{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_56517/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_56517","id":"gutenberg_56517","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/56517","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Comte, Auguste, 1798-1857"],"text":"Produced by MFR, Josep Cols Canals, Les Galloway and the\nOnline Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net\n(This file was produced from images generously made\navailable by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n THE\n PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE\n\n\n THE\n PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE\n\n BY\n L. L\u00c9VY-BRUHL\n _Ma\u00eetre de Conf\u00e9rences de Philosophie \u00e0 la Facult\u00e9 des Lettres\n de l\u2019Universit\u00e9 de Paris,\n Professeur \u00e0 l\u2019Ecole libre des Sciences politiques_.\n\n _AUTHORISED TRANSLATION_\n\n TO WHICH IS PREFIXED\n AN INTRODUCTION\n BY\n FREDERIC HARRISON, M.A.\n _Honorary Fellow of Wadham College, Oxford_\n\n [Colophon]\n\n London\n SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO. LIM.\n PATERNOSTER SQUARE\n 1903\n\n\n\n\nNOTE\n\nBY\n\nMR. FREDERIC HARRISON\n\n\nThe publication in 1900 of Professor L\u00e9vy-Bruhl\u2019s volume _The\nPhilosophy of Auguste Comte_ was an event in the history of the\nPositive movement. The eminent position in the University of Paris\nand in recent philosophical history that is held by Prof. L\u00e9vy-Bruhl\ngave great interest and importance to a systematic judgment from his\npen such as the present work. The commemorative festival of Comte held\nthis year, when the statue in the Place de la Sorbonne was unveiled\nby the Minister of War, in presence of an international gathering of\ndelegates from the civilised world, has called fresh attention to\nthe lifework of the philosopher who died 45 years ago. Accordingly,\na translation of Professor L\u00e9vy-Bruhl\u2019s book was urgently demanded.\nWhen I was invited to add to this translation, which I can confidently\nrecommend to students of philosophy, a slight introductory essay, I\nproposed to use a piece which I wrote on the publication of the French\nwork. It appeared in \u201cThe Speaker,\u201d (14 April, 1900;) and, as I see no\nreason to modify my opinion of this masterly book, I leave it nearly\nas then written. I may add that the learned Professor was a member of\nthe International Committee with many eminent representatives of the\ngovernment of France and of the Universities of the Old and New World,\nwhich in May last raised the monument to Auguste Comte in Paris.\n\nProfessor L\u00e9vy-Bruhl followed up his _History of Modern Philosophy in\nFrance_ by a substantial work on the philosophy of Auguste Comte. It\nforms a volume of the _Biblioth\u00e8que de Philosophie Contemporaine_,\nwhich has already devoted four other works to the Positive Philosophy.\nIt is as well to premise that this treatise dealt solely with the\n_philosophy_, not with the polity, or any part of the religious scheme\nof Comte. Professor L\u00e9vy-Bruhl writes as a student, but not as an\nadherent of Auguste Comte. His entire work is rather an exposition, not\na refutation, or a criticism, or an advocacy of Comte\u2019s philosophical\nsystem. But it may be said at once that no one abroad or at home,\ncertainly neither Mill, nor Lewes, nor Spencer, nor Caird, has so truly\ngrasped and assimilated Comte\u2019s ideas as M. L\u00e9vy-Bruhl has done.\n\nIn his _Introduction_ M. L\u00e9vy-Bruhl very clearly states the scope of\nhis work, and his own general attitude. He traces the origin of Comte\u2019s\nphilosophy in the mental effervescence of the first generation of\nthe present century towards a reorganisation of society, after the\nupheaval left by the Revolution and its consequences. He correctly\nstates the relation of St. Simon to Comte as being that of an initial\nstimulus. The cardinal difference between Comte and all the socialists\nand founders of social and religious Utopias consisted in this,\nthat Comte saw the necessity of a new system of philosophy as the\nindispensable preliminary to any reorganisation of society. In 1824, at\nthe age of twenty-six, Comte wrote:\u2014\u201cDiscussions about institutions are\npure folly until the spiritual reconstitution of society is effected\nor much advanced.\u201d The construction of an intellectual reorganisation,\nbefore any social restoration was possible, occupied twenty or thirty\nyears of Comte\u2019s life. And when he opened his _Polity_, or social and\nreligious scheme, the conditions had much changed: the public and its\ninterests were no longer what they had been in 1820-30.\n\nM. L\u00e9vy-Bruhl effectively disposes of the objection of Littr\u00e9, to which\nMill gave countenance, that the _Polity_, with the whole of Comte\u2019s\nsecond or social system, was in contradiction with his first and\nphilosophic system as propounded in the _Philosophy_. As M. L\u00e9vy-Bruhl\nproves, the six _Opuscules_ dating from 1819 to 1826, some years before\nthe _Cours_, which only began in 1830 and occupied twelve years,\ncontain in germ the scheme ultimately elaborated in the _Politique_,\nfrom 1851 to 1854. Besides this, the _Letters to Mill_, which M.\nL\u00e9vy-Bruhl edited in 1899, and the _Letters to Valat_, which are long\nantecedent to the _Politique_, show the same governing design. To the\nunity of Comte\u2019s doctrine M. L\u00e9vy-Bruhl bears emphatic testimony:\u2014\n\n \u201cHis whole life was the methodical execution of his programme.... He\n had but one system, not two. From the _Opuscules_ of his twentieth\n year, to the _Synth\u00e8se_ of his last year, it is the development of one\n and the same conception.\u201d\n\nM. L\u00e9vy-Bruhl then explains that, whilst recognising the entire\ncoherence of Comte\u2019s collective labours, he proposes to confine his\npresent study to the earlier and principal work, the _Philosophy_,\nwhich in M. L\u00e9vy-Bruhl\u2019s opinion is the dominant and more fruitful\ncomposition.\n\nThis he regards as the representative work of the nineteenth century,\nas shown by the intellectual history of the period. He points to its\ninfluence on thought in England, in Europe, and in America. It will\nsurprise many persons to learn that in M. L\u00e9vy-Bruhl\u2019s opinion two\neminent French writers, who assuredly neither were, nor were supposed\nto be, Positivists, \u201chave done more for the diffusion of the ideas and\nmethod of Comte than Littr\u00e9 and all the other Positivists together.\u201d\nThese two are Taine and Renan, much as they differed from Comte\u2019s\nactual scheme and doctrines. Renan indeed spoke of Comte as destined\nto prove one of the typical names of the century. The present writer\nremembers Renan saying to him with a most genial welcome, \u201cI too am a\nbeliever in the religion of humanity.\u201d History, romance, poetry, says\nM. L\u00e9vy-Bruhl, have all reflected the positive spirit:\u2014\n\n \u201cContemporary sociology is the creation of Comte; scientific\n psychology, in a certain degree has sprung from him. It is not rash\n to conclude that the Positivist Philosophy expresses some of the most\n characteristic tendencies of the age.\u201d\n\nIt is clear that, if M. L\u00e9vy-Bruhl is in no sense an adherent of Comte,\nhe is a most sympathetic and discerning master of the positive system.\n\nM. L\u00e9vy-Bruhl opens his analysis of Comte\u2019s philosophy by examining\nhis main conceptions:\u2014(1) The law of the three states, theological,\nmetaphysical, and positive, through which all human ideas pass; (2) the\nClassification of the Sciences; (3) the scheme of each science in turn.\nAnd he closes with an explanation of the general doctrines of Humanity,\nas the centre of human thought, feeling, and activity.\n\nThe law of the three states announced by Comte in 1822, is thoroughly\nexplained and entirely assimilated by M. L\u00e9vy-Bruhl. Its demonstration,\nhe thinks, is complete when we recognise that, although many orders\nof ideas have not finally reached their positive state, all of them\nexhibit the tendency to the same evolution, and there is no single\ninstance of a conception of a positive science ever retrograding\ninto unverified figment. Of course the terms _theological_ and\n_metaphysical_ have to be understood in the sense adopted by\nComte--_i.e._ \u201canthropomorphic\u201d and \u201chypothetical,\u201d a bare hypothesis\nwearing a scientific form. M. L\u00e9vy-Bruhl himself regards the law\nas irrefutable and of capital importance, \u201cthe corner stone of the\npositive system.\u201d\n\nOur professor is equally conclusive in his estimate of Comte\u2019s\nclassification of the sciences. He quite demolishes the objections\nmade to it by Mr. Herbert Spencer in his essay with that title. M.\nL\u00e9vy-Bruhl repeats the criticisms to which Spencer has been exposed in\nthis country and abroad by Littr\u00e9, Lewes, Mill, and others. And he has\nno difficulty in showing that Mr. Spencer\u2019s objections are due to his\nvery slight acquaintance with Comte\u2019s text, and his own superficial\nstudy of the English abridgments. In proposing a classification of\nthe _concrete_ sciences, Mr. Spencer enters on a task which Comte\ndistinctly repudiates, and which on good grounds he treats as\nphilosophically impracticable for purposes of evolutionary sequence.\nComte\u2019s strictly _relative_ theory excludes such a scale of _concrete_\nscience; whilst Spencer\u2019s _absolute_ theory of the universe forces\nhim to attempt it in vain. If it be objected that Comte\u2019s ascending\nscale of the sciences is \u201canthropocentric,\u201d the answer is that, when\nreasonably understood as a philosophic device for sorting human\nideas, not as a statement of _absolute_ truth, the \u201canthropocentric\u201d\narrangement of human knowledge is the only one which is at once\npossible and useful.\n\nIt would need a long essay even to sketch M. L\u00e9vy-Bruhl\u2019s analysis of\nComte\u2019s conception of _science_, of _law_, and of the six dominant\nsciences. He has thoroughly assimilated the positive spirit, that\n_science_ implies a co-ordination of _laws_, not an encyclop\u00e6dia of\nfacts, that it is _relative_ to our powers of observation and reasoning\nand not an _absolute_ explanation of the universe in itself. He goes\nthrough the sciences, physical, social, and moral, in turn, as treated\nby Comte, and justly explains that Comte never attempted or conceived\na _vade-mecum_ or handbook of contemporary scientific knowledge, but\na scheme for the co-ordination of general ideas of science. A real\n\u201cphilosophy of the sciences\u201d is something wholly distinct from a\ncompendium of all the sciences--a thing which in 1840 was far less\npossible than it might be now. Controversialists have reproached Comte\nwith the obvious fact that his concrete science is now sixty years\nold. In dealing with these shallow criticisms, M. L\u00e9vy-Bruhl has shown\nhow little able is any narrow specialist to understand the abstract\nconceptions of a real philosopher.\n\nOne of the most common of these misconceptions is the ignorant charge\nthat Comte repudiated \u201cpsychology,\u201d in the sense of the laws of man\u2019s\nintellectual and moral nature. \u201c_Psychologie_,\u201d as M. L\u00e9vy-Bruhl\nshows, when Comte wrote, meant Cousin\u2019s futile introspection of the\n_ego_. Comte certainly rejected that as idle, as do all competent\npsychologists of our time. Psychology, meaning the laws of mind and\nwill, was not only an indispensable basis of Comte\u2019s system, but its\nrational, systematic foundation dates from Comte\u2019s suggestions. His\nsignal contribution to psychology lies, not in his doctrine of its\nphysiological basis, but in his referring it to sociology as its guide\nand inspiration.\n\nM. L\u00e9vy-Bruhl concludes his study with a co-ordinate table of twelve\ncontrasted propositions of the metaphysical and of the positive\nsystems respectively. These show how simple and rational a transition\nis that between Positivism and the older theological and metaphysical\nhypotheses of the universe and of Man. We welcome a book which all\npositivists will regard as fair, learned, and instructive, and which\nall students of philosophy must regard as a masterly study of a\ncomprehensive subject.\n\n _45th Anniversary of the death of Comte_,\n (5th SEPTEMBER, 1902.)\n\n\n\n\nTRANSLATOR\u2019S PREFACE\n\n\nFifty years have now elapsed since Auguste Comte\u2019s monumental work,\nthe _Cours de Philosophie Positive_, was first introduced to English\nreaders by Miss Harriet Martineau. But her work was much more than a\ntranslation. It was a condensed exposition of Comte\u2019s doctrines, done\nwith such mastery that it obtained the emphatic approval of Comte\nhimself who, in such matters, was not very easily satisfied.\n\nIn Harriet Martineau\u2019s case, both the substance of the book and\nthe English form in which it was offered to the public, were her\nwork. In the case of the present volume, while a woman is once more\nresponsible for the translation, the substance of the book, that is\nthe comprehensive exposition of Comte\u2019s system in the light of all his\npublished works, is from the pen of Professor L\u00e9vy-Bruhl, and readers\nwho are acquainted with Harriet Martineau\u2019s book will be all the more\nin a position to appreciate the importance of this fresh contribution\nto the elucidation of the thought of Auguste Comte.\n\nWe fear that the clearness of style, the richness of expression, the\npower of condensed thought which characterise our author will be found\nto have been often weakened, if not sometimes altogether obliterated,\nin this translation. The striking simplicity of the text at first\ndeceived me into the belief that I could do justice to it. I was often\ntempted to sacrifice the literal sense in order to preserve some of the\ngraces of the original. Yet I hope to be forgiven for having uniformly\npreferred to err through too much faithfulness to the letter. My sole\nobject has been to enable the English reader to get at the meaning of\nthe text.\n\nBut, while I have only too much reason to solicit the indulgence of\nmy readers, conscious as I am of the many defects of this translation,\nI feel that no apology is needed for bringing that of which it is a\ntranslation within the reach of the English-speaking public.\n\nWe live in times when the intimate relation between the natural\nsciences and social questions is increasingly felt. Old landmarks\nare disappearing, new foundations are being laid, new problems are\nconstantly arising, generating doubts and perplexities for which the\nsolutions of other days supply no adequate answer.\n\nMeanwhile, as the facts of science reveal to us more of the conditions\nof human life, we give, more or less consciously, a larger place to\nsociology in our mental preoccupations. Thus renewed interest is being\nfelt in the writings of the Founder of the Science of Sociology. The\nmost conflicting schools of thought study the works of Auguste Comte\nand many ask: who is that man whose ideas appear to contain a clearer\nmessage to our generation than they did to his own? For such inquirers\nProfessor L\u00e9vy-Bruhl\u2019s book should prove singularly useful and timely.\nIt is a plain, independent account of what Comte really taught, written\nby one possessed of the fullest qualifications for such a task, and\nno work of recent date will enable students to understand so clearly\nthe solution given by the French philosopher to the perplexing moral,\nsocial, and religious problems of our time.\n\nHere, as elsewhere, \u201cil s\u2019agit de tout comprendre, non de tout\nadmirer,\u201d and Professor L\u00e9vy-Bruhl is himself too much of a philosopher\nto forget that golden rule; but, nevertheless, by his free, independent\njudgment of Comte\u2019s teaching, he helps us to realise to what an extent,\nin these days, Comte is inspiring many who are not perhaps conscious of\nfollowing him.\n\n KATHLEEN DE BEAUMONT-KLEIN.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n PAGE\n\n Note by Mr. Frederic Harrison v.\n\n Translator\u2019s Preface xiii.\n\n Introduction by Professor L\u00e9vy-Bruhl 1\n\n\n BOOK I.\n\n CHAPTER I.--The Philosophical Problem 23\n\n \u201c II.--The Law of the Three States 35\n\n \u201c III.--The Classification of the Sciences 49\n\n \u201c IV.--Science 60\n\n \u201c V.--Science (continued) Phenomena and Laws 79\n\n \u201c VI.--Science (continued) Positive Logic 103\n\n\n BOOK II.\n\n INTRODUCTION.--The Philosophy of the Sciences 121\n\n CHAPTER I.--Mathematics 125\n\n \u201c II.--Astronomy 142\n\n \u201c III.--Sciences of the Inorganic World 154\n\n \u201c IV.--Biology 171\n\n \u201c V.--Psychology 188\n\n\n BOOK III.\n\n CHAPTER I.--Transition from Animality to Humanity--Art\n and Language 213\n\n \u201c II.--General Considerations on Social Science 230\n\n \u201c III.--Social Statics 249\n\n \u201c IV.--Social Dynamics 260\n\n \u201c V.--The Philosophy of History 276\n\n\n BOOK IV.\n\n CHAPTER I.--The Principles of Ethics 303\n\n \u201c II.--Social Ethics 319\n\n \u201c III.--The Idea of Humanity 334\n\n CONCLUSION 343\n\n\n\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE.\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\n\nI.\n\nEvery new system of philosophy, however original in appearance, is\nmore or less directly related to the doctrines which have preceded\nit. But it is also connected with more general conditions in a manner\nno less close, if not so immediately obvious. It depends upon a whole\nset of social conditions. The influence of the religious, political,\neconomical, intellectual phenomena, in a word of the contemporary\n_milieu_ upon this system is as indisputable as its own influence\nupon the _milieu_. It is therefore not enough to study it as a\nself-sufficient whole. This whole which is in itself but a part, must\nbe restored to its place within the greater whole which alone explains\nits essential characteristics.\n\nThis rule of historical method, which Comte likes to recall, applies\nvery well to his own system. In order to reach as complete an\nunderstanding as possible of his doctrine, to appreciate exactly\nits general orientation, to understand the importance which the\nauthor attaches in it to this or that part, the study of the text\nwill not suffice. We must further take into account the historical\ncircumstances in which the doctrine found its birth, the general\nmovement of contemporary ideas, and the manifold influences which have\nreacted upon the mind of the philosopher.\n\nNow one great fact, above all others, dominates the period in which the\npositive philosophy appeared. It is the French Revolution, as Comte\nexpressly states: without it, neither the theory of progress, nor\nconsequently social science, nor consequently again positive philosophy\nwould have been possible. Was it not, moreover, inevitable that this\nextraordinary social upheaval should by reflex action have determined a\nvast and prolonged movement in philosophical and political speculation?\nThe effects of this reflex action varied according to the value and the\noriginality of the minds which experienced them. But in the greatest as\nin the most mediocre we recognise infallibly certain common features.\nFor instance, men and women, in the rising generation at the beginning\nof the XIX. century, never fail to put the same question to themselves:\n\u201cWhat social institutions should be established after the Revolution?\u201d\nand by this all understand not only the political form of government,\nbut the very principles of social order: a problem which appeared as\nurgent from the practical point of view, as it was supreme from the\ntheoretical point of view. It is this problem in various forms which\npreoccupies Chateaubriand as well as Fourier and Saint-Simon, and\nJoseph de Maistre as well as Cousin and Comte.\n\nAll agree upon the first point. We must \u201creconstruct.\u201d An \u201corganic\u201d\nperiod must succeed the \u201ccritical\u201d period which has just come to\nan end. According to Saint Simon\u2019s striking expression, humanity\nis not made to inhabit ruins. The revolutionary storm had been so\nformidable, the din so deafening, the social back-wash so violent,\nthat no one exactly measured the effect which had been produced. Many\ninstitutions which had only been shaken seemed to be overthrown. A\ngood part of the old r\u00e9gime had even gone through the crisis without\nbeing too greatly damaged, and had survived. But this fact, which was\nvery well appreciated by the men of 1850, could not yet be discovered\nby the first generation of the century. It conscientiously believed\nthat the old r\u00e9gime had crumbled altogether, and that the task either\nof restoring it, or of again laying down the very bases of society\nbelonged to it. In this the first generation remained faithful to the\nspirit of the Revolution, which had considered itself as an effort to\ninstitute an entirely new social and political system, a thought in\nwhich the civilised world had shared. Now, in spite of the labours of\nthe revolutionary assemblies, in spite of the power and of the great\ntalent which the Convention had at its command, this ambitious hope\nhad not been realised. The question remained open after the Directoire\nand after the Empire. When the old r\u00e9gime was supposed to have been\ndestroyed, how was society to be \u201creorganised\u201d?\n\nThus, at the opening of the XIX. century, philosophical speculation\nwas at first to be directed towards the religious and social problems.\nUndoubtedly the influence of the uninterrupted advance of the positive\nsciences was also felt at the same time. A study of Auguste Comte\u2019s\nsystem could hardly fail to recognise the fact. But, even with Comte,\nscientific interest, however active it may be, is subordinated to the\nsocial interest. What he asks of philosophy is the rational settlement\nof the bases of modern society. Thus, he means to discover the elements\nof a religion which can be substituted to Catholicism, whose mission he\nconsiders as at an end.\n\n\u201cThe XIX. century,\u201d Ranke has said, \u201cis especially a century of\nrestoration.\u201d A deep saying, which exactly expresses one of the leading\nfeatures in the historical physiognomy of this century. It is precisely\nthus that it was conceived by those who inaugurated it. Such indeed\nis the main tendency of the greater number of philosophical doctrines\nwhich have expressed its most intimate characteristics. Only, as is\ngenerally the case, this restoration absorbs and consolidates a large\npart of the results acquired during the crisis. At the same time new\nproblems, raised especially by the development of industry in its\nlarger aspects, made clear-sighted men feel that the revolutionary\nperiod, however desirable it might be to bring it to a close, was\nreally only beginning.\n\n\nII.\n\nLike many of his contemporaries Auguste Comte thought himself\nsingled out for the mission of formulating the principle of \u201csocial\nreorganisation.\u201d But this is where he differs from them. Each of the\nreformers begins by proposing his own solution of the social problem,\nand all his efforts only tend to justify it. As this problem is the\nmost urgent one in their eyes, it is also the only one which they have\nput directly to themselves. Now this method, according to Comte, is a\nbad one, and in following it they court certain failure. For a social\nproblem is such that its solution cannot be obtained immediately; other\nproblems, more theoretical in character, must be solved beforehand.\nIt is therefore these which must first be dealt with, if we seek\nanything else than the lengthening of the history of political dreams\nand of social chimeras. \u201cInstitutions,\u201d Comte says, \u201cdepend on morals,\nand morals, in their turn, depend on beliefs.\u201d Every scheme of new\ninstitutions will therefore be useless so long as morals have not been\n\u201creorganised,\u201d and so long as, to reach this end, a general system\nof opinions has not been founded, which are accepted by all minds as\ntrue, as was, for instance, the system of Catholic dogma in Europe in\nthe Middle Ages. Therefore, either the social problem admits of no\nsolution--and Comte does not stop at this pessimistic hypothesis,--or\nthe solution sought for supposes that a new philosophy shall have\nbeen previously established. This is why Comte wishes to be at first\nonly a philosopher. In 1824 he writes \u201cI regard all discussions upon\ninstitutions as pure nonsense, until the spiritual reorganisation of\nsociety has been brought about, or at least is very far advanced.\u201d[1]\n\nComte\u2019s originality will therefore lie in taking from science and\nphilosophy the principles upon which depends the social reorganisation,\nwhich is the real end of his efforts. While having the same aim as the\nreformers of his time, he will follow a different path. It is indeed a\npolity which he also claims to found, but this polity is _positive_: it\nrests upon ethics and philosophy both equally _positive_. Undoubtedly\nthe polity is the _raison d\u2019\u00eatre_ of the system, which Comte has\nconstructed for it. But, without the system, the Polity would remain\narbitrary. It would lack authority and that which would make it\nlegitimate. Philosophy is no less indispensable to the foundation\nof politics, than are politics to the completion and unification of\nphilosophy.\n\nWhence comes it that Comte has put this great problem, which\npreoccupied all the minds of his time, in a form which belongs to\nhim alone? We cannot here enter into the detailed biographical study\nwhich would throw some light upon this question. Let us only recall\nthat Comte was born in a Catholic Royalist family. From the age of\nthirteen, he tells us, he had broken with the political convictions and\nthe religious beliefs of his own people. Perhaps, however, the trace\nof these beliefs was less completely effaced than he himself thought.\nDuring the whole of his life he professed the liveliest admiration for\nCatholicism. On his own confession he was especially inspired in this\nby Joseph de Maistre; but, if he so much appreciated the book _du\nPape_, did not his great sympathy partly spring from impressions of\nchildhood indelibly stamped upon a passionate and sensitive nature?\n\nWhatever may be the case, the first subject which seriously occupied\nhis mind was mathematics. Being admitted to the _Ecole polytechnique_\na year before the usual age, he began to study the natural sciences.\nAt the same time he \u201cmeditates\u201d upon Montesquieu and Condorcet. He\napproaches philosophy properly so called by reading the Scottish\nphilosophers, Ferguson, Adam Smith, Hume, and he sees very well\nthat the last one is far above the others. Having left the _Ecole\npolytechnique_, he remains in Paris, and while giving lessons to earn\nhis living, he completes his scientific education with Delambre, de\nBlainville, and the Baron Th\u00e9nard. He reads assiduously Fontenelle,\nd\u2019Alembert, Diderot, and especially Condorcet who has distilled\nand clarified the philosophy of the XVIII. century. While studying\nDescartes and the great mathematicians who came after him, he also\nfollows attentively the labours of naturalists and of biologists, of\nLamarck, for instance, of Cuvier, of Gall, of Cabanis, of Bichat,\nBroussais and of so many others. He understands the philosophical\nimportance of these new sciences, as already pointed out by Diderot.\nBut for all that he does not neglect historical and social studies. He\nhas read the ideologists, among whom he especially esteemed Destutt\nde Tracy. Without giving up Montesquieu or Condorcet, he studies the\ntraditionalists: M. de Bonald, this \u201cenergetic thinker\u201d and, more than\nthe others, Joseph de Maistre who made the deepest and most enduring\nimpression upon his mind.\n\nBefore knowing Saint-Simon then--and his correspondence with Valat\ntestifies to the fact--Comte already possessed a large portion of\nthe materials for his future system. Up to this time his labours had\nborne upon two distinct orders of subjects. The one scientific proper\n(mathematics, physics and chemistry, natural sciences) the other more\nproperly political (history, politics, and social questions).\n\nIn 1818 Comte meets Saint-Simon. He is attracted and surrenders himself\nalmost unreservedly. For four years he works with Saint-Simon. He\nloves and venerates him as a master. He feeds upon his ideas, and\ncollaborates in his labours and enterprises. He calls himself \u201cpupil\nof M. Saint-Simon.\u201d However, from 1822 he detaches himself from this\ngreatly-admired master, and in 1824 the rupture is complete and final.\nWhat can have happened?\n\nThe grievances brought forward by Comte are only of secondary\nimportance. As a matter of fact master and pupil were bound to separate\nsooner or later. There was a radical incompatibility between those two\nminds. Saint-Simon, marvellously inventive and original, throws out\na multitude of new ideas and views, of which many will be fruitful.\nBut he quickly affirms, and proves little. He has not the patience to\ncontinue working long at the same subject, or to probe it to the bottom\nin an orderly way. Comte, on the contrary, thinks with Descartes,\nthat method is essential to science, and that \u201clogical coherence\u201d is\nthe surest sign of truth. He could not long remain satisfied with\nSaint-Simon\u2019s disconnected essays. He could even, without dishonesty,\nturn to account the brilliant but disorderly intuition in which his\nmaster abounds and believe that his own doctrine alone gave those\ndisconnected essays scientific value, because his doctrine alone was\nin a position to systematise them and to connect them with their\nprinciples.\n\nIt would therefore seem that we can admit at the same time that\nSaint-Simon\u2019s influence upon Comte was considerable, and, on the other\nhand, that Comte\u2019s philosophical originality is no less certain.\nSaint-Simon\u2019s influence would chiefly have consisted: 1. in suggesting\nto Comte a certain number of general ideas and of views of detail,\nespecially for his philosophy of history; 2. in showing him how\nthe two orders of labours which he had been following until then\nwere to blend into a single one, through the creation of a _science_\nwhich would be social, and consequently of a _polity_ which would be\nscientific. Would this synthesis of the two orders of studies which\nComte had undertaken side by side have been produced in his mind, had\nhe not known Saint-Simon? In any case it would have been produced\nmore slowly. Let us at least leave Saint-Simon the credit which Comte\nhimself granted him, that of having \u201cstarted\u201d his disciple upon the\nline best suited to his genius.\n\nThe intellectual intimacy between them could never be perfect. If\nComte entered entirely into Saint-Simon\u2019s ideas, (without adopting\nthem all, however), in return there was an aspect in Comte\u2019s thought\nwhich Saint-Simon scarcely discerned through the lack of a sufficiently\nstrong scientific education. It is enough to see how he speaks of\nthe law of universal attraction. Comte must have been scandalised by\nit. So, at the very moment when he submits with most enthusiasm and\nyouthful confidence to Saint-Simon\u2019s influence he does not neglect his\nspecial mathematical studies. \u201cMy labours,\u201d he writes to Valat on the\n28th of September, 1819, \u201care and will be in two orders, scientific and\npolitical. I should set little value upon the scientific studies, did I\nnot continually think of their utility to the human race. As well then\namuse myself in deciphering very complicated puzzles. I have a supreme\naversion for scientific labours whose utility, either direct or remote,\nI do not see. But I also confess, in spite of all my philanthropy, that\nI should put far less eagerness into political labours, if they did\nnot stimulate the intellect, if they did not bring my brain strongly\ninto play, in a word: if they were not difficult.\u201d[2] A year later,\nin sending a parcel of political tracts to his friend, in which he\ndistinguishes what is in his own manner and what is from Saint-Simon,\nhe says that he is besides very eagerly occupied with mathematical\nwork. He wants to take part in the competition opened by the Institut;\nand his ambition is soon to enter the _Academie des Sciences_.\n\nFrom 1822, in the celebrated pamphlet entitled _Plan des travaux\nscientifiques n\u00e9cessaires pour r\u00e9organiser la soci\u00e9t\u00e9_, the synthesis\nbetween the two orders of labours is accomplished in Comte\u2019s mind,\nthanks to the double discovery of the classification of the sciences\nand of the great law of social dynamics. We know that this work was,\nif not the principal reason, at least the occasion of the rupture\nbetween Comte and Saint-Simon. It is the moment which Comte himself\nconsiders to have been decisive in the history of his mind. The whole\nof his future doctrine was essentially contained in this pamphlet.\nThe preface added by Saint-Simon shows that he did not understand its\nfull bearings. Comte is henceforth his own master. At length he has\nfound what for several years he had been seeking without being clearly\nconscious of it; and the rest of his life is now consecrated to the\nwork which he has conceived and of which he has just outlined the plan.\nSince he has established a philosophical hierarchy of the sciences,\nwhose summit is crowned by social physics, he has no further occasion\nto ask how he can conciliate his scientific labours with his political\nstudies.\n\n\u201cIn the interval of my great philosophical labours,\u201d he writes on\nthe 8th September, 1824, \u201cI propose to publish a few more special\nworks upon the fundamental points in mathematics, which I have long\nconceived, and which I have at last been able to connect with my\ngeneral ideas of positive philosophy: so that I shall be free to give\nmyself up to them without _breaking through the unity of my thought_,\nwhich is the great condition for the life of a thinker.\u201d[3] And in a\nvery remarkable letter to de Blainville, on the 27th February, 1826,\nhe explains in the clearest way the generating idea of his system. \u201cMy\nconception of politics as social physics, and the law which I have\ndiscovered upon the three successive states of the human mind are but\none and the same thought, considered from the two distinct points of\nview of method and of science. That being established, I shall show\nthat this single thought directly and completely satisfies the great\nactual social need, _considered under its two aspects of theoretical\nneed and practical need_. I will therefore show that what on one hand\ntends to consolidate the future by re-establishing order and discipline\namong intellects, tends, on the other hand to regulate the present, as\nfar as possible, by furnishing statesmen with _rational_ lines to work\nupon.\u201d[4]\n\nHenceforth Comte\u2019s life was to be but the methodical execution of his\nprogramme. In turn, with perfect regularity, he wrote and published the\nphilosophy of the sciences and of history, the ethics, the positive\npolity and the positive religion. Does this mean that Comte\u2019s thought\nremained stationary? Most certainly not. It evolved from 1822 to 1857.\nBut this evolution followed a curve which an attentive observer might\nhave sketched beforehand after having read the _Plan des travaux\nscientifiques n\u00e9c\u00e9ssaires pour r\u00e9organiser la soci\u00e9t\u00e9_. Comte had but\none system, not two. From the _opuscules_ of his twentieth year to the\n_Synth\u00e8se subjective_ of his last year, it is the development of one\nand the same conception.\n\n\nIII.\n\nThe unity of the doctrine has been disputed. Comte himself\ndistinguished two successive \u201ccareers\u201d in his life. In the first, he\nsays, without affected modesty, he was Aristotle: in the second he\nwill be St. Paul. The founder of the philosophy did but pave the way\nfor the organiser of the religion. \u201cI have systematically devoted my\nlife to draw at last from real science the necessary basis of a sound\nphilosophy, according to which I was afterwards to construct the true\nreligion.\u201d[5]\n\nMany of Comte\u2019s disciples, even some of the more illustrious, and\nat first more fervent, such as Littr\u00e9, refused to follow him in his\n\u201csecond career.\u201d Their admiration for the philosopher could not\npersuade them to submit to the pontiff.\n\nLittr\u00e9 and his friends were undoubtedly free to follow Comte only up\nto a certain point, and, while accepting his philosophy, to reject\nhis religion. If they had stopped there, Comte could but have blamed\ntheir want of logic and himself have disowned \u201cthose incomplete\npositivists, who are not more intelligent because they call themselves\nintellectual.\u201d But it is they, on the contrary, who accused Comte of\ninconsistency and of self contradiction. Comte, they said, betrayed his\nown principles. The \u201csubjective method\u201d in his second career ruined the\nprecious results he had obtained in the first by his objective method.\nIn refusing to go beyond the _Cours de philosophic positive_ they\nremained more faithful to Comte\u2019s master-thought than Comte himself. In\na word, they defended true positivism against its misguided founder.\n\nComte answered these attacks, which were all the more painful to him\nbecause they came from those whom he had long regarded as his faithful\ndisciples and his best friends. In the course of this work it will\nappear that those attacks were unfounded.[6] Comte\u2019s two methods are\nnot opposed to each other. They complete each other, as do also the two\n\u201ccareers\u201d which they characterize.\n\nIt is true that during the last two years of his life an increasingly\nmarked tinge of mysticism spread over his thought and his writings.\nHis brief friendship with Mme. de Vaux, and the death of this \u201choly\u201d\nfriend had stirred very strong emotions within him, and these emotions\nwith him were transformed into ideas which came to be incorporated into\nhis system. At the same time he laboured to organise the Religion of\nHumanity. He claimed to secure for it an authority over souls at least\nequal to that which had been enjoyed by Catholicism at the period of\nits greatest power. The exaltation of his sentiments, the preoccupation\nof the new religion which was to be established, the ever-present\nconsciousness of his sacerdotal mission, all this was necessarily bound\nto react upon the doctrine which he had founded in the preceding period.\n\nThus the philosophy of the sciences and of history is no longer\npresented to us in the same way in the _Politique positive_ as it is\nin the _Cours de philosophie positive_. But it is designedly so. The\ndifference in tone and the difference of method in the setting forth\nis explained, according to Comte, by the different object which he\nhas in view in each of these works.[7] Essentially, the philosophical\ndoctrine has not varied. All we can grant to Littr\u00e9 is that by the fact\nof its being presented from the religious, that is to say from the\nsynthetic, point of view in the _Politique positive_, it undergoes an\napparent alteration. If we only knew the doctrine through this work we\nshould not get the perfectly clear view of it given in the _Cours de\nphilosophie positive_. Comte himself often advises the reader of the\n_Politique_ to refer to his \u201cgreat fundamental treatise.\u201d\n\nBut, on the other hand, in carefully reading the _Cours_, we find\nnumerous indications of the future structure of the Politique positive.\nComte might have been content with a reference to the _Cours_, to\nanswer the objections of his dissenting disciples. He did better. He\nreprinted at the end of the fourth volume of his _Politique positive_\nsix pamphlets written in his youth from 1818 to 1826. In them, not\nonly is his philosophy already sketched in its main outlines with\nsufficient precision; but the idea that philosophy is a preliminary\nwork, a simple prelude and that the essential work, the supreme end,\nis the positive religion which shall arise upon this philosophy--this\nidea is the very soul of these pamphlets. The proof is given. Upon\nthe question of the unity of his doctrine Comte wins the case against\nLittr\u00e9.\n\n\nIV.\n\nIn his correspondence with Stuart Mill which takes place between 1841\nand 1846, that is to say which embraces the end of his first career\nand the beginning of the second, Comte has repeatedly explained how\nthe two successive portions of his work are connected together, and in\nwhat they are distinct. It may not be useless to quote his own words.\n\u201cThe second half of my philosophical life,\u201d he says, \u201cmust differ\nnotably from the first, especially in that feeling must take, if not\nan obvious, at least a real part in it, one as great as that of the\nintellect. The great work of systematization which has been reserved\nfor our century, must indeed embrace equally, both feelings and ideas\nas a whole. Truly it was the ideas which had first to be systematized,\nunder pain of failing to bring about a complete regeneration by falling\ninto a more or less vague mysticism. That is why my fundamental work\nhad to appeal almost exclusively to the intellect. It was to be a work\nof research, and accessorily of discussion, destined to discover and\nto constitute the true universal principles, in rising by hierarchical\ndegrees from the simplest scientific questions to the highest\nsocial speculations.\u201d[8] But this being done, Comte passed to the\nsystematisation of the feelings, \u201ca necessary sequel to that of the\nideas, and an indispensable basis for that of the institutions.\u201d\n\nIt is, therefore, an entirely new work. Comte can imagine without\ndifficulty that it might have been reserved for another than himself.\nHis personal mission might have been limited to the foundation of the\nphilosophy which puts an end to the \u201c_mental_ anarchy.\u201d The ethics and\nthe religion which were to be established upon this philosophy, to put\nan end to _moral and political_ anarchy, would, in this case, have been\nthe work of one of his successors. Stubborn labour and good fortune\nallowed Comte to undertake this work himself. But even in 1845, he says\nhow \u201cunder the holy influence of Mdme. de Vaux,\u201d he had very clearly\nseen his two careers as distinct and as one, these two careers of which\nthe second was to transform philosophy into religion, as the first had\nchanged science into philosophy.\n\nThe object of the present work is to study Comte\u2019s philosophy properly\nso called, leaving aside the transformation of this philosophy into\nreligion. The choice which we thus make is not an arbitrary one, since,\nin order to justify it, we have the distinction formally established\nby Comte himself, when he admits that his philosophy and his religion\nmight have been the work of two different persons.\n\nIt will perhaps be asked in what our position differs from that of\nLittr\u00e9, and of the \u201cincomplete positivists.\u201d By the difference, we\nshall answer, which separates the historical from the dogmatic point of\nview. It is from the latter point of view that Littr\u00e9 and his friends\nreject the \u201csystematisation of the feelings,\u201d the subjective method\nand the religion of Humanity. It is as positivists that they connect\nthemselves with the first half of the doctrine, and that they exclude\nthe second half. But we are here working from the historical point of\nview, and the historian, while using his right to define the limits of\nhis work has nothing to exclude from the doctrine which he sets forth.\nAs a matter of fact far from claiming with Littr\u00e9 that the second part\nof Comte\u2019s work weakens and contradicts the first, we have recognised\nthat they both form a whole of which he had drawn out the plan in his\nearly writings, and that he was not wrong in taking as an epigraph for\nhis _Politique positive_ the fine words of the poet-philosopher: _What\nis a great life? A thought of youth fulfilled in riper age._\n\nBut then, why only study the first of the two careers, why not respect\nthe integrity of that whole which, according to us, Littr\u00e9 ought not to\nhave disregarded?--We do respect it, for we do not arbitrarily exclude\nfrom the doctrine any of the parts which Comte included in it. If we\nmake the philosophy proper the sole object of this study, in it we\nshall ever have before our minds the idea of the greater whole in which\nComte placed it. On this condition alone, our study will be accurate.\nBut once this condition is fulfilled we do not consider that we exceed\nour right, in concentrating our effort upon the philosophy.\n\nThere are two different ways of conceiving the history of a doctrine.\nThe historian may place himself exactly in the mental attitude of\nthe philosopher whom he studies, and think again after him his\nleading ideas, as indeed he should do; but further, he can judge,\njust as the philosopher himself does, of the respective importance of\nproblems, without allowing himself to distinguish what is secondary\nfrom what is essential. The historical work then assumes the shape\nof a \u201cmonography,\u201d or of an \u201cintellectual biography;\u201d or else, while\nendeavouring to penetrate to the heart of the system, in order to\ngrasp it in its principles, the historian may nevertheless place\nhimself outside it and above it, and try to \u201csituate\u201d it in the\ngeneral evolution of philosophy. Then the system is better understood\nin its entirety, since we can see its relations with the preceding,\ncontemporary and following doctrines. At the same time it becomes\npossible to separate what is of enduring philosophical interest, from\nwhat was merely of secondary or momentary importance, although the\nauthor may have judged otherwise. To borrow from Comte a distinction\nwhich he often uses, the former of these methods is better suited to\nerudition, the latter to history.\n\nApplied to the study of his doctrine, the first method would have us\nto consider positive philosophy with him as simply preparatory to the\nReligion of Humanity, which was the first and the last goal of his\nefforts. The writer should undoubtedly give a large place to this\n\u201cpr\u00e9ambule indispensable,\u201d to this great fundamental work, in which\nComte lays down the intellectual bases of his political and religious\nsystem. But he ought nevertheless to subordinate it to this system and\nplace in the front rank the \u201csocial reorganisation,\u201d the dogma, the\nworship and the _r\u00e9gime_ of the Religion of Humanity, the institution\nof a spiritual power, in fact the whole of that portion of Comte\u2019s work\nin which he takes up again \u201cthe Catholic programme of the Middle Ages,\u201d\nconfident of fulfilling it better than Catholicism itself ever did.\n\nNow it is not in this part of his work that Comte shows himself most\noriginal, and that his thought has been most fruitful. The problem of\n\u201csocial reorganisation\u201d does not belong to him alone. Its presence\nis felt, so to speak, in the air at the time that Comte\u2019s youth was\npassing away. The common aspirations of the generation which grew\nup with him were to re-establish order and to fix the conditions of\nprogress, to determine the relations of Ethics to Politics, and to\nput a new religion in the place apparently left free by Catholicism.\nThe _Politique positive_ which claims to satisfy these aspirations,\ncorresponds in Comte\u2019s system (all proper allowance being made for\nthe substance of the doctrines) to what the Saint Simon school had\nalready attempted to do before 1830. It comes thirty years later\nthan the previous attempts of the same kind, because Comte wanted\nto found his \u201csocial organisation\u201d upon philosophy and morality, and\nbecause this speculative effort occupied the better part of his youth\nand of his maturity. But it originated in fact in the first third of\nthe century as is proved by the pamphlets reprinted by Comte. When it\nappears between 1850 and 1857, a new generation brought up in other\npolitical and social circumstances gives it only passing attention.\nOther problems command attention more forcibly, and claim a more\nurgent solution. The philosophy of history no longer excites the same\npassionate interest. Men are less anxious to see the birth of a new\nreligion, and Catholicism has proved that its vitality is still very\nstrong.\n\nTherefore neither Comte\u2019s genius, nor the precautions which he thought\nhe had taken to place his \u201csocial reorganisation\u201d upon a rational\nbasis, could shield it from the common fate which sooner or later\novertakes all attempts similar to his own. Undoubtedly the _Politique\npositive_ and the other works of Comte\u2019s second career are full of\njust and deep views. Whatever may be the subject upon which a great\nmind has worked it is always interesting and profitable to see what\nthe reflection of that mind has discovered in it. But, in fact, that\nportion of his work, which to him was the most important, is far from\nmaintaining this position in the eyes of the historian.\n\nBy his _Politique positive_ Comte only represents his generation. By\nhis philosophy properly so called he is a \u201crepresentative man\u201d of\nhis entire century. Is it necessary to prove this? The intellectual\nhistory of our age witnesses to it at every step. Of all the systems\nwhich found birth in France in the XIX. century, this one alone found\na hearing beyond the frontiers and left a deep impression upon foreign\nthinkers. Comte\u2019s philosophy was at first received in England and in\nHolland even with more sympathy than in France. John Stuart Mill,\nHerbert Spencer, George Lewes, George Elliot and a number of English\nphilosophers and writers drew more or less of their inspiration from\nit. To this day, it is defended by men of great talent in England. It\nis true that no German philosopher had the same personal relations\nwith Comte as John Stuart Mill, but as a matter of fact, for thirty\nyears the positive spirit has gradually gained ground in the German\nUniversities. To be convinced of this, it is enough to see how\nmetaphysics are set aside in them and to observe the lines on which the\nmoral and social sciences are taught. In the Latin countries of the\ntwo hemispheres Comte\u2019s influence has been exercised with even greater\nstrength, in Spain, in Portugal, in South America; and North America\nhas also its Positivist societies. In his life time, Comte had already\nfound there some of his most devoted disciples. In France the principal\n\u201cvehicles\u201d of Positivist philosophy have been the works of two writers\nwho, in their time, were those most beloved by the public; Renan and\nTaine, although they were not positivists, have perhaps done more for\nthe diffusion of the ideas and method of Comte than Littr\u00e9 and all the\nother positivists together.\n\nIt is true that Taine owes a great deal to Spinoza and to Hegel, and\nmore still to Condillac. Among his contemporaries he seems to be\nespecially connected with John Stuart Mill and Spencer. But through\nthem it is from Comte that he proceeds, and there we find the origin\nof the greater number of his leading ideas. His conception of literary\nhistory, of criticism, of the philosophy of art, in a word, his effort\nto bring into the study of the moral sciences the method used in the\nnatural sciences, all this is chiefly derived from Auguste Comte. The\n_Histoire de la Litterature anglaise_ is, in a sense, an application\nof the positive theory according to which the evolution of the arts\nand literatures is governed by necessary laws which constitute its\nsolidarity with that of morals, of institutions and of beliefs. The\ntheory of the \u201cmoment\u201d and of the \u201cmilieu\u201d which is the chief one in\nTaine\u2019s work was certainly not unknown in the XVIII. century. But it\nis Comte who generalised it by bringing Lamarck nearer to Montesquieu;\nit is he who taught Taine the general definition, at once biological\nand social, of the idea of the \u201cmilieu.\u201d\n\nRenan spoke of Comte with extreme severity, and not without some\ndisdain. He owned, however, that later on Comte\u2019s name would be one\nof the most representative ones of this century, and he had himself\nstrongly felt his influence. We must certainly take into account all\nthe other French and foreign sources from which this mind at once so\nsupple and so large, drew inspiration. But is it not from Comte, as\nmuch as from Hegel, that he learnt to regard history as the \u201csacred\nscience of humanity,\u201d to expect from it what before was demanded\nfrom theology, to transform the ancient dogmas of Providence and of\noptimism into the belief in the positive idea of progress, and finally\nto conceive that truth and goodness are not immutable and immoveable\nrealities, but are realised by degrees through the effort of successive\ngenerations?\n\nThese two examples will suffice to show the point of extreme diffusion\nwhich has been reached by the positive spirit.\n\nThis spirit is so intimately mingled with the general thought of our\ntime that we scarcely notice it, just as we do not pay attention to\nthe air we breathe. History, romance, and, even poetry have reflected\nits influence and, being charged with it, have contributed to its\ndiffusion. Contemporary Sociology is the creation of Comte; scientific\nPsychology, in a certain degree has also sprung from him. From all\nthese signs, it is not rash to conclude that positive philosophy\nexpresses some of the most characteristic tendencies of the age.\n\nWe are therefore conforming to historical reality when we attach\nourselves, in Comte\u2019s work, to the philosophy which constitutes its\nmost original, and up to the present time its most fruitful and living\npart. It matters little that he himself should only have considered it\nas a preliminary portion of his work. How often has the speculative\neffort made by a great thinker for the purpose of establishing\npractical conclusions proved to be of more enduring interest than those\nconclusions themselves!\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] Lettres \u00e0 Valat, p. 156-7 (25 D\u00e9cembre 1824).\n\n[2] Lettres \u00e0 Valat, p. 99.\n\n[3] Lettres \u00e0 Valat, p. 128.\n\n[4] Revue Occidentale, 1881, I, p. 288.\n\n[5] Politique positive, II, p. XX.\n\n[6] V. book, I, ch. vi. p.\n\n[7] Correspondence de J. S. Mill et de Comte, Lettre de Comte du 14\njuillet 1845, p. 456-7.\n\n[8] Correspondance de Comte and de Stuart Mill, p. 456-7. Lettre de\nComte du 14 juillet 1845.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK I\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM\n\n\nAccording to Comte, philosophy is destined to serve as a basis for\nmorality, for politics and for religion. It is not an end in itself but\na means to reach an end not otherwise attainable. Had Comte thought\nit possible to reorganise society without first reorganising morals,\nand to reorganise morals without first reorganising beliefs, he would\nnot perhaps have written the six volumes of the \u201cCours de Philosophie\npositive\u201d which occupied him from 1830 to 1842. He would have gone\nstraight to what was of supreme interest.\n\nHe early became convinced that the shortest way would not be the\nbest. In his view, all endeavour at religious, moral, or political\nreorganisation, must be vain so long as _mental_ reorganisation has not\ntaken place. It is therefore with a new philosophy that he must begin.\nIndispensable to the social end which Comte has in view, philosophy\nbecomes, at least provisionally, an end in itself.\n\nComte is going to endeavour to reorganise beliefs, that is to say, to\nsubstitute a demonstrated faith to the revealed faith whose force is\nnow spent. This demonstrated faith will have nothing in common with\nthe natural religion of the XVIII. century, which was at bottom but\na weak and degenerate form of belief in the supernatural. Under the\nmetaphysical garb of Deism we still recognise theological thought.\nOn the contrary the demonstrated faith will have its origin and\nits justification in positive science. The two words \u201cfaith\u201d and\n\u201cdemonstration\u201d appear to clash with each other. But the contradiction\nlies merely on the surface. For we are still concerned with \u201cfaith\u201d\nsince the great majority of men will always have to take on faith the\nconclusions of positive philosophy.\n\nThe number of men with sufficient leisure and enough culture to examine\nthese conclusions and to go into their proofs will always be small.\nThe attitude of the others must be one of submission and respect. But,\ndiffering on this point from the religious dogmas which humanity has\nknown until now; the new faith will be \u201cdemonstrated.\u201d It will contain\nnothing which has not been established and controlled by scientific\nmethods, nothing which goes beyond the domain of the relative, nothing\nwhich at any moment cannot be proved to a mind capable of following the\ndemonstration.\n\nThis form of \u201cfaith\u201d already exists in the case of a great number of\nscientific truths. Thus all men to-day believe in the theory of the\nsolar system which we owe to Copernicus, to Galileo and to Newton.\nYet how many are in a position to understand the demonstrations upon\nwhich this theory rests? They know, however, that what here is a matter\nof faith to them, is a matter of science to others, and would be so\nequally for themselves had they gone through the necessary studies.\n_Faith_ therefore signifies here not indeed a voluntary abdication of\nthe intellect in presence of a mystery which surpasses its power of\ncomprehension, but a submission to fact, which in no way encroaches\nupon the rights of reason. Every man is not capable, at any moment, of\nexercising this right to criticise. In practice, Comte will severely\nrestrict the use of it.[9] But in theory this right belongs to all men,\nand must ever remain unalterable. In the last place the legitimate\nexistence of the demonstrated faith rests upon this proposition: \u201cIf\nall minds were in a condition to examine the dogmas of that faith,\nall, without exception, would understand the demonstration, and would\nagree with it.\u201d\n\nThe words \u201cbelief\u201d and \u201cfaith\u201d must not be misunderstood. In the\n\u201creorganisation of beliefs\u201d which he undertakes, Comte only concerns\nhimself with beliefs capable of demonstration. He is here faithful to\nthe thought of Saint Simon, who understood \u201creligion\u201d chiefly as a\nbasis of political organisation. At any rate, in the early part of his\nphilosophical career Comte does not bring into \u201cfaith\u201d the mystical,\nsentimental and non-intellectual elements which this word usually\nimplies and which so often oppose it to \u201creason.\u201d The word signifies\nfor Comte that which man believes concerning _what may be for him a\nsubject of knowledge_. Until now these beliefs have set forth a more\nor less mythical or metaphysical explanation of the universe and of\nman, taught by priests and philosophers. But this no longer satisfies\nthe human mind. By degrees positive science, which works on a totally\ndifferent plan, substitutes a knowledge of the laws of phenomena to\nthose \u201cexplanations.\u201d From this moment the problem thus presents itself\nto Comte: To establish by rational means a system of universally\naccepted truths concerning man, society and the world.\n\nComte thus takes for granted: 1st, that the \u201copinions,\u201d the \u201cbeliefs\u201d\nand the \u201cconceptions\u201d relating to these matters, are to-day\n\u201canarchical\u201d: 2nd, that their natural and normal condition is to be\n\u201corganised.\u201d\n\nThere is no need to prove the first part; a glance at contemporary\nsociety is enough. The confused disturbing movements which fill it with\ntrouble and agitation, and which, unless rational harmony be at last\nestablished, threaten its destruction are not due merely to political\ncauses. They proceed from moral disorder. And this in turn proceeds\nfrom intellectual disorder, that is to say from a lack of principles\ncommon to all minds, and from the absence of universally admitted\nconceptions and beliefs. For in order that a human society may subsist,\na certain harmony of sentiment or even common interests among its\nmembers will not suffice. Above all things, intellectual concord which\nfinds expression in a body of common beliefs is necessary.\n\nIf, therefore, a society be a prey to chronic disorders, which\npolitical remedies appear powerless to cure, one has every right to\nbelieve that the deep-rooted evil has its origin in intellectual\ndisorganisation. All other troubles are merely symptoms. This,\naccording to Comte, is precisely the state of contemporary society.\nIt has neither \u201cintellectual\u201d nor \u201cspiritual\u201d government, and does\nnot even feel the want of it. The minds of men recognise no common\ndiscipline. Not a principle subsists which negative and \u201ccorrosive\u201d\ncriticism has not attacked. The individual erects himself as a judge\nof all things--philosophy, ethics, politics, religion. The opinion\nwhich he adopts most frequently without any special qualification for\nso doing, and according to his passions, always appears to him to have\nas much right to be admitted as those of other men. He claims to be\namenable to no one for his thoughts. And this scattering (later on\nComte will say insurrection) of intelligences is what he calls a state\nof _anarchy_.\n\nBut, we may say, does not this state represent the ordinary condition\nof human societies? Perhaps the \u201corganic\u201d state only appears\noccasionally and as an exception? Such a supposition is groundless.\nFor, if such were the case societies could not subsist, and above all\ncould not develop. We must admit, on the contrary, that periods of\nintellectual anarchy form the exception, and that in a normal state of\nsociety men are united by their unanimous submission to a sufficiently\nlarge body of principles and beliefs. History confirms this view. The\nimmobility of civilisation in the Far-East is especially due to the\nintellectual stability which distinguishes it from our own condition.\nThe societies of Antiquity (Grecian and Roman), rested upon a\nconception of man, of citizenship and of the world, which, as a matter\nof fact, scarcely varied during the whole period of their existence.\nLastly, in the Middle-ages, Christianity had constituted an admirable\nspiritual authority. The organisation of Catholicism, \u201ca masterpiece of\npolitical sagacity,\u201d had established a body of beliefs which all minds\naccepted with complacent docility. It is the decomposition of this\ngreat system which has produced the majority of the evils with which\nwe are now struggling. Mental anarchy is therefore truly an abnormal\nstate, a pathological fact, what Comte will call later on the \u201cwestern\ndisease,\u201d a mortal disease if it is to be prolonged. Either modern\nsociety must perish, or minds must regain their stable equilibrium by\nsubmission to common principles.\n\nThe problem of the organisation of beliefs would seem to come under\ntwo heads. In the first place we have the philosophical problem: how\nto establish a system of principles and beliefs capable of being\nuniversally admitted; and, in the second place, a social problem:\nhow to bring all minds into the new faith. But this distinction only\nappears on the surface. As a matter of fact, the solution of the\nfirst problem will necessarily imply that of the second. Does not the\nprincipal cause for the lack of common discipline lie in the disorder\nwhich troubles the mind of each individual? If intellects are divided\namong themselves it is because each intellect is divided against\nitself. Let one of them succeed in establishing a perfect harmony\nwithin itself, and by the mere force of logic, this harmony, by gradual\ndiffusion will be communicated to the others--once true philosophy is\nestablished, the rest will only be a matter of time. It will therefore\nsuffice to examine the opinions and beliefs which actually exist in\n_one_ mind, and to inquire into the conditions necessary to substitute\nin it harmony to anarchy, or in a word, to realise within it a _perfect\nlogical coherence_.\n\nAs Descartes, in order to test all his knowledge, had only to examine\nthe sources from which it originated, so Comte, in order to verify the\nlogical compatibility of his opinions, will content himself with the\nconsideration of the methods which have furnished him with them. If he\ndiscovers methods which mutually tend to exclude each other, he will\nhave found the cause of the mental disorder which gives birth to all\nthe evils we see troubling modern society. At the same time he will\nhave discovered the remedy which will bring about the disappearance\nof those contradictions. The human mind is so constituted, that the\nfirst thing it requires is unity. Understanding is spontaneously\nsystematic. Opinions merely in juxtaposition in the mind but\nlogically irreconcilable cannot satisfy it. As a matter of fact, the\ncontradiction, even when it is ignored, nevertheless impresses itself.\nWhether we know it or not, each of our opinions implies a complexus\nof connected opinions all arrived at by the same method as the one in\nquestion; and this complexus is itself part of the more considerable\nwhole which finally completes itself in a comprehensive conception of\nthe world given in experience.\n\nNow Comte saw in himself, as in his contemporaries, two general\nmethods, two \u201cmodes of thought\u201d which cannot coexist without\ncontradiction, although neither one nor the other has obtained a full\nmastery up to the present time. Concerning several categories of\nphenomena he thinks as a scholar trained in the school of Hobbes, of\nGalileo, of Descartes and of their successors. He does not seek to\nexplain them by causes. When, by means of observation or deduction, he\nhas arrived at a knowledge of their laws he remains satisfied. For the\nknowledge of these laws allows him in certain cases to intervene in\nthe phenomena, and to substitute to the natural order an artificial\norder better suited to his requirements. It is thus that mechanical,\nastronomical, physical, chemical and even biological phenomena are\nobjects of _relative_ and _positive_ science for him to-day.\n\nBut, as soon as the question is one of facts which originate in the\nhuman conscience, or which are connected with social life and with\nhistory, an opposite tendency becomes predominant. Instead of solely\nseeking for the laws of phenomena, our mind desires to explain them.\nIt wants to find the essence and the cause. It speculates upon the\nhuman soul, upon the relation of that soul to the other realities of\nthe universe, upon the end which society should have in view, upon the\nbest possible government, upon the social contract, etc. All these\nquestions arise from the \u201cmetaphysical\u201d mode of thought, and this mode\nis formally incompatible with the preceding one. Yet we see both of\nthem subsisting in our minds to-day.\n\nSocial dynamics will show how this condition must have been produced.\nBut whatever the historical reasons may be, the reality is only too\nevident. The human mind to-day can neither adhere entirely to nor give\nup entirely one or the other of these two modes of thought. Undoubtedly\nit feels that the conquests of positive science are \u201cirrevocable.\u201d\nFor example, how could it return to a metaphysical or theological\nexplanation of astronomical or physical phenomena? But, on the other\nhand, metaphysical and theological conceptions seem to it no less\nindispensable. It does not believe it could do without them. And this\nis natural. For, to satisfy the desire for unity, which is its supreme\nrequirement, the human mind demands a conception of the whole which\nembraces all the orders of phenomena, what Kant called a totalizing of\nexperience, in a word a \u201cphilosophy.\u201d\n\nNow, up to the present time, the positive mode of thought has not\nshown itself in a position to respond to this demand. It has only\nproduced individual sciences. Positive Science has been \u201cspecial\u201d and\nfragmentary, always attached to the investigation of a more or less\nrestricted group of phenomena. With a laudable prudence, which has made\nher strength, she has applied herself solely to works of analysis and\npartial synthesis. She has never ventured upon a synthesis of the whole\nof the real within our reach. Until now theologies and metaphysics\nalone have made the effort, and this office is, still to-day, the chief\nreason of their existence, this office must be fulfilled. The human\nmind is carried, by a spontaneous and necessary movement, towards the\npoint of view of the universal. Sooner than leave the philosophical\nproblems without an answer, it would remain attached indefinitely\nto the solutions, chimerical as they are, which the theologies and\nmetaphysics offer him. In short, in the present state of things, the\npositive mind is \u201creal\u201d but \u201cspecial.\u201d The theologico-metaphysical mind\nis \u201cuniversal\u201d but \u201cfictitious.\u201d We can neither sacrifice the \u201creality\u201d\nof science, nor the \u201cuniversality\u201d of philosophy. Which is the way out\nof this difficulty?\n\nThree solutions alone are conceivable:\n\n1. To find a reconciliation which will make it possible for the two\nmodes of thought to coexist without contradiction:\n\n2. To re-establish unity by making the theologico-metaphysical method\nuniversal:\n\n3. To re-establish unity by making the positive method universal:\n\n\nII.\n\nThe first solution at first sight appears to be the most acceptable.\nWhy should not the positive investigation of the divers orders of\nnatural phenomena be reconciled with a theological or metaphysical\nconception of the universe? Nothing prevents one from conceiving the\nphenomena as governed by invariable laws, and from seeking at the same\ntime, by another method, for the reason which renders nature in general\nintelligible. Positive science liberated at last from theology and\nmetaphysics, would assure them of the independence which she claims for\nherself. Thus, with growing precision would be fixed the boundaries on\nthe one hand of the domain proper of positive science, and on the other\nthat of the speculation which goes beyond experience.\n\nThis reconciliation, says Comte, has for a long time been considered\nlegitimate, because for a long time it was indispensable. Up to the\npresent time Theology and Metaphysics have been the only comprehensive\nconceptions of the world which the human mind has formed. They have\nfulfilled a necessary function. Moreover, without them positive science\ncould neither have originated nor have been developed. But, as she is\ntheir heiress, she is also their antagonist. Her progress necessarily\ninvolves their downfall. The parallel history of religions and\nmetaphysical dogmas on the one hand and of positive knowledge on the\nother shows that the conciliation between them has never been a lasting\none.\n\nNot that the antagonism between the two modes of thought can be\nsolved by a supreme dialectical struggle in which the theological and\nmetaphysical dogmas would be worsted. It is not thus that dogmas come\nto an end. They disappear, according to Comte\u2019s striking expression,\n_by desuetude_, as is the case with forsaken methods. As a matter of\nfact, have they not been as methods for the human mind, which sought\nwithin a single point of view to embrace the universality of things\nbefore they had been sufficiently studied? Man demanded from his\nimagination at first sight an absolute knowledge of the real, which\nreason could only give him at a later stage, on a very modest scale,\nentirely relative and after the patient labour of the sciences. But by\ndegrees, as he has advanced in the positive study of phenomena, he\nhas forsaken the theological and metaphysical \u201cexplanations.\u201d Without\nrelinquishing altogether the search after causes, he has taken the\nhabit of relegating them to more and more remote regions. Already, in\nwhat concerns phenomena whose concept has reached a positive stage we\ncan very well do without any assumption of causes. It suffices for us\nto represent these phenomena to ourselves as subject to laws. When all\nthe phenomena of all orders are habitually conceived in this way, when\nthe idea of their laws, whatever they may be, will have become equally\nfamiliar to us, the metaphysical mode of thought will have disappeared.\n\nIn a word, as soon as the whole of science shall have become positive,\nphilosophy will necessarily be positive also: For we only have at our\ndisposal _one_ point of view concerning things. All our real knowledge\nbears upon phenomena and their laws. If, therefore, considered one\nby one, all the orders of phenomena are conceived according to the\npositive mode of thought, how could it be that considered together,\nand in their totality, they should be conceived according to a mode of\nthought completely different, and even inconsistent with the former one?\n\nAs a matter of fact, the coexistence of these two modes of thought\nlasts so long as the positive spirit has not reached its complete\nexpansion, so long as a more or less considerable portion of natural\nphenomena is still explained by their essence, their cause, or their\nend. But this cannot be indefinitely prolonged. The more the positive\nspirit progresses, the more the theological and metaphysical conception\nof the world loses ground, and it becomes more evident that we must\nmake our choice. The unity of the understanding the _perfect logical\ncoherence_, are at this price.\n\nThe conciliation being set aside, the alternative either to think\nsolely or not at all, according to the positive mode, presents itself.\nThe traditionalists, and especially Joseph de Maistre, saw this aspect\nof the problem very clearly. Comte gives them very great credit for\nit. De Maistre admits no salvation for our society except in the\ncomplete return to the theological mode of thought. He thus attacks\nat its very source, or to put it more plainly, in its many sources,\nthe spirit of modern philosophy. He does not spare Locke any more than\nthe philosophers of the XVIII. century who proceed from him, Bacon any\nmore than Locke; the promoters of the Reformation any more than Bacon.\nHe understood that the XVIII. century came as a mighty conclusion of\nwhich the XVI. and XVII. centuries were the premisses, and that the\ngreat destructive syllogism had originated in a work of decomposition\nwhich began as early as the XIV. century. He is therefore perfectly\nconsistent with himself, when he endeavours to combat this diabolical\nwork, and to bring Europe back to the mental and religious condition\nof the Middle-ages. The re-establishment of the spiritual supremacy of\nthe Pope would put an end to mental and moral anarchy. The catholic\ndoctrine would restore to men\u2019s minds that unity which is their supreme\nneed.\n\nThis solution fulfils ideally the conditions of the problem, but,\nas a matter of fact, the solution is impracticable. The tide of\nhistory cannot flow back. In order to bring men\u2019s minds once again\nunder the sway of that spiritual power which they freely accepted in\nthe Middle-ages, we should also have to reconstitute the totality\nof the conditions in which they lived at that time. How can we wipe\nfrom the pages of history the discovery of America, the invention of\nprinting, and so many other great social facts? How can we pretend that\nCopernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Newton, and all the heralds of\npositive Science never existed? And if, presuming what is impossible,\nwe should succeed in restoring the mental and moral unity of Christian\nsociety in the Middle-ages, how could we prevent the natural laws\nwhich have once brought about its decomposition, from producing again\nthe same result?\n\nWe are thus necessarily brought to the third and last solution.\nSince the conciliation between the positive mode of thought and\nthe other one is impossible; since the exclusive ascendency of the\ntheologico-metaphysical mode of thought is out of the question; since\nwhen all is said the human mind needs a philosophy, it follows that\nthat philosophy can only proceed from the positive mode of thought\nitself. There is nothing, _a priori_, to prevent this solution from\nbeing realised. For the last positions of the theologico-metaphysical\nspirit are surely not impregnable. This spirit, \u201cfictitious\u201d in\nits essence, never could become \u201creal.\u201d The positive spirit is\nonly accidentally \u201cspecial.\u201d It is quite capable of acquiring the\nuniversality which it lacks. The new philosophy would then be founded,\nand the problem of _perfect logical coherence_ would be solved.\n\nThe whole difficulty thus appears to be in \u201cuniversalising\u201d the\npositive mode of thought. To do this it must be extended to those\nphenomena which are still habitually conceived according to the\ntheologico-metaphysical mode, that is to say, to the moral and\nsocial phenomena. This will be Comte\u2019s crowning discovery. He will\nfound \u201csocial physics.\u201d By so doing he will take from theology and\nmetaphysics the last reason of their existence. He will make possible\nthe transition from a positive science to an equally positive\nphilosophy. Thus will be realised \u201cthe unity of the understanding,\u201d and\nthis mental harmony will carry with it as its consequence the moral and\nreligious harmony of humanity.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[9] cf. infra. book iii. ch. v. p.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nTHE LAW OF THE THREE STATES\n\n\nIn Comte\u2019s system the constitution of sociology may be considered at\nthe same time as a terminus and as a starting point. One sees the\npositive method attaining with it to the order of the highest, the most\n\u201cnoble,\u201d the most complicated phenomena: in this sense sociology is the\nterm reached by the positive spirit in its ascent. It thus reaches the\nsummit of the hierarchy of the sciences, and henceforth rules over them\nall. On the other hand, positive philosophy, possible from this moment,\nwill make this a starting point for establishing the principles of\nmorality and of polity.\n\n\u201cThrough the foundation of sociology,\u201d says Comte at the beginning of\nthe _Cours_, \u201cpositive philosophy will acquire that universal character\nwhich it still lacks, and will thus become qualified to take the place\nof theological and metaphysical philosophy, whose only real property\nto-day is this universality,\u201d[10] and at the end of the _Cours_ he\nconcludes: \u201cThe creation of sociology endows with fundamental unity the\nentire system of modern philosophy.\u201d[11]\n\nThis creation, upon which everything else depended, dates from the time\nwhen Comte discovered _the law of the three states_ as it is called.\nFor, once this law is established, \u201csocial physics\u201d ceases to be a mere\nphilosophical conception, and becomes a positive science. This law\nhad been anticipated and even already formulated in the XVIII. century\nby Turgot, then by Condorcet, and by Dr. Burdin. Comte, nevertheless,\ntakes to himself the merit of the discovery. As he is generally most\nprecise in doing full justice to his \u201cprecursors,\u201d we must admit that,\naccording to him, none of them had seen the scientific importance of\nthis law. It certainly is one thing to gather the notion of a law out\nof a number of facts, and another to understand its capital importance,\nand to discern in it the fundamental law which governs the whole of the\nevolution of humanity.\n\nThis is the way in which Comte enounces it, in the _Plan des travaux\nscientifiques n\u00e9cessaires pour r\u00e9organiser la soci\u00e9t\u00e9_ (1822).\n\n\u201cAccording to the very nature of the human intellect every branch of\nour knowledge must necessarily pass successively in the course of its\nprogressive development, through three different theoretical states:\nthe theological or fictitious state, the metaphysical or abstract\nstate, finally the scientific or positive state.\u201d[12]\n\nIn the first lesson of the _Cours de philosophie positive_, after\nhaving reproduced this statement, Comte adds: \u201cIn other words the\nhuman mind, by its nature, in each one of its researches makes use\nsuccessively of three methods of philosophising, essentially different\nand even opposed to each other: firstly, the theological method,\nnext, the metaphysical, and lastly the positive. Hence we find three\nkinds of philosophies, or general systems of conceptions of the\ntotality of phenomena, which mutually exclude each other. The first\nis the necessary starting-point of human intelligence, the third, its\nfixed and final state; the second is solely destined to serve as a\ntransition.\u201d[13]\n\nThe words \u201ctheological\u201d and \u201cmetaphysical\u201d are here taken in a\nparticular sense, strictly defined.\n\nComte calls \u201ctheology\u201d a general system of conceptions concerning the\nuniversality of phenomena, which explains the appearance of these\nphenomena by the will of gods. He has not in his mind theological\nspeculation as one usually understands it, as a rational or sacred\nscience. He does not in the least dream of a study of revealed truth.\nHe only designated by this name an interpretation of natural phenomena\nby means of supernatural and arbitrary causes. Theological--that is\nto say--fictitious. Elsewhere Comte calls this mode of explanation\n\u201cimaginary\u201d or \u201cmythological.\u201d It is in this sense that he could ask\nif each one of us did not remember having been in regard to his most\nimportant notions, a theologian in his infancy, a metaphysician in his\nyouth, and a physicist in his manhood?[14] Comte does not allude to the\nreligious traditions which the child receives from his parents, but\nindeed to the spontaneous tendency which causes him in the first place\nto explain natural phenomena by wills, and not by laws. Theology is\nhere synonymous with anthropomorphism in the conception of causes.\n\nSimilarly Comte does not take the word \u201cmetaphysics\u201d in the most usual\nextension of its meaning. The science of Being as such, the science of\nSubstance or of first Principles, is not here in question, at least\ndirectly. He only refers to a certain mode of explaining phenomena\ngiven in our experience. For example, in physics, the hypothesis of an\nether to explain optical and electrical phenomena is metaphysical. So\nit is in physiology with the hypothesis of a vital principle, or, in\npsychology, with the hypothesis of a soul. \u201cMetaphysical or abstract,\u201d\nsays Comte. At bottom this mode of explanation is no other than the\npreceding one, but more and more pale and colourless, vanishing, so to\nspeak, as natural phenomena, better observed, are referred no longer\nto capricious wills, but to invariable laws.\n\nLet us then be careful not to give here to the words \u201cmetaphysics\u201d\nand \u201ctheology\u201d their full meaning. For instance, to conclude from the\nlaw of the three States that the evolution of humanity ever carries\nit further from theology, to end in a final state wherein religion\nshould have no place is singularly to misapprehend Comte\u2019s doctrine.\nOn the contrary the evolution of humanity is leading it to a state\nwhich will be pre-eminently religious. In it religion will regulate\nthe whole life of man. Comte perhaps would not refuse to define man,\nas has often been done, as a religious animal. The history of humanity\nmay be represented, in a sense, as an evolution which proceeds from\nprimitive religion (fetichism) to final religion (positivism). But the\nobject of the law of the three States is not to express the religious\nevolution of humanity. It is only concerned with the progress of the\nhuman intellect. It sets forth the successive philosophies which that\nintelligence has been obliged by turn to adopt in the interpretation of\nnatural phenomena. It is, in a word, the general law of the evolution\nof _thought_.\n\nThose who made a mistake about it probably only considered this law in\nthe first lesson of the _Cours_, where it is separately presented. But\nthe error is no longer possible when one refers to the fourth volume\nof the _Cours_, where the law is put in its place, in social dynamics,\nespecially in the fifty-eighth lesson, in the sixth volume.\n\nIt is not, however, without reason that Comte set forth this law in\nthe first pages of his _Cours de philosophie positive_. In sociology\nas he conceives it, the law of the intellectual evolution of humanity,\nthat is to say the law of the three States is the essential law of\ndynamics, and therefore of the whole of social science. For, of all\nthe social factors of which the concomitant and joint evolution\nconstitutes the progress of humanity, the intellectual factor is the\nmost important. It is the dominant one, in the sense that the others\ndepend far more upon it than it does upon them. The history of art, of\ninstitutions, of morals, of law, of civilisation in general could not\nbe understood without the history of intellectual evolution, that is to\nsay of science and of philosophy, whereas this one, strictly speaking,\nwould still be intelligible without the others. This evolution is\ntherefore the principal axis around which the other series of social\nphenomena are arranged. Thus the law which expresses it is the most\n\u201cfundamental,\u201d the most \u201cgeneral,\u201d in the precise sense in which Comte\nunderstands this word. In enunciating this law he declares legitimate\nby anticipation the existence of a social science. He proves _ipso\nfacto_ not only that it is possible, but that it already exists. Hence\nthe eminent position which he gives to the law of the three states.\n\n\nII.\n\nThe demonstration of this law presents itself under two distinct forms.\nIn the first place Comte supports his argument by history. This proves\nindeed that every branch of our knowledge passes in turn through the\nthree states, with never a single retrogression. It is true that much\nof our knowledge has not yet reached the positive state. But at any\nrate it is established that up to the present even those sciences which\nhave not yet reached that state have all described the same curve,\nalready described by those that have reached it.\n\nHistorical verification would suffice, if necessary, provided it were\ncomplete. Comte is not satisfied with it. He claims moreover to deduce\nthe law of the three states from the nature of man. He will thus give\na direct demonstration of it. However useful history may appear to\nhim as an instrument of proof, he still wishes to render its verdict\nintelligible. To reach this end he has recourse to psychology. \u201cWe\nought,\u201d he says, \u201ccarefully to characterise the general motives, drawn\nfrom an exact knowledge of human nature, which must have rendered\npartly inevitable, partly indispensable, the necessary succession of\nsocial phenomena, considered directly with respect to the intellectual\ndevelopment which dominates essentially their chief advance.\u201d[15]\n\nIn the first place, the human mind could only begin to interpret nature\nby a philosophy of the theological type. For it is the only one which\nis spontaneously produced, the only one which does not presuppose\nanother. Man at first conceives all activity on the same plan as his\nown. In order to understand phenomena, he likens them to his own\nactions, whose mode of production he thinks he apprehends, because he\nhas the feelings of his own efforts and the consciousness of his own\nvolitions. This anthropomorphic explanation comes so naturally to us\nthat we are always ready to give way to it. Even to-day, if we forget\npositive discipline for a moment, if we venture to ask for the mode of\nproduction of some phenomenon, we immediately dimly imagine an activity\nmore or less like our own. And among the metaphysicians who profess to\ngive an idea of God, the most consistent, according to Comte, are those\nwho make a person of Him.\n\nThe spontaneity which characterises the theological mode of thought has\nbeen extremely useful. Without it, we do not see how man\u2019s intelligence\ncould have begun to unfold itself. For, in order to form a scientific\ntheory, however modest and fragmentary, of natural phenomena, the mind\nneeds previous observations, while, on the other hand, in default of\na theory, or at any rate of a preexisting hypothesis, no scientific\nobservation is possible. Absolute empiricism, says Comte, is barren,\nand even, strictly speaking, inconceivable. Simple collections of\nfacts, however numerous we may suppose them to be, do not possess by\nthemselves any scientific significance. Such, for instance, would be\nthe case in the meteorological facts, making interminable lists, and\nfilling volumes. They would only become observations if in collecting\nthem the mind tried to put upon them some interpretation, however vague\nor precise, real or chimerical.\n\nCaught between the two equally imperative necessities of observing\nin the first place in order to reach \u201csuitable conceptions\u201d, and of\nconceiving at the same time some theory in order to make coherent\nobservations, the human mind saves itself by the theological mode\nof thought. For it has no need of previous observations to imagine\neverywhere in nature activities similar to its own. Once this\nhypothesis has arisen, observation comes into play, first to confirm\nit, but soon to oppose it. From that moment the impulse has been given.\nThe evolution of the sciences and of philosophy will be continued\nthrough doctrines which will succeed each other in a necessary order.\n\nIn the same way, from the moral point of view, a theological philosophy\nalone could at first inspire weak and ignorant humanity with sufficient\ncourage and confidence to shake off its primitive torpor. To-day, if\nman knows that phenomena are subject to invariable laws, he also knows\nthat a knowledge of these laws gives him a certain control over nature.\nBut in the days when man could not foresee the power of science,\nthe idea that phenomena obeyed necessary laws would have filled him\nwith despair. It would probably have paralysed him for all exertion.\nThe theological mode of thought was far more encouraging since the\nphenomena are imagined to be arbitrarily modifiable. Anything may\nhappen. Nothing is impossible, neither is anything necessary. The will\nof the gods suffices for a thing to happen or not to happen. Directly,\nman has no power over nature; indirectly he can do everything, provided\nonly that he can propitiate the divinities whose will is law. In this\nway, it is at the moment when man\u2019s impotence is greatest, that his\nconfidence in his own power is the strongest.\n\nFinally, from a social point of view, theological philosophy was\nindispensable for human society to subsist and to be developed. For\nthis society does not merely imply sympathy of feeling and union of\ninterests among its members, but first and above all unanimous adhesion\nto certain beliefs. Without a \u201ccertain system of common preliminary\nopinions\u201d there can be no human society. But, on the other hand, how\ncan we conceive the appearance of such a system, if social life is not\norganised? Here is a new vicious circle, out of which the theological\nphilosophy alone can release us. It constitutes at first sight a\ntotality of common beliefs. All the members of the society defend them\nall the more energetically, because with them are bound up their hopes\nand their fears, for this world, and for the next, if they already\nbelieve in it.\n\nAt the same time, this theological philosophy determines the formation,\nin society, of a special class, consecrated to speculative activity.\nWhat an immense progress this division between practice and theory must\nhave been, however roughly outlined! Such a division was established\nas soon as a sacerdotal class began to be distinguished from the rest\nof the social body. And how slow this progress must have been, when we\nsee even to-day how hard it is for men to accept any innovation which\ndoes not seem to carry with it any immediate practical advantage!\nThe sacerdotal class, invested, by the nature of its functions with\nan authority which was precious for social progress, at the same\ntime enjoyed that leisure which is indispensable for theoretical\nresearch. \u201cWithout the spontaneous establishment of such a class,\u201d\nsays Comte, \u201call our activity, thenceforth exclusively practical,\nwould have confined itself to the improvement, very soon checked, of\nsome processes having reference to military or industrial life.\u201d[16]\nThe subsequent division of labour depended upon this initial step.\nOur savants, our philosophers, our engineers descend from the first\npriests, sorcerers and rain conjurors.\n\nThus, given the nature of Man, the theological philosophy was bound\nto appear _spontaneously_. This appearance was at the same time\n\u201cinevitable and indispensable,\u201d in a word, necessary. Immediately\nbegins what one might call the dialectics of the intellectual history\nof humanity. The theological philosophy has made possible the\nobservation of phenomena. In its turn, this observation introduces\nthe idea of invariable laws into the mind, whereby the theological\nphilosophy begins to be compromised. The time comes when it appears\nantiquated and pernicious and reason tends to take the place of the\nimagination in the interpretation of nature. The more evolution\nadvances, the more marked becomes the preference of the human mind\nfor the positive mode of thought, and, in the several orders of the\nsciences, after a more or less prolonged conflict, this latter ends by\nobtaining the ascendancy.\n\nAs a matter of fact, the theological stage of our knowledge, even when\nit exercises its greatest dominion, that is to say, at the time nearest\nto its origin, already contains the germs of its own decomposition. It\nis never perfectly homogeneous. There are very common phenomena whose\nregularity man has never failed to recognize, and which he has never\nconceived as depending upon arbitrary wills. Comte likes to quote a\npassage from Adam Smith, where that philosopher remarks that in no\ntime and in no country do we find a god of Weight. Moreover, since the\nexistence of society, man must have had some idea of psychological\nlaws since he was obliged to regulate his conduct according to the way\nin which his fellows thought and acted. Consequently \u201cthe elementary\ngerm of positive philosophy is quite as primitive, at bottom, as that\nof theological philosophy, although it could only be developed very\nmuch later.\u201d[17] Not being universal, theological philosophy could\nonly be provisional. The philosophy, that is to say, the method of\ninterpretation of natural phenomena, will alone be final, which will be\napplicable to all phenomena without exception, from the most simple to\nthe most complicated. For this philosophy alone will realise the unity\ndemanded by the understanding.\n\nThe passage from theological to positive philosophy is never suddenly\naccomplished. Their opposition is too sharply defined, and our\nintelligence does not lend itself to such an abrupt change. The\nmetaphysical state serves as a transition. This state is distinguished\nfrom the two others, in that it has no principle proper which defines\nit. Theological philosophy is sufficient to itself. It forms a\nharmonious whole, at least so long as the germ of positiveness which\nit contains has not yet revealed its activity. In the same way, the\npositive state will be perfectly homogeneous. On the contrary, the\nmetaphysical state is only described by a mixture of the two others.\n\u201cThe metaphysical conceptions,\u201d wrote Comte in 1825, \u201cproceed at the\nsame time from theology and physics, or rather are only the former\nmodified by the latter.\u201d[18] Under ever varying and progressively\nattenuated forms, metaphysics procure the indispensable conciliation\nin order that the theological and positive philosophies may coexist\nin men\u2019s minds, so long as the latter is not perfectly worked out.\nUnder cover of metaphysical hypotheses, the scientific method has been\nable to push its conquests, without greatly alarming the defenders of\ntheological philosophy. Thus metaphysical speculation has a very active\ncritical quality. It has not slightly contributed to the decomposition\nof the ancient system of beliefs. In this sense, Comte regards the\nFrench philosophers of the XVIII. century, for the most part, as\nexcellent representatives of the metaphysical spirit.\n\nNevertheless, if we must refer this intermediate stage to one of\nthe two extremes, Comte does not hesitate to approximate it to the\ntheological stage. As a matter of fact, metaphysical philosophy\nsubstitutes entities to will, and Nature to the Creator, but with a\nvery analogous function. It supplies, at bottom, the same \u201cexplanation\u201d\nof the real, although weakened by a stronger and stronger sense of\nthe need of natural laws. This equivocal method preserves theology,\n\u201cwhile destroying its principal mental consistency.\u201d It denies the\nconsequences in the name of the principles. Moreover, it offers no\nguarantee against an offensive return of theological conceptions, so\nlong as they have not been replaced by positive notions. In the final\nconflict between the theological spirit, and the positive spirit, the\nmetaphysicians will probably be seen, with the Deists, involved in\na retrograde concentration.\u201d[19] \u201cPositive philosophy,\u201d says Comte,\n\u201chas neither historical nor dogmatic solidarity with this negative\nphilosophy, and can only contemplate it as a final preparatory\ntransformation of theological philosophy.\u201d[20]\n\nThus the metaphysical stage is never other than an unstable compromise.\nIt only lasts on condition that it changes continually. In default of\na principle of its own, metaphysical philosophy is purely critical\nin character. As a fact, there are but two philosophies, that is\nto say two methods, two organic modes of thought. Only theological\nphilosophy and positive philosophy allow the mind to construct a\nlogical and harmonious system of ideas, the basis of a morality and of\na religion. The theological spirit is \u201cideal in its advance, absolute\nin its conception, arbitrary in its application.\u201d The positive spirit\nsubstitutes the method of observation to that of imagination, relative\nnotions to absolute notions. It does not flatter itself with unlimited\ndominion over the phenomena of nature; it knows that its power is\nmeasured by its knowledge. The intellectual history of humanity shows\nby what stages it has passed from the former mode of thought to the\nlatter.\n\n\nIII.\n\nComte regards the law of the three stages as demonstrated. \u201cSeventeen\nyears of continuous meditation on this great subject,\u201d he writes in\n1839, \u201cdiscussed under all its aspects, and subjected to all possible\ntests, authorise me to affirm beforehand, without the slightest\nscientific hesitation, that we shall always see confirmed this\nhistorical proposition, which now seems to me as fully demonstrated\nas any of the general facts actually admitted in the other parts of\nnatural philosophy.\u201d[21] It could only be doubted if we found any\nbranch of our knowledge which had gone back from the metaphysical to\nthe theological state, or from the positive state to either of the\ntwo preceding states. But this case has never presented itself. The\ntheoretical demonstration of the law has established that it _could\nnot_ present itself.\n\nIndeed this demonstration has shown that the successive advance\nthrough the three stages, in invariable order, was the necessary form\nof progress of the human mind in the knowledge of phenomena. It is\nfounded upon the nature of the mind. In Comte\u2019s thought, the law of the\nthree states could therefore have been equally called psychological or\nhistorical.\n\nBut we are not here concerned with introspective Psychology, which\nuses self-consciousness as a means of investigation. Comte does not\nrecognize any scientific value in this method.[22] He even denies its\npossibility. Moreover the observation of a subject by himself, were\nit possible, would be of no help in the present case. For it would\nonly reveal to him the present state of his individual intellect,\nand not the law of the evolution of the human mind. For this law\nto become manifest, we must consider not the individual, but the\nspecies. Giving up a fruitless effort at self-contemplation in its\nactivity, the intellect must grasp the law of its successive phases\nin the progress of what it has produced. The philosophical history\nof our beliefs, of our conceptions, and of our systems: such is the\nconsciousness which the human intellect can have of itself. There only,\nthe philosopher sees the faculties of which this intellect contained\nthe germ coming into play by turns, to reach a \u201cdurable harmony.\u201d Then,\nonce discovered, the law of the three States helps us to understand\nthe intellectual evolution of each individual, and the study of the\nindividual then furnishes us with a supplementary verification of\nthe law. But, by itself, this study of the individual could not have\nestablished it. Whatever utility I may have often derived from the\nconsideration of the individual, says Comte, it is evidently to the\ndirect study of the species that I owed, not only the fundamental\nthought in my theory, but afterwards its specific development.\n\nThe law of the three States is then the general formula of the progress\nof the human intellect, considered not in an individual subject, but in\nthe _universal subject_, which is humanity.\n\nIt is indeed also the \u201cuniversal subject\u201d that Kant has studied in\nhis _Critic of Pure Reason_. But Kant\u2019s method is altogether abstract\nand metaphysical, the universal subject of which he seeks the laws is\na human mind \u201cin itself,\u201d considered in its essence. Comte, on the\ncontrary, represents the universal subject as a concrete unity, which\nrealized itself in time. For him, the study of the mental functions\ncharacteristic of man only becomes positive when it is carried out\nfrom an historical and sociological point of view. That is why the\ndiscovery of the law of the three States is an event of capital\nimportance. It inaugurates the positive science of humanity, which was\nan indispensable condition for positive philosophy to be established.\nIt marks the time when, all phenomena being henceforth studied after\nthe same method, the \u201cperfect logical coherence\u201d is definitely assured.\nThis law of social dynamics is the corner-stone of the whole positive\nsystem.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[10] Cours de philosophie positive, I, 19 (5e edition, Paris, 1892).\n\n[11] Cours, VI, 786.\n\n[12] Pol. pos. IV, appendice, p. 77.\n\n[13] Cours, I. 3.\n\n[14] Cours, I. 6.\n\n[15] Cours IV, 526.\n\n[16] Cours IV, 548.\n\n[17] Cours, IV, 554-5.\n\n[18] Pol. pos., IV. Appendix, p. 144.\n\n[19] Correspondence de H. Comte avec John Stuart Mill. Lettre du 5\navril 1842, p. 51.\n\n[20] Cours, V. 573-5.\n\n[21] Cours, IV, 523.\n\n[22] Cp. infra, book II, chap. V, p.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nTHE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES\n\n\nAccording to the law of the three States, all our conceptions in the\ndifferent orders of knowledge, begin by being theological, pass through\nthe metaphysical transition, and end by becoming positive. If this\nevolution were terminated at the presented time, the philosophy which\nComte wishes to found would be _ipso facto_ established. But we are\nfar from such a state of things. On the contrary, the three modes of\nthought theological, metaphysical, and positive, coexist, still to-day,\neven in the most cultivated minds. In a different measure, all lack the\n\u201clogical coherence.\u201d\n\nEven in those sciences where the positive method has been finally\nand for a long time established, in physics, and in chemistry, for\ninstance, we observe undoubted traces of the metaphysical spirit. To\na still greater degree this spirit is manifested in what are called\nthe moral and social sciences. Nevertheless, this \u201cincoherence\u201d cannot\nlast. Now that the positive spirit has assumed full consciousness of\nitself, it is possible to proceed with a systematic purification, which\nwill disentangle it from the theological and metaphysical spirit.\n\nBut is not this critical review of the whole of human knowledge an\nenterprise above the powers of a man?--Happily positive philosophy\nitself furnishes a means of lightening the task. It establishes an\norder which allows us to determine without too much trouble to what\ndegree of positiveness the conception of a given category of phenomena\nhas reached up to the present time. Comte calls this order the\nclassification, or, more precisely the \u201cpositive hierarchy\u201d of the\nfundamental sciences. It is \u201cthe plan which he will follow in the\nexposition of positive philosophy.\u201d[23]\n\nThis plan is not a simple artifice destined to make the entirety of\nthe doctrine clearer, or its exposition easier. It is not external\nto the work. It is born from the very spirit of positive philosophy;\nit expresses the spirit of that philosophy in a new form. It is\nthe natural complement of the law of the three States. Comte puts\nit in plain words: \u201cThe different branches of our knowledge have\nnot been able with equal rapidity to pass through the three great\nphases in their development, nor consequently to reach simultaneously\nthe positive state. There exists, in this respect, an invariable\nand necessary order, which our different kinds of conceptions have\nfollowed and have been obliged to follow in their progress, and of\nwhich the exact consideration is the _indispensable complement_ to the\nfundamental law previously enounced.\u201d[24]\n\nComte did not, like his contemporary Amp\u00e8re, set himself the logical\nproblem of the classification of the sciences in their entirety. He\ndid not seek according to what principle we could arrange them all in\nan order where the fact of their respective subordination would be\nmaintained. He even doubts how far such a principle exists, and he is\nso far from thinking of establishing a complete classification of the\nsciences, that he begins by leaving out the greater number of them.\nHe first sets aside all forms of human knowledge which refer to art,\nthat is to say all the applied sciences, practical and technical.\nSimilarly he sets aside all the concrete sciences, such as zoology,\nmineralogy, geography, etc. He only places within his classification\nthe _theoretical and abstract_ sciences, that is to say those which\nhave no other object but the knowledge of laws, and which study\nphenomena, exclusive of the concrete beings in which these phenomena\npresent themselves. Comte calls them \u201cfundamental\u201d because the other\nsciences suppose their existence, whereas the abstract sciences do not\nsuppose the existence of the others before them.\n\nThese sciences are the only ones whose consideration is of\nconsequence to the end which Comte has in view. For why does he need\na classification of the sciences? It is in order to study the ascent\nof the positive spirit through the successive orders of phenomena. For\nthis, he has no occasion to consider the applied or concrete sciences,\nwhich receive their principles from the theoretical and abstract\nsciences. It suffices for him to be concerned with these. It is in the\nmethods and the progress of these sciences that the characteristic\nefforts of the human mind have been manifested; and it is therefore\nhere that we can grasp the laws of its evolution.\n\nIn order to classify the fundamental sciences, Comte will conform\nto the principles of the positive method. He will be guided by the\nrational classifications of which the model is to be found in the\nnatural sciences. The classification must spring from the very study of\nthe objects which are to be classified, and must be determined by the\nreal affinities and the series of connected links which they present,\nin such a way that this classification may itself be the expression of\nthe most general truth, made manifest by the searching comparison of\nthe objects which it embraces.\n\nComte will not therefore stop to consider the classifications which\nhave preceded his own. In the first place, when they appeared, the\nrational method of classification was not established. Further, how\ncould anyone have united the whole of the sciences into an encyclop\u00e6dic\nconception, when some had already reached the positive state, while\nothers remained in the theological or metaphysical states? How could\nanyone rationally arrange heterogenous conceptions in a single system?\n\nThose premature attempts were doomed to failure. In order that the\nundertaking might succeed, it was necessary that _all_ our conceptions,\nrelating to the various orders of phenomena should have reached the\npositive form. Here again, the creation of sociology has been the\ndecisive event, for it has allowed the series of fundamental sciences\nto be made complete. The discovery of the law of the three States\nhas founded sociology, and at the same time it has accomplished the\nhomogeneity of human knowledge. In its time, this homogeneity renders\npossible the rational classification of the sciences.\n\n\nII.\n\nHenceforth, the fundamental sciences are all conceived as equally\npositive. They have all given up the pursuit of the absolute for the\nstudy of the relative, and the search after causes for the knowledge of\nlaws. All now proceed by means of the same general methods and their\ndifferences can therefore only arise from their object, that is to say\nfrom the nature of the phenomena which are studied. Consequently their\nrelations of mutual dependence will solely result from the relations\nof these phenomena. Now, observation shows us that these phenomena\nform themselves into a certain number of natural categories, such\nthat the rational study of each category presupposes a knowledge of\nthe laws of the preceding category, and that a knowledge of this one\nis in turn presupposed for understanding the one that follows. This\norder is determined by the degree of generality of the phenomena, from\nwhich their successive dependence upon each other results, and as a\nconsequence the greater or lesser simplicity of each science results\nfrom it also.\n\nUpon this principle, the encyclop\u00e6dic ladder of the fundamental\nsciences is easily constructed. After the mathematics, in an order of\ndiminishing generality and of growing complexity, come astronomy,\nphysics, chemistry, physiology or biology, social physics or sociology.\nThe first science considers the most general, the most simple, the\nmost abstract phenomena, and those furthest removed from humanity.\nThey influence all the others, without being influenced by them. The\nphenomena considered by the last are the most particular, the most\ncomplicated, the most concrete, and the most directly interesting for\nman; they depend more or less upon all the preceding ones. \u201cBetween\nthese two extremes, the degrees of specialisation, of complication, and\nof individualisation, are in an ever-growing quantity.\u201d\n\nThis classification is confirmed, in fact, by the general usage of\nlearned men. It reproduces the historic order of the development of the\nsciences. Thus, for a long time, mathematics was the only science of\na positive type. On the other hand, social science has been the last\nto reach this point. Nevertheless, Comte does not mean to say that\nthe fundamental sciences came into existence one after the other, nor\nthat, for every one of them, each period is sufficiently explained by\nthe period immediately preceding it. His thought is very different. On\nthe contrary, he represents the development of the several sciences as\nsimultaneous. They act and react one upon another in a thousand ways.\nOften some progress in a science is the direct effect of a discovery\nmade in an art which has apparently no affinities with it. Such is,\nto quote an example which Comte could not in the least have foreseen,\nthe progress of astronomical observations due to photography. In fact,\nthe history of a science during a given period is closely allied to\nthat of the other sciences and arts during the same time, or rather,\nto be more explicit, to the general history of civilisation. But their\nrespective transitions to the positive state is accomplished in the\norder set forth in the classification. For individually they could not\nreach this state, if the fundamental science immediately preceding had\nnot attained to it before them. \u201cIt is in this order that the progress,\nalthough simultaneous, must have taken place.\u201d[25]\n\n\nIII.\n\nMr. Herbert Spencer has made several objections to Auguste Comte\u2019s\nclassification of the sciences; Littr\u00e9 has lengthily refuted them. It\nis not in our design to reopen this discussion. But it results from\nthe preceding explanations that the greater number of Mr. Spencer\u2019s\ncriticisms miss the mark, perhaps because he has not read Comte\nproperly. On his own admission, he only knows the two first lessons in\nthe _Cours de philosophie positive_ in the text, further the inorganic\nPhysics and the first chapter of the Biology in Miss Martineau\u2019s\ncondensation, and finally the remainder in Lewes\u2019s summing up in his\n_History of Philosophy_.[26] If Mr. Spencer had been able to obtain a\nknowledge of the _Cours de philosophie positive_ in its entirety, and\nespecially of the three last lessons, or at least of the _Discours sur\nl\u2019Esprit positif_ or of the _Discours sur l\u2019ensemble du positivisme_ he\nwould probably have appreciated differently the positive classification\nof the sciences. His own classification, in which he includes the\nconcrete and concrete-abstract sciences, is not really opposed to that\nof Auguste Comte who only wished to classify the fundamental _abstract_\nsciences. Comte never sought to do what Mr. Spencer reproaches him with\nnot having done.\n\nAmong Mr. Spencer\u2019s objections, there is one which, bearing upon the\nvery conception of the classification of the sciences, shows very\nclearly the misunderstanding which we are pointing out.\n\nMr. Spencer insists upon the \u201canthropocentric\u201d character of Comte\u2019s\nclassification, which is indeed remarkable; and he is surprised\nat what appears to him to be a glaring contradiction. Is not the\nconception of things from man\u2019s point of view, one of the essential\nforms of the theological mode of thought, according to Comte himself?\nDoes not positive philosophy teach that man must not consider himself\nas a sort of \u201cimperium in imperio,\u201d but as a being subordinate to the\nwhole of nature? If therefore we must substitute the objective to the\nsubjective point of view in which man at first spontaneously places\nhimself, how can the classification of the sciences be at the same time\n\u201canthropocentric\u201d and positive?\n\nThis objection would perhaps be a strong one against positive\nphilosophy as Littr\u00e9 understood it. Against Auguste Comte it has no\nforce, for he accepts it. He admits that his classification presents\nthese two characters at the same time, and he does not think that in so\ndoing he is contradicting himself. We must only distinguish with him\ntwo successive and different periods. So long as positive philosophy\nis in process of formation, (that is to say so long as the positive\nspirit remains special) it is quite true that it is orientated from\nthe objective point of view, in other words, that it goes from the\nworld to man. During this period, it is indeed opposed to the na\u00efve\nbelief which makes man the centre and the end of the universe. But,\nwhen from special the positive spirit has become universal, when it has\nrisen from science to philosophy, when sociology is at length founded,\nand when the understanding realises, from the positive point of view\nthe logical unity which is indispensable to it, this unity is only\ncompleted when, in its turn, it takes man for its centre.\n\nConsidered as an exact reproduction of the real world, says Comte, our\nscience is not capable of being completely systematised; and in this\nsense we must not seek for any unity save that of method, aspiring\nonly to homogeneity and to the convergence of the different doctrines.\nIt is otherwise in regard to the inner source of human theories\ncontemplated as the results of our individual and collective mental\nevolution. \u201cThus referred, not to the universe, but to man, or rather\nto humanity, our real knowledge tends on the contrary towards an entire\nsystematization. We must then conceive a single science, the human\nscience, more precisely social, of which our existence constitutes at\nonce the principle and the end. Into this human science the rational\nstudy of the external world becomes fused, at once as a necessary\nelement and a fundamental preamble.\u201d[27]\n\nComte would therefore not have repudiated, for his classification of\nthe sciences, the qualification of \u201canthropocentric\u201d on condition\nthat it were understood. It is no longer the spontaneous subjectivism\nfrom which the theological philosophy starts; it is the conscious\nsubjectivism to which the positive philosophy attains. It has the merit\nof uniting in itself the two methods called objective and subjective.\nThe former has been in the ascendant during the long evolution of the\nsciences, which were by degrees and successively reaching the positive\nstate. The latter allows us to concentrate the aim of the distinct\nsciences thus constituted into a supreme science, which subordinates\nall the others to itself, without absorbing them.\n\n\nIV.\n\nThe classification of the sciences is, at the same time, a plan for\nthe setting forth of the positive philosophy, and a complement of the\nlaw of the three States. But, while this law expresses the _progress_\nof the human intellect in the constitution of science and philosophy,\nthe classification supposes that science and philosophy are already\nconstituted. It expresses their _order_, and enunciates from the static\npoint of view what the law formulates from the dynamic point of view.\nIt shows the relations of the various elements of philosophy among\nthemselves, and to the whole.\n\nSo long as this idea of the whole was not defined, that is to say, so\nlong as positive science remained special, these relations could not\nbe rationally established. But, once sociology was created, and with\nit positive philosophy, it became possible to embrace the whole of the\nfundamental sciences in a single conception. For, from that time, they\ncan be represented as being various aspects of the development of the\nhuman intellect.\n\nTruly, the object of science is single, and the divisions which are\nintroduced into it for our convenience, without being arbitrary, are\nartificial. All the branches of our knowledge, that is to say all the\nfundamental sciences, must be considered as issuing from a single\ntrunk. Not that these sciences can ever be reduced one to another.\nIt suffices that they be homogeneous, and their homogeneity results\nfrom their subjection to the same method; further, from their tendency\ntowards the same end, and finally, from their subordination to the\nsame law of progress. In respect to the last and highest of these\nsciences, the others \u201cmust only be finally regarded as indispensable\npreliminaries in a progressive order.\u201d[28]\n\nThus the ladder of the fundamental sciences represents, in Comte\u2019s\nmind, the methodical ascent of the positive spirit towards universality\nand unity. It is a hierarchy, a _scala intellectus_, according to\nBacon\u2019s expression. It includes the whole of the \u201cphilosophia prima\u201d\nalso foreshadowed by Bacon and vainly sought after by philosophers.\n\nThe memory of Bacon does not prevent the preponderating influence in\nthis conception of Comte from being that of Descartes. Comte is far\nfrom ignoring it. He calls himself the continuator and by a dreadful\nbarbarism, the _completer_ of Descartes.[29] Undoubtedly Descartes had\nnot like him conceived the series of the fundamental sciences. After\nhaving applied a positive method to the study of inorganic nature, and\neven of living nature, for the rest he had reverted to a metaphysical\nmethod. But this \u201ccartesian compromise\u201d could only be provisional. None\nthe less to Descartes belongs the merit of having definitely acquired\nseveral orders of phenomena for the positive spirit, and of affirming\nthe unity of science at the same time as the unity of method. He was\nunable himself to realise this twofold unity, for its time had not\ncome, and the necessary conditions had not yet been brought together.\nMoreover in the cartesian idea of science metaphysical elements\nsubsist, and Descartes wrongly believed that the universal method was\nto be obtained by a transformation of the mathematical method.\n\nComte takes up the leading ideas of Descartes again, and, at the same\ntime, he corrects them, according as the progress of the positive\nspirit during two centuries enabled him to do. The position of \u201cleading\nscience,\u201d if this expression can be allowed, passes from mathematics to\nsociology. Moreover, the unity of science, as Comte conceives it, no\nlonger prevents the fundamental sciences from being irreducible to one\nanother. This unity is sufficiently secured by the homogeneity of the\nsciences, which form a continuous series, an \u201cencyclop\u00e6dic hierarchy,\u201d\nand which are all subordinated to the final science. Lastly the unity\nof the positive methods does not imply its uniformity everywhere. Each\nfundamental science, as will be seen further on, has its methods which\nare special to itself.[30]\n\nThe classification of the sciences thus shows how positive philosophy\nstretches back over the XVIII. cent., whence it springs, to link itself\nwith Bacon and Descartes. Comte has retained Bacon\u2019s view on this\npoint, that all scientific knowledge rests upon facts which have been\nfully observed, and that a system of positive sciences constitutes the\nindispensable basis for the only philosophy which is within our reach.\nTo Descartes he here owes the idea of the unity of method and of the\nunity of science. We might almost say that he has received from Bacon\nhis idea of the contents of the sciences and from Descartes his idea of\ntheir form. By what means did he invest such matter with such a form?\nThe answer to this question is found in the positive theory of science.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[23] Cours, I, 46-47.\n\n[24] Cours, I, 14-15.\n\n[25] Cours, I, 82, 12.\n\n[26] Herbert Spencer: The Classification of the Sciences. London, 1864,\np. 42.\n\n[27] Discours sur l\u2019esprit positif (1844) p. 24.\n\n[28] Cours, VI. 610.\n\n[29] Correspondence de H. Comte and de John Stuart Mill. Lettre du 5\nnovembre 1842, p. 132.\n\n[30] Cp. infra, book I, ch. VI.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nSCIENCE\n\n\nWe may admit, with Aristotle, that curiosity is natural to man, and\nthat we are inclined to inquire into things for the pleasure of knowing\nthem. But it must be admitted, adds Comte, that this inclination is one\nof the least active and the least imperative in our nature. It must\nhave been still less so in the beginning of mankind\u2019s development; and\nit was, in any case, much weaker than the inclination to laziness,\nor than the repugnance to accept anything new. It has therefore\nbeen necessary, in order that man might emerge from his primitive\nintellectual torpor, that the activity of his mind should be induced\nand even compelled to exert itself by pressing circumstances. Such were\nundoubtedly the necessities of hunting, the dangers of war, and in a\ngeneral way, the desire to avoid suffering and death.\n\nMoreover, the knowledge which the human mind acquires at first is only\nvery imperfectly real; for theological philosophy furnishes the mind\nwith its first conceptions. Man begins by supposing everywhere wills\nlike his own, and the world which surrounds him is peopled with gods\nor fetishes. Nevertheless, from this first period, the rudiments of a\nmore positive knowledge already appear. In every order of phenomena\nsome are very simple and of such striking regularity, that evidently no\narbitrary will intervenes in their working. Man must very quickly have\nhad a \u201creal\u201d idea of these phenomena. In all the other cases instead\nof observing the phenomena he imagined the mode of their production;\nbut here he observed the sequences and concomitances which he could not\nresist; and he regulated his conduct upon this observation. From this\nhumble beginning science came into being.\n\nIn this way, far from opposing scientific thought to common thought,\nas most of the philosophers do, Comte, without disregarding the\nspecial character of one and of the other shows that both spring from\nthe same source, and that they do not present any essential point of\ndifference. However abstract and however elevated science may become,\nit always remains, according to him, a \u201csimple special prolongation\u201d of\ngood sense, of common sense and of \u201cuniversal wisdom.\u201d The character\nof \u201cpositivity,\u201d by which scientific knowledge is distinguished from\ntheological and metaphysical conceptions, belongs also to popular\nwisdom. Like this wisdom, which the practical necessities of life have\nformed, science abstains from searching after the causes, the ends,\nthe substances, and whatever is beyond the reach of verification by\nexperience. Its efforts bear exclusively upon the laws of coexistence\nand of succession which govern the phenomena. And again it is from this\nwisdom that it has borrowed the spirit of its positive method, which\nconsists in observing facts and in systematising observations to rise\nto the concept of laws.\n\nIt follows from this that science contains within itself neither its\nstarting-point nor its terminus. Both are given it by \u201ccommon sense\u201d\nwhence it springs. The starting-point is the spontaneous observation\nof constant relations between the most simple phenomena. The terminus\nis the knowledge of these same relations among all given phenomena,\nas complete and as precise as our requirements demand. Indeed the\ncommon sense, or the popular wisdom, is soon baffled by the complexity\nof phenomena. If we had no other guide we should know very little,\nand in nearly all cases we should be reduced to a kind of empirical\ndivination. The function of science is to substitute a real knowledge\nof laws to this divination.\n\nThis function would never have been fulfilled if the human mind had not\npossessed the property of being able to separate theory from practice.\nUndoubtedly the former proceeds from the latter. As has been said,\nevery science is born from a corresponding art, and from the desire\nto perfect it. But this perfecting would not have gone very far, if\nthe human mind had never lost sight of it. Happily, man is capable\nof temporarily forgetting his immediate interests in the pursuit of\nknowledge. By degrees, from the complexity of concrete cases, he has\nlearnt to disengage the elements common to a whole class of phenomena.\nHe has thus formed the idea of law, or the invariable relation between\ngiven phenomena. Beyond the intellectual satisfaction which this\nknowledge gave him, he found in time applications of it which he would\nnever have imagined beforehand. To quote an example from a civilisation\nalready very advanced, when the Greek geometers patiently applied\nthemselves to the study of conic sections, did they suspect that\ntheir labours would one day serve in calculating certain astronomical\ndeterminations upon which the safety of mariners would depend?\n\nIn this way, science, utilitarian in its origin, since it sprang from\nthe practical needs of man, utilitarian in its end, since it aims at\nproviding for those needs, has nevertheless been unable to develop\nitself and will be unable still to do so in the future, except by\nneglecting this very utility. Better to fulfil its destiny, it must\nprovisionally forget it; and it will be the more useful, in the long\nrun, in proportion as it will have been the more disinterested. We\nnever know, _a priori_, if a discovery which finds no application\nto-day, combined later with another one, will not be of capital\ninterest for mankind. Therefore it is of the highest importance that\ntheoretical order should remain clearly distinct from the practical\norder.\n\nThat is why Comte regarded the appearance of a sacerdotal class,\nspecially occupied with speculative research, as a decisive moment\nin history of humanity. It matters little that these researches\nshould have remained chimerical and absurd during long centuries.\nThe essential point was that the human mind should form and keep the\nhabit of disinterested speculation, that it should not rest content\nwith immediately applicable knowledge, and that it should exert itself\ntowards a theoretical conception of nature, however simple at first\nthat conception was bound to be.\n\nThus, science has, properly speaking, two roots, the one practical,\nthe other theoretical. If it originated in the primitive arts, it\nis no less closely allied with primitive philosophy. It still bears\nfeatures which enable us to discern this twofold filiation. On the one\nhand, it has remained _speculative_ as was the theological philosophy\nwhich first dominated over the human mind. Only this speculation has\ngradually abandoned everything except the laws of phenomena, and it\nhas ended by undermining the theological conceptions from which it\ncame. On the other hand, science has remained _real_, like the popular\nwisdom which gave it birth. But, while dealing with given phenomena in\nexperience, it has developed in the direction of theory. Instead of\nonly considering scenes of concrete objects, it has resolved them into\ntheir elements. A more and more powerful analysis has raised it to the\nconsideration of laws more and more general and abstract. Thus, while\nthe popular wisdom is limited to empirical generalisations, a science\nsuch as, for instance, astronomy discovers the law which governs the\nwhole of an immense order of phenomena.\n\nFrom this general idea of science the following consequences at once\nfollow:\n\n1. Science is the collective work of humanity. It bears upon an object\ncommon to all: Reality. It employs the method common to all: the\npositive method. All intellects work in the same manner on a common\nground. It is what Comte calls \u201cthe profound mental identity of learned\nmen with the crowd whose destiny fulfils itself in active work.[31]\u201d\nThe progress of the scientific mind is a methodical extension of\npopular common sense to all subjects accessible to human reason.\nBut here method does almost everything. \u201cThe whole superiority of\nthe philosophical mind over the popular common sense results from a\nspecial and continuous application to common speculations, in starting\nprudently from the initial step, after having brought them back to a\nnormal state of judicious abstraction, for the purpose of generalising\nand coordinating. For, what ordinary intellects chiefly lack, is less\nthe precision and penetration appropriate for discerning partial\napproximations, than the aptitude for generalising abstract relations,\nand for establishing a perfect logical coherence among our various\nnotions.\u201d[32]\n\nThe germ of the highest scientific conceptions is often to be found\nin common reason. Comte delights in giving as an example one of the\ndiscoveries which he most admires, Descartes\u2019 invention of analytical\nGeometry. To determine at every moment the position of a point in space\nby its distance from fixed axes: is not that what geographers have been\ndoing for so long in order to determine the longitude and latitude\nof a place upon the terrestrial sphere? And has not this proceeding\nitself been suggested to the geographer by simple common sense? For he\ninstinctively seeks to mark the inaccessible points which interest him,\nby means of their distance from given points or lines. From this the\nidea of the Cartesian co-ordinates only differs by a superior degree of\nabstraction and of generality.\n\nThus all men must be regarded as collaborating in the discovery of\ntruth as much as in making use of it. Speaking generally, if the great\nphilosophers and scientific men of genius seem to be the intellectual\nguides of humanity, it is because they are the first to be affected by\neach mental revolution. They are the first to pass from a traditional\nto a new attitude and their example is decisive. But, says Comte, \u201cthe\nchanges relating to the method of thinking with originality only become\nmanifest when they are almost accomplished.\u201d The great men whose names\nare justly authors attached to are, however, more the heralds than the\nof these changes.\n\n2. Science is the work of all: it must therefore be accessible to all.\nIt is a patrimony common to the whole of mankind; and the inheritance\nmust be taken from no one. As a consequence, the State owes scientific\ninstruction to those who are not in a position to procure it for\nthemselves. Not that all men, all the people ought to acquire a deep\nknowledge of the several fundamental sciences, like those who make it\nthe particular occupation of their lives. The impossibility of such\na thing is too evident for several reasons. Neither is it a question\nof popularising the great scientific theories, for the use of badly\nprepared minds. Comte condemns severely this way of \u201csimplifying\u201d\nscience. For instance, he will not allow Newton\u2019s laws to be separated\nfrom their demonstrations. It will always be the duty of the greater\nnumber of men to adopt the majority of scientific truths on the\ntestimony of those who will have discovered, criticised and verified\nthem. But, what it will be the duty of common education to give to\nevery mind, is the habit of conceiving all phenomena, from the most\nsimple to the most complex, as equally governed by invariable laws,\nand, consequently, of understanding the whole of nature as an order\nwhich the positive method alone allows us to discover and to modify.\nAnd as this method cannot be studied apart from the sciences in which\nit is used, it will be necessary for every man to be made acquainted\nwith a summary of each fundamental science, from mathematics to\nsociology. There is nothing impracticable in this scheme. Comte has\ndrawn out, in the positive Polity, a plan of education conceived on\nthis principle. On this condition alone will philosophy, founded upon\npositive science, succeed in realising the harmony of minds, and in\n\u201creorganising the beliefs.\u201d\n\n\nII.\n\nAuguste Comte often says that the positive spirit consists in keeping\noneself equally distant from two dangers, mysticism and empiricism.[33]\nBy mysticism he understands the recourse to non-verifiable explanations\nand to transcendent, hypotheses. Men\u2019s imagination finds pleasure in\nthese things, but we must be able to bring all \u201creal\u201d knowledge back to\na general or particular fact. Positive science therefore abstains from\nsearching after substances, ends, and even causes. It only bears upon\nphenomena and their relations.\n\nEmpiricism, in its turn, is no less than mysticism contrary to the\nspirit of science, Empiricism signifies for Comte the knowledge which\ndoes not go beyond the pure and simple ascertainment of a fact. Now, an\naccumulation of even precisely noted facts has no theoretical interest.\nIt may, at most, be erudition, but it is not science. To think that by\nthus gathering facts together one is labouring at the work of science,\nis \u201cto take a quarry for an edifice.\u201d[34] In a word, \u201cscience is made\nup of laws, and not of facts.\u201d[35]\n\nStrictly speaking, no scientific observation is even possible without\na previous theory, that is to say, without a presupposed law, whose\nverification is in question. Undoubtedly in science when it has\nbecome positive, the imagination no longer constructs \u201ccauses\u201d or\n\u201cessences.\u201d It must submit to reason, that is to say, to the methodical\ninvestigation of phenomena. Nevertheless, this investigation cannot\ntake place without guiding hypotheses, and thus the imagination\nplays a part in science, subordinate it is true, but indispensable.\nComte here separates himself from Bacon. According to the English\nphilosopher, in the knowledge of nature, the mind must make itself\nas receptive as possible. In introducing anything of itself it would\nfalsify science, and its whole effort must be to hold itself up to\nphenomena as a perfectly plain and unspotted mirror, so as to reflect\nthem as they are. Now this is precisely the idea of science which\nComte rejects under the name of empiricism. Without the hypotheses or\nthe theories suggested by the very activity of the mind science would\nnever be constituted, according to him. There would never even be an\napprehension of fact, at least an apprehension such that it could be of\nservice to science. In a word \u201cabsolute empiricism is impossible.\u201d In\nthe simple observation of a phenomenon by the human mind, the entire\nmind is interested, and in it the subjective conditions of science are\nalready virtually given.\n\nThis being granted, science may be defined as a methodical processus\nof the connection and extension of our knowledge. It consists, in\nevery department \u201cin the exact relations established between observed\nfacts, so as to deduce from the least possible number of fundamental\ndata, the most extensive series of secondary phenomena, in renouncing\nabsolutely the vain search after causes and essences.\u201d So long as men\nseek to \u201cexplain\u201d phenomena the theological and metaphysical spirit has\nnot yet disappeared. Positive science abstains from all explanations\nof this kind. Thus, Newton has placed in the same category universal\ngravitation and the attraction of bodies. We cannot know what this\nmutual action of the stars and the attraction of terrestrial bodies are\nin themselves. But we know with full certainty, the existence and the\nlaw of these two orders of phenomena and moreover we know that they are\nidentical. For the geometer weight is explained when he conceives it as\na particular case of general gravitation. On the contrary it is weight\nwhich makes the physicist proper understand celestial gravitation. We\ncan never go beyond such juxtapositions \u201cof ideas.\u201d[36]\n\nBut while science brings together similar phenomena, its chief function\nis to _connect_ them, that is to say to determine them one by another\naccording to the relations which exist between them. All science, says\nComte, consists in the co-ordination of facts; and if the several\nobservations remained isolated there would be no science. We may even\nsay generally that science is destined, as far as the various phenomena\npermit, to dispense with direct observation, in allowing us to deduce\nthe greatest possible number of results from the smallest number of\nacquired data. If a constant relation is found to subsist between\ntwo phenomena, it becomes useless to observe them both; for from the\nobservation of one the variations of the other will be deduced. But\nthe first may in its turn be the function of a third, and so on; until\nat last we conceive a constant connection between all the phenomena\nof a given order, which may allow us to deduce them all from a single\nlaw. Such for Comte would be the perfect form of science: how near it\nis to the Cartesian ideal! \u201cThe positive spirit,\u201d he says, \u201cwithout\nfailing to recognize the preponderance of reality directly ascertained,\ntends to enlarge the rational at the expense of the experimental\ndomain, by substituting the prevision of phenomena to their immediate\nobservation.\u201d Scientific progress consists in diminishing the number\nof distinct and independent laws, by continually multiplying their\nrespective connections.[37]\n\n\u201cPrevision\u201d thus becomes the essential characteristic of scientific\nknowledge, and that independently of any utilitarian mental\nreservation. For the eventual applications of science do not determine\nits theoretical advance. The prevision with which we are here concerned\nconsists solely in the possibility of knowing with certainty without\nobserving. It is knowledge _a priori_ in the Aristotelian sense of\nthe word, of which mathematics present the most perfect model. A\nrectilinear triangle being given, I do not need experience to know\nwith certainty that the sum of the angles in it is equal to two right\nangles. Thus understood prevision applies to the present, and even to\nthe past, as well as to the future. When Comte writes \u201cAll science has\nprevision for its aim,\u201d[38] we must understand: \u201cAll science tends to\nsubstitute deduction to experience, rational to empirical knowledge.\u201d\nThis prevision, a necessary consequence of the constant relations\ndiscovered between phenomena, will allow men never to mistake real\nscience for fruitless erudition, which accumulates facts without\ndeducing them one from another.\n\nThus the formula cited above enlarges itself: \u201cScience is composed\nof laws and not of facts.\u201d The more deduction is substituted to\nexperience, the better is the extension and connection of our knowledge\nrealised. Consequently, the more also does science draw near to\nthat unity which is imperatively claimed by our understanding, and\nwhich is for it the criterion of truth. \u201cReal science,\u201d says Comte,\n\u201cregarded from the highest point of view, has no other general\nobject but to establish or to fortify unceasingly the intellectual\norder, which is the basis of all other order.\u201d[39] The mind which\napplies itself to the contemplation of the world requires, before\neverything, to find it intelligible. \u201cReal\u201d science satisfies it, not\nin imagining wills and causes, as did theology and metaphysics, but in\ndiscovering order in the constant relations between phenomena. When\nthis order is harmonious, that is to say, when the several classes of\nphenomena are conceived as homogenous, and as similarly governed by\nlaws, \u201cthe spontaneous unity of our understanding is consolidated.\u201d\nIt matters little that the various orders of phenomena are given\nto us as irreducible to one another. The highest object of science\nis to determine the point of view from which all phenomena appear\nintelligible, and this point of view is one as the understanding itself\nis one.\n\n\nIII.\n\nPerhaps it would have been easy to pass from this conception of\npositive science to a theory of knowledge, and to a metaphysical view\nof nature, both idealistic. But Comte neither could nor would push his\ntheory in this direction. In this respect nothing is more significant\nthan his way of understanding the relativity of science.\n\nThis relativity is usually presented as the conclusion of a criticism\nof our understanding, of its nature, of its bearings, and of its\nrelations to its objects. But, according to Comte, an inquiry pursued\non these lines, has no chance of reaching a conclusion. The only\ntheory of knowledge which is positive and \u201creal,\u201d is drawn from the\nhistory of the human mind. The laws of the mind are only revealed in\nthe examination of the successive products of its activity, that is to\nsay in its beliefs and in its science. The relativity of science can\ntherefore only be stated at first, as a fact, leaving it for subsequent\ninquiry to determine the reason of that fact. The law of the three\nStates suffices for this, for it shows that man began by seeking for\nabsolute knowledge. The philosophy to which he first turns is, at the\nsame time, the most na\u00efve and the most ambitious. But a necessary\nevolution causes him to abandon the pursuit of the absolute, first in\nits theological form and then in the metaphysical form. Having reached\nthe positive state, man knows that his science, necessarily relative,\nis limited to \u201cthe systematic co-ordination of phenomena,\u201d and the\nknowledge of their laws.\n\nThe condemnation which thus strikes researches bearing on the absolute\nis itself, moreover, only relative in character. It prejudges nothing\nrespecting the ultimate solution of questions. Positive philosophy\nin no way takes sides in respect to these problems. It simply states\nthat science has more and more cut them off from the number of those\nwhich it studies. Indeed it is impossible to apply the positive method\nto questions which concern the absolute. Now, this method being the\nonly one which our mind can henceforth follow, at least if it wishes\nto maintain the logical unity which is its supreme requirement, it\nfollows that these problems are in fact abandoned. Nothing more and\nnothing less. \u201cSound philosophy,\u201d says Comte, \u201csets aside, it is true,\ninsoluble questions\u201d; but \u201cin stating the motive of their rejection, it\navoids denying anything respecting them, which would be contradictory\nto that systematic disuse by which alone uncontrovertible opinions must\ndie out.\u201d (Comte means: opinions which do not come within the range\nof positive discussion.) The problems relating to the essence of the\nsoul or to the \u201csubstantia prima\u201d will melt away, as the majority of\nthe metaphysical problems which the scholastics put to themselves have\nalready disappeared.\n\nEven to positive science, we must be careful not to attribute an\nabsolute character--that is to say, in a sense slightly different from\nthe preceding one, but very frequently with Comte--a definite and\nimmutable character. The laws which we can determine are never true\nexcept under certain conditions. We have no right to consider them as\ntrue _absolutely_. Newton\u2019s law is demonstrated for our solar system:\nbut do we know that it is verified in all the systems throughout space?\nDo not let us confound the world, which we can study with the united\nresources of observation and calculation with the universe, of which we\nknow scarcely anything, and which outranges all our powers. In spite of\nthe famous principle of the sufficient reason the absence of motives\nfor negation does not constitute the right of affirmation, without any\ndirect proof. Absolute notions, says Comte, seem to me so impossible\nthat I would not even dare, whatever probability I may see in it, to\nwarrant the necessary and unalterable perpetuity of the theory of\ngravitation restricted to the interior of our world, if one day, (which\nis moreover very difficult to admit) the precision of our present\nobservations came to be perfected as much as we have done in comparison\nto Hipparchus.[40]\n\nIn the same way, must not attraction have seemed to be an absolute\nquality (that is to say an immutable one) of bodies, since neither\nchange of shape, nor the passage from one physical constitution to\nanother, nor any chemical metamorphosis, nor even the difference\nbetween the state of life and death could modify this quality, so\nlong as the integrity of the substance was maintained? The Newtonian\nconception came and destroyed entirely at a signal stroke this\ncharacter which must have appeared so indestructible, by showing that\nthe weight of a body is a phenomenon purely relative to the position of\nthis body in the world, or, more precisely, to its distance from the\ncentre of the earth.[41]\n\nIn order that our positive science of any part of nature should be\nabsolute, that is to say, final, it would have to be complete. But,\nas all things are caused or causing, helped or helping, according\nto Pascal\u2019s expression, all the phenomena in a reciprocal universal\naction, all the laws relative one to another, our science will never\nbe complete on any point. It only furnishes more or less imperfect\napproximations.[42] The discovery of new facts and new laws is always\npossible.\n\nHow many times does not positive science find itself obliged to modify\nand to readjust a system of long acquired notions, in order to make a\nplace for new elements? This is a work often very laborious, but from\nwhich science never dreams of shrinking, knowing that it is made liable\nto it, so to speak, by definition, that is to say, that it is relative.\nExamples of this abound, not only in the history of physical and\nnatural science, but even in that of so-called exact sciences. Do we\nnot hear M. Poincar\u00e9 declaring in accordance with Hertz, that given the\nsystem of Galileo and of Newton in mechanics it is impossible to give a\nsatisfactory idea of mass and of force?[43]\n\nThus the definitions, and even the laws, established by the positive\nsciences, are at every period approximations corresponding to the\nknowledge we have of facts. And as this knowledge can always be\nenriched the approximation may also become stricter, without ever\nreaching its confines. Leibnitz already said that the analysis of\nanything real reaches to infinity. This thought is with him, closely\nallied to the whole of his metaphysics. We find in Comte an expression\nin some way equivalent, although positive. He says, although the\nprogress of the science of nature consists in substituting as much as\npossible the rational method to the experimental method, the limit\ncan never be attained, we can never affirm that experience will not\nbring new elements which will oblige us to modify the edifice of\nscience. The relativity of science thus serves to maintain an equal\nbalance between the need of unity which comes from the understanding,\nand the inexhaustible diversity of the world of reality which this\nunderstanding studies.\n\nAs a fact, then, positive science is always relative. Rightly, it\ncannot be otherwise, and this for two essential reasons. It depends\nnecessarily upon \u201cour organisation\u201d and \u201cour situation\u201d[44] or, in\nother words, it is relative \u201cboth to the individual and to the species\nin its advance.\u201d\n\nIt is relative in the first place to our organisation. Here Comte\ntakes up again an idea which was dear to the philosophers of the\nXVIII. century and in particular to Diderot. If our organisation were\ndifferent, the data which our science elaborates would be other that\nthey are. With more organs we might perhaps grasp kinds of problems\nof which we have no idea. If we suppose our species to be blind,\nastronomy would not exist for it. And further, a natural law requires\nthat the more complex and the higher phenomena in regard to their\nconditions of existence, should be subordinated to the more general\nand the more common phenomena. The intellectual phenomena thus depend,\nfirst, upon the biological phenomena, and then upon all those to which\nthe biological phenomena are subordinated. In this sense, therefore,\nscience is relative to our organisation, which is itself relative\nin respect to the milieu in which we live. But, reciprocally, the\nrepresentation of this milieu and of this organisation rests upon\nintellectual laws which impart to science a need of unity and harmony\nspecial to the mind.\n\nComte concludes, therefore, that to endeavour to apportion what belongs\nto the object and what to the subject in scientific knowledge is a\nhopeless attempt. We simply know that science is not the exclusive\nproduct either of the subject or the object. Giving too much to the\nobject leads us to \u201cempiricism.\u201d Falling to the opposite extreme leads\nto \u201cmysticism.\u201d The efforts of philosophers to construct an abstract\ntheory of knowledge have only ended in miserable results. We have not\ngone beyond Aristotle\u2019s \u201caxiom as corrected by Leibnitz.\u201d _Nihil est in\nintellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu, nisi ipse intellectus._ We\nare only certain of one thing: our science, necessarily conditioned by\nour organisation, is also necessarily relative.\n\nBut this is not the most decisive consideration for it only makes us\nsee that our science would be different, if our organisation were to\nchange. Now, as a matter of fact, our organisation does not change.\nHuman nature, according to Comte, remains similar to itself in the\nwhole course of its evolution. It is this evolution which itself\nbecomes a cause, and a decisive one, of relativity for science. For, if\nour organisation does not vary, the system of our conceptions and of\nour science necessarily varies, according to our \u201csituation,\u201d that is\nto say, according to the position which we occupy in this evolution,\nwhich accomplishes itself according to laws.\n\nOur conceptions, our religions, our philosophies, are not only\nindividual phenomena; they are also and chiefly social phenomena,\nmoments in a collective and continuous life, of which all the phases\nare interdependent. We only know in a given order of knowledge, what\nis compatible at that moment with the generally admitted philosophy,\nwith the knowledge already acquired in this and in the other orders\nof phenomena, with the great hypotheses considered as true, with the\nmethods in force, etc. As soon as the human mind has become conscious\nof the evolution to which it is subject, as soon as it has grasped its\nmost general law (the law of the three states), in a word, as soon as\nsociology is founded, science can no longer be conceived as other than\nrelative. For from that moment the various sciences appear as so many\ngreat social facts, which vary as so many functions of the rest of\ncivilisation.\n\nOur speculations, \u201cdepending on the totality of social progression,\u201d\ncan therefore never admit of that absolute fixity which metaphysicians\nhave supposed. The continuous movement of history modifies, in the\nlong run, the beliefs which appear to be the most immutable. Our\ntheories tend to represent more and more faithfully the objects of\nour investigations, that is to say the laws of phenomena. We are thus\nbrought back to the idea of limit, which is never attained, towards\nwhich we are advancing by means of approximations ever more exact.\n\nThe time is not yet far distant, when a doctrine of this kind could not\nhave been advanced without at once being rejected as sceptical. The\nhuman mind is scarcely beginning to understand that truth cannot be\nimmutable.[45] Men believed that truth must always be identical with\nitself, always identical for all minds at all times and at all places.\nIt seems that in losing this character, it must cease to be truth.\nThat is why philosophy has been so persistent in the pursuit of the\nabsolute. It was believed that no truth could be certain, unless it\nrested, ultimately, upon an immutable foundation.\n\nScience was therefore made to hang on metaphysics. And the defeats,\na thousand times repeated, of metaphysics would not have discouraged\nthe human mind had not positive philosophy at last shown that the\ntruth of which we are capable, because it is relative does not cease\nto be truth. We are not condemned to choose between the pursuit of\nan inaccessible absolute and the crumbling down of all science. It\nsuffices to understand that human science evolves and that this\nevolution is subject to laws. It is never ended: it always \u201cbecomes.\u201d\nIt is not a \u201cstate:\u201d it is a \u201cprogress.\u201d\n\nThere are therefore provisional, and, if one may so speak, temporary\ntruths. Does science ever establish any others? The ideas which\nHipparchus and the Greek astronomers had of the heavens was not false\nin all respects. It was the astronomical truth compatible with the\nconditions of the society in which they lived. After the labours of\nthe observers of the Middle Ages, utilised by Copernicus, this idea\nfaded before another one which became more perfect with Newton and\nLaplace. Perhaps this one will be modified in its turn, in consequence\nof new discoveries! Similarly it was thought that the earth was a\nflat surface, then a round disc. Then it was represented as a sphere\nand finally as an ellipsoid. To-day we know that this ellipsoid is\nirregular.\n\nTruth is then at each period \u201cthe perfect logical coherence,\u201d or\nthe correspondence between our conceptions and our observations.\nThe history of human thought is composed of a progressive series of\nalternating periods. At a certain moment the mind has placed what\nit conceives in accordance with what it knows. But, by degrees, new\nfacts are observed, known facts are better interpreted, discoveries\nburst forth. The harmony between the conceptions and the observations\nthen becomes precarious. Minds find a greater and greater difficulty\nin fitting all the acquired knowledge into the traditional frame.\nAt last the frame gives way. Then the harmony is re-established in\na more comprehensive form, which in its turn is destined to become\ninsufficient. Here positive philosophy recognises a sociological law.\nIt gives up the vain dream of immutable truth. It no longer regards\nthe truth of to-day as absolutely true, nor the truth of yesterday as\nabsolutely false. It ceases to be critical in regard to the past.\u201d\n\nTo conclude, the theory of science can therefore only be accomplished\nfrom the sociological point of view. It remains imperfect so long as\n\u201cwe\u201d has not been substituted to \u201cI,\u201d the universal subject which is\nhumanity to the individual subject, and a philosophical history of the\nsciences to mere reflective analysis. To the logical conditions of\nscience, to define it completely, its biological and social conditions\nmust be joined. Then, but then only, it will be understood, that, at\neach period, science is at the same time true and relative, without its\nrelativity placing its truth in danger.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[31] 1 Cours, vi. 651-3.\n\n[32] 2 Cours, vi. 651-3.\n\n[33] Discours sur l\u2019esprit positif, p. 16; Pol. pos. III, 25.\n\n[34] Cours, III, 4.\n\n[35] Cours, VI, 647.\n\n[36] Cours, I. 108: II. 18, 188-9.\n\n[37] Cours, VI. 646 sqq.\n\n[38] Cours, II. 18: III, 11-12.\n\n[39] Cours, IV, 147.\n\n[40] Cours, II, 195-7.\n\n[41] Cours, II, 187.\n\n[42] Cours, IV, 672-3.\n\n[43] Revue g\u00e9n\u00e9rale des Sciences, 30 septembre, 1897.\n\n[44] Discours sur l\u2019Esprit positif, p. 15.\n\n[45] Cours, 756., VI.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nSCIENCE (CONTINUED)\n\nPHENOMENA AND LAWS\n\n\nThe perfection of the positive system, towards which it unceasingly\ntends, although very probably it may never reach it, would be to\nrepresent all observable phenomena as particular cases of a single\ngeneral fact, such as, for example, that of gravitation. The\nfundamental identity of phenomena, the reduction of particular laws to\na supreme law; this is an ideal which we are free to entertain. Comte,\nafter d\u2019Alembert and Saint-Simon, has formulated it himself at the\nbeginning of the _Cours de philosophie positive_.[46]\n\nUnfortunately this ideal is not realisable. We apply a very weak\nintellect to a very complicated world.[47] The unity which, scorning\nexperience, we might establish, would naturally be valueless. For\nthe several categories of phenomena proposed to us seem irreducible.\nIf this[48] be the case, the pursuit after scientific unity is\n\u201cirrational.\u201d Comte ended by treating it as an \u201cabsurd utopia.\u201d[49]\n\nHowever, this utopia is forever reappearing; for the human mind is\nsecretly attached to it. It is because, on the one hand, unity pleases\nit above all things, and on the other hand because there is here an\nillusion produced and maintained by a philosophy born of mathematical\ninspiration. Descartes\u2019 discovery which allowed questions of geometry\nto be dealt with by algebra has been the occasion of a grave error.\nIt gave rise to the thought that differences of quality could be\nreduced to differences of quantity. Hence the idea of \u201creducing\u201d the\nvarious categories of phenomena to one another. But this was a wrong\ninterpretation of the principle of analytical geometry. Even there,\nwe have a translation, not reduction, \u201cThe geometrical ideas of form\nand of situation,\u201d says Comte--and Mr. Renouvier will repeat it after\nhim--\u201care not naturally more like numerical notions than the other\nreal conceptions. Every phenomenon, even social, would certainly have\nits equation, as a figure or a motion if its law were known to us with\nsufficient precision.\n\nAnalysis is therefore but an instrument of incomparable power for the\nstudy of phenomena. But, from the fact that we can make use of it, it\ndoes not in the least follow that the phenomena may be all brought back\nto an identical type. Quality is in no way by this means reduced to\nquantity, which is something entirely abstract, and this no more takes\nplace in the case of geometrical quality than in the case of any other.\nNeither can the geometrical quality be reduced to pure analysis, nor\nthe physical to the geometrical, nor the living to the inorganic, nor\nthe social to the biological. At every stage something qualitatively\nnew appears. Whether or no we can formulate the relations of phenomena\nin the form of an equation, their heterogeneity subsists always\nirreducible.\n\nWhat is true of phenomena is also true of their laws. Each order of\nphenomena has its special laws over and above those which result from\nits relations with the less complicated and more general orders. The\nidea of a supreme law from which all the others would be deduced must\ntherefore be forsaken. Even within the range of each fundamental\nscience, it is doubtful how far the unity dreamt of could ever be\nattained. The number of irreducible laws is far more considerable\nthan is imagined by a false appreciation of our mental powers and of\nscientific difficulties. For instance, in physics, how can optics and\nacoustics be reduced to one another? Physiological considerations,\nin default of other reasons, would be opposed to such a confusion of\nideas.[50] Likewise in biology, how can the laws of animal life be\nreduced to those of lower organic life? and in sociology, the laws\nof human society, implying a course of history, to those of animal\nsocieties which do not do so?\n\nInstead, therefore, of conceiving _a priori_, the phenomena and the\nlaws as capable of a \u201creduction\u201d which is, in fact, impossible, the\npositive method requires the determination of the general characters of\nthese phenomena and of these laws by observations. It first establishes\nthe following:\n\n1. _The more complex phenomena become, the more also our means of\nstudying them increase in number._\n\nIt is a natural but an insufficient compensation. For the difficulty\nof establishing the science of phenomena grows much more quickly than\nthe number and the power of our methodical processes. However, without\nthis compensation, scarcely any fundamental science would ever reach\nthe positive state. Thus, to the method of pure mathematics observation\nin astronomy comes to be added. Experimentation appears in physics, the\nart of nomenclatures in chemistry, the comparative method in biology,\nthe historical method in social science. With this final science, the\npositive method is henceforth complete.\n\n2. _The more complex phenomena become, the more modifiable they are._\n\nWe have no power over astronomical phenomena. Even the perfect\nknowledge of their laws would only allow us to foresee them. But we\ncan, in a great number of cases, bring about or arrest physical and\nchemical phenomena. Our intervention is still more efficacious if we\nare concerned with biological phenomena, as is sufficiently proved by\nthe good and the evil wrought by medicine and surgery. And it finally\nreaches the height of its power in social and political life. So much\nso that even cultivated men find it difficult to persuade themselves\nthat social phenomena are governed by invariable laws, and that\npolitics can become the object of a science. Experience seems to tell\nthem, on the contrary, that the activity of man, and especially that of\nthe man of genius, is all-powerful in this domain. Nevertheless it is\nnot so, as sociology, by the mere fact of its existence sufficiently\nproves. But it remains true that, of all the phenomena of nature, the\nsocial and moral phenomena are those in which man\u2019s intervention is at\nonce the easiest and the most efficacious.\n\n3. _The more complex the phenomena the more imperfect they are._\n\nWe shall perhaps be surprised to see Comte appealing to the idea\nof perfection. It seems that he ought to have excluded it as being\nsomething metaphysical. Further on we shall consider his theory of\nfinality. At present let us only say that if he considers natural\nphenomena as imperfect, it is in the sense in which Helmholtz calls the\neye a poor optical instrument. He simply states that certain ends, in\nfact, being realized by a natural arrangement of a group of phenomena,\nthe same end might be better or more economically reached, by other\narrangements that we can easily conceive. In this sense our solar\nsystem is imperfect, but less so than many living forms whose organism\nmight present a much higher degree of advantageous adaptation. And yet\nthese living forms are themselves less imperfect than societies subject\nas they are to all sorts of pathological alterations, as history\nclearly shows. It is remarkable that the most imperfect phenomena\nshould precisely be the most modifiable, and also those whose study\nonly became positive in the last stage.\n\n\nII.\n\nMore or less complex, modifiable and imperfect, _all_ phenomena are\nsubject to laws. It is the supreme principle, the \u201cfundamental dogma\u201d\nof science and of positive philosophy. Comte thus enunciates it: \u201cAll\nphenomena whatever, inorganic or organic, physical or moral, individual\nor social, are all subjected in a continuous manner to rigorously\ninvariable laws.\u201d[51]\n\nUndoubtedly this principle is not yet extended, by the majority of\nminds, to all phenomena. This is shown clearly enough by their mode\nof reasoning in ethics and in politics. But it is, however, implied\nin their general conception of nature. It thus assumes a universal\ncharacter, which has caused it to be regarded by many philosophers\nas an innate, or at least a primitive notion, in the human mind.\nAccording to Comte, this is erroneous. Like John Stuart Mill, whom\nhe expressly quotes on this point,[52] he sees in this principle the\nresult of a long, gradual induction, at the same time individual and\ncollective. Except in the case of the most familiar phenomena, whose\nregularity is most striking, the human mind does not begin by believing\nin an invariable order. Even the mind\u2019s conceptions, (theological and\nmetaphysical), conceal the existence of laws, long after observation\nwould have made it see them, were it freed from bias. It is true that\nthe \u201cfirst germs\u201d of this principle exist as soon as human reason\nbegins to be exercised, since the dominion of theological philosophy\nnever could be absolute. But these germs are only developed very\nslowly, like the positive method and conceptions themselves.\n\nThe induction upon which this principle is founded only began to\nacquire solidity when it was definitely verified for a whole order of\nimportant phenomena, that is to say when mathematical astronomy had\nbeen founded. Phenomena of the highest importance, from the theoretical\nas well as from the practical point of view, could then be predicted\nwith perfect certainty. The invariability of their laws had been placed\nbeyond doubt. From that moment, the principle must have been extended\nby analogy, to the more complex orders of phenomena, even before\ntheir own laws could be known. But according to Comte this \u201cvague\nlogical anticipation\u201d remained valueless and fruitless. It is of no\nuse to conceive, in the abstract that a certain order of phenomena\n_must_ be subject to laws. This empty conception cannot outweigh the\ntheological and metaphysical beliefs, which have the force of habit\nin their favour. In order that the principle of laws should be really\nestablished in an order of phenomena, some laws must _in fact_ have\nbeen discovered and demonstrated in it.\n\nConsequently, while in the _a priori_ doctrines the possibility of\nall science rests upon the principle of laws, in Comte\u2019s doctrine, on\nthe contrary, it is the progress of positive science which by degrees\nfounds the principle, and which finally brings it to the universal\nform in which we find it to-day. Until the creation of sociology,\nthis principle did not yet possess an effective universality, since\nthe moral and social phenomena were not conceived as subject to\ninvariable laws. But when the last conquest of the positive spirit\nis once accomplished, \u201cthis great principle at once acquires a\ndecisive fulness, and may be formulated as applying universally to all\nphenomena.\u201d Undoubtedly, in each order, we have only established for\na few what henceforth we affirm for all phenomena without previous\nverification. But we think that laws, unknown to us, nevertheless\nexist. In this we yield to an \u201cirresistible analogy,\u201d which has never\nbeen proved to be false.\n\nThus, \u201cthe most fundamental dogma of the whole of positive philosophy,\nthat is to say, the subjection of all real phenomena to invariable\nlaws, only results with certainty from an immense induction, without\nreally being deducible from any notion whatever.\u201d[53] This immense\ninduction is a progressive sum of inductions which have taken place\nsuccessively in each category of phenomena. It would not be absurd,\nstrictly speaking, that a certain category should not be submitted,\nlike the others to invariable laws. But, since sociology has been\nfounded, we know that all are in fact so subjected.\n\nThe laws are known to us, sometimes by experience, sometimes by\nreasoning. This diversity of origin in no way influences either the\ncertainty or the philosophical dignity of the laws. Each of the six\nfundamental sciences gives examples of these two distinct modes of\nadvance which mutually complete each other. \u201cThere is not less genius\nin the discovery of Kepler than in that of Newton. The initial laws\nof mechanics and even of geometry rest solely upon observation. The\nlogical perfection consists in confirming by one of these ways what\nmust have been found by the other. But one of the two suffices when all\nthe conditions required by the method are fulfilled.\u201d[54] How should\nthe laws obtained by induction be regarded as less certain than the\nlaws obtained by deduction, since the principle of laws itself rests\nupon an induction?\n\n\nIII.\n\nIn proportion as the several orders of phenomena are conceived as\ngoverned by invariable laws, the belief in final causes becomes weaker\nand tends to disappear. The final causes are imagined by the mind to\nexplain certain combinations of natural phenomena. When the laws of\nthese phenomena are known, this explanation becomes useless, it ceases\nto have currency. It shares the fate of the whole of theological and\nmetaphysical philosophy, of which it is a part.\n\nThe doctrine of final causes is generally regarded as a constituent\nprinciple of religious systems. A special argument in favour of the\nexistence of God has even been drawn from it. Comte remarks that\nit is more probably a consequence of these systems. So long as man\nbelieves in the continual action of the gods, or of God, in nature,\nhe does not need the consideration of final causes upon which to\nfound his belief. He does not even dream of it. Later on only, when\nthe religious conception of the world has become weaker, when God has\nso far withdrawn from the world as to be no longer anything but a\nsovereign who reigns, but does not govern, then the need is felt to\ndemonstrate His existence, and the order of nature becomes an argument.\nThe consideration of final causes from this point of view is a symptom\nof the weakening of the theological spirit; it is thus pre-eminently a\nmetaphysical doctrine.\n\nWhatever may be the case, experience witnesses against it. Positive\nscience does not lay down that the world must be conceived as the\nwork of an all-powerful intelligence. For instance, the scientific\nknowledge of our solar system has shown in the most obvious manner,\nand in various ways, that the elements of this system were certainly\nnot disposed in the most advantageous manner, and that science allowed\nus to conceive of a better arrangement.[55] Astronomers may admire a\nnatural finality in the organisation of animals; but the anatomists\nwho know all its imperfections, fall back upon the arrangements of the\nstars. In what concerns animals, a blind admiration wonders even at\nevidently detrimental complications: it is the case with the eye, with\nthe bladder, etc.[56] But \u201cit is an almost universal disposition of\nphysiologists to draw, even from their ignorance, as many motives for\nthe admiration of the profound wisdom of a mechanism which they declare\nthey cannot understand.\u201d\n\nIn truth, the natural order, so much extolled, is extremely imperfect,\nand we can without difficulty conceive a better one. The human works,\nsays Comte, from the most simple mechanical appliances to the most\nsublime political constructions, are generally far superior either\nin expediency, or in simplicity, to everything that the most perfect\nnatural economy can offer us.[57] Our geometers and our physicians\n\u201csufficiently prepared\u201d would do far better than nature, if they dared\n\u201cto take the direct conception of a new animal mechanism as the object\nof an intellectual exercise.\u201d This idea of artificial organisms pleases\nComte and he often returns to it. He considers that fictions of this\nkind may be useful in biology to intercalate intermediaries between the\nseveral known organisms, in such a manner as to facilitate comparison\nin making the biological series more homogeneous and continuous.[58] In\nfact this is what Broca attempted to do, when he endeavoured to connect\nman with the other primates by hypothetical anthropoids. Quite recently\nM. Delage has made use of a similar fiction in his _Trait\u00e9 de Zoologie_.\n\nComte seldom misses an opportunity of smiling at the stupid admiration\nof those who believe that nature has done everything \u201cfor the best,\u201d or\nthat everything in it has been ordered by a providential wisdom. But we\ncan surprise him also in the very act of admiration; not doubtless on\nthe subject of astronomical or biological phenomena, but in the chapter\nwhich lies nearest to his heart, that of social facts. He writes, \u201cwe\ncannot experience too much respect and admiration when we see this\nuniversal natural disposition which is the primary basis of all\nsociety....\u201d[59] and elsewhere: \u201cCan one really conceive, in the whole\nof natural phenomena, a more marvellous spectacle than this regular and\ncontinuous convergence of an immensity of individuals....\u201d[60]\n\nHowever, there is not here a contradiction. In reality, although\nComte says that the consideration of final causes must be accepted\naltogether, or rejected altogether, he does not himself reject it as\nentirely as he seems at first to do.\n\nWhat he formally rejects, is the finality understood in the theological\nor metaphysical manner: _C\u0153li enarrant gloriam Dei_. He does not admit\nthat we can \u201cexplain\u201d the natural order by a supernatural wisdom.\nBut he in no way contests the finality which Kant called internal.\nThis finality, or better, this reciprocal causality appears in living\nbeings, where the whole and the parts are reciprocally end and means.\nThe tree could not subsist without the leaves any more than the leaves\nwithout the tree. Comte expresses this idea in terms which are almost\nidentical with those of Kant, although he did not know them. \u201cWe\nshall,\u201d he says, \u201ccease defining a living being by the collection of\nits organs, as if these could exist isolated.... In biology the general\nnotion of the being, always precedes that of any of its parts whatever.\nIn sociology, where partial interdependence is less intimate although\nwider, it would be a serious heresy to define humanity by man ...\n_a fortiori_ in biology we ought not to conceive the whole from its\nparts.\u201d[61] As soon as we rise above the inorganic world, the first\ncondition for the study of phenomena is the idea of their consensus,\nfirst in biology, and then in sociology. This _consensus_ corresponds\nto Kant\u2019s internal finality.\n\nBut the distinction between internal finality and external finality\ncannot be strictly maintained. We will never affirm that some beings\nwere made in view of others. This would be in the highest degree a\ntheological \u201cexplanation\u201d of the first order. But from the positive\npoint of view, we observe that, in order to subsist, organisms need\nnot only special intimate structure, but further require a certain\nequilibrium of external conditions. At each moment their existence\ndepends at once on their constitution and on the \u201cmilieu.\u201d This\nword, which was destined to attain such popularity and the theory\nof the \u201cmilieu\u201d which Taine has rendered no less popular, belong to\nComte. Undoubtedly, the idea was suggested to him, on the one hand by\nMontesquieu and by his successors, and on the other by the labours of\nLamarck and of the contemporary biologists. He also drew inspiration\nfrom Bichat\u2019s celebrated _Recherches sur la vie et la mort_. But Bichat\nespecially insisted upon the antagonism between the living being and\nthe forces of the inorganic world which press upon him from all sides.\nComte thinks, on the contrary, that the very existence of living beings\nis the proof of a sufficient harmony between their organism and the\nmilieu. And what we cannot dispute is his merit in having generalised\nthe idea specially applied by Montesquieu to social facts, and also\nspecially applied by Lamarck and Bichat to the phenomena of life.\n\n\u201cI designate by this word \u201cmilieu,\u201d says Comte, in excusing himself\nfor the new meaning which he gives it, \u201cnot only the fluid in which\nthe organism is immersed, but, in general, the totality of external\ncircumstances of any kind whatever necessary to the existence of each\ndetermined organism.\u201d[62]\n\nProperly speaking then, Comte does not reject the doctrine of final\ncauses; he only transforms it. He had declared this himself in his\n_opuscule_ in 1822. \u201cThe doctrine of final causes has been converted by\nthe physiologists into the principle of the conditions of existence.\u201d\nPositive philosophy appropriates, \u201cwith the understanding of a suitable\nchange,\u201d the general ideas primitively invented by the theological and\nmetaphysical philosophies. As the positive notion of the mathematical\nlaws of phenomena arose out of the metaphysical conceptions of the\nPythagoricians concerning the properties of numbers, so the scientific\nprinciple of the conditions of existence springs from the hypothesis of\nfinal causes.[63]\n\nAn example will allow us to realise this transformation in the act.\n\nThe stability of the solar system renders the existence of living\nspecies on the earth possible. A good example of finality it would\nseem. Nevertheless this stability is simply a necessary consequence,\naccording to the mechanical laws of the world, of some circumstances\ncharacteristic of our system: extreme smallness of the planetary masses\nin comparison to the central mass, small eccentricity of their orbits,\nslight mutual inclination of their planes, etc. Since, in fact, we\nexist it must be that the system of which we form a part is arranged so\nas to allow of this existence.\u201d The so-called final cause would then\nreduce itself here, as on all analogous occasions, to this childish\nremark: the only stars inhabited are those which are habitable. In a\nword, we return to the principle of the conditions of existence, which\nis the true positive transformation of the doctrine of final causes,\nand whose bearings and fertility are far superior.\u201d[64]\n\nIn order to give the formula of this principle, we must have recourse\nto the general distinction established by de Blainville between the\nstatic point of view and the dynamic point of view.\n\nEvery active being, and in particular every living being, can be\nanalysed from these two points of view. The static analysis considers\nits elements in their relations of simultaneous connexions. The dynamic\nanalysis discovers the laws of their joint evolution. The first is\nthe share of the anatomist, the second that of the physiologist. Now\nit is clear that these two analyses are complementary to one another,\nand are even separately unintelligible. For instance, the anatomist is\nconstantly guided by physiological considerations. Conversely, without\nanatomical knowledge there is no positive physiology.\n\nThus, the statical analysis establishes the laws of coexistence, the\ndynamic analysis the laws of succession or of movement. The principle\nof the conditions of existence is nothing else than _the direct and\ngeneral conception of the necessary harmony of these two analyses, that\nis to say, of the agreement of these two orders of laws_.[65] If this\nharmony, in fact, was not realised, no living being, no natural system\nof phenomena could subsist. From the point of view of the object this\nprinciple accounts for the permanence of beings: from the point of view\nof the subject it expresses the possibility of science.\n\nWhy does Comte say that the importance and fertility of this principle\nare far superior to those of the doctrine of final causes? It is\nbecause this latter doctrine claims to \u201cexplain.\u201d In referring the\nnatural order to the wisdom of a Providence, it dispenses in some\nmeasure with scientific research, or at least it does not require it.\nThe principle of the conditions of existence, on the contrary, is\nclosely allied to the positive conception of natural phenomena. It only\nimplies the existence of laws. It only establishes the continuity of\nthe relations between these laws, a continuity verified by experience,\nsince beings subsist and reproduce themselves. In a word, it allows\nus to connect the laws of succession with the laws of coexistence\neverywhere. Now, to connect is the essential function of science. By\nmeans of this principle not only the successive moments of any natural\nevolution whatever are understood as having solidarity with each other\nbut the whole of this evolution becomes intelligible by its relation to\nthe statical conditions to which it corresponds. And, in virtue of the\nrelativity of science, or, if we prefer it, of the universal reciprocal\naction of all phenomena, the principle of the conditions of existence\nleads the human mind to a scientific investigation ever more exact and\nnever completed.\n\nThis positive transformation of the doctrine of final causes had\nalready been clearly sketched by the philosophers of the XVIII. century\nwhom Comte knew very well, by Diderot, by Hume, by d\u2019Holbach. Hume\nsays, for instance,[66] \u201cIt is useless to insist upon the uses of\nparts in animals or in plants, and on their curious adaptation one to\nanother. I should much like to know how an animal could subsist without\nthis adaptation. Do we not see that if it ceases he perishes at once,\nand that the matter of which he was composed takes some other shape?\u201d\nAnd d\u2019Holbach, \u201cThese wholes would not exist in the form which they\nbear, if their parts ceased to act as they do; that is to say, ceased\nto be arranged in such a way as to lend themselves to being mutually\nhelpful to each other. To be surprised that the heart, the brain, the\neyes, the arteries, etc., of an animal act as they do; or that a tree\nproduces fruit, is to be surprised that a tree or an animal exists.\nThese beings would not exist or would no longer be what they are, if\nthey ceased to act as they do: this is what happens when they die.\u201d[67]\n\nComte makes this criticism of the doctrine of final causes his own.\nBut, faithful to his maxim, \u201cWe only destroy what we replace,\u201d he\nclaims to substitute a positive principle to this metaphysical\ndoctrine, which preserves the elements in it which are compatible\nwith the scientific method. It is the principle of the conditions of\nexistence. In virtue of this principle, by the very fact that such\nan organ is part of such a living being, it necessarily co-operates\nin a determined although perhaps unknown manner, with the totality of\nthe acts which make up its existence: an organ no more exists without\na function than a function without an organ. But it in no way follows\nfrom this that all the organic functions are performed as perfectly\nas we could imagine them to be. For instance pathological analysis\ndemonstrates that the disturbing action of each organ upon the whole\nof the economy is very far from being always compensated for by its\nutility in the normal state. \u201cIf, within certain limits, everything is\nnecessarily arranged in such a way as to be able to exist, we should\nseek in vain, in the majority of effective arrangements, for proofs of\na wisdom superior or even equal to human wisdom.\u201d[68]\n\nExtending these considerations to the whole of the phenomena known to\nus, Comte concludes in almost the same way as Cournot will later on.\nAn order establishes itself in nature, since it subsists, since it\nis intelligible, since there are laws.[69] Does not the very idea of\na law induce at once the corresponding idea of a certain spontaneous\norder? But \u201cthis consequence is not more absolute than the principle\nfrom which it is derived.\u201d[70] The experience which reveals this order\nto us also shows us that it is imperfect, of an imperfection which\ngrows with the complexity of phenomena. Every time that the necessary\nand sufficient conditions are realised for a natural system to be able\nto exist, this system exists in fact, however full of imperfections\nit may be in other respects. \u201cUndoubtedly, an inevitable necessity\nwhich links together a series of events, and a premeditated plan which\ndirects them, resemble each other very much so far as the consequences\nare concerned.\u201d[71] But, if the necessity is established, there is\nno need to suppose the plan. Now the principle of the conditions of\nexistence, in showing that all that is \u201cindispensable,\u201d is at the same\ntime \u201cinevitable,\u201d renders this supposition superfluous.\n\nA double tendency makes itself felt in this theory. On the one hand\nComte, faithful to the spirit of his philosophy, rejects all that\nclaims to go beyond experience, that is to say the transcendental\nhypothesis of final causes and of optimism. On the other hand, he\nwishes to account for the order of nature, which is a fact. Now this\norder, all imperfect as it is, implies not only the existence of laws,\nbut moreover a permanent harmony between these laws. \u201cThe present\nis full of the past, and big with the future.\u201d The principle of the\nconditions of existence explains this permanence of order, at least as\nmuch as it needs to be explained from the positive point of view. For\nit states that everywhere, in fact, the dynamical laws are in harmony\nwith the statical laws, and that \u201cprogress is a development of order.\u201d\nThe principle of the conditions of existence is no more _a priori_\nthan the principle of laws. Like it it is founded upon an \u201cimmense\ninduction.\u201d Like it again, it only acquires its full power when social\nscience is created, and positive philosophy established.\n\nShould we not be tempted to see in this doctrine a kind of projection\nof an idealism such as that of Leibnitz on the lines of positive\nthought? Just as Leibnitz makes mechanism rest upon a deeper dynamism,\nso Comte completes the principle of laws by the principle of the\nconditions of existence. True, between these two doctrines there lies\nall the distance which separates the positive from the metaphysical\nspirit. But none the less both give symmetrical solutions of the same\nproblem which correspond to one another, the one _a priori_ the other\n_a posteriori_.\n\n\nIV.\n\nAll natural laws, must be conceived as rigorously invariable, whether\nit be a question of mathematical or of sociological laws. If we could\nconceive, in any case, that under the influence of conditions exactly\nsimilar the phenomena should not remain perfectly identical, not only\nin kind, but also in degree, all scientific theory would at once become\nimpossible.[72] This principle is the very condition of the possibility\nof prevision, and consequently of positive science. Claude Bernard\nwill call it \u201cthe absolute determinism of phenomena.\u201d Comte admits\nno absolute: but he considers nevertheless that the invariability of\nnatural laws does not permit of exception.\n\nIn the case of certain laws their invariability can be directly\nverified, since they come before us in a mathematical form. Such are,\nfor instance, the mechanical, astronomical and physical laws. Others,\non the contrary, such as the biological laws, refuse to be dealt with\nby numbers and cannot be reduced to equations. But this evidently comes\nfrom their complexity: \u201cIf it were possible rigorously to isolate\neach one of the simple causes which concur in producing the same\nphysiological phenomenon, everything tends to show that under well\ndetermined circumstances, it would appear to be possessed of a kind of\ninfluence and of a quantity of action, as exactly fixed as we see it to\nbe in universal gravitation.\u201d[73] Every elementary phenomenon has its\ncurve.\n\nIf then in all cases we could go back to the elementary phenomena,\nwe could undoubtedly also formulate their mathematical law. In this\nsense, mathematical analysis would apply to all the phenomena of the\nworld without exception. But, nearly always, the decomposition of given\nphenomena into elementary phenomena is impossible to us. At any rate\nthe work of synthesis or of re-composition taken in the reverse order\nis far beyond our mathematical powers. The only phenomena to which\nwe apply the analysis without too much trouble are the most simple\nof all, the geometrical and mechanical phenomena. The difficulty\ngrows very rapidly with the complication of astronomical, physical,\nand especially chemical phenomena. When we reach the realm of living\nnature, the elementary phenomena escape us altogether. They are given\nto us in a state of almost infinite complexity, and, in virtue of the\nbiological _consensus_, closely bound up with others of no less complex\na character. These phenomena are in themselves syntheses depending upon\nother syntheses all in a state of mutual influence and of constant\ninstability. Then, although, in principle, it remains true that\nidentical antecedents can only have identical consequents, in fact,\nbecause of the very great number of elementary actions which concur in\nthe production of each phenomenon, there have perhaps never been, there\nperhaps never will be, two cases rigorously similar.\n\nIt follows that we must not confuse \u201cthe subordination of any events\nwhatever to invariable laws with their irresistible necessary\naccomplishment.\u201d[74] Relatively single phenomena appear indeed to us\nto be produced with an irresistible necessity: for instance, the facts\nof gravitation. But complex phenomena, in virtue of the more and more\nvaried combinations which their several necessary conditions admit of\nno longer present this character. They are more \u201cmodifiable\u201d and less\n\u201cirresistible.\u201d In other words, as one considers more elevated, more\ncomplex, more \u201cnoble\u201d categories of facts, the laws become removed\nfrom the type of mathematical necessity, and admit more of an ever\nincreasing element of \u201ccontingency\u201d?\n\nThe order of the world can then be conceived as a \u201cmodifiable\nfatality.\u201d[75] In the eyes of the greater number of present thinkers,\nsays Comte, this formula will seem contradictory. This comes from\nold habits of mind which are not easily broken with. In the same\nway, as we have had a great deal of trouble in representing truth to\nourselves otherwise than as immutable, so we are unwilling to conceive\norder otherwise than as necessary. During a long time the science of\nmathematics has been the only positive science. The idea of law formed\nitself in this science, that is to say according to the necessary\nrelations which are demonstrated in it. It came to be afterwards\ntransferred, just as it was, into the other orders of phenomena,\nas the positive spirit progressed. But orders of phenomena differ\nqualitatively from one another. All laws ought not to be conceived\naccording to the single type of geometrical and algebraical laws. In\norder to obtain a complete idea of a natural law, we must not confine\nourselves to the mathematical order, which is an \u201cexception\u201d in this\nrespect. All the orders of phenomena must be considered. We then see\nthat law must be defined \u201cconstancy in variety.\u201d\n\nIn fact, \u201cthe normal type is never suited to any but a medium state,\nmore ideal than real, around which effective existence ceaselessly\noscillates, so long as the deviation does not go beyond the limits\nwhich are compatible with the duration of the system. Order, even\nisolated, is no more eternal than it is absolute.\u201d[76] In this\npassage, Comte is speaking of astronomical order, but the same\nconsideration applies to all the systems or groups of phenomena. Every\nlaw is necessarily something abstract. Being indispensable to the\nintelligibility of the real, every law allows prevision and science\nto exist. But it is not an adequate expression of this reality, which\nnever remains identical with itself.\n\nComte goes so far as to say that our requirement of precision in\nthe study of natural laws must not be pushed too far. For the laws\nwhich it has been possible to establish within certain degrees of\napproximation vanish if this approximation is pushed further. Not that\nthe phenomena cease to be subject to laws; but these laws becoming too\ncomplex, escape us. For instance, it has been possible to establish\nwith our thermometers the laws of the variation of temperature of\na body under certain conditions. With very much more sensitive\nthermometers the variations becomes incessant and very complicated.\nThe known laws disappear without our being in a condition to establish\nothers.[77]\n\nThe order which positive science shows us in nature is then very far\nfrom being absolute. It is, to speak truly, the outcome of the combined\nactivity of our mind and of things. We cannot separate what belongs\nto each of these two factors, but it appears from what has just been\nsaid that the mind plays a great part, that the external relations\nare far more contingent than suits our blind instinct of universal\nconnection.\u201d[78] Nevertheless the phenomena are not irreducible to\norder, since science and prevision remain possible. But this order,\nentirely relative in respect to our understanding is only established\nwithin certain limits. More powerful minds than ours would probably\nconstruct richer and more complex orders for themselves. For us, beyond\na certain point of complexity our vision becomes confused and our\nlogical requirements are no longer satisfied. Limits would thus seem to\nbe placed upon scientific investigation, and these in the interest of\nscience itself.\n\nFinally we reach the last consequence of this theory founded upon\nexperience, the principle of laws and the principle of the conditions\nof existence only insure a provisional order. Comte readily admits that\nit might not exist. \u201cThis order might become so irregular that it might\neven escape brains superior to ours. There is nothing to prevent us\nfrom imagining words outside our solar system, always given over to\nan inorganic and entirely disordered agitation, which would not even\nallow of a general law of gravitation.\u201d[79] This is the very hypothesis\nformulated by John Stuart Mill, in almost similar terms, and in which\na kind of _reductio ad absurdum_ of his own theory was thought to be\nfound. It is, however, compatible with the existence of a science which\ndoes not claim to possess an absolute value. Moreover Comte at once\nadds, \u201cStill, even if order should be found to be particular to our\nworld, in fact, it would be in no way accidental in it, since it is the\nfirst condition for human existence.\u201d In virtue of the principle of the\nconditions of existence, the presence of a being such as man implies\nthe whole of the laws which govern our world.\n\n\nV.\n\nThe laws which for us constitute the order of the world are of two\nkinds. Some are established by the positive method in each order of\nphenomena separately considered; the astronomical laws, physical laws,\nchemical laws, etc. They belong to the domain of science properly\nso-called. The others are apprehended when the mind leaves the special\npoint of view of science, and places itself at the universal point of\nview of philosophy. They are found again in the different orders of\nphenomena, whose relations they express without compromising their\nrespective independence. They represent them severally connected, or,\naccording to Comte\u2019s expression, as convergent. Comte calls these last\n_encyclop\u00e6dic_ laws. They tend to realise the unity which the mind\nclaims, not in pursuing the chimerical reduction of all laws to a\nsupreme law, but in showing that the systems of irreducible laws are\nnevertheless harmonious among themselves.\n\nGenerally speaking, these laws have been known for a long time, but\nonly as special laws of such and such an order of phenomena. It belongs\nto positive philosophy to give them their encyclop\u00e6dic character,\nthat is to say, to make them universal. For instance, d\u2019Alembert\u2019s\nprinciple is known in mechanics as a law which connects questions of\nmovement with questions of equilibrium. Philosophy finds a similar\nlaw in biology: (physiological questions are correlated to anatomical\nquestions); and also in sociology (\u201cprogress is the development of\norder\u201d). It then formulates the encyclop\u00e6dic law which generalises\nthese three laws, that is, the principle of the conditions of existence.\n\nSimilarly the three great laws of mechanics, known under the name of\nthe laws of Kepler, of Galileo and of Newton, must be universalised\nand become encyclop\u00e6dic for they are applicable to all the orders\nof phenomena.[80] The law of Kepler, in the first place, expresses\nthe spontaneous tendency of all natural phenomena to persevere\nindefinitely in their state, if no disturbing influence supervenes;\na tendency whence are derived inertia in mechanics, habit in living\nbodies, and the conservative instinct in societies. The law of Galileo\nwhich reconciles every common movement with the various particular\nmovements, applies to all the organic and inorganic phenomena. For, in\nany system, we can always ascertain the independence of the several\nactive or passive mutual relations with regard to any action which is\nexactly common to the various parts, whatever may be their kind and\ndegree. Finally the universal character of Newton\u2019s law (reaction is\nequal to action), is evident at first sight. It is accidentally, not\nessentially, that these laws have at first been mechanical laws. They\ncould have been equally attained by the study of biological or social\nphenomena. If the science of mechanics was the first to formulate them\nit is because it has for its object the less complicated phenomena.\n\nA complete and rational system of encyclop\u00e6dic laws would realise the\n\u201cphilosophia prima\u201d which Bacon dimly foresaw. In the actual condition\nof the sciences this would probably be a rash undertaking. Comte\nattempted it in the fourth volume of the _Politique positive_.[81]\nOne can hardly say that the trial was a decisive one. It is true that\nat that moment Comte was already entirely taken up with religious\npreoccupations.\n\nHowever, the encyclop\u00e6dic laws are destined to play a part in the\npositive philosophy of nature, which may be compared, in some respects,\nwith that of the categories in Aristotle\u2019s philosophy. They are the\nmost general forms under which the phenomena given in experience become\nobjects of scientific thought for us. As in each class of phenomena we\ndetermine laws, principles of order and of harmony, so the encyclop\u00e6dic\nlaws make the order and the harmony of the different classes among\nthemselves. They are, so to speak, _the laws of laws_. Through them\nthe human mind which has already reached unity of method, may some day\nreach a certain unity of knowledge. But this unity will always differ\nby two essential characteristics from that which metaphysicians have\npursued up to the present time: it will respect the irreducibleness of\nthe various fundamental sciences, and it will remain relative, both by\nthe conditions of the object and by those of the subject, upon which it\nequally depends.\n\nOur conception of universal order \u201cresults from a necessary concurrence\nbetween that which is without us, and that which is within. The laws,\nthat is to say the general facts, are never anything but hypotheses\nconfirmed by observation. If harmony in no way existed outside us our\nmind would be entirely incapable of conceiving it, but in no case is it\nverified so much as we suppose it to be.\u201d[82] We neither make order nor\nperceive it entirely. By long and arduous labour the human intellect\ngradually disengages the concept of order out of the facts that come\ncrowding within its reach. It is an imperfect, contingent, perishable\norder, in a word, an order, relative like the mind itself. It is order\nnevertheless, and a necessary condition for ethics as well as for\nscience.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[46] Cours, I. 4.\n\n[47] Discours sur l\u2019Esprit positif, p. 23.\n\n[48] Cours, II. 505.\n\n[49] Cours, VI. 648.\n\n[50] Cours, VI, 659.\n\n[51] Cours, VI, 655.\n\n[52] Discours sur l\u2019esprit positif, p. 17.\n\n[53] Lettre inedite a M. Papot, 8 mai 1851 (archives de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9\npositiviste).\n\n[54] Cours, VI, 662.\n\n[55] Cours, II, 36.\n\n[56] Cours, III, 362.\n\n[57] Cours, VI, 833.\n\n[58] Cours, III, 339, 365.\n\n[59] Cours, IV, 452.\n\n[60] Cours, IV, 470.\n\n[61] Pol. pos. i, 641.\n\n[62] Cours, III, 235.\n\n[63] Pol. pos. iv, Appendice p. 17.\n\n[64] Cours, ii, 26-27.\n\n[65] Cours, iii, 366.\n\n[66] Dialogues on natural religion, VIII.\n\n[67] Syst\u00e8me de la nature, II. 187.\n\n[68] Cours, III. 363-4.\n\n[69] Pol. pos. II. 42.\n\n[70] Cours, IV. 274.\n\n[71] Pol. pos. Appendice, p. 25.\n\n[72] Cours, III. 325.\n\n[73] Cours, I, 128-9.\n\n[74] Cours, III. 642.\n\n[75] Pol. pos. II. 427.\n\n[76] Pol. pos. 431.\n\n[77] Cours, VI. 690.\n\n[78] Pol. pos. I. 588.\n\n[79] Pol. pos. II. 30.\n\n[80] Cours, XI., 740-46; Pol. pos., I, 494-5.\n\n[81] Pol. pos., IV., 173-80.\n\n[82] Pol. pos., II. 33.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nSCIENCE (CONTINUED)--POSITIVE LOGIC\n\n\nLogic, says Comte, almost in the terms of Descartes, is the sole\nportion of ancient philosophy which is capable of still presenting some\nappearance of utility.[83] And does even this appearance correspond to\na very solid reality?\n\nIf we distinguish, according to custom, formal logic from applied\nlogic, Comte in his system will find no place for the former, which\nestablishes _a priori_ the principles and the mechanism of reasoning.\nAs to the principles, which are the laws of the understanding, positive\nphilosophy has shown that the only way to discover them is to study\nthe products of the human intellect, that is to say, the development\nof the sciences. And it is again from these sciences that, through\nobservation, the theory of reasoning must be drawn. Formal logic, as\nmetaphysicians have constructed it, especially develops the dialectical\nfaculty, that is to say, an aptitude more harmful than useful, for\nproving without finding.[84] Descartes said the same, in speaking of\nthe syllogism, that it serves more for explaining to others the things\nwhich we know, than to discover those which we ignore.\n\nAll the utility which we can attribute to the study of logic properly\nso-called is found again more extended, more varied, more complete,\nmore luminous, in mathematical studies. The mechanism of reasoning\nis everywhere the same. Whatever may be the phenomena which are the\nobjects of a science the nature of deduction and induction never\nchanges in them. Thus in practising these forms of reasoning in the\nmost simple and the most general phenomena, those whose science is most\nadvanced, we learn to know them with the most entire evidence, and in\nall the generality of which they are capable. Nowhere is reasoning so\nexact, so rigorous as in mathematics. They accustom the mind not to\nfeed upon false reasons, and it is in that school that men ought to\nlearn the theory and the practice of reasoning.\n\nBut, if the old pure logic is thus replaced by mathematics, must we\nnot at least preserve the general study of the processes used in the\nvarious sciences, which is called methodology? Has not Comte himself\ninsisted upon the irreducibleness of the several orders of laws to\none another, and in particular to the mathematical laws? Is not the\nlegitimate object of logic to define the processes of investigation and\nof proof particular to each of the fundamental sciences?\n\nComte does not think so. This applied logic does not appear to him\nto be more indispensable than formal logic. In the first place, the\nformer, in fact, supposes the latter. It proceeds from the same\nphilosophical conception. In order to determine _a priori_, in a\ngeneral way, the rules of the application of the mind to its various\nscientific objects, we should first have to possess a knowledge of the\nlaws of the mind. But, according to Comte, this knowledge can only be\nobtained by the observation of the methods which the mind has indeed\nfollowed. Moreover, no art is taught abstractedly, not even the art\nof reasoning well, nor that of experimenting, of finding hypotheses,\netc. It has never been sufficient to know the rules of versification\nin order to write true poetry. A deep knowledge of the rules of method\nwill not lead to scientific discoveries.[85] Whatever we learn of an\nart, it is practice that has taught us. Nothing here can replace time,\nnatural disposition, and experience.\n\nMethods then cannot be studied apart from the positive researches in\nwhich men of learning make use of them. Even supposing that in the\nfar future, when the sciences are advanced, the methods and their\napplications could be taught by themselves, the study would run a great\nrisk of yielding poor results.[86] Up to the present time all that has\nbeen said of the method, considered in the abstract, reduces itself\nto vague generalities. When, in logic, we have thoroughly established\nthat all our science of nature must be founded upon observation, that\nwe must proceed sometimes from facts to principles, sometimes from\nprinciples to facts, and a few other similar aphorisms, we know far\nless of the method than the man who has studied a single one of the\npositive sciences somewhat deeply, even without any philosophical\npurpose. It is thus that Eclectic philosophers have imagined to make\ntheir psychology into a science, thinking they could understand and\npractice the positive method because they had read the _Novum Organum_\nand the _Discours de la M\u00e9thode_. But did not Bacon, Pascal, Descartes,\nand the other great scientific leaders insist on the uselessness of\nabstract considerations about method? They never separated the rules\nthey formulated from their application to positive research.\n\nComte himself, their successor and their heir, uses no other language.\nIn his long study of the fundamental sciences he never fails to\ndistinguish the contents of the science from its method, what he\ncalls \u201cthe scientific point of view and the logical point of view.\u201d\nBut, while distinguishing them, he considers that they are correlated\nand closely allied among themselves. He no more conceives method\nas separated from the science which he studies, than science as\nseparated from its method. Both constitute one intellectual reality\nseen under two aspects closely allied to one another.[87] To conclude,\ntraditional logic is fast disappearing. In its theoretical parts it is\nsuperannuated like the metaphysical philosophy whence it proceeds. In\nits applied parts it is barren if separated from the practice of the\nsciences.\n\n\nII.\n\nThere is however a positive logic, and in it we can also distinguish a\ntheoretical and a practical part.\n\nThe theoretical part deals with logical laws. These laws which,\nfinally, govern the intellectual world, are invariable, and common\nnot only to all time and places, but also to all subjects whatever\nwithout any distinction even between those which Comte calls real and\nchimerical. They are observed, fundamentally, even in dreams.[88]\nBut this universality of logical laws is not understood by him in\nthe sense in which the rationalist philosophers understand it. Comte\nis only concerned with a permanence and continuity purely historical\nin character. The mind of man, like the rest of his nature remains\nidentical with itself, through the diversity of epochs and situations.\nIt evolves without changing fundamentally \u201cwithout other differences\nthan those of gradually developed maturity and experience.\u201d\n\nAncient philosophy claimed to discover the intellectual laws by\nreflection, as if the mind could think and at the same time see\nitself thinking, reason and observe its reasoning Comte rejects this\nintrospective method, which yields no scientific results. If we apply\nthe method of positive investigation to the intellectual phenomena\nas to all the others, two ways only are open. We can look at it from\nthe static point of view, that is to say, study the conditions upon\nwhich these phenomena depend, and refer the phenomena to them as we\nrefer generally the function to its organ. In this sense the study\nof the intellectual phenomena belongs to biology. Or else, from the\ndynamic point of view, we can consider these phenomena in their\nevolution, by observing the successive phases through which they pass.\nAnd since the life of the individual is too short for this \u201cprogress\u201d\nto be appreciable, it must be studied in the life of the species. So\nunderstood, the science of the intellectual laws comes within the\nsphere of sociology.\n\nNow, higher biology which deals with moral and intellectual phenomena,\nhas only just been founded by Cabanis and Gall. Comte discovered that\nit could not be constituted as a science without the help of sociology.\nIt is then to this newly born study that the search after intellectual\nlaws in every way belongs.\n\nPositive logic abstains, as we see, from speculating upon the leading\nprinciples of knowledge, principles of identity, of contradiction\nof causality, etc. These kinds of principles are not objects of\nexamination or of discussion. Comte upon this point is in full accord\nwith the Scottish school. No positive science questions its own\nprinciples, for how can we submit the very principles of all reasoning\nto criticism? Nothing is less in accordance with the positive spirit\nthan an attempt of this kind. It is simply metaphysical and has no\nchance of success.\n\nThe intellectual laws of which the research is positive are such as\nthe law of the three states (which is the most general of all), or\nsuch, for instance, as these: the human mind always makes an effort\nto place its conceptions in accordance with its observations; in\nevery case the human mind forms the simplest hypothesis, etc. These\nlaws, which are derived from the nature of the human mind, and whose\naction has always been felt, could only be discovered and formulated\nquite recently. For biology and sociology, to which they are related,\ncould not be constituted before the more simple fundamental sciences\nwere sufficiently advanced. To reach a scientific knowledge of the\nintellectual laws, to found a \u201cpositive logic,\u201d nothing less was needed\nthan the long evolution whose term is marked by Comte\u2019s philosophy.\n\nApplied logic, or theory of method, also finds a new meaning in the\npositive doctrine. Comte does not fall into the mistake which he has\ncriticised. He does not propose to teach an art _ex professo_, and he\nwill not formulate the rules which positive research must follow in\norder to be productive. Here again Comte will found his doctrine upon\nthe intellectual evolution of humanity.\n\nIn the first place, like the sciences, the positive methods are\ncollective works, \u201cthe work of the species gradually developed in the\nlong sequence of centuries.\u201d Comte considers as impertinent the\npretensions of some modern scientists, who pride themselves upon having\ninvented the comparative method in biology. As if Aristotle had not\nalready practised it! And Aristotle had not been the first to do so.\nThe processes of the positive methods do not reveal themselves all at\nonce, under a perfect and final form. They gradually come to light\nduring a long period of groping. The human mind notices the processes\nwhich have succeeded in simple cases. It endeavours to generalize them,\nand tests them in new and slightly more complex cases. It seeks for the\nreason why in certain cases the end is reached, in others it is missed.\nMethod is thus insensibly formed by a kind of practical induction.\nIts essential processes are, like the leading ideas in the sciences,\n\u201cinspirations from universal wisdom.\u201d The office of great men--and\nthis is sufficient for them to earn our gratitude--is to recognise the\nvalue and the fecundity of these inspirations, to set them at work,\nand especially to endow them with an often indefinite extension by\nseparating them from the concrete conditions in which they were at\nfirst manifested.\n\nThus positive philosophy, less ambitious than its predecessors, does\nnot take upon itself to legislate upon method. But neither does it\nconfine itself to the mere duty of making statements, that is to say\nto simply register the processes made use of in the sciences. Is not\nits proper function to represent in human knowledge the \u201cuniversalizing\nmind\u201d which in Comte\u2019s language is synonymous with government? He\nhimself calls the fifty-eighth lesson of the _Cours de philosophie\npositive_ his _Discours de la M\u00e9thode_.[89] He rises above the\nnecessarily peculiar position which belongs to specialists, and places\nhimself at the central and universal point of view which is proper to\nthe philosopher. Thence he embraces under one point of view, the entire\nhierarchy of the fundamental sciences. Out of this well-ordered whole,\nhe watches as they arise, first the essence of the positive method,\nand then the relations of the various elements in this method to one\nanother.\n\nIn its essence, the positive method is one, as science is one. For it\never tends towards the same end: the establishment of the invariable\nrelations which constitute the effective laws of all observable events,\n\u201cthus capable of being rationally foreseen from one another.\u201d The\npositive method proceeds to this by means of a threefold abstraction.\nIt first separates the practical requirements from theoretical\nknowledge, to be only concerned with the latter, it seeks for the laws\nof phenomena without troubling itself, at least provisionally, with\nany possible applications. It also puts aside \u00e6sthetic considerations,\nwhich ought not to intervene in scientific investigation. Finally--and\nhere is the condition for the very existence of science--the positive\nmethod always carefully distinguishes between the abstract and the\nconcrete point of view. It studies not beings, but phenomena. Even\nin the simplest cases, in astronomy for instance, no general law can\nbe established so long as bodies are considered in their concrete\nexistence. The principal phenomenon has had to be detached, so to\nspeak, so as to submit it alone to an abstract study, afterwards\nallowing us to return successfully to the consideration of more complex\nrealities. This is what the ancients had known how to do in geometry;\nand this is what Comte himself has done in the most complex of all\nsciences, in sociology. Instead of stopping at the concrete reality of\nhistory, he determined, by a bold abstraction, the law of the essential\nmovement in human society \u201cleaving to subsequent labours the care of\nbringing apparent anomalies into line with it.\u201d[90]\n\nIn the main, these general characteristics of the positive method\nbring it singularly near to the Cartesian method. Comte\u2019s \u201cThreefold\ngradual abstraction\u201d seems indeed to have for its end, like Descartes\u2019\nanalysis, to go back to what is simplest and easiest to know, and\nthen to come down, by a synthetic and progressive advance, towards\nthe reality which is given to us in experience. The one and the other\nof these methods witness, here, to an effort towards generalising the\nspirit of the mathematical method. Let us never forget, writes Comte,\nthat the general spirit of positive philosophy was first formed by the\nculture of mathematics, and that we must necessarily go back so far, in\norder to know this spirit in its elementary purity. The mathematical\nprocesses and formul\u00e6 are rarely capable of being applied to the\neffective study of natural phenomena, when we wish to go beyond the\nmost extreme simplicity in the real conditions of the problems. But\n\u201cthe true mathematical spirit, so distinct from the algebraical spirit,\nwith which it is too often confounded, is on the contrary, constantly\nof value.\u201d[91]\n\nWe must therefore not take too much notice of Comte\u2019s urging and\nbitterness, when he criticises the narrowness of mind and the\n\u201cimphilosophisme\u201d of geometers.[92] Undoubtedly he never tires\nof safeguarding the higher sciences against the encroachments of\nmathematics, and of showing the impossibility of a philosophy founded\nexclusively upon their principles. But he none the less recognises\nthat this science possesses the double privilege of having furnished\nhistorically, the first model of the positive method, and of presenting\nstill to-day its finest and purest examples.\n\nHowever, Comte, even more than Descartes, takes care not to transform\nthe mathematical method into a universal method by a simple\ngeneralisation. Nothing would be more contrary to the positive spirit.\nFor the development of this spirit the study of mathematics is a\nnecessary introduction. It is, however, but an introduction. The use\nwhich mathematics can make of deduction, on account of the extreme\nsimplicity of their subject produces a very false idea of the power\nof our understanding, and disposes us to reason more than to observe.\nFar from preparing us for the method which must be followed for the\nstudy of the other orders of natural phenomena, the exclusive habit\nof mathematics tends rather to draw us from it. In a word it is a\ndangerous error to take this \u201cinitial degree of sound logical education\nfor the final degree.\u201d[93]\n\nIn order to grasp the positive method in its entirety, we must not\nconsider only mathematics, but the whole series of the fundamental\nsciences. This method, always fundamentally identical, takes particular\ndeterminations in adapting itself to each new order of phenomena.\nEach of these orders introduces, so to speak, the use of some of\nthe principal processes of which the method is composed, and \u201cit is\nalways at their source that these notions of universal logic must\nbe examined. Thus the mathematical science is the one which gives\nthe best knowledge of the elementary conditions of positive science.\nIn it all the artifices of the art of reasoning, from the most\nspontaneous to the most sublime are continually practised with far\nmore variety and fecundity than anywhere else. Astronomy then teaches\nus, in its initial purity, the art of observation accompanied by that\nof forming hypotheses. It shows in what the rational provision of\nphenomena consists, and that science always ends in assimilation or\nin combination. Physics initiate us to the theory of experimenting,\nchemistry to the general art of nomenclatures, the science of organic\nbodies to the theory of classifications. Biology specially makes use\nof the comparative method, and finally with sociology appears the\n\u201ctranscendant\u201d process which Comte calls the historical method.[94]\n\nPositive logic extends to all the fundamental sciences the use of the\nprocesses at first peculiar to each one of them. Each great logical\nartifice, once studied in the portion of natural philosophy which shows\nits most spontaneous and most complete development, can afterwards\nbe applied, with the necessary modifications, to the perfecting of\nthe other sciences. For instance, the comparative method belongs in\nthe first place to biology. But, when brought back to its principle\nand generalised, it becomes a precious instrument for sociology, for\nphysics, and even for mathematics. In every science, the method is\ncompleted by the auxiliary use of the processes whose power and whose\nsphere of action have been made known by the other sciences. By these\nmutual loans, in each one of them, the positive method reaches its\nmaximum of production.\n\nTo be cultivated in the most rational manner possible, the sciences\nmust then be subject to the direction of a general system of positive\nphilosophy, \u201cthe common basis and the uniform combining element of all\ntruly scientific labours.\u201d[95] The scientific man must at the same\ntime be a philosopher, since philosophy alone puts him in possession\nof all the resources of positive method. For instance, this philosophy\nwill show the geometer that he must at least have a general knowledge\nof biology and of sociology. Biology will teach him the comparative\nmethod, of which he can make use when occasion offers, and sociology by\nshowing him the history of his science in the general development of\nthe human mind, will help him better to understand it. If the geometers\nhad a more philosophical mind, their science would be better taught.\nThe great conceptions of Descartes, of Leibnitz, of Lagrange, would be\nmore intelligently explained and brought to light.\n\nIf it is useful for the geometer to have studied the other fundamental\nsciences, it is not less indispensable for other learned men to have\ngone through the study of mathematics. As an \u201cinitial\u201d discipline,\nthis science can be neglected by no one. It is the common school of\npositivity for all minds. It is therefore to be regretted that the\nscientific education of future physiologists should be mainly made up\nof literary studies and of a few notions of physics and chemistry.\nThe more complex the phenomena whose laws they will have to seek,\nthe more necessary will it be for them to have become familiarised\nin mathematics and in astronomy, with the precise idea of scientific\ntruth. And, as a matter of fact, until this century, the study of the\nexact sciences had always been regarded as a preliminary condition\nfor that of the natural sciences. Buffon and Lamarck in their day\nhad still received this discipline. If it has been so difficult to\nconstitute social science, it comes, among other reasons, from the lack\nof scientific education among those who, up to the present time, have\nwished to study social phenomena. Where, for instance, could economists\nhave found the scientific idea of what constitutes natural laws,\nignoring as most of them did not only biology which was being formed\nbeside them, but even the sciences which had already reached a positive\nstate?\n\nThe exclusive cultivation of a single science is always a danger for\nthe intellect. Nevertheless, so long as the chief task of the positive\nspirit was to disorganise the system of beliefs which constituted\ntheological and metaphysical philosophy, the speciality of the works\nand of the methods was an inconvenience of secondary importance.\nIt mattered little that the discoveries of the astronomers, the\nphysicians, the biologists should be more or less co-ordinated and\ndirected by a universal positive method, so long as they did their\nwork and prepared the future. But, when the positive spirit had to\nbecome organic instead of critical, when it had to substitute a new\nphilosophy to the one which it had overthrown, then it was obliged to\nsubordinate the special processes which it had made use of until then\nto a single universal method. Should the \u201cscientific anarchy\u201d have\nlasted, the progress of the positive spirit would undoubtedly have led\nto the discrediting of the metaphysical r\u00e9gime, but without replacing\nit, and consequently without having done with it. By rejecting any new\ngeneral discipline, modern scientific men would unknowingly tend to\nre-establish the system which they seemed to have shattered for ever.\n\nIn a word, the triumph of the positive method, to be final, presupposes\nthe acceptance of the positive philosophy by all men of learning. The\nold logic was bound by the narrowest ties to the metaphysical doctrines\nwhich were then dominant. In the same way positive logic is bound up\nwith positive philosophy. Speaking more precisely, it is an expression\nof this very philosophy.\n\n\nIII.\n\nIs the general method of positive philosophy objective, or subjective,\nor both at once? As we know, this question has raised passionate\ndiscussion among positivists.[96] Outside the school it has been\nsolved by some historians as if Auguste Comte, at the end of his life,\nhad gone back to a doctrine very different from the one set forth by\nhim in the _Cours de philosophie positive_. It suffices, however, to\ndistinguish, with him, two successive points of view, to see how the\ntwo methods, antagonistic in a certain sense, can, in another one, be\nvery well reconciled.\n\nIf we only consider the process followed by our mind in the explanation\nof natural phenomena, that is to say the object of positive philosophy\ntaken in the strict sense of the word, it is true that two opposite\nmethods are found face to face. The subjective method goes from the\nconsideration of man to that of the world, the objective method goes\nfrom the knowledge of the world to that of man. The first gives rise\nto theological and metaphysical philosophy, the latter to positive\nphilosophy. The incompatibility of the two philosophies proceeds from\nthat of the methods, which is irreducible. It allows us to say: \u201cThis\nwill kill that.\u201d[97] In this sense, the final establishment of the\nobjective method, which is completed by the foundation of sociology,\nimplies the exclusion, also final, of the subjective method.\n\nBut \u201chaving reached its full maturity, true philosophy should\ninevitably tend to reconcile these two antagonistic methods,\u201d wrote\nComte in 1838, in the third volume of the _Cours de philosophie\npositive_, that is to say, long before the time of what has been\nwrongly called his second philosophy.[98] This reconciliation will be\naccomplished by means of the distinction between the special point of\nview of the sciences, and the universal point of view of philosophy.\nThe scientific investigation of the laws of natural phenomena can\nonly be made by means of the objective method: Comte never varies in\nhis thought on this point. But these sciences are but the parts in a\ngreater whole, for which the subjective method alone is suitable.\n\nTwo arguments especially prove this, one belonging to the logical, the\nother to the moral and the religious order.\n\nThe supreme requirement of our intellect is unity. Shall we ever reach\nthis unity by using the objective method in the sciences? Evidently\nnot. Even in each order of phenomena separately considered we do not\nsee how to reduce the laws which we know to a single law of a more\ngeneral character. And what are the laws known to us compared with\nthose which elude our search, and which perhaps may do so for ever?\nConsidered in its object, each one of our sciences reaches, so to\nspeak, to infinity, far beyond our limited horizon. If then, in order\nto satisfy us, a _single_ conception of the world is necessary, we\nshall never obtain such a conception from the objective point of view.\nBut if we change our point of view, if we refer the whole of the\nsciences to man, or better, to humanity, as a centre, we shall then be\nable to realise the unity which we seek. This is precisely what is made\npossible by sociology, by subordinating the hierarchy of the positive\nsciences to the final science of humanity.\n\nTo consider the other fundamental sciences as \u201cindispensable\npreliminaries,\u201d[99] to represent the evolution which has brought them\nforth in turn as the very history of human progress; to verify the\nlaw of the three states in all our beliefs, and in all our knowledge;\nfinally, to control all scientific research from the sociological point\nof view: this is what Comte understands by the conciliation of the two\nmethods.\n\nThe whole development of positive science from mathematics to\nsociology, lies between the new use which is made of subjective method\nand that which was spontaneously made of it by theological philosophy.\nWhen theological philosophy considered the knowledge of man and that\nof the world as interdependent, the instinct which animated it was a\njust one. But it was imagining instead of observing. It represented\nthe world as filled with \u201ccauses\u201d analogous to the will of man and\nequally capricious. The new subjective method rests, on the contrary,\nupon the very results of the positive sciences, brought to a synthesis\nin sociology. It takes as established that the intellectual and moral\nphenomena depend upon the biological laws, and that the biological laws\nthemselves are subordinate to the laws of the inorganic _milieu_. But,\nsince the \u201cfinal systematisation of all these laws\u201d[100] must always\nremain impossible from the objective point of view, the new subjective\nmethod undertakes it from the point of view of humanity as a centre.\n\nWe can thus distinguish two great periods in the intellectual advance\nof humanity. During the first, the positive spirit successively applies\nthe scientific, that is to say objective, method, to higher and higher\norders of phenomena. The foundation of sociology marks the term of\nthis progress. Then the second period begins. The positive spirit\nfrom special has become universal, from analytical synthetical. It\nreacts upon the particular sciences, and henceforth makes use of the\n\u201cregenerated\u201d subjective method, to govern the whole of them.\n\nFrom the moral and religious point of view, once sociology has been\nconstituted, and positive philosophy has been established, the\nfunctions proper to religion appear. The intellect recognises that its\nend does not lie within itself, and that it is incapable of determining\nits own rule and aim. It submits to a directing authority, which\nwill guide its efforts and fix their object. _To act from affection,\nand to think in order to act._ But if the mind understands that it is\ndestined to be used in the service of humanity, it sees at the same\ntime that in the complete positive doctrine, which contains religion,\nthe objective method gives precedence to the subjective, or rather that\nthey mutually support each other. If we were pure intellects we should\nprobably always go from the world to man. But in us the intellect is\nonly a means. Love is the principle, action is the end; and it is to\nman, finally, that our study of the world must be referred.\n\nTowards the end of his life, Comte replaced the logic of the mind,\n\u201cespecially guided by artificial signs,\u201d by the logic of the heart\n\u201cfounded upon the direct connection of the feelings.\u201d[101] We shall not\nhere insist upon a conception which is closely allied to his religious\nsystem. We will only conclude that, from the philosophical point of\nview the two methods objective and subjective, in Comte\u2019s thought,\nare easily reconciled, provided that both have been \u201csystematically\nregenerated.\u201d Now, the regeneration is obtained as soon as sociology\nis founded. On the one hand, as a matter of fact, it furnishes the\nsciences formed by the objective method with a principle of unity,\nsince henceforth they are all subordinated to the single science of\nHumanity. And, on the other hand, the subjective method acquires the\npositivity which it lacked, for sociology has substituted to the\narbitrary \u201cindividual subject,\u201d the \u201cuniversal subject,\u201d that is to say\nagain, Humanity.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[83] Cours, III. 336-7.\n\n[84] Synth\u00e8se subjective, p. 85.\n\n[85] Cours, VI., 708.\n\n[86] Cours, I, 32.\n\n[87] Cours, VI, 709.\n\n[88] Cours, V, 79.\n\n[89] Cours, VI, 731.\n\n[90] Cours, VI, 704.\n\n[91] Cours, II. 324-5.\n\n[92] Lettres \u00e0 Valat, p. 93 (24 septembre, 1828).\n\n[93] Cours, VI. 712-15.\n\n[94] Cours, VI. 720 sq.\n\n[95] Cours, VI. 74.\n\n[96] See above, Introduction, pp.\n\n[97] An allusion to a famous passage in Victor Hugo\u2019s \u201cNotre Dame de\nParis.\u201d\n\n[98] Cours, III, 210.\n\n[99] Cours, VI. 610.\n\n[100] Pol. pos., I. 447.\n\n[101] Pol. pos., II. 101-2.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK II\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SCIENCES\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nThe Philosophy of the Sciences is one of the leading parts of Comte\u2019s\nwork. No other brings out more clearly the essential differences which\ndistinguish his doctrine from previous systems.\n\nIn Comte\u2019s eyes the philosophy of the sciences is inseparable from\nthe philosophy of history and from the theory of progress. For the\nsciences are great sociological facts and, as such, are subject, in\ntheir evolution, to invariable laws. The method of the philosophy of\nthe sciences could therefore only be the positive method, ever like to\nitself.\n\nMoreover,--and this is an immediate consequence of this first\nconsideration,--the object of the positive philosophy of the sciences\nis in no way to \u201cexplain\u201d what the sciences themselves do not explain.\nThe sciences, as is well known, do not inquire into their data and\ntheir principles. They consider them as sufficiently established by\nthe implicit consent of all men, or at least by the universal usage\nof learned men. The geometer leaves to others the care of speculating\nupon the essence of space, or upon the _a priori_ character of his\ndefinitions. The physicist, if he form an idea of matter for himself,\nunhesitatingly adopts the one which appears to be the most immediately\nadvantageous, that is to say, the one which is best in accordance with\nwhat he knows of its properties and of its laws. He attributes no more\nvalue than that of a simple hypothesis to this idea.\n\nUp to the present the business of solving the questions which\nthe scientific man does not examine has belonged to the\nphilosopher--understand by this term the metaphysician. It is for\nhim to seek what matter, time, movement, space, etc., may be \u201cin\nthemselves.\u201d Whether he descends from metaphysics to the positive\nsciences, or ascends from the latter to metaphysics, he always\nendeavours to show that such and such a transcendental hypothesis is\nmore in accordance than any other with what we know to-day of the laws\nof nature. In a word; the philosophy of the sciences has been, in\ngeneral, an effort to interpret scientific knowledge metaphysically.\nThis explanation remains in respect to such a knowledge an \u201cextrinsic\ndenomination.\u201d It explains but does not touch it.\n\nNow, according to Comte, there are not two forms of knowledge, the\none positive and properly speaking scientific the other metaphysical\nand properly called philosophical. _The whole_ of our real knowledge\nin the end bears upon special or general facts. There can therefore\nbe no question of a philosophy which should be essentially distinct\nfrom positive knowledge. Any attempt to explain by essences, causes,\nprinciples or ends, is excluded by the positive method. Metaphysical\nproblems can no longer be set and, in this sense, when they disappear,\nthe philosophy of the sciences disappears with them.\n\nBut, on the other hand, as we have already seen, the positive sciences\nare not self-sufficient. They need to be crowned and ordered by a\nphilosophy. If then a philosophy is indispensable, and if, at the same\ntime, this philosophy must be positive, relative like the sciences\nthemselves, and _homogeneous_ with them, only one solution remains\npossible. The philosophy of the sciences will consist in substituting\nthe point of view of the whole to that of the parts. It will still be a\nproduct of the positive spirit; but in it this spirit from special will\nhave become general; from particular it will have become universal.\n\nThis universal character remains common to Comte\u2019s philosophy and to\nthat of his predecessors. But Comte did not understand it as they did.\nFor metaphysicians in general, and still for Kant, universality is the\ndistinctive sign of knowledge which does not come from experience,\nwhich is therefore necessary and _a priori_. Comte, who does not know\nof any _a priori_ in the Kantian sense, calls that knowledge universal\nwhich remains relative, and which is founded upon induction, but which\nregulates the other forms of knowledge in the order of generality. Thus\nthe principle of laws is universal. The encyclop\u00e6dic laws of phenomena\nare universal. The point of view of humanity is universal, because\nfrom this point of view a synthesis of the whole of our knowledge\nis possible. And, as universality is a relative thing, we conceive\nuniversalities of different orders.\n\nHenceforth the philosophy of the sciences is easily defined. Are we\nconcerned with a certain science considered by itself? The philosophy\nof this science consists in embracing at a glance the whole, the\nobject and the method, as opposed to the special point of view of the\nscientific man who follows the discovery of more or less special laws\nin a branch of this science, but such a philosophy necessarily remains\nimperfect and fragmentary. The philosophy of a science is only really\nestablished in the general philosophy of the sciences, that is to say\nby a view at once synthetic and single of all the sciences, in which\nare co-ordinated the objects which they study, the laws which they\ndiscover, the methods which they make use of, and the ends which they\nshould pursue.\n\nIt has been said that this is not a philosophy of the sciences but\nsimply a \u201csynthesis of the most general results of the positive\nsciences.\u201d Comte partly accepts and partly rejects the objection. If he\nis reproached with not having constructed a philosophy of the sciences\naccording to the old spirit, that is to say an effort at \u201cexplanation,\u201d\nwhich goes beyond the point of view of positive science, he grants\nthe objection. He considers all philosophy of this kind as out of the\nquestion. Is it said that there is no difference between his point of\nview and that of the scientific man properly so called, unless it be\nthat he successively goes through all the fundamental sciences? Comte\ncalls our attention to the fact that it is not enough to place these\nsciences side by side to obtain their philosophy. A new point of view,\ntruly universal, although always relative, is needed. How could Comte\nhave distinguished otherwise, in each science, what is lasting and in\nconformity with the positive spirit from what is decaying and still\nbears the mark of the theological and metaphysical spirit? Could he\nespecially have fixed the relations which the sciences should maintain\namong themselves, and could he have imposed upon them a discipline\nwhose principle was not to be found in any one of them?\n\nThus, until Auguste Comte\u2019s time, the philosophy of the sciences had\nbeen a metaphysical conception, joined more or less closely to the\nwhole of positive knowledge. Comte endeavoured to form a conception of\nthis whole, which should be philosophical while remaining positive. It\nis this conception which is especially set forth in the three first\nvolumes of the _Cours de philosophie positive_. From the static point\nof view it is founded upon the hierarchy of the sciences, the unity of\nthe method, and the homogeneity of knowledge. From the dynamic point\nof view, it endeavours to show the progressive convergence of all the\nsciences towards sociology, the final and universal science. With\nthis \u201cguiding thread,\u201d Comte will be able to establish in turn the\nphilosophy of each fundamental science, without ever losing sight of\nthe relation which it bears to the whole of the others.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nMATHEMATICS\n\n\nIn the eyes of philosophers, mathematics has always occupied a\nprivileged place among the sciences. Plato located their object in an\nintermediate region between the world of sensible phenomena and that\nof intelligible realities. On the one hand mathematical objects, and\nin particular the geometrical figures, appeal to the imagination as\nsensible things; on the other hand, mathematical truths like ideas\nand the relations between ideas, are characterised by immutable and\neternal fixity. This is why the study of mathematics is an excellent\npreparation for philosophy, which is the science of ideas. While\nstill leaving to the mind the help of direct sensible perception, it\naccustoms it to permanent truth. During the whole of antiquity the\nscience of mathematics, as the name indicates, was pre-eminently _the_\nscience. The science of physics, less sure of its object and of its\nmethod, was hardly distinguished from philosophical speculation, and\nlent itself with difficulty to the purely scientific form.\n\nFor Plato then, and for those who followed him, mathematics has\ncharacteristics which distinguish it from the study of phenomena. In\na certain measure, it partakes of the nature of science, conceived\nas bearing upon _what is_, upon the absolute reality which is\nneither subject to change nor to motion. It is true that they start\nfrom definitions and hypotheses. But, once the principles are\nestablished, they are developed _a priori_ by a succession of necessary\ndemonstrations like the dialectics of ideas.\n\nThis conception offers a mixture of metaphysical and positive elements.\nIt implies that the object of science is reality such as it is in\nitself; but, at the same time, it sees in the demonstration the\nessential character of science. A long evolution, which culminates in\nComte\u2019s doctrine, has driven the metaphysical elements out of science\nwhile the other elements subsist in it still. Far from saying with\nPlato or with his successors that there is no science of the phenomenon\nor of that which passes away, Comte thinks on the contrary, that the\nonly object of science is phenomenal reality so far as it is subject to\nlaws. Science has not to search for causes or substances; it suffices\nfor it to determine invariable relations.\n\nIf the mathematical sciences have long been the only sciences properly\nso called, and if to-day they are still more advanced than any others,\nit is because the geometrical and mechanical phenomena are indeed\nthe simplest of all, and those which are most naturally connected\namong themselves. The period during which they could be studied by\nobservation could therefore be very short, so short that it is even\nnot absurd to maintain that it never existed, and that, in this case,\nrational knowledge was not preceded by the empirical establishment of\nfacts. But the difference between mathematics and the other sciences\nnone the less remains one of degree and not of kind. The Science of\nMathematics is in advance of the other sciences; but all work on common\nground. In a word, like all other sciences it is a natural science.\n\nThis endeavour to present the whole of the sciences as homogeneous,\nthat is to say, to avoid two distinct classes being formed of\nmathematics on the one hand, and of the sciences of nature on the\nother, had already been attempted before Comte. This endeavour imposed\nitself, so to speak, upon modern philosophers, from the time when\nDescartes sought for a universal method for science conceived as a\nwhole. Comte, who saw very well the defect in the Cartesian conception,\nin which the ascendency of mathematics was still too much felt, did\nnot, however, deny that his own conception proceeded from that of\nDescartes. In another form, the idea of the homogeneity of the sciences\nis also found in Leibnitz and even in Kant. Does not the _Critique de\nla raison pure_ show that mathematics on the one hand, and physics on\nthe other, equally rest upon principles which are synthetic _a priori_?\nIn the _Prol\u00e9gomenes \u00e0 toute m\u00e9taphysique future_ just as the chapter\ncorresponding to _l\u2019esth\u00e9tique transcendentale_ is entitled \u201cHow are\npure mathematics possible _a priori_?\u201d so the chapter corresponding to\nthe _Logique transcendentale_ bears as its title \u201cHow are pure physics\n_possible a priori_?\u201d On another plan Comte\u2019s theory is parallel\nto Kant\u2019s. Here as there mathematics as well as physics rests upon\nsynthetic principles--\u201csuperior to experience,\u201d says Kant--proceeding\nfrom experience, says Comte. The latter, it is true, did not know\nKant\u2019s theory, and, had he known it he would not have accepted it. But\nthe analogy of tendency subsists none the less beneath the diversity of\ndoctrines.\n\nThe immediate antecedent of Comte\u2019s theory is found in d\u2019Alembert. The\nauthor of the _Discours pr\u00e9liminaire_ had said, \u201cWe will divide the\nscience of nature into physics and mathematics.\u201d\n\n\nII.\n\nEvery science has its origin in the art corresponding to it.\nMathematics arose out of the art of measuring magnitudes. Indeed this\nart would be very rudimentary if we only practised direct measurement.\nAmong the magnitudes which interest us there are very few which we can\nmeasure thus. Consequently the human mind had to seek some indirect\nway of determining magnitudes.\n\nIn order to know the magnitudes which do not allow of direct\nmeasurement, we must evidently connect them with others which are\ncapable of being immediately determined, and according to which we\nsucceed in discovering the former, by means of the relations which\nexist between them and the latter. \u201cSuch is the precise object of\nmathematical science in its entirety.\u201d[102] We see immediately\nhow extremely vast it is. If we must insert a large number of\nintermediaries between the quantities which we desire to know, and\nthose which we can measure immediately, the operations may become very\ncomplicated.\n\nFundamentally, according to Comte, there is no question, whatever it\nmay be, which cannot be finally conceived as consisting in determining\none quantity by another, and consequently which does not depend\nultimately upon mathematics. It will be said that we must take into\naccount not only the quantity, but also the quality of the phenomena.\nThis objection, decisive in the eyes of Aristotle, who could not\nconceive that we could legitimately [Greek: metaballein] [Greek: eis\nallo genos], no longer holds good for modern thinkers. Since Descartes\u2019\ntime, they have seen analysis applied to geometrical, mechanical and\nphysical phenomena. There is no absurdity in conceiving that what has\nbeen done for these phenomena is possible for the others. We must be\nable to represent every relation between any phenomena whatever by an\nequation, allowing for the difficulty of finding this equation and of\nsolving it.[103] As a matter of fact, we are quickly stopped by the\ncomplexity of the data. In the present state of the human mind there\nare only two great categories of phenomena of which we regularly know\nthe equations: these are geometry and mechanics.\n\nThis being established, the whole of mathematical science is divided\ninto two parts: abstract and concrete mathematics. The one studies the\nlaws of geometrical and mechanical phenomena. The other is constituted\nby the _calculus_, which, if we take this word in its largest sense,\napplies to the most sublime combinations of transcendent analysis,\nas well as to the simplest numerical operations. It is purely\n\u201cinstrumental.\u201d Fundamentally, it is nothing else than an \u201cimmense\nadmirable extension of natural logic to a certain order of deductions.\u201d\n\nThis part of mathematical science is independent of the nature of the\nobjects which it examines, and only bears upon the numerical relations\nwhich they present. Consequently, it may happen that the same relations\nmay exist among a great number of different phenomena. Notwithstanding\ntheir extreme diversity these phenomena will be considered by the\nmathematician as presenting a single analytical question, which can be\nsolved once for all. \u201cThus, for instance, the same law which reigns\nbetween space and time when we examine the vertical fall of a body _in\nvacuo_, is found again for other phenomena which present no analogy\nwith the former nor among themselves; for it also expresses the\nrelation between the area of a sphere and the length of its diameters;\nit equally determines the decrease in intensity of light or of heat by\nreason of the distance of the objects lighted and heated, etc.\u201d[104]\nWe have no general method which serves indifferently for establishing\nthe equations of any natural phenomena whatever: we need special\nmethods for the several classes of geometrical, optical, mechanical\nphenomena, etc. But, whatever may be these phenomena, once the equation\nis established, the method for solving it is uniform. In this sense,\nabstract mathematics is really an \u201c_organon_.\u201d\n\nGeometry and mechanics, on the contrary, should be regarded as real\nnatural sciences, resting as the others do upon observation. But, adds\nComte, these two sciences present this peculiarity, that in the present\nstate of the human mind, they are already used, and will continue\nto be used as methods far more than as direct doctrine. In this way\nmathematics is in fact \u201cinstrumental,\u201d not only in abstract parts, but\nalso in its relatively concrete parts. It is entirely used as a \u201ctool\u201d\nby the more complicated sciences, such as astronomy and physics. It is\ntruly the real logic of our age.\n\nIn the philosophical study of abstract mathematics, Comte proceeds\nsuccessively from arithmetical to algebraical calculation, and from\nthe latter to the transcendent analysis or differential and integral\ncalculus. After having stated the manner in which this calculus is\npresented according to Leibnitz and to Newton, he adopts that of\nLagrange, which appears to him the most satisfactory. It is true that\nat the end of his life his admiration for the author of the _M\u00e9canique\nanalytique_ had greatly diminished. Without here entering into the\ndetail of questions, we will limit ourselves to the indication of a\nconsideration upon the bearings of abstract mathematics, which appears\nto be of capital importance to Comte. Whether it be a question of\nordinary analysis, or especially of transcendental analysis, Comte\nbrings out at once the extreme imperfection of our knowledge, and the\nextraordinary fecundity of their applications. He can only solve a very\nsmall part of the questions which come before us in these sciences.\nHowever, \u201cin the same way as in ordinary analysis we have succeeded\nin utilising to an immense degree a very small amount of fundamental\nknowledge upon the solution of equations, so, however little advanced\ngeometers may be up to the present time in the science of integrations,\nthey have none the less drawn, from these very few abstract notions\nthe solution of a multitude of questions of the first importance, in\ngeometry, in mechanics, in thermology, etc., etc.\u201d[105] The reason\nof this is that the least abstract knowledge naturally corresponds\nto a quantity of concrete researches. The most powerful extension of\nintellectual means which man has at his disposal for the knowledge\nof nature consists in his rising to the conception of more and more\nabstract ideas, which are nevertheless positive. When our knowledge is\nabstract without being positive, it is \u201cfictitious\u201d or \u201cmetaphysical.\u201d\nWhen it is positive without being abstract, it lacks generality, and\ndoes not become rational. But when, without ceasing to be positive, it\ncan reach to a high degree of abstraction, at the same time it attains\nthe generality, and, along the lines of its furthest extension, the\nunity which are the end of science.\n\nHence the importance of Descartes\u2019 fine mathematical discovery, and\nalso of the invention of differential and integral calculus, which\nmay be considered as the complement to Descartes\u2019 fundamental idea\nconcerning the general analytical representation of natural phenomena.\nIt is only, says Comte, since the invention of the calculus, that\nDescartes\u2019 discovery has been understood and applied to the whole of\nits extent. Not only does this calculus procure an \u201cadmirable facility\u201d\nfor the search after the natural laws of all the phenomena; but, thanks\nto their extreme generality, the differential formul\u00e6 can express each\ndetermined phenomenon in a single equation, however varied the subjects\nmay be in which it is considered. Thus, a single differential equation\ngives the tangents of all curves, another expresses the mathematical\nlaw of every variety in motion, etc.\n\nInfinitesimal analysis, especially in the conception of Leibnitz,\nhas therefore not only furnished a general process for the indirect\nformation of equations which it would have been impossible to discover\ndirectly, but in the eyes of the philosopher it has another and a\nno less precious advantage. It has allowed us to consider, in the\nmathematical study of natural phenomena, a new order of more general\nlaws. These laws are constantly the same for each phenomenon, in\nwhatever objects we study it, and only change when passing from one\nphenomenon to another \u201cwhere we have been able moreover, in comparing\nthese variations, to rise sometimes, by a still more general view, to\na _positive_ comparison between several classes of various phenomena,\naccording to the analogies presented by the differential expressions of\ntheir mathematical laws.\u201d[106] Comte cannot contemplate this immense\nrange of transcendent analysis without enthusiasm. He calls it \u201cthe\nhighest thought to which the human mind has attained up to the present\ntime.\u201d The highest, because being the most profoundly abstract among\nall the positive notions, this thought reduces the most comprehensive\nrange of concrete phenomena to rational unity.\n\nAs the consideration of analytical geometry suggested to Descartes the\nidea of \u201cuniversal mathematics,\u201d which lies at the basis of his method,\nso we can think that philosophical reflection upon transcendental\nanalysis led Comte to the idea of those \u201cencyclop\u00e6dic laws,\u201d which hold\nsuch an important place in his general theory of nature. For these\nencyclop\u00e6dic laws, analogous as they are to the differential formul\u00e6\nspoken of by Comte, are equally verifiable in orders of otherwise\nirreducible phenomena, and allow us to conceive them as convergent.\n\n\nIII.\n\nGeometry is the first portion of concrete mathematics. Undoubtedly the\nfacts with which it deals are more connected among themselves than\nthe facts studied by the other sciences, and this allows us easily to\ndeduce some of these facts once the others are given. But there is a\ncertain number of primary phenomena which, not being established by\nany reasoning, can only be founded upon observation, and which stand as\nthe basis of all geometrical deductions.[107] Although very small, this\npart of observation is indispensable because it is the initial one, and\nnever can quite vanish.\n\nIn this way, metaphysical discussions upon the origin of geometrical\ndefinitions and space are set aside. Comte here adopts d\u2019Alembert\u2019s\nopinion. The latter had said: \u201cThe true principles of the sciences are\nsimple recognised facts, which do not suppose any others, and which\nconsequently can neither be explained nor questioned: in geometry\nthey are the properties of extension as apprehended by sense. Upon\nthe nature of extension there are notions common to all men, a common\npoint at which all sects are united as it were in spite of themselves,\ncommon and simple principles from which unawares they all start. The\nphilosopher will seize upon these common primitive notions to make them\nthe basis of the geometrical truths.\u201d[108]\n\nExtension is a property of bodies. But, instead of considering this\nextension in the bodies themselves, we consider it in an indefinite\nmilieu which appears to us to contain all the bodies, of the universe\nand which we call space. Let us think, for instance, of the impression\nleft by a body in a fluid in which it might be immersed. From the\ngeometrical point of view this impression can quite conveniently be\nsubstituted to the body itself. Thus, by a very simple abstraction, we\ndivest matter of all its sensible properties, only to contemplate in a\ncertain manner its phantom, according to d\u2019Alembert\u2019s expression. From\nthat moment we can study not only the geometrical forms realised in\nnature, but also all those which can be imagined. Geometry assumes a\n\u201crational\u201d character.\n\nSimilarly, it is by a simple abstraction of the mind that geometry\nregards lines as having no thickness, and surfaces as being without\ndepth. It suffices to conceive the dimension to be diminished as\nbecoming gradually smaller and smaller until it reaches such a degree\nof thinness that it can no longer fix the attention. It is thus that\nwe naturally acquire the \u201creal idea\u201d of surface, then of the line, and\nthen of the point. There is therefore no necessity to appeal to the _a\npriori_.\n\nThus constituted, the object of geometry is the measurement of\nextension. But since this measurement can hardly ever be directly taken\nby superposition, the aim of geometry is to reduce the comparison\nof all kinds of extensions, volumes, surfaces or lines to simple\ncomparisons of straight lines, the only ones regarded as capable of\nbeing immediately established.\u201d[109] The object of geometry is of\nunlimited extent, for the number of different forms subject to exact\ndefinitions is unlimited. In regarding curved lines as generated by the\nmovement of a point subject to a certain law, we can conceive as many\ncurves as laws.\n\nThe human mind, in order to cover this immense field, the extension\nof which it was very late in apprehending, may pursue two different\nmethods. Perfect geometry would, indeed, be the one which would\ndemonstrate all the properties of all imaginable forms, and this can\nbe obtained in two ways. Either we can successively conceive each of\nthe forms, the triangles, the circle, the sphere, the ellipse, etc.,\nand seek for the properties of each one of them. Or else we can group\ntogether the corresponding properties of various geometrical forms,\nin such a way as to study them together, and, so to speak, to know\nbeforehand their application to such and such a form which we have not\nyet examined. \u201cIn a word,\u201d says Comte, \u201cthe whole of geometry can be\nordered, either in relation to bodies which are being studied, or in\nrelation to phenomena which are to be considered.\u201d The first plan is\nthat of the geometry of the ancients, or _special_ geometry; the second\nis that of the geometry since Descartes, or _general_ geometry.[110]\n\nAt its origin geometry could only be special. The ancients, for\ninstance, studied the circle, the ellipse, the parabola, etc.,\nendeavouring, in the case of each geometrical form, to add to the\nnumber of known properties. But, if this line of advance had been\nthe only one which could be followed, the progress of geometry would\nnever have been a very rapid one. The method invented by Descartes\nhas transformed this science, by enabling it to become _general_,\nand to abandon the individual study of geometrical forms for the\ncommon study of their properties. This revolution has not always been\nwell understood. Often in teaching mathematics, its bearings are not\nsufficiently shown. From the manner in which it is usually presented,\nthis \u201cadmirable method\u201d would at first seem to have no other end than\nthe simplification of the study of conic sections or of some other\ncurves, always considered one by one according to the spirit of ancient\ngeometry. This would not be of great importance. The distinctive\ncharacter of our modern geometry consists in studying in a general way\nthe various questions relating to any lines or surfaces whatever by\ntransforming geometrical considerations and researches into analytical\nconsiderations and researches.[111]\n\nAll geometrical ideas necessarily relate to the three universal\ncategories; magnitude, form, position. Magnitude already belongs to\nthe domain of quantity. Form can be reduced to position, since every\nform can be considered as the result of the advance of a point, that\nis to say of its successive positions. The problem is therefore to\nbring all ideas of situation whatever back to ideas of magnitude.\nHow did Descartes solve it? By generalising a process which we may\nsay is natural to the human mind, since it comes spontaneously into\nbeing under the stress of necessity. Indeed, if we must indicate the\nsituation of an object without showing it immediately, do we not refer\nit to others which are known, by stating the magnitude of geometrical\nelements by which we conceive the object to be connected with them?\nGeographers act in the same way in their science to determine the\nlongitude and latitude of a place, and astronomers to determine the\nright ascension and the declination of a star. These geographical and\nastronomical co-ordinates fulfil the same office as the Cartesian\nco-ordinates. The only difference, but it is a capital one, consists in\nthe fact that Descartes carried this method to the highest degree of\nabstract generality thus giving it its maximum of fertility and power.\n\nAlthough general geometry is infinitely superior to special geometry\nit cannot, nevertheless, altogether dispense with the latter. As the\nancients did, so it will always be necessary to begin with special\ngeometry. For general geometry rests upon the use of calculation. But\nif, as Comte has said, geometry is truly a science of facts calculation\nwill evidently never be able to supply us with the first knowledge\nof these facts. In order to lay the foundations of a natural science\nsimple mathematical analysis would never suffice, nor could it give a\nfresh demonstration of it, when these foundations have already been\nlaid. Before all things a direct study of the subject is necessary,\nuntil the precise relations are discovered. \u201cThe application of\nmathematical analysis can never begin any science whatever, since it\ncould never take place except when the science has been sufficiently\nelaborated to establish, in relation to the phenomena under\nconsideration, some equations which might serve as a starting-point for\nanalytical work.\u201d[112] In a word, the creation of analytical geometry\ndoes not prevent geometry from remaining a natural science. Even when\nit has become as purely rational as possible, it none the less remains\nrooted in experience.\n\n\nIV.\n\nThe second part of concrete mathematics (mechanics) is also one of the\nnatural sciences which owes its marvellous progress to analysis. Here\nagain we must distinguish the data which are at the basis of science,\nand which are facts, from the abstract development undergone by this\nscience because of the simplicity of these facts and the precision\nof the relations which exist between them. The distinction between\nwhat is \u201creally physical\u201d and what is \u201cpurely logical\u201d[113] is not\nalways an easy one. We must, however, separate facts furnished by\nexperience, from artificial conceptions whose object is to facilitate\nthe establishment of general laws of equilibrium and of motion.\n\nOnly to consider inertia in bodies is a fiction of this kind.\nPhysically the force of inertia does not exist. Nature nowhere shows us\nbodies which are devoid of internal activity. We term those which are\nnot alive inorganic, but not inert. Were gravitation alone common to\nall molecules, it would suffice to prevent the conception of matter as\ndevoid of force. Nevertheless, mechanics only considers the inertia of\nbodies. Why? Because this abstraction presents many advantages for the\nstudy, \u201cwithout, moreover, offering disadvantages in the application.\u201d\nIndeed, if mechanics had to take into account the internal forces of\nbodies and the variations of these forces, the complications would\nimmediately become such that the facts could never be submitted to\ncalculation. Mechanics would run the risk of losing its character as\na mathematical science. And, on the other hand, as it only considers\nthe movements in themselves, regardless of their mode of production, it\nis always lawful for mechanics to replace, if necessary, the internal\nforces by an equivalent external force\u201d applied to the body. The\ninertia of matter is therefore an abstraction, the end of which is to\nsecure the perfect homogeneity of mechanical science, by allowing us to\nconsider all moving bodies as identical in kind, and all forces as of\nthe same nature.\n\nThe \u201cphysical\u201d character of this science is again evident from the\nconsideration of the three fundamental laws upon which it rests.[114]\n\nThe first, called Kepler\u2019s law, is thus defined: \u201cAll movement is\nnaturally rectilinear and uniform; that is to say, any body subject to\nthe action of a single force which acts upon it instantaneously, moves\nconstantly in a straight line with invariable speed.\u201d It has been said\nthat this law is derived from the principle of sufficient reason. The\nbody must continue in a straight line because there is no reason why it\nshould deviate from it more on one side than on the other. But, answers\nComte, how do we know that there is no reason for the body to deviate,\nexcept precisely because we see that it does not deviate? The reasoning\n\u201creduces itself to the repetition in abstract terms of the fact itself,\nand to saying that bodies have a natural tendency to move in a straight\nline, which is precisely the proposition which we have to establish.\u201d\nIt is by similar arguments that the philosophers of antiquity, and\nespecially Aristotle, had, on the contrary been led to regard circular\nmotion as natural to the stars, in that it is the most perfect of all,\na conception which is only the abstract enunciation of a imperfectly\nanalysed phenomenon. The tendency of bodies to move in a straight line\nwith constant speed is known to us by experience.\n\nThe second fundamental law of mechanics, called Newton\u2019s law,\nexpresses the constant equality of action and reaction. It is pretty\ngenerally agreed to-day to consider this law as resulting from the\nobservation of facts. Newton himself understood it so.\n\nFinally the third law establishes that \u201cevery movement exactly\npossessed in common by all the bodies of any system does not alter\nthe particular movements of those different bodies in respect to each\nother; but those movements continue to take place as if the whole of\nthe system was motionless.\u201d This law \u201cof the independence or of the\ncoexistence of movements\u201d was formulated by Galileo. It is no more\n_a priori_ than the two preceding ones. How could we be sure, if\nexperience did not show it to us, that a common motion communicated\nto a system of bodies moving in relation to one another, would change\nnothing in their particular motions? When his law was made known by\nGalileo, on all hands there arose a cloud of objections, tending to\nprove _a priori_ that this proposition was false and absurd. It was\nonly admitted later when, in order to examine it, the logical point of\nview was set aside for the physical point of view. It was then seen\nthat experience always confirmed this law, and that, if it ceased to\noperate, the whole economy of the universe would be thrown into utter\nconfusion. For instance, the movement of the translation of the earth\nin no way affects the mechanical phenomena which take place upon the\nsurface or within the globe. As the law of the independence of motions\nwas unknown when the theory of Copernicus appeared, an objection was\nput to him which was thought to be drawn from experience. He was told\nthat if the earth moved round the sun all the movements which take\nplace upon it or within it would be modified by the action. Later\non when Galileo\u2019s law became known, the fact was explained and the\nobjection disappeared.\n\nOnce these three laws are established, mechanics has sufficient\nfoundation. Henceforth the scientific edifice can be constructed by\nsimple logical operations, and without any further reference to the\nexternal world. But this purely rational development no more transforms\nmechanics into an _a priori_ science than the application of analysis\ndeprives geometry of its character as a natural science. What proves\nthis, in one case as in the other, is the possibility of passing from\nthe abstract to the concrete and of applying the results obtained\nto real cases, merely restoring the elements which science had been\ncompelled to set aside. If it were possible entirely to constitute the\nscience of mechanics according to simple analytical conceptions, we\ncould not imagine how such a science could ever become applicable to\nthe effective study of nature. What guarantees the reality of rational\nmechanics is precisely its being founded upon some general facts, in a\nword, upon the data of experience.\n\nComte could assuredly not foresee the controversies which to-day bear\nupon the principles of mechanics and which have been summed up by Mr.\nPoincar\u00e9 in an article upon Hertz\u2019s mechanical theories.[115] Mr.\nPoincar\u00e9 says that the principles of Dynamics have been stated in many\nways, but nobody sufficiently distinguished between what is definition,\nwhat is experimental truth, and what is mathematical theorem. Mr.\nPoincar\u00e9 is satisfied neither with the \u201cclassical\u201d conception of\nmechanics, whose insufficiency has been shown by Hertz, nor with the\nconception with which Hertz wishes to replace it. In any case it is a\nhigh philosophical lesson to see the classical system of analytical\nmechanics--a system constructed with such admirable accuracy, and\nmade by Laplace to arise altogether, as Comte says, out of a single\nfundamental law,--to see it after a century labouring under grave\ndifficulties, not unconnected with the progress of physics.\n\nMight not this be an argument in support of the theory of d\u2019Alembert\nand of Comte on the nature of concrete mathematics? Geometry and\nmechanics would only differ from the other natural sciences by the\nprecision of the relations between the phenomena of which they treat,\nby the facility which they have for dealing with these relations by\nmeans of calculus and analysis, and, consequently, by assuming an\nentirely rational and deductive form. For the extraordinary power of\nthe instrument should not hide from us the nature of the sciences which\nmake use of it. These, like the others, bear upon natural phenomena.\nOnly, as these phenomena are the most simple, the most general and\nthe most closely allied of all, these sciences are also those which\nrespond in the best way to the positive definition of science. They\nhave \u201cvery easily and very quickly replaced empirical statement by\nrational prevision.\u201d They are composed of laws and not of facts. But,\nconforming in this again to the positive definition of science, they\nare empirical in their origin, and they remain relative in the course\nof their development.\n\nThus positive philosophy, having reached the full consciousness of\nitself, reacts upon the conception of the sciences which have most\ncontributed to its formation. When the philosophy is universally\naccepted the idea that a science can be _a priori_, that is both\nabsolute and immutable, will have disappeared. Precisely because it\nis the most perfect type of a positive science, mathematics will no\nlonger claim these characteristics, and its ancient connection with\nmetaphysics will be finally severed.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[102] Cours, I, 101.\n\n[103] Cours, I, 121-4.\n\n[104] Cours, I, 112\n\n[105] Cours, I, 256.\n\n[106] Cours, I, 195-7.\n\n[107] Cours, I, 286-7.\n\n[108] Elements de philosophie, I, p. 132-3.\n\n[109] Cours, I, 298. sq.\n\n[110] Cours, i, 314-16.\n\n[111] Cours, i, 383-4.\n\n[112] Cours, i. 322-3.\n\n[113] Cours, i. 422. sq.\n\n[114] Cours, i, 455-463.\n\n[115] Revue g\u00e9n\u00e9rale des sciences pures et appliqu\u00e9es, 30 septembre\n1897.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nASTRONOMY\n\n\nThe object of astronomy is the discovery of the laws of the geometrical\nand mechanical phenomena presented by the celestial bodies; and, by the\nknowledge of these laws to obtain the precise and rational prevision of\nthe state of our system at any given period whatever. It is in a word,\n\u201cthe application of mathematics to celestial phenomena.\u201d[116]\n\nMr. H. Spencer has taken occasion of this definition to criticise\nthe place assigned by Comte to astronomy in his classification of\nthe sciences. He makes him contradict himself. He says: you term\nfundamental sciences the abstract sciences which do not study beings in\nnature, but the laws which govern phenomena in those beings; by what\nright is astronomy placed among these sciences, between mathematics and\nphysics? Is not the object of astronomy the study of certain beings\nin nature? In what does the application of mathematics to celestial\nphenomena differ from their application to other cases? It appears\nevident that here Comte introduces into the series of abstract sciences\na science which is really concrete, or at least, according to Mr.\nSpencer\u2019s expression, abstract-concrete.\n\nComte had foreseen the objection. The answer which he makes throws\na strong light upon the sense in which he understands the words\n\u201cabstract\u201d and \u201cgeneral\u201d as applied to the sciences. He partly accepts\nthe objection. The true astronomical notions, he says, only differ\nfrom purely mathematical notions by their special restriction to\nthe celestial case; and this, at first sight, must appear contrary\nto the essentially abstract nature of the speculations which belong\nto the first philosophy. But on the other hand, these speculations\nbear upon the phenomena given in experience, and the order of the\nabstract sciences should reproduce the real order of dependence\nof the phenomena. Thus the first of these sciences, mathematics,\ndetermines the essential laws of the most general phenomena, which\nare common to all material beings (form, position, movement). Now,\nare not the most general phenomena after these, those \u201cof which the\nthe continuous ascendency inevitably dominates the course of all the\nother phenomena?\u201d[117] In other words, before passing to the study of\nphysical, chemical, biological phenomena, etc., it is indispensable\nto know the general laws of the _milieu_ in which these phenomena\nare manifested. Outside of this _milieu_, they would be impossible,\nor at any rate, it so conditions them that, were it otherwise, these\nphenomena would also be different from what they are.\n\nThe character of generality which, with that of abstraction, is made\nuse of to institute the hierarchy of phenomena is thus reduced to\nthe idea of dependence. It is the consideration of this dependence\nwhich assigns to astronomy its place between mathematics and physics\nin the encyclop\u00e6dic ladder of the sciences. Considered singly in\nthemselves, the phenomena studied by astronomy are purely geometrical\nand mechanical. They would not, therefore, constitute the object of a\nscience distinct from mathematics. But positive philosophy considers\neverything from the point of view of humanity. Now, for humanity, this\n\u201cspecial case\u201d is of unequalled importance. All the other phenomena\ngiven to us by experience (except the mathematical phenomena) depend,\nin a more or less direct manner, upon astronomical phenomena. The\nknowledge of astronomical laws is therefore the necessary condition\nfor the knowledge of all the others. Thus, the infringement of the\nprinciple of the hierarchy of fundamental sciences is only apparent. An\nanalogous case is found in chemistry. The analysis of air and water is\nincorporated in abstract chemistry, because air and water constitutes\nthe general _milieu_, \u201cin which all ulterior phenomena occur.\u201d[118]\n\nThe place given to astronomy is therefore justified. This science,\nmoreover, remains abstract. For it to be a concrete science, all\naspects of the existence of celestial bodies would have to be studied\nand considered in their relations, to each other in it. But, on the\ncontrary, astronomy only studies the geometrical and mechanical\nphenomena in the celestial bodies, all physical and chemical\nconsiderations, etc., being eliminated. Comte concludes that in passing\non to the celestial case mathematics does not lose its abstract nature.\nIt only becomes more developed in the case of a special example, whose\nextreme importance demands such a specialisation.\n\nThe abstract character of astronomy belongs to it almost _a priori_.\nThe facts upon which it rests are only revealed to us by one of our\nsenses, the most intellectual of them indeed, but by which we are only\ninformed of the mathematical properties of bodies. Our eyes alone\ntouch the stars. There is no astronomy for a blind race. Dark stars,\nif such there be, are for ever hidden from us. All that is given to\nus, therefore, is the shape, the position and the motion of visible\ncelestial bodies. We can never by any means know how to study their\nchemical composition, nor their mineral structure, nor _a fortiori_\nthe nature of the organic bodies which may live upon them. Comte might\nhave formulated in less categorical terms affirmations which were\nsoon to be contradicted by spectral analysis and by photography. But\nhe was confirmed in the entirely abstract and mathematical conception\nwhich he had of astronomy by his persuasion that no discoveries of so\nfar-reaching a nature were possible.\n\nThus, astronomy appeared to be an excellent type of a positive\nscience, because it is at once natural and abstract, and in it these\ntwo characteristics are equally apparent, which was not the case in\nmathematics. In this science the share of observation is so limited,\nso transient, that it becomes inappreciable. In astronomy, on the\ncontrary, determination of certain facts evidently plays a part in the\nscience. But, at the same time, nowhere do we see more clearly that\nscience does not consist in the mere apprehension of facts. Here they\nare so simple, and moreover so uninteresting, that their connexion\nand the knowledge of their laws alone deserves the name of science.\nIn general, what is an astronomical fact? None other than this: such\na star has been seen at such a precise instant, and under such an\nangle duly measured. The more or less profound elaboration of these\nobservations is indispensable to science, even in its most imperfect\nstate. Astronomy, says Comte, did not really come into being when\nthe priests of Egypt or Chaldea made a series of more or less exact\nempirical observations in the heavens; but only when the first Greek\nphilosophers began to reduce the general phenomenon of diurnal motion\nto a few geometrical laws.[119]\n\nOf all the natural sciences, after mathematics, astronomy is also\nthe most perfectly free from all theological and metaphysical\nconsiderations. From every point of view it is positive. Astronomers no\nlonger have recourse to a Providence, which as the intelligent cause\nof the order of the celestial world, would in its turn, witness to\nthe existence of this cause. They do not inquire any more into the\nintimate nature of forces (gravitation, attraction, etc.). Astronomy\nis content to determine the invariable relations of phenomena with\nthe greatest possible precision. It is here that philosophical minds\ncan study the essential characteristics of a positive science. In\nit they will also see how disinterested it must be in order to\nbecome useful. \u201cWithout the highest speculations of geometers upon\ncelestial mechanics, which have so greatly increased the precision of\nastronomical tables, it would be impossible to determine the longitude\nof a ship with the degree of accuracy which is now attainable.\u201d[120]\n\nFinally no science has exercised a greater influence upon the evolution\nof the human mind than this one. The great epochs in astronomy are\nalso those in cosmological philosophy. The desperate resistance\nwhich was offered by theological dogmatism to Galileo\u2019s discovery\nresponded to a just apprehension of the consequences involved in this\ndiscovery. To admit that the earth was not the centre of the world\nwas to take a first and a decisive step in the way which leads away\nfrom the anthropocentric prejudice. It was like pledging oneself to\nsubstitute sooner or later the relative point of view to the absolute\none in philosophy. It was introducing the positive spirit, to-day in\nspeculative physics, to-morrow in speculative ethics.\n\n\nII.\n\nAlthough astronomy is an \u201ceminently mathematical\u201d science, the method\nof working by observation is used in it. The astronomer observes before\ncalculating, and he observes again after having calculated. The art of\nobservation for which there is no use in mathematics appears here then,\nand, with it, the inductive method.\n\nIndeed there is no \u201cabsolute separation\u201d between observing and\nreasoning.[121] The mind does not first observe facts in a receptive\nor \u201cpassive\u201d manner, in order to work out combinations of these facts\nafterwards. In reality every observation is a combination, and this\nis particularly true in astronomical observation. The facts which\nwe observe are really constructed. We can only see simultaneous or\nsuccessive directions, according to which the mind must construct the\nform or the movement which the eye could not take in. The necessary\nand constant association \u201cbetween prevision and inspection\u201d is more\nintimate and more evident here than in any other science.\n\nIn the same way, hypothesis (which is inseparable from observation)\ncan be studied in astronomy in its most simple form. Here it is\npresented in its clearest aspect, and, if one may say so, in the one\nwhich most reveals its essential nature. Now, hypothesis in astronomy\n\u201cserves to fill up the necessary gaps in observation.\u201d It provisionally\nsupplements the knowledge--not indeed of causes, for positive science\nseeks nothing of this kind--but of facts and laws which we ignore.\nFor instance, the simple geometrical sketch of a diurnal motion would\nremain impossible without an abstract hypothesis which being compared\nwith the concrete spectacle presented by the movement itself enables us\nto connect together the various celestial positions. Modern astronomy,\nwhich has destroyed primitive assumptions regarded as real laws of\nthe world, has maintained their permanent value for conveniently\nrepresenting phenomena provisionally. And, as we are not deceived as\nto the reality of such assumptions we can use without scruple any one\nwhich seems to us most advantageous.[122]\n\nThe use of hypothesis, as it is employed in astronomy, must be carried\ninto the other sciences. This mode of procedure everywhere remains\nlike to itself, although we do not always conceive it so clearly.\n\u201cIts normal domain coincides with that of observation.\u201d An hypothesis\ncompletes by anticipation what we know of facts and of their laws.\nConsequently, it is subject to be modified, corrected, or contradicted\nby a wider or deeper knowledge of facts. Hypotheses then are only valid\nduring the time when they are advantageous, that is to say, as long as\nthey serve to unite and co-ordinate our observations. As has been said,\nthey labour to render themselves useless. But they are indispensable,\nand science, without them, could neither advance nor even begin. Far\nfrom giving too small a share to hypothesis, like Bacon, Comte would\nrather incur the reproof of having given it too large a one. He made\ntoo much use of it himself at the end of his life. But the theory\nwhich he gave of it in the _Cours de philosophie positive_ and of\nwhich certain features appeal again in Claude Bernard\u2019s _Introduction\na l\u2019\u00e9tude de la m\u00e9decine experim\u00e9ntale_, was a careful study of its\nnature and function.\n\n\nIII.\n\nAstronomy, or at least that part of astronomy which bears the name of\ncelestial mechanics, of all the physical sciences is the one which has\nbeen carried to the highest degree of perfection. Nowhere else have\nthe phenomena been better reduced to a supreme law which allows us to\nforesee them with sufficient precision. But this result could only have\nbeen obtained by substituting the notion of a solar world to that of\na universe.[123] This world is the only one which we can comprehend\nas a system. If the object of astronomy were the general laws of the\nuniverse, this science would be extraordinarily imperfect, not to say\nimpossible. For what do we know about cosmic laws?[124] We do not even\nknow whether Newton\u2019s law applies to any or all systems of stars.\n\nWe must then distinguish between astronomy as the science of our world\nand sidereal astronomy. The latter is not absolutely forbidden us, but\nwe know very little on this subject, and we shall probably never know\nmuch more. Do the innumerable suns scattered in space form a general\nsystem, or do independent systems exist? Is space limitless? Is the\nnumber of celestial bodies an infinite one? philosophers ask. In truth\nthe consideration of our world is positive. The consideration of the\nuniverse is not.\n\nHistory helps us to understand the transition which led from one to the\nother. Ancient philosophy made the earth the centre of the universe.\nNotwithstanding the diversity of their particular characteristics and\nof their motions, it was natural then for all the celestial bodies to\nbe conceived as the parts of a single system. A more or less clearly\nexpressed postulate supported this astronomical conception: the purpose\nof the universe was the existence of man. There was no occasion to\ndistinguish our world from the whole world. But could this conception\nstand when the earth was reduced to the condition of a planet revolving\nround a sun so like a multitude of other suns. Suddenly the stars were\ncarried to distances infinitely more considerable than the greatest\nplanetary intervals. Undoubtedly the human mind could continue to\nregard the very small groups of which the earth forms a part as a\nsystem. But the system (if it exists) which embraces the whole of the\ncelestial bodies ceased henceforth to be within our reach. Since then\n\u201cthe notion of the world has become clear and habitual, and that of the\nuniverse has become uncertain and almost unintelligible.\u201d[125]\n\nIt matters little, moreover, for, according to one of Comte\u2019s favourite\nmaxims, what we have no means of knowing, neither have we any need\nto know; and every thing which it is our interest to learn we can\nalso attain. Nor should we see in this any providential harmony. That\nwhich it is our interest to know must always in some way influence\nthe conditions of our existence. By the mere fact that this action\nmakes itself felt, it is inevitable that sooner or later, directly\nor indirectly, we should come to know of it. This reflection can be\nwell applied to astronomy. The study of the laws of the solar system,\nof which we form a part, is of supreme interest for us: and we have\nreached very great precision on this point. On the contrary, the exact\nnotion of the universe is inaccessible to us; but it is unimportant\nto us leaving out of the question our \u201cinsatiable curiosity.\u201d The\nindependence of our world is certain. The phenomena which take place\nwithin the solar system do not appear to be affected by the more\ngeneral phenomena which relate to the mutual action of suns. Our\ntables of celestial events, drawn up long beforehand and taking into\nconsideration no other world than our own, so far accord strictly with\ndirect observations. Supposing the law of gravitation to extend to the\nentire universe, the perturbation in our world caused by a mass equal\nto a million times its own, and which would be situated at the distance\nof the nearest sun to our own, would be several thousand million times\nless than that which brings about our tides, that is to say practically\nnil.\n\nHere, says Comte, is the only exception to the encyclop\u00e6dic law\naccording to which the more general phenomena control the more\nparticular ones without being influenced by them.[126] From this\nhe simply concludes that the phenomena of our system are the most\ngeneral to which positive research can extend, and that the study of\nthe universe must henceforth be excluded from natural philosophy.\nThe encyclop\u00e6dic law then remains true for the whole of positive\nphilosophy.\n\nThe delimitation of the object of astronomy is one of the points where\nwe can best follow the successive modifications of Comte\u2019s thought. In\nthe second volume of the _Cours de philosophie positive_ he gave to\nastronomy the place which is generally conceded to it by scientific\nmen. He even claims, as a condition for its utility, the most perfect\ndisinterestedness of scientific research in the whole extent of its\nprovince. The example which he gives of it (the determination of\nlongitude at sea), is borrowed from Condorcet. Undoubtedly, Comte\nalready insists upon the distinction between the ideas of world\nand universe, the former only being positive. Nevertheless, he\nstill admits that we should not give up all hope of obtaining some\nsidereal knowledge,[127] and that it would be very precious for us\nto know the relative motions of multiple stars, etc. But already in\nthe sixth volume of the _Cours_ he condemns entirely the \u201cso-called\nsidereal astronomy, which to-day constitutes the only grave scientific\naberration peculiar to celestial studies.\u201d[128] Ten years later, in the\nfirst volume of the _Politique positive_, he \u201cregenerates\u201d astronomy\nfrom the synthetic point of view. He is no longer content to limit it\nto the knowledge of the solar system. He confines the particular study\nof our world within narrow limits. Astronomy, like the other sciences,\nfrom objective must become subjective. Instead of the vague (that is to\nsay indefinite) study of the heavens its end must be the knowledge of\nthe earth, and the consideration of the other celestial bodies only in\ntheir relation to the human planet. At this price alone can the unity\nof this science be secured.[129]\n\nThus Comte came back to Aristotle\u2019s closed world with the earth as its\ncentre. He points it out himself in showing in what way he differs\nfrom the ancient conception. \u201cThis unity,\u201d he says, \u201cexisted for the\nancients, but was of an absolute character which at that time was\nlegitimate.\u201d When the motion of our planet became known, the ancient\nconstitution of celestial science might merely have been modified \u201cby\npreserving in it, as subjective, the centre which was at first supposed\nto be objective.\u201d That would have sufficed to change astronomy from\nan absolute science to a relative one. Undoubtedly the ancients were\ndeceived in believing the earth to be the centre of the world; but, in\norder to correct their error, it sufficed to say, the centre of _our_\nworld. The subjective synthesis \u201cindeed concentrates the celestial\nstudies round the earth.\u201d The other stars only deserve our attention\nin so far as the knowledge of our planet requires it. Comte ends by\nsaying in the fourth volume of the _Politique positive_ that, strictly\nspeaking, the study of the sun and moon would suffice. We may add to\nthem the ancient planets, but not the \u201clittle telescopic planets.\u201d[130]\n\nThis progressive narrowing of the astronomical domain does not\nindicate a radical change in Comte\u2019s philosophical thought. It only\nresults from the growing subordination of the scientific interest to\nother superior interests. To know for the sake of knowing, appears to\nComte to be a wrong use of the human intellect. The Newtons and the\nLaplaces in the past have fulfilled a necessary function, and humanity\nowes them eternal gratitude. They struck a decisive blow against\ntheological and metaphysical philosophy; and secured the victory for\nthe positive spirit. In their time scientific speculation which tended\nto the discovery of the laws of phenomena, and especially of celestial\nphenomena, was at once the most sublime and the most useful occupation\nwhich those men of genius could set themselves. But now that their\nefforts have culminated in the foundation of positive philosophy, and\nthis philosophy itself in the \u201cfinal religion,\u201d there is no longer\nany reason to continue researches with which henceforth humanity can\ndispense. We must even \u201ccut down many idle acquisitions.\u201d[131] In a\nword, from the religious point of view, Comte, in order to remedy the\nanarchy of science, suppresses its liberty.\n\nThese extreme, but logically deduced consequences, are part of the\nwhole of Comte\u2019s religious conceptions, that is to say of a distant\nideal. They must not blind us to the profundity of his philosophical\nconsiderations on astronomy. His reflections upon the relation between\nthe ideas of the world and of the universe correspond, from the\npositive point of view, to the first antinomy of the transcendental\nDialectics in the _Critique de la raison pure_. Can we ever be more\nfully conscious of the relativity of our knowledge, that when we see\nthat what we know of celestial phenomena is admirably precise so long\nas the solar system is concerned, but is reduced to almost nothing if\nwe look beyond it?\n\nOur world will perish, and its disappearance like its existence, will\nperhaps be an imperceptible incident. By the continued resistance\nof the general _milieu_, says Comte, in the end our world must be\nre-united to the solar mass from which it came, until, in the immensity\nof future ages, a fresh dilatation of this mass shall organise a new\nworld in the same manner, destined to repeat more or less completely\nthe former cycle. Moreover, all these immense alternatives of\ndestruction and of renewal have to be accomplished without influencing\nin any way the more general phenomena due to solar interaction; so\nthat the great revolutions in our world would only be secondary and,\nso to speak, local events, in relation to transformations of a really\nuniversal character.[132]\n\nThis outlook into the \u201cimmensity\u201d of space and of duration suffices\nto show that Comte was not a prisoner in the little solar fatherland\nin which he seems to seclude himself. It may be that for moral and\nreligious reasons he will not allow himself to go beyond it. But,\nlike Pascal, he well knows that he inhabits \u201ca little out of the way\ndistrict of nature.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nTHE SCIENCES OF THE INORGANIC WORLD\n\n\nIf we do not separate chemistry from physics, their common object is\nthe knowledge of the laws of the inorganic world. In this way they are\nclearly distinguished on one hand from astronomy which we may consider\nas an \u201cemanation from mathematical science,\u201d and on the other hand\nfrom biology. The distinction between physics and chemistry presents a\ngreater difficulty. Nevertheless this distinction must be maintained,\nsince the physical phenomena are more \u201cgeneral,\u201d and the chemical\nphenomena more \u201cspecial,\u201d that is to say, the latter depend upon the\nformer, without this dependence being for the most part reciprocal.\nEven if some day we succeeded in establishing that chemical phenomena\nare in reality physical, the distinction would none the less subsist,\nin this sense, that in a fact termed chemical, there is always\nsomething more than in a fact which is simply physical, namely, the\ncharacteristic alteration which the molecular composition of bodies\nundergoes, and which consequently affects the totality of their\nproperties.[133]\n\nTo speak only of physics in the first place, this science presents\ndifferent characteristics from those of astronomy. The speculative\nperfection of a science is measured by two correlative although\ndistinct considerations, by the more or less complete co-ordination\nof the laws, and by the more or less accurate prevision of facts.\nNow, under one aspect or the other, even supposing that physics\nshould make very important progress, it will always remain very much\nbehind astronomy. Indeed, the celestial science presents an almost\nperfect unity; physics, on the contrary, is composed of several\nbranches which are almost isolated from one another, and each one\ntaken by itself cannot even reduce all its laws to a more general\nlaw. And, as to the second point, while a very small number of direct\nobservations allows of rational and exact prevision of the whole of the\ncelestial phenomena, physics only renders possible predictions which\nare generally founded upon experience at once immediate and within\neasy reach. Undoubtedly some parts of physics allow of the use of\nmathematical analysis (we shall see presently under what conditions).\nNevertheless, the part played by experience is infinitely greater in\nphysics than in astronomy. So it is in the former science that we first\nmeet with the inductive method, which is afterwards used and developed\nin the other positive sciences. Although deduction continues to fulfil\nan important part, it already ceases to predominate here, because, says\nComte, in it the institution of true principles begins to become more\ntroublesome than the development of accurate consequences.[134]\n\nThe inductive method implies these essential processes; 1\u2218 observation\nproperly so called, that is to say the direct examination of the\nphenomenon such as it appears naturally: 2\u2218 experimenting, which is\nusually defined as the examination of the phenomenon more or less\nmodified by artificial circumstances instituted by us in order to study\nit better; 3\u2218 comparison, that is to say the gradual consideration of\na succession of analogous cases, in which the phenomenon becomes more\nand more simple. Of these three processes astronomy only makes use of\nthe first. Physics cannot use the third which is reserved for biology;\nbut it avails itself of the first and institutes the second. This is a\nfresh confirmation of the law established by Comte: to the complexity\nand increasing difficulty of the sciences, corresponds an increasing\ndevelopment of the processes of the positive method applicable to them.\n\nResearch by way of experiment, which is impossible in Astronomy,\nappears in Physics. It is therefore here where it originates that we\nmust study it. It is also here that it is most successful, and gives\nthe greatest number of results. Indeed, to experiment successfully we\nmust be able to compare two cases \u201cwhich present no other difference\ndirect or indirect, than that which relates to the course of the\nphenomenon under analysis.\u201d[135] By experimenting, Comte here clearly\ndesignates what John Stuart Mill will call the method of difference,\nthat is to say the most powerful of his methods for the investigation\nof phenomena.\n\nNow, experimenting, so understood, is extremely difficult when very\ncomplicated phenomena are concerned. In physiology, for instance, the\nexperiments must be combined in such a way as to maintain the subjects\nin the living state, and even, as far as possible, in the normal state.\nBut any modification of one part of the organism immediately affects\nthe other parts. The living being reacts instantly, and adapts itself\nas best it can to the new conditions in which it has been placed by the\nexperimentalist. We can therefore hardly ever establish in physiology\nwhat is so easily obtained in physics: two cases exactly similar in all\nrespects, except in the one which we want to analyse. In chemistry, it\nis true, experimenting would seem to be even easier than in physics,\nsince in it, as a rule, we merely consider facts resulting from\ncircumstances which are produced by man\u2019s intervention. But this is\nto mistake the nature of the experimental method. The essence of this\nprocess does not consist in man\u2019s institution of the circumstances\nsurrounding the phenomena; it lies in the \u201cfreest possible choice of\nthe case best suited to show the law of the phenomenon,\u201d whether this\ncase be, moreover, natural or artificial. Now, this choice is nearly\nalways easier in physics than in chemistry. For the chemical phenomena\nmore complex in themselves, in general can only be brought about by the\nco-operation of a great number of different influences; for this reason\nin chemistry, it is more difficult to modify the circumstances under\nwhich phenomena are produced, and still more difficult to isolate as\ncompletely as in physics the various conditions by which phenomena are\ndetermined.\n\nTo the use of the experimental method, physics can often join that of\nmathematical analysis. But in the employment of the latter it must be\nextremely cautious, and we must only have recourse to this application\nof mathematics after having \u201ccarefully considered the reality of\nthe starting point,\u201d which alone can guarantee the solidity of the\ndeductions. In a word, the spirit proper to physical investigation,\nmust constantly direct the use of this powerful instrument. Now, this\ncondition has not always been fulfilled. Too often the preponderance of\nmathematical analysis has been the cause of the neglect of experimental\nstudies. Not only has mathematical analysis in this way retarded the\nprogress of physics but it has even tended to vitiate the conception\nof that science, and to bring it back to a state of obscurity and\nuncertainty which, says Comte, notwithstanding the apparent severity\nof the forms differs little, at bottom, from its old metaphysical\nstate.[136]\n\nFor this reason, the application of analysis to physics must not be\nleft to geometers who are chiefly concerned with the instrument. It\nmust belong to the physicists who before all things consider the use\nto be made of it. Mathematicians have often encumbered physics with a\nquantity of analytical labour founded upon very doubtful hypothesis;\nthey must give way to physicists trained in experimental studies, and,\nnevertheless, with sufficient knowledge of mathematics to make use of\nthe analysis whenever it is possible. Within these limits mathematical\nanalysis will render the greatest service to the science of physics.\nWould optics, acoustics, the theories of heat and of electricity have\nreached the point where we see them to-day without the powerful help\nof analysis? Yet even here, physical researches are almost always so\ncomplex that, in order to assume a mathematical form, they demand the\nsetting aside of a more or less essential portion of the conditions of\nthe problem. Indeed we are here in presence of the general problem of\nthe translation of the concrete into the abstract. This problem, which\nis admirably solved in mathematics, and sufficiently in astronomy,\nis only imperfectly solved in physics. The art of closely combining\nexperience and analysis, says Comte, is still almost unknown. It\nconstitutes the final progress of the method proper to the deeper\nstudy of physics.[137] We may add, and this is in Comte\u2019s mind, that\nconversely the progress made by this art would be useful to analysis\nitself.\n\n\nII.\n\nAstronomy has reached a perfect state of \u201cpositivity.\u201d All trace of\nthe metaphysical spirit has disappeared from it. Can we say as much of\nphysics? It would not seem so, when we see the hypotheses which play so\ngreat a part in this science, and of which a few are keenly contested\nby Comte.\n\nHow can we distinguish the valuable hypotheses from the useless ones,\nthose which are useful to physics from those which are merely an\nencumbrance and should be rejected? This is not a question which can\nbe solved by referring to abstract rules. In order to answer it,\nwe must study the use of hypotheses where it is perfect, and decide\naccording to this example. To my mind, says Comte, the deeper study of\nthe art of hypotheses in astronomy can alone establish the rules which\nare suitable to direct the use of this precious artifice in physics,\nand more so still in the remainder of natural philosophy.[138] Now of\nwhat use is it to astronomers? To anticipate the results of deduction\nor of induction, \u201cby making a provisional supposition concerning\nsome of the very notions which constitute the final object of the\nresearch.\u201d It is a process of which the methods of approximation used\nby geometers originally suggested the general idea. They \u201csupposed\u201d\nthat the circumference was the limit of the perimeters of inscribed and\ncircumscribed polygons the number of whose sides went on increasing.\nIn the same way, hypotheses provisionally fill up the \u201clacun\u00e6\u201d of our\nknowledge.\n\nAn hypothesis should always be open to a positive verification, \u201cwhose\ndegree of precision is in harmony with that of the corresponding\nphenomena.\u201d For it only expresses beforehand what experience and\nreasoning might have made known immediately, if the circumstances of\nthe problem had been more favourable. If, therefore, an hypothesis\nclaimed to attain that which in its nature is inaccessible to\nobservation and to reasoning, it would immediately become illegitimate\nand harmful. In a word, it must bear exclusively upon laws, and never\nupon causes or the modes of production of phenomena.\n\nIn the physics of his own time Comte finds the two kinds of hypotheses,\nbut he also finds more bad hypotheses than good ones. He especially\nprotests against the ethers and the fluids to which the phenomena\nof heat, light, electricity and magnetism were attributed. These\nhypotheses, according to him, are destined to disappear from science.\nIt is true that the physicists deny that they attribute an objective\nreality to their ethers and their fluids. They claim to need them\nabsolutely in order to facilitate the conception and the combination\nof phenomena. However, in spite of themselves, they are drawn into\nspeaking of their ethers as if they really existed. Moreover, do they\nnot see that astronomy gets on very well without similar hypotheses?\nIn order to conceive the phenomena it is enough to observe and analyse\nthem attentively. And, as to combining them, that depends upon the\nknowledge which has been obtained of their positive relations.\n\nThe corpuscular theory is, on the contrary, an example of a good\nhypothesis in physics, where it plays a part analogous to that of the\ninertia of bodies in mechanics.[139] The innermost structure of bodies\nis unknown to us. But we have a right to introduce all the hypotheses\nwhich can help us in our research, and in particular the hypothesis of\natoms, so long as we do not understand it as something representing a\nreality.\n\nThe ethers and the fluids tend to \u201cexplain\u201d the physical phenomena by\nthe nature of the agent which produces them. It is here that these\nhypotheses bear the mark of the metaphysical spirit. To understand\nthe appearance and especially the persistence of these hypotheses, it\nis not enough to consider them in themselves. We must get back to the\nhistory of physics, and compare it with that of the other fundamental\nsciences. Was it possible for physics to pass suddenly from the period\nin which phenomena are referred to causes and essences, to the positive\nperiod where they are conceived as simply subject to laws? A period of\ntransition was necessary. The scholastic entities, before disappearing,\nbecame semi-materialised. They were transformed into fluids. What is\nheat conceived as existing apart from a hot body, light independent\nof a luminous body, electricity separated from an electric body? They\nare the old entities in a new garment, more easily grasped, in spite of\ntheir \u201cequivocal corporeity.\u201d They gradually lead to the more and more\nexclusive consideration of phenomena and of laws, until, in their turn,\nthey disappear.\n\nAstronomy went through the same phases before Physics. In it we have\nalso seen hypotheses which cannot be verified come to facilitate\nthe transition from the theological to the positive state. Such was\nthe conception of Descartes who explained the celestial motions by\nthe system of vortices. Those famous vortices introduced the idea\nof a mechanism where Kepler himself had only dared to conceive the\nincomprehensible action of souls and genii. Then Newton came, who\npreserved the idea of mechanism, while giving up the vortices. In vain\ndid the Cartesians fight against his entirely positive conception.\nTheir arguments in favour of fluids and ethers were as plausible\nas those of the physicists of our own time. But we have ceased to\nlisten to them. Having become entirely positive, astronomy no longer\nseeks anything but the laws at work in the phenomena observed. Every\naccessory hypothesis aiming at anything else has no further interest\nfor us.\n\nThe most advanced portions of physics have already reached this point.\nTake, for instance, the study of gravitation. There was not perhaps\na single scientific man of any importance in the XVII. century, even\nlong after Galileo, who did not construct or adopt a system concerning\nthe fall of bodies. At that time any science on this subject seemed\nimpossible without a hypothesis of this kind. Who troubles himself with\nit to-day? We may be allowed to think that the other parts of physics\nwill follow the same line, and that in turn they will conform to this\nrule of the positive method: \u201cEvery hypothesis must bear exclusively\nupon the laws of phenomena, and never upon their modes of production.\u201d\n\n\nIII.\n\nIn the series of the fundamental sciences Chemistry appears to fill a\nsomewhat secondary and subordinate place. In it the positive method\nis not enriched by any process of capital importance, but it confines\nitself to developing the processes already made use of in physics.\nIn spite of appearances, even experimenting is less easy and less\nfertile in chemistry than in physics. The only new process which we see\nappearing is the art of nomenclature. Whenever we wish to study this\nart \u201cat its source\u201d we shall have to refer to chemistry.[140]\n\nThe phenomena which it studies are the most complicated of the\ninorganic world. If then physics is extremely imperfect, it is not\nsurprising that chemistry should be much more so. In the greater number\nof its researches \u201cthe chemistry of the present day hardly deserves the\nname of science.\u201d[141] But this inferiority of chemistry is not only\ndue to the nature of its object. There are other causes which it would\nbe easier to remedy. The progress of chemistry is retarded: 1, by the\nwrong direction given to much of its work up to the present time; 2, by\nthe defective education of the majority of the scientific men who give\nthemselves to its study.\n\nBefore all things, chemists lack a clear and rational idea of their\nscience, of its relation to the sciences which stand nearest to it and\nthe way in which its problems should be stated. Being intermediate\nbetween physics and biology, chemistry has suffered from the vicinity\nof both. As the more advanced sciences always have a marked tendency\nto encroach upon those above them, chemistry must in the first place\ndefend itself against the ascendency of physics, as physics itself\nmust fight against that of mathematics. The chemist must undoubtedly\nhave studied physics, in order to make use of the results obtained\nby this science, and to turn them, if he can, into a method for\nhis own use. The relation of these two sciences is very close, and\na knowledge of the laws of calorific and electric phenomena, for\ninstance, is of the highest importance for chemical research. But, for\nall this, the chemist has his own point of view. He studies, (which the\nphysicist does not do), the laws of the phenomena of composition and\ndecomposition which are the result of the molecular and specific action\nof diverse natural or artificial substances upon each other. He must\ntherefore make use of physics, but not subordinate himself to it.\n\nOn the other hand physiological research is not within the province\nof chemistry. What has been called \u201cbiological chemistry\u201d belongs,\naccording to Comte, to biology alone. For the physiologist to have gone\nthrough the school of chemistry is natural and even indispensable.\nBut his point of view is quite different from that of the chemist.\nAs a matter of fact, chemists have shown themselves unqualified for\nphysiological studies. None of their numerous attempts have succeeded\nin establishing a single point of general doctrine, in biology. They\nmerely furnished materials. Moreover these cannot be used just as they\nare by the physiologist, who is obliged to take up the researches again\n\u201cunder the preponderating influence of biological considerations.\u201d\nComte admires the self-confidence of the chemists who approach\nphysiological questions without having measured or even suspected the\nspecial difficulties. It is, however, clear that the most carefully\nmade chemical analyses must be fruitless here so long as they are not\ndirected in the first place by a precise physiological notion of the\nwhole of the phenomenon, and then modified by the knowledge of the\nlimits of the normal variations to which the phenomena may be liable.\nNow, for proceeding in this manner, the physiologists alone are\ncompetent.[142]\n\nAnalogous considerations lead Comte to reject even organic chemistry.\nAlthough the chemical phenomena present characteristics which in the\ninorganic world come nearest to the solidarity which subsists between\nthe elements of living forms, nevertheless chemical phenomena remains\nirreducible to living phenomena. That which is chemical is not yet\norganic; and that which is organic is no longer purely chemical. We\nmust do away with this heterogenous and fictitious grouping which is\ncalled organic chemistry, to unite the different parts, according\nto their respective nature, some to chemistry proper, the others to\nbiology.[143]\n\nHow can we define the object of this science, so imperfectly determined\nat the present time? Comte knows that he is about to depart from the\nmethods generally in use among chemists, but he is not afraid of this.\nFor, he says, in order to understand the real nature of a science,\nwe must always suppose it to be perfect.[144] As chemistry, is in\nan extreme state of imperfection, the \u201cscientific type\u201d which the\nphilosopher conceives respecting it will appear to be very far removed\nfrom what exists at present. It matters little so long as this type is\nperfectly \u201crational.\u201d\n\nWhat is essential to science is the possibility of foreseeing\nphenomena. Given the characteristic properties of the simple or complex\nsubstances placed in chemical relations with each other under well\ndefined circumstances, the object of chemistry will therefore be to\ndetermine exactly in what their action will consist, and what will be\nthe properties of the new substances produced.[145] According to this\ndefinition, the fundamental data of chemistry should be ultimately,\nreducible to the knowledge of the essential properties of the simple\nelements alone, which would lead to that of the various immediate\nchemical substances, and consequently to the most complex and distant\ncombinations. Obviously, the study of simple bodies can only be made\nby means of experiments, which alone reveal their properties. But,\nonce this basis is laid down, \u201call the other chemical phenomena,\nnotwithstanding their immense variety, should be capable of rational\nsolutions, according to a small number of invariable laws, established\nby the science of chemistry for the various classes of combinations.\u201d\n\nThus, Comte sees clearly that the complexity of the chemical phenomena\nprevents us from expressing their relations in a form which allows of\nthe use of mathematical analysis. But none the less, in this science as\nin the preceding ones, he persists in making the experimental method a\nmere starting-point. The experimental method furnishes the data which\nit alone can supply. But these data are afterwards elaborated without\nits intervention. The scientific ideal in chemistry, as in physics and\nin astronomy, is _to substitute as much as possible rational prevision\nto experimental verification_. Science always seeks to _deduce_ the\ngreatest number of consequences from the smallest number of data, and\nthe smallest number of data in this case are the properties of simple\nbodies. Deduction will establish _a priori_ what the properties of a\ngiven combination of two simple bodies, or of two complex bodies will\nbe.\n\nIn the name of this scientific ideal, Comte reproaches the chemists\nwith the superabundance of their analytical work. In default of a\nrational conception of chemistry they do not make their work bear\nupon the necessary points. What is the use of studying such and such\na body, placed in such and such conditions, in an arbitrary way and\naccording to the fancy of investigation? The progress of chemistry\nshould consist far less in the acquisition of new materials than in the\nsystematisation of those which we already possess. Chemistry is to-day\nas rich in details as it is imperfectly constituted as a science.[146]\nIts present state in no way gives an idea of what its normal state will\nbe.\n\nNot content with showing to chemists the \u201cscientific type\u201d towards\nwhich their science should tend, Comte suggests a contrivance in method\nwhich will bring them nearer to it. It is in no way like the hypothesis\nof affinities, for this appears to him to be even more \u201contological\u201d\nthan the hypothesis of imaginary fluids or ethers. As always happens\nwhen we are concerned with metaphysical conceptions, the explanations\nwhich we draw from affinities consist in the reproduction in abstract\nterms of the very statement of the phenomenon.[147] To this hypothesis,\nwhich is not a scientific one since it bears up the mode of production\nof facts, Comte substitutes what he calls the \u201cdualist hypothesis.\u201d We\nignore, he says, and it is not for us to seek the real manner in which\nthe elements of which bodies are composed come to be grouped together.\nBut, consequently, it is lawful for us, in the very circumscribed\nsphere of our positive research, to conceive the immediate composition\nof any substance whatever as merely _binary_, each of the two bodies so\nseparated being able, according as the case may be, to lend itself to\na similar analysis, equally binary, and so on, as the occasion arises.\nWe do not affirm that dualism is a real law of nature. It will be a\nfundamental contrivance in chemistry, like the hypothesis of inertia in\nmechanics, and that of atoms in physics. It will serve to \u201csimplify our\nelementary conceptions\u201d in chemistry, and in having recourse to it we\ndo not exceed \u201cthe special kind of liberty\u201d of which our intellect may\navail itself, in the institution of science.[148]\n\nThe use of this hypothesis would allow us to endow chemistry with a\n\u201cfine\u201d character of unity and rationality which it lacks to-day. It is\ntrue that Comte himself confessed that this hypothesis, proposed by\nhim in 1838, had yet \u201cproduced nothing\u201d in 1851. But he explains this\nsterility to himself by the metaphysical spirit, from which chemists\nare not sufficiently freed.\n\n\nIV.\n\nWe can now take in at a single glance the relations of the sciences\nof the inorganic world (including astronomy), with the totality of\npositive philosophy.[149]\n\nIn several ways these sciences have contributed to the progress of the\npositive spirit. By their constitution, they allowed and prepared the\nformation of the more complex sciences of Biology and of Sociology.\nMoreover, their development struck a mortal blow at theological and\nmetaphysical philosophy. Through them minds became familiarised with\nthe idea of natural law. This idea was not so clearly brought to light\nby mathematics on account of their almost purely abstract character,\nand of the imperceptible part played in them by observation. It\nappears, on the contrary, as the mainspring of astronomy, of physics,\nand of chemistry. The whole effort of these sciences tends to discover\ninvariable relations between phenomena given in experience.\n\nTheological philosophy is the \u201cexplanation\u201d of nature which the\nhuman mind first makes for itself. In order that it may give up this\n\u201cexplanation\u201d some contrary evidence must oblige it to do so. It may\nsee for instance, that phenomena can be predicted with a perfect\nexactness which is always confirmed by experience, or that man, under\ncertain conditions, can modify them with certainty. Astronomy gives us\nan example of the former case. It studies phenomena which, it is true,\nare removed from our sphere of action. But, in return, it predicts them\nwith a certainty of which the effect has been practically infallible\nin the long run. It is astronomy which has done most to discredit the\nreligious and philosophical doctrine of final causes.[150] Not only has\nit proved that the universe is not disposed with reference to man, but\nit has shown the imperfections of our solar system. It has helped more\nthan any other science to check the mental habit of seeking the mode of\nproduction of phenomena.\n\nPhysics is far from allowing of a rational prevision which is\ncomparable to that practised by astronomy. But, as a compensation, it\nshows how the knowledge of laws gives the power to cause phenomena\nto vary with certainty. This second way leads us no less surely than\nthe first to the positive conception of nature. For example, Franklin\ndestroyed the religious theory of thunder, even in the least cultivated\nintellects. The discovery of the means of directing lightning therefore\nhad the same effect, in another way, as the exact prevision of the\nreturn of comets.[151]\n\nOn the other hand the sciences of the inorganic world furnish the\ngeneral positive method with some of its most powerful processes.\nAstronomy introduces observation and hypothesis into this method,\nPhysics adds experimenting to it, and Chemistry the art of\nnomenclatures. The inductive method, which virtually consists in simple\nscientific observation, becomes, however, enriched and is developed,\naccording as the phenomena in question become more complicated.\n\nBut, in return, positive philosophy exercises a considerable influence\nover these sciences. It claims nothing less than to direct and\n\u201cregenerate\u201d them. Viewing them from above and as a whole, philosophy\ncan bring a remedy to the difficulties which arise from their\nspecialism. It sets an exact limit to each of the sciences. It delivers\nphysics from the \u201calgebraical yoke,\u201d and protects the independence of\nchemists against the encroachments of the physicists. It places the\nentirety of the positive method at the service of each particular\nscience. For instance, it directs the use of hypothesis in physics by\nthe theory drawn from the use which is made of it in astronomy; for\nclassifications, it extends to chemistry the use of the comparative\nmethod which properly belongs to biology. When, later, the integral and\nfinal constitution of the philosophy of our age shall have organised\nthe relations between all the sciences, it will be almost impossible,\nsave from the historical point of view, to understand how the study of\nnature was ever conceived and directed otherwise.[152]\n\nPositive philosophy organises labour within each science, and puts\nan end to \u201canarchy.\u201d It distinguishes between \u201cidle\u201d researches, and\nthose which should be pursued. It avoids waste of efforts and prevents\ndigressions. We have seen within what limits Comte wishes to enclose\nastronomy in the name of philosophy. He does not perceive the means\nby which he can unite the various branches of physics; but he claims\nto replace the fragmentary and scattered chemistry of his time by a\nsingle systematic science, which will forsake the researches of detail\nwhich are without interest for humanity. \u201cAlmost the whole of those\ninnumerable compounds will not finally be worthy of any scientific\nattention. Some well-chosen series may even be able to satisfy the\nlogical requirements of chemistry for the discovery of the abstract\nlaws which belong to each order of composition.\u201d[153]\n\nFinally positive philosophy causes the disappearance of the last\nremains of the theological and metaphysical spirit from the sciences of\ninorganic nature. This philosophy has already shown that mathematics\nis not a more absolute science than the others, and that it originates\nin experience. In physics and in chemistry it banishes the hypotheses\nwhich, more or less avowedly, tend to make us conceive the essence or\nthe mode of production of phenomena. It is thus that it demands a\nscience of physics freed from ethers and fluids, and a wholly rational\nchemistry which shall give up affinities.\n\nComte is not therefore possessed of a superstitious respect for the\nsciences in the state in which they appear before him. On the contrary,\nhe intends that they should be subject to deep modifications, and that\nthey should strive towards an ideal form which is laid down for them by\nphilosophy. He calls this form \u201cpositive.\u201d In reality it is Cartesian.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[116] Pol. pos. I, 499-507.\n\n[117] Cours, VI, 749.\n\n[118] Cours, III, 93.\n\n[119] Cours, II, 16-17.\n\n[120] Cours, II, 14-15.\n\n[121] Pol. pos. I. 500.\n\n[122] Cours, II, 153.\n\n[123] Cours, II, 132-3.\n\n[124] Cours, VI, 751.\n\n[125] Cours, II, 133.\n\n[126] Cours, II, 266-7.\n\n[127] Cours, II. 7.\n\n[128] Cours, VI, 751.\n\n[129] Pol. pos. I, 508.\n\n[130] Pol. pos. IV. 212.\n\n[131] Pol. pos. I. 508-13.\n\n[132] Cours. II. 297.\n\n[133] Cours II. 310.\n\n[134] Pol. pos. I, 516-18.\n\n[135] Cours, II, 313-15; Pol. pos. I, 519.\n\n[136] Cours, II, 317.\n\n[137] Cours, II, 321.\n\n[138] Cours, II, 336 sq.\n\n[139] Pol. pos. 520.\n\n[140] Pol. Pos., I, 532.\n\n[141] Cours, III, 3-4.\n\n[142] Cours, III, 186-9.\n\n[143] Cours, III, 195.\n\n[144] Cours, I. 118: II. 311.\n\n[145] Cours III. 11-12.\n\n[146] Cours, III. 206.\n\n[147] Cours, III. 35.\n\n[148] Cours, III. 87-8.\n\n[149] Pol. pos. I. 551.\n\n[150] Cours, II. 24-26.\n\n[151] Cours, II. 331.\n\n[152] Cours, III. 75.\n\n[153] Pol. pos. I, 561.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nBIOLOGY\n\n\nThe passage from the inorganic world to the world of Life constitutes a\ncritical step in natural philosophy. Astronomy, Physics, and Chemistry\nrepresented successive steps in the same series. If each order of\nphenomena presented in itself something which was irreducible to\nprevious orders, nevertheless all these phenomena, in a certain sense,\nremained homogeneous. Without rashness, Descartes could conceive that\nphysics, like astronomy, would one day assume the mathematical form.\nAnd to-day more than one scientific man considers the distinction\nbetween physics and chemistry as provisional.\n\nBut as soon as life appears, we enter a new world. At this degree\nthe \u201cenrichment of the real\u201d is suddenly so considerable that we\nfind it difficult to admit the homogeneity of these phenomena with\nthe preceding ones. Comte here reaps the benefit of his prudence.\nHis philosophy has guarded against reducing all science to a single\ntype, and it is content with the unity of method and the homogeneity\nof doctrine. It only demands that each science should limit itself to\nthe search after the laws of phenomena. As to the way in which this\nresearch is to be carried out, it is evidently subordinated to the\nnature of the phenomena in question. Now, biological phenomena present\na number of characteristics which belong to them alone, and the first\nduty of the positive science which studies them is to respect their\noriginality.\n\nComte, therefore, here breaks with Descartes who conceived biology as\na prolongation of physics. He takes an entirely different view of this\nscience, which, in a sense, is opposed to the whole of the sciences of\nthe inorganic world. From this there arises a double effort. On the\none hand, Comte wishes to maintain the continuity of the encyclop\u00e6dic\nseries of the sciences: he thus shows Biology as immediately following\nchemistry, and maintaining the closest relations with astronomy and\nphysics. On the other hand he clearly brings out the irreducible\ncharacter of the vital phenomena, and the modifications which the\npositive method must undergo when applied to them. Despite the extreme\ndifference between the points of view and the doctrines, he often\nmakes us think of those deep and difficult passages in the _Critique\ndu Jugement_ where Kant has shown that without the hypothesis of an\ninner finality, (although this hypothesis is in itself obscure), the\nphenomena which take place in living beings remain unintelligible.\n\nWith biology, says Comte, necessarily appear the ideas of _consensus_,\nof hierarchy, of \u201cmilieu\u201d, of the conditions of existence, of the\nrelation between the static and the dynamic states, between the organ\nand the function.[154] In a word, a biological phenomenon, considered\nalone is devoid of meaning. Strictly speaking, it does not even exist.\nIt can only be understood by its relations with the other phenomena\nwhich take place in the living being, phenomena which react upon it. At\nthe same time it reacts upon them. Here, in opposition to what takes\nplace in the inorganic world, the parts are only intelligible through\nthe idea of the whole. Undoubtedly a certain solidarity of phenomena\nexists in the inorganic world, which allows us to consider united\nwholes in it. But the solidarity of biological phenomena is far closer,\nfor, without it we could not conceive them, while, as regards the\nphenomena of the inorganic world, there is nothing impossible in this\nabstraction.\n\nHenceforth, the positive method must adapt itself to the\ncharacteristics which belong to biological phenomena. It does not\nalways demand, as it has been wrongly stated, that we should go from\nthe simple to the complex, but only that we should proceed from the\nknown to the unknown. It is true that in the sciences of the inorganic\nworld we proceed from the least complex to the most complex cases;\nwe begin by the study of phenomena which are as isolated as possible\nfrom one another. But, on the contrary, living beings are all the\nbetter known to us in proportion as they are more complex. The idea\nof the animal is in some respects clearer to us than the idea of the\nvegetable. The idea of the superior animals is clearer to us than that\nof the inferior ones. Finally man for us is the principal biological\nunity, and it is from this unity that speculation starts in this\nscience.\n\nThus, in dealing with Biology the positive method undergoes a veritable\ninversion. In the preceding sciences, the last degree of composition is\nforbidden us: we never succeed in uniting the whole of the inorganic\nworld into a single synthesis. In biology, on the contrary, sums of\nphenomena are given; but it is the last degree of simplicity which\nescapes us. We have to start from those sums of phenomena, and biology\nmust in this way assume a synthetic character. In it the analysis of\nphenomena will be as minute as possible; but the analytical operations\nwill always be more or less directly subordinated to the leading idea\nof the vital _consensus_.[155]\n\n\nII.\n\nLike the other fundamental sciences Biology must be abstract, that is\nto say it must not bear upon individual beings, but upon phenomena.\nIt is thus distinct from zoology and botany which are concrete\nsciences. In its widest generality it is defined through the constant\ncorrespondence between the anatomical and the physiological point of\nview. Its object is to constantly unite them to one another. In reality\nthese two points of view are the two aspects of a single problem. It\nis owing to historical reasons that, during a certain time, these two\nsciences appeared to develop independently of one another. Physiology\nremained attached to the metaphysical methods, that is to say, to\nunverifiable hypotheses and to principles which went beyond experience,\nwhile anatomists already made use of the positive method. But to-day,\nthe two sciences being equally positive, \u201ctheir opposition is reduced\nto that which subsists between the static and the dynamic points of\nview.\u201d[156]\n\nAnother element which should enter into the more general definition of\nbiology, although it has sometimes been neglected, is the consideration\nof the _milieu_. The relation between the organism and its _milieu_\nis no less essential to life than the relation of the organ to the\nfunction. Life supposes not only that the being should be organised in\na certain way, but also that a certain number of external circumstances\nshould sustain this organisation, and should be compatible with its\nactivity. Living beings are thus dependent upon their _milieu_, and\nthis dependence grows as we rise in the organic series. The system\nof the conditions of existence becomes all the more complex as the\nfunctions develop and become more varied. Inferior organisms are\nsubject to less numerous external conditions; but, says Comte, a little\nvariation in one of these conditions suffices to make them perish.\nThe superior organisms stand a variation of this kind better. But, in\nreturn, the number of conditions upon which they depend is far greater.\nThe study of _milieux_ in their relations to organisms, a study which\nis hardly outlined, undoubtedly has many discoveries in store for the\nfuture.[157] Here is an order of problems of which Lamarck probably\nsuggested the idea to Comte, and upon which Darwin\u2019s genius will work.\n\nBichat then was wrong in saying in his celebrated definition of life\nthat it is \u201cthe sum of the forces which resist death.\u201d The radical\nantagonism between inorganic and living nature is an incomplete and\nconsequently a false idea. Indeed if, as Bichat supposed, everything\nwhich surrounds living bodies tended to destroy them, their existence\nwould become unintelligible.[158] Where could they find strength\nto resist such formidable pressure, even for a short time? On the\ncontrary, the fundamental condition for life is a certain \u201charmony\u201d\nbetween the organism and the _milieu_ in which it is placed. The proof\nof this is furnished at every turn by experience.\n\nThis being established, what will be the most general problem of the\nscience of life? From the anatomical point of view, says Comte, all\npossible organisms, all parts whatever of each organism, and all the\nvarious states of each necessarily present a common basis of structure\nand of composition, from which the tissues, organs and apparatus have\nemerged by means of a progressive differentiation. In the same way,\nfrom the physiological point of view, all living beings, from the\nvegetable kingdom up to man, considered in all their actions and all\nthe periods of their existence, necessarily possess a common basis\nof vital activity, whence the innumerable phenomena of nutrition,\nsecretion, etc., proceed, by means of progressive differentiation. Now,\nfrom both these points of view, that which is similar in these cases,\nis more important than that which distinguishes them, since the more\ngeneral phenomena govern those which are less so. We must therefore\ndisengage the elementary physiological phenomenon and the anatomical\nstructure which corresponds to it, we must determine their relation,\nand, with the help and confirmation of experience, we must deduce the\nincreasingly more complex, physiological and anatomical, phenomena from\nit.[159]\n\nThis conception which, despite Comte\u2019s reservation, still appears to be\nentirely saturated with the Cartesian spirit, leads him to the \u201cmost\nmathematical statement possible\u201d of the biological problem. \u201cGiven\nthe organ, or the organic modification, to find the function or the\nact, and vice versa.\u201d[160] There is nothing more in conformity with\nthe general definition of science, which consists in substituting the\nknowledge of laws to that of facts, and rational prevision to empirical\nobservation. Here, it is true, we have an \u201cideal scientific type,\u201d from\nwhich biology, which has scarcely reached the positive state, is very\nfar removed. But there is no science which does not fall short of its\ndefinition more or less. The use of this definition is already a help\nfor a science, and provides a means for measuring its progress.\n\n\nIII.\n\nIn part, or even entirely, biology is deprived of certain methodical\nprocesses which are utilised by the sciences which precede it. It\ncannot avail itself of calculation. Undoubtedly each of the elements\nwhich go to make up a physiological phenomenon varies according to\na definite law. But the sum of these elements forms such a complex\nwhole, that we shall never be able to express their relations in the\nterms of an equation. Further, the numbers which are relative to the\nphenomena of living bodies present continual and irregular variations,\nwhich do not allow us to establish the data of a mathematical\ncalculation.[161] Each living being has its individuality, its\npersonal formula, its characteristic reactions, which prevent us from\ntreating it as identical with the other beings of the same species.\nEach physiological or pathological \u201ccase\u201d is distinct from any other\ncase. That is why Comte distrusts statistics. In his judgment they\nare misleading in physiology, and fatal in medicine. In the same way,\nClaude Bernard will protest vigorously against averages.\n\nIs the inductive method at least a convenient one to make use of in\nbiology? Simple observation cannot lead us far in the study of such\ncomplex phenomena, of which many are not directly accessible to our\nsenses or to our instruments. Experimenting is very difficult in\nbiology, for nothing is easier than to disturb, to suspend, or even\nto bring about the entire cessation of the phenomena of life. But it\nis almost impossible to introduce an exactly determined perturbation,\nwhether of kind, or, _a fortiori_, of degree. Indeed a modification of\na single condition of the phenomenon almost at once affects the greater\nnumber of the other phenomena, by reason of their _consensus_. In\nprinciple, experimenting is not forbidden in biology. On the contrary\nit is of remarkable efficacy, but it is often impracticable.\n\nNevertheless, as we know, it is not man\u2019s intervention in phenomena\nwhich constitutes experimenting properly so called. It consists,\nbefore all things, in the rational selection of cases, (natural or\nartificial, it matters little), which are most appropriate for bringing\nout the law of variation of the phenomenon under observation. Nature\ngives us such, for illnesses resemble experiments which we can follow\nthrough their entire course and to their termination. They are often\ndifficult to interpret, on account of their extreme complexity, but\nless so, however, than the majority of the experiments which we bring\nabout ourselves. For are they not more or less violent diseases,\nsuddenly produced by our intervention, without our being able to\nforesee all their indirect and future consequences? It is pathological\nanatomy which led Bichat to his fine discoveries in histology and in\nphysiology. And to pathology we must join teratology which is, as it\nwere, its prolongation. Here again, nature supplies experiments which\nwe should not know how to institute.[162]\n\nWhatever may be the help which biology derives from these natural\nways of experimenting, its progress could only be a very slow one, if\nit did not possess besides a powerful method for proceeding which is\npeculiar to it: _comparison_. It is true that every inductive operation\nimplies comparison. We compare what we observe with other real and\npossible cases. Again we compare when we are experimenting. But, in\nthe comparative method, properly so called, we do not limit ourselves\nto bringing two cases together. Comparison bears upon a long sequence\nof analogous cases, in which the subject is modified by a continual\nsuccession of almost insensible gradations.[163]\n\nHow would the general problems of biology receive a solution without\nthis method? If we consider an organism by itself, the complication of\nfunctions and organs is inextricable in it. But, if we compare this\norganism with those which come nearest to it, and then with others\nwhich are near to them and so on, disengaging what they have in common,\na simplification is produced. The accessory characteristics disappear\nby degrees, as we descend in the biological series, and, if we have set\nourselves to study a certain function, we can finally determine its\nrelation to its organ.\n\nAlthough it belongs to biology, this method has its analogy in\nother sciences, and especially in mathematics. It appears to me,\nsays Comte, to present a character similar to that of mathematical\nanalysis, which brings forward, in each sequence of analogous cases\n\u201cthe fundamental portion which is common to all, which portion, before\nthis abstract generalisation, was concealed beneath the secondary\nspecialities of each isolated case.\u201d The comparative method, in a\nword, is a method for analysing biological continuity. Whether it be a\nquestion of an anatomical disposition or of a physiological phenomenon\n\u201c_the methodical comparison of the regular sequence of the growing\ndifferences_ which relate to them will always present the surest\nand most efficacious means of throwing light upon even the ultimate\nelements of the proposed question.\u201d We see that Comte had here his\nconception of the infinitesimal calculus in his mind. Better still,\nwhere terms are lacking in the organic series he does not hesitate to\nsuppose them to re-establish continuity. He introduces intermediary\n\u201cfictitious organisms\u201d hypotheses which some day perhaps pal\u00e6ontology\nwill turn into realities.\n\nBy means of this method, not only we shall know a far greater number of\ncases, but, what is of more importance, we shall know each one among\nthem better, \u201cas an inevitable consequence of their being drawn nearer\ntogether.\u201d We assume, it is true, that all these various cases present\na fundamental similarity accompanied by gradual modifications, which\nalways follow a regular course. But this hypothesis as we have seen, is\nimplied in the very definition of general biology.\n\nThe comparative method will then apply successively to the different\nparts of an organism, to the different ages of the same organism, and\nto the different organisms in the animal and vegetable series. It will\neven apply to embryonic life, Comte clearly formulates von Baer\u2019s\nlaw, while making indispensable reservations. The primitive state of\nthe highest organism, he says, must represent, from the anatomical\nand physiological point of view, the essential characteristics of the\ncomplete state which belongs to the more inferior organism, and so on\nsuccessively \u201cwithout our being able to find again the exact analogy\nof each of the principal terms of the inferior organic series in the\nsole analysis of the various phases of development of each superior\norganism.\u201d This comparison, so to speak, allows us to realise in the\nsame individual the growing complication of organs and of functions\nwhich characterises the whole biological hierarchy. Thus it is\nparticularly \u201cluminous.\u201d[164] Von Baer\u2019s book had appeared in German in\n1827. Had Comte known it, it is most probable that, according to his\nhabit, he would have quoted it.\n\n\nIV.\n\nIn order to consider organisms in the regular sequence which allows\nof comparison, we must first have established the order in which\nthey should be arranged. But, conversely, to establish this order, a\nknowledge of anatomy and physiology is indispensable. So between these\ntwo sciences on the one hand and \u201cbiotaxy\u201d on the other there is a\nstrict solidarity. The problem of classification is thus an essential\npart of general biology. In the natural classification sought after\nby science, the position assigned to each organism would suffice\nto define at once the whole of its anatomical and physiological\nnature, in relation to the organisms which precede and to those which\nfollow.[165] Any natural classification cannot, however, be anything\nbut imperfect. Accustomed as we are to artificial classifications,\nwhich admit of absolute and immediate perfection, we are surprised that\nthe same should not be the case in natural classification. But, if the\nlatter is a real science, we must own that, here as elsewhere, we can\nonly reach more or less distant approximations. The co-ordination of\nliving species is a problem like the static or dynamic analysis of a\ndetermined organism. Like this analysis, it only allows of solutions\nwhich are approached rather than realised.[166]\n\nHow, in the first place, must we understand species? Between Cuvier\nand Lamarck, Comte sides with Cuvier, with this reservation, however,\nthat \u201cour ideas upon this question of capital importance are not yet\nproperly fixed.\u201d Two reasons especially incline him to admit the fixity\nof of species. Lamarck\u2019s theory is not sufficiently proved: we nowhere\nsee that the _milieu_ exercises the almost boundless influence upon\norganisms which is attributed to it by Lamarck. Undoubtedly, within\ncertain limits, the exercise induced by external circumstances tends\nto modify the primitive organisation. But this action of the _milieu_\nand this aptitude of the organism are certainly very limited. On\nthe other hand, if we have a choice between the two hypotheses, the\ninterest of science would prompt us to use this liberty in favour of\nCuvier. The fixity of species guarantees that the series of organisms\nwill always be composed of terms which are clearly distinct, separated\nby insuperable intervals. This \u201cincreases the degree of rational\nperfection of which the final establishment of this hierarchy is\ncapable.\u201d[167] It is then under the influence of a purely formal motive\nthat Comte\u2019s preference is here decided. For he felt the strength and\nthe import of Lamarck\u2019s labours. Of the two celebrated antagonists, he\nsaid, Lamarck was unquestionably the one \u201cwho manifested the clearest\nand deepest sense of the true organic hierarchy.\u201d[168]\n\nComte has even dealt with certain objections which do not go against\nLamarck. Thus, we might think at first that, in his hypothesis,\nthere is no real zoological series, since animal organisms would be\nessentially identical, their differences being henceforth attributed\nto the diverse and unequally prolonged influence of the external\nconditions. But, on looking into it more closely, we see, on the\ncontrary, that this hypothesis only presents the series in a new\naspect which would even render its existence still more evident. For\nthe whole of the zoological series would then become, in fact as\nwell as ideally, altogether analogous to the whole of the individual\ndevelopment, confined at least to its ascending period. It would then\nbe conceived as continuous. \u201cThe progressive advance of the animal\norganism, which for us is only a convenient abstraction, would be\nconverted into a natural law.\u201d[169]\n\nFor the logical perfection of science, Comte prefers to regard species\nas fixed in the absence of contrary proofs. None the less Lamarck\nhas stated a problem of the highest interest. Comte points out its\nimportance. \u201cThe rational theory of the necessary action of the various\n_milieux_ on the different organisms has still almost entirely to be\nformulated. Such an order of research, although greatly neglected,\nconstitutes one of the finest subjects which the present condition of\nbiology can present.\u201d By this means, he adds, we might obtain a theory\nfor the perfecting of living species even including mankind.[170]\n\n\nV.\n\nComte\u2019s anatomical and physiological philosophy is naturally allied to\nthe science of his time. It is especially connected with the labours\nof Bichat and of de Blainville. Here again he endeavours to state the\nproblems in the most general form possible. Anatomy should begin by\nthe study of the tissues, to ascend afterwards to the association of\nseveral tissues, that is to say, to the organs, and to the associations\nof several organs, that is to say, to systems. But analysis must not\nbe concerned with the tissue itself. To attempt the passage from this\nnotion to that of the molecule, is to allow the organic to enter into\nthe inorganic philosophy. In biology, the tissue corresponds to what\nthe molecule is in physics. Such, at least, is the doctrine of the\n_Cours de philosophie positive_. Later on, instructed by Schwann\u2019s\nworks, Comte admits in the _Politique positive_ that the anatomical\nelement is the cell.\n\nBe it tissue or cell, there must be a fundamental anatomical element.\nThe simultaneous existence of several elements independent of one\nanother would greatly mar \u201cthe admirable unity of the organic world,\u201d\nand consequently the perfection of biological science. Life is always\nessentially the same. To this dynamic consideration, there must\ncorrespond, in the static order, that of a common basis invariable in\nits primordial organisation, successively producing, by deeper and\ndeeper modifications, the various special anatomical elements.\n\nSimilarly, physiology will not be entirely organised until it studies\nfunctions (at least the organic functions), throughout the whole chain\nof living beings, from the vegetable kingdom up to man. This conception\nof a general physiology leads Comte to dwell, as Claude Bernard will\nlater on, upon the phenomena of life which are common to plants and\nto animals. Some are better studied in plants and others in animals.\nBut, whether it be animal or vegetable every organism always presents\ntwo fundamental functions: 1. the absorption of nutritious materials\nborrowed from the _milieu_ (the assimilation of these materials and\nfinally nutrition); 2. the rejection of unassimilated materials.\nHowever, plants are the only organised beings which live directly upon\nthe inorganic _milieu_.[171] Comte was ignorant of the physiology of\nfungi.\n\nComte unreservedly adopts the distinction established by Bichat\nbetween the functions of organic life and those of animal life. In\nthe first place he concludes from this, in virtue of the correlation\nof the dynamic to the static point of view, that distinct tissues\ncorrespond to these distinct functions. Then, he goes more deeply into\nthe difference between the two kinds of functions. Strictly speaking,\nthe phenomena of organic life only constitute a special order of\ncomposition and of decomposition. They come very near to chemistry, and\nmay serve as a transition between the inorganic world and the world of\nlife.[172] On the contrary, the phenomena of animal life (irritability,\nsensibility), offer no analogy with the phenomena of the inorganic\nworld. We might almost believe, according to Comte, that the separation\nis established not between the chemical and biological phenomena, but\nbetween organic and animal life, the phenomena of the former reducing\nthemselves to physico-chemical phenomena, and those of the latter\npresenting entirely different characteristics. Such is not, however,\nComte\u2019s thought. Undoubtedly, considered one by one, the phenomena of\norganic life (absorption, circulation, exhalation, etc.) are indeed\nphysico-chemical phenomena. But what renders their biological character\nirreducible is that it is impossible to consider them separately: in\norder to understand them we must first look at them from the point of\nview of the whole, and appeal to the organic _consensus_, in a word, to\nwhat Claude Bernard, will call _l\u2019id\u00e9e directrice_.\n\nIn the study of organic functions we shall begin by the lower extremity\nin the series of living beings, that is to say by the most rudimentary\nforms of the vegetable kingdom, for it is here that we shall grasp the\nphenomena in their simplest form. Then we shall follow their growing\ncomplexity. For the animal functions, on the contrary, it is expedient\nto begin by man, \u201cthe only being in which such an order of phenomena\nis ever immediately intelligible.\u201d From this point of view man is\npre-eminently the biological unity. As soon as it is a question of the\ncharacteristics of animality, we must begin with man and see how they\ndescend by degrees, rather than start from the sponge, and look for\ntheir mode of development. Man\u2019s animal life helps us to understand\nthat of the sponge; but the reverse is not true.[173] Moreover, the\nphenomena of organic life, being the most general, are also the most\nfundamental. The functions of animal life are first useful for the\nneeds of organic life, by perfecting it. It is in man alone that the\nvegetative life is subordinate to the life of relation: and even for\nthat he must have reached a high degree of civilisation.[174]\n\n\nVI.\n\nIt is not surprising that biology, even more than physics and\nchemistry, preserves the metaphysical spirit. Such, for instance,\nis the hypothesis of spontaneous generation. Positive philosophy\nrecognizes that each living being always emanates from another similar\nbeing. This is not established _a priori_, but is the result of an\n\u201cimmense induction.\u201d[175] _Omne vivum ex vivo._ Efforts to explain\nhow the generating tissue should itself be formed by kinds of organic\nmonads, (an allusion to certain theories arising out of Schelling\u2019s\nphilosophy) can only fail. We should never know how to connect the\norganic with the inorganic world except through the fundamental laws\nbelonging to the general phenomena which are common to them both.\nPositive speculations in anatomy and in physiology form a limited\nsystem, within which we must establish the most perfect unity,\nbut which must ever remain separated from the whole of inorganic\ntheories.[176] We see clearly, it is true, that there is no matter\nwhich is of itself living. Life is not peculiar to certain substances\nwhich are organised in a certain manner. It never belongs to them for\nmore than a time: every organism of which the molecules are not renewed\nis dissolved. But \u201cwe can no more explain this instability than this\nspeciality.\u201d[177]\n\nIn the same way we see that in living bodies the nutritive functions\nare the basis of the others; but there is no contradiction in\n\u201cdreaming\u201d of thought and sociability in beings whose substance would\nremain unalterable. From this point of view spiritualism is not less\nadmissible than materialism, in so much as death does not seem to be a\nnecessary consequence of life. This again is an idea which is common\nto Descartes and to Comte. They both conceive an organism in which the\nplay of functions should not cease of itself. The theory of death, says\nComte, although it is founded upon that of life, is entirely distinct\nfrom it.[178]\n\nIf biology still often hesitates in the statement of its problems\nand in the choice of its hypotheses, it is in a great measure due to\nthe two opposite tendencies between which it oscillated in the last\ncentury. On the one hand, Boerhaave, and the school of physiology which\nis more or less directly connected with Descartes, sought a mechanical\nexplanation of biological phenomena, and tended to reduce biology to\nphysics and chemistry. On the other hand, Stahl in Germany, and the\nvitalist school of Montpellier in France, appealed to metaphysical\nprinciples and to unverifiable hypotheses. Being thus swayed from\none extremity to another, biology only escaped the \u201coppression\u201d of\nthe inorganic sciences to involve itself in conceptions which were\nscarcely scientific.[179] It is only at the end of the XVIII. Century,\nwith Haller, Gall and Bichat, that it finds its equilibrium, takes\npossession of its method, and at last enters into its positive phase.\n\nBy its lower extremity it is contiguous to inorganic science (the\nphysico-chemical phenomena of vegetative life). By its higher\nextremity, (intellectual functions), it reaches to the final science,\nor sociology. But the adherence is far from being as close in one case\nas in the other. At the moment when we pass from the inorganic world to\nthe world of living beings, according to positive philosophy, there is\na sudden \u201cenrichment of the real.\u201d The transition is very marked. The\ndomain of biology is not so sharply separated from that of sociology.\nFor the higher biological functions, the intellectual functions, cannot\nbe analysed from the point of view of the individual, at least in man,\nbut only from the point of view of the species. We must then, while\npreserving the distinction between the two sciences, admit a kind of\ninter-relation between them. Undoubtedly sociology could not be founded\nso long as biology had not made decisive progress. But, conversely,\nsociology once founded alone completes the positive study of the\nhighest biological functions.\n\nCertainly, biology has not been less transformed than chemistry during\nthe last sixty years, and the state in which we see it to-day differs\nsingularly from that in which Comte knew it. It has been developed\nand differentiated far beyond what he could foresee. None the less\nhe conceived some of its principles with remarkable power. He had a\nprecise idea of that which could constitute a general biology that is,\na single physiology and anatomy for the whole of living beings. He\nknew the fecundity of the comparative method, and he pointed out its\nanalogy with the method of analysis in mathematics. Finally, although\nhe refused to adopt the transformist hypothesis, he had understood the\nimportance of Lamarck\u2019s work.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[154] Cours, VI, 772.\n\n[155] Cours, IV, 285-7.\n\n[156] Cours, III, 8-239.\n\n[157] Cours, III, 490, 510.\n\n[158] Cours, III, 224-7.\n\n[159] Cours, III, 271-2.\n\n[160] Cours, III, 237.\n\n[161] Cours, III, 326 sq.\n\n[162] Cours, III. 259-65.\n\n[163] Cours, III. 284-5.\n\n[164] Cours, III. 282-546.\n\n[165] Cours, III. 437.\n\n[166] Cours, III. 456-7.\n\n[167] Cours, III, 452.\n\n[168] Cours, III, 444.\n\n[169] Cours, III, 441-2.\n\n[170] Cours, III, 452-3.\n\n[171] Cours, III, 529-31; Pol. pos., I, 594.\n\n[172] Cours, III, 553-6.\n\n[173] Cours, III, 380-1.\n\n[174] Cours, III, 562-3.\n\n[175] Pol. Pos., I, 591.\n\n[176] Pol. Pos., I, 587.\n\n[177] Pol. Pos., I, 587; Cours, III, 419-20.\n\n[178] Pol. Pos., I, 589.\n\n[179] Cours, VI, 766-68.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nPSYCHOLOGY\n\n\nPsychology has no place in the classification of the fundamental\nsciences. In it Sociology immediately succeeds Biology. Use has been\nmade of this fact in order to reproach Comte with having neglected an\norder of most important phenomena. A grave objection has been raised\nagainst his doctrine in general. What are we to think of a philosophy\nwhich, deliberately, omits a part, and, according to many philosophers,\nthe chief part of reality, the world of consciousness, the spiritual\nnature of man?\n\nPresented in this way, the objection rests upon many confused notions\nabout words and ideas. What do we understand by psychology? If the\nword means: \u201cthe science of the soul reached through the introspective\nmethod,\u201d we must own that Comte does not admit the possibility of\nsuch a science. But the same objection will also hold good against\nthe majority of the psychologists of our time. For they do not admit\nthis possibility any more than Comte, and they have endeavoured to\nconstitute the science of psychical facts by a different method than\nthat of introspection, pure and simple. Is psychology defined as \u201cthe\nscience which investigates the laws of feeling, of the intellect and of\nmoral phenomena in man and in animals?\u201d Then it is inaccurate to say\nthat there is no psychology for Comte. On the contrary, he thinks that\npositive psychology has just been founded by contemporary science of\nwhose methods he approves. If he did not use the word \u201cpsychology,\u201d\nhe did so in order to avoid confusion. At that moment the word was, so\nto speak, the property of the eclectic school. By the \u201cpsychological\u201d\nmethod, everyone then understood that of Jouffroy. \u201cPsychology\u201d was\nthe science founded by Cousin on the analysis of the _ego_. Comte\nwho opposes these philosophers, did not wish his theory of psychical\nphenomena, which differs from theirs, to be called by the same name. It\nis this very precaution which has come to be no longer understood, now\nthat \u201cpsychology\u201d does not designate the eclectic doctrine alone, but\nany theory whatsoever concerning mental facts.\n\n\nI.\n\nComte finds the field occupied by three psychological schools, and he\ncombats all three, for reasons of method and also of doctrine. He looks\nto them to refute each other mutually, and he will only attack what is\ncommon to them all.[180]\n\nThe representatives of these three schools are the Ideologists, with\nCondillac, from whom they proceed, then the Eclectics, and finally\nthe philosophers of the Scottish school. Comte sometimes calls the\neclectics the German school, in opposition to the ideologists, who\nare the French school, and to the Scottish school, the first of the\nthree in point of time. But he always speaks sympathetically of\nthe Scottish school, remembering that, in part, he owes to it his\nphilosophical education. He also esteems the sincerity and logical\nvigour of the ideologist Destutt de Tracy. But, after all, we have\nhere metaphysicians, as are also the eclectics upon whom he passes a\nmore severe judgment. By \u201cmetaphysicians,\u201d he understands all those\nwho study phenomena, (in this case psychical phenomena), by means\nof a method which is no longer theological, but which has not yet\nbecome positive. In this sense, Locke is a metaphysician, as well as\nCondillac and his other successors in the XVIII. century, Hume alone\nexcepted.\n\nComte showers derision upon the method of internal observation which\nis practised by the \u201cpsychologists.\u201d The sharpness of his language is\nat least partially explained by the indignation with which Cousin\u2019s\n\u201ccharlatanisme\u201d inspired him. This \u201cfamous sophist,\u201d in whom he\nrecognises some of the gifts of an orator, and in particular that of\na mimic, according to him, exercises most unfavourable influence over\nthe minds of men.[181] He turns them aside from the positive path,\nwhich they are about to enter, to bring them back to metaphysical\ndialectics, or to hollow and sonorous rhetoric. And, to crown all, this\n\u201cpsychology\u201d claims to follow a scientific method! the very method\nwhich has succeeded so well in the natural sciences! It conceives\nthe idea of practising internal observation, as physics makes use of\nexternal observation. But what is this internal observation? How can\nthe function of the same organ be to think, and at the same time to\nobserve that it thinks? We conceive that man should be able to observe\nhimself if it is a question of the passions which animate him. No\nanatomical reason is opposed to this since the organs which are the\nseat of the passions, are distinct from those which are used for the\nobserving functions. But as to observing the intellectual phenomena\nin the same way, it is manifestly impossible. In this case, the organ\nwhich is observed being one with the observing organ, how could the\nobservation take place?\n\nThis objection does not only hold against the eclectics, but also\nagainst the Scottish school and the ideologists. We already find it\nset forth in a letter from Comte to Valat on the 24th, of September,\n1819, when he was perhaps not yet acquainted with Cousin. \u201cWith what\nshould we observe the mind itself, its operations, its activity? We\ncannot divide our mind, that is to say, our brain, into two parts, of\nwhich one acts while the other looks on, to see how it goes to work.\nThe so-called observations made on the human mind, considered in\nitself and _a priori_, are pure illusions. All that we call _logic_,\n_metaphysics_, _ideology_, is an idle fancy and a dream, when it is not\nan absurdity.\u201d[182]\n\nThis text, to which we could add many similar ones, allows us to\nrectify an erroneous, although a frequent interpretation of Comte\u2019s\nthought. He does not deny that we are informed by consciousness of\nthe existence of psychical phenomena. On the contrary, he expressly\nrecognises the fact. What he regards as impossible is to study the\nactivity of thought by means of reflection, that is to discover the\n\u201cintellectual laws\u201d by a method of internal observation. In a word,\nit is such works as those of Condillac, of the ideologists, of Reid,\netc., which he condemns in their principle. In these works the subject\nmatter is the theory of knowledge, and not that which is called to-day\n_psychology_ proper.\n\nIf, instead of seeking specially for the intellectual laws, we wish to\nstudy psychical phenomena in general, internal observation will become\npossible in a certain number of cases. But it will not lead to the end\nwhich we wish to reach. It excludes the use of the comparative method,\nso fertile and so indispensable in the whole domain of biology. It only\nstudies man, and even adult and healthy man. What will it tell us of\nthe child, of the mentally deranged, of the animal?[183] Will it, like\nDescartes, go so far as to deny the existence of a psychical life in\nanimals? Still this life cannot be studied by internal observation. We\nmust then have recourse to another method.\n\nStrictly speaking, there are only two methods which are suitable for\nthe science of those phenomena. Either we determine with all possible\nprecision the various organic conditions on which they depend: this is\nthe object of what Comte calls phrenological psychology. Or else we\nobserve directly the products of the intellectual and moral activity,\nand this study then belongs to sociology. But, if by this supposed\npsychological, method we set aside the consideration of the agent,\nthat is to say of the organ, and that of the action, that is to say\nof the productions of the human faculties, what can remain \u201cunless an\nunintelligible logomachy,\u201d or verbal entities which are substituted to\nreal phenomena? Here then is the study of the most difficult and most\ncomplex functions suspended, as it were, in the air, without any point\nat which it touches the simpler and more perfect sciences, \u201cover which,\non the contrary, it is claimed that it should reign majestically.\u201d\n\nNothing is more opposed to the general order of nature, in which we\nalways see the more complex and higher phenomena subordinated, so\nfar as the conditions of their existence are concerned, to the more\nsimple and commoner ones. As the biological depend upon the inorganic\nphenomena, just as, within biology, the phenomena of animal life are\nsubordinated to those of organic life, so the intellectual and moral\nphenomena depend upon the other biological functions. Beyond their own\nparticular laws, the laws of all the subjacent orders of phenomena also\ngovern them. Can we study them as if all these laws did not exist? Let\nthe metaphysician be free to do so. The scientific man who follows the\npositive method will proceed on other lines.\n\nA defective method could lead but to false results. Notwithstanding\nthe differences in their doctrines, ideologists and psychologists\nhave agreed to place the intellectual functions in the front rank,\nand to thrust the affective functions further back. _The mind_ has\nbecome the almost exclusive subject of their speculations. Look\nat the titles of their great works since Locke\u2019s \u201c_Essay on the\nHuman Understanding--Principles of Human Knowledge--On the origin\nof our Ideas--On Sensations--Ideology, etc._\u201d The various affective\nfaculties have been left comparatively in the shade. Now, it is the\ncontrary which should have been done. Experience shows that the\naffections, the passions, the inclinations, play by far the most\nimportant part in the life of animals and even of man. Far from\nbeing the result of intelligence their \u201cspontaneous and independent\u201d\nimpulse is indispensable for the first awakening, and afterwards for\nthe development, of the various intellectual faculties. \u201cAgainst\nall evidence man has been represented as essentially reasoning, as\nbeing continually performing unaware a multitude of imperceptible\ncalculations with scarcely any spontaneity, even from tenderest\nchildhood.\u201d[184]\n\nHad the study of the psychical functions been made upon animals at\nthe same time as upon man, this error would not have lasted long. But\nphilosophers were maintained in it, on the contrary, by metaphysical\nand even theological preoccupations. The science of mental functions\nhad to establish a difference, not only of degree but of kind between\nman and animals. It was further required, by reason of another\nnecessity closely allied to the former, that the soul should be\nconsidered as being immortal. And it was consequently necessary that\nthe \u201cego\u201d should present metaphysical characteristics of unity, of\nsimplicity and of identity. Now, it is by thought that man is most\ndistinguished from animals. It is therefore from thought that the\ncharacteristics attributed to the soul or to the \u201cego\u201d have been\nborrowed.\n\nBut in fact the \u201cego\u201d is not the absolute unity which the eclectic\npsychologists say that it is. It represents the feeling which the\nsuperior living being has, at every moment of the \u201csympathies\u201d and the\n\u201csynergies\u201d which take place within the organism. It is the conscious\nexpression of what the French call to-day \u201cc\u00e9nesth\u00e9sie.\u201d Far from being\ndirectly perceived as Cousin asserts, it is the indirect product of a\nquantity of sensations and sentiments, of which the majority are not\nperceived in the normal state.[185] It is especially by pathological\nfacts, (diseases of the personality, double consciousness, lunacy,\netc.), that the attention of the scientific man is drawn to this very\ncomplex phenomenon. It is, moreover, impossible to regard the sentiment\nof the \u201cego\u201d as belonging exclusively to man. Everything leads us to\nbelieve that it also exists in the other higher animals. In any case\nthere is no metaphysical doctrine to be founded upon this exceedingly\ncomplex and very unstable sentiment. Comte is here speaking as the\nsuccessor of Hume and of Cabanis. In the clearest manner he defines\nhis opposition to Cousin\u2019s doctrine. The latter draws the whole of\nphilosophy from the analysis of the \u201c_ego_,\u201d Comte draws nothing from\nit.\n\nHe does not, however, stop to show the superiority of the positive\nmethod over theological or metaphysical method in this matter. Of what\nuse would it be? The progress of science, in the end, gets the better\nof methods which have become antiquated and barren. Metaphysicians\nhave already passed from the state of \u201cdomination\u201d to that of\n\u201cprotestation.\u201d[186] And when the positive method gets a footing in an\norder of phenomena, there is no instance in which, sooner or later, it\nhas not asserted its mastery over it.\n\n\nII.\n\nThe psychology of Comte is connected with that of Cabanis and of Gall,\nwithout, however, any actual confusion with them. He praises Cabanis\nfor having been one of the first to form a positive conception of\nintellectual and moral phenomena.[187] Cabanis set himself to show that\nthe phenomena so numerous and so varied which take place in the being\nwho lives and feels, constantly act and react upon each other. The\npsychical phenomena do not escape this law. At every moment, through\nthe medium of the nervous system, they are subject to the influence\nof the state of the whole body, and they make the body feel their own\ninfluence. Cabanis gives a great number of proofs of this, borrowed\nfrom the action of sex, of age, of temperament, of illness, etc.\nMoreover, the relation of psychical phenomena to the brain is identical\nwith that which exists between any function whatever and its organ,\nfor instance, between digestion and the stomach. According to Cabanis\nwe are not necessarily materialists because we refuse to explain the\nfunctions of feeling, and the intellectual functions by means of a\nspecial principle. First causes always escape us. Here, as elsewhere,\nthe scientific man confines himself to the observation of phenomena\nand to the search after their laws. On the other hand, if psychology\nclaimed to start from the analysis of the \u201cego,\u201d it would leave aside\nmany phenomena with which our consciousness does not acquaint us, and\nwhich are psychical nevertheless. This is a fruitful remark, which will\nbe taken up again by Maine de Biran, and which psychologists in our own\ntime have turned to great account.\n\nCabanis conceived psychical facts in a positive manner, but he did not\nattempt to construct their science. In Comte\u2019s opinion it is Gall who\nis the real founder of positive psychology. Whatever may be the value\nof his localisations--Comte does not think it an enduring one,--to Gall\nat least belongs the merit of having set the problem as it should be\nset, and of presenting a precise solution of it. Moreover Gall did not\nconfine himself to localising the different faculties in different\nparts of the brain. His doctrine proper is preceded by an excellent\ncriticism directed against the psychology usually received in the\nXVIII. century.\n\nIn order to combat Condillac, Helvetius and the ideologists, Gall takes\nhis stand upon experience, that is to say upon mental physiology and\npathology, and also upon the observation of animals. As a fact, each\nindividual comes into the world with tendencies, with predispositions,\nwith innate faculties. The supposed natural equality of all men is an\nill-founded abstraction, since their propensities and their qualities\noften differ very greatly. The paradox of Helvetius who attributes the\nmoral and intellectual inequality of men to the all powerful influence\nof education and of circumstances, cannot be upheld. We cannot, as we\nwill, make just minds and upright souls. Variety of organs entails\ndiversity of functions; the difference between men and animals, as\nthat of men among themselves, is therefore due to anatomical and\nand physiological differences. Condillac\u2019s absolute sensualism is\nthus refuted by facts. Moreover, if the science of psychology does\nnot advance it is because distinctions between the faculties of the\nsoul, (memory, imagination, judgment, etc.) have been arbitrarily\nestablished, from a metaphysical and logical point of view, which does\nnot correspond to the real speciality of the functions.\n\nGall lays down the following principle as the ultimate conclusion of\nexperience, and the fundamental basis of his doctrine of the functions\nof the brain:[188] _The dispositions of the individual soul and mind\nare innate and their manifestation depends upon the organisation_. We\nmust not see in this a return to the _a priori_ method. Gall guards\nagainst reverting to the innateness of Descartes and Leibnitz. He\nmeans to speak simply of dispositions, or tendencies, or \u201cfaculties,\u201d\nfor instance, the faculty of love, the feeling of the just and of the\nunjust, ambition, the faculty of learning languages, that of comparing\nseveral judgments or ideas, of deducing consequences from them, etc.\n\u201cWe confine ourselves,\u201d says Gall, \u201cto observation.\u201d We only consider\nthe faculties of the soul in so far as they become phenomena for us by\nmeans of the material organs. We deny and affirm nothing except that\nwhich can be brought under judgment by experience.\n\nComte assents to all this. With Gall he condemns the \u201cchildish dreams\u201d\nof Condillac and of his successors about transformed sensations[189];\nwith him he admits the speciality of the psychical functions,\ncorresponding to the speciality of the cerebral organs. But he only\nborrows Gall\u2019s principle. He has the strongest objections even to\nGall\u2019s psychology. Undoubtedly at the time when Gall lived, no one\ncould have done better, and his effort deserves to be admired. But his\nerrors, although they were inevitable, are errors none the less.\n\nIn the first place Gall was wrong in isolating the nervous system too\nmuch from the brain, which is in fact a prolongation of this system,\nas is proved by comparative anatomy.[190] Gall considered the systems\nof automatic life, of voluntary motion, and of the senses, as entirely\ndistinct from one another. He only included in the brain those nervous\norgans, which, at any rate in the most perfect animals, are the\nspecial organs of consciousness, of the instinctive aptitudes, of the\ninclinations, and of the faculties of the mind and soul. To this thesis\nComte opposes the facts assembled by Cabanis, and the solidarity of all\nthe elements in the living being. The brain can neither be isolated\nfrom the rest of the nervous system, nor the nervous system from the\nrest of the organism.\n\nAgain, Gall multiplies the faculties in an arbitrary manner. He had\nestablished 27 of them. Spurzheim carried this number to 35, and\nothers have further increased it. Every phrenologist will soon create\na function, and its organ, whenever it may seem opportune to him,\nwith as much facility as ideologists and psychologists construct\nentities.[191] These creations are nearly always extremely clumsy.\nThus an innate \u201cmathematical aptitude\u201d has been established. Why not\nalso a chemical, an anatomical aptitude, etc.? And this mathematical\naptitude is manifested by the facility for executing calculations. But\nthe mathematical mind, far from being an isolated and special aptitude,\npresents all the varieties which the human mind can offer by the\ndifferent combinations of really elementary faculties. For instance,\nsome great geometers have especially excelled by the sagacity of their\ninventions, others by the extent of their combinations, others again\nby the genius of language and the institution of signs and so on. From\nthis point of view, well drawn up monographies of great scientific\nmen and great artists would be extremely precious for the progress of\npsychology.\n\nIn conclusion, \u201cfundamental phrenological analysis\u201d must be\nreconstructed. From Gall, Comte only preserves \u201cthe impulsion.\u201d The\ngreater part of the localisations which Gall thought right to establish\nmust be abandoned. But he was right in searching for them, for thus he\nshowed science the path to be followed. Even an erroneous hypothesis\non positive lines is always a service rendered in the beginnings of\na science. But of Gall\u2019s doctrine only two principles henceforth\nindisputable subsist. 1st, the innateness of the various fundamental\ndispositions, be they affective or intellectual; 2nd, the plurality of\nfaculties distinct and independent of one another, \u201calthough effective\nactions usually demand their more or less complex co-operation.\u201d These\ntwo principles are moreover the two correlative and interdependent\naspects of the same conception, which is in accordance with what\n\u201ccommon sense\u201d has always thought of human nature. It corresponds to\nthe division of the brain, from the anatomical point of view into a\ncertain number of partial organs, at once independent and depending\nupon one another. To establish and to demonstrate the detail of this\ncorrespondence is the object of \u201cphrenological physiology.\u201d\n\n\nIII.\n\nComte took up the attempt where Gall had failed. But his doctrine\npassed through two successive forms. He himself calls attention to the\nimportance and to the causes of this change.\n\nIn 1837, when he was writing the third volume of the _Cours de\nphilosophie positive_, he still closely followed not only Gall\u2019s\ngeneral conception, but also his anatomical and physiological\nhypotheses. He then thought that \u201cthe doctrine deduced by Gall from the\nmethod represents the true moral and intellectual nature of man and\nanimals with admirable fidelity.\u201d He approved of the division of the\nfaculties into the affective and the intellectual, the organs of the\nformer occupying the whole of the posterior and middle regions of the\nbrain, and the organs of the others occupying only the anterior region\nof the brain, that is to say, a quarter or a sixth of the cephalic\nmass, \u201cwhich at once re-establishes the pre-eminence of the affective\nfaculties upon a scientific basis.\u201d He even accepted the sub-division\nof these faculties into inclinations and feelings, and that of the\nintellectual faculties into perceptive faculties and reflective\nfaculties.\n\nAt this moment, his objections were especially directed against the\nexcessive multiplication of the faculties, and upon the insufficiency\nof the anatomy of the brain which accompanied the distinction of so\nmany faculties. He thought the anatomists were right in protesting\nagainst this method of the phrenologists who, from the supposed\nexistence of an irreducible faculty, assume the existence of a\ncorresponding organ in the brain. But anatomy cannot thus be treated\n_a priori_. As the aim of every biological theory is to establish an\nexact harmony between anatomical analysis and physiological analysis,\nthis evidently supposes that they are not exactly modelled upon one\nanother, and that each one of them has been worked out in a distinct\nmanner. We must then take up the analysis of the cerebral apparatus\nagain, provisionally setting aside all idea of function, or at least\nonly making use of it as an auxiliary in anatomical research.[192]\n\nIn 1851, in the first volume of the _Politique positive_, Comte\u2019s\nattitude is quite different. In Gall\u2019s psychology he no longer\nrecognises anything but what is of historical interest. His own\nconception of psychology is completely altered. This great change has\nbeen determined by the foundation of sociology.\n\nUndoubtedly Gall\u2019s merit remains very great, for he rendered a\nservice of the first order in daring to construct a positive theory\nof the intellectual and moral functions. Without this theory, which\nat first he considered to be exact in its general lines, Comte could\nnot have undertaken to apply the positive method to social facts,\nnor consequently to found his philosophy. So his gratitude to Gall\nis almost as great as to Condorcet, \u201chis spiritual father.\u201d But once\nsociology is founded, in looking back, Comte understands that Gall\u2019s\n\u201ccerebral theory\u201d cannot be maintained. It resembles a provisional\nbridge by means of which positive philosophy passed over the interval\nwhich separates biology proper from sociology. Hardly has it reached\nthe other side when the bridge collapses. It matters little: it\nsuffices that, thanks to the bridge, Comte should have set foot upon\nthe sociological ground. He can now return in all security to the\nstudy of the mental functions. \u201cWhen I had founded sociology,\u201d he says,\n\u201cI understood at last that Gall\u2019s genius had been unable to construct\na real physiology of the brain, owing to the lack of a knowledge of\nthe laws of collective evolution, which alone must furnish at once its\nprinciple and its end. From that time I felt that this task, which\nbefore I expected biologists to accomplish, belonged to the second part\nof my own philosophical career.\u201d[193]\n\nThe psychology, which, in the _Cours de philosophie positive_, was\nessentially biological, and ended simply in sociology, becomes, in the\n_Politique positive_ essentially sociological, and is only secondarily\nbiological. From 1846 Comte became conscious of this new orientation of\nhis thought, and, during the five years which follow, he never ceases\nworking at his \u201ccerebral table.\u201d\n\nAt first, he no longer demands an anatomical study parallel to the\nanalysis of the mental functions, and independent of it. He intends,\nhenceforth, to determine these functions outside all anatomical\nresearch. \u201cThe logical principle of this construction consists, for\nme, in its subjective institution.\u201d He systematically subordinates\nanatomy to physiology, and he henceforth conceives the determination\nof the cerebral organs as the complement, and even as the result, of\nthe positive study of the intellectual and moral functions. At bottom,\n\u201cthis subject has never allowed of any other method but the subjective,\nwell or ill employed.\u201d It has been equally used by the disciples of\nGall and by his adversaries. What psychology has lacked up to the\npresent is, not exact localisations but a sufficiently deep analysis\nof intellectual and moral phenomena. And as a matter of fact it was\nimpossible to treat this problem well, so long as we ignored the laws\nof sociology, \u201cwhich alone is capable of dealing with these noble\nfunctions.\u201d[194]\n\nThus, in order to determine the elementary faculties, those which\nare irreducible, and which by their co-operation produce the complex\nphenomena which are apprehended by consciousness, the method must be\nat once subjective and sociological. For the subject which we must\nanalyse is not the individual consciousness, of which the study is too\ninaccessible, and whose life is too short: it is the universal subject,\n_humanity_, \u201cthe case of the species being alone sufficiently developed\nto characterise the various functions.\u201d To this analysis, as a system\nof control, will be joined the observation of animals. Indeed, all our\ninnate dispositions belong also to the other superior animals. If then\nthe study of man should seem to establish elementary, moral, or even\nintellectual functions, of which we see no trace in these animals, by\nthis alone we should consider that the analysis has been imperfect,\nand that complex results have been considered as irreducible.\n\u201c_Sociological inspiration controlled by zoological appreciation_: such\nis the general principle of the positive theory of the soul.\u201d[195]\n\nBy this method Comte obtains 18 irreducible faculties, of which 10 are\nrepresentative of the heart, 5 of the mind, and 3 of the character. To\neach of these he assigns a special organ. He places the organ of the\nheart in the posterior portion of the brain and in the cerebellum, the\norgans of the mind in the anterior portion of the brain, and those of\ncharacter in the intermediary region. Anatomists are free to verify _a\nposteriori_ the separation of the 18 elements which Comte distinguished\n_a priori_ in the cerebral apparatus. The existence of these organs,\nin any case, appears to him to be sufficiently demonstrated, and\nanatomical determination is not very important. We might confine\nourselves to the specification of the number and the situation of the\norgans, which we have deduced from the number and relations of the\nelementary functions. It would not be necessary for us to know their\nshape or their size. The utility of cerebral localisations resembles\nthat which geometers draw from curves for the better consideration\nof equations.[196] The organ is simply the static equivalent of the\nfunction of the soul. It suffices for us to know its existence and\nits position so as to situate in it all the relations of the function\nitself, so to speak. It plays the part of a schematic drawing.\n\nSo, the theory of the brain and of the soul is no longer\n\u201csimultaneous.\u201d In fact, the theory of the soul is first constructed by\na subjective and independent method and without any consideration of\nthe disposition of the cerebral apparatus. This disposition is deduced,\nafterwards, from the theory of the soul, once it is established.\n\nReturning then to Gall\u2019s psychology, Comte can explain its defects\nto himself. Gall had \u201coscillated between subjective inspiration and\nobjective tendencies,\u201d without adopting a systematic plan. There has\nnot been any very great disadvantage in this empirical fluctuation\nin what concerns the theory of the affective functions. Without a\ndoubt, Gall had established an ill-founded distinction between the\ninclinations and the feelings. But he could not be mistaken concerning\nthe fundamental inclinations of human nature. In default of the true\nmethod, he was supported on this point by common wisdom, and by the\nobservation of animals. It is on the subject of the intellectual\nfunctions that he is entirely wrong, because here this twofold help\nfailed him, and nothing, in this case, filled the place of the true\nmethod which was then unknown. In order to discover the static and\ndynamic laws of the intellect, it was necessary to abandon the\nbiological point of view. To Gall\u2019s theory Comte then substitutes a new\nclassification of the intellectual functions. He distinguishes between\nthe faculties of conception and the faculties of expression. He\nindicates the relations of the intellectual functions proper with the\naffective functions and the functions of motion. He makes us apprehend\nthe very intimate relations which connect desire and will. Finally, to\ndetermine the fundamental intellectual functions, he takes into account\nthe historical evolution of the human species.\n\nIt does not enter into the purpose of this work to set forth Comte\u2019s\ntheory in detail, and to examine the eighteen irreducible faculties\nof the cerebral table one by one. But the systematic character of\nthe doctrine does not prevent us from taking up a certain number of\ninteresting and deep psychological views in it. To limit ourselves to\na few examples, Comte drew imitation near to habit, and he brought\nhabit itself back \u201cto the great cosmological law of persistence,\u201d\nwhich, in the vital order is modified by the intermittance of\nphenomena.[197] He remarked that attention is never produced without an\naffective phenomenon upon which it depends.[198] He also indicated the\ndistinction between strong states and weak states, and the \u201creduction\u201d\nof images by actual perceptions. \u201cIf our images could offer as much\nintensity, he says, as our external sensations, our mental state would\nnot allow of any consistency. The appreciation of what is without would\nbe troubled by this conflict with what is within....\u201d Hence a theory of\nhallucination and insanity.[199]\n\nThe theory of perception which Comte opposes to the abstract sensualism\nof the ideologists is allied to his general conception of the relations\nbetween the subject and the object. Our internal operations are never\nanything but the direct or indirect prolongation of our external\nimpressions. But \u201creciprocally, the latter are always complicated\nby the others, even in the most elementary cases.\u201d The sensation,\nwhich appears simple, is already the result of a very complex\ncombination.[200] For no sensations are really perceived except after\nreiterated impressions. If the mind is ever passive, it can only be the\nfirst time. For the second, it is already prepared by the preceding\none, combined with the whole of previous acquisitions. And Comte\ninsists upon \u201cthe habitual participation of reasoning in the operations\nwhich are attributed to sensation alone.\u201d The activity belonging to the\nmind enters into all its actions, even the smallest of them.\n\nMental pathology scarcely exists, owing to the lack of the scientific\nspirit among specialists for the diseases of the mind. Still if\nBroussais\u2019 principle be true, that is to say, if morbid phenomena are\nproduced according to the same laws which govern normal phenomena,\nwhat advantage might not scientific men derive from the observation of\nmental diseases? They are privileged cases which nature supplies for\nthem, real experiments, where that which is inseparable in the normal\nstate appears disassociated. What light might be thrown by this means\nupon many physiological and even anatomical questions, in particular\nin what concerns the sentiment of the _ego_ (diseases of personality,\naboulia, etc.), and the faculties of expression, isolated from the\nfaculties of conception (diseases of speech).\n\nAnimal psychology would not be less instructive. All the affective\nand intellectual faculties are common to men and higher animals, save\nperhaps the highest intellectual aptitudes. Even this exception is\na doubtful one, if without prejudice we compare the actions of the\nhighest animals with those of the least developed savages. We should\nstudy the habits and the mind of wild animals. We should observe the\nchanges which are produced in them by domestication. Here again almost\neverything has to be done afresh.[201]\n\n\nIV.\n\nIn spite of whatever may have been said, Comte then has a psychology.\nAnd, what is more, this psychology is in a sense not far removed\nfrom that of the Scottish school and of the Eclectics although he\nso much fought against their methods. The points of contact are\nnumerous and important. In both doctrines the psychical phenomena are\nreferred to faculties and these are represented as \u201cdispositions,\u201d\ninnate \u201cproperties.\u201d In both, the essential psychological problem\nappears to be the determination of the number and the relations of\nthese faculties, whose action variously combined produces psychical\nphenomena: before everything, it is a question of not considering as\nan elementary faculty that which as a matter of fact results from the\ncombination of several faculties, or inversely. Finally in both, it is\nclaimed to establish this doctrine of the innate faculties upon the\nobservation of human nature.\n\nComte himself had seen that, at any rate in the case of Condillac\u2019s\ncriticism, he was in accordance with the eclectics. On this point he\nonly refused to grant them originality. According to him they merely\npopularised, in obscure and emphatic declamations, what physiologists\nlike Charles Bonnet, Cabanis, and chiefly Gall and Spurzheim had long\nbefore stated on this subject in a far clearer and especially in a far\nmore exact manner. For his part Garnier, the author of the _Trait\u00e9\ndes Facult\u00e9s de l\u2019\u00e2me_ had clearly seen the relations of eclecticism\nto Gall\u2019s doctrine, and had studied them in a work entitled _De la\nPhr\u00e9nologie et de la Psychologie compar\u00e9es_ which appeared in 1839.\n\nWhy then does Comte attack the eclectics with such persistence and\nsuch violence, if, indeed, the results of his psychology are not very\nfar removed from what they say?--It is because in reality, beneath the\napparent resemblance of doctrine, a difference of method as serious\nas can be conceived is concealed. For Cousin, and especially for the\nCousin we know before 1830, psychology is not an end in itself. It\nis a means which he uses to rise to the study of being in itself and\nof the Absolute. The \u201cego\u201d which he analyses is independent of the\norganism. This is what Comte condemns as a retrogression. \u201cSome men,\nnot recognizing the present and irrevocable direction of the human\nmind, have endeavoured for ten years to transplant German metaphysics\ninto our midst, and to constitute, _under the name of psychology_,\na so-called science entirely independent of physiology, superior\nto it, and to which should exclusively belong the study of moral\nphenomena.\u201d[202] And this attempt at reaction takes place at the very\nmoment when the works of Cabanis and of Gall have brought this study\nupon the positive path!\n\nIt is needless to say that, in Comte\u2019s system, psychical phenomena are\nsubordinated, as far as their conditions of existence are concerned,\nto all the orders of more general natural phenomena. Comte should then\nhave followed Cabanis and Gall, as a matter of course. But he thought\nthat to establish the science of the \u201ctranscendent functions,\u201d the\nbiological point of view was insufficient. In this case anatomical\nconsiderations are only a kind of reduplication and transcription\nof physiological considerations. As Maine de Biran said, in terms\ncuriously like Comte\u2019s, \u201ca distinction of places assigned to the\nexercise of each faculty must necessarily be itself referred to another\npre-established division of the faculties.... Hypothesis thus grafted\nupon hypothesis of a different order would not much contribute to throw\nlight upon the analysis of our intellectual functions.\u201d[203] Only,\ninstead of appealing, like Maine de Biran, to reflection, Comte rises\nfrom the biological to the sociological point of view He recognises\nthat the subjective method alone is suitable for the science of\npsychical phenomena, but, in place of the _metaphysical subjective\nmethod_, by means of which the \u201c_ego_\u201d is deluded into the belief that\nit analyses its operations, and grasps its own activity, he will make\nuse of the _positive subjective method_. The subject which he will\nanalyse will be the human mind, or better, the human soul considered\nin its continuous evolution, that is to say in its religions, in its\nsciences, in its philosophy, in its language and in its art. Here is\nmatter for a psychology which will no longer be chimerical, but real,\nwhich will be positive, in a word, like the biology upon which it\ndepends and of which it is the fulfilment.\n\nIf we leave aside the conception of the \u201cfaculties\u201d which Comte\naccepted rather hastily at the hands of the Scottish school and of\nGall, and the \u201ccerebral table\u201d which he believed to be once for all\nconstructed, his psychology contained more than one important and\nfertile seed. To the eclectic psychology, which is not positive,\nComte substituted two sciences which are such. In the first place,\nan experimental science of the psychical phenomena studied in their\nrelation to their organic conditions: it is the physiological\npsychology of which no one to-day questions the legitimacy. Then,\nby the introduction of the sociological point of view, Comte opened\nthe way to a whole series of studies which begin to be developed,\n(social psychology, ethnical psychology, psychology of the masses,\netc). It is often said that sociological laws have their foundation in\npsychological laws. But the reverse is no less true. The psychological\nlaws, at least the mental and moral laws, are, at the same time,\nsociological laws, since they are only revealed in the study of the\nintellectual history of the human species. \u201cWe must not explain\nhumanity by man, but man by humanity.\u201d To the \u201c\u03a4\u03b3\u03bd\u1ff6\u03b8\u03b9 \u03c3\u03b5\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u201d of\nancient psychology, the positive method substitutes this precept: \u201cTo\nknow yourself, know history.\u201d Man only becomes conscious of himself,\nwhen he becomes aware of his place in the evolution of Humanity.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[180] Correspondance de Comte, et de John Stuart Mill, p. 162 (27\nf\u00e9vrier 1843.) p. 365 (21 oct. 1844).\n\n[181] Pol. pos., IV, Appendix, p. 218.\n\n[182] Lettres \u00e0 Valat, p. 89-91.\n\n[183] Cours, III. 614-16.\n\n[184] Cours, III, 618-19.\n\n[185] Cours, III, 601-2; 621-22.\n\n[186] Cours, III, 611.\n\n[187] Lettres \u00e0 Valat, p. 134 (8 septembre 1824).\n\n[188] Cours, III, 631-2.--Gall, Anatomie and physiologie du syst\u00e8me\nnerveux, Paris 1810, II, 6-7.\n\n[189] Cours, III, 626-7.\n\n[190] Cours, III, 666-8.\n\n[191] Cours, III, 654-5.\n\n[192] Cours, III, 15-26.\n\n[193] Pol. pos., I, 729.\n\n[194] Pol. pos., I, 671-2.\n\n[195] Pol. pos., I, 672-3.\n\n[196] Pol. pos., I, 731-2.\n\n[197] Cours, III, 596-8; Pol. pos. I, 598-9.\n\n[198] Pol. pos. I, 727.\n\n[199] Pol. pos. II, 383.\n\n[200] Pol. pos. I, 712-14.\n\n[201] Cours, III, 660.\n\n[202] Pol. pos., IV, Appendice, p. 218.\n\n[203] Maine de Biran, _\u0153uvres in\u00e9dites_ (\u00e9d. Cousin), II, 55-58.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK III\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nTHE TRANSITION FROM ANIMALITY TO HUMANITY.\n\nART AND LANGUAGE\n\n\nOf the philosophers who flourished before the rise of the positive\ndoctrine, the greater number assumed as a postulate in the comparative\nstudy of man and animals, that there was between them a difference of\nnature, and not merely one of degree. Whatever fundamental difference\nbe attributed to reason, language, moral sense, religion, etc., the\n\u201chuman kingdom\u201d is conceived for the most part as superior to the\nanimal kingdom and as clearly separated from it. Taking their stand\nupon an analysis of the present state of the human conscience, those\nphilosophers recognise an order of \u201cmoral realities,\u201d to which animals\nhave no access. Thus they give to the science of Man a privileged\nobject which separates it from the group of the natural sciences.\n\nThe positive method admits neither this postulate, nor the consequences\nwhich are drawn from it. In general this method is characterised by the\nsubstitution of the objective to the anthropocentric point of view, and\nalso by the substitution of observation to imagination. It does not\nsuddenly change its orientation when it comes to the study of man. The\npositive method is not therefore concerned with knowing what idea man\nforms of himself to-day and of his relations with other living beings.\nInto this idea enter elements of religious and metaphysical origin,\nwhose presence is explained by historical reasons. The question is to\nobserve the nature of man in his _real_ relations with other beings.\nMan, so considered, at once takes his place again at the top of the\nzoological scale.\n\nThe problem will then be set in the following terms: Given that man is\nincluded in the animal series, of which he is the highest term, but\nstill a term, to account for the differences which to-day place him\nso high above the term immediately below him. This is taking the very\nreverse attitude of nearly all the philosophers, whose main difficulty\nis to give an account of the likenesses which exist between man and\nanimals. It is the position which Darwin will take in his _Descent of\nMan_.\n\nComte takes his stand upon two postulates. The first affirms the\nfundamental identity of the essential functions in man and animals.\nSince the whole of the moral and intellectual functions constitutes the\nnecessary complement of animal life properly so-called, it would be\ndifficult to conceive that all those functions which are fundamental\nshould not, by this very fact be \u201ccommon, at various degrees, to\nall the higher animals, and perhaps even to the entire group of the\nvertebrata.\u201d[204] The animal functions are as a blossoming out of\norganic life, destined in the first place to make this life more\nperfect and more complex: in the same way, the intellectual and moral\nfunctions are, originally, as it were, another blossoming out of animal\nlife, and must consequently be found, at least as a possibility,\nwherever animal life has reached a certain degree of development.\n\nThis postulate, according to Comte, is sufficiently established\nby biology, by means of the comparative method. All the principal\ncharacteristics which pride and ignorance set up as absolute privileges\nof our species, also appear, more or less rudimentary, in the majority\nof the higher animals.[205] The mistake was made because metaphysical\nideology and psychology place intelligence foremost in the study of\npsychical functions. Intelligence indeed puts to-day an immense\ndistance between man and animals. But a more accurate psychology\nrecognises that the most energetic, the most \u201cfundamental\u201d of mental\nfunctions are the affective functions, since, in default of the\nimpulse given by them, intelligence itself would not be developed. The\nanalogy between man and the animals at once appears: for the affective\nfunctions are common to them both. It is the same with the intellectual\nfunctions, when allowance is made for the development they have assumed\nin man. In a word, if the dynamical superiority of the human species\nover the other species is strong, its statical superiority is weak.\nThe problem consists in finding how, to such an apparently unimportant\ndifference in the organs, such a considerable difference in the\nfunctions corresponds.[206]\n\nHere comes in the second postulate: \u201cThe fundamental constitution of\nman is invariable.\u201d _Evolution but not transformation_: this great\nprinciple, transmitted by biology to sociology, dominates the latter\nscience entirely. In the course of the long history which leads\nhumanity from savage animality to positive civilisation,[207] nothing\nabsolutely new appears. Everything which manifests itself little by\nlittle, pre-existed in the nature of man--in a potential state it is\ntrue; and this state would perhaps never have ceased if a number of\nfavourable conditions had not occurred together.\n\nThe mental functions, which are indispensable to organic and to\nanimal life properly so called, quickly attained the degree of\ndevelopment without which the species would have disappeared. On\nthe contrary, the highest \u201cfundamental dispositions\u201d of our nature\nremained latent for a long time, and only manifested themselves by\ndegrees. But if their development has been slow, it is, in return,\ncontinuous and indefinite. And these dispositions tend to preponderate,\nalthough the \u201cinversion\u201d of the primitive economy can never become\ncomplete. Humanity emerges progressively from animality. The highest\ncivilization is then, at bottom, entirely in conformity with nature:\nfor it is only the manifestation more and more marked of the most\ncharacteristic properties of our species. In this sense, our social\nsolution must be understood \u201cas the extreme term of a progression\ncontinued uninterruptedly throughout the whole living kingdom from the\nmost simple forms of vegetable life, the predominance of the organic\nfunctions becoming less and less exclusive, in order in the first place\nto make room for the predominance of the animal functions properly so\ncalled, and finally for that of the intellectual and moral functions,\nwhose development is the very definition of humanity.\u201d[208]\n\nThus, the chain of being is uninterrupted. But Comte, as we know,\ndid not accept Lamarck\u2019s hypothesis. He believed in the fixity of\nspecies. Undoubtedly he admits in a measure which science will some\nday fix, acquisitions slowly incorporated into organisms by heredity.\nBut he does not think that they will go so far as to transform\nspecies. The whole evolution of man must then be explained by its\noriginal constitution. Indeed, Comte here maintains, as everywhere\nin nature, the perfect correspondence between the statical and the\ndynamical point of view. The case of man cannot be an exception to this\nencyclop\u00e6dic law, which is verified in all the orders of phenomena from\nthe most simple to the most complex. As the whole line of the curve\ncorresponds to the equation, so the whole development of humanity must\ncorrespond to the \u201cfundamental nature\u201d of man. On this condition alone\nis sociology possible as a science. Now positive sociology exists:\ntherefore the postulate is justified.\n\n\nII.\n\nThe theory of the relation between man and animals thus finds itself\ndeduced from the general principles of positive philosophy. But it can\nalso be verified _a posteriori_, through the criticism of the arguments\nof the adverse theory by means of observation and experience.\n\nThe first of these arguments and the one which in general makes the\ngreatest impression, contrasts the instinct of animals with the\nintelligence of man. It represents instinct as blind and fatal, and\nintelligence as free and progressive. But this antithesis cannot\nwithstand the examination of facts. Instinct is called too hastily\na \u201cfatal tendency of animals to the mechanical execution of actions\nwhich are uniformly determined by corresponding circumstances, and not\nrequiring nor even admitting of any education properly so-called.\u201d This\nfatal tendency does not exist. It is a gratuitous supposition, perhaps\na remnant of the Cartesian theory concerning the automatism of animals.\nGeorges Leroy, in his charming _Lettres sur les animaux_, has shown\nthat in the mammals and in the birds of our districts, the fixity in\nthe construction of habitations, in the habits of hunting, in the mode\nof migration, etc., only existed for naturalists who never left their\nstudy, or for inattentive observers.[209]\n\nUndoubtedly, habits may become hereditary. But here we only have a\nphenomenon common to men and animals, and those habits are modified\nif the circumstances which have produced them come to change.\nIt is in this sense alone that we can admit M. de Blainville\u2019s\nformula: \u201cL\u2019instinct est la raison fix\u00e9e, la raison est l\u2019instinct\nmobile.\u201d We must especially understand that instinct is not opposed\nto intelligence. What ought we really to indicate by instinct? A\nspontaneous impulse in a direction determined, independently of any\nforeign influence.\u201d But in this sense, the word applies to the activity\nof any faculty whatever, to the intellectual faculties as well as to\nthe others. There is no contrast between instinct and intelligence.\nWe say of a child that he has the \u201cinstinct\u201d of music, of drawing, of\ncalculation, etc. In this sense man has certainly as many and more\ninstincts than animals. If, on the other hand, we call intelligence the\nfaculty of modifying our conduct according to the circumstances of each\ncase, animals are, like man, more or less intelligent and reasonable.\nOtherwise they would be doomed to disappear very quickly.\n\nBut animals have no language! Another error in observation. The higher\nanimals have a certain degree of language corresponding to the nature\nand to the extent of their relations. This language is no more fixed\nthan the so-called instincts. The language of each social species is\ncharacterised by an arrest of development precisely like the society\nwhich this species tended to found. The limits of its progress, beyond\nwhich indeed it does not go, result from the whole of the obstacles\nwhich it encounters, in consequence of the competition with the other\nspecies, and particularly with the human species, without naming those\nlimits which the imperfection of organs may create.[210]\n\nMany animals are capable of experiencing needs without regard to a\nuseful purpose. For instance, they like to exercise their animal\nfunctions for the pleasure of doing so, that is to say, to play. Some\namong them experience \u00e6sthetic impressions. They are also, without\nthe slightest doubt, capable of altruistic feelings. Sometimes these\nfeelings show themselves in the shape of domestic affection, and tend\nto make a solitary life unbearable to the individual. Family life then\nbecomes permanent. Sometimes an animal devotes itself to the service of\na superior race. Do we know to what lengths the progress of altruism\nwould go in certain animal species, if their intelligence could have\nbeen more developed, and if their surroundings had allowed of their\nmore extensive social progress?[211]\n\nFinally, animals even possess a rudiment of religion, if by this we\nunderstand an endeavour to interpret the phenomena which strike them.\nWhen sufficiently developed to manifest, where there is sufficient\nleisure, a certain speculative activity, they reach spontaneously,\nin the same way as we do ourselves, a kind of low fetichism, which\nconsists in supposing that external bodies are animated by will and\nby passions.[212] \u201cA child, a savage, a dog, a monkey, seeing a watch\nfor the first time, will see in it a kind of animal.\u201d But Comte at\nonce adds that the chief difference between man and animals lies in\nthe impossibility for the latter to emerge from the lowest degree of\nfetichism, and to rise to a real religion. No animal society \u201ccombines\nsociability with intelligence sufficiently ever to constitute a\nreligious association.\u201d[213] Comte would probably have approved of M.\nde. Quatrefages\u2019 definition in which he calls man a religious animal.\nThe decisive step was taken on the day when man\u2019s intellect passed from\nfetichism to astrolatry.[214] That \u201cgreat creation of the gods\u201d was the\nfirst trial in purely speculative activity made by his mind. The whole\nsubsequent development of humanity arose from this.\n\nThus, the arguments which claim to establish an insuperable distance\nbetween man and animals, generally rest upon imperfectly observed\nfacts. On the contrary, in animals, we find the more or less visible\nrudiments of everything which has evolved so magnificently in humanity.\nWe cannot describe in detail how and why this species has become, so\nto speak, incomparable and incommensurable with the others. It must\nhave got the upperhand, not in virtue of this and that particular\nadvantage, (although an important one), such as the upright position or\nthe possession of a hand, but on account of the co-operation of many\nfavourable conditions, of which the totality allowed, so to speak, of\nan almost indefinite development. From a certain moment, there was a\ndefinite stoppage in the social evolution of the other species, and\nthe progress of the human species was decisive. We cannot estimate the\ninitial influence of the various conditions according to the present\ndevelopment of the several human faculties, for this development is\nespecially due to the social life of which those conditions allowed.\nEach superiority of man may have been very little defined originally.\nTime, the action of the other higher functions, exercise, heredity\nhave played their part here. The \u201chuman attributes\u201d must then have\ngrown constantly, ever consolidating the \u201cascendency\u201d which they had\ndetermined. At the same time the corresponding attributes must have\ndiminished in the rival species, as they were brought to a standstill\nin their development. Undoubtedly, by degrees, the interval has widened\nuntil it has become a gap so broad and so deep as to make it impossible\nto imagine how it could ever have been crossed. But biology and\nsociology help us to judge better. We must see this, in some detail, in\nconnection with the important question of language.\n\n\nIII.\n\nThe theory of language, during the eighteenth century, had been one of\nthe favourite subjects of philosophical speculation; in general, it\nhad proceeded in this matter, by way of abstract and logical analysis.\nIt chiefly saw in language a product of the intellectual faculties of\nman. But, already, from the second half of the century, this conception\nhad been attacked in Germany by the school which began the reaction\nagainst the \u201cphilosophers,\u201d and in which the most illustrious name\nis that of Herder. In France the traditionalist school felt that here\none of the weak points of the philosophy of the eighteenth century\nwas being touched. It insisted upon the characters of language which\nthis philosophy did not explain. Comte knew the works of this school,\nand, in particular, those of M. de Bonald, whom he calls an \u201cenergetic\nthinker.\u201d[215] But his method differs from theirs, and he only agrees\nwith them in the critical part of their doctrine.\n\nIf the theory of language, says Comte, is encumbered with insoluble\nquestions, the fault lies in the method made use of by the\nmetaphysicians. They have only considered man\u2019s language, in its state\nof highest complication. They have attributed excessive importance to\nthe signs of articulate human language, they have exaggerated the part\nplayed by reflection, and misunderstood that of spontaneity. Condillac\nespecially and his school attributed far too much importance to the\n\u201cdisponibilit\u00e9\u201d of signs.[216] The scientific method will not isolate\nhumanity from the other species which it dominates. It will connect\nthe positive study of language with biology and with sociology: with\nbiology more particularly for the question of origin; with sociology\nin so far as the development of language depends upon the reaction of\nsocial life upon domestic life.\n\nThe starting-point of the theory is a fact of experience. Every\nstrong emotion is accompanied by the impulse to manifest it, and\nthis expression reacts upon the emotion itself. Many species exhibit\nthis.[217] Singing and mimicking, or rather cries and gestures, are\noften used by them, as by man, not only to relieve the passions,\nbut to excite them more. For instance, anger in carnivorous animals\ngrows to exasperation, through the external signs which the animal\ngives of it. Comte is in accordance with the observations of Bell\nand of Gratiolet. The movements which co-operate in expression, he\nsays, coincide in general with those which are made use of in action.\nMoreover, in the human species, for the most part, the individual\nexpresses his affections in order to satisfy them better, by inducing\nhis fellow-creatures to second him. It is an appeal to sympathy. If\nthen the expression results from the feeling, it tends, conversely\nto develop and to consolidate it. The origin of language is thus\naffective, that is to say _\u00e6sthetic_, since \u201cwe only express ourselves\nafter having felt strongly.\u201d Language therefore translates feelings\nbefore thoughts, and this is what the followers of the ideologist\ntheory did not see. Even to-day, in our most developed language, we can\nstill trace this origin. It reveals itself by the musical accent of the\nslightest speech. Expression is always inspired and maintained by some\naffection, even in cases where it is apparently limited to a simple\nscientific or technical exposition. The affective source of language,\ndissimulated as it is by the intellectual operations of which it is the\ninstrument, reveals itself in the inflexions of the voice.\n\nLanguage is made up of signs. According to what has just been said,\nnatural signs are spontaneously produced by the play of the emotions.\nAs a voluntary manifestation language is always artificial. The\ninvoluntary signs have been gradually divided into their component\nparts and simplified, while remaining intelligible. All artificial\nsigns, says Comte, even in our species, spring from a voluntary\n\u201cimitation\u201d of the natural signs which are spontaneously produced. In\nthis way both the formation and the interpretation of these signs are\nexplained.[218]\n\nHobbes used to define a sign as a constant relation between two\nphenomena, seen by the subject. The two phenomena are here a state\nof consciousness and a motion. Sometimes the state of consciousness\ndetermines the motion, sometimes the motion causes the reappearance\nof the state of consciousness. The institution of a system of signs\nis a means of \u201cconnecting the within with the without.\u201d Language is\nthus for man a means of making the series of his intellectual states\nparticipate in the regularity which characterises external order. The\nlogical function of language therefore springs from its very essence\nin which the phenomena of the objective world and the phenomena\nwhich belong to the feeling and thinking subject are joined. It is\nequivalent to a system for rendering the mental life objective.[219]\nBeing thus made objective, these phenomena can henceforth be preserved\nand communicated, without man or the animals having had each an end\nin view, since the institution of the first signs is involuntary, and\narises from \u201cthe combination between the muscular and nervous systems.\u201d\nExternal order here acts as a regulator, even before thought has\ngrasped it.\n\nThe signs which are spontaneously produced are not all transformed into\nvoluntary signs. Those which appeal to sight or to hearing present\nspecial advantages for this use, and as a matter of fact, the two\nclasses of signs are concurrently used by the higher animals. Gestures\nand cries are the origin of what later becomes the system of artificial\nsigns. By degrees, the communication of emotions gives way to the\nexpression of thoughts. Among very civilised populations it even came\nto be believed that song had come from speech. But, on the contrary,\nspeech came from song. To be convinced of this a glance at the animal\nworld is sufficient.\n\nUp to this point the theory of language has been biological, and the\nacquired facts can thus be summed up: 1, Man does not express his\nthought in order to communicate it, but he communicates because he\nexpresses it. 2, What is first expressed is emotion, not thought.\nBy degrees language becomes intellectualized, as the mental life\nitself. 3, Expression is spontaneous and primary. It arises from the\nrelation between the nervous and muscular systems. In the progressive\ntransformation where, from being involuntary, the signs gradually\nbecome voluntary, they are at once causes and effects.\n\nThe essential condition for this transformation to take place is\nsocial life. Undoubtedly, language appears very quickly, as soon as\nindividuals of the same species find themselves in constant relations\nwith one another. Each one learns to attribute the character of signs\nto the movements which accompany his emotions. Similar beings in whom\nthe same phenomena take place, become equally capable of interpreting\nthose signs. From this moment a language is born; and this is true for\nthe animal species as for man. But human evolution follows an evolution\nwhich is peculiar to itself, and which determines that of language. Our\nlanguage would not have far exceeded the period in which it especially\nexpresses emotions, if human societies had remained purely domestic\ngroupings, without any other organisation than that of the family. \u201cThe\ninstitution of human language,\u201d says Comte, \u201cappears, in sociology, as\nthe chief continuous instrument of the necessary reaction of political\nupon domestic life.\u201d[220]\n\nHenceforth we can picture to ourselves, in its broad outlines, the\nprehistoric evolution of language. Originally it comprised gestures\nand cries. Gestures predominated in the first place as being more\nimmediately expressive. By degrees they took a second place. As the\nnatural signs became divided up so as to become artificial, the\nsuperiority of vocal signs appeared. Among other reasons it was due\nto the \u201cspontaneous correspondence\u201d between the voice and hearing\nwhich allows everyone to develop his own education. We hear young\nchildren practising for long hours, playing with the articulate sounds\nwhich they begin to emit. From this more or less organised singing,\nstill a melody of vocal signs, poetry was born. Finally from poetry,\nmuch later, springs, what is commonly called prose, that is, the\nuse of non-rhythmic phrases. Three great evolutions in the history\nof humanity: how many centuries have not been required for their\naccomplishment!\n\nWriting is to drawing what speaking is to singing. Originally it\nwas not an artifice invented to help vocal language. Here again the\nideological theory aggravates the part played by reflection. Man was\nobeying an instinct when by drawing he reproduced the familiar objects\nwhich met his gaze, occupied his imagination, and caused his strongest\nand most frequent emotions. Gradually, these spontaneous endeavours\nat imitation assumed the character of signs, became divided up and\nsimplified, and finally were co-ordinated with vocal sounds which\nthemselves had gone through a separate evolution.\n\nThus language and art have a common origin, which is the _\u00e6sthetic_,\nthat is to say, the affective expression. Comte does not separate these\ntwo terms. He takes the word \u201c\u00e6sthetic\u201d at once in its etymological\nand in its modern sense. Our movements, at first involuntary, then\nvoluntary, translate our impressions and react upon them, because they\nspring from them; that is the humble source from which everything else\nis derived. With animals it only gives rise to inarticulate vocal\nsounds, and to a more or less expressive mimicry. In man, it is the\nprinciple of language and of art. The latter begins by being a simple\nimitation. Then the reproduction of objects is perfected. It becomes\nmore faithful \u201cby bringing out better the chief features which were\nat first obscured by an empirical mixture.\u201d \u201cIdealisation\u201d consists\nin this. Finally \u201cexpression\u201d properly so called is developed, and\n\u201cstyle.\u201d[221]\n\nThus, if we call language the whole of the means suitable for the\ntransmission beyond ourselves of our various impressions, this whole\nforms a system in which the most customary and least expressive\nportion, language, was at first mingled with the portion which bears\nthe name of art, taking art in its most primitive elements: song and\ndrawing. These two parts became differentiated in evolution. Our social\nrequirements have continually increased the use and extension of the\nvocal and visual signs which are made use of in active life and in\nspeculative thought. These signs have become simpler and simpler and\neven abstract: to such an extent that their origin ended by being\nconsidered the result of a convention.[222]\n\nThe primitive parentage of language and of art accounts for many\nfacts which current theories do not explain. For instance, language\nis not only created but preserved by the people. Grammarians, \u201ceven\nmore absurd than logicians,\u201d[223] in general have understood nothing\nabout it. Their claim to authority is amusing. But it is to popular\nspontaneity, at once conservative and progressive, that our languages\nowe their admirable rectitude. The basis of each language collects\nwhat is essential and universal in the \u00e6sthetic evolution of humanity.\nHence the magic charm of poetry, the most ancient of all the arts.\nWords possess a power of evoking images from which the artist draws\ninexhaustible effects. Often during the long childhood of human reason\neven the power of words must have seemed to be supernatural: _Nomina\nNumina_. By dint of considering language as ideologists and logicians,\nwe have forgotten that its nature is emotional and \u00e6sthetic. However,\neven to-day the mysterious power of words has not disappeared. How\ngreat is the action of forms of prayer on tender souls, even when faith\nhas deserted them! Next to action itself, language is the most powerful\nof the exciting causes of feeling, and religions are well aware of\nthis fact. They know how to make use of it to conquer or to retain\nsouls.\n\n\nIV.\n\nThe logical function of language is the only one which has been\nstudied by philosophers; that is, by the \u201contologists\u201d and the\n\u201cmetaphysicians.\u201d But even their study has remained incomplete.\nCondillac and his school have solely considered the language which\nlends itself to logical analysis. Consequently, they only saw a single\nkind of combination which may be called the logic of signs. But, in\nreality, the logic of signs rests upon the logic of images, and this\none on the logic of feelings. The so-called logicians thus conceive\na narrow and false idea of our intellectual mechanism, when they\nconcentrate all their attention \u201cupon the most voluntary, but the least\npowerful of the three essential modes of which the mental combination\nadmits.\u201d[224]\n\nThe logic of feelings is the art \u201cof facilitating the combination\nof notions according to the connection between the corresponding\nemotions.\u201d It is the most instinctive: it is the source of all the\ngreat inspirations of our intelligence. We can think nothing which\ncontradicts it, or even which is not implied in it. But it has two\ngrave defects. Its elements are not precise enough, and it is not at\nour disposal. It only operates under certain given conditions, and\nthe appearance of these conditions does not rest with us. We see it\nat work, for instance, among animals, who occasionally provoke our\nadmiration for the marvels suggested to them by this logic which is\nso closely bound up with the emotions. The logic of images, though\nless strong, is more free and precise than the logic of feelings.\nNevertheless if we only had these two we should still be incapable\nof realising combinations conceived and prepared by us. This office\nbelongs to the logic of signs. For to us almost entirely belongs the\ndisposal of these signs, and it is this which has allowed of the\ndevelopment of abstract language and of the sciences.\n\nBut we must not separate this last logic from the two others. The\nlaws of our nature always cause the logical use of feelings and\nimages to prevail over that of signs. Undoubtedly, the union between\nsigns and thoughts may become direct, and moreover in the case of\nabstract notions, it could not be otherwise. Thus our inner world\nis artificially united to the outer world. We have an abstract and\nsymbolical representation of it, without going through the feelings, or\neven, strictly speaking, through the images. But this relation has far\nless consistency than the one which is established by the involuntary\nintervention of images and of feelings. As the abstract sign has its\norigin in the sign appreciated by the senses, which itself proceeds\nfrom the relation of the muscular system with the nervous system; so,\nthe relations between signs have their origin in the relations between\nimages, and these, in their turn, proceed from the relations between\nfeelings.\n\nThe facility with which we manipulate signs hides this truth from us:\nit is none the less certain that these signs are united to our thoughts\nin a far less intimate and less spontaneous manner than the feelings\nand even the images.\n\nThe positive theory further allows us, not indeed to solve, but to\nadjourn the question of a universal language. Indeed are we concerned\nwith a purely scientific language? Mathematical analysis in part\nfulfils this _desideratum_. It allows us to express the laws of the\nsimplest phenomena by symbols which are at everyone\u2019s disposal. But if\nit is a question of a complete language, destined to be in common use\namong all men, who does not see that this conception is incompatible\nwith the present state of humanity? How could we establish a universal\nlanguage, while allowing the prevalence of \u201cdivergent beliefs and of\nhostile customs.\u201d[225] The unification of tongues will arise from the\nunification of peoples. When the latter has been realised, under the\naction of positive philosophy, the other will follow as a necessary\nconsequence.\n\nMoreover, from the present time, a universal language exists! It\nis Art, \u201cthe only form of language which is universally understood\nat once in the whole of our species.\u201d[226] Truly this universal\nlanguage has its dialects. Comte\u2019s remark is none the less strikingly\naccurate. The masterpieces of Greek sculpture, Rembrandt\u2019s paintings,\nBeethoven\u2019s symphonies are accessible to millions of human beings who\nhave never known a word of Greek, of Dutch, or of German. To teach\nall children music and drawing, as Comte requires in his positivist\nplan of education, is not to make them participate in the luxury\nof \u201caccomplishments.\u201d It is placing within their reach works which\nappeal to the whole of humanity; it is giving them a stronger sense\nof the solidarity which is the essential characteristic of human\nsociety; finally it is teaching them the universal language of which\nthey possess the instinctive rudiments, and whence have sprung the\nvery languages which to-day appear as frigid systems of symbols and\ngraphic representations. Is it not fair to allow them the enjoyment of\na patrimony as ancient perhaps as humanity herself? Somewhere, Comte\ncompares language to property.[227] Like it, language has facilitated\nacquisitions and preserved social wealth. But it has an advantage over\nproperty, that of admitting of equal possession by all at the same\ntime. Art presents this advantage no less than language. Works of art\nare the common property of the whole of humanity and no one should be\ndeprived of that inheritance.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[204] Cours, III. 661.\n\n[205] Pol. pos., I, 602.\n\n[206] Pol. Pos., I. 638-9.\n\n[207] Cours, I. 81.\n\n[208] Cours, IV, 498-500.\n\n[209] Cours, III, 624-5.\n\n[210] Pol. pos. II, 229-30.\n\n[211] Pol. pos. I, 613-4.\n\n[212] Cours, V. 30.\n\n[213] Pol. pos. II, 348-9.\n\n[214] Cours, V, 100-1.\n\n[215] Cours, III, 563.\n\n[216] Pol. Pos. II, 248-52.\n\n[217] Pol. Pos. I, 722-3.\n\n[218] Pol. Pos. II, 226.\n\n[219] Pol. Pos. II, 220-1.\n\n[220] Pol. Pos. II, 217.\n\n[221] Pol. pos. I, 288-9.\n\n[222] Pol. pos., II, 250-1.\n\n[223] Pol. pos., II, 254-6.\n\n[224] Pol. pos., II, 240-1.\n\n[225] Pol. pos., II, 260-2.\n\n[226] Pol. pos., II, 237.\n\n[227] Pol. pos., II, 254-6.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nGENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON SOCIAL SCIENCE\n\n\nSocial science had at first been called social physics by Comte. Later\non he invented the name of \u201csociology\u201d[228] for it. It stands at the\nsummit of the encyclop\u00e6dic ladder of the sciences. Accordingly, it\noffers certain characteristics which the other sciences do not present.\n\nUndoubtedly, by the definition of its object and by its method, it is\nperfectly homogeneous with the rest of positive knowledge. Sociology\nstudies the laws of social phenomena as mathematics inquires into the\nlaws of geometrical phenomena. In this sense, between these extreme\nsciences there are no other differences than those which arise from\nthe diversity of the phenomena which are studied. But mathematics, and\nthe other fundamental sciences, excepting sociology, are distinctly\npreliminary. Sociology is final. Each of the preliminary sciences\nshould be cultivated only in the measure necessary in order that the\nfollowing one may in turn assume the positive form. Social science,\nwhich is not preparatory to any other, establishes the principles\nof morals and of politics. It is, as has been seen, the key-stone\nof positive philosophy. It is in it, and through it, that positive\nphilosophy acquires the universality which hitherto it had lacked.\n\nFinally, there is a last difference which Comte likes to think he is\nsuccessfully removing; the other sciences are more or less formed;\neverything has to be done for social science. Not that many trials have\nnot been attempted. Comte does not ignore them, and he prides himself\nupon doing justice to his precursors. He goes back to Aristotle, in\nwhom he admires an incomparable scientific and philosophical genius.\nIn him he sees the inventor of social statics. His _Politics_ are\nstill read with profit.[229] But Aristotle could have no idea of a\nsociology, and in particular of positive social dynamics. For that he\nlacked (without speaking of the fundamental sciences which excepting\nmathematics were yet to be born), a sufficiently wide and varied\nknowledge of history and the idea of progress.\n\nMontesquieu was in advance of his time, when, by the insight of his\ngenius, he generalised the idea of natural law so as to bring under\nit the political, judicial, economical, and, generally speaking, all\nsocial phenomena. He really conceives the idea of social science. But\nthe execution did not respond to the conception. How could Montesquieu\nhave succeeded, since he was still without two indispensable elements:\nin the first place, the positive science of man from the biological\npoint of view, and then the idea of progress, a vital necessity for\nevery positive philosophy of history? Having failed to apprehend the\nfundamental laws of social dynamics, Montesquieu made too much use\nof the comparative method. Consequently, he took secondary laws for\nessential laws, such as the laws relating to the influence of climate.\nIn the same way he has exaggerated the importance of various forms of\npolitical constitution.[230]\n\nCondorcet came after Montesquieu and Turgot, and had been formed in the\nschool of d\u2019Alembert. He came nearer than anyone to the social science\nwhich was to be founded. He understood admirably that the evolution of\nthe human race, considered as a single being, is subject to laws. He\nbrought the idea of progress into full daylight. But, nevertheless,\npositive sociology does not owe to him its origin. He shared the\nprejudice of his time on the subject of the indefinite perfectibility\nof man; this prejudice was only to disappear before the positive\nscience of intellectual and moral man. Moreover, in the heat of the\nrevolutionary conflict, he misunderstood the concrete reality of the\nprogress, whose abstract necessity he had so well realised. By painting\nthe centuries preceding the XVIII. century, in the darkest colours, he\nmade the progressive evolution of humanity a kind of miracle, \u201cdoubly\ninadmissible in a doctrine which does not imply a Providence.\u201d[231]\n\nBut soon Cabanis and Gall bring forward the positive theory of the\nmoral and intellectual faculties of man. The French revolution throws a\nvivid light upon the period which separates us from the Middle Ages. At\nlast, the theorists of the counter-Revolution show that the philosophy\nof the XVIII. century, if it excelled in the power of demolishing,\nwas incapable of reconstructing, and they also show that order must\nbe inseparable from progress. Comte regards himself as a Condorcet\nwho has profited by these lessons of experience. He has worked with\nSaint-Simon, he has read De Maistre. In short, he is possessed of all\nthe necessary elements for the foundation of sociology.\n\nAt the moment when he undertakes it, theological and metaphysical\nphilosophy is still dominant over the contemporary conception of social\nfacts. In it imagination is not subordinated to observation. Men do\nnot apply themselves to the analysis of facts in order to discover\ntheir relations and their laws; they prefer to construct philosophies\nof history, which appear as non-scientific hypotheses, that is to\nsay, which are not verifiable. Absolute results are sought for, as\nif in this order of facts, as in all the others, the absolute was not\ninaccessible. From the practical point of view, nobody doubts that\nman can modify social facts as he pleases, and that his action can be\nexercised there without any definite limits being placed upon it. It is\nsupposed, in a word, that political society has no laws which regulate\nits natural development.\n\nThe same prejudices and the same false ideas have already predominated\nin the past on the subject of the more simple phenomena, which\nafterwards became objects of positive science. Should not this analogy\ncause philosophers to conceive \u201cthe rational hope of also succeeding\nin the dissipation of those errors of conception and of method in the\nsystem of political ideas.\u201d[232] Nothing is more natural than that\nthe science of the most complex phenomena should be the last to reach\nthe positive stage. It would even have been impossible for it to have\nbeen otherwise. Finally, beyond the difficulties which belong to the\ncomplexity of its object, sociology had to overcome others, which arise\nfrom political passions. Problems of this kind are indifferent to no\none. In them the interests of each one are involved, and they influence\neven without our knowledge, the direction taken by our thoughts.\nPolitical parties excel in framing plausible theories adapted to their\nrequirements. Thus a constant effort at disinterestedness is necessary\non the part of any one who purposes to take up the science of abstract\npolitics.\n\nAt any rate, if these reasons make us understand that sociology should\nmake its appearance last among the fundamental sciences, none of them\nimply that it would not have arisen in its turn. On the contrary,\nbeside \u201cvital physics\u201d and \u201cinorganic physics,\u201d \u201csocial physics\u201d\nwas one day to take its place. From 1824, Comte had a very clear\nidea of this. We do not see, he says, why the phenomena which the\ndevelopment of a social species presents should not have laws like the\nothers, why these laws should not be capable of being discovered by\nobservation, like those of the other phenomena, with this reservation\nonly that the nature of this section of philosophy makes its study more\ndifficult. \u201cI will make it felt by the very fact that there are laws as\ndetermined for the development of the human species as for the falling\nof a stone.\u201d[233] Comte later on attenuated the rigidity of these\nexpressions. He recognised that the social phenomena were of all others\nthe most \u201cmodifiable.\u201d But he none the less maintained that they were\nruled by laws.\n\n\nII.\n\nSociology, an abstract and wholly theoretical science, only sets itself\nthe task of discovering the laws of phenomena, without first taking\ninto account any possible applications. I shall not have, says Comte,\nto concern myself directly with political anarchy.[234] Here, more than\nanywhere else, science must be separated from the corresponding art.\nThe same reasons which led to physiology being constituted apart from\nmedicine, with which it had for so long been confused, also require\nthat social science should be distinguished from politics, of which,\nup to the present time, it has only been a more or less empirical or\narbitrary interpretation.\n\nComte who took such pains to define the physical fact, the chemical\nfact, the biological fact, has not given a definition of the\nsociological fact. The reasons for this are not difficult to see. In\nthe first place, this fact defines itself so to speak, by elimination.\nAs there are no phenomena accessible to us more complicated than those\nof the social life, all the phenomena which are not studied by the\npreceding sciences are of course the subject of sociology. Moreover,\nthere might be a reason to seek for a definition of the sociological\nfact, if we started from the consideration of the individual to rise\nto that of society. But Comte\u2019s conception is radically different.\nFor him it is the individual who is an abstraction; and society is\nthe true reality. He must not explain humanity by man, but on the\ncontrary, man by humanity. From this moment, all the human phenomena\nproperly so-called are _ipso facto_ sociological. It is an essential\ncharacteristic of Comte\u2019s system that man, considered individually,\nis not an object of science. The science of man belongs for one part\nto biology, for the other to sociology. To define the sociological\nfact amounts then to establishing the relations between biology and\nsociology.\n\nWe have already seen that these relations are extremely close. On the\none hand, sociology could not be constituted so long as higher biology\nhad not reached a certain degree of development. History has furnished\nus with a proof of this: the state of infancy of biology contributed\nlargely to the failure of Montesquieu\u2019s and Condorcet\u2019s sociological\nattempts. But, on the other hand, the study of the intellectual and\nmoral functions, that is to say, the highest part of biology, can only\nbe made from the sociological point of view. Here we have a kind of\nmixed domain, which properly belongs neither to the one nor to the\nother of the sciences.\n\nCould we not then consider sociology as a simple extension of biology,\nan extension which would be far more important in the case of the human\nspecies than in any of the others? Do we not do this implicitly when we\nattribute the study of the intellectual and moral functions to biology,\nsince everything which bears the name of \u201cmoral science,\u201d history, law,\npolitical economy, etc., finally rests upon these functions? What is\nthe use of a new fundamental science for the study of phenomena which\nat bottom reduce themselves to biological phenomena?\n\nComte protested against this interpretation of his doctrine.[235]\nAccording to him, sociology is no less irreducible to biology, than\nthe latter is to chemistry. The sociological phenomena, independently\nof the more general laws which are common to them with the subjacent\norders, have laws of their own which regulate them. If animal societies\nonly existed as we see them to-day, it would perhaps not be impossible\nto consider sociology as an appendix of biology. But human society\nexcludes any attempt of this kind. For it is social life which has\nmade the extraordinary development of the intellectual and moral\nfunctions possible in man, and this development is the very definition\nof humanity. Now, the first consequence of this development is that\nbiology properly so-called, no longer suffices for studying it. We need\na new method in it, the method of historical observation. Already,\nwere it for this reason alone, there can be no question of reducing\nsociology to biology.\n\nIn the second place, when we pass from the individual to the collective\norganism, \u201cthe continued expansion and the almost indefinite\nperpetuity\u201d of the latter makes it almost impossible not to separate\nit from the former in a scientific study.[236] Comte is not deceived\nby the analogy between the two kinds of organism. To speak accurately,\nsociology with him, hardly ever considers anything except a single\norganism. Let us leave aside the little that it says of animal\nsocieties. It represents the human race as constituting, in time\nand in space, \u201can immense and eternal social unity, whose various\norgans, individuals and nations, united by universal solidarity, each,\naccording to a determined manner and degree concur in the evolution of\nHumanity.\u201d\n\nOne of the ideas which Comte most admires in Condorcet, and which\nhe regards as indispensable to social science, is that which makes\na single being in process of evolution of the totality of the human\nspecies.[237] Henceforth, the parallelism between this immense \u201csocial\nunity,\u201d and the organisms studied by biology could not be a strict one.\n\u201cThe complex nature of the former,\u201d says Comte himself, \u201cdeeply differs\nfrom the indivisible constitution of living beings.\u201d We must then\nknow how to restrain comparison wisely, \u201cin order that it should not\ngive rise to faulty approximations, instead of precious indications.\u201d\nComte has sometimes failed in carrying out this prudent precept, for\ninstance, when in the social organism he looks for what is analogous\nto tissues, organs, and systems studied by the anatomists. But he has,\nnone the less, traced very firmly the limits beyond which the use of\nanalogy here becomes an abuse.\n\nThese limits are determined by the specific character of the social\nreality, which escapes the grasp of the biological method. For the\nprincipal phenomenon in sociology, the one which establishes most\nevidently its scientific originality, is the gradual and continuous\ninfluence of human generations upon one another. Now our intelligence\ncannot \u201cguess the principal decisive phases of such a complex evolution\nwithout an historical analysis properly so-called.\u201d[238] Here is the\nfinal word: no history, no sociology. Comte had already written in\n1822: To reduce sociology to biology is to annul the direct observation\nof the social past. Undoubtedly the reason for man\u2019s superiority over\nthe other animals lies in the relative perfection of his organisation.\nIn this sense, social physics, that is to say, the study of collective\ndevelopment of the human species, is really a branch of physiology.\nIn this sense, the history of civilisation is but the sequel and the\nindispensable complement of the natural history of man. But, important\nas it is to form a proper conception, and never to lose sight of this\nrelation, yet it would be a mistake to conclude from it that no clear\ndivision should be established between social physics and physiology\nproperly so-called. For, in the case of the human race, there is\nhistory _which cannot be reached by a process of deduction_.[239]\n\n\nIII.\n\nAlready, in biology the nature of the object had compelled scientific\nmen to start from the consideration of the whole to reach that of the\nparts, to proceed from the complex to the simple. With still greater\nreason, the same inversion of method imposes itself in sociology. For,\nalthough the individual elements of society appear to be more separable\nthan those of the living being, the social _consensus_ is still closer\nthan the vital _consensus_.[240]\n\nThe spirit of the sociological method will then be always to consider\nsimultaneously the various social aspects, whether in statics, or in\ndynamics. Undoubtedly each of them can be the object of a special\nstudy, by the way of \u201cpreliminary elaboration.\u201d But, as soon as the\nscience is sufficiently advanced, the correlation of phenomena will\nserve as a guide for their analysis. Political economy has proved\nby facts that the isolated study of a series of social phenomena is\ncondemned to remain irrational and barren. Those then who, in the\nsystem of social studies, wish to imitate \u201cthe methodical parcelling\nout, which belongs to the inorganic sciences,\u201d misunderstand what the\nessential conditions of their subject require. Here the most general\nlaws must be known first. It is from them that science must then\ndescend to the more particular laws.\n\nThe more complex the phenomena, the more numerous are the processes\nof method at our disposal for studying them. This law of compensation\nis verified again in the present case. Sociology, over and above the\nprocesses made use of by the preceding sciences possesses some which\nare peculiarly its own. To put it more plainly, in its capacity of\nfinal science, the whole positive method belongs to it. As method is\nonly learnt by practice, the sociologist will therefore have to be\nformed by a complete scientific education from mathematics, which will\ngive him the feeling of positivity, to biology which will teach him\nthe comparative method. The _Cours de philosophie positive_ precisely\nretraces this methodical ascent, which leads the human mind, by\nsuccessive degrees, up to social science. And, since the intellectual\nevolution of the individual reproduces that of the species, the\nsociologist will cover the same ground to reach the same end.\n\nAt any rate, if a mathematical education is indispensable so as to\naccustom him to the positive mode of thought, he will, however,\nacknowledge that social phenomena do not allow of the use of numbers\nor of mathematical analysis, nor more especially of the calculation\nof probabilities. Comte treats Laplace\u2019s attempt upon this point\nas absurd, an attempt which has been taken up again by other\nmathematicians. He likes to quote it as a proof of the lack of the\nphilosophical spirit among geometers. Indeed, according to him, to\napply the calculation of probabilities to historical events, implies a\nfailure to understand that these phenomena are subject to invariable\nlaws like all other phenomena.\n\nIn default of the powerful instrument furnished by mathematics,\nsociology makes use of the methods employed in the physical and natural\nsciences. Of these observation is the first. Social phenomena seem easy\nto observe, because they are very common, and the observer takes part\nin them more or less. But, on the contrary, these two circumstances\nrender sociological observation very difficult. We only observe well\non condition that we place ourselves outside what we observe.[241]\nSociological facts ought then to appear objective to us, detached from\nus, independent of the state of our individual consciousness. Nothing\nis more difficult to realise. In order to obtain, and more especially\nto maintain, \u201csuch an inversion of the spontaneous point of view,\u201d\nthe mind must already have partly constructed what it wishes to see.\nWere it not already provided with a preliminary theory, for the most\npart the observer would not know what he must look for in the fact\nwhich is taking place under his eyes. It is therefore by the preceding\nfacts that we learn to see the following ones. There lies \u201cthe immense\ndifficulty\u201d of sociology, in which we are thus obliged, in a certain\nmeasure, to determine simultaneously the facts and the laws. If we are\nnot already possessed of the necessary speculative indications to grasp\nthem, the facts remain barren and even unseen, although we are, so to\nspeak, immersed in them.\n\nConsequently, a social fact can have no scientific significance if\nit is not brought into relation with another fact. In an isolated\ncondition, it remains in the state of a simple anecdote, capable at\nmost of satisfying \u201cidle curiosity,\u201d but unfit for any rational use.\nAn infinite number of facts may be useful to sociology, apparently\nvery insignificant customs, all kinds of monuments, the analysis and\nthe comparison of languages; but the mind must be provided for their\nobservation with general points of view. Only on this condition will\na mind, well prepared by rational education, be able to transform\nthe actions which take place beneath its eyes into sociological\nindications, \u201caccording to the more or less direct points of contact,\nwhich he will be able to discern in these actions with the highest\nnotions of science, in virtue of the connexion of the various social\naspects.\u201d\n\nThere can be no question of experimenting in sociology.[242] Not that\nwe cannot act upon the social phenomena: they are, on the contrary,\nthe most modifiable of all. But an experiment properly so-called\nconsists in comparing two cases which differ from each other by a\ncertain definite circumstance, and by that one alone. We have no means\nof determining two cases of this kind in sociology. It is true that in\nthe absence of direct experiments nature presents indirect ones. They\nare the pathological cases, unfortunately too frequent in the life of\nsocieties, the more or less serious perturbations which they undergo\nthrough accidental or passing causes. Such are the revolutionary\nperiods which correspond to diseases in living bodies. If we properly\nextend Broussais\u2019 principle to sociology, that is to say, if we admit\nthat morbid phenomena are produced by the effect of the same laws as\nnormal phenomena, then social pathology will in some measure replace\nexperiments. It will be said that this study has been fruitless up\nto the present time. But the reason of this is, according to Comte,\nthat direct or indirect experimenting ought, like simple observation,\nto be subject to rational conceptions. Both are only productive in a\nsociology already possessed of its essential laws.\n\nThe comparative method, so useful to the biologist, is also precious\nfor the sociologist. It draws together the various states of human\nsociety which coexist on the different parts of the earth\u2019s surface,\nand among peoples independent of one another. Undoubtedly, if the total\ndevelopment only is considered, the evolution of Humanity is one.\nIt nevertheless remains true that very considerable and very varied\npopulations have as yet only reached the more or less inferior degrees\nof this evolution. We can thus observe them simultaneously and compare\ntheir successive phases. From the Fuegians to the most civilised\nnations in Europe, we can imagine no \u201csocial shade\u201d which is not at\npresent realised on some portion of the globe. Frequently, within the\nsame nation, the social condition of the various classes represents\nstates of civilisation which are very far removed from one another.\nParis to-day contains more or less faithful \u201csurvivors\u201d of nearly\nall the anterior degrees of social evolution, especially from the\nintellectual point of view.[243] This comparative process holds good\nfor social statics as for social dynamics. Even in statics a comparison\ncan be established between animal societies and human society.\n\nHowever, this type of method is not devoid of inconvenience in\nsociology. It does not consider the necessary succession of the various\nphases in the social evolution: it seems on the contrary to consider\nthem all as simultaneous. Consequently, it prevents us from seeing\nthe filiation of social forms. It also runs the risk of falsifying\nthe analysis of the cases which are observed, and of causing simple\nsecondary factors to be taken for main causes. This is what happened\nto Montesquieu who compared indifferently the cities of antiquity,\nthe France of the Middle Ages, the England of the XVIII. century, the\nrepublic of Venice, the government of Byzantium, the Empire of the\nSultan, and that of the Shah of Persia.\n\nSo the comparative method is only an auxiliary process in sociology.\nLike observation and experiment, it has to be made subordinate to a\nrational conception of the evolution of humanity. The latter in turn\ndepends upon the use of an original method of observation, belonging\nto social phenomena, and free from the dangers presented by the\npreceding ones. This specific sociological method, this \u201ctranscendent\u201d\nprocess, by which the positive method is completed, is, says Comte, the\nhistorical method.[244]\n\n\nIV.\n\nSociology is an abstract science: history, which is its essential\nmethod, cannot therefore be history merely considered as a narrative.\nThere are two ways of conceiving history, the one abstract and the\nother concrete. The latter dominates in the historical works written\nup to the present time. Their end is to relate and to array in\nchronological order a certain sequence of events. Undoubtedly in the\nXVIII. century efforts were made to co-ordinate political phenomena\nand to determine their filiation. But for all that this kind of work\nhas not ceased to be descriptive and literary. The other form of\nhistory, which does not exist up to the present, has for its end the\nresearch of the laws which regulate the social development of the human\nspecies.[245]\n\nDifference of object leads to difference of method. If an historian\nproposes to himself to compose exact \u201cannals,\u201d to relate things as\nthey took place, he will begin by the special history of the various\npeoples, which, in its turn, is founded upon the chronicles of the\nprovinces and the towns. It will be necessary for him to investigate\ndocuments in detail, and to neglect no source: the work of combination\nwill only come subsequently. But if our end is the abstract science\nof history, that is to say the linking together of social phenomena,\nquite a different course will have to be followed. Indeed all the\nclasses of these phenomena are simultaneously developed, and under the\nmutual influence of one another. We cannot explain the line of advance\nfollowed by anyone among them, without having first conceived in a\ngeneral way \u201cthe progression of the whole.\u201d Before all things then we\nmust set ourselves to conceive the development of the human species in\nits widest generality, that is to say, to observe and to link together\namong themselves the most important steps towards progress which it\nhas successively taken in the various fundamental directions. Then\nwe shall subdivide the periods and the classes of the phenomena to be\nobserved.[246]\n\nThese \u201cvarious fundamental directions\u201d correspond to what Comte\ncalled later the \u201csocial series.\u201d By this he indicates the groups of\nsocial phenomena arranged for a scientific study. Once these groups\nare formed, then, according to the totality of historical facts, the\nsociologist seeks to determine the continuous growth of each, physical,\nmoral, intellectual or political disposition or faculty, combined\nwith the indefinite decrease of the opposite disposition or faculty:\nfor instance, the tendency of human society to pass from the warlike\nform to the industrial form, from revealed religion to demonstrated\nreligion, etc. From this will be drawn the scientific forecast of\nthe triumph of the one and the fall of the other, provided that this\nconclusion is also in conformity with the general laws of the evolution\nof Humanity.\n\nSuch a forecast could never be founded upon the knowledge of the\npresent alone. For the present exposes us to the danger of confusing\nthe principal with the secondary facts, of \u201cplacing noisy passing\ndemonstrations above deep-seated tendencies,\u201d and of regarding\ninstitutions or doctrines as growing which are really on the decline.\nOur statesmen scarcely look back beyond the XVIII. century, our\nphilosophers beyond the XVI. This is too little. It does not even\nsuffice to make us understand the French revolution. The study of the\n\u201chistorical series\u201d alone allows the understanding of the present\nand the prevision of the future. The sociologist will even exercise\nhimself in predicting the past, that is to say, in acquiring a rational\nknowledge of it, and in deducing each historical situation from the\nwhole of its antecedents. He will thus become familiar with the spirit\nof the historical method.\n\nHowever, if this abstract historical method were used by the\nsociologist to the exclusion of every other, he would sometimes\ncome to a wrong conclusion, and take the continuous decrease in a\nnatural faculty for a tendency to total extinction. For instance, as\ncivilisation becomes more refined, man eats less than formerly. Nobody\nconcludes from this that he tends not to eat at all. But the absurdity\nwhich is palpable here, might, in other cases pass unperceived. That\nis why the historical method in sociology requires to be controlled by\nthe positive theory of human nature. All the inductions which might\ncontradict this theory are to be rejected. Indeed, the whole social\nevolution is at bottom but a simple development of humanity, without\nthe creation of new faculties. The germ, at any rate, of all the\ndispositions or effective faculties which sociological observation,\n(and in particular, history), may make known, must then be found in the\nprimordial type which biology has constructed beforehand for sociology.\nAccordance between the conclusions of historical analysis and the\npreliminary notions of the biological theory is the indispensable\nguarantee of sociological demonstrations.[247]\n\n\nV.\n\nThus conceived the historical method rests upon the postulate\ngiven by Comte, as we have seen, as a basis to his sociology. This\npostulate is thus enunciated: _The nature of man evolves without being\ntransformed._ The various physical, moral and intellectual faculties,\nmust be found the same at all the degrees of historical evolution, and\nalways similarly co-ordinated among themselves. The development which\nthey receive in the social state can never change their nature, nor\nconsequently destroy or create any one of them, nor even intervene in\nthe order of their importance.\n\nIn a word, the chief regulator of sociology is the science of human\nnature. It can even be said, without forcing the meaning of Comte\u2019s\nthought, that sociology is really a psychology:[248] not indeed, it\nis true, a psychology founded upon the introspective analysis of the\nindividual subject, but a psychology whose object is the analysis by\nhistory, of the universal subject, that is to say, of Humanity.\n\nComte endeavours to bring the complexity and the extreme variety of\nsocial phenomena into an intelligible unity. This complexity is such\nthat we could not determine the laws by starting from the observation\nof the simplest phenomena to reach the more complex ones afterwards.\nMoreover, these facts only possess sociological significance if the\nobserver is already provided with a general theory before he ascertains\nthem. But, on the other hand, history cannot be deduced. Given an\nalready positive knowledge of human nature and of the \u201c_milieu_\u201d in\nwhich it evolves, we could not say _a priori_ how it will evolve.\nHistory must then teach us how, as a matter of fact, social life has\ndeveloped Humanity. Nevertheless, once this concession has been made\nto observation the method becomes again deductive. Since sociology is\na science it ought, like the other sciences, to be able to substitute\nrational prevision to the empirical establishment of facts.\n\nTo complete the characterising of this final science, it must be at\nonce positive, like the subjacent fundamental sciences, and universal\nlike philosophy, which alone up to the present time has looked at\nthings from \u201cthe point of view of the whole.\u201d Henceforth these two\nconditions are fulfilled. In the first place, the positivity of\nsociology cannot be doubted. In it social facts are conceived as\nsubject to laws, and Comte abstains from any research as to their mode\nof production. Then, sociology, in spite of the extreme difficulties\nof its object, has assumed the deductive form, and has brought\nsecondary laws under more general laws. Comte is even convinced that\nhis sociology comes nearer to the perfect scientific form than physics\nor chemistry. By his discovery of the great dynamic law of the three\nstates, has he not given it a unity which is to be found as complete\nnowhere else but in astronomy? But, at the same time, it is truly\nuniversal, since it is a philosophy of history, or, in other words,\nthe science of humanity considered in its evolution. As this science\npresupposes biology, and as biology in turn presupposes the science of\nthe \u201c_milieu_\u201d in which living beings are immersed, sociology becomes\nat once the summary and the crown of the sciences which precede it.\n\nThus in replacing man in Humanity, and Humanity in the system of its\nconditions of existence, Comte constructs a final science which is at\nthe same time the supreme science, the only science, that is to say,\nphilosophy. \u201cIf the laws of sociology could be sufficiently known\nto us, they alone would suffice to replace all the others, save the\ndifficulties of deduction.\u201d[249] The science of Humanity is the centre\naround which the others range themselves in order.\n\nAlready with Descartes, the anthropological character of philosophy\nwas strongly marked. After him, philosophical speculation took man for\nits centre more and more. This tendency also predominates in Comte\u2019s\ndoctrine. But in it it assumes a social character. Here the \u201cuniversal\nsubject\u201d is no longer the intellectual consciousness of Kant, or the\nabsolute \u201cego\u201d of Fichte; it is Humanity evolving in time, whose unity\nis displayed through the succession of generations connected in strict\nsolidarity with each other. Henceforth the philosophical problems,\nno longer present themselves from the point of view of man conceived\nin the abstract or in himself apart from time. The consideration of\nhistory necessarily intervenes. Problems are formulated in social\nterms. There lies the deep significance of the doctrine systematised\nby Comte.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[228] Cours, IV, 200.\n\n[229] Cours, IV, 191-2.\n\n[230] Cours, IV, 193-99; Pol. pos., IV, Appendice, p. 106.\n\n[231] Cours, IV, 200-205; Pol. pos. IV, Appendice, p. 109.\n\n[232] Cours, IV, 243-4.\n\n[233] Lettres \u00e0 Valat, p. 138-9 (8 septembre, 1824).\n\n[234] Cours, IV, 2-3.\n\n[235] Cours, IV, 391; VI, 775-6; Pol. pos., IV, Appendice, p. 124-7.\n\n[236] Pol. pos., II. 288-9.\n\n[237] Cours, IV. 326.\n\n[238] Cours, IV. 387.\n\n[239] Pol. pos., IV. Appendix, p. 124-7.\n\n[240] Cours, IV. 279-80.\n\n[241] Cours, IV. 337.\n\n[242] Cours, IV, 342-44.\n\n[243] Cours. IV. 354-sq.\n\n[244] Cours, IV, 360.\n\n[245] Cours. IV, 225.\n\n[246] Cours, IV., 366 sq; Pol. pos., IV. Appendice, p. 135 sq.\n\n[247] Cours, IV, 371-3; Pol. pos., I, 624-6.\n\n[248] Pol. pos., III, 47-48.\n\n[249] Pol. pos., I, 442.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nSOCIAL STATICS\n\n\nAs biology distinguishes the anatomical point of view, \u201crelating to\nthe ideas of organisation,\u201d and the physiological point of view,\n\u201crelating to the ideas of life,\u201d so sociology separates the study of\nthe conditions of existence of a society (social statics), and that of\nthe laws of its movements (social dynamics).\n\nThis distinction has the advantage of corresponding exactly to that\nof order and progress, from the practical point of view, while it is\nclosely allied to the encyclop\u00e6dic law called \u201cthe principle of the\nconditions of existence.\u201d\n\nComte will not admit that he is making two distinct sciences of\nsocial statics and social dynamics. Sociology, according to him, is\nconstituted by the constant drawing together of these two corresponding\nstudies. However, they each have their own object, and Comte has\ntreated them separately. Indeed, social statics and dynamics are far\nfrom having the same importance in his work.\n\nThe essential part, on his own showing, is dynamics.[250] When he\nmakes history the characteristic process of the Sociological method,\nwhen he shows that the tradition transmitted from every generation\nto the following one is pre-eminently the sociological phenomenon,\nwhen finally he considers the new science as having been founded\nfrom the day when the law of the three states was discovered, is\nhe not placing himself at the dynamic point of view? After having\ndemonstrated that dynamic laws of social phenomena exist, he concludes\nthat these phenomena are also subject to static laws: there would be a\ncontradiction in admitting the one set of laws without the other. In\nComte\u2019s mind then dynamics preceded statics. Even from an objective\npoint of view, dynamics seem to be the most important. For, if we knew\nthe dynamic laws it would not be impossible to deduce the static laws\nfrom them, while to do the reverse would be impracticable, at any rate\nfor minds constituted like ours.\n\nSo, in the _Cours de philosophie positive_, social statics holds a very\nsmall place compared with that occupied by dynamics. It is true that it\ntakes up the whole of the second volume of the _Politique positive_.\nBut there Comte brings into it many considerations which arise more\nfrom ethics and religion than from sociology properly so called.\n\n\nI.\n\nThe idea of the social _consensus_, more restricted than that of the\nvital _consensus_, dominates the whole of social statics. The science\nsets itself to study the continual actions and reactions which the\nvarious parts of the social system exercise upon one another. Each\nof the numerous elements of this system, instead of being observed\nby itself, must be conceived as in relation with all the others,\nwith which it has constant solidarity. From whatever social element\nwe start, it is always connected, in a more or less direct way, with\nthe whole of the others, even with those which at first sight appear\nindependent.[251]\n\nWhat are the ultimate \u201csocial elements?\u201d In biology, anatomical\nanalysis was to stop at the tissue, or at least at the cell. In\nsociology, statical analysis will stop at the family. \u201cHuman society\nis made up of families and not of individuals: it is an elementary\naxiom in statical sociology.\u201d In the eyes of social science, the\nindividual is an abstraction. All social strength is the result of a\n\u201cmore or less extended co-operation,\u201d that is to say of the combined\naction of a greater or smaller number of individuals. There is nothing\npurely individual except physical force. But what is the physical force\nof a man alone, without arms or tools? (for these already imply a\nco-operation of social activities). Intellectual power is of value only\nwhen others participate in it: so it is with moral power.\n\nOn the other hand, if all social force is the result of union, all\nsocial force is, nevertheless represented by an individual. The\nsocial organism is \u201ccollective in its nature, and individual in its\nfunctions.\u201d[252] In this way the part played by the individual again\nbecomes a very considerable one. If the individual, in so far as he\nis a social force, always represents some group, he is none the less\npossessed of his own personality which may precisely have taken a great\npart in the formation of such or such a group. We know that the social\norganism must not on all points be compared with the living organism.\nIf the family is the ultimate element for social statics, this element\nis however itself made up of persons who are naturally independent, and\nwho cannot be compared to cells.\n\nThe positive theory of the family is founded upon the biological theory\nof the physical and moral nature of man. This nature is sociable. The\nhuman species belongs to the category of those in which individuals\nnot only live in more or less permanent bands, but form definite and\ndurable societies. This is a fact in our experience. The social state\nis, for men, the state of nature. The \u201ccontract\u201d theory cannot then\nbe maintained. Comte does not stop to criticise it. The theorists of\nthe counter-Revolution have sufficiently refuted Rousseau. According\nto Comte, sociability is spontaneous in the human species, in virtue\nof the instinctive leaning towards common life, \u201cindependently of any\npersonal calculation, and often against the most immediate interest of\nthe individual. Society is not then founded upon utility, which could\nmoreover only appear in a state of society already established.\u201d[253]\n\nThus, the family is the ultimate social element. Being preoccupied\nby this idea, Comte, who had such a deep, clear-sighted feeling of\nthe evolution of societies, does not ask himself whether the family\nhas evolved from something which existed previously. For him it is\nsomething natural, that is to say something given, beyond which we\nshould not go back, and of which only the biological conditions can\nbe determined. It is from this point of view that Comte defines the\nrelations of man and woman in the family. He bases himself upon\nbiology (that is to say both upon physiology and psychology), to\nrepresent the female sex as living in \u201ca kind of state of continuous\nchildhood.\u201d Whence he concludes to the natural subordination of woman.\nThis inferiority does not moreover extend to the whole of her moral\nnature, for, \u201cin general, women are as superior to men by the natural\ndevelopment of sympathy, and sociability, as they are inferior to\nthem where intellect and reasoning powers are concerned.\u201d[254] On\nthis last point, John Stuart Mill held the contrary opinion, and this\ndisagreement contributed not a little to alienate him from positive\nphilosophy. Later on, in his \u201csecond career,\u201d Comte, who more and\nmore came to subordinate the intellect to the heart, still more\nextolled the moral excellence of woman, and ended by considering her\nas \u201cintermediary between humanity and man.\u201d But even then, while\nproclaiming the sentimental, moral, and \u00e6sthetic superiority of woman,\nhe persisted in maintaining that, from the intellectual point of view,\nby reason of immutable biological conditions, she remains inferior to\nman.\n\nFrom analogous motives, Comte regards marriage as a \u201cuniversal natural\ndisposition, the first necessary basis of all society.\u201d Every thing\nwhich tends to weaken marriage tends to disorganise the family, and,\nconsequently, to destroy society in its constitutive elements. Comte\nwill thus condemn divorce, of which he himself had the best reasons\nfor appreciating the advantages. Generally, Comte\u2019s theory of the\nfamily is modelled upon the Christian family. According to his constant\npractice, he seeks to detach the institutions of Catholicism, which he\nadmires, from its dogmas which he believes to be almost dead. These\ninstitutions, excellent in themselves only suffer from being bound up\nwith beliefs which are disappearing. So long, he says, as the family\ncontinues to have no other intellectual basis than religious doctrines,\nit will necessarily participate in their growing discredit. Positive\nphilosophy \u201ccan alone henceforth establish the spirit of the family\nupon an immoveable foundation, with the modifications suitable to the\nmodern character of the social organism.\u201d[255] This new intellectual\nbasis is established by positive psychology and social statics. The\nconstitution of the family remains the same. But its foundation is\nhenceforth positive dogma instead of religious dogma, demonstrated\nbelief instead of revealed faith.\n\nPerhaps we must recognise in the energetic defence made by Comte of\nthe family and of marriage as he found them established by the side of\nCatholic influence, a desire not to be confused with the followers of\nSaint Simon, of Fourier, and the other reformers of his time. These did\nnot hesitate to contradict current and traditional customs. In Comte\u2019s\nview, this contradiction is a sign of error. Scientific truth is found\nin the prolongation of public reason and of common sense. Here Comte\nsees a new, and not one of the least, important arguments, in support\nof his own theory.\n\n\nII.\n\nA society is composed of families: it is not itself a greater family.\nNeither is it an assemblage of contiguous families living together.\nThe family and society are distinguished from each other by very clear\ndifferential characteristics.\n\nThe family is a \u201cunion\u201d of an essentially moral nature, and secondarily\nintellectual.[256] The chief constituent of the family is found in the\naffective functions, (the mutual tenderness of husband and wife, of\nthe parents for the children, etc.). Society is, on the contrary, not\na union, but a co-operation\u201d of an essentially intellectual nature,\nand secondarily moral. Undoubtedly, an association of men cannot be\nconceived as subsisting without their sympathetic feelings being\ninterested in it. Nevertheless, when we pass from the consideration\nof the single family to the co-ordination of several families, the\nprinciple of co-operation necessarily ends by prevailing. So Rousseau\u2019s\ntheory is not false on all points. Metaphysical philosophy, especially\nin France, says Comte, has undoubtedly committed an error of capital\nimportance by attributing the very creation of the social state to\nthis principle, for it is evident that co-operation, far from having\nbeen able to produce society, presupposes it. But if we confine this\nassertion to society properly so-called (the family being set aside)\nit is not so startling. For, if co-operation could not \u201ccreate\u201d\nhuman societies, it alone at least, has been able to \u201ccommunicate to\nthese spontaneous associations a definite character and a lasting\nconsistency.\u201d\n\nThis co-operation is called to-day \u201cthe division of labour.\u201d Comte\nknew this expression: Adam Smith had already made it famous. If Comte\ndid not make use of it, it is because economists had limited the idea\nand the term to \u201cmerely material usages.\u201d He wishes, on the contrary,\nto consider co-operation in the whole of its rational extension. It\nthen becomes an extremely general principle, dominating the whole of\nsocial statics, and finding its application in the greatest as in the\nmost limited social groups. This principle leads us to regard not only\nindividuals and classes, but also, in many respects the different\npeoples, \u201cas participating together in a suitable way and a determined\ndegree, in an immense common work whose development unites those\nactually co-operating with the series of their successors and their\npredecessors.\u201d Thus we see the relation between the dynamical and the\nstatical laws of social continuity which binds successive generations,\nwith social solidarity which unites men living in the same period. This\nsolidarity arises especially from the division of labour. The latter is\nthe \u201cprimitive cause\u201d of the extension and of the growing complexity of\nthe social organism, which may be conceived as comprising the whole of\nour species.\n\nThe founder of social statics, Aristotle, had formulated its most\ngeneral principle: \u201cseparation of offices and combination of\nefforts.\u201d[257] Without the \u201cseparation of offices\u201d there would only be\nan agglomeration of families and not a society. But the indispensable\ncounterpart of the separation of offices is the combination of efforts,\nthat is to say a general thought which directs them, in a word, a\ngovernment.\n\nThus, the ideas of society and of government are implied in one\nanother. Indeed, there is no society properly so-called without\nthe division of social labour, a division immediately generating\nconsequences which make government a necessity. Society in developing\ngrows more and more complex. Instead of a small group of a few\nfamilies, it ends by numbering hundreds, thousands, and even millions\nof them. At the same time the division of labour often gives rise\nto individual differences, at once intellectual and moral. Minds\nare developed, but each one according to its special line, at least\naccording to that of his profession or of his class. The communion\nof feeling and of thought tends to become weaker. This last is not\nthe least serious inconvenience. Smith had already pointed it out\nfrom the economical point of view, and the utopian reformers, Fourier\nespecially, have shown strongly its extent and its dangers.\n\nThis is, according to Comte, what it is the mission of a government\nto remedy. Its social function consists in repressing and in opposing\nas far as possible the tendency to the scattering of ideas, of\nfeelings, and of interests. This tendency is the result of the very\ndevelopment of society, and left to itself, it would end by stopping\nthis development. Government may thus be defined in its abstract and\nelementary function as \u201cthe necessary reaction of the whole upon the\nparts.\u201d[258]\n\nGovernment, at first, appears \u201cspontaneously.\u201d As Hobbes clearly saw,\nit is then in the hands of those to whom force belongs. But it soon\nbecomes regularised and organised into a definite social function.\nAs, in the development of the sciences, the growing differentiation\nof their object rendered research more and more special, and at last\ncaused the appearance of a particular class of learned men, (the\nphilosophers), whose own function is to attempt the synthesis of human\nknowledge; so, in the division constantly more ramified of social\nfunctions, a new one had to be constituted, \u201ccapable of intervening in\nthe accomplishment of all the others, unceasingly to recall in them the\nthought of the whole, and the feeling of common solidarity.\u201d\n\nWe are then entirely mistaken, when we want to reduce the function of\ngovernment to \u201cvulgar attributions of material order.\u201d Government is\nnot a simple institution of police, a guarantee of public order, nor,\nas was said in the XVIII. century, a necessary evil which will reduce\nitself to a minimum with progress, or even will tend to disappear. On\nthe contrary, the more a society is developed, the more indispensable\nthe function of government becomes in it, the more importance it\nassumes. Progress in the future will make a more and more considerable\nplace for it in social life. Although it does not itself realise any\ndetermined social progress, government necessarily contributes to\nwhatever progress society can make.\n\nIf the idea of the division of labour is not to be understood in\na purely material and economical sense, the principle of _social\ncohesion_, which Comte calls government, cannot any more be founded\nupon a single conformity of interests. This would not suffice to\nmaintain a human society. For such a society to subsist, there must\nbe a certain \u201ccommunion\u201d of beliefs, and feelings of sympathy, which\nthemselves depend in a certain measure upon these beliefs. Undoubtedly,\nsociety could not resist a deep and durable divergence of interests.\nBut it would still less resist incompatibility of feelings, and\nespecially of beliefs among its members. In a word, the basis of human\nsociety is intellectual before all things. And, as the first object of\nthe mind of man is the interpretation of the world which surrounds him,\nthe constitutive basis of human society is religion. The groups which\nare united in the same general conception of the universe are part of\nthe same society. Hence, in the past, we see endless conflicts between\nthe societies whose religions were different; hence, in the future, the\nunity of the human species will finally become entirely rallied around\npositive religion.\n\nIf this is the case, government, which is by definition the highest\nand most general social function which represents the \u201cspirit of the\nwhole,\u201d cannot be confined to temporal action. Its object is not only\nto assure the security of property and of persons. It must at the same\ntime strengthen and preserve that \u201ccommunion\u201d of beliefs which is the\nbasis of human society. It must guarantee the union of intellects, by\nestablishing and teaching universally accepted principles. It must, in\na word, be a \u201cspiritual power.\u201d In this capacity, in positive society,\nit will exercise an action at least equal to that enjoyed by the\ncatholic clergy in the Christendom of the Middle Ages, as long as the\nPopes preserved its supreme direction.\n\nThese consequences are legitimately drawn from Comte\u2019s principles. His\nphilosophy made social reorganisation dependent upon the reorganisation\nof morals, and the reorganisation of morals upon that of ideas. He was,\ntherefore, in social statics, to seek for the foundation of society in\nthe harmony of intellects and to define government by its spiritual as\nmuch as by its temporal function.\n\n\nIII.\n\nComte\u2019s social statics are far from fulfilling the programme which he\nindicated in a word when he called it \u201csocial anatomy.\u201d Undoubtedly\nhe is right in not pushing the comparison between living beings and\nsociety to dangerous or childish attempts at precision. But, in\nsociology as in biology, he separates the study of the organs from\nthat of the functions, and we must admit that he insisted very little\nupon the analysis of the social organs. From the statical point of\nview he only distinguishes the individual, the family, and society\ntaken as a whole. Moreover the consideration of the individual is only\npreliminary, since the families represent the real social elements. He\ntherefore sees, or at least he studies nothing intermediary between\nthese elements and the totality of the social body, that is to say\nthe human species. He limits himself to indicating the separation\nof offices which increases with the extension of the social body.\nBut what is the structure of this body, what diversity of organs and\napparatus does it contain? Social statics tells us nothing of this. The\n_Politique positive_ scarcely gives us a few brief indications on this\npoint. The collective organism would be composed first of families,\nwhich constitute its real element, then of the classes or castes which\nform its tissues, and finally of towns or villages which are its real\norgans.\n\nThis is very vague. Only in the dynamics shall we find views a little\nmore precise on the appearance, the structure, and the functions of\nthe different social forms. Even then Comte does not really take the\nphysiological point of view, any more than in statics he takes the\nreally anatomical point of view. Before all things, his sociology\nremains a philosophy of history. It analyses the past of humanity, that\nit may find in it the interpretation of its present and the rational\nprevision of its future.\n\nThis science differs profoundly then from the fundamental sciences\nwhich precede it, in that it studies a single being, of which it cannot\nanalyse the phenomena or discover the laws except by considering it in\nthe first place in its totality. Comte hardly ever in social statics\n(and far less in dynamics) says society, as in biology he said, animals\nand vegetables. He says the _collective organism_: a simple, immense\norganism, whose life indefinitely extends into the past and into the\nfuture, in a word, Humanity. This conception representing humanity as a\nsingle Being which is an hypothesis for science, becomes an ideal for\nethics, and an object of love for religion. Insensibly Comte passes\nfrom one of these points of view to the other. At the same time the\ncharacter of social statics changes. From being an abstract science in\nthe _Cours_, in the _Politique_ it is transformed into a picture of\nfuture Humanity.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[250] Cours, IV, 430.\n\n[251] Cours, IV. 258.\n\n[252] Pol. pos., II, 265.\n\n[253] Cours, IV, 432-6.\n\n[254] Cours, iv, 459. Correspondance de Comte et de John Stuart Mill,\np. 219-288.\n\n[255] Cours, IV, 450.\n\n[256] Cours, IV, 472 sq.\n\n[257] Pol. pos., II, 281-3; IV, Appendice, p. 67.\n\n[258] Cours, IV, 482-5.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nSOCIAL DYNAMICS\n\n\nFor Comte, social dynamics is the chief part of sociology. He tells us\nthat it occupied his attention \u201cin a preponderating and even almost\nexclusive manner.\u201d[259] This preference is easily explained. In the\nfirst place the idea which best distinguishes sociology from biology,\nthe idea of the gradual development of humanity belongs to social\ndynamics. Then, the method which particularly belongs to sociology,\nthe historical method, applies especially to dynamics. Finally, the\nvery conception of a social science became fixed in Comte\u2019s mind by the\ndiscovery of the law of the three states which is a dynamic law.\n\nSocial dynamics is defined as \u201cthe science of the necessary and\ncontinuous movement of humanity,\u201d[260] or, more briefly, the science\nof the laws of progress. Here, as in social statics, and even still\nmore exclusively, a single case is studied, namely, the case of the\nhuman species, regarded as a single individual, and considered in\nthe whole of its past and future development. Henceforth, without\nmisunderstanding the distinction between biology and sociology, should\nwe not in the first place seek some of the conditions of social\nprogress in the physical and moral nature of the individual man? This\nquestion did not escape Comte, and he says that it would be right to\nbegin a methodical treatise on social science with it. However, he\ndid not expressly deal with the question. He contented himself with\nindicating \u201cthis fundamental instinct which is the complex result of\nthe necessary co-operation between all our natural tendencies, which\nurges man ceaselessly to ameliorate his condition in all respects, and\nalways to develop the whole of his moral, intellectual, and physical\nlife in every way as much as the system of conditions in which he finds\nhimself placed allows of it.\u201d[261] This indication is completed by the\nstudy of the conditions which determined the first efforts of man, when\nhe had to overcome his natural laziness, at the dawn of civilisation.\nIt suffices at least to show the close union which exists in Comte\u2019s\nthought between social dynamics and psychology. It is true that the\nsociological laws cannot be _deduced_ from the biological laws. Nothing\ncan replace a direct observation of social phenomena. But the very fact\nof progress, which is the object of social dynamics, would not exist\nwithout the \u201cindividual impulses which are its own elements.\u201d\n\n\nI.\n\nUnder the name of progress Comte understands a \u201csocial advance towards\na definite although never attained termination, by a series of\nnecessarily determined stages.\u201d This idea was never clearly defined\nin antiquity.[262] The men of ancient times were more inclined to\nrepresent social movements as oscillatory or circular. Upon special\npoints, for instance in morals, they had a foreshadowing of the idea of\nprogress.[263] They conceived an effort towards improvement. But the\nscientific idea of social progress in its entirety remained foreign to\nthem. For this idea is only formed by observation and by the analysis\nof history. Their historical outlook was yet too narrow for such a\nsuggestion.\n\nThe idea of progress appears with the philosophy of history taught\nby Christianity; for, this religion gives a rational explanation of\nuniversal history considered as a whole. It proclaims the superiority\nof the Christian world over the pagan world, and of the new law\nover the old.[264] But, scarcely has the idea of progress thus come\ninto existence when it becomes clouded over and tends to fade away.\nCatholicism clearly sees progress in the series of events which\ncaused it to succeed a former state, but it denies the progress which\ncontinues from that moment. It considers itself as final. It \u201climits\nonward progress to the advent of Christianity.\u201d It claims to fix an\ninvariable dogma which contains immutable and absolute truth. This is\nthe very negation of the positive idea of progress. In order to find\nthis idea clearly conceived and scientifically formulated, we must come\nto Condorcet, and even to the XIX. century, that is to say, to the\nfoundation of social science by Comte. He was especially led to it,\nhe says, by the historical study of the development of the sciences.\nFor, of all the social series, this is the one whose evolution is most\nadvanced. No other suggests so clearly the idea of a \u201cprogression\u201d\nwhose terms succeed each other by virtue of a necessary filiation.\nPascal already gave a very fine formula of it, in his _Pr\u00e9face du\nTrait\u00e9 du Vide_. Is it not remarkable that, in his sketch of the\npositive idea of progress, he should have been led at once to the\nessential hypothesis of social dynamics, that is to say, to consider\nthe whole succession of generations as a single man, always living,\ncontinually learning?[265]\n\nNevertheless, the idea of progress, so well applied to the evolution of\nthe sciences in the XVII. century, could not then be extended to all\nsocial facts. It had met with an insurmountable obstacle in the Middle\nAges. Men considered that period as one of retrogression and barbarism,\nalthough, as a matter of fact, it was \u201ccharacterised by the universal\nperfecting of human sociability.\u201d The idea of progress therefore\nremained a special one. Thus originated the quarrel of the Ancients and\nthe Moderns[266] whose importance has not been sufficiently understood.\nThe \u201ceminent\u201d Fontenelle and the \u201cjudicious\u201d Perrault have very clearly\nshown in respect to intellectual activity generally considered, what\nPascal had already established for science properly so-called.[267]\n\nThe XVIII. century was full of the idea of progress. But, failing to\nfollow a positive method, it gave a false direction to this idea.\nIt believed in the indefinite perfectibility of man and of society.\nNow, this notion does not coincide with that of progress. It is even\nfundamentally opposed to it. Progress signifies \u201cdevelopment subject\nto fixed conditions, and operating in virtue of necessary laws, which\ndetermine its advance and its limitations.\u201d It is precisely the\nignorance of these conditions and of these laws which gives rise to the\nidea of indefinite perfectibility. If Helvetius and Condorcet had had\na positive knowledge of human nature, they would not have entertained\nso many illusions and unreasonable hopes. Biology, that is to say,\nscientific psychology, would have taught them that human nature is\ninvariable in its basis, that the preponderance of the selfish over the\naltruistic instincts is essential to this nature, and that, if progress\nfavours the development of the altruistic feelings, it cannot, however,\noverturn the natural equilibrium of our inclinations. In a word,\nindefinite perfectibility is a metaphysical idea. Imagination plays a\ngreater part in it than observation. The philosophers who conceived it\ndid not realise the relations which bind the intellectual and the moral\nlife of man to the structure of his organism.\n\nIn order that the idea of progress should reach its final form it was\nnecessary, in the first place, that positive psychology should have\nput an end to the dreams of indefinite perfectibility. It was also\nnecessary that the French Revolution should come to render the course\nof the history of humanity intelligible. Indeed, according to Comte, a\n\u201cprogression\u201d cannot be understood, so long as we do not know at least\nthree of its terms. Two terms do not suffice to define it. Now, up to\nthe time of the French Revolution, several \u201cprogressions\u201d or social\nseries undoubtedly offered the required number of terms to scientific\nreflection; for instance, the evolution of such and such a science or\nof such and such an art. But, in sociology, the knowledge of secondary\nlaws is subordinated to that of primary laws, and the advance of such\nand such a social series can only be understood if the development\nof society in general is known in its fundamental law. To discover\nthis law then, we must possess at least, three terms of the general\n\u201cprogression.\u201d Now, before the French Revolution two terms only were\ngiven: the _r\u00e9gime_ of the societies of antiquity, and the Christian\n_r\u00e9gime_ (that is to say, the one which attained its highest degree of\nperfection in the Catholic organisation of the Middle Ages.) The French\nRevolution came to furnish the third term. It brought the idea of a\nnew _r\u00e9gime_. As Kant had said, in terms which were certainly unknown\nto Comte, it gave men the idea of a social organisation founded upon\nprinciples different from those of the existing societies. Henceforth\nthe idea of progress could apply itself to the whole of the historical\ndevelopment of humanity. \u201cIt is to this salutary disturbance,\u201d says\nComte, \u201cthat we owe the strength and the audacity to conceive a notion\nupon which rests the whole of social science, and consequently the\nwhole of positive philosophy, of which this final science alone could\nconstitute the unity.\u201d[268]\n\nThis social science remained to be constructed. It will be the special\nwork of Auguste Comte. According to him, the French Revolution only\nbrought an imperfect idea of social progress. It helped to bring\nabout the conception of the idea of a different _r\u00e9gime_, but without\nactually founding it. The functions of the new philosophy will be\nto realise the positive idea of social progress. In a word, the\nrevolutionary impulse made this philosophy possible. It has not done\naway with its utility.[269]\n\n\nII.\n\nSociology being an abstract and speculative science in the same way\nas the other fundamental sciences, progress in it is not understood\nin a utilitarian or moral sense. From 1826 Comte exerted himself\nto prevent any equivocation on this point. The insufficiency of\nlanguage, he says, obliges him to make use of the words \u201cimprovement\u201d\nand \u201cdevelopment,\u201d of which the former and even the latter, although\nclearer, recalls ideas of absolute good and of indefinite amelioration,\nwhich Comte has no intention of expressing. These words for him have\nthe simple scientific object of indicating, in social physics, a\ncertain succession of states of the human species, \u201cbeing effected\naccording to determined laws: a usage exactly analogous to the one\nwhich physiologists make of them in the study of the individual\norganism, to indicate a succession of transformations with which no\nidea of continuous amelioration or deterioration is connected.\u201d[270]\nIt would be easy to treat of the whole of social physics without once\nusing the word improvement, and always replacing it by the scientific\nterm development. For the question is not to appreciate the respective\nvalue of successive states referred to an ideal state, but simply to\nestablish the laws of their succession. \u201cThe present is full of the\npast and big with the future.\u201d Liebnitz\u2019s formula thus expresses the\ngeneral idea of progress. Comte only makes it positive by discovering\nthe general laws of this progress, and by showing that they are\ncorrelated to the laws of social statics.\n\nAs a matter of fact, does the development of humanity lead to\nimprovement or progress, in the moral and practical sense of the word?\nSocial science has not to answer this question. However, Comte thinks\nthat this improvement takes place, and that progress, so understood,\ncan be shown at once in our condition and in our nature.[271] As proofs\nof this, in the first place, he gives the increase in the population,\nat least in that portion of humanity which he nearly always considers\nalone, the white race; then he mentions the law--according to which\nexercise perfects the organs. This progress is fixed by heredity. Comte\nthus admits this principle laid down by Lamarck, with this reservation,\nthat evolution never transforms \u201cnatural dispositions.\u201d\n\nAs to our condition, it is improved according to the measure in which\nwe can act upon natural phenomena, and this power in turn depends upon\nthe knowledge we have acquired of the laws of phenomena. \u201cVision brings\nprevision and thus facilitates provision.\u201d Progress is here manifested\nby the extension of our scientific knowledge and by the improvement of\nthe arts founded upon this knowledge. If scientific knowledge, which\nis necessarily abstract, has to be separated from practice in order\nto seek for the general laws which regulate phenomena, science, once\nconstituted, makes possible a system of reasoned applications which\nreaches immeasurably farther than empirical art. Like Descartes, Comte\nfounds the most ambitious hopes upon the positive science of nature.\n\nNow, the most \u201cmodifiable\u201d phenomena, those in which our intervention\nis most efficacious, are the human phenomena, be they individual or\ncollective. On the other hand, our action upon the external world\nespecially depends upon the dispositions of the agent. In every way\nthen we must improve these dispositions. The most important improvement\nwill be that of our internal nature. It will consist in bringing about\nthe greater and greater prevalence of the attributes which distinguish\nman from the animals, that is to say, intelligence and sociability,\ncorrelated faculties, which are at once as a means and as an end to one\nanother. We know, moreover, that there are limits to this progress. The\nperfect preponderance within ourselves of humanity over animality is a\n_limit_, nearer to which our efforts must ever bring us, without ever\nactually reaching it.[272]\n\nWhether it be a question of our condition or of our nature the\nimprovement, in both cases, can only be very slow. It is never easy\nto substitute to natural order an artificial order resting upon the\nscientific knowledge of the former. Of those different forms of\nprogress, the first, which Comte calls the material progress, because\nit is the easiest, is the most advanced. The great attraction which\nit has for the men of to-day is thus explained, but the importance\ngiven to it is quite exaggerated. If our nature could be brought to a\nhigher degree of perfection it would assuredly be preferable. But it\nis perhaps necessary that our material conditions of existence should\nfirst have been ameliorated?\n\nThe improvement in our nature may be physical, intellectual, or moral.\nThe first would consist in an addition to the average duration of human\nlife; it depends upon the progress of biology, and, consequently,\nof medicine and hygiene. Intellectual (scientific and \u00e6sthetic)\nimprovement, would be still more desirable. It \u201cmeans a greater\nsoaring upwards\u201d than is represented by all physical improvements or\n_a fortiori_ by any material improvements: for the intellect is a\n\u201cuniversal tool\u201d whose uses have a universal application. But human\nhappiness depends far more upon moral progress \u201cover which we have,\nalso more command, although it is more difficult.\u201d No intellectual\nimprovement could be equal in value to an increase in goodness or in\ncourage. If we were wise our whole endeavour therefore would be in this\ndirection. At any rate we ought always to remember that other forms of\nprogress are desirable simply as means, and moral progress alone as an\nend.[273]\n\n\nIII.\n\nThe theory of progress is the \u201cprinciple\u201d of social dynamics, itself\nthe essential part of sociology, while sociology lies at the heart\nof positive philosophy. It was therefore to be expected that the\nadversaries of this philosophy would especially seek to ruin the theory\nof progress, which supports everything else. Indeed the objections have\nbeen numerous and pressing. Of these objections Comte had foreseen the\ntwo most important, and he had endeavoured to answer them beforehand.\nAccording to him, the theory of progress implies neither fatalism nor\noptimism, nor the quietism which has been represented as a consequence\nof it.[274]\n\nOn the first point, Comte draws our attention to the fact that the\nnecessary consequence of his principle of laws is not the absolute\ndeterminism of phenomena, whether it be a question of social or\nother phenomena. Positive philosophy admits nothing absolute.\nDeterminism, like free-will, is a metaphysical thesis, Comte is not\ncompelled to take sides either with one or the other: he leaves them\nto mutually refute each other. The positive conception of the moral\nand intellectual faculties of man, as Gall clearly established, does\nnot imply that human actions might not be otherwise than they are.\nSimilarly, if in general natural phenomena are subject to laws, this\ndoes not prevent us from conceiving these phenomena as modifiable by\nman\u2019s intervention. Now, of all natural phenomena, social phenomena are\nprecisely the most modifiable; so much so that for a long time it was\npossible to ignore that they were governed by laws.\n\nThere is then no contradiction in affirming the reality of these laws,\nand in considering at the same time the intervention of human activity\nin social phenomena as efficacious. As early as 1824 Comte wrote to\nhis friend Valat: \u201cIt would be misunderstanding my thought to conclude\nfrom it that I forbid all improvement, since, on the contrary, I\nformally establish that every government must change in consequence\nof the progress of civilisation, and that it is in no way a matter of\nindifference that these changes should take place by the mere force of\ncircumstances, or by calculated planes based upon observation. I do not\ndeny the power of political measures, I limit it.\u201d[275]\n\nIt belongs to social science to determine the limits of the useful\naction of man upon social phenomena. These limits are narrow enough.\nMan can only modify, from the static point of view, the intensity,\nand from the dynamic point of view, the speed of social phenomena.\nIndeed, here as elsewhere, modifications can only be produced in\nconformity with laws. To suppose the contrary would be to deny the very\nexistence of these laws. Now, the fundamental law of statics is the\nintimate solidarity and the mutual dependence of all social elements,\nat all the moments of their common evolution. There is, therefore, no\ndisturbing influence, whatever its origin may be, which can \u201ccause\nunsympathetic opposing elements to coexist in a given society.\u201d[276]\nRather would it destroy this society. All that is possible is to modify\nthe respective tendencies which indeed coexist in this society, but\nwithout causing the appearance or disappearance of any of them. In the\nsame way, from the dynamic point of view, the order of the successive\nphases of progress is determined by laws. No external influence (nor\nin particular that of man), could overturn or disturb this order, or\n\u201cskip\u201d one of the stages. The evolution could only be made more rapid,\nthat is to say, easier. The statesman, infatuated with his power,\nwill perhaps find this a very humble part to play. But, even within\nthese limits, human intervention could still be of capital importance\nprovided that it were directed by science.\n\nHistory confirms these views. In it we never see social phenomena\nmodified by man otherwise than in their intensity, or in their speed.\nWhere we best know their evolution, that is to say, in the social\nseries, which includes the history of the sciences, of the arts, of\nmorals and institutions, the verification of this law is constant. For\ninstance, among the scientific men at Alexandria astronomy stopped at\na certain point, because the further development of this science was\nnot compatible with the general conditions of society at that time. And\nif Montesquieu\u2019s attempt to subject social facts to laws failed, it is\nbecause, before sociology, positive biology had first to be founded.\nAnalogous examples abound, and a contrary case has never presented\nitself.\n\nThree secondary factors, race, climate, and man\u2019s political action\nespecially modify progress, in the measure which has just been\nindicated. In the present state of science it is impossible to arrange\nthem in the order of their importance. Montesquieu, made too much of\nclimates: others have made too much of races.[277] Those elements of\nsocial evolution have not yet been studied by the positive method.\nUntil the foundation of social dynamics their part was, of necessity,\nwrongly conceived. It was not known that the essential law, the law of\nthe three states, is independent of these secondary factors, whilst on\nthe contrary the secondary factors can only act in conformity with this\nlaw, without ever suspending it. In order that the modifications which\nthey produce should become intelligible, it was necessary that the\nnormal type of evolution should first be known. To study the influence\nof climates and of races before first possessing the general laws of\nsocial dynamics, was, almost, to pretend to establish pathology without\nhaving first constituted physiology.\n\nAs to man\u2019s political action, it too has been wrongly understood. In\nthe absence of a positive conception of social phenomena, some denied\nthe efficacy of this action, others exaggerated it. When it was used\nin the direction of progress, it almost necessarily appeared to be\nthe principal cause of the results which social evolution would have\nbrought about in any case. The illusion was all the more inevitable\nfrom the fact that social forces are always personified in individuals.\nOn the other hand, how often have the most vigorous political efforts\nonly been successful for a day, because the general evolution of\nsociety was proceeding in the contrary direction!\n\nSo long as the theological and metaphysical period lasts, man does not\nhesitate to ascribe to himself an almost boundless action upon natural\nphenomena. Having reached the positive period, he knows that phenomena\nare only, modifiable within certain limits, determined by their\nlaws, and that he can only aspire to relative results. Once positive\nsociology is established it wholly transforms the familiar idea of\npolitical art. But because it entertains less great and less gratifying\nambitions, this art will only be all the more effective. Compare what\nmedicine and surgery are able to do to-day for the good of the sick\nwith what they could do before chemistry and biology became positive\nsciences!\n\nBut, it is said, admitting that man can modify social phenomena, what\nreason has he to interfere with them, since progress takes place\nof itself? Why not allow the natural evolution which most certainly\nrealises it to work itself out?\n\nThis objection confuses progress understood as a succession of states\nwhich unfold according to a law, with progress understood in the sense\nof indefinite improvement. On this point again the comparison of\nsociety with living organisms is instructive. Do not these develop in\nconformity with invariable laws? Yet, Comte regards them as extremely\nimperfect, and in what concerns the human body, the intervention of the\ndoctor or the surgeon is often useful and even indispensable. When we\nreproach the sociological theory of progress with having optimism as\nits consequence, we take _the scientific notion of spontaneous order\nfor the systematic justification of any existing order_.[278] There is,\nhowever, a very long distance from one to the other. Spontaneous order\nmay often be a very rough form of order.\n\nHere, as everywhere else, positive philosophy substitutes the\nscientific principle of the conditions of existence to the metaphysical\nprinciple of final causes. It admits that spontaneously, according\nto natural laws, a certain necessary order is established; but it\nacknowledges that this order offers serious and numerous disadvantages,\nmodifiable, in certain degrees, by man\u2019s intervention. The more\ncomplex these phenomena, the more are the imperfections multiplied and\nintensified. The biological phenomena are \u201cinferior\u201d in this respect\nto those of inorganic nature. By reason of their complication, which\nis _maxima_, social phenomena must be the most \u201cdisorderly\u201d of all.\nIn a word if the idea of a natural law implies that of a certain\norder, the notion of this order must be completed by the \u201csimultaneous\nconsideration of its inevitable imperfection.\u201d\n\nThe theory of progress is then incompatible neither with the\nascertainment of social evil, nor with the effort to remedy it. The\nmost complex of all organisms, the social organism, is also the one\nmost subject to diseases and to crises. Thus, Comte foresees in a near\nfuture great internal struggles in our society, in consequence of our\nmental and moral anarchy.[279] To-day, only that is systematised which\nis destined to disappear, and what is not yet systematised, that is to\nsay all that lives, will not be organised without violent conflicts. It\nis enough here to think of the relations between masters and workmen.\n\nRevolutions occur which nothing can prevent. It is an inevitable evil,\nand Comte gives a striking psychological reason for it. Our mind is too\nweak and our life too short for us ever to form a positive idea of a\nsocial system other than the one in which we were born and in which we\nlive. It is from this one that, willingly or unwillingly, we draw the\nelements of our political and social ideas. Even men of a utopian turn\nof mind do not escape this necessity. Their dreams always reflect, at\nbottom, either the past, or a contemporary social state. In order that\na new political system should appear, and especially for it to find\naccess to men\u2019s minds, the destruction of the preceeding system must be\nalready very far advanced. Until then \u201ceven the most open minds could\nnot perceive the characteristic nature of the new system hidden from\nall eyes by the spectacle of the old organisation.\u201d[280] Hence, the\nlengthy processes of decomposition of worn-out _r\u00e9gimes_, the no less\nlengthy birth of new institutions, and the cruel periods of transition,\nfull of troubles, of wars, and of revolutions.\n\nWith this same cause are connected what we may call the phenomena of\nsurvival. Institutions, powers, as also doctrines, have a tendency to\nsubsist beyond the function which the general advance of the human mind\nhad assigned to them.[281] Conflicts then take place which it is beyond\nanybody\u2019s power to prevent: happy is he who can make them shorter and\nless acute! The solution only comes with time when the vanquished ideas\nfall into \u201cdisuse.\u201d The combat never ceases except from the lack of\ncombatants.\n\nAll this in no way excludes the possibility for man to exercise a\nbeneficent or a detrimental action. To understand is not always to\njustify. It is true that a comprehensive view of history disposes us\nto be indulgent, because it brings out the close solidarity of all\nthe social elements of the same period. The responsibilities being\nshared, and so to speak diffused, appear to be less serious for each\nindividual. Nevertheless this philosophy allows praise and blame for\nthe past, and active intervention in social phenomena for the present.\n\nBut this intervention will only produce the desired results if it rests\nupon social science. The positive polity does not propose to direct the\nhuman race towards an arbitrarily selected end. It knows that humanity\nis moved by its own impulse, \u201caccording to a law no less necessary,\nalthough more modifiable than that of gravitation.\u201d[282] It is only a\nquestion for politics to facilitate this advance by throwing light upon\nit. It is a very difficult thing to undergo the action of a law without\nunderstanding it, or to submit to it with a full knowledge of the case.\nIt remains in man\u2019s power to soften and to shorten crises, as soon as\nhe grasps their reasons and foresees the issue. He will not pretend to\ngovern the phenomena, but only to modify their spontaneous development.\n\u201cThis demands that he should know their laws.\u201d[283]\n\nLet us also know how to own that in respect to many of these phenomena,\nand not the least important of them, we are absolutely powerless.\nTheir conditions escape our grasp. For instance, the duration of human\nlife is far from being as favourable to social evolution as might be\nconceived.[284] On the contrary, after the extreme imperfection of our\norganism, the brevity of life is one of the causes of the slowness of\nsocial development. How many powerful minds have died before their full\nmaturity had yielded all its fruit! What would not have been expected\nof their genius if they had been in full possession of their faculties\nduring three or four centuries!\n\nThe positive theory of progress therefore entails neither optimism nor\nquietism. The intervention of man being excluded, the social state,\nwhich evolves, according to laws, at each period is just as good and\nas bad as it can be, \u201caccording to the whole of the situation.\u201d[285]\nMore than one pessimist would be satisfied with this formula. It is\nlegitimately drawn from the principle of the conditions of existence.\nBut, truly, from the point of view of this principle, that is to say,\nfrom the point of view of positive and relative philosophy, there can\nbe no question either of optimism or of pessimism. Metaphysics alone\ncan offer an absolute judgment upon the whole of the social reality.\nThe positive doctrine, here as elsewhere, only seeks the statical and\ndynamical laws of phenomena. It is true, that it finds that the social\nevolution is, as a matter of fact, accompanied by improvement. But this\nimprovement is so slow, so laborious, interrupted by so many crises,\ndisturbed by so many conflicts, that if humanity aspires to a better\ncondition, it is mainly from her own efforts that she must expect a\nslightly more rapid progress.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[259] Cours, IV, 430.\n\n[260] Cours, IV, 299. See also chapter II in Book I.\n\n[261] Cours, IV, 290-7.\n\n[262] Cours, IV, 182-6.\n\n[263] Pol. pos., II, 332-3.\n\n[264] Cours, V, 366.\n\n[265] Cours, IV, 185-7.\n\n[266] This referred in the Author\u2019s mind to the famous quarrel in\nFrench literature between the admirers of ancient poetry like Boileau,\nwho declared it to be superior to modern poetry, and their opponents\nlike Perrault and Fontenelle, who took the contrary view.\n\n[267] Cours, IV, 257-9.\n\n[268] Pol. pos., I, 60-3.\n\n[269] Cours, IV, 188.\n\n[270] Pol. Pos., IV, Appendice, p. 199.\n\n[271] Cours, IV, 304-6.\n\n[272] Discours sur l\u2019esprit positif, p. 59-60.\n\n[273] Pol. Pos., I, 106-8.\n\n[274] Pol. Pos., I, 54-56.\n\n[275] Lettres \u00e0 Valat, p. 140 (8 septembre, 1824).\n\n[276] Cours, IV, 314-20.\n\n[277] Pol. pos. II, 450.\n\n[278] Cours, IV, 273.\n\n[279] Cours, VI, 825.\n\n[280] Cours, IV, 30-1; V, 241-2.\n\n[281] Cours, IV, 266.\n\n[282] Pol. pos., IV, Appendice, p. 95.\n\n[283] Cours, IV, 326.\n\n[284] Cours, IV, 510-12.\n\n[285] Cours, IV, 310-11.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY\n\n\nIf social dynamics is a science, and if the law of the three states,\ndiscovered by Comte, is its fundamental law, this law (and those which\nproceed from it), must explain the successive phases of humanity,\nfrom the first dawn of civilisation, to the present condition of the\nmost advanced nations. They must \u201cintroduce unity and continuity into\nthis immense spectacle, where in general we see so much confusion\nand incoherence.\u201d[286] Thus the counterpart of social science is\na philosophy of history. In it, social science finds its concrete\nexpression and its verification. In the absence of the prevision of\nsocial facts for the future, a prevision which is rendered almost\nimpossible by the extreme complication of these facts, social science\nat least allows of the \u201crational co-ordination\u201d of the whole of the\npast.\n\nIn order to establish this philosophy of history, Comte gave himself\ntwo postulates. The first is common to him and to all those who\nendeavoured to set forth the evolution of humanity from its beginnings,\nespecially before the recent progress made by anthropology. Comte\n\u201cconstructs\u201d primitive man and the society in which he lived. The\nsecond postulate consists in considering, instead of the history of\nthe whole of humanity, \u201cthe most complete and the most characteristic\nevolution,\u201d that is to say, that of the white race; and in this race,\nonly the populations of western Europe.[287] Comte will almost confine\nhimself to the periods dealt with by Bossuet in the _Discours sur\nl\u2019histoire universelle_, which, moreover, he greatly esteems. His\nphilosophy of history only embraces Egyptian civilisation, very little\nknown in his time, then Greece and Rome, and finally after the fall of\nthe Roman Empire, the development of some Latin and Germanic peoples in\nEurope.\n\nWe can understand that Bossuet should have so limited universal history\nas to include in it only a small portion of humanity gathered on the\nshores of the Mediterranean. He was obliged to do so by the leading\nidea in his work which makes the appearance of Christianity the\nculminating point in the human drama. All that precedes it must tend\nto bring it about, all that comes after it must arise from it. But is\nAuguste Comte, like Bossuet, justified in leaving out of universal\nhistory the great civilisations of the far east, almost the whole of\nAfrica, and the whole of the new world? Since, according to him, there\nis no chosen people, nor \u201cprovidential direction,\u201d must he not consider\nthe total evolution of humanity? He has no right to isolate a part of\nit in an arbitrary manner, and to neglect the rest. He has it all the\nless in that he considers the species in its entirety as an individual,\nand that this hypothesis of Condorcet has become a principle of social\nscience with him.\n\nBut Comte believes his postulate to be as well justified by his\ndefinition of sociology, as Bossuet\u2019s plan could have been by his\ntheological doctrine. Resembling on this point the other positive\nsciences, sociology is made of laws not of facts. The pure and\nsimple knowledge of facts is only an end from the point of view of\nscholarship. Science only seeks for this knowledge in the measure in\nwhich it is indispensable for the determination of laws. Consequently,\nif the evolution of human society proceeded simultaneously at different\npoints on the globe, as, this evolution takes place, as we suppose,\neverywhere according to invariable laws, and as climate and race can\nonly modify it within very narrow limits, the sociologist is not bound\nto study all the societies of the past and of the present. He will\nonly do so in order to make use of the comparative method, in the\nmeasure which is judged useful and within the limitations permitted by\nthis method. In the second place, among those historical evolutions,\nup to the present time independent of one another, to which will he\ngive the preference to seek in it the verification of abstract social\ndynamics? Evidently to the most complete and the most characteristic:\nfor there he will have least difficulty in disengaging the laws from\nthe extraordinary complexity of facts. Have we not seen that the\nidea of progress, without which sociology cannot be constituted, has\nonly been definitely formulated since the French Revolution? Comte\nthen thought himself authorised to \u201climit his historical study to\nthe sole examination of a homogeneous and continuous series, which\nwas nevertheless justly qualified as universal.\u201d At every moment in\nhistory, the people whose evolution is most advanced represent the\nwhole of humanity since the rest of humanity is destined, sooner or\nlater to pass through the same phase. Hence the idea, which is found\nequally in Hegel and in Renan, of a \u201cmission\u201d of races and of peoples.\nA temporary mission which, while it lasts, constitutes their might and\ntheir right, but which, too often, they have the misfortune to survive.\n\n\nI.\n\nThe positive philosophy of history takes as its guiding principle\nthe idea of unity. In virtue of a postulate which is an audacious\nanticipation concerning an uncertain future, the human species, in\nit, is regarded as an immense social unity. Similarly, in it, the\nevolution of humanity is regarded as ending in the moral and religious\nunity of all men. Humanity goes from spontaneous religion where it\nbegins, to demonstrated religion where it becomes finally established.\nBetween the two lies the domain of history. The successive states\nthrough which humanity passes in evolving are not homogeneous. The\ntheological and the positive spirit are mingled in them at various\ndegrees. They struggle one against the other. These states then contain\nwithin themselves the principle of their own destruction. Each one\nnecessarily prepares the appearance of the following one, until the\nfinal state in which the positive spirit alone will predominate.\n\nThe spring of these concrete views of history is the logical need\nof unity. It is this which determined the initial movement. For the\nprimitive religions, unity was never perfect. Even at the period when\nfetichism rules without question, some rudiments of the positive spirit\nexist. Human nature, being invariable, the germ of its final state was\nalready contained in a primitive state. From that time it was certain\nthat, if humanity emerged from its primitive state, it would evolve\nuntil it found unity in the final religion.\n\nIf this be so, how is it that Comte did not regard the succession of\nreligious forms as the supreme dynamic law, as the principle of the\nphilosophy of history? Why did he believe rather that he had found this\nprinciple in the law of the evolution of philosophies? It is because,\naccording to him, the evolution of religious forms is a function\nof intellectual evolution. It is even subordinate to intellectual\nevolution, in this sense, that progress in the knowledge of the laws\nof nature sooner or later brings about a religious revolution. In the\nsecond place, if the philosophy of history had chosen the succession\nof religious forms as its chief axis, it would only have studied the\nprocess of decomposition of beliefs, which, up to the present time, has\nled them from the period when all thought is religious (fetichism), to\nthat when no thought seems to be so any more (philosophical deism). It\nwould not show at the same time the inverse and simultaneous process\nof the positive spirit, which not only determines this progressive\ndecomposition, but also prepares the elements of a new faith. It would\nnot show how by degrees, by means of science, this spirit establishes\na conception of nature which by becoming social will become universal,\nand which will be the basis of the final religion. This is why Comte,\nwhile making religion the chief element in individual and social human\nlife, was nevertheless to take the evolution of the intellect, that is\nto say, the sciences and the philosophies, as the \u201cguiding thread\u201d of\nhis philosophy of history.\n\n\nII.\n\nIt does not come within the purpose of this work to give even a summary\noutline of the philosophy of history developed by Comte first in the\n_Cours de philosophie positive_, and then in the third volume of the\n_Politique positive_. Neither shall we disengage the ingenious or\nprofound views of detail with which it abounds. It will suffice for us\nto show how, according to Comte, the laws of social dynamics are always\nverified, and how apparent exceptions end by being interpreted in the\ndirection of these laws.\n\nFetichism, properly so-called, was succeeded by astrology, then by\npolytheism, which was first conservative (the r\u00e9gime of castes in\nEgypt), then intellectual (Greece), and social (the Roman empire).\nWith the Christian religion monotheism comes to be substituted to\npolytheism. But does not the theory of progress soon meet with an\ninsurmountable obstacle? How does it explain the Middle Ages, that\nlong succession of centuries which Voltaire and the philosophers had\ndescribed as full of darkness, of superstition, and of ignorance,\nas the disgrace of history? How to reconcile this lamentable\n\u201cretrogression\u201d with the \u201ccontinuity\u201d of progress affirmed by social\ndynamics?\n\nAuguste Comte\u2019s answer is presented in two forms.\n\nIn the first place the \u201cretrogression\u201d was never complete. At the time\nwhen the Middle Ages were at their darkest in Europe, Arab civilisation\nwas going through its most brilliant period. In it many of the sciences\nwere going beyond the extreme point reached by them in antiquity.\nThe continuity of evolution was then not interrupted. It suffices to\nunderstand, in conformity with the postulate laid down by Comte at the\nbeginning of social dynamics, that, at this period, the Arabs were the\npart of humanity whose intellectual evolution was most advanced, and\nwho, consequently, represented the rest.\n\nBut, above all, the current opinion concerning the Middle Ages is\nerroneous. The philosophers of the XVIII. century did not know it.\nThey only saw this period through their prejudices, or rather they did\nnot deign to look at it. Nevertheless, the whole spiritual movement\nof modern centuries goes back to those \u201cmemorable times, unjustly\nqualified as dark by metaphysical criticism, of which Protestantism was\nthe first organ.\u201d[288]\n\nIn the first place--and this is a capital proposition in historical\nphilosophy[289]--the feudal _r\u00e9gime_ as a temporal organisation, was\nthe natural result of the situation of the Roman world. In any case\nit would have been formed, even if the invasions had not taken place.\nIn virtue of the _consensus_ which is the fundamental principle of\nsocial statics, the other series of phenomena which accompanied the\nestablishment of the feudal _r\u00e9gime_ were then also produced as a\n\u201cnatural development,\u201d and it is a misunderstanding to see in them\nan interruption of \u201cprogress.\u201d The superiority of Antiquity over\nthe Middle Ages, especially in the fine arts, will be raised as an\nobjection. But Comte only recognises this superiority in the plastic\narts, and especially in sculpture.[290] According to him, it is\nexplained by certain features in Greek customs which were sure to\nmake the people of antiquity incomparable in the art of expressing\nthe beauty of the human form. For the rest, the \u00e6sthetic education of\nhumanity \u201cprogressed during the Middle Ages. Architecture produced\nmarvels of which antiquity had no idea. Dante is a unique poet.\nModern music has its origin in the old Gregorian. Finally, the art\nof the Middle Ages presented two characteristics which the art of\nthe aristocratic societies of antiquity did not possess, at least in\nthe same degree. It was spontaneous, that is to say, in full natural\nharmony with the whole of the surrounding conditions. Consequently, it\nwas popular, it expressed marvellously for the people, the very soul of\nthe people.\n\nIf then it be true that \u201cthe mainspring of the fine arts is to be found\nunder the sway of polytheism,\u201d none the less has the development of\nour \u00e6sthetic faculties been continuous: and the law of progress has\nnot been reversed. It is true that since antiquity these faculties\nhave not found a combination of such favourable circumstances, such a\ndirect and energetic stimulus; but that proves nothing \u201cagainst their\nintrinsic activity, nor against the real merit of their productions.\u201d\nThe \u00e6sthetic spirit has become more widespread, more varied, and even\nmore complete than it could ever have been in antiquity.[291] Hence\nit is that the Renaissance did more harm than good to the fine arts.\nIt inspired an exclusive and servile admiration for the masterpieces\nof antiquity, which are related to an absolute social system. \u201cIn\nthis sense,\u201d says Comte, \u201cthe appreciation of the present romantic\nschool only sins in the direction of historical exaggeration; but its\nrecriminations are far from being groundless.\u201d[292]\n\nSimilarly, the intellectual activity of the Middle Ages has been very\nunjustly treated. Certainly, positive philosophy cannot be suspected of\npartiality in favour of theological dogmas and metaphysical subtleties.\nBut, just as in physics we distinguish the material changes, which are\nwithin reach of our senses, and the molecular movements which escape\nthem, so at certain periods the human intellect produces outside\nitself works which testify to its activity, and at other moments,\nwithout being less active its labour remains an internal one. There are\nperiods of secret and silent preparation. Such, for instance, was the\nfirst portion of the Middle Ages. Far from the human mind remaining\nstationary and inactive at that time it did, on the contrary, a very\nconsiderable work: it was creating the modern languages, that is to\nsay, the indispensable instrument for subsequent progress of thought.\n\nWe must also be fair to two immense series of labours, (alchemy and\nastrology), which have contributed so greatly and for so long to\nthe development of human reason. In coming after the astrologers\nand the alchemists, modern scientific men not only found \u201cscience\nroughly outlined by the perseverance of these bold precursors,\u201d[293]\nthey further received from them the indispensable principle of the\ninvariability of natural laws. Astrology tended to suggest a high view\nof human wisdom. Alchemy restored the feeling of man\u2019s power, which had\nbeen lowered by theological beliefs. In speaking of Roger Bacon, Comte\ngoes so far as to say that the greater number of the scientific men of\nto-day who despise the Middle Ages so much, would be incapable not only\nof writing but even of reading \u201cthe great composition of this admirable\nmonk,\u201d on account of the immense variety of views on all orders of\nphenomena contained in it.[294]\n\nComte further enlarges with pleasure upon the mutual obligations\nof feudal tenure, \u201can admirable combination of the instinct of\nindependence and of the feeling of devotion,\u201d upon the appearance\nof chivalry, upon the raising of the condition of women, upon the\nenfranchisement of the commons upon the formation of the _tiers \u00e9tat_,\netc.[295] Like the romantic school, being preoccupied with the duty\nof fighting the systematic detractors of the Middle Ages, he goes to\nthe opposite extreme. He no longer sees the famines, the the plagues,\nthe stakes, the interminable wars. He is not content with showing\nthat, in spite of all, the Middle Ages was a period of progress. He\nwants it to be a model period, in which we should find the indication,\n_in all essential aspects_, of the programme which we are to realise\nto-day.[296]\n\nThe secret of Comte\u2019s partiality for the Middle Ages is not hard to\ndiscover. He never tires of praising the Catholic organisation of this\nperiod, the separation of the temporal from the spiritual power,[297]\nlast of all \u201cthe miracle of the papal hegemony.\u201d Nothing of the\nkind was known in antiquity. That alone suffices to establish the\nsuperiority of the Middle Ages. Positive philosophy will restore this\nseparation of the two powers to-day. It will complete the \u201cadmirable\nsketch\u201d drawn of old by the Catholic Church.\n\nPositivism, says Huxley, is \u201cCatholicism minus Christianity.\u201d Comte\nwould not have protested very violently against this definition.\nIndeed, in the Catholicism of the Middle Ages, he distinguishes\nbetween the doctrine and the institutions. The doctrine is on the\ndecline and will disappear. But the institutions were masterpieces of\npolitical wisdom, and they have only been ruined by having seemed to be\ninseparable from this doctrine. They ought to be re-established upon\nintellectual bases at once broader and more permanent.[298] Positive\nphilosophy furnishes these bases. It will know how to restore the\n\u201cgovernment of souls,\u201d according to the model left by the Catholic\nChurch of the Middle Ages.\n\nIt has often been said that the social action of Catholicism was\nespecially due to its moral teaching. Comte reverses this proposition.\nThe moral efficacy of Catholicism principally depended upon the\nconstitution of the Church, and only in an accessory way upon its\ndoctrine.[299] Without the constant action of an organised spiritual\npower, a religion, however pure it may be, cannot have much power over\nthe conduct of men. Catholicism had understood this. It had founded\na system of common education which was equally received by rich and\npoor. Morality thus acquired the \u201cascendency which belongs to it.\u201d\nThe feelings were subjected to an admirable discipline, which exerted\nitself to uproot even the smallest seeds of corruption.[300]\n\nTo conclude, \u201cthe eternal honour\u201d[301] of Catholicism is to have\nbrought a decisive improvement into the theory of the social\norganism, by the separation of the two powers. Many causes have\ncontributed to its being misunderstood; the excessive admiration of\nthe modern historians for the city of classical times, the partiality\nof Protestants for the early Church, and finally the contempt of\nphilosophers for the supposed darkness of the Middle Ages. We judge\nof it better to-day. Positive philosophy does not confine itself to\nrehabilitating the Catholic organisation: it takes it up again on its\nown account. \u201cThe more I investigate this immense subject,\u201d writes\nComte to John Stuart Mill, \u201cthe more confirmed I become in the view\nwhich I already held twenty years ago, at the time of my work upon the\nspiritual power, of regarding ourselves, we, systematic positivists,\nas the real successors of the great men of the Middle Ages, by taking\nup the social work again at the point to which Catholicism had carried\nit.\u201d[302] Undoubtedly the conditions are not the same to-day, and we\nmust take the differences into account. But as to the extent and the\nintensity of action, we may say that for each of the social relations\non which the Catholic clergy had to pronounce, an analogous attribution\nexists for the modern spiritual power.[303] In a word, excepting for\nthe dogma, Comte borrows from the Catholicism of the Middle Ages\nalmost everything, its organisation, its _r\u00e9gime_, its worship, and,\nif he could, its clergy and its cathedrals. His religion will be a\nCatholicism raised upon another basis.\n\n\nIII.\n\nThe separation between the temporal and spiritual power realised by\nCatholicism in the Middle Ages marks a decisive progress in the history\nof humanity. But it was not finally established. The _r\u00e9gime_ of\nwhich it formed a part was bound to disappear, because of the \u201cmutual\nantipathy\u201d between the elements included within it. The Catholic\norganisation of the thirteenth century was first shaken and then\ndestroyed by the advancing ascendancy of the positive spirit, and the\nresistance of theological dogma. From this \u201corganic\u201d period European\nsociety has passed to a \u201ccritical\u201d period which has filled centuries,\nand which positive philosophy alone is able to bring to a close. The\nwhole of modern history, political, religious, scientific, \u00e6sthetic,\neconomic, etc., is, at bottom, merely the succession of the necessary\nstages in this double work; the decomposition of the _r\u00e9gime_ of the\nMiddle Ages, and the preparation for the positive period. In a first\nphase, which occupies the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the\nmovement remains a spontaneous one. It ignores the end to which it is\ntending. In the second, which extends to the end of the eighteenth\ncentury, the disorganisation becomes deeper under the influence of an\nentirely negative philosophy.[304]\n\nThe first signs of the decomposition which was beginning were of an\neconomic order. The phenomena of this order are indeed a factor of\nthe highest importance in the whole of social life. The economic\nevolution, according to Comte, necessarily precedes the \u00e6sthetic and\nscientific evolution. It is the former, far more than the two latter,\nwhich characterises our civilisation in contrast with the societies of\nantiquity.[305] Through it the organisation of modern societies was to\nbegin. The freeing of the serfs, the foundation of independent urban\ncommunes, the transformation of industry which arose from this, are\ndescribed by Comte almost in the same terms as those used by Augustin\nThierry, (who like him had worked by the side of Saint-Simon). It is\nthe ending of an economic organisation, and the heralding of a new\n_r\u00e9gime_.\n\nWhen this spontaneous decomposition had reached a certain point, the\ncritical doctrines could appear and push it further. But, to see in\nthese doctrines the original cause of this great movement, is to credit\nthem with an exaggerated influence, and even, strictly speaking, an\nincomprehensible one. In order that doctrines may arise and prosper\nthey must find favourable ground. The contrary opinion exaggerates\n\u201cbeyond all possibility\u201d the political influence of the intellect, and\ncreates a kind of vicious circle.[306]\n\nThe principle of \u201cfree examination\u201d was at first, in the XVI century,\nonly a natural result of the new social situation gradually brought\nabout by the two preceding centuries. For this principle corresponds to\na state of \u201cnon-government\u201d of minds. And this state, in turn, comes\nfrom the progressive dissolution of mental discipline. It lasts so long\nas a spiritual power has not been reconstituted upon new foundations.\nIn a society where spiritual power is normally exercised, that is to\nsay, where it governs the universality of minds, united by a body of\ncommon beliefs, the need of intellectual liberty is not developed in\nindividuals. At any rate it does not challenge unanimously accepted\nprinciples. But, when this power is weakened, the principles begin\nto be discussed. Each one soon claims to be a judge of their value.\nEverything then depends on the combination of social conditions. We can\nno more produce than we can stifle this disposition of minds, \u201coutside\nthe conditions which are favourable or unfavourable to it.\u201d It is only\ndeveloped during the periods which are not \u201corganic.\u201d \u201cIt is through\nhaving misunderstood this law of social statics that so many historical\nerrors have been committed, in which the symptom is mistaken for the\ncause, and the result for the principle.\u201d[307]\n\nThe first general form of the principle of freedom of examination\nexpressed itself in Protestantism. In it this freedom at first remained\nconfined within the more or less narrow limits of Christian theology.\nThe spirit of criticism at first especially endeavoured, in the very\nname of Christianity, to ruin the admirable system of the Catholic\nhierarchy, which was its social realisation. This is the characteristic\ninconsequence of the metaphysical spirit, which always denies the\nlogical deductions while claiming to maintain the principles, and\nwhich, in this particular case, aspired to reform Christianity at the\nsame time that it destroyed the necessary conditions of its existence,\nthat is to say, its organisation.\n\nIn the same way, as in the Catholicism of the Middle Ages, Comte\nchiefly admires \u201cthe masterpiece of political wisdom,\u201d which knew how\nto separate the attributes of temporal power from those of spiritual\npower; so in Protestantism he especially sees the destructive principle\nof this masterpiece. He unceasingly reproaches it with having\nsubordinated the spiritual to the temporal power in the whole of\nEurope. This \u201cchief perturbation\u201d was the origin of all the others.\nIn accordance with the leaders of the traditionalist school, with\nde Maistre and de Bonald in France, with Haller in Germany, Comte\ninsists upon the close relationship between the Protestant spirit and\nthe revolutionary spirit. Once it has been demanded, the right of\nexamination spreads by a necessity which is at once mental and social\nand cannot be overcome, to all individuals and all questions. The name\nof Protestantism should not be restricted to religious reform. It is\nno less suitable for the whole of the revolutionary philosophy. For\nthis philosophy, from Lutheranism to the Deism of the XVIII. century,\n\u201cwithout excluding Atheism which constitutes its extreme phase\u201d is\na _protestation_, at first against the principles of the old social\norder, and then against any organisation, whatever.[308]\n\nThe \u201cabsolute and indefinite\u201d dogma of free examination sets up each\nindividual judgment as an arbiter upon all social questions. From this\ndogma gradually emerge absolute liberty in speaking and writing, the\npolitical sovereignty of the masses at will creating or destroying\ninstitutions, the equality of all men, the isolation of nations: in\na word, as Haller has said, \u201csocial and political atomism.\u201d These\nconsequences had become inevitable from the day when Protestantism\ngave the supreme decision in religious questions to every one, without\ntaking into account conditions either of competence, or authority. This\nfirst step was a decisive one. If, supposing an impossibility, modern\nsociety were replaced in the state in which it was when Protestantism\nsucceeded in becoming established, the same necessary succession of\nsocial and political consequences would again unfold themselves.\n\nAfter that, it matters little that Protestantism should have fought\nagainst the revolutionary spirit, and that it should have disavowed\n\u201canarchical\u201d philosophy. It matters little that it should have made\nrepeated efforts to constitute a spiritual authority, and that it\nshould have produced a multitude of sects \u201cof which each pitied the\npreceding one and abhorred the one which followed it.\u201d[309] Whatever\nit may do, Protestantism remains purely critical, negative and\ndisorganising. Consequently the part it plays can only be transitory.\nIt contains no element which the positive organisation should preserve.\nIt naturally ends in philosophical Deism.\n\nThis Deism appears as early as the XVII. century in England, and in\nHolland with Hobbes, Spinoza and Bayle. The right of examination is\nhenceforth recognised as indefinite in principle, but in fact, it is\nthought possible to maintain the metaphysical discussion within the\nmore general limits of monotheism.[310] At bottom they continue \u201cto\ndestroy religion in the name of the religious principle.\u201d A \u201crational\ntheology\u201d is constructed; and the natural religion, dear to the XVIII.\ncentury, is finally reached.\n\nNow, in Comte\u2019s eyes, rational theology is an \u201cincoherent\nexpression,\u201d[311] and natural religion \u201ca monstrous drawing together\nof terms.\u201d As if every religion (with the exception of the positive\none), was not necessarily supernatural! The harmony between\nreason and belief, even when sought for with perfect sincerity,\nis deadly for faith. For the strength of theological conceptions\nlies in their spontaneity. Logical proof, even admitting that it\nbe really demonstrative, never fortifies and can only weaken them.\nThe innumerable proofs of the existence of God which have appeared\nsince the XII. century, not only state the bold doubts of which this\nexistence has been the object: it can also be asserted that they\nhave largely contributed to the propagation of those doubts, \u201ceither\nthrough the contempt which the weakness of many of these arguments\nwas bound to reflect upon ancient beliefs, or even by consideration\nof the strongest of these arguments.\u201d[312] Popular instinct was not\nmistaken in calling the metaphysicians who were working at these proofs\natheists. Their work was essentially anti-theological. Our century sees\nit in another light. As the decay of theology still continues, that\nwhich formerly was judged by public opinion as impious, may to-day\nappear to be a pious occupation.\n\nThe criticism of religious beliefs has been developed and spread\nwithout giving too much offence to temporal power, thanks to the care\ntaken by philosophers in general to reassure it upon the immediate\nconsequences of their labours. Hobbes in the XVII. century, Voltaire\nin the XVIII. are as conservative from the political point of view\nas they are revolutionary from the religious point of view. The\nprecaution was a very wise one on their part. But it did not arrest the\nconsequences which arose from their principles. Critical philosophy,\nurging the dogma of the freedom of examination to the assault of all\nthe principles of the established r\u00e9gime, shook and ruined them one\nafter the other, until the \u201cfinal explosion\u201d of the French Revolution.\nThis was the conclusion in fact of the long work of decomposition which\nhad been going on during five centuries. The old r\u00e9gime was rotten; the\nRevolution overturned it, meaning to clear the ground.\n\nBut did it lay down the basis of the r\u00e9gime which was to succeed\nthis one? It did not, replies Comte with Saint-Simon and de Maistre.\nHe admires the energy of the political gifts of the Convention.\nNevertheless it was wrong in believing that \u201ccritical\u201d principles could\ntake the place and carry out the functions of \u201corganic\u201d principles. So\nlong as the struggle lasted, the critical principles had been all the\nmore effective in that they were credited with an absolute value. Thus\nthe dogma of boundless liberty of conscience had served to destroy the\nspiritual power of the catholic clergy, the dogma of the sovereignty\nof the people to upset the temporal government, finally the dogma of\nnatural equality to decompose the system of social classes. But, once\nthe old r\u00e9gime was abolished the error of taking these dogmas as the\nbasis of \u201creorganisation\u201d was committed.\n\nIt was not seen that they were incompatible not only with the r\u00e9gime\nwhich they had just destroyed, but _with any social system whatever_.\nIn this way it is moral and political disorder which was upheld as\nthe end of social perfection. For, each of the dogmas of the critical\ndoctrine, when it is taken in an organic sense, \u201ccomes exactly to lay\ndown as a principle that in this particular respect society _must not\nbe organised_.\u201d[313]\n\nWhat becomes of government, for instance in this system? \u201cBy a direct\nand total supervision of the most fundamental political notions,\u201d\ngovernment is represented, the necessary enemy of society.[314] The\nlatter must always hold it in a state of suspicion and of supervision,\nit must more and more restrict its modes of activity, and finally only\nleave it functions of general police, without its contributing in any\nway to the direction of the collective life and social development.\nIn a word, with no action upon ideas, upon beliefs or feelings, the\ngovernment would only have charge of the protection of interests.\nBut is not this formally denying the very idea of government, which\nby definition, should on the contrary represent \u201cthe spirit of the\nwhole,\u201d and the \u201cdirecting function\u201d of society? Is it not giving up\nat the same time the great progress realised by the Middle Ages, that\nis to say a spiritual power independent of the temporal power? Even\nconsidering interests alone, this system only maintains order with\ngreat difficulty. It is obliged to have recourse to corruption, and it\nleads to continual increase in public expenditure.\n\nThe principles of critical philosophy cannot then be used as a\nfoundation for a new social organisation. The attempt has been made\nand has been condemned by history. This failure could have been\nforetold. For, being essentially metaphysical, this philosophy implies\na contradiction which necessarily renders it powerless. It tends to\npreserve the general bases of the old political system, whose chief\nconditions of existence it has however destroyed.[315] There is a very\nclose relationship between the natural religion of philosophers and\nthe political conceptions of the revolutionists. The latter are still\nconnected by their deepest roots with the old order of beliefs which\nthey have fought against with all their strength. Liberty, equality,\nthe sovereignty of the people, the whole of the \u201cabsolute\u201d rights which\nconstitute the basis of the revolutionary doctrine is shielded, in the\nlast place, by a kind of \u201creligious although vague consecration.\u201d The\nFrench Revolution was the work of the Deists. Comte has set apart the\nthinkers of the XVIII century whom he considers as his precursors,\nthat is to say, as the anticipatory representatives of the positive\nspirit: Fontenelle, Hume, Montesquieu, Diderot, and d\u2019Alembert, Turgot,\nCondorcet and a few others. He judges the rest of the philosophy of\nthe century more severely. He does not spare the _Encyclop\u00e9die_,\nand in the majority of the philosophical writings of this period he\nfinds little but \u201ca frivolous and feeble sophistic argumentation.\u201d\nCircumstances almost alone have made its success. This philosophy is\nincomparably inferior to that which the counter-revolution opposed to\nit. In the logical respect _which finally predominates_, says Comte,\nthe revolutionary criticism cannot to-day resist the system of the\n\u201cretrograde school.\u201d In a regular discussion, the latter would soon\nhave compelled it to admit that it allows the essential principles\nof the old r\u00e9gime while refusing to accept their most indispensable\nconsequences.[316]\n\nThe inmost contradiction from which the revolutionary philosophy\nsuffers will become more and more apparent. A not far distant moment\nwill arrive when the effort to restore the past will include a\nlarge number of those who have contributed to its destruction. The\npartisans of natural religion, and even those of the most advanced\nDeism will rally to Catholicism as to the real foundation of the\nsocial organisation which they defend. The alternative will then be\nset up between the only two solutions which are logical and organic:\neither the old r\u00e9gime, with the Catholic organisation, or the new,\nwith the positive organisation. Between these two there is no room for\nthe critical, liberal, metaphysical, revolutionary system, which, by\nwhatever name it may be called, signifies \u201cno organisation at all.\u201d\n\n\nIV.\n\nThe old r\u00e9gime was bound to perish because in it, the social\norganisation was connected with a system of beliefs and of dogmas\nwhich could not withstand the spirit of investigation. In order that\nthe new r\u00e9gime may escape this cause of death, must it be able without\nsuffering to bear the indefinite exercise of an absolute freedom\nof examination?\u2014\u2014No, replies Comte, there is no system capable of\nenduring under these conditions. But it suffices that in constituting\nitself, the new faith, which is the basis of social order, should have\nundergone the test of free examination as we see it practised in the\npositive sciences. It suffices that, instead of a revealed faith, we\nshould have a demonstrated faith which will then be immovable, and\nwhich will no more have to be called in question.\n\nComte then admits the preliminary test, but he is opposed to free\nexamination indefinitely renewed. This distinction allows us to\nreconcile some of his declarations which otherwise would appear\ncontradictory. His language differs according as he speaks of the\npositive dogma in the process of formation, or of that dogma once\nit has been formed. When it is in process of formation the dogma is\nsubject to criticism, and if it is not victorious in resisting it\nit does not become an object of belief. No matter how much we may\ndeplore the ever-dissolving energy of the spirit of analysis and of\nexamination, it remains beneficial none the less, by compelling,\nfor the intellectual and moral reorganisation, the production of\na philosophy capable of sustaining the decisive test of a deep\ndiscussion, \u201cfreely prolonged until the entire conviction of public\nreason\u201d has taken place. This is a condition from which nothing\nhenceforth can exempt us.[317] The spiritual reorganisation, says\nComte, will be the result of purely intellectual action. It supposes\na voluntary and unanimous assent at the end of complete discussion\nwithout the intervention of the spiritual powers to hasten the\nconclusion.\n\nBut does it follow that freedom of examination should _remain_\nindefinitely without limits? Undoubtedly it has been a good thing that\nmen should see in this liberty an indefeasible right which they were\nall to enjoy. The dissolution of old beliefs in this way was easier and\nmore rapid. The better this \u201csingular phase\u201d in our social development\nis analysed, the more will the conviction gain ground that without\nthe conquest and use of this unlimited freedom social reorganisation\ncould not have been prepared. But this singular phase was a transitory\none. When it has been gone through, when common principles have again\nbecome universally accepted, \u201cafter sufficient verification,\u201d the\nright of examination will again return within its normal and permanent\nlimits, which consist in discussing the connection of consequences\nwith fundamental and uniformly respected rules, but without again\nquestioning these rules themselves.[318]\n\nThe question then reduces itself to knowing when the test may be\nlegitimately considered as at an end. Will the individual approbation\nof all the members of society be required, and a kind of consecration\nby universal suffrage? As a matter of fact, such unanimity will perhaps\nnever be realised. In justice it is not necessary. When we demand it we\nforget that Politic science is a positive science, the highest and most\ncomplicated of all. No one possesses any authority in the sciences if\nhe is not competent. The people has no thought of making its opinion\nprevail in them; and, in matters of science, all who are not in a\ncondition to understand demonstrations are the people. The convergence\nof intellects presupposes the voluntary and intentional renunciation\non the part of the greater number of their \u201csovereign right of\nexamination.\u201d[319]\n\nIn this way the right is taken from no one. The use of it is simply\nintrusted by those who are incompetent to the competent ones. This\nintrusting, freely accepted by all, lasts as long as the conditions\nwhich made it necessary. No moral order could be compatible with\nthe \u201cwandering liberty of minds at the present time,\u201d if it were to\npersist indefinitely. It is not possible that any man, whether he be\ncompetent or not, should every day call into discussion the very bases\nof society. \u201cSystematic tolerance cannot exist, and has never really\nexisted, except on the subject of opinions which are regarded as\nindifferent or as doubtful.\u201d[320]\n\nSuch is the meaning of the celebrated passages on liberty of conscience\nwith which Comte has so often been reproached. He had written it in\n1822, and quoted it himself in the fourth volume of the _Cours de\nphilosophie positive_,[321] never suspecting that anything could be\nsaid against it. \u201cThere is no liberty of conscience in astronomy,\nin physics, in chemistry, in physiology, in the sense that everyone\nwould deem it absurd not to take on trust the principles established\nin these sciences by competent men. If it is otherwise in politics,\nit is because the old principles have fallen, and, as the new ones\nare not yet formed, there are, properly speaking, in this interval no\nestablished principles.\u201d It is then in no way a question of imposing\nbeliefs upon men of which they are not to judge, by a kind of spiritual\ndespotism. Comte merely wishes to extend to politics, _considered as\na positive science_, what is admitted in the other sciences by common\nconsent.\n\n\nV.\n\nWithout much trouble, it is easy to see whence originate the essential\nfeatures of this philosophy of history. In so far as it represents the\ndevelopment of humanity as subject to a law of evolution, which causes\nit to go through a succession of phases whose order is rationally\ndetermined, in a word as _progress_, the leading-idea is due to Comte\u2019s\n\u201cspiritual father,\u201d to Condorcet.\n\nFor the interpretation of more recent events, and for the judgment\npassed upon the Middle Ages, Comte draws his inspiration from Joseph\nde Maistre, from the traditionalist school, and from Saint-Simon. To\nthe latter, among other ideas, Comte owes the distinction between the\ncritical and the organic periods. But, on Comte\u2019s own confession,\nJoseph de Maistre\u2019s influence over his mind was especially decisive.\nLike de Maistre, he thinks that the entirely negative philosophy of\nthe XVIII. century knew very well how to destroy, but showed itself\npowerless to construct. Like de Maistre again, he is persuaded of the\nfact that social order requires a spiritual power beside the temporal\npower, and that the r\u00e9gime of the Middle Ages was a \u201cmasterpiece of\npolitical wisdom\u201d precisely because at that period the Catholic Church\nhad brought about the independence of the spiritual power. Finally,\nlike de Maistre, he makes the salvation of humanity in the future\ndepend upon their return to a unity of beliefs.\n\nComte then equally proceeds from the learned ideologist with whom the\nphilosophical effort of the XVIII. century ends, and from the ardent\ntraditionalist for whom this very century is the abhorred period of\nerror and of moral perversion. He undertakes, not indeed to reconcile\nthem (who can reconcile things which exclude each other?), but to\nfound a more comprehensive doctrine in which he will combine what he\nhas received from the one and the other. As such his own task appears\nto him, and he does not believe it to be above his power; he feels\nhimself in a position to avoid the mistakes which his predecessors\nwere bound to make. Condorcet had a clear idea of social science;\nbut that did not prevent him from misunderstanding the real onward\nmovement of the human mind, and only to estimate his own century justly\nat the expense of preceding periods. De Maistre in his turn, no less\nprejudiced, though in another way, does not understand history any\nbetter. To restore society, to re-establish it in the state in which\nit was in the XIII. century, he goes to absurd lengths. He claims to\ntake no notice of the advance of civilisation, and of the development\nof the sciences. Condorcet, who brought to light the idea of progress,\nunderstood nothing in the Middle Ages. De Maistre, who so clearly saw\nthe excellence of the Middle Ages, denies the glaring fact of progress.\n\nBoth are excusable, because they were still too close to the French\nRevolution to grasp its full meaning. In the heart of the fray they\nwere still partially blinded. Comte, who sees things from a greater\ndistance, also sees them from a higher standpoint. He especially has\nat his disposal an instrument which neither Condorcet nor de Maistre\npossessed: he has completed the positive method, and he applies it\nto the science of historical phenomena. In a word, he has founded\nSociology.\n\nIf he did not push social science as far forward as he believed, at any\nrate he was right in thinking that his originality lay in this attempt.\nThe problem was clearly set: to blend into a new and positive science\nthe social ideas proceeding from the speculation of the XVIII. century\nwith the historical truths brought to light by the adversaries of this\nphilosophy. The solution given by Comte is the very soul of his system.\nBy a twofold and vigorous effort, he created \u201csocial physics.\u201d On the\none hand, he carries to the past the idea of progress which Condorcet\ncould only apply to the future, and this allowed him to institute a\npositive philosophy of history. At the same time, he projects into the\nfuture that spiritual order which de Maistre had only seen in the past,\nand this furnishes him with the frame for his \u201csocial reorganisation\u201d.\n\nThis philosophy of history, which no longer contains anything\nmetaphysical, is social dynamics; this \u201creorganisation\u201d of society, by\nmeans of a spiritual power, will be the positive polity.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[286] Cours, VI, 457.\n\n[287] Cours, V, 4-5.\n\n[288] Cours, V, 360-1: VI, 50.\n\n[289] Cours, V, 318.\n\n[290] Cours, V, 124-7.\n\n[291] Cours, VI, 148.\n\n[292] Cours, VI, 156-7.\n\n[293] Cours, VI, 248.\n\n[294] Cours, VI, 194.\n\n[295] Cours, V, 325.\n\n[296] Pol. pos., II, 121-131.\n\n[297] Cours, V, 306 sq.\n\n[298] Cours, V, 362.\n\n[299] Cours, V, 335.\n\n[300] Pol. pos., II.\n\n[301] Cours, V, 541-5.\n\n[302] Correspondance de Comte et de John Stuart Mill, p. 458 (14,\njuillet 1845.)\n\n[303] Pol. pos., IV, Appendice, p. 193.\n\n[304] Cours, V, 413.\n\n[305] Cours, VI, 23.\n\n[306] Cours, V, 414.\n\n[307] Cours, V, 314-16.\n\n[308] Cours, V, 431-33; 467-8; 511-13.\n\n[309] Cours, V, 531.\n\n[310] Cours, V, 435.\n\n[311] Cours, VI, 236.\n\n[312] Cours, V, 589.\n\n[313] Pol. pos., IV, Appendice, p. 180-1.\n\n[314] Cours, VI, 36.\n\n[315] Cours, IV, 60.\n\n[316] Cours, IV, 159.\n\n[317] Cours, IV, 75 sq.\n\n[318] Cours, IV, 40.\n\n[319] Cours, IV, 100.\n\n[320] Cours, IV, 46.\n\n[321] Cours, IV, 46.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK IV\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nTHE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS\n\n\nIn Comte\u2019s system Ethics occupies an intermediate place between\ntheoretical philosophy and politics. Ethics rests upon the philosophy\nas Politics rests on the principles of Ethics.\n\nEthics is not an abstract speculative science; it does not therefore\nbelong to the hierarchy of the fundamental sciences. It is true that,\nat the end of his life, Comte added a seventh to the six sciences of\nthe early list,[322] which precisely was ethics, that is to say the\nscience of the laws which govern the emotions, passions, desires, etc.,\nof man considered as an individual. But here it is more a question of\nethical psychology than of ethics understood in the sense usual with\nphilosophers. The latter, in Comte\u2019s eyes, never constituted the object\nof a special science. As a matter of fact, either the laws of moral\nphenomena are studied, and this research, founded upon the positive\nknowledge of individual and collective human nature, forms a part\nof sociology. Or, starting from the knowledge of these laws, we ask\nourselves what would be the best use for the power possessed by man\nof modifying phenomena; in this case it is an art whose rules must be\ndetermined. But for these rules to be rationally established, social\nscience itself must be rationally founded. Thus, from the practical\nas from the speculative point of view, positive ethics depends upon\nsociology.\n\n\nI.\n\nIn the XVIII. cent. Comte distinguishes three schools of Ethics: the\nutilitarian school, especially represented in his view by Helvetius;\nthe Kantian School, which he knows through Cousin; and finally the\nphilosophy of the moral sentiment; that is to say, the Scottish school;\nby none of the three is he fully satisfied. The Utilitarianism of\nHelvetius rests upon an inadequate psychology, which distorts human\nnature by denying against all evidence the existence of altruistic\ninclinations. He involuntarily tends to \u201creduce all the social\nrelations to low coalitions of private interests.\u201d The ethics of\nduty, as presented by Cousin, at any rate, organises \u201ca kind of\nmystification, in which the so-called permanent disposition of each\none to direct his conduct according to the abstract idea of duty would\nend in a small number of clever schemers taking advantage of the human\nrace.\u201d These remarks, in Comte\u2019s mind address themselves less to the\ndoctrine than to the person of Cousin. Finally the Scottish school was\nnearer to the truth than the others, since it admitted the existence\nof the altruistic tendencies beside the selfish ones. But it lacked\nprecision and strength.\n\nThese various schools of ethics had a common failing by which they\nstood condemned as erroneous: they were constituted before the science\nof human nature had become positive. Thus utilitarian morality is\nquite deducible from a psychology such as that of Condillac: but\nthis \u201cmetaphysical\u201d psychology treated man chiefly as a reasoning\nand calculating being, and misunderstood the preponderance of the\naffective faculties. In the same way, the \u201cgerman,\u201d that is to say\nCousin\u2019s philosophy, represents the _ego_ as being free, of an absolute\nfreedom, and as being subjected to no law whatever: hence a strange and\nmetaphysical system of ethics of duty.\n\nTheological doctrines of ethics hitherto have been very superior\nto those which have been produced by philosophical speculation. The\nreason for this is simple. Without any scientific apparatus, religion\nimplies a far more exact psychology than that of philosophers up to\nthe present time. It deals with man \u201cconcrete\u201d and real. It was bound\nnot to misunderstand the relative importance of his faculties, and the\nrespective power of his inclinations and his passions. The priest very\noften has a better knowledge of men than the metaphysician.\n\nComte especially admires Christian morality or, more precisely, the\nteaching of this morality as it was given by the Catholic church in\nthe Middle Ages. \u201cAll the different branches of this morality have\nreceived most important improvements from Catholicism.\u201d In saying \u201cLove\nthy neighbour as thyself,\u201d in making charity the supreme virtue, in\nfighting against selfishness as the source of all vices, Christian\nmorality has taught what above all other things must be engraved upon\nmen\u2019s hearts. Positive philosophy will use the same language. \u201cFor\nanyone who has gone deeply into the study of humanity, universal love\nas Catholicism conceived it is still more important than the intellect\nitself in the economy of our individual or social existence, because to\nthe gain of each one and of all, love makes use even of the least of\nour mental faculties, while selfishness disfigures or paralyses even\nthe best dispositions.\u201d[323]\n\nBut the greatest merit of Catholicism has been that it considered\nethics as \u201cthe first of social necessities.\u201d Everything is subordinated\nto it: it is subordinated to nothing. It dominates the entire life\nof man so as ceaselessly to direct and control all his actions. In\nancient society, morals depended upon politics. In Christian society\neven politics borrows its principles from morals. That was the finest\ntriumph of \u201cCatholic wisdom,\u201d which instituted a spiritual power\nindependent of the temporal power.\n\nUnfortunately this pure and lofty morality has linked its destinies\nwith those of Catholicism. Now, Catholicism has been unable to keep\npace with the progress of the intellect and of the positive method.\nAt first it gave proof of \u201cadmirable liberality.\u201d Later it became\nindifferent, and then hostile, to scientific progress. Finally it\nshowed itself to be \u201cretrograde,\u201d when it had to struggle for its own\nexistence. Catholic dogmas underwent a decomposition the necessary\nstages of which have been already described[324] as it was bound to\nhappen, and as a matter of fact did happen, the morality itself came\nto be affected by the attacks which were loosening the foundations of\ndogma. The work of criticism, after having successively ruined all the\nfoundations of the old intellectual system, was subsequently to attack\nthose of ethics. So we see the family, marriage, heredity, \u201cassailed by\nsenseless sects.\u201d[325] To be sure, private morality depends upon other\nconditions than those of unanimous opinions immovably established.\nNatural feeling speaks in it. Nevertheless it is not beyond the reach\nof \u201ccorrosive discussion,\u201d when opinions of this kind are lacking, but\npublic morality is all the more threatened. Here, without naming them,\nbut clearly pointing them out, Comte attacks the schools of Saint-Simon\nand Fourier. \u201cWhile dreaming about reorganisation of society they only\ndeveloped the most dangerous anarchy.\u201d Saint-Simonism endeavoured to\nruin the family which the revolutionary storm, \u201cwith a few exceptions,\u201d\nhad respected. Fourierism denies the most general and the commonest\nprinciple of individual morality: the subordination of the passion to\nreason.\n\nMust we then go back, as the retrograde school would have us do, and\nin order to save morality base it once again upon revealed religion?\nBut the remedy, if it be not worse than the disease, is at least\npowerless to cure it. How could the religious dogmas be used as a\nsupport for morality when they cannot sustain themselves? What, in\nthe future, can we expect from beliefs which have not withstood the\nprogress of reason? Far from being able to furnish a solid basis for\nmorality to-day, religious beliefs tend more and more to become doubly\ndetrimental to it. On the one hand they are opposed to the human mind\nplacing it on a more solid foundation; and, on the other hand, they are\nnot active enough, even among those who believe in them, to exert a\nmarked influence upon conduct. The clearest result of these dogmas is\nto inspire the greater number of men who are still imbued with them,\nwith an instinctive and insurmountable hatred of those who have shaken\nthem off.\n\n\nII.\n\nBeing founded upon positive science, Comte\u2019s ethics will reproduce its\nessential characteristics. In the first place it will be \u201creal,\u201d that\nis to say it will rest upon observation and not upon imagination. It\nwill consider man as he is and not as he fancies himself to be. It will\nthen rest, not upon the abstract analysis which he may make of his own\nheart, but upon the proofs given by humanity of its inclinations and\nof the usual motives for its actions, during the centuries made known\nto us by history. In a word, through the use of an objective and truly\nscientific method, it will avoid serious causes for mistakes.\n\nBeing positive, this morality will be relative. For the immediate and\nnecessary consequence of the relativity of knowledge is the relativity\nof morality. Kant, whom Comte himself called \u201cthe last of his great\nprecursors,\u201d attempted to preserve an absolute character for ethics: it\nis because, at bottom, he also preserved metaphysics. The moral law,\nsays Kant, is universally valid for every free and reasonable being.\nBut the only species of beings of this kind which we know, the human\nspecies, is developed in time according to the laws of a necessary\nprogress. At every stage in this development it was not possessed of\nan equal aptitude for understanding a moral law. The most we can say\nis that, with time, the aptitude becomes greater and greater. Then,\nthe existence of our species depends upon a great number of natural\nconditions--astronomical, physical, biological, sociological. If these\nconditions were different, which is not an absurd hypothesis, our\nmorality would be different also. It is then relative at once to our\nsituation and to our organisation.\u201d\n\nThe idea of a relative morality is still a source of anxiety to many\nminds, who take it to be a preliminary step towards the negation of all\nmorality. They think that, either good is absolute or the distinction\nbetween good and evil vanishes; there is no middle course. However,\nhistory shows that there is a way out of such deadlocks. Was not a\nsimilar dilemma put on the subject of knowledge? Was it not even said:\neither truth is absolute, or there is not truth at all? The dilemma was\na false one. The human mind has become accustomed to relative truths;\nand an analogous solution will end by being also accepted for ethics.\nThe acknowledgment of its relativity will not be any more fatal for it\nthan it has been for science.\n\nAs the distinction between the true and the false subsists, although\ngood is no longer conceived as absolute and immutable, so the\ndistinction between good and evil subsists, although good is no longer\nconceived as a supreme theological or metaphysical reality, but as a\n\u201cprogress\u201d towards an end indefinitely approached but never reached.\nThe evolution of morality corresponds to that of knowledge. Both go\nthrough successive phases, of which each one implies the preceding\nones, and preserves while modifying them. There are then \u201cgoods\u201d as\nthere are \u201ctruths,\u201d provisional and temporary. Positive philosophy can\nthus give a reason for moral ideas, sometimes so poor and even so\nhorrible, upon which humanity formerly lived. It does not judge the\nethics of the past as compared with the ideals of to-day. It gives full\njustice to the theological and philosophical ethics which it replaces,\nand of which it proclaims itself the legitimate heir.\n\nFinally it claims neither to be moral nor original in morality. Already\npositive science is \u201ca prolongation of public reason.\u201d In its nature it\ndoes not differ from simple commonsense, to which it owes its essential\nideas: only in science these ideas assume a more systematic definition,\nand an abstract character which allows us to make the most thorough\nuse of them. In the same way systematic morality is a prolongation of\nspontaneous morality.[326] It simply disengages the principles which,\nas a matter of fact, have directed the moral development of humanity.\nDoes it follow from this that it only has, so to speak, an interest for\ncuriosity, and that moral progress takes place of itself as rapidly\nand as completely as possible, even if philosophical reflection is not\napplied to it? But Comte has already replied to this form of inept\nsophism. What is true of the evolution of humanity in general is true\nof the moral evolution included in it. This evolution allows of crises,\nof diseases, of stoppages in development, etc. It is then not at all\na matter of indifference that systematic morality should bring out\nstrongly the end towards which man\u2019s efforts must tend, according to\nhis nature and to the whole of the conditions in which he is placed. By\nthrowing light upon its advance it helps progress as effectually as it\nis in man\u2019s power to help it.\n\n\nIII.\n\nIn its positive form the enunciation of the moral problem is as much\nas possible to make the sympathetic instincts predominate over the\nselfish impulses, \u201csociability over personality.\u201d[327]\n\nThat human nature admits of sympathetic instincts, or, according to the\nname given them by Comte, _altruistic_ instincts, is not a postulate\nbut a fact. Positive psychology proves it. It is one of the solid\nportions of Gall\u2019s doctrine. To be convinced of this it is enough to\nobserve men, children, and even animals. Without these instincts,\nmoreover, society would not subsist. Metaphysicians who considered\nman as a being acting chiefly through reasoning, may have imagined a\nsociety founded upon the expressed or tacit consent of the contracting\nparties. In reality, before all things men obey their inclinations. If\nthey live in society, it is assuredly because their affective faculties\nlead them to it. Without inborn altruistic tendencies there can be no\nsociety and no morality.\n\nBut biology has proved that, since organic life preponderates\nover animal life, the selfish instincts are naturally stronger\nthan the sympathetic ones. How could the latter succeed first in\ncounter-balancing and then in dominating the former? This problem\nwould have no solution if the progressive ascendency of the altruistic\ninstincts, very weak originally, were not favoured by two orders of\nconditions, the one subjective, the other objective, whose action is\nunceasingly felt.\n\nThe following development of domestic and social affection is, in\nthe first place, the result of the fact that man lives in society,\nand, consequently, in continual relation with his neighbours and his\nfellows. For, as we know, habitual exercise favours the development\nof organs and of functions. Further, the natural inferiority of the\naltruistic inclinations is compensated for by their aptitude for\n\u201cindefinite extension.\u201d They can grow in all the members of a group at\nthe same time. Far from their being obstacles in each other\u2019s way,\nthe stronger altruism in one awakens and encourages nascent altruism\nin others. On the contrary, forms of selfishness tend to exclude each\nother. Save in the case of a more or less durable coalition, their\nrival claims clash with each other, to the peril of social peace.\nThey are bound to make mutual concessions. They are never altogether\nrepressed; however, social life obliges them to dissimulate and to\nrestrain their most violent outbursts.\n\nAdd to this that the benevolent affections find in themselves their own\nsatisfaction, and that this satisfaction is inexhaustible. We tire of\nacting, said Comte, we even tire of thinking; we never tire of loving.\nThe affections which it is sweetest to experience have also a tendency\nto occupy a larger and larger place in the heart of man. Moreover the\nquestion for them is not to take the place of egoism but to hold it\nmore and more in check. If human nature evolves it is, as we know,\nwithout any essential transformation. The preponderance of selfishness\nin us is connected with organic reasons which are beyond our power\nand which will never change. To wish to uproot egoism is folly; _qui\nveut faire l\u2019ange fait la b\u00eate_. Whatever efforts we make, we cannot\npermanently change the relations between our altruistic and egoistic\ninstincts. The latter will always be the strongest. But we can regard\nthis change as an ideal which we shall approach always without ever\nactually reaching it.[328]\n\nFinally, it is rare that our selfish instincts do not awaken some\naltruistic feeling as a counter-result. For example, the sexual\ninstinct determines the development of maternal love. The desire to\nimpose one\u2019s will generates devotion to the common weal. Once the\nbenevolent affection has arisen it persists and grows, and, after the\nselfish instinct has ceased to operate, it is sometimes sought after\nfor its own sake. This fact, says Comte, greatly facilitates the\n\u201csolution of the great human problem.\u201d[329]\n\nThis solution would however remain exceedingly uncertain and very\nprecarious if its only guarantee were the whole of the subjective\nconditions which have just been analysed. For, in order that it may\nbecome established and last, this group of conditions itself requires\nwhat Comte calls an \u201cobjective basis.\u201d The moral order within us must\nbe united to the order of the world outside ourselves.\n\nIt is true that, including the altruistic ones, our inclinations\ntend to become spontaneously developed. But it is also true that the\nexternal world tends constantly to modify them, through the medium\nof the impressions which it makes upon us. For the development of\nthese inclinations is necessarily affected by the direction of our\nconceptions and by the success of our undertakings. Now both are ever\nbecoming more subordinated to external order, since the end of science\nis to know this order, and that of the useful arts is to modify it. In\nthis way, independently of ourselves, order tends in a twofold manner\nto regulate our instincts, \u201ceither by the excitement resulting from\nthe notions which it procures, or by exercise corresponding to the\nefforts which it demands.\u201d[330] In a word, the laws of the \u201c_milieu_\u201d\nin which we live act like a regulation upon our inclinations. Although\nan indirect one, the influence of these laws upon them becomes in the\nlong run irresistible.\n\nAnd further, in order to be felt, this action does not require that we\nshould have a more or less clear knowledge of it. Even at the time when\nman knew almost nothing of the laws of nature, his activity was more\nor less controlled by them. The ends sought after by man have always\ndepended upon his moral and physical nature: the reason of the failure\nor the success of his efforts have always been found in the natural\nlaws. Gradually positive knowledge was developed. Man became conscious\nof the order by which he is himself surrounded, of which he feels\nhimself to be a portion, and in which his intellect collaborates in a\nmeasure difficult to determine but yet certain. The external regulator\nwhich, whatever our will may be, imposes itself upon our activity is\nthus revealed to our mind. The last degree to be reached is that it\nshould finally be accepted by our feeling. This is precisely the result\nobtained by positive philosophy. For it makes us know our individual\nand social nature. It has shown us that humanity must not be explained\nby man, but man by humanity. It has explained the growing development\nof social life and that of altruism, which is at once its condition and\nits consequence. We now understand that our benevolent affections find\nthemselves \u201cspontaneously in conformity with the natural laws which\ngovern the development of society.\u201d[331]\n\nThus it is the continual pressure of external order which makes our\negotistic instincts capable of being trained. They would undoubtedly\nget the mastery, if our sympathetic inclinations did not find without,\nin the laws of nature, a constant support which reason ends by\nunderstanding.\n\nMoral perfection would be harmony realised among all men, by their\nmutual goodwill, according to the principle: _Live for others_, and,\nat the same time, harmony realised in each individual soul, by the\nsubjection of egoism to the altruistic sentiments. But this harmony is\nnot what is produced in the first place. On the contrary, war rages\nbetween the social groups, discord between the members of the same\ngroups, the passions in each individual soul. Sometimes one, sometimes\nanother of our tendencies influences us, according to circumstances\nwhose details vary to infinity. No stable order of subordination is\nestablished among our tendencies: human nature, considered by itself,\ndoes not contain any principle which could maintain such an order.\nLeft to itself, the human soul would remain in the state called\nby Spinoza \u201cfluctuation.\u201d The moral problem would have no durable\nsolution. Hence the necessity of a \u201cuniversal brake,\u201d to make sure of\nthe development of the altruistic tendencies. This brake is no other\nthan the inevitable and continual pressure of the order of the world\nupon our conduct, and in the long run, _upon our motives_.\n\nWhen the human mind wishes to direct its own phenomena, it\ninstinctively seeks, in the general system of intelligible facts which\nconstitutes the world, a group of well combined data, in order to\nrefer its own less stable phenomena to it. We have already seen an\nexample of this kind in the formation of language. Man \u201cconsolidates\u201d\nhis thought by coordinating it with a combination of signs which\nthemselves are movements, and, as such, are subject to the general\nlaws of the universe. In ethics we find something analogous. The main\nartifice in moral perfection, writes Comte, lies in diminishing the\ninconsistency, indecision and divergency in our purposes, by connecting\nour moral and practical intellectual habits with external motives. The\nmutual links between our various tendencies are incapable of securing\ntheir stability, until they have found an immovable fulcrum outside\nthemselves. To endure, the harmony of the soul must be realised by\nitself as founded on reason, that is to say, upon the order of the\nworld.\n\n\nIV.\n\nWhat place must we assign to this positive ethics, in the usual\nclassification of ethical doctrines? It is often considered as a\ntheory of the moral sentiment. And, as a matter of fact, Comte himself\ncharacterises his ethics by \u201cthe direct preponderance of the social\nfeeling.\u201d In its origin also it belongs to this group. Comte makes use\nof Adam Smith and of Hume, when he affirms the existence of inborn\naltruistic tendencies within the soul. He indicates these tendencies,\nin his _Cerebral Table_, under the general name of \u201csympathy,\u201d which\ncomes from the Scottish school. Establish these altruistic feelings, he\nsays, and morality is given, take them away, and morality disappears.\n\nBut these philosophers did not push analysis any further. They\nneglected to inquire how morality is developed in fact, although\nthe altruistic tendencies are less powerful than the others. Comte\nreproaches the ethics of the Scottish school with its superficial\ncharacter and its lack of systematic strictness. He praises their\npsychology which is less incomplete than that of their contemporaries;\nhe is not satisfied with their theory of human activity. If the\nexistence of sympathetic inclinations is a fact, their evolution must\nnone the less be explained. The latter only becomes intelligible\nthrough the continued action of the objective order upon the soul of\nman, an action which becomes all the more decisive as man becomes more\nconscious of it, by the discovery of the laws of nature.\n\nThus, in order to give an account of human morality, Comte adds a\nrational element to the feeling-elements. Undoubtedly it is not an _a\npriori_ element. But it is that which for Comte is the substitute of\nthe _a priori_ in metaphysical doctrines: that is the invariableness\nof the laws of phenomena, which makes the world intelligible. From the\nspeculative point of view this intelligibility, under the name of \u201cthe\nprinciple of laws,\u201d is the basis of our science. From the practical\npoint of view, the order of the world alone can guarantee the lasting\nharmony of our inclinations. In this way it becomes the foundation of\nmorality.\n\nIn spite of the more than evident differences of all kinds which\nseparate Comte from Malebranche and from Leibnitz, it then appears that\nin his philosophy as in theirs, the idea of _order_ is made use of\nto pass from the domain of knowledge to that of action. Undoubtedly,\nwith Comte, from theological or metaphysical this idea has become\npositive. He does not intend to go beyond experience, and affirms\nnothing which cannot be verified as a fact. But, like the philosophers\nhis predecessors, he is none the less anxious to find the unity of\nthe soul beneath the diversity of its modes of activity, and to show\nthat theoretical reason and practical reason are one and the same.\nMalebranche solved the problem by appealing to the idea of divine\nperfection, expressed everywhere by order. Comte explains that the\npressure exercised by external order generates order in our mind (which\nmoreover collaborates in it), then, as a consequence, in our feelings\nand finally in our actions. The stoics had already said something\nsimilar on this subject. Briefly, Comte\u2019s ethics may be presented as\nthe positive form of the ethics of universal order.\n\nShall we then say that, being sentimental and rational at once, this\nmorality is not definite in character? Is it merely an eclectic attempt\nat conciliation?--Eclecticism in a certain sense would not frighten\nComte. Positive philosophy flatters itself on being just in regard\nto its predecessors. It takes pleasure in praising each of them for\nthe portion of truth which it contains. But, in the present case\nthere is no occasion for it to be eclectic. It suffices for it to be\nrelative, and, since it is a question of moral and social things, to\nappeal to history. Thus we see that the sentimental and the rational\nprinciples in no way exclude each other. From the historical point\nof view, that is to say, if we consider the genesis of morality, the\nlatter finds birth in the sympathetic _feelings_ which man, like many\nother animals, experiences, and which are spontaneously developed in\ndomestic affection and in social life. How is it that subsequently this\nmorality evolves, that friendly relations grow indefinitely in relative\nimportance, in spite of the inborn strength of selfishness, that\nhumanity, in a word, should gradually rise above animality? Without\nany doubt, that is due to the development of _intelligence_, itself\nbound up with the efforts which man is obliged to make to adapt himself\nto the \u201c_milieu_\u201d in which he lives.\n\nInstinctive in its animal origin, morality becomes rational in its\nhuman evolution. We can say as much of language, of art, of science,\nand even of religion. All this was in embryo in the primitive nature\nof man, since nothing absolutely new ever appears in it. All this\nonly manifested itself under pressure from external order, which,\nconsciously or unconsciously, is always being exercised. Only when we\nknow this order, we can make use of our science to turn the natural\nforces to our own ends, which in themselves are rational. It is in this\nway that systematic morality is substituted to spontaneous morality.\n\nIf we were more intelligent, says Comte, it would be equivalent to our\nbeing more moral. Understanding better the intimate connection which\nin a thousand ways, at every moment, binds each one of us to the whole\nof our fellows, we should more surely observe the precept: \u201cLive for\nothers.\u201d And, if we were more moral, it would be equivalent to our\nbeing more intelligent. We would then act precisely as a more open and\na deeper intelligence than our own would lead us to act. Now, we cannot\nbecome more moral by an immediate modification of our inclinations.\nPositive psychology has established that we exercise no direct action\nupon the affective part of our nature. But we can endeavour to become\nmore intelligent: every successful effort that we make to understand\nthe order of nature affords us the means of making fresh attempts.[332]\nIn this indirect manner morality can grow. Finally, it grows still more\nsurely, when the intellect has understood that it does not contain\nits end within itself, that it must be subordinated to the heart, and\nthat the only happiness compatible with the nature of man is found in\ndevotion and in love.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[322] Pol. pos., II, 436-7; III, 46-50; IV, 233, Cat\u00e9chisme\npositiviste, 57-59, 121-123.\n\n[323] Cours, V, 345-6.\n\n[324] Cours, IV, 103-8.--See Book III, chapter V.\n\n[325] Cours, IV, 104.\n\n[326] Pol. pos., I, 9.\n\n[327] Pol. pos., I, 92.\n\n[328] Cat\u00e9chisme positiviste, p. 10.\n\n[329] Cat\u00e9chisme positiviste, p. 138.\n\n[330] Pol. pos., II. 26-30.\n\n[331] Pol. pos., I, 23.\n\n[332] Pol. Pos., IV, appendix, p. 18.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nSOCIAL ETHICS\n\n\n\u201cLive for others\u201d: such is the supreme formula of positive ethics.\nFeeling bears witness to its justice; science discloses its\nfar-reaching importance and its deep consequences. But this formula\nis not only applied in a general way to the natural society formed by\nmen among themselves, a society in which Comte even includes animals\ncapable of affection and of devotion, whose services deserve our\ngratitude. The moral law finds a precise application in the definite\nrelations established among men by civic society, that is to say in\nthe rights and in the mutual duties of individuals. If it be true that\nethics and politics are distinct from each other, politics is none\nthe less closely subordinated to ethics. The spiritual power does not\ngovern; however it directs those who govern as well as those who are\ngoverned. It is this power which gives to all the sum of common beliefs\nand feelings which enable Society to live. Thus to ethics belongs the\ntask of determining the principles according to which positive politics\nwill regulate the relations between men.\n\nNow, as a matter of fact, these relations are in a very unsettled\ncondition to-day. Public order is unstable, revolutions are\nfrequent, suffering is excessive. Are we to lay the blame upon\npublic institutions? They are rather an effect than a cause. In\norder to understand the present condition it is necessary to grasp\nthe law of the general evolution of humanity, and in particular\nthat of European Society. It then becomes apparent that the actual\ndisturbances proceed from the great conflict inaugurated by the\nFrench revolution. This conflict is still going on. The old r\u00e9gime\nhas not yet quite disappeared, and the r\u00e9gime which is to take its\nplace is not yet organised. The struggle is prolonged between the\ntheologico-metaphysical spirit and the positive spirit, between\nrevealed belief which is becoming weaker and demonstrated belief which\nis being formed, and finally between the old economic landmarks and an\nindustrial activity whose laws have not yet been discovered.\n\nThe relations between masters and workmen are at the present time\n\u201canarchical.\u201d The advance of industry, as it grows, oppresses the\nmajority of those whose co-operation in it is indispensable. And the\never more strongly marked division between \u201cbrains and hands\u201d is far\nmore due to the political incapacity, the social thoughtlessness,\nand especially to the blind selfishness of the masters than to the\ninordinate demands of the workmen.[333] The capitalists have not dreamt\nof organising a liberal education for the people to defend it against\nthe seductions of the revolutionary propaganda. They seem to fear that\nthe people should receive instruction. As far as they can, they take\nthe place of the ancient chiefs whose social rank they covet. But they\ndo not inherit their generosity. They do not understand that \u201cnoblesse\noblige.\u201d In this way the great masters of industry too often tend to\nutilise their political influence to the detriment of the public, to\nappropriate important monopolies and to take the advantage of the power\nof capital to make the claims of the masters predominate over those\nof the workers, without any regard for equity, since the right of\ncoalition which is allowed to the former is refused to the latter.\n\nComte saw the _bourgeoisie_ at work during Louis-Philippe\u2019s reign,\nand he passes severe judgment upon it. Its political conceptions,\nhe says, refer not to the aim and exercise of power, but especially\nto its possession. It regards the revolution as terminated by the\nestablishment of the parliamentary _r\u00e9gime_, whereas this is only an\n\u201cequivocal halting place.\u201d A complete social reorganisation is not less\nfeared by this middle class than by the old upper classes. Although\nfilled with the critical spirit of the XVIII. century, even under a\nRepublican form it would prolong a system of theological hypocrisy,\nby means of which the respectful submission of the masses is insured,\nwhile no strict duty is imposed upon the leaders.[334] This is hard\nupon the proletariat, whose condition is far from improving. It\n\u201cestablishes dungeons for those who ask for bread.\u201d[335] It believes\nthat these millions of men will be able to remain indefinitely\n\u201cencamped\u201d in modern society without being properly settled in it with\ndefinite and respected rights.[336] The capital which it holds in its\nhands, after having been an instrument of emancipation, has become one\nof oppression. It is thus that, by a paradox difficult to uphold, the\ninvention of machinery, which _a priori_, one would be led to believe,\nwould soften the condition of the proletariat, has, on the contrary,\nbeen a new cause of suffering to them, and has made their lot a doubly\nhard one.[337]\n\nHere, in brief, we have a formidable indictment against the middle\nclasses, and in particular against the political economy which has\nnourished them. Comte has in view sometimes the classical economists of\nthe end of the XVIII. century, sometimes their orthodox successors in\nthe XIX. Those of the XVIII. he regards as having collaborated in the\ngreat revolutionary work. They took part in the diffusion of critical\ndoctrines and of negative philosophy. In this capacity they have, no\ndoubt, rendered certain services. They contributed to the decomposition\nof the old r\u00e9gime. Political economy had succeeded in convincing the\ngovernments themselves of their unfitness to direct the commercial and\nindustrial movement.[338]\n\nThe affinities between the philosophers and the economists of the\nXVIII. century are evident enough: is it necessary to recall the spirit\nof \u201cindividualism\u201d of the economists, and their characteristic tendency\nto restrict the functions of government as much as possible? Despite\nthe efforts of a great number among them, conservatives by temperament\nor by political tendencies, the logical consequences of their\nprinciples were bound to come to light. Thus \u201cthe superfluity of all\nregular moral teaching, the suppression of all official encouragement\nof science and the fine arts; even the recent attacks against the\nfundamental institution of property find their origin in economical\nmetaphysics.\u201d It was with this doctrine as with the other parts of\nnegative philosophy; after having accomplished its work of destruction,\nit sought to transform its critical principles into organic ones,\nwithout realising that this amounted to repudiating beforehand any\npositive organisation.\n\nThe famous formula, \u201cLaissez faire, laissez passer,\u201d is no more a\nreal principle in political economy than liberty itself is one in\npolitics properly so-called. Comte vigorously opposes the dogma of\nnon-intervention. Because in some particular and secondary cases\npolitical economy has ascertained \u201cthe natural tendencies of societies\nin the direction of a certain necessary order, it concluded from this\nthat any special institution is useless.\u201d But this order is extremely\nimperfect. The knowledge of sociological laws will give us the power\nof improving it, as we already do in the case of medicine and surgery.\nMerely to admit the degree of order which is spontaneously established\nin practice is equivalent to \u201ca solemn dismissal in the case of every\ndifficulty which arises.\u201d Look at the social crisis brought about by\nthe development of machinery. In reply to the just and urgent claims\nof the workmen suddenly deprived of their means of livelihood, and\nunable in a day to find another, our economists can only repeat, \u201cwith\nmerciless pedantry,\u201d their barren aphorism about absolute industrial\nliberty. To all complaints they dare to answer that it is a question of\ntime! And this to men who require food to-day! \u201cSuch a theory proclaims\nits own social impotence.\u201d[339]\n\nAnd so neither is political economy a science yet, nor, so far, are\neconomists men of science. Originally being nearly all barristers\nor men of letters, they were strangers to the idea of scientific\nobservation, to the precise notion of a natural law, and finally to\nthe sense of what constitutes a demonstration. If we make an exception\nof Adam Smith and of a few others, how could they apply the positive\nmethod which they did not know to the most difficult cases of analysis?\nDestutt de Tracy placed political economy between logic and ethics. And\nthis was not without reason: for it is nearer to metaphysics than to\npositive science. In it, work preserves its personal character, schools\ncontend with each other, the discussions as to the elementary notions\nof value, of utility, etc., savour of scholasticism. The very idea of\nstudying economical phenomena separately is not scientific, since the\nvarious \u201csocial series\u201d are interdependent, and since in sociology\nmore particular laws depend upon more general laws.[340] There is no\nscientific study of economical facts unless we first look at them from\nthe sociological point of view. We can no more isolate the laws which\nregulate the material existence of societies than we can describe man\nas an essentially calculating being, only actuated by the motive of\npersonal interest.\n\nThe same objections naturally hold good against the adversaries of the\neconomists, since, in general, socialists and communists have confined\nthemselves to an analogous conception of their science. However, while\ncriticising them, Comte recognises the fact that they have established\nsome truths. Everything they say is not false. Thus, they justly claim\nthe right for the government to intervene in economical relations. And,\nif it be absurd to wish to abolish private property, as certain sects\ndemanded, it is very true that property is of a social nature, and\nthat it is necessary to regulate it.[341] To endow it with an absolute\ncharacter is, says Comte, an \u201canti-social\u201d theory. No property can\nbe created, nor even transmitted, by its mere possessor without the\nconcurrence of society. Thus always and everywhere the community has\nintervened in the exercise of the right of property. The tax makes the\npublic a partner in every private fortune.\n\nIn discussing the essential problems of property, the communists\n(whom Comte confuses with the socialists), to-day render an important\nservice. The very dangers called forth by the solution they propose\nconcur in fixing the general attention upon this great subject,\n\u201cwithout which the metaphysical empiricism and the aristocratic\nselfishness of the leading classes would cause it to be set aside or\ndisdained.\u201d Merely to state the problem without the solution with which\nthe communists associate it, would not suffice. Our weak intellect\ndoes not fasten upon a question for long, unless a reply to it, be it\ntrue or false, which we must accept or reject is forthcoming at the\nsame time. Moreover, are the communist \u201caberrations\u201d more useless,\nand at bottom, more dangerous than the current illusion according to\nwhich the Revolution is ended by the establishment of the parliamentary\n_r\u00e9gime_?[342]\n\nBut, this being admitted the innovating schools have all fallen into\ngrave mistakes. In general, being devoid of the historic sense, and on\nthe other hand, ignoring the principles of social statics, they do not\nsee that man\u2019s action upon social phenomena is only usefully exercised\nwithin certain limits. The idea that a revolution can, in a moment,\ntransform the _r\u00e9gime_ of property and all the social conditions\nwhich depend upon it is destined to disappear, when the \u201cpositive\nmode of thought\u201d shall have extended to the social phenomena in the\nsame way as it has to all others. Then the \u201cextravagant proposals\u201d\nof the socialists will find no adherents, and the demand for what is\nrecognised as impossible will no longer be made by anyone.[343]\n\nFinally, Comte reproaches communism with its tendency to restrain\nindividuality. This objection, coming from him, is remarkable, for it\nhas very often been made in his own case. As an organiser of despotism,\nJohn Stuart Mill has compared him to Ignatius of Loyola. But Comte\nreminds us that, according to him, the collective organism, or society,\ndiffers from the individual organisms, or living beings, by the fact\nthat in it the elements live an independent life. The problem consists\nin conciliating, as much as possible, this free division with the\nconvergence of the activities. Neither of the two must be sacrificed\nto the other. To restrain individualities would tend to destroy the\ndignity of man by doing away with his responsibility, while the want\nof independence, and the subjection to a community indifferent to him\nwould make life intolerable. \u201cSuch is the immense danger of all utopias\nwhich sacrifice real liberty to an anarchical equality, or even to an\nexaggerated fraternity.\u201d[344] On this point, positive philosophy on its\nown account takes up again the \u201cdecisive criticism\u201d of communism made\nby our economists.\n\n\nII.\n\nPositive philosophy does not confine itself to refuting the orthodox\neconomists and the socialists by the help of their own arguments. In\nits turn it takes up all the questions raised by them, and, for their\nsolution, takes its stand upon the results obtained by sociology.\n\nIn the first place it states the problem of \u201csocial reorganisation\u201d\nin its most general form. Socialists, in the same way as their\nadversaries, are only concerned with riches as if they were the only\nill-divided and ill-administered social forces. But there are others.\nThe reform of economical conditions depends, in conclusion, upon that\nof morals. Before all things then we must \u201creorganise\u201d morals. We\nmust determine the rights and mutual duties of citizens, and inspire\neveryone with the feeling of his duty and with respect for the rights\nof others.\n\nThe two ideas of right and of duty are not dealt with by Comte in the\nsame manner. He accepts the idea of duty without subjecting it to a\nspecial criticism. Duty is the rule of action prescribed to each one\nboth by feeling and by reason. It is our duty to do what we recognise\nas most suitable to our individual and social nature. On the contrary,\nthe idea of right \u201cdisappears\u201d in the positive state. The word \u201cright\u201d\nmust be removed from political language, in the same way as the word\n\u201ccause\u201d is from philosophical language. They are two metaphysical\nnotions. Everyone has duties, and towards all. No one has any right\nproperly so-called. \u201cThe idea of right is as false as it is immoral,\nbecause it presupposes an absolute individuality.\u201d[345]\n\nThese formul\u00e6 called forth strong protests, particularly from M.\nRenouvier and his disciples. Indeed, in the constitution of civil\nsociety, they appear to neglect justice entirely, to establish the\nrelations between men merely upon charity and feeling. However, if we\nlook into it closely, Comte\u2019s thought as is often the case, has been\nforced and warped, by its expression. But the comparison between the\nideas of right and of cause suggested by him, satisfactorily throws a\nlight upon his meaning.\n\nPositive science has given up the search after causes, in order to\nconfine itself to establishing the invariable relations between\nphenomena. But these relations correspond to what was formerly called\ncausal action. They represent what was real in this supposed action.\nThe only difference--but it is important--consists in the fact that the\nhuman mind has forsaken the absolute point of view for the relative\none, and is henceforth content to establish the connection between\nphenomena, without imagining \u201cconnecting entities\u201d according to\nMalebranche\u2019s strong expression.\n\nThe idea of right has gone through an analogous transformation. In the\nsame way as the idea of cause, it was theological for a long time, and\nthen metaphysical. In antiquity it was closely allied to religion. In\nmodern times the rights of peoples, and even the rights of individuals,\nare conceived according to the ancient standard of the rights of\nprinces and masters. But, having become established by triumphing over\nthe rights of princes, the rights of peoples and individuals ultimately\nrest, as they did, upon a supernatural and mystical basis. The rights\nwhich every citizen claims are the change in small coin of the absolute\nright formerly possessed by the sovereign who represented the whole\nnation. Having become metaphysical in the XVIII. century, the idea of\nabsolute, intangible, indefeasible right, which attaches to the human\nperson, has been most useful for the decomposition of the old _r\u00e9gime_.\nBut, once this work has been accomplished, it cannot be made use of\nin the work of reorganisation any more than the other metaphysical\nprinciples. Positive philosophy admits nothing absolute. Everything\nin society is at once subject to conditions, and places conditions\nupon all things. Nothing is unconditional; and sociology teaches that\nwe must go not from the individual to society, but from society to the\nindividual.\n\nIn consequence, here again we must give up endeavouring to transform a\ncritical principle into an organic one. Undoubtedly rights will remain,\nas the constant connections between phenomena subsist. But we shall\ncease to base these rights upon a metaphysical conception of human\nnature, in the same way as we have ceased to refer the connections\nbetween phenomena to metaphysical entities called causes. Instead of\nmaking individual duties consist in the respect of universal rights,\nwe shall conceive inversely the rights of each one as the result of\nthe duties of others towards him. In a word, duty is established\nbefore right. This principle is of the highest importance in Comte\u2019s\neyes. In it he sees an expression and a proof of the predominance of\nthe positive over the metaphysical spirit, and of the subordination\nof politics to ethics. He likes to say that \u201cthe consideration of\nduty is bound up with the spirit of the whole.\u201d On the contrary, the\nconsideration of right, if it be conceived as absolute, leads to a\ndenial of all government and of all social organisation.\n\nThe new philosophy will tend more and more to replace \u201cthe vague and\nstormy discussion of rights, by the calm and strict determination of\nrespective duties.\u201d Henceforth, the problem raised by the communists\nassumes a new aspect. That there should be powerful industrial masters\nis only an evil if they use their power to oppress the men who depend\nupon them. It is a good thing, on the contrary, if these masters\nknow and fulfil their duties. It is of little consequence to popular\ninterests in whose hands capital is accumulated, so long as the use\nmade of it is beneficial to the social masses.[346] Now this essential\ncondition \u201cdepends far more upon moral than upon political measures.\u201d\nThe latter can undoubtedly prevent the accumulation of riches in a\nsmall number of hands, at the risk of paralysing industrial activity.\nBut these \u201ctyrannical\u201d proceedings would be far less efficacious than\nthe universal reproof inflicted by positive ethics upon a selfish\nuse of the riches possessed. The reproof would be all the more\nirresistible, because of the fact that the very people who would have\nto submit to it could not challenge its principle, inculcated in all\nby the common moral education.\u201d It is thus that in the Middle Ages,\nexcommunication was not less feared by the princes who incurred it than\nit was by the peoples who witnessed it.\n\nOnce common education was established, under the direction of the\nspiritual power, the tyranny of the capitalist class would be no more\nto be feared. Rich men would consider themselves as the moral guardians\nof public capital. It is not here a question of charity. Those who\npossess will have the \u201cduty\u201d of securing, first, education and then\nwork for all.\n\nThese ideas seem perhaps paradoxical and chimerical. But, says Comte,\nthis is because modern society has not yet got its system of morality.\nIndustrial relations which have become immensely developed in it are\nabandoned to a dangerous empiricism, instead of being systematised\naccording to _moral_ laws. War, more or less openly declared, alone\nregulates the relations between capital and labour. In a normal state\nof humanity these relations, on the contrary, are \u201corganised.\u201d Strength\ndoes not generate oppression. Every citizen is a \u201cpublic functionary,\u201d\nwhose well-defined functions determine at once his obligations and\nhis claims (that is to say his rights). Property is a function like\nany other, and not a privilege. It serves for the formation and\nadministration of capital by means of which each generation prepares\nthe work of the next. Those who hold it must not turn it from its\npublic use to their own individual advantage.[347]\n\nIn the same way as the capitalists, the workers are public\nfunctionaries, and they perform a no less important service.\nIndependently of their salary, they are deserving social gratitude.\nOur customs already admit of this feeling in the case of the liberal\nprofessions in which the salary does not dispense with gratitude. This\nfeeling will have to be extended to all work which contributes to the\ncommon weal. The service of humanity, says Comte, is a gratuitous\none. The salary, whatever it may be, only pays for the material part\nin every office. It serves to repair the consumption demanded by the\norgan and the function. As to the essence of service itself it allows\nof no other reward than the very satisfaction of performing it, and the\ngratitude which it arouses.[348]\n\nConsequently in a \u201ctruly organised\u201d society (note this expression\nwhich M. de Bonald often uses), the vulgar distinction between public\nand private functionaries is destined to disappear. As, in an army,\neven the private soldier has his own dignity which comes from the\nclose solidarity of the military organisation, and from this fact,\nthat all share the same honour in it; so, when positive education has\nmade evident to all the part played by each one in the social work,\nprofessions which are humblest to-day will become ennobled.[349] The\nindustrial _r\u00e9gime_ of to-day, which shows us little else than the\nconflict of rival egoisms, is an anarchical _r\u00e9gime_, or, to put it\nbetter, an \u201cabsence of _r\u00e9gime_.\u201d\n\nModern society has not yet got its morals. It will form them gradually,\nin the same way as military society did. Military life, more than\nany other, is ruled by the predominating selfish inclinations.\nNevertheless, as it could only be developed by the spirit of\nunion, this condition alone sufficed for it to determine admirable\ndevotion.[350] Why should it not be the same in industrial life which\nrests upon the peaceful and constructing instinct? Otherwise, if the\npresent \u201canarchy\u201d of morals were to last, modern society would remain\nbelow the level of the Middle Ages, which really was organised by\nits spiritual power. It would even be below the level of military\nsocieties. What would be the use of substituting monopoly to conquest,\nand a despotism based upon the right of the richest to the despotism\nresting upon the right of the strongest?[351]\n\nEverything then depends upon the common moral education, which itself\ndepends upon the establishment of a spiritual power. The superiority of\nthe positive doctrine lies in the fact that it has restored this power.\nThe innovating schools all wish to secure normal education and regular\nwork for the proletariat. But they want both at once, or work before\neducation. Positivism wishes to organise education _first_.[352]\n\nNaturally, in positive education duties will be presented in their\nsocial aspect. Thus the elementary virtues of temperance, of chastity,\netc., are recommended by positive morality;--but not from the point of\nview of their usefulness to the individual. Even if \u201can exceptionally\nconstituted nature should shield the individual from the consequences\nof intemperance or debauchery,\u201d soberness and continence would be\nno less strictly required of him as being indispensable for the\nfulfilment of his social duties.[353] In the same way, the object of\ndomestic morality is not to form \u201ca selfishness shared by several,\u201d\nbut to develop the sympathetic affections which, from the family\nwill gradually extend to the social group, and then to humanity.\nThe principle is to get man into the habit of subjecting himself to\nhumanity, even in his smallest actions, and in all his thoughts.\nOnce this point is reached, modern society will spontaneously become\norganised and the positive _r\u00e9gime_ will of itself be established.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[333] Cours, VI, 376.\n\n[334] Pol. pos. I, 128-9.\n\n[335] Cours, V, 357.\n\n[336] Pol. pos., II, 410-12.\n\n[337] Cours, VI, 268-9.\n\n[338] Cours, V, 608; Pol. pos. III, 585.\n\n[339] Cours, IV, 218-24.\n\n[340] Cours, IV, 212-15.\n\n[341] Pol. pos. I, 154.\n\n[342] Pol. pos. I, 160-3.\n\n[343] Cours, IV, 97-9.\n\n[344] Pol. pos. I, 159.\n\n[345] Cours, VI, 480; Pol. pos. I, 361-3; II, 87.\n\n[346] Cours, VI, 543-6.\n\n[347] Pol. pos. 156-64.\n\n[348] Pol. pos. II, 409.\n\n[349] Cours, VI, 511-15.\n\n[350] Pol. pos. II, 16.\n\n[351] Pol. pos. IV, Appendice, p. 211.\n\n[352] Pol. pos. I, 169.\n\n[353] Pol. pos. I, 97-8.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nTHE IDEA OF HUMANITY\n\n\nIn this world there is nothing absolute, everything is relative;\nComte wrote this to his friend Valat as early as 1818.[354] But as a\nmatter of fact, there exists a supreme reality to which all others\nare subordinated, the idea of which is the principle of a rational\nconception of the world. Comte calls this reality _humanity_. Instead\nof being the ultimate end of all thought and all action \u201cin itself,\u201d it\nis the ultimate end \u201cfor us.\u201d But this difference simply signifies that\nthe new philosophy leaves the metaphysical for the positive point of\nview. With these limitations the idea of humanity \u201ccorresponds\u201d to the\nold idea of the absolute. It takes its place and fulfils its religious\npart. It is truly, if one dares to say so, a \u201crelative absolute.\u201d\n\nIn Comte\u2019s doctrine, the idea of humanity is presented under several\nsuccessive aspects, or, to put it better, the development of his system\nhas brought to light, in turns, the various attributes of this \u201cGreat\nBeing.\u201d In his first career, Comte prefers to consider humanity as an\nobject of science. In his second career, it rather appears to him as\nan object of adoration and of love. Here we can follow the progress of\nthe mystical and religious feeling which, especially from 1846, filled\nhis thoughts and modified his language, his philosophical doctrine,\nnevertheless, remaining essentially the same.\n\n\nI.\n\nWe must not, says Comte, define Humanity by man, but on the contrary\nman by Humanity. In general this formula is understood in a moral and\nsocial sense. It is understood as a condemnation of \u201cindividualism,\u201d\nand one of the directing principles of the positivist _r\u00e9gime_. This\ninterpretation is not a false one, and consequences of this kind can\nindeed be drawn from Comte\u2019s formula. But they are only consequences.\nThe immediate object of the formula is not to subordinate the\nindividual to the multitude. In the first place it expresses a fact. If\nwe consider a man by himself, positive science only allows us to define\nhim as an animal, in whom as in all others, the end of animal life is\nto insure organic life. Do we wish to define him by what is essentially\nhuman in him, that is to say, by intellect and sociability? One must\nthen pass from the consideration of the individual to that of the\nspecies. From the strictly biological point of view M. Bonald\u2019s saying\nmust be reversed; we must say that man is an organism served by an\nintellect. It is only if we leave the biological for the social point\nof view, if we look upon the human species as a single \u201cimmense and\neternal\u201d individual (a conception which is justified by the continued\ndevelopment of intelligence and sociability),[355] that we can consider\nthe voluntary and systematic subordination of vegative to animal life\nas the ideal type towards which civilised humanity is tending. We can\nthen make use of this subordination to refine it. In a word, we are\nreally men only _by our participation of humanity_.\n\nThe essential attributes of this \u201cimmense and eternal social unity\u201d are\nsolidarity and continuity.[356] These attributes are at once social and\nmoral and it could have no others. The attributes of the theological\nand metaphysical absolute had reference to the categories of substance,\nof cause, of time, of space, etc. It was one, simple, infinite, etc.,\nall often incomprehensible and contradictory expressions of this idea\nthat the supreme principle is \u201cabsolute.\u201d On the contrary, positive\nphilosophy admits that in the scale of beings, dependence grows with\ndignity. Humanity, which is the most \u201ccomplex\u201d and the \u201cnoblest\u201d of all\nbeings known to us, is therefore also the most dependent. Its existence\nwill necessarily end with that of the planet which it inhabits. Its\nunity is one of \u201ccollection.\u201d It is imperfect and subject to crises of\nall kinds. Such as it is, however, science and morality show us in it\nthe highest term which our mind can reach, the loftiest ideal which our\nheart can love, and finally the object most worthy of our devotion.\n\nHuman solidarity has been studied by statical sociology. We have\nseen with what admiration the social _consensus_ inspired Comte, a\nconsensus, according to him, even closer and more intimate than the\nvital _consensus_. Positive education will develop the feeling of\nsolidarity and make it the principle of moral instruction. Every\nindividual in all his ways of thinking and acting, will be imbued with\ntwo convictions which imply one another. In the first place he will\nknow that he is only really a man by his participation in humanity,\nsince his intelligence and his morality are essentially social things.\nHe will also know that the life of humanity is in part made up of\nwhat he brings to it, and that each of his actions, independently of\nhis will has a social interest and a social counterpart. Once we are\nthoroughly persuaded that we live in humanity and by humanity, we shall\nalso become convinced that we must live for humanity. Malebranche said\nthat God is the _locus_ of intellects: Comte would readily say that\nhumanity is the _locus_ of good wills.\n\nAs, in sociology, dynamics is more important than statics, so among\nthe attributes of humanity, continuity is placed above solidarity.\nNot only are the individuals and the peoples of the same epoch bound\nby a common solidarity, but the successive generations co-operate\nin the same work. Each one has its \u201cdetermined participation\u201d in\nit: and their combination in time produces \u201ca still nobler and more\nperfect conception of human unity.\u201d This is the conception which Comte\nadmired so much in Condorcet, which he borrowed from him, and which he\ndeveloped in the positive idea of progress.\n\nHumanity so understood will inspire us with the strongest feelings of\ngratitude. Do we not owe to her all that is good, precious and human in\nus? Man will see \u201cco-operators\u201d in the men of all time.[357] Each of\nus has to reflect only upon his physical, intellectual and moral being\nto realise what he owes to the whole of his predecessors. The man who\nwould think himself independent of others could not even formulate this\nerror (which in Comte\u2019s eyes becomes blasphemy) without contradicting\nhimself; for is not language itself a collective and social work?[358]\n\nHistory will become the \u201csacred science\u201d of humanity. To put it more\nsimply, it will be the ever clearer consciousness which humanity\nwill have of itself, through the study of its intellectual and moral\nactivity in the past. Gradually, with the progress of the historical\nspirit, the idea of an evolution subject to laws, the idea of \u201corder\nconceived as capable of development,\u201d will become substituted to the\nprejudice which attributes to man boundless power of action upon social\nfacts. It will become apparent that the part played by each generation\nin the common work of humanity is necessarily a very small one, as\ncompared with what is transmitted to it by previous generations. To\nrefuse this inheritance would be to refuse to be what we are: it would\nbe an absurd and immoral pretention, and, moreover, entirely fruitless.\nIt is impossible for man to disown humanity without ceasing to exist.\nHe necessarily represents, while he lives, a long past of intellectual\nand moral efforts. And this is the most essential attribute of human\nlife, although we meet with more or less developed solidarity also\namong other animal species. But continuity belongs to humanity alone.\nIn a word, according to Comte\u2019s fine formula: \u201cHumanity is made up more\nof the dead than of the living.\u201d\n\nHowever, neither the \u201cyoke\u201d which presses upon the living with all\nthe weight of history and of prehistoric times, nor the _consensus_\nwhich makes of humanity a great \u201ccollective organism\u201d take from\nman his liberty of action. The consequence of human solidarity and\ncontinuity is not a kind of fatalism. Individuals remain responsible.\nWe must regard them neither as the wheels in a machine, nor as the\ncells in an organism, nor as the members of an animal colony. Humanity\nis not a polyp. This comparison, says Comte, \u201cshows a very imperfect\nphilosophical appreciation of our social solidarity, and a great\nbiological ignorance of the kind of existence peculiar to polypi.\u201d[359]\nIt likens a voluntary and deliberate association to an involuntary\nand indissoluble participation. Humanity, as a collective organism,\nstands out, on the contrary, as distinct by its own characteristics\nfrom animal colonies. In these colonies, the individuals are physically\nbound together and physiologically independent. In humanity, the\nindividuals are independent physically, and are only bound together in\nspace and in time by their highest functions.\n\nThus this \u201cimmense organism\u201d is especially distinguished from other\nbeings in that it is made up of separable elements, of which each one\ncan feel its own co-operation, can will it, or even withhold it, so\nlong as it remains a direct one.[360] The individual undoubtedly cannot\n\u201cunhumanise\u201d himself: that is too evident. But he retains a partial\nindependence. As he can collaborate in the collective work by free\nconsent, he is also free to impede it in the measure of his strength.\nBriefly, although the evolution of the Great Being is subject to laws,\nevery individuality, far from being annulled,[361] plays its part and\ncan have its merit in it. The very knowledge of sociological laws is a\nrule for human activity and not a tyranny.\n\n\nII.\n\nIn the latter part of his life, Comte drew out precisely the features\nof what he henceforth called the new Great Being. Although we were not\nhere to undertake to write an account of positive religion, we must\nnevertheless, in a few words, indicate the form which this supreme idea\nended by assuming in Comte\u2019s mind.\n\nFirstly, humanity is not conceived simply as the sum of all the\nindividuals or human groups present, past and future. For all men\nare necessarily born children of humanity; but all do not become her\nservants. Many remain in the condition of parasites. All those who are\nnot or were not \u201csufficiently assimilable,\u201d[362] all those who were\nonly a burden to our species, do not form a part of the Great Being. A\nselection takes place among men. Some finally enter into humanity never\nto leave it; others leave it never to return. The selection takes place\naccording to the life they have preferred. Those who have lived in the\npurely biological sense of the word, that is to say, those in whom the\nhigher faculties have been made to serve the organic function, those\nwhom with brutal energy Comte calls \u201cproducteurs de fumier,\u201d[363] will\nonly have been part of humanity in a transitory manner. Death for them,\nas for their anatomical system, will be an end without further appeal.\nThose in whom the \u201csublime inversion\u201d has been accomplished, or at\nleast those who have made an effort to subordinate the organic to the\nhigher functions, those finally who have worked for a pre-eminently\nhuman end: to make the intellect predominate over the inclinations,\nand altruism over egoism; those having lived for humanity will always\nlive in her. human end: to make the intellect predominate over the\ninclinations, and altruism over egoism; those having lived for humanity\nwill always live in her.\n\nAs the conduct of each one can only be finally judged after his death,\nhumanity is essentially made up of the dead and \u201cthe admission of the\nliving within her will hardly ever be more than provisional.\u201d[364] Each\ngeneration, while it lives, furnishes the indispensable physiological\nsubstratum for the exercise of the superior human functions. But this\nprivilege which momentarily distinguishes it from the others, soon\nslips away from it, as it slipped away from the preceding ones, and\nfrom the men of which they were composed; they alone who are worthy of\nit are incorporated into humanity. Moreover, they are only incorporated\nin it by their noblest elements. Death causes them to pass through a\n\u201cpurification.\u201d\n\nThis theory allows Comte to attain at the same time two results, which\nhe considers equally desirable. In the first place, the religious idea\nof humanity remains in perfect accordance with the idea given of it\nby biology and sociology. Humanity conceived as the Great Being, is\na kind of hypostasis of the functions by which man tends to become\ndistinguished from the animal. It is the progressive realisation\nthrough time, of the intellectual and moral potentialities contained\nin human nature: it is also its ideal impersonation. In this last\nsense, it becomes an object of love and adoration. Thus, the positivist\nreligion naturally leads to a \u201ccommemoration\u201d of great men, the\nbenefactors of humanity. Here we have one of the ideas which were\ndefined very early in Comte\u2019s mind.\n\nOn the other hand, the desire for immortality is very strong in the\nheart of man. On principle Comte recognised at any rate a provisional\nvalue in all that arises spontaneously from human nature. In science\nhe saw a prolongation of \u201cpublic reason,\u201d in systematic morality a\ndevelopment of spontaneous morality. He was thus led to take into\naccount the almost irresistible tendency which impels man to desire\nto triumph over death.[365] This tendency, up to the present time,\nhas satisfied itself by means of illusions. But beliefs of this kind\nhave become incompatible with the progress of our mental evolution.\nMoreover, the social efficacy of hopes and fears concerning the future\nlife has been much exaggerated. As a matter of fact, says Comte (and\nthe science of religions bears him out on this point), the tendency to\ndesire, and consequently to accept the idea of an ultimate survival,\nexisted for a long time before it was made use of to support religious\nbeliefs or to preserve public order. Here, again, positive philosophy\ndoes not deny, does not destroy: it transforms. To the chimerical\nand vulgar notion of _objective_ immortality, it substitutes the\nnotion, which is alone acceptable, of _subjective_ immortality. The\nsame doctrine which takes from us the consolations so dear to past\ngenerations, gives us an adequate compensation, by allowing each one to\nhope that he may be united to the Great Being.\n\n\u201cTo continue to live in others,\u201d is a very real mode of existence.[366]\nIt is the only one which we can hope for after death; but it is also\nthe only one which we ought to desire, if it be true that what most\nconstitutes ourselves in us does not consist in the individual in the\nbiological sense of the word, but truly in intelligence and good will,\nthat is to say, in the social and human element. He who has only lived\nfor himself, who has selfishly sought for life, has lost it: for death\ntakes him away altogether. He who has lived for others, he who has not\nsought life for himself, has found it: for he survives in others. In\nthe religions of the past, salvation was found in union with God: in\nthe positive religion, salvation is found in union with humanity.\n\nOnce incorporated in the Great Being, the individual becomes\ninseparable from it.[367] Being from that time withdrawn from the\ninfluence of all the physical laws, he only remains subjected to the\nhigher laws which regulate directly the evolution of humanity. Being\neven withdrawn from the influence of the laws of time and space,\nhe can live again at the same time in several organisms. Do we not\nsee that the thought of a poet, of an artist, of a man of science\nrevives in a great number of living men at the same time on the most\ndistant points of the globe? Subjective immortality, renewed by an\nuninterrupted sequence of successive resurrections, will last as long\nas humanity itself. \u201cTo live with the dead,\u201d says Comte \u201cconstitutes\none of our most precious privileges.\u201d[368] But, in the same way, the\ndead live with us. They live in us, and those who have been most truly\nmen, those who have made humanity by the effort of their intellect\nand their will, they are within us the best and most lasting part of\nourselves. For, when our generation disappears, it is this part of us\nwhich will survive. We shall also survive in the measure in which we\nhave contributed to the increase of this inheritance, in the measure\nin which we shall have deserved well of our contemporaries and our\nsuccessors. The present life is a trial. The \u201csubjective\u201d life, that\nis to say, incorporation into humanity, is at once a liberation and a\nreward for those who have passed victoriously through this trial.[369]\nWe see to what extent the old moral and religious ideal subsists in\nthe positive conception. We are little surprised at this, when we know\nthat, towards the end of his life, Comte made the _Imitation_ his daily\nreading.\n\nIt is then towards the idea of humanity as their centre that the\nscientific, social and religious ideas of Auguste Comte converge. If\nthis convergence be perfect, his work is accomplished. Henceforth\nmental and moral anarchy is cured; political and religious anarchy\nis about to disappear. Unity will be everywhere re-established.\nThis is already done in the understanding, since henceforth all our\nconceptions are homogenous, that is to say positive, since the same\nmethod is made use of in all our researches, since finally the whole\nsum of the sciences is regulated from the social point of view. Unity\nis also accomplished in the whole soul, since the intellect, henceforth\nconscious of its laws and of its essential functions, subjects itself\nto the heart, to be directed by love. Finally, unity will be brought\nabout in society, since a new spiritual power, possessed of universally\nadmitted principles, will give to all men and women a common education,\nwill teach them all the same morality, and will rally them all within\na same religion of love and goodness. The harmony which is realised in\nthe individual soul is the symbol and, as it were, the guarantee of\nthe harmony which will be established in the social body. Undoubtedly,\nobstacles remain to be overcome. The positive spirit must still\nstruggle to become altogether universal. The old mental _r\u00e9gime_ will\nnot disappear without struggles which, Comte foresees, will be both\nformidable and bloody. But these crises, however acute they may be,\ncannot prevent the human evolution from taking place in accordance with\nits law.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[354] Lettres \u00e0 Valat, p. 54, (15 mai 1818).\n\n[355] Cours, III, 232 sq.\n\n[356] Cours, IV, 810-11; Pol. pos. I, 363-5.\n\n[357] Cours, IV, 365.\n\n[358] Pol. pos. I, 221.\n\n[359] Cours, IV, 351.\n\n[360] Pol. pos., II, 59.\n\n[361] Pol. pos., I, 341.\n\n[362] Pol. pos., I, 411.\n\n[363] Cat\u00e9chisme positiviste, p. 30-31.\n\n[364] Pol. pos., I, 411.\n\n[365] Discours sur l\u2019esprit positif, 75-6.\n\n[366] Pol. pos., I, 346-7.\n\n[367] Pol. pos. II, 60-62.\n\n[368] Pol. pos., 262.\n\n[369] Pol. pos., IV, 36.\n\n\n\n\nCONCLUSION\n\n\nAt the end of the _Cours de philosophie positive_ Comte has himself\nsummed up the results which he believed himself to have established. In\nthe first place it is, from the intellectual point of view (which at\nfirst takes precedence of all others, although, in the positive state,\nthe mind must be subject to the heart), a \u201cperfect mental coherence\nwhich, as yet, has never been able to exist in a like degree,\u201d not\neven in the primitive period when man explained the phenomena of\nnature by the action of wills. For already, in this period, although\nimperceptibly, the positive spirit was making itself felt, while,\nin the positive period, nothing will subsist of the theological and\nmetaphysical mode of thought. From the moral point of view, which\ncomes next, the agreement of minds upon speculative problems, and in\nparticular upon the relations between man and humanity, will allow of\na common education, which will bring about ardent moral conviction\nin all. Powerful \u201cpublic prejudices\u201d will develop, and with them,\nsuch irresistible fulness of conviction, according to Comte, that\nHumanity will be able to realise what our penal system is incapable of\nachieving: to prevent instead of punishing, at least in the majority\nof cases. From the political point of view, the two spiritual and\ntemporal powers will be duly separated, and a lasting organisation will\nat once insure order and progress. Finally, from the \u00e6sthetic point\nof view, a new art will appear. No longer an aristocratic and learned\nart like the one which has been with us since the Renaissance, but an\nart closely connected with the convictions and the life of all, which\nwill be accessible and familiar to all, as was the case with the art of\nthe Middle Ages. The positive conception of man and of the world, will\nbecome an \u201cinexhaustible spring\u201d of poetical beauty.\n\nAll these results will be ordered, protected and sanctified by the\npositive religion, or religion of Humanity, of which Auguste Comte, in\nhis \u201csecond career\u201d established the dogma, the worship and the _r\u00e9gime_.\n\nWithout entering into the details of this religious construction we see\nthat, like the ethics and the politics, it depends upon the \u201cperfect\nmental coherence\u201d founded, in the first place, by positive philosophy.\nIn its turn, this perfect mental coherence, reduces itself to the unity\nof the understanding, whose necessary and sufficient conditions are\n\u201chomogeneity of doctrine and unity of method.\u201d Now, when Comte began\nto write, this homogeneity and this unity already existed for all the\ncategories of natural phenomena. The moral and social phenomena alone\nwere still an exception. In conclusion everything was reduced to this\nquestion: \u201ccan moral and social facts be studied in the same way as the\nother natural phenomena?\u201d If not, we must be resigned to the indefinite\nduration of the disorder of minds, and consequently of the disorder\nof customs and institutions. But, if the contrary is true, then the\nhuman understanding reaches the unity to which it aspires. Is sociology\nimpossible? then we have no politics and no religion. Is sociology\nfounded? then all the rest is based upon it.\n\nThus, the creation of social science is the decisive moment in Comte\u2019s\nphilosophy. Everything starts from it and comes back to it. As in\nPlatonism, all paths lead to the theory of ideas, so, from all the\navenues of positivism we see sociology. Here, as in a common centre,\nare joined the philosophy of the sciences, the theory of knowledge,\nthe philosophy of history, psychology, ethics, politics and religion.\nHere, in a word, is realised the unity of system, a unity which, in\nComte\u2019s eyes, is the best proof of its truth.\n\nIf, in sociology, we chiefly consider the end which Comte proposes to\nattain by its means, it is true that this doctrine is principally a\npolitical one, and the very title of Comte\u2019s second great work bears\nthis out. But, considered in itself, it is essentially a speculative\neffort, and the principle of a philosophy in the proper sense of the\nterm. What Kant called a totality of experience is made possible by the\ncreation of social science.\n\nBefore Comte, this totality had been attempted many times. But\nthose who attempted it started from this postulate that philosophy\nis specifically distinct from scientific knowledge proper. Whether\nphilosophy were dogmatic or critical, whether it had bearings upon the\nessence of things or rather upon the laws of the mind, it none the less\npresented characteristics of its own, which seemed to separate it from\npositive science, and even allowed it to dominate over this science,\nand to \u201cexplain\u201d its principles. Comte rejects this postulate. He is\ngoing to endeavour to see if, by taking the contrary postulate as his\nfoundation, he will not succeed better than his predecessors.\n\nIn order to reject the postulate admitted by philosophers before\nhim, he appeals at the same time to arguments founded on facts and\ndemonstration; but we must notice that, in his doctrine, these two\norders of arguments logically reduce themselves to one another. Indeed\nhe says, up to the present time no philosophy which commands acceptance\nby all minds has been established. Idealisms, materialisms, pantheisms\nfrom all sources and in every shape have never done more than ruin\nthe doctrines opposed to them, without becoming finally established\nthemselves. Those systems claimed to give a rational knowledge of that\nwhich by nature is beyond the reach of science. They prided themselves\nupon explaining the essence, the cause, the end and the order of the\nphenomena of the universe. Thus they could only build up temporary\nconceptions which were undoubtedly indispensable at the time but which\nwere doomed to die. Metaphysics is never anything but a rationalised\ntheology which is weakened by this very fact, and deprived of what\nconstituted its strength during the period when it was an object of\nbelief.\n\nBut in the name of what principle can Comte discern what is and what is\nnot \u201cbeyond the reach of science?\u201d In order to justify a distinction\nof this kind should he not before everything begin by a criticism of\nthe human mind, that is to say by a theory of knowledge similar to\nthat proposed by Kant in his \u201cCriticism of Pure Reason\u201d? M. Renouvier\nendeavours to show that, through the absence of this preliminary\ncriticism, with which Comte dispensed, his philosophy remains\nsuperficial. Mr. Max Muller expressly says that there is no need to\ntake into account a philosophical doctrine which proceeds as if the\n\u201cCriticism of Pure Reason\u201d had not been written.\n\nOn the whole the objection reduces itself to reproaching Comte with\nnot having attempted to do what he considered to be impracticable:\nnamely, not to have determined the intellectual laws by the analysis\nof the mind reflecting upon itself. But, it is said, by what right\ndoes he affirm that this is impossible? Because, like all the others,\nthese laws can only be discovered by means of the observation of facts,\nand because the only method which is suitable for the discovery of\nintellectual facts is the sociological method: the nature of these\nfacts being such that, especially from the dynamic point of view,\nthey can only be grasped in the evolution of humanity. The theory of\nknowledge demanded by M. Renouvier and Mr. Max Muller is not wanted\nin positive philosophy. It is not seen in this philosophy, because it\nis not presented in its traditional form. It is there none the less;\nbut, instead of consisting in an analysis _a priori_ of thought, as\na preliminary to philosophy, it is not separated from the philosophy\nitself. It is one of the many aspects of sociology.\n\nIn the positive doctrine, as in all the others, there are\ndialectics--dialectics which are no longer abstract and logical, but\nreal and historical. They do not seek to see the laws of the human\nmind through an effort at reflection in which the mind, beneath the\nphenomena, apprehends its very essence. They endeavour to discover\nthese laws in the necessary sequence of periods which constitute the\nprogress of the human mind. They, in their turn, study the \u201cuniversal\nsubject\u201d whose forms, categories and principles have been determined\nby Kant _a priori_. But this universal subject is no longer reason\ngrasping itself, so to speak, outside and above the conditions of time\nand of experience: it is the human mind becoming conscious of the laws\nof its activity through the study of its own past. Instead of the\n\u201cabsolute ego\u201d of \u201cimpersonal reason,\u201d or of the \u201cconscience of the\nunderstanding,\u201d positive philosophy analyses the intellectual history\nof humanity. It has then neither ignored nor neglected the problem. It\nhas put it in new terms, and has been obliged to deal with it by a new\nmethod.\n\nThe critic is free to point out the defects of this method and the\ninsufficiency of these terms. But, to reproach positive philosophy\nwith not having dealt with the problem in the usual form in which it\nis taken by metaphysicians, and, for this reason, to put it aside\nunexamined, is to commit a kind of \u201cpetitio principii.\u201d If Comte\nabstains from attempting an abstract theory of knowledge, he gives\nphilosophical reasons for his refusal to do so. Before condemning\nhim, it is but right to examine them. Had he done what M. Renouvier\nand Mr. Max Muller reproach him with having omitted, he would have\ncontradicted himself. There would have been no reason for the existence\nof his system. He claimed to have reformed the very conception of\nphilosophy: can we reproach him with the fact that his conception does\nnot coincide with the view preferred by his adversaries? Briefly that\nwhich, according to Comte, characterises positive philosophy, is that\nit no longer requires for its constitution what in the judgment of M.\nRenouvier and Mr. Max Muller on the contrary, is indispensable. Are\nthey or is he in the right? The question cannot evidently be solved\nby the mere affirmation of those interested. The examination of the\ndoctrines themselves is necessary.\n\n\nII.\n\nThe position taken by Comte may be briefly defined in a few words.\nSeeing that philosophy, such at least as it had been conceived until\nthe XIX. century, could not assume the characteristics of science, he\nasks himself whether one would not succeed better by endeavouring to\ngive the characteristics of science to philosophy. Like Kant, he might\nhave compared the revolution he was attempting to that accomplished by\nCopernicus in astronomy, had he not preferred to present it as prepared\nand gradually brought about by the very \u201cprogress\u201d of science and\nphilosophy.\n\nAccording to his own expression then he endeavours \u201cto transform\nscience into philosophy.\u201d But on what conditions will the\ntransformation be effected? If science were to lose in it its\ncharacteristics of positiveness, of reality, and of relativity, to\nassume those of a metaphysical doctrine, this change would be neither\ndesirable nor possible. The transformation will simply consist in\ngiving to science the philosophical character which it does not yet\npossess, namely universality. While thus acquiring a new property,\npositive science should lose none of those which it already possesses,\nand which constitute its value.\n\nThus, in the \u201ctransformation of science into philosophy,\u201d what is\ntransformed at bottom is not science which remains itself while\nbecoming general from being special: it is philosophy rather which\nis transformed. The latter will henceforth undoubtedly be conceived\nas the highest and most comprehensive form of positive knowledge,\nbut as constituting a part of that knowledge. It has been said that\nComte does away with philosophy, by reducing it to being merely the\n\u201cgeneralisation of the highest results of the sciences.\u201d This is not a\nproper interpretation of his thought. Up to the present time the duties\nperformed by the philosophical doctrines have been indispensable.\nComte intends that his system shall fulfil them in future. Beside\nscience properly so-called, which is always special, philosophy which\nrepresents the \u201cpoint of view of the whole\u201d must arise. On this\ncondition alone can the government of minds and the \u201cperfect logical\ncoherence\u201d become possible.\n\nPhilosophy will then not merely be a \u201cgeneralisation of the highest\nresults of the sciences.\u201d The synthesis of the sciences must be brought\nabout according to a principle to which they will be all related. It\nmust really be a \u201csumming up of experience.\u201d But if this philosophy\nthus coalesces with science it must also be _real_ like it, and\nall real knowledge is necessarily positive and relative. In short,\nthe distinction between science and philosophy implies no specific\ndifference between these two kinds of speculation. On the contrary,\nthere exists between them homogeneity of doctrine and unity of method.\n\nTherein lies the novelty of Comte\u2019s system. The question was, without\nleaving the scientific point of view, to discover a single universal\nconception of the whole of Reality as we find it in experience. The\nsolution of this problem was found on the day when Comte created\nsocial science. For indeed, in the first place, sociology makes the\npositive method universal by extending it to the highest order of\nnatural phenomena accessible to us. Moreover, once it is established as\na special science, _ipso facto_ it assumes the character of a universal\nscience, and consequently of a philosophy. Under a certain aspect,\nsociology is the sixth and last of the fundamental sciences. Under\nanother aspect it is the only science, since the other sciences may be\nregarded as great sociological facts, and since the whole of what is\ngiven to us is subordinated to the supreme idea of humanity.\n\nSuch is the way in which the transformation of science into philosophy\ntakes place. If it dates from the foundation of sociology, it is\nbecause, once this last positive science has been created, nothing\nremains in nature of which we conceive the possibility of obtaining an\nabsolute knowledge. \u201cThe relative character of scientific conception is\nnecessarily inseparable from the true notion of natural laws, in the\nsame way as the chimerical tendency to absolute knowledge spontaneously\naccompanies whatever use we make of the logical fictions or of\nmetaphysical entities.\u201d[370]\n\nConsidered as a whole, the object of positive science, according to\nComte, necessarily coincides with that of philosophy. For both of them\nit is the whole of the reality given to us. The human mind cannot exert\nitself in a vacuum. What it might draw from itself, without the help of\nexperience, (if such a conception be not absurd), is purely fictitious,\nand has no objective value. If then the human mind remains attached to\na metaphysical philosophy, this can only be in so far as the mind still\nconceives the whole or a part of reality from the absolute point of\nview, that is to say in so far as it still fails to understand that the\nlaws of phenomena alone are within its reach, and persists in seeking\nthe essence and the first or final cause for some among them. There\nwas a time when the whole of reality was so understood. The conception\nof the world was then entirely metaphysical or partly theological. But\nthe human mind has gradually constituted the positive science, first\nof the more simple and more general phenomena, and then of the more\ncomplicated ones. Finally the most complex of all, that is to say, the\nmoral and social phenomena alone remained untouched by the scientific\nform. Let us suppose that this last order of facts is conquered by\nthe positive method: the metaphysical mode of thought being no longer\npossessed of real objects, _ipso facto_ disappears. At the same time\nthe positive mode of thought becomes universal, and positive philosophy\nis founded.\n\nIn this way two great connected facts which occupy a considerable\nplace in the philosophical history of our century are explained. We\nunderstand: 1. that the fate of metaphysics appears to be closely bound\nup with that of psychology, of ethics of the philosophy of history\nand of the moral sciences in general, while the connection between\nphysics, for instance and metaphysics seems to be very weak; 2. that\nthe foundation of sociology determines that of positive philosophy. So\nlong as psychology speculates upon the nature of the soul and upon the\nlaws of thought; ethics, upon the final cause of man, the philosophy\nof history, upon the final cause of humanity; metaphysics remains\nstanding. Indeed it seems better able than positive knowledge to lead\nthe human mind to a conception of the whole of the real. It appears\nto be all the more appropriate for doing this in that the point of\nview of the Absolute can be easily made to harmonise with the point of\nview of the Universal, in the same way as the conception of substance,\nwhatever it may be, leads without any difficulty to the conception of\nthe unity of substance. But, from the day when we no longer should seek\nanything but the laws of psychical, moral and social facts, refraining\nfrom any hypothesis as to causes and essences, (a method already made\nuse of for all the other categories of phenomena), three results would\nbe obtained at a single blow: metaphysical philosophy would disappear,\nsocial science would be created, and positive philosophy would be\nfounded.\n\nAccording to the essential law of social dynamics, the metaphysical\nstage is never anything but a transitory one between the theological\nand the positive stages. The human intellect could not pass immediately\nfrom the former to the latter. The metaphysical stage which can assume\nan endless number of forms and of degrees, insensibly leads it from\none to the other. Metaphysical philosophy partakes of the theological\nin so far as it claims to \u201cexplain\u201d the totality of the Real by means\nof a first principle, and of the positive, in so far as it endeavours\nto demonstrate its \u201cexplanations,\u201d and to bring them into accordance\nwith the real knowledge already acquired. It originates in theology\nand it ends in science. But, however near it may come to positive\nknowledge, its original theological brand is never effaced. Were\nthey compelled to choose between the theological and the positive\ndoctrines, metaphysicians would certainly adopt the former. The essence\nof metaphysical philosophy is to tend towards the absolute, whilst\npositive philosophy only seeks the relative. In favouring the progress\nof positive science, metaphysical philosophy was working to make itself\nuseless.\n\nTo those then who reproach him with not leaving any function proper to\nphilosophy, Comte would answer that, in his doctrine, philosophy is\non the contrary better defined and more fully constituted than in any\nother. Indeed metaphysical philosophy has never been anything but a\ncompromise, destined to satisfy more or less, the needs of theological\nexplanation and of rational science. But positive philosophy is pure\nand unalloyed with heterogenous elements. It gives to the whole of\nexperience all the intelligibility which we can hope for, through\nthe discovery of laws, and, in particular, of the encyclop\u00e6dic laws.\nBy making humanity the supreme end at once of our speculation and\nof our activity, it furnishes morality and politics with a definite\nbasis, and gives religion an object. In this way, according to Comte,\npositive philosophy is more truly a philosophy than metaphysics,\nsince it secures the homogeneity of knowledge and the \u201cperfect mental\ncoherence,\u201d and it is also more truly religious since, as its final\nconclusion, it shows that the end of the intellect itself lies in\ndevotion to humanity.\n\n\nIII.\n\nEvery new philosophical doctrine is in general guided by a double\ntendency. At the same time it seeks to establish its originality and\nto find out its antecedents. In order to reach the former result, it\ncriticises preceding and contemporary doctrines, and shows that, better\nthan any of the others, it succeeds in \u201csumming up experience.\u201d But, at\nthe same time, it discovers a pedigree for itself in history which is\nnever very difficult to establish.\n\nLike the others, positive philosophy fulfils this twofold requirement,\nin such measure, however, as its particular nature and the definition\nof its object reasonably allow. Properly speaking, it does not\nundertake to refute the metaphysical systems which it deems itself\ndestined to replace. Those systems in refuting positive philosophy,\nare faithful to their principle; and positive philosophy is faithful\nto its own principle in not following their example. It suffices for\nit to \u201clocate\u201d them in the general evolution of the human mind, and\nto show, according to this law of evolution, how the very necessity\nwhich brought them into being is also the cause of their disappearance.\nTheir office is fulfilled, their part is ended. It matters little that\nthey should seek to prolong an ebbing existence; cases of survival\nmay slacken the rate of progress, but they are powerless to arrest\nit. And so positive philosophy is the only one which can be perfectly\njust towards its adversaries. \u201cIt ceases,\u201d says Comte, \u201cbeing critical\nin regard to the whole of the past.\u201d In order to be established, it\ndoes not require to combat and to supplant the philosophies which\nhave preceded it. With itself, it places all doctrines in history. It\nsubstitutes the historical genesis to abstract dialectics.\n\nUndoubtedly Comte recognises a long series of his precursors properly\nso-called, in the double line of philosophers and scientific men who\nhave contributed to the progress of the positive spirit from Aristotle\nand Archimedes to Condorcet and Gall. But positive philosophy, none the\nless, looks upon itself as heir to all the philosophies, even to those\nwhich are most opposed to its principle. For they, like the others,\nhave been necessary moments in the progress which was to end in the\npositive system.\n\nThus considered in its relation to the metaphysical speculation\nwhich preceded it, this system does not refute it, for it is\nneither necessary nor even possible for it to do so. Neither does\nit incorporate it within itself, for it could not do so without a\nformal contradiction. Still, according to Comte\u2019s own confession, it\nproceeds from metaphysics as much as from science properly so-called.\nIn what then does this relation consist, if positive philosophy neither\nopposes nor adopts previous doctrines?--It _transposes_ them. What its\npredecessors had studied from the absolute point of view, it projects\nupon the relative plane.\n\nAs we proceeded we have noted more than one of these _transpositions_.\nIt may perhaps not be useless to make a recapitulation of them here,\nwithout, however, claiming for it perfect completeness.\n\n _Metaphysical Philosophy._ _Positive Transpositions._\n I. Distinction between I. Distinction between the statical\n potentiality and reality. and the dynamical points of\n view, or between order and progress.\n II. Principle of finality. II. Principle of the conditions\n of existence.\n III. Theory of innateness. III. Definition of human\n nature as immutable, evolution\n creating nothing, but bringing\n out the latent potentialities in\n that nature.\n IV. The idea of the universe. IV. The idea of the world.\n V. All the phenomena of V. The idea of humanity is\n the universe are related to the only really universal conception,\n one another. because the conditions of\n existence of human societies are\n in a necessary relation, not only\n with the laws of our organisation,\n but also with all the physical\n and chemical laws of our planet,\n and the mechanical laws of the\n solar system.\n VI. The Aristotelian theory VI. Science consists in substituting\n of science, (knowledge rational prevision to the\n through causes, _a priori_), empirical establishment of facts.\n and Cartesian theory, (deductive\n knowledge starting from the\n simple).\n VII. The principles of VII. Geometry and mechanics\n mathematics are synthetical _a are natural sciences, and pure\n priori_ propositions. (Kant). analysis can never establish their\n principles.\n VIII. The order of the universe VIII. The conduct of man\n is the basis of moral order: is regulated externally by the\n (Stoics, Spinoza, Leibnitz). whole of the laws of the world in\n which he lives.\n IX. The history of humanity IX. The evolution of humanity\n is directed by a providential is accomplished according to a\n wisdom. law.\n X. The notion of a natural X. The various orders of\n law does not necessarily natural phenomena are irreducible\n imply a mechanism. and nevertheless convergent,\n the real becoming richer at each\n new degree.\n XI. Theory of the immortality XI. Theory of the \u201csubjective\n of the soul. existence,\u201d or of survival in the\n consciousness of others.\n XII. Rational theology. XII. The positive science of\n Humanity.\n\nThis list might easily be prolonged. Once again it shows us that, in\nthe history of philosophy as in history in general, the result of the\nmost apparently radical revolutions is not so much to abolish as to\ntransform. Thus, Kant\u2019s philosophy might seem to be entirely opposed to\nthat of Leibnitz. Yet we see that the metaphysics of Leibnitz is to be\nfound almost in its entirety in Kant. Of this dogmatic philosophy Kant\nhas preserved the doctrine. He only rejected its dogmatism; which, as\na matter of fact, was of capital importance. In the same way, positive\nphilosophy has often been presented as the formal negation of the\nphilosophy which preceded it. When we verify this, we nearly always\nfind them both concerned with the same problems, and often reaching\nanalogous solutions. Here again it is only a question of transposition;\nan extremely serious one it is true, on account of all that it implies.\n\nErrors of interpretation are very often due to a lack of historical\nperspective. Once they have been formulated and adopted by current\nopinion they are difficult to rectify. Time is needed in order that\nbeneath superficial differences, deep seated resemblances may appear.\nDuring many years Kant was in all sincerity looked upon as a sceptic in\nFrance. Those who criticised him could not conceive how any one could\ngive up metaphysical dogmatism, without at the same time abandoning\nthe doctrines which had been cast in the metaphysical form before\nKant. In the same way, in the eyes of most of his adversaries, Comte\u2019s\nsystem must have appeared as the very negation of philosophy, because\nthe terms \u201cphilosophy\u201d and \u201crelative\u201d seemed incompatible to them. But\nthis system, which is an effort to realise, from the point of view of\npositive science, the unity of the understanding, and the \u201cperfect\nlogical coherence,\u201d in reality ends by putting the traditional problems\nof philosophy in a form suitable to the spirit of our age.\n\n\nIV.\n\nIf the relationship between Comte\u2019s philosophy and the doctrines\nwhich preceded it is sufficiently evident, it does not follow that\nthis philosophy has brought with it nothing new. On the contrary, the\n\u201ctransposition\u201d of problems and the constant effort to substitute the\nrelative to the absolute point of view, entails serious consequences\nwith very far reaching effects. Some of these were at once apparent,\nand first served to characterise positive philosophy in the eyes of\nthe public. Others, more remote, but no less important, appeared more\nslowly.\n\nThe negative consequences almost alone attracted attention at first.\nThe chief characteristic of the new philosophy seemed to be the denial\nof the legitimacy and even of the possibility of metaphysics in all its\nforms: rational psychology, the philosophical theory of matter and of\nlife, rational theology, etc. It seemed also to deny the possibility\nof introspective psychology, of ethics in its traditional form, as\nwell as of logic. In a word, one after another, it excluded all the\nparts of what constituted a \u201ccourse of philosophy.\u201d No wonder, then, if\nthis doctrine which took the name of \u201cpositive\u201d appeared to be chiefly\nnegative.\n\nHowever, in reality, the negation only affected the so-called\n\u201crational\u201d or \u201cphilosophical sciences.\u201d Comte reproached them with what\nAristotle calls \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b6\u03b7\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd. Stringently applying the principle of\nthe relativity of knowledge, he refused to admit anything absolute. He\nwas therefore perfectly true to himself in rejecting doctrines founded\nupon metaphysical principles. But this entirely negative aspect of\nhis philosophy is very far from being the one according to which we\ncan best understand it. Truly speaking, it is only preparatory, and\nhistorians have often committed the mistake of allowing people to\nbelieve that it is essential. \u201c_We only destroy what we replace_,\u201d said\nComte.\n\nThe question was not to ruin but to transform the psychological, moral\nand social sciences. As we have seen, positive philosophy does not deny\nthe possibility of a psychology.\n\nOn the contrary, it establishes that psychical phenomena, like the\nothers, are subject to laws, and that these laws must be looked for by\nthe positive method. It only rejects the psychology of the ideologists\nas abstract, and that of Cousin as metaphysical. It claims that, in\npresence of the phenomena which he is studying, the psychologist should\nassume the same attitude as the biologist or the physicist, that\nany search after cause or essence should be carefully avoided, that\nany metaphysical or ethical after-thought should be set aside. Then\na science of physical phenomena will be established; still it will\nonly be able to study the highest mental functions in the \u201cuniversal\nsubject,\u201d in humanity. If we wish to do so, we may continue to call it\nby its traditional name, although it is to the old psychology only what\nthe chemistry of our day is to alchemy.\n\nA similar transformation gives rise to social science. Here again,\nthe indispensable condition for the scientific knowledge of facts and\nof laws is a new attitude of mind in presence of these facts. We must\nset aside what interests us subjectively in them, and consider what\nis \u201cspecifically social\u201d in them, just as the physiologist studies\nwhat is \u201cspecifically biological\u201d in the phenomena of the organism.\nM. Durkheim, as a real heir of Auguste Comte, reasonably maintains\nthat this is a condition _sine qua non_ of positive sociology. This\nonly exists as a science if there are facts which are properly social,\nsubject to special laws, besides the more general laws of nature\nwhich rule them also, and if these facts, by constant objective\ncharacteristics, are sufficiently distinct from the phenomena called\npsychological.\n\nPositive psychology is now already constituted. Positive sociology is\nbeing formed. The science of language, the science of religions, the\nhistory of art are also assuming a positive form. The movement which\nhas begun, and of which we only see the beginnings, will probably\nextend much further than we think. It supposes at least a provisional\nseparation between the scientific interest and the political, moral\nand religious interests. Being already constituted for a considerable\npart of our knowledge, this separation for the remainder is still\ndistasteful to the traditional habits of the majority of minds. We are\naccustomed to speculate upon physical or chemical nature with perfect\ndisinterestedness as to the metaphysical consequences of the results\nwhich we may obtain. For we are convinced that the laws of these\nphenomena do not necessarily imply any consequences of this kind, or\nthat they can be almost indifferently brought into accord with any form\nof metaphysics we may be pleased to adopt. What do physics, chemistry,\nnatural philosophy _prove_, as to the destiny of man or the supreme\ncause of the universe? Nothing, and it does not occur to us to be\nsurprised at it. We consider that these sciences are in accordance with\ntheir definition if they give us a knowledge of the laws of phenomena,\nand if this knowledge enables us within certain limits to exercise a\nrational and efficacious action upon nature.\n\nAre we in the same position in what concerns psychology and the\nmoral and social sciences? This is doubtful. The very name of \u201cmoral\nsciences\u201d is significant enough on this point. We cannot refrain from\nthinking that these sciences \u201cprove\u201d something outside themselves. For\nseveral of the schools of this century, psychology is still the path\nthat leads to metaphysics. Spirituality and the immortality of the\nsoul seem to have a direct interest in it. In a more or less conscious\nmanner orthodox political economy has found itself \u201cproving\u201d the\nlegitimacy of the modern capitalist _r\u00e9gime_, and has represented it as\nbeing in conformity with the immutable laws of nature. The historical\nmaterialism of Marx \u201cproves\u201d the necessity of collectivism. History too\noften serves national interests, or political parties.\n\nComte\u2019s most interesting and fertile leading idea is that the sciences\nconceived in this way are still in their infancy and do not deserve\ntheir name. Those who take them up should, in the first place,\nconvince themselves of the fact that they prove no more in favour of\nspiritualism or materialism, of protection or of free exchange, than\nphysics or chemistry prove in favour of the unity or the plurality\nof substances in the universe. In the school of the more advanced\nsciences men may be taught to distinguish between the objects of\npositive research and the metaphysical or practical questions. They\nwill see also that the human mind did not begin by making this\ndistinction in the case of inorganic and of living nature. For a long\ntime it could only think of physical phenomena religiously. Without\nthe admirable effort of the Greek men of science and philosophers, we\nmight yet find ourselves in this period, and positive philosophy might\nstill be awaiting the hour of its birth. To-day this philosophy has\ncome into being. In order to prove finally established, it requires\nthat individual and social human nature should become the object\nof a science as disinterested as physics and biology have already\nbecome. From that day alone will the \u201cSocial sciences\u201d be definitely\nconstituted.\n\nIt is true that since in a certain way the object of these sciences is\nourselves, it seems paradoxical to look upon them in the same way as\nif it were a question of salts or of crystals. We persist in believing\nthat any knowledge of this order, as soon as it is acquired, admits\nof immediate applications to our condition or conduct. But this is an\nillusion. Is not the importance of the \u201c_milieu_\u201d in which we find\nourselves, and of the forces which affect us from without for our\nwelfare and even for our preservation which depends upon them at every\nmoment, a simple matter of evidence? Nevertheless, we seek a purely\nabstract, scientific knowledge of the laws of phenomena, because we\nknow that our effective power upon natural forces is subordinate to\nscience. In the same way we separate physiology from therapeutics\nand medicine, and we especially await the progress of these from\nphysiology. So in the same way, p\u00e6dagogy, rational economy, politics,\nand in general all the social arts in the future will be subordinated\nto the theoretical science of the individual and social nature of man,\nwhen this science has been constituted by means of a purely positive\nmethod, and is no longer expected to \u201cprove\u201d anything but its laws.\n\nThis may perhaps be the work of centuries. We are only witnessing\nits early beginnings. We still have only a vague idea of a polity\nfounded upon science; and we do not yet know what individual and\nsocial psychology will yield as a positive science. Comte anticipated\nresults which could not be immediate. This is yet another feature\nwhich he has in common with Descartes, to whom we have so often had\noccasion to compare him. Having conceived a certain mathematical ideal\nof physical science, Descartes pictured the problems of nature, and\nespecially of living nature, as being infinitely less complex than they\nare. Our scientific men to-day no longer venture to put to themselves\nthe biological questions whose solution appeared to Descartes to be\ncomparatively easy. In the same way, Auguste Comte, having recognised\nthat moral and social phenomena should be objects of science, just as\nthose of inorganic and living nature, believed this new science to be\nfar more advanced by his own labours than it was in reality.\n\nIt is easy to understand his mistake. He was anxious to proceed to\nthe \u201csocial reorganisation,\u201d in view of which he was constructing\nhis philosophy. Then, given the conception he had formed of social\nscience, he was bound to think that the discovery of the great dynamic\nlaw of the three States was sufficient to finally constitute it. In\nhis eyes \u201cthe hardest part of the work was done.\u201d Sociologists at\npresent believe that almost everything remains to be done. But, here\nagain, we may renew the comparison between Descartes and Comte. In\nthe work of both, without much difficulty, we can distinguish what\nis done by the scientific man properly so-called and what is done by\nthe philosopher. It is the same with Comte the sociologist as with\nDescartes the physicist. Their hypotheses have met with the fate common\nto scientific labours, of which Comte himself has so well set forth the\nnecessary transitoriness. The other portion of their work, more general\nin character, is possessed of more enduring qualities. In this sense,\nand setting aside his political and religious views, which belong to\nanother order, the speculative philosophy of Comte is living still, and\npursues its evolution even within the minds of those who are engaged\nin opposing it.\n\n\nTHE END.\n\n\n_W. Jolly & Sons, Printers, Albany Press, Aberdeen._\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[370] Cours, IV, 237.\n\n * * * * *\n\nTranscriber's Notes\n\nObvious typographical errors have been silently corrected. Variations\nin hyphenation and accents have been standardised but all other\nspelling and punctuation, in particular the inconsistent punctuation of\nthe footnotes, remains unchanged.\n\nOpening or closing quotation marks are frequently omitted. Where these\nare obvious they have been inserted, otherwise they have been left\nunchanged.\n\nIn Book I Chapter VI, part II the quotion \u201cthe work of the species\ngradually developed in the long sequence of centuries.\u201d is referenced\nas a footnote, but no footnote is present.\n\nItalics are represented thus _italic_.","title":"The Philosophy of Auguste Comte","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":109015}