in addition to those\nincluded under the genus. Thus, if we are to define the word _man_, we\nmention the genus _animal_, and then the qualities which man has in\naddition to those possessed by other animals. Thus: \"_Man_ is an\n_animal_, having the human form, and a spirit endowed with intellect,\nsusceptibility, and will.\"\n\nThere are some words which recall only _one_ quality or circumstance,\nand which, therefore, can not be defined like the words which recall\nvarious qualities and circumstances, as joy, sorrow, color, and the\nlike. Such words as these are defined by mentioning the times or\ncircumstances when the mind is conscious of the existence of the idea to\nbe recalled by the word. Thus _joy_ is \"a state of mind which exists\nwhen any ardent desire is gratified.\" _Color_ is \"a quality of objects\nwhich is perceived when light enters the eye.\"\n\nThose conceptions which can be defined by enumerating the several\nqualities and circumstances which compose them are called _complex\nideas_, and the words used to designate them are called _complex terms_.\nSuch words as landscape, wrestler, giant, and philosopher, are complex\nterms. The word landscape recalls a complex idea of various material\nthings. The word wrestler recalls an idea of a material object and one\nof its actions. The word giant recalls an idea of a thing and its\nrelation as to size. The word philosopher recalls the idea of a thing\nand one of its qualities.\n\nThose conceptions which are not composed of several qualities and\ncircumstances, but are themselves a single quality or circumstance, are\ncalled _simple ideas_, and the words used to recall them are called\n_simple terms_. Such words as sweetness, loudness, depth, pain, and joy,\nare simple terms. Some terms which express emotions of the mind are\nentirely simple, such as sorrow, joy, and happiness. Others are words\nwhich recall an idea of a simple emotion and of its _cause_, such, for\nexample, as _gratitude_, which expresses the idea of an emotion of mind\nand also that it was caused by some benefit conferred. Words that\nexpress simple ideas can be defined only by some description of the\ncircumstances in which these ideas exist, or by a reference to their\ncauses or effects.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII.\n\nASSOCIATION.\n\n\nThe causes of the particular succession of our ideas, and the control\nwhich the mind has in regulating this succession, is a subject no less\ninteresting than important; for if by any act of choice the mind has the\npower of regulating its own thoughts and feelings, then man is a free\nagent and an accountable being; but if the conceptions and the emotions\ndepend entirely upon the constitution of things, and thus, either\ndirectly or indirectly, on the will of the Creator, then man can not be\naccountable for that over which he can have no control.\n\nIn the preceding chapter has been illustrated the effect which the\nco-existence of desire has in regard both to our sensations and our\nconceptions, tending to make those which are fitted to accomplish the\nobject desired very vivid and prominent, while others, to a greater or\nless extent, disappear.\n\nThe mind is continually under the influence of some desire. It\nconstantly has some plan to accomplish, some cause to search out, or\nsome gratification to secure. The present wish or desire of the mind\nimparts an interest to whatever conception seems calculated to forward\nthis object. Thus, if the mathematician has a problem to solve, and this\nis the leading desire of the mind, among the various conceptions that\narise, those are the most interesting which are fitted to his object,\nand such immediately become vivid and distinct. If the painter or the\npoet is laboring to effect some new creation of his art, and has this as\nthe leading object of desire, whatever conceptions seem best fitted to\nhis purpose are immediately invested with interest, and become distinct\nand clear. If the merchant, or the capitalist, or the statesman has some\nproject which he is toiling to accomplish, whatever conceptions appear\nadapted to his purpose soon are glowing and defined, in consequence of\nthe interest with which desire thus invests them.\n\nFrom this it appears that the nature of the desire, or governing purpose\nof the mind, will in a great measure determine the nature and the\nsuccession of its conceptions. If a man has chosen to find his chief\nhappiness in securing power and honor, then those conceptions will be\nthe most interesting to his mind that best fall in with his object. If\nhe has chosen to find happiness in securing the various gratifications\nof sense, then those conceptions that most coincide with this desire\nwill become prominent. If a man has chosen to find his chief enjoyment\nin doing the will of God, then his conceptions will, to a great extent,\nbe conformed to this object of desire. The current of a man's thoughts,\ntherefore, becomes the surest mode of determining what is the governing\npurpose or leading desire of the mind.\n\nBut there are seasons in our mental history when the mind does not seem\nto be under the influence of any governing desire; when it seems to\nrelax, and its thoughts appear to flow on without any regulating\nprinciple. At such times the vividness of leading conceptions, which\notherwise is determined by _desire_, seems to depend upon our past\nexperience. Those objects which, in past experience, have been\nassociated with emotion, are those which the mind selects, and which\nthus begin to glow in the distinct lineaments with which emotion at\nfirst invested them.\n\nIn past experience, all conceptions which were attended with emotion\nwere most distinct and clear, and therefore, when such conceptions\nreturn united with others, they are the ones which are most interesting,\nand thus most vivid and distinct. Thus, in our musing hours of idle\nreverie, as one picture after another glides before the mind, if some\nobject occurs, such as the home of our youth, or the friend of our early\ndays, the emotions which have so often been united with these objects in\npast experience cause them to appear in clear and glowing lineaments,\nand the stronger have been the past emotions connected with them, the\nmore clearly will they be defined. It appears, then, that there are two\ncircumstances that account for the apparent _selection_ which the mind\nmakes in its objects of conception. The first is the feeling that\n_certain conceptions are fitted to accomplish the leading desire of the\nmind_; and the second is, that _certain objects in past experience have\nbeen attended with emotion_.\n\nBut there is another phenomenon in our mental history which has a direct\nbearing on the nature and succession of our conceptions. When any\nconception, through the influence of desire or emotion, becomes the\nprominent object, immediately other objects with which this has been\nassociated in past experience begin to return and gather around it in\nnew combinations. Thus a new picture is presented before the mind, from\nwhich it again selects an object according as desire or emotion\nregulates, which, under this influence, grows vivid and distinct. Around\nthis new object immediately begin to cluster its past associates, till\nstill another scene is fresh arrayed before the mind.\n\nIn these new combinations, those objects which are least interesting\ncontinually disappear, while those most interesting are retained to form\na part of the succeeding picture. Thus, in every mental picture, desire\nor emotion seems to call forth objects which start out, as it were, in\nbold relief from all others, and call from the shade of obscurity the\ncompanions of their former existence, which gather around them in new\nand varied combinations.\n\nAlmost every object of thought in past experience has been connected\nwith a great number of other objects, and so great has been the variety\nof its former combinations, that it would be impossible to predict, with\nany degree of certainty, _which_ of its past associates will be summoned\nto aid in forming the new mental scenes which are destined to arise. Yet\nexperience has enabled us to detect some _general laws_, which appear to\nregulate these combinations.\n\nThe _first_ is, that those objects are most likely to attend each other\nwhich in past experience were united, while some strong emotion was\nexisting with them. If, for example, a retired lake had been the scene\nof death to a beloved friend, the conception of this object would be\nalmost invariably associated with the image of the friend that had\nperished beneath its waters, and also with the scene of his death. In\nlike manner, if some friend had expired at a certain hour of the day, or\non a particular day of the year, the return of these seasons would\nprobably be associated with the sorrowful scenes connected with them in\npast experience.\n\nThe _second_ law of association is, that _long continued_ or _frequently\nrepeated_ attention to objects that are connected at the time of this\nattention will secure the connected return of these objects.\n_Attention_, it may be recollected, is desire united with our\nconceptions, thus rendering them more vivid.\n\nIt seems to produce the same effect if this attention is long continued\nor if it is frequently repeated. Thus, if the mind has dwelt for a long\ntime on a beautiful picture, has noticed all its proportions, its\nshading, its outline, and its colors with minute attention, one object\nin this picture can not recur to the mind without bringing with it the\nother objects that were associated at the time of this close attention.\nThe frequent repetition of a sentence is a case where _oft repeated_\nthough short attention to certain words has the effect of recalling them\nto the mind in the connection in which they were placed during this\nrepeated attention.\n\nThe _third_ law of association is, that objects which have _recently_\nbeen associated in experience are, on this account, more likely to\nrecall each other than to recall those which were connected with them at\na more remote period of time. The passage of time, as a general fact,\nseems to weaken the vividness of our conceptions, and to destroy the\nprobability of their associate recurrence. Thus a line of poetry may be\nrepeated, and the listener may be able, the moment after, to recall each\nword, but the next day the whole may be lost.\n\nThe _fourth_ law of association is, that the recurrence of associated\nobjects depends, in a great measure, upon the _number_ of objects with\nwhich it may have been connected in past experience. If it has existed\nin combination with only _one_ object, that object will return\nassociated with it; but in proportion as the number of its associates\nincreases, the power of determining which will be its next companion\ndiminishes. As an example of this fact may be mentioned the first\nhearing of a beautiful air by some particular person. The next time it\nis heard, the idea of this performer will be associated with the sounds;\nbut after it has been sung by a great variety of persons, other\ncircumstances would determine what conceptions this air would recall. It\nis very probable, in this case, that its notes would recall from among\nthe associated scenes the friend most beloved, or some interesting\ncircumstance that awakened emotion at the time the air was performed.\n\nThe principal circumstances which operate in recalling associated ideas\nhave now been pointed out. The next inquiry is, What are those objects\nand events which ordinarily are most frequently united in our\n_perceptions_, and therefore are most likely to return together in our\n_conceptions_?\n\nThe most common connection of our ideas of perception are made by\ncontiguity in _place_. Objects are continually passing before the eye,\nand they are not in single distinct objects, but in connected groups. Of\ncourse, when we perceive any object, we must necessarily observe its\nseveral relations to the things by which it is surrounded. If it is a\nbuilding which meets the eye, it is impossible to observe it without at\nthe same time perceiving the trees around it, the sky above it, and any\nother objects which are parts of the picture of which this is the\nprominent object. Of course, objects that are united in one complex\npicture before the eye when we gain our knowledge of them by perception,\nwill ordinarily return together in our conceptions.\n\nOur ideas, also, are very much connected by contiguity as it respects\n_time_. When any two events occur at the same moment of time, or in such\nnear connection that the conception of one remains until the other\noccurs, they ordinarily will recur together in our after conceptions of\nthem. As an example of this may be mentioned the associations of a\nfamily who have been accustomed to close each Sabbath with music. As the\nstill hour of this sacred evening drew on, wherever any wanderer might\nroam, it is probable that the notes of praise, so often connected with\nthis season, would perpetually steal over the mind, bringing many\nanother image of friends, and kindred, and home.\n\nThe mind of man is so constituted that no change can take place in any\nmaterial object without awakening the idea of some _cause_. An _effect_\nis defined as \"some change of state or mode of existence in matter or\nmind.\" A _cause_ is defined as \"that without which no change would take\nplace in matter or mind, and with which it will take place.\" As the\nideas of cause and effect are so constantly conjoined in all our acts of\nperception, these ideas will return together in our conceptions. Thus,\nif we see an instrument which has been the cause of pain, the idea of\nthis effect will be recalled by a conception of the cause; or if the\nmind is dwelling on the memory of some beautiful painting or poetry, the\nauthor of these works will probably recur to the mind in connection with\nthese conceptions.\n\nWe sometimes meet with persons of such peculiar habits and dispositions,\nthat, whenever they are encountered, the feelings are wounded or the\ntemper crossed by their ill-timed or ill-natured remarks. The\nconceptions of such persons will ordinarily be attended by the memory of\nsome pains of which they have been the cause, and the mind will\ninvoluntarily shrink from contact with them, as from the points and\nthorns of a bramble-bush. Those events, therefore, or those objects\nwhich have the relation of _cause_ and _effect_ existing between them,\nwill ordinarily be united as objects of conception.\n\nThe mind of man is continually noticing the _relations_ which exist\nbetween the different objects of its conceptions. As no idea of relation\ncan be gained without comparing two or more things together, those\nobjects which are most frequently _compared_ will naturally be most\nfrequently associated together in our conceptions. It has been shown\nthat language is founded on that principle of the mind which enables us\nto notice certain qualities in things abstracted from other qualities,\nand to apply names to objects according as we find certain qualities\nunited in them. Of course, in the use of language, the mind is\ncontinually led to notice the particulars in which objects resemble each\nother, and also the particulars in which they differ; consequently the\nmind, in learning and in applying names, is continually comparing\nobjects, both to discover the particulars in which they are alike and\nthose in which they differ, so that two objects are thus brought\ntogether before the mind.\n\nIt is owing to this fact, therefore, that objects which resemble each\nother, or which are very much contrasted in their qualities, are very\ncommonly united in our conceptions. If, for example, we see the\ncountenance of a stranger, some feature will be recognized as familiar.\nDesire will be awakened to know where and in what other countenance we\nhave seen such a feature or such an expression. This particular feature\nwill thus become abstracted and vivid, and will soon recall that other\ncombination of features for which we are seeking, and of which this has\nformed a part in our past experience. Thus two objects will be brought\nbefore the mind at once, the person who is the stranger, and a\nconception of another person whom this stranger resembles.\n\nAll our ideas of contrast are relative. One thing can not be conceived\nof as very high or very low, as very large or very small, without a\nprevious comparison with some object to determine this relation. Our\nideas of poverty and riches, or of happiness and misery, are also\n_relative_. A person is always considered poor or rich, happy or\nmiserable, by comparing his lot with that of others by whom he is\nsurrounded. As, therefore, all ideas of resemblance or of contrast are\ngained by comparing two objects together, our conceptions often unite\nobjects that _resemble_ each other or that are _contrasted_ with each\nother.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII.\n\nIMAGINATION.\n\n\nAll operations of mind which are not produced by material things acting\nupon the senses consist of a continual succession of conceptions. Some\nof these conceptions are exact pictures of past perceptions, and are\nattended by the consciousness that such things have existed before, and\nsuch are called ideas of memory. Others are conceptions which, by the\nprocess of association, are continually recurring, and arranging\nthemselves in new combinations, according to certain laws or principles\nof association. Imagination has been defined as \"that power which the\nmind possesses of arranging conceptions in new combinations,\" and it can\nreadily be seen that this includes all the ordinary successions of\nthought except those of perception and memory. The term imagination has\nbeen used in rather a vague manner by writers on the subject. Sometimes\nit is used to signify all that succession of conceptions which recur\naccording to the laws of association, and sometimes it is used in a more\nrestricted sense. The more limited meaning is the one to which the term\nis most commonly applied, and it seems to be the one which precision and\naccuracy in the use of terms demand, and therefore it will now be\npointed out.\n\nThe mind is susceptible of certain emotions, which are called emotions\nof taste. These, more specifically, are called emotions of beauty,\nsublimity, and novelty. Such emotions are awakened by certain objects in\nnature, by certain works of art, and by the use of language which\nrecalls conceptions of these objects. Those objects which awaken such\nemotions are called objects of taste, and those arts which enable us to\nproduce combinations that will awaken such emotions are called the _fine\narts_.\n\nAmong the fine arts are ordinarily classed painting, music, sculpture,\narchitecture, ornamental gardening, and poetry. The art of the painter\nconsists in combining, according to certain rules of proportion and\nfitness of outline and color, certain objects, which, either from their\npeculiar character, or from the fitness of their combination in\neffecting a given design, awaken emotions of beauty or sublimity. The\nhighest perfection of this art consists not so much in close imitation\nas in the nature of the combinations, and their unity and fitness in\nproducing the effect designed by the artist.\n\nThe art of the sculptor is similar in its nature, and differs chiefly in\nthe materials employed, and in being limited to a much more restricted\nnumber of objects for combination.\n\nThe art of the architect consists in planning and constructing edifices,\nintended either for use or ornament, and in so arranging the different\nparts as to awaken emotions of beauty or sublimity from the display of\nutility, fitness, grandeur of extent, or order of proportion.\n\nThe art of the musician consists in combining sounds so as to produce\nsuch melodies or harmonies as will awaken varied emotions in the mind.\nThe power of this art over the human mind is much superior to that of\nthe others enumerated, because it can call forth both a greater variety\nand more powerful emotions.\n\nThe art of the poet consists in such a use of language as will recall\nobjects of beauty or sublimity in combinations that are pleasing to the\nmind, or as will, by the description and expression of varied emotion in\nother minds, awaken similar feelings in the breast of the reader.\n\nThe art of ornamental gardening consists in such an arrangement of the\nvaried objects which compose a landscape as will awaken emotions of\nbeauty from a display of unity of design, order, fitness, and utility.\n\nThe term imagination, then, in its most frequent use, signifies _those\nnew combinations of conceptions which will awaken the emotions of\ntaste_.\n\nThe painter or the poet, when he attempts the exercise of his art, has\nsome leading desire of an object to be secured. Under the influence of\nthis desire, all those conceptions, recurring by the principle of\nassociation, which appear fitted to accomplish this object, immediately\nbecome vivid and distinct, and are clearly retained in the mind. As\nother conceptions succeed, other objects are found which will forward\nthe general design, and these also are retained, and thus the process\ncontinues till the object aimed at is accomplished, and by the pen or\npencil retained in durable characters.\n\nThe action of mind to which the term _imagination_ is thus restricted\ndiffers in no respect from other acts of conception when the mind is\nunder the influence of desire, except in the _nature of the objects of_\n_desire_. If it is the desire of the mind to establish a proposition by\nmathematical reasoning, the mind is engaged in the same process of\nconception as when it is engrossed with the desire to form some\ncombination of taste. In both cases some object of desire stimulates the\nmind, and whatever conceptions appear fitted to accomplish this object\nimmediately become vivid and distinct.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV.\n\nJUDGMENT.\n\n\nThe term _judgment_, as a mental faculty, signifies \"that power of the\nmind by which it notices _relations_.\" It is often used to signify all\nthe intellectual powers, among which it is the most important one. Thus\nwe hear it said that, in certain cases, the _feelings_ and the\n_judgment_ are in opposition, or that the _heart_ and the _judgment_ are\nnot in agreement.\n\nIt is also used often to signify any act of the mind when a comparison\nis made between two things, or between the truths asserted in any\nproposition and a truth already believed. The act called _memory_ is a\nconception attended with one specific act of judgment, by which a\npresent state of mind is compared with a past, and the relation of\nresemblance perceived.\n\nThe nature of our ideas of relation are very different, according to the\nobject or purpose for which the comparison is made. If objects are\ncompared in reference to _time_, we learn some one of the relations of\npast, present, or future. No idea of time can be gained except by\ncomparing one period of time with another, and thus noticing their\nrelations. All _dates_ are gained by comparing one point of time with\nsome specified event, such as the birth of the Savior, or some\nparticular period in the revolution of the earth around the sun.\n\nIf objects are compared in reference to the _succession_ of our\nconceptions or perceptions, we gain the ideas of such relations as are\nexpressed by the terms _firstly_, _secondly_, and _thirdly_. If objects\nare compared in reference to the _degree_ of any quality, we gain an\nidea of such relations as are expressed by the terms _brighter_,\n_sweeter_, _harder_, _louder_. If objects are compared in reference to\n_proportion_, we gain ideas of such relations as are expressed by the\nterms _an eighth_, _a half_. If objects are compared in reference to the\nrelation of parts to a whole, we gain such ideas as are expressed by the\nterms _part_, _whole_, _remainder_.\n\nThe process of classifying objects and the use of language depend upon\nthe power of judgment; for if we see an object possessing certain\nqualities, in order to apply the name we must compare and observe their\nresemblance to the qualities to which such a name has been applied in\npast experience, and this feeling of resemblance is an act of judgment.\nThe application of a name, then, always implies the exercise of the\npower of judgment, by which a comparison is made between the present\nqualities observed in an object and the same qualities which affected\nthe mind when the name has formerly been employed. It also implies the\nact of association, by which the perception of certain qualities recalls\nthe idea of the sound or object with which they have been repeatedly\nconjoined.\n\nThe mental process called _reasoning_ is nothing but a connected\nsuccession of acts of judgment. It is a comparison of what is asserted\nin a given proposition with some truth which is believed, or which has\nbeen established by evidence, and then observing the agreement or\ndisagreement. Thus the truth that \"things will be in agreement with past\nexperience unless there is some reason for the contrary,\" is a truth\nwhich every mind believes. Whenever, therefore, any event has been\nrepeatedly an object of past experience, it is compared with this truth\nalready believed, and found to be included under it, and therefore\nentitled to the same credit.\n\nThus, also, the truth that \"things which equal the same thing equal one\nanother,\" is one which every mind believes. When any object by\nexamination is found to be included under that class of objects which\nare thus equal to the same thing, it is an act of reasoning when we\ninfer that they are equal to one another.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV.\n\nTHE SUSCEPTIBILITIES.\n\n\nHaving examined the intellectual powers, we will now attend to the next\ngeneral class, denominated _the susceptibilities_.\n\nWhen the mind is in a state of emotion, this state is always either\npleasurable or painful. _Desire_ relates to the attainment of some\nobject which will be the cause of pleasurable emotions, or else to the\navoidance of something which will cause painful emotions. This desire\nfor pleasure and for the avoidance of pain is the mainspring of all\nmental activity; for when it is not in existence, neither the powers of\nthe mind or of the body are called into exercise.\n\nThere are various sources of enjoyment or causes of pleasurable emotion\nto the mind of man, the most important of which will now be pointed out.\n\nThe _first_ cause of enjoyment at the commencement of existence is that\nof _sensation_.[2] This, at first, is small in amount compared with what\nit becomes when association lends its aid to heighten sensitive\nenjoyment. The light of day, the brilliancy of color, the sweetness of\nperfume, the gratification of taste and touch, the magic influence of\nsound, and the pleasure resulting from muscular activity, are probably\nthe chief sources of enjoyment to the infant mind. As life advances, all\nthese modes of sensitive gratification become connected with others of\nan intellectual and moral nature, so that at mature years it is\ndifficult to determine how much of the enjoyment we derive from the\nsenses is the result of association, and how much is simply that of\nsensation.\n\nAnother source of happiness to the human mind is the simple exercise of\nits intellectual powers. This includes all the pleasures derived from\nthe exercise of taste and the imagination; all the more profitless\nexercises of reverie and castle-building; all the activity of mind\nemployed in contriving, inventing, and bringing to pass the various\nprojects for securing good to ourselves and others; and all those\ncharming illusions which so often give transient delight, but burst like\nbubbles in the grasp.\n\nAnother source of enjoyment is the exercise of physical and moral power.\nThis love of power is one of the earliest principles which is developed\nin the human mind. The exercise of the muscles in producing changes in\nits own material frame or in surrounding objects is a source of constant\npleasure to the infant mind. There are few who have reared a child\nthrough the period of infancy but can recollect the times that this new\nspecies of delight was manifested, as, with his hand raised before his\neyes, he watched its various motions, and learned his own power to\ncontrol them.\n\nThis love of power continually displays itself in the sports and\npursuits of childhood. To project the pebble through the air; to drive\nthe hoop; to turn the windmill; to conduct some light stream from its\nchannel; to roll the rock from the mountain cliff--these and many others\nare the varied modes by which childhood exhibits its love of physical\npower.\n\nBut when man begins to learn the influence which mind can exert over\nmind, a new desire is awakened of _moral power_. All the different modes\nare then sought by which one mind can bend the will of others to yield\nto its controlling influence. It is this desire which is gratified when\nthe conqueror of nations beholds millions of minds yielding to the\nslightest word of his command. It is this which inspires the orator, as\nhe pours forth that eloquence which charms the delighted throng, and\nbends them to his will. It is this desire, which often becomes the\nmaster passion, to which is sacrificed all that is just, lovely, and\nbenevolent.\n\nAnother cause of enjoyment is that of sympathy in the happiness of\nothers. This susceptibility is a source of constant enjoyment when those\naround us are contented and happy. None can be ignorant of the change\nproduced in passing from the society of a sprightly, cheerful, and happy\ngroup to a circle soured by discontent or overwhelmed with melancholy.\nIn early childhood, the effect of this principle is clearly developed.\nEven the infant child is affected and disturbed with flowing tears, and\nsteals away from the chamber of sorrow, while the sight of smiling faces\nand the sound of cheerful voices sends through his heart the glow of\ndelight.\n\nAnother source of enjoyment is a feeling of conscious rectitude. Man is\nso constituted that, when he knowingly violates the principles of\nrectitude, a painful feeling is the inevitable consequence, while a\nhabit of constant conformity to them brings a peaceful and happy state\nof mind.\n\nAnother source of happiness is the consciousness of being the cause of\nhappiness to others. This is an enjoyment entirely distinct from that of\nsympathy in the happiness of others; for we may see happiness conferred\nby another and rejoice in it, but the pleasure of being ourselves the\ncause of this enjoyment is one altogether peculiar. It can readily be\nseen that the more benevolent a mind is, the more happiness it will\nderive from this source; while in exact proportion as the mind is\nselfishly engrossed by its own exclusive interests will this stream of\nenjoyment cease to flow.\n\nAnother source of happiness is the consciousness of inspiring certain\nemotions in other minds, such as esteem, respect, confidence, love,\ngratitude, reverence, and the like. The desire for this is one of the\nstrongest passions, and its gratification often secures the most\nexquisite enjoyment. This happiness, ordinarily, is proportioned to the\nnobleness of the person who renders this regard.\n\nAnother source of enjoyment is the discovery of certain qualities in\nintelligent minds. The perception of the qualities of matter through the\nmedium of the senses is a very inferior source of gratification compared\nwith the discovery of certain qualities of mind. This is the source of\nthe highest enjoyment of which the mind is capable. The emotions thus\nawakened are called esteem, veneration, love, gratitude, and the like.\n_Love_, in its most general sense, is used for the pleasurable emotion\nwhich is felt in the discovery of any quality that is agreeable, either\nin matter or mind. Thus we are said to love the beauties of nature, to\nlove delicious fruit, and to love the society of friends. But in\nrelation to intelligent beings, it signifies pleasurable emotion in view\nof certain qualities and actions, attended with the desire of good to\nthe object loved, and also a desire for reciprocated affection. There\nare certain qualities and attributes of mind which may be pointed out as\nthe _causes_ of affection.\n\nThe first is _intellectual superiority_. Our estimate of intellect is\naltogether _relative_. What in a child seems an astonishing display of\nit, would be considered puerility in a man. What excites admiration in a\nsavage or in the unlettered, is regarded with little emotion in the man\nof education. There are various qualities of intellect which awaken\nadmiration. Quick perceptions and ready invention are the peculiar\nattribute of some minds; others are endowed with great sagacity and\nwisdom in adapting the best means to accomplish the best ends; others\npossess an energy and force of purpose which enables them to encounter\ndifficulties, sustain bodily fatigue, and even to face death without\nshrinking; others possess a power of forming new and varied combinations\nthat gratify the taste; others seem to possess a readiness and\nversatility of mind which enables them to succeed in almost any object\nthey undertake. The exhibition of any of these operations of intellect\nare causes of emotions of pleasure to other minds.\n\nThe next quality of mind which is a cause of affection is the power of\n_sympathy_. There is nothing which so powerfully draws the mind toward\nanother being as the assurance that all our pleasures will be his, and\nthat \"in all our afflictions he will be afflicted.\" It is probable that\na being entirely destitute of this susceptibility, however he might\nexcite the mind by displays of intellectual power, never could be\nregarded with the warm and tender emotions of affection. If we\nencountered a mind that we felt looked upon our happiness without one\nglimmering of pleasure, and who could gaze upon our sufferings without\none shade of sympathizing woe, it is probable the mind would turn away\nwith feelings of dissatisfaction or disgust.\n\nAnother quality of mind which becomes a cause of love is the power of\n_giving_ and _appreciating affection_. There is nothing which is an\nobject of more constant and fervent desire than the admiration and\naffection of other minds. To be an object of attention and of admiration\nto others has been the aim that has stimulated the efforts and nerved\nthe arm of all the heroes and conquerors of the world. To gain the\nesteem and affection of other minds is what regulates the actions, the\nplans, and the hopes of all mankind. If, therefore, a mind should be\ndestitute of this susceptibility, that which gives the chief interest\nwould be withdrawn. If we should find, also, that the gift of our\naffections was of no value to another mind, this would deprive it of\nmuch that awakens interest and pleasure. It is the excessive indulgence\nof this desire for admiration which leads to ambition and pride--those\nprinciples which have filled the world with contention and deluged it\nwith blood.\n\nAnother quality of mind which secures affection is _benevolence_. This\nconsists in such a love for the happiness as induces a willingness to\nmake sacrifices of personal ease or enjoyment to secure a greater amount\nof good to others. Every mind is so made that, if its own wishes are not\ninterfered with, it is more agreeable to see others happy around than to\nsee them miserable. There have been cases of such perversion of our\nnature that some have seemed to find pleasure in the simple act of\ninflicting pain upon others; but this seldom occurs until after a long\ncourse of self-indulgence and crime. All persons, if it cost no\nsacrifice, would prefer to make others happy.\n\nBut there is a great difference in the character of minds in this\nparticular. Some, when they find that certain modes of personal\nenjoyment interfere with the interests and happiness of others, can find\na pleasure in sacrificing their own lesser enjoyment to secure greater\ngood for others. But others are so engrossed by exclusive interest in\ntheir own happiness that they will not give up the smallest amount of\ntheir own good to secure any amount of benefit to others.\n\nAll minds, whatever their own character may be, detest selfishness in\nothers, and never can bestow any great affection where this is a\nprevailing trait.\n\nThese are the leading characteristics of mind which are causes of\nadmiration and affection. There are other more specific exercises, such\nas modesty, humility, meekness, and the like.\n\nBut all these traits of character, which, in themselves considered, are\ncauses of pleasure, in certain circumstances may, to a selfish mind,\nbecome causes of unmingled pain. If the displays of intellect or the\nexhibition of the amiable susceptibilities in another being are viewed\nby a selfish mind as the cause of disparagement and disadvantageous\ncontrast to itself, they will be regarded only with painful emotions.\nThey will awaken \"envy, anger, wrath, malice, and all uncharitableness.\"\nThis fact is fully illustrated in the history of the world and in the\ndaily observation of life.\n\nThe _causes of pain_ to the human mind are in most cases owing to these\nvery susceptibilities of enjoyment. The organization of the material\nframe and of the external world, while it is a source of multiplied and\nconstant enjoyment, is often also the cause of the most intense and\nexquisite suffering. The strongest conception of suffering of which mind\ncan form any conception is sensitive suffering. There are many minds\nwhose constitution and circumstances are such that they can form but\nfaint conceptions of any pain which results from the exercise of\nmalignant passions, or from other sources of suffering. But every mind\nsoon acquires a knowledge of what sensitive suffering must be, and can\nform the most vivid conceptions of it. Though few ever suffered the\ndislocation of joints, the laceration of the flesh, or the fracture of\nbones, still descriptions of such sufferings are readily apprehended and\nconceived of, and there is nothing from which the mind so involuntarily\nshrinks.\n\nAnother cause of suffering consists in the loss of present or expected\nenjoyment. There are many blessings which seem desirable to the mind\nthat are never secured, and yet unhappiness is not caused by the want;\nbut there is no happiness which is actually in possession of which the\nloss does not occasion pain. We may desire the esteem and affection of\ncertain beings, and yet not become unhappy from the want of it; yet\nnothing sends such exquisite suffering through the mind as the\nconviction that some beloved object has ceased thus to respect and to\nlove, or has been taken from us by death. Thus, also, if wealth, which\nis the means of purchasing a variety of blessings, be not secured, the\nheart can desire it without being made unhappy by the wish, yet the loss\nof wealth is attended with painful disappointment and regret. The\npossession of power, also, may be desired without uneasiness, but the\nloss of it seldom occurs without painful emotions.\n\nAnother cause of suffering is inactivity of body and mind. It has been\nshown that desire is the spring both of mental and of physical activity,\nand that this activity is one source of enjoyment. The loss of this\nspecies of enjoyment is followed by consequent inquietude and\nuneasiness.\n\nAnother cause of suffering is the existence of strong desire with the\nbelief that it never can be gratified. Some desires exist in the mind\nwithout causing pain, but they may be excited to such a degree that the\ncertainty that they never will be gratified may produce anguish almost\nintolerable.\n\nAnother source of pain is sympathy in the sufferings of others. These\nmay be so realized as to affect the mind of the observer with even more\npain than the sufferer experiences. It is probable that the tender\nmother, in witnessing the distresses of her child, experiences much more\npain than the object of her sympathies.\n\nAnother cause of suffering is the violated sense of justice. In minds of\nhigh moral susceptibilities, suffering from this source may be most\nexquisite.\n\nAnother cause of suffering is the consciousness of guilt. The emotions\nthat follow the commission of crime are denominated repentance and\nremorse; and it is probable that the human mind has never suffered\ngreater agonies than have attended the existence of these emotions.\nThere are cases on record when intense bodily suffering has been\nresorted to as a relief from such anguish by withdrawing the attention\nof the mind from those subjects that call forth such emotions.\n\nAnother cause of pain is the apprehension of future evil. This is often\na source of long-continued and of distressing emotions, and the pain\nsuffered in apprehension is often greater than would be experienced if\nthe evils were realized.\n\nAnother source of suffering is the exercise of malignant passions, such\nas hatred, envy, and jealousy. These emotions never can exist in the\nmind without pain. The exhibition of wicked passions and actions in\nother minds may also be mentioned in connection with this. It is painful\nto behold a mind tossed with the furies of ungoverned passion, or\nyielding to the chain of selfishness and pride.\n\nAnother source of suffering is the consciousness of the existence of\ncertain emotions in other minds toward ourselves. The belief that other\nintelligent beings look upon our character and conduct with displeasure,\nindignation, or contempt, inflicts the keenest suffering, and there is\nscarcely any thing mankind will not sacrifice to avoid these painful\nemotions.\n\nAnother source of painful emotions is the view of certain characteristics\nin other minds. While the discovery of certain traits in other minds\nafford a high enjoyment, the want of them, or the existence of their\nopposite, awaken disagreeable emotions, expressed by the terms pity,\ncontempt, indignation, disgust, abhorrence, and the like.\n\nThere are other sources of pleasure and pain, which will be discussed\nmore at large in succeeding chapters.\n\n[2] Hereafter the terms sensation and perception will often be used\nsynonymously in cases where it is not needful to recognize the\ndistinction heretofore indicated.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI.\n\nTHE SUSCEPTIBILITIES. EMOTIONS OF TASTE.\n\n\nAmong the susceptibilities, the emotions of taste have always been\ndistinguished, and treated of as a peculiarly distinct class. Why is it\nthat certain objects of sight, and certain sounds or combinations of\nsound, awaken emotions more than other sights and sounds? Why do the\nperceptions of the eye and ear so much more powerfully affect the mind\nthan those of the other senses? These certainly are objects for\ninteresting inquiry. In attempting the discussion of this subject, the\nfollowing particulars need to be considered.\n\nAll pleasurable emotions are caused either by _perception_ or\n_conception_, for we have no other ideas but of these two kinds. That\nthey are not occasioned by perception alone must be evident from the\nfact that infants and children, who have the same perceptions as matured\npersons, do not experience the emotions of taste in view of the most\nperfect specimens of the fine arts. A combination of gaudy colors or a\nstring of glittering beads will delight a child more than the most\nfinished productions of a Raphael or a Phidias. That it is not\nconception alone which awakens such emotions is manifest from the fact\nthat it is the _perception_ of objects which are either sublime or\nbeautiful that awakens the most vivid emotions of this kind. Of course,\nit is inevitable that emotions of taste are caused by perception and\nconception _through their connection with some past co-existing\nemotions_.\n\nPerceptions and conceptions can _recall the emotions_ which have been\nconnected with them, and emotions can also recall a conception of the\nobjects with which they have been united. For example, if some dark wood\nhad been the scene of terror and affright, either the perception or the\nconception of this wood would recall the emotions of fear which had\ncoexisted with it. If, on some other occasion, a strong emotion of fear\nshould be awakened, this would probably recall a conception of the wood\nwith which it had formerly been united. It is no uncommon fact in our\nexperience to have circumstances about us that recall unusually sad and\nmournful feelings, for which we are wholly unable to account. No doubt,\nat such times, some particular objects, or some particular combination\nof circumstances which were formerly united with painful emotions, again\nrecur, and recall the emotions with which they were once connected,\nwhile the mind is wholly unable to remember the fact of their past\ncoexistence. In like manner, pleasurable emotions may be awakened by\ncertain objects of perception when the mind is equally unable to trace\nthe cause.\n\nObjects of _perception_ recall the emotions connected with them much\nmore vividly than objects of conception can do. Thus, if we revisit the\nscenes of our childhood, the places of the sorrows and the joys of early\ndays, how much more vividly are the emotions recalled which were\nformerly connected with these scenes than any _conception_ of these\nobjects could awaken.\n\nCertain perceptions will be found to produce emotions similar to those\nawakened by the intellectual operations of mind. Thus the entrance of\nlight produces an emotion similar to the discovery of some truth, and\nthe emotion felt while in a state of doubt and uncertainty resembles\nthat experienced when shrouded in darkness. Great care and anxiety\nproduce a state of mind similar to what is felt when the body is pressed\ndown by a heavy weight. The upward spring of an elastic body awakens\nfeelings resembling those that attend the hearing of good news, and thus\nwith many other perceptions. From this fact originates much of the\nfigurative language in common use; such as when knowledge is called\nlight, and ignorance darkness, and care is called a load, and joy is\nsaid to make the heart leap.\n\nIt has previously been shown that the discovery of certain operations\nand emotions of mind affords much more pleasure than attends mere\nperceptions of material objects. Those who have experienced the exciting\nanimation felt at developments of splendid genius, and the pure delight\nresulting from the interchange of affection, can well realize that no\nsensitive gratification could ever be exchanged for them. Whatever\nobjects, therefore, most vividly recall those emotions which are\nawakened when such qualities are apprehended will be most interesting to\nthe mind.\n\nNow it will appear that there are no modes by which one mind can learn\nthe character and feelings of another but by means of the eye and ear. A\nperson both deaf and blind could never, except to an exceedingly limited\nextent, learn either the intellectual operations or the emotions of\nanother mind. Of course, it is by means of certain forms, colors,\nmotions, and sounds that we gain those ideas which are most interesting\nand animating to the soul. It is by the blush of modesty, the paleness\nof fear, the flush of indignation, that _color_ aids in giving an idea\nof the emotions of the mind. The pallid hue of disease, the sallow\ncomplexion of age, the pure and bright colors of childhood, and the\ndelicate blendings of the youthful complexion, have much influence in\nconveying ideas of the qualities of mind in certain particulars. The\ncolor and flashing expressions of the eye also have much to do with our\napprehensions of the workings of mind.\n\nAs it regards _motion_ as aiding in imparting such ideas, it is by the\ncurl of the lip that contempt is expressed, by the arching brow that\ncuriosity and surprise are exhibited, by the scowling front that anger\nand discontent are displayed, and by various muscular movements of the\ncountenance that the passions and emotions of the mind are portrayed. It\nis by the motions of the body and limbs also that strong emotions are\nexhibited, as in the clasped hand of supplication, the extended arms of\naffection, and the violent contortions of anger.\n\n_Form_ and _outline_ also have their influence. The sunken eye of grief,\nthe hollow cheek of care and want, the bending form of sorrow, the erect\nposition of dignity, the curvature of haughtiness and pride, are various\nmodes of expressing the qualities and emotions of mind.\n\nBut it is by the varied _sounds_ of voice chiefly that intellect glances\nabroad, and the soul is poured forth at the lips. The quick and animated\nsounds of cheerfulness, joy, and hope; the softer tones of meekness,\ngentleness, and love; the plaintive notes of sympathy, sorrow, and pain;\nthe firm tone of magnanimity, fortitude, patience, and self-denial, all\nexhibit the pleasing and interesting emotions of the soul. Nor less\nexpressive, though more painful, are the harsh sounds of anger, malice,\nenvy, and discontent.\n\nNot only are certain forms, colors, motions, and sounds the medium by\nwhich we gain a knowledge of the intellectual operations and emotions of\nother minds, but they are the means by which we discover and designate\nthose material objects which are causes of comfort, utility, and\nenjoyment. Thus it is by the particular form and color that we\ndistinguish the fruits and the food which minister to our support. By\nthe same means we discriminate between noxious and useful plants and\nanimals, and distinguish all those conveniences and contrivances which\ncontribute to the comfort of man. Of course, certain forms and colors\nare connected in the mind with certain emotions of pleasure that have\nattended them as causes of comfort and enjoyment.\n\nIn what precedes, it appears that it is those emotions which are\nawakened by the apprehension of certain intellectual operations and\nemotions of intelligent minds which are most delightful; that all our\nideas of such operations and emotions are gained by means of certain\nforms, colors, motions, and sounds; that we designate objects of\nconvenience and enjoyment to ourselves by the same mode; that\nperceptions can recall the emotions which have been connected with them,\neven after the mind has forgotten the connection, and that perceptions\nrecall associated emotions much more vividly than conceptions.\n\nIn consequence of these considerations, the inference seems justifiable\nthat the emotions of beauty and sublimity are not owing either simply to\nthe _perceptions_ produced, nor to the _conceptions_ recalled by the\nprinciple of association. But they are accounted for in a great degree\nby the fact that certain colors, forms, motions, and sounds have been so\noften connected with emotions awakened by the apprehension of qualities\nin other minds, or of emotions which arise in view of causes of\nenjoyment to ourselves, that the _perception_ of these colors, sounds,\nforms, and motions recall such agreeable emotions, even when the mind\ncan not trace the connection in past experience.\n\nAs an example of this, the emotion of pleasure has been so often\nconnected with the clear blue of the sky and with the bright verdure of\nthe foliage, that the sight of either of these colors recalls the\nemotions, though we may not be able to refer to any particular time when\nthis previous connection existed. In like manner, the moaning sound of\nthe wind in a storm, or the harsh growl which sometimes attends it, has\nso often been united with sorrowful or disagreeable emotions, that the\nsounds recall the emotions.\n\nBut there is another important fact in regard to the causes of the\nemotions of taste. It is found that the character of the _combination_\nof sounds, forms, colors, and motions has as much to do with the\nexistence of such feelings as the nature of these objects of perception.\nThe very same colors and forms, in certain combination, are very\ndispleasing, when in others they are beautiful. Thus, also, certain\nmotions in certain circumstances are very beautiful or sublime, and in\nothers very displeasing. The very same sounds, also, may be made either\nvery disagreeable or very delightful, according to their combination.\n\nTo account for this, it is necessary to understand that objects which\ntend to awaken emotions of a directly opposite nature can not both\noperate on the mind without causing disagreeable feelings. If we are\nsurrounded by objects of awe and solemnity, it is painful to notice\nobjects that are mean or ludicrous. If we are under the influence of\nsprightly and humorous feelings, it is painful to encounter solemn and\npensive scenes, with which, perhaps, at other times, we should be\npleased. In order, therefore, to awaken emotions of beauty and\nsublimity, there must exist a _congruity_ in the arrangement and\ncomposition of parts which will prevent the operation of causes that\nwould awaken incongruous emotions.\n\nBut there is another principle which has a still more powerful operation\nin regard to the effect of combination and composition. We are always\naccustomed to view objects with some reference to their _nature_ and\n_use_. We always feel that every effect must have a cause, and that\nevery contrivance has some _design_ which it was made to accomplish.\n\nThere is no intellectual attribute of mind which is regarded with more\nadmiration than _wisdom_, which is always shown in selecting the best\nmeans for accomplishing a given end; and the more interesting or\nimportant is the object to be secured, the more is the mind pleased with\ndiscovering the wisdom exhibited in adapting means to secure this end.\nAlmost every construction of nature or of art is regarded by the mind as\nhaving some use and design. No mind, except one bereft of its powers,\nwould ever employ itself in designing any thing which has no possible\nuse, either in benefiting or pleasing the designer or others; and should\nany such object be found, it would cause only disgust, as exhibiting the\nfatuity of a mind which spent its powers in contriving so useless a\nthing.\n\nThere are many objects which meet the eye of man for which he in vain\nseeks the use and design; but such objects are never attended with the\nconviction that there is no possible use to which they can be applied;\non the contrary, they more frequently provoke curiosity, and awaken\ndesire to discover their nature and their use. There is a never-failing\nconviction attending all our discoveries of new objects in nature that\nthere is some design or contrivance of which they form a link in the\nchain.\n\nWhenever the object of any design is ascertained, immediately there\ncommences an examination of the modes by which this object is to be\neffected. If every thing is found to harmonize--if a relation of fitness\nand propriety is discovered in every part, the mind is satisfied with\nthe exhibition of wisdom which is thus discovered. But if some parts are\nfound tending to counteract the general design of the contrivance, the\nobject is displeasing. Every work of art, then, depends, for the\npleasure it affords, not alone on the various forms, colors, sounds, and\nmotions which are combined to affect the senses, but on the nature of\nthe design intended, and on the skill which is shown in so composing and\narranging the several parts that each shall duly aid in effecting this\ndesign. This is the particular in which the genius of the painter, the\nsculptor, the architect, the musician, and the poet is especially\nexhibited.\n\nAnother particular to be noticed in reference to this subject is the\nimplanted principle of curiosity, or the desire which the mind feels to\ndiscover what is _new_. After we have discovered the object for which a\nthing is contrived, and the fit adjustment of every part to this object,\none cause of interest in it ceases. And objects which have been the\nsubjects of repeated observation and inspection never yield so much\ninterest as those which afford to the mind some fresh opportunity to\ndiscover _new_ indications of design, and of fitness in the means for\naccomplishing the design. The love of novelty, then, is a powerful\nprinciple in securing gratification to the mind. Of course, the genius\nof the artist is to be displayed, not only in arranging the several\nparts so as to accomplish a given design, but in the very effort to\nsecure a design which is new, so that the mind will have a fresh object\nfor exercising its powers in detecting the fitness of means for\naccomplishing a given end.\n\nFrom the preceding, we recapitulate the following causes for the\npleasurable emotions which are felt in view of certain objects of sight,\nand in certain combinations of sound: They recall emotions which, in\npast experience, have been connected with the conception of operations\nand emotions of other minds, or with material objects that were regarded\nas the causes of pleasurable emotions to ourselves; they recall emotions\nthat are congruous in their nature; they cause emotions of pleasure from\nthe discovery of fitness in design and composition; and, finally, they\nawaken emotions of novelty.\n\nEmotions of taste that are painful are caused by the presence of objects\nthat recall painful emotions with which they have formerly been\nconnected; by objects that recall incongruous emotions; by objects that\nexhibit a want of fitness and design; and by objects that are common,\nwhen the mind has been led to expect novelty.\n\n\nOBJECTS, MOTIONS, AND SOUNDS THAT CAUSE EMOTIONS OF TASTE.\n\nThe _causes_ which produce emotions of taste have now been pointed out.\nAn inquiry as to _which_ are the objects, motions, and sounds, and their\nvarious combinations, that, in our experience, have awakened such\nemotions, may lead to facts that will establish the position assumed.\n\nEmotions of taste generally are divided into two classes, called\nemotions of _sublimity_ and emotions of _beauty_. Emotions of sublimity\nresemble those which exist in the mind at the display of great\nintellectual power, and at exhibitions of strong passion and emotions in\nanother mind. Emotions of beauty resemble those which are experienced at\nthe exhibition of the more gentle emotions of mind, such as pity,\nhumility, meekness, and affection.\n\n_Of Sounds._\n\nAll sounds are sublime which in past experience have been associated\nwith the strong emotions of fear and terror. Such sounds are heard in\nthe roar of artillery, the howling of a storm, the roll of thunder, and\nthe rumbling of an earthquake. Sounds are sublime, also, which convey an\nidea of great power and might. This is illustrated in the emotions felt\nat the uprooting of trees and the prostration of nature before a\nwhirlwind; in the force of the rolling waves, as they dash against the\ncliffs; and in art, by the working of some ponderous and mighty engine,\nthat astonishes with the immense resistance it can overcome.\n\nOther sounds, also, are sublime which have often been associated with\nemotions of awe, solemnity, or deep melancholy. Such are the tolling of\na heavy bell and the solemn notes of the organ.\n\nThere may be certain circumstances that render a sound, that otherwise\nwould be very gentle and beautiful, more strongly sublime than even\nthose sounds that are generally most terrific. Gray describes such a\ncombination of circumstances in a letter to a friend. \"Did you never\nobserve,\" said he, \"while rocking winds are piping loud, that _pause_,\nas the gust is recollecting itself, and rising upon the ear in a shrill\nand plaintive note, like the swell of the \u00c6olian harp? I do assure you\nthere is nothing in the world so like the _voice of a spirit_.\"\n\nWe have another example in Scripture: \"And behold, the Lord passed by,\nand a great and strong wind rent the mountains, and brake in pieces the\nrocks before the Lord; but the Lord was not in the wind; and after the\nwind an earthquake; but the Lord was not in the earthquake; and after\nthe earthquake a fire; but the Lord was not in the fire; and after the\nfire a _still small voice_. And it was so, when Elijah heard it, he\nwrapped his face in a mantle.\" In both these cases, the sudden silence\nand the still small voice, so contrasted with the tumult around, would\nawaken the most thrilling emotions of the sublime. In some cases it is\nthe sense which these sounds awaken of the presence of some awful and\npowerful Being that causes such emotions.\n\nThere are a great variety of sounds that are called beautiful. Such are\nthe sound of a distant waterfall, the murmur of a rivulet, the sighing\nof the wind, the tinkling of the sheepfold, the lowing of distant kine,\nand the note of the shepherd's pipe. But it must be remarked that it is\nalways a combination of circumstances that make sounds either sublime or\nbeautiful. If we know, by the source from which they originate, that\nthey are caused by no display of power or danger, or if necessarily they\nhave low and mean associations connected with them, the emotions of the\nsublime or beautiful, which would otherwise recur, are prevented. Thus\nthe rumbling of a cart is sublime when it is believed to be thunder, and\nloses this character when its true cause is discovered. The sound of the\nlowing of kine in certain circumstances is very beautiful, and in others\nvery vulgar and displeasing.\n\nMusic seems to owe its chief power over the mind to the fact that it can\ncombine all kinds of sounds that have ever been associated with any\nemotions, either of dignity, awe, and terror; or of joy, sprightliness,\nand mirth; or of tenderness, melancholy, and grief. Its power depends on\nthe nature of the particular sounds, and also on the nature of their\ncombination and succession in relation to time, and in relation to a\ncertain sound which is called the fundamental or key note.\n\nThe art of a musical composer consists in the ability with which he\nsucceeds in producing a certain class of emotions which he aims to\nawaken. The more finished productions of this art are never relished\ntill long observation and experience enable the listener to judge of the\nnature of the design, and with how much success the composer has\nsucceeded in effecting it. Music, when adapted to certain words, has its\nnature and design more clearly portrayed, and in such productions it is\neasier to judge of the success of the composer.\n\n_Of Color._\n\nThere are no colors which ordinarily excite so strong an emotion as to\nbe called sublime. The deep black of mourning and the rich purple of\nroyalty approach the nearest to this character. That colors acquire\ntheir power in awakening agreeable or disagreeable emotions simply from\nthe emotions which have ordinarily existed in connection with them,\nappears from the fact that the associations of mankind are so\nexceedingly diverse on this subject. What is considered a dignified and\nsolemn color in one nation is tawdry and vulgar in another. Thus, with\nus, _yellow_ is common and tawdry, but among the Chinese it is a\nfavorite color. Black, with us, has solemn and mournful associations,\nbut in Spain and Venice it is an agreeable color. White, in this\ncountry, is beautiful, as the emblem of purity and innocence, but in\nChina it is the sorrowful garb of mourning.\n\n_Of Forms._\n\nForms that awaken emotions of sublimity are such as have been associated\nwith emotions of danger, terror, awe, or solemnity. Such are military\nensigns, cannon, the hearse, the monument of death, and various objects\nof this kind. Those forms which distinguish bodies that have great\nstrength, or which are enduring in their nature, awaken the same class\nof emotions. Thus the Gothic castle, the outline of rocks and mountains,\nand the form of the oak, are examples. Bodies often appear sublime from\nthe mere circumstance of size, when compared with objects of the same\nkind. Thus the pyramids of Egypt are an example where relative size,\ntogether with their imperishable materials, awakens emotions of\nsublimity. The ideas of beauty of form depend almost entirely on their\nfitness to the object for which they are designed, and on many casual\nassociations with which they are connected.\n\n_Of Motion._\n\nAll motion that awakens sublime ideas is such as conveys the notion of\ngreat force and power. Motions of this kind are generally in straight or\nangular lines. Such motions are seen in the working of machinery, and in\nthe efforts of animal nature. Quick motion is more sublime than slow.\nMotions that awaken ideas of beauty are generally slow and curving. Such\nare the windings of the quiet rivulet, the gliding motion of birds\nthrough the air, the waving of trees, and the curling of vapor.\n\nIn regard to the beauty and sublimity of forms and color, it is equally\ntrue, as in reference to sound, that the alteration of circumstances\nwill very materially alter the nature of the emotions connected with\nthem. If they are so combined as to cause incongruous emotions, or if\nthey do not harmonize with the general design of any composition,\nemotions of the sublime or beautiful are not awakened. For example, if\nthe vivid green, which is agreeable in itself from the pleasing emotions\nwhich have been connected with it, is combined with a scene of\nmelancholy and desolation, where the design of the artist is to awaken\nother than lively emotions, it appears incongruous and displeasing.\n\nThe art of the poet consists in the use of such language as awakens\nemotions of beauty and sublimity, either by recalling conceptions of\nvarious forms, colors, and motions in nature, which are beautiful and\nsublime, or the strong and powerful, or the soft and gentle emotions of\nmind.\n\nEmotions of moral sublimity are such as are felt in witnessing\nexhibitions of the force of intellect or of strong feelings.\n\nEmotions of moral beauty are those that are felt in witnessing the\nexhibition of the gentler and tender emotions of mind. These emotions\nare much more powerful and delightful than when they are more faintly\nrecalled by those objects of perception which are called sublime and\nbeautiful.\n\nThe taste is improved by cultivating a love for intellectual endowments\nand moral qualities. It is also cultivated by gaining an extensive\nknowledge of objects and scenes which, either in history, or in poetry,\nor in any compositions of the fine arts, have been associated with\nemotions. It is also cultivated by learning the rules of fitness and\npropriety, by studying works of taste, by general reading, by\nintercourse with persons of refinement and taste, and by a nice\nobservation of the adaptation and fitness of things in the daily\nintercourse and pursuits of life.\n\nThe highest efforts of taste are exhibited in the works of artists who\nmake such pursuits the express object of their profession.\n\nBut in ordinary life the cultivation of taste is chiefly exhibited in\nthe style, furniture, and decoration of private dwellings, and in the\ndress and ornaments of the person. In reference to these, there is the\nsame opportunity for gratifying the eye as there is in the compositions\nof the fine arts. On these subjects there are rules in regard to color,\noutline, and combination, and also rules of fitness and propriety, of\nwhich every person of taste sensibly feels the violation. In the\nconstruction of dwelling-houses, in the proportion of rooms, in the\nsuitableness of colors, in the fitness of all circumstances to the spot\nof location, to the habits and circumstances of the proprietor, to ideas\nof convenience, and to various particulars which may be objects of\nregard, in all these respects the eye of taste ever is prepared to\ndistinguish beauties or defects.\n\nAs it regards dress, every individual will necessarily exhibit, to a\ngreater or less extent, the degree in which taste has been cultivated. A\nperson of real refinement of taste will always have the dress consistent\nwith the circumstances of fortune, the relative rank in life, the\nstation and character, the hour of the day, the particular pursuit or\nprofession, and the period of life.\n\nIf a person is dressed with a richness and elegance which fortune does\nnot warrant, if the dress is either inferior or superior to that of\nothers of the same rank and station, if it is unfitted to the hour or\nthe pursuit, if youth puts on the grave dress of age, or age assumes the\nbright colors and ornaments of youth, in all these cases the eye of\ntaste is offended.\n\nIn the adaptation of colors to complexions, and the style of dress to\nthe particular form of the person; in avoiding the extremes of fashion,\nthe excesses of ornament, and all approaches to immodesty--in all these\nrespects a good taste can be displayed in dress, and thus charm us in\nevery-day life. A person of cultivated taste, in all that relates to the\nlittle arrangements of domestic life, the ornaments of the exterior and\ninterior of a dwelling, the pursuits of hours of relaxation and\namusement, the modes of social intercourse, the nice perception of\nproprieties in habits, manners, modes of address, and the thousand\nlittle every-day incidents of life, will throw an undefined and nameless\ncharm around, like the soft light of heaven, that, without dazzling,\nperpetually cheers.\n\n_Emotions of the Ludicrous._\n\nThere is a certain class of feelings called _emotions of the ludicrous_,\nwhich are the causes of laughter. These are generally pleasurable in\ntheir nature, though there are times when the emotions which produce\nlaughter are painful. Emotions of this kind are usually caused by the\nsudden union of certain ideas in our conceptions when the laws of\nassociation appear to be violated. Such ideas are called incongruous,\nbecause, according to the ordinary experience of our minds, they would\nnot naturally have appeared together.\n\nIn order to awaken this emotion, it is not only necessary that the mind\nshould discover ideas united which have not ordinarily been so in past\nexperience, but those which are united in direct _opposition_ to the\nlaws of association. Thus, if there has been a union of certain\nqualities in an object which have uniformly tended to produce emotions\nof a dignified and solemn kind, and some particular is pointed out which\nis mean, little, or low, the unexpected incongruity occasions mirth.\n\nIn like manner, when an object in past experience has uniformly united\nideas which awakened emotions of contempt, if some particular is pointed\nout in association with these which is grand or sublime, this\nincongruity occasions an emotion of the ludicrous. This is the\nfoundation of the amusement produced by bombastic writings, where\nobjects that are grand and sublime have low and mean conceptions\nconnected with them, or where qualities that are insignificant or mean\nare connected with those which are grand and sublime.\n\nThe following example of the union of such incongruous ideas will\nillustrate:\n\n  \"And now had Phoebus in the lap\n  Of Thetis taken out his nap,\n  And, like a lobster boiled, the morn\n  From black to red began to turn.\"\n\nThe sublime ideas connected with the sun, and the classical associations\nunited with the name of Thetis, would not naturally have recalled the\nidea of so insignificant an animal, nor the changes produced in cooking\nit, and these connections violate the ordinary laws of association.\n\nEmotions of the ludicrous are also produced by the sudden conception of\nsome association in ideas which has never before been discovered. Thus,\nif ideas have been united in the mind on some other principle of\nassociation than that of resemblance, the sudden discovery of some\nunexpected resemblance will produce mirth. This is the foundation of the\nmerriment produced by _puns_, where the _ideas_ which the words\nrepresent would never have been united by the principles of association,\nbut the union of these ideas is effected on the principle of resemblance\nbetween the _sounds_ of the words which recall these ideas. When the\nmind suddenly perceives this unexpected foundation for the union of\nideas that in all other respects are incongruous, an emotion of the\nludicrous is produced. This is also the foundation of the pleasure which\nis felt in the use of alliteration in poetry, where a resemblance is\ndiscovered in the initial sound of words that recall ideas which in all\nother respects are incongruous.\n\nAll minds enjoy the excitement of this class of emotions, but some much\nmore than others. _Laughter_, which is the effect of this class of\nemotions, is enjoyed more or less by all mankind, and is regarded as not\nonly an agreeable, but as a healthful exercise.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII.\n\nTHE MORAL SUSCEPTIBILITIES.\n\n\nA brief reference has been made to those susceptibilities which are the\nsubject of this chapter. These, from their importance, are entitled to a\nmore enlarged consideration.\n\nBefore proceeding, however, it is desirable to refer to the uses of the\nterm _moral_, inasmuch as it often is employed with a vague\ncomprehension of its signification. In its widest sense it signifies\n_whatever relates to the regulation of mind by motives_ in distinction\nfrom those influences that produce involuntary results.\n\nIn a more limited sense, it signifies _whatever relates to the\nregulation of mind in reference to the rules of right and wrong_.\n\nIn the preceding pages it has been assumed that the grand object for\nwhich the Creator formed mind and all things is to produce _the greatest\npossible happiness with the least possible evil_, and that this design\nis so impressed on the human mind that the needless destruction of\nhappiness is felt to be _wrong_--that is, contrary or unfitted to the\ndesign of all things; while all that tends to promote happiness is felt\nto be right, or consistent with this plan.\n\nIn order to a more clear view of this part of the subject, it is\nimportant to inquire as to the manner in which the ideas of _right_ and\n_wrong_ seem to originate.\n\nThe young child first notices that certain actions of its own are\nregarded with smiles and tones of love and approval, while other acts\noccasion frowns and tones of displeasure.\n\nNext, it perceives that whatever gives pleasure to itself and to others\nis called _good_ and _right_, while whatever causes unpleasant feelings\nis called _bad_ and _wrong_. Moreover, it notices that there is a right\nand wrong way to hold its spoon, to use its playthings, to put on its\nclothes, and to do multitudes of other things. It thus perceives, more\nand more, that there is some _rule_ to regulate the use and action of\nall things, both animate and inanimate, and that such rules always have\nreference to some plan or design.\n\nAs its faculties develop and its observation enlarges, the general\nimpression is secured that _all_ plans and contrivances of men are\ndesigned to promote enjoyment or to prevent discomfort, and are called\ngood and right just so far as this is done. At the same time, all that\ntend to discomfort or pain are called bad and wrong.\n\nIn all the works of nature around, too, every thing that promotes\nenjoyment is called good and right, and the opposite is called evil and\nwrong.\n\nAt last there is a resulting feeling that the great design of all things\nis to secure good and prevent evil, and that whatever is opposed to this\nis wrong, and unfitted to the object for which all things exist. The\nquestion whether this impression is owing solely to observation or\npartly to mental constitution is waived as of little practical\nconsequence.\n\nBut, in the experience of infancy and childhood, the _law of sacrifice_\nis speedily developed. It is perceived that much of the good to be\ngained, if sought to excess, occasions pain, so that there must be a\ncertain amount of self-denial practiced, which, to the young novice,\nsometimes involves disappointment and discomfort. It is also seen that\nfrequently two or more enjoyments are offered which are incompatible, so\nthat one must be relinquished to gain the other. It is perceived, also,\nthat there is a constant calculation going on as to which will be the\n_best_--that is, which will secure _the most good with the least evil_.\nAnd the child is constantly instructed that it must avoid excess, and\nmust give up what is of less value to secure the greater good. All this\ntraining involves _sacrifices_ which are more or less painful, so that a\nyoung child will sometimes cry as it voluntarily gives up one kind of\npleasure as the only mode of securing what is preferred.\n\nIt is perceived, also, that there is a constant _balancing_ of good and\nevil, so that a given amount of enjoyment cancels or repays for a\ncertain amount of evil. When a great amount of enjoyment is purchased by\na small degree of labor or trouble, the _compound result_ is deemed a\ngood, and called right; on the contrary, when the evil involved exceeds\na given amount in comparison to the good, the compound result is called\nevil and wrong.\n\nThus is generated the impression that there is a law of sacrifice\ninstituted requiring the greatest possible good with the least possible\nevil, and that this is the great design of all things.\n\nThe impression is, not merely that we are to seek enjoyment and avoid\npain, but that we are to seek the _greatest possible_ good with the\n_least possible_ evil, and that in doing this we are to obey the law of\nsacrifice and suffering, by which the greatest possible good _is to be\nbought_ by a certain amount of evil _voluntarily_ assumed.\n\nIn regard to this great law of sacrifice, the highest part of it is\ndiscerned in the earliest experiences of life. The young child very soon\nperceives that its mother and its other friends are constantly making\nsacrifices for its own good, and bearing inconveniences and trouble for\nthe good of those around. And those who perform such acts of benevolent\nself-sacrifice are praised, and their conduct is called good and right.\n_Voluntary suffering to promote the welfare of others_ is discerned to\nbe the highest kind of good and right conduct in the estimation of all.\n\nThe first feature, then, in our moral nature is that _impression of the\ngreat design of our Creator_ which furnishes us the means of deciding on\nthe rectitude of all voluntary action.\n\nThe second feature of our moral constitution is what is ordinarily\ncalled the _sense of justice_. It is that susceptibility which is\nexcited at the view of the conduct of others as _voluntary_ causes of\ngood or evil.\n\nIn all cases where free agents act to promote happiness, an emotion of\napproval arises, together with a desire of reward to the author of the\ngood. On the contrary, when there is a voluntary destruction of\nhappiness, there is an emotion of disapproval and a desire for\nretributive pain on the author of the wrong.\n\nThese emotions are instinctive, and not at all regulated by reason in\ntheir inception. When an evil is done, an instant desire is felt _to\ndiscover the cause_; and when it is found, an instant desire is felt _to\ninflict some penalty_. So irrational is this impulse, that children will\nexhibit anger and deal blows on inanimate objects that cause pain. Even\nmature minds are sometimes conscious of this impulse.\n\nIt is the office of the intellect to judge whether the deed was a\nvoluntary one, whether the agent intended the mischief, and whether a\npenalty will be of any use. The impulse to punish is never preceded by\nany such calculations.\n\nThat this impulse is an implanted part of our constitution, and not the\nresult of reason and experience, is seen in the delight manifested by\nyoung children in the narration of the nursery tale where the cruel\nuncle who murdered the Babes in the Wood receives the retributions of\nHeaven.\n\nAnother feature in this sense of justice is the _proportion_ demanded\nbetween the evil done and the penalty inflicted. That this also is\ninstinctive, and not the result of reason, is seen in the nursery, where\nchildren will approve of slight penalties for slight offenses, and\nsevere ones for great ones, but will revolt from any very great\ndisproportion between the wrong act and its penalty. As a general rule,\nboth in the nursery and in the great family of mature minds, the greater\nthe wrong done, the stronger the desire for a penalty, and the more\nsevere the punishment demanded.\n\nAnother very important point of consideration is the universal feeling\nof mankind that the _natural penalties_ for wrong-doing are _not\nsufficient_, and that it is an act of love as well as of justice to add\nto these penalties. Thus the parent who forbids his child to eat green\nfruit will not trust to the results of the natural penalty, but restrain\nby the fear of the immediate and more easily conceived penalty of\nchastisement.\n\nSo, in the great family of man, the natural penalties for theft are not\ndeemed sufficient, but severe penalties for the protection of property\nare added.\n\nThis particular is the foundation of certain distinctions that are of\ngreat importance, which will now be pointed out.\n\nWe find the terms \"_reward_ and _punishment_\" used in two different\nrelations. In the first and widest sense they signify not only the\npenalties of human law, but those _natural consequences_ which, by the\nconstitution of nature, inevitably follow certain courses of conduct.\n\nThus an indolent man is said to receive poverty as a punishment, and it\nis in this sense that his children are said to be punished for the\nfaults of their father.\n\nThe violations of natural law are punished without any reference to the\nquestion whether the evil-doer intended the wrong, or whether he sinned\nin ignorance, or whether this ignorance was involuntary and unavoidable.\nThe question of the justice or injustice of such natural penalties\ninvolves the great question of the right and wrong of the system of the\nuniverse. Is it just and right for the Creator to make a system in which\nall free agents shall be thus led to obedience to its laws by penalties\nas well as rewards, by fear as well as by hope? This question will not\nbe discussed here.\n\nMost discussions as to _just_ rewards and penalties ordinarily relate to\nthe _added_ penalties by which parents, teachers, and magistrates\nenforce obedience to natural or to statute law.\n\nIn these questions reference is always had to the _probable results_ of\nsuch rewards and penalties in securing obedience. If experience has\nshown that certain penalties do secure obedience to wise and good laws,\neither of nature or of human enactment, then they are considered just.\nIf they do not, they are counted unwise and unjust.\n\nSo, if certain penalties are needlessly severe--that is to say, if a\nless penalty will secure equal obedience, then this also decides so\nsevere a penalty to be unjust.\n\nIn deciding on the rectitude of the penalties of human enactments, it is\nalways assumed to be unjust to punish for any lack of knowledge and\nobedience when the subject had _no power_ to know and to obey. If _a\nchoice to obey_ will not secure the act required of a free agent, then a\npenalty inflicted for disobedience is always regarded as unjust. The\nonly seeming exception to this is the case where a person, by voluntary\nmeans, has deprived himself of ability to obey. But in such cases the\npunishment is felt to be right, not because he does not obey when he has\nno power, but because he has voluntarily deprived himself of this power.\nAnd he is punished for destroying his ability to obey, and not for\nviolating the law.\n\nThese things in human laws, then, are always demanded to make a penalty\nappear _just_ to the moral sense of mankind, namely, that the subject\nhave power to obey, and that he has opportunity to know the law, and is\nnot ignorant by any voluntary and improper neglect.\n\nIn all questions of justice, therefore, it is important to discriminate\nbetween those penalties that are inherent as a part of the great system\nof the universe, and for which the Creator alone is the responsible\ncause, and those which result from voluntary institutions of which men\nare the authors.\n\nIn connection with this subject, it is important to recognize the\ndistinction that exists in regard to two classes of right and wrong\nactions. The first class includes those which are wrong in their nature\nand in all supposable cases, such, for example, as the wanton infliction\nof needless pain, or the breach of plighted faith, or the returning of\nlove and kindness with ungrateful treatment. In all possible\nsuppositions, the mind revolts from such actions as wrong and deserving\nof penalties. It is this class of actions which, without any reasoning,\nthe mind never fails to disapprove, and to desire should be visited with\nretributive penalties.\n\nThe other class of right and wrong acts derive their estimate solely\nfrom the circumstances in which they occur. For example, a man is angry\nand beats a little child. Now the question whether his feelings and\naction are right or wrong depends entirely on circumstances. If the\nchild has done no evil and the person knew it, his feelings and actions\nare wrong. But if the person is a father correcting his child for some\nheinous fault and with only a suitable degree of anger, then the feeling\nand action are right.\n\nThere is another mode of estimating conduct by which the same act may\nhave two opposite characters, according to the _relation_ in which it is\nregarded. For example, a good parent may give wrong medicine to his\nchild, or punish an innocent one, believing him to be guilty.\n\nIn such cases the act is right as it respects the motive or intention,\nand wrong as it respects the nature of the action. It is sometimes the\ncase that a man may do a right action with a bad motive, and a wrong\naction with a good motive.\n\nThus the same act is right in one relation, and wrong in another. It is\nimportant that this distinction should be borne in mind.\n\nThe next feature in our moral constitution is the susceptibility which\nis excited by the intellectual judgment of our own feelings and conduct\nas either right or wrong.\n\nIn case we decide them to be right, we experience an emotion of\nself-approval which is very delightful; but if we decide that they are\nwrong, we experience an immediate penalty in a painful emotion called\n_remorse_. This emotion is always proportioned to the amount of evil\ndone, and the consciousness that it was done knowingly and\nintentionally. No suffering is more keen than the highest emotions of\nthis kind, while their pangs are often enduring and unappeasable.\nSometimes there is an attending desire to inflict retribution on one's\nself as a mode of alleviating this distress.\n\nThis susceptibility is usually denominated _conscience_. Sometimes this\nword is used to include both the intellectual judgment of our conduct as\nright or wrong, and the consequent emotions of approval or remorse;\nsometimes it refers to the susceptibility alone. Either use is correct,\nas in the connection in which it is employed the distinction can\nordinarily be easily made.\n\nThis analysis of our moral constitution furnishes means for a clear\ndefinition of such terms as _obligated_, _ought_, _ought not_, and the\nlike.\n\nA person is obligated or ought to do a thing when he has the intellect\nto perceive that it is right, and the moral susceptibilities just\ndescribed. When he is destitute either of the intellect or of these\nsusceptibilities, he ceases to be a moral and accountable being. He can\nno longer be made to feel any moral obligations.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVIII.\n\nTHE WILL.\n\n\nIt is the _power of choice_ which raises man to the dignity of an\nintellectual and moral being. Without this principle, he would be a\ncreature of mere impulses and instincts. He would possess\nsusceptibilities of happiness to be excited, and intellect to devise and\ndiscover the modes of securing enjoyment; but without governing\nprinciple, the soul would be led captive with each successive desire, or\nbe the sport of chances whenever conflicting desires were awakened.\n\nHe who formed man in his own perfect image left not his work without\nthis balance-power to regulate the complicated springs of so wonderful\nan existence. Man is now not only the image of his Creator as lord of\nthis lower world, but is, like him, the lord and master of his own\npowers.\n\nIt has been shown that the constitution, both of mind and of the world,\nis such that it is impossible in the nature of things to gain every\nobject which is the cause of enjoyment. There is a constant succession\nof selections to be made between different modes of securing happiness.\nA lesser good is given up for a greater, or some good relinquished\naltogether to avoid some consequent pain. Often, also, some painful\nstate of mind is sought as the means of securing some future good, or of\navoiding some greater evil. Thus men endure want, fatigue, and famine to\npurchase wealth. Thus the nauseous draught will be swallowed to avoid\nthe pains of sickness; and thus the pleasures of domestic affection will\nbe sacrificed to obtain honor and fame. The whole course of life is a\nconstant succession of such decisions between different modes of\nsecuring happiness and of avoiding pain.\n\n\n_Specific and Generic Volitions._\n\nIn noticing the operation of mind, it will be seen that there is a\nfoundation for two classes of volitions or acts of choice, which may be\ndenominated _specific_ and _generic_.\n\nA _specific volition_ is one that secures some particular act, such as\nthe moving of the arm or turning of the head. Such volitions are\nordinarily consequent on some more general purpose of the mind, which\nthey aid in accomplishing, and which is, therefore, denominated a\n_generic volition_. For example, a man chooses to make a certain\njourney: this is the generic volition, and, in order to carry it out, he\nperforms a great variety of acts, each one of which aids in carrying out\nthe generic decision. These specific acts of will, which tend to\naccomplish a more general purpose, may also be called _subordinate_,\nbecause they are controlled by a generic volition.\n\nIt can be seen that the generic volitions may themselves become\nsubordinate to a still more comprehensive purpose. Thus the man may\ndecide to make a journey, which is a generic volition in reference to\nall acts subordinate to this end. But this journey may be a subordinate\npart of a more general purpose to make a fortune or to secure some other\nimportant end.\n\nIt is frequently the case that a generic purpose, which relates to\nobjects that require a long time and many complicated operations, exists\nwhen the mind seems almost unconscious of its power. For example, a man\nmay form a generic purpose to enter a profession for which years will be\nrequired to prepare. And while his whole course of action is regulated\nby this decision, he engages in pursuits entirely foreign to it and\nwhich seem to engross his whole attention. These pursuits may sometimes\nbe such as are antagonistic to his grand purpose, so as at least to\nimperil or retard its accomplishment. And yet this strong and quiet\npurpose remains, and is eventually carried out.\n\nIt is the case, also, that a generic volition may be formed to be\nperformed at some particular time and place, and then the mind becomes\nentirely unconscious of it till the appointed period and circumstances\noccur. Then the decision becomes dominant, and controls all other\npurposes.\n\nThus a man may decide that, at a specified hour, he will stop his\nstudies and perform certain gymnastic exercises. This volition is\nforgotten until the hour arrives, and then it recurs and is carried out.\n\nThis phenomenon sometimes occurs in sleep. Some persons, in watching\nwith the sick, will determine to wake at given hours to administer\nmedicines; then they will sleep soundly till the appointed time comes,\nwhen they will waken and perform the predetermined actions.\n\nIn regard to the _commencement_ of a generic purpose, we find that\nsometimes it is so distinct and definite as to be the subject of\nconsciousness and memory. For example, a spendthrift, in some moment of\nsuffering and despondency, may form a determination to commence a\nsystematic course of thrift and economy, and may actually carry it out\nthrough all his future life. Such cases are often to be found on record\nor in everyday life.\n\nIn other cases, this quiet, hidden, but controlling purpose seems to be\nformed by unconscious and imperceptible influences, so that the mind can\nnot revert to the specific time or manner when it originated. For\nexample, a child who is trained from early life to speak the truth, can\nnever revert to any particular moment when this generic purpose\noriginated.\n\nIt is sometimes the case, also, that a person will contemplate some\ngeneric volition before it occurs, while the process of its final\nformation seems almost beyond the power of scrutiny. For example, a man\nmay be urged to relinquish one employment and engage in another. He\nreflects, consults, and is entirely uncertain how he shall decide. As\ntime passes, he gradually inclines toward the proposed change, until,\nfinally, he finds his determination fixed, he scarcely knows when or\nhow.\n\nThus it appears that generic volitions commence sometimes so\ninstantaneously and obviously that the time and influences connected\nwith them can be recognized. In other cases, the decision seems to be a\ngradual one, while in some instances the process can be traced, and in\nothers it is entirely unnoticed or forgotten.\n\nIt is in reference to such generic purposes that the _moral character_\nof men is estimated. An honest man is one who has a fixed purpose to act\nhonestly in all circumstances. A truthful man is one who has such a\npurpose to speak the truth at all times.\n\nIn such cases, the degree in which such a purpose controls all others is\nthe measure of a man's moral character in the estimate of society.\n\nThe history of mankind shows a great diversity of moral character\ndependent on such generic volitions. Some men possess firm and reliable\nmoral principles in certain directions, while they are very destitute of\nthem in others.\n\nThus it will be seen that some have formed a very decided purpose in\nregard to honesty in business affairs, who yet are miserable victims to\nintemperance. Others have cultivated a principle called _honor_, that\nrestrains them from certain actions regarded as mean, and yet they may\nbe frequenters of gambling saloons and other haunts of vice.\n\nIn the religious world, too, it is the case that some who are very firm\nand decided on all points of religious observances and in the\ncultivation of devotional emotions, are guilty of very mean actions,\nsuch as some worldly men of honor would not practice at the sacrifice of\na right hand.\n\n\n_On Causes of Volition._\n\nIt becomes, then, a most interesting subject of inquiry as to the\n_causes_ which decide these diversities of moral purposes, and also the\ncauses which operate to give them more or less control over other\nprinciples.\n\nBut, preliminary to this, it is necessary to secure some discriminating\naccuracy in regard to the signification of the word _cause_ in its\nvarious uses.\n\nThis term, in its widest sense, signifies \"_that without which a change\nwill not take place, and with which it will take place_.\" This is the\nleading idea which is included in every use of the word.\n\nBut there is a foundation for three classes of causes which may be\ndenominated _producing causes, occasional causes_, and _deciding\ncauses_.\n\nA _producing cause_ is that which produces a change by the constitution\nof nature, so that in the given circumstances there is no power to do\notherwise.\n\n_Occasional causes_ are those circumstances which are indispensable to\nthe action of producing causes.\n\nThus, when fire is applied to your powder, the fire is the producing\ncause of the explosion, while the act of contact between the fire and\npowder is the occasional cause.\n\nIn regard to the action of mind in volition, the mind itself is the\nproducing cause, while excited desires and objects to excite those\ndesires are the occasional causes. Or, in other words, mind is the\nproducing cause of its own volitions, and motives are the occasional\ncauses.\n\n\n_On Deciding Causes of Volition._\n\nBut inasmuch as mind always has the power to choose in _either_ of two\nor more directions, the question arises as to _the causes which decide\nthe direction of volitions_, and which may be called _deciding causes_.\nWhenever it is asked, \"_Why_ did a person choose to do thus?\" the\nmeaning is, What were the causes that influenced him to decide thus?\n\nNow these causes are ascertained, as all others are, by experience. Men\nare always stating to each other, as well as noticing in their own\nexperience, the causes which decide their determinations.\n\nFirst, in certain cases, where two or more objects are presented, of\nwhich only one can be taken, the cause assigned for the direction of the\nchoice may be that _one excited a stronger desire than the other_. A\nvast proportion of human volitions are decided simply by the fact that\none object seems a greater good or excites a stronger desire than any\nother, and is thus the strongest motive.\n\nBut there are other cases where, of the objects presented, one excites\nthe strongest desire, while the judgment perceives that another will\nsecure a _greater good on the whole_. For example, in case of a sick\nperson, there may be placed a favorite drink that excites a very strong\ndesire, and beside it may stand a nauseous medicine. In this case, the\ninvalid may feel the strongest desire for the drink, and yet choose the\nmedicine as the greater good in its final results.\n\nIn such cases, what decides the direction of a volition is the judgment\nof the mind, that the object chosen, though it does not excite the\nstrongest desire, is still the greater good.\n\nAnother deciding cause of volition is the nature of the _constitutional\nsusceptibilities_. For example, when it is asked why did a man forsake\ndomestic life and become a soldier, the deciding cause may be that he\nhad a strong constitutional love of the excitement and glory connected\nwith that profession, and but little susceptibility for the quiet\nenjoyments of domestic life.\n\nIt is sometimes the case that a child, from its birth, seems to possess\na natural love for truth, so that instructions on that point are\nscarcely needed. In another case, in the same family, and under exactly\nthe same training, will be found a child who has the contrary\npropensity, so that it costs years of careful training to form a\nprinciple of veracity. The same constitutional variety will be found in\nreference to other virtues.\n\nAnother deciding cause of volition are _the habits_. The existence of a\n_habit of obedience_, for example, will induce the formation of virtuous\npurposes that would never have existed but for this. A child who began\nlife with strong propensities to certain faults, by a wise and careful\ntraining may secure habits that are fully equal in power to the same\nconstitutional traits in another child. Often, in the result, it can not\nbe seen whether the generic purpose to be truthful, for example,\nresulted mainly from natural constitution or from the formation of\nhabits.\n\nThe will itself also is more or less regulated by this principle. When a\nchild is trained constantly to submit to fixed rules, the will acquires\nincreased ease and facility in doing it. On the contrary, a mind that is\nnever controlled grows more and more averse to yielding to any\nregulating principle.\n\nAnother deciding cause of volition is such _a combination of\ncircumstances_ as excites one class of desires, while other\nsensibilities have no appropriate objects to stimulate them.\n\nFor example, it may be asked, Why did a man choose to drink and gamble?\nThe cause assigned may be the presence of liquor and of tempting\ncompanions, and the want of objects to excite higher susceptibilities.\nHe had no wise friends, no business, and no higher sources of enjoyment\nimmediately around him.\n\nAnother deciding cause of volition is the existence of _principle or\ngeneric purpose_. For example, it may be asked, Why did a man choose to\ngive up his liberty and property when he could have secured them by\nfalse testimony? The answer may be that he was a truthful man or a\nvirtuous man--that is, he had formed a strong generic purpose to speak\nthe truth or to act right on all occasions.\n\nAnother deciding cause of volition is the existence of love and\ngratitude toward other minds, and the reflex influence of such minds in\nthe bestowal of their love, sympathy, teachings, and example.\n\nThis is the most powerful of all the influences which secure and sustain\ngeneric volitions, as will be illustrated more at large in future pages.\n\n\n_Causes that regulate the Power of Generic Volitions._\n\nThe next inquiry relates to the causes which regulate the _power_ of\ngeneric volition.\n\nAmong those causes, the most prominent is that natural force of will\nwhich is strictly constitutional. Some minds are formed by the Creator\nwith great energy and great pertinacity of will, so that when a purpose\nis formed, all subordinate volitions needful to carry out this purpose\nseem easily controlled. Other minds, on the contrary, possess a\nnaturally feeble will, so that no generic volition has a strong and\nsteady control, but is constantly interrupted in its power over\nsubordinate volitions, or is easily changed by conflicting desires.\n\nIn one case the person is denominated a man of firm purpose or a man of\na strong will. In the other case he is called a man of yielding\ntemperament or a weak character.\n\nThe remaining causes that give strength to a generic purpose are most of\nthose that have been enumerated as causes of the _direction_ of\nvolition, or _deciding causes_. These are the constitutional\nsusceptibilities--the habits--the surrounding circumstances--the\nexistence of love and gratitude toward other minds, and the reflex\ninfluence of such minds in the bestowal of their love, sympathy,\nteachings, and example.\n\nIn all this variety of influences that decide those generic volitions\nwhich are the foundation of moral character, it must be remembered that\nin every case the mind has the power to choose that which the judgment\ndecides to be the greatest good on the whole for itself and for the\ncommonwealth.\n\n\n_How one Mind causes Volitions in another Mind._\n\nIn this connection, it is important to secure exact ideas of what is\nmeant when one mind is spoken of as _the cause_ of the volitions of\nanother mind.\n\nOf course, in this relation, no mind can be the _producing_ cause of\nvolition in any mind but itself. It must be, then, either as\n_occasional_ or as _deciding_ causes that we can influence other minds.\n\nThe only mode by which we can regulate the volitions of other minds is\nby _the employment of motives to stimulate desire, or by changing the\nconstitutional susceptibilities_.\n\nIn the first case, men have power to so combine circumstances of\ntemptation as to affect the most excitable and powerful sensibilities,\nor they can remove those objects and influences that sustain moral\nprinciple, or by a long course of training they can form habits and\ninduce principles. The combinations of motive influences that one mind\ncan bring to bear on another, as temptations to right or wrong action,\nare almost infinite.\n\nThe other mode is by _changing the constitutional susceptibilities_.\nThis can sometimes be effected to a certain degree by education and the\nformation of habits. It can be still more directly effected through the\nphysical organization. For example, a child may be trained to use\ncoffee, tea, alcohol, or tobacco, till the nervous system is shattered,\nand then a placid temper becomes excitable, a generous nature grows sour\nand selfish, an active nature becomes indolent, and multitudes of other\ndisastrous changes are the result.\n\nThese are the only two modes in which one mind is ever regarded as the\ncause of right or wrong volition in other minds.\n\n\n_On a Ruling Purpose._\n\nThe most important of all the voluntary phenomena is the fact that,\nwhile there can be a multitude of these quiet and hidden generic\npurposes in the mind, it is also possible to form _one_ which shall be\nthe dominant or controlling one, to which all the other volitions, both\ngeneric and specific, shall become subordinate. In common parlance, this\nwould be called the _ruling passion_. It may also be called the _ruling\npurpose_ or _controlling principle_. This consists in the permanent\nchoice of some one mode of securing happiness as the _chief end_ or\ngrand object of life.\n\nWe have set forth on preceding pages the chief sources of happiness and\nof suffering to the human mind. Now in the history of our race we find\nthat each one of these modes of enjoyment have been selected by\ndifferent individuals as the chief end of their existence--as the mode\nof seeking enjoyment, to which they sacrifice every other. Some persons\nhave chosen the pleasures of eating, drinking, and the other grosser\nenjoyments of sense. Others have chosen those more elevated and refined\npleasures that come indirectly from the senses in the emotions of taste.\n\nOthers have devoted themselves to intellectual enjoyments as their chief\nresource for happiness. Others have selected the exercise of physical\nand moral power, as in the case of conquerors and physical heroes, or of\nthose who have sought to control by moral power, as rulers and\nstatesmen.\n\nOthers have made the attainment of the esteem, admiration, and love of\ntheir fellow-creatures their chief end. Others, still, have devoted\nthemselves to the promotion of happiness around them as their chief\ninterest. Others have devoted themselves to the service of God, or what\nthey conceived to be such, and sometimes by the most miserable life of\nasceticism and self-torture.\n\nOthers have made it their main object in life to obey the laws of\nrectitude and virtue.\n\nIn all these cases, the _moral character_ of the person, in the view of\nall observers, has been decided by this dominant volition, and exactly\nin proportion to the supremacy with which it has _actually controlled_\nall other purposes.\n\nSome minds seem to have no chief end of life. Their existence is a\nsuccession of small purposes, each of which has its turn in controlling\nthe life. Others have a strong, defined, and all-controlling principle.\n\nNow experience shows that both of these classes are capable, the one of\n_forming_ and the other of _changing_ such a purpose. For example, in a\ntime of peace and ease there is little to excite the mind strongly; but\nlet a crisis come where fortune, reputation, and life are at stake, and\nmen and women are obliged to form generic decisions involving all they\nhold dear, and many minds that have no controlling purpose immediately\noriginate one, while those whose former ruling aims were in one\ndirection change them entirely to another.\n\nThis shows how it is that days of peril create heroes, statesmen, and\nstrong men and women. The hour of danger calls all the energies of the\nsoul into action. Great purposes are formed with the strongest desire\nand emotion. Instantly the whole current of thought, and all the\nco-existing desires and emotions, are conformed to these purposes.\n\nThe experience of mankind proves that a dominant generic purpose may\n_extend to a whole life_, and actually control all other generic and\nspecific volitions.\n\n\n_Mode of Controlling the Intellect, Desires, and Emotions._\n\nWe will now consider some of the modes by which the will controls the\nintellect, desires, and emotions.\n\nWe have seen, in previous pages, the influence which desire and emotion\nexert in making both our perceptions and conceptions more vivid.\nWhatever purpose or aim in life becomes an object of strong desire, is\nalways distinctly and vividly conceived, while all less interesting\nobjects are more faint and indistinct.\n\nWe have also seen that whenever any conception arises it always brings\nconnected objects, according to certain laws of association, forming a\nnew and complex picture.\n\nWhenever the mind is under the influence of a controlling purpose, the\nobject of pursuit is always _more interesting_ than any other. This\ninterest always fastens on those particulars in any mental combination\nthat are connected with the ruling purpose and seem fitted to promote\nit, making them more vivid. Around these selected objects their past\nassociated ideas begin to cluster, forming other complex pictures. In\nall these combinations, those ideas most consonant with the leading\ninterest of the mind become most vivid, and the others fade away.\n\nThe grand method, then, for _regulating the thoughts_ is by the generic\ndecisions of the mind as to the modes of seeking enjoyment.\n\nIn regard to the power of the mind over its own desires and emotions, it\nis very clear that these sensibilities can not be regulated by direct\nspecific volitions. Let any person try to produce love, fear, joy, hope,\nor gratitude by simply choosing to have them arise, and it is soon\nperceived that no such power exists.\n\nBut there are _indirect_ modes by which the mind can control its\nsusceptibilities. The first method is by directing attention to those\nobjects of thought which are fitted to call forth such emotions. For\nexample, if we wish to awaken the emotion of fear, we can place\nourselves in circumstances of danger, or call up ideas of horror and\ndistress. If we wish to call forth emotions of gratitude, we can direct\nattention to acts of kindness to ourselves calculated to awaken such\nfeelings. If we wish to excite desire for any object, we can direct\nattention to those qualities in that object that are calculated to\nexcite desire. In all these cases the mind can, by an act of will,\n_direct its attention_ to subjects calculated to excite emotion and\ndesire.\n\nThe other mode of regulating the desires and emotions is by _the\ndirection of our generic volitions_. For example, let a man of business,\nwho has never had any interest in commerce, decide to invest all his\nproperty in foreign trade. As soon as this is done, the name of the ship\nthat bears his all can never be heard or seen but it excites some\nemotion. A storm, that before would go unnoticed, awakens fear; the\nprices in the commercial markets, before unheeded, now awaken fear or\nafford pleasure. And thus multitudes of varied desires and emotions are\ncalled into existence by this one generic volition.\n\nOne result of a purpose to deny an importunate propensity is frequently\nseen in the immediate or gradual diminution of that desire. For example,\nif a person is satisfied that a certain article of food is injurious,\nand resolves on _total abstinence_, it will be found that the desire for\nit is very much reduced, far more so than when the effort is to diminish\nthe indulgence.\n\nWhen a generic purpose is formed that involves great interests, it is\nimpossible to prevent the desires and emotions from running consonant\nwith this purpose. The only mode of changing this current is to give up\nthis generic purpose and form another. Thus, if a man has devoted his\nwhole time and energies to money-making, it is impossible for him to\nprevent his thoughts and feelings from running in that direction. He\nmust give up this as his chief end, and take a nobler object, if he\nwould elevate the whole course of his mental action.\n\nThese are the principal phenomena of the grand mental faculty which is\nthe controlling power of the mind, and on the regulation of which all\nits other powers are dependent.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIX.\n\nFAITH OR BELIEF.\n\n\nWe have shown that a belief in the reality of the existence, both of\nmind and of matter, as _causes_, is one of the implanted principles of\nmind. Some philosophers have claimed that there is nothing in existence\nbut mind, and that all that is called matter is simply _ideas_ of things\nin the mind itself, for which there is no corresponding reality. Others\nhave claimed just the opposite: that there is no such existence as an\nimmaterial spirit, but that soul is the brain, or some other very fine\norganization of matter.\n\nIn both cases, the assumptions not only have no evidence to sustain\nthem, but are contrary to the common sense or reason of all mankind, and\nnever can be really believed.\n\nWhen _perceptions_ are called into existence by the agency of the\nsenses, we can not help believing that things _are as they appear to\nus_, unless we have some evidence of deception either from disordered\nsensation or some other cause.\n\nBut in regard to our _conceptions_ we have two classes. One class is\nattended with the belief that they correspond with realities, or the\nthings they represent. The other class is not attended with this belief.\nFor example, we can conceive of a house of a color, form, and details\nsuch as we never saw, and this conception is not attended with any\nbelief of the reality of such an existence; but when we conceive of the\nhome of our childhood, this conception is attended with a belief of the\nreality of the thing conceived.\n\nThis illustration furnishes the means of defining \"_truth_\" as \"_the\nreality of things_.\" We _conceive_ the truth when our conceptions\nrepresent correctly the reality of things, and we _believe_ the truth\nwhen we feel this correspondence to exist. We believe falsehood when we\nhave a conception attended by a feeling that it represents the reality\nof things when it does not.\n\nAll our comfort, success, and happiness depend upon _believing the\ntruth_; for just so far as our belief or faith varies from the reality\nof things, we shall meet with mistakes, disappointment, and sorrow.\n\nOur beneficent Creator has so formed our minds and our bodies that, in\ntheir natural, healthy state, our _perceptions_ correspond with the\nreality of things uniformly, while, as before stated, our belief or\nfaith also thus corresponds.\n\nIt is very rarely the case that disease or other causes prevent this\nuniform correct perception and belief in regard to all things that come\nwithin the reach of our own senses.\n\nIt is only in regard to that knowledge that we gain from the _experience\nand testimony_ of others, or from the _process of reasoning_, that we\nbecome liable to a false belief.\n\nMen often impart their conceptions of things to us, and we find that\nthey do not correspond with realities.\n\nWe also, by a process of reasoning, often come to conceptions of things,\nand a belief in them, which we find to be false.\n\n_Evidence_ may be defined as all those causes which tend to produce\n_correct_ ideas of truth or the reality of things.\n\nInasmuch as we find by experience that human testimony and the process\nof reasoning do not uniformly conduct us to right conceptions of\nrealities, we find that there are different degrees of belief according\nto the nature of the evidence presented.\n\nThe highest kind of evidence is intuitive knowledge, which is a uniform\nresult of the constitution of mind and its inevitable circumstances.\nThis is called _intuitive knowledge_ or _intuitive belief_.\n\nAll other evidence is gained by _experience_ or by _reasoning_. The\nexperience of other minds we gain by testimony. This is called the\n_evidence of testimony_.\n\nBelief differs in degrees according to the nature and amount of evidence\nperceived. The highest kind of evidence produces what is called\n_certainty_. It is the kind which is felt in reference to the intuitive\ntruths. There are all degrees of faith, from the highest certainty to\nentire incredulity or unbelief.\n\nThis fact lays the foundation for a distinction in practical matters\nwhich it is very important to recognize. It is often the case that there\nis an amount of evidence that produces a conviction which rests in the\nmind, but does not produce its appropriate _practical_ result. For\nexample, a man in feeble health has read enough on the subject to be\nconvinced that a daily bath in cool water would tend to restore\nstrength, and yet the belief does not secure the practice. But on a\nreview of the books which produced the conviction, or on hearing some\nlecturer on health, the conviction becomes more powerful, and leads to a\ncorresponding practice.\n\nNow, in reference to the fact that there are multitudes of convictions\nwhich are inoperative, which, if vividly realized, would become\nprinciples of action, there is a distinction made, in common parlance,\nbetween a dead or ideal faith, and a living or practical faith. Still\nmore is this distinction recognized in matters of religion, as will be\nhereafter shown.\n\nThe question whether faith or belief is under the control of the will,\nor whether it is necessary and inevitable, is one of very great\nimportance both in regard to our happiness and our obligations.\n\nIf belief is not under the control of the will, it must be because\neither the mind has not the power of directing its attention to\nevidence, or because it is so made that, when it perceives the truth, it\ncan not distinguish it from falsehood.\n\nIn regard to the first alternative, the control which the mind has over\nits own train of thought has been definitely pointed out and described\nin the articles on attention and on the will. It appears that _the will_\nis the regulating principle, which governs all mental operations by\nselecting the modes of happiness which the intellect shall be employed\nin securing. Whatever mode of present or of general happiness is\nselected, immediately all conceptions which the judgment discerns as\nhaving a fitness for accomplishing this object become vivid and\ndistinct, and recall their associate conceptions. Thus it is the choice\nof any mode of enjoyment by the will which determines the train of\nthought.\n\nWhen, therefore, any question is brought up which demands attention to\nevidence, if the mind has some desire to gratify, and the intellect\ndiscerns that the conviction of this truth will interfere with this\nchosen plan of happiness, the will refuses attention to what is not in\nconsonance with the leading desire of the mind. Where conviction of any\ntruth is foreseen to interfere with some plan of enjoyment already\nchosen, the only way by which attention can be secured is by exhibiting\nsome evil that will follow inattention which will more than\ncounterbalance the good to be gained. In this case, the mind may choose\nto attend, and run the hazard of losing the particular mode of enjoyment\nsought in order to avoid the threatened evil from inattention to\nevidence.\n\nThis is the method men pursue in all their intercourse with each other.\nThey find that their fellow-men are unwilling to believe what is\ncontrary to their own wishes and plans. But when they determine that\nbelief shall be secured, they contrive various modes to make it appear\neither for their pleasure or their interest to attend to evidence, or\nelse they exhibit some evil as the consequence of neglecting attention.\n\nThe only mode by which mankind are induced to give their thoughts to the\nconcerns of an invisible world is by awakening their hopes of future\ngood to be secured, or by stimulating their fears of future evils. It\nthus appears, from the laws and operations of the mind of which every\nperson is conscious, and also from the conduct and recorded experience\nof mankind, that the mind _has_ the power of directing its attention to\nevidence.\n\nThe other alternative which would establish the principle that belief is\nnot under the control of the will is, that truth, when seen by the mind,\ncan not be distinguished from falsehood. But this, it can be seen,\ninvolves a denial of the principles of reason and common sense. It is\nsaying that the mind may have the evidence of the senses, memory, and\nall the other principles included in the laws of reason, and yet not\nbelieve it; for every process of reasoning is, in fact, exhibiting\nevidence either of the senses, memory, or experience, that a certain\ntruth is included under a primary truth.\n\nThe only position which can be assumed without denying the principles of\nreason and common sense is, that belief, according to the laws of mind,\nis exactly according to the _amount_ of evidence _to which the mind\ngives its attention_.\n\nIn order to belief, then, two things are necessary, viz., _evidence_,\nand the _choice of the mind to attend_ to this evidence. When both of\nthese are attained, the belief of truth and the rejection of falsehood\nare inevitable.\n\nThe influence which the will and desires have upon our belief accounts\nfor the great variety of opinions among mankind on almost every subject\nof duty and of happiness.\n\nThere are two ways in which the desires and wishes regulate belief. In\nthe first place, by preventing _attention_ to the subject which would\nlead to the belief of truths that are inconsistent with the leading\ndesires of the mind. This, in a great measure, will account for the\ngreat variety of religious belief. Religion is a subject which is felt\nto be inconsistent with the leading desires of most persons who are\ninterested in the pursuit of other enjoyments than those resulting from\nobedience to God in the discharge of the duties of benevolence and\npiety. It is a subject, therefore, which receives so little examination\nthat opinions in regard to it are adopted with trifling attention.\n\nThe second cause of variety of belief is the effect which _desire_ has\nin making vivid those conceptions which most agree with the leading\npurpose of the mind. When the mind decides to examine the evidence on\nany subject, if the decision involves questions which have a bearing on\nsome favorite purpose, all those arguments which are most consonant with\nthe desires appear vivid and clear, and those which are contrary to the\nwishes are fainter and less regarded. This is a fact which universal\nexperience demonstrates. Men always fasten on evidence which favors\ntheir own wishes, and but faintly conceive the evidence which is\nopposed. This is a cause which operates most powerfully in regard to\nreligious truths whenever they interfere with the leading desires.\n\nThis view of the subject exhibits the importance of having the mind\ndirected to proper objects; for if the mind is earnestly engaged in the\npursuit of duty, it will be pleased with every development of truth, for\ntruth and duty are never found to interfere. _Truth_ is another name for\n\"things as they are,\" and it is always the duty and happiness of man to\nregulate his conduct by seeing things as they are, rather than by seeing\nthem in false relations. That man is best prepared to discover truth who\nis most sincerely desirous to obtain it, and to regulate his feelings,\nwords, and conduct by its dictates.\n\nThere is nothing more obvious, from experience and observation, than\nthat men _feel_ their ability to control their belief, and realize both\ntheir own obligations and those of their fellow-men on this subject.\nThey know that every man must act according to his belief of right and\nwrong, and thus that the fulfillment of every duty depends upon the\nnature of our belief. And the more important are the interests involved\nin any question, the more men perceive their obligations to seek for\nevidence, and obtain the knowledge necessary to enable them to judge\ncorrectly.\n\nThe estimation of guilt among mankind, in reference to wrong belief, is\nalways proportioned to the interests involved and the opportunities for\nobtaining knowledge. In the minute affairs of life, where but little\nevil is done from false judgments, but little blame is attached to a man\nfor believing wrong. Neither is a man severely judged if the necessary\nknowledge was inaccessible or very difficult to be obtained.\n\nBut where a man has great interests committed to his keeping, and has\nsufficient opportunity for obtaining evidence of truth, the severest\ncondemnation awaits him who, through inattention or prejudice, hazards\nvast interests by an incorrect belief. If an agent has the charge of\ngreat investments, and through negligence, or indolence, or prejudice\nruins his employer, his sincere belief is no protection from severe\ncondemnation. If the physician has the health and life of a valued\nmember of the community and the object of many affections intrusted to\nhis skill, and from negligence and inattention destroys the life he was\nappointed to save, his sincere belief is but a small palliation of his\nguilt. If a judge has the fortune and life of his fellow-citizens\nintrusted to his judicial knowledge and integrity, and, through want of\ncare and attention, is guilty of flagrant injustice and evil, the plea\nof wrong belief will not protect him from the impeachment and just\nindignation which await such delinquencies.\n\nThere is no point where men are more tenacious of the obligations of\ntheir fellow-creatures than on the subject of belief. If they find\nthemselves calumniated, unjustly dealt with, and treated with contempt\nand scorn from prejudice or want of attention, the reality of belief is\nlittle palliation of the guilt of those who thus render them injustice.\nThey feel the obligations of their fellow-men to _know the truth_ in all\nthat relates to their interests, honor, and good name; and often there\nis scarcely any thing which it is so difficult to forgive as the simple\ncrime of wrong belief.\n\nThe only modes by which men attempt to justify themselves for guilt of\nthis nature are to show either that the matter was of small consequence,\nor that the means of learning its importance and of obtaining the other\nnecessary information was not within reach.\n\nIt may be laid down, then, as a long-established axiom in regard to this\nsubject, that men estimate the guilt of wrong belief in all matters\nrelating to the welfare of mankind in exact proportion to the value of\nthe interests involved, and to the opportunities enjoyed for obtaining\ninformation.\n\nInasmuch as all our success and happiness depends upon our belief of the\ntruth, we have two of the principles of reason and common sense to guide\nus. The first is, that we are to consider that to be right which has\n_the balance_ of evidence in its favor; and the second is, that nothing\nis to be assumed as true unless there is _some_ evidence that it is so.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XX.\n\nCONSTITUTIONAL VARIETIES OF THE HUMAN MIND.\n\n\nIn the preceding chapters have been presented the most important mental\nfaculties which are common to the race. There are none of the powers and\nattributes of the mind as yet set forth which do not belong to every\nmind which is regarded as rational and complete.\n\nBut, though all the race have these in common, yet we can not but\nobserve an almost endless variety of human character, resulting from the\ndiverse _proportions_ and _combinations_ of these several faculties.\n\nThese constitutional differences may be noticed, first, in regard to the\nintellectual powers. Some minds are naturally predisposed to exercise\nthe reasoning powers. Others, with precisely the same kind of culture,\nhave little relish for this, and little power of appreciating an\nargument.\n\nIn other cases, the imagination seems to be the predominating faculty.\nIn other minds there seems to be an equal balance of faculties, so that\nno particular power predominates.\n\nNext we see the same variety in reference to the susceptibilities. In\nsome minds, the desire for love and admiration is the predominating\nprinciple. In others, the love of power takes the lead. Some are\neminently sympathizing. Others have a strong love of rectitude, or\nnatural conscience. In some, the principle of justice predominates. In\nothers, benevolence is the leading impulse.\n\nFinally, in regard to the power of volition, as has been before\nindicated, there are some that possess a strong will that is decisive\nand effective in regulating all specific volitions, while others possess\nvarious and humbler measures of this power.\n\nAccording to the science of Phrenology, some of these peculiarities of\nmind are indicated by the size and shape of different portions of the\nbrain, and externally indicated on the skull.\n\nThat these differences are constitutional, and not the result of\neducation, is clear from the many facts showing that no degree of care\nor training will serve to efface these distinctive traits of the mind.\nTo a certain degree they may be modified by education, and the equal\nbalance of the faculties be promoted, but never to such a degree as to\nefface very marked peculiarities.\n\nIn addition to the endless diversities that result from these varied\nproportions and combinations, there is a manifest variety in the grades\nof mind. Some races are much lower in the scale of being every way than\nothers, while the same disparity exists in individuals of the same race.\n\nThe wisdom and benevolence of this arrangement is very manifest when\nviewed in reference to the interests of a commonwealth. Where some must\nlead and others follow, it is well that some have the love of power\nstrong, and others have it less. Where some must be rulers, to inflict\npenalties as well as to apportion rewards, it is well that there be some\nwho have the sense of justice a leading principle. And so in the\ndevelopments of intellect. Some men are to follow callings where the\nreasoning powers are most needed. Others are to adopt pursuits in which\ntaste and imagination are chiefly required; and thus the varied\nproportions of these faculties become serviceable.\n\nAnd if it be true that the exercise of the social and moral faculties\nsecures the highest degrees of enjoyment, those disparities in mental\npowers which give exercise to the virtues of compassion, self-denial,\nfortitude, and benevolence in serving the weak, and the corresponding\nexercises of gratitude, reverence, humility, and devotion in those who\nare thus benefited, then we can see the wisdom and benevolence of this\ngradation of mental capacity.\n\nMoreover, in a commonwealth perfectly organized, where the happiness of\nthe whole becomes that of each part, whatever tends to the highest\ngeneral good tends to the best interest of each individual member. This\nbeing so, the lowest and humblest in the scale of being, in his\nappropriate place, is happier than he could be by any other arrangement,\nand happier than he could be if all were equally endowed.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXI.\n\nHABIT.\n\n\nHabit is a facility in performing physical or mental operations, gained\nby the repetition of such acts. As examples of this in _physical_\noperations may be mentioned the power of walking, which is acquired only\nby a multitude of experiments; the power of speech, secured by a slow\nprocess of repeated acts of imitation; and the power of writing, gained\nin the same way. Success in every pursuit of life is attained by\noft-repeated attempts, which finally induce a habit.\n\nAs examples of the formation of _intellectual_ habits may be mentioned\nthe facility gained in acquiring knowledge by means of repeated efforts,\nand the accuracy and speed with which the process of reasoning is\nperformed after long practice in this art.\n\nAs examples of _moral_ habits may be mentioned those which are formed by\nthe oft-repeated exercise of self-government, justice, veracity,\nobedience, and industry. The will, as has been shown, gains a facility\nin controlling specific volitions and in yielding obedience to the laws\nof right action by constant use, as much as all the other mental powers.\n\nThe happiness of man in the present state of existence depends not so\nmuch upon the circumstances in which he is placed, or the capacities\nwith which he is endowed, as upon the _formation of his habits_. A man\nmight have the organ of sight, and be surrounded with all the beauties\nof nature, and yet, if he did not form the habit of judging of the form,\ndistance, and size of bodies, most of the pleasure and use from this\nsense would be wanting. The world and all its beauties would be a mere\nconfused mass of colors.\n\nIf the habits of walking and of speech were not acquired, these\nfaculties and the circumstances for employing them would not furnish the\nenjoyment they were designed to secure.\n\nIt is the formation of _intellectual_ habits by mental discipline and\nstudy, also, which opens vast resources for enjoyment that otherwise\nwould be forever closed. And it is by practicing obedience to parents\nthat _moral_ habits of subordination are formed, which are indispensable\nto our happiness as citizens, and as subjects of the divine government.\nThere is no enjoyment which can be pointed out which is not, to a\ngreater or less extent, dependent upon this principle.\n\nThe influence of habit in regard to the _law of sacrifice_ is especially\ninteresting. The experience of multitudes of our race shows that such\ntastes and habits may be formed in obeying this law, that what was once\ndifficult and painful becomes easy and pleasant.\n\nBut this ability to secure enjoyment through habits of self-control and\nself-denial, induced by long practice, so far as experience shows, could\nnever be secured by any other method.\n\nThat the highest kinds of happiness are to be purchased by more or less\n_voluntary sacrifice_ and _suffering_ to procure good for others seems\nto be a part of that nature of things which we at least may suppose has\nexisted from eternity. We can conceive of the eternal First Cause only\nas we imagine a mind on the same pattern as our own in constitutional\ncapacities, but indefinitely enlarged in extent and action. Knowledge,\nwisdom, power, justice, benevolence, and rectitude must be the same in\nthe Creator as in ourselves, at least so far as we can conceive; and, as\nthe practice of self-sacrifice and suffering for the good of others is\nour highest conception of virtue, it is impossible to regard the Eternal\nMind as all-perfect without involving this idea.\n\nThe formation of the habits depends chiefly upon the leading desire or\ngoverning purpose, because whatever the mind desires the most it will\n_act_ the most to secure, and thus by repeated acts will form its\nhabits. The _character_ of every individual, therefore, as before\nindicated, depends upon the mode of seeking happiness selected by the\nwill. Thus the ambitious man has selected the attainment of power and\nadmiration as his leading purpose, and whatever modes of enjoyment\ninterfere with this are sacrificed. The sensual man seeks his happiness\nfrom the various gratifications of sense, and sacrifices other modes of\nenjoyment that interfere with this. The man devoted to intellectual\npursuits, and to seeking reputation and influence through this medium,\nsacrifices other modes of enjoyment to secure this gratification. The\nman who has devoted his affections and the service of his life to God\nand the good of his fellow-men sacrifices all other enjoyments to secure\nthat which results from the fulfillment of such obligations. Thus a\nperson is an ambitious man, a sensual man, a man of literary ambition,\nor a man of piety and benevolence, according to the governing purpose or\nleading desire of the mind.\n\nThere is one fact in regard to the choice of the leading object of\ndesire, or the governing purpose of life, which is very important.\nCertain modes of enjoyment, in consequence of repetition, increase the\ndesire, but lessen the capacity of happiness from this source; while, in\nregard to others, gratification increases the desire, and at the same\ntime increases the capacity for enjoyment.\n\nThe enjoyments through the senses are of the first kind. It will be\nfound, as a matter of universal experience, that where this has been\nchosen as the main purpose of life, though the desire for such pleasures\nis continually increased, yet, owing to the physical effects of\nexcessive indulgence, the capacity for enjoyment is decreased. Thus the\nman who so degrades his nature as to make the pleasures of eating and\ndrinking the great pursuit of life, while his desires never abate, finds\nhis zest for such enjoyments continually decreasing, and a perpetual\nneed for new devices to stimulate appetite and awaken the dormant\ncapacities. The pleasures of sense always pall from repetition--grow\n\"stale, flat, and unprofitable,\" though the deluded being who has\nslavishly yielded to such appetites feels himself bound by chains of\nhabit, which, even when enjoyment ceases, seldom are broken.\n\nThe pleasures derived from the exercise of power, when its attainment\nbecomes the master passion, are also of this description. The statesman,\nthe politician, the conqueror, are all seeking for this, and desire\nnever abates while any thing of the kind remains to be attained. We do\nnot find that enjoyment increases in proportion as power is secured. On\nthe contrary, it seems to cloy in possession. Alexander, the conqueror\nof the world, when he had gained _all_, wept that objects of desire were\nextinct, and that possession could not satisfy.\n\nBut there are other sources of happiness, which, while sought, the\ndesire ever continues, and possession only increases the capacity for\nenjoyment. Of this class is the susceptibility of happiness from _giving\nand receiving affection_. Here, the more is given and received, the more\nis the power of giving and receiving increased. We find that this\nprinciple outlives every other, and even the decays of nature itself.\nWhen tottering age on the borders of the grave is just ready to resign\nits wasted tenement, often from its dissolving ashes the never-dying\nspark of affection has burst forth with new and undiminished lustre.\nThis is that immortal fountain of happiness always increased by\nimparting, never surcharged by receiving.\n\nAnother principle which increases both desire and capacity by exercise\nis the power of enjoyment from being the _cause of happiness to others_.\nNever was an instance known of regret for devotion to the happiness of\nothers. On the contrary, the more this holy and delightful principle is\nin exercise, the more the desires are increased, and the more are the\nsusceptibilities for enjoyment from this source enlarged. While the\nvotaries of pleasure are wearing down with the exhaustion of abused\nnature, and the votaries of ambition are sighing over its thorny wreath,\nthe benevolent spirit is exulting in the success of its plans of good,\nand reaching forth to still purer and more accomplished bliss.\n\nThis principle is especially true in regard to the practice of\nrectitude. The more the leading aim of the mind is devoted to _right\nfeeling and action_, or to obedience to all the laws of God, the more\nboth the desire and the capacity of enjoyment from this source are\nincreased.\n\nBut there is another fact in regard to habit which has an immense\nbearing on the well-being of our race. When a habit of seeking happiness\nin some one particular mode is once formed, the change of this habit\nbecomes difficult just in proportion to the degree of repetition which\nhas been practiced. A habit once formed, it is no longer an easy matter\nto choose between the mode of securing happiness chosen and another\nwhich the mind may be led to regard as much superior. Thus, in\ngratifying the appetite, a man may feel that his happiness is\ncontinually diminishing, and that, by sacrificing this passion, he may\nsecure much greater enjoyment from another source; yet the force of\nhabit is such that decisions of the will perpetually yield to its power.\n\nThus, also, if a man has found his chief enjoyment in that admiration\nand applause of men so ardently desired, even after it has ceased to\ncharm, and seems like emptiness and vanity, still, when nobler objects\nof pursuit are offered, the chains of habit bind him to his wonted path.\nThough he looks and longs for the one that his conscience and his\nintellect assure him is brightest and best, the conflict with bad habit\nends in fatal defeat and ruin. It is true that every habit can be\ncorrected and changed, but nothing requires greater firmness of purpose\nand energy of will; for it is not _one_ resolution of mind that can\nconquer habit: it must be a constant series of long-continued efforts.\n\nThe influence of habit in reference to _emotions_ deserves special\nattention as having a direct influence upon character and happiness. All\npleasurable emotions of mind, being grateful, are indulged and\ncherished, and are not weakened by repetition unless they become\nexcessive. If the pleasures of sense are indulged beyond a certain\nextent, the bodily system is exhausted, and satiety is the consequence.\nIf the love of power and admiration is indulged to excess, so as to\nbecome the leading purpose of life, they are found to be cloying. But\nwithin certain limits all pleasurable emotions do not seem to lessen in\npower by repetition.\n\nBut in regard to painful emotions the reverse is true. The mind\ninstinctively resists or flies from them, so that after a habit of\nsuppressing such emotions is formed, until the susceptibility\ndiminishes, and sometimes appears almost entirely destroyed. Thus a\nperson often exposed to danger ceases to be troubled by fear, because he\nforms a habit of suppressing it. A person frequently in scenes of\ndistress and suffering learns to suppress the emotions of painful\nsympathy. The surgeon is an example of the last case, where, by repeated\noperations, he has learned to suppress emotions until they seldom recur.\nA person inured to guilt gradually deadens the pangs of remorse, until\nthe conscience becomes \"seared as with a hot iron.\" Thus, also, with the\nemotion of shame. After a person has been repeatedly exposed to\ncontempt, and feels that he is universally despised, he grows callous to\nany such emotions.\n\nThe mode by which the mind succeeds in forming such a habit seems to be\nby that implanted principle which makes ideas that are most in\nconsonance with the leading desire of the mind become vivid and\ndistinct, while those that are less interesting fade away. Now no person\ndesires to witness pain except from the hope of relieving it, unless it\nbe that, in anger, the mind is sometimes gratified with the infliction\nof suffering. But, in ordinary cases, the sight of suffering is avoided\nexcept where relief can be administered. In such cases, the desire of\nadministering relief becomes the leading one, so that the mind is turned\noff from the view of the suffering to dwell on conceptions of modes of\nrelief. Thus the surgeon and physician gradually form such habits that\nthe sight of pain and suffering lead the mind to conception of modes of\nrelief, whereas a mind not thus interested dwells on the more painful\nideas.\n\nThe mind, also, can form a habit of inattention to our own bodily\nsufferings by becoming interested in other things, and thus painful\nsensations go unnoticed. Some persons will go for years with a chronic\nheadache, and yet appear to enjoy nearly as much as those who never\nsuffer from such a cause. Again: those who violate conscience seem to\nrelieve themselves from suffering by forming a habit of dwelling on\nother themes, and of turning the mind entirely from those obligations\nwhich, when contemplated, would upbraid and pain them. Thus, too, the\nsense of shame is lost. A habit is formed of leading the mind from\nwhatever pains it to dwell on more pleasurable contemplations.\n\nThe habits of life are all formed either from the desire to secure\nhappiness or to avoid pain, and the _fear of suffering_ is found to be a\nmuch more powerful principle than the _desire of happiness_. The soul\nflies from pain with all its energies, even when it will be inert at the\nsight of promised joy. As an illustration of this, let a person be fully\nconvinced that the gift of two new senses would confer as great an\nadditional amount of enjoyment as is now secured by the eye and ear, and\nthe promise of this future good would not stimulate with half the energy\nthat would be caused by the threat of instant and entire blindness and\ndeafness.\n\nIf, then, the mind is stimulated to form good habits and to avoid the\nformation of evil ones most powerfully by painful emotions, when their\nlegitimate object is not effected they continually decrease in\nvividness, and the designed benefit is lost. If a man is placed in\ncircumstances of danger, and fear leads to habits of caution and\ncarefulness, the object of exciting this emotion is accomplished, and\nthe diminution of it is attended with no evil. But if fear is\ncontinually excited, and no such habits are formed, then the\nsusceptibility is lessened, while the good to be secured by it is lost.\nSo, also, with emotions of sympathy. If we witness pain and suffering,\nand it induces habits of active devotion to the good of those who\nsuffer, the diminution of the susceptibility is a blessing and no evil.\nBut if we simply indulge emotions, and do not form the habits they were\nintended to secure, the power of sympathy is weakened, and the designed\nbenefit is lost. Thus, again, with shame: if this painful emotion does\nnot lead us to form habits of honor and rectitude, it is continually\nweakened by repetition, and the object for which it was bestowed is not\nsecured. And so with remorse: if this emotion is awakened without\nleading to habits of benevolence and virtue, it constantly decays in\npower, and the good it would have secured is forever lost.\n\nIt does not appear, however, that the power of emotion in the soul is\nthus _destroyed_. Nothing is done but to form habits of inattention to\npainful emotions by allowing the mind to be engrossed in other and more\npleasurable subjects. This appears from the fact that the most hardened\nculprits, when brought to the hour of death, where all plans of future\ngood cease to charm the mental eye, are often overwhelmed with the most\nvivid emotions of sorrow, shame, remorse, and fear. And often, in the\ncourse of life, there are seasons when the soul returns from its pursuit\nof deluding visions to commune with itself in its own secret chambers.\nAt such seasons, shame, remorse, and fear take up their abode in their\nlong-deserted dwelling, and ply their scorpion whips till they are\nobeyed, and the course of honor and virtue is resumed, or till the\ndistracted spirit again flies abroad for comfort and relief.\n\nThere is a great diversity in human character, resulting from the\ndiverse proportions and combinations of those powers of mind which the\nrace have in common. At the same time, there is a variety in the scale\nof being, or relative grade of each mind. While all are alike in the\ncommon faculties of the human mind, some have every faculty on a much\nlarger scale than others, while some are of a very humble grade.\n\nThe principle of habit has very great influence in modifying and\nchanging these varieties. Thus, by forming habits of intellectual\nexercise, a mind of naturally humble proportions can be elevated\nconsiderably above one more highly endowed by natural constitution. So\nthe training of some particular intellectual faculty, which by nature is\ndeficient, can bring it up nearer to the level of other powers less\ndisciplined by exercise.\n\nIn like manner, the natural susceptibilities can be increased,\ndiminished, or modified by habit. Certain tastes, that had little power,\ncan be so cultivated as to overtop all others.\n\nSo of the moral nature: it can be so exercised that a habit will be\nformed which will generate a strength and prominency that nature did not\nimpart.\n\nThe will itself is also subject to this same principle. A strong will,\nthat is trained to yield obedience to law in early life, acquires an\nease and facility in doing it which belongs ordinarily to weak minds,\nand yet can retain all its vigor. And a mind that is trained to bring\nsubordinate volitions into strict and ready obedience to a generic\npurpose, acquires an ease and facility in doing this which was not a\nnatural endowment.\n\nThus it appears that by the principle of _habit_ every mind is furnished\nwith the power of elevating itself in the scale of being, and of\nmodifying and perfecting the proportions and combinations of its\nconstitutional powers.\n\nAnd sometimes the result is that there is no mode of distinguishing\nbetween the effects of habit and the natural organization.\n\nOne of the most important results of habit is its influence on _faith_\nor _belief_. Those persons who practice methods of false reasoning, who\nturn away from evidence and follow their feelings in forming opinions,\neventually lose the power of sure, confiding belief.\n\nOn the contrary, an honest, conscientious steadiness in seeking the\ntruth and in yielding to evidence secures the firmest and most reliable\nconvictions, and that peace of mind which alone results from believing\nthe truth.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXII.\n\nMIND AS PROOF OF ITS CREATOR'S DESIGNS.\n\n\nWe have seen that the mind of man, by its very constitution, has certain\nimplanted truths which it believes from the necessity of its nature, and\nthat these are the foundation of all acquired knowledge, and the guide\nto all truth.\n\nWe have seen that, independently of a revelation, we have no other\nsources of knowledge except these intuitions, the experience of\nourselves and others, and the deductions of reasoning.\n\nWe have examined as to the amount of knowledge to be gained from these\nsources in regard to the nature of mind, the laws of the system of which\nit is the essential part, the immortality of the soul, our prospects\nafter death, and the character and designs of our Creator.\n\nIn discussing the last topic, it has been assumed that the grand and\nultimate design of the Creator is \"to produce the greatest possible\nhappiness with the least possible evil.\"\n\nWe have examined, at some length, the chief faculties and laws of the\nhuman mind, for the purpose of exhibiting their adaptation to this\ndesign.\n\nWe now proceed to a brief review of this portion as a _summing up_ of\nthe evidence sustaining the proposition that the grand end of the\nCreator, in forming mind, is _to produce the greatest possible happiness\nwith the least possible evil_.\n\nAs preliminary, however, we need to refer to one principle.\n\nWhenever we find any contrivances all combining to secure a certain good\nresult, which, at the same time, involves some degree of inevitable\nevil, and then discover that there are contrivances to diminish and\navoid this evil, we properly infer that the author intended to secure\n_as much of the good with as little of the evil as possible_. For\nexample, a traveler finds a deserted mine, and all around he discovers\ncontrivances for obtaining gold, and, at the same time, other\ncontrivances for getting rid of the earth mixed with it. The inevitable\ninference would be that the author of these contrivances designed to\nsecure as much gold with as little earth as possible; and should any one\nsay that he could have had more gold and less earth if he wished it, the\nanswer would be that there is no evidence of this assertion, but direct\nevidence against it.\n\nAgain: should we discover a piece of machinery in which every\ncontrivance tended to secure _speed_ in movement, produced by the\n_friction_ of wheels against a rough surface, and at the same time other\ncontrivances were found for diminishing all friction that was useless,\nwe should infer that the author designed to secure the _greatest\npossible speed_ with the _least possible friction_.\n\nIn like manner, if we can show that mind is a contrivance that acts by\nthe influence of fear of evil, and that _pain_ seems as indispensable to\nthe action of a free agent as friction is to motion; if we can show that\nthere is no contrivance in mind or matter which is designed to secure\nsuffering as its primary end; if we can, on the contrary, show that the\ndirect end of all the organizations of mind and matter is to produce\nhappiness; if we can show that it is only the _wrong action_ of mind\nthat involves most of the pain yet known, so that right action, in its\nplace, would secure only happiness; if we can show contrivances for\ndiminishing pain, and also contrivances for increasing happiness by\nmeans of the inevitable pain involved in the system of things, then the\njust conclusion will be gained that the Author of the system of mind and\nmatter designed \"to produce the greatest possible happiness with the\nleast possible evil.\"[3]\n\nIn the review which follows, we shall present evidence exhibiting all\nthese particulars.\n\nThe only way in which we learn the nature of a thing is to observe its\nqualities and actions. This is true of mind as much as it is of matter.\nExperience and observation teach that the nature of mind is such that\n_the fear of suffering_ is indispensable to secure a large portion of\nthe enjoyment within reach of its faculties, and that the highest modes\nof enjoyment can not be secured except by sacrifice, and thus by more or\nless suffering.\n\nThis appears to be an inevitable combination, as much so as friction is\ninevitable in machinery.\n\nWe have the evidence of our own consciousness that it is fear of evil to\nourselves or to others that is the _strongest_ motive power to the mind.\nIf we should find that no pain resulted from burning up our own bodies,\nor from drowning, or from any other cause; if every one perceived that\nno care, trouble, or pain resulted from losing all kinds of enjoyment,\nthe effort to seek it would be greatly diminished.\n\nIf we could desire good enough to exert ourselves to seek it, and yet\nshould feel no discomfort in failing; if we could _lose every thing_,\nand feel no sense of pain or care, the stimulus to action which\nexperience has shown to be most powerful and beneficent would be lost.\n\nWe find that abundance of ease and prosperity enervates mental power,\nand that mind increases in all that is grand and noble, and also in the\nmost elevating happiness, by means of danger, care, and pain. We may\nproperly infer, then, that evil is a necessary part of the experience of\na perfectly-acting mind.\n\nSo strong is the conviction that _painful penalties_ are indispensable,\nthat the kindest parents and the most benevolent rulers are the most\nsure to increase rather than diminish those that are already involved in\nthe existing nature of things.\n\nAgain: without a revelation we have no knowledge of any kind of mind but\nby inference from our experience in this state of being. All we know of\nthe _Eternal First Cause_ is by a process of reasoning, inferring that\nhis nature must be _like_ the only minds of which we have any knowledge.\nWe assume, then, that he is a free agent, regulated by desire for\nhappiness and fear of evil.\n\nWe thus come to the conclusion that this organization of mind is a part\nof the _fixed and eternal nature of things_, and does not result from\nthe will of the Creator. His own is the eternal pattern of an\nall-perfect mind, and our own are formed on this perfect model, with\nsusceptibilities to pain as an indispensable motive power in gaining\nhappiness.\n\nWe will now recapitulate some of the particulars in the laws and\nconstitution of mind which tend to establish the position that its\nCreator's grand design is \"to produce the greatest possible happiness\nwith the least possible evil.\"\n\n\n_Intellectual Powers._\n\nFirst, then, in reference to the earliest exercise of mind in\n_sensation_. The eye might have been so made that light would inflict\npain, and the ear so that sound would cause only discomfort. And so of\nall the other senses.\n\nBut the condition of a well-formed, healthy infant is a most striking\nillustration of the adaptation of the senses to receive enjoyment. Who\ncould gaze on the countenance of such a little one, as its various\nsenses are called into exercise, without such a conviction? The delight\nmanifested as the light attracts the eye, or as pleasant sounds charm\nthe ear, or as the limpid nourishment gratifies its taste, or as gentle\nmotion and soft fondlings soothe the nerves of touch, all testify to the\nbenevolent design of its Maker.\n\nNext come the pleasures of _perception_ as the infant gradually observes\nthe qualities of the various objects around, and slowly learns to\ndistinguish its mother and its playthings from the confused mass of\nforms and colors. Then comes the gentle curiosity as it watches the\nmovement of its own limbs, and finally discovers that its own volitions\nmove its tiny fingers, while the grand idea that _it is itself a cause_\nis gradually introduced.\n\nNext come the varied intellectual pleasures as the several powers are\nexercised in connection with the animate and material world around, in\nacquiring the meaning of words, and in imitating the sounds and use of\nlanguage. The adult, in toiling over the dry lexicon, little realizes\nthe pleasure with which the little one is daily acquiring the\nphilosophy, grammar, and vocabulary of its mother tongue.\n\nA child who can not understand a single complete sentence, or speak an\nintelligible phrase, will sit and listen with long-continued delight to\nthe simple enunciation of words, each one of which presents a picture to\nhis mind of a dog, a cat, a cow, a horse, a whip, a ride, and many other\nobjects and scenes that have given pleasure in the past; while the\nsingle words, without any sentences, bring back, not only vivid\nconceptions of these objects, but a part of the enjoyment with which\nthey have been connected.\n\nThen, as years pass by, the intellect more and more administers\npleasure, while the reasoning powers are developed, the taste\ncultivated, the imagination exercised, the judgment employed, and the\nmemory stored with treasures for future enjoyment.\n\nIn the proper and temperate use of the intellectual powers, there is a\nconstant succession of placid satisfaction, or of agreeable and often of\ndelightful emotions, while no one of these faculties is productive of\npain except in violating the laws of the mental constitution.\n\n\n_The Susceptibilities._\n\nIn regard to the second general class of mental powers--_the\nsusceptibilities_--the first particular to be noticed is the ceaseless\nand all-pervading _desire to gain happiness and escape pain_. This is\nthe mainspring of all voluntary activity; for no act of volition will\ntake place till some good is presented to gain, or some evil to shun. At\nthe same time, as has been shown, the desire to escape evil is more\npotent and effective than the desire for good. Thousands of minds that\nrest in passive listlessness, when there is nothing to stimulate but\nhope of enjoyment, will exert every physical and mental power to escape\nimpending evil. The seasons of long-continued prosperity in nations\nalways tend to a deterioration of intellect and manhood. It is in\nseasons of danger alone that fear wakes up the highest energies, and\ndraws forth the heroes of the race.\n\nMind, then, is an existence having the power of that self-originating\naction of _choice_ which constitutes free agency, while this power can\nonly be exercised when desires are excited to gain happiness or to\nescape pain. This surely is the highest possible evidence that its\nAuthor _intended_ mind should thus act.\n\nBut a mind may act to secure happiness and avoid pain to itself, and yet\nmay gain only very low grades of enjoyment, while much higher are within\nreach of its faculties. So, also, it may act to gain happiness for\nitself as the chief end in such ways as to prevent or destroy the\nhappiness of others around.\n\nIn reference to this, we find those susceptibilities which raise man to\nthe dignity of a moral being.\n\nIn the first place, there is that _impression of the great design_ of\nthe Creator existing in every mind, either as a result of constitution\nor of training, or of both united, which results in a feeling that\nwhatever lessens or destroys happiness is unfit and contrary to the\nsystem of things.\n\nNext there is the power to balance pleasure and pain, and estimate the\ncompound result, both in reference to self and to the commonwealth. With\nthis is combined the feeling that whatever secures _the most_ good with\n_the least_ evil is right and fit, and that the opposite is wrong and\nunfitted to the nature of things.\n\nNext comes the _sense of justice_, which results in an impulse _to\ndiscover the cause_ of good and evil, and when this cause is found to be\na voluntary agent, a consequent impulse to make returns of good for\ngood, and of evil for evil, and also to _proportion_ retributive rewards\nor penalties to the amount of good or evil done.\n\nWith this, also, is combined the feeling that those retributions should\nbe applied only where there was _voluntary_ power to have done\notherwise. When it is seen that there was no such power, the impulse to\nreward or punish is repressed.\n\nSuch is the deep conviction that such retributions are indispensable,\nthat where natural pains and penalties do not avail, others are\ndemanded, both in the family and in the commonwealth.\n\nLastly, we find the susceptibility of _conscience_, which, by the very\nframework of the mind itself, apportions the retributive pangs of\nremorse for wrong doing, and the pleasure of self-approval for well\ndoing. These, too, are retributions never to be escaped, and the most\nexquisite, both in elevated happiness and exquisite pain. The mind\ncarries about in itself its own certain and gracious remunerator--its\nown inexorable prosecutor, judge, and executioner.\n\nThis same design of the Creator may be most delightfully traced in what\nmay be called the _economy_ of happiness and pain.\n\nOne particular of this is set forth at large in the chapter on the\n_emotions of taste_. Here we find the mind formed not only to secure\nmultitudinous enjoyments through the nerves of sensation, but that, by\nthe principle of association, there is a perpetual _reproduction_ of\nthese emotions in connection with the colors, forms, sounds, and motions\nwith which they were originally associated. Thus there are perpetually\nreturning emotions of pleasure so recondite, so refined, so almost\ninfinite in variety and extent, and yet how little noticed or\nunderstood!\n\nAnother indication of the same kind is the peculiarity pointed out on\nformer pages, where it is shown that securing certain enjoyments which\ntend to promote the _general_ happiness increases both desire and\ncapacity for enjoyment, while those that terminate in the individual\ndiminish by possession. Thus the enjoyment of power, which must, from\nits nature, be confined to a few, diminishes by possession. Thus, too,\nthe pleasures of sense pall by indulgence. But the enjoyment resulting\nfrom the exercise and reciprocation of love, and that resulting from\nbenevolent actions, and that which is included in a course of perfect\nobedience to all the rules of rectitude, increases the capacity for\nenjoyment.\n\nAnother illustration of the same principle is exhibited in the chapter\non Habit, where it is seen that the power of pleasurable emotions\nincreases by repetition, while painful emotions decrease when the good\nto be secured by their agency is attained. Thus _fear_ seems to protect\nfrom danger till caution and habit render it needless, and then it\ndecreases. And so of other painful emotions.\n\nIt is interesting to trace the same design in the constitution of minds\nin _regard to each other_. We find that the purest and highest kind of\nhappiness is dependent on the mutual relations of minds. Thus the\nenjoyment resulting from the discovery of intellectual and moral traits\nin other minds--that resulting from giving and receiving affection--that\ngained by sympathy, and by being the cause of happiness to others, and\nthat resulting from conscious rectitude, all are dependent on the\nexistence of other beings.\n\nNow we find that minds are relatively so constituted that _what one\ndesires, it is a source of happiness in another to bestow_. Thus one can\nbe pleased by the discovery of certain traits in other minds, while, in\nreturn, the exhibition of these traits, and the consciousness that they\nare appreciated, is an equal source of enjoyment. One mind seeks the\nlove of others, while these, in return, are desiring objects of\naffection, and rejoice to confer the gift that is sought. The desire of\nknowledge or the gratification of curiosity is another source of\npleasure, while satisfying this desire is a cause of enjoyment to those\naround. How readily do mankind seize upon every opportunity to convey\ninteresting news to other minds!\n\nAgain: we find that, both in sorrow and in joy, the mind seeks for the\nsympathy of others, while this grateful and soothing boon it is\ndelightful to bestow. So, also, the consciousness of being the cause of\ngood to another sends joy to the heart, while the recipient is filled\nwith the pleasing glow of gratitude in receiving the benefit. The\nconsciousness of virtue in acting for the general good, instead of for\ncontracted, selfish purposes, is another source of happiness, while\nthose who witness its delightful results rejoice to behold and\nacknowledge it. What bursts of rapturous applause have followed the\nexhibition of virtuous self-sacrifice for the good of others from bosoms\nwho rejoiced in this display, and who could owe this pleasure to no\nother cause than the natural constitution of mind, which is formed to be\nmade happy both in beholding and in exercising virtue.\n\nThis same beneficial economy is manifested in a close analysis of all\nthat is included in the affections of _love_ and _gratitude_.\n\nIt has been shown that, in the commencement of existence, the young mind\nfirst learns the sources of good and evil to self, and its sole motives\nare desire for its own enjoyment.\n\nSoon, however, it begins to experience the happiness resulting from the\nrelations of minds to each other, and then is developed the superior\npower of _love_, and its importance as a regulating principle.\n\nIn the analysis of this affection, it is seen to consist, first, in the\npleasurable emotions which arise in view of those traits of character in\nanother mind pointed out on previous pages. When these qualities are\ndiscovered, the first result is emotions of pleasure in the\ncontemplation. Immediately there follows _a desire of good_ to the cause\nof this pleasure. Next follows the desire of reciprocated\naffection--that is, a desire is awakened _to become the cause of the\nsame pleasure_ to another; for the desire of _being loved_ is the desire\nto be the cause of pleasurable emotions in another mind, in view of our\nown good qualities. When we secure this desired appreciation, then\nfollows an increased _desire of good_ to the one who bestows it.\n\nThus the affection of love is a combination of the action and reaction\nof pleasurable emotions, all tending to awaken the desire of good to\nanother. This passion may become so intensified that it will become more\ndelightful to secure enjoyments to another than to procure them for\nself.\n\nGratitude is the emotion of pleasure toward the author of _voluntary_\ngood to self, attended by a desire of good to the benefactor. This\nprinciple can be added to augment the power of love.\n\nThere is a foundation for a very important distinction in the analysis\nof the principle of love. In what is thus far presented, we find that\nthe desire of good to another results solely from the fact that certain\nmental qualities are _causes of pleasure to self_. Of course, this\ndesire ceases when those qualities cease to exist or cease to be\nappreciated. This kind of love is the natural result of the constitution\nof minds in their relations to each other, making it _easy and pleasant_\nto live for the good of another in return for the pleasure received from\ntheir agreeable qualities and manifestations.\n\nBut the highest kind of love consists in the _desire of good to another\nwithout reference to any good received in return_. It is _good willing_.\nIt consists in an abiding feeling of desire for the happiness of another\nmind.\n\nThis principle exists as a natural impulse more or less powerful in\ndifferently constituted minds. It is the cause of that pleasure which is\nfelt in the consciousness of being the cause of good to another. But\nthis natural impulse can be so developed and increased by voluntary\nculture as to become the strongest impulse of the mind, and thus the\nsource of the highest and most satisfying enjoyments. In many minds this\nbecomes so strongly developed that securing happiness to others is\nsought with far more earnestness and pleasure than any modes of\nenjoyment that terminate solely in self. This analysis lays the\nfoundation for the distinction expressed by the terms the _love of\ncomplacency_ and the _love of benevolence_. The first is the involuntary\nresult of good conferred on _self_; the last is a voluntary act. It is\ngood willing toward others without reference to self.\n\nThe first can only exist where certain qualities are preserved and\nappreciated in another mind. The second can result from voluntary\neffort, and become the subject of law and penalties.\n\nWe can never be justly required to love another mind with the love of\ncomplacency except when qualities are perceived that, by the\nconstitution of mind, necessarily call forth such regard. But the love\nof benevolence can be justly demanded from every mind toward every being\ncapable of happiness.\n\nHere it is important to discriminate more exactly in regard to the\nprinciple of _benevolence_ and the principle of _rectitude_.\n\nIt is seen that the benevolence which is the subject of rewards and\npenalties as a voluntary act consists in _good willing_--that is, in\nchoosing the happiness of _other_ minds as the object of interest and\npursuit.\n\nBut the principle of rectitude is more comprehensive in its nature. It\nrelates to obedience to _all_ the laws of the system of the\nuniverse--those relating to ourselves as much as those relating to\nothers. It is true that, as obedience to these laws includes the\ngreatest possible amount of good with the least possible evil, both to\nthe individual and the commonwealth, the tendency of the two principles\nis to the same result. But it may be the case that benevolence acts\ncontrary to the true rules of rectitude, and thus may mar rather than\npromote happiness. A mind must not only choose to promote the greatest\npossible happiness, but must choose _the right way_ of doing it.\n\nA very important particular to be considered is, that, while in the\nphysical and mental constitution there is not a single arrangement the\ndirect object of which is to produce suffering, the susceptibilities to\npain seem designed to protect and preserve, while the greater the need\nthe more strong is this protection. For example, in regard to physical\norganization, fire is an element that is indispensable to the life,\ncomfort, and activity of man, and it must be accessible at all times and\nplaces. But all its service arises from its power to dissolve and\ndestroy the body itself, as well as all things around it. Therefore the\npain connected with contact with fire is more acute than almost any\nother. Thus even the youngest child is taught that care and caution\nneedful to protect its body from injury or destruction.\n\nAnother fact in regard to the susceptibilities of pain is their frequent\n_co-existence_ with the highest degrees of enjoyment. The experiences of\nthis life often present cases where the most elevated and ecstatic\nhappiness is combined with the keenest suffering, while such is the\nnature of the case that the suffering is the chief cause of the\nhappiness thus secured. The highest illustration of this is in the\nsuffering of saints and martyrs, when they \"rejoice to be counted worthy\nto suffer shame,\" or when, amid torturing flames, they sing songs of\ntransport and praise.\n\nEven in common life it is constantly found that a certain relative\namount of happiness is felt to be more than a recompense for a given\namount of pain. This relative amount may be such that the evil involved,\nthough great, may count as nothing. Where there is a passionate\nattachment, for example, the lover exults in the labor and suffering\nthat will joyfully be received as a proof of affection and secure the\ncompensating return.\n\nIt is a very common fact that the existence of painful emotions _is\nsought_, not for themselves, but as ministers to a kind of mental\nexcitement which is desired. This is the foundation of the pleasure\nwhich is felt in tragic representations, and in poetry and novels that\npresent scenes of distress. The little child will again and again ask\nfor the tale of the Babes in the Wood, though each rehearsal brings\nforth tears; and the mature matron or sage will spend hours over tales\nthat harrow the feelings or call forth sighs. This also is the\nfoundation of that kind of music called the _minor key_, in which\ncertain sounds bring emotions of sadness or sorrow.\n\nAnother striking fact in regard to the desire for pain is the emotions\nthat are felt by the most noble and benevolent minds at the sight of\ncruelty and injustice. At such scenes, the desire for inflicting pain on\nthe guilty offender amounts to a passion which nothing can allay but\nretributive justice. And the more benevolent the mind, the stronger this\ndesire for retributive evil to another.\n\nThus it appears that the mind is so made as to desire pain both for\nitself and for others; not in itself considered, but as the\nindispensable means to gain some consequent enjoyment.\n\nThe highest kinds of happiness result from painful emergencies. The\ntransports of love, gratitude, and delight, when some benefactor rescues\nsuffering thousands from danger and evil, could exist in no other way.\nAll the long train of virtues included in patient toil for the good of\nothers, in heroic daring, in brave adventure, in fortitude, in patience,\nin resignation, in heavenly meekness, in noble magnanimity, in sublime\nself-sacrifice, all involve the idea of trial, danger, and suffering. It\nis only the highest and noblest class of minds that can fully understand\nthat the most blissful of all enjoyments are those which are bought with\npain.\n\nBut the most cheering feature in the constitution of mind is all that is\nincluded in the principle of _habit_. We see in the commencement of\nexistence that every action of mind and body is imperfect, and more or\nless difficult, while each effort to secure right action increases the\nfacility of so doing. We see that, owing to this principle, every act of\nobedience to law makes such a course easier. The intellect, the\nsusceptibilities, the will, all come under this benign influence. Habit\nmay so diminish the difficulty of self-denial for our own good that the\npain entirely ceases; and self-sacrifice for the good of others may so\ndevelop benevolence and generate a habit that it will become pleasure\nwithout pain. There are those, even in this world, who have so attained\nthis capacity of living in the life of those around them that the\nhappiness of others becomes their own, and then there is even less pain\nin self-denial for the good of others than for that of self. When this\nhabit of mind is attained, the happiness of the commonwealth becomes the\nportion of the individual.\n\n[3] Note B.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIII.\n\nSOCIAL AND MATERIAL PROOFS OF THE CREATOR'S DESIGNS.\n\n\nWe have now presented the organization of mind as the chief evidence of\nthe grand design of its Creator in forming all things. We now will trace\nthe evidences of the same beneficent object in the social and material\norganizations.\n\nFirst, then, in regard to the domestic relations. We have seen that\nwhile all happiness depends on obedience to laws, every mind comes into\nexistence in perfect ignorance of them, and without any power to learn\nwhat is good or evil but by experience and instruction. The intention of\nthe Creator that each new-born being should be taught these laws and\ntrained to obey them, is clearly seen in the first and highest domestic\nrelation. In this we see two mature minds, who have themselves been\ntrained to understand these laws, drawn by sweet and gentle influences\nto each other. They go apart from all past ties of kindred; they have\none home, one name, one common interest in every thing. The one who has\nmost physical strength goes forth to provide supplies; the delicate one\nremains behind, by domestic ministries to render home the centre of all\nattractions.\n\nThen comes the beautiful, helpless infant, of no use to any one, and\ndemanding constant care, labor, and attention. And yet, with its\nprofound ignorance, its tender weakness, its delicate beauty, its utter\nhelplessness, its entire dependence, how does it draw forth the\nstrongest feelings of love and tenderness, making every toil and care a\ndelight! And thus, month after month, both parents unite to cherish and\nsupport, while, with unceasing vigilance, they train the new-born mind\nto understand and obey the laws of the system into which it is thus\nushered. Its first lessons are to learn to take care of its own body.\nAnd when the far-off penalty of pain can not be comprehended by the\nnovice, the parent invents new penalties to secure habits of care and\nobedience. During all this period the great lesson of _sacrifice_\nconstantly occurs. The child must eat what is _best_, not what it\ndesires. It must go to bed when it wants to sit up. It must stay in the\nhouse when it wants to go out. It must not touch multitudes of things\nwhich it wishes thus to investigate. And so the habits of self-denial,\nobedience, and faith in the parents are gradually secured, while the\nknowledge of the laws of the system around are slowly learned.\n\nBut the higher part of the law of sacrifice soon begins to make its\ndemands. The child first learns of this law _by example_, in that of\n_the mother_, that most perfect illustration of self-sacrificing love.\nThen comes a second child, when the first-born must practice on this\nexample. It must give up its place in the mother's bosom to another; it\nmust share its sweets and toys with the new-comer; it must join in\nefforts to protect, amuse, and instruct the helpless one. And thus the\nfamily is the constant school for training ignorant, inexperienced mind\nin the laws of the system of which it is a part, especially in the great\nlaw of self-control and of self-sacrifice for the good of others.\n\nNext comes the discipline of the school and the neighborhood, when the\nchild is placed among his peers to be taught new rules of justice,\nbenevolence, and self-sacrifice for the general good.\n\nNext come the relations of the body politic, for which labors are\ndemanded and pain is to be endured under the grand law of sacrifice,\nthat the individual is to subordinate his own interests and wishes to\nthe greater general good, and that the interests of the majority are to\ncontrol those of the minority.\n\nLastly, the whole world is to be taken into the estimate, and the\nnations are to be counted as members of one great family of man, for\nwhich every portion is to make sacrifices. Thus, as age, and experience,\nand habits of obedience to the laws of rectitude increase, the duties\nand obligations grow more numerous and complicated. But the same grand\nprinciple is more and more developed, that each individual is to seek\nthe greatest possible happiness with the least possible evil, for the\nvast whole as well as each subordinate part, while _self_ is to receive\nonly its just and proper share.\n\nThe same great design of the Creator can be detected also in specific\norganizations, by which minds so differ from each other as to fit them\nfor the diverse positions and relations that the common good demands. If\nall were exactly alike in the amount of constitutional powers and in the\nproportionate combinations, it can easily be seen that the general\nresult would be far less favorable to the happiness of the whole. But as\nit is, some have the love of power very large, and love to lead and\ncontrol; others have it small, and love to follow. Some have elevated\nintellect, and love to teach; others have humbler capacities, and better\nlove humbler pursuits.\n\nThese varied combinations also give scope to the virtues of pity,\ntenderness, patience, mercy, justice, self-denial, and many other graces\nthat could not be called into being without all the disparities, social,\ndomestic, intellectual, and moral, that we find existing. Meantime, the\nprinciple of habit and the power of the will give abundant opportunities\nfor modifying these natural peculiarities to accommodate to varying\ncircumstances.\n\nTo these indications of benevolent design may be added the organization\nof the bodily system, and the constitution of the material world\nwithout. In examining the body we inhabit, so nicely adjusted, so\nperfectly adapted to our necessities, so beautifully and harmoniously\narranged, so \"fearfully and wonderfully made,\" it is almost beyond the\npower of numbers to express the multiplied contrivances for ease,\ncomfort, and delight.\n\nWe daily pursue our business and our pleasure, thoughtless of the\nthousand operations which are going on, and the busy mechanism employed\nin securing the objects we desire. The warm current that is flowing from\nthe centre to the extremities, with its life-giving energies, and then\nreturning to be purified and again sent forth; the myriads of branching\nnerves that are the sensitive discerners of good or ill; the unnumbered\nmuscles and tendons that are contracting and expanding in all parts of\nour frame; the nicely-adjusted joints, and bands, and ligaments, that\nsustain, and direct, and support; the perpetual expansion and\ncontraction of the vital organ; the thousand hidden contrivances and\noperations of the animal frame, all are quietly and constantly\nperforming their generous functions, and administering comfort and\nenjoyment to the conscious spirit that dwells within.\n\nNor is the outer world less busy in performing its part in promoting the\ngreat design of the Creator. The light of suns and stars is traversing\nthe ethereal expanse in search of those for whom it was created; for\nthem it gilds the scenes of earth, and is reflected in ten thousand\nforms of beauty and of skill. The trembling air is waiting to minister\nits aid, fanning with cool breezes, or yielding the warmth of spring,\nsustaining the functions of life, and bearing on its light wing the\nthoughts that go forth from mind to mind, and the breathings of\naffection that are given and returned. For this design earth is sending\nforth her exuberance, the waters are emptying their stores, and the\nclouds pouring forth their treasures. All nature is busy with its\nofferings of fruits and flowers, its wandering incense, its garnished\nbeauty, and its varied songs. Within and without, above, beneath, and\naround, the same Almighty Beneficence is found still ministering to the\nwants and promoting the happiness of the minds He has formed forever to\ndesire and pursue this boon.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIV.\n\nRIGHT MODE OF SECURING THE OBJECT FOR WHICH MIND WAS CREATED.\n\n\nHaving set forth the object for which the Creator formed mind, we are\nthus furnished with the means for deciding as to the _right mode of its\naction_ in obtaining this object. We may discover the design of a most\ncurious machine, and perceive that, if it is _rightly regulated_, it\nwill secure that end; while, if it is worked wrong, it will break itself\nto pieces, and destroy the very object which it was formed to secure.\n\nThe same may be seen to be as true of mind as it is of material\norganization, and the question then is most pertinent, What is that mode\nof mental action which will most perfectly secure the end for which mind\nis made?\n\nWe have seen that the self-determining power of choice is the\ndistinctive attribute of mind, and that all the other powers are\ndependent on this, and regulated by it. We have seen that the current of\nthe thoughts, and the nature and power of the desires and emotions, are\nalso controlled by the generic ruling purpose, or chief interest of the\nmind.\n\nThis being so, then the only way in which mind can act to secure the\nobject for which it is made is _to choose that object for chief end or\nruling purpose, and actually carry out this choice in all subordinate\nvolitions_.\n\nWe will now present the evidence gained from experience, as well as what\nwe should infer from the known laws of mind, to show what the result\nwould be in _a system of minds_ where each mind should thus act.\n\nLet us suppose, then, a commonwealth in which every mind is regulated by\na ruling purpose to _act right_, which actually controls every specific\nvolition. Each mind then would obey all those laws which will secure to\nthe whole community and to each individual the greatest possible amount\nof happiness with the least possible evil.\n\nTo do this of necessity involves the idea that each mind must _know what\nare all the laws of the system_; for no one can choose to obey laws\nuntil laws are known.\n\nLet the result on a single mind be first contemplated. In the first\nplace, all the trains of thought would be regulated by the _chief\ndesire_, which would be to make the most possible happiness with the\nleast possible evil. Of course, all those ideas that were most consonant\nwith this ruling passion would become vivid and distinct; and as these\nideas also would be connected with the _strongest emotions_, the two\nchief causes that regulate association would combine to secure constant\nthought and intellectual activity to promote the common welfare as the\nchief object, while self would have only its true and proper estimation\nand attention. There would be no need of effort to regulate thought and\nemotion, for they would all flow naturally to the grand and right\nobject.\n\nNext suppose a commonwealth in which every mind had its intellect,\ndesires, and emotions, and all its specific volitions thus regulated by\nthe grand aim of making the most possible happiness, guarded, too, by\nunerring judgment, so as to make no miscalculation; what would be the\nstate of things, so far as we can ascertain by past experience and by\nreasoning from the known nature of things?\n\nFirst, then, in reference to the susceptibilities of sensation. If all\nshould never touch any food but that which would expose to no danger or\nexcess; if they never encountered any needless hazard; if they exactly\nbalanced all the probabilities of good and evil, in every matter\nrelating to the pleasures of sense, and invariably chose that which\nexposed to the _least_ danger; if every being around was anxiously\nwatchful in affording the results of observation, and in protecting\nothers from risk and exposure, it is probable that the amount of\nsensitive enjoyment would be a thousand fold increased, while most of\nthe evils caused by improper food and drink, by needless exposure, by\nnegligence of danger, and by many other causes which now operate, would\ncease. With the present constitution of body, which tends to decay, we\ncould not positively maintain that no suffering would be experienced,\nbut it is probable that the amount would be as a drop to the ocean\ncompared with what is now experienced.\n\nUnder such a constitution of things, we can perceive, also, that there\nwould be no suffering from the painful emotions; for where each was\nstriving to attain the _greatest_ amount of good to all, there could be\nno competition, no jealousy, no envy, no pride, no ambition, no anger,\nno hatred; for there would be no occasion for any of these discordant\nemotions. Nor could remorse harass, or shame overwhelm; for no\nwickedness would be perpetrated, and no occasion of reproach occur. Nor\ncould fear intrude, where every mind was conscious that its own\nhappiness was the constant care of every one around. Nor could painful\nsympathy exist, where so little pain was known. Nor could the weariness\nof inactivity be felt, where all were engaged in acting for one noble\nand common object, in which every faculty could be employed. Nor could\nthe mind suffer the pangs of ungratified desire, while the gratification\nof its chief desire was the aim and object of all. So that, if all minds\nshould act unitedly and habitually on this principle, there would be no\nexposure, except to sensitive pain, and this danger would be exceedingly\ntrifling.\n\nIn the mean time, every source of happiness would be full and\noverflowing. All sensitive enjoyments that would not cause suffering,\nnor interfere with the happiness of others, would be gained; admiration\nand affection would be given and reciprocated; the powers of body and\nmind would be actively employed in giving and acquiring happiness; the\npleasure resulting from the exercise of physical and moral power would\nbe enjoyed, and employed to promote the enjoyment of others; the peace\nof conscious rectitude would dwell in every bosom; the consciousness of\nbeing the cause of happiness to others would send joy to the heart,\nwhile sympathy in the general happiness would pour in its unmeasured\ntide. But this happiness could not be perfect except in a commonwealth\nwhere _every_ individual was perfectly conformed to the laws of\nrectitude. A single mind that violated a single law would send a jar\nthrough the whole sphere of benevolent and sympathizing beings.\n\nThe next question is, How can mind be most successfully influenced to\nright action? To answer this we must refer again to _experience_, and\ninquire as to the methods which have been found most successful in\ninfluencing the mind to right action.\n\nThe first thing which experience teaches is, that it is indispensable to\nright mental action that there should be _a knowledge and belief of the\ntruth_. We must have _true conceptions_ of reality of things, and of the\nright mode of promoting the greatest possible happiness, before we have\npower to pursue this course.\n\nBut each mind, as it comes into existence, is a perfect blank in regard\nto knowledge or experience of any kind. The only way to gain knowledge\nis by experience and instruction. The knowledge secured by experience as\nto the laws of a system so vast and complicated comes very slowly and\nimperfectly. The chief reliance in the beginning of existence is on the\ninstructions of other minds. _Infallible teachers, and perfect faith or\nbelief in such teachers_, then, is the grand necessity of mind as it\nbegins existence.\n\nThe next thing which experience shows to be effective in securing the\nright action of mind is the _formation of right habits_. For this, also,\nthe new-made being is entirely dependent on those to whom is given its\nearly training. It comes into life without any knowledge and without any\nhabits, a creature of mere impulses and instincts. Its very first want\nis not only infallible teachers, but patient educators, who shall, by\nconstant care and effort, form its physical, intellectual, social, and\nmoral habits.\n\nThe next indispensable requisite to the right action of mind is the\nexistence of _a ruling generic purpose_ to obey all the laws of\nrectitude.\n\nIt has already been shown how all the powers of the mind are regulated\nand controlled by the leading purpose, and that it is impossible to\nbring all the desires, emotions, and subordinate volitions into right\naction except by the power of such a principle.\n\nBut experience has proved that such a generic purpose will not either be\noriginated or sustained except by the social influences of surrounding\nminds through the principles of _love_, _gratitude_, _sympathy_, and\n_example_.\n\nThe power of these principles may be illustrated by supposing the case\nof a mature mind already embarrassed with habits of self-indulgence and\nselfishness. Let such a person be placed in the most endeared and\nintimate communion with a being possessed of every possible attraction\nwhich is delightful to the human mind. Let him feel that he is the\nobject of the most tender and devoted affection to such an exalted\nfriend, and, spite of his own faults and deficiencies, realize that his\nown affection is desired and his communion sought. Let him, in all his\ndaily pursuits, be attended by the desired presence of the one in whom\nhis hopes centre and his affections repose; one in whom he sees every\npossible exhibition of disinterestedness, tenderness, and love, not only\ntoward himself, but all other beings who come within the circle of such\nbenevolence. Let him discover that the practice of all that is excellent\nand benevolent by himself is the object of unceasing desire to this\ndevoted friend. Let him discover that, to save him from the consequences\nof some guilty act of selfishness, this friend had submitted to the most\npainful sacrifices, and only asked as a return those efforts which were\nnecessary to overcome such pernicious habits. Let him feel that this\nfriend, though pained by his deficiencies, could forbear and forgive,\nand continue his love in spite of them all. Let him know that his\nattainment of perfect virtue was the object of intense desire, and was\nwatched with the most exulting joy by so good and so perfect a being,\nand is it possible to conceive a stronger pressure of motive which could\nbe brought to act on a selfish mind? Would not every human being\nexclaim, \"Give me such a friend, and I should be selfish no more. His\npresence and his love would be my strength in foiling every wrong desire\nand in conquering every baneful habit.\"\n\nThis illustration enables us to realize more clearly the power of love\nand gratitude toward another mind, and the reflex influence of love of\nsympathy and of example. Could the young mind be placed under the\ntraining of such minds, and in circumstances where all the rules of\nright and wrong were perfectly understood, it can be seen that _the\nhabits_ would early be formed aright, and that the difficulties against\nwhich the mature mind has to struggle would be escaped.\n\nCould we suppose a community of such elevated mature educators, with\nyoung minds of various degrees of advancement under their training, it\ncan be seen that the social influences of all would produce a moral\natmosphere that would add great power to the individual influences. What\nevery body loves, honors, and admires, secures a moral force over young\nminds almost invincible, even when it sustains false and wicked customs.\nHow much greater this power when it co-operates with the intellect, the\nmoral sense, and the will in leading to right action!\n\nThe result of all this is to show, as the result of reason and\nexperience, that it is indispensable to the perfectly right action of\nmind to secure _infallible and perfect educators_.\n\nMeantime, the degree in which any individual mind, or any community, has\nor will approach to such perfection, depends entirely on the extent to\nwhich such a character can be secured in those who are to train young\nminds. The history of individual families and of large communities shows\nthat their advance, both in intellectual and moral development, has\nexactly corresponded with the character of those who educated the young.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXV.\n\nWRONG ACTION OF MIND AND ITS CAUSES.\n\n\nWe have exhibited the _object_ for which mind was created, and the _mode\nof action_ by which alone this object can be secured.\n\nWe next inquire in regard to the wrong action of mind; its causes and\nits results as learned by reason and experience.\n\nAccording to the principles set forth, a mind acts wrong whenever it\ntransgresses any law. The grand law is that of _sacrifice_, by which\nevery mode of enjoyment is to be relinquished which does not tend to the\ngreatest possible happiness with the least possible evil.\n\nHaving set forth those influences or causes which tend to secure the\nright action of mind, we are enabled thus to indicate what are the\n_causes of its wrong action_.\n\nThe first and leading cause is a want of knowledge of the truth and a\nbelief of error. We begin existence without knowledge of any kind, and\nwithout any power to receive instruction from others. The newborn mind\nis a mere unit of impulses and instincts, with an intellect entirely\nundeveloped, and a will which never can act intelligently. It is\nentirely dependent for its experience, safety, enjoyment, and knowledge\nof all kinds on those around. As it gains by experience and training,\nmuch of its knowledge and belief is correct, and many of its mental acts\nare right; but a large portion of its actions are wrong, and many of\nthem inevitably so.\n\nAnd here we must recognize again the distinction which our moral nature\ndemands between wrong actions that result from unavoidable ignorance,\nand those which are committed intelligently and which violate\nconscience. In regard to the first class, the natural penalties are\ninevitable, and the justice of them involves the great question of the\nCreator's character and designs. In regard to those that violate\nconscience, our moral nature, as has been shown, leads us not only to\napprove additional penalties, but to demand them.\n\nThe violations of law which are sins of ignorance commence with the\nearliest period of existence. Owing to its helpless ignorance, often the\nlittle child can no more help acting wrong than it can help thinking and\nfeeling.\n\nA second cause of wrong action is false teachings. Although a large\nportion of the instruction given to the young, especially in regard to\nphysical laws, are true, yet the infant commences life among imperfectly\ninstructed beings, who often communicate error believing it to be truth.\nMeantime the little one has no power of correcting these errors, and\nthus again is inevitably led to wrong action.\n\nA third cause of wrong action is the want of good habits and the early\nformation of bad ones. As a habit is a facility of action _gained by\nrepetition_, of course, at first, there can be no habits. And then what\nthe habits shall be is entirely decided by the opinions and conduct of\nits educators. While some habits are formed aright, others are formed\nwrong, and thus the disability of nature is increased instead of\ndiminished.\n\nThe next cause of wrong action is those social influences of other minds\nthat have most power both in securing and sustaining right action. In\nthe previous chapter we have illustrated the power of the principles of\n_love_, _gratitude_, _sympathy_, and _example_ in securing right action.\n\nThe same powerful influences exist in reference to wrong action. The\nchild who loves its parents and playmates is not only taught to believe\nwrong action to be right, but has all the powerful influences which\nexample, sympathy, love, and gratitude can combine to lead to the same\nwrong courses. Thus, to the natural ignorance of inexperienced mind, to\nfalse instructions, and to bad habits, are often added these most\npowerful of all influences.\n\nThe next cause of wrong action is the want of a ruling purpose to do\nright. It has been shown that all the powers of the intellect and all\nthe susceptibilities can be regulated by a generic ruling purpose, and\nthat it is impossible, according to the nature of mind, to regulate it\nany other way.\n\nWhen such a purpose exists, and its object is _any_ other except the\nright and true one, it is as impossible for a mind to act right as it is\nfor a machine to fulfill its design when the main wheel is turned the\nwrong way.\n\nThat such a purpose does not exist in the new-born mind, and that it\nmust be a considerable time before it is possible, in the nature of\nthings, to be originated, needs no attempt to illustrate. Such a purpose\nis dependent on knowledge of truth, on habits, and these on the\ncharacter of the educators of mind, and on other surrounding social\ninfluences.\n\nThese are the chief causes of the wrong action of mind as they have been\ndeveloped by experience.\n\nIn the next chapters we shall consider the results of the wrong action\nof mind as they have been exhibited in the experience of mankind, and as\nthey are to be anticipated in a future world.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVI.\n\nWRONG ACTION OF MIND, AND ITS RESULTS IN THIS LIFE.\n\n\nWe have examined into the causes of the wrong action of mind, and have\nfound them to consist in the want of knowledge, want of habits, want of\nsocial influences from other minds, and want of a right governing\npurpose, all of which, so far as reason and experience teach, alone\ncould be secured by perfect and infallible teachers and educators in a\nperfect commonwealth.\n\nWe are now to inquire in regard to the wrong action of mind and its\nresults in this life.\n\nThe first point to be noticed is the fact that from the first there is\nin every intelligent mind _a sense of entire inability_ to obey the laws\nof the system in which it is placed.\n\nThis is true not merely in reference to that breach of law which is the\ninevitable result of ignorance, but of that also which involves a\nviolation of conscience. Where is the mother who has not heard the\ndistressed confession, even from the weeping infant, that he was happier\nin doing right than in doing wrong, that he wished to do well, and yet\nthat he was constantly doing evil? Where is the parent that has not\nwitnessed, as one little being after another passed on from infancy to\nyouth, and from youth to manhood, the perpetual warfare to sustain good\npurposes and oft-broken resolutions? And where is the conscious spirit\nthat can not look back on its whole course of existence as one continued\nexhibition of a conflict that gives unvarying evidence of this truth?\nMen _feel_ that it is as impossible for them to be invariably _perfect_\nin thought, word, and deed, as it is to rule the winds and waves.\n\nThe testimony of mankind through every period of the world, in regard to\ntheir own individual consciousness, attests a sense of the same fatal\ninability. If we go back even as far as to the heathen sages of\nantiquity, we gain the same acknowledgment. Thus we find Pythagoras\ncalls it \"the fatal companion, the noxious strife that lurks within us,\nand which was born along with us.\" Sopator terms it \"the sin that is\nborn with mankind.\" Plato denominates it \"natural wickedness,\" and\nAristotle \"the natural repugnance of man's temper to reason.\" Cicero\ndeclares that \"men are brought into life by Nature as a step-mother,\nwith a naked, frail, and infirm body, and with a soul prone to divers\nlusts.\" Seneca observes, \"We are born in such a condition that we are\nnot subject to fewer disorders of the mind than of the body; all vices\nare in men, though they do not break out in every one.\" Propertius says\nthat \"every body has a vice to which he is inclined by nature.\" Juvenal\nasserts that \"nature, unchangeably fixed, runs back to wickedness.\"\nHorace declares that \"no man is free from vices, and he is the best man\nwho is oppressed with the least.\" He adds that \"mankind rush into\nwickedness, and always desire what is forbidden;\" that \"youth has the\nsoftness of wax to receive vicious impressions, and the hardness of rock\nto resist virtuous admonitions;\" that \"we are mad enough to attack\nHeaven itself, and our repeated crimes do not suffer the God of Heaven\nto lay aside his wrathful thunderbolts.\"\n\nThis testimony of individual experience is verified by the general\nhistory of mankind. All the laws and institutions of society are founded\non the principle that mankind are prone to wrong, infirm of purpose in\nall that is good, and that every possible restraint is needed to prevent\nthe overbreaking tide of evil and crime. When we read the history of\ncommunities and of nations, it is one continued record of selfishness,\navarice, injustice, revenge, and cruelty. Individuals seem equally\nplotting against the happiness of individuals, and rejoicing to work\nevils on society. Communities rise against communities, and nations dash\nagainst nations. Tyrants fill their dominions with sorrow, misery, and\ndeath; bloody heroes, followed by infuriate bands, spread havoc, ruin,\nand dismay through all their course, while superstition binds in chains,\nracks with tortures, and sacrifices its millions of victims.\n\nIn tracing along the history of mankind, there is no period which we can\nselect when mankind have not seemed as busy in destroying their own, and\nthe happiness of others, as the lower animals are in seeking their\nappropriate enjoyments. At one time we behold Xerxes pouring forth all\nAsia upon Europe, where three million beings were brought to be\nslaughtered by the Greeks. At another time the Greeks, headed by\nAlexander, return upon Asia, and spread over most of the known world,\npillaging, burning, and slaughtering. Then we behold Alaric, at the head\nof barbarous hordes, desolating all the Roman empire, and destroying the\nmonuments of taste, science, and the arts. Then we see Tamerlane rushing\nforth, overrunning Persia, India, and other parts of Asia, carrying\ncarnage and the most desolating cruelty in his course, so that it is\nrecorded that he would cause thousands of his prisoners to be pounded in\nmortars with bricks to form into walls.\n\nFrom Europe we behold _six millions_ of Crusaders rush forth upon the\nplains of Asia, with rapine, and famine, and outrage attending their\ncourse. Then come forth from Eastern Asia the myrmidons of Genghis Khan,\nravaging fifteen millions of square miles, beheading 100,000 prisoners\nat one time, shaking the whole earth with terror, and exterminating\nfourteen millions of their fellow-men. Then from the northern forests\nare seen swarming forth the Goths and Vandals, sweeping over Europe and\nAsia, and bearing away every vestige of arts, civilization, comfort, and\npeace. At another time we see the professed head of the Christian Church\nslaughtering the pious and inoffensive Albigenses, sending horror into\ntheir peaceful villages, and torturing thousands of inoffensive victims.\n\nAt one period of history the whole known world seemed to be one vast\nfield of carnage and commotion. The Huns, Vandals, and other Northern\nbarbarians were ravaging France, Germany, and Spain; the Goths were\nplundering and murdering in Italy, and the Saxons and Angles were\noverrunning Great Britain. The Roman armies under Justinian, together\nwith the Vandals and Huns, were desolating Africa; the barbarians of\nScythia were pouring down upon the Roman empire; the Persian armies were\npillaging and laying waste the countries of Asia; the Arabians, under\nMohammed, were beginning to extend their conquests over Syria,\nPalestine, Egypt, Barbary, and Spain. Every nation and kingdom on earth\nwas shaking to its centre. The smoke and the spirits of the bottomless\npit seemed coming up to darken, and torment, and affright mankind. The\nmost fertile countries were converted to deserts, and covered with ruins\nof once flourishing cities and villages; the most fiendish cruelty was\npracticed; famine raged to such a degree that the living fed upon the\ndead; prisoners were tortured by the most refined systems of cruelty;\npublic edifices were destroyed; the monuments of science and the arts\nperished; cruelty, fraud, avarice, murder, and every crime that\ndisgraces humanity, were let loose upon a wretched world. Historians\nseem to shudder in attempting to picture these horrid scenes, and would\ndraw a veil over transactions that disgrace mankind.\n\nIf from ancient times we look at the present state of the world, at its\npresent most refined and enlightened period, the same mournful evidence\nis discovered. Cruelty and tyranny have changed some of the fairest\nprovinces of Persia to deserts. The Turk long ago turned the land of the\npatriarchs and prophets to a wilderness, and drenched the shores of\nGreece with the blood of slaughtered victims, while Syria, Kurdistan,\nand Armenia for ages have been ravaged with injustice and rapine. China\nand Japan have been shut out from the world by a cold and jealous\nselfishness. In Tartary, Arabia, and Siberia, the barbarous tribes are\nprowling about for plunder, or engaged in murderous conflicts. In\nAfrica, the Barbary States are in perpetual commotion; the petty tyrants\nof Benin, Ashantee, and other interior states are waging ceaseless wars,\nmurdering their prisoners, and adorning their houses with their skulls;\nand on its ravaged coast the white man-stealer, for hundreds of years,\nhas been prowling, and bearing off thousands of wretches as a yearly\noffering to the avarice of the most refined and Christian nations on\nearth. In North America, we have seen the native tribes employed in war,\nand practicing the most fiendish barbarities, while in South America,\nits more civilized inhabitants are engaged in constant political and\nbloody commotions. In the islands of the ocean thousands of human beings\nhave been fighting each other, throwing darts and stones at strangers,\noffering human sacrifices, and feasting on the flesh of their enemies.\n\nIf we select Europe for the exhibition of human nature as seen under the\nrestraints of civilization, laws, refinement, and religion, the same\nevils burst forth from bonds and restraints. In Europe, for ages, the\ncommon people, in slavery and ignorance, have been bowing down to a\ngrinding priesthood, or an oppressive nobility or monarchical tyranny.\nIncessant heaving of the troubled nations portends desolation and\ndismay, as man seems waking from the slavery of ages to shake off his\nfetters and call himself free.\n\nIf we look to our own boasted land of liberty and religion, what toiling\nof selfish and discordant interests--what mean and low-lived arts to\ngain honor and power--what shameful attacks on fair reputation and\nunblemished honor--what collisions of party-strifes and local interests!\nHere also the curse of slavery brings the blush of shame to every honest\nman that, from year to year, on the anniversary of the national liberty,\nhears the declarations of rights this very nation is trampling under\nfoot. Millions of slaves, deprived of the best blessing and the dearest\nrights of humanity, are held in the most degrading bondage by a nation\nwho yearly and publicly acknowledge their perfect and unalienable\nrights.\n\nThe same melancholy view is no less clearly witnessed in the opinions\nand moral sentiments of mankind. The mind of man is formed to love\nhappiness, to be pleased with what promotes it, and to detest that which\ntends to destroy it, yet the long reign of selfishness has seemed to\npervert and poison even the taste and moral sentiments of men. Who is\nthe hero sung by the poet, eulogized by the statesman, and flattered by\nthe orator? Who is it presented in classic language to the gaze of\nenthusiastic childhood, and pictured forth in tales of romance to\nkindling youth?\n\nIt is the man who has given up his life to the gratification of pride,\nand the love of honor and fame; the man who, to gain this selfish good,\ncan plunge the sword into the bosom of thousands, and stand the\nunpitying spectator of burning cities, widowed mothers, orphan children,\ndesolated fields, and the long train of ills that he wantonly pours on\nmankind, that he may gain the miserable pittance of gaping admiration\nand dreadful renown which rises amid the tears and cries of mankind. It\nis the man who, when injured, knows not how to forgive--whose stinted\nsoul never knew the dignity and pleasure of giving blessing for ill--who\ndeems it the mark of honor and manhood to follow the example of the\nwhining infant, that, when he is struck, with the same noble spirit will\nstrike back again.\n\nMeantime, the calm forbearance and true dignity of virtue, that would be\nhumbled at recrimination and can not condescend to retaliate, is put in\nthe background as unworthy such honors and eulogy. Thus, also, we find\nintellect, which the Creator designed only as the instrument of securing\nhappiness, though perverted to vice and folly, applauded and admired;\nand even some of those admired as among the wisest of mankind have often\nplaced true virtue and goodness below the fancied splendors of genius\nand learning. All the maxims, and honors, and employments of mankind\ndevelop the perverted action of the noblest part of the creation of God\nin all its relations and in all its principles and pursuits.\n\nIt is into such a world as this that every new-born mind is ushered\nwithout knowledge to guide, without habits to strengthen, without the\npower of forming a ruling purpose to do right which shall control all\nsubordinate volitions.\n\nInstead of meeting perfect educators to instruct in the laws of the\nsystem, to form good habits, and to exert all the powerful social,\ndomestic, and civil influences aright, every one of these powerful\nprinciples are fatally wrong. Parents, teachers, companions, and rulers,\nto a greater or less extent, teach wrong, train wrong, and set wrong\nexamples, while the whole moral atmosphere is contaminated and\nparalyzing.\n\nIn these circumstances, it is as _impossible_ for a young mind to\ncommence existence here with perfect obedience to law, and to continue\nthrough life in a course of perfect rectitude, as it is for it, by its\nfeeble will, to regulate the winds of heaven, or turn back the tides of\nthe ocean.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVII.\n\nWRONG ACTION OF MIND, AND ITS RESULTS IN A FUTURE STATE.\n\n\nWe are now to inquire as to the results of the wrong action of mind in a\nfuture state, so far as reason and experience can furnish data for any\nanticipations.\n\nThe following are the principles of mind from which we reason on this\nsubject. It appears that its constitution is such that the repetition of\none particular mode of securing happiness induces a habit; and that the\nlonger a habit continues, the more powerful is its force. An early habit\nof selfishness is always formed in the human mind, and the penalties\nfollowing from self-indulgence and selfishness are not sufficient to\nprevent the continued increase of this habit. Though men, from the very\nbeginning of existence, feel that they are happier in obeying the\ndictates of conscience, and that increase of guilt is increase of\nsorrow, yet this does not save them, in numberless cases, from\nincreasing evil habits.\n\nIt is also established by experience that, when a strong habit is\nformed, the mere decisions of the will are not sufficient for an\nimmediate remedy. In this life, it requires a period of long and painful\nefforts of the will to rectify an established habit. Every human being\nis conscious how difficult it is to force the mental and bodily\nfaculties to obey its decisions when contrary to the stream of a\nlong-indulged habit. There are few who have not either experienced or\nwitnessed the anguish of spirit that has followed the violations of\nsolemn resolutions, those firmest decisions of the will, in the contest\nbetween habit and conscience.\n\nAnother principle of mind is this, that when selfishness and crime have\nbeen long indulged, the natural constitution of mind seems changed, so\nthat inflicting evil on others is sought as an enjoyment. In\nillustration of this, it is related of Antiochus Epiphanes that, in his\nwars with the Jews, after all opposition had ceased, and all danger and\ncause of fear was removed, he destroyed thousands for the mere pleasure\nof seeing them butchered. An anecdote is related of him, too horrible to\nrecord in all its particulars, where he sat and feasted his eyes on the\nsufferings of a mother and her seven sons, when the parent was doomed to\nwitness the infliction of the most excruciating and protracted tortures\non each of her seven children, and then was tortured to death herself.\n\nIt is recorded of Mustapha, one of the Turkish sultans, that by\nhonorable capitulations he gained the person of a brave Venetian\ncommander called Bragadino, who was defending his country from the\ncruelty of invaders. After having promised him honorable protection, he\nordered him, bound hand and foot, to behold the massacre of his\nsoldiers, then caused his person to be cut and mutilated in the most\nhorrible manner, and then taunted him as a worshiper of Christ, who\ncould not save his servants. When recovered of his wounds, he obliged\nhim to carry loaded buckets of earth before the army, and kiss the\nground whenever he passed his barbarous tormentor. He then had him hung\nin a cage, to be tormented by his own soldiers, who were chained as\ngalley-slaves, that they might be agonized by the indignities and\nsufferings of their venerated commander. After the most protracted\nsufferings and indignities in the public place, at the sound of music he\nwas flayed alive.\n\nThe history of some of the Roman emperors, even of some who, in early\nchildhood and youth, were gentle, amiable, and kind, presents the same\nhorrible picture. Nero set fire to Rome, and dressed the Christians in\ngarments of flaming pitch, to run about his garden for his amusement.\nTiberius tormented his subjects, and murdered them in cruel pangs, to\ngratify his love of suffering, while Caligula butchered his people for\namusement with his own hand.\n\nThe mind turns with horror from such revolting scenes, and asks if it is\npossible human nature _now_ can be so perverted and debased. But this is\nthe humiliating record of some of the _amusements_, even of our own\ncountrymen, that have occurred in some parts of this refined and\nChristian nation. \"Many of the interludes are filled up with a _boxing\nmatch_, which becomes memorable by feats of _gouging_. When two boxers\nare wearied with fighting and bruising each other, they come to close\nquarters, each endeavoring to twist his forefinger into the earlocks of\nhis antagonist. When they are thus fast clenched, the thumbs are\nextended, and _both the eyes_ are turned out of their sockets. The\nvictor is hailed with shouts of applause from the sporting throng, while\nhis poor antagonist, thus blinded for life, _is laughed at_ for his\nmisfortune.\"\n\nOne very striking fact bearing on this subject has been established by\nexperience, and that is, that _extreme suffering_, either mental or\nbodily, tends to awaken the desire to inflict evil upon other minds.\nThis is probably one mode of accounting for the increased cruelty of the\nRoman emperors. As the powers of enjoyment diminished by abuse, and the\nhorrors of guilt harassed their spirits, this dreadful desire to torment\nothers was awakened.\n\nThere are many undisputed facts to establish the principle that extreme\nsuffering is the cause of terrible malignity. The following is from a\nstatement of Mr. Byron, who was shipwrecked on the coast of South\nAmerica: \"So terrible was the scene of foaming breakers, that one of the\nbravest men could not help expressing his dismay, saying it was too\nshocking to bear. In this dreadful situation malignant passions began to\nappear. The crew grew extremely riotous, and fell to beating every thing\nin their way, and broke open chests and cabins for plunder that could be\nof no use. So earnest were they in this wantonness of theft, that in the\nmorning a strangled corpse was found of one who had contested the\nspoil.\"\n\nA still more terrible picture is given in an account of the loss of the\nMedusa frigate on the coast of Africa. In the midst of dreadful\nsuffering from cold, danger, and famine, it is recorded that \"a spirit\nof sedition arose and manifested itself by furious shouts. The soldiers\nand sailors began to cut the ropes, and declared their intention of\nmurdering the officers. About midnight, they rushed on the officers like\ndesperate men, each having a knife or sabre, and such was their fury\nthat they tore their clothes and their flesh _with their teeth_. The\nnext morning the raft was strewed with dead bodies. The succeeding night\nwas passed in similar horrors, and the morning sun saw twelve more\nlifeless bodies. The next night of suffering was attended with a horrid\nmassacre, and thus it continued till only fifteen remained of the whole\none hundred and fifty!\"\n\nAnother principle of mind having a bearing on this subject is the fact\nthat those qualities of mind which are the causes of enjoyment in others\naround may be viewed with only pain and dislike by a selfish person.\nThus intellectual superiority, in itself considered, is a delightful\nobject of contemplation; but if it becomes the means of degradation or\nof contemptuous comparison to a selfish mind, it is viewed with\nunmingled pain. Benevolence and truth are objects of delightful\ncontemplation to all minds when disconnected with obligations or painful\ncomparisons, but if they are viewed as causes of evil to a selfish mind,\nit will view them with unmingled dislike and hatred.\n\nNow we find that there are two classes of minds in this world: those who\nare more or less benevolent, and find their happiness in living to\npromote the general interests of their fellow-beings, and those who are\nselfish, and are living to promote their own enjoyment irrespective of\nthe general happiness.\n\nIf, then, we reason from the known laws of mind and from past\nexperience, we must suppose that the habits of mind which are existing\nin this life will continue to increase, and if the mind is immortal, a\ntime must come when one class will become perfectly benevolent and the\nother perfectly selfish. A community of perfectly benevolent beings, it\nhas been shown, would, from the very nature and constitution of mind, be\na perfectly happy community. Every source of enjoyment of which mind is\ncapable would be secured by every individual.\n\nIt can be seen, also, that there must, in the nature of the case, be an\nentire separation between two such opposite classes; for it is as\npainful for minds suffering from conscious guilt, shame, and malignity,\nto look upon purity, benevolence, and happiness, as it is for the\nvirtuous to associate with the selfish, the debased, and the abandoned.\nThis separation, therefore, would be a voluntary one on both sides, even\ndid we suppose no interference of Deity. But if the Creator continues\nhis present constitution of things, we may infer that his power would be\nexerted to prevent the intrusion of malignity into a perfect and\nwell-ordered community; for he has so constituted things _here_, that\nthose who are incorrigible pests to society are confined from\ninterfering with its interests.\n\nFrom the laws of mind, then, and from past experience as to the\ntendencies of things, we can establish the position that, at some future\nperiod, if the mind of man is immortal, the human race will be\npermanently divided into two classes, the perfectly selfish and the\nperfectly benevolent.\n\nShould it be objected to this conclusion that when the mind passes into\nanother world more effectual motives may be brought to operate, it may\nbe replied that it is not the office of reason to meet _suppositions_ of\n_possibilities_, but to show what the _probabilities_ are by deductions\nfrom principles already known. A thousand possibilities may be asserted,\nsuch as the annihilation of mind or the alteration of its powers, but\nthese are mere suppositions, and have nothing to do with the conclusions\nof reason.\n\nIf mind is immortal and continues its present nature, habits will\ncontinue to strengthen; and in regard to motives, we know already that\nthe _fear of evil consequences_ will not save from continuance in crime.\nHow often has a man who has yielded to habits of guilt been seen\nwrithing in the agonies of remorse, longing to free himself from the\nterrible evils he has drawn around him, acknowledging the misery of his\ncourse and his ability to return to virtue, and yet, with bitter\nanguish, yielding to the force of inveterate habits and despairing of\nany remedy.\n\nWe know, also, that it is a principle established by long experience,\nthat punishment does not tend to soften and reform. Where is the\nhardened culprit that was ever brought to repentance and reformation by\nlashes or the infliction of degradation? Such means serve only to harden\nand brutify. Experience forbids the hope that punishment will ever\nrestore a selfish and guilty mind to virtue and peace.\n\nReason and experience, then, both lead to the conclusion that the two\nclasses of minds into which mankind are here divided will, on leaving\nthis world, eventually become two permanently distinct communities--one\nperfectly selfish, and the other perfectly benevolent.\n\nWhat, then, would reason and experience teach us as to the probable\nsituation of a community of minds constituted like those of the human\nrace, who, in the progress of future ages, shall establish habits of\n_perfect selfishness and crime_?\n\nIn regard to the Creator, what may we suppose will be the feelings of\nsuch minds? If he is a benevolent, pure, and perfectly happy being, and\nhis power is exerted to confine them from inflicting evil on the good,\nhe will be the object of unmingled and tormenting envy, hatred, and\nspite; for when a selfish mind beholds a being with characteristics\nwhich exhibit its own vileness in painful contrast, and using his power\nto oppose its desires, what might in other circumstances give pleasure\nwill only be cause of pain. If they behold, also, the purity and\nhappiness of that community of benevolent beings from which they will be\nwithdrawn, the same baleful passions will be awakened in view of their\nexcellence and enjoyment.\n\nThere is no suffering of the mind more dreaded and avoided than that of\n_shame_. It is probable a guilty creature never writhes under keener\nburnings of spirit than when all his course of meanness, baseness,\ningratitude, and guilt is unveiled in the presence of dignified virtue,\nhonor, and purity, and the withering glance of pity, contempt, and\nabhorrence is encountered. This feeling must be experienced, to its full\nextent, by every member of such a wretched community. Each must feel\nhimself an object of loathing and contempt to every pure and benevolent\nmind, as well as to all those who are equally debased.\n\nAnother cause of suffering is ungratified desire. In this world, perfect\nmisery and full happiness is seldom contrasted. But in such\ncircumstances, if we suppose that the happiness of blessed minds will be\nknown, the keenest pangs of ungratified desire must torment. Every mind\nwill know what is the pure delight of yielded and reciprocated\naffection, of sympathy in the happiness of others, of the sweet peace of\nconscious rectitude, and of the delightful consciousness of conferring\nbliss on others, while the ceaseless cravings of hopeless desire will\nagonize the spirit.\n\nAnother cause of suffering is found in the _loss of enjoyment_. In such\na degraded and selfish community, all ties of country, kindred,\nfriendship, and love must cease. Yet all will know what _were_ the\nendearments of home, the mild soothings of maternal love, the ties of\nfraternal sympathy, and all the trust and tenderness of friendship and\nlove. What vanished blessing of earth would not rise up, with all the\nsweetness and freshness that agonizing memory can bring, to aggravate\nthe _loss of all_!\n\nBut the mind is so made that, however wicked itself, guilt and\nselfishness in others is hated and despised. Such a company, then, might\nbe described as those who were \"hateful and hating one another.\" It has\nbeen shown that both suffering and selfishness awaken the desire to\ntorment others. This, then, will be the detested purpose of every\nmalignant mind. Every action that could irritate, mortify, and enrage,\nwould be deliberately practiced, while disappointed hopes, and blasted\ndesires, and agonizing misery would alone awaken the smile of horrible\ndelight. And if we suppose such minds in a future state reclothed in a\nbody, with all the present susceptibilities of suffering, and surrounded\nby material elements that may be ministers of hate, what mind can\nconceive the terror and chaos of a world where every one is actuated by\na desire to torment?\n\nSuppose these beings had arrived at only such a degree of selfishness as\nhas been witnessed in this world; such, for example, as Genghis Khan,\nwho caused unoffending prisoners to be pounded to death with bricks in a\nmortar; or Nero, who dressed the harmless Christians in flaming pitch\nfor his amusement; or Antiochus Epiphanes and Mustapha, who spent their\ntime in devising and executing the most excruciating tortures on those\nwho could do them no injury. What malignity and baleful passions would\nactuate such minds, when themselves tormented by others around, bereft\nof all hope, and with nothing to interest them but plans of torment and\nrevenge! What refined systems of cruelty would be devised in such a\nworld! what terrific combinations of the elements to terrify and\ndistress! If such objects as \"the lake which burneth with fire and\nbrimstone, and the worm that never dies,\" could be found, no Almighty\nhand would need to interfere, while the \"smoke of their torment\" would\narise from flames of their own kindling.\n\nTo fearful sufferings thus inflicted would be added the pangs of\nagitating _fear_; for where all around were plotting misery, what\nrelief, by day or by night, from its withering terrors? Then surely\n\"fear would come upon them like desolation, and destruction as a\nwhirlwind.\"\n\nAnother cause of suffering is inactivity of body and mind. It has been\nseen that the desire of good is what gives activity to the intellectual\nand moral powers. In such a world, no good could be hoped or sought, but\nthe gratification of inflicting ill. And even a malignant mind must\noften weary in this pursuit, and sink under all the weight and misery of\nthat awful _death of the soul_, when, in torpid inactivity, it has\nnothing to love, nothing to hope, nothing to desire!\n\nAnother cause of misery is the consciousness of guilt; and such, even in\nthis life, have been the agonies of remorse, that tearing the hair,\nbruising the body, and even gnawing the flesh have been resorted to as a\ntemporary relief from its pangs. What, then, would be its agonizing\nthroes in bosoms that live but to torment and to destroy all good to\nthemselves and to other minds?\n\nIn this life, where we can allow the mind to be engrossed by other\npursuits, and where we can thus form a habit of suppressing and avoiding\nemotions of guilt, the conscience may be seared. But it could not be\nthus when all engaging and cheerful pursuits were ended forever. Then\nthe mind would view its folly, and shame, and guilt in all their length\nand breadth, and find no escape from the soul-harrowing gaze.\n\nTo these miseries must be added despair--the loss of all hope. Here hope\ncomes to all; but, in such a community, that fearful susceptibility of\nthe soul--that terrific power of _habit_--would bind in chains which\nwould be felt to be stronger than brass and heavier than iron. If the\nspirit is conscious that its powers are immortal, with this\nconsciousness would come the despairing certainty of increasing and\nnever-ending woe!\n\nThis terrifying and heart-rending picture, it must be remembered, is the\n_deduction of reason_, and who can point out its fallacy? Is not habit\nappalling in its power, and ofttimes, even in this life, inveterate in\nits hold? Are not habits increased by perpetual repetition? Is not the\nmind of man immortal? Do not the tendencies of this life indicate a\nperiod when a total separation of selfish and benevolent minds will be\ntheir own voluntary choice? If all the comforts, gentle endearments, and\nthe enlivening hopes of this life; if all the restraints of\nself-interest, family, country, and laws; if in Christian lands the\noffers of heaven, and the fearful predictions of eternal woe; if the\nmercy and pardon, and all the love and pity of our Creator and Redeemer,\nneither by fear, nor by gratitude, nor by love, can turn a selfish mind,\nwhat hope of its recovery when it goes a _stranger_ into a world of\nspirits, to sojourn in that society which, according to its moral\nhabits, it must voluntarily seek? And if there exists a community of\nsuch selfish beings, can language portray, with any adequacy, the\nappalling results that must necessarily ensue?\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVIII.\n\nCHARACTER OF THE CREATOR.\n\n\nThe preceding pages have exhibited the nature of mind, the object of its\nformation, the right mode of action to secure this object, and the\ncauses and results of its right and wrong action, as indicated by reason\nand experience.\n\nWe are now furnished with farther data to guide us in regard to the\ncharacter of our Creator, as we seek it by the light of reason alone.\n\nWe have seen, in the chapter on intuitive truths, that by the first of\nthese principles we arrive at the knowledge of some _eternal First Cause\nof all finite things_.\n\nBy another of these principles we deduce certain particulars in regard\nto his character as exhibited through his works. This principle is thus\nexpressed: \"Design is evidence of an intelligent cause, and the nature\nof a design proves the character and intention of the author.\" We are\nnow prepared to show how much must be included in this truth.\n\nOur only idea of \"an intelligent cause\" is that of _a mind like our\nown_. This being so, we assume that we are instructed, by the very\nconstitution of our own minds, that our Creator is a being endowed with\nintellect, susceptibilities, and will, and a part of these\nsusceptibilities are those included in our _moral constitution_.\n\nThis moral nature, which we are thus led to ascribe to our Creator,\nincludes, in the first place, the existence of a feeling that whatever\nlessens or destroys happiness is unfitted to the system of the universe,\nand that _voluntary sacrifice and suffering to purchase the highest\npossible happiness is fitted to or in accordance with the eternal nature\nof things_.\n\nNext, we are thus taught that in the Eternal Mind is existing that\n_sense of justice_ which involves the desire of good to the author of\ngood, and of evil to the author of evil, which requires that such\nretributions be _proportioned_ to the good and evil done, and to the\n_voluntary_ power of the agent.\n\nLastly, we are thus instructed that the Author of all created things\npossesses that susceptibility called _conscience_, which includes, in\nthe very constitution of mind itself, retributions for right and wrong\nactions.\n\nBut while we thus assume that the mind of the Creator is, so far as we\ncan conceive, precisely like our own in constitutional organization, we\nare as necessarily led to perceive that the _extent_ of these powers is\nfar beyond our own. A mind with the power, wisdom, and goodness\nexhibited in the very small portion of his works submitted to our\ninspection, who has inhabited eternity, and developed and matured\nthrough everlasting ages--our minds are lost in attempting any\nconception of the extent of such infinite faculties!\n\nBut we have another intuitive truth to aid in our deductions. It is that\nby which we infer the continuance of a _uniformity in our experience_;\nthat is, we necessarily believe that \"things will continue as they are\nand have been, unless there is evidence to the contrary.\" Now all past\nexperience as to the nature of mind has been uniform. Every mind known\nto us is endowed with intellect, susceptibility, and will, like our own.\nSo much is this the case, that when any of these are wanting in a human\nbeing, we say he has \"lost his mind.\"\n\nAgain: all our experience of mind involves the idea of the _mutual\nrelation of minds_. We perceive that minds are made to match to other\nminds, so that there can be no complete action of mind, according to its\nmanifest design, except in relation to other beings. A mind can not love\ntill there is another mind to call forth such emotion. A mind can not\nbring a tithe of its power into appropriate action except in a community\nof minds. The conception of a solitary being, with all the social powers\nand sympathies of the human mind infinitely enlarged, and yet without\nany sympathizing mind to match and meet them, involves the highest idea\nof unfitness and imperfection conceivable.\n\nThus it is that past experience of the nature of mind leads to the\ninference that no mind has existed from all eternity _in solitude_, but\nthat there is _more than one eternal, uncreated mind_, and that all\ntheir powers of enjoyment from giving and receiving happiness in social\nrelations have been in exercise from eternal ages. This is the just and\nnatural deduction of reason and experience, as truly as the deduction\nthat there is at least one eternal First Cause.\n\nIt has been argued that the _unity of design_ in the works of nature\nproves that there is but one creating mind. This is not so, for in all\nour experience of the creations of finite beings no _great design_ was\never formed without a combination of minds, both to plan and to execute.\nThe majority of minds in all ages, both heathen and Christian, have\nalways conceived of the Creator as _in some way_ existing so as to\ninvolve the ideas of plurality and of the love and communion of one mind\nwith another.\n\nWithout a revelation, also, we have the means of arriving at the\nconclusion that the Creator of all things is not only a mind organized\njust like our own, but that he always has and always will feel and act\nright. We infer this from both his social and his moral constitution;\nfor he must, as our own minds do, desire the love, reverence, and\nconfidence of his creatures. The fact that he has made them to love\ntruth, justice, benevolence, and self-sacrificing virtue is evidence\nthat he has and will exhibit these and all other excellences that call\nforth affection.\n\nBut we have still stronger evidence. We have seen all the causes that\nexperience has taught as the leading to the wrong action of mind. These\nare necessarily excluded from our conceptions of the Creator. The\nEternal Mind can not err for want of knowledge, nor for want of habits\nof right action, nor for want of teachers and educators, nor for want of\nthose social influences which generate and sustain a right governing\npurpose; for an infinite mind, that never had a beginning, can not have\nthese modes of experience which appertain to new-born and finite\ncreatures.\n\nAgain: we have seen that it is one of the implanted principles of reason\nthat \"no rational mind will choose evil without hope of compensating\ngood.\" Such is the eternal system of the universe, as we learn it by the\nlight of reason, that the highest possible happiness to each individual\nmind and to the whole commonwealth is promoted by the right action of\nevery mind in that system. This, of necessity, is seen and felt by the\nAll-creating and Eternal Mind, and to suppose that, with this knowledge,\nhe would ever choose wrong is to suppose that he would choose pure evil,\nand this is contrary to an intuitive truth. It is to suppose the Creator\nwould do what he has formed our minds to believe to be impossible in\n_any_ rational mind. It is to suppose that the Creator would do that\nwhich, if done by human beings, marks them as insane.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIX.\n\nON PERFECT AND IMPERFECT MINDS.\n\n\nWe are now prepared to inquire in regard to what constitutes _a perfect\nmind_. This question relates, in the first place, to the perfect\nconstitutional organization of mind, and, in the next place, to the\nperfect action of mind.\n\nIn regard to a finite mind, when we inquire as to its perfection in\norganization, we are necessarily restricted to the question of the\nobject or end for which it is made. Any contrivance in mind or matter is\nperfect when it is so formed that, _if worked according to its design_,\nit completely fulfills the end for which it is made, so that there is no\nway in which it could be improved.\n\nIt is here claimed, then, that by the light of reason alone we first\ngain the object for which mind is made, and then arrive at the\nconclusion that the mind of man is perfect in construction, because, if\nworked according to its design, it would completely fulfill the end for\nwhich it is made, so that there is no conceivable way in which it could\nbe improved. This position can not be controverted except by presenting\nevidence that some other organization of the mind would produce, in an\neternal and infinite system, more good with less evil than the present\none.\n\nIn regard to the Eternal Mind, the only standard of perfection in\norganization that we can conceive of is revealed in our own mind. Every\nthing in our own minds--every thing around us--every thing we have known\nin past experience, is designed to produce the most possible happiness\nwith the least possible evil. We can not conceive of any being as wise,\nor just, or good, but as he acts to promote that end.\n\nA mind organized like our own, with faculties infinitely enlarged, who\nalways has and always will sustain a controlling purpose to act right,\nis the only idea we can have of an all-perfect Creator.\n\nBut on the subject of the perfect action of finite minds it is perceived\nthat reference must always be had to _voluntary power_ and its\nlimitations. We have shown that the implanted susceptibility, called the\n_sense of justice_, demands that the rewards and penalties for good and\nevil have reference to _the knowledge and power_ of a voluntary agent;\nthat is to say, it is contrary to our moral nature voluntarily to\ninflict penalties for wrong action on a being who either has no power to\nknow what right is, or no power to do it. We revolt from such\ninflictions with instinctive abhorrence, as unfit and contrary to the\ndesign of all things.\n\nSo, in forming our judgment of the Creator, when we regard him as\nperfectly just, the idea implies that he will never _voluntarily_\ninflict evil for wrong action on beings who have not the knowledge or\npower to act right.\n\nHere we are again forced to the assumption of some _eternal nature of\nthings_ independent of the Creator's will, by which ignorant and\nhelpless creatures are exposed to suffering from wrong action when they\nhave no power of _any_ kind to act right.\n\nFor we see such suffering actually does exist, and there are but two\nsuppositions possible. The one is, that it results from the Creator's\n_voluntary_ acts, and the other, that it is inherent in that eternal\nnature of things which the Creator can no more alter than he can destroy\nhis own necessary and eternal existence.\n\nIn judging of the perfect action of finite minds, we are obliged to\nregard the question in two relations. In the primary relation we have\nreference to actions which, in all the infinite relations of a vast and\neternal system of free agents, are fitted to secure the most possible\ngood with the least possible evil. In this relation, so far as we can\njudge by experience and reason, no finite being ever did or ever can\n_act perfectly_ from the first to the last of its volitions. In this\nrelation, every human being is certainly, necessarily, and inevitably\nimperfect in action.\n\nBut when the question of perfection in action simply has reference to\nthe knowledge and power of the voluntary agent, we come to another\nresult. In this relation, any mind acts perfectly _when it forms a\nruling purpose to feel and act right in all things, when it takes all\npossible means of learning what is right, and when it actually carries\nout this purpose, so far as it has knowledge and power_.\n\nIf a human mind is, as has been shown, perfect in that organization of\nits powers for which the Creator is responsible, and then forms and\ncarries out such a ruling purpose, it is, so far as we can learn without\nrevelation, as perfect in action as is possible in the nature of things;\nthat is to say, it voluntarily acts to promote the greatest possible\ngood with the least possible evil as entirely as is possible, and as\nreally as does the Creator, who himself is limited by the nature of\nthings.\n\nIt is as impossible for a finite mind to act right, when it does not\nknow what right is, as it is for the Eternal Mind to make and sustain a\nsystem in which there has been and never will be any wrong action to\ncause pain to himself and to other minds.\n\nWhat, then, so far as we can learn without a revelation, is a perfect\nmind in such a system of things as we find in this world? It is a mind\nconstituted like our own, which has formed a ruling purpose to feel and\nact right in all things, which takes all possible means in its reach to\nlearn what is right, and which actually carries out this purpose to the\nextent of its power.\n\nIn shorter terms, in this relation every human mind is perfect, both in\nconstitution and in action, so long as it acts as near right as is in\nits present power. At the same time, in relation to the infinite and\neternal standard of rectitude, its action may be very imperfect.\n\nWe next inquire as to the _evidence_ of a perfect mind in this secondary\nrelation; that is to say, how can we know when a mind does reach the\nfull measure of its power in voluntary right action?\n\nIn regard to this we have two sources of evidence: first, the mental\nconsciousness of the acting mind itself, and, next, the results of its\naction. In regard to the first, every mind, in reference either to its\nmental states or external deeds, can have as much certainty as to the\nextent of its power as it can of any thing. If we _choose_ to feel in a\ngiven way, or to perform a given act, and what we choose does not\nfollow, we are certain we have no power to do the thing. All the idea of\n_power_ we have is that volition is followed by the result chosen. All\nthe idea we have of _want of power_ is that the result chosen does not\nfollow the volition.\n\nEvery mind, then, in regard to _every specific volition_, has the most\nperfect of all evidence as to the extent of its powers in its own\nexperience.\n\nBut the question is a more difficult one in reference to a _generic\ngoverning volition_. A perfectly acting mind, according to our\ndefinition, is one that has formed a generic governing volition to _feel\nand act right_ in all respects; that is, it decides that the chief end\nof existence shall be to promote the greatest possible happiness with\nthe least possible evil, in obedience to all, physical, social, and\nmoral laws of the Creator, so far as it is within the reach of its\npowers.\n\nNow, as to this simple act of choice, a mind can have the highest\npossible evidence in its own consciousness. The only question of\ndifficulty would be as to _the extent_ of its powers to carry out this\ndecision, and the correspondence of all its subordinate volitions with\nthis generic purpose.\n\nTo ascertain the truth on this point, let us suppose a mind that has the\nhighest evidence (that of internal consciousness) that it has formed\nsuch a purpose. Then comes a case where a subordinate decision is to be\nmade--say it relates to the existence of a certain _feeling_ or\n_emotion_, such as love, fear, gratitude, or sorrow. It has been shown\nthat these emotions are not to be evoked into existence by a simple act\nof will. The mode by which the mind controls its own desires and\nemotions is set forth on page 162. If, then, the person chooses to do\n_all that is in its power at the given time_ to awaken these emotions,\nits action is _perfect_ in this respect: it has fulfilled the measure of\nits power. It reaches the limit of its power when it can find nothing\nmore that an _act of choice_ will secure that it perceives will tend to\naccomplish the end chosen. That is to say, at each given moment, when a\nmind is aiming to know what is right, and to do it, if it has done all\nit perceives can be done by any act of will toward this end, then its\ndecision or mental action is _perfect_; it is as good as is possible in\nthe nature of things.\n\nWe have the same method of testing our power in regard to the\n_prevention_ of desires and emotions. No matter how painful or\ninappropriate may be the desires and emotions of any mind, it is acting\n_perfectly_ when it goes to the full extent of its power to extinguish\nor to control them according to the rules of rectitude. If it wills to\nhave them otherwise, and uses the appropriate modes to have them so,\nthis is all it has power to do.\n\nIn reference to _external actions_, there are an infinite variety of\ncircumstances that must decide the character of actions as right or\nwrong. An action which is wise and benevolent in one set of\ncircumstances becomes foolish and selfish in another combination. More\nthan half the questions of right and wrong action are to be decided as\nto their character by the surrounding circumstances, while no mind but\nthe one that is infinite and omniscient can pronounce with certainty on\nactions whose character is dependent on circumstances and probable\nfuture results.\n\nWhat, then, is the limitation of power in these cases? How can we know\nwhen we act as nearly right as it is in our power?\n\nIn the first place, we can have the high evidence of consciousness that\nour chief end in life is _to act right_ in all things. In the next\nplace, we can know certainly whether there is any thing more that we can\ndo to find out what the right course is. When we have decided that we\nhave done all we can in the given circumstances, and then are conscious\nthat we choose _what we believe to be right_, or _that which has to our\nmind the balance of evidence in its favor as right, we act perfectly_;\nthat is to say, we have reached the full measure of our power in\nvoluntarily acting right.\n\nBut, besides this evidence, that rests mainly on internal consciousness\nof the nature of our volitions, we have other evidence to guide us. It\nhas been shown in the previous pages how our thoughts, and desires, and\nemotions are all dependent on the generic purposes of the mind. Whatever\nis the _chief end_ of life is the object which excites the strongest\ninterest and calls forth the deepest emotions. Therefore, when a mind\nhas chosen _to act right_ as the chief end, all its tastes, desires, and\nemotions become conformed to this purpose. Whatever is seen as tending\nto promote this end is more desired and valued than any thing else.\nWhatever is seen to interfere with this is regarded with dissatisfaction.\n\nThis being so, a mind that is controlled by a ruling purpose to act\nright finds those persons and places the most congenial and agreeable\nwho can lend the most aid in pointing out all that is wrong in thought,\nword, or deed, and in helping, by instruction, sympathy, and example, to\ndo right. One great test, then, of the existence and strength of such a\nruling purpose is the manner in which those are regarded who are most\ninterested in finding out and doing what is right themselves, and in\naiding others to do so.\n\nTo be \"meek and lowly in heart,\" so as to seek help in learning what is\nright from every source, however humble or however imperfectly offered,\nis the surest indication that a mind is under the entire control of a\nruling purpose to do right, and is thus _a perfect mind_.\n\nSuch a mind, it must be seen, has _tendencies_ that _fit_ it to that\ngreat system of things in which we find ourselves. Such a mind can not\ntrace out these tendencies by the light of reason alone without a\nconviction that _somewhere_ in the progress of ages it will attain to a\n_perfect commonwealth_, where the great end and object of the Creator in\nforming mind will be carried to entire perfection in each individual\nmind and in the all-perfect whole!\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXX.\n\nON THE PROBABLE EXISTENCE AND CHARACTER OF DISEMBODIED SPIRITS.\n\n\nWe have considered the mode by which, without revelation, we arrive at a\nknowledge of the existence and character of one eternal, self-existent\nCreator, and of other _eternal beings_ endowed with all the attributes\nof the human mind.\n\nWe will next inquire as to the existence of other created minds in\naddition to those whose existence is manifested by a material body.\nThere are several principles of reason to aid us in this inquiry. The\nfirst is that which establishes the existence of mind and matter as two\ndistinct and diverse causes or existences. By this we decide that every\nhuman being has a body and a soul.\n\nThe second principle of reason to guide us is that which teaches us to\nbelieve that things continue to exist as they are and have been, unless\nthere is some known cause to destroy or change them.\n\nThe other principles to guide us are, that nothing is to be assumed to\nbe true unless there is some evidence that it is so, and, in case of\nconflicting evidence, the _balance_ of evidence is to decide what is\nright and true.\n\nThese principles being assumed, we find that at the death of every human\nbeing we have evidence, first, that the body ceases to be connected with\nthe spirit, and is dissolved.\n\nNext, we have evidence at the period of this dissolving of soul and body\nthat the soul exists without a body, and no evidence that it is changed\nin any of its powers, or habits, or character.\n\nThus we arrive at the conclusion that the spirits that have existed in\nthis life connected with bodies are still existing with all the powers,\nhabits, and character which they possessed in this life, except as they\nare modified by causes and tendencies that experience in this life has\ndisclosed. We thus infer that all minds who have left this world have\ncontinued in the upward or downward tendencies of character which\nexisted when they were disconnected with the body.\n\nThis is all the knowledge we can gain by reason and experience alone in\nreference to other created beings, and their character and mode of\nexistence.\n\nAs to _the time when the soul commences existence_, we have no evidence\nof such existence except what is manifested in the body. We can only\ninfer, then, that the soul begins to exist when the evidence of its\nexistence commences in the body. To assert that it begins before that\ntime is to violate the principle of reason which forbids us to assume\nany thing to be true unless there is evidence of it.\n\nThus, without a revelation, we are led to a belief in the existence of\ntwo classes of disembodied spirits, the good and the bad. But we have no\nevidence of the existence of any other created minds except those that\nhave formerly been connected with bodies in this world.\n\nSo far as animals give evidence of possessing an independent spiritual\nexistence, the same argument that proves the continued existence of the\nhuman mind after death, proves that the animal spirit, if there be one,\ncontinues after the dissolution of the body.\n\nBut we can not reason in regard to animals as we can in regard to human\nminds, for we never had the _experience_ of animal existence to commence\nwith, as we have our own experience in reasoning as to the nature and\nexperience of mind in reference to other beings of the same race.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXI.\n\nPROBABILITIES IN REGARD TO A REVELATION FROM THE CREATOR.\n\n\nWe have now completed our investigations as to the nature and amount of\nknowledge to be gained on the great questions of life by reason and\nexperience independently of a revelation.\n\nWe have assumed that the great cause of the disordered action of mind is\nthat it commences action in perfect ignorance, while all those causes\nwhich experience shows to be indispensable to its right action, to a\ngreater or less degree, are wanting.\n\nThe great want of our race is _perfect educators_ to train new-born\nminds, who are _infallible teachers of what is right and true_.\n\nWe have presented the evidence gained by reason and experience that the\nCreator is perfect in mental constitution, and that he always has acted\nright, and always will thus act. This being granted, we infer that he\nalways has done _the best that is possible_ for the highest good of his\ncreatures in this world, and that he always will continue to do so.\n\nWe proceed to inquire in regard to what would be the best that it is\npossible to do for us in this state of being, _so far as we can\nconceive_.\n\nInasmuch as the great cause of the wrong action of mind is the ignorance\nand imperfection of those who are its educators in the beginning of its\nexistence, we should infer that the best possible thing to be done for\nour race would be to provide some _perfect and infallible teacher_ to\ninstruct those who are to educate mind. This being granted, then all\nwould concede that the Creator himself would be our best teacher, and\nthat, if he would come to us himself in a visible form to instruct the\neducators of mind in all they need to know for themselves and for the\nnew-born minds committed to their care, it would be the best thing we\ncan conceive of for the highest good of our race.\n\nWe next inquire as to the best conceivable mode by which the Creator can\nmanifest himself so as to secure credence.\n\nTo decide this, let each one suppose the case his own. Let a man make\nhis appearance claiming to be the Creator. We can perceive that his mere\nword would never command the confidence of intelligent practical men.\nThousands of impostors have appeared and made such claims, deceiving the\nweak and ignorant and disgusting the wise.\n\nIn case the person with such claims proved to be ever so benevolent and\nintelligent, if we had no other evidence than his word, it would, by\nsensible persons, be regarded as the result of some mental\nhallucination.\n\nBut suppose that a person making claims to be the Creator of all things,\nor to be a messenger from him, should attest his claim by shaking the\nearth, or tearing up a mountain, or turning back the floods of the\nocean, it would be impossible for any man to witness these miracles\nwithout believing that the Author of all things thus attested his own\npresence or the authority of his messenger. We have shown that, in the\nvery organization of mind, one of the intuitive truths would necessarily\nforce such a belief on all sane minds.\n\nOne other method would be as effective. Should this person predict\nevents so improbable and so beyond all human intelligence as to be\nequivalent to an equal interruption of experience as to the laws of\nmind, as time developed the fulfillment of these predictions, the same\nbelief would be induced in the authority of the person thus\nsupernaturally endowed.\n\nIn the first case, the evidence would be immediate and most powerful in\nits inception. In the latter case, the power of the evidence would\nincrease with time.\n\n_Miracles and prophecy_, then, are the _only_ methods that we can\nconceive of that would, as our minds are now constituted, insure belief\nin revelations from the Creator.\n\nBut if every human being, in order to believe, must have miracles, there\nwould result such an incessant violation of the laws of nature as to\ndestroy them, and thus to destroy all possibility of miracles.\n\nThe only possible way, then, is to have miracles occur at certain\nperiods of time, and then have them adequately recorded and preserved.\n\nThis method involves the necessity of interpreting written documents.\nIf, then, the Creator has provided such revelations, the question occurs\nas to how far they may be accessible to all men. Are there revelations\nfrom the Creator in such a form that all men can gain access to them and\ninterpret them for themselves, or are they so recorded that only a few\ncan gain the knowledge they impart, while the many are helplessly\ndependent on the few?\n\nIt is with reference to this question that the interpretation of\nlanguage becomes a subject of vital and infinite interest to every human\nbeing. This subject will therefore occupy the remaining portion of this\nvolume.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXII.\n\nINTERPRETATION OF LANGUAGE.\n\n\nThe mind of man is confined in its operations by the material system it\ninhabits, and has no modes of communicating with other minds except\nthrough the medium of the eye and ear. It is by signs addressed to the\neye and by sounds affecting the ear that ideas are communicated and\nreceived.\n\nIt is by the power of _association_, which enables us to recall certain\nideas together which have been frequently united, that the use of\nlanguage is gained. The infant finds certain states of mind produced by\nmaterial objects invariably connected with certain sounds. This is done\nso often that whenever a certain perception occurs, the sound recurs\nwhich has been so often united with it.\n\nIf language is correctly defined as \"any sound or sign which conveys the\nideas of one mind to another,\" it is probable that children learn\nlanguage at a much earlier period than is generally imagined. It is\nimpossible to know how soon the infant notices the soft tones of its own\nvoice when happy, or the moaning or shrill sound that expresses its own\npain, and by comparing them with those of its mother, learns, through\nits little process of reasoning, that another spirit has emotions of\npleasure and pain corresponding with its own. Nor can we determine how\nsoon these pleasant sounds of the mother's voice begin to be associated\nwith the benignant smile, or the tones of grief with the sorrowful\nexpression, or the tones of anger with the frowning brow.\n\nIt seems very rational to suppose that _sound_, to the infant mind, is\nwhat first leads to the belief of the emotions of another mind, by means\nof a comparison of its own sounds with those originating from another.\nAfter this is done, the eye comes in for a share in these offices. The\nlittle reasoner, after thousands of experiments, finds the pleasant\nsound always united with the smiling face, until the object of vision\nbecomes the sign for recalling the idea at first obtained by sound. In\ngaining the common use of language, we know this is the order of\nsuccession. We first learn the _sounds_ that recall ideas, and then, by\nmeans of a frequent union of these sounds with some _visible sign_, the\npower once possessed simply by the sound is conveyed to the sign. Thus\nwe have words that are sounds and words that are visible signs.\n\nThe communion of one spirit with that of others in every-day life is\nmaintained ordinarily through the medium of _sounds_; but when distance\nintervenes, or when some record is to be preserved of the thoughts and\nfeelings of other beings, then signs addressed to the eye are employed.\nIn civilized nations, the signs used are a certain number of arbitrary\nmarks, which are arranged in a great variety of combinations, and each\ncombination is employed to recall some particular idea or combination of\nideas. These arbitrary signs are called letters, and in the English\nlanguage there are only twenty-six; yet, by the almost infinite variety\nof combination of which these are capable, every idea which one mind\nwishes to communicate to another can be expressed.\n\nA _written word_ is a single letter or a combination of letters used as\na sign to recall one or more ideas. It is considered by the mind as a\nunit or whole thing, of which the letters are considered as parts, and\nis shown to be a unit by intervals or blank spaces that separate it from\nthe other words of a sentence. The fact that it is considered by the\nmind as _a unit_, or a sign separate from all other combinations of\nletters, is the peculiarity which constitutes it a _word_. A _syllable_\nis a combination of letters which is not considered as a unit, but is\nconsidered as a _part_ of a word.\n\nWords are used to recall the ideas of _things_, _qualities_, _changes_,\nand _circumstances_. Some words recall the idea of a thing without any\nother idea connected with it; such are the words _mind_, _ivory_. Some\nwords recall the idea of quality simply, such as _red_, _hard_, _sweet_.\nSome words recall the ideas of change merely, such as _motion_,\n_action_. Some words recall simply the idea of relation or circumstance,\nsuch as _on_, _under_, _about_. Sometimes ideas of things, and their\nactions and relations, are recalled by the same sign; thus _wrestler_\nrecalls the idea of a thing and its action, and _giant_ of a thing and\nits _relation_. Some words recall a variety of ideas; thus the term\n_begone_ recalls the idea of two things, of the desire of a mind and of\nits mode of expression.\n\nIn the process of learning language, mankind first acquire names for the\nseveral things, qualities, changes, and circumstances that they notice,\nand afterward learn the process of _combining_ these names, so as to\nconvey the mental combination of one mind to another. A person might\nhave names for all his ideas, and yet, if he had never learned the art\nof properly combining these signs, he never could communicate the varied\nconceptions of his own mind to another person. Suppose, for\nillustration, that a child had learned the meaning of the terms _cup_,\n_spoon_, _the_, _put_, _into_, _little_, _my_; it would be impossible\nfor him to express his wish till he had learned the proper _arrangement_\nof each term, and then he could convey the conception and wishes of his\nown mind, viz., \"Put the spoon into my little cup.\"\n\nWe see, then, how the new combinations of ideas in one mind can be\nconveyed to another. The two persons must both have the _same ideas_\nattached to the _same sign_ of language, and must each understand the\n_mode of combination_ to be employed. When this is done, if one person\nsees a new object, he can send to his friend the signs which represent\nall its qualities, circumstances, and changes arranged in a proper\nmanner. The absent person will then arrange the _conceptions_ recalled\nby these words, so as to correspond with those of his correspondent.\n\nIn all languages, the same word often is used to recall different ideas,\nand the meaning of words depends often on their _mode of combination_.\n\nThe _art of interpreting_ consists in ascertaining the particular ideas\nconveyed by words _in a given combination_.\n\nThere are two modes of using language which need to be distinctly\npointed out, viz., _literal_ and _figurative_.\n\nIn order to understand these modes, it is necessary to refer to the\nprinciples of _association_. Neither our perceptions or conceptions are\never single, disconnected objects except when the power of abstraction\nis employed. Ordinarily, various objects are united together in the\nmind, and those objects which are most frequently united in our\nperceptions, as a matter of course, are those which are most frequently\nunited in our conceptions.\n\nNow, by the power of _abstraction_, the mind can regard the same object\nsometimes as a unit or whole, and sometimes can disconnect it, and\nconsider it as several distinct things. Thus it happens that ideas which\nare connected by the principles of association are sometimes regarded as\na whole, and sometimes are disconnected, and considered as separate\nexistences.\n\nLanguage will be found to be constructed in exact conformity to this\nphenomenon of mind. We shall find that objects ordinarily united\ntogether, as cause and effect, have the _same name_ given, sometimes to\nthe _cause_, sometimes to the _effects_, and sometimes it embraces _the\nwhole_; or the thing, its causes and its effects. As an example of this\nuse of language may be mentioned the term _pride_. We sometimes hear\nthose objects which are the _cause_ of pride receiving that name. Thus a\nchild is called the pride of its parents. The same name is applied\nsimply to the _state of mind_, as when a man is said to be under the\ninfluence of pride, while the _effects_ of pride receive the same\nappellation when we hear a haughty demeanor and consequential deportment\ncalled pride. The term is used in its most extended signification as\nincluding the thing, its causes, and its effects, when we hear of the\n\"pride of this world,\" which is soon to pass away, signifying equally\nthe causes of this feeling, the feeling itself, and the effects of it.\n\n_Literal language_ is that in which all words have the ordinary meaning\nas commonly used.\n\n_Figurative language_ is that in which the ordinary names, qualities,\nand actions of things are ascribed to _other things_ with which they\nhave been associated.\n\nAs an example of the use of language which is _figurative_, we find\n_tears_, that are the _effects_ of grief, called by the name of the\n_cause_; thus:\n\n  \"Streaming _grief_ his faded cheek bedewed.\"\n\nOn the contrary, we find the cause called by the name of the effects in\nthis sentence:\n\n  \"And _hoary hairs_ received the reverence due.\"\n\nHere age is called by the name of one of its effects.\n\nThe indiscriminate application of names to things which have been\nconnected by _time_, _place_, or _resemblance_, abounds in figurative\nlanguage. The following is an example where one object is called by the\nname of another with which it has been connected by _place_:\n\n  \"The _groves_ give forth their songs.\"\n\nHere birds are called by the name of the groves with which they have\nbeen so often united as it respects _place_. The following is an example\nwhere an object is called by the name of another with which it is\nconnected by _time_:\n\n  \"And _night_ weighed down his heavy eyes.\"\n\nHere _sleep_ is called by the name of _night_, with which it has been so\noften united. The following is an example where one object is called by\nthe name of another with which it has been connected by the principle of\n_resemblance_:\n\n  \"You took her up, a little, tender bud,\n  Just sprouted on a bank.\"\n\nHere a young female is called by the name of an object with which she is\nconnected by the association of resemblance. When one object is thus\ncalled by the name of another which it resembles, the figure of speech\nis called a _metaphor_.\n\nWhen dominion is called a _sceptre_; the office of a bishop, the _lawn_;\nthe profession of Christianity, the _cross_; a dwelling is called a\n_roof_; and various expressions of this kind, one thing is called by the\nname of another of which it is a _part_, or with which it has been\nconnected as a circumstance, cause, or effect.\n\nNot only do objects which have been united in our perceptions receive\neach other's _names_, but the _qualities_ of one are often ascribed to\nthe other. The following are examples in which the qualities of the\ncause are ascribed to the effect, and the qualities of the effect are\nascribed to the cause:\n\n  \"An impious mortal gave a _daring_ wound.\"\n\nHere the quality of the _cause_ is ascribed to the _effect_.\n\n  \"The _merry_ pipe is heard.\"\n\nHere the quality of the _effect_ is ascribed to the _cause_. The\nfollowing is an example where the quality of one thing is ascribed to\nanother connected with it by _time_:\n\n  \"Now _musing_ midnight hallows all the scene.\"\n\nThe following is an example of the quality of one thing ascribed to\nanother, connected with it by _place_:\n\n                          \"when sapless age\n  Shall bring thy father to his _drooping_ chair.\"\n\nWe have examples of the qualities of one thing ascribed to another which\nit _resembles_ in such expressions as these--\"imperious ocean,\"\n\"tottering state,\" \"raging tempest.\" The following is an example of a\nthing called by the name of one of its qualities or attending\ncircumstances:\n\n  \"What art thou, that usurpest this time of night,\n  Together with the fair and warlike form\n  In which the _majesty_ of buried _Denmark_\n  Did sometimes walk?\"\n\nHere a king is called by the name of a quality and by the name of his\nkingdom.\n\nIt is owing to the principle of association that another mode of\nfigurative language is employed called _personification_. This consists\nin speaking of a quality which belongs to living beings as if it were\nthe being in which such a quality was found. This is owing to the fact\nthat the conceptions of qualities of mind are always united with some\nbeing, and therefore such ideas are connected ones. Thus it is said in\nthe sacred writings,\n\n  \"Mercy and truth are met together.\"\n\n  \"Righteousness and peace have embraced each other.\"\n\n  \"Wisdom crieth aloud, she uttereth her voice.\"\n\nAnother mode of personification is owing to the fact that the actions\nand relations of inanimate existences very often resemble those of\nliving beings, so that such ideas are associated by the principle of\nresemblance. In such cases, the actions, properties, and relations of\nliving beings are ascribed to inanimate objects. Thus, when the sea\nroars and lifts its waves toward the skies, the actions are similar to\nthose of a man when he raises his arm in supplication. An example of\nthis kind of figurative language is found in this sublime personification\nof Scripture: \"The mountains saw thee, and trembled; the overflowing of\nthe waters passed by; the deep uttereth his voice, and lifted up his\nhands on high; the sun and moon stood still in their habitations.\" Other\nexamples of this kind are found when we hear it said that \"the fields\nsmile,\" \"the woods clap their hands,\" \"the skies frown,\" and the like.\n\nOne cause of figurative language is found in the similarity of effects\nproduced on the body by operations of mind and operations of matter.\nWhatever causes affect the mind in a similar manner are called by the\nsame name. Thus, when a man endeavors to penetrate a hard substance, the\nmuscles of his head and neck are affected in a particular manner. The\nsame muscles are affected in a similar way when a person makes powerful\nand reiterated efforts to comprehend a difficult subject. Both these\nactions, therefore, are called by the same name, and a man is said to\n_penetrate_ the wood with an instrument, or to _penetrate_ into the\nsubject of his investigations. Thus joy is said to _expand_ the breast,\nbecause it does, in fact, produce a sensation which resembles this\naction. There is a great variety of figurative language founded on this\nprinciple. Indeed, there is little said respecting the mind, and its\nqualities and operations, where we do not apply terms that describe the\nqualities, actions, and relations of matter.\n\nIt is also the case that _actions_ and _relations_ that resemble each\nother are called by the same name, without regard to the objects in\nwhich they exist. Thus the skies are said _to weep_. Here there is, in\nfact, the same action as is weeping in mankind, and it receives the same\nname, though it is connected with a different subject. Thus, also, the\nsword is said to be \"_drunk_ with the blood of the slain.\" Here the same\nrelation exists between the blood and the sword as between a man and an\nimmoderate quantity of liquor, and the relation receives the same name\nin each case.\n\n_An allegory_ is a succession of incidents and circumstances told of one\nthing which continually recall another thing, which it resembles in the\nparticulars mentioned. Thus the aged Indian chief describes himself by\nan allegory: \"I am an aged hemlock. The winds of a hundred years have\nswept over its branches; it is dead at the top; those that grew around\nhave all mouldered away.\"\n\n_A parable_ is of the same character as an allegory.\n\n_A type_ is an object of conception in which many of its qualities and\nrelations resemble another object that succeeds it in regard to _time_.\n\n_Hyperbole_ is a collection of actions, qualities, or circumstances\nascribed to an object which are contrary to the laws of experience, and\nthis language is employed to express excited feeling. Thus, by\nhyperbole, a person is said to be \"_drowned_ in tears.\"\n\n_Irony_ is language used in such a manner as to contradict the known\nopinions of the speaker, and is intended to represent the absurdity or\nirrationality of some thing conceived by him.\n\n_Symbols_ are material things employed to convey the ideas of one mind\nto another. Thus, as the cultivation of the olive is connected with\nseasons of peace, an olive branch is used to express the idea of peace.\n\n_Symbolic language_ is the use of words that are names of symbols in\nplace of the names of things represented by symbols. Thus the word olive\nmight be used instead of the word peace.\n\nFigurative language, especially metaphors and symbolic words, abound in\nthe writings of the earliest nations; and as what are claimed to be the\nearliest revelations of the Creator are recorded in these languages, the\nrules for interpreting figurative language are of the highest\nimportance.\n\nThe preceding illustrates the principles upon which both literal and\nfigurative language are constructed. The question now arises, How are we\nto determine when expressions are to be interpreted literally and when\nthey are figurative? One single rule will be found sufficient in all\ncases, viz.:\n\nAll language is _literal_ when the common meaning of each word is\nconsistent with our experience as to the nature of things, and\nconsistent with the other sentiments of the writer.\n\nAll language is _figurative_ when the names, qualities, and actions\nascribed to things are inconsistent with our experience of the nature of\nthings, or contradict the known opinions of the writer.\n\nIn the preceding examples of figurative language, it can readily be seen\nthat a literal interpretation would in all cases form combinations of\nideas which are opposed to experience as to the nature of things. For\nexample, \"_grief_\" can not be conceived of as \"bedewing a face,\" because\nit is an emotion of mind; nor do \"hoary hairs\" literally ever receive\nhonor; nor do \"groves sing,\" nor \"night weigh down the eyes.\"\n\nIn like manner, where the qualities of one thing are ascribed to another\nwith which it has been connected, there is no difficulty in determining\nthat the language is figurative; for a \"wound\" can not have the quality\nof \"daring,\" which belongs only to mind, nor can a \"pipe\" be literally\nconsidered as \"merry,\" or \"midnight\" as \"musing;\" nor would it be\nconsistent with experience to think of a \"chair\" as \"drooping.\" Nor in\nthe case of personification is there any more cause of difficulty. Mercy\nand truth, righteousness, peace, and wisdom, are qualities of mind, and\ncan not be conceived of as \"meeting,\" \"embracing,\" and \"crying aloud\" in\nany other than a figurative sense. And when the ocean is said to \"lift\nup his hands,\" and the sun and moon to \"stand still in their\nhabitations,\" the laws of experience forbid any but a figurative\ninterpretation.\n\nIn the case of an _allegory_ and all symbolic language, the same rule\napplies with equal clearness and certainty. In the example given, it\nwould be a violation of the laws of experience to conceive of a man as a\ntree with branches and a withered top.\n\n_Hyperbole_ is readily distinguished by the same rule. _Irony_ is known\nby its being contradictory to the known opinions of the writer. Thus\nthere is never any difficulty in deciding when language is literal and\nwhen it is figurative in cases where men have the laws of experience by\nwhich to determine.\n\nOn the supposition of a revelation from the Creator, there must be\nsubjects upon which mankind have had _no experience_, such as the nature\nof the Deity, the character and circumstances of the invisible world and\nof its inhabitants. On these subjects all language must be literal when\nthe literal construction is not in contradiction to the known or implied\nopinion of the other declarations; for on these subjects, as the laws of\nexperience can not regulate in deciding between figurative and literal\nlanguage, it is impossible to show any reason why words should not be\nliteral except by comparison with the other statements of the same\nauthor. If these show no reasons for supposing it figurative, it must of\nnecessity be considered as literal; for if neither experience nor the\nwriter's opinions oppose a literal meaning, there is _no_ cause why the\nordinary and common signification of words should not be retained.\n\nThe next inquiry is, How are we to ascertain the ideas which are to be\nattached to words that are used figuratively? If the common ideas which\nare recalled by words are not the proper ones, what are the data for\nknowing _which_ are the ideas to be recalled? The laws of association,\nupon which language is founded, furnish an adequate foundation for\ndetermining this question. If language is such that a literal\nconstruction is contrary to the nature of things, the words used\nfiguratively must express something which has been connected with the\nobject recalled by the literal signification, either as _cause_ or\n_effect_, or as something which it _resembles_, or as something it has\nbeen connected with as a _part_, or by circumstances of _time_ or\n_place_. Of course, a process of reasoning will soon decide which of\nthese must be selected. Take, for example, the expression,\n\n  \"Streaming grief his faded cheek bedewed.\"\n\nHere, as \"grief\" can not bedew the cheek, it must be the name of\nsomething which has been connected with grief, either by the principle\nof resemblance, contiguity in time or place, or by the relation of cause\nand effect. It is easy to determine that it can not be either of these\nexcept the last. Tears are the effect of sorrow, and are therefore\ncalled by this name. The nature of the idea conveyed by the figurative\nterm will show whether the cause or effect, or some object related to it\nas it respects time, place, or resemblance, is intended, and no\ndifficulty can ever occur in deciding. In all cases this general rule\navails: when words are used figuratively, such ideas as have been in any\nway connected with them are to be retained as will be consistent with\nthe known nature of things, and consistent with other assertions of the\nwriter.\n\nIn regard to the _literal_ use of language, it has been shown that the\nsame term is sometimes used for the name of the thing ordinarily\nexpressed by it, sometimes for its cause, sometimes for its effect, and\nsometimes as including all these ideas. The rule for determining in\nwhich of these senses the term is used is the same as in regard to\nfigurative language, viz., that signification must be attached to the\nterm which is in agreement with experience as to the nature of things,\nand with the other sentiments of the writer. Thus, in relation to the\nexample given of the term pride, suppose a child is called the \"pride of\nits parents.\" We know it can not mean the _emotion of mind_; that it can\nnot mean the _effects_ of this state of mind; and its only other meaning\nis found consistent with experience, viz., it is the _cause_ or occasion\nof pride to its parents. The same mode of reasoning can be applied to\nthe other uses of the term. If a man is said to feel pride, there is but\none meaning which can be attached to the term. If it is said that \"the\npride of the world passeth away,\" it includes the whole, and signifies\nthat the causes of pride pass away, and with them the emotions and the\neffects.\n\nThe following, then, are the clear and simple rules to employ in\ninterpreting all language:\n\nLAWS OF INTERPRETATION.\n\n1. The literal, ordinary meaning is to be given to all words, unless it\nwould express what is inconsistent with experience as to the nature of\nthings, or inconsistent with the opinions of the writer.\n\n2. When the words in a sentence are capable of several literal meanings,\nthat is to be chosen which makes the writer most consistent with himself\nand with all known circumstances.\n\n3. When the literal meaning expresses what is not consistent with the\nnature of things or with the writer's other declarations, then the\nlanguage is _figurative_, and only such a part of the ideas as have been\nin any way connected with the words used are to be retained as will\nsecure such consistency.\n\n4. In deciding the meaning of words, we are to be guided by the\nprinciples of common sense, viz.: No meaning is to be given unless there\nis _some_ evidence that it is true; and, when there is conflicting\nevidence, that meaning is the true one which has the _balance_ of\nevidence in its favor.\n\n\n\n\nADDENDA TO VOL. I.\n\n\nThe second volume will commence with a description of the _kind_ of\nevidence which sustains the Bible as a collection of authentic and\nauthoritative records of revelations from the Creator. This kind of\nevidence, it will be shown, in one grand feature is entirely diverse\nfrom any that ever existed, or even that was ever _claimed_ to exist in\nreference to any pretended revelations.\n\nIt will also be shown that this evidence is as strong and reliable as\nthat which regulates men in their daily practical concerns.\n\nThis attempt the writer supposes to be, in some respects, peculiar, and\none that is particularly calculated to affect popular apprehension,\nespecially that of well-balanced and practical minds. Instead of a great\narray of detail and argument, the whole will be contained in a very few\npages, easily comprehended, and demanding but little time or effort.\n\nIn the next place, the laws of interpretation, and the principles of\ncommon sense as set forth in this volume, will be _applied_ to discover\nthe answers of the Sacred Oracles to the great questions of life, and\ntheir agreement with reason, experience, and the moral sense of mankind.\n\nThis will involve a discussion of the _philosophical theories_ which it\nis believed have obscured and diminished the influence of the great\nAtoning Sacrifice of \"the Great God our Savior Jesus Christ.\"\n\nThe work will conclude with the practical application of the views set\nforth to the greatest of all human interests, the _right_ training of\nthe human mind in infancy and childhood.\n\nBefore offering to the public the topics to be embraced in the last\nvolume, it is deemed expedient to present the _great principles_ on\nwhich all the discussions are to rest, and also a fair illustration of\nthe mode in which these principles will be applied.\n\nThe following is the illustrative example:\n\n\n_Theological Dogma of a Depraved Mental Constitution._\n\nIn the preceding pages we have seen the evidence that the mind of man is\n_perfect_ in its _constitutional powers_, and is thus the chief and\nhighest evidence of the wisdom, justice, and benevolence of its Creator.\n\nBut the systems of theology in all the Christian sects, excepting a\nsmall fraction, teach that the mind of man comes into existence in this\nworld with \"_a depraved nature_;\" meaning by this a mental constitution\nmore or less depraved.\n\nThat this is the ordinary dogma of theological teachings is clear from\nthis statement of the case. A thing can be wrong in only two conceivable\nways: one is by its nature or original construction, and the other is by\nits action. The mind of man, therefore, if it is not perfect every way,\nis either wrong in _construction_ or wrong in _action_. Now no person\never claimed that the mind of man was not depraved in action, and\ntherefore all who teach that it is depraved any other way must teach\nthat it is depraved in its constitution, or in that nature it received\nfrom its Maker, for there are only these two modes of depravity\nconceivable.\n\nIt being granted, then, that the mind of our race is depraved in its\nnature, of course the Author of this nature is responsible for this\ninconceivable and wholesale wrong. This forces us to the inevitable\nconclusion that the Creator of mind is a being guilty of the highest\nconceivable folly, injustice, and malignity. For reason and common sense\nteach that \"the nature of a contrivance is proof of the character and\nintention of its author.\" Therefore, if mind is depraved in\nconstruction, the Author of it is a depraved being, and totally unworthy\nof our trust, respect, or love.\n\nThis is the argument which, in all ages, has been pressed on those\ntheologians who maintain the dogma of the depraved nature of man, and\nthere have been these various methods by which this difficulty has been\nevaded:\n\nOne class openly avow that the Creator had power to make the mind of man\nperfect in all respects, and that he has proved that he has this power\nby making the minds of angels and of our first parents thus perfect.\nBut, in consequence of our first parents eating the forbidden fruit,\nevery mind created since that time has been ruined in the making, so as\nto be totally depraved. This, it is maintained, it was right for God to\ndo. _How_ it was right we have no business to inquire. It is an awful\nmystery; but it was so done that God \"is in no way the author of sin.\"\n\nThis amounts simply to a denial of the principle of reason, \"that the\nnature of a contrivance is proof of the intention and character of the\ncontriver.\" It is saying that the author of sin is not the author of\nsin.\n\nThis will be still farther apparent if we refer to page 158, where is\nexhibited the only conceivable modes in which one being can be the cause\nof sin or of wrong action in others. God is undisputably the author of\nall the _outward_ circumstances that surround us. If, then, he has made\nour susceptibilities wrong, or combined them wrong, he is the author of\nsin in every conceivable sense.\n\nWhoever, therefore, affirms that God is the author of a depraved mental\norganization of the human mind, affirms that he is \"the author of sin\"\nin every conceivable sense. To assert such a fact, and then deny that\nGod is the author of sin, is simply a contradiction in terms.\n\nTo avoid this dilemma, theologians have instituted the following\ntheories:\n\nThe first class teach that the first pair of the human race were made\nwith perfect minds, and then stood as representatives of the race and\nsinned for the whole. The first part of the penalty came on the actual\nsinners in the ruin of their own mental constitution, and then, all men\nbeing _represented_ in Adam and Eve, the Creator \"imputed\" this sin to\nall their posterity, and, as a penalty, all receive a depraved mental\nconstitution.\n\nThat is to say, though each of the unborn millions descended from Adam\nwas innocent of the crime, in order to be just, God \"imputes\" it to\neach, and, as a penalty, ruins each in its organization, when He has\nfull power to make perfect minds.\n\nAnother class assume that the Creator established such a constitution of\nthings that the nature of one mind is transmitted to all its myriad\ndescendants, by the same law as the nature of a plant is included in one\nseed and is transmitted to all of its future kind. The first parents of\nour race, receiving perfect minds from their Creator, ruined them by one\nact of disobedience. Then, by the above law, instituted by their Maker,\nthey transmitted this depraved constitution of mind to all their\ndescendants.\n\nThis mode of evading responsibility is about as honorable as if a\nteacher should so construct springs and traps for his pupils that one\nlittle fellow, when forbidden to do it, should touch a spring that\nshould cut off his own hand, and thus move other springs that would maim\nall the rest of the school, while the master lays all the blame on the\nchild that disobeyed.\n\nAnother class teach that the first man and woman of the race were made\nwith perfect minds, and then such a constitution of things was\ninstituted by God that every mind of the human race was so existing with\nor in them, that when Adam and Eve _voluntarily_ disobeyed the Creator's\nfirst law, every one of their descendants _voluntarily_ did the same\nthing; and then, as a penalty for the deed, the parent and every one of\nthe embryo descendants became \"totally depraved.\"\n\nThis theory, which makes every human being guilty of a crime thousands\nof years before we were born, and for which we are suffering the most\nawful of all penalties, has nearly passed away to the puerilities of the\nold schoolmen, and yet there are some of the most popular professors in\nour largest and most respectable theological seminaries who are publicly\nadvocating it at this very time.\n\nAnother method promulgated is the assumption that all the race were\noriginally created perfect, and then, while in the possession of every\npossible advantage for virtue and happiness, they ruined themselves in a\nprevious state of existence. This is the only theory which really meets\nthe difficulty, and relieves the character of the Creator from being the\nguilty author of depraved minds.\n\nBut this theory, even if it could be established by revelation, does not\nremedy the strong argument of reason and experience against the wisdom\nand benevolence of the Creator, on the assumption of a depraved\nconstitution of mind. The man denying a revelation, who is called upon\nto receive one, can say, Here is a race, every one of whom is ruined,\nand, so far as I can see, in the making of his mind by the Creator.\nTherefore this Creator, by his works, is shown to be a being of infinite\nfolly and malignity, from whom no _reliable_ revelation is possible.\n\nGranting the mind to be depraved, the light of reason inevitably guides\nto a weak or malevolent Creator. To illustrate this, suppose a man is\nseen manufacturing beautiful porcelain vases, and out of the \"clay of\nthe same lump,\" as he makes them, he spoils every one, cracking,\nmarring, and defacing them in the very process of manufacture. Now\nsuppose this person should turn to a witness, and offer to instruct him\nin the _best way of doing things_, what would be the common-sense reply?\nExactly that which would be due to a Creator who has ruined every mind\nhe sent into this world, and then proposes to reveal the _right way for\nthose ruined creatures to act_!\n\nAnother illustration may be permitted. Suppose a colony, by some\nmischance, settles on an isolated island, which is found covered with\nthe tobacco plant. They clear their plantations, but find that, by a\nremarkable and unintelligible arrangement, after every shower there is a\nfall of tobacco seeds, disseminated from an inaccessible height by a\nmachine erected for the purpose and constantly supplied.\n\nAfter some years, they receive a missive from the king to whom the\nisland belongs, in which he informs them that tobacco is the chief\nobject of his detestation; that it is doing incalculable mischief to his\nsubjects; that it is the chief end of his life, and he wishes it to be\nof theirs, to exterminate the plant, and thus its use.\n\nHe, at the same time, states that he is the author of the contrivance\nfor scattering the seed, and that he keeps it constantly supplied, and\nclaims that he has a right \"to do what he will with his own,\" without\nbeing questioned by his subjects.\n\nHe then enacts that any person who is found to use tobacco, or even to\nhave a single seed or plant on his premises, shall be burned alive in a\ncaldron of fire and brimstone.\n\nIf, in addition to this, that king were to command supreme love to him,\nand perfect confidence in his wisdom, justice, and goodness, all this\nwould but faintly illustrate that awful system under consideration,\nwhose penalties are _eternal_.\n\nThe assumption that the constitution of mind is depraved not only\ndestroys the evidence of the Creator's wisdom and benevolence by the\nlight of reason, but _destroys the possibility of a credible and\nreliable revelation from him_.\n\nFor the belief in the existence of a God is dependent on an intuitive\ntruth, while his character is understood, without a revelation, only by\nthe aid of that intuitive truth which teaches that the nature of his\nworks proves his character and designs. Now if his greatest work, the\nimmortal mind, that which alone gives any value to his other works, is\nmalformed, and thus made the cause of all the misery, crime, and evil of\nthis life, what is there to give any foundation for confidence that his\nrevelations will not be false, pernicious, and malignant?\n\nNo man can start with the assumption that there is a revelation from the\nCreator that needs no proof. The only basis for such a revelation is\nthat intuitive truth by the aid of which miracles and prophecy become\nevidences of the interposition of the Creator. Thus we perceive that the\nproof that \"the author of a depraved constitution of mind is a depraved\nbeing,\" is as strong as the evidence of a revelation by miracles and\nprophecy can be.\n\nIn regard to these theories, and in regard to the dogma of theology\nwhich they are instituted to explain, it is claimed that both reason and\nthe Bible equally forbid each and all of them.\n\nIt has already been shown, in Chapters xxii. and xxiii., that all the\nevidence of reason and experience goes to prove that the mind of man is\nperfect in its organization. We have only to inquire, then, in regard to\nthe evidence claimed to be found in revelations from the Creator.\n\nBefore examining this evidence, it is important to notice the\ndistinction between _revealed facts_ and the _theories_ invented to\nexplain them.\n\nThe _fact_, which both experience and revelation agree in teaching, is\nthat man, as a race, is guilty and depraved in _action_, and that from\nthe earliest periods of life this _depraved action_ is manifested.\n\nThe _theories_ relate to _the cause_ of this wrong action, and there are\nonly two. The first theory is, that the constitution of mind is perfect,\nand that the wrong action results from a want of experience, knowledge,\nright habits, right training, and right social influences.\n\nThe second theory is, that the constitution of mind is depraved, and\nthat its wrong action is the inevitable result of this wrong\nconstruction.\n\nThen come the theories in reference to _the cause_ of this assumed\nmalformation of mind. There are only two ever assigned, viz., God and\nman: God by creation, and man by sinning _in_ Adam or _before_ Adam in a\npre-existent state.\n\nBy those who ascribe the deed to God, it is claimed that he perpetrated\nthis wholesale wrong to our race in one of two ways, viz., either by the\ndirect miscreation of each mind at or near the time of birth, or by\ncreating such a constitution of things that by one wrong act the first\npair transmitted, from parent to child, through the whole race, a\nvitiated and depraved mental constitution.\n\nWe now resort to the Bible to ascertain what are its teachings on this\nsubject.\n\nIn the first place, then, we find a constant recognition of the fact of\na depraved _action_ of mind, and that this commences at the earliest\nperiod of life. On this, as a revealed _fact_, there is no debate.\n\nNext, in regard to the _theories_ instituted to account for this fact.\nHere we shall only discuss the commonly accepted theory of the Christian\nworld, and leave the other for the future volume.\n\nThe main reliance for the support of the common theory of a miscreated\nmind is found in Genesis, chapters i. and v., which, it is claimed,\nteaches, in the first place, that God could and did create the first\nhuman pair with minds perfectly organized, and, next, that after they\nsinned, their descendants came into life with a depraved mental\nconstitution. The passages read thus:\n\nGen., i., 26, 27: \"_And God said, 'Let us make man in our image, after\nour likeness.'_\"\n\n\"_So God created man in his own image; in the image of God created he\nhim, male and female created he them._\"\n\nGen., v., 3: \"_And Adam begat a son in his own likeness, after his\nimage, and called his name Seth._\"\n\nThe whole question in these passages turns on the meaning of the words\n\"image\" and \"likeness.\"\n\nNow the only conceptions possible of the \"image or likeness\" of a human\nmind to its spiritual Creator are, first, resemblance in its\nconstitutional powers of intellect, susceptibility, and will, and, next,\nresemblance in the _action_ of these faculties.\n\nThat man is the image and likeness of his Maker in constitutional powers\nis clear, because we can not have any conception of the Creator but as\nof a mind like our own, infinite in the extent of such capacities. This,\nthen, is _one_ respect in which the first pair could be in the image or\nlikeness to God.\n\nThe other only conceivable respect in which they could resemble their\nCreator is by _their own voluntary action, and this can not be conceived\nof as created_.\n\nMan is the sole producing cause (see page 158) of his own _voluntary_\nacts, which alone decide moral character. Should God create these, man\nwould cease to be their author and cease to be a free agent.\n\nIt is thus manifest that a mind can be _created_ in the image of God, so\nfar as we can conceive, only in its constitutional powers of intellect,\nsusceptibility, and will.\n\nThis being established as the meaning of the word when it is said that\nAdam begat Seth \"in his own image,\" if it has reference to the mind\nalone, or chiefly, then it means that the mental organization of the\nchild was like the parent's, and thus like the Creator's.\n\nIn the New Testament, the chief passages which are supposed to bear on\nthis subject are in Romans, chapter\u00a0v. These are the main texts:\n\nVerse 12: \"_Wherefore as by one man sin entered into the world, and\ndeath by sin, and so death passed upon all men for that all have\nsinned._\"\n\nVerse 19: \"_For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so\nby the obedience of one shall many be made righteous._\"\n\nHere we again are to discriminate between _facts_ and _theories_. The\n_facts_ here stated are, that by one man sin entered into the world, and\ndeath by sin; that death comes on all men because all sin; and that by\none man's disobedience many were made sinners.\n\nThen come the _theories_ as to _the mode_ by which many were made\nsinners by the sin of one man.\n\nHere the Bible is silent. But theologians have manufactured the _theory_\nthat when Adam sinned the constitution of his mind was changed, and then\nthat this nature was transmitted to his descendants. All this is without\na word of proof.\n\nOthers have assumed that all mankind were existing in Adam, and \"sinned\nin him, and fell with him,\" which is both unintelligible, and equally\nwithout support from the Bible.\n\nThese, it is believed, are all ever claimed as direct Scripture evidence\nof a depraved constitution of mind consequent on Adam's sin. Two other\npassages are quoted as having an _indirect_ bearing on this subject.\nThey are as follows:\n\n2 Peter, ii., 4: \"_For if God spared not the angels that sinned, but\ncast them down to hell, and delivered them into chains of darkness to be\nreserved unto judgment_\"--\n\nJude, 6 verse: \"_And the angels which kept not their first estate, but\nleft their own habitation, he hath reserved in everlasting chains under\ndarkness unto the judgment of the great day._\"\n\nIn regard to these passages, we are to notice, as before, first, the\n_facts_ revealed, and, next, the _theories_ instituted in regard to\nthem.\n\nThe facts are, that there are two classes of angels, those that have\nsinned and those that have not; that those that sinned kept not their\nfirst estate, but left their habitations; that God cast them down to\nhell, and that they are reserved in chains of darkness unto the judgment\nof the great day.\n\nThese are all the facts disclosed. Not a word is said as to the _cause_\nor _reason_ why some sinned and some did not, nor as to the mode or\nmanner by which these events were brought about. Here the _theories_\ncome in.\n\nThose who maintain the depravity of the human mental constitution frame\ntheir theory on these passages thus:\n\nIt is here taught that there are a class of minds that have never\nsinned. There must be _a cause_ for this diversity from man's\nexperience. _This cause is a perfect mental constitution._ This, it is\nseen, is _a mere assumption, without a word of proof from the passages\nquoted_! What is quite as remarkable is, that this theory is maintained\nin the face of the concession that both Adam and the fallen angels were\nas well endowed as the unsinning angels in regard to mental\nconstitution, and yet that they all sinned just as the descendants of\nAdam have done.\n\nThis dogma has been sustained by certain misconceptions that should be\nconsidered.\n\nThe first is in the use of the term \"nature.\" As this word is ordinarily\nused, it signifies that constitution, received from the Author of all\nthings, which makes certain results or effects _invariable_. Thus, when\na fountain invariably sends forth bitter waters, it is called its\n\"nature\" to do so; when a tree invariably produces bitter fruit, this is\ncalled its \"nature.\" Now if it was a fact that the human mind never\nacted right, but invariably wrong, it would be proper to apply this\nterm, and to say that in its \"nature\" it was totally depraved.\n\nBut this is not the fact. \"Sin is a transgression of law,\" and every\nchild, from the first, sometimes obeys and sometimes disobeys the\nphysical, social, and moral laws of God. No child ever _invariably_\nbreaks them, but sometimes obeys and sometimes disobeys.\n\nBut theologians have mystified the subject by assuming the very thing to\nbe proved, and then \"reasoning in a circle.\" Thus they assume, not only\nwithout, but contrary to evidence, that all human minds _invariably_ act\nwrong from the first; therefore there must be a cause, and this cause is\nthe \"nature\" received, directly or indirectly, from the Creator. Then\nthey assume that, as every mind is \"totally depraved\" in its \"nature,\"\nit can no more produce holy acts than a corrupt tree can produce good\nfruit, or a bitter fountain send forth sweet waters.\n\nAnother misconception which has embarrassed this subject has arisen from\nthe supposition that it is irreverent, and contrary to the Bible, to\nallow any limitation to _almighty power_, even in \"the nature of\nthings.\"\n\nBut it can be clearly shown that every person who maintains that there\nis a Creator who is \"perfect\" in wisdom and benevolence, does, by this\nassertion, maintain that very limitation to which the objection is made.\nThis is shown by means of accurate definitions.\n\nThus \"_perfect wisdom_ is that which adapts the _best possible_ means to\nthe _best possible_ ends.\"\n\n\"_Perfect benevolence_ is that which produces the _greatest possible\ngood_ with the _least possible_ evil.\"\n\nThat is to say, a Creator who is perfect in wisdom and goodness has done\nthe best that possibly can be done for the great universe of mind in all\nits infinite and eternal relations. This being so, certainly \"_He has no\npower to do better_.\"\n\nThe only way this is evaded is by using different words that mean the\nsame thing, and then refusing to define these words, or to accept exact\ndefinitions of them from others.\n\nThe infidel, who allows a God of perfect goodness and wisdom, and the\nstrict Calvinist, who is shocked at hearing that God \"_has no power_\" to\nmake a better system, or one that has less of evil, say the very same\nthing themselves, only in more vague and misty modes of expression.\nThey, therefore, are precluded from objecting to positions that involve\nsuch a limitation, when it is the very one which they themselves assume.\n\nTo affirm that almighty power can make black white and yet black at the\nsame time, or a straight line crooked and still straight, even the\nstrictest upholders of the extent of almighty power would hesitate to\naffirm, because they are contradictions and absurdities. But they teach\nequal contradictions who claim that a mind can be _created_ with\nknowledge, habits, and experience, when it has had neither instruction,\ntraining, or experience.\n\nInstead of claiming these absurdities as included in our ideas of this\nattribute of Deity, we are rather to assume that by almighty power is\nsignified \"a power to do all things _except contradictions and\nabsurdities_.\"\n\nThus has been presented what is claimed as the evidence in the Bible in\nfavor of a depraved mental constitution in the human race, and it is\nmaintained that it amounts to _nothing at all_.\n\nThis being so, then we appeal to the principle of reason and common\nsense (p. 25), \"that _nothing is to be assumed as true unless there is\nsome evidence that it is so_.\"\n\nMoreover, in Chapters xxii. and xxiii. is exhibited the evidence of\nreason and experience that the human mind is perfectly organized, and\nthus the highest evidence of its Maker's wisdom and benevolence.\n\nSo we can again appeal to another principle of reason, that \"_we are to\nconsider that right which has the balance of evidence in its favor_.\" If\nthere is no evidence to prove the mind of man depraved in organization,\nand all the evidence of reason and experience is in favor of its perfect\norganization, is it not to be assumed that it is thus perfect?\n\nTo this might be added the teachings of the Bible in the same direction.\nBut this is deferred to the future volume. In the present illustrative\nexample, the aim is simply to exhibit the fallacy of _one_ of the\ntheological theories that has been incorporated as a part of the\nteachings of the Bible, thus lessening the respect and confidence\naccorded to it, and impeding the true religious development of our race.\n\nHow it has happened that a dogma, which is so contrary to the moral\nfeelings and the common sense of man, and, at the same time, unsupported\nby revelation, should have become so incorporated with the teachings of\nthe Christian Church, will be set forth in the next article.\n\n\n_History of the Dogma._\n\nThe history of the dogma of the depraved constitution of the human mind\nimparted directly or indirectly by the creative agency of its Maker has\nbecome a matter of profound interest.\n\nSo far as appears, _theories_ on the _philosophy_ of religion did not\nagitate the apostolic age. Christianity first spread among the humbler\nclasses. They felt that they were sinful and miserable in the present\nlife, and looked with dread and dismay to the dark passage of the grave\nand the destinies to follow. They were taught to \"believe on the Lord\nJesus Christ,\" and that thus they would become good and happy now and\nforever. This they understood to mean, not a mere intellectual\nconviction, but a _practical faith_, in which Christ was received as\ntheir supreme Lord and teacher _by conforming their feelings and conduct\nto his teachings_.\n\nBut, after a while, the philosophers and rulers became Christians, and\nthen commenced the two grand evils: first, the _theories of philosophy_,\nand, next, the _enforcing of these theories by pains and penalties_.\nAbout A.D. 400 commenced the discussion of the theory under\nconsideration. _Pelagius_, a learned and devout man of Great Britain,\naided by his friend Celcius, promulgated the common-sense views on the\nnature of mind derived from reason and experience, mainly as set forth\nin this volume, and claimed that these views were sustained by the\nteachings of the Old and New Testament. He and his friend traveled and\ndisseminated these views in Great Britain, France, Africa, Italy, and\nPalestine, over which Christianity to a great extent prevailed. The\ncelebrated Augustine, a man of great goodness, talents, and learning,\nbecame their leading antagonist. He set forth the philosophical theories\nafterward adopted and taught by Calvin in the form which is now\ndenominated _the system of High Calvinism_.\n\nThis system starts with the assumption (without proof) that the Creator\n_could_ form mind on a more perfect model than that of our race, and\nthat he _proved_ it by forming the minds of angels and of our first\nparents on this pattern. But, as a penalty for one act of disobedience\nby them, first their own mental constitution was vitiated. Next, in the\nlanguage of standard Calvinists, \"Such as man was _after_ the fall, such\nchildren did he beget; corruption, by the righteous judgment of God,\nbeing derived from Adam to his posterity, not by imitation, but by the\npropagation of a vicious nature. Wherefore all men are conceived in sin,\nand are born children of wrath; unfit for every good connected with\nsalvation; prone to evil, dead in sins, and, without the Holy Spirit\nregenerating them, they neither _will_ nor _can_ return to God, amend\ntheir depraved nature, nor _dispose themselves for its amendment_.\"\n\nMen being thus terribly incapacitated for right action, so that they\nhave no power \"to amend their depraved nature,\" nor even \"to dispose\nthemselves for its amendment,\" the whole race became liable not only to\nthe pains and penalties of sin through this life, but to _eternal_ and\nhopeless misery beyond the grave. Nor could any one of the race do a\nsingle thing to escape this doom, or to induce the Author of their Being\nto pity or help them. Instead of this, a certain portion of the race\nwere \"elected\" by God to be restored to the state from which their first\nparents fell by \"the Holy Spirit regenerating them,\" while all the rest\nwere left to eternal torments, \"to illustrate God's justice and hatred\nof sin!\" Moreover, whoever was thus elected was sure to \"persevere.\"\nThese tenets are usually called the \"five points of Calvinism,\" viz.,\n_original sin_, _total depravity_, _election_, _regeneration_, and\n_saints' perseverance_.\n\nPelagius denied that there was any difference between the mental\nconstitution of Adam and his descendants, or any other connection\nbetween his and their sins than always exists between the sins of\nchildren and those of their parents. Of course, the vitiated nature\nimparted directly or indirectly by God, and the tenets based on it, were\ndenied by him.\n\nAt this period all matters of doctrine were settled by ecclesiastical\ncouncils. The first council on this matter was in Africa, and, led by\nAugustine, they condemned the views of Pelagius. The two next councils\nwere in Palestine, and both sustained his teachings. Next, in Italy, the\nPope, then at the early period of pontifical power, first sustained\nPelagius, but finally, by the exertions of Augustine and his party, was\nled to condemn him with the greatest severity. Finally, the emperors\nwere enlisted against him with their civil pains and penalties. The\nresult was, Pelagius and his followers suffered the perils and miseries\nof civil and ecclesiastical persecution. \"And thus,\" says the historian,\n\"the Gauls, Britons, and Africans by their councils, and the emperors by\ntheir edicts, demolished this sect in its infancy, and suppressed it\nentirely.\"\n\nIt is very probable that, if Pelagius had had the power and adroitness\nof Augustine, the edicts of emperors and decrees of councils would have\nmaintained _his_ views, and those of Augustine would have gone into\nobscurity. But ever since that day the organized power of the Latin,\nGreek, and Protestant churches have been arrayed to sustain the theories\nthus inaugurated.\n\nBut the common sense and the moral nature of man have maintained a\nfeeble but ceaseless warfare against the tenets of the Augustinian and\nCalvinistic creed, while now this \"conflict of ages\" is invigorated by\nthe intervention of a new power. The authority of councils, popes, and\nemperors is on the wane, while _the people_ are fast advancing to that\nposition of umpires in the moral and religious world which they have\ngained in the political.\n\nIn this long and unequal struggle, the principal actors since the days\nof Pelagius have been, in the first place, _Arminius_ at the time of the\nReformation. While maintaining the foundation dogma of a depraved mental\nconstitution consequent upon Adam's sin, he strove to give some slight\nfeature of humanity and tenderness to the consequent system by\nmaintaining that there was _some_ way in which man, in spite of his\nruined nature, could attain some right feeling and action acceptable to\nhis Creator, and tending in some degree to remedy the dreadful calamity\ninflicted on the race.\n\nThe historian thus narrates:\n\n\"After the appointment of Arminius to the theological chair at Leyden\n(University), he thought it his duty to avow and vindicate the\nprinciples which he had embraced, and the freedom with which he\npublished and defended them exposed him to the resentment of those that\nadhered to the theological system of Geneva (Calvinistic), which\nprevailed in Holland. The Arminian doctrines gained ground under the\nmild and favorable treatment of the magistrates of Holland, and were\nadopted by several persons of merit and distinction. The Calvinists\nappealed to a _national synod_. Accordingly, the Synod of Dort was\nconvened (by the States-General), and was composed of ecclesiastical\ndeputies from the United Provinces, as well as from the Reformed\nchurches of England, Hessia, Bremen, Switzerland, and the Palatinate.\n\n\"It was first proposed to discuss the principal subjects in dispute, and\nthat the Arminians should be allowed to state and vindicate the grounds\non which their opinions were founded.\n\n\"But some difference arising as to the proper course of conducting the\ndebate, _the Arminians were excluded from the assembly, their case was\ntried in their absence, and they were pronounced guilty of pestilential\nerrors, and condemned as corrupters of the true religion_!\n\n\"In consequence of this decision, the Arminians were considered as\nenemies to their country and its established religion, and were much\npersecuted. They were treated with great severity, deprived of all their\nposts and employments, their ministers silenced, and their congregations\nsuppressed. The great Barnevelt was beheaded, and the learned Grotius\nfled and took refuge in France.\"\n\nThus it is seen that, while Pelagius and his followers were wasted by\npersecution in the commencement of the Calvinistic system under\nAugustine, the attempt to soften its hard features by Arminius was put\ndown by the same method.\n\nBut, in spite of all such opposition, Arminianism gained ground, and the\nArminian and Calvinistic systems have existed side by side in most\nProtestant communions. In the Church of England, and formerly in the\nMethodist churches, these two parties have existed. So in the\nPresbyterian, Congregational, and Baptist churches, there has always\nbeen a division in reference to the tenets of Calvinism, some holding\nthem strictly according to Augustine and Calvin, and others more or less\nmodifying their sterner features by various theories and expositions.\n\nThe main point of difference between these two classes is in reference\nto that most disheartening and deplorable tenet of men's entire\ninability to \"amend their depraved nature,\" or even to \"dispose\nthemselves for its amendment.\" The strict Calvinist maintains that the\nmind of man is so entirely ruined in its nature that no one but the\nAuthor of mind can rectify it, while he can in no way be moved to this\nact of mercy (justice?) by any thing the _unrenewed_ creature can do.\nThe Arminian sects hold that, though the \"natural man\" is utterly\nincapable of any acceptable moral action in himself, yet, through the\natonement of Jesus Christ, he is endowed with \"a gracious supernatural\nability,\" by which he can accept the offers of salvation. This, it is\nsupposed, is a statement that most Arminians would accept as expressing\ntheir views.\n\nIn our own country, the earliest leader of an attempt to modify the\nCalvinistic system was the celebrated metaphysician, Jonathan Edwards.\nWhile maintaining, as did Arminius, the foundation theory of an utterly\ndepraved mental constitution of the race as a penalty for the first act\nof disobedience, he first labored to prove this penalty to be _just_,\ninasmuch as in some mysterious way the whole race existed in Adam, and\nsinned just as he did, thus becoming the authors of their own mental\nruin and incapacity.\n\nAnd inasmuch as our moral nature revolts from the infliction of\npenalties for not doing what there is _no power_ to do, he originated a\nmetaphysical theory to this effect: that, in spite of the injury\nresulting from this first sin of the whole race, there is full power and\nobligation in every human being to obey all that the laws of God\ndemanded, but that man is _unwilling_ instead of _unable_. This\n_unwillingness_ is the result of that first sin of the race; and so\ngreat is its pertinacity, that no man ever did or ever will feel or act\nright in a single case, from the beginning to the end of life, until\n\"regenerated by the Holy Spirit.\" Neither will they do any thing \"to\namend their depraved nature,\" or to \"dispose themselves to its\namendment;\" nor will any man, before \"regeneration by the Holy Spirit,\"\ndo a single thing that has even any _tendency_ to gain this Divine aid,\nbut it is all dependent on \"sovereign, unconditional election.\" Still\nworse, the more efforts an unrenewed man makes to love and obey God, the\nmore wicked he grows, because he is _voluntarily_ resisting increased\nlight and obligation in refusing to regenerate himself, which, on this\ntheory, he had full power to do.\n\nAs it respects God, this theory, indeed, relieves his character very\nessentially; but as to affording any comfort to man, it only adds a new\nthorn to wound sensitive consciences. For no man could possibly help\nfeeling that when, according to High Calvinism, he had _no power at all_\nto do right, he was relieved from some portion of obligation, even if,\nsix thousand years ago, he did join Adam in that sinful repast. But\nPresident Edwards and his followers took away this small alleviation,\nand put the whole blame entirely on the depraved and guilty creature,\nboth for the ruin of the fall and the refusal to remedy the evil.\n\nThis attempt to prove that _God does not require men to perform what\nthey have no power to do_, has been regarded as a most terrific heresy\nby the strict Calvinist, while for nearly a hundred years New England\nand the whole Presbyterian Church have been agitated by it. Again and\nagain, some of the wisest and best of their clergy have been arraigned\nfor this heresy, with the threatened or inflicted penalty of loss of\ncharacter, profession, and daily bread for themselves and their\nfamilies. Three times the author has seen a revered parent thus\narraigned. And in these ecclesiastical trials, she has herself heard\notherwise sensible persons maintaining that men were required by their\nMaker to do what they had no power of _any_ kind to do, under the\npenalty of eternal damnation, and that it was a dangerous heresy to\nmaintain that God did not thus require it.\n\nAnother attempt to modify the Augustinian dogma is found in the work\nentitled \"The Conflict of Ages,\" by the Rev. Edward Beecher. The theory\nthere presented was first started by the great and learned Origen in the\nthird century, and has been advocated by individuals ever since. It\nassumes the entire and fatal depravity of the mental organization, but\nrelieves the Creator of all blame by assuming that every human mind was\ncreated with a perfect mental organization, and placed in the most\nfavorable circumstances possible in a _pre-existent state_; and yet the\nsame sad results then occurred as our race are approaching, viz., the\nexistence of two classes of minds, the holy and the sinful. Meantime\nthis world was prepared as a merciful arrangement to afford a _second_\nprobation to those who ruined themselves in the pre-existent state.\n\nThis theory entirely relieves the Creator of all blame, but gives no\nother help or comfort to the miserable race of man. It certainly _is_ a\ncomfort to feel that our Maker is not a being who ruins his creatures in\nthe very process of creation, and then exposes them to eternal, hopeless\nmisery as the consequence of it. But whoever believes this pre-existent\ntheory takes the load of a guilty conscience for all he considers as\nwrong in his own mental constitution, and for all the dreadful\nconsequences.\n\nThese several theories all were originated to escape from the inevitable\ndeduction of reason, that _God, as the author of a depraved constitution\nof mind, is himself depraved_.\n\nAnd yet neither of them avails but one of the two _pre-existent\ntheories_, that makes man himself the author of this ruin of his own\nmind, either _in_ Adam or _before_ Adam, while neither of these is\nsupported either by reason or revelation.\n\nMoreover, neither of these theories _could_ be established by revelation\nfor want of means to prove a revelation to beings who find themselves\nendowed with _miscreated_ minds, as has been shown on pages 287 and 288\nof this volume.\n\nAnother effort to change the hard features of Calvinism was by the New\nHaven school of theologians. These gentlemen maintained that _a holy\nnature_ and _a sinful nature_ were not what _could be_ created, inasmuch\nas all sin implies a knowledge of what a morally right choice is and\npower to make such a choice, while it consists not at all in a wrong\n_nature_ or _constitution_, but solely in _wrong voluntary action_.\n\nThis is precisely what, as the author supposes, was the doctrine of\nPelagius in opposition to that of Augustine, and for the propagation of\nwhich, popes, emperors, and councils drove Pelagius and his followers\nfrom their churches.\n\nA similar penalty seemed for a while to await the New Haven innovators;\nfor, as professors in a theological seminary connected with the most\ninfluential university in the nation, their doctrine on this subject\noccasioned a controversy that agitated all the New England as well as\nthe Presbyterian churches.\n\nAt the same time, an earnest controversy was in progress with the\nUnitarian sect, which had adopted this tenet of Pelagius as a part of\ntheir creed. Of course, the charge, both of Pelagianism and\nUnitarianism, was rife all over the land against these innovators on the\nestablished creed of the churches.\n\nTo meet this, these gentlemen maintained that they had not essentially\ndeparted from the system of New England divinity as exhibited in the\nwritings of President Edwards. Thus they had two labors to perform--the\none to maintain the doctrine that sin consisted solely in wrong _action_\nand not at all in _nature_, and the other to show that in this they did\nnot differ from Edwards.\n\nIn attempting the first, at one time and another, they have maintained\nthat mankind _since the fall_ are as truly created in God's image as\nAdam was; that the nature of man is still like the nature of God; that a\ncorrupt, depraved, or unholy nature can not be affirmed of the human\nmind in any proper use of these terms.\n\nThe inquiry, then, must arise, in many minds that are familiar with the\nwritings of President Edwards, how it is possible that men so\nintelligent and so honest should maintain that on this subject they had\nnot departed from the system of New England divinity as exhibited by\nEdwards.\n\nTo the author this enigma is solved by the character of Edwards's\nwritings, which, like those of many other metaphysicians who hold\ntheories contrary to common sense, are _contradictory and inconsistent_.\nThus it is seen that one class of very acute minds find in Edwards's\n_Treatise on the Will_ the most complete exposition and defense of\n_fatalism_, and thus the author regards it. Another class, equally\nacute, claim this same essay as a full exposition and defense of the\ncontrary doctrine of _free agency_.\n\nThe Augustinian theory of a totally depraved mind, transmitted through\nthe Catholic Church to its reformed offsets, was received by Edwards. He\nperceived that if God was the cause of this depravity, he is the author\nof sin, and so he labored to prove that all mankind \"sinned in Adam and\nfell with him,\" and thus caused their own depravity.\n\nHe perceived, too, that requiring men to originate holy acts with a\ntotally depraved nature seemed to demand what they had no power to\nperform, and thus made God unjust. So he brought forth his _Treatise on\nthe Will_ to prove that man had a _natural ability_ to obey God, and a\n_moral inability_; and so at once he established _fatalism_ to one class\nof minds, and _free agency_ to another.\n\nThus it is that the New Haven divines find language in Edwards that\nsustains their views, while their antagonists find as much, or more,\nthat condemns them.\n\nThe ancient followers of Pelagius, the modern Unitarians, and the\nleaders of the New Haven school of divines, all hold exactly the\nposition set forth in this work of the _perfect organization_ of the\nhuman mind, while the only depravity maintained by them is that of\n_voluntary action_. At the same time, it is believed that but a very\nsmall portion of the younger clergy of _any_ theological school in New\nEngland, or in a large portion of the Presbyterian churches, would\nopenly avow a belief in the depraved mental constitution of man as\ncreated by God, either directly at or near birth, or indirectly by\nhereditary transmission.\n\nIt is interesting, yet sad, to trace the dominant influence of the\nAugustinian theory of a depraved mental constitution in originating most\nof the leading sects of the present Christian world.\n\nMan being assumed to be thus miserably miscreated, and his sole hope\nbeing the gift of the Holy Ghost to recreate, the priesthood soon\nclaimed to be the only medium through which this gift could pass; and\nhaving the eternal life and death of the soul in their hands, they\nspeedily thus gained that domestic, civil, and religious power which\nmade the papal hierarchy the most tremendous tyranny that earth ever\nwitnessed.\n\nThe question of the transmission of this power through properly ordained\npersons was the chief feature of the Episcopal organization.\n\nMost of the other large sects in this country are descended from the\nPuritans, who, as it appears, were the first to institute \"a church\" as\nconsisting solely of persons who \"profess\" to be \"regenerated\" on the\ntheory of the renewal of a misformed or depraved mind.\n\nThe Greek, Roman, Episcopal, Scotch, and European Protestants recognize\nno such organization, all being born into the Church; and this seems to\nhave been the case in the first churches of the New Testament, where\nparents and _their families_, and all who joined their communities, were\nconsidered as constituting the Christian Church, whether \"regenerated\"\nor not.[4] So, in the Jewish Church, all who submitted to the initiatory\nrite were members, without respect to religious attainments in\ncharacter. This new principle of organization, originating with the\nPuritans, is retained among most sects in this nation, and is the\nfoundation of their separate organizations.\n\nThus the Baptists are separated on the question of the mode of\nadministering the _rite of admission_ to this Church.\n\nThe Presbyterians and Congregationalists separate on the question of\n_appointing the officers_ of this organization.\n\nThe Methodists are an offset from the Episcopal Church, with reference\nchiefly to modes of bringing men into their Church.\n\nAll agree that it is \"regenerate persons\" alone who are fully members of\nthis organization.\n\nThere are diversities of opinion as to the relation of baptized children\nto this body, but none allow them to be admitted to its distinctive\nordinance except they profess to be \"regenerated.\"\n\nIt is a matter for interesting conjecture as to the probable results on\nChristendom had the theory of Pelagius been established by pope,\nemperor, and councils instead of that of Augustine.\n\nIn that case we may suppose that the efforts and energies of the\nchurches, instead of to these rites and forms, would have been mainly\ndirected to the _right training_ of the human mind in obedience to all\nthe physical, domestic, social, and moral laws of the Creator.\n\nInstead of instituting two standards of right and wrong, the \"common\"\nand the \"evangelical,\" as is now so generally done, children would have\nbeen taught that all that was just, honorable, benevolent, and lovely in\ntheir feelings and conduct was as acceptable and right to God as it is\nto men. Their parents, instead of that sense of helpless inability\nresulting from the belief that their little ones could feel and do\nnothing but sin until new mental powers were given, and that the gift\nwas bestowed by the rule of sovereign \"election,\" would have felt that\nevery successful effort to cultivate all lovely and right habits and\nfeelings was advancing their offspring nearer to God and their heavenly\nhome, and that, when their wisdom failed, the promise of \"the Comforter\"\nwas given to encourage them in this great work.\n\nThus they would expect their children to become \"new creatures in Christ\nJesus\" by the combined influence of the heavenly and earthly parents\ngradually transforming their ignorance and selfishness to knowledge and\nbenevolence.\n\nThat the theory of Augustine, originally established in the Christian\nchurches by pains and penalties, is still sustained there by such\ninfluences, is apparent from these facts.\n\nAlthough there is a large amount of real virtue and piety that is not\nwithin the pale of any sectarian organization, yet the vast majority of\nconscientious persons are either enrolled in _the Church_, or intimately\nconnected with it in principle and feeling. All this intellectual and\nmoral power is organized into various denominations, each controlled and\nled by a number of highly-educated, conscientious, and religious men.\n\nWith these denominations are connected high positions in the pulpit,\nwith great influence and liberal salaries; literary institutions, with\nposts of honor and competency; and theological seminaries that are the\ncentral ecclesiastical mainsprings of influence.\n\nThen there are connected with each denomination large voluntary\nassociations for benevolent purposes, with officers who control large\npecuniary means. Finally, each sect has its quarterlies, monthlies, and\nits religious newspapers, whose editors are speaking every day to the\nminds of thousands and hundreds of thousands.\n\nNow it is a fact that this vast array of wealth, position, influence,\nand ecclesiastical power is actually combined to sustain these\ntheological theories. So much is this the case, that a minister,\ntheological professor, president of a college, secretary of a benevolent\nsociety, or editor of a periodical or newspaper, could not openly deny\nthis Augustinian tenet but under penalty of the loss of reputation,\nposition, influence, and the income that sustains himself and family.\nOur largest and best theological seminaries demand an avowal of belief\nin this dogma as a condition of holding any professorship, and in some\nof them it must be renewed by all the professors every few years.\n\nAt the same time, this dogma of a depraved mental constitution\ntransmitted from Adam is inwrought into all the standard works of\ntheology, the sermons, the prayers, the sacred poetry, the popular\nliterature, and even the Sunday-school and family literature of\nchildhood.\n\nThe power of such influences is intensified by the present stringency of\nsectarian organization. By those who have marked the tendencies of the\nreligious world, it will be remembered that, at the time the\nassociations for religious benevolence began their great work, all sects\nseemed to be harmonizing and uniting in the efforts to send Bibles,\ntracts, and missionaries to the destitute. At this period, the questions\nthat separated Christians in reference to modes of ordination, baptism,\nand church officers, seemed to disappear as matters of small moment\namong all whose great aim was to save the lost of every name and nation.\n\nBut, while this served to liberalize the feelings and opinions of good\nmen in all sects, it soon became apparent to the leaders that, if these\ntendencies were not counteracted, the sects would all come together.\n\nIf this should happen, where would be all the great machinery that was\nsupported by these several denominations for their distinctive aims?\n\nSoon the tide turned, and, though now there is less sectarian\nbitterness, and most sects can allow each other to be Christians with\ndifferent names and badges, yet each is active for its own separate\ninterests more decidedly than ever. And now the _leading_ concern of\neach denomination seems to be, to increase its own separate churches,\nschools, colleges, theological seminaries, religious periodicals, and\nbenevolent associations, not because the salvation of the lost depends\non these distinctive matters, but chiefly as modes of increasing the\n_extent_, _respectability_, and _influence_ of their sect. In order to\ndo this, the importance of the points which divide each from the other\nmust be magnified; for if there is but a trifling difference between an\nOld School and New School Church, or a Baptist, Congregational, or a\nPresbyterian, then, in small places, and especially in our new\nsettlements, all these would unite in one large, harmonious church, that\ncould properly support all its own ordinances, and send of its surplus\nto supply the destitute. On the contrary, if these differences are\nmagnified, there will be two, three, or four small churches, all\ncontending with each other, poorly supporting their own ordinances, and,\ninstead of helping the destitute, sending to other churches of their own\nsect for help.\n\nThus it is that we see vast sums raised every year to multiply these\nneedless, weak, and militant churches all over the land. There are facts\non this subject that should be deeply pondered.[5]\n\nSo in regard to education; although intelligence has diminished the\nacerbity of sectarianism, it has led to a higher appreciation of\neducational institutions as an element of _sectarian influence_ and\n_respectability_. From this has come the struggle to multiply colleges\nand female seminaries in each of the several denominations. Each is now\nacting _as a sect_ in starting new institutions all over the land, that\ndemand immense investments for buildings, apparatus, and endowments, and\nthis without reference to the actual wants of the community. For\nexample, in Indiana, where the low state of common school education\nmakes such institutions least patronized, there are _eleven endowed_\ninstitutions, with an aggregate income from these endowments of $14,000\n_per annum_, besides tuition. In Ohio there are _twenty-six_ colleges\nand professional schools, with an annual income from endowments of\n$25,000; and yet, as appears in the public prints, $100,000 has been\nsubscribed in one city in this same state to start another college for\nthe Old School Presbyterians, who are expected to raise as much more\namong that sect. Besides endowments to support teachers, vast sums are\nexpended in buildings, some of which are standing unused for the purpose\nfor which the money to build them was given. This is a fair specimen of\nwhat is transpiring in most of the other states in raising new\ninstitutions or increasing the funds of those already started. In this\nway, two, three, and four colleges are often found as competitors in a\nsection that could properly patronize scarcely one.\n\nAfter each sect has thus reared an institution, it must then struggle to\nfind pupils, and thus multitudes of young boys, who are to go into\nfuture pursuits where such knowledge will be of little or no service,\nare pressed into a Latin and Greek course, which probably the larger\nportion of them forsake before it is completed, with little knowledge of\nancient literature, and far less of their own mother tongue. The waste\nof educational benefactions in this way is little realized, while the\neffect of congregating the young in boarding-school life, away from home\nand parental influence, is most disastrous.\n\nHow can it be otherwise? To take the unformed youth at the most\nexcitable period of the nervous system, at the point where temptations\nare strongest, and habits of self-control the weakest, away from\nmothers, sisters, and home influences; herd them promiscuously with good\nand bad; stimulate the brain to excess; end all the healthful domestic\nexercise, and what could be expected but just such wrecks of health,\nmorals, home habits, and all that is good and pure, as is constantly\ngoing on in such institutions?\n\nIf parents could hear the details that have come from mothers and their\nyoung sons of the experiences of boarding-school and college life all\nover the land, especially in reference to that most contaminating and\nhorrible literature and prints that no care can exclude, they would\nunderstand only a small part of the evils included in such institutions\nfor the young.\n\nNot only colleges, but female seminaries, and even private schools, are\nbecoming more and more sectarian, as especially patronized by some one\ndenomination, and relying on this for success.\n\nAll this sectarian influence in education is, in fact, operating to\nsustain the Augustinian theories _by the pains and penalties_ that first\nenforced them; for no teacher of a school, or college, or female\nseminary could avow a dissent from theories so powerfully sustained,\nwithout subjecting himself, his institution, and his sect to attacks\nfrom other sects and institutions, as one mode of supplanting a rival.\n\nIt was this powerful array of antagonistic influences that for years\nwithheld the author from any public expression of some of the views set\nforth in this work.\n\nIt has been stated in the introduction that, while teaching mental\nscience, in connection with the Bible, to highly gifted minds, an octavo\nvolume was printed, but not published, which embraced the leading\nfeatures of this work. In that, the principles of reason and\ninterpretation were _not_ applied to the theories of a depraved mental\nconstitution, which at that time were not, to her own mind,\nsatisfactorily solved, but to theories on the character and atoning\nsacrifice of Jesus Christ, where relief was first experienced by the\nwriter.\n\nOn taking advice as to the publication of such a work, it became clear\nthat it would probably result in such powerful theological influences as\nwould end a connection with a public institution, and all labors as a\nteacher.\n\nIn obedience to the counsel of friends, it was concluded to go quietly\non as an educator, and work out practically all that could be done\nwithout innovating on accepted opinions, and wait till time and\ncircumstances should afford more maturity and completeness to the\nwriter's own views; for it was soon perceived that no one ever objected\nto having children trained exactly according to the author's present\nviews, provided nothing was said against the accepted theological\ntheories. So faithfully has this method been pursued, that it is\nprobable that there is not an individual with whom the writer has been\nassociated as an educator, who will not, for the first time, learn her\nviews on the Augustinian and Calvinistic theories from this work; while,\neven in her own family circle, though opinions have been expressed\nfreely, all discussions on this subject have been avoided.\n\nIn pursuing the course of a practical educator, the first years were\nspent mainly in the intellectual department, at the period when the\n\"higher branches\" first began to enter as a part of female culture.\nSurrounded by some of the most gifted female minds in the country as\nboth teachers and pupils, and all excited by the interest of pioneers in\nthe effort to elevate the standard of female education, there resulted\nsuch an amount of intellectual activity and enthusiasm as has never been\nwitnessed by the author before or since.\n\nIgnorant of the laws of health, and unaware of any danger from excess,\nthe result was such entire and irretrievable prostration of the nervous\nsystem as forbade forever any farther labor as a practical teacher.\n\nExtensive journeyings to restore health among a widely-dispersed family\nconnection led to frequent reunions with former pupils. Thence resulted\na deep conviction of the necessity of _training the domestic habits and\ntastes_ of young girls as had never yet been attempted, and of the\nextreme suffering and _ill health_ consequent on the neglect of it as _a\npart of school education_. This led to two works on Domestic Economy,\none of which was designed as a text-book for girls at school, and the\nother for their use after they became housekeepers.\n\nContinued ill health, inducing frequent resort to health establishments,\nwhere invalids from all classes were congregated, increased the\nconviction that modes of education and other causes were fatally\nundermining national health, especially that of women. Thus originated a\nwork on Health, and another on Physiology and Physical Training.\n\nIncapacitated from labor as a teacher, the only field of effort to the\nauthor was in more general efforts to interest her own sex to enlarged\nand _organized_ efforts to secure the proper training of woman for her\ndistinctive duties, and also to provide _employment_ for her in her\nappropriate profession.\n\nTwo small works addressed to American women on this subject were issued\nby her, and two organizations were the result: one conducted by ladies\nin Boston, and one by Governor Slade as General Agent of the Board of\nNational Popular Education.\n\nAs both of these restricted their efforts mainly to providing employment\nfor teachers already educated, the next attempt was to secure an\norganization to prepare woman for her _distinctive duties_ on a more\ncomplete and comprehensive scale.\n\nIn this attempt, it was perceived that the other sex have always secured\nproper attention to any particular department of education by\n_endowments to support highly-educated teachers to give their whole time\nto that object_. Thus chemistry, agriculture, and the practical sciences\nare made honorable, and are insured as branches of liberal instruction.\nThe question then arose, Why should not this method be taken to make\nwoman's _distinctive_ profession honorable, and to secure a proper\ntraining for it?\n\nThe business of a woman is divided into three as distinct departments as\nthe liberal professions of law, medicine, and divinity for men, which\nare so honored and endowed. Nor are they less important or universal.\nFor, in the first place, woman is to train the human mind at just that\nperiod when principles, tastes, and habits are most firmly fixed; next,\nshe has the care of the human body all through its period of\ndevelopment, when the physical habits are formed, and also in periods of\nsickness for all ages. Lastly, she has charge of the whole circle of\ndomestic economy, and of all the _home_ interests of the family state.\nEducator, nurse, and housekeeper, these three departments are not less\nin importance than law, medicine, and divinity.\n\nThe leading feature, then, in this attempt was to secure an organization\nof American women, who should aim to establish model institutions for\nwoman, that should prepare her _thoroughly and properly_ for the three\ndistinctive employments of her profession, by means of endowments to\nsupport highly-educated teachers for this express object. In all other\nfemale institutions, the training of the _intellect_ has been the\nleading object; in these, the preparation of woman for her distinctive\nduties was to be the leading object.\n\nTo the common remark that the mothers must do this _at home_, it is\nreplied, in the first place, that the mothers, to a great extent--_as\nthe general rule, having but few exceptions_--are not qualified to do\nthis; and, next, if they were, they have not the _health_, or they have\nnot the _time_, or they have not the _will_ to do so. When men wish to\nperfect and honor any profession, they provide _endowments_ to sustain\nteachers of the highest order. Thus, for example, though it may be said\nthat farmers can best train their sons for their own profession, still\nagricultural professorships in our colleges, and teachers sustained by\nendowments, are found to be indispensable to honor and raise that\npursuit to a _science_ and a _profession_.\n\nWhile the young women of the nation see every thing else more honored\nand provided for than the very profession and future business of their\nlives, they will grow up to neglect and despise such duties.\n\nThe education of woman, to be what Heaven designed for the race, should\nunite the _home training_ of the parents with the _school training_ of\nthe teacher. Instead of taking young girls from all domestic interests\nand pursuits, and turning all the energies of their nervous system into\nthe intellectual department of the brain, there should be an equable and\nhealthful training, at once, of the bodily powers, the social and\ndomestic habits, the intellect, and the moral nature; and in effecting\nthis, the parents and the teachers should _work together_ harmoniously.\nIt is in reference to this that the tendency of this age and country to\nconduct the education of the higher and middling classes in\n_boarding-schools_ instead of _at home_ is most disastrous.\nBoarding-schools should be the exceptions to meet the wants of a sparse\npopulation. Instead of this, the country sends its daughters to city\nboarding-schools, and the city sends to country boarding-schools, and so\n_home_ education is becoming more and more neglected.\n\nThe consequences to the health, happiness, and moral interests of woman\nare more and more disastrous.\n\nIn reference to this, the efforts of the above association have been\nconfined to establishing what it is hoped would become _model\ninstitutions_ in the _centres of influence_ of the states where they\nwere located, in which the funds should _not_ be spent in providing\ngreat buildings to take children away from all home influences and\ndomestic pursuits, but rather in providing such teachers and influences\nas would have a direct bearing on the homes of the pupils, and aid the\nparents in cultivating _home habits_, _home virtues_, and _home tastes_\nand _pursuits_.\n\nThis brief history of the writer's efforts is given because its results\nwill now be seen to form a part of the \"history of the dogma\" which is\nthe subject of this section.\n\nFor, during the whole period of these efforts to promote the _right\ntraining of the human mind by woman as the Heaven-appointed minister for\nthis end_, the influence of this dogma has been constantly forced on\nattention as the real antagonistic force. That is to say, the whole\nenergies of the Christian Church, in its distinctive character, are\norganized to remedy the evil _after the mind is educated wrong_, while\nlittle is attempted by the powerful agency of _organization_ to secure\nits _right education_. In proof of this, it will be seen that all the\ngreat benevolent organizations for which collections are enforced from\nthe pulpit are for adults, with one only seeming exception. There is an\norganization to send Bibles, another to send tracts and colporteurs,\nanother to send missionaries abroad, another to send home-missionaries,\nanother for the sailor, another for the slaves, another to educate\nministers, another to raise up colleges, another for temperance, and so\non. All these have as their direct aim those who are educated wrong, and\nare to be redeemed from sinful habits. Not one has any direct reference\nto the _formation of right habits in the daily training of every-day\nlife_.\n\nThe Sunday-school is the only seeming exception. But this is only a\nweekly exercise of an hour or two, in which every sect secures the\ntraining of its children in its own religious system, while this system,\nin most cases, is based on the Augustinian doctrine of the inability of\nchildren to feel or do a single right thing till they are \"regenerated,\"\nwhile not only the teaching, but the Sunday libraries for children all\nenforce this dogma. The practical influence of this, though counteracted\nmore or less by other influences, is fairly illustrated in the mental\nhistory of the author in the Introduction.\n\nThus the Christian Church has all its organizations to _cure_ diseased\nand miseducated mind, and not a single one to _prevent_ this ruin by its\nright training.\n\nThis being so, this effort to promote the neglected and yet great end of\nChristian effort has been looked on with indifference, or as a small\nconcern to receive its mite, while all others are to receive their\nhundreds and thousands.\n\nMoreover, the enterprise has been looked upon with jealousy by many\nwhose attention has been called to it as a _covert_ sectarian movement\nto promote the interests of that denomination with which some of its\nmovers have been connected. Then, too, because it really has not favored\nany one sect, it has secured the special favor and sympathy of none.\nThere has never been a time when its movers have not been made to\nunderstand that success in raising endowments would be certain if the\nanti-sectarian feature could be relinquished, and the enterprise could\nassume a sectarian banner.\n\nThe most influential clergy of the large sects are engaged in\ndenominational enterprises, to found colleges or theological seminaries,\nor to establish book or newspaper agencies _devoted to the interests of\ntheir sect_. The great body of laymen who have wealth to bestow in large\nsums are more or less influenced by their clergymen, either as personal\nfriends or as spiritual advisers. Especially is this true of the few\nbenevolent ladies who have such independent means as to be able to\nfurnish endowments.\n\nAnd thus it has come to pass that this first attempt yet known to\norganize Christians _as Christians_, to train woman for her great work\nof forming the physical, social, domestic, and moral habits of childhood\nby methods deemed indispensable by man for his professions, is on the\nverge of failure, after four years of trial. And this is not owing to\nthe fact that the motives, or the plan, or the conductors of it have\nbeen extensively distrusted, or in any particular disapproved. On the\ncontrary, the leading clergymen of most of the Protestant sects have\ngiven their unqualified approval, while the Board of Managers embraces a\nlarge proportion of the most distinguished female educators and\nauthoresses, with some of the most distinguished business men and\nfinanciers of our land. At the same time, the agents and educators who\nhave performed for four years the details of the enterprise have secured\nthe entire approval and confidence of the public as to their\nqualifications.\n\nThe real difficulty at the root of all is the indifference to the\ntraining of the habits of childhood, resulting from the long-established\ndogma of a misformed mind, whose propagated incapacity is not within the\nreach of educational training. Meantime, the chief energies of the\nChristian Church are now tending to the extending of sectarian\norganizations, based on peculiarities as to baptism, ordination, and\nchurch officers, which no intelligent person believes are either\nindispensable to salvation, or even so important as to be subjects of\ndirect Divine commands.\n\nIt is this view of the subject that has at last brought the author to\nrelinquish any farther practical educational efforts, and now to attempt\nwhatever may be in her power in directing public attention to what seems\nto be one grand impediment in the Christian world to the right training\nand development of the human race.\n\nIn presenting this work to the special attention of the laity, the\nauthor does not intend to imply that theologians are not to take the\nlead in all discussions and investigations that are to guide and\nenlighten mankind in their special department.\n\nThe aim is rather to lessen the general impression that the whole matter\nis to be left exclusively to them; that it is a _professional_ concern,\nin which a layman is to resign his own judgment as he does to his\nphysician or lawyer. Instead of this, there are some reasons why the\nlaity have superior advantages to the clergy in cases where\nlong-accepted theological errors are to be eradicated.\n\nIn the first place, they are free from the strong influence of _a\nsystem_ into which the mind has been _educated_. The power of a system\nover men who are trained to reason, and who reason on that subject which\ninvolves all the greatest interests of existence both for time and\neternity, is most insidious and incalculable. To this is added the\nreverence, love, and veneration felt by pious persons for those great\nand good men who, like Augustine, Calvin, and Jonathan Edwards, have\nbeen the revered masters of theological systems for ages. Under these\ntwo influences, every new opinion is compared with _a system_, and when\nit is seen to be inconsistent with it, all the veneration attached, both\nto that and to its authors and advocates, stands opposed to any\ninnovation.\n\nThe powerful influence of educational training, and of love and\nreverence to a revered parent, has taught the author to understand and\nsympathize with other minds similarly influenced.\n\nFrom all such biasing influences the laity are far more free than their\nclerical guides.\n\nAdd to this the fact that the \"pains and penalties\" attached to all\nchange in theological opinions have very little reach among the laity.\nAny layman, if he adopts new views, can quietly withdraw from one\nreligious communion and join another more congenial, or remain\nunconnected with any, while no man can call him to an account. But men\nconnected with parishes, colleges, and all educational institutions, are\nsubject to the supervision of councils, presbyteries, synods, and many\nother organs of surveillance, making it indispensable that all changes\nshould be known to the public. Thus profession, reputation, and daily\nbread become more or less involved.\n\nAnd here it is but justice to express the author's convictions, which an\nextensive acquaintance with the clergy of various sects has induced,\nthat there is not another body of men, of equal number and education,\nwho are so free from personal considerations of this kind in forming and\nmaintaining opinions.\n\nThe entrance on the clerical profession in this country involves the\nsacrifice of all hope of wealth and its advantages, and includes often\npoverty and a painful dependence on the vacillating favor of parishes;\nso that, to a man of talents and worldly ambition, the command to enter\nthis profession is very nearly equivalent to that of the Great Master's,\n\"Sell all that thou hast and give to the poor, and come and follow me.\"\n\nBut while allowing that, as a class, this profession is, most of all,\nfree from biasing influences of the kind indicated, it can not but be\nallowed that they are subject to like temptations as other men, and that\nthese considerations must have more influence with them than with the\nlaity, who are exposed to little or nothing of this kind.\n\nTo this, add the fact that men in other professions are far more\nhabituated to look at all questions in a _practical_ relation, and to\nuse the principles of _common sense_ more than the principles of _a\nsystem_.\n\nThe writer has had frequent occasion to notice how the well-trained\nreasoners of other professions throw aside the theories and systems of\ntheology, and settle down on the great practical truths of Christianity.\n\nIt has sometimes been a matter of wonder to perceive how little\nattention is often given by some of the most gifted and well-trained\nlaity, even those that are devoutly religious, to questions deemed of\nparamount and absorbing interest by the clergy.\n\nIn presenting this work to public attention, the author is not animated\nwith the expectation of any immediate or very striking results.\n\nLong-established and time-honored opinions, especially when they are\nentwined with the sacred hopes and interests of religion, are changed\nonly by slow and gradual transitions, and these, often, almost\nimperceptible.\n\nIt is the hope of the author to do something to promote at least a\n_renewed discussion_ of these subjects, under more favorable auspices\nthan have heretofore existed.\n\nThe circumstances that favor and indicate such a renewal are, in the\nfirst place, a gradual change that has been going on the last thirty\nyears in the theological world as the result of discussions on these\nvery subjects. Some of the most candid and acute minds that have been\ninterested in such discussions have, more and more, been led to feel the\ndifficulties involved in the accepted theory of Augustine; and though\nfew have come to such clear convictions on the subject as to feel\nwarranted in taking any public stand as innovators or reformers, many\nare ready to examine and discuss in a very different attitude of mind\nfrom what has ever before been so extensively experienced.\n\nOne striking indication of this change is the almost universal neglect\nof \"indoctrinating preaching\" among the younger clergy in those sects\nwhere, forty years ago, it was deemed indispensable to success to thus\nestablish the \"five points of Calvinism.\"\n\nA still more important change is an increase in that _practical_\npreaching that urges on the consciences of men all their domestic,\nsocial, and moral duties, _as constituting an essential part of\nreligion, as truly as the affections toward God and the special duties\nowed to him_.\n\nAn equal or greater change is apparent among the laity. The strong\nCalvinistic doctrines that used to be so reverently received are either\nsimply tolerated or quietly rejected. This is particularly the case with\nmothers and teachers, both in the family and in the secular and Sunday\nschools. Thousands of practical, tender mothers utterly refuse to teach\ntheir little ones that a depraved nature has descended to them from\nAdam, and that they can never perform any thing that is right or\npleasing to God till this nature is recreated; or, if they use such\nlanguage, it is with explanations entirely un-Calvinistic.\n\nInstead of this, they teach their offspring that they can please and\nobey their Heavenly Parent as truly and acceptably as they do their\nearthly parents; that when they have so learned to love and please Him\n(or to feel and act right) that it is their _chief desire_ thus to do,\nthey have a _new life_. This \"new birth,\" they also teach, is the result\nof that aid from the Holy Spirit, the Comforter, which both parents and\nchildren so need that they can never succeed without it, and yet which\nis promised to all who earnestly desire it, and seek it by proper\nmethods.\n\nMultitudes of parents and teachers are pursuing this method in churches\nwhose ministers would entirely revolt from the idea of denying the\nAugustinian theory or the system of Calvin resting upon it. Many are\ndoing this, unconscious that they are taking a course that is contrary\nto the standards of their Church.\n\nIn conclusion, the author would ask attention to the chief points\npresented in this volume.\n\nThe main question is, are these principles of reason or common sense,\nand the rules for interpreting language here set forth, accepted as\nguides in deciding the great questions of life?\n\nNext, are the deductions gained by their aid as to what can be learned\nwithout a direct revelation from the Creator accepted?\n\nLastly, is the Augustinian theory of a depraved mental constitution\nconsequent on the sin of the first parents of the race, as tried by\nthese principles, supported either by reason or the Bible; and, if not,\nshould not all men renounce it, both theoretically and practically?\n\nIn answering this last, it is to be remembered that the question is not\none of _fact_ as to the _depraved action_ of mind, but of the\n_philosophy_ of this fact, or _the cause_ of this wrong action. A man\nmay not be able to form any satisfactory theory on this question, and be\ncontent, as the early Christians used to be, to remain without one. The\nrepudiation of the Augustinian theory does not necessarily involve the\nadoption of any other, while it does remove insurmountable difficulties\nfrom just and generous minds in accepting the Bible as of Divine\nauthority while encumbered with what seems so contrary both to the moral\nsense and the common sense of mankind.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt has been the privilege of the author all her life to be intimately\nassociated, by family and other connections, with the ministers of\nreligion in a variety of denominations--those intelligent, excellent,\nand pious men who, more than any other class, can understand that heavy\nburden of spirit connected with that awful subject, _the eternal loss of\nthe human soul_.\n\nBefore closing, they will permit a few inquiries in reference to this\nsubject. The almost universal cessation of \"revivals\" of religion, the\ndiminished attendance of the masses on Sabbath worship, the decrease in\nthe relative proportion of the ministry, the diminution of spirituality\nand the consequent laxness in the Church, the increase of skepticism and\ninfidelity of various grades, the terrific rush of worldliness on all\nclasses, as wealth, and luxury, and temptations of all kinds abound, are\nnot all these signs of the times of fearful import, foreshadowing either\nsome dreadful judgments, or the advent of some moral forces that are\nappropriate to such a crisis?\n\nIn this position of the moral world, is it to be supposed that theology\nalone, of all departments of science, has reached its culminating point,\nso that there is no possibility of improvement? Is there not manifestly\nneeded far more powerful motives than any now wielded to stop the\ninrushing tide of worldliness? In former times, when revivals abounded,\nit was the principle of _fear_ that was first appealed to with such\nwonderful results. But where now are such appeals made as once shook\nmen's consciences with fears of \"_the wrath to come_?\"\n\nIf such preaching abounds in any quarter of our nation, where is it? In\nall her travels the writer finds it wanting, and the testimony of others\nis similar.\n\nHere, now, is the great question: Could the ministry _now_ preach the\n_distinctive_ theories of Calvinism, and at the same time those awful\nviews of the _eternal loss of the soul_, warranted by Scripture\nlanguage, with any prospect of being sustained by the moral sentiments\nof the great body of benevolent and intelligent hearers? Would not some\nbe driven to reckless worldliness, others to infidelity, others to\nUniversalism, others to another style of preaching, till the remainder\ncould scarcely maintain any preaching at all? Is not this perceived and\nfelt by many ministers, and is not this one great reason why that\nterrible doctrine, on which the whole Gospel is based, is now so hidden\nor so slightly recognized in the pulpit ministrations?\n\nAnd yet, to the writer, it seems that this very doctrine, so plain and\nawful in Holy Writ, could be so drawn forth by the light of reason alone\nas to furnish a power of motive now almost unwielded. It seems as if the\nterrible exhibitions of this volume in the chapters on _Habit_, and on\nthe _Wrong Action of Mind in a Future State_, might be wrought out by a\nman of talent and eloquence so as to draw such audiences as once\nthronged around Whitfield, and with equal results. What, then, could be\ndone with the added power of revelation, dissevered from obstructing\ntheories?\n\nWhen the writer looks back on her own mental history for the last thirty\nyears, and feels how every step of her life, during the whole of that\nperiod, has been regulated by the overmastering pressure of this\ntremendous subject, and when she is sure that a conviction that no such\nawful dangers beset our race would bring her life on to just that level\nwhere so many Christians complain that they find themselves, the query\nwill often arise whether ministers who _say_ so little about the matter,\nand those professed Christians who _act_ so little in consistence with\nit, _really do believe it_? And yet, when her own difficulties in\nexpressing all that has been thought and felt are recalled, it is\nunderstood how others too may have been equally embarrassed and\nrestrained.\n\nIn regard to the main topics of this work, is not every minister called\nto decide, _practically_, between these two theories?\n\nThe first is, that the great and leading aim of all Christian\norganization should be _to train new-born minds aright_, and that it is\nthe special office of the ministry to influence the _educators_ of the\nrace to the right performance of this, their chief duty.\n\nIn doing this, it is to be assumed that the end for which we are made is\n\"to glorify God\" by obedience to those laws by which \"the most happiness\nwith the least evil\" is to be secured to His vast eternal empire.\n\nThat, at the _first birth_ of a child, it is \"impossible, in the nature\nof things,\" for it to feel and act for the happiness of others till it\nhas learned to know what gives pleasure and pain to _self_, and to\nunderstand that there are other beings who can thus enjoy and suffer; so\nthat a child, by its very nature, is at first obliged to be _selfish_ in\nthe _exercise_ of faculties which, _in reference to the great whole_,\nare perfect.\n\nThat the \"second birth\" is the sudden or the gradual entrance into a\nlife in which the will of the Creator is to control the self-will of the\ncreature; while, under the influence of love and gratitude to Him, and\nguided by \"faith\" in his teachings, _living chiefly for the great\ncommonwealth_ takes the place of _living chiefly for self_. For this,\nthe supernatural aid of the Holy Spirit is promised to all who seek it;\nand, without this aid, success is hopeless. But the grand instrumentality\nis the _right training_ of parents and teachers.\n\nThen, in reference to that great change of character which\nwrongly-educated mind must pass in order to gain eternal life, there are\nthree modes of expression in the Bible in regard to that, viz., \"love to\nGod,\" \"faith in Jesus Christ,\" and \"repentance.\"\n\nAccording to all uses of these terms, in _practical_ matters, _love_ is\nnothing which does not include obedience or conformity of will and\naction to the being loved. _Faith_, or _belief_, is nothing unless it\nincludes its fruits of obedience. _Repentance_ is nothing unless it\nincludes ceasing to do evil.\n\n_Obedience_ to the laws of God, physical, social, moral, and religious,\nis the grand, indispensable requisite. Now, when any person is so\nengaged in striving to obey all these laws that it is the _first\ninterest_ of the mind, then there is a \"new heart;\" and so great is the\nchange from the life of self-indulgence and disobedience to one of such\nearnest desire and efforts to obey God, that it is properly expressed by\nthe terms \"born again\" and \"created anew.\"\n\nThe contrasted theory is, that the chief end of man is \"to glorify God,\"\nwithout, perhaps, any very definite ideas of what this signifies; that\nour whole race comes into life with dwarfed and ruined moral powers, so\nthat it is as impossible, before a \"second birth,\" to feel and act\nright, as it is for a corrupt tree to bear good fruit, or a bitter\nfountain to send forth sweet waters; and that the great end of Christian\norganizations is to secure and administer certain appointed methods by\nwhich God re-creates these diseased minds. Thus all training, all\ninstructions, all good habits, are nothing as having any fitness toward\neither preparing a child for eternal happiness, or inducing God to\nre-create its mind. For it is \"unconditional election,\" and not any\nforeseen act, either of parent or child, that decides their eternal\ndestiny.\n\nCan any minister preach without assuming one of these two theories as\nthe very foundation-principle of his ministrations? And is this matter\nany the less a _practical_ one to all the laity?\n\nDuring the period in which the author has been engaged as a practical\nlaborer in the field of education, her chief earthly reliance has been\non the counsel, sympathy, and co-operation of _her own sex_; and in\nclosing a work especially dedicated to them, a few parting words may be\npermitted.\n\nThis work is offered, not as one of metaphysics and theology, to\nexercise the intellect alone. It presents the grand practical question\nof life to _woman_ as the mother, the educator, the nurse, and the\nfountain of home sympathies for the race. It is the question over which\nevery Christian mother ponders with aching heart as every new immortal\nis brought to her arms. It is the question where every Christian teacher\nstands in awe, as, gazing into the dark futurity over the dim ocean of\neternity, each young mind is felt to be a voyager whose frail and\nsolitary bark is soon to be launched. The Protestant mother or teacher,\nwith the Bible in her hands, can not, as in the Catholic Church, throw\noff this tremendous responsibility on to _her priest_. She may go to her\nminister for aid, but at the last _she must decide for herself_ what is\nthat path which Jesus Christ decides to be right in guiding the lambs of\nHis flock through such awful dangers.\n\nHere, then, is the great practical question on which depends the _life\nof the soul_, and for ETERNITY! and every parent and every teacher must\ndecide on which theory the young minds committed to their care shall be\ntrained.\n\nIn contemplating the discussions that must ere long be renewed on these\ngreat topics, and in such forms as to involve, not theologians alone or\nchiefly, but _the_ _people_, and especially the most intelligent of her\nown sex, the writer recalls with deep interest her early efforts as a\npioneer in elevating the course of female education. Then she supposed\nherself the first, as she was among the first, to introduce such works\nas Butler's Analogy, Mental Philosophy, and a Mathematical course as a\nregular part of female education. And as she recalls the hundreds of\nbright, vigorous, and independent minds under her care thus trained to\nreason accurately, and now scattered as mothers and influential members\nof society in almost every state in the Union, and then remembers, too,\nhow many institutions all over the land have for years pursued the same\ncourse, she can not but thankfully believe that the Almighty Teacher and\nRuler was thus preparing her sex for these very responsibilities.\n\nIn relinquishing that educational enterprise which for years has\nabsorbed her time and strength, while as yet it is so imperfectly\nunderstood and so little appreciated, she asks, with tender and grateful\nmemories, the attention, not only of her dear former pupils, but of that\nmultitude of noble and benevolent women who, at so many times and\nplaces, have afforded her their sympathy and aid, to what is still\nfarther offered on this subject in the closing note.[6]\n\n[4] The word \"church\" in the New Testament, in the Greek, signifies\n\"assembly\" or \"congregation,\" and not an organization of regenerate\npersons.\n\n[5] See Note C.\n\n[6] See Note D.\n\n\n\n\nNOTES.\n\n\nNOTE A, page 17.\n\nSome atheists imagine that they escape the difficulty by assuming that\nmatter is eternal, and thus uncreated. But the question is, not in\nreference to the existence of matter, but as to the _organization_,\n_contrivances_, and _changes of matter_, all of which prove the\nexistence of some Intelligent First Cause.\n\nThe theory of an \"infinite series of changes and causes without a\nbeginning\" is a contradiction in terms, as can be shown to any person\nwho understands the use of definitions, and no other person is prepared\nto discuss such subjects intelligently.\n\nLet it be remembered that the author, in this work, has not attempted to\npresent a complete exhibition of _all_ the intuitive truths, but only\nsuch a portion of them as are adapted to the design of this work. At the\nsame time, by a close analysis, some here presented as distinct\nintuitions could be shown to be specifics, under a more general\nproposition. But in a popular work, and for the purposes aimed at, this\nclose analysis is inappropriate.\n\n\nNOTE B, page 192.\n\n\"Man's chief end is to glorify God and to enjoy him forever,\" is an\nexpression equivalent to what is here maintained, if we assume that the\nchief \"glory\" of God consists in the rectitude and happiness of his vast\nempire of intelligent minds.\n\nVarious other terms used to express the ultimate end of the Creator in\nhis works, _accurate definitions_ would show to be simply different\nwords chosen to express the same idea as that here presented.\n\n\nNOTE C, page 314.\n\nIn the _Home Missionary_ for February, 1856, is the following mournful\nexhibition of the results of these sectarian divisions:\n\n\n\"_Subdivision a Source of Weakness and Destitution._\n\n\"Now it is but too evident that our American Christendom is prosecuting\nits work, in some respects, at a disadvantage. True, funds have been\nfurnished with a commendable liberality; but, worse than a dearth of\nmoney--which a few months of vigorous effort, or a prosperous turn in\nthe market might remove--there is a dearth of men. Fields are explored,\nopenings are found, communities are fast forming, and even make urgent\nrequests for ministers, but often there are no ministers to send. The\ngreat exigency of the missionary work now is the want of capable and\ndevoted _men_.\n\n\"However we may charge this upon the lukewarmness of the churches, upon\nthe absence of correct views respecting ministerial support--and its\nconsequent meagreness--or on the prevalence among young men of a subtile\nskepticism, we may not shut our eyes to the fact that the want must\ncontinue as long as that unfortunate division of the field continues,\nwhich must ever come from divided counsels and sectarian rivalries.\nDestitutions are likely to last while alienations last.\n\n\"Every denomination naturally feels that it must be strong in the\ncentres of population; and so, without asking whether the Church of\nChrist needs so many congregations there, we crowd our six separate\nenterprises, of as many rival names, into a little place where two\nchurches would do more good than the half dozen.\n\n\"The evils that result from this course are many and various. One\nconsequence of it is a weakening of the unity and the moral force of the\nChurch as a whole. Another is the diminution of the numbers and the\nstrength of the several local societies, so that an amount of assistance\nmany times greater is needed, and this need is prolonged for years, when\noften its period should have been reckoned in months. But a third\nconsequence of this overcrowding of one portion of the missionary field\nis the _destitution_ of other portions. While many villages are so well\nsupplied as to leave pastors and churches leisure to quarrel, many rural\ndistricts and young communities are almost totally neglected. If all the\npreachers in the United States were evangelical men, well educated and\ndevoted to their work, they would no more than supply the real wants of\nthe country, upon a system of wise distribution. On a system, then, so\nunfortunate as this, its destitutions are not supplied; and we hear from\nall quarters the cry, Send more laborers into the harvest.\n\n\n\"_A Cause of Unwillingness to enter the Ministry._\n\n\"Again, a fourth consequence of our denominational divisions, and\nanother cause of destitution, is seen in the difficulty of persuading\nyoung men of enterprise to enter the ministry. When we consider how the\nfield of ministerial labor is cut up into small parishes, affording to\nmen of superior capacity but a limited scope for some of their best\nqualities--with scarcely the possibility of much improvement--promising,\nalso, only a meagre support and a moderate usefulness, we can not wonder\nthat young men who are conscious of the ability to occupy a larger\nsphere, and whose nature thirsts after something stirring and an\nopportunity for a hopeful struggle and for achievement, should often\nshrink from the seeming narrowness and hopelessness of the work which is\nhere offered them. We need not praise the truthfulness of their\nappreciation in all particulars, but have we, on the whole, a right to\nanticipate a different decision? No. The result is manifestly one that\nmust be _expected_. There is not the least doubt that this diminution in\nthe size of parishes is also a diminution in the attractiveness of the\npastoral office. And so this very multitude of denominations, which has\nincreased the want of ministers, operates, in more ways than one, to\ndiminish the supply.\n\n\n\"_A Discouragement and a Weariness._\n\n\"But, what is yet worse, it tends to _injure_ the ministry. No preacher\nbut has felt, at times, the depressing influence of a small audience. A\nlarge proportion of the missionaries at the West feel this at all times;\nand often the intellect is jaded, and the heart is wearied out, from the\nwant of that natural stimulus which the presence of a multitude and the\npressure of an important occasion alone can afford. If it is\ndiscouraging to find your people coming out in small numbers on rainy\nSabbaths, what is it to have nothing but small numbers the year through,\nand year after year? How must this tend to check youthful enthusiasm,\nand to dull the fires of intellectual and moral energy. If our brethren\nof the West have not fallen behind themselves, it certainly is not due\nto the inspiration of large audiences or of populous and able parishes;\nfor, with so many divisions in such sparse and unstable communities,\nthese can not be otherwise than small. Good men will labor on, indeed,\nunder all these discouragements; and the greatness of their faith will\nmake their work and achievement great. They may triumph over these\ndifficulties, but they contend at disadvantage; and the difficulties are\n_real_, notwithstanding the highest fidelity.\n\n\n\"_Number and Policy of Denominations._\n\n\"There are more than _forty_ religious denominations in the United\nStates. Four of these--the N. S. Presbyterians, the O. S. Presbyterians,\nthe Congregationalists and Baptists, together with the Methodists and\nEpiscopalians--habitually esteem it a matter of obligation to be\nrepresented in every community where it is possible to gather a church\nof their name, and, in establishing these churches, deem it no part of\ntheir duty to consider, in the least, the welfare of any congregation of\na different name that may have been previously gathered. We have six\ngreat evangelical churches, each one of whom feels bound to push forward\nits own growth, with a disregard of the interests of all other churches,\nwhich is equivalent to an ignoring of their existence, and, in practical\neffect, identifies the Kingdom of God with the denomination. It is very\nmuch as though each one had laid it down as the fundamental principle of\nits procedure--WE are the saints.\n\n\n\"_Waste of Resources._\n\n\"Now it is obvious that this system must bring about an unfortunate\ndistribution of labor and a great waste of power; in some localities\nmultiplying churches to excess, and leaving other regions destitute;\nmaking the town congregations weak, from their very multitude, and\nlosing the happy moment in communities that are just forming from the\nwant of the right men to occupy them at the right moment; while many\nlaborers abuse as much time and strength in working against each other\nas they use in working for Christ. So churches are born weak, and are\ncompelled to worry through a long and fretful infancy, are kept on a\ndiet irritatingly low, and compelled to struggle, with slow and\nuncertain growth, toward a maturity which must come late, and may come\nnever.\"\n\n\n_Statistics._\n\nHere follow statistics, the details of which we omit, and give these as\nthe results, as seen in _three_ of the larger denominations, viz.: the\nO. S. Presbyterian, the N. S. Presbyterian, and the Congregational.\n\nIn this table is shown the _number of churches_, with a given number of\nmembers to each church.\n\n -------------------+------+------+------+------+------+------------\n                    | Not  | Not  |      |      |      |\n                    | more | more | More | More | More |\n                    | than | than | than | than | than |   Total\n Number of Members. |  50. | 100. | 100. | 200. | 300. | reporting.\n -------------------+------+------+------+------+------+------------\n Presbyterian O.S.  | 1239 | 1907 |  763 |  278 |  101 |    2670\n Presbyterian N.S.  |  743 | 1180 |  432 |  163 |   70 |    1612\n Congregational     |  696 | 1219 |  752 |  245 |   83 |    1971\n                    +------+------+------+------+------+------------\n Total of three     |      |      |      |      |      |\n     denominations  | 2678 | 4306 | 1947 |  686 |  254 |    6253\n -------------------+------+------+------+------+------+------------\n\n\n\"_Proportion of strong and weak Churches._\n\n\"More than _one fifth_, therefore, of all the churches connected with\nthese denominations may be counted as _very weak_, none of them having\nmore than twenty-five members, and the average falling considerably\nbelow that number. Nearly _one fourth_ may be counted as _weak_, their\nmembership ranging between twenty-five and fifty; and these, taken\ntogether with those that are weaker yet, constitute nearly forty-three\nper cent. of the whole. More than two thirds of all the churches do not\ncontain over one hundred members. Those that exceed one hundred are\nabout thirty-one per cent., and those that exceed two hundred are not\nquite eleven per cent. of the entire number.\n\n\n\"_Present Supply of Ministers inadequate._\n\n\"The whole number of ministers in these three denominations is 6150. The\nnumber of pastors and stated supplies (errors excepted) is 4336, leaving\n1814 to be classed as without charge, as professors, teachers, editors,\nsecretaries, etc.\n\n\"The number of churches in the three denominations whose membership\nexceeds fifty is some five hundred less than the number of pastors and\nstated supplies. If, therefore, each of the five hundred men remaining\nafter the largest churches were supplied were to take two of the smaller\nchurches, more than sixteen hundred churches would still be left\ndestitute; and if allowance be made for those not reporting, this number\nmust be taken as exceeding two thousand. Probably none of these contain\nmore than thirty-five members.\n\n\n\"_Deficiency due to Divisions._\n\n\"Now we need a thousand-fold _increase_ of our effective force in the\ngreat harvest-field of the world; but have we any reason to expect that\nthe Lord of the harvest will hear our cry for laborers, and raise them\nup indefinitely, in order to meet wants unnecessarily, nay, wickedly\ncreated by our divisions? Would a spendthrift son expect to prevail with\nan indulgent father to administer to his necessities on the plea or the\nconfession that he had squandered his former bounty, and, moreover, was\nintending to make a similar use of what he then solicited? The\nresponsibility rests upon Christians of no one name, and it would seem\nthat if the people of God every where could but have a full realization\nof the heart-rending inadequacy of all means yet employed for the\nconversion of the world, or of the utter hopelessness of ever meeting\nthe vast want under such a waste of power, the work of economical\nadjustment would at once and earnestly commence, and also a new\nconsecration--that the evangelization of the world may be carried\nforward upon a scale commensurate with the providential openings for\nmissionary effort.\n\n\"That would be, indeed, a glorious revolution which should bring the\ntrue disciples of Christ every where to this position--to a consecration\nthat should keep nothing back from the Lord, to a heaven-appointed\neconomy in the adjustment of forces, a _condensation_ of churches in the\nsame neighborhood, till the combined body could support a pastor,\nfurnish him with all needed facilities for the prosecution of his work,\nand, at the same time, open to him an _adequate_ field of labor. All\nsupernumerary ministers in a given locality would thus be set loose for\neffort where men are perishing for lack of vision. Then Apollos would\nnot interfere with Paul when he planted, nor Paul with Apollos when he\nwatered, nor would both either plant or water at the same point or time,\nprovided one could do the work.\n\n\n\"_Divisions unnecessary._\n\n\"But it is possible that some, calling to mind the large number of weak\ncongregations at the East--where denominational rivalry is less active\nthan at the West--may claim that this feebleness is but a part of the\nnecessary imperfection of human arrangements; that we must always have\nthe poor with us, and that it is not the sectarianism of the West which\nso reduces our churches. It were sufficient to suggest, in reply, that\nthe weak churches in the older states are found where the communities\nare weak, in barren or uncultivated districts, or in regions depopulated\nby emigration, while a large proportion of the feeble churches of the\nWest are in populous, vigorous, growing communities, where nothing but\nirreligion or division could keep the congregations from being numerous,\nand where nothing less than the combination of the two could keep them\nso small as they are. Yonder are three debilitated churches struggling\nfor existence against each other. Is it necessary to ask whether, if\nthey were joined in one, and were with one heart and voice contending\nfor the kingdom of God, the Christian strength of that community would\nnot be greater?\n\n\n\"_Proportion of weak Churches at the West._\n\n\"But facts are at hand which show that the relative number of feeble\nchurches is much larger at the West than at the East. Of the churches in\nIllinois and Iowa connected with three leading denominations, the\nproportion that must be accounted very weak--having not more than\ntwenty-five communicants--is almost twice as great as in the same\ndenomination taken entire, and amounts to nearly _two fifths_ of the\nwhole number reporting. These, again, taken with those whose membership\nranges between twenty-five and fifty, make up nearly _seventy per cent._\nof the whole!\"\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe author would ask attention to a few questions in view of these\nstatistics.\n\nThe above table was formed from _reporting_ churches. There are 934\nchurches _not reporting_. Giving to these last the average proportion of\nministers and weak churches, and we find this result:\n\n Whole number of churches                      7187\n Ministers acting as pastors and supplies      4336\n                                               ----\n Churches without ministers                    2851\n\nThat is to say, in three of our largest and most wealthy and intelligent\ndenominations, _nearly one third_ of their churches are without\nministers, and _nearly one half_ of them have not over fifty members,\nand the majority of these members, no doubt, are women. Then the\nrelative number of ministers is _constantly decreasing_.\n\nIn this state of things, to what is the Church and ministry coming?\n\nWhen young men of talents and energy see not only independence, but\nwealth before them in other callings, where, in preparing, they will not\nneed to spend _nine years_ in dead languages and literature never to be\nused; where they can have an abundant field of usefulness, and where\ntheir minds can be _free_ from creeds and the supervision of\necclesiastics and parishes, how long will any such seek the ministry?\n\nWill not the ministry thus soon become the resort, first, of poor,\nambitious young men, who find in its official standing the surest mode,\nwith moderate talents and means, to gain the _highest social position_;\nand next, of _ambitious young men of talents_, who, among such inferior\ncompetitors, are sure of the best pulpits and highest salaries?\n\nAgain: How long will the _laity_ so freely pour out their earnings to\nendow colleges and theological seminaries when such results as these are\nseen?\n\n\nNOTE D, page 336.\n\nIn resigning all farther agency in practical educational efforts, the\nwriter hopes, after so many years of devotion to it, she may be allowed\nto speak with entire frankness her views as to the present modes of\neducation.\n\nThe last thirty years have witnessed great efforts all over the nation\nto improve and increase common schools, and to multiply higher\neducational institutions. Although much has been said and written in\nregard to physical and moral training in schools, unfortunately very\nlittle has been accomplished.\n\nIt is the intellectual department of the brain that has absorbed\nattention, as if this were the chief, or even the whole of man. Parents\nstimulate, teachers stimulate, lecturers stimulate, superintendents\nstimulate, school committees stimulate--all turning their full energies\non to only one function of the brain.\n\nIn our colleges, this _intellectual_ stimulating is divided and\nsubdivided, one professor for one department, another for a second, and\nanother for a third, and so on, till from twelve to twenty are thus\nemployed. Meantime the training of the body, or the development of the\nsocial, domestic, and moral powers, have not even one to minister the\nneedful care.\n\nThen, in preparatory boarding-schools for boys, taken from mother,\nsisters, and home influences in the first blush of youth, all the school\nstimulus is turned on to the brain to develop Latin, Greek, and\nmathematics, while health of body and soul perish under abuse or\nneglect.\n\nThen the boarding-school is taking the young girls through a kind of\ncollege course at the most critical period of life, while their chief\nnervous energies are exhausted in completing _a given course of study in\na given time_, and almost every law of health for body and mind are\nviolated.\n\nThen, in our primary schools, especially in cities, where pure air,\nhealthful exercise, and home employments are least at command, all the\nenergies of school committees and superintendents of schools are\ndirected to securing a given amount of intellectual labor.\n\nBut what is the teaching of physiology on this matter? Through one of\nits greatest writers, thus it speaks:\n\n\"If young children are compelled to sit quietly while their minds are\nurged to undue action, _we take from them the noblest part of their\nstrength, and consume it in the function of thinking_. Thus growth is\nretarded, the limbs imperfectly developed, the digestion (and thus the\nblood) becomes bad, scrofula perhaps appears, and then ensues a great\npredominance of the nervous system. Any _unequal_ development of our\nfaculties is injurious. It is certain that _mental exertions_ weaken the\nmore they are unaccompanied by bodily movements. Those who, _between_\nmental occupations, take bodily exercise, can _do more_ than those who\nneglect this exercise.\"\n\nThe grand evils of our present modes of education are, not that too much\nintellectual training is bestowed, but that physical, social, and\ndomestic training are neglected. The result is a _universal decay of\nnational vigor and health_. Other causes, such as the use of stoves and\nunventilated houses, improper diet and dress, with excess in other modes\nof stimulating, have had a large share in the evil, but there can be no\ndoubt that mistaken modes of education are the chief causes of the\nacknowledged fact that our national health is perishing at a frightful\nrate.\n\nThere are facts that prove the Anglo-Saxon race, as developed in America\nunder the best circumstances, is the most perfect race on earth as it\nrespects size, strength, and beauty. The mountain regions of Kentucky\nand Tennessee, where the climate allows all to live in pure air night\nand day, with the simple food and habit of forest life, send out sons\nthat, appearing in foreign lands, are followed by admiring crowds as\nspecimen giants. General Washington's staff, though not picked men, were\nmost of them over six feet in height, with size and muscle to\ncorrespond. The vigorous mothers and stalwart sons that achieved our\nRevolution have given place to sickly mothers with a delicate and puny\noffspring.\n\nThe Greeks, though they educated the mind, took even more pains to train\nthe body, and thus they became the wisest, strongest, and most powerful\npeople on earth. We might do the same, and with far greater facilities;\nbut, should our present rate of deterioration proceed, two or more\ngenerations would bring us out a race of deformed and unhealthy pigmies.\nFor facts to sustain such a prediction, the author begs leave to refer\nto her _Letters to the People on Health and Happiness_.\n\nThe great point now urged is that woman should be _trained_, not, as\nsome would urge, to enter the professions of men, but _for her own\nproper business_, in educating mind in developing the body of infancy\nand childhood, and in conducting the economy of an orderly, happy, and\nwell-regulated _home_. These arduous and complicated duties demand able\nassistance, and here is the calling of the female educator; not to carry\noff children from their parents and home, but rather to aid these\nparents in education in _all_ departments.\n\nIt is manifestly the Divine intention that parents should be the chief\neducators of the race, and all plans consistent with this will succeed,\nand all counter to it will fail. The boarding-school is not in\nconsonance with this Heaven-appointed plan, and the evils multiply\naround it so fast that a nation of so much common sense as ours must\nsoon forsake it for the true method.\n\nAgain: in the grand object of educating humanity for an _eternal_\nexistence, the questions as to how ordination or baptism shall be\nadministered, or whether it shall be church elders or church committees\nthat rule, are to be made secondary, and the followers of Christ are to\nunite for the education of the race, not as _sects_, but as\n_Christians_.\n\nThese views present the principles on which is organized the _American\nWoman's Educational Association_.\n\nIts main features are, that it unites all sects in education; that it\nspends its funds, not for great buildings to deprive the young of\nparents and homes, but to provide well-trained educators to assist\nparents _in_ their homes; and, finally, its leading aim is to prepare\nwoman for her _distinctive duties_ as educator, nurse, and fountain of\nhome sympathies for the race.\n\nIn attempting this, the methods the other sex have employed to honor and\nsustain _their_ professions have been claimed, viz.: institutions\ngoverned by _a faculty_ instead of an individual, and teachers supported\nby _endowments_ for this express object.\n\nThe following extract from the _fourth_ Annual Report of this\nAssociation gives some of the results.\n\n\"We are now prepared to indicate what has been accomplished. We have,\nthen, in the first place, evolved and set forth a fundamental _idea_.\nThis is no small part of the success of any great movement. Whatever\nwere the difficulties of first learning to print, the triumph of\nGutenberg was nearly achieved when he first mastered the _idea_ of the\ntype. It was a secondary affair to work it out and set the world\nvibrating to its power. We have got the _idea_, and done something\ntoward its execution.\n\n\"We have secured the existence of two institutions on our plan, one at\nMilwaukee, Wisconsin, and the other at Dubuque, Iowa, whose united\ncatalogues will show some five hundred pupils the past year. Both are in\nvery successful operation, with efficient boards of teachers, silently\ndoing the work for which they have been established.\n\n\"We have united all the Protestant citizens in the noble work of\nfounding and patronizing these institutions, which they cherish as among\ntheir most valued public establishments. We have shown that the _faculty\nprinciple_ is as good for female institutions as for those of the other\nsex, and that results may be expected from it for woman corresponding in\nutility and dignity with those it has secured to man.\n\n\"We have shown that, by the _offer_ of the small endowment of twenty\nthousand dollars, we can secure the establishment of one of these\ninvaluable institutions, and make it a permanent source of measureless\ngood--a most economical and wise expenditure of educational\nbenefactions.\n\n\"We have, in short, carried out our plan successfully just as far as it\ncan be done _before_ the endowments are actually furnished.\n\n\"We have made a beginning toward raising the first endowment, and are\nable to report on hand and pledged nearly ten thousand dollars.\n\n\"Our movement has the confidence and full endorsement of many leading\nclergymen, educators, and editors of our country. Our institutions have\nthe hearty co-operation of the religious bodies where they are located.\n\n\"At our last annual meeting, an urgent request was made to the\nAssociation to aid in the establishment of a third institution at\nKalamazoo, Michigan. Without any pledge of immediate action, it was\nagreed that, if the citizens should comply with our conditions, we would\naid them as soon as our means would allow. Those conditions have not yet\nbeen met, and we have not, therefore, been called to do any thing at\nthat place.\n\n\"It has seemed desirable, moreover, that the endowment of the two\ninstitutions already established should be completed before attempting\nto found others.\"\n\nThe questions most frequently proposed to the conductors of this\nenterprise, and the answers to them, will now be introduced.\n\nHow can the business of domestic economy be taught as a part of school\ntraining?\n\nNot in great boarding-schools, where it never was or can be done. The\n\"Mount Holyoke\" plan, now so popular, is widely supposed to embrace this\nin its design. But the _teaching_ of this science is not the aim of\ntheir domestic department. It is a measure for _reducing expenses_ by\nsaving hired labor, while certain social advantages are supposed to be\ncombined with it. But no pupil is to be _taught_ any thing in this\ndepartment. Meantime, introducing cooking, washing, ironing, and\nhouse-cleaning as a regular part of school duty, makes a system of such\ndetail and complication, demanding so many rules and such strict\nobedience as adds enormously to the already excessive pressure that is\nput on the female brain. This is probably an insuperable difficulty\nattendant on this system, that will forever forbid its introduction\nwherever the _healthful_ development of woman has its proper regard.\n\nHow, then, is the object aimed at to be accomplished?\n\nIn reply we say, that, with institutions established for the express\npurpose of training women to be healthy themselves, and to perform\nproperly all their duties as educator, nurse, and regulator of the\ndomestic state; with teachers supported by endowments for this express\nobject; with a board of managers embracing some of the most influential\nladies in the land, who are or have been both practical teachers and\nhousekeepers; with committees of influential ladies in each place where\nsuch institutions are located to co-operate, the thing attempted can not\nfail to be done, and in the best manner. Whatever ought to be done, can\nbe; and whatever can be done, will be, when energetic American women\nfairly undertake it.\n\nBut will endowments for such institutions be furnished?\n\nIn reply, we point to the multitudes of needless colleges for the other\nsex all over the land, for which the people are pouring forth such\nabundant endowments, while _women_ are even more liberal, according to\ntheir relative means, than men.\n\nSince this effort commenced, one lady has endowed a professorship in\nBrunswick College, Maine. Another lady has added $20,000 to the nearly\n_one million_ endowments of Cambridge. These two are the first cases of\nendowments for the _physical_, _social_, and _moral_ departments of\neducation. Woman, then, has first done for man what is now sought for\nher sex.\n\nIn this same short period, sufficient for the endowment of a theological\nprofessorship in Connecticut has been furnished by female benefactors.\nIn New Jersey a lady has given some $30,000 for a college. In New York\nCity another lady has endowed a theological professorship. In Albany,\nNew York, a lady has given $50,000 for a scientific institution for man.\nIn Massachusetts a lady has given more than enough to endow a\nprofessorship for a college in Wisconsin. Many more cases can be given\nof large benefactions, amounting in all to hundreds of thousands, given\nby woman within a few years for the richly-provided professional\ninstitutions of man, while as yet not one complete endowment for her sex\nhas been raised.\n\nWhy is this? Because it is so difficult to change long-established\ncustoms and habits of thought. The idea that every thing must be done\nfor man's profession, and nothing for woman's, has so long been\ndominant, that even our own sex have fallen into that belief and\npractice.\n\nBut the American people are eminent for practical wisdom and common\nsense. The time is certainly coming when the _true view_ is to possess\nthe public mind, and then the right practice will follow. The question\nis simply one as to time, and as to _who_ are to be the first to provide\nmeans for this great movement to promote the right physical, domestic,\nand moral training of our race, whose names shall shine as benefactors\nof our sex, as Harvard and Yale have shone for the other.\n\nBut it is asked, Why go to the West to establish such institutions?\n\nBecause the evils of sectarian strife affect educational interest most\nseverely there; because educational institutions are most needed there;\nand because the moral soil, like the natural, bears fruit so quickly and\nso abundantly.\n\nBut why not endow large boarding institutions already established?\n\nBecause it is contrary to the grand design of Providence to take\nchildren away from parents to educate them; because it is more\neconomical to provide superior teachers and school-houses in cities and\nlarge towns, than to turn funds into brick and mortar to congregate\ngreat communities of the young away from parents, home, and all domestic\npursuits; and because those who need to go to boarding-schools can find\nhomes in private families in large towns.\n\nBut why not have our public schools on this model?\n\nBecause it can not be done until the public, by fair experiments, have\ntested the value of such institutions. So long, too, as foreign lands\nare emptying all classes into our country, and their children enter all\npublic schools, it will be impossible to bring the children of the\nwealthy classes into them.\n\nIn conclusion, the author asks every true woman who reads this to help\nin this effort for the _women and the children_ of our country. If she\nhas money to give, it can be sent to our agent, Rev. William L. Parsons,\nNo. 11 Cliff Street, New York.\n\nIf she has _time_ to devote to the work, let her send $1 25 by mail to\nHarper & Brothers, New York, and she will receive, without farther\nexpense, the author's two works, one on Domestic Economy, and the other\non Physiology and Physical Training, designed as text-books for schools.\nShe can then _use her influence_ to introduce them, while the author's\nprofits, as they ever have been, will be devoted to this object.\n\nThe following is the Constitution of the association and the names of\nthe ladies and gentlemen who superintend the enterprise. Most of them\nhave been practical teachers, most are practical housekeepers, while\nthey represent seven different religious denominations:\n\n\nCONSTITUTION OF THE AMERICAN WOMAN'S EDUCATIONAL ASSOCIATION.\n\nART. 1. The name of this Society is the AMERICAN WOMAN'S EDUCATIONAL\nASSOCIATION.\n\nART. 2. The object of this Association is to aid in securing to American\nWomen a liberal education, honorable position, and remunerative\nemployment _in their appropriate profession_; the distinctive profession\nof woman being considered as embracing the training of the human mind,\nthe care of the human body in infancy and in sickness, and the\nconservation of the family state.\n\nART. 3. The leading measure to be pursued by this Association is the\nestablishment of permanent endowed institutions for women, embracing the\nleading features of college and professional institutions for the other\nsex, _i. e._, they shall be conducted by a _Faculty_ of _Teachers_, each\nbeing the head of a given department, and no one having control over the\nothers. An office corresponding to that of the President of a college\nshall be optional with those who control each institution.\n\nART. 4. The mode of establishing such institutions shall be as follows:\nAn agent of this Association shall make this offer to some city or large\ntown in a section where teachers and schools are most needed.\n\nFirst: That the citizens shall organize a Board of Trustees, in which\nthe various religious denominations of the place shall be fairly\nrepresented; that these Trustees shall provide temporary accommodations,\nand pupils enough to support four Teachers; that a Primary and a High\nSchool Department be organized, and that the college plan of a Faculty\nof Teachers be adopted.\n\nOn these conditions, the Association shall furnish the Institution with\na library and apparatus to the value of one thousand dollars. The first\nBoard of Teachers shall be appointed by the Association, with the advice\nand consent of the Trustees, and thereafter the Faculty shall have the\nnominating and the Trustees the appointing power.\n\nSecond: As soon as the Teachers have secured public confidence, and\nproved that they can work harmoniously together, the citizens shall\nerect a building at an expense of not less than ten thousand dollars,\nand engage to give gratuitous tuition to twenty Normal Pupils. In\nreturn, the Association shall provide an endowment of twenty thousand\ndollars, the interest of which shall furnish the salaries of the three\nsuperior teachers, each having charge of one of the three departments\nset forth above as constituting the profession of woman. They shall also\naid in the literary instruction. These three teachers, with the\nbeneficiary Normal Pupils, and any others who may wish and are qualified\nto enter, shall constitute the Normal Department. The Normal Pupils\nshall act as Assistants in the Primary and High School Departments,\nunder the direction of the Principal Teachers.\n\nART. 5. With each institution shall be connected an organization of\nladies resident in the place of location, who, with the Teachers of the\nNormal Department, shall carry out a system for raising up schools in\ndestitute places, and for securing employ and suitable compensation for\nall teachers trained in the institution. When the home supply is\ninadequate, the Teachers shall be sought from the Board of National\nPopular Education, and other similar associations. All teachers thus\nlocated shall be under the special care of this local Association, and\nthe boarding establishment of the Normal Department shall serve as a\ntemporary home to them in all emergencies demanding it.\n\nART. 6. Funds contributed for endowments shall be held in trust for this\nAssociation by gentlemen Trustees incorporated for the purpose.\n\nART. 7. The whole control of the business and funds shall be in a Board\nof Managers, who shall appoint their own officers, agents, and executive\ncommittee. This Board shall have power to perpetuate and increase\nitself, but the number from any one religious denomination shall never\nexceed one fifth of the whole. Not less than seven different\ndenominations shall be represented in the Board, and a majority shall be\nladies who are or have been practical teachers. Any number of members\npresent, of the Board or of the Executive Committee, at any meeting of\neither, due notice having been given of such meeting, shall constitute a\nquorum. The Board shall meet annually at such time and place as it shall\nappoint, and the presiding officer shall be appointed at each meeting. A\nmeeting may also be called at any time, at the request of any three\nmembers of the Board.\n\nART. 8. Any person may become an honorary _life member_ of this\nAssociation by the payment of twenty-five dollars, and an _honorary\npatron_ of the enterprise by the payment of fifty dollars or upward.\n\n\nBOARD OF MANAGERS OF THE AMERICAN WOMAN'S EDUCATIONAL ASSOCIATION.\n\n Mrs. Z. P. G. Banister,        _Newburyport, Mass._\n Mrs. L. H. Sigourney,          _Hartford, Conn._\n Mrs. S. J. Hale,               _Philadelphia_.\n Miss P. Fobes,                 _Monticello, Ill._\n Mrs. Gen. J. Gould,            _Rochester, N. Y._\n Mrs. E. Ricord,                _Newark, N. J._\n Mrs. H. B. Stowe,              _Andover, Mass._\n Mrs. Prof. H. C. Conant,       _Rochester, N. Y._\n Miss C. E. Beecher,            _Boston, Mass._\n Miss Mary Mortimer,            _Milwaukee, Wis._\n Miss C. M. Sedgwick,           _New York_.\n Mrs. Prof. D. C. Van Norman,        \"\n Mrs. Marcus Spring,                 \"\n Mrs. C. M. Kirkland,                \"\n Mrs. Prof. H. Webster,              \"\n Mrs. A. H. Gibbons,                 \"\n Mrs. C. W. Milbank,                 \"\n Mrs. Rev. Dr. Cheever,              \"\n Mrs. Henry Dwight, Jr.,             \"\n Mrs. James Harper,                  \"\n Mrs. D. Codwise,                    \"\n Mrs. Charles Abernethy,             \"\n Mrs. Prof. Henry B. Smith,          \"\n Mrs. Joseph F. Stone,               \"\n Miss Caroline L. Griffin,           \"\n Mrs. Rev. Abel Stevens,             \"\n Mrs. Rev. W. L. Parsons,            \"\n\nThe following gentlemen are the Officers under the Act of Incorporation\ngranted to the Association by the Legislature of New York in 1855.\n\n BENJ. W. BONNEY, President.\n WM. L. PARSONS, Cor. Secretary.\n HENRY A. HURLBUT, Treasurer.\n\n\nBOARD OF MANAGERS.\n\n CYRUS W. FIELD,\n JOSIAH W. BAKER,\n BENJ. W. BONNEY,\n HENRY A. HURLBUT,\n WM. L. PARSONS.\n\n\nFINANCE COMMITTEE.\n\n CYRUS W. FIELD,\n JOSIAH W. BAKER,\n BENJ. W. BONNEY.\n\n\nFORM OF BEQUEST.\n\nI give and bequeath to the \"American Woman's Educational Association,\"\nincorporated by or under an Act of the Legislature of the State of New\nYork, the sum of [space] Dollars, which I direct to be paid by my\nexecutors to the Treasurer of said Association for the time being.","title":"Common Sense Applied to Religion; Or, The Bible and the People","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":98918}